
    Louis C. NEMETH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee FOR STRUCTURED ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-3; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 17-55567
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted January 16, 2018 
    
    Filed January 25, 2018
    Louis C. Nemeth, Pro Se
    Timothy A. Burnett, Attorney, Green & Hall, LLP, Santa Ana, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Nationstar Mortgage, LLC
    Christian C. Chapman, Attorney, AMSL Legal Group, LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss, LLP
    Before:, REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). To the extent that Nemeth requests oral argument in his opening brief, the request is denied.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Louis C. Nemeth appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Nemeth’s fraud claims because Nemeth failed to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.... ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Nemeth’s complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041 (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nemeth’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion because Nemeth did not demonstrate any grounds warranting relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief from judgment).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We reject as without merit Nemeth’s contentions that the district court judge was biased and that Nemeth was held to a higher standard as a pro se litigant.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     