
    Pamela MOULTRIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CARVER FOUNDATION, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-2453-cv
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    September 27, 2016
    FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Pamela Moultrie, pro se, Norwalk, Connecticut.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Jill Perno Hallihan, Farrell, Musco and Ias-sogna, New Haven, Connecticut.
    PRESENT: John M. Walker, Jr., José A. Cabranes, Circuit Judges, Richard M. Berman, District Judge.
    
    
      
      The Honorable Richard M. Berman, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Pamela Moultrie (“Moultrie”), proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment of the District Court dismissing her complaint with prejudice. Moultrie filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., alleging that defendant-appellee Carver Foundation had terminated her employment as a bus driver on the basis of her race as an African-American. The District Court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The District Court concluded that “Moul-trie did not plead that any specific actions or events took place prior to her termination that would give rise to an inference of unlawful race discrimination, nor has she pleaded facts giving rise to an inference that she was treated differently than other similarly-situated, non-African-American employees.” Moultrie v. Carver Found., No. 3:13-cv-1443 (SRU), 2015 WL 4478249, at *4 (D. Conn. July 22, 2015). This appeal followed.

On appeal, Moultrie principally contends that the District Court erred in dismissing her complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Moultrie’s argument lacks merit.

We “review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). A complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggests].” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). To survive dismissal, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” however, “do not suffice.” Id. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a plaintiff bringing a Title VII claim “need, only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Based upon our independent review of the record, we agree with the District Court that Moultrie has failed to allege sufficient facts to support an inference that her employment was terminated on the basis of her race. Moultrie alleged that she had “been treated differently] than all other employees that work at the Carver [Foundation concerning their record,” No. 13-cv-01143-SRU, ECF No. 18, and she identified two white females and one white male in response to the District Court’s inquiry as to whether she knew of any similarly situated, non-black employees who were treated differently than she was. Moultrie failed to provide any factual allegations, however, as to how these employees were similarly situated or how she experienced disparate treatment. In fact, Moultrie alleged that two of the three employees she identified were employed in different positions than hers. See Mandell v. Cty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff relying on disparate treatment evidence must show she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Due to the absence of any specific allegations in Moultrie’s complaint giving rise to an inference of discriminatory discharge, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Vega, 801 F.3d at 84. In the circumstances presented here, we also uphold the District Court’s decision to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, in light of the repeated opportunities the District Court provided Moultrie to cure the deficiencies in her pleading.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the plaintiff-appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the July 30, 2015 judgment of the District Court.  