
    DEBTORS AND CREDITORS.
    [Hamilton Circuit Court,
    January Term, 1900.]
    Smith, Swing and Giffen, JJ.
    In re Estate of John P. Skelton, Deceased.
    Child Allowed Compensation for Taking Care of Parent.
    While it will not be presumed that services of a child in taking care of and nursing a parent are to be compensated, yet such compensation should be allowed, without express agreement, where it appears that the circumstances were such that the child, who was in needy circumstances, was justified in assuming that she would be compensated for such services, and it also appears that the lather, who was abundantly able to pay, required all of the daughter’s services, aud compelled her to give up working for others, and also that he received such services expecting to pay for them, but died without making provision therefor.
    Heard on Error.
   Swing, J.

We are of the opinion that the judgment of the court of common pleas in this cause should be affirmed.

The evidence was clear and certain as to the character of the services incurred by Mrs. Martin to her father, Mr. Skelton, and the value of the services was also shown with equal clearness, and the judgment was not excessive if the relation of debtor and creditor existed. There is, however, room to doubt whether the services were rendered with the understanding between the parties that Mrs. Martin was to be paid for the same ; but we are of the opinion that the court was justified in finding that in rendering the services Mrs. Martin was authorized to believe that she would receive compensation for her services, and that Mr. Skelton understood that they were so rendered, and that he received them expecting to pay for the same. The circumstances and relations ot the parties together with the declarations of Mr. Skelton would seem to authorize such a conclusion.

It is shown that they were not living together as parent and child, for it is fair to conclude that Mr. Skelton lived with his daughter in her home, and that he paid for his board by paying $16.00 per month for the rent of the house. It is also fairly shown that Mrs. Martin had no property, but depended largely upon her own work to support herself and her family of four children. Mr. Skelton had property, and was able to pay for the services of this kind, which he so badly needed. He required all of Mrs. Martin’s services. He compelled her to quit working for others where she was raising money required to support her children in order to take care of him, and he could hardly expect her to do this without receiving compensation, especially when he was able to pay her and she needed the compensation to discharge an obligation which was more obligatory on her than his care, viz., the support of her children. Nor do we see how she could perform this work without expecting under these circumstances, to receive pay for the same.

The circumstances and the relations of parties are always to be looked to by the court to ascertain the true relation of the parties, and in this particular case, we think, it goes a long ways towards showing that Mrs. Martin was to be paid for her services. But in addition to the court being in possession of these facts, there was direct evidence to the effect that Mr. Skelton told others that Mrs. Martin would be well paid for the services rendered to him, and that they were of great value, and under the circumstances, we think, these declarations indicated that he, Skelton, understood the relation of debtor and creditor to exist, and that the services rendered by Mrs. Martin were not to be gratuitous.

The judgment will be affirmed.  