
    Rupinder KAUR, a.k.a. Norma Irene Bustamante, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-73006.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 15, 2011.
    
    Filed June 29, 2011.
    Mohinder Singh, Law Office of Mohin-der Singh, Walnut Creek, CA, for Petitioner.
    Rupinder Kaur, Union City, CA, pro se.
    Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Thankful Townsend Vanderstar, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Rupinder Kaur, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir.2008), and de novo due process claims, Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir.2005). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur’s motion to reopen because it considered the record and acted within its broad discretion in determining that the evidence of changed country conditions was insufficient to warrant reopening given the underlying adverse credibility determination. See Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial). Kaur has not overcome the presumption that the BIA considered all the evidence. See Larita-Martinez v. INS, 220 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (9th Cir.2000) (petitioner must overcome the presumption that the agency has considered all the evidence).

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen based on the birth of Kaur’s U.S. citizen son, the son’s and Kaur’s “sickliness,” or the approval of an 1-130 petition filed on Kaur’s behalf by her husband because Kaur failed to demonstrate how these changes in her personal circumstances were material to the removal proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(1) (BIA may reopen only if it appears that the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”); see also He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.2007) (change in personal circumstances does not qualify as a change in country circumstances).

We lack jurisdiction to review the underlying adverse credibility finding, including Kauris separation of powers argument, because this petition for review is not timely as to the agency’s order finding her not credible. See Singh v. INS, 315 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir.2003); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     