
    OCTOBER SESSIONS, 1784.
    Respublica v. Keating.
    
      Witness.
    
    On .to indictment for forging a promissory note, the supposed indorser is competent to preve the forgery.
    Luke Keating was indicted for forging a promissory note, payable to John Meng, with a forged indorsement of John Meng & Co.
    
      Lewis, for the defendant,
    objected to the admission of Meng’s testimony; contending, that if Meng could prove that the note was false, it would discharge him from the payment; and if he proved it to be a genuine note, his evidence might be given against him, in a civil action founded upon the note; in either event, he was an interested witness, and, consequently, an incompetent one. Salk. 283; Hardr. 331; 2 Hawk. 433; Str. 728, 1043, 1104.
    
      Lngersoll (who prosecuted on this occasion for the Attorney-General) argued,
    that, to prevent an interruption and failure of justice, and the escape of offenders, the injured person was, in all cases of indictment, a competent witness. Vent. 49, 78; Vin., tit. Evid., pl. 26; 2 Str. 1229, and Abrahams v. Bunn, 4 Burr. 2252, establish this doctrine. He insisted, that the evidence given by Meng, on the present trial, could not affect him in a civil action; and observed, that if anything relative to tne civil action should decide the case before the court, the probability was, that Meng’s testimony would be favorable to the prisoner; for if Meng swears the note to be false, he can gain nothing; but if he proves it to be true, he testifies against his own interest.
    
      Lewis, in reply,
    acknowledged that the evidence given on this trial, could not be offered in favor of Meng on another ; but he urged, that if the note itself were proved to be forged, it might be detained by the court, and not suffered afterwards to be sued; on *the same principle, that it is r*-,-,-, said in 6 Co. 45, “ the court will damn a bond, on which the obligee *- has recovered.”
   McKean, Chief Justice.

The court will not detain a note or bond in the circumstances mentioned. With respect to the competency of the witness, I remember a case before Chew, Chief Justice, where one Chapman was indicted for playing with false dice, and the person cheated was admitted to be a witness. On the authority of that decision, in a recent trial at Lancaster, the injured party was allowed to give evidence, after a full argument upon the present objection. We have, therefore, no doubt that Meng is a competent witness. 
      
      
         The case of The King v. Chapman, cited by C. J. McKean in the text, is also stated in Respublica v. Ross, 2 Yeates 4, as follows: “In Rex v. Bates & Chapman, on indictment for a cheat in playing with false dice, and tried in the Mayor’s Court, July sessions 1772 (before Chew, Recorder), Henry Barnhold, the person defrauded, was admitted a witness, after long argument. A copy of the report of the case, taken by Allen, then attorney-general, was read by the counsel.” In Respublica v. Ross (also reported in 2 Dall. 289), which was an indictment for forging a promissory note, the alleged drawer, Joseph Ileister, was held to be competent to prove that his signature was forged. The same point was ruled in Pennsylvania v. Parrel; Addis. 246. But in Respublica v. Ross, it was held, that the indorser, who admitted his signature to be good, was not competent to impeach the validity of the note, until he had paid or satisfied the holder. So, on an indictment for uttering a forged indenture, the party injured was ruled to be a competent witness. Respublica v. Wright, 1 Yeates 401.
     