
    Kennedy et al. vs. Farnsworth.
    Farnsworth obtained one judgment against Williams & Kennedy, and another against Kennedy. Kennedy & Williams presented a joint petition to a judge, praying for writs of certiorari and supersedeas In both cases. These suits'were distinct' in their nature and orig'm. The writs were granted and the causes were brought up: Held, on a motion to dismiss, that it was irregular and improper to have granted said petition, but that having Been granted, the causes brought up, and separate action taken upon them, such irregularity was not a good cause to dismiss such irregular petition.
    On the 18th of January, 1842, C. Easterly, a justice of the peace for Greene county, issued a warrant in favor of Rebecca Farnsworth, against And. Kennedy and Jas. Williams. This warrant was for an alledged trespass, in cutting timbers on the land of plaintiff, Farnsworth. It was tried on the 22d of January succeeding, before Easterly and Gass, justices, and judgment rendered-in favor of the plaintiff for $38 20 damages, and $10 costs. No appeal was taken. On the 8th day of February succeeding, Kennedy & Williams presented a petition to two justices of the peace of Greene county, alledging that Rebecca Farnsworth had obtained two judgments against the defendants; one against Kennedy & Williams, and the other against Kennedy; that said judgments were obtained on the al-ledged ground of trespasses committed by petitioners on the land of the plaintiff; that they were not guilty of the trespasses, and that the judgments were unjust; and after setting forth reasons why they did not appeal, praying that writs of certiorari and supersedeas be-ordered to be issued “in both cases,” &c.
    This petition was granted, and writs issued accordingly “in both cases,” and they were transferred to the circuit court of Greene.
    At the February term, 1842, judge Lucky presiding, a motion was made by the plaintiff 'to dismiss the petition and discharge the supersedeas. This motion prevailed and the court" entered up judgment in affirmance of the justice’s judgment in the case of Farnsworth against Kennedy & Williams. The petitioners appealed in error to the supreme court.
    
      R. J. McKinney, for the petitioners.
    
      J. A. McKinney, for- Farnsworth.
   Reese, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

A judgment was obtained before a justice of the peace in favor of Rebecca Farnsworth, against Kennedy & Williams, and another in favor of the same against Kennedy separately. A petition was filed by them jointly, stating grounds applicable to each case, separately, why writs of certiorari and super-sedeas should issue in each case, and praying therefor. In the circuit court a -rule was granted to the defendant in error, to show cause why the writs should be dismissed, which on argument was made absolute, and tlie same were dismissed. Tlie statement of meritorious grounds in the petition for another trial, and of the reasons why an appeal was not taken, in each ease, we do not deem it necessary to go into, but content ourselves with the assertion, that we consider them altogether satisfactory and sufficient. The only question is, whether the writs should be dismissed, on the ground that there is but one petition common to both cases, and not a separate petition in each case. Certainly the latter would have been the proper course. Cases separate and distinct in their nature and their origin, and necessarily separate and distinct in the trial and tlie judgment, ought not in their progress to be conjoined at one point, by a document such as the petition in this case, constituting an essential part of the record of each. The practice is certainly inconvenient and irregular, and should be discouraged. But we do not think, that after the petition has been granted, and the writs have issued, and where there is no purpose or attempt in the petition to consolidate the cases, and where one of the petitioners is not party in each case, the writs should have been dismissed. It is not a misjoinder of action, because the petition is not leading process. It is a statement of fact with a view to obtain an order for issuance of the writs of certiorari and supersedeas. They obtained, its office is done. Perhaps tlie prayer of the petition might have been refused on the ground in question. If a joint affidavit were made by distinct parties for a new trial in their separate cases, tlie court would do 'well not to receive it. But if it did receive it and act on it, and grant a new trial, and the matter of it were sufficient, it would be difficult to contend, that it would be such error as would invalidate subsequent proceedings. Upon the whole matter, we are of opinion that the court erred in making the rule, to dismiss the writs, absolute. Wc think it should have been discharged. We, therefore, reverse the judgment and remand the cause.  