
    WALKER v. STATE.
    (No. 7445.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 21, 1923.
    Rehearing Denied May 23, 1923.)
    1. Indictment and information <&wkey;l38 — Motion to quash held) to raise question whether accused was informed of nature of charge.
    Motion to quash indictment as insufficient for failing to charge the means by which the homicide was committed, setting up no facts controverting the averment that the means were unknown, raised only the legal question whether such indictment met the constitutional requirement of informing defendant of the nature of the charge.
    2. Homicide <&wkey;135(2) — If means of death are unknown to grand jury, indictment so stating is sufficient.
    If means of death are unknown to grand jury, indictment so stating is sufficient.
    3. Criminal law <&wkey;>636(3) — Defendant’s presence not necessary at making of order directing issuance of a special venire writ.
    It was not necessary that defendant should have been present at the time an order was made directing issuance of a special venire writ; the judge certifying that defendant was out on bond and his attorney was present.
    4. Criminal law <&wkey;il 122(6) — Refusal of request for special charges not reviewed, where record does not show when presented.
    Under Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proe. 1916, art. 737a, requiring requests for special charges to be presented before argument, refusal thereof cannot be reviewed, where the record does not show when they were presented to the .court.
    
      5. Homicide <&wkey;300(5) — Self-defense charge held not misleading.
    An instruction that if, at the time of the hilling, deceased had made an áttach on defendant which, from the manner and character, relative strength, and defendant’s knowledge of character and disposition of deceased, caused him to have a reasonable expectation or fear of death or serious bodily injury, and that, acting under such reasonable expectation or fear, he killed deceased, he should be acquitted, was not misleading, as informing the jury that, unless deceased was armed and “making such [threatening] acts,” self-defense would not be available.
    6. Homicide <&wkey;286(I) — Instructions held not defective, in not giving appellant benefit of requirement of proof of intent, where weapon is not deadly.
    The charge was not subject to the objection that it failed to give defendant benefit of the requirement of proof of intent to kill, where the weapon is not per se a deadly weapon, where court instructed that, if the jury, believed or had reasonable doubt that the instrument was not a deadly weapon, “that is, a weapon which, from the * * * manner used, was not calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, or if. you * * * have a reasonable doubt that defendant * * * had no intention of killing him,” he could not be convicted of any grade of homicide, but only of aggravated assault.
    7. Homicide <&wkey;282 — Evidence held to require submission of the issue of murder.
    Evidence held to require submission of the issue of murder.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    8. Homicide <&wkey;)276, 282 — Self-defense in issue of manslaughter or murder held issues of fact for jury.
    If one, not in self-defense, or not under circumstances reducing to manslaughter, intentionally assault another -with a deadly weapon, and death ensue, it is murder, and whether such assault be in self-defense, or be reducible to manslaughter, or be murder, are fact issues for the jury, under appropriate instructions.
    9. Homicide <&wkey;269 — Character of weapon and intent to kill held questions of fact for jury.
    If one, not in self-defense, and not under circumstances reducing to manslaughter, assault another, and death ensue, and it be contended that the weapon used was not deadly, and that the intent to kill was lacking, these are fact issues for the jury, under appropriate instructions.
    10. Homicide <&wkey;l286(I) — Instruction as to intent and manner of using weapon held sufficiently favorable to defendant.
    Where defendant contended that the evidence did not show use of a deadly weapon or intent to kill, the charge of the court, giving Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1147, and requiring the jury to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an intent to kill, and that the weapon used was one which by. the mode and manner of its use was likely to-produce death, was sufficiently favorable to defendant.
    11. Homicide &wkey;>l6 — Use of weapon with deadly intent and effect held murder, though weapon not per se deadly.
    If one, intending to kill, uses a weapon not per se deadly, but in a manner likely to produce death, he is guilty of murder, if death results.
    12. Homicide <&wkey;>233 — Proof of motive not indispensable.
    Proof of motive is not indispensable in murder cases; the abolition of degrees not having deprived the jury of right to imply malice from the evidence.
    tffcsaFor other cases see same topic and KBY-NXJMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
    Appeal from District Court, Titus County; R. T. Wilkinson, Judge.
    Duck Walker was convicted of murder, and appeals.
    Affirmed.
    I. N. Williams, of Mt. Pleasant, for appellant.
    W. A. Keeling, Atty. Gen., and O. D. Stone, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

Conviction is for murder; punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of 25 years.

The deceased, Don Turner, and appellant were together on the night of January 4th at the home of the witness Thomas. There was evidence that they had been drinking intoxicating liquor. They left the home of Thomas together, apparently in a friendly mood towards each other, and were riding in a buggy drawn by a mule. Dater in the night, the witness Hargrove, who kept a country store, was aroused by a crash and heard a voice outside of his store, and shortly thereafter he heard, some one knock at his door and use vile language to insist that the door be opened. The witness did not stir, however, and heard a voice say:

“God damn it, what did you run off and leave me for; I will cut your damned head off.”

On the following morning he found a buggy, which was by every evidence identified as that in which the parties were riding. The buggy had struck a post near the store building and was in a damaged condition. It was called for during the morning by the son of the appellant. The post had wire twisted upon it, and we gather from the record that the wire was barbed wire. Appellant’s son testified on behalf of the state, and said that appellant came home at about 10 o’clock on the night in question; that he had been drinking; that he had bruises about his body. These were described in some detail. Appellant told the witness that, he had had a fight with Don Turner near Hargrove’s store.

The deceased lived at the home of his uncle, Ed Coleman. After the deceased had been missed ior some days, Coleman mentioned the fact to the appellant, who at first said that he had seen nothing of him. The witness then told the appellant that he had heard that they were together on the evening that the deceased was missed, and appellant said:

“We came along by the Redfearn crossing and slopped, and I got out, and we had a big switch in the buggy, and he just come'down on the mule with that switch, and the mule ran off down the road as fast as he could go, and that was the last I saw of Don.”

There were two ponds near Hargrove’s store. About two weeks after the deceased had been missed, there was blood discovered on the bank or dam which held the water in the pond, and about 15 or 18 feet distant therefrom the body of the deceased was fished out of the pond. There was a wound on the head of the deceased. It started at the eye brow on the left side, and extended 4 or 5 inches back, and ended over the left ear. It was a deep wound and oval-shaped and came to a feather edge at the end. It entered the skull in a place about an inch and three-fourths. It penetrated the skull to that extent, and opened an artery, which, according to some of the medical testimony, would have necessarily proved fatal.

There was evidence, pro and con, on the cause of the death of the deceased. The medical opinions were somewhat conflicting upon this subject, hut were sufficient to support the theory that the deceased was killed and afterwards put into the water. There was some evidence introduced to the effect that there were tracks, or -at least impressions, that might have made in the mud between the blood that was found on the bank and the place where the body was found. These impressions were discovered1 after the water had been drained out of the pond. There was evidence that the deceased’s character was that of a violent and dangerous man, and especially when he was under the influence of liquor.

Appellant’s reputation as a kind and inoffensive man was good. He testified in his own behalf, in substance, that after leaving the home of Thomas he and the deceased were on their way tq Hargrove’s store; that the buggy was stopped. Appellant got out of the buggy, and while standing between the wheels to relieve his bladder, the deceased whipped the mule and caused it to run, and the buggy ran over the appellant. Appellant, after recovering himself, followed on foot and found that the buggy had been run against a post and the mule had gone. The buggy was in a broken condition. He heard the deceased knock at the door of a store and curse, and as he left the door appellant met him and asked him why he ran over him and tore up the buggy. Deceased said, “Damn you, I did not run over you.” Ap« pellant replied, “You know damned well you did;” and deceased said, “By God, don’t you like it?” and appellant said, “No, I don’t like it; that is Hale’s buggy, and you will have it fixed.” Deceased then said, “Damn you and Hale both; I will kill the whole damned business.” Appellant said:

“I got my knife and started to walk off, and I told him not to run onto me with that knife. He had a knife in his hand. When I started to walk o^E, he said, ‘Run, you son of a bitch, you,’ and ran on me and struck at me. I threw up my left hand first, and when he struck at me I struck him. I do not know whether I hit him or not. I could not tell, for he either tripped me, or I tripped myself, and I fell. We both went to the ground, but I twisted loose from him some way. I 'ran home, and he ran towards the pools.”

Appellant also described the wounds that were on him as a result of the buggy running over him and knocking him down. He said: “I don’t know to this day whether I cut Don Turner or not, and, if I did, I don’t know when it was, unless it was when I struck at him” in response to the attack by Turner; that he did not know when Turner cut him on the arm, unless it was at the same time. Appellant .said that all that ‘ he did was for his own protection and wifh no intention of killing him. Appellant exhibited the knife that he was using at the time, which was described as- having a blade 2% inches long and three-eighths of an inch wide. The blade came down to a point and was not very sharp. There was opinion testimony to the effect that the knife in the hands of a man of appellant’s size could be used so as to cause death.

In a motion to quash the indictment, appellant urged that it was insufficient, in failing to charge the means by which the homicide was committed. The motion purports to set up no facts controverting the averment in the indictment that the means of death were unknown to the grand jury, and no evidence was offered or was admissible under the averments of the motion. • It simply raises the legal question whether an indictment in the form mentioned-would be so indefinite as to meet the constitutional and statutory requirement demanding that the accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him. Mr. Wharton, in his work on Criminal Procedure (10th Ed.) § 198, treats the subject‘thus:

“If a particular fact, or condition, which is one of the component parts of the offense, cannot be . accurately described, the indictment will be good, if it state that such fact or condition is unknown to the grand jury, provided that the fact or condition in question be described as accurately as possible. But this allegation, that the name or other particular fact is ‘unknown to the grand. jury,’ is not merely formal; on the contrary, if it be shown that it was, in fact, known to them, then, the excuse failing, it has beefl repeatedly held that the indictment was bad, or that the defendant should be acquitted, or the judgment arrested or reversed.”

■ See, also Bishop’s New Crim. Proc. § 514; Wharton on Homicide, p. 847.

The correctness of the principle stated in the text was affirmed by this court in the case of Harris v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 447, 36 S. W. 88. It is there stated that, in a case where it is doubtful how death was caused, it is allowable to charge that it was done by some means unknown to the grand jury. In the same case it is also said that it was not necessary that the state introduce proof to show that the means of death were unknown to the grand jury. The court said that the rule applicable to an indictment for theft requiring proof of an averment that the name of the owner was unknown to the grand jury was not to be applied to an averment touching the means of death in a case of homicide, especially where there is nothing to suggest that the means of death were known to the grand jury. See, also, Wharton’s Crim. Law, § 658; Wharton’s Crim. Ev. § 93.

We understand the case of Carr v. State, 80 Tex. Cr. R. 465, 190 S. W. 728, is not in conflict with this view. It simply asserts the view that the grand jury should state the means of death if known. The same is true of Ruddleston v. State, 70 Tex. Cr. R. 260, 156 S. W. 1168. Touching the name of the deceased, it seems that the same rule applies in homicide cases as in cases of theft; that is to say, that the averment of want of kn9Wledge on the part of the grand jury must be sustained by proof. McCloy v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 125, 80 S. W. 524, 122 Am. St. Rep. 678; Wharton on Homicide, § 569.

We fail to find any bill of exceptions to the action of the court in refusing to sustain the motion to quash the special venire. The motion contains averments of facts which are apparently controverted by the memorandum of the trial judge. The complaint in the motion, however, is that the appellant was not present at the time that the order was made directing the issuance of a special venire writ, and the drawing of a special venire of 90 men. The judge certified that the appellant was out on bond and that his attorney was present. We do not understand that appellant’s presence was necessary.

The court submitted to the jury the issues of murder, manslaughter, self-defense, and aggravated assault. No' complaint of the refusal of special charges is presented in a manner which can be reviewed. We find some special charges copied in the record and mentioned in the brief, but there is nothing to-show when they were presented to the court before he gave his instructions to the jury. The law requires that they be presented before -the argument begins. See Vernon’s Ann. Code of Crim. Proc. art. 737a; Berg v. State, 64 Tex. Cr. R. 612, 142 S. W. 884; Bain v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 528, 166 S. W. 505; Gill v. State, 84 Tex. Cr. R. 531, 208 S. W. 926; Whitley v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 503, 236 S. W. 470.

The exceptions to the court’s charge are all general. One more specific than others is that contained in the fourth subdivision, from which we take the following quotation;

“This is misleading to the jury, and in a way informs the jury that, unless the deceased was armed with such an' instrument and making such acts, that the right of self-defense would not be available to defendant.”

After stating abstractedly the law of self-defense, the court charged thus:

“If from the evidence you believe that defendant killed the said Don Turner, but further believe that at the time of so doing the deceased had made an attack on him, which, from the manner and character of it, and the relative strength of the parties, and the defendant’s knowledge of the character and disposition of the deceased, caused him to have a reasonable expectation or fear of death or serious bodily injury, and that acting under such reasonable expectation or fear, the defendant killed the deceased, then you should acquit him.”

Apparently this charge is not subject to the criticism addressed to it in the exception quoted. From appellant’s testimony, it ■appears that the deceased attacked him and cut him with a knife. The paragraph of the charge in question seems applicable to this phase of the testimony.

The general criticism of the charge of the court, to the effect that it does not give the appellant the benefit of the law requiring proof of an intent to kill where the weapon is not per se-a deadly weapon, we think is not sustained by the record. The court used this language:

“ * * * And if you further believe from the evidence, or have a reasonable doubt as to such fact, that the instrument used was not a deadly weapon — that is, a weapon which, from the mode and manner used, was not calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury — or if you believe from the evidence, or have a reasonable doubt as to such fact, that the defendant, at the time he cut the deceased, if he did cut him. had no intention of killing him, then you are instructed that you could not convict the defendant of any grade of homicide, but could only convict him of an aggravated assault, as the same is hereinafter explained to you.”

We do not regard the general charge of the court as open to the objections urged against it. The evidence did not warrant the trial court in ignoring the issue of murder. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony was for the jury,' Article 786 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: The words. uttered by the appellant on the trial were not the sole criterion. His testimony was to be weighed in the light of all the facts at hand. It is true that he testified that he struck the deceased with a knife, which knife he exhibited on the trial. There was also evidence, however, that this was a deadly weapon. Appellant testified that the deceased, when last seen by him, was running towards the pond. There was much evidence that the' deceased was not- drowned, carrying the inference that he was killed, and that his body was hidden in the pond. The wounds upon him, according to some of the testimony, would instantly have disabled him, so that he could not run. The evidence also suggests an ax as the weapon used. i

Appellant’s silence and the declaration that he knew not the whereabouts of the. deceased, may have been regarded by the jury as incompatible with his testimony describing the fight. We think this court would not be justified in holding that the evidence of manslaughter or self-defense was of a nature to exclude the issue of murder. ■ -

There being no errors of the trial court brought up for review which make against the fairness of the trial, and the evidence as a whole being sufficient to support, the verdict of murder, the decision of the jury, sanctioned by the trial judge, is binding upon this court.

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

LATTIMORE, J.

Appellant insists that the evidence as to the character of weapon used by him in the'fatal difficulty is such that the learned trial judge erred in submitting the law of murder. The matter was discussed in our original opinion, but deference to the insistence of appellant has led to another review. If one, not in self-defense, or not under circumstances reducing to manslaughter, intentionally assault another with a deadly weapon, and death ensue, it is murder; whether such assault be in self-defense, or be reducible to manslaughter, or be murder, are fact issues for the jury, under appropriate instructions. If one, not in self-defense, and not under circumstances reducing to manslaughter, 'assault another, and death ensue, and it be contended that the weapon used was not deadly, and that the intent to kill was lacking, these still are fact issues for the jury under' appropriate instructions. Harding v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 559, 103 S. W. 401; Price v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 91, 131 S. W. 319; Ford v. State, 64 Tex. Cr. R. 14, 142 S. W. 6.

The court below gave in charge to the jury article 1147, Vernon’s Ann. P. C., and in applying the law to the facts required them to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an intent to kill on the part 'of appellant, and that the weapon used by him was one which by the mode and manner of its use was likely to produce death, before they could convict. This wás as far as the court was required to go. Johnson v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 379, 60 S. W. 48; Posey v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 190, 78 S. W. 689; Lucas v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 137, 90 S. W. 880; Betts v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 631, 133 S. W. 251. This would be the law, even when death ensued from the cut of a knife, which was not per se a deadly weapon. If one, intending to kill, uses a weapon not per se deadly, but in a manner, likely to produce death, he is guilty of murder, if death results.

There seems little room for controversy as to what caused the death of deceased. All the witnesses who actually examined the only wound upon him said it was on the right side of the head, was 4 or 5 inches long, and penetrated the skull for more than an inch of its length. That this wound was inflicted by appellánt is almost beyond dispute. He admitted a fight with deceased at Hargrove’s store on the night of the disappearance of deceased, and claimed to have struck at deceased with a pocket knife. The body of deceased was found two weeks later in a pool of water some 300 yards from said store; clotted blood covering a space about the size of a hat was found on the bank of said pool, about 16 feet from the body. When the pool was drained, long tracks led from a point where the. blood was found to w^g^e the body was found, and-thence away. Nothing was observed to indicate that deceased was alive when his body was placed in the water, but the evidence seems convincing to the contrary. In the interim between the disappearance of-deceased and the finding of his body, appellant disclaimed any knowledge of the whereabouts of deceased. The story told by him on the witness stand was that he got out of the buggy in which he and deceased were riding in apparent friendliness, and was standing near or between the wheels, and that deceased began to whip the mule, causing it to run, and thus knocked him to the ground; that the mule ran to Hargrove’s store, and there struck the buggy against a post, wrecking it; that when he'walked up to s.aid buggy deceased came from around the corner of the store, and when asked why he ran over appellant and tore up the buggy deceased began to curse and threatened to kill appellant; that he got out his knife and started to walk away, and told deceased not to run on him with the knife which he said deceased had; that deceased cursed him again and ran at him, and that he struck back at deceased; both fell to the ground and got-up, and one ran one way and the other another; that he .had seen deceased no more after this parting until his body was found-in the pool. He swore that if he cut deceased he did- not know- it, and that he did not put the- body in said-pool of water.

The law of manslaughter was fully submitted as well as that of aggravated assault, and in this connection the learned trial judge told the jury that if appellant, in a sudden passion arising from adequate cause, unlawfully attacked deceased, and they believed, or had a reasonable doubt thereof, that the instrument or means used by appellant in said attack was not a deadly weapon, or if in such case they had a reasonable doubt of the fact that appellant intended to kill deceased, they could not convict him of more than aggravated- assault. Again, applying the law to the facts in reference to aggravated assault, the court told the jury that, if they believed that appellant attacked the deceased with a weapon which was not deadly, or without intent to kill, that they should find him guilty only of aggravated assault. This seems to us to have been eminently fair to appellant, and to have presented fully the only defensive theory appearing to have foundation in the facts.

Appellant strenuously Insists that under the facts he is not guilty of more than manslaughter. We regret our inability to conclude that the verdict of the jury finding him guilty of murder is without support. The whole course of conduct of appellant at the time and thereafter, as well as his testimony upon the stand, were for the jury. If appellant had frankly told that deceased drove over him with the buggy, and that this caused him to bfecome so enraged as that he seized an ax or pocket knife and struck him, thereby causing death, the jury might have concluded that he was telling the truth, and adjudged him guilty only of manslaughter. But when the body of deceased is concealed, and when' found bears upon it a .wound testified to by at least one physician as appearing to have been made by an ax, and when it further appears that after death the body of deceased was concealed apparently by his slayer, and when there is testimony that one killed by such a wound could not have gone the distance from the store to the pool of water, and when thereafter appellant denies any knowledge of the whereabouts of deceased, and when on trial tells the apparently flimsy story that he and deceased struck at each other with knives and separated, and one ran one way and one the other, and that he had not seen deceased since, we can understand how the jury seriously doubted the truth of any of his statements as to how the fatal difficulty arose or its attendant circumstances.

To prove motive is not indispensable in murder cases. Under the former law, when an unlawful killing was shown, and the facts did not reduce it to manslaughter or show express malice, malice was implied, and it would be murder in the second degree. While the degrees have been abolished by the statute, the power and right of the jury to imply malice was not taken away, nor is the right of the jury to settle conflicting facts and theories in any wise abridged. The jury are the exclusive judges of the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony, and can in no wise be held to accept as true the statements and explanations made by one accused of crime. They may reject entirely his testimony and be wholly within their province. Ordinarily men who kill their friends, in moments of passion do not conceal their bodies or manufacture and tell false stories about the occurrences. When the law of a given case is fairly submitted upon' the trial, and all the theories are considered in the light of a proper instruction, this court does not feel inclined to disturb the verdict.

Finding no error in the motion for rehearing, same will be overruled. 
      j^jFor other eases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     