
    (99 South. 707)
    No. 24289.
    LESTER v. ROACH.
    (March 24, 1924.)
    
      (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
    
    Í. Municipal corporations <&wkey;>705(IO) — Pedestrian’s negligence held proximate cause of collision with automobile.
    Where a policeman, on a - dark night and during a high'wind and heavy rain, while crossing a street at a place different from the regular crossing, and holding an umbrella over his head, was struck by defendant’s automobile, driven at a moderate rate of speed, with jail lights burning, plaintiff not observing the approach of the ear and having nearly reached the curbing when struck by the right front fender and light of the automobile, JieZcZ.that, plaintiff’s negligence being the proximate cause of the accident, a dismissal of the suit was proper.
    2. Municipal corporations <&wkey;705((0) — Last clear chance doctrine held inapplicable to striking of pedestrian by automobile on dark rainy night.
    Where a policeman on a dark night and during a high wind and heavy rain, while crossing a street at a place different from the regular crossing, and holding an umbrella over his head, was struck by defendant’s automobile, driving at a moderate rate of speed, with all lights burning, plaintiff not observing the approach of the car, and having nearly reached the curbing when struck by the right front fender and light pf the automobile, held that the doctrine of the last clear chance was inapplicable.
    Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; J. H. Stephens, Jr., Judge.
    Action by W. H. Lester against L. B. Boach. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Hall & Bullock, of Shreveport, for appellant.
    Barnette & Blanchard, of Shreveport, for appellee.
    By Division A, composed of O’NIELL, C. J., and BOGEBS and BBUNOT, JJ.
   BBUNOT, J.

The plaintiff was injured by an automobile operated by the defendant. He sued for $10,000 as damages, and from a judgment dismissing the suit he has appealed.

The facts are that the accident occurred on a dark night, at about 11 o’clock, and during a high wind and heavy rain. The plaintiff was a policeman. He attempted to' cross Texas street, in the city of Shreveport, at' a place different from the regular crossing, and was holding an umbrella over his head and inclined, at an angle, towards the direction of the wind. The defendant was approaching from that direction, and the rain and moisture on the windshield of his car obscured his vision to such an extent that he could not see more than a few feet ahead of the machine. The automobile was being driven at a moderate rate of speed, with ail lights burning. The plaintiff did not .observe the approach of the car, and he had nearly reached the street curbing when he was struck by the right front fender and light of the automobile. The lower court found that plaintiff’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and dismissed the suit.

The evidence in this case is so conclusive of that fact that we do not think it worth while to review it. We are also of the opinion that the doctrine of the last clear chance has no application to the facts of this case.

For these reasons we are of the opinion that the judgment of the lower court is correct, and it is therefore affirmed, • at appellant’s cost.  