
    Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v. Ambrose.
    
      Death Action.
    
    (Decided Nov. 18, 1909.
    50 South. 1030.)
    
      Jurisdiction; Venue; Corporation; Death Action. — The provisions of section 4207, Code 1896, and of General Acts 1903, p. 182, apply to a suit by an administrator for personal injury resulting in •the death of his intestate, so that such action must be brought in the county where the. in jury occurred, or where the plaintiff resides ; and this, notwithstanding the first clause of the statute, or section 232, Constitution 1901.
    Appeal from Bessemer City Court.
    Heard before H'ou. William Jackson.
    Action by W. L. Ambrose, as administrator, against the Alabama, Great Southern Railway Company, for damages for the death of his intestate. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    A. G. & E. D. Smith, for appellant.
    — Counsel insist that under section 4207, Code of 1896, as amended by General Acts 1903, p. 182, the court improperly sustained demurrers to defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction. They also cite in this connection sec. 1751, Code 1896. Counsel discuss other matters assigned as error and cite authority in support of same, but it is deemed unnecessary to here set them out.
    Frank S. White & Sons, for appellee.
    — Counsel insist that the action contemplated are actions for personal injuries and not actions for injuries causing death, and that the statute has no application to administrators suing. They cite in support of their contention.— 
      J ames v. R. & D. R. R. Go., 92 Ala. 231; L. & N. v. Orr, 91 Ala. 548; L. & N. v.Trammel, 63 Ala. 354. They insist further that even if the statute is applicable to this suit that the pleas nowhere allege that the defendant is a domestic corporation, and that hence, the constitution determines the jurisdiction. Theyv cite. — Sec. 232, Const. 1901; City Council v. Wetumpka, 31 Ála 76; Kelley v. Trustees, 59 Ala. 489; Drake v. Fletoellen, 33 Ala. 136. Counsel discuss other assignments of error, not deemed necessary to be here set out. •
   SIMPSON, J.

— This action is by the appellee against the appellant for damages on account of a personal injury to plaintiff’s intestate, resulting in his death. Pleas to the jurisdiction -were interposed, alleging,that • the injury occurred in Bibb county, that the intestate resided in said county, and said administrator, the plaintiff, also resided in said county. Demurrers were interposed to said pleas, which demurrers were sustained.

Section 4207 of Code of 1896 provided that “a foreign or domestic corporation may be sued in any county in which it does business by agent.” The act of March 5, 1903, amended that action by adding: “Provided, that all actions for personal injuries must be brought in the county where the injury occurred, or in the county where the plaintiff resided; provided, further, that such corporation does business by agent in the county of plaintiff’s residence.” Acts 1903, p. 182. The appellee insists that this provision does not apply to a suit brought by a personal representative.

We can see no reason to justify such a holding. The objects sought by the statute are just as applicable to the case of an action by a personal representative as one by the party injured himself. Besides, the wording of the statute is clear and explicit, and there is no room for any construction beyond its language. Although the personal injury has resulted in death, yet the action is for. the personal injury, the. administrator is the plaintiff, and the action must be brought either. “in county where the injury occurred, or the county where the plaintiff resides.” The fact’that the first clause of the section, and section 232 of the Constitution of 190i, provide generally that a corporation may be suód in any county where it does business by agent, does not in the least affect the particular provision that in this class of cases the action must be brought in the counties designated. The demurrers should have been overruled.

The judgment of the court is reversed, and the cause remanded.

Dowdell, C. J. and McClellan and Mayfield, JJ., ■concur.  