
    The State ex rel. Brown v. Bellows.
    
      Coroner’s inquest — Section 1221, Rev. Stat. — Supposition as to death from violence.
    
    Within the meaning of section 1221, Revised Statutes, providing for inquests by the coroner, a dead body “is found within the county” when it is ascertained to be in the county; and death is supposed to have been caused by violence whenever the coroner from observation or information nas substantial reason for believing or surmising that death was caused by unlawful means.
    (Decided March 20, 1900.)
    Error to the Circuit Court of Franklin County.
    The relator is a taxpayer and the defendants are the commissioners, the coroner, the auditor and the treasurer, of Franklin county. The plaintiff brought suit in the court of common pleas to enjoin the payment to the coroner of the statutory fees for holding an inquest on the body of one Richard Claprood, who came to his death by violence. The ground upon ivhich the injunction was sought was that the case was not within the statutory definition of cases in which such inquests are authorized to be held at the expense of the county. After issues of fact joined the cause was tried in the court of common pleas and appealed to the circuit court. In the circuit court the cause was heard upon the pleadings and the evidence, and the following facts were found:
    
      First — The relator is a taxpayer having all the attributes and having performed all the conditions and requisites necessary to maintain this action and this cause is properly before the court.
    Second — That on September 5,1897, at about 2:30 o’clock p. m., in a public street in the city of Columbus, Ohio, one Richard Claprood was killed by one George Robinson.
    Third — That said killing was the result of a fight between said parties. In the beginning of said fight there were six or seven witnesses to the same, and this number was augmented by others attracted thereby, and when the killing occurred there were present and witnessing the same between twenty-five and thirty persons.
    Fourth — That policemen were on the scene within a few minutes after the killing, viewed the dead body and learned from the Avitnesses and bystanders of the circumstances of the killing and the name of the man who committed the deed.
    Fifth — That within about ten minutes after the killing, the police having pursued Robinson, had captured him, and said Robinson was locked up in the city prison by said police at 3:05 p. m. same day.
    Sixth — The dead body of Claprood was removed by the police at the same time the arrest was made.
    Seventh — That the coroner of Franklin county, J. W. Birmingham, on the afternoon of the killing was engaged in official duties near the village of Shade-ville, Ohio, about eight miles from Columbus, and returned to the city of Columbus about four o’clock that afternoon.
    Eighth — Said police officers informed said coroner apon his return to the city that said Robinson had been arrested and was in prison and that the dead body had been remoA-ed to the morgue, and that its death had been caused by unlawful means.
    Ninth — Said coroner thereupon went to the morgue and found there the dead body of said Clap-rood, whose body bore evidence of having come to his death by violence.
    Tenth — Said coroner on the next day as soon as his other duties would permit proceeded to the place where the killing ocurred, issued subpoenas for such witnesses as he deemed necessary and proceeded to hold an inquest and to inquire how the deceased came to his death; and as a result determined that decedent did come to his death by means of violence inflicted by said Robinson, and the proceedings in said inquest were returned to the clerk of the court of common pleas according to law.
    Eleventh — That said coroner acted in good faith, believing the circumstances were such as the law contemplated, and that the same warranted the holding of an inquest.
    Twelfth — The amount of the bill of the coroner for fees for holding said inquest is correct, if the inquest itself be lawful or authorized.
    Thirteenth — That if not .previously restrained in this case, the county commissioners would have allowed and paid said bill as in the petition alleged.
    Upon these facts the court dismissed the petition of the plaintiff below and rendered judgment against him for costs.
    
      Albery & Dillon and George D. Jones, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Dyer & Williams, for defendants in error.
   By the Court :

Whether the judgment of the circuit court was justified by the facts which it found is the only question before us. The duties of the coroner are prescribed in section 1221 of the Revised Statutes: “When information is given to any coroner that the body of a person whose death is supposed to have been caused by violence, has been found within the county, he shall appear forthwith at the place where such body is, shall issue subpoenas for such witnesses as he deems necessary, and administer to them tlm usual oath and proceed to inquire how the deceased came to his death, if by violence from any other person or persons, by whom, whether as principals or accessories before or after the fact, together with all the circumstances relating thereto: the testimony of the witnesses shall be reduced to writing and subscribed, and with the finding and recognizances hereinafter mentioned, if any, shall be by the coroner returned to the clerk of the common pleas court, and he shall, if he deems it necessary, cause the witnesses attending, as aforesaid, to enter into recognizances for their appearance at the succeeding term of the court of common pleas to give testimony concerning the matter aforesaid,” etc. Section 1222 provides for a finding of facts regarding “the subject of the inquiry to be made by the coronor, and that he shall cause the arrest of any person apparently guilty of causing death by violence.”

It is thus indicated that the inquest is intended to aid in the detection of crimes and in the punishment of those who perpetrate them. Construed with this purpose in view, and with reference to their natural meaning, the sense in which the words and phrases of the statute are used should not be the subject of serious doubt. A death “caused by violence” is a death caused by unlawful means, such as usually call for the punishment of those who employ them. A body “is found” within the county when it is ascertained by any means that it is within the county. “Death is supposed to have been caused by violence” whenever from such observation as he may be able to make, and from such information as may come to him, the coroner is for reasons of substance led to surmise or think that the death has been so caused. To hold that within the contemplation of the statute death cannot be supposed “to have been caused by violence” if persons other than the coroner may know that it was so caused, would defeat the purpose of the statute, since murderers and their accomplices always know that the death of their victims were so caused.

It is the duty of the coroner to hold an inquest and to perform the other duties enjoined upon him by these sections of the statute whenever a dead body is found within his county and he knows or may reasonably believe that death was caused by unlawful means. For such services he is entitled to the compensation which the defendants propose to pay.

These conclusions are well supported in the opinion of Shearer, chief justice,- when disposing of this case in the circuit court, 15 C. C. Rep., 504; 8 C. D., 376.

Judgment affirmed.

Davis, J.

I dissent from the judgment, being of the opinion that Section 1221 of Revised Statutes does not authorize a coroner to hold an inquest when the death is not “supposed” to result from violence, but is known to be the result of a murderous assault openly perpetrated in the presence of a number of persons. He can not take the place of a prosecuting attorney, examining court or grand jury, under the pretext of an inquest.  