
    S. D. Harris v. Joseph G. Gest.
    Reserved from the district court of Franklin county.
    This was a motion to dismiss the appeal in the district court, upon the ground that the appeal bond was not filed “ in thirty days from the rising of the court” of common pleas. The question is entirely as to what constituted the June Term, 1854, of the court of common pleas of Franklin county, Ohio. The facts are as follows : At the June Term of the court of common pleas, to wit, on 9th day of June, a. d. 1854, the plaintiff obtained a verdict against defendant for three hundred dollars, and thereupon judgment was enter'ed upon the verdict and for costs. The defendant at that time gave notice of his intention to appeal. No other order was made in the case at that term.
    On the 26th day of June, at same term, the following order was entered upon-the journal: “Ordered that an additional and adjourned term of this court be held, commencing on the 5th day of July next, such additional and adjourned term being necessary for the purpose of completing the business now on the docket and unfinished for the want of time.”
    On the 26th day of June the following entry was made at the close'of the day: “ And thereupon the court adjourned until nine o’clock on the 5th day of July next.” And on the 5th'day of *July, the following entry commences the day’s proceedings: “Wednesday morning, July 5, A. d. 1854, court met pursuant to adjournment.”
    During the interval between June 26 and July 5, the court of common pleas was held in Madison county by the same judge that presided in the Franklin common pleas. The regular summer term thereof commenced on the 27th day of June, and ended by a sine die adjournment before the 1st day of July. Madison and Franklin are in the same subdivision.
    On the 7th day of July, the following order was made on the journal of the court of commou pleas of Franklin county, Ohio : “ Ordered by the court that all causes on the docket in which decrees, orders or judgments have not been entered, and all motions, applications and petitions on file, and all other matters and things undisposed of, be continued until the next term.”
    
      On the 10th day of July, the final entry on the journal as follows : “ And the court adjourned sine die.”
    
    The defendant executed his undertaking for his appeal with good ■ and sufficient sureties, which was approved and filed on the 2d ■day of August, A. d. 1854, within thirty days of the last adjournment, but more than thirty days after the first adjournment.
    The law provides, 52 Ohio Laws 10, sec. 5: “ That whenever the •state of business in any of the courts of common pleas [in the 5th ■district] is such as to render it necessary, such court shall have power to appoint and hold an additional term for the purpose of ■completing the business of any regular term upon notice thereof being entered upon the journals.”
    
      Swayne & Baber, and Galloway & Matthews, in support of the motion to quash the appeal.
    I. If the “additional and adjourned term ” was a part and continuation of the term at which the judgment was entered, then the ■appeal bond was filed in time, otherwise not. Constitution, art. 4, sec. 3 ; 52 Ohio L. 10, sec. 5; Swan’s new Stat. 107, sec. 2.
    II. *If it was a mere continuation of the regular term, then, in contemplation of law, the common pleas courts were in session in two counties of the same subdivision — Madison and Franklin — at the same time; which is not constitutional. Cons., art. 4, sec. 3. It follows, that the regular term in Franklin ended when the'law required the term in Madison to begin. Gregg v. Cook, Peck, 82; Garner v. Carral, 7 Geyer, 365.
    III. The language of the act is, “an additional term for the purpose of completing the business of any regular term.” Nothing is said of an adjourned term. The use of the word “ adjourned ” in the order of the court, was from carelessness, or accident. The word ■is mere unmeaning surplusage. Now the order shows that the court was acting under the statute, for it limits the business to be done in July, as the statute limits the business of an additional term. Hence, as the statute contemplates a distinct term, the court must ■be held to have done so. The court has no power to so limit the business of any part of a regular term, whether held before or after an adjournment.
    
      Henry C. Noble, against the motion.
    I. We admit that “an additional term” is different from an ad-, journod term; that an adjourned term is the continuance by adjournment pf the same term. 5 Mass. 535. An additional term is an independent, separate term. If, therefore, the court find this “ an additional term,” the motion should be sustained; if “ an adjourned term,” or an adjournment of the June term, then should the motion be overruled.
    II. We maintain that every court has the right to control its own sessions, unless expressly prohibited by law;-and that in pursuance of that right they may adjourn not only from day to day, but from one day to a distant day specified.
    In The Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria v. Withers, 6 Wheat. 106, C. J. Marshall says :
    
      “ The sole question in this case is whether the adjournment *from the 16th of May until the fourth Monday in June was a continuation of the April term, or constituted a distinct term.
    “ There being nothing in any act of Congress which prevents the courts of the district from exercising a power common to all courts, that of adjourning to a distant day, the adjournment on the 16th day of May to tho fourth Monday in June would be a continuance of the same term, unless a special act of Congress expressly enabling the courts of the district to hold adjourned sessions, may be supposed to vary the law of the case.”
    In that case the court decided that a law enabling the court to hold “ an adjourned session ” was simply an affirmance of the common-law power above mentioned, as an adjourned session meant “the same session with that at which the adjournment was made,” and therefore did not affect the question.
    III. That the order of June 26 was out of abundant caution, and not to appoint an additional term under the statute. That this is evident by the using of the words “and an adjourned term" to qualify the words additional term; and we infer this from the journal entry at the end of the 26th June and beginning of the 5th of July sittings; as, also, from the fact that the general order of continuance was not made until July 7.
    IV. We think that the order entered on June 26 does not affect the general power of the court to adjourn its sessions for any length of time, by an adjournment to a fixed day, which it did, as appears by the journal entries.
    V. The constitution, section S, article 4, authorizes two sittings at once in the district, and therefore in the same subdivision, if two-sittings were held at once in Madison and Franklin counties.
   Thurman, C. J.

The judges of the courts of common pleas are judges of their respective districts, and not of the mere subdivisions thereof. The subdivision of the districts is for election purposes merely. Const., art. 4, sec. 3.

There is nothing in the constitution that forbids the holding of ^common pleas courts in different counties of a subdivision, at the same time.

Courts are not limited, in their power of adjournment, to an adjournment from one day to the succeeding day. They have an inherent power to adjourn to a more distant day, when not restrained by the constitution or statute law; and there is no such restraint upon the common pleas courts in Ohio. 6 Wheat. 106. When this-power is exercised, the sitting after the adjournment is a prolongation of the regular term, and, in contemplation of law, there is but one term. 6 Wheaton, supra. But the “additional term,” provided for by section 5 of the act of January 31, 1854 (52 Ohio L. 10), is a distinct term, and not a prolongation of a regular term.

When the journal entries leave it doubtful whether it was intended to appoint an “additional term,” under said section, or-merely to adjourn the regular term to a distant day, the former' construction ought to be preferred, since adjournments to a distant day are, in general, highly impolitic, and ought not, except for very weighty and special reasons, to take place. In this case, the limitation upon the business to be transacted at the July sitting, contained in the order appointing that sitting, shows that a distinct term, under the statute, was intended.

An appeal bond executed more than thirty days after the regular term at which judgment was rendered, but within thirty days after an “ additional term,” held under said statute, is not within the time-required by law.

Appeal quashed.  