
    Isaac Pratt and Another versus Daniel Putnam.
    A return by the sheriff, that he delivered seizin and possession of land taken in execution to the agent, instead of the attorney, of the creditor, is sufficient.
    An attorney for such purpose need not be by deed.
    The previous request of the creditor, or his subsequent ratification of the doings of the person acting as attorney, will be sufficient.
    The recording such levy is evidence of a subsequent ratification.
    This was an action of trespass quare clausum, fregit, originally brought before a justice of the peace ; and the defendants there
    
      pleaded not guilty, and also soil and freehold. The cause was carried to the Common Pleas according to the statute, and thence came tc, this Court by appeal.
    The action came on for trial, before Putnam, J., at the sittings here after the last September term ; when the judge directed the jilea of not guilty to be struck out, and that the cause should be tried on the plea of soil and freehold, as if that alone had been pleaded before the justice.
    The plaintiffs, to maintain the issue on their part, produced an execution, wherein they were creditors, and one Ezra Mllen was1 debtor, and a levy of the same upon the locus in quo, as the estate of the said Mien. The execution issued upon a judgment rendered in this Court on the 26th of January, 1808; the premises having been attached on the original writ in that suit on the 23d of December, 1805.
    The defendant objected to the lev}, on the ground, that it did not appear that one Stratton had authority to act as attorney to the plaintiffs in the levying of said execution ; the sheriff returning, that the said Stratton “appeared as agent,” and that he chose an appraiser for the creditors, and on their behalf received seizin in possession. The defendant also offered in evidence the deposition of Stratton, stating, that 7'. Bigelow, Esq., handed the execution to him, and requested him to cause it to be levied on Mien's * property, which he did; and that he had no written power or authority whatever from the creditors, nor instructions of any kind from them, or from any other person, relative to the said business, except what he received from Mr. Bigelow, as above stated.
    The execution and levy were admitted in evidence, notwithstanding the said objections.
    The defendant derived his title by a deed from Jonathan Kellogg, dated the 7th of February, 1811, acknowledged and recorded ; and he produced a deed from the said Mien to the said Kellogg, dated the 21st of March, 1807, acknowledged and recorded the 29th of June, 1808.
    A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the whole Court; and, if the said execution and levy ought to have been rejected, the plaintiffs were to become nonsuit; otherwise, judgment was to be rendered on the verdict.
    
      Mien, for the defendant,
    contended, that the return of the execution was defective. The statute, which prescribes the manner of extending and serving executions, must be pursued strictly, or a title derived under its provisions will be unsound. The statute expressly directs, in case of levying execution upon the debtor’s real estate, “ that the officer shall deliver possession and seizin thereof to the creditor or creditors, his or their attorney.”  To receive livery of seizin, an attorney must be by deed,  at common law, and the statute has not altered the law in this respect. The word “ attorney ” must be taken technically, and has a very distinct signification from agent. And, if it should be yielded that an attorney for this purpose might be without deed, yet in this return Stratton is not even named as such. Further, if the sheriff had seen fit to call him the attorney of the creditors, it was competent for the defendant to prove that he had no authority to represent them. Here, even the authority of Mr. Bigelow, as whose substitute Stratton undertook to act, is not shown. 
    
    Strong, for the plaintiffs,
    insisted, that the officer’s * return was conclusive in this case, as against the judgment debtor, and those claiming under him, as the present defendant does.  An officer is not to be holden to strictly technical language ; and, whatever nice distinction the law may intend between agent and attorney, they are perfectly synonymous in common parlance.
    But, whether the return be of itself conclusive or not, it was in the creditors’ power, by their posterior assent, to ratify the doings of Stratton as their attorney. This they have done by bringing this action, and it is equivalent to a previous appointment. 
    
    
      
      
        Stat. 1783, c. 57, § 2.
    
    
      
      
        Bac. Abr. Tit. Leases, &c , M. — Co. Lit. 49, b., 52, a.
      
    
    
      
       8 Mass. Rep. 120. — 9 Mass. Rep. 99.
    
    
      
       9 Mass. Rep. 99.
    
    
      
      
        Hei ing & al. vs. Potly, 8 Mass. Rep. 113.
    
   Parker, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. It has never been considered necessary, that the attorney, to whom seizin is delivered by the sheriff, when he extends an execution upon real estate according to the statute, should be regularly constituted attorney by deed. On the contrary, it was decided some years since by this Court, before the commencement of our reports, that the attorney of record, under whose management the judgment had been recovered, might, without any further authority, receive seizin for the creditor.

Neither do we see any reason, why any person, undertaking to act in this respect for the creditor, may not be legally considered his attorney for this purpose, if he have the previous request of the creditor, or his subsequent ratification. That assent or ratification will be presumed, unless the creditor shall, within a reasonable time after notice of the transaction, disaffirm the doings of the person assuming to act as his attorney.

It must be taken for granted, that the execution, and the proceedings under it, were registered within the time prescribed by the statute ; and this act of registering is a sufficient proof of the creditors’ ratification of the levy, and of the seizin taken by Stratton.

As to the objection, that the sheriff has returned that he delivered seizin to Stratton as agent, and not as attorney, we think this wholly unimportant. The words agent #and attorney are frequently used synonymously ; and it ought not to be in the power of a sheriff, who uses one instead of the other, by ignorance or design, to defeat the creditor’s title.

The attachment having been made before the deed from Mien, under which the defendant claims, and a levy having been regularly made within thirty days after judgment, the title of the plaintiffs must prevail; so that judgment must be entered according to the verdict  