
    W. S. Gibbs v. John McGuire.
    1. Seals. Code 1880, § 993, abolishing. Not retroactive.
    
    Section 998, code 1880, abolishing all distinctions between sealed and unsealed instruments, except as to corporations, was not retroactive. It does not affect conveyances executed prior to the adoption of, said code, either as to the rights conferred by them or the remedies on them.
    2. Same. Title in ejectment. Unsealed deed. Lev rei situs.
    
    Accordingly, an unsealed deed, executed prior to the code of 1880, did not convey the legal title, and cannot now be relied on as evidence of title by a plaintiff in ejectment. That the deed was executed in another state, where seals were not required, makes no difference. The lev rei situs controls.
    From the circuit court of Bolivar county.
    Hon. W. R. Williamson, Judge.
    Ejectment by W. S. Gibbs against John McGuire.
    The assignments of error present many and complicated questions, but the single point decided by the court is sufficiently illustrated by the facts stated in the opinion. On the trial the court, as to the issue here involved, gave a peremptory instruction for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
    
      Moore $ Jones and Mayes § Harris, for appellant.
    It is true that a deed must be executed according to the lex rei situs. It is manifest that the failure to affix the seal arose from the fact that the grantor was a citizen of Texas, where seals were not necessary, and the deed was executed before the code of 1880 was adopted; but by § 993' of that code the defect was cured. The question is merely one of remedy, and this section abolishes all distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments, both as to rights and remedies. An unsealed deed, even before the code of 1880, was not a nullity. It conveyed a perfect equitable title. Nixon 
      v. Careo, 28 Miss., 414. Besides, § 998 was intended to effectuate the intention of the grantor, which was in danger of failure because of a technical rule as to conveyancing, not applicable- under the law of the domicile of the grantor. See Cooley’s Con. Lim., 369-378. Appellee does not claim to be a bona fide purchaser of this title who will be injured by this application of the statute. The point can serve him only to defeat appellant’s action by the rule that plaintiff in ejectment must recover on the strength of his own title.
    
      Nugent § Me Willie, for appellee.
    In an action of ejectment, the plaintiff must show a perfect legal title in himself. The unsealed instrument, executed prior to the code of 1880, was not evidence of title. At that time real estate could only be disposed of by deed, and a seal was an essential part of a deed. See Davis v. Brandon, 1 How. (Miss.), 154; Alexander v. Polk, 39 Miss., 737.
   Cooper, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

It is unnecessary to consider several important and interesting questions argued by counsel, for, whatever might be the conclusions reached upon them, the insufficiency of the plaintiff’s title is so evident that but one result can be reached, which is to affirm the judgment of the court below. In the chain of title, the plaintiff produced and relied upon a conveyance of title by a writing not under seal, executed on the twentieth of January, A.D. 1880, some nine months before the code of 1880, -by which seals were abolished, became operative. The instrument was executed by the maker in the state of Texas, by whose laws, it is said, seals were not required to deeds, and this fact is suggested as explanatory of the failure to seal the conveyance on which the plaintiff relies. The rule that a conveyance of land must be made according to the lex rei situs is recognized by counsel, who seek to avoid the consequence of the absence of the seal by the suggestion that by the code of 1880 the use of private seals was dispensed with, and all distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments, made by private persons, either as to rights conferred by them or the remedies on them, were abolished. Code 1880, § 993.

Counsel’s position is that the instrument is not a nullity, but is effectual to convey a complete, equitable title, and that all-else is a mere question of remedy, and that, since, by the section of the code referred to, all distinction of remedy was abolished, the plaintiff may recover at law, as well as in. equity, upon the right given by the instrument.

While the power of the legislature to have so legislated as to give effect to unsealed conveyances according to the intention of the parties is admitted, we find no evidence of any such purpose in the law. It does not declare a rule for the past, but for the future, and, having abolished the use of seals, it, at the same time, abolished those distinctions which had. previously existed in reference to remedies which rested upon the existence of seals. But there is nothing to indicate that a different effect was to be given to an instrument previously executed than it had at the time of its execution. The one introduced by the plaintiff was confessedly insufficient to convey the legal title to land when it was made. Alexander v. Polk, 39 Miss., 737. And the plaintiff suing in ejectment at law must recover upon a legal title. Thompson v. Wheatley, 5 Smed. & M., 499; Wolfe v. Dowell, 13 Ib., 103; Torrance v. Betsy, 30 Miss., 129; Heard v. Baird, 40 Ib., 793; Lockhart v. Camfield, 48 Ib., 470.

Judgment affirmed.  