
    WALKER et al. v. STATE.
    (No. 11599.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    May 9, 1928.
    Bail &wkey;>55 — Bail bond held void, where signed by principal’s attorney instead of by principal personally (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, arts. 269, 273, subd. 4, and art. 436, subd. I).
    Bail bond, as defined by Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 269, held invalid under article 436, subd. 1, where principal’s name was signed by attorney, instead of principal personally having signed bond as required by article 273, subd. 4.
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from District Court, Harrison County ; P. O. Beard, Judge.
    Action by the State against Tom Walker and others. From the .judgment, defendants appeal.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Bibb & Caven, of Marshall, for appellants.
    A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   CHRISTIAN, J.

This is an appeal from a final judgment upon forfeiture of a bail bond.

Appellants, who were sureties, denied under oath the execution of the appearance bond by. the principal. It is undisputed that the name of the principal, Tom Walker, was signed by F. M. Scott, in the manner following: “Tom Walker, by Attorney F. M. Scott.’’

Article 269, O. C. P., provides:

“A ‘bail bond’ is an undertaking entered into by the defendant and his sureties for the appearance of the principal therein before some court or magistrate to answer a criminal accusation; it is written out and signed by the defendant and his sureties.”

Subdivision 4.of article 273, C. C. P., requires that a bail bond “be signed by name or mark by the principal and sureties.” Subdivision 1 of article 436, C. C. P. provides that if a bail bond he “invalid and not binding as to the principal, each of the sureties shall be exonerated from liability.” We quote from 21 R. C. ÍL. p. 857, as follows:

“Unless in cases where a personal signature is necessary by reason of some statutory or other prescribed requirement, an agent authorized in any way may bind his principal by a written instrument.”

In Corpus Juris, vol. 6, p. 1009, the general principle applicable to bail bonds is announced as follows:

“Where signatures are required, a signing with the initials or the marks of the parties, or in blank will be sufficient, and the fact that the signatures are not placed at the 'bottom of the bond will not avoid such bqnd, but the principal’s signature, if required, must be made in person and not by his attorney.”

It is seen that our statutes provide that a bail bond must be written out and signed by the principal and sureties by name or by mark. Construed in connection with the principle announced in Corpus Juris, supra, we are led to the conclusion that such statutory provisions require that the signature or mark of the principal be made in person. It would follow that the bond under consideration is void.

It was evidently the intention of the Legislature, in requiring that the principal’s signature or mark be made in person, to 'avoid in forfeiture proceedings a multiplicity of issues and the uncertainty of recovery by the state. To permit the name of the principal to be signed by another would, when the question of the authority of the agent to act for his principal was raised, enlarge the opportunity to defeat the due administration of justice. A simple procedure for the forfeiture of bail bonds is provided by statute, and causes which will exonerate the principal and sureties from liability upon the forfeiture are held within narrow limits, evidencing, in our opinion, an intention on the part of the Legislature to insure the state against the burden of meeting multiplied issues of fact. In consonance with such intention, the simple requirement was made that the bond be signed by name or mark by the principal, gee title 7, c. 4, C. ,C. P.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.  