
    STATE of Louisiana v. Reginald SPURLOCK.
    No. 2015-KK-1173.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Sept. 25, 2015.
   PER CURIAM.

11Writ granted; Conviction Reinstated; Case Remanded. It is preferred but not statutorily required for the defendant to waive his right to a jury trial personally. State v. Pierre, 2002-2665 (La.3/28/03), 842 So.2d 321. Defense counsel may waive the right on his client’s behalf, provided that the defendant’s decision to do so was made knowingly and intelligently. Id. The defendant’s jury waiver is deemed knowing and intelligent when he understands “that the choice confronting him is, on the one hand, to be judged by a group of people from the community, and on the other hand, to have his guilt or innocence determined by a judge.” United States ex rel. Williams v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1072, 104 S.Ct. 982, 79 L.Ed.2d 219 (1984). The defendant’s prior criminal history may be considered in determining whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. See State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304, 1309 (La.1978).

In these proceedings, the defendant was aware prior to the instant criminal charges of his due process entitlements as they related to a choice to have his guilt or innocence determined by a judge or a jury of his peers. Among other criminal matters, the defendant has past experience as an accused in the trial of a criminal prosecution where he was found guilty by a jury. See State v. Spurlock, 539 So.2d 977 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989). In the instant case, the trial record and defense counsel’s hearing testimony, which was not found to lack credibility, reflect defense counsel, after consulting with the defendant, waived the defendant’s right to a jury trial in open court in the presence of the defendant.’ Weeks later, the defendant proceeded to a bench trial without raising an objection to the absence of a jury. Under the given facts, the defendant’s waiver of a jury trial was knowing and intelligent.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and reinstate the defendant’s conviction. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

JOHNSON, C.J., dissents and would deny the writ.

CRICHTON, J.,

additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

hi additionally concur with the writ grant and write separately to note that the instant case is but one of many cases questioning the sufficiency of a jury trial waiver effected 'through' counsel. See e.g. State v. Muller, 351 So.2d 143 (La.1977); State v. Phillips, 365 So.2d 1304 (La.1978); State v. Pierre, 2002-2665 (La.3/28/03), 842 So.2d 321; State v. Bazile, 2012-2243 (La.5/7/13), 144 So.3d 719.

Because this issue continues to appear before this’Court, it is important to reemphasize that, while not absolutely mandated, the preferred method of securing a defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial is for the trial court (i) to advise the defendant on the record of his constitutional right to a jury trial; (ii) to secure an oral waiver from the defendant himself; and (iii) if warranted, to make a finding that the defendant has intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. See State v. Brooks, 2001-1138, p.8 (La. App 1 Cir. 3/28/02), 814 So.2d 72, 78, writ denied, 2002-1215 (La.11/22/02), 829 So.2d 1037. In addition to holding this colloquy on the record, the clerk of court should record a minute entry of the colloquy and the court’s ruling. See State v. Fustier, 2006-1438, p. 13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/4/07), 954 So.2d 866, 874.

laHere, there was no colloquy and no minute entry reflecting a jury waiver determination, which necessitated the appellate court remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Again, this method is not mandated under Louisiana law, but it clari-fiés for the record — and forevermore— that defendant and his counsel have made a considered and strategic decision in waiving this fundamental constitutional right.

Nevertheless, the lower courts misinterpreted the law as requiring an oral waiver from the defendant. The evidence presented at the hearing — namely, the uncon-troverted testimony of defendant’s seasoned counsel and the defendant’s rather extensive experience in the criminal justice system — leads to but one rational conclusion: the defendant, with the benefit of effective counsel, voluntarily and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Therefore, the conviction is properly reinstated.  