
    No. 8599.
    The State of Louisiana ex rel. Morris Ranger vs. The City of New Orleans.
    A mandamus lies to compel the city authorities to levy a special tax to satisfy a judgment rendered on the City’s matured bonds and coupons, where a fi. fa. issued is returned nulla bona.
    
    Laws in force at the date of the contract, providing for themeans of executing the obligations of the same, forming part of the contract, cannot he repealed; neither can the remedy be suppressed, to the injury of the obligee, but they may be replaced by legal provisions for another adequate or equivalent mode of enforcement; otherwise they impair the obligation of a contract.
    The registry law of 1870, (Act 5) cannot affect a contract entered into in 1854, so as to retard or stay the execution of the obligations thereof. If enforced in this case, it would have that effect. Judgment affirmed.
    APPEAL from the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Tissoij J.
    
      J). G. (& L. L. Ldbcitt, for the Relator and Appellee :
    1. Where a judgment creditor of the City has pursued and exhausted all legal remedy for the satisfaction of his judgments fruitlessly, he will be entitled to a mandamus to compel the corporation to levy a sufficient tax to pay the same, where the judgments are absolute and unaffected by any limitation whatever. See 8th Otto, p. 381, Hanger case.
    2. Tile obligation of contracts beiug impaired by any legislation which lessens the efficacy of the remedy in force at the time of the debt was created, it inevitably folLows that any construction of Act Ho. 5 of 1870, requiring registration of city judgments, undep facts shown by this record, must impede, obstruct or postpone indefinitely plaintiff's right to punctual satisfaction, would be obnoxious to State and Federal prohibition. See 12fch Otto, 203; Louisiana vs. H. 0. and Wolff, 13 Otto.
    3. In order to obtain the writ of mandamus, three things only are required to be shown by relator, which he has done in this case: first — that he has a clear right; second — that a corresponding duty rests on defendants; third — want of any other specific or adequate remedy. See Justice Strong, Commonwealth vs. Pittsburg, 35 Penn. Stat., 509 ; 8 "Wh. 1; 2 How. 605; 4 Wall. 553.
    4. It being satisfactorily shown that the contract between a bondholder and the corporation defendant antedated a subsequent constitutional provision limitiug taxation, so as to prevent or iudefinitoly postpone payment of matured municipal obligations, thelimitation should he declared unconstitutional, as impairingthe obligation of contracts.
    0. Jb\ JBuelc, City Attorney, for Defendant and Appellant:
    1. la a proceeding by mandamus to compel the levy of a special tax to pay a judgment, the latter will be accepted as evidence of a valid claim; hut to determine whether the relator is entitled to the tax prayed for, the court must look to the original contract between the bondholder and the City.
    2. If the law authorizing the issuance of the bonds not only provides no tax for the payment of the principal, but excludes the idea of payment by .special taxation by other provisions for their retirement, a special tax to pay judgmeut founded on such bonds, will not be awarded; the judgment creditor must bo left to Ms ordinary remedy under the terms of Act No. 5, Aots of 1870, and no tax can be ordered for Ms benefit beyond the limit now imposed by law.
    3. The provisions in the Act No. 109, Acts 1854, that the bonds therein authorized to he issued shall be redeemable by conversion into railroad stock, while it may leave the bonds not so redeemed as a valid debt of the corporation, is an exclusion of payment by special taxation.
    4. The city authorities will not be compelled by the writ of mandamus to the performance of a specific duty, unless it is alleged and proved that a formal and proper demand was made on them before the institution of the suit.
   The opinion of tlie Court was delivered by

Bermudez, C. J.

This is an application for a mandamus to compel the city authorities to levy a special tax to satisfy two final judgments obtained by the Relator against the City, and upon which fi. fa's issued, were returned nulla bona.

The defenses set up are numerous.. We deem it unnecessary to enumerate and to consider them expressly.

They wrere each and all presented, urged and decided in three cases, 'which received tlie entire attention of the highest Court in tlie country, in two of which tlie Relators were parties complainant. See 3 Otto, 381 ; 12 Otto, 203; 13 Otto, 358.

The record shows that the registry of tlie judgment, which was not freely made, but under judicial compulsion, will have tlie undoubted effect of retarding, if not altogether staying the execution of the obligations of the contract between the Relators and the City of New Orleans, evidenced by the bonds and coupons held by the Relators, and upon which they recovered.

The amount of other judgments registered approaches a million of dollars. The provision made by tlie municipal authorities to satisfy them is practically insignificant, as it proves insufficient to discharge even one-half of the interest generally due on the same.

When the bonds were issued in 1854, the contract was entered into, and the laws in force at that time, for the enforcement of the obligations of the contract, formed part of it. ■

■ The writ oí fieri facias was then the practical means for the execution of the contract.

The suppression of that proceeding, as against the City, by the subsequent legislation of 1870, (Act 5) and the failure to replace it by an equivalent and adequate remedy, cannot affect the right of the bondholders in this case, without impairing the obligation of their contract.

Under the authority of the cases cited, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, which is obligatory upon- this Court, and under the facts disclosed in this controversy, the Relators are entitled to the relief sought.

Judgment affirmed.

Rochó, J., concurs, for reasons in his separate opinion.

Concurring Opinion.

Pociiri, J.

I rest my concurrence in the decree rendered in this case exclusively on the ground that all the defenses set up by the Respondent have already been passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States, and that Relator’s position had thus become unassailable, so that the relief obtained by him has been forced through this Court, by the adjudications of the Supreme Court of the United States.  