
    GEORGE F. SCHAFFER vs. BARBARA LEHMAN.
    At Law. —
    No. 12800.
    3. A married woman is bound by a contract which her husband has entered into on her behalf for improvements upon her separate estate, he having acted as her agent, and with her knowledge and consent, and she having accepted the benefits resulting from the performance of such contract.
    II. A motion for judgment ought to be sustained upon an award which has been filed more than seven days in the cause, and no exceptions filed.
    III. Evidence offered by the dofendant for the purpose of showing that plaintiff had done inferior and defective work of a similar kind on the house of another person was properly rejected by the referee.
    The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
    
      R. Ross Perry for plaintiff:
    I. An award can be impeached in two ways only, viz: By exceptions filed thereto, and by a motion to set the award aside. Evans’s Practice, p. MS. Neither of these methods was resorted to in this case. Conceding that the referee erred in excluding the testimony offered by the defendant, 'non constat that the defendant has not abandoned his objection taken before the referee, since he has not seen fit to raise it before this court by excepting to the award on that ground.
    II. Conceding that this objection now lies in the mouth of the defendant, it can scarcely be necessary to argue to. the court that evidence tending to prove unliquidated damages cannot be adduced under a plea of set-off resulting from express contract. That the fact that S„ did some work for E. in an imperfect manner, which E. was compelled to repair at a certain expense, cannot possibly tend to prove that L., who had some months previous had his work done by S., ought to recover damages therefor in addition to his expenses for repairs. The objection which has just been considered seems the only one proper for consideration, as it is the sole point presented by the record in the shape of an exception taken by the parties. As, however, the court refused to enter judgment upon the award on general grounds, it may be proper to add:
    III. That under all the authorities this award is absolutely final and conclusive as to all findings of fact. Goldsmith vs. Lilly, 1 Har. & Johns., 364; Cromwell vs. Owings, 6 Har. & Johns., 12.
    IV. That since the 10th day of April, 1869, a feme covert in the District of Columbia is liable on contracts concerning her separate estate as absolutely as if she were unmarried, and that ■ her husband is not a proper party to any action brought by or against her, arising from Her contracts in relation thereto., sections 727, 729, 730, Rev. Stats. District of Columbia.
    V. That a feme covert can contract through an agent as potentially as a feme sole can, and that the authorized acts of her agent bind her as principal according to the general principles of the law of agency.
    
      F. W. Jones for defendant.
   Mr. Justice Wylie

delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant was a married woman, and the present action was brought to recover $211.55 for work and labor and materials furnished in making improvements upon a piece of real estate in this District owned by her in her separate right; By agreement of parties, the cause was referred, under rule of court, to James G-. Payne, esq., “for his arbitration and. decision on such evidence as may be adduced before him bjr either party.”

It was proved before the referee that the work was done and materials furnished under an agreement between the-plaintiff on the one part, and the defendant’s husband on the other, and that the husband acted as the agent of his wife,, and under her authority, and for her advantage, in the matter. The referee corrected some errors and made certain allowances by way of set-off in favor of the defendant, in consequence whereof plaintiff’s bill was reduced to $59.05, with interest. Among these credits was a set-off of $87.25, on account of a claim set up for a debt due from the plaintiff to the defendant’s husband. To say the least of it, this was liberal toward the defendant. On the trial before the referee the defendant, in order to prove that the work done upon her house by the plaintiff was of inferior character, offered to show by evidence that several months after the work on her house was finished, the plaintiff had done work of a similar kind on the house of one Mrs. Easby, which was so defective in quality that Mrs. Easby was obliged to have it done over again by another person. The offer of this evidence was rejected by the referee, and properly so, in our opinion, for reasons too obvious to require mention here.

The award was filed on the 11th May, 1875, and contains, on its face, a statement of the facts substantially as now related. No exceptions to the award were ever filed by the defendant, and on the 8th of June, 1875, plaintiff moved the court for judgment. This motion was resisted by defendant’s counsel, and was overruled by the court, and from that decision plaintiff has appealed. We are of opinion that judgment ought to have been entered upon the award. We think the defendant was bound by the contract which the husband has entered into on her behalf, with her knowledge and consent, and of which she has accepted the benefits, and that all of the other rulings made by the referee were correct; at least such as afford no ground for exception on the part of the defendant.

Independently, however, of the unobjectionable character of the award itself, the motion for judgment ought to have been sustained, for the reason that the award had been filed in the cause more than seven days before the motion was made for judgment, and no exceptions had been filed, or were taken at the argument, of the character prescribed by the act of assembly of 1778, ch. 21. That act prescribes the causes for which an award of the kind made in the present case may be set aside by the court; and these are, “ that the same was obtained by fraud or malpractice in, or by surprise, imposition, or deception of, the arbitrators, or without due notice to the parties, or their attorney or attorneys.” The award in this case being unobjectionable for either of these causes, it was error to refuse the judgment; and it is ordered that the same be now entered for $59.05, with interest from January, 1874, and costs.  