
    Chander PRAKASH, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 05-71470.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Jan. 8, 2007.
    
    Filed Jan. 12, 2007.
    Jason Marachi, Law Office of Jason Marachi, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.
    Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Julia K. Evans, U.S. Department of Justice, Environmental & Natural Resources, Barry J. Pettinato, Esq., Jamie M. Dowd, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Before: ALARCÓN, HALL and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Chander Prakash, a native and citizen of Fiji, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision summarily affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“LJ”) denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence and will uphold the IJ’s decision unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). We deny the petition in part, grant in part, and remand.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s decision that Prakash failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on ethnic Fijians threatening him to leave his house, difficulties finding work in Fiji, and an incident in which an ethnic Fijian punched him. See Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th Cir.1995) (finding no past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution where the petitioner was arrested, detained for four to six hours, beaten, and private citizens threw stones at his house and attempted to steal property).

Because Prakash failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he necessarily failed to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. See Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 673 (9th Cir.2004).

The IJ granted voluntary departure for a 60-day period and the BIA streamlined and changed the voluntary departure period to 30 days. In Padilla-Padilla v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir.2006), we held “that because the BIA issued a streamlined order, it was required to affirm the entirety of the IJ’s decision, including the length of the voluntary departure period.” We therefore remand to the agency for further proceedings regarding voluntary departure.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part; and REMANDED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     