
    The Central Bridge Corporation vs. John Sleeper.
    The Central Bridge Corporation, in April, 1832, in consideration of certain sums of money to them paid by certain persons, owners of certain lands in Dracut, voted and agreed that those persons, wherever they might reside, with their families, and all persons who might thereafter have their homes upon any of said land, and all persons, carriages, vehicles, stages, animals, and conveyances, going to or from any of said lands, upon the proper business of any person owning or having his home upon any of said lands, should pass over the bridge of the corporation forever, without paying any tolls, and by such vote and agree ment all tolls for so passing were “ compounded, satisfied, and ended forever.” It was held, that this vote and agreement were within the authority conferred on the corporation by St. 1832, c. 117, “to reduce the tolls which are granted by their act of incorporation, and to compound the same in all cases in which the said corporation may deem it expedient for their own benefit and the public convenience.” It was held, also, that by this vote and agreement one owning a line of stages for the conveyance of passengers for hire between Lowell and Methuen, and residing on the lands, hud the right to pass with his stages over the bridge fiee of toll.
    This was an action of assumpsit to recover certain tolls of the defendant for passing over the plaintiffs’ bridge, and was submitted to the court upon the following facts: —
    On the 10th of March, 1832, the legislature passed an act (St. 1832, c. 117,) providing that “ the Central Bridge Corporation shall have power and authority to reduce the tolls, which are granted by the act of incorporation, and to compound the same in all cases in which the said corporation may deem it expedient for their own benefit and the public convenience.” This act was duly accepted by said corporation at a meeting legally called for that purpose on the 3d of April, 1832, and at the same meeting it was duly voted: “ That whereas Jonathan M. Dexter, of Boston, Elisha Fuller, of Lowell, and Henry H. Fuller, of Boston,” and certain other persons in the vote named, “ are the owners of certain lands in Dracut,” particularly described in the vote; and “whereas the said Jonathan, Elisha,” &c., “had petitioned to compound then tolls, and the tolls of those who might hereafter own said lands, or live upon the same, and have paid to said corporation the following sums of money each,” which sums were duly specified in the vote, amounting in the whole to eighty-six dollars; and further, it was by the vote, “ in consideration of said sums of money, conceded, granted and contracted with said Jonathan M. Dexter and others, their heirs, successors and assigns, that from and after said date the said Jonathan and others, wherever they might reside, with their families, and all persons who might thereafter have their homes upon any of the lands above described, and all persons going to and from any of the said lands, upon the proper business of any person owning, or having his home upon any of said lands, and all carriages, vehicles, stages, animals and conveyances, going to or from any of said lands, upon the proper business of any person, owning or having his home upon any of said lands, or for the purpose of conveying any of the persons above described, to or from the lands above described, or for the purpose of conveying said Jonathan and others, or their families, or any person residing or abiding with them, or in their families, to or from any place whatever, shall and may pass over and upon the bridge extending across Merrimack river, owned by said corporation, and any other bridge or bridges, extending across said river, which might thereafter be owned by said corporation, wholly free, discharged and released of and from all tolls, excise, exactions and payments, which may or might be due to said corporation by force and virtue of their charter, forever, and all such tolls, excise, exactions and payments, for so passing over and upon said bridge or bridges, were thereby wholly compounded, satisfied and ended forever.” And by this vote, the president of the corporation was duly authorized and directed to make or cause to be made a deed in due form, of the rights and privileges above described and set forth. And the president of the corporation afterwards, on the 5th of April, 1832, in compliance with this vote and authority granted and conveyed to said Jonathan M. Dexter and others the rights and privileges above set forth.
    The lands mentioned in the vote amounted to more than two hundred acres, situated in the immediate neighborhood of the plaintiffs’ bridge, and were then and have since been holden at high prices for building lots, and a large portion of them have since been sold and used for that purpose.
    The passing over the plaintiffs’ bridge by the defendant, for which toll is sought to be recovered in this action, was with a stage coach for the conveyance of passengers for hire. The defendant, at the time of so passing over the plaintiffs’ bridge, had his home upon and occupied under a written lease a part of the land described in the vote; and was the owner of a line of stages for the conveyance of passengers from Lowell to Methuen for hire; and then kept his horses and coaches at a stable hired by him on the land occupied by him. He was accustomed to take his horses and coaches from the stable, go across the bridge to Lowell for his passengers, bring his passengers in his coach across the bridge back by the land he lived upon to Methuen, pass by said land to Lowell across the bridge, and deliver his passengers, and then return from Lowell across the bridge to the stable. It is admitted that if the defendant had not the right to pass the plaintiffs’ bridge free of toll, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.
    
      I. W. Beard, for the defendant.
    
      J. G. Abbott, for the plaintiffs.
    
      
       This act was repealed on the 28th of March, 1833, by St. 1833, c. 117.
    
   Fletcher, J.

There really is no question in this case which will bear an argument. The contract was made while the statute of 1832 was in force, which gave to the corporation, in express terms, the power to compound, or make agreements in regard to, these tolls, in all cases in which the corporation might deem it expedient for their own benefit and the public convenience. There can, therefore, be no valid objection to the power of the corporation to make the contract, and, in fact, it is understood that all objection to the power to make the contract was ultimately waived on the part of the corporation.

The only remaining question is, whether the contract embraces the case of a stage running between Methuen and Lowell in the manner set out in the agreed statement. Upon this question there can be no doubt, as stages used in the manner in which these were used are clearly exempted by the terms of the contract from all obligation to pay tolls.

Judgment for the defendant.  