
    *George Job v. James Collier.
    Money paid on a judgment can not be recovered back -while the judgment remains in force.
    A judgment entered without objection, in the name of the plaintiff, as commissioner of insolvents, is, between the parties, evidence that the plaintiff was such officer.
    This was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of G-reene county.
    The original action was assumpsit. The declaration was on the common counts, the plea non assumpsit. At the May term of the Supreme Court, 1841, the cause came on for trial, and, by consent of parties, was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury. The court found for defendant, and rendered judgment in his favor for costs. A bill of exceptions was taken, which showed the following facts:
    In 1824, James Collier, the defendant in error, was appointed commissioner of insolvents, under the law then existing, and was not thereafter reappointed. He was at no time appointed under the act of 1831. In December, 1832, Collier, holding himself out as commissioner of insolvents for Greene county, one Robert C. Poland, believing him to be such commissioner, made application to him for the benefit of the act for the relief of insolvent debtors, gave in his schedule,' made an assignment, took the oath, and gave the bond required, with George Job, the plaintiff in error, as one of the sureties. The proceedings were returned to the court of common pleas, there dismissed, and the bond forfeited.
    The bond was put in suit by Collier as commissioner, judgment rendered in his favor against Job for the penalty, and $800 has been paid by the plaintiff in error in part satisfaction. To recover back the sum so paid to Collier, this suit was brought.
    William Ellsberry, for plaintiff.
    A. Harlan, for defendant.
   *Wood, «T.

In rendering judgment for the defendant, upon the above facts, did the Supreme Court err?

To determine this, it seems to us unnecessary to refer to the act of 1831, repealing that of 1824, and re-enacting, among others, the same provisions. Whether Collier was, or was not, the commissioner of insolvents, when the bond was executed, dejure, or even defacto, is now of no import. The judgment, in his favor, quoad this plaintiff, establishes that fact sufficiently. If he were not such commissioner, the plaintiff in error should have litigated that question in the suit on the bond. Instead of doing so, he suffered judgment to pass, and paid the money on the judgment. It went to pay the debts of his principal, and now he seeks to recover it again out of the pocket of the commissioner, who was, doubtless, innocently acting under the belief that he was, de jure, the commissioner, whether he was so, or not, in fact.

But that judgment on the bond still remains unreversed, and the payment of money on it, is a payment by him, and a receipt by the commissioner, of the money, under authority of that judgment. It is equivalent to the payment of money into court, and can not be recovered back.

Judgment affirmed.  