
    [Philadelphia,
    January 26,1836.]
    RICHARDS and Others against MURPHY.
    IN ERROR.
    In trover against one who had purchased goods from a person alleging himself to be the owner, declarations by an agent of the plaintiff, made at the time of the purchase by the defendant, disclaiming title in the plaintiff, were held to be admissible in evidence on the part of the defendant.
    Error to the District Court for the City and County of Philadelphia.
    An action of trover was brought to September term, 1832, of the District Court, by Mark Richards, John Hemphill, George M’Clelland, and Tobias Súber, against James Murphy, to recover the value of certain pieces of lumber, alleged to be the property of the plaintiffs, and to have been converted t¡y the defendant.
    It appeared, upon the trial, that the plaintiffs were concerned together in the business of planing boards by steam power, and received lumber for that purpose: that a quantity of lumber was landed upon the w.harf of Davis & Bjddle, on the river Schuylkill, at the request of one Inslee, for the purpose of being carted thence to the lumber yard of the plaintiffs, upon a contract made by Inslee on their behalf, for the purchase of it from the consignees. It was not, however, taken away from the wharf; the plaintiffs refusing to ratify the contract; but, while there, part of it was sold to the defendant by one Trimmels, who alleged himself to be the agent of the consignors, and to whom the defendant paid the price agreed upon between them. It appeared, also, that the consignors of the lumber had recovered the value against the present plaintiffs, in an action on the contract. The plaintiff having proved the possession of the lumber by the defendant, and that the property was in the plaintiff, by reason of the recovery of the price or value of it from them by the owner; the defendant offered in evidence declarations of Inslee, made after the landing of the lumber on the wharf, and before the purchase by the defendant — that the lumber did not belong to the plaintiffs. It was shown, that Inslee was employed in the lumber yard of the plaintiffs, and had charge of their planing machine. The plaintiffs’ counsel objected to the admission of Inslee’s declarations; but the judge admitted them, and the evidence having been gone through, charged the jury in substance as follows:
    “ There being no dispute about the value of the lumber, the case depends on a few plain principles. The only person known in the business, on the part of the plaintiffs, was Mr. Inslee, who had applied to Davis ¡fc Biddle for permission to land the lumber, and throughout acted for the plaintiffs, who must take his acts throughout. Unless somebody else is answerable, one or other of these parties must lose their money. It appears that Inslee, after having been repeatedly sent to by Davis & Biddle, declared that the concern had nothing to do with this lumber, and would not receive it, and left Davis & Biddle to take their own course with regard to it;' and in consequence of that, as a point of law, any person purchasing for, .or with the knowledge and approbation of Davis &c Biddle, had a right to take the property; and if Davis & Biddle chose to sell or allow a sale, by a person they honestly believed had a right to sell, after Inslee had disclaimed- the ownership, the purchaser may hold the property, and the plaintiff may look to Davis & Biddle, or to the person actually selling, if they have any claim. But as a point of law, Murphy is protected, having purchased with the knowledge'and approbation of Davis & Biddle. Murphy used due precaution, received the lumber from a responsible house, and he is protected. - If he is responsible, then every one, who has- a piece of this wood in a bureau, may also be made responsible, and may be sued on the same principle. There must be some limit to a man’§ following his property.”
    . The plaintiffs’ counsel excepted to the admission of Inslee’s de-r clarations, and to the charge of the court; and, having removed the record to this court, assigned the following errors i
    “1. The judge who tried the cause, permitted the declarations of John Inslee to be given in evidence to the jury, to affect the rights of the plaintiffs, the said Inslee being ho party to the record, and no authority shown to bind the plaintiffs by his declarations — the said evidence being objected to by the counsel for the plaintiffs.
    
      2. The judge charged the jury, that there being no dispute as to the value of certain lumber which was the subject in controversy, and the said Inslee having applied to land the said lumber, and be-' ing the only person known in the business, on the part of the plaintiffs, his declarations and acts bound them throughout.
    3. The judge charged the jury, that the plaintiffs were prevented from recovering by the declarations of Inslee, that the lumber in question did not belong to the concern, and that they wmuld have pothing to do with it. That the owners of the wharf might sell it, or do as they pleased with it.
    4. The judge further charged the jury, that any person buying the said lumber, with the knowledge and consent of the owners of the wharf, after the said declarations, would have a right to hold it.”
    Mr. 'Chew, for the plaintiff in error,
    cited Hosack v. Weaver, (1 Yeates, 478..) Easton v. Worthington, (5 Serg. ^ R, 130.)
    
      Mr. Hirst, contra,
    cited Shelhamer v. Thomas, (7 Serg. .R. 106.)
    
   Per Curiam.

A disclaimer of title by the plaintiff in person, when the defendant bought, would have concluded him ; whether it wére made in fraud or in ignorance; for every man is bound to bear the consequences of his own mistakes. The matter, then was, whether Inslee, who appears to have had some sort of agency under the plaintiff, had power to represent him on the occasion; and that presented a question foi the jury. There was at least some evidence to raise it; and as error is not to be presumed, we are bound to say the assignment of it has not been sustained.

Judgment affirmed.  