
    The Case of F. Gray.
    The act of 1842, ch. 191, sec. 1, provides that when any slave shall be emancipated in the State of Tennessee, or any free person of color shall have removed to the State prior to the first day of January, 1836, if any county court upon petition of such person and proof of good character shall he satisfied that such person ought to be permitted to reside in the county, such court may authorise such person to reside in such county, upon condition that bond for good behaviour is given. This act delegates a political'not a judicial power to the county court, and the judgment of the court is not subject to revisal in the superior 'tribunals. The petitioner may renew the petition in the county in which it was rejected, or present it in any other county.
    Frances Gray presented a petition to the Circuit Court of Lincoln county.
    Tbe petitioner stated that tbe County Court of said county bad emancipated her on tbe petition of her master, and that she bad given security to remove beyond tbe limits of the State; that at tbe same time petitioner presented her petition to the county court “ setting forth her recent emancipation and showing that long before the first day of January, 1836, she was in this State, and that she had several children belonging to citizens of the county, and that being without husband or friends beyond the limits of the State, she desired to remain in the county, and proposed to enter into bond conditioned that she should not become chargable to the county, and that she had introduced indubitable testimony as to her good character and bearing in society. That the county court, notwithstanding the proof of these facts, refused to permit petitioner to remain in the State, and that from that judgment petitioner prayed an appeal; which was .refused.”
    This petition prayed a writ of certiorari to remove the proceedings of the county court to the circuit court. It was verified by the affidavit of the petitioner. The circuit court refused to order the writ, and the petitioner appealed.
    
      J. M. Bright and McEwen, for the petitioner.
    The act of 1881, ch. 102, required the removal, of all emancipated slaves from the State. Bond was to be given to that effect, and the removal was to be a part of the judgment of emancipation. The act of 1842, ch. 191, was intended to soften the rigor of that act: it provides that any person emancipated by the county court, may petition the county court to be permitted to remain, and introduce evidence of good character, and if the county court should be of opinion the applicant ought to be permitted to remain, judgment to that effect should be given. The county court is the authorised organ of the State to relieve against the rigorous operation of the act of 1831, and confer the right to be an inhabitant. By the passage of this act the legislature did not intend to vest the county court with an arbitrary discretion to render or refuse assent to remain. It was selected as a judicial tribunal to hear proof and give its assent or refusal on the facts proved and the law. What would make out a proper case for permission to remain ? First, proof of good character; second, that it would violate the feelings of humanity to remove the applicant; third, a bond with satisfactory Security for good behaviour. They contended that where these circumstances concurred the applicant was entitled, as matter of law, to remain, and that the power vested in the court was a legal and not an arbitrary discretion, and that in this instance, the court not having discharged its duty and obeyed the law, should be corrected. 2 Yer.. 173; 2-Yer. 306.
   McKinney, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

We are of opinion that the unlimited discretion with which the county court is invested by the act of 1842, eh. 191, sec. 1, to adjudge whether or not it Would be consistent with the interest and policy of the State to permit any manumitted slave or free person, of color, to reside in this State, is not subject to the supervision or control of the superior judicial tribunals.

The assent of the Government to the emancipation of a slave, as also to his admission as a member of the community, is held to be the exercise of an act of sovereign power, and in giving such assent, in either instance the county court acts alone in virtue of the sovereign authority conferred by statute.

. The power delegated in such cases, is a political rather than a judicial power — and in its exercise the courts act, not in a judicial capacity, but as the deputed agent or representative of the State. As such, the county court possesses the exclusive and unrestricted discretion to determine whether or not the person making the application, “ ought to be permitted to reside in the county ” in which such application is made, and “ may grant such privilege,” upon the condition prescribed in the statute, or refuse it, as in the judgment of the court, in the particular case, may be deemed proper — and from such determination, no appeal will lie, however unreasonable may have been the exercise of the discretion. As we have no power to interpose in this case, it would avail nothing to show, as we think might easily be done, that in acceding to the prayer of the petitioner, the liberal and humane views of the legislature would have been better effectuated by the county court.

The refusal of the county court in this instance, however, will not preclude the petitioner from renewing her application to the same court, or to the court of any other county in the State.

There is no error in the judgment of the circuit court.  