
    The Board of Education of Fairfield Township, Highland County, et al. v. John R. Ladd, Administrator de bonis non with the will annexed of William M. Johnson, deceased, and the Board of Education of Penn Township, Highland County, Ohio.
    A testator directed that, after the termination of a life estate created by bis will, his property should be sold, and the proceeds placed in the public school fund of a township named, and applied to the education of the youth of that township. After the making of the will, but before the death of the testator, the part of the township in which he resided was set off and made to form part of a new township. Held:
    
    
      1. That the primary object of the testator was to apply his property to the education of the youth of the township named, and that the reference to the public school fund of the township was merely to indicate a means or instrumentality for administering the charity.
    2. That the township is referred to as it existed territorially at the time of the execution of the will, and that the youth in the part wnich was set off, are entitled, equally with the youth in the remaining part, to the benefit of the bequest.
    Motion for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the District Court of Highland county.
    
      On the 25th day of January, 1851, "William M. Johnson executed his last will and testament, in which, after making provision for his wife and a sister-in-law for their natural lives, he directs that the remainder of his property, after the death of his sister-in-law and wife, be sold and the proceeds applied as directed in the following clause of his will:
    “ Item 3. And ever being concerned for the prosperity and happiness of my country, and fully believing that the diffusion of light and science constitute one of the most paramount of Christian duties, I hereby authorize my executor, or his successor, after the death of the aforenamed legatees, to cause the whole of my property to be sold to the best advantage, and the proceeds thereof I wish to be placed in the public school fund of Eairfield township, and the same to be applied to the education of the youth of said township.”
    The farm on which Johnson lived, and which forms the chief part of the property devised, was then included within the limits of Eairfield township.
    Afterward, on the 2d of March, 1852, -that portion of Eairfield township in which Johnson’s farm lay was cut off and made a part of a new township, which was formed from parts of two other townships, and called Penn.
    Johnson died August 28, 1854, nearly two and one-half years after the creation of Penn township.
    After the death of the widow and sister-in-law of the testator, the farm was sold by the executor, and a controversy arising as to the distribution of the proceeds, the original petition was filed against the several claimants, to require them to set up their respective claims, and to obtain a construction of the clause of the will above quoted, and an order for the proper distribution of the funds in the hands of the executor.
    So far as- concerns the present controversy, the claimants were the board of education of Eairfield township and the board of education of Penn township.
    The District Court found that the board of education of Penn township was entitled to share in the fund in the proportion that the youth of school age in that part of the territory of Penn township taken from Fairfield, bore to the-youth of school age in Fairfield township at the date of the death of the widow of the testator, she having survived' the sister-in-law; and the executor was ordered to pay over to the board of education of Penn township such share of the funds, for the benefit of the common schools in that part of the township of Penn taken from the township of Fairfield. On this basis, the board of education of Penn township was found entitled to 33J per cent, of the funds. The remainder was ordered to be paid over to the board of education of Fairfield township for the benefit of the-common school fund of that township.
    The plaintiffs in error claim that the court erred in awarding any part of the funds to the board of education, of Penn township, and on this ground seek a reversal of the judgment.
    
      Sloane $ Smith, for plaintiffs in error.
    
      James H. Thompson, for defendants in error.
   White, J.

The only question submitted for determination in this case, is whether the testator, in the third clause-of his will, refers to Fairfield township as it existed territorially at the time of the execution of the will, or whether the reference is to the township as it might thereafter be constituted.

The District Court held that the reterence was to the-township as it then existed; and in this we see no error.

If such is not the intent and meaning of the will, its operation might have been enlarged or diminished by the act of the county commissioners in changing the territorial limits of the township; or they might, by allotting the whole territory to other townships, have extinguished the township, and thus have defeated the bequest.

Fairfield township, and the public school fund of that township, are only referred to as furnishing the means or instrumentality for reaching the intended objects of the testator’s bounty.

The primary object of the testator is to- apply his property to the education of the youth of Fairfield township; and to accomplish this purpose he expresses the wish that the proceeds be placed in the public school fund of that township.

Civil townships have always existed in this state for the purposes of local administration. They are recognized in the constitution of 1802; and the public school system was introduced and has been fostered through the township organizations. In the act of 1838, for the support and regulation of common schools, the township treasurer of each township was made the treasurer of the school funds of the township; and similar provisions are found in the subsequent laws.

It is true, as a general rule, that “ a will speaks from the death of the testator, and not from its date, unless its language, by fair' construction, indicates the contrary intention.”

But among the exceptions to this rule, it is laid down, that “ whenever a testator refers to an actually existing state of things, his language should be held as referring to the date of the will, and not to his death, as this is then a prospective event.” 1 Redfield on Wills, 379, sec. 30.

The present case comes within this exception. Fair-field township is referred to in the will as an existing territorial organization; not as the beneficiary of the charity, but as a means of ascertaining such beneficiaries when the time should arrive for its administration.

The objects of the charity can be as well ascertained since as before the division of the township. The only effect of the division seems to be that two agencies of a like nature are required to execute the trust instead of one.

Leave refused.

Welch, C. J., Rex, Gilmore, and McIlvaine, JJ., concurred.  