
    Richard P. DAGRES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTRYWIDE BANK, N.A., succeeded by merger with BAC Home Loan Servicing LP; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-56799
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted January 18, 2017 
    
    Filed January 26, 2017
    Richard P. Dagres, Pro Se
    Kasey Curtis, Reed Smith LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Elena O. Gekker, Reed Smith LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees
    Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Richard P. Dagres appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his federal and state law claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Dagres’ securitization related state law claims because California law does not permit Dagres to bring a preemptive suit to challenge defendants’ authority to foreclosure. See Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819, 823-24 (2011). Each of Dagres’ arguments for why defendants lack authority to foreclose have been rejected by the California courts. See, e.g., Saterbak v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 245 Cal.App.4th 808, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790, 795-96 (2016) (borrowers lack standing to challenge assignments of loans into a securitized trust); Siliga v. Mortg. Elect. Registration Syst., Inc., 219 Cal.App.4th 75, 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 500, 506 (2013) (“California courts have held that a trustor who agreed under the terms of the deed of trust that [electronic database provider Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.], as the lender’s nominee, has the authority to exercise all of the rights and interests of the lender ... is precluded from maintaining a cause of action based on the allegation that MERS has no authority to exercise those rights.”), abrogated in part by Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Carp., 62 Cal.4th 919, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 66, 365 P.3d 845 (2016).

We do not consider arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     