
    * Dempsey v. Lawrence.
    June, 1821.
    Chancery Jurisdiction — Suits for Freedom. — The chancery as well as the common law courts have jurisdiction in suits of paupers for freedom; and will on a case proper for a court of equity, appoint counsel to prosecute for the pauper &c.
    Dempsey was born the slave of one David Wallace, and descended to his son William. He hired himself of his master William Wallace, and having accumulated the sum of $¡100, agreed to pay it, and $¡200 more at a future day to his master, provided he would emancipate him. The proposal was accepted. After it was accepted, Walace insisted that Dempsey should find some one to be surety, for the payment of the $200; one Bacon agreed to become bound for the payment, and executed his bond to Wallace. In this state of things, one Lawrence took the place of Bacon, agreed to pay the $200, and Dempsey was to be bound to him for it. This arrangement was made in concert between Bacon, Wallace, and Lawrence. Dempsey paid the money to Lawrence 'by instalments. Lawrence then went to North Carolina, and promised Dempsey if he would go with him he would emancipate him. Dempsey went and remained two years: returned and lived on a piece of land abjoining Lawrence, always acting as a free man. Lawrence died, and his widow claimed Dempsey as a slave. The bill prayed, that all persons be injoined from molesting or selling the plaintiff as a slave; and that the widow of Lawrence, be decreed to execute a deed of emancipation.
    The defendant (the widow of Lawrence) never answered the bill, and Dempsey’s counsel asked a final decree. Chancellor Nelson was willing to continue the injunction, *until Dempsey could assert, his freedom in a regular manner, in a court of law; but it being insisted that he should make a final decree, he dissolved, the injunction and dismissed the bill: and an appeal was taken.
    M. Robinson for the appellant; no counsel for the appellee.
    It is unnecessary to enquire whether a court of equity would or would not enforce-the agreement between Dempsey and his master, though great and unusual merit, and money besides were the consideration. In England, such a contract by the rules, of the common law would have insured to-a villain his freedom. 1 Inst. Lib. 2 sect. 204.
    It is sufficient to observe, that this agreement was soon changed into another, more-effectual in law for Dempsey, by which Wallace transferred Dempsey to Bacon, in trust, to be emancipated in a certain event. After this, Bacon having the legal right to-Dempsey transferred him to Lawrence in trust, also, for the same purpose.
    There appears to have been no writing to-this effect: but the fact appears, by oral evidence, and slaves may, like other chattels, be transferred by delivery.
    But admitting that there had been no-trust, and that D. had been absolutely the slave of Lawrence, Dempsey is nevertheless entitled to freedom, in consequence of being brought by Lawrence from North-Carolina to Virginia, contrary to the act of 1792. Vid. Vir. L. Edition, 1803, Vol. I. p. 191, sec. 36. 
    
    The right of freedom, prima facie acquired by a slave, brought into this state, contrary to the act, can only be obviated, by evidence shewing, that the oath, prescribed by it, had been taken, or by circumstances authorizing a ’-presumption, that it had. Vid. 5 Munf-S42. Garnett v. Sam and Phillis.
    The cause was certainly in a situation enabling and requiring the court below to decide the only important point in it, to wit, Dempsey’s right to freedom.
    1st. Because the only adversary right was that set up by the appellee.
    2dly. Because, if any other right existed, in any other person that person not being a party to this suit would not be bound by a -decision in it.
    3dly. Because, in suits for freedom, where essential justice can be done, the court ought not to adhere to strict form. 2 Cal. 3S0; Pleasants v. Pleasants, 1 Hen. & Munf. 134; Hudgins v. Wrights.
    An account, as prayed for, ought to have been directed. A person, illegally holden as a slave, ought, upon recovering his freedom, to recover the profits of his labor. This seems to be a legal consequence.
    The case of Pleasants v. Pleasants does not decide, that a person, held as a slave shall not upon recovering his freedom recover the profits of his labor while so detained. It only decides, that, under the circumstances of that case, such profits were not recoverable.
    
    
      
      Chancery Jurisdiction — Suits for Freedom. — To the point that chancery as well as common law courts have jurisdiction in suits of paupers for freedom, the principal case is cited in Talbert v. Jenny, 6 Rand. 160; Dunn v. Amey, 1 Leigh 471; Nicholas v. Burruss, 4 Leigh 298; Reid v. Blackstone, 14 Graft. 366; foot-note to Peter v. Hargrave, 5 Gratt. 12; foot-note to Ellis v. Jenny, 2 Rob. 597. The principal case is also cited in Sawney v. Carter, 6 Rand. 173; Manns v. Givens, 7 Leigh 715.
    
    
      
      The Reporter is indebted for this argument, to the counsel who delivered it; who obligingly drew it up as it is now printed. — Edition 1821.
    
   By the COURT.

The court of Chancery had jurisdiction of the case, and might have proceeded to a final decree, after the proper preliminary steps; it might have assigned counsel, to the appellant, and have conformed to the other provisions of the act, prescribing the mode of conducting suits for freedom, () The decree is therefore reversed, and the cause is to be sent back to the ^Chancery court of Wil-liamsburg, with directions to the court, to appoint counsel for the appellant, and to proceed to a final decree on the merits. 
      
      (b) Oh. l&t, 1 Rev. Code.
     