
    Michael HENSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. La Tia W. MARTIN, in her official capacity and as an individual, Janette A. Baxter, as an individual, Nancy Dwinell, as an individual, Yoko Hense, as an individual, Defendants-Appellees.
    
    No. 10-2467-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 1, 2011.
    Michael Hense, pro se, Brooklyn, NY, for appellant.
    Ann P. Zybert, Assistant Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY, Mark Housman, Housman & Associates P.C., Tarrytown, NY, Scott Kossove, L’Abbate, Balkan, Colavita & Contini, L.L.P., Garden City, NY, for appellees.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, ROSEMARY S. POOLER and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . The Clerk of the Court is instructed to conform the caption in accordance herewith.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant, pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.2005). Under that doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims that effectively challenge state-court judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005), we have set forth four requirements for the application of Rooker-Feldman: (1) the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff must “complaint ] of injuries caused by [a] state-court judgment;” (3) the plaintiff must “invit[e] district court review and rejection of [that] judgment;” and (4) the state-court judgment must have been “rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85).

Here, the district court properly dismissed Appellant’s complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The record demonstrates that: (1) Appellant conceded that he had challenged the sale of the marital residence and that the Appellate Division, Second Department dismissed his claim; (2) the underlying injury complained of was the deprivation of Appellant’s property, which resulted from the state court’s order directing the sale of the marital residence; (3) Appellant’s requested relief was, in essence, for the district court to review the state court’s decisions, find them to be improper, and redress his harms accordingly; and (4) Appellant filed his complaint after the state court’s order and issuance of divorce were entered. Accordingly, because all four factors were satisfied, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellant’s complaint.

We have considered Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  