
    William H. Boothroyd v. Joseph Engles.
    
      Presumption of law as to name signed to instrument: Peed must be signed as well as acknowledged by the grantor. Tbe law presumes that parties, in executing instruments, use their real names, and does not presume they have different names.
    The record of a deed purporting to be signed by Harmon Sherman, and to be acknowledged by Hiram Sherman, is not admissible to prove a conveyance by" 
      Biram Sherman. The signing of a deed is as necessary as any other part of it, and no one but the signer can acknowledge it as grantor. And there can be no presumption, in the absence of proof, that the two names belong to the same person.
    
      Heard April 21.
    
    
      Decided April 25.
    
    Error to St. Clair Circuit.
    This was an action of ejectment, brought by Boothrovd against Engles. On the trial the- plaintiff’s counsel, on his part, to maintain said issue,- read in evidence a patent for the lands in question, from the United States to Hiram Sherman, dated August 21, 1838; and then offered in evidence the record of a deed, of which the following is a copy:
    “Know all men by these presents, that I, Hiram Sherman, of Washington, county of Macomb, and state of Michigan, in consideration of twelve hundred dollars, paid by Aaron B. Eawles, of Bruce, county and state aforesaid, the receipt whereof I do hereby acknowledge, do hereby give, grant, sell and convey, unto the said Aaron B. Eawles, his heirs and assigns (here follow a description of the lands and the ordinary terms of conveyance and covenants).
    “In testimony thereof, I, the said grantor, have hereunto set my hand and seal, the 20th day of February, 1838. Harmon Sherman, [l. s.]
    “Signed, sealed and delivered, in presence of D. C. Walker, Azariah Prentiss.
    “ State or Michigan, )
    “County of Macomb, f
    “Be it remembered, that on the 20th day of February, 1838, there personally appeared the above named Hiram Sherman, to me known, and acknowledged the above instrument by him subscribed to be his free act and deed. Azariah Prentis, Notary Public, Macomb Co., Mich.”
    To the reading of which the defendant’s counsel objected, for the reason that no deed had been shown from Hiram Sherman to Harmon Sherman, and that it appeared to be signed by a person other than the grantor named in the body of it. The court sustained the objection, and the plaintiff’s counsel excepted.
    The plaintiff’s counsel, further to maintain said issue, offered and read in evidence deeds tending to show title in himself, by mesne conveyance, from Aaron B. Rawles, the grantee named in said first mentioned deed. -
    The plaintiff brings this writ of error to test the correctness of such ruling.
    
      Atkinson Bros., for plaintiff in error, cited:
    
      Catlin v. Washburn, 3 Vt., 25; Pidge v. Tyler, 4 Mass., 541; Catlin v. Ware, 9 Mass., 218; Norris v. Wadsworth, 17 Wend., 108; Jackson v. Schoonmaker, 4 Johns., 161; 6 Johns., 154; Lyon v. Kain, 86 Ill., 868; Norris v. Sargent, 18 Iowa, 93; Van Orman v. McGregor, 23 Iowa, 302.
    
    
      Conger & Harris, for defendant in error.
   Campbell, Ch. J.

. ,The only question in this case is whether the record of a deed, purporting to be signed by Harmon Sherman, and certified to have been acknowledged by Hiram Sherman, (the latter name being inserted in the beginning of the deed as the grantor), can be received in evidence as the conveyance of Hiram Sherman, the original deed not being shown.

Our statutes now require every deed to be usigned and sealed by the person from whom the estate or interest is intended to pass,” as well as acknowledged by the person executing it. The signing cannot be dispensed with, and no one but the signer can be regarded as the grantor.

The presumption of law always must be that a person uses his real name, and there is no presumption that he is known by different names. And in the absence of proof, a deed signed by Harmon and acknowledged by Hiram is. signed and acknowledged by different persons. There is nothing in the certificate of acknowledgment which can supply the defect, if it could be supplied in that way, upon which there is no occasion to express an opinion. Hiram Sherman, in legal presumption, has executed no deed which he could acknowledge.

A person may be known by an alias, as well as by his real name, and perhaps may use a name for a single occasion which he would be estopped to deny. But this could only be shown by directly connecting him, by proof, with the execution and delivery of the deed, and in such a case he would not be bound because he had acquired a new name in fact, but only because he had so acted that in the given case he could not be heard to dispute his own act. If there had been proof in this case that Hiram Sherman was known also by the name of Harmon Sherman, we are not prepared to say it would not have laid a foundation for introducing the record. But it was not competent to introduce it until some such foundation had been laid to connect the two variant names.

The judgment was correct and must be affirmed, with costs. ‘

The other Justices concurred.  