
    Wingate vs. Dail.
    A parol contract between a father in law, and son in law, that the father in law would give a real estate to Ins grand son in consideration of the son ip law paying one half of the value of the land — Not enforced, tho’ possession was held by the son in law, and a part of the pur* chase money paid.
    Appeal from a decree of the Court of Chancery dismissing the bill of complaint. By the bill, answer, and testimony taken in the cause, it appears that a certain TVilliam Dail, having a daughter married to Wingate, the complainant, entered into a verbal agreement with him to sell to him two parcels of land, on which Wingate then resided, for £150, being one half the value of the land; the other half lie intended to give to Wingate’s wife; and that Bail often declared that the land was to be deeded to Wingate’s son. That Wingate paid ¿240 in part of the purchase money, and continued in possession, and paid the' taxes on the land, which were charged to him by the direction of Bail, and with the approbation of Wingate. That Bail made an entry in his book of accounts, crediting Wingate on the 25th of August '179S, “By cash received for a contract for the plantation where he now lives,” &c. £40. That Bail afterwards had a son born, named Joseph, (the appellee,) and in order to make provision for his son, declared his intention of taking the land from Wingate, and giving it to his son, and in lieu thereof to give Wingate personal property; which intention was made known to Wingate, who was not altogether satisfied with the arrangement. That Bail offered to return the ¿240 to Wingate, which the latter did not refuse to take, but said he had no occasion for it, and Bail said he would keep it for him until he should call for it. Bail afterwards, by his will, devised the land to his son, (the appellee,) and bequeathed sundry slaves to Win-gate’s wjfe,
    Hanson, Chancellor, (3d July 1804.) It appears, that to prevent the setting up of contracts, like the one stated in the bill, was the object of the statute of frauds and perjuries; and this court never did, and never ought, by its decision, to defeat the salutary intent of the act.
    It has, indeed, under some circumstances, enforced the performance of parol contracts, but never in a case like the present, where it remains uncertain whether or pot there was any contract, and even if there was a contract, it does not appear clearly what was the engagement on the complainant. Decreed, that the bill be dismissed, but without costs.
    From iyhich decree the1 complainant appealed to this Qoqrt.
    
      The cause was argued before Chase, Ch. J. Tilghmají, NxcitoLso>r, and Gajjtt, J.
    
      J. Buyly, for the appellant,
    to shew that such a contract -ought to be «¡forced, cited l Eq. Ah. 31. 1 Vern. 363. 2 Vern. 455. 2d pt. 1 Eq. Ab. 32, 42, 44. 1 Atk. 12, 15. 1 Ves. 83, 221, 297, 411. 2 Ves. 299. 3 Atk. 4.
    
      Slmajf, contra,
    contended, that chancery would not enforce a contract which the party who applied to have it enforced had shown an unwillingness to comply with on his part. That a contract, if in waiting, would not be enforced if there was proof that it had been rescinded J»y parol. 1 Fonbl. 392, (note o..)
    
   The Cor jit or Appeals

i ¡/firmed the decree of the Oenrt of Chancery.  