
    In the Matter of the Adoption of T. W. C. (Anonymous). Natural Mother, Appellant; Adoptive Parents, Respondents.
    Argued October 14, 1975;
    decided November 20, 1975
    
      Ira H. Leibowitz and Jack B. Solerwitz for appellant.
    I. If the irrevocable consent signed by an infant unwed mother was signed while she was under duress, the consent is not valid. (Matter of Anonymous, 60 Misc 2d 854.) II. Since the provisions of the Domestic Relations Law relating to adoption are in derogation of the common law, they must be strictly construed. (People ex rel. Marabottini v Farr, 186 Misc 811; Matter of Bamber, 147 Misc 712; Matter of Kirby, 145 Misc 756.) III. The Surrogate’s Court must appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of an infant unwed mother in an adoption proceeding or the adoption of her child by adoptive parents is invalid. (Matter of Anonymous, 47 Misc 2d 139.) IV. An infant unwed mother may revoke her consent to an adoption in that her consent is voidable. V. The dissenting opinion of the court below contains a summary of the cogent basis upon which a reversal must be granted. VI. The provisions of the Domestic Relations Law (§ 115-b) are contrary to the public policy of the State of New York insofar as they affect the rights of a minor to revoke her consent to the adoption of her child. (Matter of Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v Polk, 29 NY2d 196; Matter of Infant D., 41 AD2d 961; Tierney v Flower, 32 AD2d 392.)
    
      Joseph Canzoneri for respondents.
    I. The consent of petitioner was pursuant to statute, freely and voluntarily given, and is therefore valid and irrevocable. (Matter of Anonymous, 60 Misc 2d 854.) II. Since the provisions of the Domestic Relations Law relating to adoption are in derogation of the common law, they must be strictly construed. III. There is no requirement that the court appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant unwed mother in an adoption proceeding. (Matter of Anonymous, 47 Misc 2d 139.) IV. The statutory consent of a consenting party whether infant or adult is binding and irrevocable. V. The court below has concurred in the prior decision and sustained the statute. VI. Since the statute must be strictly construed, common law and traditional meaning of "duress” is the applicable standard. (Grad v Roberts, 35 Misc 2d 811.) VII. As there was no duress, the court is not authorized to negate the irrevocable consent of petitioner previously given. (People ex rel. Stone v Maglio, 62 Misc 2d 292.) VIII. Enactment of Domestic Relations Law (§ 115-b) has effected a change and established the new public policy of our State on adoption consent. (Matter of Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v Polk, 29 NY2d 196.) IX. Maintenance of a stable environment is mandated by the statute and must be sustained.
   Per Curiam.

We are asked to consider the validity of an irrevocable consent to adopt which was executed by a natural mother at a time when she was four months shy of her 21st birthday. The appellant seeks to revoke her consent on the grounds of duress and infancy.

On October 31, 1973 the appellant appeared before a Judge of the Surrogate’s Court and executed an irrevocable consent pursuant to section 115-b of the Domestic Relations Law. Five months later the appellant apparently suffered misgivings and attempted to revoke her consent. A hearing was conducted to review the procedures followed and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the challenged consent. The testimony accepted by the Surrogate indicated that the natural mother received thorough and painstaking explanation of the gravity of her consent from the Surrogate as required by subdivision 2 of section 115-b of the Domestic Relations Law. In addition she had previously received elucidation from the adoption clerk of the court and the attorney for the adoptive parents. The record further indicates that she had consulted with her parents and friends before executing the consent; Accordingly, the hearing court found no duress and concluded that petitioner’s consent, made after full disclosure of all relevant facts and with full understanding of its legal consequences, was voluntary.

We see no reason to disturb that determination. The consent was effectuated in the manner required by statute and the statute makes no provision for the defense of infancy. Therefore the consent was valid and irrevocable and the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke concur in Per Curiam opinion.

Order affirmed.  