
    Brandon Eugene BALES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Clarence W. DUPNIK; Attorney General of the State of Arizona; Charles L. RYAN, Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 14-16067.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    
      Submitted Feb, 10, 2016.
    
    Filed Feb. 12, 2016.
    Mark F. Willimann, The Law Office of Mark F. Willimann, LLC, Tucson,- AZ, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Jonathan Bass, AGAZ-Office of the Arizona Attorney General, Tucson, AZ, for Respondents-Appellees.
    Before: SILVERMAN, FISHER, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Brandon Eugene Bales appeals the denial of federal habeas relief after he challenged his Arizona state conviction for driving under the influence. The district court held that Bales’s habeas appeal was barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.CL 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Bales contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when his blood was drawn pursuant to Arizona’s “implied consent” statute, Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 28-1321 (2015). However, Stone v. Powell directs that “where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone, 428 U.S. at 494, 96 S.Ct. 3037 (footnote call number omitted). Bales appears to argue that he did not receive a “full and fair” trial because the state court misconstrued the facts and misapplied clearly established federal law.

But these arguments, like all of the arguments in Bales’s opening brief, go to whether his Fourth Amendment claim was wrongly decided, not whether the hearing itself was fair. See id. at 482, 96 S.Ct. 3037. In this case, Bales had a full eviden-tiary hearing on his suppression motion, as well as an appeal to the superior court and an opportunity for further appellate review. Thus, the district court properly ruled that Bales had the opportunity for a full and fair hearing on his Fourth Amendment claim.

Finally, in his reply Bales argues for a new exception to the Stone doctrine that would allow habeas review of Fourth Amendment issues that affect a large number of people or claims. He provides no persuasive reason to support this alleged exception, however, and we decline to create such a rule. Stone is clear: We cannot reconsider the merits of Bales’s Fourth Amendment claim, so federal habeas relief is unavailable.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. Rule 36-3.
     
      
      . We recently confirmed that Stone survived enactment of the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Newman v. Wangler, 790 F,3d 876, 879-81 (9th Cir.2015).
     