
    Davis Moses LEUDVICK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Roy W. CHERRY, Superintendent, Hampton Roads Regional Jail, Portsmouth, Virginia; Warren A. Lewis, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service; James Zigler, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service; John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 03-7736.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: July 21, 2004.
    Decided: Aug. 24, 2004.
    Davis Moses Leudvick, Appellant pro se.
    Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM:

Davis Moses Leudvick appeals the district court’s order of October 23, 2003, dismissing his petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000), pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 41(b). After the district court dismissed Leudvick’s petition for failure to inform the court of a new address, Leudviek filed a notice of appeal. He subsequently filed a document tending to show that he did not have a new address. The district court construed this document as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) and issued an order indicating its inclination to grant the motion. See Fobian v. Storage Tech. Corp., 164 F.3d 887, 891 (4th Cir.1999). This Court remanded for the limited purpose of considering the merits of Leudvick’s motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). See Fobian, 164 F.3d at 892.

On remand, the district court entered an order vacating the October 23, 2003, order of dismissal, and reopened the action. Because the order on appeal has been vacated, this appeal is now moot. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 363-64 (4th Cir.2003) (“When a case has become moot after the entry of the district court’s judgment, an appellate court no longer has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 124 S.Ct. 1750, 158 L.Ed.2d 636 (2004). Therefore, we dismiss the appeal as moot. We deny Leudvick’s motion for appointment of counsel, and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED 
      
       The district court, by order of June 1, 2004, again dismissed the action without prejudice, citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Leudvick has not noted an appeal from that order.
     