
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lorenzo COTTON, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 05-10295.
    Summary Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Decided Dec. 12, 2005.
    Vicki H. Lamberson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Amarillo, TX, Nancy E. Larson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Bonita L Gunden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Amarillo, TX, for Defendant Appellant.
    Before SMITH, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Lorenzo Cotton appeals his conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. Challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, he argues that (1) the search warrant was supported by only a “bare bones” affidavit, precluding application of the good-faith exception to the probable cause requirement, and (2) exigent circumstances faded to excuse the officers’ failure to knock and announce when executing the warrant.

We hold that the affidavit in this case, nearly identical in all pertinent respects to the affidavit at issue in United States v. McKnight, 953 F.2d 898, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1992), was not a “bare bones” affidavit or facially invalid. Therefore, the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement is applicable, and we need not reach the issue whether the warrant was in fact supported by probable cause. United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir.2000).

We further hold that the officers’ failure to knock and announce was reasonable and therefore not violative of the Fourth Amendment based on the following nonexclusive list of exigent circumstances: (1) Cotton had several prior arrests for violent crimes; (2) there was evidence that he had fought with police on one occasion; (3) there was reliable information that he carried a firearm; (4) he was on state parole; and (5) there was a risk of evidence destruction. See United States v. Washington, 340 F.3d 222, 227 (5th Cir.2003).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     