
    Cotton and others v. The State.
    A recognizance to appear and answer to a charge of “playing at a game of cards” is bad» because “ playing at a game of cards ” simply is not an indictable offense.
    It is not necessary, it seems, to recite the specific charge. To answer a charge of felony would be sufficiently explicit, because for every felony an indictment will lie. (Note 74.)
    Note 74. — Tousey v. The State, 8 T., 173: McDonough v. The State, 19 T., 293.
    Error from Walker. This writ of error was brought to reverse a judgment rendered against t-he plaintiffs in error, the principal and his sureties, iíi a recognizance for tlie appearance of tlie principal to answer a charge u of playing-at a game of cards.”
    Tlie recognizance recited that Francis Cotton “had that clay been arrested by said sheriff upon the charge of tlie State aforesaid, of playing at a game of' cards.” This was the only description given to tlie offense in the recognizance. The scire facias referred to the recognizance, but did not describe tlie offense or state for what purpose the defendant was recognized to appear.
    
      B. O. Franldin, for plaintiffs in error.
    
      Attorney General, for defendant ill error.
   Wheeler, J.

This case does not differ in principle from that of Daily et al. v. The State. (4 Tex. R., 417.) We there held, that to authorize a judgment upon a recognizance, it must have been taken to answer a charge which will) warrant a criminal prosecution. (5 Ala., 21; 1 Stew. & Port., 465.)

The case of West v. The Commonwealth (3 J. J. Marsh., 641) is in point.. Tlie recognizance was to answer an indictment for “gaming,” and it was-held invalid. Tlie court said: “ We know of no law which authorizes an indictment or a recognizance for gaming. A person maybe indicted-for permitting gaming in his house, or for setting up or keeping a prohibited gaming tabic or bank. But there is an essential difference between these offenses and tlie simple act of playing a game, or merely gaming. An indictment for‘gaining’would not be good. A recognizance to answer a charge for which a prosecution cannot -be maintained should not be enforced. Neither the recognizance nor the scire facias upon it will be sufficient to authorize a judgment against the principal or surety, unless tlie charge appears to be such as may he the subject of a criminal prosecution and which requires bail. It is not necessary to recite the specific charge. To answer a charge of felony would be sufficiently explicit, because for every felony an indictment will lie. But an indictment will not lie on every charge of ‘gaming.’ ” The. same may be said of the charge of “playing at a game of cards.” These words do not describe an indictable offeuse. There ‘must be something more than simply “ playing at a game of cards ” to subject the party to a criminal prosecution.

It does not, therefore, appear that the principal in the recognizance was bound to answer to an offense for which a criminal prosecution could be maintained. The recognizance consequently was not obligatory upon him or his-sureties, and no valid judgment upon it could be rendered.

Tne judgment is therefore reversed, and the proceedings upon the recognizance dismissed.

Judgment reversed.  