
    HONG PING GAO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-3914-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 20, 2012.
    Peter D. Lobel, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Senior Litigation Counsel; Laura M.L. Maroldy, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      PRESENT: JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Hong Ping Gao, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 31, 2011, order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings. In re Hong Ping Gao, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Aug. 31, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Gao’s motion to reopen as untimely as she filed it nearly seven years after her final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Although the time limits on motions to reopen may be excused when the movant demonstrates changed country conditions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), the BIA reasonably concluded that Gao did not demonstrate changed conditions in this case.

We defer to the BIA’s general conclusion that the ongoing persecution of Christians across China did not change significantly between 2002 and 2010. See Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 171 (2d Cir.2008) (“We do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the agency.”); see also Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 257 (BIA 2007) (explaining that an “incremental or incidental” change in a country’s policies does not constitute changed country conditions for purposes of motions to reopen).

The BIA’s decision noted that the repression of Christians in China varies by locality. Gao contends that the BIA abused its discretion in failing to consider the letter she submitted from a friend who was arrested for being a Christian in Gao’s hometown. This argument is unavailing.

While the BIA did not expressly consider the letter, it was not required to “expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner.” Shao, 546 F.3d at 169 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we presume that the BIA considered the letter and gave it the appropriate weight. See Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that this Court will “presume” that the agency “has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). The letter did not establish changed conditions in Gao’s hometown because there was no evidence about conditions in that hometown at the time of her 2002 merits hearing. See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 253 (“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, we compare the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”); Moosa v. Holder, 644 F.3d 380, 386-87 (7th Cir.2011).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  