
    
      Kennedy against Raguet.
    debtor ’'after v;f .ate the proceedings against the garnishees, who m.-.’-e de-feotathrvíave ín their hands, after such default, the goods in their hands arc liable. ,. The death
    CASE on attachment. The plaintiff, Kennedy, having, a demand against the absent debtor, Raguet, attached' his property in the hands of Messrs. Conde and Doughty, as-a-arnishees. The garnishees made no return to the attach* d . . ment; by which means, they admitted effects in their hands . . sufficient to pay the plaintiil s demand, who proceeded to against them, and issued out his execution for levying the amount. About the time, or immediately after, the issuing of the execution, it was discovered that Rae-uet, the absent debtor, had died a short time before at s ’ , . . . Bourdeaux; consequently, before the signing of the judg- . , - , - , , ~ . meat agamsi the garnishees, and the issuing out or the execution.
    
      Pringle, on behalf of the garnishees,
    moved for setting-aside the judgment and execution against them ; alleging that the attachment suit against the absent debtor, had abated by his death previous to the entering up of this judgment; and that it followed of course, that if the original suit abated, all its concomitants, and every right under it, fell with it. That the great end of the attachment act was to make the absent debtor a party in court, so as t© 
      charge his goods after judgment; but if he died before fudgment, then his goods would go over to his representa- , ,. tives, or be cast on the ordinary.
    
      Pinckney,, in reply,
    cont-nded, that the great end of the attachment act was to charge the effects o f the absent debtor, and not his person. That it was a proceeding in rein, and not ad personam. The moment garnishees made default in not making a return on oath, they admitted effects in their hands sufficient to pay the debt. They,- and not the absent debtor, from that moment became the real defendants. It was immaterial to them whether the absent debtor was dead or alive; whether they paid over the money to him, his representatives, or the plaintiff in the action. All that was necessary afterwards, was to prove the plaintiff’s demand, and then they, and not Raguet, became chargeable ; they owed the money, and it did not lie with them to plead in abatement. That it was well established law, that wherever you proceed against a thing, and not against the person, it is immaterial whether the party lives or dies. Gilb. Hist. Com. Law, 242. That where the death of the party happens during the pendency of the writ, which makes no difference in the plea, the suit should not abate. In the present case, the death of Raguet made no difference in the plea, which was effects or no effects. All the plaintiff had to do, if a plea had been put in, would have been to shew that they had effects. As no plea was filed, or put in, he had only to prove his debt ¡ this he did, and the garnishees were liable. That with regard to landed property, he admitted it might have been otherwise ; because, by the statute of frauds, it is only bound by a judgment.
   Per Curiam»

The death of Raguet makes no difference in this case, if it happened after default made by the garnishees. The policy and design of the attachment act is to make .the effects of the absent debtor liablef wherever found. The garnishees had a right to come in and deny they liad effects ; or if they had, that they had a right to retain as creditors in possession, or the like, See. But as they did not make any such return, they thereby admitted effects to be in their hands sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s demand, and then they became liable*, and from thenceforth, they ought to be considered as defendants. If the death of the absent debtor had happened before any return was, or could be made, then the doctrine urged in support of the motion might have applied ; but as the case now stands, the plaintiff’s claim against the garnishees remains unim-peached. Therefore, let the rule for setting aside the proceedings be discharged, and. the plaintiff have leave to-proceed against the garnishees.  