
    The State v. Willie Clemons.
    ■The act of 1794, ( Rev c. 406,) to prevent owners of slaves from hiring to them their time, does not subject the master to an indictment, the x-emedy being against the slave alone.
    The defendant was convicted on the following indictment :
    “ The jurors for the Slate, upon their oath, present that Willie Clem“ons, late of, &c. on 8cc. with force and arms at, &c. unlawfully did “ permit his slave by the name of March to hire his own time to divers “ persons, to the jurors aforesaid unknown, contrary to the act of the “General Assembly, in such case made and provided, and against,' &c.
    The defendant was convicted and judgment for the State being rendered by Daniel Judge, on the last circuit at Beaufort, he appealed.
    No counsel appeared for the defendant.
    The Attorney-General for the State.'
   Ruffin, Judge.

This is an indictment against the master; and it is founded on a misconception of the act of 1794. The statute directs the grand jury, to make “presentment of any slave.” The great purpose of the act is to prevent and abate the nuisance, as was said in Woodman’s case. The proceeding is therefore primarily against that; and the notice to the master is to give him an opportunity, as in other cases, of defending his slave, and not defending himself personally. It is tx*ue, the on net* is indirectly punished, by having his slave hired out for one year. But that is only the incidental consequence of the judgment. The personal liability of the master, is for the penalty of twenty pounds. The act does not make him guilty of a misdemeanor, nor subject him to indictment.

The judgment of the Superior Court is therefore reversed, and the judgment arrested.

Per Curiam. — Judgment reversed.  