
    Anthony Neal et al. v. W. C. Maxwell.
    1. Probate court: jurisdiction: executors and administrators : right to PROCEED AGAINST DISTRIBUTEES ON REEUNDING BOND : CASE IN JUDGMENT. — M., the administrator of R., in 1863, distributed tho assets of the estate, amounting to $3,536, to the distributees, and took from them their refunding bond, conditioned to refund to him such sums as might be required to pay any debt that might come against the estate. The administrator retained in his hands the sum of $2,300 in Confederate money, for the purpose of paying a debt due one Healy from the estate. The administrator filed his bill in chancery, alleging the foregoing facts, and that the Confederate money had become worthless, and the debt of Healy had come against the estate, and that he had no funds to pay it; and asked for a decree against the distributees to refund to him the amount of the debt due 'Healy. Held — That the Probate Court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not the administrator was chargeable with the Confederate money; and, until he was discharged on account of the Confederate money by the Court of Probates, he could not sue the distributees, either at law or in equity.
    Appeal from the Chancery Court of Rauola county. lion. Alexander M. Clayton, judge.
    
      James R. Chalmers, for appellants,
    contended,
    
      1. That the bill was for the settlement of an administrator’s account, and of such matters the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction. 2 How. Miss. 856; 3 lb. 252; 7 lb. 314; 6 S. & M. 194; 24 Miss. R. 87..
    2. That there must be a settlement of the administration account in the Probate Corn’t, before the relative rights of the parties can be ascertained. Ratliff v. JDmis, 38 Miss. R. 112; Sea/rles v. Scott, 14 S. & M. 94; JVeylan v. Bwrg, 14 lb. 204.
    
      G. Miller <& Son, for appellee.
    No brief on file.
   Handy, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.'

The bill in this case states in substance that the complainant— the appellee here — was appointed administrator de lohis non of the estate of one James M. Rowzie, and in January, 1863, at the solicitation of the appellants, who were the distributees of the estate, he distributed to them the assets of the estate, amounting to $3,536, and took from them refunding bonds, conditioned to refund to him such sum as might be required to pay any debts that might afterwards come against the estate, which arrangement was made privately between him and the distributees, without any order of the Probate Court. But he retained in his hands $2,300 of Confederate money for the purpose of paying a debt due one Iiealy from the estate; which was done by the consent of the distributees. This sum of money was collected by the administrator in payment of a note due the deceased in his lifetime for the sale of a tract of land, and the Confederate money was received when it was the common currency of the country, and was believed to be good, and with the consent of the distributees. The debt of Healy has now come against the estate, and the administrator has no funds to pay it, the said Confederate money being of no value; and the bill prays a decree against the distributees for the pro rata share of each of them to be refunded to the complainant.

The defendants demurred to the bill on the ground that no final settlement had been made by the complainant in the Probate Court, and that that court bas full jurisdiction of tbe matter set up in tbe bill. This demurrer -was overruled, and tbe defendants bave taken this appeal.

We think tbe demurrer was well taken.

The right of tbe complainant to call on tbe distributees to refund tbe money received by them of tbe assets of the estate, depended primarily on tbe question, whether be was chargeable with tbe amount of tbe money received by him in Confederate money. If be was so chargeable, it is clear that be bad no right to call on tbe distributees to refund tbe money they bad received, when be bad retained in bis hands assets of the estate for which be received Confederate money, and which, if collected in good funds, would bave been sufficient to pay tbe debt which was outstanding against the estate. Tbe bill in this case, therefore, in substance, asks tbe aid of a court of equity to allow him credit for this sum of Confederate money; and to compel tbe distributees to refund, of tbe assets distributed to them, an amount sufficient to pay tbe outstanding debt.

The question whether be was chargeable or not, was one peculiarly appropriate to tbe Court of Probates, and which a court of equity bas no jurisdiction to determine. When tbe administrator settles that question in tbe Court of Probates, and it is there determined that be is entitled to credit, to tbe amount of tbe Confederate money received by him, it will be time enough for him to proceed against tbe distributees; which, for aught that appears in this bill, be may do in tbe Court of Probates, or at, law on tbe refunding bonds. But it is very clear that be is entitled to no remedy in any court, against the distributees, until be shall bave been discharged, on account of tbe Confederate money, in tbe Court of Probates.

Tbe decree must, therefore, be reversed, tbe demurrer sustained, and tbe bill dismissed.  