
    Jennie Kind, Respondent, v. Alfred E. Cortis, Appellant.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Term,
    February, 1910.)
    Principal and agent — Bights and liabilities of principal as to third person — Extent of actual authority of agent to bind principal (including implied authority)—By agent for Lloyds insurance association.
    Attorneys in fact authorized to adjust and compromise losses, to contest claims, and to defend, compromise or settle suits brought on account of policies of insurance issued by them on behalf of an unincorporated insurance association may not employ attorneys at law to defend suits and impose liability for their compensation upon the underwriters, but by such employment the attorneys in fact are themselves liable only, it being their duty under their contract to make all proper defenses.
    Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, eighth district, borough of Manhattan, rendered in favor of the plaintiff after a trial by the court without a jury.
    Arnold L. Davis, for appellant.
    Mortimer M. Menken and Howard T. Cole, for respondent.
   Whitney, J.

Defendant was one of the underwriters of an unincorporated association known as the Hew York Fire Lloyds. The underwriters, by power of attorney, appointed three attorneys in fact, one of whom was the defendant, with power to act jointly and severally. They were authorized, among other.things, to adjust and compromise losses, to contest claims, and to defend, compromise or settle suits brought on account of the policies issued by them. Plaintiff’s assignors were attorneys at law, and were employed by one of the other attorneys in fact to defend certain suits and settle others. By their contract of employment, which is contained in the correspondence, each underwriter was to be directly liable to plaintiff’s assignors for his share of their compensation. We do not think that the power of attorney gave any authority to the attorneys in fact to insert such a stipulation in the contract'. It was their own duty to supervise the defense and settlement of these suits and, incidentally, to settle with their attorneys at law for the services of the latter. The policy which has been put in evidence as a sample is signed by fifteen of the underwriters, among whom this defendant is responsible for only one-thirty-ninth. If this is his proportionate risk upon the policies in connection with which plaintiff’s assignors performed their services, his total pecuniary responsibility, according to their claim, would have been but about forty-six dollars; and yet to defend an action he would have to examine into the facts concerning twenty-two different suits or settlements. The underwriters were not individually responsible to plaintiff’s assignors, and the contract of the latter was not made with the defendant in his capacity as one of the attorneys in fact.

Hence the judgment should be reversed and a new trial , ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event.

Seabdby and Guy, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.  