
    The President and Fellows of Harvard College versus John Kettell.
    The estates of the corporation of Harvard College, in the hands of their agents, wheresoever situated within this state, are exempted from public taxes by the annual tax acts.
    Trespass for taking and carrying away the goods of the plaintiffs, of the value of one hundred dollars, and converting and disposing of the same to the defendant’s use.
    The parties agreed to. submit the action to the decision of the Court upon the following case stated. The plaintiffs, in their corporate capacity, were owners of a parcel of real estate in Charles-town, consisting of a dwelling-house, a tan-yard, and about five acres of land, during the whole of the years 1817 and 1818. The defendant was one of the assessors for the same years for said town, duly elected and qualified. The said assessors assessed the plain fifis for their said estate in Charlestown in the years aforesaid. The taxes not being paid, the collector made application to the defend ant, as a justice of the peace, for a warrant of distress, [ * 205 ] * pursuant to the provision of the statute of 1785, c. 70, § 10, by virtue of which the taxes were collected of the plaintiffs, with an additional sum for the costs of collection. The estate so assessed was included in the last general valuation of taxable property in Charlestown, taken in the year 1810; the same not being then the property of the plaintiffs.
    If, in the opinion of the Court, the said assessments were illegal, the defendant was to be defaulted, and the plaintiffs to have judgment for the amount of the sums paid by them, with costs; otherwise they were to become nonsuit.
    [By the general tax acts for the years 1817 and 1818, it is provided, “ that the president, professors, &c. of Harvard, Williams and Bowdoin colleges respectively, who have their usual residence at those colleges, shall not be assessed for their polls and estates, under their personal management and improvement, in the towns, districts or parishes where they are settled.” “ And that all persons, who have the management of the estates of Harvard, Williams and Bowdoin colleges respectively, shall not be assessed for the same.”]
    
      Stearns, for the plaintiffs,
    relied on the foregoing provision of the tax acts, as exempting all the estates of the plaintiffs, wheresoever situated within the commonwealth, from all assessments. It was not necessary, therefore, he thought, to recur to the laws of the colony or province, to aid in the inquiry. The law, under which the defendant must claim to justify or excuse himself, is express and conclusive on the point. If the property of the plaintiffs is not tax able against their agents, when in their possession and management, a fortiori, it cannot be liable to be taxed against the plaintiffs themselves.
    
      Phinney, for the defendant.
    By the colony law of 1650, the estates of the plaintiffs, to the amount of 50ÓZ., were to be freed from rates and taxes . Nor is there any law of a later date, on which the plaintiffs can claim the exemption; unless ' * 206 ] these annual tax acts should be held to * contain it. It is universally known, and will not be here denied, that the plaintiffs were owners of real property, to an amount vastly exceeding the amount so exempted from taxation, long before they purchased this estate in Charlestown. These same tax acts authorize the taxing of estates of non-resident proprietors. The plaintiffs are necessarily included ; for corporations have no locality.
    The exemption in the tax acts is personal to the agents of the plaintiffs, and does not include the plaintiffs themselves ; and when parties claim to be freed from a universal public burden or duty, they must prove their right to such exemption strictly and explicitly. Taking the whole provision of these tax acts together, it may well be argued, that the legislature had in view only the estates belonging to the plaintiffs in Cambridge, where the college is situated. If the estate in question is to be exempted, the town of Charlestown must still pay the amount of the state and county taxes assessed upon it, since it was included in the last valuation returned ; a consequence manifestly hard and unjust.
    
      Stearns, in reply. By the act to ascertain the ratable estate within this commonwealth, passed in 1811, not only the estates in the occupation of the officers of the several colleges and academies are to be excluded from the returns of taxable property, but “ also all the estates belonging to the said colleges and academies” . And by stat. 1813, c. 113, the plaintiffs are authorized to take and hold lands, &c. within this commonwealth, .to the yearly value of 12,000 dollars, in addition to what they before had a right to hold, and in addition to their public buildings. It will not escape the recollection of the Court, that all the privileges and immunities, which the plaintiffs were entitled to at the formation of the constitution of the commonwealth, are by that instrument ratified and confirmed to them forever.
    It is a forced and wholly unauthorized construction of all these provisions and exemptions, to confine their operation * to lands in Cambridge. If the estate in Charlestown is [ * 207 J not exempted, lands in Cambridge are not, unless in the immediate occupation of the plaintiffs, or of the officers of the college mentioned in the tax acts.
    
      
      
        Ancient Charters, &c. 90.
    
    
      
      
        Stat. 1810, c. 78, § 1.
    
   Parker, C. J.

The plaintiffs contend that the estate owned by them in Charlestown, which was assessed for state, county and town taxes in the years 1817 and ,1818, was, by force of the general tax acts for those years, wholly exempted from taxation ; and whether they are right or not, must depend upon the construction of those acts. The words are sufficiently comprehensive to exempt all estates of the several institutions named, wherever situated; and there would seem to be no intention to limit the exemption to the persons of the agents, or to the estates situated in the towns where the colleges are respectively situated; as has been argued by the counsel for the defendant. Probably the phraseology was adopted, to exclude from the exemption all such estates as were in the actual occupation of individuals by lease or otherwise so that they might be taxed therefor; and to confine it to such estates as were under the management of the college officers, for the benefit of the col lege; or of agents, who, might be specially appointed to take the charge of them.

This intention seems to be made manifest from the proviso in the same acts, for the benefit of the town of Cambridge. If the college estates were not exempt, except those in the occupation of the president and the other officers named, there was no necessity of providing that Cambridge should have the privilege of assessing such as were without the college bounds, but within that town, in the" town tax only. But such is the provision, founded probably on the apprehension, that so much real estate might be owned by Harvard, College within the town of Cambridge, as, if the whole should be exempted, might subject the inhabitants of that town to a greater burden for municipal expenses, than other towns would be liable to. And the privilege, thus secured to Cambridge, being [ * 208 ] * limited to the town tax, carries with it a necessary implication that, by the general provisions of the act, there was no authority to assess such property within that town. And if not in that town, we perceive no reason for supposing that such property should be assessed in other towns.

The fact that the estate taxed in this case was included in the last valuation as taxable property, cannot vary the case. It produces an inconvenience, but cannot alter the law. The same difficulty would occur whenever a minister, or other person exempt from taxation, should purchase land in the town ; or if fire or other accident should destroy houses or other buildings, after a valuation.

Defendant defaulted,  