
    JIANG YUN, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-3763.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 5, 2015.
    Robert J. Adinolfi, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    
      Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Steven J. Flynn, Assistant Director; Arthur Rabin, Trial Attorney; Lindsay G. Donahue, Law Clerk, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, RICHARD C. WESLEY, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Jiang Yun, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a September 10, 2014 decision of the BIA affirming a January 23, 2013 decision of an Immigration Judge (“U”) denying Yun’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jiang Yun, No. 087 531 701 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 2014), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 23, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we consider both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

For asylum applications such as Yun’s, governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of her account, and inconsistencies in her statements and evidence, so long as they reasonably support an inference that the applicant is not credible. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam). We defer “to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no / reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

The agency based its adverse credibility determination on inconsistencies in Yun’s testimony and evidence regarding when she became pregnant and was allegedly subjected to a forced abortion. Because Yuris inconsistent testimony relates to the heart of her claim for asylum, and she did not rehabilitate that inconsistent testimony with corroborating evidence, substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination, based on a totality of the circumstances. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007); Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir.2006). Further, because the only evidence of a threat to Yuris life or freedom depended upon her credibility, the agency’s finding that she was not credible necessarily precludes success on her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  