
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric Lamont JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 14-2169.
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    Feb. 26, 2015.
    Laura Fashing, Roberto D. Ortega, Office of the United States Attorney, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Eric Lamont Johnson, Adelanto, CA, pro se.
    Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Eric Lamont Johnson seeks a certificate of appealability (GOA) to appeal from the district court’s dismissal of his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4) as an unauthorized second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). We deny a COA and dismiss this matter.

Mr. Johnson pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. See United States v. Johnson, 376 Fed.Appx. 858, 859 (10th Cir.2010) (direct appeal). After unsuccessfully pursuing relief under § 2255, see United States v. Johnson, 529 Fed.Appx. 876, 876, 879 (10th Cir.2013) (denying a COA), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1041, 188 L.Ed.2d 132 (2014), he filed a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) claiming that he was entitled to relief under Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). The district court dismissed the motion as an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion. Mr. Johnson then sought authorization from this court to pursue relief under Bailey. We denied authorization, noting that Bailey had been decided years before Mr. Johnson’s conviction. See In re Johnson, No. 14-2087, at 2-3 (10th Cir. June 6, 2014) (unpublished order). Mr. Johnson’s most recent filing is his “Subsequent Motion Invoking the Power of U.S.C. 2255(f)(4),” which again relies upon Bailey, and which the district court dismissed as an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion.

Mr. Johnson must obtain a COA to appeal. See United States v. Harper, 545 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir.2008). For a COA, he must show “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). But no reasonable jurist would find the district court’s procedural disposition debatable.

“A § 2255 motion is one claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, ... or [the sentence] is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is the relief sought, not [the] pleading’s title, that determines whether the pleading is a § 2255 motion.” Id. at 1149. It is apparent that Mr. Johnson seeks relief in the nature of a § 2255 motion. He points out that he is relying on § 2255(f)(4). But § 2255(f) does not allow him to evade § 2255(h)’s restrictions. Rather, he must meet both subsections’ requirements. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 591 (10th Cir.2011) (noting potential effects of the interaction between §§ 2255(f)(3) and 2255(h)(2)).

Mr. Johnson’s district court filing has not been authorized; to the contrary, as noted above, this court has denied him authorization to bring claims based on Bailey. Accordingly, no reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s decision to dismiss the “Subsequent Motion” for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Johnson complains that the district court did not address his arguments regarding a miscarriage of justice, but it was not within the court’s power to do so. “[I]f the prisoner’s pleading must be treated as a second or successive § 2255 motion, the district court does not even have jurisdiction to deny the relief sought in the pleading.” Nelson, 465 F.3d at 1148.

We deny a COA and dismiss this matter. 
      
       This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
     