
    John Presbrey and Others versus Joshua Williams.
    A promise made on the 1st of November, 1811, was sued on the 1st of November, 1817; and it was holden to be barred by the statute of limitations.
    Assumpsit on a promissory note, dated February 16, 1810, payable on demand. The action was commenced on the 1st day of November, 1817. The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations, on which issue was joined. Upon the trial of this issue, before the Circuit Court of Common Pleas for this circuit, it appeared that, on the 1st of November, 1811, a payment was made and endorsed on the note; and the plaintiffs relied on this, as sufficient to maintain the issue on their part.
    The cause was entered in this Court, according to the provisions of the statute of 1817, c. 185, with a bill of exceptions containing the facts stated above.
    
      
      W. and F. Baylies, for the plaintiffs,
    contended that the action was brought within six years next after the new promise or acknowledgment, made on the 1st of November, 1811 ; and that the day of the promise ought to be excluded in the computation, as is done in the case of a note * payable in a certain number of days from or after the date.  So, as to goods or estate attached, which are to be held for the space of thirty days next after final judgment, it has been decided that the day after the judgment is rendered is the first of the thirty days.  They cited also the cases of Pugh &f Ux. vs. Duke of Leeds, 
       and Holden vs. James, Adm., 
       in which last case it is said by the Court that, where an administrator had accepted the trust on the 2d of December, 1806, the four years limited bylaw for bringing an action against him expired on the 2d of December, 1810.
    
      J. M. Williams, for the defendant,
    cited the cases of The King vs. Adderly, 
       and Castle & Al. vs. Burditt &f Af., 
       and observed that a promissory note, made on the 1st of November, 1811, and payable in one day from or after its date, would not be payable until the 2d of November; whereas, in the case at bar, the note was payable on the 1st of November, 1811, and an action might have been commenced upon it on that day. He relied on the case of Norris vs. The Hundred of Gautris, which is mentioned in Doug. 465, where the robbery was committed on the 9th of October, and the action was commenced on the 9th of October in the following year; and it was held not to have been commenced “ within one year next after the robbery.”
    
      
       8 Mass. Rep. 453, Henry vs. Jones.
      
    
    
      
       11 Mass. Rep. 205, Portland Bank vs. Maine Bank.
      
    
    
      
      
        Cowp. 714.
      
    
    
      
       11 Mass. Rep. 400.
    
    
      
      
        Doug. 468.
    
    
      
      
        4 D. S E. 623.
    
   Jackson, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. In the computa tian of time, the question, whether the terminus a quo shall be included or excluded, has been differently decided—not only according to the words made use of in the different cases, but according to the subject matter, or the context, where the same words are used.

By the statute of limitations, it was intended that the plaintiff should have six full years, and no more, within which to bring his action. In this case, he might have brought his action on the 1st of November, 1811, as upon the new promise then made, (supposing that the action had been previously barred by the statute ;) and if he may also commence it on the 1st day of November, 1817, it would * make seven first days of November, in the six years prescribed by the statute.

In the construction of a promissory note payable in a certain number of days, the day of the date is excluded; because, otherwise, a note payable in one day would be the same as a note payable on demand ; and this is the reason given in the case of Henry vs. Jones, cited in the argument. .In the case of goods or estate attached, the legislature intended that the creditor should have thirty days within which to levy his execution ; and as he cannot sue out execution until the day after the judgment, it was rightly considered that that day ought to be excluded.

In the case of Holden vs. James, Adm., this point was not before the court; as that action was not brought until long after the 2d of December, 1810. The expression quoted appears to be inaccurate, as applied to the statute referred to in that case. But whether so or not, it is manifest that the court were not then considering whether the first day should be excluded or included; and of course the case furnishes no authority on the point now in question.

The case of Norris vs. The Hundred of Gautris, cited in the at gument, is a direct authority in support of the opinion which we have adopted, that the action was not brought within six years next after the cause of action accrued, 
      
       Vide Lester vs. Garland, 15 Ves. 248. — Bigelow vs. Wilson, 3 Pick 485. — Glossington vs. Rawlins, 3 East, 408. — Windsor vs. China, 4 Greenl. 298. — Sims vs. Hampton, 1 S. & R. 411.— Watson vs. Pears, 2 Camp. 294.— Cochran vs. Retsburgh, 3 Esp. 121. — Castle vs. Burditt, 3 T. R. 623. — Anon. 1 Lord Ray. 480.— Fitzburg vs. Dennington, 2 Lord Ray. 1096. — Hardy vs. Ryle, 9 B. & Cr. 607 — Pellew vs Ink. Hund. Wynford, 9 B. & C. 134. — Lester vs. Garland, 35 Ves. 247
     