
    HASKELL’S CASE. Leonidas Haskell’s executors v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      The claimantbringshis action torecover certain reductions made by i7ieDavis-Holt-Campbell commission from his accounts. Before trial the Supreme Court decides in Adams’ Case that the award of the eommission,followed by acceptance, tfc., bars an action for the batanee. The clamant suspends the prosecution of his suit until Congress pass a private act directing this court to adjudicate the claim “ on terms of equity and justice.” The claimant then brings his caseto trial, and relies on the private act to remove the bar.
    
    A private act which confers “ jwrisdiction and authority ” on this court “ to adjudicate, on terms of equity and justice,” is not equivalent to an enactment to adjudicate the case upon its merits, irrespective^! any legal bar or estoppel. Therefore the Government may ntilljinsist on a defense, which has been held in similar cases to bar the claim, irrespective of the merits.
    
      
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    In tbe month of September, 1861, at Saint Louis, Mo., Leonidas Haskell, the claimant’s testator, sold and delivered to J. McKinstry, brigadier-general and assistant quartermaster of the Army of the United States at Saint Louis, under the command of Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, a large number of mules, at the price of $119 each, for which, as the mules were from time to time received by the said McKinstry, he delivered to said Has-kell vouchers therefor in favor of said Haskell, to the effect that the United States were indebted to said Haskell for a certain specified number of mules at the above price. All of the vouchers so delivered to said Haskell, except one hereinafter mentioned, were by said Haskell sold and transferred to various parties.
    In the month of October, 1861, one H. C. Worth sold and delivered to said McKinstry 514 mules, at the price of $119 each, for which, as they were from time to time received by said McKinstry, fie delivered to said Worth vouchers therefor of like import with those delivered to said Haskell. All of the vouchers so delivered to said Worth were by him sold and transferred to various parties.
    All the mules purchased by said McKinstry from said Has-kell and said Worth were purchased in an emergency, which did not admit of advertising for proposals for furnishing the same.
    In November, 1861, a commission was organized at Saint Louis, by order of the President of the United States, to examine and report upon all claims presented to them against the Military Department of the West which had originated prior to October 14, 1861. This commission was composed of Hon. David Davis, Hon. Joseph Holt, and Hugh Campbell, esq.
    Before this commission all the vouchers issued by said Mc-Kinstry, as aforesaid, to said Haskell and said Worth, except one hereinafter mentioned, were by the assignees thereof presented to said commission, by which they were all allowed in full, and were afterward paid in full by the United States to the assignees thereof.
    Before the said commission was also presented, but by whom does not appear, a voucher in the following terms:
    
      “ The United States to L. Haslcell, Dr.
    
    “September 7,18G1. For 37 mules, at $119.$4,403 00
    7,1861.For 55 mules, at $119. 6,545' 00
    10,1861.For 123 mules, at $119. 14, 637 00
    10.1861. For 58 mules, at $119. 6,902 00
    11.1861. For 36 mules, at $119. 4,284 00
    11,1861.For 17 mules, at $119. 2,023 00
    11,1861.For 99 mules, at $119.1. 11, 781 00
    55, 375 00
    “ I certify that the above account is correct and just, and that the articles have been accounted for on my property-return for the quarter ending on the 30th of September, 1861.
    “ J. McKINSTRY, uBrig. Gen., QuartermasterP
    
    From this voucher the said commission made, on the face thereof, the following deductions:
    1. A deduction of $11 on each of the 425 mules specified in the voucher, amounting to $4,675 in all.
    2. A reclamation of $29,700, on nine other assigned vouchers in favor of said Haskell.
    3. A reclamation of $5,654, on ten vouchers in favor of said H. O. Worth.
    And upon the face of said voucher for $55,375, the said commission caused the said deductions to be written, and also upon said voucher made the following indorsement:
    “ The amount of ten thousand five hundred and forty-six dollars allowed upon this claim, the sum of $40,029 having been deducted on account of reclamation upon the claim of said Haskell and H. O. Worth before this commission.
    “D. DAVIS, “ Chairman of CommissionP
    
    On the 12th of November, 1862, the sum of $10,546, so allowed by said commission on said voucher, was paid to said Haskell by a quartermaster of the Army of the United States, and the said Haskell signed and delivered therefor a receipt, in the following terms:
    “Received at Washington, D. C., the 12th of November, 1862, of Maj. Morris S. Miller, quartermaster, U. S. A., $10,546, in full of the within account.
    “LEONIDAS HASKELL.”
    
      Since the death of said Haskell an act of Congress has been passed entitled “An aetfor the relief of the heirs and legal representatives of Leonidas Sashell, deceased,” in terms as follows.:
    
      “Be it enacted by the Senate and Souse of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That jurisdiction and authority are hereby conferred on the Court of Claims to adjudicate, on terms of equity and justice, the claims of the heirs and legal representatives of Leonidas Haskell, deceased, for stores furnished the Quartermaster’s Department of the Army of the United States in the year eighteen hundred and sixty-one and thereafter; and there shall be the right of appeal from the ■finding and judgment of said Court of Claims to the Supreme Court of the United States as in other cases.”
    Approved March 3, 1873.
    
      'Mr. G. P. Pech for the claimant.
    ilir. Alexander Johnston (with whom was the Assistant Attorney - General) for the defendants.
    ■ This claim is founded upon a contract. It is, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the court, without reference to the act referred to. Hence the only effect of the.act (if it has any) is to prescribe either the form of action or the manner of deciding the case. The law governing the case was well settled by the Supreme Court of the United States before the passage of the Act March 3,1873; and, unless the Congress meant to change the law as thus settled, or prescribe a rule of decision to this court and the Supreme Court, it was not advised of the nature of this claim. The question involved in the ease is simply one of accord and satisfaction. A disputed claim of Has-kell' against, the defendants was settled and paid, and the amount paid was received and receipted for in full satisfaction of the claim. There was no fraud in the settlement and no mistake. The law governing such cases is well settled ; and “ equitas sequitur legem.” Congress might pass an act which would declare that a receipt in full shall have no effect, and that accord and satisfaction shall not be pleaded or proved in defense of any suit, and the courts would observe such act, and decide accordingly.
    
      If tbe phrase “ equity and justice” in the act has any meaning other than we have given it, it must be construed as an attempt to confer upon the court legislative and not judicial power. It does not appear that Congress knew anything about this claim. The act refers generally to ‘‘ claims ” for ‘‘ stores,” and does not allude to a suit four years and a half old, brought to recover certain deductions made (eleven years before the act) on vouchers given for mules.
   Dkake, Oh. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This case, like that of Child, Pratt & Fox, (12 Wall., p. 232,) involves the action of the Pams-Holt-Campbell commission, at Saint Louis, in 1861, and would be in every essential particular identical with that, but for two facts, viz: First, that the commission deducted from the voucher held by the claiimant’s testator, Leonidas Haskell, a reclamation on account of vouchers issued to him for other mules by the same quartermaster, which vouchers Haskell had sold to other parties; and, secoud, that they also deducted from Haskell’s voucher a reclamation on account of vouchers for other mules issued by that quartermaster to one H. 0. Worth. Whatreasons influenced the commission to make these two deductions does not appear, but only the simple fact that they were made, and that the commission allowed only $10,546 on a voucher issued to Haskell for $55,375.

Under ordinary circumstances we should have felt justified in investigating the action of the commission in this respect ; but it seems to us that the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Adams, (7 Wall., p. 463,) Child, Pratt & Fox, (ut supra,) and Justice, (14 Wall., p. 535,) preclude our going behind the voluntary taking by Haskell of the amount allowed by the commission, and his giving his receipt therefor as in full of the account.

This barrier is not, in our opinion, removed by the special act for the relief of the parties interested, passed about five years after the institution of this suit, authorizing this court to adjudicate the claim “ on terms of equity and justice.” This cannot be considered as setting aside in favor of those parties the law as adjudicated by the Supreme Court; for it is a familiar maxim that equity follows the law, except in relation to those matters which give a title to equitable relief, because tbe rules of law would operate to sanction fraud or injustice in tlie particular case. It cannot be said here that equity ought to relieve against the bar created by the voluntary receipt in full, for equity, equally with the law, recognizes and enforces such a bar, unless there are facts which justify the interposition of equitable relief to prevent fraud or injustice; and such facts are not shown in this case. Had Congress directed this court to adjudicate the claim upon its merits, without regard to any technical defense, we might have felt warranted in going into a full investigation of all the facts, and passing upon them,irrespective of the receipt; but the terms of the special act do not seem to us to authorize such a proceeding.

Under the controlling authority of the rulings of the Supreme Court the petition must be dismissed.  