
    KEY v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Oct. 22, 1913.
    1. Disorderly House (§ 9*) — Ownership os Premises — Husband and Wife —Conviction of Husband.
    Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 2969, provides that all property of a wife, both real and personal, owned by her before marriage shall be her separate property, but during the marriage the husband shall have the sole management thereof. Meld, that where a husband and wife lived together on property belonging to her, and it did not appear that he iñ fact was not in control thereof, or that the wife had ever objected to his control, it was no defense to a prosecution of the husband for maintaining a disorderly house thereon that the title was in the wife.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Disorderly House, Cent. Dig. § 1; Dec. Dig. § 9.]
    2. Disobdebly House (§ 16) — Evidence — Reputation oe Inmates. ,
    In a prosecution for keeping a disorderly house, in which accused, his wife, and certain other women resided, evidence of the general reputation of such women, and that they had confessed and pleaded guilty to being prostitutes when arrested on that charge, and that accused had gone on their bonds in connection with such charge, was admissible.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Disorderly House, Cent. Dig. §§ 21-25; Dec. Dig. § 16.]
    3. Disobdebly House (§ 16*) — Evidence — Conduct oe Inmates.
    In a prosecution for keeping a disorderly house, evidence of the conduct of the inmates was admissible.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Disorderly House, Cent. Dig. §§ 21-25; Dec. Dig. § 16.]
    4. Cbiminal Law (§ 1169) — Appeal — Review — Pbejudice—Evidence.
    Where, in a prosecution for keeping a disorderly house, it was conclusively proven that one of the women residing there was defendant’s wife, he was not harmed by evidence of witnesses that she was supposed to be his wife.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 754, 30S8, 3130, 3137-3143; Dec. Dig. § 1169.]
    5. Disobdebly House (§ 16) — Ownebshlp oe Property — Evidence.
    Where, in a prosecution for keeping a disorderly house, it was shown that defendant’s wife was the owner of the premises, the fact that records showed that accused had no interest in the property was immaterial.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Disorderly House, Cent. Dig. §§ 21-25; Dec. Dig. § 16.].
    6. Disobdebly House (§ 20) — Husband and Wiee — Operation by Husband — Instructions.
    Where, in a prosecution of a husband for keeping a disorderly house on property owned by his wife, there was no proof that the wife objected to his control of the property, or that he in fact was not in control thereof, the court did not err in refusing to charge that the husband was not bound to assume control of the separate property of his wife.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Disorderly House, Cent. Dig. § 31; Dec. Dig. § 20.]
    Appeal from Wichita County Court; C. B. Felder, Judge.
    Pat Key was convicted of keeping a disorderly house, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic anfl section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   HARPER, J.

Appellant was prosecuted and convicted as the keeper of a disorderly house in Wichita Falls, Tex., and his punishment assessed at 20 days’ confinement in jail and a fine of $200.

It may be said that the wife of appellant was the owner of the property, under the evidence in this case, and that she owned it prior to her marriage to appellant He and his said wife lived on the premises, and the question is, Could he be convicted of keeping a disorderly house, when the proof showed that his wife owned the property? Article 2969, Sayles’ Rev. Stat., provides that all property of the wife, both real and personal, owned by her before the marriage, shall be the separate property of the wife, but during her marriage, the husband shall have the sole management of all such property. The husband, having the sole management of the property, even though it was the separate property of the wife, he would, in law, be held responsible for the character of business conducted in such house, and especially is this true when appellant and his wife lived in the house and made it their home.

But to take up each bill separately we may say that it was permissible to show that the wife of appellant was the owner of the property during the period covered by the information. And it was permissible to show the general reputation of those females who occupied the house with appellant and his wife, and that they had pleaded guilty to being common prostitutes, and appellant had gone on the bonds of such women when arrested, charged with being common prostitutes. It was also permissible to show how the house was conducted; that the female inmates sat in men’s laps, etc.

It was conclusively proven that May Key was the wife of appellant by his admissions and otherwise; therefore, no hurtful error was committed in permitting witnesses to state that she was “supposed to be his wife.”

Inasmuch as the record discloses that appellant’s wife was the owner of the premises and house, the fact that the records of the county clerk showed that appellant had no interest therein would be immaterial. If his wife owned the property, the law placed him in charge and control thereof, especially so when he and his wife lived in the house.

Ast to whether the inmates of the house were common prostitutes would be a legitimate inquiry, and the confessions of such inmates that they were common prostitutes would be admissible. As to whether appellant was aware of such facts would be a different question, but the record in this case discloses that appellant was fully aware of the character of women who lived in the house.

As the law puts appellant in control of the separate property of his wife, in the absence of any proof that he was not in control of same, and it further appearing that appellant and his wife lived on the property, there was no error in refusing the special charges requested by appellant “that the husband is not bound to assume control of the separate property of the wife.” If the record before us disclosed that appellant had not assumed control of the property, or that the wife had objected to him doing so, or that he, in fact, was not in control of the property, a different question would be presented, but in this case the evidence shows that appellant and his wife lived on the premises and in the house, and under such circumstances, even if it was the separate property of his wife, the law places him in control of the property; therefore there was no error in refusing the special charges requested, nor in the charge of the court in this respect.

The evidence amply supports the verdict, and the judgment is affirmed.  