
    State of Tennessee vs. Cross.
    1. .Betting on elections is indictable. Act of 1823, ch. 25, sec. 2, N. &. C. 4!)1.
    2. Where an order is made by a circuit judge directing a prosecution by the attorney for the State, esc officio, without limiting the time within which it must bo executed, it operates as a mandate to the officer so long as the cause for mating it exists, and-the thing directed remains unaccomplished.
    3. In an indictment for betting on an election, an allegation charging the pendency of the general election for a particular year, and that the bet was made upon the event of that election is sufficient. It is not necessary to charge that the defendant bet upon the success of any particular candidate.
    At the March term, 1840, of the circuit court of Henderson county, Dunlap, judge, presiding, on the motion of King, district attorney, the following order was made: “It appearing to the satisfaction of the court, that James N. Cross,” (and some twenty others) “have been guilty of a misdemeanor by betting upon elections, and it further appearing, that no peison will prosecute them; it is therefore ordered by the court, that the attorney general file bills of indictment against them, ex officio, without a prosecutor marked thereupon.”
    At the March term at which this order was made, no bill of indictment was found by the grand jury. At the May term succeeding, King, district attorney, presented under and by virtue of the order of the previous term an indictment against Cross and others endorsed, “Filed ex officio by order of the court.” This indictment charged, that “on the first day of August, 1839, in the county of Hardeman, there was pending an election for governor of the State of Tennessee, a representative in the congress of the U. States and a senator and representative in the general assembly of the State of Tennessee, and that one James N. Cross and J. K. Bet-tesworth, &c. on the first day of August aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, whilst the said election was pending, did bet and. wager with each other upon the event of said election, money, bank notes, bills single, merchandise and other valuable things of the value of ten dollars, contrary,” &c.
    At the January term, 1841, the defendant appeared and moved the court to quash the indictment, which was done, Dunlap, judge, presiding. King, in behalf of the State, appealed in error.
    
      Attorney General, for the State.
    
      Fentress, for defendants.
   Gkeen, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an indictment for betting on an election. The indictment was filed ex officio by the district attorney in obedience to an order made at the previous term of the court. It is insisted that this order ceased to confer such power on the district attorney from the expiration of the term at which it was made. We do not think so; there is no legal analogy from which such a conclusion can be drawn. When an order of court, directs a thing to be done, without limiting the time within which it must be performed, it continues to speak so long as the cause for making it exists, and the thing directed remains unaccomplished.

2. It is argued that the indictment is bad, because it does not allege that the bet was made on some particular election, and was dependant upon the result of that contest; that the allegation of the pendency of the general election for 1839, and that the bet was made upon the event of that election, is insufficient. Wethink the allegation is sufficient; the word “event” is as expressive as the word “result.” It means, issue, hap, chance, success, that follows doing any thing, and is appropriately used to express the idea, upon which the bet depended. The allegation of the pendency of the election, and that the defendant bet upon the event of that election is sufficient. It is not necessary that the indictment should alledge that the party bet upon the success of any particular candidate. The circuit court erred in quashing the indictment in this case. The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded to be proceeded in according to law.  