
    [110] ARMSTRONG v. DAVIS, BAIL OF CARSON.
    The rules of proceeding with regard to bail are according to the practice in the courts of Westminster.
    This was a rule to show cause why an exoneretur should not be entered on the bail piece, and all further proceedings against the bail stayed, upon the ground that the principal was dead.
    The answer to this was, that Davis had become fixed, by a return of non est inventus on the oa. sa. in May Term, 1791.
    Against this it was proved that the ea. sa. was delivered to-the sheriff during the term, not before the first day of it.
    
      Leake contended that it must lie in the sheriff’s office at least four days before the return, in order to affect the bail. He cited Highmore on Bail 81, 82; 2 Salk. 599; also Ball v. Manucaptors of Russel, 2 Rayd. 1176; and, to show that rules of practice ought to be adhered to, cited Hunt v. Cox, 3 Burr. 1360.
    
      R. Stockton said that the ea. sa. and return, in point of form, were unexceptionable; that the rule of its lying four days previous to its return, in the sheriff’s hands, was not a rule of law, or a general principle, but a mere regulation of practice, adopted in and confined to Westminster Hall, and never used here. Our sheriffs keep no offices. It is, so far as respects the bail, a formal thing to procure the return of non est inventus.
    
   Per Our.

The rule must be made absolute. We know of no other rules of proceeding respecting the liability of bail, than those which regulate it in the courts of Westminster. Without these, we are without any. I look upon the practice in this case to depend upon rules of court, and these rules on reason and justice. On the return of a ca. sa. non est inventus, the bail is bound. The extension of the time upon the sci. fa., I take to be founded on rules of practice.

The proceedings were stayed, and the bail exonerated.

Cited in Boggs v. Chichester, 1 Gr. 211; Kinny v. Muloch, 2 Harr. 335 ; Van Winkle v. Alling, 2 Harr. 448.  