
    Leo Felix CHARLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward SAUNDRY, I/O, Rodriguez, I/O, Depalma, I/O, Peters, I/O, James Dzurenda, I/O, Angel Quiros, I/O, Scott, I/O, Chance Martin, I/O, Mark Strange, I/O, James Taylor, I/O, Ricardo Ruiz, I/O, Pauline Husband, I/O, Mary Johnson, I/O, Patricia Ottolini, I/O, Clyde McDonald, I/O, Drouin, I/O, Scudder, I/O, Siliman, I/O, Daniel Martin, I/O, Theresa C. Lantz, I/O, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 08-3397-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 18, 2010.
    
      Leo Felix Charles, pro se, Uncasville, CT, for Appellant.
    Richard Blumenthal, Connecticut Attorney General (by Neil Parille, Assistant Attorney General), for Appellee.
    PRESENT: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges, and TIMOTHY C. STANCEU, Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Timothy C. Stanceu, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Leo Felix Charles, pro se, appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Nevas, /.), granting the Ap-pellees’ motion for summary judgment and sua sponte dismissing Appellant’s remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, and ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We also review de novo the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint under § 1915(e), bearing in mind that, under 1915(e)(2), a court may dismiss an action if satisfied that the action is frivolous. Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir.2001). An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact; i.e., where it is “based on an indisputably mer-itless legal theory,” or presents “factual contentions [which] are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327,109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (defining when an action is frivolous).

As an initial matter, we note that Appellant has failed to raise any arguments on appeal with respect to his claims other than those relating to the alleged sexual assault, inadequate medical care, and his transfer to a mental health facility. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that issues not raised in a pro se litigant’s appellate brief are waived). In any event, we conclude, for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned ruling, that the Appellees were entitled to summary judgment, and that Appellant’s remaining claims lacked an arguable basis in law or fact. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.  