
    Mark Allen BIR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. BO-298.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 13, 1987.
    Mark Allen Bir, pro se.
    
      No appearance by appellee.
   NIMMONS, Judge.

Appellant appeals from an order denying his Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 motion. We affirm.

The only ground alleged in the motion which merits discussion is that which states that the trial court, in conducting the plea dialogue after the entry of the defendant’s nolo contendere plea, failed to tell the defendant of “his right to preserve issues for appeal in the context of a nolo contendere plea.” It is one thing to fail to inform a defendant that by entering his plea he waives his right to appeal. See Diaz v. State, 439 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1983). That is entirely different from saying that a defendant who pleads nolo contendere must be informed, as a prerequisite to the validity of the plea, that the Court, in its discretion, may, if the defendant so requests, permit the defendant to appeal certain dispositive rulings which the trial court has made. Our research reveals no case which has interpreted Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.172 in such a distorted manner.

AFFIRMED.

ERVIN, J., concurs.

MILLS, J., dissents with written opinion.

MILLS, Judge,

dissenting.

I dissent. I would reverse the summary denial of appellant’s motion and remand for attachment of portions of the record conclusively showing appellant is entitled to no relief, or for further proceedings.

Appellant writes in his motion that the trial court “failed to appraise [sic] defendant of his right to preserve issues for appeal in the context of a nolo contendere plea as contemplated by Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.172(c)(iv).” In a memorandum of law attached to the motion, appellant makes it clear that the issues referred to are the trial court’s denial of various pretrial suppression motions. The majority finds the allegation facially insufficient. I do not.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(c)(iv) does not merely provide that the trial court should tell a defendant that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives his right to appeal. It provides that the trial court should determine that the defendant understands that “if he pleads guilty, or nolo contendere without express reservation of right to appeal, he gives up his right to appeal all matters relating to the judgment, including the issue of guilt or innocence, but he does not impair his right to review by appropriate collateral attack.” (emphasis supplied). In my view, the plain language of the rule requires that the trial court, before accepting a nolo contendere plea, determine that the defendant understands that he may reserve the right to appeal dispositive rulings in those cases where such rulings occurred. See Brown v. State, 376 So.2d 382 (Fla.1979). Reservation of the right to appeal such rulings is an important exception to the general rule that a plea of nolo contendere operates as a waiver of the right to appeal all matters relating to the judgment. The concepts are inextricably intertwined. Only if the defendant understands this dimension of a nolo contendere plea, can it be said that he has a full understanding of the significance of the plea. 
      
      . The original appeal (our docket number BK-129) from the subject order was earlier dismissed by this Court as untimely. However, appellant subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition seeking a belated appeal. The petition was granted and the instant appeal was allowed to proceed under docket number BQ-298. The original appeal in BK-129 was alluded to in another appeal involving another 3.850 motion filed by this appellant. See Bir v. State, 493 So.2d 55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
     
      
      . Rule 3.172(c) provides, in pertinent part:
      (c) * * * [x]he trial judge should, when determining voluntariness, place the defendant under oath and shall address the defendant personally and shall determine that he understands the following:
      
        
      
      (iv) That if he pleads guilty, or nolo conten-dere without express reservation of right to appeal, he gives up his right to appeal all matters relating to the judgment, including the issue of guilt or innocence, but he does not impair his right to review by appropriate collateral attack.
     