
    Richard WEAVER, Appellant, v. GOLD KIST, INC., Self-Insured, Appellee.
    No. AU-102.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 21, 1984.
    Eugene W. Harris of Smith, Cassidy, Platt & Harris, Lakeland, for appellant.
    Jack A. Langdon, of Jones & Langdon, Gainesville, for appellee.
   McCORD, GUYTE P., Jr. (Retired), Associate Judge.

In this worker’s compensation action, the claimant contends that the deputy commissioner erred in disregarding without reason the uncontroverted opinion of a physician, selected by the employer/carrier (E/C), that claimant needed psychiatric evaluation, and then denying claimant’s claim therefor. We agree, and remand to the deputy commissioner for clarification of the basis of his order denying the claim for psychiatric evaluation.

Claimant incurred a compensable injury to his neck and back in December, 1980. From the date of the injury until October, 1982, the E/C referred claimant to numerous orthopedic physicians because of continuing pain in the area of the injury. In October, 1982 claimant consulted Dr. Russell Sklenicka of the Watson Orthopedic Clinic, who examined claimant and subsequently submitted a report which stated that, although no objective physical findings explained claimant’s pain, claimant “need[ed] supportive care ... done on a neuro-psychiatric basis.” This opinion was the foundation of claimant’s subsequent claim against the E/C for a psychiatric evaluation. No additional evidence supporting the claim was adduced by claimant at the hearing thereon, nor did the E/C there attempt to refute the opinion of Dr. Sklenicka. The deputy denied the claim, stating in his order: “I disregard the report of Dr. Sklenicka and find that the claimant is not entitled to further medical attention of a psychiatric nature.”

This court said in Castro v. Florida Juice Division, 400 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), that

[although a deputy commissioner’s order does not have to state expressly that the testimony of a particular witness is not credible, see John Caves Land Development Co. v. Suggs, 352 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1977), the deputy should offer a sufficient reason for rejecting expert medical testimony, especially if such testimony is unrefuted.

Id. at 1282. We find that the deputy rejected the medical opinion relied on by claimant without providing a sufficient reason for that rejection.

We therefore remand to the deputy with instructions to order a psychiatric evaluation of claimant or enter an order clarifying the basis of his order denying psychiatric evaluation.

MILLS, J., concurs.

WENTWORTH, J., concurs specially with opinion.

WENTWORTH, Judge,

concurring specially.

Although I agree with the remand for more particular findings to facilitate our review of the denial of psychiatric evaluation, I find no parallel with the Castro decision and do not think it supports reversal of a deputy’s explicit rejection of a medical opinion absent articulation of a sufficient reason therefor. Instead, I think we should in most contexts read an explicit rejection as a determination of lack of credibility with the usual attendant presumptions on appeal. Remand in this case, however, is in order because the condition of the order and the record here makes any appellate review burdensome. 
      
      . The order contains no factual findings other than an orthopedic MMI without permanency, but the record reflects many circumstances potentially impacting the medical opinion in question, including lack of currency at the time of hearing as well as lengthy testimony from claimant, but also including unexplained testimony of a carrier witness that, “It is my understanding that if a person has reached maximum medical improvement from an orthopedic or neurological standpoint that there is no grounds for psychological impairment."
     
      
      . There the order contained no reference to the three medical experts in question (who might therefore have been overlooked), and the court reviewed the record to determine that no evidence supported rejection.
     