
    City of Chicago, Appellee, v. Alex Langer, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 23,163.
    (Not to he reported in full.)
    Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. William N. Gemmill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1917.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 31, 1917.
    Statement of the Case.
    Prosecution by the City of Chicago, plaintiff, against Alex Langer, defendant, for selling malt liquor in quantities of one gallon or more without obtaining a license so to do for the place of business where the liquor was sold, in violation of section 1553 of the Municipal Code of Chicago. From a judgment assessing against him a fine of $50, defendant appeals. The statement of facts recited that defendant was agent of a named distilling company and that he sold to a specified person, at such person’s residence, a case of twenty-four bottles of beer, exceeding one gallon in quantity, and delivered such beer at the purchaser’s residence, and that neither defendant nor the distilling •company had obtained a license for the place of business of the company, of which defendant was manager.
    Abstract of the Decision.
    1. Intoxicating liquobs, § 81
      
      —what is not defense in prosecution of agent of distilling company for selling without license. In a prosecution for selling malt liquor in excess of one gallon without having obtained a license, in violation of section 1553 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, it is no defense that in selling the liquor the defendant was acting as agent for a distilling company, where it also had no license.
    2. Intoxicating liquobs, § 122*—when complaint in prosecution for selling without license is sufficient. In a prosecution for selling malt liquor in excess of one gallon without having obtained a license, in violation of section 1553 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, requiring that the seller shall have a license for its place of business, it'is no defense that the complaint did not charge that defendant did not have a license to sell at the place at which the sale was made, the residence of the purchaser, where the evidence shows that he had a fixed place of business and that neither he nor the company employing him there had a license.
    Charles W. Stiefel, for appellant.
    Samuel A. Ettelson and Harry B. Miller, for appellee; Daniel Webster, of counsel.
    
      
      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
    
    
      
      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
    
   Mr. Presiding Justice Goodwin

delivered the opinion of the court.

3. Intoxicating liquobs, § 78 —when license ordinance contemplates sales elsewhere than at fixed places of business of sellers. Section 1553 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, providing for a license for persons selling malt liquor in quantities in excess of one gallon, contemplates that such sales will be made elsewhere than at the fixed places of business of the sellers.

4. Intoxicating liquobs, § 78*—when contention that ordinance against selling without license provides no penalty is without merit. On an appeal from a judgment in a prosecution for selling malt liquor without a license in violation of section 1553 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, there is no merit in the contention that no penalty is prescribed by that section, as the penalty is provided by section 1560.

5. Municipal Court op Chicago, § 29*—when assumed that court found that sections 1553 and 1560 of Municipal Code of Chicago were part of same article. On an appeal from a judgment in a prosecution for selling malt liquor without a license in violation of section 1553 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, it is not ground for reversal that section 1560, under which the penalty was imposed, provides a penalty for the violation of “any of the provisions of this article,” where the statement of claim recites that the two sections constitute “an ordinance” of the City of Chicago, and it will be assumed that the Municipal Court of Chicago, in taking judicial notice of the ordinances of the City of Chicago, found that the sections were a part of the same article'.

6. Municipal Court of Chicago, § 36*—when judicial notice tahen of city ordinances. The Municipal Court of Chicago has the right to, and does, take judicial notice of the ordinances of the City of Chicago in criminal cases.  