
    DOE ON DEMISE OF REBECCA CRUMP vs. JOSEPH H. THOMPSON.
    A declaration in a deed, that the land, conveyed by it, had been before granted to a certain person, is not evidence for the parties to the deed, that in fact it was thus granted.
    In cases of adverse possession of land, the statute of limitations begins to run from the ouster. If the one having the right be a feme covert, and the seven years have expired in the lifetime of her husband, she has three years, and only three, after the death of her husband, within which to commence her suit: when the seven years have not expired in the lifetime of her husband, the two periods of seven years from the ouster, and three years from the death of the husband are concurrent, until one of them shall have run out; and then the feme is entitled to the other and longer period, to enter or sue.
    Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Davidson .County, at the Spring Term 1849, his Honor Judge Dick presiding.
    The action was commenced on the 16th of August 1845. The plaintiff gave in evidence a grant for the premises to Thomas Monroe, dated on the 27th of November 1792, and that he died many years ago, and that the lessor of the plaintiff was his only child and heir at law, and intermarried with Mark Crump.
    The defendant gave in evidence a Patent to one Henry Dolin, dated in 1752, for a large tract of land, and a deed from Dolin to Edward Williams for the same land, and a deed from Williams to Richmond Pearson for certain lands, therein described by metes and bounds, and dated in 1791. The defendant gave no direct evidence to show, what land the said patent and deed covered or that they included any part of the premises in dispute. But the defendant gave in evidence a deed from the said Pearson to one Nathaniel Peebles, dated in 1817, conveying a certain tract of land in fee, which is therein described by metes and bounds and also as being part of a tract of land conveyed by Edward Williams to the said Pearson in the year 1791; and the defendant then gave evidence, that the deed to Peebles covered that part of the land, claimed by the plaintiff, of which the defendant .was in possession, and that he, the defendant, entered and claimed under the said Peebles.
    Thereupon, the counsel for the defendant moved the Court to instruct the jury, that the recital in the deed from Pearson to Peebles was sufficient evidence to satisfy the jury, that the patent to Dolin covered the premises in dispute. The Court refused to give the instruction.
    The defendant then offered evidence, that in the year 1837 or 1838, the land conveyed by Pearson to Nathaniel Peebles was divided between his heirs : and that the part thereof, which is covered by the grant to Monroe, was allotted to Hubbard Peebles, one of the heirs, under whom the defendant claims ; that Mark Crump, then the husband of the lessor of the plaintiff, was present at the time, and objected to the allotment thereof, but that, nevertheless, the said Hubbard took the possession of the land in dispute immediately, and he and those claiming under him have continued in possession ever since. The defendant further gave evidence, that Mark Crump died in November 1838, after the said Hubbard had taken possession.
    The counsel for the defendant thereupon prayed the Court to instruct the jury, that, if they should believe that Hubbard Peebles and those claiming under him had seven years continued possession of the premises, before the commencement of this suit, the lessor of the plaintiff’s right of entry was barred by the statute of the limitations. But the Court refused to give the instruction , and, on the contrary, directed the jury, that, although the defendant’s possession might have begun in 1837, yet the statute oí limitations did not bar, because the lessor of the plaintiff had seven years from the death of her husband in November 1838, in which to enter or bring suit; and that it was immaterial to this purpose, whether the possession of the defendant was under or in opposition to Mark Crump.
    Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
    No counsel for the plaintiff.
    /. T. Morehead, for the defendant.
   Ruffin, C. J.

The Court concurs with his Honor on the first point. One object of the defendant was to show the better paper title to be out of the lessor of the plaintiff, by virtue of a grant for the same land, prior to that of Monroe. But the only evidence he gave, that the two tracts, or parts of them, were identical, was, that Pearson’s deed to Peebles, after describing the land by corners, metes, and bounds, goes on to say, that the land was part of a tract one Williams conveyed to Pearson. But there is no warrant of authority or reason for the position, that a recital or description in a deed proves its own truth in favor of the party himself. Upon a question of boundary, it might perhaps be evidence, with other things, of the locality of a line of the patent, that the parties to an ancient deed therein called a particular line that of the patent. But, of itself, a declaration in a deed, that the land, conveyed by it, had been before granted to a certain person, is not evidence for the parties to the deed, that in fact it was thus granted.

On the point of the statute of limitations, however, the Court holds the opinion given to the jury to be wrong. It assumes, that the defendant’s possession may have begun in 1837, or so early in 1838, as to have continued for more than seven years before suit brought, and that it may have been adverse to Crump and wife at the beginning, yet it Concludes, that the Statute did not bar, because the wife has seven years from the death of the husband to enter. But that is clearly erroneous — being in direct contradiction to the words of the act. The Statute runs against all persons, as well femes covert as others, making the seven years, next after the right accrued, a bar ; with a proviso, however, that a person, who was a feme covert when her right first accrued, shall and may, notwithstanding the seven years be expired, commence her suit withift three years after discoverlure. The language of the act is as plain as it can be. The seven years began to run from the ouster of the owner,’when an action arose against the wrong doer. The possession was taken by Peebles adversely to Crump and wife, and there is no doubt the husband might have entered, in right of himself and his wife, or have brought an ejectment. Piad seven years expired in Crump’s life time, the proviso is explicit that the feme should have three years more, and only three, to commence her suit. Hut when the seven years have not expired in the life of the husband, as was not the case here, the two periods of seven years from the ouster, and three years from the death of the husband, are concurrent, until one of them shall have run out, and then the feme is entitled to the other and longer period to enter or sue. She derives no benefit from the proviso, therefore, unless the seven years from the ouster shall have expired, before the three years from her discovertnre. It was, consequently, wrong to make the death of the husband the terminus, from which t he seven years began to run. It is only the three years, which refer to that event; and the seven years never relate to it, but cnly to the period of the ouster. If, indeed, the defendant had entered under the husband, as upon a conveyance from him purporting to be for the fee,-then the lessor of the plaintiff would have had seven years from the husband’s death to bring suit. But that would be, not because the act gives the feme seven years from her hus* band’s death to bring suit, but because it gives her seven years from her right of entry and action accrued, and that would not accrue until the husband died ; for, the possession of the husband’s alienee would be consistent with the estate of the lessor of the plaintiff, until the death of the husband, and it would be upon that event only, that the possession would become adverse to her, so as to entitle her to an action. But here the ouster was in the time of the husband, and the adverse possession continued for more than seven years from the ouster, and also more than three years from the death of the husband. The case, therefore, was within the express words of the enacting clause of the Statute, and not within the saving of the proviso ; and^the jury ought to háve been instructed, that, upon the facts supposed, the statute was a bar.

Per Curiam. Judgment reversed, and venire de novo.  