
    Anderson v. Bernard.
    April Term, 1793.
    Nonpayment of Fees Due Deputy Clerk — Right of Sheriff to Distrain — Qumre. -If a Sheriff can distrain for nonpayment of fees stated in the Clerk’s hill, as due to the Deputy Clerk.
    This was an action of trespass, brought in the District Court of Prince Edward, by the appellant, against the appellee, for taking a saddle from his possession. Plea, not guilty. The defendant at the trial offered in evidence to Úie jury, a record of his qualification as a deputy sheriff, and also a witness to prove, that the defendant, as deputy sheriff, had seized the saddle in the declaration mentioned, to satisfy certain fees due in 1781, to the clerk of the General Court. The account of the fees due, and stated in the record to have been produced in evidence, is headed thus, “Dr. Thomas Anderson, to Adam Craig, deputy clerk, General Court.” To this evidence the plaintiff filed a bill of exceptions. Verdict and judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.
    Ronold for the appellant,
    contended, that the deputy clerk, was not entitled by law to demand fees from suitors, and therefore, the account offered in evidence, could not justify the sheriff in levying the distress. That these summary modes of enforcing *'the payment of debts, ought to be strictly pursued, to prevent oppression upon individuals.
    The sheriff saw his authority, and ought to have known, that no fees could be dis-trained for, but such, as were due to the principle officers of the courts. The evidence therefore, was improperly admitted by the court.
    Marshall for the appellee.
    By the act of 19th Geo. II. C. 1, 'i 12, the sheriff, if sued for levying a distress for officers fees, is permitted to plead the general issue, and to give in evidence the special matter of his justification.
    As to the mode of stating the account, by which the deputy clerk is made the creditor, no advantage can now be taken of it; because the account, though it appears in the record, is properly no part of'it, nor is it excepted to, as inadmissible testimony.
    
      
      Tffe principal case is cited In Mayor, etc., of Alexandria v. Chapman, 4 Hen. & M. 276; Greenhow y. Barton, 1 Munf. 593.
    
   The court being divided in opinion, the judgment was affirmed.  