
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jose William QUINTANILLA, also known as Pablo, also known as Ronko, Defendant-Appellant
    No. 16-20555 Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Filed October 25, 2017
    John Richard Berry, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carmen Castillo Mitchell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Mark Glendon Parenti, Parenti Law, P.L.L.C., Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Jose William Quintanilla appeals following his guilty-plea conviction for conspiring in the sex trafficking of children by force and coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). He argues that the district court’s refusal to hear his testimony at the sentencing hearing violated the Due Process Clause, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, U.S.S.G, § 6A1.3(a), and this court’s precedents.

Quintanilla entered his plea in accordance with a written plea agreement wherein he waived the right to appeal his conviction and sentence, except with the respect to his right to appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Government seeks to enforce the waiver. Our review whether the waiver provision bars the instant appeal is de novo. United States v. Jacobs, 635 F.3d 778, 780-81 (5th Cir. 2011). We construe the plea agreement “like a contract, seeking to determine the defendant’s reasonable understanding of the agreement and construing any ambiguity against the Government.” United States v. Farias, 469 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2006) (footnote omitted).

We need not reach whether the waiver encompasses Quintanilla’s challenge to the conduct of the sentencing hearing. Rather, our review of the record satisfies us that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hear testimony. See United States v. Jackson, 453 F.3d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Henderson, 19 F.3d 917, 927 (5th Cir. 1994).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     