
    French, Treasurer, v. Bobe, Assignee.
    
      Personal property in hands of assignee for creditors — Of manufacturing corporation — Being held and operated as before by corporation itself — Is subject to taxation and should be listed by assignee.
    
    Personal property in the possession of an assignee for the benefit of creditors of a manufacturing corporation, which is not being reduced 'to money for distribution among the creditors of the corporation, but is being held and operated, under the orders of the insolvency court, and at the joint request of the creditors of the assignee, in the conduct of a going business, such business being conducted as it had been theretofore by the corporation itself, is subject to taxation, and it is 'the duty of the assignee to list such property for taxation.
    (Decided March 26, 1901.)
    Error to the Circuit Court of Hamilton county.
    Tilden E. French, plaintiff in error, is the treasurer of Hamilton county... John B. Bobe, defendant in error, is the assignee in insolvency of The Jackson Brewing Company, a corporation having its principal place of business in the city of Cincinnati. The controversy out of which comes the present error proceeding arose in the court of insolvency of Hamilton county by the filing in that court, April 22, 1897, by French, as treasurer, of an application for an order upon the assignee to require him to pay certain state and county taxes upon personalty charged against him as such assignee on the duplicate of Hamilton county for the years 1894, 1895 and 1S96, and that he be further ordered and directed to make a correct return of all the property, moneys and credits in his hands for taxation for the year 1897. Issue was made up by answer and reply, and a trial had and judgment rendered in favor of the assignee, denying the application, from which the treasurer appealed to the court .of common pleas. That court upon trial, June 8, 1899, found the following facts, viz:
    “1. On the 3rd day of March, 1894, The Jackson Brewing Company, a corporation, operating a brewery and doing business in the city of Cincinnati, Hamilton county, Ohio, and being unable to pay its debts, filed its deed of assignment pursuant to the insolvent laws of the state of Ohio in the probate court of said county to John B. Bobe, assignee, for the benefit of its creditors, who accepted the trust and duly qualified as said assignee.
    “2. Upon the request and with the consent of all the creditors of the said Jackson Brewing Company, and pursuant to the orders of the said court made for that purpose, the said assignee was authorized immediately after the assignment to continue and did continue the business of the Company in the manufacture and sale of beer in the usual and ordinary way; and the assignee, ever since said time, has continued so to operate the business of said Company, and is still doing so, the debts of said Company having not yet been fully paid.
    
      u3. When the assignment Avas made the brewery plant and property was in very bad condition, and incapable, Avithout repairs and improvements, of successful operation. The assignee borrowed money and put it into the plant, to make it capable of operation, since which the operation of the brewery has been profitable. The assignee has paid the operating expenses, and repaid the costs of repairs and improvements from the earnings. He has also, from the earnings, paid off about 50 per cent, of the admitted mortgage debts of The Jackson Brewing Company, under orders of said court, but no part of the general and unsecured debts and liabilities thereof have yet been paid, or sufficient realized to pay any part thereof. The breAvery plant has not yet been converted into money, but some of the assets have been. There is a suit pending, on proceedings in error in the Supreme Court of Ohio, involving the question as to whether a certain amount of the mortgage bonds against said Company are valid obligations of The Jackson Brewing Company, the decision in the courts below having been against the validity thereof.
    “4. That the said John B. Bobe, as assignee of the said Jackson Brewing Company for the benefit of its creditors, stands charged on the tax duplicates of Hamilton county, as set forth in the application herein of Tilden R. French, county treasurer. The said John B. Bobe, assignee for the benefit of the creditors, refused to list any property for taxation, and the same was listed by the assessor, and the said taxes so charged have never been paid by the said John B. Bobe, assignee, and no part thereof; the said charges on the said tax duplicates, as returned by the assessor, were made upon the tangible personal property employed in the conduct of said business by the assignee, and being the property in his hands as assignee for the benefit of creditors.”
    By reference to the records of the probate and insolvency courts it appears that, by inventory and appraisement filed March 30, 1894, the assets of the corporation were appraised at $138,298.09, and that the liabilities amounted tó $134,505.10; that the order of March 7, 1894, authorizing a continuance of the business, directed the assignee to employ labor, purchase materials and supplies necessary to prevent waste, to preserve the property and assets and to manufacture beer in the usual and ordinary way until further orders; that February 9, 1895, the case was transferred to the court of insolvency; that that court, August 30, 1895, upon a written application of the creditors and the assignee, being satisfied that it would be for the advantage of the creditors that the business be continued by the assignee, ordered that said business be continued by him as theretofore until March 6, 1896, and until the further order of the court.' Also, that October 23,1897, the assignee made a report to the court showing, among other things, that the sales of the company for the year preceding the assignment were 14,715 barrels of beer, those of the first year under the assignment were 21,813, of the second year, 26,070, of the third year, 31,500, and the fourth year (estimated), 35,000; that substantial and necessary improvements and repairs of ice machine plant, boilers and engines, and machinery generally, as well as additions, etc., had been made; that he had reduced one mortgage on the plant from $24,-636.20 to $5,000; had paid from earnings for betterments, repairs and improvements aggregating $44,-455.18; also preferred claims, $1,446.18, his own services, $13,300; his attorneys, $1,500, for salaries and pay rolls, $89,678.73; that he had loaned the estate of his own money $3,000 in 1894, and during succeeding years sums amounting in the aggregate to $20,500, all of which was necessary for the successful conduct of the business, and all of which he has since repaid to himself; that there remained in merchandise indebtedness of the estate, which was due for current expenses and costs of administration, about $500; that he had cash on hand in bank $20,288.26; government stamps $1,700.87, and 7,272 barrels of beer in the cellar; that there had been large additions to the machinery, horses, wagons and cooperage, all paid for, and a sufficient quantity of supplies and materials, all paid for, to maintain the business in its present demands, and that the plant is in a much better condition than at the date of assignment. Having no need for at least $15,000 of the cash on hand he desired an order directing its payment on debts, and such order was made. The sales by the assignee have been of the manufactured products. No attempt has been made to sell the brewery plant or the personal property used in the manufacture of beer.
    Upon the facts found by the common pleas thax court adjudged that the assignee pay the taxes so claimed from moneys in his possession as assignee, and that he list the personal property for taxation during his continuance in the operation of the brewery. This judgment was reversed by the circuit court, and the treasurer brings error.
    
      Gideon G. Wilson; Otway J. Gosgrave and Oliver B. Jones, county solicitors, for plaintiff in error.
    The question to be determined in this case is whether tangible. personal property in the hands of an assignee for the benefit of creditors, and used by the assignee in continuing the business operated under the orders of the coxirt of insolvency, is chargeable with taxes, and whether, it is the duty of such assignee to list such property so held by him for taxation, and to pay the taxes levied thereon.
    The claim of the plaintiff in error is that property held and used by the assignee in operating and running the brewery is subject to taxation in the same manner as other property, and that the assignee should list the same for taxation and pay the taxes thereon while so holding it.
    Section 2, article 12, of the constitution provides that: “Laws shall be passed taxing by uniform rule * * * all real and personal property, * * * but burying grounds, public school houses and houses used exclusively for public worship, institutions of purely public charity, public property used exclusively for any public purpose, and personal property to an amount not exceeding in value |200 for each individual, may, by general laws, be exempted from taxation.” Pursuant to this constitutional provision, section 2731, Revised Statutes, provides that: “All property, whether real or personal, in this state, and whether belonging to individuals or corporations, * * * shall be subject to taxation except only such as may be expressly exempted therefrom.” Section 2732, and the sections supplemental thereto, specifically provide for all exemptions which have been allowed by the general assembly under the authority of the section of the constitution above quoted. Exemptions from taxation are strictly construed, and must be expressed in clear and unmistakable terms. Cincinnati College v. State, 19 Ohio, 110; Library Assn. v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St., 253; Lee v. Sturges, 46 Ohio St., 153; Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S., 511, 521. All property must bear an equal and just proportion of the burden of taxation. Toledo Bank v. Toledo, 1 Ohio St., 622.
    Our opponents will hardly claim that any of the property sought to be taxed in this case is exempt from taxation by direct provision.' Rut it will probably be contended, m order to avoid the listing and payment of taxes thereon by the assignee, that the several creditors should each be taxed on his interest in said property. Section 2734, Revised Statutes, provides who shall list personal property, and among other things, that the property “of every person for whose benefit property is held in trust” shall be listed “by the trustees.” Sections 2735 and 2736 provide where and when property shall be listed for taxation. Section 2737 provides for a distinct statement of the several classes of personal property under separate numbered paragraphs. The paragraphs named in the statute applicable to the property held by the assignee in this case, are: (1) horses, (3) mules, (7b) wagons, etc., (7f) office furniture, etc., (12) average value of articles purchased, held as a manufacturer, (12a) average value of articles on hand, manufactured, etc., (12b) tools, engines, machinery, etc., (13) moneys. This section also provides, under the 14th item, for listing the amount of credits as defined by section 2730, and provides that no indebtedness can be deducted from any item enumerated in the section except from the 14th item. In the returns that have been made on which it is sought to collect taxes in this proceeding, nothing has been listed under the 14th item, only “the tangible personal property employed in the conduct of the business;” therefore, for the purpose of determining whether taxes should be paid, it is immaterial whether this estate is insolvent or not. The other side makes the argument that the creditors of this estate should separately list their credits and in that way the entire property would be at once listed for taxation, except a possible surplus which should be listed by the assignor. In answer to this it is sufficient to say that no creditor owns any particular horse, or any certain interest therein, nor any particular piece of machinery, barrel of beer, or any specific part of the tangible property required to be scheduled under section 2737, and, therefore, could not, in the way prescribed by that section, list his beneficial interest or credit. We also call attention to section 2742, which requires every manufacturer to list for taxation certain property in accordance with its terms. Even though Mr. Bobe is an assignee for the benefit of creditors, he is in that capacity, while carrying on his business, a manufacturer, and is by the terms of this section required to list property, for taxation. It is contended that because the chapter on insolvent debtors in no place makes it the specific duty of the assignee iri trust for creditors, as such, to list or pay the taxes upon the personal property, that it is therefore intended in the law that he should be free from that duty. Section 6355, however, provides that all taxes of every description assessed against the assignor on any personal property held by him before his assignment, shall be paid by the assignee or trustee, out of the proceeds of the property assigned in preference to any other claims against the assignor. It is claimed that because this provision refers only to taxes “assessed against the assignor” that therefore taxes assessed against the assignee after the assignment are not contemplated ; but it seems to us under the general provisions of the chapter on taxation that it Avould more readily appear that the duty of listing and paying the taxes assessed against himself would go as matter of course against the assignee, especially as section 6357 expressly authorizes the allowance by the court of all actual and necessary expenses of the assignment. • Surely taxes which in all other business enterprises are such might in assignments be considered an actual and necessary expense.
    Our opponents rely upon the case of McNeill v. Hagerty, 51 Ohio St., 255. The cases are not analogous. In the McNeill case the securities were not held by the assignee as an investment for the sake of interest, but were in that form for temporary purposes only, being held subject to the order of the probate court, and might be required to be converted into money and that money distributed at any time. Here, in the case at bar, the entire investment in the hands of the assignee is being used for the purpose of making money, and under the skillful management of those having the estate in charge it has not only made money, but has added to the manufacturing plant and increased its value, and it will not do to say that the respective equitable interests of the creditors should be separately returned by each of them as a credit and in that way the property would be listed for taxation, because even if it Avere in practice possible or practicable for each creditor to list the value of his claim, there would then be a large residuum belonging to the assignor company which would go free from taxation, unless it were either returned by such assignor or by the assignee. Taxes paid would be a proper expense. See generally Ex. Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St., 1; Rheinboldt v. Raine, 52 Ohio St., 160, and Lee v. Sturges, 46 Ohio St., 153.
    
      The decisions in other states hold such property liable for taxes. The weight of authority is to the effect that property in the hands of a trustee, whether a receiver or assignee, or any other of the numerous classes of trustees, is liable for taxation. State Clark Pros. v. Grover, Collector, 37 N. J. L., 174; Schmidt, Treas., v. Failey, Receiver, 148 Ind., 150; N. J. & C. R. R. Co. v. Comrs., 41 N. J. L., 235; George v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 44 Fed., 117; Ex parte Chamberlain, 55 Fed., 704; Central Trust Co. v. Railway Co., 26 Fed., 11; Dunlap v. Gallatin County, 15 Ill., 7; Jack v. Weiennett, 115 Ill., 105; Spalding M. C. v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky., 135; People v. Lardner, Treas., 30 Cal., 243; Stevens v. N. Y. & O. M. R. R. R. R. Co., 13 Blatch., 104.
    
      Kramer & Kramer, and Latcrence ila.rwell, for defendant in error.
    Brief of Kramer & Kramer.
    
    The statute regulating the mode of administering assignments in Ohio contemplate and provide for two general methods of settlement. The one has reference to the property of the assignor, not engaged at the time of the assignment in a manufacturing business; the other to the property and business of a manufacturing concern, the continuation of which for a time within the discretion of the court, is essential to the preservation of the property and its ultimate sale. The one method is provided by section 6350 and the other by section 6350h. The business of the assignor in this case being that of manufacturing and selling beer, the court under the latter section ordered the business to be continued by the assignee until the further order of the court. The same section provides that the court may order the discontinuance of the business, when deemed advisable, so that the order to continue and to discontinue, are confided exclusively to the sound discretion of the court of insolvency. This wise provision of the statute is peculiarly adapted to the exigencies of a case of this character. Here was the brewery with a certain amount of unfinished material on hand, with beer in the process of manufacture, possessed of machinery out of repair which required improving for the finishing of the material. The claim made by the treasurer practically amounts to this: that the assignee who, under the order of the court, administers the property pursuant to section 63501i of the statute is required to list and pay taxes upon the personal property assigned to him. While on the other hand, property administered by the assignee under section 6350 of the same general statute, is not so required. No such distinction is made by the statute and none can be implied. Nowhere in the entire act regulating the mode of administering assignments for creditors can there be found any obligation resting upon the assignee in relation, to the payment of taxes upon personal property held by him in trust for the benefit of creditors except under section 6355. That section provides that “All taxes of every description assessed against the assignor upon any personal property held by him before his assignment, shall be paid by the assignee or trustee out of the proceeds of the property assigned, in preference to any other claims against the assignor.” This sole provision, therefore, negatives the idea that any other taxes are chargeable against the property held by the assignee under any section of the statute. It would seem that if any intention of the legislature existed to make such property chargeable in the hands of an assignee for taxes, after the assignment is made, the section which provides for the payment of taxes assessed against the assignor would also have provided for the listing and payment of taxes upon such property after the same came into the hands of the assignee. If not under that section, under some other; either under the general statutes relating to taxation, or under the act relating to assignments for the benefit of creditors. The method employed in continuing the business of the assignor, by manufacturing its product, maintaining its goodwill, and preserving its machinery, looking to, as contemplated by the statute, the final sale for the benefit of the creditors, instead of at once selling out at unnecessarily sacrificing prices, can make no difference in the principle governing the question of taxes. If an assignee for the benefit of creditors is not required by law to list the property in his hands while administering it, the fact that the assignee is using it in carrying on the business, it seems to us, cannot create any new liability for taxes which did not exist before.
    We have supposed that the law had been settled in this state by this court. In McNeill v. Hagerty, 51 Ohio St., 255, this court held: “Personal property, whether in the form of moneys, bills receivable, bonds, certificates of stock, or otherwise, held by an assignee of an insolvent debtor whose estate is being settled in the probate court, is not subject to taxation, and it is not the duty of such assignee to make return of the assets of such estate to the county auditor for taxation.” It is urged, however, that the assignee was there strictly following the statute,, which, it is claimed, provides for the entire winding up of the assigned estate. The record in this cause shows that the assignee was also strictly following the statute with the, object of winding up the estate. Can the time within which the estate is settled make any difference touching the question of taxation? Time is not the essence of the obligation. It is said that because the property is not at once converted into money and distributed it is subject to taxation. The section of the statute which authorizes the continuance of the business has in view the ultimate sale of all the property, and its conversion into money at such time as the court orders the discontinuance. The time within which the sale is to be had is within the sole discretion of the court. The assignee is but the officer of the court in the administration of the assignment whether it be in the immediate or ultimate sale of the property. This court has already held that the only section of the statute under which any pretense of claim might be made, namely, section 2734, does not apply to an assignee of an insolvent who administers the same under the orders of the court. The power of taxation, it is true, is inherent in the government. It is, however, strictly a legislative power. “The courts cannot control its exercise unless such exercise conflicts with the constitutional limitations.” Wheeling Trans. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S., 273; Porter v. Rockport, 76 Ill., 561; Board of Education v. McLandsborough, 36 Ohio St., 227, 232.
    Unless, therefore, the case under consideration, can be distinguished from that of McNeill v. Hagerty, supra, it would seem useless .to consider any other question. We maintain that it cannot be. It is urged that receivers of corporations are required to list for taxation. While that is true, it is so by virtue of the statute. There can be no analogy between the relation of an assignee of an insolvent company to that of a receiver, within the meaning of the tax laws. The possession and control of the property of a company by a receiver is within the ultimate object of returning the property to the corporation itself. The possession and administration of the property of an insolvent by an assignee is for its ultimate sale and distribution of proceeds to the creditors, not to the corporation itself. In the administration by an assignee the proceedings are had under a statute which provides “that all the property shall be devoted absolutely to the payment of the debts of the corporation.” The duty of the assignee to convert assigned property into money is not affected by the authority under section 6850h, to continue the business; the business is not to be continued, under the insolvent laws, with a vieAv of turning the property back, but to sell it in the discretion of the court so that it may be wound up and in its place shall be realized money to be distributed ratably to the creditors. A receiver is appointed by a court of equity, which has the power, even upon objection of creditors, to return the property to the corporation when the purpose for which the receiver is appointed is accomplished. No power exists on the part of the court, however, to return the property to the assignor without the consent of each and every creditor, however large or small his claim may be. Equitably the title is vested in them; no title whatever is vested in creditors of a corporation for which a receiver is appointed.
    The argument also,made is that section 6357 authorized the allowance by the court of all actual and necessary expenses of the assignment, that the payment of taxes would be an actual and necessary expense. No construction, however, of that kind has been placed by this court upon that section of the statute in considering the case of McNeill v. Hagerty, supra. If such construction should be given it would be equally applicable in cases where the court did not order a continuation of the business wdth the property until ready for sale. It could not be considered as an expense unless it was legally allowable as such.
    We claim that there is not even a distinction between this case and the other on the facts so far as the subject matter against which taxes are claimed to be chargeable is concerned. After all, the question involved here is the same as was involved in the other case. As the taxes charged are against the res, the property, not for the right to carry on the business, we can see no distinction even in the facts between the two cases. Hence there can be no distinction in the law. If this property is subject to taxation it would result in double taxation, equally so as to property involved in the case cited. The courts will always avoid a construction of the statute which results in double taxation unless the legislative intent be clear. Cooley on Tax., 225.
    If the judgment of the common pleas, which the petition in error in this court seeks to affirm, is restored, the effect would be to defeat the control and administration of the estate in the court of insolvency. Thus the very object of the statute authorizing that court to order the property to be employed in running the business, would be defeated. The original and exclusive jurisdiction in the court of insolvency in determining how long the business should continue and when it should terminate will be interfered 'With and taken from the control of the court itself. The jurisdiction of that court in the administration and settlement of insolvency estates is original and exclusive. Lindeman v. Ingham, 36 Ohio St., 114; Saylor v. Simpson, 45 Ohio St., 141; Clapp v. Bank
      
      ing Co., 50 Ohio St., 528. The principle of law for which we contend, applicable to the case under consideration, is sustained by the authorities. Lancaster School Directors v. Rathbone, 30 P. St., 533; Brooks v. Hartford, 61 Conn., 112; State v. Irons, Collector, 35 N. J., 464; State v. Staats, 39 N. J., 653.
   Spear, J.

The question arising upon the record is this: Is the personal property in the possession of an assignee for the benefit of creditors of a manufacturing corporation, which estate is not being reduced to money for distribution among the creditors of the corporation, but is being held and operated under the orders of the insolvency court at the joint request of the creditors and the assignee, as a going business, such business being conducted as it had been theretofore by the corporation itself, subject to taxation, and is it the duty of the assignee to list such property for taxation?

From a consideration of section 2 of article 12 of the constitution, respecting taxation, and of sections 2731, 2732 and 2734, Revised Statutes, relating to the same subjects it is manifest that property thus in possession of the assignee is subject to taxation, and that it is his duty to list it for taxation, unless the same is exempt by direct provisions of law or by fair inference from all the legislation bearing on the subject. It was the opinion of the insolvency court and of the circuit court, and is urged in argument by counsel for defendant in error, that it should be held to be exempt, and that the case is ruled in favor of the assignee by the case of McNeill, Assignee, v. Hagerty, Auditor, 51 Ohio St., 255. We are of opinion that the property is not exempt and that the case, at bar is so clearly distinguishable from the ease cited, that its decision is not controlled by that case. That action was an application for an injunction to prevent the auditor from enforcing against the assignee' a claim for taxes based upon a return made by the assignee under threat to take legal steps against him for failing to make return, and looking to an attempt at distraint in case the taxes were not paid. It appeared that the entire assets in the hands of the assignee were collectible notes for property sold by him and cash on hand, amounting in all to $25,910.90; that the debts of the assignor aggregated $65,000; that there could be paid creditors a dividend of between thirty and thirty-five per cent, only, and that the assets awaited an order of distribution to creditors. The assignee’s claim was that the assets were in his hands as an officer of the probate court, subject to an order of distribution so soon as the same could be made, and that the beneficial interest in the property thus held was in the creditors, and that to the extent of the value of- the claims of the creditors against the assignor such claims were, under the law, required to be returned for taxation by the creditors, and not by the assignee, and hence an injunction should be allowed against the auditor. This claim was sustained by the trial court and by this court. That the condition in the present case is an essentially different one, recurrence to the facts heretofore recited will abundantly show. There the indebtedness largely exceeded the value of the assets, and the assignee was proceeding strictly under section 6346, Revised Statutes, and following, to. reduce the assigned property to money and close out the estate by a distribution of the proceds among the creditors. He had sold all the property and held only its avails; he was neither holding the property of the assignor, or any of it, nor operating the business. Here the appraised value of the property exceeds the indebtedness. The assignee is not selling, and has not attempted to sell, any oíf the assigned property, but is proceeding under section 6350h, to operate the plant. That section gives authority to the court, upon the written application of three-fourths in number and amount of the creditors and upon being satisfied that it Avill be for the advantage of the creditors, to order the assignee to continue to carry on the business of the assignor, and, with the approval of all concerned, he has been, under the court’s order, thus conducting a beer manufacturing plant for six years and over. It has been a sort of partnership affair. The corporation having ceased to do business because insolvent, and the property thus being held in trust for the benefit of creditors, they — the cestuis que trustent — have, in effect, invested the property in a scheme to continue the business, and the assignee has advanced his own personal funds in the venture. Large and valuable additions have been made to the plant, its productive capacity greatly increased, its volume of yearly business more than doubled, much of the original indebtedness discharged, and the business transformed from a losing affair to a prosperous one, with a fair promise of finally discharging all debts and leaving to the corporation a surplus. Thus the business has been conducted like any other business of similar character and has proved a source of profit apparently to all concerned, and yet has yielded to the state no taxes during all these years. A controlling distinction between the case cited and the present case at bar is that in the former the assigned property had been sold and the estate was, in substance as well as form, being settled in the probate court, while in this case the assigned property is being held and operated in the management of a manufacturing business, and the estate is thus being continued as before, but is not being settled. Hence, the rule of law applied to the McNeill case has not application to the present case.

In substance, and in all essential particulars, the position of the assignee in this case is much like that of a receiver. He is clothed with the legal title to the property of which he has possession (which cannot be said as to a receiver), but in no other particular is there any real difference. He has held, and is holding, the property, not for the purpose of sale and distribution, but for the purpose of operating the same for profit. Indeed the very order which directs him to operate in effect forbids him to. sell. It may be conceded that in form, and from the strict legal standpoint, the estate is in the court of insolvency for settlement, but in reality it is not being settled, but, on the other hand, the arrangement amounts to an investment of the creditors’ money in the management of a going concern. There is no present effort nor purpose to sell, but simply a purpose to hold and operate. As a receiver, if directed by the court, manages the property in the interest of creditors, so this assignee manages under the Order of the court for the benefit of creditors; and as a receiver, where all debts and expenses have been paid, may be ordered by the court to turn over the remaining property to the original debtor, so may the assignee in case all of the debts of this corporation, including the expenses of the trust, are satisfied, be required to reconvey the remaining property to the assignor. Each is equally an officer of the court and bound to carry out its behests. As a general rule.it may be stated that there is no sound principle upon which the property of a person or corporation in the hands of a receiver to be managed for the interests of those concerned, can be regarded as exempt from the burden of taxation; and this principle is distinctly recognized in our statute, by the requirement of section 2734, defining by whom property shall be listed for taxation: “Of corporations whose assets are in the hands of receivers, by such receivers.” In spirit this requirement applies to the case at bar.

Our conclusion is that the property in the hands of the defendant in error, as assignee, is subject to taxation, and that it is the duty of such assignee to list it for that purpose.

The judgment of the circuit court will be reversed and that of the common pleas affirmed.

Reversed.

Minshall, C. J., and Williams, Burket, Davis, and Shauck,'JJ., concur.  