
    PEOPLE State of Illinois, Respondent, v. William E. DAY, Petitioner.
    No. 124518
    Supreme Court of Illinois.
    May 22, 2019
    Petition for Leave to Appeal Denied.
    In the exercise of this Court's supervisory authority, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, is directed to vacate sections E and F of its opinion in People v. Day, case No. 4-16-0217 (01/22/19), regarding defendant's claims for an additional day of presentence credit and an additional $ 5 of per diem credit. With regard to these claims, the appellate court is directed to remand the case to the circuit court where the defendant may raise these contentions of error in sentencing as set forth in Supreme Court Rule 472.
    Burke, J., joined by Neville, J., dissenting from denial of the petition for leave to appeal with entry of a supervisory order. Dissent attached.
    JUSTICE BURKE, dissenting from denial of the petition for leave to appeal with entry of a supervisory order:
    ¶1 For the reasons stated in my dissents in People v. Griffin, No. 122549 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2019) (supervisory order), and People v. Rios-Salazar, No. 123052 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2019) (supervisory order), I disagree with the majority's use of supervisory authority in this case to summarily vacate, without explanation, portions of the judgment of the appellate court. As I explained in Griffin and Rios-Salazar, this court may not permanently reverse or vacate a judgment of the appellate court without providing a legal basis for that action. Merely invoking the words "supervisory authority" is not a legal explanation for why the appellate court erred, nor is it a legal justification for vacating a reasoned disposition of the appellate court.
    ¶2 This case aptly illustrates the problem of inappropriate use of our supervisory authority. The appellate court below held, in part F of its opinion, that the defendant was not entitled to an additional $5 of per diem credit because he was not incarcerated on the day for which he sought the credit. People v. Day, 2019 IL App (4th) 160217, ¶ 73. This holding may be legally correct or incorrect; I express no opinion on that question. However, the appellate court's ruling stands as a binding determination that precludes the defendant from recovery. Yet the majority simply eliminates this ruling without offering any legal reason for doing so. This is more like rule by decree than rule by law. The majority's failure to provide a legal justification for its actions is a clear abuse of this court's supervisory authority. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
   ¶3 JUSTICE NEVILLE joins in this dissent.  