
    Colquhoun and others against New-York Firemen Insurance Company.
    Where an insurance was effected during the late war with Great Britainf on goods frorn Norfolk to Lisbon, and the policy contained a warranty that the vessel should have a genuine British license on board: and the vessel sailed with, and had such license on board at the time of the loss: held, that as the taking of such license was unlawful, and subjected the vessel to forfeiture, the policy was void.
    THIS was an action of assumpsit on a policy of insurance on 1,000 barrels of flour, valued at the sum insured, which was 12,766 dollars, from Petersburg to Norfolk, on hoard of crafts or vessels; and at and from Norfolk to Lisbon, on hoard the ship Debby 8/ Eliza. The policy was dated the' 8th of February, 1813, and contained a warranty, that the vessel should have a genuine British license on board; and that the cargo should he in conformity to the license. The cause was tried before Mr. J. Spencer, at the New-York sittings, in April, 1817.
    The vessel set sail on the voyage intended, on the 5th of March, 1813, and proceeded as far as Hampton Roads, when the master, understanding that the Chesapeake was blockaded by a British squadron,'put back, and the voyage was discontinued ; and on the 15th of March the plaintiffs abandoned. It was proved that the vessel had a genuine British license on board at the time she sailed, and until her return.
    A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, by consent, subject to the opinion of the court, on a case in which the above facts were stated.
    
      T. A. Emmet, for the plaintiff.
    
      Wells, and S. Jones, jun. for the defendants.
    
      The counsel declined arguing the cause, as the question had been before raised and discussed, but submitted it-to the consideration of the court on the facts of the case.
   Spencer J.

delivered the opinion of court. Whether the defence urged ought to have been set up, was a question for the consideration of the defendants only ; we are called upon to pronounce the law of the case, without regard to honorary considerations.

The objection is, that the voyage was illegal, and if it be so, there is an end of the question; for any contract founded upon an illegal voyage, partakes of the character of that voyage, and stands or falls with it.

The court do not propose, upon a ease submitted by the parties without argument, to go into much discussion. By reference to the cases of the Julia, (8 Cranch, 189.) the Aurora, (8 Cranch, 219.) the Hiram, (1 Wheaton, 440.) and the Ariadne, (2 Wheaton, 147.) it will abundantly appear, that the supreme court of the United States have repeatedly decided, that the mere sailing under an enemy’s license, without regard to the object of the voyage, or the port .of destination, constituted, of itself, an act of illegality which subjected the ship and cargo to confiscation; that it was an attempt by one individual of a belligerent country to clothe himself with a neutral character, by the license oí the other belligerent, and thus to separate himself from the common character of his own country.

This doctrine we consider sound, and not only warranted, but required, by the duty of allegiance which every citizen owes to his country. The converse of the proposition laid down, cannot be endured for an instant. It would go the whole length of justifying a citizen of one of the belligerents, in holding a correspondence with the enemy, .and in lending himself to them in furtherance of their views, in direct hostility to the views and interests of his own government. In short, it would open the door to the most trea* sonable correspondence with, and aid to, the enemy.

Were it necessary to show, that in this case, the shipment was to promote the views, and subserve the interests of the enemy, the license under which the vessel, sailed, affords the most incontestible evidence of the fact. The court forbear going into the evidence, as they do not found their opinion on the fact, that the voyage was undertaken to supply the enemy; but on the broad ground, that the enemy’s license, per se, was a cause of forfeiture.

Judgment for the defendants.  