
    ZHE XING FANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-4177.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 12, 2014.
    
      Ramesh K. Shrestha, New York, N.Y., for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Richard M. Evans, Assistant Director; Nancy E. Frieman, Senior Litigation Counsel; Zorba C. Leslie, Law Clerk, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Zhe Xing Fang, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of the September 21, 2012, decision of the BIA affirming an August 30, 2011, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhe Xing Fang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Sept. 21, 2012), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 30, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

In order to qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, Fang was required to demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in resistance to China’s family planning policies; and (2) he suffered harm rising to the level of persecution or had a well-founded fear or likelihood of suffering such harm as a direct result of his resistance. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 313 (2d Cir.2007). Contrary to Fang’s contention, the BIA reasonably determined that impregnating his then-girlfriend did not constitute resistance, id. at 313, and Fang does not contend that he engaged in any other act of resistance before authorities detained and fined him.

Even assuming that Fang’s confrontation with family planning officials, several years after his detention, constituted resistance he did not establish that he was subjected to persecution on account of this resistance. Rather, he testified that the police were called to arrest him, but he hid at a friend’s house, and that he remained in China, unharmed, for more than one year after, this incident. One unsuccessful attempt to arrest him does not rise to the level of persecution. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir.2006).

Fang also contends that the BIA engaged in improper fact-finding in concluding, contrary to the IJ, that his detention and fine were not on account of his resistance to the family planning policies. But whether Fang established “other resistance” is a question of law, and the BIA relied only on facts found by the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(h) (providing that BIA reviews questions of law de novo); cf. Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2012) (“The BIA ... is on sound ground in its view that de novo review applies to the ultimate question of whether the applicant has sustained her burden to establish that her subjective fear of persecution is objectively reasonable.”).

The agency also reasonably concluded that Fang failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that absent solid support in the record for the petitioner’s assertion that he would be persecuted, his fear was “speculative at best”). In making this determination, the agency noted that Fang’s wife remained in China unharmed, he alleged he was now permitted under the family planning policy to have a second child, and Chinese officials were not looking for him. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir.1999) (determining that petitioner’s fear of future persecution was diminished when similarly-situated relatives continued to live in petitioner’s native country without harm).

Finally, because the agency did not err in finding that Fang failed to demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution, it reasonably denied him asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, as the claims were all based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  