
    THE ALEXANDRIA, LOUDOUN AND HAMPSHIRE R. R. v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 16328.
    Decided May 18, 1891.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    The claimant presents his claim to the War Department in 1862, and to the accounting officers in 1886. At their request the claim is referred to this court by the Secretary of the Treasury.
    I. Where a claim is referred to this court under the Devised Statutes, $ 1063, it must appear that it was presented to the proper Department within six years, or it will be barred by the statute of limitations.
    II. The War Department is the proper Department for a claim for railroad supplies furnished to the Army. If the claim remains in the War Department, neither allowed nor transmitted to the accounting officers, the Secretary of the Treasury can not refer it.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of this case as found by the court:
    The claim or matter in the above-entitled cause was transmitted to the court by the Secretary of the Treasury, under the provisions of section 1063. of the Revised Statutes, on the 11th day of September, 1888.
    I. Thomas J. Power was employed by the War Department in the capacity of civil engineer from May 1,1861, to March 17, 1862, at first in connection with the construction of bridges on the Northern Central Railway, and afterwards, under R. F. Morley, general manager United States military railroads, in charge of employes on the Alexandria and Washington Railroad, the Long Bridge, the railroad on Sixth street, Washington, and other similar labor, and bought material for the Government, and was intrusted with public moneys. Under direction of the Secretary of War he examined and repaired the Alexandria, Loudon and Hampshire Railroad.
    
      II. While acting as set forth in finding i, said Power purchased of said Alexandria, Loudoun and Hampshire Eailroad railroad supplies, such as oil, picks, lumber, spikes, frogs, chairs, ties, etc., then reasonably worth the sum of $3,043.49, which were used by him in the repairs and maintenance of the Orange and Alexandria Eailroad, then iu possession of the United States. Said Power also took from said Alexandria, Loudoun and Hampshire Eailroad one baggage car and three gondola cars for use upon the Orange and Alexandria Eailroad; these cars were not returned; they were worth the sum of $2,700. These cars were in the station of the plaintiffs, and defendants brought an engine there and took them away; there is no further proof as to the nature of this taking; plaintiffs were not asked for the cars and did not give permission to take them; there was no communication between the parties upon the subject of these cars. March 15,1802, an itemized bill of the property used as aforesaid was presented to the Secretary of War for payment by the president of the Alexandria, Loudoun and Hampshire Eailroad Company, and referred by that officer to the Quartermaster-General, and by the Quartermaster-General disallowed, on the ground that the property was captured by the Army of the United States, with the road, and that the road and property were then in the military possession of the United States; that the company was understood to be disloyal, the stockholders, or a majority of them, aiding and abetting the rebellion, and that if the president should happen to be loyal, he probably would be repudiated by the stockholders and directors. This decision was not made known to the railroad company, and when they learned of- it they were unable to find the papers in the War Department until 1873, although they endeavored to do so. A copy of the amount was again presented to the Quartermaster-General for payment September 11, 1873. On November 11,1873, the said president of the railroad was informed that the account had been “ disallowed,” on the ground that the “ road and property of the company which fell into the hands of the Government was captured property;” also that the act of July 4,1864, and amendment of February 19, 1867, prohibited the “Executive Departments paying claims of that character.” The claim has not been passed upon by the Secretary of War.
    III. The real property of the Alexandria, Loudoun and Hampshire Eailroad in Alexandria was rented by the Government, and the rental paid to the president of the corporation. This did not include the roadbed. The road was not seized. The president of the company was loyal throughout the war, and the use of the road by defendants was assented to by him.
    IV. Eebruary 2,1874, Mr. Lewis McKenzie, the president of the railroad, requested leave to withdraw the account from the Quartermaster-General’s office. In compliance with this request the papers were handed to him upon that date, but a record thereof remained with the Quartermaster-General. The railroad thereupon applied to Congress for relief. No relief was granted there.
    • V. November 3, 1886, the receivers of the Alexandria, Lou-doun and Hampshire Eailroad presented the claim to the Third Auditor for settlement. The Third Auditor called upon the Quartermaster-General for information in regard to the claim, and a history of all proceedings and rulings upon it was given. The Quartermaster-General did not report the case to the Third Auditor, nor did he make to that officer any recommendation about it. June 17,1887, the claim was disallowed by the Third Auditor, who certified the papers, with his decision, to the Second Comptroller. June 27, 1887, the Second Comptroller concurred with the Auditor in his opinion and disallowed the claim. July 5, 1887, the said receivers applied to the Third Auditor for a rehearing. January 30, 1888, the Third Auditor recommended that the former decision be reconsidered and the claim be referred to the Court of Claims for adjudication under section 1063, Eevised Statutes. July 23, 1888, the Second Comptroller concurred in this recommendation of the Third Auditor, and September 11,1888, the Secretary of the Treasury transmitted the case to this court, writing the following letter:
    “ Treasury Department,
    “ Oprice or the Secretary,
    “ Washington, D. C., September 11,1888.
    “ To the honorable the Chief Justice and Judges of the Court of Claims:
    
    
      “ Under the provisions of section 1063 of the Eevised Statutes of the United States, I herewith transmit to your honorable court, upon the recommendation and certificate of the Third Auditor, approved by the Second Comptroller, the claim of the receivers of the Alexandria, Loudoun and Hampshire E. R. Company against tlie United States, with all the original vouchers, papers, documents, and proof pertaining to said claim, for trial and adjudication by your honorable court, as provided by sections 1063 and 1064, Revised Statutes.
    “ Respectfully, yours,
    
      “ O. S. Faikchild,
    “Secretary.”
    
      Mr. O. H. Glaughton, for the claimant.
    
      Mr. John 0. Chaney (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Cotton) for the defendants.
   Dayis, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The head of an Executive Department is, by section 1063 of the Revised Statutes, authorized, under certain limitations, to transmit claims to this court for adjudication. This provision is broad in its terms, but provides that the cases enumerated shall belong “ to one of the several classes of cases which, by reason of the subject-matter and character, the said court under existing laws takes jurisdiction of on such voluntary action of the claimant.” This section has been analyzed and interpreted by the Supreme Court and by this court upon several occasions. In Finn’s Case (123 U. S. R., 227) the Supreme Court said:

“The statute, in our opinion, makes it a condition or qualification of the right to a judgment against the United States that — except where the claimant labors under some one of the disabilities specified in the statute — the claim must be put in suit by the voluntary action of the claimant, or be presented to the proper Department for settlement within six years after suit could be commenced thereon against the Covernment.”

In Lippitt’s Case (100 U. S. R., 663) the same court said that limitation is not pleadable against a claim cognizable here—

“ which has been referred by the head of an Executive Department for its judicial determination, provided such claim was presented for settlement at the proper Department within six years after it first accrued. * * * Where the claim is of such a character that it may be allowed and settled by an Executive Department, or may, in the discretion of the head of such Department, be referred to the Court of Claims for fiual determination, the filing of the petition should relate back to the date when it was first presented at the Department for allowance and settlement.”

From these decisions it results that a claim reaching this court by virtue of the provision of section 1063, Revised Statutes, must be shown to have been presented to the proper Department within six years after the cause of action accrued; that is, it must have been presented not simply to an Executive Department, but to ‘‘the proper” Executive Department, the Department where “ it may be allowed and settled; ” failing this, the case falls within the bar of the statute of limitations.

The railroad company, plaintiffs herein, did present their claim to the Department of War promptly after the events through which they suffered loss. In due course it was ruled upon adversely by the Quartermaster-General, but no action of any kind in regard to it has been taken since by the Secretary of War, the head of the Department; he has not ruled favorably or unfavorably upon the case, and he has not transmitted the claim to this court. Plaintiffs, after constant and unsuccessful effort to obtain compensation through the Quartermaster-General and Congress, made application to the Treasury Department for payment. This was done twenty-four years and more after the loss; after long.examination in that Department the Secretary of the Treasury transmits the claim to this court upon the certificate of the Second Comptroller. The Secretary of War did not refer the claim to the Treasury Department, and if the Treasury was the proper Executive Department to “allow and settle” the claim, it came there much too late, and is now barred here by the statute of limitations. The correspondence between the Third Auditor and the Quartermaster-General did not operate as a transfer of the claim from the War Department to the Treasury, for even if the Quartermaster-General had jurisdiction and had power to transfer it, he indicated no intention to do so, but simply complied with the Auditor’s request to furnish information.

There is no connection between the presentation to the War Department and the later presentation to the Treasury, and plaintiff's can not in the Treasury proceeding avail himself of the presentation to the War Department. To have the presentation to the War Department avail in this action the claim should have gone to the Treasury from that Department, thus completing a chain of proceedings through which the petition here can be traced back to the first filing of the claim. The statute and the Supreme Court recognize the differing jurisdictions of the principal executive offices by the use of the words proper Department.” Whether the Secretary of War can or can not transmit the claim here at this time, and whether it would then be found to be within the bar of the statute of limitations, are questions upon which we need not now express an opinion.

Petition dismissed.  