
    Samuel Levy v. Thomas J. Rossel et al.
    [Motion.]
    ■Chancery. Receiver. Interlocutory decree. Appeal. Code 1892, \ 34.
    A defendant from whom property is taken and placed in the hands of a receiver by an interlocutory decree, notwithstanding his claim that it is exempt from liability to- his creditors (code 1892, § 1971) is entitled to an appeal from the decree, under code 1892, § 34, providing for appeals from interlocutory orders whereby the possession of property is changed.
    From the chancery court of Harrison county.
    Hon. Stone Deavoubs., Chancellor.
    Rossel and another, appellees, were complainants in the court below, Levy, appellant, and others were defendants there. When the case reached the supreme court on Levy’s appeal, appellees moved the court to dismiss the same. The facts relating to the motion are fully stated in the opinion of the court •ovei ruling the motion.
    
      Ford & White and Dodds & Griffith, for the motion.
    The appeal in this case is not warranted by code 1892, section 34. The general rule is that appeals only lie 'from final ■decrees. The present appeal, not being authorized by statute, should be dismissed. Hanon-v. Weil, 69 Miss., 477; Pearson v. Kendriclc, 74 Miss., 240; High v. Receivers, sec. 25 ; Beach v. Receivers, sec. 40.
    
      Harper <fi Ha,rper, against the motion.
    The petitioner for the appeal brings himself clearly within § 34, code 1892, as the decree required money to be paid and the possession of property to be changed, and, further, the appeal was applied for within ten days after the date of the decree complained of and an appeal bond, with two good and sufficient, sureties, was tendered with tbe application; we are clearly within both of said sections of the code in which an appeal is expressly given as of right and not as a matter of discretion. Yause v. Woods, 46 Miss., 120; Hill v. Robertson, 23 Miss., 306; Simmons v. Henderson et ai., Freeman’s Chancery Be-ports, p. 500.
   Terral, J.,

deivered the opinion of the court on the motion.

The creditors of Levy & Bellande — the latter being dram-shop keepers in Biloxi — filed their petition in the chancery court of Harrison county to have a receiver appointed to take charge of the moneys and effects of Levy & Bellande, and to administer them for the benefit of the petitioners. No objection was made by Levy & Bellande to the appointment of a receiver, but Levy alleged that he was a householder and the head of a family, residing in the city of Biloxi, and that he was entitled to and claimed an exemption of $250 in said assets of Levy & Bellande. The court, without noticing Levy’s claim of exemption, made an order placing the moneys and other assets of Levy & Bellande in the hands of a receiver, from which order Levy asked an appeal to the supreme court, which the chancellor refused. Levy then applied to a justice of this court for an appeal, and the same was granted to him. The motion here is to dismiss the appeal.

We think Levy entitled to an appeal. His property — the moneys and assets of Levy & Bellande — was taken out of his hands and put into the hands of a receiver, and against his assent, as to the exemption claimed by him. If he is the head of a family and a householder in Biloxi, he is entitled to his exemption, and it should not be taken from him and put into the hands of a receiver.

The appeal is clearly maintainable, under section 34, code 1892, and the motion to dismiss the same is overruled.  