
    William Sanders versus Jonathan Richardson
    Where the defendant, having the title to certain land, gave the plaintiff a bond stating that the plaintiff was in possession of the land and was to keep possession, and was to pay the defendant a certain sum of money in one year from the date, and the condition of the bond was, that the defendant should deliver to the plaintiff a deed of the land after the plaintiff should have performed what on his part was to be done, and the plaintiff continued in possession after the expiration of the year without paying the money, it was held, that he was not a tenant at will but merely a tenant at sufferance.
    Trespass for breaking and entering the plaintiff’s close in July 1827 and subsequently, and cutting and carrying away the plaintiff’s grass and trees therein growing.
    The defendant pleads, that the locus in quo was his soil and freehold.
    The plaintiff replies, that the- defendant, by his writing obligatory, dated December 1, 1824, demised the close to the plaintiff to hold as tenant at will, and that the defendant committed the trespasses during the continuance of the lease.
    The bond above mentioned states that the defendant has taken a deed of the land from Jacob Sanders ; that the plaintiff is in possession and is to keep possession of the same, and is to cut off the timber that is fit to saw, and carry the same to the defendant’s mill in order that the defendant may have the profit of sawing the same, and that the plaintiff is to pay the defendant the sum of 110 dollars and interest in one year from the date ; and the condition is, that the defendant shall deliver to the plaintiff a warranty deed of the land, after the plaintiff shall have performed what on his part is to be done.'
    • The defendant, after oyer of the bond, demurs ; and the plaintiff joins in demurrer.
    
      Hoar and G. F. Farley supported the demurrer.
    
      H. H. Fuller and B. Russell argued for the plaintiff.
   Putnam J.

delivered the opinion of the Court. The counsel for the plaintiff rests the cause on the point that this was a tenancy at will, continuing, and has contended, that the lessee may maintain trespass quare clausum against his landlord, under the facts set forth in the pleadings. But the labor and learning bestowed upon this point cannot be considered to be material in the case before us, as we are all clearly of opinion that the plaintiff was not a tenant at will but a tenant at sufferance merely, after the non-performance of theo things which should have been performed and the expiration of the year within which the plaintiff should have fulfilled the contract. It follows, therefore, that the defendant’s rejoinder is good, and that the defendant shall recover his costs.  