
    Davison’s Appeal. [Reed’s Estate.]
    A -will contained a devise and bequest to a daughter, with a subsequent ■provision that, in case the daughter died single, all the property left her should go to testator’s mother, with a further provision that, in case the mother should die "before the daughter, the disposal of the property should be left to the daughter. Beld, that, upon the marriage of the daughter, the testator’s mother still living, the property vested in the daughter absolutely, the meaning of the word single” being unmarried or not having been married.
    
      Oct. 31, 1888.
    Appeal, No. 209, Oct. T. 1888, from O. 0.. Allegheny Co., to review a decree of distribution, at Dec. T. 1886,. No. 190.'
    At the audit of the account of John S. Davison, guardian of Rebecca Turner Reed, the following facts appeared:
    Rebecca Jane Reed died on June 19, 1883, leaving a will, by which, after directing the payment of debts, a legacy of $2,600 to a. church for charities and $500 to her step-daughter, she further provided as follows:
    “ To my daughter, Rebecca Turner Reed, my house and lot in "Wilkinsburg, all my household furniture, jewelry and clothing and all my remaining property of whatever kind.
    “In case the said Rebecca Turner Reed dies single, all the-property left her to go to my mother, Mrs. Rebecca Davison.
    “Likewise, I appoint my brother, John S. Davison, executor of this my last will, and, in case my daughter is not of age, guardian for her.
    In case my mother, Mrs. Rebecca Davison, should die before-my daughter, Rebecca Turner Reed, then the disposal of the property is left to the said daughter, Rebecca Turner Reed.”
    John S. Davison, the executor and guardian, filed his account Dec. 8, 1887, showing a balance of $15,657 in his hands. Rebecca. Turner Reed became of .age on December 9,1887, and, on February 9, 1888, was married to John L. Walker.
    On the audit, Mrs. Walker, nee Rebecca Turner Reed, claimed' that, as she was no longer a single woman, and was of full age, she-was entitled to the immediate possession and absolute control of the estate in the hands of her guardian. Her grandmother, Rebecca Davison, the appellant, contended that Mrs. Walker, under her-mother’s will, was only entitled to the interest or income of the estate during the lifetime of appellant, and that, in the meantime, it. should be placed in the hands of a trustee to be appointed by the court. The court decreed in favor of Mrs. Walker, directing the-guardian to turn over the entire estate to her at once.
    
      The assignments of error specified the action of the court, 1, in decreeing the balance to Mrs. Walker; and, 2, in not directing the-balance to be paid into the hands of a trustee appointed hy the court.
    
      Thos. C. Lazear, with him C. P. Orr, for appellant.
    -The contingency on which the estate is to vest in Rebecca absolutely, cannot,, from its nature, happen in her lifetime. The words “ if she should die single,” mean a contingency at her death and not before. The-concluding clause is clearly a limitation of the power of disposal,, which is not at all inconsistent with ownership. The disposal was. to be left to the daughter in the event of her surviving her grandmother, plainly implying that this power could not be executed so-long as the grandmother lived. This was no unreasonable restriction as to time, for the presumption would be, the grandmother would not live many years. Restraint of alienation during the life of a person in existence is good. Williams v. Nisly, 2 S. & R. 507. Nor was it unreasonable as to tbe enjoyment of tbe estate, for, in the meantime, the daughter would be receiving the interest and income of the property, safely invested as it was in productive securities, and amply sufficient for her support, without the risk of' its being squandered by extravagance or bad management on the part of herself or her husband. When the testatrix penned her will she knew there was a probability that her daughter would sui’~ vive her grandmother, and that, by that time, she would likely be old enough and wise enough to receive full possession of the property, to dispose of as she pleased.
    This construction will give effect to every part of the will,, which is a cardinal rule of construction. Nathans v. Morris, 4 Wh. 389; Hoge’s Estate, 1 Brewst. 307.
    We^ cannot reasonably suppose, in the case in hand, that testatrix had“in mind the marriage of her daughter, the death of her husband, and the daughter’s subsequent death as a widow. In such an event, should the daughter die a widow, leaving issue, such issue-would be disinherited for the benefit of their great-grandmother, Mrs. Davison. Such a provision would be both unusual and unnatural, and, in the absence of a plain declaration of testatrix to that' effect, is not to be presumed. But to make sure that her daughter-shall be her beneficiary, testatrix adds the third clause, supra, giving-her property to her daughter upon the death of Mrs. Davison, even although still single; thus clearly showing that her daughter was-first in testatrix’s mind, and that her intention was that her estate-should vest in her daughter absolutely upon her marriage, or upon the death of Mrs. Davison, if then still single.
    
      A. W. Duff for appellee.
    The clearly expressed purpose of a testator is not to be overborne by modifying directions that are-ambiguous and equivocal, and may justify either of two opposite-interpretations. Such directions are to be so construed as to support the testator’s distinctly announced main intention. Sheetz’s Ap., 82 Pa. 217; Doebler’s Ap., 64 Pa. 15; Middleswarth’s Admr. v. Blackmore, 74 Pa. 418; Hitchcock v. Hitchcock, 35 Pa. 393; Schott’s Est., 78 Pa. 43; Findlay v. Riddle, 3 Binn. 150.
    In the construction of wills, the law in doubtful cases leans in. favor of an absolute rather than a defeasible estate. Smith’s Ap., 23 Pa. 9; Fulton v. Fulton, 2 Gr. 28 ; Wilson et al. v. McKeehan, 53 Pa. 79;
    In Biddle’s Est., 28 Pa. 59, the will provided : “ I give to my daughter, A. E. B., everything of which I die possessed. In the-event of my daughter’s death without children, I give and devise ” certain specified legacies. Meld, that the devise to A. E. B. is absolute, and the subsequent disposition was intended to provide for the-contingency of her death in the life time of testatrix.
    Jan. 7, 1889.
   Per Curiam,

The court below made a proper-disposition of this case. In case Rebecca Turner Reed dies single, all the property left her to go to my mother, Mrs. Rebecca Davi1 son,” — the word single ” must be taken to mean unmarried, or not having been married, and, as she is now covert, the devise vests in her absolutely.

Decree affirmed at costs of appellant. A. 13. W.  