
    Darby v. Henderson and Duncan, Administrators of Drummond.
    Thursday, March 12th, 1812.
    j. Appellate Practice — Reversal of Judgment. — An appellate Court ought not to reverse a judgment, without proceeding to give such j udgment as the inferior Court should have given. See Blane v. Sansum, 2 Call, 496, and Mantz v. Hendley, 2 H. & M. 308, pi. 7, to the same effect.
    3. Sergeant of Corporation — Right to Sue for Money Due Judgment Debtor, — A Sergeant of a Corporation has not the right to sue for money due to an insolvent debtor. See an important law on the subject of recovering the debts due to insolvent debtors, in Acts of 1812, c. 6, p. 36.
    Declarations — Blanks Therein — Effect.—As to the effect of blanks in declarations, see Blane v. Sansum, 2 Call, 494; Stephens v. white, 2 Wash. 203; Taylor & Co. v. M’Clean, 3 Call, 557; Crag-hill, &c. v. Page, 2 H. & M. 446, pi. 4; Digges V. Norris, 3H. &M. 268: from all which it appears, that the circumstance that the damages are left blank is unimportant; but if the gist of the action be blank, it is fatal.
    This was an action of assumpsit in the Corporation Court of Fredericksburg, on behalf of Adam Darby, Sergeant of said Corporation, against the administrators of William Drummond, deceased; the declaration charging the defendants, on the ground that their intestate was indebted, by simple contract, for work and labour, &c. to a certain John Blanton, who was taken upon a capias ad satisfaciendum, and discharged from custody, as an insolvent debtor, having subscribed and delivered in a schedule of his estate, and taken the oath prescribed by the 38th section of the Execution Daw of 1793.  It was stated in the declaration, that the schedule contained a statement of the sum of , due to the said Blanton from ; by reason of which premises, the defendants were duly, and according to the directions of the 41st section of the same act, summoned to appear before the Court of the said Corporation, at a Court to be held “on the day of , 180 ; and they the said defendants appearing accordingly, and not .confessing any thing to be due to the said *Blanton, or to the plaintiff, were discharged from the said summons ; and the plaintiff averred that no part of the recovery aforesaid” (by William Smith, the creditor of Blanton, which was set forth in a preceding part of the declaration) “was discharged, and the said judgment was not altered, suspended, or reversed; by reason of all which premises, and by force of the Act of Assembly in that case made and provided, action had accrued to the said plaintiff to recover whatever sums of money might be due from the said defendants to the said plaintiff.”
    The declaration then proceeded to set forth and charge, in several counts, a debt by simple contract from the said Drum-mond, in his lifetime, to the said Blanton, with several promises to pay the said debt; averring that “no payment thereof had been made to the said Blanton by him the said Drummond, or by the defendants, his administrators, and that the whole remained due and unpaid,” &c. but the sums of money were left blank throughout those counts, except the damages, which were laid at 5001.
    The defendants pleaded “non assumpsit by their intestate;” and issue being joined, a verdict was found, and judgment entered, in favour of the plaintiff, for 1291. 9s. 2d. damages.
    A writ of supersedeas to this judgment was awarded by a Judge of the General Court; the petition alleging, 1. “That upon the face of the record, it was apparent the plaintiff had no right of action; the effects of an insolvent debtor being vested by law in the Sheriff of the County where they lie, or are found: and the right of recovering the debts, &c. due such debtor, being vested in the Sheriff, or such debtor only; 2d. That if a Sergeant of a Corporation has the right to sue for the debts of an insolvent debtor; yet the plaintiff, in his declaration, had made no averment that the petitioners, or their intestate, were charged in the schedule of the insolvent debtor, as his debtors; which was a fatal chasm in the *title of the plaintiff to the action;” and, 3d. “That it did not appear from the declaration, that the petitioners, or their intestate, assumed to pay any sum of money to the insolvent.”
    The District Court reversed the judgment, and awarded the costs of prosecuting the writ, to the plaintiff in error; but did not proceed to give such judgment as the Corporation Court ought to have given.
    The defendant in error appealed to this Court.
    Botts, for the appellant, being dead, Robert Stanard, for tne appellees, submitted the case without argument.
    
      
      Appellate Practice — Reversal of Judgment. — To the point that an appellate court, on reversing a judgment, ought to enter such judgment as the inferior court should have entered, the principal case is cited in .Taney v. Blake, 8 Leigh 92, citing the principal case; Mantzv. Hendley, 2 Hen. & M. 308; Blane v. Sansum, 2 Call 495.
      See further, monographic note on "Appeal and Error” appended to Hill v. Salem, etc., Turnpike Co., 1 Rob. 263.
    
    
      
       Rev. Code, vol. 1, c. 151, sect. 303.
    
   Thursday, April 9th, 1812, the following was delivered by

JUDGE ROANE

as the opinion of the Court.

“The Court is of opinion, that the judgment of tne Superior Court reversing that of the County Court, is correct, as far as it goes, for the reason stated in the first error assigned in the petition for a super-sedeas; but that the said Superior Court erred in not proceeding to enter such judgment as the said County Court ought to have rendered; namely, that the plaintiff should take nothing by his bill, and the defendant recover against the said plaintiff his costs in the County Court expended. On this ground, the judgment of the said Superior Court is reversed, with costs, and reformed in pursuance of the foregoing principle.”  