
    James Frazier, and Others, v. The Executors of John Frazier, Dec’d.
    The Act of 1820 (p. 22) relates to emancipation within the State only, and does not prohibit the removal of slaves to another State for the purpose of being emancipated. [*314]
    The owner of property may by his will direct his executors to dispose of it in any way he could; and as he could in his lifetime have removed his slaves to another State, and there have emancipated them, he may by will direct his executors to remove and emancipate them. [*315]
    Testator by his will directed his negroes to be hired out during the life of his wife, and at her death declares “it is my will and desire that the whole of my negroes be set free by my executors, and the amount of money arising from the hire of the said negroes be equally divided among them; and if the hire does not amount to one hundred dollars each, it shall be made up out of the other part of my estate: the interest of the money is to enable them, with the assistance of government, to go to St. Domingo to be colonized, or to any part they with government may choose.” — Held, that the intention of the testator was that his slaves should be removed to parts where emancipation is lawful, and there be emancipated; that such will was legal and would be enforced: and on a bill by the next of kin claiming the slaves, the executors were ordered to remove to parts beyond the State where emancipation is lawful and there set them free; that they defray the expenses of removal from the interest on the one hundred dollars bequeathed to each of the slaves, and that they pay the legacies of one hundred dollars each to them after being so emancipated. ["316]
    The testator, John Frazier, by his will, dated 14th October, 1824, directs all his estate, real and personal, except his negroes, to be sold on twelve months’ credit or a longer time, if the executors should think it better so to sell: the proceeds of the sale, and, the money due to the testator at his death, were to be divided among his executors to be severally managed by them; and they were to retain to their own use all that they could make over the legal interest from the said funds. But out of these funds the testator’s widow was to be comfortably supported during her natural life. She was to have the use of one or two of the testator’s slaves during life to *wait and attend on her “ own proper person. ” The other slaves were directed to be hired out during the lifetime of the widow. After the death of the widow, the testator directed the balance of the funds of his estate arising from the sales of his land and the personal estate and money due to him at his death, which" might be left after maintaining his wife during life, to be divided between James Frazier, John M. Frazier, James Jetter, John Livingston, John Frazier, son of Benjamin, -and John Gomillian, subject to a contribution from this fund to make up the sum of §100 for each of his negroes, if the fund arising from their hire should be insufficient. The will then proceeds, “ as respects the hire of my negroes, it is my will for my executors to hire out my negroes and see that they are treated well and not abused. It is my will that the money arising from the hire of said negroes be equally divided among my executors as the before-mentioned part of my estate, only the money arising from the hire of my negroes to be kept entire and distinct from the other part of my estate before-mentioned; and after the decease of my wife, Nancy Frazier, it is my will and desire that-the whole of my negroes be set free by my executors, and the amount of money arising from the hire of the said negroes be equally divided among the said negroes; and if the hire does not amount to one hundred dollars each, that it shall be made up to them out of the other part of my estate before-mentioned: the interest of the money is to enable them, with the assistance of government, to go to St. Domingo to be colonized, or to any part that they with government may choose.”
    
    The testator appointed John S. Jeter, Benjamin Frazier, and James Jeter, executors. The two last named qualified. By a codicil, dated 4th February, 1825, the testator directed that if his man slave, Isaac, would pay to his executor §600, that he, his wife Lively, and his daughter Haily, “ shall be set free to enjoy liberty foreverand that if his negro boy, young Isaac, should wish to be set free, that upon the payment by him of $650 to the executors, he “shall be set free and enjoy liberty forever more. ”
    The testator' died shortly after the execution of his codicil, leaving a widow but no issue. The widow died in 1832, and shortly after Benjamin Frazier, one of the executors, seized the negroes, with the view of carrying the will into effect.
    This bill was filed by the next of kin of the testator, claiming, amongst *3061 ot^er things, the negroes and an account for their hire, *on the J ground that the provisions in regard to them were void, as being contrary to the policy and laws of this State.
    The case was heard at Edgefield, June, 1833.
    De Saussure, Chancellor. The questions which arise for the present consideration of the Court, are :—
    1. Is the bequest as to the freedom of the slaves valid and effectual ?
    2. If not, who are entitled to them ?
    On the first question I have no doubt: our statute forbids the emancipation of slaves, and declares the act null and void. An argument was set up for the defendants, which was urged with great ingenuity, and applied with great talent. It was, that although the statute forbade direct emancipation, it did not forbid a direction that the slaves should be sent abroad, and there emancipated ; and that a direction to the executors to do so, raised a. trust in them, which they were bound to fulfil, and the Court would enforce it. Upon considering this argument, I am inclined to think it cannot be sustained.
    The statute is founded on deep policy, and was intended to prevent emancipation of slaves as a great political evil, dangerous to the institutions of the State, and injurious to the property and interest of the citizens. I am aware that a statute is not to be enlarged beyond a fair and reasonable construction of its words 'and provisions, in order to give effect to some supposed recondite meaning. But Courts are bound to look to the real object of a statute, and to give it effect, if the meaning be obvious and the provisions of the statute sufficient to cover the meaning. In the case before us, it is quite obvious, the object and intent of the Legislature was to prevent the emancipation of the slaves held in the State. A direction to others to do what the owner is prohibited from doing cannot be permitted to defeat the prohibition. Such an easy evasion would be making the statute a mere cobweb. The frailty of the argument was felt by the counsel, who therefore endeavored to sustain it by saying the executors might and were bound, as trustees, to carry it into effect, by sending the slaves out of the State, and there emancipating them, which would be effectual. What effect a will, which directed slaves to be sent out of the State and there emancipated would have, need not be now decided in this case, for the direction to the executors is simply *to emancipate, which I take to be clearly against the statute, and null and void. >- It is true that after the direction to set the slaves free, a clause is inserted providing a fund for them, which was to enable them, with the assistance of the government, to go to St. Domingo, to be colonized, or to any part that they and the government may choose. This provision is an incidental one, and not a direct order to make an application to the Legislature for permission to liberate the slaves and send them abroad.
    The liberation is not made conditional and dependent on the will of the Legislature to confirm the emancipation. It is an absolute direction to the executors to emancipate, and then to get the assistance of the government to be colonized at St. Domingo or elsewhere. I consider the direction to emancipate null and void : and the rest of the provision depended on that. Besides, what government is meant ? If the State government, that has no foreign relations with St. Domingo, or any other power or dominion by whichfit could give its assistance. If the government of the United States be meant, assuredly neither the State nor its authorities, nor any of its citizens, would ever permit the interference of that government with that subject, on which the government of the United States has no right to intermeddle, and on which, if it made any attempts directly or indirectly, a disruption of the bonds which bind and unite the States, would necessarily take place. It is the noli me tangere subject. Any intermeddling by the government would be the immediate death of the Union (however valued and cherished on other grounds) by the general consent of the citizens. If the executors choose to apply to the State Legislature, they may do it. But till that be done, and a decision be made by that body, I feel myself bound to consider and treat this direction to executors to emancipate slaves as an attempt to evade‘the statute, and merely null and void. Consequently the slaves attempting to be emancipated, remain in their former condition, slaves. 2. The question then arises, who are entitled to these slaves ? Three claims are set up: — 1. By the executors. 2. By the residuary legatees. 3. By the nearest of kin.
    His Honor then went into an examination of the several provisions of the will, and on its construction held that the next of kin were entitled to the negroes and their hire, and decreed accordingly.
    
      *3081 *Jh’om this decree the defendants appealed on the ground :— -* That the negroes are effectually' disposed of by the will; and the trust reposed in the executors to remove and emancipate the negroes, is not in violation of the laws of this State.
    
      Bauskett, for the appellants.
    The negroes are not emancipated by the will — there is a mere direction to the executors to remove them out of the State, and set them free. The will was executed in 1824; and the legal presumption is, that this was done with a knowledge of the existing laws against emancipation in the State; it had reference therefore to emancipation beyond its limits. Is the bequest void according to this construction ? The Court has no right to control the actions of its citizens without the State. If the executors now asked leave of the Court to remove the negroes for the purpose of emancipation, it would be a different question ; perhaps in such case, the aid or interference of the Court would be refused. But the aid of the Court is not asked — all that is required, is to leave the executors uncontrolled — and they will, according to their oaths, perform the trust imposed on them by the will. The trust is not, as has been said, void, for it is not in violation of either the express letter, or intention of the law of this State. The Act of 1820 is the only statute having any application to this subject. It is manifest from the preamble of this act, that the mischief intended to be remedied, was the emancipation of slaves within the State. There is no attempt here to evade the act; but, in fact, a plain direction to the executors to conform to it — not to attempt its violation, but with certain funds set apart for that purpose, and with the assistance of the government, to remove the negroes to St. Domingo, or to any part that the government may choose, where they might be lawfully emancipated. As the State has no foreign relations, and the government of the United States cannot interfere in this subject, the executors or the negroes themselves may choose the place of their removal. In Young v. Sylvester, 1 Bail. 632, it was held, that but for the act’ of 1820, which was passed after the death of the testator in that case, the executors would have been compelled to emancipate according to the directions of the will. If then the provisions of this act do not reach this case, the executors here may be compelled in like manner to carry the trusts of the will into effect. The testator, in his lifetime, beyond all *3031 question, could have removed his negroes to *St. Domingo, or -* anywhere else, and have emancipated them. The Legislature neither could impose restrictions on his rights in this respect, nor so intended. If he had such rights in his lifetime, could he not delegate them by will to his executors ? What prevents ? The executor is the representative of his testator, invested with all his legal rights — he is -in law the owner of the chattels, and may dispose of them, or do any act in relation to them not prohibited by law. If the executors in pursuance of the will had removed the negroes, would the Court have held them accountable ?
    The law of the domicil governs the disposition of personal estate, and the Courts of another State are bound to notice and enforce it. Suppose the testator had lived and died in Georgia, and by his will had given directions to his executors to hire out his negroes in South Carolina during the life'of the widow, and at her death to take them back to Georgia, and there set them free. In such case, the executors would not only have the right to perform the trust, but the Courts of this State would be bound to compel its performance.
    
      Waddy Thompson,
    
    on the same side. It seems to me that this case may be discriminated from that class of cases embraced in the act of the Legislature prohibiting emancipation. It will be seen that the will does not directly emancipate the negroes, but directs the executors to do it. Now, it is said in the decree that it would be an evasion of the law to allow one to do by the agency of another what he could not do himself; certainly it would. What is the conclusion from this admission ? Why, that the executor could do whatever his testator could. Now the testator could not emancipate the negroes in this State, therefore his executors could not emancipate them in this State; and a provision that they should do so would be void. But on the other hand, the testator could have removed them from the State, and then have emancipated— so can the executor; and a bequest directing the executor to do so would be good. Suppose the bequest had been an explicit direction to the executors, to take the negroes out of the State, to some State where emancipation was tolerated, and there to manumit them. What law of the State, or what policy of the State, would be thereby violated ? Would the letter of the law be violated ? And let it be remembered that this is a statute in restraint* of the rights of the citizen, and therefore r,.»,. to be strictly interpreted, and not extended by construction. Its L prohibition is against emancipating in this .State — there is no prohibition against removing them out of the State, nor any against emancipating them after they are out, nor could there be. What is the evil intended to be prevented, if even the Court will look to that with the view of extending the words of the law ? not the removal of slaves ; for on that subject there would be much diversity of opinion — at all events, no legislative prohibition has been, or ever will be enacted against it. What considerations of policy are there to influence the State, to desire to prevent emancipation in other States ? With the domestic institutions or policy of other States, we are in no way concerned, and have no sort of right in any way to interfere. The evil intended to be remedied was the accumulation of free negroes residing amongst us, from the acts of emancipation of their owners. This was all that the State had any interest or power to prevent. The master had the power to remove his negroes— why has not the executors ? Suppose the bequest had been, that his executors should remove his slaves to Alabama to plant cotton — surely it would be good. Suppose in the violence of our opposition to the tariff laws, all manufactories of cotton goods in the State had been prohibited under the severest penalties — a bequest that his executors should establish a cotton manufactory in the State, and employ his slaves as operatives, would have been clearly bad. But if the bequest had been that the negroes be taken to Georgia, (where there would be no such law) and there thus employed, the bequest would be good. The laws of this State prohibit gaming, and the keeping of gambling-houses — a bequest to the executors to establish such a house, and employ his capital and slaves in the establishment, would be void. But I apprehend, that if the, bequest had been to the executors, to take the property to Louisiana, and there establish a gaming-house (where such things are legalized) that the bequest would be good. A bequest that they be tafepn there, and the proceeds of their sale or of their hire invested in the Commercial Bank of Louisiana would be good Why not equally good if the bequest were, that they should be thus invested in stock in a faro-bank which is there lawful; and in which, to my knowledge, men of large fortune, who never see the game played at all, invest their money as a profitable investment ? It is there lawful, and deemed as fair an investment, and as fair a risk, *to put their money upon the issue whether an ace or a -* deuce will be the next card turned up, as whether a house will be burned down in a given time, or a ship going to sea will reach its destination in safety. Here our notions of morals and-of policy are different, and I think wisely — we have the right to declare what shall be lawful, and what not, and a provision for an unlawful purpose is void ; but we have no right to say what shall be ,done with property the moment it passes beyond the control of our laws, and as certainly none to prevent it from passing beyond that limit. The testator had a right to remove his negroes to Alabama to make cotton, or to New York to make freemen — and he had a right to have appointed an agent in his lifetime, to have done the same thing; and I cannot see why he had not a right to appoint an executor to do the same thing after his death. The executor is in fact strictly the agent of the testator — the agent to execute his wishes after his death; as an attorney in fact is the agent to do the same thing whilst he is alive.
    I think it cannot be denied, that if the testator had expressed in so many words his wish that his executors should take his negroes out of the State and emancipate them, that it would have been a valid bequest, as not conflicting with any provision of the law, nor with any considerations of public policy. Has he in fact expressed such an intention ? For if he has, and that intention is conveyed by the words used, it is sufficient. It seems from the will, that the testator was aware of some legal impediment to emancipation in the State — he does not emancipate himself, but directs his executors to do it. Are we not then to presume, 'that knowing the difficulty, he intended to guard against it ? And when he creates a trust, that he intended as far as in him lay to give all the powers which were necessary to enable his trustees to execute it ? One of those powers was, that they be taken out of the State. And this was not an independent and separate provision, but necessarily connected with the other. They were not to be set free immediately, but at a remote time; until that time, to be hired out, and that not for the benefit of any one else, but solely for the purpose of raising a fund to take them out of the country — for the fund arising from their hire was to be kept separate. If the bequest had been that they should be sent to New York, and then sent to Liberia, it would have been good — is it the less *3121 g°°d because there are inserted the words that they *are to be set -1 free ? Where set free ? In this State ? What is there to show it ? Nothing — but much to show the reverse. I will not contend that a general direction to set free would mean a direction to set free out of the State — but admit that, in the absence of any other words, such a provision would be construed as intending to set free in the State, and therefore void; still I do contend, that there is indissolubly connected with the provision to set free, a direction to send out of the State; and that the order in which the two things are stated in the will, or rather in the same sentence, is in no wise material — and that, to say that they be set free and sent to Ohio, is the same precisely as to say, that they be sent to Ohio and set free: and the more especially will the expressions be regarded as convertible, when by such construction alone, can the purpose of the testator be accomplished.
    
      D. L. Wardlaw, contra.
    The construction contended for is, that this is a bequest to remove the slaves to St. Domingo or elsewhere, settle and emancipate them. Conceding this to be the true interpretation of the will, how is it to be enforced ? At whose instance ? In contemplation of law, slaves are chattels, things — they have no civil rights; can hold no property, nor maintain a suit, in Court. Should the executors refuse to perform the trust, there is no one authorized to compel them — the Court cannot interfere but in the regular course of proceedure at the instance of the cestui que trusts, and they cannot be recognized as parties, or regarded as having any rights. To entertain a bill at their instance, the Court must recognize persons unknown to the law, and actually confer rights on mere chattels. The case is totally different from a devise to charitable uses in mortmain; for there is no one here capable of complaining to the Court. If then the Court is wholly powerless to enforce such a bequest, the bequest itself must be void. For it would be a solecism in terms, to say that the bequest is valid, the trust is good, without the means of enforcing it — a right without a remedy.
    But the construction contended for on the part of the defendants is not the true one. It is not, according to the will, a bequest to remove, and then set free; but first to set free, and afterwards to remove them to St. Domingo, or elsewhere, with the assistance of the government, to be colonized. The words,are, “after the decease of my wife, &c., it is my will and desire, that the whole of *my negroes be set free by r^g-. g my executors,” &c., and then follows the direction to give them a ■- hundred dollars each, to “ enable them to go to St. Domingo, &c.” There is no direction here given to the excutors to remove them before emancipation — it must take place here. The negroes were to receive each a hundred dollars; before they could receive the legacies, they must be emancipated — as slaves, they are incapable of taking. Whatever ambiguity there may be in the will, there is none in the codicil: that directs that certain negroes, on the payment of certain sums of money, shall be set free; and this is an absolute, and not a mere directory bequest — not a direction to the executors to remove and emancipate, but a positivfe bequest of freedom here ; and goes to show that such was also his intention in the will, in regard to all his negroes, after his wife’s death — the future destination of the negroes is purely matter of advice.
    The aid of the government, too, is to be obtained, and the consent of St. Domingo to receive these negroes. These are serious difficulties to the fulfilment of this trust, independently of the act of 1820; but that act utterly prevents it, by declaring emancipation illegal. The seizure by tlfe executor could not avail. Young v. Sylvester, 1 Bail. 632. The bequest being void, the interests of the next of kin attached, and they became entitled to possession after the widow’s death, and the executor must hold for their benefit. In Walker v. Bostick, 4 Eq. Rep. 266, it was held, that a bequest of a slave to a trustee with directions to liberate, was an attempt to evade the law, and void; and a legacy to the slave was declared void, and fell into the residuum of the estate. — See also, Chapman & Brown, 6 Yes. 403. As to the argument drawn from the law of the domicil; the law of the domicil is to prevail generally, but not where the rights of the State and her public policy is concerned, and would.be affected by it. 3 Dallas, 310; Dixon v. Ramsay, 3 Cranch, 319.
   O’Ngall, J.

It does not appear that any question is made under the codicil: the slaves, under it, have not, I presume, attempted to obtain any benefit. The probability is, that in no event could it benefit them. Under the clause of the will which has been already set forth at length, the question arises, Can the slaves be set free according to its directions ? To solve this question it will be necessary to examine first the law on the *3141 su^Ject emancipation *of slaves ; and then see whether, accord-J ing to law and a just construction of this will, the provisions directing and connected with the emancipation of the testator’s slaves can be carried into effect.

The Act of 1820, (Acts of 1820, p. 22,) by its preamble, recites that “ whereas the great and rapid increase of free negroes and mulattoes in this State, by migration and emancipation, renders it expedient and necessary for the Legislature to restrain the emancipation of slaves, and to prevent free persons of color from entering into this Stateand therefore enacts “that no slave shall hereafter be emancipated but by act of the Legislature.” Other provisions of that, and the Act of 1823, are intended to prevent the migration of free.negroes into this State; but, at present, it is only necessary to look to the enactment in restraint of emancipation. The great rule of construing a statute, is to construe it by the old law, the mischief and the remedy, so as to put down the mischief and advance the remedy The law, as it stood prior to the Act of 1820, allowed emancipation to take place by deed upon an examination before, and to the satisfaction of a Justice of the Quorum and five freeholders, that the said slaves were of good character and capable of gaining a livelihood in an honest way. Under this law, it seems from the preamble of the Act of 1820, there was a rapid increase of free negroes and mulattoes by emancipation. This was the evil, to remedy which the Act of 1820 was passed. The remedy provided was, that emancipation should only take place by act of the Legislature. This provision is general, and might, from the words, prohibit emancipation out of, as well as within, the State by a citizen of the State. But this is a construction altogether by the letter and not by the spirit of the law. Eor the intention of the legislature is manifest — to prohibit the emancipation of slaves within the State except by act of the Legislature. The evil was the increase of free negroes within the State from emancipation. So this was remedied, the end of the law was obtained. The removal of slaves belonging- to citizens of the State, and their emancipation in parts beyond her territorial limits, was no injury to her. They could not return upon her as free negroes; for the Acts of 1820 and 1823 provide penalties to prevent the migration of free negroes into South Carolina.

The Act of 1820 could not, however, have effect upon emancipation beyond the limits of the State. For the slaves within her *limits, r*gi c when lawfully removed beyond them, ceased to be liable to her <- jurisdiction. They then became liable to another jurisdiction, and were to be held, enjoyed or disposed of, according to its laws. It is not, as I understand, denied that the owner might have removed his slaves from South Carolina and manumitted them in any State where he could lawfully do so. But if it were denied, the denial could not be sustained: for there is no law prohibiting the owner from removing his slaves from this State at any moment, and for any purpose he pleases. If he has the power to remove them, after they have crossed beyond the exterior line of the State she cannot reach out a hand to touch them for any cause; and hence, if they should be then manumitted, no person can capture them for being emancipated contrary to her laws; for they have been set free beyond her territorial limits, and beyond the operations of her laws. In Cline v. Caldwell, 1 Hill, 427-8, we recognized this principle. In Linam v. Johnson, 2 Bail. 137, it was held that a slave emancipated contrary to the Act of 1820, could be seized under the provisions of the Act of 1800 ; and that this was the only penalty which could be imposed against illegal emancipation. This being so, and there being no right of seizure for an emancipation out of South Carolina, it follows that the emancipation must prevail. But it is said, although the owner might remove from the State and set free his slaves, yet his executors cannot, by the direction of his will, do the same acts. As a general rule, to which there is no exception, unless it be by express statutory provisions, it may be laid down that the owner of property may by hi§ will direct his executors to dispose of it in any way which he could. The case of Bynum & Wallace v. Bostick & Walker, 4 Eq. Rep. 266, under the Act of 1800, does hold that a bequest of slaves to a trustee with directions to set them free is void, as being contrary to that Act: but that opinion was certainly prepared under a strange misapprehension of the law, and without looking at the Act. For it states that the “ statute expressly forbids any emancipation in any other way than by deed executed in the lifetime of the master a certain time before his decease. ” On looking at the Act, (2 Faust, 355,) it will be seen that there is not a word said about the deed being executed “in the lifetime of the master,” or within “a certain time before his decease.” This shows at once the unsoundness of that decision. The case of Lenoir v. Sylvester, and Young v. the Same, 1 Bail. *632-7-8-9, held that an executor, „ under the Act of 1800, might execute the deed and do every “ other act requisite by it, and thus give effect to a legacy of freedom. So that at the passage of the Act of 1820, an executor could have carried out and given effect to the testator’s directions to emancipate his slaves, just as well as he could have done. The Act of 1820 did not profess to abridge the rights of an executor in this respect, any more than it did the rights of the owner, the testator. Emancipation by either, in the State, could not be effected — it could only be done by act of the Legislature. But, if the Act of 1820 did not deprive the executor of the power of doing anything which his testator could lawfully do, (and in the absence of any provision to that effect, it cannot be doubted that it did not,) then it follows that a testator’s directions to his executor to remove his negroes from the State and set them free, are legal and valid, and must be obeyed. For he had the power in his lifetime to do the act; and it follows that he may authorize his executor to do the same.

This makes it necessary now to inquire as to the construction to be placed on the bequests in favor of the testator’s slaves in his will. It directs in substance that the interest on their hire during the life of his wife, or on the sum of $100 each, should constitute a fund to enable them to go to St. Domingo or any other place they may choose, and to which the government may be willing that they should go, and that his executors should set them free, and pay them the sum of $100 each. In construing a will, it is a uniform rule to give it, if possible, such a construction 'that it may have effect and not be defeated. It is hence admissible to transpose words and sentences to subserve the intentions of the testator. In this bequest it is manifest that the testator intended that his slaves should enjoy freedom, not within the State, but in parts beyond her limits, where it might be lawful and proper that they should be free. This is not contrary to the law of this State. The direction to his executors to set them free must be taken to be part of the provision to “enable them to go to St. Domingo to be colonized, or to any part that they, with the ■j-o-h-i government, may *choose.” To set them free within the State, is J contrary to law ; and this the executors cannot therefore do : but they can remove them from the State to parts where emancipation is lawful, and there set them free. This comports with the testator’s intention, and is therefore admissible. The legacy of freedom here is in its words altogether executory: and according to Lenoir v. Sylvester, and Young v. the Same, 1 Bail. 637-8-9, it is the duty of the executors to give it effect. But it is said, how can the Court compel the executors to carry such a bequest into execution ? for the slaves themselves cannot, nor can any other person, for them, file a bill to compel the executors to execute a-will in this respect. But I apprehend there is in this ease, and others like it, no difficulty. For on a bill filed by the heirs to partition the slaves, the Court would, if on looking into the will they should find that the executors could execute it by sending the slaves out of the State and there set them free, order them to so discharge the trust reposed in them by the testator. In other cases, the executor’s oath to execute the will, and the fair claim which they have to the confidence of the Court by the confidence reposed in them by the testator, are sufficient guaranties that such a bequest will be faithfully executed. To remove the slaves beyond the State to the place to which they may choose to go, the testator’s estate under his directions to his executors to remove them, would have been liable to the expenses, had he not provided a fund in the interest on the sum of $100 each which he had bequeathed to them. This last sum they will also be entitled to receive on being emancipated ; for in the will it follows the bequest of freedom, and is intended to vest in them and be payable to them when they shall become free people. In this point of view, it is not liable to the objection to which it would be subject was it a legacy to slaves.

It is therefore ordered and decreed that the defendants do forthwith remove their testator’s slaves to parts beyond the limits of this State, where it may be lawful to emancipate them, and that they there do there legally emancipate and set them free; that they defray the expenses thereof out of the interest from one year after the testator’s death, on the sums of $100 bequeathed to each of the said slaves when they should be set free: and that they pay to the said slaves when they do set them free as hereinbefore ordered, the sum of §100 each, and any arrears of interest which may remain after defraying the expenses of their removal and emancipation.

*It is ordered and decreed that the defendants do account to R such of the plaintiffs as may be entitled under the will, for the pro- >-' ° ° eeeds of the sale of the land and personal estate and the hire of the slaves, after deducting from the aggregate of principal the sum of $100 for each of the said slaves at the end of one year from the testator’s death; and also after deducting all sums paid properly for the maintenance of the widow, and all other proper payments and expenditures touching the estate, and ■ the costs of this case, which are to be paid out of the estate. The defendants must account for interest on the annual balances.

Johnson, J., concurred.  