
    Terrance N. CARTER v. Rickey BELL.
    Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.
    June 4, 2008 Session.
    Feb. 27, 2009.
    
      Peter D. Heil, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Terrance N. Carter.
    Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Rachel E. Willis, Assistant Attorney General; Victor S. Johnson III, District Attorney General; and Roger Moore, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
   OPINION

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J.,

delivered the opinion of the court,

in which JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., WILLIAM M. BARKER, and CORNELIA A. CLARK, JJ., joined. GARY R. WADE, J„ filed a dissenting opinion.

This appeal involves the application of the transfer provisions in Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116 (Supp.2008) to habeas corpus petitions challenging a criminal conviction. The petitioner, who was incarcerated in Davidson County, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Criminal Court for Davidson County. The trial court promptly denied the petition on its merits. Rather than filing a petition seeking post-conviction relief, the petitioner appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals. For the first time on appeal, the petitioner, invoking Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116, requested the Court of Criminal Appeals to transfer his habeas corpus petition to Maury County, where he had been convicted, for consideration as a post-conviction petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals declined to transfer the habeas corpus petition to Maury County and affirmed the denial of the petition. Carter v. Bell, No. M2006-01363-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 2744998 (Tenn.Crim.App. Sept.21, 2007). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

I.

In 2005, Terrance N. Carter pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court for Maury County to possession of less than one-half (.5) grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. On August 29, 2005, in accordance with Mr. Carter’s plea agreement, the court in Maury County sentenced Mr. Carter as a Range I offender to seven years to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. The judgment stated in the space for “Special Conditions” that Mr. Carter had agreed to both consecutive sentencing and to a sentence outside of the range.

Mr. Carter was incarcerated in a prison in Davidson County. On May 23, 2006, he filed a pro se “Petition for a Writ of Habe-as Corpus” in the Criminal Court for Davidson County. He asserted in his petition that the trial court in Maury County lacked jurisdiction to impose his consecutive seven-year sentence because it exceeded the maximum sentence available to a Range I offender convicted of the crime to which he had pleaded guilty. Mr. Carter farther contended that “[gjiven the illegality of the agreed sentences,” his guilty plea “was not knowingly and voluntarily entered” and may be withdrawn.

On June 8, 2006, the trial court denied Mr. Carter’s habeas corpus petition without appointing counsel or holding a hearing. Noting that Mr. Carter had agreed to be sentenced outside of his range, the trial court concluded that Mr. Carter’s judgment was neither illegal nor void.

Mr. Carter then appealed pro se to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Counsel was appointed to represent him. In his pro se brief filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals, Mr. Carter argued (I) that the trial court erred by denying the habeas corpus petition without appointing counsel and holding a hearing and (2) that the judgment was void because he received an out-of-range sentence. Mr. Carter also asserted that the Court of Criminal Appeals should treat the habeas corpus petition as a petition for post-conviction relief and should order the Criminal Court for Davidson County to transfer the case to Maury County.

The Court of Criminal Appeals filed its opinion on September 21, 2007. The court, in a holding entirely consistent with Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tenn.2007), held that the sentence that Mr. Carter agreed to serve was legal because it was within the maximum sentence allowable for the offense. Carter v. Bell, No. M2006-01363-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 2744998, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. Sept.21, 2007). After noting that other panels of the Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed on the transfer question, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Mr. Carter’s argument that Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116 empowered the trial court in Davidson County to transfer Mr. Carter’s habeas corpus petition to Maury County. Carter v. Bell, 2007 WL 2744998, at *3. The court, therefore, affirmed the denial of Mr. Carter’s habeas corpus petition. We granted Mr. Carter’s application for permission to appeal to secure uniformity of decisions regarding the transfer issue. See Tenn. R.App. P. 11(a).

II.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus “should be made to the court or judge most convenient in point of distance to the applicant, unless a sufficient reason be given in the petition for not applying to such court or judge.” TenmCode Ann. § 29-21-105 (2000). Filing with the nearest court or judge generally means the county where the petitioner is being held, unless a sufficient reason is given for not doing so. State ex rel. Leach v. Avery, 215 Tenn. 425, 427, 387 S.W.2d 346, 347 (1964). A post-conviction petition, on the other hand, must be filed “with the clerk of the court in which the conviction occurred.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-104(a) (2006).

Mr. Carter properly filed his habeas corpus petition in the county in which he was incarcerated. His claim — that he agreed to an illegal sentence and should therefore be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea— was properly presented in a habeas corpus petition. See Smith v. Lewis, 202 S.W.3d 124, 129 (Tenn.2006) (recognizing that where sentence bargained for is otherwise illegal, guilty plea may be withdrawn upon habeas corpus proceedings). The court in Davidson County properly declined to grant Mr. Carter habeas corpus relief on the merits of his claim. See Hoover v. State, 215 S.W.3d at 780 (holding that an agreed sentence outside of offender range but within statutory maximum is legal).

Mr. Carter asserted for the first time before the Court of Criminal Appeals that the habeas corpus petition should be treated as one for post-conviction relief based on the claim that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides that a “petition for habeas corpus may be treated as a petition under this part when the relief and procedure authorized by this part appear adequate and appropriate, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in title 29, chapter 21, or any other statute.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-105(c) (2006). No similar statutory provision exists, however, specifically authorizing a ha-beas court to transfer a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to a court with jurisdiction to treat the petition as one for post-conviction relief.

Even in the absence of such a statutory provision, a court has the discretion to treat a pleading according to the relief sought. Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tenn.1995). In Norton, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Morgan County, alleging that the Board of Paroles had illegally revoked his parole. The trial court dismissed the petition, concluding that it failed to state a claim for habeas corpus relief and that a claim for review of the actions of the Board of Paroles must be filed in Davidson County. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court should have converted the habeas petition into a petition for common-law writ of certiorari and transferred it to a proper court in Davidson County. Although this Court agreed with the Court of Criminal Appeals that a trial court has the discretion to treat a pleading according to the relief sought, we determined that a trial court lacking subject matter jurisdiction over a case may not transfer it in the absence of statutory authority. Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d at 319-20. Thus, even if Mr. Carter’s habeas corpus petition could be treated as one for post-conviction relief, the habeas court, lacking subject matter jurisdiction over a post-conviction case, may not transfer the action in the absence of statutory authority.

While bound by this general rule, the Court in Norton observed in dicta that “both judicial economy and our state’s policy of disposing of cases on the merits, rather than for technical reasons, would be better served by the adoption of a rule allowing courts without subject matter jurisdiction to transfer the case to any proper court.” Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d at 320. The Court, therefore, invited the General Assembly to enact a broad transfer statute. Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d at 320.

Apparently in response to this Court’s invitation, the General Assembly enacted TenmCode Ann. § 16-1-116 in 2000. See Hawkins v. Tenn. Dep’t of Correction, 127 S.W.3d at 766. This transfer statute provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court to the contrary, when an original civil action, an appeal from the judgment of a court of general sessions, or a petition for review of a final decision in a contested case under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, is filed in a state or county court of record or a general sessions court and such court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was originally filed. Upon such a transfer, the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been originally filed in the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in the court from which it was transferred.

Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116. Mr. Carter argues that Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116 authorizes transfer of a habeas corpus petition to the proper post-conviction forum. The State responds that Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116 does not provide authority for a transfer because neither a habeas corpus nor a post-conviction proceeding may be fairly characterized as an “original civil action.”

The issue presented for review requires statutory construction. We review issues of statutory construction de novo with no presumption of correctness attaching to the rulings of the court below. State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tenn.2007). The most basic principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent without broadening the statute beyond its intended scope. State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn.2008). When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain meaning in its normal and accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would extend the meaning of the language and, in that instance, we enforce the language without reference to the broader statutory intent, legislative history, or other sources. Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 630 (Tenn.2008). Statutes relating to the same subject or having a common purpose should be construed together. Lawrence County Educ. Ass’n v. Lawrence County Bd. of Educ., 244 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Tenn.2007). We must presume that the General Assembly is aware of prior enactments and of decisions of the courts when enacting legislation. Ki v. State, 78 S.W.3d 876, 879 (Tenn.2002).

Although the petitioner in Norton v. Ev-erhart filed a habeas corpus petition, this Court agreed with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the petition should be treated as a civil action. The issue in Norton, therefore, concerned transferring a civil action. As such, the General Assembly’s presumed awareness of Norton provides no support for Mr. Carter’s argument that Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116 should be construed to apply to transfer of habeas corpus or post-conviction proceedings.

Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116 permits transferring an “original civil action” only when the court in which it was filed “determines that it lacks jurisdiction.” In this case, the Criminal Court for Davidson County had jurisdiction over the habeas corpus action. Therefore, Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116, on its face, does not authorize transfer of the habeas corpus petition to the Circuit Court for Maury County for that court to treat the petition as a post-conviction petition under Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-105(c). Cf. Benson v. Herbst, 240 S.W.3d 235, 238 n. 4 (Tenn.Ct.App.2007) (noting that the general sessions court having jurisdiction to award damages requested would not have been able to transfer the case to circuit court under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116). In this case, the Criminal Court for Davidson County lacked jurisdiction over a post-conviction action. Therefore, assuming Mr. Carter’s habeas corpus petition may be properly treated as a petition seeking post-conviction relief, we must determine whether a post-conviction action is an “original civil action” for the purpose of TenmCode Ann. § 16-1-116.

This Court has held that a post-conviction proceeding is criminal in nature for the purpose of Tenn. R.App. P. 4(a). State v. Scales, 767 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tenn.1989) (waiving notice of appeal in interest of justice). On the other hand, we have held that a post-conviction petition should be considered as civil in nature for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations. Watkins v. State, 903 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tenn.1995) (applying general saving statute, TenmCode Ann. § 28-1-106) (application of Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-106 superseded by statute in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a) (2006)). As we recently observed, however, a proceeding that is “civil in nature” is not necessarily a “civil action.” State v. Harrison, 270 S.W.3d 21, 35 n. 11 (Tenn.2008) (concluding that competency hearing is not civil action for purpose of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 1).

Post-conviction proceedings are best described as proceedings arising out of a criminal case. See TenmCode Ann. § 16-5-108(a)(2) (1994) (defining jurisdiction of Court of Criminal Appeals as including habeas corpus and post-conviction proceedings and “other cases or proceedings instituted with reference to or arising out of a criminal case”). Post-conviction proceedings are not considered civil actions for the purpose of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. See TenmCode Ann. § 16-4-108(a)(l) (1994). We must presume that the General Assembly was aware of these statutes when enacting Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116. The General Assembly could have included post-conviction actions within the scope of Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116 by referring to these actions by name. Instead, the General Assembly used the unambiguous term “original civil action.” We derive legislative intent from the plain and ordinary meaning of this statutory language. Applying the aforementioned principles of statutory construction, we conclude that “original civil action” does not include a post-conviction action. Therefore, Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-116 does not authorize transfer of Mr. Carter’s petition, even if it were treated as a post-conviction action.

Having determined that Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116 does not authorize a transfer in this situation, we lastly decide whether to fashion a remedy. See Norton v. Everhart, 896 S.W.2d at 322 (applying Tenn. R.App. P. 3 6(a) to suspend statute of limitations for filing a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari). After the trial court promptly denied his habeas corpus petition, Mr. Carter had almost three months in which to file a post-conviction petition before the one-year statute of limitations expired. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a). To ensure review of any additional ground for relief that might render his conviction merely voidable, as opposed to void, Mr. Carter could have presented his illegal sentence claim in a post-conviction petition. See Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 n. 3 (Tenn.2007) (noting that void or illegal sentence may be challenged collaterally in post-conviction proceeding when the statutory requirements are met, including the one-year limitations period). Because Mr. Carter is not without fault in failing to avoid the situation, we decline to invoke our authority under Rule 36(a).

III.

We have concluded that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that the trial court did not err by denying Mr. Carter’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have also concluded that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116 does not authorize transfer of Mr. Carter’s habeas corpus petition to another county for consideration as a post-conviction proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. It appearing that Mr. Carter is indigent, we tax the costs of this appeal to the State of Tennessee.

GARY R. WADE, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

GARY R. WADE, J.,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. In my view, our legislature has granted trial courts with broad statutory authority to transfer claims filed in the wrong jurisdiction under the remedial provisions found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-116 (Supp.2008). Moreover, this Court has traditionally encouraged the disposition of colorable claims on the merits rather than on procedural grounds. In consequence, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for a transfer of the claim to the court having jurisdiction under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

Background

The relevant facts are as stated by the majority. On August 29, 2005, the Petitioner was convicted of possession of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell. The trial court imposed a seven year sentence. Nine months later, the Petitioner, while incarcerated in Davidson County, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Davidson County Criminal Court. The Petitioner contended that he had been illegally sentenced to seven years, when, as a Range I offender for a class C felony, he only qualified for a term of between three and six years. See State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.1978). He further alleged that his guilty plea was “not knowingly and voluntarily entered,” a claim of constitutional violation subject to review under the PosU-Conviction Procedure Act of 1967. TenmCode Ann. § 40-30-103 (2003); see, e.g., Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 330-37 (Tenn.2006) (considering challenge to knowing and voluntary nature of plea in post-conviction proceedings). He specifically asked the trial court to “promptly remand [the] case to the Criminal Court of Maury County [the place of his conviction] ... for appropriate disposition.”

On June 8, 2006, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to establish that his conviction or sentence was “void or illegal,” grounds for habeas corpus relief. See Hogan v. Mills, 168 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tenn.2005). The trial court did not, however, address the Petitioner’s request to remand the case to the Criminal Court of Maury County. Afterward, the Petitioner filed a timely appeal, but he did not file a separate post-conviction petition in Maury County Criminal Court within the one year statute of limitations. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a) (2003). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief and further held that the Davidson County Criminal Court lacked the statutory authority to transfer the constitutional claim to the Maury County Criminal Court, which had exclusive jurisdiction over any alleged grounds for post-conviction relief.

Analysis

Habeas Corpus and Postr-Conviction

The statutory provisions governing ha-beas corpus relief and post-conviction relief in Tennessee are two “separate and distinct” procedures. Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 261 (Tenn.2007). “Any person imprisoned or restrained of liberty, under any pretense whatsoever ... may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-21-101 (2000). An application for writ of ha-beas corpus “should be made to the court or judge most convenient in point of distance to the applicant, unless a sufficient reason be given in the petition for not applying to such court or judge.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-105 (2000). In most instances, this court is in the county where the petitioner is incarcerated.

A trial court may grant a writ of habeas corpus “only when ‘it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered’ that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence ... or that a ... sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn.2000) (quoting Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn.1993)). The burden is on the petitioner to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged judgment is void or that a term of imprisonment has expired. State ex rel. Kuntz v. Bomar, 214 Tenn. 500, 381 S.W.2d 290, 291-92 (1964). If the petition fails on its face to state a colorable claim for a writ of habeas corpus, the trial court may then summarily dismiss the petition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109 (2000); Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 260.

In contrast, a petitioner may seek relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act “when the conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-103. “A post-conviction proceeding is commenced by filing, with the clerk of the court in which the conviction occurred, a written petition naming the state as the respondent.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-104(a) (2006).

A pro se petition in a post-conviction case is “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and the test is whether it appears beyond doubt that the [petitioner] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Swanson v. State, 749 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tenn.1988) (quoting Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Tenn.1975)). Although a pro se litigant generally must adhere to the same procedural rules as one represented by counsel, this Court has previously ruled that a “pro se petition cannot be held to the standards of a petition drafted by a lawyer.” Id. at 735. Moreover, the trial court has the discretionary authority to treat a petition for habeas corpus relief as one for post-conviction relief. TenmCode Ann. § 40-30 — 105(c) (2006).

Transfer of Cases

These principles are the backdrop for the question of first impression posed in this case: whether a trial court should transfer grounds , for post-conviction relief contained in a pro se petition for habeas corpus to the court having proper jurisdiction. I would have answered in the affirmative.

In Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn.1995), the petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Morgan County Criminal Court seeking review of a parole revocation decision. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner did not allege any possible grounds for habeas corpus relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals, which applied the relaxed standard applicable to pro se proceedings, reversed, concluding that the trial court had the inherent power to transfer the habeas corpus petition to Davidson County for review as a petition for certiorari. Id. at 318. After granting an application by the State for permission to appeal, this Court reinstated the judgment of dismissal, holding “that a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction over a case has no authority to transfer it, unless that authority is specifically conferred by statute, rule, or constitutional provision.” Id. at 319. Importantly, however, Justice Frank Drowota, writing for a unanimous court, also observed that “both judicial economy and our ... policy of disposing of cases on the merits, rather than for technical reasons, would be better served by the adoption of a rule allowing courts without subject matter jurisdiction to transfer the case to any proper court. ” Id. at 320 (emphasis added). Based upon a desire to facilitate the consideration of claims on their substance rather than their form, or lack thereof, this Court “invite[d] the legislature to enact a broad transfer statute.” Id.

Shortly after the decision in Norton, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a broad, remedial transfer provision. The statute, effective on May 23, 2000, provides as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court to the contrary, when an original civil action, an appeal from the judgment of a court of general sessions, or a petition for review of a final decision in a contested case under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, compiled in title 4, chapter 5, is filed in a state or county court of record or a general sessions court and such court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was originally filed. Upon such a transfer, the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been originally filed in the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed in the court from which it was transferred.

Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116 (emphasis added).

The question in this instance is whether this statute governs in these circumstances. I believe that it does, whether by the plain meaning of the words or by the historical context of the legislation. If that is so, the trial court had the duty to transfer the post-conviction claim in the interests of justice.

Plain Meaning of Section 16-1-116

Well-defined precepts apply to questions of statutory interpretation. Our chief concern is to carry out legislative intent without broadening or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn.2002). When a statute is clear, we apply the plain meaning without complicating the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn.2004). Our obligation is simply to enforce the written language. Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn.2006). It is only when a statute is ambiguous that courts may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources. Parks v. Tenn. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn.1998).

When attempting to ascertain the plain meaning of a statutory text, courts will often rely on dictionaries for widely-accepted definitions of individual words and terms. See, e.g., State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 719-20 (Tenn.2008) (interpreting Tenn. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)); Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Track, Inc., 249 5.W.3d 301, 309 (Tenn.2008) (interpreting Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-18-109(a)(l)); State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 927-28 (Tenn.2007) (interpreting Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-404); State v. Pickett, 211 S.W.3d 696, 705 (Tenn.2007) (interpreting Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1003(a)). Recently, this Court specifically identified Black’s Law Dictionary as an authoritative informational source. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d at 928 (“When the Legislature does not provide a specific definition for a statutory term, this Court may look to other sources, including Black’s Law Dictionary, for guidance.”). Although reliance on dictionaries does not absolve us of our duty to consider the “statutory context in which the words are used, the underlying facts, the legislative history, and prior judicial decisions” when construing a statute as a whole, Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173, 176 n. 2 (Tenn.2008), a dictionary may be an invaluable tool for determining the plain meaning of individual terms, such as “original civil action.”

At the time the General Assembly enacted section 16-1-116 in 2000, the latest edition of Black’s Law Dictionary provided the following definition of “civil action”: “[a]n action brought to enforce, redress, or protect a private or civil right; a noncriminal litigation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 30 (7th ed.1999). A “private right” was defined as “[a] personal right, as opposed to a right of the public or the state.” Id. at 1323. A “civil right,” on the other hand, was defined as follows:

1. The individual rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and by the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th Amendments, as well as by legislation such as the Voting Rights Act. Civil rights include esp. the right to vote, the right of due process, and the right of equal protection under the law.
2. CIVIL LIBERTY

Id. at 240. The synonym “civil liberty” was defined as “[fjreedom from undue governmental interference or restraint.” Id. at 239.

By the use of this definition, a petition containing a claim of constitutional abridgement qualifies as “[a]n action brought to enforce, redress, or protect a private or civil right.” In this instance, the Petitioner, who sought to protect his “individual rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the Bill of Rights” and his “[flreedom from undue governmental interference or restraint,” claimed his action was to protect a civil right guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Although the dictionary definition of “civil action” included only “non-criminal litigation,” and a claim under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act is an attack upon a criminal conviction or sentence, Black’s Law Dictionary limited the definition of “criminal proceeding” to a determination of “a person’s guilt or innocence [or] a convicted person’s punishment,” or “a criminal hearing or trial.” Id. at 1221. Here, the Petitioner did not seek to establish his guilt or innocence or to set his punishment; instead, he presented a collateral challenge to the constitutionality of his earlier conviction, a proceeding this Court has previously described as not strictly criminal in nature. See Watkins v. State, 903 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tenn.1995) (“A post-conviction proceeding is a hybrid affair ... which is considered under civil rules of 'procedure.”). Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-5-108(a)(2) (1994) grants the Court of Criminal Appeals appellate jurisdiction in post-conviction cases as cases “instituted with reference to or arising out of a criminal case.” There is no contradiction, however, in holding that a post-conviction claim is a civil action, but one instituted “with reference to or arising out of’ litigation that qualified as criminal in nature. At most, the language used creates some ambiguity as to whether a post-conviction petition qualifies as a “civil action.”

If a post-conviction action fits the plain meaning of “civil action,” it must only fall outside the meaning of “original civil action” if it is not “original.” The term “original” in its most natural meaning refers to any jurisdiction which is not appellate. See Black’s Law Dictionary at 856 (defining “original jurisdiction”). A post-conviction claim is a new, collateral challenge to an earlier judgment, not an appeal. Edwards v. State, 269 S.W.3d 915, 919-20 (Tenn.2008) (“Indeed, recognizing the limited nature of Tennessee’s habeas corpus procedure, the Legislature enacted the Post-Conviction Procedure Act to provide a collateral procedure that allows state courts to consider and to remedy a broader range of claims.”).

In consequence, I cannot concur with the majority’s conclusion that “original civil action” unambiguously excludes actions for post-conviction relief. It is my opinion that the term includes actions for post-conviction and habeas corpus relief — both of which are actions by private individuals to enforce their personal civil rights. If, however, the phrase qualifies as ambiguous, or if there is reason to think that the General Assembly intended to employ a definition other than its plain meaning, it is our duty to ascertain intent by consideration of the legislative history of a statute.

Context of Section 16-1-116

Section 16-1-116 was enacted against a background of prior judicial decisions considering the appropriate application of procedural rules to litigation involving both civil and criminal elements. Neither the rules of criminal procedure nor the rules of civil procedure apply to post-conviction proceedings, except as specifically provided by statute or Supreme Court Rule. See Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 28 § 3(B). This Court has previously addressed the nature of post-conviction proceedings:

The procedural characteristics of the post-conviction remedy should be appropriate to the purposes of the remedy. While the post-conviction proceeding is separate from the original prosecution proceeding, the post-conviction stage is an extension of the original proceeding and should be related to it insofar as feasible.
Post-conviction review has become an established part of the criminal process. In formulating a rule we recognize that the post-conviction proceeding is procedurally separate and apart from the original criminal prosecution. It may be initiated by a petition for habeas corpus. It seeks not to convict, but to set aside a conviction which is void or voidable because of the abridgement of constitutional rights.... The procedure by which a criminal conviction may be set aside is civil in nature, therefore it is tried under the Rules of Civil Procedure and less stringent evidentiary rules apply. If the petitioner is unsuccessful in his application his criminal status is retained.

Watkins, 903 S.W.2d at 305 (quoting ARA. Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 22-1.2) (2nd Ed.) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).

By the application of these principles, we previously determined that Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-106 (1980), which tolled the statute of limitations in “civil causes of action” for mental incompetency, applied to post-conviction cases. Watkins, 903 S.W.2d at 305. While confirming “the fundamental nature of the rights litigated within the post-conviction process and the important function this process serves within our criminal justice system,” the Court in Watkins chose not to “quibble” as to whether the proceeding would be classified as civil or criminal. Id. at 304-05. Quoting Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39 (1961), this Court ruled that “[t]he availability of a procedure to regain liberty lost through criminal process cannot be made contingent upon a choice of labels.” Watkins, 903 S.W.2d at 305. Thus, when the General Assembly enacted section 16 — 1— 116, it did so in the historical perspective that caviling distinctions between “civil” and “criminal” should not frustrate procedural recourse.

Statutory context, like our earlier precedents, supports the applicability of 16 — 1— 116 to post-conviction and habeas corpus actions. Significantly, section 16-1-116 does not exclude either habeas corpus or post-conviction cases. Moreover, that the statute was enacted after our decision in Norton, without specific exclusion, implies that transfers of petitions for lack of jurisdiction met with legislative approval. See State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 394 (Tenn.2003) (stating that the legislature is presumed to know existing law when legislation is enacted). Similarly, there is no specific provision in the habeas corpus statutory scheme that either allows or prohibits the transfer of a habeas corpus case to the court of conviction for further proceedings under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. In the absence of specific statutory guidance, the general provisions of section 16-1-116 should control.

In my view, section 16-1-116 clearly vests the trial courts with the authority to transfer a post-conviction claim from one county, which has no jurisdiction, to another, which does. Had the trial court, in this instance, exercised that authority, the post-conviction procedure would have been available to the Petitioner under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). In the context of due process, a ruling on the merits is always preferable to the procedural bar, even if the results are equally unfavorable.

Our admonition in Watkins is applicable here: “The availability of a procedure to regain liberty lost through criminal process cannot be made contingent upon a choice of labels.” 903 S.W.2d at 305 (quoting Smith, 365 U.S. at 712, 81 S.Ct. 895). Because I believe that the trial court had the statutory authority to transfer the case to the court of conviction for proceedings under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, I would reverse and remand for transfer to the Criminal Court of Maury County. 
      
      . Possession of cocaine with intent to sell less than point five (.5) grams, a Class C felony, has a sentence range of three to six years for a Range I offender. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-112(a)(3) (2006).
     
      
      . It was not until the oral argument before the Court of Criminal Appeals that Mr. Carter’s lawyer cited Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116 as authority for his request to transfer Mr. Carter's habeas corpus petition to Maury County.
     
      
      . The maximum sentence allowed for a Class C felony is fifteen years. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-111(b)(3) (2006).
     
      
      . Compare Anderson v. State, No. M2004-02116-CCA-R3-HC, 2006 WL 739885, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. Mar.23, 2006) (No Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application filed) (directing the habeas court to transfer the petition to convicting court for docketing as post-conviction matter) with State v. Darden, No. W2001-0183 3-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1482798, at *2 (Tenn.Crim.App. Feb.12, 2002) (No Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application filed) (holding that the habeas court did not have authority to transfer case to proper post-conviction court).
     
      
      .As a preliminary matter, the State argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in addressing the transfer issue because it was not raised in the trial court. Whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice may be addressed for the first time on appeal. See Hawkins v. Tenn. Dep't of Correction, 127 S.W.3d 749, 766 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002) (transfer of petition for writ of certiorari challenging result of prison disciplinary proceeding).
     
      
      . Act of May 15, 2000, ch. 794, 2000 Tenn. Pub. Acts 2271.
     
      
      . Mr. Carter does not allege in his petition that he was unaware that his agreed sentence was outside of the range. The face of the judgment makes clear that he agreed to be sentenced outside of the range. The alleged illegality of the sentence is the only factual basis stated for his claim that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. As we stated above, the trial court correctly determined that the agreed sentence is legal. Therefore, this factual basis may no longer be considered. Under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, ''[fjailure to state a factual basis for the grounds alleged shall result in immediate dismissal of the petition.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-106(d) (2006). Since Mr. Carter's petition would now be subject to immediate dismissal, treating it as a post-conviction petition would appear to be futile. When a petition is filed pro se, the trial court has the discretion to allow the petitioner to file an amended petition to avoid dismissal. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-106(d) (providing that "the judge may enter an order stating that the petitioner must file an amended petition that complies with this section within fifteen (15) days or the petition will be dismissed”). The issue in this case, however, is whether Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-1-116 authorizes a transfer. In making that determination, we must treat Mr. Carter's petition as it was filed, not as it could be amended. Notwithstanding our concerns about the futility of any potential transfer in this case, we will address the issue in the interest of resolving the conflict among panels of the intermediate court.
     
      
      . The Post-Conviction Procedure Act was adopted by the Tennessee General Assembly in 1967 upon the recommendations of the Tennessee Law Revision Commission. The purposes of the act, in recognition of the need for an adequate procedure for the consideration of constitutional claims, are as follows:
      (a) To provide a post-conviction process at least as broad in scope as existing federal statutes under which claims of violation of constitutional right asserted by persons convicted by the state courts of Tennessee are determined in federal courts under the federal habeas corpus statutes.
      (b) To provide a procedure in such cases that is swift and simple and easily invoked.
      (c) To provide for full fact hearings to resolve disputed factual issues, and for compilation of a record to enable federal courts to determine the sufficiency of those hearings.
      (d) To provide for decisions supported by opinions, fact findings and conclusions of law, which disclose the grounds of decision and resolution of disputed facts. Gary L. Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Tennessee-Fourteen Years of Judicial Administration Under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 48 Tenn. L.Rev. 605, 609-10 (1981) (quoting F. Dennis, A Post-Conviction Procedure Act for Tennessee (First Draft) § 102(2) (Tenn. State Archives)).
     
      
      . In Anderson v. State, No. M2004-02116-CCA-R3-HC, 2006 WL 739885 (Tenn.Crim.App. Mar.23, 2006), the Court of Criminal Appeals considered the propriety of a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus relief filed in Wayne County, the place of the petitioner Manny T. Anderson's imprisonment. Anderson alleged that he had not knowingly and voluntarily entered a plea which corresponded to the judgment of conviction. After concluding that Anderson was not entitled to habeas corpus relief, Judge David G. Hayes, writing for the Court of Criminal Appeals, confirmed that habeas corpus relief was not appropriate but remanded the proceeding to Wayne County to transfer the petition to Davidson County Criminal Court, the county of conviction, for consideration as a colorable claim for post-conviction relief:
      Notwithstanding this holding, we are constrained to note that "[a] petition for habeas corpus may be treated as a petition under [the Post-Conviction Procedure Act] when the relief and procedure authorized by [the Act] appear adequate and appropriate....” T.C.A. § 40-30-105(c). In considering whether a post-conviction petition states a colorable claim for relief, the post-conviction court is to take the facts alleged as true. See T.C.A. § 40-30-106(0 (2003). Anderson, 2006 WL 739885, at *3.
     
      
      .The petition must be filed “within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one (1) year of the date on which the judgment became final....” Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30~102(a) (2006). The one year statute of limitations in post-conviction cases is subject to certain exceptions, none of which are relevant in the present case. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-102(b).
     
      
      . "[I]t must be borne in mind that they were not prepared by counsel, but by a layman unlearned in the law. The allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and the test is whether it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 939.
     
      
      . Our intermediate courts have addressed (and reached conflicting results) in similar cases. See Anderson, 2006 WL 739885, at *3 (affirming the Wayne County Circuit Court's denial of habeas corpus relief but directing the court to transfer the case to the Davidson County Criminal Court for docketing as a post-conviction matter). But see State v. Darden, No. W2001-01833-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1482798, at *2 (Tenn.Crim.App. Feb.12, 2002) (holding that the Lake County Court did not have jurisdiction over post-conviction issues and was without authority to transfer those issues to Robertson County); Smith v. Hesson, 63 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (finding no authority to transfer). These decisions, however, did not include any consideration of the terms of Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-116.
     
      
      . A 1994 computer search performed by the Harvard Law Review estimated that the U.S. Supreme Court had referred to dictionaries in more than six hundred cases. Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 Harv. L.Rev. 1437, 1437 (1994). The Court did so recently in its consideration of litigation to which a metropolitan government of this state was a party, Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., -U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 846, 850, 172 L.Ed.2d 650 (2009). The Court, charged with defining the term “oppose” as it is used in section 2000e-3(a) of chapter 42 of the U.S.Code, concluded that " 'oppose,' being left undefined by the statute, carries its ordinary meaning” and looked to dictionaries for its answer. Id.
      
     
      
      . Prior to adoption of Supreme Court Rule 28, however, the rules of civil procedure were generally deemed applicable to post-conviction proceedings. Watkins, 903 S.W.2d at 305.
     
      
      . The specific holding in Watkins regarding the tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations has been superseded by a statutory amendment. See Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 275-76 (Tenn.2000).
     
      
      . One observer has criticized the courts that have implemented the Post-Conviction Procedure Act for their tendency to place "unnecessary judicial restrictions on the availability of post-conviction relief.” Anderson, 48 Tenn. L.Rev. at 662.
     