
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kevin D. JEFFERSON, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 05-1452.
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Submitted Sept. 22, 2005.
    Decided Sept. 28, 2005.
    Stephen B. Clark, Fairview Heights, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Richard H. Parsons, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Peoria, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before COFFEY, ROVNER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER

Kevin Jefferson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and possessing a firearm in connection with a drug offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Jefferson cooperated with the government’s investigation and was sentenced after United States v. Booker, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), to a total of 102 months’ imprisonment, well below the combined minimum mandatory of 180 months otherwise applicable to the counts of conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Jefferson filed a notice of appeal but the government moved to dismiss because his written plea agreement includes a waiver of his right to appeal his sentence. Jefferson’s appointed counsel responded to the government’s motion by filing what we construe as a motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). See United States v. Mason, 343 F.3d 893, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2003). Counsel’s submission is facially adequate, and Jefferson has not responded to our invitation under Circuit Rule 51(b) to comment on counsel’s motion. We therefore limit our review to potential issues identified in counsel’s submission. United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir.1997) (per curiam).

Counsel first considers whether Jefferson might challenge the voluntariness of his guilty pleas. But counsel informs us that Jefferson does not wish to take back his pleas, and we have held that lawyers making an Anders submission should not even explore questions about a guilty plea unless the defendant wants it set aside. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir.2002). It follows, then, that Jefferson is also bound by his appeal waiver. See United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir.2002) (noting that waiver of appeal “stands or falls” with the plea); United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 860-61 (7th Cir.2001) (same). That waiver precludes any challenge to a “sentence within the maximum provided in the statute(s) of conviction (or the manner in which that sentence was determined) on the grounds set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 or on any ground whatever.” And though Jefferson agreed to that waiver before Booker was decided, we have held that such waivers are nonetheless enforceable absent an explicit “escape hatch” in the plea agreement. United States v. Bournes, 405 F.3d 634, 636-37 (7th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Lockwood, 416 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 362 (7th Cir.2005). Jefferson’s waiver allows no exception, and thus we cannot reach the other potential issues identified by counsel.

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.  