
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mitchell Jerome BOOTHE, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 12-30213.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 19, 2012.
    
    Filed Dec. 31, 2012.
    Tara Elliott, Timothy John Racieot, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Missoula, MT, J. Bishop Grewell, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorneys, Helena, MT, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Andrew J. Nelson, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Defenders Of Montana, Missoula, MT, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Mitchell Jerome Boothe appeals from the district court’s order affirming his bench-trial conviction for disorderly conduct, in violation of 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Boothe contends that the magistrate judge violated his First Amendment rights by requiring, as a condition of his one-year term of unsupervised probation, that he secure the permission of the presiding district judge before entering any United States District Court facility in the District of Montana. As the district court concluded, imposition of the challenged condition was a permissible exercise of the magistrate judge’s discretion. See United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir.1988) (sentencing judge has broad discretion to set probation conditions). The condition is reasonably related to both the circumstances of Boothe’s conviction and the goals of deterrence, punishment, and promotion of respect for the law, and it involves only such deprivation of liberty as is reasonably necessary to serve those objectives. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2) and 3563(b); Terrigno, 838 F.2d at 374.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     