
    Marian INGUANZO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOUSING & SERVICES, INCORPORATED et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-3914.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 6, 2015.
    Michael H. Zhu, Michael H. Zhu P.C., New York, N.Y., for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Rhonda Lisa Epstein, Hoey, King, Epstein, Prezioso & Marquez, New York, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, PIERRE N. LEVAL, Circuit Judges, GEOFFREY W. CRAWFORD , District Judge.
    
      
       The. Honorable Geoffrey W. Crawford, United States District Judge for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Marian Inguanzo appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Ramos, J.), granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir.2005).

1. Inguanzo challenges the dismissal of her Title VII failure to promote claims. However, with respect to the Scatter Site position, applicants were contractually required to have a license of social work (“LMSW”), which Inguanzo did not possess; so she was unqualified for the position. J.A. 130-31. As for the Narragansett position, Inguanzo concedes that her claim as to this position is time-barred. Summary judgment was therefore proper on these claims.

2. Inguanzo contends that a genuine issue of material fact remains on her Title VII claim alleging denial of training opportunities. A plaintiff “sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Galabya v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the district court found, In-guanzo identified no negative consequence stemming from the alleged denial of training.

3. With respect to Inguanzo’s claim that her termination was motivated by discrimination, she has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to sustain her burden. Because her employer provided alleged nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination, the initial presumption in Inguan-zo’s favor established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) “completely drops out of the picture.” James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Inguanzo was therefore required to adduce sufficient evidence to sustain a reasonable finding that her termination was attributable to discrimination. This she has failed to do.

Inguanzo’s discrimination termination claim depended upon three comments, only two of which had record support. Inguan-zo cites a statement by her former supervisor, Reardon, to the effect that promotion decisions were influenced by racial considerations; but Inguanzo adduced no evidence that Reardon had personal knowledge of promotion decisions. Accordingly, the remark she attributed to Reardon was the kind of “stray remark” that is insufficient to show discriminatory intent. See Danzer v. Norden Sys’s, Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir.1998) (“[S]tray remarks ... without more, cannot get a discrimination suit to a jury.”). The remark attributed to Kimmerle does not on its face indicate a racially discriminatory attitude. As for the statement attributed to Horton, the discriminatory phrase “women’s work” appears to have been Inguanzo’s characterization, rather than something spoken by Horton.

Inguanzo’s sex discrimination claim is further undermined by the fact that she was hired and fired by the same person. See Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 137 (2d Cir.2000) (“When the same actor hires a person already within the protected class, and then later fires that same person, it is difficult to impute to her an invidious motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision to hire.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). In-guanzo’s replacement by another Hispanic woman further undermines her race and gender discrimination claims.

Inguanzo’s employer has adduced legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment decision, including Inguanzo’s continued lateness in submitting work product; Inguanzo failed to adduce sufficient evidence that the employer’s justification was a pretext for discrimination.

4. Inguanzo challenges the entry of summary judgment on her retaliation claim. A viable retaliation claim “requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Univ. of Texas S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). Although “temporal proximity can demonstrate a causal nexus,” causality is lacking when “adverse -employment actions were both part, and the ultimate product, of an extensive period of progressive discipline [beginning prior to the complaint].... ” Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). As in Slat-tery, the record in this case reflects that before Inguanzo complained of discrimination, she had received a stream of disciplinary warnings regarding her lateness in filing records. J.A. 197-223; see also J.A. 142 (“The discussion of the situation that happened, the late care plans, her not turning them in on time, repeat issues, insubordination, assigning her supervisor her work. A lot of different things transpired, including her supervisor asking her to put the correct dates on the service plan and she refused to do so.”). The district court correctly granted summary judgment on Inguanzo’s retaliation claim.

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Inguanzo’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court,  