
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 09-10029
    Non-Argument Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    Aug. 18, 2009.
    Kathleen M. Salyer, Anne R. Schultz, Sally M. Richardson, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Larry Jones, Atlanta, GA, pro se.
    Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Appellant Larry Jones, a federal prisoner convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). On appeal, he argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying him a § 3582(e)(2) sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 651 to the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”), which clarified the standard for imposing an upward departure based on the inadequacy of a defendant’s criminal history category. Jones also argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a sentence reduction because his original sentence was arbitrary, the district court relied on prior convictions that may not have complied with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and Jones’s sentence exceeded the guideline imprisonment range. Jones further argues that (1) his sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment and gives rise to a presumption of vindictiveness; and (2) we have discretion under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), to grant the requested relief.

I.

We review a district court’s resolution of a motion under § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion and review issues of legal interpretation de novo. United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir.2003); United States v. Pringle, 350 F.3d 1172, 1178 (11th Cir.2003). We review the district court’s determination of the scope of its authority under § 3582(c)(2) de novo. United States v. James, 548 F.3d 983, 984 (11th Cir.2008).

A district court may modify a term of imprisonment in the case of a defendant who was sentenced based on a sentencing range that subsequently has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The amendment to the Guidelines must be retroactively applicable, however, and only amendments listed in U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(c) qualify as retroactively applicable amendments warranting § 3582(c)(2) relief. U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(a)(l), (c); United States v. Armstrong, 347 F.3d 905, 907-08 (11th Cir.2003).

Amendment 651 elucidated, inter alia, the standard for imposing departures pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 based on the inadequacy of a defendant’s criminal history category. See U.S.S.G.App. C, Amend. 651, Reason for Amendment. Amendment 651 is not listed in § lB1.10(c), and, therefore, it is not a retroactively applicable amendment that may be the basis for § 3582(c)(2) relief. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) (listing the retroactively applicable amendments, which does not include Amendment 651).

Proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) and § 1B1.10 “do not constitute a full re-sentencing of the defendant” or a de novo resentencing. U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(a)(3); United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir.2005). Accordingly, § 3582(c)(2) does not “grant to the court jurisdiction to consider extraneous resen-tencing issues.” United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 782 (11th Cir.2000). Constitutional challenges to a defendant’s sentence are the sort of “extraneous” issues that are not cognizable under § 3582(c)(2). Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker does not provide an independent basis for granting a sentence reduction in the context of § 3582(c)(2) proceedings because Booker does not apply to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. United States v. Melvin, 556 F.3d 1190, 1192 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, -— U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2382, 173 L.Ed.2d 1300 (2009).

After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we conclude that Jones’s arguments are unavailing because Amendment 651 cannot provide the basis for § 3582(c)(2) relief, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider “extraneous resentencing issues” in the § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying a sentence reduction.

AFFIRMED.  