
    Rosetta McPHATTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY, New York City Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 09-3364-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 24, 2010.
    
      Rosetta McPhatter, pro se, Brooklyn, New York.
    Dona B. Morris, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of New York Law Department, for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, New York, for Appel-lees.
    Present: AMALYA L. KEARSE, ROBERT D. SACK, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Rosetta McPhatter appeals, pro se, from the August 3, 2009, 2009 WL 2412980, judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to defendants, the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) and New York City (“the City”). Plaintiff, a former employee of the NYPD, brought this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”). Before this Court, plaintiff appeals only the dismissal of her claims brought pursuant to the ADA and the dismissal of her claim of improper retaliation for bringing a charge before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. [PL Br. at 1-2]

We presume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. After conducting a de novo review of the record, drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff, we conclude that the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants was proper. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003).

We agree with the district court that, even assuming plaintiff made out a prima facie case that she had a history of a disability as defined by the ADA, or was perceived by her employer as disabled within the meaning of the statute, she did not show that her suspension — the act upon which her claim was founded — was based on discrimination. See McPhatter v. N.Y. City, No. 06 Civ. 1181(NG)(LB), 2009 WL 2412980, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 3009). Defendants offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for McPhatter’s suspension, and her subsequent termination. Plaintiff failed to offer any “argument at all that this reason was merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive.” Id.; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

With respect to McPhatter’s retaliation claim, we hold that she failed to establish a causal connection between the filing of her discrimination charge and any adverse employment action. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001). As the district court noted, “plaintiff was subject to escalating disciplinary actions ... well before she engaged in any protected activity.” McPhatter, 2009 WL 2412980, at *7. Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation, her claim must fail. McPhatter did not proffer any material evidence that would permit a rational fact-finder to conclude that defendants’ legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions were pretextual.

The Court has reviewed all of plaintiffs arguments and finds them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  