
    Waicella Chandra PUSPITA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-4130 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 13, 2013.
    H. Raymond Fasano, Youman, Madeo & Fasano, LLP, New York, N.Y., for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Melissa Neiman-Kelting, Senior Litigation Counsel; Lori B. War-lick, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Present: JON O. NEWMAN, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Waicella Chandra Puspita, a native and citizen of Indonesia, seeks review of a September 12, 2011, decision of the BIA, dismissing her appeal from the April 5, 2010, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Sandy K. Horn, which denied her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Waicella Chandra Puspita, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Sept. 12, 2011), aff'ing, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 5, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Under the circumstances presented, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam)(internal quotation marks omitted). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir.2008).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Puspita failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution against ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia, thus vitiating her claim of a well-founded fear of future persecution. As the agency observed, record evidence— and, in particular, recent U.S. State Department reports — confirms that ethnic and religious conflict has decreased substantially in recent years, and that the Indonesian government has taken noticeable steps to prosecute those responsible for sectarian violence. These facts refute Puspita’s assertion that the Indonesian government is unwilling or unable to control anti-Chinese Christian violence, and are fatal to her pattern-or-practice claim. See Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir.2009) (identifying no error in agency determination that there is not a pattern or practice of persecution of ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia based on U.S. State Department reports).

In addition, we decline Puspita’s invitation to adopt the “disfavored group” analysis addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2004), which we have consistently refused to adopt in the past, and we conclude that, in general, the BIA’s legal analysis of Pus-pita’s pattern-or-practice claim was proper. Moreover, unlike the situation in Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir.2007), the agency here considered Puspita’s pattern-or-practice claim. For these reasons, the agency did not err by denying Puspita’s claims for asylum and withholding of removal, which were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006).

The petition for review is DENIED. 
      
      . Because Puspita does not challenge the agency’s determination that she failed to demonstrate past persecution or the agency’s denial of her claim for CAT relief, she has abandoned these issues and we decline to consider them. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005).
     