
    James Lowry, v. Joseph R. Moss.
    The declarations or statements of persons are admitted as evidence in many cases, where they appear to have been made against their interest; but, in all such cases the persons must be shown to be deceased at the time of trial.
    Tried before Mr. Justice Frost, at York, Spring Term, 1846.
    This was an issue to try whether an execution of John Minter, a. Kidd and Moi’row, lodged in the Sheriff’s office the 11th June, 1827, was satisfied.
    The proof was, that soon after Minter recovered the judgment, he took in payment of it, the joint note of the defendant Morrow, and one Coonrod; which had been paid by Coonrod to Minter, some years before the assignment, by Minter to Moss, of the said execution. The witness, who paid the money, could not remember how many years had elapsed since the payment. Afterwards, Coonrod being indebted to Moss, procured Minter to make an assignment of the execution to Moss. This assignment is dated the 4th March. 1842, andadas, that the execution assigned, “had been settled with Minter, March 2d, 1843;” appended to the execution was a certificate by Minter, without date, that he “had received payment in full of this case, about October, 1836.” Thomasson, the Sheriff, proved that this certificate had been given and affixed to the execution at his request, and for his protection in applying the proceeds of the sale of a tract of land of Kidd, which he had levied on and advertised for sale in November, 1841, and that the certificate was given between the date of the advertisement and the sale day.
    The defendant in the issue offered to prove the declarations of Kidd, that the execution in question was not satisfied; and the proof was rejected.
    The jury found in favor of the plaintiff in the issue; and the defendant appealed and moved for a new trial; because his Honor excluded the declarations of William Kidd, the defendant, in the execution of John Minter.
    Witherspoon, for the motion.
    Williams, contra.
    
   Fiiost J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The payment of the judgment of Minter, v. Kidd and Morrow, was proved by undisputed evidence of the payment by Morrow of the money to Minter; by Minter’s acknowledgement in writing on the execution of payment in full, and by the statement in the assignment of the execution by Minter to Moss, that it had been settled in March, 1834. Against this plenary proof, the declarations of Kidd were offered that the execution was not paid- It was not even stated that Kidd was dead. The evidence was held to be incompetent, because it did not appear that Kidd was not living, and within the jurisdiction of the Court. He was a competent witness to prove that of which his declarations were offered in evidence. The declarations or statements of persons are admitted in many cases where they appear to have been made against their interest, but in all the cases the person who made the declaration was deceased at the time of trial. 1 Phil. Ev. 255-260. If the rule were not confined to such cases, collusions might be formed between the party and his witnesses, who might easily be induced to make declarations which they would be afraid to verify on oath in open Court; and without this, partial statements and misapprehension in various particulars, which are essential to the whole truth, would operate great injustice. A more striking case than the present of the danger of receiving such declarations, could hardly ho presented.

The motion is refused.  