
    JULIUS VIEDT vs. THE EVENING STAR NEWSPAPER COMPANY.
    Libel; Pleading; Bailment.
    1. In an action for libel the innuendo cannot enlarge the natural meaning of the words alleged to be libelous.
    2. A bailee who converts the property of his bailor to his own use is-not thereby guilty of embezzelment in this jurisdiction, but is guilty of a breach of trust.
    3. Any publication which is calculated to bring the plaintiff into disgrace, to injure his fame or good name and expose him to ridicule and contempt is libelous per se, although if spoken verbally it would not be actionable.
    4. The averment of the declaration in this case considered by the court and adjudged to allege a cause of action in libel.
    At Law.
    No. 28,421.
    Decided January 26, 1891.
    The Chief Justice and Justices James and Montgomery sitting.
    Appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a declaration in an action for libel.
    
      Judgment reversed.
    
    Ti-ie pacts are stated in the opinion.
    Messrs. J. G. Bigelow and O. D. Barrett for plaintiff ;•
    In Villars vs. Mousley, 2 Wills., 403, it is said that: “The publishing of anything concerning another which renders him ridiculous or'tends to hinder mankind from, associating with him is actionable.”
    In Cropp vs. Tilney, 3 Salk., 226, C. J. Holt said: “ Scandalous matter is .not necessary to make a libel; it is enough if the defendant induces an ill opinion to be had of the plaintiff, or make him contemptible and ridiculous.”
    In Archbishop vs. Robinson, 5 Bing., 17, Best, C. J., said : “ In a libel, any tendency to bring a party into contempt and ridicule is actionable, and in general any charge of' immoral conduct, although in matters not punishable in law.”
    
      In the case of Edsall vs. Brooks, 2 Robt., 29, the defendant published of the plaintiff, in his newspaper, an article headed “Blackmailing by a policeman,” and charged that he had been dismissed from the service for that cause. The words were held libelous, and being untrue, actionable.
    In Colby vs. Reynolds, 6 Vt., 489, it was held libelous to charge a member of a firm with dishonesty.
    In the case of Moore, 63 N. C., 397, it was held that “ any and all publications in writing or print, imputing to another, disgraceful, fraudulent or dishonest conduct, or which is in any respect injurious to his private character or credit, are actionable.”
    Starkie on Slander and Libel, Sec. 188, says: “ The general rule is, that where the libel affects'a person in his official capacity, profession, trade or business by imputing to him any kind of fraud or dishonesty, * * * an action will lie, without proof of actual malice or of special damage.”
    Language published in writing, concerning an individual, is actionable, per se.
    
    Which tends to bring a party into public hatred or disgrace. Woodward vs. Downing, 2 Mon. & Ry., 74.
    Which imputes something disgraceful to him. Digby vs. Thompson, 4 B. & Adol., 821.
    Which reflects on his character. O’Brien vs. Clement, 15 M. & W., 435; Johnson vs. Stebbins, 5 Ind., 364; Adams vs. Lawson, 17 Grat., 250.
    Which tends to injure his character. Dunn vs. Winters, 2 Humph., 512 ; Melton vs. The State, 3 Humph., 389.
    Which induces an ill opinion of him. Hillhouse vs. Dunning, 6 Conn., 391.
    All defamatory words injurious in their nature. Chaddock vs. Biggs, 13 Mass., 284.
    And in the case of White vs. Nicholls et al., 3 How., 236, the Supreme Court of the United States laid down the law of libel as follows:
    
      “Actions may be maintained for defamatory words published in writing or in print, which would not have been actionable if spoken. Thus to publish of a man in writing. that he had the itch and smelt of brimstone, has been held to be a libel. Per Wilmot, C. J., in Villers vs. Mousley, 2 Wils., 403. In Cropp vs. Tilney, 3 Salk., Holt, C. J., thus lays down the law : ‘ That scandalous matter is not necessary to make a libel; it is enough if the defendant induce a bad opinion to be had of the plaintiff, or make him contemptible or ridiculous.’ And Bailey, J., declares in McGregor vs. Thwaites, 3 Barn. & Gres., 33, that ‘ an action is maintainable for slander either written or printed, provided the tendency of it be to bring a man into hatred, contempt, or ridicule.’ To the same effect are the decisions in 6 Bingham, 409, the Archbishop of Tuam vs. Robeson; and in 4 Taunt., 355; Thorley vs. The Earl of Kerry.”
    That the charge complained of was injurious to the plaintiff is shown by the language itself. It caused his dismissal from the Treasury Department. Hence no time need be taken up in discussing that branch of the case. That the language complained of appeared in a newspaper is no excuse whatever.
    “ The law recognizes no distinction as to liability between the author and the publisher of a libel. And therefore it is no justification or excuse to a man that he published a libel, to the injury of another, merely in the course of his business and occupation as a printer; for he, as well as others, is bound so to carry on his trade or business as not to injure others.” Starkie Sl. & Lib., Sec. 346.
    Mr. R. Ross Perry for defendant :
    The plaintiff has by his declaration selected the alleged charge of embezzlement as the foundation of his right to recover. Therefore this criminal charge must be with reasonable certainty contained in the suspected publication.
    The charge must contain with reasonable certainty all the elements of the alleged crime. Odgers on Libel and Slander, 121; Sweetapple vs. Jesse, 5 B. & A., 27; Kelly vs. Partington, 5 B. & A., 645; Arne vs. Johnson, 10 Modern, 111; Gostling vs. Brooks, 2 F. & F., 76 ; Mulligan vs. Cole, L. R., 10 Q. B., 549; Richardson vs. Allen, 2 Chitty, 657; Boynton vs. Shaw Stocking Co. (S. C. Mass.), 25 Rep., 366; Ramsear vs. Jersey, 1 N. Y. Supp., 635.
    The innuendo cannot enlarge words. Pollard vs. Lyon, 91 U. S., 233; Brooker vs. Coffin, Bigelow’s L. C. in Torts, 80; Odgers on Libel and Slander, 100; Holt vs. Sholefield, 6 T. R., 691; Gompertz vs. Levy, 9 A. & E., 282; Wheeler vs. Haynes, 9 A. & E., 286; Capel vs. Jones, 4 C. B., 259; Lay vs Robinson, 1 A. & E., 554.
    There can be no embezzlement by bailees under the statutes in force in this jurisdiction. People vs. Burr, 41 Howard’s Pr., 293 ; State vs. Slotter, 38 Iowa, 322; Hutchins vs. Commonw., 82 Pa., 484; Kribs vs. People, 82 Ill., 425; State vs. Meyers, 68 Mo., 266; State vs. Small, 26 Kans., 210; Pullman vs. State, 78 Ala., 31; Warmoth vs. Commonwealth, 81 Ky., 133.
    Applying these principals of law to this case it is evident—
    (1) That the publication complained of is no libel upon the plaintiff.
    (2) That had the publication charged the plaintiff with converting to his own use without right property which he held as bailee, there would yet have been no charge of embezzlement.
   Chief Justice Bingham

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This cause comes here on appieal from the judgment of the Circuit Court sustaining a demurrer to the declaration. The action is for libel.

The demurrer is urged upon the following grounds:

1. That the alleged libel is upon its face no libel.

2. That the alleged libel does not charge the plaintiff with the crime of embezzlement, as in the said declaration is averred.

3. That the innuendo of the declaration is not supported-by the contents of the alleged libel.

It is assumed by counsel for the defendant that the purpose of the plaintiff was to set forth in the declaration an action based entirely upon the theory that the alleged publication 'Contained a charge of embezzlement against the plaintiff, and the claim is made that a proper interpretation of the language of the publication does not warrant any such conclusion, counsel very properly claiming that the innuendoes in the declaration cannot enlarge the natural meaning of the words used in the publication.

As a matter of law it is not the office of an innuendo in a declaration to enlarge the meaning of the words alleged to be libelous.

The publication alleged to be libelous is as follows:

“ Dismissal of a Cabinet Maker. — The Secretary of the Treasury has directed the removal of Mr. Julius Viedt, a cabinet maker employed in the Treasury Department, on the complaint of Mrs. Lucy O’Brien, of this city, the dismissal to take effect on the 31st. The case has been under investigation more than a yeai\ The cause of the difficulty between Viedt and Mrs. O’Brien dates back two or three years ago. The latter and her husband took rooms in Mr. Viedt’s house; after a short time Mr..O’Brien, it is alleged, eloped with Miss Viedt. This step on the part of her husband, of- course, caused some difficulty in Mrs. O’Brien’s financial condition, and she finally left Mr. Viedt’s house, leaving her furniture there for storage; Viedt, she reported to the Treasury authorities, sold the goods and retained the money. Mrs. O’Brien has tried to get the Treasury Department to order Viedt to refund, but this was refused’. After hearing the evidence on both sides, Assistant Secretary Thompson, to whom the case was referred, decided to dismiss the man and recommended that action to the Secretary.”

We think the publication does not import that a charge is made against the plaintiff of embezzlement, at any rate not. of legal embezzlement, because a fact is stated in the’ publication which would at once refute the idea of the plaintiff being guilty of any such crime.

Prom the statement of facts in the publication, the implication is that the plaintiff was simply a bailee of Mrs. O’Brien, and it is a well settled principle of law that a bailee may convert the property of his bailor to his own use is not thereby guilty of embezzlement in this jurisdiction,, but is guilty of a breach of trust, and of defrauding his bailor.

But as we view this publication, there is a substantial ground for an action of libel, excluding from the declaration all words charging the intent of the defendant to have been by such publication to charge the plaintiff with embezzlement. [It is well settled that any publication which is-calculated to bring the party into disgrace, to injure his-fame or good name and expose him to ridicule or contempt is libelous yicmse, although if spoken verbally it would not be actionable./^

Omitting all in the declaration which relates to embezzlement, it will read as follows : .

Por that whereas the plaintiff now is a good, true,, honest, and faithful citizen and as such hath always behaved and conducted himself, and until the committing of the grievance by the defendant as • hereinafter mentioned was always reputed, esteemed, and accepted by and amongst all his neighbors, and other good and worthy citizens, to whom he was in anywise known, to be a person of good name, fame, and credit, to wit, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia. * * * Yet the defendant well knowing the premises, but contriving, and wickedly and maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff in his good name, fame, and credit and to bring him into public scandal, infamy and disgrace with and amongst all his neighbors and other good and worthy citizens, * * * and to vex, harass, oppress, impoverish, and wholly ruin the plaintiff, heretofore, to wit, on the 26th day of January, A. D. 1888, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia aforesaid, falsely, wickedly, and maliciously did compose and publish and cause and ¡irocure to be published in the said newspaper called The Evening Star, of and concerning the plaintiff a certain false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous matter as follows [here follows the publication heretofore recited] : Which said false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel was composed and published and procured to be composed and published by the defendant of and concerning the plaintiff, the defendant meaning and intending thereby to charge the plaintiff with having sold the goods and household furniture left with him for storage by the said Lucy O’Brien, and with having converted the proceeds thereof to his own use, and thus defrauding the said Lucy O’Brien, and further meaning and intending thereby to make it appear that the plaintiff was discharged from his position in the Treasury Department as cabinet maker by the Secretary because he had been adjudged guilty of the charge of having thus sold the goods and furniture of the said Lucy O’Brien ” “ to the wrong and prejudice of the said Lucy O’Brien, whereby and by reason of the said false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel, the plaintiff hath been and is greatly injured,” &c.

Thus stripped of all relation to embezzlement it is a good declaration. The alleged publication does charge that the plaintiff was the bailee of Mrs. O’Brien; that the plaintiff ■sold the goods without her consent must be inferred from the language used, and that he appropriated the money to his own use, for the reason that the article assumes that Mrs. O’Brien, unable to get her money, made application to the Treasury Department, in which Department the plaintiff in this action was employed, for the purpose of compelling the defendant to pay it to her. The publication states that the case on this application was pending for a year in the Department, and that finally, the case being referred to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and he having heard the evidence .on both sides, determined, not to order the money to be refunded but to dismiss the plaintiff as an employee of the Treasury Department. The inference is irresistible from this statement that the plaintiff was to be dismissed because of the facts stated in the publication.

Such a charge published in the manner and in. the language in which it is thus stated, is undoubtedly libelous, because it tends to injure the good name and fame of the party to whom the article is directed and to bring him into disgrace.

The judgment of the court below is reversed, the demurrer overruled, and the cause sent back for further proceedings.  