
    Mohamed Aly Baba ELY TEM, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-3736-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 20, 2012.
    
      H. Raymond Fasano, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Francis W. Fraser, Senior Litigation Counsel; Linda Y. Cheng, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, PIERRE N. LEVAL and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Mohamed Aly Baba Ely Tem, a native and citizen of Mauritania, seeks review of a September 2, 2011, decision of the BIA affirming the July 7, 2010, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Brigitte Laforest, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mohamed Aly Baba Ely Tem, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Sept. 2, 2011), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 7, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision, “including the portions not explicitly discussed by the BIA.” See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.2005). We review the agency’s adverse credibility determination under the substantial evidence standard, treating it as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

For asylum applications such as Ely Tem’ s, governed by the amendments made to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on inconsistencies or omissions in the applicant’s statements, without regard to whether the inconsistencies or omissions go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008).

Ely Tem challenges the agency’s adverse credibility determination as a whole. However, in appealing the IJ’s decision to the BIA, Ely Tem addressed only one of the IJ’s bases for finding him not credible — the inconsistency regarding the date of his arrest. He did not specifically dispute the other inconsistencies identified by the IJ, including inconsistencies between his testimony and the personal statement included with his asylum application concerning other details of his arrest (whether police beat him upon his arrival at the police station, whether he was conscious at the time, and what occurred at the police station after his arrest); inconsistencies between his testimony and his asylum application concerning his place of residence from August to October 2008 and his activities during that period; inconsistencies between his testimony and evidence submitted in support of his asylum application regarding which of his family members had been questioned by Mauritanian authorities about his present whereabouts; and inconsistencies between his testimony and the affidavit he submitted describing how he obtained his Mauritanian passport.

In his appeal to the BIA, instead of specifically contesting these adverse credibility findings, Ely Tem conclusorily asserted that the IJ “denied the case based on misunderstanding or incorrect assumptions” and that “[a] review of the record demonstrates that the appellant was responsive and detailed with respect to the questions asked of him.” In his petition to this Court, Ely Tem makes similarly con-clusory arguments.

Even assuming that Ely Tern’s challenge to the agency’s adverse credibility determination is properly preserved for our review, see Karaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 113, 119 & n. 2 (2d Cir.2006), his challenge fails on the merits. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination, based on the above-mentioned inconsistencies between and among Ely Tern’s testimony and his asylum application, the personal statement included with his application, and the evidence submitted in support of his application.

Ely Tern’s challenges to the BIA’s opinion are unavailing. Ely Tem argues that “the Board did not apply any test, standard or scrutiny with respect to [his] appeal of the Id’s denial of his asylum claim.” The BIA’s decision, however, explicitly stated and correctly applied the appropriate standard of review. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (providing that factual findings, including credibility determinations, are reviewed by the BIA for clear error).

Next, Ely Tem claims that the agency “mischaracterized the record,” because the IJ and the BIA described his testimony as “inconsistent,” whereas he claims that “he answered every question in a detailed and responsive manner.” However, the BIA’s decision addressed the many inconsistencies noted by the IJ, including several inconsistencies not addressed by Ely Tem on appeal, and reasonably concluded that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not clearly erroneous. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (finding that the agency “may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination” as long as the totality of the circumstances establishes the applicant is incredible (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, Ely Tern’s suggestion that the BIA failed to “carefully” or “thoroughly]” consider the record is without merit.

Finally, Ely Tem characterizes the inconsistencies noted by the agency as “a minor misunderstanding, all of which were cleared up with consistent and reasonable explanations.” But his proffered explanations are non-compelling, concern only some of the inconsistencies identified by the agency, and fail to establish that “no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” See id,.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005).

Because the totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination, we defer to that finding. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. As the only evidence of a threat to Ely Tern’s life or freedom depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination in this case necessarily precludes success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  