
    
      Major B. Clark v. J. N. Bailey et al.
    
    Columbia,
    (May, 1848.
    It is incompetent to offer evidence of defendant’s general bad character, for the purpose of invalidating his answer.
    The denials of an answer cannot be rebutted by a single witness, unaided by corroborating circumstances.
    A witness who, although competent, is under manifest bias, is liable to suspicion. It is a circumstance of suspicion where one of the defendants, whose bias is in favour of the plaintiff, re-echoes the bill; especially when he goes beyond the bill to promote the plaintiff’s cause.
    
      This cause was heard at Edgefield, June Sittings, 1847, by His Honor Chancellor Johnston.
    
    The plaintiff filed his bill originally against the defendants Bailey and Abney, setting forth that he was a judgment creditor of Abney, whose property was insufficient to satisfy the debt, by reason of the prior lien of a judgment held by Bailey against his said debtor. The bill charged, that the judgment was for a greater amount than was really due by Abney; that the sum really due on it had been paid, and that it was kept on foot for the fraudulent purpose of covering the property of Abney the debtor, against the claim of the plaintiff.
    Bailey, in his answer, denied all the charges of the bill. Abney’s answer sustained the charges fully, and proceeded to corroborate them by a circumstantial detail of facts, beypnd the statements of the bij],
    
      Upon the death of Bailey, the suit was revived against his executor, who, in his answer, relied on the answer which had been put in by his testator.
    The case was heard on the pleadings and proofs.
    At the hearing Abney was examined in support of the plaintiff’s claim. Being apprehensive that his testimony might not be sufficient, the plaintiff proposed to prove Bailey’s general bad character, by way of doing away with the effect of his answer. The Court rejected the testimony; and delivered its judgment as follows.
    Johnston, Ch. This is a bill standing, formally, in the name of a junior judgment creditor, and seeking to enjoin a senior judgment creditor from enforcing his demand against the common debtor. There is strong inherent evidence, however, that it is really the bill of the debtor, who by his answer and his deposition gives a very earnest support to the plaintiff’s cause.
    The answer of Bailey, the senior creditor, very fully denied the charges exhibited against him by the original bill in his lifetime; and his executor relies on that answer.
    Abney, the debtor, has, as I have stated, sustained the bill throughout in his answer ; in which he enters into a detailed statement, much beyond the bill, of all the circumstances: and this answer he has reaffirmed, in all its particulars, on his examination at the hearing.
    The general scope of the bill is that the senior judgment of Bailey has been paid and satisfied, and is kept on foot to hinder the plaintiff in the collection of his junior judgments. Assuming that Abney is a competent witness, it is impossible not to see that he is under the bias of a strong interest. But admitting that he is not only competent but reliable, there js but the one witness against the positive denials of the answer, and if the circumstances arising from the other evidence in the case concurred with his testimony (whereas their tendency is rather the other wayl there is still too much doubt left, to warrant the Court in interfering with the legal rights of the parties. The Court should require clear proof in such cases; but, to make the most of the circumstances in this case, they leave the transactions of the parties in great obscurity and liable to much suspicion.
    It is proposed to impeach the general character of Bailey, as a means of shaking the credit of his answer. But I exclude the evidence, as unwarranted hy^the principles and practice of this Court. But if the most successful assault had been made on his veracity, I must still s% that the case would have been left in too great doubt to allow of my interfering.
    It is ordered that the bill be dismissed with costs. Abney to pay his own.
    The plaintiff appealed, and moved the Court of Appeals to reverse or modify the decree of his Honor the Chancellor, on the following grounds:
    1. Because his Honor erred in overruling and rejecting, as incompetent, the testimony offered and tendered by the plaintiff, to show the general bad character of the defendant Bailey, and that he was unworthy of belief in a Court of Justice.
    
      2. Because his Honor erred in not ordering an'issue at Law, as desired by the plaintiff at the hearing of the cause, to try and determine the question of fact, whether the judgment of Bailey v. Abney, as stated in the pleadings, was not paid off and satisfied in full.
    3. Because it respectfully submitted that the testimony of Abney, sustained and corroborated as it was by the letters, offered in evidence, of Bailey to Abney, and of Abney to Bailey, and by the final settlement made by them in the Sheriff’s office, was abundantly sufficient to outweigh and overturn the answer of Bailey, even if he had been of ordinary good character; and therefore the plaintiff’s hill should have been sustained, and the relief granted, as prayed for.
    Bauskett, for the motion.
    Wardlaw and Carroll, contra.
   Per Curiam.

This Court concurs in the decree of the Chancellor; and it is ordered that the same be affirmed and the appeal dismissed.

Decree affirmed.  