
    ABBA BAIL BONDS, INC., a California Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeff L. GRUBBE, Acting Tribal Council Chairman, Agua Caliente Band of Chauilla Indians; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Richard S. Held Retirement Trust, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeff L. Grubbe, Tribal Council Chairman, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians; et al., Defendants-Appellees, and Clifford Wilson Mathews, aka Clifford Wilson Matthews, Defendant.
    Nos. 13-56701, 14-56760.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 8, 2016.
    
    Filed March 22, 2016.
    Emile Mark Mullick, Esquire, Law Office of Emile M. Mullick, San Bernardino, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    
      Art Bunce, Law Offices of Art Bunce, Escondido, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Before: REINHARDT, MURGUIA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P., 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

ABBA Bail Bonds, Inc. and Richard S. Held Retirement Trust appeal from the district court’s dismissal of their suits against named officials of the Agua Cal-iente Band of Cahuilla Indians, a federally recognized Indian tribe. The district court determined it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over either action. We affirm the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Both appellants obtained money judgments against a member of the Tribe in California Superior Court. The state court also issued corresponding assignment orders requiring the Tribe to make payments to appellants from the individual member’s “regular periodic monthly payments” from the Tribe to satisfy the respective judgments. Though the tribal officials had the power to authorize such payments, they refused to do so on the basis that sovereign immunity barred enforcement of the assignment orders. Appellants brought the instant actions in federal district court, effectively to enforce those same state court assignment orders.

Appellants have failed to establish that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that federal courts “shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir.2007) (“To confer subject matter jurisdiction in an action against a sovereign, in addition to a waiver of sovereign immunity, there must be statutory authority vesting a district court with subject matter jurisdiction.”). “For a case to ‘arise under’ federal law, a plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint must establish either (1) that federal law creates the cause of action or (2) that the plaintiffs asserted right to relief depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir.2004) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L,Ed.2d 420 (1983)). “The fact that the defendant is a Native sovereign is not, by itself, sufficient to raise a federal question.” Id. (citing Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, 626 F.2d 708, 714 (9th Cir.1980)). Appellants have not established federal question jurisdiction under either prong of the Franchise Tax Board test.

First, appellants did not bring suit under a federal cause of action. Their asserted basis for federal jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, neither confers jurisdiction on federal courts nor provides a private right of action. To the contrary, § 1360 grants California state courts jurisdiction over “civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties” which arise in Indian country within California, “to the same extent that [California] has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action.” § 1360(a). While § 1360(b) limits this jurisdiction, in that it provides that a state court may not “authorize The alienation ... of any ... property ... belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe ... that is held in trust by the United States,” this section does not confer jurisdiction on federal courts. See K2 Am. Corp. v. Roland Oil & Gas, LLC, 653 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir.2011) (“The district court correctly concluded that § 1360(b) limits the exercise of state jurisdiction; it does not confer jurisdiction on federal courts.”); see also Nisqually Indian Tribe v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir.2010) (“A plaintiff may only bring a cause of action to enforce a federal law if the law provides a private right of action.”). Nor have appellants demonstrated that Congress intended § 1360 to imply a federal cause of action. See Nisqually Indian Tribe, 623 F.3d at 929 (“[A]n implied right of action is only authorized when there is clear evidence Congress intended such a right to be part of the statute”).

Second, appellants do not assert a right to relief under a non-federal claim that “necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 28, 103 S.Ct. 2841. Federal law is relevant to appellants’ state-law claims only to the extent that appellees assert sovereign immunity as a defense to enforcement of the state-court judgment. This does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule, as “[federal jurisdiction cannot hinge upon defenses or counterclaims, whether actual or anticipated.” K2 Am. Corp., 653 F.3d at 1029; see also Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1386 (9th Cir.1988) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction because “[fjederal questions, e.g., whether the Band is immune from a state tax levy under the federal common law doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, would be injected into the Board’s state-law action only by way of defense”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     