
    Tauland DESHATI, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-4615 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 9, 2014.
    Michael P. DiRaimondo, DiRaimondo & Masi, LLP, Melville, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; David V. Bernal, Assistant Director; Dara S. Smith, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, GUIDO CALABRESI, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Tauland Deshati, a native and citizen of Albania, seeks review of an October 25, 2012, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Tauland Deshati, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Oct. 25, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322-23, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)). When the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

An alien may file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Deshati’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than three years after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We find no error in the BIA’s determination that Deshati failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions excusing the untimely filing of his motion to reopen.

As an initial matter, because the BIA explicitly considered the evidence submitted with Deshati’s motion, and compared it with the evidence in the record at the time of his hearing, the record does not compellingly suggest that the BIA failed to adequately consider the full record and Deshati’s due process claim is without merit. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dept, of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir.2006); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336-38 (2d Cir.2006); see also Matter ofSY-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A.2007) (“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”). Furthermore, the BIA reasonably concluded that the country conditions evidence Deshati submitted failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions because that evidence demonstrated continued political violence in Albania, and did not indicate that conditions had materially worsened since Deshati’s 2007 hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii); see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 171-72; Matter of S-YG-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 253. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Deshati’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this peti-

tion is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  