
    The Agricultural Bank of Mississippi vs. Moses M. Pallen et al.
    Where a judgment debtor has various pieces of property subject to the judgment, portions of-which he has alienated, the alienee may, by bill in chancery, force the judgment creditor to levy his execution on that property of the judgment debtor, not aliened; and if all be aliened he may force the property to be subjected in the inverse order of alienation, the last alienated being first liable.
    And it seems to a bill by an alienee for that end, the only necessary parties are the judgment creditor and the alienee; the bill must, however, show that there is other property liable before that for which the exemption is claimed.
    On appeal from the superior court of chancery; Hon. Robert H. Buckner, chancellor.
    Moses M. Pallen and Janet Pallen, his wife, filed their bill against the Agricultural Bank of Mississippi, in which they state that in November, 1837, the defendant obtained judgment in the Warren circuit court against Thomas J. Randolph, on a note for about $4700; that an execution issued on this judgment to the April term, 1842, of that court, and was levied on lot two hundred, in square thirty, in the city of Yicksburg, as the property of Randolph.. That on the 1st of May, 1839, Randolph, for valuable consideration, by legal deed, conveyed this lot to one Thomas J. Scott, who afterwards conveyed it to the complainant, Mrs. Pallen. That at the time Randolph conveyed this lot to Scott he possessed in fee simple, and upincum-bered, a large amount of property, then and still, bound by the defendants’ judgment, more than sufficient to pay and satisfy it.
    Yarious pieces of real estate were specifically described in the bill, and stated to have been the property of Randolph, at the time of the rendition of the judgment of the Agricultural Bank, and to have been conveyed by him subsequently thereto, to other persons who knew of the liability of the property to this judgment when they purchased. The bill does not give the names of these subsequent alienees. Randolph and Scott are alleged to be insolvent.
    The bill prays that the bank may be made defendant; for an injunction against the sale of the complainants’ property, and for general relief.
    To this bill the bank filed a general demurrer, which the chancellor disallowed, and the bank appealed.
    
      Eustis, for appellants, contended,
    1. That the bill did not show an existing available fund at the time of the filing of the bill. The property pointed out being in the possession of third parties, alienees of the judgment debtor; the nature of their title not disclosed, and they not in the parties to the bill. On this point he cited and commented on the following authorities : Wright v. Nutt, 1 Henry Black. 151; Wright v. Simpson, 6 Yes. 735 ; Sto. Eq. Plead. 416, n. 2d edition; Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 Yes. 391; Cheeseborot/gh v. Millard, 1 John. Ch. R. 409 ; Clowes v. Dickenson, 5 lb. 239; Taylor v. Porter, 7 Mass. 355; Sto. Eq. § 1233 ; Barnes v. Racster, 1 Younge & Collyer, New Rep. 401; Lanoy v. Duchess of Athol, 2 Atk. 448; Averal v. Wade, 1 Lloyd & Gould, 252; Herbert's Case, 3 Coke, 11; Avery v. Petten, 7 John. Ch. R. 211; Sto. Eq. Plead. § 162; Evertson v. Booth, 19 Johns. R. 493; Guión v. Knapp, 6 Paige, 38; 2 Des. 560; Thompson and Wife v. Murray and Wife, 2 Hill’s Chan. 213; Ex parte Kendall, 17 Yes. 527; Carkhuff v. Anderson, 3 Binney, 9; 1 Sto. Eq. 528.
    2. That there was no equity in turning the appellants against property of others, without making them parties. This point was reviewed, and the authorities cited on the first point referred to and commented on. It was insisted, if the subsequent alienees were not made parties, the practical effect would be, that the' owners of the other lots, when levied on, would file similar bills against the judgment creditor alone; thus pro-' ducing endless litigation, and delaying the judgment creditor.
    
      
      George S. Yerger, for appellees, contended, that it was well settled that the court would, in a case like the present, enjoin the sale, and compel the execution creditor to sell the property conveyed last. 5 John. Ch. R. 244 ; 2 Dess. 561; 9 Cow. 403; Guión v. Knapp, 6 Paige, 36; Collins v. Drake, 4 How.
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case, as decided in the chancery court, is reported in Freeman, 419. The view taken by the chancellor is regarded as correct.

The decision rests upon the principle, that where a judgment debtor has various pieces of property, .affected by the judgment lien, if he alienate one piece, that is not to be charged, until the others, not alienated, have been subjected, provided they still remain within reach of the execution. If all be alienated, then each is liable to the satisfaction of the judgment, in the inverse order of alienation; the last alienated being first liable. But if all be necessary to satisfy the judgment, then all must be. so applied. It is a question only as to the order of application.

The interposition of equity of course presupposes that the alienation was made in good faith, and for valuable consideration. The bill, in a case of this kind, must show that there is other property liable, before that for which the exemption is claimed.

These principles are well settled in equity jurisprudence, and are recognized in the cases referred to by the chancellor.

The decree is affirmed.  