
    Thomas Crymes v. Nathaniel Day.
    Columbia,
    Dec. 1829.
    A salef to an infant, by a person of full age, divests the title of the latter; nor will bis retaining, or afterwards coming into possession of the property, as guardian of the infant, authorize him to rescind the sale.
    The property of a defendant, who has come of age. may be levied on whilst it remains in the possession of bis guardian: if the latter has any claims upon the property, for advances to his ward, his remedy is in Equity.
    Tried before Mr. Justice O’Neall, at Laurens, Fall Term, 1829.
    This was an action of trover for a slave, which had been levied on and sold, by the defendant, as sheriff of Laurens District, under execution against John D. Crymes, hut which was claimed by the plaintiff as administrator of William Crymes deceased, the father of John D. Crymes. At a sale of the intestate’s estate, John D. Crymes, who was then an infant, purchased the slave in question ; and the plaintiff executed a bill of sale to him, and permitted the slave to go into his possession. John D. Crymes shortly afterwards hired the slave to Nathaniel Davis for a-specified time, and Davis fearing that his contract would not avail him, by reason-of the infancy of John.D. Crymes, applied to the plaintiff, who was his guardian, and who entered into a contract to the same effect. When the time had expired, Davis delivered the slave to the plaintiff, and paid the biro to John D. Crymes, having previously consulted the plaintiff, who said, that if the law would permit him, as guardian of .John D. Crymes, to sanction the payment, he would do so. John D. Crymes afterwards came of age, but the plaintiff remained in possession of the slave, until he was levied on by the defendant.
    The presiding Judge sustained a motion «for a nonsuit, on the ground, that the plaintiff’s title was divested by the sale, which was binding on him, although the vendee was disabled by infancy from incurring any reciprocal obligation. A sale to an infant is a valid transfer of property, although the infant is not bound to pay the price stipulated ; and the sale in effect amounts to a gift.
    The*plaintiff now moved to set aside the nonsuit.
    Baüsioütt, for the motion,
    cited Dupree n. Harrington, Harp. 391, and contended, that the plaintiff had a right to retain possession until the price was paid, and that his title was not divested until the sale was completed by a delivery of the property : and that there had been no delivery in this case ; for although John D. Crymes had been suffered to take possession, yet the plaintiff being his guardian, his possession was the possession of the plaintiff, and the latter had never parted with his possession.
    I any, contra.
    
   Colcock, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The only point in this case for our determination, is, whether the creditors of John D. Crymes could divest the plaintiff, acting us his guardian, of the possession of his ward’s property: for there is no room to doubt, ou the evidence, that the property had passed to John D. Crymes. The plaintiff’ himself says his interference in the hiring was as guardian ; for upon being asked by Davis if he should pay the hire to John D. Crymes, he replied, “ that if the law would permit him as guardian of John D. Crymes, to sanction the payment, he would do so.”

I think the levy was properly made. The legal estate was in John D. Cryines, and the creditors could not get at his property in any other way. They could not file a bill against the plaintiff, as guardian. And if he has alien on the slave for advances to his ward, he can apply to the Court of Equity, and stay the proceedings of the creditors. It did, at first, appear to me to be improper, to permit the creditors to take the property from one, who might have a lien ; but his ward was of age, and he would have, and probably had settled with him ; and if he had not, it was his own fault.

Motion refused.  