
    JIMMY RAY HEIDEMA, Personal Representative of the Estate of Louis Heidema, Jr., Deceased, Agnes Heidema, Louis J. Heidema, Judith Gail Heidema, Jimmy Ray Heidema, individually, and Leila May Heidema, d/b/a Heidema Partnership, Defendants and Appellants, v. FIRST BANK (N.A.) — BILLINGS, Plaintiff and Respondent.
    No. 84-102.
    July 3, 1984.
    682 P.2d 1374.
    Jim R. Heidema, pro se.
    Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, Billings for First Bank (N.A.) — Billings.
   ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND OPINION

The Heidemas appeal from an order of the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, sustaining plaintiff First Bank’s objections to defendants’ request for jury trial. For the reasons stated below, we dismiss the appeal as premature.

Plaintiff First Bank filed suit against the Heidemas in June, 1982, to recover monies due on two promissory notes. The Heidemas retained counsel, who filed a series of motions, including a motion to dismiss, before being removed and replaced by another attorney in September, 1982. An answer to the original complaint was filed shortly thereafter, but the answer did not contain a demand for jury trial. A pretrial conference was held in June, 1983, with a non-jury trial scheduled for later that month. Three days before trial, defendants sought and obtained a continuance, after which time defendants’ attorney withdrew as counsel of record.

In October, defendants, acting pro se, filed an amended answer with a request for jury trial. The amended answer is more detailed than the original answer, and sets forth several affirmative defenses and counterclaims against First Bank. However, it appears that both the original and the amended answer related to the same conduct, transaction or occurrence in dispute.

First Bank filed objections to the late request for jury trial. Upon examination of the pleadings, the District Court sustained the objections and denied defendants’ demand for jury trial. Defendants appeal from this denial.

We dismiss the appeal as premature. Denial of a timely or belated request for jury trial is not a final judgment appeal-able under Rule 1(a), M.R.App.Civ.P. The denial is in the nature of aninterlocutory order, and can only be made appealable by specific rule or statute. Neither Rules 1(b) or 1(c), M.R.App.Civ.P., which enumerate certain orders that fall short of final judgment but which are appealable, provide for immediate appeal of the denial of demand for jury trial,. Any improprieties involved in the denial are reversible only upon appeal from the final judgment in the case.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The appeal is dismissed as premature.

2. The Clerk is directed to mail a true copy of the Order to defendants and counsel for plaintiff.  