
    Garret Dorland v. Hugh Mulhollan, Executor of Rudolph Mulhollan, deceased.
    In a letter addressed to John H. Dorland and family by the plaintiff in error, was the following paragraph: “ Now, John, if yon can get that draft (one of $1,000) of Hugh Mulhollan, till the first day of September, I will be responsible for the money, and Pry will come that way and pay them in gold. If they will let you have it, they may depend upon it for sure.”' Held—
    
    1. That upon the purchase of the draft, on the strength of the letter, by John, he leaving the letter ’as security for the payment, the writer of the letter, on reasonable notice, was liable for the value of the draft.
    2. That the letter might be regarded either as an authority to John to purchase, as agent of the writer, or as a direct undertaking to pay the price of the-draft to Mulhollan, the owner, according to the terms of the letter.
    *Error to the district court of Ashland county.
    The original action was brought by the defendant in error, in the court of common pleas of Ashland county, to recover from Garret Dorland and John H. Dorland (the latter of whom was not served with process), on four several causes of action set forth in the petition.
    The whole controversy arises on the fourth cause of action, in which it is claimed that Garret Dorland, residing in Ashland county, Ohio, wrote a letter of credit to his son, John H. Dorland, residing in Charlotte, Michigan, authorizing the defendant’s testator to deliver John H. Dorland & Co. a certain draft held by him, drawn by the Wayne County Branch of the State Bank of Ohio-on the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, for one thousand dollars. The letter was addressed to John H. Dorland and family,, but contains. the following paragraph, which is relied On as fixing the liability of the writer: “Now, John, if you can get that draft from Hugh Mulhollan till the first day of September, I will be responsible for the money, and Fry will come that way and pay them, in gold. If they let you have it, they may depend on it for sure.” Dated Rousburg, Ohio, June 29, 1855, and signed by Garret Dorland.
    The record shows that at the time the letter was written John. H. Dorland and Joshua Patterson were doing business as merchants, under the name and style of John H. Dorland & Co., at. Charlotte, Michigan, where the Mulhollans resided. That after-the receipt of the letter John H. Dorland & Co. purchased the draft of Rudolph Mulhollan, which, including exchange, amounted to one thousand and twenty-five dollars, for which they*executed their firm note, due two months after date, dated July 19, 1855. That payment was demanded of the makers of the note at maturity. That at the time of making said note John H. Dorland delivered the letter received from his father, and left it in pledge-for the payment of the *draft. That on the 23d of July, 1855, the firm of Dorland & Patterson dissolved partnership, Dorland continuing the business till October 12th or 13th, when he left the country with a drove of cattle for the eastern market, and never returned. That the testator died October 23, 1855, and that no notice was given to Garret Dorland by the Mulhollans of the delivery of the draft till some time in the fall of 1855, after the death ■of Rudolph Mulhollan, when Hugh Mulhollan called at Rousburg, where Garret Dorland resided, and demanded of him payment for the draft.
    Judgment was rendered in the common pleas for Garret Dorland, and Mulhollan, the executor, appealed to the district court, where judgment was rendered against Garret Dorland for the full amount claimed due. To reverse which judgment this petition in ■error is filed.
    It appears that the court charged the jury, “ that if the jury find the letter given in evidence to bo genuine, that it was received by .John H. Dorland, and by him exhibited and read to plaintiff’s testator, that the latter was the owner of the draft set forth in the petition, and that plaintiff’s testator sold it either on the sole credit •of the promises contained in said letter, or- the joint and co•operating credit of both the letter and note for $1,025, given at the receipt of the draft by John H. Dorland, and that defendant, ■Garret Dorland, received due notice of the transaction -within a reasonable time thereafter, then the plaintiff was entitled to'recover from defendant, Garret Dorland, the price and value of the draft.”
    The court charged further, “ that the phrase 1 until the first of September,’ referred to the period or limit of credit on the purchase ■of said draft, and not to a period during which the writer would be responsible for the price thereof.”
    The court also charged the jury, that “ if the knowledge of the •transaction between John H. Dorland and the plaintiff’s testator came to Garret Dorland within a reasonable *time, it was a •matter of indifference in law through what source or agency that knowledge was derived, and that if such knowledge came to the defendant (Garret Dorland) so soon after the transaction that his (Garret’s) opportunities for obtaining, and John’s ability to give security for his (Garret’s) liability on said draft had not in the meantime been in any way diminished or impaired, it was in law a reasonable and timely notice.”
    
      The court also charged, that “ if the draft mentioned in said letter,, and the one subsequently actually purchased, wholly or in part on its credit (if they should so find), were the same identical draft, the fact that said letter was addressed on its face to John H. Dorland, and the fact that the draft happened to be the property of Budolph, instead of Hugh Mulhollan, would not alter the liability of the defendant, G-arret Dorland.”
    These several propositions, given by the court to the jury, are-assigned for error.
    
      J. W. Smith, and Fulton & Me Comb, for plaintiff in error.
    
      McSweeney & Given, and N. H. Swayne, for defendant in error.
   Sutliff, J.

It is objected to the charge of the court below, in. regard to the letter, that the court held that it created a liability on the part of Garret Dorland, the writer of it, to Budolph Mulhollan, when the letter was only addressed to John H. Dorland. It is-urged by counsel, that the letter must be regarded as a special lettei*' of credit addressed only to John H. Dorland, and that it could create no undertaking or liability to any other person. Others attempting to acquire any rights under the letter, it is said, would be mere volunteers, and could not impose any liability upon the writer of the letter, to pay them for any advances made to the party to whom the special letter of credit was so addressed.

*If, indeed, the letter were a special letter of credit, addressed only to John H. Dorland, the argument would be pertinent to the case, but it is difficult to perceive how the letter can .properly be termed such. It is true, the letter is said to be addressed to-John H. Dorland and family; and the clause material in this ease is apparently addressed to. John H. Dorland. But that clause is-not, in its terms, a letter of credit to him. At most, it can only be regarded to him as an authority. This is the language: “Now, John, if you can get that draft of Hugh Mulhollan till the first day of September, I will be responsible for the money; and Fry will come that way and pay them in gold. If they let you have it, they may depend on it for sure.” It is not said therein, “I will be responsible to you, John;” or, “I will pay you, John, the money;" but the language is: “If you can get the draft of Hugh Mulhollantill the first day of .September, I will be responsible for the money.” And if there were any ambiguity as to the party to whom the writer thereby undertook to be responsible, that ambiguity is removed by what immediately follows. After the words, “I will be -responsible for the money,” the writer adds, “ and Fry will come that way and pay them in gold.” The amount of this undertaking is, that if Hugh Mulhollan or the Mulhollans will consent to sell the draft on a credit till the first of September, the writer promises that he will be responsible to pay them the money, and that Fry : shall go that way and pay them in gold; and if they should accede to the proposition, authorizing its delivery to John H. Dorland, as his agent, thus: “If they let you have it, they may depend on it (the pay) for sure.” This can in no sense be regarded as a special letter of credit to John H. Dorland, for, however the letter may have heen addressed, this proposed undertaking, contained in the ¡letter, is an undertaking only to the owner or owners of the draft. In no possible contingency could a right of action have accrued thereon to John H. upon the price *of the draft becoming -due and remaining unpaid after the first of September. The only undertaking to John H. was, as has already been remarked, to be •responsible for his act of purchase as the agent of the writer. It .authorized John H. to make a contract’of purchase of the draft in the name and on behalf of the writer, and to receive the draft for him of the Mulhollans. It is, however, immaterial whether the letter be regarded as a power of attorney, showing the authority of John H. to act as the agent of Garret Dorland in the purchase of •the draft, or as a direct undertaking to Mulhollan to pay for the ■draft on the first of September. In either case, the proof is that the money was advanced or the draft delivered on the faith of the letter, and notice of the fact given; which shows a right of action ■■against the writer of the letter, Garret Dorland.

Nor do we think the fact of Hugh Mulhollan being named in the letter, in the place of Budolph, constitutes any objection to a re•■covery. The language is, “ if you can get that draft of Hugh Mulhollan;” but in relation to paying for the same, it continues, “I will be responsible for the money, and Fry will come that way and pay them in gold.. If they let you have it, they may depend on it for sure.” A reasonable construction of this language, we think, would be an authority to purchase of either or both; and the undertaking is to pay accordingly to the owner, whether both or either.

We perceive no error in the record, and the judgment of the district court must therefore be affirmed.

Brinkbrhoee, C. J., and Scott, Peck, and Gholson, JJ, concurred.  