
    George C. Bodine, Respondent, v. M. Harold Bodine, Appellant.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,
    February, 1913.)
    Attachment — warrant of—sufficiency of affidavit under section 74(2) of Municipal Court Act — resident sojourning abroad not a nonresident.
    An affidavit that defendant has removed all his property, as deponent is informed and verily believes, and has gone abroad and has no intention of returning and with full intention of cheating and defrauding his creditors in this country, which does not give the sources of deponent’s information and grounds of belief, and no facts are set forth therein from which the conclusions sworn to could be drawn, is insufficient to sustain a warrant of attachment under section 74(2) of the Municipal Court Act.
    Where the affidavit of plaintiff to obtain a warrant of attachment was for the most part made on information obtained from his attorney, who in his affidavit stated that defendant informed him that he and Ms wife were to sail the following morning for France, where they expected to take up their residence with her parents, and at the same time showed to deponent the passage ticket for himself and wife, and informed deponent that he did not know when he would return to the United States, the alleged statement of defendant is insufficient proof of Ms nonresidence, his exact words not being quoted, but only defendant’s conclusion; and where by the affidavit of defendant’s attorney it appears that defendant told him that he would return in a few weeks and that defendant had stored his furniture in the city of New York, his mail to be sent to his attorney’s office to be held awaiting his return, the conclusion is justified that defendant is merely a resident sojourning abroad subjéct to the provision of law for attaching the property of absent residents rather than nonresidents, and an order denying defendant’s motion to vacate the attachment will be reversed and the attachment vacated.
    Lehmab, J., dissents.
    Appeal from an order of the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, borough of Manhattan, fourth district, denying tEe defendant’s motion to vacate a warrant of attachment.
    
      Strauss, Beich & Boyer (Eugene D. Boyer, of counsel), for appellant.
    William F. Quigley, for respondent.
   Page, J.

The attachment was obtained pursuant to the Municipal Oourt Act, section 74, subdivision 2, which recites for a ground for attachment if the defendant is a natural person and a resident of the state, that he has departed, or is about to depart from the county where he last resided, to a place ■ outside the city of Mew-York, with intent to defraud his creditors * * The affidavits in support of the warrant must state facts from which the fraudulent intent may be presumed and the mere conclusion of the moving party unsupported by evidence is insufficient. Rallings v. McDonald, 76 App. Div. 112; Doheny v. Worden, 75 id. 47; Ringler Co. v. Newman, 33 Misc. Rep. 653. The only statement contained in the moving papers which relates to the intent of the defendant is the conclusion at the end of the affidavit of the plaintiff’s attorney “ That defendant has removed all 'of his property, as deponent is informed and verily believes, and has gone abroad with no intention of returning and with full intention of cheating and defrauding his creditors in this country.” The sources of his information and grounds of his belief do not appear and no facts are set forth from which such a conclusion could be drawn.

It has been suggested that the warrant might be sustained on the ground that the facts stated disclose that the defendant was a non-resident, although neither in the -affidavit upon which the warrant was granted nor in the brief of counsel is it specifically claimed that the defendant is non-resident, nor is the proof of non-residence, in my opinion, sufficient to justify the attachment.

The affidavit of the plaintiff is for the most part upon information obtained from his attorney. We must, therefore, look to the affidavit of his attorney, William F. Quigley, for the facte showing that the defendant is a non-resident. The only statements contained in it which bear upon the point are “ That defendant informed deponent that he and his wife were to sail the following morning, October 3rd, for France, where they expected to take up their residence with his wife’s parents. He exhibited to deponent at that time passage tickets foi his wife and himself on board the steamer La Loraine. The. defendant at that time informed deponent that he did not know when he would return to the United States.”

As proof of non-residence this statement is insufficient, first, because the exact words of the defendant are not quoted but merely the conclusion of the deponent from them. It is very probable that the defendant said he expected to stay at his wife’s parents’ house while in Paris, but we cannot say from this statement alone that he used the word- “ residence ” in its legal sense and declared his intention of becoming a non-resident. Furthermore the subsequent statement “that he did not know when he would return to the United States ” would rather rebut such an inference. In the second place these words merely indicate an expression of future intention on the part of the defendant and there is no statement that he ever carried out this intention and took up a residence abroad. Opposed to it is the affidavit of the defendant’s attorney that the defendant informed him he would return in a few weeks and that the defendant has stored his furniture in Hew York city, and has his mail sent to his attorney’s office to be held awaiting his return to Hew York. The facts seem to fully justify the conclusion that the defendant is merely a resident sojourning abroad and subject to the provisions for attaching the property of absent residents rather than nonresidents. .

Many of the old ■ cases -seem to hold that the term “ residence,” within the meaning of the sections of the Code relating to attachments, refers merely to the present place of abode of the debtor irrespective of his intention. In Hanover National Bank v. Stebbins, 69 Hun, 308, the General Term of this department said, at page 309: “ The fact that the defendant never acquired a residence in another place, and that he had all the time since 1891 (speaking in 1893) an intention to return and resume housekeeping with his family in this city, would be sufficient to constitute a domicile within this State. But the word, residence, as used in section 636 of the Code, means the abode or place where one actually lives and not one’s legal domicile.” Again, in Mayor v. Genet, 4 Hun, 487, the court said: “ The fact that his family may continue to reside within this State, and that his home or domicile may be here, is not enough, under the circumstances shown, to render him a resident of the State.”

These cases were all decided before 1895 when the last part of section 636 of the Code was added providing as a ground for attachment where the defendant, being an adult and a resident of the state, has been continuously without the state of Hew York for more than six months next before the granting of the order of publication of the summons against him, and has" not made a designation of a person upon whom to serve a summons in his behalf. * * * ” If the rule established by them be correct, and mere place of abode irrespective of intention establishes residence, then every person who leaves the state however temporarily becomes eo- instemti a non-resident and subject to attachment and the above provision for attachment of the property of absent residents is vain and foolish.

Granting, however, that mere living abroad is sufficient proof of non-residence, it would not help the case of this attaching creditor, as there is positively no proof in the papers that the defendant has a place of abode in another state or that he has not a regular place of abode in this state. The only proof in the case is an alleged declaration of intention to become a non-resident at some future time.

The statutes authorizing the attachment of property are a provisional remedy in derogation of the common law. They must be construed strictly in favor of the attachment debtor. Applying this principle I do not think we can support this attachment upon a mere inference of non-residence in the face of almost conclusive proof to the contrary. The facts of this case are. not as strong as those in Doheny v. Worden, 75 App. Div. 47, in which the attachment y^as vacated.

The moving papers are insufficient and the attachment should have been vacated.

The order appealed from is reversed with costs and the warrant of attachment is vacated.

Seabuky, J., concurring.

Lehman, J. (dissenting.)

I agree with Hr. Justice Page that there is no evidence that the defendant has left the state or removed his property with intent to defraud creditors. 1 do not agree with him in his view that such evidence was necessary or that the attachment was sought or granted upon this ground. The moving papers upon which the attachment was sought do not in terms allege that the defendant is not a resident of the state, but they contain allegations which in my opinion require the inference that he is a non-resident of the state. " The principal affidavit is made by the plaintiff himself and sets forth that “ the defendant above named was a resident of this State * * * prior to the third day of October last, on which day as plaintiff is informed by his attorney, William F. Quigley of 149 Broadway, Hew York City, and verily believes, the defendant departed from this State of Hew York for Paris, France, with intent to remain a resident thereof -and not return to the city of Hew York.” The plaintiff further states in this affidavit that defendant told him that he “ was going to Paris, France, with his wife and there take up his residence and start in business, and that he did not intend again to return to this country.” The affidavit of William F. Quigley states about the same facts and also facts from which-it is. fair to infer that the defendant has- carried out his expressed intention. Both affidavits further contain statements of the removal of defendant’s property, but as I read these allegations their sole purpose is to show that defendant does not reside in this state. The attorney’s affidavit concludes with these words: That defendant has removed all of his property, as deponent is informed and verily believes, and has gone abroad with no intention of returning and with full intention of cheating and defrauding his creditors in this country.” This statement is, of course, of no legal effect, consisting merely of conclusions and allegations made on information .and belief, and represents, in my opinion, merely the opinion of the deponent that the defendant has left the state with intent to reside elsewhere.

A defendant is amenable to the process of attachment ■when he has left the state with, intent no longer to reside here even though he may have failed to obtain a domicile elsewhere; and an attachment which is granted upon affidavits' stating facts from which the inference of non-residence must necessarily he drawn is valid even though the affidavits fail to state explicitly that defendant is a non-resident. Mayor v. Genet, 4 Hun, 487.

The order should he affirmed with costs.

Order reversed, with costs and covenant of attachment vacated.  