
    In re Leona Phyllis FERRARA, Debtor, Leona Phyllis Ferrara, Appellant, v. Mary Jane Condit, Appellee.
    No. 11-60051.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Jan. 16, 2013.
    Filed Feb. 25, 2013.
    Gary L. Thomas, Esquire, Gary L. Thomas, P.C., Phoenix, AZ, for Appellant.
    Craig Collins, Craig Collins Law Office, L.L.C., Sun City West, CA, for Appellee.
    Before: NOONAN, GRABER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

We affirm a holding of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (the BAP) in favor of Mary Jane Condit, the conservator of John Charochak.

The parties are familiar with the facts and prior proceedings. We note only that the Arizona Probate Court held.that Fer-rara in 2006 became a trustee for her husband by her acts and the operation of Arizona’s Adult Protective Services Act (APSA). The Arizona Probate Court held her liable for $48,663.53 in damages and $28,818.10 in attorney fees, costs, and interest. Ferrara did not appeal the judgment.

In 2009, Ferrara began this action in the bankruptcy court in chapter 7 and sought to discharge the probate court’s judgment against her. Both the bankruptcy court and the BAP ruled against her. She appeals to us.

The BAP held that it should afford pre-clusive effect to the judgment of the Arizona Probate Court, if Arizona courts would do so Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Condit had established the required factors under Arizona law to preclude further litigation of the claim already decided definitively by the Arizona Probate Court.

Following Blyler v. Hemmeter (In re Hemmeter), 242 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir.2001), the BAP found that a person acting as a trustee under the APSA was also acting in a fiduciary capacity within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). By virtue of the Arizona statute, Ferrara had been the trustee of her husband’s property prior to her wrongdoing. That she claimed to have been unaware of her fiduciary status was no defense, as ignorance of the law is no defense.

It is anomalous to treat a person as a trustee when that person asserts her ignorance of such a role and its responsibilities. As Ferrara did not appeal the judgment of the Arizona Probate Court, she cannot effectively attempt to do so here. But, it may be argued, to be a trustee under the Arizona statute is not to be a trustee under § 523(a)(4) of the bankruptcy statute. In this instance, we reject this argument. We agree with the BAP that the Arizona statutory trust that exists here meets the three criteria articulated in Hemmeter, 242 F.3d at 1190. We therefore affirm the judgment.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     