
    Chandrasena SUDUSINGHE, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
    Nos. 03-2814-pr, 08-6044-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 10, 2010.
    Glenn L. Formica, Formica, P.C., New Haven, CT, for Petitioner.
    Sue Chen, Special- Assistant United States Attorney (Neil M. Corwin, Assistant United States Attorney, of counsel), for Lev. L. Dassin, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, GUIDO CALABRESI, Senior Circuit Judge, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, District Judge.
    
      
       Christopher F. Droney, Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Chandrasena Sudusinghe petitions for review of two orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), one entered September 18, 2002 summarily affirming an order of removal, and the other entered June 18, 2008 denying his motion to reopen. Sudusinghe, a Sri Lankan, alleges persecution by the Janatha Vimukthi Pera-muna (“JVP”) on account of his support for the United National Party (“UNP”), and seeks asylum. We assume familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

I. Petition for Review of Order of Removal (Docket No. 03-2814)

When considering a petition to review an order of removal, we review legal conclusions and applications of law de novo, and findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard. Mendis v. Filip, 554 F.3d 335, 338 (2d Cir.2009). Under the substantial evidence standard, a finding of fact is reversible only if “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude” that the finding was erroneous. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Gao v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 482 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir.2007). ‘Where, as here, the BIA summarily affirms the [Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) ] decision[,] we review the decision of the IJ directly.” Pavlova v. I.N.S., 441 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir.2006).

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that any alleged persecution was not “on account of’ Sudusinghe’s support for the UNP. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Sudusinghe offered little, if any, evidence suggesting that his alleged persecution was politically motivated. The evidence that was offered suggests instead that the JVP targeted Sudusinghe initially because he worked for a bank and could cash a fraudulent check. Thereafter, he was threatened because he alerted the police. The only evidence suggesting a political motive is Jamis’s threat to “get ‘The UNP Ba[stard]’ ” (meaning Sudusinghe). But the suggestion is weak at best — the UNP reference seems more epithet than material fact — and Sudusinghe himself diminished its value by testifying that Jamis made the threat because “he couldn’t get money from me” and because “I told the police and I trapped him and I caught him and put him in the jail.” On this record, the IJ was warranted in finding that Sudu-singhe’s political opinions were not a “central reason” for his alleged persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(i). This finding renders Sudusinghe ineligible for asylum and is accordingly sufficient to support the order of removal, and we therefore need not reach Sudusinghe’s remaining assignments of error to it.

II. Petition for Review of Order Denying Motion to Reopen (Docket No. 08-6044-ag)

We review orders denying motions to reopen for abuse of discretion, Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam); and we find none here. Denial of Sudusinghe’s untimely motion to reopen was warranted because none of “the proffered new evidence would likely alter the result” of his asylum proceedings. Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168 (2d Cir.2008). The proffered evidence does nothing to remedy the deficiency noted above: that Sudusinghe is ineligible for asylum because he has offered insufficient evidence of persecution “on account of’ his political opinion. Having failed to establish a pri-ma facie case of asylum eligibility, he is not entitled to reopening. Id.

Finding no merit in Sudusinghe’s remaining arguments, we hereby DENY his petitions for review.  