
    Samuel G. Smith v. James Ramsey.
    Under the present bankrupt law of the United States, the discharge of a bankrupt can be set aside for fraud in obtaining it, only by a direct proceeding for that purpose, pursuant to the provisions of its thirty-fourth section. It can not be collaterally impeached, on the ground that it was fraudulently or improperly obtained.
    Error to the District Court of Harrison county.
    The action in the court below was brought by Ramsey •against Smith, to recover on hook account for $469.13.
    The defendant, Smith, among other defenses, pleaded the •certificate of his discharge in bankruptcy in bar of the .action.
    Replication, that the discharge was fraudulently obtained in this, etc. (setting out several acts alleged to have been committed by Smith, which are designated in section 29 of “the bankrupt law as causes for invalidating the certificate).
    To this replication Smith demurred, on the ground that the certificate could not he collaterally impeached, and that the Common Pleas had not jurisdiction to hear and determine the validity of the certificate. The demurrer was overruled and exceptions taken on the record. On the trial evidence was tendered by Ramsey, tending to prove the matters stated in his replication, to which Smith objected, but the court overruled the objection, and permitted the evidence to go to the jury; and in the charge the jury were instructed to consider such evidence. Verdict, on ■second trial, for plaintiff, Ramsey, for $451.
    Motion for new trial, because the court erred in admitting testimony to impeach the certificate, and in its charge to the jury. Motion overruled, and a bill of exceptions taken. Judgment, on verdict, for plaintiff’.
    On proceedings in error, in the District Court, this judgment was affirmed. The present plaintiff’ now asks a reversal of this judgment of affirmance, and of the judgment of the common pleas.
    
      Lewis Lewton, for plaintiff in error:
    1. The certificate of’ discharge is conclusive evidence of the final judgment of bankruptcy, and of the regularity of the final proceedings (section 84 of the bankrupt act), and can not be collaterally impeached. Voorhees v. U. S. Bank, 10 Peters, 449; Sheldon v. Newton, 8 Ohio St. 498; Goodrich v. Jenkins, 6 Ohio, 43; Anderson v. Anderson, 8 Ohio, 110; 1 Ohio, 261; 5 Ohio, 346; 3 Ohio, 306; 7 Cranch. 483; 16 Ohio St. 455.
    2. When a statute gives a remedy, and prescribes in what court the remedy must be sought, no other coui’t has-jurisdiction in the case. Grissel v. Marlow, 15 Ohio St. 114; 8 Ohio St. 590; Dodge v. Com’rs, 3 Met. 380; Stevens v. Middlesex C. Co., 12 Mass. 466; 11 Mass. 364; 4 Wend. 667; 1 Barn. & Ald. 359; 1 Met. 130; 4 Cush. 245; 55 Me. 389. And a state court has no jurisdiction to try the question of fraud to impeach the validity of these certificates. Corey v. Ripley, 57 Me. 69; Symonds v. Barnes, 59 Me. 000; Burpee v. Sparhawk, 108 Mass. 111; Payne & Bro. v. Able, 7 Bush. (Ky.), 344; Way v.Howe, 108 Mass. 502; Black v. Blazo, 117 Mass. 17; Ocean National Bank v. Olcott, 46 N. Y. 12; 34 N. J. (5 Vroom), 305; Parker v. Atwood, 52 N. H. 181.
    
      Estep &; Shotwell, for defendant in error.
   Scott, Chief Judge.

The sole question in this case is, whether a discharge duly granted under the bankrupt act of Congress, enacted in 1867, when pleaded in bar to an action brought in a state court for prior indebtedness, can be impeached in such state court on the ground that it was obtained by fraud. Both on principle, and authority, this question must be answered in the negative.

The 34th section of the bankrupt law of 1867, contains the following proviso: “ Any creditor or creditors of said bankrupt, whose debt was proved or provable against the estate in bankruptcy, who shall see fit to contest the validity of said discharge, on the ground that it was fraudulently obtained, may, at any time, within two years from the date thereof, apply to the court which granted it, to •set aside and annul the same.” The act itself having thus prescribed the forum, mode, and time for the direct impeachment of a discharge on the ground of fraud in obtaining it, the remedy thus given is exclusive. The authorities, on this subject, are quite uniform, and render a discussion of the question unnecessary. The policy of the law accords with the maxim, “Interest reipublicce ut sit finis Zitiumf and forbids the discharge to be collaterally impeached. Corey v. Ripley, 57 Me. 69; Linn et al. v. Hamilton et al., 34 N. J. 305; Ocean Nat. Bank v. Olcott, 46 N. Y. 12; Parker v. Atwood, 52 N. H. 181; Way v. Howe, 108 Mass. 502; Payne v. Able, 7 Bush. (Ky), 344.

It follows that the Court of Common Pleas erred in overruling the demurrer to the replication of the plaintiff bemw ; in admitting evidence in support of the replication, .and in its charge to the jury.

Judgment of District Court and of Common Pleas reversed, •and cause remanded.

Day, Wright, Johnson, and Ashburn, JJ., concurred.  