
    (71 South. 512)
    No. 21643.
    MANDEVILLE ICE & LIGHT CO. v. TOWN OF MANDEVILLE et al.
    (April 3, 1916.)
    ' (Syllabus by BMtorial Staff.)
    
    Municipal Corporations <S&wkey;680, 681(5) — Use of Street — Injunction—Statutes.
    Act No. 76 of 1914, authorizing towns to grant to corporations the right to use' and occupy the streets and to obstruct them with buildings necessary to such corporations, provided the consent of the taxpayers is obtained, containing no repealing clause, did not repeal section 1, par. 7, of Act No. Ill of 1912, authorizing towns to grant the use of their streets for the erection of electric light poles, etc., as the later act was intended to enlarge and not to restrict the powers of towns, and referred to unusual and serious obstructions, such as buildings, and not to the customary obstruction of electric light poles, so that a company, proceeding'to erect such poles under the authority of an ordinance of a town, will not be enjoined.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1463; Dee. Dig. 680, 681(5).]
    Appeal from Twenty-Sixth. Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany; J. B. Lancaster, Judge.
    Suit for an injunction by the Mandeville Ice & Light Company against the Town of Mandeville and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Henry L. Garland, of Opelousas (Wm. Y. Seeber, of New Orleans, of counsel), for appellant. M. R. Neuhauser, of New Orleans, for appellee Town of Mandeville. I-Iarvey E. Ellis, of Covington, for appellee St. Tammany & N. O. Ry. & Ferry Co.
   PROYOSTY, J.

The St. Tammany & New Orleans Railway & Ferry Company was proceeding to erect electric light poles in the streets of the defendant town, under an ordinance authorizing it to do so, when the present suit was brought, enjoining the further prosecution of the work.

The sole ground of injunction alleged in the petition is that, as an effect of Act 76, p. 194, of 1914,' towns can grant such a use of the streets only with the consent of the taxpayers of the town, obtained at an election held for that purpose.

Authority to grant such use of streets is conferred upon towns by paragraph 7 of Act 111, p. 128, of 1912, without anything being said about consent of taxpayers. But this restriction upon the authority of the town is imposed, says counsel, by the said act of 1914. The act reads:

“Towns * * * shall have authority to grant to railroads and other corporations the right to use and occupy the streets and alleys therein" and to obstruct same, or part thereof, with buildings necessary to and used by said corporations,” provided the consent of the taxpayers is obtained.

The act contains no repealing clause. Evidently its object was to enlarge, not to restrict, the powers of towns. Evidently, also, it has reference to unusual and serious obstructions, such as buildings, and not to the customary ones of poles for stringing wires, pipes for conducting gas and water, and rails for operating cars. The idea that a town should have to consult the taxpayers by means of an expensive election preliminarily to allowing electric light poles, or gas or water pipes, or railway tracks to be laid in a street, were it even for one single block, is evidently foreign entirely to the purpose and intendment of this act.

Judgment affirmed.  