
    ANSON CRITCHER v. G. F. HOLLOWAY and others.
    A bond given in consideration of the loan of money with which to put a substitute into the Confederate army, is upon illegal consideration, and therefore cannot be enforced.
    (Reade, J., dissenting.)
    
      (Smitherman v. Sanders, ante, 522, approved.)
    Debt, tried before Watts, J., at Spring Term 1870, of' Granville Court.
    The cause of action was a bond for $1,600, dated February 3d 1863, the consideration of which was the loan of money, to be used, as the plaintiff knew, for the purpose of putting into tbe Confederate army a substitute for tbe defendant Holloway.
    His Honor instructed tbe jury tbat this formed an illegal consideration, and tbat tbe plaintiff, therefore, could not recover.
    Verdict for tbe defendant, &c. Appeal by tbe plaintiff.
    
      C. M. Busbee, for tbe appellant.
    
      Rogers & Batchelor, contra,
    cited Martin v. McMillan, 63 N. 0. 486; Turner v. N. G. R. R. Go., Ib. 522 ; Clemmons v. Hampton, ante, 264, and Leah v. Oomm'rs, ante, 132.
   Dick:, J.

Money lent for tbe purpose of equipping soldiers for tbe Confederate army, cannot be recovered in tbe Courts of the rightful government: Smiiherman v. Sanders, at this term. In our case tbe money was loaned by tbe plaintiff to tbe principal obligor, with a fab knowledge that it was to be used for tbe purpose of sending a substitute to tbe Confederate army. If this object was illegal, then tbe plaintiff cannot recover.

The Confederate army was sustaining a rebellion against tbe rightful government, and it must necessarily follow tbat any act done voluntarily, and with a knowledge tbat it would have tbe effect of adding to tbe strength and efficiency of tbat army, was illegal. It was insisted in tbe argument, tbat tbe act of putting in one man as a substitute for another, did not add to tbe efficiency of tbe army. This may or may not have been so, but tbe transaction, both as to tbe principal and substitute, was illegal. If tbe principal bad been conscripted and forced into tbe army, be would not have been guilty of rebellion; but if be furnished a substitute, tbat act would have been voluntary and illegal.

We will not consider further tbe nice distinctions presented in tbe ingenious argument of tbe plaintiff’s counsel. Tbe fact that the money furnished, by the plaintiff placed a soldier in the Confederate army, and was lent with a. full knowledge that it was to be used for that purpose, vitiated the contract, and defeats the plaintiff’s recovery: Cannon v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179, and the authorities cited in the brief of the defendants’ counsel.

Justice Reade dissented.

Pee, Cueiam. Judgment affirmed.  