
    [Philadelphia,
    January 22, 1825.]
    M‘WILLIAMS against MARTIN.
    IN ERROR.
    A deed conveying all debts, dues, and demands, real, personal, or mixed, which are due and owing-, or of right belonging to the grantor, by virtue of inheritance, legacies, bonds, notes, book debts, or otherwise, to the grantee, and his heirs and assigns, passes real estate.
    Parol evidence of the declaration and intention of the grantor in a deed, is not admissible.
    Ejectment, in the District Court for the city and county of .Philadelphia, by Mary M‘ Williams against Elizabeth Martin, to recover one-fourth part of a house and lot in the city of Philadelphia. On the trial, it appeared that the plaintiff having obtained a judgment against John M. Martin, son of the defendant, issued a fieri facias, which was levied upon the premises in question. They were subsequently condemned and sold by the sheriff, under a venditioni exponas, when they were purchased by the plaintiff. At the time of the sale, the defendant gave notice that the property belonged to her, but on searching the office of the recorder, no conveyance from John M. Martin to Elizabeth Martin could be found.
    The defendant gave in evidence, an assignment from the said John M. Martin to her, dated the Sd of November, 1814, in these words:
    “ Know all men by these presents, that I, John Martin, of the city of Philadelphia, mariner, in consideration of the suirf of one thousand dollars, to me paid by Elizabeth Martin, gentlewoman, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, as also for divers other good and valuable considerations, — have granted, bargained, sold, conveyed, and assigned, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell, convey, and assign, all debts, dices, or demands wheresoever, and whatsoever, real, personal, or mixed, which are due and owing, or of right belonging unto me, either by virtue of inheritance, legacies, bonds, notes, book debts, or otherwise, or which hereafter may become due: The said Elizabeth Martin to have and to hold the same, unto her, the said Eliza-Mih, her heirs and assigns for ever. In vyittiess whereof,” &c.
    
      The defendant also offered ito prove, that John M. Martin had said, that this paper was a conveyance of his estate in Sixth Street, the premises in question. The evidence was objected to, but admitted by the court, who sealed a bill of exceptions. It was then proved, that John M. Martin had said, that the deed in question was a conveyance to his mother of his share of the estate, and that it was drawn by a lawyer.
    The verdict being for the defendant, the plaintiff removed the record by writ of error.
    P. JL. Browne, for the plaintiff in error,
    observed, that if the court should be of opinion, that John M. Martin’s interest in the premises, passed by the deed to his mother, he hoped the cour.t would nevertheless reverse the judgment, if they should think the parol evidence had been improperly admitted; because, the deed not being on record, the plaintiff was taken by surprise by its production, and ought to have an opportunity of showing that it was fraudulent.
    He contended, further, that no title to the house passed by the deed. There was no particular property described, and the words, debts, dues, and demands, referred to personal estate alone. The term inheritance, must be understood to mean legacies. There was no word in the deed which could pass an interest in land.
    
      Malmny, for the defendant in error,
   DüNcaN, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The construction of the deed is mattter of law.

If the record had not informed us to the contrary, I should have supposed it the conveyance of some person, not conversant in conveyancing. But be it drawn by whom it may, clerk or layman, it must receive the same construction. The controversy does not respect words limiting an estate; because they are absolute — to her and her heirs — technical words of limitation and perpetuity.

Words describing the subject of the grant, are very different from words limiting the estate granted; and, except as to words of limitation, courts are bound to give the same effect to intention in a deed as in a will; for if there was a distinction as to description, between deeds and wills, these distinctions would so multiply, that the knowledge of the common law would become rather a matter of memory, than of judgment or reason.

Now, it is impossible to doubt, that if Thomas Martin had devised in these words, it would have comprehended his real estate. The construction ought to be favourable to the intent, as near as possibly may be.

The law is not nice in grants; — neither false Latin nor bad English will make a deed void. When the words are doubtful, the point to be inquired into, is the intent of the parties. If the intent be as doubtful as the words, it will be no assistance at all; but if it be plain, wo ought to put the construction on it which ■will best answer the intention, though the words be doubtful; but we cannot put words into a deed which are not there! nor put a construction on words in the deed, directly contrary to the plain sense of them. But take the intention as plain and manifest, and the words doubtful and obscure, it is the duty of judges to find out such a meaning in. the words as will best answer the intent of the parties. The rules and maxims which Justice Willes has drawn from Littleton, Plowden, Coke, Hobart, and Finch, are full of good sense. Willes, 332.

The word demands is not restrained by its association with other words (noscitur a sociis) to personals; for it is united with words of realty, as, real, personal, and mixed, comprehending all, and with words precisely technical, the word heirs and the word inheritance, which is as strong as hereditaments, and will pass real estate, and by such release all actions real are gone.. Co. Litt. 291. 8 Rep. 154. Brooke’s Ch. 67, cites, 6 T. Rep. 15. How much stronger are (he words used here! Though the broad construction of the word demands might be confined to releases, which discharge, and not conveyances, which charge; yet still, as it is coupled with the word real, and with words of inheritance, it shows a strong intention to dispose of the realty. The words might, 1 admit, be restrained by the particular occasion of making the instrument, or by other expressions more limited; but there are none such. The words were used in their most comprehensive meaning. It never was a rule of construction in deeds, that the words were to be taken in their technical sense, but according to their proper and most known signification; that which is most vulgar and in use. The necessary use of particular technical expressions, is chiefly regarded in the sense of law terms, which matter of desci’iption is not; and even whore these are used, there is always a presumption in favour of technical meaning and inference, yet it is no more than presumption, and it is to be contradicted by the manifestation of a contrary intention; and the primary inquiry in conveyances, as well as in wills, is, the intention, and when that appears on the face of the instrument, is clearly and satisfactorily ascertained, and is not contrary to any rule of law, the court is bound to construe it conformably to the intention. Acting on this principle, I do not think, that any two men of common capacity, could be found to differ, in the construction of this conveyance, which clearly on its face, intended to convey the real estate of the grantor to his mother, “all property, of whatever nature or kind,” and this might be supposed to end the controversy. But the record shows, that it is open to other inquiries, admitting this to be the legal construction, whether it was fraudulent or not, as to the creditors. The plaintiff, a purchaser at sheriff’s sale, might be ignorant of the execution of such conveyance. It might have taken her by surprise on the trial, and unprepared to exhibit any evidence to show the fraud; and as the court is of opinion there was error in admitting parol evidence of the declaration and intention of the grantor, justice requires that the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial take place.

Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.  