
    Amadou FOFANA, aka Moussa Bassirou, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-4635 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 3, 2014.
    Theodore Vialet, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Jennifer L. Lightbody, Senior Litigation Counsel; Matthew A. Connelly, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Amadou Fofana, a native and citizen of Cote d’Ivoire, seeks review of the October 25, 2012, decision of the BIA affirming the September 13, 2011, decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his motion to reopen. In re Amadou Fofana, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Oct. 25, 2012), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig.Ct.N.Y.C. Sept. 13, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

The agency’s determination that Fofana did not show a change in country conditions is not supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, the agency abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008); Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). An alien may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). There is no dispute that Fofana’s July 2011 motion was untimely and number-barred, as it was his second motion to reopen, and the final administrative decision was issued in April 2010. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).

The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(ii). While the agency concluded that conditions in Cote d’Ivoire remained adverse, and had not worsened, the country conditions evidence Fofana submitted shows that there was a material worsening of conditions for individuals, like him, who were members of the political party Rally for Republicans (“RDR”).

The 2010 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report on Cote d’Ivoire explains that in November 2010, the RDR candidate for president, Alassane Ouattara, won the runoff election against the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo; Gbagbo refused to relinquish control; and the two men established separate governments. The Report further provides that, although forces loyal to Gbagbo had engaged in human rights abuses prior to the election, following the election, they began targeting RDR members and Ouattara supporters specifically, raiding campaign offices and individual homes, killing, injuring, and detaining RDR supporters, and, in one instance, firing on RDR supporters during a demonstration, killing at least twenty people and arresting hundreds. Accordingly, the agency’s conclusion that Fofana did not show changed country conditions is not supported by substantial evidence. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169; Delgado v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 702, 705 (2d Cir.2007) (the substantial evidence standard “requires a certain minimum level of analysis from the IJ and BIA, as well as some indication that the IJ considered material evidence supporting a petitioner’s claim.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this decision.  