
    Harvey v. Spaulding et ux.
    
    1. Redemption op property sold on execution. After a judgment attached as a lien upon real estate, it was sold by the judgment defendant, and conveyed by a deed containing covenants against incumbrances and of warranty, after which it was sold under an execution issued upon the judgment. Meld:
    
    1. That the judgment defendant was entitled to redeem said premises within one year after such sale.
    2. That the grantee also had a right to redeem as a subsequent purchaser.
    
      
      Appeal from Dubuque District Court.
    
    Thursday, June 16.
    A judgment was rendered against Spaulding, which became a lien on the real estate in controversy. After the lien attached, Spaulding conveyed the property, by deed absolute, to one Holland, the deed “ containing full covenants against incumbrances and of warranty.” After this conveyance, execution issued upon the judgment against Spaulding, and the real estate which had been conveyed to Holland was sold by the sheriff to the plaintiff. The day before the year for redemption expired, Spaulding paid into the hands of the Clerk of the District Court the sum necessary to redeem the land from said sale. The plaintiff refused to accept this redemption, and filed his petition to compel the sheriff to execute a deed. His action being dismissed, the plaintiff appeals.
    
      John D. Harvey for the appellant.
    
      Cooley & JEKghmey for the appellee.
   Dillon, J.

The plaintiff contends that Spaulding, the judgment debtor, had ho right to redeem from the sheriff’s sale, because, before the sale, he had parted with all of his interest in the land, and because, at the time he sought to redeem, he had no interest whatever in the real estate. In other words, it is claimed that Spaulding was a stranger to the land, and, therefore, not entitled to redeem from the sale thereof, under the judgment.

The question gives us no trouble. The statute expressly provides that the judgment debtor “may redeem at any time within one year from the day of sale.” Rev., §§ 3332, 3342, 3358.

The plaintiff ingeniously argues that after the sale the judgment ceased to be a debt against Spaulding, and that the plaintiff, in execution, could not call upon him to pay it again, it being discharged. The argument is not sound. If no sale of tbe land to Holland bad ever been made, tbe same argument could be used against tbe right of Spaulding to redeem. In tbe latter case Spaulding might redeem and save tbe land. In tbe case at bar, be has an equal interest in making tbe redemption, and thus prevent liability on bis covenants.

It is also argued that tbe right to redeem cannot be in both Holland and Spaulding, and that tbe conveyance to Holland operated to assign Spaulding’s right to redeem. This argument is also untenable. It does not follow that tbe right of redemption cannot be in both. Tbe true view is this: Spaulding, as tbe judgment debtor, certainly, where, as in the case at bar, be has conveyed with covenants, may, as such debtor, redeem.

His grantee, by virtue of bis conveyance, has such an interest in tbe property as would also entitle him to redeem.

Affirmed.  