
    WILLIAM F. INGRAM v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [32 C. Cls. R., 147; 172 U. S. R., 327.]
    
      On the defendants' Appeal.
    
    The petition alleges that the claimant made an entry nnder the desert-land act upon a reserved section within the limits of a railroad grant; that he acquired no right or title thereby; that accordingly he did not reclaim the land; that his entry has heen canceled; that the consideration was void, and that he brings this action to recover hack the purchase money on the implied contract. The defendants demur, setting up the distinction between implied contracts and quasi contracts, and contending that the obligation to refund the purchase money is not an implied contract, and that the court is without jurisdiction. A primary question in the case is whether an entry can he made under the desert-land act upon reserved sections of railroad land grants.
    
      The court below decides:
    1. Whether an entry under the Desert-Land Act, 3d March, 1877 (19 Stat. L., 377), upon a reserved section within a railroad grant (Eev. Stat., § 2357) is absolutely void, and whether such an entry, if not void, is authorized at the minimum price of $1.25 acre?
    2. The land laws are a matter of general public concern, and the Executive Departments should not be embarrassed by decisions which can not be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
    3. The Tucker Act, 1887 (24 Stat. L., p. 505), considered as a jurisdictional statute, is largely a codification of existing law and was intended to be in enlargement and not in restriction of jurisdiction.
    4. The term “upon any contract, expressed or implied,’’ is used in all the jurisdictional acts with reference to the common-law classification of actions “ex contracta’’ and “ex delicto.” The meaning is that the court shall have jurisdiction of all actions ex contracta but not of actions ex delicto.
    
    5. The peculiarity of cases against the Government is that there exists a compact between it and the citizen that it may take his property for public use on the condition of making just compensation, but that its liability is to be measured always by the authority which it has expressly given its agent or the benefit which it has actually received. Hence there may be actions which are ex delicio when between individuals, yet ex contractu when between the citizen and the Government.
    6. The Tucker Act, when it provides that the court shall have jurisdiction of “all claims founded upon the Constitution” and excepts suits “sounding in tort,” does little or nothing more than provide that the court shall not be troubled with suits in which there is no governmental liability.
    7. The phrase, “ the law will imply a contract,” is well understood, both in courts and legislatures, and when used figuratively is not incorrect. The meaning is that on a given state of facts the law authorizes a court to infer from them the contract which the defendant ought to have made, and precludes him from evading responsibility by setting up his own tortious act or unconscionable intent as a defense.
    8. Where the agents of the Government sold land which they had no authority to sell, and received money which they ought not to have accepted, the money is due, ex aequo et hono, and recoverable in an action on implied contract.
    9. There are cases of implied contract where it is necessary to discriminate, in ascertaining the rights and obligations of the parties, between contracts which are implied and obligations which are enforceable quasi contracts.
    10. The scope and nature of obligations which may be enforced quasi contracts, and which in this court have been treated as implied contracts for purposes of jurisdiction, examined and stated.
   The court below overruled the demurrer ou the question of jurisdiction, and on the defendants pleading to the merits entered judgment for the claimant, but only for the purpose of an appeal, the claimant having no right of appeal because the amount involved was less than $3,000.

The judgment of the court below is reversed on the ground that the claimant voluntarily abandoned his entry and has no claim for the sum he paid to initiate it.

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, January 3,1899.  