
    PEOPLE v NICHOLAS
    Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Bargained Plea — Waiver of Right to Jury Trial.
    The trial court’s refusal to grant either the prosecutor’s motion to add the charge of speeding or the defendant’s motion to withdraw his waiver of right to jury trial is an abuse of discretion requiring reversal where defendant offers to plead guilty of speeding rather than stand trial for reckless driving and the trial court first requires the defendant to waive his right to jury trial before passing on the motion to add.
    Reference for Points in Headnote
    21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 495.
    Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Wiliam C. Hague, J.
    Submitted Division 1 May 10, 1972, at Detroit.
    (Docket No. 12301.)
    Decided June 1, 1972.
    Joseph Nicholas was convicted of reckless driving. Defendant appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Thomas P. Smith, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
    
      Mark E. Weiss, for defendant on appeal.
    Before: Danhof, P. J., and Levin and Borradaile, JJ.
    
      
       Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.
    
   Per Curiam.

After a nonjury trial, the defendant was convicted of reckless driving. MCLA 257.626; MSA 9.2326. On the day set for trial, the defendant appeared and offered to plead guilty to driving ten miles per hour over the speed limit.. The trial judge indicated that the defendant must first waive his right to jury trial and this was done. The trial court then denied the prosecutor’s motion to add a charge of driving ten miles per hour over the speed limit. The defendant moved to withdraw his waiver of a jury trial and the motion was denied. Because of this abuse of discretion the judgment of conviction is reversed.

Reversed and remanded.  