
    ANDERSON v. STATE.
    (No. 9017.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    May 6, 1925.)
    1. Rape <&wkey;5l (4) — Conviction of rape by forcibly aiding another to commit offense held not sustained by evidence.
    Evidence 7^eld insufficient to sustain conviction of rape by forcibly compelling prosecutrix to submit to carnal intercourse with another.
    2. Rape &wkey;>54(I) — Conviction of rape by forcibly aiding another to commit offense not sustained on uncorroborated testimony of prosecutrix complaining too late and going ' with defendant after alleged offense.
    . Conviction of rape by forcibly aiding another to commit offense will not be sustained on uncorroborated testimony of prosecutrix who waits too long before telling of it, especially where she met people who would have protected her, or where she went with defendant after alleged offense, or where her pregnancy or detection in act was motive for statement.
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from District Court, Wichita County ; P. A. Martin, Judge.
    Clarence F. Anderson was convicted of rape by forcibly compelling prosecutrix to have carnal intercourse with another, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Davenport, Cummings & Thornton, of Wichita Falls, for appellant.
    Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.
   BERRY, J.

Appellant was convicted in the district court of Wichita county for the offense of rape by assaulting and by force, threats, and fraud compelling Mildred Kear-ney to submit to carnal intercourse with one John White, and' his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of 15 years.

Prosecutrix testified that White raped her by force, and that appellant aided- him in the perpetration of the alleged crime. She further testified that she told no one about the affair for 4 months; that she lived with her father and mother at home, and was at home a few hours after the alleged rape; that between the time of the alleged rape ánd the time she first told it she had intercourse 12 or 15 times with appellant; that during these times she did not- always consent, but that she did consent a number of times; that she did not tell it until her people discovered that she was pregnant. The witness admitted having her, picture taken, in June, after' she was raped in May, with the defendant' and John White, and .that when said picture was taken they had their arms around her, and that she was smiling. She also identified a picture, of herself and John White, which she says was taken in June after she was raped by force in May, and in that picture she and John White were lying on the ground, and she was in his arms, with a smile on her face.

This testimony is not sufficient to show rape by force; it is utterly inconsistent with the very idea of force. We do not care to write at length on the question, but satisfy ourselves by saying that the following proposition announced by Mr. Branch is decisive of this case:

“A conviction will not be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of a woman who waits too long before she announces her decision that she has been raped, especially if she has met persons who would have given her protection, or where she went with defendant after the supposed rape, or where her pregnancy or her being detected in the act was a motive for her statement.”

See paragraph 12, § 1784, p. 1002, Branch’s Penal Code, for a full citation of authorities sustaining this proposition.

Because the evidence is wholly insufficient to show force, the judgment is réversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.  