
    J. R. McKain vs. Jonathan Miller.
    Any letters, such as “ L. S.” or a circumflex scroll, made by a party in connection with the words ‘ ‘ sealed, ” or “ witness my hand and seal, ” or proved by evidence aliunde to have been intended as a seal, will constitute a valid seal.
    The intention of a party, where the letters “ L. S. ” are annexed to his signature, is properly a question of fact for a jury to decide.
    Before Earle, J., at Sumter, Spring Term, 1841.
    The plaintiff declared in assumpsit on a promissory note, and proved on the trial an instrument in the following words:
    “$212 05. Camden, March 6th, 1840.
    Six days after date, I promise to pay James R. McKain or bearer, two hundred and twelve dollars and five cents, for value received, with interest from the 1st January, 1840, as witness my hand and seal.
    J. MILLER, [l. s.]”
    
      *The defendant’s counsel, on the production of the paper, moved for a nonsuit, on the ground that it was a sealed instrument, and therefore assumpsit could not lie. The instrument was a printed form, except the sums, dates and maker’s name. The letters L. S. were printed capitals, and there was no scrawl of any kind to denote a seal, and no parol proof of intention. “ Witness my hand and seal,” was also printed. I did not consider it as a sealed instrument, and overruled the motion. The counsel then made the same question to the jury, and it was submitted to them by the Court, with ample instructions, to say whether in fact the defendant intended, and the plaintiff accepted it as a sealed instrument. I explained the nature and office of a seal, and the material distinctions between sealed and unsealed instruments, especially in regard to the statute of limitations, and the order of paying debts against estates. I instructed them that less strictness was observed here on this subject than in England, and some other States; that any letters, as L S., or a scrawl, made by the party, in connection with the words “sealed,” or “witness my hand and seal,” or proved by evidence aliunde to have been intended as a seal, would constitute a valid seal. The printed letters L. S. only denoted where the seal should be, and were intended to represent a seal, were usually surrounded by a scrawl of the party, to denote a seal. In the absence of any thing done or written by the defendant here, to manifest an intention to adopt these letters as a seal, I thought the paper ought not to be regarded as a sealed instrument. The jury were of a different opinion ; and, as they were instructed to do in that event, they found a verdict for the defendant, assumpsit not being the proper action.
    The plaintiff appeals:
    1. Because the printed letters L. S. at the end of defendant’s name, does not constitute a sealed note, and is no seal.
    2. Because, upon the proof made in the case, it was not the seal of the defendant.
   Curia, per

Richardson, J.

Whether the letters “L. S.” annexed to the signature of Jonathan Miller, had been adopted by him for his seal, was a question of fact properly submitted to the decision of the jury. Relph & Co. vs. Gist, (4 McCord, *261.) And the jury having decided that such letters constituted his seal, the question for the Court to decide is, whether those two letters, not written, but in print, and standing without a circumflex, scrawl, or other visible mark of the pen of Jonathan Miller, can, in law, constitute his seal. It is not unfre-qnent, that such letters, when circumscribed by a scrawl, either in print or handwriting, constitute, in practice, a seal. And we cannot lay it down as a rule of law, that the letters alone, if used for such a purpose, may not be a valid seal. Any stamp, impression, or mark, made or adopted by the signer to a written contract, and annexed to his signature, as and for his seal, would seem to answer the purpose of sealing, in order to render such written contract a sealed instrument or deed in law. McKenzie vs. Ioor and Mathews, MS. Dec. 1833; Rice’s Dig. 212; 4 McCord, 239. In such a case, the question is upon the intention and will of the signer. Did he or not intend to subscribe and deliver the contract as his deed, and not as a mere parol or written instrument? And did he or not, actually adopt the letters, as and for his mark and exhibition of a seal ? In a case like the one before the Court, where the signer affixes his name to the words, “as witness my hand and seal,” there is little room to question his intention to seal the contract. For I can lay no stress upon its being printed. And wherever the intention to seal is so plain, the jury are warranted in inferring that the signer fulfilled his intention, practically, by adopting the printed L. S. as his promised seal. And this authenticates the contract, and renders it a deed in law, upon delivery. See Mitchell vs. Parkham and Davis, (Harper, 3.) The motion is therefore dismissed.

Note. This case was submitted by both of the counsel without argument. Repoktek.

See O’Cain vs. O’Cain, 1 Strob., 402. Giles et al. vs. Maulden, 7 Rich., 11; 1 Bur., 308; 11 Rich., 131. An.

J. M. De Saussure, for the motion. C. W. Miller, contra.

The whole Court concurred.  