
    STATE v. I. W. BRIDGERS.
    (Filed 17 March, 1915.)
    Criminal law — Concealed Weapons — “His Own Premises” — Interpretation of Statutes.
    A superintendent or overseer of a department of a cotton mill, in this case a carding room, is not, while therein, “on his premises,” within the meaning of Revisal, sec. 3708, prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons; and where such person has carried a pistol concealed on premises of this character, especially when he does so in anticipation of a difficulty with another employee therein, he is indictable for the offense prohibited by the statute.
    Appeal by defendant from Peebles, J., at January Term, 1915, of LENOIR.
    
      Attorney-General for the State.
    
    
      Rouse & Land for defendant.
    
   ClaRK, C. J.

The defendant was indicted for carrying a concealed weapon (a pistol) off his own premises. Revisal, 3708. The only question raised is whether the defendant, who was overseer or superintendent of the carding room of the cotton mills, was “on his own premises,” within the meaning of the statute.

In S. v. Perry, 120 N. C., 580, it was held that the superintendent of a turnpike company is not, when on such turnpike, within the exception, although he was in absolute control of all the property of the company. The Court said: “The use of the words, ‘on his own premises,’ and being ‘not on his own land,’ shows an intention to restrict the right to carry concealed weapons to those who are in the privacy of their own premises, where they are not likely to be thrown in contact with the public nor tempted, on a sudden quarrel, to use to the detriment of others the great advantage a concealed weapon gives to one who unexpectedly pulls it out upon his defenseless neighbor.” And the Court further said: “The statute clearly does not contemplate that in the crowded cars and thoroughfares the corporation officials shall have leave to carry concealed weapons about their persons, while all other citizens traveling thereon dare not do the same, under fear of criminal punishment.”

S. v. Terry, 93 N. C., 585, and S. v. Peyton, 119 N. C., 880, bold tbat an employee wbo carries a concealed weapon on tbe premises of bis employer is indictable. In S. v. Terry it was beld tbat it is not necessary tbat tbe legal title to tbe land should be in tbe defendant, wben be is in charge thereof as a tenant or as an overseer, acting as to tbe control, of tbe land in lieu and tbe stead of tbe owner.

In S. v. Anderson, 129 N. C., 521, it was beld tbat a private night watchman while on duty upon the premises be is employed to watch is not liable under tbe statute. He is there in lieu of tbe owner of tbe premises and is carrying out tbe duty of protecting tbe premises just as tbe owner could do if present in person. Tbat case bolds tbat there is no conflict between S. v. Terry and S. v. Perry, both above quoted.

It is not necessary, in this case, to determine whether a superintendent of tbe mill wbo is in sole charge thereof would have tbe right to carry a concealed weapon, for this defendant merely bad charge of one floor of tbe mill, tbe carding room, and was overseer thereof. To bold tbat one occupying tbat position was “on bis own premises,” within tbe meaning of tbe statute, would bring within tbe exception many persons in tbe same factory wbo might be overseers in different departments. Tbe statute was intended to except only the owner, or tbe person wbo exercised dominion in bis stead. Only such person could be said to be “on bis own premises.”

Rarely can an official of a corporation, unless a watchman, be said to be “on bis own premises,” .within this statute, for be does not stand in tbe shoes of tbe owner for this purpose. Certainly neither tbe superintendent or conductor of a street car line nor tbe superintendent or conductor of a railroad would be authorized, unless commissioned as a policeman under the statute, to carry a concealed weapon. Tbe fact tbat tbe defendant here concealed tbe pistol in bis pocket in expectation of trouble with an employee shows tbat be proposed to take advantage of tbe concealment. As said in S. v. Perry, supra, this exception was intended for tbe owner in tbe privacy of bis own property, and not to give any one an advantage over others with whom be is expecting a difficulty. It is because tbe advantage given by such concealment is a temptation to use tbe weapon tbat the statute forbids such concealment to- others than tbe owner “on bis own premises,” except certain persons “wben acting in tbe discharge of their official duties.”

No error.  