
    Kaljang SHERPA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-234.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 12, 2015.
    
      Jason A. Nielson, Mungoven & Associates, New York, New York, for Petitioner.
    Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Douglas E. Ginsburg, Assistant Director; Washington D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, GERARD E. LYNCH and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Kaljang Sherpa, a native and citizen of Nepal, seeks review of a December 30, 2013, decision of the BIA, affirming the December 12, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Kaljang Sherpa, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Dec. 30, 2013), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Im-mig.Ct.N.Y.C. Dec. 12, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

For asylum applications like Sherpa’s, governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “[considering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility determination on inconsistencies in an asylum applicant’s statements and other record evidence, “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii). “We defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

The agency reasonably found inconsistent Sherpa’s initial testimony that, after he left Nepal, his wife lived in Kathmandu and did not receive any threats from the Maoists, his later testimony that she actually lived in Solukhumbu and did receive threats from the Maoists, and his witness’s statement that Sherpa’s wife lived in both places. While these inconsistencies formed the crux of the agency’s adverse credibility determination, it also reasonably relied on an inconsistency regarding the number of interactions Sherpa and his family had with Maoists when Sherpa was in Nepal. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166-67 & n. 3. Sherpa did not provide compelling explanations for these inconsistencies. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that the agency need not credit an applicant’s explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so).

Given these inconsistency findings, the totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. That determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief as those claims are based on the same factual predicate. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, Sherpa’s pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  