
    QUICK against OVERSEER OF AMWELL.
    ON CEKTIOBABI.
    Order of affiliation to be made in the native county of bastard, though not die mother’s residence.
    Ruth Wilson was delivered of a bastard child, in Amwell; but her residence was in a neighboring county. Two justices of the peace of the county of Hunterdon, on the application of the overseers of the poor of Amwell, made an order on Tunis Quick, the reputed father of the child, for a weekly sum for the maintenance of the said child, under the first section of the act for the maintenance of bastard children. This order, on appeal, was confirmed by the sessions. The two orders being removed by Quick, into this court, by oertiorari.
    
    
      R. StoeMon, for the plaintiff,
    moved this court to quash these orders, on the ground that as the residence of the mother of the child was not in Hunterdon [*] county, the justices in that county had no jurisdiction of the subject matter; that the justices had no authority to make the order, except the bastard was likely to become chargeable to some town in the county of which they are justices; the language of the act being to take order for the relief of the township. To take order for the relief of a town can only be where the town is liable to the maintenance of the bastard, and that is where the legal settlement of the bastard is; the legal settlement of this bastard is in the township where the mother’s residence is, and not in Amwell, where it was born. The bastard cannot be likely to become chargeable to Amwell, nor to any township in Hunterdon. An order of bastardy was quashed, because it was not adjudged that the town was chargeable. Comb. 36. In case a bastard is legally settled in another town, the overseers cannot be made to maintain it. Root’s Poor Law, 408, 4IV
    
      Ewing, contra.
    The justices of the county have an express authority by the statute to make the order of affiliation. Pat. 152. The words of the statute are explicit, and clear of all ambiguity. The court has no latitude of construction where the language of the statute is unambiguity. The law is reasonable; the justices on the spot are the proper officers to take cognizance of the matter. The statute not only gives to justices, of the county, within which any bastard shall be born, an authority to take order for the better relief of the township where such bastard shall be born, but also to take order for the keeping such bastard child, by charging the mother or reputed father with a weekly sum for its sustenance. Again, a pauper is likely to become chargeable where it is likely to require sustenance; settlement and chargeable are not convertible terms. A pauper may become chargeable where he has not a settlement; chargeable, and being compelled by necessity to ask relief, is the same case.
   Kirkpatrick, C. J.

I am of opinion that these orders cannot be supported. It is only in virtue of a [*] bastard’s being chargeable that the justices have an authority to make an order of filiation. The bastard, in this case, is not chargeable to Amwell, but only in the place of the residence of the mother. The mother ought to have been removed to the place of her legal residence, and the justices of that county to make the order of filiation.

Rossell, J.

On a full consideration of the case, was of opinion that the proceeding below was correct; and that the order of the sessions be affirmed.

Pennington, J.

The question of jurisdiction is the only point under consideration. It is worthy of observation [742] that this act passed after the act which changes the settlement of bastard children from the place where born, to the settlement of the mother; and it expressly authorizes any two justices of the peace of any county within which any bastard shall be born, to take order for the keeping of such bastard child, by charging the mother or reputed father with the payment of money weekly, or other sustenance for the relief of such child, as they shall think meet and convenient. The justices of the county in which is the residence of the mother have no such authority. It follows, that if the justices of the county where the child is born, cannot act, the law, as it relates to this case, cannot be executed; and the reputed father escapes. By a former decision of this court, it has been determined, that the justices ought not to make an order of filiation until application is made to them by the overseers of the poor; and it is contended that the overseers of the poor where the child is born have no power to act. But I am not satisfied that this is so; every pauper is, from necessity, prima facie, likely to become chargeable where its actual residence is; the township may be relieved by finding out the residence of the pauper, and obtaining by legal means, its removal. Until that is done, it must be provided for where it actually is. I am of opinion that the overseers [*] have an authority to apply to the magistrates for the order of filiation; and that the justices have jurisdiction of the subject matter; and that this authority has been judiciously exercised, and is the course to be recommended to be pursued in such cases; and is the true meaning and intent of the act; and that the order of sessions, confirming the order of the justices, ought to be affirmed.

The order of the sessions, affirming the order of the justices,

Affirmed.

Cited is State v Bidleman, 2 Harr. 20; Dally v. Over’s of Woodbridge, 1 Zab. 491; State v. Overseers of Poor, 4 Zab. 533. 
      
       See 3 John Rep. 15.
      
     