
    LIN-HUANG MIAO, aka Lin Mau, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-1825.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 7, 2013.
    Troy Nader Moslemi, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; William C. Pea-chey, Assistant Director; Daniel E. Goldman, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, GERARD E. LYNCH and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Lin-Huang Miao, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of an April 13, 2012, order of the BIA, affirming a September 30, 2009, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Sandy Horn, denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Lin-Huang Miao, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2012), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 30, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision. Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 523 (2d Cir.2007). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). For applications like this one, governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of her account, and inconsistencies in her statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260, 265 (B.I.A.2007). Analyzed under these standards, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence.

In finding Miao not credible, the IJ reasonably relied on the inconsistency between her testimony that she had been pregnant and had a forced abortion in China and her medical records in the United States showing that her 2009 pregnancy with her son was her first pregnancy. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam). Although Miao argues that the IJ should have interpreted one particular notation in her records as evidence of a prior pregnancy, the IJ explicitly noted multiple references to her 2009 pregnancy as her first. Miao did not explain these other notations. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that an agency need not credit an applicant’s explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so).

Furthermore, the agency did not err in finding that Miao failed to provide sufficient corroboration of her pregnancy or abortion in China, as the IJ identified specific documents that might have corroborated her claim and reasonably found that she had not attempted to obtain them or adequately explained their absence. See Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir.2011) (per curiam); Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam). In light of the agency’s properly supported adverse credibility and corroboration findings, it did not err in denying Miao’s applications for relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  