
    Linsley v. Logan et al.
    In an action to recover the balance due on a land contract, and to subject the land to sale for the payment thereof, the defendant, by cross-petition, set up an alleged cloud on the plaintiff’s title to the land. The court, on the trial, made an entry, finding that the cloud had been removed; that the plaintiff had deposited with the clerk of the court deeds conveying a clear title ; the amount due on the contract; and adjudging the defendant to pay the amount to the clerk within thirty days, and, in default thereof, that execution issue therefor; and, on payment by defendant, that the deeds be delivered to him. The land was sold, and. for the balance remaining due, an execution was issued on the judgment and levied on other lands of the defendant, which were claimed by another party under a lien acquired after the rendition of said judgment: Held, That the entry so made was a final determination of the rights of the parties to the action, and was, therefore, a judgment within the meaning of section 370 of the code; and, being a final judgment against the debtor for the payment of money, under section 421, became a lien on his lands in the county where it was rendered, superior to that subsequently acquired.
    Error to the District Court of Trumbull county.
    A brief statement will be sufficient to present tire question made in tbe case. The controversy relates to the priority of liens on a piece of land. The liens arise on judgments against John C. Logan, who was the owner of the land. The judgment of the plaintiff, Linsley, was obtained in the Court of Common Pleas of Trumbull county; at its November term, 1870; and that of Harriet Logan was obtained in the same court, at the June term, 1871, by a decree giving her the land as alimony in a divorce suit against John C. Logan, her husband.
    The judgment of the plaintiff is prior in date to that of Mrs. Logan; but it is claimed that the judgment of the plaintiff is of such a character that it never became a lien on the land.
    The judgment was rendered in an action brought by the plaintiff against John C. Logan, to recover the balance due ■on a land contract between them, whereby Logan agreed to pay the plaintiff $3,000 for two pieces of land to be conveyed by him to Logan on payment of the price. One piece was paid for and deeded by the plaintiff to Logan. Logan resisted a judgment, on the ground that the plaintiff could not make a good title to the land, by reason of a mortgage lien and dower right resting thereon. He filed a cross-petition making these lienholders parties, who answered disclaiming all interest, and showing that the liens had been fully discharged. The court rendered judgment as follows:
    “And at the November term, a. d. 1870, this cause came on to be heard on the petition of plaintiff, the answer of ■defendant, Logan, his cross-petition against his co-defendant, and the proof and exhibits; and was submitted to the ■court, who find that a contract subsists between the parties, and that the defendant, Logan, is entitled to a conveyance free from all incumbrance in fee simple of the lands therein ■contracted to be bought and paid for by him on his paying the purchase-money as agreed; and that plaintiff is entitled, on his completing such title, to receive of him the balance of the purchase-money, and interest thereon, due ■on the first day of this term, amounting to the sum of nine hundred and sixty-six dollars and ninety-eight cents ($966.98); and that the title deeds tendered on the maturity of the contract were not such that Logan was bound to accept, owing to the dower incumbrance and the •defective discharge of the mortgage lien held by said defendant, Horner. Also, that by virtue of the answer filed "by said defendants,. Alma H. Linsley, John and E. H. Horner, with the deed now produced by plaintiff ready to be ■delivered to said Logan, the court has the means of securing to him, the said John C. Logan, substantially the title for which he contracted, and which contract both parties .are anxious to execute and comply with. It is therefore •ordered, adjudged, and decreed that within thirty days from the rising of this term of court the said John C. Logan shall pay to the clerk of this court the said sum of $966.98, ■with any interest that may have accrued, thereon after the first day of this term of court, or in default that execution issue to collect the same ; and on payment or sale of said lands under this order, to receive the deeds that have been made and left with the clerk for his use ; and hold title to the said lands to himself or the purchaser at said sale, as the ease may be, free and clear of all claims in any way upon or against said parcels of land therein described, under any of the defendants to the cross-petitions, who are-hereby perpetually enjoined from making any claim adverse-to said title. It is further ordered that each party pay his-own costs.”
    Under this order, the piece of land contracted, but not deeded, to Logan was sold, and the proceeds were applied on the judgment, leaving a balance of $191 still due thereon. To satisfy this balance, an execution was issued on the judgment, and, on June 2, 1871, levied on the piece of land that had been deeded by the plaintiff to Logan ; but, as the land had been mortgaged by Logan, and decreed to his wife as alimony, subject to the mortgage, it could not he sold without a judicial settlement of the rights of the parties. This action was brought to determine the priorities of the parties, and to bring the land to sale. The case was appealed to the district court, which rendered a judgment in favor of Mrs. Logan. To reverse this judgment, the plaintiff, Linsley, filed his petition in error in the Supreme Court.
    
      Milton Sutliff, for plaintiff in error:
    
      Geo. M. Tuttle, for defendant in error, cited:
    
      Myers v. Hewitt, 16 Ohio, 549; Conn v. Rhodes, 26 Ohio St. 644; Beaumont v. Herrick, 24 Ohio St. 445; Towner v. Wells, 8 Ohio, 136; Hamlin v. Bevans, 7 Ohio, 161.
   Day, J.

The case depends on the determination of a single question, viz.: Was the judgment rendered at the-November term, 1870, against John C. Logan, of such a character as to constitute a lien on his lands ? If it became-such a lien, it is prior to that of Mrs. Logan, which was-subsequently acquired.

Judgment liens exist only by statutory creation. Before-the code of civil procedure took effect, both judgments at law and decrees in chancery were statutory liens on the lands of the debtor in the county where they were rendered. The code abolished the old forms of remedy in both law and equity proceedings, and substituted therefor one mode of procedure, called a civil action, the final determination of which is called the judgment. All remedies, whether of a legal or equitable character, are, therefore, now obtained by a judgment in the civil action of the code. Section 421 makes the judgment a lien on the lands of the debtor in the county where it is rendered.

The form of the pleadings, in the case in which the-judgment constituting the lien in question was rendered,, was such as to warrant a judgment against John C. Logan for money, although equitable relief was also sought by both the petition and cross-petition. A judgment for money, rendered, in such cases, constitutes a lien on the debtor’s land as effectually as it would have done had the action been for money only. McCarthy v. Garraghty, 10 Ohio St. 438.

The amount of money due to the plaintiff from John C. Logan, was not disputed; but the controversy related to-the equitable rights of the parties. Accordingly, the form of the judgment corresponds somewhat to a decree in chancery. It finds the amount due to the plaintiff from Logan, and the facts relating to the equitable rights of the parties, and Logan is adjudged to pay a specified sum of money, and, in default thereof, execution is awarded to collect the same, and the entry proceeds to a full and final adjudication and disposition of all the matters in controversy. Nothing remained to be done but to execute the judgment. The action of the court in the case was in no sense interlocutory, but was final and conclusive.

Section 370 of the code, defines a judgment to be “the-final determination of the rights of the parties in an ac~ tion.” Though not in the best form, the judicial entry in question answers, in substance, this definition of a judgment; it was, therefore, a judgment within the meaning of the code. It was a judgment for the payment of money, final between the parties, upon which an execution was expressly awarded. The delay of execution and payment to the clerk, provided for, worked no change in the finality of the judgment between the parties. It was, nevertheless, a final and conclusive determination of all the matters in controversy between them, and put an end to the action. Those provisions merely relate to the mode of the execution of the judgment. The judgment, then, was one which, within the meaning of the code, became a lien on the debtor’s land in the county where it was rendered. The court below- held otherwise, and, in so doing, fell into an error, for which its judgment must be reversed.

Judgment reversed.  