
    
      C. D. Evans, Adm’r. of Anne Waties Donnelly, v. Francis B. Durant.
    
    Where testator left personal property to his daughter, during her natural life, and at her death to vest, absolutely, hr any issue she might leave, who had or should attain the age of eighteen years, with-a limitation over, in case she left no such issue — the daughter took only a life estate, and the remainder vested absolutely in her issue, who was eighteen years of age at the time of the daughter’s death.
    
      Before Dunkin, Ch. at Marion, February, 1846.
    This case will be fully understood from the following Circuit decree:
    Dunkin, Ch. The following clauses occur in the will of James Coachman, of Prince George, Winyaw, dated 22d April, 1789, viz:
    “I leave the use of Bess, Scipio, Fanny, Molly, Chloe, Jenny, as shall be mentioned hereafter, for the uses and purposes thereof, to my daughter, Ann Waties Coachman; the remainder of my negroes, not mentioned, with all kinds of stock, as cattle, &c., I leave to be equally divided into four parts,” &c. One part is bequeathed to each of his two sons, one other part to the use of his daughter, Mrs. Postell, with certain limitations, and then as follows: “ One fourth part the use of which I leave, with the others named before, to my daughter, Ann Waties Coachman, during her natural life, and at her death, if there be no living issue of her body, that may arrive to the age of eighteen years, to whom I mean it shall descend, in failure of which, then my will is, it shall be the property forever of Hannah Postell, or the issue of her body.”
    
      The testator’s daughter, Ann Waties, subsequently intermarried with Patrick Donnelly, and surviving him, she departed this life August, 1844. She made a will, disposing of the property derived from her father, but the executors declining to qualify, administration, with the will annexed, was committed to the complainant, Chestley D. Evans.
    The only child of Mrs. Donnelly was Mary C., the wife of the defendant, Francis B. Durant, to whom she was married in 1840. Mrs. Durant now resides with her husband, in Savannah. Some of the negroes which were held by Mrs. Donnelly, under her father’s will, are now in the possession of the defendant. This bill is filed against him, claiming the slaves as the absolute estate of Mrs. Donnelly, and subject to the disposition of her will.
    It is first necessary to fix the construction of James Coachman’s will. Without repeating the language of the clauses in reference to Ann Waties, the meaning of the testator seems to be clear enough, that the use of the property is given to his daughter, dining her natural life. If, at the period of her death, there should be issue of her body living, and which issue should attain the age of eighteen years, the property is bequeathed absolutely to such issue, (to whom I mean it shall descend.) But if, at the termination of his daughter’s life estate, there should be no living issue, or no issue living who should arrive at the age of eighteen years, (in failure of which,) then, that is, at the death of his daughter, without issue, which should be then alive, or at the death of such issue before attaining eighteen years of age, then his will is, that it shall be the property forever of Hannah Postell, or the issue of her body. •
    ThA Court is unable to .perceive the vice or fallacy of this construction.' Every word-of tlie-bequest is satisfied', andmo more. Mrs. Durant, the child of Mrs. Donnelly, was alive at her mother’s decease,, and riiad attained'the age of eighteen years. She answered -directly.the .description of the issue in whom the testator meant the property should vest absolutely. In .-giving effect to this intention, no.'rule of law is violated. See Fenster vs. Robei'ts, Rice’s Eq. R:, 37.
    It was argued,-that the contingent limitation, being to Hannah .Postell, or .the issue of'-her body, was bad. But it is not perceived that 'this inquiry is important, in the events which have occurred,-if the..interpretation which has-been given may be sustained. I am of opinion, however, that' in.a different contingency the limitation over would have been valid. If at the death of the daughter, there should be no issue alive, «fee., then my will is, it shall be the property, forever, of Hannah Postell, or the issue of her body. No language can be more emphatic, to express the meaning and deshe of the testator, that a final disposition was then to be made. It shall be the property, forever, of Hannah Postell or her issue. One or the other was then to have it forever. To borrow the expressions of Lord Eldon, in Montague vs.-, 1 Russell, 170, “ The words cannot be fully satisfied, without giving to each some interest.” “ Here the word is or: both are not to take, but either the parent, or the children, in the alternative ; and though in many cases or has been construed and, you must shew an intention, requiring that the natural import is to exclude the one from any particapation of that which is given to the other.” The context of the will rather strengthens the presumption that the word was intended to have its natural signification. The bequest of Mrs. Postell’s property is couched in precisely the same terms. The testator contemplated the alternative contingency of survivorship in the sisters, and seems to have provided that the issue should take what the parent would have taken. I do not understand the analogy attempted to be shown between the case at bar and that of Postell vs. Postell, Bail. Eq., 390. The limitation over does not imply that the issue of Hannah Postell should take at any time, when the issue of the first taker should fail; but they must take, if at all, on the death of Mrs. Donnelly. The estate vested absolutely in the wife of the defendant.
    It is ordered and decreed that the bill be dismissed, but without costs.
    From this decree the complainant appealed, and moved to reverse the decree, on the ground, that under a proper construction of the will of James Coachman, the complainant’s testatrix took an absolute estate In the negroes bequeathed to her therein, and therefore the complainant was entitled to recover.
    Evans & Dargan, for the motion.
    Harllee & Munro, contra.
    
   Per Curiam.

This Court concur in the decree. The appeal is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.  