
    The Lessee of De Segond and Warden v. Culver and Burk.
    The record of a deed, purporting to be acknowledged before an officer not known to our laws, is not admissible in evidence, unless his authority bo shown.
    
      This is a motion for a new trial, in an action of ejectment from, the county of Knox.
    The plaintiff offered, as a part of his title, a copy of the records of deeds of the county, which contains a document, purporting to be a deed, by General De Segond, executed in *the pres- [189 once of two witnesses, and bearing the following acknowledg ment:
    “On June 11, 1804, came personally before me, De General Segond, of Paris, in the kingdom of' France, and to me known to be the person described in, and who executed the within conveyance, and he duly acknowledged before me, that he executed the same”' — what follows is'obscure; if read correct, it is, “per fait Donegle Bannati.
    “ Onze day June, 1804. “ Bebigny, Public Auditor.”
    
    This record was objected to, but admitted, and a verdict having been rendered for the plaintiff, this motion is made for a new trial.
    H. Delano and C. B. Goddard, for the motion;'
    The laws of Ohio have uniformily held all deeds to be valid which were executed according to the laws and usages of the state or country where made. 1 Chase’s L, 342, 484 ; 2 Chase’s L. 1041, 1149; 3 Chase’s L. 1843.
    Was, then, the deed admitted in evidence, executed according to the laws and usages of France? The laws and usages of any country are matters of fact, capable of proof, and the party who offers a foreign deed in evidence ought to show what such laws and usages are, that the court may see whether they have been complied with or not. In this case no such evidence was offered. Of our own laws the court will take notice ex officio, but not so of the laws of foreign states.
    Nor does the act of 1831 (3 Chase’s L. 1843) dispense with the necessity of this proof. That statute provides, “that all copies from the records of deeds,” etc. “shall b q prima facie evidence of the existence of such deeds.”
    This act makes a copy from the record evidence that an original deed did exist, but it by no means declares that such copy shall carry with it the evidence of the due execution of the original. The copy is received in place of the original, and he who offers the copy is still to prove that the original *was exe- [190 eiited according to the lavvs of the country where made. The statute, at best, is liable to abuse, and the court will hesitate to give it an interpretation which will permit any instrument in ie shape of a deed to be put on record, and then make a copy of the record evidence of its conformity to the laws of the country where it purports to be executed.
    H. Stanbery and M. A. Sayre, contra:
    The certificate of the officer taking the acknowledgment, where it appears he acts in his official capacity, is prima facie evidence that he is duly authorized, and that it is in conformity with the laws of the country where made. In Johnson v. Haines, 2 Ohio, 55, this court held, that “ the acknowledgment or proof is nothing, unless it be taken by an -authorized officer, and whether the person be authorized or not, is a fact which ought to appear in the certificate of the officer himself. This, prima facie, would be sufficient to authorize the record, and throw the proof on the person impeaching tho deed.”
    The burden then lies upon the defendants to show that tho deed was not made in conformity with the laws of France.
    The certificate contains all the requirements demanded by our law. If, therefore, the deed has been duly admitted to record, agreeably to the requisitions of law, there can be no question but what it was properly admitted in evidence.
    That this construction of the different acts, respecting the acknowledgment and recording of deeds, is correct, is clearly illustrated from the fact, that it has been the uniform practice to admit deeds thus proved or acknowledged to record in all parts of tho state. To adopt a different rule at this time would create infinite mischief; and jeopardize nearly one-half of the titles to real estate in Ohio. Many patents have been issued by the general government, as in this instance, to foreigners or citizens of other states, for services rendered in the revolution, who had no design of occupying the land thus conveyed. They have conveyed them to others, according to the laws and usages of the country or state 191] where they resided. It is not ^presumed that they were familiar with our laws. Hence, there has been a disposition, at all times, by our laws and usages, to provide against the difficulties that might arise, if any other construction should be given to our statutes upon that subject.
   Lane, C. J.

If I should indulge my conjectures as to this paper, I should take it that the acknowledgment was written in French, and was translated for the record. If this be so, the record is not a true copy of the deed, and should be rejected. But waiving all inquiry upon this point, we must look to see if it carries with it the legal marks of authentication. It is acknowledged, before a “public auditor.” The deed is said to be made by the General do Segond, of Paris, in the kingdom of Prance; but the place where either deed or acknowledgment are made, are nowhere stated, and nowhere discoverable from the paper or proof. A public auditor is the designation of an officer not known to our laws, and I am ignorant of the country to which he belongs.

The statutes of Ohio have always recognized deeds as valid which were executed according to the laws of the place where made. This deed has no locality on its face, and we know not the country to whose laws we should recur for proof of its proper execution. But if the laws of France are to prescribe its forms, and those different from such as our own laws direct, we must look to the person introducing the deed for information and proof that they have been duly pursued. It is not enough that the acknowledgment should have been made before some one who assumes some official capacity to receive it. If the officer be not one, to whom, in the ordinary scope of official duty, the authentication of such instruments belongs, we can not presume any such authority without proof. The case in 9 Ohio, 168, does not conflict with this.

We think the court erred in admitting the deed.

Now trial granted.  