
    Decided July 27, 1896;
    rehearing denied.
    WATSON v. BUCKLER.
    [45 Pac. 765.]
    1. Chattel Mortgages — Breach of Condition — Sufficiency of Findings.— A chattel mortgage given by a husband and wife provided that, if the property should be attached by creditors of the mortgagors, the mortgagee might take possession. In an action by the mortgagee to recover possession of the property on the ground of breach of this condition, the court found that an attachment was issued by a creditor of the husband, but that the account was settled, and the attachment dissolved; that, prior to such settlement, the wife claimed the property as her own, and, upon trial of this issue, verdict was rendered in favor of the wife, giving her the property; and that there had been no'breach of the condition relative to attachment. Held, that the findings were sufficient to justify a judgment for the mortgagors.
    2. Amendment of Pleadings — Discretion of Court.— On appeal to the circuit court, it is within the discretion of the trial judge to refuse permission to file an amended complaint offered there for the first time.
    3. Joint Judgment — Practice.— In an action against a husband and wife jointly, where the answer, the defense, and the findings are all joint, a judgment in their joint favor is proper.
    From Multnomah: Hartwell Hurley, Judge.
    This action was brought to recover possession of a stock of merchandise mortgaged by defendants to plaintiff. It is claimed that defendants have been guilty of a breach, of the mortgage conditions, and for that reason plaintiff was, at the commencement of the action, entitled to possession of the stock. The action was first tried in the county court, and, on being appealed to the circuit court, a trial was there had without the intervention of a jury. By the terms of the mortgage the defendants were to remain in possession, but it was conditioned that in case they should suffer the property to be attached or levied upon by their creditors, the notes secured thereby were to become at once due and payable, and the mortgagee was thereupon empowered to take possession and sell the property to satisfy the mortgage debt. Such was, in effect, the finding of the court. As touching a breach of this condition the court further finds as follows: “ Sixth. — That on the thirteenth day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, an action was commenced by J. M. Arthur and Company against William Buckler, defendant, in the Justice Court of North Portland Precinct, Multnomah County, State of Oregon, to recover the sum of forty dollars and- fifty-three cents, and an attachment issued in said cause by said court, and placed in the hands of the constable of said precinct for service, and that on the thirteenth day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, said constable proceeded to attach, or attempted to attach, said property by virtue of said attachment, but the defendants on or before the sixteenth day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, settled said cause and the amount claimed in said action, and said attachment was dissolved.” “ Seventh.— That prior to said settlement the defendant Eleanor H. Buckler claimed said property by a demand in writing, on the grounds that it was her property, and not subject to attachment for the debts of her husband, and thereupon a jury was called and a trial had, upon which the verdict of the jury was rendered in favor of the said Eleanor H. Buckler, giving her said property.” “ Tenth. — There was no breach of any of the conditions of said chattel mortgage on the part of the defendants prior to the commencement of this action to recover the possession of said property.” The conclusions of law are in effect that the defendants were entitled to possession of the property, and to judgment for its return, and judgment was rendered accordingly.
    Affirmed.
    For appellant there was a brief by the law corporation of Emmons and Emmons, with an oral argument by Mr. William A. Williams.
    
    For respondents there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. Lawrence A. McNary.
    
   Opinion by

Mr. Justice Wolverton.

The plaintiff contends that the judgment is not supported by the findings of fact; that it is found in effect that the creditors of the defendants had attached the property prior to the commencement of the action; that thereby the defendants had suffered a breach of one of the mortgage conditions, by reason whereof the plaintiff became and was entitled to possession; and that the conclusions of law are erroneous deductions from the facts found, heneo the judgment is without the requisite support. It is clear that until the mortgagors have suffered a breach of some stipulated condition of the mortgage, they are entitled to the possession of the property covered thereby, as against the mortgagee. Plaintiff’s cause of action is dependent upon his right of possession, he must therefore establish the breach, or fail in his purpose. Conceding, without deciding, that an attachment by a creditor of William Buckler would be a breach of such condition of the mortgage we will consider the effect of the findings. Do they show that the property was attached or levied upon? A meaningless finding of fact or one so obscurely stated as to render its import dubious and uncertain should be disregarded, as it establishes nothing from which the law may deduce a result: Figg v. Mayo, 39 Cal. 264. The findings, however, have the effect of a special verdict, which should receive a reasonable construction, and are not to be avoided unless from doubt of their meaning or from the immateriality of the issue found: Hallock v. City of Portland, 8 Or. 39; 28 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 354; Woodward v. Davis, 127 Ind. 173 (26 N. E. 687). Two or more findings may be read together, for the purpose of ascertaining the precise shade of meaning intended: Kimball v. Lohmas, 31 Cal. 157; Dixon v. Duke, 85 Ind. 437. The language of finding sixth is: “ Said constable proceeded to attach, or attempted to attach,” but the defendants “ settled said cause and the amount claimed in said action, and said attachment was dissolved.” It must be admitted that, when read alone, there is some uncertainty as to its exact meaning. The seventh finding is easily understood. From this there is, perhaps, an implication that the defendant Eleanor H. Buckler admitted the attachment by making a demand in writing claiming the property as hers, and hence not subject to attachment in that cause, but it is possible that the property may not have been attached when she made the demand for it. Finding tenth is more general, and is to the effect that defendants had not suffered a breach of any of the conditions of the mortgage prior to the commencement of the action, and may be said to include the sixth finding. If taken as resulting therefrom, it would bear very much the semblance of a conclusion of law, but the court has stated it as a conclusion of fact.* Viewing it as such, it is entirely inconsistent with the idea of an actual attachment. So that, construing the findings as a whole, we must conclude that the intendment of finding sixth is not that there was an actual seizure of the goods, but that while proceeding to attach, that is to say, while making an attempt to attach, and before the service of the writ had been perfected, the cause was settled, and the attachment proceedings rendered ineffectual. The defendants, by preventing the attachment of the mortgaged property, avoided a breach, and hence the judgment is supported by the findings in this respect.

Error is predicated upon the refusal of the circuit court to permit the plaintiff to file an amended complaint, which was offered there for the first time. But if otherwise competent, the matter was within the sound discretion of the court below, and is therefore not reviewable here. There was certainly no abuse of discretion.

Another matter complained of is that the judgment, which is for a return of the property, or, in case return thereof cannot be had, then for its value, is in favor of defendants jointly. But it is such as plaintiff ought to have expected if unsuccessful in the action. The instrument upon which the action is based was executed by defendants jointly. They were sued and answered jointly, and the court found that they were at the date of the commencement of the action in possession and lawfully entitled thereto. The judgment was a logical sequence: Myers v. Moulton, 71 Cal. 498 (12 Pac. 505); West Michigan Savings Bank v. Howard, 52 Mich. 423. Other questions were argued, but this disposes of all that properly arise upon the record. Let an order be entered affirming the judgment of the court below. Affirmed.  