
    The State vs. Moore.
    
      PjSNAIjTY - to State alone, limitation of actions for — 31 iCliz. 0. $, (> 5 — 1829, C. 62, $2. — Actions for penalties where the recovery is for the government alone> must be prosecuted within two years after they shall have accrued. The statute of Elizabeth, so limiting; those actions, is in force here.
    The defendant was sued before a justice of Giles upon the following warrant:
    “State op Tennessee: Giles county. To any lawful officer of said county to execute and return. You are hereby commanded to summon Osborne It. Moore, if to be. found in your county, personally to appear before me, or some other justice of the peace for said county, to answer the State of Tennessee in a plea of debt for one hundred dollars, for peddling in, and selling clocks in the said county of Giles, for the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-four, without having obtained a license therefor, as by law he was bound to do: the said one hundred dollars being the penally claimed from said Moore, in consequence of his neglect and refusal to obtain license as aforesaid. Herein fail not. Witness my hand, seal — a justice of the peace for said county. January 4, 1838. B. N. Sessum, justice of the peace. (Seal.)”
    January 18.
    January 23.
    The warrant had on it the following endorsement. "On the information of Thomas J. Kennedy, that the offence mentioned in the within warrant has been committed, I, E. D. Jones, clerk of the county court of Giles, have consented that this case may be proceeded in by any justice of the peace having cognizance of the case. Jan. 4, 1838. E. D. Jones clerk.
    The defendant was tried on the 19th of January before Mr. Justice John Young of Giles, who discharged him. The clerk appealed to the circuit court. There it was tried at February Term, 1838, before his Honor Judge Dillahunty, and a jury. The jury found a verdict for the State. The defendant moved in arrest of judgment; and on argument of the rule, it was made absolute. The Solicitor-General appealed in error.
    The Attorney General, for the State,
    submitted the cause to the court,
    N. S. Brown and Combs, for the defendant,
    insisted that the judgment was properly aarested.
    Because the warrant shows the whole case, and in doing so, shows that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and that, therefore, there was no cause of action when this suit was commenced. The act of 1715, c. 21, § 7, adopts all the statute laws made for the limitation of actions in England.
    The statute 31 Elizabeth, c. 5, § 5, limits all actions upon penal statutes, made, or to be made, if the recovery is to be made for the government alone, to two years; and if the penalty be given to' the government and to any one who will sue, to one year. 4 Bacon’s Abridgment, Gwillim’s Ed. 466.
   Turley, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit brought by the clerk of the county court of Giles, against the defendant, to recover a penalty of one hundred dollars, for having peddled clocks in said county, without having first procured a license therefor, under the provisions of the act of 1829, c. 62.

.Note. The statute of Elizabeth, in question, is entitled “An act concerning informers.” It is preceded by the following preamble. “For that divers of the Queen's Majesty’s subjects be daily unjustly vexed and disquieted by divers common informers upon penal statutes, notwithstanding any former statute that hath been made against their disorders, for remedy whereof” divers provisions are made, and the fifth section provides—

“And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that all actions, suits, bills, indictments or informations, which after twenty days next after the end of this session of Parliament, shall be had, brought, sued or exhibited, for any forfeiture upon any statute penal, made or to be made, whereby the forfeiture shall be.limited to the queen, her heirs or successors only, shall be had, brought, sued or exhibited within two years next after the offence committed, or to be committed, against such act penal, and not after two years. And that all actions, suits, bills or informations, which, after the said twenty days, shall be had, brought sued or commenced, for any forfeiture upon any penal statute, made or to be made, except the statute of tillage, thebenefit and suit whereof is, orshallbe, by the said statute, limited to the queen, her heirs or successors, and to any other which shall prosecute in that behalf, shall be had, brought, sued or commenced, by any person that may lawfully pursue for the same as aforesaid, within one year next after the offence committed, or tobe committed, against the said statute; and in default pf such pursuit, that the same shall be had, sued, exhibited or brought for the Queen’s majesty, her heirs or successors, at any tíme within two years after that year ended. And if any action, suit, bill, indictment or information for any offence against any penal statute, made or to be made, except the statute of til. lage, shall be brought after the time in that behalf before limited, that then the suit shall be void and of non effect, any act or statute made to the contrary notwithstanding.”

The warrant was issued on the 4th of January, 1838, and charges the offence to have been committed in the year 1834. This suit is prosecuted by the clerk for the benefit of the State.

By the words of the warrant, it is manifest that more than two years had elapsed after the commission of the offence, before the suit was instituted. The statute of the 31st Eliz. c. S, § 5, enacts “that all actions upon penal statutes, made, or .to be made, if the recovery is to be for the King alone, shall be prosecuted within two years after they shall have accrued.”

The question is, whether this statute is in force here? We think it is. The act of 1715, c. 31, § 7, passed in North Carolina, and in force in this State, provides that “all the laws of England made for the limitation of actions, and preventing vexatious law suits, shall be in force,” &c. This is conclusive on the question. The statute has the same validity here, as if it had been enacted here.

The judgment of the circuit court in arresting the judgment, was therefore correct, and will be affirmed.  