
    BI ZHU CHEN, Long Qing Chen, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-3251-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 21, 2012.
    John Chang, New York, NY, for Petitioners.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Holly M. Smith, Senior Litigation Counsel; Joseph D. Hardy, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Bi Zu Chen and her husband, Long Qing Chen, natives and citizens of the People’s Republic of China, seek review of a July 27, 2010, decision of the BIA denying their motion to reopen. In re Bi Zu Chen, Long Qing Chen, Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ], [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 27, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of the Chens’ motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). When, as here, the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although the Chens’ motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than six years after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mr. Chen’s newly commenced practice of Christianity and his recent illness constituted changes in his personal circumstances, rather than a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the untimely filing of the Chens’ motion to reopen. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that a change in “personal circumstances in the United States ” did not constitute a change in country conditions excusing the filing deadline for motions to reopen). Moreover, the BIA did not err in finding that the country conditions evidence that the Chens submitted in support of their motion to reopen did not demonstrate a material change in country conditions excusing the untimely filing of their motion because, although the evidence indicated that the Chinese government had begun a “crackdown” against leaders of unregistered Christian churches, it did not indicate that the treatment of Christians practicing in those churches had changed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the Chens’ motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.  