
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Juan TOLENTINO, AKA Chamacho, AKA Ismael (Federal Prisoner: 91942-054), Defendant-Appellant, Manuel Peguero-Franco, AKA Manny, Edwin Lopez Diaz, AKA Doctor, Defendants.
    
    17-265
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    December 12, 2017
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Juan Tolentino, pro se, Philipsburg, PA.
    FOR APPELLEE: Edward Diskant, Margaret Garnett, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Joon H. Kim, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.
    PRESENT: José A. Cabranes, Debra Ann Livingston, Circuit Judges, Richard W. Goldberg, Judge.
    
      
       The clerk is ordered to amend the caption of this case as shown herein.
    
    
      
      
         Judge Richard W. Goldberg, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Juan Tolentino, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”), which lowered the base offense levels applicable to most drug crimes under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Under § 3582(c)(2), a district court mag reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment if his sentence was based on a sentencing range that the Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered. United States v. Borden, 564 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2009). But the statute “clearly allows for a district court to exercise its discretion”; even if the defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction, the district court may decline to reduce the sentence if it determines that a reduction is not warranted. Id. at 104; see Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 821-22, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). To determine whether a reduction is warranted, the district court considers any applicable § 3553(a) factors and decides “whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by reference to the [applicable Sentencing Commission] policies ,.. is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We review a district court’s discretionary denial of a § 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rios, 765 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). A “district court has abused its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Borden, 564 F.3d at 104 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Upon review, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by determining, after concluding that Tolenti-no was eligible for a sentencing reduction, that a reduction was not warranted. The District Court reasonably relied on the same factors it considered at the original sentencing proceeding, including the sophistication and seriousness of the offense, the quantities of drugs trafficked, and the harm to the community, in reaching its conclusion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A); see also Borden, 564 F.3d at 104. And although a district court ruling on a § 3582 motion “may consider post-sentencing conduct,” it is not required to do so. U.S.S.G. § IB 1.10 cmt. 1(B)(iii) (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

We have considered Tolentino’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.  