
    Adam Dingle vs. Robert Bowman.
    Under the act of 1731, upon proof of the loss of the original deed, a certified copy from the registers office, proved and recorded, is good evidence, 
    
    This was an action of trespass to try titles to land. In-tracing the plaintiff’s title from the original grantee, he off Jeted in evidence, after proving very satisfactorily the loss and destruction of the original, the copy of a deed from Vanderhorst and Waring- to John Miller, certified by the clerk of the court, who is also register of mesne conveyances, as a true copy from the records in his office.
    The admission of this copy in evidence, was resisted on the part of the defendant, on the common law rule, that the witnesses to the original ought to have been produced and examined; as they might possibly be able to state the circumstances attending the execution.
    The court so decided; and the plaintiff suffered a non ■ suit, with leave to move this court to set it aside,
    
      
      
         The same point was decided during this term» in thé cáse o? Turnipseed vs. Hawkins. R.
    
   Mr. Justice Johnson

delivered the opinion of. the Court,

This case was tried by myself; and upon a review of the case, I am satisfied that although the copy was not admissible by the rules of the common law, it was under the act of 1731, (Pub. Laws 133,) which was not brought to view on the circuit. That act expressly provides that, “ the records of all grants and deeds duly proved before a justice of the peace in the usual method, and recorded, or to be recorded in the registers office of this province j and also the attested copies thereof shall be deemed to be as good evidence in law, and of the same force and effect as the original would have been if produced, in all the courts of law and equity.”

Miller, for the motiom

Levy, contra.

ít seems to have been decided, however, that to admit this secondary evidence, proof of the loss of the original was necessary. (1 Bay, 375, 493.)

In this case the proof on this subject was plenary.; the motion is therefore granted.

Justices Nott, Colcock, Gantt and Huger, concurred.'  