
    Chapman vs. Jackson.
    The Act of Congress of 1852, requiring certain "steam vessels to have on board a pilot for the voyage, has not superseded the laws of the different States relative to pilots for ports and harbors : Such pilot for the voyage must, therefore, on entering a port or harbor, give place to a local pilot.
    IN THE CITY COURT OE CHARLESTON, JULY TERM, 1855.
    The report of his Honor, the Recorder, is as follows:
    “ This was a summary process on an account for pilotage. The service was not actually rendered, but was offered to the defendant, by the plaintiff, and declined. The plaintiff’s right to recover was predicated upon the Ordinance of the City of Charleston, in regard to pilotage, dated August 8th, 1842, and especially upon the 17th section of the same ; that section is as follows: ‘ Section 17. Any master or commander of a vessel, bearing towards the coast or bar of Charleston, (all coasters, and other vessels, trading between any ports within this State, which are wholly owned in this State, and' all stéamboats carrying the United States mail, excepted,) who shall refuse to receive on board a licensed pilot, shall be, and is hereby made liable, on his arrival in the port of Charleston, to pay the pilot who first offered, without the bar, to go on board and take charge of such vessel, the rates and fees allowed and established, as hereinafter mentioned, as if such pilot had actually .brought in such vessel into port; provided, however, that if a pilot having a license of nine or twelve feet only, as the case may be, is refused by the master of a vessel of a greater draft, such master shall not be liable to him for her pilotage; and provided also, that if a pilot refuse to produce his license to the master of a vessel, when the latter demands it, the fees of pilotage shall not be charged against the master rejecting the services of such pilot.’
    
      “ There was no dispute as to the facts of the case ; it was admitted that the plaintiff, a regularly licensed pilot, for the harbor of Charleston, tendered his services to the defendant, and that the defendant refused to accept them. It appeared that the defendant was master of the Steamship Tennessee, a vessel trading between Charleston and Baltimore ; he declined accepting the services of the plaintiff, on the ground, that having a pilot for the vessel on board, as required by the Act of Congress of 1852, the employment of a mere local or special pilot, for the harbor and bar of Charleston, was dispensed with, and not required by law. I thought differently, and that the employment of a pilot, and his duties on board of a steanv vessel, running from port to port within the United States, as contemplated by the Act of Congress, did not interfere with, or in any way supersede the laws previously existing in regard to local pilotage; that indeed the qualifications for the two positions, were, and must of necessity be, of an entirely different character, and that although called by the same name, their several and respective offices were clearly distinguishable and separate. Upon this view of the matter, I decreed for the plaintiff.”
    The defendant appealed upon the grounds :
    1. That the Act of Congress of 1852 was a revocation, pro tanto, of the previous laws upon the subject of pilotage, and the defendant having on board a pilot, qualified according to the provisions of the said Act, was not liable for refusing to employ the local pilot.
    2. Because his Honor’s decree was in other respects contrary to law.
    
      Petigru and Petigrew, for appellant.
    
      Pressley, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Munro, J.

By the 4th Section of the Act of Congress of 1789, 1 S. L. U. S., page 33, the passing of laws for the regulation of all pilots of the harbors and ports of the United States, is committed to the States respectively. This State has entrusted that duty to the City of Charleston so far as pertains to her own harbor, and who assumed and has discharged the trust from the date of her charter until now: Samuel Chapman, the appellee, is admitted to be, a pilot for the said bar and harbor duly appointed and licensed according to the ordinances of the city. He offered his services as pilot outside the bar to the appellant, who was in command of a steamship then about to enter the port. Appellant declined to receive the said services upon the ground that he had on board his ship, a pilot duly licensed under the Act of Congress of 1852, entitled “ an Act to amend the Act which provides for the better security of the lives of passengers on board vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam, and for other purposes.” It is not denied, that under the ordinances of the City of Charleston, upon the tender and refusal of the pilot’s services, the appellant became liable to pay the usual pilotage fee in such case, unless the Act of Congress of 1789, which commits to the States the regulation of the pilots for harbors and ports, is repealed or modified by the Act of 1852. But the appellant insists that the Act of 1789 is in part repealed by the Act of 1852, that Congress thereby resumed and committed to certain inspectors, named in the said Act, the power of appointing pilots for vessels propelled by steam, who, as to such vessels, supersede the pilots appointed by the States respectively for their harbors and ports. The Act of 1789 is not expressly repealed by that of 1852, nor is it therein so expressly or plainly referred to, either by its date or subject matter, as to satisfy the Court that its subject was at all in the contemplation of Congress when the Act of 1852 was passed. If it were clear that both Acts refer to the same subject, and that Congress by the Act of 1852 intended to remedy mischiefs which had sprung up in the system of pilotage for ports and harbors as regulated by the States, then the Act of 1852 would be held to repeal or modify that of 1789, so far as the two are inconsistent with each other. But the general purposes of the two'Acts are not the same, nor does it appear to the Court that any of their provisions are inconsistent with each other. The Act of 1789, is confined specially to conferring upon the States authority to regulate the pilots of their respective harbors, whilst the Act of 1852 was intended to remedy numerous defects in the boilers, engine, and the management of steamers, whereby the lives of passengers were endangered. After providing for additional pumps, life-boats, safety-valves,, plugs and other improvements in the machinery, the Act of 1852, further requires, that there shall be employed upon every such vessel, an engineer and pilot, who shall be licensed according to the provisions of the said Act. It further declares, that “ it shall be unlawful for any person to employ, or any person to serve as engineer or pilot, on any such vessel who is not so licensed.” Did Congress intend here to use the term pilot in such sense as to supersede the pilot of the ports and harbors ? or was it the intention only to provide a skilful licensed pilot who should guide such vessel upon the voyage after leaving port ? The mere requiring a pilot for such vessel does not necessarily imply that Congress intended to supersede the pilots of the harbor; for according to Mr. Abbot, the name “pilot,” is applied, either to a particular officer serving on board a ship during a voyage, and having charge of the helm and of the ship’s course; or to a person taken on board at a particular place, for the purpose of conducting the ship through a road or channel, or from, or into port. The term then being applicable to two distinct offices, any provision for the one, does not necessarily imply an interference with the other. So that the provision of the A.ct of 1852, for licensing pilots for steamers, and requiring them to have such pilots on board during the voyage, may still' be so construed as not to dispense with the necessity of taking a harbor pilot on entering and leaving port. Upon close examination of the Act, we have no doubt of this being its true construction. It does not require that the pilots who may be licensed under it shall be examined touching their knowledge of the roads, channels, or ports into which the vessel is to be piloted; it does not even require that the inspectors who are to license such pilpts, shall have any knowledge of the channels, ports and harbors which such vessels are to enter. It does not confine the license to any one or more particular channels or harbors, but for aught that appears in the Act to the contrary, the inspectors in Charleston, or in New York, may license a pilot of such vessel for the whole Atlantic and Gulf coast. If such pilot is to supersede the harbor pilot on entering port, his license may authorize, nay, even compel him under the penalty of the Act to take his vessel into a port which he may never before have entered, and of the entrance to which he may know nothing at all. The Court cannot suppose, that in an Act to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers, such points as these could have escaped the attention of Congress, if it had been the intention of that body to provide a system of pilotage for such vessels, which was to dispense with the service of the harbor pilots. The latter, by the regulation of the respective States, are required to undergo a searching examination, touching their knowledge of the harbor, before they can receive license as pilots of the same ; they are also required to remain constantly at their respective ports, so that they may. be ever ready and practiced, and may have constant observation of the shoals and obstructions of the channel, and state of the tides, and be fully fitted for their difficult duties. It would not be reasonable without an express enactment to that effect, to suppose that Congress would supersede the pilots appointed with such care, and so constantly practised in their particular duty, and commit their office to pilots appointed with no more guards than are required by the Act of 1852.

The Court is therefore of opinion, that the Act merely intended to provide for a shilled licensed pilot for steamers for the course of their voyage, but that on leaving or entering ports, such pilots must give way to the pilots of the port.

The motion for a new trial is therefore refused.

O’Neall, Wardlaw, Withers and Whither, JJ., concurred.

Motion refused.  