
    Richard A. SHAW, Appellant, v. Barbara L. SHAW, Appellee.
    No. 81-1176.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Feb. 22, 1984.
    
      James K. Pedley, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
    John L. O’Brien, Boca Raton, for appel-lee.
   ANSTEAD, Chief Judge.

The former husband brings this appeal from a final judgment denying his petition for modification of alimony. The threshold issue at trial was whether the parties’ separation agreement was a genuine property settlement agreement, not subject to modification, or whether its support provision was severable and therefore subject to modification. In its order denying relief the trial court did not specify whether the petition was being denied because the agreement was not subject to modification or, rather, because even though the agreement was subject to modification, the appellant had failed to establish a case for modification. On appeal the husband claims the trial court was wrong in either event, and, of course, the wife claims the trial court was right in either event.

Although we have never imposed a strict requirement that trial courts make written findings of fact, this case represents the perfect example of a case where effective appellate review is made impossible by the absence of specific findings. We could, of course, speculate that the trial court concluded that the agreement was not subject to modification and then review the correctness of that decision. In that event, and, if we agreed with that decision, we would not even address the issue as to the sufficiency of the husband’s proof as to modification. On the other hand, if the trial judge determined that the agreement was not subject to modification he would not even have addressed the sufficiency of the husband’s evidence. However, if we knew that, and subsequently, we were to determine that the agreement was subject to modification, we would remand to the trier of fact to determine the implications of the evidence, not take it upon ourselves to try the issue just because the case was here. Under our system of civil justice the trier of fact must resolve the disputed issue of whether modification is justified. We are limited to reviewing the propriety of that decision.

We simply do not know what the trial judge did, and, not knowing, do not believe we can properly address the issues raised on appeal. Under these circumstances we think the most appropriate thing to do is to request the trial court to specify the grounds for its ruling.

Accordingly, we hereby relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court for a period of thirty days and direct that the trial court enter an amended final judgment reflecting the basis of its decision. Upon receipt of the amended judgment we will be in a position to complete our review.

HURLEY, J., concurs specially with opinion.

WALDEN, J., dissents with opinion.

HURLEY, Judge,

concurring specially.

For the reasons set forth in the majority opinion and for those expressed in my dissenting opinion in Neger v. Wright, 428 So.2d 777 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), I agree that a relinquishment of jurisdiction is essential to effective appellate review in this case.

WALDEN, Judge,

dissenting:

I would affirm.

In my opinion, the separation agreement was mixed: part property settlement agreement, not modifiable, and part support, subject to modification. There was not a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant modification of the agreed support payment. Thus, the trial court was correct in denying modification.

I do particularly disagree, albeit with respect, to the portion of the majority opinion that commands the trial court to now enter an amended final judgment reflecting the basis of its earlier decision. It is our appellate task to determine if the trial court arrived at a correct conclusion. The process of reasoning whereby the trial court reaches its decision is not controlling. For instance, the trial court will be affirmed if the result is correct, even though based on erroneous reasoning. So this court should accord the appealed order the presumption of correctness and see if there is any legal basis whereby it may be affirmed. See generally 3 Fla.Jur.2d, Appellate Review, Section 296. The foregoing approach was specifically reflected in In re Freeman’s Petition, 84 So.2d 544 (Fla.1955) at page 547:

While, as noted, the order of dismissal did not specify this ground as a basis for the order, we will consider it under our settled practice to affirm a decree of the lower court, even though based on an erroneous ground, if its result is justified on any other ground appearing in the record. [Citation omitted.]

See also Crudele v. Cook, 165 So.2d 424 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963).

I agree that the trial court’s reasoning might be helpful to us. However, since we will not be bound by it, I do not see that it is indispensable. Moreover, I am not acquainted with any rule or authority whereby we are authorized to require the trial court to write an opinion stating reasons for a decision simply because it might be helpful.

Finally, as a matter of policy and respect, I feel that it is unwise for this court to tell a trial court that it must fashion an order or judgment, after the fact, so as to contain the basis for the decision earlier reached. To put the shoe on another foot, I imagine that my colleagues, or some of them, might be somewhat surprised if the Supreme Court should send back one of our affirm-ances without opinion with instructions to write an opinion justifying the affirmance. See Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 172 So.2d 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), where the Third District Court of Appeal enunciated its reasons for being disinclined to reconsider a cause and prepare an opinion setting forth its theory and reasoning as ordered by the Supreme Court, which reasons I think are applicable to the instant case. See also Williams v. State, 425 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 279 So.2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Hoisington v. Kulchin, 178 So.2d 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).

With this, I respectfully dissent.  