
    MAY TERM, 1786.
    Robert Smith’s Lessee against John Volga mot and Christian While.
    EJECTMENT for a tract of land called The Resurvey on part of Porto Sancto, lying in Washington county, Containing 91 acres.
    By the bill of exceptions taken in the cause, it appears that the plaintiff, to show title to the land mentioned in the declaration, which was delineated on the plat in the cause, as beginning at a letter D-, being the end of the thirteenth line of The Resurvey on the Addition to Pile’s Delight, and running as located and described on the plat by the plaintiff, offered in evidence to the J ury the patent of The Resurvey on part of Porto Sancto, by which patent it appears, that The Resurvcy on part of Porto fiancto, was granted to fames Smith on the 9th of January, 1765, being in virtue of a special warrant of reSurvey on part of a tract of land called Porto Sancto, originally granted on the 15th July, 1753, for 23 acres, which said special warrant was dated the 9th of December, 1762, and renewed and continued in force rptil the 9th of December, 1764, and a certificate was returned, dated 1st of December, 1764, for “ The Resurvey on part of ¡’otto Sancto, containing 9 acres of the original part of 
      Porto Sancto, and three acres deficiency, and 82 acres of vacancy, beginning for the outlines of the whole reduced into one entire tract at the end of the 13th line of a tract of land called Addition to Pile’s Delight, and running, &c. containing 91 acres of land.”
    That the plaintiff also offered to prove, that the surveyor, when he made the said survey, began at the end of the 13th line of the Resurvey on the Addition to Pile’s Delight, and that the said survey last mentioned, in the certificate thereof, is called and denominated “ The Addition to Pile’s Delight Enlarged.” That the plaintiff also offered in evidence the original certificate of The Resurvey on part of Porto Sancto, on which the said land is platted, and the location thereof exactly agrees in shape and form with the plaintiff’s location on the plat in the cause ; and offered the record of the patent of The Resurvey on the Addition to Pile’s Delight, in the margin of which record the said land was called The Addition to Pile’s Delight.
    
    To -w|iich evidence the counsel for the defendant objected, alleging that the same was variant from the plaintiff’s location of the said land called The Resurvey on ,part of Porto Sancto, on the plat: And the Court ruled and adjudged the said objection to be good, and would not suffer the said evidence to be given to the Jury. To which opinion the plaintiff’s counsel excepted, and the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals.
    In the Court of Appeals.
    
      F. T. Chase, for the appellant.
    The question is, whether The Resurvey on part of Porto Sancto, the tract of land for which the ejectment is brought, is truly located on the plats returned in the cause.
    It was contended in the Court below, that the patent of The Resurvey on part of Porto Sancto, was variant from the plats, and could not be admitted as evidence to support the plaintiff’s location of that tract; and so the General Court determined; and that parol evidence could not be admitted to establish the beginning according to the location. To determine whether there is a variance between the patent and the location, the Court must consider the patent, and what is the true construction of it.
    
      The Resurvey on part of Porto Sancto, is located according to the patent, and the land described on the plat as such, is the land which passed by the patent.
    In expounding a grant or deed, the Court will be governed by these principles or rules of construction.
    1. The intention of the parties shall prevail.
    2. Every deed and grant shall be taken most beneficially for the grantee, and most against the grantor.
    In support of the first position, 2 Bac. Abr. 660. 665. grants are to be construed according to the intention of the parties. Deeds are to be construed liberally according to the intent, ut res magis valeat. The intent ought always to prevail, unless it be contrary to law. 1 Burr. 285. The intention of a deed is to be collected from the whole tenor of it, and the Court will support the intention, if, by any construction, they can do it. 1 Burr. 286. Judges are astuti to construe deeds to take effect according to the intent and meaning of the parties, and to give the most liberal and benign construction to deeds ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Wils. 22, 23. 78. Hob. 277. Shep. Touch. 82, 83. 2 Atk. 91. 3 Atk. 136. If by any words the intention of the grantor appears to pass the thing, a slight mistake or error in the description will not vitiate the grant. 2 Bac. Abr. 661. Deeds are to be interpreted as much as possible according to the intention of the parties. IQ Mod. 47. If the Court can support the deed by any construction, they will do it. 1 Burr. 286. The king’s patents shall be taken in such sense, and to such intent, as that they shall be good. 1 Co. 46. a. The name of the party is not material,. if the thing was intended to be conveyed. 10 Mod. 45.
    
    In support of the second position. If there appears any doubt or repugnancy in the words of a deed, such exposition is to be made as is most strong against the grantor. 2 Bac. Abr. 665. Co. Litt. 146. It is a general rule, that where it is impossible the grant should take effect according to the letter, there the law.shall make such construction as the gift, by possibility, may take effect. 2 Bac. Abr. 666. Co. Litt. 183. b.
    Whether parol evidence, to prove the place of beginning, supposing it doubtful, can be admitted ?
    Collateral proof is admissible to make certain a person or thing described in a will. 2 Vern. 593. 1 Eq. 231, 232. Parol evidence admitted to explain the meaning of the testator, where it was uncertain. 2 Fern. 517. Where there was a devise to heirs on the part of his mother, parol evidence was admitted to show he intended heirs on the part of his grandmother. 2 Eq. 415. pi. 7, Parol evidence admitted to show which heir, whether of the mother’s mother’s side, or of the father’s father’s side. 2 Eq. 416. pl. 11. 2 P. Wms. 135. Parol evidence was admitted to help out the description of the parish. 2 Bac. 118. Admitted where there is a mistake in the Christian name. 2 Eq. 415. pl. 6. Parol evidence may be given to prove a mistake. 3 Atk. 388. Allowed to ascertain the person or thing, or where the description or thing is uncertain. 1 Vez. 231. Parol evidence admitted to prove a mistake in an agreement. 1 Vez. 457,
    
    Martin, (Attorney-General,) for the appellees.
    There is no other description of ■ the beginning of the tract in question, but the end of the 13th line of Pile’s Delight. Can the plaintiff be admitted to begin elsewhere, or prove a different place of beginning ? If parol evidence is admitted in this case, manifold inconveniences will result from the decision. The plat or location of the plaintiff is part of his declaration.
    The positions laid down will not be controverted, but the application of them is denied. The intention is to , , „ , r , ' . . , prevail, but it must be collected from the grant. Aid cannot be drawn from extrinsic circumstances. The grant does not say, running with The Resurvey of Addition to Piles Delight. There is no call or expression of the kind. Where a tree stands, or where a particular line ends, is a matter of fact for the Jury. But those facts being admitted, if a grant calls for one of those places, whether the beginning shall be there, is a matter of law. If there are two tracts of the same name, evidence may be given to show which tract was intended. If a beginning is called for and proved, a different place of beginning cannot be established from subsequent expressions in the patent. This is not to he considered as a dispute between the proprietary and the patentee. The mistake, might have been rectified before an innocent person acquired a right. The patent might have been vacated, and a new grant have issued, according to the intention, of the parties.
    It is not a general principle, that where there is doubt, you may go into parol evidence. The principle is confined to cases, where there are two things, or two persons of the same name. If a man grant or devise to one of his sons, and he has several, it is void, and parol evidence cannot he received, to show which of his sons was intended. 2 Vern. 624. Brown’s Chancery, 219.
   The Court of Appeals,

at May term, 1789, reversed she judgment of the General Court.  