
    PEOPLE v. TAYLOR
    1. Criminal Law — Arraignment—Constitutional Law — Advice of Rights — Plea of Guilty — Court Rules.
    Court rule does not require a trial judge, before accepting a plea of guilty, to apprise a defendant who is represented by counsel of his constitutional rights regarding compulsory self-incrimination, trial by jury, and confrontation of witnesses against him (GCR 1963, 785.3).
    2. Criminal Law — Constitutional Law — Waiver, op Rights — Prospective Application.
    A United State Supreme Court decision of June 2, 1969, relating to waiver of constitutional rights is not retroactive; consequently, a defendant’s plea of guilty entered before that date cannot be affected by the holding in that case.
    References for Points in Headnotes
    
       21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 484 et seq.
    
    
       16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 131.
    Appeal from Washtenaw, Howard R. Carroll, J., presiding.
    Submitted Division 2 April 7, 1970, at Lansing.
    (Docket No. 8,002.)
    Decided April 30, 1970.
    Anthony N. Taylor was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of possession of marijuana. Defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William F. Delhey, Prosecuting Attorney, and Karl V. Fink, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
    
      Fred 8. 8teingold, for defendant on appeal.
    
      Before: McGregor, P. J., and Danhoe and Larnard, JJ.
    
      
       Circuit Judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
    
   Per Curiam.

On April 11, 1969, the defendant, while represented by counsel, pled guilty to the charge of possession of marijuana, CLS 1961, § 335.153 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 18.1123). On June 4, 1969, he was sentenced to a term of two to ten years in prison.

Defendant appeals as a matter of right and is properly before this Court, MCLA 1970 Cum Supp § 600.308 and MCLA § 600.309 (Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp §§ 27A.308, 27A.309).

Defendant contends that his case should be remanded for a trial because the court did not advise him of the following constitutional rights before accepting his plea of guilty :

(a) The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination;

(b) The right to trial by jury; and

(c) The right to confront one’s accusers.

Michigan law does not require the trial judge to inform an accused who wishes to enter a plea of guilty of the aforementioned constitutional rights when he is represented by counsel. GCR 1963, 785.3 does require the judge to advise an accused charged with a felony who is not represented by counsel of his right to a trial by jury and his right to counsel. Defendant’s reliance on People v. Dunn (1968), 380 Mich 693, is misplaced as defendant in that case did not have counsel.

Defendant argues that the decision in Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 US 238 (89 S Ct 1709, 23 L Ed 2d 274) does require the trial judge to advise an accused of the three cited constitutional rights before accepting a gnilty plea even when the accused has counsel representing him. Without deciding whether Boykin does in fact state such a require-, ment, we hold that the decision in Boykin was not intended to have retroactive application. See McCarthy v. United States (1969), 394 US 459 (89 S Ct 1166, 22 L Ed 2d 418); Halliday v. United States (1969), 394 US 831 (89 S Ct 1498, 23 L Ed 2d 16) reh. den. 395 US 971 (89 S Ct 2106, 23 L Ed 2d 761); Ernst v. State (1969), 43 Wis 2d 661 (170 NW2d 713). Since Boykin was decided June 2, 1969, and defendant’s guilty plea was taken on April 11, 1969, the Boykin decision has no effect on this case.

The record discloses no miscarriage of justice as required by People v. Winegar (1968), 380 Mich 719.

Affirmed.  