
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Bibi OMAR, aka Zameena Omar, Shane Browne, Cassandra Cean, Defendants, Kim Ramlochan, aka Kim Cupeles, aka Kim Yohay, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 14-605-CR.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 20, 2016.
    Daniel M. Perez, Law Offices of Daniel, M. Perez, Newton, NJ, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Amy Busa, Margaret E. Gandy, Maria, Cruz Melendez, Assistant United States Attorneys, of counsel, for Robert L. Capers, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Ap-pellee.
    PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-appellant Kim Ramlochan (“Ramlochan”) appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in the District Court on February 20, 2014, following a plea of guilty to a charge of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The District Court sentenced Ramlochan principally to 86 months’ imprisonment, a five-year term of supervised release, and restitution of $1,196,356. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Ramlochan argues, and the Government agrees, (1) that the District Court committed plain error by imposing a procedurally unreasonable five-year term of supervised release, and (2) that the District Court improperly ordered restitution based on intended, rather than actual, loss. Both parties request that the cause be remand-' ed for the limited purpose of allowing the District Court to impose a corrected term of supervised release and a corrected restitution order.

We agree that a limited remand is appropriate. Ramlochan pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349. That offense is deemed a Class C felony, The maximum authorized term of supervised release for a Class C felony is three years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2). Accordingly, the five-year term of supervised release imposed by the District Court exceeded the statutory maximum and was therefore plain error. See United States v. Cadet, 664 F.3d 27, 33 (2d Cir.2011).

The parties disagree as to whether we should review the restitution order for “plain error” or “abuse of discretion.” We need not decide which standard applies, because even under the more demanding plain-error standard, this case must be remanded.

Because “[t]he purpose of restitution is essentially compensatory,” “a restitution order must be tied to the victim’s actual, provable, loss.” United States v. Browne, 621 Fed.Appx. 44, 49 (2d Cir.2015) (quoting United States v. Zangari, 677 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir.2012)). Here, the Government concedes that the restitution order misstated both the actual loss amount and the identity of the victims to whom restitution is due. Accordingly, further proceedings are required so that the District Court may recalculate the restitution amount and issue a revised restitution order.

CONCLUSION

We therefore REMAND for the limited purpose of allowing the District Court (1) to impose a revised term of supervised release within the three-year maximum permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2), and (2) to enter a revised restitution order. 
      
      . Ramlochan’s case originally came before this Court as part of a consolidated appeal involving two other codefendants. We resolved her codefendants’ appeal in a summary order, United States v. Browne, 621 Fed.Appx. 44 (2d Cir.2015). In a separate order, we directed the Clerk of Court to unconsoli-date Ramlochan’s appeal. We also rejected an Anders motion filed by Ramlochan’s counsel, as well as the Government’s motion for summary affirmance, and directed the parties to brief the two issues we resolve today.
     
      
      . Neither § 1343 nor § 1349 contains a letter grade, but § 1343 provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years for commission of that offense. Accordingly, the offense is deemed a Class C felony pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3).
     