
    *William L. Hull versus Anson Blake.
    In an action by the indorsee of a promissory note against the maker, he pleads in bar a judgment rendered against him by a county court in the State of Georgia, having jurisdiction of the cause, as the garnishee or trustee of the - promissee, the defendant having in the said cause disclosed the said note; the action, in which such judgment was rendered, having been commenced after the actual indorsement of the note to the present plaintiff; and the plea was holden to be a good bar. f
    t Parker vs Darnforth Sf Trustees, 16 Mass. Rep. 304.
    Assümpsit by the indorsee against the maker of two several promissory notes, both bearing date at Augusta, in the State of Georgia, November 11th, 1811, and payable to Eleazar B. Billings or bis order, one for $ 500 in six months, and the other for $ 300 in twelve months, with interest after maturity, and, on the 19th of the same November, indorsed by said Billings to the plaintiff at Providence.
    
    The defendant pleaded two several pleas in bar ; the first of which alleges, that, after the notes declared on were made, namely, on the 21 st of November, 1811, one Alvarez Fisk of Georgia (of which State the said Billings and the defendant are also citizens) impleaded the said Billings in the Inferior Court in the County of Richmond, in the said State, in a plea of debt, for the contents of two promissory notes made to said Fisk by said Billings, and caused the said Blake to be summoned as the garnishee of the said Billings ; which process was, pursuant to a statute of the said State of Georgia, set forth in the plea ; that the said Billings appeared at the said court, and there disclosed upon oath the giving the said notes declared on in this action; and thereupon, at the same court, upon the default of the said Billings, damages were assessed by a jury in favor of said Fisk, and judgment was rendered against Billings for the sum of $668.25 damages and costs, and against said Blake as garnishee; with liberty to sue execution instanter for $504.44, being the amount due on the first note, and for the residue of the judgment after the 11th of November, 1812, when the second note would fall due. These proceedings were declared, in the said judgment, to operate as a bar in favor of Blake against Hull or his indorsee on said notes, for as much as the judgment consumed.
    In his second plea in bar, the defendant sets forth an act of the legislature of the State of Georgia, by which it is * provided, “ that, where any creditor apprehends the loss of his debt by his debtor being about to squander or waste his property, and shall make oath thereof, he shall be at liberty to piosecute his suit to judgment.” He then alleges, that the now plaintiff, in September, 1813, by petition, -instituted an action upon the same notes in the Superior Court of said State, under the provisions of the said act; that he, the said Blake, being duly summoned, appeared and pleaded in bar of said suit the attachment and judgment made and obtained by Fisk, as set forth in the first plea in bar ; and that thereupon, on the 12th of October, 1814, the said Hull dismissed and discontinued his said suit against him, the said Blake.
    
    To both which pleas in bar the plaintiff demurred generally, and the defendant joined in demurrer.
    
      Prescott and Parker, for the plaintiff,
    contended, that the notes, having been indorsed by Billings before the process instituted against him and the defendant, as his garnishee in Georgia, the defendant had ceased to be the debtor of Billings : so there was nothing for that process to operate upon. It is no answer, that the courts in Georgia have authority to construe their own statutes. Our own courts, will also construe them, so far as to prevent injury to our own citizens. But, if the right to explain those statutes were exclusively in the courts in Georgia, still it was the duty of the defendant to have obtained, by an appeal, the opinion of the Superior Court of that State.
    This being a question, rather on the remedy than on the right, our own laws are to govern.  In Baker vs. Wheaton,  the Court say expressly, that, if the note had been transferred to the plaintiff, a citizen of this State, while it remained due, and undischarged by the laws of Rhode Island, his right could not have been affected by the proceedings of the court in that State.  Whether these notes were negotiable by the laws of Georgia or not, they were certainly so at Providence, and were there legally transferred to the plaintiff, by the laws of Rhode Island, * prior to the commencement of Fisk's process in the State of Georgia.
    
    
      W. Sullivan, for the defendant,
    argued, that the notes, being made in the State of Georgia, must have been" made and indorsed with reference to the laws of that State. Those laws gave them all their original validity, and by those laws should their effect and operation be determined. The action of Fisk, on which judgment was rendered that the creditor of Billings should have his satisfaction out of the notes, was within the legal jurisdiction of the court which rendered the judgment; and no fraud is imputed to it. It was, therefore, binding upon the notes. If the defendant has to pay them to the present plaintiff, he will be twice charged for the same debt. On the other hand, the plaintiff has still his remedy against Billings, his indorser, who will have no defence, either legal or equitable, against such demand. 
    
    
      [Note. It was agreed, on the part of the defendant, that judgment should be rendered, as on nil dicit, for the part of the sum demanded not covered by the judgment of the court in Georgia.]
    
      
      
        Pearsall & al. vs. Dwight & al. 2 Mass. Rep. 84.
    
    
      
       5 Mass. Rep. 511.
    
    
      
      
        Watson vs. Bourne, 10 Mass. Rep. 337. — Folliott vs. Ogden, 1 H. Black. 135.— Potter vs. Brown, 5 East, 131
    
    
      
      
        Bissell vs. Briggs, 9 Mass. Rep. 468 — Nash vs. Tupper, 1 Caines’s Rep. 402. — Melan vs. Fitzjames, 1 Bos. & Pul. 138. — 3 Ves. Jun. 447.— Taylor vs. Bryden, 8 Johns. Rep. 173.— Galbraith vs. Neville, Doug. 5, note 2. — Bartlet vs. Knight, Mass. Rep 401. — 1 Johns. Cases, 341.— Wtight vs Nutt, 1 H Black 149.
    
   Parker, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. The defence set up against the notes, which are the subject of this action, is contained in the first plea in bar ; the second plea being unquestionably bad, it merely showing that a process, in the nature of an action, had been prosecuted by the present plaintiff upon the same notes, in the State of Georgia, which was afterwards discontinued. The question presented, then, is, whether the facts contained in the first plea are a good bar to the action.

The plea alleges in substance, that the defendant, who was the promissor in the notes sued, has been summoned as the garnishee or trustee of Billings, the promissee, in the State of Georgia; that, by a court of that State which had jurisdiction of the process, upon a disclosure by the defendant that he had made the notes to Billings, which are the subject of the present suit, judgment was rendered * against him as the trustee of Billings, at the suit of one of his creditors in Georgia; and that the same judgment still remains in force against him.

Upon an examination of a transcript of the record of that process, it appears that such judgment was rendered, although it was stated in the disclosure, that the notes were negotiable.

Is this a good bar to the suit of the plaintiff, who is a bona fide indorsee of the notes, having acquired his title before the commencement of the process in Georgia by which the defendant attempts to discharge himself ?

The plaintiff, although his contract with Billings, his indorser, was made in the State of Rhode Island, and so probably subject to the laws of that State, must be considered as having purchased a security which was subject, for its construction and its legal qualities and character, to the law of Georgia ; it being a well settled principle, that the law of the place where a contract is made is to govern in ;ts construction, and that, by the law of the same place, it may be avoided and defeated. The notes were dated at Jlugusta, in the State of Georgia; and the plaintiff, when taking them as his property, must be presumed to have known that they were made with reference to the laws of that State.

If, then, by the laws of the State of Georgia in force when these notes were given, they might be discharged by a payment to the original promissee after they were indorsed, and such a payment had been actually made, proof of these facts would secure the defendant from a second payment, although it should be demanded by an indorsee, who had paid a valuable consideration, and who must, in such case, be considered as relying upon his indorser, if he should fail of recovering the amount from the promissor. A law providing that any creditor of the promissee may compel the promissor to pay the debt to him, notwithstanding the evidence of its negotiable quality, and that it may have been actually negotiated, would have the same effect.

* Such a provision would be extraordinary, and contrary to the effect generally given to negotiable securities in any mercantile country ; but, if the law be so, it must have its operation upon the contract, wherever it may be sued ; because the laws of the place where the contract is made necessarily make a part of the contract, and are understood as its governing principle.

The question, then, in the present case, would seem to be, whether such was the law of Georgia with respect to a negotiable promissory note, at the time this contract was made. That it was, the evidence resulting from the judgment of the Court of that State, which had the jurisdiction of the subject matter, is perhaps conclusive. Al least it ought to be so considered in favor of a party, who has been there concluded by it, and has no means of avoiding the execution of it; unless it should be made to appear that he aided in the procurement of such a judgment, by withholding facts essential to the right determination of the Court. In this case a true disclosure appears to have been made ; and, although the law of this State would not authorize a similar judgment upon similar facts, the law of Georgia may be different, and must be presumed to be so, because a Judicial Court of that State, of competent jurisdiction, has so declared it.

It is true, there are higher tribunals in the State, to which the present defendant might have resorted ; but we do not think that he was obliged to do so. It was enough for him to present to the Court a true state of his relation to Billings, his creditor ; and he might safely acquiesce in the decision of that tribunal to which the laws of the State had given authority over the subject. If he had collusively submitted to a judgment which by law could not have been recovered against him, he could derive no advantage under it if the other party should put in issue the collusion ; and, upon such issue, the failure to appeal might, under some circumstances, be sufficient evidence of the collusion. In this case no collusion is alleged against the * judgment, and the presumption must be that it was fairly rendered ; so that the defendant is under legal obligation to pay the debt to the creditor of Billings.

It has been settled, that a judgment thus rendered will protect the judgment debtor, as much as if he had actually satisfied the judgment ; although the want of satisfaction might be another material fact, in the trial of the issue whether the judgment was collusive or not.

The result is, that the defendant’s pleas in bar are good and sufficient, for so much as the sum which the defendant is bound to pay to Fisk, the judgment creditor in Georgia. For the residue the plaintiff is to take judgment as by the agreement of the parties.  