
    Cramer against Bradshaw.
    Where, by a bill of sale, B. granted, bar* gained and sold, <( a negro woman slave named, See. being of sound wind and limb, and free from all disease” it Ivas held that these were not words of description, but an averment of a fact, and amounted to an express covenant, or warranty .as to the, soundness of the slave.
    THIS was an action of covenant. The plaintiff declared ore a bill of sale, by which the defendant, in consideration of 175 dollars, granted, bargained and sold to the plaintiff, “ a negro woman slave, named Sarah, aged about thirty years, being of sound wind and limb, and free from all disease,” to have and to hold, &c. And the defendant, by the same instrument, covenanted to warrant and defend the slave, so sold to the plaintiff, against the defendant arid all other persons. The plaintiff alleged as a breach of the covenant, that the slave was unsound, and affected with divers diseases, to wit, fits, &c.
    The defendant, after craving oyer of the bill of sale, demurred to the plaintiff’s declaration. The point raised on the demurrer was, that the bill of sale did not contain any such covenant, as to the soundness of the slave, but only a warranty as to the title.
   Per Curiam.

The words in the bill of sale, “ being of sound wind and limb, and free from all disease,” arc an averment of a fact, and import an agreement to that effect. The words were not used as a mere description of the slave; they amount to an express, not an implied, covenant; to a warranty of the soundness of tlfe slave. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to judgment.

Judgment for the plaintiff  