
    Harwinder VILKHU, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Hoehl, Police Officer and/or Sergeant, Adam Jangel, Police Officer, Defendants-Appellants, John and Jane Does 1-10, Police Officers, James Long, Police Officer, Jeffrey Cline, Police Officer, Stephen Samartino, Police Officer.
    Nos. 09-1178-cv(L), 09-3032-cv(CON).
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 21, 2010.
    
      Elizabeth I. Freedman (Francis F. Ca-puto and Arthur G. Larkin, on the brief) for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Appellants.
    Mariann M. Wang (Eric Helker and Kennisha Austin, on the brief), Emery Cel-li Brinkerhoff & Abady, LLP, New York, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Debra Ann Livingston recused herself from participating in the decision of this case, which is decided by the remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement. See 2d Cir. Local Rules, Internal Operating Procedure E(b).
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellee Harwinder Vilkhu brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and New York state law against the City of New York and several New York police officers. A jury found in favor of Vilkhu on two claims and awarded him $20,000 dollars in compensatory damages. In a detailed fifty-three-page memorandum opinion and order, the late Judge Sifton awarded Vilkhu $671,056.80 in attorney’s fees, $58,221.70 in costs, and $401.26 in interest.

Defendants-appellants (“defendants”) appeal the District Court’s November 20, 2008 judgment and its June 26, 2009 order awarding attorneys fees. They argue that the District Court erred by (1) declining to give a jury instruction about nominal damages, (2) admitting “similar act” evidence, and (3) awarding excessive attorney’s fees and costs. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of this action.

With respect to defendants’ arguments regarding the nominal damages jury instruction and the admission of “similar act” evidence, we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court’s March 3, 2008 memorandum opinion and order denying defendants’ motion for a new trial.

With respect to defendants’ challenge to the award of attorney’s fees, we vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings in light of our recent decision in Simmons v. New York City Transit Authority, 575 F.3d 170 (2d Cir.2009). The District Court calculated the attorney’s fees award by reference to billing rates in the Southern District of New York. The District Court relied on those out-of-district rates because the District Court determined that (1) Vilkhu’s counsel, who were located in the Southern District of New York, had a “reputation for a high degree of success” in similar cases, and (2) “travel time between the Southern and Eastern Districts is minimal, given that the principal courthouses for each district are minutes away from each other, on either side of the East River.”

In Simmons, which was decided after the District Court entered its order awarding attorney’s fees, we examined the scope of the so-called “forum rule,” which provides that “courts should generally use the hourly rates employed in the district in which the reviewing courts sits.” 575 F.3d at 174 (quotation marks omitted). We held, most importantly, that “a district court must first apply a presumption in favor of application of the forum rule,” and “[i]n order to overcome that presumption, a litigant must persuasively establish that a reasonable client would have selected out-of-district counsel because doing so would likely (not just possibly) produce a substantially better net result.” Id. at 175.

Because the District Court did not have the benefit of our guidance in Simmons, the District Court here did not “apply a presumption in favor of application of the forum rule.” Id. Nor did the District Court examine whether “Eastern District counsel were unable or unwilling to take [Vilkhu’s] case” or whether Vilkhu had submitted sufficient evidence showing that, “had [ ]he retained Eastern District counsel instead of Southern District counsel, []he would have received a substantially inferior result to that provided by h[is] selected counsel.” Id. at 177.

We therefore vacate the District Court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and remand the cause to the District Court to reconsider the attorney’s fees issue in light of our guidance in Simmons. On remand, the District Court should keep in mind that “the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) (quotation marks omitted). “Both the quantity and quality of relief obtained, as compared to what the plaintiff sought to achieve as evidenced in [the] complaint, are key factors in determining the degree of success achieved.” Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 152 (2d Cir.2008) (quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s November 20, 2008 judgment is AFFIRMED; its June 26, 2009 order awarding attorneys fees is VACATED; and the cause is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order. 
      
      .Although this judgment was dated November 19, 2008, it was entered on the District Court's docket on November 20, 2008.
     
      
      . Although this order was dated June 25, 2009, it was entered on the District Court's docket on June 26, 2009.
     
      
      . Although this order was dated March 2, 2008, it was entered on the District Court's docket on March 3, 2008.
     
      
      . The District Court entered its order awarding attorney’s fees on June 26, 2009 and Sim-morn was decided on August 3, 2009.
     