
    In re Disbarment of JOHN M. BRITTAIN.
    (Filed 22 June, 1938.)
    1. Attorney and Client §§ 12, 15 — Disbarment ordered in this case by Supreme Court on motion of Attorney-General, it appearing respondent had confessed in open, court to guilt of crimes involving moral turpitude.
    When on appeal to the Supreme Court in disbarment proceedings instituted before the Trial Committee of the State Bar, it appears that respondent has confessed his guilt in open court to four crimes, all involving moral turpitude, and nothing is offered in defense or by way of excuse, respondent will he disbarred by order of the Supreme Court upon motion of the Attorney-General without the necessity of deciding the questions sought to be presented by the appeal.
    2. Appeal and Error § Sle—
    When order of disbarment entered by Supreme Court renders academic the question sought to be presented by the appeal in the disbarment proceedings instituted before the Trial Committee of the State Bar, the appeal will be dismissed.
    Sea well, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
    Appeal by'North Carolina State Bar from Rousseau, J., at December Term, 1937, of RaNdolph.
    Disbarment proceeding instituted 10 December, 1935, by the North Carolina State Bar, under authority of ch. 210, Public Laws 1933, and amendments thereto, on allegations showing:
    1. That the respondent, John M. Brittain, was duly licensed to practice law in 1920, and is a member of the North Carolina State Bar.
    2. That on 17 October, 1933, the respondent pleaded guilty in the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of North Carolina, Rockingham Division, to an indictment charging him with forgery with intent to obtain $208.50 from the United States on a falsely endorsed Yeteran’s Administration check, and with uttering said falsely endorsed instrument on or about 9 August, 1932; that upon said plea the respondent was sentenced to a term of two years in the Federal penitentiary in Atlanta, and that he was thereupon disbarred from practicing law in said court.
    3. That thereafter, at the January Term, 1935, Superior Court of Montgomery County, the respondent pleaded guilty in three cases to charges of embezzlement, forgery and false pretense in obtaining $2,395.93 on or about 17 January, 1933, upon a forged check, and was sentenced to twelve months in the State’s Prison at Raleigh, N. C.
    Wherefore, the respondent was ordered to appear before the Trial Committee of the Bar, etc.
    
      At tbe bearing before tbe Trial Committee, tbe respondent being present in person and represented by counsel, “stipulates tbat tbe allegations in tbe complaint are true in fact, as therein stated, but in apt time demurs to tbe jurisdiction of tbe Council of tbe North Carolina State Bar to pass upon said matter, for tbat all tbe offenses complained of in tbe said complaint occurred prior to tbe first day of July, 1933,” tbe effective date of tbe act incorporating tbe State Bar.
    Tbe demurrer was overruled and tbe committee recommended disbarment, which was adopted by tbe Council and disbarment ordered 16 July, 1937.
    On appeal to the Superior Court of Randolph County, December Term, 1937, tbe respondent’s demurrer was sustained and tbe order of tbe Council reversed.
    From this ruling, tbe North Carolina State Bar appealed, assigning errors.
    On tbe argument, tbe respondent further challenged tbe constitutionality of tbe act incorporating tbe State Bar. Ob. 210, Public Laws 1933, as amended by cb. 51, Public Laws 1937.
    It appearing tbat tbe facts are not in dispute, but are admitted, and tbat tbe case is a clear one for disbarment, tbe Attorney-General intervened and suggested tbe propriety of action by tbe court without further proceedings in tbe matter.
    
      Gover & Covington and Hugh L. Lobdell for North Carolina State Bar, appellant.
    
    
      B. L. Brown, Jr., G. B. B. Reynolds, and G. Hobart Morton for respondent, appellee.
    
   Stacy, C. J.

Tbe constitutionality of tbe act incorporating tbe State Bar is not perforce presented on tbe present record. In re Parker, 209 N. C., 693, 184 S. E., 532. Nor is it necessary tbat we here decide whether tbe General Assembly intended to make its provisions retroactive as well as prospective in effect. Ashley v. Brown, 198 N. C., 369, 151 S. E., 725. Tbe respondent has confessed bis guilt in open court to four crimes, all involving moral turpitude, and be has been disbarred from prácticing in tbe District Court of tbe United States. Nothing is offered in defense or by way of excuse. Tbe record engenders but a single conclusion.

Tbe respondent’s admissions require bis disbarment, and tbe action of tbe Attorney-General is well advised. S. v. Spivey, 213 N. C., 45, 195 S. E., 1; S. v. Harwood, 206 N. C., 87, 173 S. E., 24; In re West, 212 N. C., 189, 193 S. E., 134, and eases there cited. This course renders academic tbe question presented by tbe appeal. What shall it profit tbe respondent if be gain tbe whole case and lose bis own license ? Disbarment must ultimately result in any event.

Nor is it necessary tbat there should be further proceedings in the matter. The facts are not in dispute, and the indictments, pleas and judgments in the criminal prosecutions speak for themselves. Respondent’s disqualification is complete. Rut even if the record were less compelling or respondent’s peccancy less glaring,-the findings and recommendation of the Trial Committee, approved and adopted, as they are, by the Council of the State Bar, would perhaps afford sufficient predicate for disbarment on motion of the Attorney-General.

Respondent disbarred.

Appeal dismissed.

Sea well, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.  