
    Peck vs. Bullard.
    Where a bill was filed by vendor of land after the lapse of nine years from the date of the conveyance, to rescind such contract on the ground of misrepresentation of thequantity and quality of the land by the vendee: Held, that the complainant was not entitled to relief though the bill was filed within seven years after the discovery of the fraud, there having been no misrepresentation of any facts by which the complainant could have been prevented from obtaining a full knowledge 'of his rights at any moment of time.
    Jacob Peck filed this bill in the Chancery Court of Tazewell, in Claiborne county, against William Bullard, for the purpose of rescinding a deed of conveyance of two tracts of land.
    Complainant in the year 1827, (at what precise time does not appear,) being in want of a horse, and having a large quantity of wild, uncultivated and second rate land in the county of Claiborne, requested and authorised his brother Adam Peck to sell a portion of his land and procure him a horse therewith. Adam Peck proceeded from the county of Jefferson to the county of Claiborne, and to the residence of defendant Bullard. The land in controversy lay in the vicinity of Bullard’s. Peck proposed to sell, and did sell by metes and bounds to Bullard two tracts of land, one supposed to contain fifteen acres, the other otae hundred and fifty acres, for a horse of the value of $75. The land was not surveyed with a view to ascertain the exact quantity which lay within the boundaries, nor does it appear that there was much concern about the exact quantity sold.
    The complainant was the owner of much wild land, subject to annual taxes and not advancing in value, and seemed desirous to get clear of some of it. Some time after this sale, to wit: on the-23d day of November, 1827, Bullard called on Peek for the purpose of getting a deed to the premises in controversy. In the mean time Peck had been informed that Ballard had “cheated his brother Adam” in the .quantity and value of the land sold in the specified boundaries. Complainant so stated to the defendant when he applied for a deed of conveyance. Thereupon Bullard stated to him, that if he desired to put an end to the contract he was willing that it should be done.. This, however, complainant declined doing, and expressed a willingness to adhere to the contract and executed a, deed accordingly.
    Complainant alledges in his bill, that the number of acres within the specified boundary amounted to upwards of a thousand, and that it was within three miles of the town, of Tazewell, and of the value of $1 50 or $2 per acre. He alledges also, that his brother Adam resided in a different county, knew but little of'the valuó of' the property sold or the quantity thereof; that his agent relied on the representations of Bullard as to both quality and; quantity of the land sold, and that Bullard grossly misrepresented both. He further alledges that he did not discover the great quantity sold and the value thereof until within seven years next before the filing of the bill for the rescission of the contract of sale.
    The defendant denied that the agent of complainant had relied upon his representation, as to either quality or quantity of said land — denied that he made any false representation in regard to either, or that he knew the amount purchased b.y him. at the time of the sale. He denied that the number of acres was so. great as represented in the bill, but stated that it was understood by complainant at the time of the execution of the deed, that there was much more land within the specified boundaries than the deed called for, and that the words more or less were inserted in the conveyance with that understanding; that said Peck on being so informed, stated that it mattered not, the defendant had aided hi.s brother in the sale of his land, «fee, «fee.
    The allegations of the bill were partially, but not satisfactorily sustained by the mass of proof introduced, which it is not deemed necessary here to set forth. There appeared to be some eight hundred or a thousand acres of land conveyed. Adam Peck stated that he relied in a great measure as to quantity and quality of land Sold on the representation of Bullard, the force of which., however, Was much neutralized by the fairness subsequently indicated by the conduct of Bullard.
    The cause came on for hearing on bill, answer, replication and' jDioof, at the June term, 1840, before Bfomfield L. Ridley, Chancellor, who being of the opinion that the' complainant had beeii defrauded by means of the misrepresentations of defendant, decreed that the defendant was entitled to one hundred and fifty acres of the land in the specified boundaries, and that he have the liberty of selecting the same out of the entire -tract, &c. &c. The defendant Appealed from the decree.
    
      R. J. McKinney.
    
    Peck supposed he was selling and conveying between one hundred and fifty or two hundred acres for - á horse bf the' value of seventy-five dollars. It appears that he was selling between eight hundred and due'thousand acres. - Inadequacy is bf itself á sufficient cause for setting aside a conveyance where the inadequacy is so great as at once to shock the conscience. This case comes within the case stated by Lord Thurlow in 1 Bro. Ch. Rep. 9: that to set aside a conveyance' there must be an inequality so strong, gross and manifest, that it must be impossible to state it to a man of common sense without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it. The facts are proof of themselves of fraud and imposition. 2 Johnson, Oh. Rep. 23:10 Yesey, 209: 9 Brown* Rep. p. 175. The civil law went further than the common law in this respect, and a contract for the sale of land was rescinded by judicial authority though made in good faith if the price was below one-half of the value. Fonblanque Eq. p. 47, in note;
    2. Here fraudulent misrepresentation is directly proved. ■ But if the fraud he not regarded as proven, it is still so gross a mistake as is relievable. 1 Story Eq. 572. The insertion of the words “mere or less” would cover only a few acres, not double and treble the quantity intended to be sold.
    3. The mistake was here discovered only about a year before the filing of the bill, and the statute of limitations runs from the time of the discovery and not from the date of the conveyance'. Haywood vs. Marsh Rtfss, 6 Yerger; Pugh vs. Bell, 1 J. J. Marsh. 401: Croft, vs. Arthur, 3 Desau. 223: Van Rhyan vs.- Vincent, Ex. 1 McChord, Oh. 314: 3 Leigh, 729: 1 Hill,- Oh. 121: 4 Desau. 480.-
    
      J. Á. McKinney.
    
    There is no fraud proven; the allegations of the bill are directly denied, and they are not sustained by the testimony. The insertion of the words “more or less” in the deed of conveyance, the fact being communicated to Peck that the defend-" ant had got the best of the bargain, and the defendant having offered, when he applied for a deed, to rescind the contract, all go to repel the existence of a fraudulent intent. Mr. McKinney commented on the cases in regard to inadequacy of consideration, and insisted that there was a distinction between contracts which were executed fully by the parties and those which were not. That here the contract had been executed for nine years previous to the filing of the bill.
    2. There was no principle better established in the jurisprudence of Tennessee or abroad, than that the statute of limitation applies to courts of equity as well as courts of law. “We take the law at this day to be well settled, nay conclusively settled, that the courts of equity are equally as much bound to respect the statutes of limitation as courts of law. Such is apprehended to have been the rule of decision in the courts of equity in this State.”— See Hickman, lessee, vs. Gaither ¿f Frost, 2 Yerger, 206: Cooke, 179: Peck, 30: 9 Wheaton, Tailor vs. Emendorf, S. C., U. S.: in England, Cholmondely vs. Clinton, et. als. 2 Jacobs & Walker. Equity follows the law. But it is insisted that in courts of equity the statute does not commence running until the fraud is discovered. The courts had never gone so far as to lay down so broad an exemption from the operation of this beneficial statute. It had only been declared that it did not operate where there was a fraudulent concealment of the wrong done, which was relievable in equity. No such case was made out here.
   ToRtiEY, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This bill is filed to rescind a contract for the sale of lands to the defendant, upon the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation as to the quantity and quality of land contained within the boundaries specified by the contract.

The contract to sell and purchase was made between the defendant and the agent of the complainant, but the deed was executed by the complainant and beais date the 23d day of November, 1827. The bill to rescind was filed on the 27th day of December, 1836, nine years after the contract was executed, but che complainant alledges as an excuse for his delay, his ignorance of the fraud practised upon him. If there was any fraud in procuring the contract, it consisted in the misrepresentation of the quantity of land sold; but we are not satisfied that there was any fraud ulent misrepresentation. The defendant denies that he did know what quantity of land was embraced by the lines; that there was more than the nominal amount called for in the deed is true, and the defendant avers and proves that he so informed the complainant at the time he executed the deed. The proof is not satisfactory as to the existence of a fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant; but, if it were, we are of opinion that the great length of time the complainant has slept upon his right, precludes him from now asking the aid of a court of Chancery. There was no fraudulent concealment, and could have been none, of any facts by the defendant by which the complainant could be prevented from a full knowledge of his rights at any moment he might have thought proper. He had been informed before he executed the deed that the defendant had obtained an advantage over his agent; he was told at the time he executed the deed, that there were several hundred acres of land within the limits of the sale. He might have gone at that moment of time and satisfied himself both as to the quantity and quality of the land by personal observation, but this he does not think proper to do, and by accident some seven years after-wards he discovers that his conveyance covered more and better land than he had thought, and then he seeks the aid of a court. The peace of society requires those rights shall be enforced in a reasonable time, and that they shall be barred if they are not. If a man gets possession of another’s land and holds it seven years it belongs to him, although the real owner might have no knowledge of the adverse possession, because it was his business to have known. Lands are acquired by a conveyance, the metes and bounds of which cover more land than the vendor designed, and after a lapse of seven years he files his bill' to set it aside, because he did not know of the error sooner. ■ Upon what principle shall he be heard, when the other is not? None that we are aware of.

Therefore, let the decree of the Chancellor be reversed, and the complainant’s bill be dismissed.  