
    Daniel Green vs. Fletcher Creighton, Administrator of Amos Whiting, deceased.
    The court of chancery does not possess jurisdiction, at the instance of the creditor of a deceased person, to compel persons who have been at different times his administrators, to file an inventory of the assets of his estate, and to account fully for their actings and doings in their respective administrations, and to pay the complainant’s debt; and if there be not assets for that purpose, that the administrator of one of the sureties on the administration bond of the administrator may be compelled to pay it. The settlement of the different administrations was for the probate court; and if liability on the administration bond is to he enforced, it must be through the circuit court.
    Where a fraud is practised by an administrator, in his settlement in the probate court, a court of equity, on a bill filed for that purpose, will set aside the settlement and direct a new settlement in the probate court; the jurisdiction of the court of chancery extends no further.
    Where an administrator’s settlement in the probate court is impeached as fraudulent by bill in chancery, and no proof is offered to sustain the allegation of fraud, which the answer denies, and no proof offered to show that the settlement was made without the notice required by the statute, it will not be disturbed.
    Where there is an entire want of jurisdiction of the ^subject-matter in the court, it is never too late, even in the high .court of errors and appeals, to object to the jurisdiction of the court; it is only in cases of concurrent jurisdiction that a demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court is requisite.
    On appeal from the superior c'ourt of chancery; Hon. Robert H. Buckner, chancellor.
    Daniel Green states in his bill that he is a creditor, in the sum of sixty thousand dollars, of the estate of Amos Whiting, who died in August, 1837 ¡"^George Lake, and Maria Louisa Whiting, his widow, administered on his estate, and gave James S. Mc-Aleb and Robert H. Moore as sureties on their administration bond. In March, 1839, Maria Louisa married Jeremiah'M. Rhodes, and they jointly administered until October, 1841. In April, 1841, John D. Freeman, administrator of James W. Sinclair, having a claim against Whiting’s estate, impleaded the administrators in the probate court of Claiborne county, to compel them to account for the rents, issues, and profits of the estate of Whiting, and especially of his plantation; but the probate Court decreed that his widow was entitled to possession of it in lieu of dower. The proceedings on this petition are set out at length in the bill. Rhodes also filed his annual account with the probate court, which was referred to commissioners, who, at the October term, 1841, reported in its favor, and it was allowed. The bill attacks this account as fraudulent, in numerous items and particulars, and charges Rhodes with having withdrawn and concealed the vouchers to hide his fraud, and with having corrupted the attorney employed to resist the account before the auditors.
    At the October term, 1841, McAleb, the surety of the administrators, petitioned for counter security, which not being given, letters de bonis >non were granted to Fletcher Creighton, who was ordered, out of the assets and property of the estate, to pay a large sum as their commissions to the former administrators ; also, the balance found to be due them by the commissioners.
    At the November term, 1841, Freeman, as administrator, filed another petition to set aside the order to pay the commissions and balance due on the administration account to Rhodes and wife, and attacked their - settlement as fraudulent; this petition the probate court dismissed for want of jurisdiction, as Rhodes and wife were no longer administrators, and Freeman appealed to the high court.
    Creighton gave as his sureties, on his bond, James 8. McAleb and Elias E. Hankisson. In October, 1842, McAleb died, of doubtful solvency; Hankisson was insolvent; so was Creighton; and so, also, was Whiting’s estate. Creighton had sold negroes of the estate, and was collecting the money, and would pay, unless prevented,'the amounts contained in the decree to Rhodes and wife, which would be wholly lost, if that decree should he reversed.
    The bill proceeds to charge Mrs. Rhodes, while sole, with having received, and not accounted for, property of the estate, and charges her with having received thirty thousand dollars’ worth of available assets, and with having worked and used sixty-five slaves of the estate, and never having accounted for anything; similar charges are also made against Rhodes; and it is stated, that instead of the estate being in debt to them, on a fair settlement, they are greatly in arrear to the estate.
    Mrs. Rhodes had left the state and gone to Maryland, which prevented service of process on her personally in the probate court; and it was the object of the administrators of Whiting to force and procure such delay in the probate court as would prevent any decree against them until it was too late to present that decree against the estate of James 8. McAleb, and thus that estate would wholly escape responsibility.
    Yarious other charges are made in the bill touching the conduct of the parties and the course of administration, which need not be noticed. The bill prays that Rhodes and wife, Creighton, Jonathan McAleb, the administrator of James S. McAleb, may he made defendants; may make an inventory of the slaves and property of Whiting’s estate, and disclose all the particulars of their knowledge of its affairs, and of their respective administrations of it; may state the history of all sales of its property, account for their proceeds, &c. &c.; may account each of them fully to the chancellor for all their acts of administration; that they may be decreed to pay complainant’s debt; and if, from the insolvency of the estate, they cannot do it, that Jonathan McAleb, as administrator of James S. McAleb, may be compelled to do it; that a receiver might be appointed to take charge of the slaves and other property of the estate, and that Creighton might be enjoined from paying over to Rhodes and wife the amount decreed in their favor.
    The injunction was granted.
    Subsequently, an amended and supplemental bill was filed, setting out additional details of the administration and other matters.
    Rhodes and wife answered, and denied all fraud in their settlements with the probate court, and plead in bar the final decree of the probate court in their favor. The answer also set up other matters.
    No proof was taken on either side, and the chancellor dissolved the injunction. Green appealed.
    
      Crapoo, for appellant.
    
      II. T. Ellett, for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a bill filed in the superior court of chancery by the appellant. Its allegations are numerous and complicated, and it would be difficult for any abstract to embrace them. Its objects are to compel the several persons, who, at various times have been the administrators of Amos Whiting, deceased, to file an inventory of the assets of the estate, and to account fully to the court of chancery for their actings and doings in their administration, and that they may be compelled by a decree of the court, to pay to the complainant the amount of his claim, and if there be not sufficient assets1 for the purpose, then that the administrator of one of the sureties in the administration bond may be decreed to make the payment.” These are the leading objects of the bill, though auxiliary matters are also introduced. The court below dissolved the injunction, which had been granted, and from this order the appeal was taken.

Nothing, certainly, is better settled in this court, than that the court of chancery does not possess the jurisdiction, which it is here asked to exercise. The administration of estates, and the settlement of the accounts of administrators falls peculiarly and exclusively under the cognizance of the probate court. See Jones v. Coon, 5 S. & M. 751. Suits upon the bonds of administrators pertain to the circuit court. See Buckingham v. Owen, 6 S. & M. 502. Upon the well defined principles of the law, then, it would seem that there is no error in the decree.

It is alleged, however, that fraud was practised by the admin-istratorsfin their settlements. If this were true, upon a bill filed to set aside the settlement, a court of equity would have the power to do it, and to direct a new settlement in the probate court. Turnbull v. Endicott, 3 S. & M. 304. But this would give the court of chancery no power to have the settlement made in its own forum. When it had set aside the fraudulent settlement, and removed it out of the way of the complainant, its functions would be at an end. He must then proceed as if the fraudulent settlement had never been made. In this case there is no evidence to sustain the allegation of fraud. The charge is denied, and no proof is offered to show its existence, or that the settlement was made without the notice required by the statute. Stubblefield v. McRaven, 5 S. M. 142.

It is said in argument, that there was no demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court below, and that it is too late to raise the objection here. That rule is only applicable in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, and has no place where there is an entire want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter. Marsh v. Haywood, 6 Hum. 213; 4 S. & M. 549.

On the whole no error is perceived in the decree, and the same is affirmed. But the cause is remanded for farther proceedings, if by the parties deemed expedient, and found within the jurisdiction of the court.  