
    Cincinnati Street Railway Company v. Horstman.
    
      Street railway company — Power to lease or purchase — Consolidation of companies — Sections 2505a and 2505b, Revised Statutes — Acts of May 1, 1891, and April 22, 1896, are valid— Laws of a general or special nature — Law of corporations— Constitutional law.
    
    
      1. The act of the general assembly entitled “An act to amend and supplement sections 2505a and 25056 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, as enacted May 1, 1891, and amended April 18, 1892,” passed April 22, 1896 (92 O. L., 277), is constitutional, it being a law of a general nature which operates uniformly throughout the state and upon every individual corporation of the classes therein defined.
    
      2. A temporary act may be either general or special; and an act of a general nature which operates uniformly throughout the state and upon every individual corporation of the classes therein, defined, but which is by its terms limited in operation to a specified period of time, is a temporary general statute.
    (No. 9017
    Decided February 28, 1905.)
    Error to the Superior Court of Cincinnati in general term.
    The plaintiff below, defendant in error here, as a taxpayer, 'filed his original petition in behalf of the city of Cincinnati, under sections 1777 and 1778, Revised Statutes, against The Cincinnati Street Railway Company, on the twenty-first day of January,. 1901, alleging in substance that the city of Cincinnati,, on the thirteenth of August, 1896, entered into a contract with The Cincinnati Street Railway Company for an extension of the time, of the grants it held, for the various lines of road it owned and brought under its control and ownership by uniting its lines of road with the lines of the Mt. Adams & Eden Park Inclined Railway Company and the Mt. Auburn Cable Railway Company, under the provisions of the act of the general assembly of Ohio, passed April 22, 1896, commonly known as the Rogers law (92 O. L., 277).
    The petition charged that the contract was invalid because the act of the general assembly, under which it was made, was as alleged an unconstitutional law-And the defendant in error (plaintiff below) prayed that the defendant might he enjoined from operating its cars over the route known as the John street route, as provided for in said contract.
    The street railway company defended on the following grounds: First, That the act of April 22, 1896, known as “the Rogers law” is constitutional. Second, That.the city of Cincinnati, and the plaintiff suing in i ts behalf, are estopped from alleging the unconstitutionality of that act. Third, That section 31 of the act of October 22,1902 (96 O. L., 32), under the facts of this case, operated as a direct and independent grant by the general assembly to the street railway company in accordance with the terms and conditions of the grant to it under the resolutions of the board of administration passed August 13, 1896; and Fourth, That this action, not having been brought within one year from the date of the contract to be enjoined, is barred by the limitation of section 137 of the act of October 22, 1902 (96 O. L., 65).
    The cause came on for final hearing in the general term, at the May term, 1904,' upon the pleadings and bill of evidence, and the court entered its final decree therein, finding that the resolutions of August 13, 1896, were invalid, by reason of the.unconstitiitionality of the act of the general assembly of April 22, 1896, under which said resolutions were passed, and upon the further ground that the provisions of sections 31 and 137 of the act of 1902 were also unconstitutional, and that the defendant had no right to operate the John street route under said resolutions of August 13, 1896, but that the right of the defendant, by reason of grants made prior to the resolutions of August 13,1896, should not in any way be affected by the decree. The defendant was enjoined from operating the John street route under the resolutions of August 13,1896, and was adjudged to pay the costs of the case.
    This petition in error is prosecuted to reverse that decree.
    
      
      Mr. E. W. Kittredge; Mr. J. W. Warrington; Mr. W. M. Ampt and Mr. J. B. Foraker, attorneys for plaintiff in error.
    The act of April 22, 1896, called the Rogers law, violates no provision of the constitution.
    The only standard recognized in Ohio for testing the validity of an act of the legislature is the constitution. Probasco v. Paine, 50 Ohio St., 378.
    Every act of the general assembly is supported by a strong presumption of validity. No statute, whose subject-matter is of a legislative character, can he judicially declared invalid, unless it clearly and incontestably violates some express or necessarily implied provision of the constitution. Any doubt of invalidity is the certain. sign of validity. McCormick v. Alexander, 2 Ohio, 65; Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347; Railway Co. v. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 77; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St., 573; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St., 14; State v. Kendle, 52 Ohio St., 346; State ex rel. v. Baker, 55 Ohio St., 1.
    As to the constitutionality of the act of April 22, 1896: Vought v. Railroad Co., 58 Ohio St., 123; New York Elevated Railroad Co., In re., 70 N. Y., 327; State v. Nelson, 52 Ohio St., 88; Kittinger v. Buffalo Traction Co., 160 N. Y., 377; Adler v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St., 574; Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St., 661; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St., 475; State v. Turnpike Co., 37 Ohio St., 481; Railway Co. v. Cox, 102 Fed. Rep., 825; Point Breeze Ferry Co. v. Railroad Co., 53 N. J. Law, 108; Shields v. State, 26 Ohio St., 86 (affirmed, 4 O. F. D., 471; 95 U. S., 319); State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio St., 354; Dutoit v. Doyle, 16 Ohio St., 400; State v. Sherman, 22 Ohio St., 412; Cmcin
      
      nati v. Taft, 63 Ohio St., 141; State ex rel. Knisely v. Jones, 66 Ohio St., 453; State v. Baker, 55 Ohio St., 1; Platt v. Craig, 66 Ohio St., 75; Shoemaker v. Cincinnati, 68 Ohio St., 603; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St., 542; State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St., 113; Southern Gum Co. v. Laylin, 66 Ohio St., 578; Sutherland on Stat. Const., see. 107; People ex rel. v. Salomon, 51 Ill., 37; Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal., 343; Plummer v. Jones, 84 Me., 58; Hobart v. Supervisors Butte Co., 17 Cal., 24; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md., 184; 1 Kent Com. (14 ed.), *455 and *458; Smets v. Wethersbee, R. M. Charlt. (Ga.), 537; Matthews v. Zane, 7 Wheat., 164; The Brig Ann, 1 Gall. (U. S.), 62; People ex rel. v. Clark, 1 Cal., 406; In re Welman, 20 Vt., 653; People v. Wright, 70 Ill., 388; Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St., 85; People ex rel. v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 68 N. E. Rep., 953; Hazelett v. Butler University, 84 Ind., 230; Berks Co. v. Railway, 167 Pa. St., 102; People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal., 436; Falke ex parte, 42 Ohio St., 641.
    
      Mr. Theodore Horstman, attorney for defendant in .error.
    The language of the “Rogers law” is so involved, that, in order to clearly present the points we wish to present, we submit the following substantial copy ef said law, the surplus language being eliminated from the full text thereof':
    “Section 2505a. Any street railway company may lease or purchase any street railroads operated by electric, cable or other rapid transit motive poioer, constructed and held by any other company or companies, the latter being vested with corresponding power to let or sell upon such terms as may "be agreed upon between the companies.
    
      “Section 25055. Whenever the lines of any street railroad companies meet or intersect or whenever any snch line and that of any railroad operated by electric or other means of rapid transit may be conveniently connected, snch companies whose road or roads have been made or are in process of construction are authorized to consolidate.
    ‘ ‘ Section 2505A Whenever it is proposed to bring any two or more lines of road within the ownership of one company under sections 2505a and 2505b,. which roads are held under grants providing different terms, the board of administration in any city of the first grade of the first class may agree with the company so acquiring ownership that such terms, shall remain unchanged on condition that the company provide a system of transfers of passengers, provided that for a continuous ride in the same general direction within a municipal corporation the-fare shall not exceed five cents.
    “And in lieu of the foregoing the board of administration may extend the time of each of said grants or franchises for such period as together with the unexpired term of such existing grant the franchises shall not exceed the period of fifty years from and after the passage of this act (April 22, 1896); provided the company agree to such changes in the-existing terms and conditions; and provided further, that no increase of fares shall be allowed in any case and no decrease shall be allowed in any case of car-license fees or percentage tax on gross earnings notv required to be paid. And provided that the municipal corporation may at the end of twenty years from-the passage of this act (April 22, 1896) and every fifteen years thereafter fix the rates of fare, car license fees, percentage, tax on gross earnings, transfers and all other terms and conditions on which such railroad is operated in said city. The said terms shall he fixed by the board of administration if there be such board, otherwise by the legislative body of the municipal corporation and must be approved in the manner which at the time may be required for other acts of such municipal corporation. The terms there fixed shall be equitable according to the then cost of carrying passengers. Should the parties not agree as to whether said terms are equitable the same may be submitted to the adjudication of a court of competent jurisdiction in a suit brought by the company to enjoin the municipal corporation from enforcing such terms.”
    We here substitute for the greater part of our own argument in the courts below as to the unconstitutionality of the “Rogers law” a full reprint of the opinion of the general term, excepting that portion of the opinion which discusses the defense of estoppel, which portion of the opinion will be found reprinted in this brief under the “Estoppel” proposition.
    [As- the question of estoppel is not considered in the opinion of the court herewith published, that part of Mr, Horstman’s brief is here omitted. The argument to which Mr. Horstman alludes will be found in the citation immediately following.— Reporter.]
    
      Theodore Horstman, on behalf of The City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Street Railway Company, 12 Dec., 756.
    Concerning the argument as to the unconstitutionality of the “Rogers law” we desire to say:
    
      Section 2505d excludes from its operation street railway companies which have acquired two or more lines of road prior to the passage of the act, even though acquired by lease, purchase or consolidation.
    We also call attention to the fact that section 2505d provides as follows: “And provided further that the municipal corporation in which such street railway is 'situated shall have the power at the end of twenty years from the passage of this act and every fifteen years thereafter, to fix the rates of fare, car license fees,” etc., and if the council and company cannot agree they may apply to the court. Even though a grant was made on the first day of the fifty-year period, nevertheless after the first twenty years, it would leave only one fifteen-year period within the fifty years for the fixing of rates, etc. The use of the language “every fifteen years thereafter,” shows that even after the fifty-year grants have expired, in case of any renewal of grant, such renewal would be subject to those provisions as to how rates of fare, terms and conditions, should periodically be fixed, as to these particular corporations, thus forming an arbitrary class of corporations with extraordinary perpetual powers. After the fifty year period even those companies thereafter purchasing, leasing or consolidating would be excluded from availing themselves of the provisions of 2505i.
    Counsel for the company referred to the “little word ‘now’ ” in the act. The little word “yes,” and the little word “no” have often decided the destinies of men and nations. And the word “heretofore,” which has a somewhat analogous meaning to that of “now,” has been the cause of a number of statutes being held to be unconstitutional. The claim that section 3239 confers all corporate powers on street railroads, and that all other sections only limit snch powers, is novel. Section 3239 creates the corporations so that they may receive powers, which are conferred by many varying sections.
    The limitation of the operation of this law in part to fifty years, is virtually a. provision for a'repeal of the statute within the enacting statute. It will be observed, however, that as to the refixing of rates of fare, and the right of appeal to the courts, the statu,te makes a perpetual provision, applicable at least for so long a time as the grants may be renewed.
    This act is a special act conferring corporate power.
    It will be observed that section 2505a gives power to lease or purchase only street railroads operated by certam motive powers. What is to be embraced under the description “rapid transit” is very uncertain. It is certain, however, that street railroads not operated by electric, cable or other rapid transit motive power are not provided for by said section. How rapid the transit must be to entitle the company to the benefits of said section cannot be determined. Presumably it was intended to discriminate against the old-fashioned mule cars. The language of the section seems to havé reference to the present tense, or to existing railroads, only. The limitation of the act to roads operated by certain hinds of motive power is an arbitrary classification without reference to the purposes sought to be accomplished by the consolidations authorized by said sections.
    Section 2505d limits the right to receive grants for fifty years to companies in existence, and leased, purchased or consolidated prior to April 22, 1946, because it provides that the extension of grants thereunder shall not exceed fifty years from the passage of the act. It also limits the operation of said act and the right to receive grants for fifty years to corporations which have brought two or more lines of road within their control or ownership by lease or sale or consolidation, so that any street railway, even though in all other physical respects it be like the former road which has leased, purchased or consolidated, cannot receive a fifty-year franchise nor avail itself of any other provision of said act. This also is an arbitrary discrimination and classification, having no appropriate reference to the subject-matter or purposes of the enactment.
    The language of section 2505d throughout also incates that it has reference to existing companies, or a present tense, as is shown by the language “fifty years from and after the passage of this act,” and the language “percentage tax on gross earnings now required to be paid” and the language “shall have the power at the end of twenty years from the passage of this act.”
    Section 2505d applies only to roads brought within the control of one company under sections 2505a and 2505b, which roads are held and operated under grants providing different terms, and does not apply to roads brought under one control if the original grants provide the same terms and conditions. This also is an arbitrary classification and discrimination.
    An act which is not general is special. That is to say, the fact that an act applies to more than one or even a hundred corporations, does not prevent its being special. In order to not be special it must apply to all corporations of its class, and the class distinctions must not be arbitrary. State v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St., 18; State v. Cincinnati, 23 Ohio St., 445; State v. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St., 592; State v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St., 112; Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne & Chicago Railway Co. v. Martin, 53 Ohio St., 386; State v. Smith, 48 Ohio St., 211; Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 Ohio St., 476; Kenton v. State, 32 W. L. B., 394; Kenton v. State, 52 Ohio St., 59; Merrill v. Toledo, 3 Circ. Dec., 524; 6 C. C. R., 430 (affirmed by Supreme Court, 29 W. L. R., 220); State v. Baker, 55 Ohio St., 10; Costello v. Wyoming, 49 Ohio St., 202; State ex rel. v. Anderson, 44 Ohio St., 247; Coal Co. v. Rosser, 53 Ohio St., 12; Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 54 Ohio St., 284; State v. Gardner, 58 Ohio St., 599; State v. Davis, 55 Ohio St., 15; Gaylord v. Hibbard, 56 Ohio St., 25; Emery v. Coles, 7 Dec., 414; 5 N. P., 199; Hall v. Kleeman, 6 Dec., 323; 4 N. P., 201; Hubbard v. Fitzsimmons, 57 Ohio St., 436; Silberman v. Hay, 59 Ohio St., 582; State v. Buckley, 60 Ohio St., 273; Diemer v. Hudson, 9 Circ. Dec., 858; 18 C. C. R., 890; Hixson v. Burson, 54 Ohio St., 470; State v. Bader, 5 Circ. Dec., 703; 12 C. C. R., 659; Sullivan v. Williams, 5 Dec., 577; 7 N. P., 562; Mott v. Hubbard, 59 Ohio St., 199.
   Davis, C. J.

The controlling question in this case is whether “An act to amend and supplement sections 2505a and 25056 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, as enacted May 1,1891, and amended April 18, 1892” (92 O. L., 277), is constitutional or not.

The defendant in error maintains that the act is unconstitutional and it was so held by the court below. The theory upon which this contention is based is that the act is special and that it confers corporate powers, thus infringing section 1 of article 13 of the constitution; and also that it is a law of a general nature which does not operate uniformly throughout the state, violating section 26 of article 2 of the constitution.

Section 2505d contains the legislation which is especially assailed here, and it does not require a critical reading to disclose the fact that it operates throughout the state upon every municipal corporation therein, and upon every street railway corporation or company of the class defined in that section. If it be true, as argued by the defendant in error and as held by the court below, that it is possible that some street railway companies may be excluded from the class, section 26 of article 2 of the constitution would not thereby be violated. This was the precise point decided in State v. Nelson, 52 Ohio St., 88. In that case it was remarked in the opinion: “Of late years an effort has frequently been made to claim for this section of t the constitution a wider scope than to guard against the evils resulting from legislation of the character mentioned by Thurman, J., in Cass v. Dillon; Scott, J., in Lehman v. McBride; Boynton, J., in McGill v. State, and Okey, J., in Falh, Ex parte, but such efforts have uniformly failed. The only statutes which have been declared in conflict with this section of the constitution, are statutes making different classes of different parts of the territory of the state, such as cities, villages,” etc. That remark is just as true now as it was when it was made, a little more than ten years ago.

The proposition that because some individuals were not included in a class defined in a law of a general nature, the law was for that reason repugnant to section 26 of article 2 of the constitution, was distinctly advanced in Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St., 661, 665, and was denied by the court, both in the syllabus and at length in the opinion by Spear, J. It was there held that the constitutional rule of uniformity of operation throughout the state' was not violated, notwithstanding the contention of counsel that “the uniformity of operation required applies as well to individuals and occupations as to geographical limits.” The law then under consideration was of a general nature, but it did not operate alike on all liquor dealers. The court said: “The principle of uniform operation requires simply that the law shall bear equally in its burden upon persons standing in the same category. * * * We are not prepared to say that the classification is not warranted.” It was truly and forcibly said by Burket, J., in State ex rel. v. Spellmire et al., 67 Ohio St., 77, that “when a law is available in every part of the state as to all persons and things in the same condition or category, it is of uniform operation throughout the state.” See also Platt v. Craig et al., 66 Ohio St., 75, at page 79. This, act, as we have already said, operates throughout the state upon every municipal corporation therein, and upon every street railway corporation or company of the class defined; and therefore it is not in conflict with section 26 of article 2 of the constitution.

■ But it is insisted that the act in question is not only a special act, but that it confers corporate powers, - in violation of section 1 of article 13 of the constitution. If it shall appear that the act is not special, bnt on the contrary is a general law, it will not be necessary to determine whether it confers corporate powers either upon municipal corporations or street railway corporations, or both, or whether it does not do so. Adopting the language of the superior court, it is argued on behalf of the defendant in error, that corporate power is conferred in this act “not generally but specially according to the particular circumstances of each particular case;” and that “the law is therefore a special law conferring corporate power.” This conclusion is reached through the following propositions: First, That the classification of street railways in section 2505d is arbitrarily and unreasonably limited to such railroad companies as come into the control of the different lines by lease or purchase from other railroad companies or by the consolidation of different companies into a single company; and that it excludes from the enjoyment of the powers therein granted street railroad companies which may have come into the control of the lines by original or renewed grants from the municipal corporation itself. Second, That section 2505d does not confer equal powers upon all the municipal or private corporations within the classes respectively described, in that municipal corporations immediately exercising the power of extending the unexpired grants, or franchises to fifty years from the passage of the act have a different power as to time from that of a municipal corporation exercising the power twenty years later, and conversely there is an unequal power to receive grants on the part of the street railroad companies, and so likewise as to the readjustment of rates, etc., at the end of twenty years and every fifteen years thereafter; and Third, That section 2505d does not grant the same powers to all corporations which act under the law at the same time.

We do not accept without qualification the postulate of the court below, that ‘‘ Classification cannot be made arbitrarily by the general assembly by seizing upon any incident or characteristic that may-suit its purpose.” The legislative authority of this state is vested in the general assembly in the broadest terms, by section 1 of article 1 of the constitution, subject only to the limitations elsewhere found in the constitution. It is therefore not within the province of any court to declare void, and annul, a statute by reason of a supposed violation of the principles of justice and common reason, if it be within the bounds of constitutional power. The courts have nothing whatever to do with the policy, the justice, or the wisdom óf a statute so long as it cannot be said that it contravenes some constitutional provision. It is true enough that many courts, including this court, have said that classification must be fair, that it must be just, that it must be reasonable, that it must not be arbitrary, that it must not be a sham; but such expressions have ' uniformly been used in cases where the plainly evinced legislative purpose has been defeated or prevented from reaching all of its objects by an imperfect classification, or more frequently, where a false and unnatural classification has been resorted to for the purpose of giving a special law the appearance of a general law, to evade some constitutional limitation. Accordingly this court said in a recent case: ‘ Classification is' often proper and sometimes necessary in legislation, in order to define the objects on which a general law is. to take effect and in order to effectuate the purposes of the legislation; but when classification is unnecessary, arbitrary, fictitious or otherwise faultily made, and is used to evade the constitutional limitations, under the form of general legislation, such legislation in relation to a class may be both special and unconstitutional.” Gentsch et al. v. State ex rel., 71 Ohio St., 151. Now, putting aside the utter improbability of a case arising in which a company had' accepted and had been granted by the same municipal corporation different franchises, all differing in time, rates of fare and other terms or conditions (for it is not pretended that such a case now exists), what, constitutional limitation is violated? The defendant, in error answers: “The general assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers.” But the conferring of corporate powers does not render1 the act invalid if it be not a special act. The act operates over the whole territory of the state and it does not exclude any individual corporation of the1 class defined. How can the non-inclusion of an individual corporation which is not of the class defined, render the act special in its nature? The opinion of a court that the legislation is unwise or unjust cannot be the criterion. The legislative purpose very plainly was to secure to the public continuous passage over all routes in any municipality, uniformity and reduction of fares, and uniformity in the expiration of franchises. The legislature sought to accomplish that purpose in general terms, by a definite classification which does not contain within itself •even a hint of a purely special application. We have no right to attempt to defeat that purpose by extraneous considerations which do not amount to an infraction of any constitutional limitation of the general power conferred upon the general assembly. No street railway company of the class claimed to be •excluded by this statute, has yet appeared to complain about it; and it does not seem to us to lie in the mouth of a taxpayer, speaking for a municipal corporation, to make the claim for an imaginary corporation of such description. For the reasons stated we approve as the fair result of all the cases the statement of the law which is made in State ex rel. v. Parsons et al., 40 N. J. Law, 123, as follows: “A law framed in general terms, restricted to no locality, and operating equally upon all of a group of objects, which, having regard to the purposes of the legislation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves, is not a special or local law, but a general law. ’ ’

If the law was imperfect in its operation, or if the classification should be broadened, the remedy, as suggested by Burket, J., in State v. Nelson, supra, should be sought through the general assembly. The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S., 155, was a case which involved the question whether an act of the general assembly of Iowa was an act of a general nature having a uni- ' form operation, and also whether the act was in conflict with the provision of the constitution of the state of Iowa that “the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens; ’ ’ and tbe following extract from tbe opinion, which was delivered by Chief Justice Waite, is pertinent here. “The statute divides the railroads of the state into classes, according to business, and establishes a maximum of rates for each of the classes. It operates uniformly on each class, and this is all that the constitution requires. * * * This act does not grant to any railroad company privileges or immunities which,, upon the same terms, do not equally belong to every other railroad company. Whenever a company comes into any class, it has all the ‘ privileges and immunities ’ that have been granted by the statute to any other company in that class. ’ ’

“It is very clear that a uniform rate of charges for all the railroads in the state might operate unjustly upon some. It was proper, therefore, to provide in some way for an adaptation of the rates to the circumstances of the different roads; and the general assembly in the exercise of its legislative discretion, has seen fit to do this by a system of classification. Whether this was the best that could have been done is not for us to decide. Our province is only'to determine whether it could be done at all, and under any circumstances. If it could, the legislature must decide for itself, subject to no control from us, whether the common good requires that it should be done. ’ ’

It is also argued that the operation of this act is limited to fifty years from the date of its passage, that it is therefore a temporary act, and that being-such it is necessarily also a special act; and the court below has gone to the extent of asserting that this court has so decided State v. Hoffman, 35 Ohio St., 435, 443, and in Platt v. Craig, 66 Ohio St., 75, 79. This point was not made, considered, or decided in either of the cases cited, and the language of the judges delivering the opinions in those cases is that where the subject-matter and operation of an act is local and temporary, it may be a special act, and valid if it does not confer corporate powers. Here the question is, pure and simple, whether the limitation as to the time of operation stamps this statute as special; for this act, so far as appears from the act itself, is not restricted to any locality nor to any individual corporation. This question was before the supreme court of Illinois in People ex rel. v. Wright, 70 Ill., 388, and the court said: “The distinction then, seems plain — ’a local or special statute is limited in the objects to which it applies; a temporary statute is limited merely in its duration, and, necessarily, a local or special law may be perpetual, or a general law may be temporary. This, therefore, is a temporary general law, and not within the prohibition of the section referred to. ’ ’ This is likewise our conclusion in this case.

Having, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that the act in question, which is commonly known as “the Rogers law,” is constitutional, it is unnecessary to determine the other questions which have been so ably and interestingly presented.

The judgment of the superior court in general term is

Reversed and the petition is dismissed.

Shauck, Price, Crew, Summers and Spear, JJ,, concur.  