
    Luzerne A. Wild, as Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Allen Wild, Deceased, Appellant, v. William C. Porter, Sheriff of Delaware County, Respondent.
    
      Chattel mortgage not filed — what possession of the chattels by the mortgaged s'agent is not effective as against a subsequent levy under a judgment by confession against the mortgagor — effect of such a judgment.
    
    Where a chattel mortgage is void, as against- judgment creditors of the mortgagor, because there was no actual or continued change of possession of the-mortgaged property, and because the mortgage was not filed in the town wliere= the mortgagor resided, the fact that the mortgagee commenced proceedings for the foreclosure, of the chattel mortgage and posted a notice of the sale of the-mortgaged property, and,, through his attorney-, told a-tenant of the mortgagor, who was in possession of the mortgaged property and who pointed out such. ' property to the attorney, that he (the attorney) took possession of the property by virtue of the chattel mortgage, does not prevent the sheriff from levying-on the mortgaged chattels under an execution issued upon a judgment by confession thereafter, but before the sale under the mortgage, entered against the; mortgagor.
    A judgment by confession establishes the relation of debtor and creditor between, the parties to the record and the amount of the indebtedness, and can only be-impeached for fraud or collusion in its procurement.
    Appeal by the plaintiff, Luzerne A. Wild, as executor of the last will and testament of Allen Wild, deceased, from -a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of' the clerk of the county of Delaware on the 28th day of May, 1900,. 'upon a nonsuit granted by the court after a trial at the Delaware Trial Term, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office ón. the 7th day of July, 1900, denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new-trial made upon the minutes.
    This action was brought to recover the possession of fifteen cows, and a mowing machine, or the value thereof, in case possession could, not be had,-against the defendant, who, as.sheriff, levied on and sold, the property by virtue of an execution.
    The plaintiff claimed the property under a chattel mortgage-executed to his testator by W. D. Aylesworth on April o, 1893, insecure $797, payable in one year from date.
    This mortgage was never filed in the town of Unadilla, in which, town the mortgagor resided at. the time of its execution, and the» mortgaged property remained in the possession of the mortgagor.. The defendant, as sheriff, justified his seizure of the property under an execution issued on a judgment by confession in favor of George Cornell against William D. Aylesworth, the mortgagor, in the Supreme Court, dated Hay 22, 1895, entered in Delaware county clerk’s office May 23, 1895, for the sum of $257.29.
    On about May 20, 1895, the plaintiff, through his attorneys, commenced proceedings for the foreclosure of his chattel mortgage and on that day posted a notice of the sale of the mortgaged property for May 21, 1895, and one of the attorneys went upon the farm of the mortgagor, which was in possession of a tenant who had hired of the mortgagor the farm and the dairy, including the cows in question. The attorney inquired of Bowman, the tenant, where the cattle were, and Bowman told him they were in the pasture. There were other cattle in the lot where these cows were. Bowman pointed out to the attorney the cows mentioned in the mortgage, and the attorney said to Bowman that he (the attorney) took possession of the cows by virtue of the chattel mortgage, and told Bowman not to let them go out of his hands without some authority from the law. Bowman said to him, “ Probably they wouldn’t go out of my possession because I had hired them for a year.” The cows thereafter remained on the farm in the actual possession of Bowman, the tenant, and the levy on them was made by the sheriff on May 23, 1895, while they were in Bowman’s possession. On the sale by the plaintiff, under Ms mortgage, on May twenty-fourth, the cows and mowing machine were bid in by the plaintiff. They remained on the premises and about a week thereafter were sold by the sheriff.
    At the close of the testimony the court dismissed the complaint, and from the judgment entered thereon this appeal is taken.
    
      Andrew G. Washbon, for the appellant.
    
      James R. Baumes, for the respondent
   Edwards, J.:

This action has been twice tried and is here for the second time on appeal. On the first trial the court held that the judgment by confession was void, and directed a verdict for the plaintiff for the value of the property as assessed by the jury. This court, on appeal, reversed the judgment for the plaintiff and granted a new trial, holding that the judgment by confession was valid. ( Wild v. Porter, 22 App. Div. 179.) That decision as to the sufficiency of the judgment by confession must be regarded as conclusive on this appeal.

As against this judgment creditor, the chattel mortgage held by the plaintiff was absolutely void, there -never having been any actual or continued change of possession of the mortgaged property nor any filing of the mortgage in the town where the mortgagor resided. (3 R. S. [9th ed.] 2013, §§ 1, 2.)

The plaintiff sought to avoid the consequences of the statute by ■claiming to have taken possession of the mortgaged property three •days before the levy was made by the sheriff. Assuming that if he had taken possession of the property it would have been beyond the power of the defendant to levy upon it, it clearly appears irom the plaintiff’s evidence that no actual'possession was taken by him. At the time of the levy the cattle were on the farm of the mortgagor in the possession of his tenant, who had three days- before pointed them out to the plaintiff’s attorney, who simply said that he took possession of them under the chattel mortgage. This was .insufficient. Mere words and inspection cannot effect a change of possession. There must be an actual possession by the mortgagee; ¡a possession in fact. .

The judgment by confession established the relation of creditor and debtor between the parties to the record and the amount of the indebtedness, and could only be impeached for fraud or collusion in its procurement. (Candee v. Lord, 2 N. Y. 269 ; Acker v. Leland, 109 id. 5 ; Carpenter v. Osborn, 102 id. 552.) There was but little, if any, evidence on this question, and none to be submitted to the jury. There was none from which they could reasonably infer that the judgment was fraudulently or eollusively procured. The testimony of the judgment debtor, who was a witness for the plaintiff, instead of impeaching the judgment, showed that it was confessed on a note given on November 26, 1894, to his wife for full and fair consideration for money theretofore borrowed of her and for indebtedness for rent.

The complaint was properly dismissed by the court, and the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs.  