
    Mary Bobo, Administratrix v. John M’Beth.
    The possession of a mortgagee, of personal property, is adverse, to every one but the mortgagor, from its commencement; and a prior mortgagee, whose mortgage was forfeited when the possession of the second mortgagee commenced, is barred as to the latter, in four years from that period, and not merely in four years from the time when the mortgagor’s right to redeem was barred.
    Tried before Mr. Justice Earle, at Union, Spring Term, 1831,
    Trover for a slave. The slave in question was formerly the property of Alexander M’Beth, deceased, and was sold by his executors, of whom the defendant was one, to John Spain: who-Save bis acknowledgments, in writing, but without seal, for the purchase money, payable, one of them in February, and theotber hi August, 1823 ; and to secure payment gave a mortgage of the slave, which was also without seal. 'Spain shortly after-wards mortgaged the slave to Alexander Boyce, to secure the payment of money borrowed ; and sometime in the early part of the year 1824, and about a year before the mortgage was forfeited, delivered the slave to Boyce to work for the interest of the debt. Boyce retained possession until his death ; and at a sale of his estate, made by his administrators, in September, 1825, the slave was purchased by the plaintiff’s intestate. The defendant recovered judgment against Spain, on his acknowledgments for the purchase money, in March, 1825 ; and in April, 1828, which was more than four years after Boyce’s possession commenced, he took the slave out of the possession of the defendant, by virtue of his mortgage.
    P. L. 103.,
    It was contended for the defendant, that Boyce not being an-absolute purchaser, his possession was that of a trustee for Spain, and could no more be adverse to the defendant, than the possession of Spain would have been. And that, at all events, admitting that Spain would have been barred, under the 15th section of the act of 1712, in two years after the forfeiture of the mortgage : still the possession of Boyce, and of those who claim under him, was not adverse to the defendant until then : and as four years had not elapsed from that period to the seizure under defendant’s mortgage, the statute of limitations could not avail the plaintiff.
    The presiding Judge instructed thé jury, that the defendant’s-mortgage not being under seal, his rights under it were barred' in four years from the forfeiture; and that Spain, himself, was barred in two years after the forfeiture of his mortgage to Boyce so that as against both Spain, and the defendant, the plaintiff’s title had been matured by the statute of limitations.
    The jury found for the plaintiff; and the defendant now moved to set aside the verdict for misdirection.
    Williams, for the motion.
    Herndon, contra.
    
   Harper, J-

delivered the opinion of the Court.

If the slave in question had remained in the hands of Spain, I should think, that the statute of limitations could not have run, so as to give him a title, so long as the contract subsisted, which the slave was mortgaged to secure. But from the time Boyce obtained possession of him, Ire remained long enough in the possession of Boyce, and of Bobo, for the statute to mature a title, if the possession was adverse.

A person purchasing personal property from a mortgagor in possession, without notice of the mortgage, will certainly be protected by the statute. If he should purchase with notice, this might constitute a fraud, which would suspend the operation of the statute, until the fraud should be discovered. But fraud is not in question in this case. Adverse possession consists in the holding of property in an adverse right; in a right-inconsistent with the title of the party, who afterwards seeks to enforce his claim. In general the possession of a person claiming in his own right is adverse to all the world. Was Boyce’s possession of that character? for there is no question about Bobo’s. So it séems to me. He went into possession claiming in his own right, and by a title inconsistent with the defendant’s. He claimed the legal title, for a mortgage of personal property transfers, the legal title. It is said, that he went into possession under Spain, and held consistently with Spain’s title. But this is not so ; he claimed in his own right, which was adverse to Spain, and to every one else. It is true he claimed by a title subject to be divested on a future contingency ; and if the negro had been claimed by Spain, he might, in his hands, have remained subject to defendant’s claim. But the contingency never happened. Boyce’s title, became, matured, as against Spain ; and I think his possession must be regarded as adverse to every one else, from the time it was taken. Defendant was under no disability to sue ; for his mortgage was forfeited before Boyce obtained possession. I perceive nothing in principle to distinguish it from the case of a man who purchased absolutely, in the first intance, from a mortgagor in possession. The motion is therefore dismissed.

Motion refused.  