
    Weber v. Eppstein et al.
    (Decided October 17, 1929.)
    
      Mr. W. A. Summit, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Messrs< Seemann <& Seemann, for defendants in error.
   Lemert, J.

This cause was first tried in the Canton municipal court, and judgment rendered therein. Appeal proceedings were then taken by plaintiff in error, A. Weber, to tbe Stark county common pleas court.

A motion was filed by tbe defendants, H. Eppstein and Minnie Eppstein, to strike tbe appeal proceedings from tbe files, and attacking tbe judgment of tbe common pleas court upon tbe contention tbat sucb a case cannot be appealed from the Canton municipal court. Tbe motion was sustained by tbe common pleas court, with tbe suggestion that tbe question be referred to tbe Court of Appeals.

Tbe question then in issue is whether or not a case is appealable from tbe Canton municipal court, and this question is entirely one of law.

Tbe Canton municipal court was proposed and established for tbe purpose of superseding and eliminating tbe justice of tbe peace courts, together with other purposes too numerous to mention.

Section 1579-670, General Code of Ohio, provides tbat, in all supplemental and ancillary proceedings after judgment, the Canton municipal court shall have the same jurisdiction as is conferred upon justices of tbe peace. And Section 1579-672 provides tbat, in all actions and proceedings in which tbe Canton municipal court has jurisdiction, all laws conferring jurisdiction upon tbe court of common pleas, police courts, or justices of tbe peace, giving such courts power to bear and determine sucb causes, prescribing tbe force and effect of their judgments, orders, or decrees, and authorizing and directing tbe execution or enforcement thereof and their modes of procedure, shall be held to extend to tbe Canton municipal court, unless inconsistent with tbe act.

Section 1579-690 provides that tbe laws governing tbe court of common pleas, as to pleadings and procedure, except as otherwise provided, shall be held to apply so far as applicable to the Canton municipal court.

So, having reviewed the above sections, it is well to note Section 10354 of the General Code with reference to whether or not this section would apply to appeal proceedings, whether, if ■plaintiff or defendant claims more than $20, the case may be appealed to the court of common pleas. The Canton Municipal Court Act provides that the procedure of the justice of the peace court should apply to the Canton municipal court, unless otherwise specified, and there is nothing otherwise specified in the act creating and governing the Canton municipal court.

Section 10382, General Code, specifies that in all cases not otherwise specially provided for by law either party may appeal from the final judgment of a justice of the peace to the common pleas court of the county where the judgment was rendered. And it is well to note the conditions of Section 11215, wherein it is provided that common pleas courts shall have appellate jurisdiction from the decisions of county commissioners, justices of the peace, and other inferior courts in the proper county, in all civil cases, subject to the regulations provided by law.

Therefore the question arises whether or not the municipal court of the city of Canton is an inferior court to the court of common pleas.

In the case of Commonwealth Oil Co. v. Turk, 118 Ohio St., 273, 160 N. E., 856, it is held that the sections of the General Code pertaining to appeals from the common pleas court to the Court of Appeals in chancery cases apply by analogy to the municipal court of Cleveland, and it is our contention that by analogy and by law the sections pertaining to the appeals from the justice of the peace court apply to appeal proceedings from the Canton municipal court to the common pleas court of Stark county.

We therefore find and hold that a litigant is entitled to an appeal from the municipal court of the city of Canton to the common pleas court of Stark county, Ohio, and the finding and judgment of the court below will be, and the same is hereby, reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Houck and Sherick, JJ., concur.  