
    GUANGJIE CUI, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-682.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 27, 2013.
    Gang Zhou, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Ernesto H. Molina, Assistant Director; Nancy N. Safavi, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Guangjie Cui, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a January 26, 2012, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Guangjie Cui, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (BIA Jan. 26, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). We find no abuse of discretion in this case.

There is no dispute that Cui’s 2011 motion to reopen was untimely because his administrative removal order became final in 2009. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). To the extent Cui contends that the time limitation does not apply because his motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in” China, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), his arguments are unpersuasive.

Initially, the basis of Cui’s motion to reopen&emdash;his renewed claim for asylum based on his conversion to Christianity in the United States&emdash;was a change in personal circumstances arising in the United States, not a change of conditions arising in China. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (e)(7)(C)(i)-(ii) (providing that the 90-day time limitation circumscribes eligibility for relief unless the motion is based on a change in the country of removal); see also Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.2008); Wei Guang Wang v. BIA 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir.2006).

Moreover, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Cui’s documentation failed to demonstrate changed conditions in China. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (reviewing BIA’s factual findings regarding changed country conditions under the substantial evidence standard). Contrary to Cui’s claim, the BIA’s decision indicates that it considered the background evidence and the letters from Cui’s family and his pastor. Based on that evidence, the BIA reasonably found that Cui did not establish changed conditions in China as the evidence showed the same type of treatment of Christians at the time of Cui’s hearing. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008); Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I & N Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  