
    Bedford against M'Elherron.
    In Error.
    THIS was a writ of error to the Common Pleas of Allegheny county, returned with a bill of exceptions. ,
    It was an ejectment to August Term, 1809. On the trial] the plaintiff produced no other evidence than alease, dated 19th \ October, 1788, by which he had rented the land in dispute to : the defendant for the term of four years, rendering the annual ] rent of a turkey, on the 23d December, in each year, if re- ¡ quired. The defendant covenanted to clear four acres of land each year, and inclose the same with a fence, and to pay; all taxes during the term. The defendant produced no evidence. The president of the Court of Common Pleas gave in charge to the jury, that the plaintiff, not having given notice to the defendant to quit the premises previous to the commencement of the suit, was not entitled to recover. To this charge the plaintiff excepted.
    , \ : Where a lease is to expire at a time certain, a notice to quit is not necessary, in order to recover in ejectment.
    ] ¡ But if the lessor allows the tenant to remain in possession 17 years after the expiration of a lease, he cannot recover in ejectment without notice to (¿nil.
    
      Wilkins and Campbell, for the plaintiff in error.
    The only question is, whether the landlord can recover without a previous notice to quit. We admit, that notice is necessary on a lease from year to year, or on a lease at will: but not on a lease to end at a time certain. Woodfall's land, and ten. 218. 228. Runn. on Ej. 21, 22. A tenant holding over after notice to quit is a trespasser. Boggs v. Black.
      
       This is a lease for four years : and there is no evidence of any renewal, or payment of rent, or taxes, or any improvement since the lease expired: some of which it was incumbent on the defendant to shew, to entitle him to notice. As to the presumption from length of time, this should have been left to the jury. They cited Jackson v. Rogers.
      
    
    
      Baldwin, contra,
    admitted, that the landlord was not obliged to give notice to quit at the end of four years, to entitle him to recover in ejectment. But having suffered the tenant to remain over so long, it became an implied lease at will, and the tenant could not be turned off without notice. Woodfall's land, and ten. 218. 220. It would be a great hardship if he could, after being suffered to remain seventeen years. The tenant, under the circumstances of this case, would not' be admitted to plead the statute pf limitations and set up an adverse possession.
    
      
      
         1 Binn. 333.
    
    
      
       1 Johns. Cas. 33.
    
   Tilghman C. J.

(After stating, the case.) Where a lease is made for a year, and so from year to year as long as both parties please, there must be notice to quit in due time before the end of the year: otherwise the law implies a new lease for a year. So where a lease is made to one to hold, during the pleasure of the lessor, there must be due notice to quit: because it would be unreasonable that a man who has gone to the expense of cultivating land and making preparations for a crop, while his estate was uncertain, should be turned off at a moment’s warning. But where the lease is to expire at a certain time the law is different, because each party knows what he has to trust to. There can be no occasion to give notice to quit, where the lessee has agreed to quit at a certain time. In the present case the lessor might have maintained an ejectment at the i of the lease. But there is no evidence that the lessor required the possession at the end of the lease. On the contrary, he permitted the lessee to retain possession for seventeen years afterwards. From this, I think, it may be fairly presumed, that the defendant retained the possession with the consent of the plaintiff: and if so, he was tenant at will at least, or perhaps it might be more reasonably inferred, that he remained tenant from year to year at the same rent, which was reserved by the written lease for four years. But whether he was tenant at will or from year to year, is immaterial, because in both cases notice to quit was necessary. The charge of the president of the Court of Common Pleas was correct, therefore, and the judgment should be affirmed.

Yeates J. absent.

Brackenridge J. concurred.

Judgrpent affirmed.  