
    Frank V. Gillespie, an Infant, Resp’t, v. The Coney Island & Brooklyn Railroad Co., App’lt.
    
      (City Court of Brooklyn, General Term,
    
    
      Filed November 23, 1891.)
    
    Railroad—Negligence—Evidence.
    The action was brought to recover damages for injuries sustained in a collision between two of defendant’s cars, by reason of which plaintiff was thrown against a window. The answer admitted defendant’s negligence and joined issue only as to the damages. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to prove the speed of the car at the time, as such proof would tend to show the violence of his fall.
    Appeal from judgment in plaintiff’s favor, $930.79, entered upon verdict.
    The defendant railroad company operates its cars by electric power, from the southerly end of Prospect Park to Coney Island. The system used is that which is known as the single trolley system.
    The complaint of the plaintiff alleged, in substance, that the plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant’s electric cars, and that solely through the negligence and carelessness of defendant’s agents said car collided with another of defendant’s cars, by reason of which plaintiff was thrown against a glass window, and received certain injuries.
    The answer of defendant denied knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations contained in the complaint.
    Upon coming into court for trial of the issues joined by the pleadings, the defendant asked to amend its answer so that the only issue to be tried should be the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, the negligence of .defendant being admitted. There was no objection on the part of the plaintiff, and defendant’s answer was amended accordingly.
    The plaintiff testified that he got on one of defendant’s cars on the 2d of January, 1891, and that while the car was running at ordinary speed, something occurred and he was knocked senseless on the floor. When he got his senses again, he got up and walked toward the platform. One or two gentlemen came up and told him he was hurt, and put a handkerchief around his head and one under his chin, where he was cut and bleeding; that the witness Maher came with a carriage and took him to two doctors, one of whom refused to sew it up, but said to bring him to the hospital. That he was taken to the hospital, and there four stitches, he believed, were put in his forehead and two in his chin ; that he went home, for several nights had some trouble with his sleep; that his forehead and chin swelled where they were sewed up; that the wounds were sore and sensitive to touch, and that he did not go to work for a month after the injury, because he was afraid of catching cold in his head.
    On cross-examination plaintiff testified that he went around the house the day after the accident as much as he wanted to ; that he did not go out in the yard, but did go to the door; that the accident happened January 2d, and that he remembered seeing defendant’s attorney in Mr. Backus’ office, but could not say for sure that it was in January; that he did not go back to work for a month because he was afraid of catching cold in his head where it was cut.
    Plaintiff was asked the following question:
    “ Q. Was the car running at ordinary speed? ” .
    
      To this question the witness answered: “Yes, sir.” Defendant’s attorney moved to strike out the answer as irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial evidence under the pleadings. The motion was denied and exception taken.
    
      Backus & Manne, for resp’t; H. W. Slocum, Jr., for app’lt.
   Per Curiam.

We think that the plaintiff had the right to prove the speed of the car; such proof would have a tendency to show the violence of the fall of the plaintiff. We have carefully examined the record in this case and concluded that no error was committed by the judge or the jury on the trial.

Judgment and order denying new trial affirmed, with costs.

Clement, Ch. J., and Osborne, J., concur.  