
    TIAN MING CHAI, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondents.
    No. 10-1163-AG.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 10, 2011.
    Yee Ling Poon, Deborah Niedermeyer, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; James A. Hunolt, Senior Litigation Counsel; Christopher P. McGreal, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondents.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Tian Ming Chai, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 4, 2010, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Tian Ming Chai, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 4, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). Because Chai’s motion was untimely, as it was filed approximately five years after the final administrative decision, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), reopening could be granted only upon a showing of changed country conditions or through the BIA’s exercise of its authority to reopen sua sponte, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Because Chai does not challenge the BIA’s finding that he failed to demonstrate a change in country conditions, the only issue before us is whether the BIA erred in declining to reopen his case sua sponte.

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen Chai’s case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because that decision was “entirely discretionary.” Ali, 448 F.3d at 518. Whereas in Mah-mood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 471 (2d Cir.2009), we vacated and remanded the agency’s decision because it was based on an erroneous legal assumption, here, the BIA declined to exercise its discretion to reopen Chai’s case because he failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See Guyadin v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 465, 468-69 (2d Cir.2006) (emphasizing that it is not possible to create jurisdiction over a discretionary determination by simply framing a challenge to such a determination as a legal question). Because the BIA’s conclusion that there were no exceptional circumstances was based on its factual findings regarding the country conditions, there is no basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction. Cf. Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 471.

To the extent Chai challenges the BIA’s review of the record, we have jurisdiction to consider that argument because it is a question of law. See Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir.2011). Given the BIA’s explicit references to the documentation submitted with the motion to reopen, there is no basis to find that it ignored any evidence. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the BIA is not required to “expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner” as long as it “has given reasoned consideration to the petition, and made adequate findings”); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (presuming that the agency “has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.  