
    Wilfredo FLEITAS and Nicolasa Fleitas and Jogar Remodeling Services, Inc., Appellants, v. JULSON, INC., Appellee.
    No. 90-1797.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 19, 1991.
    Rehearing Denied July 3, 1991.
    Washington M. Quinones, Hialeah, for appellants.
    Carlos A. Lopez, Jr., Coral Gables, Virginia M. Best, Fort Lauderdale, and Evelyn Margaret Grey, Miami, for appellee.
    
      Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL and GERSTEN, JJ..
   BARKDULL, Judge.

The trial court permitted a corporation to recover as a “laborer” pursuant to the exception in Section 713.06(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). It also permitted recovery of the same amount pursuant to an equitable lien, and also under an implied contract theory. We reverse.

The corporation was a subcontractor to a general contractor, to supply structural work on a house up to the tie beam, and was to be paid for its services by draw, on a thirty day basis, for work as satisfactorily completed. According to Section 713.01(9), Florida Statutes (1989) a “laborer” has been defined as:

“(9) ‘Laborer’ means any person other than an architect, landscape architect, engineer, land surveyor, and the like who, under properly authorized contract, personally performs on the site of the improvement labor or services for improving real property and does not furnish materials or labor service of others.”

Recent decisions of the courts have indicated that the Mechanic’s Lien Law, which is in derogation of the common law, is to be strictly construed. Home Electric of Dade County, Inc. v. Gonas, 547 So.2d 109 (Fla.1989); Hardrives Company v. Tri-County Concrete Products, Inc., 489 So.2d 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Sprinkler Filters v. F.I.T.R. Corporation, 461 So.2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Partin v. Konsler Steel Company, 336 So.2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Reversed on other grounds 356 So.2d 264 (Fla.1978). All payments by the appellant, owners, were properly made to the general contractor. The subcontractor did not timely file a notice of intention with the owners and not being a laborer, it was not entitled to the benefits of the exception in Section 713.06(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). Any cause of action that it has, is against the general contractor against whom it was awarded a judgment. We also find no basis in the record for the entry of an equitable lien or a finding of implied contract. Peninsular Supply Company v. C.B. Day Realty of Florida, Inc., 423 So.2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Morgan v. Goodwin, 355 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The homeowners fully complied with the Mechanics Lien Law, made proper payments to the general contractor, and received upon the final payment, a No Lien Affidavit, or Release of Lien, pursuant to Section 713.06, Florida Statutes (1987), and are entitled to the protections of the statute.

Therefore, for the reasons above stated, this cause is reversed with directions to enter a judgment in favor of the appellant homeowners.

GERSTEN, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I think the trial court was correct in ruling that appellee Julson, Inc. (Julson), was a “laborer” and thus, exempt from the notice requirements of section 713.06(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989) of the Mechanics’ Lien Law.

As the majority points out, section 713.-01(9), Florida Statutes (1989), defines a “laborer” as:

[A]ny person other than an architect, landscape architect, engineer, land surveyor, and the like who, under properly authorized contract, personally performs on the site of the improvement labor or services for improving real property and does not furnish materials or labor service of others.

The undisputed testimony was that Julson personally performed “on the site of the improvement labor ... for improving real property ... [and did] not furnish materials or the labor service of others.” Clearly, appellee is a “laborer.” § 713.01(9), Fla. Stat. (1989).

Since Julson meets the definition of a “laborer” under the statute, we should turn to the central issue on appeal of whether Julson, a corporation, can be considered a laborer even though Julson is not a human being. The term “person” encompasses individuals and entities, as it is used in the definition section of the Mechanics’ Lien Law. See, e.g., Sprinkler Fitters and Apprentices Local Union No. 821, U.A. v. F.I.T.R. Service Corporation, 461 So.2d 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 472 So.2d 1182 (Fla.1985).

If we adopt the majority’s reasoning that “persons” refers solely to human beings, we would find the Mechanics’ Lien Law in chaos. It would mean that contractors, laborers, materialmen, owners, subcontractors, and sub-subcontractors who are entities, would not be protected under the Mechanics’ Lien Law, because each of the definitions for these terms refers to them as “a person” or “any person.” § 713.01(2), (9), (11), (12), (16), (17), Fla.Stat. (1989). This result would lead to an unreasonable conclusion. “[Wjhere a literal interpretation of the statute would lead to an unreasonable conclusion or purpose not designated by the legislature, it is the court’s duty to interpret the statute in accordance with the clear purpose and intent of the legislature.” Bauer v. Reese, 161 So.2d 678, 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964).

Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court has recognized that the term “persons” in legislative enactments, doesn’t necessarily refer solely to human beings. Village of El Portal v. City of Miami Shores, 362 So.2d 275 (Fla.1978) (ruling the term “persons” in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act includes municipal corporations).

I would affirm the final summary judgment foreclosing the mechanics’ lien in favor of Julson. 
      
      . These recoveries are mutually exclusive. First Data Resources, Inc. v. Safecard Services, Inc., 574 So.2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
     