
    Barbee et al. vs Shannon, et al.
    Opinion delivered January 30, 1897.
    
      Judgment of Indian Cotirt — Res Judicata.
    
    A judgment of dismissal, entered by a Court of the Creek Nation, on the ground that there has been a former adjudication, is res judicata in a subsequent action between the parties in the United States Court.
    
      
      2. Lease.
    
    All inquiry as to the power of the Chief of the Creek Nation to make a lease, is precluded m the United States Court, by an adjudication, in a suit between the parties in a Creek Court, that the lease is valid.
    
      3. Record — Amount in Controversy.
    
    The record must affirmatively show that the amount in controversy in an action, exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the court rendering judgment, and where it does not do so, it will be presumed in a subsequent action that the court had jurisdiction.
    
      4. Judgment of Creek Court — Informalities.
    Informalities in the judgment of a Court of the Creek Natior will be disregarded by the United States Court, in determining its validity, and such judgment will be enforced if the intenl can be discovered from all of the accompanying circumstances
    5. Conveyance— Want oj Consideration.
    
    No rights are acquired by a conveyance, without consideration of a reversionary interest in a lease to pasture lands in th< Creek Nation.
    
      6. Trespass — Right of Reversioner to Maintain Action to Prevent — Injunction.
    
    Although the reversioner, who holds a lease of pasture lam from the Creek Nation, is not entitled to possession, he has fight of action against third persons, who build fences on th land, thereby obstructing the tenant and injuring the revesion And in such case injunction would lie to prevent the' continr anee of such wrongful acts, for the reason that the remedy a law was inadequate and to prevent a multiplicity of suits.
    Appeal from the United States Court for the Norther District.
    Wm. M. Springer, Judge, H
    Action for injunction by S. Barbee and others again® George Shannon and others. Judgment for defendant® Plaintiffs appeal.
    Reversed. ®
    
      This was a suit in equity brought by appellants igainst appellees to restrain them from continuously tres->assing upon certain lands in the Creek Nation, which had >een leased from said Creek Nation, as a pasture, under its aws regulating the fencing and use of pastures. On Octoer, 6, 1889, the Creek council passed a law authorizing the encing of what are known as “border pastures.” James Viilison, a Creek Indian by blood, by complying with the reek law.obtained the right to fence one of these border astures; said pastures being for rental to United Scates itizens, or personal use, as the owners thereof chose. The asture in question was fenced to rent to Edwards Bros, .tizens of the United States, who at once filled the same ith cattle, and continuously used and occupied the same, aid pasture lease was to extend for the term of three years, it prior to its expiration, to-wit, November 3, 1892, the reek council passed a law renewing said pasture leases, id extending them for the term of six years. Prior to the :piration of Willison’s lease, one Mose Smith, an Indian, ed an application for a lease of the property used and ased by said Willison, together with some other property hich had been used by Willison & Weldon, — said Weldon ing married to a sister of said Willison, — but which ised property was not embraced in any pasture contract. |illison & Weldon protested against the issuance of a con-,ct to Smith upon the property to which they had a lease, d the matter was compromised by taking in Smith, and ving the renewal contract embrace all the land filed on him. Thereupon, on January 3, 1893, a contract was en on the whole of the property. The other lessees from Nation purchased Mose Smith’s interest, and at once en-[•ed into a contract subletting the whole pasture to Edwards os., who had.occupied the pasture for some three years .or thereto, and who are made parties to this suit. Bent s paid to and received by the Creek Nation for said pastures. Subsequently one of the appellees, Georg< Shannon, who also had certain rights by marriage to a siste: of James Willison, and who claims to have been in posses sion of the land in controversy long prior to the lease fror the Nation above mentioned, leased a portion of the same fo the term of seven years from one Richard Nixon, a Cree' citizen, and attempted to occupy it under Nixon’s right t hold such pasture, — first under the mile-square law of' th Nation, and under the right of a citizen to make an improv< ment within three miles of a railroad, and then by virtue c a lease obtained by Shannon and Nixon from the same chit who had granted a contract to Willison and his associate; Appellants set up the claim of prior adjudication of tl matters in controversy had in the United States Court in tl Indian Territory (but this claim was abandoned); that, aft the determination of the suits in the United States Cour above mentioned, appellee George Shannon and his hei went to the Creek Court in Coweta district, and there i stituted suit to determine the rights between himself ai heirs and these appellants as to the property involved in tl suit; that said suit was tried upon its merits, and all parti were represented by counsel, and that judgment in said ca was rendered in favor of appellants; that thereupon an ord was issued to said Shannon and his heirs to take down a: remove the wire fence inclosing that portion of the ■ pastu of appellants now in controversy, and a further order w issued to Arley Davis, captain of the Indian Light Hoi Company, to cut said fence in event of Shannon’s failure obey said order. In support of these allegations, appellai introduced the following: First, An order from N. Childers, judge of the Coweta district, Creek Natic “Coweta District, M. N., June 1, 1893. Arley Davis, Capti L. H. Company, Greeting: By power of authority vested me by law [of the Muscogee Nation, I do hereby comma you to cut down all fences built in these following pasture lingo & Miller, Weldon & Willison, P. Weldon, Smith., and Irs. Barbee pastures; said fences which were not built ac-irding to law in regard to building and improving in these used pastures. Given under my hand this 1st day of June, .. D. 1893. N. B. Childers, Judge Coweta District, M. N.” econd. A certified copy of a judgment as follows : ‘ ‘ Geo. hannon & Heirs vs Smith, Willison & Co. Pasture. The oove-entitled cause was brought before this court by Geo. hannon on behalf of himself and heirs. Both parties to the fit were present, — the plaintiff, represented by N. B. hilders and Wm. Perryman; and the defendants, by A. P. [cKellop, Thos. Scott, and Jos. Keely. The defendants .oved that the cause be dismissed for the reason that the iline had been legally and properly brought before the court iring the official term of Hon. N. B. Childers, judge of the id district, and adjudicated, and that the judgment of the bid court had been enforced, and the wire fence built and aimed by said Geo. Shannon was cut down by the light irsemen of said district by order of said court. All cases uning under the jurisdiction of the District Court, when Ljudicated, become final, and there is no appeal from such cisión. Our laws make special provision for reopening vil cases, and, as it appears from the records of this office at a rehearing has not been granted in the above-styled use, it is clearly evident that the said case cannot be tried accordance with law. The motion of the defendaht is erefore sustained, and the case dismissed. Witness my md and seal this 23d day of May, 1894. Jo.e Mingo, Judge ftweta District, M. N.” Third. A certified copy of an Bder by Judge Mingo to Shannon and heirs, as follows : ■udge’s Office, Coweta District, M. N. May 23,' 1894. ftorge Shannon and Heirs, Gibson Station: You are here-B notified and ordered to take down and remove all wire Bices inclosing any pasture or pastures claimed, owned, or Bled by you in the contracted pastures known as ‘Smith, Weldon, Willison & Barbee Pasture Company’s Pastur witliin,ten days from this notice and order; and, uponfailui on your part to obey this order, the same will be enforced t • the proper officers. Witness my hand and seal the date an year above mentioned. Jos. Mingo, Judge Coweta Distric M. N. ” Fourth. Affidavit of Arley Davis, captain Indian Light Horse Company, to the effect that he execute an order from N. B. Childers, judge of Coweta district, ■ cut a certain fence built in the Smith, Willison Weldon Barbee pasture, in the Creek Nation, and built by Geor^ Shannon contrary to the laws of the Muscogee Natio: Order given June 1, 1893. Fifth. An order of L. C. Peru man, principal chief, as follows: “Executive Office, M. May 3, 1895. Messrs. Thomas Grayson and Geori| Shannon: I am in receipt of a letter from A. P. McKello' and another 'from T. J. Adams, stating that the pasture dispute between you and the Smith, Willison, Weldon Barbee Pasture Company had been decided in the CoweJ district to be the property of said Smith, Willison, Weld' & Barbee Pasture Company. A certified copy of the do sion of said court, dated May 23, 1895, in confirmation of £ above-mentioned statements, has been submitted to £ office. In view of the above showing, which I considl reliable and conclusive, I am again compelled to cancel £ Shannon & Nixon pasture contract, and to declare the sarj to be null and void. Witness my hand and seal of £ Muscogee Nation, the date first above written. L. Perryman, Prin. Chief, M. N.”
    The appellees’ answer attacked upon various grounl the validity of the lease made by the principal chief of t| Creek Nation to appellants, and averred that .in June, 18E| before the passage of the pasture law of 1892, Bichard Nixc a Creek citizen, began to improve the pasture in dispute, a| was entitled to hold the same under what is known as t| “Mile-Square Pasture Law” of the Creek Nation; thatin If s leased the same for seven years to Shannon, and sold his versionary interest to the defendant Thomas Grayson, ley denied that the Coweta District Court ever decided at the pasture in dispute belonged to appellants, or any of em, and alleged that there was no such record, and that e pretended record filed was made and procured by fraud, d is insufficient to support the allegation of a former deci->n in behalf of appellants. They denied that the Creek urt had jurisdiction of the case. They alleged that the ler of Judge N. B. Childers set'out above was not directed ainst them, but was directed against appellants. They erred that Joseph Miugo, judge of the Coweta district, dined to hear the case presented to him by George annon, but dismissed the same without a hearing. They ared the affidavit of N. B. Childers, signed by his mark, the effect that the order signed by him, set out above, was ected against appellants; that, upon leaving the bench, he, counsel, brought the second suit for appellee Shannon in Creek Court; that in that suit defendants objected to the .sdiction, because Shannon was an intermarried citizen, . because the amount in controversy exceeded $100; that ge Mingo dismissed the case on the ground that he had no sdiction, and declined to hear the same; that he refused idicate upon which ground he held he had no jurisdiction, davits of others were offered to the same effect. Appel-offered in evidence the lease from the principal chief to nnon & Nixon, and also the receipt showing the payment 3nt to the Nation by them, and other evidence not deem-■naterial to be stated. The court below awarded appel-Hs a preliminary injunction, but upon final hearing disHed the same, from which order this appeal is prosecuted.
    I Stuart, Gordon d; Hailey, Marcum & Fears, and Hutch,-\é English, for appellants.
    
      The injury is irreparable when the property of th plaintiff is rendered wholly useless for his purpose. Unles the defendant is enjoined, the trespass would continue to th expiration of the license. McPike vs West, 71 Mo. 901; Beach on Injunctions, § 35; Dudley vs Hurst, 8 Atl. 90 When a trespass is continuous, an injunction is the propc remedy, as remedy at law would have necessitated a multipl city of suits. Wheelock vs Noonan, 15 N. E. 413; 1 Beach o Injunctions, § 523; Ellis vs Wren, 1 S. W. 440; Ellsworth ^ Hale, 33 Ark. 638; Tautlinger vs Sullivan, 45 N. W. 76: Shafer vs Stull, 48 N. W. 882; Mills vs New Orleans Seed Co 4 So. 298. The action of ejectment in such a case does n( afford adequate relief and is not the proper remedy. Oolaga Coal Co. vs McCaleb, 68 Fed. 86; 15 C. C. A. 270; U. S. i Cattle Co., 33 Fed. 323; U. S. vs Ranch Co., 26 Fed. 218; Pom. Eq. Jur. 1357 and note.
    
      G. W. Pasco and Geo. E. Nelson, for appellees.
    An injunction will not be granted to disturb the poj session of one in possession when the title to land is in dil pute. 2 Beach on Injunctions, § 998; Erie R. R. Co. vs Dell ware R. R. Co., 21 N. J. Eq. 183. Courts of Equity will nj restrain trespasses by injunction when there is an adequaj remedy at law, and never, when the title is in dispute. Beach on Injunctions, § § 1125, 1126; Carney vs Hadley, So. 4; Rend vs Venture Oil Co., 48 Fed. 248. Injunction wj not issue for repeated trespass where the law affords J adequate remedy, unless the acts complained of are in til nature of a private nuisance. 2 Beach on Injunctions, § 112| To prevent multiciplicity of suits by injunction, the plaint! must first have his title adjudicated at law. 2 Beach Injunctions, § 1130; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 252. And the trespal must be continuous and general and not limited. 2 Beach J Injnuctions, § 1131, and note. Miller vs Burkett, 132 Ini 469. And will not be granted where the title is purely lega
    
      Beach on Injunctions, § 1164 and cases cited. The bill iraying for an injunction to restrain trespass must state, acts showing ground for equitable relief. 2 Beach on In-unctions, § 1166.
    2. The act of Chief Perryman in leasing the pasture ) appellants was ultra vires, and done under mistake, irrors committed by officers in a matter of law, with respect ) land grants maybe corrected by the courts and -the proper fiief granted. Johnson vs Townsley, 13 Wall. 72; Warren 3 VanBrunt, 19 Wall. 646; Shepley vs Cowan, 91 U. S. 330; anforth vs Moracal, 84 Ill. 456; Bird vs Ward, 4 A. D. 507; reek Laws, 1893, § 344.
   Lewis, J.

(after stating the facts). Construing sec-m 905, Rev. St., U. S., it is held by the United States rcuit Court of appeals for the Eighth circuit that the pro-edings and judgments of the courts of the Cherokee and ■eek Nations are upon the same footing, and entitled to the me faith and credit, as the proceedings and judgments of e courts of the territories of the Union. Mehlin vs Ice, 5 C. A. 403, 56 Fed. 19; Davison vs Gibson, 12 U. S. App. 4, 5 C. C. A. 543, and 56 Fed. 443; Exendine vs Pore, 6 C. A. 112, 56 Fed. 777; Standley vs Roberts, 8 C. C. A. 305, Fed. 836. These decisions are supported by the authority Mackey vs Coxe, 18 How. 100. The judgments of the irts of the territories, by the terms of the statute, stand m the same footing as the judgments of the courts of the bes. In fixing the scope and extent of section 905, the áreme Court has declared that, in a collateral attack upon idgment of the courts named therein, it is of no avail to w that there are errors in the record relied upon, unless IHy be such as prove that the court had no jurisdiction of M case, or that the judgment rendered was beyond its Hrer. Scotland Co. vs Hill, 132 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 26; Cooper vs Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308. The record of a judg-mant rendered in one state may be contradicted, in a collateral attack in another state, as to the facts necessary tc give the court jurisdiction; and, if it be shown that such fact! did not exist, the record will be regarded as a nullity, not withstanding it may be recited that they did exist. Want o: jurisdiction may be shown either as to the subject-matter oí as to the person, or, in proceedings in rem, as to the tliini Thompson vs Whitman, 18 Wall. 451. A judgment of a state court or of courts of the United States cannot be impeached collaterally in courts of other states or of the United State: for errors of law or practice. Town of Lyons vs Munson 99 U. S. 684; Cooper vs Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Marchand v. Frellsen, 105 U. S. 423; Trust Co. vs Seasongood, 130 U. S 482, 9 Sup. Ct. 575. A judgment of a state court may not b( impeached collaterally in the-court of another state, or in ¡ United States Court, on the ground of fraud. Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290; Maxwell vs Stewart, 21 Wall. 71; Ids. 22 Wall. 77; Nougue vs Clapp, 101 U. S. 551; Graham vs Railroad Co., 118 U. S. 161, 6 Sup. Ct. 1009; Simmons vs Saul 138 U. S. 439, 11 Sup. Ct. 369; Randolph vs King, 2 Bond, 104, Fed. Cas. No. 11,560; Amory vs Amory, 3 Biss. 266, Fed) Cas. No. 334. The facts and questions of law decided by judgment are generally considered res adjudicata. Thu: the construction of a state constitution or a state statute, th decision of the court as to the character of the judgment! whether interlocutory or final, and the finding of the com as to fraud or testamentary capacity, are conclusive. Mill vs Duryea, 7 Cranch, 481; Hampton vs McConnell, 3 Wheat. 234; Board of Public Works vs Columbia College, 17 Wal 521. A decree dismissing a complaint entitling the defen' ant to recover costs, set up as a plea in bar, is conclusive, ij dismissal is not, in direct terms, “without prejudice.” Lyo vs Manufacturing Co., 125 U. S. 698, 8 Sup. Ct. 1024.

In applying these rules to the case in hqmd, the fir: question that arises is, has the Creek Court rendered a judf. nent determining the rights of the parties as to the. matters low in controversy? An order from N. B. Childers, judge >f the Coweta district, Creek Nation, commanding the light íorsemen of the district to destroy certain fences, is in evi-lence. It is shown that, pursuant to this order, the fences 1 aimed by appellee Shannon upon the land in controversy /ere cut by the Indian officer. Whether the order of Judge ¡hilders was the result of a hearing; whether it is a judg-íent, or a writ of execution based upon a judgment, of a ourt, — is<not shown by any record in proof. We think this rder cannot be regarded as a judgment to which the faith ud credit commanded by the statute must be given. But, ibsequent to its issuance, appellee Shannon filed suit ainst appellants in the Creek Court, Coweta district; and íat court, upon hearing (Judge Mingo presiding,) with both irties present and represented by counsel, entered a judg-ent dismissing the case upon the finding (clearly made and /pressed) that the same had been legally and properly ought before Judge N. B. Childers and adjudicated, and e judgment of the court enforced, and the wire fences ilt and claimed by said Shannon cut down by the light irsemen of the district. Upon the day of the rendition of is judgment, appellee Shannon was officially notified by e judge rendering the same to take down and remove all re fences inclosing any pasture or pastures claimed, ned, or used by him in the contracted pasture known as “Smith, Willison, Weldon & Barbee Pasture Company’s ,sture, ” under penalty of having said order enforced after days by the proper authorities. In recognition of the |lgment rendered by Judge Mingo, the principal chief of nation canceled the lease he had heretofore made to ellees Shannon & Nixon. The judgment of Judge Mingo, |ted by the requirements of our law, is informal and defec-It is, however, sufficient to show a dismissal of the It because of a former adjudication between the parties to the latter proceedings,- and that the same was- adverse to Shannon, and resulted in the cutting of his fences. The notice following is evidently based upon the judgment found! to have been rendered by Judge. Childers. True, it is claimed that Judge Childers'never rendered a judgment, but that is immaterial in this controversy. Judge Mingo found that he] had rendered judgment, and for that reason he dismissed th' case, and gave a notice in way of enforcement of the juds ment he found to exist. The finding by Judge Mingo that ¿ judgment adjudicating the rights of the parties had bee: made, and of the effect thereof, is binding upon this court, and is as effectual as if such judgment had in fact bee: rendered. A judgment of dismissal may be pleaded, and th findings of fact upon which it is based cannot be inquire' into in a collateral proceeding.

Judgment of Crook Court. Conclusive.

Jurisdiction of Court — i?re sumption in favor.

Much of the testimony in the record goes to show thal the lease from the Creek Nation under which appellant] claim is illegal because not made in compliance with th Creek laws upon the subject, and because the grant was i: excess of the authority of the principal chief. The jud, ment of the Creek court precludes our consideration of the: questions. We cannot review errors of law or practice i| such courts, when their judgments are presented to u unless such errors are jurisdictional. Cornells vs Shannon 27 U. S. App. 329, 11 C. C. A. 465, and 63 Fed. 305.

' It is further ■ urged that the judgment of the Cre< court is in excess of its jurisdiction, because the amount i| controversy exceeds $100, the limit of the jurisdiction of tl| District Courts of the Creek Nation. It is enough to say this that the record does not show what the value of tl| premises in controversy was at the time of the rendition the judgment by Judge Mingo in the Creek court, and tl| presumption is in favor of the jurisdiction.

We have considered long whether we should rega: the proceedings before ■ Judge Mingo, with their pate: defects of form, or whether we should on this account disregard them entirely. In courts sometimes presided over by judges unable to write, technical correctness in procedure and in judgment cannot be expected. To require it is practically to annul all their proceedings and decrees. To comply with the statute, and to give faith and credit to the judgmentS'Of these tribunals, we must look beyond the form, and enforce the manifest intent, gathered broadly from the intire proceedings. This we have done in the present case, aelieving it to be in accord with the spirit of the decisions of he Circuit Court of Appeals, and further illustrated in Talton vs Mayes (decided May 18, 1896) 16 Sup. Ct. 986. We onclude that appellee Shannon, having invoked the jurisdic-ion of the Creek Court, is bound in this action by its judg-uent therein rendered. Cornells vs Shannon, supra. As to he other appellee, Thomas Grayson, his claim to the preña-ses in controversy rests upon a sale of the reversionary .terest of Richard Nixon, Shannon’s lessor, upon the de-rmination of Shannon’s lease. The sale was not upon a onsideration paid or fixed by agreement, and therefore assed no right. It is suggested that by the lease from ap-ellants Barbee, Wiilison & Weldon to the appellants dwards Bros., the appellants first mentioned were not titled to the possession of the premises at the time of the stitution of the suit, but their lessees were so entitled, and at, therefore, the parties first named cannot maintain this tion. In 1 Tayl. Landl. & Ten. 190, it is said: “If any e interferes with his tenants so far as to disturb their en-[yment, and thereby cause loss of rent or other damage, e landlord may have an action; and, if the disturbance is mtinued, he may from time to time bring a fresh action. ” is statement is supported by the decisions in Shadwell vs Hutchinson, 2 Barn. & Adol. 33, and in Aldridge vs Stuyvesant, 1 Hall, 210. In the first case, tried before Chief Justice nterden, it is held that it is no defense to an action for obstructing ancient lights that the nuisance merely affects the plaintiff’s rights as reversioner, and that he has already, in a former action, recovered against the defendant for the same obstruction. In the last case it was held that an action lies in favor of a landlord against any person who so wrongfully and maliciously disturbs his tenants that they abandon his premises, and the landlord thereby loses his rent. No reason is perceived why the rule should not be the same if the disturbance does not cause the tenants to leave the pre-| mises, but results in damage for which the landlord mus' respond to them. In this case it alleged that the tenants,) Edward Bros., had rented the premises for the purposes o: pasturing cattle, and that they had a large number of cattl in the pasture, and that by the trespass of the appellee, their possession was disturbed, and they were exposed t damage. Under these allegations, we think the landlor had a right of action, notwithstanding the right of pos session, under the' terms of the lease, still in his tenants) Furthermore, it is well established that the landlord ma; maintain actions, for the protection of his reversionar, interest, for such injuries as wpuld, in the ordinary course o| things, continue to affect such interest after the terminatia of the lease, whether the injury be committed by a tenam an undertenant, or a stranger, and whether the term slm have expired or not. Of such actions are those for protec ing -the windows of a house, stopping up a rivulet, whereb| the timber becomes rotten, the erection of unwholeso: nuisance near the premises, undermining the foundation a house, cutting down trees, and the like. Tayl. Landl. Ten. art. 173; Lachman vs Deisch, 71 Ill. 59; Brown v. Bridges, 31 Iowa 138. In the latter case it was decided th the landlord might have an action for throwing down fenc<| while the premises were in possession of a tenant; such r jury being damage to the real estate, and therefore to t reversionary interest. We conclude that the appellant lanj lords in this case, under the allegations that the appellee's were erecting fences upon their premises, had a right of action therefor.

Judgment oí Oreok Court - Intent to be enforced.

Sale without consideration —No right passes.

Right of action of reversioner.

Equity, Mui-tij>licUy oi s^-

The contention is further made that, if the appellants had a right of action at all, their action should have been at law. Equitable jurisdiction, in our judgment, can be sustained upon distinct grounds. It is alleged and proven that appellees were entering in and upon a portion of the premises adjudged by the Creek Court to belong to appellants, and had run a wire fence across the same, inclosing nearly 1,000 acres of said pasture, and threatened to turn their own cattle in and upon the same, and to use and graze it, to the exclusion of the appellants and their lessees. In 2 Beach, Inj. 1146, it is said: “A trespass upon real property, effected by m unlawful structure, is continuous in its nature, and gives eparate, successive causes of action from time to time, jarred only by the running of the statute of limitations, igainst the successive trespasses.” This statement of the aw is abundantly supported by the authorities cited by the buthor. The principle upon which equitable relief is grant-r r r ° d in such cases is the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits; uch multiplicity not necessarily and solely arising from the xistenee of a number of parties for or against whom a cause ay exist, as held in Carney vs Hadley (Fla.) 14 South. 4, ut arising from the necessity of bringing many and succes,ive suits at law to obtain full redress for a continuous rong. “Jurisdiction of equity arises by reason of the ecessity of repeated actions at law to redress the owner’s rievance, and .must, from the nature of the case, continue long as that necessity exists. ” Galway vs Railway Co., 28 N. Y. 132, 28 N. E. 479. That this is one of the grounds ion which equity interferes to avoid a multiplicity of suits stated by Mr. Pomeroy in his work on Equity Jurispru- ' ¡nee (volume 1, § 264), and is supported by an array of thorities cited by him. The rule has been acted upon in every variety of trespass. Thus, in Iowa, where a cropper for shares turned cattle upon plaintiff’s land before the crop was harvested, it was decided that the owner of the land, to avoid a multiplicity of suits, might have an injunction to prevent repeated trespass thereon without alleging irreparable injury or the insolvency of the defendant. Tantlinger vs Sullivan, 80 Iowa, 218, 45 N. W. 765. To the same effect was it'held in that state in a case where défendant falsely claimed that there was a highway upon plaintiff’s land, and repeatedly tore down his fence and passed over his premises, ■ and threatened to continue to do so. Ladd vs Osborne, 79 Iowa 93, 44 N. W. 235. Of like effect, upon similar facts, is the decision in Shaffer vs Stull, 32 Neb. 94, 48 N. W. 882. An injunction was granted when a trespass already committed by a road overseer in removing obstructions from an alleged highway, which had no existence, would probably| be indefinitely repeated. Smithers vs Fitch, 82 Cal. 153, 22 Pac. 935. And so it was held that when defendant had pile' heavy boulders on plaintiff’s lot, and plaintiff’s only remed at law was repeated actions for damages, injunction shoub be granted. Wheelock vs Noonan, 108 N. Y. 179, 15 N. E. 67. For other applications of the rule, see, also, Slack vs. Lawrence Tp. (N. J. Ch.) 19 Atl. 663; Warren Mills vs New Orleans Seed Co., 65 Miss. 391, 4 South. 298; Ellis vs Wren, 84 Ky. 234, 1 S. W. 440. It is believed further that tin equitable jurisdiction should be sustained upon the gronn that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, appellant! had not, at law, a remedy so plain, adequate, and complet as in equity. Appellants had leased the land trespassed u; on to Edwards Bros., who were pasturing cattle. Unde| given circumstances, appellants might become liable for co: sequen fcial damages because of Edwards Bros. ’ failure to e: joy the leased premises. For their trespass, appellees we: liable to respond in damages, the measure whereof mig' not by any means be as comprehensive as the damages f which appellants might become liable to their lessees. In other words, appellants by appellees ’ wrong might be made liable for greater damage than they could recover. Under such circumstances the remedy at law cannot be held ■ to be as plain, adequate, and complete as the equitable remedy. As said by the Supreme Court of the United States, it is not inough that there exists a remedy at law; it must be plain, adequate, and complete, — in other words, direct and effective, and as sufficient to the ends of justice as the remedy in quity. Boyce vs Grundy, 3 Pet. 210; Sullivan vs Railroad Co., 94 U. S. 806. So, also, it will give its aid, says that ourt, when the injury is of such a nature that it cannot be adequately compensated by damages at law. Parker vs Manufacturing Co., 2 Black. 544; Wylie vs Coxe, 15 How. 15. This record discloses that these litigants have been ndeavoring for nearly six years to obtain at law a seftle-nent of their controversies. Twice have they applied to the uthorities of the Creek Nation, and twice to the United States Court in the Indian Territory. We think that they hould not now be met with the barren formula that there is n adequate remedy at law, but that the jurisdiction and the emedies in equity are ample to give present relief, and to |nd this long drawn controversy. The judgment of the urt below will be reversed, and here rendered for appel-nts, who will be granted the relief in equity prayed for.

Remedy at law must be adequate.

Kilgore, J., concurs.  