
    GING RUI DONG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-3500-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 11, 2011.
    
      Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director; Greg D. Mack, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Ging Rui Dong, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the August 12, 2010, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Ging Rui Dong, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Aug. 12, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

The BIA’s denial of Dong’s motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005). A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Dong’s 2010 motion was untimely, as the final administrative decision was issued in 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Dong contends that his new practice of Christianity in the United States constitutes changed circumstances. As the BIA noted, Dong’s baptism into the Christian faith, which occurred in 2009 in the United States, reflects a self-induced change in personal circumstances and therefore does not exempt his motion from the applicable bars. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir.2006); Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.2008).

Dong also argues that he demonstrated changed country conditions by submitting evidence that conditions for Christians in China worsened in 2008, and that the BIA abused its discretion by overlooking this evidence. However, the BIA referenced this evidence in its decision, and its acknowledgment was sufficient. See Jian Hid Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that the BIA does not need to expressly parse or refute every piece of evidence submitted by the petitioner); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (“[W]e presume that an IJ has taken into account all of the evidence before him, unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.”).

The BIA’s determination that the evidence failed to demonstrate changed country conditions is supported by substantial evidence. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169. While the background materials submitted by Dong show a continued repression of Christians who worship in unregistered churches, and continued strict regulation of the registered churches, they do not show a worsening of conditions for Christians in China, particularly as much of the evidence is focused on the level of persecution in Beijing around the time of the 2008 Olympics.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  