
    Tony SCHWARTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRISTIANA TRUST, a division of Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB as trustee of ARLP Trust 3, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 16-35536
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted October 23, 2017 
    
    Filed October 30, 2017
    John Cochran, IV, Attorney, Pacific Property Law LLC, Forest Grove, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellant
    Lukasz I. Wozniak, Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for Defendant-Appellee
    Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Tony Schwartz appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging violations of federal statutes related to his mortgage loan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011).

The district court properly dismissed Schwartz’s Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim because Schwartz did not send a notice of rescission to defendant within three years of consummation of the loan. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (providing a right of rescission within three years of the date of the consummation of a loan if the lender fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 790, 792, 190 L.Ed.2d 650 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years after the transaction is consummated); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the three-year limitation period.”). We reject as without merit Schwartz’s contention that the subject loan transaction was not consummated.

The district court properly dismissed Schwartz’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim because it was based solely on his TILA claim.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised arid argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     