
    *Seekright, Lessee of Wm. Mayo v. Paul Carrington and Others.
    October Term, 1791.
    Wills — Slaves—Conditional Manumission — Effect npon Other Property Bequeathed Along with Slaves.—
    After several bequests to different persons, and a request that her executors will endeavour to obtain an act of Assembly for the manumission of his slaves, the testator adds, that in case his executors should fail in obtaining such an act, on that condition, and no other, he gives his said slaves, and his other property, remaining after discharging his legacies and devises, to such and such persons in fee, amongst whom are his executors. The condition is confined to the slaves, and not to the other part of the residuary estate.
    This was an ejectment tried in the General Court. The parties argued a case, in effect as follows, viz. “ That Joseph Mayo being seized of the lands in question at the time of making his will, as well as at the time of his death, did, on the 27th day of May 1780, duly make and publish his last will and testament, whereby, after sundry specific bequests of land and personal estate, he earnestly requests his executors to petition the General Assembly for leav,e to emancipate all his slaves, and to use every exertion in their power to succeed in such application. But provided it should not be in the power of his executors to get this act of humanity effected, on that condition and no other, he gives and disposes of the said slaves, and his other property, which might remain after discharging his legacies and devises, ,.in the following manner, viz. three of his slaves (by name) to John Tabb ; all the residue of his slaves and other property, remaining after the discharge of the above legacies and devises, he gives to be equally divided between the sons of Joseph Mayo, William Mayo, son of Daniel, and Paul, George, Joseph, Nathaniel, and Mayo Carrington, sons of George Carrington, the same to be to them and their heirs for ever.”
    “ That the testator departed this life in the year ■ 1785, and that his will aforesaid was duly proved and admitted to record.”
    “ That the lessor of the plaintiff, who is the son of Daniel in the will mentioned, is the heir at law of the said testator.”
    “That an act of the General Assembly was, upon the petition of the administrators with the will of the said testator annexed, passed into a law authorizing the Chancellor to make all such orders and decrees from time to time as might be necessary for carrying into effect the bequest of the said testator in favor of his slaves, having regard to the payment of all debts due by the said testator, and such legacies (if any) as ought to be paid prior to the emancipation ; and also, to raise such a sum of money from the labor of the said slaves, as might be sufficient to provide for the maintenance and support of the aged negroes and such as were of tender years, so as to prevent them from becoming burthensome to the community. *That so soon as these purposes were answered, it should be lawful for the High' Court of Chancery to make such order or decree for emancipating the said slaves, as to the said court might seem proper r and that the slaves so decreed free should receive a certificate thereof, and be to all intents and purposes free.
    “ That a decree of the High Court of Chancery was made pursuant to the above law, whereby the said slaves were declared free.
    “ That after the personal estate was sold, the slaves were hired out for the purpose of paying the residue of the testators debts, and raising a fund for the maintenance of the aged, young and infirm ; and that after paying the debts there will remain a surplus from the hires in' the hands of the administrators, subject to the future decree of the High Court of Chancery.
    “ That the lands in question, and one other tract not specifically devised, were the most profitable parts of the testator’s estate, from whence he drew his chief support: That he possessed three other considerable tracts of laud.”
    “ That the defendants are the residuary legatees of the said testator, and in equal degree of relationship to the testator, as the lessor of the plaintiff. And if upon the whole matter the law be for the- plaintiff, &c.”
    Judgment for the defendants from which the plaintiff appealed.
   The PRESIDENT

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The case may be at once discharged of the condition, which, it was contended, had prevented the devise of the residue from taking effect, inasmuch as the act of manumission had been obtained. The condition is clearly confined to the slaves, and not to the other part of the residuary estate.

The testator was anxious about the liberation of his slaves, which he considered as depending very much upon the zeal of his executors in their application for that purpose to the legislature. His executors are, with others, constituted his residuary legatees, and therefore, it never could have been in the contemplation of the testator to tempt his executors to withhold the ardor necessary ■to promote this his favorite wish, by punishing them with the loss of all the residue if they succeeded. He was under the necessity of confiding- in them, so far as the slaves 'x'were concerned ; and the event has proven that his confidence was not misplaced, or injudiciously given.

How then does this cause stand upon the principal question, throwing the slaves out of the question? It is admitted on all hands that the intention of the testator is to be sought for, and observed : but that intention is to be collected from the will itself. In questions which relate to the subject of the devise, or to the quantum of interest given, we find the judges labouring and catching at slight expressions of illiteral men, in order to effectuate their intentions. In the case of Hogan, lessee of Henry Wallace, v. Rowland Jackson, Cowp. Rep. 299, the court are seen struggling to give to the words “ worldy substance ”— “ all my effects &c. ” the same meaning as property.

That term is used in this case, and is as comprehensive as any which could have been thought of, for the purpose of embracing every thing. In the case of Huxtep v. Broo-man. — Brow. Ch. Rep. 437 : The words; “all I am worth were adjudged sufficient to pass lands.

Upon the whole the court are unanimously of opinion that the judgment of the District Court is right and is to be affirmed.  