
    Harrison v. Knight.
    
      Quero whether vagueness in a plea and interrogatories propounded to the plaintiff, to which no exceptions have been taken, can constitute any ground for overruling a motion to strike out the answers and take the interrogatories as confessed.
    If'all the interrogatories propounded to the plaintiff be substantially answered ,’it is not necessary that the answers should correspond numerically with the interrogatories, unless it can bo perceived that the rights of the defendant were prejudiced thereby.
    
       Mere irregularities in practice, in no way affecting the merits of the ease or the rights of the parties, will not authorize the reversal of a judgment.
    It was not until the act of 1840 that the provision was introduced requiring claims against estates to ho presented to the executor or administrator within one year for his approval. That act did not take effect until the 16th of March of that year.
    The probate law of 1840 became the law of procedure from the 16th of March of that year, as well in respect to estates then in progress of administration, as to those of which the administration was subsequently opened.
    In the absence of proof of iraud, the assignment of a negotiable right of action is a sufficient consideration to support a promise; so, a promise in consideration of the assignment of an uncertain debt is valid, and may be enforced. /
    
      Quero whether, in the absence of fraud, the assignment of a claim against a third person, which proved to be of no value to the assignee without any fault of his, would support a promise.
    Appeal from Fayette. This was a suit upon a promissory note bearing date May 5, 1845, by the appellee. The defendant pleaded that the note was given by him “without any consideration, and extorted from him by the plaintiff by fraudulent misrepresentations; that the consideration has wholly failed, and was and is of no value, being a note hereunto annexed, marked A; and lie were tenders the same to the plaintiff.”
    To this pica lie annexed the following interrogatories propounded to the plaintiff, vis*:
    “1st. Was not the note sued on by the plaintiff obtained from said defendant without any consideration and by fraudulent misrepresentations of plaintiff to defendant!”’
    “2d. Was not the note sued on given for the note filed as exhibit A to defendant’s second plea?”
    The note here referred to was the promissory note of Joseph Thompson, bearing date 29th June, 1S3S, due one day after date, on which was the following indorsement: “I know no reason why the within note is not a just claim against the estate of Joseph Thompson, deceased.” Signed, Wily Harrison, administrator of the estate of Joseph Thompson, and" dated February 24, 1841.
    
      To tlie first interrogatory propounded to him, the plaintiff answered : “I made no suggestion to defendant which ho did not perfectly understand, and I regarded 'him as possessing a more thorough knowledge' of tlie whole subject than I did. I made no misrepresentations to defendant.” To the second interrogatory lie answered : “The note given me by the defendant now in suit was given in consideration of a claim which I held against tlie estate of Joseph Thompson, deceased; the defendant was the administrator on the estate of said Thompson, and in his capacity as administrator repeatedly promised to pay said claim to the affiant, and finally did liquidate the same hy giving his own individual note in lieu thereof; tlie act was voluntary on the part of the defendant, and the consideration was a good and valid one to him, so far as I know and believe. No fraud was or could at any time have been practised hy me on the defendant, for he knew the value of claims against the estate of his intestate better than I did.”
    Tlie defendant moved the court to strike out the answers of the plaintiff to the interrogatories, and that they be taken as confessed, which the court refused.
    Tlie note sued on and the answers of the defendant to the interrogatories were given in evidence. It was proved that the defendant was appointed administrator of the estate of Joseph Thompson in December, 1830. A record of the Probate Court was given in evidence by the defendant, in order to show that by his account, approved on the final settlement of his administration in April, 1S43, he appeared to have then paid ont all the funds of the estate which had come into his hands as administrator, and that the estate was then indebted to him.
    The defendant’s counsel asked the court to instruct the jury, in substance, that claims against tlie estate of Joseph Thompson not presented to the defendant, his administrator, within twelve months from the date of his appointment as such administrator were barred, and that a claim so barred was no consideration to support a promise by tlie defendant or his promissory note for the payment of its contents.
    This instruction the court refused, but instructed the jury “that the probate law of 1S40 did uot apply to this case, and that the answer of the plaintiff to the second interrogatory propounded to him by the defendant referred to the note appended to tlie defendant’s plea,” “at which time the attorney for the plaintiff'said lie would admit that said answer referred to said note.”
    Tlie jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant having moved for a new trial, which was refused, appealed.
    IV. II. Hunger, for appellant.
    I. The court erred in overruling the defendant’s motion to strike out the plaintiff’s answers to the interrogatories, and to take the interrogatories as confessed. The answer to tlie first is not categorical, but argumentative or inferential, and artfully avoids answering whether tlie note sued on was obtained from defendant without any consideration and by the fraudulent misrepresentations of tlie plaintiff. (Hart. Dig., arts. 730, 737.) The second answer does not answer any of the second interrogatory; at least it does not “simply confess or deny the fact,” as art. 737 requires. He was asked about a particular note, and be answers about a claim against the succession of Thompson, which might or might not he tlie note asked about. Nor can this answer lie applied to make out tlie answer to tlie first interrogatory: 1st. Because it refers to a claim against tlie estate, and uot the note asked about; and, 2d. Because eaeli answer must be entire to the question asked.
    II. The court should have given the instruction asked by tlie defendant. (12 Bob. II., 'loo; Ang. Him., 291-294.) Should it be said that there appears to he an acknowledgment of tlie administrator on the note — 1st. It will be. seen tliflt it was more than twelve months after administration was granted; and, 2d. That more than four years intervened from tlie time of tlie acknowledgment to tlie time when Harrison gave his note for the same; and there being no order of the judge for payment, the acknowledgment merely interrupted proscription, which ran again from that time. (12 Rob. R., 511.)
    III. It was error to instruct the jury that the probale law of 1840 did not apply to the case. It was a mere rule”of practice, and the administrator and creditors should have been governed by it after its passage. (See see. 60 of that act.)
    IV. It was also error to instruct the jury that the answer of the plaintiff to the second interrogatory referred to the note appended to defendant’s plea. It was charging' on the weight of the testimony. (Hart. Dig'., art. 753.) It was telling the jury that the plaintiff had proved what he had never said.
    
      A. J. Hamilton, also, for appellant.
    
      Hancock and Paschal, for appellee.
    It was admitted in the concluding argument of the appellant that the judge correctly instructed, “that the answer of Knight was to be taken as an admission that the consideration of the note was as alleged by trie defendant; ” therefore the defendant below obtained by his bill of discovery all which he sought.
    II. Harrison’s note is the foundation of the action, and the only question is, whether or not Thompson’s note, surrendered by Harrison, formed a valuable consideration for Harrison’s note. That it did, there can be no doubt. It is not proven that it was unavailable to the administrator on his settlement of his accounts; indeed, not proving the items of his credits as administrator is strong presumption that the note of Thompson had been used as a voucher. The jury wore authorized in so finding', and there being no palpable error in the finding on the facts, the new trial could not have been legally granted by the judge. The judgment ought to bo affirmed with damages.
   Wheeler, J.

It admits of a question whether the first interrogatory propounded by the defendant, taken with his plea, was so framed as to enable him to require an answer. The plea is expressed in the most general terms. It apprises the plaintiff of no fact on which the defendant proposes to rest his defense of a failure of consideration, and (ho interrogatory annexed does not call upon the plaintiff to answer to any special matter of fact, but asks him generally if the note sued on was not obtained “without auy consideration and by fraudulent misrepresentations.” In this interrogatory the plaintiff is not asked in what the pretended consideration of the note consisted, or by means of what particular representations he obtained it. To interrogate a parly as to whether he has not made “fraudulent misrepresentations,” without indicating as to what matter of fact or in what respect it is proposed to show falsehood is, to say the least, extremely vague. The inquiry as to whether there was “any” consideration might perhaps be sufficiently definite if it was intended to prove that nothing whatever passed between the parties as a consideration. But that this was not proposed is apparent from the plea, which alleges, and the second interrogatory, which suggests, that the consideration for the note in suit was a note of anterior date, hold by the plaintiff as a demand against the estate of which the defendant was the administrator. It evidently was not intended, then, to rely on the absence of any ostensible, but of a legal consideration, and to show that although an ostensible consideration did pass, yet that it was valueless, and was therefore no consideration in law. Where, as here, the plea gives no information as to the facts intended to be relied ou as constituting the defense, it'may well be doubted whether an interrogatory thus general, indicating no fact respecting which information is sought, requires an answer.

The object of testimony, whether obtained from witnesses or extorted from the party, is to establish facts. But it may be asked, wlmt matter of fact would he established by hiking this interrogatory as confessed. Certainly not any one of the special facts in which the failure of consideration is said to consist. Tlie answer of the defendant to tlie first interrogatory was not more objectionable for vagueness and uncertainty than the interrogatory to which it was an answer. It is evident that tlie answers of the defendant were not intentionally evasive, for in Ills answer to tlie second he evidently intended to give, and does give, though inartificially expressed, a full answer to the first. He expressly denies the suggestion of fraud and failure of consideration. That the answer to the first was made in response to the second interrogatory was an irregularity, but it is not perceived that it can have prejudiced the rights of tlie defendant.

To tlie second interrogatory, which related to a distinct fact, the defendant had a right to a categorical answer, admitting or denying it. (I-Iart. Dig'., arts., 736, 737.) But tlie object of the interrogatory, namely, to prove that the note annexed to tlio plea was tlie consideration for that sued on, was fully attained at the trial by tlio implied admission in the answer, and tlie express admission of tlie plaintiff’s counsel that that was the consideration of tlie note. Had the interrogatory been taken as confessed, as the defendant insisted it should be, it would have proved precisely this, and no more. How, then, can the party now complain? All he asked was accorded to him, though in a manner irregular in point of practice.

The defense relied on was, that the note, which was tlie consideration for that of the defendant, on whieli the suit was brought, not having been presented to the administrator for his approval within one year from the dale of his appointment, was barred, and did not constitute a good consideration to support tlie promise of the defendant. This defense was made tlie subject of instructions to the jury, in which tlie court, in effect, held that it was not a valid defense; and tlie correctness of this ruling is the material subject of inquiry. It is unnecessary to notice separately the several propositions embraced in the instructions.' They are to bo considered in reference to the facts of tlie case, and are material only in so far as applicable to tlie issues and evidence.

Tlie date of the appointment of the defendant as administrator was in December, 1830. At that time there was no law in force here limiting tlie time to a fixed period within which claims against estates must be presented for approval. The Louisiana law, then the rule of practice on this subject, did not require claims to be presented within one year, where, as in this case’, the time for administering the succession was extended beyond that period. Although the holder of a claim, was required to present it to tlie curator or executor before commencing an action, his omission to do so did not defeat the right of action, but ouiy prevented tlie recovery of costs, as in other cases where amicable demand was not made before bringing suit. (3 Rob. R., 264.) It ivas not until tiie act of 1840 that the provision was introduced requiring claims against estates to he presented to the executor or administrator for his approval wil liin one year. That act did not take effect until the 16th of March of that year. (Iiavt. DÍg., pp. 324, 320, seo. 16.) From that time it became the law of-procedure, as well in respect to estates then in progress of administration as to those of which the administration was subsequently opened. But the note which was the consideration for that sued on in this case, and wliieh, it was insisted, was barred, was presented to the administrator, and by him approved on tlie 2-11 li day of February, 1841, less than one year from the time when the act took effect. Consequently it was not barred at the time of its presentation. It was evidence of a subsisting legal demand against tlie estate of tlie defendant's intestate, and its transfer to the defendant, was doubtless a consideration deemed valuable in law, and sufficient to support his promise. The assignment of a negotiable right of action is a sufficient consideration to support a promise. So a promise in consideration of the assignment of an uncertain debt is valid and may be enforced. (Chit. Cont.. It.)

There does not appear to have been any fraud or deception practiced upon the defendant to induce him to purchase the demand against tlio estate of his intestate. He must have been aware of the affairs of tlie estate, and of the value to him of the note. How he administered the estate does not appear, and it may have been his own fault that this demand was not paid in the due course of administration. A consciousness of this and his consequent personal liability may have induced him to purchase the demand. lie has, at least, failed to show that it was of no value to him, without any fault of his, if even that would have afforded him a defense.

We conclude that the defense relied on was not a valid defense to the action ; and are of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  