
    BRIDE v. BAKER.
    Equity; Marshal’s Sales; Estoppel.
    1. Equity looks to substance, and not form, and -will not lend its aid to one whose sole ground for seeking such aid is based upon a technicality.
    2. A party admittedly liable for costs for which a judgment has been rendered against another person, and who permits a marshal’s sale in satisfaction of such judgment to be made of land belonging to him, but the title to which was in such other person until two days before the sale, when it was conveyed to him, cannot maintain a bill in equity to set aside the sale and the marshal’s deed thereunder to the judgment creditor, merely because the latter knew that the property belonged to him and he recorded his deed before the sale; and it is immaterial, in the absence of any allegation of fraud, what amount of money was realized from the sale. (Citing American Sav. Bank v. Eisminger, 35 App. D. C. 51.)
    No. 2267.
    Submitted April 4, 1911.
    Decided May 1, 1911.
    Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a court of equity, dismissing a bill to set aside a marshal’s sale and a deed made thereunder, together with a tax deed.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    
      The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:
    This appeal [by CQtter T. Bride] brings into review a decree of the supreme court of the District dismissing appellant’s bill praying the setting aside of a marshal’s sale and deed to appellee, Galen E. Green, as well as a tax deed from one Harris to said Green.
    The facts necessary to the determination of the issues involved are substantially these: The early record title to lot 5, square 882, situate in the District of Columbia, and immediately involved in this controversy, was in the heirs of David Peters and others. On Eebruary 28, 1903, one Christopher R. Hunter executed a deed purporting to convey this lot and lot 4, adjoining, to James A. Gassaway, the deed containing a covenant of adverse possession by the grantor for more than twenty years. The appellant, Bride, was the real purchaser, Gassaway being an agent or trustee. The deed to Gassaway was immediately recorded. Subsequently, on December 7, 1903, Gassaway executed a deed covering both lots to Bride. This deed was withheld from record until July 24, 1906.
    On Eebruary 4, 1904, Gassaway, acting for Bride, but proceeding in his own name, filed a bill seeking to have the title to the lots decreed good by adverse possession. On March 8, 1905, Martha A. Mayse, one of the appellees, filed a similar bill as to part of lot 4. She also filed a petition in the Gassaway ease with supporting affidavits, as appears from evidence introduced by appellant, in which she averred that Gassaway and Robert Graham, one of the defendants in that proceeding, were “ignorant and impecunious colored men, used merely as lay figures to give the semblance of reality to the pretended suit to establish title, and that the real litigant is one Cotter T. Bride,” and that both Gassaway and Graham were wholly dominated by said Bride. Leave to be admitted as a defendant was thereupon sought. Gassaway, after the filing of the Mayse petition for leave to intervene, entered his case dismissed as to lot 4, and, on March 30, 1905, received a decree purporting to establish his title as to lot 5.
    
      On May 24, 1905, Graham and Gassaway, who had been made defendants in the Mayse suit to quiet title to the part of lot 4 claimed by her, filed separate answers, Gassaway still acting for Bride, although ostensibly for himself. Testimony was-thereupon taken by the parties, and, on May 29, 1906, after-hearing, a decree was entered for the complainant Mayse, and that she recover against the defendants Gassaway and Graham the costs of suit to be taxed by the clerk, execution to issue as-at law. From this decree Gassaway and Graham entered an. appeal, which, however, appears not to have been perfected. The costs were taxed at $129.40, and, on June 26th following,, that is to say almost a month after the rendition of the decree, fi. fa. issued upon the judgment for costs. The same day the-marshal levied upon said lot 5 as the property of Gassaway, his-deed to Bride not then being of record, and, on July 26th, sold the same for $25, the expenses of the levy and sale being-$32.28. The appraisers summoned by the marshal fixed the-value of the lot at $1,055.60.
    On May 21, 1907, Miss Mayse filed a bill against Bride setting forth the history of the litigation resulting in her decree-as to lot 4 and judgment for costs, and praying for a special-decree against Bride for said sum of $129.40. To this bill a demurrer was filed by Mr. Bride, alleging, among other things, the existence of an adequate remedy at law. This demurrer-was sustained. On June 19, 1907, about a month subsequent to-the .filing of the Mayse bill seeking to charge him with the payment of her judgment for costs, Mr. Bride filed the petition-herein, setting forth, inter alia, that the marshal, on July 26, 1906, the day of the sale of said lot 5, executed a deed to the-defendant Green; that Gassaway, while holding the apparent fee-simple title to said lot, “nevertheless took said title at the instance of this complainant as trustee;” that Green had constructive and actual notice of this fact at the date of said sale; that’ Miss Mayse was merely Green’s agent; that Green had subsequently, on December 13, 1906, taken a quitclaim deed from one Job Harris to said lot 5, “apparently to bolster up his title;” that on December 19, 1906, Green and wife conveyed! ■said lot 5 to the defendant Baker; that “said Baker is chargeable with the knowledge of said Green as it appears in the rec•ord of the two equity causes.”
    The petition also contains the following: “This complainant is advised that, inasmuch as the said Gassaway was holder of -the title as trustee for him, he is probably responsible, in equity, for such costs as are properly chargeable, and he tenders himself as ready and able to pay the same, insisting, however, that he should not be required to pay any of the costs of the fi fa. or •any of the costs of the publication against nonresidents or unknown heirs.”
    The petition closes with a prayer that the deed from the •marshal to said Green be set aside on such terms as to the payment of the costs of the Mayse suit “as to the court may seem right and equitable,” and also “for a decree declaring ineffectual to affect the complainant’s title the quitclaim deed from Harris to Green and the deed from Green to Baker,” and for general relief.
    
      Mr. O. R. Hallaraj Mr. W. M. Hallam, Mr. D. G. 0" Callar ■■ghan, and Mr. W. W. Bride for the appellant.
    
      Mr. John Bidowt and Mr. Henry M. Baker for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Bobb

delivered the opinion of the Court:

Succinctly stated, the case presented is this: Mr. Bride purchased Hunter’s interest, whatever it may have been, in lots 4 and 5, and, for reasons of his own, caused the deed to be executed to Gassaway, who was financially irresponsible. This deed Mr. Bride placed on record. Gassaway, by Bride’s direction and for his benefit, brought suit to perfect the title. The Mayse petition to be made defendant as to lot 4 followed, and the suit was discontinued as to that lot, Mr. Bride preferring to have Gassaway litigate that title in the Mayse suit (Gassaway representing Bride), the result being a decree in her favor for ■the lot and for the costs. Mr. Bride, in his bill, admits re■sponsibility for the payment of those costs. -Regardless of his -admission, there can be no question as to his liability under the facts disclosed. He was the real, Gassaway the nominal, •defendant. Having full knowledge of all that had been done, Mr. Bride nevertheless neglected to pay the costs he should have paid, merely recording his deed from his agent and trustee, Gassaway, two days prior to said sale by the marshal. He then sat by, permitted the sale to take place, and, when an attempt was made almost a year later to compel him to pay these •costs, he still avoided payment. He now comes into a court of -equity and.seeks its aid. Why ? To undo what resulted from his own dereliction and negligence. A court of equity is not thus to be trifled with. If Mr. Bride is now liable for the ■costs of the Mayse suit, and he admits and we have said that he is, he was equally liable when the judgment for costs was entered; and that judgment, under sec. 1214 of the Code [31 Stat. .at L. 1381, chap. 854], became a lien upon whatever equitable interest he held in said lot 5. Had a different proceeding been instituted against that interest, Mr. Bride would have had no .ground whatever for complaint. His quarrel, therefore, is solely with the form of the remedy pursued. He admits liability, admits dereliction, but nevertheless seeks to have the marshal’s sale set aside, because Green, the purchaser, knew Gassaway was a mere trustee, and because, two days before the sale, Bride recorded his deed. On the face of the record, at the time of the ■marshal’s sale the proceedings were regular and proper. The judgment for costs was against Gassaway, and the levy resulting from said judgment attached prior to the recording of the Bride deed. American Sav. Bank v. Eisminger, 35 App. U. C. 51. The forms of law having been followed, we are not concerned, in the absence of any allegation of fraud, as to the ■Amount realized by the sale.

Under the present contention of Mr. Bride, the judgment ■for costs was really against him, and yet he stood by and did .absolutely nothing for almost two months after that judgment was rendered, and then, instead of paying the judgment, recorded his deed. He now seeks the aid of a court of conscience to have undone something which he admits should have been, done, but in a different way. Equity looks to substance, and not to form, and will not lend its aid to one whose sole ground for seeking such aid is based upon a technicality. Courts of equity are established to do justice in cases where an adequate remedy at law may not be had, and they should seek to do ultimate justice in all cases. They are not established, and will not permit themselves to be used, for the purpose of assisting litigants, either directly or indirectly, in avoiding just responsibility for their own obligations, acts of omission or commission, or the consequences thereof. We hold, therefore, that the conduct of the appellant was such as to estop him from seeking relief at our hands.

Decree affirmed, with costs. Affirmed.  