
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, Michael YELVERTON, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-493-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 16, 2012.
    Rajit S. Dosanjh (Daniel Hanlon, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, N.Y., for Appellee.
    Lisa A. Peebles, Acting Public Defender (Molly K. Corbett, Research & Writing Assistant, on the brief), Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Northern District of New York, Albany, N.Y., for Defendant-Appellant.
    Present: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges, JANE A. RESTANI, Judge.
    
    
      
       Judge Jane A. Restani, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Michael Yelverton appeals from a January 10, 2011 judgment of the district court, issued after defendant’s entry of a guilty plea, finding that defendant violated the terms of his supervised release and sentencing him principally to five months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. On appeal, Yelverton argues that the district court’s imposition of a two-year term of supervised release was substantively unreasonable. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.

We review a sentence for a violation of the terms of supervised release using “the same standard as for sentencing generally.” United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir.2005). The substantive reasonableness of the sentence and the procedures employed in arriving at the sentence are reviewed under a deferential “abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Hasan, 586 F.3d 161, 167-68 (2d Cir.2009). “We will ... set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir.2007)).

In challenging the district court’s substantive determination, Yelverton argues principally that the imposition of a two-year term of supervised release was greater than necessary to comply with the purposes outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because the district court also imposed a term of imprisonment as part of its sentence. He maintains that “[t]he additional supervised-release term rendered the sentence of Mr. Yelverton unreasonable because the prison term was adequate punishment for the violations, and the record failed to indicate the additional supervised release would accomplish anything, especially when the district court could not articulate reasons for the additional term.” Def.’s Br. 14.

This argument is without merit. It is abundantly clear from the record that the district court’s decision to impose a two-year term of supervised release in addition to a five-month term of imprisonment was well within the range of permissible decisions. The district court expressly considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and reasonably concluded that the sentence imposed was sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth under that provision. For example, the district court noted Yel-verton’s responsibilities to his son and to his fiancee, and expressed its hope that a term of supervised release would help Yel-verton stay away from further criminal activity. The district court explained that the purpose of supervised release was not to “catch” him, but rather to help him avoid further wrongdoing, including by requiring him to participate in a substance-abuse program that provided for drug testing and treatment.App. 65, 71, 87-89. The record therefore demonstrates that the district court imposed the term of supervised release primarily to deter Yelver-ton’s further criminal conduct and “to provide [Yelverton] with needed ... medical care ... or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (D);. see also United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000) (“Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.”); United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 282 (2d Cir.1994) (noting that courts may consider “medical and rehabilitative needs of the offender” in setting term of supervised release). In addition, the length of the term of supervised release was eminently reasonable in light of Yelvertoris history of repeated violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (directing courts to consider “history and characteristics of the defendant” under § 3553(a)(1) when determining length of supervised release term); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a)(2)(A) (directing courts to consider the need for the sentence imposed “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”).

We have considered Yelvertoris remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  