
    Daniel Webster WRIGHT, aka Abdul Hakim, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D. FIELDS, Correctional Officer, CSP-Sacramento; C. Darling, Correctional Officer, CSP-Sacramento, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 17-15851
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted November 15, 2017 
    
    NOVEMBER 20, 2017
    Daniel Wright, Lancaster, CA, pro se.
    David Charles Goodwin, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Jonathan B. Paul, Esquire, Jesse Rivera & Associates, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Appel-lees.
    Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Daniel Webster Wright appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Wright failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted administrative remedies or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See Ross v. Blake, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858-60, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (setting forth circumstances when administrative remedies are unavailable, including when “prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation”); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies ... means using all steps that the agency-holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     