
    Roland RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION EMPLOYEES, in their individual capacities, Patrick J. Griffin, Superintendent of Sullivan Correctional Facility, C.O. R. Lordo, Sergeant William Haas, Carol Liciago, Facility Nurse—RN, C.O.D. Lawrence, Lieutenant Sipple, C.O. Bruno, Visit Room Officer, Defendants-Appellees.
    
    No. 14-3365.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 22, 2016.
    Ellyde R. Thompson (William B. Adams, on the brief), Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, NY, for Appellant.
    David Lawrence III, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, and Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
    Present: AMALYA L. KEARSE, ROSEMARY S. POOLER and ROBERT D. SACK Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform with the caption above,
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Roland Richardson appeals from the August 12, 2014 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Schofield, /.), dismissing his complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e et seq. On appeal, Richardson argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants because, according to Richardson, there are disputed factual issues concerning whether Richardson’s failure to exhaust is excused under the three-part inquiry articulated in Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680 (2d Cir.2004). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

“We review de novo a district court’s ruling on whether a plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies under the [PLRA].” Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40, 44 (2d Cir.2009). In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we “eonstru[e] all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and affirm[ ] only where ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the mov-ant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Hubbs v. Suffolk Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 788 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir.2015) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)).

The PLRA’s exhaustion provision provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006), the Supreme Court interpreted this provision to require “proper exhaustion.” Id. at 84, 126 S.Ct. 2378. “[A]n untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal” will not suffice. Id. at 83-84, 126 S.Ct. 2378.

Here, there is no serious dispute that Richardson failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, as he failed to take an administrative appeal to the centrar office review committee. Richardson argues, however, that his failure to exhaust should be excused under the three-part inquiry articulated in Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 686. Under Hemphill, to determine whether an inmate’s failure to exhaust should be excused, we ask, first, “whether administrative remedies were in fact ‘available’ to the prisoner.” Id. Second, we “inquire as to whether the defendants may have forfeited the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion by failing to raise or preserve it, or whether the defendants’ own actions inhibiting the inmate’s exhaustion of remedies may estop one or more of the defendants from raising the plaintiffs failure to exhaust as a defense.” Id. (citations omitted). Third, if we “find[ ] that administrative remedies were available to the plaintiff, and that the defendants are not estopped and have not forfeited their non-exhaustion defense, but that the plaintiff nevertheless did not exhaust available remedies, [we] should consider whether ‘special circumstances’ have been plausibly alleged that justify ‘the prisoner’s failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements.’ ” Id. (quoting Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 676 (2d Cir.2004)). While we have questioned the “continued viability” of these exceptions after Woodford, see Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir.2011), there is no need to address that issue here because Richardson has not demonstrated that his failure to exhaust is justified even under pre-Woodford caselaw.

With respect to the first part of the Hemphill inquiry, Richardson’s failure to properly exhaust is not excused because administrative remedies were in fact available to him. Although Richardson claims that he never received the superintendent’s decision denying his grievance, this fact is ultimately irrelevant because department of corrections regulations expressly provide that “[i]f the superintendent fails to respond within the required 25 calendar day time limit[,] the grievant may appeal his/her grievance to [the central office review committee].” N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, 701.8(g). The fact that Richardson was transferred to a different facility after he filed his grievance does not affect this analysis because Richardson retained the ability to appeal his grievance to the central office review committee even after he was transferred. Nor does the fact that Richardson may have believed an appeal to be futile excuse his failure to exhaust. See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 150-51 (2d Cir.2001) (“[T]he alleged ineffectiveness of the administrative remedies that are available does not absolve a prisoner of his obligation to exhaust such remedies when Congress has specifically mandated that he do so.”).

Second, Defendants are not estopped from raising Richardson’s failure to exhaust. Richardson has never contended that he failed to appeal because of threats from prison officials, and any such contention would be implausible given that Defendants’ conduct did not deter Richardson from submitting a grievance to the grievance committee.

Third, there are no “special circumstances” that justify Richardson’s failure to exhaust. Richardson argues that special circumstances exist essentially for the same reasons that he argues exhaustion is excused under the first two parts of the Hemphill inquiry. For the same reasons that Richardson has not demonstrated that exhaustion is excused under the first two parts of the Hemphill inquiry, he has not demonstrated that special circumstances justify his failure to exhaust.

We have considered the remainder of Richardson’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.  