
    Lessee of Anderson v. Brown and Others.
    .A deed upon a sale on execution in 1799, might be executed’ by a sheriff’s deputy, in the name of his principal.
    -An acknowledgment of such deed, made by a deputy after the death of his principal, is void.
    Ejectment. From Athens. This case is submitted upon the following agreed facts : That Ebenezer Sproat was sheriff of Washington county in 1799, and John White his deputy : that a deed was made upon a sheriff’s sale of the property which, after reciting the receipt of writ of levari facias, dated.the 9th of April, 1799, his sale as deputy, proceeded ; “ I, John White, as well by the power and .authority to me given, as in the consideration of, etc., to me paid, etc., do hereby in said capacity, grant, bargain and sell,” etc., in fee, covenanting in his said capacity, that he was “ lawfully authorized to execute the writ,” had duly advertised and sold, and would “ warrant, secure and defend the same against all people.” Signed, John White, •deputy sheriff. This deed was acknowledged before a justice, in June, 1799, snd recorded in September, 1803. In 1836, after the death of Sproat, the sheriff, White appeared in the court of Common Pleas, and .acknowledged the said deed, “ in his said capacity as deputy sheriff,” in open court. The only objection to the plaintiff’s recovery, are-raised to the sheriff’s deed.
    J. T, Brazee, for the defendants, insisted :
    1. That the sheriff had no power to appoint a deputy, as no statute conferred such authority * until 1817 or 1818. The common law right did not prevail in the north western territory at that time. 2. The deed wasexscuted long after the expiration of the sheriffs term -of office, and after his death; and the deputy’s power ceased with that of the principal, unless continued by express statute. Wat. of Shff. 7 Law Lib. 24; 18 Johns. 122 : 4 Ohio, 88. And 3. The deed is void, because not executed in the name of Sproat, the sheriff. All the acts of a deputy-must be done in the name of the sheriff 7 Law Lib. 23.
    J. Welch, for plaintiff
    It is a sufficient reply to the first objection-to refer to Haines v. Linsey, 4 Ohio, 88. The sheriff and deputy are mere ministerial public officers. The rule between principal and agent does not apply, because the law disposes of the property of the defendant in execution ; neither the sheriff nor deputy have any interest. The only act done by the deputy after the death of the sheriff, was to achnowledge the deed. This is merely furnishing evidence-of what he had before done.
   By the Court,

Lane, C. J.

The first objection to the deed is that-the sheriff in 1799, could not lawfully appoint a deputy to make a deed in any form. The power of the sheriff at common law, and without any authority from the statutes, to execute all ministerial duties by deputy, and particularly the power of making sales and deeds, is-fully established by a former judgment of this court. 4 Ohio, 88. The second objection is that the deed was made in the name of White,, the deputy, and not in the name of the sheriff. We think this objection sufficient. Where delegated authority is exercised, it must be exercised in the name of the principal. Where one acts as the attorney of another, the act should purport to be -the act of the constituent. The deputies of a sheriff compose but one officer, and they have no-. authority except that exercised in the name of the principal. If, th'en, as in this case, a deputy assume to convey lands himself in his own name, his acts are void, like those of any other agent. 3. The acknowledgment of the deed was void likewise, for it was nc t until 1836, after the death of the principal. As the act of the agent acquires validity, because it is the act of the constituent, his power-ceases when the capacity of the principal ends. We unite, therefore, in holding the deed void upon both grounds.

Judgment for the defendants.  