
    JUHUA DONG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    Nos. 07-5035-ag (L), 08-3877-ag (Con).
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 31, 2010.
    Theodore N. Cox, New York, New York, for Petitioner.
    Michael F. Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney General; David V. Bernal, Assistant Director; Jesse M. Bless, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, JON O. NEWMAN, PIERRE N. LEVAL, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Juhua Dong, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, séeks review of: (1) a November 2, 2007 order of the BIA, reversing the June 22, 2005 decision of Immigration Judge (“I J”) Robert D. Weisel insofar as it pretermitted her application for asylum as untimely and affirming the IJ’s decision insofar as it denied her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), In re Juhua Dong, [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Nov. 2, 2007), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 22, 2005); (2) a November 2, 2007 order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen, In re Juhua Dong, [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Nov. 2, 2007); and (3) a July 23, 2008 order of the BIA denying her motion to reconsider, In re Juhua Dong, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 23, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

When the BIA issues an independent decision on remand, we review the BIA’s decision alone. See Belortaja v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 619, 622-23 (2d Cir.2007). We review the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.2008). We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider for abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam); Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir.2006). When the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

The BIA did not err in finding that the evidence in support of Dong’s application for relief from removal did not establish that she has a well-founded fear of forced sterilization based on the birth of her U.S. citizen children. We have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of evidence similar to that which Dong submitted and have found no error in its conclusion that such evidence is insufficient to establish an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 156-65.

Likewise, the BIA did not err in denying Dong’s motion to reopen. Contrary to Dong’s assertion that the BIA erroneously required her to satisfy a heightened burden of proof in support of her motion, the BIA did not err in declining to consider her previously available evidence, see INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988), and reasonably concluded that her previously unavailable evidence was not material to her motion because it would not support her ultimate claim of a well-founded fear of forced sterilization, see Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 168-72; see also Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I & N Dec. 247, 251 (BIA 2007) (recognizing that a movant “must meet the heavy burden of showing that if proceedings before the immigration likely change the result in the case”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Insofar as Dong argues that her due process rights were violated by the BIA’s reliance on mistranslated country conditions evidence to deny her motion to reopen, she has no due process right in seeking a discretionary grant of a motion to reopen. Cf. Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 156-57 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that “an alien who has already filed one asylum application, been adjudicated removable and ordered deported, and who has nevertheless remained in the country illegally for several years, does not have a liberty or property interest in a discretionary grant of asylum”).

Because Dong does not sufficiently challenge the BIA’s dispositive determination that her motion to reconsider was untimely, we decline to review the BIA’s denial of that motion. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in these petitions is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in these petitions is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in these petitions is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  