
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
    NOV. 1806.
    Lehre v. Murray.
    Oh a motion for a new trial, the court was equally'dividéd, and it was-adjudged that the verdict should stand.
    An execution of habere facias possessionem having issued in the case, after the decision as herein before reported, application waé ■made to Beevard, J., at Chambers, who granted an order to stay the execution of the writ until the next court, to be held for Sumter district; when the defendant obtained a rule on the plaintiff to shew cause why the judgment in the case, and the said writ of habere facias possessionem,, should not be set aside, Wilds, J., who presided in file court holden for Sumter district, on hearing cause, ordered the judgment and execution to he set aside, as incompatible with the previous proceedings in the cause, and unsupported by the decision of the Constitutional Court at Columbia; whereupon, a motion was made in this court to rescind the said order of the district court, setting aside the judgment.
    Present all the judges, Geimke, Waties, Bat, Teezevant, Beevaed, and Wilds.
    Richardson, in support of the motion,
    contended, that the'decision warranted the judgment to have possession of .the land, as in case of trespass to try title. That Waties, J. had determined on the trial of the action, that the objection on the ground of want of notice indorsed on the original writ, was waived and insufficient; and the judges in the Constitutional Court being equally divided on that point, the determination of the district court remained un. shaken ; therefore the judgment was warranted, and cannot now be overruled and set aside.
    The majority of the judges, namely, Geimke, Waties, Bat, and Teezevant, would not suffer Branding, and Nott, to argue on the other side; but declared that the judgment had been properly entered up, as in case of trespass brought expressly to try titles, following the determination of the district court, which had not been overruled; and, therefore, granted the motion made to rescind the order to set aside the judgment.
   Teezevant, J.

acknowledged that in the opinion which he declared on the former motion for a new trial, he thought the judg-jnent could not be entered for the land.  