
    J. COLEMAN QUEEN, Deceased, ROXANNA HENSON QUEEN, Deceased Widow of J. COLEMAN QUEEN, and W. N. HENSON, Administrator of the Estate of ROXANNA HENSON QUEEN, v. THE CHAMPION FIBRE COMPANY, Employer, and THE GLOBE INDEMNITY COMPANY, CARRIER.
    (Filed 29 June, 1932.)
    Master and Servant P g — Upon death of claimant soon after award is made to her as sole dependent, her administrator is entitled to balance thereof.
    Where compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is awarded the widow of the deceased employee as his sole dependent, and the widow dies within a few months after the award is made: Seld, under a liberal interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Compensation Act the administrator of the widow is entitled to the balance of the award.
    
      Appeal by defendants from Stacie, J., at January Term, 1932, of Haywood.
    Affirmed.
    Tbe judgment of the court below is as follows:
    “This cause coming on to be heard and being heard at this the January Term, 1932, of Haywood Superior Court, before his Honor, A. M. Stack, judge presiding, upon the appeal of the Champion Fibre Company and the Globe Indemnity Company from the judgment rendered by the North Carolina Industrial Commission, the court finds the following facts:
    That J. Coleman Queen was an employee of the Champion Fibre Company at Canton, N. C., and that he lost his life as an employee of the Champion Fibre Company while in the discharge of his duties as such employee. That thereafter Roxanna Henson Queen, his widow, was found by the Commission his sole dependent and was awarded compensation at the rate of $13.41 per week for a period of 350 weeks.
    The court further finds as a fact, from the record and the admission of the parties, that the said J. Coleman Queen left surviving him his widow, Roxanna Henson Queen and several children, that the award and allowance was made to Roxanna Henson Queen. The court further finds as a fact that soon after the award, to wit: on 6 March, 1931, Roxanna Henson Queen, widow as aforesaid, died intestate in Haywood County, North Carolina.
    The court further finds as a fact that W. M. Henson is the duly named and appointed administrator of the estate of Roxanna Henson Queen, deceased, and as such administrator has been made a party hereto in proper form. ■
    The court further finds that on 10 July, 1931, this matter came on to be heard before the Hon. T. A. Wilson, one of the members of the North Carolina Industrial Commission, and that after hearing all the evidence in said ease the said T. A.- Wilson, Commissioner, found the facts and rendered judgment to the effect that W. M. Henson, administrator of Roxanna Henson Queen, deceased, was entitled to recover of the Champion Fibre Company and the Globe Indemnity Company, carrier, the weekly payments of $13.41 per week for the remainder of said period of 350 weeks.
    The court further finds as a fact that on appeal from the said T. A. Wilson, Commissioner, said cause was heard before the North Carolina Industrial Commission, as a whole, and that on 29 October, 1931, the Industrial Commission rendered judgment adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law as set forth in the opinion of the Hon. T. A. Wilson, Commissioner, and from the hearing before the full Commission, the defendants, Champion Fibre Company and Globe Indemnity Company appealed to this court, and after bearing the same and argument of counsel tbe court hereby adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law as set forth in the opinion rendered by T. A. Wilson, Commissioner under date of 10 July, 1931, and further adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law as set forth in the full Commission’s report bearing date 29 October, 1931, and judgment is hereby rendered against the Champion Fibre Company and Globe Indemnity Company for the unpaid compensation under the agreement and judgment heretofore approved and rendered in this cause.
    It is further considered, ordered and adjudged by the court, that the Champion Fibre Company and the Globe Indemnity Company pay the costs incurred on this appeal.”
    The defendants excepted and assigned error to the judgment as signed, and appealed to the Supreme Court.
    
      Jones & Ward for plaintiff.
    
    
      Heazel, Shuford & Hartshorn for defendants.
    
   Clarkson, J.

The question involved in this cause: Where an employee has lost his life in the course of his employment and thereafter an award has been made by the Industrial Commission to his widow, as his sole dependent, and within a few months after the award is made his widow died intestate, is her administrator entitled to the benefits of the award as made to her ? We think so.

In construing the many statutes on this subject the decisions of the different states are conflicting. It seems that there is no straight line on the subject. In this State the following statutes have some bearing:

Section 40 of the Compensation Act reads as follows (chap. 120, Laws of 1929) : “If the deceased employee leaves no dependents, the employer shall pay to the personal representative of the deceased, the commuted amount provided for under section 38 of this act, less the burial expenses which shall be deducted therefrom.”

Section 40 above, of the original act was amended by the 1931 General Assembly by striking out all of said section and adding in lieu thereof, the following (chap. 274, sec. 5) : “If the deceased employee leaves no dependents, the employer shall pay to the next of kin, as herein defined, the commuted amount provided for under section 38 of this act for whole dej>endents; but if the deceased left no next of kin, as herein defined then one-half of said commuted amount shall be paid to the Industrial Commission to be held and disbursed by it in the manner hereinafter provided; one-half of said commuted amount shall be retained by the Industrial Commission and the other one-half paid to the personal representative of the deceased, to be by him distributed to the next of kin as defined in tbe statutes of distribution; but if there be no next of kin as defined in tbe statutes of distribution, then tbe personal representative shall pay tbe same to tbe Industrial Commission after payment of costs of administration,” etc.

Section 38 of tbe original act, provides: “. . . that tbe employer shall pay ... in one of tbe methods hereinafter provided, to tbe dependents of tbe employee wholly dependent upon bis earnings for support, at tbe time of tbe accident, a weekly payment equal to sixty per centum of bis average weekly wages, but not more than - eighteen dollars nor less than seven dollars a week for a period of three hundred fifty weeks from tbe date of tbe injury,” etc.

Tbe insurance carrier received a premium to cover tbe liability in question. J. Coleman Queen, lost bis life in tbe performance of duty and at tbe time an employee of tbe Champion Fibre Company. He left a widow, Roxanna Henson Queen, wholly dependent. Tbe Industrial Commission fixed tbe award that she should be paid. Tbe widow died a few months after tbe award bad been made to her. Plaintiff administrator of Roxanna Henson Queen, claims tbe balance of tbe award. Giving a liberal construction to tbe act, we think tbe administrator is entitled to it. We can see no reason why tbe Globe Indemnity Company, defendant, tbe insurer, is interested in tbe matter. With knowledge of tbe law it took tbe premium to carry tbe liability. Suppose tbe widow died an hour after her husband, would it have been conscionable, for tbe insurance carrier that bad received tbe premium, to pay no compensation? We think not. Tbe carrier is not hurt in this particular situation, now presented. We do not pass upon tbe question that might arise in cases where there are several dependents and there is death among them after tbe award is made. Tbe judgment below is

Affirmed.  