
    *Green against Long.
    In an action for saying of another “ lie is perjured,” it is enough to prove the -words spoken, and that they refer to the plaintiff. If it appear they were spoken in giving testimony in an inferior or particular court, the competence of that court to administer an oath need not be proved, but its incompetence must appear from the defendant.
    This was an action of slander for saying of the plaintiff “you have perjured yourself.” The plea not guilty, with a notice subjoined that it would be proved on the trial, that the plaintiff was examined as a ■witness before a court-martial, held, agreeably to law, upon the defendant, as a captain, for disobedience of orders. The notice then set forth to what the plaintiff testified, that it was material to the charge in issue, and was not the truth. The cause came on before Mr. Justice Kent, at the Washington circuit, in 1803. The plaintiff at the trial proved the words spoken, and to be understood as referring to him ; but the defendant urging, that in addition to this testimony, the proceedings of the court-martial ought to have been produced to evince its existence, and competence to administei an oatb, tbe judge allowed tbe objection, and nonsuited tbe plaintiff.
    Tbe application now made was to set aside this nonsuit, and order a new trial.
    
      Russel, for tbe plaintiff.
    We shall submit to tbe court wbt fcher, in an action for words actionable in themselves, tbe plaintiff is bound to prove more than tbe speaking those wor Is ? Secondly, whether, in case be is, as tbe notice in the present instance acknowledges tbe existence of tbe com !, and proceedings therein, the defendant is not pre-clud jd from taking tbe objection be has raised ?
    
      T\-n Vechlen, contra.
    On tbe first point it is necessary only to inquire whether actionable words may not be explained by others uttered at tbe same time, or by circumstances tending to show that, though in themselves actionable, their actionable quality was done away. Suppose it had been said tbe plaintiff 'was perjured in a court which do?s not exist ? It surely might be shown that there was no such court, and .therefore no perjury could have been committed. As to the second point, the notice is merely provisional, to be availed of if the person chooses. The plaintiff must always prove his case, in the same manner as if a notice was not annexed.
    
      Woodworth, in reply,
    was stopped by
   Sent, Ch. J.

I am clear I was wrong at nisi jprius. It "x'ought to have been intended and presumed, that everything took place before a court of competent jurisdiction. The onus lay on the defendant to show that it was otherwise. As to the argument that there might not have been any such court as that in which the perjury was alleged to have been committed, it would, in my opinion, have been an aggravation of the offence. The assertion might have had all the effects of a charge of perjury before a competent jurisdiction: I am therefore for granting a new trial, with costs to abide the event of the suit.

New trial granted. 
      
       See Hopkins v. Beedle, I Caines’ Rep. 348, n.’(a.)
     