
    Patrick McNamara, Respondent, v. John P. Nolan, Appellant.
    (New York Common Pleas — General Term,
    June, 1895.)
    An order of the City Court of New York allowing a plaintiff to sue as a poor person is one affecting a substantial right, and as such is appeal- • able to the Court of Common Pleas.
    To constitute one a poor person within the meaning of the Code it is not necessary that he be a pauper; it is sufficient that he is not worth §100 besides the wearing apparel and furniture necessary for himself and his family and the subject-matter of the action.
    
      It is not a condition precedent to the granting of the order that the plaintiff should prove his right to recover; it is only necessary that the complaint set forth facts which, if established on the trial, will entitle the plaintiff to a recovery.
    
      McNamara v. Nolan, 11 Misc. Rep. 621, affirmed.
    Appeal from an order of the General Term of the City Court of New York which affirmed an order, made at Special Term, permitting the plaintiff to prosecute the action as a poor person.
    Action against a physician to recover damages for the alleged unskillful medical treatment of the plaintiff’s child, a minor.
    
      John It. Tresidder, for appellant.
    
      J. J. Kcurbry O’ Kennedy, for respondent.
   Bischoff, J.

The action is against a physician to recover damages for the alleged unskillful medical treatment of the plaintiff’s child, a minor; and from an order made at Special Term in the court below, and by the same court affirmed at General Term, permitting the plaintiff to prosecute as a poor person (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 458-467), the defendant has appealed to this court.

The right to costs given to litigants by statute is a substantial one (Sturgis et al., as Bd. of Comrs. of Pilots, v. Spofford et al., Exrs., etc., 58 N. Y. 103) ; and as the effect of the order appealed from is to deprive the defendant of his costs, if the issue of the action proves to o be in his favor, it affects a substantial right, and so is appealable to this court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 3191, subdivision 3.

It is contended for the appellant that the order is erroneous for two reasons, firstly, that the plaintiff does not appear to be a “ poor person ” within the proper meaning of those words, and, secondly, that it does not satisfactorily appear that he has, prima facie, a cause of action against the defendant. Code Civ. Proc. § 460. We are of the opinion, however, that both of these constituents to the validity of the order sufficiently appear from the record, and upon a mere conflict of evidence no reversal should follow. An appellate court should only then reverse upon the facts if the preponderance of the evidence is so greatly against the findings of the court which made the order that there can be said to have been an abuse of judicial discretion (Dietlin v. Egan, 46 N. Y. St. Repr. 763), which is not here the case.

True, a “poor person ” is one who is indigent, dependent upon charity, ,a pauper; but the words also comprehend one who, though not a pauper, is not rich. Century Diet. “ Poor; ” 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,-767, “Poor and Poor Laws,” and cases collected in the notes. The Code, however, has wisely defined the “ poor person ” comprehended hy its provisions to be one who “ is not worth one hundred dollars besides the wearing apparel and furniture necessary for himself and his family, and the subject-matter of the action.” § 459. That the plaintiff comes within this class clearly appears from his verified petition. The defendant’s deposition is subject to discredit as that of a person in interest; but waiving such consideration, there is nothing in his testimony, that the plaintiff resides with his wife and child upon a second floor, consisting of four or five rooms, neatly and comfortably furnished, which in anywise conflicts with the plaintiff’s allegations. The same is to be said with regard to the further fact that the plaintiff is employed and in receipt of fifteen dollars weekly wages.

The Code (§ 460) does not, require the plaintiff, as a condition precedent to the order permitting him to prosecute as a poor person, to prove his right to recover in the action. The court to which the application for such an order is addressed must be “ satisfied ” that the applicant “ has a good cause of action.” Obviously, this implies no more than that the facts alleged must, if true, constitute a cause of action, and that the action is instituted in good faith. In other words, the court is charged with the duty of refusing the order where the facts alleged for the purpose of a recovery do not constitute a cause of action, or the action is not brought in good faith. Here the complaint concededly sets forth alleged facts which, if established upon the trial, will entitle the plaintiff to recovery. Again, the deposition of the defendant’s experts do not so controvert the plaintiff’s allegations regarding the maltreatment of his child that the cause of action may said to be absolutely disproved. As mere opinion evidence, the statements of the experts are not conclusive of the facts to which, they relate-Rogers’ Expert Testimony, 486, § 207.

The order should be affirmed, with costs.

Bookstaver and Pryor, JJ., concur.

Order affirmed, with costs.  