
    Manlove v. Thrift.
    Decided March 20th, 1817.
    3. Arbitration Pendente Lite — Substituted Arbitrator— Entry of Award without Previous Order of Court — If, pending' a suit, the parties, by an Order of Court, refer the matter In controversy to arbitrators, whose award Is to be made the J udgment. of the Court; and, afterwards, by an agreement un. der seal, appoint a substitute for one of them; agreeing that an award, to be made by the remaining referees and such substitute, shall be entered as the .Judgment of the Court; such award may be so entered, without any previous Order of Court confirming the appointment of such substitute.
    2. Appeal — Refusal of Court to Enter Judgment. — A Court’s refusal to enter a Judgment according to an award, without proceeding to determine the controversy, is not a Judgment, from which an Appeal can be taken.
    In an action of slander brought by Robert Manlove against William Thrift, sen’r the parties, by an order of Court, referred the matter in controversy to John Pegram and Thomas Thweatt, whose award was to be made the Judgment of the Court. They afterwards signed and sealed a written agreement, purporting that, as Thomas Thweatt had refused to act as one of the referees, they requested Edward Pegram to serve, in his place, in conjunction with John Pegram, and bound themselves, their heirs, &c. to abide by their decision ; and also agreed that their award should be entered as the Judgment of the Superior Court of Dinwiddie County in the suit then pending therein between them. John Pegram and Edward Pegram accordingly made up an award in writing, declaring that they had heard the parties, and their testimony, and awarded that the defendant pay to the plaintiff five hundred dollars. “Thereupon came the parties by their at-tornies, and the plaintilf moved the Court for Judgment on the award aforesaid, but the Court over-ruled the motion, because Edward Pegram "'was not appointed a referee under an order of the Court; but this Judgment was without prejudice to an action founded on the agreement and award.” “Erom which Judgment the plaintiff appealed.”
    May for the Appellant.
    Eeigh for the Appellee.
    
      
       Arbitration Pendente Lite —Substituted Arbitrator — Entry of Award without Previous Order of Court.— St e principal case cited with approval In State v. Rawson, 25 W Va. 81, and distinguished in Tennant V. Divine. 24 W. Va. 389.
      See further, monographic note on “Arbitration and Award” appended to Bassett v, Cunningham, 9 Gralt. 684.
    
    
      
       Decrees — When Final. — All judgments and decrees are either final or interlocutory. Final judgments or decrees are such as at once put an end to the action or suit. They are the ultimate and final adjustment of the whole matter in controversy, and put the parties out of court. A verdict and judgment in favor of all the defendants except one, in a joint action of trespass, is nota final judgment, and no writ of error will lie until the action has been abated, dismissed or decided as to that one defendant. State v. Hays, 30 W. Va. 118, 3 S. E. Rep. 183.
      See further, monographic note on Decrees” ap pended to Evans v. Spurgin, 11 G-ratt. 615.
    
   March 20th, 1817, the President pronounced the opinion of this Court.

The Court has no doubt but that the Judgment of the Court below, refusing to enter Judgment pursuant to the award, is erroneous, on the principles settled by this Court in the case of Shermer v. Beale, 1 Wash. 11; but the appeal was prematurely allowed, as no final judgment was entered in the case. The Appeal is therefore dismissed with Costs, as having been prematurely granted.  