
    Joe WICKERSHAM; Carter Wickersham, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. State of WASHINGTON; Wendy Willette, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-35265
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted July 12, 2017 Seattle, Washington
    Filed July 24, 2017
    
      Richard L. Pope, Jr., Law Office of Richard Pope, Bellevue, WA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants
    Catherine Hendricks, Senior. Counsel, AGWA—Office of the Washington Attorney General (Seattle), Seattle, WA, Allyson Zipp, Assistant Attorney General, AGWA—Office of the Washington Attorney General (Tumwater), Tumwater, WA, for Defendant-Appellee State of Washington
    Allyson Zipp, Assistant Attorney General, AGWA—Office of the Washington Attorney General (Tumwater), Tumwater, WA, for Defendant-Appellee Wendy Wil-lette
    Before: MURPHY, McKEOWN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Honorable Michael R. Murphy, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs Joe and Carter Wickersham (“the Wickershams”) appeal the denial of their motion to remand and the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity as to their Fourth Amendment claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The district court did not err in denying the Wickershams’ motion to remand. A defendant that has the consent of all other defendants may remove a civil action when the federal courts have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1446(b)(2)(A); see also Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Because all defendants, including the State of Washington, consented, removal here was procedurally proper. Cf. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002) (discussing the separate issue of state sovereign immunity after removal to federal court).

The Wickershams failed to establish that Officer Willette’s entry onto their property constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Namely, the Wickershams have not shown that Officer Willette was acting outside her authority under Wash. Rev. Code § 77.15.080 when she entered the property but did not see a woman actively fishing. In general, an officer whose actions are authorized by a duly enacted statute or ordinance is entitled to qualified immunity. Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 1994).

The Wickershams also cannot show that Officer Willette’s shooting of their dog was an unreasonable seizure. Considering the totality of the circumstances, especially the uncontroverted testimony that the Wick-ershams’ dog lunged at Officer Willette, her actions were reasonable. See San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 975-77 (9th Cir. 2005). Additionally, the Wickershams have failed to identify any clearly established law indicating that, under these facts, Officer Willette violated the law. See id. at 971.

The totality of the circumstances indicates that Officer Willette did not unreasonably seize Joe Wickersham. See Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 875-77 (9th Cir. 1994). Further, Joe Wickersham has failed to identify any clearly established law indicating that, under these facts, Officer Willette violated the law. See Hells Angels, 402 F.3d at 971.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     