
    *Pigg v. Corder.
    March, 1841,
    Richmond.
    (Absent, Staxariv J.)
    Specific Performance — What Are Sufficient Objections to Decree for. — Upon a bill by a son-in-law for specific execution of an agreement or promise of a mother-in-law. brought against her executor, legatee and devisee, after her death : if the terms of the agreement are uncertain — or, if it appear probable, that the promise was made to or for the benefit of the daughter, and not the son-in-law— or, if the plaintiff have delayed for an unreasonable time to assert his claim to specific execution —or if such a change of circumstances has occurred, that the object of the mother-in-law in: making the promise, cannot be accomplished by specific execution ; any of these considerations would be a sufficient objection to a decree for specific execution, much more, all combined.
    Same — Same.—And per Tucker, P., if the promise of the mother-in-law do not appear to have been intended by her as a binding contract, or if it be unreasonable, or if it was iounded on no valuable, or on very inadequate, consideration; equity ought not to decree specific execution, but should leave the party to his remedy at law.
    Same — Variance between Pleading and Proof. — Upon a bill for specific execution of an agreement, the agreement alleged in the bill must be proved by the evidence, and specific execution can only be decreed of the same agreement so alleged and proved ,* it is error to direct specific execution of a different contract — per Tucker, P.
    Elizabeth., the widow of Hezekiah Pigg? married a second husband, Adin Gray, who died in 1816, and by his will gave his whole estate, real and personal, to his wife for life, with power to dispose of one moiety thereof, at her death, in any way or manner she should think proper. She died in 1827, and by her will, reciting the will of her second husband, and the power thereby given her, to dispose, at her death, of a moiety of his estate, she gave and disposed of the moiety thereof to her son, the appellant Clement Pigg. and gave him the whole of her own estate, and appointed him her executor. She *had many grandchildren, the descendants of the two other sons. The appellee Corder married Anne Pigg, the only daughter of Mrs. Gray, by her tinst husband; and she died before her mother.
    In 1828, Corder exhibited a bill in the superior court of chancery of Lynchburg, against Clement Pigg the executor and sole devisee and legatee of Mrs. Gray, and others her heirs at law and next of kin ; wherein he alleged, that he having married Anne Pigg, the only daughter of Mrs. Gray, and having with his wife and family removed to and settled in Kentucky, where he was doing well, Mrs. Gray, in October 1816, wrote him a letter (which had been lost or mislaid, but its contents could be proved) wherein she promised or offered, that if he would sell out his property in Kentucky, remove back to the county of Pittsylvania, Virginia, and settle there beside her, she would give him, Corder, and his family, one third of the whole estate which she at her death would have a right to dispose of; that in consequence of this assurance, Corder sold his property in Kentucky at a sacrifice, removed with his family back to Pittsylvania, and settled there near Mrs. Gray ; that Mrs. Gray, in part compliance with her promise, laid off 200 acres of land for him, built a house upon it, and put him in possession thereof, but did not make him a conveyance of the same ; that she af-terwards brought an ejectment against him for the land, which was pending at her death, and was still pending. That shortly before Corder removed from Kentucky, he being in Virginia, and on a visit to his mother-in-law Mrs. Gray, she gave him a female slave named Charity, who had since had two male children ; that Mrs. Gray intended to deliver him possession of the woman Charity, when he should return with his family to Pittsyl-vania, and to retain till then the possession for him; but that, in fact, she never delivered the possession of the slave to him ; he had demanded the slave of Mrs. Gray, but she refused *to deliver her, and retained the possession of her and her increase as long as she lived. And that Mrs. Gray died many years after these transactions, and by her will gave her whole estate, and all which she had power to dispose of to her son Clement Pigg, and appointed him her executor. And the bill prayed specific execution of Mrs. Gray’s alleged promise or contract of October 1816, above stated ; a decree for one third of her estate, and of all the property she had a right to dispose of, and for the slave Charity and her increase, and the profits thereof ; and general relief.
    Clement Pigg (the only defendant who had any interest in the subject), in his answer, controverted the facts alleged in the bill, touching the promise or contract of Mrs. Gray of October 1816, and insisted, that, even if the facts were true, Corder was not now, under the circumstances, entitled to the relief he prayed ; that his neglect to assert his claim during so many years while Mrs. Gray was living, and the change of circumstances (his wife being now dead), were decisive objections to specific execution of such a contract. And he relied on the statute of limitations as a bar to the claim to the slave Charity and her increase. The cause was transferred, in 1831, to the circuit superior court of Pittsyl-vania. The letter of Mrs. Gray of October 1816 mentioned in the bill, not being produced, nor its contents satisfactorily proved, the court, on a hearing in June 1832, dismissed the bill. But Corder, having after-wards found that letter, filed a bill of review, by leave of the court, exhibiting the letter ; and the controversy was renewed.
    The document now exhibited, and the principal and the only written evidence of the contract alleged in the bill, was a letter of Mrs. Gray, dated the 19th October 1816, addressed “to Shadrach Corder and Nancy his wife,” in the following words :
    *“ Honored son and daughter — I am glad to embrace the opportunity of writing a few lines to you, to let you know that we are all well at present, thanks be to God for his blessings ; hoping that you are enjoying the same state of health. Dear daughter, I want to inform you, that when Mr. Corder was in here last summer after the negro girl Charity that I give her, that he and I made a bargain for him and his family to remove back from the state of Kentucky. I have promised him, that if you did move back here, that I would give you 200 acres of land, and have a house built on it, and the third part of all my estate, as my husband has died, and has left me one half of the estate to do with as I think proper. I am to give Mr. Corder all my hands and plantation, with two mills, as long as I live; and all he can make over and above supporting the family, is to be his own. Also, my dear daughter, I don’t want you to regard your property you have gathered in that part of the world — -but I would part with it on the best terms I could, and move in here — I have a plenty, and you shall have it; and my house shall be your home as long as you live. Still I want you to build on your own. land that I have given you. Will write you another letter in full in a short time. No more at present, but still remains your loving mother till death. (Signed) Elizabeth Gray.”
    
    This letter was written for Mrs. Gray by one Hutchings, by whose deposition it was identified ; and he deposed that it was written at, and agreeably to, her request. It was proved, that she was extremely illiterate. Another witness, named Lovell, deposed, that Corder, not long after the date of the above letter, shewed him two letters from Mrs. Gray ; one of which (now said to be lost) purported to explain her views more fully than the *letter of the 19th October 1816. That other letter was never produced, nor did Corder give any account of it, except that he said it had been lost.
    The deposition of several witnesses, examined on behalf of Corder, were filed, to prove declarations of Mrs. Gray, sometimes in Cor-der’s presence, sometimes when he was absent. These declarations of Mrs. Gray, as stated by the several witnesses, were somewhat variant from each other : they, however, amounted to this, that Mrs. Gray admitted, that she had written the letter of the 19th October 1816 to Corder and his wife; that she had induced Corder to sell off his property in Kentucky, and come back with his family to Pittsylvania, by promising that she would give him possession of her plantation and slaves, and put the whole under his management, and let him take to his own use whatever he could make over and above the support of his and her family; that it was her intention to give Corder and his wife one third of her estate, bat so to give it that Corder should not have a right in it (for fear that if she gave him such right, he might sell it, and go off to the west again), and yet he should enjoy the use of it during his life ; that she intended to lay off 200 acres of land, and to aid Corder in building a house upon it, but she did not intend to vest the right in Corder, “ so that he could make way with it,” but he should have his lifetime in it, and at the death of Corder and his wife, she intended to give it to their son Francis Corder.
    It was proved, that Corder and his wife left Kentucky, and returned to Mrs. Gray’s house, in January 1817, and lived for about a year with her ; that she at first put all her property into Corder’s hands, and gave him the entire management of it, and Corder made one crop ; that, in the mean time, Mrs. Gray had 200 acres of land laid off, and aided Corder in building a house upon it; that after the expiration of about a year, Corder and Mrs. Gray disagreed; and then he and his family *removed from Mrs. Gray’s house to the house which had been built on the 200 acres of land that had been laid off for them, and Corder occupied that house and enjoyed the use of the 200 acres of land till his wife died ; after which Mrs. Gray brought an ejectment for the land, which was pending when she died, and still pending when Corder brought this suit.
    It was proved, that a conveyance of the 200 acres of land had been prepared to be executed by Mrs. Gray, but she said “she had willed it” to Corder and his wife “in the same way, and it was not necessary to sign the deed.”
    This 200 acres of land was about one half of the land of Mrs. Gray’s second husband Adin Gray, of which by his will she was authorized to dispose of a moiety in fee.
    All the property which Corder had in Kentucky, consisted of two wagons and teams, about thirty heads of cattle, and a stock of hogs. He retained one wagon and team, with which he removed his family to "Virginia ; the other wagon and team, and his stock of cattle and hogs, he sold in Kentucky, but there was no proof that he sold them at less than their value.
    A witness named Sally Owen, examined for the defendant, deposes, that she was present at a conversation between the plaintiff Corder and Mrs. Gray, when he was at her house on a visit previous to his removal from Kentucky: in which Mrs. Gray told Corder to tell his wife (her daughter), that Mr. Gray her deceased husband had given her his whole estate during her life, and one half of it to dispose of as she pleased at her •death ; a nd that if she (th e daugh ter) would remove back to Pittsylvania, her (Mrs. Gray’s) house should be her home ; that she would employ him (Corder) as her overseer, and all above the support of her family should be his as long as they could agree, and if they could not agree, she would build her (the daughter) a house on '"'some part of her (Mrs. Gray’s) land, so that she should have a home during her life; and that she intended to give her (the daughter) one third part of her estate for her and her heirs, but that Corder himself should not be one dollar the better thereby, as he had spent too much of her money already. That Mrs. Gray also desired Corder to tell his wife, not to regard disposing of her property, but to come as light as possible, as she (Mrs. Gray) had a plenty here, and would furnish her.
    It appeared in proof, that Mrs. Gray had lent Corder 450 dollars to pay a debt he owed, for which he promised her security; that she afterwards demanded the money, and brought a suit for it, and that this claim was adjusted between them by arbitration.
    It appeared, that Corder had children by his wife ; but whether those children or any of them survived her, did not appear. „
    With regard to the woman slave Charity, it was proved, that Mrs Gray admitted, at the time of Corder’s visit to her previous to his removal from Kentucky, that she had given him, or given his wife, the woman Charity, and told him he was at liberty to take her to the west with him ; but she said, that as he had concluded to return and settle in Pittsylvania, it was unnecessary to incur the expense of carrying her to Kentucky ; and, therefore, he did not take her away. But possession of this slave was never, at any time, actually delivered to Corder or to his wife; on the contrary, Mrs. Gray retained the possession, without interruption and without any claim set up by Corder. The woman Charity had two male children after the alleged gift to Corder, one of whom was sold by Mrs. Gray in her lifetime ; of Charity, and her other child, Mrs. Gray held possession as long as she lived, and died in possession, and they came to the hands of the defendant as executor and legatee of his mother. The defendant had sold Charity, but still held one of her children.
    *On the hearing in 1837, the circuit superior court decreed, that the defendant should convey to Corder for his life, the 200 acres of land above mentioned, and should deliver to him the child of Charity which he yet held, and render an account of the prices for which the woman Charity and her other child had been sold, and the dates of the sales thereof.
    Pigg applied to this court for an appeal from the decree ; which was allowed.
    Heigh, for the appellant.
    R. C. Stanard, for the appellee.
    
      
      He had been counsel in the cause.
    
    
      
      Specific Performance — Discretionary Character.— Every bill filed in a court of equity for the specific execution of a contract in relation to lands, calls for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of equity, and is an application to the sound discretion of the court. It is not a case requiring the interposition of the court at debito justitiae, but rests in the discretion of the court, upon all the circumstances. This rule applies as well when the contract sought tobe enforced is by parol and there has been part execution as to contracts in writing. West Virginia O. & O. L. Co. v. Vinal, 14 W. Va. 686, citing the principal case ; Anthony v. Leftwich, 3 Rand. 238 ; Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 565 ; McComas v. Easley, 21 Gratt. 29.
      The principal case is cited in Rockecharlie v. Rockecharlie, 2 Va. Dec. 586.
      Same- Requisites — Certainty—Variance. — In order that a court of equity may specifically enforce a contract for the sale of real estate, the first essential is that the contract shall be established by competent proof to be clear, definite and unequivocal in all its terms. Moreover, the contract proved must be the contract charged in the bill. The principal case is cited, in support of this proposition in Patrick v. Horton, 3 W. Va. 24; Baldenberg v. Warden, 14 W. Va. 407; Litterall v. Jackson, 80 Va. 613; Edichal Bullion Co. v. Columbia Gold Mining Co., 87 Va. 646, 13 S. E. Rep. 100; Rockecharlie v. Rockecharlie, 2 Va. Dec. 586.
      Same What Adjustments Admissible. — The principal case is cited in Cox v. Cox, 26 Gratt. 309, for the proposition that, where the substance of the agreement can be fully executed, and when a trifling adjustment only is needed to satisfy the equities of the case, performance may be decreed with satisfaction. If. however, the default of the plaintiff goes to the substance of the agreement, or if there be some things which he is bound to do and cannot do, or has not done, and the court cannot compel him to do, equity will not decree specific execution in his favor.
      Same — Laches.—To the point that unreasonable and injurious delay on the part of the plaintiff in filing his bill for specific performance, may preclude a decree in his favor, see the principal case cited in Ford v. Euker, 86 Va. 79, 9 S. E. Rep. 500. The principal case is cited in McCue v. Ralston, 9 Gratt. 436.
      See monographic note on “Laches” appended to Peers v. Barnett, 12 Gratt. 410.
      Same — Parol Gift of Land. — As to the point that a child, who has taken possession and improved land under a verbal gift, may demand specific performance in equity from the parent, see the principal case cited in Frame v. Frame, 32 W. Va. 476, 9 S. E. Rep. 906; Burkholder v. Ludlam, 30 Gratt 262. In the latter case the court said that there was nothing to be found in the principal case in conflict or at all inconsistent with the decision in Shobe v. Carr, 3 Munf. 10.
      But in Cox v. Cox, 26 Gratt. 312. Judhe Staples, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “This court has repeatedly expressed its disapprobation of those pretended contracts based upon declarations by parents of intentions to make certain specific provision for children, in consideration of supposed services rendered or sacrifices made by the latter. Such promises are generally made in the freedom and confidence of domestic intercourse, and without a suspicion that they constitute legal obligations. The efforts constantly made to enforce them fully vindicate the statute of frauds and
      perjuries. Reed’s heirs v. Vannorsdale & wife, 2 Leigh 569; Pigg v. Corder, 12 Leigh 69.”
      See the principal case cited in foot-note to Parrill v. McKinley, 9 Gratt. 1.
      Upon the general subject of “Specific Performance,” see monographic note appended to Hanna v. Wilson, 3 Gratt. 243.
    
    
      
      The letter was so ill-spelt, that there was some difficulty in making out the words intended by the writer. The spelling has been corrected; but the copy in the text is in other respects exact. — Note in Original Edition.
    
   AELEN, J.

I am of opinion, that the decree in this case should be reversed and the bill dismissed.

It is an application for the specific execution of a contract alleged to have been made with the appellee, or with him and his wife, by his mother-in-law Mrs. Gray. Judge Carr, in Anthony v. Keftwich, 3 Rand. 245, says, “ Every bill calling for the exercise of this extraordinary jurisdiction of equity, is an application to the sound discretion of the court. It is not a case requiring the interposition of the court ex debito justitae, but rests in their discretion, upon all the circumstances.” And among the objections which he enumerates to the interference of the court, were, 1. the uncertainty of the agreement ; and 2. the time suffered to elapse before the filing of the bill. Both apply with great force in this case. To which may be added the complete change of circumstances in the situation of the parties before the bill was filed.

The agreement relied on is contained in a letter from Mrs. Gray to the appellee and his wife, dated the 19th October 1816. It was not written by Mrs. Gray, who was an illiterate woman, and, upon its face, is manifestly the production of a most unskillful draftsman. The witness Hutchings deposes, that he wrote it in pursuance *of the instructions of Mrs. Gray ; but it is very doubtful, whether a writing drawn up by one so unaccustomed to write, could be relied on as expressing her real intentions. It is proved by the witness Lovell, that not long after the date of this letter, the appellee shewed him two letters from Mrs. Gray, one of which (said to be lost) purported to give the views of Mrs. Gray more fully than the letter filed. Another witness, Sally Owens, proves, that she was present at a conversation between the appellee and Mrs. Gray, when he was in Virginia, on a visit from Kentucky, the time when the agreement was made, which is referred to in the letter of the 19th October 1816. In this conversation, Mrs. Gray told the appellee to inform her daughter, yrhat she intended to do for her if they returned, but added, that the appellee should not himself be one dollar the better thereby, as he had spent too much of her money already. From this evidence, it appears the plaintiff was in possession of another letter, which he has not produced, and which, according to the evidence of Lovell, set out the agreement more fully than the letter he has produced ; but what that agreement was we know not. And the evidence of Owens, confirmed by the whole current of the proofs, even by the letter of the 19th October 1-816, phews, that the daughter was the object of the mother’s bounty : it was for her she intended to provide ; and she did not contemplate any provision for the appellee distinct from her. It was contended in argument, that the letter contained either a promise to give the land to the husband, or to the husband and wife. I think the promise was intended for the wife alone, especially when the letter is taken in connection with the other proofs in the case. But the uncertainty which rests upon the character of the promise, is of itself a strong objection to the relief prayed ; and this uncertainty, taken in connection with the circumstances, that the letter was not written by Mrs. Gray, but by another *person who may have misapprehended her views, and that another letter was written stating the terms of the contract.more fully, and perhaps differently, which letter is not produced, furnishes to my mind an insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of equity decreeing a specific execution. .

Then, as to the time ; the letter is dated in October 1816. The appellee returned to Virginia in January 1817. He remained with Mrs Gray that year; they quarrelled ánd separated; controversies arose between them ; a suit was instituted against him by Mrs. Gray, for a large sum she had lent him, which was settled by arbitration. All this occurred many years before Mrs. Gray’s death; and this suit was not commenced until November 1828. There was no reason for such long delay. “It is laid down generally,” says Judge Carr, (in Anthony v. Left-wich) “that he who comes for a specific execution, must not sleep on his case, but come recently. Time is pretty certain te» operate a change in the circumstances of the parties, and the situation of the subject matter of the contract. It destroys evidence ; it cuts off the parties to the transaction ; and their successors know not how to explain what they might have made perfectly clear.” All this has occurred in the present instance. Mrs. Gray is dead : her daughter, the object of her solicitude, is dead ; evidence which is shewn to have once existed is lost, or perhaps withheld ; and the property has been disposed of to another. There could have been no considerations of good will or friendship, which restrained the appellee from asserting his rights at an earlier period, for they had differed and were at law. Such gross negligence, if there were no other objection, should prevent the interference of a court of equity.

And in the last place, there has been an entire change in the circumstances of the parties. Mrs. Corder is dead. Mrs. Gray’s promise was made to provide her with a *home. The evidence shews she did not contemplate any permanent provision for the appellee, except so far as he might be benefited by the provision for his wife. To permit him now to assert the contract, would, under the changed condition of the parties, violate the intention of the party by whom the promise was made.

As to the slave Charity and her increase: there are two objections to the relief granted, either of which is decisive. To constitute a valid parol gift of slave property, there must be a delivery. Here no delivery was made; the slave never left the possession of the donor. It was nothing but a promise to give, and being without consideration never could be enforced. In the second place, if there had been a delivery, the slave was instantly returned and continued in possession of Mrs. Gray until her death; and though the bill avers a demand, and her refusal to give her up, no suit was brought for more than ten years after the alleged gift. In the mean time, Mrs Gray sold one of the slaves, and she died in possession of the other two. If the appellee ever had a claim, it is barred by the statute of limitations, which is relied on the answer.

CABELL and BROOKE), J., concurred.

TUCKER, P.

Whether the evidence in this record establishes any claim against the appellant or not, it is apparent, that, upon legal principles, this decree can never be supported. The bill set up one claim, the testimony goes to prove another, and the decree is for a third. The bill alleges a promise to give one third of the estate which Mrs. Gray had a right to dispose of, to the plaintiff, Corder ; the letter produced as evidence of the contract, goes to prove, that Mrs. Gray had'promised not one third of her estate, but 200 acres of land definitively, and this was to be given not to Corder himself .but to his wife; and the decree is for a life estate *to Corder in the 200 acres of land. These discrepancies are fatal to the case, unless we discard at once those principles which require the proofs to correspond with the demand, and the relief afforded to be consistent with both. If, then, there were nothing more in the case, I should be of opinion to reverse the decree and dismiss the plaintiff’s bill.

But the objections to his case are yet more radical. Whether we consider the paper called the contract, or its reasonableness, or the consideration of it, or the performance on his part by Corder, or his delay in asserting' his rights, or the evidence afforded by that delay of abandonment, we must come to the conclusion, that this is no case for specific execution.

With respect to the letter itself, which is introduced by the bill of review, and which supersedes all the oral testimony as to the contract, I am of opinion, that it ought not to be taken to be, in itself, a contract binding Mrs. Gray. I have always thought, that the loose dicta of some of the judges in Rowton v. Rowton, 1 Hen. & Munf. 91, were calculated to give rise to claims on the part of children and sons-in-law, to conveyances, upon pretended contracts, sustained by evidence of loose family conversations or correspondence, and of abandonment of imaginary profits in consideration of the promise of a title to real estate. I have always thought there was much good sense in the remark of Chancellor Kent, “that it would be injurious to that freedom of intercourse, and to the operation of those kind and generous affections which ought to be cherished in the circle of domestic connections, to deduce a trust from loose and general expressions in a confidential correspondence, between one member of a family and another, and to give them the force of legal obligations.” 5 Johns. 13. What parent could address a letter to his child in the free and unreserved language of affection, if he is to be trepanned into a contract by every expression of favorable intentions ^towards his offspring ? What parent, in the use of such expressions, means anything more, than to indicate that, in the exercise of his own free will — in the fulfilment ex mero motu of his parental obligations to provide for his child — it is his purpose to make a particular provision. What parent, by such language, conceives himself tied down by an obligatory contract, for which he has received not a stiver, merely upon the pretence that his son has given up some scheme of fancied profit to gratify a father’s wishes ? The natural interpretation of all such transactions is the reverse of this. If I were even to propose distinctly to my son-in-law, that if he would leave the place in which he resides and settle my daughter near me, I would give her a particular estate, it might, nevertheless, admit of doubt, whether without some definitive arrangement, the parties would have an obligatory claim upon me, or must look altogether to the exercise of my untrammelled discretion in the bestowal of this gratuity. The latter would be the fair inference, at least where instead of asserting their rights in my lifetime they lie by till my death, depending upon my voluntary act, and setting up no pretence to bind me until the grave has closed upon me and on their hopes. It is then too late to demand from my justice what in my lifetime they had looked to only from my affection and munificence. The ordinary principles which require promptness in the assertion of the right to specific performance, apply with peculiar force, where no consideration is given, and where from that circumstance there is always reason to doubt, whether there was any intention in the parent to bind himself irrevocably by contract.

In the present case, indeed, there are strong expressions which have been relied on to prove there was a contract. Mrs. Gray says, that Corder and herself made “ a bargain.” But, besides that this form of this expression, in familiar use, does not always mean a technical contract, *it would be going far indeed, to take this most inartificial letter, of a woman who could not write, written by a scribe who could not spell, and the terms of which are not defined, to be a contract binding her absolutely, without consideration save love and affection, to convey the whole of the land she had to dispose of, to her daughter, when she had three sons, or their descendants, to provide for. Add to this, that in the bill itself, and in the evidence of various witnesses, it is stated, that Mrs. Gray was to convey one third only of what her second husband left her, and not the 200 acres (which was all the land in which she had a fee under his will); and we may well question, whether this paper contains the true understanding of the parties. But every doubt is removed, when we see that she promises “ to write another letter in full in a short time,” and when we find that she did write another letter, which explained her views more fully, and which the plaintiff has not produced. Whether he has suppressed it, or has not taken care of it, because he looked upon neither of the letters as of any importance, it is not necessary to enquire. On the ground, therefore, that it does not satisfactorily appear that this letter does contain the real contract of the parties, if any, and that it is of itself doubtful and uncertain, I should be clearly of opinion to deny the relief asked by the bill, or that given by the decree.

There are, however, other vital objections to the plaintiff’s case. What was the consideration of this pretended contract ? There was none moving to her, except affection for her child ; and it is therefore attempted to supply the want of it, by his pretended losses and sacrifices in the sale of his property in Kentucky. His property consisted of little more than two wagons and two teams ; and there is no proof that these were sacrificed. What adequate consideration then was there for the conveyance of a tract of 200 acres of land and other *property ? It is said he sacrified his prospects. What those prospects were, does not appear. From his past successes, they could not have been very flattering. But be this as it may, a decree for specific performance, being a matter of discretion, a court of equity will never make it, where the consideration is inadequate, but will leave the party to his action for damages for the breach of the contract. And this is the more proper, where the contract was in its origin unreasonable, where the lapse of time and change of circumstances have rendered it more so, where the evidence of performance on his part by the plaintiff is at least unsatisfactory, and the presumption of his abandonment of title, if he ever imagined he had any, is well nigh conclusive. Was it reasonable, in the first instance, that Mrs. Gray should have promised to give to her daughter and son-in-law, the whole of her disposable lands, when she had sons and grandchildren having equal claims upon her affections ? Was it reasonable, that she should be compelled to do so for the imaginary sacrifices made by her son-in-law in his property'and his prospects? and this too, without any security provided by the contract, that as soon as he had got the title he would not sell the property and move out again to the west ? Was it reasonable to enforce the contract in favour of Corder when the main objects of Mrs. Gray, the desire. namely, of her daughter’s society, and of his services in her family, were frustrated by the quarrel between them in a few months, arising as it seems to me from his own misconduct ? And would it now be reasonable, after the death of Mrs. Gray, and of her daughter, and .the laches of the plaintiff, to assert his claims until ten or twelve years had elapsed, and the other contracting party was in her grave ? I think not, and have no hesitation in saying that as to the land, the decree should be reversed and the bill dismissed.

*1 am also of the same opinion as to the slaves, for the reasons so well presented by my brother Allen in his views of the plaintiff’s pretensions.

Decree reversed, and bill dismissed.  