
    The People ex rel., John Lynch and James Lynch, Relators, v. John Duffy, as Sheriff, etc., Resp’t.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term,, Second Department,
    
    
      Filed June 25, 1888.)
    
    1. Municipal corporation—Charter oe Mt. Vernon—Laws 1887, chap. 544—Legislative power. •
    It was competent for the legislature by Laws 1887, chap. 544 (an act incorporating the village of Mt. Vernon), to give the police justice therein provided for. exclusive jurisdiction of all criminal processes within the corporate limits of the village, when he was present and able to act within the said village. The power to take away the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace in criminal cases follows by necessity from the power to create a. police justice.
    3. Same—Act not within title 3, § 18 op constitution.
    The act is not a local act, decreasing the fees of public officers, within the provisions of section 18, title 3 of the constitution of the state.
    3, Same—Title op act sufficient.
    The title of the act “An act to amend the general laws as to the incorporation of the village of Mount Vernon, and to enlarge the powers of its officers, and to extend and enlarge the powers of the corporation,” was sufficient. The provisions of the act are all addressed to the government of the village, and are all germane to the title.
    Appeal from an order made by the county judge of' Westchester county discharging from the custody of the respondent the relators from further imprisonment in proceedings upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus.
    
    
      P. L. McClellan and Martin J. Keogh, for resp’t; Lawlor & Swits, for relators.
   Barnard, P. J.

The legislature in 1887 substantially incorporated the village of Mt. Vernon. By the act, chapter 544, Laws of 1887, there was a police justice provided for, and this officer was given exclusive jurisdiction of all criminal process within the corporation limits of the village,, when he was present and able to act within the village. The relator was arrested on a criminal complaint by the warrant from the justice of the peace when the police justice was present in the village and ready to act. The accused was released on habeas corpus, and this appeal brings up for review the propriety of this order. It was competent for the legislature to clothe police justices with the power to exclusively issue all criminal processes within the corporate limits. There is scarcely a city where such an officer does not exist in some form and under some name, either judge, police justice or recorder. The power was sustained in Sill v. The Village of Corning (15 N. Y., 297), and this decision was applied in the People v. Porter 90 N. Y., 73. The power to take away the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, in criminal cases, follows by necessity from the powers to create a police justice. The act is not a local act decreasing the fees of public officers within the provisions of section 18, title 3, of the Constitution. The title of the act was sufficient. It was designated as an act to amend the general laws, as to the incorporation of villages as to the village of Mount Vernon, and to enlarge the powers of its officers, and to extend and enlarge the powers of the corporation. The provisions of the act are all addressed to the government of the village, and all are germane to the title. Matter of Department of Parks, 86 N. Y., 440; Matter of Knaust, 101 N. Y., 190.

The order should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs. Peatt and Dykman, JJ., concur.  