
    YOUNGBLOOD v. STATE.
    (No. 7008.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    June 7, 1922.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 1922.)
    1. Criminal law <©=►!032(I) — Objections to state’s pleading, not fundamental, must be made below.
    Objections to the sufficiency of the state’s pleadings, which do not involve any fundamental defect, cannot be considered when raised for the first time on appeal.
    2. Disorderly house <®=>d7—Evidence held to sustain conviction for keeping a bawdyhouse.
    Evidence held to sustain conviction for aiding and assisting in keeping a bawdyhouse.
    3. Criminal law <©=>939(1)—New trial to hear new evidence not warranted where evidence not offered at trial.
    A motion for a new trial, based upon the charge that an officer has falsely testified as to the number of times accused has been arrested, and offering to introduce contradicting testimony, is without merit when no effort was made at trial to produce such testimony or to secure a nostponement for that purpose.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    4. Disorderly house <©=>17—Evidence connecting accused with a disorderly house held to support conviction.
    Proof of the general reputation of a disorderly house will not alone support a conviction for its maintenance, though it is amply sufficient, when supported by the evidence connecting the accused with the place and tending to show the character of the inmates.
    Appeal from Wichita County Court at Law; Guy Rogers, Judge.
    Juanita Youngblood was convicted of aiding and assisting in keeping a bawdyhouse, and she appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Mathis & Caldwell, of Wichita Falls, for appellant.
    R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   LATTIMORE, J.

Appellant was convicted in the county court at law of Wichita county of aiding and assisting in the keeping of a bawdyhouse, and her punishment fixed at a fine of $200 and 20 days in the county jail.

The case is before us without a single bill of exceptions. There was no motion made to quash the complaint or information in the trial court, and no motion in arrest of judgment. We cannot consider complaints of the sufficiency of the state’s pleadings which do not go to any fundamental defect when made for the first time in this court.

The evidence introduced on behalf of the state appears to us amply sufficient to justify the verdict. It was shown by witnesses that appellant had been for many years ,a common prostitute, and her statements to various people of her ownership and control of the premises charged to have been occupied by her as a bawdyhouse appear in the record. There is much evidence of the resorting to said place of many people for a long period of time and of the presence there of other women of similar reputation to that of appellant. It was shown that on one occasion a woman and man were found in bed together in a rear room of the house, and that appellant attempted to give them some character of warning of the coming of the officers.

In her motion for new trial appellant set up the fact that an officer had testified falsely with regard to the number of times that she had been arrested and had paid fines for prostitution. We are unable to see how appellant’s offer to prove the fact of such falsity in support of her motion for new trial would have demanded at the hands of the trial court the granting of such motion. No reason is shown why said contradicting evidence might not have been produced upon the trial of the case if same was desired. We are not impressed with the fact that one may sit quietly by and listen to testimony asserting that such party has been arrested a number of times, and without any claim of surprise at such testimony, or any attempt at a postponement in order to have time to procure testimony to overcome that so claimed to be false, the trial be allowed by the accused to proceed to judgment and then an attack be made upon the judgment by way of a request that a new trial be granted in order to permit the bringing in of testimony to show that the evidence above mentioned was false.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

MORROW, P. J.

Referring to Levy v. State, 84 Tex. Cr. R. 493, 208 S. W. 667, appellant insists that the evidence is inadequate to support the judgment of conviction. We do not interpret the Levy Case as changing the rule, but simply as declaring that under the established rule the evidence was insufficient in that case. The rule is stated in many decisions, which are collated in Vernon’s Texas Crim. Statutes 1916, vol. 1, p. 245; Stone v. State, 22 Tex. App. 185, 2 S. W. 585. The character of the house may be established by proof of its general reputation, but such proof alone will not support a conviction. Sara v. State, 22 Tex. App. 639, 3 S.W. 339; Roeder v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 200, 45 S. W. 570. In the instant case the state does not depend on reputation alone. It also established appellant’s connection with the house. There was evidence to show that its inmates were common prostitutes. It was permissible to prove their reputation as such. Wimberly v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 11, 108 143, 29 S. W. 779; Sprague v. State (Tex. S. W. 384; Golden v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. Cr. App.) 44 S. W. 837. Moreover, evidence of their acts and conduct tending to show circumstantially their occupation was before the jury. This character of proof has often been approved. Hickman v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 88, 126 S. W. 1149; Robbins v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 523, 132 S. W. 770. A synopsis of the evidence is given in the original opinion. We deem it unnecessary to pursue it in detail, suffice to say that our reconsideration of the record confirms our original conclusion that affirmance of the judgment was proper.

The motion for rehearing is overruled. 
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