
    SIMMONS v. STATE.
    (No. 7422.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    March 14, 1923.)
    1. Intoxicating liquors <©=>236(4)— Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction for manufacturing intoxicating liquor.
    In a prosecution for manufacturing intoxicating liquor, evidence held sufficient to sustain the theory of the prosecution that the accused and another were acting together in the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor.
    2. Intoxicating liquors <©=>202 — Allegation that manufacture of whisky was for purpose of sale held unnecessary.
    An allegation in an indictment for the unlawful manufacture of whisky that it was for the purpose of sale was unnecessary.
    3. Criminal law <&wkey;449(I) — Admission of opinion testimony of method of making whisky not error.
    In a prosecution for illegal manufacture of intoxicating liquor, admitting the testimony of a witness that he knew what processes were necessary for converting mash into whisky, and that it was necessary for the mash to ferment and boil, was not error.
    4. Intoxicating liquors <©=>233(1)— Proof that one who assisted accused to manufacture liquor made his headquarters at garage of accused held competent.
    In a prosecution for unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor, where the accused was arrested on the premises of another, where a still and whisky were found, in order to show the relationship and intimacy between the accused and the other person, proof that such person made his headquarters at the garage of the accused was competent.
    5. Intoxicating liquors <©=>229 — Inquiry as to accused’s knowledge of guilt of person on whose promises accused was arrested held not error.
    In a prosecution for unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor, where the accused was arrested on the premises of another where a still and whisky were found, inquiry of the accused touching his knowledge of the fact that the other person was engaged in manufacturing whisky, and the accused’s opportunities of knowing that fact, held not error.
    6. Criminal law <©=>792(2) — Charge on law of principals held proper.
    In a prosecution for unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor, where the accused was arrested on the premises of another, who was also present, an,d a still and whisky were found on the premises, it was proper for the court to charge on the law of principals.
    Appeal from Criminal District Court, Tar-rant County; George E. Hosey, Judge.
    Walter Simmons was convicted of the manufacture of intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Jesse M. Brown, Or. Dist. Atty., of Fort Worth, and R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

Conviction is for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor; punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for one year.

From the state’s testimony it appears that the state’s witness went to the home of one Adams; that he there found some whisky in an outhouse on Adams’ premises. Adams was present, as was also the appellant. There was a still in operation at the time, and whisky in the process of making. When the officer entered the house, there were no lights burning but, using a flashlight, he saw the appellant with a little stick stirring in a barrel which contained mash. The still was sitting on a little oil stove, and the mash was getting warm. The fire was burning, but there had not been sufficient heat to cause the whisky to “pay off.”

Appellant’s testimony was to the effect that he was merely a guest of Mr. Adams; that he had no knowledge that he. was manufacturing liquor; that he had tM'en in the house only about 10 or 15 minutes at the time the officers arrived; that he was not stirring the mash in the barrel, but was standing there waiting for Mr. Adams to come from the house where he had gone for some purpose unknown to the appellant. He admitted on cross-examination that prior to the time the officers came the light was burning in the room; that Adams turned it off as he went out. He also said that he, at Adams’ request, helped to dump the barrel of mash.

Against the indictment the point was made that it did not allege that the manufacture of whisky was for the purpose of sale. This allegation was not necessary. Stringer v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 241 S. W. 159; Ex parte Mitchum, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 62, 237 S. W. 936.

We fail to discern any merit in the bill of exceptions complaining of the receipt of testimony of one of the witnesses to the effect that he knew what processes were necessary in converting the mash into whisky, and his statement that it was necessary f<Sr it to ferment and boil. One of the objections urged was that the witness was a nonexpert, and that the testimony was hypothetical. The bill does not show that the witness was 'a nonexpert. On the contrary, the injury touching his knowledge seems to have qualified him to give the testimony.

In order to show the relationship and intimacy between the appellant and Adams, on whose premises the still and whisky were found, and on which the appellant was arrested, it was competent to prove that Adams, made his “headquarters” at the garage belonging to the appellant. The bill complaining of this proof reveals no error, the same is true with reference to the inquiry of appellant touching his knowledge of the fact that Adams was engaged in manufacturing whisky and his opportunities for knowing that fact.

It was proper for the court to charge 'on the law of principals, and the charge upon that subject apparently follows the' approved precedents.

The evidence of guilt is not the most satisfactory, but, in view of the fact that it was so regarded by the jury and the trial judge, it is sufficient to sustain the state’s theory that appellant and Adams were acting together in the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor, and therefore this court does not feel warranted in disturbing the verdict.

The judgment Is affirmed: 
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