
    Smith et al. v. Dobbins.
    1. Where several executions in favor of different plaintiffs have been , levied on the same property, and one person has filed in resistance to each levy a separate claim, and the claim cases thus made are pending in court, all involving the same question, and it being one upon the decision of which the subjection or non-subjection of the property to all the executions depends, an equitable petition will lie in favor of the claimant against all the plaintiffs jointly, to bring to trial all of the claims together, and dispose of them by one verdict and judgment.
    2. An agreement between an insolvent debtor whose land is about to be sold at sheriff’s sale under execution, and another not a party to the same, to the effect that the latter will purchase the land and give the former a year’s time to refund the purchase money with interest, and thereupon convey to him the land, the plaintiff in fi.fa. not participating in the agreement, is not per se fraudulent as against the debtor’s creditors. Nor is such agreement rendered fraudulent by a stipulation that the debtor should have the crop then upon the land without paying for it, nor by a stipulation that the succeeding year’s crop should be the property of the purchaser at the sheriff’s sale in case the debtor failed to take the land and pay for it within the time agreed upon.
    3. After the purchase of the land at the sheriff’s sale, in pursuance of the agreement above set forth, the purchaser was the exclusive owner thereof, and the debtor had no interest in it subject to levy and sale. That the purchaser extinguished the debtor’s right to pay for and take the land by paying him, or his assigns, a consideration for such extinguishment, was not a fraud upon his creditors, the debtor having paid nothing whatever for such right, nor upon the agreement out of which it sprang.
    May 27, 1891.
    Equity. Debtor and creditor. Fraud. Contracts. Levy and sale. Before Judge Milner. Bartow superior court. January term, 1890.
    Dobbins by his bill filed June 11, 1887, alleged the following : Sometime previous to the first Tuesday in October, 1881, one Burkhalter had bargained with W. T. Wofford, then in life, to sell Wofford certain land (describing it), and for the purchase price of the land Wofford had given Burkhalter his promissory notes, taking BurkhalterV bond for titles. Wofford paid a part of the purchase money, and having failed to pay the balance, Burkhalter brought suit therefor, obtained judgment and had execution levied upon the land, after filing his deed to Wofiord in the office of the clerk of the superior Court. After due advertisement the laud was sold by the sheriff, under the levy, on the first Tuesday in October, 1881, at public outcry to the highest bidder, and was knocked off to complainant for $4,150, which he paid, and the sheriff made him a deed. On the same day and after the sale, Wofford asked him for a chance to buy the land back, and he agreed with Wofford to allow him to do so at the amount of his (complainant’s) bid and eight per cent, interest per annum, to be paid by October 4th following, which agreement was reduced to writing, and a copy of it is annexed to the bill. Shortly before the last named date, Wofford found he was unable to pay, and transferred all his rights under the contract to T. K. Jones, who was his creditor, the consideration of the transfer being the settlement of a note for $800 held by Jones aginst Wofford, and the payment of $800 by Jones to Wofford. On September 23, 1882, Jones presented to complainant the writing obtained by him from Wofford, and complainant, desiring to hold the place, paid Jones $1,200 for the relinquishment of all Jones’ rights under the writing and took a transfer of it. All the transactions above mentioned were in good faith and with no intention on complainant’s part to wrong any one, and he believed and believes neither Wofford nor Jones had any intention to wrong any one. Complainant had gone into possession shortly after the sheriff’s sale, was in possession when he purchased Jones’ rights, and from that time on had so remained. After he had been in possession over two years and had made valuable improvements, J. M. Smith, having on January 11,1883, obtained a judgment against Wofford, had a Ji. fa. 
      issued and levied on a portion of the land, to which complainant filed his claim, which claim was tried and a portion of the property was found subject, and complainant moved for a new trial which was granted. Afterwards, on September 1, 1886, a fi. fa. in favor of M. L. Johnson against the executrix of "Wofford, one in favor of the same person against Wofford, and one in favor of the same person as guardian against Wofford, were levied on the land, and complainant filed separate claims which were returned to court and are now pending. On January 24, 1887, a fi.fa. in favor of Satterfield against W. T. Wofford as principal, and J. C; Wofford as endorser, was levied upon the same land, and to this complainant filed his claim which was returned to court, where it is now pending, but since the claim was filed Sattei'field has' died intestate and there is no administx'ation on his estate, for which reason his estate is not made a party defendant. Plaintiffs in these various fi. fas. claim that complainant procured his title in fraud of the rights of creditors of W. T. Wofford, who died May, 1884, leaving his estate utterly insolvent, and besides the fi. fas. named there are a number of others which will probably be levied so as to put complainant to the annoyance axid expense of a number of trials, unless this bill is sustained compelling all of the issues to be tried and disposed of therein. All the charges of fraud are denied by complainant; he had evei-v x-eason to believe and did believe that the sheriff’s sale was fair and open and nothing done to deter any one from biddixxg ; he entered into his agreement with Wofford after the sale, being moved by appeals being made to him by Wofford and out of kind feelings éxcited by these appeals, and without any hint from Wofford that he desired or intended by such arrangement to hinder, delay or defraud his creditor's, nor was the true status of the matter sought to be kept secret, but it was all done honestly that Woftord might, if he could, procure the money to buy the land back, which, if he had done so, would have been to the benefit of his creditors. The land brought its full cash value at the sheriffs sale, and since he bought it complainant has put upon it valuable improvements to the extent of about $5,000, nearly all of which were made before the above mentioned levies, and without notice on his part that any one would or could question the validity of his title. He charges that said creditors have'conspired for the purpose of annoying and harassing him, hoping to induce him to pay them considerable sums of money to buy his peace. As his remedy is less adequate at law than in equity, and in order to avoid the delay, expense and trouble of a multiplicity of suits and so many scparate trials involving the same issues, he prays that each of the plaintifts in ft. fa. be enjoined from proceeding with the claim cases and be compelled to submit their alleged rights to adjudication under this bill; that the rights of all parties be settled by final decree under it; that so soon as the estate of Satterfield is represented, he have leave to amend his bill by making the administrator a pai'ty defendant; for temporary restraining order, perpetual injunction, general relief, etc. He waived discovery. Exhibited with the bill was a copy of the agreement made between Dobbins and Wofford, the transfer to Jones, and the transfer by Jones to Dobbins. The agreement was signed by Dobbins, dated October 4, 1881, and recited that Dobbins that day had bought the land, which contained 1,200 acres, more or less, and that day went into possession of it, “but except the present crops, with the understanding that any tenant I may rent to have the right to sow gram and grass of any kind and make any other improvement I, the said Dobbins, may think proper for the preparation of crops for the ensuing year”; and that should Wofford pay to Dobbins, or his legal representatives, $4,150 with interest from date at eight per cent, per annum, on or before October 4,1882, the crops then on the lands being reserved to Dobbins with the right to remove them, Dobbins would make to Wofford or to his legal representatives or assigns quit-claim deed to the land. IJpon this agreement was an order from Wofford to Dobbins to make to Jones a deed to the land on Jones paying Dobbins the $4,150 and interest, dated September 22, 1882. Also, the transfer by Jones to Dobbins, • which was “for value received” and was dated September 23, 1882.
    The defendants demurred on the grounds that there was no equity in the bill; that it was multifarious ; that complainant had a full, adequate and complete remedy at law, and the facts alleged showed that a court of law had already taken jurisdiction of the cases, and the ease of Smith was pending on writ of error in the Supreme Court, so that of that case the superior court no longer had jurisdiction; and that the bill was filed since 1885, and under the law as it stood when it was filed and now, even if complainant were entitled to relief, he could have obtained it by proper pleadings in any one of the claim cases. The defendants answered, in brief, as follows : The alleged judgment of Burkhaíter was a nullity, because it was granted by the court without a verdict when an issuable plea under oath was on file, and all the sales or proceedings under it are void and did not divest Wofford’s title. The lands were bid off at the sheriff’s sale by Dobbins for $4,000, and he paid $4,150 under the fraudulent scheme. The agreement between Dobbins and Wofford was made before the sale, though it may have been put in writing ' afterwards. Jones did relinquish his rights to Dobbins, but on the basis of $1,600 instead of $1,200, and Dobbins did not act in good faith in this matter. When tlic bill was filed the grant of a new trial in the case of Smith against Dobbius, claimant, had been excepted to, and the case was pending in the Supreme Court, and therefore the superior court had no jurisdiction of that case. The estate of Satterfield had no interest in the Satterfield^, fa., as J. C. Wofford, before Satterfield’s death, as endorser, paid Satterfield the money due on the fi. fa., aud it is now proceeding for the benefit of J. C. Wofford. W. T. Wofford is dead and his estate is insolvent, and he was insolvent October 4,1881. The land did not bring its value at the sheriff’s sale by $2,000 or more. If Dohhius made improvements on it he did not make them iu good faith, as he had full notice of the worthlessness of his title. There has been no conspiracy among defendants, hut they antagonized each other, each claiming priority if the property is subjected. Before the sheriff’s sale Dobbins, Burkhalter and W. T. Wofford agreed, in fraud of all other creditors of Wofford, that the land he sold and that Dobbins should bid it off, and whatever his bid might he he should pay Burkhalter his debt and give Wofford twelve months in which to redeem the land, both Dobbins and Burkhalter knowing at the time that Wofford was insolvent and that the land was worth $7,000. This combination was not only known aud rumored among the bystanders at the sale, but Burkhalter told several persons that the sale would be for Wofford’s best interest, and Wofford, before the sale, told others that the arrangement had been made. By this means bidding was depressed, only one bid being made, which was Dobbins’ at $4,000, and while the sheriff was- crying this, Dobbins, Wofford and Burkhalter, a few feet off^ had a consultation in which Burkhalter complained that the hid was not enough to pay his debt, and the other two both assured him that, if the property was knocked oft to Dobbins at that bid, his debt should be paid in full; and Burkhalter allowed the sale to proceed, which he would not have done but for this assurance, which was simply carrying out the fraudulent scheme; and in further pursuance of it, on October 4, 1881, Dobbins paid Burkhalter $150 in addition to the bid of $4,000 and gave Wofford the writing. While the sheriff’s deed was recorded, the right of redemption left in Wofford, which was worth $1,600, has never been recorded, which was a fraud on Wofford’s creditors. The scheme did hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of at least $800, which went into Wofford’s pocket and which they could not reach, so 'that the scheme is a fraud and void as to the whole property, and as against the creditors Dobbins cannot hold it. Defendants pray that the sheriff’s deed be cancelled, and the property ordered to be sold and the proceeds distributed among the creditor’s of Wofford according to their priority. They further allege that Dobbins, and since his death his estate, was liable to them for rents and profits of the land, amounting to $500 a year, and pray that an accounting be had as to the amount thereof, which should be decreed to be a lien upon the land.
    The case made by the bill and answer was referred to a master who reported, in brief, as follows: He overruled the demurrer. There were proved before him the judgments of M. L. Johnson, both individually and as guardian, of Satterfield, now J. C. Wofford’s, and of Smith. The judgment of Johnson as guardian was rendered October 8, 1881, of Johnson individually, August 10, 1881, of Satterfield November 23, 1881, and of Smith January 11,1883. These judgments now amount to $5,649.92. The testimony failed to establish an intention on the part of either Wofford or Dobbins to defraud Wofford’s creditors. The estimates of all the witnesses, reduced to an average, would put the value of the property, at the time Dobbins bought it, at a little less than $5,000, so that it may be seriously doubted whether Dobbins did not pay full value. The agreement between Wofford and Dobbins was made before the sale, and by reason of it Dobbins paid, at the end of the twelve months, $1,200 in addition to what he had before paid on the land, making the cost of the land to him $5,350, which was its full value. The agreement allowing Wofford to redeem the property did not render the sale void, there being no intention upon Wofford’s part to defraud his creditors, known to or participated in by Dobbins. Wofford tried, before the sale, to get others of his creditors to pay off the purchase money and take the laud on their claims against him. He made no secret of the agreement, but after the sale told it to different creditors of his, among them J. C. Wofford, and tried to get them to furnish the mopey to redeem the land and take it on their debts, and finally did procure one of them, Jones, to do so. While the agreement to redeem was not put on record, there is no law authorizing such record, and there is little probability that if it had been put on record it would have done any good. Wofford did nothing that could be construed into a want of good faith, and was moved, both before the sale and afterwards, by a desire to prevent the sacrifice of his property so far as he lawfully could; and the fact that $800 in cash was paid in by Jones does not affect the transaction. No person was prevented from bidding, either from sympathy with Wofford or from any other reason. That Wofford realized $1,600 by sale of his right to redeem, would not warrant a decree to that extent, or to the extent of $1,200, the amount paid by Dobbins for the transfer to himself of that right, in favor of the creditoi-s, since the judgments of the defendants were no lien on the interest of Wofford under his agreement with Dobbins. Wofford’s rights were simply an option on the property; "he was not liable to be called on to pay anything and could pay or not as he chose, and had paid nothing on the purchase or option price at all; hence his equity was a naked equity upon which a judgment against him took no lien, .and there was nothing to prevent his selling the equity as he might have sold a promissory note, and the purchaser got it free from any lien or encumbrance in favor of judgment creditors. The trade with Jones was a fair and honest transaction, and he got all "Wolford’s right free from any encumbrance, and could and did convey the same to Dobbins for value. If the sale by Wolford to Dobbins were but a private sale, yet, if it were an honest sale and the purchase of Dobbins were in good faith, the land would not be subject to defendants’ judgments. There was nothing in Dobbins’ conduct inconsistent with entire good faith under the law. The fact that he may have got the land at less than its value and knew Wolford’s insolvency and expected to get the land at the price he did, would not invalidate his purchase. If a private sale were made, those having judgments against the seller would have four years in which to'levy their executions or lose their liens; hence, if this were a private sale, these judgment creditors lost such rights as they had, by failure to levy on the property for more than four years after it went into the hands of Dobbins. And if the purchase was in good faith, it would he difficult to find a reason why the land should be subject to the judgment of Smith, the sale having been made before Smith began suit against Wofford. The deed of Dobbins is not void for usury, the fact that Dobbins, under the contract with Wofford, was to be repaid his money with eight per cent, interest and in addition to have the crops grown on the land for 1882, not making it so.
    All the testimony which was introduced before the master seems not to have been sent up in the record. The deed by the sheriff to Dobbins was an ordinary sheriffs deed, and recited a consideration of $4,000. It was made October 4, 1881, and recorded October 5, 1881. Burkhalter’s deed to Wofford was made May 3, 1881, and recorded May 4,1881. The contract between Dobbins and Wofford ivas put in evidence. Dobbins testified, in brief, that the bidding at the sheriff’s sale commenced at about $2,000, and witness ran the property up to $4,150 and it was knocked off to him at that sum, and he paid the money and the sheriff made him a deed ; that no arrangement about the land was made between him and Wofford before the sale, and he never saw Wofford at ,the sale at all; that he never had any conference before the sale with Wofford or Burldialter about buying the land in for Wofford, and never heard that such a thing was claimed to be true until after the levy of the Smith fi.fa.; that he never did or said anything, or heard anything said by anybody, or saw anything done by anybody to deter bidders or depress the bidding ; that after the sheriff had made him the deed, Wofford came and asked him for a chance to get the property back and get more for it if he could, and he told Wofford that he would let him pay back the purchase money, $4,150, with eight per cent, interest per annum, if he would do so by the 4th of the following October, and would make Wofford a quit-claim deed to the land, but he (Dobbins) was to have the crop to be grown on the land for that year and the right to take it away, to which Wofford agreed and the writing was executed; that just before the time for Wofford to redeem had expired, Jones came to witness with the paper witness had given Wofford, with the written request on it from Wofford that Jones be allowed to pay the money and for Dobbins to make the deed to Jones; that Jones did not pay the $4,150 with interest, nor tender it, nor offer to pay it, but witness proposed to give Jones $1,200, for such rights as might be secured to Wofford by the paper, and he did pay Jones that sum and Jones transferred the paper to him ; that witness thought the land brought its value at the sale, but after the sale Burkhalter said he had lost $150 by not having run the land high enough to cover his debt, but witness would not have bid any more and said so at the time ; and that witness has improved the land to the extent of about $5,000. It appeared from the documentary evidence that the bid made by Dobbins and the amount paid by him to the sheriff'was $4,000, but that he paid Burkhalter $150 in addition, on the day of the sheriff’s sale. There was further evidence tending to show that $4,000 was full value for the property at the time of the sale, for a cash sale; that persons were-not deterred from bidding; that the character of Wofford and Dobbins for honesty was good; that Dobbins’ improvements to the place would amount to about $5,000; that the rent of the place at present is worth $500 a year, but was only worth $200 to $300 in 1881; that the only plea filed in the suit of Burkhalter against Wofford was that the note on which Burkhalter sued would not draw more than seven per cent, after its maturity, as matter of law; that Wofford tried to get one "Veach, who was a creditor of his, to buy the land to make his (Veach’s) money, but Veach would not have given $4,000 for it, the place being in bad condition ; that Wofford said nothing to Veach about depressing the bidding at the sale; that the farm was advertised for sale under the Burkhalter ji. fa. when Wofford tried to get Veach to buy it, and while Wofford’s plan was not fully unfolded to Veach, if he had any other plan than to enable Veach to save his debt, Veach did not remember it; that he had before that time solicited Veach to furnish him money to pay his debts, giving him an inventory of.his assets; that in 1881, Wofford was very much embarrassed, but thought he was solvent, and if his property had been worth as much as he estimated it, ho could have paid his debts and had property left; that "V each thought then he was solvent, but from what he learned afterwards changed his opinion. From the testimony of Jones it appeared that the consideration of the transfer to him by Wofford of the written agreement between Dobbins and Wofford was $6,000, of which he was to pay Dobbins $4,400, the amount Wofford then owed Dobbins for the property, and the balance of $1,600 was made up of two items, $800 in money, which he paid Wofford, and $800 which he paid Wofford in a note Wofford owed him. On the day after the transfer was made to him Jones transferred the writing and all his interest to Dobbins for $5,600, that is, for the difference between the $4,400 which he owed Dobbins, and $5,600 which Dobbins gave him, in other words, $1,200 was paid him in cash by Dobbins. The Smith ji. fa. was levied on the property March 26, 1884, theji. fas. of Johnson, and Johnson guardian, on September 1, 1886, and the Satterfield fi. fa. on January 24, 1887.
    The defendants excepted to the master’s report on the following grounds :
    (1) The master erred in overruling the demurrer.
    (2) The master did not decide on all the issues made in the answer, one of the issues made being that the property, or a sufficiency thereof, should be found subject to raise the sum of $800 which was paid to Wofford, and by the action of Dobbins was withdrawn from Wofford’s creditors, Dobbins having put it into the power of Wofford to withhold said sum from his creditors.
    (3) The master erred in holding that the making of the agreement before the sale was not a fraud in law and fact on the then existing creditors of Wofford.
    
      (4) He erred in not holding, under the circumstances under which the contract was made and the rumors of the contract among the bystanders that the sale was being had for "Wofford’s benefit, that the sale was fraudulent and void and the whole of the land subject as to the existing creditors of Wofford.
    (5) He erred in holding that the contract did not give Wofford such an interest in the land as was subiect to levy and sale, but only gave him a naked equity; and in not finding that the contract gave to Wofford the crop then on the land, which was worth at least $250.
    (6) Because he did not find on the issue as to whether or not Bobbins was liable to the creditors of Wofford for the value of' said crop, Bobbins having put it into the power of Wofford so to defraud his creditors.
    (7) Because he did not find that the land was subject to the executions of defendants to the extent of the value of the contract or equity of redemption as proved, $1,G00, or at least to the value of $1,200.
    (8) Because he found that the sale of October 4,1881, was not a private sale and void on account 'of usury.
    (9) Because he reports that the bar of four years would have precluded defendant, Johnson, even if it had been a private sale.
    (10) As an exception of fact, because the master found that the contract was a naked equity, when the only evidence on the question was by the contract itself, which conveyed the crop then on the land, which, as the master reports, was worth $250 ; and the testimony of Jones shows that it was worth $1,200 or $1,600 and that Bobbins paid him $1,200 cash, and $400 being the interest due from Wofford to Bobbins, and Bobbins himself so swore.
    The exceptions were overruled and the master’s report confirmed, and the defendants excepted.
    
      A. S. Johnson, for plaintiffs in error.
    M. R. Stansell, contra.
    
   Lumpkin, Justice.

The facts of this case are set forth in the reporter’s statement.

The doctrine is well established that equity will interfere to restrain the bringing of a multiplicity of suits when the rights of all concerned may be adjudicated without prejudice to any in a single proceeding, and there is no reason in principle why this rule should not be applied to cases already brought and pending by consolidating them into a single case. In 1 High on Injunctions, §12, we find the following: “Where there is one common right in controversy which is to be established by or against several persons, one person asserting the right against many, or many against one, equity may interfere, and instead of permitting the parties to be harassed by a multiplicity of suits, determine the whole matter in one action.” See, also, 2 High on Injunctions, §1406; Story on Eq. Pl §286 ; and Wait on Fraud. Con. §§151, 152, and cases there cited. The doctrine.is fully discussed in 1 Pomeroy’s Eq. Jur. §§255 et seq. In §269 is the following : “Under the greatest diversity of circumstances, and the greatest variety of claims arising from unauthorized public acts, private tortious acts, invasion of property rights, violation of contract obligations, and notwithstanding the positive denials by some American courts, the weight of authority is simply overwhelming that the jurisdiction.may and should be exercised either on behalf of a numerous body of separate claimants against a single party, or on behalf of a single party against such a numerous body, although there is no ‘common title,’ nor ‘community of right,’ or of ‘interest in the subject-matter,’ among these individuals, but where there is and because there is merely a community of interest among them in the questions of law and fact involved in the general controversy, or in tlie kind and form of relief demanded and obtained by or against each individual member of the numerous body.” See, also, §274.

In Orton et al. v. Madden et al., 75 Ga. 83, it was held that equity “will entertaiu a bill to avoid a multitude of suits by establishing a right in favor of or against several persons which is likely to be the subject of legal controversy, or in similar cases.” And see Johnson & Co. v. O’Donnell & Burke et al., Id. 453. In the case of McHenry v. Hazard, 45 N. Y. (6 Hand) 580, it appeared that an obligation was obtained from the plaintiff by fraudulent representations. A. and B. both claimed to own it by assignment. Each commenced an action against him, and claimed in hostility to each other, and it was held that he might, during the pendency of the actions against him, bring a separate suit against both claimants to be relieved from the contract on the ground of fraud therein. Andrews, J., delivering the opinion of the court, observed that “It was a prominent motive, in constituting a single court having jurisdiction in law and equity, to remedy the inconvenience, which existed when legal and equitable remedies were administei’ed by separate tribunals, of obliging parties to resort to two courts to determine rights connected with a single transaction,” and that conferring such power upon the court was “designed to prevent unnecessary litigation, and to enable parties to bring'into one suit all the elements of the controversy for the purpose of a complete and final adjudication.” Again, in the case of the Board of Supervisors of Saratoga Co. v. Deyoe, 77 N. Y. 219, it appeared that a county treasurer, under authority to issue notes for money advanced to the county for a certain amount, had fraudulently issued notes for a much lai’ger amount. Some of the claims against the coxinty were valid, while others were not. Thirty-one persons holding these notes had brought separate actions thereon against the county, and others intended to do so. The petition brought at the instance of the county alleged that it could not be ascertained who were the rightful owners of the debt owing by the county, or how much thereof was due to either of the holders of the notes, and that separate litigation with each would subject the plaintiff to great expense. Upon demurrer to the complaint, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled, upon equitable principles, to implead the holders of the notes for the purpose of having their respective rights and the liability of the county determined in one action; that the claims were of the sanie general character, and the action was maintainable for the purpose of preventing a multiplicity of suits.

In reply to the suggestion that the plaintiff in the present case should not be allowed to consolidate all these claim cases into one, because he himself was responsible for their existence, he having filed his claim to the property in every instance where a levy thereon was made, which he was not absolutely compelled to do, it may be said that in filing such claims he only availed himself of one of the methods which the law gave him for the protection of his alleged rights. The fact that he resorted to a statutory remedy in each case should not, we think, deprive him of the more valuable remedy in equity of having all this litigation terminated by a single verdict and judgment, the more especially as so doing could in no way injure any of the parties. Whether or not the agreement between him and Wofford constituted such a fraud upon Wofford’s creditors as would invalidate Dobbins’ title to the land, was a question involved in all the claim cases, and was a vital one in each. Upon its determination depended, m every one of these cases, the subjection or non-subjectioii of the property; and we are unable to perceive why, injustice and upon principle,this question should not be determined once for all, and thus finally settle in one judgment, without having numerous, tedious and expensive trials, the rights of all these parties.

We do not think that such an agreement as is set forth m the second head-note was necessarily fraudulent as against the creditors of Wofford. It was not shown that Burkhalter, the plaintiff in execution, participated therein. There was no binding obligation on Wofford’s part to redeem the land by paying back the purchase money with interest, and Dobbins would have had no power to compel a performance of this agreement by Wofford. It was simply a privilege of which the latter might or might not avail himself, as he chose. Considered even as a bond for titles, no part of the purchase money was paid by Wofford, and he therefore had no leviable interest in the land. To make such an agreement fraudulent on the creditors, it must have been intended to defraud them, the object, and not the effect of the agreement, being the true test of its validity. Upon this question the master reports that Wofford’s whole conduct was a laudable effort to cause his property to bring full value for the benefit of his creditors ; and he further reports that there was no fraud whatever throughout the entire transaction in the conduct of Dobbins. The fact that Dobbins agreed that Wofford should have the crop upon the land at the time of the sale, could not invalidate his title to the land itself; and if, by this arrangement, the title to the crop passed into Wofford, it was subject to executions against him, and the creditors could have had it levied upon. The agreement that, in case Wofford failed to redeem the land within the time agreed upon, the succeeding year’s crop should be the property of Dobbins, was entirely immaterial, because the same would have been his, as the owner of the land, without any such agreement.

The master having found that the title of Dobbins to the land in controversy was wholly free from fraud, such finding negatives the liability of the property to be subjected to any part of the debts of the plaintiffs in Ji. fa. or 'any of them. The fact that "Wofford transferred his right to pay for and redeem, the land to another, to whom Dobbins paid a valuable consideration for the extinguishment of this right, could not, under tlie facts of this case, be a fraud upon the creditors of Wofford. He had paid nothing whatever for this right, and it appears to have been a mere gratuity to him on the part of Dobbins. In the absence of actual fraud, and of any intention on the part of Dobbins, Wofford • or Burkhalter to injure the several plaintiffs in execution who sought to subject this land as the property of Wofford, the fact that Dobbins donated, without valuable consideration, a privilege to Wofford which the latter afterwards sold for money, and which Dobbins purchased from Wofford’s transferee, does not, in our opinion, affect the honesty or legality of .Dobbins’ title to the land. Judgment affirmed.  