
    Edward McGowan, by Patrick H. McGowan, Appellee, v. Chicago City Railway Company, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 21,846.
    (Not to be reported in full.)
    Abstract of the Decision.
    1. Street railroads, § 53
      
      —what does not constitute use of cars on street railway within fender ordinance. Where plaintiff was injured by certain dismantled and discarded summer street cars belonging to defendant while such cars were being moved from certain temporary tracks to defendant’s car barns, held that such use of the cars by defendant was not within the term “each and every car used on such street railway,” used in an ordinance providing that “every person or corporation controlling any street railway in the City of Chicago shall equip and provide each and every car used on such street railway with fenders," etc.
    
      Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Riciiabd E. Burke, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1915.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed April 18, 1917.
    Statement of the Case.
    •Action by Edward McGowan, by Patrick H. McGowan, his father and next friend, plaintiff, against the Chicago City Railway Company, defendant, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by being struck by one of defendant’s street cars. From a judgment for plaintiff for $2,000, defendant appeals.
    Franklin B. Hussey and Watson J. Ferry, for appellant; W. W. Gurley and J. R. Guilliams, of counsel.
    Litzinger, McGurn & Reid, for appellee; Edward R. Litzinger, of counsel.
    
      
      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
    
    
      
      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
    
   Mr. Justice Goodwin

delivered the opinion of the conrt.

2. Street railroads, § 131 —when evidence is insufficient to show wanton and wilful misconduct in injuring person crossing street car trade. Evidence held insufficient to warrant finding that certain cars of defendant were being pushed along the track at an excessive rate of speed, or that defendant’s servants were so conducting the moving of the cars as to constitute wilful and wanton misconduct, undér a count of a declaration charging defendant with wilful and wanton injury to a person crossing the street car tracks.  