
    *Lessee of William M’Causland, jun. et al. against William M’Causland, sen. and James Crawford.
    Defendant in ejectment is not entitled (by tbe practice of Pennsylvania) to tbe reply, where tbe plaintiff claiming by descent proves bis pedigree and stops, and tbe defendant sets np a new case in bis- defence, wbicb is answered by evidence on tbe part of tbe plaintiff.
    Ejectment for 240 acres of land in Leacock township.
    It was admitted that one Daniel M’Causland was seized of the lands in question. The plaintiffs’ lessor claimed the same by descent as heir at law, being the eldest son of John M’Causland, who was the eldest brother of the said Daniel, and died before him. The defendant, Crawford, claimed under a deed from Daniel, dated 8th December 1772, which was impeached on the grounds of insanity in the grantor, and misrepresentation in the grantee.
    Both parties went into a considerable detail of evidence to establish their several positions; and after the testimony was closed, the defendant’s counsel moved for the general reply, under the authority in 4 Term Rep. 497. The defendant in ejectment is entitled to the general reply, where the plaintiff claiming by descent, proves his pedigree and stops, and the defendant sets up a new case in his defence, which is answered by evidence on the part of the plaintiff.
   By the court.

Though we see much reason for the practice iu England in the point now before us, we cannot venture to innovate on the established usage of Pennsylvania, under which, the plaintiff’s counsel in ejectments have uniformly concluded. To alter this custom at Nisi Prius by one or two judges, would be highly inconvenient; for it might thus happen that the rules of practice might vary on the different circuits. ' Until therefore the present -mode of practice in a case circumstanced like the present, is reconsidered and altered in bank by the whole court, we must pursue the ancient system, which has never yet been broken in upon, either before or since the revolution. Motion denied.

Messrs. Ingersoll, Hopkins and M’Kean, pro quer.

Messrs. Kittera, C. Smith and Montgomery, pro def.

A motion was afterwards made for a new trial, founded chiefly on misconduct of the jurors who tried the cause. The argument came on in April term 1794, when, after a hearing of considerable length, the court discharged the rule to shew cause why a new trial should not be had.

A verdict passed for the plaintiff.  