
    Aspden's Appeal.
    1. Before the Act of 14th April, 1853, giving jurisdiction to a single judge of the Quarter Sessions in Philadelphia county, one judge only of that Court had not jurisdiction of cases arising under the poor laws.
    2. The clerk of the sessions, in a controverted matter, had no power to enter a judgment or order in the absence of the judge who directed it although a written order had been transmitted by the judge for the purpose. The sentence, judgment, or order in a case in the sessions should be pronounced in open Gourt.
    
    CERTIORARI to the Court of Quarter Sessions, Philadelphia.
    
    On complaint to an alderman by the wife of the appellant that he refused to support her, he was bound in recognisance to appear at the next Court of Quarter Sessions. On 22d June, 1850, the Court of Quarter Sessions being held by a single judge, the defendant Avas ordered to pay a weekly sum for her support. A bond with surety Avas given. In September folloAving the wife returned home; but, in May, 1851, she again left, and made application to tbe overseers of tbe poor, who received ber under tbe order of June, 1850.
    On 14th May, 1851, on tbe part of the husband, a rule was obtained, in tbe Sessions, upon tbe overseers, to show cause why tbe order of June, 1850, should not be revoked. Depositions were taken under tbe rule, which were read in Court, and were taken away by tbe judge. On 9th August, tbe judge not being in Court, sent, with tbe depositions, to tbe clerk’s office a vrritten order discharging the rule and confirming the. original order which bad been made by him. From such order tbe appeal was taken. Tbe fact that the judge was not in Court when the last order was entered, and that tbe order was sent by him to the clerk’s office, was certified by tbe clerk.
    It was specified for error: 1. That a Court of Quarter Sessions, held by one judge, had not jurisdiction of this case. 2. That the second order was informal and illegal, not having been delivered or announced in open Court.
    
    Two other assignments related to the merits of the case.
    In the case of Commonwealth v. Nathans, 2 Barr 138, it was decided in 1846, that one judge only, holding a Court of Quarter Sessions in Philadelphia, had no jurisdiction of cases arising under the poor laws. In the case of Commonwealth v. Martin, Id. 244, it was decided that, under the constitution, a single judge is competent to hold a Court of Quarter Sessions when so directed by the legislature; and, in the Act of I4th April, 1853, it was provided that proceedings under certain Acts relating to the poor of Philadelphia, may be had before one judge of the Court of Common Pleas, holding a Court of Quarter Sessions. See Acts, p. 418.
    
      McLaughlin, for the appellant.
    It appears from the record that but one judge held the Sessions in June, 1850, when the original judgment was pronounced. He had not jurisdiction of it: 2 Barr 138, 144. 2d. The publicity of judicial administration is material to its purity. A place and time is prescribed for holding Courts of Quarter Sessions. Article 6 of the amendments to the United States Constitution, and the 9th section of the 9th article of the state constitution, require not only a speedy, but a publie trial in criminal prosecutions. The trial and judgment are inseparably connected.
    The case decided in 1851, was on a new complaint, the wife having returned to her home after the first order.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Lewis, C. J.

The order complained of was made' before the passage of the Act of 14th April, 1853, giving jurisdiction to a single judge of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia., in cases of this kind. It seems to have been decided in the Commonwealth v. Nathans, 2 Barr 138, that, under the law as it then stood, a single judge had no authority to take cognisance of cases arising under the poor laws. The order of the 9th August, 1851, is therefore void.

Proceedings in the Court of Quarter Sessions should be conducted in such a manner as to afford to the parties an opportunity to know how far their rights are affected by them. If a sentence or judgment be given, or an order made in a cause, it should be pronounced in open Court. The clerk cannot, in a controverted matter, enter a judgment, sentence, or order, in the absence of the judge who directs it, although written directions may have been transmitted for the purpose. All Courts are to be open, and all parties duly served with process are bound to know everything that is openly 'transacted at the regular and adjourned sittings of these tribunals. The limitations upon the right of appeal and writ of error begin to run from the time the decision is made. But this would be unjust, if a decision might he privily entered by the clerk in pursuance of a written order from a judge not present. The order complained of was therefore erroneous, for- the reason that it was not made in open Court.

The order of the 9th August, 1851, discharging the rule of the. 14th May, 1851, is'vacated; and the record remitted for further proceedings according to law.  