
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Deshawn REESE, also known as Day Day, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 09-4934-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 2, 2010.
    See also 328 FedAppx. 686.
    Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York (Jo Ann M. Navickas and Andrew E. Goldsmith, Assistant United States Attorneys, of counsel), Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
    Curtis J. Farber, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Present: RALPH K. WINTER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Deshawn Reese, a/k/a Day Day (“Reese”), appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Irizarry, J.), finding him guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and one count of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii). The court sentenced Reese to 120 months imprisonment on the conspiracy charge, and 120 months imprisonment on the firearm count, to be served consecutively. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

On appeal, Reese contends that his total sentence of 240 months was substantively unreasonable, on the ground that the district court relied too heavily on his criminal history to the exclusion of other relevant factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113-15 (2d Cir.2005). Our review of challenges to “the sentence itself,” United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir.2006), is limited to “ ‘reasonableness,’ ” United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir.2008) (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-64, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)). We have made clear that “ ‘reasonableness’ is inherently a concept of flexible meaning, generally lacking precise boundaries.” Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115; see United States v. Jones, 460 F.3d 191, 195-96 (2d Cir.2006); United States v. Fairclough, 439 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir.2006). We thus “exhibit restraint, not micromanagement,” in our review. United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir.2005).

On the record before us, we cannot agree with Reese that the district court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable. The district court explicitly noted the § 3553(a) factors during Reese’s original sentencing and incorporated its prior findings during resentencing. The court reasonably arrived at an above-Guidelines sentence, concluding that Reese’s continuing criminal activity supported such a sentence. See Fairclough, 439 F.3d at 79-81. We therefore decline to vacate Reese’s sentence on the grounds before this Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
      
      . Reese also argued that his sentence violated this Court’s decisions in United States v. Whitley, 529 F.3d 150 (2d Cir.2008), and United States v. Williams, 558 F.3d 166 (2d Cir.2009). As Reese has subsequently withdrawn this argument, we do not consider it here.
     