
    ROBERT L. SNOW v. HOBART HAWKES.
    (Filed 19 April, 1922.)
    1. Contempt — Courts.
    Contempt of court is not only a willful disregard or disobedience of its orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of the law into disrepute, or to defeat, impair, ox-prejudice the rights of witnesses or parties to pending litigation.
    2. Same — Common Law — Classification—Statutes.
    Contempt of court is classified at common law as direct contempt, or words spoken or acts done in the presence of the court tending to defeat or impair the administration of justice, and consequential or indirect or constructive contempt, having a like tendency, done at a distance, and not in the presence of the court, and is preserved with its distinction by our statute, C. S., 978, 985, in the former of which the offender may be instantly apprehended and dealt with, and in the latter by a rule issued based upon affidavit requiring the suspected party to show cause why he should not be attached; and in either instance the guilty person may be suitably punished.
    3. Same — Inherent Powers — Legislative Powers.
    The power to punish for either direct or indirect contempt is inherent in the court as necessary’ to its exercise of its other powers, and is a part of the fundamental law which the Legislature dan neither create nor destroy.
    4. Same — Jurisdiction—Culminating Effect.
    Where a defendant has been liberated on bail by a bond given by himself with his father as surety, in plaintiff’s action to recover damages for the seduction of his daughter, and in proceedings as for indirect contempt it is found as a fact by the Superior Court judge hearing the same that the respondent, the defendant’s father, meeting the plaintiff in another state, procured his written agreement to have his pending suit dismissed through fear of arrest and imprisonment: Held, the act of the respondent in obtaining the writing under illegal duress, was punishable as for indirect contempt of court; and he having submitted to- the jurisdiction of the court wherein the action was pending, the unlawful scheme, though originating in another state, was coextensive with the illegal purpose culminating in our court, and there punishable.
    Appeal by respondent from Long, J., at .October Term, 1921, of Subry.
    Rule to attach W. A. Hawkes as for contempt.
    The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant to recover damages for the seduction of the plaintiff’s daughter, and upon proceedings in arrest and bail the defendant executed a bond with his father, W. A. Hawkes, as surety. Later, the plaintiff and ~W. A. Hawkes happened to meet each other in Hillsville, Va. There W. A. Hawkes compelled the plaintiff by threat of immediate imprisonment (in default of bail) to affix Ms signature to .a withdrawal of, or an agreement to withdraw, his suit against the defendant, then pending in Surry County, N. C. Upon plaintiff’s affidavit a rule was served on said "W". A. Hawkes to show cause why he should not be attached as for contempt. The respondent answered the rule, and did not question the court’s jurisdiction of his person. Several affidavits were filed, and at the hearing his' Honor found, in substance, the following facts:
    The plaintiff duly instituted the above entitled action in Surry, where the cause arose, and .obtained an order for the arrest of the defendant, and the defendant entered into bond in the sum of $5,000 with the respondent as surety. The summons was duly served and the pleadings were regularly filed. After the action had been instituted and while it was pending W. A. Hawkes met the plaintiff in Hillsville and told him that Hawkes and the clerk of the court of Carroll County, Ya., had found a bill of indictment pending in the court there charging the plaintiff with burning Hawkes’s barn some fifteen years before that time, and that if the plaintiff did not withdraw the suit pending in Surry, Hawkes would have plaintiff arrested before he could leave town. Plaintiff could give no bail at Hillsville, and to avoid arrest and imprisonment he signed the paper referred to purporting to be a receipt or agreement executed in consideration of $10. The plaintiff can neither read nor write, and did not understand the full meaning of the paper. The plaintiff is satisfied that his daughter was debauched by the defendant. W. A. Hawkes for many years has had the general reputation of being a blockader, and now has the general reputation of intimidating witnesses and joarties who appear against him and of exerting a demoralizing influence on the entire community in which he lives. His general character is bad.
    His Honor further found as a fact that procuring the plaintiff’s signature to the paper by the means set out tended by its operation to embarrass and obstruct the due administration of justice in the pending suit, and pronounced judgment, from which the respondent appealed.
    
      J. II. Folger'for appellant.
    
    
      Garter & Garter for appellee.
    
   Adams, J.

Contempt of court signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of its orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of the law into disrespect or to defeat, impair, or prejudice the rights of witnesses or parties to pending litigation. At common-law contempts were classified as direct and consequential. Direct contempt may be defined as words spoken or acts done in the presence of the court which tend to defeat or obstruct tbe administration of justice; and consequential, or indirect, or constructive contempt is an act, baying like tendency, done at a distance, and not in tbe presence of tbe court. Tbe distinction between these classes is preserved in our statute law. Acts punishable for contempt are set out in section 978, and acts punishable as for contempt in section 985 of tbe Consolidated Statutes. In case of tbe former tbe offender may be instantly apprehended and dealt with, but for tbe latter, ordinarily a rule based upon affidavit is issued requiring tbe suspected party to show cause why be should not be attached. But in either instance suitable punishment may be administered. In McCown's case, 139 N. C., 95, Walker, J., in a learned and comprehensive opinion said, in substance, that tbe power of tbe courts to punish for contempt is a part of tbe fundamental law; that it is not conferred by legislation, being an inherent power which tbe Legislature can neither create nor destroy; and that it arises from necessity, because it is necessary to tbe exercise of all other powers. And Blackstone characteristically remarks that tbe process of attachment for contempt “must necessarily be as ancient as tbe laws themselves.” 4 BL, 286.

Tbe respondent does not controvert tbe power of tbe court to punish for contempt, whether direct or constructive; but to tbe judgment rendered in tbe case at bar be interposes two objections. He contends (1) that tbe act complained of is not punishable as for contempt, and (2) that if it is, tbe act was done outside tbe territorial jurisdiction of tbe court.

As to tbe first contention, tbe instant question is whether tbe means used by tbe respondent to effect dismissal of tbe plaintiff’s suit tended to impair or prejudice tbe rights or remedies of tbe plaintiff, or to defeat tbe administration of justice. At common law contempt might be committed by treating with disrespect tbe rules or process of tbe court, or by perverting such process to tbe purposes of private malice, extortion, or injustice. 4 BL, 286. Tbe common-law principle includes any attempt to intimidate or willfully and unlawfully to prevent a person from instituting or defending an action in any court of record. Rapalje on Con., 27 n, 1. To compass tbe same end our statute in like manner provides that every court of record shall have power to punish as for contempt any person whose unlawful interference with tbe proceedings in any action shall tend to defeat, impair, impede, or prejudice any party’s rights or remedies, and that such power shall extend to all cases where before tbe statute was enacted attachments and proceedings as for contempt bad been adopted and practiced in courts of record for tbe enforcement of remedies or tbe protection of rights. C. S., 985, subsecs. 3 and 7. This principle is applied in numerous decisions. It has been held, for example, that a person who presents to tbe court a fraudulent claim for tbe payment of money, or willfully interposes a false answer, or decoys a witness or dissuades bim from attending tbe trial, or insults, on account of an adverse verdict, a juror wbo bas been discharged, or willfully does any other act which tends to defeat tbe rights of any party to a pending action-may be punished as for contempt. In re Fountain, 182 N. C., 49; S. v. Moore, 146 N. C., 653; In re Young, 137 N. C., 553; In re Gorham, 129 N. C., 481; Ex parle Toepel, 102 N. W., 369; Scott v. State, 109 Tenn., 390. Here it may be noted that the last paragraph of section 978 is applicable not to constructive but to direct contempt. If the respondent, by the direct application of overpowering physical force, had obtained dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit, his act would have been no more effective than intimidation or duress by a threat of imprisonment; and the written agreement procured under duress, although the court was not in session, was unquestionably an act which tended directly to interfere unlawfully with the pending suit, and to impair the remedy and defeat the rights of the plaintiff.

The second objection involves a question of jurisdiction, but in our opinion it cannot avail the respondent. It is true that the plaintiff’s signature to the alleged agreement was procured in Virginia, and that the court had no extra-territorial jurisdiction; but since the respondent appeared in court, answered the rule, and made his defense the question of jurisdiction is material only as it relates to the operation and ultimate effect of his wrongful act. It is perfectly obvious that the respondent’s paramount object was to secure dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit by fraud, deceit, and imposition on the court. The imposition was to be consummated in the county where the action was pending through an unlawful scheme which was intended to be not only continuing, but coextensive with the illegal purpose, and therefore operative in the Superior Court of Surry. The respondent’s act is plainly embraced in the provisions of the statute to which we have referred and the mere fact of his absence at the time he put the agency in motion cannot absolve him from the imputation of constructive contempt.

There being no error in the record, his Honor’s judgment must be

Affirmed.  