
    Moore, et al. vs. Trustees of Campbell Academy.
    Where an attorney’s fee was unconditional, and neither to be increased or diminished by the event of the suit, but the attorneys admitted that his client was so poor, that unless the cause was gained , be will not be able to realize any part of it, and that he knew thia before he commenced the suit: Held, that this was not a champertous contract within the meaning of the act of 1821» c. 66.
    An attorney was requested by letter to institute a suit, and the writer offered to give one thouand dollars, if the suit was gained: to which the attorney replied, he was not permitted by law to take a contingent fee, but he would see the interest of the writer protected. And he accordingly commenced a suit to prevent the operation of the act of limitations, and it was afterwards stipulated that he should be paid a certain fee: Held, that this was not champerty in the attorney.
    The contingency of a fee necessary to constitute champerty, depend upon the terms of the contract or agreement, not from the inability of the party to pay all or a part of the fee, unless successful in the suit.
    The act of 1821, c. 66, is summary in its course of procedure, and highly penal in its sanctions, therefore, the same liberal and extended construction cannot be given to it, which is given to statutes remedial in their character.
    Mary Ann Moore, of the city of Philadelphia, claiming to be sister and sole surviving heir at law of Thomas Wilson, who died several years since in' the county of Wilson, in this State, intestate, and as then supposed without heirs, brought an ejectment against the trustees of Campbell academy, who had possessed themselves of the estate of Thomas Wilson, as having escheated and by operation of law, vested in them. During the pendency of those suits in the circuit court of Wilson county, this bill was filed in that court against Mary Ann Moore, the plaintiff at law, three attorneys of the court, (her counsel in those causes,) and certain other persons, upon the ground that champerty existed in the institution and prosecution of the suits, and the answers of all the defendants were put in, and upon the bill and those answers the cause was brought to hearing; and the court was of opinion, from the answer of John H. Martin, one of the attorneys in the ejectment, that the plaintiff was guilty of champerty, in employing said Martin in those suits; and therefore, ordered the actions of ejectment set forth in the hill, to be dismissed and stricken from the docket, and that said Martin pay the costs in chancery, and the plaintiff at ]aw pay the costs in the suits at law. The answer of Martin “that before the institution of the suits, he received ⅜ , from Philadelphia a letter from a certain Henry W. William-goj[^ wh0 claimed to be the son and agent of Mary Ann Moore, addressed to him and another gentleman of the bar, in which he stated, that his mother wished suit brought against the trustees of Campbell academy, that she was very poor, but would give as a fee a thousand dollars, provided they would prosecute her rights and recover the estate. He immediately wrote to Williamson, that a fee, contingent in its character, could not be taken, but that suits should be brought before the statute of limitations should bar the claim, and that the interest of Mrs. Moore should not be neglected.
    The other gentleman written to having declined to act, and Martin having become satisfied of the probable validity of Mrs. Moore’s claim, and the statute of limitations having almost ran against it, and feeling the pressure of the obligation, which the written pledge imposed, he procured security for the prosecution of the suits, and they were brought.
    Some time afterwards, Williamson came out with a power of attorney from Mary Ann Moore; expressed himself grateful for what had been done; acknowledged the receipt of the letter, on the subject of the contingency of the fee, and expressed himself anxious -for the continuance of Martin’s services; urged that his mother was very poor, and would perhaps be unable to pay one cent, if the suit went against her; alleged his regret that the other attorneys’ had declined appearing in the cases; upon which Martin recommended him to employ another, and that he would, for that purpose reduce the fee originally offered. Williamson then cheerfully executed, as attorney in fact, Mary Ann Moore’s note to Martin, for seven hundred and. fifty dollars, and employed another -counsel to aid him.
    Martin in his answer further stales, that his fee is unconditional, neither to be increased nor lessened, by gaining or losing the suits. He adds, that it is true, he believes Mrs. Moore to be wholly unable to pay one cent to her lawyers, nor does he expect ever to attempt to 'enforce it, as it would be wholly futile, and he is wholly indifferent what shall become of it, if the suits fail, and he would he willing, in that event, to throw it into the fire, or surrender it to Mrs. Moore. This is the substance of the answer upon the point A A oi champerty.
    '£?eo. $. and 3. S. Yerger, for compláinants.
    
      J. Rucies and R. J. Meigs, for defendants.
   Reese, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

"The question in this case is, whether the answer, under the construction and operation of our statute, (1821, c. 66,) makes out a case of champerty ? A highly respectable judge? sitting ⅛ the circuit court, has determined the question in the affirmative, and this determination involves a construction both of the answer and of the act of .assembly.

1. As to the answer, it makes out .the case of a very poor female living in another state, and at a great distance, claiming a considerable estate in lands, held so long in the adverse possession of others, as that, by the operation of .the statute of limitations. her title is about Jo be divested; who., proposing .to institute .an action, writes to an attorney here, that if he twill commence suit for her and successfully prosecute it, she twill-give him a liberal, perhaps a large fee. He replies that the law of his community does not permit that the compensation to be received by him, shall be contingent upon the event of the suit, but that her interest shall be attended to. He brings suit, takes an obligation which he says is unconditional, and to the payment of which he would be entitled, let the recovery eventuate as it may. But such, in his estimate .of them, are .tire circumstances of the plaintiff, that he deems the security for his fee utterly worthless if the termination of the suit should be unfavorable. What does this amount to? Not that the terms of the contract, the understanding of the parties to it, or the obligations of conscience arising out of it, are such, that if by the death of relations, or other event, the plaintiff should become able to pay, he would be precluded from enforcing his security. The contingency in the character of his compensation proceeds, not from the terms of the agreement, hut from existing inability to pay, which nothing is likely to obviate but success in the suit.

2. Does the statute make a contingency of this sort champerty? To say so, would be to give a most extended operation .to the statute. But it is contended for the defendants that it should be liberally and largely expounded in advancement of the remedy. The nature of the remedy is shown in the decree which w.as. rendered; the cases at bar were ordered to be stricken from the docket at the costs of the plaintiff, and the attorney was ordered to p ay the costs in chancery; and to that, by the provisions of the act, might have been annexed, that 'he he stricken from the roll, and deprived of his privileges of attorney and counsellor. The statute therefore, is not only summary in its course of procedure, but highly penal in its sanction. It cannot therefore, on obvious and long settled principles, have the liberal and extended construction claimed for it. It is true, that notlvng is more pernicious to die security of the community, nor any thing more injurious to that character, for dignity, integrity, and purity, so indispensable in members of the bar, than the indulgence of a gambling spirit which would lead them, for contingent and possible advantage, to agitate society in the prosecution of doubtful, pretended or obsolete claims. And, therefore, champerty where it exists, and is distinctly.made out, deserves severe reprobation. On the other hand, to investigate the claims or redress the wrongs of the indigent and the injured, is no quixotism, hut a grave and highly honorable duty of the profession, the performance of which, if not voluntarily assumed, may he enforced by the court. And we are not prepared to say, that if an indigent man, who in the opinion of the attorney has probable cause of action, employ him, instead of applying to the court to have him .assigned as counsel, by himself suing as a pauper, that such employment, although the ability of the party to pay will depend upon his success, shall be construed to amount to champerty.

Let the decree rendered in this case be reversed, and the bill be dismissed, and let the trustees of Campbell academy pay all the costs, except the costs of defendants, Mary Ann Moore, Henry Wilson Williamson, and John H. Martin,incurred up to the time of filing their answers, which, up to that time let them pay.

Decree reversed.  