
    Sheely vs. Biggs.
    In an action of slander, the word* charged to have en spoken were, that "He the said J tworejalse, and wore to a lie',— innuendo, “mean* nig chat the said J* had eommitteif peiyurj; mat the said J, had taken ft false oath before a nmgisti ate” — held not to be action* able.
    N o words are ac« tionabie unless they impute a dime to the ptain* ufl* which subjects Jum to punish,*incut.
    
      \ The office of the innuendo is to ex® piaui doubtful words, where there is iinicur sufficient in the declaration to maintain the action; uu it the woids in themseives are not atUunab.e, tlmr meaning cannot be extendeu by the innuendo to make uiem action*’
    » If the words may he understood mu, suisonotcummai, colloquium in the iui.ouuctoiy part, t<> snow they worn spoken m a crum* nai sense, or they aio not actiouahie.
    To make the woid forsworn, siander, n must be introduced by a colloquium, setting ihrili sume judicial proceeding, iu which the paiiy sworn,
    Appeal from Frederick County Court. It was an action ©f Slundcr, and the declaration stated, that the plaintiff, (now the appellee,) was a good, true, honest, and faithful citizen, and had always lived free and wholly unsuspected of and from all manner of peijury, &c. yet the defendant, • (the appellant,) maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff" in his good name, and to bring him into public scandal, ignominy and disgrace, and to subject him to the pains and penalties, by the laws amt statutes of this state, made and provided against those who are guilty of false sweating, on, &c. spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiff these false, scandalous, and malicious woids, viz. ‘Tie (meaning the plaintiff',) swore false, and swore to a lie,” (meaning that the plaintiff' had committed peijury, that he had taken a false oath before a magistrate.) The second\ count charged the defendant with uttering these words, to other citizens, of the plaintiff: “Le (meaning the plaintiff',) had swore false, and would, if he did not take care, lose his ears for it,” (meaning that the plaintiff' committed per-1 jury before a magistrate.) The general issue was pleaded, and the plaintiff obtained a general verdict for £22 17 6 curreni money. The defendant moved in arrest ot judgment, and assigned the following reasons; 1. Because the» words charged in the first count of the declaration arc not actionable. 2. Because the words charged in the» second count are not actionable. 3. Because the words” charged in the different counts of the declaration, and al -111 Jegod to have been spoken by the defendant, are not so laid* and set forth in the said counts, as to entitle the plaintiff to maintain his action. 4. Because there is no colloquium^ set forth in the declaration, showing the words were spoken in reference to a judicial proceeding, or to what the words spoken referred. The county court overruled the motion, and rendered judgment on the verdict for the plaiiitiuj From that judgment this appeal was brought. on ff, l-1 pij ru II" * , HI )U o, [a 99 kii ff u . •“ \ >/ 6 . ~ Ü - 2 2 » $ . 1 1 .
    The cause was argued before Chase, Ch. J. Buchanan-, Nioeqlson, and Gantt, J.
    
      Taney and F, S. Key, for the Appellant,
    cited Holt vs. Scholefield, 6 T. R. 691.
    
      Shaaff, contra,
    cited 6 Bac. Abr, tit. Stander, (B. 3.) and Gruneth vs. Derry, 3 Lev. 166.
   Chase, Ch- L

delivered the opinion of the cgyrt. There are some principles well established in actions of slander,, which govern the court In determining this pase.

First. No words are actionable unless they impute a crime to the plaintiff, which subjects liim to punishment, 5 Bill. Com. 123. Holt vs. Scholefield, 6 T. R. 691, 694.

Secondly. The office of the innuendo is to explain doubtful words, where there is matter sufficient ip the declaration to. maintain the action; and if the words in them» sélves are not actionable, their meaning cannot be extended by it to make them actipnqble, Holt vs. Scholefidd, 6 T. R. 694.

Thirdly, tf the words may be understood ip a sense not criminal, there must be a colloquium ip the introductory part, to show they were spoken in a criminal sense, or they áre nbt actionable.

The word foyswom, although in one sepse it may import perjury, yet it does not necessarily imply it; fora person may be forsworn without committing perjury; apd no cxtrinsip aid can b,e derived from the innuendo to give the words a criminal meapipg.

If the words'before the innuendo do not import slander, po Words produced by the innuendo will piake the action maintainable. It is not the nature of an innuendo to beget an action. Forsworn, by itself, does not import slander; otherwise óf the word perjured. Core vs. Morton, Yelv. 27. Holt vs. Scholefield, 6 T. R. 694.

. To make the word forsworn slander, it must be intro-cl need by a colloquium, setting forth some judicial proceeding in which lie was sworn. Core vs. Morton, Yelv. 27.

The words in the declaration charged to have been spoken are, that “he, the said Jacob, swore false, and swore to a lieThe subsequent words, “meaning that the said facob had committed perjury, that the said Jacob had taken f false oath before a ipagistrate, ” are part of, and come under the innuendo.

The question is, whether these words are actionable? and it is admitted, if they are not, the judgment must be arrpsted, there beipg one defective count in the declaration * — a general verdict and entire damages having been given.

The court are pf opinion they are not; and that the judgment of the county court lie reversed, and judgment on yépetiot tip árfestédo

^UqfíJJENT REVERSÉX),  