
    GUANGYU ZHAO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TIME, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 10-3867-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 23, 2011.
    Guangyu Zhao, Beijing, China, pro se.
    Andrew B. Lachow, Time, Inc., New York, N.Y., for Appellee.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, B.D. PARKER, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Guangyu Zhao, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Time, Inc. (“Time”) in her employment discrimination action. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. See Miller v. Wolf off & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “con-elusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. State of N.Y., 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2002).

Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its decision. In opposing Time’s motion for summary judgment, Zhao has attempted to establish only that she was justified in engaging in the conduct for which Time terminated her, not that she never engaged in such conduct. Even if we found her justifications compelling, however, in a discrimination case, this Court is “decidedly not interested in the truth of the allegations against [the] plaintiff,” because “the factual validity of the underlying imputation against the employee is not at issue.” McPherson v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We are concerned only with the employer’s motivation. Id. Here, as the magistrate judge and district court correctly found, Zhao has not produced evidence that would permit a rational trier of fact to conclude that her termination was motivated by her gender, race, or national origin, such that Time’s proffered performance-based reason for terminating her could be considered a pretext for discrimination.

We have considered Zhao’s other arguments on appeal and have found them to be without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  