
    [Lancaster,
    May 30, 1825.]
    SMITH against ANKRIM.
    IN ERROR.
    The carrying away by flood of a bridge, no part of the demised premises, whereby their value is diminished, is no reason why the tenant should have a right to an abatement in the rent agreed on.
    After a lease under seal, the landlord by parol engages to the tenant, who wa9 about moving, (in consequence Of a diminution in the value of the property) to reduce the rent, if he staid: this is so uncertain, that equity cannot give relief.
    Error to the District Court for the city and county of Lancaster.
    
    
      Replevin brought by George Smith, the plaintiff below, and plaintiff in error, against Samuel Jlnlerim, who made cognizance of the taking as a distress for rent, as bailiff of Adam Gochenauer, Henry Resh, and Samuel B. Moore. The pleas were non, demiserunt, riens in arrear and payment with leave, &c. Replication, non solvit and issues.
    The defendant gave in evidence an assignment of the premises from Benjamin Hart to Gochenauer, Resh, and Moore, and also a lease or agreement under seal between them and the plaintiff Smith, dated the 8th of December, 1817, by which Smith, “agreed to take the property late of Benjamin Hart, which he then occupied at Ml Call’s ferry bridge for one year from the 1st of April, 1818, for which he was willing to pay the sum of three hundred and forty dollars, payable quarterly in advance: said Smith to have fire-wood on the premises, but not to cut any green or thriving timber.”
    The plaintiff then offered to prove, that the property demised was a tavern house with its appurtenances; that what constituted its chief and almost its only value, was the erection of the M’Call’s ferry bridge over the river Susquehanna, immediately adjoining the said public house. That an ice-flood in the river on the 3d of March, 1818, carried away the said bridge, in consequence of which all the travelling which supported the said public house ceased, and it became entirely useless to the plaintiff, for the only purpose for which it was rented: that within a few days after thé 3d of March, 1818, and before the 1st of April, 1818, George Smith complained to Samuel JB. Moore, one of the assignees of Benjamin Hart, and informed him, that since the bridge had gone he was not able to pay ro much rent, and that he would immediately leave the possession of the said premises if they did not make the rent lower. The said Samuel B. Moore requested him to remain, acknowledged his request was reasonable and promised it should be complied with, and the rent should be reduced, and that in consequence of this assurance the said George Smith did remain in the possession of the said premises.” To the admission of this testimony the defendant objected; the court sustained'the objection, and the defendant excepted.
    There had been an award in favour of the defendant for three hundred and two dollars eighty-eight cents, from which the plaintiff had appealed, and the verdict and judgment in favour of defendant were for two hundred and. seventeen dollars eighty-five cents.
    
      Frazer and Buchanan, for the plaintiff in error,
    cited Pollard v. Shaffer, 1 Dall. 211. Dr. and Stud. Dial. 2. c. p. 126. Gilb. Rents, 186. Hallett v. Wilie, 3 Johns. 44. Landis v. Shaffer, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 196.
    
      Hopkins, contra.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Gibson, J.

It cannot seriously be pretended that there should be an abatement of the rent in consequence of the destruction of the bridge, without regard to any other circumstance. The bridge was not even a part of the thing demised; and if it had been, no case would authorize an abatement on that ground. The question then rests exclusively on the supposed agreement of the tenantwith one of the lessors. When this agreement took place, the tenant was about to commence a second year under a written lease, which, at law could not be altered by parol, although it might in equity, by an agreement on good consideration. The inquiry then is, what relief would a chancellor give on the foot of this agreement? In consequence of the reduced value of the premises by reason of the destruction of the bridge, the tenant informs the landlord that he will quit, unless the rent be reduced; the landlord says he thinks this reasonable, promises that it shall be done, and requests the tenant to remain. Now, although equity will do all it can to execute an uncertain agreement, by reducing it to certainty, by reference to something else, where that is practicable; yet here the terms are altogether uncertain: or, rather there are no terms at all. The parties do not appear to have considered this transaction as an agreement, but rather as an understanding, that an agreement should be entered into thereafter, on such terms as might be found mutually beneficial. Now how could the sum to be deducted, be ascertained? That was a matter to be settled afterwards. But it was not understood in the meantime, that the written lease was to be vacated, or that the landlord was to part with his security by specialty. Parol agreements, to dispense with any part of a written contract, are at least dangerous things, as they are always to be established by a dangerous species of evidence; and before they are executed, it ought clearly to appear, that there is no ambiguity as to the terms. Beside os the tenant was bound by his covenant to pay the rent at all events, and could not discharge himself of it by quitting the premises, I am by no means certain that there was any consideration for the subsequent promise. But be this as it may, the terms of the agreement were altogether so uncertain that it would be impossible to carry it into execution; and I am therefore of opinion the judge who tried the cause did right to exclude the evidence. The question of costs is decided by the case of Shaffer v. Landis; where in a case like the present it was held that each party should pay his own part of the costs of the appeal.

Judgment affirmed.  