
    The State vs. Mary Cummings.
    A servant picked up.a ring in the house of her mistress, knowing it to have been accidentally dropped by the latter and to belong to her, and when questioned a few minutes afterwards denied having taken it, and having concealed it, within a few weeks earned it to a distant city and offered it for sale. Held, that she had committed the crime of theft at common law.
    The common law prevails in the District of Columbia.
    One who has committed the crime of theft in another state, and brings the stolen goods into this state, thereby commits the crime of theft in this state.
    Information for theft. Upon the trial of the case to the jury iu the superior court, before Phelps, J., upon the plea of not guilty, the state claimed to have proved that the article alleged to have been stolen, — a diamond-ring of great value— was the property of Mrs. Henry O. Hood of the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia; that it was lost from her finger in a wash-tub while she was engaged in washing in the tub, and missed by her within ten or fifteen minutes after-wards, dui’ing which interval the accused, who was then a servant in her family, had been washing in the same tub ; that as soon as the loss of the ring was discovered, the tub and all its contents were carefully examined without its being found, upon which the accused was immediately charged with having stolen it, and in reply to the charge strongly protested her innocence, offered to be searched, and denied having it in her possession or knowing in any manner what had become of it; that the accused shortly before had seen the ring and knew its appearance and value; that she had in fact taken and concealed it; and that upon leaving the service of Mrs. Hood, about three weeks afterward, she brought it to the city of New Haven in this state, and gave it to her husband to sell.
    The state introduced no evidence of any statute or other law of the District of Columbia defining -or relating to the crime of larceny.
    The counsel for the accused claimed that, in the absence of such evidence, the jury could not find that she had been guilty of any crime in -that district, and that upon the facts claimed and proved no larceny had been committed either there or in this state, and requested the court to charge the jury upon several points in conformity with these claims.
    The court did not so charge, but instructed the jury, among other things, that the state must show clearly that the prisoner took the ring with the intent at the time of taking to convert it to her own use, and that in cases of lost goods the intent-was usually indicated by knowledge or means of knowledge of the owner, concealment, sale, or appropriation of the goods, by contradictory and false statements, &c. ; and expressed the opinion that in this state a person might be prosecuted and convicted for stealing lost goods, where at the time of the original finding he intended to convert them to Ms own irse ; and also expressed the opinion that if the jury found such a taking or finding and conversion of the ring by the prisoner, as was claimed by the state, and found the intent by the prisoner to steal the ring at the time of such finding or taking, the offence was complete in the District of Columbia, and that although such finding or taking was in the District of Columbia, if the ring- was subsequently and before the filing of the information brought by the prisoner into this state and county and here disposed of as claimed by the state, the facts would constitute the crime of larceny here.
    The jury rendered a verdict of guilty, and the prisoner moved for a new trial for error in the charge of the judge.
    
      Doolittle and Johnson, in support of the motion.
    The finder of lost goods can not under any circumstances be prosecuted for larceny at the common law. 2 Russell on Crimes, 11; Lawrence v. The State, 1 Humph., 228 ; Scoville v. Canfield, 14 Johns., 338. Even in the case of Ransom v. The State, 22 Conn., 159, the court admit that this opinion is generally entertained. But if the accused were guilty of any crime the prosecution must be in the District of Columbia where the ring was lost and found. 1 Arch. Crim. Law, (Waterman’s ed.,)230, 231; 2 Russell on Crimes, 118, 119 ; People v. Gardner, 2 Johns., 477; People v. Schenck, id., 479; Simmons v. Commonwealth, 5 Binn., 618; Simpson v. The State, 4 Humph., 456. This principle is recognized in the Constitution of the United States, (Art. IV., sec. 2,) and the remedy there given is the only one proper to be pursued when one comes into this state with the fruits of a crime committed in another jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Uprichard, 3 Gray, 434. If a crime was committed by the' accused in the city of Washington, it was a statutory not a common law offence. The District of Columbia is governed wholly by United States laws, and the United States have no unwritten criminal code to which resort can be had as a source of jurisdiction. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat., 415 ; United Slates v. Bevans, 3 id., 336 ; United States v. Willberger, 5 id., 76; 2 U. S. Stat. at large, p. 105 ; 5 id., p. 306. A statutory larceny can never be transferred from one state to another. 2 Russell on Crimes, 118. In those states in which the common law doctrine of crimes has been disregarded in these respects, it has been done by force of special statutes, except in the case of Connecticut. 1 Arch. Crim. Law, (Waterman’s ed.,) 241; People v. Burke, 11 Wend., 129.
    Foster, State Attorney, contra.
    Stealing in another state and bringing the stolen property here constitutes the crime of theft here. The State v. Ellis, 3 Conn., 185 ; Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass., 14. By common law lost goods may be the. subject of larceny. Ransom v. The State, 22 Conn., 153. The common law existed in Maryland and Virginia at the time of the creation of the District of Columbia, and was continued in force over the territory ceded by each for the district, by an express statute of the United States, and such changes only as the change of jurisdiction required. See Brightley’s Dig., 203, 240, 241, 243, note; Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet., 524, 619, 651; United States v. Simms, 1 Cranch, 252; Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet., 568. The larceny in this case being a common law offence, proof of its being a statutory offence is neither necessary nor proper. It is not the offence in the District of Columbia that our courts punish, but the offence , in Connecticut in continuing in possession. People v. Burke, 11 Wend., 129; The State v. Ellis, supra. A new trial will never be granted but upon substantial grounds, and not where the court can see that strict justice has been done. Lester v. The State, 11 Conn., 418.
   McCurdy, J.

The question in this case respects the correctness of the charge.

The court instructed the jury that the state must show clearly that the prisoner took the ring with the intent, at the time of the taking, to convert it to her own use, and that if the jury found such a taking or finding and conversion of the ring by the prisoner as was claimed by the state, and found the intent by the prisoner to steal the ring at the time of such taking or finding, the offence was complete in the District of Columbia.

What then are the facts as claimed to be proved by the-state. They are, that the owner of the ring left it by accident in the tub where she had been washing, that knowing where it was she went for it in ten or fifteen minutes, that in the mean time it had been taken by the prisoner out of the tub, that she knew whose it was and denied the taking of it, and concealed it and brought it to New Haven as her own, and offered it for sale. Under these circumstances it is very apparent that, except for the act of the prisoner, there was no loss of the ring, any more than if the owner had left it on her table for a temporary purpose. Of course if the jury should find these facts, they must find that a-theft had been committed at the common law. And there can be no doubt that the common law prevails in the District of Columbia. Kendall v. United States, 12 Peters, 524, 619, 651; United States v. Simms, 1 Oranch, 252; Ex parte Watkins, 7 Peters, 568. The charge of the court then on this point was perfectly correct.

But a more serious question is made whether, supposing the ring' to have been stolen there, the bringing of it into this state constitutes the crime of theft here!

By the common law as understood in England, if stolen goods are taken into another county from the one in which they are stolen, it is theft in the county, into which they aré carried. But the law is otherwise when they are taken from one country to another. The position of the states of the Union in relation to each other is a peculiar one. In many respects each is independent of the others and possesses certain attributes of sovereignty. But in .many other and very important particulars they form one country and one nation.

Owing to the different views of the analogy arising from these conditions, different opinions have been entertained on the subject now under consideration. In Massachusetts and Connecticut it has been held uniformly, and from an early period, that such carrying into another state is theft. Com monwealth v. Cutting, 1 Mass., 116; Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 id., 14; 2 Swift’s System, 381; State v. Ellis, 3 Conn., 185. In the last case, C. J. Hosmer says: “ On this subject I, am incapable of entertaining a doubt. The decisions have been uniform and numerous and the transaction alluded to has ever been considered a theft.”

In a recent case in Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Uprichard, 3 Gray, 434, 440, the court intimates a doubt of the propriety of the original judgment, but adheres to the principle as the now settled law of the state.

Of the necessity of such a law no question is made. In the words of Judge Sedgwick, it would be intolerable “ that a depot for plunder should be here established, and gangs of desperate villains be employed in the neighboring states for its support.” The provision for taking the thief back on a requisition to the jurisdiction where the first crime was committed, is entirely inadequate. The only claim is that the legislature and not the courts should provide a remedy for the evil. Biit the proper result having been accomplished judicially without any mischief, and having been so long acquiesced in without any complaint, the principle must be considered as established beyond the reach of cavil.

We do not advise a new trial.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.  