
    CASE 30. — ACTION BY R. W. BRUNK AGAINST THE OHIO & KENTUCKY RAILWAY CO. AND THE LEXINGTON & EASTERN RY. CO. TO.RECOVER THE VALUE OF LOST FREIGHT.
    November 22.
    Brunk v. Ohio & Ky. Railway Co.
    Appeal from Boyd Circuit Court.
    S. Gr. Kinnbr, Circuit Judge.
    Prom a judgment sustaining a plea to the jurisdiction of the Court plaintiff appeals
    Affirmed.
    1. Carriers — Connecting Carriers — Loss of Goods — Action—Jurisdiction. — In an, action against an initial and an intermediate carrier for Joss of goods, it appeared, that the initial carrier ■accepted plaintiff’s goods for transportation, to a town in another county into which the line of neither defendant ran; the bill of lading providing that the responsibility .of each company should cease on delivery to a connecting carrier. Civil Code PraC., section 73, provides that an: action against ,a carrier must be brought in the county in which defendant, or either of defendants, resides, or in which the contract is made, or in which the carrier agrees to, deliver the property. Heidi That a plea to the jurisdiction of the court in the county of final destination was properly sustained.
    2. Same — Limitation of Liability — Bill of Lading. — A common ■carrier may limit its liability for loss on connecting lines by a stipulation in the bill of lading that articles to be transported beyond its lines may be delivered bo connecting lines for transportation to their destinations, and that its responsibility shall cease with such delivery.
    ■3. Same — Construction)—“Forwarding” and “Delivering” Carriers. —In a bill of lading stipulating that the liability of a forwarding carrier for loss shall cease on delivery to- the connecting carrier, and thiait of a delivering carrier on delivery at tne station of delivery, the term “rorwarding carrier” applies to all carriers who transport goods to the delivering carrier, and' the term “delivering carrier” to the carrier who actually delives thq good© at their destination.
    JOHN W. WOODS, Attorney for appellant.
    The contention of appellant is that under sections 73 and 51 of the Civil Code of Practice he had a right to bring his action ini Boyd county, the county in which appellees agreed to deliver his property, and to serve summonses on tiheir passenger and freight agents stationed- nearest the county seat of Boyd county. Applesiless contend that the contract to carry was separable and that there was no agreement intered into by either the initial carrier, the Ohio & Ky. Ry. Co., or the Lexington & Eastern Ry. Co. to deliver the property in Boyd county, -and that therefore section 73 of the Code does not apply.
    AUTHORITIES CITED.
    L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Carrico, 95 Ky., 491; Pittsburg, Chicago- & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Viers, 113 Ky., 536; Chicago. & E. I. Ry. Co. v. Chestnut Bros., 89 S. W., 298.
    HAGER & STEWART, Attorneys- for appellees. . .
    PROPOSITIONS AND AUTHORITIES.
    1. The contract in question- conclusively -shows that the undertaking of each of the appellee companies with appellant to carry the property in question, was several, and that the O. & K. Company limited its liability for damages or loss in carriage to- such as might occur upon its own line, or upon -the line of its connecting carrier. This- i,f could lawfully do. (Bryant v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 11 Bush, 597; U. S. Mail Co. v. Carrolton, etc., Co., 101 Ky., ait page 622; Ireland v. M. & O. Ry. Co., 105 Ky., 400; P., C. & St. L. Co. v. Viors, 113 Ky., 526; Railroad Co. v. Tarter, 19 Ky. Law Rep., 230; Myriek v. R. Co., 107 U. S., 102; Elliott on Railroads, 1433; Hutchison on Carriers, sections 149b, 154; Southern Pac. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com., 200 U. S., 536.)
    2. The fact that the destination of a shipment received by a railroad fo-r transportation is beyond its own line, or that it was received from lanothier carrier to be- transported to a point on its -ow-n line, does not create any joint responsibility between the connecting carriers, where the shipment over each is under a separate contract 'limiting liability ior loss .or injuries to sucb as may occur on it® -own' line. (.Myrick v. Ry. Co., supra; .Hutchison on Carriers, supra; ,6 Cye., 482-; .and for other oases in point, Cent. Dig., vol. 9, Carriers, sections 817-818.)
   Opinion op the Court by

Wm. Rogers Olay, Commissioner

Affirming.

Appellant, R. W. Brunk, delivered to appellee Ohio & Kentucky Railway Company at Cannel City, Ky., a lot of household goods to he shipped to appellant at Ashland, Boyd county, Ky. Two boxes containing a portion of the goods were lost in transit. Thereupon appellant instituted this action in the circuit court of Boyd county against appellees, Ohio & Kentucky Railway Company and Lexington & Eastern Railway Company, to recover the sum ■ of $210, the value of the goods- lost, alleging that the Ohio & Kentucky Railway Company undertook and agreed for itself and its connecting lines, including the Lexington & Eastern Railway Company, to transport said goods to Ashland, Ky., but that appellees violated their contract by failing to deliver the two boxes as agreed. Summons was had upon the Ohio & Kentucky Railway Company by services upon its agent at Cannel City, Ky., and upon the Lexington & Eastern Railway Company by service upon its agent at Lexington, Ky.; neither of the two companies having an agent in Boyd county, and each of the persons served being the agent of his company stationed nearest to Boyd county. Appellees each filed an answer in the nature of a plea to the jurisdiction, accompanied by a motion to quash the summons and the return thereon. Each pleaded, in effect, that it did not have a line of- railway extending to Ashland, Boyd county, Ky., or reside in that county, and that the only contracts either had with appellant was to transport the goods in question over its line and deliver them to its connecting line, and that the liability of each under the contract of shipr ment ceased upon such delivery. A copy of the bill of lading containing the contract of shipment was filed. The trial court sustained the plea of each company to the jurisdiction, quashed the summons and return thereon, and dismissed appellant’s petition. It is the contention of appellant that section 73 of the Civil Code of Practice is applicable to this case. So much of that section as is necessary to consider is as follows: “Excepting the actions mentioned in section 75, an action against a common carrier, whether a corporation or not, must be brought in the county in which the defendant, or either of several defendants, resides, or in which the contract is made; or in which the carrier agrees to deliver the property.” As neither of the appellees resides in Boyd county, and the contract was not made in that county, the jurisdiction of the Boyd circuit court depends altogether upon the question whether or not there was an agreement on the part of appellees to deliver the property in Boyd county. It is pleaded by each of appellees, and not controverted by appellant, that neither had any such agreement with appellant, but inasmuch as the bill of lading, constituting the only contract of shipment, is filed in support of the pleas to the jurisdiction, it will be necessary to consider that instrument and determine from the provisions thereof whether or not there was an agreement to , deliver the goods in Boyd county. The bill of lading is in part as follows: “Received, Cannel City, 8-15, 1905, by Ohio & Kentucky Railway Company, in apparent good order, the packages (contents unknown) mentioned below, to be forwarded in like good order to R. W. Brunk, at Ashland, Kentucky, subject to conditions noted below. [Here follows a description of the articles.] ‘Conditions: * * * (2) That articles agreed to be transported to points beyond the lines of this company may be delivered to connecting lines for transportation to their destination, and that upon such delivery, the responsibility of this company shall cease except as to guaranty of the freight rate to be charged thereon. * * * (6) This contract is executed and accomplished, and the' liability of the common carriers thereunder terminates as to the forwarding carriers respectively on delivery to the next connecting carriers, and as to the delivering carriers of the goods or property at the station or depot of delivery,” etc.

Counsel for appellant contends that the words, “To be forwarded in like good order to R. W. Brunk, at Ashland, Kentucky,” constitute an agreement on the part of the Ohio & Kentucky Railway Company and its connecting lines to deliver the goods at Ashland, Ky. It will be observed, however, that whatever agreement those words import is subject to the conditions noted below, and those conditions are that the articles may be delivered to connecting lines for transportation to their destination, and thereupon the responsibility of the Ohio & Kentucky Railway Company ceases, and furthermore, that the liability of the forwarding carriers ceases on delivery of the go'ods to the next connecting carrier, and that the liability of the delivering carrier ceases on delivery of the goods at the station or depot of delivery. It. is manifest, therefore, that there is a difference between a forwarding carrier and a delivering carrier; the former term applying to all carriers who transport goods to the delivering carrier., and the latter to the carrier who actually delivers the goods at their destination. Keeping this distinction in view, and taking into consideration the fact that the contract provides that the goods may he delivered to connecting lines, and that the liability of each road is limited to its own lines, it is perfectly plain that the only place where either of appellees agreed to deliver the goods was at the point of its connection with the nest connecting line. The only carrier that agreed, if.it received the goods, to deliver them at Ashland, Ky., was the delivering carrier, the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, but that company is not before the court, nor is it sought to hold it liable on the contract of shipment. As neither of appellees agreed to deliver the goods in Boyd county, it necessarily follows that the plea of each company to the jurisdiction of ■ the court was properly sustained.

•Judgment affirmed.  