
    *Ex Parte Richardson.
    December, 1831.
    Mandamus — When Issued to Compel Chancery Court to Hear Cause. — The statute of 1825-6, ch. 15, was Intended to prevent unreasonable and causeless delays In suits In chancery; and, with that view, the 14th section authorizes the court of appeals to award a mandamus to the courts of chancery, to compel them to hear causes at the first term at which they are prepared for hearing', when no special cause appears for the refusal of the court to hear them; but the statute does not authorize a mandamus to compel a hearing of a cause, which the court of chancery, in its discretion, for reasons satisfactory to it, thinks proper to continue.
    William Richardson and Judith Richardson, being the maker and indorser of a note for 1700 dollars, discounted at the Farmers’ bank of Virginia, for the accommodation of Thomas Richardson, he, by deed, conveyed and assigned to J. G. Williams, a life estate which he owned in a parcel of land in Hanover, two slaves, a horse, two cows, some furniture, and two debts due to him, in trust, to sell the specific property, if necessary, for the purpose of indemnifying William and Judith Richardson from loss by reason of their engagements for his accommodation. Williams, the trustee, was called upon by William and Judith Richardson the cestuis que trust, to sell the trust subject, in pursuance of the deed, and to apply the proceeds to their indemnification; and he gave notice to Thomas Richardson, of his intention to make the sale, unless he should satisfy the claim, of the cestuis que trust.
    Whereupon Thomas Richardson exhibited his bill against the trustee and cestuis que trust, in the superiour court of chancery of Richmond, alleging, that the whole of the debt due to the Farmers’ bank, on the accommodation note, had been paid and satisfied, out of his Thomas’s own funds; and praying an injunction to restrain the trustee from proceeding to sell the trust subject. The injunction was awarded, at first, upon condition, that the plaintiff should give an injunction bond with surety, in the penalty of 200 dollars, to abide and perform the decree, in case the injunction should be dissolved (a bond required only as security for the costs) but this condition was afterwards dispensed *with by order of the court, and the injunction awarded, without any security being required.
    The defendant, William Richardson, answered, and denied that the debt due to the Farmers’ bank, on the accommodation note, had been fully paid off and discharged out of Thomas’s funds ; and insisted, that there was a sum of money still due and chargeable on the trust subject, for which it ought to be sold.
    At January term 1831, William Richardson moved the court to dissolve the injunction. The chancellor overruled the motion, and ordered an account, to ascertain whether any, and if any, what balance remained of the debt properly chargeable on the trust subject.
    The bill was then regularly taken pro confesso as to Judith Richardson and the trustee Williams; and the cause, having been transferred to the circuit superiour court of law and chancery of Henrico, stood on the docket of that court, ready for hearing, at October term 1831.
    The cause was called in its turn, on the 10th November. The plaintiff demanded a hearing. But the courts, on the motion of the defendant William Richardson, made an order, that the injunction should stand dissolved, unless the plaintiff should within twenty days after he should be served with a copy of the order, enter into bond with sufficient surety, in the clerk’s office, in the penalty of 1200 dollars, with condition to pay the defendant all such damages, as he might sustain by the depreciation of the value, or the eloignment of, or termination of the plaintiff’s title in, the trust subject, whereof the sale was injoined, in case the injunction should be dissolved in whole or in part.
    The plaintiff’s counsel insisted, that notwithstanding that order, the cause should be heard and disposed of during the term ; because it was regularly prepared and set for hearing, and no cause was shewn against the hearing, except the order requiring bond with surety to be given by the plaintiff, and that order constituted no objection to the hearing of the cause; for he insisted, that, as the plaintiff would be entitled to a hearing of his cause, if the time for giving the *bond had! expired, and the injunction stood absolutely dissolved, so he was entitled to a hearing presently, when the injunction was only conditionally dissolved. The defendant’s counsel objected to a hearing of the cause, until the bond with surety should be given, as required by the order; because, if it was heard before that order should be complied with, the benefit of it would be lost to the defendant, whatever might be the decree of the court: if the court, on the hearing, should dissolve the injunction and dismiss the bill, the plaintiff might appeal, on giving security for costs only: if the court should perpetuate the injunction, and the defendants should appeal, they would be intirely without security pending the appeal; and the termination of the plaintiff’s title in the land mortgaged, by his death, and the removal of the personal part of the trust subject, pending the appeal, would deprive the cestuis que trust of an3r benefit from a decree of the court of appeals in their favour.
    The circuit court refused to hear the cause at that term, unless the plaintiff should comply with its order requiring bond with surety.
    And now, during the term of the circuit court, Robinson, for the plaintiff, moved this court for a. rule upon the judge of the circuit court, to shew cause, why a mandamus should not be awarded, to compel him to proceed to hear and determine the cause, upon the proofs therein, as they now existed.
    He founded the motion on the statute, “to alter and reform the mode of proceeding in the courts of chancery,” passed at the session of 1825-6, ch. 15, § 14, Sess. Acts, p. 18.
    
    
      The rule was made.
    *The judge of the circuit court returned and shewed for cause why the mandamus should not be awarded, that the hearing and determining the cause at the then term of the court, would frustrate the order therein made on the 10th November, requiring the plaintiff to give bond with surety &c. and that there was no other reason for his refusal to hear the cause.
    Robinson argued, that the refusal of the court to hear the cause, under the circumstances ’ of the case, amounted, in effect, to this: that the plaintiff should not be permitted, before a sale was made of his property, to shew that such sale ought not to be made; but after the sale, he might shew, that it ought not to have been made: that he should not be permitted, at the present term of the circuit court, to shew that he was entitled to retain his property; but at the next term, after it had been taken from him and sold, he might shew, that he was entitled to the proceeds', and upon shewing this, have a decree against the defendant for the proceeds of sale, and recover them of him, if he should be solvent. Neither, he said, could he perceive the force of the reasons against a present hearing, assigned by the defendant’s counsel in the circuit court. If it were true, that the consequences he complained of would ensue, the inconvenience was imputable to the defendant’s own fault in not earlier asking, or to the fault of the court in not sooner requiring, the security required by the order of the 10th November: the plaintiff ought not to suffer for their neglect, nor ought the hearing of this cause to be longer delayed on account of it. It seemed to him impossible, that the plaintiff could, with justice, be placed in a worse situation now, than he would have been in if the defendant had asked, and the court had required, the security lately ordered, when the injunction was first awarded: if the security had then been required, and not given, the plaintiff would, indeed, *have lost the benefit of the injunction, but his cause would, nevertheless, have been proceeded in, and would have been prepared for hearing at the present term: and if in such a state of the case, he would have been entitled to a.hearing now, he could see no reason why he should not be entitled to it, in the actual circumstances of the case.
    
      
      This statute provides, “That all causes, which shall be prepared for a hearing- agreeably to the provisions of this act, shall he docketed, called and disposed of, at the term to which they shall be so prepared; and if the court stall refuse to try any suet cause, or continue it, without good cause shewn, the party asking for a trial, may have his application spread upon the record, with a true statement of the facts relative thereto. Upon such statement, it shall he lawful for the court of appeals, upon the application of the p'arty injured, to award a mandamus, and compel a trial of the cause, upon the proofs as they existed at the time when it was erroneously continued, or the trial was improperly refused.” — Note in Original Edition.
    
   CARR, J.,

delivered the unanimous resolution of the court, to discharge the rule for the mandamus. He said — We think we should restrict this provision of the statute, as nearly as possible to the class of cases for which it seems' to have been made. A contrary course would bring before us every cause, which the chancellor might, upon reasons deemed sufficient by him, continue. This, surely, could never have been intended, nor could it be endured. We think, that by taking this 14th section in connex-ion with those which precede it, in the statute, we may find ground for this narrow construction. The purpose of the statute was to quicken the slow and cumbrous march of equity; to bring cases more speediljL and with less expense, to hearing: to these ends, all its provisions are directed. It takes away the necessity of serving a decree nisi; and- enables the plaintiff to have the cause set for hearing, unless the defendant, within four months after service of the subpoena, shall appear and plead, answer or demur. After several other provisions, comes this 14th section, which gives the mandamus. We think we may fairly say, that the provision was meant to provide against any attempt of the judge to thwart the object of the statute, by refusing to try the causes prepared for hearing, at the first term: and not, in all causes depending, to give an immediate application for a mandamus, whenever the court should, in its discretion, continue a cause. The provision is sufficiently anomalous in this restricted form; but taken in the larger sense, it would be monstrous. We think it best to place our decision on this general ground alone.

Rule discharged.  