
    STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. P.C., A Child, A.R., A Child, D.C., A Child, A.M., A Child, J.B., A Child, D.M., A Child, W.L., A Child, K.B., A Child, J.S., A Child, O.H., A Child, M.C., A Child, J.D., A Child, E.B., A Child, P.T., A Child, M.G., A Child, W.H., A Child, J.S., A Child, T.C., A Child, and T.M. A Child, Respondents.
    Nos. 98-4251, 98-4253 to 98-4255, 98-4257 to 98-4264, 98-4266 to 98-4270, 98-4272 and 98-4273.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 3, 1999.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kristina White, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
    Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, Michael L. Minerva, Assistant Public Defender, and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for respondents.
    Cheryl L. Gentry, Esquire, Tallahassee, for respondents T.C. and E.B.
   PER CURIAM.

Each of the respondents in this cause are juveniles who were charged as adults with various felonies. A circuit judge entered orders transferring pending juvenile cases involving these same respondents to the adult court pursuant to section 985.227(3)(b), Florida Statutes. (1997). Subsequently, however, another circuit judge rescinded the transfer orders. The state timely seeks certiorari review of the second set of orders and we have jurisdiction. See State v. A.C., 714 So.2d 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

Upon consideration of the responses and the state’s reply thereto, it appears that these petitions have been rendered moot. In some, the respondents have been sentenced as adults and the remedy which the petitioner seeks, sentencing on all pending matters at a single proceeding, is no longer possible. As to those cases which still have pending adult charges, respondents show that an administrative order has been entered which creates a new criminal division in Leon County Circuit Court and all pending and future direct-filed felony cases, along with any juvenile court proceedings involving the same defendants, have been transferred to that division. This administrative order has accomplished the result which the petitioner asks this court to order.

Upon consideration of the above, we find that the petitions for writ of certiorari are all moot and accordingly, it is hereby ordered that they are DISMISSED.

WOLF and LAWRENCE, JJ„ CONCUR.

WEBSTER, J., CONCURS IN RESULT, WITH OPINION.

WEBSTER, J.,

concurring in result.

It does not appear that the state ever presented to the trial court the issue it asks us to resolve by its petitions for writs of certiorari. Accordingly, it seems to me that the state is not entitled to seek the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. See, e.g., North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Judson, 439 So.2d 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Danieli Corp. v. Russo, 329 So.2d 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); 3 Fla. Jur.2d Appellate Review § 497 (1997). I would deny all of the petitions' on this basis, making it unnecessary to reach the mootness question.  