
    FA CHANG ZHANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-1673 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 1, 2014.
    
      Scott E. Bratton, Margaret Wong & Associates, Cleveland, OH, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Leslie McKay, Assistant Director; Margot L. Carter, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, DENNY CHIN and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Fa Chang Zhang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the April 10, 2012, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Fa Chang Zhang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 10, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

The BIA’s denial of Zhang’s motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005). An alien may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Zhang’s 2011 motion was untimely and number-barred, as it was his second motion to reopen, and the final administrative decision was issued in 2009. However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

As the BIA noted, Zhang’s 2010 conversion to Christianity reflects a self-induced change in personal circumstances rather than a change in country conditions, and therefore does not exempt his motion from the applicable bars. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir.2006).

The BIA may also deny a motion to reopen when the movant fails to establish his prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Zhang failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution based on his Christian faith because he did not show that anyone in China was aware of his conversion or sought to persecute him because of it. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir.2008); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 172 (2d Cir.2008).

Because Zhang’s failure to demonstrate his prima facie eligibility for relief is dis-positive of his motion to reopen, we do not reach the BIA’s additional finding concerning changed country conditions.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 84.1(b).  