
    Sven GOLDMANIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Linda Insinger, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John INSINGER; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-35776
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 6, 2017  Seattle, Washington
    Filed March 08, 2017
    Sven Goldmanis, Pro Se
    
      Matthew Erik Johnson, Esquire, Attorney, Johnson Legal Group, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant
    Thomas M. Brennan, Michael D. McKay, Attorneys, McKay Chadwell, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appel-lee John Insinger, John Insinger, Robert Insinger, Susan Insinger, Risch Goss In-singer & Gustavel, Virginia Hayes Teta-mentary Trust, Insinger-24 LLC, Hollis Seim
    Sam B. Franklin, Attorney, Lee Smart, P.S., Inc., Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Ap-pellee Theressa Pulliam
    Before: GRABER, IKUTA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Linda Insinger appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants and the district court’s award of sanctions against her. We affirm.

1. The district court correctly granted summary judgment to Defendants on the ground that this civil RICO action is untimely. See Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment.”). Plaintiff had knowledge of her alleged injuries by 2007 at the latest, yet did not file this action until 2013—well after the expiration of the four-year statute of limitations. See Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The statute of limitations for civil RICO actions is four years.”); id. at 1109 (“[T]he civil RICO limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that underlies his cause of action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The fact that Plaintiff later discovered additional information concerning Defendants’ conduct does not affect the analysis. See id. at 1110.

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions under its inherent powers. See Moore v. Keegan Mgmt. Co. (In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig.), 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th Cir. 1996) (“We review the district court’s entry of sanctions under its inherent power for an abuse of discretion.”). The court properly concluded that Plaintiff “knowingly brought a frivolous, time-barred suit in bad faith.” See id. (“Bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or- recklessly raises a frivolous argument....” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED as to Plaintiff Linda In-singer, and DISMISSED as to Plaintiff Sven Goldmanis. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     
      
      . We dismiss Plaintiff Sven Goldmanis’ ap
        peal for failure to prosecute.
     