
    Rex B. CRUSE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Scott RUSSELL, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 15-35290.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 26, 2016.
    
    Filed April 29, 2016.
    Rex B. Cruse, pro se.
    Handy Lynn Rose, Acting Assistant Attorney General Attorney General’s Office, Olympia, WA, for Respondent-Appellee,
    Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Washington state prisoner Rex B. Cruse appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as time barred. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir.2009), and we affirm.

Cruse contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling in light of his reliance on erroneous third-party legal advice, pro se status, limited access to legal materials in his prison’s law library, and lack of “fair notice” that the statute of limitations was running. “A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the heavy burden of showing (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir.2010) (internal quotation omitted). Cruse’s reliance on erroneous legal advice, pro se status, and limited law library access do not constitute extraordinary circumstances. See Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998 (access to law library); Rasberry v. Gar cia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.2006) (pro se status); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (9th Cir.2002) (erroneous legal advice). Furthermore, there is no authority to support Cruse’s contention that he was entitled to “fair notice” that the statute of limitations was running. Thus, we conclude that none of Cruse’s allegations, nor their combination, so interfered with his ability to file a timely federal habeas petition as to warrant equitable tolling. See Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1049.

We treat Cruse’s additional argument as a motion to expand the certificate of appealability and deny the motion. See 9th Cir. R. 22-1(e); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir.1999).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3,
     