
    DAVIS against STEWART.
    OJST OEKTIOBAKI.
    Davis was the defendant below, against whom a verdict and judgment was had for $60, on the following state of demand:
    Samuel C. Davis, to Robert Stewart, accountable for damages sustained in the following manner, viz.: Some time in the year 1803, the aforesaid Samuel C. Davis was charged by Elizabeth Hurst with being the father of a bastard child, which the said Elizabeth was then pregnant with ; and the said Samuel C. Davis, in [*] order to get clear of the same, gave her, the said Elizabeth, a certain sum of money (which she accepted) to charge the same to me, which was done, and for which I have had to pay the sum of $60: the whole of which I am able to prove by the most powerful evidence, the law and the nature of the case require, as I presume.
    Robebt Stewakt.
    The principal point raised in this case for the determination of the court was, as to the legal effect of this state of demand.
    ' Mr. Griffith, for the plaintiff,
    on this point, contended, that it did not contain a legal cause of action. He said it was true, that it would seem that the action was brought against the defendant below, for some unlawful attempt to charge the plaintiff with being the father of a bastard child; but the complaint lay no one circumstance with legal certainty. 1st. No time [241] or place where Elizabeth Hurst charged Samuel C. Davis, nor before whom, nor whether on oath or not. 2d. Nor how, when or where the said Davis procured her to charge the same to Stewart; but only that to clear himself, he gave her a sum of money to charge Stewart — not laying that he procured her falsely and maliciously, or by subornation of perjury, &c., to charge him. 3d. How Stewart was charged by the said Elizabeth, whether judicially, or only in conversation, or why he had to pay $60, whether rightfully or w'rongfully, is not stated ; or whether acquitted or convicted, does not appear. In short, that the state of demand was -wholly vague and uncertain in every respect.
    
      Griffith, for plaintiff.
   Kirkpatrick, C. J.

— Said he thought that there was not enough contained in the state of demand filed, to show that the plaintiff below had a lawful cause of action; this is essential to the support of the judgment; we cannot guess out a cause of action for the plaintiff.

The other justices concurred.

Cited in Meeker v. Garland, 1 Harr. 486, Ewing v. Ingram, 4 Zab. 820.  