
    Gurjit SINGH, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-5233-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 26, 2011.
    Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; William C. Peachey, Assistant Director; Daniel E. Goldman, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, REENA RAGGI, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Gurjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a November 20, 2009 decision of the BIA affirming the July 31, 2007 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Margaret R. Reichenberg denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Gurjit Singh, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Nov. 20, 2009), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig.Ct.N.Y.C. July 31, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We need not address the IJ’s pretermission of Singh’s asylum application as untimely because the BIA assumed that Singh’s asylum application was timely filed. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). Accordingly, the only issue before us for review is the agency’s adverse credibility determination. Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s adverse credibility determination including portions not explicitly discussed by the BIA. See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mulcasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66, 167 (2d Cir.2008).

The IJ’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. First, we defer to the IJ’s finding that Singh did not appear to testify from personal experience but rather from information that he had memorized. See Dong Gao v. BIA, 482 F.3d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.2007); see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005). Second, the IJ reasonably concluded that Singh’s testimony about his detentions was vague and lacked detail due to Singh’s inability, despite repeated questioning, clearly to specify not only the number of people who beat him but any injuries that resulted from his treatment in detention. See Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir.2003). Third, the IJ did not err in finding the account of Singh’s entry into the United States to be implausible because that finding was based on record evidence “viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary experience.” Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir.2007).

In addition, the IJ reasonably found that Singh failed to provide reasonably available corroborating evidence to rehabilitate his questionable testimony. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007). The IJ reasonably questioned the veracity of letters submitted by Amrik Singh and Lakhvir Singh because their form and content were “virtually identical.” See Surinder Singh v. BIA, 438 F.3d 145, 148 (2d Cir.2006). Further, the IJ reasonably noted the lack of corroborating details in the letters Singh submitted and that his wife had not provided a letter to corroborate his claim. See Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273.

Finally, the IJ did not err in finding that the fact that the head of the local Mann party and Singh’s family remained unharmed in Singh’s village in India diminished his contention that he would face persecution in the future. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir.1999).

In sum, the agency reasonably determined that Singh failed credibly to demonstrate past persecution, a well-founded fear of persecution, or a clear probability of future persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Accordingly, the agency did not err in denying Singh’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 155-56 (2d Cir.2006); see also Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  