
    The Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore City vs. The Northern Central Railway Company.
    
      Situs for the Assessment of the Rolling Stock of a Railroad Company.
    
    The home office of the appellee being in the City of Baltimore, its rolling stock must be taxed in that city.
    Appeal from the Baltimore City Court.
    This appeal was taken from a pro forma order passed hy the Court below, on the 9th September, 1878, in proceedings instituted hy the Northern Central Railway Company under the Act of 1876, ch. 260, sec. 28, whereby the Appeal Tax Court was directed to strike certain property of the Company, as not subject to taxation, from the list of property, valued and assessed to it. From this order the Appeal Tax Court appealed. The case is further stated in the opinion of the Court.
    The cause was submitted to Bartol, C. J., Miller, Alvey and Robinson, J., for the appellant; no brief was filed for the appellee.
    
      A. Leo Knott, State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, and Charles J. M. Gwinn, Attorney General, for the appellant.
    The statutory provisions, relating to the appellee, construed by this Court in State vs. Northern Central R. W. Co., 44 Md., 160, differ essentially from those, which were construed by the Supreme Court in the cases of the Central Railroad and Banking Company vs. Georgia, and South Western Railroad Company vs. Georgia, 92 U. S., 666-677. In the Georgia cases, the Central Railroad and Banking Company, and the South Western Railroad Company were not merged in the respective new organizations of which they became members, and their respective original charters remained operative. The cases which are precisely analogous to the case decided by the Court of Appeals in 44 Md., 160-169, and by which its reasoning and conclusions are fully supported, are the cases of Shields vs. Ohio, 95 U. S., 320-325; and Railroad Company vs. Maine, 96 U. S., 507-513.
    The appellee was incorporated by the Pennsylvania Act of May 3rd, 1854, as well as"by the Maryland Act of 1854, ch. 250; and was, therefore, a distinct corporate body in each one of said States. Ohio and Mississippi R. R. Co., vs. Wheeler, 1 Black, 297, 298; Railroad Co. vs. Harris, 12 Wall., 82, 83; Railroad Co. vs. Whitton, 13 Wall., 284; Muller vs. Dows, 94 U. S., 446-448.
    The presumption of law, in the absence of averment and proof to the contrary, is that the valuation of the rolling stock, belonging to the appellee, was made in the locality in which the appellee had its principal office, or place of business, in this State. State vs. Reaney, 13 Md., 240; Strother vs. Lucas, 12 Pet., 437.
    If the rolling stock of the appellee must he treated as movable fixtures, then, until some provision is made by law for creating different situs, for different portions of such rolling stock, in use upon different parts of the line of the appellee within this State, the valuation of such property must he made at the principal place of business of the appellee in this State. Such property is confessedly not real estate in the meaning attached to those words in the Gen eral Assessment Act. It is not property, which is, as a matter of fact, permanently located in any city or county of this State. It is property used from day to day in carrying freight and passengers to and from the situs of the appellee in the City of Baltimore. This property, consisting, under the ruling in 18 Md., 217, 218, of movable fixtures, belonging to the appellee, which have confessedly no situs of their own as property permanently located in any city or county of this State, must, therefore, for purposes of taxation, under our existing laws, he located at the situs of their owner, the appellee, in the City of Baltimore. They can he properly valued in no other place. Pacific R. R. vs. Cass Co., 53 Mo., 31, 32 ; Hodges on Railways, (5th Eng. Ed.,) 629, 665 ; Stevens vs. Buffalo and N. Y. R. R. Co., 31 Barb., 596; Beardsley and Kirkland vs. Ontario Bank, 31 Barb., 619; Randall vs. Elwell, 52 N. Y., 521; Orange and Alexandria R. R. Co. vs. City Council of Alexandria, 17 Grattan, 185; Railroad Co. vs. County of Morgan, 14 Ill., 163 ; Pacific R. R. Co. vs. Cass Co., 53 Mo., 31, 32; R. R. Co. vs. Saco, 60 Maine, 196.
    
      Bernard Carter for the appellee.
   Robinson, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellee was formed by the consolidation of the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad Company, with the York and Maryland Line Railroad Company, the York and Cumberland Railroad Company and the Susquehanna Railroad Company.

In State vs. The Northern Central Railway Co., 44 Md., 160, it was decided that although the corporate rights and privileges formerly belonging to the Baltimore and Susquehanna Eailroad Company, including the exemption of the shares of its capital stock from taxation, were vested in the new Company, formed under the Act of 1854, ch. 250, yet that the rights and privileges thus conferred operated as grants of original powers to the new Company.

The Court further decided that the charter thus granted to the Northern Central Eailway Company was under the Constitution of 1850, and the Constitution of 1867 now in force, in this State, subject to amendment: and that the exemption from taxation granted by such charter had been repealed by the Act of 1866, ch. 157, and by the Act of 1870, ch. 322.

(Decided 7th February, 1879.)

The right to tax the property of the appellee is, therefore, no longer an open question.

We have also decided in Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company vs. Appeal Tax Court, ante p. 397, that the rolling stock of a railroad company is not real estate under the G-eneral Assessment Act; and that whether it is to he considered as movable fixtures, or as personal property, it was under the terms of that Act liable to assessment at the home office, or principal place of business of the Company.

Assuming, then, the home office of the appellee to be in Baltimore City, it follows that its rolling stock must be taxed in that city.

The order of the Court below, directing the property of the appellee to be stricken from the tax lists of that city, must therefore be reversed.

Order reversed, and cause remanded.  