
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, CHARLESTON,
    JAN. 1815.
    (Present — Judges John Fauchereaud Grimke, Elihu Hale Bay, . Joseph Brevard, William Smith, Abraham Nott, and Charles Jones Colcock, Esquires.)
    The State v. William Porter, Esq.
    Amey Lapier, a woman of color, was convicted before a magistrate and two freeholders, for slandering and insulting a white woman, and sen-fenced to pay a fine of ten dollars and costs of prosecution, which fine was received by the magistrate, but not paid over by him within the time prescribed by A. A. 1787. Held by the court, that as there -was no evidence that the magistrate intended to keep the fine fraudulently? its non-payment within the time -limited could only be imputed to negligence.
    A justice of peace is not answerable criminally for error of judgment; but he is answerable for corruption.
    Motion for a new trial,"and to quash the indictment.
    Indictment, tried in Charleston district, Court of Sessions, before Colcock, J., for extortion and mal-practice in office ; for trying, convicting, and fining a free woman of color named Amey Lapier; the defendant being a justice of peace and Q. U. for Charleston district,
    Amey Lapier had been charged before the defendant and two freeholders, under the negro act, A. A. 1740, P. L. 165, 1 Dig. Tit. 107, sec. 25, of having slandered and insulted Mrs. Thomas, a white woman. She was found guilty, and the court sentenced her to pay a fine of ten dollars, and the costs of prosecution. The defendant received the fine and costs, and gave Amey Lapier a receipt for the same. The defendant, it seems, had not paid over the sum received as a fine, before this prosecution against him was commenced, according to the A. A. 1787, P. L. 410; 1 Dig. Tit. 70, sec. 12; but there was no evidence to prove that he intended to keep the same fraudulently.
    It appeared in evidence, that the defendant had applied to the Attorney General, for his advice, as to the disposition of fines received by him ; and also, as to the proper mode of proceeding in relation to the charge against Amey Lapier. She was proved to have committed barratry, as also an assault. Her counsel at the trial did not pretend to deny the authority of the court to take cognizance of the charge, or to award punishment on. her conyietion. Her counsel only insisted that she was not punishable cor-porally.
    Judge Colcock charged, that no words,, however abusive, used by a person of color, whether free, or a slave, would amount to an offence, punishable, by indictment; that the charge was for slanderous words; and that although barratry mighthave been proved, and also an assault, at the trial, yet as the warrant on which Amey was arrested, w;as not for such offences, she could only be tried on the matter of complaint set forth in the warrant. The judge fur. ther charged, that as the court proceeded illegally, in trying the woman of color without authority, for a pretended offence for which she was not liable to their jurisdiction, the money received by the defendant, Porter, as a fine, which had been unlawfully imposed, was without any authority; and that the jury wight infer corruption, and that the same money was extortiously received. Verdict, guilty.
    The motion was argued January 8, 1815,
    by M. King, for the defendant, and the Attorney General, Riciiaudson, for the State. Mr. Tho. Giujike, in reply,
    was stopped’by the court.
    It was argued in support of the motion, that the court had jurisdiction of the matter charged as an offence, against Amey Lapier, that she had been duly convicted, and that the receipt of the money by Porter, was not an act of extortion. That the negro act ought to be construed “ most largely for carrying the same into execution.” That common barratry is an offence at common law. Amey La-pier was tried for abusive words, for barratry, and for insulting a white woman. A liberal exposition of the negro act will authorize a court of magistrates and freeholders to punish for such offences, which strike at the root of the peace "and security of society. Whilst slavery is allowed to exist, strict subordination must be maintained, and slaves held in a state of humble subjection. But admitting the court had not jurisdiction, yet there is no evidence that the defendant, and the others composing the court, were ac»' tuate'd by other than pure motives. If they were mistaken, it was a mistake which might have befallen the worthiest men in community, and some of the best informed, for the opinion is'very prevalent, that such offences are cognizable by a court of magistrates and freeholders. Even the counsel of Amey Lapier was under that impression. If the defendant, Porter, neglected to pay over the fine, as by law required, he is liable to the penalty in such case provided, but such neglect is no evidence 'per se, of extortion. Cited 2 Hawk. 369. 2'Bay, 74. 2 Bay, 5. 6 D. and E. 691. 1 N. Y. T. R. 131.
    The Attorney General contended, that as the charge against Amey Lapier, was for abusive language to Mrs. Thomas, and scandalizing her character, the court that tried her had no jurisdiction, or copld not take cognizance of such charge ; and that the proceedings of the court therein was illegal and void ; consequently, that the exaction of the fine in question, was an act of oppression and extortion. Inferior courts must be confined strictly within their spheres ofjurisdiction. The negro actgivesno powers to magistrates and freeholders to try for such misconduct as that charged agninst Amey Lapier.
    Jan. 14, 1815.
   Per curiam.

There was no evidence of wilful or corrupt conduct on the part of the defendant. At most, it could only amount to error of judgment. The non-payment of money within the time limited by law, could only be imputed to negligence. There was no proof of extortion, or oppression. Some of the judges were of opinion the court which tried the woman of color, acted very properly for any thing that appeared ; and that such a court may take cognizance of charges of the sort alleged against Amey Lapier.

[Nott, J.

This is an indictment against a magistrate, for extortion and mal-practice in office, for trying, convicting, and fining a free woman of color, charged with having insulted and slandered a white person. Whether the defendant, as a magistrate, had jurisdiction over the case, or if he had, whether he ought to have imposed a fine, or inflicted corporal punishment, are questions not necessary to be decided in this case ; for whether he acted right or wrong, [unless he was governed by corrupt motives, he was not liable to be indicted. A judicial officer is not answerable, crimi-inally, for an error of judgment. There was no evidence to authorize a belief that the defendant, in this case, intended any oppression, or acted corruptly. The person accused before him had counsel, who made no objection to .the jurisdiction of the court: he had two respectable freeholders associated with him ; he had evidence that the magistrates in Charleston had long exercised jurisdiction over such cases; and the case relied on in 2 Bay, almost amounts to a decision of this court, that he had jurisdiction. The receipt which ho gave for the fine, in which he states, at large, the nature of the case, the conviction, the amount of the money received, and the purpose for which it was paid, afford additional evidence of his innocence: a new trial, therefore, ought , to “e granted.]

Note. The A. A. 1740, sec. 10, gives authority to one J. P. and two freeholders, to try any slave for any offence, not capital, and inflict any corporal punishment not extending to life or member. Sec. 14 of same act, declares, that offences committed by free negroes, mulattoes, &c., shall be tried as slaves are directed to be tried. The trial was for insulting and abusive words; but the conviction was for assaulting. The conviction appears to have been irregular. The conviction was of the charge contained in the warrant, to arrest Amoy, though evidence was given against her of an assault, and also of barratrous acts.

New trial granted;  