
    MING ZHENG, Jai Yong Zheng, aka Ja Yun Zhang, aka Ja Yun Zheng, aka Jia Yun Zheng, aka Jia Yong Zheng, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-3374-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 4, 2012.
    
      Vlad Kuzmin, Kuzmin & Associates P.C., New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Carol Federighi, John W. Blakeley, Senior Litigation Counsel; Sul Kee Kim, Law Clerk, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, REENA RAGGI and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioners Ming Zheng (“Zheng”) and Jai Yong Zheng, natives and citizens of the People’s Republic of China, seek review of a July 20, 2011, decision of the BIA denying Zheng’s motion to reopen. In re Ming Zheng, Jai Yong Zheng, Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/877 (B.I.A. July 20, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322-23, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)). Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Zheng’s September 2010 motion to reopen was untimely, because the BIA issued its final order of removal in 2006. However, the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen do not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding^].” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

In this case, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Zheng’s motion to reopen as untimely. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that the background materials do not demonstrate a change in country conditions material to Zheng’s claim that she is eligible for relief. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (applying the substantial evidence standard to the agency’s determination of whether there was a change in country conditions). Zheng’s decision to begin practicing Christianity in the United States constitutes a self-induced change in personal circumstances that did not merit an exception to the time and number bars applicable to motions to reopen. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006).

Further, the BIA reasonably gave limited evidentiary weight to the letters and documents from China that Zheng submitted in support of her application. The BIA’s decision to give limited weight to this evidence is entitled to particular deference, see Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006), and, here, nothing in the record compels the conclusion that the BIA erred, as it relied on the IJ’s underlying adverse credibility determination to decline to credit Zheng’s corroborating evidence, see Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-49 (2d Cir.2007) (relying on the doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus to conclude that the agency may decline to credit documentary evidence submitted with a motion to reopen by an alien who was found not credible in the underlying proceeding) (citing Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir.2007)). As we previously upheld the agency’s adverse credibility determination, that determination constitutes the law of the case and we decline to revisit it. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 726 (2d Cir.2009).

Finally, although Zheng provided articles describing the harassment, arrest and interrogation of members of underground churches in China, those articles did not describe a change in country conditions since Zheng’s 2005 hearing. See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (holding that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions, the BIA “compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below”). Rather, the 1998 U.S. State Department profile of asylum claims and country conditions in China submitted for Zheng’s 2005 merits hearing reflects that, between 1994 and 1997, the government of China was engaging in a policy of repressing unregistered church activity, including surveillance, detentions, arrests and destruction of property. The 2002 U.S. State Department report on country conditions in China — also submitted for Zheng’s 2005 merits hearing — describes similar conduct by the Chinese government. Although the 2008 U.S. State Department report submitted with Zheng’s motion to reopen reflects that religious repression continues in China, nothing in these materials reflects that the treatment of Christians in China has worsened. Accordingly, as Zheng failed to demonstrate a change in conditions, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  