
    Geier et al. versus Shade.
    1. While an agreement made in consideration, of stifling a prosecution for a felony is void, yet certain misdemeanors which chiefly affect the individuals aggrieved and not the public interests, do not come within that rule, and may be settled by private agreement.
    2. The obtaining of money by one individual from another by false and fraudulent representations is such a misdemeanor which may lawfully be settled by the parties after the institution of a criminal proceeding. Henee, a jmomissory note given to the prosecutor to settle such an offence, and in consideration of the abandonment of a criminal prosecution begun thereon, is founded upon a valid consideration.
    March 2d, 1885.
    Before Mercur, C. J., Gordon, Paxson, Trunkey, Sterrett and Clark, JJ. Green, J., absent.
    Error to tbe Court of Common Pleas of BerJcs county: Of January Term 1884, No. 363.
    Assumpsit, by Ignatius Shade against Osmund Geier and Christoph Becker, on a promissory note for $300, dated May 26th, 1883, given by the defendants to the plaintiff, payable six months after date.
    The defendant Booker filed the following affidavit and supplemental affidavit of defence: “ The plaintiff’s demand
    is founded on a promissory note given by Osmund Geier as principal, and this deponent as bail, to Ignatius Shade, the plaintiff, for tbe payment of $300 six months after date, which said note is dated on the 26th day of May, 1883. That this deponent is informed and verily believes the same to bo true, that the said Ignatius Shade gave no value for said note, and that the same was given without consideration to the said Shade, and that there is nothing due on said note from this deponent to the plaintiff; that said note was given to the plaintiff to secure the payment of a collateral, to wit, building association shares of stock, and in settlement of a criminal prosecution ; that after the note was given, the plaintiff, in violation of said settlement, subsequent to the delivery of said note brought another prosecution founded upon the same matters as the first prosecution, for the settlement of which this note was given; that this deponent is not indebted to tbe plaintiff in any sum in law.”
    Supplemental Affidavit. — “ The note upon which this suit is founded was executed and delivered by the defendants to the plaintiff in consideration of the plaintiff withdrawing and settling a criminal prosecution for false pretence which the plaintiff had instituted against Osmund Geier, one of the defendants; that this deponent is informed and verily believes the same to be true, that some time in the year 1882 Osmund Geier above named obtained some money by means of false and fraudulent representations from the plaintiff with intent to cheat and defraud the plaintiff, and that some time in the month of April or May, 1883, the plaintiff swore out an information before Alderman Brown well, charging the said Osmund Geier as above. That this deponent is informed and believes the same to be true, that the said Osmund Geier delivered certain building association shares of stock as collateral security for the payment of the debt due the plaintiff; that some time in May, 1883, the plaintiff was pressing his said criminal prosecution and threatened to imprison the said Osmund Geier unless the case was settled by the said Geier. That these defendants thereupon executed and delivered this note to tbe plaintiff, as was distinctly agreed upon by the plaintiff and Geier, one of the defendants, in settlement of the said criminal prosecution; that in'violation of the said agreement, which was the consideration for the giving of said note, the plaintiff some time in the month of September, 1883, and long before this note became due and payable, had a new warrant issued on the same information, for the same subject-matter, and for the same cause as the first prosecution, and had the said Osmund Geier re-arrested, and gave as an excuse for said arrest that this note upon which this suit is brought was worthless. That the said Osmund Geier is now under bail for his appearance at the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace of Berks county, to answer the above charge, the settlement of which was the consideration for the giving of this note.
    That the consideration of this note wholly failed, and that this deponent is not indebted to the plaintiff in any manner whatever.”
    Upon a rule to show cause why judgment should not be entered for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence, the court entered judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant Becker. Judgment was entered against the defendant Geier by default for want of an affidavit of defence.
    The defendants took this writ of error, assigning for error the action of the court in entering judgment against Becker for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence.
    
      Israel C. Becker and Henry C. G. Reber, for the plaintiffs in error.
    The note being given to compound a criminal prosecution for an offence of a public nature is void. The obtaining of money by false pretences is such an offence, of a public nature, involving moral turpitude and affecting the public morals and example : National Bank of Oxford v. Kirk, 9 Norris, 49; Kimbrough ¶. Lane (Ky.), 15 Amer. L. Reg., N. S., 389; Riddle v. Hall, 3 Out., 116; Ormerod v. Dearman, 4 Id., 564. The agreement was designed by all the parties to it to have the effect to stifle the prosecution and to discharge the accused, and the fact that the prosecution was subsequently renewed does not remove the moral turpitude from the agreement, or change the illegality of the consideration.
    
      James A. O’Reilly and Cyrus G. Derr, for the defendant in error.
    The criminal prosecution, in settlement of which the note in question is said to have been given, is stated in the affidavits of defence to have been for a false pretence which is not an offence of a public nature.
    In Steinbaker v. Wilson and Young, 1 Leg. Gaz. Rep., 76, the same question arose, and the same defence, want of confikloration, was made. Paxson, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “ There is nothing in tile law to prevent the prosecutor in a ease of false pretences from compounding the offence and abandoning tile prosecution. If the defendant will make restitution, there is no legal objection to its reception by the prosecutor, the offence being a mere misdemeanor. If the defendant may make restitution, he may do so by paying tbe cash, or he may give his note or other obligation therefor, if the prosecutor is willing to accept it: ” Act of March 81st, 1860, sec. 9, P. L., 432.
    March 16th, 1885.
   Chief Justice Mercur

delivered tbe opinion of the court,

It is well settled that an agreement in consideration of stifling or compounding a criminal prosecution or proceeding for a felony or a misdemeanor of a public nature is void: Riddle v. Hall, 3 Out., 116. There are, however, misdemeanors of an inferior class in which the public is presumed to have less interest. They are assumed to affect chiefly the parties especially aggrieved thereby. The settlement of offences of this class is not illegal, and therefore an agreement between the offender and tbe party aggrieved, to settle one of this kind is not invalid. Section 9 of the Act of 31st March, 1860, Pur. Dig., 377, authorizes the magistrate or the court to which the proceedings have been returned, to permit the? settlement of such offences. The obtaining of money by means of false and fraudulent representations, with intent to cheat and defraud is an offence for which there would also be a remedy by action, and may be settled. There was therefore no error in entering judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence.

Judgment affirmed.  