
    Margaret McNally, App’lt, v. The City of Cohoes, Resp't.
    
    
      (Court of Appeals, Second Division,
    
    
      Filed June 9, 1891.)
    
    Negligence—Cohoes (city of)—Municipal corporation—Ice and snow-on sidewalk—Notice—Laws 1881, chap. 183, p. 237.
    Under Laws 1881, chap. 183, p. 227, to charge the city of Cohoes with liability for injuries sustained by a person falling on a street rendered' dangerous and slippery by ice or snow, actual information, intelligence- or knowledge of the defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of the sidewalk, by its superintendent answers the requirements of the statute, but the fact that he had been seen to pass over the walk ten or twelve days before-the accident and again a week before, and that he testified that he did not remember the dates when he had passed through, that there was ice there but it was covered with ashes where the people walked, does not justify a finding that he had the notice required by the statute.
    Appeal from a judgment of the general term, third department, affirming a judgment entered upon a nonsuit
    
      Matthew Hale, for app’lt; D. Cady Herrick, for resp’t.
    
      
       Affirming 25 N. Y. State Rep., 65.
    
   Haight, .

—This action was brought to recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in falling upon a sidewalk in the city of Cohoes on the 7th day of February, 1885.

The statute provides that: “ The city of Cohoes shall not be liable for any damage or injury sustained by any person in consequence of any street, highway, bridge, culvert, sidewalk or cross-walk in said city being out of repair, unsafe, dangerous, or obstructed by snow, ice, or otherwise, or in any way or manner, unless actual notice of the defective, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition of said street, highway, bridge, culvert, sidewalk or cross-walk shall have been given to the common council of said city, or the superintendent of streets and public grounds of said city, at least twenty-four hours previous to such damage or injury.” Laws 1881, .chap. 183.

Prior to the passage of this act, the liability of the municipality could be established by showing constructive notice, and the evident purpose of the act was to prevent a recovery unless actual notice be shown. The words shall have been given ” are used, but it is not specified how or in what manner notice shall be given. The word notice,” as used in this connection, imports information, intelligence or knowledge. If the defendant’s superintendent had actual information, intelligence or knowledge of the defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of the sidewalk, it would seem to answer the requirements of the statute. Actual notice may be established by evidence either direct or circumstantial the same as any other fact. The trial court appears to have been of the opinion that the evidence did not justify a finding that defendants superintendent had actual knowledge of the condition of the sidewalk at the time of or the place where the plaintiff fell. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine whether the evidence is of that character which requires a reversal

The plaintiff tells us that she was upon the sidewalk upon Factory street; that it was covered with a glare of ice its entire width up to within a foot of the building, and that it extended lengthwise of the walk about five feet; that she saw it, stopped and looked at it, then stepped upon it, and after walking about three feet upon the ice she slipped and fell, breaking her wrist Evidence was given tending to show that ice had been upon the walk for about three weeks; that on thp 4th and 5th there was rain, snow and sleet turning cold on the morning of the 6th; the temperature going down below'zero; that the defendant’s superintendent had been seen to pass over the walk ten or twelve days before the accident, and again about a week befora He was then called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff and himself testified that he had passed through the street several times before the accident, but did not remember the dates; thinks he may have passed through the street after the first of the month; that when he passed through the street there was ice upon the sidewalk, the same as on every other walk in the city; that the ice was covered with ashes, on that part on which the people traveled.

This is the evidence in substance bearing upon the question of actual notice. It will be observed that it fails to show any knowledge on the part of the superintendent as to the condition of the walk after the rain and sleet on the 5th and the freezing on the morning of the 6th. We do not understand his testimony to be controverted; and if, as testified by him, the walk was covered with ashes prior to the storm of the 4th and 5th, it is quite apparent that there was a material change in the condition of the walk thereafter rendering it dangerous if it was as described by the plaintiff at the time of her fall on the morning of the 7th; Taylor v. The City of Yonkers, 105 N. Y., 202; 7 N. Y. State Rep., 332, and Harrington v. The City of Buffalo, 121 N. Y., 147; 30 N. Y. State Rep., 719._

_ These views render is unnecessary to consider the question as to whether the defendant was guilty of negligence, or whether the plaintiff upon her own showing was guilty of contributory negligence in going upon the ice after observing its condition.

The judgment should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.

All concur, except Potter and Vann, JJ., dissenting.  