
    Michael CALMESE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Anthony E. MCNAMER, Attorney, OSB # 00138; Oregon State Bar Professional Liability Fund, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-35569
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted October 25, 2016 
    
    Filed November 02, 2016
    Michael Cálmese, Pro Se
    Jonathan Mark Radmacher, Attorney, McEwen Gisvold LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appellee
    Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Michael Cálmese appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his diversity action alleging legal malpractice in connection with Anthony E. McNamer’s representation of Cálmese in a trademark action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 260 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Calmese’s action against McNamer as barred by the statute of limitations. See Kaseberg v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 351 Or. 270, 265 P.3d 777, 781-82 (2011) (two-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims; the discovery rule postpones accrual until a plaintiff knows or should have known of a substantial possibility that he was harmed by a lawyer’s acts or omissions). Contrary to Calmese’s contention, he is not entitled to tolling due to wrongful concealment. See Chaney v. Fields Chevrolet Co., 264 Or. 21, 503 P.2d 1239, 1241 (1972) (wrongful concealment of facts that prevents discovery of a wrong or knowledge of a cause of action will toll the statute of limitations).

Dismissal without leave to file a Second Amended Complaint was proper because amendment would have been futile. See CHoPP Computer Corp. v. United States, 5 F.3d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir. 1993) (standard of review for implicit denial of request for leave to amend; district court does not abuse its discretion where amendment would have been futile).

Calmese’s contentions that the district court failed to conduct a de novo review of his objections and ignored evidence, he was tricked into changing his motion to amend, and he should be able to re-file the original version of his operative complaint, are unpersuasive.

In light of our disposition, we do not consider Calmese’s contentions regarding the merits of this action or the underlying trademark action, which was addressed in a prior appeal. See Adidas Am., Inc. v. Calmese, 489 Fed.Appx. 177 (9th Cir. 2012).

Calmese’s motion to stay, filed on March 31, 2016, is denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     