
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, CHARLESTON,
    JAN., 1813.
    Anthony Chardon v. Oliphant, Calder & Co.
    After the dissolution of a copartnership, the admission of a debt by one partner is not sufficient, of itself, to charge the other partners, and no act can be done by one which would bind the rest, unless under special circumstances.
    Motion for a new trial. Assumpsit, to recover the amount of a book debt, tried in Charleston, before Judge Grimke.
    The plaintiff’s books, and especially the book containing the original entries of the several items of merchandize charged to the defendants by the plaintiff, was required by the defendants to be produced in evidence, which was not done, nor was the person who charged the goods, and made the same entries, produced as a witness, nor examined by commission. It appeared that the plaintiff lived in Philadelphia, and defendants in Charleston, when the goods were charged. James Nicholson, Esq., testified on the part of the plaintiff, that he heard Oliphant, one of the defendants, acknowledge the receipt of the articles charged in an account presented to him, being an account similar to that which is the foundation of this action. But this happened some years after the copart, nership of Oliphant, Calder & Co. had been dissolved, and after Oliphant had become insolvent. It also appeared, that Oliphant and Calder had disagreed, and were on ill terms when the suit was brought. Also, that Calder was the only solvent partner.
    The case was submitted without argument.
    7th Jan. 1815.
   Per curiam.

The evidence was not sufficient, under the circumstances of the case, and ought not to have been admitted after the dissolution of the partnership, to charge tho concern. At any rate the books of account ought to have been produced in evidence, or else their non-production satisfactorily accounted for.

Note. After the partnership dissolved, the acknowledgment of one of the partners was held sufficient to take the demand out of the statute of limitations. 6 Johns. 207. Smith v. Ludlow. See Dong. 652. 2 H. Bl, Rep. 340. An admission of one partner after the dissolution of the partnership, concerning a joint contract, made during the partnership, was allowed in evidence to charge the co-partners jointly. 1 Taunt. 103. Wood v. Braddick.

[Colcock, J,

This action was brought to recover the value of certain goods said to have been sold and delivered by- the plaintiff to the defendants, and the evidence offered to support it was the declaration of one of the co-partners, who had become insolvent; which declaration was made, too, a long time after the dissolution of the co-partnership. It was contended on behalf of the defendants, or rather the only one who was said to be solvent, that if the books of original entry of the plaintiff were produced and examined, it would appear that the goods were delivered to another .person j and generally, that the evidence was insufficient to prove the sale and delivery. It must be supposed that the jury thought that the acknowledgment of one co-partner would as effectually bind the firm as that of an individual would bind himself; but in this they were misinformed, for it is clear, that after tho dissolution of a co-partnership, no act could be done by one which would bind the rest, unless under special circumstances: much less can,the vague, loose declaration of one co-partner be permitted to operate against the rest; but no reasen has been given for this attempt. . From the general rules of evidence in such cases, the books of original entry should have been produced, or evidence of the delivery of the goods. I am of opinion a new trial should be granted.]

New trial granted.  