
    David ESPARZA; Alan Mark; Anthony Mora; Irene Redd, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors; Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission; Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-56523.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted June 6, 2013.
    Filed June 12, 2013.
    
      Christopher Gaspard, Michael Andrew McGill, Esquire, Michael Alan Morguess, L'ackie, Dammeier, McGill & Ethir, APC, Upland, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Christopher Lovrien, Elwood Gon Ho Lui, Esquire, Peter E. Davids, Jones Day, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appel-lees.
    Before: THOMAS, SILVERMAN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

David Esparza, Alan Mark, Anthony Mora, and Irene Redd (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.

I

The district court did not err in concluding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under § 1983. Plaintiffs did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment as sworn peace officers with the Sheriffs Department or any other County agency, so they could not state a claim under § 1983 for violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. See Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178,1185 (9th Cir.2006) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State law.”); Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (9th Cir.l988)(stating that one “has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in continued employment ... [only] if he has a reasonable expectation or a legitimate claim of entitlement to it” under state or local law (internal quotation marks omitted)).

No state or local law granted Plaintiffs a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to continued employment as sworn peace officers upon the elimination of their entire department. Brady, 859 F.2d at 1547-48. The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (“Board”) had plenary authority under the County’s charter to implement a workforce reduction plan and consolidate the Los An-geles Office of Public Safety (“OPS”) with the Sheriffs Department. L.A. County Charter art. Ill, §§ 11(3), (4); Holmgren v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 159 Cal.App.4th 593, 601, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 611 (2008). Nothing in either the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights (“PBRA”) or the Los Angeles County Civil Service Rules entitled Plaintiffs to continued employment or administrative appeal hearings when the Board eliminated OPS. PBRA and the Civil Service Rules require administrative hearings only when an officer is being punished, suspended, demoted, or discharged for cause. Cal. Gov.Code §§ 8303, 3304; L.A. Cnty. Civ. Serv. R. 18.01, 18.03. Civil Service Rule 19, which concerns the abolishment of employees’ positions, is silent on an officer’s entitlement to an administrative hearing.

Nor were Plaintiffs entitled to a sworn peace officer position with the Sheriffs Department. OPS and the Sheriffs Department were separate organizations with separate hiring qualifications, Frank v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 149 Cal.App.4th 805, 810-11, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 (2007), and the Board made clear when it eliminated OPS that existing OPS officers would be placed in the Sheriffs Department or other County departments only if they met those departments’ qualifications and standards. Plaintiffs concede that they did not meet the Sheriffs Department’s qualifications for sworn deputy sheriff positions, so they did not have a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to those positions. Brady, 859 F.2d at 1547-48.

II

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim with prejudice. The defect in Plaintiffs’ complaint is due to the lack of a cognizable legal theory, not insufficient factual allegations. Therefore, further amendment would be futile. Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir.2011).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . Defendants-Appellees’ Request for Judicial Notice is granted.
     