
    Jacob Roach against Levi Williams.
    hlrcenemi'!iority“ iog“de"acnTand married before wived “"on hei ‘he did'cimíof veyance of the avoid'iier conveyaodln'minority.6’ Where a female
    This was an action of trespass to try titles to iand. The plaintiff deduced a regular chaip of title down to his ancestor, from whom he held by devise. The title was derived through two sisters who were co-parceners, the daughters of J°hn Oswalt. At the time of the conveyance from these two sisters, the youngest was a minor, After the conveyance, and during her minority, she intermarried with Jacob Gross. Shortly after the marriage, Gross conveyed the same-land to another person. At this stage of the cause two questions were made:
    1st. Whether the deed of Jacob Gross’s wife, made during her minority, was absolutely void, or only voidable. If it was absolutely void, it was contended that the defendant, though a stranger, might take advantage of it; if only voidable, it was a personal privilege, of which no one could take advantage but the minor herself.
    . 2d. Suppose it to be only voidable, she had a right, on coming of age, to confirm or avoid it ; and that having been married during her minority, that right devolved on the husband, who had made his election by conveying the land to another. The case was tried at Granby, Fall Term, 1816, before Mr Justice JYoti.
    
    Being of opinion, that the husband had a right to avoid the deed made by the wife during her minority; and that he had done so by conveying the land, he instructed the Jury to that effect. And that, having failed in one half of his title,' the plaintiff was only entitled, according to the decisions of our Courts, to an undivided moiety of the land. But that he was entitled to recover such damages as it had been proved he had sustained, and full costs. The Jury found a verdict for an undivided moiety of the land, and one cent damages, leaving the plaintiff to pay the costs of the action.
    A motion was now made for a new trial, on two grounds:
    1st. For a misdirection of the Court respecting the operation of Gross’s conveyance.
    2d. Because the verdict was contrary to law and evidence.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Nott.

From the view which I have taken of this case, it is unnecessary to 'determine whether the deed of a minor is absolutely void in its creation, or only voidable. That question 1 consider superseded by another: to wit, whether the deed of the wife was not avoided by the subsequent conveyance of the husband. It. is admitted, that a minor, upon his arrival at full age, may avoid any deed made by him during his minority. It has already been determined, during the sitting of this Court, that a husband has a right to the rents and profits of the wife’s lands during coverture. And that he has a right to sell, convey, or dispose of them in any manner he pleases during that period. Brown vs. Spann, If the wife could have made her election on her arrival at full age, being unmarried, to avoid or confirm her deed, all that the Court would require in order to declare it void, would be satisfactory evidence that she had made such election. And no higher evidence of that fact, I presume, would be required, than that she had conveyed to another person. I take it to be equally clear, that whatever rights the wife would have had in that respect before marriage, devolved on the husband afterwards, 1 Bacon, 290; Bacon & Ferne, &c. He could not convey her inheritance, but he could avoid her deed, which was voidable. And the plaintiff’s right being once suspended, was gone for ever. I do -not mean to say, that in all cases a right once suspended can never revive.- But where the ground of suspension goes to the destruction of the right, as in this case, it never can.

Some of my brethren, however, entertain doubts on this point, and think it a question of too much difficulty to be determined hastily^. No opinion, therefore, is given upon it by the Court.

But we all agree that the verdict is against evidence. The plaintiflf’s right was clearly established to an undivided moiety. His interest, therefore, ran through the whole. The defendant was a trespasser. He set up no title. If he had occupied but an inch of ground, he would • have been liable to this action. The plaintiff was entitled to recover an undivided half of the land, and such damages as he proved he had sustained; and the costs followed as a legal consequence. • This was an extremely ignorant Jury. I believe there was but one man on it who could write his name. They could not be made to understand, that a person having a right to one half of a tract of land, might hold per mi and per tout. And that ■ any entry by a stranger was a trespass upon the plaintiff But whether they erred through ignorance or obstinacy, the verdict is wrong. And Juries are not to be indulged in capriciously measuring the rights of parties according to their narrow views, although the injury is small. I am of opinion a new trial ought to be granted.

Colcock, Cheves, Ganit, and Johnson, J. concurred.  