
    William R. GUMPER, Appellant, v. Richard S. BACH, D.D.S., Appellee.
    No. 84-2309.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 27, 1985.
    
      Ralph P. Ezzo, Miami, for appellant.
    Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson and Sally R. Doerner, Miami, for appellee.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HENDRY and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

William Gumper appeals from a final judgment entered after the trial court denied his motion for a new trial on the grounds that the jury award was inadequate. The jury awarded appellant $2,150 in this dental malpractice action and found him to be 40% comparatively negligent. We affirm upon a holding that 1) the jury’s monetary award was reasonable in light of the evidence presented and appellant’s actual damages, and 2) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on comparative negligence where the appellee raised it as an affirmative defense and the evidence showed that appellant delayed seeking treatment for five months after the root canal was performed. Cf. Cuozzo v. Ronan & Kunzl, Inc., 453 So.2d 902 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Borenstein v. Raskin, 401 So.2d 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

Affirmed.

HENDRY and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ., concur.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge

(dissenting in part).

Although the issue is close, I concur with the conclusion that the record does not demonstrate error with respect to the jury’s minimal damage award. I do not agree, however, that there is any basis for the finding of comparative negligence. As I understand it, this determination arises only from the claim that Gumper endured the pain caused by the defendant’s defective root canal work too long before seeking relief. I cannot believe, however, that even excessive stoicism in the face of the agony which almost inevitably follows dental treatment may properly be deemed conduct which falls below that of a reasonable person. See Mack v. Garcia, 433 So.2d 17, 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), pet. for review denied, 440 So.2d 352 (Fla.1983) (“[A] patient does not have an obligation or duty to determine whether an injury is being properly treated by a physician.”); Piper v. Moore, 410 So.2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). A rule that a person whose teeth hurt after he goes to a dentist must go back to that dentist or to another one at any particular time may be a great (but unnecessary) boon to the dental profession, but it does not comport with the experience of life; therefore, it should not be accepted as a principle of law. For this reason, I would order that judgment be entered for the full amount of the plaintiff’s damages.  