
    Sarah M’Dowall, and Others, Infants, by their next friend, v. Mary M’Dowall, and Alexander Black.
    The testator made several bequests to Ms widow, including an annuity of $500, and added, “this settlement on my good Tyife, I hope she will consider a full compensation for any right of dower on my estate, as I fully doand in a codicil speaks of the surplus of his estate, after pay» ing all gifts, and his “wife’s dower oí $500, per annum,.” The widow received her legacies, but subsequently sued out a summons in dower, from the Court of Common Pleas, against the executor; who shewed for cause the foregoing clauses in the testator’s will: and the Court overruled the cause shewn, and ordered a writ of admeasurement to issue; whereupon the widow’s dower was assessed by the commissioners at $6,560, for which sum judgment was entered, and the amount was paid to her by the executor. There being no evidence of fraud, or collusion, held, that although the provision for the widow was expressly in satisfaction of her dower, yet the judgment at law was conclusive of the question of satisfaction, which could not, therefore, be re-examined in equity; and that the judgment, until it was reversed, was binding on the residuary devisees and legatees of the testator.
    A provision for the' widow, made expressly in satisfaction of dower, if actually received by her, is a good defence to proceedings at law for the recovery of dower; and if this defence is made in such proceedings, and overruled, or, it seems, if it be neglected to be made, and the widow recover her dower, she cannot afterwards be called upon in equity to restore the provision accepted by her, or to elect between it and her dower. The equity jurisdiction is not exclusive, except in cases of implied satisfaction, and in those cases of express satisfaction, where the widow has not actually received the provision made for her in lieu of dower.
    When a matter has once been adjudicated by a competent jurisdiction, it shall not again be drawn in question: nor will parties be permitted again to litigate, what they have once had an opportunity of litigating in the course of a judicial proceeding; but whatever might properly have been put in issue in that proceeding, shall be concluded to have been put in issue, and determined, vide Manigault v. Deas, ante, p. 284.
    Under the Act of Assembly regulating the proceedings in dower, if the heir be an infant, and have no guardian, the summons may be issued to the executor, or administrator; and where there has been a judgment at law, in dower, against the executor, equity will not inquire whether the executor was properly the party, against whom the proceedings should have been instituted. If there was error, it belongs, to the Court of Law to correct the error; and whilst the judgment stands unreversed on the record, it is conclusive, and binding, on the estate, and all persons interested in it.
    
      Irregularity, or error, in proceedings at law, furnishes no ground for reviewing the judgment in equity. If a party were under a disadvantage, as if he needed a discovery, or was prevented from making his defence by accident, or surprise, this might form a distinct ground of equity jurisdiction ; but mere laches in making his defence, is not a ground for appealing to another jurisdiction: and the Court of Law must judge of the regularity of its own proceedings, and the correctness of its judgments.
    An executor is not bound, by any general rule, to appeal from a judgment against the estate, upon a disputed point of law; nor is it his duty to plead in abatement for the purpose of changing the jurisdiction, when there is no reason beforehand to expect any advantage from the change. In both cases, if he litigates in good faith, and is guilty of no actual laches, and especially if he acts under the advice of counsel, he cannot be made liable for the result.
    The complainants, Sarah M’Dowall, Mary M’Dowall, Sophia M’Dowall, John M’Dowall, and William M’Dowall, all of whom were infants, and sued par prochein amy, were the children of William M’Dowall, and residuary devisees and legatees, under the will of their grandfather, John M’Dowall, deceased. The defendants were the executrix and executor of the said testator; and this was a bill against them for an account of his estate. The cause came on to be heard at Charleston, in February, 1829, before Harper, Chancellor, from whose decree the questions made at the hearing will be fully understood.
    Harper, Ch. John M’Dowall, deceased, by his will, dated in 1819,, devised and bequeathed to his wife, the defendant, Mrs. Mary M’Dowall, his household furniture, plate, and carriage and horses, with the privilege of living five years rent, and tax, free, in the' house behind house No. 194 King street ; and also an annuity of five hundred dollars, payable quarterly, out of his estate, with the use of the fellow Tom, and washerwoman Mealy, during her life only, and at her death, the said slaves to be set free from their mistress. And the will adds, “ this settlement on my good wife, I hope she will consider a full compensation for any right of dower on my estate, as I fully do” In a codicil, the testator speaks of the surplus of his estate, after paying all gifts, and his “ wife’s dower of, $500, per annum,.” The testator appointed the defendants, Mrs.* M’Dowall, and Alexander Black, executrix, and executor, of his will. The defendant, Mrs. M’Dowall, admits, that she has received the annuity of $500, from the estate, and that the furniture and plate were delivered to her, not amounting, in value, to more than $500 ; that she received but one of the carriage horses, the other ^av^nS died; that she received the negro woman Mealy, the mati Tom having been sold by the testator in his life time; and that she had the use of the house, for the five years directed by the will. die defendants qualified ; but it seems, that the defendant, Mr. Black, acted, principally, in the execution of the will, and delivered the property bequeathed, and made the payment of the annuity, to his co-executrix. In 1824, Mrs. M’Dowall sued out a summons in dower against the executor, Mr. Black, in the Court of Common Pleas for Charleston district. This was pending until June, 1826, when the following order appears on the minutes of the Court. “ Mrs. M’Dowall’s claim of dower — Clause in testator’s will — After hearing the Attorney Genera], for the motion for a writ of admeasurement of dower, and King, contra, ordered, that the writ do issue.” The writ issued accordingly, and the dower was assessed by the commissioners, at six thousand five hundred and sixty dollars; for which judgment was entered, and the amount paid by the executor, Mr. Black, out of the funds of the estate.
    The present bill is against the executor, and executrix, for an account of the estate: and the only question at present submitted, preparatory to taking the account, is, whether the widow, Mrs. M’Dowall, is intitled to retain, both, the bequests to her contained in her late husband’s will, and the amount recovered by her, as dower ; whether the bequests to her were not intended in satisfaction, or bar of dower; and whether she is not bound to elect, and, indeed, whether she has not already elected, by accepting, the provision made for her by the will, in the first instance.
    If the question were properly before me now, whether, on the face of the will, this bequest appears to have been intended in satisfaction of dower, I have no hesitation in saying, that it does appear to have been so intended ; expressly so : and it is only by un. due refinement, that I could arrive at any other conclusion.
    But the question which strikes me, as being of much more difficulty, and importance, is, whether I am not bound to consider this as a matter already adjudicated, by the Court of Law. There is no doubt about the rule; and it is one of the utmost importance, and binding on this, and every other Court; that when a matter has once been adjudicated, by a competent jurisdiction, it shall not again be drawn into question.' Now, if this sort of defence, might have been made in the suit for dower; if it was actually offered, and considered, and the very question now presented, decided on; what authority have I, to review that decision, however clearly it may seem to me to have been erroneous, and notwithstanding, it may have been a matter of concurrent jurisdiction, in the first instance 1 It is said, that to compel an election, appertains, exclusively, to the jurisdiction of this Court. There is no doubt of that; and in order to exercise that jurisdiction, the Court determines the questions, which arise on the construction of wills, whether a devise, or bequest, was intended in satisfaction. But when the ques. tion of construction, has been settled, by a competent authority, and the provision, actually accepted, decided not to be a bar to the demand ; what foundation is there, for the exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court ? . It would amount to this. A Court of Law, in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction, determines, that a party is intitied both to a legacy, and dower; and that the acceptance of one, on a just construction of the will, is no bar to a demand for the other: but in cases, where the party is intitled to but one of the provisions, it belongs only to this Court, to compel the party to elect; and in order to clear the way, to an exercise of this jurisdiction, it may set aside the judgment of a tribunal of equal authority.
    The first question is, whether this defence, might have been made, to the action of dower, at law. The rule seems to be, as laid down by Mr. Hargrave, in his note to Co. Lit. 36 b. note 6, that when a devise is expressly in bar, or satisfaction, of dower, that is a defence at law ; but that a Court of Equity, will sometimes raise a case of election, from the special circumstances, when the will is silent: as that the party cannot take both provisions, without defeating some of the dispositions of the will. I believe, all the cases, which have been litigated in the Courts, have relation to this doctrine, of implied satisfaction.
    The doctrine, laid down by Mr. Hargrave, is recognized by the Master of the Rolls, in Strahan v. Sutton, 3 Ves. 251. In Birmingham v. Kirwan, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 444, Lord Redesdale examines the doctrine, and the grounds of the equity jurisdiction. I understand him to say, that when something has been given in satisfaction, and actually accepted, this is a defence at law; but if the party declines to elect, and it is uncertain, under what title he may take, it belongs to the Court of Equity, to compel him to determine, and remove the uncertainty. In the present case, it is agreed, on all hands, that the provision made for Mrs. M’Dowall, by the will, had been accepted, before the institution of the suit for dower.
    Lord Redesdale assimilates the case of a devise, in satisfaction of dower, to other cases of election, which are of frequent occurrence in Courts of Equity; and these cases may serve to illustrate the present subject. A testator gives A., a benefit by his will, and by ^ie same will, disposes of a piece of property belonging to A. At law, A. would be intitled to both ; but it belongs to the equity jurisdiction, to compel him to elect. But if the testator, being indebted to A. £100, bequeaths him a horse, or a piece of plate, expressly in satisfaction, and the legacy be actually received, there is no ground of equity here. It is like any other case of legal satis, faction, of a debt, and the testator’s representative must defend him. self at law, if he is sued for the debt. So if a testator makes provision for his wife by will, and, at the same time, makes such a disposition of his real estate, as would be defeated by his wife’s taking dower of it; this is a case of election. Or if the provision be expressly in bar of dower, and she delays to elect, equity may, perhaps, interfere, to compel an election. But if the provision be expressly in bar of dower, and be actually received, this is a plain le-. gal defence, to the demand of dower ; as much so, as payment of a debt.
    The case of Lawrence v. Lawrence, has been often referred to, as a leading case on this subject. That was a case of implied satisfaction. The testator gave his wife a provision for widowhood, and bequeathed awaythis real estate. At the first hearing, 2 Yern. 3G5, Lord Somers was of opinion, that the claims were inconsistent, and that the wife must elect. Dower, it appears, had been demanded at law, and the devise pleaded as a satisfaction ; which defence, as I understand from the subsequent report, 1 Bro. P. C. 591, had been overruled, and the dower recovered. Lord Somers injoined the judgment. On the cause coming on to be re-heard, before Lord Keeper Wright, he was of opinion, that there was nothing in the will, to bar the wife of dower; “ and in case any such thing did appear by the will, it would only be a bar at law, where the matter had been already determined.” 1 Bro. P. C. 593. He therefore reversed Lord Somers’ decree, as to the injunction, and dismissed the bill, so far as it respected the dower. Another bill, on the same matter, was afterwards brought, and heard before Lord Oowper, who declined to interfere with Lord Keeper Wright’s decree ; and, on appeal to the house of Lords, the bill was dismissed, as to the point of dower. 1 Bro. P. C. 594, 597.
    That case seems perfectly in point with the present, except that it was a case of implied satisfaction, from the supposed inconsistency of the dispositions of the will, with the claim of dower. In that respect, the doctrine seems to have been modified, by the later authorities ; but otherwise, the authority of Lawrence v. Lawrence, is undisputed. The master of the Rolls says, in Strahan v. Sutton, «I perfectly agree with Mr. Hargrave, that the principle of Lawrence v. Lawrence has never been impeached ; and the only question has been, whether a gift, out of the same estate, was incompatible with the widow’s claim of dower upon that estate.” 3 Ves. 252. That is the question for a Court of Equity. It is true, that in French v. Davies, 2 Ves. Jun. 578, the Master of the Rolls says, referring to Lawrence v. Lawrence, “ There the heir pleaded the will at Jaw, in satisfaction of the dower. I do not know why that is not a good plea, if she accepted that provision, in bar of her dower ; but never since that case, has it been attempted, to make that a defence at law: but a bill has been filed here, because the inconsistency of the claims is a ground of equity.” The Master of the Rolls plainly speaks here, not of express, but of implied bar, or satisfaction, where the inconsistency of the claims forms the ground of jurisdiction. These are the cases, which have never been tried at law, but have always been brought into equity ; although he seems to intimate an opinion, that even these might be tried at law, if the widow accepted the provision, in bar of dower. This is further apparent, from the cases, referred to by the Master of the Rolls, in his opinion; Villareal v. Lord Galway, Ambl. 682, and note to Pearson v. Pearson, 1 Bro. C. C. 292; Foster v. Cook, 3 Bro. C. C. 347 ; Arnold v. Kempstead, Ambl. 466 ; Pitt v. Snowden, cited in the note, 1 Bro. C. C. 292 ; Jones v. Collier, Ambl. 730 ; all of them cases of implied satisfaction, resting on the alleged incompatibility of the dispositions, with. the claim of dower. But if we suppose, that, in every possible case, in which a widow may claim a provision under a will, and dower out of the estate, this Court has jurisdiction to try her right to both, and put her to her election, if she be found not intitled to both, there can be no doubt, that the Court of Law has, at least, concurrent jurisdiction of the question of actual, and express satisfaction ; and if it has actually exercised its jurisdiction, and determined that there was no satisfaction, but that the widow was intitled to both provisions, what is left for the jurisdiction of this Court? It is res judicata.
    It is argued, however, that this cannot be considered res judicata ; for there appears no plea of satisfaction, on the record at law, and the point was not in*ssue. In point of fact, it appears, pretty clearly, that the point was made, and decided. The minutes of the Court of Law shew, that a clause of the testator’s will was read, and argument heard, previously to the order for a writ of admeasurement dower. There could be no dispute about the right to dower, unless barred by the will; and I cannot conceive of any other point, on which argument could have been made; Indeed', no plea at all appears on the record, and it would seem irregular, that counsel should have been heard for the defence ; unless the ^'ourt: so construed the act- of the Legislature on the. subject, as, that in the summary proceeding allowed by it, all matters of defence might be taken advantage of ore tenus. The terms of the act are, that if the party “ shall not shew sufficient cause against the petition, then the said Court shall cause a writ for admeasure, ment of dower, to be issued.” Act of 1786, P. L, 409. If the Court of Law did make that construction, it is not for this Court to make a different one. That Court must judge of the regularity of its own proceedings. I am satisfied, however, that when the question is, de re judicata, the true rule, is this : that what the parties have once had an opportunity of litigating, in the course of a judicial proceeding, they shall not draw into question again ; but that whatever might properly have been put in issue, shall be concluded to have been put in issue, and determined.
    Such is the doctrine laid down in the elaborate case of Le Gfuen v. Gouverneur, and Kemble, 1 Johns. Cas. 436 ; a case, certainly deserving much respect, from the ability, and labor, with which it was argued, and determined. The doctrine seems to me, of the utmost importance to the public peace. To be sure, if a party were under a disadvantage; if he needed a discovery, or was prevented from making his defence, by accident, or surprise ; these circumstances might form a distinct ground of equity jurisdiction. But if, from mere laches, he neglected to make a defence, which the Court was competent to try, he has no reason to complain, that other jurisdictions should be shut against him.
    The other arguments are, that the complainants were not parties to the proceedings at law, and ought not to be bound by them ; that the proceedings were irregular, in an executrix suing her co-executor ; and that the defendants are trustees, accountable for the estate, and that if the dower has been improperly recovered, they are responsible for the injury the estate has sustained.
    The act of the Legislature, for the admeasurement of dower, provides, that the summons shall be directed “ to the heir at law, of the deceased, if of full age, or to his, or her guardian, if he, or she, shall be an infant, and if there be no guardian, then to the executor, or administrator, of the deceased, or to any other person, or persons, who may be in possession of any of the lands.” P. L. 408. The complainants were not the heirs at law ; but, perhaps, a liberal construction of the statute would require that the 
      hares factus, or devisee of the land, should be summoned. The complainants sue in the present case, par prochein amy, which may afford reason to conjecture, that they had no guardian; in which case the act directs the executor to be made the party. But, however, this may have been, if there was either error, or irregularity, in the proceedings against the executor, it belongs to the Court of Law, to correct the error, or irregularity. None, however, has been shown. I must hold the judgment to be valid, until reversed, or annulled ; and that the executor was properly made the defendant. If he were properly made the defendant, the act must have intended, that the estate, and all parties interested in it, should be bound by the judgment: otherwise, the proceedings would be nugatory. This is not extraordinary. A demand for dower is in the nature of a debt; and the executor alone is made a party when suit is brought for a debt, but yet the estate, and all parties interested in it, are bound.
    It seems to me to have been irregular, that an executrix should sue her co-executor, in a Court of Law. If a third person sues one executor, without joining the other, this may be pleaded in abatement, and the action will fail; but if the defendant neglects to plead in abatement, judgment may be recovered, and will bind the estate. Still more, it seems to me, might the executor, who was sued by his co-executrix, have pleaded in abatement. But he omitted to do so, and I cannot, therefore, say, that the judgment is void. I repeat, it belongs to that Court, to correct its own errors, and irregularities ; and I must respect the judgment, whilst it stands unreversed on the record.
    The defendants are certainly responsible for the estate, as trustees : and although I must respect the judgment of the Court of Law, determining their rights, yet, if they have been guilty of breach of trust, and, if the judgment was obtained by means of fraud, collusion, or laches, they must make good the injury, which the estate has sustained. If any third person had recovered against the executor, through his laches, he would certainly be responsible. The only fact of laches, which seems to be distinctly charged by the bill, is, that the defendant neglected to appeal. I would observe here, that I feel bound to disregard an argument, which is, perhaps, calculated to make the strongest impression ; to wit, my own conviction, that the judgment was erroneous, and might have been reversed on appeal. It is possible, that it might have appeared, as clearly, otherwise, to the Court of Appeals. As I must respect this judgment of the Court of Law, I am bound, whatever may be my individualopinion, to acquiesce in its correctness. Apart then from my conviction in the particular case, the question is, whether, as a general rule, an executor is bound to appeal, when the judgment Court, in the first instance, is against him, on a disputed point of law. I am not aware of any such rule. An executor is generally governed by the opinion of his counsel, and 1 think, may safely, and properly, be so governed. Mr. Black states in his answer, that he delivered a notice to the gentlemen, who had acted as the counsel of the complainants, in some other proceed, ings before this Court, informing them of the judgment’s having been rendered, and requesting their attention to it, if further proceedings should be thought adviseable. It is true, that one of the gentlemen in question, stated, that if such notice were left at his office, it was unknown to him, or the parties ; but if the notice were left, although it was overlooked by the counsel, it seems to repel any imputation of laches, or ill faith. The defendant swears, that he resisted the claim strenuously, and in good faith ; and that he endeavored, by the most obvious means, to give the parties, who were chiefly interested, an opportunity of appealing, if those who were most competent to judge, should think it adviseable. I think it would be new, and hard, that an executor should be held answerable for money, which he has paid under the sanction of a Court of Law, deciding on the merits.
    The other circumstances, which may be imputed as laches, are, that the executor failed to plead in abatement, and that he filed no plea of satisfaction. As to pleading in abatement, I think that was a matter fairly within the discretion of the executor. The tribunal, before which the suit was brought, was as proper a one, as any other, to determine the merits of the defence : and, I think, the most proper. I do not perceive, that, beforehand, he could have expected to gain any advantage, by changing the jurisdiction. As to the plea of satisfaction, I cannot undertake to say, that it was necessary, or that any advantage would have been gained by filing it. It appears, that a defence was made, and that the order for the writ was made on argument. I think that no charge of laches is sustained against the executor.
    Nor does any reason appear to impute collusion. There is nothing to shew, that Mrs. M’Dowall did not prosecute her suit in good faith, and with a full belief of her rights ; and she swears, that she acted by advice of counsel.
    It may appear a matter of hardship, that the intention of a testator, which seems to have been so clearly expressed, should be disappointed ; but it would be a greater public detriment, that the boundaries of jurisdiction should be confounded.
    It is, therefore, ordered, and decreed, that it be referred to the master, to take the account of the defendants, as executor, and' ex-ecutnx, of John M Dowall, deceased ; and, that in such account, he do not charge the said defendants, with the money, or property, received by Mrs. M’Dowall, by virtue of the bequests to her, contained in the will of her husband, the said testator, nor, with the money received by her, on the judgment in dower.
    From this decree, the complainants appealed, on the following grounds.
    1. That the will of the testator, in terms, declared the provision for his wife to be in lieu of dower, and as dower; and it was received by her as dower.
    2. That the judgment at law concludes nothing but the widow’s original right to dower, without reference to the question of satis, faction ; and it determined her election, so as to render her liable to refund the legacies, which she had received.
    3. That the attempt of the widow, who was also executrix, and, therefore, a trustee for the residuary legatees, to defeat the will, by a proceeding ht law, is contrary to equity, and good conscience.
    4. That, at all events, if the dower was properly assessed, and paid, equity will treat her as a trustee for the legatees, and compel her to account for it.
    Hunt, for the appeal,
    cited Middleton v. Quarles, 4 Desaus. 148. Adsit v. Adsit, 2 Johns. C. R. 448. Jones v. Collier, Ambl. 730. Arnold v. Kempstead, lb. 466. Wilson v. Lord Townshend, 2 Ves. Jun. 693. Strahan v. Sutton, 3 Ves. 251. Greatorex v. Cary, 6 Ves. 615. Arnold v. Kempstead, 2 Eden, 236. Gretton v. Haward, 1 Swanst. 413. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 1 Bro. P. C. 591.
    King, and Petigru, contra.
    
   Per Curiam.

This Court concurs in the views taken of this case by the Chancellor; and it is, therefore, ordered, and adjudged, that his decree be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.  