
    DAVID MYERLE, EXECUTOR OF PHINEAS BURGESS, v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [Nos. 14547, 14548.
    Decided January 27, 1896.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    The Secretary of tlie Navy contracts for tlie building of the monitor Monadnock. He acts under general appropriations for the Bureau of Construction and Refiair. During the progress of the work the contractor is interfered with and the work suspended by order of the Secretary of the Navy.
    I. The Secretary of the Navy has authority to settle the amounts due under a contract for the building of a ship of war, and demands for extra work agreed upon, and expenses incurred because of the Department’s action of which the Government has received the benefit.
    II. A naval contractor, who has furnished extra work and incurred expenses caused by the action of the Department, is not obliged to sue upon each item thereof separately; and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the completion of the contract work.
    III.When an Executive Department refers, under the Revised Statutes, (§ 1063) a claim which the Department might have settled, a demand for unliquidated damages is within the jurisdiction of the court as if presented by voluntary petition, though the Department may have had no authority to settle it.
    IY. A contract repeatedly brought to the attention of Congress by the reports of a Department, and recognized legislatively as binding on the United States by repeated appropriations, must be deemed to have been ratified by legislative authority.
    Y. A contractor, building a vessel under general appropriations, is not chargeable with a knowledge of the condition of the fund.
    VI. A contractor can not recover interest which he paid upon loans necessitated by the action of the defendants in suspending work upon his contract.
    VII. A contractor may recover as damages the profits which he would have realized if he had been allowed to perform.
    VIII.A contractor can not recover damages pieeuliar to himself individually in the case before the court and not of general application, under similar conditions, in all cases.
    
      The Reporters statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of this case as found by the court:
    I. At the time of the events stated in the petition and until lie departed this life, in 1884, Pirineas Burgess, plaintiff’s testator, was a citizen of the United States and a resident of Kings County, N. Y.; lie left a last will and testament, duly admitted to probate, of which claimant was made an executor; letters testamentary thereon have been issued to claimant.
    • II. Pursuant to duly advertised requests for proposals, which were accepted by Phineas Burgess, he being the lowest bidder therefor, and at a time when the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Department of the Navy, had sufficient moneys to pay the contract price hereinafter mentioned, the contract found annexed to the petition was made.
    III. This contract has been thus recognized by the Congress of the United States:
    “Act of June 6,1874, 18 Stats., 53, 57, general appropriation of $3,300,000 for Bureau of Construction and Repair.
    “Act of June 23,1874, 18 Stats., 226, authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to use balance of appropriation “for the purpose of completing the repairs on such double-turreted monitors as the Secretary of the Navy may deem necessary for the public service.”
    “Act of January 18,1875, 18 Stats., 29C, general appropriation of $3,300,000 for the Bureau of Construction and Repair.
    “Act of June 14,1878, 20 Stats., 123, appropriating moneys to said Phineas Burgess on account of delayed x>ayments on said contract.
    “House resolution, December 10,1878, asking for a report from the Secretary of the Navy as to the delay in the completion of the Monadnock, and as to whether or not any damages had been or were being sustained.
    “Act of April 2,1880, 21 Stats., 303, directing the Secretary of the Navy to organize a board to personally examine the double-turreted monitors to ascertain whether they should be completed, and the cost of their completion.
    “Act of August 5, 1882, 22 Stats., 284, 291, 293, appropriating $400,000, a part of which was for the launching of the Monadnock.
    “Act of March 3,1883, 22 Stats., 472, 477, directing the Secretary of the Navy to take possession of the double-turreted monitors, and directing him to ascertain what amounts should be paid to the contractors severally for the use and occupation of their yards with said ships and for the care thereof, and directing him to report the same to Congress.
    “Act of August 3,1886,24 Stats., 215, authorizing the President to complete the Monadnock, and appropriating moneys therefor.
    “Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stats., 581, 594, appropriating moneys for the completion of the Monadnock and other vessels.”
    
      IY. The following among other reports of committees of Congress has been made relating to the subject-matter of this action:
    “ Report No. 787, Forty-fifth Congress, second session (Appendix, page 60, Ex. F), dated July 12, 1876. . Proposals for repairs of Monadnock having been invited, this fact was reported to Congress.
    “Report committee, second session Forty-fifth Congress, 1877-78.
    “Report No. 787 of the House, Forty-fifth Congress, second session, dated May 10, 1878. (Page 4, majority report; page 16, minority report.)”
    The contract and the work done thereunder have been considered and approved by the Navy Department in the following reports:
    “Report dated February 15, 1877, to the Bureau of Construction and Repair, approving of the work upon the Monad-nock, said report appearing upon page 22 of Appendix to House Report 787, second session Forty-fifth Congress.
    “Report by Naval Inspector Much to the Secretary of-the Navy, dated July 21,1877, stating that said Phineas Burgess was properly caring for the Monadnock.
    “ Report of the Secretary of the Navy, dated November 20, 1877, to Congress, recommending that the Monadnock be speedily finished. Found in reports of the ■ Secretary of the Navy for 1877, pages 28 to 31,276, 280.
    “Reportof Judge-Advocate to Secretary of the Navy, dated October 30,1878, holding that the contract was made in accordance with law.
    “Report of the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 20, 1879, in response to House resolution, dated December 10,1878,. showing delay of the Government and failure to pay approved bills on the Monadnock, and reporting that the contractor, Phineas Burgess, had suffered damages and was still sustaining damages.
    “Report, February 21,1879,112 H. R., Forty-fifth Congress,, third .session.
    “Report of the Secretary of the Navy to the chairman on Naval Affairs of the House, dated January 23,1880, showing what is needed to complete the Monadnock, stating that the work has been well done, recommending appropriations therefor, and stating that the contract had thus far been executed according to law.
    “Report by Secretary of the Navy to Congress, dated May 20, 1880, recommending the completion of the Monadnock. (Executive Document 82, Parts I, II, and III, House Report, Forty-sixth Congress, second session.)
    
      “Report of Secretary of the Navy, December, 1881, showing that the contractor, Phineas Burgess, was sustaining expenses by reason of the condition of the Monadnoek, and that these were a hardship to him.
    “Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy for 1882, Vol. I, page 23, in which the Secretary states he has been authorized by Congress to finish the Monadnoek, and that he has made contracts with the various contractors to furnish the balance of the materials and to launch the boat, without prejudice, however, to the contractor’s existing rights.
    “Report of a board appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, dated February 14, 1883, recommending that the said Phineas Burgess should receive for his damages under the contract of October 2,1875, the sum of $192,430.56.
    “Report of Chief of Bureau, January 7, 1884.
    “Report of Secretary of Navy, February 12, 1884, recommending certain payments to builders of the Puritan, Amphi-trite, and Terror, which was adoi>ted'by Congress.”
    The following correspondence and documents are found as facts herein: Exhibits A, B, O, D, E annexed to the petition.
    V. The beginning of the work under the contract of October 2,1875, was delayed without the contractor’s fault until February 1,1876, through the following causes: Unavoidable delay in the finishing of the previous necessary work for the erection of the frame of said Monadnoek under the contract dated September 18,1875, which is referred to in said contract of October 2,1875; by reason of delay in the Government’s delivery of materials for said former contract, and also deficiency of proper materials which the Government was to furnish. Phineas Burgess began the work under the contract of October 2,1875, ■on February 1, 1876, as soon as the former frame contract was finished.
    VI. After the beginning of the work, February 1,1876, the Government long delayed the delivery to the contractor of certain material which was to be incorporated into the structure; much of the material delivered by the Government was delivered out of the proper order for use; some of it was faulty material; the Government also long delayed to deliver certain necessary plans; and also changed its plans in some respects after they had been already carried out; certain of the necessary plans were at first, and long remained, insufficient and unadapted for being carried out; and the Government withdrew some needed specifications, and delayed furnishing new ones; some of tbe specifications were deficient and inharmonious, causing delay to tbe contractor; consultations and conferences, consuming’ considerable time, became necessary between tbe contractor and tbe Government’s agents in respect to such inharmonious plans or specifications, and tbe remedy therefor; and about tbe middle of July, 1876, tbe contractor stopped work, by order of tbe Government.
    YII Tbe said Pbineas Burgess suspended work, in accordance with said order of tbe Government, from about tbe middle of July, 1876, until on or about December 20,1876, when be received oral orders from tbe Navy Department to proceed with tbe work; said delay and stoppage, and all delays and stoppages in these findings appearing, were without any fault on the part of the contractor and were due to tbe Government’s acts or omissions.
    VIII. Said Pbineas Burgess, under oral orders from tbe Navy Department, proceeded with tbe work under said contract on or about December 20,1876, and continued thereon until on or about December 20,1877, when said contractor was obliged to stop work because of lack of materials, which the Government bad failed to deliver under said contract, and because of tbe fact that certain materials then on band could not be incorporated into tbe vessel until other and additional materials should be received from tbe Government.
    IN. On or about December 20,1877, when work under said contract so ceased, a large portion of the outer and inner skin and of tbe deck plating had not been put on, certain of tbe bulkheads were not in place, nor bad tbe ventilators, battle batches, deck lights, timberbeads, cleats and sockets, ventilating and turret engines been put on the vessel because tbe materials necessary to accomplish this bad not been delivered by tbe Government to tbe contractor.
    N. From on or about December 20,1877, to on or about March 1,1883, tbe Government failed to deliver tbe materials which were lacking and were necessary, in order to enable the contractor to finish said contract of October 2,1875, although said contractor continually urged the Government to deliver the same in order that he might complete said contract, and although the officers of the Navy Department continually held out the hope that the necessary materials would soon be delivered.
    
      XI.The following letter was written Burgess by the Acting Secretary of the Navy:
    “ Navy Department,
    “ Washington, November 8, 1882.
    
    “ Sir : The Department has had no reply from you to its two letters of August 21 aud 28,1882, relative to the launching of the monitor Monadnock. As it is desirable that there shall be no more delay in arranging for the launching of the vessel, the Department proposes (1) that you shall furnish the materials and do the work necessary to be done before launching (the same to be first specified in detail by the Department and the cost thereof agreed upon), and shall also launch the vessel at the earliest practicable day; and (2) that the Department shall pay you for such materials and work, and for launching, the actual cost thereof, as may be mutually agreed upon.
    “This arrangement shall have no effect whatever upon the existing rights or obligations of yourself or the Government, but shall be made and carried into effect without prejudice to any claim of either party.
    “You are requested to respond to this proposition without delay.
    “Very respectfully,
    Ed. T. Nichols,
    
      “Acting Secretary of the Navy.”
    
    Pursuant to said request, to which he acceded, Phineas Burgess, in 1883, furnished, and has been paid for, the materials necessary to be had before the contract of October 2,1875, could be finished, and proceeded with the work under the contract of October 2,1875.
    XII. Phineas Burgess, from on or about March 1,1883, until on or about November 1,1883, proceeded with and completed the following work:
    Completed the placing of the outer and inner skin plating and deck plating, placing the remainder of the bulkheads, the ventilators, battle hatches, deck lights, timberheads, cleats and sockets, the ventilating and turret engines.
    XIII. All delays since the beginning of work were caused by the Government’s failure to deliver proper material, or by its delivery of material out of the order necessary for its incorporation into the vessel, or by the delivery of faulty material, or by the Government’s delay in furnishing necessary plans, or by the insufficiency of some of the plans furnished, or because some of them were not adapted to the work because the Government changed the plans or withdrew certain of the specifications, or the Government delayed furnishing new specifications, or because of deficiency and lack of harmony in some of, the specifications furnished, or through consultations aud experiments necessitated by the defects and insufficiency of some of the plans furnished; thus, without contractor’s fault and through the Government’s acts, the work on the Monad-nock was delayed over seven years beyond the contract time of nine months. The contractor could have finished the work in nine months after work commenced on February 1, 1876, that is, on November 1,1876, had it not been for the acts and defaults in these findings recited.
    N1Y. The work on the contract of October 2, 1875, was completed on or about November 1, 1883, and on or about November 10,1883, the Secretary of the Navy accepted said work and took said vessel from the contractor’s yard in accordance with act of Congress dated March 3,1883 (22 Stats., 472, 477).
    XV. The Government repeatedly delayed making to the contractor certain of the payments which, under the contract, were earned by him and were demanded and due. By reason of the delays by the Government in making payments to the contractor, after the times at which, by the contract, they were to be made, and in some part by reason of the delay in furnishing material under “frame” contract, which preceded the contract which is Exhibit E of the petition, the contractor was forced to borrow money upon Government vouchers in order to carry on the work upon the vessel, which money he employed in carrying it on and in caring for and protecting the vessel during periods of delay and in paying interest on the loans which had thus been necessitated, being the loans stated in Exhibits G and L of the petition. Owing to the value of the partly finished vessel, the said borrowing was necessary to provide the means to enable the contractor to carry forward the construction of the Monadnock and also to care for her during the delay in her completion. The interest paid for these loans was an extra expense to the contractor, caused by the acts of the Government in these findings recited. For interest on these loans and for commissions in obtaining them, i. e., loans contracted np to June 27, 1878, Burgess paid various sums, amounting to $20,300.14 in all, which expense was caused said contractor by the acts in these findings recited, and no part thereof has been repaid.
    
      XVI. Besides said loans, tlie contractor was obliged to borrow further sums which (through the Government’s failure to^ pay his authenticated bills, and the course of the Government, as in these findings shown) it became necessary for him to borrow in order to protect the vessel and complete her, and also to pay interest upon the other loans before made by the contractor for these purposes, being the loans for which the expense incurred in Exhibit L of the petition was incurred; for which further loans, up to March 3, 188(5, the expense to Burgess for interest amounted to $25,173.26, paid to the Tradesmen’s Bank of New York City, and $9,730.70 to the Continental Bank of New York City — in all, the sum of $34,903.96, in which further sum he was caused extra expense by the acts of the Government in the manner in these findings shown and not otherwise; no part of these sums has been repaid.
    XVII. At the request of the Government, which had not at that time its usual means of attending to the payment of certain freight at Vallejo on materials immediately necessary for the Mouadnock, the contractor, Burgess, paid the said freight (from time to time), amounting to $60,554.65. For said payment of freight by him the contractor received Government vouchers, of Avhich, however, only one or two were promptly paid, although payment was demanded, and, in consequence of the delay in the payment of the remainder, the contractor became destitute of funds ■ and could not pay the rest of the said freight save by borrowing money upon such vouchers from time to time — which money he did so borrow and paid it for said freight, paying interest for the money so borrowed. The principal sums so paid by the contractor were repaid him, but generally long after such payments were made by him, and not any of the interest which he had been obliged to pay for the use of the money has been paid him; the said interest which he was so obliged to pay amounted to $2,161.26, which sum was an extra expense caused by the acts hereinbefore detailed; no part of which has been repaid. Certain of the loans hereinbefore referred to remained outstanding up to January 22,1887, to wit, $33,921.55, bearing interest from January 27,1886; $6,785.97, bearing interest from February 10, 1886; $4,526.33, bearing interest from February 17,1886; $6,788.33, bearing interest from February 23,1886; $4,526.33, bearing interest from February 26, 1886; $4,626.33, bearing interest from March 3, 1886; all being loans from tbe Tradesmen’s Bank of New York City and bearing 6 per cent interest, and $10,000 to tbe Continental Bank of New York City, bearing 6 per cent interest from March 3,1886, being in all the sum of $71,074.84, upon which sum the interest accrued up to January 22,1887, amounted to $4,011.95, in which further sum the contractor has been caused extra expense by the acts of the Government in these findings set forth, no part of which has been repaid. The further accrued interest on the loans, referred to in the preceding findings, of $71,074.84, up to the 13th day of March, 1888, amounted to $4,856.78, in which further sum the contractor has been caused extra expense by the acts of the Government in the manner hereinbefore set forth, no part of which has been repaid.
    .XVIII. During portions of the time Avhile the work was in progress, but after the contract period of nine months for finishing the Monadnock, viz, from December 20,1876, to December 20,1877, and from March 1,1883, to November 1,1883, the contractor necessarily employed upon the work an engineer and a machinist, whose reasonable wages, which have been paid by the contractor, amounted to $3,002.25, and whose employment would, except for the facts set forth in these findings, have been unnecessary for this extra period, in which sum the contractor was caused extra expense, no part of which has been repaid.
    XIX.- During the years of delay the contractor necessarily employed a superintendent of the said work whose reasonable wages, paid him by the contractor, were $10 per day, and for the said period amount to $21,910, whose employment, except for
    ■ the Government’s acts aforesaid, would have been unnecessary, and whose employment was beneficial to the Government in the preservation of the incompleted structure and in protecting it; which sum was an extra expense caused to said contractor by the Government’s course, as in these findings set forth, no j>art of which has been repaid.
    XX. While the work was in progress, but after the contract period for finishing the same, viz, from December 20,1876, to December 20, 1877, and from March 1,1883, to November 1, 1883, the contractor employed an agent at Vallejo for various services in said work, whose reasonable wages were $10 per day, and amount to $5,640 in all for tbe said extended period; and wliose employment would not have occurred save for the acts of the Government, no part of which has been paid the contractor. The duties of this agent were those of a general agent and representative; he kept the time of the men, had charge of Burgess’s bank account, paid wages and bills, bought materials, and had a general supervision of the yard.
    XXI. Upon suspensions of the work, either by order of the Government or from lack of materials to be furnished by it, and upon recommencing the same respectively, the contractor transp>orted thrice his agent between New York, where said agent’s home was, and California, in lieu of paying him wages; and the fares of the said agent, being three fares at $186 each, or $558 in all, were paid by the contractor.
    XXII. In .the period between nine months after the time limited for the finishing of the work and the time of finishing it in fact, the contractor necessarily employed a night watchman and a day watchman to guard the work and materials. By reason of the value of the structure the said employment was proper, and the reasonable wages of the same paid by the contractor were $8,600 (during the period when the work was suspended). Except for the aforesaid acts of the Government the employment of said watchmen for said extended period would not have been necessary and would not have been made. This extra expense has not been repaid.
    XXIII. During the whole period of delay the contractor employed in the city of New York an agent to negotiate and from time to time renew the loans which the contractor was obliged to obtain in consequence of the Government’s omission to pay at the proper times his approved bills, and to obtain money to carry on sometimes, and to protect always, the work. The reasonable wages of the said agent, paid by the contractor, were $75 per month, being $6,300 in all. Except for the acts in these findings recited on the part of the Government, the said agent at New York need not have been employed during the extended periods. No part of this sum has been paid the contractor by defendant.
    XXIY. During the said delay in the work the Monadnock necessarily, without the contractor’s fault and owing to the conduct of the Government, remained in his yard at Yallejo unfinished, and occupied the same and its appliances, and meanwhile no other work was or could be carried on therein than that relating to the Monadnock. The contractor’s yard and plant were during the said time of delay useful in this, that they furnished quarters for the Monadnock and in maintaining in readiness the appliances for completing her. The fair and reasonable rental value of said yard and plant during the said period of delay was $13,800. No part of this sum has been paid the contractor.
    SXY. As precaution against fire and for the Monadnock’s preservation the contractor did, during the delay aforesaid, use water and pay tax therefor of the value and to the amount of $564, which expenditure was beneficial to the Government, necessary, and wise, and which, except for the aforesaid acts on the part of the Government, would none of it have been necessary; this sum was an extra expense so caused to said contractor, no part of which has been repaid. The water was used on said vessel, and also was a protection against fire thereon.
    XXYI. Burgess was a skilled mechanic and shipbuilder. During the seven years of delay beyond the time in which the contractor but for the acts of the Government could have finished the work the contractor was, as hereinbefore recited, prevented from attending to other business as a shipbuilder, but it is not shown that if free he could have obtained other contracts or employment, nor is anything shown by which the value of his time so employed can be measured.
    XXYII. By reason of the facts hereinbefore set forth the total damage to the contractor through wear and tear of his machinery was increased by the sum of $1,500 above that which would have resulted had the contractor been furnished with proper materials and plans and specifications in due course and in the usual order at the proper times. No part of this has bi en paid.
    XXYIII. Through the facts in these findings recited the contractor’s necessary expenditures for oil, coal, waste, felt, lard, and such substances in and about the work were increased in all $5,595.47 above those which would have been sufficient had the contractor been duly furnished with proper materials, plans, and specifications. No part of this sum (and it was expended in protecting the vessel from the action of the elements) has been repaid.
    
      XXIX. The facts hereinbefore recited occasioned a long cessation of the work and so caused an additional necessary expense for setting up fastenings of boilers, putting on “ soft patches,” etc., made by contractor in preparing the machinery again for work, which otherwise would not have been necessary, amounting to $1,829.90, no part of which has been repaid.
    XXX. During the years that the Monadnock contract remained uncompleted, as hereinbefore set forth, the style of the machinery of the contractor grew partly obsolete, and the machinery thereby less valuable, and the market for it became cheaper; but owing to the pendency of the contract the contractor did not sell the machinery (as he probably might otherwise have done), nor use it by working it, as he might otherwise have done; but the machinery was necessarily retained until the contract was finished; thereby the contractor was caused some damage, the amount of which is not satisfactorily shown.
    XXXI. By reason of the facts in these findings recited the contractor’s necessary expenditure for labor, incurred through the consequent disorganizing of his work and of his trained gangs of workmen (many of whom he deemed it unwise to dismiss), was increased without his fault, but the court is unable to determine from the evidence in what amount.
    XXXII. None of certain necessary butt and seam straps were furnished to the contractor, which the Government under said contract should have furnished, and under orders from the authorized Government agents he furnished them to the Government, made in a proper manner. A fair price and reasonable compensation to the contractor for so doing is $985, no part of which has been paid.
    XXXIII. Some of the streaks furnished by the Government were not wide enough, and “stealer” or extra streaks were found to be necessary. Under order from the authorized Government agents, the contractor made and furnished them to the Government.
    XXXIY. In putting on the “stealer” streaks there was extra riveting, fitting, and calking necessary over and above what would have been necessary had the sheets or “ streaks” been originally (as furnished by defendants) of the proper size, and the contractor did the said riveting, fitting, and calking. The fair price and reasonable compensation to the ■contractor for making, and for his extra labor for putting on, the “ stealers,” as shown in the preceding two findings, was $237.58, no part of which has been paid.
    NXXY. Under order from the authorized agents of the Government the contractor made, in the after frames, necessary holes for the sleeves of the propeller’s shafts to go into; the fair price and reasonable compensation to the contractor for making the said holes is $1,532.37, none of which has been paid.
    XXXYI. Rivets of the right length for the keel, for the garboard streaks from the stem and stern posts, and for the frame and intercostals for outside skin were not furnished to the contractor until after the outside and inside skins of the ship had necessarily been nearly riveted on; by reason thereof the rivets finally furnished could not be put in save at an additional necessary expense, arising from the necessary difference in the method in which they must then be put in.
    Had the proper length rivets been furnished at the proper time, the rivets could and would have been put in at an expense of $288, but in consequence of the said delay the necessary expense to the contractor in putting them in (which he did) was $1,378 in excess of that amount, all incurred without his fault; none of which has been repaid.
    XXXYII. The iron for the seam straps and angle iron for the top and bottom of the outer skin and backing was, by the Government’s fault, not delivered to the contractor till long after the proper time. In consequence thereof the shops and works of the contractor had to be run by him for these purposes alone, necessitating an additional expense, at reasonable prices, to the contractor, in and about the said straps and irons, of $1,086, caused by the acts of the Government, no part of which has been paid. A special need existed on the part of the Government for getting made, at that time, the said straps and iron, viz, in order that theMonadnock might be preserved safe from getting out of line during the subsequent suspension of the work; the making of the same was of benefit to the Government during the last suspension of five years’ duration.
    XXXYIII. The Government changed the plan for certain bulkheads, after the skin of the ship had been put on; and at the Government’s request, the contractor drilled out by hand certain rivet holes in the material to which the bulkhead had to be riveted. The necessary extra expense to the contractor in the said hand drilling amounted to $980, and the same is a reasonable compensation to him, no part of which has been paid.
    .XXXIX. After the contractor had put up, in conformity with instructions furnished by the Government, the bulkheads between the engine room and the fire room, the Government directed the position of the lower part of said bulkheads to be changed by the contractor, and the contractor thereupon put up again the bulkheads in the new position.
    The necessary extra expense to the contractor of carrying out the Government’s new instructions as to the new position of the bulkheads, incurred in cutting off the former rivets, taking up angle irons on the skin, and altering and shifting the said irons, plugging holes and riveting, was $550, no part of which has been paid:
    XL. After the contractor had, in due course and in conformity with the plans furnished to him, made by machinery the holes in the inner skin for the rivets, whereby the plates for manholes were to be fastened to the inner skin, and after he had put on the inner skin, the defendant changed the plans so as to do away with the plates, and the Government ordered rings in place of plates; thereby it became necessary that holes should be drilled again (by hand and at increased expense) in the said skin for rivets, and the contractor thereupon, at the Government’s request, so drilled the said holes in the inner skin. The defendant’s change of plan required also the making of the manhole rings and the drilling of the holes therein for the rivets whereby they were to be riveted; the Government did not furnish the said rings, but, at the Government’s request, the contractor made and furnished them to the Government and drilled such holes in said rings.
    A reasonable compensation for making the said manhole rings and making the holes therein, and for drilling holes in the inner skin corresponding thereto is $780, and the same was the extra expense to the contractor, no part of which has been paid.
    XLI. Among the attachments or fittings of the vessel it was necessary that the berth deck and the woodwork in it should be prepared for the capstan bed. At the request of the Government’s authorized agents the contractor made the said preparation. A reasonable compensation to tlie contractor for making such preparation is $266,*and the same was the extra expense thereof to the contractor lor the labor therein. No part of this has been paid.
    XLII. At the request of the Government the contractor prepared the heads and heels of 18 additional stanchions which the Government determined to put into the vessel, for which preparation a reasonable compensation to the contractor is $10 each, or $180 in all, the actual expense to the contractor for the labor thereon, no part of which has been paid.
    NLIII. At the request of the Government the contractor made and furnished to defendants certain angle irons and gussets on the skin, back of the armor, to fasten the wooden armor to its place thereon. A reasonable compensation to him for making the same is $1,536, which sum was the actual extra expense to the contractor for the labor thereon, no part of which has been paid.
    XLIY. At the request of the Government the contractor made and furnished certain bulkhead doors for communication between the compartments of the said vessel. A reasonable compensation to him for making them is $1,018.37, no part of which has been paid.
    XLY. On or about November 10,1883, the Government took and appropriated to its own use in the vessel, with plaintiff’s consent, sundry frames for hatches of the value of $170, and certain timber of the value of $207.60, and certain stairways of the value of $150, in all, $527.60 in value, all belonging to the contractor, no part of which has been repaid.
    XLYI. Personal conferences and communications between the contractor, whose temporary residence (because of-this contract) was in California, and the Navy Department at Washington, with respect to the plans and specifications of the Monadnock and certain materials to be incorporated in her, became necessary through lack of sufficient plans, specifications, and materials. For this purpose Burgess necessarily visited Washington (traveling from California and returning there) at au expense for traveling of $200. Said expenditure was made for the benefit of the Government, and the Government availed of and accepted the contractor’s services therein, and was benefited thereby. No part of this sum has been repaid.
    
      NLYIT At defendant’s reguest the contractor acted for the Government in receiving the material (on which freight was paid) from the transporting railroads which delivered the same at Yallejo, after transporting it from the east of the United States, and in examining the freight bills thereof. A reasonable compensation for these services, if any be due, is $500, none of which has been paid.
    XLYIII. The contractor’s work has been satisfactorily completed, and has been accepted by the Government, the compensation of $216,90;', including the reservation of 10 per centum agreed upon between the Government and the contractor, has been earned by the contractor; but so much of the reservation thereof as amounts to $12,190 has not been paid him, save that he received from railroad companies the sum of $8,138.02 belonging to the Government, which last sum he has retained on account of the said reservation, by the Government’s consent, leaving still unpaid to him, as the balance of the said reservation, the sum of $4,051.98.
    XLIX. The contract of October 2,1875, was not completed until November, 1883. The petition herein was filed in this court April 10, 1886.
    L. No payment has been made by the United States to said contractor or the claimant (his legal representative) for, or on account of, any of the items of claim set forth in the petition and the foregoing findings.
    Upon the foregoing facts the court decided, as conclusion of law, that the claimant recover the sum of $77,550.45, the aggregate of the following items of claim allowed by the court, to wit:
    ALLOWED.
    rinding.
    XVIII. Extra wages for engineer and maeliinists.$3, 002.25
    XIX. Wages of superintendent. 21,910.00
    XX. Agents at Vallejo. 5,64-0.00
    XXII. Night and day watchmen. 8, 600. 00
    XXIV. Occupation of yard.. 13, 800. 00
    XXV. Water tax. 564. 00
    XXVII. Increased wear and tear of machinery. 1, 500. 00
    XXVIII. Expense for oil, coal, waste, felt, lard, etc. 5,595.40
    XXIX. Setting up toiler fasteners, putting in soft patches,
    etc. 1,829.90
    XXXII. Butt and seam straps. 985. 00
    XXXIII. Stealer streaks. 237.58
    XXXV. Propeller shaft sleeves.. 1,532.-37
    
      Finding.
    XXXVI. Extra riveting. $1,378.00
    XXXYII. Seam straps and angle irons. 1, 086.00
    XXXVIII. Change in bulkheads. 980.00
    XXXIX. Further change in bulkheads.1. 650.00
    XL. Manhole rings and drilling. 780.00
    XLI. Caijstan hod. 266.00
    XLII. Heads and heels of additional stanchions. 180.00
    XLIII. Angle irons and gussets. 1, 536. 00
    XLIV. Bulkhead doors. 1,018.37
    XLV. Hatch frames, timber, and stairways. 527.60
    XLVIII. Retained percentage.■. 4,051.98
    Total allowed. 77,550.45
    DISALLOWED.
    XV. Interest on loans up to June 27,1878. 20, 300.14
    XVI. Interest on loans up to March 3,1886. 34, 903.96
    XVÍI. Interest on money advanced for freight. 2,161. 20
    Interest. 4, Oil. 95
    Interest. 4,856.78
    XXI. Agents’ traveling expenses. 558.00
    XXIII, Agent in New York. 6,300.00
    XXVI. Contractor’s time.
    XXX. Deterioration of machinery.
    XXXI. Disorganization of work.
    XLVI. Traveling expenses. 200.00
    XLVII. Receipt of freight. 500.00
    Total disallowed. 73,792.03
    The allowances for wages and other items is limited to the extended period of the contract.
    
      Mr. Walter 8. Logcm for the claimant:
    1. It is very clear that until the contract was completed the contractor would be unable to know just how much extra expense, loss, and damage he had suffered. He had the right to wait until the completion of the contract before suing the Government. This was what he did, and in the year 1886, less than three years after the contract was completed, he brings this suit in the Court of Claims. Under such circumstances the statute of limitations has no possible bearing upon this suit. It would seem to be unnecessary to cite cases to support so plain a proposition of law. A few are cited, however, and many more can readily be furnished. (Rickman v. Rickman, 10 N. J. L., 134; Jones v. Conoway, 4 Yeates (Pa.), 109; Odlin v. Greenleaf, 3 N. H., 270; Lessee of Sail y. Vande-
      grift, 3 Binn. (Pa.), 374; Gibbons v. United States, 15 C. Cls. B., 174; affd. 109 U. S., 200; Littler v. Smiley, 9 Ind., 110; Jones v. Leivis, 11 Tex., 359; TLallv. Wood, 9 Gray, 60; Schoonover v. Vachon, 121 Ind., 3; Peck v. S. S; Co., 5 Bos. (N. Y.), 226; Wood on Limitations, pp. 314, 332; Elliot v. Lawton, 7 Allen, 274; Gibbons v. The United States, 15 C. Ols. B., 174.)
    This case was affirmed in the Supreme Court in 109 U. S., 200. (See also Dunbar v. The United States, 22 O. Ols. B., 109); Eighv. United States, 8 C. Cls. B., 319; Wood on Master and Servant, sec. 125, and cases cited; Dubois v. Del. and H. Own. Go., 4 Wend., 285; Allamon v. The Mayor, 43 Barb., 33; Eender-nagle v. Codes, 19 Wend., 207; Badger v. Titcomb, 15 Pick., 409.)
    2. Tlie statute of tlie United States prohibiting- the recovery of interest against the Government does not apply to any of tlie items of this claim.
    Tlie payment of these moneys for interest was the necessary and proximate result of the Government’s action. Here was a large property to be preserved. Here was work to be done. Here was a large force of men to be employed. Here were large amounts of money due tlie contractor on approved vouchers. The Government, knowing all of these facts, repeatedly advised of them, nevertheless failed to pay these vouchers. Mr. Burgess could have submitted in despair, let the Government’s property go to ruin, thrown rip the work, and pocketed his loss.
    He did nothing of the kind. He borrowed money on these vouchers; he borrowed other money to keep up these loans and' to get funds to protect the property and to carry on the work. These were just as much expenses necessarily incurred in preserving the property as the payment of water taxes were necessary to preserve the property from fire. In fact, to get the money to pay the water taxes and other expenses, Mr. Burgess had to borrow moneys and pay this interest.
    We rely, for the recovery of these items, upon the case of the State of Weio York v. The United States, reported in 26 O. Cls. B., 468.
    Were we claiming interest against the Government on the balance due of the contract price, our claim would properly be rejected. We claim nothing of the kind. Wo simply show to the court what moneys we had to pay out to preserve the Government’s property and to do the work; what expenses the Government caused us; and among these expenses is this sum, measured by the interest we paid — not interest, but expense, loss, damage — and therefore we confidently submit that this court, sitting as it does to do exact justice, will allow these items, and for the same reasons that they allow any item of this claim which is allowed as an expense caused to the contractor by the Government’s acts or omissions.
    3. The contract was valid in its inception. It was duly made after advertised proposals pursuant to law. It was duly executed and a bond thereon given pursuant to law. At the time it was entered into there was sufficient money in the Treasury applicable to the payment under this contract.
    At the time the contract was entered into the Secretary of the Navy had power to make it as coming within the lines of construction and repair; that the Bureau of Construction and Repair, at the time, under both special and general acts, had authority to make repairs, and that the Bureau was especially authorized to make this contract by the special appropriation act passed in 1874, which appropriated the unexpended balance which had previously been appropriated for an iron dock to the repairs on the double-turreted monitors.
    Whether or not the contract was valid in its inception, the contract has been been repeatedly brought to the attention of Congress, recognized as valid by the Houses of Congress and by committees of Congress, and by officers of the Government, and has been repeatedly referred to in legislative acts. The contractor, by appropriation acts, has been paid on account of it; and the Navy Department has been repeatedly authorized,, by acts of Congress, to launch and finish the vessel.
    Whether or not there ever was a contract is now immaterial, inasmuch as the Government has accepted the vessel and has the fruits of our labor. We submit that it needs no further argument to convince this court that the contract sued on is absolutely valid.
    The following cases show that such a contract as this, even if it had been originally illegal, would, under the circumstances disclosed, be considered as ratified and approved by Congress. Performance and acceptance of the work binds the Government to pay for its value. (Danold v. United States, 2 O. 01s. R., 65; Riley v. United States, 1C. 01s. R.,299; Adams v. United States, 2 C. Cls. R., 70.)
    
      The contract bas been ratified by Congress. (Fremont v. United States, 2 O. 01s. R., 1; Riley v. United States, 1 O. 01s. R., 299; Adams y. United States, 2 O. 01s. R., 70; McCollum v. United States, 17 O. 01s. R., 92.)
    4. There was no rescission of the contract. Mr. Burgess had a rig'ht to hold himself in readiness to perforin the work, and finally to complete it, when the Government was ready, in spite of the Government’s breach of contract. (Figh v. United States, 8 O. 01s. R., 319; Wood on Limitations, yol. 1, p. 332; Allamony. The Mayor, 43 Barb., 33; see also Howard v. Daly 61 N. Y, 362.)
    6. The extra work and materials were authorized by the Government; the Government has received the benefit of them, and of course they are recoverable under a quantum meruit. Such extra expenses are always recoverable. (Shipman v. The United States, 18 O. 01s. R., 138, 147; Cooper v. The United States, 8 O. 01s. R., 199; Harvey v. The United States, 105 IT. S., 671; Gibbonsy. The United States, 15 0.01s.R., 374; affirmed in 109 17. S., 200; Fremont v. The United States, 2 O. 01s. R., 1.)
    The third cause of action is for the recovery of all extra expenses and losses caused Mr. Burgess by the Government’s acts and omissions. We submit various authorities which clearly show that claimant should recover all of the various items of his claim, as set forth in the petition and evidence.
    The plaintiff can recover all the profits he would or ought to have made. (Floyd v. United States, 2 O. 01s. R., 429; Adams v. United States, 1 O. 01s. R., 106; McAndrews v. Tip-pett, 39 N. J., 105; Clark v. Mayor of Weio York, 4 N. Y., 338; United States v. Behan, 110 U. S., 338.)
    All extra expenses which the contractor was put to by reason of the Government’s act or omission can be recovered. {Alla/mon v. The Mayor, 43 Barb., 33; Dubois v. Del. and Hudson Canal Co., 4 Wend., 285; Freeman v. Chote, 3 Barb., 424; Durkee v. Mott, 8 Barb., 423; Bennett y.' Lockwood, 20 Wend., 223; Miller y. Garling, 12 How. Pr., 203; Dermott y. Jones, 69 TJ. S. (2 Wall.), 1 and 9.)
    Generally speaking, when performance of a contract is delayed or extended, or the mode of performance is changed by the act of the defendant, the plaintiff can recover all damages and expenses caused by these acts. (Allamon v. The Mayor, 43 Barb., 33; Dubois v. Del. and Hudson Canal Co., 4 Wend., 285; Ciar7c y. The Mayor. 4 N. T., 338; Merrill v. Ithaca B. B., 16 Wend., 586; United States v. Smith, 94 IJ. S., 214; Figh y. United States, 8 O. Ols. R., 319; Adams y. United States, 1 O. Ols. R., 106; Cooyer v. United States, 8 O. Ols. R., 199; Harvey v. United States, 8 O. Ols. R., 501; 105 II. S., 671; United States v. Speed, 8 Wall., 77.)
    All losses suffered by fcbe contractor can likewise be recovered. This is established by the foregoing cases, and also by the following: Friedlander v. Pugh S. & Co. (48 Miss., 111).
    As a general rule, the contractor must be made whole. He must be put in the same situation as he would have been in had not the Government impeded him. (United States v-Smith, 4 Otto, 214; Flizdbethtown B. B. v. Pottinger, 10 Bush. (Ky.), 185 : Buckley v. United States, 7 O. Ols. R., 543 ; affirmed in 19 Wall., 37; Wormer v. United States, 4 O. Ols. R., 258; Floyd v. United States, 2 O. Ols. R., 429.)
    Where extra work or extra materials are ordered or necessitated by the Government’s acts, the Government must pay for them at their reasonable value, (Shipman v. United States, 18 O. Ols. R., 138,147.)
    
      Mr. John L. Cadwalader, appeared for the Continental-National Bank, intervening.
    
      Mr. Felix Brannigan (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Bodge) for the defendants:
    1. Section 1063 does not contemplate the reference of claims for unliquidated damages, but only of such claims as are within the jurisdiction of the Executive Departments for settlement.
    No question of law has been more firmly decided by the courts than the proposition that a claim for unliquidated damages is not a subject for settlement in the executive branch of the Government, and that the reference of such a claim to the Court of Claims by the head of a Department does not place it within the jurisdiction of the court. (Car-mieli v. United States, 2 C. Ols., 126; Winnisimmet Co. v. United States, 12 O. Ols. R., 319; McKee v. United States, 12 O. Ols. R., 556; TJppitt v. United States, 14 O. Ols. R., 148; Green v. United States, 18 C. Cls. R., 93; Power v. United States, 18 O. Ols. R., 275; McClure v. United States, 19 O. Ols. R., 25,179; Dennis v. United States, 19 0.01s. R., 121; Hart v. United 
      
      States, 19 C. Cls. R., 427; Dunbar v. United States, 19 O. 01s. R., 493; Brannen v. United States, 20 C. Cls. R., 223; Pitman y. United States, 20 O. Cls. R., 254; Day’s Administratrix v. United States, 20 C. Cls. R., 266; State of Illinois v. United States, 20 C. Cls. R., 345; Hodge v. United States, 20 C. Cls. R., 354; Pope v. United States, 21 C. Cls. R., 52; Dennis v. United States, 23 C. Cls. R., —; United States v. IAppitt, 100 U. S. R., 663; Ford y. United States, 116 U. S. R.; 213; United States v. MeDougall’s Administrator, 121 U. S. R., 89; Finn v. United States, 123 U. S., 231; Opinions of tbe Attorneys-General: Yols.IY, 327, 627; Y,29; YI, 516; XIII, 164; XIY, 24, 183; XY, 39.
    Until tbe passage of tbe JLci Mareh 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 505, chap. 359), tbe jurisdiction of claims against tbe United States for unliquidated damages was alone vested in tbe Court of Claims, and before tbe establishment of that court there was no remedy in such cases except by an appeal to Congress. (Rev. Stat. sec. 951 — set-off; United States v. Barker, 1 Pa., 157; United States v. Lent, 1 Pa., 417; United States v. Martin, 2 Pa., 68; United States v. Collier, 3 BL, C. Cls. R., 326; United States v. Duval, G-ilp., 356; United States v. Ingersoll, Crabbe, 135; United States v. Giles, 9 Or., 212; Walton v. United States, 9 Wheat., 651; United States v. Robeson, 9 Pet., 319; United States v. Hawkins, 10 Pet., 125; Fmerson’s Heirs v. Hall, 13 Pet., 409; United States v. Biiclianan, 8 How., 83.)
    As tbe claims for damages in tbe case at bar were not filed in tbe Court of Claims within six years after they first accrued, they are barred from its jurisdiction and should be dismissed.
    2. In addition to tbe foregoing objection to tbe maintenance of tbe present suit for damages, the defendant insists that tbe power of tbe Navy Department to enter into tbe contract of October 2, 1875, has not been established by the claimant.
    It has not been shown that there was an adequate appropriation for tbe work, or a statutory authority to contract for it. Tbe contract was therefore void for want of power to contract, and as against public policy. Fx paeto illicito non oritur actio. (Rev. Stat., 3679, 3732; Broom, Leg. Max., 732, 742,8th ed.; Carmiek v. United States, 2 C. Cls. R., 126,135; YI Op. Att’y Gen., 40, 99.)
    “ Our statute books are filled with acts authorizing tbe making of contracts with tbe Government through its various officers and Departments, but in every instance the party entering into such a contract must look to the statute under which it is made, and see for himself that his contract comes within the terms of the law. (The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall., 666, 680; The United States v. Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Pet., 377.)
    “ Wherever any engagement is entered into with a view to contravene the general policy of the law, no form of expression can remove the substantial defect inherent in the nature of the transaction. The law will investigate the real object of the contracting parties, and if that be repugnant to the general principles established for the benefit of society, it will vitiate the most regular instrument which ingenuity can contrive.” (Pothier on Obligations, Evan’s Appendix No. 1, Phihi. ed., 1826; Johnson et al. v. United States, 5 Mas. O. C., 425, 441; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat., 258, 271, 278; Ilanauer v. Woodruff, 15 Wall., 439, 443;- Fecit v. Burr, 10 N. T., 294,299.)
    The claimant insists that the words “ in the line of construction and repair,” as found in the regular annual appropriation acts for the naval service for the “Bureau of Construction and Repair,” meet the requirements of sections 3679 and 3732 of the Revised Statutes; and if those words do not validate the contract, he holds that the contract was valid under the following provision in the sundry civil act of June 23, 1874, which is in this words:
    “ That the Secretary of the Navy is authorized to use during the ensuing fiscal year [the year ending June 30, 1875] the balance of appropriation heretofore made to the Navy Department for the construction of a floating iron dock remaining unexpended, for the purpose of completing the repairs on such double-turreted monitors as the Secretary of the Navy may deem necessary for the public service.” (18 Stat., 204, 226.)
    If work on these monitors had been authorized in the regular annual appropriation of $3,300,000 for the Bureau of Construction and Repair for the fiscal years 1875 or 1876 (18 Stat., 53, 57, 296, 300), this special appropriation would not have been made. It is in this special appropriation only that the monitors are mentioned. It is well known to the court that prior to this special appropriation, and for many years thereafter, Congress was in doubt as to the policy of building these vessels.
    Defendant contends that, notwithstanding this special appropriation for the monitors, the contract of October 2,1875, was without authority; because, after June 30,1875, the balance of that special appropriation, if any remained, would not be available as the basis for a contract.
    Even if it were admitted that this special appropriation remained available for that contract, there would still be no grounds for damages; because, in that view of the case, the claimant took the risk in respect to the sufficiency of the amount. The stoppage of work jmrsuant to the order of July 8,187G, owing to the failure of appropriations, was therefore no improper interference with the contractor, because it is well settled that—
    “Where an alleged liability rests wholly upon an appropriation they must stand and fall together, so that when the latter is exhausted the former is at an end, to be revived, if at all, only by subsequent legislation of Congress.” (Shipman v. United States, 18 C. Cls. É., 138,147; MeOullom v. United States, 17 O. Cls. R., 103; Trenton Go. v. United States, 12 C. Cls. B., 157; Moline IF. P. Go. v. United States, 20 C. Cls. B., 331.)
    The subsequent legislation affecting the construction and repair of the Monadnock is as follows:
    
      Joint Resolution of April 2, 1880 (21 Stat., 303); Naval Appropriation Aet of August 5,1882, chapter 391 (22 Stat., 284 and 291-293); Aet of .March 3,1883, chapter 97 (22 Stat., 472, 477); Aet of July 7, 1884, chapter 335 (23 Stat., 2G2, 263); Aet of January 30, 1885, chapter 43 (23 Stats., 287, 292); Act of August 3,1886, chapter 849 (24 Stat., 215); Naval Appropriation Aet of March 3,1887 — for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1888 — (24 Stat., 581, 594).
    In this legislation there is no ratification of the contract in suit. The only legislation that could by any possibility be construed as tending to a ratification of it, is the special appropriation for decedent in the Deficiency Appropriation Act of June 14, 1878 (20 Stat., 123), which reads as follows:
    “In the Bureau of Construction and Repair * * * to-Phineas Burgess, one hundred and ninety thousand two.hundred and thirty-two dollars and thirty cents.” * * *
    This special appropriation must be regarded as in the nature of an award, or rather as a quantum meruit; because the work paid for was not authorized by law or by any former appropriation adequate therefor, and it was made after a legislative examination of the items of a statement of indebtedness made by the Navy Department on account of the work done.
    
      The legislation can in no sense be regarded as validating a contract that was expressly forbidden tobe entered into by the statutes. It can aid the claimant no further than as a recognition of work done for and accepted by the defendant. For the reasonable value of this work we might refer to the contract of October 2,1875, and the evidence offered by the claimant, that the decedent would have realized a profit of 20 per cent of the contract price if the work had not been interrupted in the manner alleged. (United, States v. McDougall’s Admr., 121 U. S., 89, 98.)
    3. It may be here noted that a large portion of the claim for damages in this suit grew out of decedent’s care of the Monadnock and the use and occupation of his shipyard and plant after July 8, 1876, when work was stopped by the Navy Department.
    In respect to this part of the claim, defendant contends that in addition to the objections made above this court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate it, because Congress by the Act of March 5,1883, chapter 97 (22 Stat., 472, 477), constituted the Secretary of the Navy a special tribunal to ascertain the amount which ought to be paid the contractor for the use and occupation of his yard by said ship and for the care thereof, and required him to report the same, with all the facts, to Congress. •
    Whether or not the Secretary of the Navy performed this duty is not material to the issue, but as an evidence of the intention of Congress to reserve to itself the settlement of these unliquidated demands, the attention of the court is called to the appropriations made in favor of other shipbuilders for like compensation on page 459, volume 23, of the Statutes at Large.
    These appropriations, it will be observed, were to be paid only upon full receipt and discharge of all claims of the parties for their care and storage of the said vessels, and for the use and occupation of their yards for the period from July 8, 1876, to December 29, 1882. This period commenced on the very day that the Navy Department ordered work to cease on the Monadnock.
    4. Defendant takes the position that the distinction made in behalf of the claimant between a demand for interest accrued on a claim and a demand for damages of which the measure would, be a certain rate of interest is immaterial to the merits of the case. It is a distinction in terms only and not in substance, since interest, in the absence of a contract for its payment, is always regarded as a measure of compensation under the law of damages. (Sedgwick on Damages, 374; Lee v. IAn-gard, 1 East., 401; Lotee y. Waller, 734, 740; Pothier on Obligations, P. 1, c. 2, Art. Ill [159], [172].),
    It is not alleged that the defendant contracted to pay interest. Instead, the demand is for “damages.”
    (1) There is no jurisdiction in the Court of Claims to render a judgment for such damages. Section 1091 of the Eevised Statutes is express in its terms on this point. ‘ It confers jurisdiction to recover for interest agreed to be paid, but it denies jurisdiction of claims for damages measured by interest.
    “ Sec. 1091. No interest shall be allowed on any claim up to the time of the rendition of judgment thereon by the Court of Claims, unless upon a contract expressly stipulating for the payment of interest.”
    There can be no question that the jurisdiction here denied is in respect to damages measured by interest rates. (Curtin v. Inverairity, 6 How., 146.)
    The fact that the money was borrowed militates against rather than favors the claimant’s contention, for no department. of the Government, except Congress, has the power to borrow money for the use or benefit of the United States. (Const., Art. I, Sec. VIII, cl. 3.)
    It follows from this, in the absence of legislative enactment for its foundation, that there can be no valid claim against the United States Government either for interest on moneys borrowed-or expended for its use and benefit or for commissions on loans obtained for that purpose. The propriety of withholding jurisdiction from this court in respect of claims not having this foundation must be apparent, in the light of the constitutional restrictions. (Tillsonv, United, States, 11 C. Cls. R., 758; S. 0.100 U. S., 43; McKee v. United States, 91 U. S., 442; Sedgwick on Damages, 374.)
    5. All the items of damages set forth in the claimant’s requests for findings are without legal foundation. It can not be said that they were the immediate and necessary result of any breach of contract, because in contemplation of law there was no contract.
    
      (1) So far as these items resulted from a failure of appropriation, the defense is that no Executive Department could contract that Congress would make an appropriation for any ship.
    (2) So far as the damages resulted from stoppage of work by order of July 8,1876, the defense is:
    
      (a) The order ivas a legal one, since the statutes forbid work to be done in the absence of an adequate appropriation for it, or a law authorizing it.
    (&) The prosecution of the work thereafter was a wrong and injury to the defendant. (Ciarle v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio, 317; Wilson v. Martín, 1 Denio, 602, 605; Shannon v. Comstoclc, 21 Wend., 457; Keclcscher v. McCrea, 24 Wend., 304, 310; McKee v. United States, 1 O. Gis. R., 242.)
    (3) With all the contract stipulations in respect to delays and failures, accidents and laches, the decedent agreed to do the work at a stipulated price, which, in effect, was fully paid in June, 1878.
   Davis, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff’s intestate made with the Government two contracts in relation to the monitor M'onadnock; these contracts provided for building the framework and hull and for all ironwork except the armor. It was in one contract provided, substantially, that the Government should furnish the plans and specifications and deliver all materials, freight paid, at Yallejo, Cal., where the vessel was to be built.

The other contract was for the ironwork (except armor), and construction thereunder was to be begun so soon as the first contract had been completed; to be finished within nine months, there being a penalty for delay. This second contract is not important to this action.

Work on the vessel should have been finished by November, 1876. Through delays caused by defendants this became impossible; plans and specifications were not promptly furnished to the contractor, were often changed, and were often defective, all of which involved delay in the vessel and expense to the contractor; while materials were delayed in delivery, were often delivered out of regular order, and were delivered in such defective form as to make alteration necessary, always at expense to the contractor.

Iu July, 1876, the Department of the Navy ordered all work on the vessel suspended until further order; this suspension was indefinite as to time; therefore the contractor felt himself obliged to remain in readiness to go on with the work when called uxion, and did not deem it wise to disperse his force of trained and skilled mechanics.

In December, 1876, work was resumed and proceeded (with interruptions and delays, all caused by defendants), for about a year, when it was again stopped because of defendants’ failure to deliver materials as in duty bound. The contractor could not again proceed until May, 1883, and the work was not finished until the following November, more than seven years after the date first contemplated by the parties.

There does not appear in the findings of fact anything tending to show neglect or default upon the part of the contractor; on the contrary, the very unusual delay was due to the defendants’ fault alone and was caused, as appears, by lack of money in the Navy Department.

As early as November, 1878, this claim was presented to the Department of the Navy, where it was held under consideration until February 17, 1885, when the Secretary of the Navy referred the case to this court under section 1063 of the Devised Statutes.

It is urged by defendants that the claims for damage under the contract of October 21, 1875, are barred by virtue of the limitation prescribed by section 1069 of the Devised Statutes, unless the Secretary of the Navy had authority to refer them, as he did, under section 1063 of the Devised Statutes; that section 1063 does not contemplate the reference of claims for unliquidated damages, but only of such claims as are within the jurisdiction of the Executive Department to settle; that claims for unliquidated damage not being within that jurisdiction this claim was not presented to a competent tribunal within six years from the date when it accrued. The work upon the vessel required of plaintiff’s testator was not entirely completed until 1883, but the cause of several items of claim herein occurred more than six years before the petition was filed in this court, and it is contended that the statute of limitations bars those items.

If this contention by defendants be correct, then any contractor with the Government must, to protect his right, sue upon every item of difference of fact and every item of difference of interpretation of tbe contract as each, detail of his work is undertaken or completed, as the case may be.

There is no more complicated engine known than a completed vessel of war with its massive hull and armor, its many varied and ingenious engines, its guns with their ammunition and appliances, and its provision for comfortably lodging and feeding a large body of men under all the possible conditions of weather and combat. In the construction of such a vessel it would be strange if there were not daily presented matters of detail involving dispute between the inspecting officer and the contractor, and requiring an immediate final and, indeed, arbitrary decision of points of detail, as to which difference of opinion may well exist. If each time such a point arises and is decided adversely to the contractor he must forthwith begin the prosecution of his remedy against the Government, the parties as well as the courts would be subject to great and unnecessary labor and expense in adjusting j>etty difference, which could more economically and advantageously be settled in a single action brought after completion of the work. Further than this, if an action be brought before all items of damage have occurred, damages thereafter happening in the prosecution of the same work under the same contract would be held barred. The work in this case was in fact not completed until more than seven years after the contract period, and this not by reason of any fault of the contractor; for most of the time he was held in anxious readiness to proceed, being ignorant of the moment when an order to complete the vessel might be received. The contractor was not lacking in diligence, and if, under these circumstances, defendants’ argument as to the statute of limitations be correct great hardship to the contractor will result.

The claim was presented to the Secretary of the Navy in. November, 1878, and afterwards was referred to this court. The Secretary had jurisdiction to settle the amounts due under these contracts and the claim made for extra expenses and work agreed upon and incurred because of' defendants’ action and of which defendants have received the benefit. Possibly, because of' Government’s repeated and long-continued delays, plaintiff might have elected to terminate his contract, but he was not forced to do so, as he was guiltless of fault or neglect in the matter and was free t© go on, finish the work, and then sue.

We hold that Burgess had a right to wait until his contract was completed; that he was not forced to sue in 1877 and thus risk greater loss, and that the right of action herein became complete, as to the items herein allowed, when the work was finished, to wit, in 1883. This being so, and the claim having-been presented to the Navy Department in 1878 and filed in this court April 10,1886, the action is not barred by the statute of limitations. (Dubois v. Del. and H. Canal, 4 Wend., 285; Allamon v. The Mayor, etc., 43 Barbour, 33; Bendemagle v. Codes, 19 Wend., 207; Badger v. Libcombe, 15 Pick., 409.)

When a Department transmits a case to this court involving controverted questions of fact and law arising upon a claim under a contract which the Department might have settled, and, on the trial, claims for unliquidated damages on either side which the Department had no authority to settle are set up, this court may adjudicate upon all such claims the same as though they had been presented here on voluntary petition.

Was there a contract? In this case there was an advertisement and Burgess was the lowest bidder. The contract was made in accordance with the then policy of the Government under which new vessels were constructed from the general appropriation for the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and uot, as now, under statutes explicitly authorizing the construction of vessels of specified classes. This practice was. continued for several years, was public, and was known to Congress, and through appropriations was approved by that body. The course of Congress in relation to the contracts of which Burgess’s was one is indicated by the following citations:

June 6,1874, general appropriation for 1875 of $3,300,000 for the Bureau of Construction and Repair. (18 Stat. L., 53, 57.) June 23, 1874 (18 Stat. L., 226), statute authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to use the balance of aj)propriations “heretofore made to the Navy Department for the construction of a floating iron dock, remaining unexpended, for the purpose of completing the repairs on such double-turreted monitors as the Secretary of the Navy may deem necessary for the public service.” January 18, 1875 (18 Stat. L., 296), general appropriation of $3,300,000 for the Bureau of Construction and Repair was made. July 12,1875, proposals for the repair of tlie Monadnock were invited, and this fact was made known to Congress. (Appendix, p. 50, Ex. F., Rep. 787, 45 Cong., 2d sess.) The general facts as to this vessel and others in course of construction or repair at the same time were from time to time reported to Congress, and very considerable appropriations for the Bureau of Construction and Repair were thereupon made by the Congress with full knowledge of the facts as to the Monadnock, the Terror, and other vessels then being built from these appropriations, but without more specific'statutory authority. (Report 787, H. R., 45 Cong., 2d sess., vol. 4; Rep. Com., 2d sess., 45 Cong., 1877-785 Act June Id, 1878 (20 Stat. L., 123); House Res. of December 10, 1878, as to the delay in building Monadnock and damages, etc.) January 20,1879, Report Secretary of the Navy. February 21, 1879, Report 112, H. R., 45 Cong., 3d sess. January 23, 1880, report of the Secretary of the Navy to the Committee on Naval Affairs showing liow much was needed to complete the Monadnock, and which contains this statement: So far as the Department is aware, the contractors for all the double-turreted monitors named in the bill have thus far executed their contracts as required by law.” (On the subject of legislative recognition, see Fremont's Case, 2 C. Cls. R., 1; Riley's Case, 1 id., 299, Adams's Case, 2 id;, 70 5 Behan's Case, 110 U. S., 338.) Later (April 2,1880, 21 Stat. L., 11. 303), Congress authorized the Secretary to organize a board to examine the monitors for the purpose of determining whether the Government should finish them 5 this board reported that the vessels should be completed (the plans to be somewhat modified), and the Secretary of the Navy so informed the Congress. (Ex. Doc. 82, Parts I, II, and III, H. R., 46 Cong., 2d sess.) In December, 1881, the Secretary of the Navy reported to Congress that expense was continually accruing on the Monadnock and Burgess was suffering hardship. August 5, 1882, followed the statute (22 Stat. L., 284, 291, 293) providing for a Naval Advisory Board, appropriating $400,000 for building and fitting up the turret and pilot house of the Miantouomah and for launching the Monadnock. December 1, 1882, the Greer Board was appointed, as appears in the petition. In his annual report (1882) the Secretary of the Navy (vol. 1, p. 23) states that he has been authorized by Congress to finish the ironclads, and that he has made contracts with the various contractors to furnish the balance of materials and to provide for the launching of the boats, these contracts having been made “without prejudice to any existing rights of either the Government or the contractors.” On March 3, 1883 (22 Stat. L., 472, 477), the Navy appropriation act authorized the Secretary of the Navy to take possession of the double-turreted ironclads, to remove them to the Government yards if he should think best, and to ascertain the amounts which should be paid the contractors severally for the use and occupation of their yards and for the care of the ships. February 14, 1883, the Greer Board reported to the Secretary, recommending as a payment to Burgess the sum of $192,436.50, and stating that there were monthly damages accruing, amounting to $1,116.11. January 7, 1884, the Chief of Bureau reported that there was due Burgess of the contract price $12,190, or if he should be charged with the amount received when freight was refunded, then the balance would be $4,051.98. February 12,1884, the Secretary of the Navy reported as to this Board and recommended certain payments to the builders of the Puritan, Amphitrite, and Terror, for the use of their yards, and these recommendations were adopted by Congress. (23 Stat. L., p. 459.) Congress later (August 3, 1886, 24 Stat. L., p. 215) authorized the President to complete the’double-turreted monitors, of which the Monadnoclc was one, at a total fixed cost. March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. L., p. 594), appropriation was made toward the “ construction and completion” (exclusive of armament) of the five double-turreted monitors and the four vessels authorized by the act of March 3,1885, and the vessels authorized by the act of August 3,1880.

From all this it appears that the contract, whether authorized in its inception or not, has been repeatedly brought to the attention of the Congress, recognized by it as binding on the United States, that body has authorized payments to be made upon it, and the Navy Department has made payments upon it. The work was done under whatever authority the Secretary of the Navy had; Congress was fully cognizant of the facts and ratified the Secretary’s course; the contractor honestly and diligently, at a loss to himself and in the face of hardship, competently completed his work, and the Government has the vessel, which is an important part of the naval defense of tbe United States. The contract, we hold, was made by competent authority and was binding upon the parties.

The service performed by this contractor was under general appropriations covering several vessels; he was not therefore chargeable with knowledge as to the Secretary’s apportionment of the appropriation between him and other contractors for other vessels built from the same fuud. It has been heretofore decided, That persons contracting with the Government for partial service under general appropriations are not bound to know the condition of the appropriation account at the Treasury or on the contract book of the Department. (Dougherty v. The United States, 18 C. Cls. R., p. 496. See also upon this point Trenton Company’s Case, 12 id., 147; McCollum's Case, 17 id., 92; Shipman's Case, 18 id., 138; Illinois Cent. R. R., 18 id., 118; Chicago and N. W. R. R. Co., 104 U. S., 680; N. Y. C. and H. R. R. R. 21 C. Cls. R., 468.)

This case cannot follow those of McKay et al. (27 C. Cls. R., p. 422), for those cases came to this court under special acts containing provisions peculiar to them as to the measure of damage, whereas this cause must be determined by the general rules of law applicable to such cases.

As to the interest on borrowed money: The delay forced the contractor to borrow money to carry on his contract, and for this he was forced to pay interest, an extra expense; the recovery of this sum in this court is forbidden by statute, and whether it be claimed in the guise of a damage caused by delay, or in some other form, it remains in fact a claim for interest, and such a claim we are prohibited from allowing. (Rev. Stat., § 1091.) The distinction (by plaintiff sought to be made) is one of terms only, not of substance. If plaintiff had used his own money and so lost the interest which, it might have earned for him, the claim would have been as meritorious, but would not have differed in principle from that now made.

In Fox and Another v. Harding and Another (7 Cush., p. 516), the court said (upon the question of damages):

"The rule has not been uniform or very clearly settled as to the right of a party to claim a loss of profits as a part of the damages for breach of a special contract. But we think there is a distinction by which all.questions of this sort can be easily tested. If the profits are such as would have accrued and grown out of the contract itself, as the direct and immediate results of its fulfillment, then they would form a just and proper item of damages to be recovered against the delinquent party upon a breach of the agreement. These are part and parcel of the contract itself, and must have been in the contemplation of the parties when the agreement was entered into. But if they are such as would have In en realized by the party from other independent and collateral undertakings, although entered into in consequence and on the faith of the principal contract, then they are too uncertain and remote to be taken into consideration as a part of the damages occasioned by the breach of the contract in suit.”

The court add that in the case then at bar plaintiffs would be entitled to recover such sum in damages—

“As they would have realized in profits if the contract had been fully performed. To ascertain this it would be necessary to estimate the cost and expense of work and materials in completing the contract on their part, and to deduct (his sum from the contract price. The balance would be the profit which would have accrued to them out of the contract itself if it had been fulfilled, and which they have a right to recover in addition to such further sum as would compensate them for the labor and materials supplied toward the completion of the contract.”

And the court add that if plaintiffs had offered to prove that in consequence of the breach of the contract they lost other profitable contracts which they had entered into for the purpose of fulfilling the contract then in suit such evidence would have been inadmissible.

In Sutherland on Damages (p. 106) it is said: “In another class of cases the question of the certainty of damages is more distinctly involved. * * * The plaintiff’s right to recover for such a loss depends on his proving with sufficient certainty that such advantages would have resulted, and therefore that the act complained of prevented them.” (See also Taylor v. Maguire, 12 Missouri, p. 313.) In Blanchard v. Ely (21 Wendell, p. 342) the Supreme Court of New York thus approves the rule of the civil law, as stated byPothier: “In general, the parties are deemed to have contemplated only the damages and interest which the creditor might suffer from the nonperformance of the obligation, in respect to the particular thing which is the object of it, and not such as may have been accidentally occasioned thereby in respect to his own affairs.” In Walker et al. v. Ellis et al. (1 Sneed, p. 515) the rule is thus stated by the Supreme Court of Tennessee: “In actions of contract, generally speaking, the damages are limited to the natural and proximate consequences of the breach complained of, and the damages remotely or consequentially resulting-therefrom, or merely speculative damages, can not be claimed.” In the same State the Supreme Court (following Blanchard v. Ely, 1 Wend., 346) held (in action for breach of agreement to deliver castings) that plaintiff was not entitled to damages for delay in business caused by the nondelivery, nor for expenses incurred in attempting to procure the castings, nor for speculative profits. Again (in Shaw v. Turnpike Co., 3 Penn., 445), it was decided that, while a party may have the right to declare the contract at an end, if he elects to treat it as still subsisting, “he thereby waives the consequences of such default, and can not afterwards allege the rescission of the contract by the defendant and recover on a quantum meruit

We hold that the plaintiff can only recover those items of damage which are the proximate result of the acts of the Government. What those items are is somewhat difficult to determine. For a damage to be direct there must appear no intervening incident (not caused by the defaulting party) to complicate or confuse the certainty of the resultbetween the cause and the damage; the cause must produce the effect inevitably and naturally, not possibly nor even probably. The damage must be such as was to have been foreseen by the parties, who are assumed to have considered the situation, the contract, and the usual course of events; but eliminated from this consideration must be any condition of affairs peculiar to the contractor individually in the particular case and not of general application under similar conditions. There must not be two steps between cause and damage. We have followed this rule in the decision as to the different items of claim shown in the Conclusion of Law.

On the whole case judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $77,550.45.  