
    Martin DEKOM, Julie Dekom, Kenneth Jacoby, Deborah Jacoby, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NASSAU COUNTY, William Biamonte, Louis Savinetti, John Ryan, Esq., Matthew Kiernan, Francis X. Moro-ney, Donald T. O’Brien, Ronald Hores, Cindy Perdikakis, Joseph Mondello, Peter Bee, John Doe 1-100, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-4080-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 11, 2014.
    
      Martin Dekom, Julie Dekom, pro se, Manhasset, NY, Kenneth Jacoby, Deborah Jacoby, pro se, Oceanside, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Gerald R. Podlesak, Nassau County Attorney’s Office, Mineóla, NY, for Nassau County. Steven G. Leventhal, Leventhal, Cursio, Mullaney & Sliney, LLP, Roslyn, NY, for the individually named defendants-appellees, for Defendants-Appellees.
    PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, GERARD E. LYNCH, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs Martin Dekom, Julie Dekom, Kenneth Jacoby, and Deborah Jacoby appeal the judgment of the district court dismissing their claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. We presume familiarity with the facts and procedural history and reference them only as necessary to explain our decision.

The district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for violations of their procedural due process rights stemming from the rejection of plaintiffs’ petitions for candidacy in the Nassau County Republican primary. As we held in Rivera-Powell v. N.Y.C. Board of Elections, 470 F.3d 458 (2d Cir.2006), New York Election Law § 16-102 provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for random and unauthorized deprivations of due process in disputes over failure to list a candidate’s name on the ballot in a New York election. Id. at 465-67. Plaintiffs argue on appeal that they were entitled to a pre-deprivation remedy because defendants’ acts were part of an established state procedure. We did not decide in Rivera-Powell whether New York Election Law § 16102 provides a pre-deprivation remedy, in addition to a post-deprivation remedy, because the injury to a prospective candidate does not occur until the candidate’s name is not listed on the ballot on election day. See id. at 467, n. 10. We need not decide that question here because plaintiffs’ complaint makes clear that, in their view, defendants’ actions violated New York law and local party policies and procedures, and therefore were random and unauthorized. Because New York Election Law § 16-102 provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for precisely the injuries plaintiffs allege, plaintiffs suffered no “deprivation[ ] without due process of law.” Id. at 464. For the same reasons that we dismissed the plaintiffs First Amendment claim in Riverar-Powell as “virtually indistinguishable from her due process claim,” id. at 468-69, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim here.

The district court also correctly dismissed plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause claim for discrimination based on creed. Even assuming that plaintiffs’ status as Republican Party “outsiders” aligned with the Tea Party could support such a claim, plaintiffs failed to allege facts that would support an inference that they were treated differently from other candidates who were similarly situated to them. As the district court noted, the other candidates that plaintiffs identified whose petitions were accepted were either supported by a sufficient number of local voters or by members of the Nassau County Board of Elections, and therefore were not similarly situated to plaintiffs. Although the question whether other individuals are similarly situated to a plaintiff is ordinarily a question of fact, see Brown v. Daikin Am. Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 230 (2d Cir.2014), on a motion to the dismiss, facts may be gleaned from the complaint and the exhibits attached ■ thereto. See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir.2010). The district court therefore properly concluded, based on the Board of Elections minutes attached to the complaint, that plaintiffs’ allegations of discrimination based on creed or as a “class of one” fail to plausibly state a claim.

We also affirm the district court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ Voting Rights Act § 11(b) claim for voter intimidation, based on one of the defendants “yelling” at Martin Dekom that the North Hempstead Republican Convention was not public, though for different reasons than those stated by the district court. See Olsen v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Div. of United Techs. Corp., 136 F.3d 273, 275 (2d Cir.1998) (noting that “we may affirm on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, including grounds not relied upon by the district court” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim that defendants attempted to intimidate Dekom “for the purpose of interfering with [his] right” to vote, 52 U.S.C. § 10101(b), since the complaint alleges that Dekom sought to participate in the North Hempstead Republican Convention only as a proxy of a party member of the party, and he was permitted entry when he produced the proxy.

Because plaintiffs’ federal claims under § 1983 all fail, the district court properly dismissed their claim for conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, which itself provides no substantive rights. See Traggis v. St. Barbara’s Greek Orthodox Church, 851 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir.1988). The district court also properly declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims after determining that all the federal claims should be dismissed, and therefore properly dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. See Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 103 (2d Cir.1998).

Finally, plaintiffs advanced no basis for the district judge to recuse herself, and she did not abuse her discretion in denying their motion for recusal. See In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 957-58 (2d Cir.2008). Plaintiffs’ vague allusion on appeal to a conversation with a law clerk that plaintiffs considered questionable creates no possibility that “a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, [would] conclude that the ... judge’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 775 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ recusal motion. Accord, Dekom v. New York, No. 13-2773-cv, 2014 WL 6480730, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2014) (summary order).

We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 
      
      . Similarly, plaintiffs’ argument that their rights as voters were infringed and cannot be remedied by New York Election Law § 16-102 is foreclosed by Rivera-Powell, wherein we rejected any notion that the plaintiff's supporters had a due process claim independent of the plaintiff’s.
     
      
      . Contrary to the district court’s ruling, plaintiffs’ claim is not barred by the Rooker-Feld-man doctrine. "[F]ederal plaintiffs are not subject to the Rooker-Feldman bar unless they complain of an injury caused by a state judgment.” Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir.2005) (emphasis omitted). There is potentially divergent authority on whether the dismissal of a state cause of action by a New York court on statute of limitations grounds precludes a subsequent federal suit under § 1983. Compare Cloverleaf Realty of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Wawayanda, 572 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir.2009), with Joseph v. Athanasopoulos, 648 F.3d 58, 64-67 (2d Cir.2011). We need not resolve any tension in our precedent, however, because the dismissal of plaintiffs’ Voting Rights Act claim is affirmed for the reasons set forth in the text.
     