
    CHARLES M. DENNISON v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 15775.
    Decided April 21, 1890.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    The accounts of a chief supervisor of elections are approved by a district court in the usual manner. Numerous items of the accounts so approved are rejected by the accounting officers.
    I.Circuit Court commissioners are in legal effect magistrates, and in no sense administrative officials or assistants of the court.
    II.The duties of a chief supervisor of elections under the A ct 2%th February, 1871 (16 Stat. L., p. 433, § 13; Rev. Stat., § 2025), are in no sense judicial.
    III.The purpose of Congress in committing the appointment of chief supervisor of elections to'the judiciary, and in restricting it to the mere designation of one-of many already existing judicial officers, the commissioners, was to secure non-partisan service.
    
      IV.The functions of the Circuit and District Courts in the examination of accounts of commissioners and chief supervisors may not he judicial, hut the methods are. The judge does not act as an accounting officer; he hears the objections of the district attorney and passes upon them.
    V. Nothing short of a clear intent 'Unequivocally expressed in a statute will warrant a court in holding that the accounts of an officer are not to he settled at the Treasury as other public accounts axe.
    VI. Beading all the statutory provisions together it must he held, that a chief supervisor of elections is in legal effect a Circuit Court commissioner, designated to perform certain additional and prescribed duties; and that his accounts are subject to the same law, and the same revision, and the same mode of settlement as the accounts of Circuit Court commissioners, -lei 16th August, 1856 (11 Stat. L., p. 49, § 2; Eev. Stat., 846, ‘2035); Act 28th February, 1871 (16 Stat. L., p. 433, § 13); Act 2‘¿d February, 1875 (18 Stat. L., p. 333, § 1).
    VII. Where the services of a commissioner or chief supervisor of elections are within the scope of the law defining his duties, (Bevised Statutes, § § 2025,2026), the approval of the Circuit or District Court determines the fact that they were necessary and proper and sufficient to entitle the officer to the fee prescribed by law; but the approval does not establish the accuracy of the account, nor tate it out of the supervision of the accounting officers, nor render the Government liable for a service or expenditure not authorized by law.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of the ease as found by the court:
    I. The claimant, Charles M. Dennison, was a commisioner of the Circuit Court of the United States, and chief supervisor of elections for the northern district of itew York from April 22, 1871, to June 30, 1887, duly qualified and acting.
    II. During said time he performed the duties required of him as chief supervisor of elections under the provisions of title 26 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, known as the “Elective Franchise,” at the following general elections, at which Representatives in Congress were voted for, namely, 1872, 1874, 1876,1878, 1880,1882,1884, and 1886.
    III. The northern district of Rew York embraces forty-six counties, and contained a population in 1880 exceeding 2,000,000, and the vote cast for Representatives in Congress in 1880 in cities and towns where supervisors of election were appointed exceeded 122,000. Since then the population and number of election districts in said cities and towns have largely increased. During the election of 1886 450 supervisors of election were appointed in Albany, Auburn, Bing-hamton, Buffalo, Cohoes, Elmira, Oswego, Rochester, Syracuse, Troy, Utica, and Watervliet, with a population of nearly 800,000.
    1Y. During said time the claimant made out his accounts for the services performed by him as chief supervisor of elections, and verified by his oath, were presented to the courtfor approval, and an order approving the same as being just and according to law was duly entered of record, hereinafter set forth in Finding Y. The accounts were then presented to the accounting officers of the United States Treasury Department for payment. The accounts embraced in this suit for the elections of 1882,1884, and 1886 were adjusted by the accounting officers, and they refused payment for the following services, to wit:
    Subitem 1 — Acc’t 1886, item 9. Entering and indexing original reports to the judge, and furnishing information with respect to the appointments of supervisors in the several cities, consisting of copies of applications and recommendations, with the recommendations of the chief supervisor, 747.folios, at 15 cents each.. $112.05
    Subitem 2 — Aco’t ’84; item 11. 353 folios, at 15 cents each. 52.95
    Subitem 3 — Acc’t ’82, item 15. 1,375 folios, at 15 cents each. 206.25
    Subitem 4 — Acc’t '86, item 10. Drafting original notices of appointment and notifying supervisors when and where to take the oath of office, receive commissions, and entering and filing said notices as records of the chief supervisor’s office, 100 folios, at 15 cents each. 15.00
    Subitem 5 — Acc’t ’84, item 12, 92 folios, at 15 cents each. 13.80
    Subitem 6 — Aco’t ’82, item 17. 932 folios, at 15 cents each. 139.80
    Subitem 7 — Ace’t ’84, item 2. .Filing and oaring for written acceptances from supervisors of their appointment, 443 folios, at 10 cents each. 44.3Q
    Subitem 8 — Acc’t’82, item 2. 442 folios, at 10 cents each. 44.20
    Subitem 9 — Acc’t ’82, item 5. Filing 74 stubs to oaths of office of supervisors in Albany, at 10 cents each. 7.40
    Subitem 10 — Aoc’t ’84, item 15. Drawing instructions to supervisors relative to their duties, and drawing index to same, 142 folios, at 15 cents each. 21. 30
    Subitem 11 — Acc’t ’86, item 7. Filing and caring for original reports received from supervisors of election, giving the number of (lays served by each supervisor, and the amount of compensation claimed, on which the chief supervisor recommends to the marshal the amount due each supervisor, 477 reports, at 10 cents each 47.70
    
      Subitem Hi — Acc’t ’82, item 9. 429 reports, at 10 cents eacb-Subitem 12 — Ac’t ’86, item 8. Filing and caring for miscellaneous letters and papers received from supervisors and electors, 538 papers, at 10 cents each. $42.90 53.58
    Subitem 13 — Aec’t ’86, item 4. Filing and caring for reports received from supervisors of election relative to the first meeting of boards of registry, 646 reports, at 10 cents each. 46.40
    Subitem 14 — Aoc’t ’86, item 6. Filing and caring for registry hooks, preliminary and final, made by the supervisors of election and returned to the chief supervisor, 816 registry hooks, at 10 cents each.„. 81.60
    Subitem 15 — Acc’t ’82, item 14. Entering and indexing original letters acknowledging receipt of each application for appointment as supervisor, 710 folios, at 15 cents each. 106.50
    Subitem 16 — Ace’t ’82, item 18. Entering and indexing written acceptances of office by each supervisor, 331 folios, at 15 cents each. 69.95
    Subitem 17 — Acc’t ’82, item 21. Entering and indexing oaths of supervisors, 1,131 folios, at 15 cents each. 169.65
    Subitem 18 — Acc’t ’82, item 16. Entering and indexing commissions of supervisors, 610 folios, at 15 cents each. 91.50
    Subitem 19--Acc’t ’82, item 22. Entering and indexing original letters of instructions to supervisors of election, requiring them to make reports of the proceedings at the polls, the result of the canvass, irregularities, and to swear to their accounts, 684 folios, at 15 cents each. 102.60
    Subitem 20 — Acc’t ’82, item 24. 702 folios, at 15 cents each._ 105.30
    Subitem 21 — Acc’t ’82, item 19. Entering and indexing letters to each supervisor, requiring report of condition of registry at the - end of first meeting of board of registry, with a list of added names, and a report of all violations of law, 573 folios, at 15 cents each. 85.95
    Subitem 22 — Acc’t ’82, item 20. Entering and indexing reports of supervisors of proceedings of board of registry at first meeting, containing the added names and violations of law, 1,072 folios, at 15 cents each..... 160.80
    Subitem 23 — Acc’t ’82, item 23. Entering and indexing the report of supervisors as to the conduct and completion of canvass, 1,491 folios, at 15 cents each. 223.65
    Subitem 24 — Acc’t ’86, item 13. Entering and indexing the records of names of persons who were registered and who voted for Representatives in Congress in the several cities, 29,609 folios, at 15 cents each.e L 441.35
    Subitem 25 — Acc’t ’82, item 25. Entering and indexing reports of supervisors as to their services and certification of accounts, 1,506 folios, at 15 cents each. 225.90
    Subitem 26 — Acc’t ’82, item 20. Entering and indexing original notifications to supervisors of condition of accounts, amount allowed, and disposition made thereof, 701 folios, at 15 cents each. 105.15
    
      Subitem 27 — Acc’fc ’82, item 13. Drawing and attaching certificates to the accounts of supervisors for services rendered by them, as per instructions of the IT. S. marshal, being a prerequisite to payment, 814 folios, at 15 cents each. $122.10
    Subitem 28 — Acc’t ’82, item 28. Entering and indexing reports of U. S. commissioners in criminal cases, 349 folios, at 15 cents each. 50.55
    Subitem 29 — Acc’t ’84, item 19. Expenses incurred for furnishing the following blanks: 1,000 notices of appointment, at $5.00; 1,000 acceptances of appointment, at $3.50. 8.50
    Total.6,998.68
    Y. The claimant’s accounts for the years 1882, 1884, and 1886 were respectively presented to the district court for the northern district of Hew York for approval, being at the-same time verified by the oath of the claimant in the following form:
    “ United States of America,
    “ Northern District of New York, ss:
    
    “ I, Charles M. Dennison, do solemnly swear that I am a commissioner of the circuit court of the United States and chief supervisor of elections for the northern district of Few York; that the foregoing account is in all respects just and true, according to the best of my knowledge and belief; that the several items charged, as set forth in. detail and vouchers therein referred to and annexed, are at the reasonable and customary prices at the place where the charges were incurred and the work performed; that each and all of them were necessary for the proper discharge of my oficial duties :;s chief supervisor of elections; that the services charged in said account have been actually and necessarily performed as therein stated, and the disbursements were made in good faith; that said account nor any part thereof has not been paid or heretofore presented for audit.
    “C. M. Dennison.
    “ Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of January, 1885.
    
      “ Wi. W. Gilbert,
    “ U.8. Commissioner Nor. Dist. of N. Y.”
    
    And thereupon each of the said accounts, including the items subsequently rejected by the accounting officers as set forth in Finding IY, was approved by an order in the following terms :
    
      “At a stated term of the district court of the United States for the northern district of New York, held at the city of Albany, on the 20th day of January, A. D. 1687, present the honorable Alfred 0. Ooxe, judge. In the matter of the account of Charles M. Dennison, chief supervisor of elections for the northern district of New York.
    “An account of Charles M. Dennison, chief supervisor of elections for the northern district of New York, for official services and disbursements for the election held in said district on the 2d day of November, 1886, at which Representatives in Congress were chosen, and the registration therefor having been submitted to the court in the presence of D. N. Lockwood, district attorney, to this court for approval. And it appearing to the satisfaction of the court, by the oath of the said chief supervisor upon the account, that the services have been actually and necessarily performed as stated, and the charges appearing to be just and according to law,
    “ It is hereby ordered that said account, amounting to five thousand eight hundred seventy-seven dollars and eighty-five cents ($5,877.85), bé and the same is hereby approved.
    “ALFRED C. COXE.”
    YI. The only evidence considered by the Court of Claims on behalf of the claimant to establish the rendition of the services for which he seeks compensation as set forth in Finding IY was the orders approving his accounts set forth or described in Finding Y. The defendants have produced no evidence to rebut or otherwise contradict the orders so referred to, or to impeach the accuracy and verity of the accounts so approved.
    
      Mr. Charles C. Lancaster, Mr. Flihu Boot, Mr. John I. Davenport and Mr. John J. Allen, for the claimant.
    
      Mr. Felix Brannigan (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-■General Cotton) for the defendants :
    In this court “claimants are required to establish their rights ■by original and. legal evidence.” (MeKnight v. United States, 13 C. Cls. E., 310.)
    It is in evidence that the accounts mentioned in the petition were approved by the district judge of the northern judicial district of New York.
    The counsel for claimant argues that the effect of such approval is to make the accounts admissible evidence to prove the correctness of the items in dispute. If this were the legal effect of such approval, it would follow that no vouchers would Re necessary to support items of accounts so approved. But this can not be the effect, because after their approval by the judge such accounts are still open to revision upon their merits by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department, who-never have regarded such approval as even prima facie evidence of the correctness of any charge made in them. {Rev. Stats. 846; act Feb. 22, 1875, see. 1, 18 Stat. L., 333.)
    If such approval is not even prima facie evidence of liability in the Treasury Department for the purposes of accounting, ■we fail to see how it can possibly operate as evidence to prove a debit charge in a traversed account in this or any other court of law. The orders of the district judge approving these accounts show for themselves that there was no prior investigation whatever of the items of the accounts, nor any competent proof offered as to whether the services charged for in them had been actually and necessarily performed. The order of approval for each account was based solely on an ex parte affidavit, viz, “the oath of the said chief supervisor upon the account.”
    
    When acting under the statute in this matter, the judge was not exercising any judicial power. His action was voluntary. It had not the effect of a judgment or an award {Rayburn's Case, 2 Dali., 410, notes; United States v. Ferriera, 13 How., 40; United States v. Yale Todd, ib., notes; Turner's Case, 19 0. Ols. R., 629), because the statute above cited says that the judge’s order of approval or disapproval shall not “be deemed in anywise to diminish or affect the right of revision of the accounts to which this act applies by the accounting officers of the Treasury, as exercised under the laws now in force.” {Exparte Zellner, 9 Wall., 247.)
    This court does not regard the approval of the judge, in such case, as a material fact on its merits. {Knox v. The United States, 23 O. Ols. R., 367, affirmed by the Supreme Court 128 U. S. E., 230.) Such approvals are often forms without substance, made “in the hurry of the close of the term.” {United States v. Smith et al., 1 Wood. & M., 184.)
    It was not the intention of Congress to make the formal approval of accounts by the district or circuit courts evidence of the legality and justice of the items charged therein, nor that such approvals should make the accounts pass current, through.the accounting officers as drafts upon the Treasury.
    
      If such, an approval as that shown by the transcript makes an account prima fade evidence of the correctness of its charges in this court, while it has no such effect in the executive branch of the Government, the object of Congress in enacting the law which requires the submission of such accounts .to the district judge and their subsequent revision by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department must forever remain a legislative mystery. Certainly that law contains no evidence of such an anomaly. On the contrary, it expressly rebuts any inference of it. It leaves the accounts still subject to all the revision that “other public accounts” are subject to. The charges made in them must, therefore, be sustained in this court by vouchers and other satisfactory proofs, as “ in [the] case of other public accounts.”
    Congress created this court as a tribunal in which the disputed facts of claims and accounts against the United States could be investigated judicially under the rules of evidence, and the. legal questions arising upon these facts be judicially determined. Hence it has always been held here that ex parte evidence, which would generally be satisfactory to the accounting officers, could not be admitted to prove charges or items of accounts or claims against the United States; that when claimants come into this tribunal they must offer better evidence to sustain their demands than that which would ordinarily satisfy the accounting officers, and that they must prove their claims or accounts according to the strict rules of the law of evidence.
    We have been unable to find any case wherein it. has been decided that the approval of such an account by a circuit or district judge made it prima fade evidence of the rniount due thereon. But as the case of United States v. Smith et al. (1 Wood. & M., 184) was cited in the opinion in Turner’s Case (19 O. Gis. R., 629), and also in some subsequent cases, as bearing on that proposition, we will examine it and see what it did' decide.
    The action in United States v. Smith et al. was brought in the United States district court, for debt, upon the official bond of Smith as United States marshal.
    Plaintiffs offered in evidence a certified transcript of the marshal’s adjusted accounts, to prove the balance due (Walton v. United States, 9 Wheat., 651). Defendants offered to set off certain disallowances of fees, etc., which had been made by the accounting officers in the settlement of the accounts, and which exceeded in amount the debt in suit. Prior to the submission of these accounts and their vouchers to the accounting-officers for adjustment they had been examined, approved, and certified by the judge of the court in which the service had been rendered under the provisions of section 4 of the Act of May 8,1792, oh. 36 (1 Stat. L., 277). That section, after reciting several fees and items which might be included in the “ account of the marshal, ” proceeds to say:
    “ And the same having been examined by the court or one of the judges of it, in which the services shall have been rendered, shall be passed in the usual manner at, and the amount paid out of the Treasury of the United States to the marshal, and by him shall be paid over to the person entitled to the same, ” etc. (I Stat. L., 277.)
    This language gives far more countenance to the theory that the judge’s approval made the accounts so passed upon “prima, facie evidence of the amount due thereon from the United States,” as suggested in the Turner case, ttuin the language of section 846 of the Revised Statutes, or that of the Act of 1875 (supra); because the act of 1792 did not in terms subject accounts so approved to revision by the accounting officers of the Treasury. The report of the case says the defendant proved that the claims for the items offered in set off: had been “duly substantiated by competent testimony,” and (as the statute of set-off required Act of March 3, 1797, sec. 4,
    1 Stat. L., 512) that they had been rejected by the proper officer of the Treasury Department. The court admitted the items offered in set-off, and instructed the jury that if these rejected claims were proved to their satisfaction, the defendants were entitled in law to be allowed the set-off; whereupon the jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and judgment was entered for them..
    Afterwards the case went up to the circuit court on writ of error. It was there contended by the same defendants that the certificate of the judge upon the marshal’s accounts was “conclusive on the Treasury Department and not open to reexamination or disallowance.”
    The distinguished Justice Woodbury, who had been for several years Secretary of the Treasury before his elevation to the Supreme Court bench, presided at the hearing of the arguments at the May term of 1846, and delivered the opinion of the court. He was especially familiar with what had been the constant practice for fifty years in the Treasury Department under the said provision of the act of 1792 in respect to the amount of consideration which should be given to such certificates by the accounting officerá. He construed the provision, and said:
    “It is manifest that if the true construction of this clause is, as contended by the defendants, the re'-examination and rejection of any of the items by the Treasury Department which have been certified by a judge, was unwarranted, and that it is also my duty to decide In favor of them all without re-exami nation. For if such a certificate is conclusive upon the Treasury, no question can be agitated here on its propriety any more than by the accounting officers, and it should be sent back there for the account to be registered up without inquiry.”
    In respect of the language of the act he said :
    “ It does not say the certificate of a judge shall be final or conclusive; but tbat after it the account shall be passed in the ‘ usual manner,’ which manner is to have the vouchers accompany it, and be examined so far as necessary to satisfy the accounting officer of the legality and propriety of the various items.”
    His reasoning further on is to the effect that because the marshal is a responsible officer under oath, and also the judge and the district attorney, “ whose opinion is usually taken in the examination of the accounts,” it is certainly to be presumed that the claims are legal. And so he says:
    “Aprima facie case in their favor is thus made out, * * * [which] under such circumstances may properly be enough to insure the passage and payment ,of the account, unless something novel or extraordinary appears in respect to parts of it which may seem to require fuller explanation, and if not receiving it, * * * they do and they ought to suspend or reject it.”
    
      
    
    “ My own opinion corresponds with this practice. Under a different station, at the head of the Treasury Department, it had my sanction for several years.”
    But this language is qualified by the following:
    “The decision of a court, when proper parties, as now, are before it, and contest an item of charge, is a different matter. It is then a judgment, which, in the views of most persons, is entitled to respect and consent of the Departments so far as to pay the items thus allowed if any suitable appropriation exists therefor. But a certificate of a judge, eon parte, in the hurry at the conclusion of a. term, to an item that has never been litigated nor argued by any opposing counsel, surely can make claim to no such binding and decisive weight.”
    In the Turner Case (19 C. Ols. R., 629), which was a suit upon an implied contract to pay the fees prescribed in section 829 of the Revised Statutes, the claimant had rendered his account as United States marshal to the Treasury Department. The account and the vouchers therewith had been duly approved by the district judge under the provisions of the act of February 22, 1875, in that behalf. The Comptroller disallowed certain of its fee items, and suit was brought in this court for the recovery of the amount disallowed. The claimant then produced witnesses, who were examined at length under the rules of the court, and these witnesses proved that the services for which the fees were claimed had been fully performed. Transcripts of the account and vouchers, with the said approval thereon, duly certified, were also presented to the court. Hence the question now presented was not in issue in that case, and this court disregarded the approval of the district judge and dismissed the petition.
    In the case of Wallace v. The United States (20 C. Ols. R., 273), which was a similar suit brought by a circuit court commissioner for the docket fees prescribed by the statutes, a trans-script of Wallace’s approved account was put in evidence, and the clerk of the circuit court of claimant’s district was examined as a witness for him to prove performance of the services charged in the account.
    Fo objection was made at the trial as to the competency of the evidence offered, and, as stated by- Mr. Justice Weldon, delivering the opinion of the court, the only question involved was a question of law, which was as to whether the claimant could, under the provisions of section 847 of the Revised Statutes, recover “for making dockets” the like fees allowed to clerks of court by section 828 for “ like services.”
    The question as to the effect of the approval by the judge of the claimant’s account was not in issue, and the .court merely ruled upon the law question, as did also the Supreme Court on appeal. (United States v. Wallace, 116 IT. S. R., 398.)
    
      The case of Waters v. The United States (21 C. Ols. R.. 30) explained what the learned chief-justice meant by the language above quoted from the opinion delivered by him in the Turner Case. Referring to' the provision in the act of February 22, 1875, which requires the approval of the judge of the local court upon accounts of district attorneys and other officers of the courts, Mr. Chief-Justice Richardson, delivering the opinion of the court, says :
    “This means nothing more than that the approval or disapproval by the court shall not be held to be a judicial act conclusive upon all parties, but shall be regarded merely as a step or process in the executive business of settling accounts, as we held in Turners Case (19 C. Cls. R., 629).”
    The case of Knox v. The United States (23 C. Ols. R., 367) was similar to the Wallace Case {supra). The suit was for docket fees. The district judge had declined to receive and approve the claimant’s account therefor. As in the other cases above mentioned, the depositions of witnesses were taken in order to prove the performance of the services charged in that account. The decision of the court gives no support to the supposition that an approval of such an account by a circuit or district judge makes it prima facie evidence of the amounts claimed to be due thereon; nor does the affirming opinion of the Supreme Court in the same case (128 U. S. R., 230) adopt any such doctrine.
    . On the contrary the latter court held, that the action of the judge upon such accounts is merely advisory to the accounting officers.
    As the account without the judge’s approval would not be prima facie evidence of liability, the quality of his action must be more than advisory to produce such a result. In effect it would be an award by a judge left open to review by the accounting officers!
    Congress never intended to place the judges or the accounting officers in such as embarrassing position.
   Rott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action brought by one of the chief supervisors of elections for an unpaid balance of his accounts for services rendered and expenditures made at the Congressional elections. of ] 882, 1884, and 1886. The legal questions involved will be best understood by adverting to them in the order of the facts on which the demand rests.

In 1871 the claimant was a commissioner of the circuit court for the northern district of blew York. The term “ commissioner” is a misnomer, inasmuch as these officers are in legal effect magistrates. They are in no sense administrative officials or assistants of the courts, and the duties which they perform are chiefly and almost entirely judicial. Their connection with the courts grows out of the fact that the courts are the appointing power and may prescribe rules for their procedure, but their official relations with the courts are nothing more than those which subsist between a committing magistrate and a court of oyer and terminer. (Rev. Stat., § 627, etc.)

While thus acting as commissioner of the circuit court the claimant was named and appointed by that court as chief supervisor of elections, under the Act 28th February, 1871 (16 Stat. L., p. 433, 437, § 13, Rev. Stat., § 2025), which authorizes the circuit courts in certain cases “to name and appoint” “from among the circuit court commissioners” “one of such officers, who shall be known for the duties required of him under this act as the chief supervisor of elections.” The duties of that office are in no sense judicial. Instead of continuing to act, as all judicial officers must, with his own brain and hand, he became the chief of four hundred and fifty deputies, and the work which he supervised was as strictly administrative as that of a sheriff, a marshal, or the chief of police in one of our. .great cities.

The purpose of Congress in committing the appointment of an executive officer to the judiciary was undoubtedly to secure non-partisan service in the difficult and delicate task of preventing frauds and crimes against the elective franchise; and this is plainly manifested in the additional restrictive safeguard which does not allow a circuit court to appoint any citizen •as chief supervisor, but restricts the appointment to the mere designation of one of the already existing judicial officers, termed cqmmissioners (Rev. Stat., § 2025), and by requiring the chief supervisor in certain cases, “ acting both in such capacity and officially as a commissioner of the circuit court,” to examine facts, subpoena and compel the attendance of witnesses, administer ■oaths, and take testimony. (Act 1871, § 7; Rev. Stat., § 2020.)

After the claimant’s services had been rendered at the Congressional elections of 1882, 1884, 1886, respectively, he presented his accounts as supervisor to the District Court of the-northern district of Hew York for approval. In this matter of the examination and approval of the accounts the functions of the court may not have been judicial, but the methods were. The judge did not come down from the bench and turn a single leaf of the accounts; he did not add up a single column of the multitudinous figures, nor reckon the compensation of one of the four hundred and fifty supervisors who had been appointed;, nor compute the number of folios of written matter in any report, index, order, or notice. And it is safe to say that all the judges in the service of the Government could not have gone through these voluminous accounts of these chief supervisors of election with the necessary care and particularity of accounting officers, and audited the accounts as they are audited at the Treasury, page by page and item by item, though they'had devoted to them all the days and hours of an entire term.

What the district judge in this case did do, and it was stated on the argument and conceded by counsel that he did all that any other judge has done in such cases, was to see that the chief supervisor’s affidavit of verification was in due form, and then to call on the district attorney to specify his objections to the account. If the district attorney had raised an objection, the judge would have heard him on the one side and the chief supervisor on the other, and would then have rendered a decision on the item objected to in the form of an approval or disapproval of the account. But when it appeared that no objection was raised by the district attorney, the approval followed as a matter of course, being embodied in the following order:

“At a stated term of the District Court of the United States for the northern district of blew York, held at the city of Albany, on the 20th day of January, 1885 — present the honorable Alfred 0. Coxe, judge — in the matter of the account of' Charles M. Dennison, chief supervisor of elections tor the northern district of Hew York.
“An account of Charles M. Dennison, chief supervisor of elections for the northern district of Hew York, for official services and disbursements for the election held in said district on the 4th (lay Qf Hovember, 1884, at which Representatives in. Congress were chosen, and the registration therefor having., been submitted by Alden Chester, the assistant district attorney, to this court for approval, and it appearing to the satisfaction of the court, by the oath of the said chief supervisor .upon the account, that the services have been actually and necessarily performed as stated, and the charges appearing to' be just and according to law—
“It is hereby ordered that said account, amounting to five thousand five hundred and ninety-two dollars and fifty-nine cents ($5,592.59),be, and the same is hereby, approved.
“Alfred C. Coxe.”

It is not the purpose of this court to express a criticism as to the method pursued by the district court, or intimate that the true intent of the statute was not carried into effect; on the contrary, we have already said that it would have been impossible for all the district and circuit judges combined to'have properly audited these accounts during a term; but it is proper to advert to what was actually done as a fact to be considered in the case; and it is manifest from the terms of the order as it is from the circumstances of the ease that there was no examining, no auditing, no scrutiny of the claimant’s charges or vouchers. All that was gained by the proceeding was that it secured the verification under oath of the claimant, and enabled the district attorney to raise objections to questionable items if he saw fit to do so. The order was granted, first, because the district attorney, having the opportunity, raised no objection to the account; second, because the claimant had sworn that'the services had been “actually and necessarily performed as stated.”

The next step in the history of the case was the rejection by the accounting officers of many items in the several accounts, amounting in the aggregate to $7,4á8. The correctness of some of the reductions (not before the court) is apparently conceded by the claimant, for the items which form the cause of action aggregate $7,005, and this amount is further reduced in the claimant’s requests for a finding of the facts to $6,998.68. This amount of $6,998.68 is therefore the subject of the controversy, and the amount involved in the litigation.

The compensation of the chief supervisor of elections consists of fees prescribed by the Revised Statutes, § 2031, and his accounts must “be made out, verified, examined, and certified as in the case of accounts of commissioners, save that the examination or certificate required.may be made by either the circuit or district judge.”

At the time when this law was enacted, in 1871, an earlier statute, the Act 16th August, 1856 (11 Stat. L¡, p. 49, § 2; Rev. Stat., § 846), provided that the accounts of commissioners should be “examined and certified to by the district judge of the district in which they are appointed previous to their presentation to or revision by the accounting officers of the Treasury Departments The only change that the act 1871 made was that the examination and certification might be before either the circuit or district judge. As to the effect of certification on both sets of accounts, those of the commissioner and those of the chief supervisor, the law was silent, i. e., approval or disapproval, or the neglect or refusal or inability of the judge to act were not in terms provided for; but both accounts were manifestly to be presented “to the accounting officers of the Treasury Department” for “revision.”

Such was the law when the-office of chief supervisor of elections was created. Since then two alterations have been enacted. '

The first of these was caused by the revision of the statutes in 1874. In the original act of 1856 the accounts of district attorneys, clerks, and marshals had been grouped together (§ 1), and it had been ex¡ ressly declared that they should be “ subject to revision upon their merits by said accounting officers as in case of other public accounts;” but the accounts of commissioners had been separately placed in a distinct section (§ 2), which did not contain this declaratory clause. The Revised Statutes, on the contrary, grouped the commissioners with the other officers, and made their accounts equally subject to the clause just quoted.

The second alteration of the law was made by the Act 22d February, 1875 (18 Stat. L., p. 333, sec. 1), which provides that “commissioners shall forward their accounts, duly verified by oath, to the district attorneys of their respective districts, by whom they shallbe submitted for approval in ojien court, and the court shall pass upon the same in the manner aforesaid,” i. e., in the manner in which a court must pass upon the accounts of clerks and marshals, by their presentation in open court and the entry of record of an order approving or disapproving the account.

A strenuous argument has been pressed upon the attention of the court by the counsel for the claimant to the effect that the act of 1875 applies only to the accounts of commissioners, and does not change the law as it' was enacted by the devised Statutes, § 2031, which prescribes for the accounts of chief supervisors certification by the judge, but is silent as to revision by the accounting officers. And hence it is inferred that the latter are not “subject to revision upon their merits by said accounting officers as in case of other public accounts,” but are dependent only upon the certification of a circuit or district judge.

The court is of the opinion that this distinction can not be maintained. The chief supervisor of elections and the commissioner of the circuit court are in all cases one and the same person; the two accounts are the accounts of the same individual; the compensation of the two offices is'by fees, which, though not identical, are closely analogous; the appointing power and the removing power are the same — the circuit court; and the channels by which the two accounts reach the Treasury are identical, with the single and expressed exception that the accounts of the chief supervisor may be certified by either the circuit or the district judge.

Reading all of the statutory provisions together, it must be held that a chief supervisor of elections is in legal effect a commissioner of a circuit court designated to perform certain additional and prescribed duties; that his compensation for these additional duties is to be ascertained, examined, certified, and paid in the same manner and by the same means and methods as his compensation for his other or ordinary duties as commissioner, and that whatever restrictions may be set or provisions made by new statutes for settling, revising, and paying the accounts of commissioners, in the absence of an expressed intent to the contrary, will extend to those of his accounts which are for services rendered eo nomine as chief supervisor of elections. Moreover, the accounting system of the Treasury is one of the oldest, best known, and most highly esteemed'párts of our governmental machinery. To its scrutiny all accounls are subjected of persons having business or financial relations with the Government, from, the President to the smallest contractor. If there are any accounts which should be subjected to the close revision of trained and competent auditors they are such accounts as these, accounts made up of innumerable items, and each item involving renewed calculations. Nothing short of a clear intent, unequivocally expressed in a statute, will warrant a court in holding that the involved accounts of a public officer are not to be settled at the Treasury as other public accounts are settled, or that Congress has intended to create an extraordinary exception to the accounting system of .the United States where no need of such an exception exists, and where none is in terms declared. We, must accordingly hold that the accounts of chief supervisors of elections are subject to the same law, and the same revision, and the same mode of settlement as the accounts of circuit court commissioners.

Such then being the facts and (in the opinion of the court) the law of this case, we come to the final question of its disposition.

On the argument it was maintained by the counsel' for the Government that the claimant had failed to establish the quantum of his services and expenditures by competent evidence; and as to many of the items such is the opinion of the' court. That is to say, if these services and expenditures were to be treated as res nova and established ab initio by ordinary evidence, exclusive of the action of the district judge and the accounting officers, we should be obliged to hold that the evidence is insufficient. But since the argument, the Supreme Court has rendered a decision in the case of the United States v. Jones, (134 U. S. R., 483), wherein it is expressly held that the approval of a commissioner’s account by a circuit court” is prima facie evidence of the correctness of the items of that account; and in the absence of clear and unequivocal proof of mistake on the part of the court it should be conclusive.”

Of course, this exceedingly broad language is to be construed with reference to the facts to which it was applied. Those facts were that a commissioner had on “ eleven different days,” “ in as many criminal cases,” performed some judicial duty; that is to say, the duty of a magistrate in deciding on the amount of bail, or for hearing and deciding on a motion for continuance. By the Eevised Statutes, § 847, a commissioner is to be compensated “ for hearing and deciding on criminal charges $5 a day for the time necessarily employed.” The circuit court had approved this commissioner’s accounts; that is to say, had virtually determined that each of these acts constituted a day’s work, entitling the commissioner to his per diem within the intent of the statute. This was a question which the district attorney and circuit judge were much better .able to determine than the accounting officers.

Nevertheless, the accounting officers refused to allow those items ; and on the appeal, the Assistant Attorney-General, who represented the Government, contended that in such cases the u time actually employed is an element to be considered.” On these facts and that argument, the Supreme Court held that the approval of those items by the circuit court was evidence prima facie of their correctness; but the court did not hold that the approval attained the conclusiveness of a judgment or award ; nor that in matters of detail and calculation it placed the account above the revision of the accounting officers ; nor that matters of mistake could not be corrected at the Treasury; nor that it rendered final and conclusive the account as an account.

On the whole case — the evidence, the facts, the statutes, and the decision of the Supreme Court — we have reached in this suit the following conclusion as the rule of its decision:

Where the services of a commissioner or chief supervisor are within the scope of the law as declared by the Eevised Statutes, § 2025, 2020, the approval of the circuit or district court determines the fact that they were necessary and proper and of a character sufficient to entitle the officer to the fee prescribed by law for such services; but the approval of the cqurt does not establish the accuracy of the account, nor take it as an account out of the supervision of the accounting officers, whose duty still remains to examine it, revise it, verify its calculations, scrutinize itsv vouchers, and ascertain its true amount; nor will the approval of the court render the Government liable, either before the accounting officers or in this court, for a service or expenditure not authorized by law.

The judgment of the court is that the claimant recover of the defendant the sum of six thousand nine hundred and ninety-eight dollars and sixty-eight cents ($6,998.68).  