
    GUOQIN WU, aka Guoqin Jiang, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-2378-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 20, 2012.
    
      Lee Ratner, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director; Tim Ramnitz, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Roger J. Miner, originally a member of the panel, died on February 18, 2012. The two remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement, have determined the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b); United States v. Desimone, 140 F.3d 457 (2d Cir.1998).
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Guoqin Wu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 26, 2011, order of the BIA affirming the April 20, 2009, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Sarah M. Burr, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Guoqin Wu, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 26, 2011), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 20, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Because the BIA largely adopted the IJ’s decision, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). We review the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard, which requires us to treat those findings as conclusive unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Su Chun Hu v. Holder, 579 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir.2009). We review de novo questions of law and the application of law to undisputed fact. See, e.g., Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008).

In Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, this Court determined that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), an individual is not per se eligible for asylum based on a spouse or partner’s forced abortion or sterilization because “applicants can become candidates for asylum relief only based on persecution that they themselves have suffered or must suffer.” 494 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir.2007). Thus, in order to establish eligibility for relief, Wu must show “other resistance to a coercive population control program,” and that as a result of that resistance, he was persecuted. See id. The agency did not err in finding that Wu did not establish persecution based on a brief detention and beating.

The BIA has defined persecution as a “threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded as offensive.” Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985), overruled in part on other grounds, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987); accord Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir.2006). The harm must be sufficiently severe, rising above “mere harassment.” Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d at 341. Here, the agency considered Wu’s description of his assault, and reasonably concluded that the beating did not amount to persecution because the detention was brief, Wu did not require medical attention as a result of the beating, and the beating had no lasting physical effect. See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir.2011) (‘We have never held that a beating that occurs within the context of an arrest or detention constitutes persecution per se. Rather, we have held that a beating that occurs in the context of an arrest or detention may constitute persecution, and that the agency must be keenly sensitive to context in evaluating whether the harm suffered rises to the level of persecution.” (internal quotations omitted)); Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir.2006).

Wu also argues that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution because family planning officials came to his home and told his wife that they sought to punish him, a claim supported by a letter from his wife stating that officials “started frequently coming” to the house after Wu left, and threatened Wu with “severe punishment.” The agency evaluated the letter and reasonably found that because it did not indicate the type of punishment Wu would face if he returned to China, it did not demonstrate that he would face harm rising to the level of persecution. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 172 (2d Cir.2008) (evidence of penalties or sanctions does not necessarily signal a reasonable possibility of persecution).

Because Wu did not demonstrate past persecution, or a well-founded fear of future persecution, the agency did not err in denying his application for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). Moreover, because Wu did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution, he necessarily cannot show that it is more likely than not he will be persecuted or tortured if he returns to China, and thus, the agency did not err in denying withholding of removal or CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(b), (c), 1208.17; Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  