
    
      Thomas Parker and wife v. John Bryce.
    
    When the jury have passed upon questions of fact merely, the Court will not interfere with them verdict.
    
      Before O’Neall, J. at Columbia, Bpring Term, 1849.
    This was an action of trespass, to try the title to a lot of half an acre in the town of Columbia, of which the defendant was in the possession. The plaintiffs alleged that of this lot, one Sarah C. Colvin, alias Egan, alias Thomson, was, at her death, on the 24th of May, 1845, legally seized; that she was the lawful wife of one Daniel Colvin, who died 19th September, 1847; that the plaintiff, Lavinia, was the lawful child of that marriage, and was consequently entitled to recover the lot.
    The facts in relation to the title to the lot in Sarah C. Col-vin, alias Egan, alias Thomson, had better be stated together. On the 4th May, 1819, Ainsley Hall executed a deed to her by the name of Egan, reciting that he had bought this lot and another, making an acre, at sheriff’s sale, as the property of Thos. Egan, and by it conveyed the lots to her. She was proved, in this case, to have had possession from Egan’s death, 3d April, 1820, to the 20th June, 1824, when, being about to marry a man who had been previously called Twitched, but who had then changed his name to Thomson, she conveyed the lots to Guignard, trustee, to hold for the separate use of herself, daring marriage, and on the death of either, to the use of the survivor. She, or Guignard for her, had possession from that time until 17th July, 1834, when she and Thomson and Guignard, by several deeds, conveyed the lot in dispute to Miss Jane Bryce. She conveyed to John Bryce, the defendant, 1 Jan’y. 1844, who had possession and admitted a trespass before action brought. The deaths of Sarah C. and of Daniel Colvin were proved to have taken place at the time stated above.
    The proof established that the plaintiff, Lavinia, was the same person who had, when a mere infant, been received into the family of Thomas H. Egan, and was raised by his reputed wife, Sarah C., until 1818 or 1819, when she disappeared, and was unknown here until five or six years ago, when she returned.
    Who was she ? was she the child of Sarah C., or a found ling, adopted by her ? If she was the child of Sarah C. then was she the legal child of her marriage with Daniel Colvin, or was she illegitimate ? These were questions to which the voluminous proof was addressed, which it is unnecessary to detail.
    The case was fully and most carefully submitted to the jury. The rule was fully explained to them, if the child was the child of Mrs. Colvin, when there was a possibility of access to her by her husband, then that the child would in law be the child of that marriage, unless the facts should satisfy them that, notwithstanding the possibility, there was in fact no access, then in such case they might find the child to be not the child of the marriage. The main question, however, was whether the plaintiff, Lavinia, was the child of Mrs. Col-vin. The Circuit Judge says, he was clearly of opinion she was not. The facts were overwhelming against the plaintiffs. The jury, however, were told, the facts were for them, and the Judge’s opinion, if they discovered it, ought not to influ-encethfm. ’
    His Honor told the jury he thought it was clear that Guig-nard’s possession for ten years would make his legal estate, under the deed of Mrs. Egan, perfect, and then that his conveyance conveyed the whole fee to Miss Bryce. But he directed and positively instructed them, that as the whole of the facts had come out, and the defendants had made no such point, it was better the case should be decided on the facts, and therefore they might assume that Guignard’s possession was Mrs. Egan’s, alias Thomson’s, and at her death the fee was in her, as her conveyance was void, being a married woman ; and if the plaintiff, Lavinia, was her lawful child, she would be entitled to recover. He said to the jury, that if Jane Bryce had continued her possession to the 17th July, 1844, instead of conveying to her brother 1st January, 1844, who had continued the possesion beyond the time which would have perfected her title, it would have saved this entire investigation, and that it was a pity she had not. But this was a mere remark, not intended to, and which could not have influenced the decision of the jury. For they were told that John Bryce’s possession could not be connected with Jane Bryce’s, and therefore the statute could not operate in favor of the defendant.
    The jury found a verdict in favor of the defendant.
    The plaintiffs appealed on many grounds, in which a different view was taken of the evidence from that taken by the jury, and in which several exceptions were taken to the charge of the Circuit J udge, but it will be perceived, from the opinion of the Appeal Court, that it is unnecessary that they should be reported at length.
    
      Gregg & Gregg, for the motion.
    
      Tally, contra.
   O’Neall, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case I think it cannot be necessary to do more than refer to the report. The questions were those of fact merely. Upon them the jury have passed: and according to settled principles this Court will not interiore.

O’Neall, J, — EvaNs, J. — Wardlaw, J. — and Frost, J.— concurred.  