
    Francis G. Deliesseline, sheriff of Charleston district, ads L. Bunch.
    
      In an- action against the sheriff, for the mis-feazance of his deputy, the admission of the sheriff is sufficient evidence of the deputation} it is not necessary to prove a written deputation er special warrant.
    
      ■Jl deputy sheriff, executing process, is authorized to take bail.
    
    
      Sheriff ta' ing bail bond, without seals annexed to the names of the sureties, and afterwards detaining the person ai-rested, and demanding money for fees, teas held not justified in the detention, by the informality o/ the bond.
    
    This was an action brought by the plaintiff, against the sheriff, for false imprisonment, by his deputy, Singletary.
    The evidence adduced, was as follows: Mr. M‘Cants swore, that the witness and plaintiff were arrested by John I. Single-tary, on a capias ad respondendum, with an order for bail. That they went before esquire, to execute the bond,, which was done, as he supposed, correctly. ' He stated that Singletary put the bond in his pocket and demanded certain fees of office, which he and the plaintiff refused to pay. Sin-gletary then took the bond out of his pocket and said that it was not properly executed, and that he would not discharge them, as there were no seals to the sureties names and they had not justified. He did not detain plaintiff long in custody, and did not bring her to town. On his cross-examination, he adapted that the bond was’ not completed, when Singletary refused to discharge plaintiff, and bail had not justified. There were no seals to the names of the Dehays, the sureties. When witness came down with Singletary to' sheriff’s office, Singletary imme-diatelysaid to the sheriff, the bond is not properly executed, blit • it is not my fault; witness stated that the only reason why he supposed Singletary was the sheriff’s deputy, was that Single-tary said, when witness was brought to the office, he had brought these men to town, and produced the bond. The sheriff said-“it is not possible you have done so;” “why the Dehays are, good men.” The impression on his mind, was, that he was Mr. Deliesseline’s deputy. Witness said he hoped the sheriff had brought him as a prisoner. The sheriff immediately discharged witness. He did not speak of Singletary as his general deputy. He did not say that Singletary was his officer, but witness inferred it.
    Benjamin Dehay, another witness, says, that he was at plaintiff’s house. Saunders, the justice of the peace, was there to see the bónd executed- Witness was a surety; after it was executed, Singletary took it out of his pocket; he does not recollect any conversation before his brother signed, about his being -worth the amount for-which he became bail; he heard a dispute about fees, he then went off.
    Andrew Dehay, another witness, swore he was there, signed the bond, docs not recollect that it had any seals to it; Single-tary demanded no fees of Mrs. Bunch, the plaintiff, while he remained. Here the evidence on the part of the plaintiff closed,
    
      Defendant demanded a non-suit on the following ground. That in this case it was not enough to prove Singletary a general bailiff, but that the privity between him and defendant, ought to have -been established in the particular transaction, by proving the original warrant of execution directed by him to his bailiff; or, at least, the plaintiff ought to prove notice to produce it, so as to let in secondary evidence of its contents. The presiding judge refused the non-suit.
    Defendant then examined F. A. Deliesseline, who produced the bond, which was admitted by M'Cants to be the bond taken by Singletary, and which wanted the seals to the names of the sureties, and which the sheriff had given to M‘Cants, to carry into the country and have perfected; which had been done, and returned by M£Cants, in a letter to the sheriff, in which he says he is determined to have redress for the injury of the deputy.
    The presiding judge charged the jury, that as to the liability of the sheriff for the act of his deputy, the law is, that it must appear that the deputy is acting in the character of deputy. In ordinary cases, the warrant or authority ought to be produced; but it depends on the view the jury takes of the facts whether this rule was complied with. The admission of the sheriff is the very highest authority, better than the warrant. The liability of the officer, is founded in public policy; it is stricti juris, and the strict rules of law ought to be applied in his favor. He did not think- this public officer could take the ground that the bond was insufficient; but if the plaintiff was detained on that account, a verdict, even if the deputy had a bad motive, might be found for the defendant.
    Verdict for the plaintiff.
    A new trial was moved for, on the following grounds; and likewise for leave to enter a non-suit.
    1st. That the presiding judge ought to have granted the motion for a non-suit, the plaintiff not having proved the authority from defendant to his deputy, in the particular case, by producin'-; the capias and the authority under which it was pretended he acted.
    
      2nd. That the jury found against evidence and the direction of the presiding judge; as there was evidence that, the bond was not executed according to law; that the deputy asserted, among other reasons, for the imprisonment of plaintiff, before-he detained her, that the bond was not completed, and the presiding judge charged them, that if even the officer had a bad motive, still if he detained her because of the deficiency of the bond, it would be a good defence for the sheriff.
    3d. That the sheriff had a right to have the defendant brought to his office to receive bail, and the deputy had no right to take bail, unless by pecial authority, which was not proved to have been given in this case.
    4th. That it was immaterial what were the pretences of the deputy, the bond not being duly executed; the process being a capias ad respondendum, the sheriff had a right to the custody of plaintiff’s person, and therefore could not be charged with false imprisonment.
    5th That at the period when the false imprisonment, if any, commenced, the deputy had executed the mandate of the sheriff, and the subsequent conduct of the deputy was his private, and not official act, and therefore, the sheriff was not liable by virtue of his office.
    
      Kennedy, for the motion.
    The office of sheriff is one of
    great responsibility, and he ought to be protected by the court, unless a liability has been clearly incurred. Especially in such a case as this, where the act has been done by one pretendiug to act under his authority, the strictest proof of the authority, should be required.
    In order to charge the sheriff for the act of his deputy, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to produce the warrant under which the deputy acted. Peake Ev. 440; 7 T. R. 113.
    The bond wanted the seals of the sureties, and was therefore incomplete; until the bond was made perfect, the officer had a right to detain the party arrested. Jacob Law Die.
    
    The office of a deputy in this country, corresponds with that of a bailiff in England. A bailiff cannot take bail, without a special warrant. 20 Kin. Jib. 500, Pit. Trespass.
    
    
      By the act of 1809, 1 Brev. Dig. 54, 5, bail to the sheriff is special bail; the taking of. which is a judicial act, which the sheriff must execute in person; he cannot delegate this authority. The deputy was therefore justified in bringing plaintiff to the sheriff’s office, in order to the giving of the bond. 2 Johns. R'ep. 50; 2 Wash. Rep. 126.
    The deputy had arrested the plaintiff and taken the bond,, and was functus officio; the re-caption, was an act of his own, for which the sheriff is not responsible. It is like the case of a Supersedeas, where the deputy is alone liable^ if he does an act contrary to its tenor. 2 Roll. 552; 20 Viner, 418; Cro. Elis. 918; Cro. Jac. 379; 4 John. Rep. 32.
    
      Hunt, contra.
    Singletary was the general deputy of defendant, he had the writ in his hands, he brought the plaintiff and delivered her'to the sheriff, who did not disavow his act. Here is an end then to the pretence that Singletary was not authorized by defendant.
    The defendant may take either alternative, that the deputy had or had not the power to take the bail. If he had the power and abused it, the sheriff is liable: If he had not, then it was the duty of the sheriff to have gone in person. He ought to accept bail wherever it is tendered, and not to drag the citizens over the country for the purpose of attending his person. He had no right to send out his retainers and bring them bound into his office.
    it is a mere pretext that the bond was not formally executed; the whole object of detaining the plaintiff was to extort money from' her. There was nothing like a discharge and re-caption, it was one continued act. The depiity acted throughout, under the capias,-and the detention Was colore officii.
    
    It is not denied that strict proof is necessary to shew that' Singletary acted under tiie authority of the sheriff. But it does not appear that any -better than that which was offered (the admission of defendant) ever existed. It was all plaintiff could produce and all that was necessary.
    
      JDeliesseline, in reply.
    This is a hard action, and the proof ought to be strict. Proof that Singletary was the general -deputy, is not enough; the special warrant ought to have been produced, and in the absence of that proof, a nonsuit ought to have been ordered. 7 T. R. 113. The only proof in the case was mere inference from a loose admission of the sheriff.
    The sheriff is required by law to keep his office in Charleston, and he is entitled to reasonable time for enquiring into the sufficiency of the bail tendered. He must of necessity execute process by his deputies, and .to enable him to judge of the sufficiency of the bail, the person arrested must be brought to his office, with the bail.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Colcock.

The motion for a non-suit cannot prevail: there was sufficient evidence to prove that Singletary was acting in the capacity of deputy sheriff. The sheriff did not say so, in so many words, hut his acts leave no doubt on the subject: he reproved him for having done wrong; told the witness, M‘Cants, that he was at liberty; gave him the bail bond to be completed, which he carried with him and after putting the [L. S.] to the names, as he had been desired to do, sent it to the sheriff in a letter, who produced it, together with the letter on the trial.

On the third ground — it has been the invariable practice-ill this country to authorize the deputy sheriff’s to take bail; it is indispensably necessary that it should be so. To bring every man to Charleston, against whom an order for bail might issue, would be to enable a malicious creditor unjustly to harrass his debtor, and in any view, to subject unfortunate'debtors to unnecessary expense and trouble. The defendant cannot succeed on the fifth ground; for the misconduct of the deputy was attempted to be justified by the very fact that his duty had not been completely performed. . He must be considered as acting jn bis official capacity. It is not like the case of Stevens and for there the defendant had been taken from the deputy, his authority was superseded, and he, in opposition to the order of the judge to release the prisoner, continued to detain him in his custody. On the grounds ©f fact, the most favorable view of the case, was submitted to the jury, and they were given to understand that the court thought nominal dama-, ges would be sufficient; but they chose to differ from the court* as they had a right to do, and we cannot disturb the verdict*

Kennedy &/■ He Lessieline, 'for the motion*

Hunt, contra.

Bay, JYott, Johnson & Huger', Justices, concurred.-  