
    BELL COUNTY v. HALL.
    (Supreme Court of Texas.
    Jan. 29, 1913.)
    Statutes (§ 94)— Special Laws — Regulation oe County Aeeaiks.
    Under Const, art. 3, § 56, providing that the Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided, pass any local or special law regulating the affairs of counties, Act 31st Leg. c. 120, exempting Bell county from the provisions of xicts 29th Leg. c. 161, § 1, as amended by Acts 30th Leg. c. 168, creating the office of auditor for all counties having a population of 40,000 or containing a city of 25,000, is invalid.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 103, 104; Dee. Dig. § 94.)
    Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Third Supreme Judicial District.
    Action by W. E. Hall against Bell County. A judgment sustaining a .demurrer to the petition was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Third district (138 S. W. 178), and the cause remanded, and defendant brings error.
    Affirmed.
    A. L. Curtis, of Belton, for plaintiff in er-v ror. W. S. Banks, of Temple, for defendant in error.
    
      
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   PHILLIPS, J.

By act of the Twenty-Ninth Legislature, c.- 161, § 1, as amended by act of the Thirtieth Legislature, c. 168, there was created the office of auditor for all counties in the state having as large population as 40,000 inhabitants, or containing a city with as many as 25,000 inhabitants. Bell county was within the law, and under it W. B. 1-Iall became the auditor for that county. Thereafter it was enacted by the Thirty-First Legislature, c. 120, that Bell county should be exempt from the provisions of the law; and, under the authority of suck act, the commissioners’ court of the county refused to longer recognize Hall as the county auditor or pay his salary. He brought this suit to compel the observance of his right to discharge the duties of the office and the payment of its salary. A general demurrer to his petition was sustained by the trial court.

The case turns upon the constitutionality of the act of the Thirty-First Legislature, which, as stated, exempted Bell county by name from the operation of the county auditors’ law. Section 56 of article 3 of the Constitution provides: “The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law, authorizing * * * regulating the affairs of counties,” etc.

The honorable Court of Civil Appeals for the Third district held on this appeal that the act was within the constitutional prohibition. 138 S. W. 178. Upon a careful consideration .of the question, we concur in this conclusion, and do not regard it necessary to supplement the able opinion written in the case by Chief Justice Key. In relieving Bell county from the operation of the general law, this act, in effect, changed the administration of its affairs in every particular provided by the general law, and thus by indirection regulated its affairs as effectually as though it had directly and affirmatively prescribed a different method for their management.

The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, reversing the judgment of the district court and remanding the cause, is affirmed.  