
    Abraham Perry v. Benjamin Massey.
    Columbia,
    May, 1828.
    The rule that a party cannot impeach his own witness, is confined to the introduction of general evidence to destroy his credit; he may call other witnesses to contradict him as to particular facts relevant to the issue.
    Tried before Mr. Justice James, at Lancaster, Fall Term, 1827.
    The single point decided in this case, arose upon a question, as to the admissibility of evidence. At the trial, the defendant called John Weaver to prove payment to him, as agent of the plaintiff, of the debt sued for; but on his examination, hetesti-. lied, that the payment was made on account of a debt due to himself by the defendant, and not on account of the plaintiff’s demand. The defendant then called other witnesses to prove that Weaver had acknowledged, that the payment made to him by the defendant, was on account of the debt due to the plaintiff, and not on account of his own demand. The plaintiff objected to the introduction of this testimony, but his Honor, the presiding Judge, overruled the objection; the witnesses .were examined, and the jury found a verdict for the defendant.
    The plaintiff appealed, and moved for a new trial, on the ground that the defendant had been improperly permitted to impeach the credit of his own witness.
    Williams, for the motion.
    It is not denied that a party may contradict his own witness as to particular facts; but those facts must .be relevant to the issue, and they must be proved by legally competent testimony. If the testimony, by the rules of evidence, is inadmissible, except for the purpose of impeaching the credit of the first witness, then it cannot be introduced by the party who placed that witness on the stand. This is the substance and the spirit of the rule. 1 Ph: ,Ev: 232. Now Weaver’s acknowledgments were mere hearsay, and inadmissible for any other purpose than to destroy his credit, and this, the party who called him could not do.
    Miller, contra.
    
    The case cited in 1 Ph: Ev: 232, Alexander v. Gibson, 2 Camp. 556, is exactly in point: There the plaintiff was permitted to contradict his witness by the former declarations of the witness himself. It is true, the witness was the agent of the defendant, and his declaration was the fact in issue, to wit, a warranty by him as agent. But that is the ease here. Weaver’s agency 'was established, and his acknowledgment of payment was evidence in the cause, independently of any purpose to impeach Weaver’s credit.
   Johnson, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The position that a party will not he permitted to produce general evidence to discredit his own witness, is unquestionably correct: But it is only necessary to advert to the rule, to detect at once, that it doe's not apply to this case. The object of introducing testimony, is to ascertain the truth of the facts in dispute between the parties, and it would be a perversion of this object, to permit a party to shew, that what he has offered as evidence of the truth of the facts, was derived from a source so foul and polluted, as to be utterly unworthy of credit; and if one will, knowingly, so far practise on the Court as to offer a witness of infamQus character, he deserves all the consequences which may follow such a fraud.

It is then the general character of the witness, which, according to the rule, the party introducing him is not permitted to call in question, and not a particular fact, to which the witness may have deposed; for, if carried to that extent, a party would be debarred from introducing more witnesses than one, unless they should all state the circumstances in the same terms; a thing not to be expected, and in itself a ground of suspicion.

A party is not then concluded by a fact which a witness, called by him, may unexpectedly state ; and he will be permitted to shew by other evidence that he was mistaken. It was so ruled by Lord Ellenborough, in Alexander v. Gibson, 2 Camp. 556, (cited 1 Phil. in Ev. 232) which was a case very like the present. There the defendant’s servant was called by the plaintiff to prove that he had warranted the soundness of a horse ; but he unexpectedly swore that he had not; and yet the plaintiff was permitted to call another witness to prove that he had. In the case under consideration, Weaver was called to prove that he had received the amount due to the plaintiff, he unexpectedly denied it. The defendant was, acecording to the case referred to,- at liberty to call another witness to prove that he had acknowledged payment, and his declaration or admission was clearly evidence proper to go to the Jury.

Motion refused.  