
    WHELEN v. HALCOMB.
    (City Court of New York, General Term.
    December 12, 1896.)
    John M. Gardner, for appellant.
    John Delahunty, for respondent.
   VAN WYCK, C. J.

The plaintiff’s alleged cause was for services as a dressmaker, and for materials used in making dresses for defendant’s wife, at his request, between September, 1894, and January, 1896, and the account between plaintiff and defendant, marked in evidence by defendant’s consent, shows that between said dates he was charged with twenty-six items for dressmaking for his wife, aggregating $1,377.29, and was credited with twelve payments on account thereof, aggregating $707, leaving an unpaid balance of $670.29. It is in proof, and defendant admits, that he was willing that his wife should order dresses, for which he was originally liable to plaintiff, down to and including the items charged in the account in July, 1895, but that defendant then gave notice to the plaintiff that she must not do any worn—dressmaking—for his wife on his account. So defendant, conceding his liability for items so charged, made dispute at trial as to the items charged on the account subsequent to .Tulv. and those subsequent items were for three dresses made for his wife, and for certain repairing and altering of dresses for her. The plaintiff admitted that defendant had then instructed her not to furnish anything more to his wife except upon his authority, and she testifies that the items subsequent to July were furnished upon his express request, and that he repeatedly promised to pay the balance as shown by the account; and plaintiff’s bookkeeper testified that, when she asked the defendant for payment of the balance, he said to her that he had no work, and was unable to pay her, and that he then told plaintiff, “I told you not to make my wife any more dresses,” and she said to him, ‘‘Your instructions were afterwards rescinded,” and he said, “I admit that; I like to see her well dressed, and I like to have her have nice clothes.” However, the defendant at trial denied that he had ever rescinded his instructions not to supply his wife except upon his authority, and that he had himself ordered any of the items charged. The ease was properly sent to the jury to determine the disputed questions of fact, and their verdict for plaintiff will not be set aside. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.  