
    Davis vs. Parks and Campbell.
    A. purchased cotton from B. The latter raised it upon land which he rented of C. C recovered a judgment against B, his tenant, for the rent, and then sued A. A, at the time of his purchase, had no notice that the rent was due, or that the cotton was raised on the land of C. Held, that the action would not lie against A.
    Davis, the plaintiff in error, rented a piece of land to -Howard, on which the latter raised a small quantity of cotton. He sold twelve hundred and thirty six pounds of the cotton in the seed to Parks and Campbell, at the rate of one dollar and fifty cents per hundred pounds, for which they paid him in cash and merchandise. Parks and Campbell, at the time they purchased the cotton, had no knowledge, (at least none was proved,) that the cotton was raised upon rented premises.
    Davis brought a suit against Howard for the rent due, within the time prescribed by the act of 1825, ch. 21, and recovered a judgment against him for the rent. He then commenced an action upon the case before two justices of the peace for the value of the cotton. Prom the judgment of the justices the case was carried by appeal to the circuit court. The circuit court instructed the jury, that the plaintiff had alien upon the cotton, and that the action would lie against the defendants, if they purchased the cotton, whether they had notice or not of the fact that the cotton was raised upon land rented by the plaintiff to the defendant. A verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff below.
    
      David Campbell, for the plaintiffs in error.
    The lien which the act of 1825, ch. 21, gives the landlord on the crop raised on the rented premises, was only intended to give the debts due for rent a precedence over all Other debts of the tenant, but not to render an innocent purchaser of the crop liable to pay the landlord the rent, or so much of it, as the value of the crop he purchased might amount to. This construction of the act is based on the principle or law, that “no clause, sentence or word” used in a statute, shall be “superfluous, void or insignificant.” 4 Bacon’s Abr. 645: Gwillim’s ed. 6th, 380.
    The words of the act are, “that when any debt shall hereafter be contracted to become due for rent, whether by note, account or otherwise, the amount so contracted to become due and owing, shall be a lien on the crop growing or made on the rented premises, and shall have precedence over all other debts of every description whatever, till said debt for-rent shall be discharged.”
    If the construction of this act be not such as is contended for by the defendants below, the latter clause of the above sentence is wholly “superfluous, void and insignificant,” for it is clearly embraced in the first; as the term “lien” used in that clause, if understood in the broad sense contended for by the plaintiff below, includes the very precedence for which it seems to provide. But if the construction for which the defendants below contended be supported, every part of this act will be rendered operative. The first clause of this act will then be understood to declare, that the debt due for the rent shall be a lien on the crop raised on the rented premises, and the latter to prescribe the extent of that lien. And this construction receives support from the principle of law, that “the intention of the legislature is to be deduced from a view of the whole, and of every part of a statute, taken and considered together;” (1 Kent’s Comm. 431;) and “that one part of a statute may be used to explain another part of the same statute;” (4 Bacon’s Abr. 465;) for, if the principle be, that where the legislature employs in a statute, a term which has a settled, technical, legal meaning, such term is to be understood in its settled sense, it is a necessary and inevitable conclusion from it, that if the legislature use in a statute, the same term, connected with others which limit its expression, that it is in this latter case, to be understood in tho sense which such , . T, other terms affix to it. Ibis is tho present question, li tho legislature had only prescribed, that tho debt for the rent should be a lien on tho crop, the present case would have been clearly within the act, as the term lien must then have been understood in its most extensive legal sense, and that sense would embrace it; but as the legislature have used other terms which, if allowed to operate at all, must limit the extended sense of the term “lien,” this case is not within the act. If this conclusion be incorrect, the legislature can never lay down a limited proposition, because it cannot limit the sense of any general term employed by the use of particular ones. If, however, the court should doubt whether this more limited construction of the act be the correct one, it will certainly be inclined to adopt it, as it will attain the object of the legislature, which was to secure the appropriation of the crop to the payment of the debt for the rent, in preference to the debts of all the other creditors of the tenant; and as the broader construction must operate oppressively and unjustly upon innocent third persons. “Acts of Parliament are to be so construed, as no man who is innocent or free from injury or wrong be punished or endamaged.” I Thomas’ Coke Litt. 31. It is clear, that the more extended construction must “punish or endamage” individuals who are innocent or free from injury; for the crop raised on rented premises has no ear mark to distinguish it from that which is raised on land, of which, the farmer is owner in fee, and to warn third persons not to purchase it; nor is there any thing in its appearance, which will inform him the rent for the land on which it was raised is unpaid.
    A, a farmer of Williamson county, rents of B, another farmer of the same county, a piece of land, on which he raises a crop of cotton; he brings the cotton to Nashville, sells it to C for the highest market price, puts the money in his pocket and goes home. B ascertains that C has purchased the crop and paid for it, and he sues C for it because A has not paid the rent. This is both absurd and unjust, for C has no means to ascertain that the article he is purchasing was raised on rented premises, and that the rent is unpaid, as there are transactions of a private nature, between the landlord and the tenant, of which the world is necessarily ignorant. It will be idle to reply that there are other liens recognized by the law, statute and common, which sometimes operate as a hardship upon innocent persons. Such is the nature of every other lien jyhich exists under our law, that the individual who is about to purchase the property charged with it, must, if he use due diligence, be informed of its existence; for all of them, with the exception of the lien of the vendor on property sold, is either the charge of some judgment or process of the law on the property of the debtor, or the right to retain some property which the creditor has already in his possession, until his demand against the owner of it is satisfied: the records of the courts, which are things of a public nature, will inform the purchaser of the existence of the former, and the possession of the creditor will warn him of the latter, so that if he sustain any loss by purchasing property subject to a lien, such loss is justly imputable to his own negligence. Both of these kinds of liens are widely different from the one for which the plaintiff below contended under this act, for there is no public record of the renting of the land on which the crop was raised, nor that the rent is unpaid, to which the purchaser can resort for information; and there is no possession of the crop by the landlord. And the principle which the courts have always applied to the latter kind of these liens, that the moment the creditor relinquishes possession of the property on which his lien exists, such lien is gone, if applied to the present case, will compel the more limited construction of this act; and the reason assigned in the books for this rule is, that if “liens were allowed to rema‘n uPon goods after they had been negotiated and sold, the consequences would be highly injurious to trade, as no dealer could in that case know when he purchased goods safely.” Whitaker on Liens, 68. This is peculiarly and forcibly applicable to this case; the purchaser is entirely within the power of the seller. Another reason against the more extended Construction is, that it will encourage the commission of fraud by putting it in the power of the landlord and tenant, by combining together to defraud the purchaser; for the court below decided, that the act gave the landlord such a lien on the crop of the tenant, that he could not so sell it as to render it free from the lien; that an execution for the rent, on a judgment against the tenant, might be levied on the cotton which Parks and Campbell had purchased at any time within the three months specified in the act.
    The defendants below further insisted, that though the debt for the rent were a lien on the crop under the act, the having taken a deed- of trust on other property to secure the rent, was a waiver of the lien. The rule is well established in England, and has been repeatedly recognized in this country, that if a party who has a lien on the property of another, take of that other an additional security for his debt, it is a waiver of the lien. Yelver-ton’s Rep. 67, note 6: Vesey, 752: 4 Wheaton, 255: Martin and Yerger, 309: 2 Yerger, 88: Peck, 32. But the court below decided in this case, that the having taken a deed of trust on two horses, was not a waiver of the lien, on the ground that there is a distinction between common law liens, to which that principle has been applied, and such statutory liens as the one under this act.
    The defendants below likewise insisted, that the plaintiff below could not maintain this action against them, as he was not the owner of the land, and had no authority from the owner to rent it. The plaintiff below was a mere traspasser upon the land of the heirs of Wilkinson. The rule of law is, that the action must he brought in the name of the party whoso legal right has been affected. — ■ 8 T. R. 487: 7 Chitty’s Plead. I. Has the trespasser such a legal right in the land on which he has wrongfully entered, as will enable him to maintain this action? A satisfactory answer to this question may be found in the fact, that a recovery in this action against the defendants, would not be a bar in an action brought by the rightful owners of the land, for the same cause against them, for the reason, that the acts of a trespasser are invalid against the rightful owner. But the court below decided the plaintiff could maintain the action, on the ground that he actually rented the land to the person of whom the defendants purchased the cotton, who could not be heard to question the title of his landlord; and that the defendants stood precisely in his place.
    The defendants below also contended, that as the act gives the landlord, a lien on the crop of the tenant, which is a new remedy, it must be strictly pursued, and though the crop might have been levied on, wherever found, the purchaser cannot be held liable for it in an action on the case, because no such remedy is provided in the statute. “If a new remedy be given by a statute, in a particular case, this shall not extend to alter the common law in any other than that particular case.” 4 Ba. Abr. 647. But the court below decided that an action on the case would lie against them.
    
      Alexander, contra.
    1st. The act of 1825, ch. 21, (Hay. and Cobbs, 282,) gives the landlord a lien on the crop raised on the rented premises, for the rent, and the tenant cannot so sell the crop as to defeat the lien. An execution on a judgment for this rent, might have been levied on the cotton which had been sold to the defendants below, at any time within the three months specified in the act. Rutlege vs. Walton, 4 Yerger’s Rep. 458: 0 Peter’s Con. Rep. U. S. 504: 12 Wheat. Rep. 177, Parkins vs. Scott: 3 Bl. Com. 6, 7: 1 Dane,632,ar. 3, 8t i. This lien is similar to that created by execution. No sale is good pending execution. 2 Hay. Rep. 57.
    
      2d. If the landlord take a deed.of trust on other property, this is not a waiver of his lien. The statutory lien created by the act of 1825, ch. 21, is given in terms too strong to be waived by implication, and is as effectual as a mortgage. 12 Wh. Rep. 177:6 Peters’ U. S. Cond. Rep. 506.
    3d. Elisha Davis can, if he rented the land to Howard, on which the cotton grew, maintain this action against the defendants, as assignees of Howard, his tenant, although he is not the owner of the land, and shews no authority from the owner to rent it; because neither a tenant nor his under-tenant can dispute his landlord’s title. Adams on Ej. 247: 2 Ten. Rep. 399, 423: Philips vs. Robinson, 5 Hay. Rep. 101.
    4th. An action on the case by the landlord will lie for his rent against any person who, like the defendants below in this case, purchase the crop of the tenant, the rent not being paid; and this has been the practice of the courts under this statute: otherwise, the plaintiff below would have received an injury and be without remedy. 3 Bl. Com. 122-3: 1 Wh. Sel. 332-4: 1 Chit. PI. 135-6, 140.
   Catron, Ch. J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

Parks and Campbell ’purchased of Howard one thousand two hundred and thirty-six pounds of seed cotton, at one dollar fifty cents per hundred, and paid him in cash and merchandize, and a previous account, immediately for the cotton. The purchase was made in the usual course of dealing, without any knowledge on the part of the purchasers that H. was a renter, or indebted for the rent, or that the cotton had been raised on rented premises. Davis had rented the premises to Howard on which the cotton was grown, and H. owed the rent for that year. Davis obtained mdgment against Howard for the rent, and then sued Parks and Campbell belore two justices, for the value of the cotton, by force of the act of 1825, ch. 21. The circuit court held the action would lie.

1st. Was it intended by"the act of 1825 to vest in the landlord a legal title to the crop grown on the premises, and cut off all power in the tenant to sell and convey a legal title to the purchaser of any part of it, as against the landlord.

2d. Was it the intention of the legislature to subject to suit on behalf of the landlord, every person who fairly and innocently purchased any part of the crop, or obtained it for toll, or in barter. If so, the miller and the gin holder, who grind and pick for toll — the neighboring woman who borrows a little meal or cotton, or a few potatoes — is subject to be sued in trover, and to be harrass-ed by the constable. From the ripening of the crop to the first of January, when the rent falls due, the subject of twenty petty lawsuits may exist. The legislature could not have intended to let in these multiplied mis-chiefs. Furthermore: the tenant generally is so poor as to be dependant on his crop to feed and clothe his family, and will not have the power to sell, if the purchaser can only take a title at the landlord’s mercy. Here is a good instance; cotton spinners and weavers purchased, and furnished clothing for the renter’s-family, on the 18th December, (the coming in of the winter;) in February following they were sued by the landlord.— Did the legislature intend the family should go without clothes? It cannot be that the act intended to afflict the most destitute families in this country with nakedness, and drive them from the mill and the gin. The proviso to the act informs us what kind of lien on the crop was intended. It was a lien to be enforced by judgment and execution against the tenant, by the landlord, and not by suit against purchasers from the tenant. The landlord may levv his execution on the crop, growing or made; which execution shall have precedence over all other judgments and executions against the crop, for three months after the rent falls due, and until any suit for the rent against the tenant is decided, if it be brought within the ninety days. So, if the tenant underlets, the sub - tenant’s crop is liable for the first landlord’s rent. Priority of satisfaction, in cases of contending executions, was intended to be provided for. To go the length insisted on is oppressive on the poor, and, to say the least of it, very questionable policy. The judgment will be reversed, and the defendant go hence. It is useless to remand the cause for another trial. The warrant commands Paries and Campbell to appear to answer Elisha Davis “in a plea of trespass on the case under fifty dollars.” Had the warrant set out, that it was for one thousand two hundred and thirty-six pounds of cotton, converted to their use, 'purchased from John Howard, the tenant of said Davis, on which he had a lien for rent, then we would arrest the judgment, because'no action lay for the cotton. But as no cause of action is set out in the warrant, which is in fact an action of trover, we must arrest the judgment for this defect, as we did at Sparta, last term, where trover for a colt was brought before two justices, and the same language was used on the face of the warrant. This case shews the necessity of requiring a substantial but brief description of the cause of action, in cases brought before two justices. Had it been stated, much cost would have been prevented in this instance.

Judgment reversed.  