
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Hampton TEDDER, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 05-4448.
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Submitted Jan. 23, 2007.
    
    Decided March 2, 2007.
    Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 17, 2007.
    
      Daniel J. Graber, Office of the United States Attorney, Madison, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Thomas W. Dressier, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, Hon. RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge and Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
    
      
       This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating Procedure 6(b). After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).
    
   Order

We affirmed Tedder’s conviction but remanded for resentencing after concluding that conspiracy to commit money laundering should be treated the same as a substantive money-laundering conviction under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Tedder, 403 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2005). Our decision had the effect of establishing the Guidelines range at 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment. Under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the range is advisory, so we remarked: “Whether this conclusion will benefit Tedder in the end is a question for the district judge. Booker provides district judges with additional discretion, so on remand the judge might reimpose the 60-month sentence if she thinks it the most appropriate response to Tedder’s crimes and risks of recidivism; appellate review after Booker is for reasonableness.”

After concluding that Tedder’s risk of recidivism is exceptionally high, the district judge resentenced him to 60 months’ imprisonment. Tedder again appeals, and his lead argument is that the district judge did not warn him that he could be resentenced above the top of the Guidelines’ range. That line of argument is incompatible with the law of this circuit. See United States v. Walker, 447 F.3d 999, 1006-07 (7th Cir.2006) (notice is unnecessary because Booker jettisoned the concept of “upward departure” from the Guidelines). Tedder could not benefit even if we were prepared to change circuit law: he knew from the district court’s original sentence and from our opinion that a sentence exceeding 46 months’ imprisonment was a distinct possibility. That was all the notice required under any circuit’s standard.

This sentence was reasonable, for the reasons the district judge gave. Tedder asks us to disagree with the district judge’s conclusions, but that’s functionally a request for a de novo decision on appeal. The question is not what sentence we would have imposed, but whether the district judge abused her discretion. The 60-month sentence is not beyond the wide latitude set by a “reasonableness” standard. No more need be said.

Affirmed.  