
    Harrison v. Sims.
    June, 1828.
    Injunction — Execution on Personalty. — The owner of slave property, which has been taken by virtue of an execution issued against the goods and chattels ot another, is entitled to an Injunction to stay the sale, though he neither alleges, nor proves the peculiar value of the property.
    Randolph Harrison and Samuel Jones exhibited their Bill to Chancellor C. Taylor, in which they alleged that Executions to the amount of more than $700, were levied upon three negro girls, viz: Julia, Eavinia and Eucy, *together with other property, belonging to a certain Charles Irvine, of the county of Buckingham : that at the sale which took place on the 22d June, 1827, under the Executions, the Plaintiffs became the purchasers of the three girls, and of three mules, at the price of $736, which property was left on the plantation of the said Irvine, for the convenience of his family, the said girls being favorite house-servants, but at all times completely under the control of the Plaintiffs: that a short time after the sale and purchase aforesaid, Edward W. Sims, the Defendant, who had an Execution, of subsequent date to those under which the Plaintiffs purchased, caused it to be levied on the three negro girls by the Sheriff of Buckingham, and they will be sold, if not prevented by the interposition of the Chancellor, on the second Monday in the following month. The Plaintiffs further state, that in consequence of their purchase, and the payment of the money, the Executions first spoken of have been returned satisfied; and to remove any false impression on the subject, they aver that it was a fair bona fide purchase, made with their own money. They therefore prayed that Sims might be made a party, and that an Injunction might be awarded, to restrain him and the Sheriff from proceeding further on the said Sims’s Execution.
    The Injunction was refused by the Chancellor, but was awarded by Judge Cabell, of the Court of Appeals.
    The Defendant, Edward W. Sims, answered the Bill, denying that a .Court of Equity had any jurisdiction in the cause, and stating many facts, which it is unnecessary to report, as the question before the Court did not turn on the verity of those facts.
    The Court of Chancery, on the 28th January, 1828, made the following order: “On motion of the Defendant by Counsel, the Court, after considering the Bill only, and with due deference, being under the impression that perhaps the cases on like subjects in 3 Rand, may have escaped the notice of the Judges, doth order, that the Injunction ^awarded the Plaintiffs, the 6th July, 1827, by a Judge of the Supreme Court of Appeals, to injoin the sale of the slaves in the Bill mentioned, be discharged, the same having been, as it seems to this Court, improvidenlly awarded.”
    Prom that order the Plaintiffs appealed to this Court.
    Stanard'for the Appellants.
    The Attorney General for the Appellee.
    
      
      See on this subject, footnote to Randolph v. Randolph, 6 Rand. 194;foot-note to Kelly v. Scott, 5 Gratt. 479; monographic note on “Executions" appended to Paine, Surv., etc., v. Tutwiler, 27 Gratt. 440; monographic note on "Injunctions” appended to Claytor v. Anthony, 15 Gratt. 518.
      The principal case is cited in Snoddy v. Haskins, 12 Gratt. 366.
    
   June 4.

The PRESIDENT

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Chancellor was mistaken in supposing, when he dissolved the Injunction in this case, that the cases in 3 Rand, on like subjects, had escaped the notice of the Judges of the Court of Appeals. A more attentive consideration of those cases would have conducted him to a different conclusion. Though there is some little diversity of opinion, whether peculiar value of slave property ought to be stated in the Bill, praying relief in such cases, yet the result of the cases is, that when that matter is alleged in the Bill, as in the case now before us, an Injunction ought to be awarded, although the party might recover damages at Law for the abduction of his property, and possibly the property itself, in an action of Detinue. But, in the case of Randolph v. Randolph, ante, 194, by a full Court on a re-view of those cases, and to settle the Law, it has been decided, that in every case in which the owner of slave property, as in the case now before us, applies to a Court of Equity, he will be entitled to an injunction, and if he makes out his case, he will be entitled to relief, though he neither alleges, nor proves peculiar value of the property. The Decree dissolving the Injunction in this case is, therefore, reversed, and the Injunction re-instated. 
      
      Absent, Jots® Grebn.
     