
    Jason K. Snook et al. v. Martin Snetzer.
    1. Under the provisions of the code of civil-procedure which relate to attachment proceedings, and proceedings in aid of execution, the earnings of a debtor for the three months next preceding the levy of an. attachment, or the issuing of an order for the examination of the debtor, are exempt from being applied to the payment of his debts, where the same-are necessary for the support of his family.
    2. A citizen of this state may be enjoined from prosecuting an attachment in another state, against a citizen of this state, to subject to the payment of his claim the earnings of the debtor, which, by the laws of this-state, are exempt from being applied to the payment of such claim.
    Motion for leave to file a petition in error to tbe District Court of Licking county.
    On tbe 27th day of December, 1873, tbe defendant in error commenced an action in tbe Court of Common Pleas, of Licking county, against tbe plaintiffs in error, to enjoin them from proceeding in an action then pending in Ohio county, in tbe State of West Virginia, wherein tbe plaintiffs in error were plaintiffs, and the defendant in error was defendant, to subject tbe earnings then due to him from tbe Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company for services rendered as tbe conductor of a freight train of tbe company, to the payment of tbe amount due on a judgment recovered by tbe plaintiffs in error against tbe defendant in error, before a justice of tbe peace of Newark township, in tbe said county of Licking, for tbe amount due on a promissory note, given by him to tbe plaintiffs in error, for tbe sum of eighteen dollars^ dated June 2,1866, and payable one day after date. A temporary injunction was allowed, and tbe allowance thereof duly indorsed on tbe summons issued in tbe action.
    It is averred in tbe petition that tbe parties to these actions all reside in tbe city of Newark, in tbe county of Licking; that the defendant in error is tbe bead of a family; that tbe action pending against him in Ohio county, West Virginia, was commenced by tbe plaintiffs in error on the 28th day of November, 1873; that the process served upon .the railroad company requires it to answer as garnishee, on the 30th day of December, 1873 ; that the earnings sought to be subjected in the action to the payment of the judgment, are the earnings due to him for services rendered, the railroad company, as the conductor of a freight train on its road, during the months of October and November, 1873; that such earnings are necessary for the support of his family, and that the action is prosecuted against him by the plaintiffs in error in the State of West Virginia, for the purpose of evading the exemption laws of this state, and preventing him and his family from having the benefit thereof.
    On the 21st of August, 1874, a supplemental petition was filed in the action, of the filing of which the plaintiffs in ei'ror were duly notified, in which it is averred, that after the plaintiffs in error had been duly notified of the allow■ance of the temporary injunction, they, in disregard of the •order of the court, prosecuted their action then pending in 'Ohio county, West Vii’ginia, against the defendant in error, to final judgment, and received of the garnishee, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, $40.25, the full amount •of the judgment. The answer of the plaintiffs in eiTor .denies the averments of the original and supplemental petitions.
    The issues ai’ising upon the pleadings were found by the •court for the defendant in error, and a judgment was rendered in his favoi', against the plaintiffs in error, for the .amount received by them of the railroad company, with interest and costs.
    A motion for-a new trial was filed and overruled, to which ruling the plaintiffs in error excepted, and presented their bill of exceptions, which was allowed, signed, and •sealed by the court.
    The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas was afterward affiimed by the District Court, on a petition in ei’roi filed therein by the plaintiffs.
    
      
      Gibson Atherton and Jesse A. Mory, for the motion:
    The injunction should not have been allowed. U. S. Con., art. 4, sec. 2, construed in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 U. C. C. 380; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 100, and notes h and s; Ex parte Simeon Bushnell et al., 8 Ohio St. 599; Mead v. Merritt & Peck, 2 Paige, 402; Peck v. Jennings, 7 How. 612; Keating v. Spink, 3 Ohio St. 126; 31 Barb. 364.
    
      Buckingham $ Davies, contra:
    A court of equity will interfere, in a proper case, to prevent the prosecution of a suit in a foreign court when it has jurisdiction of the parties, Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 899; even after suit has been commenced in the foreign court, Engel v. Scheuerman, 40 Ga. 206; Dehon v. Foster,. 4 Allen, 545; and to secure to an individual the-benefit of the laws of the state in which he resides, Vail v.. Knapp, 49 Barb. 299; Dehon v. Foster, 7 Allen, 57.
   Rex, J.

The assignments of error and the arguments in? the case present two questions for the determination of this court.

The first question relates to the exemption laws of this-state, and makes the point, whether, by the laws in force, when the debt in question was contracted, June 2, 1866,. the earnings of the debtor for his personal services within the three months next preceding, when necessary for the: use and support of his family, were exempt from being applied to the payment of his debts. The policy of this state, as exhibited by its legislation for more than a quarter of a century, had been to protect the family of a debtor,, in some measure, from the consequences of debts contracted by its head.

In furtherance of this policy, and in addition to the real and personal property then exempt, it was provided by-section 467 of the code of civil procedure, passed March 11, 1853 (S. & O. 940), that the earnings of a debtor for his personal services, at any time within three months next preceding the issuing of an order for his examination under the provisions of the code relating to proceedings .in aid of execution, should not he applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment, where it was made to appear by the debtor’s affidavit or otherwise, that such earnings were necessary for the use of a family supported, wholly or in part, by his labor; and section 194 of the same act provides, that all the property, both real and personal, of. the debtor, “ not exempt by law from being applied to the payment of the plaintiff’s claim,” may be attached to satisfy such claim. Construing the provisions of the code in accordance with the well-established rules on that subject, we have no doubt that by these provisions it was intended to exempt, as well in attachment as under the proceedings in aid of execution, the earnings of the debtor for his personal services for the time prescribed, where the same -were necessary for the purpose named.

The remaining question to be determined is: have the courts of this state authority, upon the petition of a resident who is the head of a family, by injunction, to restrain a citizen of the county in which the action is commenced from proceeding in another state to attach the earnings of such head of a family, with a view to evade the exemption laws of this state, and to prevent such head of a family from availing himself of the benefit of such laws?

The authority of the courts in such a case to restrain a citizen from thus proceeding for the purpose named, is, in our opinion, clear and indisputable.

In exercising this authority, courts proceed, not upon any claim of right to control or stay proceedings in the courts of another state or country, but upon the ground that the person on whom the restraining order is made resides within the jurisdiction and is in the power of the court issuing it. The order operates upon the person of the party, and directs him to proceed no further in the action, and not upon the court of the foreign state or country in which the action is pending. On this subject, Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, section 899, says: “Although the courts of one country have no authority to stay proceedings in the courts of another, they have an undoubted authority to control all persons and things within their territorial limits. When, therefore, both parties to a •suit- in a foreign country are resident within the territorial limits of another country, the courts of equity in the latter may act in personam upon those parties, and direct them, by injunction, to proceed no further in such suit.” In such a case, these courts act upon acknowledged principles of public law in regard to jurisdiction. They do not pretend to direct or control the foreign court, but, without regard to the situation of the subject-matter of dispute, they consider the equities between the parties and decree in personam according to those equities, and enforce obedience to their decrees in personam.” Engel v. Scheureman, 40 Ga. 206 ; Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 545; Vail v. Knapp, 49 Barb. 299; Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. v. May, ante, 347. Regarding these principles as decisive óf the questions presented for determination in this ease, the motion must be overruled.

Leave refused.

McIlvaine, O. J., Welch, White, and Gilmore, JJ., concurred.  