
    The Inhabitants of Uxbridge versus The Inhabitants of Seekonk.
    A notice by the overseers of the town of A. to those of the town of B., that .expenses had been incurred for the support of <e O. S. widow of G. S. who was an inhabitant ofB.,” was held to be sufficient; for the meaning of these words is, that the widow was an inhabitant of B.
    In an action by a town for the support of a pauper against the town in which she had her settlement, it appeared that the notice, that expenses had been incurred, was dated December 6th, 1826, and was delivered to the defendants on January 22d, 1827. It was held, that the statute limitation of two years after the cause of action arose, within which the action must be brought, must be computed from the delivery of the notice, and not from its date.
    Assumpsit for expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in the support of Olive Smith, a pauper, from January 20th, 1827, to January 17th, 1829.
    Upon a case stated it appeared, that the pauper resided in Uxbridge, and was chargeable to that town from December 5th, 1826, to January 17th, 1829. The settlement of the pauper was in Seekonk. On January 22d, 1827, the following notice from the overseers of Uxbridge was delivered to those of Seekonk:—“Uxbridge, December 5, 1826. Olive Smith widow of Gains Smith deceased who was an inhabitant of' your town has become chargeable to the town of Uxbridge, which we are charging to your town, and shall continue so to do, until you pay the charges &c. and provide for her in future.” The plaintiffs’ writ was dated January 17th, 1829, and was served on the 19th of the same month.
    The plaintiffs were to become nonsuit or the * defendants to be defaulted, according as the opinion of the Court should be upon this statement of the facts.
    By the St. 1793, c. 59, § 9, a town may recover the expenses of supporting a pauper whose settlement is in another town, provided the action is commenced against such other town “ within two years after the cause of action arose.”
    
      Oct. 9th
    
    Adams, for the plaintiffs.
    Kinnicutt, for the defendants.
    The notice is insufficient; for it does not state that the pauper had a settlement in Seekonk, but only that her deceased husband was an inhabitant there. It does not necessarily follow that the widow retains the settlement o5 her husband. Quincy v. Braintree, 5 Mass. R. 86 ; Westminster v. Bernardston, 8 Mass. R. 104; Embden v. Augusta, 12 Mass. R. 307 ; Shutesbury v. Oxford, 16 Mass. R. 102; Walpole v. Hopkinton, 4 Pick. 358 ; Andover v. Canton, 13 Mass. R. 547.
    This action is barred by St. 1793, c. 59, § 9. It must bo commenced within two years from the time of the notice ; and the time of this limitation is to be computed from the date of the notice, and not from its delivery. The town to be charged must be informed of the state of facts as they exist within two years before the commencement of the action. But the notice in this case did not contain any of these facts ; it merely stated that on December 5th, 1826, (the date of the notice,) which was more than two years before the commencement of the action, the pauper was chargeable, &c. Nor is this difficulty removed by the circumstance that the notice was delivered within the time limited. The information given to the town to be charged must be wholly in writing ; the delivery of the notice cannot supply any defect in such notice, nor alter the written statement. It cannot make a notice of facts existing on December 5th, 1826, apply to facts existing on January '22d, 1827. In Hallowell v. Harwich, 14 Mass. R. 186, the question arose, whether a new notice was necessary in a second suit between the same parties, brought for the expenses of supporting the same pauper, and it was held to be necessary ; because the town to be charged could not know that the pauper continued to be chargeable ; and it is clear that a redelivery of the old notice would not have been deemed sufficient. Walpole v. Hopkinton, 4 Pick. 358; Needham v. Newton, 12 Mass. R. 452 ; Dalton v. Hinsdale, 6 Mass. R. 501 ; Readfield v. Dresden, 12 Mass. R. 317 ; Townsend v. Billerica, 10 Mass. R. 411 ; Harwich v. Hallowell, 14 Mass. R. 184 ; Belfast v. Leominster, 1 Pick. 123.
    Oil. 13ft.
   Per Curiam.

The defendants object that the notice does not state that the pauper was an inhabitant of Seekonk. There is a little ambiguity in the phraseology of the notice ; but taking the whole of it together, it could not have been misunderstood. It implies that Olive Smith was an inhabitant of Seekonk. The ambiguity depends on the punctuation, and is removed by including in a parenthesis the words, “ widow of Gaius Smith deceased.”

The most important question is, whether the action was commenced in due season. The provision referred to in the statute of 1793, c. 59, [Revised Stat. c. 46, § 13,] is not in the nature of a statute of limitations, but of a condition precedent. If the plaintiffs do not show that the action was brought within two years after the cause of action arose, they cannot prevail. The question then is, when did the cause of action arise ; that is, when could an action have been commenced ; and we are of opinion that the cause of action accrued qt the delivery of the notice, and not at its date. Incurring the expenses of sup-, porting the pauper did not alone give a right of action ; there must also have been notice to the defendants that such expenses had been incurred. It was contended that the notice must be of facts existing at the date of the notice, and that it cannot be inferred that the same facts exist at the time when it is delivered. There might be a case where the notice would be rendered unavailing on this ground, but in the present instance the lapse of time between the date and the delivery has not been so great as to sustain the objection.

Defendants defaulted. 
      
       See Gilford v. Newmarket, 7 N. Hamp. R. 251, 252.
     