
    Scott v. M‘Crary.
    
      1. A Justice of the peace is competent to prove his warrant ant] proceedings by their production and his oath.
    2. A discharge from a prosecution on a warrant made by two justices, may be proved by the production of the warrant and judgement, and by the oath of one justice only, though the judgement was given by both.
    This was an action on the case brought by McCrary, in the County Court of Lawrence county, against Scott, for the recovery of damages for a malicious prosecution instituted by Scott before a justice of the peace, against him for felony; A trial was had on the plea of not guilty, and a verdict was found for the plaintiff for $154 damages'.
    On the trial in the County Court, the defendant ten* dered three bills of exceptions to the decisions of the Court. The first states that the plaintiff below offered the original warrant issued by the justice againstM‘Crary? for ]10rse stealing, which was proved by the oath of * justice, to have been issued by him as justice, &c ih> the defendant below objected to this incompetent tesfi-mony, which objection the Court overruled. Also, that the plaintiff offered in evidence, a writing which was on the opposite side of the paper, containing the warrant, and is as follow s : “ State of Alabama, Lawrence county, June 13,1825, to wit: This day Jesse Scott, plaintiff, and Allen M‘Crary, defendant, appeared, and the defendant pleaded not guilty. This defence being heard, and the witnesses on both parts being fully examined, judgement is given that the defendant is not guilty in manner and form as is alleged; he therefore is discharged by us.
    Anohew Keiser, J. P. V m. Moore, J. P.”
    Andrew Reiser was the justice who issued the warrant, and he proved that this discharge was signed by himself and Moore, the other justice. The defendant objected also to the introduction of this writing, thus proved on the gound that the writing on its face did not purport to be a discharge and acquittal of the offence mentioned in the declaration j which objection was overruled and it was read.
    The second bill of exceptions states that, after the writing in the first bill mentioned was read to the jury, the plaintiff offered to prove by said Reiser, that he had written said writing with the intention of its being an acquittal and discharge of the plaintiff of the offence for which the warrant mentioned in the plaintiff’s declaration had issued. The defendant objected on the ground: 1st. That it was an addition and explanation of the writing by verbal testimony; and 2nd. That if explainable by parol, it must also be explained by the justice Moore, (who was not present) to make it legal evidence, as his intention must also appear; that the defendant also moved to exclude the said writing from the jury, because not proved by the justice, Moore, to be also signed and assented to by him. But the Court overruled all those objections and admitted the testimony.
    The third bill of exceptions stated that, to prove express malice ip. the defendant, the plaintiff offered to prove by a witness, that in a conversation which took place after the commencement of the suit, in relation to the offence mentioned in the declaration, that the defend' nt said 11 that he was mad when he procured the warrant mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration, and that the treatment be bad received from the plaintiff was enough to have made any person angry that said evidence was objected to by the defendant, and the objection was overruled by the Court.
    The defendant, Scott, brought the cause to this Court, and assigned for error, the several decisions of the Court below, as stated in those three bills of exceptions.
    M'Kixley and Hopkins, for the plaintiff in error.
    Orhond, for the defendant.
   JUDGE GAYLE

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In these proceedings there is but one question presented for the consideration of the Court, and that is, whether it is competent for the magistrate to prove the warrant, and the order of acquittal and discharge. 1 he decision of this question will embrace all the points raised by the,assignments of error. The proceedings in this case must either be considered as records, or placed upon the footing of written evidence of less dignity. If the former, then the evidence of the justice could have no effect, and if the latter, no reason can be perceived for its exclusion. 'A witness is competent to give evidence if he be not interested in thé event of the suit, or is not under some other legal disability, such as,insanity, ignorance of the obligations of an oath, and the like. If the maker of anyhvritten instrument would, in any case, be competent to prove its execution, it cannot be perceived why a justice would not be permitted to prove his own warrants when such proof is necessary. This view of the subject will as well apply to the endorsement which states the acquittal and discharge of the defendant in error as to the warrant. The circumstance of the-discharge being-signed by another justice, cannot alter the case. Like one of several makers of an instrument, or of.several attesting witnesses, he is admissible to prove the execution, though the others be absent.

But it seems that the justice was also allowed to prove the meaning- and intention of the endorsement. This, it is contended, is opposed by all the rules of construing written testimony. It is not necessary here to examine the force of this objection. It is very apparent that no explanation was necessary. The circumstance of the prosecutor being called plaintiff, cannot and does net obscure or render doubtful the order of discharge. It would require not a small degree of incredulity, to suppose the endorsement on the other warrant was intended t0 ¡-,,, applied to any other case or prosecution than that contained in the warrant itself.

It is the opinion of the Court that the judgement of the Circuit Court was correct, and it is therefore affirmed.  