
    Charles DECKER, New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Association, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, Brian Fischer, in his official capacity, Glenn Goord, in his official capacity and individually, Richard Roy, in his official capacity and individually, Harold Graham, in his official capacity and individually, Joseph Bellnier, in his official capacity and individually, Vincent Lume, in his official capacity and individually, Defendants-Appel-lees.
    
    No. 11-1800-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 28, 2012.
    
      Lawrence Schaefer (Edward J. Greene, Jr., on the brief), Sheehan Greene Golder-man & Jacques LLP, Albany, NY, for Appellants.
    Robert M. Goldfarb, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Nancy A. Spiegel, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, NY, for Appellees.
    PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, RALPH K. WINTER, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption as shown above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs, Correctional Officer Charles Decker and the New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc., appeal from an award of summary judgment for defendants on Decker’s 42 U.S.C. § 1988 unreasonable seizure claim. Decker alleges that defendants, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, unreasonably detained him for approximately six hours in his workplace based solely on an inmate’s accusation of sexual assault. We review an award of summary judgment de novo, see Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.2010), and may affirm a district court’s judgment for any reason supported by the record, see 10 Ellicott Square Court Corp. v. Mountain Valley Indem. Co., 634 F.3d 112, 125 (2d Cir.2011). Applying these standards, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, and reference them only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

Decker asserts that the district court erred in failing to recognize that, even if he was detained for criminal investigative purposes, defendants had no probable cause to believe that he committed the alleged sexual assault. See Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 199-200 (2d Cir.2001). The argument fails because, even assuming that Decker’s initial detention was for purposes of criminal investigation, the inmate’s accusation of sexual assault was sufficient to provide probable cause— or, at a minimum, arguable probable cause — until an investigation undermined the inmate’s credibility. See Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.1995); see also Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 536 (2d Cir.2010) (“Arguable probable cause exists if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause te+st was met.”).

After the inmate’s credibility was undermined, defendants may not have had arguable probable cause to detain Decker further. Nevertheless, for purposes of sound prison administration, it was entirely reasonable for defendants to require Decker — as a condition of his continued employment — to remain at work for an additional three hours so that the accusation, even though apparently false, could be more fully investigated. See Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228, 281 (2d Cir.1971) (declining to require probable cause where officer’s seizure was not “conducted exclusively with criminal prosecution in mind”). Whether or not a labor contract allowed Decker to ask for the investigation to be delayed, nothing in the record indicates that superior officers exceeded the reasonable bounds of their administrative purpose during the remaining time at issue. Indeed, Decker received overtime compensation, and the inmate was eventually criminally prosecuted for making a false statement to the criminal investigators. On this record, no constitutional claim against defendants can be pursued. See id. (observing that so long as actions of superior officers “remain within reasonable bounds, there can hardly be that affront to expectations of personal autonomy which marks the state’s coercive power in the typical arrest case”).

We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 
      
      . Because the record satisfactorily demonstrates at least arguable probable cause, we need not here consider whether the circumstances of Decker’s initial segregation were sufficiently distinguishable from the detention in Cerrone not to demonstrate an exclusive criminal investigative purpose.
     
      
      . Insofar as defendant Commissioner Goord is sued in his individual capacity, the lack of any evidence demonstrating his personal involvement in the events at issue further supports judgment in his favor. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir.1994) (requiring personal involvement by defendant in constitutional violation to support § 1983 action).
     