
    Alecia BRACCI, Frederick J. Neroni, Tatiana Neroni, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Barbara O’Sullivan, Appellant, v. Carl F. BECKER, In His Official and Individual Capacity Justice of New York State, Delaware County Family Court, Surrogate’s Court, County Court, Acting Justice of Supreme Court, et al., Defendants-Appellees and United States of America, Defendant.
    No. 13-510-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 29, 2014.
    Tatiana Neroni, pro se, Delhi, NY; Frederick Neroni, pro se, Delhi, NY; Ale-da Bracci, pro se, Albany, NY; Barbara O’Sullivan, pro se, Delhi, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Andrew B. Ayers, Assistant Solicitor General of Counsel (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Denise A. Hartman, Assistant Solicitor General, on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, NY, for defendants-Appellees.
    Present: RALPH K. WINTER, JOHN M. WALKER, JR. and JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the January 9, 2013, judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Pro se appellants Tatiana Neroni (an attorney), her husband, Frederick Neroni (a disbarred attorney), her former client, Aleda Bracci, and Bracci’s mother, Barbara O’Sullivan, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Judge Carl Becker, who sits on various courts in Delaware County, New York. Appellants alleged that Judge Becker violated their constitutional rights by ruling against them and sanctioning them in a number of state-court cases (including a family court case involving Bracci). They sought damages and injunctive relief against Judge Becker and other judges who did not sanction or remove Judge Becker. The District Court dismissed their claims. It held, inter alia, that judicial immunity barred their claims against Judge Becker and the other judges who did not remove him from plaintiffs’ cases. The District Court also rejected their facial challenge to New York’s regulatory schemes for judicial recusal. The District Court rejected a proposed supplemental complaint as futile because plaintiffs’ proposed conspiracy claims were vague and conelusory, and their proposed challenges to the New York Family Court Act and its application in prior family court proceedings lacked merit. Appellants generally challenge the dismissal of their complaint and denial of their motion to supplement, and argue that the District Court was biased against them. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court decision dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997). Dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). We also review de novo “the essentially legal determination of whether the requirements for abstention have been met.” Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review a district court’s denial of a motion to supplement a complaint for abuse of discretion. Weeks v. New York, 273 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir.2001), abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002).

Upon such review, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated in the District Court’s thorough and well-reasoned order. We have considered all of appellants’ arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court. 
      
      . We note that the District Court found that Younger abstention precluded it from considering appellants’ claims that were, at the time, being litigated in state court. The court applied the three-part test derived from Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). See, e.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir.2003) ("Younger abstention is mandatory when: (1) there is a pending state proceeding, (2) that implicates an important state interest, and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of his or her federal constitutional claims.”). While this appeal was pending, however, the Supreme Court rejected this three-part test in favor of a so-called categorical approach. See Sprint Commc’ns., Inc. v. Jacobs, — U.S. -,-.,-, 134 S.Ct. 584, 591, 593, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013). In another case concerning the Neronis and Judge Becker, we vacated the district court's decision to abstain pursuant to Younger and remanded with instructions to consider whether abstention remained appropriate in light of Sprint. See Neroni v. Becker, No. 13-263-cv, 2014 WL 657927, at *1-2 (2d Cir. Feb.21, 2014) (sum-, mary order). Remand is unnecessary here. Although the district court found that Younger abstention precluded it from considering any of appellants’ claims that were being litigated in the state court proceeding (effectively all of their claims against Judge Becker), the court had already properly held that their claims concerning Judge Becker were barred by judicial immunity, sovereign immunity, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
     