
    Ripon Hardware Company, Appellant, vs. Haas and Others, Respondents.
    
      May 26
    
    June 13, 1916.
    
    
      Fraudulent conveyances: Husband and wife: Intent: Appeal: Review: Findings of fact: Inferences.
    
    1. Findings by tbe trial court to tbe effect that conveyances by bus-band to wife were not made with any fraudulent intent, but solely in pursuance of bis idea to retire from business and provide for the disposition of his estate during his life, are held to be sustained by the evidence.
    2. Inferences of fact drawn from the evidence by the trial court will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.
    
      Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Eond du Lac county: A. H. Reid, Judge.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    Action to set aside conveyances from husband to wife as fraudulent. This case was here on a former appeal and is reported in 157 Wis. 466, 145 N. W. 1096, to which reference is made for a complete statement of facts. The liability of the deceased was predicated upon a guaranty of a note given August 22, 1901, as follows:
    “For value received we hereby guarantee the payment of the within note at maturity or at any time thereafter, with interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum until paid, waiving notice of nonpayment and protest.”
    The guaranty was signed by the deceased and two other. guarantors. On the former appeal the judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed and the cause remanded, and a new trial was had on the question as to whether or not the deceased made the conveyances in question with fraudulent intent. Upon that question the trial court found:
    “That taking into consideration the decision of the supreme court already made in this case, and sec. 2323, R. S., providing that The question of fraudulent intent in all cases arising under the provisions of this title shall be deemed a question of fact, and not a question of law, nor shall any conveyance or charge be adjudged fraudulent as against creditors or purchasers, solely on the ground that it was not founded on a valuable consideration,’ I find that the evidence falls far short of convincing me that a fraudulent intent was present in the making of the conveyances to Theresa Haas. These conveyances to the said Theresa Haas, together with the conveyances to the said O. J. Haas, resulting in a gradual turning over of all of the property of the said John Haas, appear to me to have been made by him solely in pursuance of an idea of his to retire from business and secure release from business cares, and provide for the disposition of his estate during his life instead of after his death. I therefore find that there was no fraudulent intent on the part of either John Haas or Theresa Haas as to any or all of the transfers of real estate sought to be attacked by the complaint in the above entitled action.
    
      “That at tbe time of tbe making of these various conveyances, tbe said John Haas appears to have bad no occasion to believe that tbe note of Dodge to Cowan would not be paid, and that be was not advised that it was not paid when due. That be was wealthy enough so that be did not need to worry about tbe loss on this note, if it should occur. That there is nothing to indicate that be bad tbe note in mind at all. That while tbe conveyances to bis wife and son were not recorded, they were not otherwise made under circumstances of secrecy. That on tbe contrary they were made openly, and that tbe execution thereof was perfected at tbe bank where Mr. Cowan, tbe bolder of tbe Dodge note, was in active management, and that tbe conveyances in August, 1902, were made almost simultaneously with tbe collection by tbe cashier of tbe bank of tbe annual interest on tbe Dodge note. That said conveyances were certified by tbe 'same cashier as notary. That the brewery business was immediately thereafter carried on in tbe name of O. J. Haas, and that all of tbe banking in respect thereto was done at tbe German National Bank of Eipon, and that thus tbe changes in titles to property and business were openly brought- to tbe attention of Mr. Cowan, rather than secreted from him, and that I am satisfied that John Haas bad no thought in bis mind concerning bis liability on tbe guaranty of tbe Dodge note, when be made tbe conveyances in question. That it further appears that after tbe making of tbe last conveyances to bis wife, Theresa Haas, on August 29, 1902, tbe said John Haas still retained mortgages worth in excess of $12,000, and tbe Crowther parcel of real estate worth at least $1,000, and a bank account of $358, and that for several years thereafter be continued to bold property in tbe form of mortgages and bank account, and certificates of deposit, in an amount amply sufficient to ^ discharge bis liability on tbe Dodge note.”
    Tbe defendant bad judgment accordingly, and plaintiff brings this appeal.
    For tbe appellant there was a brief by Garter & Pedrickj, attorneys, and Maurice McKenna, of counsel, and oral argument by $. M. Pedrick.
    
    For tbe respondents there were briefs by Morse & Chad-
      
      bourne, attorneys, and Thompson, Thompson, Allen & Gruene-wald, of counsel, and oral argument by Boy L. Morse and J. G. Thompson.
    
   RoseNberry, J.

The only question presented is whether or not the evidence sustains the findings of the trial court. We have carefully examined the evidence and we think the findings are in accordance with the great preponderance thereof. Counsel for plaintiff contend that because the court found as a fact that the conveyances sought to be set aside were made by .the deceased, John Haas, “solely in pursuance of an idea of his to retire from business” and “provide for the disposition of his estate during his life,” all the conveyances were made pursuant to a plan or scheme; that the last conveyance, as they claim, left him practically insolvent and was therefore fraudulent, and that in consequence all the transactions made pursuant to the plan were fraudulent, including those sought to be set aside.

The conclusion reached by counsel is an inference of fact from the evidence. The trial court made an opposite deduction or inference from the evidence. Inferences drawn from the evidence by the trial court will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. Will of Mitchell, 157 Wis. 327, 147 N. W. 332; Spuhr v. Kolb, 111 Wis. 119, 86 N. W. 562. In this respect there is no difference between inferences and facts, if indeed there is a substantial difference in any respect. 1 Wigmore, Ev. § 30 et seq.

By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.  