
    The People vs. Williams.
    A representation, though false, is not within the statute against obtaining property &c. by false pretences, unless calculated to mislead persons of ordinary prudence and caution.
    
    Accordingly, where an indictment charged the defendant with obtaining V.’s signature to a deed of lands, by falsely pretending that G., who held a bond and mortgage against V., was about to sue him on the bond, foreclose the -mortgage &c., and that G. had so told the defendant: Held, that the pretences set forth were not sufficient to warrant a conviction.
    Certiorari to the Erie general sessions, where Williams was convicted of obtaining the signature of one Van Guilder to a deed of lands, by false pretences. The case turned mainly upon the sufficiency of the indictment, which charged the following facts, viz : That Williams, heretofore &c., at &c., did falsely pretend to Van Guilder that one Gray was about to sue him, the said Van Guilder, on a bond which he, the said Gray, then held and owned against Van Guilder, and that the said Gray was also about to foreclose a certain mortgage which he then held and owned, and which was a lien upon a farm of Van Guilder, situate &c., and that he, the said Gray, would take said farm by such foreclosure away, and deprive the said Van Guilder of the same; and further, that the said Gray had told him, the said Williams, that he was going to sue him, the said Van Guilder, upon said bond, and was going to foreclose the said mortgage: By means of which said false pretences the said Williams did then and there unlawfully obtain the signature of said Van Guilder to a certain written instrument, commonly called a warranty deed, which said instrument bore date &c.,. and purported to convey to said Williams all that piece or parcel of land known &c., [describing it,] being the premises upon which the said Van Guilder then resided; with intent then and there to cheat and defraud him the said Van Guilder. Whereas in truth &c. said Gray was not about to sue said Van Guilder on the bond &c., and was not about to foreclose the said mortgage &c.; and whereas in truth See. the said Gray had not told the said Williams that he was going to sue him, the said Van Guilder, upon said bond, or foreclose the said mortgage &c.
    At the trial, evidence was given of the facts alleged in the . indictment; and the defendant’s counsel requested the court to charge that the pretences laid were not such as could be made the subject of a criminal prosecution under 2 R. S. 677, ^ 53. The court refused so to charge, and held the contrary, to which the defendant’s counsel excepted. The jury found the defendant guilty ; whereupon judgment was suspended and the proceedings brought here by certiorari, pursuant to 2 R. S. 736, § 27.
    
      E. Cook Sr D. Tillinghast, for the defendant,
    contended that, to bring a case within the statute, the false pretences must be such as may mislead men of ordinary prudence and caution while engaged in the lawful pursuits of business. (2 R. S. 677, § 53 ; The People v. Haynes, 11 Wend. 566, per Nelson, J.; Young v. The King, 3 T R. 102, per Kenyon, Ch. J.) 
      The pretences alleged in the present case are not of that character. True, the indictment shows the defendant told Van Guilder a falsehood; but that is not enough. It was a falsehood unproductive of any legal injury—a mere moral irregularity, at most. Its direct tendency was to quicken Van Guilder in the payment of a debt due from him, (The People v. Thomas, 3 Hill, 169,) and, in its own nature, it was not calculated to operate any other result. If he was influenced by it to attempt a transfer of his property beyond the reach of creditors, the act is the legitimate offspring of his own folly or fraud, and not of the falsehood charged upon the defendant. The statute could not have been intended for such cases.
    
      H. W. Rogers, (district attorney) contra,
    insisted that -the case was within both the letter and spirit of the statute. The English statute, 33 Hen. 8, c. 1, related to frauds effected by means of false tokens, and required that these should be such as might deceive persons of ordinary prudence. Though this statute extended the common law rule, it was found to be insufficient ; and hence the enactment of 30 Geo. 2, c. 24, •which embraced frauds effected by false pretences, as well as tokens. The latter has been considered as extending to every case of obtaining goods &c. by false representations,u to which persons of ordinary caution might give credit.” (Young v. The King, 3 T. R. 102 et seq.) Our statute of 1813, (1 R. L. 410,) was substantially a transcript of 30 Geo. 2, ch. 24, and the course of decision under both has been the same. (See The People v. Johnson, 12 John. Rep. 292.) The phraseology of the present statute, (2 R. S. 677, § 53,) is more comprehensive than that of either of the others adverted to. It leaves no room for speculating as to the adequacy of the means employed to effect the fraud ; but looks to the fact, and embraces all “ false pretences” by which goods &c. have been actually obtained. That this court have regarded it as extending to a new class of cases, not provided for by the law of 1813, is evident from repeated adjudications; (The People v. Stone, 9 Wend. 182 ; 
      
      The People v. Genung, 11 id. 18 ; The People v. Haynes, id. 557 ; The People v. Herrick, 13 id. 87 ; The People v. Kendall, 25 id. 339 ;) and if they have not already gone the entire length of construing it co-extensively with the fraud actually perpetrated by the pretences used, they have as yet established no limit short of that. The opinion of the chancellor in The People v. Haynes, (14 Wend. 546,) fully maintains the doctrine contended for here.
   Per Curiam.

It is impossible to sustain this indictment without extending the statute to every false pretence, however absurd or irrational on the face of it. The charge is of falsely representing to Van Guilder that he was about being proceeded against for a debt due from him, and that, by means of the representation, his signature was obtained to a deed of lands. How such a result was made to follow from means apparently so inadequate, we are left to conjecture. Looking to the case made by the indictment, Van Guilder’s only ground of complaint would seem to be, that in attempting to defraud another he had himself been defrauded. But whatever the fact is in this particular, there can be no doubt that an exercise of common prudence and caution on his part would have enabled him to avoid.being imposed upon by the pretences alleged ; and if so, the case is not within the statute. (See Goodhall's case, Ry. & Mood. Cr. Cas. 461, 463 ; Rose. Cr. Ev. 362.)

New trial ordered. 
      
      
         See The People v. Thomas, (3 Hill, 169) and the cases cited in note (a.) to that case.
     