
    -Wilcox alias-Nichols v. The State.
    Article 734 of the Penal Code reads as follows: “If a house be entered in such manner as that the entry comes within the definition of burglary, and the person guilty of such burglary shall, after so entering, commit theft, or any other offense, he shall be punished for burglary, and also for whatever other offense is so committed.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 2370.) An indictment which stated that the defendant broke and entered, &c., with intent to commit a larceny, is not bad for duplicity.
    To charge that the defendant entered the house of one person and stole the goods of another is not bad for duplicity.
    It is sufficient to charge that the Christian name is unknown. •
    
      The defendant cannot he heard after arraignment to aver that he is not indicted by his true name. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 2937.)
    A motion for a new trial must be disposed of at the term at which it was made. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1473, Note 569.)
    Appeal from Galveston. The case was tried before Hon. William E. Payle, judge of the criminal court for Galveston and Harris counties.
    As there was no statement of facts or bill of exceptions, it is only necessary to state that the indictment charged the defendant with breaking and entering the banking-house of William B. Sorley, and stealing the goods and money of E. H. Cuny. There was no motion to quash or in arrest of judgment. The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, from which judgment he appealed.
    
      John B. Conally, for defendant.
    
      E. B. Turner, Attorney General, for the state.
   Caldwell, J.

—We have neither bill of exceptions nor assignment of errors. There is nothing before this court on appeal but the sufficiency of the indictment, the evidence, and motion for a new trial.

The indictment charges the defendant with burglariously entering the banking-house of W. B. Sorley, with the intent to steal the goods, &c., of said Sorley, and after such burglarious entering did steal, take, &c., of the goods and chattels of one E. H. Cuny.

It is insisted on, in behalf of the prisoner, that the indictment is bad for duplicity, in that it charges the defendant with burglary and theft in the same court. The objection is not well taken. It is provided, in article 2370 of Paschal’s Digest, that if a house be burglariously entered, the person thus guilty shall, if he commit theft or any other offense, be punished for the burglary as well as the theft or any other offense.

A count .stating that the defendant broke and entered * * with intent to commit a larceny, and did commit a larceny, is not bad for duplicity. So, when the indictment alleged that the defendant broke, &e., and entered the house of one person with the intent to steal his goods, and, having so entered, stole the goods of another person, there was no misjoinder. (Wharton’s Criminal Law, 139, and authorities cited.)

Again, it is objected that the indictment does not give the Christian name of the defendant, though it is averred that his Christian name is unknown. This objection is too late after verdict. Even in a capital case the defendant could not be heard (after arraignment) in denial of his true name having been set forth. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 2937.)

A motion for a new trial must be disposed of at the term of the court to which it is presented. The adjournment of the court without judgment upon the motion for a new trial disposes of it by operation of law. This is a peremptory statutory rule, and leaves ¿he court without discretion. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1473; McKean v. Ziller, 9 Tex., 58; Bullock v. Ballew, 9 Tex., 500.)

Upon a careful review of the evidence we are satisfied that the verdict is well founded.

Judgment aeeirmed.  