
    STEPHEN COLEMAN, Plaintiff in Error, v. THE PEOPLE, etc., Defendants in Error.
    
      Deceiver of stolen goods — Bcienter — what evidence of, allowed. — Declarations by prisoner as to collateral facts — when their falsity may be shown.
    
    Evidence of transactions of the prisoner, other than those connected with the offense charged, may he given for the purpose of proving guilty knowledge.
    On the trial, the prosecution was permitted to give evidence of declarations of the prisoner, respecting collateral facts hearing more or less directly upon the question in controversy, and then to prove that such declarations were untrue— held not to he error.
    Writ of error to the Court of Sessions in and for the county of Monroe.
    The plaintiff in error was indicted in the Monroe Oyer and Terminer, in April, 1873, and, by an order of that court, the indictment was sent to the Monroe County Sessions, and in December, 1873, he was tried in the latter court.
    The indictment charged, that on March 3, 1873, the prisoner received five bars of pig-iron, knowing them to have been stolen. The evidence tended to show that on March 10, 1873, Dennis and Daniel Connors stole five bars of pig-iron from P. Burke & Co., and sold the same to Coleman for four dollars; that while the Conners were waiting for their pay, other parties, who had stolen them, brought to Coleman, and sold him, twenty more bars of P. Burke & Co.’s pig-iron. It also tended to show other larcenies by these persons and sales of the results to the prisoner, under suspicious circumstances, for some time previous to March tenth.
    
      J. 0. Ooehrane, for the plaintiff in error.
    
      George Haines, District Attorney, for the people.
   Gilbert, J.:

The prisoner was convicted of having received from two boys, named Dennis and Daniel Connors, five bars of pig-iron, stolen by them from Burke & Co., knowing that they had been stolen. His guilt was clearly established, and no honest jury could have failed to convict him. It is now sought to reverse the conviction on several grounds. First, it is objected that evidence of other. transactions with other persons than the two boys mentioned, amounting to distinct offenses, was received. This evidence was admitted for the purpose of proving guilty knowledge on the part of the prisoner, and was confined to purchases of pig-iron by the prisoner, from confederates of the Connors boys. These purchases were so connected with the act charged in the indictment, as, with it, to form a chain of facts constituting together a single course of business. Evidence of this kind, illustrative of the soienter, has often been admitted, and, in many cases, is indispensable to the attainment of justice. The general rule, no doubt, is, that evidence must be confined to the issue. But the evidence objected to, within proper limits, is no infringement of the rule, for it bears directly upon the main point to be determined, namely, the knowledge of the prisoner that the property, charged in the indictment, had been stolen. We think the admissibility of such evidence in a case like the present, is fully sustained by authority.

The prosecution was also permitted to give evidence of declarations of the prisoner, respecting collateral facts bearing more or less directly upon the question in controversy, and then to prove that such declarations were untrue. We do not perceive any fatal error in this. It bore somewhat on the question of the guilty knowledge of the prisoner, and therefore was not irrelevant or immaterial. Nor did the admission of it violate the rule against allowing a contradiction of evidence upon collateral matters, by the party giving it. That rule is confined to.the testimony of witnesses, and does not embrace the declarations of parties. Several other exceptions to the admission of evidence were taken, but they are too unimportant to require comment. We are satisfied that the result would have been the same, if the evidence, last referred to, had been excluded, and, therefore, the admission of it, even if erroneous, would not justify a reversal of the conviction.

The request made to the court, to charge the jury that the prosecution was confined to the larceny of the five bars of iron, March eleventh, and that, as there was no proof that the Connors, were engaged in it, the jury were bound to acquit, was too broad. The court could not properly be required to charge that there was no proof that Dennis and Daniel Connors were engaged in that larceny, or that the jury were hound to acquit. The request therefore was properly refused.

We are satisfied that the defendant was legally and justly convicted, and that the judgment should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. 
      
       2 Russ. on Crime, 777; Gr. Ev., § 53 ; Wheat. Cr. Law, 7th ed., §§ 1889, 639, 647.; Osborne v. The People, 2 Park C. R., 583 ; People v. Wood, 3 id., 681; People v. Hopson, 1 Den., 574 ; Rex v. Ellis, 6 B. & C., 145.
     
      
       People v. Gonzalez, 35 N. Y., 49, 59 ; Vandevoort v. Gould, 36 id., 639, 644.
     