
    JOHN HAMILTON v. SAMUEL SMITH.
    In slander, the words are to be taken as having been used in their ordinary-acceptation among those in whose presence they were uttered.
    In an action of slander, transactions between the defendant and others, to which the plaintiff was in no way privy, are not admissible in evidence against the plaintiff.
    This was an action on the case, for slanderous words, in which, on the trial before Pearson, Judge, at Buncombe, on the last Circuit, it was proved, that during an altercation between the plaintiff and the defendant, in the streets of Asheville, the former called the latter a mean man ; to which thedefendant replied, “ If I had cooped as many hogs as you have been guilty of, I would not say ‘ mean,’ to any man.” Upon the plaintiff’s asking what was meant by that observation, the defendant replied, “ I mean that you cooped four of my hogs ; and there is a man,” (pointing to one Murray, a bystander,) “ I can establish it by.” Murray observed, “ Smith, you are mistaken, it was Jones and Hamilton had no hand in it:” to which the defendant replied, “ Damn him, I believe he had.” It was in proof, that several years before, the defendant drove hogs to the south, and in so doing passed by the plaintiff’s house: that in a few days he returned and told Murray that he had lost four hogs, and asked him to aid in looking for them: that after much investigation, it was discovered that Jones had taken the hogs, and killed and cured them. No connection in this transaction was proved between the plaintiff and Jones. The defendant took the note of the latter with surety, for the value of the hogs. The defendant offered to prove that Jones had paid off this note in counterfeit bills; and that he, the defendant, was much provoked at this additional instance of dishonesty ; but the testimony was rejected by the Court.
    His Honor charged the jury, that if they believed that the defendant, in the altercation in Asheville, meant to charge the plaintiff with stealing his hogs; and that the words used on .that occasion, would, in their ordinary acceptation, convey that idea to those in whose presence they were spoken, the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict.
    The jury returned a verdict accordingly; and the defendant appealed.
    No counsel appeared for either party in this Court.
   Gaston, Judge.

An exception has been taken to the charge of the judge, because he instructed the jury, that if, from the evidence, they were satisfied that the defendant meant to impute to the plaintiff the crime of having stolen his hogs, and that the words used by him did, acccording to their ordinary acceptation, convey that imputation to those in whose presence they were spoken, the plaintiff had made out his case, and was entitled to a verdict. We hold that this instruction was correct. Whatever may have been the rule which prevailed in ancient times, it has long since been settled, that in actions for defamation, words are to be construed by the Courts in the plain •and popular sense in which the rest of the world naturally understand them, if the jury be satisfied that the defendant used them in the defamatory sense imputed. We are also of opinion, that .-the evidence offered by the defendant and rejected by the Court, with respect to the transactions between the defendant and Jones, with which transactions the plaintiff was not shown to have any connection, w'as altogether irrelevant to the matter in issue between the plaintiff and the defendant, had no tendency to explain the sense in which the defendant used the defamatory language spoken of the plaintiff, and was therefore properly rejected.

Pee Curiam. Judgment affirmed with costs.  