
    The People of the State of New York v. The Open Board of Stock Brokers Building Company of the City of New York. James W. Randall v. Cortland L. Parker, as President of the Open Board of Stock Brokers of the city of New York.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department,
    
    
      Filed, July 3, 1888.)
    
    1. Specific performance of a contract to purchase land—When ordered—Receiver of corporation—Deed.
    Exception was taken by the purchaser at the receiver’s sale to the title of the premises in question because one of the deeds in the chain of title to-the property is from Crocker to McLean, “ as trustee for the association of the Open Board of Brokers of the city of New York.” This association was unincorporated and consisted of about 400 persons. On the same-date as the aforesaid deed, McL., as such trustee, conveyed the premises, by deed to “The Open Board of Stock Brokers Building Company in the-city of New York.” This was a duly incorporated company. The same-person is the duly appointed receiver of both the incorporated and unincorporated associations, and was authorized by an order of the court to sell the premises. No other evidence of the nature of the trust vested in McL. is given. Held, that this was not a good objection. That the receiver was vested with the title whether it remained in the association or-was conveyed by McL.’s deed to the corporation. That the receiver’s deed would be good.
    2. Trust—Not presumed to be invalid.
    In the absence of evidence as to the nature of a trust, if the court can as easily presume a valid as an invalid trust, the court is not at liberty to presume an invalid one.
    Appeal by Lewis S. Samuel from an order of the-supreme court, special term, held in the city of Kingston, requiring him to complete his purchase of real estate sold by James K. 0. Sherwood, as receiver, under an order of' the court made in both these actions.
    
      George G. Coney, for app’lt; John S. Smith, for receiver,, resp’t.
   Landon, J.

Exception is taken by the purchaser at the receiver’s sale to the title of the premises. One of the deeds in the chain of title is from Burton W. Crocker to George W. McLean, “as trustee for the association of the Open Board of Brokers of the City of New York.” This association was unincorporated, and consisted of about 400 persons.

This deed was dated March 25, 1880. On the same date, McLean, as such trustee, conveyed the premises by deed te “ The open board of stock brokers’ building company of the city of New York.” This was a duly incorporated company. The same person is the duly appointed receiver of both the incorporated and unincorporated associations, and was authorized by an order of the court to sell the premises. No other evidence of the nature of the trust vested in George W. McLean, is given. We therefore only know George W. McLean as a trustee, both in his capacity as grantee and grantor in these deeds. The deed to McLean, is not to him in his individual capacity, for the simple reason that the language used excludes that meaning. It is to him 1 £ as trustee.” His grantor is estopped by the deed to claim otherwise, and as against him the entire title is gone, and was vested in McLean as trustee. It is objected that the trust is not defined. True, but we are not therefore, in the absence of evidence to suppose it impossible that MeLean was the trustee. The statute permits certain express trusts. If we can as easily presume a valid as an invalid trust, we are not at liberty to presume an invalid one. We therefore presume that by the deed to McLean, as trustee, he held the title to the premises upon an express trust, valid as such in its creation, and therefore the whole estate in law and equity, in the premises, was vested in him. 1 R. S., m., p. 729, § 60. The trust was expressed in the deed to McLean, though not defined. He could convey the lands therefore, except in contravention of the trust. Id., §§ 64, 65. No suggestion is made that the conveyance by McLean was anywise in contravention of the trust, and therefore no ground exists to declare the deed from him to the corporation void. The objection to the title is therefore not sustained.

The receiver’s title may also be upheld upon the ground that he is receiver, both of the association and of the corporation. Whatever rights the members of the association had, they had in their associated capacity. It does not in anywise appear that the association was an illegal body. We infer that it was not for the reason that it had sufficient legal status to become the party to the action in which the receiver was appointed. If the deed to McLean, as trustee, imports a trust ‘ ‘ for the use of or in trust for ” the unincorporated association, then the title vested in the association, by force of the 49th section of the statute already cited. That title either remains in the association or was conveyed by McLean’s deed to the corporation. In either event, the receiver should be vested with it. Hence his deed will be good.

The order should be affirmed, with ten dollars costs and printing disbursements.

Learned, P. J., and Ingalls, J., concur.  