
    Akilah YOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZAPPOS.COM, INC.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-16545.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Oct. 25, 2011.
    
    Filed Nov. 1, 2011.
    
      Akilah Young, Las Vegas, NV, pro se.
    Jody M. Florence, Esquire, Jen Jane Sarafina, Esquire, Kamer Zucker & Abbott, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Ap-pellee.
    Before: TROTT, GOULD, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Akilah Young appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her employment action alleging violations of Title VII and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Young’s sexual harassment claims because Young failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment, and whether Zappos.com, Inc. took adequate corrective action once it had notice of the alleged harassment. See Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1191-92 (9th Cir.2001) (explaining plaintiffs burden in establishing a harassment claim under Title VII and employer’s responsibility to take corrective action); Pope v. Motel 6, 121 Nev. 307, 114 P.3d 277, 280 (2005) (Nevada courts look to Title VII cases for guidance in analyzing state discrimination claims).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Young’s retaliation claims because Young failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was a causal link between her protected activities and termination, and whether Zappos.com, Inc.’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Young’s termination were pretextual. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 646-47 (explaining plaintiffs burden in establishing a retaliation claim).

The district court properly concluded that Young’s tort claims were preempted by Nevada’s workers’ compensation scheme. See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 121 P.3d 1026, 1031-34 (2005) (per curiam) (employee’s tort claims arising from sexual assault by co-worker at their workplace preempted by Nevada’s workers’ compensation scheme).

Young’s remaining contentions, including those regarding her breach of contract claim, are unpersuasive.

We do not consider Young’s contentions raised for the first time on appeal. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.1999).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     