
    *Gibson v. Carrell & als.
    January Term, 1856,
    Richmond.
    Wills— After-Acquired Land — Case at Bar. — Testatrix hy her will made in 1837 when she possessed no real estate, gave two slaves to her daughter M and six to her son S, and then says, “All the balance of my property of every description, real and personal, I give and bequeath to my son S;” but if her daughter had a child or children, three of the slaves given to S should go to them. Land after-wards acquired by the testatrix does not pass by the devise to S.
    This was a hill in the Circuit court of Jefferson county, by Eli H. Carrell and Margaret his wife against Samuel Gibson and others. And the only question was, whether certain real estate of which Margaret Gibson died seized, passed by her will to Samuel Gibson, or descended to her heirs, of whom Samuel Gibson and the female plaintiff were two. The will was made in October 1873, when the testatrix was possessed of no real estate. After giving two slaves to her daughter Margaret Carrell, and six to her son Samuel Gibson, she says, “All the balance of my property of every sort or description, real or personal, I give and bequeath to my said son Samuel Gibson, and his legal representatives, except that in case my said daughter should have child or children, then, and in that case, Irena, William - John and Mary Jane, (three slaves she had before given to Samuel,) shall be the property of said child or children, and his, her or their legal representatives; but if no child or children should be born unto my said daughter, then the said Irena, William John and Mary Jane are to be the property of my said son.
    After the making of her will, Mrs. Gibson acquired, by purchase, the real estate which was the subject of *this controversy, and died in 184S, when her will was duly admitted to probat.
    On the hearing of the cause, the Circuit court held that the land did not pass under the will; and made a decree for the partition thereof among the heirs of Margaret Gibson; whereupon Samuel Gibson applied to this court for an appeal, which was allowed.
    J. M. Mason; for the appellant.
    There was no counsel for the appellees.
   DANIEE, J.

It seems to me that this case must be governed by the rules and principles declared in Raines v. Barker, just decided by this court. There is nothing in the language of the will from which to infer an intention on the part of the testatrix to dispose of lands to be acquired after the date of her will. It is proved, however, that the testatrix owned no lands or real estate at the date of her will, and as by a residuary clause she gives the balance of her property “of every sort or description, real or personal,” to the appellant, it is argued that the testatrix must have contemplated the future acquisition of real estate, and intended it should pass by this clause, as otherwise the word “real” is left without meaning, and superfluous: and that the court ought not to presume that the testatrix used a word of such important meaning without a purpose. The argument is not without show of force; Yet when we see that the testatrix has used no language referring in terms to 'any land she might thereafter acquire, but on the contrary, in the commencement of the will, declares her purpose simply of disposing of what worldly effects she then owned, and that she was ignorant and illiterate, and consequently not apt to assign exact meaning and value to the language she might use, it seems *'that there is no such manifestation of the purpose of the testatrix to dispose of after acquired lands, as would justify us in making this case an exception to the general rule.

I am for affirming the decree.

The other judges concurred in the opinion of Daniel, J.

Decree affirmed.  