
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert SIMMONS, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 12-1637-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 26, 2013.
    Richard Bruce Lind, New York, N.Y., for Appellant.
    Michael Douglas Maimin (Katherine Polk Failla, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, N.Y., for Appellee.
    Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR. and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Robert Simmons seeks review of an April 16, 2012 order of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Scheindlin, J.), denying Simmons’s motion to suppress evidence of a firearm seized from his room, which argued that the seizure was in violation of Simmons’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

We affirm the district court’s determination that the seizure of the firearm from Simmons’s room did not violate the Fourth Amendment because Simmons gave implied consent to this seizure. It is a factual question whether Simmons voluntarily gave implied consent to the officers on the scene to seize the firearm from his room. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (“[T]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary5 or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.”). Accordingly, a district court’s finding with respect to implied consent is reviewed only for clear error. United States v. Isiofia, 370 F.3d 226, 232 (2d Cir.2004) (“[W]e review the District Court’s conclusions on the voluntariness of [the defendant’s] consent[] for clear error.”); see also United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 131 (2d Cir.2006) (“We will not reverse a finding of voluntary consent except for clear error.”). “Under this standard, ‘[if] the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, [we] may not reverse it even though convinced that had [we] been sitting as the trier of fact, [we] would have weighed the evidence differently.’ ” Isiofia, 370 F.3d at 232 (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)).

A prior panel of this Court stated that the record before it did not allow the panel to determine whether Simmons voluntarily gave implied consent to the seizure of the firearm from his room because “the trial court made no finding on this issue.” United States v. Simmons, 661 F.3d 151, 158 n. 3 (2d Cir.2011) (“Simmons I”). On remand, the district court adopted the reasoning in Judge Winter’s dissent in Simmons I. United States v. Simmons, 861 F.Supp.2d 307, 311 (S.D..N.Y.2012) (“Simmons II ”) (“ ‘[A] defendant’s directions to a firearm amounts to, or may be found to amount to, implied consent[ ]....’” (quoting Simmons I, 661 F.3d at 159 (Winter, J., dissenting))). Though the district court’s discussion of the question of volun-tariness is relatively sparse, the district court did ultimately “find that Simmons voluntarily consented to the seizure of the weapon.” Simmons II, 861 F.Supp.2d at 311 (emphasis added). Absent any indication that this determination was clear error, we are bound by this factual finding. Concluding that the district court made no such error, we thus affirm the district court’s determination that the seizure of the firearm from Simmons’s room was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because of Simmons’s voluntary implied consent to the seizure.

We have considered all of the defendant’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.  