
    MANSFIELD et al. v. SECURITY TRUST CO. OF HOUSTON.
    (No. 5459.)
    (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.
    April 7, 1915.)
    Judgment <@=»17 — Service of Process — Requisites for Default Judgment.
    Nothing essential by statute to service of citation may be left to inference to sustain a default judgment, and where the return does not show that a true copy of the citation was delivered to each of the defendants, a default judgment against them will be reversed.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 25-33; Dec. Dig. <®=>17.]
    Appeal from Harris County Court, at Law; Clark C. Wren, Judge.
    Action by the Security Trust Company of Houston against H. P. Mansfield and others. There was a default judgment for plaintiff, and certain of the defendants appeal.
    Reversed and remanded.
    O’Brien Stevens, of Houston, for appellants.
   MOURSUND, J.

The Security Trust Company of Houston obtained a judgment by default against H. P. Mansfield, W. C. Moore, and C. F. Stevens. Mansfield and Moore seek, by this proceeding, to set aside such judgment; their contention being that the return on the citation is insufficient to authorize a judgment by default against them.

Under the rule that nothing essential by statute to the service of a citation should be left to inference in order to sustain a judgment by default, we hold that the return in this case is insufficient to show that a true copy of the citation was delivered to each of the defendants Moore and Mansfield. The judgment against said two parties is reversed and the cause remanded. 
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