
    Richard M. Gaines et al. Administrators of Samuel Hunter, deceased, vs. Alexander Smiley.
    After distribution of the estate of a deceased person under an order of the probate court, the superior court of chancery has not jurisdiction of a bill by a person alleging himself to be a distributee, whose claims had been overlooked or disregarded in the distribution in the probate court, against one of the other distributees to recover from him a ratable proportion of the estate. The remedy was in the probate court.
    On appeal from the superior court of chancery; Hon. Robert H. Buckner, chancellor.
    Richard M. Gaines and Augustus E. Addison, administrators of Samuel Hunter, exhibited their bill of complaint in the superior court of chancery, stating that Samuel Hunter removed from Ireland into this state in 1824, obtained letters of naturalization, and married Susannah, the daughter of John and Susannah Bisland, who then resided in Adams county in this state; that Mrs. Hunter died in 1825, leaving only one child, Catharine Ann, the issue of her said marriage. That Catharine Ann died in 1827; Hunter returned to Ireland, and there died in 1830, having first made and published his last will and testament, appointing John Hunter, Edward Reed and Samuel Sproul, of Ireland, his executors and trustees of all his estate in that country and elsewhere; who proved said will and obtained probate thereof in the high court of prerogatives in Ireland. Said trustees executed a power of attorney to complainants, requesting and authorizing them to administer on the estate of Hunter in Mississippi; and complainants accordingly obtained letters of administration in Adams county, in 1839, and have continued ever since in the administration of said estate. That in the year 1821, John Bisland departed this life in Adams county, leaving by his last will and testament certain slaves to his wife, said Susannah Bisland, during her natural life; remainder to his own children. That these slaves remained in the possession of Susannah Bisland till her decease, which occurred in Adams county in the year 1836. That the probate court of Adams county, at the March term, 1836, appointed commissioners to make division and allotment of said slaves ; and they divided the property into six equal parts, allotting the same to the surviving children and representatives of children of said John Bisland. That no provision was made in the division and allotment for the representatives of Mrs. Hunter, who was one of the children of said Bisland. Complainants state that they suppose this omission occurred through a mistaken belief on the part of the commissioners that there were no representatives of Mrs. Hunter living. That seven of the said slaves were allotted to Alexander Smiley, the defendant, as the only heir of one of the deceased children of the said Bisland. That these slaves, when received by the defendant, were worth seven thousand dollars. That the defendant has refused to make contribution to complainants out of said distributive share received by him, and they pray for an account to be taken as to the value, &c. of the slaves received by the defendant, and that he be decreed to pay to complainants one-seventh part of their value.
    The defendant demurred generally to the bill; demurrer was sustained, the bill dismissed, and the plaintiffs appealed.
    
      W. Q. Thompson, for appellants.
    John Bisland died in 1821. His children then living took by his will a vested interest in the slaves which he bequeathed to Mrs. Bisland during her lifetime, remainder to his children. Mrs. Hunter was one of his children, and took a vested interest. Upon her death in 1828, her interest passed to her surviving child, Catharine Ann. Upon the death of this child in 1827, its interest passed to its father, Samuel Hunter. He held a vested interest, which, at his death in 1830, passed to complainants, as his representatives in law.
    It is deemed unnecessary to cite authorities to show that the children of John Bisland took a vested interest in the property immediately under his will. The only question, it seems, is as to the jurisdiction of the court of chancery. There is no remedy at law. The complainant’s right is to an undistributed share of part of Bisland’s estate. This is an equitable, not a legal right. The remedy is in chancery, or. in the probate court. There is no mode in which complainant’s right can be asserted in the probate court. The bill alleges that John .Bis-land’s estate has been finally settled. And whether this be the fact or not, the probate court has no jurisdiction over the defendant in regard to the subject of controversy here. It has had no jurisdiction over him in regard to this subject, except in the proceedings had there on the application made under the statute for distribution. The proceedings for that object have closed, and the jurisdiction has ceased. The remedy is not by appeal; complainants admit that the probate court acted without error upon the facts before it. A bill of review cannot be maintained except by parties to the order or decree. And this court has decided, in several cases, that a bill will not lie in the probate court. There is no other conceivable mode of obtaining relief in that court. The remedy is in chancery, where the defendant will be held a trustee as to complainant’s interest in the slaves he has in possession as distributee.
    There may seem a little vagueness on the record in the figures designating the year of John Bisland’s death. I will state that I drew the bill, and the intention was to state 1821.
    Hughes, for appellee.
    The court of chancery had no jurisdiction of the case; it belongs to the probate court, which yet has jurisdiction of the subject-matter. If a decree has been rendered in that court by which a partition has taken place between persons not entitled, or between less persons than are entitled, and the person now claiming was a party to those proceedings, he should have taken such steps as would have enabled him, in a court of appeal, to correct the error committed by the court. But if he was not a party, was not before the court, and had no notice, he was and is not bound by the decree; and if he is entitled, the proceedings are liable to be reviewed and reversed. He may go into the said probate court and petition, and under the statute plenary proceedings may be had. In fact, the same relief may be had in that court that could be had in this, had a decree been rendered here which affected the estate of a person not a party. As, for instance, in the familiar case mentioned in the books of practice, where a decree has been rendered against a trustee, without making the cestui que trust a party. The cestui que trust may file a bill and impeach the decree on the ground of fraud. This might be done in the probate court. There is no reason why it was not so done. It is submitted that the demurrer ought to be allowed, and the bill dismissed.
    This court has decided, that a bill of review cannot be filed in the probate court. This, however, does not make the complainant’s case any better. He should have applied for his distributive share, and having failed, he is like other persons in default. He must take the consequences of his laches. If he has slept on his rights until the administration has been closed in the probate court, it is not the fault of the defendant. To give him aid in a court of equity on this ground would be establishing a new ground or cause for coming into a court of equity, that of negligence.
    
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion'of the court.

After distribution of the estate of a decedent, under an order of the probate court, this bill was filed by the appellants in the superior court of chancery against one of the distributees, to recover from him a ratable proportion of the estate, to which they alleged their intestate was entitled, and whose claims had been overlooked or disregarded in the distribution. To this bill a demurrer was filed, which was sustained by the court, and the bill dismissed. *

According to the well-understood powers of the probate court, under repeated decisions of this court, it has exclusive jurisdiction over the distribution of the estates of intestates. If in this instance error was committed to the prejudice of the appellants, their remedy was not by original bill in chancery against one or more of the distributees.

The decree of the court below was correct, and must be affirmed.  