
    Rogers v. Watrous.
    The law does nob favor repeals by implication. But a subsequent statute revising the subject-matter of a former one. and evidently intended as a substitute for it, although it contains no express words to that effect, must operate to repeal the former to the extent to which its provisions arc revised and supplied. (Note 15 )
    So, though a subsequent statute be not repugnant in its provisions to a former one, yet if it was clearly intended to prescribe the only rules which should govern, it repeals the prior statute.
    The act of 1843, (Hart. Dig., art. (537.) providing for a change of venue in cases where the judge was interested, was supplied and repealed by the act of 1840. (Hart. Dig., arts. (553, (554, (555.)
    It is true that the District Court cannot, in general, revise its own judgments of a former term; but where ail interlocutory order has been inadvertently and erroneously made, which, after judgment on appeal, may occasion a reversal of the judgment, there can be no reason why the District Court should not, before final judgment, correct such erroneous order, if susceptible of being corrected without prejudice to the rights of parties.
    "Where a change of venue is ordered in a case nob authorized by law, the court to which the transfer is ordered may direct- the case to be retransferred.
    
      Where the defendant procured a change of venue on the ground that the judge was interested, and tile case was, on motion of the plaintiff, stricken from the docket by the court to which tho change of venue had been ordered, on error by the defendant the court remanded the case to the original court at the costs of the plaintiff in error.
    Error from Galveston. The defendant in error filed his petition in the District Court of Harris county on the 30th day of August, 1848, to enjoin the collection of a judgment recovered against him by the plaintiff in error in that court.
    At (lie Fall Term, 1850, on motion of the attorney for the defendant in the injunction suggesting that the judge of that district was interested, having been of counsel iu the cause, the court awarded a change of venue to the county of Galveston; and the case was accordingly transferred to and placed upon the * docket of the court in the latter county. * But on motion of tile plaintiff it was stricken from the docket on the ground of a want of jurisdiction.
    The defendant brought a writ of error.
    
      Alexander Atchison, for plaintiff in error.
    The District Court of Galveston county erred in striking the cause from the docket. The venue was properly and legally changed. Section 14 of art. IV of the Constitution of the State of Texas does uot affect the subject of change of venue. That subject is disposed of by section 14, article VII, and by articles (¡53, 030 and 637 of Hartley’s Digest. , Articles 036 and 037 were the only laws to which art. 653 could be applicable at the time that it was enacted; they wore " the rules and regulations prescribed by law ” referred to.
    This position is sustained by section 3 of the schedule (art. XIII) of the Constitution of the State, which was a contemporaneous provision against implied repeals.
    At till events no objection was made to the change of venue in the court where it was obtained.
    The. causes of a motion under art. 637, as they would lie within the personal knowledge of the judge, need not have been spread upon the record. There is always a legal intendment or presumption that a judicial officer acts upon a proper showing and that his orders are properly made, until the contrary is made to appear. (Dallam’s Dig., 404; 2 Tex. R., 594; 3 Id., 305, and the cases cited.)
    
      R. Hughes, for defendant in error.
    The Constitution prohibits the judge sitting in a case in which he is interested; and because he cannot sit lie cannot hear a motion or make an order.
    The new Constitution directed the Legislature to provide for changes of venue iu civil and criminal cases, which was done. (Hart. Dig., arts. G53, 654.)
    But to show that the general provision made was not intended to embrace tlie cases when the judge was interested, or of counsel, immediately a provision is made providing for those cases, which provides a mode of trial, not a change of venue. (Hart. Dig'., art. 655.)
    The convention knew that laws were then in force by virtue of which changes of venue could be had even in the case when the judge was interested or of counsel, and t hey knew that those laws would continue in force unless repealed; but because there was a provision in the Constitution which came in conflict with one of those cases it was, in effect, directed that the laws on the subject should lie revised. That revision took place and the provision as to changes on account of the ¡merest of the judge was omitted. This was a constructive repeal.
    (Goodenor v. Bnttrick, 7 Mass. R., 140; Barttell v. King, 12 Id., 537, 545; Ashby, appellant, 4 Pick. R., 21, 23; Commonwealth v. Coole.y, 10 Id., p. 39; Ellis r. Paige, 1 Id., 43, 45; Rutland ». Hendon, 1 Id., 154; Blackton v. Walpole, 9 Id., 97.)
   WiikelisR, J.

The change of venue was awarded under the provision of an act of (he Congress of the Republic, passed in 1843, (Hart. Dig., art. 637,) which provides "that hereafter it shall be the duty of any one of the district Judges of the Republic of Texas to change the venue upon the motion of any practicing attorney, in any case in which said judge may be interested, from tlie county in which he may be presiding to the nearest adjoining comity out of his district.”

Note 15. — Lovett v. Casey, 17 T., 59Í; Cain v. The State, 20 T., 355; ex parte Valasques, 20 T-17S; Selmati v. Wotie, 27 T., 6S.

Was fciiis statute in force at the time of tlie awarding of the change of venue?

The Constitution of the State (art. 7, sec. 14) directs that “the Legislature shall provide for a change of venue in civil and criminal cases.”

Tlie act of 1846, sec. 14, (Hart. Dig., art. 656,) provides that “the District Courts may order a change of venue for tlie trial of any suit, civil or criminal, under tlie rules and regulations prescribed by law.” The next succeeding section of the same act provides that “when any judge of tlie District Court may be interested in any canses pending in his district,” &e., “or when tlie judge has been of counsel in the causes, he may exchange districts with any judge who is not subject to like disabilities,” &c. And by section 16 it is provided that “ when any judge is disqualified the parties may, by consent, ciioose and appoint some other person to try the cause,” &c. (Hart. Dig., art. 653 to 655.)

Tlie provision of the Constitution which we have cited evidently contemplates a revision by tlie Legislature of tlie law upon the subject of change of venue. Tlie provisions of tlie statute referred to contain such revision as respects eases in which the judge is interested or has been of counsel, and they seem to have been intended to provide for that entire subject-matter and to supersede all former laws on tlie same subject. Tlie law does not favor repeals by implication. But a subsequent statute, revising the subject-matter of a former one, and evidently intended as a substitute fo: it, although it contains no express words to that effect, must operate to repeal tlie former to tlie extent to which its provisions are revised and supplied. (1 Ashm. R., 170.)

So, though a subsequent statute lie not repugnant in its provisions to a former one, yet if it was clearly intended to prescribe tlie only rules which should govern it repeals tlie prior statute. (3 How. U. S. R., 636.)

Applying these rules of construction to tlie present case, we entertain no doubt that tlie act of 1843 was repealed by tlie provisions of the act of 1846. It follows that tlie change of venue was unauthorized. Whether void, for the want of authority in tlie judge to grant it, or only erroneous as having been granted for an insufficient cause, the court at Galvest.on was justified in striking the ease from its docket. It is true that tlie District Court cannot, in general, revise its own judgments of a former term. But where an interlocutory order lias been inadvertently and erroneously made, which, after judgment, on appeal, may occasion a reversal of the judgment, there can be no reason why the District Court should not correct such erroneous order, if susceptible o£ being corrected without prejudice to tlie rights of parties, before final judgment, so" as to preserve legality in its proceedings and render its final judgments irreversible.

Tlie District Court of Galveston County might, in our opinion, have gone even further, and directed the case to be re-transferred to the County of Harris, where it belongs. And tlie only hesitancy we have in giving that direction is that it was removed from that comity at tlie instance of the plaintiff in error. Tlie rights oí both parties, however, may be jeopardized by the removal if tlie case be not restored to its place, in the proper county. It is clear I hat they ought to have an opportunity afforded of having their rights finally adjudicated, and that if deprived of that opportunity it would be in consequence of an. error in which tito defendant in error is not implicated.

Tlie case presents a novel aspect. But we may, we think, without transcending our authority as an appellate court, direct that the cause, he remanded to tlie District Court of Harris County, to he reinstated upon the docket of that court, and for further proceeding at the costs of the plaintiff in emir.

Ordered accordingly.  