
    David Jerold SHANK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CORIZON HEALTH SERVICES, Health Services Provider at A.S.P.C. Florence—East Unit; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-16773
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted May 24, 2017 
    
    Filed June 5, 2017
    David Jerold Shank, Pro Se
    Jennifer B. Anderson, Brandi Christine Blair, Esquire, Attorney, Edward G. Ho-chuli, Esquire, Attorney, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Neil Fisher
    Justin Dean Holm, Esquire, Attorney, Daniel J. O’Connor, Jr., Attorney, O’Con-nor & Campbell, P.C., Tempe, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee Charles L. Ryan
    Brandi Christine Blair, Esquire, Attorney, Edward G. Hochuli, Esquire, Attorney, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee Fisher
    Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

David Jerold Shank, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Shank failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his prostate condition. See Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (supervisors can only be' hable under § 1983 if they are personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or if they implement a constitutionally deficient policy); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (municipal liability applies to suits against private entities under § 1983 if the entity acts under color of state law and the violation is caused by a policy, practice, or custom of the entity); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (deliberate indifference entails a purposeful act or failure to respond and harm caused by the act or failure to respond).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We reject as unsupported by the record Shank’s contentions that defendant Ryan perjured himself, that defendant Ryan’s attorney perpetrated perjury, and that Judge Rosenblatt was biased and prejudiced against Shank.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     