
    Columbia,
    
      November Term. 1814.
    William Brown & Co. vs. John W. Rees.
    Blanding, for Motion
    
    Willet, Contra.
    
    A debtor b" open account is not bound to take debtin°fa the hands of RD RS* signee. Sign” ment only operates as an authority or power of attorney to settle the account and -receive the money for his principal; and a receipt from or will dis-debtor,the even after notice of such assignment.
    Motion to set aside ar non-suit. judge Smith. Tried before
    this tbe plaintiff proved an account against tbe defendant, amounting to $219,84; all of • which was due previous to the 16th April, 1811. And that, on that day, the account was assigned to Burner Starke, and the defendant had notice of such assignment.
    The defendant proved in defence, a receipt In the following words: viz. i6Received, April 11th, 1812, of Mr. John W. Rees, five shillings, in full to this date. Signed, Wm. Brown & Co.”
    
    The plaintiff contended that this receipt would not operate as a discharge, as it was taken by the defendant after the notice of the transfer of the account.
    The court decided, that whatever the doctrine as to the assignment of bond» might be, yet in case of an account, the assignor might release the defendant, even after he had notice of the assignment. The pláintiff thereupon, submitted to a non-suit, with leave to move to set it aside.
    
      That motion was now made on the same ground ° as taken by the plaintiff on the trial.
   Nott, J.

A debtor by open account, is not bound to take notice of a debt in the hands of an assignee. Such an assignment only operates as an authority or power of attorney to settle the account, and receive the money for his principal. The terms may indeed be such as' to authorise the assignee to receive the money to his own use. But then it is only in the nature of a contract between the assign- or and assignee that he may so receive it. A receipt from the creditor will discharge him: But in this case, it does not appear that he had any notice, except so far as mere report might be considered as notice. This motion, therefore, must be refused.

JusticesXJoLcocK, Brevard, Grimke, and Smith concurred.

Bay, J. absent from indisposition.  