
    SHUNFU JIN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-4554 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 13, 2014.
    Guang Jun Gao, Flushing, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Richard M. Evans, Assistant Director; Christina Bechak Parascandola, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, PETER W. HALL, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Shunfu Jin, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of an October 25, 2012, decision of the BIA affirming the August 3, 2011, decision of Immigration Judge (“LJ”) Robert Weisel, denying Jin’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Shunfu Jin, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Oct. 25, 2012), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 3, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513-14 (2d Cir.2009).

We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that Jin’s asylum application is untimely, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), or the agency’s finding that untimeliness has not been excused by changed or extraordinary circumstances, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). Notwithstanding these provisions, however, we retain jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Jin does not dispute the agency’s determination that she failed to file her asylum application within one year of her arrival in the United States but challenges the BIA’s determination that there was insufficient factual support for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on Jin’s meeting with unidentified attorneys. Jin’s challenge to the BIA’s determination, therefore, is not a colorable constitutional claim as it merely disputes the BIA’s factual findings. Furthermore, although Jin’s brief identifies the requirements for raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as described in In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), there is no assertion or evidence suggesting that Jin complied with these requirements.

Jin has also failed to show any error in the agency’s determination that she did not prove past persecution or a probability of future harm as required for withholding of removal or CAT relief.

The record establishes that Jin assisted a North Korean refugee, was detained for 15 days, and fined 4,000 RMB. At no time was Jin physically harmed or threatened by authorities. These allegations are insufficient to establish past persecution. See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir.2011) (per curiam) (holding that petitioner failed to establish persecution where “he suffered only minor bruising from an altercation with family planning officials, which required no formal medical attention and had no lasting physical effect”); Ivanishvili v. U.S. DOJ, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006) (defining persecution).

As to future persecution, Jin argues on appeal that she may be persecuted in China due to imputed political opinion. Jin’s testimony, however, undercuts this argument; she stated that she joined an association to help North Korean refugees, yet no Chinese officials contacted her. Thus, there is no indication that Chinese officials knew of Jin’s connection to the association or that she was persecuted by officials because of an imputed political belief. Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008)(per curiam) (“[T]o establish a well-founded fear of persecution in the absence of any evidence of past persecution, an alien must make some showing that authorities in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities”)- Furthermore, after Jin left China, her family was contacted only once by police in 2004. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam) (concluding that “ab-sen[t] solid support in the record” a fear of persecution is “speculative at best”). As Jin has not shown a “clear probability” of persecution or torture, the agency properly denied her request for withholding of removal and CAT relief. Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 143; Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir.2005) (stating that particularized evidence showing the likelihood of torture is necessary to establish eligibility for CAT protection).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED, in part, and DENIED, in part. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  