
    DIMOND v. DIMOND.
    (Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County.
    July 26, 1910.)
    Divobce (§ 213)—Action fob Sepabation—Counsel Fees.
    Though a wife, suing for separation, will be granted counsel fees where her own statement makes out a prima facie case and her income is insufficient to support her and defray the expenses of the suit, alimony will not be allowed where there is grave doubt as to the merits of plaintiff’s case.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Divorce, Dec. Dig. § 213.*]
    Action by Lillian B. Dimond against James R. Dimond. Heard on motion for alimony, and counsel fee. Granted in part, and denied in part.
    House, Grossman & Vorhaus, for the motion.
    Charles De Hart Brower, opposed.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Eep’r Indexes
    
   GIEGERICH, J.

I do not think I would be warranted in granting any alimony, but I will allow a counsel fee of $100. In Browne v. Browne, 9 Civ. Proc. R. 180, Vann, J., after citing various cases, stated that the principle governing the subject of counsel fees in actions for separation was that the wife should be granted such a fee when her own statement makes out a prima facie case and her income is not sufficient to support her and defray the expenses of the suit, but that alimony should not be allowed if the opposing affidavits throw doubt upon the merits of her. application. In the present case, upon all the papers submitted I have such grave doubt as to the merits of the plaintiff’s case that I do not feel that any alimony should be allowed.

Motion granted as indicated. Settle order on notice.  