
    Satish SHETTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SELENE FINANCE LP, a Delaware Limited Partnership; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-55790
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted August 9, 2017 
    
    Filed August 24, 2017
    Satish Shetty, Pro Se
    James J. Ramos, Gwen Heather Ribar, Esquire, Attorney, Jonathan M. Zak, Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Sel-ene Finance, LP, DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., U.S. Bank, Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities, Corp., Credit Suisse Group Securities (USA) LLC, Donna Brammer
    Melissa Robbins Coutts, Esquire, Attorney, Matthew B. Learned, Esquire, Attorney, McCarthy & Holthus 'LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Quality Loan Service Corporation
    Kevin Broersma, Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Chicago Title Insurance Company
    Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges,
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Satish Shetty appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims relating to a mortgage loan on real property transferred to him by the borrower. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on an basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Shetty’s action was proper because Shetty failed to allege facts suffi-dent to show that he has standing to prosecute claims on behalf of the third-party borrower. See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273-74, 89-90 (2008) (elements of Article III standing; prudential standing requires that a party must assert its own legal rights and may not assert the legal rights of another).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Shetty leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint because amendment would be futile. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied if amendment would be futile); see also Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (a district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad when it has afforded plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend).

To the extent Shetty is challenging the district court’s order as the representative of a trust, the appeal is dismissed because Shetty, as a. non-attorney, “has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.” C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1987).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 986 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We reject as without merit Shetty’s contention regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.

AFFIRMED. 
      
      
         This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     