
    Eliza Poland, Respondent, v. United Traction Company, Appellant.
    
      Change of venue—a railroad company considered to have a residence in each county through which its road runs.
    
    The venue of an action, brought by a person residing in Albany county to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by her in that county, in consequence of the alleged negligence of the defendant, a street railway company having its principal office and place of business in Albany county, but which operates its road and carries on a large portion of its business in Rensselaer county, may properly be laid in Rensselaer county.
    In such a case the railroad company may be deemed to be a resident of Rensselaer county.
    
      Semble, that, in the case of a corporation other than a railroad company, its resi- ■ dence will be deemed to be its principal place of business as fixed, in 'the articles of association.
    Appeal by the defendant, the United Traction Company, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Albany Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of j Rensselaer on the 23d day of June, 1903, denying the defendant’s motion to change the place of trial of the action from the county of Rensselaer to the county of Albany.
    Plaintiff resides in Albany county, and was injured' by defendant in that county. She brought this action to recover damages for. such injury, and places the venue in Rensselaer county. Defendant has its principal “ office and place, of business ” in Albany county, and moves to change the venue to the latter county, as a matter of right. The proper demand was made under section 986 of the Code of Civil Procedure, before this motion was noticed. The justice at Special Term denied such motion, and from that order this appeal is taken.
    
      Patrick C. Dugan, for the appellant.
    
      Herbert F. Roy, for the respondent.
   Parker, P. J.:

It is substantially conceded upon the record in tins matter that the defendant, although it has its principal office in Albany, operates its road and carries on a layge part of its business in Rensselaer county. Under such circumstances I am of the opinion that it may be deemed a resident of the latter county, and, therefore, under the provisions of section 984 of the Code, the venue was well laid in such county.

When the defending company is other than a railroad company, and has named its principal place of business in its articles of association, it is well settled that the place so fixed is to be deemed its place of residence. (Rossie Iron Works v. Westbrook, 59 Hun, 345; Speare v. Troy Laundry Machinery Co., 44 App. Div. 390; Remington & Sherman Co. v. Niagara Bank, 54 id. 358.)

But it seems also to be settled that, in the case of a railroad company, its place of residence must be ascertained by its place of business, and, if it have several places of business, it must also be deemed to have several places of residence. (Pond v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 17 How. Pr. 543; Buffalo & State Line R. R. Co. v. Supervisors of Erie Co., 48 N. Y. 103, and cases there cited; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law [2d ed.], 679, 680, and cases there cited.)

No authority to the contrary has been cited, nor do I find any.

Although its principal office may be located in a specified county, the principal business of a railroad company can hardly be said to be located in any particular place. It owns property in, and operates its road through, many counties, and there ai’e various reasons why its place of residence should not be limited to the place where its main office is located. (People v. Fredericks, 48 Barb. 173, 186, 187.) I am not aware of any reason why the rule so established should be changed, and I conclude that the order must be affirmed, with costs.

All concurred; Houghton, J., not sitting.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.  