
    Bray v. The State.
    
      Indictment for an Assault icith Intent to Rape.
    
    1. Assault -unch intent to rape; admissibility of evidence. — On a trial under an indictment for an assault with intent to rape, it is competent for the State, after the woman assaulted has testified to the commission of the offense, to prove in corroboration of her testimony as to the main fact, that recently after the outrage she made complaint to those to whom complaint of such an occurrence would naturally be made; but on direct examination such testimony is confined to the bare fact of complaint, and details of the occurrence including the identity of the person accused, are not proper subjects of inquiry, and can not be proved.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Walker.
    Tried before the Hon. A. A. Coleman.
    The appellant in this case, Oliver Bray, was indicted and tried and convicted for an assault with intent to rape one Ida Andrews, and was sentenced to the penitentiary for five years.
    Upon the examination of prosecutrix, Ida Andrews, she testified to the details of the assault committed upon her and that said assault was made in the woods a short distance from the house of the defendant. The prosecutrix further testified that at the time of the assault she was living with the defendant and his wife. The State then asked the witness the following question: “State whether or not shortly after the alleged assault you told any one about it?” The defendant objected to this question upon the ground that it called for immaterial, irrelevant and inadmissible evidence. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. The witness testified that immediately upon her return she told Mrs. Bray about the assault committed upon her by Mr. Bray. The prosecutrix was then asked the following question: “Did you tell any one else what he had done?” The defendant objected to this question upon the ground that it called for irrelevant, immaterial and inadmissible evidence. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. The witness answered that she told her mother. The rulings upon this evidence present the only questions reviewed on the present appeal.
    Leith & Sheiier, for appellant, cited
    
      Griffin v. State, 76 Ala. 29; Barnett v. State, 83 Ala. 40; Scott v. State, 48 Ala. 420.
    Chas. (1. Brown, Attorney-General, for the State,
    cited Barnet v. State, 83 Ala. 43; Lacy v. State, 45 Ala. 80; Griff,nv. State, 76 Ala. 29; Barnes v. State, 88 Ala. 205; 1 McClain’s Cr. Law, § 455; 3 Green, on Ev. (15th ed.), § § 212-213, 228, 229; 2 Bish. Or. Procedure, § 457, pp. 456-57.
   SHARPE, J.

Where in prosecutions for rape the woman assaulted has testified to the commission of the offense the State may, in corroboration of her testimony as to the main fact, prove also that recently after the outrage she made complaint to those to whom complaint of such occurrence would naturally be made. On direct examination such testimony is confined to the bare fact of complaint; and details of the occurrence, including the identity of the person accused, are not proper subjects of inquiry. In such case, the State is not privileged to prove that the woman complained that any particular person assaulted her until after the defendant has brought out particulars of the complaint, or has introduced evidence tending to impeach the witnéss who testifies to the complaint. — Barnett v. State, 83 Ala. 40; Griffin v. State, 76 Ala. 29; Barnes v. State, 88 Ala. 204; 3 Green. Ev., § 213.

In the present case this rule was violated by the court’s action in overruling defendant’s objection to the question addressed to the prosecutrix as to whether she told any one other than Mrs. Bray what the defendant had done to her. The affirmative answer elicited by the question was calculated to prejudice the defendant’s case and the error of its admission requires a reversal of the judgment.

Reversed and remanded.  