
    MINGO v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Jan. 18, 1911.)
    1. Just (§ 56) — Disqualification of Jurors —Deputy Sheriff.
    Since Code Cr. Proc. art. 673, and the civil statutes relating to the competency of\jurors merely permit civil officers to exempt themselves from jury ‘service, at their option, that a juror was a deputy sheriff did not disqualify him from serving.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. § 264; Dec.-Dig. § 56.]
    2. Criminal Law (§ 789) — Instructions — Reasonable Doubt.
    An instruction that if the jury were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that accused was guilty of murder, but had a reasonable doubt whether it was committed under express or implied malice, they must give accused the benefit of such doubt and not find him guilty of a higher grade than murder in the second degree, if he was guilty of any offense, was not objectionable as not giving accused the benefit of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
    ■ [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1846-1849, 1904-1922; Dec. Dig. § 789.]
    Appeal from District Court, Grayson County ; J. M. Pearson,1 Judge.
    Allie Mingo was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    H. H. Cummins, for appellant. . John A. Mobley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes-
    
   HARPER, J.

Appellant was indicted, tried, .convicted, and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 20 years, on a charge of murder;'in the district court of Grayson county, Tex.

1. In the fourth paragraph of appellant’s motion for a new trial he complains that one of the jurors was at the time of his service on the jury a deputy sheriff, and claims this is a disqualification. Article 673 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enumer■ates the causes for challenge to a particular juror, and the reason assigned is not one of them. The civil statutes relating to persons who are competent jurors do not name this as a disqualification, but give to civil officers the right to exempt themselves from jury service if they so desire. This question was recently decided by this court adverse to appellant’s contention in the case of Edgar v. State, 127 S. W. 1053, and. other cases recently reported.

2. Complaint is also made of the follow^ ing paragraph of the court’s charge: “If from the evidence you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder, but have a reasonable doubt whether it was committed upon express or implied malice, then you must give the defendant the benefit of such doubt, and not find him guilty of a higher grade than murder in the second degree, if from tlie evidence you believe he is guilty of any offense” —appellant alleging that paragraph does not give the defendant the benefit of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. There is no merit in the contention. The court’s charge, when taken as a whole, presents favorably to appellant the doctrine of reasonable doubt as to every phase of the case.

The judgment is affirmed.  