
    Twogood v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York.
    
      (Court of Appeals,
    
    
      Filed April 13, 1886.)
    
    Municipal cokpobations — Negligence — Icy sidewalks — Repobt by
    PATBOLMAN, WHEN EQUIVALENT TO NOTICE TO CITY.
    In an action for injury occasioned by slipping on icy walk, it is error for the trial judge to charge that the facts that the patrolman, for eight consecutive days, observed the snow and ice, made entries in his book, and left notices at the station-house that “snow and ice not removed from around public park,” which the inspector was accustomed to forward to headquarters, and thence to the corporation counsel, were not in themselves sufficient to charge the city with notice,
    
      Oeo. C. Lay, for appellant,
    
      D. J. Dean, for respondent.
   Andrews, J.

The defense was placed on two grounds: the negligence of the plaintiff, and the absence of negligence on the part of the defendant. The trial judge submitted both questions to the jury, who found a general verdict for the defendant. It is impossible to say whether the jury found for the defendant on both issues, or only on the issue of the defendant’s negligence. It is claimed that, upon the uncontroverted facts, the plaintiff was negligent in venturing upon the walk in its icy condition, when she could have avoided all danger by going upon the walk upon the other side of the street, which was clear and safe. We think this question, under the decisions, was for the jury. Todd v. City of Troy, 61 N. Y., 506; Evans v. City of Utica, 69 N. Y, 166. The plaintiff is entitled, therefore, to the benefit of any valid exceptions to the rulings of the court on the issue of the defendant’s negligence. The main charge of the judge was fair and discriminating, and except for a ruling at the request of the defendant, bearing upon a question of notice, made after the conclusion of the principal charge, we should affirm the judgment.

The accident occurred on the 20th of January, 1881, and the locality was a sidewalk on the south side of a public park on Christopher street. This territory was within the precinct of Patrolman Pitcairn, who, in January, 1881, was detailed for duty by the police department within this precinct, and to report any violation of the city ordinances. On the tenth, twelfth thirteenth, fifteenth, reventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth days of that month, he made reports in writing, substantially as follows: Snow

1 Reversing 11 Daly, 167. and ice not removed from around public park -bounded by West Fourth, G-rove, and Christopher;” and left them at the station-house. This was according to the usual custom, and it is the practice for the inspector to forward reports lodged there to police headquarters, and from there they are sent to the office of the corporation attorney. The trial judge, on the request of the defendant’s counsel, charged “that the fact that Officer Pitcairn observed the snow and ice on the 12th, 13th, 15th, 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th of January, and made the entry in his book, as he testified he did, and the further fact that he reported the facts as he testified, such facts are not in themselves sufficient to charge the city with notice.” The plaintiff excepted to this charge. The judge, in his main charge, pointed out that notice, to charge the city, might be either actual or constructive, and charged that the city was hable for injuries from an obstruction on a sidewalk, only where the proper authorities had actual notice of its existence, and neglected to remove it within a reasonable time thereafter; or where, although not having actual notice, nevertheless the obstruction had existed for such a length of time that its existence ought to have been known to the public authorities, and they thereafter negligently omitted to remove it.

The point of the request was that the reports of Pitcairn to his superior officer, made in the usual course, was not notice to the defendant. We think the court erred in charging this proposition (Rehberg v. Mayor, etc., 91 N. Y., 138), and we cannot say that the error was harmless. It left the negligence of the defendant to rest upon the question of constructive notice, assuming that the jury should find that the sidewalk was in a dangerous condition, and upon the further question whether this condition had existed for such a length of time that actual notice ought to be imputed. We feel constrained to reverse the judgment on this exception, although it is by no means certain that the error affected the verdict. The judgment is therefore reversed, and a new trial ordered.

All concur, except Rapallo, J., absent.  