
    George LARIVIERRE a/k/a George Harvey, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D97-2820.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Feb. 9, 2000.
    Opinion Granting Rehearing June 21, 2000.
    
      Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Siobhan Helene Shea, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for’ appellant.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Barbra Amron Weis-berg, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PERCÚRIAM.

Appellant pled guilty to burglary of a dwelling and escape. The trial court sentenced appellant as a violent career criminal to two concurrent thirty year sentences.

The supreme court recently held that , Chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, is unconstitutional “as violative of the single subject rule contained in article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution.” State v. Thompson, 750 So.2d 643 (Fla.1999).

This court and the second district have identified two different window periods for challenging Chapter 95-182 on single subject rule grounds. According to the second district, “persons who committed their criminal offenses on or after October 1, 1995, and before May 24, 1997, and were sentenced as violent career criminals for those offenses, have standing to challenge chapter 95-182 on single subject rule grounds.” Thompson, 750 So.2d at 645; see Thompson v. State, 708 So.2d 315, 317 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). In Salters v. State, 731 So.2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), rev. granted, 749 So.2d 503 (Fla.1999), this court held that , the window period for the single subject rule challenge closed on October 1, 1996. In Thompson, the supreme court declined to resolve this conflict on the standing issue.

Appellant committed the burglary in this case on May 5, 1997. Thus, this charge falls outside the Salters window period; but inside that time limit identified in Thompson. The escape occurred on June 1, 1997, so for this charge appellant has no standing to raise the single subject rule challenge under both Salters and Thompson.

We find no error in the trial court’s denial of appellant’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea.

The judgments and sentences are affirmed. On the issue of the applicable window period, we certify conflict with the second district’s decision in Thompson, 708 So.2d at 317 n. 1.

KLEIN, GROSS, JJ., and BAILEY, . JENNIFER D., Associate Judge, concur.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

We grant the motion for rehearing. In light of Salters v. State, 758 So.2d 667 (Fla.2000), we reverse appellant’s sentence on the burglary charge and remand for resentencing. Although the escape charge fell outside the Salters window period, we remand that charge for resentencing as well, since the court relied partly on the May 5, 1997 burglary as a basis for declaring appellant a violent career criminal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

KLEIN, GROSS, JJ., and BAILEY, JENNIFER D., Associate Judge, concur.  