
    Chester L. MITCHELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 10-15816.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 14, 2011.
    
    Filed June 20, 2011.
    Steven Gilbert Rosales, Law Office of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, Santa Fe Springs, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Kathryn R. Watson, SSA—Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: SCHROEDER and BEA, Circuit Judges, and ANELLO, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Michael M. Anello, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Chester Mitchell appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Mitchell contends the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not properly take into account Mitchell’s severe borderline intellectual functioning. The ALJ considered it, however, and concluded that the impairment resulted in few functional limitations, none of which were work-related. The ALJ noted that Mitchell was diagnosed with borderline intellectual functioning, not mental retardation, and found that Mitchell had been able to work in the competitive workplace as a construction laborer.

These findings are supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Stoltz observed that Mitchell was alert, cooperative, and well-oriented in all spheres, and concluded that Mitchell’s only limitations were that he should not operate heavy machinery or drive. Dr. Spindell opined that Mitchell could perform work activities on a consistent basis without special or additional supervision, could complete a workweek without interruptions resulting from his psychiatric condition, could accept instructions from supervisors, and could interact with co-workers and the public. Furthermore, Dr. Spindell stated that Mitchell had the ability to perform daily activities, could maintain social relationships, had the ability to sustain concentration, persistence, or pace, and could function outside highly supportive arrangements. Dr. Spindell thus concluded that Mitchell could enter the workforce in several entry-level capacities.

The record reflects that Mitchell’s borderline intellectual functioning affects his inability to perform detailed and complex tasks. The ALJ, however, considered such limitations when he concluded that Mitchell could perform unskilled jobs. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.968(a) (“Unskilled work is work which needs little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of time.” (emphasis added)). Mitchell does not allege what other limitations he has as a result of his borderline intellectual functioning. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir.2008) (finding that the only concrete limitation resulting from claimant’s severe borderline intellectual functioning was her inability to perform complex tasks).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     