
    June, 1809.
    John Mowatt, jun. against Joseph Howland, Joseph Howland, jun. and Jesse Brown.
    MOTION for a new trial.
    
      -9. and B. of Ness-York, and C of having been trade, dissolved their partnership, and published notice of such dissolution,for severa] weeks successively, ne'vy printed at ⅜⅛ ⅛ was ,. ?s.ual place ot doing business, and the other at JYew-Ltmdon, 'after-warr!s endorsed a bill of exchange in I’™-v the endorsee had, or had not,actual no-⅞ >lot ^ appear; pear, thatlfe ^correTptrd! e“t of the company» Held, that these facts constituted reasonable notice to him, and to every other person not a correspondent, of the company.
    This was an action of assumpsit, in which the plaintiff declared, as the holder of a bill of exchange, against the defendants as endorsors.
    The Howlands suffered a default. Brown appeared, and pleaded the general issue.
    On the trial, the drawing, non-acceptance, and were proved as stated in the declaration. The only question was, whether the endorsement was so made as to render Brown liable. The facts were these : A part-1 nership had existed, by the name of Joseph Rowland (S’ . » Co. consisting of Joseph Howland and Joseph Howland, jun. of N-w-Ydrk, and Jesse Brown, of Norwich, in Coimi cticut. Their usual place of doing business was at Norwich, Osi the 14th of May, 1806, they dissolved their partnership, and published notice of such dissolution, for several weeks successively, in two newspapers, one in Norwich, the other in New-London. The settle- ... . ... rnent ot the company concerns was immediately committed to Brown; and the company name extinguished at the banks, and insurance offices, and the dissolution there publicly known. The plaintiff lived in New-York; but whether he had, or had not, actual notice of the dissolution did not appear; nor did it appear, that 11 he had ever been a correspondent of the company. On
    The facts, which are supposed to constitute notice of a dissolution of partnership feeing ascertained, it is a question of Ime whether the notice he reasonable, or not, '
    
      the 20th of August, 1806, Joseph Howland, jun. endorsed the bill in question, in Hew- York, with the late, company name, without the knowledge of Brown. Upon these facts, the superior court instructed the jury, that Joseph Howland, jun. was not authorized to make the endorsement with the company name; and that Brown was not liable. The jury thereupon found a verdict for the defendants ; and the plaintiff moved for a new trial, on the ground of a misdirection. This motion being reserved for the opinion of the nine judges at this term,
    
      Daggett argued in support of it, on two- grounds.
    1. That the notice of dissolution was not sufficient. It should have been advertised in Hew- York. Newspapers printed in Nero-London and Harwich, cannot be presumed to be read in Hew-York. In Gowram v. Hope et al. lisp. Dig, 776. Dub. edit. Lord Kenyon held, that notice in the London Gazette alone was not sufficient, but that particular notice by letter or message should be given besides to all persons having had antecedent dealings with the firm. But that case goes much further than is necessary for our purpose. The London Gazette circulates through the mercantile world. It is in the mercantile world what the government paper is in the political world. Would there have been a question, if, in the case cited, notice had been given only by an advertisement in a provincial paper ? Hew- York is the emporium of business for Connecticut merchants. If notice may be dispensed with there, it may be everywhere. In Gorham et al. v, Thompson et al. Peake’s Cas. 42. it appeared, as in this case, that the dissolution was generally known in the neighbourhood. But Lord Kenyon said, this was not sufficient; the dissolution must be notorious to the public, and actual knowledge of it brought home to the creditor. His lordship subjoins a very satisfactory reason. “ It would be the hardest measure imaginable upon the creditor,” says he, “ were the Jaw otherwise ; for while he supposed he was giving ■' credit to a man having sufficient to satisfy the whole of his demand, he might be trusting a beggar.”
    2. That at least it should have been left to the jury to decide whether the plaintiff had notice of the dissolution. All the circumstances respecting the question of notice, the extent of the partnership transactions, of the circulation oí the Netv-London and Norwich papers» and of the plaintiff’s means of information or the subject, ought to have been submitted to the jury. In Godfrey v. Turnbull and Mucauley, 1 lisfi. 371. the question was, whether the evidence of notice, which was an advertisement in the Gazette, was sufficient. Lord Kenyon did not deem it correct to decide upon its sufficiency in point of law, but left it to the jury to make their own inference. The jury are to judge, he added, from the practice in the usual course and ordinary mode of business. In the principal case, the court ought to have said, that an advertisement in the New-'London and Norwich newspapers was, fier ae, sufficient notice to Mo watt in New-York.
    
    Goddard, contra,
    insisted, that notice of a dissolution of partnership in the newspapers, printed at and in the vicinity of their usual place of doing business, was sufficient, in point of law, to all persons, who had no previous dealings with the firm. As it did not appear, in the present case, that the plaintiff had ever had any such previous dealings, he must be taken to be within the rule. The opinion of Chief Justice Kent, in Laming v. Guiñe and Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Heft. 304. was cited as precisely in point, and entitled to great consideration. Graham et al. v. Hojie at al. Peake’s Cas. 154, Gorham et ml, v. Thompson et al. Peake’s Cas, 42, and Abel et al. y. 
      
      Sutton, 3 Esp. 108. were also read, and commented UP°n'
   By THE Court.

Whether Joseph Howland, jun. was authorized to make the endorsement by the name and firm of Joseph Howland U Co. depends upon the question, whether there had been reasonable notice of the dissolution of the partnership previous to making the endorsement. When the facts, which are supposed to constitute notice, are once ascertained, it is altogether a question of law, whether the notice was reasonable, or not; and, in such case, there is nothing to be left to the jury.

The facts agreed to, on the statement in this case, in the' opinion of the court, do constitute reasonable notice to every person not a correspondent of the company. The direction of the superior court was correct; , and, therefore, this court do not advise a new trial.

New trial not to be granted.  