
    The State vs. Elkins.
    Criminal Lav/. Indictment, finding of. '-‘True Bill” endorsed on a bill of indictment, and signed by the foreman of the grand jury, is a sufficient memorandum of the finding, and is as good as — “A true bill.”
    
      Semble, that the word “true” endorsed on the bill and effectually signed, would be a sufficient memorandum of the finding, and the words, “not true," of the rejection of a bill.
    Several equivalent expressions enumerated by the court.
    The defendant was indicted at February term, 1838, of the circuit court of Knox, of larceny in stealing bank notes. The notes were described as “two bank notes on the Planters’ Bank of Tennessee, of twenty dollars each, one three dollar bill on Yeatrnan, Woods, & Co., two two dollar bank notes on the Bank of the Slate of South Carolina, one bank note of two dollars on the Union Bank of the State of Tennessee, all of the value of forty-nine dollars.” The signature of the attorney general to the bill of indictment was, — “Reuben B. Rogers, Atto. Gen’l.” The finding of the bill by the grand jury was noted by the following endorsement— “True Bill. Benjamin McNutt, foreman of the Grand Jury.”
    June 14.
    The defendant appeared, pleaded not guilty, at the same term, and was put upon trial before his Honor Judge Scott of the second circuit, and a jury of Knox, and found guilty. He moved in arrest of judgment and assigned the following reasons. 1 — The description of the property stolen is vague and uncertain. 2 — The indictment charges that the felony was committed of certain bank notes of Tennessee banks, North Carolina banks, and South Carolina banks, and does not ever that such banks exist. 8 — The indorsement of a true bill on the indictment is not made by the foreman of the grand jury, Benjamin McNutt, but Benjamin McNutt. 4— The bill of indictment is not signed by the attorney general of this judicial circuit — nor does the signature show of what solicitorial district the attorney general is: and for these and other reasons -to be shown in argument, he prayed that the judgment be arrested.
    His Honor gave the following judgment — “It is considered by the court that the reasons in arrest of judgment be sustained, — it appearing that no sufficient finding by the grand jury is made on the indictment.” The attorney general appealed in error.
    George S. Yerger, attorney general for the State.
    Swan and Alexander, for the defendant,
    insisted that by the omission of the article “a” in the finding of the jury, the accusation was incomplete, and cited 1 Chitty’s Criminal Law, 824; 4 Bl. Comm. 305, 306: and that no writ of error could be prosecuted in this case, because there is no final judgment, either punishing-or discharging the defendant, so as to. terminate the cause-in the court appealed from.
   Reese, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

,-The defendant,-who is charged with larceny in stealing certain bank notes, having been found guilty by the verdict of the jury, moved in arrest of judgment, and assigned various-reasons, as that the bank notes are not well described; that the existence of the bank is not sufficiently alledged; that the official signature of the attorney general to the indictment does not name the district for which he is attorney, and that the indorsement of the finding of the bill of indictment, by the foreman of the grand jury, is not sufficient.

As his Honor, the circuit judge, very properly as we suppose, thought the first, second and fourth reasons not well taken, we shall confine our consideration to the third, which the circuit court thought of sufficient importance to arrest the judgment.

The only difference from the usual finding, consists in the omission of the indefinite article, “a,” before the words “true bill.” The indorsement is, “true bill,” instead of “a-true bill.”

We deem it wise and prudent, because safe, in all concerns in the administration of justice, to adopt those words- and forms of expression, which long and well established usage may have prescribed. But we do not suppose that the omission of the article “a” changes the meaning of the indorsement, or the character of the finding. Either mode of expression is highly eliptical, and is intelligible only because of its relation to the paper upon which it is written.

They alike by the place where put and by conventional use, import that “we, the grand jury, find that the within bill of indictment is true.”

If the words just quoted were used, although differing from the common form, would any one doubt that the return would be good? So of any of these, “This is a true bill of indictment,” “This is a true bill,” “a true bill of indictment,” “a true bill,” “true bill,” — who shall say that but one of these is good, or that all of these 'modes of expression but the last are good, when that last, from its relation to the indictment-on'which it is written, and from its intrinsic meaning, although the-‘most simple and eliptical, is as intelligible as any, and conforms most nearly to the severe simplicity and brevity of the latín original.

One word, ignoramus, by being placed upon the bill, was deemed sufficiently explicit, when a bill was returned as not true. We are not prepared to say that the single emphatic word, “true,” indorsed upon a bill, and officially signed, would not sufficiently find it, and the words, “not true,” reject it.

We think therefore that the judgment was erroneously arrested, and we reverse the decision, and give'judgment [.for the state.  