
    
      WATERS vs. BACKUS.
    
    East'n District.
    
      April, 1820.
    When the natural meaning of the words of an act presents no ambiguity, there is no room for interpretation.
    Appeal from the court of the first district.
    The petition stated that the plaintiff purchased, from the executor of Boisclair, a lot of ground of sixteen feet in front, with a depth of forty-five, having a right of passage and entry of four feet, in width from the front, along the whole depth, over the next lot, which belongs to the defendant, whose house covers, in its whole depth, twenty-one inches of the passage to which the plaintiff is entitled : that the defendant refuses to clear the said passage, so that the plaintiff cannot have the benefit of it.
    
      The defendant pleaded the general issue, and farther, that the passage was, at the time it was granted, of its present width, and that whatever may have been said in the deed, under which it is claimed, it was the intention of the parties it should remain as it then was.
    The district court was of opinion that, “ the parties to the deed intended to reserve the passage, as it then existed, and although it calls for a passage of four feet, the absurdity in supposing that it was contemplated to cut down two feet of the house, justified the court in departing from the words of the deed, in order to give it such an interpretation as the parties evidently intended ; as a contrary one would be absurd, unreasonable and manifestly unjust;” whereupon judgment was given for the defendant : the plaintiff appealed.
    The evidence on which the case was heard below was all written, and consisted of a deed of partition, between J. B. Boisclair, and the defendant, of a lot of ground of sixteen feet in front and ninety in depth, holden in common between them ; the certificate of the register of wills that the portion of said lot, which belonged to Boisclair, was adjudicated to the plaintiff, and a deed of sale, executed, in consequence of such adjudication, by Boisclair’s executor.
    
      The deed of partition states that Boisclair and the present defendant, being desirous to put an end to the joint ownership which they had in a lot sixteen feet in front and ninety in depth, have effected their intention in the following manner, viz. “Louisa Lacombe, widow of N. Backus shall have, in full property the sixteen feet of front, on Bienville-street, to the depth of forty-five feet, burdened, by her consent, with a passage of four feet in width, on the whole extent of the part of the lot abandoned to her by Boisclair, who shall have and possess in full and absolute property the remainder of the lot, after and beyond the forty-five feet abandoned to the widow—which remainder contains an equal quantity of ground, viz. sixteen feet in width and forty-five in depth, and is bounded by the limit of the whole lot,—Boisclair and his heirs or assigns to have and enjoy for ever a right or passage, of the above-mentioned width, which the widow is to allow on the sixteen feet of ground set off to her, along the whole depth of the forty-five feet.”
    The executor’s deed and the certificate of the register shewed that the whole estate of Boisclair, in his portion, with the right of way expressly mentioned, was acquire by the plaintiff.
    
      By a survey which was made, under a rule of court, it appeared that, at the date of the deed of partition, a building, of 13 feet 9 inches in width, which existed on the part of the ground allotted to the defendant, covered 21 inches of the portion of it over which the right of way reserved to Boisclair was to be enjoyed ; and that the passage then existed so obstructed by the building.
    
      Hennen, for the plaintiff.
    It is contended, on the part of the defendant, that, as at the time of the partition, there was a passage of two feet and three inches only, it must have been the intention of the parties to give a passage of that extent only, though, in the deed of partition, it is expressly said that the extent thereof shall be four feet. In other words, the defendant contends that a passage of two feet three inches was intended, when one of four feet was stipulated for in the deed. On a case so very plain, as plain as words can make it, I think it necessary only to refer the court to the rule, laid down by Vattel, for the interpretation of treaties, which equally apply to the interpretation of contracts.
    “The first general maxim, in regard to interpretation, is that one is not to be allowed to interpret that which needs no interpretation. When an act is written in clear and precise words, when the meaning of the parties is evident, and one arrives at no absurd conclusion, there cannot be any reason to reject the sense naturally presented by the act. To resort to conjectures to extend the sense is to seek to elude it. If this dangerous practice be once admitted, there is no act which may not become useless. Let light shine on every disposition of it, let it be couched in the clearest and most precise words, this will be of no avail if reasons are permitted to be looked for out of it, to shew that it is not to be understood in the sense which it naturally presents.
    When chicane attacks the sense of a clear and precise disposition, it seeks to render it unavailable by a recurrence to the intention, the views of the party. It would be often dangerous to enter into the discussion of an intention which the act itself does not present. Here is a case which defeats chicane. If he, who could and ought to have spoken clearly and precisely, has not done so, he must suffer therefor, and ought not to be permitted to speak of intentions which he did not mention. ff. 2, 14 de pactis, 39 ; 18, 1. de contract. empt. 21. Pactionem 
      obscuram iis nocere, in quorum potestate fuit legem apertius dicere.”
    
    This short authority contains a full answer to every argument drawn from the probable intention of the parties. The act of partition is clear and destitute of all ambiguity; and any attempt to resort to such an interpretation of it, as that which the defendant’s counsel has given it, would render every written act totally useless.
    Unless words have no meaning, and unless four feet means two feet three inches, the plaintiff must obtain the judgment of this honorable court in his favour, for the free enjoyment and use of the passage of four feet, which the defendant contracted to give him over her lot, and likewise some compensation in damages for the frustration of his right thus far.
    
      Cuvillier, for the defendant.
    It cannot be imagined that the parties intended that the widow should demolish her house, in order to widen the passage which existed at the date of the deed of partition, to the width which is there mentioned. If such had been the intention of Boisclair, his view was to deviate from the maxim that the covenant ought to be executed in good faith. Civ. Code, 267, art. 34. If such were his views, the defendant has justice on her side, and may confidently seek relief, in the courts of her country. It is, however, due to the memory of the person, with whom she contracted the obligation of furnishing the passage, that, as long as he lived, he did not consider the demolition of the defendant’s house, as something due to, or desired by him. This cotemporaneous view of the parties, may aid us in ascertaining their intention, which is to be the guide of the court, called upon to compel the execution of their agreement. Civ. Code, 271, art. 56. The interpretation of every convention is to be made according to certain rules, which enable us to determine what was the intention of the parties, when the instrument was drafted and executed, Vattel, 2, 17, § 268.
    These principles once admitted, we are to inquire whether the intention of the parties was that the defendant should not enjoy the piece of ground, having sixteen feet in front, with a building thirteen feet nine inches wide, leaving a passage between the house and the ground of Boisclair, of two feet three inches ; whether it is not to be presumed that during the existence of the house, that portion which narrowed the passage in the length of the house, should remain as it was: rather than to conclude that the whole side of the house should be pulled down, the cross timbers cut off, and the side rebuilt at an expence to one party, which bore no possible proportion to the benefit resulting to the other.
    That the intention of Boisclair was not to compel the defendant to pull down her house, or part of it, to leave a four foot passage, is apparent from the conduct of the former. He lived six years after the partition, and never complained that the passage he enjoyed was not the one he had stipulated for.
    An error of fact is discernible in the deed of partition. When the defendant accepting, as her share, the house and sixteen feet of ground on which it stands, contracted to leave a four foot passage for the advantage of the owner of the piece of ground of the same extent, to which she abandoned her right, in order to enjoy the other part as absolute owner, it is impossible to believe that she understood that she covenanted to pull down the house, in order to give to the existing passage a width of four feet: it is clear that she intended only to leave the passage as it existed, and if there be an error of fact the agreement ought to be rescinded. Code Civ. 207, art. 250.
    
    The parties were two old negroes, the defendant and a decrepit woman, unable to discover or avoid the error in which she has fallen.
   Martin, J.

delivered the opinion of the court. The defendant’s counsel contends that the intention of the parties manifestly was that a passage of two feet three inches was to be given, and the district court so determined it.

That a passage of four feet in width was stipulated, and contracted for, the words of the partition deed do not allow us to doubt. The only question, which might have arisen, in this case, is whether equity would not, had the case appeared a proper one, have compelled the plaintiff to accept a commutation, to be satisfied with a reasonable compensation, during the existence of the building which obstructs his passage. If it had been shown that the building is a very valuable one, and that its reduction, to the size it was intended to have by the parties, would be attended with such an inconvenience and expense, as bore no possible proportion to the benefit he could reap from a specific performance of the defendant’s obligation, we are not ready to say that he might not be compelled to accept a pecuniary retribution, during the reasonable existence of the building. But the building, the property of an old negro woman, thirteen feet nine inches wide, not alledged to be built of brick or new, may most likely be reduced, at a much less expense than would attend the remanding this case, in order that the proper costs of the reduction might be ascertained. This is the only remedy of which the defendant’s case is susceptible, and we are not by the record enabled to apply it; it was not asked in the pleadings.

Left, therefore, to ascertain the intention of the parties from their words, the conclusion is irresistible that a passage four feet wide was intended and is due.

It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the district court be annulled, avoided and reversed, and proceeding to give such a judgment, as in our opinion ought to have been given in the district court, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendant do leave a passage of four feet in width in the whole length of her lot for the use of the plaintiff, and that she pay costs in both courts. 
      
       The cases of this term are continued from the preceding volume.
     