
    Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles
    [Civ. A. No. 21705.
    Jan. 30, 1985.]
    THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MOON CHOI, Defendant and Appellant.
    
      Counsel
    Charles C. Kwak for Defendant and Appellant.
    Ira Reiner, District Attorney, Donald J. Kaplan and Sterling S. Suga, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
   Opinion

BERNSTEIN, J.

Appellant Choi was found guilty of violating section 13470.5 of the Business and Professions Code. Section 13470.5 requires any retailer who uses the metric system in pricing gasoline to post a table converting the liter price to its gallon equivalent. In the trial court, appellant filed a demurrer based on the ground that section 13470.5 is preempted by federal laws authorizing the use of the metric system throughout the United States. The court overruled the demurrer and this appeal followed.

Section 13470.5 specifically provides that: “Any person selling, .offering for sale, or advertising for sale, at retail to the general public, any gasoline or other motor vehicle fuel from any place of business in this state by use of or through or from any dispensing apparatus and displaying any sign showing the actual total price per liter, shall, in addition, display in a conspicuous fashion in full view of the retail purchaser and in accordance with provisions of this chapter, a gallon-to-liter conversion table showing quantity and price equivalents.” In requiring retailers to post a conversion table, appellant contends that section 13470.5 creates obstacles to the use of the metric system and, therefore, violates express congressional intent and policy.

Specifically, appellant argues that, pursuant to its powers under article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution, Congress has declared that “the policy of the United States shall be to coordinate and plan the increasing use of the metric system in the United States ....’’ (15 U.S.C. § 205b.) He further contends that not only does section 13470.5 conflict with this general policy but also with section 204 of title 15 of the United States Code which makes it “lawful throughout the United States to employ the weights and measures of the metric system . ...” We disagree with appellant’s reading of the federal statutes and his contention that the statute in issue is in conflict with and preempted by federal law or policy.

The preemption doctrine is embodied in the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.) A state law may be preempted by operation of the supremacy clause in one of two ways. First, where “[t]he scheme of federal regulation . . . [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.” (Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. (1947) 331 U.S. 218, 230 [91 L.Ed. 1447, 1459, 67 S.Ct. 1146].) Under this first aspect of the preemption doctrine, a state regulation is invalid on its face if it regulates in an area expressly “occupied” by Congress. Under the second aspect of preemption, a state law is invalid if it actually conflicts with federal law even though Congress has not occupied the specific field. (Fidelity Federal Sav. and Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta (1982) 458 U.S. 141, 153 [73 L.Ed.2d 664, 675, 102 S.Ct. 3014].) Such a conflict occurs when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . .,” (Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 [10 L.Ed.2d 248, 257, 83 S.Ct. 1210]) or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” (Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67 [85 L.Ed. 581, 586-587, 61 S.Ct. 399], fn omitted.) We conclude that there is no evidence of either a congressional intent to completely occupy the field of weights and measures or any conflict between the subject state statute and federal law and policy.

By making the use of the metric system lawful, Congress has clearly seen fit to encourage a uniform national system of weights and measures. (See 15 U.S.C. §§ 204, 205a-205k.) Congress has not, however, mandated the adoption of the metric system by the states. The legislative history of the federal statutes indicates that Congress believes the international metric system should be the dominant but certainly not the exclusive system of measurements in the states. (Sen.Rep. No. 94-500, 1st Sess., pp. 1-3 (1975) Therefore, based on what can only be described as a preference for the metric system, we cannot conclude that Congress intended to occupy the field, and state laws regulating weights and measures are not invalid on their face.

Under the second aspect of the preemption doctrine, a state law is invalid if it is in direct conflict with a federal law even where Congress has not completely displaced state regulations in the specific field. (Fidelity Federal Sav. and Loan Assn., supra, 458 U.S. at p. 153 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 675].) Accordingly, “[t]he regulation of weights and measures by a state is valid so far as not in conflict with any act of Congress.” (Higgins v. California P. & A. (1895) 109 Cal. 304, 310 [41 P. 1087].) Because Congress intended the eventual adoption of the metric system under the current statutory scheme to be entirely voluntary (see Sen.Rep. No. 94-500, 1st Sess., pp. 1-3 (1975)), it is apparent that it envisioned the alternative use of nonmetric weights and measures by individual states. Therefore, we conclude that the statute in issue is not in conflict with any federal law nor does it obstruct the implementation of congressional policy.

The requirement that retailers using the metric system also post a conversion chart is an effort to prevent confusion, deception and fraud and is based on this state’s exercise of its police powers. (See Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, supra, 373 U.S. at pp. 144-146 [10 L.Ed.2d at pp. 257-259].) The requirement imposed by the statute in issue is California’s solution to the problems created by general unfamiliarity with the metric system. California’s Legislature has merely concluded that the retailer rather than the consumer is in a better position to calculate the conversion rate. When compared with the potential for confusion about the price being charged for gasoline, the burden imposed by the statute is insignificant. Accordingly, we conclude that Business and Professions Code section 13470.5 is a reasonable exercise of California’s police powers and is not preempted by federal law.

The judgment is affirmed.

Reese, P. J., and Cooperman, J., concurred.  