
    PEOPLE v SAYIG
    Criminal Law — Guilty Plea — Court Rules — Witnesses—Right to Compulsory Process — Waiver.
    Strict adherence to the requirements of a court rule governing the acceptance of guilty pleas is mandatory and neither substantial compliance nor the absence of prejudicial error will be deemed sufficient; therefore, a guilty plea will be set aside where the tried court did not specifically tell the defendant at the plea proceedings that by pleading guilty he was waiving his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor (GCR 1963, 785.7[1] [d] [iii], 785.7[5]).
    Appeal from Wayne, Richard M. Maher, J.
    Submitted Division 1 November 7, 1974, at Detroit.
    (Docket No. 19774.)
    Decided January 9, 1975.
    Ricky Sayig was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of an attempted breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny. Defendant appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney, Research, Training and Appeals, and Arthur N Bishop, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
    
      Solomon & Stern, for defendant.
    References for Points in Headnote
    21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 487, 492-494.
    Court’s duty to advise or admonish accused as to consequences of plea of guilty, or to determine that he is advised thereof. 97 ALR2d 549.
    
      Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Allen and Peterson, JJ.
    
      
       Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
    
   Allen, J.

Originally charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, MCLA 750.110; MSA 28.305, defendant pled guilty on January 21, 1974, to attempting to commit that particular act. MCLA 750.92; MSA 28.287. On February 11, 1974, defendant was sentenced to three to five years in prison. He appeals, arguing that the trial court’s failure to inform defendant of his right to have compulsory process issued for witnesses on his behalf requires that his guilty plea be reversed.

Although the plea proceedings were otherwise quite proper, at no point did the trial court specifically tell defendant that by pleading guilty he was waiving his right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor”. GCR 1963, 785.7(l)(d)(iii). As recently indicated by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v Shekoski, 393 Mich 134; 224 NW2d 656 (1974):

"The bench and bar are hereby advised that strict adherence to those requirements is mandatory and that neither substantial compliance nor the absence of prejudicial error will be deemed sufficient. GCR 1963, 785.7(5).”

Pursuant to that mandate, we must agree with defendant.

Reversed and remanded.

All concurred.  