
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Ramon PERALTA-PENA, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 08-50997
    Conference Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Aug. 18, 2009.
    Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Henry Joseph Bemporad, Federal, Public Defender Federal Public Defender’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Ramon Peralta-Pena (Peralta) appeals the 46-month prison sentence imposed by the district court after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He argues that the sentence is greater than necessary to meet the sentencing goals outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and specifically asserts that, in light of Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), the presumption of reasonableness does not apply to his within-guidelines sentence because U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, the guideline provision applicable to violations of § 1326, is flawed in that it is not supported by “empirical data and national experience” and allows previous convictions to be “double counted” in the calculation of guidelines ranges. Peralta further asserts that the sentence fails to adequately account for his circumstances and motives and that the Sentencing Guidelines produce unwarranted sentencing disparities because of the random availability of “fast track” programs.

We have consistently rejected Peralta’s “empirical data” argument, concluding that Kimbrough does not question the presumption of reasonableness and does not require district or appellate courts to independently analyze the empirical grounding behind each individual guideline. See United States v. Duarte, 569 F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir.2009); United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 366-67 (5th Cir.2009), petition for cert. filed, (June 24, 2009) (No. 08-11099). Furthermore, we have also rejected the argument that using a prior conviction to increase the offense level and in calculating criminal history is impermissible “double counting.” See United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358, 364 (5th Cir.2001). Peralta has not rebutted the presumption that the district court sentenced him to a reasonable, properly calculated within-guidelines sentence. See United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 338 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 328, 172 L.Ed.2d 236 (2008); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554-55 (5th Cir.2006).

Peralta’s argument that the district court abused its discretion in not considering the circumstances and motives surrounding his offense is equally unavailing. A review of the record reveals that the district court considered Peralta’s argument that his circumstances justified a sentence below the guidelines range but ultimately implicitly rejected this argument by imposing the minimum guidelines sentence. Moreover, when reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence within a properly calculated guidelines l’ange, we will infer that the district court “considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.2005).

As Peralta concedes, the argument that his guidelines range was excessive because it resulted in an unwarranted disparity between defendants to whom the “fast track” program is available and those to whom it is not available is foreclosed by current circuit precedent. See United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 624, 172 L.Ed.2d 617 (2008). Accordingly, this court need not consider it further. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5tii Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     