
    McMunigal v. Ingram, Appellant.
    
      Liquor law — Wholesalers—Bottlers—Statutes—Act of April 25, 1907, P. L. 122.
    The Act of April 25, 1907, P. L. 122, giving wholesale liquor dealers the rights and privileges of bottlers, applies only to such dealers as were licensed after the passage of the act.
    Argued Nov. 21, 1907.
    Appeal, No. 158, Oct. T., 1907, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Delaware Co., June T., 1907, No. 80, on case stated in suit of John McMunigal v. Harry G. Ingram.
    Before Rice, P. J., Porter, Henderson, Morrison, Orlady, Head and Beaver, JJ.
    Affirmed.
    Case stated to determine liability on a contract.
    The case stated was as follows:
    1. The defendant, Harry G. Ingram, holds a bottler’s license issued to him by the court of quarter sessions of the peace in and for said county, and is duly authorized and engaged in the business of bottling by purchasing malt or brewed liquors in kegs, barrels or otherwise in bulk and transferring the same into bottles or smaller packages and selling the same in such bottles or smaller packages in the quantities and under the limitations allowed by law, and has duly paid the annual license fee required of such dealers in the city of Chester, in which his said business is conducted.
    2. The said plaintiff, John McMunigal, in like manner holds a wholesale liquor seller and dealer license and is a wholesale liquor seller and dealer and was licensed by the said court of quarter sessions to sell vinous, spirituous, malt or brewed liquors at wholesale for one year from the first Monday of January, 1907, at his place of business in the second ward of the city of Chester, in said county, and has duly paid his license fee therefor and is authorized by law to carry on his'said business.
    3. On or about January 7, 1907, the said plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement for a good, sufficient and valuable consideration, that the said John McMunigal should and would purchase and buy of and from the said Harry G. Ingram certain malt and brewed liquors-.bottled by the said Ingram, and that he, the said Ingram, should deliver the same to the said MeMunigal in the quantities called for by said contract until such time as that he, the said MeMunigal should have and enjoy the right to purchase vinous, spirituous; malt or brewed liquors in kegs, barrels, or otherwise in bulk, and to transfer the same into bottles or smaller packages and to sell and dispose of the same in such bottles or smaller packages, vinous or spirituous liquors in quantities not less than one quart, and malt or brewed liquors in quantities not less than twelve pint bottles, and none of such liquors to be sold to be drunk upon the premises or in any other place provided for such purpose by the vendor, it being further agreed between the said parties hereto that upon failure to comply with the agreement aforesaid the party so in default should pay to the other the sum of $125 as damages fairly liquidated and ascertained by the parties for such default.
    4. On May 10, 1907, in pursuance of and in full accordance with the contract aforesaid, the said John MeMunigal made demand of and on the said Ingram to have delivered to him malt or brewed liquors in bottles, as called for by said contract, with which demand the said Ingram refused to comply, on the ground and for the reason that the act of assembly, a copy of which is annexed hereto and made a part of this case stated, had before that time become a law of said commonwealth and under said act of assembly the said John MeMunigal had and enjoyed a right to purchase vinous, spirituous, malt or brewed liquors in kegs, barrels or otherwise in bulk, and to transfer the same into bottles or smaller packages and to sell and dispose of the same in such bottles or smaller packages and that thereby the agreement aforesaid between said parties had come to an end and the said Ingram was no longer bound thereby. The said MeMunigal thereupon demanded of the said Ingram the said sum of $125, claiming that said act of assembly did not give him the right to bottle as claimed by said' defendant, which demand and payment the said Ingram thereupon refused.
    The court entered judgment for plaintiff on the case stated.
    
      February 28, 1907:
    
      Error assigned was the judgment of the court.
    
      O. B. Dickinson, for appellant,
    cited: Elbert v. Lowenstein, 58 N. Y. Supp. 889; Kelly v. Owen, 74 U. S. 496; Plum v. Fond du Lac, 8 N. W. Repr. 283; Mason v. Heyward, 5 Minn. 74; Forbes v. State, 43 Atl. Repr. 626; Outcalt v. Outcalt, 8 Atl. Repr. 532; Reg. v. Christ Church, 12 Q. B. 149; Fitzpatrick v. Simonson Bros. Mfg. Co., 90 N. W. Repr. 378; Grimes v. Byrne, 2 Minn. 89; Maysville & L. R. R. Co. v. Herrick, 76 Ky. 122; Clapp v. Sherman, 14 R. I. 299; Com. v. Dracut, 74 Mass. 455; Commonwealth v. Jones, 10 Pa. C. C. Rep. 611; Commonwealth v. Sellers, 130 Pa. 32; Commonwealth v. Donahue, 149 Pa. 104.
    No book for appellee.
   Per Curiam,

We all are of opinion that the learned court below properly construed the Act of April 25,1907, P. L. 122, as applying only to wholesale liquor sellers and dealers who should be licensed after its enactment. As shown by the opinion filed, this conclusion accords more fully with the grammatical construction of the language used than does that contended for by the appellant’s counsel; and it is supported by the weightier argument that it harmonizes the act with the general system of laws of which it forms a part. Under the other construction a person licensed as a wholesaler at the date of the approval of the act became invested at. once with the privileges conferred by a bottler’s license without having submitted an application for a license conferring those privileges to the discretion of the court of quarter sessions and (if he was licensed in a borough or township) without paying the increased license fee, which, in view of the additional privileges that a wholesale license will give, the legislature has provided shall be paid by the grantee of such license. Doubtless the legislature had power to give the statute this retroactive effect upon licenses already issued, but an intention so to do is not to be imputed where the words used to express the legislative intent are perfectly consistent with the conclusion that the act was intended to operate prospectively only. It is true it was held in Commonwealth v. Donahue, 149 Pa. 104, that the provision in the act of June 9, 1891, prohibiting wholesale dealers from selling brewed or malt liquors in less quantities than twelve pint bottles, and from permitting liquor to be drunk on the premises where sold, applied to dealers licensed before the passage of the act. But the words of that act include all wholesale dealers and left no room for supposition that the prohibition was to apply only to wholesale dealers thereafter licensed; whereas in this act the words are not only susceptible of, but plainly suggest, the construction which restricts the enlargement of privileges to future licensees.

The judgment is affirmed.  