
    M.C., a minor, BY AND THROUGH his parent D.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 16-35828
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted August 9, 2017 
    
    Filed August 15, 2017
    Donna Jo Coningsby, Pro Se
    Cecil Reniche-Smith, Assistant Attorney General, AGOR—Office of the Oregon Attorney General (Salem), Salem, OR, for Defendant—Appellee
    
      Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

M.C., a minor, by and through his parent D.C., appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco City & County, 364 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004) (decisions regarding issue preclusion). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. United States v. Wash., 969 F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1992). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed M.C.’s claims relating to the due process hearing because M.C. faded to allege a legal theory or facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief against the Oregon Department of Education (“ODE”). See Or. Admin. R. 581-015-2345(1)(a)(A) (“A parent may request a due process hearing if the parent does not agree with the identification, evaluation, educational placement of a child, or the provision of a free appropriate education to a child who may be disabled.”); see also Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Dismissal of M.C.’s claims relating to the complaint resolution procedure matter was proper because M.C.’s claims were previously litigated against ODE to a final judgment in state court, both actions involve the same factual transaction, the claims could have been joined in the first action, and the remedy sought in the instant action is additional or alternative to that sought in the state court case. See Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005) (“To determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment federal courts look to state law.” (citation omitted)); Lincoln Loan Co. v. City of Portland, 340 Or. 613, 136 P.3d 1, 3-4 (2006) (elements of claim preclusion under Oregon state law).

The motions to take judicial notice (Docket Entry Nos. 19, 31) are denied.

M.C.’s motion to extend the time to file a reply brief (Docket Entry Nos. 32 and 34) is granted. The clerk shall file the reply brief submitted at Docket Entry No. 30.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     