
    Mark William STANLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, South County Regional Center; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 08-55752.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    
      Submitted July 12, 2011.
    
    Filed July 25, 2011.
    Mark William Stanley, San Diego, CA, pro se.
    Attorney General CA, Esquire, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Mark William Stanley, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging denial of access to courts and related state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Stanley’s access-to-courts claim because an inmate’s constitutional right to access the courts is limited to attacks on his or her conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Stanley’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

We assume that the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Stanley’s state law claims after dismissing his § 1983 claim, and therefore construe the dismissal of these claims to have been without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); cf. Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir.1994) (requiring clarification on remand that dismissal based on declining supplemental jurisdiction was without prejudice).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     