
    (First Circuit — Hamilton Co., O., Circuit Court
    Jan. Term, 1899.)
    Before King, Haynes and Parker, JJ. [Of the Sixth Circuit, sitting in the First Circuit.
    LENA RUDERSHAUER v. THE METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    
      Life Insurance — Testimony as to intended beneficiary— Designation of beneficiary in life insurance policy — Testimony as to who the applicant intended should be the beneficiary admissible.
    Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton county.
    The plaintiff applied for a policy of insurance on the life of Sarah Putthoff at her request and as seourity for loans theretofore made to her when in need. A policy was delivered to her, made payable to the estate of Sarah Putthoff. At the trial below plaintiff was net permitted to testify that she asked that the policy be made payable to her, being told by the agent that the change was not necessary in a policy of that kind, and she would get the money when the insured died. This so far satisfied her that she paid the premiums as they fell due. The policy was for $300. At the death of the insured the company obtained from heradminstrator a receipt in full of all claims under the policy for $100.
    King, P. J.; Haynes and Parker, JJ., concur.
   Held — The designation of a beneficiary in the applioaticn is not made a part of the policy. The policy is the contract of the parties. Only so much of the application asjjs expressly in the policy made a part of it can be held to be a part. The name of the beneficiary is not so expressly referred to.. The classes of persons to whom insurance is to be paid are named in the policy. Plaintiff *is one of the classes named. See 50 N. J. L., 72. The trial court should admit evidence of the conversations between plaintiff and the agents of the company, and also showing to whom the policy and other papers were delivered by the company’s agent.

Keam & Keam, for Plaintiff in Error.

Robertson & Buchwalter and R. C. Pugh, for the Company.

There is no error in ruling on questions asked plaintiff’s witness, because questions call for conlusicns, and not what was said or done; neither is there any offer made of what is expected to be shown by the answers cf the witness.

The requests to charge involve particular faots which are not controlling, and were properly refused. But the court should have submitted the case to the jury with an appropriate charge, and for instructing the jury to and for defendant, and because the judgment is against the evidence and law, the judgment is reversed and new trial awarded. I’fel  