
    Baldwin’s Appeal.
    1. It is not error for the Orphans’ Court to refuse to reverse and set aside a decree on the petition of one of the persons at whose instance it was made, after an appeal to the Supreme Court to review the same.
    2. No appeal lies from the refusal of the court to reverse or modify such a decree.
    February 3d, 1886.
    Before Mercub, C. J., Gordon, Paxson, Trunkby, Sterrett, Green and Clark, JJ.
    Appeal from the Orphans’ Court of Fayette county: Of January Term, 1886, No. 272.
    
      This was an appeal by George E. Baldwin from a decree of the court, refusing to revoke and set aside a decree of the samé court revoking letters of administration, granted to H. G. Frick. This decree appointing Frick administrator had been made on a petition in which George E. Baldwin had joined. An appeal had been taken by Frick to the Supreme Court to review the action of the court in making this decree. The following is the decree of the court in this case from which this appeal is taken:
    And now December 17th, 1885, this matter came on for hearing and was argued by counsel. And now, December 21st, 1885, after consideration thereof, it' appearing to the court that an appeal from the decree entered June 12th, 1885, revoking the letters granted to H. C. Frick, had been taken prior to the presentation of the petition of George E. Baldwin, for a rule to show cause why said decree should not be revoked and set aside, etc., etc., and it further appearing to the court that a certiorari had been filed in said matter prior to the hearing on the rule granted to the said George E. Baldwin, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that said petition and all proceedings had thereon be dismissed at the costs of said petitioner.
    
      R. H. Lindsey for appellant.
    
      Thomas C. Lasear (N. Ewing, P. S. Newmyer with him), for appellees.
    We submit that the appeal in this case should be quashed for the following reasons :
    (1.) It does not appear from appellant’s paper book that the affidavit was made and recognizance entered into as required in appeals. On the contrary, if the docket entries are correctly given, these requisites were not complied with.
    (2.) It appears from the errors assigned that this appeal is from the refusal of the court below to set aside a former decree, and such refusal is not the subject of review by appeal to this court. Kepner’s Appeal, 94 Pa. St., 76; Breden v. Gilliland, 67 Id., 34.
    (3.) The appellant not being the party aggrieved by such refusal, is not entitled to an appeal: H. C. Frick is the only party interested. who could take an appeal, provided such appeal would lie.
   The opinion of the.court was filed February 15th, 1886.

Per Curiam.

The specification of error is not sustained. The refusal of the court to reverse and set aside a decree on the petition of one of the persons at whose instance it was made, after an appeal to and a certiorari from this court to review the same, presents no cause for reversal here. If the complaint was an error in making the original decree, it would be a proper subject of inquiry. Such however is not now tbe case. After the court has made a definitive decree which has been appealed from, it is not error for it to refuse to review or modify the same. No appeal lies from its refusal to do so.

Appeal quashed.  