
    Joseph PARKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph T. SMITH, Superintendent, Sha-wangunk Correctional Facility, John Maly, Deputy Supt. of Security, Sha-wangunk Correctional Facility, G. Gardner, Lieutenant, Shawangunk Correctional Facility, K. Skwera, Prison Guard, Shawangunk Correctional Facility, J. Krom, Inmate Grievance Supervisor, Shawangunk Correctional Facility, Thomas G. Eagen, Former Inmate Grievance Director, Louis Franco, Deputy Superintendent of Programs, Otisville Correctional Facility, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-4249-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 12, 2012.
    
      Joseph Parks, WalMLl, N.Y. pro se, Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Martin A. Hotvet, Assistant Solicitor General, for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, N.Y. (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Andrew D. Bing, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges, JED S. RAKOFF, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Joseph Parks (“Parks”), pro se, initiated this action by filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging eight causes of action for violations of constitutional and statutory rights while imprisoned at Shawangunk Correctional Facility in 2007. Parks now appeals from the District Court’s judgment dismissing his complaint following motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment by defendants-appellees (“defendants”). The sole issue Parks raises on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying his three motions for appointment of counsel. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review a district court’s decision whether to appoint counsel for abuse of discretion. See Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, 610 F.3d 776, 780 (2d Cir.2010). Although there is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel for litigants in civil cases, see Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172-74 (2d Cir.1989), federal courts may “request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In considering a motion to appoint counsel, a district court “should first determine whether the indigent’s position [is] likely to be of substance.” Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnston v. Maha, 606 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir.2010). If a plaintiff satisfies this threshold requirement, courts consider secondary factors, including the “plaintiffs ability to obtain representation independently, and his ability to handle the ease without assistance in ... light of the required factual investigation, the complexity of the legal issues, and the need for expertly conducted cross-examination to test veracity.” Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172; see also Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 203-04 (2d Cir.2003). We do not require that “all, or indeed any, of the factors ... be controlling in a particular case” as “[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts.” Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1986).

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that, even if Parks met the threshold requirement, secondary factors weighed against the appointment of counsel, since the issues presented in Parks’ action were not overly complex and Parks was able to effectively litigate his case without counsel, as when he succeeded in partially defeating defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Parks also argues on appeal that appointed counsel would have sought, inter alia, five years worth of misbehavior reports and all grievances alleging religious and racial discrimination. This contention is unavailing, however, as there is no indication that the District Court would have permitted such a broad discovery request absent any evidence that Parks’ own misbehavior report was based on religious or racial discrimination. See In re Dana Corp., 574 F.3d 129, 148-149 (2d Cir.2009) (“A court plainly has discretion to reject a request for discovery ... if the request is based only on speculation as to what potentially could be discovered.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Parks’ arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the September 12, 2011 judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.  