
    MRS. CRUGKER’S CASE.
    Lydia Cruger, executrix of Moses Shepherd, v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      The Secretary of the Treasury refuses to pay a contractor on the Cumberland road on the ground of his fraudulent collusion with the superintendent. Congress, by a committee of the Bouse, virtually retry the case and pass a private act for the relief of the contractor. It gives him $33,674, and expressly sets forth in terms that this shall be “ in full for the balance due him.” Be accepts payment, but brings an action for moneys remaining due to him sunder the same contract on the ground that at the suggestion of the Bouse committee he temporarily withdrew this part of his demand in order that he might obtain immediate relief, but with the mutual understanding that Ms claim for the portion tvithdrawn should be re-presented to the next Congress. The former Court of Claims decides in his favor on the merits and reports a bill to Congress for his relief. Congress send the case bach to this court.
    
    I. Where a private act awards a contractor a large amount and expressly sets forthin terms that it shall he “ i/n full for the balance due him,” (there having been a dispute between him and an Executive Department,) his acceptance of the amount will forever conclude him from re-opening the case.
    
      II. An agreement, between a claimant and a committee of the House of Representatives cannot be introduced to affect the construction of a private-act, nor remove conditions which it imposes upon him.
    III. A private act re-referring a case to this court, does not by implication waive the finality of a previous settlement of the claim imposed by the express terms of a former private act passed for the relief of the same party.
    IV. A simple reference of a claim by Congress to this court will not change by implication the law otherwise applicable to the facts of the case, except that it may waive in some cases the statute of limitations, and in others may operate as a ratification of a transaction which was made subject to the approval of Congress.
    V. The fact that the former Court of Claims rendered a decision on the merits in favor of the claimant, and reported a bill to Congress for his relief in a case where a previous compromise concluded him from re-opening the controversy, does not preclude the court, as at present constituted, from giving effect to the compromise. The former court sent up the facts and the evidence and enabled Congress to waive or insist upon a bar; the present court renders a final jndgmont which must be determined solely upon legal pn-inciplos.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of tbe case.
    I. On the 7th February; 1817, Moses Shepherd entered into a contract with Elie Williams, the agent of the United States, to construct certain mason-work and bridges upon the Cumberland road, by the terms of which contract the work was to be completed in such manner and form as the superintendent of the United States might direct and approve, and no mason-work was to be paid for except such as should be approved by the superintendent, and any sum reserved was to be paid to the contractor as soon as the work should be completed and approved by the superintendent. Subsequently one Joseph 1-hompson was appointed by the President superintendent of tne section of the road within which was Shepherd's contract, and he was at the same time instructed that the execution of the contracts upon that section of the road was left entirely to his supervision. After his appointment, and during the progress of the work, payments were made habitually to the contractor, and, as the regular mode of proceeding, upon Thompson’s admeasurements. According to Thompson’s admeasurements, for work done by Shepherd pursuant to his directions and with his approval, there remains due and unpaid $18,124.34.
    
      II. Ia 1819 the superintendent, Thompson, being suspected of fraudulent collusion with the contractor, Shepherd, was removed from office. At that time the accounts of Shepherd had not been fully adjusted and paid. The Secretary of the Treasury appointed commissioners to remeasure the work. The commissioners, after examination, reported a less amount than that allowed by the superintendent, and the Secretary of the Treasury refused to pay for the amount of work claimed by the contractor. The contractor then petitioned Congress for relief, and the House of Representatives passed a resolution directing the accounting-officers of the Treasury to make a statement of the contractor’s accounts on certain principles therein referred to. At the next session of Congress such a report was made accordingly, but the report thus made did not include all of the contractor’s items of demand for work done on the Cumberland road. Congress thereupon passed the following Private aet, 3d March, 1825, (6 Stat. L., p. 336:) “Be it enacted, &c., That there be paid to Moses Shepherd, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of §33,674.36 in full for the balance due him.” The amount thus allowed by the private act was the amount of the balance fouud due by the report of the auditing officers of the Treasury. It was paid to and accepted by the contractor, but the amount so paid still left remaining the balance of $18,124.31, set forth in the first finding of fact.
    III. In 1855 the claimant filed her petition in the Court of Claims to recover the items of demand which, as she alleged, had not been included in the private act passed for the relief of Moses Shepherd, as set forth in the second finding. On the 19th November, 1860, the court rendered a decision, awarding to the claimant the balance of $18,124.34, before set forth, and ordering a bill to bo reported to Congress for her relief to that extent. The bill so reported was not passed, but Congress, in place thereof, passed the following private act, March 3, 1875 : “Be it enacted, dec., That the claim heretofore reported to Congress by the Court of Claims in favor of Lydia Oruger, executrix of Moses Shepherd, deceased, be referred back to said court, with power to hear and determine the same, as in other cases, and with the right to either party to use the evidence heretofore taken in said cause, so far as the said court shall ■deem the same pertinent and competent.”
    
      
      Mr. Walter 8. Cox for tbe claimant.
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Simons for the defendants.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The only question which the court has considered in this case, and indeed the only question of law which there is to consider, is whether the demand or cause of action has not been finally compromised by the parties.

The contractor, whom the claimant in this suit represents, lay under the burden of a charge of fraudulent collusion between himself and the official superintendent, under whose supervision the work was performed and upon whose measurements the contractor’s claim is based. The matter had been the subject of an investigation by a commission appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury, and the commission had reported adversely to the contractor, and the Secretary had sustained the report and refused to pay any portion of his demand. When he came into Congress for relief, a committee of the House of Eepreseutatives virtually retried the case, and Congress directed a statement of the contractor’s accounts to be made by the accounting-officers of the Treasury according to certain instructions.

Here, then, was a fair case for compromise, according to all the authorities. It was, if not doubtful, still fairly disputable, and upon whatever basis the settlement may have been placed, a settlement of such a disputable case is never allowed to be disturbed.

With that state of facts before them as a basis for compromise, the two houses of Congress united in passing the private act for the relief of the contractor. It gave to him a large sum, $33,674.36, and it expressly set fprth in terms that the payment of this sum to the contractor should be “in full for the balance due him.” In no other case that can now be recalled has this provision been actually written on the face of such a statute, but there have been cases in which it has been held by the Supreme Court that such a provision should be implied, and that a payment made after such a dispute is conclusive upon the contractor. (Adams’s Case, 7 C. Cls. R., p. 58; Child, Pratt & Fox’s Case, id., p. 209.) The fundamental difference between this and the Supreme Court in those eases was that this court held that the intent of Congress in passing the statute which was the subject of construction, was to afford the parties immediate relief for certain reduced amounts which an ene-parte commission had awarded to them, and that it was not the intention of Congress to preclude the parties from seeking a judicial investigation upon the merits. In this case that construction would not be tenable, for Congress have attached to the private act a provision which leaves no room for conjecture.

It has been shown, or attempted to be shown, by the claimant that at the suggestion of the committee of the House of Rep: resentatives the contractor temporarily withdrew a part of his demand, in order that he might obtain immediate relief for the balance; and that he did so in the mutual understanding of himself and the committee that his claim for the items withdrawn should be re-presented to the next Congress. We need not doubt that such was the fact, and yet it is impossible to vary the terms of the statute, and certainly impossible to annul an express provision by contradicting it in such a way.

It has also been suggested by the claimant that the private act 3d March, 1875, re-referring the claim to this court, was intended to take it out of the operation of any compromise, and enable this court to again adjudicate it upon the merits. But the reference to this court in that act does not waive the former settlement in terms; and the only waiver that appears on the face of the statute is a right given to “ either party to use the evidence heretofore taken;” and that is indeed confined to evidence which shall be found to be “pertinent and c'ompetent.”

It has been held in previous discussions, and it must now be regarded as a fixed principle in this court, that a simple reference of a case by Congress to this court, of itself, waives no legal defense which the Government, as defendant, may have, excepting only the statute of limitations. When Congress specially sends a case to be heard and determined here, that enactment probably overrides the existing general enactment, that such a case is barred from being brought by lapse of time. There are, indeed, cases where the reference of a claim by Congress to this court may operate as a ratification of a transaction which was in terms made subject to the approval of Congress; but, apart from these two exceptions, it is difficult to conceive of any case where the mere act of referring by enactment will change by implication tlie law otherwise applicable to the facts of the case.

The circumstance has not been overlooked that this court, before its reorganization in 1873, rendered a decision in favor of the contractor, and ordered a bill to be reported to Congress for his relief. But there are two answers to the apparent incongruity of the court deciding one thing then and another thing now. In the first place, the Supreme Court had not then rendered the series of decisions upon compromises with the Government, which is practically, if not theoretically, so much new law; and, in the second place, the former court did not render a final judgment in the suits brought before it, but sent them to Congress for consideration and final determination. It was and still is within the proper discretion of Congress to give effect to the informal understanding alleged to have subsisted between the contractor and the committee of the House, and to waive the legal defense then as now existing. The former decision set forth the facts and carried up the evidence, and placed Congress in a position to act for or against the claim. The court, as at present constituted, renders a final judgment, which must be determined solely upon legal principles, and cannot be aided by legislative discretion.

The judgment of the court is that the petition be dismissed.

Loring-, J., dissented.

Bichardson, J., was absent when the judgment was announced, but heard the case, and took part in the decision, and concurred in the opinion of the court.  