
    Catlin v. Glover.
    Tlio facts that are well pleaded only are to bo taken for true on general demurrer.
    The mere use of a person’s name as trustee is not sufficient to raise an implied promise oa the part of the beneficiary to pay him a sum of money as commissions or otherwise. Allegations that “‘the plaintiif attended to the duties imposed on him by said trust, and to the interest, of said defendant in that behalf, to the best of his judgment and in compliance with the instructions of said defendant,” and that “he ought to have unci recover” the sum demanded “as his reasonable commissions for his care, trouble, attention, and responsibility in that behalf:' Held to lie insufficient, oven on a general demurrer.
    The object of the petition is to inform the court and the defendant of the facts which constitute tiio plaintiff’s cause of action; therefore general expressions, independent of time, place, or circumstances, are not sufficient.
    Whore a general demurrer to the petition is sustained, and the plaintiff does not ask leave to amend, final judgment for the defendant should be entered.
    Appeal from Austin. The appellant brought suit against the appellee for the recovery of a sum of money. The petition alleges that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $272.70, and states the cause of action as follows, viz: “That on the 1st day of March, A. D. 1844, one William E. Crump, being in debt to the said Glover in the sum of four thousand live hundred and twenty and 90-100 dollars, executed and delivered a deed of trust on certain property therein mentioned, to secure the paj-ment thereof, in which deed said petitioner was trustee, with the power and authority and rights-usually conferred in such eases; and that lie, the said plaintiff, attended to the duties*imposed on him by said trust-deed, and to the interest of said Glover in that behalf, to the best of his judgment., and in compliance with the instructions of said Glover, from the lime of making said trust-deed as aforesaid until afterwards, to wit, the 1st day of October, A. D. 1S40, about which time, or at some time not known to your petitioner, the said William E. Crump settled the said debt secured in said trust-deed with the said Glover. The premises considered, your petitioner says that lie ought to have and recover the said sum of two hundred and seventy-two 76-100 dollars from said defendant as his reasonable commissions for Ills care, trouble, attention, and responsibility in that behalf.”
    The defendant excepted to the legal sufficiency of the petition. The exceptions were sustained and the case dismissed, and* the plaintiff appealed.
    Munger, for appellant.
    The petition disclosed a good canse of action if the facts stated were true, which depended upon the evidence adduced, which was admitted by the demurrer. (3 IT. S. Dig., 598, art. 144; Guild v. Holbrook, 11 Pick. K., 101.)
    Willie, for appellee.
    There was no .sufficient cause of action stated in the petition. The mere use of the plaintiff's name did not entitle him to commissions. If lie had actually become entitled to compensation by performing labor or rendering service in the collection of the mouey, he sliouid have stated distinctly of what nature tiie labor was, in what the service consisted.
   Wheeler, J.

The question presented by the record is as to the legal sufficiency of tiie petition.

It is true, as insisted for the appellant, that for the purpose of considering the exceptions to the petition, it is to be taken, as to every fact well pleaded, to be true; but it is only the fact's well pleaded which are admitted by the exception. Are there, then, in this petition facts pleaded which disclose a contract or promise on tiie part of tiie defendant, either express or implied, to pay to the plaintiff tiie money claimed ?

There is no averment of an express promise; and it is. evident that the mere fact of naming the plaintiff' in a deed of trust in which the defendant was tiie the beneficiary is not of itself sufficient to raise an implied promise on the part of the latter to pay the former a sum of money as commissions or otherwise. 1£ a promise can he implied'iu this ease, it must be, from the aver-ments that (lie plaiuiiff “attended to (lie «huios impu.-ml on him by said trust, am! n> the interest of said Glover in that behalf, to «¡»o best of his judgment ami in compliance with tiie instructions of said Che r,” and that “he ought to have and recover ” tiie sum demanded as his reasonable commissions for ids care, trouble, attention, and responsibility in that, bduilf.” But what fact is here stated from which a promise may he implied? V.’hat duties were imposed on the plaintiff by the trust? In wluit respect did lie attend to the interests of tiie defendant? And in compliance with what instructions? In what did his ‘‘•care, trouble, attention, and responsibility” consist? We are not informed by the petition. If facts susceptible of proof existed, (hey were, iiie proper subject of averment, and should have been alleged lo a))]wise tiie defendant of the, proofs intended to be -introduced. IE it be essentially the object of pleading to apprise the court and the opposite party of the facts intended to he relied on in evidence, it is manifest that that object has not boon attained in the present case.

Tiie court, iu our opinion, did not err in adjudging the petition'insufficient; and as the plaintiff declined to amend, the judgment must he affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  