
    *Francis Roberts v. Jacob D. Stagg.
    This Court will not hear a motion to reverse an order for a new trial, made by the Judge of the City Court, on an appeal to him from the verdict of the jury; nor to reverse any interlocutory order of that Court, until the final determination of the cause.
    The verdict of a jury is conclusive only on facts which are either doubtful in themselves, or in their application to the case.
    The delivery over of a note, held by defendant, to the plaintiff, furnishes a conclusive presumption of the payment of it, unless the manner of its coming into his possession be otherwise accounted for.
    The plaintiff brought an action in the Inferior City Court, against the defendant, to which he set up, by way of discount, the amount of a promissory note, made by the plaintiff to himself. It appeared from the evidence, that the note had been cancelled and delivered up to the plaintiff, and the only evidence to support it was an entry in the books of the defendant, proved by his clerk, debiting the amount of the note to the plaintiff, and crediting him with sundry payments ; but after deducting them, a balance appeared due to the defendant, a sum, including $31 interest, on the note, exceeding the plaintiff’s present demand by $20 16 cents. The note, it appeared, had not been duly paid when it became due ; and one witness stated, that it was usual to deliver them up, especially when a balance was only due, and to rely solely on the book entry. On this evidence, the jury found for the defendant the above sum of $20 16 cents ; and the recorder, on an application for that purpose, ordered a new trial.
      
       A motion was made in the Circuit Oourt to reverse that order, which the presiding Judge refused, and an appeal was brought up to this Oourt to reverse that decision, on the ground, that the matters in dispute were wholly questions of fact, and therefore the decision of the jury was conclusive.
    
      
       MoC. 557.
    
   The opinion of the Oourt was delivered by

Johnson, J.

The position, assumed by the ground of the motion, *is certainly correct, as a general rule, yet its indiscriminate application would be productive of incalculable mischiefs. Jurors, like other men, possess their passions and prejudices, and if a party’s rights were to be concluded by the indulgence of them, law would furnish but a slight protection to our lives, or reputation and property; for we often see a a whole community convulsed with those passions, in opposition to the strict rule of right. Such an application of the rule never was contemplated, and I take its true meaning to be, that the verdict of a jury is conclusive only on facts which are either doubtful in themselves, or in their application to the case. On the application of it to this case, I think it will be found, that the verdict of the jury is in direct opposition to the facts. The defendant’s demand was originally a book debt, which had been closed by the promissory note, and although it ivas a security of the same class and rank, and did not extinguish the book debt, yet its delivery over to the plaintiff furnishes a conclusive presumption of the payment of it, unless the manner of its coming into his possession could be otherwise accounted for. But admitting that the delivery of the note to the plaintiff, did not prove per se an extinguishment of the debt, yet his liability on that contract certainly ceased, and the defendant must have resorted to his account for the goods, and this was not offered in evidence on the trial; and admitting also, that the proof offered was evidence of the book debt, and that it was admissible under the notice, yet, if the plaintiff was not liable on the note, he was not chargeable with the interest, which would have left abalance in his favor; so that, in any view of the subject, the verdict of the jury was directly opposed to the evidence. But on another ground, I am clearly pf opinion that the Court below ought not to have entertained the motion". The order of the .City Court directing a new'trial, vacated the verdict of the- jury, so that the cause is still depending in that Court. Now, if every interlocutory* order of ^oul’^ be made the subject of appeal to the Circuit* Court, it would lead to an endless source of litigation, and the jurisdiction of that Court would become indeed a dead letter. No cause originating there, ought therefore to find its way to the Circuit Court, until the final determination was had ; and I believe I have the authority of my brethren to say, that it is their unanimous opinion. This ground, although not made in the argument of the case, is one on which' the Court feel justified in expressing an opinion as a protection to itself, and as indispensably necessary, to the speedy administration of justice; and it is conceived, that no possible injury, delay, or inconvenience, can result from it, as after the final determination of the cause in that Court, all its errors may be reviewed and corrected.

Hunt, for the motion. J. B. White, contra.

Corcocik, Cheves, Gantt and Richardson, JJ., concurred. 
      
       2 MoC. R. 132; 2 MoC. 26.
     
      
       2 Strob. 255.
     
      
       MSS. 1 Rice Dig. 43, 15,19 ; 3 McC. 80; 2 Strob. 255; 2 N. & McC. 488 ; Harp. 531, 536.
     