
    THE CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD CO. v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 30120.
    Decided May 18, 1914.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    Early in 1907, the Postmaster General issued order No. 165, which was modified in June, 1907, whereby he gave notice to the plaintiff and other railroad companies engaged in carrying the mails that for the quadrennial term commencing July 1, 1907, he would use for a divisor, in ascertaining the average daily weights of the mails, the number of days included in the weighing period, and since then the average daily weights have been ascertained accordingly. The plaintiff contends that the mails should have been weighed for 105 days. The aggregate of these weighings taken as a dividend and 90 as a divisor and the quotient be accepted as the average weight per day, insisting that such had been the practice of the department for over 30 years under the act of 1873, 17 Stat. L., 558, which, however, was amended in 1905, 33 Stat. B., 1088. The plaintiff has been paid quarterly since July, 1907, upon the basis of 105 for a divisor, but now contends that by the use of 90 as a divisor it would receive much more, and it is to recover this difference this suit was brought. The principal question, therefore, is upon the construction of the act of March 3, 1873, and the several acts amendatory thereof.
    I.In the consideration of a doubtful and ambiguous law the contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act thereunder and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect is entitled to great respect and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons and may be accepted as determining its meaning.
    II.Where property rights have arisen or contracts been made under departmental construction of a statute of doubtful meaning, the courts will adopt that construction rather than interfere with the vested property or contract rights.
    III. Departmental or contemporaneous practical construction being resorted to in aid of interpretation is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation, and unless the statute is ambiguous or doubtful no erroneous construction by a department charged with its execution, however long continued, will influence the courts’ ascertainment of the true meaning.
    IV. It is well established that debates, committee reports, and opinions of individual Members of Congress can not be considered as interpreting the meaning of statutes enacted by Congress, but the rule does recognize that such congressional records may be consulted in the ascertainment of the history of the period of the enactment of the statute.
    V.By the act of July 2, 1838, 5 Stat. L., 283, every railroad in the United States then or thereafter completed was declared to be “ a post route," and the Postmaster General was directed to “ cause the mails to be transported thereon, provided he can have it done upon reasonable terms and not pay therefor in any instance more than 25 per cent over and above what similar transportation would cost in post coaches.”
    VI.By the act of January 25, 1839, 5 Stat. L., 314, a limit of not exceeding $300 per mile per annum was placed upon the payment to railroad companies “for the conveyance of one or more daily mails upon their roads.”
    
      VII.By the act of February, 1845, 5 8tat. L., 788, the Postmaster General was authorized to “ divide the railroad routes * * * into three classes, according to the size of the mails, the speed with which they are conveyed, and the importance of the service” and to contract with the railroads for transporting the mails without advertising for bids.
    VIII.Where the statute authorized the Postmaster General to divide the postal routes into three classes and fixed the maximum rate he could pay per mile per annum for the transportation of the three respective classes of mail, hut left the classification thereof to his judgment and discretion, the application of the rules provided by the act was also to be made by the Postmaster General.
    IX.Where the statute authorized a readjustment of the compensation for transporting the mails upon “ the conditions and terms ” mentioned therein and one of these conditions is that in the matter of weights the statutory rule shall be used to find the average weight of the mails carried per day, the aggregate of “ the actual weighings of the mails for such a number of successive worlcmg days not less than thirty,” as the Postmaster General may direct, furnishes the dividend, the number of successive working days so used furnishes the divisor, and the quotient the average daily weight of the mails carried per day.
    . X. Where the ascertainment of the average weight of the mails carried per day by the departmental method was because of discretionary power granted by the statute, that discretion must be held to have existed in each successive Postmaster General and still to continue.
    XI.The general rule is that the reenactment of a statute that has received a judicial construction amounts to a legislative adoption of such construction.
    XII.Where certain words in a statute have received a construction by the Supreme Court, Congress is presumed to have knowledge of it, and like words being again repeated by Congress, it may well be considered that a like construction was intended and was expected' to be given those words.
    XIII.Where the meaning of a statute is clear, executive exposition or construction of it is given little consideration by the courts in its construction. It is only where the statute is ambiguous or doubtful that resort is had to contemporaneous construction given to it in the departments. The reenactment of a statute which had been construed by the executive department would not carry into the new statute that construction unless the older statute were itself ambiguous and doubtful.
    
      XIV.In tlie construction of an act tlie courts aim must be to arrive at tbe intention of the legislative body and to apply the language of the act toward the attaining of that intention as near as possible.
    XV.While it is the duty of the courts to ascertain the meaning of the legislature from the words used in the statute and the subject matter to which it relates, there may be an equal duty to restrict the meaning to general words whenever it is found necessary to do so in order to carry out the legislative intent.
    XVI.Where words or terms used in a statute are ambiguous or are found to have application to diverse conditions actually arising, their meaning must be resolved by an examination of and the comparison of the doubtful words with the context of the law, considering its reason and spirit and the inducing cause of its enactment.
    XVII.The ambiguity or doubt must inhere in the language of the abt as applicable to conditions to which the law is intended to apply, and it is not the doubt occasioned by a consideration whether an executive exposition put into practice is free from criticism which will produce the ambiguity or doubt in the meaning of the terms of the statute itself. Misconstruction is not sufficient to generate the doubt required to produce a latent ambiguity.
    XVIII. Where an act is not, when properly considered, ambiguous and uncertain, contemporaneous and long-continued executive exposition and practice will not prevent the court construing the act according to its terms and the intention of Congress.
    XIX.Where the statute prescribed a method for ascertaining the average weight of mails per day carried on railroad routes and fixed the maximum rate of pay which the Postmaster General was authorized to pay for the transportation of mails over such routes and authorized contracts with the carriers for four-year periods based upon the transportation of such average weights, the statutory method of ascertaining the average weights was obligatory on the parties, and the amount of compensation to be paid the carrier was, within the limits of the maximum rates, a matter of agreement between the parties. The price could not be greater than the maximum rate named in the statute could be less.
    XX. When the question of the average weight of the mails carried per day was fixed it became one of contract between the Government and the roads carrying the mails.
    XXI. Where a statute, together with the amendments, does not authorize the application of the rule of contemporaneous and long continued executive exposition it should, and will, be given the construction which its words in their usual and generally accepted meaning import, and an amendment is not an adoption of any preexisting departmental practice which is controlling upon the interpretation to be given by the courts.
    XXII. Where matters of such grave importance as the transportation of the mails are involved it is of prime importance that the terms and regulations as between the carriers and the Gov-érnment should befcmown and the plaintiff having the right to refuse the terms offered should be held to the effect of his action in proceeding with the performance of the work and receiving payments based upon the department’s understanding of the contract.
    
      The Reporter’s statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
    I. The claimant herein is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois in 1906. It owns and operates the system of railroads in the States of Illinois and Missouri which, at the time hereinafter stated, were operated by claimant itself or by its predecessors in title, and since that date has transported the mails of the United States oyer certain of its lines of railways designated by the Postmaster General as follows:
    
      
    
    In the construction of the above lines of railroads the claimant was not aided by any grant of lands or other property made thereto by the United States.
    II. In 1867 the mails were being conveyed under agreements made between the railroad companies and the Post Office Department in pursuance of the act of Congress of 1845, and were thereafter carried up to the time of the passage of the act of 1873 under similar agreements. At the latter date a large majority of the railroad postal routes carried the mails six days per week, so as to make six round trips per week, and did not carry mails on Sundays. A much smaller number of railroad postal routes carried mails one or more times each day in the week, so as to make not less than seven round trips per week, and these carried mails on Sundays.
    At the time Order No. 412 was promulgated and became effective in 1907 the service performed by claimant on the routes involved in its claim was on six days in the week on routes Nos. 135074,135127, and 145021, and seven days in the week on routes Nos. 135017, 135018, 135019, 135112, 135138, 135142, and 145022.
    After the enactment of the act of 1873 the mails were continued to be carried over railroad postal routes under agreements between the Post Office Department and the railroad companies concerned, and were being so carried at the date of Order No. 412, dated March 2, 1907. At the date of the latter order the relative proportion of seven and six days’ carriage of mails had changed, and over a majority of the railroad postal routes mails were being carried every day in the week.
    TTT- For a long time previous to 1867 mails were carried by railroad companies under separate contracts between the respective companies and the Post Office Department under authority of the acts of Congress referred to by the Postmaster General in his report for 1867, wherein he stated as follows:
    “There are three acts of Congress which contain provisions prescribing the rates of compensation which shall be allowed for the transportation of mails on railroad routes. By the first, approved July 7,1838, section 2, the Postmaster General is authorized to cause the mail to be transported upon ‘each and every railroad within the limits of the United States which now is, or hereafter may be, made and completed,’ ‘ provided he can have it done upon reasonable terms, and not paying therefor, in any instance, more than twenty-five per centum over and above what similar transportation would cost in post coaches.’ The second, approved January 25, 1839, section 1, restricts the authority vested in the Postmaster General by the act above quoted, so as not to permit him to ‘ allow more than three hundred dollars per mile per annum to any railroad company in the United States for the conveyance of one or more daily mails upon their roads.’ And the third, approved March 3,- 1845, section 19, prescribes that ‘ To insure, as far as may be practicable, an equal and just rate of compensation, according to the service performed, among the several railroad companies in the United States for the transportation of the mail, it shall be the duty of the Postmaster General to arrange and divide the railroad routes, including those in which the service is partly by railroad and partly by steamboats, into three classes, according to the size of the mails, the speed with which they are conveyed, and the importance of the service; and it shall be lawful for him to contract for conveying the mail with any such railroad company, either with or without advertising for such contract: Provided, That for the conveyance of the mail on any railroad of the first class he shall not pay a higher rate of compensation than is now allowed by law; nor for carrying the mail on any railroad of the second class a greater compensation than one hundred dollars per mile per annum; nor for carrying the mail on any railroad of the third class a greater compensation than fifty dollars per mile per annum. And in case the Postmaster General shall not be able to conclude a contract for carrying the mail on any of such railroad routes at a compensation not exceeding the aforesaid maximum rates, or for what he may deem a reasonable and fair compensation for the service to be performed, it shall be lawful for him to separate the letter mail from the residue of the mail and to contract, either with or without advertising, for conveying the letter mail over such route by horse express or otherwise, at the greatest speed that can reasonably be obtained, and also to contract for carrying over such route the residue of the mail, in wagons or otherwise, at a slower rate of speed: Provided, That if one-half of the service on any railroad is required to be performed in the night season, it shall be lawful for the Postmaster General to pay twenty-five per centum in addition to the aforesaid maximum rates of allowance: And provided further, That if it shall be found necessary to convey over any railroad route more than two mails daily, it shall be lawful for the Postmaster General to pay such additional compensation as he may think just and reasonable, having reference to the service performed and the maximum rate of- allowance established by this act.’
    
      “ In order to make such an arrangement and classification of railroad routes as the act last mentioned contemplates, there is an obvious necessity for accurate and reliable information as to the £ size of the mails ’ they severally convey. Yet, until recently, no measures were ever taken to procure from any considerable proportion of the roads in the service of the department statements of the amounts of mail matter conveyed by them, respectively. In February and March last, however a ‘railroad weight circular’ (a copy of which is hereto annexed) was issued and addressed to the proprietors of each railroad route, requesting them to ‘weigh all the through mails and way mails ’ conveyed in both directions to and from every station for thirty consecutive working days, commencing on all roads east of the Rocky Mountains on the 1st, and on all roads west on the 15th of April, 1867, and report the results to the department in a prescribed tabular form annexed to the circular, and to return also a description of the accommodations provided for mails and agents, with the dimensions, fixtures, and furniture of the car or apartment allotted to their use, and a statement of the number of trips per week in each direction.
    $$$$$$$
    “No general systematic revision and readjustment of these rates, based upon the returns received, has yet been attempted, but in a number of cases of disagreement between the department and railroad companies the returns have been used as a guide to a proper settlement of the dispute; and, as the terms of existing contracts expire and it becomes necessary to enter into new engagements, it is expected that such changes will from time to time be made as will eventuate ultimately in the nearest practicable approach to a perfect classification of railroad routes and graduation of their pay according to the comparative value and importance of the service they perform.”
    The result furnished data for each route respecting the whole weights of mails carried in each direction, the total weight and the average weight carried the whole distance for the 30 consecutive working days, and the average weight carried the whole distance per day, ascertained by dividing such average total weight by 30, the size of mail car or apartment, and the number of trips performed per week.
    In the years 1868, 1869, 1870, 1871, and 1872 revisions and readjustments of the rates of pay on railroad routes were made under the terms of the law of 1845 according to classifications based upon the returns of the weight of the mails conveyed and the accommodations provided for the mails and the agents of the department, ascertained in the manner above stated.
    In the revision and consolidation of the statutes relating to the Post Office Department in 1872, 17 Stats. L., 309, the principal provisions of the law of 1845 were reenacted, as follows:
    “ Sec. 210. That the Postmaster General shall arrange the railway routes on which the mail is carried, including those in which the service is partly by railway and partly by steamboat, into three classes, according to the size of the mails, the speed at which they are carried, and the frequency and importance of the service, so that each railway company shall receive, as far as practicable, a proportionate and just rate of compensation, according to the service performed.
    
      “ Sec. 211. That the pay for carrying the mail on any railway of the first class shall not exceed three hundred dollars per mile per annum; on any railway of the second class it shall not exceed one hundred dollars per mile per annum; and on any railway of the third class it shall not exceed fifty dollars per mile per annum; but if one-half the service on any railway is required to be performed in the nighttime the Postmaster General may pay twenty-five per centum in addition to the above maximum rates.
    “ Sec. 212. That if the Postmaster General is unable to contract for carrying the mail on any railway route at a compensation not exceeding the maximum rates herein provided, or for what he may deem a reasonable and fair compensation, he may separate the letter mail from the other mail and contract, either with or without advertising, for carrying such letter mail by horse express or otherwise at the greatest speed that can reasonably be obtained, and for carrying the other mail in wagons, or otherwise, at a slower rate of speed.”
    The following year Congress passed the act of March 3, 1873, 17 Stats. L., 558, which makes appropriation for carrying the mails, and also provides as follows:
    “ For increase of compensation for the transportation of malls on railroad routes upon the condition and at the rates hereinafter mentioned, five hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary: Provided, That the Postmaster General be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to readjust the compensation hereafter to be paid for the transportation of mails on railroad routes upon the conditions and at the rates hereinafter mentioned, to wit: That the mails shall be conveyed with due frequency and speed; that sufficient and suitable room, fixtures, and furniture, in a car or apartment properly lighted and warmed, shall be provided for route agents to accompany and distribute the mails; and that the pay per mile per annum shall not exceed the following rates, namely: On routes carrying their whole length an average weight of mails per day of two hundred pounds, fifty dollars; five hundred pounds, seventy-five dollars; óne thousand pounds, one hundred dollars;. one thousand five hundred pounds, one hundred and twenty-five dollars; two thousand pounds, one hundred and fifty dollars; three thousand five hundred pounds, one hundred and seventy-five dollars; five thousand pounds, two hundred dollars, and twenty-five dollars additional, for every additional two thousand pounds, the average weight to be ascertained in every case by the actual weighing of the mails for such a number of successive working days, not less than thirty, at such times after June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-three, and not less frequently than once in every four years, and the result to be stated and verified in such form and manner as the Postmaster General may direct.”
    The said provision of the act of 1873 was embodied in Eevised Statutes, section 4002, as follows:
    
      “ Sec. 4002. The Postmaster General is authorized and directed to readjust the compensation hereafter to be paid for the transportation of mails on railroad routes upon the conditions and at the rates hereinafter mentioned:
    “First. That the mails shall be conveyed with due frequency and speed, and that sufficient and suitable room, fixtures, and furniture, in a car or apartment properly lighted and warmed, shall be provided for route agents to accompany and distribute the mails.
    “ Second. That the pay per mile per annum shall not exceed the following rates, namely: On routes carrying their whole length an average weight of mails per day of two hundred pounds, fifty dollars; five hundred pounds, seventy-five dollars; one thousand pounds, one hundred dollars; one thousand five hundred pounds, one hundred and twenty-five dollars; two thousand pounds, one hundred and fifty dollars; three thousand five hundred pounds, one hundred and seventy-five dollars; five thousand pounds, two hundred dollars, and twenty-five dollars additional for every additional two thousand pounds, the average weight to be ascertained, in every case, by the actual weighing of the mails for such a number of successive working days, not less than thirty, at such times, after June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-three, and not less frequently than once in every four years, and the result to be stated and verified in such form and manner as the Postmaster General may direct.”
    Prior to July 1, 1876, the weighing was done by the railroad companies transporting the mails as above set forth. Subsequent to that time, by virtue of an act of Congress approved March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. L., 451, the weighing was done by Government agents under the direction of the Postmaster General, the latter act providing:
    “Amd out of the appropriation for inland mail transportation the Postmaster General is authorized hereafter to pay the expenses of taking the weights of mails on railroad routes, as provided by the act entitled ‘An act mailing appropriations for the service of the Post Office Department for the" year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-four,5 approved March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-three; and he is hereby directed to have the mails weighed as often as now provided by law by the employees of the Post Office Department, and have the weights stated and verified to him by said employees under such instructions as he may consider just to the Post Office Department and the railroad companies.”
    IV. Subsequent to the act of 1873 the Postmaster General, for the purpose of putting said act into effect, adopted the division of the United States, theretofore made into four sections, and had the mails weighed and the annual compensation for a term of four years fixed for all railway routes in one section each year.
    Before the compensation was fixed for any route the Postmaster General secured from the company performing the service an agreement in the form following:
    “The company named below agrees to accept and perform mail service upon the conditions prescribed by law and the regulations of the department applicable to railroad mail service.”
    After the weighing of the mails was completed and the compensation for the transportation thereof was fixed for the term the Postmaster General caused to be sent to each railroad company a notice in the form following:
    “The compensation for the transportation of mails on route No. —, between-and-, has been fixed from July 1, 18 — , to June 30, 18 — •, under act of March 3, 1873, upon returns showing the amount and character of the service for 30 successive working days, commencing-, 18 — , at the rate of $-per annum, being $-per mile for-miles.
    “ This adjustment is subject to future orders and to fines and deductions, and is based on a service of not less than six round trips per week.” ■
    After the passage of said act of March 3, 1873, whereby the weighings were required to be made under direction of the Postmaster General as above stated the mails were weighed for 30 successive days, exclusive of Sundays, on routes not carrying mails on Sundays, and on 35 successive days, inclusive of Sundays, on routes carrying mails on Sundays. The totals of the weighings in each class were used as a dividend, and in both classes 30 was used as a divisor. The quotient so obtained was treated as the average weight of mails per day carried. This practice was followed until 1907, and the mails were carried and paid for accordingly.
    Y. The act of Congress approved July 12, 1876, making appropriations for the expenses of the Post Office Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1878, made a deduction of 10 per cent upon the compensation theretofore fixed for the transportation of mails, under the act of March 3, 1873, and the Postmaster General in administering this act obtained the average of mails carried in the same manner as he did in administering the act of March 3, 1873, and the same method was pursued in determining the average weight of mails and compensation therefor under the act of June 17,1878, making appropriations for the expenses of the Post Office Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1879.
    VI. In his report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1884, the Postmaster General refers to the matter of “railroad rates,” as embodied in the report of the Second Assistant Postmaster General, to which he called careful attention, and adds that “it is important that the rates paid should be arrived at by some equitable method.” He says that in the 50 years intervening between 1834 and 1884 “ legislation has touched this subject but four times” — in 1838, 1839, 1845, and 1873; that while the system of 1873 was an improvement on what went before, it was “still objectionable,” “since it undertakes to pay for weight chiéfly,” and that the pay per ton per mile ranged from 8 to 96 cents. He recommended the passage of a proposed bill as follows:
    “ PROPOSED BILL FOR THE READJUSTMENT OP COMPENSATION POR THE TRANSPORTATION OP THE MAKS ON RAILROAD ROUTES.
    
      “Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Postmaster General is authorized and directed to readjust the compensation to be paid for the transportation of the mails on railroad routes upon the conditions and at the rates hereinafter mentioned, and which shall take effect July first, eighteen hundred and eighty-five.
    “First. That the mails shall be carried upon any train at the request of the Postmaster General; and railroad companies shall provide necessary depot rooms, with heat and light for the same; shall receive the mails from and deliver the mails to the Post Office Department at depots; shall put the mails into and out of the cars; shall transfer the mails between trains at depots, and shall transport the superintendent and assistant superintendents of the Eailway Mail Service and post-office inspectors upon the exhibition of their credentials, and railway postal clerks over the lines upon which they may be assigned to duty.
    “ Second. That the compensation for carrying closed mails in baggage cars and for railway post-office service, the minimum car width in every case being hereby fixed at eight feet and six inches, inside measurement, or its equivalent in floor space, shall not exceed the following rates, namely: For closed mails, five* mills per linear foot of space (inside measurement) per mile run; and for two hundred pounds of mail or less the equivalent of six linear inches shall be required; for five hundred pounds one foot, and for each additional five hundred pounds one foot. For railway post-office service, at a rate of speed of twenty or less miles per hour from terminus to terminus, five mills per linear foot of space (inside measurement) per mile run; and for each additional two miles per hour to and including thirty miles per hour, one-tenth of a mill, and for each additional mile per hour, one-tenth of a mill. And the adjustment of space by linear feet for railway post-office service shall be as follows: For a daily average of from twenty-five to five hundred pounds of mail, not to exceed thirteen feet; from five hundred to one thousand pounds, not to exceed fifteen feet; from one thousand to two thousand pounds, not to exceed twenty-five feet; from two thousand to four thousand pounds, not to'exceed forty feet; from four thousand to five thousand pounds, not to exceed forty-five feet; for six thousand pounds, fifty feet; eight thousand pounds, sixty feet; the weight to be ascertained by a weighing of not less than twenty-eight consecutive days; and in all railway post offices the load shall not exceed double the greatest weight for the respective lengths as herein provided; and for any gross weight, if carried on two or more trains daily, the space may be subdivided upon the basis of amounts of space for lower weights as the nature of the service may require; and- no additional space shall be required or paid for unless found to be necessary: Provided, That the pay for the transportation of mails upon any railroad route for six round trips per week shall not be less than thirty-five dollars per mile per annum; but the Postmaster General may increase the compensation upon any railroad route not to exceed fifty per centum per annum for special mail trains performing service upon schedules fixed by him; and at any post office contiguous to a railroad route, and where trains do not make regular stops, the Postmaster General may require that the mails shall be exchanged directly with the railway post office at the nearest available point upon the track; and the Postmaster General may allow to postmasters at post offices of the third and fourth classes, located not more than one-fourth of a mile from railroad stations, not to ■ exceed twenty-four and twelve dollars per annum, respectively, in each case, for the exchange of mails as often as may be necessary between such post offices and stations; and in any case where the allowance herein provided shall be insufficient to procure the proper exchange of mails, the Postmaster General may invite proposals for mail-messenger service and make an award thereof under such regulations as he may prescribe: Provided further, That the Postmaster General may employ mail-messenger service at separating post offices. And no postmaster, assistant postmaster, or clerk employed in any post .office where the cost for the carriage of the mail is based upon an advertisement, or is adjusted by an allowance otherwise than as herein provided, shall have any interest in its transportation. And all acts and parts of acts inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed: Provided further, 
      That nothing herein shall be construed to repeal or change existing law, in so far as it discriminates against land-grant or subsidy railroads, in fixing relative rates of compensation to such railroads for the transportation of the mails.”
    Following this report said bill was introduced in the House, but no action was taken by the House on said bills, H. R. 8057 and 6124; Forty-ninth Congress.
    In September, 1884, the then Postmaster General prepared and issued an order in the form following:
    “ Order No. 44- — Hereafter, when the weight of mails is taken on the railroad routes performing service seven days per week, the whole number of days the mails are weighed, whether thirty or thirty-five, shall be used as a divisor for obtaining the average weight per day.”
    Thereafter, October 22, 1884, the succeeding Postmaster General submitted the question to the Attorney General for his opinion as to whether the method adopted was a proper construction of the act of March 3,1873.
    “ Sir: The act of March 3,1873, 17 Stat. L., p. 558, regulating the pay for carrying the mails on railroad, routes, provides:
    “ ‘ That the pay per mile per annum shall not exceed the following rates, namely:
    “ ‘ On routes carrying their whole length an average weight of mails per day of 200 pounds, $50; 500 pounds, $75; I,000 pounds, $100; 1,500 pounds, $125; 2,000 pounds, $150; 3,500 pounds, $175, etc. * * * ’
    “ ‘ The average weight to be ascertained in every case by the actual weighing of the mails for such a number of successive working days, not less than thirty * *
    “Upon a large number of the railroad routes mails are carried on six days each week — that is no mail is carried on Sunday. On others they are carried on every day in the year.
    “It has been the practice since 1873, in arriving at the average weight of mails per day on these classes of service to treat the ‘ successive working days ’ as being composed of six secular or working days in the week, which is explained by the foregoing illustrations:
    “Two routes, Nos. 1 and 2, over each of which 313 tons of mails are carried annually.
    “On route No. 1 mails are carried twice daily, except Sunday, six days per week, and are weighed 30 successive working days, covering usually a period of 35 days. The result is divided by 30 and ail average weight of mails per day of 2,000 is obtained.
    Transportation per mile of road per annum_miles__ 1,252
    Weight per mile of road per annum_tons__ 313
    Pay per ton per mile of road per annum_cents— 47. 92
    Pay per mile run of road per annum_do 11.09
    Bate of pay allowed per mile per annum_ $150
    “ On route No. 2 mails are carried twice daily, seven days per week, and weighed for 30 successive working days and for the intervening Sundays, the weight on the Sundays being treated as if carried on Mondays, the weighing as before covering usually a period of 35 days. The result is divided by 30 and an average weight of mails per day of 2,000 pounds is obtained.
    Transportation per mile of road per annum_miles 1,460
    Weight per mile of road per annum_tons 313
    Pay per ton per mile of road per annum_cents— 47. 92
    Pay per mile run_do_10. 02
    Bate of pay allowed per mile per annum_ $150
    “ I have thought it necessary to give the foregoing illustrations in order that the practice of this department under the law cited may readily appear, and I will thank you to advise me whether that practice is in compliance with or in violation of the statute.
    “ If not in conformity with the law, will you please indicate the correct method by which the average weight per day should be obtained and the compensation adjusted thereon ?
    “Very respectfully,
    “Frank IIattoN,
    
      “Postmaster General.
    
    “Hon. B. H. Brewster,
    
      “Attorney General, Department of Justice.”
    In reply, the Acting Attorney General gave his opinion as below:
    “DEPARTMENT OP JUSTICE,
    “Washington, October 31, 1884.
    
    “ The Postmaster General.
    “ Sir : I have considered your communication of the 22d instant requesting to know whether the construction placed by the Post Office Department on section 4002, subsection 2, prescribing the mode in which the average of the weight of mails transported on railroad routes shall be ascertained is correct, am of the opinion that that construction is correct, and that a departure from it would defeat the intention of the law and cause no little embarrassment.
    “ I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
    “ Wm. A. MauRV,
    
      11 Acting Attorney General.”
    This Order No. 44 was thereafter, in January, 1885, revoked, and no weighings having occurred in the meantime, it never had any practical operation or result.
    VII. What is called “ a documentary history of the Railway Mail Service from its origin in 1834 to the present time,” prepared by the general superintendent of the Railway Mail Service, was transmitted to the Senate with a letter by the Postmaster General on January 21, 1885, in compliance with a resolution of the Senate, and among other things said document refers to the method of obtaining the weights of mail carried. Said document was printed as Senate Executive Document 40, Forty-eighth Congress, second session.
    VIII. The act of March 3,1905, 33 Stat. L., 1088, changes the minimum weighing period provided by the act of 1873 so as to require the inclusion of at least 90 instead of at least 30 successive working days, as follows:
    “Provided, That hereafter before making the readjustment of pay for transportation of mails on railroad routes, the average weight shall be ascertained by the actual weighing of the mails for such a number of successive working days, not less than ninety, at such times after June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and five, and not less frequently than once in every four years, and the result to be stated and verified in such form and manner as the Postmaster General may direct.”
    The Post Office appropriation bill for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1906, as reported to the House of Representatives by its Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads, contained the following:
    “For inland transportation by railroad routes * * * $40,900: Provided, That hereafter before making the readjustment of pay for the transportation of mails on railroad routes, the Postmaster General shall have the mails on such routes weighed, and the average weight per day ascertained for a period of not less than three consecutive months.”
    
      Said proviso was stricken out in the House of Representatives and the following was adopted in lieu thereof and became a part of the act approved March 3, 1905:
    
      “Provided, That hereafter before making the readjustment of pay for transportation of mails on railroad routes, the average weight shall be ascertained by actual weighing of the mails for such a number of successive working days, not less than ninety, at such times after June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and five, and not less frequently than once in every four years, and the result to be stated and verified in such form and manner as the Postmaster General may direct.” Cong. Rec., 58th Cong., 3d sess., p. 1744.
    In the administration of said act the Postmaster General made no change in the said system of weighing the mails theretofore adopted, except to weigh the mails for a period of 105 days instead of for a period of 35 days, and to use as a divisor 90 instead of 30 to ascertain the average weight, until the issuance of Order 412, set forth in Finding X.
    IX. At the second session of the Fifty-ninth Congress the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads of the House of Representatives prepared and introduced a bill making appropriations for expenses of the Post Office Deparment for the fiscal year ending June 30,1908, and the same became law on March 2, 1907. As drawn by said committee said bill contained, among other things, the following provision:
    “ Provided, That hereafter the average weight per day be ascertained, in every case, by the actual weighing of the mails for such a number of successive days, not less than one hundred and five, at such times and not less frequently than once in every four years, and the result to be stated and verified in such form and manner as the Postmaster General may direct.”
    Said bill was accompanied by a report of said committee which fully explained the construction and practice, under said previous acts of Congress, in the weighing of the mails, and that the purpose of said provision in the bill was to change the method of ascertaining the daily average weights by requiring that all of the days in the weighing period be included in the divisor. There was extensive debate in the House on said provision, in which many Members participated. In said debate the chairman of said committee and other Members of the House stated and discussed the history, as hereinbefore narrated, of said existing practice of including the secular days only in the divisor of weights. Before the House had acted on said provision a motion was made to amend the bill by inserting the following proviso, referring to the sum appropriated for the Railway Mail Service:
    “Provided, That no part of this sum shall be expended in payment for transportation of the mails by railroad routes where the average weight of mails per day has been computed by the use of a divisor less than the whole number of days such mails have been weighed.”
    A point of order was made against this amendment on the ground that it changed existing law, and the Chair sustained the point, observing:
    “ The existing law has received a construction by the officers charged with the duty of administering it, and. that construction the Chair feels bound to follow. The proposed amendment changes existing law as construed by the proper officer by changing the divisor.”
    Upon appeal from the decision of the Chair, its ruling was sustained.
    Another amendment was then offered, as follows:
    “Provided, That no part of this sum shall be expended in payment for transportation of the mails by railroad routes where the average weight of mails per day has been computed by the use of a divisor less than the whole number of working days such mails have been weighed; and
    
      “Provided further, That the words £ working days ’ shall be construed to mean days upon which work in the transportation of the mails by railroad routes is performed.”
    Said second amendment was also rejected after debate, and said provision reported by the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads was then stricken out. Thereafter an amendment was offered, as below, by the chairman of said committee, and was adopted by the House.
    “The Postmaster General is hereby authorized and directed to readjust the compensation to be paid from and after the first day of July, nineteen hundred and seven, for the transportation of mail on railroad routes carrying their whole length an average weight of mail per day of upward of five thousand pounds by making the following changes in the present rates per mile per annum for the transportation of mail on such routes, and hereafter the rates on such routes shall be as follows:
    “ On routes carrying their whole length an average weight of mail per day of more than five thousand pounds and less than forty-eight thousand pounds the rate shall be five per centum less than the present rates on all weight carried in excess of five thousand pounds, and on routes carrying their whole length an average weight of mail per day of more than forty-eight thousand pounds the rates shall be five per centum less than the present rates on all weight carried in excess of five thousand pounds up to forty-eight thousand pounds, and for each additional two thousand pounds in excess of forty-eight thousand pounds at the rate of nineteen dollars and twenty-four cents upon all roads other than land-grant roads, and upon all land-grant roads the rate shall be seventeen dollars and ten cents for each two thousand pounds carried in excess of said forty-eight thousand pounds.”
    When said bill had gone from the House of Representatives to the Senate and had been reported by the Senate Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads an amendment was offered in the identical language of said amendment first rejected by the House. Said amendment was not debated or explained, but was adopted by the Senate. The bill was then sent to a conference of the two Houses. In the conference objection was made on the part of the House of Representatives to said Senate amendment, and the committees of conference in their reports recommended that the Senate recede from the same, and the two Houses adopted said reports and passed the bill with said amendment stricken out, but containing said provision which had been inserted by amendment in the House of Representatives.
    When offering said amendment which was adopted in the House, the chairman of the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads pointed out that the pending bill had provided four distinct reductions (including the three carried in the provision hereinbefore set out) in the compensation of railway mail carriers, and he explained that two of said four reductions, viz, that carried by the amendment he was offering and one other, relative to pay for post-office cars, had been selected as those which the House apparently preferred to adopt.
    X. Thereafter the Postmaster General on March 2, 1907, and June 7, 1907, respectively, issued orders as follows:
    
      “ Order No. 165. — That when the weight of mail is taken on railroad routes the whole number of days the mails are weighed shall be used as a divisor for obtaining the average weight per day.
    “ Order No. 1¡12. — Ordered, that Order 165, dated March 2, 1907, be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:
    “ That when the weight of mail is taken on railroad routes the whole number of days included in the weighing period shall be used as a divisor for obtaining the average weight per day.”
    In accordance with the last-named order for all weighings and readjustments made subsequent to its promulgation, the Postmaster General weighed the mails on railroad routes for 105 days and divided the aggregate weights by 105, and the readjustments were made on the average weight per day so computed, and the claimant company was paid accordingly.
    Thereafter the Postmaster General submitted to the Attorney General the Order No. 412 for an opinion as to its legality, and the Attorney General, under date of September 27, 1907, rendered an opinion sustaining the legality of said order, 26 A. G. Op., 930.
    XI. As the quadrennial term for which readjustments had been made on the routes of the claimant, as set forth in Section I hereof, would expire by limitation June 30, 1907, the Postmaster General, on February 12,1907, notified the claimant of direction given to weigh the mails on such routes. Accompanying said notice there was sent to the claimant a Post Office Department distance circular, known as Form No. 2504, which it was requested to fill out with certain specific information called for thereon and to return the completed circular to the Second Assistant Postmaster General. As transmitted to the claimant the form contained an agreement clause to be executed by a principal officer of the company, as follows:
    “ The company named below agrees to accept and perform mail service upon the conditions prescribed by law and the regulations of the department applicable to railroad mail service.”
    On September 16,1907, after the completion of the weighing of the mails on its routes, the claimant returned to the Second Assistant Postmaster General the completed distance circular containing the agreement clause set forth thereon, executed by its president, with specific exception thereto noted to Order No. 165 and to Order No. 412. The agreement clause, as modified by the claimant’s exception and as executed by it, reads as follows:
    “ The company named below agrees to accept and perform mail service upon the conditions prescribed by law and the regulations of the department applicable to railroad mail service; exception taken to Order No. 165, issued by the Postmaster General March 2,1907, and Order No. 412, issued by the Postmaster General June 7,1907. (See attached letter of protest bearing date of July 1, 1907.)
    “ S. M. FeltoN,
    
      “President or General Manager.”
    Accompanying the returned distance circular was a letter from the claimant to the Second Assistant Postmaster General stating its protest against certain practices of the Post Office Department in language as follows:
    “ [S. M. Felton, president]
    “The Chicago & AltoN Katlroad CompaNY,
    “ Office of the President,
    “ Chicago, July 7,1907.
    
    “ Railway Mail Service — Distance Circulars, Route 135017. “ Hon. James T. McCleary,
    “ Second Assistant Postmaster General,
    Washington, D. C.
    
    “Dear Sir: In submitting distance circular for route 135017 in connection with the quadrennial readjustment of July 1, 1907, in view of the reductions of mail pay, loss of mail revenue from withdrawal of empty equipment, change in method of ascertaining the daily average weight, under Postmaster General’s Orders 165 and 4Í2, objected to, and heavy fines and deductions for delays and otherwise, protest is hereby respectfully made:
    “ 1. Against fines or reductions for late mail trains, believing the Post Office Department should accept schedules and trains as ran, as all classes of traffic must necessarily, do, compensation being for carriage only.
    “2. Against 105 days’ weighing, beginning late in February to determine the daily average weight, as it is believed not to represent a fair basis.
    “ 3. Against furnishing rooms at stations for use of Post Office Department employees for distribution of mail, without payment or rental therefor. '
    “4. Against the performance of messenger service between post offices and stations at terminal and intermediate points and between railway stations.
    “5. Against setting mail cars at stations for use as distributing post offices for more than a reasonable time necessary for loading.
    “ 6. Against furnishing transportation other than for railway postal clerks accompanying the mail, as provided by Bevised Statute 4000, sec. 1182, Postal Laws and Begula-tions.
    “ 7. Against furnishing space and facilities for distribution of mail on trains and for traveling post-office purposes without specific space pay therefor.
    “ 8. Against the practice of the Post Office Department in denying railroad companies full-line pay on what it terms a ‘half-line of railway post-office cars,’ although the same service is required and furnished as on a full line.
    “ .. s. M. Ito0N,
    The Second Assistant Postmaster General addressed a letter to the claimant on October 3, 1907, replying to its exceptions and protests. This letter is as follows:
    “J H H
    “ Post Office DepaktmeNT,
    “ SecoND Assistant Postmaster GeneRal,
    “ Division of Bailwat Adjustment,
    “ Washington, October 3,1907.
    
    
      “ Mr. S. M. Felton,
    “ President Chicago da Alton R. R. Co., Chicago, III.
    
    “ Sir : This office is in receipt of the distance circular for route No. 135017, from Chicago to Granite City, Ill., filed by you for the term beginning July 1, 1907, and ending June 30, 1911, for railroad mail service by your company.
    “Note is taken of the modification made by you in the agreement clause in which you except Order No. 165, issued by the Postmaster General March 2, 1907, and Order No. 412, issued by the Postmaster General June 7, 1907, and enter protest against other rules, regulations, or requirements of the department with respect to the performance of service. In regard to this I have to advise you that the department will not enter into contract with any railroad company by which it may be excepted from the operation or effect of any postal law or regulation, and it must be understood that, in the performance of service, from the beginning of the contract term above named and during the continuance of such performance of service, your company will be subject, as in the past, to all the postal laws and regulations which are now or may become applicable during the term to this service.
    “Very respectfully,
    “ J. T. McCleary,
    “ Second Assistant Postmaster Generad.”
    The Postmaster General caused the mails to be weighed on each of said routes for 105 days, then caused the average daily weight carried thereon to be computed as provided in said Order No. 412, and on the basis of the weight so ascertained caused the compensation for the service to be calculated; and in November, 1907, he issued orders stating the amounts and rates of such compensation. Said orders were in the form below:
    “No. of order, B-24598. Railroad service. 135017-111., Chicago and Granite City, 275.74 miles, 42.99 t. a. w., a. d. w. 34,563 lbs. Chicago & Alton Railroad Co.
    “ From July 1, 1907, to June 30, 1911, pay the Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. quarterly, for the transportation of the mails between Chicago and Granite City, Ill., at the rate of $129,796.33 per annum, being $470.72 per mile for 275.74 miles, and for R. P. O. car service at the rate of $33,038.40 per annum, being $120 per mile of 275.32 miles, Chicago to Granite City, for 3 lines 60-foot cars. This adjustment is subject to future orders, and to fines and deductions, and is based on a service of not less than 6 round trips a week.
    “ G. v. L. Meyer,
    “ Postmaster General.”
    
    The Second Assistant Postmaster General sent to the claimant a notice of such readjustment of pay, as follows:
    “ Post Oeeice DepartmeNT,
    “ Oeeice oe the Second Assistant
    “ Postmaster General,
    “Division oe Railway Adjustment,
    “ Washington, D. O., November £0,1907.
    
    
      “ Sir : The compensation for the transportation of mails, etc., on route No. 135017, between Chicago and Granite City, Ill., has been fixed from July 1,1907, to June 30,1911 (unless otherwise ordered), under acts of March 3,1873, July 12,1876, June 17,1878, March 3,1905, and March 2,1907, upon returns showing the amount and character of the service for a number of successive working days, not less than ninety, commencing February 20, 1907, at the rate of $129,796.33 per annum, being $470.72 per mile for 275.74 miles, and pay is allowed for use of E. P. O. cars from July 1, 1907, to June 30, 1911, at the rate of $33,038.40 per annum, being $120.00 per mile for 275.32 miles, Chicago to Granite City, for 3 lines 60-foot cars. This adjustment is subject to future orders and to fines and deductions, and is based on a service of not less than six round trips per week.
    “Very respectfully,
    
      “ J. T. McCleaRt,
    
      “Second Assistant Postmaster General.”
    Similar orders were issued and notices thereof sent to the claimant following the readjustments made on its other routes.
    In its said calculations the Post Office Department began by applying the same rates that were named in said act of March 3, 1873, and then made those deductions which were prescribed respectively by said acts of July 12, 1876, June 17,1878, and March 2, 1907.
    XII. The claimant continued to carry the mails of the United States from and after the 1st day of July, 1907, on its respective routes under such orders of the Postmaster General, as hereinbefore set forth, and has been paid for the service at the rates of compensation fixed by such orders.
    XIII. The act making appropriations for the service of the Post Office Department for the fiscal year ended June 30. 1909, as reported to the House by the committee, contained no reference to the matter of weighings of the mails or to the question of the divisor. While in the Committee of the Whole an amendment was offered providing in effect that not exceeding six-sevenths of the amount payable under the orders adjusting pay in the two contract sections to which Order 412 had not been applied should be paid out of the appropriation thereby made until such adjustment should have been made in accordance with Order 412, or until it should have been finally determined by law that the first or then existing adjustment was binding upon the Government notwithstanding any error or wrong in the basis of such as-certainments. A point of order was raised on this in the House, and the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole overruled it, and the amendment was agreed to. The bill with the amendment was passed by the House and sent to the Senate. It was reported from the Senate Committee on Post Offices and Post Eoads to the Senate with a substitute amendment for the one passed by the House, which substitute amendment, among other things, provided that the whole number of days included in the weighing period shall be used as a divisor for obtaining the average daily weight. A point of order was raised on this in the Senate and the President of the Senate overruled it, and then the amendment was agreed to. The bill with the amendment was passed by the Senate. A slight change was made by the conferees of the Senate and the House, and their agreement was reported to their respective bodies. The House, however, refused to adopt the Senate amendment and the Senate receded, and the provision failed of enactment. In the discussion of the bill in the Senate the active member of the committee in explaining the bill stated that the provision was intended to crystallize into law the requirement that seven days instead of six shall be used as the divisor in determining the amount due the railroad companies, and the chairman of the committee in the House declared that the provision “ makes permanent law what is now known as the divisor. It is now but a department official order, subject to change or repeal by any subsequent official in control of the department. By making it permanent law we avoid that possibility.”
    . In the annual reports for the fiscal year 1907 and following years the Post Office Department stated its estimates of expenses for transportation by railroad routes, which estimates were calculated upon the application of the new divisor in so far as the same had been applied from year to year. These reports reached Congress through the usual channels of transmission. The report for 1907 stated that the railroad companies were dissatisfied with the order and had modified their distance circulars by excepting to it. Notwithstanding such protests, Congress made the appropriations as submitetd by the department. The reports for 1910 and succeeding years further stated that the railroad companies protested against the use of the new divisor, and that suits had been filed calling into question its validity. In submitting its estimates for appropriations for the years mentioned the department prepared them upon the basis of the application of Order 412 in so far as it had been applied from year to year, and Congress made appropriations based thereon.
    
      Mr. Benjamin Garter and Mr. B. A. Putnam for the plaintiff. Mr. F. Garter Pope was on the brief.
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney General Huston Thompson, Mr. Joseph Stewart (Second Assistant Postmaster General), and Mr. P. M. Ashford for the defendants’ motion. Former Assistant Attorney General J. Q. Thompson and Mr. S. S. Ash-baugh were on the brief.
   Campbell, Ghief Justice,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Early in 1907 the Postmaster General issued an order, No. 165, which was modified in June, 1907, whereby he gave notice to the claimant and other railroad companies engaged in carrying the mails that for the quadrennial term commencing July 1, 1907, he would use for a divisor in ascertaining the average daily weights of the mails the whole number of days included in the weighing period. By this was meant that he would use as the divisor 105 days, that being the number of days, including Sundays, comprised within the period of 90 successive working days. The claimant company claims that the mails should have been weighed for 105 days, the aggregate of these weighings taken as a dividend and 90 taken as a divisor and the quotient be accepted as the average weight per day, insisting that such had been for over 30 years the practice of the department under the act of 1873, 17 Stat. L., 558, which provides that an average weight of mails per day carried the whole length of the railroad route shall be ascertained in every case by an actual weighing of the mails for such a number of successive working days, not less than 30, as the Postmaster General may direct. By the amendment of 1905 the 30 mentioned in the act of 1873 was changed to 90. Claimant has been paid quarterly since July, 1907, upon, the said basis of 105 for a divisor, but claims that by the use of 90 as a divisor it would have received much more, and this difference furnished the claim sued upon here.

The principal question, therefore, is upon the construction of the act of March 3, 1873, and the several acts amendatory thereof, which are set out in the footnote.

A ruling on the demurrer filed to the original petition is unnecessary, it having been waived, because both parties file requests for findings of fact.

Two propositions urged by the claimant will be first noticed :

(a) Contemporaneous and long-continued exposition by the Post Office Department. (5) That recourse should be had to debates in Congress, reports of committees, and the failure of Congress to change the departmental practice.

(A) Eelative to the effect to be given to a contemporaneous or practical exposition of an act of Congress by the executive department charged with its execution where that construction has been used for many years in the conduct of public business contemplated by the act certain rules are deducible from the authorities:

1. That “ in the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law the contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act under the law and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect is entitled to very great respect,” Edward’s Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat., 206, and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons, Brown’s case, 113 U. S., 568, and may be accepted as determining its meaning. Hammer’s case, 221 U. S., 226. See United States v. Alabama Great Southern R. R. Co., 142 U. S., 621, and cases cited in margin in Fairbanks case, 181 U. S., 307-308.

2. That where property rights have been arisen or contracts been made under departmental construction of a statute of doubtful meaning the courts will adopt that construction rather than interfere with the vested property or contract rights. New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S., 361; Union Pac. Co. v. Snow, 231 U. S., 204-213; Webster v. Luther, 163 U. S., 331, 342; Bate Refrigerator Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S., 1, 34; United States v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 142 U. S., 621.

3. That departmental or contemporaneous practical construction being resorted to in aid of interpretation “is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation,” and unless the statute is ambiguous or doubtful no erroneous construction by a department charged with its execution, however long continued, will affect the meaning of the statute or influence the court’s ascertainment of the true meaning. Graham's case, 110 U. S., 119; Houghton v. Payne, 194 U. S., 88, 99, and cases there cited; Robertson v. Downing, 127 U. S., 607; Dickson case, 15 Pet., 141; Webster v. Luther, 163 U. S., 331, 342.

These views are sustained by Fairbanks v. United States, 181 U. S., 283, where the authorities are collated and reviewed and wherein the court says, p. 306:

“ From this résumé of our decisions it clearly appears that practical construction is relied upon only in cases of doubt. We have referred to it when the construction seemed to be demonstrable, but then only in response to doubts suggested by counsel. Where there was obviously a matter of doubt, we have yielded assent to the construction placed by those having actual charge of the execution of the statute, but where there was no doubt we have steadfastly declined to recognize any force in practical construction. Thus before any appeal can be made to practical construction, it must appear that the true meaning is doubtful.”

(B) Another proposition urged for the claimant is that in constructing the act of 1873 and acts amendatory thereof the court should have recourse to the debates in Congress, reports of committees, and the failure of Congress to change the departmental practice, especially when amendments were offered having in view the change of the practice then obtaining in the Post Office Department, to ascertain the average weights carried per day by trains operating seven days per week.

The question arose in Aldridge v. Williams, 3. How., 9, where the court was called upon to construe provisions in the act of March 2,1833, relating to tariff duties called the compromise act, and in the opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, it is said:

“In expounding this law the judgment of the court can not in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual Members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage, nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both Houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself; and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.”

This case is cited in United States v. Freight Association, 166 U. S., 290, 318, where the reason for discarding consideration of debates, etc., in construing an act is thus stated by the court:

“The reason is that it is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of a legislative body that passed it by resorting to the speeches of individual members thereof. Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke might differ from each other; the result being that the only proper way to construe a legislative act is from the language used in the act and, upon occasion, by a resort to the history of the times when it was passed.”

See also United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72, 79; District of Columbia v. Washington Market Co., 108 U. S., 243; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S., 581; Dunlap v. United States, 173 U. S., 65, 75; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S., 41, 72.

In Bate Refrigerator Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S., 1, 42, the court said it could not “ accept as controlling, much less conclusive, the opinion of the House Committee on the Revision of the Laws of the United States, as reported by Mr. Jenckes, that the bill it reported embodied only the existing law.”

To the same effect is Penna. R. R. Co. v. Internat'l Coal Co., 230 U. S., 184; Omaha Street Rwy. v. Interstate Com. Comm., 230 U. S., 324, 333.

Other cases, some of which may at first view be thought to qualify the rule easily deducible from the foregoing authorities, may be collected as follows:

In Binns v. United States, 194 U. S., 486, 495, it is said:

“ While it is generally true that debates in Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of the statute passed by that body, United States v. Freight Association, 166 U. S., 290, 318, yet it is also true that we have examined the reports of the committees of either body with a view of determining the scope of the statutes pased on the strength of such reports, Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 148 U. S., 457, 464.”

In Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S., 457, the court considered the effect of the act of February 26, 1885, prohibiting the importation and -migration of aliens under contract to perform labor in the United States, and in the course of the opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Brewer, refer to and quote from a report of the Senate committee recommending the passage of the act, speaking of it as “ a singular circumstance, throwing light upon the intent of Congress,” and further along says: “We find, therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which was intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress, the reports of the committee of each Blouse, all concur in affirming that the intent of Congress was simply to stay the influx of this cheap, unskilled labor.”

In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S., 1, 50, a reference was had to the debates, Mr. Chief Justice White delivering the opinion, and saying:

“Although debates may not be used as a means for interpreting a statute, United States v. Freight Association, 166 U. S., 318 and cases cited, that rule in the nature of things is not violated by resorting to debates as a means of ascertaining the environment at the time of the enactment of a particular law — that is, the history of the period when it was adopted.”

The claimant relies upon the Alexander case, 12 Wall., 177. A widow of a Revolutionary soldier brought suit for what was claimed to be arrears of pension due her under the act of 1853. The act of July 29, 1848, had authorized the payment of pensions to widows of soldiers and marines married ~before January 1,1800, to commence the 4th of March, 1848. The act of February 3,1853, authorized pensions to widows of soldiers married after January 1, 1800, but omitted any reference to widows of mariners and marines. A subsequent act, February 28, 1855, extended the operation of the act of 1853 to widows of mariners and marines, giving them pensions in “ the same manner and to the same extent ” as widows of soldiers under the act of 1853. Mrs. Alexander claimed that the act of 1853, by which her right to a pension was controlled, should be construed with reference to the prior act of 1848, and that her pension should date from the latter act.

Mr. Justice Strong, delivering the opinion of the court, said it was clear that if the act of 1853 stood alone no widow could be entitled to a pension under it commencing anterior to its passage, because “all statutes are to be construed as operating prospectively unless a contrary intention appears beyond doubt.”

Turning to the contention that the act of 1853 should be construed with reference to that of 1848, he points out that it does not profess to be an amendment to that act and has no necessary reference to the latter; and while it was true that the act of 1853 declared that the said widows shall be entitled to pensions in the same manner as those referred to in the act of 1848, it was said: “ Certainly such a direction is not inconsistent with our holding that the act of 1853 was not intended to have a retroactive effect or to confer a right to a pension commencing prior to its passage.” It is then declared that the question could not be regarded as an open one, and that immediately after the passage of the act the Commissioner of Pensions had construed it as granting pensions commencing from and after its passage, which construction had ever since been adhered to by the Pension Bureau. Then it is said: “ That such was its meaning seems also to have been the understanding of the next succeeding Congress after it was enacted,” and the opinion proceeds to discuss pertinent parts of said three acts, calling attention to the fact that the act of 1855 granted pensions “ in the same manner and to the same extent ” as the act of 1853, and saying that thus “measuring the extent by the grant made in 1853 and not by that of 1848 tends to show that Congress regarded the extent or commencement of the pension under the act of 1853 as different from that of those granted by the act of 1848.” Proceeding, it is said: “And this is made quite certain by the history of the legislation,” the opinion pointing out that when the act of 1855 was first proposed it contained a provision quoted which would have directed that pensions granted by the act of 1853 should commence March 4, 1848. “This provision,” it is said, “was intended to change the construction which the Commissioner of Pensions had given the act of 1853, but it was stricken out and the statute was enacted as it stands. The intention of Congress was thus • clearly manifested to adopt the construction of the act of 1853 which had been given it by the Pension Bureau, and we are hardly at liberty now to interpret it differently.” Concluding, the opinion says: “ In view of this action of Congress and the long-standing construction of the act given by the department whose duty it was to act under it, we are of opinion that the plaintiff’s intestate was not entitled to a pension commencing anterior. to February 3, 1853.” The case had been decided in 1868 by the Court of Claims and was decided by the Supreme Court in 1870, over 17 years after the passage of the act in question, which had uniformly been given by the Pension Bureau the construction which the Supreme Court held to have been a proper one.

As the case is relied upon here because of its expressions as to the adoption by Congress of a departmental construction, it may be of interest to note a somewhat detailed history of the act of 1855 referred to in the opinion in said case (30 Cong. Globe, 92), as illustrative of the difficulty and uncertainty that must attend any attempt to construe statutes by referring to debates or views of individual Members or the action of one House of Congress not concurred in by the other. The House had passed the invalid pension bill, and while it was under consideration in the Senate (30 Cong. Globe, 81), Senator Fessenden offered as an amendment to it section 3, being the part referred to above as the act of 1855, his proposed amendment containing the provision “ and the pensions granted by this act and those under said second section of the act of February 3, 1853, shall commence on the 4th of March, 1848.” It will be noted that the provision applied not alone to pensions granted by the act of 1853, but to those granted by the proposed act of 1855 as well. The amendment was objected to by Senator Hunter, because it was new legislation upon an appropriation bill, and considerable expression of views was given by different Members — Senators Fessenden, Stuart, Hunter, Chase, and Brown. Senator Adams made a point of order, which was overruled, and the discussion was continued by Senators Hunter, Brown, Weller, Toombs, Cbase, Dawson, and Fessenden, some contending that the matter should be carried in a different bill, others that it was proper to put it on the appropriation bill, all but one expressing sympathy with the general purposes of the amendment, and one only referring to the bureau’s construction of the act of 1853. Senator Chase said: “ There is, however, an extension by the amendment in both these classes of cases conformable to the idea originally entertained by those who supported the provision in favor of the widows of officers and soldiers in the Army. Their idea was that those pensions should commence from 1848. The construction of the Government officers, I believe, makes them commence from 1853. In both these cases the pensions are made to commence from 1848. That is the only change, and that simply carries out the purpose of the Senate and of Congress in passing the original provision.” A vote was taken and the amendment was adopted with said provision in it, 30 Cong. Globe, 94, by a vote of 19 to 18. The bill as amended was then adopted and went back to the House. The Senate had adopted two amendments to the House bill, and as amended the bill was called up in the House on January 9,1855, 30 Cong. Globe, 217, by Mr. Houston and the first Senate amendment was readily agreed to. When the second amendment was offered, the one in question here, a Member proposed an amendment to the Senate amendment which, however, did not affect its purpose but was an extension of the pension laws to other cases. These amendments were subsequently referred to the Ways and Means Committee, which later, on February 9, reported back recommending the adoption of the first part of the Senate amendment and the rejection of the latter part, the provision above quoted. In reporting this Senate amendment from the Ways and Means Committee Mr. Houston explained that it had two objects, one to put widows of sailors on an equality with widows of soldiers and the other to extend the law of 1853 so as to make pensions commence in 1848. The committee advised the adoption of the first branch of the amendment, and as to the latter branch Mr. Houston said: “ But if the latter part of it be agreed to, it will, according to the letter of the Commissioner of Pensions, require $1,000,000 to commence the extension. The committee therefore recommend that the amendment of the Senate be amended by striking out the words ‘ and the pensions granted by this act and those under said second section of the act of February 3, 1853, shall commence on the 1st day of March, 1848.’ I now move the previous question.” And the amendment was agreed to. 30 Cong. Globe, 656. When the bill as thus amended went back to the Senate the House amendment was vigorously opposed by Senator Hamlin upon the ground that, as he and other Senators understood at the time of its passage the act of 1853 was intended to relate back to 1848; that he had hastily drawn the amendment in 1853, which was then adopted, intending to make the pensions date from 1848; that the then Commissioner of Pensions had indicated he would so construe the statute, but a subsequent commissioner had construed it differently, and that therefore the Senate should not concur in the House amendment. A letter from the commissioner was read, showing not only the bureau’s construction of the act of 1853 but also the necessary increase in amount of the pensions, calling for additional appropriations, if the proposed act extended the prolusions of the act of 1853 back to 1848. But the House amendment was agreed to and the bill passed. 30 Cong. Globe, 878. It may be said, in view of said history, as was said in Freight Association case, 166 U. S., 318: “All that can be determined from the debates and reports is that various Members had various views.”

Several conclusions are apparent from the opinion in said case — (1) that the meaning of the act (that it was prospective and not retroactive in its operation) was definitely ascertained from its terms by the court; (2) that upon consideration of the act in connection with two others the intention of Congress as to said act was ascertained to coincide with the court’s view of the meaning of the act; (3) that this latter cQnclusion was “made quite certain by the history of the legislation.”

We do not think, therefore, that the Alexander case is an authority upon the question of congressional adoption of departmental construction of an act if that construction be erroneous, because in that case the court holds the construetion to have been a correct one. Whether the court would have felt bound by the Pension Bureau’s construction if it had been erroneous is answered by the other authorities sufra.

The said cases referred to in this connection, commencing with Binn’s case, supra, do not tend to abridge the well-established rule that debates, committee reports, and opinions of individual Members of Congress can not be considered as interpreting the meaning of statutes enacted by Congress, but they do recognize that such debates, etc., may be consulted in the ascertainment of the history of the period. And while in some of the cases mentioned references will be found to reports and debates and, as in the Alexander case, to a rejection of a proposed amendment, it will be found that these references were not made by the court in order to ascertain the meaning of an act, but rather and usually arguendo as vindicating and confirming the conclusion which the court would and did reach without having recourse to such extrinsic matters to enable it to reach its conclusion. See McLean case, 226 U. S., 374, 380. And it is clear that in said cases the references had relation to proposed statutes that were being considered and were enacted, and not to discussions, debates, rulings, or reports with reference to statutes or amendments of statutes which were not enacted or adopted. And the debates and reports to which we are asked to look occurred in 1907, when the amendment then adopted was enacted, and not in 1905, when the act of 1873 was amended by requiring weighings for not less than 90 successive working days, which latter is the material one here.

By the act of July 2, 1838, 5 Stat. L., 288, every railroad in the United States then or thereafter completed was declared to be “ a post route,” and the Postmaster General was directed to “ cause the mails to be transported thereon, provided he can have it done upon reasonable terms and not paying therefor in any instance more than 25 per cent over and above what similar transportation would cost in post coaches.”

By the act of January 25, 1839, 5 Stat. L., 314, a limit of not exceeding $300 per mile per annum was placed upon the payment to railroad companies “ for the conveyance of one or more daily mails upon tbeir roads.”

By the act of February 20, 1845, 5 Stat. L., 738, the Postmaster General was authorized to contract with railroads for transporting the mails without advertising for bids. By that act it is provided:

“ Sec. 19. And he it further enacted, That to insure, as far as may be practicable, an equal and just rate of compensation, according to the service performed, among the several railroad companies * * * for the transportation of the mail, it shall be the duty of the Postmaster General to * * * divide the railroad routes * * * into three classes, according to the size of the mails, the speed with which they are conveyed, and the importance of the service.”

The act approved June 8, 1872, 17 Stats., 283, was an act to revise, consolidate, and amend the statutes relating to the Post Office Department, and by section 265 the Postmaster General was authorized to enter into contracts with railroad companies for carrying the mails without advertising for bids therefor, thus bringing forward the provisions of the act of 1845.

No further legislation occurred until 1873, and the mails had been carried under the provisions of said acts under contracts made by the Postmaster General with the respective roads. It was made that official’s duty by the act of 1845 to divide the railroad routes into three classes, and it is to be noticed that by this act “the size of the mails” was made one of the important elements in the road’s classification, though no method of its definite ascertainment was pointed out. It was not until 1867 that the plan was suggested of having the mails weighed for 30 consecutive working days with the view of securing data upon the “ size of the mails,” and securing the average weight per day. But the compensation being paid was regulated by the act of 1845. That act, authorizing the Postmaster General to divide the postal routes into three classes, fixed the maximum rate he could pay per mile per annum for the transportation at no higher rate than $300 per mile for routes of the first class, no greater compensation than $150 per mile for routes of the second class, and no greater compensation than $50 per mile for routes of the third class. The classification was left to his judgment and discretion, with the direction of that statute, that in making it he should have regard to “ the size of the mails, the speed with which they are conveyed, and the importance of the service,” having in view also that a purpose of the law was “ to insure, as far as may be practicable, an equal and just rate of compensation according to the service performed.” The elements of size, speed, and importance of the service thus entered into his consideration, but the statute did not define these, and the application of the rules which should guide him, if they may be so called, was to be made by the Postmaster General. If he could not conclude contracts “ at a compensation not exceeding the aforesaid maximum rates or for what he may deem a reasonable and fair compensation for the service to be performed,” he was authorized to contract for transportation by other means.

Between 1845 and 1873 great development had occurred in the country, and in railroad building as well. The amount of the mails and the importance of the service had vastly increased and the system of handling the mails had become a complex one. Over some railroad routes mails were carried one or more times per day every day in the week; on others six times per week; on others less than that. Some routes were long and others short.

Let us examine this act of 1873. We find (1) that it appropriates a large amount “ for increase compensation,” thus recognizing that the plan adopted for ascertaining the average weight per day was expected to result in increase of compensation; (2) that payments are to be made on the basis of average daily weight per mile — thus answering the question of “long haul” and “ short haul”; (3) that a scale of maximum rates is given to be based upon the average obtained from actual weighings “ in every case,” for 30 or more successive working days; (4) that a rule for ascertaining an average weight per day is provided. This last marks a departure from the older law wherein no method of ascertaining “the size of the mails” is provided, though it was required by the act of 1845 that it enter into the Postmaster General’s computation in fixing pay for the service. It was as impracticable in 1873 and the years following to ascertain the size of the mails or their weight as it had been in prior years, except by constant weighings, and as the weight carried was necessarily considered a material element a plan was adopted which was at once practicable and fair to the parties concerned. This plan amounted to discarding the idea of actual weights by providing a contract basis to be an average ascertained by a rule stated in the statute, and it will be observed that the statute directs the average weights to be ascertained “in every case” by that rule. With the average weight carried daily throughout the route ascertained, the length of the route known, the right to “ increase compensation” given, and the maximum rate named, the Postmaster General was prepared to submit his proposal to each road with the conditions and terms provided in the act. Among the conditions named were that the mails be carried with “ due frequency and speed,” and that proper and suitable mail cars be provided.

He was given a limit as to compensation to be paid, maximum rates being stated, and his contract was to be based upon an average weight of mails per day carried the whole length of the route and the ascertainment therefrom of the average weight carried per mile per annum.

The statute left many matters to be worked out by the Post Office Department calling for the exercise of discretion and judgment. We point out some and perhaps many others occur in the practical operation of the law. For instance:

1. The amount of compensation to be paid in any case is not fixed, but the maximum that can be paid is stated.

2. What shall be regarded as “ due frequency and speed ” is left open.'

3. The suitableness of the mail cars employed was left for consideration.

4. The adjustment of the maximum rates allowed to the varying average weights of all above or below the figures mentioned in the scale of prices had to be made, because while the statute allowed a maximum rate of $50 per mile to a route carrying its whole length an average of weight of mails per day of 200 pounds, the next figure stated is 500 pounds, for which a maximum of $75 was allowable. How much was allowable where the average weight proved to be 300 pounds- or exactly 375 pounds ?

5. Different roads carrying the mails on different days— some for seven days, some for six days, some for less days per week — were to be treated with accordingly.

6. The additional amounts allowed for railway post-office cars were not definitely fixed.

7. The times of the year the weighing should occur are not stated.

The principal point in dispute in this case is involved in what is called “ the divisor ” to be used in ascertaining the average weight contemplated by the statute, its language being—

The average weight to be ascertained in every case by the actual weighing of the mails for such a number of successive working days, not less than 30, at such times * * * as the Postmaster General may direct.

Since the statute mentions working days, some meaning should be ascribed to the terms. It would have shortened the phrase to have omitted the word “ working,” but it was inserted. Working days generally refer to secular days; that is, they exclude Sundays. It was said in a case involving the use of the term in a charter party: “ The expression ‘working days’ has in commerce and jurisprudence a settled and definite meaning; it means days as they succeed each other, exclusive of Sundays and holidays. The court gives this precise and formal definition in Brooks v. Minturn, 1 Cal., 483.” Pederson v. Engster, 14 Fed. R., 422; Field v. Chase, N. Y., Lalor’s Supp., 50. Working day is a day in which work is generally done in distinction to Sundays or holidays. Webster’s Dictionary. We may not find an entirely satisfactory reason for the use of the expression in said connection, and it is immaterial what the reason was if the meaning be clear. Congress certainly had the right to use it and did so. At that time, 1873, there were a great many more railroad routes carrying the mails six days per week than there were carrying them seven days per week. We are told the proportion was then 7 to 1, a condition very much changed since. It may, therefore, be that Congress recognized that by using the working days — or excluding Sundays — for weighings it was adopting days common to all the roads, and thus securing an average weight fairly representative of the service of all, the daily average being the factor desired. Or it may be that the suggestion was made that the railroads were operated under charters granted by the States, which might claim the right to regulate or prohibit the running of Sunday trains, and that the authority from Congress to weigh the mails on Sundays might be construed as legislation by Congress in reference to the mails, a matter peculiarly within the province of the Federal Government, and as thereby interdicting any interference by the States with railroads operating their trains on Sundays while carrying the mails. Whatever the ■ reason, Congress directed that the mails be weighed for such a number of successive working days, not less than 30, as the Postmaster General might direct.

Having in mind the fact that prior to 1873 much difficulty had been experienced in determining “the size of the mails,” that actual weights could only be found by constant and actual weighings, which would be so expensive and inconvenient as to amount to impracticability, and that it was essential to have a basis upon which contracts for terms of fours years could be made, we can see a reason for adopting the plan of ascertaining an average weight and accepting that instead of actual weight. If Congress had directed, as it could readily have done, that the mails should be actually weighed on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday of one week and on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday of the next week, and so on for five successive weeks, and the average of these weighings be taken, no one would doubt that 15 days’ weighings would be divided by 15 to obtain the average. It should be borne in mind that the evident purpose of the statute was to furnish a plan whereby the average weights in distinction to actual weights could be found; that it was adopting a method under which the Government would be willing to make contracts extending for a long period; that certainty, even though based upon average weights, was preferable to uncertainty resulting from any other method; that this certainty of average weight would furnish a basis for estimates for appropriations relieving the uncertainty of estimating weights or the variableness of actual weights; and that it therefore provided a plan and furnished a rule which, if literally followed, would determine the average weight per day.

The statute authorized a readjustment of the compensation upon “the conditions and terms” mentioned therein. One of these conditions is that in the matter of weights the statutory rule shall be used to find the average weight of the mails carried per day. The aggregate of “ the actual weigh-ings of the mails for such a number of successive working days not less than 30 * * as the Postmaster General may direct, furnishes the dividend, the number of successive working days so used furnishes the divisor; and the quotient is, of course, the average daily weight of the mails carried on said days.

At this point it is suggested by claimant that the foregoing rule might serve for six-day roads, but works an injustice to routes carrying mails every day of the week. Because, it is said, when the mails carried by six-day roads are weighed for 30 successive working days it means that all of the mail carried throughout the week by such roads goes to make up the average — Sunday’s accummulation going into Monday’s mail and weight; while the seven-day roads carrying mails on Sunday do not get the benefit of its weight in this aVerage. At first view this contention may seem to have merit, but in reality it is unsound when the whole statute is considered.

Congress knew when it enacted the statute that some routes were seven-day and others were six-day routes, and yet it provided a rule which it declared should be applied “in every case” by actual weighings of the mails for a number of successive working days. But chiefly the vice of said contention is that, in order to show the supposed inequality produced by the rule stated specifically in the statute, the emphasis is laid upon the wrong feature. The statute itself considered as an entirety answers the contention, for it provides that, among the terms and conditions upon which the mails are to be carried, there shall be prominently considered the “ frequency ” with which they are conveyed and that the price to be paid shall be within a named maximum price. In other words, the latitude given the Postmaster General within which to “ readjust ” the compensation so as to comply with the terms and spirit of the act of 1873 is not found in a disregard of the rule for finding the average weight, but is found in the price to be paid. He may pay on the basis of “ due frequency ” of carriage to seven-day roads a larger amount for the average daily weight per mile per annum than he pays a six-day road. He may pay one for 365 days and the other for 313 days per annum. And this can be done because of the flexibility of the provisions fixing the compensation without doing any violence to any terms of the statute.

It is, however, insisted that the contemporaneous exposition of the statute given by the Post Office Department is contrary to the view above expressed, and that from 1873 to 1907 the department, in the execution of the law, pursued the course of weighing the mails for 30 successive working days and for the five intervening Sundays, taking the total of the 35 weighings, dividing it by 30 and using the quotient as the daily weight carried by the seven-day roads. -

If the statute in this particular were ambiguous or doubtful, the exposition by the department so long continued should be given great weight and a controlling effect under the authorities sufra, but we do not so construe the statute.

If the ascertainment of the weight by the departmental method was because of any discretionary power granted by the statute, that discretion must be held to have existed in each successive Postmaster General and still to continue.

But it is insisted that by the amendment of 1905, if not by prior amendments to the act of 1873, Congress reenacted that statute, and that when a statute is reenacted without change the construction which had been given it is carried into the reenactment. United States v. Hermanos y Compania,, 209 U. S., 337, is relied upon by claimant. As stated in the opinion in that case by Mr. Justice McKenna, “ The only question in the case is the construction of paragraph 296,” and after quoting that paragraph the opinion says: “ It is the contention of the Government that the paragraph separates still wines in bottles into three classes and fixes a specific duty in each as follows ” (setting them out a, 5, e). Then follows this expression of opinion: “ We think the contention is light and needs no comment to make it clear.” It seems evident, therefore, that the court (or a majority of the court) did not regard said paragraph 296 as ambiguous or doubtful in meaning, and, on the contrary, considered that no comment was necessary to make it clear. But the Government also contended that the Treasury decisions for a long period had given a like interpretation to said paragraph 296, and the opinion proceeds: “ We have said that when the meaning of a statute is doubtful great weight should be given to the construction placed upon it by the department charged with its execution, Robertson v. Downing., 127 U. S., 607; United States v. Healy, 160 U. S., 136,” thus recognizing the principle annottnced in said two cases and many others that the meaning of the act must be “ doubtful ” before a court is warranted in accepting a departmental construction of it which is variant from the meaning the court would otherwise give the act.

The question involved was, it seems to us, decided by a majority of the court without reference or appeal to the department’s exposition, while the entire court agreed that if the statute was of doubtful interpretation the contemporaneous exposition of the executive department charged with its execution and continued through a long period was entitled to “ great weight,” but that, as stated in one of the cases there cited, “the regulation of a department of the Government is not, of course, to control the construction of an act of Congress when its meaning is clear.” Robertson v. Downing, 127 U. S., 613.

A third statement in the opinion is: “And we have decided that the reenactment by Congress without change of a statute which had previously received long-continued executive construction is an adoption by Congress of such construction. United States v. Falk, 204 U. S., 143, 152.” It is to be noted that two of the justices who concurred placed their concurrence upon the second of the three propositions stated in the opinion.

In the Falk case, supra, cited to the third proposition in the above-mentioned case, the question involved construction of a proviso in the tariff act of 1897, where it appeared that the opinion of the Attorney General had been sought by the Treasury Department as to the effect of a proviso in section 50 of the tariff act of 1890. He gave his opinion, holding that the said proviso was of general application and was not to be restricted to the matter of said section immediately preceding the proviso. 20 Op. Atty. Gen., 80. This construction was followed by the executive officers of the Government until the Dingley Act was passed in July, 1897. The proviso in section 50 of the act of 1890, which had been construed by the Attorney General and acted upon as above stated, was reenacted in section 83 of the Dingley Act, and the question was pressed that a “ proviso ” should be referred “ only to the provision of a statute to which it is appended.” The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Mc-Kenna, said: “■ This, then, is our view: The Attorney General having construed the proviso of section 50 of the act of 1890 as not restricted to the matter which immediately preceded it, but as of general application, and this construction having been followed by the executive officers charged with the administration of the law, Congress adopted the construction by the enactment of section 83 of the act of 1897, and intended to make no other change than to require as the basis of duty the weight of the merchandise at the time of entry instead of its weight at the time of its withdrawal from warehouse.”

But we find that after the decision of the last-named case the Supreme Court, in Copper Queen Mining Co. v. Arizona Board, 206 U. S., 474, 479, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, says:

“And again, when for a considerable time a statute notoriously has received a construction in practice from those whose duty it is to carry it out and afterwards is reenacted in the same words, it may be presumed that the construction is satisfactory to the legislature, unless plainly erroneous, since otherwise naturally the words would have been changed,” citing New York, N. H. & H. Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S., 361, wherein Mr. Justice White, delivering the opinion, refers to rulings made by the commission in certain cases adhered to during many years and concedes (p. 401) “ that the interpretation given by the commission in those cases to the act to regulate commerce is now binding and as restricted to the 'precise conditions which were passed on in the cases referred to must be applied to all strictly identical cases in the future, at least until Congress has legislated on the subject. We make this concession, because we think we are constrained to do so in consequence of the familiar rule that a construction made by the body charged with the enforcement of a statute, which construction has long obtained in practical execution and has been impliedly sanctioned by the reenactment of the statute without alteration in the particulars construed when not plainly erroneous, must be treated as read into the statute.” (Italics ours.)

The language of the opinion in the Hermanos case, 209 U. S., 339, is quoted in The Komada case, 215 U. S., 396, which involved construction of a clause in the tariff act, just as the Falk and Hermanos cases involved tariff laws, and the long-continued construction of the Treasury Department was upheld, the ruling having been followed in the department from 1894 and “receiving in the meantime at least a qualified approval by Congress” (p. 397).

In Latimer v. United States, 223 U. S., 501, effect was given to certain words in the tariff act of 1897 which had been given by the construction by the Supreme Court of the same words in the act of 1883, “ on the theory that in using the phrase in the later statute Congress adopted the construction already given it by this court” (p. 504), citing Baruch’s case, 223 U. S., 191.

The general rule stated by text writers in that the reenactment of a statute which has received a judicial construction amounts to a legislative adoption of such construction. Endl. on International Stat., secs. 368, 371; Black Inter. Laws, 161; 36 Cyc., 1153.

Where certain words in a statute have received a construction by the Supreme Court, Congress is presumed to have knowledge of it, and “like words being again repeated by Congress it may well be considered that a like construction was intended and was expected to be given to those words.” Mason v. Fearson, 9 How., 248, 258; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S., 263, 301; The Abbottsford, 98 U. S., 440-444; Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S., 100, 124; Talbert case, 25 C. Cls., 158.

“It is doubtless a rule that when a judicial construction has been given to a statute the reenactment of the statute is generally held to be in effect a legislative adoption of that construction. This, however, can only be when the statute is capable of the construction given to it and when that construction has become a settled rule of conduct. The rule, we think, is inapplicable to this case. In the first place, the decisions of the Internal Revenue Commissioner can hardly be denominated -judicial constructions.” (Italics ours.) Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall., 227-237; Fairbanlc case, 25 C. Cls., 158.

It was said by Sanborn, circuit judge, in Hemmer v. United States, 204 Fed., 898, 905: “And it is the function and duty of the officers of the judicial department of a government, which they may not lawfully renounce, to exercise their own independent judgments, guided only by the established legal principles and the recognized canons of interpretation, in the construction of its statutes, and to adjudge their just and true interpretation, even though the officers of an executive department have construed them otherwise,” citing authorities.

Whether, therefore, we are to be governed by the rule as stated in the Falk case or as stated in the Hermanos case, where emphasis is laid upon the fact that the Attorney General had given an opinion which had been followed, though that opinion admits its construction leads to a departure from a preexisting rule of action by the department, 20 Op. Atty. Gen., 82, or whether we are to be governed by the more limited rule announced in the other cases cited above, and especially whether the construction which is supposed to be adopted by a reenactment of a statute refers to a judicial, or authoritative, construction given the earlier act, is in view of the positive language of the Falk case not entirely free from doubt.

It may be said, however, that as we read the Falk case the said statement of the rule was not essential to the decision made. And if the view we have expressed, which finds support in many decisions, that executive exposition is given little consideration where the meaning of a statute is clear, Osborne v. Blank, 9 Wheat., 738, and that it is only where the statute is ambiguous or doubtful that resort may be had to contemporaneous executive construction, Houghton v. Payne, 194 U. S., 88, and other cases sufra, it does not seem that the reenactment of a statute which in the particular involved had been construed by the executive department would in any event carry into the new statute that construction unless the older statute were itself ambiguous and doubtful. For it must be conceded that the proper construction of a statute is a judicial function, and if its meaning is clear there is no necessity for construction. Thornby v. United States, 113 U. S., 310.

But the contention of claimant upon the effect of a reenactment assumes that the act of 1873 was reenacted in 1905, at least to the extent of adopting the practice or construction of the department under the former act. This contention is, however, open to serious doubt. The act of 1873 was not reenacted in 1905, but in the Post Office appropriation bill for that year appears a proviso as follows:

“Provided, That hereafter before making the readjustment of pay for transportation of mails on railroad routes the average weight shall be ascertained by the actual weighing of the mails for such a number of successive working days, not less than ninety, at such times after June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and five, and not less frequently than once in every four years, and the result to be stated and verified in such form and manner as the Postmaster General may direct.” 33 Stat. L., 1088.

It is evident that Congress was not satisfied with the average weights being obtained, whether the dissatisfaction arose from the method or the result, and they therefore changed the law to insure a more satisfactory average, and when we find an amendment which is designed to change a feature in or practice under the older act we think the amendment should be construed to give it the effect intended.

We may eliminate from consideration any question of equities growing out of contracts made in accordance with the construction which, prior to 1907, the Post Office Department had applied to the act of 1873 and its amendatory acts. Such a question was involved in one branch of the case of United States v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co., 142 U. S., 615. In the present case is involved the right to make a new contract and not a change in any respect of a preexisting one. The question therefore is whether the Postmaster General was authorized in ascertaining the average weight per day to adopt the statutory rule or was he bound by prior executive exposition and long-continued practice? In other words, to state it plainly, must he obey the statute or the department’s exposition of it?

In the construction of an act the court’s aim must be to arrive at the intention of the legislative body and to apply the language of the act toward the attaining of that intention, if possible. As words must be used as the vehicle of the legislative intention, their popular or received import furnishes the general rule for the interpretation of the laws in which they appear, and whilst a strict literalism is not required, especially if it tends to defeat the purposes of the law, yet where the language used is clear and imperative “ reasoning ah inconvenienti is of no avail and there is no room for construction.” Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How., 261; Boudinot v. The United States, 11 Wall., 616. While it is the duty of courts to ascertain the meaning of the legislature from the words used in the statute and the subject matter to which it relates there may be an equal duty to restrict the meaning of general words whenever it is found necessary to do so in order to carry out the legislative intent. United States v. Freight Assn., 166 U. S., 290, 320. AnH where words or terms used are ambiguous or are found to have application to diverse conditions actually arising their meaning must be resolved by “ an examination of and comparison of the doubtful words with the context of the law, considering its reason and spirit and the inducing cause of its enactment.” Endl. Inter Stat., secs. 26, 27. But the ambiguity or doubt must inhere in the language of the act as applicable to conditions to which the law is intended to apply. It is not the doubt occasioned by a consideration of whether an executive exposition put into practice is free from criticism which will produce the ambiguity or doubt in the meaning of the terms of the statute itself, because misconstruction is not sufficient to generate the doubt required or produce a latent ambiguity. In City of New York v. New York City Railway Co., 193 N. Y., 543, the rule of practical construction as stated above, Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall., 50, 54; United States v. Alabama Great Southern Railway Co., 142 U. S., 615, is recognized to the broad extent that the practical construction of a doubtful statute by the legislative and executive departments continued for many years is held to have controlling weight in its interpretation and to have great weight even in the construction of the Constitution itself. Illustrating by two classes of cases then before it, the court expressed the controlling distinction between them to be that in the one there was ambiguity in the grant and in the other there was not, saying that the doctrine of practical construction should not be applied where there is no ambiguity in the grant and adding (p. 550): “ We think that position is sound, for the doctrine is never applied unless the door is opened by an ambiguity, which is the foundation of the principle upon which the doctrine is founded. It goes without saying that the ambiguity must not be captious, but should be so serious as to raise a reasonable doubt in a fair mind reflecting honestly upon the subject, before the principle of practical construction can be applied.”

Is the act of 1873, as amended, ambiguous in any particular, especially with reference to the matters involved in this action? Is there any ambiguity in the amendment of 1905 above quoted?

Claimant insists that (1) both questions must be answered affirmatively, and (2) if not, that the amendment of 1905 was an adoption of a long-continued executive exposition of the clause which it amends. As to the last proposition, we dismiss it from further consideration upon our understanding of the authorities to the effect that if the act is not, when properly considered, ambiguous, and uncertain, contemporaneous, and long-continued executive exposition and practice should not prevent the court construing the act according to its terms and the intention of Congress, and that said amendment, in view of its purpose, was not an adoption by Congress of the departmental construction or practice under the prior act. It is earnestly urged that the Postmaster General in 1884 called upon the Attorney General for an opinion upon the departmental construction of the act of 1873, and received an opinion from an Acting Attorney General, 18 Op. Atty. Gen., 71, that the construction was correct, “ and that a departure from it would defeat the intention of the law and cause no little embarrassment.”

As above suggested, an opinion by the Attorney General may be sought, and he acts upon an authoritative statement of facts furnished by the head of the department asking for the opinion. 18 Op. Atty. Gen., 487.

The Postmaster General’s letter to the Attorney General states that it had been “ the practice since 1875 in arriving at the average weight of mails per day on these two classes of service [6-day and 7-day roads] to treat ‘ successive working days’ as being composed of the 6 working or secular days in the week,” and then follows, by way of illustration, the practice as applied to two different routes, each supposedly carrying the same amount of mail per day. In the one the mails are weighed for 30 successive working days, the total divided by 30, and the average weight per day thus found. In the other the mails are weighed for 30 successive working days “ and for the intervening Sundays (£ the weight on Sunday being treated as if carried on Mondays ’), the weighing as before covering usually a period of 35 days.” The total of 35 days’ weighings is divided by 30 and “ an average weight of mails per day” thus attained. It appears that the “successive working days” in the law were construed as exclusive of Sundays, and the Sundays’ mails were treated for the purpose of the computation “ as if carried on Mondays.” There can be no question that “ an average” of 35 weighings can not be secured by dividing the total by 30. A quotient may be gotten by that method just as one would be gotten if 19 were used as the divisor, but that quotient does not represent the daily average weight. Nor can the method be sustained, within the language of tbe act, unless there was a discretionary power vested in the Postmaster General by it as regards ascertaining the average daily weight of mails transported. We are not informed whether the treating of the Sunday weighings “ as if carried on Mondays ” was thought to find support in the act of March 3,1875 (18 Stat. L., 341), which changed the practice of weighing the mails from the railroad companies to the department, directing the Postmaster General “to have the mails weighed as often as now provided by law by the employees of the Post Offiee Department, and have the weights stated and verified to him by said employees vrnder such instructions as he may consider just to the Post Office Department and the railroad companies,” though the practice referred to in the said letter of the Postmaster General seems to have existed “since 1875.” It is conceivable that in the language of the act of 1875, above italicized, there may have been considered some warrant for having the weights of Sundays’ mails treated as carried on Mondays, and so stated and verified under instructions from the Postmaster General, he considering that method just to the Post Office Department and the railroads. But if a discretion were thus lodged, it is manifest that the discretion did not wear out in its use and that it could be exercised again and differently in 1907. The Postmaster General’s letter recognized the meaning of successive working days and the apparent necessity of treating all mails in ascertaining their weights as .carried on working days, thus appreciating at, least the importance and meaning of the words of the statute. It must be admitted that the Acting Attorney General, 18 Op. Atty. Gen., 71, stated that the construction placed by the Postmaster General upon said act for ascertaining .the average weight of mail “ is correct,” but it is also apparent that the Postmaster General’s letter stated there were two methods used in practice, one applicable to six-day and the other to seven-day routes, and another Attorney General, more than 20 years thereafter, said a like construction was “ an impossible one.” 26 Op. Atty. Gen., 390. While great respect is due to opinions of the Attorneys General, and an apparently controlling influence was ascribed to that mentioned in the Hermanos case, they are- not necessarily controlling. And “ without stopping to review the subjects in detail we content ourselves with saying that we think neither the reference to expressions in debate, upon the concession for the sake of argument that they are competent to be looked at, nor an opinion of the Attorney General upon which reliance is placed are adequate to control or modify the conclusion we have reached as to the meaning of the provision.” Per Mr. Chief Justice White delivering the opinion in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 29 U. S., 228, 311.

The argument for claimant is that the amendment of 1905, taken in connection with the whole act, is ambiguous and doubtful, one of the reasons for the contention being that its literal application works a hardship or is inequitable toward the roads carrying mails every day in the year, while favoring the roads carrying them only six days per week. We do not concur in that view, and at the cost of some repetition we point out that the Government having the right to declare the terms upon which it would contract for transportation of the mails could and did provide a plan whereby an average daily weight of the mails carried could be ascertained. The weight of the mails had always been a controlling element in fixing the price of transportation, and three methods were open for consideration: (1) Actual weights to be secured by weighing the mails day in and day out, a method expensive, inconvenient, uncertain in making appropriations, and therefore impracticable; (2) estimating the weights from such data as was attainable, a method unreliable, unsatisfactory, and open to more serious objections; (3) average weights to be ascertained by .a definite rule which admitted of a sufficient number of weighings to enable the Government and the railroads alike to deal on terms of exact equality and approximate at least the actual weights. And this plan lends certainty to the element of weight, furnishing as it does a basis for estimates for appropriations. The theory of the law was that compensation should be based upon the average weight of mails carried daily per mile per annum, readily ascertainable when the average weight carried daily upon the whole length of the route was known.

The three essential elements of the contract would be weight, mileage, and price in connection with due frequency and speed. The mileage was known, the price could be fixed, but what of the weight?

The rule was established for finding the average weight, the statute authorized contracts based upon such average weight, and the period of the contracts could be four years. The amelioration of the supposed hardships or inequity as between roads carrying mails different numbers of days was not to be accomplished by a different and incorrect “ average,” but was amply provided for within the maximum price. The Postmaster General could exercise some discretion in the compensation offered, but the average weight should be found by the statutory rule, without which there was no authority conferred by the statute to ascertain or contract with reference to average weights. Claimants’ contention therefore lays emphasis on the effect of the average weights as between classes of roads instead of taking note of the fact that one of the conditions prescribed by the act is that the price was to be regulated according to the “ frequency and speed” and the facilities furnished to properly handle and distribute the mails. It affords no reason apparent to us for the adoption of a method which increases by one-sixth the proper daily average in favor of one class of roads and extends the increase throughout 365 days per year for four years. The question when the average weight per day was fixed became one of contract between the Government and the roads. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 225 U. S., 640; Texas Pacific By. Co. v. United States, 28 C. Cls., 379, 310.

There is no reasonable ground for mistaking the meaning of the amendment of 1905. It declares that “ hereafter ” the average weight shall be ascertained by a rule stated and of ready application. The words “ average weight,” which are to be ascertained “in every case” by a definite rule, are easily understood. We can not conceive of its being used in said connection by Congress in any involved sense. We must construe it in its ordinarily accepted sense.

“It is not only the safer course to adhere to the words of the statute construed in their ordinary import, instead of entering into any inquiry as to the supposed intention of Congress, but it is the imperative duty of the court to do so.” Bate Refrigerator Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S., 1, 33.

It is a matter of common knowledge that the teachers in the public schools in their reports of the pupil’s record state the marks of the different studies and the average of all. What would be thought of a teacher finding the average of sis studies by dividing by 6 and then finding the average of seven studies by dividing by 6, upon the theory that in the latter case the student was doing more work?

In Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How., 251, 261, it is said:

“And it would seem to be a most extravagant supposition which could hold that, in the enactment of a law affecting the interests of the Nation at large, the legislature should select for that purpose language by which the Nation or the mass of the people must necessarily be misled. The popular or received import of words furnishes the general rule for the interpretation of public laws as well as of private and social transactions, and wherever the legislature adopts such language in order to define and promulge their action or their will, the just conclusion from such a course must be that they not only themselves comprehended the meaning of the language they have selected, but have chosen it with reference to the known apprehension of those to whom the legislative language is addressed and for whom it is designed to constitute a rule of conduct, namely, the community at large.”

Our conclusion is that said statute as amended in the particulars involved in this case does not authorize the application of the rule of contemporaneous and long-continued executive exposition, but that it can be and should be given the construction which its words in their usual and generally accepted meaning import, and that the amendment of 1905 was not an adoption of any preexisting departmental practice which is controlling upon the interpretation to be given by the court.

The Postmaster General issued Order No. 165, dated March 2, 1907, reading:

“ That when the weight of mail is taken on railroad routes, the whole number of days the mails are weighed shall be used as a divisor for obtaining the average weight per day.”

And later issued Order No. 412, dated June 7, 1907, reading:

“ Ordered,, That Order 165, dated March 2, 1907, be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows:
“ That when the weight of mail is taken on railroad routes the whole number of days included in the weighing period shall be used as a divisor for obtaining the average weight per day.”

For the purpose of obtaining the daily average of mail transported the country had been divided into four divisions, called first (the Eastern States), second (Southern States), third (Middle States), fourth (Western States), the four-year periods commencing on Julyl of different years; and in the division covering claimant’s territory the four-year period commenced July 1, 1907.

It appears that on or about February 12, 1907, the Postmaster General notified claimant of the direction given to weigh the mails on said routes and transmitted to it “ a distance circular” calling for certain information, such distance circular containing a form of the acceptance of the proposed contract to be signed by the railroad company. Under date of July 1,1907, the claimant wrote a letter to the Post Office Department calling attention to certain features in the distance circular and making “protest” to certain features mentioned. In the meantime claimant had received notice of said Order No. 412. Claimant continued to transport the mails from July 1, 1907, the beginning of the new four-year period, and, on September 16, 1907, returned the distance circular duly signed, except that to the form of acceptance there were added before the signature the words, “Exception taken to Order No. 165, issued by the Postmaster General March 2,1907, and Order No. 412, issued by the Postmaster General June 7, 1907 (see attached letter of protest, bearing date of July 1, 1907).”

To this the Second Assistant Postmaster General replied on October 3, 1907, stating in effect that it must be understood that the claimant, in the performance of the service from the beginning of the contract term and during the continuance of the service, would be subject to all the postal laws and regulations. Payments have been regularly made to claimant based upon the terms of said Order No. 412.

Conceding for the sake of argument that the claimant could have objected to Order 412, we think the objection should have been timely and that some effect should be given to its action in entering upon the performance of the contract for carrying the mails without objection made before July 1, 1907, when the contract period commenced, if indeed the letter of July 1,1907, can be construed to be an objection. By holding the distance circular until September and then returning it with “ exception ” noted claimant waived any right of objection, not only upon the principle statéd in Philadelphia & Baltimore R. R. Co. v. United States, 103 U. S., 703, and Texas & Pacific R. R. Co. case, 28 C. Cls., 379, wherein it is said, “The contract could not be changed-by complaints and protests,” but also upon another principle, namely, that where an offer is made by one party its acceptance by the other may as well be signified by doing acts which clearly show assent as by express words, especially when there is a duty on the part of such party to make known his unwillingness to proceed under the contract. If such acts are done with the knowledge of the party making the offer, they amount to an acceptance thereof.” I Page Contr.., sec. 50. And illustrations of the rule may be found in Muscatine Water Co. v. Lumber Co., 85 Iowa, 112; 39 Am. St. R., 287; Horner School v. Westcott, 32 S. E. R., 885; Old Jordon Co. v. Society, 164 U. S., 261; Vogel v. Pekoc, 157 Ill., 339; 30 L. R. A., 493, where it is said: “ The acceptance of the contract by the parties of the first part and holding it and acting upon it as a valid instrument may be regarded as equivalent to its formal execution on their part.” Thompson v. Sanborn, 52 Mich., 141.

Where matters of such grave importance as the proper transportation of the mails are involved it is of prime importance that the terms and regulations as between the carrier and the Government should be known, and the claimant having the right to refuse the terms offered should be held to the effect of its action in proceeding with the performance and receiving payments based upon the department’s understanding of the contract. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 28 C. Cls., 379; Eastern R. R. Co. v. United States, 129 U. S., 391, 396; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. Co. v. United States, 225 U. S., 640.

An order will be entered dismissing the petition. 
      
       The act of March 3, 1873, appropriates for the service of the Post Office Department “ out of any moneys in the Treasury arising from the revenues of said department, in conformity to the act of July second, eighteen hundred and thirty-six” (5 Stats., 80), “Por inland mail transportation, fourteen million eight hundred and forty thousand and twenty dollars,” and makes appropriations for messengers, route agents, mail-route messengers, local agents, letter carriers, etc., and then follows:
      “ For increase of compensation for the transportation of mails on railroad routes upon the condition and at the rates hereinafter mentioned, five hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary: Provided, That the Postmaster General be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to readjust the compensation hereafter to be paid for the transportation of mails on railroad routes upon the conditions and at the rates hereinafter mentioned, to wit, that the mails shall be conveyed with due frequency and speed; that sufficient and suitable room, fixtures, and furniture, in a ear or apartment properly iighted and warmed, shall be provided for route agents to accompany and distribute the mails; and that the pay per mile per annum shall not exceed the following rates, namely: On routes carrying their whole length an average weight of mails per day of two hundred pounds, fifty dollars; five hundred pounds, seventy-five dollars; one thousand pounds, one hundred dollars; one thousand five hundred pounds, one hundred and twenty-five dollars; two thousand pounds, one hundred and fifty dollars; three thousand five hundred pounds, one hundred and seventy-five dollars; five thousand pounds, two hundred dollars, and twenty-five dollars additional for every additional two thousand pounds, the average weight to be ascertained in every case by the actual weighing of the mails for such a number of successive working days, not less than thirty, at such times, after June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-three, and not less frequently than once in every four years, and the result to be stated and verified in such form and manner as the Postmaster General may direct: Provided also, That in case any railroad company now furnishing railway post-office cars shall refuse to provide such cars, such company shall not be entitled to any increase of compensation under any provision of this act: Provided further, That additional pay may be allowed for every line comprising a daily trip each way of railway post-office cars, at a rate not exceeding twenty-five dollars per mile per annum for cars forty feet in length; and thirty dollars per mile per annum for forty-five feet cars; and forty dollars per mile per annum for fifty feet ears; and fifty dollars per mile per annum for fifty-five feet to sixty feet cars: And provided also, That the length of the cars required for such post-office railway-car service shall be determined by the Post Office Department, and all such cars shall be properly fitted up, furnished, warmed, and lighted for the accommodation of clerks to accompany and distribute the mails : And provided further, That so much of section two hundred and sixty-five of the act approved June eighth, eighteen hundred and seventy-two, entitled ‘ An act to revise, consolidate, and amend the statutes relating to the Post Office Department,’ as provides that ‘ the Postmaster General may allow any railroad company with whom he may contract for the carrying of the united States mail, and who furnish railway post-office cars for the transportation of the mail, such additional compensation beyond that now' allowed by law as he may think fit, not exceeding, however, fifty per centum of the said rates,’ be, and the same is hereby repealed.”
      The act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. L., 341), appropriates $17,548,000 for inland mail transportation.
      “ And out of the appropriation for inland mail transportation the Postmaster General is authorized hereafter to pay the expenses of taking the weights of mails on railroad routes, as provided by the act entitled ‘An act making appropriations for the service of the Post Office Department for the year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-four,’ approved March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-three; and he is hereby directed to have the mails weighed as often as now provided by law T>y the employees of the Post Office Department, and have the weights stated and verified to him by said 
        employees under such instructions as he may consider just to the Post Office Department and the railroad companies.”
      
      The act of July 12, 1876 (19 Stats., 79), appropriates for inland mail transportation, separating other than railroad routes from the latter, and—
      “ For transportation by railroad one million one hundred thousand dollars: Provided, That the Postmaster General be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to readjust the compensation to be paid from and after the first day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, for transportation of mails on railroad routes by reducing the compensation to all railroad companies for the transportation of mails ten per centum per annum from the rates fixed and allowed by the first section of an act entitled ‘An act making appropriations for the service of the Post Office Department for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-four, and for other purposes,’ approved March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-three, for the transportation of mails on the basis of the average weight. And the President of the united States is hereby authorized to appoint a commission of three skilled and competent persons, who shall examine into the subject of transportation of the mails by railroad companies, and report to Congress at the commencement of its next session such rules and regulations for such transportation and rates of compensation therefor-as shall in their opinion be just and expedient, and enable the department to fulfill the required and necessary service for the public. And to defray the expense of said commission the sum of ten thousand dollars is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.”
      By the act approved March 3, 1877 (19 Stats., 386), this commission was continued, but so far as the record in this case shows no report by that commission was made.
      The act of June 17, 1878 (20 Stats., 142), appropriates—
      “ For transportation by railroad, nine million one hundred thousand dollars ; * * * And provided further, That the Postmaster General be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to readjust the compensation to be paid from and after the first day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, for transportation of mails on railroad routes by reducing the compensation to all railroad companies for the transportation of mails five per centum per annum from the rates for the transportation of mails, on the basis of the average weight fixed and allowed by the first section of an act entitled ‘ An act making appropriations for the service of the Post Office Department for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-seven, and for other purposes,7 approved July twelfth, eighteen hundred and seventy-six.”
      The act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stats., 1088), appropriates for inland transportation by railroad routes $40,900,000, of which $120,000 may be employed for other purposes mentioned—
      
        "Provided, That hereafter before making the readjustment of pay for transportation of mails on railroad routes, the average weight shall be ascertained by the actual weighing of the mails for such a number of successive working days not less than ninety, at such times after June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and five, and not less frequently than once in every four years, and the result to be stated and verified in such form and manner as the Postmaster General may direct.”
      The act of March 2, 1907 (34 Stats., 1212), appropriates—
      “ For inland transportation by railroad routes, forty-four million six hundred and sixty thousand dollars.
      “ The Postmaster General is hereby authorized and directed to readjust the compensation to be paid from and after the first day of July, nineteen hundred and seven, for the transportation of mail on railroad routes carrying their whole length an average weight of mails per day of upward of five thousand pounds by making the following changes in the present rates per mile per annum for the transportation of mail on such routes, and hereafter the rates on such routes shall be as follows: On routes carrying their whole length an average weight of mail per day of more than five thousand pounds and less than forty-eight thousand pounds the rate shall be five per centum less than the present rates on all weight carried in excess of five thousand pounds; and on routes carrying their whole length mi average weight of mail per day of more than forty-eight thousand pounds the rate shall he five per centum less than the present rate on all weight carried in excess of five thousand pounds up to forty-eight thousand pounds, and for each additional two thousand pounds in excess of forty-eight thousand pounds at the rate of nineteen dollars and twenty-four cents upon all roads other than land-grant roads, and upon all land-grant roads the rate shall be seventeen dollars and ten cents for each two thousand pounds carried in excess of said forty-eight thousand pounds ”
     