
    Awad JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; Joel I. Klein, as Chancellor for the New York City Department of Education; Marianne T. Ferrara, individually and in her capacity as Superintendent of Community School District No. 22; Phyllis F. Marino, individually and in her capacity as Principal at I.S. 78, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-3576-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 18, 2016.
    Gerald Graves, South Orange, NJ, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Jonathan A. Popolow, for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, RALPH K. WINTER and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Awad Johnson appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Kuntz, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on Johnson’s claims of race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the relevant facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, “construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir.2005).

When analyzing a discrimination claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or 42 U.S.C. § 1981, we employ a three-step burden-shifting analysis derived from McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir.2013) (per curiam) (clarifying that the analysis is the same for § 1983 and § 1981 as for Title VII). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the first burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case by demonstrating (1) “membership in a protected class”; (2) “qualification for the position”; (3) “adverse employment action”; and (4) “circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir.2000). If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to provide “a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for his or her actions. Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir.2006). “[T]he final and ultimate burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s reason is in fact pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir.2014).

Johnson, a probationary employee as to whom tenure was denied, argues that the district court erred in finding that he had failed to establish a prima facie case because he had not demonstrated circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Yet even assuming, arguen-do, that Johnson had established a prima facie case, defendants-appellees met their resulting burden by articulating several legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for denying his tenure, including (a) Johnson’s refusal to continue on in his position as School Safety Designee, (b) defendants-appellees’ dissatisfaction with the quality of Johnson’s evaluations of other teachers, and (c) defendants-appel-lees’ belief that Johnson failed to order student textbooks and then lied when confronted about the incident.

Johnson has failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that these reasons are pretextual. In support of his claims, he offers a few isolated, ambiguously-worded comments made by one individual defendant about racial tensions in the larger community. He points to the fact that Principle Reggio, in denying him tenure, stated that he did not “fit in.” This comment could have racial implications in a given case, see Abrams, 764 F.3d at 253-54, but such implications can only take meaning from the surrounding context involving that employee. Here there is no racial context as to Johnson. Apart from these comments, he fails to identify a single instance in which defendants-appellees made a derogatory statement towards him, or directly about him, before deciding to deny his tenure. In fact, Johnson testified that he liked working with Principal Reggio and admitted that he had never heard Superintendent Ferrara or Principal Reggio make a derogatory statement to him about his race. A summary of Johnson’s appeal to the Chancellor’s Committee, moreover, describes Johnson’s arguments at that time and makes no mention of a discrimination allegation.

We have considered Johnson’s remaining arguments and find that they lack merit. For the reasons given, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  