
    Kumler v. Silsbee.
    Tie act of March 25, 1880 (77 Ohio L. 83, § 2), “to authorize municipal corporations to use or grant the use of the streets, avenues, alloys and public places, for certain purposes,” is not in conflict with art. 2, § 28, or art. 13, § 1, of the constitution.
    Error to the District Court of Hamilton county.
    An ordinance adopted by the board of eouncilmen and board of aldermen of the city of Cincinnati, and approved by the mayor of the city, in January, 1880, purported to authorize Samuel Silsbee, his associates, etc., to lay pipes in the streets of Cincinnati, for the purpose of supplying the public with steam heat and power, in accordance with the method known as “The Holly System of Steam Heating in Cities,” and to provide in detail as to the manner and conditions of such use.
    Before any step had been taken by Silsbee, or any other person, in pursuance of the ordinance, it was provided by the act of March 25, 1880 (77 Ohio L. 83), as follows: § 2. “Ia all municipal corporations which may have heretofore, by ordinance, authorized the use, by any person or corporation, of the streets, avenues, alleys, lanes and public places of such municipal corporation, for the purpose of laying pipes and drains below the surface thereof to convey to and supply its inhabitants heat and power, — such ordinance shall be held as valid and binding as if the power in all such municipal corporations to so grant such use of its streets, avenues, alleys, and public places had been expressly enumerated in the general municipal corporation act now in force.”
    At the request of a taxpayer, P. H. Kumler, Esq., city solicitor, in pursuance of Rev. Stats. §§ 1777, 1778, filed a petition for an injunction in the court of common pleas of Hamilton county, against Silsbee, who was about to proceed under the ordinance and statute to lay such pipes. The court of common pleas held the ordinance and statute to be valid, and dismissed the action, the district court on appeal rendered the same judgment, and this petition in error was filed by the city solicitor to reverse the latter judgment.
    It is conceded by counsel that the authority of the city to pass such ordinance did not exist prior to the passage of the act of March 25, 1880.
    
      James H. Perldns and Mitchell <& Holmes, for plaintiff in error :
    1. The second section of the act of March 25, 1880, is in contravention of section 28 of article 2 of the constitution, because retroactive. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 391; Society v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 139; Potter’s Dwarris (ed. of 1878) 75; 1 Const. Debates, 278; Chesnut v. Shane, 16 Ohio, 599; 34 Ohio, St. 523; 2 Ohio St. 153; 5 Ohio St. 497; Goshorn v. Purcell, 11 Ohio St. 641; Miller v. Hine, 13 Ohio St. 565; Kairden v. Holden, 15 Ohio St. 207.
    2. It is in contravention of section 1, article 13 of the constitution, because the act confers corporate power. State v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18; 23 Ohio St. 445; State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102; State v. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St. 592.
    
      
      M. W. Oliver, for defendant in error,
    relied on Cooley’s Const. Lim. (4th ed.) 474, 475, 476, and eases there cited.
   Okey, C. J.

The cities of Ohio are public corporations, authorized and organized for convenient administration of the government. Their powers and duties are neither created nor regulated by contract, express or implied, but by statutes, Avhich may, from time to time, as occasion requires, be altered or repealed. And it is a general rule, subject to exceptions (as in Park Commissioners v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 288), that as to matters relating to the government of a public corporation, —concerning which the legislature' may authorize the corporation to make provision by ordinance, — the legislature may directly provide by statute, and a duty thus required of the corporation may be enforced by the courts. The State v. Commissioners, 35 Ohio St. 458. A statute granting authority to lay pipes, for the purposes specified, in the streets of municipal corporations, would be clearly authorized by the general grant of legislative power (Const, art. 2, § 1); and where a statute does not impinge upon any constitutional inhibition, the legislature is the sole judge as to the form it may be made to assume. Stall v. Macalester, 9 Ohio, 19; People v. Dana, 22 Cal. 11.

The claim is made, however, that the statutory provision in question is retroactive, and hence Avithin the constitutional prohibition on that subject. Art. 2, § 28. But “ the constitutional inhibition does not ajsply to legislation recognizing or affirming the binding obligation of the state, or any of its subordinate agencies, with respect to past transactions. It is designed to prevent retrospective legislation injuriously affecting individuals, and thus protect vested rights from invasion.” New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644, 655; Rev. Stats. 99, note; State v. Hoffman, 35 Ohio St. 435. And the further claim is made, that the statutory provision confers corporate power, and, being special, violates the constitution, art. 13, § 1. But the statute is general and not special. Rev. Stats. 123, note.

Judgment affirmed.  