
    Ramnand RAMNARAINE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERRILL LYNCH & CO, INC., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith and Bank of America Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-3562-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 25, 2015.
    
      Ramnand - Ramnaraine, Elmhurst, NY, pro se.
    Beth L. Kaufman, Paulette Jeanne Morgan, Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Stern LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants-Ap-pellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, ' ROSEMARY S. POOLER and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Ramnand Ramna-raine, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s September 5, 2014 order granting summary judgment to the defendants-appellees, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, and Bank of America Corp. Ramnaraine’s complaint alleged that defendants failed to comply with his instruction to sell all shares of Merrill Lynch stock held in his three ERISA plans, thereby breaching the fiduciary duty owed to him under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and assess whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Upon de novo review, we find no error in the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants because, for the reasons stated in the district court’s order, the undisputed evidence shows that Ramnaraine had “actual knowledge” of the purported breach of fiduciary duty in September 2007, more than three years prior to filing his initial complaint in June 2011. Thus, his action was time-barred under the relevant three-year statute of limitations, set forth in ERISA § 413(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2). See Caputo v. Pfizer, Inc., 267 F.3d 181, 193 (2d Cir.2001).

We have considered Ramnaraine’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court for substantially the reasons set forth in its thorough and well-reasoned order.  