
    Marianne STIKAS, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.P MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant-Appellee, John Does 1-20, Defendants.
    16-1629-cv
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 3, 2017
    Amended May 31, 2017
    FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Neal Deyoung, Sharma & DeYoung LLP, New York, NY.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: James L. Brenard, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, New York, NY.
    PRESENT: José A. Cabranes, Debra Ann Livingston, Circuit Judges. William H. Pauley III, District Judge.
    
    
      
       Judge William H. Pauley III, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Marianne Stikas appeals the May 13, 2016 district court judgment, granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“J.P. Morgan”). On appeal, Stikas argues that the district court erred by concluding that she lacked standing to bring her claim that J.P. Morgan breached the terms of a mortgage note by seeking non-legal fees in a foreclosure judgment under the guise of attorneys’ fees. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

For substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion, we hold that this claim is without merit. After discovery, the district court found no evidence that J.P. Morgan billed Stikas for the disputed “referral fee,” or that Stikas actually paid said “referral fee” to J.P. Morgan. See Special App’x at 4-6. Accordingly, Sti-kas does not have standing to challenge the “referral fee,” nor has she suffered an “injury in fact” required to meet the jurisdictional requirements of Article III of the Constitution. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Stikas and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.  