
    [Philadelphia,
    January 22,1836.]
    SLETOR against ORAM.
    
      IN ERROR.
    A discharge of the person of a debtor, under the insolvent laws of this Commonwealth, does not prevent the operation of the statute of limitations against the claim of the creditor.
    Upon- a writ of error to the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, it appeared that Davis Oram, (for the use of John Carey, Jr.,) had brought an action on the case against John Sletor, to April term, 1833. The original writ was issued on the 2d of April, 1833. The plaintiff declared in indebitatus assumpsit, for goods sold and delivered, and the defendant pleaded non assumpsit, and payment with leave, &c.-, and non assumpsit infra sex annos; upon which pleas issues were joined.
    The case came on for trial' in the court below, on the 26th of January, 1835, when the plaintiff, after'proving the sale and delivery’of certain goods to the defendant, on the 8Si of June, 1816, gave in evidence the record of certain proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, by which it appeared that on the 27th of January, 1821, John Sletor presented his petition to the said court, praying for the benefit of the insolvent laws of the state ,- and that on the 17th of February, 1821, he was discharged according to law; having previously executed an assignment to William Barnet and John Carey, trustees appointed by the court. The trustees so appointed having declined acting, William Innes was appointed in their place on the 18th of April, 1821. In the month of July, 1823, Barnet and Carey, the trustees first appointed, assigned the trust property to Innes, who, on the 21st of October, in that year, executed the bond required by law. But it did not appear that the surety was approved of by the court. In the list of creditors attached to his petition for the benefit of the insolvent laws, Sletor included the debt due to Oram. It was admitted that the real estate returned by Sletor, in his petition, was sold by the sheriff, after his discharge, upon judgments obtained prior thereto.
    Under these circumstances, the counsel for the plaintiff requested the court to charge the jury, “ that the statute of limitations did not protect the defendant in this case, he having been discharged under the insolvent laws of this Commonwealth; and the assignees appointed by the court not having acted or become qualified; and the real estate of the defendant having been sold under previous judgments.”
    In answer to which, the court charged the jury that the statute did not protect the defendant. “ That under the provisions of the insolvent laws, and the construction given to them by the Supreme Court, in the case of Feather’s Appeal, (1 Penn. Rep. 332,) the statute of limitations, as such, must be laid out of view in this case; and that it did not apply in cases generally, where there has been a discharge under the insolvent laws now in force in this Commonwealth, although a presumption of payment may arise from lapse of time, which would protect the defendant.”
    In this court two errors were assigned, but the only point insisted on, was the direction given by the court below, on the subject of the statute of limitations.
    Mr. Brooke, for the plaintiff in error, having stated the question, was stopped by the court.
    Mr. Porter, for the defendant in error.
    The thirteenth section of the act of the 26th March, 1814, provides, that “ notwithstanding the discharge of any debtor by virtue of this act, all and every debt and debts, due and owing from such debtor, and all and every judgment had and taken against him, shall stand and be good and effectual in law, to all intents and purposes, against the lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods and chattels of such debtor, which he or any person in trust for him at the time of his discharge shall have had, or at any time thereafter shall or may be in any way seized or possessed of, interested in, or entitled to, in law or equity, áse. — and it shall be lawful to take out a new execution,” &c. The language of the act is general; and being subsequent to the act of limitations, must be taken to abrogate it, so far as respects insolvents.
    There are many cases, in which the statute is held to be suspended, although they are not in the number of exceptions. 1 Wash. (Virg.) Rep. 147. Munford’s Dig. 408, PI. 7. Diechman v. The Northampton Bank, (1 Raiole, 54.) Power v. Hollman, (2 Watts. 218.) Thompson v. M’Gaw, (2 Watts. 161.) In Feather’s Appeal, (1 Penn. Rep. 332,) the judge who delivered the opinion of the court, seemed to consider the statute of limitations out of the way, in the present case.
   Per Curiam.

The remark made by the judge who delivered the opinion- of the court, in the case of Feather’s Appeal, was a mere suggestion. The point was not considered by the court, as it was not necessarily involved in the determination of that case. We have since decided, after argument, in two cases, (Gest v. Hieskell, at the last term in Philadelphia, and a case at Pittsburgh,) that a discharge under the insolvent laws, does not prevent the statute of limitations from running against the creditor. The question must now be considered at rest.

Judgment reversed.  