
    Mounce against Ingraham.
    
      Columbia,
    
    1802.
    Where there have been contending claimants for a grant of vacant land, its have been heard and determined "by caveats,mt °a moUrtiaw°°idii never suffer those merits to be again opened, or any evidence offered about the priority of right previous <o the date of the grant.
    TRESPASS to try title to land in Lancaster district. Verdict for defendant. Motion for new trial,
    This was an action of trespass to try title to land. There were two grants for the same tract of land, and the question was, which of them should have the preference.
    NTr. Blanding, for the plaintiff,
    who held the junior §rant> *n suPPort of this motion, stated, that there was a mistake in the dates of the grants ; that the grant to his client was at first filled up in 1785, and afterwards altered to the 1st of June, 1786, which was a mistake or fraud practised on the plaintiff. That in the mean time, between the first date of the plaintiff’s grant and the 1st of June, 1786, the day of the alteration, the defendant had obtained a grant, which was dated before the 1st of June,i78Q, by which means he had obtained a priority in point of time, This, he contended, was either a gross mistake, which ought to be corrected by a verdict of a jury, or a palpable fraud committed upon him, which was equally within the province of a jury. That although mistakes and frauds were originally branches of the jurisdiction of the courts of chancery, yet our courts had liberalized the doctrine of late, so far, as to suffer them to go to a jury, where they could be traced out, or made to appear in a court of common law as well as in a court of equity. He therefore prayed, that this case might be sent back to a jury, in order that the fraudulent circumstances of the case might be more fully investigated.
    For defendant, it was insisted, that this was neither a mistake or fraud committed upon the plaintiff, but the result of deliberate justice done to the parties, by a court of competent jurisdiction. It was admitted, that there was an alteration in the plaintiff’s grant, but the justice of the case rendered it necessary, that such alteration should be made. The plaintiff had included in his survey a part of defendant’s land, and the matter had been submitted to the court of caveats before either of the grants passed, where the case had been depending till the 1st of June, 1786, when the go--vernor and council who then formed the court, decided in favour of the defendant, and gave him the priority. That in consequence of this decision, a note or memorandum was made by the secretary of state, assigning this dispute about the lines as the reason why the plaintiff’s grant had been so long delayed, and that it had not been finally determined till that day ; consequently, the defendant’s grant by that means gained the priority, as in the mean time his; grant had been signed and passed under the great seal of the State.
    The plaintiff, however, still insisted upon going into the merits of the original surveys, alleging he had a right to the priority, notwithstanding the decision of the governor and council to the contrary. But the presiding Judge refused to permit him to go into any evidence of that kind, holding, that he was precluded by a court of competent jurisdiction, which had determined the point; and the jury under his direction, found for the defendant.
    This, therefore, was a motion for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection.
   When after hearing the parties, the Judges were unanimously of opinion, that the presiding Judge had, on the trial of the cause, very properly rejected the testimony offered. That the governor and council at that time con-stituated a court of caveats, for the express purpose of hearing all disputes between applicants for grants of the vacant lands of the state, and finally determining who had the best right to the lands claimed by the contending parties ; and having made that determination, the parties themselves, and all claiming under them, were for ever concluded and bound by such decision ; and that a court of common law jurisdiction, would not go further back than the date of a grant, as it is then that the fee of the soil vests in the grantee. The . right of the state then ceases, and that of the individual commences.

The determination of this kind of questions, about the priority of right to the vacant lands, was formerly a branch of the royal prerogative ; but upon the revolution in America, it was transferred to the governor and council of the state, whose decision was conclusive.

Rule for new trial discharged.

AU the J udges present.  