
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Shamont HOOUSENDOVE, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 12-2714.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 25, 2013.
    Marjorie M. Smith, Brooklyn, New York, for Appellant.
    Jo Ann M. Navickas, (Sean C. Flynn, on the brief), for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, for Ap-pellee.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges, and JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge.
    
      
       Judge John G. Koeltl, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Shamont Hoousendove appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Platt, J.), denying his two motions for resentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). On appeal, Hoousendove argues that the district court’s order was procedurally deficient and thus violated his due process rights because the court did not require a written submission from Hoousendove’s newly appointed counsel. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

There is no statutory right to counsel under the Criminal Justice Act in connection with a § 3582(c) motion, and the provision of counsel for such motions is left to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Reddick, 53 F.3d 462, 465 (2d Cir.1995). The merits of the motion are a “significant factor in the exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 465 n. 2.

Section 3582(c)(2) provides that, “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission ..., the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” In exercising that discretion, the court must comply with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, which directs a sentencing judge to “determine the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the amendment(s) to the guidelines ... had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced” and to assess the request for a sentence reduction accordingly. U.S.S.G. § lB1.10(b)(l).

Here, the district court fully complied with § 3582(c)(2) and § 1B1.10. The court correctly calculated the new Guidelines range of 110 to 137 months. The court then reviewed Hoousendove’s history and characteristics, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the legal basis for the original sentence, and concluded that no reduction was warranted. Specifically, the court stated that its application of a lower Guidelines range at the original sentencing constituted a “substantial break” for Hoousendove. This was clearly the case, given Hoousendove’s extensive criminal history and the repeated drug dealing for which he was convicted. The court also considered that Hoousendove continued to violate rules and regulations while in prison, receiving two disciplinary sanctions at FCI Fairton.

It is clear from the district court’s review that, even with a written submission from counsel, Hoousendove had a very small likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his motion. Because Hoousendove was not legally entitled to the appointment of counsel, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying him relief without requesting a written submission from defense counsel.

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Hoousendove’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the order of the district court.  