
    (34 Misc. Rep. 216.)
    WILLISON v. JEWELERS’ & TRADESMEN’S CO. OF NEW YORK.
    (City Court of New York, General Term.
    February 28, 1901.)
    Insurance—Proof of Death—Estopper.
    An insurance company would not be heard to say in an action on a life policy that satisfactory proof of insured’s death had not been furnished, as required by the policy, it appearing that the vice president and adjuster, after being notified of the death, endeavored to have the beneficiary accept a nominal sum.
    Appeal from trial term.
    Action by Margaret Willison against the Jewelers’ & Tradesmen’s Company of New York. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals.
    Reversed.
    See 61 N. Y. Supp. 1125.
    Argued before FITZSIMONS, C. J., and CONLAN and O’DWYER, JJ.
    Isaac N. Miller, for appellant.
    Mooney & Shipman, for respondent.
   FITZSIMONS, C. J.

The policy of insurance issued by defendant to plaintiff’s father provided “that defendant should have satisfactory evidence of the death of the insured.” Upon the trial the complaint was dismissed upon the ground that no such satisfactory evidence of death was presented to it. The testimony clearly shows that defendant had proper and satisfactory evidence of the death of the insured, because its vice president and adjuster, after they were notified of such death, endeavored to have plaintiff accept a nominal sum for her claim, and, upon her refusal to accept such offer, notified her that she was entitled to nothing. Thus it appears that they had full and satisfactory evidence of death, but wished to escape their liability under the policy to pay $500 to plaintiff; also to avoid the payment o£ any sum, if possible; and had a clear and well-defined determination to pay as little as possible in any event. Such seems to be the habit of many life insurance companies. During the lifetime of the insured they willingly receive all the money he offers, but after his death seem unwilling to pay to the beneficiary the sum fixed by the policy. I think that such a practice should be discouraged, not encouraged.

. The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event. All concur.  