
    Jane Marley vs. William Rodgers.
    The owner of a tract of land, which he has leased, can sell the re-mainderbr reversion in said land, during the continuance of the lease; and such sale will pass the remainder or reversion to the purchaser.
    The purchaser of the remainder or reversion of a tract of land, which has been leased, may, by virtue of the act of 1821, ch. 14, sec. 5, maintain a forcible entry and detainer after the expiration of the lease, against the tenant or sub-tenant, to obtain possession of the land, in the same manner that his grantor could.
    Neither a tenant, nor sub-tenant, can purchase during the continuance of the lease, the title of a third person, and set up the same against his landlord, or the purchaser from his landlord.
    The declarations of a tenant may be given in evidence, in an action against one coming in under him, to show the character of the tenant’s possession.
    The act of 1821, ch. 14, sec. 5, having limited no time at which a written notice to quit is to be given, before the commencement of proceedings, if demand of the possession be made, and written notice given for the delivery, and the tenant refuse to surrender the possession, the owner may proceed against the tenant at any time after such refusal.
    The present defendant, Rodgers, commenced his action of forcible entry and detainer, before two justices of the peace, for a tract of land in Knox county, particularly described in the proceedings, and upon a trial before said two justices of the peace and a jury, a verdict was render-ecj and judgment given for said Rodgers against said Jane Marley; ^nd afterwards the proceedings in this cause were removed by certiorari to the circuit court of Knox county, and at the term of the court after Said certiorari was filed, the counsel of said Jane Marley moved the court to quash the proceedings in said cause, which motion was overruled. Upon a trial in the circuit court, the facts as shown in the hill of exceptions were as follows: .In 1830, James Bell claimed to be the owner of a part of the island in the Holston river; one Robert Long applied to him to rent the same from him, and the said Bell did by a written lease rent the same to said Long for the year 1831, and he accordingly took possession as a tenant under Bell. In 1831, and whilst Long was in the possession of the land, Bell sol'd and conveyed the same by deed to the present defendant, Rodgers. After this sale to Rodgers, the land in dispute was sold by one Parker Edmondson to Joseph and Robert Long, before the expiration of the lease. It was proved that Jane Marley had said she got possession- of the land from Robert Long, that she had his bond to save her harmless. It was also proved, that Robert Long had acknowledged, after Edmondson’s deed was made, that he had rented and held the land under Bell, and that he would not contend with Bell for the land; that when urged by Bell to remove and give up the possession of the land, he promised to do so. To the introduction of statements made by Robert Long, the present plaintiff, Jane Marley, by her counsel, objected; but the court overruled the objections, and permitted his statements to go to the jury. The present defendant, Rodgers, produced and read the deed from Bell to him, covering the land, and .the lease from Bell to Rodgers, covering the same; and proved that he, Rodgers, had given Jane Marley notice in writing to surrender the possession of the land, which she refused to do, alleging that she held under Robert Long, as his tenant. The writ for forcible entry and detainer was not taken out until the term for which the land had been leased to Robert Long had expired. The court charged the jury, that this case came within the provisions of the act of 1821; that if Rodgers had purchased the land from Bell after the contract was entered into between Bell and Long for the renting of this land, that he, Rodgers, could maintain the writ of unlawful detainer against Long, if he held possession over the time agreed upon in the contract between him and Bell; that the legislature intended by the words “remainder or reversion,” used in the act of 1821, to embrace and provide for persons who might have purchased from lessors, and to give them the same remedy to acquire the possession of the land that the act gives to the lessor. The court charged further, that the act of assembly not having fixed or limited any time for which notice to deliver the possession was to be given, it would be sufficient if the notice was reasonable, and that in this case one day would suffice, the party in possession having refused to surrender the possession. Upon the evidence and charge of the court, the jury found a verdict for the present defendant, Rodgers; and the defendant below, Jane Marley, moved the court for a new • trial, which motion was overruled and judgment entered according to the verdict. Prom this judgment of -the court, the defendant prosecuted her writ of error to this court.
    
      R. M. Anderson & T. L. Williams, for pl’ff. in error.
    £. Jarnagin & E. Alexander, for def’t. in error.
   Catron, Ch. J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

1. Did the circuit court err in refusing to quash the proceedings? This involves the main question in the cause: the proceeding" warranted by the act of 1821, ch. 14? The court is of opinion, Bell might well alien his estate in the land, and his right in reversion to the possession, to Rodgers, and that the latter had the same right to the possession after the expiration of the term, that his grantor had: That such is the meaning of the fifth section of the act.

2. The court below did not err in permitting the declarations of Robert Long to go to the jury to explain the character of his possession; it having been established to the satisfaction of the court, that Jane Marley was his lessee, of course sub-lessee to Long, and subject to be turned off by the writ of forcible detainer by Bell, or his assignee, by force of the fifth section of the act of 1821.

S. The act prescribes no time before the proceeding is commenced, at which written notice to quit must be given. The possession was demanded in this case, and written notice given for the delivery thereof. The defendant refused to surrender the possession at any time. We think she might well be proceeded against at anytime after such refusal. Let the judgment be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  