
    Rochelle DRIESSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND, a brand of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group, Defendant.
    
    No. 16-1496-cv
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 25, 2017
    
      FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Rochelle Driessen, Miami Beach, FL.
    PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges,
    
      
      . The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption to conform with the caption above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Rochelle Driessen, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissing her complaint as frivolous. Driessen’s complaint alleged that she received an email informing her that she had won £750,000 from the “Google lottery.” The complaint further alleged that she responded to the email and attempted to claim her winnings from Defendant Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”). The instructions that Driessen received in reply led her to exchange email correspondence with an individual purportedly associated with RBS. In her complaint, Driessen claimed that RBS prevented her from transferring her winnings by refusing to provide her with a “Non Residential Tax Code” in violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693 et seq.

Driessen had sought to proceed in for-ma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The district court, in accepting a recommended ruling from a magistrate judge, determined that Driessen’s claim was legally and factually frivolous, however, and dismissed her complaint sua sponte ' in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). We assume familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).” Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 963 (2d Cir. 2015). “A district court must dismiss an informa pauperis action if the action is frivolous .... An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co,, 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court correctly concluded that Driessen’s complaint was frivolous and therefore properly dismissed it. Dries-sen’s claim was founded on a clearly baseless notion that she had won a lottery rather than been the target of an obvious scam. As the district court explained, Driessen, who has a long history of filing claims that are virtually identical to her claim in this case, should have known that “there is no such thing as a Google lottery that randomly selects winners without their knowledge to award large sums of money.” Indeed, Driessen should have realized that whomever she was communicating with was not connected to RBS, and that RBS cannot possibly be held liable.

Driessen’s arguments that the district court misapplied Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989), and should have given her leave to amend her complaint are not persuasive. The district court properly applied Neitzke’s holding that an action is not frivolous merely because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id. at 328, 109 S.Ct. 1827. We have already explained why Driessen’s claim is obviously frivolous. Giving Driessen leave to amend her complaint could not have cured the complaint’s deficiencies, and was therefore properly denied. See Krys v. Pigott, 749 F.3d 117, 134 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Leave to amend may properly be denied if the amendment would be futile.,..”).

We have considered Driessen’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  