
    STATE v. ROBERT SCOTT.
    (Filed October 23, 1906).
    
      Intoxicating Liquors — Repeal of Statutes — Effect—Special V erdict — Form—Sufficiency.
    1. Where an act of the Legislature, forbidding the sale of liquor without license, repealed all laws in conflict with it, an earlier act forbidding such sale is repealed, but only as to offenses committed after the passage of the later one, and, as to all offenses committed before that time it has its contemplated force and effect.
    2. Where in a special verdict the jury stated the facts essential to the defendant’s conviction, and upon them, found him guilty, adding that “upon their opinion of the law, of which they were ignorant, they rendered a verdict of not guilty,” this the Judge properly ignored as surplusage, or at least as erroneous, and adjudged the defendant guilty upon the facts.
    INDICTMENT against Robert Scott, beard by Judge M. II. Justice and a jury, at the duly Term, 1906, of tbe Superior Court of Union. Tbe defendant was convicted, and appealed.
    
      Robert D. Gilmer, Attorney-General, and Walter Clark, Jr., for tbe State.
    
      Williams & Lemmond for tbe defendant.
   Per Curiam.

Tbe defendant was indicted for selling liquor without a license in July, 1902, when there was a law forbidding tbe sale of liquor without a license in Union County. ITis counsel contends that this law was repealed by subsequent enactments, which still made it an offense to sell liquor without a license, but which repealed all laws in conflict with them. It seems to us clear that the question raised in this case is the same as that which was presented in State v. Perkins, 141 N. C., 797. There is really no substantial difference between the two cases, and that case must govern tbis one. Tbe latex act repeals tbe earlier one only in so far as they are in conflict. It cannot retroact so as to affect offenses committed prior to its passage, and tbe earlier act cannot operate prospectively, so as to affect offenses committed in tbe future. Tbeir respective fields of operation are bounded by a line drawn at tbe date of tbe later act, tbe earlier act applying to offenses committed before, and tbe later to those committed after, that date. As neither can trench upon tbe legitimate province of tbe other, there is no necessary repugnancy between them. Tbe earlier act, therefore, is repealed, but only as to offenses committed after tbe passage of tbe later one, and, as to all offenses committed before that time, it has its contemplated force and effect. In tbis way, tbe two acts are brought into harmony and tbe intention of the Legislature is not only effectuated, but given full play.

Tbe form of tbe special verdict was, it is true, a little unusual, but tbe jury -stated tbe facts essential to tbe defendant’s conviction, and upon them found him guilty, adding that “upon tbeir opinion of tbe law, of which they were ignorant, they rendered a verdict of not guilty.” Tbis tbe Judge properly ignored as surplusage, or, at least, as erroneous, and adjudged tbe defendant guilty upon tbe facts ("utile per inutile non vitiatur"). Indeed, it would seem that tbe jury meant to submit tbe question of guilt to tbe Court upon tbe facts, though they expressed their intention to do so somewhat awkwardly. Tbe result of the case was tbe correct one.

No Error.  