
    Winston H. HANLAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STRONG MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 13-2193.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 26, 2014.
    Winston Hanlan, pro se, Rochester, NY., for plaintiff-appellant.
    No Appearance, for defendants-appel-lees.
    Present: GUIDO CALABRESI, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Winston Hanlan, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s judgment sua sponte dismissing his complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., for failure to timely file an administrative claim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir.2001). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. Courts should read pro se complaints liberally with “special solicitude” and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that [they] suggest[].” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Hanlan’s Title VII claim because he failed to: (1) file a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; (2) obtain a so-called “right-to-sue letter;” or (3) file a timely action upon receipt of that letter, as required to state a claim under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e),(f); McPherson v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir.2006); Tiberio v. Allergy Asthma Immunology of Rochester, 664 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir.2011).

We have considered Hanlan’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court. 
      
      . 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) provides that a district court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action or appeal ... fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”
     