
    Christopher B. COPENHAVER v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al.
    2940502.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Aug. 25, 1995.
    Rehearing Denied Sept. 29, 1995.
    Certiorari Denied Nov. 22, 1995 Alabama Supreme Court 1950068.
    J. Danny Hackney of Gaiser and Associates, Birmingham, for Appellant.
    Garry Tucker, Alabama Department of Public Safety Legal Unit, Montgomery, for Appellees.
   SAM A. BEATTY, Retired Justice.

Christopher B. Copenhaver appeals from a judgment affirming the suspension of his driver’s license. The trial court held that the provisions of the Youthful Offender Act, § 15-19-1, et seq., Ala.Code 1975, were not applicable in a proceeding to review a driver’s license suspension and to stay the enforcement of that suspension. We affirm.

Copenhaver holds a driver’s license issued by the Alabama Department of Public Safety (“DPS”). On November 2, 1993, in the State of Georgia, he was convicted of driving under the influence after entering a plea of nolo contendere. See § 32-5A-195(i), Ala.Code 1975. Thereafter, DPS suspended his license and driving privileges under §§ 32-5A-191(c) and 195(e). At Copenhaver’s request, DPS held an administrative hearing on January 19, 1994, but it upheld the suspension of his driving privileges. Copenhaver then petitioned the trial court, pursuant to § 32-5A-195(q), to review the suspension of his driver’s license and to stay the enforcement of the suspension. Copenhaver also claimed eligibility for youthful offender status. After a hearing, the court denied his request for youthful offender status.

The parties concede that youthful offender status was not available to Copenhaver in Georgia.

Copenhaver contends that the Youthful Offender Act applies to proceedings pursuant to § 32-5A-195(q) relative to the suspension of a driver’s license. He argues that with youthful offender status, he would not be subject to losing his driving privileges, citing § 15-19-7, Ala.Code 1975, which states that no determination under the Youthful Offender Act will “operate as a forfeiture of any right or privilege or make him ineligible to receive any license granted by public authority.”

We are convinced that Copenhaver has confused his remedies. The Youthful Offender Act is intended to relieve persons younger than 21 years from the harshness of criminal prosecution and conviction. Pardue v. State, 566 So.2d 502 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). Copenhaver’s appeal arises from the suspension of his driver’s license. Under Alabama law, a proceeding for review of the suspension or revocation of a driver’s license is strictly a civil proceeding. Director, Dep’t of Public Safety v. Irvine, 603 So.2d 1074 (Ala.Civ.App.1992); Madison v. Director, Dep’t of Public Safety, 465 So.2d 1148 (Ala.Civ.App. 1984). The sanction imposed in such a proceeding is not to punish the driver but to protect the public, and a finding adverse to the driver seeks to remove him as a life-threatening road hazard. Mechur v. Director, Dep’t of Public Safety, 446 So.2d 48 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). Thus, an appeal from a decision adverse to the driver does not constitute an appeal from a conviction of a crime, and, therefore, any consideration of the propriety of youthful offender status is not relevant in such an appeal. Indeed, the Youthful Offender Act begins by stating that “[a] person charged with a crime” may be eligible for youthful offender status, thus identifying both the subject matter and the person to be considered thereunder. § 15-19-1(a), Ala.Code 1975. It follows that the trial court’s judgment denying youthful offender status to Copenhaver in this proceeding was correct.

Let the judgment be affirmed.

The foregoing opinion was prepared by SAM A. BEATTY, Retired Justice, Supreme Court of Alabama, while serving on active duty status as a judge of this court under the provisions of § 12-18-10(e), Ala.Code 1975.

AFFIRMED.

THIGPEN, YATES, and CRAWLEY, JJ., concur.

ROBERTSON, P.J., concurs in the result.

MONROE, J., dissents.

MONROE, Judge,

dissenting.

Unlike the majority, I believe the propriety of youthful offender status is relevant to this appeal. The law is clear that in Alabama, a person under the age of 21 is entitled to youthful offender status when charged with the crime of DUI. Ex parte King, 547 So.2d 579 (Ala.1989); Pressey v. State, 597 So.2d 1385 (Ala.Crim.App.1992); see also § 12-15-1(8), Ala.Code 1975.

Alabama’s Youthful Offender Act provides:

“No determination made under the provisions of this chapter shall disqualify any youth for public office or public employment, operate as a forfeiture of any right or privilege or make him ineligible to receive any license granted by public authority, and such determination shall not be deemed a conviction of crime; provided, however, that if he is subsequently convicted of crime, the prior adjudication as youthful offender shall be considered.”

§ 15-19-7(a), Ala.Code 1975 (emphasis added).

We could find no cases dealing with a youthful offender appealing the suspension of his or her license. However, based on § 15-19-7(a), it follows that one who has been granted youthful offender status in Alabama who enters a plea of nolo contendere to DUI would not be subject to having his or her driver’s license suspended.

The Georgia trial judge made clear in his order that, had he the authority to do so, he would grant Copenhaver youthful offender status, and that Copenhaver was eligible for youthful offender status under Alabama law.

Ala.Code 1975, § 32-5A-195(e) authorizes the revocation of the driver’s license in Alabama if the driver was convicted “in another state of any offense therein which, if committed in this state, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of the license of a driver.” (Emphasis added.) A plea of nolo contendere to DUI by a person who has been granted youthful offender status would not be grounds for the suspension of his or her license.

I also would like to point out that this court’s recent decision in Bruno v. Department of Public Safety, [Ms. 2940393, August 25, 1995] — So.2d — (Ala.Civ.App.1995), concerned the conduct of the party, which, at the time of the offense, was not per se illegal in Alabama, and therefore the Alabama Department of Public Safety did not have grounds to suspend the appellant’s driver’s license. In this case, Copenhaver’s conduct is not at issue. Instead, his status as a youthful offender is what precludes suspension of his driver’s license.

I believe the trial court erred in affirming the Alabama Department of Public Safety’s suspension of Copenhaver’s license. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court, and therefore, I must respectfully dissent.  