
    A. A. Smets, v. James Plunket.
    In civil cases, where the nature of the action itself does not involve the general character of a party, evidence as to that character cannot be offered to contradict an imputation of dishonesty, or even of fraud.
    The transaction presented in an ordinary civil case, must depond upon its circumstances, and not upon the character of the parties. In such a case, no matter how serious a moral delinquency may be involved in a fact, and how much the establishment of that fact may affect a party’s reputation, he cannot invoke the aid of his previous reputation to disprove the^fact
    
      Tried before Mr. Justice Riciiaedson, at Barnwell, Spring Term, 1847.
    This was an action of assumpsit, brought by summary process on the following account:
    Account sales of two rafts ) T -ni i , ,• , 7VT , ¡ r or accountoi Mr. James Plunket. timber, os. 1 and 2. ⅜
    
      Sold Oglethorpe Steam Saw-Mill Company,
    95 pieces timber, (in a state of decay) 47,311 feet, a 11, #53 22
    105 do. do. do. 55,786 “ a If, 76 70
    200 103,097 #129 92
    
      Charges.
    
    Dockage, re-rafting, wharfage, and ⅛ mt.; 55 cts., 56 70 Commissions, 5 per ct, 6 49 63 19
    Due, 1st January, 1844, 866 73
    1842.
    May 23. To paid yon in advance, 8100 00
    “ Interest on 8100 from 31st May, 1
    1842, to 1st January, 1844, IV 12 77 year, 215 days, )
    1843. $112 77
    July 10. By proceeds of the above two rafts, 66 73
    Due by James Plunket, $46 04
    The defendant having given notice of his intention to offer the following account as a discount to the plaintiff’s demand, obtained an order requiring the plaintiff to declare, in order that the defendant might put his account in issue.
    
      Defendant’s account.
    
    Mr. A. A. Smets, To James Plunket, Dr.
    1842—May 31. To proceeds of 250 pieces timber, ) $gQ0 qo measuring 150,000 feet, at 84 per thousand, )
    On the trial, the defendant admitted the plaintiff’s demand, and introduced witnesses to prove the truth and justice of his own account against the plaintiff.
    
      In reply, after proving the actual quantity and sale oí the timber in question, the price of lumber generally, and the state of the market during the time the defendant’s timber was in his possession, the plaintiff proposed to prove his general character. The evidence was objected to, but admitted, and two witnesses examined on that point. It should have been mentioned, that the plaintiff was and is a lumber and timber factor in the city of Savannah, and the timber in question was left with him for sale, without any special instructions.
    The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff.
    The defendant appealed, and moved for a new'trial, on the following grounds:
    1. Because his Honor, the presiding Judge, permitted the plaintiff on the trial to go into evidence as to his general good character.
    2. Because the verdict was contrary to law and evidence.
    Owens, for the motion.
    The character of neither party can be inquired into in a civil suit, unless the circumstances involve it; 1 Phil. Ev., 176.
    Bellinger, contra,
    
    To prove the evidence competent, cited a note in 1 Phil. Ev., 176; Bunce u.-3 M’C., 66; Pierce v. Miruff, 1 Dev., 255; and Hogg v. Martin, in Riley’s Pamphlets.
    Patterson, for the motion.
    This is a motion for a new trial, after a second trial by consent. The brief is very imperfect, but with his Honor’s notes of the evidence taken viva voce, and the brief made on the appeal after the first verdict with the evidence taken by commission, which is annexed to it, the case may be understood. The character of neither party in a civil suit can be inquired into, unless put in issue bv the nature of the case. Where a party is charged with fraud from mere circumstances, evidence of his good character is admissible to repel it. To exclude such evidence in such cases, would be unreasonable and unjust. It is vain to say the plaintiff ’s character wag not in issue, because witnesses were not examined on that point. The discount never can be established without convicting the plaintiff and his witnesses of a conspiracy to defraud the defendant. A number of witn> sses were examined on the part of the defendant, to prove his discount, which only can be done by inducing the jury to believe that the account rendered by the plaintiff is false and fraudulent. Besides the defendant's counsel, in opening his case to the jury, charged fraud on the plaintiff in the broadest and. strongest terms. This charge, though unfounded, was not gratuitous on the part of the counsel. The defence he was instructed to make for his client, could not be sustained without making and supporting that charge. Would it be just or reasonable to refuse the plaintiff, who is a citizen of another State, and a stranger, liberty of repelling the charge by evidence of good character? 1 Phillips, 139; Rúan v. Perry, 3 Caine, 120. But admitting that the Circuit Court erred in receiving this evidence, if justice has been done, this Court will not grant a new trial. Let the evidence he examined, and see if the jury could do otherwise than find for the plaintiff. If substantia! justice has been done, even had there been error on a collateral point, which there certainly was not, this Court will not disturb the verdict. 2 Brevard, 426; Cogswell v. Brown, 1 Mass., 202; Brazier v. Clap, 2 Mass., 116; Jones et nl., v. Fales, 5 Mass., 1; Alsop v. Bradley, et al., 4 Day’s Cases, 42.
    Owens, in reply.
    The allegations of fraud below, were met by evidence on the other side. The evidence of good character was made in reply, and to this we object, as it was not suitably in reply. In this case, the evidence of general good character should not have been admitted. It was neither in the proper time, nor admissible, and on these two grounds we claim a new trial.
   Wardlaw J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Evidence of the plaintiff’s general character was no doubt intended to show that he was incapable of having first appropriated a portion defendant’s lumber dishonestly, and then rendered a false account of sales; and the evidence tendered towards this purpose, if it could have laid bare the beart of the plaintiff, and ascertained really the strength of his moral principles, it would have been highly influential. But examinations in Court into general character, according to reputation, usually distinguish only between the two classes, the good and the bad, without nice discrimination between the infinite degrees and varieties which exist of either class; of most persons, there is really no general reputation as to character, and of some the general reputation is widely different from the truth, which a full knowledge of their motives, principles and habits, would disclose: sometimes upon trials, the good are overthrown by unexpected assault, and often the bad are burnished and strengthened by the ready testimony which their influence procures in their favor, whilst many of their neighbors, who think ill of them, shrink from being examined, or being examined, cannot say that the suspicions which they entertain, and which they feel rather than know that others also entertain, have been uttered so as to constitute a bad reputation: in investigations concerning character, feeling and prejudice are more, frequently exhibited than in inquiries upon any other subject: the number of witnesses is often extended far beyond the limit, which, upon other topics, the Court would indulge; and if there be contrariety of opinion, the matter usually is left at last in great uncertainty. These considerations suggest the propriety of adhering closely to the rules which have been established to regulate the admission of the evidence of reputation concerning general character. If, in every case where an act of dishonesty is imputed, the imputation may be met by such evidence, then there are few cases into which such e vidence might not be introduced; trials would be insupportably tedious, and the result of a trial would as often depend upon the popularity of a party, as upon the merits of his case. It has been held in New York, that whenever in an action of tort, a defendant is directly charged with fraud, and the charge sustained by evidence of circumstances only, his good character may be shown to repel the charge; Rúen v. Perry, 3 Caine, 120, approved and qualified in 6 Cowen, 673; 2 Cow. Ph., 456. This decision serves for authority to rest cases upon, when to rebut the imputation of fraud in the execution of a will, the good character of deceased subscribing witnesses has been shown; (3 Esp. R., 284, 4 Id., 50; 1 Green. Ev., sec. 54, 55.) Whether the authority sustains the decision, whether the decision shall be here approved, and if so what particular cases fall within it, it is needless now to inquire. In the case before us, neither the original count nor the discount is an. action of tort, whereby fraud was directly charged upon a party. It is plain, that in civil cases, where the nature of the action itself does not involve the general character of a party, evidence as to that character cannot be offered to contradict an imputation of dishonesty, or even of fraud. The transaction presented in an ordinary civil case, must depend upon its circumstances, and not upon the character of the parties. In such a case, no matter how serious amoral delinquency may be involved in a fact, and how much the establishment of that fact may affect a party’s reputation, he cannot invoke the aid of his previous reputation to disprove the fact. Thus, where in ejectment the title depended upon the question, whether a party had committed a fraud in procuring a will, he was not allowed to show his good character; Bul. N. P., 296. And thus, where an information was filed against a defendant under the excise laws, to recover a penalty for his keeping false weights, his good character could not be brought into the evidence; 2 Bos. & Pul., 532, A. In this case, then, the evidence as to character should not have been admitted. But it has been seen on examination of the whole evidence in the case, that the defendant himself first violated the rule by propounding to Avitnesses in Georgia, who were examined by commission, cross-interrogatories, concerning the plaintiff’s character; and that, independent of all evidence as to character, the plaintiff had, by the defendant’s own admission, clearly established his demand, and the defendant had failed to prove his discount. It is not intended to lay down the rule, that the offer of irrelevant testimony on one side, vauII sanction the adduction of opposing testimony of like kind on the other side. But the Court is satisfied that justice has been done, and that the result has not been influenced by the evidence now objected to. The motion is therefore dismissed, and these observations have been made only that this case may not be a precedent for the admission of such evidence in other cases.  