
    TAM VU, also known as Vu Tam, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ricardo RUIZ, Doctor at MacDougall Walker Correctional Institution, Utilization Review Committee, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Utilization Review Committee, et al., Defendants.
    No. 14-755-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 21, 2015.
    
      Tam Vu, Suffield, CT, pro se, Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Alayna Stone, Assistant Attorney General, for George Jepsen, Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Present: RALPH K. WINTER, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . The Clerk of Court is directed to correct the docket to reflect that Appellant’s name is Tam Vu. See Tam. Vu v. LaFrance, No. 3:12-cv-1019 (DJS), 2014 WL 655285 at *1 n. 1 (D.Conn. Feb. 19, 2014).
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Tam Vu, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s summary judgment ruling dismissing his claims, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s, grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[sjummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant. Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

In order to successfully substantiate a claim for deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must adequately show first that, objectively, “the alleged deprivation [was] sufficiently serious, in the sense that a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain existed],” and secondly that, “[subjectively, the official charged with deliberate indifference ... act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the record and relevant ease law reveal that the district court correctly ruled that Vu’s deliberate indifference claims failed, because he did not provide evidence showing that the defendants were made aware of serious medical needs and disregarded those needs.

We have considered all of Vu’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for the reasons stated in the district court’s well-reasoned and thorough decision.  