
    John D. Wyatt vs. William Beaty.
    By the act of 1844, regulating the liens of judgments and decrees, it is provided, in the 6th section, that judgments thereafter or theretofore rendered shall cease to be liens unless entered upon the “ judgment roll,” when the lien shall be from the enrolment; by the 14th .section it is provided that the act shall not operate upon judgments theretofore rendered until after the first of July, 1844, nor upon those thereafter rendered until sixty days after its approval; held to be the true construction of the act; that all judgments rendered before the act, or within sixty days after its approval, if enrolled at any time before the first day of July, 1844, retained the order of priority which appertained to them before its approval, and derived no priority from an earlier date of enrolment prior to the first day of July, 1844.
    Where two judgments were obtained on the same day, against the same defendant, prior to the enrolment law of 1844, and both enrolled, but on different days ; and on the judgment latest enrolled the plaintiff issued an execution and made some money; held, that the execution on which the money was made was entitled to it.
    On appeal from the circuit court of Yazoo county; Hon. Robert 0. Perry, judge.
    Berry Nall, use of John D. Wyatt, obtained a judgment against William H. Courtenay on the 14th day of February, 1838, for $2,416.63, a forthcoming bond on which was forfeited on the 30th day of April, 1838. On the 3d day of June, 1844, the original judgment and the judgment on the bond were duly enrolled. No execution issued on this judgment after its en-rolment.
    On the 24th day of February, 1838, Rufus Bean recovered a judgment for $347.02 against the same person, a forthcoming bond on which was forfeited on the 30th of April, 1838; on the 16th day of June, 1844, this judgment and the bond were also duly entered on the judgment roll of the county. On the 24th day of April, 1845, execution issued on this judgment, directed to the coroner of the county, and was by him levied on a lot of land, as the property of Courtenay, on the 28th day of April, 1845, and returned not sold for want of time. On the 26th day of June, 1845, a venditioni exponas issued, under which the land was sold, on the 20th of October, 1845, for $525.
    The coroner, on this state of facts, moved the circuit court for instructions as to the appropriation of the money. The circuit court ordered it to be appropriated in satisfaction of the judgment of Rufus Bean. Wyatt appealed.
    
      R. S. Holt, for appellant,
    contended,
    1. That by the 6th and 14th sections of the enrolment law, the liens of all judgments rendered before the enactment of that law ceased, on the first day of July, 1844, to operate and date from the rendition of the judgment, and from that day became dependent upon a new event, viz. the enrolment of the judgment, and dated from the time of the enrolment.
    2. That the constitutional right of the legislature to make such a law is founded on the same principles as the right to enact any other statute of limitations.
    
      N. G. and iS. E. Nije, for appellee.
    1. If this case be considered under the law as it existed prior to the enrolment law, the judgment below is correct; for the. judgments being of the same day were of the same age. Burney v. Bogett, 1 How. Miss. R. 391 j and the creditor whose execution first issued would have priority, ib. ; or the money being made on this judgment of Bean, that will be entitled to it. Com. Bank of Manchester v. Coroner of "Yazoo Co., 6 How. Miss. R. 530.
    2. The enrolment law, which in all its parts we believe thoroughly constitutional, does not affect this conclusion; the 6th and 14th sections, when construed together, as they must be to retain the lien of judgments rendered prior to its passage, if duly enrolled, as they were before; and they are not affected by the date of enrolment, if made before July 1, 1844.
    3. If any other construction of the law of 1844 prevail, and especially if that prevail contended for by appellants, the law itself is unconstitutional and void, as impairing rights previously vested. 3 Story’s Com. on Const. 242, 250-251; Ogden v. ¡Saunders, 12 Wheat. 284; Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 200.
   Mr. Justice Thacker

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a motion by the coroner for instructions how to appropriate a sum of money which came to his hands by a sale of real estate under a venditioni exponas. The two judgments were of even date, the 30th day of April, 1838. One was entered upon the judgment-roll of the circuit court on the 3d day of June, 1844, upon which no execution issued. The other was entered upon the judgment-roll on the 16th day of June, 1844, and execution issued, by virtue of which the sale took place, and the money levied.

The inquiry is, as to the effect of the act of 1844, ch. 8, approved February 24th, 1844, entitled “an act to amend an act entitled an act to regulate the liens of judgments and decrees, approved 16th February, 1841, and for other purposes.”

The 6th section of this act provides that any judgments or decrees theretofore rendered or thereafter to be rendered, shall cease to operate as liens upon property until the same shall be entered on the “judgment roll,” and the lien shall be from such enrolment, instead of from the rendition of the judgments or decrees.

But the 14th section of the same act provides that the act shall not operate upon judgments and decrees theretofore rendered, until after the first day of July, 1844, nor upon those thereafter rendered, until sixty days after its approval.

Our interpretation of this act is, that all judgments and decrees rendered before the approval of the act, if enrolled at any time on or before the first day of July, 1844, retain the order of priority which appertained to them before its approval, and that they do not derive a priority from an earlier date of enrolment previously to the first day of July, 1844; and that the same principle controls, in judgments and decrees rendered within sixty days after the approval of the act.

The judgment of the circuit court, appropriating the money first to the satisfaction of that judgment upon which execution and venditioni exponas issued, was correct.

Judgment aifirmed.  