
    Rich, Plaintiff in Error, vs. Johnson, Defendant in Error.
    In an action of covenant to recover damages for the breach or failure of a covenant of seizen contained in a deed, the measure of damages which the plaintiff is entitled to recover, is the consideration mentioned in the deed, and the interest thereon for six years from the time of the breach, for 'for so -long a time as, by the local law, mesne profits are recoverable, after the breach has occurred.
    Errol’ to the Jále territorial District 'Court‘of Racine Co.
    This was an action of covenant for the recovery of damages, on the failure of title in a deed executed by the defendant to the'plaintiff in the Court below. The declaration assigned several breaches, on which issue was taken. The cause was tried in the Racine District Court, at the April term, 1847, and a judgment was obtained in favor of the plaintiff below, against the 'defendant below, for the sum of four hundred and seven dollars and fifty-four cents.
    On the trial the plaintiff below introduced a duly exemplified record of one of the Courts of Record of the State of Illinois, showing the proceedings whereby a mortgage, executed by the defendant below, upon the conveyed premises, had been foreclosed, and the premises sold. He also produced the' record of the deed, for the breach of the covenant whereon the action was brought.
    The judge who tried the cause charged the jury that the record (in proof) showed a sufficient breach of the covenants in the deed, to enable the plaintiff below to recover.
    That the amount of damages which the plaintiff was entitled to recover was the consideration expressed in the deed executed by the deféndant to the plaintiff, with interest, to the time of trial; and the jury so found.
    To these charges arid opinions the counsel for the defendant below took exceptions, and brought his writ of error.
    
      Evans, for Plaintiff in Error.
    
      Chatfield, for Defendant in Error.
   By the Court

Stow, C. J.

We do not think it necessary to examine the numerous points made on the argument of this writ of error, as we are of opinion that the judgment must be reversed on a ground not involving the principal questions in the case. Under the direction of the Court below, the jury, in assessing the damages,added to the consideration expressed in the deed, interest from its execution to the day of trial — being 4 period of something more than ten years. In giving this direction, wo think the learned Judge, before whom the cause was tried, erred. Though the measure of damages in actions on con venan ts of seizen g.nd warranty, is not uniform throughout the United States, the prevailing, and we think the better rule is, to allow but six years’ interest, or interest for the time for which mesne profits are recoverable. 13 Johnson's R., 50; 4 Dallas, 441; 2 Bibb, 273; 1 H. and M., 202; 1 McCord, 466; 2 Rand. 122; 1 Brown, 161. And this rule this Court now adopts. For this reason, the judgment of the late District Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Eacjne Circuit, for the further action of that Court.

Judgment reversed,  