
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Marquis McTAW, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-3348-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 9, 2014.
    Robin C. Smith, San Rafael, N.Y., for Appellant.
    Joseph J. Karaszweski, Assistant United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, (William J. Hochul, Jr., United States Attorney, on the brief) Buffalo, N.Y., for Appellee.
    Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, REENA RAGGI, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of conviction of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

Marquis McTaw appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on August 27, 2013, in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Larimer, J.). After pleading guilty to three counts of conviction arising out of his unlawful possession of one sawed-off short-barreled rifle, McTaw argues for the first time on appeal that his conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(c) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

On March 6, 2013, McTaw pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to all three counts of his indictment. Count Three charged him with “Possession of an Unregistered Short-barreled Rifle” in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), which makes it unlawful to knowingly “possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.” 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Count Two charged him with “Possession of a Short-barreled Rifle” in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(c), which makes it unlawful to “possess a firearm made [or altered] in violation of’ the requirements in 26 U.S.C. § 5822 that an individual who manufactures or alters a firearm in the United States must file a written application to make and register the firearm, pay certain taxes, identify the firearm, and obtain approval to make and register the firearm. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(e), 5845(i), 5822. On August 15, 2013, the district court sentenced McTaw principally to 84 months’ imprisonment, to run concurrently on each of the three counts, as well as a $100 special assessment on each count of conviction.

“The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, inter alia, ‘protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994)). “[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). McTaw argues that his conviction on Count Two runs afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause, because it does not require proof of an element not contained in Count Three, and therefore proof of Count Three “necessarily includes” proof of Count Two. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 862, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985).

We review a Double Jeopardy claim raised for the first time on appeal for plain error. See United States v. Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 78 (2d Cir.2009). In order to establish plain error, “there must be (1) ‘error,’ (2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’ ” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467-68, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)).

We conclude that McTaw has not met this standard. “An error is ‘plain’ if the ruling was contrary to law that was clearly established by the time of the appeal.” Irving, 554 F.3d at 78. Both parties concede this circuit has not addressed the question that McTaw now raises. “A reviewing court typically will not find [plain] error where the operative legal question is unsettled.” United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 152 (2d Cir.2001). Moreover, we do not observe a uniform rule among the circuits. Cf. United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 43 (2d Cir.1998) (holding defendant established plain error where other circuits had “uniformly decided” the convictions violated Double Jeopardy). To the contrary, while the Ninth Circuit has concluded that “it was not Congress’s intent to impose multiple punishments for possessing a single firearm even if that firearm violates different subsections of 26 U.S.C. § 5861,” United States v. Zalapa, 509 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir.2007), other circuits have permitted simultaneous convictions under these two provisions so long as the sentences imposed were concurrent or did not exceed the statutory maximum, see United States v. Talbott, 902 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Bogden, 865 F.2d 124, 128 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. Nation, 832 F.2d 71, 74 (5th Cir.1987); United States v. Kiliyan, 504 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir.1974).

Without a prior decision from this court or the Supreme Court supporting the argument McTaw now advances, we could not find any error to be plain, if error it was. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction, imposed by the district court is here by AFFIRMED. 
      
      . McTaw does not challenge Count One of the indictment, which charged him with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).
     