
    Michael Anthony GUMMO, aka Michael Chiofar, aka Michael Anthony Gummo Bear, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PIERCE COUNTY, All its agents and Employees; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-35387.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 18, 2013.
    
    Filed June 20, 2013.
    Michael Anthony Gummo, Federal Way, WA, pro se.
    Daniel Hamilton, Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, Tacoma, WA, Todd Richard Bowers, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Washington Attorney General, John Cobb, Esquire, King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, Karen Cobb, Stephen P. Larson, Esquire, Stafford Frey Cooper, Sam B. Franklin, Esquire, Michael Patrick Ryan, Lee Smart, P.S., Inc., Jeffrey T. Kestle, Esquire, Forsberg & Umlauf, P.S., Larry R. Garrett, Holman Cahill PLLC, Kristin Berger Johnson, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Seattle, WA, Michael J. Underwood, Olympia, WA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    
      Before: TALLMAN, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Michael Anthony Gummo, aka Michael Chiofar, aka Michael Anthony Gummo Bear, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his civil rights action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir.2010), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Gummo’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against defendants City of Seattle, King County, and Pierce County because Gummo failed to allege facts demonstrating that any alleged federal constitutional violations resulted from an official custom, policy, or a failure to train. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir.2007) (discussing requirements for municipal liability under § 1983).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gummo’s motion for appointment of counsel because Gummo failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.2009) (setting forth standard of review and requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for appointment of counsel).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gummo’s motions for reconsideration because Gummo failed to establish any ground for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and discussing grounds for reconsideration).

Gummo’s contentions concerning the guardian ad litem appointed by the district court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c) and alleged violations of due process are unpersuasive.

We do not consider arguments concerning claims that were not included in Gum-mo’s complaint, including the negligence claims. See Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining the reasoning for not considering arguments that were not raised before the district court).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     