
    BARNES v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    March 16, 1910.
    On Motion for Rehearing, Jan. 18, 1911.)
    1. Ceiminal Law (§ 364) — Evidence—Indefiniteness.
    Evidence that witness could not exactly understand the language defendant used when he first shot at deceased, but understood him to say something like, “I have got you,” that witness could not say the exact language, but understood it that way, was not objectionable for indefiniteness.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 805-818; Dec. Dig. § 364.]
    2. Criminal Law (§ 448) — Evidence—Conclusion of Witness.
    Where, in a prosecution for homicide, a witness was asked the position of the door of the house in which deceased was standing when he was shot, and answered that he could not give a definite answer, but could only judge from the range of the ball and from the way it hit the door, his answer was properly excluded as an opinion deduced from physical facts which could have been detailed to the jury.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1035-1051; Dec. Dig. § 448.]
    3. Criminal Law (§ 821) — Instructions — Clerical Error.
    An instruction on self-defense contained the expression “expectation or fear of death or serious bodily injury.” After being so written, the "r” in “or” was overwritten by “f” in pencil so as to make the phrase read “expectation of fear.” The court explained that the change was made without his knowledge or consent, and that the clause was read to the jury as originally written. Reid, that an objection to the instructions because of the change was 'hypercritical and unsustainable.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1989; Dec. Dig. § 821.]
    4. Homicide (§ 300) — Self-Defense — Instructions.
    Defendant’s brother testified that just before the killing he noticed C. standing in the door of a house with his hand in his bosom as if drawing, or about to draw, a weapon, and called to his brother to “look out,” and that thereupon defendant fired twice, killing deceased. The court charged that if defendant killed deceased at a time when deceased was making an attack on defendant, and from the manner thereof, and from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties at the time, and defendant’s knowledge of deceased’s character and disposition, he was caused to have a reasonable expectation or fear of death or serious bodily injury, and, acting under such expectation or fear, defendant killed deceased, then he should be acquitted, and if deceased was armed at the time he was killed and was making such an attack on defendant, and. if the weapon used by him, and the manner of its use, was such as were reasonably calculated to produce death or serious bodily injury, then the law presumes that deceased intended to murder, or aimed to inflict serious bodily injury on defendant, and if deceased made a demonstration as if he were armed, or was about to draw a weapon, defendant had the same right to act as if deceased had been armed. Reid, that the charge sufficiently presented the law of self-defense and was applicable to the facts.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 614-632; Dec. Dig. § 300.)
    5. Homicide (§ 300) — Instructions — Self-Defense — Threats—Applicability to Evidence.
    In a prosecution for homicide, an instruction on the law of threats .was not objectionable for failure to include serious bodily injury, as well as the taking of defendant’s life, where the only threats testified to were directed exclusively to killing defendant by “shooting it out with him.”
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 614-632; Dec. Dig. § 300.]
    6. Criminal Law (§ 854) — Jury — Separation.
    During the trial of a murder case, a horse belonging to one of the jurors got out of a pasture where it was being kept, and passed along the street dragging a rope. A .juror, left the jury, caught the horse 25 or 30 steps away, and an attorney in the case took the horse from the juror. Nothing was said by the juror to the attorney, or by the attorney to the juror, or by anybody else to the juror, in regard to the case. Reid, that such separation was not material.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law., Cent. Dig. §§ 2039-2047; Dec. Dig. § 854.]
    7. Criminal Law (§ 918) — Motion for New Trial — Necessity of Objection at Trial — Witnesses—Omission of Oath.
    An objection for the first time on a motion for new trial that two of the witnesses were not sworn is too late.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2163-2196 ; Dec. Dig. § 918.]
    On Rehearing.
    8. Criminal Law (§ 823) — Instructions — Manslaughter — Adequate Cause — Limitations.
    Where the court, in applying the law to the facts with reference to manslaughter, limited the issue of adequate cause to the acts and words of deceased at the time of the killing, the charge was erroneous, though the court in previously stating the law generally had stated that the jury should take into consideration all the facts and circumstances in the case.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. 823.] i§ 1992-1995; Dee. Dig. §
    9. Homicide (§ 300) — Threats—Appearance of Danger.
    An instruction on threats, in a homicide case omitting to charge that defendant would be entitled to act on the appearance of danger, held erroneous.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 614-632; Dec. Dig. § 300.]
    10. Criminal Daw (§ 361) — Evidence—Relevancy.
    Where, in a prosecution for homicide, the state offered evidence that defendant had furnished money to 6. to purchase a horse of S. and induce him to leave the state, and that defendant’s brother and G. carried S. to a train, and that he did leave the state, defendant was entitled to show by G.’s father that G. gave his son the money with which to purchase the horse.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 802-803; Dec. Dig. § 361.]
    11. Criminal Law (§ 351) — Evidence—Relevancy.-
    In a prosecution for homicide, evidence warranting an inference that a state’s witness had been induced to leave the state by defendant’s brother and certain others was inadmissible, in the absence of some proof that accused was connected therewith.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 776-785; Dec. Dig. § 351.]
    Appeal from District Court, Grimes County ; S. W. Dean, Judge.
    L. O. Barnes was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded on rehearing.
    Buffington, Buffington & Bowen and Carl T. Harper, for appellant. John A. Mobley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
    
      
      For otter cases see same topic and section NTJMBER. in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   DAVIDSON, P. J.

Appellant was allotted 10 years in the penitentiary for murder in the second degree.

About half after 1 o’clock on the afternoon of October 17, 1908, in a little room attached to the barber shop and Hiawatha joint of the deceased, Cecil M. Hall, there was a game of cards played in which the deceased and appellant participated. There were also others in the game. The deceased won the money of appellant on one of the hands played. Growing out of the loss of this money there grew an angry altercation. Appellant left the room and went across the street to his drug store and almost immediately returned, tie, however, did not enter the place of business of the deceased, but sat on the gallery, either of the deceased or adjoining gallery; the two business houses being joined by an unbroken gallery running in front of both. Appellant left his coat and pocketbook in the room where the card playing had occurred, for which he sent a friend, who secured and gave it to the appellant. Appellant afterwards returned to his drug store and remained there until about 4 o’clock. It is shown by some of the witnesses that the deceased threatened the life of appellant and armed himself for that purpose. These threats were communicated. These threats were to the effect that deceased intended to kill appellant before night. This is the concrete substance of the threats. It is in evidence that he (deceased) armed himself for this purpose. It is further shown in this connection that deceased had exchanged pistols with one of the officers some time prior to this trouble; the officer desiring the deceased’s pistol because there was some defect in the pistol of the officer and it would not work satisfactorily. After the difficulty over the game of cards, the deceased got his pistol from the officer and made some remarks to the effect that the officer’s pistol would not work well, but his own pistol would, and he was ready for the trouble with appellant. We are not undertaking to state the exact language, but the concrete substance of the evidence in regard to this phase of the evidence. About 4 o’clock, or a little after, the deceased entered the store of Lee Hall, which was across the street from his place of business, and immediately thereafter appellant and his brother entered the store behind the deceased. The deceased went to the back of the store and spoke to two of the witnesses who were sitting near the back door of the store. Afterward he went out of the back door to a little warehouse belonging to Lee Hall, which is estimated to be something like 20 feet from the main building, and entered it. Lee Hall and Mooring were in there at the time, and perhaps another party. Immediately after deceased went out the back door of the main building, appellant went to this back door and leaned up against the side of it for two or three minutes looking in the direction of the door of the warehouse where the deceased entered. After remaining at this point two or three minutes, appellant hurriedly left it, going in the direction of where the deceased was, drawing his pistol, and before reaching the warehouse fired as many as two shots — before getting on the little gallery of the warehouse. There is evidence indicating that the deceased fired one shot; at least there was one empty shell in his pistol showing evidence of having recently been discharged. The brother of appellant, who accompanied and went out of the back door behind him, says that he thought his brother was going home when he went out at the back door; that he was following along behind him and saw deceased standing in the door of the warehouse. He further states that he saw the hand of the deceased in his bosom, as he thought, to pull a pistol, and called to his brother to look out; that his brother immediately fired two shots, and he did not know who fired the third shot. Deceased’s body was found some distance back from the door where he was seen standing, resting against a barrel on one side and some sacks of salt or flour upon the other. He was shot in the back, left side, and one ball entered through the fleshy part of the right arm and back of the bone. There was also one ball found imbedded in a barrel of syrup close to where the body of the deceased was found after the firing ceased. The testimony is very voluminous, a great deal of it of minor details not necessary to be noticed and of no significance so far as this appeal is concerned. This is thought to be a sufficient statement to bring in review the questions suggested.

1. The first bill of exceptions recites that the state was permitted to prove by the witness McDonald, as follows: “I couldn’t exactly understand the language the defendant used when he first shot at deceased, but I understood him to say something like, ‘I have got you.’ I can’t say the exact language, but I understood it that way.” The bill then recites as follows: “It having been material for the defendant to have the language said to be that of the defendant, and not guesswork, in order that said witness might be contradicted by another witness for the state, George Miles, who heard deceased and not defendant make use of language of similar import. The importance being also in showing that defendant did not make the first attack, and the testimony should therefore have been exact.” The objections were by the court overruled. There was no error in this ruling of the court if it be conceded that the bill shows any grounds of objection. The testimony was clearly admissible. The witness was stating the language as best he understood it as used by the appellant as he approached the deceased and before he fired the first shot. The court did not err in admitting this testimony.

2. Another bill recites that the defendant asked Robert Hall the following question: “What position, according to your judgment, do you think that the door was in at the time the ball struck the. door?” To which question the witness answered: “I can’t give a definite answer on that. I can only judge from the range of the ball, and from the way it hit the door.” This was excluded on objection by the state. It is further stated that it was proposed by the defendant to show by the testimony of this witness, and he would have shown by him, that from the range of the ball and the way it hit the door no witness, save Luther Barnes, a witness for the defendant, could have seen the deceased just before and at the time of the difficulty, or into the room where deceased then was. There was no error on the part of the court in this ruling. We are unable to ascertain the purpose for which this testimony was sought, unless it was for the purpose of showing the range of the ball by the way it hit the door. The bill is too meager to ascertain what the purport of this testimony was or what would have been its bearing. The witness could have stated the physical facts as to where the ball struck the door and the direction it took and let the jury draw such conclusions as they deemed proper. It was not proper for the witness to state his opinion as to the position of the door from the bullet marks nor the position of appellant’s brother at the time. By reference to the record, the evidence in regard to the shot marks on the door was fully and elaborately brought out on the trial. In fact, there was a great deal of testimony in regard to the marks on the door where one of the bullets is said to have taken effect. As this matter is presented, we could not intelligently review it without going over the •whole record, which the court is not required to do, and, if we did, there was no error in the ruling of the court, for the matter was fully exemplified before the jury.

3. Appellant offered the witness Guerrant to show that he had given his son money with Which to purchase a horse from Ross Stewart, a witness for the state. The state had shown by the witness Stewart that he had sold a horse to Joe Guerrant, the son of the witness, and had received the money therefor in the store of L. O. Barnes, the defendant, the defendant not being present; and the subsequent riding of said witness Ross Stewart to Mesa with Luther Barnes, a brother of the defendant, and the said Joe Guerrant, and his departure from the state from that point. It is further recited as follows: “The state having attempted to show by the sale of said horse and the purchase thereof that the brother of the defendant had attempted to have the witness Ross Stewart leave the state and not be at the trial of the defendant; and it being material for the defendant to show that neither he nor his brother had anything to do with the purchase of said horse.” This bill is qualified as follows: “The testimony of the witness C. R. Guer-rant was that he was not present when his son bought the horse in question, and that he did not know of his own knowledge that his son purchased the horse with the money he had given him; that he only knew it from what his son had told him. The state objected to this testimony because it was hearsay, irrelevant, and immaterial and on its face showed that there was better evidence. The witness Joe Guerrant was in attendance on the court, and at the time had not been offered as a witness. All of which appears from the record.” As qualified there was no error in rejecting this testimony. Ross Stewart was present and testified on the trial, and it was not questioned that the father gave the son the money with which to buy the horse; that Ross Stewart sold the horse to young Guerrant and went to Mississippi, but returned to Grimes County, attended the trial, and testified as a witness.

4. Another bill of exceptions recites that the district attorney urged that the brother of defendant, Luther Barnes, had procured the absence of Ross Stewart from the state to prevent him from testifying in this case. Objection was interposed to this line of argument because there was no testimony going to show that Luther Barnes had in fact procured the absence of said witness; it having been shown by the state that said witness Ross Stewart had voluntarily returned to the state to testify, and this without being under process. The court qualifies this bill by stating that the remarks of the district attorney complained of were deductions from the evidence as shown by the testimony of the witness Ross Stewart in the record. We are of opinion this argument is not subject to criticism. By referring to the record, it will be seen that the testimony of Ross Stewart and one or two other witnesses shows that Ross Stewart sold the horse to young Guerrant, and Guerrant and one of appellant’s brothers carried him to the depot, where he took the train for Mississippi. They say they took him there as an accommodation to the witness; that they were going by the depot to a lake on a fishing excursion ; that young Guerrant, who accompanied Ross Stewart to the depot, was the man who purchased the horse, paying him $42.50 — $27.50 in money and assuming a debt and mortgage of $15 on the horse.

There are several criticisms of the court’s charge in regard to manslaughter which we think hypercritical. The charge on manslaughter was very full and favorable to appellant. There are also several criticisms of the court’s charge with reference to self-defense. In a general way we would say that it is more than seriously to be questioned whether manslaughter or self-defense was in the case from the defendant’s testimony, and clearly it was not from the evidence introduced by the state. However, the court gave a favorable charge on manslaughter, if it be conceded that it is in the case.

5. It is contended that the twenty-fourth section of the charge was deficient in not instructing the jury that the danger must be viewed from the standpoint of the defendant and from his standpoint alone at the time. That particular clause in section 24 of the charge is as follows: “Provided, he acted upon a reasonable apprehension of danger as it appeared to him from his standpoint alone at the time, and in such ease the party acting under such apprehension of danger, real or apparent, is in no event bound to.retreat in order to avoid the necessity of killing his assailant, and has the right to act as long as such danger appears to exist.” This quotation answers the criticism set out in bill No. 11.

6. Bill No. 12 criticises paragraph 25 of the charge, wherein it uses the following expression in its charge on defendant’s right of self-defense: “‘Expectation of fear,’ said expression having been originally written ‘expectation or fear,’ but the ‘r’ having been erased by the placing of an ‘f’ over it in pencil, the original ‘or’ having been written on a typewriter.” The exception being that the expression “expectation of fear” is meaningless in law, and the court having nowhere charged on the expectation or fear of death or serious bodily injury; and here now tenders this his bill of exceptions, etc. The court qualifies tnis bill in the following language: “Attention is directed to the charge of the court and preceding and succeeding paragraphs, where this error is fully covered, with a correct statement ‘expectation or fear.’ I will state in this connection that the charge was prepared by me ‘expectation or fear,’ and the change made by some one without my knowledge or consent. It was read by me to the jury as if written ‘expectation or fear.’ ” We think this objection is hypercritical; but, if there were any merit in it, it was eliminated by the statement of the trial court as above quoted.

Another bill recites that the court erred in paragraph 25 in instructing the jury as follows: “Now, if from the evidence you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the said Cecil M. Hall, but you further believe that at the time of so doing the deceased had made an attack on him,” etc. The objection being that it placed the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of the facts which would constitute self-defense, and limits the right of self-defense to an attack already made, and does not give the right as to an attack then being made, and in the act of being made, the evidence showing that such an attack was in the act of being made, not had been made. The court qualifies this bill by referring to the charge of the court in regard to this matter. A reference to this section of the charge in full, we think, demonstrates there was no merit in it. In order that we make it plain, we copy the whole section: “Now, if from the evidence you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the said Cecil M. Hall, but you further believe that at the time of so doing the deceased had made an attack on him, which from the manner of it, and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties at the time, and the defendant’s knowledge of the character and disposition of the deceased, caused him to have a reasonable expectation or fear of death or serious bodily injury, and that, acting under such expectation of fear, the defendant killed the deceased, then you should acquit him; and if the deceased was armed at the time he was killed and was making such attack on the defendant, and if the weapon used by him and the manner of its use were such as were reasonably calculated to produce death or serious bodily injury, then the law presumes that the deceased intended to murder or aimed to inflict serious bodily injury on the defendant. And if the deceased made demonstrations as if he were armed, and as if he were about to draw a weapon, the defendant had the same right to act as if the deceased had been armed.” Taking this latter clause without reference to the prior clause of the quoted charge on self-defense, we are of opinion there could have been no possible injury done appellant. The court not only authorized the jury to acquit if the deceased had made an attack threatening life, or serious bodily injury, but in the latter part of the charge directly applied the charge to the very facts detailed hy the brother of defendant, to wit: “If deceased made demonstrations as if he were armed, and as if he were about to draw a weapon, the defendant had the same right to act as if the deceased had been armed.” We are of -opinion that the charge as given sufficiently covers the facts of the case and pertinently directed the attention of the jury to the very facts of whatever danger could have presented itself to the mind of appellant as testified by his brother. As stated in the ■early part of the opinion, the brother of defendant said he noticed the deceased, as he ■stood in the door, had his hand in his bosom as if drawing or about to draw a weapon, ■and called to his brother to look out, and that thereupon his brother fired twice. We think the charge, as before stated, was a direct application of the law to the facts.

7. Subdivision 28 of the charge is also crit-icised because it limits the law of threats to take the life of defendant by deceased. That charge in full is as follows: “You are further instructed, in this connection, that if you believe from the evidence that the ■deceased, Cecil M. Hall, had made threats to take the life of defendant or against his life, ■and at the time of the killing, if any, was ■doing or had done some act manifesting an intention to execute the threats so made, then you should acquit the defendant.” Recurring to the testimony of the witness who testified in regard to threats, it will be noted that appellant emphasized, through the witnesses, that the deceased had threatened to shoot it out with defendant on the street, and that he would do so before night. There was no other character of threats indicated except to take the life of appellant under this character of testimony. Usually the charge in regard to threats should include serious bodily injury as well as taking the life of the threatened party; but, where the threats are directed exclusively to taking the life of the threatened party with a pistol or a gun, as in this case, we are of opinion that the omission in regard to serious bodily injury is not of such character as would require the court to reverse. The rule is that the charge must be directly applicable to the facts adduced before the jury, and, when the charge has pertinently applied the law to the given state of case, it is usually sufficient. If the deceased made the threats imputed to him, it was for the purpose of killing, and therefore, under the circumstances, we are of opinion that this omission is not of sufficient importance in this case to require a reversal.

8. One of the grounds of the motion for new trial is that the jury separated after being impaneled. The facts show that the horse of one of the jurors had gotten out of the pasture where he had placed it for safekeeping during the trial and was passing along the street dragging a rope; that the juror left the jury and caught the horse a distance of 25 or 30 steps away; and that an attorney in the case walked up and took the horse to take care of, or at least to relieve the juror of the trouble of the matter. There was nothing said by the juror’to the attorney, or the attorney to the juror, or by anybody to the juror, in regard to the case. The above is the substance of the matter in regard to the separation. We are of opinion that this is not of sufficient importance to require a reversal.

9. Another ground of the motion for new trial is that two of the witnesses testifying in the case were not sworn, and that this fact was not discovered until after the trial. This comes too late. This direct question was adjudicated in the case of Goldsmith v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 112, 22 S. W. 405. The language in the Goldsmith Case is as follows: “It is made ground for a new trial, by amended motion, that the witness McConnell was not sworn before testifying. The agreed statement of the facts shows that he was introduced by, and testified for, the defefid-ant. The amendment alleges that he ‘testified for the state.’ No objection was reserved at the trial, and it is too late to raise this question on motion for new trial, even if he testified for the state..”

Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.

MeCORD, J., disqualified.

On Motion for Rehearing.

DAVIDSON, P. J.

The judgment herein was affirmed. Appellant has filed a motion for rehearing based upon several propositions.

1. It is contended the charge on manslaughter is erroneous, and that this court was in error in holding that said charge sufficiently presented the law to the jury. Upon a review of the facts and the charge complained of, we have reached the conclusion that we were in error. The twenty-second subdivision of the charge, in a general way, defines manslaughter; but, when the court came to apply "the law to the facts in the twenty-third subdivision of the charge, it limited the adequate cause to the acts and words of deceased at the time of the killing. The twenty-third subdivision of the charge reads as follows: “Now, in this case, if you should find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, D. O. Barnes, shot and thereby killed the said Cecil M. Hall, and at the time he did the actions and words of the said deceased were of such a nature as to produce adequate cause, and did produce such adequate cause, and did produce in the mind of the defendant, L. O. Barnes, sudden passion, such as anger,” etc. An inspection of the language quoted will show that the court limited th.e adequate cause to the “actions and words of the deceased” at the time of the shooting. In the previous section of the charge the court had informed the jury that they should take into consideration all the facts and circumstances; hut, when applying the law to the facts, he limited same to the action and words of the deceas&d at the very time of the shooting. This, under the authorities, is a restriction and limitation upon this phase of the law unwarranted by our statute,' and we were in error in holding the charge sufficient in the judgment of affirmance. The facts bearing upon this, without going into detail, substantially show that the parties had been, in the morning of the day of the homicide in the evening, engaged in some character of game in the Hiawatha joint of the deceased. High words and trouble ensued between deceased and appellant, and appellant left. Deceased threatened to take appellant’s life, which was subsequently communicated to appellant some time prior to the homicide. Deceased had armed himself under the circumstances stated in the original opinion unnecessary here to repeat. In the evening, just before the killing occurred, the parties were in the store of Dee Hall. Deceased went out the back door and into a storeroom, and was standing in the door when appellant, from his theory, was passing out the back door going home. The deceased made a remark to the effect, “Now damn you, I have got you,” and about that time placed his hand where his pistol was. It is shown that he did have a pistol and fired one shot. The testimony leaves it in doubt as to whether this remark was directed jocularly to Lee Hall, or intended for appellant. Appellant thought that it was intended for him. As appellant left the store, as he contends, going towards home, his brother hol-loed to him to look out, and upon looking up, and taking in the situation, he jerked his pistol and fired. Under this state of case, we are of opinion that we were wrong in the original opinion in sustaining this phase of the charge wherein the court limited manslaughter to the actions and words of the deceased at the time of the killing. The jury should have been instructed to view the case in the light of all the facts and circumstances. Reinhardt v. State (decided at the present term of the court) 133 S. W. 265; Orman v. State, 24 Tex. App. 500, 6 S, W. 544; Howard v. State, 23 Tex. App. 278, 5 S. W. 231; Alexander v. State, 25 Tex. App. 266, 7 ;S. W. 867, 8 Am. St. Rep. 438; Thomas v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 386, 56 S. W. 71; Swain v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. R. 98, 86 S. W. 336; Neyland v. State, 13 Tex. App. 549.

2. The charge in regard to threats is seriously attacked as being erroneous. The attack upon this charge is based upon the omission from it to instruct the jury that appellant would have the right to act upon the appearance of danger. Under the authorities this point seems to be well taken. Upon another trial the court in giving a charge upon threats will also charge in reference to apparent danger in connection therewith. Sims v. State, 9 Tex. App. 594; Sebastian v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 84, 57 S. W. 820; Swain v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. R. 98, 86 S. W. 338. There are quite a number of other authorities in line with these cited. We think that, in so far as the original opinion is in conflict with the above views, it is erroneous. The charge upon self-defense and upon threats upon another trial should apply the law applicable to serious bodily injury, as well as danger to the life of appellant

3. After a careful review of bills of exception Nos. 3 and 4, we have reached the conclusion we were wrong in holding there was no error shown on the face of them. Appellant offered proof by the witness C. R. Guerrant that the witness had given his son money with which to purchase the horse from Ross Stewart. It was shown by the witness Stewart that he had sold a horse to Joe Guerrant, son of O. R. Guerrant, and had received money therefor in the store of appellant; the appellant not being present; that subsequently Ross Stewart had ridden in a wagon to Mesa with a brother of appellant and Joe Guerrant, purchaser of the horse, and there took the train and left the state. The state’s purpose by this was to impress the jury that, by the sale of the horse and the purchase thereof, the brother of defendant had attempted to have the witness Ross Stewart leave the state and be absent from the trial of appellant; that therefore, the evidence of O. R. Guerrant became material to show that neither appellant nor his brother had anything to do with the purchase of the horse. The state objected to this, and it was excluded. The court qualifies the bill by showing that C. R. Guerrant was not present when his son bought the horse in question, and did not know of his own knowledge that his son did purchase the horse with the money he had given him; that he only knew it from what he said his son had told him. The state objected because it was hearsay, irrelevant, and immaterial, etc., and also because Joe Guerrant had not at that time been offered as a witness. We are of opinion that inasmuch as the state was trying to convey to the jury’s mind that appellant had furnished the money to Guer-rant to purchase Stewart’s horse, and that his (appellant’s) ■ brother and Joe Guerrant, the purchaser of the horse, had carried Stewart to the train when he left the state, the appellant ought to have been permitted to show by the elder Guerrant that he in fact did let Joe Guerrant have the money. The reason for the introduction of this testimony is made stronger by reason of another bill of exception, which shows that the district attorney urged before the jury that the brother of appellant had procured the absence of the witness Ross Stewart from the state to prevent his testimony from going before the jury. To this argument appellant urged objection because there was no testimony which showed that appellant’s brother had in fact procured the absence of the witness; it having been shown also in the record that Eoss Stewart had voluntarily returned to the state to testify, and that appellant’s brother had nothing to do with the purchase of the horse from Stewart by Joe Guerrant, and therefore there was no basis for this argument Objection to this argument was overruled by the court, and he states as a reason for doing so that the remarks of the district attorney were but deductions from the evidence as shown by the testimony of the witness Eoss Stewart in the record. "While these bills are not as clear as they should be, still they were of sufficient importance and clearness to put the appellant in a damaging light before the jury through the fact that the horse had been paid for in his store, and his brother had carried the witness Stewart who sold the horse to the train when he left Texas. Upon another trial, if the case should develop as these bills show, the testimony of the elder Guerrant should be permitted to go to the jury. "We will state, however, we do not see why the testimony of the acts of these parties, either Stewart, appellant’s brother, or Joe Guer-rant, should have been admitted in evidence in the absence of something connecting defendant with those matters. They seem to have been all done in his absence, and he is in no way connected with either the purchase of the horse, the payment of the money, or the departure of Stewart from the state. If appellant was instrumental in having a state witness leave the state, it would be a damaging fact against him before the jury. Therefore we say upon another trial, before any of this testimony should be permitted to go to the jury, appellant must be in some manner connected With the acts of those parties.

Believing that we were in error in the former opinion in affirming the judgment, we grant the rehearing, set aside the affirmance, and now reverse the judgment and remand the cause.  