
    *Spotts v. Gillaspie.
    November, 1828.
    Abolition ol Slavery — Act of Pennsylvania — Construction. — The Act of Pennsylvania of 1780. for the gradual abolition of slavery, clearly Includes all negro and mulatto children born of slave mothers alter the passage of the Act, except in the cases excepted by the 10th section, such as domestic slaves attending on Delegates to Congress, &c. &c.
    Same — Same—Same—Case at Bar. — If, therefore, a citizen of Pennsylvania, after the passage of the Act, bequeath a female slave to a citizen and resi- ■ dent of Virginia, and after the legatee’s title has accrued, the slave have a child horn in Pennsylvania, and the child be then brought to Virginia, together with its slave mother, hy her master, such child may recover its freedom in the Courts of Virginia.
    Same — Same—Same—Same.—It seems, that though by the Act of Pennsylvania, the condition of the mother is so far changed, that her children born there, cannot be slaves, yet if she be removed by her master, her children born in Virginia are slaves, though those born in Pennsylvania are free.
    'Susanna Gillaspie, a woman of colour, instituted her action in forma pauperis, in the Superior Court of Augusta, to recover her freedom, against Jacob Spotts, who detained her in slavery. The Jury found a special verdict, in which they found two Acts enacted by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, the first passed to the 1st March, 1780, entitled, “An Act for the gradual abolition of slavery,” the other passed 29th March, 1788, in amendment of the former Act. By the third section of the first Act, it is enacted “That all persons as well negroes and mulattoes as others, who shall be born within this State from and after the passing of this Act, shall not be deemed and considered as servants for life, or slaves; and that all servitude for life, or slavery of children, in consequence of the slavery of their mothers, in the case of all children born within this State from and after the ’ passing of this Act as aforesaid, shall be, and hereby is, utterly taken way, extinguished, and for ever abolished.”
    Sect. 4th. “Provided always, and be it further enacted, That every negro and mulatto child, born within this State after the passing of this Act as aforesaid, (who would, in case this Act had not been made, have been born a servant for years, or life, or a slave,) shall be deemed to be, and shall be, by virtue of this Act, the servant of such ^person, or his or her assigns, who would, in such case, have been entitled to the service of such child, until such child shall attain unto the age of twenty-eight years, in the manner, and on the conditions, whereon servants bound by indenture for four years are or may be retained and holden ; and shall be liable to like correction and punishment, and entitled to like relief, in case he or she be evilly treated by his or her master or mistress, and to like freedom dues and other privileges, as servants bound by indenture for four years are or may be entitled, unless the person, to whom the service of any such child shall belong, shall abandon his, or her claim to the same; in which case, the Overseers of the Poor of the Citv, Township or District, respectively, where such child shall be so abandoned, shall, by indenture, bind out every child so abandoned, as an apprentice, for a time not exceeding the age herein before limited for the service of such children.”
    The 5th section enacts, “That every person, who is, or shall be the owner of any negro or mulatto slave or servant for life or till the age of thirty-one years, now within this State,'or his lawful attorney, shall, on or before the said first day of November next, deliver or cause to be delivered, in writing, to the Clerk of the Peace of the County, or to the Clerk of the Court of Record of the City of Philadelphia, in which he or she shall respectively inhabit, the name and surname, and occupation or profession of such owner, and the name of the County and Township, District or Ward, wherein he or she resideth; and also the name and names of any"such slave and .slaves, and servant and servants for life, or till the age of thirty-one years, together with their ages and sexes, severally and respectively set forth and annexed, by such person owned or statedly employed, and then being within this State, in order to ascertain and distinguish the slaves and servants for life, and till the age of thirty-one years, within this State, who shall be such on the said first day of November next, from all other persons; which particulars *shali, by said Cierk of the Sessions and Clerk of the said City Court, be entered in books to be provided for that purpose by the said Clerks ; and that no negro or mulatto now within this State, shall, from and after the said first day of November, be deemed a slave or servant for life, or till the age of thirty-one years, unless his or her name shall be entered as aforesaid on such Record, except such negro or mulatto slaves and servants as are herein-after excepted : the said Clerk to be entitled to a fee of two dollars for each slave or servant so entered as aforesaid, from the Treasurer of the County, to be allowed to him in his accounts.”
    The 10th section enacts, “That no man or woman of any nation or colour, except the negroes or mulattoes who shall be registered as aforesaid, shall, at any timé hereafter be deemed, adjudged or holden, within the territories of this Commonwealth, as slaves or servants for life, but as free men and free women ; except the domestic slaves attending upon Delegates in Congress from the other American States, Foreign Ministers and Consuls, and persons passing through or sojourning in tills State, and not becoming resident therein, and seaman employed in ships not belonging to any inhabitant of this State, nor employed in any ship owned by any such inhabitant; provided, such domestic slaves be not alienated or sold to any inhabitant, nor (except in the case of Members of Congress, Foreign Ministers and Consuls,) retained in this State longer than six months.”
    It is not deemed necessary to transcribe any other parts of the Act, or of the subsequent Act of 1788.
    The Jury further find, that James Gil-crist, previous to, and on the 26th April, 1782, held possession of a negro woman, named Hannah, in the County of Dan-caster, and State of Pennsylvania, whom he claimed and treated as his slave ; and that the said Gilcrist, who was a citizen of the said County and State, on the 26th April, 1782, made his last Will and Testament, which was duly admitted to record after his death, which happened before the 5th of June ^following. They find the Will in haec verba, of which the fourth and fifth clauses are as follows: “4, I give unto my well beloved wife, Sarow Gilcrist, the remaining part of all my personable estate, except my negro wench Hannah, forever, and the benefits of my real estate in during her natural life. 5th. After the deyses of my well beloved wife Sarow, 1 give unto my son-in-law James Roberts, and Sarow his wife, my negro we'ncfa Hannah, to them, and their heirs forever.
    They find, that the said Hannah is the negro wench mentioned in the fourth and fifth clauses of the said Will: that the Testator’s widow in the said Will mentioned, departed this life before the birth of the said Plaintiff, Susanna, to wit, in the Spring of the year 1786; and that the said Plaintiff, Susanna, was born in the County and State aforesaid, in the Surrimer of the year 1786; and that after the death of said widow, to wit, in the Summer of 1786, when the Plaintiff. Susanna, was six weeks of age, a certain James Robertson, (by mistake, in the fifth clause of the Will, called James Roberts,) whoresided at, and before the date of the said Will in Augusta County, Virginia, brought the said Hannah, and her child, the said Susanna, from the said County of Lancaster, in Pennsylvania, to his residence in Augusta County, in this State, claiming them as his property under the said Will. They farther find, that the said James Robertson did not remove the said slave, Hannah, from Lancaster to his residence, before the birth of the child, the Plaintiff Susanna, because he conceived his right of possession did not vest until the death of the Testator’s widow, which was a short time before the said birth, not more than sufficient to receive intelligence, and make preparation for the journey.
    They further find, that the Defendant purchased the said Susanna from the said James Robertson, for a valuable consideration : that the said Law of Pennsylvania remained in full force from the passage of it, tiil after the removal of the said Hannah and Susanna to Virginia: "*and conclude, that if upon these facts the Law be for the Plaintiff, they find that the Plaintiff is free, and not a slave, and find for the Plaintiff' one cent damages; but if the Law be for the Defendant, then they find lor the Defendant.
    The Superior Court gave Judgment for the Plaintiff, and the Defendant appealed.
    Stanard, for the Appellant.
    Johnson, for the Appellee.
   November 17.

The PRESIDENT

delivered his opinion.

This suit is in behalf of a pauper, and her descendants, for their freedom. The Jury have found a special verdict, on which the Court below has adjudged the Law for the Plaintiff, and an appeal is taken to this Court.

The Jury find, that in 1780, the State of Pennsylvania passed a Law for the gradual abolition of slavery, which they set out at length. The third section enacts, that all persons, as well negroes and mulattoes as others, who shall be born within this State, from and after the passing of this Act, shall not be deemed, and considered as servants for life, or slaves, and that all servitude for life, or slavery of children, in consequence of the slavery of their mothers, in the case of ail children born within the State from and after the passing of the Act shall be, and is hereby utterly taken away, extinguished and abolished. By the fourth section, the children of slaves born within the State after the passing of the Act, are to be held by the owners of their mothers, until they shall arrive at the age of twenty-eight years, upon the same terms and conditions, that servants bound by indenture for four years are subject to, unless the person entitled to the service of such child, shall abandon his claim, in which case, the Overseers of the Poor shall by indenture, bind out every such child as an apprentice, for a time not exceeding the age before limited. *The fifth section directs, that all slaves, or servants for life, or thirty-one years, shall be registered by their owners, with the Clerk of the County, &c., in which he resides, before the 1st November following, and that no negro or mulatto now within the State shall be deemed a slave unless his, or her name shall be entered as aforesaid on such Record, expect as after excepted. The tenth section contains the exception, which extends to domestic slaves attending upon Delegates in Congress, Foreign Ministers and Consuls, and persons passing through, or sojourning in the State, and nor becoming residents therein, and seamen, &c. employed in ships not belonging to inhabitants of the State. These are all the parts of the Law that have any bearing on the case before us. The Jury also set out an Act of Pennsylvania in 1788, explaining and amending the former, which it does not seem necessary to notice. They next find the Will of Gilcrist, a citizen of Pennsylvania, made in 1782, in which he gives to his wife for life, and after her death, to his son-in-law James Robertson, and Sarah his wife, his negro woman Hannah, whom the Jury find, he claimed and treated as a slave: they find that his widow died in the Spring of 1786: that shortly after, in the Summer of 1786, Hannah had a child, the Plaintiff, Susanna; that when Susanna was about six weeks old, the said James Robertson, who then, and at the making of the Will, lived in Augusta County, Virginia, went to Pennsylvania, and brought to Augusta, Hannah, and the Plaintiff, Susanna, claiming them as his property: that the Defendant Spotts, bought Susanna of Robertson., for a valuable consideration: and they further find, that the Pennsylvania Law of 1780, remained in full force from the passage thereof until the removal of Hannah and Susanna. These are the facts on which the question depends.

In the argument, it was contended, 1st. That the case before us was not embraced by the Law of Pennsylvania, because not within the words, and meaning of the Law; "and 2dly. If it were, a Court in. Virginia would not give effect to it, and thereby confiscate the property of a citizen of Virginia.

As to the first objection, it seems to me that the case is clearly embraced by the Law of Pennsylvania. The third section includes all children born of slaves after the passage thereof, to whomsoever their mothers might belong, whether citizens of Pennsylvania, or other States. The exceptions in the tenth section are pointed to children born of slaves within the State', and excludes them from the operation of the Act, because of the ownership of Delegates to Congress, &c. These exceptions do not narrow the construction of the Act, by any possible inference as to other children born of slaves within the State, than those within the exceptions. Throughout, the Law applies to them as persons, and not as property, by which to limit its operation, by the rights of the owners of the moth ers.

The second question, then, as to the power of the State of Pennsylvania to confiscate the property of a citizen of Virginia, does not directly occur. The power of the State of Pennsylvania to change the condition of persons, held under its Law (and no other) in slavery, cannot be questioned, especially if they were not then the property of a citizen of another State, which is not the case before the Court.

If at the time the Act of 1780 passed, and went into operation, Hannah, the mother of Susanna, the Plaintiff, was the slave of Gilcrist, (which is not positively found by the verdict,) both his property in her, and her condition as a slave, were subject to the Law of Pennsylvania. It might, and did change the character of his property in her, and in so far, her condition as a slave. Before the passage of the Act of 1780, he held an absolute property in her, and her children then to be born. Afterwards, though his property in her was, as to her services, the same, her condition was so changed that she could not be the mother of a slave in Pennsylvania, and his property in her to that extent was changed. The Law of Pennsylvania was, as regarded his property Ji'in her and her condition, executed. His Will could not affect this state of things. It might pass his qualified property in her and her future offspring, according to the provisions of the Act, but it could not alter the then condition, either of Hannah, or of her offspring born after-wards : They remained as before under the Act. Susanna, the Plaintiff, was born under its operation in Pennsylvania: by it though born of a slave, she was free: and in this aspect of the case, the Court is not called on to execute the Law of Pennsylvania, but the Law of Virginia, which does not now, and did not then, permit a person free in Pennsylvania, to be held in slavery here.

If Susanna had been born in Virginia, after the removal of her mother, the question would be a different one. It might be argued, that though the Law of Pennsylvania had imparted to Hannah a new condition ; that is, that though a slave absolutely as to service, her children were not to follow her condition as in Virginia, yet that in Virginia, her condition in Pennsylvania would not protect her children born here. How that would be, it is not necessary for the Court to decide. The Judgment ought to be affirmed.

The other JUDGES, CABELL, COAL-TER, GREEN and CARR, concurred, that the Judgment be affirmed.  