
    Clements v. Lee.
    Where a partnership was largely indebted at the time of its dissolution, and the partners divided die as.-el.-, agreeing that they would respectively proceed to liquidate and settle the . ebts of tlie inn then outstanding, and that each partner at some future (lay, and on demand of the other, would account to and settle with the other for the partnership properly in 11 is hands and the debts so paid: Held, That if it were eoneeded that the cause of action did not accrue when the last payment was made, and that the statute consequently would not ei an menee running until a demand of settlement, (he demand should have been made within a reasonable timo, which lias been held to be the period of limitation.
    Error front Harrison. On the T5Mi day of May, 1847, the plaintiff in error iileil lii.s petition in tlie District Court, alleging in substance that lie entered into a commercial partnership with the defendant in the year 1840; that tlie partners were to share alike in tlie profits and losses of the partnership; that in January, 1842, it was dissolved ; that tlie firm was then largely indebted, and that it was agreed between the parties that they should proceed to liquidate and settle tlie debts of the firm then outstanding, and that each partner, at some future day and on demand of tlie other, would account to and settle with the other for the partnership property in his hands ami the debts so paid; that in 1843 the partnership effects were divided between the parties without settling the partnership accounts, but upon mutual trust and confidence that each would proceed to pay the partnership debts still outstanding, and afterwards, upon demand, make a settlement of the partnership account; that the plaintiff, pursuant to the agreement, proceeded to pay the debts of the partnership to a large amount, at different times, down to the 1st day of October. 1844, when the last payment was made,; that in December, 1840, the plaintiff presented his account to the defendant and demanded a settlement, which the latter refused.
    There was a demurrer to the petition, and a plea of the statute of limitations. Tlie demurrer was sustained and the case dismissed, and the plaintiff brought a writ of error.
    
      W. P. Pill, for plaintiff in error.
    
      J. R. Mahone and Q. M. Adams, for defendant in error.
   WHEELER, J.

To obviate the bar interposed by the statute of limitations, it is insisted for the plaintiff'in error (hat the cause of action did not accrue until the demand made upon the defendant to account in December, 1840.

If it be conceded that the cause of action did not accrue when the last payment was made, and that the statute cousequently-would not commence running until a demand of settlement, the demand must have been made within a reasonable lime; and in Hie case of a promissory note payable within a given time after demand, it is held that a demand must bo made within a reasonable time from the date of the note, and (hat a reasonable time would require that the demand he made within tile, time limited by the statute for bringing tin*, action. (Angell on Lim., 2d ed., 98.)

The reason of the rule would cercaiulyappiy with quite equal force to a pa,rol promise, like that set up in the present case." And in this view, which is certainly the most favorable which can be taken for the plaintiff, the demand was not made within two years from the time of the last payment, nor the action brought until still later, and consequently not in time.

In any view which can be taken of this case the action appears to have been barred by the statute of limitations at the time of commencing the suit. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

Judgment affirmed  