
    Reeves & Hayter vs. Dougherty & Ewing.
    As a general rule, where the legal right is barred at law, the equitable right, by analogy, will be barred in equity; except in eases of fraudulent concealment of the cause of action.
    Where personal property has been conveyed, with a view to defraud the creditors of the grantor, the fraudulent grantee may plead, and rely upon the statute of limitations, in bar of a bill filed by a creditor of the grantor.
    The act of limitations, in case of a fraudulent conveyance, commences running from the time the grantee obtained possession of the property, not from the time judgment was obtained by .the creditor.
    Where a bill charges a fraudulent concealment of the cause of action, which is denied by the answer, the complainant must prove the allegation, or prove facts and circumstances from which it may be inferred.
    Where no objection is made below, for want of proper parties, the supreme court will not dismiss the bill on that account.
    This bill was filed in the year 1831, and charges, that at the January term, 1824, of the circuit court for Franklin county, the complainants Reeves and Thomas Faris, recovered a judgment against John and George Dougherty, for the sum of one thousand and fifty dollars sixty-nine cents, and also one hundred and thirteen dollars seventy'five cents for costs of suit; that said . , . . n , . «it * judgment is yet unsatisfied and unpaid; that an execution has been issued thereon, and returned no property found; that John J. Hay ter, since the rendition of said judgment, has purchased Faris1 interest therein, and is entitled to his moiety; that in the year 1824 or 525, George Dougherty departed this life intestate,.leaving no visible property, except a debt due to him, in his individual character, of four or five hundred dollars, from Hugh Blackman; that Blackman, after the death of George Dougherty, executed his note to the defendants, which he afterwards paid to Mrs. Ewing, she not having any right thereto, either legal or equitable. The bill also charges, that at the time the debt, upon which the judgment was obtained, was contracted, John and Geo. Dough-erty were doing a large business in a mercantile way, and had acquired much property, part of which 'consisted in lands and negroes, and a house and lot in Winchester; that before the judgment was obtained against them, they pretended to fail; and for the purpose of defrauding their creditors, and to defeat the collection of this claim, they fraudulently, and without consideration, assigned and transferred all the property they then owned to Elizabeth Ewing; that among the property thus transferred were twenty or thirty negroes, which now remain in the possession of John Dougherty and Elizabeth Ewing; that a house and lot in Winchester, worth four thousand dollars, was assigned in the same way, which has been disposed of by her; that at the time of their pretended failure, they had on hand a large amount of money, debts and notes, due to said firm, which were handed over to her, and which she has collected. It also states, that John Dougherty, about the time of theirpretended failure, deposited in the hands of said Elizabeth large sums of money, notes, and debts, due to the firm, to be by her kept, used, and disposed of, for the use and benefit of himself and children; that the said Elizabeth is the mother-in-law of the said John, and has resided in his house since the death of her husband, which was before the pretended failure; and that she was poor, and unable to acquire property by labor.
    That the said John and Elizabeth, now have in their possession a valuable gold watch, chain, seal, See. the separate property of George Dougherty, worth one hundred dollars, which is concealed, so that it cannot be reached by an execution.
    That John Dougherty continues to hire, receive the wages, and exercise complete control over said negroes, and applies the proceeds of their labor to bis own use.
    That out of the money, debts, and notes, placed in the hands of said Elizabeth, she has purchased and paid fora tract of land of about one hundred acres, adjoining Winchester, upon which they have erected handsome improvements, so as to enable the said John to enjoy the benefit of his property, and remain in the prison bounds: and prays, that the land and negroes may be sold to pay the debts; and that an account be taken, and for general relief.
    To this bill, the defendants filed separate answers and pleas, relying upon the statute of limitations of three years, as a bar. These pleas were set down for argument, and overruled.
    The complainants then obtained leave to file an amended bill, which charges, that the transfers of the property mentioned in the original bill, whether negroes, land, money, or debts, by the said John to the said Elizabeth, for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of the said John and George Dougherty, came to their knowledge within three years next before the filing of the original bill; that the defendants fraudulently concealed the same; and that the transaction with Blackman was only made known to them a few weeks before the bill was filed; and that out of the money and debts deposited by John Dougherty with Mrs. Ewing, she has purchased the tract *of land mentioned in the bill, and taken the title in her own name; that she has purchased several negroes and ■other property, with the means of said John, and had the 'title taken in her name, to defraud his creditors; that :there is an agreement existing between them, that she is to hold the title to his property, and is to devise the ■same, at her death, to such persons as Dougherty may direct, and to appoint him her executor, without security; that the property mentioned in the bill has remained in the possession of John Dougherty ever since the transfer, subject to his order and control; that he has hired out the negroes, and disposed of their hire to the use of himself and family, without the consent of Mrs. Ewing.
    The defendant Ewing obtained leave to amend her answer and plea, upon the affidavit of John Dougherty. The answer admits the existence of the judgment and execution, and the death of George Dougherty, as stated; but it expressly denies that a house and lot in Winchester, or any other real property in Winchester, was ever assigned to her by Dougherty.
    The partnership of John and George Dougherty is admitted, and that they failed in business, and were unable to pay their debts and liabilities.
    As to the watch, she denies all fraud and want of consideration; but in answer thereto states, that her husband, Colonel Ewing, now deceased, was the owner of a tract of land in Virginia; that George Dougherty sold this tract of land, received the price, and appropriated it to the use of the firm; that Colonel Ewing died in 1817, having made a will, which is proven and recorded, in which he appointed her his executrix and legatee. The answer further states, that'upon a settlement between her, as executrix, and Dougherty, on the 19th of June, 1819, in regard to the price of said land, the balance which then remained in the hands of the firm, due and unpaid, was $1,436 00, for which they gave their note to her, as executrix, which is filed, exhibit A, to her original answer and plea, which is unpaid, except as endorsed on the back. The answer also states, that on the 1st ^aJ’ °f June, 1830,' John Dougherty paid and delivered to her a gold watch, which had been in the possession of George Dougherty, in part payment of said note, which she credited on said note at one hundred and sixty dollars, being more than it was worth, and which was the property of the firm, and not of George Dougherty. That' said John and George were greatly indebted to the estate of Colonel Ewing, and said John had in his possession a number of negroes, which were of the assets of the estate; and that she lived with Dougherty, while her daughter lived; denies that she was destitute of property. and insists that she was entitled to the whole of Colonel Ewing’s estate. She states, that when the fact was known to her, or apprehended, that the firm was in failing circumstances, she demanded a settlement, and required a surrender to her of all the property of the estate of Colonel Ewing; and that John Dougherty did deliver to her, on a settlement, in the year 1819, as well the said property as several negroes of his own, and assigned a number of notes, debts, &c. as stated in the bill, which were not of value sufficient to pay the debt due her; and that John Dougherty is justly indebted to her to a large amount, over and above the full value of all said negroes and money received, in payment as above stated, which he is unable to pay.
    She positively denies, that she at any time received from said John the transfer of either negroes, notes, debts or money, or any other valuable thing, or any part or portion thereof, fraudulently, or for any intention or purpose of hindering or delaying complainants, or any other creditors of John and George Dougherty, from recovering their just debts, but in good faith. It is also, positively denied, that in receiving the property, any part of it was received in trust for the use of said John or his family, but for ner own use and disposal; and that said property has not remained m the possession of the said John, except that it may be considered in his possession from his living with her, and acting sometimes as her agent and friend in the management of her business, under her authority and directions. The answer further alleges, that after she obtained the possession of her property, she made arrangements for conducting her own business and keeping house, she rented the house herself, and paid the rent, until she, with her own means, purchased a small tract of land near Winchester, built a house thereon, where she now lives; and that the said John and his children have lived with her ; that she has done much for them and hopes to do more ; that she has had complete possession of all the property, money, &c., claiming it as her own, and believing it to be her own, for more than, three years before the bringing this suit, and that she is not in the possession, nor does she claim title to any land or real estate whatever, to which John and George Dougherty, or either of them, ever had or claimed title. She also pleads, and relies upon the statute of limitations of 1715 as a bar.
    The answer of the defendant, Ewing, to the exceptions of complainants taken to her answer, states, that not one dollar of the money, notes, or debts which were placed in her hands by Dougherty, was paid for the tract of land purchased by her; that she has appropriated the same in various ways, impossible for her at this time to tell, having kept no account of it; that Dougherty does not continue to receive and apply the proceeds of the labor of the negroes to his own use ; that he acts as her agent in the hiring of said negroes, under her authority and control.
    The answer to the amended bill, states, that the whole statement about complainants only coming to the knowledge of the various transfers and transactions therein referred 'to, within three years before the filing of the bill, must be untrue; that they lived in Winchester; the business was done openly, and without concealment; that Hayter was the deputy register, and registered the deeds, and denies that it has yet come to their knowledge that said transfers were made to defraud the creditors of Dougherty; and insists that all this matter in the amended bill is no sufficient exception to the act of lim--itations, and claims the benefit of that defence, as though, the bill had been demurred to. She also states, that, the Cunningham tract of land was sold at sheriff’s sale, and purchased by her for upwards of one thousand dollars; that Miller and Woods agreed, and did take notes of her, in satisfaction of her bid; that the land on which she now lives was purchased entirely with the proceeds of the land sold to Cunningham, except three hundred and sixty dollars; that these tracts of land were paid for entirely out of her own means, and not one cent of any thing belonging to Dougherty was in either of said payments.
    She expressly denies, that there is any agreement or understanding between her and Dougherty that she will hold her title to said property in trust for his use, and to devise the same at her death, as he may desire, or to appoint him executor without security. The original and amended bill, as against Dougherty, were taken for confessed.
    Martin Beatty proves, that in June, 1 SI 9, he was ealled on to make a settlement between Mrs. Ewing and Major Dougherty, and that on the 19ih day of June, 1819, he did make a settlement, contained in exhibit A in his deposition.
    In this account Dougherty is charged for the hire of seven negro men from the 1st of March, 1816, to the 1st of March, 1819, at one hundred dollars per year. 1,100
    Also, for the hire of three negro women for the same time, sixty dollars each, 540
    Also, for the hire of two girls for the same time, at twelve dollars each, 72
    Also, for the hire of George, a boy, for the same time, - 30
    Also, for the hire of four horses, for the same time - 144
    $2,886
    He is then credited with the following negroes :
    Dilce, at the sum of $800
    Jim, ~ • - 700
    Charlotte, - 300
    Joice, - - 300
    Juda, a boy, - - 350
    Bob, a boy, - 200
    George, a boy, - - 150
    - 2,800
    $86
    On the same day, Dougherty executed his note to Mrs. Ewing for eight hundred and sixty dollars, for the hire of eleven negroes, from the 1st of March, 1819, to ihe 1st of March, 1820.
    Five of these negroes, to wit: Jim, Charlotte, Juda, a boy, Bob, a boy, and George, a boy, belonged to Dougherty, up to that day; and this note is the consideration for the conveyance of all Dougherty’s household property and corn and bacon at the farm.
    This bill of sale was executed oh the 14th of February, 1820, before the note fell due.
    On the 15th day of February, 1820, Dougherty conveyed to her his equity to the Patterson tract of land. and also thirty two,and a half acres adjoining, for the consideration of eighteen hundred dollars, due to her for the land sold by him in Virginia, and thirteen hundred anc^ ninety-seven dollars due to Thurman.
    William Thurman was Dougherty’s overseer for the years 1818 and 1819, and had under his control the following negroes, to wit, York, Loudon, Henny, (a woman) Cffisar, Adac, Jacob, Harry, Jim, Charlotte, George, Bob, Little Jim, Charity, and Juda, and a small boy, who did not work. Loudon belonged to Dough-erty, and he owned horses, cattle, hogs, and farming utensils sufficient to carry on the farm.
    Thomas Cunningham proves that he purchased the Patterson tract of land from Mrs. Ewing, for thirty-five hundred and seventy-five dollars, containing five hundred and sixty-two acres.
    Mark Hutchins proves that he rented the store of Major Dougherty, the 1st of January, 1820, and paid rent for it to Mrs. Ewing, at two hundred dollars a year, for four years, and left it in April, 1825. That he boarded with Mrs. Ewing three years, and his clerk four, at two dollars and fifty cents per week.
    That Major Dougherty controlled the servants, and the house, in the name of Mrs. Ewing; that the accounts were kept with her, and she paid for the goods that Dougherty got for himself and children, and for a horse which Dougherty took and paid his debt with.
    Thomas Wilson proves, that he rented the store, at two hundred dollars a year, and kept it for two years and nine months; he also proves the payment of the debt due from Blackman.
    William Woods proves, that Mrs. Ewing paid rent for the white house for three years, at the rate of four hundred and fifty dollars a year.
    Richard B. Moore proves, that he has hired * negroes from Major Dougherty for several years.
    James Campbell proves, that Major Dougherty paid Patterson about one thousand dollars towards the tract of land before it was sold under Patterson’s judgment.
    Alexander Young proves, that he was present when the personal property, conveyed by the bill of sale of the 14th -of February, 1820, was delivered; that this property was sold in Green county, Alabama.
    James Lewis proves, that Dougherty owed him about fifty dollars, which he paid in an execution in their favor, to the use of Elizabeth Ewing; that they had a judgment against James Lewis, of two hundred and forty dollars, which he paid,to Mrs. Ewing.
    Thomas Faris proves, the transfer of his interest in the judgment at law to Hayter.
    James Taylor proves, that Dougherty mortgaged one of •the negroes in Alabama for five hundred dollars.
    The evidence, generally, tended to establish that the transfer of all this property, notes, debts and money was done in fraud, for the purpose of hindering and delaying the creditors of John and George Dougherty from the -collection of their debts and demands, and to secure it for the use and benefit of Major Dougherty and family.
    
      H. L. Turney and Goodwin, for complainants.
    The complainants consider the fraud in this case completely established by the proof; and it is therefore insisted, that the statute of limitations will not run in favor of afraud. . So abhorrent is the consideration of all fraudulent acts to the law, that an estate, which is acquired by fraud, is said to be no estate in the judgment of the law. An estate thus acquired forfeits the protection of every statute which gives confirmation to doubtful titles; and while a disseisor has the benefit of the statute of fines and limitations in support of a wrongful title, a title acquired by fraud is indefinitely open to be disputed. Roberts on Frauds, 521.
    No length of possession, under a fraudulent conveyance, will be a bar to the creditors of the grantor, and -SUch deed is void as to subsequent, as well as prior, cre'd- . . ^ , Í,, • 1 itors. 4 Day, 284; 5 Day, 341, in note.
    The statute will run in favor of fraudulent convey-anees only from the time of the discovery of the fraud. 3 Des. 23S; 7 John. Ch. Rep. 122; 2 Des. 216; 2 Term Rep. 587; 1 Mad. 205; 2 Yes. 280; 1 Ves. Jr. 160, 328.
    If a deed has no lawful existence, it must be absurd to recognise it for any purpose. No right can be deduced from a case of actual fraud, 4 John. Rep. 598, 599;. 9 Wheat. 541; Peck Rep. 234.
    If a person be prevented by fraud from doing an act', it will be considered, in equity, as if that act had been done. 1 J. and W. 94; R. and T. 786, 80;, 3 Atk- 383; 2 Fon. 38, (note Z.) 1 Yes. 296. Possession, to give title, must be adversary; 9 Wheat. 241, 288.
    A judgment, and execution returned no property found, creates a lien on the real and personal estate of the debt- or. 4 John. Ch. Rep. 676.
    Statutes of limitations relate to the remedies that are furnished for the recovery of rights. They only establish, that certain circumstances shall amount to evidence that a contract has been performed, but do not dispense with its performance. Courts of equity are not bound by its provisions; and when they adopt it, it is only as presumptive evidence. 2 Ves. 280: 3 Yerg. Rep. Hammons vs. Hopkins.
    Courts of law have no dispensing power, from any cause whatever. They are expressly bound by it; it relates to specified actions; and it declares that such actions shall be commenced and sued within three years next after the cause of action accrued, and not after; thus not only affirmatively declaring within what time they must be brought, but inhibiting their being brought after that time.
    In cases, therefore, where fraud is imputed and proved, no length of time ought, upon the principles of justice' and honesty, to be admitted to repel relief. It would seem that the length of time during which the fraud had been successfully concealed and practised, is rather an aggravation of the offence, and calls more loudly upon a court of equity to grant ample and decisive relief.
    
      Rucks and Isaacs for defendants.
   Cateon, Ch. J.

To give any account of the receipt of notes, money, &c. Mrs. Ewing pleads the statute of limitations. The principal question is, does it apply in cases where the possession has been acquired by fraud? This is the well settled rule at law. Cocke and Jack vs. M’Ginnis, Martin and Yerger, 361: Porter’s lessee vs. Cocke, Peck, 41. Generally, not to say in all cases, where the legal right has been barred by the legislature, and the remedy in the courts of law cut off, the equitable right and remedy in the courts of chancery to the same thing have been hcilden to be concluded by the same bar. And although the act of limitations applies by its terms only to suits at law, and has been applied in a court of equity by analogy, yet this court proceeds upon principles as fixed and certain as the «courts of law do; and of these settled principles one is, that the act of limitations is a good plea, where, if the suit had been at law, the plea would be good, except in cases of a fraudulent concealment of the cause of action. Peck, 43, 46: 3 Yerger’s Rep. 232: 17 Vesey, 96: 7 John. Ch. Rep. 122: 1 Maddox, 205.

The object here is to aid an execution at law; to give effect to a legal writ and legal right, because of the concurrent jurisdiction in equity; to relieve against the fraudulent conveyance tending to hinder the creditor of the grantor. There being no express trust by contract between Dougherty and Mrs. Ewing, time would bar Dougherty. The complainants come in asserting Dougherty’s right to the property, treating (as they have a .right to do) the fraudulent conveyance as merely void. Had he the same right, (which the statute prohibits to him) would he be barred by the adverse possession for three years? As to the slaves, this court held in Kegler vs. Miles, (Martin and Yerger, 426) that three years adverse possession conferred a good title, on which the possessor for three years might recover from the former owner. As to these, Dougherty’s right of property was gone when the bill was filed, and the complainants are equally barred.

The other personal property possessed by Mrs. Ewing for more than three years before suit brought, it is insisted is yet the property of Dougherty. Mrs. Ewing’s possession barred any remedy he had, the complainants come in to enforce his remedy, and must abide by his title to recover, and are equally barred. There is no fair distinction between the case of lien by execution, and a lien by an implied trust, otherwise arising. The cause of Campbell and Armstrong (3 Yerger’s Reports, 232) furnishes a fair instance. Campbell held possession of land warrants by express trust; as to him, Armstrong’s heirs were not barred. His possession was deemed consistent with their right. But Trimble claimed by purchase from Campbell; the court declared him to be a. trustee by implication, and would have protected his title by the statute of limitation had he retained it. So here, the-judgment formed a lien on the personal property of Dough-erty, and he held possession in the nature of an express trustee for the creditors! But Mrs. Ewing was no party to the judgment; she is pursued, and her legal tille (prima facie valid) is challenged, on the ground that she paid no consideration, and aided in the fraud, and therefore she holds as a trustee by implication, for those having aright to stand in Dougherty’s stead. Her title is just as capable of being protected as was that of Cocke, in the cause of Porter vs. Cocke. His deed was voluntary and void as to creditors, yet adverse possession protected the title. In Jack and Cocke vs. M’Ginnis, an express trustee, holding by parol contract, and sued at law, was protected on the best settled principles. That Mrs. Ewing is entitled to avail herself of the statute, from the nature of the title by which she claims to hold, is clear; but the difficulty is, when does the act of limitations commence its operation in her favor, as against the complainants. If from the time when the judgment was obtained, as is insisted, society would have no repose under such circumstances. To hold thus, and then apply the principle asserted in Reed vs. Norton, (3 Haywood) that a vendee from a fraudulent vendee took no title, which, as to the creditors of the fraudulent vendor, rested with him, the evil consequences would be very great. There is no principle upon which to rest the bar other than the one stated, that the creditors must take .the title as it stands between the fraudulent vendor and vendee, at the time he files his bill or levies his execution.’ If time has confirmed the title to lands or slaves, or barred the remedy to recover other goods, it is in accordance with the established policy of the country, that the general repose of society is preferred to the few chance cases of hardship which the general rule inflicts. Here Dougherty kept the complainants in litigation for more than three years, and Mrs. Ewing, the fraudulent vendee, might have profited by it. But had her title been fair, she might have been unable to prove it after the lapse of time, for it was over eleven years after she took her title and possession before she was sued; and sub-purchasers from her would still more need the protection of the statute. In truth, the time to form the bar is too short for our advanced state of society. In countries where the time to form the bar is five or six years, cases of hardship can rarely occur. But the remedy of the evil, if evil there be, is with the legislature, not the courts; we are bound to apply the law as we find it, without repealing it, in effect, by making exceptions. This the court declared it had no power to do in Cocke and Jack vs. M’Ginnis, and a stronger temptation to judicial legislation can hardly present itself. We adjudge the plea of the statute of limitations to the original bill to have been a good defence, save as to the watches first possessed by Mr. Ewing shortly before this bill was filed.

An amendment alleges the concealment of the fraud until within three years next before the filing of the bill. This is denied by the answer, and not proved on the part of complainants, or any facts from which it may be inferred. The transactions were all open and subject to be known.

In June, 1819, Martin Beaty made a settlement between the Doughertys and Mrs. Ewing. They fell one thousand and thirty-six dollars in her debt, and executed their note for this sum. In 1830, there is a credit endorsed on this note for two watches, the one left by Geo. Dough-erty at his death, at one hundred and sixty dollars, and John’s, at two hundred and twenty-five dollars. The complainants call on the defendant, Mrs. Ewing, to disclose the property of John and George Dougherty, which they allege she fraudulently conceals. They charge that Mrs. Ewing had placed in her hands a large amount of money, notes and effects of the firm, for the purpose of covering the same from the creditors. She admits she had assigned to her a large number of notes and debts, &c. as stated in the complainants’ bill, all of which were not of sufficient value to pay and satisfy the bona fide claims which she, as executrix of her husband, had against the said John and George Dougherty. Mrs. Ewing held two notes, as executrix of Nathaniel Ewing, one for one thousand and thirty-six dollars, and another for eight hundred and sixty dollars. The latter was discharged by the household furniture, and which did not cover it. For the one thousand and thirty-six dollars, a mortgage was given on the Patterson tract of land. Her lien purports to have been for eighteen hundred dollars, but forthe amount over the note it was colorable. Thevendor of the land to the Doughertys had a prior lien by judgment for part of the purchase money, and Mrs. Ewing bought it in at execution sale for about one thousand dol- ° . . lavs, to give effect to her lien. She afterwards sold it for some thirty-six hundred dollars. That by this means and others this note was extinguished is manifest. The evidence is Found in the bill and answer. - The bill alleges, that John and George Dougherty, as merchants, had acquired much property, and were doing a large business; that they pretended to fail; and to defeat their creditors, and that without consideration, said John assigned and transferred all the property that they then owned, that could be reached by execution, to said Elizabeth Ewing. Amongst the property thus transferred were twenty or thirty ne-groes, &c. That at the time he pretended to fail, he had on hand a large amount of money, debts and notes due the firm, which were also handed over to the said Elizabeth, and which she has long since collected, &c. That Mrs. Ewing received the notes and debts she admits, but pleads the act of limitations to the discovery of the amount. We will take it there was abundance to extinguish the note for one thousand and thirty-six dollars, this being the only debt due her from the Doughertys, as executrix of Nathaniel Ewing. The defendant, Mrs. Ewing, has then in her possession two gold watches, which she received without consideration, and which are subject to the satisfaction of the judgment of the complainants.

It will be well not to overlook several objections made in argument. The first is on part of the defendants, that Thomas Faris, one of the joint judgment creditors and plaintiff at law, is not before the court, but his assignee, Hayter, who as assignee, has no right to enforce the execution at law by bill. The assignment to Hayter is proved by the assignor; no objection was made below for want of parties, by demurrer or otherwise, and we think it is not proper now to dismiss the bill on this ground.

The complainants object, that the possession of the property by Mrs. Ewing has not been adverse to Dough-erty, that they lived in the same house and jointly exercised ownership over it, and Mrs. Ewing’s name was merely used as a cover. The proof of adverse possession by Mrs. Ewing is satisfactory.

The decree will be reversed and the watches ordered to be sold.

Peck, J.

The question of the statute of limitations, as presented in this case and before this court, is not void of difficulty. Taking it for true, that the bar by limitations may be avoided by showing concealment of the fact of fraud in the transfer of the property, and that proof of the concealment must come from him making the averment, still enough has been shown by the complainant to insist that he shall not be barred.

In such a case, full and conclusive proof of the concealment is not to be expected: at most, prima facie evidence is all that should be required. That evidence is before us in the return on the execution. It was the duty of the sheriff to find property, and here, in a case whe're so recently Dougherty held property more than sufficient to satisfy the demand, owing to a concealment by color of right in another, he, by the concealment, has no alternative but to return nulla bona; the sheriff is not compelled to run the hazard of a trespass by seizure of the property, nor is the plaintiff bound to give a bond of indemnity. When, therefore, the sheriff returns the fact of nothing found, we look to that return, in connection with the other facts of fraud proved in the case, and the mind, by the return' itself, is brought to the conclusion that such a return, by an officer on oath, could not have been made if the concealment had not existed. It is the very best evidence of the concealment where the fraud is proved; because, but for that concealment the execution, which is called the life of the láw, would, in the hands of him acting on oath, have been effectual.

Thus, I conclude, by the return of the execution we , . , - _ . . are put upon the enquiry as to the iraud, and it it is proved to exist, then the bar by the statute of limitations is out of the way. If this be not so, then are creditors helpless, and the whole of our laws made to prevent frauds lifeless. The enquiry in this case, in my opinion, should be conducted further than to the watches only.  