
    Samuel M. Papot vs. Thomas Trowell.
    An infant beyond seas is entitled to but four years after coming of age within •which to commence an action of trover.
    BEEOBE WAEDLAW, J., AT OHABLESTON, SPRING TERM, 1854.
    The report of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows:
    
      “ Trover for certain slaves.
    “ The defendant, besides the general issue, pleaded actio non acerevit infra quatuor annos.
    
    
      “ The plaintiff replied preoludi non, because he saith ‘ that the said slaves in the said declaration mentioned being the property of the said plaintiff, were converted by the said defendant, on the day of , in' the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight, at which time the said plaintiff was an infant under the age of twenty-one years, that he arrived at the age of twenty-one years in the month of May? A. D. 1847; and that during all the time he was so under age, and at the time he arrived at the age of twenty-one years, he, the said plaintiff, was in parts beyond the seas, to witin Savannah, in the State of Georgia, where he now resides and has always resided, and hath never, to this time, been domiciled in the State of South Carolina, or elsewhere than in the State of Georgia. And that the said plaintiff commenced his suit within five years after the coming of age of the said plaintiff, to wit: on the 16th day of June, A. D. 1851, and this the said defendant is ready to verify, wherefore he prays judgment,’ &c.
    “ To this replication the defendant filed a general demurrer; and after argument, I sustained the demurrer, holding that the plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations.”
    
      Tbe plaintifí' appealed on t]ie ground,
    That he was entitled to five years within which to commence suit, after attaining the age of twenty-one years.
    
      Martin, for appellant.
    Northrop, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Wakdlaw, J.

The replication shows that this action was neither brought within five years from the time the cause of action accrued, nor within four years from the time the plaintiff came of age. The Act of 1712, (2 Stat. 586,) in its sixth section, provides general regulations for the limitation of personal actions, which are applicable to all persons,'and then, in the tenth section, enlarges the time of limitation, by special exceptions, in behalf of persons in peculiar conditions. According to this scheme, every action of trover is unbarred for four years from the time the cause of action accrued. Where the plaintiff is beyond seas, feme covert, or imprisoned, five years from the cause of action accrued are given; and an infant, who in no case is barred in less time than would bar an adult, is allowed, notwithstanding more than four years from the cause of action accrued would thus be given, to bring action within two years from coming of age, or if beyond seas, within three years. By the Act of 1788, (5 Stat. 77,) the time from his coming of age for an infant to bring a personal action is extended to four years, without distinction between the cases of his being within the State and being out of it. It follows that an infant beyond seas may avail himself of either of the provisions made for the two disabilities to which he is subject. He may have five years from the accrual of his cause of action, or four years from his coming of age, which ever may be most advantageous to him; but there is no exception to the general Act of limitations, which, after the expiration of five years from the cause of action accrued, adds to the four years given by the Act of 1788, another year, because the plaintiff, who was an infant when his cause of action accrued, was then and always afterwards out of the State.

The motion is dismissed.

O’Neall, Withers, Whitner, G-rover, and Munro, JJ., concurred.

Motion dismissed*  