
    Seth Miller versus John Adams.
    In an action against the sheriff for an insufficient return upon an original writ, by reason of whicli the judgment rendered in that suit for the plaintiff was reversed, it was holden that the statute of limitations began to run from the time of the said return, and not from the reversal of the judgment
    Case against the defendant, a deputy of the sheriff of Plymouth, for misfeasance in not duly serving and returning an original writ against Thatcher &f Al. The present action was commenced the 30th of October, 1819. The misfeasance complained of was, that the defendant, in returning the said writ, certified an attachment of certain real estate, and a summons to one as trustee, but made no return of any summons to the principal defendants. The return was dated February 6th, 1808. Judgment was rendered in that suit for the plaintiff in December, 1808; and execution was levied on real estate of Thatcher &f Al. In 1814, the judgment was reversed by writ of error, for the above defect in the service. [Vide ante, vol. xi. page 413.] ‘
    
      The defendant pleaded the general issue, and the statute of limitations, on which issue was also joined.
    With a view to ascertain the plaintiff’s damages, the jury were instructed by Putnam, J., before whom the trial was had, that the statute of limitations was not a bar. But if the Court should think otherwise, the verdict for the plaintiff was to be set aside, and he was to become nonsuit.
    
      Beal, for the defendant,
    contended that the statute of limitations was a good bar to the action. The plaintiff knew, or might have known, of this mistake of the officer, when the writ was returned. The cause of action arose, and the six years comménced, at that time. The reversal of the judgment, in 1814, did not furnish the cause of action .
    [ *457 ]
    * Wood, for the plaintiff.
    The limitation of six years commences at the time the injury is sustained, which, in the present case, was the reversal of the plaintiff’s judgment in 1814. Thus, in an action against a sheriff, for the default of his deputy in taking insufficient bail, the limitation commences from the return of non est inventus upon the execution against the principal .
    
      
       1 Mod. 254. -2 Mod. 25. -2 Show. 79. —1 Sid. 305, 95. —Sir T. Raym. 61. —-3 Johns. 516. —2 H. Black. 14.
    
    
      
       12 Mass. Rep. 127.
    
   Per Curiam.

The question in this case is, at what time the plaintiff’s right of action accrued to him. And we are all of opinion that it accrued when the return of the writ was made into the clerk’s office. The plaintiff should then have seen the defect in the return, and procured its amendment, if a sufficient service had been made. If not, he should have pursued his remedy against the officer at that time ; or, at the furthest, after extending his execution ; for, the judgment being then liable to reversal, he might immediately have brought his action against the officer, and would have been entitled to his damages.

This differs from the case cited of insufficient bail taken by the sheriff. In that- case there was a good return, and the debtor might have appeared, or have been surrendered, notwithstanding the insufficiency of the bail. It was in that case, only upon the return of non est inventus, that a right of action accrued. The (verdict is set aside, and the plaintiff must be called .

Plaintiff nonsuit. 
      
      
        [Howell vs. Young, 8 D. & R 14. —5 B. & C. 259. -2 C. & P. 238. —Short vs McCarthy, 3 B. & A. 626. —Ed.]
     