
    [721 NE2d 971, 699 NYS2d 721]
    Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc., Appellant, v Town of Mamaroneck et al., Respondents.
    Argued October 19, 1999;
    decided November 23, 1999
    
      POINTS OF COUNSEL
    
      Shamberg Marwell Hocherman Davis & Hollis, P. C., Mount Kisco (Stuart R. Shamberg, Adam L. Wekstein and Geraldine 
      
      N. Tortorella of counsel), for appellant.
    I. The court below erroneously found the challenged rezoning to be constitutional when it unconstitutionally takes plaintiffs property without just compensation. (Nollan v California Coastal Commn., 483 US 825; Seawall Assocs. v City of New York, 74 NY2d 92, cert denied sub nom. Wilkerson v Seawall Assocs., 493 US 976; Manocherian v Lenox Hill Hosp., 84 NY2d 385, 514 US 1109; Vernon Park Realty v City of Mount Vernon, 307 NY 493; Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255; Rent Stabilization Assn. v Higgins, 83 NY2d 156, 512 US 1213; Matter of Gazza v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 89 NY2d 603; Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374; Matter of Eckart, 39 NY2d 493; City of Buffalo v Cargill, Inc., 44 NY2d 7.) II. The challenged rezoning violates plaintiffs constitutional right to due process of law. (French Investing Co. v City of New York, 39 NY2d 587; McMinn v Town of Oyster Bay, 66 NY2d 544.) III. Plaintiff is entitled to damages as a result of defendants’ constitutional violations and an award of attorneys’ fees under Federal Civil Rights Law. (First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v County of Los Angeles, 482 US 304; Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424; Matter of Johnson v Blum, 58 NY2d 454; Matter of Rahmey v Blum, 95 AD2d 294; Continental Bldg. Co. v Town of N. Salem, 150 Misc 2d 145, 211 AD2d 88, 86 NY2d 818; Town of Orangetown v Magee, 215 AD2d 469, 86 NY2d 778, 218 AD2d 733, 88 NY2d 41.) IV. Local Law No. 6 violates Town Law §§ 261 and 263 and, therefore, must be invalidated. (Matter of Kamhi v Planning Bd., 59 NY2d 385; Reuschenberg v Town of Huntington, 143 AD2d 265; Northeastern Envtl. Developers v Town of Colonie, 72 AD2d 881; Vernon Park Realty v City of Mount Vernon, 307 NY 493.)
    
      Robinson Silverman Pearce Aronsohn & Berman, L. L. P., New York City (Robert S. Davis, James M. Altman and Judith M. Gallent of counsel), for respondents.
    I. Local Law No. 6 does not effect a taking of plaintiffs property because it substantially advances legitimate Town interests. (Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255; Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470; Concrete Pipe & Prods. v Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 US 602; Hawaii Hous. Auth. v Midkiff, 467 US 229; Berman v Parker, 348 US 26; Town of Riverhead v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 193 AD2d 667; Elias v Town of Brookhaven, 783 F Supp 758; Matter of Whitman v Aman, 91 AD2d 719; Curtiss-Wright Corp. v Town of E. Hampton, 82 AD2d 551.) II. Heightened scrutiny is inapplicable in determining whether Local Law No. 6 effects a taking of plaintiffs property and, in any event, Local Law No. 6 survives such scrutiny. (Nollan v California Coastal Commn., 483 US 825; Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374; Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365; Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255; Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668; Manocherian v Lenox Hill Hosp., 84 NY2d 385; Rent Stabilization Assn. v Higgins, 83 NY2d 156; Seawall Assocs. v City of New York, 74 NY2d 92, cert denied sub nom. Wilkerson v City of New York, 493 US 976; Federal Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 87 NY2d 325; Matter of Whitman v Aman, 91 AD2d 719.) III. The lower courts correctly held that plaintiff misconstrues Vernon Park Realty. (Vernon Park Realty v City of Mount Vernon, 282 App Div 890, 307 NY 493; Spears v Berle, 48 NY2d 254; Chusud Realty Corp. v Village of Kensington, 22 AD2d 895; Northern Westchester Professional Park Assocs. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492; Matter of Ward v Bennett, 214 AD2d 741; Thomas v Town of Bedford, 29 Misc 2d 861, 15 AD2d 573, 11 NY2d 428; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v New York City, 438 US 104; Dauernheim, Inc. v Town Bd., 33 NY2d 468.) IV. The lower courts properly held that Local Law No. 6 does not violate plaintiffs right to due process. (Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365; McMinn v Town of Oyster Bay, 66 NY2d 544; Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449; Rivervale Realty Co. v Town of Orangetown, 816 F Supp 937.) V. Plaintiffs requests for damages and attorneys’ fees are premature. (Farrar v Hobby, 506 US 103; Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v State of New York, 22 NY2d 75.) VI. The lower courts correctly held that Local Law No. 6 is a proper exercise of the Town Board’s zoning authority pursuant to Town Law §§ 261 and 263. (Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449; Rivervale Realty Co. v Town of Orangetown, 816 F Supp 937.)
    
      Community Rights Counsel (Douglas T. Kendall and Timothy J. Dowling, of the District of Columbia Bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), and Bachner Tally & Polevoy, L. L. P., New York City (Norman Marcus of counsel), for American Planning Association, amicus curiae.
    
    I. The causal nexus scrutiny of Nollan, Seawall and Manocherian does not apply to this case. (Nollan v California Coastal Commn., 483 US 825; Commercial Bldrs. v City of Sacramento, 941 F2d 872, 504 US 931; Yee v City of Escondido, 503 US 519; Garneau v City of Seattle, 147 F3d 802; Manocherian v Lenox Hill Hosp., 84 NY2d 385; Texas Manufactured Hous. Assn. v City of Nederland, 101 F3d 1095, 521 US 1112; Clajon Prod. Corp. v Petera, 70 F3d 1566; Harris v City of Wichita, 862 F Supp 287, 74 F3d 1249; Del Monte Dunes at Monterey v City of Monterey, 95 F3d 1422; Seawall Assocs. v City of New York, 74 NY2d 92.) II. The reasonableness of zoning should be evaluated under the Due Process Clause, not the Takings Clause. (Eastern Enters. v Apfel, 524 US 498; Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255; Unity Real Estate Co. v Hudson, 178 F3d 649; Manocherian v Lenox Hill Hosp., 84 NY2d 385; Town of Orangetown v Magee, 88 NY2d 41; Nectow v City of Cambridge, 277 US 183; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v County of Los Angeles, 482 US 304; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US 393; Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419; Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172.) III. The zoning ordinance at issue easily survives review under the Due Process Clause. (Williamson v Lee Opt. Co., 348 US 483; United States v Carolene Prods. Co., 304 US 144; Schad v Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 US 61; Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365.) IV. This Court should decline plaintiff’s invitation to recast Seawall and Manocherian as interpretations of the New York Constitution. (Seawall Assocs. v City of New York, 74 NY2d 92; Manocherian v Lenox Hill Hosp., 84 NY2d 385; Lochner v New York, 198 US 45; Eastern Enters. v Apfel, 524 US 498.)
    
      Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City (Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Alexandra S. Wald and Kimberly M. Duckett of counsel), for Natural Resources Defense Council and others, amici curiae.
    
    I. Open space is of such fundamental importance, and unique character, that legislative bodies must be afforded significant latitude and deference in zoning to preserve open space within local communities. (Turner Broadcasting Sys. v Federal Communications Commn., 520 US 180.) II. No taking has occurred in this case, under any test, and therefore this Court should reject any such claim. (Goldblatt v Town of Hemp-stead, 369 US 590; de St. Aubin v Flacke, 68 NY2d 66; Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365; Thomas v Town of Bedford, 11 NY2d 428; Town of Islip v Summers Coal & Lbr. Co., 257 NY 167; United States v Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 US 121; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v New York City, 438 US 104; Armstrong v United States, 364 US 40; Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003; Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419.) III. This Court should clarify the standard of review applicable to the relationship between legislative ends and means, and should' unequivocally state that due process, rational basis review is the correct standard for zoning and other general land-use regulation. (McCray v New York, 461 US 961; McMinn v Town of Oyster Bay, 66 NY2d 544; French Investing Co. v City of New York, 39 NY2d 587; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US 393; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003; Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v County of Los Angeles, 482 US 304; Nectow v City of Cambridge, 277 US 183; Schad v Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 US 61; Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419.)
    
      Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Albany (Preeta D. Bansal, Peter H. Schiff, Denise A. Hartman, Peter H. Lehner, Lisa M. Burianek and John J. Sipos of counsel), for State of New York, amicus curiae.
    
    I. The Court should continue to exercise deference to State and local authorities when reviewing traditional land-use regulations that do not result in physical exactions or dedications of property. (Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374; Nollan v California Coastal Commn., 483 US 825; Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255; Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365; Nectow v City of Cambridge, 277 US 183; Manocherian v Lenox Hill Hosp., 84 NY2d 385, 514 US 1109; Seawall Assocs. v City of New York, 74 NY2d 92, cert denied sub nom. Wilkerson v Seawall Assocs., 493 US 976; Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419; Kaiser Aetna v United States, 444 US 164; New Port Largo v Monroe County, 95 F3d 1084, 521 US 1121.) II. The Mamaroneck ordinance must be sustained because its requirements are rationally related to and substantially advance legitimate governmental interests. (Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365; Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v New York City, 438 US 104; Wambat Realty Corp. v State of New York, 41 NY2d 490; Concrete Pipe & Prods. v Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 US 602.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Levine, J.

Plaintiff owns a 150-acre tract of land in the Town of Mamaroneck which, since 1921, has been used as a private golf course. This appeal addresses whether the change in zoning of plaintiff’s property in 1994, from residential to solely recreational use, constituted a regulatory taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Resolution of this question requires us to ascertain the appropriate standard to be applied in reviewing the sufficiency of the relationship between the Town’s interests and the rezoning determination on this purely regulatory taking claim.

The Bonnie Briar Country Club has leased the land from plaintiff since 1921. The following year, the area in which the Club is located for the first time became subject to a zoning ordinance. The land was zoned for residential use, permitting single family detached homes on lots of at least 15,000 and, in some areas, 30,000 square feet. The area surrounding Bonnie Briar was similarly zoned, and over the years has been developed in accordance with those zoning restrictions.

In the 1960’s, the Town of Mamaroneck began to focus on its diminishing open spaces and in 1966 developed a “Master Plan” in order to address the issue in a comprehensive manner. This Master Plan recommended that Bonnie Briar remain a golf course. A Master Plan “Update” in 1976 recommended that another neighboring golf course — the Winged Foot — also affected by the rezoning in Local Laws, 1994, No. 6 of the Town of Mamaroneck, remain a golf course. In 1985, the two golf course properties were included in a land-use study, “Westchester 2000.” That study also recommended the retention of the golf course properties as recreational areas and open spaces, concluding that development of these properties would increase the risk of flooding from the Sheldrake River. A portion of plaintiff’s property is within the flood plain of the Sheldrake River. In its current non-developed state, the land helps control flooding by acting as a natural detention basin for rising river waters due to storms.

In 1986, the Towns of Mamaroneck and Larchmont together adopted a “Local Waterfront Revitalization Program” (LWRP) for a comprehensive examination of land-use policies. The LWRP was primarily concerned with, and sought effectively to protect against, the flooding potential in both the flood plain and coastal areas. The LWRP identified flood damage to the Town’s wetlands, fish and other wildlife habitats and streams, cautioning the Town to prepare itself for further adverse effects that would result from future changes in land use.

The LWRP found that the Town golf clubs were “appropriate uses which, in addition to their ecological, recreational, architectural and scenic value, provide open space and natural water retention. They should remain in their present use if possible.”

In 1988 the Town retained Shuster Associates, a private planning firm, to assist in formulating its comprehensive plan to address and best implement the goals stated in the LWRP. Shuster examined a number of varying development options and issued a report and addendum considering three alternative development schemes. These development schemes did contemplate some residential development, not unlike that subsequently proposed by plaintiff.

Because rezoning these golf course properties required a review pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), on May 30,1990, defendant Town Board declared its intention to serve as lead agency for the purpose of conducting the SEQRA review and retained yet another planning firm to assist in the review process. After preparation of a Generic Environmental Impact Statement in 1991, the Board issued a Findings Statement in completion of its SEQRA review in 1994. The Findings Statement described in great detail how the various proposed development and rezoning schemes would impact this environmentally sensitive area.

Specifically, the Findings Statement noted that the area was facing “long-term pressure toward continuing urbanization in an already over-developed landscape,” noting that “less than 5% of the Westchester County watershed of the Long Island Sound remains open space.” In response to these concerns over dwindling existing open spaces and to ensure their retention, the Board determined that zoning the Winged Foot and Bonnie Briar club properties solely for recreational uses was the best alternative.

In addition, the Findings Statement explained that further residential development would frustrate the Town’s goal of preserving recreational opportunities for Town and area residents, noting that 70% of Bonnie Briar’s membership resided within a five-mile radius of the property.

Finally, in connection with concerns over flooding, the SE-QRA Findings Statement noted that, without even considering further development beyond the Town’s control, residential development within the Town could increase the flooding already experienced by many area homeowners. Furthermore, the Board was not adequately persuaded that proposed measures to mitigate the increased flooding associated with residential development would be effective.

Based upon all of the foregoing considerations, the Findings Statement concluded that the “Recreation Zone best achieves the objectives of the Town, State, regional and federal policies that have guided the Town’s comprehensive planning process for almost three decades.” The Town Board rezoned accordingly, enacting Local Law No. 6.

Just months prior to the passage of that law, plaintiff retained its own planning firm and submitted a Preliminary Subdivision Plan for the golf club property to the Town Board. This plan provided for the construction of 71 residential lots, leaving approximately 112 acres of standing open space on the existing 18-hole golf course site. Upon receipt of this plan submitted by plaintiff, the Town Board requested certain revisions with which the plaintiff complied. The final plan submitted by plaintiff comported with the various possible development schemes recommended to the Board by the Shuster planning firm. In the end, however, as previously discussed, the Board chose to implement a rezoning of the property for exclusively recreational use to achieve its stated goals and interests of (1) preserving open space, (2) providing recreational opportunities for Town and other area residents and (3) mitigating flooding of both coastal and flood plain areas.

Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action, the main thrust of which was that Local Law No. 6 effected an unconstitutional taking of its property without just compensation. Plaintiff averred that Local Law No. 6 was not sufficiently related to the three stated purposes and that the application of the zoning ordinance deprived them of all economically viable uses of their land. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on a number of its various causes of action; defendant opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the same claims.

Supreme Court granted defendant partial summary judgment, dismissing plaintiff’s cause of action in which it alleged that there was an insufficiently close relationship between the Town’s goals and its zoning ordinance. That holding was affirmed by the Appellate Division (242 AD2d 356). Subsequently, defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining causes of action concerning the alleged economic taking of plaintiff’s property brought about by the enactment of Local Law No. 6. This motion was denied by Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reversed, granting defendant’s motion and remitting to Supreme Court for the entry of judgment declaring the law constitutional as applied in this case (256 AD2d 293). This appeal is before us as of right (CPLR 5601 [b] [1]). We now affirm.

DISCUSSION

In Agins v City of Tiburon (447 US 255), the United States Supreme Court articulated the general test for determining whether “[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking” (id., at 260). Agins held that a zoning law effects a regulatory taking if either: (1) “the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests” or (2) the ordinance “denies an owner economically viable use of his land” (id). Plaintiff has abandoned its claim that it has been denied all economically viable uses of its land. Thus, its only remaining claim is that the “substantially advance” alternative regulatory taking-prong of Agins is not met here because there is an insufficiently “close causal nexus” (Manocherian v Lenox Hill Hosp., 84 NY2d 385, 392; Rent Stabilization Assn. v Higgins, 83 NY2d 156, 174; see, Nollan v California Coastal Commn., 483 US 825) between the rezoning measure and the legitimate public interests defendants sought to achieve.

Relying on this Court’s decisions in Seawall Assocs. v City of New York (74 NY2d 92) and Manocherian v Lenox Hill Hosp. (supra), plaintiff claims that Local Law No. 6 fails to meet the Agins standard because there is not a “close causal nexus” between the Town’s objectives and Local Law No. 6. Plaintiff argues that this was demonstrated as a matter of law, because in the opinion of the Shuster planning firm the same three objectives could be accomplished by less restrictive land control, permitting some residential development. We disagree with plaintiff’s analysis and reject its proposed standard of review.

The close causal nexus standard urged by plaintiffs was derived from two United States Supreme Court cases, Nollan v California Coastal Commn. (supra) and Dolan v City of Tigard (512 US 374). In Nollan, the Supreme Court applied the “substantially advances” prong of the Agins standard for a regulatory taking in the context of an exaction. In that case, the State had conditioned the granting of a permit to build a larger residence upon the owners’ conveyance of a public easement across the property. In that specific circumstance, the Supreme Court applied the Agins standard to require an “essential nexus” between the property interest exacted from the owner and the identified legitimate governmental objective.

Seven years later, the Supreme Court decided Dolan v City of Tigard (supra), another exaction case, in which the municipality conditioned a permit for an expansion of a commercial establishment upon a dedication of portions of the owner’s property for recreational and flood-control uses. In Dolan, the Court elucidated its “essential nexus” requirement in such cases. The Court explained that the essential connection is more than merely some relationship, but, on the other hand, the municipality need not “demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the specifically created need” (id., at 38,8-390). The Court adopted an intermediate position, i.e., that the essential nexus is a “rough proportionality” between the required exaction and the governmental interests involved (id., at 391).

Following the Supreme Court’s Nollan and Dolan decisions, there was considerable disagreement as to the reach of those holdings. There were takings scholars who read the cases as creating a new standard for all regulatory takings (see, Peterson, Land Use Regulatory “Takings” Revisited: The New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 Hastings LJ 335, 351; Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 Colum L Rev 1630, 1648-1654). Indeed, even Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Nollan, expressed concern over the heightened level of scrutiny, predicting its general application in takings cases: “the Court demands a degree of exactitude that is inconsistent with our standard for reviewing the rationality of a State’s exercise of its police power for the welfare of its citizens” (Nollan v California Coastal Commn., supra, at 842-843).

Other takings scholars opined that the heightened level of judicial scrutiny was applicable only in the specific context of an exaction (see, Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum L Rev 1600, 1608-1609; Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protection and the Takings Clause, 1989 Wis L Rev 925, 949-950, nn 146, 149; Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 9-4, at 599, n 20 [2d edj). Judges on this Court likewise differed in interpreting this line of cases (compare, Seawall Assocs. v City of New York, 74 NY2d 92, with id., at 117 [Bellacosa, J., dissenting], supra; compare, Manocherian v Lenox Hill Hosp., 84 NY2d 385, with id., at 400 [Levine, J., dissenting], supra).

The issue was finally resolved by the United States Supreme Court in City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes (526 US 687), in which the Court reaffirmed the continued viability of the Agins standard in regulatory takings that do not involve an exaction. In Del Monte, the Court expressly held that where, as here, “the landowner’s challenge is based not on excessive exactions but on denial of development * * * the rough-proportionality test of Dolan is inapposite” (id., 526 US, at 703).

Plaintiff concedes that Del Monte clearly removed Dolan’s “rough proportionality” inquiry from a general regulatory takings analysis. It asserts, instead, that because the Supreme Court failed expressly to declare as inapplicable Nollan’s “essential nexus” test, a reviewing court is still bound to determine if a generally applicable zoning regulation has a close nexus with the interests sought to be furthered. We disagree.

Two reasons persuade us to reject plaintiffs contention that Del Monte has left Nollan’s “essential nexus” test applicable in all takings cases. First, as we have previously demonstrated, the “rough proportionality” test articulated in Dolan was nothing more than the Court’s explication of the required closeness of the connection between the condition of development and the governmental objective under the essential nexus standard in an exaction case. Thus, in explicitly rejecting the application of the “rough proportionality” test when, as here, the zoning law merely “denfies] * * * development” (City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes, supra, 526 US, at 703), limiting its application to those cases involving exactions, the Supreme Court necessarily rejected the applicability of the “essential nexus” inquiry to general zoning regulations as well.

Second, our disagreement with the plaintiffs reading of Del Monte is confirmed by the Court’s treatment of the other major issue before it in that case: whether, in a 42 USC § 1983 damage action for an unconstitutional taking, the plaintiff was entitled to have a jury consider the validity of that alleged taking. Although the Del Monte Court was divided over the issue of the availability of a jury trial, all concurring and dissenting Justices agreed upon the applicable standard and that the charge given by the trial court accurately reflected the current standard for regulatory takings analysis when no exaction is involved. The trial court in Del Monte instructed the jury that

“one of your jobs as jurors is to decide if the city’s decision here substantially advanced any such legitimate public purpose.

“ ‘The regulatory actions of the city or any agency substantially advanc[e] a legitimate public purpose if the action bears a reasonable relationship to that objective’ ” (City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes, supra, 526 US, at 701 [emphasis supplied] [alterations in the original]).

Importantly, this charge makes no reference at all to a necessary essential nexus between the regulation at issue and the governmental interests at stake.

Here, Local Law No. 6 easily qualifies as a valid regulatory denial of development pursuant to a generally applicable zoning law. Because zoning plaintiffs property for solely recreational use bears a reasonable relation to the legitimate objectives stated within that law (to further open space, recreational opportunities and flood control), the regulatory action here substantially advances those purposes (see, City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes, supra, 526 US, at 701).

As we have already described in detail, this shift in the zoning districts was in response to years of-study and documentation regarding the recurrent flooding problems and concerns. The LWRP concluded that “in addition to their ecological, recreational, architectural and scenic value, [the properties’ exclusive use as golf courses] provide [s] open space and natural water retention.” Consequently, the LWRP recommended that the golf courses “should remain in their present use if possible.”

That defendant Board had before it other less restrictive options to choose from in arriving at its ultimate conclusion with respect to zoning is irrelevant. So long as the method and solution the Board eventually chose substantially advances the public interest, it is not this Court’s place to substitute its own judgment for that of the Zoning Board (see, Rent Stabilization Assn. v Higgins, 83 NY2d 156, 174, supra [“The question before us, however, is not the general wisdom or desirability of * * * (the regulation) — that is a question for the legislature”]). It is similarly not for this Court to determine if, in regulating land use, the rezoning determination was more stringent than one might reasonably conclude was necessary to further public objectives (see, Keystone Bituminuous Coal Assn. v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 487, n 16 [“That a land use regulation may be somewhat overinclusive or underinclusive is, of course, no justification for rejecting it”]).

We have considered plaintiffs remaining claims and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Bellacosa, Smith, Ciparick and Wesley concur; Judge Rosenblatt taking no part.

Order affirmed, with costs. 
      
      
         As shown in both Del Monte Dunes and Eastern Enters, v Apfel (524 US 498), no majority has accepted the invitation to rework the Agins standard (see, the response of the Court to the contentions of the amici in Del Monte (supra, 526 US, at 704). We similarly decline to address or revisit that standard.
     