
    *Crawford v. Thurmond and Others.
    October, 1831.
    In.lasircctioEi — Ag'aiusst Execution--Remedy at Law,-- -A. recovers a judgment against B. and C. wiio bad prosecuted the suii to judgment. as A.’s agent, sues out a ii. fa. upon it. and indorses on the execution, that it is partly for his O.’s own benefit: beiore this execution is delivered to the sheriff, B. the debtor, makes satisfaction to A. of the full amount of the debt, and A. gives him a receipt, in full and discharge: Held, though B. the debtor, might have made a motion to quash the execution, and thus had remedy at law, yet a court of equity has jurisdiction to give him relief by way of injunction to inhibit further proceedings on the execution.
    Philip Thurmond and John Eicheson exhibited a bill against Nelson Crawford and Daniel Shrader, in the county court of Amherst, in chancery, setting forth; that Shrader, a resident of Tennessee, recovered a judgment at law, in the same county court, against Thurmond and Eicheson, for "993 dollars with interest and costs: that, before the execution uoon this judgment was delivered to the sheriff, Shrader having come to Virginia to collect the debt, a contract was made between him and Thurmond, whereby the latter agreed to sell Shiader three slaves and a horse, and to pay him 30 dollars, and Shrader agreed to receive this property and money, in full satisfaction of his judgment; and the property being soon after delivered and the money paid, Shrader gave his receipt for the same, in full discharge of the judgment and execution thereupon; which contract, and receipt for the property and money, were evidenced by instruments under seal: that after this, the defendant Crawford, having previously taken out an execution upon Shrader’s judgment, and made an indorsement in these words,— “This execution, except 480 dollars, is for the benefit of Nelson Crawford. (Signed) N. Crawford agent for D. Shrader,” — delivered the execution so indorsed to the sheriff, who proceeded to levy it on Eicheson’s property, which he had adverlised for sale to satisfy the execution. The bill prayed an injunction to inhibit xtbe sale, and all future proceedings upon the judgment; and the injunction was accordingly awarded.
    Crawford, in his answer, said, that the bond of Thurmond and Eicheson', on which the judgment was recovered, had been placed by Shrader in his hands -as an agent to collect the debt; and that while the bond was in suit, he had advanced and paid to one Frazer, who was duly authorized by Shrader to receive the money for him, 550 dollars, which he was to reimburse to himself out of the proceeds of the bond when collected; and Shrader was apprised of this advance, and agreed, that Crawford should retain out of the proceeds of the bond, the money so by him advanced with interest: that thus, the judgment on the bond, when recovered, was, by Shrader’s agreement, a judgment for the benefit of Crawford, to the extent of his advances for Shrader: and that Thurmond was well informed of the transaction between Shra-der and Crawford, and of the right of the latter to retain the 550 dollars with interest, out of the debt due upon the judgment when collected, at the time he made the contract with Shrader mentioned in the bill, and was tempted by an exorbitantly high price for his slaves, to combine with Shrader to defraud and disappoint Crawford of the portion of the debt due on the judgment, to which he was justly entitled; and Shrader immediately after receiving the property he had purchased of Thurmond, absconded, and carried the property with him, from Virginia.
    Shrader did not put in an answer; and the bill was taken for confessed as to him.
    The controversy, upon the merits, turned intirely, on questions of fact, 1. as to the fairness of Thurmond’s conduct in procuring a discharge of the judgment from Shrader; and 2. as to the justice of Crawford’s claim, even as between him and Shrader, to the money he alleged he had advanced and paid to Frazer for Shrader, and (by consequence) as to the equitable right of Crawford to the benefit *'of any part of the judgment. And upon these points, there was a good deal of evidence filed by both parties.
    Crawford moved the county court to dissolve the injunction ; which motion being overruled, he carried the cause by appeal to the superiour court of chancery of Bynch-burg, which approved the opinion of the county court, but retained the cause, and gave both parties commissions to take additional evidence; and upon -the final hearing, perpetuated the injunction, with costs. From this decree Crawford appealed to this court.
    Johnson, for the appellant, and Leigh for the appellees,
    argued the cause, chiefly, upon the merits, which depended on the questions of fact before mentioned, and the evidence relating to them. But Johnson took an objection to the jurisdiction of the court of chancery to relieve the appellees upon their own shewing in their bill; for, he said, supposing the facts of the case truly stated in the bill, the a'ppellees had a complete and summary remedy at law, by motion to the county court to quash the execution. And this objection presented the only point of law in the case.
    
      
       “Execution-Injunction against — Relief at Law — Tn the principal case before the execution was delivered, to the sheriff the debtor made full satisfaction to the creditor, and took his receipt iu full for the debt; and it was held that though the debtor might have made a motion to quash the execution, and thus have had a remedy at law, yet equity may give relief by way of injunction to inhibit further proceedings on the execution.
      In Lewis v. Hpencer, 7 W. Va. (¡91, citing the principal case it is held, that a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin a sheriff from selling personal property for the payment of taxes, upon which he has levied, where the bill alleges that the said faxes have been fully paid.
      The principal case is also cited with approval in Hay v. Alexandria, etc., R. Co., 11 Fed. Cas. 888; Penn v. Ingles, 83 Va. 73.
      In the following cases the principal case is ditin-guished on the ground that there was a complete and adequate remedy at law: Morrison v. Speer, 10 Gratt. 380; Beckley v. Palmer, 11 Gratt. 634; Coleman v. Anderson, 89 Gratt. 438, 429; Hall v. Taylor. 18 W. Va. 556. See monographic notes on “Injunctions” appended to Claytor v. Anthony, 15 G-ratt. 518; '¡Executions” appended to Paine, Surv.. etc., v. 'Tutwiler, 27 Gratt. 440.
    
   CARE, J.

After discussing the cause upon the evidence, and determining it upon the merits for the appellees, said — It was objected, that the appellees, instead of filing th-is bill, might have moved the county court to quash the execution; and that having this complete remedy at law, equity ought not to entertain them. It is true, that every court has a right to watch over its process, and where it has been irregularly or fraudulently executed, to quash it, as being the best and speediest mode of doing justice. But this was not a question of fraud or irregularity, in the execution of process; no officer of the court had acted improperly. The execution was taken out by Crawford, who had acted as the agent of the plaintiff Shrader, and was indorsed by Crawford for his own benefit, except as to 480 dollars; and at a date subsequent to this indorsement, Thurmond had ^'obtained a complete discharge of the execution from Shrader: a state of things which presented several questions complicated of law and fact; as 1. the genuineness of Shrader’s receipt and discharge to Thurmond; 2. its • effect in law ; 3. the fairness of that transaction; 4. the effect of Crawford’s indorsement, involving the question whether his agency was not destroyed by the presence and acting of the principal; 5. the equity of Crawford’s pretensions in fact and in law. Now I do not say, that the county court, sitting as a court of law, could not upon motion, in a summary way, try these questions: but I do say, that in that mode, it would not have afforded as safe or as convenient a tribunal for the trial of them, as a court of equity upon regular pleadings and proofs. And this consideration, it will be recollected, forms one of the grounds in equity for assuming jurisdiction. But there is another, perhaps a stronger ground. The indorsement of the execution for Crawford’s benefit, gave him nothing but an equitable right, which could have no weight in a court of law, belonged exclusively to equity', and must finally have brought the cause there for decision. This consideration, it will be seen, had a good deal of weight with a majority of the court, in Ambler v. Warwick, 1 Leigh, 19S. Taking all these things into view, I do not feel disposed to disturb the decree.

The other judges concurred, and the decree was affirmed.  