
    Mary A. GALINDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant—Appellee.
    No. 10-55242.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Oct. 12, 2011.
    
    Filed Oct. 17, 2011.
    Lawrence David Rohlfing, Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, Santa Fe Springs, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    
      Assistant U.S. Attorney, Esquire, USLA-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, Marcus Kerner, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Santa Ana, CA, Tova D. Wolking, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: PREGERSON and D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and LYNN, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Barbara M.G. Lynn, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for Northern Texas, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Claimant Mary Galindo appeals from the judgment of United States Magistrate Judge Arthur Nakazato of the Central District of California, affirming the determination of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that Claimant was not disabled and, therefore, was ineligible for Title II disability insurance benefits. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

We review the decision of a district court (or, where, as here, the parties have consented, the decision of a Magistrate Judge) denying benefits de novo. We must independently determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is (1) free of legal error and (2) supported by substantial evidence. Smolen v. Chater; 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir.1996) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir.1989)).

The ALJ’s finding that Galindo could perform light work with restrictions was not erroneous and is supported by substantial evidence. The finding appropriately accounted for Galindo’s physical and mental conditions. The ALJ considered work restrictions determined by Galindo’s examining and treating physicians, and the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding is consistent with the medical evidence. When the ALJ discredited a medical opinion from a treating physician or discounted portions of Claimant’s testimony, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for doing so. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.1983)).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     