
    UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS and JOINERS OF AMERICA v. ROGERS.
    No. 21681.
    Opinion Filed April 11, 1933.
    Rehearing Denied Sept. 26, 1933.
    Stevens & Cline, for plaintiff in error.
    C. T. O’Neal and Arch M. Parmenter, for defendant in error.
   CULLISON, V. C. J.

Lucinda Rogers, as plaintiff, instituted suit against the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, as defendant, seeking to recover a funeral donation in the sum of $300. The record discloses that F. E. Rogers was a carpenter by trade who joined tbe local union No. 1585 at Lawton in 1915. At tbe time of joining said local, Rogers was a single man. Under tbe by-laws of tbe brotherhood, provision was made to pay a certain funeral donation to tbe wife or blood relative of a member to aid in tbe proper burial of said miember upon bis death. Tbe deceased designated bis mother as tbe party to receive tbe funeral donation when be made application for membership, and after marriage be never made any arrangements for change in designation of the party to receive tbe funeral donation.

Rogers died in 1928, and tbe question of payment of tbe funeral donation arose, and upon consideration of tbe same the brotherhood paid tbe same to the widow of F. E'. Rogers, deceased, to aid in paying tbe funeral expenses of the deceased member of tbe organization. Tbe mother demanded payment of said funeral donation and upon failure to pay instituted the suit at bar. Upon tbe conclusion of the trial of said cause, tbe court sustained a motion of plaintiff for a directed verdict, and directed a verdict favorable to plaintiff for tbe amount of tbe suit, from which judgment defendant appeals, and contends that tbe judgment was contrary to law and contrary to tbe evidence.

In our consideration of tbe question raised, we first observe that there was no policy of insurance or beneficial certificate issued by tbe brotherhood to any person. It is not a question of insurance, and cases based on insurance policies or certificates of beneficial interest are not applicable to tbe case at bar. Tbe provisions applicable in the case at bar are found in tbe by-laws of tbe brotherhood. It appears that tbe by-laws are amended at tbe various annual meetings and the by-laws of tbe organization in force at tbe time Rogers became a member of tbe brotherhood wore not introduced and made part of tbe record, but from those portions that were introduced from tbe later by-laws it appears that tbe brotherhood provided that it would pay a certain funeral donation to either the wife ór a blood relative of tbe deceased to aid in properly burying the deceased brother. Said payments are referred to at all times in tbe by-laws as funeral donations. There was no special assessment of premiums to take care of any such benefits, but tbe same were taken care of out of tbe regular dues of tbe member. There was further provision that should tbe wife of a member die, tbe brotherhood would give tbe brother a funeral donation to aid in • caring for tbe funeral of tbe wife. Tbe bylaws also provided that should a member die without leaving legal heirs, tbe local union shall see that be is respectably interred, and that tbe United Brotherhood shall pay tbe funeral expenses, but in no case shall tbe same exceed tbe donation to which tbe member is entitled at bis death, nor shall tbe brotherhood be liable for any further donation in the name of the deceased.

Tbe. record further discloses that when plaintiff requested payment from defendant, defendant immediately advised her that under the general laws of tbe organization a wife of a member is his legal beneficiary, and, since tbe deceased member left a wife, tbe funeral donation would necessarily be paid to her. Tbe record further discloses that the wife buried her deceased husband and furnished the defendant with a statement of tbe costs of burial and last sickness, which statement amounted to slightly more than $300, and upon receipt of said proof defendant paid the funeral donation to the wife of deceased as his legal representative to aid in taking care of funeral expenses of the.deceased brother. The record discloses that plaintiff herein did not pay any of the expenses of funeral or last sickness of the deceased.

When we carefully consider the entire plan of defendant, we find that it does not pertain to or have any connection with insurance. It is merely a plan devised by defendant brotherhood whereby defendant seeks to aid in providing a proper and appropriate burial of deceased .members, the idea being that the legal representative of the deceased be provided with sufficient funds to give the deceased member an appropriate burial and pay the expenses of his last sickness, thereby maintaining an appropriate financial status for the members of said organization.

We consider that this is the purpose and intent of the by-laws of defendant brotherhood, and that defendant carried out the same by paying the funeral donation to the legal representative of deceased, to wit. his wife, to be used by her in caring for the expense of funeral and last sickness of said deceased brother; and that when defendant had paid the amount of said funeral donation to the proper person there was no further liability upon the part of defendant to pay a further and additional funeral donation to another person.

We consider that defendant, acting as a board of trustees only, held the money as a trust fund for a specific purpose, to wit, to aid in giving each deceased member an appropriate burial and to aid in paying expenses connected with his last sickness. That is the specific purpose for which the money was provided and the donation of money given. “Donation” is defined by Webster as “Voluntary alienation of property; gratuitious transfer of property from one to another; gift.”

A funeral donation would be a gift or voluntary alienation by the giver of the money donated for the specific purpose for which said money was provided. The money was provided to pay funeral expenses and expenses incident thereto. The defendant held the money in trust for that purpose, and where defendant paid the money to the wife to be used in payment of the expense of funeral and last sickness, defendant complied with its obligation to pay and terminated further obligation.

After a careful consideration, we hold that the judgment of the district court should be reversed, with directions to proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed.

RILEY, O. X, and SWINDALL, ANDREWS, McNEILL, OSBORN, BAYLESS, and BUSBY, JJ., concur. WELCH J., absent.  