
    Juan Ricardo PAMATZ-LUQUIN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-74667.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    
      Submitted June 29, 2010.
    
    Filed July 1, 2010.
    Christopher John Stender, Esquire, Immigration Practice Group A Professional Corporation, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.
    Brendan Paul Hogan, Esquire, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: ALARCÓN, LEAVY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Juan Ricardo Pamatz-Luquin, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for cancellation of removal. We dismiss the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary determination that Pa-matz-Luquin failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S. citizen children. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir.2009).

Pamatz-Luquin contends that the brevity of the Id’s explanation of the hardship determination in her decision, as well as her failure to expressly articulate that the documentary evidence was cumulatively considered, establishes that the agency did not fully consider the hardship evidence or consider it in the aggregate. We disagree. The record reflects that Pamatz-Luquin was given an opportunity to present evidence at the IJ hearing and that the IJ was aware of this evidence when she rendered her decision. Pamatz-Luquin also contends the Board did not fully consider the hardship evidence because the Board’s decision references only two of petitioner’s three children. We disagree, because the record reflects the Board was familiar with the record and all evidence therein when it agreed with the IJ’s hardship determination. Accordingly, Pamatz-Lu-quin’s contentions do not raise a colorable due process claim. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.2005).

Pamatz-Luquin’s contention, that the IJ applied an improper legal standard to the hardship analysis, is unexhausted. See Ontiveros-Lopez v. INS, 213 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.2000). Moreover, this contention does not raise a colorable due process claim, when the record shows the IJ actually applied the proper standard in determining the evidence in the record did not establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. See Martinez-Rosas, 424 F.3d at 930.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     