
    Santos Rene FLORES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUMAYA; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-16758.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Sept. 10, 2012.
    
    Filed Sept. 24, 2012.
    Santos Rene Flores, San Quentin, CA, pro se.
    Diana Esquivel, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Ap-pellees.
    Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Santos Rene Flores appeals pro se from the magistrate judge’s order denying his request for review by an Article III judge of the magistrate judge’s prior order dismissing Flores’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We review de novo whether the magistrate judge had jurisdiction over Flores, Irwin v. Mascott, 370 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.

Contrary to Flores’s contention, the magistrate judge did not act without jurisdiction because both parties consented in writing to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction. See Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir.1993). To the extent that Flores challenges the denial of his request to withdraw consent to proceed before the magistrate judge, the challenge fails because he did not show “extraordinary circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4); Dixon, 990 F.2d at 480 (explaining that a party in a civil action may withdraw its consent to proceed before a magistrate judge only by showing extraordinary circumstances).

We do not address the issues Flores raises with regard to the magistrate judge’s underlying order dismissing his action for failure to exhaust as the court previously ordered that the scope of Flores’s appeal was limited to review of the June 13, 2011 order denying his motion for reconsideration.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     