
    Atkinson against The Executors of Scott.
    Changing an indent from its real to itá nominal value in specie, •when it was worth only 8 1-2 for 1, will make the contract usurious.
    Parol tesfci* mony against the face of a bond, to prove any such agreement, is inadmissible.
    DEBT on a bond conditioned for payment of an indent for 1,267/. 3s. 6d. in September, 1786.
    
      Rutledge stated to the court,
    that at the time this bond was given, the testator, Scott, agreed that if the indent was not returned on the day mentioned in the condition, that then it should be converted into a specie debt, to be paid for at the rate of pound for pound j and offered to call a witness to prove the agreement.
    
      Pinckney objected to this testimony on two grounds : first, because it had a tendency to alter the face of a deed under seal, by parol testimony. And secondly, because it would have the further effect of turning a fair contract into a usurious one, which would defeat the plaintiff from the justice of his claim. With respect to the first objection, he said, it was an established rule of evidence, that parol testimony shall never be admitted to vary, or substantially alter, the tenor and effect of a deed under seal. 2 Black. Rep. 1249, "50. Stra. 794. For if it was once admitted, that sup~ pletory or explanatory evidence should be received to supply and explain written contracts' and agreements, it would introduce all that uncertainty which the statute of frauds was
    
      so well calculated to prevent. As to the second objection, **• vva3 evident from the nature of the testimony offered that ^ wouId make the contract usurious, and in the end defeat the object of the plaintiff entirely ; for, he observed, that the current value of indents in September, 1786, was at the rate of 850/. for 100/. specie j so that 150/. would have done more than purchased indents to the amount of those specified in the condition of the bond. But according to this proposed proof of a contract, it would have required instead of 150/. 1,267/. 3.s-. 6d. So that there would have been a clear profit of upwards of 1,179/. for the use of 150/. for one year. If this was not usury, he did not know what usury was. It was a shift or evasion, which the law would not countenance or warrant. And in order to support this position he quoted Cro. Jac. 507. where it is laid down, that any shift to take more than Jive per cent, is usurious, be what it may. Our act of assembly, passed in 1776, made the interest seven per cent, but in other respects it was the same as the British act. Indents were considered as the stock of South-Carolina, and stock was a species of merchandise as much as rice and indigo here, or flour or wool in England. The value of stock, he said, was what it would bring at market. In Ambler’s Reports, 37. 371. a contract was deemed usurious, because five per cent, was charged on 100/. when the value of stock was 75/. So in 2 Stra. 1242. the discounting a note at a greater rate than five per cent, was deemed usurious, because it was deemed a loan. From the whole of the authorities it was evident, that wherever there was an attempt to turn stock into its nominal value, or to take more than the legal interest for the use of money, by any device or pretext whatever, it made the contract usurious.
    Rutledge, in reply,
    said, that this should be considered as a specie contract, and not a contract for the sale of stock. That the plaintiff would not have parted with it upon any other terms, and it would be hard to prevent him from having the full benefit of his contract.
   Per Cur.

This kind of testimony, which is intended so materially to alter or vary a deed, cannot be admitted, be-c?use it would be productive of all the mischiefs and un-r _ c mindes which the statute of frauds has so wisely guarded against. And, indeed, the contract, if proved, as the plaintiff states, would be manifestly usurious. It would, in fact, bi converting a debt of 150/. into one of 1,267/. 3s. Qd. which is so evidently usurious, that it must strike every n.iud at the first blush. But the contract on the face of the bond in this case, appears fair s 1,26 71. 3s. Qd. appears to have been borrowed by the deceased, and that sum was to be repaid in indents in September, 1786. The value of indents at that time and interest, is what the plaintiff is now entitled to, and no more. The case of Davis v. The Executors of Richardson, (ante,) and many others, are in point on this head.

Verdict for plaintiff accordingly.  