
    Marcus Benjamin WARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sherman CHAMPEN, N.P.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 12-15084.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 19, 2012.
    
    Filed Jan. 3, 2013.
    Marcus Benjamin Ward, Represa, CA, pro se.
    
      Todd Irby, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Marcus Benjamin Ward appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Ward failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his shoulder pain. See id. at 1057-58 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health and safety; neither negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical need, nor a prisoner’s difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment, amounts to deliberate indifference).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ward’s motion for a continuance of summary judgment because Ward failed to identify particular facts he hoped to discover to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. See Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1306 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1986) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a party seeking to continue summary judgment has the burden of showing what facts he or she hopes to discover to raise a triable dispute).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ward’s motion to extend discovery because Ward failed to show good cause to amend the scheduling order. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir.1992) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a party seeking to amend a scheduling order must show good cause).

We reject Ward’s contention that the district court erred in denying his motion to certify counsel.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     