
    FAN CHEN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-4816-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 30, 2011.
    
      Jeffery E. Baron, Baron & Shelkin, P.C., New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director; Lindsay B. Glauner, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, REENA RAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Fan Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 25, 2010, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Fan Chen, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Oct. 25, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We have reviewed the agency’s denial of Chen’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). As Chen does not challenge the BIA’s findings regarding his family planning claims or the denial of sua sponte reopening, we address only his arguments concerning changed country conditions. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005).

Because Chen’s motion to reopen was untimely, he was required to establish changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). He presented the agency with evidence suggesting that religious activity was more vigorously suppressed in some regions of China surrounding the Olympic Games. However, the agency reasonably determined that this evidence did not establish a material change in conditions for Chen, because it showed that persecution varied region by region and did not show changes in Chen’s home province, Fujian. See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir.2005).

The agency also reasonably determined that Chen’s great-aunt’s letter, describing a raid on a house church and the destruction of a church in Chen’s hometown, did not establish a change in the persecution of Christians as Chen provided no evidence about prior conditions in the town to establish that these events constituted a material change since his 2003 merits hearing. See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007).

Chen argues that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to draw a link between his evidence about his home town and his wider evidence of an increase in the suppression of Christians. However, the BIA was not required to draw any such inference. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167-68 (2d Cir.2007). Thus, because the BIA reasonably concluded that Chen did not establish a change in country conditions, it did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  