
    BINDER v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Term.
    June 28, 1906.)
    Street Railroads—Collision With Pedestrian—Contributory Negligence.
    The testimony ot plaintiff: that before stepping from the sidewalk to cross an avenue she looked and saw cars in both directions on the avenue, one north-bouhd, a block south, and one south-bound, two blocks north, and that she then proceeded to cross, and had passed the track of northbound cars, and as she went on the track of south-bound cars she was struck by a car coming so quickly she could not save herself, fails to show her free from contributory negligence; there being no evidence that her attention was distracted, or that anything obstructed her view, or that she looked a second time for cars, unless it was when the car was right on her.
    [Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 44, Cent. Dig. Street Railroads, §§ 208, 249.]
    
      Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Seventh District.
    Action by Anna Binder against the New York City Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
    Reversed, and new trial ordered.
    Argued before GILDERSLEEVE, LEVENTRITT, and McCALL, JJ.
    William E. Weaver, for appellant.
    I. Seymour, for respondent.
   McCALL, J.

This is an action brought to recover damages for injuries received in an accident, the happening of which, the plaintiff alleges, is attributable solely and alone to the negligent handling and operation of defendant’s cars by its employés. The testimony of the plaintiff shows that she started to cross Third avenue at Seventy-Seventh street, going from east to west; that before she stepped from the northeast corner she looked north and south, and saw cars in both directions—one at Seventy-Eighth street south bound, and one at "Seventy-Sixth street north bound; that she then stepped off the curb, and started westwardly, passed over the tracks that carried north-bound cars, and that, as she went on the rails which the south-bound cars traveled, she was struck, the car coming so quickly she could not save herself. The record is absolutely devoid of any evidence which would show that her attention had been distracted, or that any obstruction blocked hér view, or prevented observation of the car in the exercise of the care law imposes as a duty. The proof is somewhat unsatisfactory that plaintiff looked a second time, but, accepting her testimony as correct on this point, it would seem that the second observation she made was when the car was right upon her, and it was occasioned by the danger that then menaced her. Upon the whole, we are not satisfied on this record that she has successfully borne the burden of proving herself free from contributory negligence, and hence should not have prevailed, and the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.

Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event. All concur.  