
    Ronald CLAUSNITZER; Gabriel Contreras; Andy Kubicki; Frank Martinez; Jody Lynn Mitchell, and all those similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 08-56155.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Nov. 6, 2009.
    Filed Nov. 20, 2009.
    David Douglas Deason, Esquire, Deason & Archbold, Newport Beach, CA, David L. Rose, Earlene W. Rosenberg, Esquire, Rose & Rose, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Edward John Efkeman, Senior Counsel, Federal Express Corporation, Memphis, TN, Christopher James Yost, Esquire, Fe-dex Litigation, Irvine, CA, for Defendant Appellee.
    Before: SCHROEDER and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and SEDWICK, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable John W. Sedwick, United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

The named plaintiffs in a proposed collective action against Federal Express under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., appeal the district court’s denial of class certification and summary judgment for the defendant.

The district court did not err in denying class certification and dismissing the claims of opt-in plaintiffs. The district court correctly denied certification because the plaintiffs failed to show they were “similarly situated” as required by 29 U.S.C. § 216(c). There was a wide variety of circumstances surrounding each of the alleged adverse employment actions. The district court did not require that plaintiffs had to have the same routes, hours, and shifts as a condition of class certification.

Summary judgment was appropriate for the individual named plaintiffs because they failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Energy Lab. is not applicable because it deals with the defendant’s burden after the plaintiffs establish a prima facie case. See — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2395, 2398, 171 L.Ed.2d 283 (2008).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     