
    John Leland versus Henry Marsh.
    Every continuation oft an illegal imprisonment being a new trespass, a recovery in an action, commenced during the continuance of the imprisonment, is no bar to another action brought after it has ceased, for an assault,- battery, and imprisonment; and if so pleaded, the plaintiff may newly assign, for the continuance of the imprisonment.
    Under the statute of 1808, c. 65, § 6, the execution against a manufacturing cor- ' poration, which an officer levies on the body or estate of a member of such corporation, must have been the same execution on which the officer made demand on the president, &c., of the corporation, as provided in the statute; and the member, so levied upon, must have been such at the time of the levy. Bu the statute of 1817, c. 183, has altered the law on both these points
    
      This was trespass, for assaulting, beating and wounding the plaintiff, and imprisoning him for the space of ninety days, viz., from the 18th of September to the 18th of December, 1816. The writ was dated the 29th of May, 1818.
    The defendant pleaded, first, a recovery before a justice of the peace, for the same trespass. The plaintiff replied, * and newly assigned for other trespasses, at other times, [ * 390 ] and on other occasions, than are mentioned in the plea in bar. To this the defendant rejoins, that he is not guilty of the trespass newly assigned, upon which issue was joined. The defendant pleaded, secondly, the general issue, and offered a brief statement under the statute; stating that he was a deputy sheriff, and had an execution in favor of one Daniel Robinson against the Cheshire Crown Glass Company; and that he levied the same on the body of Leland, for want of property of the company, having pursued the requisitions of the statute in that case provided, Leland being a member, &c.
    Trial was had before Putnam, J., at the last May term in this county. The first execution in favor of Robinson issued on the 22d of April, 1816, on which the demand was made upon the officers of the company; and this being returned unsatisfied, an alias execution issued the 18th of September, 1816, upon which the defendant arrested Leland. The plaintiff was a member of the company when Robinson’s suit was commenced, and so continued until the 5th of August, 1816 ; when he conveyed his interest, which was of no real value, to one Hunt, to enable him, Leland, to swear himself out of prison on the poor debtor’s oath.
    In respect to the plea of a former recovery, it was for an assault, battery, and imprisonment on the 3d of December, 1816, and the original writ in that case was dated the 5th of that month. But the imprisonment newly assigned was from the 6th of the same December to the 10th of January following; and there was evidence of a detention from the 6th of December to the 4th of January. It was insisted for the defendant that the assault and battery and imprison ment on the 3d of December, and the continuation of the imprison ment to the 4th of January, constituted but one injury, and that the former recovery by the plaintiff was a legal satisfaction for the whole subject of complaint.
    * The judge instructed the jury, that there was no [ * 391 | legal defence, and left to them the question of damages for the trespass newly assigned.
    
      Howe, for the plaintiff.
    
      Gold, for the defendant.
   By the Court. The objection to the new assignment is, that there was but one act of trespass, viz., when the plaintiff was arrest ed upon the execution ; and that the former judgment pleaded .was a sufficient bar; all the consequences of the trespass being merged in the first action. But the imprisonment is the gist of the action, and every continuation of it is a new trespass; so that the plaintiff might well have brought his action for an assault, &.c., committed on the day after the date of his former writ; and if so, he might well assign that anew.

By the statute of 1808, c. 65, $ 6, it is provided, that an oxeen ti on, issued against a manufacturing corporation, if not satisfied within fourteen days after a demand made upon the president, treasurer or clerk of such corporation, may be levied upon the body or estate of any member or members of such corporation. But it must be the same execution. If the demand be made by virtue of one execution, the levy cannot be made upon another issued upon the same judgment, without a new demand and the lapse of fourteen days thereafter. In this case it appeared that the demand was made upon the first execution, and the arrest of the plaintiff was made upon an alias execution, without any new demand. The officer therefore, on this ground, was not justified.

Further, the person upon whom an execution is so levied, must be a member of the corporation at the time of the levy. In this case the plaintiff had transferred his interest in the stock of the company, and so had ceased to be a member, before the defendant arrested his body upon the execution. He was then not liable to arrest; and upon this ground, also, the defendant fails in his justi fication.

Judgment on the verdict.

* [Note. By the statute of 1817, c. 183, if there has been a demand upon the original execution, an alias execution may be levied upon the individual members, without any new demand; and upon any one, who was a member of the corporation when the debt accrued, upon which the execution issued. 1  