
    SEPTEMBER TERM, 1773.
    Lib. D. D. No. 19. fol. 567.
    James Drane against Charles Hodges.
    THIS was an action’of trespass qiiare clausum fregit, commenced on the 4th day of March, 1771. By the declaration, the trespass is stated to have been committed,on the 10th June, 1764, and on divers days and times between the said day and the 20th June, 1766, into a tract of land called Greenfield.
    
    
      The following point was saved, viz.
    “ Under leave entered in the proceedings in this cause, a for the defendant to give special matter in evidence upon u the general issue pleaded, the defendant, by his counsel, u objected against the plaintiff’s recovery, for that more “ than three years had elapsed before the 4th of March, “ 1771, the day of the impetration of the writ in this “ cause, and it was not proved that any trespass had been “ committed since the month of November, 1765; and that, “ by virtue of the act of Assembly for limitation of suits, “ the plaintiff was barred of this suit. The plaintiff there- “ upon produced, and read in evidence, the transcript of a “ record from the Court of Appeals ; and alleged, and “ the same is admitted, that the cause for which that ac- “ tion was originally commenced in this Court, is the u same cause for which the present suit is brought, 6i and that the said former suit was brought within “ three years next after the cause thereof first accrued. “ But whether the said former suit, verdict, judgment, re- “ covery and reversal, in the said record mentioned, and “ the recent prosecution of this suit, the same being brought “ within one month after the said reversal, shall prevent a “ bar from the act of limitation or not, the Court will ad- “ vise and reserve that point for further consideration ; so (l that if a verdict should be found for the plaintiff, and the u Court should be of opinion that the plaintiff is barred by “ the act of Assembly for limitation of actions, judgment. “ shall, notwithstanding such verdict, be entered for the “ defendant, otherwise for the plaintiff.
    “ y. Hall, for plaintiff,
    “ S. Chase, for defendant.”
    Previous to the point being saved by the Court, S. Chase, for the defendant, contended,
    That the plaintiff should not be admitted to prove the trespass at the time alleged, as it appeared by the plaintiff’s own shewing that he was barred by the act of limita* tions. That by the act of 1715, c. 23. no person could bring an action who did not shew he was within the express exceptions of the act. That an infant, or a feme co~ vert, would have been bound by the act, unless excepted by express provision of law. 1 Lev. 31. where it was held that, in times of rebellion, when the Courts were not open, the statute was a good bar, because no particular exception of such a case in the statute. See Salk. 420. 10 Mod. 206. The statute is general, and must work upon all cases not exempted by exception. Where the statute of limitations once attaches, and the time once begins to run, it overruns all mesne acts. 1 Stra. 556. The statute 21 Jac. I. c. 16. makes an exception in favour of the plaintiff, where he is beyond seas; but it has been held, that where the defendant has been beyond seas, be is not within the equity of the statute. Carth. 136. And therefore it was that the statute of 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16. was made to provide for that case. The Courts of Justice, in this Province, were shut during the time the stamp act was in force ; a subsequent act of Assembly was thought necessary to provide that that time should not be accounted, and run under the act of limitations. In cases of causes referred, an act of this Province provides, that if the arbitrators die or refuse to act, the time shall not be accounted within the act of limitations. Where an action is brought and the plaintiff dies, the act of limitation attaches, and runs against the executor. 1 Lutw. 261.
    Johnson, for plaintiff, argued,
    That the former judgment, obtained in the Provincial Court, was for the same trespass for which the present suit was brought, and which judgment had been reversed in the Court of Appeals, and the present suit was brought within a month thereafter. That the statute of 21 Jac. I. was enacted before the charter of Maryland was granted, and therefore was a part of the law of this country. After-wards, our own Legislature, by an act of Assembly, abridged the time limited by the statute of James, which statute has an express saving of cases where judgment has been reversed on writ of error. And to shew the savings by construction, which were not within the express words of the statute, he cited 1 Raym» 434» 12 Mad. 578. 2 Sira. 907. 719. 2 Raym» 1427» The statute of James and the act of Assembly, being both made by adequate authority, ought to be construed together as parts of one system ; for it is a rule, that where divers statutes relate to the same thing, they ought to be all taken into consideration in construing any one of them. 4 Bac. Abr. 646. 1 Burr. 447.
    
      
      
        Vide the case reported ante, May term, 1668, p. 262.
    
   Mr. Hall was about to proceed, when the Court resolved to save the point.

The Jury found a verdict for the plaintifF, and the Court gave judgment on the point saved for the plaintiif.  