
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jennifer LAYDEN, Defendant-Appellant.
    16-317
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    January 30, 2017
    FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Varuni Nelson, Rachel G. Balaban, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, for Robert L. Capers, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Jennifer Layden, pro se, South Ozone Park, NY.
    PRESENT: Robert A. Katzmann, Chief Judge, Amalya L. Kearse, Debra Ann Livingston, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Layden, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s entry of default judgment against her, as well as from the district court’s subsequent order of garnishment of her wages, in the government’s suit to recover the outstanding balance on a defaulted student loan. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Layden’s notice of appeal was not timely filed from the underlying default judgment, and we therefore lack jurisdiction to review that judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (“[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.”)- Layden did timely appeal from the district court’s order of garnishment-However, because the merits of Layden’s appeal of the garnishment order are so closely related to the merits of her challenge to the default judgment, we decline to address Layden’s appeal of the garnishment order without first allowing Layden to seek relief in the district court from both the default judgment and the garnishment order under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) and 60(b). Further proceedings in the district court would enable the parties to compile a factual record, without which we are not well situated to rule on the merits in this case. See United States v. Tucker, 5 FedAppx. 23, 24 (2d Cir. 2001).

We observe that, although a motion brought by Layden to set aside the default judgment would ordinarily be based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), the time limit in which to file such a motion has expired during the pendency of this appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). We further observe, however, that “if [Layden’s] motion [in the district court] is meritorious and if the one-year limitation was not met because of’ the time elapsed during Layden’s appeal to this Court, “the district court may find a means to grant [Layden] the relief that [she] seeks” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) “or otherwise, although we express no opinion as to whether there is a legal or factual basis for such determination.” Tucker, 5 Fed.Appx. at 24.

Accordingly, we DISMISS Layden’s appeal without prejudice to her ability to renew the appeal after the disposition of any motion she files in the district court for relief from the default judgment and the garnishment order.  