
    Rune KRAFT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OLDCASTLE PRECAST, INC., a Washington corporation; Inland Concrete Enterprises, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan, an employee stock ownership plan, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-56561
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted October 23, 2017 
    
    Filed October 31, 2017
    Rune Kraft, Pro Se
    Joseph C. Faucher, Esquire, Attorney, Trucker Huss, APC, Los Angeles, CA, Timothy J. Rozelle, Esquire, Trucker Huss, APC, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Oldcastle Precast, Inc.
    Joseph C. Faucher, Esquire, Attorney, Trucker Huss, APC, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Inland Concrete Enterprises, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan
    Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Rune Kraft appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim, among other claims, arising from a 2007 stock purchase transaction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Kraft’s RICO claim was proper because the claim involves issues that were previously litigated as part of the proceedings that resulted in judgment being entered against Kraft on June 22, 2011. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 891 n.4, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008) (“For judgments in diversity cases, federal law incorporates the rules of preclusion applied by the State in which the rendering court sits.” (citation omitted)); White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that California’s issue preclusion doctrine “precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings” and setting forth six criteria to determine whether an issue is precluded (citation omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Affirmed. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     