
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ruben RODRIGUEZ, a.k.a. Jackson Miller, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 12-10676.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 18, 2014.
    
    Filed Feb. 27, 2014.
    Karen Elizabeth Rolley, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Rodolfo Valenzuela, Esquire, Law Office of Rudy Valenzuela, Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: ALARCÓN, O’SCANNLAIN, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Ruben Rodriguez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 30-month sentence imposed following his jury-trial conviction for reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Rodriguez contends that the district court legally erred by interpreting U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a) to include a per se bar against a downward adjustment for aceep-tance of responsibility when the defendant proceeds to trial. He argues that he was entitled to the adjustment notwithstanding his decision to go to trial because he accepted responsibility for his crime. We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines, and for clear error the district court’s determination that Rodriguez did not accept responsibility for the offense. See United States v. Ramos-Medina, 706 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 134 S.Ct. 64, 187 L.Ed.2d 52 (2013).

It is unclear from the record whether Rodriguez requested a Guidelines adjustment based on acceptance of responsibility, or merely a downward variance. See id at 941 (district court may vary downward on the basis of acceptance of responsibility even if it does not grant a formal adjustment under the Guidelines). Even if Rodriguez requested an adjustment, however, his arguments are unpersuasive. The district court described it as a “close question” whether Rodriguez accepted responsibility for the offense, noting that Rodriguez decided to go to trial but then admitted his guilt on the witness stand. On this record, we cannot conclude that the district court believed that it was precluded from granting an acceptance of responsibility adjustment solely on the basis that Rodriguez went to trial. Moreover, in view of Rodriguez’s failure to express contrition for the offense, the district court did not clearly err by denying the adjustment. See id at 940.

Rodriguez also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court should have varied downward in view of his acceptance of responsibility for the offense. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Rodriguez’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). His within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3558(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including his criminal and immigration history. See id.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     