
    STEVENS v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Oct. 23, 1912.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 20, 1912.)
    1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION (§ 125)-Duplicity.
    That an indictment for pandering charged that accused committed the offense in more than one of the modes specified in the statute •did not render it duplicitous.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment • and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 334 — 400; Dec. Dig. § 125.]
    :2. Indictment and Information (§ 86) — Venue.
    Where an indictment for pandering charged that defendant in B. county, Tex., did then and there procure a place for prosecutrix as an inmate in a house of prostitution kept by J., it ■sufficiently charged that the offense was committed in Bowie county, Tex.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment • and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 230-243; Dee. Dig. § 86.]
    •3. Prostitution (§ 1) — Defenses — Prior Misconduct — Reputation.
    In a prosecution for pandering, evidence that prosecutrix had previously lived an immoral life and was willing to accompany ac■cused to the place where she was taken was no •defense.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prostitution, Cent. Dig. §§ 1, 2; Dec. Dig. § 1.]
    4. Witnesses (§ 52) — Criminal Prosecution — Competency of Wife — Testimony Against Husband.
    Under the express provisions of Acts 32d Deg. c. 23, § 3, a wife is a competent witness against her husband in a prosecution for pandering.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 124, 126-136, 165; Dec. Dig. § •52.]
    -5. Criminal LaIw (§ 1091) — Examination of Jurors — Appeal—Record.
    Where it did not appear that the jury or any one of them were not competent, fair, and impartial, the refusal of the court to permit ■counsel for accused to ask certain questions of the jury was not error; the expected answers not being incorporated in the bill.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, ■2819, 2823, 2828-2833, 2843, 2931-2933, 2943; Dec. Dig. § 1091.]
    •6. Criminal Law (§ 1111) — Bill of Exceptions — Qualification—Conclusiveness. Where accused accepted a bill of exceptions as to the alleged admission of certain evidence, so qualified by the court as to show that the •evidence was not admitted, he was bound by it.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2894-2896; Dec. Dig. § 1111.]
    7. Criminal Law (§ 400) — Best and Secondary Evidence — Proof of Marriage-Person Present.
    A marriage may be proved by the evidence of one who testified that she knew the parties, was present at their marriage, and knew that they were married.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 879-886, 1208-1210; Dee. Dig. § 400.]
    8. Trial (§ 81) — Evidence—-Objections.
    It was not error to permit a witness to testify to the marriage of defendant, over the objection that he was drunk at the time.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 193; Dec. Dig. § 81.]
    9. Prostitution (§ 4) — Evidence.
    In a prosecution for pandering, witnesses were properly permitted to testify that defendant first sought to obtain a room at B.’s, and, failing in this, obtained a room at J.’s, both of which were houses of prostitution, that he subsequently carried his wife to each of those places, and the statements made by him on those occasions.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prostitution, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dec. Dig. § 4.]
    10. Criminal Law (§ 346) — Venue—Proof.
    In a prosecution for pandering, alleged to have been committed in B. county, evidence that the house of J., to which defendant took his wife, was situated in B. county, Tex., was admissible to prove the venue.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 786; Dec. Dig. § 346.]
    11. Criminal Law (§ 1120) — Rulings on Evidence — Bills of Exceptions.
    Bills of exceptions showing that certain questions were propounded, but failing to show the answers of the witness, or what it was expected to be proven, present no question for review.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2931-2937; Dec. Dig. § 1120.]
    12. Prostitution (§ 4) — Defenses — Evidence.
    In a prosecution for pandering, evidence of the prosecutrix’s prior immoral character, and that her prior reputation was bad, related to a collateral issue, and was inadmissible as matter of defense.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prostitution, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dec. Dig. § 4.]
    13. Prostitution (§ 4) — Evidence — Subsequent Acts.
    In a prosecution for pandering, evidence as to the place where prosecutrix was placed by another after the prosecution of accused had been begun was inadmissible.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prostitution, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dec. Dig. § 4.]
    14. Witnesses (§ 383) — Cross-Examination —Immaterial Matter — Conolusiveness.
    Where defendant on cross-examination asks a witness a question on an immaterial matter, he is bound by the answer and cannot impeach the witness with reference thereto.
    [Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1224; Dec. Dig. § 383.]
    15. Criminal Law (§ 829) — Triai^-Request to Charge — Instructions Given.
    It was not error for the court to refuse a special charge defining a teym which was fully defined in the main charge.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2011; Dec. Dig. § 829.]
    
      16. Criminal Law (§ 814) — Trial — Instructions — Applicability to Evidence.
    Where, in a prosecution of defendant for pandering, by taking his wife to the house of J., all the evidence showed that prosecutrix while in the house was engaging in sexual intercourse with others than defendant, her husband, and that defendant knew it was a house of prostitution when he placed his wife therein, a request to charge that, if defendant procured a room in the house from J. for the use of himself and wife, and remained in the house for that purpose, he should be found not guilty, though the jury should also find that the house was a house of prostitution, was properly refused as not supported by the evidence.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1821, 1833, 1839, 1860, 1865, 1883, 1890, 1924, 1979-19S5, 1987; Dec. Dig. § 814.]
    17. Prostitution (§ 1) — Pandering — Instructions.
    In a prosecution for pandering, an instruction that, if it was understood between defendant and prosecutrix, his wife, that they should leave H. county and enter a house of prostitution, and they did so enter the house of J., or if they formed such understanding at that time and entered and remained in such house of J., the jury should find defendant not guilty, was properly refused, since, if defendant left H. county with prosecutrix and carried her to B. county with the understanding that she was to enter .a house of prostitution, and he procured her admission thereto, he was guilty, though he did so with her consent and at her request.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prostitution, Cent. Dig. §§ 1, 2; Dec. Dig. § 1.]
    18. Criminal Law (§ 53) — Defenses — Drunkenness.
    Under Pen. Code 1911, art. 41, providing that drunkenness is no excuse or justification for a crime, a request to charge, in a prosecution for pandering, that a person who is in a state of intoxication to such a degree that he does not reasonably comprehend his acts, and is incapable of forming an attempt or design, is not responsible in law for his acts and conduct, was properly refused.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 65; Dee. Dig. § 53.*]
    19. Criminal Law (§ 1172*) — Appeal—Review — Prejudice.
    In a prosecution for pandering, defendant was not prejudiced by the court’s assumption in its charge that the house to which defendant took prosecutrix was a house of prostitution, and in omitting to define “prostitute” and “prostitution”; the meaning of both being too well known to need defining.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3128, 3154-3157, 3159-3163, 3169.; Dee. Dig. § 1172.]
    20. Prostitution (§ 4) — Evidence.
    In a prosecution for pandering, evidence held to sustain a conviction.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prostitution, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dec. Dig. § 4.]
    Appeal from District Court, Bowie County; P. A. Turner, Judge.
    M. A Stevens was convicted of pandering, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    E. Newt Spivey, of Texarkana, and R. D. Allen, of Sulphur Springs, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
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   HARPER, J.

Appellant was indicted under the provisions of section 1, c. 23, of the Acts of the Thirty-Second Legislature, pi 29, and was convicted of pandering; his punishment being assessed at five years’ confinement in the penitentiary.

1. The court did not err in overruling the motion to quash the indictment, as it charged an offense under that article of the Code, and the fact that the indictment charged that he committed the offense in more than one of the modes named in the statute did not render the indictment duplicitous. Moore v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 552, 40 S. W. 287; Reum v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 128, 90 S. W. 1109; Cooping v. State, 7 Tex. App. 61; Howell v. State, 29 Tex. App. 592, 16 S. W. 533; Morris v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 163, 121 S. W. 1112.

The indictment alleges the offense to have been committed in Bowie county, Tex. It states that appellant “in Bowie, county, Tex., did then and there procure a place as an inmate for Goldie Stevens, a female person, in a house of prostitution kept by Ida Joplin,” etc.

2. The court did not err in overruling the application for a continuance. It is stated that he expected to prove by the absent witnesses that the prosecuting witness, Goldie Stevens’, reputation for virtue was bad in Hopkins county just prior to her going to Bowie county, and by one of the witnesses that Goldie Stevens had told her that she had always lived a fast life, and that most of her life she had lived in cities. This would be no defense to procuring her a place as inmate in a house of prostitution, for the statute makes such conduct an offense, whether with or without the consent of the person placed in such house. The fact that she was of such character that she might be perfectly willing to go in such house is not an issue under those grounds of the statute submitted by the court to the jury in his charge.

3. Neither was there any error in the court permitting the witness Goldie Stevens to testify. It is true she was the wife of. defendant, but this act of the Legislature specifically provides that the wife may testify against her husband when charged with this offense. Section 3, c. 23, Acts of. Thirty-Second Legislature.

4. No error is shown in the bill complaining of the action of the court in not permitting appellant’s counsel to ask the jury certain questions. The answers the jurymen would have made are not incorporated in the bill, and no facts stated that would show that the jury or any one of them were not competent, fair, and impartial jurors. Grissom v. State, 8 Tex. App. 386; Scott v. State, 29 Tex. App. 217, 15 S. W. 814.

5. Appellant complains that the court erred in permitting the state to prove by Goldie Stevens that, when leaving Hopkins county on their way to Bowie county, defendant procured her to have carnal intercourse with one Mr. Martin, stating that he needed, the money to get out of the county with her. In approving the hill the judge states: “On cross-examination defendant proved by this witness that she knew Martin, and that defendant left the buggy next to Martin’s house, brought him to her, and that she had carnal intercourse with him, and she gave the money to defendant. I refused the state the right to prove these facts.” As thus qualified, the bill presents no error, and when appellant accepted the bill as thus qualified, and files same, he is bound thereby. Hardy v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 289, 20 S. W. 561; Levine v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 647, 34 S. W. 969; Blain v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 448, 31 S. W. 368.

6. It was not improper to permit Bell Bryant to testify that she was present and saw appellant and Goldie Stevens married, under the allegations in the indictment. The objection made was that it was hearsay and not the best evidence. We know of no better evidence to prove the fact of marriage than one who testifies that she knew the parties, was present at their marriage, and knows they were married. Dumas v. State, 14 Tex. App. 464, 46 Am. Rep. 241.

Neither was it error to permit the witness to testify to the marriage of defendant over the objection that “he was drunk” at the time.

The witnesses were properly permitted to testify that defendant first sought to obtain a room at Bell Bryant’s; failing in this, that he did obtain a room at Ida Joplin’s, and that he subsequently carried his wife to each of these places, and the statements made by defendant on these occasions were properly admitted in evidence.

7. Neither was there any error in permitting the state to prove that the house of Ida Joplin was situated in Bowie county, Tex. The indictment alleged the offense to have been committed by procuring and placing his wife in this house, and the indictment laid the venue in that county.

8. All of those bills which show that certain questions were propounded, but the answer of the witness is not stated, nor what it was expected to be proven, present no question for review.

9. The defendant asked the witness Dock Henderson if “Goldie Stevens, the prosecuting witness, had told him she had carnal intercourse with men before coming to Hop-j-kins county.” Objection of the state to this question was sustained. The bill shows he would have answered that she had stated about three years ago she had carnal intercourse with a young man while she was picking hops. The fact that, while she was living with her father on the farm, the girl had been immoral would be no.defense to a prosecution under this statute. Nor was the girl’s general reputation and chastity in Hopkins county an issue in the case. The issue in this case was, Did appellant procure a place in a house of prostitution for Goldie Stevens as an inmate thereof? and all these extrinsic matters on collateral issues, which had no bearing on that question, were properly excluded by the court.

10. Nor was it permissible to show where Goldie Stevens was placed by another after the prosecution of this defendant had been begun. Events taking place subsequent to the commission of this offense would not be admissible unless they tended to throw some light on the transaction for which defendant was being prosecuted. -It seems by a number of these bills that, while the state was prosecuting defendant, defendant’s counsel desired as a part of their case to prosecute his wife, but she was not on trial for any offense.

11. Where the defendant on cross-examination asks a witness a question on an immaterial matter, he is bound by the answer, and will not be permitted to impeach the witness. Hart v. State, 15 Tex. App. 202, 49 Am. Rep. 188; Hill v. State, 18 Tex. App. 665; Rosborough v. State, 21 Tex. App. 672, 1 S. W. 459.

12. The court in his main charge properly defined a house of prostitution, and there was no error in refusing the special charge relating thereto.

There were many special charges asked, one reading: “You are instructed that, if you believe from the evidence in this cause that the defendant procured a room from Ida Joplin for the purpose, use, and benefit of himself and his wife, Goldie Stevens, and remained in said house for said purpose, use, and benefit, you are instructed that you will find the defendant not guilty, although you should find that said house was a house of prostitution.”

Another reads: “If you believe from the evidence in this cause that it was understood between the defendant and Goldie Stevens that they should leave Hopkins county and enter a house of prostitution, and did so enter the house of Ida Joplin, or if you believe they formed such understanding at any time, and with such understanding did enter and remain in the house of Ida Joplin, you will find the defendant not guilty by your verdict.” The first of these was properly refused because there was no evidence upon which to base it. All the testimony shows-that Goldie Stevens, while in this house, was receiving men and engaging in adulterous intercourse with them, and appellant knew it waa a house of prostitution when he placed his wife therein. The second is not the law, under this statute, for if he left Hopkins county with her and carried her to Bowie county, with the understanding that she would enter a house of prostitution, and he procured her admittance to such house, he would be guilty, even though he did so with her consent and at her request.

13. Appellant also requested the court to charge the jury: “Yo.u are instructed that a person who is in a state of intoxication to such a degree that he does not reasonably comprehend his acts and incapable of forming an attempt or design is, in a case of pandering, not responsible in law for his acts and conduct.” This is not the law. Drunkenness is no longer an excuse or justification for crime in this state. Article 41 of the Penal Code. Many other special charges were requested, and we have carefully considered each of them, and none of them present reversible error, viewed in the light of the charge of the court.

14. Nor was it error for the court to charge the jury: “To procure, with or without her consent, a place as inmate in a house of prostitution for a female person would constitute pandering.” This is one of the definitions of pandering as laid down in section 1, c. 23, Acts of Thirty-Second Legislature. All definitions of the offense in the court’s charge are in strict accord with the statute, and the court did not err in refusing the special charges requested in relation thereto.

15. The court committed no hurtful error in assuming in his charge that the house of Ida Joplin was a house of prostitution. The evidence, and all the evidence, including that of defendant, shows this to be an undisputed fact. It was not necessary for the court to define the meaning of the words “prostitution” or “prostitute.” The meaning of these words is too well known and understood by all men to need defining.

16. There are some 48 assignments of error, many of them presenting the same question, only in different form. We cannot see that any useful purpose will be served by taking up and discussing each of them separately. Suffice it to say that we have carefully read and considered each of them. The evidence would show that Goldie Stevens, the prosecuting witness, was living with her father in Hopkins county. That she and defendant fled from that county in the nighttime and went to Texarkana. Arriving there, defendant slept with her one night and carried her to the Arkansas side and there married her. That he procured a room at the house of Ida Joplin, well known as a house of prostitution, and carried his wife to this room immediately after the marriage ceremony. That she engaged in receiving men at this house and copulating with them; the evidence being amply sufficient to show that it was with the knowledge and consent of appellant. She says she turned the money thus received over to appellant, and a witness testifies that, after making arrangement to spend the night at this house with appellant’s wife, appellant went with him after his baggage, and, while on the way to the hotel to get it, appellant told him “that the girl he (the witness) had made arrangements to spend the night with was his (appellant’s) wife; that he had her at this house making money for him. That she was a green country girl and did not know much about the ways of the world, and did not know how to dance or act in a whorehouse, but that the madam would soon teach her, and when she learned he would take her to a big city and she could make lots of money for him.” Appellant in his testimony, it is true, denies some of this testimony, but his testimony conclusively shows that he knew he had carried his wife to a house of prostitution, and she was having intercourse with other men. The testimony of Bell Bryant and others shows that he procured her admittance to the house and in person carried her there. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the jury assessed the maximum penalty fixed by law, and, after careful consideration of the entire record, we are of the opinion that the motion for new trial points out no reversible error.

The judgment is affirmed.  