
    Patricia KLOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 10-4448-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 27, 2011.
    Patricia Klos, pro se, Flushing, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Varuni Nelson, Kathleen A. Mahoney, Scott R. Landau, Seth D. Eichenholtz, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, B.D. PARKER, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Patricia Klos, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment granting the motion of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and thereby upholding the Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review district court orders granting motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) de novo. Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir.2003). When reviewing determinations made by the Commissioner, we conduct a plenary review of the administrative record. See Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir.2008); see also Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 500-501 (2d Cir.1998) (noting that the focus of review is the administrative ruling, not the district court’s decision). Moreover, we may set aside the Commissioner’s decision only if the factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision was based on legal error. See Burgess, 537 F.3d at 127. “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 127. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, after having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the district court’s judgment. The evidence in the record concerning Klos’s conditions, along with her own testimony, provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination that she was not disabled under the Act during the relevant time period (March 17, 2000-December 31, 2005).

In addition, the new evidence that Klos submitted to the district court did not warrant remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Tirado v. Bowen, 842 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir.1988). As the district court correctly determined, much of the new evidence was cumulative, and, in any event, it was not material to Klos’s disability claim for the reasons set forth in the district court’s opinion and order. Although medical evidence that postdates an ALJ’s decision is not per se irrelevant, see Pollard v. Halter, 377 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir.2004), the letters from Drs. Marin and Kamel here did not indicate that Klos’s condition was more serious than previously thought.

We have considered all of Klos’s remaining arguments and find them to be unavailing. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  