
    Kirby vs. Lee.
    In a suit before a justice of the peace to recover a penalty given by statutfe, strict conformity to the statute is not necessary in describing the offence; nor is it necessary that the warrant should conclude against the form of the statute; it is sufficiently certain if the warrant shows what the party is called upon to answer, and thereby precludes the plaintiff from giving evidence of another and different cause of action.
    This is a suit by warrant, before a justice of the peace. The warrant is in the following words, to wit,
    “State of Tennessee,
    “White County.
    “To any lawful officer to execute and return; whereas complaint has been made by Richard Kirby to me, Charles Reeves, an acting justice of the peace for said county, that one John J. Lee, of said county, miller, did not grind a grist of corn for him, the said Richard Kirby, in its proper turn, but on the reverse thereof, ground for others, which came to the mill long after the grist of the said Richard Kirby was placed in the hands of the said John J. Lee. These are therefore to command you to summon the said John J. Lee to appear before me, or some other justice of the peace, for said county, to answer the said Richard Kirby of a plea of debt, due by penalty, three dollars, by reason of the premises ”
    On the trial of the suit before the justice, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, for three dollars and costs, from which judgment the defendant appealed to the circuit court. In the circuit court a motion was made by defendant Lee, to quash the warrant, because it did not describe the offence, according to the statute, or conclude, contrary to the form of it.” The circuit court quashed the warrant, and gave judgment for Lee, the defendant, from which judgment of the circuit court Kirby, the plaintiff, prayed an appeal in the nature of a' writ of error to this court, and prosecuted the same in forma pauperis.
    
    
      A. Lcine, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Samuel Turney, for defendant in error.
   Catron, Ch. J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

The statute of 1777, ch. 23, sec. 10, requires a miller to grind in turn, and if he failed to grind according to turn, for every such offence he shall forfeit and pay three dollars to the party injured; to be recovered before any justice of the county wherein such offence is committed,with costs.

The circuit court on motion quashed the warrant, because it was holden not to conform to the statute, or con-elude against it.

In proceedings before justices against millers, the sta--tute gives an action of debt for the penalty, in which no further description of the offence is necessary in the warrant, than to notify the defendant in a plain and sensible manner, why he is sued, so that he may bring proof to defend himself. In these causes there is no pleading; the_ warrant is a mere notice to appear before the justice and there go to trial viva voce, when the plaintiff must prove his cause of action, giving the justice jurisdiction, and authorising a recovery: but if the warrant gives no notice of the cause of action, it will be quashed, unless amended, because the plaintiff might have given in evidence, not that his grist was ground out of turn, but an account for goods sold, work and labor, or any other matter: or before the justice, one cause of action might be given in evidence, and if insufficient, and judgment went for the defendant, the plaintiff might appeal and in court set up a different demand, and recover the debt, and all costs.. Did the warrant, therefore, give notice to the defendant Lee, of the cause of complaint; so that he might come prepared to make his defence: and second, did it preclude the plaintiff from harassing the defendant with any cause of action he might elect to rely upon at the trial? If so, it was'error to quash the warrant. We think, in these respects, it was sufficiently explicit to authorize a trial on the merits of the claim, and' that the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for a trial to be had before the circuit court.

Judgment reversed.  