
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Keat Shaun WINGATE, Defendant—Appellant.
    No. 04-4540.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: Oct. 14, 2005.
    Decided: Nov. 7, 2005.
    
      Langdon D. Long, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan S. Gasser, Acting United States Attorney, Stanley D. Ragsdale, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM:

Keat Shaun Wingate appeals his sentence of 262 months of imprisonment imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). Counsel has filed an Anders brief asserting that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the district court complied with the requirements of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 when it accepted Wingate’s plea, and whether it erred in sentencing Wingate as a career offender pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 4B1.1 (2002). Wingate was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, and did so, raising a claim pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). Because we conclude that Wingate’s sentence was enhanced based upon facts not charged in the indictment or admitted by Wingate, we vacate his sentence and remand.

In United States v. Booker, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the Supreme Court applied the rationale of Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines and held that the mandatory guidelines scheme that provided for sentence enhancements based on facts found by the court by a preponderance of the evidence violated the Sixth Amendment. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 746-48, 755-56 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). The Court remedied the constitutional violation by severing and excising the statutory provisions that mandate sentencing and appellate review under the guidelines, thus making the guidelines advisory. Id. at 756-57 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). Subsequently, in United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir.2005), this court held that a sentence that was imposed under the pre-Booker mandatory sentencing scheme and was enhanced based on facts found by the court, not by a jury (or, in a guilty plea case, not admitted to by the defendant), constitutes plain error that affects the defendant’s substantial rights and warrants reversal under Booker when the record does not disclose what discretionary sentence the district court would have imposed under an advisory guidelines scheme. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546-56. The court directed sentencing courts to calculate the appropriate guidelines range, consider that range in conjunction with other relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp.2004), and impose a sentence. If the district court imposes a sentence outside the guidelines range, the court should state its reasons for doing so. Id. at 546.

Because Wingate did not object to the sentencing range of 262 to 327 months of imprisonment determined by the district court, we review the district court’s guidelines calculation for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); Hughes, 401 F.3d at 547. Under the plain error standard, Wingate must show: (1) there was error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Even when these conditions are satisfied, this court may exercise its discretion to notice the error only if the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 736. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Wingate’s base offense level was properly determined and is supported by the drug quantity alleged in the indictment and included in the factual basis stated at Wingate’s plea hearing, with which he explicitly agreed. However, Wingate also received a five-level enhancement of his offense level for career offender, pursuant to USSG § 4B1.1. We conclude that the imposition of this enhancement was error under the Sixth Amendment as applied in Booker, because the facts supporting this enhancement were not alleged in the indictment or admitted by Wingate, and because, absent this enhancement, Wingate’s guidelines range would have been 135 to 168 months, below the range in which Wingate was sentenced.

In his Anders brief, counsel also asserts error in the district court’s acceptance of Wingate’s plea. We find that Wingate’s plea colloquy was proper and conducted in accordance with the law. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 117, 120 (4th Cir.1991).

As required by Anders, we have examined the entire record and find no other meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm Wingate’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing in accordance with Booker and Hughes. We grant leave to Wingate to file his pro se supplemental brief and deny his motion to relieve his attorney. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED 
      
      . See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).
     
      
      . Just as we noted in United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 545 n. 4 (4th Cir.2005), "[w]e of course offer no criticism of the district judge, who followed the law and procedure in effect at the time” of Wingate’s sentencing.
      
        See generally Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (stating that an error is plain’ if "the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal”).
     
      
      . Although the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory, Booker makes clear that a sentencing court must still "consult [the] Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” 125 S.Ct. at 767. On remand, the district court should first determine the appropriate sentencing range under the guidelines, making all factual findings appropriate for that determination. See Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546. The court should consider this sentencing range along with the other factors described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000), and then impose a sentence. Id. If that sentence falls outside the guidelines range, the court should explain its reasons for the departure as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (2000). Id. The sentence must be "within the statutorily prescribed range ... and reasonable." Id. at 546-47.
     