
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jobeth Lester DEJESUS, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 17-50024
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted  January 16, 2018
    Filed January 29, 2018
    Janet Cabral, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Nicole Ries Fox, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Lauren Cusitello, Esquire, Crossroads Justice Center of San Diego, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jobeth Lester DeJesus appeals from the sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for possession of images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

DeJesus contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to acknowledge its discretion to reject the child pornography guidelines on policy grounds under Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), and by providing an insufficient explanation for the sentence. The record reflects that the district court recognized its Kim-brough discretion, considered Dejesus’s arguments regarding his mental health, and adequately explained the below-Guidelines sentence. See United States v. Ayala-Nicanor, 659 F.3d 744, 752-53 (9th Cir. 2011).

DeJesus next argues that the 51-month term of imprisonment is substantively unreasonable because the district court gave too much weight to the .Guidelines, The district court properly considered the Guidelines as a starting point and initial benchmark, as required by. Molina-Martinez v. United States, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1345, 194 L.Ed.2d 444 (2016), and then gave due consideration to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Dejesus’s sentence, which is substantively reasonable in light of the 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

Finally, DeJesus contends that the 10-year term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this term of supervised release in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the need to rehabilitate DeJesus. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     