
    Perla A. HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-15563
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 13, 2018 
    
    Filed February 27, 2018
    Perla A. Hernandez, Pro Se
    Amy F. Sorenson, Attorney, Snell & Wilmer LLP, Salt Lake City, UT, Kelly Harrison Dove, Esquire, Attorney, Karl 0. Riley, Esquire, Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, Andrew Martin Jacobs, Esquire, Attorney, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee
    Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, 'and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Perla A. Hernandez appeals pro se from the district court’s judgement dismissing her action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Hernandez’s FDCPA claims because Hernandez failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Wells Fargo is a “debt collector,” and because the alleged communications were not attempts to collect a debt as defined by the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (defining “debt collector”); Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2013) (establishing that debt collection is part of a defendant’s business is insufficient to state an FDCPA claim); Ho v. ReconTrust Co., NA, 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A]c-tions taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure ... are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.”); Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “while the FDCPA regulates security interest enforcement activity, it does so only through Section 1692f(6),” and that “[a]s for the remaining FDCPA provisions, ‘debt collection’ refers only to the collection of a money debt”).

The district court properly dismissed Hernandez’s remaining claims because Hernandez failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), 1681s-2(b); Hall v. SSF, Inc., 112 Nev. 1384, 930 P.2d 94, 98 (1996) (elements of claims for negligent hiring, and negligent training and supervision); PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 615, 895 P.2d 1269, 1279 (1995) (ele-merits of invasion of privacy claim), overruled on other grounds by City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Hecht, 940 P.2d 134, 138 (1997).

We do not consider matters not properly raised before the district court, or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and, argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We do not consider documents not presented to the district court because they are not part of the record on appeal. See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     