
    Richard Colvin vs. Elisha Warford, et al.
    
    On the hearing of a motion to dissolve an injunction, and discharge a receiver, the allegations of the answer, so far as the same are responsive to the allegations of the bill, must be taken as true.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore city.
    The bill iti this case, filed on the 25th of June 1860, by the appellees against the appellant, alleges that the complainants, as eight out of eleven heirs at law of Rachel Colvin, instituted an ejectment suit in the Superior court of Baltimore city, and obtained a verdict and judgment in their favor for eight-elevenths of the real estate of the said Rachel; that the defendant is in possession of all said veal estate, claiming as devisee under a will of said Rachel, which had been admitted to probate, but which was found to be invalid by the verdict and judgment in said ejectment suit, and has been so in possession since the 6th of August 1855, the date of said probate. The bill further alleges (hat the defendant has received and appropriated to his own use the rents of said estate, not only from the said 6th of August, but for a period before that time, viz., from the 9th of February 1853, while said real estate was in (he hands of receivers; that said rents and profits during said period amount, after proper allowances, to between $50,000 and $60,000, for the payment of which, to them, they allege they have no security. They also allege that the defendant is heavily indebted, and his property mortgaged, and that he is engaged in business transactions by which he may lose, in addition to the heavy losses he has already met with, and that they have just cause of apprehension that, in the event of an affirmance of the judgment in ejectment, from which the defendant has appealed, or upon other final settlement of the controversy between them and the defendant, they will sustain great loss by his inability to refund the rents received, or which he may hereafter receive. The bill then prays a discovery by the defendant of all the rents and profits since the 9th of February 1853, and that he may bring the same into court, and that a receiver should be appointed fo take possession of all said real estate, and to manage the same, and to collect all the rents thereof pending the controversy to the title thereto between them and the defendant. It also prays an injunction against the defendant, prohibiting him from intermeddling in any manner with the said estate, or collecting the rents thereof, and that the tenants may be prohibited from paying any rents to him.
    Upon this bill an injunction was granted, and a receiver appointed, as prayed.
    The answer of the defendant-, under oath, among others things, denies that the net rents during the entire period, exceeded $5000 per annum, and alleges that the amount received by him from rents of said real estate, cannot exceed. $35,000, to be reduced by large outlays and payments, which-are specially set forth, and for which he claims allowance ins any claim for rents and profits against him. He denies that he has met with heavy losses, except from the litigation prolhoted by the complainants, or that he is engaged in any business which will expose him to pecuniary losses of importance, and he expressly alleges that he has belonging to. him, besides and in addition to the real estate devised to him*, by the said Rachel, property much more than sufficient to pay any liability which can be established against him, and that his entire liability at this time, except for the alleged claim of the complainants, does not exceed $100,000, while-his property, without including the real estate from the said Rachel Colvin, is fully worth- $200,000. The answer also-, sets out at length many other, facts and reasons why the injunction should not have been granted, and the receiver appointed, all of which need not now be stated, and. also denies-the jurisdiction of the court over sucha case.
    Upon the filing of this answer, a motion was made to dissolve the injunction, and rescind tlie order appointing the receiver. But the court, (Krebs, J.,) on the hearing of this-motion, on the 14’th of July 1860, overruled the same, and the defendant then appealed from the order granting the-injunction and appointing a receiver, and also from the order of the 14th of July 1860, overruling his motion to dis— solve the injunction and to rescind the appointment of the receiver.
    (Decided October 29th, 1861.)
    The cause was argued before Le Grand, 'G. 3., Tuck, Bartol and Goldsborough, J.
    id W. Brum and Win. Schhy, for the appellant, and 6r. Ij. Dulany, for the appellees.
    The arguments upon either side were confined to the question of the propriety of granting the injunction and appointing the receiver, and the jurisdiction of the court. As this question was not decided by this court, these arguments need not be reported.
   Bartol, J.,

delivered the opinion of this court.

It is unnecessary for this court to determine whether, upon the case stated by the bill of complaint, an injunction was properly granted by the circuit court, and a receiver appointed. We are ail of opinion that there was error in the subsequent order of the 14th of July I860, refusing to dissolve the injunction, and continuing the same, and refusing to rescind the order appointing a receiver.

Whatever equity the complainants may have had under their bill, to claim the interposition of the court in their behalf, upon the ground of apprehended danger to their interests, in the event of their ultimate success in the action of ejectment now pending, has been taken away by the answer of the appellant, which, under the rules governing proceedings in chancery, must be taken as true, so far as the same is responsive to the allegations of the bill. See Code, Art. 16, sec. 103. A decree will be signed reversing the orders of the circuit court, dissolving the injunction, and discharging the receiver, and remanding the cause.

Orders reversed and cause remandedt  