
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT,
    COLUMBIA,
    NOV. 1802.
    Hammond v. Barber.
    Parol evidence of a contract for the sale of lands is inadmissible upon-the trial of an issue ordered by the court of equity, although the issue is upon a wager, and the court of equity had directed that such evidence should be admitted at the trial.
    This was a feigned issue directed to be made up by the court of equity, and tried by a jury, to ascertain certain matters of fact in controversy in the court of equity respecting a parol agreement for land, which was in part executed, and confessed by the defendant, in his answer, but stated to have been different from what the plaintiff had alleged in his bill. The declaration was in the usual form of such issues, and stated a wager for the purpose of determining the matters in dispute. The court of equity had gL ven directions relative to the evidence which should be allowed upon the trial, and particularly that parol evidence of the verbal contract for the land should be admitted, and that the defendant, should be allowed the benefit of his answer in equity, to the plain-, tiff’s bill, in evidence on the trial.
    At the trial, before Bay, J., at Lancaster district court, in November, 1802, it was objected for the defendant, that it would b& against the statute of frauds and perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, P. L„, 82, to admit any evidence to establish a parol contract concerning land, or to shew that a conveyance, which was alleged to have been imposed on the plaintiff, by the defendant, fraudulently, ought to have been differently expressed, to answer the agreement of the parties by parol. The objection was sustained by the presiding judge, who refused to follow the directions of the court of equity: and the plaintiff thereupon submitted to a nonsuit, with leave to move to set it aside in the constitutional court.
    In this court it was argued, that in all cases where the court of equity directs an issue at law to inform the conscience of that 1 ^ . . . court on any point of fact, it is usual to give directions as to the evidence to be allowed upon the trial of such question ; and the issue is always made up upon a wager. The consent of the parties is always understood, to admit the wager, and the evidence directed to try it; for if cither party should refuse to consent to the terms imposed by the court of equity, that court would decree against him. Therefore, in this case, the court ought not to have allowed the defendant to object to the evidence directed to be received on the trial. Besides, there could be no impropriety in admitting the evidence offered, which did not go establish, or to invalidate a contract for the sale of land, by parol, but only to determine a wager. The title to lands could not be affected by the question in the district court. The court of equity,- to be sure, might make use of this decision to guide them in doing equity in the cause depending in that court. But this court will not refuse to determine a wager, under an apprehension that the court of equity should take occasion- from such decision to establish a parol agreement concerning land, contrary to the statute of frauds.
    Falconer, for plaintiff. Blandujo, for defendant.-
   Brevard, J.,

having been of counsel for the plaintiff in this case, delivered no opinion. The other judges were of opinion for the defendant, and supported the determination of the district court.

Motion refused!  