
    *Edward Tuite v. William Miller.
    Where dower exists but is not assigned at the time a conveyance is made, a subsequent decree against the grantee to pay an annual sum for dower, is no breach of the covenants in the deed of conveyance that the grantor is the lawful owner and has good right to convey, nor of the common warranty.
    Equity has no jurisdiction to enforce the specific performance of the covenant of warranty.
    This is a bill in chancery from the superior court of the city of Cincinnati.
    It sets forth, that in April, 1836, Miller conveyed to the plaintiff a lot in Cincinnati, by deed, containing the following covenants :
    1. That he was the lawful owner.
    2. That he had good right to sell.
    3. The common warranty.
    The bill proceeds to relate, that Elizabeth Satterthwaite, in 1838, filed her bill in the common pleas, topbtain an assignment of dower in these premises; that dower was ordered by decree, and the land being found incapable of division, the payment of the sum of $66, in half-yearly installments, was imposed as an annual charge upon it, in the hands of the plaintiff, and on failure of payment, so much of it as necessary was ordered to be sold on execution. He therefore asks relief, and his counsel at bar asks a decree for the specific execution of the covenants.
    Wright, Walker and Miner
    insisted that the covenants are broken, and that the complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and, to sustain these positions, cited King v. Kerr’s Adm’rs, 5 Ohio, 154; Waldron v. McCarty, 3 Johns. 471; Kortz v. Carpenter, 5 Johns. 120; Kerr v. Shaw, 13 Johns. 236 ; Greenby & Kellogg v. Wilcocks, 2 Johns. 1; Hamilton v. Wilson, 4 Johns. 72; Co. Inst. 315, n. 3 ; Delavergne v. Norris, 7 Johns. 358 , Stanard v. Eldridge, 16 Johns. 254; Hall v. Dean, 13 Johns. 105; Smith v. Shepard, 15 Pick. 147; Hamilton *v. Cutts, 4 Mass. 349 ; Abbott v. [383 Allen, 14 Johns. 248 ; Stone v. Hooker, 9 Cow. 154; Day v. Chism, 10 Wheat. 449; 19 Vin. Ab. 306; Dane’s Ab, C. 104, 3; Morris v. Phelps, 5 Johns. 49 ; Mitchell v. Warner, 5 Conn. 497 ; Lockwood v. Sturdevant, 6 Conn. 373; Thomas v. Perry, Pet. C. C. 49; Wheeler v. Hatch, 3 Fairfield, 389 ; Backus v. McCoy, 3 Ohio, 211.
    Equity will décree a specific performance of covenants, and its mode of administering relief is peculiarly adapted to cases like this. Allen v. Deschamps, 13 Ves. 228; Iggulden v. May, 9 Ves. 333; Willan v. Willan, 16 Ves. 84; Furnival v. Crew, 3 Atk. 89; Davis v. Hone, 2 Sch. & Lef. 340; Johnson v. Nott, 1 Vern. 271.
    Riddle and Roll, for the defendant,
    insisted that there was no eviction or disturbance of the possession, and that if the complainant had any remedy, it was at law. King v. Kerr3s Adm’rs, 5 Ohio, 154; Kortz v. Carpenter, 5. Johns. 120; Waldron v. McCarty, 3 Johns. 471; Hamilton v. Cutts, 4 Mass. 348.
   Lane, C. J.

There is a well-established chancery jurisdiction over certain covenants. The chancellor will exercise a restraining power where the covenantor, contrary to his stipulation, disturbs the tenant by his own act; and he will enforce the specific performance of the covenant for further assurance. But we find no case of interference on this side the court, in relation to the covenant of warranty. This absence of precedent, although not conclusive, is a strong argument against the plaintiff’s right to relief.

In cases, too, of covenants real, any innovation of the settled construction of the parties’ rights should be made by courts with great caution. The parties select their own covenants, and the liability of the defendant is not to be extended beyond the intendment of those by which he binds himself. It would have been easy for them to have inserted the covenant against incum384] brances, under which -the plaintiff would have *found an easy protection. But he has no rights, except those which arise from other stipulations, and we must examine if the defendant has incurred any liability under them.

The two first, viz: “that he was the lawful owner,” and had good right to convey,” are not broken ; for at that time he held the estate, and it passed by the deed; the interest of the dower was not then a vested estate, but an interest contingent and uncertain, which might never be set up.

There remains nothing but the covenant of warranty. The rule is universal, that no right of action arises under this covenant, except after an eviction, or something which, is equivalent. King v. Kerr’s Ad’mrs, 5 Ohio, 154. But all the rights which the party is authorized to claim exist at law, and admit entire compensation in damages. Whatever difflcultiés may bo in the way of the plaintiff, in seeking indemnity against this rent charge, it seems to us that to extend the defendant’s liability beyond that of responding in damages, after an eviction, or its equivalent, would be to extend it beyond the settled terms of the covenant. Bill dismissed.  