
    Hughes v. Hall.
    Decided February 20, 1817.
    1. Superior Court of Chancery — Jurisdiction—Service of Process. — The several Superior Courts of Chancery have jurisdiction in cases where their process is served, upon the defendant, within their respective Districts; though his x>lace of residence, and a! so the land in controversy be in a different District.
    To a Bill exhibited by the Appellant in the Superior Court of Chancery for the Richmond District against the Appellee, he pleaded, on Oath, “that the Hand in the said Bill mentioned, relative to which the Complainant prays for a specific execution of the Contract in the Bill mentioned, lies in the County of New Kent; and the said alleged Contract, relative to said Hand, was made and entered into in the said County of New Kent; and this defendant also alleges that he himself at the time of the institution of the said suit, in which the said Bill is filed, and for a long time before, and at this time, was and is an inhabitant of and resides in the said County of New Kent; and that the said suit, so instituted against this defendant as aforesaid, ought to have been, if brought in a Superior Court of Chancery, brought in the Superior Court of Chancery holden at Williamsburg, and not in this Honourable Court;” &c.
    Chancellor Taylor, being of cpinion, “that, since, by the 12th section of the Act, entitled, “an Act concerning *the High Court of Chancery,” it is clear that, wherever there may be more than one defendant in a suit, the same may be instituted in that district, where either of the defendants may reside, it would seem to follow, as clearly, that, if there be but one defendant, a suit against him should be in the district of his residence, or the obvious intention of the legislature might be frustrated,” therefore dismissed the Bill with Costs; declaring, also, “that this opinion did not in anj' manner conflict with the principle of any case heretofore decided in this Court.”
    Whereupon the plaintiff appealed.
    William Hay, jr. for the Appellant.
    The case may be stripped of every thing relating to the locality of the subject in controversy. To give the Court jurisdiction, it is not necessary that the Band should lie within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court.
    Equity acts upon the person, and not upon the thing, and, where the person is amenable to its process, may take jurisdiction concerning Lands, even in foreign states,  The single question then is, whether, upon general principles, or the construction of the Acts of Assembly, the defendant should have his domicil within the district. This is not necessary upon general principles. Equity, acting upon the person, may act whenever the person is within the reach of its process. There is no venue in a Bill in Equity. The Equity, whatever it may be, attaches upon the person, and is as transitory as the cause of action for an assault and battery,  I will proceed, then, to review the Acts of Assembly.
    By the law constituting the late High Court of Chancery,  it was not necessary, to give the Court jurisdiction, that the defendant should have his domicil within the State. That Court had “general jurisdiction over all persons and all causes in Chancery,” &c. to be exercised, of course, upon the general principles of equitable jurisdiction, so far as not restrained by the Act itself: there is nothing in the Act requiring residence in the defendants. Quoad the case in question, then, that Court had jurisdiction. Now, by the provisions of the Acts, arranging the present Districts, the Judges of the Courts, thereby constituted, have ‘‘the same jurisdiction within their Districts,” which the Judge of the High Court of Chancery *had anterior to the passage of those acts. Jurisdiction, then, is expressly conferred in the case in question; because the Judge of the High Court of Chancery would have had it unless the words ‘ ‘within their Districts,” ex vi terminorum, require residence, or there be other words, in the Act, requiring it. They do not. Their effect is to restrain the execution of process, without the local limits of the jurisdiction, unless in a case, where there are defendants residing in different Districts; but not to take away jurisdiction, where the defendant is found within the limits.
    There is an analogous clause in the County Court Daw.  General jurisdiction is conferred upon the County and Corporation Courts, in Chancery and Common DaW, ‘‘within their respective Counties and Corporations.” It has never been questioned that a County Court, in transitory actions at common law, and in suits in equity, had jurisdiction, if the defendant could be served with process in the County, although he might reside in a different County. The provision concerning Bail, in the 23d section of the Act, directing, “that no Bail shall be demanded on a Writ of Capias ad respondendum, which shall be issued against a resident of one County in any other, until a non est inventus has been returned in the County or Corporation, in which the defendant resides, ” is a recognition of the right to sue the defendant in any County, in which he may be found. It does not, indeed, confer this right, but is a recognition of jurisdiction already conferred. By what words of the Act? There are none which can have this effect, but those just recited, conferring jurisdiction upon the Courts “within their respective Counties and Corporations.” These words, then, and the words, “within their Districts,” in the Chancery law, do not restrain the jurisdiction to cases of residence, within the limits, upon the part of the defendants.
    The only other clause in the Act, necessary to be noticed, is that, providing that, where there are several defendants residing in different Districts, suit may be instituted in either District, and process may be sent to the other District. Some rule was necessary to be established in a case of this kind, which might frequently occur, and in which there would be difficulty in proceeding; for the other defendants might not *come within the District, so as to be served with process: what was then to be done? The Act provides for the case, and authorizes process to be sent without the District. This, and this alone, is the object of the clause.
    Nicholas for the Appellee.
    This is a question of Jurisdiction. The Dand in controversy lies out of the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court at Richmond; and the defendant is a resident out of the District.
    It is a general principle that the Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity can only operate in personam, or in rem. The first is where the defendant is within the jurisdiction ; the second where the Dand or other property is; as in the case of Attachments against absent defendants. Under the original jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery, its jurisdiction being coextensive with the State, no question could arise, as to the residence of the defendant. Wherever the process could be served, the Court had jurisdiction. But the case is different now. The Preamble to the Act of January 23d 1802, (1 R. C. p. 426,) speaks of the delays, inseparable from that Court, as producing the division. The object, then, was to distribute the jurisdiction, so as to divide the persons, on whom it was to operate. Otherwise, if a man trav-elling through a District could be sued, one of the Courts might absorb all the jurisdiction, and thus renew the evil, intended to be abolished.
    The 11th section of that Act, and also the 1st section of the supplemental Act, of February 2d 1802, (1 R. C. p. 428,) which prescribes the rule for distributing the suits then pending in the High Court of Chancery, shews plainly that, in determining the jurisdiction, the Degislature chiefly regarded the place of the defendant’s residence. If this be not attended to, the great object of the Degislature must be defeated. Similar provisions, too, are introduced into the subsequent laws farther dividing the Chancery Districts. All those laws, which are to be considered in pari materia, shew clearly the intention of the General Assembly, that a defendant should not be sued out of his Chancery District; and, being remedial laws, such construction should be given them, as will promote the case of suitors and public convenience; not such, as would defeat the great object, they had in view.
    
      Hay in reply.
    The instance mentioned by Mr. Nicholas, in which a Court of Equity acts in rem, to wit, the proceeding in foreign Attachment, rather confirms than weakens my position. The proceedings in that case are authorized by Statute; anterior to which there is no instance of a Court of Equity exercising the jurisdiction conferred by it.
    It is not pretended that there is any express provision in the Act requiring residence, but only a strong implication, that such was the intention of the Degis-lature, from the various clauses relating to the arrangement of the papers, and from the obvious policy of the law. Some rule was necessary to be established for that purpose, to control the arbitrary discretion of the Clerk; and none was more convenient, than the one adopted.
    Besides, the implication, however strong, cannot have the effect contended for. It is a sound rule of construction, that the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be ousted by impiication, but must be expressly taken away.
    As to the policy of the law, Mr. Nicholas seems to think that it was intended for defendants alone. This surely was not the case. If it be an evil for a defendant to travel a great distance to the Court, it is as great an evil for a plaintiff. The argument founded on the policy of the law then proves nothing.
    
      
      See generally, monographic note on “Courts” appended to Cropper v. Com., 2 Rob. 842.
      • The principal case was cited with approval in Lawrence v. DuBols, 16 W. Ya. 466.
    
    
      
       Ld. Cranslown v. Johnston, 5 Vesey 1r. 182; Farley v. Shippen. Wythe’s Rep’ts. 136; Guerrant y. Fowler Harris, i I-T. & M. 6.
    
    
      
       Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk. 687.
    
    
      
       1 R. C. ch. 64, § 8.
    
    
      
       1 R. C. ch. 67, § 5.
    
    
      
       Sup. to R. C. ch. 95, sect. 14: Acts of 1813 — 14, p, 44, sect. 3 and 7.
    
   February 20th, 1817.

JUDGE ROANE

pronounced the Court’s opinion, that the Decree be reversed, the plea to the Jurisdiction over-ruled, and the cause remanded for farther proceedings.  