
    SHAW v. LANE.
    Injunction; Supersedeas; Appeal and Error; Moot Questions; Equity; Prayer for General Belief.
    1. A decree dismissing a bill for an injunction cannot be superseded and the status quo of the subject-matter of the suit maintained, except under the provisions of rule No. 74 of the equity rules for the courts of the United States, promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, November 4, 1912 (22G U. S. G70), which is binding upon the courts of this District.
    2. An appeal from a decree dismissing a bill for an injunction docs not disturb the operative effect of the decree or operate as a stay of the proceedings; so that if, during the pendency of an appeal from such a decree dismissing a bill to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from approving and delivering certain mineral leases of Indian -lands, the Secretary approves and delivers the leases, the appeal will be dismissed as presenting only a moot question.
    3. A prayer for general relief in a bill in equity is in aid of the specific grounds enumerated, and is limited to the objects of the bill.
    4. Where, pending an appeal from a decree dismissing a bill in equity to enjoin the approval and delivery of certain mineral leases by the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary approves and delivers the leases, the fact that the bill epntains a prayer for general relief will not permit this court to take jurisdiction to determine whether a mandatory injunction should not be granted to compel the Secretary to cancel the leases for' the excess or abuse of discretion in approving and delivering them. (Citing Cardoza v. Baird, 30 App. D. C. 80.)
    No. 3047.
    Submitted November 8, 1917.
    Decided December 3, 1917.
    Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a decree of the Supremo Court of tbe District of Columbia dismissing a Dill in equity to enjoin the Secretary of tbe Interior from approving and delivering certain mineral leases to Indian lands.
    
      A firmed.
    
    
      The facts are stated in the opinion.
    
      Mr. Charles A. Towns, Mr. Duane TJ. Fox, Mr. Frank Houghton Fox, Mr. Norton K. Fox, and Mr. Benjamin F. Spellman, for the appellants, in their brief cited:
    
      Addyston Co. y. United Stales, 175 F. S. 211; Anchor v. Howe, 50 Fed. 866; Angel! v. Angell, 28 it. 1. 592; A tty. (Jen. v. Broten. 1 Swan, 265; Ally. Gen. v. Heelis, 2 Sim. k Stu. 67; Ally. (ten. x. Dublin, 1 Pligli, N S. 312; Barbour v. Cummings, 26 P. I. 201; Bound v. South Car. 11. (Jo. 50 Fed. 853; Bucksfaff v. Hicks, 94 Wis. 34; Col lister v. Fassili, 168 N. Y. 281 ; Sinking Fund Commissioners v. Walker, 6 IIow. (Miss.) 143; Corn. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 ; Conley r. Ballinger, 216 F. 8. 84; Cromie v. Hull, 81 Ky. 646; Daniels v. 'Wagner, 287 F. S. 547; Del a plains v. Lewis, 19 Wis. 500; Demising v. McNulla, 86 Fed. 825 ; Ding man v. Beall, 218 111. 238; Dunbar v. Souls, 129 Hass. 284; Dakin v. Raid), 12 S. k II. 330; Filis v. In-man Co. 131 Fed. 182; Worming v. Gamble, 316 lud. 45S; Tnglisx. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 8 Pot. 99; Jones v. Jones, 30 N. Y. Supp. 177; Keeler v. Trnuer, 78 Ivan. 388; Lake Shore £ M. S. 11. Co. x. Ohio, 173 F. S. 285; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 F. S. 873 ; Mitford x. Ileynolds, 1 Phil. 185; Morrison v. Lane, App. 1). O., No. 2908, April, 1916; New v. Bonaker, F. P., 4 Fq. 655; O’Neil v. American F. Ins. Co. 166 Pa. 72; Patterson v. Banning, 62 Neb. 681; People x. Draper, 15 N. Y. 582 ; President, of United States x. Drummond, see Whicken x. Hume, infra; Price v. Bassett, 168 Mass. 598; Read x. Patterson, 44 N. J. Eq. 211; Schaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598; 8loo v. Law, Fed. Cas. No. 354; 8tale x. Denny, 118 Ind. 382; State x. Merrill, 2 Piimey, 279; State v. Rusk, 21 Wis. 214’; Stephenson x. Norris, 128 Wis. 242; Trout v. Pratt, 106 Ya. 481; United States x. Chesapeake Co. 105 Fed. 93, 115 Fed. 610; United Slates x. Colorado Anthvacile Co. 225 TI. S. 219; United Stales x. Mille. Luc Hand, 229 F. S. 498; United Slates x. Munday, 186 Fed. 875; United Slates x. Swift £ Co. 196 F. S. 875; Wade v. Fisher, 89 App. F>. C. 245; Whicken v. 
      
      Hume, 7 H. L. Cas. 124; Whitwell v. Tobacco Co. 125 Fed. 454; Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425.
    
      Mr. Charles D. Mahaffie and Mr. C. Edward Wright, for the appellee, in their brief cited:
    
      Black feather v. United States, 190 IT. S. 368; Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 IT. S. 294; Cherokee Nation v. Journeycakej 155 IT. S. 196; Cherokee Trust Funds, 117 IT. S. 188; Conley v. Ballinger, 216 IT. S.'84; Fleming v. McCurtain, 215 IT. S. 56; Garfield v. United States, 211 ti. S. 249; Grills v. Fisher, 37 App. D. C. 473, 229 IT. S. 640; Hayes v. Barringer, 168 Fed. 221; Ligón v. Johnston, 164 Fed. 670; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 IT. S. 553; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 IT. S. 445; United Stales v. Aaron, 18-3 Fed. 347; United Stales ex ret. Brown v. L,ane, 40 App. D. C. 533; Wade v. Fisher, 39 App. D. C. 245.
   Air. Justice Van Oesdel

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This appeal [by Franklin Shaw and John F. Palmer] is from a decree of the supreme court of the District of Columbia dismissing a bill for injunction to restrain Franklin K. Lane, the Secretary of the Interior of the United States, from approving and 'delivering certain mineral leases of property belonging to the Osage tribe of Indians in the State of Oklahoma, under authority of section 3 of the Act of Congress of June 2S, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 539, chap. 3572).

It appears that pending appeal the leases had been approved and delivered. It is contended, therefore, that, since the sole purpose of the suit was to restrain the Secretary from approving the leases, and no action was taken by the court below to preserve the status quo pending appeal, there is only a moot question presented, and the appeal should accordingly be dismissed. The decree dismissing the bill could not be superseded and the status quo preserved except by an order of the court in accordance with equity rule No. 74, 226 U. S. 670, as follows: “When an appeal from a final decree, in an equity suit, granting or dissolving an injunction, is allowed by a justice or a judge who took part in 1he decision of the cause, he may, in his discretion, at the time of such allowance, make an order suspending, modifying, or restoring the injunction during the pendency of the appeal, upon such terms, as to bond or otherwise, as he may consider proper for the security of the rights of the opposite; party.” This is a rule applicable generally to the Federal courts of the country, specially authorized by act of Congress, and is binding upon the courts of the District of Columbia.

This is a clear case, where appellants applied to the court for a restraining order, which was denied, and no stay of proceedings was had pending appeal. The rule is without exception that, where appeal is taken from a decree dismissing a bill for injunction, and pending appeal the act sought to be restrained is done, the appeal will not operate as a stay of proceedings. “The general rule is null settled that an appeal from a decree granting, refusing, or dissolving an injunction, does not disturb its operative effect. Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 161, 27 L. ed. 888, 891, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136; Slaughterhouse Cases, 10 Wall. 273, 297, 19 L. ed. 915, 922; Leonard v. Ozark Land Co. 115 U. S. 465, 468, 29 L. ed. 445, 446, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 127. When an injunction has been dissolved, it cannot be revived except by a new exercise of judicial power, and no appeal by the dissatisfied party can of itself revive it. A fortiori, the mere prosecution of an appeal cannot operate as an injunction where none has been granted.” Knox County v. Harshman, 132 U. S. 14, 33 L. ed. 249, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8.

But it is urged that, inasmuch as plaintiffs’ bill contains a prayer for general relief, the court has power to order the Secretary of the Interior to cancel the leases, whether they be found to be void or merely voidable for the excess or abuse of discretion in approving and delivering them. But such a decree would not be consistent with the object of the bill, and would be ineffectual, in that it would disturb the rights of the lessees who are not before the court. A suit to restrain an official from doing a particular thing cannot be revised on appeal into an action to compel the undoing of the act sought to be restrained. A mandatory decree cannot be passed upon a bill the sole object and prayer of whieli is for restraint. “The tilings sought to be prohibited have been done, and cannot be undone by any order of this court or the court below.” Cardoza v. Baird, 30 App. D. C. 86. A prayer for general relief is in aid of the specific grounds enumerated, and is limited to the objects of the bill. The bill having been dismissed, and no action taken to preserve the status of the case made by the bill pending appeal, this court is without jurisdiction to revive it and grant relief either general or special.

The appeal is dismissed without prejudice, with costs to the appellee. Dismissed.

An appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was allowed on February 16, 1918.  