
    WHITAKER v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 5, 1911.
    On Motion for Rehearing, April 26, 19110
    1. Criminal Law (§§ 1092, 1099) — Appeai>— Bills of Exception — Statements of Pact —Time of Piling.
    The act of 1907 (Acts 30th Leg. c. 7), which provides that 20 days shall be allowed after the adjournment of the term of the county court in which to file bills of exception and statements of fact, and not the act of 1909 (Acts 31st Leg. c. 39, §§ 6, 7), which providestfor official stenographers in certain courts, other than the county courts, and for a greater allowance of time than 20 days after adjournment, and for extensions, fixes the time in which bills of exceptions and statements of fact must be filed, in appeals from the county court.
    [Éd. Note. — Por other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. §§ 1092, 1099.]
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    2. Larceny (§ 15) — Offenses — Conversion by Bailee. •
    Where the purchaser of land moved into possession, and the seller left certain harvester canvases on the land, because not ready to move them, and there was no false pretext used by the purchaser to obtain possession of them, his subsequent theft of these canvases is the crime defined by Pen. Code 1895, art. 877, making a fraudulent conversion by bailee theft, and in a prosecution for such conversion the defendant should be tried under the bailment statute, and charges presenting the issue of theft by a bailee should be given.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Larceny, Cent. Dig. §§ 39-42; Dec. Dig. § 15.]
    Appeal from Donley County Court; J. H. O’Neall, Judge.
    John A. Whitaker was convicted of a misdemeanor theft, and be appeals. Reversed and remanded.
    Cooper, Merrill & Lumpkin, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for tbe State.
    
      
      For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   DAVIDSON, P. J.

Appellant was convicted of a misdemeanor theft, having been tried in tbe county court.

There was an order entered by tbe court, allowing 30 days after the adjournment of the term in which to prepare a statement of facts and bills of exception. Before the expiration of the 30 days, appellant applied for and obtained an extension of time. The statement of facts and bills of exception were filed before the expiration of the extended time. The Assistant Attorney General insists that the statement of facts in this condition of the record cannot be considered, and we are of opinion that his contention is correct. The act of 1907 (Acts 30th Leg. c. 7) prescribes that 20 days shall be allowed after the adjournment of the term of the county court in which to prepare these papers, ana that appeals from county courts are governed by that law, and not by the act of 1909 (Acts 31st Leg. c. 39, §§ #7). The act of 1909 only relates to courts where official stenographers are employed, and not to county courts where they are not authorized by law to take down the testimony. In those courts where official stenographers are used, it was evidently the purpose of the law to extend sufficient time in which the statement of facts and bills of exception may be filed. Under that law the parties to the case cannot prepare the statement of facts, or at least the law proceeds upon the theory that, as the notes were taken stenographically, parties to the case are unprepared te make a statement of facts, and the stenographer is required to reduce the stenographic reports to narrative form, or put it in such language, at least, that the parties may be able to understand the report of the evidence and bills of exception.. In other words, the law relieves the parties to the case from making out the statement of facts after they have been transcribed by the stenographer, and the extension of time beyond the 30 days was allowed because of the inability of the parties to transcribe the stenographic notes; but this rule does not apply to county courts. The responsibility of making out the statement of facts is upon the parties to the case, and not on the stenographer. Therefore the statement of facts will not be considered.

There were several special charges requested, as well as exceptions taken to the court’s charge. The requested instructions were refused. We are of opinion the matters set out in bills of exception as being erroneous cannot be reviewed, in the absence of statement of facts, as they all pertain to matters sought to be brought before the jury by the special charges.

In the condition of the record, we are of opinion, therefore, no such error has been brought to the attention of the court that can be reviewed, and the judgment will be affirmed, and it is accordingly so ordered.

On Motion for Rehearing.

On a former day of this term, the judgment herein was affirmed without consideration of the statement of facts. That mattefc is sufficiently explained in the original'opinion. Since the affirmance appellant lias made a motion for a rehearing, asking a consideration of the facts, which we think is sufficient, and entitles him to a rehearing on tiie merits of his case.

The evidence shows that one of the alleged owners, Smith, sold appellant the place occupied by Smith, in Donley county. Appellant moved upon and took possession of the place. Smith vacated the place. When Smith moved his effects, he left what is termed in the statement of facts some “harvester aprons’’ or “canvases,” stating to appellant that he was not ready to move them, and if it did not inconvenience him (appellant) that he would like to leave them in the barn or under a shed. To this appellant agreed, and the harvester aprons -or cahvases were left. Subsequently trouble arose between them, which resulted in a cancellation of their contract in regard to the sale of the place.

The state’s contention is that appellant appropriated or committed theft of these aprons or canvases. This was denied by appellant, and evidence was introduced in support of the conflicting issues. Smith testified that with the consent of appellant the property was left in appellant’s barn, and that appellant had no authority to use the aprons. Appellant agrees to this part of Smith’s evidence, but denies taking Smith’s property, and accounts for those found in his possession by stating that he purchased same in Oklahoma before moving to Texas.

The pleadings charged theft under the general statute. Appellant’s contention is that under the state’s evidence it is not theft under the general statute, but under the bailment statute. Under the facts introduced by the state, there is nothing to indicate, if the goods belonged to Smith, a fraudulent intent on the part of appellant at the time he obtained possession, or rather at the time the property was left on his place in his barn. There was no false pretext used to obtain possession, and in fact the state’s evidence excludes the idea there was such pretext. It is beyond any question from the state’s evidence that the property was left in appellant’s possession at the request of Smith. These facts, if they prove any case for the state, would prove it with reference to bailment. The property was sufficiently under the control of appellant by authority of Smith, and at Smith’s request, to bring appellant’s possession within . the statute of bailment. Article 877, Penal Code 1S05.

Appellant reserved exception to the court’s charge submitting the issue of general theft, and presented the issue in regard to bailment, which the court refused to sustain. We are of opinion the court was in error. Appellant, if guilty, is so under the statute with reference to conversion by bailment, and not under the general statute. See Penal Code, art. 877; Nichols v. State, 28 Tex. App. 105, 12 S. W. 500; Taylor v. State, 25 Tex. App. 96, 7 S. W. 861; Cunningham v. State, 27 Tex. App. 479, 11 S. W. 485; Fulcher v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. R. 621r 25 S. W. 025; Williams v. State, 30 Tex. App. 155, 16 S. W. 760; Long v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 464, 46 S. W. S21, 73 Am. St. Rep. 954; Maíz v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 447, 34 S. W. 267, 37 S. W. 748. Appellant was entitled to a charge under article 877 of the Penal Code. He should have been tried under this article, and not under the general statute.

The affirmance is set aside, the motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment is now reversed, and the cause remanded.  