
    CLARK’S APPEAL.
    Where the holder of a judgment note transfers it for value before-the judgment debtor obtains a judgment against him, the latter judgment cannot be set-off against the former.
    Appeal from Common Pleas of Luzerne County, No. 99 July Term, 1884.
    Mrs. Samuel Clark borrowed from Patrick Quinn $106 on August 31st, 1875. He boarded with her at the time. On June 12, 1879, he entered up the note, and issued execution thereon on January 29,1881. Certain goods levied on were-claimed as belonging to her husband’s estate. On February 11th, 1881, Mrs.' Clark brought suit before a Justice of the Peace against Patrick Quinn for board; and on February 16th,. 1881, the Justice gave judgment in favor of Mrs. Clark for $140. Patrick Quinn then appealed to the Common Pleas. On February 13, 1883, the jury rendered a verdict against-Quinn and in favor of Mrs. Clark for $148.21; and judgment was entered thereon on September 27th, 1883. Patrick Quinn, however, had owed William Nilón about $40 for board; and on June 1st, 1882, transferred the judgment against Mrs. Clark for $106 and interest in payment of his debt of $40. After the judgment in favor of Mrs. Clark wTas rendered, Nilón issued execution. Mrs. Clark then obtained a rule to set off the judgments; which, however, was discharged in the following opinion, per
    Woodward, J.
    This seems to be a hard case for the plaintiff, and if we could grant her the relief sought, without violating our duty to the-law, we would gladly do so. But it seems that Quinn assigned his judgment against her to Nilón some months before she obtained her own judgment, and this assignment was founded on a legal consideration existing between the parties. This, under the authorities, disposes of the right of set off, and the rule must be discharged. We refer to Horton vs. Miller, 44 Pa., 256; Ramsey’s Appeal, 2 Watts, 228; Hopkins vs. Beebe, 26 Pa., 85. The rule is discharged.
    Mrs. Clark then tendered to Nilón the sum of $45.30, being the full amount of Quinn’s indebtedness to Nilón, with interest and costs, and, on his refusal to accept the same, took a rule to offset the balance of the judgment, after payment of the $45.30, with the judgment obtained by her. The Court discharged the rule.
    
      J. L. Lenahan and E. G. Butler, Esqs., for appellant,
    argued that an insolvent debtor like Quinn is not allowed to transfer his sole asset to one creditor at one quarter of its value; and. cited Kaine vs. Weigley, 22 Pa., 179; Redfield vs. Dysart, 62 Pa., 62; Harman vs. Reese, 1 Browne, 11; Covanhovan vs. Hart, 21 Pa., 495; Bank vs. Carter, 38 Pa., 446; Streeper vs. Eckart, 2 Wh., 302; Hopkins vs. Beebe, 26 Pa., 85.
    
      S. J. Strauss and J. McGahren, Esqs., contra,
    
    argued that if the consideration is valuable, the Court will not, in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, inquire whether it is adequate; Harlan vs. Harlan, 20 Pa., 303. They also cited Mellon’s Appeal, 1 Gr., 212. Horton vs. Miller, 44 Pa., 256, and Hopkins vs. Beebe, 26 Pa., 85.
   The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of Common Pleas on April 27th, 1885, in the following opinion :

Per Curiam.

When a debtor owes several persons he may transfer property to one creditor to pay the debt due him, and the latter may take and hold the same, although he knows his debtor owed' other persons and could not pay all of them. There is no evidence of any fraud in this case. In the absence of a bankrupt law, a creditor may be preferred as was done here.

Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant.  