
    Joseph Pearson vs. James B. Davis.
    In caso of eviction, by title paramount, the measure of damages is the price paid for the land, with interest.
    Consequential damages cannot be recovered for any inconvenience or loss which the vendee may sustain in his improvements, however expensive or permanent. (The case of Henning, Executor, v. Withers, (3 Brev. Rep. 458,) considered and confirmed.)
    See 1 Bay. 18, 92, 265. 3 Bus. 2 Tread. 584. 1 McC. 384, 466. 2 McC. 413. Chir. 128. An.
    
    Before Earle, J., at Fairfield, Fall Term, 1840.
    Assumpsit on a note of hand, given for the purchase money of a tract of land, conveyed by the plaintiff to the defendant.
    The defendant, by suit at law, had been evicted, by title paramount, of twelve acres, lying about the middle of the tract, and running in a narrow slip, nearly through it; the defendant, by way of discount claimed an abatement, not only for the actual value of the land thus recovered from him, in proportion to the price given for the whole, but additional damages for the injury and inconvenience which the person in possession must suffer.
    I overruled this latter claim, and instructed the jury to allow an abatement pro tanto, for the actual value of the land, who found accordingly.
    *CROUNDS OP APPEAL.
    1. That the presiding Judge erred in charging the jury, that they could not allow the defendant any discount beyond the value of the deficient land.
    2. Because the verdict was contrary to law and evidence.
   Curia, per

Earle, J.

The Act of 1824, provides that incases, “ the true measure of damages shall be the amount of purchase money, at the time of alienation, with legal interest.” Such has been the settled rule at law, since the case Furman vs. Elmore, The defendant, under his discount, has under that rule, been allowed damages, proportioned to the actual value of the land recovered from him. Independently of the Act, and the previous settled rule, it would be difficult to sustain, on any principle, or by any argument, the proposition, that damages could be recovered for the inconvenience complained of, as resulting from the loss, in addition to the value of the land. The standard of damages should not only be uniform, but such as to enable it to be applied to every case of eviction, by title paramount. There is no reason why the rule for assessing damages, where the land recovered lies in one part of the tract conveyed, should be different from what it would be if the land lay in another place. Indeed, it is a conclusive answer to the proposition, to say, that there can be no standard, or rule, for assessing damages, for the inconvenience here complained of. They are altogether speculative and uncertain. If it should suit the interest of the vendee to sell the remainder of the tract in two parcels, then there is no damage at all. If he cultivates on one side only, the inconvenience is trifling ; if on both sides, it is greater. If a person were to purchase a tract of land adjoining one whereon he resided, and should be evicted from a portion of his purchase, nearest his residence, he too might claim additional consequential damages, to a greater amount than if the loss accrued on the side of the tract most remote ; and in every case, the assessment would depend on the accidental circumstances of residence and cultivation. It is well settled, that a vendee cannot recover for actual improvements, however expensive or permanent; and for a much stronger reason, he should not be allowed to recover for a mere inconvenience, arising from a change in the shape of his tract, or the Relative position of his fields. This question was settled in the case of Henning vs. Withers, (3 Brev. Rep. 458) which was very well considered. The defendant purchased a tract of land, with a stream of water running through it, on which, but lower down, and without the boundaries of the tract, he built a saw mill. He was evicted by title paramount, of a narrow strip of the land, on the side nearest the mill, and extending across the stream ; in consequence of which, he was obliged to lessen the height of his dam, and of course the quantity of water in his pond ; whereby the profits of his saw mill were greatly diminished. Being- sued on the bond for the purchase money, he claimed by way of discount, not only an abatement for the actual value of land, but for the consequential damage, resulting from the loss, in its effect upon the profits of the mill. But it was held, the whole Court concurring, that he was entitled only to an abatement for the value of the land.

Woodward, for the motion. Fair, contra,

The motion is refused :

the whole court concurring. 
      
       4 Stat. 238. An.
      
     
      
       2 N. & McC. 189. An.
      
     