
    William Vannerson vs. Julius Culbertson.
    iThe great rule.of interpretation of wills is, that the intention of the testator must be ascertained from the language employed, and must be carried into effect if not inconsistent with the rules of Iawv| In seeking for the intention, words are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another, can be collected.
    Where a clause of a will was in the following words : “I give, devise and bequeath to my beloved wife, Mary Purnell, for her life to her exclusive use, during the term of her natural life, in lieu of her dower and distributive share, in and to my real and personal estate in the state of Mississippi, the mansion-house occupied by us as our residence, and the tract of land on which said house stands, and all the outbuildings, improvements and appurtenances thereunto belonging; together with all the furniture, plate, carriages, horses, mules, stock, garden and farming utensils, servants, slaves and chattels, now used or engaged in and about said dwelling-house and premises, or either of them, and constituting any part of our said dwelling establishment on said premises, or the cultivation of the same; and that upon my said wife’s death, said land and mansion-house shall go to my said son Thomas and his heirs;” and there was no other portion of the will affecting the sense of these words ; it was lieli, that.the wife did not have an absolute interest in the slaves therein bequeathed to her, but took only a life estate in them.
    Error from the circuit court of Adams county; Hon. Thomas A. Willis, judge of the second judicial district, presiding.
    This was an action of detinue, brought by William Vanner-son against Julius Culbertson, to recover certain slaves claimed under the will of Levi Purnell. The plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: “ That by the will of Levi, his wife Mary took an absolute interest or fee simple in the slaves therein bequeathed to her.” The court refused to give the instruction, and the plaintiff excepted. The whole controversy turned upon the construction to be given to the following clause in Purnell’s will:
    “ I give, devise and bequeath to my beloved wife, Mary Pur-nell, for her life, to her exclusive use during the term of her natural life, in lieu .of her dower and distributive share in and to my real and personal estate in the state of Mississippi, the mansion-house occupied by us as our residence, situated in said county, between one and two miles from the city of Natchez, and the tract of land upon which said house stands, containing about two hundred and eleven acres, and all the outbuildings, improvements and appurtenances thereunto belonging; together with all the furniture, plate, carriages, horses, mules, stock, garden and farming utensils, servants, slaves and chattels, now used or engaged in and about said dwelling-house and premises, or either of them, (the grown servants and slaves being between twenty-five and thirty in number,) and also besides, Walter, and constituting any part of our said dwelling establishment on said premises, or the cultivation of the same; and that upon my said wife’s death, said land and mansion-house shall go to my said son Thomas and his heirs.”
    The jury found for the defendant below; and the plaintiff prosecutes this writ of error.
    
      L. Madison Day, for plaintiff in error,
    Contended that the widow was barred of her dower by the devise of the realty, and the limitation on that did not extend to the personalty; together with was strictly an appendative adverb, and could not, grammatically speaking, transfer the regimen of the preceding clause, except that in relation to the act of giving. He cited, Hodgson v. Ambrose, Doug. 341; How. & Hutch. 351, § 39 ; 1 Jarm. on Wills, 432-434; 2 Ibid. 744; Dong. 759 ; 1 Iredell’s Rep. 166-170 ; 4 McCord’s R. 60 ; Breioster et al. v. McCall’s Devisees, 15 Conn. 274-291; Lutz v. Lutz, 2 Blackf. 72; 3 Dessaus. 517; Areson v. Areson, 5 Hill, 410; 7 Blackf. 490; 18 Pick. 537-539; 12 Wend. 602, 660-662. ,
    
      The intention must prevail. 6 Peters R. 75 ; 17 John. 281-288; 1 Munf. 537; 2 How. S. C. Rep. 577, 578; 7 Cond. Eng. Ch. Rep. 305; 2 B. Mon. R. 314-316; 12 Mass. 427; 8 Port. 197; 22 Maine, 257; Richards v. Baker, 2 Atk. 320-323; 1 Atk. 470.
    The testator did not contemplate dying intestate as to any part of his property; this is shown by the preamble of the will and by the very making of the will; and yet no remainder over of this property is made. Cowp. 657 - 661; 6 Durnf. & East, 277 ; 7 Blaclcf. 488, 490; 2 Dessaus. 32, 576;'3 Ibid. 168, 169; 2 How. S. C. Rep. 577, 578; 12 Mass. 427; 1 Call’s Rep. 127; 2 Humph. 50; 10 Yerg. 25; Reeves v. Reeves, 1 Dev. Eq. Rep. 386 ; Stehman v. Stehman, 1 Watts, 466, 475 ; 1 Jarm. on Wills, 769; 1 Mon. R. 27; 2 Dev. Eq. Rep. 391; 17 John. R. 283-289, n. a.; 2 Dev. &. Batt. 481; 6 Binn. 94; 14 East, 370; 18 Pick. 539; 12 Wend. 660-662 ; 1 Call, 114; 1 Watts, 466; 2 Dev. Eq. 387; Yaughan, 289; 3 Burr. 1634; 4 Mass. 214; Sisson v. Seabury, 1 Sumn. 235 ; 1 S. & M. Ch. 591; Roper on Leg. 453; 2 Dev. & Batt. 479 ; 4 Hawks. 215 ; 4 Paige, 115; 9 Ibid. 94; 1 Dana, 206; 1 John. Ch. R. 498; 1 Dev. &• Bat. Eq. Cases, 115, 116.
    
      Prentiss and Bullock, on same side.
    
      J. F. Route, on same side,
    Insisted that, as there was no remainder over of the slaves -and other personalty, it was an absolute bequest to the wife; and relied on the authorities cited by Mr. Day.
    
      J. T. McMurran, for defendant in error,
    Contended that a life estate in the slaves was all that was given by the will; that such was only the fair as well as grammatical construction of the language. He cited Lush v. Bennett, 1 Atk. 470, 471; Richards v. Baker, 2 Atk. 320, 321; How. & Hutch. Dig. 39, §29; 6 Peters, 68-78; 2 Wash. Circ. Ct. R. 417; 4 Ibid. 631; Frederick v. Hall, 1 Yesey, jr. 396; 3 Lomax’s Dig. 120, 121; Cowp. 657 - 661; 6 Durnf. & E. 610-613; 1 Jar. on Wills, 740, § 5, et seq.
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case involves the construction of the will of Levi Pur-nell, deceased. Upon the trial in the court below, the plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury, “ that by the will of Levi Purnell, his wife Mary took an absolute interest or fee simple, in the slaves therein bequeathed to her.” This instruction the court refused to give, and the propriety of that decision is the only question for this court to determine.

A great number of cases was read upon the argument, to show what is the true meaning of the will; but unless precisely the same words are used in both wills, and in the same connection, adjudicated cases can give but little aid in exposition. The great rule of interpretation is, that the intention of the testator must be ascertained from the language employed in the will, and must be carried into effect, if not inconsistent with the rules of law. In seeking for the intention, words are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another, can be collected. Good faith and common sense alike sanction these rules. 2 Jarman on Wills, 738, et seq.; Lieber’s Legal Herman. 120. When there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for interpretation.

The clause of the will, which has given rise to the controversy, is in these words : I give, devise and bequeath to my beloved wife, Mary Purnell, for her life to her exclusive use, during the term of her natural life, in lieu of her dower and distributive share in and to my real and personal estate in the state of Mississippi, the mansion house occupied by us as our residence, and the tract of land on which said house stands, and all the out-buildings, improvements and appurtenances thereunto belonging; together with all the furniture, plate, carriages, horses, mules, stock, garden and farming utensils, servants, slaves and chattels, now used or engaged in and about said dwelling house and premises, or either of them, and constituting any part of our said dwelling establishment on said premises, or the cultivation of the same, and that upon my said wife’s death, said land and mansion house shall go to my said son Thomas and his heirs.”

To our minds there is neither ambiguity nor obscurity in this language. The testator expressly limits the duration of the estate to the life of his wife. If he has made no farther disposition of the slaves, the law makes it for him. He might have known this, and have been satisfied with that destination ; or there may be an unintentional omission to dispose of the remainder after the life estate ; but in either event, this court can neither supply words, nor add to the plain meaning of those employed. There is no other portion of the will which affects the sense of the words in this clause.

The judgment is affirmed.  