
    PEOPLE v POOL
    Docket No. 109488.
    Submitted October 19, 1989, at Detroit.
    Decided November 15, 1989.
    Anthony L. Pool was charged with unarmed robbery and pled guiliy in Recorder’s Court of Detroit to larceny from a person pursuant to a plea agreement that his sentence would be a prison term of from three to ten years. At the sentencing hear neither the prosecution nor defendant raised the subject of the sentencing agreement. The trial court, Thomas J. Brennan, J., sentenced defendant to a prison term of from IY2 to 10 years. The prosecution did not object to the sentence at the time of imposition; however, the prosecution moved to vacate the sentence about a month later, citing the sentencing agreement. The trial court vacated the sentence and sentenced defendant to a prison term of from three to ten years in accordance with the plea agreement. Defendant’s motion to vacate the second sentence was denied. Defendant appealed.
    The Court of Appeals held:
    
    A trial court has authority to resentence a defendant only where the original sentence is invalid. The fact that defendant’s first sentence was not in accord with the sentence agreement did not render it invalid. Accordingly, the trial court was without authority to set aside the original sentence and impose the second sentence.
    Sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.
    Criminal Law — Sentencing — Resentencing — Plea Bargains.
    A trial court has authority to resentence a defendant only where the sentence originally imposed is invalid; accordingly, a trial court may not set aside an otherwise valid sentence and impose a harsher sentence merely because the sentence originally imposed was not in accordance with a plea agreement made _between the prosecutor and the defendant._
    References
    Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 485, 581, 583.
    Power of state court, during same term, to increase severity of lawful sentence—modem status. 26 ALR4th 905.
    
      State Appellate Defender (by Anne Yantus), for defendant on appeal.
    Before: Maher, P.J., and Marilyn Kelly and H. E. Deming, JJ.
    
      
       Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
    
   Per Curiam.

Defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of larceny from a person, MCL 750.357; MSA 28.589. In exchange for the plea, the prosecutor dismissed the original unarmed robbery charge, MCL 750.530; MSA 28.798. The parties agreed to a sentence of three to ten years in prison.

The trial judge sentenced defendant to a prison term of IV2 to 10 years. He noted that defendant’s record was not that bad and that he had a good relationship with his family. The prosecutor did not object to the sentence. Neither party raised the subject of the sentence agreement.

About a month later, the prosecutor moved to vacate the sentence. He argued that it was a violation of the sentence agreement. The judge acknowledged that he had made a mistake. He vacated the original sentence and resentenced defendant to three to ten years. He denied defendant’s subsequent motion to vacate the second sentence.

On appeal defendant argues that the trial court did not have authority to resentence him. We agree.

A trial court’s authority to resentence a defendant is limited. It depends on whether the previously imposed sentence is invalid. People v Whalen, 412 Mich 166, 169; 312 NW2d 638 (1981). We are unable to find any authority which holds that a sentence which does not follow the sentence agreement is invalid. Even where there is a sentence agreement, the trial court is not bound by it and must still exercise discretion when imposing sentence. People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189; 330 NW2d 834 (1982). Since defendant’s original sentence was valid, the trial court did not have authority to resentence him.

Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for reinstatement of his original sentence of IVi to 10 years in prison.  