
    Fausto Enriquez Illescas CASTRO, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    16-895
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    November 17, 2017
    FOR PETITIONER: Gregory Osakwe, Hartford, CT.
    FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Jesse Matthew Bless, Senior Litigation Counsel; Barbara Joan Leen, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
    
      PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, GERARD E. LYNCH, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Fausto Enriquez Illeseas Castro (“Castro”), a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of a March 16, 2016, decision of the BIA affirming an October 23, 2014, decision of an Immigration Judge (“U”) denying Castro’s application for withholding of removal. In re Fausto Enriquez Illescas Castro, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. March 16, 2016), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. Hartford Oct. 23, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA — that is, without regard to the IJ’s determination regarding credibility. Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014).

To establish eligibility for withholding of removal based on membership in a particular social group, an applicant must establish both that the group is legally cognizable, Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 2007), and that the applicant has suffered past persecution or has demonstrated a likelihood of future persecution on account of his membership in that group, Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2010). A particular social group is cognizable if “the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014). The group must be “discrete and have definable boundaries — it must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.” Id. at 239. And the group “must be perceived as a group by society.” Id. at 240.

We conclude that the agency did not err in finding that Castro failed to show that his proposed particular social group of “young Ecuadorian men who resist recruitment efforts by criminal.gang members” was cognizable. Castro offered no evidence that individuals who oppose forced gang recruitment are viewed by the relevant society as a distinct group and the record is devoid of documentary evidence discussing the treatment of such individuals as compared to the rest of the relevant country’s population. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (providing that burden of proof for withholding of removal is on alien); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 244 (“[T]he applicant has the burden to establish a claim based on membership in a particular social group and will be required to present evidence that the proposed group exists in the society in question.”).

The agency’s determination that Castro failed to establish a cognizable particular social group is dispositive of withholding of removal. Accordingly, we decline to reach the agency’s additional finding regarding the likelihood of harm. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  