
    FEI XU, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, on behalf of NING ZHANG, Appellee.
    No. 4D12-2823.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 18, 2013.
    Fei Xu, Brookings, South Dakota, pro se.
    Carrie R. McNair, Tallahassee, for ap-pellee.
   WARNER, J.

Appellant appeals an order denying his motion contesting the interception of his federal tax refund to offset retroactive child support. For the first time on appeal, appellee contends that appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, thus requesting an affirmance based upon a “right for the wrong reason” analysis. We hold that the appellee waived the right to assert failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On the merits addressed by the trial court, we reverse.

In the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, appellant was ordered to pay $1,259.54 a month in child support and an additional $200 per month towards $20,536.20 in retroactive support. Although appellant remained current in his payments, he received a letter from the Office of Child Support Enforcement (“OCSE”) stating that his federal tax refund was subject to interception because of past-due support owed. The letter specifically stated,

You have a right to contest our determination that this amount of past due support is owed, and you may request an administrative review. To request an administrative review, you must contact us at the address or phone number listed above within 30 days of the date of this notice.

(emphasis supplied). Appellant filed motions in the trial court, challenging the letter and the subsequent interception of his federal income tax refund. In his motions, he alleged that he had called OCSE, which informed him that his case would not be submitted to the Department of Treasury, only to find out later that the case was submitted. In contesting the interception on the merits, appellant drew a distinction between retroactive support and past-due arrearages. The trial court denied relief. It did not rule that appellant had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Instead, it ruled that the ar-rearages were required to be reported to the Department of Treasury.

Appellee asks us to dismiss this case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Florida Administrative Code Rule 12E-1.014(4)(e) states, “If the obligor does not ask for an informal review or administrative hearing within 30 days from the date of the notice, the obligor waives the right to contest the certification.” “[I]f adequate administrative remedies are available, it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted.” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Baker v. Baker, 24 So.3d 1254, 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that “appellee was required to pursue his administrative remedies under TRIP [Tax Refund Intercept Program] before challenging any interception of his IRS tax refund in court”). See also Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 792 So.2d 539, 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

On this record, however, it appears that appellant exhausted his remedies. He claims that he called the OCSE, as allowed by the letter which informed him of his right to review. The Department did not raise the exhaustion requirement at trial. The court ruled on the merits of the motion, not on exhaustion. Where the party asserts facts which would support exhaustion, and the Department does not challenge the exhaustion requirement in the trial court, the Department has waived any challenge on appeal. State, Dep’t of Lottery v. Gtech Corp., 816 So.2d 648, 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (where agency did not raise exhaustion of remedies in trial court, its failure to object waives the argument for appeal).

On the merits, we reverse, relying on Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Harper v. Cessford, 100 So.3d 1199, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), which explained that “retroactive child support that is not otherwise overdue does not constitute a delinquency” and thus cannot serve as a basis for intercepting federal tax returns.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

GROSS, J., concurs.

LEVINE, J., dissents with opinion.

LEVINE, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent for a number of reasons. First, in light of the limited record in this case, one cannot conclude what arguments the Department did or did not raise below. The parties filed appendices in lieu of the entire record. Appellant did not submit certain motions, any responses the Department may have filed below, or any transcripts from the hearings. The majority asserts that the Department contends for the first time on appeal that appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Because we do not have a complete record and have only appendices in lieu of the entire record, I believe we cannot say with certainty that this is the first time the Department argued this point. “In appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error.” Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1980).

Second, appellant does not even argue on appeal that the Department waived its right to assert failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It is well-established that issues “will not be considered by an appellate court unless they are properly raised and discussed in the briefs.” City of Miami v. Steckloff, 111 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1959). Where “the appellant[] ha[s] not raised [an issue] in this court, the court itself should not sua sponte reverse the solemn decrees of the court below.” Scott v. Jenkins, 46 Fla. 518, 35 So. 101, 104 (1902). See also Lightsee v. First Nat’l Bank of Melbourne, 132 So.2d 776, 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961) (An appellate court is “not authorized to pass upon issues other than those properly presented on appeal.”); Gladstone v. Smith, 729 So.2d 1002, 1004 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“A pro se litigant should not be held to a lesser standard than a reasonably competent attorney.”).

Third, appellant does not establish through evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedies before seeking relief in the trial court. Therefore, appellant waived the right to contest the interception of his federal tax refund. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.014(4)(e); Dep’t of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Baker v. Baker, 24 So.3d 1254, 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Although appellant alleged in one motion that he had called the Office of Child Support Enforcement, it is well-established that allegations in a motion are not evidence. See Britt v. State, 88 Fla. 482, 102 So. 761, 763 (1924) (“A motion is not evidence of the facts averred in it.”); Hayman v. Weil, 53 Fla. 127, 44 So. 176, 178 (1907) (“[T]his court has held many times that the recital, in a motion of any kind, of facts as a ground for the motion, is not evidence.”). “Facts are established by testimony, affidavits and stipulations.” Rosar-Hemandez v. Hernandez, 979 So.2d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citation omitted).

The principal of exhaustion of administrative remedies is significant. As our sister court has explained:

We are well aware that the doctrine requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. The exhaustion requirement is a court-created prudential doctrine; it is a matter of policy, not of power. Its purpose is to assure that an agency responsible for implementing a statutory scheme has a full opportunity to reach a sensitive, mature, and considered decision upon a complete record appropriate to the issue. In this manner, the exhaustion requirement permits full development of the facts, allows the agency to employ its discretion and expertise, and helps preserve executive and administrative autonomy.
In certain situations, a party may pursue judicial relief without first exhausting administrative remedies. One such exception to the exhaustion doctrine exists where the agency is alleged to have acted without colorable statutory authority and in excess of its delegated powers. This narrow exception is inapplicable, and exhaustion of administrative remedies will be required, where the agency’s assertion of jurisdiction has apparent merit or depends upon some factual determination.

State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Brock, 576 So.2d 848, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (citations omitted). In the present case, the Department did not “act[ ] without colorable statutory authority and in excess of its delegated powers,” as the law permits the Department to intercept tax refunds. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.014.

Of course, had appellant established through evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedies, I would agree with the majority that this case would be like Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Harper v. Cessford, 100 So.3d 1199, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Because appellant failed to establish that he exhausted his administrative remedies, I would affirm the order of the trial court. 
      
      . Additionally, even accepting the facts alleged in appellant’s motion as true, appellant has not established that he timely exhausted his administrative remedies. Appellant was advised in a September 13, 2011 letter that he had thirty days to contact the Office of Child Support Enforcement. In his motion filed to contest the agency's actions, appellant alleged that the trial court entered an order on October 5, 2011 and that "[l]ater the Petitioner called the office of child support enforcement.” (emphasis added). We do not know how many days “later” appellant called and even if the call was placed within the thirty-day timeframe. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.014(4)(e).
     