
    David Lawrence DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Darren R. FRANCIS, individually and in his official capacity as a law enforcement official of the West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory; Thomas Kirk, individually and in his official capacity as the West Virginia State Police Superintendent; Kenneth W. Blake, individually and in his official capacity as Director of the State Police Criminal Identification Bureau; Ted Smith, individually, personal and in his official capacity as the Serology Division Supervisor; Brian K. Cochran, individually and in his official capacity as a law enforcement official of the West Virginia State Police; West Virginia Department of Public Safety; Continental Casualty Company; West Virginia Board of Risk Management, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 00-7658.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 6, 2001.
    Decided Feb. 26, 2001.
    
      David Lawrence Dixon, pro se. Charles Patrick Houdyschell, Jr., West Virginia Division of Corrections, Charleston, WV, for appellees.
    Before WIDENER and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

David Lawrence Dixon appeals from the magistrate judge’s order terminating his civil action filed under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). Because we find that the magistrate judge did not have authority to enter a final, appealable order on this matter, we dismiss the appeal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994), a magistrate judge may enter a final order directly appealable to the court of appeals upon consent of all parties. Otherwise, under § 636(b), a district court must initially review the magistrate judge’s order or proposed findings under either a de novo or clearly erroneous standard of review depending upon the nature of the ruling appealed. Absent an express adoption, modification, or rejection of the magistrate judge’s ruling by the district court, the ruling is generally not reviewable by the court of appeals. See Reynaga v. Cammisa, 971 F.2d 414, 416-18 (9th Cir.1992).

In this case, we find nothing in the record showing that the parties agreed to have Dixon’s complaint decided by the magistrate judge. As a result, the magistrate judge lacked the authority to enter a final order terminating the case. See Gleason v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 777 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir.1985). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and remand to the district court for further proceedings. See Massey v. City of Ferndale, 7 F.3d 506, 510-11 (6th Cir.1993) (dismissing appeal from unauthorized order issued by magistrate judge but remanding to district court for corrective action). We dispense with oral argument because the facts are adequately presented in the material before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED AND REMANDED.  