
    John S. Duval and another versus Israel E. Trask.
    A merchant at Natchez writes to B. in Philadelphia, that, if the bearer of the letter, C., who was the brother of A., should be disposed to purchase goods in Philadelphia, and B. could recommend him to any of his friends, or procure goods for him, he, A., would be responsible for them agreeably' to contract. B. introduced him to the plaintiff, who, on the strength of B.’s assurance of A.’s ability, credited him with goods, taking C.’s promissory note for the amount. The promise of A. was holden to be an original undertaking on his part, collateral to the promise of C. as security ; and not liable to any contingencies, except gross negligence in securing the debt, by means of which the debt might be thrown on the vendor of the goods.
    This was an action of assumpsit, to recover the sum of $ 1659.38 for certain goods sold and delivered by the plaintiffs to one Augustus Trask, at the request of the defendants, and upon his promise to be responsible to them for the payment therefor.
    On the trial, before Jackson, J., upon the general issue, at the last November term in this county, it appeared, that, in the year 1809, the plaintiffs were merchants residing in Philadelphia; and the de fendant resided at Natchez in the Mississippi territory. The said Augustus, who is the defendant’s brother, was then about establishing himself as a merchant at Natchez; and was going to Philadelphia, with the expectation of purchasing goods there. The defendant thereupon wrote a letter, dated on the 17 th of July in that year, addressed to Chandler Price, a merchant in Philadelphia, introducing his said brother, and mentioning his intention of beginning the mercantile business at Natchez. He also mentions, that his brother had shipped goods to the eastward, and that it was uncertain whether he would receive cash for them as soon as he could wish ; and he adds, in the same letter, “ If he should be disposed to purchase * goods in Philadelphia and you can recommend him to [ * 155] any of your friends, or procure goods for him, I will hold myself responsible for them agreeably to contract.” Price had been previously acquainted with the defendant, and considered him to be a man of property, and entitled to credit as such ; but he had never been acquainted with the said Augustus, until the 29th of September, 1809, when he received the abovementioned letter. In consequence of that letter, and from the confidence which Price had in the credit of the defendant, he introduced the said Augustus to the plaintiffs, and to several other merchants in Philadelphia, of whom the said Augustus wished to purchase goods. • The said Price represented to the plaintiffs, and to the said other merchants, that the defendant was fully able to fulfil his engagements ; and testified, on this trial, that they credited the said Augustus entirely on the supposed ability of the defendant. The plaintiffs, in consequence of the said letter of the defendant, and of the said representations of Price, did, on the 27th of October, 1809, sell and deliver to the said Augustus goods to the value of $ 1659.38 ; for which sum he gave them his negotiable note of that date, payable on the 1st of June then next ; which note had never been paid. It did not appear that the plaintiffs had ever demanded payment thereof from the said Augustus ; but they had caused inquiries to be made respecting him, and his ability to pay his debts ; from which it appeared that he was unable to pay them.
    It did not appear that the plaintiffs had ever notified the defendant of the failure of payment on the part of his brother, or demanded payment of the money from the defendant, until the 19th of July, 1812 ; at which time the defendant resided at Brimfield in the State of Massachusetts. On that day they wrote him a letter, to which he replied in a letter, dated the 26th of the same July. In that letter, after mentioning his brother’s neglect to pay, and the difficulties he had met with at Natchez, he adds, “ A variety of unfortunate occurrences has prevented me from giving * him that [ * 156] aid and assistance to liquidate the demands against him, which I should have been happy to have done.” He then mentions his intention of visiting Philadelphia in the following October ; and adds, “ I will then have the pleasure of seeing you, and whatever is in my power to do in behalf of my brother, I will most cheerfully contribute.”
    A verdict was taken by consent for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the Court upon the facts appearing at the trial. If the Court should be of opinion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, the verdict was to be set aside, and a verdict to be entered for the defendant; otherwise, judgment was to be entered upon the verdict.
    Dutton, for the plaintiffs.
    
      Selfridge and Aylwin, for the defendant.
   Per Curiam.

The objections urged against the verdict, although ingeniously and learnedly supported, are not substantial. The promise, contained in the defendant’s letter to Price, is a promise to any one who should give credit to Augustus Trask upon the faith of that letter ; which was in truth a letter of credit to all the world. Nor do we consider it in the light of a conditional undertaking ; so as to require a demand of, or diligence in the pursuit of, the original contractor. It was of itself an original undertaking, collateral to the promise of the vendee, as security ; but not liable to any contingencies, except that of gross negligence in securing the debt, by means of which the loss might be thrown upon the vendors.

The circumstance of a promissory note having been taken from the vendee of the goods does not diminish the liability of the defendant. The cases cited for the plaintiff clearly show, that the interposition of a promissory note by the vendee does not affect the contract of him whose recommendation or promise was the ground of the credit.

The distance of the parties from each other, — one being in the Mississippi territory, another in Pennsylvania, and the third in Massachusetts, — is a sufficient reason for the lapse of [* 157] * time which has intervened ; especially considering, that, in July, 1812, the defendant recognized by letter the undertaking for his brother, upon which this action is founded.

Judgment according to the verdict. 
      
      
        Walton vs. Doddon, Car. & P. 162. — Lawrason vs. Mason, 3 Cranch, 492.
      
     