
    ZHAO HUI ZHU and Xue Yun Zhu v. HOLDER, [ AXXX XXX XXX ], [ AXXX XXX XXX ].
    Nos. 08-5671-ag(L), 09-3747-ag(CON).
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 28, 2010.
    Ernesto H. Molina, Esq., Joanna Leigh Watson, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Richard Tarzia, Esq., The Law Office of Richard Tarzia, Belle Mead, NJ, for Petitioners.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, JON O. NEWMAN, and PIERRE N. LEVAL, Circuit Judges. x
    
      
      . Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric. H. Holder, Jr., is automatically substituted for former Attorney Generals where necessary.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioners, citizens of China, seek review of a BIA order reversing the IJ’s decision granting relief based on their claim that they fear persecution based on the birth of their children in the United States. For largely the same reasons as this Court set forth in Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008), we find no error in the BIA’s decision denying then* application. See id. at 168-72.

The petitioners argue that the BIA failed to give sufficient consideration or importance to the affidavit of Jin Fu Chen, who alleged that he suffered forcible sterilization after his return to China based on the two children born to his wife in Japan. A prior panel of this Court has remanded a petition making a similar claim so that Jin Fu Chen’s affidavit (which was submitted to the BIA after a remand) could be considered by the IJ. See Zheng v. Holder, 361 Fed.Appx. 184 (2d Cir.2010). Since the remand in Zheng, the BIA has considered the Jin Fu Chen affidavit in numerous cases and has repeatedly concluded that it neither demonstrates material changed country conditions nor supports a well-founded fear of persecution. See, e.g., In re Ai Bin Chen, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A.2009); Mei Feng Weng, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A.2009). Accordingly, it is clear that further consideration of the affidavit in cases in which the IJ or the BIA failed to consider it would not change the result. See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir.2008). We cannot say, furthermore, that the agency’s conclusion concerning the probative force of the affidavit involved any error of law.

The petitioners also argue that the BIA has erreci by improperly conducting de novo review of determinations made by an IJ. They rely on the recent decision of the Third Circuit, ruling, in the context of a claim under the Convention Against Torture, that the BIA must review for clear error findings of fact, including predictions of future events, but that conclusions of law as to whether the facts found satisfy a legal standard are reviewed de novo. See Kaplun v. Attorney General, 602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir.2010). Their claim lacks merit. The BIA has not reviewed de novo any of the IJs’ factual findings. Instead, the BIA has concluded, on de novo review, that the factual findings do not meet the legal standard of an objectively reasonable fear of persecution, in these cases, a fear of forced sterilization. That approach is entirely consistent with the applicable regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3). See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 162-63 (concluding that the BIA did not erroneously conduct de novo review of the IJ’s factual findings by making “a legal determination that, while [petitioners’] credible testimony was sufficient to demonstrate a genuine subjective fear of future persecution, more was needed to demonstrate the objective reasonableness of that fear”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  