
    Senator Ronald C. BEAN v. LOUISIANA GAMING CONTROL BOARD and Rivergate Development Corporation.
    Nos. 98-CD-0786, 98-CD-0787.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 9, 1998.
   PER CURIAM.

In response to two applications for supervisory writs, this court on March 27, 1998 denied a request to bypass the district court and ordered the cases to be consolidated in the district court and to be decided by the district court on or before April 3, 1998. However, this court reserved ruling on the request to bypass the court of appeal, pending action by the district court.

On April 3, 1998, the district court rendered reasons for judgment, concluding among other things that the Louisiana Gaming Control Board was authorized by La.Rev. Stat. 27:210 B and 245 A to execute the casino operating contract without the approval of the Legislature or the Governor. The judgment was signed by the district court on April 9,1998.

This court,' acting upon the request to bypass the court of appeal that was reserved for later consideration, now issues the following order:

The request to bypass the court of appeal is denied. However, this court orders that the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, hear the appeal in this case en banc within five days of the filing of the petition for appeal and decide this case within ten days thereafter. Applications for rehearing may be filed in the court of appeal not later than forty-eight hours after the rendition of the judgment by the court of appeal, and the court of appeal shall act on any application for rehearing within twenty-four hours after filing. Any application for review by this court may be filed within five days of the later of (1) the judgment of the court of appeal or (2) the denial of the application for rehearing in the court of appeal. In all other respects, the application is denied.

CALOGERO, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.

CALOGERO, Chief

Justice, concurring in the court’s order.

While I would prefer to see this legal matter resolved more quickly for reasons alluded to hereinafter, I concur in the Court’s action today because I believe that with reasonable expedition on the part of the court of appeal and this Court, a final judgment can be rendered without the issue and the prp-ject involved in this,, case becoming.-moot through the mere passage of time.

Much like in the case of Arata v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District, 254 La. 579, 225 So.2d 362 (1969), the supporting financial markets in the instant case apparently need a resolution by this Court as to the legality of the action of the Gaming Commission — not just a decision of the court of appeal followed by, say, a writ denial from this Court. That being the case, the court of appeal’s disposition, though it might be helpful in the exposition of the legal issues, is no more than a way stop towards this Court’s anticipated full treatment of the legal issues. This Court could well, therefore, bypass the court of appeal, and more assuredly prevent a mooting of the issue. We have done that in similarly important cases. See Progressive Security Ins. Co. v. Foster, 704 So.2d 1177 (La.1997); Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So.2d 577 (La.1975).

Nonetheless, I go along with the majority with the expectation that both the court of appeal and this Court will address and resolve the case within the next 30 days or so— a period, in my judgment, that will likely suffice to prevent the bankruptcy referee’s hammer from destroying the project simply because of lack of timely judicial attention to the case. The project should not be defeated simply because of delay within the court system. 
      
       VICTORY, J., not on panel. Rule IV, Part 2, § 3.
     