
    SAM J. STEVENS v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
    (Filed 9 April, 1924.)
    1. Contracts — Employment for Life — Consideration—Railroads.
    A contract for the continued employment of a railroad company for Ills life, in consideration of the employee’s forbearance to sue tbe company for damages be bas received, caused by tbe company’s negligence, is not invalid for indefiniteness of tbe duration of tbe employment, and is supported by a sufficient consideration.
    2. Same — Evidence.
    Wber.e a railroad company is sued by. its employee for breach of a valid contract of employment for life, in consideration of forbearance of its employee to sue for damages for a personal injury negligently inflicted by it while in its employment, evidence of tbe extent of sucb injury is competent upon tbe question of tbe sufficiency of- tbe consideration to support the contract.
    3. Railroads — Consideration—Contracts—Employment — Personal Retentions.
    Where a valid contract for tbe employment of personal services for life bas been made by a railroad company in consideration of forbearance by tbe employee to sue tbe company to recover damages for a personal injury, it is binding upon a subsequent combination of this and other railroads that continued to accept tbe employee’s services in recognition of tbe contract, and tbe principle upon which a contract of this character may not be assigned is inapplicable.
    4. Appeal and Error — Objections and Exceptions — Instructions—Presumptions.
    On appeal, it will be presumed that the charge to the jury of tbe trial judge submitted all material and substantive phases of tbe evidence, when no exception bas been taken thereto.
    
      Appeal by defendant from Connor, J., at January Term, 1924, of DURHAM.
    The jury returned the following verdict:
    1. Did the defendant enter into contract with the plaintiff that it would keep him in its employment so long as plaintiff should live, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes.
    2. If so, did defendant wrongfully breach said contract, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes.
    3. What sum, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover of defendant as damages? Answer: $1,000.
    The plaintiff testified that he had worked for the Richmond and Danville Railroad and the defendant, its successor, from 1819 until his discharge, which took place in July or August, 1921; that he had been injured through the negligence of the road for which he' was working in 1883; that he had suffered later injuries, which were due to the same cause, and had afterwards entered into a written contract- executed by himself, Captain West, Captain Green, superintendent of the road, who was afterwards general manager of the Southern Railway, and another man whose name he did not remember; that all these men were dead but had worked for the defendants; that the contract, which had been burned, provided substantially that if he did not sue the railroad for his injuries it would give him a job as long as he could work and take care of him afterwards. He further testified that in 1916 the president of the defendant company gave him a bronze badge on one side of which was the inscription, “Southern Railway Company for Loyalty,” and on the other, “Sam J. Stevens, 1879 to 1916”; that he was 71 years old and at the time of his discharge was earning about $60 a month.
    The defendant denied the execution of the alleged contract and introduced evidence tending to show that the Southern Railway was not organized until 1894 and that the plaintiff had been discharged for neglect of duty. The defendant also alleged that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, but tendered no issue as to this question, and none was submitted.
    
      Brawley & Gantt and R. O. Everett for plaintiff.
    
    
      Fuller & Fuller for defendant.
    
   Adams, J.

The first six exceptions are addressed to the admission of evidence tending to show the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. These injuries are described in the complaint, not for the purpose of stating a cause of action, but of showing both the reasonableness of the contract relied on and the circumstances under which it was made. The plaintiff alleges that he filed no claim for damages because be was assured by the company, tbrougb whose negligence be bad been injured, tbat in consideration of bis waiver be should have employment as long as be lived, and the evidence excepted to was properly admitted as tending to show the consideration upon which the agreement was made, and it was no doubt so understood by the jury.

It has been held tbat contracts of this character are not against public policy or incapable of enforcement on the ground of indefiniteness merely because the exact period of service is not specified. Hence the courts have sustained contracts by employers to give to servants injured by their negligence “steady and permanent” employment, or employment “as long as the company’s works are running,” or “so long as the business of a corporation continues,” or during the life of the employee, or to give “a living wage required for the support of the employee and bis family.” As we have indicated, it cannot be said tbat the contract' between the plaintiff and the" railroad was without consideration. They entered into a compromise and adjustment of the plaintiff’s claim for damages, and “such adjustment will afford a sufficient consideration for the agreement whether the agreement was well founded or not.” Fisher v. Lumber Co., 183 N. C., 485; Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App., 109; Lead Co. v. Kinlin, 47 Neb., 409; McMullen v. Dickinson Co., 63 Minn., 405; Carnig v. Carr, 35 L. R. A. (Mass.), 512; Texas C. R. Co. v. Eldridge, 155 S. W. (Texas), 1010; Cox. v. Railroad, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) (Ind.), 453 and note. See, also, Rhyne v. Rhyne, 151 N. C., 400; Re Estate of McVicker, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1112.

These propositions, as we understand, are not seriously disputed, but it is insisted tbat the contract was made, if at all, with the Richmond and Danville Railroad, and is therefore not binding on the defendant. We are not inadvertent to authorities holding that executory contracts for personal services involving a personal relation or confidence between the parties cannot be assigned (R. R. v. R. R., 147 N, C., 368), but in our opinion the disposition of the present appeal is not dependent upon a decision of this question. There was evidence tending to show that the contract had been duly executed on- the part of the Richmond and Danville Railroad Company by three men, including Captain Green, the superintendent, who was afterwards superintendent of the defendant; that the defendant was formed by the combination of the Richmond and Danville Railroad and other roads, and that when the consolidation was concluded the Richmond and Danville Railroad was “one of the constituent elements of the Southern”; that after the combination sonie of the former officers continued in the service of the defendant, and that the plaintiff had been awarded a bronze medal bearing the two inscriptions, “Sam Stevens, 1879 to 1916” and “Southern Railway Company for Loyalty.” These and other circumstances appearing from tbe evidence were sufficient to create a reasonable inference tbat tbe defendant, witb knowledge of tbe contract, continued tbe plaintiff’s employment and recognized and ratified tbe agreement, under wbicb tbe compromise was effected and tbe service rendered and accepted. There was no exception to tbe charge, and we must presume tbat all material and substantive phases of tbe evidence were properly submitted to tbe jury. Todd v. Machis, 160 N. C., 352; Brown v. Brown, 182 N. C., 42; S. v. Jones, 182 N. C., 781.

After a careful examination of tbe record we find no reversible error.'

No error.  