
    First Appellate Department,
    December, 1897.
    Reported. 24 App. Dlv. 51.
    In the Matter of the Petition of Caroline A. Livingston, Respondent, to Revoke and Cancel the Liquor Tax Certificate Issued to John Shady, Appellant.
    A liquor tax certificate is property—The holder is not entitled to a jury trial on an application for its cancellation.
    A certificate, issued under the Liquor Tax Law (Laws of 1896, chap. 112, as amended by chap. 312, Laws of 1897), is made property by the Tax Law, which may also provide for its cancellation without giving the holder a trial by jury of the questions presented on the application therefor.
    Appeal by John Shady from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Hew York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Hew York on the 23d day of October, 1897, revoking and canceling a liquor tax certificate issued .to the said John Shady.
    
      James A. Dunn, for the appellant.
    
      Robert A. B. Dayton, for the respondent.
   Williams, J.

The proceeding was instituted by a citizen residing within two hundred (200) feet of the premises licensed, tinder subdivision 2, section 28 of the Liquor Tax Law (Laws of 1896, chap. 112, as amended by Laws of 1897, chap. 312), to revoke the certificate, on the ground that the applicant did not file with the application for the license the consent that traffic in liquor be carried on in the premises signed by two-thirds of the owners of buildings occupied exclusively for dwellings within two hundred feet of the place licensed, as required by subdivision 8, section 17 of the Liquor Tax Law.

The application stated that there were but three owners of such buildings, and the applicant filed the consent of two of the three. The evidence given in this proceeding showed beyond question that this statement in the application was untrue, and that the consent of two-thirds of such owners was not filed with ¡the application, and the court very properly made this order revoking the license for that reason.

It is said, however, that, before the applicant could be deprived of his certificate, he was entitled to have a trial by jury under the Constitution; that the certificate was property, and he could not be deprived of such property without due process of law. We have held that these certificates are property. (People v. Durante, 19 App, Div. 292.) They were made such by virtue ol the provisions of the Liquor Tax Law, but the legislature,- which gave the certificate the character of property, had power to and did by the same act provide both for their issuance and cancellation, and under what circumstances they should be valid, and when and how they might be revoked. The character given them as property was subject to all these provisions attached to them when they were created. Applicants take them with all the privileges and subject to all the burdens imposed upon them by the Liquor Tax Law.

The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

Van Brunt, P. J., Patterson, O’Brien and Ingraham, JJ., concurred.

Order affirmed, with costs.  