
    CAMDEN DISTRICT,
    FALL TERM,
    1799.
    Carpenter v. Kennedy.
    The insolvent debtor’s act of 1759, and the prison bounds act of 1788,' furnish distinct modes of relief to prisoners for debt; differing in the nature and extent of the relief, the effect and consequences of obtaining it, the terms and conditions which entitle a prisoner to it, and the form and course of proceeding: and, a party applying for either form of relief, must pursue, strictly, the specific course of proceeding prescribed, or his application will be refused.
    The defendant in this case, having been holden to bail by virtue of a writ of capias ad respondendum, filed a petition in the Court of Common Pleas, in order to take the benefit of the acts for the relief of insolvent debtors; and published a notice in the gazette, stating his being in custody, and that he had petitioned the judges of the Court of Common Pleas, and commissioners of special bail of Camden district, to be admitted to the benefit of the acts aforesaid, and summoning the plaintiff, and all others, to whom the said petitioner was indebted, to appear before the judges of the county court of Kershaw county, Who would sit as commissioners of special bail, &c., to shew cause why the prayer of the petition should not be granted.
    He had previously filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of Camden, a schedule of his estate and effects, sworn to before a justice of peace.
    The judges of the county court met in October, 1799,' at the court house in Camden, to hear the application aforesaid. It Was opposed, in behalf of one Luyten, a principal creditor of the defendant, on several grounds, but principally because the county court judges, exercising the powers of commissioners of special bail, had no authority to discharge the defendant under the insolvent debtor’s act of 1759, as the defendant’s counse^ contended they had, and besought them to do; and ths county court judges, having doubts on the question, refused to make any final determination thereon, but referred the same for the dec‘s'on superior court. Whereupon the defendant’s counsel moved for his discharge under the insolvent debtor’s act of 1759) in the district court of Camden ; and they contended, that the county court judges, as commissioners of special bail, which by act of assembly they are constituted ex officio,
      
       were competent to put in force the said act of 1759, and discharge the defendant from all claims against him, in the manner prescribed by that act. They admitted that the acts of 1759, and of 1788, respecting prison bounds, &c., did seem to point out different modes of relief not entirely reconcileable with each other : but they insisted that the intention of the act of 1788, was to amend the act of 1759, so as to extend the relief, and alter, in some respects, the manner of proceeding to obtain the same, and that both acts ought to be taken and construed together, as one entire and connected sj'stem, for the relief of insolvent debtors ; and that in order to render them con» sistent, and make them agree, every repugnant provision of the former act must be considered as repealed by the latter. They en» deavored to give such interpretations to the several clashing clauses of those two acts, as suited their purpose,’ and to evince that the commissioners of special bail might give the relief afforded by the act of 1759, in the way that it had been applied for; and they contended that the present application being by way of appeal from their decision, this court would do what they ought to have done, or take it up as a motion, de novo, and give the relief applied for.
    On the other side, against the motion, it was laid down, that the insolvent debtor’s act of 1759, and the act respecting prison bounds, passed in 1788, establish two different and independent modes of relief; distinguishable not only as to the forra and man. ner of proceeding to be pursued for obtaining the benefit, of the relief afforded by each, but also as to the extent of the relief, and the effect and consequences resulting therefrom. The act of 1759, it was argued, relates only to “ poor, distressed and insol» vent prisoners for debt,” as appears by the preamble thereof; and, therefore, before the year 1788, many persons confined on civil process, who did not answer the description of debtors, could not receive any relief under that act. To remedy this grievance,, the legislature thought proper, by a distinct and separate clause of the prison bounds act of 1788, (the 6th clause,) to extend the benefit of the relief afforded by the act of 1759, to “all prisoners in execution, or on mesne process, in any civil action,” except as is therein excepted. But this is the only part of the act of 1788, which has any reference to, or dependence on, the act of 1759. The other clauses of the act of 1788, prescribe another and a different system, for the relief of prisoners confined on .civil process. The counsel then proceeded to contrast the modes prescribed by these several acts, for proceeding, in order to obtain the relief given by them, respectively, and the nature and extent of the, relief afforded by them, respectively. By the former act the application must be by petition to the court from whence the process issues; and after delivering in a schedule, there must be an order of court for the prisoner and all his creditors to appear before the court, at the next court thereafter, &c.; and after hearing and examining the matter, the court is authorized to administer a certain oath, and set the prisoner at liberty. By the latter act, the prisoner is- entitled to the relief thereby provided, upon rendering a schedule of his property, on oath, to the clerk of the court out of which the process issues, by virtue of which, he is kept in custody ; and the clerk, within ten days, must give public notice, that the prisoner will be liberated, and his property assigned, unless cause be shewn to the contrary, before one or more of the judges of the circuit courts, or one or more commissioners of special bail. No time is prescribed for notice by the latter act. The former act requires three months notice in the gazette. The former act requires the assignment to be made to the creditor, at whose suit the prisoner stands charged, or to such other person as the court shall direct; and such assignment to be in trust for all the creditors who may be willing to accept dividends. The latter act directs the assignment to be made to the plaintiff, at whose suit the prisoner is confined, subject to all prior incumbrances. By the former act the prisoner is to be discharged from the claims and demands of all his creditors, if such creditors shall agree to accept dividends of his estate, under the assignment; which discharge shall be an absolute release of all such demands, so that any property which the prisoner may afterwards acquire, shall not be liable thereto : and if any of the creditors shall not agree to accept dividend's, as aforesaid, although their debts and demands shall not be discharged, in like manner, as if they had accepted, but shall remain to charge the future estate of the debtor; yet shall their claims be postponed, and suspended for twelve months, during which time they shall not be permitted to pursue any legal means for recovering their demands, and in the meantime shall not be allowed any benefit of the estate assigned, which shall be exclusively divided among the creditors willing to accept their proportionable parts thereof, as under a commission of bankruptcy, they thereby agreeing to the entire release- ■ ment and discharge of the debtor, from their respective demands, and that the same shall not enure to charge any estate he may afterwards acquire. But the act of 1788, contains no such provisions. The effect of an assignment and discharge under that act, is to release the prisoner from confinement, under the process, by virtue of which he shall be in custody, and transfer, by way of bargain and sale, the effects, &c., contained in the schedule, to the creditor or plaintiff, at whose suit the defendant is confined, in satisfaction of the demand for which he is so confined ; and after such assignment, the assignee may sue in his own name, to. recover the effects, &c., assigned. But the other creditors of the prisoner shall not be at all affected by such proceedings 5 nor shall such assignment extinguish the claim of the plaintiff, to whom the assignment shall be made, oxcept as to so much as shall be satisfied by the property assigned, but the future property and effects of such prisoner, shall be liable to all his former debts, and all prior demands, as if no advantage had been taken of this act; and no postponement or suspension of the common modes of recovery, is effected by this act. By the act of 1759, the creditors, after notice, shall attend at the time and. place appointed, for hearing the prisoner’s application for relief; and mortgagees and trustees of the prisoner, or their representatives, must also attend, and deliver to the court a fair account, on oath, of what is really due to them, respectively, &e. The act of 1788, contains no provision of this sort; and it cannot be reasonably contended, that the provisions of the act of 1759, in this respect, apply to, or consist with, the scope and design of the act of 1788.
    Upon the whole, it was insisted, that these two acts afforded relief in two different causes, and that it was necessary to consider them as relating to different objects, and not as relating to the very same object, and as furnishing one entire and uniform system of relief in all cases embraced within their respective provisions. That it is a rule of construction, applicable as \vell to statutes as to deeds, ut res magis valeat tpiam pereat. Such interpretation ought to be made of them as to preserve every part of them in force, and give effect to their several provisions, rather' than such a construction as must necessarily destroy or make void any part, for the purpose of forcing into agreement and consistency the other parts. And that statutes made in pari materia, ought to be liberally and beneficially expounded, to advance the objects in view, and give consistent effeet to every part of them, so as to reconcile every seeming contradiction, if possible, and give force to the whole ; and not so as to do away, as null and void, every repugnant particle in one statute, for the purpose of giving effect to an arbitrary construction of another, which construction must necessarily set one at variance with the •other. The counsel then proceeded to shew, that the prisoner had not proceeded properly to take the benefit of the relief provided by ■either of the acts of assembly in question. That he had gone upon mistaken ground, and had no claim to present relief under either act; ■for that the relief afforded in either case, being given by act of assembly, by which the • specific mode is expressly pointed out, the prescribed mode ought to be strictly pursued, otherwise the party cannot bring himself within the benefit of the relief provided.
    Brown and Mathis, for the prisoner. Brevard, for the creditor, Luyten.
    
      
       See act assembly, December, 1791. This act authorizes them to take recogí nizances of special bail. 1 Faust, 167.
    
   By the court.

Waties, J.,

expressed an opinion in favor of the construction contended for by the counsel' in opposition to the prisoner’s application, on all the points contended for in the argument ; in consequence of which the prisoner’s claim was negatived, and himself remanded to gaol.

Note. The doctrine upon which the above case was decided, has been repeatedly recognized since, by a majority of the judges, individually.  