
    CRIMSON INDUSTRIES, INC. v. Larry P. ELLER.
    2970211.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Oct. 9, 1998.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1998.
    Certiorari Quashed April 28, 2000 Alabama Supreme Court 1980506.
    
      Edwin 0. Rogers and E. Shane Black of Hand Arendall, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
    J.O. Isom, Hamilton, for appellee.
   MONROE, Judge.

In 1996, Larry P. Eller filed a workers’ compensation claim against his employer, Crimson Industries, Inc. Eller alleged that he had suffered a cardiac arrest that arose out of and in the course of his employment and that it had rendered him permanently and totally disabled. After trial, the circuit court found that Eller’s injury was compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act and that Eller was totally and permanently disabled. Crimson appeals.

Our review is governed by the new Workers’ Compensation Act, which provides: “In reviewing the standard of proof set forth herein and other legal issues, review by the Court of Civil Appeals shall be without a presumption of correctness.” § 25 — 5—81(e)(1), Ala.Code 1975. Furthermore, the new act provides that “[i]n reviewing pure findings of fact, the finding of the circuit court shall not be reversed if that finding is supported by substantial evidence.” § 25-5-81(e)(2), Ala. Code 1975. Additionally, this court will not reverse the trial court’s finding of fact if that finding is supported by “substantial evidence,” that is, if that finding is supported by “evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.” West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989); Ex parte Trinity Industries, Inc., 680 So.2d 262, 268 (Ala.1996).

Crimson is a mobile home manufacturer. In 1993, Eller began working at Crimson, where his primary job was building cabinets. Eller contends that shortly before his cardiac arrest, his job duties had increased and had become physically harder. He explained that in addition to building cabinets he was required to saw the wood he needed to build the cabinets, and that he had to transport the finished cabinets to the mobile homes by lifting the cabinets and placing them on carts.

On January 25, 1996, Eller stated, he felt a pain in his chest after he had loaded a large cabinet onto a cart; he said the pain grew worse when he loaded a second cabinet. Eller continued to work until he was suffering severe pain in his shoulder, neck, jaw, and chest. He was taken to a hospital, where he suffered a cardiac arrest. Doctors diagnosed Eller as having no observable heart disease, abnormal coronary arteries, or abnormal heart rhythm. However, the doctors determined that he had suffered electrical problems in his heart, and they implanted a defibrillator.

Crimson’s initial argument is that the trial court erred in failing to include in its order findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient for this court’s review.

Pursuant to § 25-5-88, Ala.Code 1975, a final judgment in a workers’ compensation case must contain a statement of the law, the facts, and the conclusions of the trial court. Substantial compliance with § 25-5-88 is sufficient. American Auto. Ins. Co. of Missouri v. Hinote, 498 So.2d 848, 851 (Ala.Civ.App.1986); Littleton v. Gold Kist, Inc., 480 So.2d 1236, 1238 (Ala.Civ.App.1985).

In its judgment, the trial court summarized the facts of the case and stated that Eller “sustained a ventricular fibrillation, a heart condition, as a result of cardiovascular stress arising out of and in the course of his said employment with defendant, such injury being to [Eller’s] whole body.” Further, the court stated that Eller “was totally and permanently disabled as the result of the heart condition above-described, arising out of and in the course of his said employment with [Crimson].” We find that the trial court sufficiently complied with § 25-5-88.

Crimson contends that the trial court erred in finding the legal and medical causation required for a nonaccidental injury.

In nonaccidental-injury cases, the employee must satisfy a two-pronged test, by proving (1) that the performance of the duties of his or her employment exposed the employee to a danger or risk materially in excess of that to which people not so employed are ordinarily exposed in their everyday lives; and (2) that the particular exposure to the risk proven in the first part of the test was a contributing cause of the injury at issue. The first prong of the two-pronged test is legal causation; the second is medical causation. City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App. 701, 318 So.2d 729 (Ala.Civ.App.1975); Ex parte Trinity Industries, Inc., 680 So.2d 262 (Ala.1996).

The record contains substantial evidence to support a finding of legal and medical causation. There was testimony that Eller’s job was a stressful, physical job and that the stress caused Eller by that job exceeded the stress the ordinary person would be exposed to. Dr. Bates, an internist, testified that stress had a causal relationship to Eller’s heart condition and that it was his opinion that work and stress contributed to Eller’s condition. Dr. Epstein, the cardiologist who implanted Eller’s defibrillator testified that in his opinion Eller’s condition was not caused by his work. When asked if stress contributed to Eller’s condition, Dr. Epstein testified that the possibility was small and that there was no way of giving a yes or no answer. There was also testimony that Eller’s work duties had increased. Further, the testimony shows that Eller had been away from work for over a week and that upon his return, on the day of his cardiac arrest, he was confronted with an unusually heavy workload. Thus, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to establish legal and medical causation.

Crimson further claims that the trial court erred in accepting the testimony of Dr. Bates as expert testimony on the issue of the cause of Eller’s heart condition. Basically, Crimson argues that because Dr. Bates is an internist and not a cardiologist he was not qualified to testify as an expert on this issue and that his testimony was a mere guess or speculation.

“Whether a witness has the qualifications to testify as an expert is within the discretion of the trial court.” Redi Roast Products, Inc. v. Burnham, 531 So.2d 664, 667 (Ala.Civ.App.1988), citing Ensor v. Wilson, 519 So.2d 1244, 1269 (Ala.1987). Dr. Bates testified that he is an internist and that he had been practicing for 13 years. He explained that he primarily takes care of patients with problems with internal organs such as the lungs, the kidneys, and the heart. He stated that 30% to 40% of his practice deals with heart conditions. Also, Dr. Bates’s testimony was based upon his examination of Eller.

We conclude that there was evidence presented to establish Dr. Bates’s qualifications as an expert and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Dr. Bates to testify as to his opinion of the cause of Eller’s heart condition. Furthermore, the trial court may consider Dr. Bates’s qualifications or lack of qualifications in assessing the weight and credibility of his testimony. Redi Roast Products, Inc., 531 So.2d at 667.

Crimson further contends that the court erred in finding that Eller suffered a permanent and total disability.

Pursuant to § 25 — 5—57(a)(4)d., Ala.Code 1975, a “permanent disability” is “any physical injury or mental impairment resulting from an accident, which injury or impairment permanently and totally incapacitates the employee from working at and being retrained for gainful employment.” Total disability does not mean entire physical disability or absolute helplessness. Hinkle v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 667 So.2d 92, 94 (Ala.Civ.App.1994), citing Genpak Corp. v. Gibson, 534 So.2d 312 (Ala.Civ.App.1988). It is the trial court’s duty to determine the extent or percentage of disability, based on all the evidence before it, including its own observations. Genpak Corp., 534 So.2d 312. When there is conflicting evidence regarding the employee’s disability, the trial court’s findings are conclusive if there is substantial evidence to support those findings. Winn-Dixie, Inc. of Montgomery v. Ates, 628 So.2d 791 (Ala.Civ.App.1993).

Both Dr. Epstein and Dr. Bates testified that Eller cannot do work that involves repetitive motion. Dr. Epstein stated that Eller would be able to do work that did not involve heavy lifting, repetitive motion, or interaction with large machinery or magnetic fields. Eller was 57 years old at the time of trial and has an 11th grade education. There was evidence that Eller has done manual labor practically his whole life, and all the experts testified that Eller can no longer do manual labor. He has no office or light-duty skills.

The evidence included a letter from Dr. Epstein that states, “Eller cannot work in any situation in which he could hurt himself or others were he to lose consciousness.” The letter also states, “Eller would very much like to work, but from a medical point of view is unable to do so. I support his request for disability.” Moreover, the evidence indicated that Eller had been awarded permanent and total disability benefits by the Social Security Administration.

As the dissent suggests, there was evidence that Eller has remained active at home. He testified that he helps his wife with housework, goes for walks, does a little gardening, and occasionally mows the lawn. He also stated that he works in a woodworking shop for short periods of time and that he has built a knitting machine and has learned to knit. It appears that the dissent’s biggest problem lies with Eller’s desire to stay active instead of just sitting at home and drawing his Social Security disability benefits.

In reviewing workers’ compensation cases, we are ever mindful that the Workers’ Compensation Act is to be liberally construed to accomplish its beneficent purposes and that doubts must be resolved in favor of the employee. Yates v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 670 So.2d 908 (Ala.1995). To reverse the trial court’s judgment would require us to reweigh the evidence presented; our standard of review does not allow us to do that. Edwards v. Jesse Stutts, Inc., 655 So.2d 1012 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). Because there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of permanent, total disability, we must affirm that finding.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTSON, P.J., and YATES, J., concur.

CRAWLEY and THOMPSON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.

CRAWLEY, Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Crimson presents four arguments on appeal, namely: (1) that the trial court erred by failing to enter specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on legal causation and medical causation; (2) that the trial court erred by determining that Eller had established legal and medical causation; (3) that the trial court erred by accepting as expert testimony the deposition of Dr. Johnny Bates; and (4) that the court erred because its finding of permanent total disability was not supported by substantial evidence. Although I find no reversible error as to the first three arguments, I dissent from this court’s affirmance of the finding of permanent total disability.

Permanent total disability is defined, in § 25-5-57(a)(4)d., Ala.Code 1975, as “any physical injury or mental impairment resulting from an accident, which injury or impairment permanently and totally incapacitates the employee from working at and being retrained for gainful employment.” Total disability does not mean that the employee must be absolutely helpless, but means that the employee is not able to perform his or her trade and is unable to obtain other reasonably gainful employment. M.C. Dixon Lumber Co. v. Phillips, 642 So.2d 477 (Ala.Civ.App.1994); Mead Paper Co. v. Brizendine, 575 So.2d 571 (Ala.Civ.App.1990).

The trial court is not bound by expert testimony regarding the extent of a worker’s disability and must determine the percentage of disability based on all the evidence. See Reed v. James R. Fincher Timber Co., 659 So.2d 660, 663 (Ala.Civ. App.1995); Gibson v. Southern Stone Co., 518 So.2d 730, 731 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); Armstrong v. Lewis & Associates Construction Co., 469 So.2d 605 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). However, a trial court’s finding as to the degree of disability will be upheld only if it is, indeed, based on the evidence. In this case, I do not think there was any evidence upon which to base a finding that Eller was permanently and totally incapacitated “from working at or being retrained for gainful employment.”

Dr. Epstein sent Crimson a letter in which he gave his opinion that Eller would not be able to return to the job he had been doing before January 25, 1996, because any repetitive motion could damage the wiring on the implanted defibrillator. He stated:

“Mr. Eller’s implantable defibrillator does not prevent cardiac arrest but only treats the heart rhythms that cause the arrest and subsequent loss of consciousness, if they were to recur. Thus, Mr. Eller cannot work in any situation in which he could hurt himself or others were he to lose consciousness.... Mr. Eller would very much like to return to work, but from a medical point of view is unable to do so. I support his request for disability.”

On the strength of Dr. Epstein’s letter, Eller applied for and received Social Security disability benefits.

In deposition testimony, Dr. Bates agreed with Dr. Epstein that Eller “cannot do any sort of work where he’s going to have repetitive motion ... or lifting, or anything along that manner.” Neither doctor testified, however, that Eller was unable to work. Dr. Epstein said that Eller would be able to work at a job that did not require heavy lifting, repetitive motion, or interaction with large machinery or magnetic fields.

At the time of trial, Eller was 57 years old. He had an eleventh-grade education. He testified that for most of his life he had worked in heavy labor jobs, but he also testified that while he was in the United States Navy, he had worked as a mail clerk and as a security guard, and that, for a short time after his military service, he worked as a book salesman. Eller stated that he had not looked for a job since he had his defibrillator implanted. He said that his daily routine included helping his wife with the housework, going for walks, doing a little gardening, and occasionally mowing the lawn. He testified that he also works in his woodworking shop for short periods and that, since his surgery, he has built two small cabinets. He has also built a knitting machine and has learned to knit sweaters as a hobby.

Crimson presented the testimony of Jack Russ Gurley, a vocational consultant, who interviewed Eller and reviewed El-ler’s medical and employment history. Gurley gave his opinion that Eller had sustained a 45-49% vocational disability. He testified that there were sedentary or light-duty jobs in the surrounding three-county area that did not require repetitive motion and for which Eller was qualified.

Wade Gaston, the personnel manager at Crimson, testified that there were several jobs at Crimson that did not involve repetitive motion and for which Eller was qualified. He stated that Crimson employed six people with heart problems, including four security guards.

Three experts testified about the extent of Eller’s disability: Dr. Epstein; Dr. Bates; and Mr. Gurley. None said that Eller was totally incapable of working. Dr. Epstein and Dr. Bates described the kinds of jobs Eller could not do; Dr. Epstein said that Eller could do other kinds of jobs. Gurley gave his opinion that Eller was already qualified and, therefore, would not have to be retrained for a number of light duty jobs available in the area. He rated Eller as 45-49% disabled.

Eller did not testify that his heart condition or surgical implant caused pain, depression, or excessive fatigue. Compare, e.g., Elite Transportation Services v. Humphreys, 690 So.2d 439, 441 (Ala.Civ.App.1997)(trial court could consider worker’s pain and depression, which worker said interfered with his ability to concentrate, in determining degree of disability). Eller’s testimony indicates that even after he was unable to work at his former employment, he was energetic and resourceful enough not only to perform household chores and to continue his old hobby of cabinetmaking, but also to take up the new hobby of knitting and to build the equipment needed for that hobby.

The evidence established that Eller left school after the eleventh grade and that he did not have a high school diploma. There was no evidence, however, that Eller is cognitively impaired or mentally unable to adapt to new employment. Compare, e.g., Fovil Mfg. Co. v. Watts, 569 So.2d 406, 409 (Ala.Civ.App.1990) (trial court considered worker’s IQ of 79 in determining whether he was employable); Bailey v. Walker Regional Medical Center, 709 So.2d 35, 36 (Ala.Civ.App.1997) (in determining extent of disability trial court considered limited ability of worker who could “barely read and write at the third-grade level”); Wright v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 591 So.2d 518, 519 (Ala.Civ.App.1991) (trial court considered worker’s lack of education and “low average” IQ in determining degree of disability).

Because I do not believe that the trial court’s finding of permanent total disability is supported by substantial evidence, I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding otherwise.

THOMPSON, J., concurs.  