
    Isaiah Noel WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ebra WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 13-17284.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Dec. 8, 2015.
    Filed Feb. 2, 2016.
    Eugene G. Illovsky, Esquire, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Palo Alto, CA, Tyler Alexander Baker, Esquire, Todd Richard Gregorian, Hailey C. Teton, Fenwick & West LLP, Mountain View, CA, Elizabeth B. Hagan, Bradley T. Meissner, Fenwick & West LLP, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    John Randall Andrada, Esquire, Lynne Stocker, Andrada & Associates Professional Corporation, Oakland, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Appellant Isaiah Williams argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on his due process claim, and that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence during trial regarding his alleged membership in a prison gang and one of his tattoos. We affirm.

Appellant Williams is an inmate in state prison. He alleges a due process violation based on Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Wolff accorded prisoners certain limited due process rights in prison disciplinary proceedings “to insure that [a] state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” Id. at 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The Court applied' the “minimum requirements of procedural due process” because “the determination of whether [prisoner misconduct] has occurred becomes critical” when a state deducts good time credits as punishment. Id. at 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Unlike Wolff the sole plaintiff in this case admitted commission of misconduct by starting a prison fight. This fight was the subject of the challenged disciplinary hearing. Appellant does not claim that his rights have been “arbitrarily abrogated” or explain how he was prejudiced by not attending the hearing. Thus, we decline to remand his case to the district court for a trial on his due process claim.

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the name of a white supremacist prison gang to which he allegedly belongs, and when it admitted into evidence testimony regarding one of his tattoos.

If a district court abuses its discretion by admitting evidence improperly, this court must determine whether or not the error was harmless. United States v. Ramirez-Robles, 386 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir.2004). An error is harmless if it is “more probable than not that the erroneous admission of the evidence did not affect the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quoting United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir.1995)). This court will not reverse a jury verdict absent a showing of prejudice. Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int’l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 638 (9th Cir.1991)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony about the gang name and the tattoo, But even assuming that these rulings were erroneous, it is more probable than not that the same jury verdict would have obtained. Absent the challenged evidence, the jury still would have heard that Plaintiff was validated as a member of a prison gang, and that he picked a fight with a rival gang member. To the extent that the jury was swayed by reference to the name of the gang and Plaintiffs tattoo, it would likely still be swayed in the same manner by the evidence that Plaintiff belonged to an apparently violent prison gang. Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     