
    Michael HULZBERG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 87-2041.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 6, 1988.
    Rehearing Denied May 11, 1988.
    
      Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Margaret Good, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   STONE, Judge.

The defendant was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting arrest, fleeing a police officer, driving with a revoked or suspended license, and having improper plates attached to a vehicle. The incident arose out of a chase following an attempted traffic stop. After his apprehension and arrest on the first three charges, the arresting officer discovered that Hulzberg had no driver’s license. At trial, the officer testified that he then ran a radio check:

Q. Okay. Did you run a check on the car and the tags on the license?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What, if anything, did you ascertain from that?
A. All right. At the time we first attempted to stop the car, the tags were radioed in and after we had apprehended him, we were advised that the tags were—
[Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Hon- or. Hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A. — we were advised by the dispatcher that the tag on the rear of the vehicle that we called in was stolen from Sunrise.
Q. He had no driver’s license. You ran a check and found them suspended?
A. Yes.

The defendant was not charged with the actual theft of the tag. The sole issue on appeal is the contention that the court erred in overruling the hearsay objection, and that the resulting testimony that the tag had been reported as stolen prejudiced defendant by implicating him in a collateral crime. We note that the prejudice issue was not raised before the trial court and that defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal was directed solely at the level of violence used in resisting arrest. There was no motion for mistrial, and no request for a curative or explanatory instruction. Furthermore, the defense conceded throughout the trial that the defendant did not have a license, and that the tag found on the car was not the tag for that vehicle.

We find no error since the trial judge could conclude that the testimony was not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Cf. Breedlove v. State, 413 So.2d 1 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 184, 74 L.Ed.2d 149, reh’g denied, 459 U.S. 1060, 103 S.Ct. 482, 74 L.Ed.2d 627 (1982); Freeman v. State, 494 So.2d 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Johnson v. State, 456 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), rev. denied, 464 So.2d 555 (Fla.1985). In any event, we must also conclude that any error was harmless. The evidence against the defendant on the battery, resisting, fleeing, and license charges, was overwhelming. The improper tag charge was essentially uncontested except for an argument not raised on this appeal. See, e.g., Roman v. State, 475 So.2d 1228 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1090, 106 S.Ct. 1480, 89 L.Ed.2d 734 (1986); Brown v. State, 473 So.2d 1260 (Fla.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1038, 106 S.Ct. 607, 88 L.Ed.2d 585 (1985). The judgment and sentence are, therefore, affirmed.

DELL, J., concurs.

ANSTEAD, J., dissents with opinion.

ANSTEAD, Judge,

dissenting.

I would affirm all of appellant’s convictions except for the charge of attaching an improper license plate to a motor vehicle. It is undisputed that the only evidence of that crime was presented in the form of a hearsay statement by a police dispatcher to the arresting officer who had already stopped appellant’s vehicle on a traffic stop because of defective equipment. The appellant objected to the admission of this hearsay both before and during trial. It is a fundamental principle of our justice system that the commission of an offense cannot be proven by a witness saying, in essence, that a crime was committed because someone told him so. That is precisely what the hearsay rule is all about.

I also disagree with the majority’s characterization of defense counsel’s opening and closing statements to the jury and failure to move for a directed verdict. Having specifically objected to the hearsay testimony in advance of trial and having been specifically overruled, it is not surprising that defense counsel would concede that there would be evidence presented that the tag didn’t belong on the vehicle. The same is true of a closing statement conceding that this evidence was presented. At no time, however, was the defendant’s responsibility for having the tag on the vehicle conceded. As to the absence of a motion for directed verdict, it is apparent that such motion could not have been properly made in the face of the admission of the hearsay testimony. It is the admission of the improper evidence that was error and that was challenged, before and during trial.  