
    Black et al., Trustees, etc., v. Hagerty, Auditor, and Schott, Treasurer.
    
      Power of auditor of state to remit taxes — Cannot reduce valuation by local board of equalization, when — Laws of Taxation.
    
    The power conferred upon the auditor of state to remit taxes does not authorize him to reduce a valuation of real estate made in pursuance of law by a local board of equalization, merely because he believes the valuation to be excessive.
    (Decided June 20, 1899.)
    Error to the Circuit Court of Hamilton county.
    The cause was tried on appeal in the circuit •court, and the questions presented arise upon the record there made. In their petition the plaintiffs .allege that they are the qualified and acting trustees under the will of A. W. Frank, deceased, and that in that capacity they are charge! with the management and full control of all the property of his estate including certain described tracts of real estate in the city of Cincinnati. They allege that in the year 1890 said property was grossly ■overvalued for taxation by the decennial appraisers •of that year; that in 1892 they made applicatioh to the Board of Review then sitting as the city annual board of equalization for a reduction of said valuation, and that on the twelfth of September of that year said board did make a small reduction in said valuation, but left the valuation excessive and much higher than that of other like property in the same locality. Thereupon in December, 1892, said trustees made an application to said city annual board of equalization for a further reduction in said valuation, but their application was denied. Thereupon the trustees appealed the matter of said valuation and their application for the correction thereof to the auditor of state. On the twenty-fifth of January, 1893, the auditor of state, acting in conjunction with the attorney general and governor, as a state board of remission, granted the application of the trustees and made a further reduction in said valuation which reduction the auditor of Hamilton county was ordered to enter. Upon the receipt of said mandate the auditor of Hamilton county changed the duplicates accordingly, whereupon the city annual board of equalization notified plaintiffs that it would consider and act upon a motion to restore the valuation of September 12, 1892, and in August, 1895, said board of equalization did make such addition as restored the said valuation of September 12, 1892, which the county auditor has placed upon the duplicate and delivered the same for collection. The plaintiffs allege that there has been no change in the value of this property or other property in the vicinity since the reduction made by the state board. They further allege a tender of the taxes due upon said property upon the valuation fixed by the state board of remission, and pray for an injunction as to all taxes above that sum. The defendants answering allege that the plaintiffs appeared before the city annual board of equalization pursuant to the notice of August, 1895, and were heard upon the resolution then pending, and that after such hearing, on the seventeenth of August, 1895, said board passed said resolution to make additions to said valuation, not for the purpose of restoring the reduction made by order of the state board, but because of inequality which the board found to exist. A finding of facts was made by the circuit court, but in our view the case may be determined on the pleadings.
    
      G. 0. Archer; L. G. Black and Sidney G. Strieker, for plaintiffs in error.
    The Auditor of State, acting through the State Board of Tax Remission, had power to reduce the tax valuation on each of the pieces of property in question.
    For the purpose of argument, we propose to admit that the failure of the Board of Revision to sit, as such, during the year of 1892 rendered it impossible to perfect an appeal from the decision of the Board of Review under section 2805a, Revised Statutes.
    We claim that under section 167 and section 2800, Rev. Stat., the Auditor of State, acting through the State Board of Tax Remission, had original power to correct the return of the County Auditor and reduce the tax valuation $5,000 on each of the pieces of property in question, finding, as they did, that the property was taxed too high, and that, therefore, it was not necessary to perfect an appeal under section 2805a.
    Sections 167 and 2800, are clearly in pari materia.
    
    The word “any ” is a word of general signification, and is synonymous to “ all,” and the word “all” is synonymous to the word “every.” Stone v. Elliott, 11 Ohio St., 258; Smith Bridge Co. v. Bowman, 41 Ohio St., 37; Collector v. Hubbard, 12 Wall., 1; Murray v. Brown, 91 U. S., 254.
    Having regard, therefore, for the intention of the Legislature, and construing the words according to their plain, natural and ordinary signification, there can be no doubt, we submit, that under sections 167 and 2800 Rev. Stat.. the Auditor of State had full and express power to order the county auditor to reduce the tax valuation $5,000 upon each of the pieces of property in question. State ex rel. v. Leffler, 40 W. L. Bull., 174.
    If the question were an open one, which we submit we have clearly shown it is not, the reasoning’ of the circuit "court would but confirm the correctness of the rule laid down by this court — -if any confirmation were needed — since the reasons upon which the circuit court proceeded are so manifestly erroneous as to confirm the necessity of the opposite conclusion reached by this Court. 16 O. C. C., 255; 9 Circ. Dec., 93.
    This might, indeed, have been one of the reasons that prompted the circuit court to throw out the suggestion “if that law be constitutional.” The constitutionality, however, of that law is not involved in this case, and therefore cannot be collaterally impeached or attacked. The law must be presumed to be constitutional. State ex rel. v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St., 18; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St., 14; Kendall v. State, 52 Ohio St., 346.
    It is a settled axiom in the construction of statutes, that courts will always adopt that view which will avoid absurd consequences, injustice, or great inconvenience, as none of these can be presumed to have been within the legislative intent. Moore v. Given, 39 Ohio St., 661; Railway Co. v. Jump, 50 Ohio St., 651.
    It is thus clear that the power of the auditor of state to correct a fundamental error under section 167 was in no wise involved. The court simply held that the error sought to be corrected was clerical and not fundamental, and that under section 166 the auditor of state had power to direct the county auditor to correct a clerical error. It decided nothing more. It did not decide that if application had been made by the taxpayer to the auditor of state under section 167 to correct a fundamental error, that the auditor of state would not have bad power to correct it. State ex rel. v. Jones, 51 Ohio St., 492.
    We freely admit the general proposition, that when the board of equalization once lawfully acquires jurisdiction, that courts will not collaterally inquire into, or impeach the propriety of their action. Fratz v. Mueller, 35; Ohio St., 395. Hirschman v. Fratz, 7 W. L. Bul., 35.
    While courts will not collaterally impeach their judgments when jurisdiction is once acquired, a court of equity will inquire into their jurisdiction, and for that purpose may go behind their record and look into their proceedings. Lessee of Adams v. Jeffries, 12 Ohio, 254; Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Ohio St., 494.
    
      Rendigs, Foraher dk Dinsmore, for defendants in error.
    The question, is, whether section 167 authorizes the state auditor and the state board of tax remission to review the acts of a board of equalization, and substitute the judgment of the state officials for the judgment of the local board.
    Boards of equalization are independent tribunals created by the legislature for the purpose of assisting in carrying on an important branch of the government relating to the appraisement of property for taxation. Their authority is prescribed by the statute, and while acting within the scope thereof their conclusions are final, unless an appeal is provided by law. Their acts are judgments, which can not be reviewed bv the courts, nor impeached for any reason, except fraud or want of jurisdiction. Wagoner v. Loomis, 37 Ohio St., 571; Stanley v. Supervisors of Albany, 121 U. S., 535; Railway Co. v. People, 119 Ill., 182; Olympia Waterworks v. Thurston Co., 14 Wash., 268; Maish v. Arizona, 164 U. S., 599; McDonald v. Escanaba, 62 Mich., 555; Ex rel, Attorney General v. Supervisors etc., 42 Mich., 72; Mayor, etc., of New York, v. Davenport, 92 N. Y., 604; Bellinger v. Gray, 51 N. Y., 610; Moore v. Taylor, 147 Pa. St., 481; Ry. Co. v. Backus, Treasurer, 133 Ind., 625; The People ex rel. v. Lots in Ashbey, 122 Ill., 297; Macklot v. City of Davenport, 17 Iowa, 379; Stewart v. Maple, 70 Pa. St., 221; Hughes v. Kline, 30 Pa. St., 227 ; R. R. Co. v. Smith county, 54 Texas, 1; Rhoads v. Cushman, 45 Ind., 85; The Republic Life Ins., Co. v. Pollak, 75 Ill., 292 ; Porter v. R. R. Co., 76 Ill., 561; Ry. Co, v. Backus, 154 U. S., 421; San Jose Gas Co. v. January, 57 Cal., 614; Brooks v. Shelton, 47 Miss., 243; The People v. Goldtree, 44 Cal., 323; Cooley on Taxation, pp., 422, 748; 1 Desty on Taxation, 498; High on Injunctions, section 493; 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 261, and cases cited thereunder.
    Boards of Equalization in considering values for taxation act judicially. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 422; State v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St., 109; Black v. Gonigle, 103 Mo., 192; Griswald v. Bay City, 24 Mich., 262.
    We do not claim that it is not within the power of the legislature to provide for the review of acts of local boards of equalization, and for setting aside the valuations as determined by them upon a further investigation by the reviewing authority. In the absence, however, of a statute, plainly-providing for such review, the judgment of the local boards must stand, and it is our claim that it was not the intention of the legislature to provide such an authority in the enactment of section 167, Revised Statutes.
   Shauck, J.

In any view that may be taken of the case the plaintiffs are not entitled to the injunction prayed for if the board composed of the auditor of state, governor and attorney general was. without authority to reduce the valuation of the lots under the circumstances and for the.reasons alleged in the petition. By taking to his assistance the governor and the attorney general the auditor of state complied with the requirement of section 167 of the Revised Statutes with respect to cases in which the amount to be remitted exceeds $100, but, excepting the provision as to the amount to be remitted, the powers of the three officers are those only which the statute confers upon the auditor of state. They had no more authority than he to make a reduction in the valuation of the land because.of a supposed error of judgment in that regard by the local board. It is contended that the authority assumed in this case is conferred upon the auditor of state by section 167 of the Revised Statutes, which, defining the duties of the auditor of state, provides: “He may remit such taxes and penalties thereon as he ascertains to have been illegally assessed and such penalties as have accrued or may accrue in consequence of the negligence or error of any officer required to do any duty relating to the assessment of prop-' erty for taxation, or the levy or collection of taxes, and he may from time to time correct any error in any assessment of property for taxation or in the duplicate of taxes in any county; provided that when the amount to be remitted in any one case shall exceed one hundred dollars, he shall proceed to the office of the governor and attorney general and take to his assistance the governor and attorney general, and in such cases may remit no more than shall be agreed upon by a majority of the officers named.”

It is further contended that in the unreported case of the State ex rel. The Commissioners of Marion county v. Loeffler, 4 L. B., 174, we construed this section in accordance with the views of counsel for the plaintiffs. But the record in that case did not show that the state auditor had attempted to exercise his judgment as to the value of the personal property of the Marion Steam Shovel Co., a corporation, upon whose application the remission was made. It did show that upon the consideration of said application the board found “that said auditor of Marion county erred in adding to and placing upon the Marion county tax duplicate the additional sum of $26,099 in taxes and penalties charged against the Marion Steam Shovel Co., and that said additional sum has been illegally assessed and said penalties thereon erroneously added by said auditor of Marion county.” The case is authority for the proposition that the auditor of state may remit additions and penalties charged by the county auditor against a corporation without authority of law. Nothing’ further was presented or decided. And this we think suggests the limits within which the state auditor may act in making’ such remissions. There is no provision of law to enable him to acquire information concerning the values of real estate in the different counties, if it were practicable for him to acquire such information by the most efficient provisions that could be devised. The terms of the statute conferring power upon local boards of equalization show it to be the policy of the legislature to require the valuation to be determined by officers having some knowledge upon the subject and facilities for acquiring full knowledge concerning the same. Moreover such boards are confined to the duties of equalizing values, and subject to express restrictions that they shall not reduce the value of the real property of the state below the aggregate value thereof as fixed by the state board of equalization. If we aeeept the views of counsel for plaintiff we must concede that. the legislature provided for the annulment of this requirement by vesting revisory power in an officer upon whose action there is no such restriction. While the auditor of state is vested with authority under section 167 to remit taxes and penalties illegally assessed, he is without authority to overrule the judgment of the local board in a case in which it might legally act. This conclusion is consistent with the view of the general subject taken in State ex rel. Poe v. Raine, 47 Ohio St., 447, and Hagerty et al. v. Huddleson et al. ante. p. 149.

Judgment affirmed.  