
    [Pittsburg,
    October 1, 1824.]
    BEACH against MORRIS.
    IN ERROR.
    if a man covenants by articles of agreement, to convey land to another, for which the latter agrees to pay by instalments, and on payment of the last instalment, to receive a deed of conveyance, and he assigns the articles and the land to another, subject to the payment of the whole of the purchase money, by whom no part of it is paid, the vendor cannot, after all the instalments have become due, maintain an action of debt for the purchase money against the assignee; there being no privity either of contract or of estate between them.
    Writ of error to Crawford county.
    This was an action of debt, for the purchase money of a tract of land, in which, on a demurrer to the plaintiff’s declaration, judgment was given for the defendant. — The facts were as follows:
    
      Isaac Beach, the plaintiff, by articles of agreement, dated the 1st of March, 1815, agreed to sell and convey in fee simple, to a certain James Wilson, a tract of land containing one hundred and twenty acres in Crawford county; for which Wilson covenanted to pay him one hundred and thirty-seven dollars, in six equal annual instalments, and on the payment of the last ins.,alment ho was to receive a deed of conveyance. Possession was delivered to Wilson, who made improvements and resided on the land until the 1st of April, 1817, when he assigned to the defendant the aforesaid articles of agreement and tract of land, subject to the payment of the whole purchase money. The defendant, immediately after this assignment, entered on the land, cultivated it, and received the produce thereof for his own use, and continued so to do until the bringing of this suit, which was after the instalments were all due. Neither Wilson nor the defendant paid any part of the purchase money. Previous to the commencement of the suit, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant a deed of conveyance duly executed, and demanded payment of the purchase money, which, being refused by the defendant, this action was brought.
    
      Wallace, for the plaintiff in error,
    argued, that when Wilson sold to the defendant, the intention was that he should pay the purchase money. The land was then the debtor, which constituted Such privity of estate as made the holder of the land liable to pay. He cited Walker’s Case, 3 Co. 22. 1 Saund, 238, 241, (noted.) Barker v. Damer, 3 Mod. 337. Way v. Yalley, 6 Mod. 194. Wadham v. Marlowe, 8 East. 315, (note.)
    
      Selden, contra.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Tilghma&, C. J.

I do not see how the action can be supported, because, between the plaintiff and defendant, there is no privity either of contract or estate. That there is no privity of contract is evident, because privity of contract is personal privity, and is confined to the persons of the contracting parties, and there can be no privity of estate, because the estate has never passed from the plaintiff. The assignment of Wilson passed to the defendant all the right which Wilson had, that is to say, an equity, by virtue of which he was entitled to demand a conveyance, on payment of the purchase money. Wilson, notwithstanding his assignment, remained liable for the purchase money, on his covenant in the articles of agreement between him and the plaintiff; and from this liability he could not withdraw himself, by substituting the defendant in his place. The counsel for the plaintiff has cited many cases, in which a man has been subject to an action of debt, without pri-vity of contract. But in all those cases, it will be found that there •was privity of estate. For example, — A. leases to B., rendering rent; B. assigns to C. A. may maintain an action of debt for the rent, against C.; because there is privity of estate between them, and the rent is incident to the reversion. The law of privity of estate, as well as of contract, is well laid down in Walker’s Case, 3 Co. 22; and in Thursby v. Plant, 1 Saund. 237. In no point of view, is the plaintiff entitled to this action against the defendant, who never made any kind of contract with him. The plaintiff' made his bargain with Wilson, and kept the legal estate in himself by way of security; and the defendant contracted, not with the plaintiff, but with Wilson, and is liable to Wilson on that contract, whatever it may have been. It would be most unjust, therefore, as well as illegal, to make the defendant subject to the actions both of the plaintiff and of Wilson. But the plaintiff may recover the land from the defendant in an ejectment, by virtue of the legal estate which remains in him, in ease the purchase money be not paid. He may resort to the land, in whatever hands it may be, but can maintain no personal action against any one but Wilson. I am of opinion, that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, which was in favour of the defendant, should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  