
    [Sunbury,
    July 1, 1824.]
    MAXWELL and Wife against ALLISON.
    IN ERROR.
    A toother cannot maintain an action of slander, for calling her daughter a bastard; there being no colloquium of the mother.
    Of the nature and office of an innuendo.
    
    This was a writ of error to the Common Pleas of Mifflin county, in an action of slander, in which the plaintiffs in error, John Maxwell, and Mary his wife, were plaintiffs, and John Mlison defendant. ‘
    The declaration contained three counts, the first of which, laid the words to have been spoken “of, and to one Nancy Maxwell, the legitimate daughter of the said John Maxwell, and Mary his wife,” in the following manner: “You, (the said Nancy Max-. Well meaning,) are a bastard; (thereby insinuating and intending to have it understood and believed by all the good citizens so hearing him, the said John Mlison, proclaim and speak the said false, feigned, and scandalous words, th’at,the said Nancy Maxwell was a bastard, and that the aforesaid Mary, the wife of the said John Maxwell, had committed the crime of adultery and incontinence).”
    The second count laid the words thus: “She, (the said Nancy Maxwell, the legitimate daughter of the said John Maxwell meaning,) is a bastard; (thereby insinuating, and intending to have it understood, by all persons hearing the same, that the said Nancy Maxwell was a bastard, and not. the legitimate daughter of the said Mary, and that the said Mary had been- guilty of the crime of incontinence and adultery).”
    In the third count the words were laid as spokén, “'of, and concerning Nancy Maxwell, the legitimate daughter of the said John Maxwell, and Mary his wife,” thus: “I, (the said John Mlison meaning,) have called her, (the said Nancy meaning,) a bastard, and she is a bastard, and I have said nothing but what I can maintain; (meaning thereby, that the said Nancy Maxwell was a bastard, and that the said Mary Maxwell, the mother of the said Nancy, had been guilty of the crime of incontinence and adultery, and that the said John Mlison could maintain the same).”
    On the trial of the cause, several bills of exceptions were taken by the plaintiffs counsel to the opinion of the court below, in the admission and rejection of evidence, which were returned with the record to this court, and argued by Carothers and Hale, for the plaintiffs in error, and by Burnside, for the defendant in error;
    but as *the cause was decided on grounds wholly independent of them, they are not here stated.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Duncan, J.

Whatever may have been the errors of the court in the admission and rejection of evidence, still, if the plaintiffs, in their declaration, have set out no legal cause of action, if the words laid are not actionable, if they never could obtain a judgment against the defendant, the judgment must stand affirmed. The words laid in this declaration, are clearly not actionable. They were not spoken of the plaintiffs; to the person to whom they were addressed, they imputed no crime, they exposed her to no punishment. It might be considered a misfortune to her to be esteemed a bastard, but it did not impute to her any moral turpitude, nor any crime subjecting her to indictment or punishment. If any temporal damage had been stated to have been occasioned by speaking the words, as the danger of losing a situation, the action might have been sustained. The mother of Nancy, to whom want of chastity was imputed, might be said to be charged with adultery or fornication. But the words were not spoken of her. If this meaning could be rendered certain, it could not be by means of an innuendo, but must have been by way of averment or colloquium. If the person to whom the words relate, be'not described with certainty, but require some extrinsic fact'to render them so, this is not the office of an innuendo. The intention to have it understood, that Mary Maxwell, the plaintiff, liad been guilty of the crime of incontinence and adultery, because the defendant said Nancy, her daughter, was a bastard, is not an averment of a fact, on which issue could be taken, nor is it susceptible of proof; and there was no colloquium at the time of publishing the words, that they were spoken of her. Where a person is so ambiguously alluded to, as that without the aid of extrinsic facts, the identity is not ascertained there by the introduction of proper averments and a colloquium, the words may, notwithstanding be rendered sufficiently certain to maintain an action. Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 5 Johns. 223. Cheetham v. Tillotson, Id. 430. An innuendo cannot supply the place of a colloquium; nor is an innuendo capable of proof. But where an innuendo and colloquium introduce extrinsic matter, that is a proper subject of proof. The true rule is, that where words do not in themselves virtually convey the meaning imputed to them, or where they refer to some extrinsic matter, to make them actionable, it must not only be predicated, that the said matter exists, but that the words were spoken of and concerning that matter, and this is matter of fact, to be decided by a jury. 1 Saund, 243. Innuendo, means nothing more than id est, scilicet, or meaning as aforesaid; explanatory of a subject matter sufficiently expressed before; as, such a one, meaning the defendant; or, such a subject, meaning the subject in question. But as it is only received as a word of explanation, it cannot extend to the sense of the words, beyond their own meaning. Unless something is put in the record for it to explain, there is nothing to throw light on the innuendo, nor has it connection with any part of the declaration. It stands alone, without any support, and implies no charge to. the plaintiff, Mary, personally.

Judgment affirmed.  