
    Mygatt against Washburn.
    Assessors who enter upon their assessment roll, as liable to be taxed for personal property, the name of a person not a resident of their town or ward at the time the assessment is made, act without jurisdiction and are liable for the damages resulting from the collection of a tax founded on such entry.
    The words of the statute, “ the time the assessment is made,” relate to the binding and conclusive act of the board of assessors which designates the tax-payers and the amount of taxable property.
    
      It seems that this time is the first day of July, the assessors being required to complete their preparatory inquiries in the months of May and June. Per Denio, Oh. J.
    The action in the Supreme Court was brought July 24th, 1852, to recover damages against the defendant for having, as.one of the assessors of the town of Oxford, in Chenango county, illegally assessed the plaintiff for personal property, he being, as alleged, at the time of the assessment a resident of the county of Oswego, and not taxable in the county of Chenango, by means of which illegal assessment the plaintiff’s property was sold by the collector of the town of Oxford. On the trial, which took place at the Chenango Circuit, in March, 1855, the material facts were agreed upon, and were as follows: The plaintiff was a resident of Oxford until the 25th day of May, 1840, when he removed from that town to Oswego, where he has since resided, and where he was assessed and paid taxes in 1846. On the nineteenth of May in that year, and while the plaintiff was still residing at Oxford, the defendant, as one of the assessors, called upon him, (he living in the defendant’s district, as the town had been divided among the assessors,) took down his name and placed opposite to it the amount of $10,000 as his personal property, and informed him of what he had done. On the first day of July following, the assessors met to make out the assessment roll, which they completed within two days thereafter; the plaintiff being named therein as a person liable to assessment, and being assessed for personal property to the amount of $10,000. The assessors then posted the notices required by law, and on the 24th day of the same month completed the roll, signed it and attached to it the certificate required by the statute, and on the same day delivered it to the supervisor of the town. The supervisors of the county annexed to the plaintiff’s name a tax of $100, and this amount, together with the collector’s fees, was collected by levy and sale of personal property of the plaintiff, in January, 1847. All the proceedings of the town and county officers were legal and regular, provided the plaintiff was liable to taxation. The stipulation by which the foregoing facts were admitted, stated in addition that the assessors were diligent in their inquiries to ascertain the names of the taxable inhabitants of the town. The justice who held the court was of the opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the property sold to raise the tax, with interest thereon, and directed a verdict for that amount, which was accordingly rendered ; and the judgment entered thereon was affirmed at a general term. This appeal .was then brought by the defendant.' The case was submitted on printed briefs.
    
      James W. Glover, for the appellant.
    
      R. J. Baldwin, for the respondent
   Brown, J.

This is an action brought to recover damages against the defendant, an assessor of the town of Oxford, for illegally assessing the plaintiff for personal property in that town, he being at the time resident in the county of Oswego. All the questions involved in the case have been decided in The People v. Supervisors of Chenango County (1 Kern., 563), except one, and that is, the defence of the statute of limitations. The assessment was made on the 24th of July, 1846, and the action commenced on the 24th day of July, 1852. Counting one day (the day the act complained of was done) exclusive and the other inclusive, the action was commenced within the period of six years. I entertain no doubt but that the day on which the assessment roll was signed, certified and delivered to the supervisor was the completion of the assessment which forms the ground of the action.

The judgment should be affirmed.

Denio, C. J.

The act relating to the assessment of taxes requires that every person shall be assessed in the town or ward where he resides when the assessment is made, for all personal estate owned by him. (1 R. S., 389, § 5.) As the plaintiff resided in Oxford, during a portion of the year 1846, and changed his residence to Oswego while the proceedings to make out the assessment for that year were going on, it becomes necessary to ascertain when, in the course of these proceedings, the assessment shall be said to be made. Between the first days of May and July, in each year, the assessors are to proceed “ to ascertain, by diligent inquiry, the names of the taxable inhabitants ” in their towns or wards; and for this purpose they are authorized to divide the town into as many convenient districts as there are assessors. (Id., 390, §§ 7, 8.) They are then allowed until the first day of August to complete and copy the assessment roll, after which they are to give notice that on the third Tuesday in August they will review their assessment, and that parties considering themselves aggrieved may appear before them and make their complaints. Finally, they are to deliver the corrected roll to the supervisors by the first day of September following. (Id., 393, 394, §§ 19, 20, 27.) The period for ascertaining the names of the tax paying persons, it is thus seen, includes the months of May and June, and is limited to those months, during which period, namely, on the twenty-fifth of May, the plaintiff changed his residence; and, it must be added, if the fact is of any importance, an account was taken by the defendant of his taxable property during the period assigned to the inquiry and before his change of residence. But this was not, the making of the assessment. The amount then put down as the value of the plaintiff’s taxable property, was liable to be changed by the three assessors, when assembled to prepare the roll; and it was perfectly competent to leave his name entirely off the roll when it came to be completed. If the plaintiff, instead of removing from Oxford the latter part of May, had moved into the town on that day, and remained there until the roll was completed, there can be no doubt but that he would have been liable to be assessed there. He did go. to Oswego in May, so that in June he became subject to the perquisitions of the assessors of that town , and he was assessed there, and compelled to pay taxes upon the same property for which he was taxed in Oxford. The fact that he was taxed in Oswego is of no legal consequence in this action. It is, however, a circumstance well calculated to illustrate the incoherency which the defendant’s construction of the statute would produce. It may be safely assumed that the law does not intend to tax the property of the citizen more than once in the same year, and that no increased burthen is designed to be imposed on a person on account of a lawful change of "residence at any time in the year. The defendant argues that the assessment is made when the assessor, within whose district the tax payer is found, takes down his name and an account of his taxable property. But this may be done on any day in May or June; so that if he has two or more places of residence in different towns, during these two months, ho may be assessed and taxed once in each town, and each of the assessments will be entirely legal. This, then, cannot be the true construction, for it leads to a manifest absurdity. Evidently there must be some day, in the course of the proceeding, on which the assessment may be said to be made. The fixing of this day cannot depend upon the degree of diligence with which the assessors perform their duties; for in that case it would be different in different towns, and there would be a liability to a double assessment. In my opinion the assessment should be considered as made at the expiration of the time limited for making the inquiry, namely, on the first day of July. If there is any change, of residence or the ownership of the property, after that day, it does no affect the assessment roll. The inquiries are then com pleted. Any changes which the assessors are authorized to make after that time, are such as may be required to correct mistakes. No earlier day can be assumed, because what is done by one or all the assessors prior to the first of July is inchoate and preparatory, and liable to be altered according to their final judgment upon the matter. When the statute speaks of the time “when the assessment is made’.’ it refers to the binding and conclusive act which designates the tax payers-and the amount of taxable property. If I am correct, in what has been said, it follows that the time, referred to in the statute, is the first day of July. It cannot be an earlier or a later day without involving incongruities which •we cannot suppose the legislature would have permitted to exist. We arrived at the same conclusion when this tax was before the court in another aspect; and I should not have thought it necessary to add a word to what was then said, were it not that the case was decided upon another point, namely, the propriety of the remedy by mandamus against the board of supervisors; and what is contained in the opinion as to the present question was not absolutely necessary to the judgment which was given. ( The People v. The Supervisors of Chenango County, 1 Kern., 573.)

The plaintiff, therefore, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the assessors. In placing his name on the roll, and adding thereto an amount as the value of his personal property, they acted without authority. As the board of supervisors was obliged by law to annex a tax to the name of every person assessed upon the roll, and to issue a warrant for the collection of the tax, the unauthorized act of the assessors was the means by which the property of the plaintiff was procured to be sold. They are, therefore, responsible to the plaintiff for the damages which ensued. It was not, in the view of the law, the case of an error of judgment. It is a salutary rule, though in some cases, and perhaps in the one before us, it may operate harshly, that a subordinate officer is bound to see that he acts within the scope of the authority legally committed to him. The principle is too well settled to require a reference to authority; but its application to the case of the assessment of a person not liable to taxation in the town or district in which the assessment is made has often been declared in the courts of this and other states. (Suydam v. Keys, 13 John., 444; Prosser v. Secor, 5 Barb., 607; People v. The Supervisors of Chenango County, supra; Freeman v. Kenney, 15 Pick., 44; Lyman v. Fiske, 17 id.B 231.)

The action, was not barred by the statute of limitations. The cause of action arose when the plaintiff’s property was taken in consequence of the illegal assessment, which was within six years before the suit was commenced. The assessment, which was wholly void, could not have prejudiced the plaintiff if it had not been made effectual to his injury by the acts which followed. (Merritt v. Read, 5 Denio, 352; Roberts v. Read, 16 East., 215.)

The judgment of the Supreme Court should be affirmed.

All the judges concurred in affirming the judgment, except Shankland, J., who dissented.

Judgment affirmed.  