
    MILLS v. STATE.
    (No. 7180.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    June 27, 1923.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 17, 1923.)
    Criminal law <&wkey;507(f) — Purchaser of liquor not accomplice within law of accomplice testimony.
    In a prosecution for sale of intoxicating liquor, the purchasers of the liquor were not accomplices regardless of motive in purchasing, since Acts 37th Leg. 1st Called Sess. (1921) c. 61, subd. 2c (Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1922, art. 588:^3) expressly exempts such purchasers from the law of accomplice testimony.
    Appeal from District Court, Shelby County; Chas. L. Brachfield, Judge.
    Bill Mills was convicted for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    D. M. Short & Sons and D. R. Taylor, all of Center, for appqjlant.
    R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

In the indictment appellant was charged with the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor to Hagar Hooker; upon conviction his punishment was assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for one year.

Hagar Hooker testified that he bought a quart of whisky from the appellant, for which he paid him $4; that he purchased the whisky, and delivered it to Edwin Booth. Booth testified that he gave Hooker $4 in order that he might buy a quart of whisky from the appellant; that he saw the transaction, and saw appellant deliver to Hooker two quarts of whisky, giving him $4. One of the quarts was returned to the appellant.

The state’s witnesses were cross-examined with the view of showing that Booth and Hooker had conspired to trap the appellant into making the sale. Hooker’s reputation for truth and veracity was also attacked.

The only question presented on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence. The point is made that both Hooker and Booth were accomplices on account of the nature of the transaction. The Legislature has declared that the purchaser of intoxicating liquor unlawfully sold is not an, accomplice witness. See Acts 37th Leg. (1st Called Sess.), c. 61, subd. 2c (Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1922, art. 588% a3). Were it not for this, statute, appellant’s position might be plausible. See, also, Bush v. State, 68 Tex, Cr. R. 301, 151 S. W. 554; Huggins v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 205, 210 S. W. 804; Franklin v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 342, 227 S. W. 486; Guyer v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 489, 36 S. W. 450; Lamm v. State (No. 7719; Tex. Cr. App.) 252 S. W. 535, not yet [officially] reported. The statute on the subject, however, forecloses the matter against the appellant.

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

LATTIMORE, J.

This court cannot concern itself with the motive that induces one to become a purchaser of liquor. It is insisted in this ease that the motive of the purchasers was for the purpose of securing a reward which had been offered for the conviction of any person charged with a violation of the liquor law in a certain vicinity. Our statute expressly exempts from the law of accomplice testimony the purchaser of intoxicating liquor, and the trial court in the instant case did not err in declining to charge on the law of accomplice testimony. The case was decided correctly in the original opinion. Finding nothing of substance in the contentions in this motion, same will be overruled. 
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