
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Derrick Jay ALBERS, Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 14-6220.
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    April 14, 2015.
    Debra W. Pauli, Esq., Travis Dean Smith, Office of the United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.
    Ty Gee, Esq., Haddon, Morgan, and Foreman, Denver, CO, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, KELLY and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER AND JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to a plea agreement with a broad appeal waiver, Derrick Jay Albers pleaded guilty on May 7, 2014, to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1843 and 1349, and was sentenced on October 23, 2014, to 120 months’ imprisonment. Despite his appeal waiver, Mr. Albers filed a pro se notice of appeal. The government has moved to enforce the appeal waiver under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir.2004) (en banc) (per curiam). On November 20, 2014, we appointed new counsel to represent Mr. Albers in this matter. In light of the response prepared by counsel, we grant the government’s motion to enforce and dismiss this appeal.

Under Hahn, we ordinarily consider three factors: “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1325. But Mr. Albers “do[es] not contest the government’s motion to enforce the plea agreement to the extent it seeks to bar a direct appeal.” Aplt. Resp. at 6. As a result, we need not address the Hahn factors in this instance. See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir.2005) (stating that court need not address Hahn factor not in dispute).

Mr. Albers argues, however, that the appeal waiver should not be read to foreclose a future collateral attack raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as to the plea agreement or his sentence. See Aplt. Resp. at 6. He “agree[s] with the government that the evidence in the record is insufficient to raise [this] issue in a direct appeal,” id. at 2, but he wishes “to preserve his ability to collaterally attack the plea agreement or sentence,” id. at 6. Because the government’s motion is directed solely to the appeal now before us, we need not and do not decide whether the appeal waiver bars Mr. Albers from filing a future collateral attack raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Cf. United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir.2001) (addressing a motion to enforce an appeal waiver against a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255).

Accordingly, we grant the government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver as to this appeal, and the appeal is dismissed. 
      
       This panel has determined that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
     