
    Jeff LEGGETT, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Leslie D. COMER, Craft Shop Supervisor/Correction Officer; Todd S. Walters, Sergeant; FNU Madden, Craft Shop Supervisor/Correction Officer, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 07-10577
    Summary Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    May 19, 2008.
    
      Jeff Leggett, Abilene, TX, pro se.
    Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
   per CURIAM:

„ Proceeding pro se, as he did m district . T ° T „ m . court, Jeff Leggett, Texas inmate „ _ ' ,. . , ,. # 590716, appeals, on numerous bases, the .. . ~ , „ , . ...... dismissal, as frivolous, of his civil-rights , . , . , m , . . complaint agamst Texas Department of ^ . . , T ,. . , , , Criminal Justice officials, pursuant to 28 TT c, „ ,ni_. , . U.S.C. § 1915A. The district court may dismiss a prisoner’s complaint against an officer or employee of a governmental entity if it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l). Such a dismissal is reviewed for abuse of diseretion. E.g., Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir.1998). A complaint is frivolous “ ‘if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact’ ”. Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir.1998)).

This action concerns claims about Leggett’s personal property, concerning his being transferred from one prison unit to another. He agreed to proceed before a magistrate judge.

r-i T ,, , , ,, ... [1] Leggett contends the magoste ■judge abused his discretion when he ap00 ^ plied the Parratt/Hudson doctrine to his procedural-due-process claim, because De- , 1 , ’ . fendants acts were not random and unau- „ thonzed. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534, 104 S.Ct 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984): Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Leggett, how- ... ..i . t ever, points to no state law or prison di- ,. . . 77 j, i , , i • rective requiring Defendants to deprive , . o,, i . i ~ , him of his craft tools, materials, or finished i , t ,,, i • , . , , products. Leggett s claim rests instead on these assertions: Defendants intentionally failed to comport with prison policy to mventory and secure his property; and . ..... their failure was eonspn-atorial and retalia- , , L , tory. The Parratt/Hudson doctrine ex- ,, . , . , plicitly applies to the unauthorized, mtenf. , , , , tional deprivation of property by a state , , „ . . , employee, and the magistrate judge did . . . . not err when he applied the doctrme to T ,7,,. ~ t. , Leggett s claim. See Zinermon v. Burch, 94 U.S. 113, 115, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990).

Leggett’s contention that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine did not apply because Texas does not provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy is without merit. See Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543-44 (5th Cir.1994) (holding Texas tort of conversion provides adequate remedy), That Leggett was unsuccessful in filing his state-law action does not render Texas’ post-deprivation remedies inadequate, See Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287, 1293 (5th Cir.1986). Thus, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion when he determined Leggett’s procedural-due-process claim was frivolous. Leggett’s substantive due process claim need not be reviewed because he did not raise it in district court. See Steward Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. United States Auto Glass Disc. Ctrs., Inc., 200 F.3d 307, 316-17 (5th Cir.2000)

ro „ T .. ,. . ... . , , [3,4] Leggett contends the magistrate . . . , , . .. ,. , , , judge abused his discretion when he de- . ., . ,. „ . . ,. . ““‘l”8 ^ Bl^e «taf. Tins “ks lh» “ LeBB8“ 23 ****^ í,”' “"‘T? mg order. See Faulder v. Johnson, 178 ° F.3d 741, 742 (5th Cir.1999). The magisI , , . ,. trate radge did not abuse his discretion , , , . , T when he denied Leggetts motion for a . . . .. . m preliminary injunction, given Texas post- ' . . J ° ,, , deprivation remedies. See Women s Med. Ctr. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 419 n. 15 (5th ooni. ' '

[g] L tt correctly asserts the . , , . . , . , . ,. ... istrate judge abused his discretion by dis- .. , . ... . , ,, missmg his complamt agamst Madden on ,, , . , T the basis that Leggett failed to allege ,, .. . . , ... Madden was personally mvolved with a ... .. , . , ,. T ,, , . constitutional violation. Leggett asserted ... , . , ,, ,, „ ., , , m his complamt: Madden failed to secure . . ,,, , . „ and mventory Leggetts property before , „ . ., , °° . , ., mi transferring it to the Robertson Unit. The ... , „ ... dismissal of Leggett s procedural-due-process ^ ^ m>y less be affirmed because that claim was frivolous as to all Defendants. See Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003,1005 (5th Cir.1998).

Leggett maintains the magistrate judge abused his discretion when he dismissed his claim that Defendants conspired to retaliate agamst him. This contention fails because Leggett does not allege facts tending to show Defendants had an agreement to deprive Leggett of his property. See Hale v. Haney, 786 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.1986).

Leggett contends the magistrate judge abused his discretion when he dismissed his claim that Defendants deprived him of his property in retaliation for his letter-writing campaign. A prison official may not retaliate against, or harass, an inmate for exercising his First Amendment right to complain through proper channels about a guard’s misconduct. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir.1995). “To prevail on a claim of retaliation, a prisoner must establish (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 596, 166 L.Ed.2d 443 (2006). [A]n inmate must allege more than de minimis retaliation to proceed with [a retaliation] claim”. Id. at 684-85.

Obviously, Leggett’s purported loss of $11,000 worth of personal property is not de minimis. See id. Moreover, as noted, a prisoner has a constitutional right to complain about prison guards. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1164. However, to prevent prisoners from shielding themselves from disciplinary action under the guise of claims of retaliation, a prisoner has to show: but for retaliatory animus, the adverse act would not have occurred. Id. at 1166. Mere conclusory allegations will not suffice. Id. Specifically, “[t]he inmate must produce direct evidence of motivation or, the more probable scenario, allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),

With respect to Madden, Leggett faUg to show: hig property would not have been missing but for his letter-writing about Robertson Unit officials, and retaliab°ry motivated the lack of adequate inventories and storage of his property, Madden was responsible for inventorying and securinS Leggett’s craft materials before Le^ett was transferred to the Robertson Unit and beSan complaining about the Robertson Unit officials,

Leggett’s claims about the Robertson Unit officials, however, allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may be plausibly inferred. See Jones, 188 F.3d at 324-25. Thus, Leggett’s retaliation claim against the remaining Defendants is not frivolous. Accordingly, the dismissal of Leggett’s retaliation claim against all but Madden is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings on this issue.

Leggett maintains the magistrate judge erred when he dismissed, as frivolouS; his equal-protection claim. To state a ciajm for an equal-protection violation, Leggett must allege, inter alia, different treatment of similarly-situated individuals; and purposeful or intentional discrimination- See Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir.1992). Leggetts assertion that Defendants had been dePriving Robertson Unit prisoners for years belies his assertion that he alone was sin-Sled out for discriminatory reasons. See id.

Leggett maintains the magistrate judge abused his discretion by granting Defendants “Eleventh Amendment immunity” when Defendants did not offer that defense. To the extent Leggett sued Defendants in their official capacities, his contention is unavailing. See Aguilar v. Tex as Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir.1998).

Leggett claims the magistrate judge erred when he dismissed his action without giving him: notice, or an opportunity to amend or conduct discovery. Leggett s contention with respect to his retaliation claim is moot because the dismissal of that claim is vacated. Leggett pleaded his best case with respect to his remaining claims and amendment was not necessary. See Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 602-03 (5th Cir.1996); Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir.1986); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; and REMANDED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     