
    HOTELERAMA ASSOCIATES, LTD., and Hilton Hotel Corporation d/b/a the Fontainebleau Hilton, Appellants, v. Ivory WILCOX and Ana Lee Wilcox, Appellees.
    No. 90-301.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 14, 1992.
    Rehearing Denied March 17, 1992.
    Holland & Knight, and Daniel S. Pearson and Amy D. Ronner, Miami, for appellants.
    Abramson & Magidson, and Hicks, Anderson & Blum, and Bambi G. Blum, Miami, for appellees.
    Before BASKIN, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.
   GERSTEN, Judge.

Appellants, Hotelerama Associates, Ltd., and Hilton Hotel Corporation (collectively Fontainebleau) appeal from an order denying motions for a new trial, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a directed verdict. We reverse and remand.

Appellee, Ivory Wilcox, (Wilcox) was an employee of Fontainebleau. Wilcox alleges that he suffered injuries while he was employed by Fontainebleau. Wilcox claims that the injuries he suffered from exposure to dangerous chemicals resulted from Fon-tainebleau’s negligence and fraud.

Previous to this action, Wilcox filed a worker’s compensation claim. In the worker’s compensation proceedings, findings of fact were entered, and Wilcox was awarded benefits. Wilcox then filed this action against Fontainebleau based on negligence and fraud. The trial court instructed the jury that they were bound by the findings in the worker’s compensation proceedings.

Fontainebleau contends, and we agree, that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it must accept the findings of the worker’s compensation proceedings. This court has previously stated:

[A]ny information as to prior verdicts has the inevitable tendency of causing the jury in the present case to defer to decisions made in a previous one and thus to delegate the uniquely wow-dele-gable duty of reaching its own independent conclusions.

Secada v. Weinstein, 563 So.2d 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Thus, it is reversible error:

[To admit] evidence that a previous “fact finder” — whether an investigating police officer, a traffic court, or a jury in a previous trial in the same case-reached a conclusion on an issue in the present trial.

Secada v. Weinstein, 563 So.2d at 173.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

BASKIN, J., concurs.

COPE, Judge

(specially concurring).

While I concur, a word should be said about the rationale for the trial court’s ruling, which was based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The plaintiff, Ivory Wilcox, had obtained a worker’s compensation award against his employer, Hotelera-ma Associates, Ltd. The trial court ruled that the worker’s compensation findings of fact were binding on Hotelerama in the instant civil suit, and the jury was so instructed.

Because the worker’s compensation statute creates presumptions in favor of the claimant and eliminates employer defenses (including comparative negligence), the burden of proof is lower for a claimant in a worker’s compensation proceeding than for a plaintiff in an ordinary civil action. See Johnson v. Dicks, 76 So.2d 657, 661 (Fla. 1954); § 440.11, Fla.Stat. (1989). That being so, the lower-burden worker’s compensation findings could not be introduced at the instance of the plaintiff to discharge plaintiff’s higher burden of proof in the civil suit. See 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 79.72(f) (1989). In the absence of collateral estop-pel, there is no alternative basis on which to sustain the admission of the findings, for the reasons set forth in the majority opinion. 
      
      . The only claim which went to trial against Hotelerama was fraud.
     
      
      . As to Hotelerama’s first ppint on appeal, see 2A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation §§ 68.23, 68.30, 68.32 (1990). See generally id., §§ 68.00, et seq.; Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., 552 So.2d 1099, 1101 n. 5 (Fla.1989).
     