
    Gail HARPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ryan LUGBAUER; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 12-15847.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted May 13, 2014.
    
    Filed May 30, 2014.
    Gail Ellen Harper, San Francisco, CA, pro se.
    David Jerome Kennedy, I, Esquire, David J. Kennedy, Attorney at Law, Richard S. Diestel, Bledsoe, Cathcart, Diestel, Pedersen, & Treppa LLP, R. Michael Lieberman, Law Offices of R. Michael Lieberman, Cherokee Melton, Esquire, James M. Wagstaffe, Esquire, Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Elizabeth Pederson, Deputy City, San Francisco City Attorney’s Office, San Francisco, CA, Edward Joseph Rodzewich, Stratman, Patterson & Hunter, Oakland, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Sea Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Gail Harper, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s order granting an anti-SLAPP motion to strike certain state law claims against the City and County of San Francisco, the San Francisco Police Department, George Gascon, Carl Ten-nenbaum, Chad Ertola, and Anna Brown (the “City defendants”). We dismiss Harper’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The district court’s order dismissed Harper’s claims against some, but not all, defendants in the action, and, therefore, is not an appealable final order. See Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc).

Moreover, this court does not have jurisdiction over Harper’s appeal of the district court’s order granting the City defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike under the collateral order doctrine because the order can be “fully and effectively reviewed after final judgment.” Branson v. City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d 334, 335 (9th Cir.1990) (collateral order doctrine does not apply to order granting immunity to some defendants before trial); see also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106-07, 113, 130 S.Ct. 599, 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009) (discussing collateral order doctrine, and reiterating “that the class of collaterally appealable orders must remain narrow and selective in its membership” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); DC Comics v. Pac. Pictures Corp., 706 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir.2013) (treating California anti-SLAPP motions as a form of immunity from suit).

DISMISSED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     