
    David J. PRYOR, AKA Latiya Pryor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; San Francisco Police Department; Greg Suhr, San Francisco Police Chief, individually and in his official capacity; San Francisco Sheriff Department; Michael Hennessy, former San Francisco Sheriff, individually and in his official capacity; Vicki Hennessy, San Francisco Acting Sheriff, in her official capacity; Sutter, Deputy Sheriff; Martinez, Deputy Sheriff; Ross Mirkarimi, Sasn Francisco Sheriff, in his official capacity; Curley, Deputy Sheriff; William Rold, Deputy Sheriff; Percy Grant, Deputy Sheriff; Thomas P. Macmahon; Aaron Foltz, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-15210
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted March 17, 2016 San Francisco, California
    Filed January 05, 2017
    
      Rani Gupta, Covington & Burling LLP, Redwood Shores, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant
    David J. Pryor, Pro Se
    James Frederick Hannawalt, Esquire, Attorney, San Francisco City Attorney’s Office, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees
    Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff-Appellant Latiya Pryor appeals several district court rulings following a jury verdict in favor of the sole defendant remaining in the case following pretrial proceedings.

1. The district court did not err when it granted partial summary judgment in favor of Deputy Grant because even taking Pryor’s version of events as true, no reasonable jury could determine that Deputy Grant’s actions were anything but “de min-imis and thus constitutionally reasonable.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2001). Pryor’s Bane Act claim also fails because there was no constitutional violation. See King v. State, 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 294, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 (2015) (requiring interference with a constitutional right).

2. Because Pryor failed to object to the expert testimony of defense witness Michael Pickett on the same grounds that she raises on appeal, we review her challenges to that testimony for plain error. United States v. Chang, 207 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000). The district court did not plainly err. Pickett permissibly testified that San Francisco Sheriffs Department policy requires officers to remove hairpieces that can be removed without injuring a prison-' er and that removing only several natural hairs would not constitute an injury for purposes of the policy. Even if Pickett offered an impermissible legal conclusion about the nature of “force,” that testimony did not “affect[] the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

3.The district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the jury instructions. See United States v. Lloyd, 807 F.3d 1128, 1165 (9th Cir. 2015). “[Ljooking to the instructions as a whole, the substance of the applicable law” on excessive force was “fairly and correctly covered,” even if the jury was not separately instructed on Pryor’s alternative factual theory of the case. Gantt v. City of L.A., 717 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     