
    William SCHEIDLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of WASHINGTON; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 17-35202
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    
      Submitted December 18, 2017 
    
    Filed December 20, 2017
    William Scheidler, Pro Se
    Suzanne LiaBraaten, AGWA — Office of the Washington Attorney General (Olympia), Torts Division, Olympia, WA, for Defendants-Appellees State of Washington, Jesse Young, Michelle Caldier, Jan Angel
    lone George, Attorney, Christine Palmer, Deputy Prosecutor, Kitsap County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, Port Orchard, WA, for Defendant-Appellee Kevin Hull
    Thomas Scott, Pro Se
    Sara Naheedy, Pro Se
    Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

William Scheidler appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing with prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims related to his 2010 property tax assessment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Hicks v. Small, 69 F.3d 967, 969 (9th Cir. 1995). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Seheidler’s action because Scheidler failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49, 118 S.Ct 966, 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998) (state legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for their legislative activities); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Booker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.”); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (explaining that “(jjudges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in taxing costs against Scheidler because the requested costs are allowable. See 28 U.S.C. §. 1920(1) (permitting court to include fees of the clerk as costs).

We reject as meritless Scheidler’s contentions that federal pleading standards are inapplicable, that the district judge was biased, and that the removal of his complaint from the state court was improper.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions or requests are denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     