
    Ridley and Wife vs. McNairy, et als.
    
    I-. A parol promise to give real estate, possession taken by virtue oí sucf* promise, and valuable and permanent improvements made with the consent of the Owner, furnish no ground for a deoreo enforcing the promise.
    2. Where, in a parol contract, by gift or sale, a decree for a specific peribrmancs is refused because within the act of 1801, ch. 25, an injunction will not be granted to quiet the possession of the donee or vendee. Patton vs. McLure, M. & Y,
    3. Where the owner of real estate puts a relative in possession thereof, for the purpose of cultivating and improving the same, under the promise of a future gift, and the occupier influenced by such expectation, makes lasting and valuable improvements upon the premises with the knowledge of the owner, such occupier will be entitled to the full value of the improvements, although it may exceed the amount of the rents and profits.
    4. In such case the owner cannot set up any independent claim to the rents and profits, yet if the occupier files his bill for the value of his improvements, the value of what he has enjoyed is a necessary element in the adjustment.
    John McNairy, having made his last will and testament, died in the county of Davidson, leaving a very large real and personal estate. His executors, devisees and legatees on the 13th day of April, 1838, filed a bill in the chancery court at Franklin, praying that an account of the real and personal estate of the testator might be taken, and the trusts of the will executed under the supervision of the chancery court. This testament made a disposition -of all the real estate belonging to the deceased, without s^e-. cifying what lands he considered himself the owner of, or intended’ to devise. The bill filed for the execution of the trusts of the will was accompanied by a schedule of lands which complainants charged to belong to the deceased in his life-time, and amongst other-tracts, the schedule set forth a tract of 501 acres, upon which? lames Ridley lived in the county of Davidson. This bill made James Ridley and his wife, Ann, parties defendant. They filed their answer to this bill and claimed the land as the absolute property of James Ridley.
    On the 20th day of October, 1838, Ridley and wife filed their 'cross bill praying, that an account should be taken of the value of the improvements put upon the tract of land in his possession, and that complainant be allowed the value of them out of the estate of John McNairy, deceased, or that he might be quieted in the possession of said land, and that the title be divested out of the devi-sees of the intestate and vested in complainant Ridley. This cross bill alledges that John McNairy possessed in his life-time a large estate, real and personal; that complainant, Ridley, married Ann Hamilton, the niece of McNairy, who had no children; that for a number of years complainant was the manager and superin-tendant of the affairs of said McNairy; that about the year 1824,, heleft the employment of said McNairy, McNairy being largely indebted to him and the accounts between them being open and; unsettled; that said McNairy conceived an attachment for him, put him, in 1824, in possession of the tract of land upon which he resided, and told him he intended that property for him and his wife Ann,, and instructed him to put valuable and lasting improvements, thereupon, such as would suit him and make the place an agreeable- and permanent residence for life.
    The bill further charges, that he accordingly took possession of the premises with the understanding that he was to have a conveyance of the estate to him in due time; that he, with the knowledge and approbation of the deceased, cleared upwards of 200 acres of land, erected a stone mansion-house, two stories high and fifty-eight feet long; valuable stables, hay-houses and all other out-houses convenient and necessary to the plantation, as a permanent and comfortable place of residence; that these improvements were made from time to time between the year 1825 and the death of the testator; that testator was on the premises during the progress of them, and stated on various occasions, that he intended the estate for his. hiece; that the testator had not only consented to his undertaking these costly and valuable improvements, but was perfectly aware that the complainant was acting in good faith upon the understanding created by testator, that the property was complainants; and that complainant had resided on the place about fourteen years upon that understanding. The bill further charged, that he expressed the intention at a late period of his life to convey the title to complainant and wife, but that he became deranged and failed so.to do.
    In.March, 1839, the. executors devisees and legatees filed their separate answers. These answers denied most of the allegations of the bill and relied on the act of 1801,, ch. 35, for the prevention of frauds and perjuries. The bill, however, on all its material allegations was substantiated by the testimony taken in the cause.
    The cause was heard at the November term, 1840, before Chancellor Bramlett, upon the bill, answers, replications and evidence. The chancellor, though he regarded the facts alleged in the bill to have been proven, being of the opinion that complainant was not entitled to a decree for a title,nor to a decree for quiet enjoyment, nor for an injunction restraining defendants from taking possession of the land, and being further of opinion, that complainants were not entitled to a decree for the value of the improvements, dismissed the bill and ordered .the costs to be paid by the estate of McNairy, deceased. From this decree the complainant appealed to the supreme court.
    
      Meigs and Ewing, for complainants,
    cited, I Story, Eq. 375, 6, 7, 8, 9, 333: 13 Ves. 87:- 5 Ves. 688: -6 John. 166: 7 Ves. 334: 1 Sch. and Lefroy, 73:3 Story, sec. 1337: 9 Peters, 304.
    
      James Campbell, for defendants.
    The case of Patton vs. McLure, Martin & Yerger, 331, is decisive of this case upon both points, upon the claim for improvements as well as the title to the land. If complainants could not have a decree for the land or pay for improvements when they took possession of the land and made improvements under a parol contract, a fortiori, can they have no such decree when they set up their claim under a parol gift. There can be no such thing as a decree for specific execution of a promise to make a gift. 1 Ves. Jr. 54: 3 Bro.-Oh. Rep. 14:1 Vern. 40: 1 Peere, W. 60: Woodie vs. Read, 1 Maddox, 510: 6 Ves. 544.
    Mr. Campbell commented upon the case of King’s heirs vs. 
      Thompson and wife, 9 Peters, 204, and contended that, that case could not be supported upon principle or authority, but if it could be sustained as an authority, it still did not go far enough to authorise the decree asked for by complainants.
   Reese, J.

delivered the opinion of the -court.

Upon the first point discussed in the case before us, we are of opinion, that it results from the principles established by this court, in the case of Patton vs. McLure, M. &. Y. Rep., that where, in a parol contract of gift, or sale, a decree for a specific performance is refused, because, within the act of 1801, ch. 25, an injunction will not be granted to protect or quiet the possession of the donee or vendee.

2. We are of opinion, that where the owner of real estate puts a relative into possession thereof, for the purpose of cultivating and improving the same, under the promise of a future gift, and the occupier, influenced by such expectation, makes lasting and valuable improvements upon the premises, with the knowledge of the owner, such occupier will bé entitled to the full value of the improvements, although it may exceed the amount of the rents and profits. But although in such case, the owner could not put forth any independent claim to rents and profits, still when- the occupier comes to be compensated for his improvements, the value of what he has actually enjoyed, the rents and profits, enters upon principles of natural equity as a necessary element into the compensation. The case of King’s heirs vs. Thompson and wife, 9 Peters, 204, may perhaps be supported upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances. But we cannot regard it, as determining any general principles decisive of the case before us. We regard the contrary as a general principle as being established in 4 Littel, 364. The accidental situation and circumstances of the parties to this record, may move us to strong feelings of regret, that we cannot give the relief to complainants in their bill prayed for. But to these feelings of regret we cannot yield. Circumstances change in each case. Establish the principles contended for, and the next case might be that of a wealthy elder son, claiming for improvements to the exclusion of rents and to the ruin and to the impoverishment of minor children.  