
    Ibrahim ANNAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    16-837-cv
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    November 9, 2016
    FOR APPELLANT: Ibrahim Annan, pro se, Staten Island, NY.
    FOR NEW YORK STATE APPEL-LEES: David Lawrence III, Steven C. Wu, and Barbara D. Underwood, New York State Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY.
    FOR NEW YORK CITY APPELLEES: Ingrid Gustafson and Zachary W. Carter, New York City Law Department, New York, NY.
    PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., PETER W. HALL, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Ibrahim Annan, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his complaint, which the court liberally construed as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Annan alleged that the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), various DMV officials, and a New York City police officer violated his constitutional right to travel by issuing and adjudicating several traffic tickets, which resulted in the suspension of his driver’s license. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review dismissals pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) de novo. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 162 (2d Cir. 2002); Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 824 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2016). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929-(2007). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citation omitted). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” and pleadings that “are no more than conclusions! ] are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal citation omitted). We have not yet addressed whether we review de novo or for abuse of discretion a district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for frivolousness where the litigant has paid the filing fee. Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp,, 221 F.3d 362, 364 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2000). We need not reach that issue here because the district court’s decision “passes muster under the more rigorous de novo review,” See id. at 364 n,2. A claim is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Upon review, we find no error in the district court’s dismissal of Annan’s complaint without leave to amend, because, for the reasons stated in the district court’s order, sovereign immunity barred the majority of Annan’s claims, his remaining allegations failed to state a claim, and an amendment would have been futile. Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned order.

We have considered Annan’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  