
    Manuel GUZMAN-GUZMAN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-1794 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 18, 2013.
    Gregory C. Osakwe, Hartford, CT, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy, Assistant Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director; Julia J. Tyler, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, PIERRE N. LEVAL and JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Manuel Guzman-Guzman, a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of an April 6, 2012, order of the BIA affirming the August 8, 2011, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Philip Verrillo, denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Manuel Guzman-Guzman, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 6, 2012), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig.Ct.Hartford, Aug. 8, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as the final agency decision. See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

As the agency concluded, Guzman-Guzman failed to demonstrate that he would be persecuted on account of his membership in a social group. Guzman-Guzman argues that he will be persecuted by gang members in Ecuador due to his membership in a social group defined as “perceived wealthy Ecuadorians.” The BIA has long interpreted the term social group to mean “a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.” Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). An “immutable characteristic” is one that members of the group “either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.” Id. A particular social group “is comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor-or in the eyes of the outside world in general.” Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir.2007).

In order to be sufficiently visible, a group must also have “well-defined boundaries”; accordingly, “relative and subjective” descriptors will not suffice. Id. at 73-74 (the group “wealthy Guatemalans” is not cognizable because wealth is a relative term). Neither “wealth” nor “perceived wealth” serves as the boundary of a cognizable social group. Id. at 73. Accordingly, because Guzman-Guzman defined the social group of which he was a part as “perceived wealthy Ecuadorians,” the agency did not err in finding him ineligible for withholding of removal because he failed to demonstrate a nexus to a protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73.

As to Guzman-Guzman’s CAT claim, the IJ found that he failed to demonstrate a clear probability of torture, or that the Ecuadorian government would acquiesce to his torture. CAT relief requires that government officials perform the acts of torture or “know of or remain willfully blind to an act and thereafter breach their legal responsibility to prevent it.” Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir.2004). Because Guzman-Guzman presented no evidence showing that Ecuadorian officials would consent or acquiesce in his torture, we find no error in the agency’s denial of CAT relief.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  