
    STATE v. W. C. KROUT.
    (Filed 17 May, 1922.)
    Evidence — Criminal Law — Forgery—Corroboration—Appeal and Error— Prejudice — New Trials.
    The defendant upon a trial for forgery offered evidence that he was a traveling salesman, and at the time and place charged was in another town, some five hundred miles distant, and in corroboration of his own and of that of others of his witnesses, offered as evidence an order signed by a customer at the latter place, and also testimony of his landlady there that the defendant and his wife had lodged at her hotel, identifying several checks he had given for their board. The court excluded the evidence as to the order for merchandise and testimony of the defendant’s witness as to the date and the period of time for which the checks were given: Held, the evidence rejected was competent as tending to prove a pertinent circumstance in corroboration of defendant’s testimony, and that of his other-witnesses, and its exclusion by the court was reversible error.
    Appeal by defendant from Finley, J., at January Term, 1922, of GASTON.
    Criminal prosecution tried upon an indictment charging the defendant with forgery.
    There was evidence on behalf of the State tending to show that the defendant had obtained the sum of $626.70 from two banks in Gastonia by uttering and publishing certain false, fraudulent and forged checks.
    The defendant offered evidence tending to show that he was in the State of Alabama at the time of the alleged offense. His evidence, if believed, was sufficient to establish an alibi.
    From an adverse verdict and a judgment of ten years in the State’s, prison the defendant appealed, assigning errors.
    
      Attorney-General Manning and Assistant Attorney-General Nash for the State.
    
    
      Porter & Mebane, Carpenter & Carpenter, and Bivens & Wilkins for defendant.
    
   Stacy, J.

The State’s evidence, if believed, showed conclusively that the defendant was the person who committed the crime for which he was being tried. Conversely, the defendant’s evidence, if believed, established conclusively an alibi on behalf of the defendant. The jury were at liberty to accept either view of the evidence. The controlling issue, upon the trial, was the identity of the person who uttered the forged checks.

Tbe defendant prosecutes tbis appeal, assigning' as error bis Honor’s refusal to admit certain material and competent evidence, and contends but for tbe exclusion of tbis evidence tbe jury would bave returned a verdict of acquittal.

Tbe evidence of the State was to tbe effect that tbe forgery was committed in Gastonia, N. 0., on tbe morning of 29 November, 1921. The defendant, who was a traveling salesman, testified that he was not in Gastonia at tbis time, but that be was approximately five hundred miles away in Gadsden, Ala. In corroboration of tbis testimony be offered to show, by introducing tbe original written order, that be bad taken an order for tbe purchase of a “money weight” scale from one J. J. Cook in Gadsden, Ala., on tbe afternoon of 28 November, 1921. He testified that tbe said order was signed in bis presence and witnessed by him on that date. Tbe order, upon objection, was excluded.

There was also evidence tending to show that tbe defendant and bis wife took their meals at tbe Mallard Hotel, in Gadsden, Ala., from 7 November to 9 December, 1921. Mrs. O. L. Lewis, tbe proprietress of said hotel, testified that both were there on tbe 28th and 29th of Novem-' ber, 1921, and she identified three checks which bad been given to her for their board; but, upon objection, she was not permitted to state when they were given nor for what period of time each was intended to cover. In fact she was not allowed to make any explanation at all in regard to them. Tbe defendant then offered tbe checks as corroborative evidence and they were excluded.

Tbe defendant further testified that on the morning of 29 November be went to tbe office of tbe Southern Express Company in Gadsden, received a package from the agent, signed for it on tbe regular delivery sheet, and tbis was admitted in support of bis testimony as corroborative evidence.

Defendant contends that bis Honor’s refusal to allow him to corroborate bis testimony by showing tbe original order, signed by Cook on tbe evening of 28 November was materially prejudicial to tbe complete establishment of bis alibi. He also contends that Mrs. Lewis should bave been permitted to testify in regard to tbe checks given to ber for tbe board of himself and bis wife. We think tbis evidence was competent, and tended to prove a pertinent circumstance in corroboration of tbe defendant’s testimony. Johnson v. Ins. Co., 172 N. C., 148. Not only was it in support of what tbe defendant himself bad said, but it was álso material as bearing upon, and in corroboration of, tbe circumstances and details related by other witnesses. Tbe entire defense was being controverted by tbe State. Under such conditions considerable latitude must necessarily be allowed in tbe admission of corroborative evidence. 40 Cyc., 2785, and cases collected in note. Indeed, in 40 Cyc., 2790, it is said that tbe “corroboration of a witness on one point may render bis testimony more credible on points as to wbicb be is not corroborated.” And speaking to tbe question of corroborative evidence in S. v. Morton, 107 N. C., 890, Merrimon, C. J., observed: “Tbe evidence tended to strengthen wbat tbe impeached witness said, and to increase tbe probability that it was true. -... It bad some relevancy and point, taken in connection with other evidence, and it was tbe province of tbe jury to determine its weight and force,” citing S. v. Green, 92 N. C., 779; S. v. Whitfield, ibid., 831; S. v. Freeman, 100 N. C., 429.

For tbe error, as indicated, we think a new trial must be awarded, and it is so ordered.

New trial.  