
    PEOPLE v. CURLEY PEOPLE v. SHAW
    Criminal Law — Evidence—Proof of Similar Offenses.
    Admission of evidence tending to show that a person who was accused of murdering another in the course of an armed robbery had committed similar robberies on previous occasions held, prejudicial to the rights of defendant and thus grounds for reversal in the circumstances of the ease.
    Reference for Points in Headnote
    29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 320 et seq.
    
    Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Groat (Gerald W.), J.
    Submitted Division 1 October 8, 1968, at Detroit.
    (Docket No. 3,553.)
    Decided November 25, 1968.
    Curtis Curley and Alvin Sh'aw were cónvicted óf first-degree murder. Defendants’ delayed motion for new trial denied. Defendants appeal.
    Reversed and remanded.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cabalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, and Angelo A. Pentolino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
    
      Marshall C. Hill, for defendants.
   Per Curiam.

Defendants were jointly tried and convicted of first-degree murder by a jury. We find reversible error occurred during the course of the trial as to each of the defendants for the following reasons.

Defendant Shaw was seriously prejudiced by the introduction of evidence of similar robberies committed by him. See People v. Askar (1967), 8 Mich App 95.

Defendant Curley’s conviction violated the constitutional mandate of Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 US 123 (88 S Ct 1620, 20 L Ed 2d 476), made retroactive and effective upon the States in Roberts v. Russell (1968), 392 US 293 (88 S Ct 1921, 20 L Ed 2d 1100). Unlike the situation in People v. Shirk (1968), 10 Mich App 121, defense counsel made spontaneous objections to the use of such statement.

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

J. H. Uillis, P. J., and R. B. Burns and Kelley, JJ., concurred. 
      
       CL 1948, § 750.316 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.548).
     