
    * Calvin Gould versus Thomas Barnard.
    A writ of replevin must be endorsed. If the defendant in replevin pleads the want of an endorser in abatement of the writ, without any suggestion entitling him to the possession of the goods, and the writ is abated, he shall have judgment for his costs, but not for a return.
    This was a writ of replevin, to which the defendant pleaded, in abatement, that, at the time of the service of the writ, it was not endorsed by any responsible person with his Christian and surname, as the law requires.
    To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the defendant joined in demurrer.
    
      Bliss, for the plaintiff,
    argued that the statute, which required writs to be endorsed by the plaintiff, related only to those writs, the forms of which were prescribed by that statute . But he seemed to rely more on the special provision prescribed by the statute particularly relating to this process of replevin , which requires the plaintiff to give bond to the sheriff in double the value of the goods to be replevied, conditioned, among other things, for the pay ment of the costs which the defendant might eventually recover in the action. This special provision, being in a statute posterior to that requiring original writs to be endorsed, has superseded the use- or necessity of such endorsement in this case, even if the former statute should be understood to apply to writs of replevin, of which there is great room to doubt, as the necessity of giving bond in suing out writs of replevin, existed long before the law required writs to be endorsed for the securing to the defendant his costs.
    
      Ashman, for the defendant,
    observed that the words of the statute required “ all original writs issuing out of the Supreme Judicial Court, and Court of Common Pleas ” to be endorsed, whether those prescribed in that statute, or in any prior or posterior statute. The language is authoritative and binding. No argument, showing that in any particular case, there is less necessity or use in the endorsement. can avail against the plain and positive requirement of a statute. We are not bound to give reasons which induce the legislature to enact any particular law. It is enough for citizens to understand and obey it, and for courts to enforce it, when enacted. One [ * 200 ] reason, however, of this provision, and it will apply * as well to writs of replevin as to any other original writs, may have been that the defendant, by the plaintiff’s signature on the back of the writ, may be assured that the action was really commenced at his instance. This in many cases is quite as essential to the defendant as an assurance for a bill of costs which he may eventually recover. But suppose the whole use of the endorsement to be the assuring to the defendant his eventual costs; the legislature might think it proper, in an action so different from the usual common law process, to give a cumulative remedy to the defendant for his costs by requiring a bond, over and beyond the endorsement of the writ.
    
      Bliss, in reply,
    observed that the defendant might be equally satisfied that the suit was commenced at the plaintiff’s instance by the bond given, as by the endorsement upon the writ. The statute regulating the process in replevin, was not in existence until years after the statute requiring the endorsing of writs, was enacted.
    
      
       1784, c. 28.
    
    
      
       1789, c. 26.
    
   Parker, J.,

thought it an unnecessary provision of the law that writs of replevin should be endorsed, in addition to the ample bonds required to be given to the sheriff, to secure to the defendant his eventual damages and costs. But the statute was express that all original writs should be endorsed. It was impossible to get over it. There was no place for argument or construction, where a statute was so intelligible and so positive. It was his opinion that the writ must abate.

Sedgwick, J.,

said he had no doubt upon the question; and he was always happy when he found the rule of law plain, and its language so decisive as not to permit him to doubt The statute in positive terms requires all original writs to be endorsed. In this case, the necessity of an endorser is indeed far from apparent. But whether we can discern the reason of a legislative act or not, we are still bound by it.

It is said that the statute prescribing the form of this writ of replevin, is posterior in date to that which requires original writs to be endorsed. But the words of the latter statute are general and positive, including all original writs. Writs of replevin [ * 201 ] are undoubtedly original writs, and were * well known at the date of the statute requiring endorsements, to issue out of the Court of Common Pleas. I see no difference, as to the point under consideration, between them and other original writs, think the writ must be abated.

Parsons, C. J.

I do not see any benefit accruing to the defendant, from requiring writs of replevin to be endorsed. The replevin bond, which must be executed by the plaintiff, with sufficient suretj or sureties, is conditioned, among other things, to pay the defendant the costs he shall recover; and to secure to him his costa by a cumulative remedy, does not appear necessary. But the statute expressly requires all original writs to be endorsed, or they may be abated. A writ of replevin is, without question, an original writ. It must therefore be endorsed.

Writ abated

After this decision, the defendant’s counsel moved for a return. The Court, after taking time to consider the motion, refused to grant it. They observed that as the defendant had neither avowed, nor made conusance, nor made any plea or suggestion on record to entitle him to the possession of the goods, he could not have a return, and they gave judgment only for

Costs for the defendant.  