
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daron D. ALEXANDER, a.k.a. Parron Alexander, a.k.a. Daron Walker, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 06-10378
    Non-Argument Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    Sept. 11, 2006.
    E. Bryan Wilson, Terry Flynn, U.S. Attorney’s Office, N.D. of Florida, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    
      Gwendolyn L. Spivey, William Rourk Clark, Jr., Randolph P. Murrell, Ofc. of the Federal Public Defender, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Daron D. Alexander appeals his 180-month sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Specifically, he argues the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) — which, in relevant part, requires a district court to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary” — because it failed to state on the record that his sentence was “not greater than necessary.” We affirm.

The parties are familiar with the facts, and we do not recount them here. Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), § 3553(a) “ ‘remains in effect, and sets forth numerous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.’ ” United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 766). Although Booker directs district courts to consider the § 3553(a) factors, “nothing in Booker or elsewhere requires a district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (11th Cir.2005). Rather, a statement that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors is sufficient in post-Booker sentences. Id. at 1329.

After carefully reviewing the sentencing transcript, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant case law, we reject Alexander’s argument that the district court violated § 3553(a) by failing to state on the record that his sentence was “not greater than necessary.” At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated it considered the § 3553(a) factors and “the facts and circumstances surrounding this particular case” before imposing the mandatory statutory minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. As explained above, such statements alone are sufficient to support a post-Booker sentence. We thus affirm Alexander’s 180-month sentence.

AFFIRMED. 
      
      . The mandatory statutory minimum sentence for Alexander’s offense is 180 months, which is greater than his advisoiy Guidelines range of 135-168 months; thus, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b), his Guidelines sentence is also 180 months. Because the Government did not file a substantial assistance motion, the district court lacked discretion to sentence him below this 180-month sentence. See United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1333 n. 10 (11th Cir.2005) (explaining that district courts remain bound by statutory mínimums despite Booker's remedial holding that the Guidelines are merely advisory). Although Alexander concedes that "the district court had no discretion but to impose the 180-month sentence," he nevertheless brings this appeal because he believes "it will change the [sentencing] process.”
     
      
      . To the extent Alexander implicitly contends his sentence is "greater than reasonable" (i.e., unreasonable), we conclude he has failed to carry his burden of establishing his sentence is unreasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir.2005).
     