
    Ex parte HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF MONTGOMERY. (Re Shirley JONES, et al. v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF MONTGOMERY.)
    84-1055.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Decision Announced March 31, 1986.
    Opinion Released April 4, 1986.
    Rehearing Denied June 20, 1986.
    Michael S. Jackson, of Melton & Espy and J. Richard Piel, Montgomery, for petitioners.
    Patricia E. Ivie and Robert J. Varley, of Legal Services Corp. of Alabama, Montgomery, for respondents.
   FAULKNER, Justice.

Certiorari was granted in this case in order to decide a question of first impression in the appellate courts of Alabama. The issue is whether the Housing Authority of the City of Montgomery (hereinafter “Montgomery Housing Authority” or “MHA”) provided adequate notice, sufficient to satisfy fourteenth amendment due process requirements, to its tenants of the changes in its eviction policy. Holding the notice was sufficient, we reverse.

Pursuant to Rule 39(k), A.R.App.P., MHA presents an additional statement of facts. The respondents contend that MHA did not completely comply with Rule 39(k), and therefore, that its petition for certiora-ri should have been denied. The petitioner did not provide references to page numbers in the record in its statement of additional facts. References to the clerk’s record or reporter’s transcript is required in the petitioner’s additional statement of facts, as well as in the petitioner’s briefs. Rule 28(e) and Rule 39(k), A.R.App.P. Since the rules are to be liberally applied, however, noncompliance should not result in a denial in this case, where the record is short and simple and non-compliance causes no difficulty in understanding the argument. See Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 280 So.2d 758 (1973).

The six tenants involved in this appeal reside in federally subsidized housing projects operated by MHA. Each tenant signed a standard lease agreement which incorporated MHA’s 1977 rent collection and eviction policy.

On April 1, 1983, a new policy became effective. Under this new policy the rent became delinquent on the fifteenth day of the month rather than on the sixth day. The new policy was adopted to provide a stricter eviction policy, after a determination by the Department of Housing and Urban Development that MHA was too lenient in its eviction practices.

MHA sent a two-page notice of the new policy to all of the tenants and a ten-page notice to the project managers. The contents of the cover sheet of the notice, along with additional facts, may be found in the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion in Jones v. Housing Authority of Montgomery, 495 So.2d 1097 (Ala.Civ.App.1985).

The Court of Civil Appeals held that the notice given to the tenants violated their due process rights because the notice did not convey adequate information. We do not agree.

In Grant v. Housing Authority of Savannah, 153 Ga.App. 482, 265 S.E.2d 834 (1980), dispossessory proceedings were brought against tenants for failure to pay rent. In the past, the housing project manager had had the discretion to decide whether to accept late payment of rent after a dispossessory warrant was issued, and the late rent was often accepted, even after the tenant had received two or more dispossessory warrants within the preceding twelve months. The Housing Authority of Savannah adopted a new policy whereby it refused to accept rent tendered by a tenant after the issuance of a dispos-sessory warrant if that tenant had received a prior warrant within the preceding twelve months. The Court of Appeals of Georgia held that these changes did not involve changes in the lease requiring notice to the tenants of changes in policy and procedure under 24 C.F.R. § 866, and, therefore, that the lack of notice was not a sufficient defense to eviction for nonpayment of rent.

In the instant case, the tenants received notice of the new policy: “nonpayment of rent will result in prompt eviction.” A provision in the policy allowed an “exception” to be granted if the tenant requested one before the delinquent rental due date (the fifteenth of the month). The “exception” allowed tenants to enter a “Rent Payment Schedule Agreement” whereby delinquent rent would be paid by a specific date. None of the tenants involved in this appeal requested an “exception,” or even approached MHA before the fifteenth of the month concerning their inability to pay the rent on time. They simply did not pay. After receiving a “lease termination notice,” they contacted MHA. The Court of Civil Appeals found that the tenants were not given notice of the “exception” provision in the new policy. However, even under the old policy tenants could obtain a similar exception if it was requested before the rental due date.

The Court of Civil Appeals also found that the tenants were informed that they had no route of redress until a grievance hearing was held. The court stated that this hearing would be of no help to tenants after the rental due date. This holding is not supported by the record. Four tenants, not involved in this appeal, requested and were given informal grievance hearings. The trial court found that none of the six tenants involved in this appeal requested a grievance hearing.

The only changes in policy involved rent collection and eviction and these were addressed in the notice to the tenants. The tenants were not informed that they had no right to a grievance proceeding.

The notice informed tenants that if rent was not paid they would be evicted and that no exceptions to that rule would be granted. Even though a copy outlining the procedure for obtaining an “exception” (i.e., the procedure for entering a “Rent Payment Schedule Agreement”) was not sent to the tenants, but only to the project managers, the tenants were not misinformed. This procedure was not changed in the shift from the old policy to the new policy. Even if it had been changed, it would be difficult for us to see how the six tenants involved in this appeal could complain on that basis. They did not pay rent by the fifteenth of the month and made no effort to explain or remedy their actions until after the fifteenth. It appears that these tenants, like those in Grant, supra, felt they would not be evicted because they had not been evicted in the past. Yet, here the tenants received notice of a stricter eviction policy.

We find that the notice given to the tenants complies with due process requirements; therefore, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, BEATTY, ADAMS and HOUSTON, JJ. concur.

ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

STEAGALL, Justice.

Petitioners, six tenants of the Montgomery Housing Authority, argue that the following statement in our original opinion is not supported by the record: “However, even under the old policy tenants could obtain a similar exception if it was requested before the rental due date.” The opinion in this case is extended in order to clarify that statement. The old written policy of Montgomery Housing Authority did not provide for an “exception” like the one written into the new policy. However, it was a standard custom or practice for the project managers of Montgomery Housing Authority to grant permission for certain tenants to skip one month’s rent payment and make rent payments every other month.

Wiley Thomas, assistant executive director for the Montgomery Housing Authority, testified as follows:

“Q. Now, some of the projects, is it not correct, that the project managers would actually allow certain tenants, and especially these ADC recipients that have very low rents, to skip months and pay every other month?
“A. They would grant permission if there were circumstances that warranted it.
“Q. Well, that, in fact, was a practice in some of the housing projects, was it not?
“A. It was a practice if permission was requested. It was not a blanket policy practice.
“Q. But it was a practice in some Housing Authority offices to do that?
“A. These managers were taking, as I said before, into consideration the personal problems of our residents and working with them to the fullest extent.
“Q. But it was a practice to do that? Yes?
“A. I just said yes.
“Q. Well, I didn’t hear a yes in that answer, but thank you very much.”

Even though late payments were accepted under the old policy, it appears from the record that permission had to be requested before a tenant could skip payment of rent altogether rather than just being late with the payment. The clarification of fact does not change the basis and conclusion in our original opinion. We have carefully reviewed the petitioners’ application for rehearing and feel that it is due to be overruled.

OPINION EXTENDED; APPLICATION OVERRULED.

TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, BEATTY, ADAMS and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.  