
    * Stevenson Richards versus Nathan Blood.
    In an action for money paid by the plaintiff as surety for the defendant, the lattei was permitted to file, as a set-off, an account for money had and received by the plaintiff for the use of the defendant.
    This was assumpsit for money paid upon a promissory note, which the plaintiff had signed as surety for the defendant.
    The defendant filed an account, as a set-off, for 132 dollars, money had and received by the plaintiff for the use of the defendant.
    At the trial of the cause before Putnam, J., at the sittings here, after the last November term, the plaintiff objected that an account for money had and received could not be filed, by way of set-off, in an action for money paid.
    The judge was of that opinion, and a verdict was taken for the plaintiff, for the sum he proved to have been paid by him for the defendant.
    If, in the opinion of the Court, the set-off should have been admitted, a new trial was to be granted for the defendant to prove his demand in this action; otherwise judgment was to be rendered upon the verdict.
    
      Cummings, for the defendant.
    The question in this case arises under the statute of 1793, c. 75, <§> 4; wherein it is provided, that “ in any action brought, for any debt upon simple contract or promise in writing, not under seal, the defendant therein may give in evidence, upon the general issue, his or her demands against the plaintiff, for goods delivered, moneys paid, or services done,” an account thereof having been filed, &c.
    Money had and received by the plaintiff is money paid to him, within the intent of the words of the statute; and where there is any ambiguity in the words of a statute, the manifest intention of the legislature is to govern in the construction . The statute under consideration was most clearly intended to prevent a multiplicity of suits. To effect this desirable purpose, it should receive the most liberal construction; particularly as it is not expressed in technical language. By “ moneys paid,” must naturally [ * 67 ] * be understood any moneys paid to or received by the plaintiff, or for his use and benefit .
    
      Saltonstall, for the plaintiff.
    There are two statutes upon this subject. The first is that of 1784, c. 28, <§>12, which provides that, “ when an action shall be brought to recover a debt on book accounts, an account stated by the parties, a quantum meruit, quantum valebat, or for services done upon an agreed price, the defendant may file any account he hath, in the clerk’s office,” &c. Under this provision, the defendant could not claim to set off his demand, because the action is not within the statute.
    But the statute of 1793, c. 75, revising the whole subject matter of the prior one, must operate as a repeal of it . It is evident that the last was intended as a substitute for the first. Probably the actions, in which accounts might be filed under the former law, were found to be too limited; and the permission to file any account, too general.
    If, however, the first statute is still in force, then the account filed is not within either. It is an established rule, that all acts iny pari materie are to be taken as if they were one law .
    The account cannot be filed under the first provision, because the action is for money paid; nor under the second, because accounts can only be filed, by- that statute, in actions for goods delivered, moneys paid, or services done.
    This is a mere statute regulation. In England, similar statutes have received a strict construction . There is no reason in equity, which entitles them to any other construction ; for the defendant, in all cases, has an ample remedy by action.
    A. charge for money had and received is not within the meaning of goods delivered, moneys paid, or services done; and it cannot, therefore, be filed .
    
      
      
        Plowd. 57.
    
    
      
      
        Plowd. 232.—1 Co. 110.—Dr. and Student, 856.
    
    
      
       12 Mass. Rep. 545.
    
    
      
      
        Bac. Mr. Statutes, I., 3.—Doug. 30.
    
    
      
      ?5) Tidd’s Pract. 603
    
    
      
       10 Mass. Rep. 223.—Witter vs. Witter.
      
    
   By the Court.

The last statute was plainly intended as an en* largement of the rights of defendants, by making their remedy, in suits upon simple contracts, coextensive * with [ * 68 ] the plaintiffs’ actions; and thus preventing the necessity of cross-actions. It is a very useful provision, and therefore claims a liberal construction.

The plaintiff objects that the defendant’s demand is not within the statute, because it is neither for goods delivered, moneys paid, or services done. But we must not be too nice in the construction of a remedial statute like this. Where money is in the hands of one party, which belongs to another, it is no great straining of language to call it money paid . It would not be insisted, if a demand for goods delivered were filed by the defendant, that the goods should actually have been delivered by him, and received by the plaintiff, on account of the same cause of action. So money in the hands of the plaintiff, and due to the defendant, need not have been paid by the latter in satisfaction of the sum demanded in the action. Independent accounts may be set off, and the balance makes the debt. There can be no inconvenience in this, as the plaintiff is by the statute entitled to notice; and if the defendant’s demand is not sufficiently explicit, the Court can require of him an explanation, in the nature of a bill of particulars. We are all of opinion that the set-off claimed in the case at bar is within the statute.

New trial granted. 
      
       [This is so palpably wrong that no comment is necessary.—Ed.]
     