
    In the matter of the application of Theodore Bartles and others, for payment to them of a trust fund under the control of this court.
    By a will, proved in 1849, a testator gave to Ms executor his homestead farm in trust during the life of his daughter (petitioner’s mother), to receive the rents and profits, and to pay them to her for her separate use, and to keep the property clear of any encumbrance by her or her husband; apd he gave the farm, after her decease, to such person or persons as should he her heir or heirs at law of land held by her in fee simple. In 1868 the farm was sold by order of this court, under the act authorizing the sale of lands limited over to infants or in contingency, the proceeds paid into court and invested for the benefit of the parties interested. — Held, that such proceeds of sale could not be paid over to her children and heirs at law, on their own application, exhibiting the release of their mother and her consent thereto; nor can they be paid over until after her death, because it cannot until then be determined who are her heirs at law.
    On petition.
   The CHANCELLOR.

The petitioners are the children of Phoebe Ann Bartles. Her father, now deceased, by his will, proved in 1849, gave to his executor his homestead farm in Morris county during her life, in trust, to rent it and receive the rents and profits and pay them over as he should receive them, to her, for her separate use, and to keep the property clear of all encumbrances by her or on her account, or by or on account of her then or any future husband, and he gave and devised the farm after her decease to such person or persons as ” should be her heir or heirs at law of land held by her in fee simple.” The farm was sold by order of this court in 1868, under the act to authorize the sale of land limited over to infants or in contingency (Rev. p. 1058), and the net proceeds of sale were paid into this court and invested under its direction according to the provisions of that act. Mrs. Bartles is still living, but has released her right and interest to and in the fund to the petitioners, who are all of her children, and they apply for the fund on the ground that having extinguished her life estate they are entitled to the money. That they are not so is entirely clear. The remainder in fee is given at the death of the life tenant to such person or persons as shall be her heir or heirs at law of land held by her in fee simplethat is, to those who by law would inherit the property at her death if she died intestate seized thereof in fee. "Who those persons will be cannot now be determined. Nemo est hceres viventis. She has heirs apparent and presumptive now, but whether those persons will be her heirs at her death and so entitled to the remainder, cannot be told until that time arrives. The testator manifestly did not refer to any particular individual or individuals, or class of existing persons, by the language which he employed, but used the word “ heir ” in the technical sense, as is particularly evident from his use of the future tense — “ such person or persons as shall be her heir or heirs at law, &c.” — that is, such person or persons as shall be her heir or heirs at law when she dies.

Note. — Under nemo est hceres viventis, a testamentary gift to the heirs of A during A’s lifetime is void (8 Greenl. Cruise *106 § 37 ; 2 Jarm. on Wills *13 et seq.; Otis v. Prince, 10 Cray 582 ; Stith v. Pames, 1 Law Pepos. (N. O.) 434; Ohessun v. Smith, 3 Id. 392 ; Norris v. Hensley, 27 Cal. 439, 430; Campbell v. Pawdon, 18 N. Y. 413,416.

But if A be referred to in the will as a living person, a gift to his heirs is valid (James v. Richardson, 1 Venir. 334; Coodright v. White, 2 W. PI. 1010 ; Winter v. Perratt, 5B.&C.43 ; Came v. Poche, 7 Ping. 226; Parbison v. Peau-mont, 1 P. Wms. 229; Vannorsdell v. Van Peventer, 51 Parb. 137; Heard v. Horton, 1 Pernio 165 ; Cushman v. Horton, 59 N. Y. 149 ; Cosbey v. Lee, 2 Pisn. 460; Jourdan v. Creen, 1 Pev. Eq. 270; Levitt v. Wood, 17 Grants Ch. 414; Knight v. Knight, 3 Jones Eq. 167; Simms v. Garroit, 1 Pev. & Pat. Eq. 393 ; Ward v. Stow, 2 Peo. Eq. 509 ; Stith v. Pames, 1 Law Pepos. 484; or, in case the term heirs is evidently used as designatio personanm (Sams v. Garliek, 14 M. & W. 698 ; Paher v. Tucker, 3 H. of L. Cos. 106 ; Pittson v. Stordy, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 771; Powers v. Porter, 4 Pish. 198; Johnson v. Whiton, 118 Mass. 340; Morton v. Parrett, 22 Me. 257; Williamson v. Williamson, 18 P. Mon. 370; Popp v. Matthias, 35 Ind. 332; Putler v. Heustis, 68 111. 594; Bailey y. Palter son, 8 Pich. Eq. 156; Caulk v. Fox, 13 Fla. 148,161; Ware v. Piehardson, 3 Md. 505; Poberts v. Ogboume, 37 Ala. 174; Myers v. Anderson, 1 Slrobh. Eq. 344); so where the term heirs is qualified, as heirs of the body, right heirs, &e. (Nightingale v. Quarterly, 1 T. R. 630; Sweety. Herring, 1 East264; Parbison v. Peaumont, 3 Pro. P. C. 60; Poe v. Laming, 2 Purr. 1100; Tucker v. Adams, 14 Ga. 548; Sharman y. Jackson, SO Qa. 224; Tipton y. La Rose, 27 Ind. 434; Grout y. Townsend, 2 Hill 554; Pradford y. Howell, 43 Ala. 422; Lemarhs v. Glover, 1 Pich. Eq. 141).

The grantee in a deed must be in existence and certain, therefore a grant to a dead man is void (Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. 863 ; McCracken y. Peal, 8 A. K. Marsh. 208; Galloway y. Finley, 12 Pet. 264; see Holden v. Smallbroke Vaughn 199); or to a fictitious person (Thomas y. Wyatt, 25 Mo. 24, 31 Mo. 188 ; Phelps y. Call, 7 Ired. 262; Muskingum Co. y. Ward, 13 Ohio 120; Smith y. Pridges, Preese 2); or to one unborn (Newsom y. Thompson, 2 Ired. 277; Pupree v. Pvpree, Push. Eq. 164; Hall y. Thomas, 3 Strobh. 101; Hamilton y. Pitcher, 53 Mo. 334); although in Nelson y. Iverson, 24 Ala. 9, the property in a slave delivered by a father to his daughter to belong to her child, with which she was then pregnant, should it be a boy, was held to vest in such boy at his birth.

The petition must be dismissed.

A grant to the heirs of a deceased person is good (Shaw v. Loud, 12 Mass. 441; Boone y. Moore, 14 Mo. 420 / Gearhart v. Sharp, 9 B. Mon. 31; see Sargent v. Simpson, 8 Me.148 ; Duncan v. Barper, 4 Bich. (N. S.) 84).

A deed to the heirs of a living person is, ordinarily, void (Ball v. Leonard, 1 Pick. 27; Morris v. Stephens, 4*> Pa. St. 200 ; Winslow v. Winslow, 52 Ind. 8; Newsom y. Thompson, 2 Ired. 277); yet if such intent be apparent from the instrument, who are the beneficiaries may be shown (Bogg v. Odom, Dud. 185; Martin v. Youngblood, 8 Bumph. 581; Gearhart v. Sharp, 9 B. Mon. 34; Buss y. Stephens, 51 Pa. St. 282 ; Buss v. IKbms, S3 Pa. St. 367 ; Flint v. Steadman, 36 Vt. 210; Biekman v. Quinn, 6 Yerg. 95; see further Epperson v. Mills, 19 Tex. 65; Cole v. Lake Go., 54 N. B. 290) ; thus a deed to the joint heirs of A and B, the grantor’s daughter and son in law, was held good as to the two children of A and B, then living, but not as to any subsequently born (Boleman v. Port, 3 Strobh. Eq. 66).

A note payable to the heirs of a living person is valid (Bacon v. Pitch, 1 Boot 181; Lockwood v. Jesup, 9 Conn. 272; Coxy. Beltzhoover, 11 Mo. 142; but see Bennington v. Dinsmore, 2 Gill 348).

A deed to S. or his heirs is good (Beady v. Kearsley, 14 Mich. 215; Bogan y. Page, 2 Wall. 605; see Carhart v. Miller, 2 South. 573); or a bond payable to A or B (White v. Bancoek, 2 C. B. 830 ; Bazen v. Drummond, 4 Allen (N. B) 267; Parker v. Carson, 64 N. C. 563); but not a promissory note (Musselman v. Oakes, 19 Bl. 81; Blanckenhagen v. Blundell, 2 B. & Aid. 411; Osgood v. Pearson, 4 Gray 455; National Ins. Co. v. Allen, 116 Mass. 400; Bayden v. Snell, 9 Gray 365; Willoughby v. Willoughby, 5 N. B. 244; see Doak v. Bob-inson, 1 Bannaiy 278).

In a conveyance to an unmarried woman and her children, she takes a life estate with a remainder to her after-born children, if any (Fcdes v. Ourrier, 55 N. B. 392 ; Frazer v. Supervisors, 74 III. 282 ; see Chess» v. Smith, 2 Law Be-pos. (N. C.) 392).

If to a married woman and her children, those subsequently born do not take (Ayton v. Ayton, 1 Cox 327 ; Stroman v. Bottehburg, 4Desauss. 268 ; Bogg y. Odom, Dud. 185 ; Grimes v. Orrand, 2 Beisk. 298 ; Boleman v. Fort, 3 Strobh. Eq. 66; Kitchens v. Oi-aig, 1 Bail. 119); unless a contrary intent appears (Dillard v. Buckers, 9 Yerg. 64; Bead v. Fite, 8 Bumph. 328; Shepherd y. Nabors, 6 Ala. 631; Walts v. Clardy, 2 Fla. 369; Conklin v. Conklin, 3 Sandf. Ch. 64; Woodruff y. Woodruff, 32 Ga. 358; Boughton y. Kendall, 7 Allen 72; Foster v. Shreve, 6 Bush 519; Simms v. Garrott, 1 Deo. & Bat. Eq. 393; Bullock v. Bullock, 2 Dev. Eq. 307 ; Noe v. Miller, 4 Stew. Eq. 234).

A life tenant’s covenant indemnifying one against damage and loss by reason of suits by the covenantor’s heirs, executors or administrators, was held not to include such covenantor’s children (Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227, 275).

A mere contingent interest is subject to legislation, affecting or destroying it before it becomes vested (Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210 ; Scott v. Key, 11 La. Ann. 232; Sleight v. Bead, 9 Bow. Pr. 278; Aspden’s Estate, 2 Wall. Jr. 368; Barnes v. Bason, 60 Bari. 598; Dixon v. Dixon, 4 La. Ann. 191; Marshall v. King, 24 Miss. 85; Bid v. Chambers, 80 Mich. 422 ; Price v. Taylor, 28 Pa. St. 95; McOunnigle y. McKee, 77 Pa. St. 81; see, however, Coleman v. Peed, Walk. 258 ; Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 548; Gilpin v. Williams, 25 Ohio St. 288; Dunn y. Sargent, 101 Mass. 886; Shonk y. Brown, 61 Pa. St. 820; Van Tilburgh y. Bolr linshead, 1 McCart. 82).

An heir cannot convey his interest or expectancy in his ancestor’s estate, before such ancestor’s decease, or the happening of the contingency (Suitings y. Richmond, 5 Allen 187; Jackson v. Bradford, 4 Wend. 619; Tooley v. Dibble, 2 Bill (N. 7.) 64I; Whibney v. Bust, 1 Gralt. 483; Arrington v. Arrington, 2 Law Repos. (N. C.) 258; Dennett v. Dennett, 40 K. B. 498 ; Vance y. Vance, 21 Me. 864; Grogan v. Garrison, 27 Ohio St. 50; Striker v. Mott, 28 N. 7. 82; Ludmig's Case, 8 Rob. (La.) 99; Beard v. Griggs, 1 A. K. Marsh. 26; Boynton v. Bubbard, 7 Mass. 112 ; Bun v. Chaffee, 14 N. B. 215; Blanchard v. Brooks, 12 Pick. 47; Barksdale v. Gamage, 8 Rich. Eq. 271; Brewer v. Baxter, 41 Ga. 212; Bart v. Gregg, 32 Ohio St. 502; Pelletreau v. Jackson, 11 Wend. 110; Robertson v. Wilson, 88 K. B. 48; Ball v. Nate, 88 N. B. 422; Edwards v. Variek, 5 Demo 664) ; or mortgage it (Bayler v. Com., 40 Pa. St. 87; Carlton v. Leighton, 8 Meriv. 667 ; Purcell v. Mather, 85 Ala. 570 ; see Batty v. Lloyd, 1 Vern. 141; Cook y. Field, 15 Q. B. 475 ; John Street, 19 Wend. 659 ; Bamilton v. Pitcher, 58 Mo. 834; Bacon y. Bonham, 12 C. E. Gr. 209). As to post obits seel Story’s Eq. Jur. \\ 842-348; Lushimgton y. Wallis, 1 B. Bl. 94; Spencer v. Jansen, 2 Fes. Sr. 125; Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Bear. 284; Beynon y. Cook, L. R. (10 Ch.) 889; Miller y. Cook, L. R. (10 Eq.) 641).

Equity, however, will enforce an executory contract to convey such contingent interest to third persons, provided it be fair and bona fide (Bopson y. Trevor, 1 Strange 583 ; Phipson v. Turner, 9 Sim. 245; Binde v. Blake, 8 Beav. 234 ; Westby v. Westby, 2 Dr. & War. 502; Ridgeway v. Undemood, 67 III. 419; McLaughlin v. Maher, 17 Bum, 215; Smallman’s Estate, Ir. L. R. (8 Eq.) 249 ; Cook v. Field, 15 Q. B. 460; Mastín v. Marlow, 65 N. C. 695; Nesmith v. Dinsmore, 17 N. B. 515; Trull v. Eastman, 3 Meta. 121; Russ y. Alpaugh, 118 Mass. 876 ; Curtis v. Curtis, 49 Me. 24; McDonald v. McDonald, 5 Jones Eq. 211; Stover v. Eyeelshimer, 46 Barb. 84, 3 Keyes 620); especially if made to the ancestor (Cox y. Bditha, 2 P. Wms. 272; Persse v. Persse, 7 Cl. & Fin. 279; Quarles y. Quarles, 4 Mass. 680; Jones y. Jones, 4s Iowa 466 ; Firestone v. Firestone, 2 Ohio St. 415; Needles v. Needles, 7 Ohio St. 432; Fitzgerald v. Vestal, 4 Sneed 258; Parsons v. Ely, 45 M. 232; Bavens v. Thompson, 11 C. E. Gr. 383)-, or to another heir (Wethered v. Wethered, 2 Sim. 188 ; Marwood v. Tooke, Id. 192 ; Byde v. White, 5,Sim. 524; Jeefers v. Lampson, 10 Ohio St. 101; Coates Street, 2 Ashm. 12; Walker v. Walker, 67 Pa. St. 185; D’Wolf v. Gardiner, 9 R. I. 145; Miller y. Emans, 19 N. 7. 884; Lewis v. Madison, 1 Munf. 80S ; Johnson v. BubbeU, 2 Stock. 832; Smith v. Axtell, Saxt. 494); or with the ancestor’s express consent (Fitch v. Fitch, 8 Pick. 480 ; Jenkins v. Stetson, 9 Allen 127; Lee v. Lee, 2 Duv. 184; McBee v. Myers, 4 Bush 856).

But equity does not always enforce such assignments (Méek y. Kettlewed, 1 Phil. 342 ; Lowry v. Spear, 7 Bush 451; Wheeler y. Wheele¡-,2 Mete. (Ky.) 474; Hardin v. Smith, 7 B. Mon. 892; Mereier v. Mereier, 50 Ga. 546) ; and may impose terms (Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. G. G. 1).

As to the mode of alienating such interest, see Dorsey v. Smith, 7 Harr. & Johns. 845; Bennett v. Morris, 5 Bawled; Lintner Y. Snyder, 15 Barb. 621; Wilson v. Wilson, 82 Barb. 828; Ackerman y. Vreeland.l MeOart. 28; Faber y. Police, 10 Rich. (N. S.) 376; McElwee v. Wheeler, Id. 892; Roof y. Fountain, 20 Barb. 527; McGlure y. McGlure, 1 Phila. 117; Hopper y. Demurest, 1 Zdb. 525.

A tenant by curtesy initiate may convey his interest in lands (Beaume v. Chambers, 22 Mo. 86; Jackson v. Maneius, 2 Wend. 857; McGorry v. King, 3 Humph. 267; Evans Y. Kingsberry, 2 Band. 120; McQlain y. Gregg, 2 A. K. Marsh. 457 ; see Oldham y. Henderson, 5 Dana 254); or one who has “ entered ” a tract of land before receiving his patent therefor (Hayward v. Ormsbee, 11 Wis. 8 ; Harmer v. Morris, 1 McLean 44; Bledsoe v. Little, 4 How. (Miss.) 18 ; Lamb Y. Kama, 1 Sawy. 288; Carroll v. Norwood, 4 H. & McH. 287; Graham Y. Henry, 17 Tex. 164; Cobb y. Stewart, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 255); or after an entry for condition broken (Homer v. Chicago B. B., S8 Wis. 165; 2 White & Tudor’s Lead. Cos. (4th ed.) 1609 ; Southard v. Centred B. B., 2 Dutch. 18 ; Bice y. Boston R. B., 12 Allen 141; Boone v. Tipton, 15 Ind. 270 ; Underhill v. Sara-toga B. B., 20 Barb. 455.

An heir whose title is abated by a stranger cannot devise it before entry. Hall y. Hall, 8 Call 488; 1 Jarm. on Wills (5th Am. ed.) 158; see Watts y. Cole, 2 Leigh 664; Varick v. Jackson, 2 Wend. 166 ; Herrington v. Budd, 5 Denio 321; Leach v. Jay, L. B. (6 Ch. Div.) 496, (9 Ch. Div.) 42); nor one who has a mere possibility of reverter (Deas v. Horry, 2 Hill Oh. 248; Miller v. McNair, 11 Iowa 525 ; see Fowler v. Griffin, 8 Sandf. 885).

A possibility coupled with an interest is devisable or descendible (Manners y. Manners, Spen. 142 ; Thornton v. Boberts, 8 Stew. Eq. 476; Kean v. Hoffiecker, 2 Hairing. 108; Thompson v. Hoop, 6 Ohio St. 480; Lewis v. Kemp, 1 Ired. 145 ; Pond y. Bergh, 10 Paige 140,153 and cases cited; Davis v. Baweim, 10 Heisk. 406; Woodgate Y. Fleet, 44 N. 7.1; Ingilby v. Amcotts, 21 Beav. 585; Moor Y. Hawkins, 2 Eden 842; Austin v. Cambridgeport, 21 Pick. 215; 4 Kent *512; Winslow v. Goodmn, 7 Mete. 868; Smith v. Sweringen, 26 Mo. 551; McDonald v. McMullen, 2 Hills 91; see Bigelow v. Wilson, 1 Pick. 493; Grayson Y. Sandf ord, 12 La. Ann. 646) ; but not a bare possibility, as if a conveyance be to A and B and the survivor, A has no interest to assign during B’s lifetime (Doe Y. Tomkinson, 2 M.& Sel. 165; Jackson v. Waldron, 18 Wend. 178; CBiemés Case, 1 Jon. & Lat. 852; Decker v. Salisman, 1 Hun 421, 59 N. Y. 275 ; see MacAdam v. Logan, 8 Bro. C. C. 810 ; Thomas v. Jones, 1 De G. J. & S. 68 ; Miller v. Emans, 19 N. Y. 884; Wilson v. Wilson, 82 Barb. 828),

No act of the life tenant, or trustee of such life tenant, can affect the rights of the remaindermen. (Putnam v. Gleason, 99 Mass. 454; Noble v. Andrews, 37 Conn. 846; Jackson v. Edwards, 22 Wend. 498; Frazer v. Supervisors, 74 III. 282 ; Emison Y. Whittlesey, 55 Mo. 254; Austin v. Rutland B. B., 45 Vt. 215; Fdtman v. Bidts, 8 Bush 115; list v. Rodney, 83 Pa. St. 488; Homier v. Carter, 68 'III. 98; Wilkins v. Kirkbride, 12 C. E. Gr. 98; Booraem v. Wells, 4 C. E. Gr. 87 ; see Knight v.Weathenoax, 7 Paige 182; Isler Y.Whitfield, Phü. (N. O.) 498 ; Kali v. Want, Id. 502; Baylor v. Be Janette, IS Gratt. 152 ; Stephens v. Evans, 80 Ind. 89; Hamilton v. Piteher, 53 Mo. 334; Lewis v. Kelson, 4 Mich. 630; Garner v. Howling, 11 Keish. 48; Allen v. Allen, 2 Tern. Gh. 28 ; Mv/rett v. Mathews, 2 Bay 897).

But statutory proceedings authorizing courts to convey or release estates in expectancy, &c., are valid. (Beisley v. Garter, L. B. (4 Gh.) 230; Basnettv. Moxon, L. B. (20 Eq.) 182; Wills v. Slade, 6 Ves. 498; Gaskell v. Gaskett, 6 Sim. 643; Mead v. Mitchell-, 17 N. Y. 210; Willimam, v. Holmes, 4 Bieh. Eq. 475; Faulkner v. Earns, 18 Gi'ait. 651; Loyless v. Blackshear, 43 Ga. 827; BeindersY. Koppelmann, 68 Mo. 482; Nutter v. Bussell, 8 Mete. (Ky.) 168; Taylor v. Blake, 109 Mass. 518; Hodd’s Gase, Phil. (N. Oi) Eq.97; Micklds Case, 10 G. E. Gr. 53; Ghism v. Keith, 1 Hun 589).

A contingent remainder cannot be seized on execution. (Allen v. Scurry, 1 Yerg. 86; Hargan v. Biehardson, Hud. 62; Penn v. Spencer, 17 Gratt. 85; Watson v. Hodd, 68 N. O. 528; Jackson v. Middleton, 52 Barb. 9; Perkins v. Clock, 3 Head 784; Allston v. Bank, 2 Hill Gh. 242 ; Baker v. Gopenbarger, 15 111. 103; Bidgeway v. Underwood, 67 III. 430; Striker v. Mott, 28 N. Y. 82; see Lockwood v. Nye, 2 Swan 515; Payn v. Beal, 4 Henio 405; Woodgate v. Fleet, 44 N. Y. 1; Sheridan v. House, 4 Kbb. Ap. 218; Bolton v. Stretch, 3 Stew. Eq. 536).

What contingent interests pass under an insolvent or bankrupt assignment, see Inkson’s Trusts, 21 Beav. 310; Ivison v. Gassiot, 27 Eng. L. & E. 483; Huggan’s Trusts, L. B. (8 Eq.) 697; Mitchell v. Hughes, 6 Bing. 689 ; Burn v Carvalho, 1 Ad. & El. 888; Gibbins v. Eyden, L. B. (7 Eq.) 371; Higden v. Williamson, 3 P. Wms. 131; Mudge v. Bowan, L. B. (3 Exch.) 185; Blake-mords Case, L. B. (5 Oh. Hiv.) 872; Havids Case, Mont. 297; Naden’s Case, L. B. (9 Oh.) 670; Nimmo v. Hams, 7 Tex. 26; Outcalt v. Van Winkle, 1 Gr. Oh. 518; Sanford v. Lackland, 2 Hill. 6; Krumbaar v. Burt, 2 Wash. G. G. 406; Kimie v. Winston, 56 III. 56; Banks v. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57; Butler v. Merchants Ins. Co., 8 Ala.146; Shay v. Sessaman, 10 Pa. St. 432; Moth v. Eróme, Amb. 894; Vizard’s Tntsts, L. B. (1 Eq.) 667, (1 Gh.) 588; Lee v. Olding, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 850; Bash’s Estate, 2 Pars. 160; Stucker v. Harvey, 1 Miles 247; Shaw v. Steward, 1 A. & E. 300; Grow v. Creditors, 81 Gal. 828 ; Bowan v. Harrison, 2 Pug. 503.

For instances of assignments of expectancies, &c., under statutory provisions, see Moore v. Littel, 49 Barb. 488, 41 N. Y. 66; Sheridan v. House, 4 Abb. Ct. of App. Hec. 218; Stover v. Eydeshimer, 3 Keyes 620; Qoodell v. Hibbard, 82 Mich. 47; 4 Kent *512; Turpin v. Turpin, Wythe 22 (137); Lawrence v. Bayard, 7 Paige 70; Laeland v. Nevins, 3 Mo. App. 835. — Rep.  