
    VINCENT against BAMFORD.
    
      New York Superior Court;
    
    
      General Term, May, 1871.
    Action against Stockholder.—Who is “ Servant” within Manufacturing Companies’ Act.
    The word “servant,” as used in section 18 of the Manufacturing Companies act (Lams of 1848, 54, ch. 40, § 18), is not restricted to one who performs menial service, but includes one acting as engineer and foreman, and sometimes as superintendent, in a mining company.
    The case of Hovey t>. Ten Broeck (3 Both, 316) on this point, approved and followed, and held not to be overruled by Coffin v. Reynolds (37 JL. T., 642), which applies only to officers of companies, a class of agents specifically mentioned in other sections of the statute.
    
      Appeal from a judgment.
    Victor Vincent brought an action against Charles Bamford, in the New York superior court, to charge the defendant as a stockholder in the New York & Galena Lead Mining Co., for a debt due to the plaintiff from the company, for which he had recovered a judgment, execution on which had been returned unsatisfied. The defendant was sought to be made liable therefor as a stockholder of the company, under section 18 of the manufacturing companies act of 1848. The material facts appear in the opinion. Plaintiff had a verdict, on which judgment was entered; and a motion was made by defendant on the judge’s minutes, to set aside the verdict as against evidence. This motion was denied. From the order denying the motion, and from the judgment, defendant appealed to the general term.
    
      Erastus Cooke, for defendant, appellant.
    
      Frederick R. Coudert, for plaintiff, respondent.
   By the Court.—Feeedmah, J.

J, [After discussing certain exceptions to the admission of evidence which he held to be not well taken.]—This brings up the main question of law involved in the case, which is presented chiefly by the exceptions of the defendant taken to the refusal of the court to charge certain requests, namely, whether plaintiff, in the performance • of the services rendered, was or was not a servant within the true intent and meaning of section 18 of the statute referred to, which provides that the stockholders of any company organized under the provisions of said act, “shall be jointly and severally individually liable for all debts that may be due and owing to all their laborers, servants and apprentices for services performed for such corporation.” The cases cited by defendant in opposition to plaintiff’s claim upon this point, did not arise under the same, but under other and different statutes, for the passage of which, entirely different reasons may have existed. They have all been considered, and held inapplicable to a case of this kind, in Hovey v. Ten Broeck (3 Robt., 316), where it was decided by this court that the word “servant,” as used in the statute under consideration, cannot be confined to mere menial service. According to the testimony, plaintiff was employed to do, and did do everything he was told to do. He was a sort of engineer, a sort of foreman ; he showed the men how to work, and yet worked with them ; during the absence of the superintendent from the mines, he was made to act as such ; he sometimes kept the time of the men, and in fact did everything he was ordered to do, and everything that was necessary and possible for him to do. He is, therefore, clearly entitled to the application of the rule laid down in Hovey v. Ten Broeck {supra), unless, as it is claimed, that case has been reversed as an authority, upon the point stated, by the decision of the court of appeals in Coffin v. Reynolds (37 N. Y., 642). Upon examination, it will be found, however, that such is not the fact. The latter case simply decides that the secretary of a company organized under the act of 1848, being an officer thereof, and- belonging, as such, to a class of agents specifically mentioned in other sections of the statute, does not come within the designation of a laborer or servant, as used in section 18. This distinction is a marked and material one, and not in conflict, but in harmony with the views expressed by this court in Hovey v. Ten Broeck {supra). Williamson v. Wadsworth (49 Barb., 294), is another express authority under the statute in question, in plaintiff’s favor.

The judgment and order appealed from must be severally affirmed, with costs. 
      
       Present, Barbour, Ch. J., and Freedman and Spencer, JJ.
     