
    Fred SIMONI, a.k.a. Agim Murtez Ani, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-0475-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 11, 2010.
    Parker Waggaman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    
      Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Anh-Thu P. Mai-Windle, Senior Litigation Counsel, Lynda A. Do, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, PIERRE N. LEVAL and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Fred Simoni, a native and citizen of Albania, seeks review of the January 7, 2009 order of the BIA affirming the December 6, 2006 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Robert D. Weisel, denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Fred Simoni, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 7, 2009), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 6, 2006). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

This Court reviews the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 289 (2d Cir.2007). We review de novo questions of law and the application of law to undisputed fact. Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008). As an initial matter, contrary to the government’s assertion that Simoni’s challenge to the IJ’s changed country conditions finding was unexhausted before the BIA, the issue is considered exhausted because the BIA addressed it. See Xian Tuan Ye v. DHS, 446 F.3d 289, 296-97 (2d Cir.2006).

Assuming, as did the BIA, that Simoni established he suffered past perse-

cution, substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that country conditions in Albania have significantly changed such that Simoni did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(l)(i). Before this Court, Sim-oni argues, principally, that the agency erred in relying on Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 179 (2d Cir.2006), in reaching its determination because his case is factually distinguishable from Hoxhallari. To wit, he does not have relatives who remain in Albania and are politically active. Petitioner, however, misreads Hox-hallari. The agency relied on the fact that Hoxhallari’s relatives remained in Albania to support an adverse credibility finding, not as a basis for its alternative finding that changed circumstances in Albania rebutted any presumption that Hoxhallari had a well-founded fear of future persecution. Hoxhallari, 468 F.3d at 182-83. Here, the agency properly conducted an

individualized assessment of how the Democratic Party’s victory in the 2005 and 2007 Albanian elections would affect Simoni’s claim, and reasonably concluded that Sim-oni did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Niang v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 138, 148-49 (2d Cir.2007); see also Hoxhallari, 468 F.3d at 187 (holding that the agency need not enter specific findings regarding changed country conditions where “changed conditions evidently prevail in a country that is the subject of an appreciable proportion of asylum claims,” such as Albania). Moreover, Sim-oni identifies no evidence compelling the conclusion that changed country conditions in Albania do not negate his well-founded fear of persecution. See Manzur, 494 F.3d at 289.

Because Simoni was unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim, he was necessarily unable to meet the higher standard required to succeed on his claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief where those claims are based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 567 (2d Cir.2006). Additionally, because Simo-ni presented no evidence of any long-lasting physical or mental effects of his alleged persecution, the agency did not err in finding that he failed to demonstrate eligibility for humanitarian asylum pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). See Jalloh v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir.2007); Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 20 (B.I.A.1989). Accordingly, the agency’s denial of asylum was not improper.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).  