
    The State, ex rel. The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., v. Duffy et al., Industrial Commission of Ohio.
    
      Writ of prohibition—Function and purpose of writ—Workmen’s compensation—Enforcement of award against self-insurer—Sections 1465-74 and 1465-100, General Code— Petition to prohibit industrial commission from requesting attorney general to sue—Revocation of right of employer to pay compensation direct—Section 1465-69, General Code.
    
    Prohibitions, 32 Cyc. pp. 599, 00, 604, 605, 613; Injunction, 32 C. J. §1; Workmen’s Compensation Acts, C. J. §148 (Anno.).
    (No. 19376
    Decided March 16, 1926.)
    In Prohibition.
    This is an original action in this court brought to secure a writ of prohibition to prevent the Industrial Commission of the state of Ohio from applying to the Attorney General of the state of Ohio to collect a certain award made by the Industrial Commission under Section 1465-100, General Code, and to prevent the Industrial Commission from revoking the relator’s privilege of self-insurance. The case arises upon demurrer.
    The petition alleges, in substance, the following facts:
    The relator is a self-insurer under the Workmen’s Compensation Law. John Winkleman prior to March 31, 1922, was an employe of the relator, and on or about March 31, 1922, he' discontinued his employment with the relator because of illness. On July 10, 1922, Winkleman died. When application was first made to the Industrial Commission for compensation because of occupational disease alleged to have been incurred by Winkleman in his employment with the relator, the Industrial Commission denied the claim. Later the commission granted a rehearing, and ordered compensation to be paid the widow.
    The petition alleges that the respondents will unless restrained certify to the Attorney General of Ohio a transcript of the proceedings in the matter of the said claim with instructions to bring suit for collection of the award and for the additional penalty of 50%. The petition further alleges that the respondents have threatened to and will take away from the relator its right of self insurance unless restrained.
    The petition also alleges that subsequent to the award the Commission notified the relator, .that unless the award was paid within a given time the relator’s right to self insurance would be cancelled.
    The prayer of the petition has been set out above.
    
      The award and finding made by the commission upon June 29, 1925, read as follows:
    “This day, to wit, June 29, 1925, this claim coming on for consideration of report of oral hearing conducted by a claims referee, and the other proof on file, which report and all proof filed in connection therewith was duly and fully considered by the commission, it was the finding of the commission that application for compensation was made to the employer by the decedent through his wife within a period of 60 days from the date his disability began as a result of an occupational disease.
    “It was the further finding of the commission that the death of decedent was due to an occupational disease.
    “Wherefore, it was ordered that compensation be paid to the wife as a person wholly dependent upon decedent, in an amount of $6,500, payable at the rate of $37.50 in biweekly payments, for a period of 346, plus, weeks.”
    
      Mr. Eugene Carlin, and Messrs. Waters, An-dress, Bouthworth, Wise & Maxon, for relator.
    
      Mr. C. C. Crabbe, attorney general, and Mr. R. R. Zurmehly, for respondents.
   By the Court.

Relator is asking for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Industrial Commission of the state of Ohio (1) from asking the Attorney General to collect the award made by the Industrial Commission against the relator; (2) from canceling the relator’s privilege of carrying its own insurance.

Now the proper function of the writ' of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts and tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction.

The purpose of the writ is to prevent the exercise by a tribunal possessing judicial powers of -' jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance, or to prevent it from exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. It differs from injunction in the fact that injunction is directed only to the parties litigant, while prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from the exercise of jurisdiction which it does not possess.

Its principal purpose is to prevent an inferior court or other tribunal from assuming jurisdiction with which it is not vested. 22 Ruling Case Law, 3, 4. See, also, Clendaniel v. Conrad, 26 Del., (3 Boyce) 549, 83 A., 1036, Ann. Cas., 1915B, 968; State ex rel. Kochtitzky v. Riley, 203 Mo., 175. 101 S. W., 567, 12 L. R. A., (N. S.), 900; State ex rel. Sullivan v. Reynolds, 209 Mo., 161, 107 S. W., 487, 15 L. R. A., (N. S.), 963, 123 Am. St. Rep., 468, 14 Ann. Cas., 198; State ex rel. Terminal Rd. Ass’n. v. Tracy, 237 Mo., 109, 140 S. W., 888, 37 L. R. A., (N. S.), 448; notes, 38 Am. Dec., 594: 3 L. R. A, 57; 1 L. R. A., (N. S.), 843; 6 Ann. Cas., 986.

Prohibition will not issue to restrain action where the inferior tribunal has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person. It will not issue where there is an adequate remedy at law or in equity readily available to the applicant. 32 Cye., 604 to 617, and cases cited.

Prohibition will not issue to prevent an inferior tribunal from deciding the question erroneously; State ex rel. v. Clendening, 93 Ohio St., 264, 112 N. E., 1029; State ex rel. v. Brough, 94 Ohio St., 115, 113 N. E., 683; Kelley, Judge, v. State ex rel. Gellner, 94 Ohio St., 331, 114 N. E., 255; State ex rel. v. Jones et al., Judges, 95 Ohio St., 357; State ex rel. v. Allen, 96 Ohio St., 10; State ex rel. v. Jones et al., Judges, 96 Ohio St., 506, 118 N. E., 115; State ex rel. v. Bonds, 96 Ohio St., 604, 118 N. E., 1086; State ex rel. v. Court of Common Pleas, 98 Ohio St., 164, 120 N. E., 335; State ex rel. v. Johnson, Judge, 98 Ohio St., 438, 121 N. E., 647; State ex rel. v. Johnson, Judge, 98 Ohio St., 450, 121 N. E., 647; State ex rel. v. Langdale, 98 Ohio St., 470, 121 N. E., 903; State ex rel. Carmody v. Justice, Judge, 114 Ohio St., 94, 150 N. E., 430.

Has the Industrial Commission jurisdiction to do the acts which the relator is asking this court to prohibit?

Section 1465-74, General Code, empowers the Industrial Commission to determine the amount of compensation due an employe from a self-insuring employer, and Section 1465-68b makes the provisions of this and other sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Act applicable to cases of occupational disease. The Code (Section 1465-74 [103 O. L., 82]) provides that the amount awarded becomes a liquidated claim for damages which “may be recovered in an action in the name of the state for the benefit of the person or persons entitled to the same.”

Section 1465-74 and Section 1465-100, General Code, authorize the Attorney General, “upon the request of the board,” to institute and prosecute tlie necessary actions or proceedings for the enforcement of any of the provisions of the act. It is self-evident, therefore, that the Industrial Commission will not be exceeding its authority if it asks the Attorney General to bring a suit to enforce the award in question herein.

Under Section 1465-69, General Code (109 0. L., 291), the Industrial Commission is authorized to revoke the right of an employer to pay compensation direct, if in its judgment such action is necessary to secure and assure a strict compliance with all of the provisions of the law in reference to the payment of compensation. This statute gives the commission a wide discretion with regard to the revoking of the right to reinsure.

Since the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to do the acts complained of, the writ will be denied.

Writ denied.

Marshall, C. J., Matthias, Day and Allen, JJ., concur.  