
    Widrig against Oyer and wife.
    To cay of a woman, “sheprocured, or took medicine,- or ?hebut»id child haveTand^siie aou ktíe basCd fikedtoShLv"as> síb¿ ls actl?a
    IN ERROR, from the court of Common pleas of HerTcirnei' > " 1 county. The plaintiff brought an action of slander in the court J i . o kel°w* The words- charged, as spoken by the wife of Oyer, the-defendant, of and concerning the plaintiff, were, “ She (mean-’ng the plaintiff) did, with the assistance of her mother, procure, ai)d take medicine, or poison, in order, and with intent, to kill, ai)d poison to death, a bastard child she (the plaintiff) was pregnant with, or like to.have; and she (the plaintiff) did kill the bastard child which she was like to.have, by means of taking, the said medicine,’’ &c. The defendants demurred to the declaration, and the court below gave judgment for the defendants on the demurrer.
    The only question was, whether the words charged, in the declaration were actionable l
    
    
      M. Williams, for the plaintiff in error.
    He. cited Brooker v, Coffin, 5 Johns. Rep. 188. 3 Co. Inst. 50. 1 Bl. Com. 129., Christian’s note. 1 Hawk, Pl. Cr. b. 1. ch. 31. sect. 16. Bracton, 1. 3. ch. 21. Finch’s Law, 186. He was stopped by the court.
    
      Skinner, contra,
    said it was idle to go back to ancient books,, v, hen this court had so clearly laid down the rule, as to what words were actionable, in Brooker v. Coffin ; “ That where the charge, if true, will subject the party charged to an indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude, or subject him to an infamous punishment, the words, in themselves, were actionable.” We admit the soundness of the rule, but witha slight alteration.of “ or” to and, which would make it conformable to the cases in Wilson
      
       and Salkeld.- The charge, we contend, must not only in- . . ° . . , . , J volve moral turpitude, but, also, subject the party charged to an infamous punishment.. Procuring an abortion is not, by the law of England, or of this state, murder, or manslaughter, The impossibility of proving the fact may, perhaps, be the reason why no case, can be found, in which such an offence has been punished in England»
    
      
      
        Onslow v. Horne, 3 Wils. Rep. 177. 3 Salk. 328.
      
    
    
      
      
        1 Hale P. C. 433. 3 Co Inst. 150. Hawk b. 1. ch. 31. sect. 6.
    
   Per Curiam.

We have no doubt the offence charged is indictable, and its criminality, or moral turpitude, cannot be questioned. The words were clearly actionable, witbin the rule laid down by üs in Brooker v. Coffin, which we consider as affording the best criterion for determining whether words spoken are actionable or not. The judgment of the court below must be reversed.

Judgment reversed*  