
    W. H. B. Richardson vs. J. H. Dingle, Jr.
    Evidence— Witness — -Hiring— Contract — Slave.
    A party objecting to the competency of a -witness on the ground of interest must make it clearly appear that he has a certain direct and immediate interest in the event of the cause itself. If his interest be doubtful, the objection goes to his credit and not to his competency.
    The terms upon which a negro was hired, may be shown by parol, although it appears that a promissory note was given for the amount of the hire.
    Defendant having hired a negro ‘ to work on his farm’ employed him on a steamboat and he was drowned : — Held, that defendant was liable for the loss of the negro.
    BEFORE GLOVER, J., AT CLARENDON, SPRING TERM, 1858.
    The report of bis Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows:
    
      “ The plaintiff sued in case to recover damages for the loss of a slave named Washington, hired to defendant in 1855, and drowned while employed on a steamboat, contrary, as is alleged, to the terms of hiring.
    “The competency of W. E. Butler, a witness offered on the part of the plaintiff, was objected to on the ground of interest. Prom his confused manner and contradictory statements, it was difficult to ascertain the nature and extent of his interest. He once said, that whatever is recovered in this action, he expected to get, that when he pays back what he owes the plaintiff he is to get back Washington, and other slaves; that he has paid the plaintiff some of his debt and has received some of the negroes back. This, however, he afterwards either denied or qualified.
    “ His examination enabled me to collect the following facts: — Butler, who was much embarrassed, had confessed a judgment to plaintiff for a large sum, and under tbe fi. fa. entered on that confession, Washington and other negroes were sold and bought by plaintiff. There was and still is an understanding between them, that, as Butler shall pay for the negroes, the plaintiff will deliver them to him. I held Butler competent, who said that defendant hired Washington and other negroes of plaintiff in 1855, to work on the farm which he superintended; in September, Washington was ordered to Wright’s'Bluff, to go on the steamer; Butler advised the defendant not to send him unless he informed the plaintiff; defendant replied, “ you are an old granny, there is no danger.” The defendant told Butler, and also S. B. Tuning, that Washington was drowned from the steamer, and he told the former that it occurred about Pond Bluff, between Nelson’s and Murray’s Perries.
    “ A promissory note was given for the hire of Washington and other negroes, and the defendant had served a notice on plaintiff to produce the note on trial, which was done, and the note was handed to defendant’s counsel; but it was not offered in evidence by either plaintiff or defendant, nor was I advised of the contents. The only evidence of the terms of hiring was the statement of Butler, who said that the negroes were hired by the defendant “ to work on the farm.” This was objected to because the note was higher evidence and should have been produced. It was produced, however, but not offered; and the evidence of Butler was admitted as it did not appear to me objectionable on the ground insisted upon. Parol evidence of the understanding of the parties and terms of hiring at the time of the contract, may be admitted, even if a note was given.
    “ The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff.”
    The defendant appealed, and now moved this Court for a new trial on the following grounds, viz :
    
      1. Because bis Honor held that Butler was a competent witness, whereas it is submitted that Butler had a direct interest in the event of the suit.
    2. Because his Honor allowed parol proof of the terms of hiring, although it appeared that there was written evidence in relation to the hiring.
    3. Because the verdict is contrary to evidence in this, that the testimony of Butler (on which only the case rested) was unsatisfactory and insufficient, and evidently biassed.
    4. Because the verdict is contrary to law in this, that on the fact as sworn to, the defendant had not incurred any legal liabilities, not having employed the negro in any dangerous work, nor in any work incompatible with the terms of hiring.
    
      M. B. Moses, Bellinger, for appellant,
    cited on first ground Cavan vs. Dunlap, Chev. 243; Clery vs. Spears, 2 Sp. 690; Brown vs. O'Brien, 1 Bich. 270; Gist vs. Rogers, Bice, 86; and on the fourth ground, Duncan vs. Railroad Company, 2 Bich. 613 ; McLaughlin vs. Lomas, 3 Strob. 85; Milcel vs. Milcel, 5 Bich. Eq. 221.
    
      Moses, Richardson, contra,
    cited 1 Green. Ev. § 387, 390 ; Knight vs. Knotts, 7 Bich. 35.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

WhitNer, J.

It may be safely assumed that the interest which disqualifies a witness must be a certain legal and immediate interest in the event of the cause itself. The test is found in a narrow compass, whether the record in that cause will affect his interest.”

The party objecting must sustain.bis exception by satisfactory evidence. It is not enough that a doubt is created, for then it is manifest the safer rule is to hear the witness.

In Bent vs. Baker, 3 Term Rep. 27, Lord Kenyon, Ch. J., presents some views, instructive and apposite at this day, and in such a case as the one under consideration. Keferring first to Lord Mansfield who had said in Walton vs. Shelley, 1 T. E. 300, that the old cases upon the competency of witnesses have gone upon very subtle grounds. But of late-years the courts have endeavored, as far as possible, consistent with those authorities, to let the objection go to the credit, rather than to the competency of a witness;” and to Lord Hardwick, who said in King vs. Bray, Rep. Temp. Hard. 360, “ That whenever a question of this sort arose, on which a doubt might be raised, he was always inclined to restrain it to the credit rather than to the competency of the witness, malting such observation to the jury as the nature of the case should require,” and thus fortified Lord Kenyon, felt no scruple in declaring his concurrence. If we turn to the circumstances of this case we look in vain for such facts as would have justified the rejection of the witness. Surely it cannot be said there was any evidence to establish a binding subsisting contract between the plaintiff and witness, such as would give the latter an interest in the recovery sought, much less when to the statement in the report is superadded the further fact to which the witness testified, that he had rendered a schedule, and made an assignment without any intimation of any such interest.

The precise point made in the second ground of appeal was decided in Knight vs. Knotts, 8 Eich. 35. The promissory note was in Court, and in the hand of appellant’s counsel, and if it contained anything beyond a mere promise to pay money it should have been brought; more distinctly to the view of the Judge.

The third ground was abandoned, and the fourth, very little relied on, is very fully responded to by tbe evidence, tbe verdict, and tbe authorities cited in tbe brief and cases referred to in them.

Tbe motion for a new trial is dismissed.

O’Nball, Wardlaw, GIlover and Munro, JJ., concurred.

Motion dismissed.  