
    Edward Winsor & another vs. George Griggs.
    One who signs a submission to arbitration, as agent, without disclosing the name of his principal, or the name of the principal being known to the other party, is personally bound by the submission.
    It is no objection to an award, that the arbitrator, after the hearing, received a paper relating to the case from one of the parties, with the assent of the other.
    This was an action of assumpsit on an award, to which the defendant specified in defence, among other things : 1st. That he was not a party to the submission; 2d, That the award was void, because evidence was received by the arbitrator in the absence of the defendant; and 3d, Because the award was made before the hearing was closed.
    At the trial, before Bigelow, J., in the court of common pleas, the plaintiffs produced the submission, the signatures to which were admitted. The defendant signed the same “ George Griggs, Agent ” ; and it did not appear, that he disclosed, or that the plaintiffs knew, the name of his principal. The plaintiffs produced the award, and called the arbitrator, as a witness, to prove the same, who testified that it was the award signed by him, and sent by him to the parties.
    The arbitrator was then examined by the defendant, and testified as follows : “ The hearing took place at the defendant’s office, and when it was closed, the defendant was told, in my presence, by Winsor, one of the plaintiffs, that there was a particular document in existence, which the defendant doubted, and we all went to Swan’s office to get it. Swan was not in his office, and the paper was not obtained. As we were coming away, I told the defendant and Winsor that I should like to have the document. Winsor said, 1 We will get it.’ When we separated, the defendant did not intimate that he wanted another meeting. The document was after-wards obtained by Winsor, and sent to me, without any thing further being done or said by him. I did not notify the defendant, that I had received the document, before I made the award, and I gave him no opportunity to be heard about it.” The witness, being then examined by the plaintiff, said, that 11 Griggs was present, when Winsor spoke of getting the bill, and assented to it; the evidence was closed; they said they had nothing more to say; Griggs did not say, that when the document was produced, he wanted to be heard on it.”
    No further evidence being produced, and it being admitted that the plaintiffs, after receiving the award, duly demanded performance of it by the defendant, the case was withdrawn by consent from the jury, and submitted to the court upon the above evidence, as upon an agreed statement of facts. The court of common pleas rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed to this court.
    
      G. Minot, for the defendant.
    
      C. A. Welch, for the plaintiffs.
   Wilde, J.

This is an action of assumpsit upon an award, and the first question to be decided is, whether the defendant is bound by the submission to arbitration, he having signed the same as agent, but without disclosing the name of his principal. And on this question the rule of law is well laid down by judge Story in his Commentaries on the Law of Agency, §§ 266, 267. “ A person,” he says, “ contracting as agent, will be personally responsible, where, at the time of mairing the contract, he does not disclose the fact of his agency. And the same principle will apply to contracts made by agents, where they are known to be agents, and acting in that character, but the name of their principal is not disclosed; for until such disclosure, it is impossible to suppose, that the other contracting party is willing to enter into a contract, ex onerating the agent, and trusting to an unknown principal, who may be insolvent, or incapable of binding himself.”

This is a very reasonable rule of law, and it is supported by the authorities; 2 Kent, 630, 631, and the cases there cited. If a person,” says chancellor Kent, “ would excuse himself from responsibility on the ground of agency, he must show that he disclosed his principal at the time of making the contract.” The same principle is laid down as a rule of law well settled, by lord Tenterden, in the case of Thompson v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 78, and by Parker, C. J., in Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 27. It is clear, therefore, that the defendant is personally bound by the submission, which he signed as agent, as he did not disclose the name of his principal, and it does not appear that the same was known to the plaintiffs.

The second ground of defence is founded on an objection made to the proceedings of the arbitrator. The objection is, that the arbitrator, after the hearing of the parties had been closed, received a document from Winsor, one of the plaintiffs, in the absence of the defendant, and without his knowledge ; and sundry cases have been cited in support of the objection. We do not think it necessary to consider these cases, because we think it was proved by the arbitrator, that the defendant assented to his receiving the document, “ and did not say, when the document was produced, that he wanted to be heard on it; ” and the case, by consent of the parties, is submitted to the court on the evidence, as upon an agreed statement of facts.

Judgment of the court of common pleas affirmed.  