
    Eloida RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, New York City Department of Education, Jeanette Sosa, Individually and as Principal of Public School 151K, Chancellor, Joel I. Klein, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-3754-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 18, 2012.
    
      Rae Downes Koshetz, Rae Downes Koshetz, P.C., New York, New York, Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Janet L. Zaleon,(Kristin M. Helmers, Jamie M. Zinaman, on the brief) of Counsel, for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York City Law Department, New York, New York, for Defendants-Appellees.
    PRESENT: DENNY CHIN, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Eloida Rodriguez appeals from the district court’s judgment entered on August 18, 2011, pursuant to a memorandum and order dated August 16, 2011, granting summary judgment to defendants — the City of New York, New York City Department of Education, Jeanette Sosa (individually and as Principal of Public School 151 (“P.S. 151”)), and Joel I. Klein, Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues presented for review.

Rodriguez began working for the New York City public school system in 1988. In October of 2005, she was transferred to work as a paraprofessional at P.S. 151 in Brooklyn, New York. Upon termination from P.S. 151, effective April 29, 2008, Rodriguez sued defendants for employment discrimination on the basis of her age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. L. § 296(1), and New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(l)(a). On appeal, Rodriguez argues principally that the district court erred in concluding that she failed to demonstrate that: (1) the circumstances of her termination gave rise to an inference of discrimination, see Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir.2005); and (2) defendants’ reasons for her termination were merely pretextual, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Upon de novo review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in Rodriguez’s favor, we conclude that the district court correctly held that no genuine dispute as to any material fact existed for trial and that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 104-05 (2d Cir.2011). Even assuming Rodriguez had established a prima facie case of discriminatory or retaliatory termination, defendants offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Rodriguez— her disciplinary record from October 2007 to April 2008, which consisted of three incidents — and Rodriguez, as the district court concluded, did not present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the stated reason was pre-textual. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817; McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir.2009); Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 187-88 (2d Cir.2006); Stratton v. Dep’t for the Aging, 132 F.3d 869, 879 (2d Cir.1997). The district court therefore did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

We have considered Rodriguez’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  