
    Kofi OBENG-AMPONSAH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Randall D. NAIMAN, an individual; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-56593
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    
      Submitted February 14, 2017 
    
    Filed February 22, 2017
    Kofi Obeng-Amponsah, Pro Se
    John Paul Girarde, Esquire, Attorney, Murphy, Pearson, Bradley & Feeney, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Randall D. Naiman
    Ann Marie Thompson, Esquire, Sünde-land McCutchan, LLP, San Diego, CA, Darin L. Wessel, Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Peter Hettinga, Craig Finlayson
    Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App, P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for oral argument set forth in the opening brief is denied.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Kofi Obeng-Amponsah appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging foreclosure related claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs action as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it is a “forbidden de facto appeal” of state court decisions, and raises issues “inextricably intertwined” with those decisions. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A federal district court dealing with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a state court must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.”); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because alleged legal injuries arose from the “state court’s purportedly erroneous judgment” and the relief he sought “would require the district .court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void").

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend his complaint because the jurisdictional defect could not be cured by amendment. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he court need not extend the general rule that parties are allowed to amend their pleadings if amendment would be an exercise in futility” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiffs requests set forth in his opening brief and pending requests for judicial notice are denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     