
    AHERN against THE STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
    
      New York Superior Court; Special Term,
    
      June, 1870.
    Costs.—Appeal prom Judgment akd Order.
    On an appeal from a judgment, after trial by jury, and an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial," costs of two appeals may be allowed, although both appeals are brought to hearing at the same time and place, and upon one set of papers.
    Appeal from taxation of costs.
    This action was brought by Simeon J. Ahem against the Standard Life Insurance Company.
    This was an appeal from the taxation of costs by the clerk. Plaintiff obtained a verdict at the trial term. A motion was made at special term for a new trial upon a case, which was denied. Judgment was thereupon entered, and the defendants appealed to the general term from the judgment, and also from the order denying the motion for a new trial. The general term affirmed the order and judgment appealed from. The clerk allowed the following costs :
    Costs before argument on appeal from judgment, $20.00 “ for “ of “ “ “ 40.00
    
    
      “ before argument of appeal from order denying new trial ......20.00
    Costs for argument of appeal from order denying new trial.......40.00
   Freedman, J.

In consequence of the omission of the cases arising under subdivision 2 of section 349, from the exceptions contained in subdivision 5 of section 307 of the Code, as it now stands, the same costs may be taxed on appeal from an order denying motion for new trial, as upon appeal from the judgment. Although in practice both appeals are brought to a hearing at the same time and place, and upon one set of papers, they are nevertheless, entirely distinct from each other. An appeal from the judgment, after trial by jury, presents only questions of law; but an appeal from the order denying motion for a new trial, enables the appellant to obtain a review of the questions of fact as well as of law. Such combined appeal calls for a more full preparation of the appeal papers, imposes vastly greater labors upon the counsel for the respondent, and entitles the appellant to a more thorough consideration by the appellate court of the whole case, than by an appeal from the judgment alone.

The clerk, therefore, was right in taxing the costs of both appeals.  