
    Fletcher H. HYLER; Sheryl Root Hyler, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INVESTMENT GRADE LOANS, INC.; Lincoln Trust Company FBO; Doug Pickering; Chern S. Lin; Felicia Lin; Janice Tempey; Roy S. Wolf; Thomas C. O’Connell, Jr.; Janice K. O’Grady; Pensco Trust Company as Custodian FBO John A. Snyder Ira; Pensco Trust Company as Custodian FBO Phil Ahlfeldt Ira; John Stevens, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 08-17260.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Dec. 11, 2009.
    Filed Jan. 13, 2010.
    John Huster, the Huster Law Group, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Michael E. Stone, Law Office of Michael E. Stone, Campbell, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: SCHROEDER and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and LYNN, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Barbara M. Lynn, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Fletcher Hyler and Sheryl Hyler appeal the denial of their Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion to set aside a judgment entered after they settled their claims against defendants Investment Grade Loans et al. brought under the Truth in Lending Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. They contend that information they received after the judgment showed that statements by defendants’ counsel during the course of the litigation were false and that the judgment was therefore procured by fraud.

We review for abuse of discretion. U.S. v. Asarco Inc., 430 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir.2005). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion and in refusing to set aside the settlement. The statements amounted at worst to legal arguments about facts that may have been incorrect. As the district court noted, “fraud requires more,” Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2004), and nothing prevented the plaintiffs from pursuing rather than settling their claim.

We deny the defendants’ request for sanctions; they have not properly invoked the provisions of any applicable rule.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     