
    Adriana C. TOMASINO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. JOHN’S UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 10-4257-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 20, 2012.
    
      Adriana C. Tomasino, Brooklyn, NY, pro se.
    Lyle S. Zuckerman, Vedder Price P.C., New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, AMALYA L. KEARSE, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Adriana C. Tomasi-no, pro se, appeals from the judgment of the district court, granting Defendant-Ap-pellee St. John’s University summary judgment on Tomasino’s employment-discrimination claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, considering whether the district court correctly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). “In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita, Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Having conducted an independent and de novo review, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned decision of September 23, 2010.

(1) No reasonable factfinder could conclude on the record that Tomasino was fired on the basis of her race or national origin as opposed to her insubordination and misconduct. She offers explanations for why she failed to conduct certain presentations as instructed by her supervisor, or call in when out sick, or personally notify her supervisor when she left the office. But even accepting her explanations, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Tomasino has identified no evidence that would permit a rational factfinder to infer that Defendant was motivated by any unlawful discriminatory intent. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“[A] reason cannot be proved to be ‘a pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.”) (emphasis omitted); cf. Timothy v. Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., 233 Fed.Appx. 17, 20 (2d Cir.2007) (summary order) (“Even assuming, however, that inconsistencies or other indicia of pretext are present, they would not here support, either alone or in conjunction with the other evidence, an inference that discrimination on the basis of [plaintiffs protected status] was the real reason for any of these allegedly adverse actions.” (citing Fisher v. Vassar Coll, 114 F.3d 1332, 1339 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)).

(2) Tomasino’s religious-discrimination claim also fails. Even assuming arguendo that Tomasino could establish a prima facie case for this claim, Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it offered her a reasonable accommodation for her desire to act as a lector at a weekday Mass: she could take her lunch hour at 11:15 a.m. so that she could serve as lector at the 12:15 p.m. Mass. Tomasino’s objection to an early lunch hour does not render the accommodation unreasonable. See Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir.2002) (“In formulating such an accommodation, both the employer and employee should remain flexible, with an eye toward achieving a mutually acceptable adjustment.... [T]o avoid Title VII liability, the employer need not offer the accommodation the employee prefers. Instead, when any reasonable accommodation is provided, the statutory inquiry ends.”).

(3) Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the retaliation claim because Tomasino failed to establish a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment action that followed. The only basis Tomasino offered for establishing that connection was the proximity between the complaint she made to Human Resources on September 14 and her October 6 termination. However, because the record is replete with undisputed evidence that Defendant imposed progressive discipline against Tomasino well before September, an inference of discrimination will not arise based solely on the proximity between her complaint and termination. See Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir.2001) (“Where timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected activity, an inference of retaliation does not arise.”).

We have considered all of Tomasino’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  