
    Trousdale vs. Campbell.
    An entry for land was made on the 23d September 1785. The warrant on which it was founded, purported to have issued on tho 30th Sept. 1785. The entry referred to the warrant, by its number 2420. Held, in the absence of fraud, and alter so great lapse of time, it will be presumed there was a mistake as to the time when the warrant was issued, and that the entry was valid.
    The substance of complainant’s bill is, that on the 14th November 1785, an entry was made in the office of Martin Armstrong, entry-taker of military lands, for 640 acres, in pursuance of a good and valid warrant, and a survey was made and a grant issued, on the 15th September 1787, to John Nichols, who, for a valuable consideration, sold the same on the first December 1804, to Trousdale, the complainant. Trousdale took possession on the-day of-■-and made improvements, &c. That Michael Campbell caused a survey to be made, and a grant to issue from the State of Tennessee, dated 28th March 1810, for 640 acres, which includes the same land, or a'part of the same, granted to John Nichols. The grant issued in the name of Philip Philips and Michael Campbell. That an action of ejectment was commenced on the demise of the latter, and judgment rendered at law. Complainants charge, that said entry of Philips and Campbell was not a good and subsisting entry at the time the same purports to bear date, to wit, on the 23d day of September, A. D. 1785; and that the warrant No. 2420, upon which the entry was founded, was not applied to said entry, until a long time after the pretended date of the entry, nor until a long time after the date of the entry and grant to John Nichols. Said warrant was not issued by the secretary until the 30th September 1785, a time.subsequent to the date of the entry, and that it did not belong to, nor was it in the possession of Philips and Campbell, until long after that time.
    
      The warrant was issued 30th September 1785, to the heirs of Daniel Gauler; his heir, John Gauler, on the 3d October 1785, assigned it to Thomas Butcher. Butcher indorsed to Smith, Smith to Armstrong, and Armstrong indorsed in blank, the three last without dates.— Philips and Campbell’s entry number is 1419. The number of location of Nichols’ entry is 1562.
    The complainants further charge, that said Philips and Campbell caused, or procured Martin Armstrong, the entry-taker in said office, to make entries and iur-nish warrants and obtain grants in their names; and in pursuance of said contract, said warrant was applied to said entry at a later date, and after the grant to said Nichols, and after the date of other entries made in said office; and that the warrant did not belong to Philips and Campbell, at the time of the pretended date of said - entry. The evidence above stated was offered on the trial at law, to show that Philips and Campbell’s grant ought not to relate, but the evidence was rejected. They further charge, that said pretended entry was put on the entry-books, and rendered a void or blank entry, without any warrant being applied thereto, or without being filled up in the names of Philips and Campbell, until long after the title of said Nichols, and that said Philips and Campbell, or some person for them, for the fraudulent purpose of acquiring a title to said land of older date, filled up the number of the warrant in figures, with No. 2420, and wrote the names of Philips and Campbell, assignees of John Gauler, and applied said warrant to said entry at a later period, &c. Prays for a perpetual injunction, and that complainant may be quieted in possession, &c.
    To which there are answers, denying all the frauds charged as committed by defendants, or any agent for them; and insisting that there is no equity in the bill; that no averment is to be made against the entry, it being a record,, or in the nature of a record, and proves itself. That the consideration for the land granted is not, nor cannot be impeached, and defendants’ title cannot be called in question, in this honorable court, for any mistake or omissions of the officers who are entrusted with entering, surveying and granting lands, if any such mistake existed, which is not admitted.
    The chancellor dismissed the bill, as there was no proof of fraud, and defendants had the oldest entry; and if there was any mistake, it was in the date of the warrant.
    Washington, for the plaintiff.
    1. If the entry of Philips and Campbell can be shown to be void, Nichols’ grant being the oldest, and his title unimpeached, he must hold the land.
    The entry of Philips and Campbell was void, because it was not founded upon a warrant; the warrant upon which it purports to be founded having emanated after the date of the entry.
    This discrepancy between the entry and warrant cannot be imputed to mistake. Mistake is not predicable of a record, when it comes collaterally in question.' A record is absolute verity itself, and no averment or in-tendment can be made against it, until some proceeding is commenced, the direct object of which is to impeach it, either for falsehood or mistake, and to have it vacated entirely, or corrected.
    If you suppose the date of the entry a mistaken one, when will you fix its date? It must be older than Nichols’ to overreach his grant. Will you fix it at the date of the warrant, or the next day, or the next week, or the next month, or the next year? Suppose its date to be false, and you have no criterion by which to ascertain its true, or even its probable date. Unfix its date, as appearing of record, and you might as well go backward as forward in giving it another date. This would expose the rights of individuals to too much uncertainty.
    
      Abstractly speaking, it is just as probable that there was a mistake m the date ot the warrant, as m that oí the entry, and if yon once unfix it, why not give it a date subsequent' to the one appearing of record, as well as a prior one. There is neither guide nor authority for substituting a new date.
    The attendant circumstances in this case, render it most probable that the warrant bears its true date, and consequently, that the entry must have been made without a warrant.
    The warrant issued to Gauler, and Gauler, before his assignment upon the warrant, had possession of it, and was the owner of it at a date subsequent to the date of the entry.
    There are two other assignments upon the warrant, both posterior to that of Gauler, before the property of the warrant is transmitted to Armstrong. If Campbell and Philips ever owned the warrant, or if their, entry was founded on it, they must have derived title to it under Armstrong, from the nature of the contract between them and Armstrong, mentioned in the pleadings.
    
      2. If Campbell and Philips acquired the warrant after the date of the entry, that does not make the entry good by relation. 4 Hayw. 180-1. ,
    In the first place, Campbell and Philips never did acquire the warrant, so far as appears from any thing in this cause. Martin Armstrong was the last owner of it, and it neither issued to Campbell and Philips, nor ever passed through their hands.
    It does not appear that Martin Armstrong, or that they acquire⅛ the warrant before the date of the defendant’s entry, which was in November 1785; and if he nor they did not so acquire it, to make the entry good by relation, so as to overreach an intervening title, would be manifestly unjust and iniquitous.
    But the making of the entry, without the warrant to found it upon at the time, was ipso facto, a void act, and therefore incapable of confirmation, or of being made good by any e* post facto occurrence. 2 Coke Lit. 516, note a, Confirmation.
    It was void, because it'was in fraud of the law, both on the part of the entry-taker and of the enterer; and especially where there is much room for believing, as in this case, that it was an actual, intentional fraud, committed in execution of a contract between the enterer and entry-taker, and for the sake of private lucre to themselves.
    If the making of the entry without the warrant, is in itself a void act, the subsequently acquiring the warrant is an act to be taken by itself, or not to be viewed with reference to any thing else; and consequently, such acquisition of the warrant merely, is no inception of title to any specific - piece of land.
    Although such enterer might afterwards acquire the warrant, that does not necessarily imply that he intended to apply the warrant to that specific piece of land which he had already entered, and which entering presupposes the appropriation of a warrant in the very making of it.
    No law would prevent him from entering the warrant subsequently acquired, upon any other piece of land, or if he did so, would make that appropriation of the warrant void. Of course, his afterwards acquiring the warrant would not inevitably confine it to the securing of the land, which had been illegally entered in the first place without! it.
    3. The entering of said warrant, No. 2420, by Martin Armstrong, on the 25th February, ¡1786, tends very strongly to prove, that he had not the warrant at the date of Philips and Campbell’s entry, and that it never was, in point of fact, applied to that entry; and also, such entering of the warrant, in February 1786, was a distinct renunciation of the entry made in September 
      ¥785, or a vacation of the same. 101,118. 4 Hayw. 263. 5Hayw. J J
    
    The entry made upon this warrant in September 1785, was in the name of Philips and Campbell; that made upon it in February 1786, was in Martin Armstrong’s name. Taking this fact in conjunction with the assignments upon the warrant, by which it appears that Campbell and Philips never owned the warrant, and the inference is irresistible, that the first appropriation of it was by Armstrong, when he entered it in February 1786.
    The last entry made by Armstrong upon the warrant, on the 8th of December 1788, also shows that he owned it, or had control over it, as late as that date, which is wholly repugnant to the idea of Campbell and Philips’ having previously appropriated it.
    4. It is consistent with the principles of a court of equity, where an older legal title is attempted to be su-perceded by an equity, for the owner of the legal title to go into an investigation tending to impair or invalidate the equity. 7 Wheat. 6, 212.
    
      F. B. Fogg, for defendants,
    argued at considerable length, insisting that the entry was valid; that if there was a mistake at all, it was in the date or issuance of the warrant; and that after such a lapse of time, the court would so presume. He cited and commented upon Porter vs. Kerr, 1 Tenn. Hep. 15; 1 Tenn. Rep. 396.
   Peck, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

The parties have had a trial at law for the land in controversy, and Campbell has prevailed by connecting his entry with his grant. The want of connection between the grant and entry in the suit at law, was the only point before that court. Trousdale now brings this bill, alleging fraud, and praying to have the warrant and entry put out of the way; they necessarily being applicable to the grant.

Trousdale has the elder grant, and this, if the entry of Campbell be inoperative, must prevail. The main objection to the entry pointed out in the pleadings is, that its date is anterior to the date of the warrant, and therefore the latter must be taken as having had no existence on the day of the entry, and that an entry without a warrant is void. The entry purports to have been made on the 23d of Sept. 1785. The warrant purports to have issued 30th Sept. 1785. The entry refers to the warrant by its number, 2420, and to the quantity of acres, 640. There would be no ambiguity but for the seeming inconsistency observable in those dates; and the question is, shall the doubt thus created defeat the entry?

In argument it is urged, that nothing can be averred against a record; the entry being a record must be taken as having been made on the day of its date, and that it is void if made without a warrant; and it being shown that the warrant had no existence on the 23d of September, 1785, all proceedings previous to the grant, must fail for the want of connection!

The. answer to this is, that both warrant and entry are matters of record. The one is of a grade in the scale of evidence as high as the other. It is the ‘duty of the court to reconcile them. There is as much authority for the existence of the warrant on the day of the entry, as there is against it. The officers to whom it belonged to issue warrants and make entries, must be taken as having discharged their duty. One making an entry is supposed to have had no influence over these officers. There is a mistake somewhere; but there is no proof of fraud. The board of commissioners passed these as valid documents; and this would be a circumstance, (though not conclusive,) to show that the evidence before them established such a fitness, that the entry could not be defeated.

It is much more reasonable to infer mistake in one of these dates, than it is to presume a violation of duty and of obligation in the entry-taker. The entry of Campbell and Philips, being No. 1419, and that under which Trousdale claims, being 1560, is conclusive to show the entry of Campbell the elder. The object of the bill is to set aside an entry on slight grounds; which entry was made almost forty years before filing this bill. Time, with the circumstances, operates conclusively in favor of the defendant.

Decree affirmed.  