
    No. 12,098.
    Joseph Henry et al. vs. Brackenridge Lumber Company, Limited, et al.
    Indirect allegations that the officers of a corporation against whom suit has been brought “had failed in their duty in certain respects,” and ** had not taken due precautions to ascertain the fitness of an employee before placing him in charge of dangerous machinery,” are insufficient to charge such officers with liability, when it is not alleged what part, if any, said officers were called on to take in the premises within the scope of the duty imposed upon them by virtue of their office, and wherein they had failed in the performance of such duty.
    'The mere fact of an accident does not carry with it a presumption of negligence. The facts and circumstances connected with the accident must be shown so as to enable the court to trace results to definite causes.
    APPEAL from the Civil District Oourt for the Parish of Orleans. Monroe, J.
    
    
      Benjamin Riee Forman for Plaintiffs, Appellants.
    
      Dart & Kernan for Defendants, Appellees.
    
      Argued and submitted April 21, 1896.
    Opinion handed down June 1 1896.
    Plaintiffs, the father and mother of George E. Henry, deceased, claim frorn the defendant corporation, and its officers and agents, Edward F. Braekenridge, its president; Charles E. Brack - enridge, its' treasurer; V. A. Longacre and James J. Green, its foreman and superintendent, the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars. That about April 17, 1895, their said son, a lad of about sixteen years of age, employed by defendants in their factory, was, by the carelessness and negligence of said defendants, horribly mangled, and after suffering great pain and agony of body and mind, he died from the injuries then and there received, and that the defendants were at fault and negligent at the time of the injury and killing of the son of petitioners, which fault and negligence caused his injury and death. (1) In having their factory where he was employed and at work constructed in a defective and dangerous and unskilful manner; there was not a sufficient space between the floor and the shaft, nor between the shaft and the roof; nor between the floor and the roof; the machinery and appliances defective and in bad order and repair; a gum belt in bad ■order and repair was used, when a leather belt in good order would have been safer; ordinary prudence and a proper construction would have required a support for the belt so as to lift it off the shaft when being repaired; proper prudence and care required that the shaft shonld have been stopped while the belt was being repaired and placed in position; dangerous machinery of this character should have been placed in charge of a competent mechanical engineer, but the defendants had failed in their duty in all of the respects above stated and had employed to have charge of said machinery said James Green, who was not a mechanical engineer and was grossly incompetent and unfit for his position, and the other •defendants were at fault in not taking due precautions to ascertain his fitness before placing him in charge of such dangerous machinery, ■and this they did out of parsimonious economy; .the said George E. Henry was without fault or negligence on his part at the time he was injured and ignorant of his danger and an inexperienced youth when he was ordered by said Green (his superior) to hold the belt while he (Green) laced it, when the shaft and other machinery was still in motion and revolving at a highly dangerous rate of speed, when by reason of the fault and negligence above detailed, the belt being of gum, and it and the machinery being then and there in bad order and repair and the space being too short, and all these things combined with the ignorance and carelessness of Green in placing an immature boy in so dangerous position when the shaft was rapidly revolving at a highly dangerous rate of speed, the gum belt caught on and was twisted on the rapidly revolving shaft, threw the said George E. Henry with great violence against the roof and mangled and crushed his body, so that suffering great agony, he died. In order to suppress and conceal the evidence of their carelessness, the defendants destroyed his shoes and clothing; they could have prevented the said injury and did not do so. The other named defendants were the vice principals of the corporation and by their fault and negligence as above described petitioners have been damaged in the said sum for which they prayed judgment in solido against the defendants.
    EdwardF. Brackenridge, president; CharlesE.Brackenridge, treasurer ; Y. A. Longaere, secretary, and James G. Green, secretary and superintendent of the Brackenridge Company, excepted to the petition on the ground that nothing therein said or averred showed any cause or reason for making them parties to the suit; that on the face of the papers, and, in fact, they are officers and agents of the corporation, and therefore, they are improperly made parties. They further excepted that the petition disclosed no cause of action against them.
    The defendant corporation answered, first pleading the general issue. Further answering they averred that it was true that George E. Henry was employed by respondent in its factory at and about the time set out in the petition and that he was accidentally killed, but said Henry was a boy of strength and of intelligence and able to perform the duties assigned to him; that he was not a child, nor an infant, and was well acquainted with the factory and its operation and that the unfortunate injury by which he lost his life was due entirely to his own carelessness and culpable contributory negligence on his part, and not in any manner to the fault, negligence and carelessness of respondent.
    On the trial of the exceptions they were sustained as to E. F. Brackenridge, Charles E. Brackenridge and Y. A. Longacre, and the suit as to them dismissed, but they were overruled as to James G. Green.
    Green then answered, pleading the general issue. The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs, after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a new trial, appealed from the judgment of the court, sustaining the exceptions as to certain of the defendants, and also from the judgment on the merits.
   On the Judgment Sustaining Exceptions Filed on Behalf of the President, Treasurer and Superintendent of the Defendant Corporation.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Nicholls, C. J.

Appellant has practically filed no brief on his appeal from the action of the court, sustaining the exceptions filed by the president, the treasurer and the superintentendent of the company, but have contented themselves with saying that the authorities cited by the District Judge should have led up to a ruling directly the reverse of that which was made. We think the ruling correct. The petition fails to show what part, if any, these officers were called on to take in determining the construction of the building or its accessories, in fixing the character of the appliances, or in controlling the appointment of Green, as foreman of the company. It is not alleged that these matters fall within the scope of the dnty of any one of them. Indirect allegations that “ they had failed in their duty in all of these respects,” that “they had not taken due precautions to ascertain Green’s fitness before placing him in charge of such dangerous machinery” are totally insufficient to charge them with any liability in respect to the matters complained of.

The charter of the company is not annexed to plaintiffs’ petition, and we know nothing of the duties assigned by it to these different officers. The judgment is affirmed.

On the Merits.

This ease comes to us on an appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment against them based on the verdict of a jury. We have examined the record and find no ground upon which we could reverse it.

Plaintiffs’ petition contains many allegations as to the defective construction of the building and its different parts, and as to the improper character of the appliances, and evidence was introduced endeavoring to sustain the same, but the conclusions we have reached do not call for any expression of opinion in respect to the same, for let their condition be what it might, such fact would not enter as a factor in the case, unless it should appear that the injury received was the result of the same. Nivette vs. New Orleans & Lake Shore Railroad Company, 42 An. 1153; Clements vs. Electric Light Company, 44 An. 694; Snider vs. Railroad Co., 48 An. 11. The mere fact of an accident does not carry with it a presumption of negligence or fault. The facts and circumstances connected with the accident must be shown so as to enable the court to trace results to definite causes. This has not been done in this case. We are unable to say how the accident occurred. The only person who seems really to have had any knowledge of it at all is the foreman Green. Though he was so excited and matters occurred so suddenly as to render his account not thoroughly reliable in all respects, yef it is clear and positive on certain points, and those negative the condition of things on which plaintiffs base their action. Plaintiffs’ contention is that the deceased, an inexperienced youth, was directed by his superior Green, the foreman of the establishnient, to hold a certain belt, as he, Green, laced it, while the shaft and other machinery was still in motion, revolving at a highly dangerous rate of speed — that the deceased, ignorant of the danger, obeyed; that the belt being of gum and in bad condition, it caught on the shaft and was twisted around it while rapidly revolving, throwing deceased, with great violence, against the roof, in consequence of the space between the shaft and the roof being so short as not to permit the passage of his body without striking. It is very evident, from the allegations of the petition itself, that the plaintiffs did not know themselves in what manner and under what circumstances the deceased became caught or entangled in the belt, for there was no attempt in the pleadings to set out the facts connected therewith, and they were left to be elicited, if possible, by the evidence. Green positively denies that he had either ordered the deceased to help him lace the belt or that he, in point of fact, did so; he says there was no need of his helping him, for if he had been holding it, witness could not have laced it; if he had been holding it he would have borne it down on the shaft, and he (witness), could not have laced it.” He says that the belt, needing to be laced, he sent the deceased for a piece of lacing, and on his handing it to him he ordered him to remove some shavings which had accumulated around the particular machine he was in the habit of feeding; that he himself hung the belt free from the shaft and laced it tight himself ; that he then reached over and put it on the side of the pulley to throw it on, when in some way Henry got his hand on it and the result followed.

He says the thing occurred so quickly that he could not account how in the world he got his hand in it; he must have grabbed it in some way. That Henry was standing on the opposite side where he feeds the machine at which he works. It is plain that the deceased got entangled in the belt and was carried up by it to the shaft and that his body was repeatedly struck as it passed between the shaft and the roof, but the weakness of the case consists in no one knowing how he came to be so entangled. His duty did not call him to the belt ornear it. Green’s statement is extremely indefinite, but such as it is it is the only direct testimony on the subject. Discrediting it, striking it out, we have nothing left (Ferguson vs. Tarbox, 44 Pacific, 905). We have no reason to believe that the building with its accessories was not suitable for carrying out the purposes for which it was designed. It could scarcely be expected that those who constructed it should have done so with reference to the possibility of a human body being carried up and around a revolving shaft and that they should have left a larger space between the roof and the shaft than they did for the purpose of enabling a body to pass without being struck,' nor have we reason to suppose that the belt, assuming it to have been precisely in the condition which plaintiffs claim it to have been in, conld not have been safely used for months in the work for which it was designed. As no one would anticipate that it would slip off from the upper pulley and that just as it did so a heavy weight should be suddenly thrown upon it, no one would guard against that special contingency. We think’ the testimony shows that plaintiffs’ claim that the machinery should be stopped in a factory while belt connections between some of the smaller, shafts in the establishment are being made, is unreasonable. We think that the question as to what appliances are best to be used to guard against accidents while belts are being laced does not affect this case, as the belt had already been laced and was being put on when the accident occurred.

It is not shown that any special scientific skill was needed in the discharge of the kind of work with which Green was entrusted. The evidence shows him to have been engaged about machinery for a number of years, with practical knowledge of his duty. He had been in the employ of this company for a long time and no accident of any kind prior to the one we are now called on to deal with is charged to have occurred during his administration — no failure of duty by him, either by way of omission or commission, has either been established or attempted to be established.

The accident was a deplorable one, but we do not think that defendants are responsible for it.

The judgment is affirmed.  