
    Robin G. PUGH-PERRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee.
    
    No. 09-2860-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 30, 2010.
    Robin G. Pugh-Perry, pro se, Jersey City, NJ.
    Scott Shorr, Senior Counsel, Appeals Division (Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, on the brief), The City of New York Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.
    PRESENT: WALKER, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judges, JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the official caption of this action to conform to the caption listed above.
    
    
      
       The Honorable John G. Koeltl, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Robin G. Pugh-Perry, proceeding pro se, brought this action against the New York City Human Resources Administration, alleging that she was discriminated and retaliated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because it is time-barred pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Pugh-Perry filed a timely appeal. On appeal, Pugh-Perry argues that the District Court erred in declining to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling and in denying her leave to amend her complaint. She also argues that the District Court erred in dismissing her claims under the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Pughr-Perry’s Federal Claim

We review de novo a District Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, assuming all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint to be true, see, e.g., Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). We read pro se complaints with “special solicitude” and interpret them to raise the “strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Having conducted a de novo review, we conclude, for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, Pugh-Perry v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., No. 07-CV-4050 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2009), that Pugh-Perry has not demonstrated the type of extraordinary circumstances that would merit the application of equitable tolling in this case. See Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir.2000) (placing the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that equitable tolling should be applied, and noting that vague or eonclusory assertions are “insufficient to justify any further inquiry into tolling”). Just as the Supreme Court observed in Baldwin Cnty Welcome Ctr. v. Brown:

This is not a case in which a claimant has received inadequate notice; or where a motion for appointment of counsel is pending and equity would justify tolling the statutory period until the motion is acted upon; or where the court has led the plaintiff to believe that she had done everything required of her. Nor is this a case where affirmative misconduct on the part of a defendant lulled the plaintiff into inaction. The simple fact is that [Pugh-Perry] was told [several] times what she must do to preserve her claim, and she did not do it. One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.

466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (internal citations omitted). We therefore hold that the District Court correctly dismissed her Title VII claim as time-barred.

We review the District Court’s denial of leave to amend for “abuse of discretion.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir.2007). “A district court has abused its discretion if it [has] based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (citation, alterations, and quotation marks omitted). “Although Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires,’ it is within the sound discretion of the district court to grant or deny leave to amend.” McCarthy, 482 F.3d at 200.

The District Court denied leave to amend because it found that amendment would have been futile. Pugh-Perry, No. 07-CV-4050, at *4. We agree. While Pugh-Perry’s appellate briefs contain no indication of the manner in which she might amend the complaint, to the extent, as the District Court suggests, Pugh-Perry, No. 07-CV-^4050, at *3, that Pugh-Perry seeks to amend the complaint to add additional allegations of “retaliatory harassment,” those allegations would not cure the defect in the original complaint— that is, that the complaint was time-barred. Because “[i]t is well-established that one good reason to deny leave to amend is ... when the additional information does not cure the complaint,” Mortimer OffShore Svs., Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 615 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks and alternations omitted), we cannot conclude that the decision to deny her leave to amend was outside the range of permissible decisions available to the District Court. See Porat v. Lincoln Towers Cmty. Ass’n, 464 F.3d 274, 276 (2d Cir.2006).

Pughr-Perry's Pendent State Laiv Claims

On appeal, Pugh-Perry also claims that the District Court erred in dismissing with prejudice her pendent claim under the New York City administrative code. However, neither the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) nor the District Court’s order adopting the R & R in its entirety addressed any aspect of Pugh-Perry’s complaint other than the timeliness of her Title VII claim and her argument regarding equitable tolling as discussed above. Accordingly, because it is well settled that “[njeedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law,” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), Pugh-Perry’s putative claim under the New York City administrative code— which would be governed by a different statute of limitation — should have been dismissed without prejudice on the ground that the District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it. We therefore direct that, to the extent Pugh-Perry asserted a claim under the New York City administrative code — a question on which we intimate no view — the judgment should be modified to clarify that the dismissal of any such asserted claim is based on a lack of jurisdiction. Such a dismissal does not foreclose Pugh-Perry’s pursuit of such a claim in the appropriate forum.

CONCLUSION

We have considered each of Pugh-Perry’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we MODIFY the judgment of the District Court, and as modified the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.  