
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Pablo Edwin Rafael CEPEDA-VALDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 02-4629.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted March 21, 2003.
    Decided March 31, 2003.
    
      Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jeanette Doran Brooks, Research and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne Margaret Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Pablo Edwin Rafael Cepeda-Valdez appeals the district court’s order sentencing him to sixty-three months imprisonment following his guilty pleas to aggravated assault on a United States law enforcement officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2000), and illegal reentry into the United States after having been convicted of an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (2000). In his appeal, filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), counsel for Cepeda-Valdez claims that 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is facially unconstitutional because it subjects defendants to statutory sentencing enhancements in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This claim was not preserved in the district court. Accordingly, it is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1785, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002); United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1355 (4th Cir.1996).

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), the Supreme Court held that § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and, therefore, a sentence under that section could be enhanced based on a prior conviction even if the fact of the earlier conviction was not charged in the indictment. Cepeda-Valdez contends that Almendarez-Torres may no longer be valid after Apprendi. We disagree. The Supreme Court declined to revisit Almendarez-Torres in Apprendi, so Almendarez-Torres remains in force. See United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1202, 121 S.Ct. 1214, 149 L.Ed.2d 126 (2001); United States v. Gatewood, 230 F.3d 186, 190 n. 1 (6th Cir.2000); see also Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir.1998) (lower courts should not presume that the Supreme Court has overruled one of its cases by implication; courts must follow case that directly controls unless clearly overruled by subsequent Supreme Court decision). Accordingly, this claim lacks merit.

We have reviewed the record in accordance with Anders and find no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Although Cepeda-Valdez was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, he has not done so.
     