
    Hamed FATHI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-56251
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 14, 2016 
    
    Filed December 22, 2016
    Hamed Fathi, Pro Se
    Aileen Marie Hunter, Esquire, Attorney, Bryan Cave LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Appellee
    Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Hamed Fathi appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his diversity action alleging state law claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Fathi’s claims against defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) because Fathi failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Chase was not a proper party to initiate foreclosure proceedings, and Fathi lacked standing to bring a preemptive suit to challenge Chase’s authority to foreclose. See Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 245 Cal.App.4th 808, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 790, 795 (2016) (California courts do not allow preemptive suits challenging the foreclosing party’s authority to foreclose because such suits “would result in the impermissible interjection of the courts into a nonjudicial scheme enacted by the California Legislature.” (citation omitted)); Gomes v. Countryimde Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 819, 824 (2011) (California law does not “provide for a judicial action to determine whether the person initiating the foreclosure process is indeed authorized” absent “a specific factual basis for alleging that the foreclosure was not initiated by the correct party”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in an opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     