
    Beverly K. Weicker, Appellant, v. Lowell P. Weicker et al., Respondent.
    Argued February 14, 1968;
    decided April 18, 1968.
    
      
      Max Freund, Arnold I. Both and Joseph Zuckerman for appellant.
    I. The second cause of action states a good cause of action. There is a cause of action in tort for mental suffering inflicted by intentional, wrongful acts. (Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N Y 2d 16; Battala v. State of New York, 10 N Y 2d 237; Williams v. State of New York, 308 N. Y. 548; Pickle v. Page, 252 N. Y. 474; Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, 262 N. Y. 320; Boyce v. Greeley Sq. Hotel Co,, 228 N. Y. 106; Garrison v. Sun Print. & Pub. Assn., 207 N. Y. 1; Talcott v. National Exhibition Co., 144 App. Div. 337; Preiser v. Wielandt, 48 App. Div. 569; Brown v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, 16 Misc 2d 692; Halio v. Lurie, 15 A D 2d 62; Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc 2d 106; Scheman v. Schlein, 35 Misc 2d 581; Ruis v. Bertolotti, 37 Misc 2d 1067.) II. Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleged a cause of action in tort for mental suffering inflicted by intentional, wrongful acts. (Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N Y 2d 528; Kalina v. General Hosp. of City of Syracuse, 31 Misc 2d 18, 18 A D 2d 757, 13 N Y 2d 1023; Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382; Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107; Lee v. Lee, 184 Misc. 686; Beck v. Beck, 21 Misc 2d 225; Becker v. Becker, 207 Misc. 17; Leventhal v. Liberman, 262 N. Y. 209; Abrahams v. Abrahams, 246 N. Y. 611; Bonilla v. Reeves, 49 Misc 2d 273.) III. The second cause of action properly seeks punitive damages. (I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Central Park South Corp., 12 N Y 2d 329; Soucy v. Greyhound Corp., 27 A D 2d 112; Scheman v. Schlein, 35 Misc 2d 581; Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 19 AD 2d 464,14 N Y 2d 899, 380 U. S. 916.) IV. The request for injunctive relief should not have been dismissed.
    
      Robert M. Bozeman for Lowell P. Weicker, respondent.
    I. The allegations of the purported second cause of action fail to state a valid claim for damages. (Burtis v. Burtis, 1 Hopk. Ch. 557; Erkanbrach v. Erkanbrach, 96 N. Y. 456; Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N. Y. 72; Johnson v. Johnson, 206 N. Y. 561; Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268; Weintraub v. Weintraub, 302 N. Y. 104; Langerman v. Langerman, 303 N. Y. 465; Ravaud v. Ravaud, 273 App. Div. 507; Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U. S. 714; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. O’Connor, 8 A D 2d 530, 8 N Y 2d 359; Walsh v. Walsh, 276 App. Div. 753.) II. Section 3-313 (subd. 2) of the General Obligations Law neither creates nor authorizes such a claim for damages as plaintiff’s purported second cause of action. (Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641; Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571; Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366; Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644; Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445; Essenfeld Bros. v. Hostetter, 14 N Y 2d 47; Matter of New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 2 N Y 2d 677; Saint Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 302 N. Y. 1; Jacobs v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 2 Misc 2d 428; People v. Bell, 306 N. Y. 110; Ampco Print-Advertisers’ Offset Corp. v. City of New York, 14 N Y 2d 11; Tuck v. Tuck, 14 N Y 2d 341; Lee v. Lee, 184 Misc. 686.) III. Apart from the bar of the statutes, the purported second cause of action is without basis in law. (Kalina v. General Hosp. of City of Syracuse, 13 N Y 2d 1023; Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382; Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N. Y. 371; Garvin v. Garvin, 306 N. Y. 118; Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N Y 2d 528; James v. Powell, 19 N Y 2d 249; Wolf v. Wolf, 26 A D 2d 529; Decker v. Kedley, 148 F. 681.) IV. Such part of the alleged first cause of action as seeks injunctive relief was properly dismissed. (Lowe v. Lowe, 265 N. Y. 197; Somberg v. Somberg, 263 N. Y. 1; Shenker v. Shenker, 18 Misc 2d 606.) V. Extrinsic evidence was properly submitted and properly considered in support of the motion to dismiss. (Epps v. Yonkers Raceway, 21 A D 2d 798; Harges v. Harges, 46 Misc 2d 994.)
    
      Arthur M. Beyer for Antoinette F. Littell, respondent.
    I. The alleged second cause of action of plaintiff’s second amended complaint does not state a cause of action against defendant Littell. (Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N Y 2d 16; Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N Y 2d 237; Halio v. Lurie, 15 A D 2d 62; Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc 2d 106; Beck v. Libraro, 220 App. Div. 547; Didier v. Macfadden Pubs., 299 N. Y. 49; Jennings v. 
      Burlington Ind., 19 A D 2d 877; Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saum Mfg. & Eng. Corp., 2 A D 2d 27.) II. No basis for punitive damages appears in the alleged second cause of action. (James v. Powell, 19 N Y 2d 249; Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N Y 2d 401; Wolf v. Wolf, 26 A D 2d 529.) III. The claim for damages alleged in the second cause of action is barred by the Civil Rights Law. (Tuck v. Tuck, 14 N Y 2d 341.) IV. Plaintiff’s claim for an injunction was properly severed and dismissed. (Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382; Lowe v. Lowe, 265 N. Y. 197; Garvin v. Garvin, 306 N. Y. 118; Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N. Y. 371.) V. Extrinsic evidence was properly submitted in support of the motion under CPLR 3211 (subd. [c]).
   Per Curiam.

In this action, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Appellate Division dismissing so much of her second amended complaint as seeks: (1) compensatory and punitive damages for the intentional or reckless infliction of mental suffering and (2) injunctive relief restraining the defendants from holding themselves out as husband and wife and defendant Littell from assuming or using defendant husband’s name. Assuming that New York law now permits “ recovery for the intentional infliction of mental distress without proof of the breach of any duty other than the duty to refrain from inflicting it ’ ’ (Halio v. Lurie, 15 A D 2d 62, 66; see, also, Battalla v. State of New York, 10 NY 2d 237; Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N Y 2d 16, 21), strong policy considerations militate against judicially applying these recent developments in this area of the law to the factual context of a dispute arising out of matrimonial differences. To sustain the claim for damages would result in a revival of evils not unlike those which prompted the Legislature in 1935 to outlaw actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation (L. 1935, ch. 263; Civil Rights Law, § 80-a, formerly Civ. Prac. Act, § 61-b).

The same policy reasons, which would deny an action for damages for the conduct complained of by plaintiff, should also operate to bar the request for injunctive relief. Additionally, “ [i]t is not the province of courts of equity to administer paternal relief in domestic affairs. As a matter of practical fact, such decrees cannot be enforced ” (Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 389).

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

Chief Judge Ftjld and Judges Burke, Scileppi, Bergan, Keating, Breitel and Jasen concur.

Order affirmed.  