
    (65 South. 109)
    No. 20,117.
    GOMEZ v. WILDE. In re RIDDELL.
    (Nov. 17, 1913.
    On Rehearing, May 11, 1914.)
    
      (Syllabus by the Court.)
    
    1. Taxation (§ 734*) — Assessment — Certainty.
    A tax assessment and sale of lot No. 14 in a certain square are void for uncertainty, where no such numbered lot appears on any map or plan of the square, or can be located thereon by reference to title deeds or other competent evidence.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1408, 1470-1473; Dec. Dig. § 734.*]
    
      On Rehearing.
    
      (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
    
    2. Taxation (§ 814*) — Annulment oe Tax Sale — Condition Precedent — Payment.
    A judgment annulling a tax sale is ineffective until the price and all taxes and costs paid, with 10 per cent, interest, has been paid to the purchaser, as required by Const, art. 233, though such payment has not been prayed for by defendant; this constitutional provision being imperative.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1612, 1613; Dec. Dig. § 814.*]
    Action by William Gomez against R.' D. Wilde. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and P. G. Riddell, owner of the rights of defendant, applies for certiorari or writ of review to the Court of Appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Dinkelspiel, Hart & Davey, of New Orleans, for relator. Emile Pomes, of New Orleans, for respondent.
   LAND, J.

The case is thus stated by the Court of Appeal:

“The plaintiff acquired certain lots of ground in this city by purchase from the Succession of St.' Romes at a judicial sale in January, 1900, and has been in physical possession of the property continuously since. From that time to the present the property has been assessed in his name, and he has paid all the taxes due thereon.”
“The purpose of this suit is to cancel as null and void tax sales made by the tax collector to Englebach and Panghaff, on the grounds that the assessments were erroneous, and that the description of the property in the assessment and tax sale does not identify it with plaintiff’s property.”
“According to the act of sale by the Succession of St. Romes to the plaintiff and a plan of Pilie in the record, the plaintiff’s property consists of lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 in square No. 629, bounded by Laharpe, Villere, Columbus, and Robertson streets, measuring in the aggregate about 141 feet front on Laharpe street.”
“The description in the tax deeds were under assessments in 1896 and 1899, and are ‘a certain lot of ground in the third district of the city of New Orleans designated as lot No. 14 in square No. 626 bounded by Laharpe, Columbus, Villere, and Robertson streets, and measuring 96 feet front on Laharpe street by 66 feet in depth.’
“The property conveyed by the tax deed is not the one in suit, and the discrepancy in the two descriptions is so great as to exclude the theory of any possible connection between the two.”
“It is not merely an insufficient and incorrect description, but one absolutely unidentifying and uneffective to oust plaintiff from the property claimed by him.”
“A plea of estoppel has been filed to the effect that the plaintiff, having paid taxes under the description in the tax deed, cannot now claim that it was insufficient to identify the property.”
“No copies of the assessment rolls were offered to prove this, and the tax bills paid show the correct measurements according to plaintiff’s deeds.”
“But, going a step further, we do not find that the defendants were induced to act to their detriment by plaintiff’s conduct, and this is necessary to afford a basis for estoppel. We are not prepared to say that a payment of a tax made in 1900 or 1901 can cure an invalidity in 1896 and 1899, before the taxpayer acquired it; had the payment preceded the tax sale, the results might have been different.”

There is no map or plan in the record calling for lot 14 in the square bounded by Laharpe, Columbus, Villere, and Robertson streets. The plat in the record made by Pilie shows only lots 1, 2, 3, and 4. It follows that the descriptions in the tax deeds in question do not identify any particular portion of said square.

After the purchase of the four lots by the plaintiff, the assessors did not assess them, but continued to assess lot 14, so called. In the first assessment no area is given, and in others the area varies. There is no evidence that plaintiff, is responsible for these misdescriptions.

It is therefore ordered that the judgment of the Court of Appeal be affirmed, with costs.

On Rehearing.

PROVOSTY, J.

The Constitution, art. 233, provides as follows:

“No judgment annulling a tax sale shall have effect until the price and all taxes and costs paid, with ten per cent, per annum interest on the amount of the price and taxes paid from date of respective payments, be previously paid to the purchaser.”

In the several judgments heretofore rendered in this case by the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and this court, this provision of the Constitution was not taken into account. It appears to us to be imperative.' Unless its requirement is complied with, any judgment that may be rendered annulling a tax sale is stricken with ineffectiveness, or, in other words, is practically no judgment at all.

Plaintiff says that this relief was not prayed for by defendant, and therefore cannot be granted. But, unless this relief is granted, the judgment which plaintiff has sued for and obtained will be ineffective, and that is a condition of things not desired by even plaintiff himself.

Plaintiff’s learned counsel argues that, inasmuch as the assessment does not identify his property, nothing shows that the tax sale had reference to his property, and not to some other property, and that he should not be made to pay taxes which, for all that is known, may be due *by some other property than his own.

That is a singular contention for plaintiff to make, since, if successful, it would have the effect of putting him out of court.' A person has no standing in court to maintain a suit to annul the tax sale of the property of some other person. Hence, if the property affected by said tax sale were not known to be plaintiff’s, this suit would simply have to be dismissed, at plaintiff’s cost.

Our former judgment is reinstated, except that it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the plaintiff, William Gomez, pay to the defendant, R. D. Wilde, $12.05, with 10 per cent, per annum interest thereon from July 21, 1897, and the further sum of $17.50, with 10 per cent, per annum interest from August 2, 1900, and that the plaintiff pay the costs of the Court of Appeal and of this court, and the defendant pay all other costs of the suit.

O’NIELL, J., takes no part.  