
    Brown v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation et al.
    
    
      (Nashville,
    
    December Term, 1943.)
    Opinion filed June 10, 1944.
    
      Solon Fitzpatrick, of Carthage, for petitioner-plaintiff in error.
    Poore, Kramer & Overton and Erima G. Greenwood, all of Knoxville, for respondent-defendant in error.
   Mr. Justice Prewitt

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a workman’s compensation suit and the only question presented is one of venue. The accident took place in Anderson County and the suit was brought by petitioner Brown in Smith County.

Under proper pleas the judge held that the criminal court of Smith County had no jurisdiction, that the cause of action was local, and that the suit should have beeii brought in Anderson County where the accident took place.

The petition set out that the defendant, Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, is a foreign .corporation and qualified to do business in Tennessee, and tbat it bad designated tbe Honorable Mitcbell Long in Knox County as its agent upon whom process could be served; tbat tbe petitioner and defendant were operating under tbe Workmen’s Compensation Law of Tennessee; tbat on June 30; 1943, petitioner sustained an injury to bis eye in tbe course of bis employment by tbe defendant, tbis injury causing bis eye to go out; tbat tbe injury occurred on tbe job near Clinton; tbat tbe petitioner bad requested hospitalization to be provided by tbe defendant wbicb bad not been done; and tbe petition further set out tbe defendant, Royal Indemnity Company, was a foreign-corporation and bad become tbe surety of Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation pursuant to tbe Workmen’s Compensation Law, and tbat it bad designated tbe Commissioner of Insurance of Tennessee in 1917 as its agent upon whom process could be served and said appointment bad not been revoked:

Tbe defendant filed a plea in abatement to tbe petition setting out tbat tbe accident took place in Anderson County and tbat tbe jurisdiction of the cause would be in Anderson County as provided by section 6685 of the Code. In other words, it is the contention of tbe petitioner tbat tbe jurisdiction is in .the county in wbicb be resides and tbat tbe cause of action is transitory; while tbe defendant insists that under tbe peculiar wording of our statute the jurisdiction must of necessity be local and in tbe county in which tbe accident occurred.

Section 6885 of tbe Code covers tbe procedure to be followed in tbe event tbe employer and employee are not able to agree as to compensation. In tbe first paragraph of tbis section it is provided tliat “either party may submit tbe entire matter for determination to tbe judge- or chairman of the county court in "which the accident occurred. ’ ’

In the second paragraph of the section it is provided: “Either party dissatisfied with the judgment of the judge or chairman may appeal as in other civil cases to the next term of the circuit court of the county where the cause will be heard by the circuit judge de novo.”

And further on in the second paragraph it is provided: ‘4 The party filing the petition may, at his option, instead of filing the same before the county judge or chairman, file the same as an original petition in either the circuit, criminal, or chancery court of the county in which petitioner resides or in which the alleged accident happens, ? ?

This Court has held that an action based on the Workmen’s Compensation Act is transitory. Harr v. Booher, 146 Tenn., 694, 244 S. W., 493 ; Chambers v. Sanford & Treadway, 154 Tenn., 134, 289 S. W., 533; Redman v. DuPont Rayon Co., 165 Tenn., 585, 56 S. W. (2d), 737.

In the last-cited case the Court held that the venue against corporations, except such suits as may be instituted by original attachment, is limited to counties where the corporation has an office, agency or resident director, and that venue of suits against corporations under the Compensation Act is limited to counties where the corporation has an office, agency, or resident director, the provisions of the Compensation Act respecting venue not being excluded. In that case there was a suit to recover workmen’s compensation brought by a resident of De-Kalb County in the circuit court of that county against a foreign corporation licensed to do business in Tennessee, which corporation had no office, agency, or resident director in DeKalb County, but maintained its office or agency in Davidson County. In tlie opinion the Court said at page 590 of 165 Tenn., at page 739 of 56 S. W. (2d):

“The whole matter comes down to this: With certain exceptions, a transitory action can he brought in any jurisdiction in which the defendant is found. Code, sec. 8640. Such an action, however, cannot be brought, in personam, in a jurisdiction in which the defendant is not to be found. A corporation, an artificial person, is not to be found in any jurisdiction or county unless the corporation maintains an office, agency, or resident director in that county. ’ ’

The Court then held that although the petitioner was a resident of DeKalb County, he could not maintain a suit there under the Compensation Law. The effect of the holding in that case was that venue is not governed exclusively by section 6885 of the Code.

In Borden Mills, Inc., v. Manis, 173 Tenn., 440, 121 S. W. (2d), 523, 524, the Court held that the statute authorizing either the employer or employee to submit a dispute about compensation “to the judge or chairman of the county court in which the accident occurred” manifests an intent to fix the local jurisdiction in the county in which the accident occurred, notwithstanding the venue statute providing that in all transitory actions the cause of action follows the person of the defendant “unless otherwise expressly provided, ’ ’ since such proceeding is within the quoted exception. Code 1932, secs. 6885, 8640.

It is true that this Court has held that service of process upon the Insurance Commissioner, as agent by appointment of a foreign insurance company, is agent for the whole State, on whom process is a valid service and may run from any county of the State without regard to the location of the company’s principal office or place of business or of the place where the cause of action arose. Cartmell v. MechanicsIns. Co., 167 Tenn., 498, 71 S. W. (2d), 688.

The service of process upon the designated agent for the State appointed for that purpose is cumulative of other provisions for service of process upon the corporation. McClearen v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 108 Tenn., 268, 77 S. W. (2d), 451.

’ It is insisted that in the instant case service of process having been adjudged on the designated agent of the employer and the designated agent of the Insurance Company, the Insurance Commissioner, that therefore this suit could be maintained in Smith County.

We think the suit was improperly brought in Smith County and should have been brought in Anderson County where the accident occurred. See McClearen v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., supra. Here the defendant corporation had designated a resident agent in Knox County on whom process could be served. It had no office or agency in Smith County. We do not think it was the intention of section 6885 taken ag a whole to give the construction as contended by the petitioner under the facts of this case.

It results that we find no error in the judgment' of the court below and it is affirmed.  