
    MULLIN v. LONG ISLAND R. CO.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
    March 4, 1910.)
    1. Carriers (§ 248)—Tickets—Regulations.
    A rule of a carrier, requiring an uncanceled ticket as evidence of purchased transportation, is reasonable.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. § 994; Dec. Dig. § 248.]
    2. Carriers (§ 856*)—Ejection—Canceled Tickets.
    A passenger cannot recover for an ejection when, holding a round-trip excursion ticket, and knowing that the conductor of the outgoing train had canceled the return coupon, he presents such coupon for a return passage, and the conductor, in obedience to the rule of the company, ejects him on his refusal to pay fare.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. § 1423; Dec. Dig. § 356.]
    Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Queens, First District.
    Action by Susan Mullin against the Long Island Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
    Reversed, and new trial ordered.
    Argued before HIRSCHBERG, P. J., and WOODWARD, THOMAS, RICH, and CARR, JJ.
    Dominic B. Griffin, for appellant.
    Gordon Ireland, for respondent.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
    
    
      
      For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
    
   THOMAS, J.

The plaintiff had purchased for herself and her sister two excursion tickets. The outgoing conductor by mistake punched, and thereby apparently canceled, the return tickets. The holders thereof attempted their return on a train in charge of another conductor, and, upon tendering only the canceled tickets as evidence of the right to ride, were told that in default of paying the fare they must leave the train, which they did at an intermediate station, where they were detained for a short time, and resumed their journey on another train. .

The rule requiring an uncanceled ticket as evidence of purchased transportation is reasonable. It was the duty of the conductor to enforce this rule. The plaintiff knew that the wrong tickets had been canceled. The wrong done to her was by the conductor of the first train. He, acting for the company, had so mutilated as to destroy evidence of her right to return in a later train. Yet she presents and demands recognition of the ticket, knowing that the conductor had no power to accept her statement, and, by condoning what another erroneously had done, rehabilitate her ticket. One citation is sufficient. Monnier v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 175 N. Y. 281, 67 N. E. 569, 62 L. R. A. 357, 96 Am. St. Rep. 619; but also may be considered Wiggins v. King, 91 Hun, 340, 36 N. Y. Supp. 768, and Townsend v. N. Y. Cen. & H. River R. R. Co., 56 N. Y. 395, 15 Am. Rep. 419.

The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered; costs to abide the event. All concur.  