
    Finney vs. Ackerman and another.
    Tax Deeds, issued by municipal officers. — Ch. 528, Lams of 1865, not retrospective.
    
    1. Statutes are not to be construed as having a retrospective effect, unless that intention is clearly expressed in them; and mere general language capable of such construction is not sufficient.
    
      2. Ch. 523, Laws of 1865, extending the remedy provided by ch. 22, Laws of 1859, to persons claiming lands under tax deeds executed by the treasurer of any city or incorporated village, does not apply to the case of a deed executed before said ch. 523 took effect.
    APPEAL irom tbe Circuit Court for Fond du Lac County.
    Action, by tbe bolder of tax deeds of lots in tbe city of Osh-kosb, to establish bis title. The second and third causes of action alleged, were based upon tax deeds executed by tbe treasurer of said city in April, 1863. A demurrer to these counts as not stating a cause of action, was overruled; and tbe defendants appealed.
    
      J. Ware, for appellants,
    to tbe point that statutes are not construed as having a retrospective effect unless they so expressly provide, cited 7 Johns., 499; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 325; Johnson v. Burrell, 2 id., 238; Berley v. Bampacher, 5 Du-er, 183 ; State v. Atwood, 11 Wis., 422. This is true of amend-atory acts. Fly v. Holton, 15 N. Y., 595; People v. Carnal, 2 Seld., 463 ; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns., 477 ; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 333-4.
    
      Hooper & Bailey, for respondent,
    argued that tbe few eases in which city charters provided for tbe sale of lands by cities, for city taxes, were within tbe reasons of tbe law and tbe intention of tbe legislature, though overlooked in tbe passage of tbe law of 1859 ; but that this defect was designed to be remedied by sec. 2, ch. 138, Laws of 1861, as amended bycb. 277, Laws of 1861. 2. Sec. 2, ch. 163, Laws of 1860, provides that all general laws of tbe state relative to tbe assessment and collection of taxes shall be in force in tbe city of Oshkosh. Laws providing for the foreclosure of tax deeds come under this description, in the view of tbe legislature. See title to ch. 15, E. S., 1849, and ch. 18, E. S. 1858. 3. Tbe plaintiff relies also upon ch. 523, Laws of 1865.
   Cole, J.

In Grimmer v. Sumner, [ante, p. 179], it was held that the special remedy given by chap. 22, Laws of 1859, even as amended by chaps. 138 and 277, Laws of 1861, to bar the interest of the original owner in lands sold for taxes, did not apply to a tax deed made and executed by the officers of a municipal corporation. The ruling in that case is decisive of the questions presented on the demurrer here.

Both the deeds mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of the complaint were executed by the treasurer of the city of Oshkosh in April, 1863. This action, however, was not commenced until July, 1865, after chapter 523, Laws of 1865, took effect; and the question is, Can this law properly be construed as giving the remedy of the law of 1859 to tax deeds executed by the officers of municipal corporations previous to its going into operation ? In other words, is the law of 1865 retrospective in its character, or does it only give the special remedy upon such tax deeds as may be executed by the treasurer of an incorporated city or village after its passage ? There is language used in the law of 1865, which, in its broad general sense, might perhaps be held to apply to tax deeds of municipal corporations previously executed. It declares that the “ grantee named in any deed” made by “ the treasurer of any incorporated city or village on the sale of lands for the nonpayment of taxes,” may, at any. time within three years after the date of such conveyance, commence an action,” &c. This language must; however, be construed as applying to deeds executed after the passage of the law. For the rule is well settled, that statutes are not to be construed as having a retrospective effect unless the intention of the legislature is clearly expressed that they shall so operate. Seamans v. Carter, 15 Wis., 548. “That intention is not to be assumed from the mere fact that general language is used which might include past transactions as well as future. Statutes are frequently drawn in such a manner. Yet such general language is held to have been used in view of the established rule that statutes, are construed as relating, to future transactions, and not to past.” This is the language of Mr. Justice Paine in the above case; and there can be no doubt that it is fully in harmony with the authorities upon this subject.

We think the law of 1865 must be construed as having only a prospective operation.

It follows from these views, that the order of the circuit court overruling the demurrer to the second and third causes, of action stated in the complaint, must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

By the Court. — Ordered accordingly.  