
    Caroline BIRK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROYAL CROWN BANCORP, INC.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-16737
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted September 26, 2017 
    
    FILED OCTOBER 3, 2017
    Caroline Birk, Mt. Shasta, CA, pro se.
    Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Caroline Birk appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims relating to her loan and a subsequent foreclosure. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C.,§ 1915(e)(2)(R)(ii). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Birk’s action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Birk’s claims arose from the same transactional nucleus of facts and could have been raised in her prior action, which resulted in a final judgment. See Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth elements for res judicata and ■requirements for identity of claims and final judgment on the merits).

Birk’s challenge to the district court’s denial of her motion for a temporary restraining order is moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of preliminary injunctive relief would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     