
    Elizabeth Saenz JARA, aka Elizabeth Cristina Saenz Jara, aka Elizabeth Saenz, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-2145.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 26, 2016.
    
      Robert C. Ross, West Haven, CT, for Petitioner,
    Joyce R. Branda, Assistant Attorney General; .Francis W, Fraser, Senior Litigation Counsel; W. Daniel Shieh, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, PETER W. HALL, and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Elizabeth Saenz Jara, a native and citizen of Peru, seeks review of a May 20, 2014 decision of the BIA affirming the January 19, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Elizabeth Saenz Jara, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May. 20, 2014), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 19, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the decisions of the IJ and the BIA “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009),

Absent past persecution, to establish an independent fear' of persecution, an applicant must show that it is more likely than not that his or her “life or freedom would be threatened in [that] country because of .[his or her] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1); Ramsameachire v. Ash croft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004). An applicant is “ ‘not require[d] ... to provide evidence that he or she would be singled out individually for such persecution’ ” provided the applicant proves the existence of “ ‘a pattern or practice of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,’ ” and the applicant establishes her “‘inclusion in and identification with such group.’” Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 565 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2)).

The agency did not err in finding that Jara failed to meet her burden to show that she would more likely than not be persecuted in Peru on account of being homosexual. The 2010 U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Peru (“Human Rights Report”) stated that homosexuals were “sometimes harassed and abused” by government authorities, including police, and were subject to discrimination. However, the report also described various efforts being made to alleviate the problem. The agency did not err in giving more weight to the Human Rights Report&emdash;which did not show widespread mistreatment&emdash;than various articles that gave inconsistent accounts of the level of discrimination and incidents involving homosexuals in Peru. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341-42 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that a country report from the U.S. Department of State is “usually the best available source of information on country conditions” and that the weight of evidence “lies largely” within the agency’s discretion (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007) (“[W]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous”),

While the agency did not make an explicit credibility determination, we may deem this requirement satisfied if a credibility finding can be gleaned from the record. Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008) (concluding that “the IJ’s analysis in the present case was sufficient to qualify as an ‘explicit credibility finding’ ” even without a clear adverse credibility finding). Because there was no indication that Jara’s testimony had been called into question, and the agency considered her testimony about the treatment of homosexuals in Peru, we find the agency’s analysis sufficient to qualify as a finding that Jara was credible. See id. There is no indication here that the agency failed to consider Jara’s testimony or her documentary evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 337 n. 17 (presuming that the agency “has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”).

Accordingly, because Jara failed to establish her eligibility for withholding of removal, she necessarily could not show, to qualify for CAT relief, that she would more likely than not be tortured, as that claim was based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED. 
      
      . Jara has not challenged the agency’s denial of her asylum claim on timeliness and discretionary grounds.
     