
    Green P. Johnson vs. The State.
    1. CniMiNAi. Law. Gaming. Oock-fighting. Act of 1799, eh. 8, $ 2. To bet or hazard money or other thing of value upon the result of a cock-fight is gaming; and all who aid, encourage, or promote a cockfight upon the result of which money or other thing of value is bet and hazarded are indictable as principals.
    2. Same. Same. Same. Case in judgment. Where the proprietors of a certain cockpit, where cock-fighting was carried on and money bet and wagered by them upon the result thereof, advertised that spectators would be admitted to witness the sport upon the payment of a certain fee, it is held that all persons who entered under said conditions as mere spectators of the sport so carried on are indictable for gaming.
    3. Cases cited. Walker vs. The State, 2 Swan, 290.
    EROM' WILLIAMSON.
    At the July Term, 1857, of the Circuit Court of Williamson county, tbe grand jury returned into Court the following presentment against the plaintiff in error:
    
      “State op TenNessee: Williamson County.
    Circuit Court: July Term, A. D. 1857.
    “Tbe grand jurors of tbe State of Tennessee, duly elected, empanelled, sworn, and charged to inquire for tbe body of tbe county of Williamson aforesaid, upon tbeir oatb aforesaid present, that heretofore, to wit, on tbe 10th day of June, eighteen hundred and fifty-seven, certain evil - disposed persons, to tbe jurors here unknown, did then and there make a match and game at cock-fighting, and announce the same to the public by issuing handbills advertising the time and place, and did thereby cause divers citizens of this and other States of the Union to be present, and did then and there produce and cause to be produced certain cocks, which the said evil - disposed persons did then and there cause to fight with each other publicly in a pit prepared for that purpose at Smith’s Spring in the county of Williamson, and did then and there play, bet, gamble, and wager at said match and game at cock-fighting — the same being then and there a game of hazard and address for money, to wit, fifty silver dollars of good and lawful money, and current bank notes of the value of five hundred dollars, and other valuable things did then and there bet, hazard, gamble, and play, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided; and for the lucre and gain of said evil - disposed persons, and to injure and corrupt the morals of the community, and to procure the aid, countenance, and encouragement of said community to said illegal practice, did then and there invite the public to become spectators and witnesses of said cock-fighting, upon the payment of a certain consideration, to wit, the sum of one dollar, as an entrance fee. And the jurors aforesaid upon their oath aforesaid present, that Green P. Johnson, late of said county yeoman, on the day and year aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, did then and there pay said entrance fee aforesaid, to wit, one dollar, and did enter said cockpit or premises when and where said cocks were fought as aforesaid, for the purpose and with the intent of witnessing said cock - fighting, and was then and there present at the said cock - fighting, and then and there remained and witnessed the same; and by his said paying said entrance fee of one dollar, his entrance into said premises, and presence at -and witnessing said cock - fighting and other illegal practices, did then and there aid, encourage, countenance, and promote said match and game at cock-fighting, the same being then and there a game of hazard and address, to the great corruption of the public morals and to the evil example of all other persons; and by his said acts the said Green P. Johnson did then and there play, bet, wager, and gamble at said game or match at cock-fighting, the same being then and there a game of hazard and address for money, to wit, fifty silver dollars, good and lawful money, and current bank notes of the value of five hundred dollars, and other valuable things, did bet, gamble, hazard, and play, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State.”
    The defendant demurred to the presentment, which was disallowed by Judge BAXTER, who thereupon rendered final judgment against the defendant. He appealed in error to this Court.
    MARSHALL and Ewing, for the plaintiff in error.
    
      Attorney - General Bate and J. Litton Bostick, for the State.
    This is an indictment for gaming. The facts fully appear in the indictment, and the only question is, do they constitute the offence of gaming under the statutes?
    The act of 1799, ch. 8, § 2, declares that “if any person or persons shall encourage or promote any match or matches, or shall play at cards, dice, billiards, or any other game of hazard or address for money or other valuable thing, every such person so offending shall, upon conviction thereof before any justice of the peace of the county •wherein such offence shall have been committed, forfeit and pay the sum of five dollars for every such offence.”
    The act of 1803, ch. 12, § 2, makes all such persons further liable to be indicted or presented by the grand jury of the county where such offences may have been committed.
    The act of 1824, ch. 5, § 5, declares that “in every case which may arise under any of the laws of this State made for the prevention, discouraging, and suppressing of gaming, the Court shall interpret said laws as remedial and not as penal statutes,” etc.
    Under these statutes, actual betting is not necessary to constitute the offence of gaming, but every .person who aids_, assists, and encourages any game of hazard or address, or who does any acts by which such game for money or other valuable thing is directly promoted and encouraged, is guilty of gaming as a principal, and as such is indictable. Upon this point see McQ-owan vs. The State, 9 Yerg., 184; State vs. Smith Lane, 2 Yerg., 272; 
      Howlett vs. The State, 5 Yerg., 144; Walker vs. The State, 2 Swan, 28T.
    In the cases above cited, there are several examples of acts merely promoting and encouraging games of hazard for money, which' are declared to be gaming under the statutes, and this where there was no pretence that the defendants bet or had the slightest intention of betting. The statutes were made to suppress gaming, and were wisely directed, not only against the principal offenders, but against all who promote and encourage gaming, in order thus to eradicate the evil in all its connections and ramifications.
    What facts could make a stronger case under the statutes and these adjudications than those put forth in this indictment ? A game or games of hazard and address, to wit, cock-fighting, for a large sum of money, is duly advertised and the public invited to attend; a cockpit is built for the battle-ground, and accommodations prepared for all who may choose to participate: these are the paraphernalia or adjuncts of the game, and are necessary for its success and proper regulation. The principal sources whence the funds necessary to the support and maintenance of the game are expected to be derived, are the contribution and entrance fees paid by persons who attend. It is impossible to separate these several parts which constitute one transaction. Without the attendance of spectators and the payment of entrance fees, the game itself could not be supported and would not go on. The purpose and object of the affair are duly advertised, and the spectators are well aware that it was gotten up for the express and only purpose of gaming.
    It has been held that “persons who go to a prize-fight
    
      to see the combatants strike each other, and who are present when they do so, are, in point of law, gnilty of an assault.” See Russell on Crimes, yol. i. p. 639, and cases there cited. On same page a case is referred to in which Littledale, J., used this language: “I am of opinion that persons who are at a fight, in consequence of which death ensues, are all guilty of manslaughter if they encouraged it by their presence: I mean, if they remain present during the fight. I say, if they were not casually passing by, but stayed at the place, they encouraged it by their presence, although they did not say or do any thing.” Here mere presence at a prize-fight constitutes the party guilty of an assault as a participator in the illegal act. How much stronger the case here presented in the indictment! The defendant was not only present, lending countenance to the game, but had actually contributed money to its support.
    The statute of 1799 does not only include persons who shall encourage or promote betting, but, in express terms, applies to the encouraging or promoting the game or match itself on which the bets are made. Again, by the common law, to promote and encourage a misdemeanor constitutes an accessory, and accessories in misdemeanors are treated as principals, upon the maxim, “ de minimis non curat.” But our statute of 1799, above cited, declares that promoting and encouraging a game of hazard for money is gaming; and hence a defendant who is guilty of thus promoting and encouraging such games is a principal absolutely by statute, and not by virtue of the maxim that accessories in misdemeanors are principals. To apply this to the present case: The builders and owners of a cockpit erected expressly for a game of hazard for money, and in which said game is actually carried on by their procurement and consent, are certainly aiders and promoters of the game, and as such liable to indictment as principals. Then all persons who aid and assist and encourage such owners and builders of a cockpit by contributions for its support, knowing the purpose of the same, and by their presence at the games themselves, are certainly guilty as accessories at least, and indictable for gaming.
   CáRUTHERS, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a charge for gaming of rather a singular character : though very plain in its principle, it is novel in its facts. The charge is that in June, 1857, at Smith’s Spring, in the county of Williamson, certain 'evil-disposed unknown persons made a bet of fifty dollars on a cockfight, and issued handbills giving the public notice of the same, and that a large crowd did attend, and among others the defendant, who paid the fixed price of one dollar for the privilege of entering the pit and witnessing the sport, and thereby encouraged and promoted the said gaming and match of hazard and address. The indictment is in due form, and in substance charges that the defendant is guilty of the offence of gaming, because by entering the pit, and by his presence and the payment of the fee of one dollar, he did “encourage and promote” gaming, although he may not have actually made or been concerned in any bet, or otherwise participated in the unlawful match of hazard.

The indictment was met * by a demurrer, which was overruled by the Court, and the defendant fined for his offence.

Was the defendant guilty of an indictable offence? is the question. Is the act of cock-fighting for money, or other valuable thing, gaming? There can he no doubt of this. The definition in the act of 1799, ch. 8, § 2, clearly embraces it. By that act, “any game or match of hazard or address for money or other valuable thing” is gaming. Walker vs. The State, 2 Swan, 290. By the same act, all who “encourage or promote” any game, etc., are involved in the same guilt with the actors or betters. Such would be the effect of the common law principle, that all who advise, encourage, or promote the commission of a misdemeanor are guilty as principals, independent of the statute.

How could any one more effectually promote and encourage a game or match of this kind than by not only giving it countenance by his presence, but actually paying his money to support and sustain it? The preparations are made by the principal offenders; notice is given of the time and place; the public are called upon to attend and pay money for the privilege of participating in the enjoyment of the sport; and the defendant accepts the invitation, and contributes his money to the extent of the fee demanded. Is he not actively and efficiently aiding, abetting, and encouraging the unlawful thing?

All men should keep at a distance from such degrading practices. Gambling is punished by law more on the ground of public policy, on account of its effects upon the actors and society, than the intrinsic wickedness of the thing itself. It is prohibited by law and visited with penalties because of its destructive effects upon the moral character and social habits of individuals. It leads to idleness, dissipation, bankruptcy, and wretchedness. Its victims are almost invariably converted into cold, selfish, reckless harpies.

If one species of this vice could be more low, grovelling, and despicable than another, it would seem to be that under consideration. It adds barbarity and cruelty to the other attributes of ordinary gaming. The age has passed when it could be tolerated as a sport, much less as a mode of gambling. Gaming is a seductive vice, and well calculated to entrap the young and inexperienced, and lead them to ruin and disgrace. It holds out the prospect of making money otherwise than by the “sweat of the brow,” (some honest calling,) and of getting something for nothing. Like intemperance, it grows upon those who engage in it; and the advance from the point of respectability, if there be any such point, where gentlemen play for amusement, or only bet a little to keep the game and make it interesting, to the point of infamy and degradation where the cognomen of “blackleg” is given, is gradual and almost imperceptible.

The policy of the State is to save her citizens from this depth of infamy, and society from contamination, by arresting the evil in its incipient stages, and rebuking all who encourage it.

In some parts of the community it has been found that these professional gamblers have commanded strength enough to obtain office and reach places of trust and confidence. This consequence could only result from the countenance and support extended to them by men of character and influence. They should have no encouragement or support, and for that reason the law punishes all who sustain, promote, and aid the practice. This is the predicament of the defendant,- and in that consists his guilt. He did not do tbe unlawful thing himself, but countenanced, aided, and encouraged those who did by his presence and the contribution of his money.

We therefore affirm the judgment.  