
    Jeremiah Warder, Jeremiah Parker and Richard Parker against William Bell, Christian Febiger, James Read and Robert M’Clay, executors of Joseph Carson.
    S. C. 2 Dall. 223.
    Whether reasonable notice of a bill’s being dishonoured, has been given by an indorsee to an indorser, has been usually left to the jury, and the strictness of notice in England has not been adopted.
    A RUDE had been granted to shew cause why a new trial should not be granted in this suit.
    The action was tried in bank at the last September term, before Shippen and Smith Justices, and a verdict passed for the plaintiff. It was brought against the defendants on an indorsement of a foreign bill of exchange by their testator.
    
      The bill was dated ioth September 1788, and drawn by Hugh Moore on John Balfour in Londonderry, for 120I. sterling, payable to the order of Joseph Carson in London, in sixty days after sight, and by him indorsed to the plaintiffs. The bill was accepted on the 32d November 1788, and protested for non-payment on the 24th January 1789. The only proof on the trial, of notice of the protest to Carson, was the deposition of Daniel Williams junior, which was agreed to be read in evidence. He swore that he lived with the plaintiffs in 1789, and the two succeeding years, and went frequently to Carson’s for money due on this protested bill, and about the same time he delivered a note to Hugh Moore, but he could not fix on any particular period.
    The argument on the rule to shew cause, took place at the last term.
    * Mr. Ingersoll for the defendants,
    urged, that before [-*530 an indorsee could recover on a protested bill of ex- ■- change against an indorser, he must give early notice to him of the bill being dishonored. If there is any unreasonable delay, the indorser is discharged. There is no reason why the same scrupulous exactness should not be kept up here, as in England, where the parties live in the same city. In that kingdom, to preserve certainty and an uniformity of decision, notice is matter of law. To say there is no fixed rule amongst us in such cases, is putting mercantile concerns to the greatest amount, in a most perilous situation. But though the precise time in which notice to an indorser must be given, is not ascertained here, yet it has been clearly settled that early and convenient notice is indispensibly necessary; and so is the case of Steinmetz v. Currie. Dali. 234, 270. In the present instance, the evidence of notice is altogether defective.
    Mr. Rawle e contra for the plaintiffs.
    The court in their charge left the point open to the jury, to determine whether there had been reasonable notice; and at the same time, told them it was necessary that the notice should be early and convenient. It would be highly improper to adopt the strict rules in England, as to notice; our trade differs every day, as much as our climate. But should it be deemed eligible to fix a new rule of decision as to what shall be deemed early and convenient notice, of a protest, it is submitted that the plaintiffs should not be made the sacrifice to this doctrine. As to them, it would be an ex post facto law. The court instructed the jury expressly, that notice of the protest should not be presumed. Here there was direct proof of notice, though not of the time of giving it.
   The chief justice now delivered the opinion of the court. The ground on which a new trial is moved for, is, that notice was not proved to Carson the indorser in due time, of the bill being dishonoured; and that therefore he, and his executors after his death, are discharged from all responsibility on account of non-payment. The rule certainly is, that reasonable notice must be given in convenient time and at an early day. What is reasonable notice, has been lately settled in England to be a question of law, when the facts are established, and the time of giving notice extremely narrowed, (i Term Rep. 168, 169, 170.) Our trade and usages are not so well fixed as to admit these strict rules, and for the reasons given in Robertson et al. v. Vogle, (Dali. 255, 256.) such strictness would in its consequences be dangerous and inconvenient. No de-*,--0-1 cisión that we know of amongst *us, has fixed any 0 J general rule; and the question respecting the reasonableness of notice has usually been left to the jury as a matter of fact, with this provision, that they should, be satisfied in their consciences, that t-here was convenient notice. Indeed in suits brought by the banks against indorsers of promissory notes, we have gone so far as to say, that as they themselves have adopted the practice of giving notice to indorsers within six or seven days at furthest, where the parties live in the city, this usage shall be obligatory on them, and that a further delay will discharge the indorser. But we have gone no further. The court in their charge in this case, have conformed themselves to the usual practice, and informed the jury they should not presume a notice. The point was wholly submitted to their decision, and they had a right to infer from the known habits and regularity of the plaintiffs in the transaction of their business, that the notice which Williams gave by their order was made in due time, though he does not now recollect it. We cannot therefore now interfere in a matter which was left open to the jury for their decision, and consequently the rule to shew cause must be discharged.

Cited and approved in 7 S. & R., 326, the court saying “the language of McKean, C. J., who delivered the opinion of the court, is worthy of great consideration.

Judgment, pro quer.

[Vid. 4 Term Rep. 468. Where a verdict had been found for the plaintiff, on a presumption contrary to evidence, court refused a new trial, the plaintiff being entitled to recover in conscience and equity.]  