
    COURTS — CRIMINAL LAW — JURY—TRIAL.
    [Franklin (2nd) Circuit Court,
    October 8, 1906.]
    Dustin, Wilson and Sullivan, JJ.
    Clara Fendrick v. State of Ohio.
    1. Jury Districts and Trial Districts Coextensive.
    Tbe jury district and trial district under act 97 O. L. 7 .(Lan. 3202; B. 1536-795a), extending tbe jurisdiction of police courts to offenses committed witbin four miles of tbe municipal limits, should be coextensive. Hence, a trial of one for an offense, committed without tbe limits of tbe municipality but witbin tbe jurisdiction of such court, by a jury selected wholly from witbin tbe municipal limits, pursuant to an ordinance so-requiring, is illegal.
    [For other cases in point, see 2 Cyc. Dig., “Constitutional Law,” §§ 743-758. — Ed.]
    2. Aeeidavits in Minor Criminal Prosecutions need not Conclude with Formal Statements Required in Indictments.
    Affidavits on which prosecutions for misdemeanors and minor offenses are based need not conclude with tbe words “contrary to tbe form of tbe statute in such case made and provided and against tbe peace and dignity of tbe state of Ohio.” If the affidavit describes tbe crime, tbe court will take judicial knowledge that it is contrary to the statutes, and against tbe peace and dignity of tbe state.
    [For other cases in point, see 1 Cyc. Dig., “Affidavits,” §§ 90-131; 5 Cyc. Dig., “Indictments and Informations,” § 59. — Ed.]
    [Syllabus approved by tbe court.]
    Error to Franklin common pleas court.
    C. D. Saviers, for plaintiff in error:
    An affidavit for prosecution of misdemeanor is not required to conclude with “contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio.” Laning, Crim. Law & Prae. 540; Olendorf v. State, 64 Ohio St. 118 [59 N. E. Rep. 892],
    An impartial jury of the district in which an offense is committed is necessary to conviction in the police court where its jurisdiction extends, beyond corporate limits. Section IQ of the bill' of rights of 1851 Anonymous, 86 Bull. 301; State v. Voris, 10 Dee. 451 (8 N. P. 16) ; Lloyd-v. Dollisin, 13-23 O. C. C. 571; Cooley, Const. Lim. Sec. 320; Cooper v.. State, 16 Ohio St. 328; State v. Peters, 67 Ohio St. 494 [66 N. E. Rep.. 521] ; Hanaghan v. State, 51 Ohio St. 24 [36 N. E. Rep. 1072]; Carper v.. State, 27 Ohio St. 572; Davis v. State, 19 Ohio St. 270; Hogue v. State,. 13-23 O. C. C. 567; Smith v. State, 4 Circ. Dec. 35 (12 R. 458); Geiger v.. State, 3 Circ. Dec. 141 (5 R. 283) ; Pope v. Cincinnati, 2 Circ. Dec. 285-(3 R. 497); Frank v. Cincinnati, 7 Dec. 544 (7 N. P. 146) ; Ladd v. Stater 3 Circ. Dee. 137 (5 R. 276) ; Hartnett v. State, 42 Ohio St. 568; Palmer v. State, 42 Ohio St. 596; Reed v. State, 15 Ohio 217.
    J. M. Butler, G. S. Marshall, C. E. Carter and J. G. Westwater, for defendant in error.
   DUSTIN, J.

Plaintiff in error was prosecuted in the police court of the city of Columbus for ‘‘keeping a house of ill fame,” it appearing from the affidavit that the house was located some two hundred feet outside the corporate limits pi the city.

The claim of jurisdiction was based upon 97 O. L. 7, giving said court jurisdiction in minor offenses over the city, and the adjoining territory within four miles of the corporation line.

Upon trial a jury was summoned from the city, pursuant to ordinance No. 14,401 which provides for the selection of jurymen from the city only.

Plaintiff in error demurred to the affidavit because it did not close with the words “contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio.” The demurrer was overruled. She also challenged the jury because selected from the city, and not from the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. 1 of the constitution. The challenge was not sustained.

Exception was also taken to the admission of evidence as to the reputation of the place, and of the women who were found there. There was a verdict of guilty and sentence.

On error to the common pleas court, the proceedings were affirmed; and error is now prosecuted to this court to reverse the judgments of the courts below for the reasons above stated, and because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

We are of the opinion that there was no error in overruling the demurrer to the affidavit. Section 20, Art. 4 of the constitution provides that all indictments shall conclude with the words “against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio.” There is no such requirement as to affidavits upon which prosecutions for minor offenses are founded. Nor is it necessary. If the affidavit describes the crime, the court will take judicial notice that it is contrary to the statutes and if contrary to the criminal statutes, it is against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio.

The next question is more serious. It would be easy of solution but for the provision of the ordinance with reference to the drawing of the jury. The mere fact that all the members of the jury happened to be citizens of Columbus, was a matter of no consequence. If their names were drawn from a box containing names of citizens of the outside townships, the'rights of the accused would have been fully preserved. But, the ordinance referred to required that the jury 'be selected from citizens of Columbus. Residents of other parts of the county were excluded. As Judge Earnhart aptly remarks in State v. Voris, 10 Dec. 451 (8 N. P. 16), tfye citizens of the outside territory 4‘could appear only as culprits.” They had no part in the administration of the law; even with reference to offenses committed within their own bailiwick. Although living in a district defined in the statute, and much larger in area than the city of Columbus, they are subject to be dragged to the smaller district, and tried before what is to them an alien court, although in their residence district there is an organized judicial system. We think that is not within the letter or the spirit of the constitution.

The question has not been passed upon in Ohio, except by Judge Earnhart, in State v. Voris, supra, and by Judge Slough, of Fairfield county common pleas court in Friend v. Holliday, 48 Bull. 107. In the report of Friend v. Holliday, no authorities are cited. But Judge Earnhart’s opinion is supported by pertinent citations.

In Olive v. State, 11 Neb. 1, it is held in a very full opinion, that,

“While the legislature doubtless may, in their discretion, by general law, create trial districts larger than a single county, yet, to be effective, such law must be accompanied by one under which jurors can be called from the whole, and not from merely a portion of such district. In other words, the trial district and the jury district must be the same.”

To the same effect is Armstrong v. State, 41 Tenn. (1 Coldw.) 338.

As holding to the contrary, two citations are noted: State v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587 [50 Am. Rep. 388], and State v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 447, and upon these the decision of the court below was founded. Both of these cases were with reference to proceedings under a statute giving a county court jurisdiction over crimes committed within the territorial limits of the county “and one hundred rods beyond the boundary line.” In the first case the accused was charged with obtaining property under false pretenses, and it appeared that the alleged false pretenses were made in one county and the property (a horse) obtained in another. The accused was arraigned in the county where the false pretenses were made, and the point was suggested that the crime was not complete without obtaining the property, and that the law giving the court jurisdiction beyond the county was unconstitutional for the reasons urged in this case.

The court held the law constitutional, but its opinion was founded upon cases holding that where a crime was committed partly in one county and partly in another, the accused was triable in either. The , nourt, however, went further and held that the law was constitutional as applied to any crime; but expressly refused to decide “whether a juryman residing outside of the county, but within one hundred rods of the county line, and hence within the district, would for that reason be .incompetent, or a subject of peremptory challenge,” such a question not being before the court.

In State v. Robinson, supra, the court was inclined to sustain a law of long standing, which served a useful purpose in avoiding embarrassing questions and technical difficulties in prosecutions for crimes committed near county lines.; and also because there was “an entire absence of adverse authority.”

With due respect to the high character of these authorities, we think the holding in the Nebraska and Tennessee cases above cited, and by Judge Earnhart is more logical and consistent. In all criminal ■cases, we think the jury district should be coextensive with the trial district, in order to meet the requirements of the constitution.

We find no other error in the proceedings.

The judgments of the common pleas and policé courts will be reversed, and remanded to the police court for a new trial before a. competent jury.

Wilson and Sullivan, JJ., concur.  