
    Roy Den HOLLANDER, Sean Moffett, Bruce Cardozo, and David Brannon, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Director of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Director of the Department of Homeland Security, and Director of the Executive Office for Immigration, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 08-6183-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 3, 2009.
    Roy Den Hollander, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Natasha Oeltjen, Assistant United States Attorney (for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York), New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.
    
      Present: AMALYA L. KEARSE, ROBERT A. KATZMANN and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs Roy Den Hollander, Sean Mof-fett, Bruce Cardozo, and David Brannon appeal from the decision of the district court dismissing their suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of Article III standing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case.

Plaintiffs argue that they have standing to bring suit because the Violence Against Women Act, by allowing aliens who have been battered or subject to extreme cruelty by their spouses to self-petition for legal permanent resident status, created incentives for their alien wives and ex-wives to file false police complaints and false applications for temporary restraining orders against them. This argument lacks merit because plaintiffs’ injury is not fairly traceable to defendants, but to the independent actions of their wives or ex-wives who are not before this Court. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-43, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). The links in the chain of causation here, which depend upon the independent actions of (1) plaintiffs’ wives or ex-wives, (2) state courts and state officials, and in some cases (3) private employers are too attenuated and too numerous to satisfy the standing requirement. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (“the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court”) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Moreover, similar “incentive” arguments have been rejected as a basis for establishing causation. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973) (concluding that the incentive created by the prospect of jail time was not sufficient to support finding that requested prosecution would result in the payment of child support).

Plaintiffs further argue that the government or third parties have or will disseminate information about them that was gathered during the self-petitioning process, harming their reputation and privacy. Plaintiffs fail to state an injury-in-fact, however, because this injury is purely speculative — plaintiffs have failed to allege that any information concerning them has or will likely be disseminated. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (an injury must be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the Violence Against Women Act does permit limited disclosure of information to certain third parties such as agencies that provide public benefits, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1367(a), (b), there is no reason to believe that such information would include any information about plaintiffs themselves. Moreover, those parties to whom dissemination is permitted are bound by the statute’s nondisclosure provisions. See id. § 1367(c). Similarly, plaintiffs’ argument that they are injured because they are constrained in their marital affairs is purely speculative. Nowhere in plaintiffs’ complaint do they allege that they did not divorce because of the contested provisions or would marry an alien in the future but for the contested provisions. Finally, plaintiffs are not injured by being “shut out” of the self-petitioning process because they cannot show that they have been injured as a result of the self-petitioning process.

We have considered the remainder of plaintiffs’ arguments and conclude that they lack merit.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  