
    HANCOX ET AL.’S CASE. Clement D. Hancox et al. v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      The claimant, on the trial, offers evidence to shoio that by the usage of the JExeoutive Departments his receipt in full is to be regarded as a receipt for the amount paid, and does not conclude him from maintaining his action for the balance. -It, however, appears that the claim was disputed, and contained elements of doubt and uncertainty which, would malee it fairly disputable within the usual rule.
    
    Where a claim, disputed and compromised by the officers of the Government, contains elements of doubt and uncertainty which would make it fairly disputable under the usual rule, evidence to show that a receipt in full is by usage of the Executive Departments to be regarded as a receipt only \ for the amount paid, is immaterial.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The'court found the following facts:
    I. On the 4th of August, 1SG3, the claimants and the defendants entered into the agreement or charter-party for the steamer Edwin Lewis.
    II. On the 31st of December, 1863, while tlie steamer was still in the service of the Quartermaster Department, lying in Folly Creek, South Carolina, the quartermaster under whose control she was sent a Government pilot aboard, with orders to take her through the creek. The master of the Aressel objected, upon the ground that Folly Greek is a small inlet, full of narrow, short curves, while the vessel was long, and that it would be difficult and dangerous to run her through the creek in the night-time. Nevertheless the pilot, under his instructions, endeavored to take the vessel through the creek, and while so doing she was run aground, sunk, and greatly injured, and was abandoned by her owners. The reason of the quartermaster for sending her in the night-time was to avoid a rebel battery at Secessionville, which would fire upon her if she passed by daylight, and strict orders had previously been issued to the vessel not to go through the creek in the day-time. After the casualty the Government employed wreckers to raise the vessel, and repaired and restored her to her owners, and she then continued in the Government service under her charter-party aforesaid.
    III. The time occupied in making the repairs and restoring the vessel to her owners was one hundred and twenty-nine and one-fourth days, amounting in value at the charter rate of compensation to $19,387.51.
    IY. After the vessel had been returned to her owners it was a subject of dispute between the claimants and the officers of the Quartermaster Department whether the owners were liable for the salvage of the vessel, and also whether the defendants were liable for the charter rate of the vessel during the time she was undergoing repairs; and it was finally agreed between them that, in consideration of the defendants’' paying the sal-vors, and of their allowing and paying the running expenses of the vessel during the one hundred and twenty-nine and one-quarter days before mentioned at the rate of $40 per day, amounting in the aggregate to $5,170, the owners would relinquish the amount of the charter earnings of the vessel from the date of her being sunk to the date of her being ready for service. In pursuance of such agreement or compromise the defendants paid to the salvors the sum of $5,500, and paid to the owners the sum of $5,170 for their running expenses, and the owners at the same time gave to the defendants a written receipt in full for the money so received.
    
      Mr. Thomas J. Durant for the claimants.
    
      Mr. A lemnder Jolmston (with whom was the Assistant Attorney - General) for the defendants.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In this case evidence was offered by the claimants to show that by the usage of the Executive Departments receipts in full are to be regarded only as receipts for the amount of money actually paid, and that they do not conclude the party from maintaining his action for the balance of the debt which may be actually due. The purpose of the evidence was to take the case out of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Clyde, (7 O. Cls. B., p. 262.)

In Comstoelc’s Case, (ante, p. 141,) we endeavored to classify the decisions of the Supreme Court upon the subject of compromises with the Government, and from those decisions drew the following deductions:

“ What does seem to have been decided may be reduced to three heads, and nothing more: First, where the Government is contractor, a refusal to carry out an express contract by the head of an Executive Department, or a dispute on the part of the'officers authorized to adjust such accounts, will render the case not merely disputed, but ‘ disputable,’ within the intent of the ordinary rule of law, so as to make it the subject of compromise, without the compromise being necessarily supported by a new consideration. Second, where payment of an express contract is disputed by the head of an Executive Department, and a means of compromise is proffered beyond the ordinary accounting officers of the Treasury or the officers authorized by law to adjust such accounts, such as a quasi arbitrament in the form of a commission, then, if the party, voluntarily or involuntarily, avail himself of the proffered means, and accept the amount which is allowed, without affirmatively informing the Government that it will not be taken in discharge of the debt, it will constitute a final and conclusive compromise. Third, where an express contract is, for any reason or without a reason, disputed by the officers authorized to adjust such accounts, acceptance of the portion allowed, accompanied by the giving of a receipt in full, will attach to the receipt all the consequences of a. release under seal, and be deemed conclusive evidence of a legal agreement to accept a portion in satisfaction of the whole.”

But, irrespective of the decisions of the Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that in this case there were those elements of doubt and uncertainty about the demand which would make it fairly disputable within the decisions of the English courts and of this court in numerous cases. (Sweeney’s Case, 5 C. Cls. R., p. 285; Comstock’s Case, ante, p. —.) As such it was properly the subject of compromise; and we think that it actually was compromised within the intent of both parties, irrespective of the terms of the receipt.

The judgment of the court is that the petition be dismissed.  