
    Milton WIGGINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUSTICES OF the SUPREME COURT OF the State of NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants-Appellees.
    
    No. 10-3362-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 20, 2011.
    
      Milton Wiggins, pro se, Stormville, NY.
    No appearance., for Appellees.
    Present: PIERRE N. LEVAL, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Milton Wiggins, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and because the court found the claim to be frivolous. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case.

On appeal, Wiggins argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint as frivolous without setting forth the factual or legal basis to support its conclusion, and in concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction. We affirm on the basis that Wiggins lacks Article III standing, with the consequence that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his claims.

In reviewing a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, accepting all material facts alleged in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2008), aff'd,-U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010). Dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is proper “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). Here, the district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Wiggins’s case.

“Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution restricts federal courts to deciding ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ and thus imposes what the Supreme Court has described as the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,’ — injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.” Jenkins v. United States, 386 F.3d 415, 417 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 631-32 (2d Cir.2003)). Therefore, to meet the requirements of Article III standing, “[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). The injury alleged must be “concrete in nature and particularized to [the plaintiff].” In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1023-24 (2d Cir.1989). In determining standing, the Court’s focus is on “the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, rather than the justiciability of the issue at stake in the litigation.” Fulani v. Bent-

sen, 35 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir.1994). “[A]n asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.” Id. (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 754, 104 S.Ct. 3315); see also Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439, 127 S.Ct. 1194, 167 L.Ed.2d 29 (2007) (per curiam) (“[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government — claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large — does not state an Article III case or controversy.” (internal quotation mark omitted)).

Wiggins’s complaint contains no suggestion that he has suffered or is likely to suffer any concrete or particularized harm stemming from the Second Department’s alleged practice of denying defendants in criminal cases a full and fair review on appeal. To the extent that Wiggins attempts to rely on the assertion of harm arising from his desire as a citizen that the government act in accordance with the Constitution, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that such assertions of generalized injury are insufficient to establish standing. See, e.g., Lance, 549 U.S. at 439, 127 S.Ct. 1194. Moreover, while Wiggins’s complaint indicates that he is in the process of investigating his criminal conviction for statutory or constitutional grounds on which it could be overturned, and that he is therefore likely to “confront” the Second Department’s allegedly unconstitutional practice, “[a] future injury or threat of injury does not confer standing if it is ‘conjectural or hypothetical’ and not ‘real and immediate.’ ” Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 134 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)). Wiggins’s asserted threat of future injury — that he might find a ground for overturning his criminal conviction, and that the Second Department then might deprive him of a full and fair review of his hypothetical claim — is attenuated and speculative, and is therefore insufficient to satisfy the standing requirements of Article III.

Because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and was therefore precluded from making a determination on the merits of the case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-85, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999), we need not address the district court’s finding that Wiggins’s claim was frivolous. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  