
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Rafael JIMENEZ, Defendant-Appellant, Alfredo Rivera, Defendant.
    
    No. 15-3303-cr
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    November 1, 2016
    FOR APPELLANT: Georgia J. Hinde, Law Offices of Georgia J. Hinde, New York, New York.
    FOR APPELLEE: Dina McLeod, Margaret Garnett, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, New York.
    PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, REENA RAGGI, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant Rafael Jimenez was convicted following a guilty plea of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, for which he received.a 127-month prison sentence. Jimenez now appeals the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We review the denial of such a motion for abuse of discretion, which we will identify only when a court’s decision rests on an error of law or clearly erroneous factual finding, or cannot “be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Borden, 564 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so doing, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

The district court presumed Jimenez’s eligibility for § 3582(c)(2) relief but concluded that a reduction was not warranted because Jimenez breached the public trust by using his position as a New York City auxiliary police officer to commit the crime of conviction, including recruiting a retired New York police officer to join the conspiracy. We identify no abuse .of discretion in that decision.

Jimenez argues that the district court’s decision effectively subjected him to an unexplained upward enhancement to his amended 120-month Guidelines range. The argument has no merit. A district court’s decision not to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) is entirely discretionary and does not constitute an upward departure or variance from the amended sentence. See United States v. Borden, 564 F.3d at 103-04 (observing that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), court may reduce sentence for eligible defendant, but decision to do so—or not to do so—is within court’s discretion). Moreover, the court’s explanation for its decision to retain Jimenez’s original sentence was sufficient both (a) to assure this court that it had considered both the relevant policy statements and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s sentencing factors, and (b) to provide meaningful appellate review. See United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that court must only provide “minimal statement of reasons” to explain § 3582(c)(2) ruling).

We have considered Jimenez’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 
      
      . Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jimenez’s motion and adhering to its original sentence, we need not consider here whether Amendment 782's effective adjustment of Jimenez’s Guidelines range from 120 to 135 months’ imprisonment to 120 months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum, constituted a "lowering” of his applicable Guidelines range, thereby making him eligible for a § 3582(c)(2) reduction. See United States v. Johnson, 732 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that "it is arguable that a range of exactly 120 months is lower than a range of 120 to 135 months”).
     