
    David Heffner vs. Thomas T. Lynch.
    Judgment by Default: Jurisdiction: The Act of 1794, cu. 46, providing a more convenient method of taking inquisitions, assumes and proceeds on the theory, that all interlocutory judgments, where inquisitions are required to give them effect, establish the plaintiff’s right to recover, without regard to the amount which the jury may subsequently ascertain to be due.
    
      The failure of tlio defendant to plead, is an admission of the jurisdictional facts stated in the declaration, as well as a concession of tho jurisdiction of tho Court to enter a final judgment for the amount ascertained to be due by the jury; and ho is not at liberty to draw the jurisdiction of the Court into question by any subsequent proceeding.
    Appeal from tlio Circuit Court for Washington County ;
    This was an action of ansumpsil brought by the appellant against tho appellee, on the 1.1th. of June 1860.
    The facts of the case &re sufficiently stated in the opinion of this Court.
    The cause was argued before Bowie, C. J., and Bartol, Goldsborough and Cochran, J.
    
      R. H. Alvey, for tho appellant:
    The judgment in this case was Iriíerlocútory in its character, and such “whereby the right of the plaintiff was established, but the damages sustained by him” could not be ascertained without the intervention of a jury. Act of 1794, ch. 46, sec. 2.
    By the failure to plead, and permitting the judgment to be entered by default, the defendant admitted tho jurisdiction of the Court, and the propriety of rendering the judgment against him; and having onco conceded the jurisdiction, submitted himself to it, and by his own conduct induced its exercise, he will not bo permitted to gainsay or deny it.
    By suffering the judgment to be entered, the defendant admitted all the facts stated in tho declaration; and if the declaration states a good case for the exercise of jurisdiction, tho defendant is precluded from questioning its existence and exercise in tho premises. IJvunl Prac., secs. 331, 338.
    “A judgment by default, if regularly entered,” (and there is no question as to the regularity of tho judgment entered in this case,) “is as binding as any other, as far as respects tlio power and jurisdiction of tho Court, in deolar • ing that the plaintiff is entitled to recover; though the amount of the recovery, in some cases, remains to be ascertained by a jury.” Green vs. Hamilton, 16 Md. Rep.} 317. Madhouse vs. Inloes, 18 Md. Rep., 328.
    Though the Court in entering the original judgment, determined and .declared that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in the action, yet, by entertaining and sustaining the motion that was made to non pros., it reversed and annulled its former adjudication in the premises; and in so doing the appellant contends it committed error. Smith vs. Kernochen, 7 Hoio., 198.
    
      A. K. Syester, for the appellee:
    The general principle is, “in cases of contract, the sum recovered, and not the matter put in demand, is made to decidethe question of jurisdiction.” O’ Riley vs. Murdock, 1 Gill, 33. Carter vs. Tuck, 3 Gill, 251. Ott vs. Dili, 7 Md. Rep., 251. Hence, although the nar. “put in demand” a sum within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, that will furnish no ground of jurisdiction for a final judgment; that question can only be tested by the sum recovered. Until the “sum recovered” was ascertained by the verdict of a jury, no question of jurisdiction could have been raised, even though the defendant had been in Court, because that could only have been brought to the notice of the Court by a demurrer, or plea to the jurisdiction. And on a demurrer the Court cannot go beyond the nar. to try the question. Tomilson vs. McKaig, 5 Gill, 257, 276.
    A plea to the jurisdiction must state in what, particular the jurisdiction fails, and assert the proper tribunal before which the jurisdiction exists. And in determining such a plea, the Court cannot try the quantum. Oultonvs. Perry, 3 Burrows, 1592. Chit. Plea., 84.
    The plaintiff is bound to know the general law of the land. He must know on what account he contracted, and how much is due him, and his attempt to invest the Circuit Court with jurisdiction, in a case where he is presumed to have known otherwise, ought to be discouraged.
    
      A plea to tbe jurisdiction in such a case as this is unnecessary; the defect can be raised at any time before final judgment, either before the jury on the general issue,- — ■ Parker vs. Hiding, 1 East., 353, Chit. PI., 381, — or on motion to nonpros., after verdict. 1 Md. Code, Art. 29, see. 44, and Art. 78, sec. 16, Act of 1852, cb. 239.
   Cochran, J.,

delivered the opinion of this Court:

In this case a judgment was entered against the appellee in default of a plea. At the next succeeding term an inquisition was had, and the amount of the appellant’s damages ascertained to be $33.32, upon which the appellee moved for a non pros., on the ground that the Court liad no jurisdiction to enter a final judgment for the amount-found to be due, which was granted. The case shown by the record therefore presents the single question, whether the judgment by default was so far final as to conclude’the appellee of the right to deny the jurisdiction of the Court, after the inquisition of the jury.

It was formerly held that a defendant in default was out of Court for all purposes, but that of entering the final judgment; and in a case where the question of jurisdiction was raised after an inquisition upon a default, precisely as it was raised here, it was held that the defendant could not even enter a suggestion on the roll from which the want of jurisdiction would appear. Brampton vs. Crabb, 1 Strange, 46. 2 Sellon’s Prac., 345. Nor could a judgment, objectionable on the ground of irregularity, be set aside “after the defendant had attended and cross-examined the witnesses on the execution of a writ of inquiry.” 1 Tidd, 614. 4 Taunt., 544. These rules may have been relaxed in some respects, but our Act of 1794, ch. 46, providing a more convenient method of taking inquisitions, assumes and proceeds on the theory, that all interlocutory judgments, where inquisitions are required to give them effect, establish the plaintiff’s right to recover, without regard to the amount which the jury may subsequently ascertain to be due. And in Green vs. Hamilton, 16 Md. Rep., 317, it was expressly decided, that “a judgment by default, if regularly entered, is as binding as any other, as far as respects the power and jurisdiction of the Court in declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.”

(Decided June 1st, 1864.)

Applying the principles recognized by these authorities to the present case, we are bound to hold that the failure of the appellee to plead, was an admission of the jurisdictional facts stated in the declaration, as well as a concession of the jurisdiction of the Court to enter a final judgment for the amount that was ascertained to be due by the inquisition; and that he was not at liberty to draw the jurisdiction of the Court into question by any subsequent proceeding. We shall therefore reverse the judgment of the Court upo'n the appellee’s motion, and direct a judgment to be entered for the appellant for the amount of his damages and costs, as ascertained hy the jury.

Judgment reversed.  