
    QWEST CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION, Defendant, Mike Gleason et al., Defendants-Appellees, Level 3 Communications, LLC, Defendant-Appellant, and Pac-West Telecomm, Inc., Defendant.
    No. 08-15887.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued Nov. 4, 2009.
    Resubmitted Feb. 19, 2010.
    Filed March 26, 2010.
    Thomas M. Dethlefs, Esquire, Attorney, U.S. West Inc. Law Department, Denver, CO; Norman G. Curtright, Qwest Corporation, Phoenix, AZ; John Michael Devaney, Esquire, and John Roche, Perkins Coie, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee.
    Joan S. Burke, Esquire, Law Office of Joan S. Burke, Phoenix, AZ; John Matthew Derstine, Esquire, Michael Patten, Esquire, Roshka Dewulf & Patten, PLC, Phoenix, AZ; Maureen A. Scott, Esquire, Senior Attorney, Janice Alward, Esquire, Chief Counsel, Arizona Corporation Commission, Phoenix, AZ; Christopher W. Savage, Esquire, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Washington, DC; Christopher J. Wright, Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
    
      Before: B. FLETCHER, CANBY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Level 8 Communications, LLC (“Level 3”), and Qwest Corporation (“Qwest”) entered into an Interconnection Agreement to provide for the exchange of Internet Service Provider (“ISP”)-bound traffic pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“the Act”). The parties agreed to exchange “ISP-bound traffic (as that term is used in the FCC [Federal Communications Commission] ISP [Remand] Order) at the FCC ordered rate, pursuant to the FCC ISP [Remand] Order.” Level 3 filed a complaint with the Arizona Corporation Commission (“Commission”), claiming that this provision required Qwest to pay inter-carrier compensation to Level 3 for virtual NXX calls (calls to a customer whose area code bears no relation to its physical location). The Commission ruled in favor of Level 3, and Qwest appealed to the district court. Level 3 now appeals an order from the district court that remanded the case to the Commission.

We dismiss the appeal as being from a non-final order. A remand order

is considered final where (1) the district court conclusively resolves a separable legal issue, (2) the remand order forces the agency to apply a potentially erroneous rule which may result in a wasted proceeding, and (3) review would, as a practical matter, be foreclosed if an immediate appeal were unavailable.

Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir.1990). Here, the remand order fails the third prong because denying an appeal now would not foreclose review in the future. The district court in this case did not resolve Qwest’s claims for relief, and it did not enter a final judgment. In fact, the district court did not enter judgment on any of the issues presented by Qwest.

Our precedent instructs that a remand order may be considered a final, appeal-able order only when “review would, as a practical matter, be foreclosed if an immediate appeal were unavailable.” Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dep’t of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither party is foreclosed from seeking appellate review, in the future, of any legal determination made in the district court’s final order. Because the remand order is not a final, appealable order, we must dismiss the appeal. See Williamson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 160 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that a remand order was not a final order); Alsea Valley Alliance, 358 F.3d at 1184 (same).

DISMISSED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     