
    DULUTH, SOUTH SHORE & ATLANTIC RAILROAD COMPANY v. CORPORATION & SECURITIES COMMISSION.
    1. Taxation — Determination of Privilege Tax — Corporate Books.
    Since the corporate books represent the action of the corporation in establishing values of its assets and are required by statute to be kept correctly and the State is neither required nor authorized to audit and appraise eaeh corporation each year, the State is generally justified in determining the corporation privilege tax from the corporate books (CLS 1956, §§ 450.82 [p], 450.305).
    2. Same — Construction of Statutes — States.
    The corporation privilege tax statute should be read and administered to secure to the State all sums justly due it, but no more (CLS 1952, §§ 450.304, 450.305b).
    3. Corporations — Privilege Pee — Definition of Surplus.
    Surplus, as that term is used in determining the privilege fee payable by a corporation for doing business in this State, is the difference between assets and liabilities plus paid-up capital (CLS 1952, § 450.304).
    4. Certiorari — Corporation Tax Appeal Board — Finding of Fact.
    On appeal in nature of certiorari from corporation tax appeal board, the Supreme Court does not disturb a finding of fact by the board that is supported by competent evidence.
    References for Points in Headnotes
    [1, 3, 5] 51 Am Jur, Taxation § 818.
    [2] 51 Am Jur, Taxation § 817.
    [4] 10 Am Jur, Certiorari § 19.
    [6, 7] 51 Am Jur, Taxation § 844.
    '[8-10] 51 Am Jur, Taxation §§ 871, 879, 880.
    [11] 51 Am Jur, Taxation § 2.
    [12,13,15] 51 Am Jur, Taxation § 808.
    [14] 51 Am Jur, Taxation § 287.
    [16] 14 Am Jur, Costs § 21.
    
      5. Taxation — Corporation Annual Privilege Pee — Paid-Up Capital — Evidence.
    Determination of corporation and securities commission as to paid-up capital and surplus of plaintiff railroad company held, supported by competent evidence in action to recover corporate annual privilege fee paid under protest (CLS 1952, § 450.304).
    6. Constitutional Law — Interstate Commerce — Prohibited State Taxation.
    The commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States does not specifically interdict State taxation of interstate commerce, but a State may not impose (1) a privilege tax as a simple condition precedent for carrying on exclusively interstate commerce, (2) a direct tax upon either interstate commerce or gross receipts from interstate sales without a reasonable apportionment thereof, (3) taxes, unreasonably burdensome upon interstate commerce or which are discriminatory in effeet as between interstate and intrastate commerce (US Const, art 1, § 8).
    7. Same — Interstate Commerce — Permitted State Taxation.
    The commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States permits the levying by a State of taxes (1) on property located within the State and used for interstate commerce, (2) upon net income of business engaged in interstate commerce where portion of net income taxed is reasonably apportioned as to the taxing State, (3) upon interstate commerce or gross receipts therefrom but reasonably related to occasioning interstate commerce to pay its own way in the taxing State, and (4) privilege or franchise taxes upon the right to do intrastate business, including where the business concern was engaged in both inter- and intrastate commerce, provided only that the tax or fee was reasonably related to the value of the intrastate business done by the taxpayer in the taxing State (US Const, art 1, § 8).
    8. Taxation — Railroads—Interstate Commerce — Privilege Tax.
    State annual franchise tax upon railroad company measured by portion of its paid-up capital and surplus determined by the average of 2 ratios of State to entire amount of net ton miles of freight handled and number of track miles operated was not in contravention of commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, so far as concerned railroad company most of whose trackage and other physical facilities were located in this State and year-round use was made thereof; its business was principally interstate although it had substantial intrastate business; the tax was a reasonable tax and non- -, ¡A"1 discriminatory asa.toosfíchutaxpayer.o&ndAwa's'''levied' -oh'"the privilege of doing business in this State arid ínbt'iúpori-'.its y<\ interstate'eomnieree'i(US-Constí¡airtoli §-.'8;»G]jS>®52;.§'450':.304, uv-á 46O;30§b)'.o-<,ni,i't ‘.¡¡¡.-'ih!'; to ¿ii!¡¡ni« ion; 1,;;i<j(.*■■ -.¡u ;»r.j
    iif ;c'{'ro,')7» — >¡ o-t ooii-).; ,r! •< ii’ un "<il i)'>‘i:><¡‘ír ¡ 9, BAI^ROA^S-^^IYfLIjGE, State annual franchise tai upon railroad company measured by ■ t.'ipóftiótííof' its'paí®JufG2apíféil:':dStermiriéd-,-by:'tK&;avefágS'í¿J: 2' ratios of State to entire amount of net ton miles' 'ó’fl'ffdi¿ht • >■ A'hknSl'ed afid number"'df'tfráfek1Mile's Op,éfate'd,'p'fé§ented‘'á! tax •'¡¡¡¡¿-¡'formúla with^'a-íputlgóse ó'f'^áSeérita'Üi'iri'¿''ia'xfáirr<jJio(i'ó'rtion of i. '-í-:thg,'taxpayéri^^aidVpf dá’^itall,íifiá,iB?Lr|)líis^all&'ííátBlé0,to this i' 3n; S.taté'for'pu>rpffáéi'bf‘ taxing -ftS-rightt t'óGédWybbri'-it's'intrastate iau. 'business'-and*was;not fforitrafy!ítoíHlíe-)eoffift'él,tíS'!¡élatisfeivof the •'íK>6onstitütion -’ofldiK'Qotrnitaal Stótfe's';'"''thér'e'Fbeilíg riovlShowing cií ¡.'Kinatle-¡that'-the tai le'Weü'>'ívas''riüfé'a¿óh'able oi-diScfiminatory (1,,;rk<L(-TJBt Const;»'art '1; -§s8¥»®S l:952;'-§§ 450l304f 4'50;305b<). ■ h.A.f;-'!iú t'*i /»>'>-;/¡'MÍ ¡»o ít/íío ‘-1 noj
    10. Same — Railroads—Corporation FRAN,pi^iSE.>-3lAX-tT-AD»:'S’^LOREM Property Tax. , . , The' annual corporation franchise lax,''measured “by- portion of its paid-up capital and surplus determined, by average of 2 '■* d :*»» ■Uio'íoiOcttóAíi -CLSi? to Xi Xüt'tjFi'i ''Ai-iiO'dV'i__ • ion rt iamV'sufeji3ei!,of ts^xa&on'as ’tie ad’ vaíofeiñ/tax upon '" {ÍiellvaÍuSr-óf fáiiróad’property'Vimreín'francliMes)s'were “not .- -o.,-, t^’b^'ctireeily assesseef^but !tb' bé't'aken'into"consideration in lei’.i de'tdifmMing íñe Valde^of *&fe,'o'Elíé.f property*’'(tó Í9'4Í3/*§ 207.5; ív,“ ^=ClJs' Í9S'2V§§'’4!50.3‘04/¿5d‘.vgtÍ5TD5- . 'y,í‘,ísmm‘’ ■.i.vtíor-iivi el ni-»» —r -ni, i ; ir. *>;¡ I r-'¿-- ij < F ;
    11;- SAME — SDBt'EOTS‘OF-''TAXÍ-TÍONní-PiaSÍXÍRY.;SBHÓ'0L'IÑ0!ERÉST'‘PPND. - •»< '■'Subjects bf'tkxation’iiag-that te’rrfí'.is used'ih ptóvíi'si'dh’of1 present ■»i.-:iCo'nsti:bution''íb0ntinmri'gl,'sbÚ¥geí,J3f ,1f&ifeñtíe'v’for': the primary ' "•'1s&fió61-'iiltéíe'Stúftíñd'<&beS n'O't'ffiéah tílte iJáxphyfer"'vVhb'is made the subject of the tax (Const 1908, art 10, §1)\,’1 !
    12. SAMÉ-^CÓRT'ÓilATitíNS^piAlictíisF'jrÉE — ÜoÍÍÍG 'EÍt}SÍÑESSÍ ' '<■' ^THe ■&tfftet'cb,ti3o'imtb’”frkfiehiá3í;feéí’M’''¿“tái1 inlpb^éd1 upbíi1 the -i.v. 1'privíHegS'’ '<yt d'ólri'g^busffiiess1 %Í,tliiAi,ith'í^‘lStátel<in,l’á' "'eórporate gápa'cify1ririd;!nót‘,aí’taxb5i' th'é':ass'dtS'Ib'f;prbp¿rty'■'óí, tile cor-f jWáfiánXtUlS'ítSSá, «SÓ.^, *IMÍ05)’:,,!'Íi,-:»' > - -,-: ;i, lo ■»: ’í- : r
    13;■ SjAM-E-i-6oRl?ORAá¡E''FRANeHisEí Tax-t-Adí-Yalóbeíi'Property Tax • ■^GENEÍÁL'FDÑD-^-BfeIM-AR‘StSOFHOOL'i[?SnÍEREST‘®DÑD. ni
    «,t; ;The,Statelamnufak eor,pórate- franchise tirad-ñpbhi tKeí¡privilege of s vio Adding fousiriesfewithin this'Státé aifd'produeing'írevenúeKfor the .“general1 furideds mot subject.itd t-héí provisions of .the -Coiistitu- . tipR.re.qniiiing.cp.n^ipyan^^ofis.ci'ui-cflof yev.pnpeyps.tfeespyiiñáí)' school interest fund, since such tax is not the saip^^jijp&c^pf taxation as the ad valorem tax on property imposed upon certain public utility companies (Const 1908, art 10, § 1; CL .v*¡!t!M8,v.§ 2On$'OBgil0éá, ^'§^0il34»^!3O5&)/Ki>l:AVjr<i^
    14; ,SAMÉ-^LórB’f.E!TAíXA‘!ri([)ír-i-í-:lJiriroSM#Y.';'1,4í?!líís t bit ‘•M/r.h ; i... ’Two" 4a^osl^o)3 uponv thpjsam’&BÜÍiieCtloíi'iíortthé ísáihe? gurp'dte'do - ,, „n.qt,eonstit,u^e dphb^q-t^xItffión^Q^vjplgte ¡l$e¿pp£fo£iRÍtyí clause ,r:ofí’-iiiiir'>-"5 i‘',q<j{r
    —Due'Process. ‘ 7 ' ‘, s '' . ‘ ‘, f process'- -,-- t^stitúfloni^si^ee»jtjfé ebrporatelAxpajief’siin'giibftoUdo íbiiMhbáá qwithin^th^^tit^ysí Jraye^onlycope$|th(e asaltó*. evfgy .-pthei
    M COstó — hbBLÍé ‘Que^tionAcorporate PRANCHÍbE Tax. t . No costs are allowed in railroad company's action ! to' "' recover ;.-1 .-annua-1 .kübphSate')'Ítetri7hite'/ilaxíspiai&1"*'{iiiíder,í’prb”íélt]' ípíhere / ’A-7publip)qp.9?tjtes.ay©..i¡4vpl,Yetl;:(CLS-3!95Í,S §•§‘450-304,;Í50:8(/á)‘:'
    DETEn,tE?g,.'p;vJ.;7anfl« Sarr ándtKELL^Áj), dá'ssentíhg! iíí ’¿áirt.' •
    Appeal from Corporation Tax Appeal Board
    Submitted January 14, 1958
    (Docket No. 45, Calendar No. 47,303.)
    Decided September 10, 1958.
    Rehearing denied October 13, 1958.
    Claim of appeal ’ filed in the Supreme Court of the United States February 20, 1959.
    Duluth, South Shore & Atlantic Eailroad'Compa.ny,: a-.Minuebota corjsbnafioií;<;e'onfSste'Glíth-e^def6rmipa.tion of.?itg..;corporation«íifirán'chiso feé'-'by ifhe Michigan Corpo;íation!!á;nd''iSecuritibsí>@orñiíiássiótí.! Determination upheld -by - Corporation' -Tas : Appeal Board-iyBlaintiiShaippeals;->
    AffirmMl
    
      iHbdmcm,' %p$gley, \&o^é^:!¿rmsíf^.^ (Hénry íl'Armstfong^Jr.,'and*TJidmas MV BeckTey^ of counsel),..for.plaintiff..._________ ______________. 7 ! '
    
      Paul Hi 1,zlÍdmf, 'Xftoraey'vb'éáér^,,J')§rówVétJ J. Torina, Solicitor General, T. Carl Holbrook and 
      William D. Dexter, Assistants Attorney General, for defendants.
   Edwards, J.

The Duluth, South Shore & Atlantic Railroad Company is a Minnesota corporation engaged primarily in hauling iron ore and freight to and from Minnesota and Wisconsin and Michigan’s upper peninsula. Five hundred and fifty-eight miles of its tracks, 81% of the total, are within the borders of Michigan. Of all net ton miles of revenue freight hauled in 1951, 532,709,000 miles, or 78%, were hauled in Michigan. Most of this freight moved between States with only 61,031,000 miles of it, or 9% of the total, representing freight miles between loading and unloading points located in Michigan.

In 1952 the Michigan legislature sought to include railroads under then-existing legislation (CL 1948, § 450.301 et seq. [Stat Ann § 21.201 et seqj]) requiring the payment of a franchise and privilege fee by each domestic and foreign corporation. These amendments which are applicable to railroad corporations were PA 1952, Nos 183 and 270 (CLS 1952, §§450.304, 450.305b, 450.82 [Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp §§ 21.205, 21.208(2) ]). These amendments were given immediate effect as of April 29 and J une 12j1952.

On August 28, 1952, appellant filed a report and paid under protest the sum of $5,908.45 which it claimed to be the amount due under PA 1952, No 183, if such was constitutional.

On April 13, 1953, the corporation and securities commission issued a determination rejecting the railroad’s computation and computing the tax as follows:

“April 13, 1953
“Duluth, South Shore & Atlantic Railroad Company 1824 First Natl. Soo Line Bldg.
Minneapolis 2, Minnesota “Gentlemen:
“On September 2 we received your 1952 Michigan annual report with $5,908.45
“The privilege fee is computed on the paid-in capital and surplus as shown by the books of a corporation as of close of its fiscal or calendar year next preceding the time for filing. TJ.S. Government securities and paid-in capital surplus are not allowable deductions from surplus in computing the fee.
“We find the average ratio to be .798943. Applying this to paid-in capital of $10,500,000 and surplus of $1,693,500 at rate of 4 mills on the dollar results in $38,969.64 including $2 filing fee. Kindly remit balance due of $33,061.19.
“Very truly yours,
/s/ Ann Sawasky, “Director, Annual Reports”

The railroad then appealed this determination to the Michigan corporation tax appeal board which, after hearing, approved the fee as computed by the commission; and from this decision the railroad brings this appeal to this Court.

Before we detail and deal with the issues presented on appeal, some additional facts must be stated:

The appellant railroad was incorporated under the laws of Minnesota on October 19, 1949, and on November 1, 1949, it acquired the assets of Duluth, South Shore & Atlantic Railway Company and of Mineral Range Railroad Company. This acquisition was pursuant to a reorganization of these 2 railroads under section 77 of the United States bankruptcy act, as amended, by virtue of which appellant purchased these assets. It paid for them by the issue o'f<'2fOy00.G' shares of stock of no par value hut with ;a-statedvalue of! $501 á share,i!áhdi$5,’000,OODxifr face value of 4 % bojúks? Hhasússuédoho ad'ditiónhl stock so that at the time df^filirígíifs 'EnUháhihp'dit for 1952, its ..outstanding .paid-in capital coh'sistbd 'o’! jiL'l'C íridi rí. rían íil-'iUU t>‘ Si a OtJ 14„C,k > these ,!21&;060 :sháír!éé. ^^^o^hí^ stptík'wás'iBspM to and is owned by. 1hetCaná?dÍ&n'^a¿mó/j^ ■ ní co avJn‘;í» mccw';! nomíímoo mí opT-ic'rtnm* hí nü'i • pany. , Nonecof .it has. ever been sold. This reoxgani■‘Av.yA , :>;*» o ¡i» ;us 1 vrj_¡: m»,i>, m:, -xij'nuw nsi Qf!,fhg.,.as|,pi'|s sp^jqqt,..^ the > jappp Qvalfj an^paythfiFfe^ipíl-l fláíAft > Q.ommeMce>íc:pniinissÍQ3í andffee idietriét«cbp¡iítepf -tfe. United, SiM§&*&>r>4lhe} district-.pfr-Minné’sót'ay fb.híth division? cm íí00,í)(/(;„(í• A "U> tetiquo üi-fx.cq oS' mv

r’éb’igafiízhtí'á pl'án facts • AN. l<- on!) oomPm:

“The debtor wrpdrate's lipes of railroad extending frdm:qSSultmSte? Marie; i'i Michigan, and from St. Ignaee,, Michigap, westward to Soo Jiinction, Mpchighi'' ^lidfyNhey'jolh’; dMhée'ytésíWard fhVoiglPMkrquett'é; -Mibliigaíi,! Oto " Nesto'fiá? »fMichigan;1 -- then'cb northward' *‘fardill1' Ne stdriW No'! Ho'ughton;t1 'Michigáify and westward fromNestbEia to: Marengo; iWiscdnsiny, thence westward through ••AhhlandjcíW^iscohsiny;. and Superior,) ‘Waseohsiny ft®■.PulpthyiMinpegotay pqaip.xisingj425í;milpsip£;maín,;line,¡fgh jmileai.pfJ.^)ra,p(;h,lin^, pud l-Q2,.piilp?-p,í,leased,- l'ipe, ^fotaLpf ra^prp^imatply of’ land aid'rights' |ari¡Lpuhteá(' tjd,^ih,717,941?;'ah1 b,f pW5é&beV:f^íT'944yt'áfe¿pf9ümfg 'f bs the'hupdrf df^the literst&td"’comméfóéi1 doiinliisidi'?'s¿ b'ür'éau df'whli^ ktionh!' f,[t coibií ’ííov'io >-i ts r.;i bcmichm c.v* mW

’ * :“The} fcbrtidh1 df* ft/e lineé > extending:. ‘from-.- Mam quettfe thrdttghoNebtoriajlo'' Houghton >waá -£oppajeply o^whed.and!operated by theyMarquetfepljpugiitop;.^ Ontonagon — Railroad Company, and is-known-as MH&O mortgage ;ñiétrfct:-c^heAf§íoiklin'íñg'''í)0'ftrbns of, the .debtor’s” railroad, extending • westward .from Nestoriá and eastward frorh■ Márqhette,, áre collecknown as the,DSS&A

connection'!rith'the abode pailrM’t^ Mineral .Range, 2b milés lóhg,-' exfendiiig froil ÉoughtóñlMichiganj through ’Háñdó'ek'*tp'Cajifnaietj*.* ’The'’ cost óf xdpimdu^ifíhAf 'the/^tóiri^ralNahge'ljarlróadj, léiss déprebia&&f* 'jpliafe1 H)¿,lW(‘óf land' !áhd; pights', was $797,917 a‘á[ ¿hpptíember ‘31) l94l; accórárhg'ío' tíre re^orttotl’.lhb'/^^ df; vahíatioiis] This ídilt'b'ad'has'Válíie 'bnhcibally'aF'a ''feedérí'tb the ’debtor’s liriesf'1"t,,f*s ,r'::ií v i;i' Arr»

..“Qn January 2, 1937,,the debtor began this:píocpódíng1' by: 'fi|ih¿! ‘ íñ 'líiia $du£t*:,á' petition5’ hhóydpg that ’it 'wás hínábie1 fp. ihpet ithdéht^ds^d^ mkthrbd áñd!fthat'-ít desíyed íó!; effect ''a'plah'pf, r'épfgahi2á~ tidh; piirsñaht to,' Aectiod" 775 of’ lbs1 haufeiiptcy ‘ apt. The,' debtor’^' obligations) ;at ;thát lime inclüdedópü addífioh to’ large1 ■ amoiifi'tó cóf üíi’s'ócuféd,! d'óbt';the ibF lowing amounts of debt secured b‘y' 'b'utstáhdirig mortgages - of ,it^:,properties:- .¡..g a

“■Bonds;¡secured by ;the. ;MH&0 $.%;.-m.or.tr:anhr. b ;m•.«i ••■•jgage .of 1885t.(hereinafter called,Sixes),gw , g ¡\„ assumed by the principal debtor......$.1,400,000

“Bop^s.ipdarel.by fhe ^S.S&N.b^^r^t ; ,...ihortgage [pf 1887 .{.hereinafter- called y‘"\ Fives)..,...;^dl/,,,..';;i,. :... ' 4,ooo[ooo

“Bonds 'secured oy‘ '[•fliq'.í&^&AÍ^cdA'édlí- r(‘"/ !,t”' iS dated mortgage' of ’ 1890 ’ (h'eféihafteF ír‘;;;rrw: wt palled Fours) .... •. ..... .;í;g.. .g....:,;... /15,1Q7-,Q00 “Fnpaid ipter;esf pn.Fóurs> ,.g.i. ,¡,,Sh... ¿(¡21,599,315

;,, ■ i->c ‘-Total. ,:... uw<'...hgA

■ “On danhary 30,: 1937, Ihe corirt-appbinted^.-tru'sitees in bankruptcy! Hi. 'dñiheh'ilk. Ilomire whx> was nominated bygConhSellorlhe’ Brudénfial' Insurance Company whiéh -'owned ¡ ’-$416)000! :'of >th© Fives): -and MrV B/A. Whítiha'h%hó''wa& nominated‘.hy'-cohrlsOl for the Canadian5’ Pacific -'Railway CompanyiA..'Mr. Homire has since resigned, and Mr. Whitman is deceased. Mr. P. L. Solether is now the sole trustee.

“On July 1, 1937, the Mineral Range filed in this court a petition showing that it was unable to meet its debts as they matured, and praying that it be allowed to effect a plan of reorganization in connection with the plan to be effected for the debtor. The outstanding obligations of the Mineral Range at that time included, in addition to large amounts of unsecured debt and equipment trust obligations, $1,598,-675 of principal and $231,912 of unpaid interest owing on bonds secured by mortgages of its properties.
“Persons other than the Canadian Pacific held $3,-199,000 of the debtor’s Fives; an individual bondholder held $4,000 (reduced to $2,800 by subsequent payment) of Mineral Range bonds; and the Canadian Pacific owned directly or indirectly all of the other outstanding bonds of both the debtor and the Mineral Range.”

As indicated above, the great majority of bonded indebtedness was due the Canadian Pacific Railway, with $3,203,000 held by other persons or insurance companies.

After lengthy discussion of various proposed plans for reorganization, the Federal court approved a new capitalization plan proposed by the interstate commerce commission, as follows:

“Turning now to the plan approved by the commission, it contemplates that all properties of the principal and subsidiary debtors be vested in the reorganized company, which will then issue $5,000,000 of new 4% contingent interest bonds secured by a first mortgage on all properties of the reorganized company, and $10,500,000 of new capital stock consisting of 210,000 shares of common stock without par value but having a stated value of $50 per share. $500,000 of this stock is to be issued on the basis of the reorganized company’s acquisition of the properties of the Mineral Eange.
“In support of such capitalization, the commission’s report referred inter alia, to the evidence establishing the following facts. The debtor’s average net income available for fixed charges as adjusted, for the years 1928 to 1945 (excluding the so-called depression years of 1930 to 1933, inclusive, and the so-called boom years of 1942 to 1945, inclusive) was $312,468. On the basis of studies made by the officers and staff of the trustees and debtors, it was estimated that net earnings of the future normal year would amount to $312,468. Deducting from the anticipated normal year’s net earnings of $312,468, $200,000 of interest on new bonds, Federal income taxes at 38% on the remainder, and $25,000 as a sinking fund payment on the new bonds, there would be about $44,730 available for dividends on the new stock in the future normal year, or about 21 cents per share. On the basis of net earnings equal to those of 1936 or 1941, the income available for dividends ■on the new stock would amount to over $1 per share. Capitalized at 4%, $312,468 produces $7,811,700 and the 1936 and 1941 earnings produce $15,569,850 and $16,055,400 respectively. The commission’s bureau of valuation estimates of cost of reproduction less depreciation plus the value of land and rights for the 2 debtors produce a total of $16,515,858.
“The court concludes that it should approve the new capitalization as approved by the commission.
“The commission’s plan proposed (in addition to cash distributions hereafter mentioned) the following divisions of the proposed issues of new bonds and stock as between (a) the $3,199,000 of Fives which were held on the effective date of the plan, January 1, 1945, by persons other than the Canadian Pacific, and (b) the holder of $4,000 of the subsidiary debt- or’s bonds, and (c) the Canadian Pacific as the then owner of $801,000 of Fives and of all other securities of the debtor and of all other securities of the Mineral Eange.

¡ f <- ¡ Cíí' h. ■ K>! I!S' [ ">'.i B ÓjbtlS}'■ ■ ■ ' ' Stocks ■ “To holders of $3,199,000 .‘'■•.‘■sváí ;s"r<>: ;,’■ f: . ; of , .Fivqs ¡. £¡,.,.^1^9^09^,...^,-.. • “To ..riqlders.ri'q^.'^OQÜ .pf.J. i a 111 ¿i<o¡

’'Thq effect'bf this rbbrganizatibh'is shb'wnlri fe^híbitlál'the aoM^riíjal'i^h'báldíiqé1 sheafs1 bf'4he pí'e'déces“br rail?óacís..ancí .the dué£y¿éof !t!ai$qtó ¡fár'íitíe yfé&r showed' bn 'ended..December', 31, l-949'.V. Tidái.erfpit,Y.T, the;|i-ss,ehi gide,, a 4 repnctipn'.ppdhe, .¡Bgijces,, p.tat{3d, £or .\tqt,al, -inyqstHréiit.s>, lqss ;V-ijepo^deí ;.dqprepiatiqn; and ;aipor:tózhtibn,:;f.rqipo$46í73,8j97Q! ¿0,;|>16:,'03,7,6561..;,. On ¡the--liability, side, it showed'. a; ■ reduction - .of '.capital '■stock'from.‘$22,000,í0OO<ítio/$Í®/5.OO,-O@0iVa’-riedhcti©níof Ibng-teí'ni débtf iban $Q6!,176y972’t'o‘ $6>7€1;272;< arid -the 'wiping off'the ‘bobit's-bf $32,85’4,b73!bf Siriter‘est!iii; de'fáriít. !'5 odi (fl0r -;o u.-N >.-»

; Triq.!i*égnlt,ri''of' .trié' rieriucompáriy ^dowri.!©,.1 J)éqepil'bE.'M] '$pi&f’balance'.’sheet ..pryo^to-(tfl,e. ta^jepr.,in .parablq total inyéstipqntofi-giWiqy legp rpeqqrdédj-depreciation and ,,.ahippti£atioip i.s..ishqwp.uas.'inprie^sed to ■ !$17",198466. I -The! -capital istockáb) 'shown -a>b t-hé .'Same hgurej-'^lO'500',000, fend^theiriotal sh^lhsrishows' -an > ■ínbréa'Sé'-’ Pf! %1,!000,-00@' lo; ¡'$1'693,501.

'■ :The ftíbV^¿T^bfe‘)tóyd'^e6tirifieSi'8ólñíídi^^da'!tó‘ók 'thesé ■l'áiét''fig'rire'é,,dallhé':'!p^id^típicdp'ital'hri¿[' <súi?<pfe;íbf|Lé'piiípBseybl í^cb^phtgilóri!oMffe "■jipe .nridjep'spci^^ "• .¡Anp -1^3;CÍnriy Sjípp 3 3 ’ t

-<..sThe;appellant ;rat|^p^dpfiftrs ,3> a^gllj>rient.i&.,in,..tliis ..appeal';-) indio iví '/o Ui\n yo/il ‘jo íh}04íCf-l;; ‘io '•-■-uyai

¡V (l)bTihat tithe:;commission.sand-«fax,jappeab hoard erred in the determination of paid-up. capital, and snrplns.,as stated pboye.;-,, .K.,p/ ; 2

,.T;hai.ngtitonip^e§iip^’i^Vs',^les fpCigh’tj transported, hy-itiinj Michigan. ;cama¡qt h;e used iq pleasure 'that- pó'idioni,offpái'd-np7éapit,alvand swjpfeis. ¡whiehds taxable'.im-Michigan* ;■ without, wiblatidmof the commence’ clausUOf ithc TFirited states 'Constitution.;;- »•/» '('3');'That-Púíd úepaiPaíe-^ibfimds' BAj Í'952/Nb 183, is úhéonStitutióhál’ lnthé''própóseah|jpNhátioñ‘'td appellant railroad, nncler the Michigan Constitution ‘ (1908).'"- v''; -d bad ''i^k,hvq id 'i'[ bdM' I . •

- 1/1 'We’shall -exUrniPb these>eont'entions¡d!n.:ithis; order.

1 * ids'to the-first’i-ssne lr:aise'd, the appellant ¡railroad contends that the corporation and securities, commission "erred ddmccbptingv appellant's > own 'book "figures hs tó!!capitar;an&'Surplus.■••'■It -coíitendíb that--its „book .figurq?., areycputepllOidí by, ipt§ESjfcf$g, -qoipaerce • commission, accounting! naethods apd ibylfitle .49, .§ 20 ,-ai, Of the-UiiitediSthteb'codejfiand .relies.-¡upon In.r.e ' 'Appeal of Hó¡sldf¿s»Mdnfg:-.Go.¡ ^i.OiMich.hQaj.where‘-iri'th'isdCoUrt'St^édíon'r'g'enérhlvrn'le .-(<pp 5,96,• 597):

>?-f #A¡9 0e State- is justified ip-holdijig that-thej, tap as ¡ ¿etqrmined ‘from ¡■the, corporate bAPliS-í ^ithe; statulejdoe^inqt^proyidp, in express language qp.by puthorizajioñi bf ..expense, ■ fopthe impractical prqecdure.o^nii^ anc|-appraisal -of,, each corpo-rafiqn .each sy.ear ,f>y‘, .tlilj .gtáte.;Tlt cpn.templates that .the.-tax ^hall ibe .fopiid.from ’thelah,,.nual .report,.,of,,the corporation., f b.,0$)'sn'cir étary' pf .State,. snppierne,ntecl,(by, tlje .further-'f.kefs; dém^ndjsd -under BÍl 19.31, ,t!o¿27,^§ ^tqlleá ,^nd ', exact Information -8 lÓtítój ; ¡Qhyiouslyjthé-source -fáct.s;íg the corporate hoohs¿Mwhich'bhentatutp assnihcsi, and, requires, shall be kept' correctly. 'Obviously, also, the h'óbks■"réprbsfent'the'>aotíon''o£.tbe‘Corpbrátibn ihlValuing its assets and it has little cause to complain of such book values.

“But, because humans may err, there are exceptions to such rule. The State itself holds the balance sheet final only in the absence of fraud or error. Such exception is reasonable and proper if ‘error’ is given the broad meaning of ‘incorrectness’ and works to the protection of the taxpayer as well as the State. The law should be read and administered to secure to the State all sums justly due it, but no more.”

It should be noted in passing that the Hoskins rule was applicable only to computation of “surplus” and did not involve any dispute concerning “paid-in capital.”

The statutory provisions under which paid-in capital and surplus are computed are as follows:

“For the purpose of this act only, each share of no par value shall be deemed to have the value of at least $1, or such value as shall have been fixed by the corporation for the sale of such stock, or the book value as determined by the Michigan corporation and securities commission, whichever may be the higher. In any case where the capital of a corporation is not divided into shares, the whole property thereof shall be deemed to be the authorized capital stock for the purposes of this act.
“The term ‘surplus,’ as used in this act, shall be taken and deemed to mean the net value of the corporation’s property, less its outstanding indebtedness and paid-up capital; but in no case, either as to domestic or as to foreign corporations, shall any deduction be made from the item of paid-up capital, in computing the franchise fee thereon, by reason of any impairment of the same.” CLS 1952, § 450.304 (Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 21.205).

The statutory language above, plus the interpretation placed thereon in In re Appeal of Newton Packing Co., 279 Mich 139, lends weight to appellees’ contention that appellant’s fair value argument is applicable only to the surplus item. Nonetheless we will discuss the issue as appellant poses it.

Appellant’s brief cites the evidence upon which it argues that the commission’s finding of paid-up capital and surplus overstated the actual value of its assets:

“As will be remembered, in the course of the reorganization certain creditors of the old railroads desired to receive bonds of the corporation resulting from the reorganization (this petitioner) rather than the shares of its stock to which they would be entitled under the plan. It was agreed between them and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company that the stock to which they would be entitled would be exchanged for some of the bonds to which that railroad company would be entitled. It was, therefore, necessary to fix a true value for the stock and a true value for the bonds. After arm’s length negotiations, it was determined that the value of the stock was $7.50 per share and the value of the bonds $70 per $100 of face value. These values were approved both by the I.C.C. and the court.
“Again, at the hearing petitioner gave evidence that the stocks of railroads comparable to petitioner had a market value about equal to 7.78 times their annual earnings per share. It also showed that the annual earnings of petitioner in 1951 were about $1 per share. On this basis, the value of each share of the no par stock of petitioner was $7.78 per share which is very close to the value assigned to this stock by the I.C.C. at the time of reorganization.
“This means that the actual value of the assets received by petitioner at the time of its incorporation was actually no more than $5,133,800 even allowing a value of $7.78 per share to the stock.
“210,000 shares at $7.78 per share......$1,633,800
“$5,000,000 of bonds at 70% of face value 3,500,000
$5,133,800”

..J TNftjífiusk computation" íappell£j,iitJ:r.élie's<'.,í6n'>'was rpade piiiOfitO/tboriOutryiióifi-.tbLe réorgariizatibh» order.. The opinipjiKnp.oaii wMéh|th;ati order .iwasi based,i;aá iVé hay e; fiiotedy <slaied.the>f'aii valuelof'íthe'.phybi'eaNasse.tg qfj theiíappepáñtuás-tíMySlé^SSS) -alidrauthoiized ca'Pífahzihtioriíatjí$10j5'00',DO@J>-'o aijUyi ua

The record discloses no protests at the hearing in

1 ' MPF» r\ /-> -v> I TT y\ +-lv z-v yi w /-, 1*4- n -r-w -i -*-v m 4~ ,— fair.! mate nailnoadí stocks :'ol!7y.>78 times.;qaa?nip.gS.í.‘! i^ppailarikiñrgeá thát.'this; formula should ibeeaccbpteotíto'>áhbwothev'tbtal!fívú;lUé-'íoíríthe c'ápitáb iétoikí ¡ámdoth'ístíút 1 shétilfij.'bS^pliái Ho> 19$1 earning’^bnlyy i* .i¡>oi.iiííh,> od bfuov.' viioqu-o-í ru.ír»

'■'•Wé5 ho'tfe -thht- d¥ r'|t^j6«IÍk±íJ,^.*íaí;íiíáSf1 i‘¿ q'ikiíb^TyífeW^fi^Rdiaii^Pácifití^NHílw^y CompEny, ■Wb ’ftot?¿ !th9Lt,'tipnfe_ ‘tíájs Wé nBfé mák‘Nie,$Í per.sjíare eáimngsPnqwHhefihpi »yt\(nj/xtn 'rnw iwTffdv oesítrt:. .'«dn <■ Son l lo jj.í >'¡. yjt, ject oí- appellants eo^|ii)l,ai,^ts,t)ar.e .^i^^taj^allyjirtlie i,te.-^ftí>í?8§4l9?tt)Ít&]ft?a^í>hAc.-d/8 utjifiY Jy.-j'.íia-i í: i

. .“in Support pi,,such capitalization, the, eommissiU^'WfcJMMa «n<¿^ 4é^Tjywl^’1112 -PiliikkAv; n=J¥á„4iJ ^'TtóVi¿fá-™-’« V,i ¿U fbi‘ the^ye^y’H’^W'fe Islo (excluding ^hétsó-c'áíle , •'.(uu/ilMac^MiUi© “WSW*'^ e* ..ov.8.:. yqT,¿ $3Í¿',“4$ál ’°'0n ^VS|í^^o?'$tt^4s^ipáy^yn5tA.e’pfiic^is"‘‘ailcLfstaff QÍ-'H^é^fr-ustees1 and 'aéb^orá’-'ifcwas. estimated, ..tháíwií^%yf^^^'j|.^e0|úfe^!!!í)^ííÍB^ anticipated normal year’s net earnings of $312,468, O.Q,QO.@.-of interest on new bonds, Federal income taxes at ,38:%! An ,• th©» remainder/candr $25)000'ríás1 -a , sjinkfflg fundpayntent. qmfhe Tiewhbnds',? there , would he, abopt $4f for, dividends-,op -the: .peyr stock, in'the fntphe: ng,f)nal njp^ah.qiiic^l'v ce^ts per Share.'.'' .,Onf the ."libáis., of: bet ,'eafhings, e$pal> b'o ‘those 0£'1936?0^ Í911,'thédhhóijie qyáíjáhleffór dividends ’ 6ii 'tM 'hé$ sfbplFwóhi'd 'ámo'iiht' t’q óyex, '$1'per share. • Oápitáliáed ai 4%,’$312; 108‘produces $7',f8lír 700 and the Í936 ájddfÍ9M;daMh¡ig^ jjfbdúce $lb?4§9,-850 'arid ;$16Th5,400LRésp'e'ctÍvélyv- 'Thé'hoihhii!sSip'h’'S bureau of valuation; estimate 'of’cost óf fépfodricúoh le'ss,. depreciation plus, the value Oof - land l-an'd ? fights for the 2;debtqrh;prpdnce^ábotalm£':$16',b;15,:858.':’’i' •

-•'The" to'the capital* ax'hppéahbbhrdbumM^izedits holdings, as disputed computation óf' appellant’s paid-tip tis.n.v' ' • rim; m-maíma -me UmC yemmem

. /Tn.determiningbhe amquntpf-capital of- appbllánt created, by ih,etcpnir4hutipiis ,of the shareholders, the áppiélleé/cdfiniissipininfilis case.nsedbhe;-bpp:,kriypi]ie óf $10,500,’ÓO'O as returned by the ebrporation .pn its 1952 annual report. There i.s evidence in. the record in the pfpcb'é'din|-s: before 'the. ‘interstátV' pqmfnprc^ CommiSsióbfánd' the',’ Féjlé^&T, dist'fict’ courif ’ from which' theboirinlissíóN cdhld' hhdbd’oii'M that 'fhb bom tributiriris’ ;pftbe'P'sbáré'hóldefs 'tdbapiikf b^iial'ed'of exceeded ibis'.'stated figütfeV-'» íTbb’ te'Stiihóh.y_ of blib witness; Weston búppórthbhé ¿ppellfeeiri-bhiS'regard! Upon this tr.ócord'.fMredsvüo’.evidehce;‘-from!'which this appeal board can find* that-brichidefermiriátion! by iV.thó'. 5appe%e..',commissipn .wáSiperrpnaousUor amounted to an abusive exercise^er- itsrdiscrietipii.' Therefore; tip?! ^ ^^pea.l^.Uo.^nd.^aonghuijie^; that.;on. this issue the determination.of^cabitaimade,hw, the borno-. ration and seCu: is approved.’’.' ‘‘ ¿ ' i *. -he y< • ;iée: commission ?w,asf pr.pper and, it !yf; jí'70:p¡iífí (o ‘í'C'Tsn ."JUí! ;r--ii.-eOT

As to the dispute about the.-¡surplus::figure? eimployed, by the commission in? computing'the. -disputed tax,, appellee iagainepoiptsj tobhefact fhát it accepted'' appellant’s^ o.-wp-fi-gukesb AppellántfebasiCla^guménb' on this point follows that just outlined above — namely, that at the time of the reorganization plan the total equity in the new railroad should be measured by 7.78 times $210,000 (at $1 a share earnings), plus 70% of the value of $5,000,000 worth of bonds, or a total of $5,133,800. As a consequence, appellant contends that the surplus of $629,110 reported in its 1949 balance sheet was unrealistic and nonexistent and should be deducted from the surplus of $1,693,-501 reported in its 1951 balance sheet.

In the end, appellant’s argument pertaining to the computation of its paid-up capital and surplus amounts to the assertion that its own balance sheet figures overstated the value of its physical assets, including land and buildings and trackage and equipment, by $9,500,000.

■ Yet, in a supplemental statement dated December ■31, 1953, exhibit 11 in this proceeding, appellant shows its “transportation property” valued at $18,-970,629.

This is an appeal in the nature of certiorari from a decision of the Michigan tax appeal board. In such a case we do not disturb the findings of fact of the board when they are supported by competent evidence. Udylite Corporation v. Corporation & Securities Commission, 319 Mich 1; Chicago, Duluth & Georgian Bay Transit Co. v. Corporation & Securities Commission, 319 Mich 14.

See, also, Royal v. Ecorse Police & Fire Commission, 345 Mich 214.

We do not find the “error” or “incorrectness” refferred to in the Hoskins Case, supra. There was competent evidence to support the determination of appellant’s paid-up capital and surplus made by appellee commission.

We now turn to what is, in our view, the most significant constitutional issue presented by this casé. It is appellant’s claim that the formula applied by the commission to appellant’s paid-np capital and surplus to determine the portion thereof which is allocable to Michigan is offensive to the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.

The formula objected to as set forth in the 1952 amendment as section 5b (CLS 1952, § 450.305b [Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp §21.208(2)]) is as follows :

“For the purpose of determining the annual franchise fee, the tax payable by a railroad company shall be measured by that portion of its paid-up capital and surplus determined by the average of the following 2 percentage ratios: The net ton miles of freight handled in this State to the total net ton miles of freight handled within and without the State; the number of miles of all track over which it operates within this State to the total number of miles of all track over which it operates within and without the State.”

It is appellant’s contention that the appellee commission could not constitutionally employ, in determining “net ton miles of freight handled in this State,” any net ton miles of freight which had moved in Michigan in interstate commerce. The practical importance of this argument is shown in the following calculations of the percentage of appellant’s paid-up capital and surplus to be allocated to Michigan for the purpose of computation of the franchise tax. The first calculation is that of appellee commission, and the second as proposed by appellant railroad :

• pirbidsíb'h0^ lhbnNñíftéd:; St^teáiiCbfi.btitütfón * rélíb4J,tipbni%y’“áríphllaiít is* "as*‘foiló^^í1'‘:>J*’’* 1

b.v,:;í JJfePcPíWmM.-te »rf¿ ^«RS; - “3. To regulate, commerce»with, foreign ^nations, ayá^amóng me “s'eyeral States,! anb:'witlj,''t4ie',In'áife!n ‘inks?11#'(i^'fffi,í!!5l,,'son í,fti

Few provisions in our Constitution have provided as much ground for debate as to interpretation, or provoked as much litigation. And the supreme court has divided closely and repeatedly from early, down to recent, history upon the general question presented by this case, pertaining to the extent of restraint imposed by these words upon a State’s power tbvt'a£’,aí%'tí^ihekS't7'hitílri^ b%Lgág,e&4h4n'te’r§t'atéJ-eóm,.,or JV'» ¡f If [láV ,T '¡V* fV£>i [='\ &> W*' K'M f:.)I Í rip \,'yi >tv\ rtiGrcck 1 -■ el */;■ ¿\j ' h o^-; lf,» <41.. s ^i>w-.r \ •. •

It should perhaps be noted at thb'lbúts^tUHhb-'thé Wúrds-bl^liéffebMfiiu^ceíblÉkS'é 'fdb^^'iñifhemáéíves specifically-1 iPté^'dict^ State “taxation» »-'of--'interstate commeréb-/ lilíefUiiile'd1 Si/dfes^áhpi’éhi-e' cbUrtVUh•tbr^rétatiofi' bUihb'blaufee líks/lib^fev'ér• hél'd» cOhstrtutionally offensive certain general classifications8 of Stkte thxdsU1 Afiitíííg ‘thes'e ¡dlksbifiCatibn’S- thb fóllówiáíg'*lna^'b'é'5<^^'»k^-#i^M^ií|»Jto^dÉ[e<-ae¿hé'e‘'ú3pfóíQ oiir present •pikibhmi:8- i tUííJ -iC: ,'v,v\y;

- ($1) ■Pritilb'ga ^ákesUequarin^'pa^m'éht as k'siinpe'jeSiíditibh; prbcedbnh'ftíí'-caíryíh’g fin1 excfásively interstate commerce. Ozark Pipe Line Corporation v. Monier, 266 US 555 (45 S Ct 184, 69 L ed 439); Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission, 302 US 90 (58 S Ct 72, 82 L ed 68); Spector Motor Fuel Service, Inc., v. O'Connor, 340 US 602 (71 S Ct 508, 95 L ed 573); Railway Express Agency, Inc., v. Virginia, 347 US 359 (74 S Ct 558 98 L ed 337, 757).

-U(«2) ®if eht'i'ta^es»'upmr;='éith,er’'’int@f s-tkte 'bbñimé'rCe Or'v 'grbss; (réeéipts; ftfomOahtérstkfé "sáleá-C-at' ¡dé&st WhebU siich» fkMbsC^drélhbt)rS'asóÍfdbÍy~a^)?pb'rti'bhéíd. Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 US 411 (8 S Ct 1127, 32 L ed 229); Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 US 298 (32 S Ct 218, 56 L ed 445); East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio 283 US 465 (51 S Ct 499, 75 L ed 1171); Cooney v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 294 US 384 (55 S Ct 477, 79 L ed 934); J. D. Adams Manfg. Co. v. Storen , 304 US 307 (58 S Ct 913, 82 L ed 1365, 117 ALR 429); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 US 249 (67 S Ct 274, 91 L ed 265).

See, also, United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 US 321 (38 S Ct 499, 62 L ed 1135, Ann Cas 1918E, 748).

(3) Taxes which it held unreasonably burdensome upon interstate commerce. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 US 1 (30 S Ct 190, 54 L ed 355); Ingels v. Morf, 300 US 290 (57 S Ct 439, 81 L ed 653).

(4) Taxes which it held discriminatory in effect as between interstate and intrastate commerce. Webber v. Virginia, 103 US 344 (26 L ed 565); Walling v. Michigan, 116 US 446 (6 S Ct 454, 29 L ed 691); Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 US 389 (72 S Ct 424, 96 L ed 436).

On the other hand, the same court has upheld as not offending the commerce clause State taxes in at least the following classifications:

(1) Property taxes levied on property located within the taxing State and used for interstate commerce. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 125 US 530 (8 S Ct 961, 31 L ed 790); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 US 185 (17 S Ct 604, 41 L ed 965); Baker v. Druesedow, 263 US 137 (44 S Ct 40, 68 L ed 212); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 US 169 (69 S Ct 432, 93 L ed 585).

(2) Taxes levied upon net income of business engaged in interstate commerce where the portion of net income taxed was reasonably apportioned as to the taxing State. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, supra; Underwoood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 US 113 (41 S Ct 45, 65 L ed 165); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Limited, v. State Tax Commission, 266 US 271 (45 S Ct 82, 69 L ed 282).

(3) Taxes levied directly upon interstate commerce (or gross receipts therefrom) but held reasonably related to occasioning interstate commerce to pay its own way in the taxing State. Postal Tele graph Gable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 US 252 (39 S Ct 265, 63 L ed 590); Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 US 245 (48 S Ct 230, 72 L ed 551); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 US 250, see cases cited, p 254 (58 S Ct 546, 82 L ed 823, 115 ALR 944).

See, also, Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 US 435 (61 S Ct 246, 85 L ed 267, 130 ALR 1229).

(4) Privilege or franchise taxes levied upon the right to do intrastate business, including where the business concerned was engaged in both inter- and intrastate commerce, provided only that the tax or fee was reasonably related to the value of the intrastate business done by the taxpayer in the taxing State. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Middlekamp, 256 US 226 (41 S Ct 489, 65 L ed 905); Hump Hairpin Manfg. Co. v. Emmerson, 258 US 290 (42 S Ct 305, 66 L ed 622); International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 US 429 (49 S Ct 380, 73 L ed 781); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 US 331 (60 S Ct 273, 84 L ed 304); International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 US 416 (67 S Ct 444, 91 L ed 390); Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 US 662 (69 S Ct 1264, 93 L ed 1613).

Against this background of instances where the commerce-clause objection to a State tax has been sustained or denied, we consider our instant tax.

The specific facts frequently determine whether or not a State tax as applied to a specific taxpayer is held repugnant to the commerce clause. Five relevant facts distinguish our instant case from the cases relied upon by the appellant:

(1) The appellant is a railroad corporation which has most of its trackage and other physical facilities located in Michigan and hence makes year-round use of the services and protection of this State;

State'* iai’trkátatéi:c'óilimérce

Ttñ'éJ‘• coiasu3ater<^M¿Í-afti^©'f*. &fgttifiehtl advanced’1 bys apioelíaíif) ndTlaiAMT advanced tífat the $38,969 tax is unreasonable and 4bis-feéo'rd-¿amply isu^)p0rtsi¿ ’nOfit-Mry finding' of1 ‘fa'etv'0f IlrdMichigan corpofálión'fax^a^pballhoábdp'_’-;H ,<}*& )•) <1 lo>

■* ” ''(4y:Thé'táxÍsdeVi6d'úponrall hüslnéks ¡organized fór ¿profit ,añd-dOlng-5bdkine^sf-*WitMai'ítbe> Staté.'.of 'Michigan knd'<is! pláiñly: >nondiáci,iMinatory‘ias 16 tbiáít=axpkyéí'f! í!l¡o b'>!>r *<■ n; /a-;.; "io- -ü/í>-■■■■

a r(5<)‘ t Tliectk&'Is’fiioi ■ leVibd-'tip'on’ .'any.’part '‘-of the interstate bór&xü.eriSé'iófíihé'.'kppellant/--dr-¡©¡by*direct pródiíbt -thereofybut -np6nv'¡appellant^ privilege' -of doing bfiteilfess1 vntliiiilMibbi^ant) S: i cb,K pp f! Tlfi’sdast point *b!eái’S'lél‘ücidati6n, sinboitls-Official •tto *oiiV 'de&ihttttófeiii:''''*\ ¡y, ■. I hi; .'V::; ,i-P h

;; (The1‘tax* complainkd of '••fids -been'1'interpreted'-’by ÜfiiS' ©Bíir^'ás^ fraiicbiSé''fax' ibiftosed'Upoiillíe ‘right -t'o do intrastate 'bfisiness — Vitfi tliat;pfivilegefhieasnfeddDy'-tife1 amBuni’ of-=^uid-up» eaifiit'klJaiadtstfrplus 'fikksóáia'bl'y allbcáble'to-M-icliigan; '■<■■■' '.»*> ; s-'v,v-./.«

matter counsel,lqse sip . legesought ‘tolbeTblléfitefi/* Tt is‘nb't‘a’ upon ' " It •those ...... .... ..... ‘by daw-fob th'ó'privslege! óf< esmMSi®.grits¡ falanbldse - and of transacting its busme'sSiovithin.fhi'S State.’1'* The i distinction; hepweehisubhca fee án.d;ía;r-tax upon'property i W&sLcle,arljy! pointedi-onf. Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Secretary of State, 216 Mich 261, and later in In re Truscon Steel Co., 246 Mich 174, and in In re G. H. Hammond Co., 246 Mich 179. The ques tidn .presented risv^o .cleprly; disposed ;pf do, In re Detroit & Windsor Ferry Co., 232 Mich 574, that further discussion seems unnecessary." In re Detroit International Bridge Co., 257 Mich 52, 59.

See, also, Holland, Hitch Co. v. State Michigan, 318 Mich 474.

v*Mr. 'Jpstíce ÍStiÍTHj th'! a'Vdcdnti debisidh Of; this tiiburt interpreting‘.the ‘sk^'^^^'falWeif'T^iff&rem allocation foxhiula') ? held: ; " ‘

of the ex’érc;sé.p£a State land wé ascertain that value through the application- of property,'payroll) !and;sal’fesbfactjdr>s too the-.-fair; ay.erage ¡stock Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Corporation & Securities Commission, 351 Mich 652, 682.

.,."7|)yér‘'ánpC.fftoye $Jj&’^e^4^^!!|,tíí|e^xií ^ (Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 21.205), and,.the hjteiTr pretation thereof by this Court just cited, the intrastate 1ahá^áctéiíiof 1Éie"t$ík)Is hhfetijpórttiáyed By- Section. 5e pjhthe statute :-'-';,5!3'/ ‘"ílíí!! l^'tc if-mn

; ,“If,-it..§li!a]l5ja^pefí. pn sthe jappjipatipii,. o^(thef'taxpayer^pr] pthe^i^p. ]{Íi^t ’§in;^lócafióhj f'áptoh dbterpayef feakoffaktyAiiriMptibfe 'tó'ffilé,BthtP'', IHd••¿¡éÜii*r'!>y ^'.«1 w!f

Excluding "í?dr ihohé''-_&f;ífhétig£etb“és óí”añy 'ObmppÍieiitiíherbdfí;''i''d ?.s*r *>»0 •rohín ■y>'.'my.vo‘i -oIncllidihg^li oromorerothei3xfáctoiísvísuch;í.as -ékpenses,!pnrchasss>;’eOntract.válliesr(,:ihihlis.>su;hpp.h-

tract.vallfes).hrn hi „•/ ,. ,.h ,-.vh.d -■nwuhn-h'i ht\ “(3) Excluding',0®ro;pp;’tionatetly( 1 jpr^^ojp^asspt , it-pmsein ,$nd.,,pr-

“"(4) Apply any other similar 'mp^oépglSfP^tp^lo effect a fair and proper allocation A' J- receipts, activity, business and capital reasonably attributable to this State.” (Emphasis supplied.) CLS 1956, § 450.305e (Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp § 21.208 [5]).

Under all of these facts, Michigan’s right to levy the tax here contested would be supported by many of the previous holdings of the United States supreme court to which we have already referred.

The cardinal question, however, which appellant submits • pertains to the allocation formula and the use therein of a factor of interstate commerce. As stated by appellant, the crucial question is:

“Can the net ton miles of freight transported in interstate and foreign commerce by petitioner and appellant (a railroad) in the State of Michigan be considered and used together with other factors for the purpose of measuring the portion of such railroad’s capital and surplus that is taxable by the-State of Michigan for purposes of the annual franchise tax?”

The question is not a new one and it has been answered many times before.

In Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 US 217 (12 S Ct 121, 35 L ed 994), a State excise tax for the privilege of doing business in Maine was levied upon all gross receipts of the railroad, apportioned according to- the number of miles operated in Maine.. The tax was held not offensive to the commerce clause although, obviously, there was an interstate-commerce factor in the tax formula. The case has-been cited and approved many times since. See Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, supra, 666; Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., v. Mealey, 334 US 653, 658, 663 (68 S Ct 1260, 92 US 1633).

In the Interstate Oil Pipe Line Case, Mr. Justice-Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the court,, said (pp 666, 667)

“The statute is not invalidated by the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution merely because, unlike the statute attacked in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 US 80 (68 S Ct 1475, 92 L ed 1832), it imposes a ‘direct’ tax on the ‘privilege’ of engaging-in interstate commerce. Any notions to the contrary should not have survived Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 US 217, which flatly rules the case at bar. That case sustained a State statute which imposed upon an interstate railroad corporation ‘an annual excise tax [measured by apportioned gross receipts], for the privilege of exercising its franchises in this State.’ The Grand Trunk decision has been approved by this court as recently as the other controlling case of Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 US 653, at 658, 663, in which the court permitted New York to impose a tax on the gross receipts from the operation of an interstate bus line, provided that tax was apportioned according to mileage traveled within the State. The Mealey Case is not distinguished by saying that it involved only a tax on gross receipts and not a tax on interstate commerce itself, for gross receipts taxes have long been regarded as ‘direct’ in cases which are supposed to support the proposition that ‘direct’ taxes on interstate commerce are invalid under the commerce clause.”

In International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, supra, the United States supreme court considered an Ohio privilege tax described as follows (p 419):

“The tax is computed under the Ohio statute in the following manner: Section 5498 prescribes the formula used in determining what part of a taxpayer’s total capital stock represents business and property conducted and located in Ohio. To determine this, the total value of issued capital stock is divided in half. One half is then multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the value of all the taxpayer’s Ohio property, and the denominator of which is the total valué ,of all itsTpiPpertyyhéféver'ówú'ed'. ' ' The dthpi:‘Nal£.-Tk mhltipHfedyhy-'anbthérlfractíoñ5 '«vhósé rititiléfatbNi's thdtdtal valúe* 5f( the h'úhihess:done?iin tde/S^ate; and *.údibsé' 'denómihhibr imcóünthy-widd Bubihe'sA5 ‘Additioh bf these !2 prbd'uéts' 'give's-the tax Bkéeywhi.chy WheU'ihtiltiplied By‘the'tax- ráté-of 1/10> of tKé ÚMbúrit'Of'thd franchise tax*. •

y xej¡¿t úú^élra’toiy 4he State in-ól'úded; as *‘ fá!i phrt! bf - -‘Ohio’ BUsiñeSs: ah • amount' equal tp"Üfe-'sálésíp‘íb,pé'é<i§'>bf5’á" láfígé púlt';o'£-'the goods maüúf-a’ctute’d5 at ,'appbll'aniffe 'Oteo plants, ¡nib -matter Miéré ‘the; foods' had Bé'éir sold - oh1 delivered!.”' • »'•

. J^^l?,l^pfedor.a»i|nai^mQ,iil?;.cop]rt,. said as .-folloys' (p-42,1): ". '« '■ =•> -■-.■> ; ....

!».''<ítJí’9b/rééV‘'^é>;éb^^éfeel'felát's^;á¡6es;i^ot',:^ár a $tate, fi’pmhihpOEing'a ti^ h^pd'bh^Hé ''Vfdjié bf thé pfiviíégé1 fo btísih$%&éf ély Béé’aúsb it also’ does’án intéfsHté’1rasihésé. Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 US 331, 336 (60 S Ct 273, 84 L ed 304). Á ‘Nóffdg&s; tyié 'fcick fmf d éb'rúfíúíütioti spch * as; tíiat yndeC'Óííid’g 'ttim in'éíicdbó ffeóeffgi's 'frÓffC'mtbrb, slate[gate's ‘affect ilíeá’ fair''ápp'ó'riio.nmentJ4 'See, e.g., Hump Hairpin Manfg. Co. v. Emmerson, 258 US 290 (42 S Ct 305, 66 L ed 622); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 US 113 (41 S Ct 45, 65 L ed 165); American Manfg Co. v. St. Louis, 250 US 459 (39 S Ct 522, 63 L ed 1084); International Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 US 429, 433 (49 S Ct 380, 73 L ed 781); Western Cartridge Co. v. Emmerson, 281 US 511 (50 S Ct 383, 74 L ed 1004). And helé'; It clearly' áppéars' ffom thé-haélíg'rouñd of Ohio’-s'-tax? legislation'thia-t the'vrhólé'pu'rpOse 'of thé Stát'é'fbridülai'Vyús'/tP-■arrivé/úuthóút undúé’cOmplieatioúy.at/á -fáir Bohcliisi'óii as %6-!'W'Káti'W,ás M;hé‘-yaihté d£ théi'ihtrastatshüsíhdss'hof'-‘'whi’ch'-itS'lfailchise-'waS g'fantéd.”'p‘(Emphasis1 ísupplié'd:)- y oA' >0

..¡¡See, ,a¿¡-sp¿; the-. piscu,ssph!,of.dhe.,.comna.e.rce-elause problem-in Mr. Justice-Smithes opinionin- Cleveland Cliffs, supra, ‘6M'''ff;''

■In a.reéenf.yíell-óonsidferpdMenision/.upholding a Massachusetts '-excise; itkx wherein.-the,allocation dpTr? muía likewise, contained; inteustateffac,tors,; the rM^-r, sachusettu.;sup.reiu'0;-cou-rt.;said: :><,i »,: ,..T-

■'(f‘Th’eshude!Oisiohs1' 'of the ! sh^reriid’" ■cdhrt bf • ttfé’. United' Stakes’,3 as’’ yk untíérskaiid!theim, * sustain the5 cdhstitu’tiohality■ arid'ér ■ the'^bhrmOrfee olausé'-’bf a-Skate'1 excise» (like' that iuc/tihe'pr.eshnk;ca’Se-')cG®a' 'd©¿> mestió- corporation ?:for >J)ossessihg' -or- exercising, if scoxpóráth'drikileges,'- if’measured -by net'income,) áp-;' portioned,-; as i-Urfhepi'eseut case;1, úna practical way* (which., neudynot by,.any roeans;he precisp); to;giyena: reasonable andj,F0Itg'hLvk.RprQ?Wll.atipfl5 ,®f y-aj(ues.taj;tributat)le to.the taxing/ $’tate, priyil'egefs-. The. fact, that,net income •.fróñí(iiñier§j^t:fce,,traii^acT' tións ’ (and the’ value 'given 'io m"tr asíate priylegpSby’ them) may be taken.,iMo. account reasonably in (the3 tax' coiripntatiohs’ ih' immaterial.” Stae Tax Commission v. John H. Breck, Inc., 336 Mass 277 (144 NE 2d 87, 101).

Wé*recognize, - o’f courseA'that tlíe’précise' formula with which we deal’ in the instant case ’is- somewhat different from the formulae in cases just cited. "But we áre unable io-’find any ‘.distinction1 in -the constitutional" Wmciples.’n]Spliekble. <*■ • >f- i>' .chM; "wo

’ 'We cón'strú'é' the ’-fóílhüla in' s'e'ctióll-’hh rib having-as3 its purpose’" the '°f" ri 'fair1 proportion3 -of rippélíaiííy’p^^ shrplu’b kildcahlh' to’ Michigan (for purpose’ c>f .ítórd^tlájípéllán^s!(njjiítí to carryonóts.iny'astatesBúsinépsi,(

-Appellant relies; heavilyirpon the ’Michigan,pases, of Gartland Steamship Co. v. Corporation & Securities Commission, 339 Mich 661; and Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Corporation & Securities Commission, 346 Mich 50.

Both of these cases may be distinguished from our instant case on their facts. Gartland had no property in Michigan and did what the Court apparently regarded as only an inconsequential intrastate business in Michigan. Over 90% of Panhandle’s pipe line, properties and activities were located outside of Michigan. In addition, Panhandle involved the continuous flow of gas from the wellheads in the Southwest to Michigan customers. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 US 157 (74 S Ct 396, 98 L ed 583). Neither case involved the identical formula objected to here. And in both cases, this Court, while rejecting the specific formula, upheld the right to levy the tax and ordered recomputation under section 5e to achieve a reasonable result.

It is obvious that what the State offered in service and protection to the Gartland and Panhandle taxpayers in return for the tax was substantially different (particularly in the Gartland Case) from the fact situation considered herein. This distinction has been cited as a decisive one:

“The Constitution is not a formulary. It does not demand of States strict observance of rigid categories nor precision of technical phrasing in their exercise of the most basic power of government, that of taxation. For constitutional purposes the decisive issue turns on the operating incidence of a challenged tax. A State is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the State has exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society.” Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 US 435, 444 (61 S Ct 246, 85 L ed 267, 130 ALR 1229).

Both Gartland and Panhandle opinions, however, relied upon Cooney v. Mountain States T. & T. Co., 294 US 384 (55 S Ct 477, 79 L ed 934), for constitutional authority. Both failed to distinguish between the direct taxation of interstate commerce (which Cooney ruled out) and the employment of an interstate-commerce factor in the formula for determining the amount of paid-up capital and surplus to be allocated to Michigan in computing the fee to be assessed for doing intrastate business in Michigan.

We find no United States supreme court precedent which interprets the commerce clause as forbidding use of such an allocation formula unless the result is shown to be unreasonable or discriminatory.

We now limit the application of the opinions in Gartland and Panhandle and hold that there is no constitutional barrier to the use of an interstate-commerce factor in the allocation formula for determining the portion of paid-up capital and surplus allocable to Michigan for computation of a franchise tax for the right to carry on intrastate business in Michigan where, as here, there is no showing that such formula reaches an unreasonable or discriminatory result.

As to the third group of issues wherein appellant argues that this tax violates 4 separate provisions of the State Constitution, we can be more concise.

The essence of appellant’s contention is that the instant franchise tax is in fact a tax upon the same subject of taxation as is taxed by a much older statutey-P!á)á£[05pE»>p82.5(.©ErlM8 áaa&<Ml9Sá, 4=307.1 et.''seq: fiStátYAsiiá/ I960;'íféi. and5»’1963'-’ ©uta SSufcp §¡7-/2§l at"se{qST- te P» ted-. •*'1 te; -'-i ^

oExarnteatioiii» tfósi ¡earlier! statute tedicd-t'Chube-* yond¡questiOnYThatdt fe* iiiteb-.sehsd»afihx!típoai>ili'é right. t©'>do'/b-rá;piii'ess'i i ©mtpe»eán£rary,¡¿tds: plainly an ;ad< waldcem éta Jiipomi theivaTueyoT The <pr©]3 brfy ¡óf railroad 'andi e&rtaiaivo-theitfthaiisportati'bíl ?s«i« ¡6@m-municatibnncóhapaniesp¡levied!te< died Jfofiloca!»prbp-1 ertyiTax'es-jc/juiwírtf A-»V.v:vCoh y.moh u<ñ bon^OHafc te

The title to the act begins, “An act to provide'Tor the.'.'assessriTen.t-fo/íi7m'pr'0-p'dí!Í|/1 II© ’te; í Pm¡of> r&itfb'ad cohípahiesl’hei (Em$hates«s®ippliedí)*ny >odd riotó'v Section-í5íp.r.oiíidesb:.oí¡'(o'! nteisyoüc a a /.bay io oho

, “The 'Term property,as:*used'm'/’tUis .áct^slialí-^e ________i>i,NV. h\.O h?;ú»¿©lid «i te 'taxhtib'ii ‘ühdé'r ‘this . „

.,-£k.ere í>5«f. tiep, pqnchiding;; •;.!Vv:..„r,v; ' “and:' alí''Oth'ébr: re'al dánd rper só'ixal’t pbb all £rahchis:e'sr¡¡saiíd> f-rafíOMáep) AOt --’to dheo'dirfedtlybásl s essed;'hnt»toí <hei rtalcen i into «consider ató-6n ¡ in‘detfer^ mining the value of the other propertyü?--:;>€I¡nit9á8/ §¡-í?«2^)nirfi vííí o! a A

' It ‘isTHis lastldnl-hágié'-'úp'óí fwhích^á^péll'anf'hSsés hip;^té^f f * * ’ • * n¡íi>'A '“-j

: Wc;tíelíevb * file'^t^flrt bi^Liláiígíuíág*é'1 if'áblf ^rp-^icles the‘áns'yeíí‘ yTt 're'cltes^as^ff"¿n1' áhfi'ci^aíípn ofJ*tliis ar'guriíeüt<,> “ásííd Tfanch'is'ék/’hot/'■ ahse§s,ed,,,hnt,-to,:-:he!..tak!em. teto popsiderationrte,¡determining1 thé"'váhie!.bf!The\0^ íV-^y. 1“.’."? f

.''.^Th’e.ígl.aftep'iíii q,WsMonte®k^ its' ad valorem!”‘natnre. ■'W’hen It''proyteeh .for - the -tax (as/te arid doc!álr‘’prir|>ó‘sé'ff''*(¡® (1M8«:'§ 2Q7íl# t'S'ta't -Ann: .VV'ij j,cj¿ ,H(’|, ..v-iSU-j ; .lO.- Mili!-.: 1950 Bey.'§, 7i264},).*.sand- \fttr<fcb®p\pr<mdegl-fbr,the State.board t© certifyvthey-havé estimated-and así. spssed the'1-samé labwhat they ©“believe-,t©'. beithe.tfue cash value'--thedeofi-’and- ■* í tí fí'Aate-assessed the taxes thereon at- the■, average., rate-, of: ■ta'áesdor1 State; county, township, school, municipal and other-pur^ poses, levied thr.oughdhis-State,during ;the;precedlng year-'hs-'deterñlinedabyuusr.” i© l-jcCbj'--a; -1--. >'.5.

s tóíftjtiáíí, ! Bj&én'deáft* with' and' settled 'by1 this^Couft1' in Western Electric Co. v. Department of Revenue, 312 Mich 582, #htch required!cbhst^hhtiqn'hnd’hp^licatioh of ’article.’Í.0, §'1;! 5'(190'81, whicji1 appellant' in'thisfcásé ássíhhs as a barf to‘¿lie tax because by jt^PermslitdhbayaBle°t¿,4hküghheÍal! iimcí

,,,Alij spbie.qtg, qf,taxatipfl. p.qyrf op^^bp^g ¡to ,tbes pBÍrnary.,.schoihl int^eslafund'¡under .p^qserjt shall'contiiihe to'contribute to'thht fund.’’1

.hJhder(the>:éóhstitütÍ0nSl interpretationagiven- By this 'Cpurt,- ;the> words -kail'“subjects off taxation’:’''do not r'efer- to.particular taxpayers;’ - This '-Court' has heldjthe phrhse'Nc'onnqtBtl tó deeper igignilcanceythe ■underlying© principle! tin'«which'--the ©tax dáBdesigned anddm-p'oseds’i-i Western Electric Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra 589.

In our. ca-seythé -'subject; of>taxation .thhn coh-tribu-t-ing bathe primáry schoolinterést-fund was'set-fbi-th as far as appellant is concerned in PA 1905, N©;-282y This tax has been construed, and in our opinion can drily bAconst rued,las providing Bfor bhedáhing'of.’ihe property of certain corporations on an ádívaloT-eni basis.” Western Electric Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra, 593.

BOn -the Pthei?¡handy the instant? tail hasya'síwe;have seen,'béem 'eohs-truediUTGbeatedl^'as yai taü ihiposed U-ponthe righttO doíBuisinéss’-witMníthef State. Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Secretary of State, 216 Mich 261; In re Detroit International Bridge Co., 257 Mich 52, aff’d, Detroit International Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax Appeal Board of Michigan, 287 US 295 (53 S Ct 137, 77 L ed 314); Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Corporation & Securities Commission, supra.

The franchise tax imposed upon appellant is not upon the same subject of taxation as the ad valorem tax on property imposed by PA 1905, No 282, and, hence, article 10, §1, of the Constitution (1908) is not applicable.

For similar reasons, we hold inapplicable appellant’s argument that the franchise tax constitutes double taxation or violates the uniformity provisions of article 10, §§ 3 and 4, Const (1908), when applied to appellant in conjunction with PA 1905, No 282. The 2 taxes are not upon the same subject or for the same purpose. C. F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich 659.

See, also, 1 Cooley on Taxation (4th ed), § 223.

Nor does the franchise tax discriminate against railroads or offend the due process clause: of the Michigan Constitution (1908), art 2, § 16. Appellant’s right to do business within Michigan is taxed only once as is that of every other profit corporation doing business within this State. Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Secretary of State, supra.

Affirmed. No costs, public questions being involved.

Smith, Black, and Voelker, JJ., concurred with Edwards, J.

Kelly, J.

(dissenting in part). The 1952 legislature amended the general corporation fee act (PA 1921, No 85) by adding section 5b and, for the first time, imposed an annual franchise tax on railroad corporations, as follows:

“Sec. 5b. For the purpose of determining the annual franchise fee, the tax payable by a railroad company shall be measured by that portion of its paid-up capital and surplus determined by the average of the following 2 percentage ratios: The net ton miles of freight handled in this State to the total net ton miles of freight handled within and without the State; the number of miles of all track over which it operates within this State to the total number of miles of all track over which it operates within and without the State.” (CLS 1952, § 450.305b, Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 21.208[2].)

Section 5b has since been amended, but this formula prevailed in 1952 and is involved in this appeal.

My Brother cites over 30 United States supreme court decisions, but section 5b is unique not only because it was the first effort by the Michigan legislature to impose an annual special franchise tax on railroads but, also, because the legislature created a formula different than the numerous formulas adopted by legislatures of other States and passed upon by the United States supreme court.

The main question is whether the formula applied by the commission to appellant’s paid-up capital and surplus to determine the portion thereof allocable to Michigan is offensive to the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Justice Edwards decides it is not, and I conclude that it is offensive.

In determining the tax, the commission and the appeal board found as factor number 1 that the net ton miles of freight in Michigan (interstate and intrastate) was 532,709,000, which would constitute 78.61% of appellant’s total 677,639,000 net ton miles of freight carried by petitioner in 1951. The commission then decided as factor number 2 that there was in Michigan 558.37 miles of trackage out of the total 637.85 miles of appellant’s trackage, which would make the Michigan trackage 81.18% of the total trackage. Prom these 2 factors, the commission arrived at the conclusion that 79.8943% of appellant’s paid-up capital and surplus was allocable to Michigan for the purpose of the 1952 franchise tax.

Appellant contends that:

“Under the decisions of this Court and of the supreme court of the United States, the commission and the board should have omitted all consideration of the ‘net ton miles of freight’ transported by petitioner from points within Michigan to points outside of it, from points outside of Michigan to points within it, and between points both of which were outside of it; and the calculation of the portion of a petitioner’s paid-up capital and surplus allocable to Michigan should have been made as follows:

“Net ton miles of freight:

61,031,000 (Michigan intrastate) - = 9.00%

677,639,000 total)

"Tracking: 558.37 (in Michigan) 81.18%

687.85 (total) 90.18%

-=-2 = 45.09%

“Properly only 45.09% of the paid-up capital and surplus of petitioner is allocable to Michigan for the purposes of this tax. The commission and the appeal board have allocated 79.895% thereof to this State. * * *

“The error in the interpretation and application of the allocation formula alone caused the assessment of a tax excessive in the amount of $16,975.44.”

The tax in question is a franchise tax based, in part, on ton miles of freight transported in interstate commerce.

A State cannot levy a franchise tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, within its border.

Cooney v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 294 US 384 (55 S Ct 477, 79 L ed 934), dealt with the State of Montana’s right to levy an occupation tax on a telephone company. The supreme court stated (pp 392, 393):

“There is no question that the State may require payment of an occupation tax from one engaged in both intrastate and interstate commerce. But a State cannot tax interstate commerce; it cannot lay a tax upon the business which constitute such commerce or the privilege of engaging in it. And the fact that a portion of a business is intrastate and therefore taxable does not justify a tax either upon the interstate business or upon the whole business without discrimination. * * * Where the tax is exacted from one doing both an interstate and intrastate business, it must appear that it is imposed solely on account of the latter; that the amount exacted is not increased because of the interstate business done; that one engaged exclusively in interstate commerce would not be subject to the tax; and that the one who is taxed could discontinue the intrastate business without also withdrawing from the interstate business.”

In deciding East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio, 283 US 465 (51 S Ct 499, 75 L ed 1171), the supreme court left no doubt that a State cannot increase its tax on interstate commerce by any device calling for the inclusion of ton miles of interstate freight and, further, that transactions which are an essential and integral part of interstate commerce cannot be considered. The court expressed its views as follows (p 470):

“It is elementary that a State can neither lay a tax on the act of engaging in interstate, commerce. nor on gross receipts therefrom. * * * And, while a State may require payment of an occupation tax by one engaged in both intrastate and interstate commerce, the exaction in order to be valid must be imposed solely on account of the intrastate business without enhancement because of the interstate business done, and it must appear that one engaged exclusively in interstate business would not be subject to the imposition and that the taxpayer could discontinue the intrastate business without withdrawing also from the interstate business.”

In Gartland Steamship Co. v. Corporation & Securities Commission, 339 Mich 661, the Court followed the United States supreme court’s rulings as set forth above and ordered the commission to recompute the franchise fee “excluding any and all cargoes transported in interstate and foreign commerce.”

In Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Corporation & Securities Commission, 346 Mich 50, we dealt with a legislative-created franchise fee formula (section 5 of the corporation fee act [CLS 1952, § 450.305; Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 21.208]) which provided that the ratio of corporate Michigan property to total corporate property; plus a ratio- of Michigan wages to total wages; plus 1/2 of the receipts from Michigan interstate sales to all sales, should determine the tax. We held that the formula could not include the 1/2 of the sale of gas in interstate commerce.

Justice Edwards endeavors to reconcile his opinion with our previous opinions, as follows:

“Appellant relies heavily upon the Michigan cases of Gartland Steamship Co. v. Corporation & Securities Commission, 339 Mich 661; and Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Corporation & Securities Commission, 346 Mich 50.
“Both of these cases may be distinguished from our instant case on their facts. Gartland had no property in Michigan and did what the Court apparently regarded as only an inconsequential intrastate business in Michigan. Over 90% of Panhandle’s pipe line, properties and activities were1 located outside of Michigan. In addition, Panhandle involved the continuous flow of gas from the Avellheads in the Southwest to Michigan customers. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 US 157 (74 S Ct 396, 98 L ed 583). Neither'case involved the identical formula objected to here. And in both eases, this Court, while rejecting the specific formula, upheld the right to leA^y the tax and ordered recomputation under section 5e to achieve a reasonable result.”

I do not agree with such a reconciliation. The fact remains that it is not the ownership of propery within this State that is in issue, but the attempt to use the ton miles of freight transported in interstate commerce.

I agree with my Brother’s conclusion that the commission did not err in its determination of the value of paid-up capital and surplus.

The determination should be reversed, with order that the commission recompute tax excluding ton miles of freight transportation in interstate commerce.

Dethmers, C. J., and Carr, J., concurred with-Kelly, J.

Kavanagh, J., did not sit. 
      
       See, also, Stat Ana § 21.82 and supplements.—Reporter.
     
      
       See, currently, 11 USCA, § 205.—Reporter.
     
      
      ,See, eurrektly,'pLS 1956, S§ 450,82^ sübcl, "akcl, 45Ó.305.—Kb-
     
      
      See,Iit:b justice fioúgíá's, dí^sénti11g,' in part, Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 US 422, 445 ( 67 S Ct 815, 827, 91 L ed 993, 1010).
     
      
       See last portion of this opinion.
     
      
       See Page’s Ohio Rev Code Ann, § 5733.05.—Reporter.
     
      
       See interesting critique on' these cases, Phillips, The Allocation Formula Under the Michigan Annual Franchise Tax, 35 Taxes, March; 1957, 162.
     
      
       It should be noted that no Federal due process question is presented to us in this case presumably because the interstate-commerce factor complained of was a part of “the net ton miles of freight handled in this State.” CLS 1952, § 450.305b (Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 21.208 [2]). As to the effect of the due process clause upon inclusion of an out-of-State factor in the formula for measuring the value of the right to do intrastate business, see the excellent analysis in Mr. Justice Smith’s opinion in Clevelancl-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Corporation & Securities Commission, 351 Mich 652.
     