
    No. 7408.
    Interdiction of Scott Watson. Intervention of Mrs. Weatherly, et al.
    The interdiction of a person will not be pronounced on the evidence of two medical experts, neither of whom had ever conversed with him until the day before the filing of their report of his condition, and who had had no opportunity to test his mental condition.
    Mere weakness of mind in the defendant will not warrant a decree of interdiction when such a decree is not asked for by any of his relatives, and when, in view of the evidence adduced, it does not appear that the interdiction is necessary, either for the protection of his person, or his property.
    ^PPEAL from the Parish Court, Tensas, Bondurant, J.
    
      Beeve Lewis .and E. Howard Farrar, curator for Scott Watson, •defendant and appellant.
    
      J. W. Montgomery, Steele & Garrett forintervenors, appellees.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Manning, C. J.

Scott Watson, the elder, died in 1859, leaving a widow and three minor children, the youngest of whom died shortly afterwards. His estate was valuable, consisting chiefly of a cotton plantation in Tensas parish, and he owed no debts. The mother was confirmed as natural tutrix of the children, and an inventory was made of the succession property. In 1860, she married John R. Weatherly, having first convoked a family meeting, which advised that she be retained as natural tutrix of her children, but that she must give a bond according to the requirements of law relative to dative tutors, and she accordingly executed a bond as tutrix in the sum of one hundred thousand dollars.

The two surviving children of the Watson marriage are a son, now called Scott, whose interdiction 'is now sought, and a daughter, Ida, now Widow Robert Weatherly. In 1866 these children-were taken to France» by their mother to complete their education. Scott was then about nineteen years old, and was a promising youth — ‘ the brightest boy in. school,’ says his cousin as a- witness — ' both mentally and physically sound,’ says another. Two years afterwards, he was brought home in a condition, as is now charged, of mental idiocy and imbecility, and has so remained ever since.

In 1878, the parish judge of Tensas, reciting that Scott Watson is afflicted with a permanent and complete idiocy, and subject to an habitual state of imbecility, to such an extent that he is now and has been for more than ten years entirely unable to take care of his person and property, and that he has real and personal property of great value as well as large sums due him from his mother, and whereas his interdiction has never been solicited by any of his relatives, whose duty was to institute proceedings to that end, and it is made the duty of the judge to pronounce the interdiction ex officio, it was ordered that cause be shewn why the decree should not be made, both by Scott himself, and by an attorney at law who was at once appointed to represent him. The proceeding is taken under art. 38á of the Oivil Code, and is as follows ; — If the person who should be interdicted has no relations and is not married, or if his relations or consort do not act, the interdiction may be solicited by any stranger, or pronounced ex officio by the judge after having heard the counsel of the person whose interdiction is prayed for, whom it shall be the duty of the judge to name, if one be not already named by the party. New No. 391.

E. H. Farrar, Esq., the counsel appointed by the court to represent the proposed interdict, answered by a general denial, and requiring proof of the judge’s allegations. About two weeks thereafter, Scott Watson answered through “ counsel appointed by himself,” as is stated therein, denying that there is any necessity for his interdiction, and praying, should the court decree otherwise, that he be placed under the curatorship of his mother. At the same time, the mother and sister intervened, the former alleging that for many years she has had charge of her son, taking care of him, and protecting him with the attention and solicitude which a mother alone can bestow, and that there is no necessity for the appointment of a curator whereby she will be deprived of the care and supervision of his person. The sister reiterates her mother’s allegations, and charges that the proceedings are wholly unnecessary, and are the result of impertinent and officious intermeddling by outsiders, who have no interest in the matters involved. She further avers that she is her brother’s presumptive heir, as her mother is his forced heir, and she desires the appointment of her mother as curatrix, if one be deemed necessary.

Upon these pleadings the case was tried, and judgment of interdiction was pronounced.

We have heretofore had occasion to consider the difference between idiocy, imbecility, and insanity, and to define these three mental conditions. Francke’s case, 29 Annual, 302. Insanity is not attributed to the subject of the present proceedings. His interdiction is demanded because of idiocy and imbecility. The allegation is, that he is “ afflicted with a permanent and complete idiocy, and is subject to an habituaj state of imbecility.” It is very clear that he is not an idiot. Idiocy is marked by congenital deficiency of the mental faculties, says a. writer on this subject. 2 Taylor’s Med. Jurisp. 502. The first appearance of mental lesion was about the time he had attained majority, and while pursuing his studies in France, with the same promise of a brilliant future that his school-fellows had noticed in his early youth. The cause for the interdiction must be imbecility.

Two physioians were appointed to examine him. One of them had never conversed with him ‘ before yesterday,’ the day of the examination, which lasted an hour and a half. He describes him as very weak both in body and mind, having comparatively no mind, and would suppose from the nature of the disease, that he would at times be violent, although that form of the disease is not so apt to produce violence as some other forms — thinks he would only be violent when irritated or interfered with — the disease is rather an atrophy of the mind than melancholia, and is incurable. The other physician had known Watson longer — dressed a wound in his hand once, but had little or no conversation with him at the time, and consequently could form no idea of his mental condition, and this was the extent of his intercourse with him until the examination of ‘ yesterday’ — says he was quiet on both occasions, and judging from his condition yesterday, should think he never had mind enough to take care of his person and property. The first physician says that Watson has not now mind enough to take care of his person or property. They both join in a formal report that Watson has that form of insanity described in medical jurisprudence as dementia.

It is manifest that if the necessity for interdiction rests solely upon the testimony of the two medical experts, no sufficient cause is shewn for a decree which entails such serious consequences upon the subject of it. Neither of them had had opportunity to test the mental condition of the imbecile. Neither of them had ever conversed with him except during the examination of the previous day, and the opportunities for forming an opinion upon one’s permanent mental condition, which often displays deceptive manifestations, were conspicuously meagre.

Other testimony is in the record, from which we gain much information of his condition. Mr. Clinton, an intelligent lawyer, speaks from knowledge of Watson in his earlier youth, and before there was any mental lesion, as well as from personal observation of him since. The mother and sister also testified. We gather from the evidence that Watson is in the same condition as was Mrs. Erancke. Early after his mental disturbance was manifested, he was submitted to the late Dr. Warren Stone for examination, who advised that restraint of any kind should be avoidéd, and the largest liberty allowed to him. This course was pursued, and with apparent benefit. He ate with the family — slept in a chamber adjoining his mother’s — had perfect freedom of action, and required only the supervision that a child does. The only vicious or violent propensity he exhibits is cutting his clothes, but he is tractable and never wild. Some years after Dr. Stone’s examination, he was placed in a Retreat near Baltimore, but was removed therefrom by the advice of the physician in charge of it, who saw that even a partial restraint was hurtful, and commended Mrs. Weatherly to renew her former personal supervision and control of him. Last summer he was sent to a place in Mississippi in the highlands, and remained until late in the autumn, and returned in better condition than he has exhibited since his malady began. Everywhere he manifests a very warm love for his mother, and submits himself readily to her direction. “ It would be more than cruel, says the sympathetic sister, to take him away from her. It would be death.”

The matter for our decision now is, not whether he shall be taken away from his mother, but whether he is in that condition which requires the interposition of a court to pronounce his interdiction. We do not think he is in such condition.

The case is almost a complete parallel to that of Mrs. Erancke. The malady of both is the same. Neither is able to take care of his person or of his property. Restraint, if prolonged, would unquestionably in either case produce dementia, and the experiment, tried with both, exhibited the same result.

We infer from a part of the testimony, that the fact that neither Mrs. Weatherly nor her husband had ever filed an account of Scott and Ida Watson’s property and revenues, is supposed to create the necessity for interdicting the former. As a consequence of this, and to rebut the presumption of mal-appropriation or mismanagement of the property, it is in evidence that the property is managed with unusual skill and judgment, and it is worthy of remembrance in this aspect of the case that his sister, who has the same interest in the property, does not call for an account, nor allege misappropriation of its revenues, and she, her mother, and the half-brother of the second marriage are the heirs of Scott, and the only persons who could be injured by wasting his revenues, or deteriorating, or injuring his property. If it were otherwise, we should hesitate before pronouncing a sentence, which might incalculably affect the proposed interdict for worse, and could not ameliorate his physical or mental condition. If the lessons of experience, taught by subjecting him to different modes of treatment, and the advice and opinion of those physicians, in whose care he was placed with the special view of ascertaining what was necessary for his well-being, are to be considered, we must conclude that he is not labouring under insanity (which indeed is not charged in the pleadings) but rather that he is afflicted with a permanent feebleness of intellect, which only requires uncongenial treatment to be developed into dementia.

This subject is attracting a large share of the attention of philanthrophists and legists now, and courts are proceeding in such matters with more caution and circumspection than formerly. We perceive no good reason for interdicting this unfortunate man. His person could not be better cared for than it now is by his mother. His property seems to be so little in danger that his co-heir, equally interested with himself, is satisfied with its present management, and those who will inherit it upon his death, are making no complaint. Therefore

It is ordered, and decreed that the judgment of the lower court is avoided and reversed, and that there be now j udgment in favour of the defendant and intervenors, the costs of appeal to be paid by the defendant.

Dissenting Opinion.

White, J.

I cannot agree with the conclusion of the Court in this case, and express my dissent with much hesitancy, but to my mind the proof in the record is so clear and the law applicable to it so free from ambiguity, that I feel compelled by a sense of duty to state the reasons by which my mind has been convinced that the interdiction should be pronounced.

What is the issue before us ? The Parish Judge of Tensas of his own motion, after reciting that it had come to his knowledge that Scott Watson, a resident of his jurisdiction, who was the owner of large estates, was insane and incapable of managing either his person or property, instituted proceedings for his interdiction. To this proceeding the mother and sister of the defendant intervened and resisted the interdiction. Was the action of the Judge warranted by law ? The question does not in my mind admit of discussion in face of the plain text of 0. C. 391, saying: If the person who should be interdicted has no relations and is not married, or if his relations or consort do not act, the interdiction may be solicited by any stranger or pronounced ex offido by the Judge after hearing the counsel of the person whose interdiction is prayed for, whom it shall.bethe duty of the Judge to name, if one be not already named by the party. The question of procedure being thus determined, what is the fact as to insanity vel non ? To my mind there is no doubt of the overwhelming and uncontradicted proof of insanity. To make this obvious, let us examine the proof in the record. What does that proof show ?

The father of Scott Watson died years ago, leaving a widow and three children. The unfortunate subject of this litigation grew up full of promise ; having been sent to school in Prance he was after a short absence brought back, if not a maniac at least a person of insane mind. What do the witnesses say ? Let us examine the testimony of each and every one, so as to leave no room for misconception.

1. Two physicians appointed by the court to examine him both testify and report him as insane, as incompetent to exercise volition, as utterly incapable of taking charge of his person or property.

2. Alex. Reed, who had been employed to take care of him, describes him as a person of unsound mind, as an insane person, unable to take care of his person and his property.

3. Wm. Watson, who had been employed to take charge of the young man on a trip made by him to Mississippi, describes him as insane, as at times frantic, at others quiet, but never either rational or capable of taking care of his person or his property.

4. Robert Murdock, an old resident of the parish, who has known him from his boyhood, testifies that he is insane and completely incapable of volition.

5. Eli Tullis, who has known him from birth, testifies to the same effect.

6. J. T. Watson, a cousin, describes him as an insane man, never in his moments of partial tranquillity able to take care of his person or property. In speaking of his condition, he says: He is perfectly wild at times; he has tried to kill his mother, and she has so told me.” The Parish Judge testifies to the insanity from personal knowledge ; says he was impelled to institute the proceedings from a sense of duty, having seen the young man in an apparently neglected, condition. Such is the proof for interdiction; could it be plainer ? Is it in any way rebutted ? I think not. The mother and sister, who oppose the interdiction, both in their testimony admit the insanity, but think the insane young man will be better eared for by his mother than any other person. T. P. Clinton, Esq., testifies to an interview, or rather a meeting with him ; he mentions him as then reasonably quiet. He concludes his testimony by saying r “ He is certainly incapable of managing his own estate, and requires more supervision than a ten-year old boy.” Such is every particle of testimony in the record. If it does not establish insanity beyond peradventuré, what could prove it ? Whatisthelaw ? “No person above the age of majority who is subject to an habitual state of imbecility, insanity, or madness, shall be allowed to take care of his person and administer his estate, although such person shall at times appear to have the possession of his reason.” O. 0.389. If the defendant be insane, how can the mandatory provisions of the law be avoided without substituting the volition of the judge for the will of the law-maker ? True, the mother does not desire the interdiction, but that her wish or desire ought not to control is rendered, it seems to me, self-evident by keeping in mind the words shall be allowed, already referred to, and by considering that even a stranger may provoke interdiction, if the relatives do not act. But, it is said, if the defendant is in the care of his mother, no interest of his person requires his interdiction. The wise provisions of the Code as I read them are placed on no such narrow basis. They contemplate giving to the unfortunate person who may be bereft of reason the benefit of every safe-guard, without regard to individuals or relationship ; they provide the inflexible and disinterested will of the law, as a shield, as a protection where the natural will no longer exists. Their policy is •obvious, founded in a knowledge of human nature, the result of the accumulated experience of all ages, to obviate all danger of temptation ; they provide that the person whose insanity is such as to render him incapable of taking charge of his person or property is to be directed not by any one or two of his relations who might in any given case be' interested in the perpetuation of this insanity, but that the courts shall with the family meeting guard his person and administer his property. In the present case it may be that the disease is incurable, and that its victim will be happier in the hands of his mother than elsewhere. Does it follow that a decree of interdiction will remove him ? He is the owner of a large and fruitful estate, and the law has wisely and humanely provided that the revenues of the property of the interdict shall be expended in operating his cure or in mitigating his sufferings. The very object of the law in interdicting is to have such revenues applied to these desirable ends under the eye of the court, so that the person who would enjoy the revenues if no interdiction were allowed is not to judge of the necessity of their application. It is for this reason that the books speak of the decree of interdiction as a merciful decree, as one guaranteeing to the sufferer every care and hope of cure, free from the danger which might otherwise flow from the selfishness, the depravity, the interested motives of individuals. Aside, however, from these considerations, the interdiction is in my judgment required to protect the defendant from being defrauded by any misguided exercise of his now diseased will. As by majority the law presumes capacity to contract, so it continues the presumption of capacity until destroyed by the presumption juris et de jure, the decree of interdiction. If to-morrow we were called upon to enforce against the defendant a contract by which he had divested himself of his heritage, would we not with the facts in this record recoil from so doing ? How, however, could we escape it if' we now fail to recognize that disordered will from which incapacity results ? It is from these reasons that Marcadé says the law-maker has said a person deprived of reason “ shall be interdicted,” not only as a benefit to himself, but also as a protection to society, to avoid the pitiable spectacle of courts being made'the instruments of wrong and injustice. Whatever may be the correctness of the foregoing views as to the necessity of interdiction for the sake of the person and the will of the defendant, in my mind they, even if incorrect, would not obviate the necessity of inter" diction. The large estate of the defendant is shown to be in the hands of his step-father, and whilst there is a statement that the real estate appears to be in a flourishing condition, there is nothing whatever to show what is done with its revenues, or what has become of the personal estate, which was very large. This whole estate, both personal and real, in my opinion can and ought to be administered as the law requires. It is said that his mother and sister are his presumptive heirs, and they do not complain, hence there is no reason for judicial action. The law, however, is not so harsh as to consider the light of a darkened mind as gone out forever ; it contemplates the possibility of a cure, and it acts with that object in view. It does not consider an unfortunate sufferer dead by anticipation, so that his heirs can take his property and administer it without bond, without supervision, without responsibility. The presumptive heirs, were such not the case, would be interested in perpetuating the mental disturbance. The mother of the young man has remarried ; at the date of the second marriage the family meeting retained her in the tutorship upon her giving bond as <a dative tutor. Years have gone away, the revenues of the son’s estate have year by year been acquired. How disbursed is a question upon which the record is silent, •and which, in my opinion, should be answered by an account rendered with the formalities required by law. Eor the sake of the defendant for that of his person, his will, and his property, as also for society itself I think the judgment of interdiction pronounced below should be affirmed.

Seencer, J. I concur in the opinion and conclusion of Mr. Justice ’White.  