
    J. Parravicene, vs. Geo. E. Schwart.
    
      The Prison Bound’s Act, only requires the defendant to surrender so much property, as shall be sufficient to satisfy the debí for which he is arrested. Whether the property be sufficient for that purpose, is amatter, in the first instance, for the deter- ■ mination of the judge. The judge may. allow defendant’s schedule to be amended, even after it is sworn to.
    
    This was an application for the benefit of the prison bound’s act. Defendant filed a schedule on the 2d August, 1823f with an oath, that it contained a full account of all his estate and effects; upon which the plaintiff was summoned to shew cause why he should not- be discharged, On the 12th August, the parties appeared before judge Bay, and at the defendant’s-request, the cause was postponed to Friday 15th, to give him an opportunity to account for his having spent more than two shil-ings and six pence, per day, while in prison. On the 15th the plaintiff produced tax returns, showing that defendant’s wife, before marriage, was interested in a considerable estate, which the defendant did not explain, and . the judge granted the plaintifl till Tuesday, 19th August, to show why defendant should not be discharged. On the 19th August, the plaintiff produced the' affidavit of Mr. Monpoey, in the following terms: “H. Mon-■poey, swears that he knows a boy, Hercules, who was in the possession of George E. Schwart,'before he went to gaol lately,, believes he is his property, and that he acquired him by his intermarriage with Ann Wilkinson, otherwise called Ann Lloyd.” The defendant’s schedule made no mention of this or any other negro, or any property but wearing apparel.
    Plaintiff then insisted, that as he had shewn cause to disbelieve the defendant’s oath, he ought not' to be discharged. The defendant neither admitted nor denied Mr. Monpoey’s statement, but offered to assign his right to the boy Hercules, without any explanation however of his right, or accounting for the omission of the negro in his schedule. The plaintiff insisted on a jury, or to be allowed to examine witnesses before the judge, to ascertain whether the oath of defendant was true; but the presiding judge refused it, because he said the defendant had a right to amend, and directed him to do so. The plaintiff then offered to interrogate the defendant, and proposed to ask him, where the boy Hercules was, and what title he had to him, but the presiding judge refused to allow any question to be asked and ordered the defendant to be discharged. From, this order, the plaintiff appeals for the following, among other reasons:
    1st. Because the presiding judge refused to allow the plaintiff to prove that the defendant, Schwart; had' rendered a false and fraudulent schedule. j
    
    2nd. Because the presiding judge discharged the defendant, after the plaintiff had shown, in the language of the act, that the oath which he had taken ought not to be believed.
    3d. Because the presiding judge refused to let the plaintiff interrogate the defendant, m order to know where the negro Hercules was to be found, or how the plaintiff was to obtain possession of him.
   The opinion of the court, was delivered by

Mr. Justice Mott.

This was an application for the benefit of the act commonly called the prison bound's act, and not of the act, for the relief of insolvent debtors; and although the objects of the two acts, are in general distinct, the seventh clause of the prison bound’s act, has been held to apply equally to persons applying for the benefit of the other. But in the construction of it, we must nevertheless have regard to the nature of the application. The prison bound’s act, requires the defendant only to deliver up property enough to satisfy the debt for which he is confined. If therefore, he surrenders enough for that purpose, the judge to whom the application is made is not bound to prosecute his enquiries any further. The object-of the act, as well as the object of both parties is satisfied, and whether the property surrendered be sufficient or not, must always be referred, in the first instance, to the discretion of the judge.

In the case now under consideration, the judge.reports to us that the property surrendered was' amply sufficient, independent of the negro boy Hercules. It is true, the judge may sometimes be deceived; but a discharge from imprisonment is not a discharge of the debt. If the property mentioned in the, schedule, is not sufficient; any other property that the defendant has at the time, or any that he may afterwards acquire, will’still be liable, and if the schedule be false, he may be arrested again! on the same execution. If the property surrendered, should' not appear to be sufficient, and it be suggested that the schedule is false, I think the case ought to be referred to a jury. 1 have no doubt, however, but that the judge may suffer the schedule to be amended, and if it shall appear that the property was not kept back with any fraudulent view, that the person may be discharged. • <

Petigru, for motion,

Hunt, contra.

It appears to have been the intention of the act, to allow a considerable latitude of discretion in the judge to whom the application is made; and, I' think, it ought to be liberally exercised in favor of liberty. I am of opinion, therefore, without going into an examination of the several grounds made in tha brief, separately, that the motion ought to be refused.

ColcocU, Johnson and Huger, Justices, concurred,  