
    REICH v. STATE.
    (No. 7277.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    May 30, 1923.)
    1. Intoxicating liquors <§=>222— Indictment held not vitiated by absence of averment that liquor was not manufactured for one of excepted purposes.
    Where an indictment charged the manufacture of intoxicating liquor on the 10th of November, 1921, and “anterior to the presentment of the indictment,” but contained no averment that such liquor was not manufactured for one of the excepted purposes, which averment was necessary if the offense was committed prior to the statutory amendment of fhe prohibition law on November 15, 1921 (Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1922, art. 588% et seq.),.held that the absence of such averment did not vitiate the indictment, but limited the proof under it to offenses committed subsequent to November 15th and prior to the filing of the indictment.
    2. Intoxicating liquors 132 — State prohibition act not in conflict with congressional enactments.
    The Dean Law (Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1922, art. 588%. et seq.) is not in conflict with similar laws enacted by Congress.
    3. Jury <@=580 — Where 22 Jurors remained In panel, court did not err in refusing to fill panel preliminary to exercising of peremptory challenges.
    Where, after excusing the jurors who were disqualified, there remained 22 in the panel the trial court committed no error in refusing to fill the panel preliminary to the exercising of peremptory challenges.
    4. Criminal law <@=» 1152(2) — -Jury <§=>1131 (2) —Limits of voir dire examination within discretion of court, but abuse of discretion will l)e corrected on appeal.
    The questioning of veniremen on their voir dire need only be kept within reasonable limits, which, in each case, are to be determined by the trial judge, and his discretion in such matter, when abused, will be corrected on appeal.
    5. Jury <©=>131 (4) — Court’s refusal to permit questioning as to whether veniremen were members of Ku Klux Klan held error.
    In a prosecution for manufacturing intoxicating liquor, where defendant’s counsel requested permission to interrogate veniremen as to whether or not they were members of the Ku Klux Klan, and stated that he believed some of them were, and that the Klan had been discussing at their meetings numerous criminal prosecutions and insisting upon convictions, and that he feared prejudice, held that it was error for the court to refuse permission to so examine. •
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    Appeal from District Court, Wood County; J. R. Warren, Judge.
    Bob Reich, was convicted of unlawfully manufacturing intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
    Reversed.
    Jones & Jones, of Mineóla, for appellant.
    R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

Conviction is for the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor; punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of three years.

The indictment contained no averments to the effect that the intoxicating liquor was not manufactured for one of the purposes permitted by the Constitution and statutes. It was filed in March, 1922. The date of the offense was laid on the 10th of November, 1921, and “anterior to the presentment of the indictment.” The attach on it because of the absence of the negative averments is deemed.unsound. Such averments were required in offenses committed prior to November 15, 1921, at which time the statute was amended. The present indictment would have limited the proof to an offense committed subsequent to that date and prior to the filing of the indictment, but would not have vitiated it. See Plachy v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 2S9 S. W. 979.

The so-called Dean Law (Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1922, art. 588*4 et seq.) is not void by its alleged conflict with similar laws enacted by Congress. Ex parte Gilmore, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 529, 228 S. W. 199.

After excusing the jurors who were disqualified, there remained 22 in the panel. The trial court committed no error in refusing to fill the panel preliminary to the exercising of peremptory challenges. See Speiden v. State, 3 Tex. App. 156, 30 Am. Rep. 126; Logan v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 180, 115 S. W. 1192; West v. State, 7 Tex. App. 150; also Riley v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 249 S. W. 1066.

Preliminary to the trial, appellant told the court that a number' of the veniremen were believed by appellant’s counsel to be members of a secret organization known as the Ku Klux. Klan; that, according to his information, many criminal cases pending in Wood county had been discussed by the members of that organization and speeches had been' made in their lodge rooms insisting upon convictions in criminal cases, and that, for the reasons stated, he feared that prejudice-had been created against him and against his case, and on that account he requested! the court to permit him to inquire of the-jurors on their voir dire whether or not they were members of the organization mentioned. The court refused this request, to which actiofi appellant took exception, and now presents the matter for review. Ten peremptory challenges are allowed the accused in felony eases less than capital. In article-690 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is-said:

“A peremptory challenge is made to a juror without assigning any reason therefor.”

Under the practice in this state, the-right to interrogate veniremen on their voir dire is not open to question. This may be done in order to elicit facts that will enable-them to exercise their right of peremptory challenge in an intelligent manner. This must, of course, within reasonable limits, be determined under the facts of the particular case by the trial judge. His discretion in-the matter, however, has limitations, and, when abused, will be corrected upon- appeal. Cyc. vol. 24, p. 338, 3d subdivision of the text, notes 23, 24; H. &. T. C. Ry. Co. v. Terrell, 69 Tex. 650, 7 S. W. 670; Barnes v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 88 S. W. 805; Patrick v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 587, 78 S. W. 947.

Upon the facts revealed by the bill of exceptions in the instant case, it is conceived that the inquiry proposed was a proper one. The information which was called for was-certainly calculated to have enabled appellant to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges. We fail to discern anything in its nature that would give the court the discretion to deny the privilege of propounding the questions. Illustrative eases are numerous. See Houston v. State, 83 Tex Cr. R. 190, 202 S. W. 84; De Arman v. State, 80 Tex. Cr. R. 147, 189 S. W. 145; Hibbitt v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 527, 236 S. W. 739; Crow v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 142, 230 S. W. 148; Stagner v. State, 9 Tex. App. 440; Lavin v. State, 69 Ill. 303; State v. Miller (Mo.) 207 S. W. 797; State v. Smith, 57 Mont. 563, 190 Pac. 107; Barnes v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. R. 501, 168 S. W. 858.

The facts set forth in the bills of exception, in our opinion, reveal error requiring a reversal of the judgment, which is ordered. 
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