
    John Marley vs. D. H. Cummings, Adm’r, et al.
    
    1. Statute oe Limitations. Administrators and executors. Insolvent estates. Presentation 0/ claims. Act of 1789, eh. 23, § 4. The laws regulating the administration of insolvent estates, do not affect the operation of the act of 1789, ch. 23, g 4, limiting the time within which creditors are required to make demand of their respective accounts, debts and claims of every kind whatever, from the personal representative of the estate.
    2 Same. Same. Same. Where, upon a bill filed by an administrator of an insolvent estate, for administration thereof, and orders made for the filing of claims, a party filed his petition, setting up a claim to one of the slaves of said estate, more than four years after the qualification of the administrator, and the filing of the bill; it is held that he is barred by the act of 1789, eh. 28, g 4; and the operation of the statute is not affected by the fact, that said petition was delayed to await the result of a similar claim set up by the widow of the intestate.
    FROM KNOX.
    Tbe administrator of Daniel McCallum filed an insolvent bill in tbe Chancery Court at Knoxville, for tbe administration of said estate, and an order was made at tbe October Term, 1852, directing tbe creditors to file tbeir claims with the master. Soon after said order, in tbe month of December, 1852, tbe widow of said McOal-lum filed her - answer, in which she set up a claim to the separate ownership under the will 'of her father, of a slay'e named Lucinda, claimed as part of ‘said estate. This claim was decided against her at the April Term, 1856, and the slave was declared to belong to the estate. The petitioner, John Marley, a citizen of Knox county, who had in 1852, made himself a party to the cause as a creditor, on account of certain debts alleged •to be due him from the estate; at the December Term, 1856, filed his petition in said cause, claiming said slavé as his' property, under' a bill of sale from the intestate, and alleging as the reason of his delay,, the pending proceeding of the widow, whose claim, if decided for her, would be superior to his. At the April Term, 1858, said petition was dismissed, and the slave decreed to be sold among the other assets, for the bene fit of the creditors. The petitioner, John Marley appealed.
    Trigg and Temple, for the petitioner.
    LyoN, for the respondents.
   McKiNNEY, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was an insolvent bill for the administration of D. McCallum’s estate, in the Chancery Court of Knox. The bill was filed prior to the October Term, 1852, of said Court; and at that term, an order was made, directing the. creditors of the estate to file their claims with the master. •

In December, 1852, Mrs. McCallum, the widow of the intestate, filed her answer, in which she set up claim to a female slave, named Lucinda, and her infant child, as her separate property, derived from her father’s estate. Her claim to the slaves was resisted; and at the April Term, 1856, the Chancellor decreed against her, and declared the slaves to belong, to the estate, in which decree she acquiesced.

Afterwards, at the December Term, 1856, John Marley presented his petition, in which -he alleges, that said slaves, Lucinda, and her issue, belong to him, under and by virtue of a bill of sale for Lucinda, executed to him by D. McCallum, the intestate, on the 8th of June, 1842, w7hich was duly registered, and of which he exhibits a copy.

Marley was a resident of Knox county, and had made himself a party to this cause, as early as December, 1852, by a petition in which he claimed to be a creditor of the estate, on account of different sums of money paid for the intestate, and on other accounts.

In his last petition, he excuses himself for the delay of four years, in asserting his claim to the slaves, on the ground of the pending contest in behalf of the widow, as her claim, if sustained, was superior to his.

At the April Term, 1858, the Chancellor dismissed Marley’s petition, and ordered the slave to be sold for distribution amongst the creditors.

In this there is no error. There is nothing in the act, providing for the administration of insolvent estates, that affects the operation of the act of 1789, ch. 28, sec. 4, limiting the time within which creditors are required to “ make demand of their respective accounts, debts, and claims of every kind whatever,” from the personal representative of the estate.

The petition of Marley is, in effect, a new suit; a “claim” to recover the slaves, set up, for the. first time, more than four years after the qualification of the administrator, and the filing of this bill. The “ claim” was clearly barred by the act of 1789, the bar of the act of 1715, aside.

The cause of delay in presenting the claim, alleged in the petition, is plausible, but it is of no efficacy in excluding the operation of the statute.

The decree will be affirmed.  