
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Nolan CRUZ-CASTILLO, aka Nolan Curz-Castillo, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 12-2980-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 1, 2013.
    Harris M. Fischman and Michael A. Levy, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
    Marsha R. Taubenhaus, Law Offices of Marsha R. Taubenhaus, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, AMALYA L. KEARSE, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Nolan Cruz-Castillo appeals from a July 11, 2012 judgment of conviction entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Crotty, J.) following a plea of guilty. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

First, Cruz-Castillo appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He claims that his motion should have been granted, asserting that he did not understand the plea agreement, which he alleges was not properly translated into Spanish, and because he could not easily communicate with his attorney, who he alleges was not fluent in Spanish. But Cruz-Castillo’s allegations in the motion to withdraw and on appeal “merely contradict the record.” United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir.1992)). At his plea allocution, Cruz-Castillo confirmed while under oath that he had reviewed his plea agreement with his attorney and that he was satisfied with his attorney’s advice and representation. “A defendant’s bald statements that simply contradict what he said at his plea allocution are not sufficient grounds to withdraw [a] guilty plea.” Id. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cruz-Castillo’s motion to withdraw his plea.

Next, Cruz-Castillo appeals from the district court’s imposition of a sentence of 99 months of imprisonment, arguing that the sentence was unreasonable. However, in his plea agreement Cruz-Castillo agreed not to appeal from “any sentence within or below the Stipulated Guidelines Range of 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment.” J.A. at 23. This waiver covers the sentence that was imposed by the district court.

Cruz^Castillo contends that he is not bound by the appeal waiver because the government breached the plea agreement when it advocated against the application of an acceptanee-of-responsibility adjustment. We disagree. The agreement states that “[njothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility ... if the defendant fails clearly to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the Government, through his allocution and subsequent conduct prior to the imposition of sentence.” J.A. at 23. The government reasonably determined that Cruz-Castillo had failed to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility to the government’s satisfaction because Cruz-Castillo had filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in which, at the least, he “maintain[edj his innocence to some degree.” J.Á. at 44. The government was therefore entitled to advocate against a finding that Cruz-Castillo had accepted responsibility, and in doing so it did not breach the plea agreement. Consequently, the appeal waiver within that agreement bars Cruz-Castillo’s sentencing appeal. We will enforce that waiver here and decline to consider his sentencing challenges. See United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (“It is by now well-settled that a defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal a sentence within an agreed upon guideline range is enforceable.”).

We have considered Cruz-Castillo’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  