
    City of Buffalo, Appellant, v Cargill, Incorporated, Respondent. County of Erie, Appellant, v Cargill, Incorporated, Respondent.
    Argued January 12,1978;
    decided February 16,1978
    
      POINTS OF COUNSEL
    
      Leslie G. Fosehio, Corporation Counsel (Charles S. Desmond and Hugh B. Scott of counsel), for appellant in the first above-entitled action.
    I. The decision of the court below in holding that the city taxes were "paid” when the city in theory of law "purchased” its own tax liens is erroneous in fact and in law. (Matter of Ueck, 286 NY 1; Strong v Reeves, 280 App Div 301, 306 NY 666; Schenck v State Line Tel. Co., 238 NY 308; Smith v Kirkpatrick, 305 NY 66; Matter of Tate v Dickens, 276 App Div 94; Matter of Gelbin v Metro Goldwyn Mayer Pictures, 261 App Div 196, 1010.) II. The policy of New York State, as expressed in the Real Property Law and other statutes and in the common law, as well as the necessities of local government, and reason and fairness, and the very language of the present controlling statutes, require a holding that defendant, a resident corporate owner, remains liable in personam for unpaid city realty taxes, regardless of whether the tax liens are "deemed” to have been "sold” to the city itself. (Williams v Townsend, 31 NY 411; Smith v Cornell, 111 NY 554; Village of Lynbrook v Otto, 266 NY 308; Village of Massapequa Park v Massapequa Park Villa Sites, 278 NY 28; Seabury v Bowen, 3 Bradf 207; Griswold v Griswold, 4 Bradf 216; Milwaukee County v White Co., 296 US 268.) III. The court below erred in holding that Matter of Ueck (286 NY 1) requires dismissal here, since (a) not only are there factual differences between this case and Ueck, but the statutes on which Ueck is based have been changed since Ueck so that they now clearly impose, under circumstances like those in this case, personal liability on a corporation having a place of business in the city, for unpaid city taxes; (b) this court held in Matter of County of Nassau (Gelb — Siegel) (24 NY2d 621) as did the dissenting opinion in the court below in the present case, that the Ueck language is no longer applicable since under the modern statutes, the city or county does not, by "purchasing” at its tax sale, become the owner of the realty, nor are the taxes "paid”. (Town of Amherst v County of Erie, 260 NY 361; City of Buffalo v Dankner, 48 AD2d 572, 38 NY2d 826; Sharkey v Thurston, 268 NY 123; Riggs v Palmer, 115 NY 506; Surace v Danna, 248 NY 18; Motor Vehicle Acc. Ind. Corp. v Eisenberg, 18 NY2d 1; Kauffman & Sons Saddlery Co. v Miller, 298 NY 38; County of Nassau v Lincer, 254 App Div 746.)
    
      Alexander C. Cordes, Gerard R. Haas, John K. McCormick and Paul F. Jones for respondent in the first above-entitled action.
    I. The annual tax sales held by the city extinguished whatever real estate tax liability Cargill may have had for the period 1970-1971 through 1974-1975. (Matter of Ueck, 286 NY 1; Canino v Engelstein, 86 Misc 2d 1066, 58 AD2d 981; Empire Lien Corp. v Young Transp., 59 Misc 2d 782; Matter of Van Korb, 266 App Div 1041; Matter of Wood, 187 Misc 972, 273 App Div 937; Matter of Schmitt, 187 Misc 988; Matter of Martin, 187 Misc 980; Matter of County of Nassau [Gelb—Siegel], 24 NY2d 621; Seligman v Friedlander, 199 NY 373; Matter of Delmar Box Co. [Aetna Ins. Co.], 309 NY 60.) II. The city, having commenced an in rem foreclosure action against the Cargill properties and others, and having failed to sever the Cargill properties therefrom, upon notice and in accordance with the statute, could not thereafter maintain this inconsistent separate action to impose personal liability. (Selzer v Baker, 295 NY 145; American Woolen Co. of N. Y. v Samuelsohn, 226 NY 61.)
    
      Thaddeus J. Szymanski, County Attorney (Jan P. Egger of counsel), for appellant in the second above-entitled action.
    I. Cargill is personally liable for real property taxes as a matter of law. (Village of Massapequa Park v Massapequa Park Villa Sites, 278 NY 28; City of New York v McLean, 57 App Div 601, 170 NY 374; Goergen v Maar, 2 AD2d 276; Matter of Schmitt, 187 Misc 988; City of Buffalo v Dankner, 48 AD2d 572.) II. Matter of Ueck is not controlling because it is distinguishable from the present circumstances both on its law and its facts. (Matter of Ueck, 286 NY 1; Matter of Nassau County [Gelb—Siegel], 24 NY2d 621; Town of Amherst v County of Erie, 260 NY 361; City of Buffalo v Dankner, 38 NY2d 826; Matter of Grifenhagen v Ordway, 218 NY 451.) III. The acquisition by the county of tax sale certificates representing its tax liens on the subject property does not extinguish Cargill’s personal liability, because the tax debt owed to the county remains unpaid. (Village of Massapequa Park v Massapequa Park Villa Sites, 278 NY 28; People v Gates, 56 NY 387; Antinora v Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 76 Misc 2d 599.) IV. The election of remedies doctrine does not support Cargill’s motion to dismiss. (Matter of Wood, 187 Misc 972; Strong v Reeves, 280 App Div 301, 306 NY 666; Riviera Congress Assoc, v Yassky, 48 Misc 2d 282, 25 AD2d 291, 18 NY2d 540; Rennie v Rennie, 261 App Div 587, 287 NY 86; Saso v State of New York, 20 Misc 2d 826; Vitarelli v Brunson Constr. Corp., 235 App Div 804; Schenck v State Line Tel. Co., 238 NY 308; Smith v Kirkpatrick, 305 NY 66; Abramson v Leo, 240 App Div 343; Matter of Tate v Dickens, 276 App Div 94.) V. Matter 
      
      of Ueck, upon which the court below relied, should be overruled or limited to the facts upon which it was determined.
    
      Alexander C. Cordes, Gerard R. Haas, John K. McCormick and Paul F. Jones for respondent in the second above-entitled action.
    I. The annual tax sales held by the county extinguished whatever real estate tax liability Cargill may have had for the years in which the sales were held. (Matter of Ueck, 286 NY 1; Canino v Engelstein, 86 Misc 2d 1066, 58 AD2d 981; Empire Lien Corp. v Young Transp., 59 Misc 2d 782; Matter of Van Korb, 266 App Div 1041; Matter of Wood, 187 Misc 972, 273 App Div 937; Matter of Schmitt, 187 Misc 988; Matter of Martin, 187 Misc 980; Matter of County of Nassau [Gelb—Siegel], 24 NY2d 621.) II. The county, having commenced an in rem foreclosure action, against the Cargill properties and others, and having failed to sever the Cargill properties therefrom, upon notice and in accordance with the statute, could not thereafter maintain this inconsistent separate action to impose personal liability. (Selzer v Baker, 295 NY 145; American Woolen Co. of N. Y. v Samuelsohn, 226 NY 61.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Gabrielli, J.

The issue on these appeals is whether the acquisition of a tax sale certificate by a taxing district as the result of a tax sale held pursuant to established statutory procedures, extinguishes the right of that taxing district to thereafter impose personal liability for the unpaid taxes in a separate action against the taxpayer. The Appellate Division, relying on this court’s decision in Matter of Ueck (286 NY 1), held that the taxpayer’s personal liability was extinguished when the tax district acquired the tax sale certificates at a duly authorized tax sale. We affirm.

Cargill, Inc., a Delaware corporation with an office and place of business in the City of Buffalo, was the owner in fee of three parcels of real property located in the City of Buffalo, County of Erie, when it ceased paying real property taxes to the city in 1970 and the county in 1971. Cargill failed to pay its taxes in each subsequent year as well, and following these delinquencies the city proceeded to conduct tax sales covering the property. Since no sufficient bids were entered for these properties, the city bid in those parcels, as provided by section 612 of the City Charter and subdivision 2 of section 1160 of the Real Property Tax Law. Following these sales the city issued to itself certificates of sale authorized by section 614 of the City Charter and section 1160 of the Real Property Tax Law. Likewise the county, at its tax sales in which similar procedures were followed, purchased tax certificates for each year of tax default pursuant to Erie County Tax Law (L 1942, ch 812, as amd by L 1969, ch 682).

The city and county commenced these actions to collect personally from the defendant for unpaid property taxes under section 926 of the Real Property Tax Law. The city seeks $677,319, including interest and penalties, for unpaid taxes and alleges that if it is relegated to collect only from the property it will engage in a losing proposition since the value of the property is exceeded by the outstanding taxes plus the cost of demolition of the existing abandoned structures now situated on the property. The county seeks $218,963.71. Section 926 of the Real Property Tax Law provides, in pertinent part:

"1. The owner of real property, or of an interest therein, if a resident of the city or town in which such property or interest therein is assessed and if his name is correctly entered on the roll, shall be personally liable for the taxes levied thereon. The term 'resident’ shall include a corporation having within such city or town a place for the regular transaction of business or in actual possession of real property therein.
"2. After the thirty-first day of January, the collecting officer may call on any person personally liable for unpaid taxes listed on the roll and demand payment thereof. If any such person refuses to pay the taxes demanded, the collecting officer may levy upon any personal property in the county belonging to or in the possession of such person and, unless the taxes are paid prior thereto, cause the same to be sold at public auction for the purpose of paying the taxes due and the expense of levy and sale.”

Cargill, relying on Matter of Ueck (286 NY 1, supra), moved to dismiss the complaints in both actions, contending that its personal liability for unpaid taxes was extinguished when the city and county made their purchases at the annual tax sales. In Matter of Ueck (supra) the decedent, Alfred Ueck, had owned parcels of real property in the City of Buffalo, on which real property taxes had not been paid from 1926 to 1937. Tax sales had been held by the city and county respectively and, following statutory procedures for the sale of the property for the payment of unpaid taxes, they each obtained certificates of sale. Following Ueck’s death the taxing districts sought to impose personal liability upon his estate for the real property taxes. This court held that the personal liability of the taxpayer for the taxes was discharged when the taxing districts acquired the tax certificates at a sale held pursuant to the appropriate real property tax law, stating that "[t]he policy of the State and of the political subdivisions affected indicates clearly that when the decedent’s real estate was sold and bid in by the city of Buffalo or the county of Erie for non-payment of taxes, there was payment and discharge of such taxes and that the purchaser, whether city or county, became the inchoate titleholder of the land, evidenced by the tax sale certificate” (Matter of Ueck, 286 NY 1,17-18, supra).

The city charter provisions before this court in Ueck are essentially the same provisions before us now. The charter provides that the collection of every tax remaining unpaid "may be enforced by a sale of the real estate” (§ 610) after appropriate notice which shall state that the real estate will "be sold at public auction to the highest bidder, to pay the taxes” (§ 611). If no bid is made in "an amount sufficient to pay the taxes” the assessor "shall bid in for the city” such parcels since no land can be sold for less than the outstanding taxes and charges (§ 612). After sale, a tax certificate is issued which describes the real estate and states "that the same was sold for unpaid taxes and assessments” (§ 614). The purchaser, whether the city or some other person, was still required to "pay” for its purchases (§ 614). During certain proscribed periods of time the owner of the land may redeem the property by paying the amount of the tax, plus charges and fees (§§ 613, 618-621). If no redemption is made, the holder of the certificate (whether the city or another) may apply for and receive a "conveyance of the real estate so sold, which conveyance shall vest in the grantee an absolute estate in fee” (§ 623).

Emphasizing the statutory language as noted above, which declared that the tax certificate is exchanged in satisfaction of the unpaid taxes, this court held that, under this statutory scheme, the tax liability as it affects the taxpayer personally, had been extinguished. The issue was not whether the taxes had actually been paid but whether they are considered paid as far as the taxpayer is concerned (Matter of Ueck, 286 NY 1, 6, supra). Indeed, the city charter itself declares that the real estate will be sold "to pay the taxes” (§ 611). The evidence of the payment of the taxes and extinguishment of any personal liability is the tax certificate. The city charter provides that the certificate shall state that it was "sold for unpaid taxes” (§ 614). Whether this provision amounts to a declaration that an actual or theoretical payment has occurred, the result is that a payment as a matter of law has been effectuated and the personal liability for the taxes is extinguished by that payment.

Prior to a tax sale, the tax district may seek payment for overdue real estate taxes from either the property or the taxpayer, personally. However, when the taxing district acquires a tax sale certificate it, in essence, exchanges its prior rights for the rights which attach, by virtue of law, to the certificate. Personal liability is not one of those rights (see Empire Lien Corp. v Young Transp., 59 Misc 2d 782). Nowhere in the charter nor in any statute or regulation does the holder of a tax certificate acquire the right to seek payment on that certificate from the taxpayer personally. This is not to say that a tax certificate does not provide significant benefits for the holder. The holder may, after the period of redemption has been extinguished, take possession of the property, by eviction if necessary (§ 617) or he may obtain an administrative conveyance of an absolute estate in fee (§ 623). These simplified procedures for obtaining possession or title attach only to the holder of the tax certificate.

Under these statutory provisions the court in Ueck determined, and properly so, that the tax sale extinguished the taxpayer’s personal liability and, further, that the holder of a tax certificate may not sue the taxpayer on a claim of personal liability. The charter provisions before the court in this case are essentially the same as those considered in Ueck and, absent a clear legislative intent to abrogate the effect of Ueck, it must control.

The city urges that the effect of the charter provisions has been changed by the adoption of title 3 of article 11 of the Real Property Tax Law (Resolution 185, Proceedings of the Council, City of Buffalo, 1970, Part II, p 2042). Title 3 merely provides that a taxing district, holding its own tax certificates, may pursue a simplified in rem foreclosure procedure. Section 1120 of the Real Property Tax Law (the first provision in title 3) provides that:

"1. Whenever it appears that a tax district owns a tax lien which has been due and unpaid for a period of at least four years from the date on which the tax or other legal charges represented thereby became a lien, such tax lien, except as otherwise provided by this title, shall be summarily foreclosed by the tax district in the manner provided in this title notwithstanding the provisions of any general, special or local law and notwithstanding any omission to hold a tax sale prior to such foreclosure.
"2. Ownership of a tax lienor of a tax sale certificate or of any other instrument evidencing such tax lien by the tax district issuing the same shall be evidence of the fact that the tax or other legal charges represented thereby have not been paid to the tax district or assigned by it.”

This section provides a rule of evidence that a tax district holding its own tax sale certificate may avail itself of the in rem foreclosure proceedings; and this rule expands the rights that attach to the tax certificate when held by a taxing district to include the availability of the simplified in rem proceedings. It does not expand the rights under a tax certificate to encompass personal liability. Indeed, a personal judgment cannot be entered under the in rem proceedings (Real Property Tax Law, § 1124, subd 1).

The adoption of title 3 by the city in no way altered the basic tax provisions applicable here but merely expanded the city’s available remedies. Likewise, this additional remedy did not alter the effect of the city charter provisions which, interestingly, remained the same as those considered in Ueck. Thus, there can be no doubt that Ueck is dispositive of the city’s claim and the purchase by the city of the tax sale certificates extinguished the taxpayer’s personal liability.

The position advanced by the county in this case is likewise unconvincing. The Erie County Tax Law (L 1942, ch 812, as amd by L 1969, ch 682) provides for substantially the same procedures and rights as those embodied in the Buffalo City Charter as already considered above. When real estate taxes remain unpaid the county shall hold a tax sale to "sell tax certificates upon such real estate for the payment of such tax” (§ 7-1.0) and the notice of such sale shall state that the tax sale is being held "to satisfy the taxes, fees, penalties interest and charges which may be due” (§ 7-2.0); and, of importance, a tax certificate may be sold only for a sum sufficient to pay all the taxes and charges due (§ 7-5.0). By statutory declaration, when the county purchases at such a sale it shall obtain the same rights as an individual purchaser (§ 7-7.0); and similar redemption rights are provided (§§ 7-13.0, 8-1.0 — 8-7.0). Upon failure to redeem within the specified time the holder of a tax certificate may obtain an administrative conveyance of an absolute fee (§§ 8-8.0, 8-11.0).

Although the statute considered in Ueck and the provisions before us now are essentially the same, the county urges that the amendment in 1969 (L 1969, ch 682) embodied significant changes which evidenced a legislative intent to overturn the effect of Ueck as it applied to the county. The county argues that under the controlling tax law at the time of Ueck "property” was sold, whereas presently only a "tax lien” is sold. The 1969 amendment effected a change in language but any reliance on this change ignores the fact that the focus in Ueck was not on the nature of what was sold but on the purpose and effect of the sale. For example, the amended statute still provides that the tax sale is being held "to satisfy the taxes” (§ 7-2.0) and thus by operation of law the taxes have been paid when the county purchases the tax certificate, just as the taxes would have been paid in full if the certificate were purchased by a private party. Whether the statutes state that it is the "property” or a "tax lien” which is being sold, the effect remains the same. By acquiring the tax sale certificate the tax district obtains the special rights which attach to it but at the same time the right to collect from the taxpayer personally is extinguished because the tax has been paid as a matter of law.

As with the city, the county can point to no legislative history or any other bill or statute which even faintly suggests that the Legislature intended to overturn the holding of Ueck as it affects the county. Nor does the county point to any provisions of law establishing that the holder of a tax certificate may collect personally from the taxpayer. The tax laws are creatures of the Legislature and changes in these laws or the establishment of specific rights under these laws may not be inferred but must be made in clear and express terms (County Securities v Seacord, 278 NY 34, 37; see People v Cook, 34 NY2d 100, 110). The inference of legislative intent suggested here is particularly weak in view of the fact that the basic tax collection scheme found in the city charter and the county law is essentially unchanged. Had the Legislature, at any time, intended that personal liability would survive a tax sale or would attach to a tax sale certificate, it would have been a simple matter to so declare. The Legislature could have easily amended section 926 of the Real Property Tax Law to extend personal liability. But no such declaration has been made and Ueck has been law since 1941. When the Legislature has refrained from changing the rule for 37 years it would be presumptuous of us to attempt to do so now. To reach a contrary result, this court would be remodeling the law on a scale which is well beyond our judicial power (see F. T. B. Realty Corp. v Goodman, 300 NY 140, 148).

A number of property owners, especially in large cities, are finding that the value of their property has decreased to such an extent that continued ownership is no longer profitable or desirable, particularly in view of the ever increasing real property tax liability. Consequently, some owners have ceased paying taxes, realizing that title to the property will eventually vest in another person or the taxing district. The taxing districts in certain instances, on the other hand, may not only lose income but may also become the owners of some of this unwanted real property, which the previous owners can no longer maintain. In some instances the district must assume the additional burden of demolishing dangerous and dilapidated structures. Perhaps a part of this problem lies in an increasing tax burden and our tax statutes which provide for a variety of foreclosure procedures for the collection of unpaid real property taxes. The solution to this dilemma, having ramifications beyond the problem posed by these cases, is one which rests with the Legislature.

We find nothing of substance which distinguishes the present cases from Ueck. Since Ueck has been consistently followed by the courts of this State (see Matter of Van Korb, 266 App Div 1041; Matter of Wood, 187 Misc 972 [Witmer, J], affd 273 App Div 937; Empire Lien Corp. v Young Transp., 59 Misc 2d 782, supra) and in view of the nature of the Ueck rule we deem the doctrine of stare decisis of no small importance. The doctrine is particularly compelling in cases such as these involving property rights and property dispositions (see People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 489; Matter of Eckart, 39 NY2d 493, 500). Likewise, precedents involving statutory interpretation should be accorded great reliability (Matter of Schinasi, 277 NY 252, 265-266) since the Legislature is readily able to make any appropriate change (see People v Hobson, supra; Matter of Eckart, supra, p 499). Adherence to precedent is particularly applicable to interpretations of tax statutes which may effect and influence major decisions that taxpayers must make. Because of the nature of the question in issue here the doctrine of stare decisis is appropriate and the rule announced in Ueck is to be followed.

A contrary result is not dictated by Matter of County of Nassau (Gelb—Siegel) (24 NY2d 621), which is in no wise dispositive of the issue before us. The issue in that case was whether ownership in condemned real property lies with the owner of record at the time of condemnation or with the holder of a tax certificate who obtains a title deed after the condemnation. Intimating that the reference in Ueck to the holders of tax sale certificates as "inchoate titleholders” was dicta, the Nassau court held that under the statute applicable in that case the purchaser of the tax certificate obtained only a lien interest which was extinguished by the condemnation. In determining who had valid ownership at the time of condemnation, the court did not address or consider what effect the purchase of a tax sale certificate has on the personal liability of a taxpayer, which remains the basic and sole issue in these cases. Thus, there is nothing in Matter of County of Nassau to suggest that Ueck is not applicable nor controlling in the present cases.

Accordingly, the orders of the Appellate Division, so far as appealed from, should be affirmed, with costs.

Jasen, J.

(dissenting). Today, this court holds that the acquisition of tax sale certificates by Erie County and the City of Buffalo "purchased” at a tax sale extinguished the defendant taxpayer’s personal liability for delinquent real property taxes. I do not agree.

Critical to the court’s determination in Matter of Ueck (286 NY 1), which the majority finds dispositive of this case, was the court’s interpretation of the language employed in the Erie County Tax Law and the Buffalo City Charter to describe a tax sale conducted to collect delinquent taxes. Interpreting this language literally, the Ueck court held that purchase of a tax sale certificate resulted in the transfer to the purchaser of inchoate title to the underlying property.

At the outset, I view Ueck as having been wrongly decided. By literally interpreting the statutory language contained in the Erie County Tax Law and the Buffalo City Charter, the Ueck court clothed a tax sale wih the legal effectiveness of an immediate transfer of title from the taxpayer to the tax district. Because of the transfer of what it termed "inchoate” title, the Ueck court held that a taxpayer’s personal liability for delinquent real property taxes was discharged upon the tax district’s purchase of a tax sale certificate. (286 NY, at pp 17-18.) In reality, however, the tax district’s purchase of a tax sale certificate had no such effect.

No passage of title, choate or inchoate, occurred upon this event. Certainly no one would contend that the tax district which purchased a tax sale certificate had the power to convey the affected property to a third party. Both the Erie County Tax Law and the Buffalo City Charter afforded the taxpayer a period of time in which to redeem the property "purchased” at the tax sale. As a result, it is clear that the delinquent taxpayer’s property encumbered by a tax lien and "purchased” at a tax sale by the tax district remained the property of the taxpayer until expiration of the redemption period and foreclosure of the lien. (Matter of Ueck, 286 NY, at pp 21, 22 [Lewis, J., dissenting opn].) In essence, the tax sale resulted merely in the assignment of the tax lien. (Williams v Townsend, 31 NY 411.) This event, in my view, is insufficient to extinguish a delinquent taxpayer’s personal liability.

As a practical matter, the majority’s holding permits an owner of real property to reap the commercial benefits of such ownership and yet avoid its accompanying tax consequences. In the present case, defendant Cargill failed to pay its real estate taxes for the years 1970-1974 — a sum amounting to more than $700,000. During this entire period, Cargill continued in possession and control of the property, and its grain elevators located on this property did a gross business in excess of $3,000,000. After having avoided payment of its delinquent taxes for these years, Cargill began, in 1974, to abandon the property, taking with it much of its valuable equipment. To hold as the majority does that the purchase of tax sale certificates extinguishes a delinquent taxpayer’s personal liability leaving the purchasing tax district with recourse only against the now abandoned and commercially worthless property defies both logic and equity. I would overrule Matter of Ueck.

Short of overruling Ueck, I believe that, today, a literal interpretation of the Erie County Tax Act and the Buffalo City Charter no longer requires the result reached by this court over 35 years ago in Ueck.

In the years since this court’s decision in Ueck, the Erie County Tax Law has been amended, resulting in significant changes in its provisions. (L 1942, ch 812, as amd by L 1969, ch 682.) For example, in regard to the nature of a tax sale, the county law formerly provided: "In the event that there is no purchaser for any parcel of land so offered for sale * * * such premises shall be deemed to have been sold to and purchased by the county of Erie.” (§ 7-7.0 [emphasis added].) In contrast, it now utilizes the term tax certificate in place of the terms parcel of land and premises. (§ 7-6.0.)

Similarly, the county law interpreted by this court in Ueck provided for the issuance of "certificates of sale of all lands so bid in by or sold to the county, describing the lands purchased”. (§ 7-8.0 [emphasis added].) As amended, this section now speaks in terms of tax certificates, rather than land sold to the county (§ 7-7.0), and of tax certificates which describe the land affected rather than purchased. (§ 7-7.0.) Although the county law once provided that a purchaser at a tax sale purchases real estate (§ 7-12.0), it now provides that it is a tax lien which is purchased, and not real estate. (§ 7-11.0.)

Finally, in regard to redemption, while the predecessor of today’s Erie County Tax Act considered in Ueck provided that if land sold was not redeemed the purchaser would be issued a deed (§ 7-8.0), the act now provides for issuance of a deed "[i]f the amount of taxes on the land so affected by the sale of a tax certificate shall not be paid”. (§ 7-7.0 [emphasis added].) The right of redemption itself, having been formerly characterized as existing in real estate sold for taxes (§ 7-14.0) is now spoken of as existing in real estate affected by tax certificates sold. (§ 7-13.0.)

In light of these amendments, even a literal interpretation of the present Erie County Tax Act no longer necessitates a holding that a taxpayer’s personal liability for delinquent taxes is extinguished upon a tax district’s acquisition of a tax sale certificate. It is abundantly clear from the present statutory language that a purchaser of such a certificate is intended to receive only a lien as opposed to inchoate title to the affected property. This conclusion is in accord with our recent unanimous decision in Matter of County of Nassau (Gelb—Siegel) (24 NY2d 621), in which we, distinguishing the statutory language considered in Ueck, held that, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Law, a purchaser of a tax sale certificate "acquired only a lien interest in the subject property.” (Id., at p 626.) I conclude, therefore, that a delinquent taxpayer’s personal liability should not be extinguished upon the "purchase” by the county of a tax sale certificate.

With respect to the Buffalo City Charter, although many of the provisions interpreted by this court in Ueck remain the same, the city has since that time adopted title 3 of article 11 of the Real Property Tax Law. (Resolution 185, Proceedings of the Council, City of Buffalo, 1970, Part II, p 2042.) This title, which establishes an in rem foreclosure procedure for tax districts holding their own tax sale certificates, provides in its first section: "Ownership of a tax lienor of a tax sale certificate or of any other instrument evidencing such tax lien by the tax district issuing the same shall be evidence of the fact that the tax or other legal charges represented thereby have not been paid to the tax district or assigned by it.” (Real Property Tax Law, § 1120, subd 2 [emphasis added].)

Although as the majority states the purpose of this section is an evidentiary one, its language indicates a recognition of the true nature of the real property interest purchased by a tax district at a tax sale. A tax certificate merely evidences the existence of a tax lien; it does not evidence ownership of title, whether choate or inchoate. While it is true that the provisions of title 3 as adopted by the City of Buffalo do not supersede any of the city’s charter provisions (Real Property Tax Law, § 1104), I believe the adoption of this title by itself is sufficient to preclude the result reached in Ueck — a result reached by a literal interpretation of the city’s charter.

For this reason, as in the case of the present Erie County Tax Act, I would hold that the language contained in the Buffalo City Charter, as supplemented by title 3 of the Real Property Tax Law, sufficiently demonstrates the intent of the tax district to view the purchase of a tax sale certificate as the purchase of a tax lien and not as the purchase of the property itself with its resultant discharge of the delinquent taxpayer’s personal liability.

Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division and grant summary judgment in favor of the City of Buffalo and the County of Erie against Cargill, Inc.

Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jones and Wachtler concur with Judge Gabrielli; Judge Jasen dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Judge Cooke concurs; Judge Fuchsberg taking no part.

In each case: Order affirmed, etc. 
      
       The adoption of title 3 did not supersede any of the charter provisions but merely added a new in rem foreclosure proceeding to the city’s available remedies (Real Property Tax Law, § 1104).
     