
    Hancock County v. John W. Simmons.
    Taxation. Assessment of land. Increase. Improvements. Code 1892, l 3799.
    Under Code 1892, § 3799, authorizing the hoard of supervisors to increase the assessment of land, in case its value he enhanced hy the erection of improvements, the hoard is authorized to increase an assessment only when the improvements have been erected on the land, and is without authority to increase an assessment because the value of the land has been enhanced by the building of a railroad near it and the consequent growth of values in the neighborhood.
    Fbom the circuit court of Hancock county.
    Hon. William T. McDonald, Judge.
    ■The board of supervisors of Hancock county at its August term, 1904, entered an order changing the land assessment of 1902, so as to increase largely the value of Simmons’ land. He petitioned the board at its September term, 1904, to annul the order on the ground that the board was without authority to make it, and hence it was illegal'. This petition was denied, and Simmons, appellee, appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court decided the ease for Simmons, appellee, and the county appealed to the supreme court.
    The case was tried in the circuit court upon the following agreed statement of the facts — viz.: “Simmons was the owner of the lots assessed, and in 1902 an assessment of the real estate of the county was made and approved, as required by law, and these lots assessed to appellee; that at that time the village of Picayune, in which the lots lay, had just been platted, and was nearly a wilderness, and the lots were then of the value assessed, but between the date of the approval of the assessment roll in 1902 and February 1, 1904, the lots had constantly increased in value, owing to the building of a railroad to the village (but the railroad was not hnilt on any of the lots), the sale and improvement of lots adjacent, the building of residences and a hank on adjacent lots, the building of hotels in the village, and a coal chute by the railroad company, and other public and private improvements and sawmills in the village and immediate proximity to the lots; that because of this enhanced value, and without previous notice to Simmons, and without his knowledge, the hoard of supervisors increased the assessments of the lots to what they were really worth at the time of the increased assessment; that there had been no improvements of any kind erected on the lots mentioned at the time of the increased assessment.”
    W. J. Qex, for appellant.
    It being admitted that the property was of the value as raised by the hoard of supervisors, if the hoard had any authority to make the increase, then the petition should have been denied. Section 3188 provides that at the August meeting the boards of the several counties shall meet to equalize the assessment; sec. 3793 provides what shall be done at said August meeting, fully empowering the board to make such increase as shall -be necessary to equalize the assessment. Again, sec. 3799 goes further and provides that at any time, if property has increased in value, because of the erection of improvements, the board may raise the assessment to its true value. Hote here that the erection of improvements is not confined to the very lands themselves, and such statutes are always construed liberally.
    The central and controlling idea of sec. 3799 is to ascertain the true value. The clause “or in the case of the increase of values by erection of improvements” is, for illustration, a cause for increasing, rather than a limitation upon the power to increase.
    
      Harper & Potter, on- the same side.'
    Appellant contends that Oode 1892, § 3799, authorized it to increase the value of the property of appellee up to its true value in 1904, since the same had decidedly increased since the regular assessment in 1902, as the direct and proximate result of other improvements, whether the same were made directly on the land in question, or any other lands immediately and closely contiguous thereto, so as to leave no doubt as to the cause of such increase in value.
    It has always been the policy of the courts to construe such statutes as this in a broad and liberal spirit, with the purpose of carrying out the intent of the lawmakers of securing all property to be taxed at its real and true value. An assessment is, therefore, not a final judgment under this statute, and no man can ever complain if his property be not taxed beyond its true value. The statute expressly and intentionally omits the word “thereon,” which appellee is bound to supply in order to give it the meaning that he contends for. The clause “or in case of the increase of values by the erection of improvements” is inserted here merely as an illustration of a cause for increasing the value, and it is not a limitation upon the power of the board to increase the value.
    The increase in the case at bar is such an immediate, direct, and proximate result of the erection of the improvements on adjoining land as to leave no doubt that such improvements were the real cause of the increase in value and it would seem that it comes within the intent of the lawmakers, as manifested in Code 1892, § 3899. This has always been the uniform construction of the clause by the several boards of supervisors throughout the state, and they were authorized and directed so to construe it by the several opinions of the attorney-general of 1900-1901, pp. 101 and 104, which ruling has been followed by the present attorney-general.
    
      J. N. Flowers, assistant attorney-general, on the same side.
    Simmons could have applied to the board under see. 3799 of the code to have his assessment reduced. This is the remedy provided by the statute, and the one invoked by the taxpayers and endorsed by this court in Simmons v. Scott County, 68 Miss., 37, and in Jennings v. Coahoma County, 79 Miss., 523. And, as was held in those cases, an appeal lies- to the circuit court from an order of the board denying a petition to reduce an assessment. Appellee had other remedies. He could have enjoined the collection of the tax (if illegally assessed) under sec. 483 of the code. Ball v. City of Meridian, 67 Miss., 91. Or he might have resisted payment and tested the legality of the assessment; or he might have paid and then proceeded to recover it from the tax collector. Tuttle v. Everett, 51 Miss., 27; Yicksbwrg v. Butler, 56 Miss., 72. See also Cooley on Taxation, ch. 24.
    But appellee adopted the novel remedy of petitioning the board of supervisors to set aside the order entered at the former term instead of availing himself of prescribed and approved remedies. He did not petition the board to reduce the assessment, as he might have done, but he petitioned that body to set aside a former order. Because the former order sought to be annulled related to an assessment for taxes, appellee insists that the petition to set it aside is also a tax matter, and that an appeal from the order denying the petition was properly taken under sec. 80 of the code. But the order appealed from is not an order raising an assesment, nor is it an order denying an application to have an assessment reduced. It is not an order relating to taxes.
    Section 3799 of the code is one of the several statutes intended by the legislature to execute the purpose of sec. 112 of the constitution and to accomplish the general purpose of taxation. This is shown nowhere better than in State v. Tonella, 70 Miss., 70,1, 708. The purpose of the entire plan is to make all the property in the state bear its just proportion of the burden of taxation. Every piece of property was intended, as far as such result is practicable, to bear such part of the entire burden as its value is of the value of all the property^ in the state. It is impossible for the system to be made absolutely perfect, but the best plan which has yet been tried is that which our legislature adopted.
    We have a regular assessment of real estate only every four years. The infrequency of our regular assessments, the long period of time intervening, is a fact to be taken into consideration in passing upon our aiding or supplemental provisions. In many of the states assessments are made every year. Cooley on Taxation, p. 604. And it seems in nearly all the states the regular assessments are more frequent than in Mississippi. This doubtless accounts for the absence of such provisions as that now under discussion contained in see. 3799. I have been able to find no similar provision discussed in the books. Since we have a regular assessment of land once in four years, the necessity for a statute like sec. 3799 is urgent, and the section becomes of large importance as a part of our system.
    Bowers, Neville & Griffith, for appellee.
    The point raised for appellant that the board had no power or authority at the September meeting to vacate their order of the August meeting is without merit.' The order of the board of supervisors at the August meeting was simply void, void for two reasons — first, that even if they were able to proceed under sec. 3799, or under any other section at that time, and without notice to increase the assesment of the land of the ap-pellee, it not being the year in which the land assessments had been made by the assessor, that the failure of the board to recite that the increase was made by reason of increase of value by erection of improvements, and it is well settled, and nothing could be better settled in this state, than that when the board of supervisors are proceeding in • matters of this kind, the jurisdictional facts must appear of record. We cite two cases only out of a vast number of eases in Mississippi — to wit: 
      Grafts v. DeSoto County, 79 Miss.,t 618, and Lester v. Miller, 76 Miss., 309.
    The failure of the board to recite the jurisdictional facts and make it appear of record renders any order that they enter simply void. They did fail to recite the jurisdictional facts, as will he shown by the record in the case.
    Again, it appears in the agreed statement of facts that there were no improvements erected on these lots, and we say that their assuming to raise this assessment by virtue of the improvements, not on the lots themselves, is an excess of the aui-thority of the board of supervisors, and that would make their actions simply void. Jefferson County v. Grafton, 74 Miss., 441 et seq., and numerous decisions in the state of Mississippi, and of other states universally holding the same doctrine.
    It is elementary law that void judgments can be vacated at any subsequent term; furthermore, that they ought to be. Railway v. Bolding, 69 Miss., 262; 17 Am. & Eng. Ency Law (2d ed.), 825; Cotton v. McQehee; 54 Miss., 621; American, etc., . v. Thomas, 12 L. R. A., 687.
    The real question in this case is whether the erection of the improvements, not on the land, but on some adjacent tracts or lots, is the erection of improvements contemplated by see. 3799, which would give the board of supervisors the statutory power and authority necessary to enable them to make this increase at any time.
    If the building of a railroad through a county, or the erection of a city hall or bank in a town, or the establishment of a factory therein, or the building of a big lumber mill somewhere in some part of the county is to be an improvement such as to authorize the board of supervisors at any time to change the assessment of the lands on account of the erection of improvements in the vicinity, we ask, at what term of the board of supervisors, then, would it not be possible for them to increase the value of all the lands in the county on account of improve-meats in each vicinity thereof ? If snch a construction of this statute were permitted, no. man at any time could rest concerning his right with any degree of assurance that his assessment would not be changed without notice to him, and after the five days had elapsed for an appeal the said changed assessment would be absolutely res adjudicata and leave him without remedy. It would in effect deprive the citizens of the county of their right of appealing from the orders of the board of supervisors, and leave the matter of taxes at any time to be taken up by the boards, raised according to their peculiar ideas or whims, and make them the tribunal of final decision. Such a construction would discourage any man from owning property in this state. 3STo man could own property in two counties, for the reason that he could not be in both counties at the same time twelve times a year to catch the board of supervisors to see that they did not raise the assessments of his lands on account of some improvements erected by some neighbor in the vicinity.
    . There is a sentence in the opinion in the case of Tunica County v. Tate, 18 Miss., 294, on p. 299, which uses the words “improvements on land,” and we say in all seriousness and with the utmost insistence that this is what is meant by this statute, and nothing else could be meant.
   Teuly, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Lands are assessed at stated times and in a manner expressly pointed out by statute. The plan devised by law covers every possible contingency to insure an accurate, full, and fair assessment of lands, and prevents the possibility, if all officers faithfully discharge the duties imposed upon them, of any land escaping taxation or being assessed below its just, proportionate value. Code 1892, § 3781, provides that the assessor shall not bo paid unless he shall show on the assessment roll the assessment of every acre of land in his county; and it is made the duty of the board of' supervisors to compare the assessment rolls with the township maps of the county, so that they may be advised whether or not the assessor has faithfully discharged his duty. By sec. 3113 it is the duty of the assessor to list all lands, whether the same have been returned to him by the owners or not — to assess the same at the intrinsic value thereof — and it is mandatory that he shall provide himself with all necessary maps 'of the county, and of every portion thereof, and of every city, town, or village therein. If, therefore, the assessor and the board of supervisors scrupulously discharge their respective duties in this regard, no acre of land, and no lot within a municipality, can escape being listed for purposes of taxation. If the owner, as under the law he is required to do, returns his lands, and fixes the value thereof, then every portion of the county will bear its just proportion of the burden of government. If the owner fails to return his lands, the assessor is charged with the duty of listing them, and is granted authority to fix the value; and in so doing he must take into consideration the “improvements, the proximity to navigation, to a city, town, village, or road, and any other circumstance that tends to enhance its value.” Should any owner put his property at a lower valuation than, in the judgment of the assessor, it should bear, he must so report to the board of supervisors, and it shall be the duty of the board upon discovery of undervaluation of any property to increase the same as it may deem just and proper. If by inadvertence or other cause any land should, notwithstanding the requirements above refered to, be omitted from the roll, both the assessor and the tax collector are granted authority to add the same to the roll. Code 1892, §§ 3800— 3804. All persons are charged with notice of the contents of the rolls from the return and filing thereof in the office of the clerk of the board of supervisors, and failure to file objections thereto precludes them from questioning its validity after it is approved by the board of supervisors or by operation of law. The taxpayer who feels himself aggrieved by any valuation placed on his property has his day in court at the regular August meeting of the board of supervisors “in the years in which a land assessment is made” to present his objection and have corrections made in his assessment. After the land rolls thus prepared have been examined by the board of supervisors, the valuation of the property equalized, in the doing which the board “may increase or diminish the valuation of any property so that property of the same value shall be assessed for an'equal sum,” and the rolls approved as required by law, this assessment becomes, until the next general assessment of lands, made every four years, the fixed and determined valuation for purposes of taxation of the lands of the county. These assessments can only be changed for the causes and in the specified cases enumerated by Code 1892, § 3799. That section provides that the board of supervisors shall not, after the approval of the land roll, change an assessment, except in the following cases: (1) Destruction or deterioration in value of any real estate by any casualty;- (2) overvaluation known to he such; (3) clerical error in the assessment rolls; (4) change of ownership after assessment; (5) increase of value by the erection of improvements. In all such cases the board has the authority, on the application of the party interested or otherwise, to change the assessment at any time so as to reduce or increase it to the true value of the property, or to cause the taxes thereon to be charged to the true owner. These enumerated causes are restrictions upon the power of the board of supervisors, and no assessment of real estate after having once been duly and formally approved and adopted can be changed, unless the individual case clearly constitutes one of the stated exceptions. Anderson v. Ingersoll, 62 Miss., 73. It is the plain intent of the law that each individual assessment must be passed upon solely with reference to the facts of that particular parcel of property. The causes enumerated as authorizing changes are not difficult to understand. If real estate be destroyed, or its value deteriorated, by casualty, such as flood, which would lay waste the land, or fire, which would destroy the improvements thereon, the board is granted the right to extend relief. In case of overvaluation, known to be suck, where it is manifest that injustice has been done through mistake in calculation, proper reduction can be allowed. In case of clerical error correction can be made. In case of increase of value by the erection of improvements the property can be raised to its true value. It should be noted that the board is granted the right to raise the assessment only in one instance — i. e., where the land has been increased in value by “the erection of improvements.” The fact that the value of all the lands in the county has been enhanced by the mere natural growth of value incident to the development of the country gives the board no authority to raise the assessments, because the increase so caused is incident to all lands alike, and all share in the common good. The increase of value justifying a raise of assessment must be an increase of that specific parcel, and must arise solely from the erection of improvements. It is contended for appellant that the improvements need not be erected on the particular land in question, but that, if the increase of value be due to the “erection of improvements,” the board is justified, in raising the assessment to the true value of the property, without regard to the location of the improvements, whether on the land itself or in close proximity thereto. Upon an analysis of the section we do not think this contention can be sustained. It is true that the construction of a railroad through a village increases, perhaps appreciably, the value of all property within the corporate limits. But this is likewise true, though perhaps to a lesser extent, of property throughout the entire county, but it could hardly be contended that because a railroad traverses a county the board of supervisors would have the right at any time, and without notice, to arbitrarily increase the valuation of all the lands in the county, and yet this is the logical result of the argument presented by appellant. Again, it is not only the construction of a great public work, such as a railroad, which increases the value of adjacent property, but at least in a limited sphere, and in close proximity to the improvements, the erection of an oil mill, a cotton mill, a factory, or an extensive manufacturing plant, incidentally yet inevitably increases the value of all the property in the town, and also, proportionately, other property lying some distance from the town. It also increases, to some slight degree at least, the value of all tax-hearing property in the county, because it reduces, to the extent which such new enterprises must pay taxes, the burden of taxation which rests upon such other property. There are many things which our law recognizes as elements to he considered in ascertaining the value of land, such as the improvements -on the property itself, its proximity to navigation, to a city, town, or village, or public highway. Surely it could not he seriously insisted that the laying out of a public road in proximity to, yet not upon, a tract of land, so that transportation to a railroad or a town would he rendered easy, or the property made more accessible, would be sufficient to justify the board of supervisors to increase the assessment of the property near the public highway, on the theory that improvements had been erected. To render more manifest the fact that the position assumed by appellant is untenable, it is only necessary to contrast two sentences in the section granting the board of supervisors authority to make changes in assessments: The board is given authority to reduce an assessment in case of destruction or deterioration of any real estate by any casualty, or to increase the assessment in case of increase of value by the erection of improvements. If, then, improvements erected on one tract of land in proximity to another tract give the board the right to increase the valuation of such adjacent property, does it not necessarily follow that the deterioration by casualty of the value of one parcel of property would entitle the owner of adjacent property to ask for a proportionate reduction of assessment ? If the proposition be sound upon the one hand, it must necessarily be equally as sound upon the other. Yet, if this he true, every fire in a city which may destroy any manufacturing plant or other work of local importance would entitle all other property owners in the municipality to a reduction of their assessments; or every overflow or devastation by flood or storm of one section of a county would give every other section of the county the right to insist upon a reduction of assessment on account of the deterioration of value of real estate by reason of casualty. This construction of the section is too refined and artificial to receive our approval. The conclusion can only be arrived at by departing from the meaning of the words in their ordinary acceptation and placing upon them a strained and unnatural interpretation. It would furnish the board no certain or definite basis on which to calculate the real or supposed increase of value. It would submit the entire subject to their own private and uncontrolled judgments, to be exercised at any time without notice to the taxpayers interested.' This is not in accord with the well-defined scheme established by the laws regulating assessments] But if we construe the clause to mean that the assessment of the land can only be raised when its value has been increased by erection of improvements thereon, the entire difficulty disappears, and the harmonious details of the plan become apparent. Giving the law this interpretation, the board has only to increase the assessment of each tract by adding thereto the value of the improvements erected thereon. This is a simple mathematical calculation, not requiring excursions into the realm of speculation in an effort to determine how much one man’s land has been enhanced in value because his neighbor has erected a fine dwelling or other improvements on his own.

So, too, this construction affords security to the taxpayer, who, having discharged the duties imposed upon him by assessing his land at the proper time, and seeing that the assessment was regularly approved, is entitled to rest secure in the knowledge that no officer has the power to increase the valuation of his property a's fixed, unless the same has been enhanced by the erection of improvements thereon.. This is the manifest intent of the law. How different would be the case if the contention of the appellant was sound! Ho taxpayer would be certain that his assessment would not be increased at any meeting of the board, and without notice to him, because of some fancied benefit which he was supposed to derive from the erection of a railroad, or some other improvement, somewhere in proximity to his property. In such case eternal vigilance would be demanded of every taxpayer. Such was not the purpose and is not the true construction of the law. Anderson v. Ingersoll, supra; State v. Tonella, 70 Miss., 113 (14 South. Rep., 17; 22 L. R. A., 346); Forsdick v. Quitman Co. (Miss.), 25 South. Rep., 294; Tunica County v. Tate, 78 Miss., 298 (29 South. Rep., 74); Simmons v. Scott Co., 68 Miss., 39 (8 South. Rep., 259). The appeal was properly prosecuted. Jennings v. Coahoma Co., 79 Miss., 525 (31 South. Rep., 107).

Affirmed.  