
    ROYSTER versus WATKINS et al.
    QUESTION IN THIS CASE.
    
      Principles, upon which Chancery will enjoin a judgment at law.
    
    
      l.A Court of Chancery will not relieve against a judgment at law, on the ground of usury, although well established, where it appears, that the facts were available to the complainant, before the rendition of the judgment at law.
    In this oase, Royster filed a bill in Chancery, in Madison Circuit Court, for the purpose of enjoining the defendants from .proceeding to enforce a judgment obtained against him, at law.
    The facts were, that, in 1829, Royster, being in pecuniary embarrassment, applied to Watkins, to obtain' the loan of one thousand dollars; for which, for twelve .months, induced by his necessities, he agreed to give fifteen hundred dollars. That, to effect the purpose of the loan, the complainant gave his note, for fifteen hundred dollars, to one Meux, due at "twelve months; and which Meux was to sell to Watkins, or to a third person, designated by him.— That Watkins directed Meux to apply to one Irby, who would purchase the note, at one thousand dollars; all of which was effected, by the payment of the money, by Irby, who, to disqualify Meux from giving evidence, took his indorsement on the note.— That, some time after this note became due and payable, 'Watkins applied to the complainant, to take up the said note, by executing another; which he did. That the said Meux subsequently signed the latter note, as surety, without the complaint’s knowledge, or consent. That Watkins then induced the complainant to execute a power of attorney, t.o confess judgment of the note; which, confession was made, also, by Meux.
    The defendants not having answered, the bill was token pro confesso. At the fall term of 1832, the complainant moved to set aside the judgment, pro confesso; and for a rule against the defendants, compelling an answer : and, also, for an order, to take the testimony of Irby and Meux, as witnesses. On final hearing the injunction was dissolved, and a writ of error taken, here.
    It was assigned, as cause for reversal — first, the, refusal of the Court to set aside the decree pro con-fesso; secondly, the refusal of the Court, to award a commission, to examine Irby and Meux; thirdly, the refusal of the Court, bn final hearing,'to receive the deposition of Meux, as testimony ; fourthly, the refusal of the Court, to perpetuate the injunction.
    Robinson, for the plaintiff in error; Thornton, contra.
    
   Hitchcock, C. J.

This is a bill, in Equity, to enjoin a judgment at law, on the ground of usury.— The bill was .dismissed by the Circuit Court of Madison Co'unty, and the case’ comes here, on a writ of error, to reverse that decree.

The facts disclosed in t’he bill make out, undoubtedly, a case of usury — every one of which, unfortunately, for the complainant, were within his knowledge, before the rendition of the judgment; notwithstanding which, the complainant voluntarily gave a power of attorney, to confess the judgment, which he now seeks to avoid; and without stating any legal excuse, either for giving the power of attorney, or. for not applying, before, judgment, to avoid the contract.

It is a well settled principle, that a Court of Chancery will not relieve, against a judgment at law, on the ground of its being contrary to equity; unless 4he defendant in the judgment was ignorant of the fact in question, pending the suit; or, it could not be received as a defence at law: or, unless, without any neglect or default, on-his part, he was prevented, by fraud or accident, or the ac't of the opposite party, from availing himself of the defence.

The facts relied upon, by the complainant, are the alleged collusion of Watkins and Meux, and the threat, by Watkins, that he would sue on the nóte, if the defendant did not give a power of attorney, to confess judgment.

These, so far from furnishing an excuse, for not going into equity, till after the judgment, furnish the strongest reasons why he should have applied himself to equity, .before the judgment. The complainant comes into Equity, entirely too late. Although it may be a hard case; yet, the complainant has made it so, by his own neglect; and ne cannot relieve him.

It is contended, that this'Court cannot look into the equity of the bill, as the assignments ar'e confined to the refusal of the Court below, to grant the motions for the attachment, and the order to take the testimony of Meux and Irby.

This reasoning cannot be sustained. We are obliged to look into the bill, to ascertain whether the motions should have been granted ; and, in doing so, if we find there is no equity in the bilí, dt furnishes all the reasons that are necessary, to dispose of. the case.

It would be idle to reverse and remand the case, when we are satisfied, that the'bill itself, would.be bad, on demurrer.. Besides this, it is .conceived, that the fourth assignment'brings the equity of the bill, directly befpre the Court.

Let the decree be affirmed.

Hopkiiís, J., not sitting. 
      
       6 Johns Rep. 87
     