
    Joseph A. NEVEL and Pershing Auto Leasing, Inc., Appellants, v. Nicholas MONTELEONE and Sunbelt Financial Investment Corp., Appellees.
    No. 85-2364.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Sept. 16, 1987.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 24, 1987.
    
      Ronald S. Lowy, of Law Offices of Nevel & Lowy, Miami Beach, for appellants.
    William H. Lefkowitz, Glenn E. Gold-stein, of Ruden, Barnett, MeClosky, Schus-ter & Russell, P.A., Port Lauderdale, for appellees.
   LETTS, Judge.

This dispute arises out of an employment contract. The trial court found that the employer breached the contract by terminating it without cause. We reverse.

The written contract set forth in clear and unambiguous language that:

The employee agrees to devote his full time and energies exclusively to the above activities on behalf of the [Employer].

The evidence at trial clearly established that the employee did not devote his full time and energies exclusively to his duties under the contract. However, he was allowed to introduce parol evidence to excuse his outside activities. As a consequence, he was forgiven by the trial judge who held the employer liable for wrongful firing. This was error.

“The general rule is that parol evidence is not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the terms of a complete and unambiguous written instrument.” Bond v. Hewitt, 111 Fla. 180, 149 So. 606 (1933). It is our conclusion that this case law applies to the matter before us and that none of the recognized exceptions to the general rule are applicable here.

If the employee desired to continue his outside competing interest (in the instant case, the leasing of twelve automobiles), provision to do so should have been made in the employment contract. It was not; the employer maintains that these extra curricular activities were never contemplated.

Our conclusion here may appear to be harsh, but we have no alternative because “if the rule were otherwise, the obvious result would be to abrogate the long settled rule respecting the finality of written contracts.” Id. at 608.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR ENTRY OF A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT.

WALDEN, J., concurs.

WEBSTER, PETER D., Associate Judge, concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.

WEBSTER, PETER D.,

Associate Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority that the trial judge erroneously permitted testimony by the plaintiff-employee which violated the parol evidence rule; that this error was prejudicial to defendants-appellants; and that the case must be reversed and remanded. However, I am unable to agree that the trial judge should be directed to enter a judgment in favor of defendants-appellants.

This was an action for wrongful discharge from employment. The key issue in dispute was whether the employer was justified, pursuant to the terms of a written contract, in terminating the employee. The employer’s position was that termination was justified because the employee had breached the contract by failing “to devote his full time and energies exclusively to the ... activities ... of [the employer].”

The general rule appears to be that whether an employee has breached the terms of his employment contract in such a substantial degree as to justify his discharge is generally a question of fact to be decided by the jury if the pertinent evidence on this issue could lead the minds of reasonable men to conflicting conclusions. If not, the issue becomes a question of law to be decided by the court. Jimarye, Inc., v. Pipkin, 181 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966).

Accord, Strahm v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 285 So.2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).

The trial judge never decided whether the employee’s breach was sufficiently “substantial” to justify discharge because he concluded, based principally upon the inadmissible parol evidence, that the employer, rather than the employee, had breached the contract. Without the inadmissible parol evidence, the only possible finding is that the employee did breach the contract. Because, however, there has been no finding regarding whether the breach was sufficiently “substantial” to justify discharge and because, in my opinion, reasonable men could reach conflicting conclusions, I would reverse and remand with directions that the trial judge make a finding of fact on that issue and enter an appropriate judgment based upon that finding.  