
    Rodolfo VELASQUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Megan J. BRENNAN , Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 14-15016
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 14, 2017 
    
    Filed February 27, 2017
    Rodolfo Velasquez, Pro Se
    Neill Tseng, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee
    Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Megan J. Brennan has been substituted for her predecessor, Patrick R. Donahoe, as Postmaster General under Fed. R. App. P, 43(c)(2).
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Velasquez’s request for oral argument, set forth in the reply brief, is denied.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Rudolfo Velasquez appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging discrimination and retaliation in connection with the termination of his employment with the United States Postal Service. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Berg v. Popham, 412 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (judgment on the pleadings); Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (summary judgment). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Velasquez’s disability discrimination claim because Velasquez failed to state a claim for relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). See Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); Lovett v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth elements of a disability discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Velasquez’s retaliation claim because Velasquez failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was a causal connection between his protected activity and his termination. See Coons v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim under the Rehabilitation Act and rejecting plaintiffs contention that mere closeness in time established causality).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     