
    John B. Nevit, Administrator of Thomas Nixon vs. M. B. Hamer.
    N. obtained judgment in 1830 against B. in Adams county ; in 1834, B. sold a piece of land in Yazoo county to H., and afterwards died; H. being in possession of the land, N. in 1840 sued out a scire facias against him as the terre-tenant, to subject the land to the judgment; H. suffered judgment by default upon the scire facias, and filed a bill in equity to enjoin the further prosecution of the judgment, averring in the bill the above facts, and his belief that the judgment had been paid : Held, that the injunction could not be sustained, and must be dissolved for want of equity on the face of the bill.
    On appeal from the superior court of chancery, from an order of the chancellor refusing to dissolve an injunction in the case of Malachi B. Hamer against John B. Nevit, administrator of Thomas Nixon, deceased.
    The complainant averred, that on the 17th day of July, 1834, one William A. Baughan, then a resident of Yazoo county, sold to him a town lot in the town of Manchester, (now Yazoo city,) in Yazoo county, for a valuable consideration ; gave him a deed thereto and put him in possession, which he had retained without molestation ever since, and had made valuable improvements on the same; that the sheriff of Yazoo county had advertised this lot for sale on the 8th day of July, 1841, by virtue of an execution from the Adams circuit court, in favor of John B. Nevit, administrator of Thomas Nixon, deceased; that the execution recites that the judgment on which it issued was rendered on the 31st day of May, 1830, against the said William A. Baughan, John Sturges, and Sturges Sprague, who had all since died; and that judgment at the May term, 1841, of the Adams circuit court had been rendered against the said M. B. Hamer for the amount, as the party in possession of this lot; wherefore the sheriff was commanded to expose the same to sale.
    
      The complainant further stated, that he believed this judgment had been and ought to be satisfied; that it had stood for eleven years without his having any knowledge of its existence; that Baughan had long since the judgment been in possession of more than sufficient property to satisfy it; that Sprague was a merchant in good repute in Natchez, in Adams county, doing a large business as late as 1836; that these facts were notorious ;■ from which he believes the judgment has been paid; that judgment by default was taken against him as terre-tenant of Baughan, but that other parties who were also served with scire facias, as tenants of Baughan, of other property purchased of him, resisted the judgments, and in all such cases the plaintiff therein took nonsuits.
    The bill prayed for injunction and for other relief; the injunction was granted, and the plaintiff in the judgment at law moved to dissolve it for want of equity on the face of the bill. The chancellor heard the motion and overruled it; from which the defendant to the bill appealed.
    
      Wilkinson and Miles, for appellant.
    An appeal is prosecuted in this cause to reverse the chancellor’s decree, refusing to dissolve the injunction.
    The injunction ought to have been dissolved for the following reasons :
    1 st. No release of errors was filed.
    2d. It is not distinctly stated that the' judgment is satisfied; and
    3d. The defence, if any exists, should have been made at law.
    The statute requires, in express terms, that a party obtaining an injunction to stay proceedings upon a judgment at law, shall execute and file a release of all errors, &c. H. & H. Dig. 514, sec. 40. This has not been done in the present case.
    All the equity of the bill is predicated upon the presumption from lapse of time (about ten years,) that the judgment enjoined has been paid. The law does not raise that implication until the statute of limitations will operate as a bar. The judgment, not being barred by limitation in this case, no legal presumption or implication of its payment can be indulged.; and the vague suppositions put forth in the bill are too indefinite and uncertain to be entitled to any weight.
    But if any defence really exists, according to the showing of the bill, it existed prior to the judgment which is enjoined. It was as much in the party’s knowledge as now, and should have been made at law. He had due and timely notice by service of the scii'e facias, to show cause against the issuance of execution against him as terre-tenant of Baughan. He failed to make de-fence, or show cause against its issuance. No excuse is shown why a defence at law was not made. It is therefore too late to apply to a court of equity for relief. 5 How. Rep.
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion of the court.

In 1830 a judgment was rendered in the circuit court of Adams county, in favor of Nevit, as administrator of Thomas Nixon, deceased, against one William A. Baughan. In 1834, Baughan sold a lot in the town of Manchester to the complainant. Subsequently a scire facias was issued upon the judgment against the complainant as the terre-tenant of Baughan, who was then dead, to subject the land to the payment of the judgment. The complainant made no defence at law, and a judgment was entered upon the scire facias, to subject the land to sale. An injunction was granted, and a motion made to dissolve for want of equity upon the face of the bill, which was overruled.

The bill does not disclose any ground for the interposition of equity, except that it states the belief of the complainant that the judgment had been paid, and his purchase of the lot without knowledge of the judgment lien.

We can see no ground upon which to sustain the bill. There is no allegation that the judgment has been satisfied. Although the complainant might have had no actual notice of the judgment, yet, as the law then stood, he was chargeable with notice by construction. The 'law was perhaps a harsh one, and has since been modified to some extent by legislative enactment; yet it is not for us to declare a rule different from that prescribed by the statute.

The decree of the chancery court must therefore be reversed, and the injunction dissolved, and cause remanded.  