
    
      George R. Robinson vs. Hugh H. Stewart.
    
    A motion for leave to file a suggestion, to try whether a confession of judgment is fraudulent, is not grantable of course, on the affidavit of the creditor, that he believes the judgment to be fraudulent, but only on satisfying the court that there is a reasonable ground of suspicion.
    
      Before Evans, J. at Abbeville, Spring Term,, 1844.
    This was a motion in behalf of Wade Speed and James M. Hester, judgment creditors of Hugh H. Stewart, for leave to file a suggestion to try whether a judgment confessed by Hugh H. Stewart to George W. Robinson was fraudulent. The presiding judge refused the motion, on the following grounds.
    
      “ On reading the affidavits submitted on both sides, I do not perceive any sufficient reason to believe the confession of judgment by Stewart to Robinson is fraudulent. That Robinson has had about five hundred dollars received on the estate of his wife, is pretty clear, and from his habits and character, it is not likely he has spent it. This sum, there is reason to believe, was loaned to Stewart.”
    The creditors appealed, and moved to reverse the order of the presiding Judge, and for leave to file the suggestion, on the grounds,
    1. That the affidavits submitted, shewed sufficient reason to believe the confession fraudulent.
    
      2. That his Honor decided on the merits of the case, instead of the merits of the application.
    
      Thos. Thompson, for the motion.
    
      Perrin & McGowan, contra.
   Curia, per

Evans, J.

This was an application made to me at Abbeville, for an issue to try whether the confession of judgment in this case should not be set aside for fraud. Both parties submitted affidavits. On the hearing the motion was refused; on the ground, that there was no reasonable ground to impeach the judgment.

If these motions are to be granted of course, on the declaration of a creditor that he believes the judgment to be fraudulent, the rule to shew cause and the investigation by the Judge is a useless ceremony. The rule seems to me to be, that the showing must be such as to excite a reasonable ground of suspicion. It did not seem to me that such evidence was offered, and I dismissed the motion. The majority of this court concur in that decision, and the motion to reverse it is dismissed.

O’Neall, Butler, Wardlaw and Frost, JJ. concurred.  