
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jose Ferreira ALMONTE, also known as Jose Almonte, also known as Jose Virgilio, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 09-3894-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 11, 2011.
    Darrell B. Fields, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., New York, NY, for Appellant.
    Burton T. Ryan, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney (David C. James, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief) for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
    Present: WILFRED FEINBERG, ROGER J. MINER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Jose Ferreira Almonte appeals from a September 18, 2009 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Bianco, J.) sentencing him to ninety-six months’ imprisonment and three years’ conditional supervised release for illegally reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b). Almonte, through a pro se supplemental letter brief, contends for the first time on appeal that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s parsimony clause. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). In applying that standard, we must “take into account the totality of the circumstances, giving due deference to the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind the institutional advantages of district courts.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc). We will not “substitute our own judgment for the district court’s on the question of what is sufficient to meet the § 3553(a) considerations in any particular case,” and will “set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’ ” Id. at 189 (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir.2007)).

Here, the district court noted that Almonte is a violent offender who has been convicted of six crimes since 2002; weighed the relevant mitigating factors, particularly the sentence’s effect on Almonte’s children; and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence designed to achieve deterrence in light of Almonte’s present conviction for illegally reentering the United States. This does not present one of the “exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s decision, let alone plain error!

We have reviewed Almonte’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. 
      
      . We construe Almonte’s letter challenging the sentence’s "fairness” as a substantive reasonableness challenge. "It is well established that the submissions of a pm se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
      In addition to Almonte’s letter, we have also considered a supplemental letter filed at the Court’s request by Almonte’s counsel on April 26, 2011.
     