
    Norris v. Tomlin and Gray.
    
    Monday, June 24th, 1811.
    Appeals — Reversed Judgment oí County Court.— When, upon the reversal ot a county court judg-merit, a cause has been retained in the district court, by consent; if, at a subsequent term, the order for retaining the cause be set aside, an appeal cannot then be taken, to the court of appeals, even by consent of parties, but the cause should be sent back to the county court for farther proceedings.
    
      
       In Janey v. Blake, 8 Leigh 91, it is said that the case of Norris v. Tomlin, 2 Munf. 336. is ba dly reported, and is no authority for the doctrine laid down therein.
    
    
      
       Appeals. — See monographic note on “Appeal and Error” appended to Hill v. Salem, etc., Turnpike Co., 1 Rob. 263.
    
   In this case a judgment of the county court of Fauquier, in an action of ejectment, was reversed by the district court of Hay-market. The parties consented . that the cause should be retained in the district court for a new trial to be had therein ; and, after various proceedings in that court, again consented that the former order for retaining the suit for trial be set aside; and Norris prayed an appeal to the court of appeals, which, by the like consent, was granted.

This court (“deeming it unnecessary to say any thing in relation to the judgment of the district court, because it did not appear that there was any appeal from that judgment”) was of opinion that, when the order retaining the cause in that court was set aside, it ought to have been sent back to the county court for farther proceedings to be had therein ; and therefore dismissed the appeal, as having been improvidently allowed.  