
    Sarah Ilsley, Administratrix, versus Samuel Knight.
    
      Practice. — Costs not allowed to the petitioner when a review is granted, where the mistake complained of was a miscalculation of the interest on a note; though the defendant had notice, was requested to pay, and refused; for the plaintiff’s counsel ought to have seen that the computation was correct.
    This was a petition by the administratrix for the review of an action, in which a judgment was rendered in the Court of Common Pleas, upon the default of Knight, for the sum of 326 dollars 79 cents damages, stating that there was a mistake, in the computation, of thirty-four dollars and nineteen cents; and that, on discovering the mistake, she had given notice thereof to Knight, and requested him to pay the sum, which he had refused to do Knight, having had regular notice of this petition, was called, but did not appear.
    * It appeared, and was so alleged in the petition, that the action was brought upon a note of hand, and the mistake originated from the mere error of the clerk in computing the interest on the note.
    
      
      Longfellow, for the petitioner,
    stated that the practice was to allow costs upon applications of this kind; and mentioned a case precisely, as he said, similar to the present, in which costs were allowed. And he urged that as the mistake, alleged in the petition, was confessed by the present default, and was indeed apparent from the copies of the case produced in Court, and as the petitioner, in order to obtain justice, had been compelled to make this application to the Court, Knight having refused to correct it, upon the notice which he originally, and before this application, had had from the petitioner, it was but reasonable for him to pay the costs of the petition.
    But the Court said that, as there was no precise or particular report of the case referred to, they could not consider it as governing the present; indeed, that cases of this kind depended upon the particular circumstances of each, and that no general rule could be laid down as to granting costs, in such cases. In the present case, admitting that Knight was in fault, yet it originated from the previous negligence of the attorney of the petitioner, who ought to have seen that the judgment was entered up for the sum actually due on the note, it being a matter of computation merely. That to grant costs in such cases, would be encouraging a species of negligence, or possibly something worse, which might be the means of frequently making two actions out of one, and putting two bills of cost, instead of one, into the pocket of an * attorney ; that applications of this kind were so frequent, that it had become necessary to put a check upon them, which they thought could not be done so effectually, as by denying costs, and thereby making it the interest, as well as the duty, of counsel to attend to the making up of judgments in cases like this now before the Court; they would not therefore rescind the order.
   The Court (Sedgwick, Sewall, and Thacher, justices) granted a review to correct the error, and directed the clerk to enter that no costs were allowed to the petitioner on the petition.  