
    Robert Reed v. City of Greenville.
    1. Criminal Law. Misdemeanor. Accessory before the fact.
    
    An accessory before the fact to a misdemeanor is a principal.
    3. Same. MvmAcipal ordinance. Adoption of common law definition. Incidents.
    
    Where a municipal ordinance creating an offense uses the terms of the common law definition of a misdemeanor in so doing, one who is an accessory before the fact to its violation may he punished as a principal.
    From tbe circuit court of Washington county.
    HoN. A. McC. Kimbrough, Judge.
    Reed, tbe appellant, was charged, tried and convicted of the violation of an ordinance of tbe city of Greenville. lie appealed to tbe circuit court from tbe municipal court and was there again tried and convicted and appealed therefrom to the supreme court.
    Tbe ordinance made it an offense against the city for any person to feloniously take, steal or carry away any personal property of another, or to have any stolen property in one’s possession, knowing said property to be stolen. Tbe evidence showed that-appellant was an accessory before tbe fact to the crime of petit larceny, committed by one Reuben Frazier. Tbe contention of counsel for appellant was that while, under tbe common law, accessories to misdemeanors are deemed principals, tbe common law does not apply to, and is not in force in, municipalities; that while tbe city of Greenville, having been' chartered by a legislative enactment, was given power to pass ordinances defining what were and what were not offenses, its municipal authorities must first pass ordinances defining offenses ; and that tbe ordinance under which appellant was convicted did not, by its terms, make accessories to petit larceny principals, and the common-law rule making them such could, not be invoked to aid municipal ordinances.
    
      Jayne & Watson, for appellant.
    We are aware that at common law and in Mississippi, under the statute and common law prevailing, the defendant could have been convicted, if the evidence was sufficient to justify it, under the common law ruling that in misdemeanors accessories would be treated as principals. 1 líale, P. C., 613; 4 Blacks. Com., 36; Williams v. State, 12 Smed. & M., 58; Hogsett v. State, 40 Miss., 522.
    We contend, however, that the two Mississippi cases, above cited, were based on the common law, which was adopted when this state entered the Union, and which, save when modified by statutory enactment or by judicial finding, remains the law of the land. However, the common law does not apply to and is not in force in municipalities. When a municipality -is chartered by the legislature of the state (as was the case of the city of Greenville) or under the provisions of the municipal chapter of the code, as many towns and cites in the state are, the powers granted to the municipality are fixed by the charter, or by the municipal code chapter. The city of Greenville, having been chartered by legislative enactment, was given power to pass ordinances defining what were and what were not offenses and denouncing penalties for such offenses.
    But under the charter powers granted to the city, its council must, first pass ordinances defining offenses, which it did. Among the defenses defined was the one of petit larceny set out in the ordinance introduced in this cause, which does not reach a case of the kind charged against appellant. This we contend for the reason that either the ordinance must make an accessory in a misdemeanor a principal by its terms, or the common law must be called in in aid of the ordinance to give it the effect sought by the prosecution. Were the ordinances a state statute the common law could be invoked to its aid by which all aiders and abettors in tbe commission of a misdemeanor are principals in tbe offenses; bnt tbe municipality cannot call in tbe common law to aid it in extending its ordinances to aiders and abettors in misdemeanors by converting them into principals.
    
      William Williams, Attorney General, for appellee.
    In misdemeanors accessories are made principals. If one with an intent to commit larceny is near by aiding and abetting others to commit larceny, be is a participant and guilty as principal. McLean on Criminal Law, Vol. 1, § 210; Williams v. Stale, 12 Smed. & M., 58; Hogsett v. State, 40 Miss., 522.
    Tbe proposition that tbe city, under tbe said ordinance, bad no authority to punish an accessory to larceny cannot be maintained. When tbe city council passed tbe ordinance fixing tbe punishment for one guilty of petit larceny it also fixed tbe punishment for an accessory to larceny, for tbe reason that an accessory to petit larceny is a principal. It was not necessary to pass an ordinance fixing tbe punishment for an accessory for tbe reason that when it fixed, by ordinance, tbe punishment for one guilty of larceny, it also fixed tbe punishment for one guilty as accessory to larceny.
    Tbe contention of counsel that tbe common law does not apply to and is not enforced in municipalities is not sound. It is absolutely necessary to look to tbe common law to determine tbe meaning of ordinances passed by municipalities. To properly determine tbe meaning of words and sentences, we must necessarily look to authorities. When this is done, we can reach no other conclusion than that an accessory to petit larceny is just as guilty under tbe above ordinance as a principal.
   Whitfield, O. J.,

delivered tbe opinion of tbe court.

Tbe contention of learned counsel for appellant is ingenious, but not sound. Tbe definition of petit larceny in tbe section quoted from tbe. ordinance of tbe city of Greenville is tbe common law definition, and carries with it all tbe common law incidents of tbe crime, among others tbe one that an accessory, in petit larceny is a principal, and is to be punished as such. The doctrine that an accessory before the fact in misdemeanors is a principal is an inseparable incident of every definition of each offense. We look to the common law for the definition of the offense of petit larceny, and we must take with the definition of the offense all incidents the common law attaches.

Affirmed.  