
    Camden Safe Deposit and Trust Company, trustee, &c., complainant, v. Annie G. Fricke et al., defendants.
    [Submitted May 28th, 1926.
    Determined July 2d, 1926.]
    1. In a will directing active trustees to pay the income of a trust fund to specifically named children of testator during their lives, with the added provision: “The representatives of any of said children who may be deceased to have' the share of his or her parent,” the ■word “representatives” held to refer to the children of a deceased child of testator.
    2. The gift above quoted to the children of a deceased child of testator held to be — (1) A contingent substitutionary gift as distinguished from an original 'or substantive gift; (21) a gift to a class to be ascertained at the death of the parent; (3) a gift creative of a joint tenancy in the members of the class as to income from time to time accruing.
    On final hearing on bill for construction of will of Welling Schrack, and for instructions.
    The bill filed herein seeks the construction of the will of Welling Schrack, deceased, touching the payment of the income from time to time accruing from a certain trust fund created by testator’s will.
    The will directs the trustees
    “to pay the [net] income thereof from time to time as received unto my wife, Annie Schrack, during her life, to her sole and separate use and benefit, and after her death to pay said income in equal parts to each of our four children, Annie G. Fricke, wife of Harry Fricke; Bertha L. Schrack, Harry B. Schrack and Nellie M. Schrack, during the term of their natural lives, to their sole and separate use and benefit, the representatives of any of said children who may be deceased to have the share of his or her parent, and, after the death of said children, I devise and bequeath, all of my said estate so held in trust, unto the heirs of the said Annie G. Fricke, Bertha D. Sehraek, Harry B. Sehraek and Nellie M. Sehraek, their heirs and assigns forever, that is to say the heirs of each of said children are to take one share of said estate.”
    Testator died in 1891. His widow died in 1905. Nellie M. Moller, me Sehraek, one of the daughters of the testator, died in 1901, leaving three daughters. Since the death of Nellie S. Moller the share of the income which she would have been entitled to receive, if alive, has been regularly paid to her three daughters until the year 1925, when one of them, Annie Moller Gorham, died without having had a child, but leaving a will giving all her estate to her husband, Standish B. Gorham, who also is executor of her estate.
    The present inquiry is to determine whether Standish B. Gorham is entitled to receive from the trustees the share of the income accruing subsequent to his wife’s death which his wife would be entitled to receive, if alive — that is, the one-third part of the income which Nellie M. Moller, daughter of testator, would be entitled to receive from time to time as such income should accrue, if she were still alive.
    
      Mr. George Reynolds, for the complainant.
    
      Messrs. McCarter & English, for the defendant Gorham.
    
      Mr. Charles E. Hendrickson, for the defendant Wolfe and others.
   Leaming, V. C.

It will be observed that the present controversy in no 'way is concerned with the distribution of the corpus of the trust fund. The present inquiry is to determine to whom the income shall be paid which has accrued since the death of Annie Moller Gorham, and which will from time to time hereafter accrue. The direction of testator is that: “The representatives of any of said children [of testator] who may be deceased to have the share of his or her parent.” Obviously, the word “representatives,” as here used, refers to children of a deceased child of testator, since the words “his or her parent” cannot otherwise be given recognition. Thus understood, the direction of testator is that the income of the trust fund, as it from time to time accrues, is to be paid to the widow of testator during her life. At her death the income as it from time to time thereafter accrues is to be paid to testator’s specified children. At the death of either of testator’s said children the share of the accruing income which such child would have been entitled to receive, if alive, is to be paid to the children of such deceased child. The interests which vest under provisions of that nature are well defined in this state. At the death of testator an interest in the income which should accrue during the life of testator’s widow vested in her in right and in possession for the period of her life. At the death of testator an interest vested in right in the several children of testator, limited to. the period of their respective lives, to receive the income which should accrue after the decease of testator’s widow; such several interests became vested in possession upon the death of the widow. These gifts to the children of testator were to them in severaltjr, since the gifts were to the children of testator, nominatim; but the gifts only embraced the right to receive the proportionate share of the income during their respective lives after the death of the widow. At death their interest in the income terminated. In the event of the decease of any of these several children pending the income-paying trust, leaving children, the share of the income which the parent would have received, if alive, was to be paid to the children of such parent so long as the trust continued. This provision for the substitution of the children of a deceased child to receive the share of the income theretofore payable to their parent is a contingent substitutionary gift to a class, the members of which are to be determined at the death of the parent, as distinguished from an original or substantive gift. At the death of the parent a right to receive the share of the income which the parent would receive, if alive, vested in interest and in possession in the members of the class.

The determining factor in this ease arises from the circumstance that the substitutionary gift is to a class with no words of severance or other expression denoting an intent of severance. Gifts of that nature create, a joint teaney in the members of the class. At the death of Nellie M. Schrack, leaving three children, the income which would have been payable to her, but, for her death, became payable to her three children; upon the subsequent death of one of them (Annie Moller Gorman) the remaining two in right of survivorship became entitled to receive their mother’s share of the income.

The views herein stated will be found adequately supported in the following adjudications in this state: Crane v. Bolles, 49 N. J. Eq. 373 (at pp. 381 et seq.); Redmond v. Gummere, 94 N. J. Eq. 216 (at p. 219); Hutchinson v. Ex-ton, 53 N. J. Eq. (at p. 690).  