
    Andreas PLONKA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard BROWN, Assistant District Attorney of Otsego County, Donald Laraway, Former Unadilla Town Justice, Steven Clark, Town Justice of Unadilla, Karen Sastra, Town Justice of Unadilla, Frank Schaeffer, Former Town Justice of Sidney, Ronald Decker, Town Justice of Otego, Gerald Kramer, Attorney (Albany Bar), Andrew Skrabanski, State, Police Troop C (Sidney), Dean Edwards, State, Police, Troop C (Sidney), Lawrence L. Brown, State Police, Troop C (Sidney), Robert Gouldin, Attorney (Albany Bar), Michael Getman, Attorney (Albany Bar), Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 03-7746.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 2, 2004.
    Andreas Plonka, on the brief, for Appellant, pro se.
    Alison M. Pavlakos, Napierski, Vandenburgh & Napierski, L.L.P., Albany, NY, on the brief, for Appellee Decker.
    Thomas K. Murphy and Catherine A. Barber, Murphy, Burns, Barber & Murphy, LLP, Albany, NY, on the brief, for Appellees Clark and Sastra.
    James E. Konstanty, Oneonta, NY, on the brief, for Appellees Brown and Get-man.
    David M. Gouldin, Levine Gouldin & Thompson, LLP, Binghamton, NY, on the brief, for Appellee Gouldin.
    Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General for the State of New York, Nancy A. Spiegel, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, and Dorothy E. Hill, Assistant Solicitor General, on the brief, for Appellee Edwards.
    PRESENT: VAN GRAAFEILAND, JACOBS, and POOLER, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Andreas Plonka appeals from a decision and order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.), entered on July 2, 2003, dismissing his complaint against all defendants. Familiarity by the parties is assumed as to the facts, the procedural context, and the specification of appellate issues.

Appellant fails to state a claim for slander against appellee Brown because he alleges neither special damages nor slander per se. See Aronson v. Wiersma, 65 N.Y.2d 592, 594, 493 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 483 N.E.2d 1138 (1985) (a statement that “does not, on its face, defame plaintiff in her trade, business or profession ... does not constitute slander per se, actionable without proof of special damages”). We affirm the dismissal of the claims against the remaining defendants for substantially the reasons stated by the district court.

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  