
    ZHONG CHI YANG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-290.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 25, 2015.
    For Petitioner: Peter D. Lobel, New York, N.Y.
    For Respondent: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Kohsei Ugumori, Senior Litigation Counsel; C. Frederick Sheffield, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, REENA RAGGI, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Zhong Chi Yang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a January 2, 2014, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Zhong Chi Yang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 2, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen “for abuse of discretion, mindful that motions to reopen ‘are disfavored.’ ” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (quoting INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)). When the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial-evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

The BIA’s denial of Yang’s motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion. Because Yang filed his motion more than 90 days after the agency’s final administrative decision, he was required to demonstrate a material change in conditions in China to excuse the applicable time limitation. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).

We find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s conclusion that the evidence Yang submitted was insufficient to establish changed country conditions material to his claim that he was eligible for relief based on his conversion to Christianity while in the United States. Contrary to Yang’s contention, . the BIA acknowledged evidence that supported his claim, such as reports of the arrests of some house church leaders and the harassment of church members. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (stating that the Court “presume[s] that [the agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). Despite that evidence, the BIA reasonably found that the record did not demonstrate that Yang would face persecution under current conditions. The reports indicated that whether authorities tolerate or repress unregistered religious activity varies regionally. And the 2011 ChinaAid Annual Report, which lists incidents of religious persecution by province, reflects none in Yang’s home province of Fujian for the reporting year. The BIA was not compelled to conclude that this evidence reflected a change in country conditions material to Yang’s claimed fear of harm. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 171.

Because Yang failed to demonstrate changed country conditions material to his eligibility for relief, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 168-69. Accordingly, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding the BIA’s alternative findings as to Yang’s pri-ma facie eligibility for relief.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.  