
    [No. 20452.
    Department Two.
    May 12, 1927.]
    The State of Washington, on the Relation of White Pine Sash Company, Plaintiff, v. The Superior Court for Ferry County et al., Respondents. 
    
    
       Eminent Domain (15) — Delegation of Power — Private Wat for Logging Roads. Rem. Comp. Stat., §§ 6747-6749, authorizing the condemnation of a right of way for a logging road is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal constitution or § 16, of Art. 1, of the state constitution.
    
       Same (39, 40). A finding of public necessity for the condemnation of a right of way for a logging road is sustained, where it appears that the relator has purchased very extensive timber tracts from the United States which it was required to remove at the rate of 30,000,000 feet annually, and has acquired most of its right of way for thirty miles to the nearest feasible connection with a trans-continental railway line.
    Certiorari to review an order of the superior court for Ferry county, Neal, J., entered January 6, 1927, declaring a public use and necessity in eminent domain proceedings for a logging right of way.
    Affirmed.
    
      ■ Alex M. Winston, for relator.
    
      Davis, Heil S Davis, for respondents.
    
      
      Reported in 255 Pac. 1025.
    
   Parker, J.

This is a certiorari proceeding in this court wherein the relator, "White Pine Sash Company, seeks review and reversal of a judgment of the superior court for. Perry county adjudicating in favor of the Hedlund Lumber & Manufacturing Company the necessity for, and.its eminent domain right to acquire by condemnation, a right of way for its proposed logging railroad over land of the relator as a private way of necessity to enable it to remove to market a large amount of timber from lands belonging to the United States, which timber it has purchased from the United States. The condemnation proceeding was prosecuted and the judgment in question rendered under ch. 133, Laws of 1913, being §§6747 et seq., of Bemington’s Compiled Statutes.

The Hedlund Lumber-& Manufacturing Company is a large concern maintaining its plant at Spokane, It has purchased from the United States approximately 337.000. 000 feet of standing merchantable timber, covering approximately 121,000 acres of government land in Perry county, known as the Twin Lakes unit, and has also purchased from the United States approximately 67.000. 000 feet of standing merchantable timber, covering approximately 8,300 acres of government land in Perry county, known as.the Sherman Creek unit. By its purchase contracts with the United States, it is required to remove the timber from these units at the rate of 30,000*000 feet per annum. The Twin Lakes unit lies on the west side of the Columbia river, bordering thereon, being some twenty miles southerly from Hedlund Spur, a station on the Great Northern Bail-way. The Sherman Creek unit lies some four miles west of the Columbia river and some ten miles southwesterly from Hedlund Spur. The Great Northern Railway crosses the Columbia river from the east to the west side about one mile south of Hedlund Spur. There is no railroad on the west side of the Columbia river south of that'crossing, nor any railway shipping point bn the west side of the Golumbia river nearer to either of the units in question than Hedlund Spur, though there are some nearer shipping points upon the Great Northern Railway east of the Columbia river. The Hedlund Lumber & Manufacturing Company has constructed its proposed logging railroad, from a connection with the Great Northern Railway at Hedlund Spur southerly towards its timber units, for a distance of some two miles, and has acquired most of the right of way for the remainder thereof to each of its timber units. The condemnation here in question has to do with the acquiring of less than two miles of right of way over the lands of the relator.

Apparently, the principal contention made in behalf of the relator seems to be that ch. 133, Laws of 1913, p. 412, is unconstitutional, in that to give it effect according to its terms will result in taking private property for a private use and thus deprive relator of its property, in violation of the due process of law guaranty and the eminent domain restrictions of §§ 3 and 16, of Art. 1 of our state constitution; and also in violation of the guaranties of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution of the United States. Our decisions in State ex rel. Mountain Timber Co. v. Superior Court, 77 Wash. 585, 137 Pac. 994, State ex rel. Grays Harbor Logging Co. v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 503, 144 Pac. 722, and State ex rel. Eastern R. & L. Co. v. Superior Court, 127 Wash. 30, 219 Pac. 857, are decisive against this contention, wherein we upheld the constitutionality of ch. 133, Laws of 1913, as not viola-tive of any rights guaranteed by the state or federal constitution.

It is further contended that, in any event, upon the trial of the condemnation proceeding in the superior court for the determination of the question of necessity, the evidence does not sustain the judgment. A reading of the evidence seems to us so decisive in support of the judgment as not to call for our here analyzing it with a view of demonstrating the correctness of the judgment. That has been well done by the trial judge in his memorandum opinion leading to his conclusion, with which we agree, that there has been shown a reasonable necessity for the Hedlund Lumber & Manufacturing Company acquiring the right of way in question.

The judgment is affirmed.

Mackintosh, C. J., Tolman, French, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.  