
    (21 App. Div. 172.)
    In re ROWLAND.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
    October 12, 1897.)
    Supplementary Proceedings—Venue.
    Under Code Civ. Proc. § 2458, providing that to sustain, in certain cases, the issue of an order in supplementary proceedings, an execution must have been issued to the sheriff of the county where the judgment debtor “resides,” where an execution is issued in the county in which the judgment debtor resides in the summer, an order for an examination in supplementary proceedings in such county is valid, though defendant’s permanent residence is elsewhere.
    Appeal from Rockland county court.
    John T. Rowland, a judgment debtor, appeals from an order of the county judge denying his motion to set aside an order for his examination in supplementary proceedings. Affirmed.
    Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and CULLEN, BARTLETT, HATCH, and BRADLEY, JJ.
    Chas. D. Ridgway, for appellant.
    William J. Griffin, for respondent.
   GOODRICH, P. J.

On April .16, 1897, Phebe Hobby obtained a judgment against John T. Rowland in the supreme court in the county of Queens, and the same was docketed in Rockland county. Execution was issued to the sheriff of that county, and, on its return unsatisfied, an order was obtained from the county judge for the examination of Rowland in supplementary proceedings. On the return day Rowland appeared, and moved to vacate the order, on the ground that the county judge had no power to make the order, as Rowland did not reside in Rockland county. Section 2458 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that, to sustain the issue of the order, an execution must have been issued to the sheriff of the county where the judgment debtor resided at the time of the "issuance of the order. The question, therefore, is whether Rowland resided in the county of Rockland when the order for his examination was made, on August 12, 1897. He testified in April, on the trial of the action, as follows: “Q. Where do you live? A. I live in Jersey City part of the time, and part of the time in Rockland county.” It appears by the affidavit used in opposition to the motion that on August 23d Mr. Ridgway, his attorney, informed the plaintiff’s attorney that Rowland had resided at Hempstead, Rockland county, since May 1, 1897, and was still residing there; that he was at New Hempstead, and had been there every summer for 28 years. It is the evident intention of the Code that a judgment debtor should not be compelled to attend for examination at a place distant from his ordinary place of abode, and the limitations of the section are primarily intended for the protection and convenience of the debtor. In this view, no hardship would be imposed by his compulsory attendance at a place in Rockland county contiguous to what he admitted was his place of abode during the summer. The question of permanent residence does not obtrude itself into this view of the purpose of the statute. The use of the word “resident” in many other statutes—such, for instance, as those relating to the residence of a party necessary to give jurisdiction in actions of divorce—does not apply to the present proceedings.

We are of opinion that the order was proper, and it is affirmed. All concur.  