
    DAVIS v. STATE
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 30, 1913.)
    1. Forgery (§ 29) — Indictment — Allegations— Creating Pecuniary Obligation.
    Where the instrument, claimed to have been forged, as set out in the indictment, was an ordinary check on a bank, which imported a pecuniary obligation on its face, it was not necessary for the indictment to allege that the instrument would have created a pecuniary obligation if valid.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Forgery, Cent. Dig. §§ 77-81; Dec. Dig. § 29.]
    2. Forgery (§ 29) — Indictment — Allegations.
    An indictment charging the forgery of a check need not allege that “S. F. Hackney and son,” the payee, was a firm.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Forgery, Cent. Dig. §§ 77-81; Dec. Dig. § 29.]
    3. Forgery (§ 29) — Allegations of Indictment-Name of Person Defrauded.
    An indictment for forgery need not allege the name of the person to be defrauded.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Forgery, Cent. Dig. §§ 77-81; Dec. Dig. § 29.]
    4. Forgery (§ 29} — Allegations of Indictment.
    An indictment alleging the forging of a check payable to the order of a firm named, “$15.00 Fiftheen no/Dollars For Goods,” was not defective for not alleging what was meant by the word “no,” or the words “For Goods”; their meaning being well known in the commercial world.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Forgery, Cent. Dig. §§ 77-81; Dee. Dig. § 29.]
    5. Forgery (§ 29) — Allegations of Indictment-Incorporation of Bank.
    It was not necessary that the indictment, charging the forgery of a cheek on a bank, allege whether the bank was incorporated or unincorporated ; it not being the injured party.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Forgery, Cent. Dig. §§ 77-81; Dec. Dig. § 29.]
    6. Forgery (§ 39) — Admission of Evidence.
    In a prosecution for forging a check, complete and valid on its face, the cheek was admissible in evidence.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Forgery, Cent. Dig. §§ 109, 110; Dec. Dig. § 39.]
    7. Criminal Law ■(§§ 419, 420) — Hearsay.
    Evidence that another told witness that he had given authority to sign a certain name to a check claimed to have been forged was not admissible in a prosecution for forgery, being hearsay.
    [Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 973-983; Dec. Dig. §§ 419, 420.]
    8. Criminal Law (§ 1172) — Harmless Error-Instructions.
    An instruction, in a prosecution for forgery, that if accused actually believed he had authority to -sign to a check the name which he signed thereto, the jury should acquit, cannot be complained of for not being based upon the hypothesis that accused “reasonably” believed, etc.
    [Ed. Nóte, — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3128, 3154-3157, 3159-3163, 3169; Dec. Dig. § 1172.]
    Appeal from District Court, Jones County; Jno. B. Thomas, Judge.
    Leonard Davis was eonvictéd of forgery, and appeals.
    Affirmed.
    J. C. Randel, of Anson, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Deo. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   HARPER, J.

Appellant was convicted in the district court of Jones county under an indictment charging him with forgery, and his punishment was assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for the term of two years.

The first contention is that the court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to quash the indictment. The motion to quash the indictment states the following reasons: (1) That the indictment does not charge that the instrument forged would have created, diminished, discharged, or defeated any pecuniary obligation; (2) 'because the indictment does not allege that “S. F. Hackney and son,” was a firm; (3) because the indictment does not allege and show that W. H. Travis, the purported maker, or the said S. F. Hackney & Son, or, either, could have been injured ; (4) because said indictment does not contain allegations as to what was meant by the words “no Dollars” following the word “Fiftheen”; (5) because the indictment does not contain allegations as to what is meant by “For Goods”; (6) because the indictment does not contain innuendo averments to the effect that “The First Bank of Swenson” was a corporation, association, or banking concern, nor where located.

The indictment under which appellant was convicted reads as follows:

“And the grand jurors aforesaid upon their oaths in said court do further present that Leonard Davis, on or about the 10th day of August, A. D. 1912, and anterior to the presentment of this indictment, in the county of Jones and state of Texas, without lawful authority and with intent to injure and defraud, did willfully and fraudulently make a false instrument in writing, purporting to be the act of another, to wit, the act of W. H. Travis, the said W. H. Travis being a fictitious person, which said false instrument is to the tenor following:
“ ‘Swenson, Texas, 8/10 1912. No.-
“ ‘The First Bank of Swenson (unincorporated)
“ ‘Pay to the order of S. F. Hackney and son $15.00
Fiftheen no/ Dollars
For Goods
“ ‘W. H. Travis.’
“By the figures ‘8/10’ in the line at the top of said cheek after the words ‘Swenson, Texas,’ was intended and meant to be and stand for ‘August tenth.’ By the word ‘Fif-theen’ after the dollar mark and figures was intended and meant to be the word ‘Fifteen.’ Against the peace and dignity of the state.”

As to the first ground upon which this motion to quash is based, we think the instrument" on its face imports a pecuniary obligation, and therefore it was not necessary to allege that the instrument, if genuine, would have created, increased, diminished, or discharged or defeated any pecuniary obligation. See Horton v. State, 32 Tex. 79; Labbaite v. State, 6 Tex. App. 257; Morris v. State, 17 Tex. App. 660; Dooley v. State, 21 Tex. App. 549, 2 S. W. 884. It is drawn in the form that virtually all checks on banks are now given.

It was not necessary to allege that “S. F. Hackney and son” was a firm. It has been so decided in a number of cases by this court.

As to ,the third ground, to wit, that the indictment was bad because it did not allege that Hackney & Son, or Travis, or either, could have been injured, it is not tenable. It is not necessary to allege the name of the person to be defrauded. Labbaite v. State, 6 Tex. App. 257; Westbrook v. State, 23 Tex. App. 401, 5 S. W. 248; English v. State, 30 Tex. App. 470, 18 S. W. 94.

As to the fourth ground, that it should have, by explanatory averments, alleged what was meant by “no/” just before the word “Dollars” in the check, we think the entire commercial world knows that it meant “no cents,” and the check as written was an ordinary commercial instrument, and called for fifteen dollars—no more and no less. The words “For Goods” after the amount simply evidences that the check had been given for goods purchased. Forcy v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 206, 131 S. W. 585, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327.

As to the remaining ground in the motion, it was not necessary to allege that the bank in question v;as incorporated or unincorporated ; the hank not being the injured party. See Reeseman v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 430, 128 S. W. 1127; Webb v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 534, 47 S. W. 356; Lucas v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 48, 44 S. W. 825; Usher v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 97, 81 S. W. 309; Carter v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 46, 114 S. W. 839; Brown v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R: 505, 132 S. W. 790.

The check being such an instrument as, if valid, would have created a legal obligation, and being properly described in the indictment, the court did not' err in admitting it in evidence.

The only other bill complains of the action of the court in not permitting defendant to prove by his witness Davis that one Cxoom told witness (Davis) that he had given defendant authority to sign the name of W. H. Travis to the check. This testimony was inadmissible because it was hearsay. If it was desired to make this proof, Croona should have been summoned. What he told a third party would not be admissible.

The only other complaint is that the court erred in his charge to the jury wherein he instructed them that, if the defendant actually believed he had authority to sign to the cheek the name of W. H. Travis, to acquit, whereas the charge should have been that if he reasonably believed he had authority to sign the name to the check, he should be acquitted. There is no merit in this ground. The charge presented the theory of defendant affirmatively in a way he has no grounds for complaint. See article 540, White’s Penal Code; Hatch v. State, 6 Tex. App. 384; Burge v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 359, 23 S. W. 692; Sweet v. State, 28 Tex. App. 223, 12 S. W. 590; Williams v. State, 24 Tex. App. 342, 6 S. W. 531; McCay v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 233, 22 S. W. 974.

Bills of exception Nos. 3, 4, and 5, referred to in the motion for new trial, are not contained in the record before us.

The judgment is affirmed.  