
    McADAMS v. STATE.
    (No. 3374.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Jan. 13, 1915.)
    1. Laeceny (§ 30) — Complaint and Information — Description of Property — ‘ ‘Theft’ ’ — ‘ ‘Property. ’ ’
    Under Pen. Code 1911, art. 1329, defining “theft” as the fraudulent taking of corporeal personal property belonging to another, etc., art. 1337, providing that “property” as used in relation to the crime of theft includes money, etc., Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 458, providing that when it becomes necessary to describe property of any kind in an indictment, a general description thereof by name, kind, quality., number, and ownership, if known, shall be sufficient, and article 468, providing that in indictments tor theft of any coin or paper, current as money, it shall be sufficient to describe the property in general terms as “money,” etc., of or about a certain amount, a complaint and information charging that accused took from the possession of W. certain money of the value exceeding $1, was not insufficient because of the failure to allege that the stolen money was coins of the United States, or current as money of the United States.
    [Ed. Noto. — Por other cases, see Larceny, Cent. Dig. §§ 64-75, 99; Doe. Dig. § 30.
    
    Por other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Pirst and Second Series, Theft; Property.]
    2. Larceny (§ 31) — Complaint and Information — Value of Property.
    A complaint and information, charging accused with stealing money of the value exceeding $1, was not insufficient to support a conviction of petty theft, as failing to show that the offense was not a felony, because of the failure to allege that the money was of a value of less than $50, since the complaint did not charge a felony in the absence of an allegation that the money was of the value of $50, or over, and it could not have misled accused, especially where he made no objection in the court below.
    [Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Larceny, Cent. Dig. §§ 76-80; Dec. Dig. § 31.]
    3. Criminal Law (§ 1099) — Appeal—Time for Piling- Statement of Pacts.
    On appeal from a conviction in a county court a statement of facts, filed more than 20 days after adjournment, was filed too late,, and would be stricken and not considered.
    [Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2866-2880; Dec. Dig. § 1099.]
    Davidson, J., dissenting.
    Appeal from Milam County Court; John Watson, Judge.
    George McAdams was convicted of petty theft, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    . Lyles & Lyles, of .Cameron, for appellant, C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes-
    
   PRENDERGAST, JP. J.

Appellant was convicted of petty theft, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $25 and one day in jail.

The complaint and information alleged that appellant, with other necessary allegations, did unlawfully and fraudulently take from the possession of Carrie Wyatt “certain money, the exact description and value of which is to affiant unknown, but of the value exceeding $1.” Appellant moved to quash said pleadings “because the description of the money is vague and uncertain and fails to inform him what he is called upon to' answer, and the complaint does not charge that the money alleged to have been stolen was coins of the United States, or that the said stolen money was current as money of the United States, or any other country.” The statute (article 1329, P. C.) defines theft as the fraudulent taking of corporeal personal property belonging to another, etc. It says (article 1337) property in. relation to-the crime of theft includes money. . The Code originally prescribed (Code Cr. Proc. art. 458) that when it becomes necessary to describe property of any kind in an indictment or information, a general description of the same, by name, kind, etc., if known shall be sufficient. Under the earlier decisions of the Supreme, and of this court, it was held that the pleading was insufficient if it merely alleged the theft of money, and required that some description thereof was necessary. For the very purpose of avoiding the effect of these decisions, the Legislature enacted, among others, article 468, C. C. P., which says in indictments or informations for theft of any coin or paper, current as money, it shall be sufficient to describe the property in general terms as “money” of or about a certain amount. Since then, while the decisions have not always marked this additional provision, they are to the effect that it is only necessary, in indictments or informations for thefts of money, to allege that the property stolen was money. Green v. State, 28 Tex. App. 493, 13 S. W. 784; Taylor v. State, 29 Tex. App. 466, 16 S. W. 302; Wofford v. State, 29 Tex. App. 536, 16 S. W. 635, and many other decisions. See, also, Sims v. State, 64 Tex. Or. R. 442, 142 S. W. 572, and Ferrell v. State, 152 S. W. 901, and cases cited and reviewed in those decisions. We said in Sims v. State, supra:

“It has many times been held, and may be stated to be the law of this state, that in this character of case an allegation that the stolen property was ‘money’ is held to mean money of the United States. Kirk v. State, 35 Tex. Or. R. 224 [32 S. W. 1045]; Menear v. State, 30 Tex. App. 476 [17 S. W. 1082]; Burries v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 13 [35 S. W. 164], And that the court will take judicial knowledge -of the value of United States money. Gibson v. State, 100 S. W. 776; Sowles v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 17 [105 S. W. 178]; Nelson v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 205 [32 S. W. 900]; and Menear v. State, supra.”

In our opinion the pleading describing the money in this case was sufficient, and the lower court correctly overruled appellant’s motion to quash.

For the first time appellant, in his brief in this court only, contends that the said pleading is insufficient, in that the alleged value of the stolen money, shown in the quotation above that the exact value is unknown, but “exceeding one dollar,” does not show it is not a felony. Appellant thereupon contends that the pleading does not exclude that it is a felony because the stolen money might equal or exceed the value' of $50. We think that by no reasonable construction of the language could it be contended that the pleading in this case charges a felony. In order to charge a felony it would have been necessary for the pleading to allege that the money stolen was of the value of $50 or over. The language used, we think, could not be so construed to mislead, and evidently it did not mislead, appellant because he made no such objection in the court below and for the first time, only, makes the point by his brief filed in this court. Evidently he understood, as we do, that the language used indicated sufficiently, clearly, and distinctly that, while the amount and value of the stolen money was not exactly known, yet the language used would indicate that its value was of about, but a little more than, $1, and in no event as much as $50.

This case was tried at the October term of the court, which adjourned October 24, 1914. What purports to be a statement of facts herein was not filed until December 3, 1914, more than 20 days after adjournment. The Assistant Attorney General’s motion to strike out and not consider the purported statement of facts because filed too late is therefore well taken, and it is struck out. In the absence of a statement of facts, no other question is raised which we can review.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

DAVIDSON, J.

(dissenting). Appellant was convicted of misdemeanor theft under an information charging him with the “theft of certain money, the exact description and value of which is to affiant unknown, but of the value exceeding $1.” Theft is of two grades: If the value of the property is $50 or above, it is felonious; if under that amount, it is a misdemeanor. This information charges him with the theft of property exceeding $1 in value. The excess of the value above $1 is not stated, and no reason given why it is not stated. A value in excess of $1 may have gone, far in excess of $50, or it may have been less than $50. This information or complaint does not undertake to say whether it is a felony or misdemeanor. It is too uncertain, in the face of the statute which draws the line of demarcation, as the statute of theft does as to value. The appellant should have been notified by the complaint and pleadings against him that he was to answer for a felony or a misdemeanor. The reasoning in the opinion affirming this case does not meet legal requirements. Of course the defendant knew he committed the theft of the property that he obtained if he committed the theft; he would know that whether he was charged with it or not. It is absolutely essential, in the indictment or information or complaint, to charge the party with the offense for which the conviction will be sought. The pleadings in this case charge theft generally, without specifying whether it is a felony or a misdemeanor. The allegations, where the life or liberty of a citizen is desired at the hands of a criminal prosecution, must be specific and charge the offense for which the conviction is sought. This court nor the trial court would have any right to supply the amount or value of the property. The pleadings must do this. This was not done, and, in my judgment, the pleading is wholly insufficient. I, therefore, most respectfully enter my dissent.  