
    COXE v. LUNDY.
    1. Where the parties submit all controversies “ of and concerning the right, title and possession of a piece of ground,” and the arbitrators award that the land “ is the property of A,” (one of the parties,) and order B (the other party) to deliver possession, such award is certain and final.
    2. Arbitrators are not bound to employ technical words in their report, and their language is to be interpreted according to their obvious meaning
    This was a rule to show cause why a verdict, which had been obtained at the Hunterdon Nisi Prius, should not be set aside and a judgment of nonsuit entered.
    The parties had submitted “all controversies, but more particularly of and concerning the right, title and possession of a piece of land of about eighty-three acres, at the great meadows, in Sussex, so as the award be made in writing, and ready to be delivered on the 20th of April, 1787.”
    The arbitrators, under this submission, awarded “ that the lot of land (in question) is part of 6,230, and is, therefore, the property of Charles Coxe,” the plaintiff, and they order Lundy to deliver the possession to Coxe.
    
      Ab. Ogden and Woodruff contended
    that this award was void — 1st. Because it was not final — the arbitrators not having decided the title which was submitted to them. 2d. Because it was uncertain — awarding the land to be “ the proper-[256]-ty of Charles Coxe,” did not declare what right he had, and the expression is not descriptive of any legal title. 3d. They award it to be his, because part of 6,230, not saying what, or where situated, so as to bring it within the submission. They cited Kyd on Awards 117, (old ed.) 170, 176, (Phil, ed.); 8 Co. 89, Baspole’s case.
    
    
      B. Stockton and Leake, contra.
    
    The award is sufficiently certain, and within the express words of the submission. They awarded the land to be the properly of Coxe, and order Lundy to deliver him the possession. The word property must be taken in its most extensive signification, according to its ordinary acceptation, and carries with it the entire estate. At any rate the possession is submitted, and that is ordered to be delivered to Coxe. Awards are not now examined with the same strictness as formerly — they are liberally construed ; and, therefore, this mode of terminating differences has become eminently beneficial and convenient. Kyd 154, &c., (old ed.) 228, &c., (Phil. ed.)
    
   Per Curiam.

The counsel on the part of the defendant appear to consider it as necessary for the arbitrators to make use of technical language in order to express their meaning. This was formerly required by the courts; but in modern times a greater" latitude and more liberality has been found beneficial to all parties, and common words are sufficient; their meaning is to be expounded according to the intentions of the arbitrators, appearing on the award.

The submission is general — of right, title and possession; the award, that it is the property of Coxe. Now, admitting that the word property is not particularly and specifically appropriated to any one kind of estate, still it is so far clear that it shows some title; to the possession especially, for the delivery of that immediately follows, and should have been performed. It may, for aught that appears, be the whole dispute between the parties. What estate belongs to Coxe under this award, is not the question before us. It appears that he had some right to the laud, which the arbitrators thought ought to be delivered to him.

Rule discharged.

Cited in Imlay v. Wikoff, 1 South. 139 ; Hazen v. Addis, 2 Gr. 337.  