
    Cooke v. Piles.
    Thursday, April 4th, 1811.
    Court of Appeals — Jurisdiction—Subject in Controversy. — Where a complainant is appellant from a superior court of chancery, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction, unless the subject in controversy be a freehold or franchise, or amount to one hundred and ñfty dollars, exclusive of all costs, incident to the original judgment, or arising from injunctions, or appeals, subsequent thereto.
    In this case a judgment at law in the county court of Fairfax, was obtained by Piles against Cooke for ninety-nine dollars, and costs of suit; to which an injunction was granted by the same court, but after-wards dissolved, on a regular hearing, and the complainant decreed to pay the costs. The bill had stated, inter alia, that a forthcoming *bond was taken, but did not set forth the amount, nor whether it was forfeited. Cooke appealed to the superior court of chancery, for the Richmond district, by which the decree was affirmed; whereupon, he appealed again, to the court of appeals.
    Botts, for the appellee, moved a dismission of the appeal, on the ground that, this court had no jurisdiction, the original subject of controversy being less than one hundred and fifty dollars, exclusive of costs. The motion was opposed by Call and Wick-ham, for the appellant.
    Thursday, April 11th. The court, consisting of judges Fleming, Roane and Cabell, unanimously dismissed the appeal. The following observations were made by Cabell and Roane.
    
      
      Court of Appeals — Jurisdiction—Subject in Controversy. — If a judgment of a county or corporation court, being for less than one hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, be reversed by a superior court of law. upon a writ of supersedeas, whereupon judgment is entered that the plaintiff take nothing by his bill, etc., he cannot appeal to the • court of appeals; notwithstanding his declaration demanded a larger sum than one hundred dollars. Henry v. Elcan, 2 Munf. 541.
      See further, monographic note on Appeal and Error” appended to Hill v. Salem, etc.. Turnpike Co., 1 Rob. 263.
      Judgment — Satisfaction — Forthcoming Bond. — In Lusk v. Ramsay, 3 Munf. 454, Judge Roane said he entirely concurred in the opinion of Judge Cábele in the principal case, that a forthcoming bond is no satisfaction of a judgment, until the forfeiture; and Judge Roane further expressed the opinion that, until such satisfaction has taken place, the lien created under the judgment is not extinguished.
      See further, monographic note on '‘Judgments” appended to Smith v. Charlton, 7 Gratt. 425.
    
   JUDGE CABELL.

This is a motion to dismiss an appeal, on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The appeal, in this case, having been granted to the complainant in the court of chancery, the question will turn altogether on the construction of the second section of the “Act for reducing-into one act, the several acts concerning the court of appeals and special court of appeals,” which passed in 1792; and no regard can be had to the act entitled “An act concerning granting appeals from decrees in chancery,” which passed in 1794; this latter act being confined to cases where the appeals shall be granted to defendants. According to the act first mentioned, this, court shall have jurisdiction on appeals, from the court of chancery, if the matter in controversy be equal in value, exclusive of costs, to 150 dollars. It was admitted by the counsel for the appellant, that, whenever a suit, either at law or in equity, shall maintain or preserve its original character, in a course of appeal, that, there, it is the original judgment or decree only to which we must resort in order to determine whether this court has jurisdiction, and that, in our estimate, all the costs, of *every court, must be excluded. But he contended for a difference, where, as in the case now before the court, the original judgment was at law, but has been enjoined by the intervention of a court of equity, and the appeal is taken from the decree of the court of equity. In such a. case, he contended that we are not to exclude the costs of the court where the judgment was originally obtained, but only the costs of that court from whose decree the appeal is taken.’ I do not perceive any foundation for such a distinction; for where an injunction has been obtained, as-in the present case, to a judgment of a court of law, what is, in the language of the act of assembly, the matter in controversy between the parties? Unquestionably the judgment itself; and that must be of the value of 150 dollars, exclusive of costs. The legislature intended to exclude all costs; and it would have been difficult for them to have adopted stronger language. I do not perceive that this case is varied by the mere statement in the bill that a delivery bond bad been executed. The answer is silent as to the fact; nor is it established by any testimony in the cause, although no fact would be more susceptible of proof; it cannot, therefore, enter into the consideration of the court. But, admitting a delivery bond to have been given; its amount not appearing, must the court necessarily infer, that it was at least 150 dollars; and, even admitting that it did amount to that sum, must the court presume, without proof, that the bond was forfeited? Certainly not; and, until a delivery bond shall have been forfeited, I presume it would not be considered as a discharge of the original judgment, or even as changing its character. I think, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.

JUDGE ROANE.

By the 2d section of the act concerning the court of appeals, jurisdiction is given to this court upon appeals from final decisions in the high court *of chancery, “if the matter in controversy be equal in value, exclusive of costs,” to 150 dollars, where the judgment sought to be reversed shall have been rendered in the general court, ■or high court of chancery, or be a freehold or franchise. The matter in controversy in this case, was a judgment in a county court for the sum, exclusive of costs, of only 99 dollars; and the question made both in the county court in chancery, and in the high court of chancery, from whose decision this appeal is taken, was whether that judgment should be enjoined, or suffered to take its course. Nothing, therefore, can be clearer than that this appeal is taken from a decree of the court of chancery, respecting a matter the value whereof, exclusive of costs, is below the standard which gives jurisdiction to this court.

In the case of Hepburn v. Lewis, which was an appeal from the judgment of a district court refusing to enter judgment, upon a verdict for less than thirty pounds, where the writ was for fifty pounds, it was decided that this court had no jurisdiction of the appeal, which was therefore dismissed, on the ground that “the verdict was for less money than the law allows appeals to this court for, and was below the jurisdiction of the court.”

The principle in that case is decisive of -the case before us, and the appeal must be dismissed. 
      
       Rev. Code, vol. 1, p. 60.
     
      
       Rev. Code, vol. 1, p. 318.
     
      
       Rev. Code, v. 1, p. 69.
     
      
       2 Call, 497.
     