
    The Mayor, etc., of New York v. New Jersey Steamboat Transportation Co., Impleaded, etc
    
      (Court of Appeals,
    
    
      Filed June 7, 1887.)
    
    1. Ferries—New York city.
    The fact that the terminus of a ferry in the city of New York was at a private pier in Staten Island seven-eighths of a mile from the ferry terminus, can make no difference as to the rights of a corporation to operate such ferry, and it cannot compel the city to grant such franchise, where it is not shown nor claimed that more than one ferry was needed for the accommodation of the public, there already being one to the same places.
    2. Same—May run to several places.
    The business of defendant did not lose its character as a ferry because its boats stopped at places on the New Jersey shore as well as at places upon the Staten Island shore.
    3. Same.
    There is nothing in the nature of a ferry business which requires that a ferry should be operated from but one place upon one shore to a single place upon the opposite shore. Following case of Independent kteamboatuo.
    
    Appeal from judgment of the superior court of the city of New. York.
    
      Noah Davis, James McNamee and Adolph L. Pincoffs, for app’lts; James C. Carter and W. W. MacFarland, for resp’ts.
   Earl, J.

The opinion in the case against the Independent Steam-Boat Company covers substantially all the questions which arise in this case, and but little more needs now to be written. The complaints in both cases are substantially alike, and so are the judgments rendered, except that the individual'defendants in this case were by their own consent enjoined with the other defendents, and they have not appealed.

The ferry established by the city, and operated under it, ran between the foot of White Hall street, in the city, and New Brighton, Sailors’ Snug Harbor, West Brighton, Port Richmond, and Elm Park, all places on the north shore of Staten Island; and the unauthorized ferry operated by the Independent Steam-Boat Company ran between pier 18, on the Hudson river, in the city, and the same places on the shore of Staten Island. The ferry operated by the New Jersey Steam-Boat Transportation Company started from the same pier in the city, and ran thence to the city of Bayou, in the state of New Jersey, on the north shore of the Kill Van Kull, to West Brighton, thence to Port Richmond, thence to Elm Park, and thence to Elizabeth Port, New Jersey; then it returned, stopping at the same places, to the same pier—the round trip being about twenty-four miles.

The right of the defendant to operate a ferry between the city and any places on the coast of New Jersey is not involved in this action. The sole question is whether it had the right to operate the ferry between the city and Staten Island. The fact that the terminus of the ferry in the city was at a private pier, seven-eighths of a mile distant from the ferry terminus established by the city, can make no difference. The city, in the discharge of its duty as the owner of the ferry franchises, was not bound to have more than one terminus for its Staten Island ferries in the city. It is not shown nor claimed that more than one was needed there for the accommodation of the public, and it does not appear that passengers and freight were not sufficiently accommodated by the terminus established by the city.

The distance of Elm Park, or even of Elizabeth Port, from the city, is not so great that a ferry could not be established and operated between it and the city. Ferries to Elizebeth Port have been operated and known as ferries for more than one hundred years, and it appears never to-have been doubted that ferries could be operated between the two places. It is impossible in a general way to specify to what distance over intervening waters ferries may be operated. A ferry could not be established between New York and Boston, or New York and Newport or Philadelphia. The distance would be too great, and the business of transporting passengers and freight between such distant places would be that of common carriers upon public waters. But when the intervening waters are not wide, and can be traversed at regular and brief intervals by boats adapted to a ferry business, there can be no question that ferries may be established and operated.

The business of the defendant did not lose its character as a feny business because its boats, in their passages, stopped at places upon the New Jersey shore as well as at the places upon the Staten Island shore. It was undoubtedly engaged in a ferry business between every point at which its boats touched for passagers and the city. In the carriage of passengers from one place on the New Jersey shore, or the Staten Island shore to other places on the same shore, it was simply doing the business of a common carrier, as its boats did not pass over intervening waters. But in going from the city its boats could leave passengers from the city at each of the places at which they stopped, and so in returning they could take passengers at each of the places and carry them to the city; and in doing this they would be engaged in a ferry business. There is nothing in the nature of a ferry business which requires that a ferry should be operated from but one place upon one shore to a single place upon the opposite shore. There was nothing in the structure of the defendant’s boats which deprived them of the character of ferry-boats. They were adapted to carry travelers, with their horses, vehicles and other property, and hence they could engage in a ferry business.

So, too, it cannot be successfully contended that the city could not lawfully establish a ferry, which was to run from one place in the city to several places on Staten Island. If it had a single franchise for but one ferry between it and Staten Island, perhaps it could not do so; but as it owned all the franchises between it and Staten Island, it could discharge its duty to the public as owner by establishing one ferry, with as many termini upon the shores of Staten Island as there were landing places. Different questions would be presented for consideration if the Staten Island Rapid Transit Railroad Company were plaintiff, claiming a franchise simply to run a ferry between the city and Staten Island.

We, therefore, see no reason to distinguish this case from that against the Independent Steamboat Company. The judgment in this case, as in that, is too broad, and it should be modified, as to the restrain imposed, so as to restrain the company from maintaining and operating a ferry between the city and Staten Island, and affirmed as thus modified, without costs to either party upon this appeal.  