
    Terrance HOLLOWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-1822
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Submitted September 22, 2016 
    
    Decided September 22, 2016
    Terrance Hollowed, Elkhart, IN, Pro Se.
    Jill M. Wheaton, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Ann Arbor, MI.
    Before MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge, ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge.
    
      
       We have unanimously agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R, App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
    
   ORDER

Terrance Hollowed appeals the district court’s dismissal of his untimely appeal from a bankruptcy court’s order. We affirm.

Hollowed, a debtor in a Chapter 13 case, brought an adversary complaint in bankruptcy court against Chase Home Finance and JPMorgan Chase, alleging that they had committed fraud during his bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court dismissed Hollowed’s complaint for fadure to state a claim and on February 18, 2016, denied his motion to amend the complaint.

Twenty days later, on March 9, 2016, Hollowed filed a notice of appeal with the district court. The district court concluded that he failed to file his notice of appeal within the 14-day period required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002(a)(1), and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal Hollowed does not meaningfully challenge the district court’s dismissal and instead repeats his claims that the defendants committed fraud and violated his rights to equal protection and due process. Even pro se litigants must comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8), which requires that an appellate brief contain a cogent argument and reasons supporting it. See Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545-46 (7th Cir. 2001). In any event, the district court properly dismissed the appeal because it was filed outside of the 14-day period required by Rule 8002(a)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2); In re Sobczak-Slomczeivski, 826 F.3d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 2016).

AFFIRMED.  