
    William H. DOURLAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 08-4790-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 24, 2010.
    William H. Dourlain, pro se.
    John A. DiCicco, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Kenneth L. Greene and Steven K. Uejio, Attorneys, Tax Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
    PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges, JED S. RAKOFF,’ District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant William H. Dourlain, pro se, appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Mordue, /.), granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, in part, and granting Appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the remaining claims in Appellant’s action, brought under 26 U.S.C. § 7433, alleging the unlawful collection of a tax liability. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, and ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We also review de novo a district court’s judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Hardy v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 792 (2d Cir.1999).

As an initial matter, we note that Appellant raises arguments on appeal only with respect to the sixth and seventh of his original causes of action, thereby abandoning any challenge to his remaining seven causes of action. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that issues not raised in a pro se litigant’s appellate brief are waived). In any event, we conclude, for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned ruling, that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether the Internal Revenue Service had served Appellant with a “Notice and Demand,” pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6303 and 6331(a), and that Appellant’s complaint did not otherwise “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that [wa]s plausible on its face.’ ” Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40, 44 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, - U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949,173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).

We have considered Appellant’s remaining claims and find them to be without merit.

While this appeal has been pending, the plaintiff has filed a number of motions requesting injunctions. To the extent these motions are still outstanding at this time this order is filed they are hereby denied for substantially the same reasons as articulated above.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.  