
    [Lancaster,
    May 24, 1826.]
    SHEETS against HAWK, and another.
    IN ERROR.
    The record of the discharge of an insolvent debtor, is conclusive as to the fact of Iris having complied with all things required by law to entitle him toa discharge; and cannot be enquired into in a collateral action.
    It is not a forfeiture of the bond given by an insolvent debtor to the arresting creditor, under the act of 28th of March, 1820, if the record merely show that the debtor appeared and presented his petition at the time appointed; that the court appointed the first day of the next term for a hearing, directing, at the same time, notice to be given to the creditors, and that on the fourth day of the next term, he was sworn and discharged, without any record being made of his appearance or non-appearance on the first day, or of any continuance of the case from day to day; particularly if the arresting creditor, or the person beneficially interested, had notice, that the debtor was not discharged on the first day of the term, and endeavoured to make an arrangement with lfim respecting the debt, which would render it unnecessary for him to take the benefit of the act.
    Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon courity.
    In the court below, it was an action of debt on a bond given by Adam Hawk with Stephen Sigler, as his security, to the plaintiff, Mathias Sheets, the arresting creditor under the supplement to the act for the relief of insolvent debtors, passed the 28th of March, 1820. The condition of the bond was, that if Adam Hawk should be and appear before the judges of the Court of Common Pleas, to be holden on the first Monday of August, 1822, then and there to take the benefit of the insolvent laws and surrender himself to the jail of the said county, if he should fail to comply with all things required by law 16 entitle him to be discharged, and generally to abide by all the orders of said Court of Common Pleas then and there to be held, then the said obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and virtue.
    The said Adam Hawk appeared on the first day of August Term and presented his petition for the benefit of the insol vent laws, and the court appointed the first Monday of the next term for a hearing and directed notice to be given to the creditors. The first day of the next term was the 4th of November, 1822. On that day Hawk did not appear; nor did he appear on the fifth or sixth of the month. No record was made in the case until the 7th of November, when it was entered on the minutes and endorsed on the petition, that Adam Hawk was sworn and discharged. This suit was then brought upon the bond, and on the trial, the defendant, after having proved the publication of the notice of Adam Hawk, to his creditors, in a Lebanon newspaper, on the 2Sth of September, and on the 5th, the 12th, the 19th, and the 26th of October, 1S22, offered to prove that a notice to the creditors of Adam Hawk was published in another newspaper on the 5th and 19th of 
      October, and on the 22d of November, 1822; that on Monday, the 4th of November, 1822, Adam Hawk was called among other insolvent debtors and did not answer, upon wh.ich the court, on motion of Mr. Kline, his attorney, ordered the case to be continued from day to day; that he then sent a man for Hawk, who came in on the 7th of November, and was discharged; that it was the practice of the court, on the application of the attorney of an insolvent debtor, who does not appear on the day appointed for the hearing, to hold the case over or to continue it to the next term, or to some time fixed by the counsel for the petitioner; that it was also the practice to continue the case from day to day during the term: that Hawk's case was not continued to any particular day, but from day to day during the term; that Mr. Wright, the counsel, and not Sheets, was the party really interested in the bond; that Mr. Wright was attending court during the term, and on the 5th of November, trying to make an arrangement with Hawk, having offered to take security to the amount of two hundred dollars for the bond and give him time, so that he might not be compelled to take the benefit of the act. To this evidence the counsel for the plaintiff objected, but the court overruled the objection; and the admission of this evidence, formed the subject of three bills of exceptions, the substantial parts of which, for the sake of brevity, are thrown together.
    When the evidence was closed the court instructed the jury as follows: “ the continuation of Hawk’s case on Monday the 4th of November, by the court generally without fixing any particular day during the term for the hearing of the' case, was a good and legal continuance, and his discharge on the 7th day of November, was such a one as discharged the bond It is the practice of this court, at every term, to continue the insolvent cases generally during the term, when the insolvent does not appear on the day appointed'for the hearing of his cause.”
    The counsel for the plaintiff excepted to the charge of the court also, in which, as well as in the admission of the evidence above stated, error was assigned, on the removal of the record to this court.
    
      Wright and Norris, for the plaintiff in error,
    
      Weidman and Elder, for the defendants in error.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Duncan, J.

The plaintiff insists, that inasmuch as it does not appear by the record, that Hawk did appear on the first day of the term, the bond is forfeited, and the bail has become liable. If this be so, it is a matter of the strictest law, and an exaction of great rigour; for it does appear, that the party having the beneficial interest, had notice that the insolvent was not discharged on the first day of the term, and endeavoured to obtain from him security for a part of his debt, persuading him not to take the benefit of the act.

Looking at the state of the record, and not inquiring further, the condition would appear to have been complied with. The term is but one day, in strictness. Continuances from day to day are not usually entered as continuances from term to term are.1 Where, as in the city of Philadelphia, hundreds sometimes are to come out on the same day, on notices to áppear on the same day, they cannot be all discharged. Indeed, thei common routine of business generally occupies the first day : — empannelling the e;rand jury, charge to the grand jury, calling and receiving returns of constables, forfeiting the recognizances of parties and witnesses who do not appear; and I believe that it rarely occurs, that the Court of Common Pleas begin to act on the first day of their session. It must be presumed, unless the contrary appear by the record, that the party complied with all things required by law to entitle him to be discharged, and generally abode all orders of the court. Omnia presumantur rite acta. The court was competent to discharge, — they have discharged, they have decided that the insolvent has complied with all things required by law to entitle him to his discharge, — that he has abode by all orders of the court, and this is all the bond covenanted he should do. ■

Now, as it appears on the record that the court had jurisdiction to discharge, and as they have exercised that legitimate power, it cannot consist with the general analogy of the law, that in a collateral action there can be any inquiry on the facts which they have decided. The record is as conclusive in that case as it is in any other of which they have jurisdiction. It was not a nullity. The insolvent debtor, with that discharge in his hand, was free from arrest. He was discharged by competent authority. In Lestet v. Thompson, 1 Johns. Rep. 300, it was determined, that the discharge of an insolvent debtor was conclusive as to the facts. If this cause went back on the exception to the evidence, it would be a hopeless one on the part of the plaintiff, because his exception is, that the whole must depend on the record of the court, and on the record he has no case. But the evidence excepted to, although unnecessary, did not goto contradict the record, and I think the court may inquire of their own officers, and attorneys are officers of the court in this respect, what the course of business is. The proof of that practice was, that on an application of the attorney of an insolvent debtor, the court will postpone the day of hearing, and continue it from day to day during the term; and the attorney of the insolvent debtor proved the fact, that the case of this insolvent debtor was continued from day to day; and if even it had been necessary that the continuance-should appear of record, the court would direct the prothonotary at any time so to amend the record, by the insertion of the order for continuance; for the attorney of the insolvent swears, that the court, on Hawk’s not appearing, on his application, continued the hearing from day to day.. The court had authority so to do. We are not now to inquire why they exercised this discretion. The reason for the continu-anee is never stated on the record, and if it was, this court, in this indirect manner, cannot reverse the sentence of discharge, though they might conceive that the reason for granting the continuance was not a sufficient one. The insolvent might have been taken sick, or broken his leg in his way to the court; the waters might have been impassable; many accidents might have occurred to have made it the duty of the court to continue the hearing, and we must suppose the court has done its duty.

Judgment affirmed.  