
    Ricardo PEREZ-MORALES, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-71901.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 13, 2014.
    
    Filed Feb. 18, 2014.
    Murray David Hilts, Law Offices of Murray D. Hilts, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner.
    
      OIL, Rebecca Hoffberg Phillips, Esquire, Trial, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, and O’SCANNLAIN and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Ricardo Perez-Morales appeals the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen to seek discretionary relief under former § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. We review for abuse of discretion. Valeriano v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 669, 672 (9th Cir.2007).

The deadline for filing a special motion to reopen to apply for discretionary relief under former § 212(c) was April 26, 2005. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44(h). Perez-Morales filed his motion in November 2009. Equitable tolling of a deadline to file a motion to reopen will apply “where, despite all due diligence, [the party invoking equitable tolling] is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of the claim.” Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). We assume arguendo that the Immigration Judge at Perez-Morales’s 1998 final removal hearing erred by not informing Perez-Morales of the availability of relief under former § 212(c). Perez-Morales is presumed to have had notice of the April 26, 2005, deadline because it was subsequently enacted by the Attorney General and published in the Federal Register. Luna v. Holder, 659 F.3d 753, 760 (9th Cir.2011). And even if Perez-Morales’s ignorance of the deadline could serve as a basis for equitable tolling, Perez-Morales has no explanation for why, if he first learned about his potential eligibility for § 212(c) relief when his current counsel first reviewed his file in June 2008, he waited until November 2009 to file his motion.

Additionally, a special motion to reopen to seek § 212(c) relief must establish that the alien “[a]greed to plead guilty or nolo contendere to an offense rendering the alien deportable or removable, pursuant to a plea agreement made before April 1, 1997.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44(b)(2). Perez-Morales did not allege in his motion to reopen that his 1994 drug possession conviction was the result of a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement.

Because Perez-Morales’s motion was untimely and did not establish his eligibility for a § 212(c) waiver, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion.

PETITION DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     