
    ASH v. ASH.
    Husband and Wife — Conveyances—Gifts—Tenancy by Entirety.
    Quitclaim deed from husband to wife of property held by the entireties, given shortly after he left their home, which purported to have been given for a valuable consideration held, on appeal in divorce proceedings from decree which had set it aside, valid as between the parties even though a purely voluntary conveyance, in the absence of testimony of fraud, undue influence, coercion, want of consideration or other thing tending to invalidate it, a tenancy by the entirety being subject to termination by conveyance from one spouse to the other (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 13069).
    Appeal from Wayne; Jayne (Ira W.), J.
    Submitted April 14, 1937.
    (Docket No. 77, Calendar No. 39,344.)
    Decided May 21, 1937.
    Bill by Lillian Asli against Michael Ash for a divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and for an injunction. From decree for plaintiff granting divorce and setting aside deed from defendant to plaintiff, plaintiff appeals.
    Reversed as to provision setting aside deed.
    
      Walter Phillips and William B. Brandt, for plaintiff.
   Potter, J.

Plaintiff filed bill for divorce against defendant September 3, 1935. Defendant filed an answer and cross-bill. Plaintiff’s right to a decree of divorce was not contested. Defendant offered no testimony. There is no contest over plaintiff’s right to a divorce here.

The only question in' dispute arises over the trial court having- set aside a quitclaim deed from defendant to plaintiff of real estate, their then home, held by them as tenants by the entirety.

Defendant left home July 6, 1935, and about two weeks later sent to his wife a quitclaim deed of his interest in the property in question. There is no testimony of fraud, undue influence, coercion, want of consideration, or other thing tending to invalidate the deed in question.

Defendant could terminate the tenancy by the entirety by a conveyance of his interest in the land to his wife. 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 13069.

The deed in question purports to have been made for a valuable consideration, — and even though it was a purely voluntary conveyance, it would be valid as between the parties. Draper v. Brown, 153 Mich. 120; Wipfler v. Wipfler, 153 Mich. 18 (16 L. R. A. [N. S.] 941); Coleman v. Coleman, 239 Mich. 139.

The deed was valid. That part of the decree of the trial court setting the same aside and dividing the real estate between the parties is set aside, with costs to plaintiff.

Fead, C. J., and North, Wiest, Btjtzel, Btjshnell, Sharpe, and Chandler, JJ., concurred.  