
    *Richmond A. Reid, plaintiff in error, vs. John B. Whitfield et al., defendants in error.
    (Atlanta,
    January Term, 1873.)
    1. New Trial. — Where several grounds-are taken in a motion for a new trial, and the Court grants the motion, without stating on what ground, if there be any one of the grounds on which, if the Court had rested its judgment, this Court would not interfere, the order granting the new trial will be allowed to stand.
    2. Same — Plea of Payment. — Where the plea of payment is filed, and the evidence is conflicting whether a check given by one of the defendants was accepted in payment of the debt sued on, and the Court grants a new trial on the ground, amongst others, that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, this Court will not interfere with the discretion of the Judge so granting the new trial, unless the evidence be so strongly in favor of the verdict as to show an abuse of that discretion.
    New trial. Payment. Before Judge Robinson. Jasper Superior Court. August Term, 1872.
    Richmond A. Reid brought complaint against John B. Whitfield and Elbert W. Baynes upon the following note:
    “On or before the 3d day of November next, we or either of us promise to pay H. J. Dennis or bearer two hundred and seventy-five dollars, for value received. October 20th, 1868.
    (Signed) “J. B. Whitfield,
    “E. W. Baynes, security.”
    The defendants pleaded the general issue and payment; and the security the further fact that his signature to said note was obtained by misrepresentations.
    The evidence made the following case: Whitfield gave the note sued on in part payment for a horse. Dennis and Reid were selling horses together. The former stated to Whitfield that his cash price for the horse was $275 00; if he credited any one he knew well, his price would be $300 00; but if he sold the animal to him on time, he must pay $325 00, and must give security for $275 00 of this amount. Baynes agreed to stand security for this last amount. The evidence is conflicting as to whether Baynes, believed this sum to be the entire price of the horse, or whether he was informed as to the *fact that Whitfield was to give his individual note for an additional $50 00. Whitfield gave to plaintiff, on March 22d, 1869, the following order:
    “$335 00. Mr. John F. Patterson, executor of Mathew Whitfield, deceased, will please pay Richmond A. Reid or bearer, three hundred and thirty-five dollars, on two notes he holds against me, and oblige, yours, etc.
    (Signed) “John B. Whitfield.”
    Plaintiff required that an additional $10 00 should be embraced in this draft to cover the interest on the notes. The evidence is conflicting as to whether this order was given in payment of, or as collateral security for the notes. Whitfield had seen Patterson and made arrangements for the payment of the order. He had given to Patterson his receipt for $326 82, and it had been allowed him in his returns as executor. Neither the notes nor the order had been paid.
    The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against both defendants, for the full amount of the notes sued on, principal and interest. The defendants moved for a new trial, because the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. The motion was sustained, and the plaintiff excepted.
    
      Fleming Jordan ; Key & Preston, for plaintiff in error., •
    C. E. Bartlett, for the defendant.
    
      
      New Trial — Discretion of Court. — The ruling of the first headnote is adhered to in Taylor v. Central Railroad, etc., Co., 79 Ga. 332, 5 S. E. Rep. 114, citing principal case. See Ency. Dig. Ga. Rep., vol. 9, p. 587.
    
   Trippe, Judge.

The motion for a new trial recited several grounds, and was granted by the Court without specifying the ground on which it was allowed. An examination of the testimony will show that it was strongly conflicting on the point whether the check drawn by Whitfield on the executors of his grand-father was accepted by plaintiff in payment of the note. Both of the defendants say it was. Baynes states that before it was given the plaintiff agreed so to take it; that he put himself to some trouble to have the check drawn, and after plaintiff got it he told Baynes it was satisfactory. The plaintiff says it was *taken as collateral security. The Judge who tried the case was riot satisfied with the verdict, which was for the plaintiff, and we do not feel compelled to hold that he abused his discretion.

Judgment affirmed.  