
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jorge Luis AGUERO-CARLOS, aka Jorge Rosas-Ayueros, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 14-10503
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 13, 2016  San Francisco, California
    Filed December 15, 2016
    Ann L. DeMarais, USTU—Office of the US Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Michael L. Burke, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDAZ-Federal Public Defenders Office (Phoenix), Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: GRABER and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and FOOTE, District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decisión without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Elizabeth E. Foote, United States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

After representing himself at trial, Jorge Luis Aguero-Carlos was convicted of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). On appeal, Agüero challenges the validity of his waiver of the right to counsel and the district court’s excusing a potential juror for cause. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

1. Agüero argues that his waiver of counsel was invalid because the magistrate judge conducting the Faretta colloquy failed to explain adequately the sentence enhancement sought in the indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1826(b)(1). The record, however, supports the magistrate judge’s determination that Agüero was informed of, and understood the charges against him, including the enhancement. The judge did not err in concluding that Aguero’s waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Agüero also argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to remove a potential juror for cause. But Agüero does not challenge the impartiality of the jury that was ultimately impaneled. See United States v. Padilla-Mendoza, 157 F.3d 730, 733-34 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The core question here is whether defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury has been violated.”). Moreover, because the juror twice stated that he would find it difficult to be fair, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing him. See Merced v. McGrath, 426 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2005).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       xhis disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     