
    Henry Koon, Administrator of Lucy Souter, vs. James M. Ivey.
    
      JSd. fa. by administrator of plaintiff to revire a judgment founded on a note. Defence, that before judgment recovered, plaintiff had assigned the note to the wife of the defendant and the heirs of her body — the assignment to take effect after the death of the donor: — Held, that defendant was estopped by the judgment from making the defence.
    BEFORE O’NEALL, J., AT UNION, FALL TERM, 1854.
    The report of his Honor, the presiding judge, is as follows:
    “ This was a sei. fa. on a judgment recovered by the intestate against the defendant, on the 24th of October, 1844, for one thousand two hundred dollars, with interest from the 11th of May, 1844.
    
      “ The defendant’s defence rested upon a deed made by the intestate, conveying to Dolly Ivey, the wife of the defendant, and the lawful heirs of her body, after the death of the donor, her real estate, and the personal property as thus described: ‘my wagon, and all my household and kitchen furniture, and one table, with all other property that I am or may be possessed of during my life.’
    
    “This deed was executed 5th September, 1844. The note on which the judgment was founded, was made before the execution of the deed, but the judgment was subsequent to it.
    “ I thought the judgment could not pass under the deed. It could only convey property existing at its execution. The note was merged in the judgment, and could not now be regarded, at law, as passing under the deed. The plaintiff had, therefore, .a verdict and judgment of revival.”
    The defendant appealed, and now moved this Court for a new trial, on the ground,
    
      Because bis Honor erred in deciding that the deed from Lucy Souter to Dolly Ivey and her children, did not cover the • note, and the judgment predicated thereon, in this case.
    
      Herndon, for the motion.
    
      Dillard, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

WaRDLAw, J.

The judgment conclusively established an indebtedness of the defendant, in October, 1844, growing out of the note upon which it was founded. The defence now offered to the sci.fa. is in effect, that such indebtedness did not exist, because prior to the judgment the note had ceased to be the property of the plaintiff in the judgment. This is bringing under review now matter before adjudged, and cannot be permitted. If events supervening the judgment have given interests to third persons, which require the administrator, present plaintiff, to use the recovery for the benefit of those persons, remedies are not wanting to prevent injury to equitable assignees.

This Court has no information upon which it could rely in looking beyond the parties before it.

The motion is dismissed.

O’Njgall, Whither, Glovee and Munro, JJ., concurred,’

Appeal dismissed.  