
    DEWEY and ux. against TEN EYCK.
    In dower, judgment amended by entry of judgment of seizin, after a term, the omission being the clerk’s error.
    This was a motion to amend. It was an action of dower. The demandants had obtained a verdict, and the jury had found the annual value, and assessed the damages for the detention of the dower; and on the coming in of the postea, the usual rule for judgment was obtained. But the clerk, in making up judgment, had only entered it for the annual value and damages; and had omitted to enter the judgment of seizin.
    
      R. Stockton
    
    now moved for leave to amend the judgment in this respect, and alleged that the omission was a mere misprision of the clerk, and amendable by the statute.
    
      Ewing, contra,
    contended that it was a substantial error; that the amendment required was a distinct, independent, substantive judgment, to be newly entered, and could not be introduced into the record after the term.
   Kirkpatrick, C. J., and Rossell, J.

Were of opinion, that this was not the error of the court, but a misprision of the clerk, and amendable.

Pekhsxn'Gtoit, J.

I have had some doubts as to the propriety of this amendment, it going to the introduction of a new judgment; but on a little reflection, [*] I concur with my brethren. From the voluminous subject of amendment found in our law books, 1 think this rule is to be extracted, that where the court pronounce a wrong judgment, it cannot be amended after the [747] term; but the error of the clerk in recording the judgment pronounced, may; that is, the record may be so amended as to comport with what was really and truly done.

Kirkpatrick, C. J.

That is the true rule.

By ale the Court. — Let the amendment be made.

Cited is Hay v. Estell, 3 C. E. Gr. 251; Davis v. Township of Delaware, 13 Vr. 515.  