
    Adams v. Nashville.
    1. The act of Congress, approved June 3,1864 (13 Stat. 99), was not intended to curtail the power of the States on the subject of taxation, or to prohibit the exemption of particular kinds of property, but to protect the corporations formed under ij:s authority from unfriendly discrimination by the States in the’ exercise of their taxing power.
    2. People v. The Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244, and Hepburn v. The School Directors, 23 id. 480, cited and approved.
    3. The Supreme Court of Tennessee having decided that the act of' the legis. laturé of that State, requiring that all personal property of every kinfl and nature sh,all be listed and assessed .for taxation, overrides and repeals the previous ordinance of the city of Nashville exempting from municipal taxa-' tion certain city bonds, and brings them within the scope of general taxation, that decision is binding upon this court.
    ■Error, to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.
    The facts- are stated in- the opinion of the CQurt.
    
      Mr. Edward Baxter for the plaintiffs in error.
    
      Mr. J. E. Bailey, contra.
    
   Mr. Justice Hunt

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiffs in error, stockholders in- the Fourth National' Bank óf Nashville, Tenn., filed' their bill in the Chancery Coui-t of Davidson County in that State against the Mayor and ■City Council of Nashville, to enjoin the collection of a tax imposed upon their shares of stock by that municipal corpora^ tion, and to have the tax declared illegal' and void. •

The bill was demurred to. The Chancellor sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill. Upon áppeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the highest court of law or equity in the State, the decree of the Chancellor was affirmed; and thereupon the case was brought to this court by writ of error.

It is contended that the statute of the United States, which authorizes the taxation by State authority of the. shares of stock in a national bank, but provides that such taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed-capital in ithe hands’ of individuals, has been violated-in the case Of the present plaintiffs. 18 Stat. 102. The first carise of complaint arises out of the. act of the legislature of the State of Tennessee of March 1, 1869. The act, it'is said, provides that no tax shall be assessed upon thé capital of any bank of joint-stock Company organized under the laws of that State or of the United States! This, it is insisted, is an exemption from taxation of property in the hands of individual citizens, and operates to produce a greater rate of taxation on the plaintiffs’ shares in the Fourth National Bank of Nashville than is assessed on other moneyed'capital in the hands of individuals, to' wify on such banking capital, and hence that such taxatior is illegal.

The statute enacts that no tax shall be assessed upon the capital of • a State bank, but proceeds', in the same section, to say that its shares shall be included ’in the valuation of the personal property of the owner, for the purpose of assessment for' State, county, an'd municipal taxation, at the same rate that is assessed upon other moneyed capital, and that, in addition thereto, the real estate owned by the bank shall be subject to the same taxation as other real estate.

This objection, in its general character, may be considered in connection with the second objection. The answer to both of them is found in the principle thus laid down in People v. The Commissioners, 4 Wall. 256: “That the rate of taxation upon the shares should be the same or not greater than upon *be moneyed capital of the individual citizen which is liable to taxation; that is, no greater in proportion or'percentage of tax in the valuation of shares should be levied than upon other moneyed taxable capital in the hands, of.the citizens.” See also Hepburn v. The School Directors, 28 id. 480.

By an ordinance of the defendants’ corporation, passed on the 18th of April, 1870, it is provided that certain interest-paying bonds issued by the said .corporation shall be exempt from taxation by^said corporation: It is said that there are many such bonds in existence in the hands of individuals ; that by süch exemption the complainants’ shares are taxed at a greater rate than is assessedJapon such bonds; and that, therefore, the taxation complained of is- in violation of the act of Congress forbidding the taxation of national shares at a greater rate, than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of-individuals.

There are several answers to this objection: —

It is not alleged in the bill that .the bonds therein -referred to are in fact exempted from taxation for municipal purposes. After reciting the issue and proposed- exemption, the bill says that said' property is “thus exempted from all municipal taxes; ” that is; that, as a matter of', law, it follows from the facts beforé stated that it is thus- exempt.'

This is not sufficient, especially when it is alleged in the brief opposed that the fact is otherwise.

By the statutes of the State of Tennessee, passed subsequently to the issue of, the bonds,, all', personal, property, of every kind and nature, is requiredto be listed and assessed for taxation.

The Supreme Court of Tennesseé hold, in the case before - us,' that this statute repeals and overrides the ordinance of exemption, and brings these bonds within the scope of general taxation. This is- á decision of a State tribunal upon the con-'struction of its own statutes,'which we are bound to respect.

Considering the objection on its merits and in connection with the objection first described, the case is- met by Hepburn v. The School Directors, supra.

By a statute of Pennsylvania, it./was enacted that'“ all mortgages, judgments; recognizances,.and moneys owing upon articles of agreement for the salé of- real estate shall be exempt: from taxation, except for State purposes.”-. There, as here, it was objected that this exemption, by relieving certain specified property from taxation, brought the case within the prohibition of the act of Congress, and thus vitiated the tax sought to be enforced'. This court held otherwise.

The act of Congress was not intended to .curtail the.State power on the subject of taxation. It simply required that capital invested in national banks should not be taxed at a greater rate than like property similarly invested. . It was not intended to cut off the power to exempt' particular kinds of property, if' the legislature chose to do áo. Homesteads, to a specified value, a certain amount of -household furniture (the six plates, px knives and forks, six teacups and saucers, of the old statuteá), the property of clergymen to some extent, schoolhouses,- academies, and libraries', • are generally exempt from taxation. The discretionary- power of the legislature of the. States over all these subjects remains as it was before the act of Congress of June, 1864. The plain intention of that statute was tb protect the corporations formed under its authority from unfriendly discrimination by the States in the exercise of their taxing power. That particular persons or particular articles are relieved from taxation is not a matter to which either' class can object.

The third objection is .equally ^ untenable. The statute referred to does not purport to relieve any property from taxation. It provides a mode for ascertaining the average capital of the merchant, and for giving a license to carry on the business of a merchant. He is required to .pay an ad valorem ,tax on all his capital, and a license tax in addition. •

■The observations already made are pértinent under this head.

Judgment affirmed.  