
    Alice BRISSETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MANHATTAN AND BRONX SURFACE TRANSIT OPERATING AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee, Joseph Staniszewski, Nelson Hernandez, Lou Maiello, Michael Danilczyk, Larry Mustillo, Defendants.
    No. 11-2554.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 9, 2012.
    
      Alice Brissett, pro se, Staten .Island, NY.
    Kristen M. Nolan, Office of the General Counsel, New York City Transit Authority Law Department, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellees.
    PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . We direct the Clerk of Court to amend the official caption of this case to reflect the parties’ designations herewith.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Alice Brissett, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her employment discrimination action pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(v) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due to her non-compliance with discovery orders. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

This Court reviews the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal, for abuse of discretion, and the factual findings made in support of the district court’s decision for clear error. See S. New England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 143 (2d Cir.2010). “[I]n evaluating a district court’s exercise of discretion to dismiss an action under Rule 37,” this Court has considered: “(1) the willfulness of the non-compliant party or the reason for noncompliance; (2) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) the duration of the period of noncompliance, and (4) whether the non-compliant party had been warned of the consequences of ... noncompliance.” Agiwal v. Mid Island Mortg. Corp., 555 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir.2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also S. New England Tel. Co., 624 F.3d at 144 (stating that “these factors are not exclusive, and they need not each be resolved against the party challenging the district court’s sanctions for us to conclude that those sanctions were within the court’s discretion” (citation omitted)). Moreover, “[t]he severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice may be imposed even against a plaintiff who is proceeding pro se, so long as a warning has been given that noncompliance can result in dismissal.” Valentine v. Museum of Modern Art, 29 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir.1994) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

After an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Brissett’s complaint. We recognize that dismissal is a harsh sanction, particularly for a pro se litigant. But where, as here, a litigant has been warned explicitly and repeatedly that failure to comply with the court’s orders will lead to dismissal, it cannot be called abuse of discretion when that sanction is ultimately imposed for continued non-compliance.

We have considered Brissett’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  