
    Leroy SIMON, Appellant, v. Mary Elizabeth SIMON, Appellee.
    No. 88-0460.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 19, 1989.
    Rehearing Denied May 25, 1989.
    Ronald M. Zakarin of Schwartz, Gold, Cohen and Zakarin, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellant.
    Alan J. Pollock, Deerfield Beach, for ap-pellee.
   DOWNEY, Judge.

The appellant husband seeks reversal of the final judgment of dissolution contending the trial court erred in the equitable distribution fashioned by the court and in the allowance of permanent periodic alimony.

The husband and wife, age forty-five and forty respectively, were married for approximately twenty years and had one child, age sixteen. The wife was primarily a housewife, but at the time of the dissolution she was a legal secretary trainee, earning approximately $13,500. The husband was employed by IBM at a salary of $42,-000 per year.

The trial court awarded the wife the marital home, valued at approximately $145,-000, a BMW automobile worth approximately $13,000, custody of the child, $500 per month child support, and $500 per month permanent periodic alimony. He awarded the husband a parcel of California real estate, his automobile, jewelry, his pension plan, and some stocks and bonds, all totaling in value approximately $56,000.

We do not believe the distribution of the marital assets of the parties is equitable, particularly in view of the award of permanent periodic alimony and child support. The wife was awarded seventy-five percent of the assets and, after payment by the husband of $12,000 in alimony and child support, there is not a sufficient disparity in the parties’ incomes to justify the tremendous disparity in the distribution of assets.

Although the husband complains of the allowance of permanent, instead of rehabilitative, alimony, we believe permanent alimony was justified here. The problem is with the distribution of assets, which on this record does not appear equitable. While such distribution does not have to be equal, it must be fair. Accordingly, we hold that a seventy-five/twenty-five percent division, with the respective income picture present here, is too lopsided to pass muster.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment appealed from and remand the cause for further consideration by the trial court in distributing the assets of the parties. In doing so, we suggest the proof in the record of the value of the husband’s pension is inadequate and should be revisited.

Each of the parties has prayed for attorney’s fees on appeal. As the trial judge did in the final judgment, we direct each to pay his or her own attorney’s fees and costs.

DELL, J., concurs.

WARNER, J., concurs specially with opinion.

WARNER, Judge,

concurring specially.

While I concur in the court’s opinion, I would also note that in my opinion the trial court erred in his treatment of a $40,000 gift to the wife by the wife’s parents as a ground for equitable distribution to the wife of a greater share of the parties’ assets. The money was used in the joint purchase of the parties’ prior residence. If such a gift was pled and proven, it establishes a special equity, not an entitlement to a greater share of marital assets on equitable distribution principles.

A contribution to a joint asset from a source unconnected with the marital relationship would establish a special equity in favor of the contributing spouse in that asset. Ball v. Ball, 335 So.2d 5 (Fla.1976). Thus, it would remove part of that property from the marital assets subject to equitable distribution, and in Landay v. Landay, 429 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1983), the supreme court set forth a detailed formula to determine the amount of a spouse’s special equity in jointly held property.

A petition claiming a special equity should set forth ultimate facts entitling the petitioner to that relief. See Rankin v. Colman, 476 So.2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). In this case, all petitioner pled was a special equity grounded on her employment during the marriage and her household duties. These would not give rise to a special equity claim. Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So.2d 949 (Fla.1980). No mention was made in the petition of a claim arising from a $40,000 gift, and the husband was not prepared to rebut that claim at trial.

Blurring the concepts of special equity and equitable distribution of marital assets does not assist the litigants in the clear presentation of the issues, the trial court in its determinations, or this court in attempting to review the trial court’s decision based upon established principles of law. To request equitable distribution of marital property, and then establish a greater than equal share to those assets because of a contribution unconnected with the marital relationship without pleading it as such prevents the opposing party from meeting with proof the issue of special equity. I would have reversed the property division on that basis, as well as the basis stated in the majority opinion.  