
    George P. Clarke v. The State of Ohio.
    1. An indictment for forgery must not only allege the false making or alteration of a writing specified in the statute, with intent to defraud some named person or body corporate, but it must also appear on the face of the indictment, that the fabricated writing, either of itself or in connection with the extrinsic facts averred, is such, that if genuine, it would be valid in the law to prejudice the rights of the person or body corporate thus named.
    2. Where an indictment charged that C., with intent to defraud L., had falsely altered a receipt made to L. by a county treasurer, for the payment of certain taxes due from L. for a given year, so that the receipt, in its altered form, represented the payment of a sum larger than that originally expressed therein, but did not aver any extrinsic circumstances giving to the receipt an operation beyond that imported by its terms. Held — That the indictment was bad because upon the face thereof the receipt had no legal efficacy as against L., and could not, therefore, in contemplation of law, impair any of his rights.
    In- Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson county.
    At the February term, 1856, of said court, George P. Clarke was indicted for forgery, and was put upon his trial upon the first count of the indictment, which was as follows:
    “At a court of common pleas- began and held at Steubenville, within and for the county of Jefferson, and State of Ohio, on Tuesday, the nineteenth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, the grand jurors summoned to inquire for the body of the county of Jefferson, upon their respective oaths and affirmations, and in the name and by the authority of the State of Ohio, do present and find, that George P. Clarke, late of said county, on the nineteenth day of December, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and fifty-three, at the county aforesaid, having in his possession a certain receipt for the payment of money, which said receipt for the payment of money, at the time when it camejnto the possession of said George P. Clarke, was as follows, to-wit:
    ‘Jefferson Co., Decern. 19, 1853 — Rec’d of Nathan Lupton R. T. S. Qr. Acres. D. C.M.
    Tax on land.................3, 7, 29, N. J, 105, 20 74 2
    Tax on $715 personal property.................................... 6- 75 7
    Tax on town lots No............................................
    27 49 9
    A. SKELLY, Treasurer of Jefferson county.'
    
      “He, the said George P. Clarke, afterward, to wit, on the twenty-first day of December, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and fifty-three, at the county aforesaid, did falsely alter said receipt for the payment of money, by falsely erasing the figure 0 under the letter D, where it occurs in the line of figures in the first item of said receipt, for the payment of money, which said figure 0, before said erasure, with the other figures in said line, did mean and signify twenty dollars, seventy-four cents and two mills, and did falsely and fraudulently insert in the place of said figure 0 the figure 7, by reason of which said alteration the said line of figures did mean and signify twenty-seven dollars, seventy-four cents and two mills, and the said George P. Clarke did further falsely and fraudulently alter said receipt for the payment of money, by erasing the figures 2 and 7 where they occur in said receipt, in the line of figures in the third item of said receipt under the letter D, which said line of figures, before said alteration, did mean and signify twenty-seven dollars, forty-nine cents and nine mills, and did falsely and fraudulently insert in the place of said figures, the figures 3 and 4, whereby and by reason of said false and fraudulent alteration the said line of figures was caused to mean and did signify thirty-four dollars, forty-nine cents and nine mills, which said receipt for the payment of money, so falsely and fraudulently altered, is in the words, figures, and letters, as follows, to wit:
    ‘Jefferson Co., Decern. 19,1853 — Rec’d of Nathan Lupton R. T. S. Qr. Acres. D. C.M.
    Tax on land.................3, 7, 29, N. £, 105 27 74 2
    Tax on $715 personal property.................................... 6 75 7
    Tax on town lots No..............................;.............
    34 49 9
    A. SKELLY, Treasurer of Jefferson county. ’
    
    “ With intent to defraud Nathan Lupton, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio.”
    Clarke having been found guilty in manner and form as he stood charged in the indictment, his counsel filed a motion in arrest of judgment, for the reasons, 1st, that the indictment charged no crime against the prisoner; and 2d, that the paper described in the indictment could not, from anything that appears in the indictment, effectuate a fraud upon Nathan Lupton.
    The court overruled this motion and passed judgment upon the prisoner; but, on motion of his counsel, suspended the execution of the sentence until the next term of the court, to await the result of proceedings in error.
    
      
      George W. McCook and It. S. Moodey, for Clarke,
    claim that the indictment charges no crime against the laws of Ohio, and ask a reversal of the judgement.
    
      Mr. Attorney General
    
    stated to the court that upon a thorough examination of the questions arising in this case he had been led to the conclusions following, which necessarily precluded him from objecting to a reversal of the judgment:
    I. To constitute forgery, under the crimes act of this state, it is essential that the fabricated writing shall not only'answer'the general description of some one of those enumerated in the statute, but that it shall also be such an instrument as that, if genuine, it would tend in the law, to establish or defeat some claim, impose some duty, create some liability, or otherwise prejudice one in his rights of person or of estate. The evident purpose of the statute is to protect society against the falsification of those writings only which have some legal efficacy, and the instrument must, therefore, either on its face, or with reference to extrinsic facts, be capable, in the law, of accomplishing a fraud.
    H. This conclusion, derived from the intent of the statute, is fortified by the consideration that as every man is conclusively presumed to know the law, no one can, in legal contemplation, be damnified by the fabrication of an instrument to which, if genuine, the law would give no operative effect.
    HI. Nor, in this respect, is there any difference between instruments, void on their face, and those which, though apparently operative, are yet not so by reason of matters dehors the paper. Wherever, upon all the proofs, it appears that the writing, however seemingly effective on its face, could have no legal tendency to affect injuriously the rights of another, the accused must go acquit. Barnum v. The State, 15 Ohio Rep. 717.
    IY. The settled rules of criminal pleading require that every indictment shall contain a complete description of the offense charged, with such particularity in respect to time, place and circumstance, as that the defendant may know with certainty “ the nature of the accusation against him.” Accordingly an indictment for forgery must allege not merely the fabrication — with intent to damage some named person — of a writing which, either upon its face, or in connection with the extrinsic facts averred, may, in contemplation of law, be capable of compassing a fraud, but it must also show that the writing may exert this legal capacity to defraud against the very person so named. If, then, it do not appear, upon the face of the indictment, that the simulated writing, though seemingly effective for some purposes, may, by its apparent legal operation, tend to accomplish the fraudulent intent charged in the particular case, it must, as to all the purposes of the given case, be deemed invalid, and so not the subject of forgery under the circumstances then averred.
    V. Where, therefore, an indictment charges that Clarke, with intent to defraud Lupton, falsely altered a receipt made by a county treasurer to Lupton, reciting the payment of Lupton’s taxes upon certain property, for a given year, so that the receipt, in its altered form, indicated the payment of a larger sum than that originally expressed therein, and does not aver any extrinsic circumstance, showing how this altered receipt was clothed with any apparent legal attributes by which it could operate to the prejudice of Lupton, it is bad. Whatever might be its legal tendency to defraud the treasurer, yet, as against Lupton, oh its face the writing seems utterly powerless, in the law, for mischief. Of itself it does not tend to impose on him any duty; defeat any of his rights'; charge him with any liability, nor could it be used as evidence against him. Quite possibly some circumstances can be imagined under which it might seem legally effective against Lupton, but if there were such, they should have been averred in the indictment, so that the court could judicially see that the writing was invested with an ostensible legal capacity for evil. The indictment must always show a practicable fraud. Courts are not to explore for possible mischiefs, nor is the liberty of the citizen to be surmised away upon any such vague conjectures.
   By the Court:

An indictment for forgery must not only allege the false making or alteration of a writing specified in the statute, with intent to defraud some named person or body corporate, but it must also appear on the face of the indictement, that the fabricated writing, either of itself or in connection with the extrinsic facts averred, is such, that if genuine, it would be valid in the law to prejudice the rights of the person or body corporate thus named.

Although in this case the indictment charges that Clarke, with intent to defraud Lupton, falsely altered the receipt made to Lupton by the county treasurer, for the payment of certain taxes due from Lupton, for the given year, so that the receipt, in its altered form, represented the payment of a sum larger than that originally expressed therein; yet, as the indictment does not aver any extrinsic circumstances giving the receipt an operation beyond that imported by its terms, and as by its terms, solely, the receipt had no legal efficacy as against Lupton, it could not, therefore, in contemplation of law, impair any of his rights-. The indictment is, therefore, on its face, defective.

Judgment reversed and, cause remanded.  