
    Maria Santos Saenz OVIEDO, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-73083
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted July 11, 2017 
    
    Filed July 18, 2017
    
      Judith Leslie Wood, Esquire, -Attorney, Law Office of Judith L. Wood, Los Ange-les, CA, for Petitioner
    Dana Michelle Camilleri, OIL, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
    Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Maria Santos Saenz Oviedo, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying her application for withholding of removal and cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law, Latter-Singh v. Holder, 668 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012), and we review for substantial evidence the agency’s findings of fact, Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006), We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The agency correctly determined that Saenz Oviedo’s petty theft convictions under California Penal Code section 484 render her statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); see also Castillo-Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing petty theft under California law as a categorical crime involving moral turpitude). Because Saenz Oviedo has been convicted of more than one crime involving moral turpitude, Saenz Oviedo does not qualify for the petty offense exception. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II).

The agency found that Saenz Oviedo failed to establish a clear probability of future persecution based on her generalized fear of violence in Honduras or her fear that her son will be harmed because he is effeminate. Substantial evidence supports these findings. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”); see also Fakhry v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence did not compel a finding of future persecution). Further, we lack jurisdiction to consider the particular social group argüment that Saenz Oviedo presents in her opening brief because she did not raise it to the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (petitioner must exhaust issues or claims in administrative proceedings below). Thus, we deny the petition as to Saenz Oviedo’s withholding of removal claim.

We deny Sainz Oviedo’s request to refer the case to mediation.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     