
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
    APRIL, 1807.
    Cash v. Lyle.
    A judgment upon a summary process may be revived by petition aad process, after the form of the original proceedings; and it is not necessary to proceed by writ of sci fa.; and only summary process costs shall be chargeable, unless the amount due for debt and interest, with costs, should be beyond the summary jurisdiction of the court.
    The highest evidence of the judgment on summary process, is the original entry of the decree in the book of minutes of the clerk; and on this the process, byway of sci. fa, to revive judgment, must be founded.
    
      Sci. fa., to revive a judgment recovered on a summary process, in Darlington district, before Brevard, J. Defendant pleaded nul tiel record, and upon inspection of the record, the court.gave judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant moved that plaintiff should be allowed the costs of a summary process, and not full costs, for declaring. But the court overruled this motion.
    
      The motion in this court was to set aside the judgment, and for leave to enter a nonsuit; or to reverse the decision of the District Court as to the costs. The record produced in evidence was a sum. mary process, in common form of petition, and summons, and the copy of the minutes of the court in which the judgment was had in the cause, which stated the case, with this minute subjoined, “ Decree for the plaintiff, for —— dollars.”
    Richardson, in support of the motion,
    contended, that the document produced in evidence, did not prove that any judgment had been entered up in the origiual action. That the copy from the minute book of the proceedings of the court in which the suit was prosecuted, was not evidence of a judgment. That a regular judgment ought to have been entered, and produced in evidence, to au. t’norize a revival of it, and the issuing of an execution, as prayed by the sci.fa. That the preamble, or introductory part of all executions, issuing upon decrees given upon cases under the summary jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Pleas, are the judgments en. tered up in such cases, and not the loose minutes of the court. But, at all events, he contended the plaintiff was only entitled to the original sum recovered, and interest, together with the originad costs, and the costs of a summary process, by way of sci, fa,, and not to the full costs of a scire facias, as in cases beyond the summary jurisdiction of the court.
    Witherspoon, on the contrary.
    It never has been customary to enter up regular judgments upon decrees on summary process, nor is it necessary. The act, which grants this summary jurisdic. tion, prescribes no particular form of proceeding. The practice under the act has been for decrees, to be pronounced in open court,viva voce by the presiding magistrate, which are recorded in the clerk’s book of the minutes of the proceedings of the court; and no other kind of decrees or judgments are usually given. This mode of proceeding is conformable to the proceedings in the Courts of Equity, where an order confirming the report of the master has been holden equivalent to a decree, and under the summary jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas, the equity of cases are considered, as well as their legal merits ; and decrees are often founded on the equity of the causes in which they are given. The entry of the decree im the minute book must, therefore, be regarded as the decree itself, or judgment awarded in the case; and so it has been uniformly regarded hitherto. But the entry, or minute, is said to be imperfect and uncertain. This, however, if it can be so considered, has proceeded from the neglect or misprision of the clerk, and ought not to prejudice the party. Decrees are considered as the judgments of the court. By act of assembly, decrees on summary process bind property. Common bail cannot enter themselves special bail after the entry of a decree on summary process. As to the question of costs, the summons, or sci. jfa., was in the form of a summary process. The defendant, by appearing, made it necessary to declare on’ the writ. If the defendant had not required a declaration to plead to, the costs in question would not have'accrued. It was his own fault that they have been incurred, and therefore he ought to pay them.
   TREzevant, J.,

declared the resolution of the whole court. The preface, to the execution on summary process, cannot be con* sidered as the judgment of the court, but only the recital thereof. The minute of the judgment, or decree, made at the time that it is given in court, is the record of such judgment or decree, and though brief, and informal, is a sufficient record to authorize the issuing of execution thereon ; and of course sufficient to support a sei. fa., to shew cause why execution should not issue thereon. The judgment of the District Court, on the plea of mil tiel record, was therefore right. But the decision, on thq question of costs, was incorrect. It is unnecessary to declare, on a summary process, set. fa. The sci. fa. to revive execution on sci. fa., need not be in the common formal mode, but may be short and substantia], by way of petition and process, and the defendant may be required to answer to it as a summary process. Therefore motion granted as to the costs.  