
    In Re DENNIS JACKSON, BY C. M. SMITH, HIS ATTORNEY.
    At Law. —
    No. 11,948.
    T. Where a prisoner has been convicted on three several informations in the Police Court, and sentenced to be imprisoned three several terms of one hundred and eighty days each without any specification as to the time of beginning or ending of the last two terms of imprisonment, it was held that he could not be imprisoned for a period exceeding that of a single sentence.
    It. It is now well settled that in a criminal case there is no error in a judgment malting one term of imprisonment commence when another terminates; but this should form part of the judgment.
    III. Process after judgment must strictly follow the latter. Mere process, lilte a warrant of commitment, cannot be resorted to for the purpose of enlarging what the court has solemnly adjudicated.
    
      STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
    A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the justice holding the criminal term on the 9th day of May, 1877, upon the petition of Dennis Jackson, alleging that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by John S. Crocker, warden of- the District jail, by reason'of an unlawful sentence of the Police Court of the District of Columbia. The return of the warden sets out as the cause of the detention that he holds the relator by virtue of three commitments issued by the said Police Court, reciting that the relator had been convicted in three several prosecutions, and sentenced to be imprisoned in each case one hundred and eighty days in said jail; that in the last case he was also to pay a fine of three hundred dollars, or in default to be imprisoned a further period of one hundred and eighty days. The return further shows that Jackson is now serving the period of imprisonment as under the third commitment, prior to default being made in payment of the said fine.
    The record, certified by the clerk of the Police Court, discloses the fact that Jackson was convicted before the Police Court on three several informations, respectively numbered 8,670, 3,671, 3,672.
    In the first case the record contains the following entry: “Defendant arraigned January 1, 1876; plea, not guilty; judgment, guilty; sentence, one hundred and eighty days in jail; committed.” In the second ease the entry is: “Defendant arraigned January 1, 1876; plea, not guilty; judgment, guilty; sentence, one hundred and eighty days in jail; committed.” And in the third case the entry is: “ Defendant arraigned January 1,1876; plea, not guilty; judgment, guilty; sentence, one hundred and eighty days in jail and a fine of $>300, or in default a further period of one hundred and eighty days in jail, unless the fiue be sooner paid; committed.” It is contended that the last two terms of imprisonment are not good in law, for the reason that there is no specification of the time at which the same are to begin or end. The objection was not sustained by tbe justice holding the criminal term, who accordingly made an order, on the 16th day of May instant, dismissing the writ and remanding the prisoner to the custody of the warden. The case is here on appeal from that order.
    
      C. M. Smith, for petitioner.
    
      Francis Miller, Assistant District Attorney, for the warden.
   By the Court :

The relator appears to be imprisoned for three several terms of one hundred and eighty days each, without any specification as to the time of beginning or ending of the two last terms of imprisonment. The sentences pronounced by the court do not provide that the period of imprisonment under these convictions are to commence at any future period, or after the expiration of the period mentioned in the former judgment. This omission is fatal to any imprisonment which exceeds that of a single sentence. The law is well settled that in a criminal case there is no error in a judgment making one term of imprisonment commence when another terminates, and when this forms part of the sentence, the judgment is then considered sufficiently certain a's to the time when the successive sentences are to be carried into execution. (Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Bur., 2577-8; Kite v. Commonwealth, 11 Metc., 585; The Commonwealth v. Leath, 1 Va. Cases, 151.)

It was contended at the argument that the commitment might be resorted to as part of the record for the purpose of justifying the imprisonment beyond the first conviction, and it was sought to give effect to a memorandum on the commitments that they were to take effect after each other. In the first place, it is a rule that all process after judgment must strictly pursue the latter. A mittimus is merely to furnish the officer to whom it is directed a justification for the detention of the prisoner. It cannot be used to control or vary the judgment, which is the only matter that can be carried into effect. So that even if this memorandum were embodied in the commitment, it could have no effect, for the reason that mere process can never be resorted to for the purpose of enlarging what the court has solemnly adjudged. The sentences in the second and third cases do not state that each imprisonment is to commence from and after the expiration of the imprisonment in those which preceded, and that important modification could not be added by a memorandum on the process.

The order dismissing the writ must be reversed, and as the relator has undergone confinement for the full period of a single sentence, he must be discharged from further custody.  