
    Elizabeth and Mary Ann Nelson v. William D. Nelson and others.
    Where a testator divided all Ms property, except Ms homestead, among his children, and devised that, after the death of Ms widow, to his three sons, with a proviso, that his unmarried daughters should not be deprived of a home upon it while they remained single, — Held :
    That this proviso gave the daughters a right to reside on the homestead, but not to a maintenance from the rents and profits.
    This is a bill in chancery, reserved in Morgan county.
    The complainants are the children of James Nelson, de ceased, who have filed their bill, claiming certain' rights under the will of their father, of which they allege they have been deprived by the defendants, who are also children and devisees of James Nelson. The case involves a construction of his will. It provides as follows:
    
      “ First. I give and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Priscilla Nelson, all my whole estate, goods and chattels, lands, and tenements, of whatsoever nature, or wheresoever found, so long as she remains my widow, by paying all my just debts and funeral expenses, as soon as convenient, after my decease, and to remain on my home farm, in Deerfield, aforesaid, and to have the nett proceeds thereof, for to assist her in bringing up the children, schooling and clothing them, and in case any of my daughters should marry, to be furnished with such goods as my wife can best spare, as nigh the amount as may be to what my daughter, Catharine Scott, has received.
    
      “ Secondly. I give and bequeath unto my three sons, namely, John Nelson, William Davis Nelson, and Thomas Nelson, my home farm, after the death of my wife, to be divided equally among them, share and share alike for them, their heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, forever; — ■ Provided, that in case any of my daughters should not be deprived of a home while they remain single, and in case any of my daughters do remain unmarried until the death of my wife, it is my will and desire for each of them to receive out of my estate, ap equal portion with those that have been married; also two hundred and eighty acres of land which I .hold in Randolph county, Yirginia, it is my will and desire that it should be sold, and the proceeds thereof to be equally divided among all of my children, share and share alike; it is also my will and desire, that the rest, residue, and remainder 'of my estate unto my three sons, aforesaid, share and share alike.”
    On the death of the widow, the three sons, to whom it had been devised, took possession of the homestead farm, and divided it amongst them. John, the oldest, has since deceased, and his children, with the two surviving brothers, are still in possession. The evidence shows the whole farm to be worth about $2,500, and the value of the annual rents, $80.
    
      The bill alleges that the complainants are the unmarried daughters of James Nelson, deceased; that under his will they are entitled to a residence on the premises, and also to a support from the rents and profits thereof, and that the defendants have refused them such residence and support. The guardian of the infant children of John Nelson, deceased, has answered, denying that they have ever prevented the complainants from residing on the farm, and also denying their right to-a support from its proceeds.
    
      M. Clark, for complainants.
    
      Hayward & Meese and C. C. Covey, for defendants.
   Caldwell, J.

We find no evidence in this case that the complainants have ever been prevented from residing on the homestead, and consequently, the only question presented for consideration, is, whether, by the provisions of the will, they are entitled to their maintenance from it. It will be seen that the devise of the homestead farm to the three sons and their heirs, is absolutely made, with the single proviso, that if any of testator’s daughters should remain unmarried, they should not be deprived of a home on it.

On the part of complainants, it is contended that the term home, as here used, implies, not only a place of residence, but also, a right to maintenance. The term home, generally means nothing more than the place where a person has his habitation — his place'of residence. The habitation or home may be, and often is, at one place, and the means of support at another; there is no necessary connection between them. If the proviso had been made in favor of persons, who, when the contingency might happen, would be unable to support themselves, and who would necessarily have to depend on the care and support of others, there would be more force in the suggestion that the term home should be taken in the comprehensive sense contended for. It is not a proviso in favor of those who might become sick or disabled, or from any cause might need the personal assistance of others, “ but in case they should remain unmarried.” The testator had provided that his wife should enjoy the homestead during her life, provided she remained his widow. It is also clearly expressed in his will, that he expected their children to live with her. In case of her death, the three sons were to take possession of the farm, and enjoy it; but the unmarried daughters, who might reasonably be expected to be living with their mother at her death, were not to be disturbed in their right to a home, on account of the change of owners. The evidence • in the case shows that the complainants were raised to habits of industry, and that they have maintained themselves by their own exertions.

Although the compensation for a female’s labor is small, yet every one acquainted with the farming community knows, that the labor of the female part of the community is worth more than the cost of their support, and that when in health, they are a burden on no one. Besides, the testator had devised property to all his children; he had made provision for his sons and daughters separately, and a portion of his property he had divided amongst all his children equally: what amount came to each one we have no means of ascertaining; it may have been a fair and sensible division of his property, or it may not. We have only the value of the piece of property' about which the present controversy arises: it is said to be worth about $2,500, and the annual value, from $75 to $80. The yearly value of each of the sons’ share would be from $25 to $27. Now this amount is so small, that, in the absence of any terms necessarily expressing it-, we think it could not reasonably be inferred, after dividing it amongst his sons, that it should be charged with the support of his unmarried daughters; the whole amount would be insufficient to maintain them, if they had to depend on it solely for support, and might leave the devise to the sons wholly valueless. As good brothers, the defendants are morally bound to support their sisters, if in need, to the extent of their ability; but we do not think that the will makes their maintenance a charge on the farm; we think it merely gives them a right to live on it, and as there is no evidence that they have been deprived of this right, the bill must be dismissed.  