
    Eugene R. DANIELS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H. MOORE, Lieutenant; M. Brown, Correctional Officer; A. Smith, Correctional Officer; Scott Johnson, Grievance Clerk, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 02-6624.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted May 30, 2002.
    Decided June 19, 2002.
    Eugene R. Daniels, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Thomas King, Jay Hupfer, Willcox, Buyck & Williams, P.A., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellees.
    Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Eugene R. Daniels appeals from the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2001) complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that a prisoner exhaust administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 action concerning his confinement. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West Supp.2001). In Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies regarding his excessive force claims, even if the prisoner seeks only money damages and such relief is not available under the administrative process. Id. at 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819. More recently, in Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. 534 U.S. at-,122 S.Ct. at 992.

There is evidence in the record that Daniels pursued administrative remedies and it is not clear from the district court’s opinion whether the district court considered this evidence. Therefore, although we express no opinion as to whether Daniels in fact has demonstrated exhaustion of administrative remedies, we vacate the district court’s order dismissing the action without prejudice and remand to enable the district court to make such a determination. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED.  