
    Lyle Mark COULTAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steven PAYNE, individually and in his official capacity as Oregon State Crime Laboratory Detective; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-35704
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted October 23, 2017 
    
    Filed October 30, 2017
    Lyle Mark Coultas, Pro Se
    Dustin Buehler, Denise Gale Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General,' Oregon Department of Justice, Salem, OR, for Defendants-Appellees Steven Payne, Carroll Tichenor, Yamhill County District Attorney’s Office, State of Oregon
    Judy C. Lucas, Oregon Department of Justice, Salem, OR, for Defendant-Appel-lee Department of the Oregon State Police
    Gerald L. Warren, Attorney, Law Office of Gerald Warren and Associates, Salem, OR, for Defendants-Appellees Curt Gilbert, Yamhill County Jail, Russell W. Ludwig, Yamhill County Sheriff Department
    Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Lyle Mark Coultas appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a violation of due process, conversion under state law, and an independent claim of fraud on the court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations and for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Ventura Mobilehome Cmtys. Owners Ass’n v. City of San Buenaventura, 371 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Coultas’s conversion claim as barred by the Oregon Tort Claims Act’s (“OTCA”) two-year statute of limitations. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.275(9); Bell v. Tri-Cty. Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 353 Or. 535, 301 P.3d 901, 908 (2013) (the OTCA supersedes statutes of limitations that might otherwise apply in tort actions against public bodies and their officers and employees).

Dismissal of Coultas’s claim to set aside a prior judgment for fraud on the court was proper because Coultas failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Appling v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir. 20Ó3) (“Fraud on the court requires a grave miscarriage of justice.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v, Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We reject as unsupported by the record Coultas’s contention concerning judicial bias.

AFFIRMED, 
      
       xhiS disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     