
    Sigl, Respondent, vs. Green Bay Traction Company, Appellant.
    
      March 12
    
    April 3, 1912.
    
    
      Street railways: Injury to person attempting to hoard moving car: Negligence: Questions for jury.
    
    It was, in this case, negligence as a matter of law for plaintiff to attempt to board the front vestibule of a moving street car after it had stopped at a usual stopping place and had started again and was being speeded up, it appearing, among other things, that the vestibule door was closed and locked and that it was evident to the plaintiff that the motorman either did not see his signals or did not intend to pay any attention to them.
    Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Brown county: S. D. HastiNgs, Circuit Judge.
    
      Beversed.
    
    Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for injuries sustained while attempting to board one of defendant’s interurban cars in the city of Green Bay. The complaint alleged that the car in question was proceeding in a northerly direction on Webster avenue, after having stopped at the corner of Porlier street and Webster avenue; that plaintiff approached the car from the south and at the same time signaled to the motorman to indicate that he desired to get on; that the ear proceeded very slowly up to tbe point where plaintiff met it, and, as he was about to board the front end, started with a jerk, materially increasing its speed, and plaintiff was thrown to the ground and rolled against the trucks of the car. The answer put in issue the material allegations of the complaint. By its answers to questions submitted on a special verdict the jury found that plaintiff was injured by falling from one of defendant’s cars while attempting to get on; that his fall was caused by the car being jerked forward by a sudden increase of speed after plaintiff had gotten hold of the hand-rails and had his foot on the lower step; that the motorman was negligent in so increasing the speed of the car; that a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence in the motorman’s position should reasonably have foreseen that suddenly increasing the speed of the car would cause some injury to the plaintiff; that no want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff contributed proximately to his injury; and that plaintiff was damaged in the sum of $569. On such verdict judgment was entered. Defendant appeals.
    Eor the appellant there was a brief by Greene, Fairchild, North & Parleer, and oral argument by B. L. Parker.
    
    Eor the respondent there was a brief by Minaban & Mina-han, and oral argument by V. I. Minahcm.
    
    They contended, inter alia, that the true rule concerning contributory negligence in boarding or alighting from moving street cars is that the matter is entirely a question for the jury except when the admitted facts require a court to say that it was reckless in the person to attempt to get upon the car. Fosnes v. Duluth St. B. Go. 140 Wis. 455, 122 N. W. 1054; Hemmingway v. O., M. & St. P. B. Go. 72 Wis. 42, 50, 37 N. W. 804; Citizens3 St. B. Go. v. Spahr, 7 Ind. App. 23, 33 N. E. 446; Fp-pendorf v. Brooklyn City & N. B. Go. 69 N. Y. 195, 197; Sahlgaard v. St. Paul City B. Go. 48 Minn. 232, 51 N. W. Ill-; 3 Thompson, Neg. 886, 887, § 3511; 6 Cyc. 644.
   BaeNes, J.

Tbe following facts are undisputed: Tbe car was in motion when plaintiff attempted to board it. It bad stopped at a usual stopping place and bad just started. The-signals wbicb tbe plaintiff made to tbe motorman were made before tbe car started. It was evident to tbe plaintiff that, the motorman either did not see tbe signals or that be did not intend to pay any attention to them. Tbe attempt to board tbe car was made when it was being speeded up. Tbe front vestibule door of tbe car was closed, so that plaintiff was notified to stay out rather than invited to come in. It was not only closed, but was locked by means of tbe trap door being down, although tbe plaintiff did not know this fact. Still,, be bad as much right to assume that it was locked as be did to assume that it was unlocked. Tbe bottom of tbe door came close to tbe top of tbe platform. When tbe door was closed it was nearly if not quite flush with tbe step leading to tbe platform. Or, stated in another way, tbe outer edge of tbe step was almost on a line drawn perpendicularly from tbe door to tbe step. There was a foothold on tbe step, but plaintiff could retain bis position thereon only by banging to tbe band-holds, and be could not open tbe door if it were unlocked except by using one of bis bands. Under these facts, we conclude that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Champene v. La Crosse City R. Co. 121 Wis. 554, 99 N. W. 334; Fosnes v. Duluth St. R. Co. 140 Wis. 455, 122 N. W. 1054; Paulson v. Brooklyn City R. Co. 13 Misc. 387, 34 N. Y. Supp. 244; Phillips v. R. & S. R. Co. 49 N. Y. 177.

Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider any other errors that are assigned. There was no evidence of gross negligence to go to tbe jury. Tbe evidence of ordinary negligence was, to say tbe least, slight. It may be that tbe áccident would have happened if tbe vestibule door bad been open, but it would not have happened if tbe plaintiff bad not negligently attempted to board tbe car.„ It follows that tbe court should have directed a verdict for the defendant.

By the Gourt. — The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.  