
    
      William Moore ads. John Lemon. Same ads. James R. Aiken.
    
    1. On the trial of a suggestion of fraud, presenting four issues before a commissioner of special bail, the verdict was, «guilty of fraud.” The jury, from the commissioner’s report, were only agreed as to the first charge, that defendant had paid some debts in preference to plaintiff’s, but said they were not as to a fraudulent schedule; and the commissioner refused to require them to find on all the issues. ' For the error of the commissioner, in refusing to direct them so to find, and because the verdict was vague and indefinite, a new trial was ordered. Vide 1 Hill, 291, Walker vs. Briggs.
    
    
      Before a Commissioner of Special Bail, Fairfield, March, 1844.
    This was a trial before the clerk of the court, sitting as commissioner of special bail, and a jury summoned under the Act of 1833.
    The defendant, William Moore, having applied for the benefit of the prison bounds Act, to get discharged from. arrest under mesne process in the above stated case, his discharge was opposed, and suggestions of fraud having been filed, a special jury was impannelled as the law directs. The issues are stated in their order, in the opinion of the court.
    The jury returned the following verdict: “Guilty of fraud.” When the verdict was read, defendant’s counsel asked the jury if they were unanimous on all the specifications. Several of the jury replied they were not; that they were not agreed as to a fraudulent schedule.
    Defendant’s counsel then moved that the jury should not be discharged until they found on all the specifications.
    The jury was then dismissed.
    Defendant moved the Court of Appeals to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial, on the grounds:
    1. Because the verdict is indefinite, and not a finding on the issues submitted to the jury.
    2. Because the jurors expressly stated, when they rendered the verdict, that they were not unanimous on all the specifications, but that they could not agree as to whether the defendant’s schedule was true or false.
    3. Because the jury should not have been discharged without finding on all the issues.
    4. Because the verdict is ambiguous, insufficient, imperfect and uncertain.
    
      Mr. Boyce, for the motion.
    The first specification is defective, and raises an immaterial issue. A finding on this is of no avail. Cited 11 Pickering Rep. 45.
    The fact that the jury said they were not agreed as to a fraudulent schedule, prevented the verdict from being a general verdict, comprehending all the issues. Though there were four specifications, they are all reducible to two general charges, a preference of creditors and a false schedule; the three last specifications were only varied forms of charging a false schedule. The only specification charging a preference of creditors, is the first; the verdict, therefore, is driven back to that, and must stand or fall on it, if it can stand at all. This being defective, the verdict cannot be sustained. It does not charge a fraudulent or undue preference, but only a preference.
    
      The verdict is bad, because not a fin ding, on all the issues. Cited Lord Raym. 324. In further support of his argument; the counsel cited Doug. 730; 2 Ala. Rep. 359 ; 1 Croke, 31-2 ; Rolle’s Abr. 697, 722; Trials per Pais, 285, 288, 310 ; Bacon Abr. 18, 37; Com. Dig. Pleader, sec. 22 : 2 Mod. Rep. 137; 2 Bos. Pull. 352; 3 Caine’s Rep. 163 ; 6 Johns, Rep. 1 ; 1 Mason, 169 ; 2 Wheat. 225 ; 1 Day. 192 ; 5 Burr. 2267.
    
      Mr. Rutland, contra,
    cited 1 Mason, 153 ; 1 McMullan, 147.
   Curia, per

Frost, J.

The suggestion of fraud presented four issues: that the defendant had paid some debts in preferencé of the plaintiff’s: that defendant had omitted to insert in his schedule the sum of five hundred dollars, the proceeds of certain sales; that he had made a fraudulent confession of judgment to one Henry Moore ; and that he had failed to insert in his schedule divers other pioperty in his possession at the time of filing it. The verdict, “guilty of fraud,” is limited and qualified, but indefinite, so as not to ascertain which of the charges it was intended to find. It appears from the report of the commissioner, that the jury were agreed only respecting the first charge, and that he refured to require them to find on all the issues. On a suggestion of fraud against a debtor’s discharge, if the jury find for the plaintiff, the verdict should express the particular issues it comprehends. 1 Hill, 291, Walker vs. Briggs. For the error of the commissioner, in refusing to direct the jury so to find, and because the verdict was vague and indeterminate, a new trial is ordered.

Richardson, O’Neall, Evans, Butler, and Wardlaw, JJ. concurred.  