
    Deborah D. McELHANEY v. McKEEHAN HOSIERY MILLS, INC.
    AV92000398.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Nov. 5, 1993.
    
      Leon Garmon and Michael L. Allsup of Law Office of Leon Garmon, P.A., Gadsden, for appellant.
    Éichard I. Lehr and Albert L. Vreeland II of Lehr, Middlebrooks & Proctor, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.
   THIGPEN, Judge.

This case was commenced as a workmen’s compensation claim by Deborah D. McElha-ney against McKeehan Hosiery Mills, Inc. Ultimately, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and the trial court conducted a hearing to approve the agreement. The approved agreement expressly reserved MeElhaney’s right to pursue a claim for wrongful discharge against McKeehan. Subsequent to the settlement hearing and on the same date the judgement was entered, MeE-lhaney filed an amended complaint to add a count for wrongful discharge. The trial court refused to allow McElhaney’s amendment. Hence, this appeal.

Rule 15, A.R.Civ.P., allows a party to amend a pleading without leave of court at any time before the first setting of the case for trial, or thereafter, “only by leave of court, and leave shall be given only upon a showing of good cause.” Whether to allow or disallow amendments pursuant to Rule 15, A.R.Civ.P., is a matter that lies soundly within the discretion of the trial court. Government Street Lumber Co. v. AmSouth Bank, 553 So.2d 68 (Ala.1989).

In the instant case, MeElhaney attempted to amend her complaint to add the retaliatory discharge claim after the settlement hearing and on the same date the judgment was entered. There is nothing to indicate that MeElhaney requested or was granted leave of court for such amendment.

Our Supreme Court has consistently affirmed judgments of trial courts that refused to allow amendments filed after the cases were set for trial and without leave of court. See e.g., Government, supra; Robinson v. Kierce, 513 So.2d 1005 (Ala.1987); Arfor-Brynfield, Inc. v. Huntsville Mall Associates, 479 So.2d 1146 (Ala.1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Sullen, 413 So.2d 1106 (Ala.1982); Burge v. Jefferson County, 409 So.2d 800 (Ala.1982); Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Guthrie, 338 So.2d 1276 (Ala.1976).

The trial court was acting within its discretionary authority when it disallowed the amendment, and we find no abuse of discretion in that decision which would warrant reversal. We are mindful of th'e argument that judicial economy would be served by allowing such amendments so as to dispense with the necessity of filing another action or paying another filing fee; however, to allow an amendment at such a late date would expose Rule 15 to widespread abuse, militate against the finality of the proceedings, and jeopardize the discretion of the trial court. Apparently, the trial court was not convinced that justice would be served by allowing an amendment, subsequent to the settlement hearing and on the day the judgment was entered, to raise a matter that had been known by the amending party and considered in prior settlement negotiations. Accordingly, this case is due to be, and it is hereby, affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

YATES, J., concurs.

ROBERTSON, P.J., dissents.

ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge,

dissenting.

The parties to this appeal reached a compromised settlement, which specifically reserved McElhaney’s right to pursue a claim for wrongful discharge against McKeehan. The trial court’s judgment, approving the compromised settlement of the workmen’s compensation claims, specifically excluded any wrongful discharge claim by McElhaney.

I agree that under Rule 15, AR.Civ.P., trial judges are given discretion to allow or refuse amendments. Government Street Lumber Co. v. AmSouth Bank, 553 So.2d 68 (Ala.1989). Our supreme court has held that amendments to complaints are to be freely allowed unless it caused a trial on the issues to be unduly delayed or the opposing party to be unduly prejudiced; however, a trial court’s refusal of an amendment must be based on a valid ground. Id.

In this case, both McKeehan and the trial court knew that McElhaney intended to file a claim for wrongful discharge. McElhaney specifically reserved any claim for wrongful discharge, and, in fact, she amended her complaint on the same date of the settlement hearing to include this claim. The trial court struck the amended complaint almost two months later.

The amendment to the complaint certainly would not have caused an undue delay in the trial of that issue nor would it have unduly prejudiced McKeehan. In fact, striking the amendment does cause an undue delay in the trial of this issue, and considering the statute of limitations, not allowing the amendment could certainly unduly prejudice McElhaney.

In the interest of judicial economy and because I find no valid ground for the refusal of the amendment, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion by striking the amended complaint; therefore, I respectfully dissent.  