
    Cofer v. Scroggins.
    
      Contest of Claim of Homestead Exemption.
    
    1. General objection to evidence — A. general objection to evidence, a part of which is legal, an ■ another part illegal, may be overruled.
    2. Questions as to character of improvements; relevant evidence. — In a contest of the claim lo a homestead exemption, questions asked of the claimant as to the character of the improvements on the land in controversy, are proper as tending to show the value of the property.
    3. Answer a collective fact, not, conclusion of witness.— The answer of a witness to the question, whether improvements had been made? : “yes, a right smart improvements have been made in clearing and fencing,” was properly allowable, as an inference necessarily involving facts as to quantity of land cleared and fenced — a collective fact— subject to the right of cross-examination by opposing counsel.
    4. (lopy of claim of exemptions certified, relevant evidence. — A properly certified copy of the claim of exemptions filed in the probate judge’s office is relevant evidence in support of claimant's claim.
    5 Legal effect of adoption of child. — Though adoption, by operation of the statute, § 2367 of Code, does not establish all the legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation of parent and child, the adoptive parent thereby assumes the duties of a natural parent and becomes entitled to the custody, services and earnings of the adopted child.
    6. Adopted child entitled to homestead exemption. — The homestead exemption is one in favor of the family, and is founded in the spirit of humanity and benevolence, and the statutes on the subject are to be liberally construed; and, so construing them, we hold that an adopted child, as a natural one, is entitled, during minority, to this claim of exemption.
    7. § 2507 and § 2537 construed in pari, materia. — Bight to exemption only during the minority of adopted child.
    Appeal from Cullman Circuit Court.
    Tried before tbe Hon. H. C. Speake.'
    Tbis action was begun by an attachment sued out by W. T. L. Cofer against Bobert Jones, and levied on tbe land in controversy. Mary J. Scroggins, defendant’s adopted daugb-ter, filed a declaration of claim of exemption, and in tbe contest of exemption proceedings bad judgment, and plaintiff appeals.
    Tbe evidence on tbe part of tbe plaintiff tended to show tbat on December 3, 1888, tbe plaintiff, W. T. L. Oofer, sued out an attachment against one Bobert Jones on a debt contracted after April, 1873, and the same was levied by tbe sheriff of Cullman county, Ala., upon tbe N. 1-2 of tbe S. W. 1-4 of section 14, township 10, range 2 W., in said county and State; and tbat at tbe July term, 1891, of tbe Circuit Court tbe plaintiff recovered a judgment against said Jones for tbe sum of $103.24; tbat said Jónes was tbe owner of tbe said above described land, and occupied and used tbe same up to January or February, 1886, when be left tbe land and State. Tbe defendant being introduced as a witness in her own behalf, testified tbat she was tbe adopted daughter of Bobert Jones; tbat she was 22 years old in February, 1892, was married, and was living with her husband; that said Bobert Jones was in possession of tbe land involved in this suit, exercising acts of ownership over tbe same, and owned tbe same up to tbe time be left Cullman county, in tbe early part of 1886; tbat when be left the State be left bis wife,. who has since died, and tbe defendant herself is now residing upon tbe land above described, and has resided upon tbe same continuously since tbe said Jones left in 1886. The defendant further testified tbat she was tbe Mary Jane Stephenson who was adopted by Bobert Jones in 1882; tbat she afterwards married one Scroggins; tbat she lived with tbe said Jones on tbe land involved in this suit from tbe time be adopted her up to tbe time be left in 1886, and tbat tbe land was tbe homestead of Jones, and was occupied as such, and was tbe only land be oVned; tbat her husband has made considerable improvements on tbe land; tbat on tbe day she filed her claim of exemption in tbe Probate Court of Cullman county she was a Resident of tbe State of Alabama, and intended to remain a resident of said State; and tbat tbe land in contest did not exceed $2,000 in value at tbe time said claim of exemption was filed nor at tbe time of tbe filing of tbe contest, nor at tbe time of tbe trial. During tbe examination of this witness she was asked by her counsel tbe following question: “State whether or not you were a resident of this county and State, and whether you intended to remain so in December, 1888.” Tbe plaintiff objected to this question, and duly excepted, and tbe court overruled bis objection. Tbe defendant answered tbat she was, and intended to remain so. She was then asked by her counsel tbe following questions, and tbe plaintiff separately excepted to tbe asking of eacb of them, and to tbe court’s allowing tbe defendant to answer tbe same: “Wbat were tbe improvements on tbe land in 1886, when Bobert Jones left, and wbat were tlieir condition? “State whether or not any other improvements have been made on tbe land since Jones left, by you or for you?” On cross-examination of this witness the plaintiff asked her tbe following questions: “Was bis [Bobert Jones] wife on good terms with him when be left?” and “Did bis [Bobert Jones] wife go with him?” The court sustained tbe defendant’s objections to eacb of these questions, and the plaintiff separately excepted. The defendant next introduced in evidence a certified copy of the record of the claim of exemptions. Tbe plaintiff objected to the introduction of tbe said record, on tbe ground that tbe plaintiff’s claim to exemption was tbe best of evidence. Tbe court overruled tbe objection, and tbe plaintiff excepted. Tbe defendant introduced in evidence a certified transcript of tbe minute entry of tbe Probate Court of Cullman county, in which said Bobert Jones adopted her, Mary Stephenson. Plaintiff objected to tbe introduction of this paper in writing, and duly excepted to tlie court overruling bis objection. Upon tbe introduction of all tbe evidence tbe court made tbe following remark to tbe defendant’s counsel: “If you ask tbe general charge in writing, I will give it.” Tbe plaintiff duly excepted to this remark, and also excepted to tbe court’s giving tbe general affirmative charge at the request of defendant.
    J. W. Austin, and W. T. L. Cofer, for appellant.
    Tbe policy of tbe exemption laws of this State is to exempt property in favor of widow and minor children during life of widow, or minority of children. — Norton v. Norton, 94 Ala. 485; Murphy v. Hunt, Miller d: Go., 75 Ala. 438.
    Tbe claim of exemption of Mary J. Scroggins in this case is founded upon section 2537 of tbe Code. This statute does not embrace adopted children, as tbe evidence shows she was, but if it does, slie could have no benefit of her exemptions after she became of age. — Code, 2537, 563; Norton v. Norton, 94 Ala. 485; Davenport v. Brooks, 92 Ala. 630; Englehart v. Young's Heirs, 76 Ala. 542.
    Geo. H. Parker, for appellee.
    (No brief).
   HARALSON, J.

1. The question propounded to tbe defendant, on her examination as a witness, — “State whether or not yon were a resident of tbis county and State, and whether you intended to remain so, in December, 1888 ?— contains two inquiries, either of which might have been differently answered. The first, — whether she was a resident of this State, — is a collective fact, (Pollock v. Gantt, 69 Ala. 373; Hood v. Disston, 90 Ala. 379), and was legal and pertinent, as only residents are entitled to exemptions; the second, calling for her intentions was not.—Sternau v. Marx, 58 Ala. 608; Wilson v. Slate, 73 Ala. 527. But, it is a familiar rule, that where there is a general objection to evidence, as in this instance, a part of which is legal and another part illegal, it may be overruled.—R. & D. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 92 Ala. 225.

2. The questions allowed to be asked defendant, and excepted to by plaintiff,- — -“What were the improvements on said land in 1886, when Robert Jones left, and what were their condition, and whether any improvements have been made on the land since Jones left, by you, or for you?”. — were not improper, since answers to them might tend to show the value of the property, an important inquiry, in one phase of the case. The answer to the last question, — “A right smart improvements have been made in clearing and fencing;” — was a mere conclusion of facts, an inference necessarily involving facts as to the quantity of land cleared and fenced, which, as a collective fact, was properly allowable, subject to the cross-examination of the plaintiff, if he desired the matter stated more explicitly, or in detail.—S. & N. A. R. R. Co. v. McLendon, 63 Ala. 276; Hood v. Disston, 90 Ala. 379.

Besides, a sufficient answer to all these exceptions is, that if immaterial, they could not 'have influenced a jury in any way, since the court gave the general charge for the defendant, thereby withdrawing from the jury all consideration of the facts, except as to their belief of them, there being no conflict in the evidence. — 1 Gr. Ev. § 52.

3. There was no error in refusing to allow plaintiff to ask defendant, on her cross-examination, — “If Jones’ wife was on good terms with him, when he left, and, if she went with him?” Answer to the question was irrelevant to the principal fact or matter in dispute.

4. The declaration of claim of exemption, made and filed in the office of the judge of probate of Cullman county, in this State, was made and recorded in accordance with the statutes on the subject, and was relevant, since the statute makes it, thereafter, prima facie correct, and operative as notice of its contents.-; — Code, §§ 2515-2517, 2507 and 2537.

The statute makes the certified copy of such proceedings, (and these were properly certified), have the same effect as if the originals were produced and proved. But, in addition to the certified transcript, the defendant introduced, proved and read the original minute entries of this proceeding from the record book of the Probate Court, to which the plaintiff also objected. But, these objections were properly overruled, since either was sufficient.—Code, § 2488; Stephenson v. Moody, 85 Ala. 35.

5. A transcript of the proceedings in the Probate Court of Cullman county, duly certified, by- which defendant claimed to have been adopted as the child of Robert Jones, was offered and read in evidence, against the objection of the plaintiff. The proceedings were in close and satisfactory compliance with the statutory mode for the adoption of a child.—Code, § 2367; Abney v. DeLoach, 84 Ala. 393. The defendant also proved and read in evidence the original minute entry of said proceeding, from the record book from the Probate Court of said county. The transcript of the entry, or the original entry itself, was admissible. — Authorities supra.

6. The act of adoption of a child, has been defined to be, “One by which a person takes the child of another into his family and treats it as his own.” — 1 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 204; “To receive or treat as a son or daughter, one who is the child of another.” — Worcester’s Die. ; “To take into one’s family as a son or heir; to take and treat as a child, giving a title to the privileges and rights of a child.”—Web. Dic.; Tilley v. Harrison, 91 Ala. 295; Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48.

Our statute on the subject is: “Any person desirous to adopt a child so as to make it capable of inheriting his estate, real and personal, or to change the name of one previously adopted, may make a declaration in writing attested by two witnesses, * * * which being acknowledged by the declarant before the judge of probate of the county of his residence, * * has the effect to make such child capable of inheriting such estate of the declarant, and of changing its name to the one in the declaration.”

The primary object of the statute would seem to be, to .allow any person to adopt the child of another and make it capable of inheriting his estate, if he should die intestate, or to change the name of one previously adopted. But, a liberal intendment and operation should be given to the statute. Accordingly, we held on this subject, in another connection, that, “Though adoption may not, by operation of the statute, originate and establish all the legal consequences and inci-dent's of tbe natural relation of parent and child, when the adoptive father declares his own name, as the name by which he wishes the child to be thereafter known, and takes it into his family to be treated as a child, he assumes the duties of a natural parent, and is entitled to its custody and services, or earnings as against all persons, unless it may be, the true parents, when they have not consented to the adoption.”—Tilley v. Harrison, 91 Ala. 297. And so, our homestead exemption, deemed so important as to be made the subject of constitutional and legislative provision, is one in favor of the family, is founded in a spirit of humanity and benevolence, and the statutes on the subject, like the one providing for the adoption of a minor, are to be liberally construed.—3 Brick. Dig., 490, § 2; Thompson on Homestead, §§ 47, 131. Applying such construction to our homestead and exemption laws, we hold, that an adopted child, as a natural one, is entitled, during minority, to this claim of exemption.

7. The judgment in this case is one of exemption to the defendant,' “so long as said Mary J. Scroggins remains a bona fide, resident oí the State of Alabama,” etc. The statute, Code, § 2507, and the Constitution, Art. 10, § 33, limit the exemption as to children during their minority. The judgment entry, no doubt, followed § 2537 of the Code, —making provision for exemption in favor of children, when the father absconds or abandons his family, as was the case here,' — -which provides, that “such exemptions shall continue only so long as the wife and minor child or children, or either, shall remain bona fide residents of this State.” But, this section must be construed in pari materia-with said § 2507, and said Article of the Constitution, and clearly means that the exemption is to be enjoyed by the children, during minority only, if they remain bona fide residents for that length of time.—Marx v. Miller, 55 Ala. 322; Hunter v. Law, 68 Ala. 365; Barber v. Williams, 74 Ala. 333; Norton v. Norton, 94 Ala. 481. The judgment will be, here, so corrected, and as corrected, affirmed.

Affirmed.  