
    STINSON v. STATE.
    (No. 3407.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 3, 1915.
    Rehearing Denied March 3, 1915.)
    1. Indictment and Information <&wkey;-159 — Amendments-Power to Authorize Amendment.
    Where a word in an indictment was misspelled, the district judge had no power to authorize the district attorney to 'add the omitted letter; and, if the omission invalidated the indictment, the addition did not cure the defect.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 505-514; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>159.]
    2. Indictment and Information &wkey;>79 — Requisites and Sufficiency — Mistakes in Spelling.
    An indictment charging that accused assaulted S. with “inten” to murder her sufficiently charged an assault with intent to murder, notwithstanding the omission of the “t” from the word “intent.”
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 209-214; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>79.]
    Appeal from District Court, Gregg County; W. C. Buford, Judge.
    Uriah Stinson was convicted of assault to murder, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    F. B. Martin, of Longview, for appellant. C. C. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   DAVIDSON, J,

Appellant was convicted of assault to murder; his punishment being assessed at ten years’ confinement in the penitentiary.

There was a motion made to quash the indictment on the ground that it did not charge “intent” to murder. In this respect the indictment copied in the record reads as follows:

“Did then and there unlawfully with malice aforethought make an assault in and upon Lela Stinson with the intent then and there to murder the said Lela Stinson against the peace and dignity of the State.”

The motion to quash is based upon the-statement in the motion ihat the word “intent,” as copied in the transcript, was writ-teh as follows, “inten,” omitting the “t” from the end of the word. There is a. bill of exceptions which recites that the' word “intent” was written as claimed by appellant in the motion to quash. It is further recited that the court permitted the district attorney to add the letter “t” to the word in the indictment. Of course, the district judge was not authorized to do this, and, if the matter was fatal to the indictment, the mere fact that the court permitted the district attorney to place the letter “t” at the end of the word “intent” would not be cured by such addition. The writer, however, does not believe that the mere fact that the letter “t” was added by authority of the district judge invalidates the indictment or makes it any stronger or better than if such action had not been taken. The indictment will be treated as if the unauthorized letter “t” had not been added to the word “intent.” We are of opinion, however, from this standpoint, that under our authorities this ought not to require a reversal of the judgment. We think this indictment is,sufficient, and sufficiently charges assault with intent to murder, whether the “t” was added or left out. So believing, we believe there is no merit in the contention. A statement of facts does not accompany the record.

In the condition it is presented to us we are of the opinion there is no reversible error ; therefore the judgment is affirmed.  