
    Fimber FREDRICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 5D02-985.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 6, 2002.
    
      James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Brynn Newton, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
    Richard E. Doran, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.
   HARRIS, J.

The issue in this case is whether the trial judge’s restrictions of voir dire denied the defendant a fair trial. Frederick was seen in a playground area at 3:40 in the morning. As the police approached, the man talking to Frederick left the area. The police requested permission to search Frederick and he consented. When the officer discovered a plastic baggie containing “rock-like substance,” Frederick twisted the officer’s hand, grabbed the baggie from the officer, pushed the officer away, and ran. Although Frederick was caught shortly thereafter, the baggie was not found. He was charged and convicted for battery on a police officer and resisting an officer without violence.

The trial from opening statements to verdict took only three hours and thirteen minutes. The judge at the outset advised the jury that he would not permit repetitive questioning and would see that the voir dire process was handled efficiently. In that regard, the court inquired of the panel members whether they were close to any police officer and whether they would" accord more credibility to a police officer than anyone else. Even though the court asked these questions generally to the panel and followed up as to those who indicated a problem might exist, appellant contends that the court’s refusal to permit him to ask questions of individual panel members about their relationship with the police and their feeling about police credibility deprived him of a fair trial.

A trial court has considerable discretion in controlling the time allotted for voir dire and in placing reasonable limits on counsel’s questioning. The issue in this regard is whether the court’s limitations somehow denied a fair trial. Because there is nothing in this record which indicates that the jury selected was not fair and impartial, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

SAWAYA, J., concurs.

THOMPSON, C.J., concurs specially, with opinion.

THOMPSON, C.J.,

concurring specially.

I agree that the appellant received a fair and impartial trial. Although the trial court was active in the jury selection process by trying to eliminate repetitious questioning of jurors, the attorney for the appellant was allowed to ask questions of individual jurors.

Further, my review of the record indicates that this issue was not preserved for appeal.

After voir dire, the jury was selected and impaneled. Significantly, the appellant did not renew any objections before the jury was accepted and sworn. Because the jury was sworn with no further objections, the issue was not preserved. In Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174 (Fla.1993), the supreme court stated:

We agree with the district court that counsel’s action in accepting the jury led to a reasonable assumption that he had abandoned, for whatever reason, his earlier objection. It is reasonable to conclude that events occurring subsequent to his objection caused him to be satisfied with the jury about to be sworn.

Id. at 176.

This court has held that failure to renew an objection to improper voir dire waives the issue for appellate review. Barnette v. State, 768 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that by failing to renew an objection concerning jury selection appellant did not preserve the issue for appellate review); see also Berry v. State, 792 So.2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Green v. State, 679 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Stripling v. State, 664 So.2d 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).  