
    Smith and another committee of Probst against Painter.
    Tuesday, June 14.
    A purchaser of land at sheriff’s sale, cannot object to receiving the deed on the ground of defect of title where the made.
    Caveat emptor applies in allits force to such purchaser.
    But it seems such purchaser takes the legal estate of the defendant discharged from secret trusts, of which no notice is given till after the acknowledgment of the sheriff's deed.
    In Error.
    ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Union county.
    This was an action brought by Thomas Painter-, the de- ° J fendant in error, the plaintiff below, late sheriff of Northumberland county, for the recovery of the purchase money of a tract of land sold by him to Probst as the estate of Evan R. Evans, in the hands of his administrator. The sale was made on the 25th August, 1813, on an alias venditioni ex-ponas, returnable to the August Term. The deed was knowledged on the 26th November, the Term following, and tendered to Probst, who refused to accept it. The estate was formerly owned by one Henry Hendricks, and was sold as his property by the sheriff to E. R. Evans, and the deed acknowledged and delivered to E. R. Evans, on the 30th ° ,, , November, 1810. The defendants contended, that Evans s title was defective ; that he was trustee for Hendricks: and to prove it, gave in evidence the following receipt given by Evans, on the 1st February, 1811. “ I received of Jo hn Zimmerman, five hundred and seventy-five dollars, and cents, for 95 acres, 138 perches of FI. Hendricks's land.’’ Signed, E. R. Evans. And they offered to prove the declarations of E. R. Evans, soon after his purchase, that he had bought in the land for Hendricks, who was his client, and for whom he acted, and who had satisfied him for his services ; that this receipt was for money paid him on Hendricks'1 s account, to repay the money Evans had paid the sheriff, and that Hendricks was to have the land, on paying him'the whole money. This evidence was objected to by the plaintiff, and overruled by the Court. The defendant excepted to their opinion.
    
      Lachells, for the plaintiff in error.
    
      Probst purchased at sheriff’s sale, the land in dispute, as the property of E. R. Evans, deceased, and afterwards discovered, that Evans had no title because he held, subject to a trust in Hendricks. Being a purchaser at sheriff’s sale, he would hold the land subject to this trust. 1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 583. 2 Binn. 40. 5 Binn. 266. The judgment against Evans,. only bound such interest as he had: and parol evidence is admissible to prove a resulting trust. 2 Atk. 71. It has been decided, that a purchaser, under a deed with special war-, ranty, may take advantage of a defect of title, at any time before the money is paid ; Steinhauer v. Witman: and for the same reason, a purchaser at sheriff’s sale, may, before he pays the purchase money, avail himself of a want of title to the property contracted for.
    
      Greenough and Hepburn, contra.
    In sheriff’s sales, the rule of caveat emptor applies. The contract is, to buy the title such as it is, whether good or bad: but a purchaser at sheriff’s sale, is a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and cannot be affected by a secret trust, of which he has no notice. It is held in Heister’s lessee v. Fortner,
      
       that the purchaser at sheriff’s sale is, like other purchasers, protected by the want of notice. Lazarus’s lessee v. Bryson,
      Sugd. on Vend. 416. 476.
    
      
      а) 1 Serg. & Rawle, 458.
    
    
      
       2 Binn. 40.
    
    
      
       6 Binn, 54.
      
    
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Duncan J.

If this was an ejectment between Evans, or his heirs, and Hendricks; this evidence, connected as it was with the receipt, would have established the trust, and on the payment of the money, Hendricks would hold the land. But if Evans had sold to one who had no notice of the trust, the sale could not be disturbed. A purchaser without notice of a trust, never can be affected by it. This doctrine is fully considered, in Lazarus's Lessee v. Bryson, 2 Binn., and is a plain principle of natural justice, and an established rule in equity. If Probst had received the deed from the sheriff, and paid the purchase money, he could have recovered the land from Hendricks: for here was a public sale, Hendricks living on the land, and never giving notice. It would have been the duty of Hendricks to have called on the administrators of Evans and paid the balance. The lands never would have been returned to the sheriff by them ; and if they had, he should have given notice at the time of sale. But here, he lies by, from February, 1811, to November, 1813, and it is not until after the acknowledgment of the deed, that he gives notice. No man would purchase at sheriff’s sale, if such secret trust could defeat his purchase. The purchaser knew that Hendricks was in possession: but the public records informed him, that his interest had been sold to Evans, and the sale confirmed by the Court, and the deed acknowledged in Court, delivered to him. A sale by the sheriff, has been compared to a conveyance with special warranty,' in which case it has been decided, that if there is a manifest defect of title, the purchase money, although bond has been given for it, cannot be recovered. But there is not the least resemblance. The sale by sheriff excludes all warranty. The purchaser takes ail risque. He buys on his own knowledge and judgment. Caveat emptor, applies in all its force to him. If this were not the law, an execution, which is the end of the law, would only be the commencement of a new controversy ; the creditor kept at bay during a series of suits, before he could reap the fruits of his judgment and execution. A party may sell his claim to lands, whatever they may be; and if there is no covenant other than an express stipulation, that he sells only his own interest, unless he has been guilty of some misrepresentation as to the intent, or some fraudulent concealment, he may recover the purchase money. Lands at sheriff’s sale, are frequently sold greatly below their value, because the usual understanding is, that the purchaser takes his chance of the1 title. An inadequacy of price, is no reason to set aside a Sale on the application of the defendant in the execution; the defect of title is no reason to set it aside on the application of the purchaser. I speak of sales fairly made ; for fraud will affect these, as it will all other sales. Here was no fraud in the sale. Here was no application by the purchaser, to set it aside, the first Court, nor the second Court. The party buys, and gives himself no further trouble ; the sheriff makes out, executes, and acknowledges the deed, and tenders it to him, and when, after many months, he is called on for payment, he suggests a defect of title; w-hile if he had accepted the deed, this title never could dis- - turb him. Probst was liable to pay on the sale. He could not be affected by subsequent notice of a secret trust. The same protection was afforded to him, as if he then had paid his money, and taken the deed. In this case, Evans held the legal title ; and the legal title discharged of the trust was transferred to Probst. But he had likewise a beneficial interest to cover the balance of the money he had paid on Hendricks’s account.

The Court properly overruled the evidence, and the judgment must be affirmed.

judgment affirmed.  