
    Cornelius Coolidge and Another versus William Gray.
    A cargo was insured from Boston to the port of discharge m Europe, against all risks of every name and nature, (bad debts and illicit trade excepted;) it being understood by the parties that the vessel was intended for some port in Holland, or wherever else the master should deem proper, in case she could not get into Holland: The vessel arrived in the Maese, and might have gone to Rotterdam, but the master, learning that if he proceeded to Rotterdam the property would be confiscated, left Holland and proceeded to Gottenburg, and in going from thence for a market in the Baltic the vessel was captured by the Danes, and with the cargo condemned as prize. — It was held that neither the departure from Holland, nor the going from Gottenhurg for a market, was a deviation; but that the property was still protected by the policy, and the underwriters bound to pay the loss.
    Assumpsit on a policy of insurance, dated April 10th, 1810, for 15,000 dollars on Batavia sugars, coffee, and spice on board the schooner Cremer, at and from Boston to her port of discharge in Europe, including blockaded ports, and there until safely landed, and in quiet possession of the consignee thirty days. It was also contained in the policy, that it was understood that all risks of every name and nature (bad debts and illicit trade excepted) were included in the policy; that the vessel, though cleared for Tonningen, was intended for some port in Holland, or wherever else the master should deem proper, in case he could not get into Holland; that by illicit trade in the policy was understood an infraction of the municipal laws ; but the assured was to take the risk of French and Dutch decrees against American commerce; at a premium of twenty-five per cent., to return ten per cent, if from any cause the vessel should not discharge in Holland, or any blockaded port, and there should be no loss on the policy.
    The declaration contained a second count for 15,000 dollars paid, laid out and expended by the plaintiffs to the use of the defend ant.
    * The action was tried before the Chief Justice, who reported the following facts as appearing in evidence.
    The schooner with her said cargo sailed from Boston on the 28th of March, 1810, and proceeded on her said voyage; and having escaped the British blockade of Holland, went so far up the Maese that she might have gone to Botterdam, to which she was then proceeding, secure from capture by any British cruiser or any blockading force. But the master being there informed by his owners’ correspondent in Botterdam, that if he entered that port with his vessel, he would not be permitted to enter or land his cargo there, or in any port in Holland; and that his vessel and cargo would be seized and confiscated, if they were discovered by the French guards or custom-house officers; and there being imminent danger thereof, he immediately proceeded, with said schooner and cargo, for Gottenhurg, to ascertain whether his cargo could be sold there to advantage, and if not, to what market in the north of Europe it would be best to carry it. He arrived at Gottenhurg on the 13th of June, and remained there until the 21st of the same month; when he left Gottenhurg, with the schooner and cargo, to proceed for a market in the Baltic. On the day following he was captured by a Danish privateer, and carried into Copenhagen, where he arrived on the 26th of said month, and where the vessel and cargo were libelled as prize, and after an acquittal at the Lower Court, were condemned on the appeal. Some money was expended by the plaintiffs in claiming the cargo at Copenhagen. The plaintiffs had property on board, in the articles mentioned in the policy, to the amount thereby insured. Those articles were the produce of a Dutch colony, and commanded a higher price in the Boston market, because such property was thought more secure from condemnation in Holland than similar articles not the produce of a Dutch colony.
    The counsel for the defendant contended on the trial: — First, that by the true construction of the policy upon the * facts proved in the case, the voyage insured terminated in Holland. Secondly, that if the master was authorized to leave the coast of Holland, yet by the true construction of the policy upon the facts proved, the voyage insured terminated in Gottenburg.
    
    These points were overruled by the Chief Justice, and a verdict was taken for the plaintiffs for 16,405 dollars 60 cents. Whereupon the defendant’s counsel moved for a new trial for the misdirection of the judge on the points aforesaid.
    If the direction aforesaid was erroneous, the verdict was to be set aside, and a new trial granted"; otherwise' judgment to be rendered on the verdict for the plaintiffs.
    
      Hall and Dexter for the defendant.
    By the port of discharge in the policy must be understood the port, at which the vessel may be able to discharge. The insurance was to some port in Holland, ’unless the vessel was unable to gain such port, being prevented by a blockading force. But not being so prevented, the risk terminated on the safe arrival of the property in the river Maese. The leaving that port exposed the property to another risk from the blockading squadron, and was a deviation not from necessity, but merely from apprehension of danger, which is no excuse for a deviation. 
    
    But admitting the departure from Holland to have been from necessity, and that the policy covered the property to Gottenburg, the voyage must clearly be held to be at an end at this latter place. The policy contemplated but one port of discharge, that is any port where the cargo might be safely discharged, and this without any regard to the state of the market at such port, whether good or bad.  This expression, port of discharge, is novel, as applied to a port in a foreign country, although usual in relation to the return voyage to the United States, in which cases it has never been understood that the vessel has a right to range from port to port to find a convenient market for her cargo. A voyage insured must have some limits either * of time or place. But if we are wrong in considering Gottenburg the end of this voyage under the policy in question, the voyage had no limits. The vessel might have gone to every port in Europe, and still have been protected by the policy. Such a construction is unreasonable in the extreme.
    
      Prescott and Jackson for the plaintiffs.
    By port of discharge in the policy was intended the port where the vessel should begin to discharge. If the expression had been, as is not unfrequent, port or ports of discharge, we should contend that the cargo might have been partly discharged in one port and partly in another. If the intention of the parties to this policy had been to confine the voyage to one port, and oblige the master there to unlade, such port would have been named, instead of the general phrase, port of discharge, as the intention of the voyage is well known at the vessel’s departure. By being able to get into Holland, must be understood an ability to get in for the purposes of the voyage, not merely that there should be no physical impossibility. The certainty of a total loss of the property, had the vessel proceeded to Rotterdam, was tantamount to the seizure by a blockading force. There was no opportunity, afforded while the vessel was in Holland, to learn the state of the markets, or to determine in what port to discharge. It was therefore within the fair and reasonable construction of the policy, that the vessel should have liberty to go to Gottenburg, or any other port, to obtain the necessary information, and that having obtained it, she should still be protected by the policy in proceeding to the port elected as the port of discharge. There was then no deviation, either in going to Gottenburg, or in proceeding from thence to a suitable market.
    
      
      
         Richardson vs. Maine Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 6 Mass Rep 102.
      
    
    
      
      
        Lee & Al. vs. Gray, 7 Mass. Rep. 349.
    
   By the Court.

Two objections are made on behalf of the defendant to the right, of the plaintiffs to recover in this action. First, it is said that after the vessel had eluded the blockade, and had gotten safely into Holland, she had no right to leave Holland and go elsewhere at the risk of *the underwriter. But our opinion is, that by getting into Holland, as used in this policy, must be understood getting in for some beneficial purpose, as the sale and delivery of the cargo, which was known to be the sole object of the voyage. The master had a right, and it was his duty, after receiving the information which he had from the correspondent of the plaintiffs at Rotterdam, to depart from the Macse, and seek some other port to discharge his cargo, as it would have been his duty to do, in case he had been boarded and warned to depart by a blockading squadron or ship, on his approaching the river. It would have been as wicked as imprudent for him under the circumstances, to have pursued his route to Rotterdam. This objection therefore cannot prevail. The second objection is, that even if the master had a right to leave Holland under the existing circumstances, yet that the policy having limited the voyage to one port only, the vessel must have discharged at Gottenburg, and that the voyage contemplated by the policy must cease there. The determination of this objection depends on the construction to be given to the words “ port of discharge.” As it appears that the policy was made some time after the vessel had sailed, it is presumable that no particular port of destination had been fixed upon previously to her sailing, and that it was left to the discretion of the master or supercargo to what port he should go. If he had broken bulk, or begun to unlade at Gottenburg, that must have been considered he port of discharge, and the voyage would have ended there within the policy. But we think, and in this opinion we are confirmed by that of several eminent underwriters of whom we have inquired, that when property is insured to a port of discharge, the assured has a right to obtain advice at his port of arrival respecting the markets, and having informed himself, has a right to proceed to such port as promises the best sales, and is still protected by the policy ; not being obliged to discharge his cargo at the first port he makes.

Judgment on the verdict.  