
    *Gaskins v. The Commonwealth.
    [Saturday, October 21, 1797.]
    Writ of Error — Statute of Limitations. —No writ of error lies to a judgment of the General Court, after five years from the rendition thereof.
    Interest on Damages — When Due. — Interest is not due upon the damages, until after judgment, against a public collector.
    , These were writs of supersedeas to four judgments of the General Court, two in the year 1786, and the other two in the year 1788, upon the following cases: Gaskins was Sheriff of Northumberland, for the year 1785, and did not pay the amount of the taxes due into the treasury, within the time prescribed by law. For default of which, motions were made, and the judgments aforesaid obtained on behalf of the Commonwealth, for the principal and damages with interest on both, from a date anterior to the rendition of the judgments. The error assigned was, “that interest was directed to be computed on the whole amount of the taxes due, and the damages from a day preceding the judgment, whereas, it ought only to have been computed thereon, from the date of the judgments.” To these judgments, writs of supersedeas were applied for, and obtained, more than five years after the rendition of the judgments.
    Warden, for the plainti.ff.
    It is the judgment which fixes the sum that is due, and the whole damage is to be computed at the time of the rendition thereof. The public ought not to have interest and damages too. That the doctrine will be inconvenient, and will overturn a great many judgments, is no argument against the positive law of the case. The mischief has already begun to be redressed ; the General Court has altered its practice, and now render rightly their judgments in such cases.
    The next question is, whether as the judgments were above five years standing at the time of awarding the writs, the plaintiff is barred by any statute of limitations from taking advantage of the error? The acts of Assembly, upon the subject, do not apply to judgments of the General 195 Court. For *they all speak of District, County, or other Inferior Courts; and, do not mention the General Court at all, until the act of 1792, concerning this Court, which being posterior to these judgments, could not abridge the right which the plaintiff already had to obtain writs of supersedeas to them. For, that would be unconstitutional, and so was the opinion of this Court in the case of Turner v. Turner’s ex’x. [1 Wash. 139,] upon the act of 1787, for amending the act concerning fraudulent gifts of slaves.
    Brooke, Attorney General, contra.
    The act of assembly refers to the practice of the District Courts in granting writs of error and supersedeas to the judgments of inferior Courts. According to which, no writ of supersedeas can be issued after five years, either by the act of 1792, or that of 1778. The 15th section of the act of 1792, concerning this Court, expressly enumerates the General Court amongst the others; and subjects it to the practice of the District Courts. Therefore, as' these judgments were above five years standing, no writs of supersedeas ought to have issued.
    As to the other point. It is right, that a man having mon’ey in his hands- should pay interest on it. By his bond, he was to collect and pay into the treasury, and failing to do so, he became debtor; and interest attached. It was urged that the damages were not ascertained till the judgment; but the returns fixed it. The inconveniences of disturbing these judgments will be very great; for, all the judgments of-the General Court, prior to these writs, are entered so, and some regard is justly due to such long practice.
    Warden, in reply.
    The act of 1792, upon the subject of writs of error, has the word principles, which don’t relate to time, but the mode of proceeding. As to the other point, interest was not due till the rendition of the judgment.
    
      
      Writ of Supersedeas — Statute of Limitations — Construction. — The principal case is cited in Overstreei y. Marshall. 3 Call 192, for the proposition that, the five years mentioned in the District Court law, R. C. p. 88, applies to writs of supersedeas from the appellate court, as well as from the district courts.
      The principal case is further cited in this connection in Hite v. Wilson, 2 H. & M. 287 ; Fisher v, Duncan, 1 H. & M. 575 ; Templeman v. Steptoe, 1 Munf. 346.
      Construction of Statutes — Rule Stated. — The principal case is cited 'in Hutchinson v. Kellam, 3 Munf. 207, for the proposition that, in construing statutes, it is proper, that all acts inpari materia, though some of them may be out of force, are to be consulted in forming a conclusion.
      Same — Court of Appeals Law. — The principal case is cited in Tomlinson v. Dillard, 3 H. & M. 204, for the proposition that the‘words “in the same manner, and on the same principles” contained in the Court of Appeals law, (See this law set forth in opinion of PendI/Kton, P., in the principal case,) are to be construed to embrace the period of limitation, provided for suing out writs of supersedeas, to the judgment of district courts, and to adopt it in relation to judgments rendered in the general court.
      The principal case is further cited on this point in Tomlinson v. Dillard, 3 H. & M. 207.
      Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals — Construction of Statute. — The principal case is cited with approval in Hutchinson v. Kellam, 3 Munf. 214.
      Legislative Power — Remedies.—The principal case is cited in Day v. Pickett, 4 Munf. 109, for the proposition that the legislature has power to act upon remedies, in cases in which the legislative intention is clearly expressed, and in which, also, such interference does not in effect destroy the right of the parties.
      In Elliott v. Lyell, 3 Call 281, the court, in discussing the principal case, said : “That decision neither affected the right, or the remedy ; it only imposed a limitation of time, by construction of law, within which the remedy should be asserted. None of the fundamental principles in question were invaded by that decision.”
    
   PENDLETON, President.

It can never be necessary to labor that point. 196 It is clear, that interest *was not recoverable till the rendition of the judgment.

Upon a succeeding day of the term, the Court delivered their opinion to the following effect.

ROANE, Judge. These cases will go off, in my opinion, on this point, whether the writs of supersedeas did not improvidently and irregularly issue, as being beyond the limitation prescribed by law in such cases?

The judgments were all of them rendered in the General Court, prior to the commencement of the operation of the District Court law of 1788; [c. 67, 12 Stat. Larg. 730,] which law'has a clause to this effect: [§ 86.] “That no supersedeas or writ of error shall be granted to any judgment in the District, County, or other inferior Court, after the expiration of five years from the date, in case of judgments hereafter to be obtained; or, after the first day of January, 1793, in case of judgments already obtained,” with the usual saving to infants, feme coverts, &c.

The District Court law of 1792, [c. 14, 13 Stat. Larg. 427,] omits the provision in the law just stated, respecting judgments already obtained, i. e. prior to December, 1788, not because unconstitutional to have made it, but because it was wholly unnecessary to insert it; inasmuch as the act of 1788, which gave time for a supersedeas in the case of judgments already obtained, till the first of January, 1793, was to be in force till that time, the new law having a suspending clause till the first of January, 1793. And there was no reason for extending a time, which a former Assembly thought sufficient as to those prior judgments, and which, even from the date of that law, (though many judgments were then of considerable standing,) w'as nearly as long as that prescribed by the same law, in case of judgments in future.

But it is objected, that the limitation of that law, as applied to existing judgments, is unconstitutional. I answer, that it takes from the party no right but that of overhauling judgments after a con-197 siderable *lapse of time, to the great disturbance' and injury of the public; that, ón the other hand, it operates as an invitation to a party speedily to come forward and assert his right, if he has any, and is only an accelleration of the Courts of Justice; and that, if the objection is valid, it would perhaps equally lie,-which was never pretended, against the limitation, in case of future judgments, arising on claims prior to the act; as a judgment does not originate, but only ascertains a right. But what is equally conclusive with me, is, that the power exercised by the Legislature, and now in question, is one which even Courts of Law, of their own mere authority, have often exercised, bj- shutting the door to a stale assertion of right. An instance of this kind is to be found in the Winchelsea Causes, 4 Burr. 1963, in which the Court of King’s Bench determined, that after twenty years unimpeached possession of a franchise, in a corporation, the Court will not oblige a person in possession, to show by what right he holds it: A decision, which was founded on the inconvenience oí having rights disturbed after a great lapse of time, and dictated, as to the particular length of time, by an analogy to other cases of limitation.

If, then, the- right to review judgments given in District Courts, prior to the commencement of the District Court law of 1788, ceased on the first of January, 1793, how does the case stand with respect to judgments given in the General Court during the same period? i. e. how does the law in this particular affect the cases at bar?

The act constituting the Court of Appeals, which passed upon the 26th day of October, 1792, [c. 11, 13 Stat. Larg. 405,] and was in force from that time, has a provision to this effect: [§ 14.] Appeals, writs Of error and supersedeas may be granted, heard and determined, by the Court of Appeals, 'to or from any final decree or judgment of the High Court of Chancery, General Court, or District Courts, in the same manner, and on the same principles, as appeals, writs of error and supersedeas are granted, heard and determined, 198 by the *High Court of Chancery and' District Courts, to judgments, &c. of the County Courts.

If this act had passed on the same day,' or even in the same session with the District Court law of 1788, no person could have' doubted that it would have embraced, as to General Court judgments, the limitation therein prescribed for writs of supersedeasin the District Courts; 1st. Because the words, I think, are sufficiently comprehen-' sive, and, 2d. Because there is a very strong presumption, that the Legislature of a country would mean to extend equally to' all Courts, a limitation of this kind; and, especially, could never be supposed to have intended to exempt alone the judgments of that Court, which administers, in a peculiar manner, the fiscal jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.

We well know, that it is so desirable a thing to have an equal measure of limitation in different Courts of the same country, that Courts of Equity, of their own authority, have adopted the statute of limitations as a positive rule; and apply it, by parity of reason, to cases not within it,

Notwithstanding, however, the strong reason supposed to be on the mind of the Legislature in this respect, it so happened, that adequate words were not used to extend the limitation to judgments of the General Court, until October session, 1792; when the system of our Courts underwent a revision, and the Legislature enacted a clause of the Court of Appeals law above mentioned.

At the time of the enacting and commencement of this last act, the law of 1788, was in force, and for some time after. The former act, therefore, may well be considered as expressly referring to the latter, and adopting all its provisions in this respect ; and, even had the latter been then expired, it is a general rule, that all acts in pari materia, though some of them may be out of force, are to be consulted in forming a conclusion depending upon more than one of them.

I have said, that the words of the 199 Court of Appeals *law are, in themselves, with the reference just stated, sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the cases at bar. They are, that “appeals, writs of error and supersedeas, may be granted, heard and determined by the Court of Appeals, to and from any final decree or judgment of the High Court of Chancery, General Court and District Courts, in the same manner and on the same principles as appeals, writs of error and supersedeas, are to be granted, heard and determined by the High Court of Chancery and District Courts, to and from any final decree or judgment of a County, City or Borough Court.” Now, if it were asked, on what principle a supersedeas was refused, would I speak improper, if I said on the principle of its being barred by length of time? And, vice versa, might I not say, that a supersedeas was granted on these principles? 1st. That the judgment to which it related was erroneous; and 2d. That a supersedeas was applied for in due time.

If, however, in grammatical strictness, there be a doubt in this particular, yet, certainly a liberal construction of the words would extend to this case; for, clearly, the Legislature must have meant to include all Courts, and emphatically the General Court, for the reasons I have stated.

And, it ought not to be lost sight of, that if the limitation now in question does not embrace the cases at bar; that is to say, the case of judgments prior to October, 1788, there is no Legislative limitation whatever, of any past or future judgments of the General Court, but that Court is, in this respect, entirely pretermitted; and, consequently, all that confusion and inconvenience will follow, which would arise from reviewing at very distant periods, and reversing, perhaps, many judgments relative to transactions which our government has supposed, and certainly must have wished, to be perfectly closed.

Eor these reasons, I think the writs of supersedeas ought to be quashed.

*ELEMING, Judge. By the act of 1792, appeals, writs of error and supersedeas, are to be granted, heard and determined by this Court, to decrees and judgments of the High Court of Chancery, General Court and District Courts, in the same manner, and on the same principles, as appeals, writs of error and supersedeas, are to be granted, heard and determined by the High Court of Chancery and District Courts, to and from any final decree or judgment of a County, City or Borough Court. It is, therefore, to be seen how they are to be obtained in those Courts. The act; of 1788 prescribes as well a mode of obtaining and conducting them, as the principles upon which they are to be granted. The mode relates to the petition, the certificate by counsel, application to a Judge, or the Court, and the giving bond for performance in case of affirmance. The principles are the causes of granting them, and every other thing not relating to the mere forms of proceeding; as, for instance, the limitation of time, jurisdiction of the Court, and other things of that kind. And, by this law, no supersedeas was to be granted to any such judgment, after five years from the rendition thereof, in the case of future judgments, or after the first day of January, 1793, in the case of past judgments. Now, apply the first mentioned act to the directions of this, and it is impossible to resist the inference: for, this Court is to grant writs of supersedeas upon the same principles and under like limitations and restrictions with the District Courts: but, those Courts cannot grant them after five years; and, therefore,'necessarily, no more than this. The acts, when fairly considered, do not take away any right, but merely prescribe limits to the time of asserting it, like all other acts of limitation: which are made for the sake of quieting rights, and putting an end to litigation after a great length of time. The plaintiff has, indeed, sustained an injury from the error, which the Legislature, on application, will, perhaps, relieve him against; but the Court cannot.

CARRINGTON, Judge.

Concurred,

'"PENDLETON, President. On Dec. 14th, 1786, two judgments were entered against Mr.” Gaskins, as Sheriff of Northumberland: One for the revenue tax, the other for the certificate tax, collected in 1785. Two other judgments are entered against the same Sheriff for like taxes in 1787; and, in all of them 15 per cent, damages are allowed; and, interest on them, as well as on the principal, from days preceding those on which the judgments were entered.

This was contrary to the revenue act of 1782; [c. 8,, 11 Stat. Larg. 112,] severe enough in itself, since by that act the principal and damages were to form an aggregate ; on which, interest was to run from the time of the judgment until paid, similar to judgments on protested bills. How this mistake crept into the judgments of the General Court, is not accounted for; but, whoever discovered it, and interposed to stop its progress, did a meritorious act, to prevent future injustice. If we were at liberty to decide upon the merits, I am inclined to think, we should not have been restrained ‘from reversals, by the arguments of the Auditor and Attorney General, drawn from the bonds and the inconvenience of unravelling so many judgments.

The latter was a proper consideration with the Legislature, when they were contemplating the propriety of shutting the door against the correction of stale judgments, They have by their laws, interdicted all Appellate Courts, this as well as others, from hearing appeals from judgments which have rested five years.

The last of these judgments was in April, 1788, the supersedeas in' October, 1794, (six and a half years after,) and by the District Court law of 1792, l 52, [13 Stat. Larg. 446,] no supersedeas of writ of errof shall be granted to judgments in their own or Superior Courts, after five years from the date.

The counsel objected, that this' law could not ’ have a retrospective operation upon • • prior judgments, as'the present were; 202 -not recollecting, that *the District ■ ■ Court law of 1788, has the same clause, providing for prior judgments, which are left open until January, 1793; which was neither unconstitutional or unreasonable.

The Court of Appeals law- is, that writs of error and supersedeas may be granted, heard and determined in this Court, in the same manner and on the same principles, as they are to be granted, heard and determined in the District Courts, to judgments of Inferior Courts.

The counsel said, this only respected the mode of proceeding, and did. not reach the limitation. But, if by law, it could not be granted in • a similar case in the District Court, (and that is made the standard of this Court for manner and principles,) it is clear it could not be granted here.

The Court are concerned, at having, by granting the writ, drawn the party into expense. However, it was done at his request, passed in silence, and was not attended to. We think with Mr. Warden, that error, when discovered, should be abandoned and not persisted in ; and, according to a precedent in this Court, in October, 1783, in Maze v. Hamilton, quash the writ of supersedeas as improperly granted, but without costs.  