
    ATOCHA'S CASE. The United States, ex Parte.
    (8 Court of Claims R., p. 427; 17 Wallace R., p. 439.)
    
      On the defendants’ motion for a Mandamus.
    
    
      By the treaty of Guaddlupe-Sidalgo the United States relinquish all previous demands of their citizens and engage to satisfy them to am amount not exceeding $3,250,000. A hoard of commissioners is established by statute to examine the claims. The claimant presents his claim to the commission and it is rejected. When the hoard is dissolved a balance of ike Mexican indemnity fund remains in the Treasury of the United States. A private act is passed directing the Court of Claims to examine this claim, and if found to be a “just one against Mexico, to fix and determine tire amount of the same," with a proviso thatthe amount so tobe paid shall inno event exeeedthe balanceof thefundremain ingin the Treasury. Subsequently another private aet is passed, authorizing the court to use the evidence taken by the commission. The court below decides that the suit must be regarded as against Mexico, and not as against the United States, and it renders judgment for the claimant and allows interest on the claim in the same manner and-at the same rate as was alloioed by the commission. The defendants seek to appeal, but the court below refuses an allowance of appeal upon the same ground. The defendants llweupon apply to the Supreme Court for a mandamus. A rule nisi is alloioed, and the courtbelow returns the foregoing facts.
    
    Where a claim for which the United States are not primarily liable, arising out of its treaty relations with a foreign power, is referred to the Court of Claims by a private act, no appeal lies from the judgment, unless i t he given by the express terms of the act. The appeal given by the Amended Court of Claims Act (12 Stat. L., p. 765, § 5) to either party, and by the Act 25lh June, I860, (15 Stat. L., p. 75, § 1,) to the Government, are both limited to cases coming within the ordinary jurisdiction of the court, and not to a matter referred to the court by Congress for the ascertainment of a particular fact to guide the Government in the. execution of its treaty stipulations.
    
      The Reporter’s statement of the case:
    The facts upon which this application was founded fully appear • in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
    
      Mr. Attorney-General Williams, Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Hill, and Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Goforth for the relat-ors.
    The judgment of the court in this cause has the form and all the characteristics of a judgment. The reference hy the act of Congress was to- the Court of Claims, and not to the judges thereof. The court was to adjudicate and determine, and the defendant was to pay out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, with a proviso fixing a limit to the amount. The court sat as a court, and the defendants were brought into court as defendants, and to the amount o.f their judgment were interested in their proceedings. The judgment against the defendants was to be paid by the defendants out their own Treasury. The money, if not paid upon this judgment, will remain in the Treasury, and be subject to other appropriations. The court was not sitting as a Mexican commission, and Mexico has no interest in this judgment. She is neither the richer nor the poorer for it. She was not consulted before the reference, and is not a party to it afterward. The indemnity fun d was retained to indemnify up to its amount, and was not an unpaid balance, subject to future settlement and payment of balance to Mexico.
    The right of appeal from the decisions of the Court of Claims is exercisable in all cases, except where it is withheld. (United States v. Adams, 6 Wall., 103; Klein's Case, 7 C. Cls. E. p. 240.) In this case it is not only not withheld, but it is expressly provided for by the Acts of March 3, 1863, and June 28,1868. The former, antedating this reference, provides “ that either party may appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from any final judgment or decree which may hereafter be rendered in any case where the amount is over $3,000.” The United States was certainly a party, and, as such, have a right to their appeal, given by the same law that made the court.
    The cases under the “Captured and abandoned property act” are somewhat analogous to this. There the United States is the trustee for the true owner, and the submission of those cases was very much stronger toward the claimant’s view than the language of this reference, and it was contended there that the decisions of the Court of Claims was not reviewable; but this court decided otherwise. Fxparte Zellner, (7 0. Oís. É., p. 137.)
    In United States v. Ferreira, (13 How., 40,) an appeal was ashed for from the report of the judge of the district court for the northern district of Florida, and arose under the following state of facts:'
    No tribunal named or mode of redress indicated in treaty.
    The act of Congress to carry this into effect, March 3,1819, (3 Stat. L., p. 7G8,) authorized and directed the judges of the supreme court, at Saint Augustine and Pensacola, to receive and adjust all claims within their jurisdiction, agreeably to the provisions of said treaty.
    
      “ Sec. 2. In all cases of decisions for claimants, the decisions, with the evidence on which they are founded, shall be reported by the judges to the Secretary of the Treasury, who, being satisfied that same is just and equitable, and within provisions of treaty, shall pay amount,” &o.
    
    The acts of Congress vested no power beyond that of an accountant in the judges of either the territorial or United States courts. Everything, from evidence to conclusion, was to be sent to the Secretary of the Treasury that he might decide. The judge was but his clerk.
    If the reference of Atochaos Case to the Court of Claims was to be submission to another tribunal sitting as a Mexican commission, then it was without notice to Mexico, is not within the proviso of the treaty,and is illegal and void. “If it acts at all,' it must act under authority of law, and must obey the law.” It can only be a reference to the Court of Claims as a court.
    The act of reference prescribed no form of judgment to be entered by the Court of Claims. The petition of Atocha prays, in the usual form, for judgment against the United States. The Court of Claims enters that which is in effect and substance a judgment against the United States. If any set phraseology or form of words is necessary to technically enter judgment, then we ask the court to issue a mandamus, directed to the Court of Claims, that the judgment may be clothed in proper and appropriate language, and reviewable by this court.
    
      Mr. B. M. Gomvine and Mr. Bdward Janin for respondent:
    No appeal is allowable by law in this case. The jurisdiction is derived from and wholly referable to this special act. No general jurisdiction conferred upon the court by other acts is invoked j on the contrary, the act contains within itself all the power and authority necessary to fully consider and finally dispose of the case, even to the payment of the amount found to be due. It leaves nothing to be done outside of the act itself. It is as if Congress had said, we appoint the judges of the Court of Claims a commission like unto the one we did create to consider like claims, (9 Stat. L., pp. 393, 394,)'and clothe them with like powers, and the award of said judges shall be treated and paid like the awards of said commission were paid, excepting only that in the latter case they were paid in “ certificates of stock,” bearing 6 per cent, interest; whereas in the former., they are paid in money out of the Treasury. Congress specifies the particular fund out of which the award shall be paid, and is particular to limit the payment to the balance that may remain of the sum set apart by the fifteenth article of the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo. It may take the whole of that balance but cannot take more.
    But it is said that the first section of the Act of June 25,1868, authorizes the appeal. We submit, with all deference, that such a view is erroneous. If that law embraced all special cases wherein the jurisdiction is circumscribed, and the powers of the court confined within the narrowest limits, we submit that this case is not embraced in it, but expressly exclitded from it by the terms of the act. This is not a proceeding, much less a “judgment, adverse to the United States. There was no controversy with the United States; there was no question of dispute between the United States and claimant. The United States, by the fifteenth article of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, had agreed to appropriate, and did appropriate, three and a quarter million dollars to pay her own citizens for damages done to them and their property by the authorities of Mexico, according to the awards of the commission to be appointed. This was a treaty stipulation, made in pursuance of the settlement by that treaty of all matters of dispute between the two governments; so that the sum set apart by that article was so set apart to pay the debts of Mexico, and was a trust-fund for that purpose, and consequently the money of Mexico held by the United States. The United States agreed to audit the claims and disburse the fund. Beyond that, they had no further interest in it.
    The claim of Atocha was not settled. Hence, Congress creates another tribunal, clothed with similar powers, to consider Atocha’s claim. Although the new tribunal is the court of Claims, the duties thus cast upon it are not j udicial functions, to be exercised in the ordinary powers of a court of justice. There is nothing in the act which makes these proceedings adversary, which requires process to be served on any one, as a party to the suit, which requires the United States to appear in said cause and resist the claim or which requires any pleadings to be filed other than the presentation of the claim itself; neither is there any form prescribed in which it shall be presented. Manifestly it was not intended to be a judicial proceeding wherein the forms of a suit at law or a proceeding in chancery were to be observed and followed. The court were to award, as were, also, the commission, the amount of damages according to the terms of the treaty, and within the circumscribed limits of the special act of Congress.
    
      Mr. John J. Weed and Mr. W.Penn Clarice also filed a printed argument for respondent:
    The act by which the said court was authorized to take jurisdiction of this casé is as follows :
    “That the Court of Claims be, and the said Court is hereby, directed to examine into the claims of Alexander J. Atocha against the government of Mexico, for losses sustained by him by reason of his expulsion from that republic in 1845; and if they shall be of opinion that the said claim was a just one agaiust Mexico, when the treaty of 1848 was ratified, and was embraced by said treaty, they shall then fix and determine the amount of the same; and that, the loss or damage so sustained being adjudicated and determined by said court, the same shall be paid to the said Alexander J. Atocha, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated: Provided, however, That the amount so to be paid shall in no event exceed the balance of the three and a quarter million dollars provided by the fifteenth article of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo for the payment of claims of citizens of the United States against the government of Mexico, which still remains unapplied to that object.” — (13 Stat. L., p. 505.)
    The Court of Claims, in execution of the requirements of the said act of Congress, on the 26th day of May, A. D. 1873, announced the following conclusions of law: 1. That the claim of the said Atocha forand on account of his expulsion from Mexico was a just claim against Mexico when the treaty of 1848 was ratified; 2. That said claim was embraced by said treaty; 3. That the claimant is entitled to have allowed her, as administratrix of said Atocha, the amount of damages fixed and determined by the court.
    
      It is clear that the appellate jurisdiction, of this court is subject to statutory regulation. Congress may either confer or withhold from this Court appellate jurisdiction in any case or in any class of cases. — Duromseau v. United States, (6 Crunch,, p. 307;) Wiseart v. Pouchy, (3 Dallas, p. 321;) Sarehet v. United States, (12 Peters, p. 143.)
    . The act'of Congress by which the Court of Claims acquired jurisdiction of this case did not give any right of appeal from the adjudication of said claim or the award rendered thereon. And unless such appeal is conferred by the fifth section of the Act of Congress, approved March 3,1863, (12 Stat. L., pp. 765, 766,) or by the first section of the Act of Congress, approved June 25, 1868,. (15 Stat. L., p. 75,) then the Court of Claims were justified in refusing the application for the allowance of said appeal, and its return to the alternative writ must be held to be sufficient.
    In such a case the right of appeal is not conferred as an in-. cident of the special jurisdiction or power, nor can the general laws giving the right of appeal from judgments of the Court of Claims adverse to the United States be invoked to sustain such an appeal. The case of the United States v. Nourse (6 Peters, pp. 493-, 494) is an authority in support of this proposition.
    Nor is the right of appeal, in the case under consideration, at all aided by the decision of this court in the case of Zellner, ex Parte, (9 Wall., p. 244.) In that case the court held .that the right of appeal was conferred by the fifth section of the Act of March 3, 1863, (amendatory of the act for the organization of the Court of Claims,) because the Act of March 12,1863, by which that court was authorized to examine the claims of the owners of abandoned or captured property, was a general act enlarging the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, and prescribed to it no special proceedings by tvhich the cases embraced by the enlarged jurisdiction should be heard or determined. But it is. evident that this decision would have been otherwise had the jurisdiction been a limited or special one, or had the Court of Claims been limited by Congress as to the manner in which the-new or enlarged jurisdiction should be exercised.
    Congress seemed to have regarded the unexpended balance of this fund remaining in the possession of the United States as. the rightful property of Mexico, unless it should be absorbed in the payment of this claim, for it expressly limits the amount which the Court of Claims may award in satisfaction of the-claim of Atocba to, “the balance of the three and a quarter million dollars,provided by the fifteenth article of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo for thepayment ofclaims of citizens ofthe United States against the government of Mexico which still remain unapplied to that object.TheAetofJune‘25,1868, was passed to give the United States the right of appeal in the cases over which the Court of Claims acquired jurisdiction by the third section of the Act of March 12,1863. The Court of Claims had refused to allow an appeal prayed by theUnited States from a judgment rendered under that act, and it was to provide for appeals' in that class of cases that this act was passed. It was passed before the decision in the case of Zellner, but since the decision in that case it would seem to be without any force, because all the rights intended to be given by it are secured by the fifth section of the Act of March 3,1863. It results, therefore, that this appeal cannot be allowed, for the following reasons: 1st, Because the act conferring the jurisdiction is a special act, prescribing a special mode of examination, and limiting the court in its power to award indemnity to a sum not exceeding a certain amount. 2d, Because the finding of the Court of Claims was in no sense a judgment, bnt only an award, which, by the terms of the act conferring the jurisdiction, was final and conclusive. 3d, Because the claim of Atocha, which the Court of Claims was “ directed ” to examine, was a •claim against Mexico, and the award is payable out of funds which theUnited States hold in trust for Mexico, and the award is not therefore adverse to the United States.
    This case is analogous in principle to that of United States v. Ferriera, (13 How., p. 40.) In that case Ferriera had neglected to prosecute his claim within the time prescribed in the act of 1834, and Congress, by an act approved March 3, 1849, authorized and directed the United States district judge for the northern district of Florida to receive and adjudicate the claim of the said Ferriera and others. Under the authority of this act the district judge adjudicated the claim, and made an award against the United States.
    To this effect and in recognition of these principles are the following cases: United States v. Ritchie, (17 How., 525, 531;) United States v. The Circuit Judges, (3 Wall., 673.)
    The proposition for which we are contending here is much strengthened by the provisions of the act amendatory of the act for the relief of the said Atocha, approved April 5,1870, which authorized the use in the Court of Claims, by either party, “of such portions of the evidence taken in pursuance of the rules and regulations of the commission, * * * and laid before said commission, as consists of the evidence of persons since deceased.” (16 Stat. L., p. 033.)
    It will not be denied that if Congress had repealed section 9. of the act approved March 3, 1863, and conferred upon the Court of Claims jurisdiction of claims “ growing out or dependent upon treaty stipulations,” that an appeal could be prosecuted from all judgments rendered in such cases. But the repeal of that section of the statute would not in any way have benefited Atocha, because if he had filed his petition, as any other claimant, in the Court of Claims, having a claim against the United States, he would have met with the plea that his" case was res adjudieata, and that the decision of the board of commissioners upon his claim was final and conclusive. This is clear from the principles decided in the case of Comegys v. Vasse, (1 Peters, 212.)
    These principles are expressly re-affirmed in the case of Meade v. The United, States, (7 O. Cls.K. p. 161.) In that case, the-act conferring'jurisdiction provided that the claim should be referred to the Court of Claims for adjudication thereof pursuant to-authority conferred upon said court dy any existing law to examine and decide claims against the United States.
    
   Mr. J ustice Field

delivered the opinion of the court:

By the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, made on the 2d of February, 1848, between the United States and Mexico, the United States exonerated Mexico from all demands of their citizens which had previously arisen, and had not been decided against • that government, and engaged to satisfy them to an amount not exceeding three and one-quarter million dollars. They also stipulated for the establishment of a board of commissioners to ascertain the validity and amount of the claims, and provided that its awards should be final. (9 Stat. L., p. 933,. Arts. XIV and XV of the treaty.)

In execution of this stipulation, Congress, on the 3d of March, 1849, passed an act creating a board of commissioners to examine the claims, and provided for the payment of its awards, or-¡a proportional part thereof, from the amount designated in the treaty. The act required the board to terminate its business within two years from the day of its organization. (Ibid., 393.)

To this board Alexander J. Atocha, a naturalized citizen of the United States, presented a claim against the government •of Mexico for losses sustained by reason of his expulsion from that country in 1845. In the prosecution of his claim evidence was taken and laid before the board, but whether it was acted upon, and what proceedings were subsequently taken, we are not informed by the record. For aught that appears the claim may not have been prosecuted to a final determination; it may have fallen from the expiration of the board, or it may have been rejected on its merits. It is immaterial, so far as the present inquiry is concerned, what its fate was before the board. If rejected, the United States were the only party to insist upon the finality of the determination. Mexico was released from the claim, and it did not concern her what consideration the United States might choose to give to it, so long as other claimants against her were not in consequence denied payment of their demands, and there is no pretense that such was the case. On the contrary, a balance remained of the amount designated in the treaty after the satisfaction of the awards made. And on the 14th of February, 1865, Congress passed a special act for the relief of Atocha, and by it directed the Court of Claims to exaiiiine into his claim, and provided that if the court was of opinion that the claim -was a just one against Mexico -when the treaty of 1848 was ratified, and was embraced by that treaty, it should “fix and determine” its amount, and declared that the loss or damage sustained by him, thus adjudicated and determined, should be paid out of any money iii the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, subject only to the condition that the amount did not exceed the unapplied balance of the sum designated in the treaty. (13 Btat. L., p. 595.)

The claim was accordingly brought, in pursuance of the act, before the Court of Claims for examination and determination. To aid in its examination Congress passed, on the 5th of April, 1870, an amendatory act authorizing Atocha in the prosecution of his claim, and the government in defending against it, to use such portions of the eiddence taken in pursuance of the rules and regulations of the commission established under the treaty as consisted of tire testimony of persons since deceased, and declared that the court should give to .this evidence, so far as its subject-matter was competent, such, weight as, in the judgment of the court, under all the circumstances, it ought to have. (16 Ibid., p. 633.)

On the 26th of May, 1873, the Court of Claims rendered its decision, reciting that, having examined into the claim in pursuance of the act of Congress, it announced that it was of opinion that the claim was a just one against Mexico when the treaty of 1848 was ratified and was embraced by that treaty, and “fixed and determined” the amount of the loss and damage sustained by Atocha by reason of his expulsion from that country at the sum of $207,852.60, and declared that this sum would be satisfied and discharged by the payment by the United States to Eliza J..Atocha, who is the administra-trix of the estate of the original claimant, of the balance remaining unapplied of the sum designated in the treaty, which was a few hundred dollars less than the amount awarded.

From this decision the Attorney-General applied for an appeal on behalf of the United States. The application was denied, the Court of Claims being of opinion that no appeal was by law allowed in the case. On motion of the Attorney-General, an alternative writ of mandamus was directed to the judges of that court to allow the appeal. In their return the judges refer to the special act under which the Court of Claims heard the case, and place their refusal on the ground, substantially, that the court acted not under any general grant of jurisdiction, but under the limited authority prescribed by that act; that it was the intention of Congress that the court should proceed, not as a court trying an action against the United States, but as a commission similar to that provided by the treaty; that no claim against the United States was submitted to its adjudication; that in the absence of any provision in the special act for an appeal none would lie, unless some other provision of law authorized it; and that the provisions contained in the general Acts of March 3, 1863, and June 25, 1868, in relation to appeals from judgments of the Court of Claims, did not apply, as the first act only gave an appeal from judgments on claims against the United States, and the second act from judgments adverse to the United States.

Upon this return, as upon a demurrer to its sufficiency, the Attorney-General asks for a peremptory mandamus.

The question for determination is, whether, under the acts of Congress investing the Court of Claims with general jurisdiction to hear and determine claims, an appeal lies from its decision in this case. If an appeal is authorized, it must be by the provisions of the Act of March 3,1863, amending the act establishing the Court of Claims, or of the Act of June 25, 1868, providing for appeals from its judgments.

The original Act of February 24,1855, establishing the Court of Claims, gave it jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an Executive Department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government of the United States, which might be suggested to it by petition, and all claims which might be referred to the court by either House of Congress; but it did not authorize any appeal from the decisions of the court. It required the court to report to Congress the cases upon which it had finally acted and the material facts established by the evidence in each, with its opinion and the reasons upon which the opinion was founded. It was not until the passage of the Act of March 3,1863, that an appeal from its decisions was allowed. That act materially amended the original act, added two more judges, gave the court jurisdiction over set-offs and counter-claims, and authorized an appeal to the Supreme Court in all cases where the amount in controversy exceeded $3,000, and without reference to the amount where the case involved a constitutional question, or the judgment or decree affected a class of cases, or furnished a precedent for the future action of an Executive Department. But the act at the same time declared that the jurisdiction of the court should not extend to or include any claim against the Government not pending in the court on the 1st of December, 1862, growing out of or dependent on any treaty stipulation entered into with foreign nations or the Indian tribes. All the-cases of which the court could subsequently take cognizance, by either the original or amendatory act, were cases arising out of contracts or transactions between the Government or its officers, and claimants ; and in their decision the court was to be governed by those established rules of evidence which determine controversies between litigants in the ordinary tribunals of the country. Those acts have since then applied only to claims made directly against the United States, and for the payment of which they were primarily liable, if liable at all, and not to claims against other governments, the payment of which the United States had assumed or might assume by treaty.

The Act of June 25,1868, while allowing appeals on behalf of the United States from all final judgments of the Oonrt of Claims adverse to the United States, did not change the character of the claims of which that court could previously take cognizance. Claims under treaty stipulations are not brought within it, and when jurisdiction over such claims is conferred by special act, the authority of that court to hear and determine them, and of this court to review its action, is limited and controlled by the provisions of that act. In the case of Meade v. United States, the special act of Congress was passed to remove the restriction of the ninth section of the Act of 1863, and his claim was referred to the Court of Claims “ for adjudication thereof, pursuant to authority conferred upon said court by any existing law to examine and decide claims against the United States, referred to it by Congress.” (14 Stat. L., p. 661.) His claim was thus placed under the jurisdiction of the court equally as though the ninth section were not in existence.

In the present case, no such general reference was made of the claim of Atocha, nor was any such extended authority over it conferred. The court was directed to make a specific examination into the justice of the claim against Mexico, and whether it was embraced within the treaty; and if the court was of opinion that the claim was a just one and was embraced within the treaty, it was required “ to fix and determine” its amount, and when so determined, the act declares .that the amount shall be paid. The matter was referred to the court to ascertain a particular fact to guide the Government in the execution of its treaty stipulations. The court has acted upon the matter, and as no mode is provided for review of its action, it must be taken and regarded as final.

Our judgment is, that the return of the judges of the Court of Claims to the alternative writ is sufficient, and a peremptory mandamus is denied.  