
    FENG LIN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-134.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 28, 2014.
    Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Russell J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel; John D. Williams, Trial Attorney, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RICHARD C. WESLEY and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Feng Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 26, 2012, order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen proceedings. See In re Feng Li, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (BIA Dec. 26, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). We review the agency’s factual findings regarding country conditions under the substantial evidence standard. Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008). There is no dispute that Lin’s motion to reopen, filed in 2012, was untimely because the BIA issued a final order of removal in 2001. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (setting forth 90-day deadline for filing to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same).

To the extent Lin argues that her conversion to Christianity excuses the untimeliness of her motion to reopen, her conversion is a change in her personal circumstances, not a change in conditions in China as required to excuse the 90-day time limit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir.2006) (clarifying that limitations on motions to reopen may not be suspended because of a “self-induced change in personal circumstances” that is “entirely of [the applicant’s] own making after being ordered to leave the United States”).

Further, the agency did not err in finding that Lin failed to present sufficient evidence of changed conditions in China. First, the BIA was not required to credit Lin’s individualized evidence given the earlier adverse credibility determination. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir.2007). The agency also reasonably rejected Lin’s own statement, and those from her daughter and sister, as unsworn and/or submitted by interested parties. See Matter of H-L-H & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (BIA 2010) (rejecting affidavits from applicant’s friends and relatives because they were prepared by “interested witnesses”), remanded in part on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.2012). Further, Lin’s objective evidence of country conditions was unrelated to religious persecution or related to repression of religion in Hong Kong, Macau and Tibet, but not in her province of Fujian in mainland China.

Accordingly, nothing in the record compels the conclusion that there has been a material change in conditions in China, as required to overcome the time limitation. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a (c)(7)(C)(ii), 1252(b)(4)(B) (The BIA’s factual findings are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  