
    Charles W. Geekie vs. William B. Harbourd.
    
      Removal of Causes under the’ Constitution as modified by the Act of 1874, oh. 364—Appeals from judgments of Justices of the Reace not embraced in said Act.
    
    The provision in the Constitution relating to the removal of causes, as that provision has been altered by the amendment of 1874, ch. 364, does not extend to the case of an appeal from a justice of the peace pending in a Circuit Court.
    
      Appeal from the Circuit Court for Kent County.
    The appellant was sued by the appellee before a justice of the peace of Kent County, and judgment being rendered against him, he appealed to the Circuit Court. In that Court he applied for a removal of the case on the ground that he could not have a fair and impartial trial before a jury of Kent County. The Court, (Wicices and Stump, J.,) passed an order refusing the application, and the defendant appealed.
    The cause was submitted to Bartol, C. J., Brent, Grason, Miller, Alvey and Robinson, J.
    
      James A. Pearce, for the appellant.
    No counsel appeared for the appellee.
   Alvey, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The only question in this case is, whether the power of removal of causes, as given and limited by the Constitution, applies to the case of an appeal from a justice of the peace pending in a Circuit Court. The provision in the Constitution authorizing removals has never been construed as extending to cases of appeal pending in the Circuit Courts, and we are clearly of opinion that it has no application to them whatever. In the case of Hoshall vs. Hoffacker, 11 Md., 362, it was held that under the provision of the Constitution of 1851, then in force, in relation to removal of causes for trial, the Circuit Courts had no power to remove causes pending before them on appeal. That was a case of an appeal from an order of the County Commissioners pending in the Circuit Court; but the principle and reason of the decision are completely applicable to this case, and must be taken as conclusive of it. The provision in our present Constitution in relation to removal of causes, as that provision has been altered by the amendment of 1874, ch. 364, is substantially the same as that contained in the Constitution of 1851, so far as the nature and character of the causes or proceedings embraced by it, are concerned, except as to petitions for freedom, not mentioned in the present Constitution; and there can be no reason why the construction, in this respect, of the two clauses, should be different. See also Cooke vs. Cooke, 41 Md., 368.

(Decided 16th July, 1879.)

The order of the Court below must, therefore, be affirmed.

Order affirmed,

with costs.  