
    The Ordinary of Charleston District, vs. C. J. Steedman, Ex'or of B. Cudworth. Same, vs. Daniel Stevens.
    
      The lapse of twenty years will raise the presumption of performance of any other condition of a bond, as ivell as that for the payment of snoney.
    
    The above cases are presented upon one brief, because they were brought upon the same bond and depend upon the same evidence; being actions of debt on an administration bond, ¿signed by John Moncrief (who had taken the administration of the estate of one John Gaborial,) and also, by Daniel Stevens and Benjamin Cudworth above named; said bond bearing date, 19th March, 1785, in the penalty of £2000. The condition of bond was, that the said administrator should make or cause to be made a true inventory of said estate and exhibit the same into the Ordinary’s office.of this district, at or before the 19th June then next ensuing, and well and truly administer the same, according to law; also that he should make or cause to be made a true account of his administration, at or before the 19th March then next ensuing; and that the residue found remaining on said account (when examined and allowed by the Ordinary) he should deliver and pay, pursuant to the act of Parliament of 22nd and 23d, Charles 2nd, entitled “an act for the better settling of intestate’s estates.” The defendants craved oyer ©f the bend and pleaded performance; the plaintiff replied non-performance and set forth breaches in most of the-particulars mentioned in the condition.
    The plaintiff proved by Mr. Armstrong, clerk of the Ordinary, and Mr. Laval, Secretary of State, that diligent search hf¿d been made in their respective offices, and that no inventory whatever of the estate of said Gabo rial had been returned into either office, and that no record of any account of the ad ministration of said estate could be found in said offices; that the record of .the granting letters of administration of said estate to said Moncrief, were all that appeared.
    Upon the adduction of the original bond and the foregoing testimony, the plaintiff contended that he was entitled to recover’ the amount of the penalty; that ex necessitate rei, all the testimony that the nature of the case admitted was produced; that the administrator, Moncrief, having possessed himself of the whole of said estate, and being the only person acquainted with the extent and value, might or might not have returned an inventory thereof, as the same might have exceeded or fallen short of the penalty of the bond; being interested, if the value of the estate were less than the penalty, to make a return; but otherwise, if it exceeded it. The proof of his not having done so, raised a very strong presumption, (uncontradicted by any counter proof or presumption,) that the nett estate ivas worth-more than £2000.
    The presidingjndge charged the jury that in making up their verdict, they might legally regard the lapse of time since the date of the bond as evidence of performance of its condition, and also charged generally against the plaintiff. The jury found a verdict accordingly for defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed and moved for a new trial:
    1st. Because upon tiie evidence and the law of the cases, plaintiff was. entitled to a verdict for £2000, the penalty of the bond.
    2nd. Because under the plea of performance, the lapse of time could not avail the defendants, there being no pléa of sol-vit.std diem.-
    
      3rd. Because there was no proof whatever of performance by defendants,’ but on the contrary, clear proof by the plaintiff of breaches of the condition of the bond and damages sustained, which entitled the plaintiff to a verdict.
    4 th. Because the verdict was entirely without evidence to .support it and against both law and evidence.
   The opinion of the Court tons delivered by

Mr. Justice ‘JYott.

The only question in this case is, whether the judge below was correct, in instructing the jury that the performance of the covenants contained in the condition of the bond .might be presumed from the lapse of time. It is now well settled in this state that the lapse of twenty years is, perse, conclusive evidence of the payment1 of a bond conditioned for the payment of money; and whether a bond is to be discharged by the payment ■of a sum of money, or by doing any other act, can, in my view. make no difference m that respect. The presumption is as strong, that the act has been performed in one instance, as that the money has been paid in the other. Indeed, I think it is stronger, particularly in the case of bonds of a public nature. The performance of the duly does not affect his interest nor impair his estate like the payment of money. His interest therefore, consists in the faithful discharge of his duty. Neither are persons interested in the distribution of an estate, so much disposed to give indulgence to one who has the administration of it, as those to whom money is due, are to a person who is bound to pay out of Ins own estate. Besides, it is a maxim of law# « interest reipubliese ut sit finis litium.” There never would be and end to litigation, if any old paper sleeping in the desk of a public officer, may, after a lapse of nearly forty years, be dragged from its bed of repose, to disturb the peace of a family whicli lias never derived any benefit from it; and may perhaps not even know of its existence.

The presumption to be sure might have been rebutted by -tbe evidence of any fact which went to shew an existing demand; but no such thing was attempted. Mr. Moncrief, the adminis-tpr, has beep dead but a few years, yet no account of bis has been shewn, recognising his liability. No claim has been interposed by those entitled to the estate, if there is any. No en-quiry has been made by creditors or others interested in the administration. It is unreasonable to suppose that those who had so deep an interest in investigating the subject, would have, slept over their rights for such a length of time, while the administrator was in the quiet enjoyment of what belonged to them; and it would be still more unreasonable now, when he is dead and gone, to suffer a dormant claim which has groivn grey with age to be resuscitated againt his securities, who it cannot be expected have the means of defending themselves against it. I am of opinion^ therefore, that the motion ought to be refused.

Clark, for motion.

Pepoon, contra.

Bay, Colcock, Johnson, and Huger, Justices concurred.  