
    [Lancaster,
    May 24, 1824.]
    ROUD against GRIFFITH.
    IN ERROR.
    If] on an appealfrom a justice of the peace, the plaintiff’s declaration or statement, lay a cause of action, which accrued subsequently to the commencement of the suit before the justice, the judgment must be reversed on writ of error.
    Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster county, in an action brought by Thomas Griffith against Philip Roud, before a justice of the peace, who gave judgment for the plaintiff, for 94 dollars and 81£ cents, and costs, on the 2d Jlpril, 1817. The defendant appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, where the cause was tried, and the plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment for 53 dollars, with cdsts. In the Common Pleas, the plaintiff filed a statement of his cause of action, in which he claimed the sum of 96 dollars and 82 cents, “ for advice, assistance, medicine, and attendance on the defendant, as his physician, and at his special instance and request, when he got his foot broken, and during the cure of the same, from the 15th May, 1817, to the 1th July 1817.” Several errors were assigned in the record, of which it is necessary to state only the following, viz.
    That the5 cause of action laid in the plaintiff’s statement, accrued after the commencement of the suit before the justice.
    
      Porter, for the plaintiff in error.
    
      Hopkins, contra.
   Per Curiam.

One of the errors assigned in this case is, that the cause of action in which the plaintiff recovered, is subsequent to the time when he commenced his suit before the justice. I know not how this exception is to be answered. It appears by the plaintiff’s own showing, that when he commenced his action, the services for which he recovered in the Common Pleas, had not been performed. It is said by the plaintiff, that in contracts of this kind, the day laid in the declaration is not material. And that is true, provided it be laid, before the commencement of the action.. But if after, it is very material. The point has been expressly decided in three cases, cited by the counsel for the defendant; (Stewart v. M'Bride, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 202. Miller v. Ralston, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 309. and M‘Laughlin v. Parker, 3 Serg. & Rawle, 144.) It must therefore be considered as settled, and we can only express our regret, as we have done on similar occasions, that the judgment should be reversed, for what was probably only the slip of the clerk who drew the statement. There were several other questions argued, relative to costs, whieh it is unnecessary to decide, as it is the opinion of the court, that the judgment should be reversed.

Judgment reversed.1  