
    IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGED LUNACY OF DAVID ROGERS.
    1. A guardianship in lunacy may be superseded, on its being made tc appear that he who had been found lunatic, is restored to sanity.
    2. The usual course is, to refer it to a master to take proofs as to the state of mind of the petitioner, and to report the proofs and his opinion thereon. But though the master reports the proofs and his opinion thereon, that the petitioner is restored, the Chancellor, in his discretion, may direct the petitioner to appear before him for inspection and examination.
    3. The Chancellor, in his discretion, may discharge the guardianship, on the ground of restored sanity, or direct an issue to try the question.
    ' In 1843, a commission in the nature of a writ de lunático inquirendo, was issued, directed to commissioners therein named, to inquire of the lunacy of David Rogers. The commission was executed in 1843, and an inquisition returned, finding that said Rogers was a lunatic.
    In February, 1845, a petition was presented to the court by Rogers, supported by affidavits of different individuals, praying that his guardians may be discharged, and that the inquisition and the proceedings thereon may be vacated and set aside.
    An order was thereupon made, referring it to a master to inquire whether the said David Rogers is restored to his reason and understanding, and is of sound and disposing mind and memory.
    The master' made his report on the 8th of April, 1845, that the petitioner was restored to his reason and understanding, and was of sound and disposing mind and memory, and sent up the testimony on which his report was founded.
    This report was not satisfactory to the guardians, and the Chancellor directed an argument before him, and ordered that the petitioner be brought before the court for inspection and examination. This was done, and on that occasion he was subjected to a protracted examination, under the direction of the court, by questions propounded to him by his counsel and the counsel of the guardians.
    The matter of the petition was then argued on the testimony returned by the master, and the answers of the alleged lunatic to the questions which had been propounded to him.
    
      Stratton and H. W. Green, for the petitioner.
    
      Spencer and W. L. Dayton, for the guardians.
    Cases cited for the petitioner. 1 Collinson on Idiots 48, § 12; lb. 49, § 14; lb. 328, § 15; Saxton 24.
    Cases cited for the guardians. Shelford on Lunatics 43, 51, 206; 3 Brown’s Ch. Rep. 403; lb. 277, 441; 1 Eng. Eccl. Rep. 296; 4 lb. 186, 191; 13 Ves., Jr., 88; 11 lb. 11; 1 Collinson 324, § 3.
   The Chancellor.

I am clearly of opinion that, on the testimony and the inspection and examination of the petitioner, a final order should not be made against the prayer of the petition. The only doubt I have been able to entertain is, whether an issue should not be awarded. But, on consideration of the whole case, I am satisfied that a final order vacating (.he inquisition should be made. I do not propose to go at large into an examination of the testimony, or into a statement of the reasons which have brought me to this conclusion. It is a subject on which the ordinary rules of reasoning furnish no certain guide, and in reference to which, deductions apparently the most correct, are not to be relied on.

Is the petitioner now capable of managing his own affairs ? Looking at the testimony without reference to the finding of the inquisition, it is my decided opinion that he is so. What influence, then, should be allowed to the fact that, two years ago, he was found to be incapable ? It is certainly entitled to some influence, but not on the ground that, though sane now, he may again be, and perhaps is more likely to be afflicted in the same way. The court can act only in reference to his present state of mind; the future is inscrutable to us all.

The only influence it can properly exert on the mind of the court is, in causing apprehension that all the evidence of his restored sanity, derived from all the sources to which we may address ourselves, may, from the insidiousness of a distemper of the mind, be fallacious. This apprehension should influence the court to proceed with caution in vacating an inquisition. Yet there are frequent instances of restoration.

This brings us to the consideration, what degree of doubt the court should indulge, arising from the inquisition two years ago, against the idea of his present capability.

On one side it was contended that the present question should be determined without reference to the finding of the inquisition two years ago; that not only the future, but the past should be shut out. If mind is what some suppose it to be, this may be correct; but it is not consistent with my ideas of it, and of the laws that govern it.

On the other side, it was contended that the inquisition should not be vacated, unless the court be satisfied, beyond all doubt, of a permanent restoration of sanity. This may do when we come to be so well acquainted with the nature of mind as to be able to say of the mind of a sane individual, that he will, beyond all doubt, always remain sane.

I suppose it to be an approach to the true rule for the present action of the court to say that if, taking the finding of the inquisition as a part of the evidence to be considered, the court is satisfied of present capacity, the relief sought by the petition should be granted.

Looking at the whole case, the nature of the incapacity that onoe existed, or was supposed to exist, as described by the witnesses, the symptoms of which, as they say, were trading and driving about j and considering that for the last eight months, at least, the petitioner has had the management and control of his farming and other business, and that his own immediate family, whose interests are more at stake than those of any other person, are satisfied of his capacity to manage his affairs; and considering further, that if disease in this form should agaiu be laid on him, the guardianship of this court could again be extended over him and his property, I am of opinion that the relief sought by the petition should be granted.

Order accordingly.

Cited in Matter of Weis, 1 C. E. Gr. 319.  