
    Campbell v. Woodworth et al.
    
    The price at which goods were sold at public auction is some evidence, slight or cogent according to the circumstances, to be considered by the jury in arriving at their value.
    ■ Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at general term in the seventh district, affirming the judgment upon a verdict at circuit. The facts are stated in the following opinion. The case was submitted on printed arguments.
    
      Martin S. Newton, for the appellant.
    
      Selah Matheivs, for the respondent.
   Denio, J.

We think the evidence should have been received. In many cases the result of a forced sale of goods ought not to influence the jury in assessing the damages against a party who has wrongfully taken them—but in some other cases a sale at auction would afford high evidence upon a question of value. We understand that in the city of Hew York many kinds of. property are ordinarily disposed of in that way, and it seems that in Eochester it is not unusual to sell dry goods at auction, even where the owner is not forced to sell in that manner. In such cases as the present we think that the evidence of what the goods sold for at the auction should be received for the consideration of the jury, to be compared with the other eAridence of value that might be offered, and to be allowed such weight as the circumstances of the sale, and the degree of competition actually exhibited, should entitle it to. Lord Tenterden, Oh. J., seems to have acted at, nisi prim upon this rule, in Whitehouse v. Atkinson (3 Carr. & Payne, 344). The action was by the assignees of a bankrupt against a sheriff who had sold the goods on execution. He said to the jury: “With respect to the damages, a plaintiff is not bound by the sum at which goods have been sold at an auction; but where the plaintiff is an assignee who must have sold the goods if they had come to his hands before any sale by the sheriff, it often happens that the jury considers the sum at which they were actually sold at auction, as a fair measure of damages.”

The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial awarded.

Johnson, Ch. J., Comstock, G-ray and Grover, Js., concurred.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.  