
    John R. STASZAK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Randy LIND, Warden, CTCF; Cynthia H. Coffman, The Attorney General of the State of Colorado, Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 16-1078
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    FILED August 19, 2016
    John R. Staszak, Pro Se.
    John D. Seidel, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center, Denver, CO, for Respondents-Appellees.
    Before KELLY, McKAY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Monroe G. McKay, Circuit Judge

Mr, Staszak was convicted in Colorado court and sentenced to probation. A few years later, after violating the terms of his probation, he was given a new sentence: two concurrent twelve-year terms of imprisonment. Believing his new sentence was illegal, he filed this § 2254 petition.

The district court dismissed part of his petition without prejudice, recognizing that it raised only state law issues and could not be considered in a federal habeas case. It dismissed the rest of the petition with prejudice because it was time-barred.

Mr. Staszak does not challenge the first part of the district court’s ruling — its dismissal of state law claims without prejudice — and so we do not review it. But he does challenge the court’s application of the time bar. He argues that “[bjecause his sentence was ‘not authorized by law,’ it was never final and therefore no time bar exists.” (Appellant’s Br. at 3.) He supports this argument by quoting the Colorado Supreme Court: “If a sentence is not in full compliance with the sentencing statutes, it is an illegal sentence, and [the time period for the sentencing court to modify its sentence] does not begin to run until the defendant receives a legal sentence.” Delgado v. Colorado, 105 P.3d 634, 638 (Colo. 2005) (en banc).

But the Colorado Supreme Court does not control the statute of limitations for federal habeas- corpus petitions. Congress does. And Congress has established the date on which state prisoners’ sentences are considered final: “the date ... [of] the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). We are aware of no relevant exception to this rule, and Mr. Staszak has cited none.

Thus Mr. Staszak’s sentence became final on July 12, 2010. He was required to file this petition by July 12, 2011. He did not file it until October 8, 2015. He now complains that the district court should have treated him more leniently because he is not a lawyer, but the district court had no power to treat him more leniently. It had to dismiss his petition.

No reasonable jurist would question the district court’s ruling. Mr. Staszak’s application for a certificate of appealability is DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED. His motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. 
      
       This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
     
      
      . Additionally, to the extent that Mr. Staszak argues that the district court should have appointed an attorney, we see no reason to reverse the district court on this basis.
     