
    Lewis Harrell vs. Elias Kelly.
    Where a person obtains money fraudulently, the plaintiff is not bairei if he commence his action within four years after the fraud is discovered.
    Darlington district, Spring Term, 1823. — Tried before Mr. Justice Colcock.
    
    THIS was an action to recover the sum of one hundred dollars, which it was alleged the defendant had received from the sheriff of the district for the plaintiff, and had neVer paid it over. The evidence was that the defendant on being applied to for the money, at first denied that he had ever received it; but upon being told that the sheriff had his receipt, he said he had forgotten it, but was sure if he ever received it he had paid it over. The sheriff then produced the receipt, and stated, that in settling with the plaintiff about 18 months before this action was brought, the plaintiff denied he ever authorized the receipt of the money, and refused to allow the same ; but it was insisted on by him and acquiesced in. That the plaintiff had frequently sent for inone;/ in that way. The receipt was dated more than four years before the action was commenced.
    The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations, and the plaintiff relied on two grounds to prevent the operation of the statute :
    1st. That the money had been received fraudulently without his knowledge or consent, and
    2ndiy. That if it could be presumed that he consented, that it should then be considered as a trust.
    The defendant’s counsel contended that there was in fact no evidence of fraud.. That the defendant’s character ..stood fair, and that the plaintiff was in the habit of sending for money in that way, and that the jury ought to presume that if the money had been received, that it was paid over. That nothing was more common than sending for .money by a friend without any written order, and receive ing it without giving any receipt. Nor was it extraordinary that he should have forgotten such a circumstance after the lapse of four years. But that at all events he was entitled to the benefit of the act; for the doctrine contended for by the plaintiff’s counsel was a doctrine of equity and not of law.
    The presiding judge charged the jury that if they thought the money had been fraudulently obtained they should find for the plaintiff. That the doctrine of trusts had no application to the case, and that it was his opinion that on the facts, they were authorized to find for the defendant.
    The jury, however, found a verdict for the plaintiff, and a motion was now made to set aside the verdict, and fora new trial, on the ground that there was no evidence tp take the case out of the statute.
    
      
      Miller, for the motion.
    
      Evans, contra.
   Mr. Justice Colcocle

delivered the opinion of the court:

The jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff in this case, this court cannot interfere, although they may think that the verdict ought to have been for the defendant on the facts.

The finding determines that the money was fraudulently obtained, and in such case, if the plaintiff prosecute his claim within four years from the time the fraud is discovered, the ease is not barred. It would be a violation of every moral principle to permit a man thus to reap the fruits of his own wrong. The statute was not intended to work such mischief; it was meant to protect honest men from being compelled to pay their debts a second time ; and it is allowed to operate on the supposition that the defendant is paid. Nor is this doctrine confined to the Court of Equity alone. In 4 Bacon’s abr. 476, it is said, at law as well as in equity, if a plaintiff is prevented from obtaining a knowledge that he has a cause of action by a fraudulent concealment on the part of the defendant, he will not be barred by the statute if he commence his action within six years after the fraud is discovered ” And-this is supported by the case of Bree fy Holbcch, (Doug lass, 655,) and by the case of the Massachusetts Turnpike Corporation vs. Field, (3 Mass. T. Rep. 201.)

The motion is dismissed.

Justices Nott, Richardson and Johnson, concurred.

Mr. Justice Gantt dissented.  