
    102 P.3d 985
    STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Joel CASTANEDA, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 02-0066.
    Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department C.
    Dec. 21, 2004.
    Terry Goddard, Attorney General, By Randall M. Howe, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section and Eric J. Olsson, Assistant Attorney General, Diane L. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson, Attorneys for Ap-pellee.
    James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender, By Spencer D. Heffel, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellant.
   OPINION

LANKFORD, Judge.

¶ 1 This appeal returns to us on remand from the Supreme Court of Arizona. The supreme comí; remanded for us to reconsider our prior memorandum decision in light of its opinion in State v. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. 321, 78 P.3d 732 (2003). After further review, we vacate that part of our previous decision that addressed the issue on which the supreme court granted review and resolve the question by this opinion.

¶ 2 As in Sepahi, this appeal involves the applicability of a statute that increases punishment for “dangerous crime[s] against children.” Ariz.Rev.Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13-604.01 (Supp.2004). Thus, the question is not defendant’s guilt, but whether the Arizona Legislature authorized additional punishment beyond that already authorized for aggravated assault.

¶ 3 This appeal differs from Sepahi in its facts and procedural posture, however. We are obliged to follow the decisions of our supreme court. State v. Anderson, 185 Ariz. 454, 916 P.2d 1170 (App.1994). Sepahi requires us to hold that the State may not invoke the special sentencing provisions of the statute: Defendant was not shown to have “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target[ed] a victim under the age of fifteen.” Sepahi 206 Ariz. at 322, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d at 733 (quoting Williams, 175 Ariz. at 103, 854 P.2d at 136).

¶ 4 Proof of this requirement was not contested in Sepahi. 206 Ariz. at 323, 324, ¶¶ 13, 19, 78 P.3d at 734, 735. Indeed, defense counsel conceded that the defendant’s conduct “was directed at and targeted the minor victim.” Id. at 324 n. 3, ¶ 19, 78 P.3d at 735 n. 3. That concession flowed from facts clearly showing that defendant’s conduct was aimed directly at the child victim. Defendant and his companion had approached an adult and the child victim. A verbal confrontation escalated when defendant struck the child, she responded by striking back, and defendant then used a firearm to shoot the victim at close range. Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault arising out of this conduct. Id. at 321-22, ¶ 4, 78 P.3d at 732-33. Thus, it was undisputed that the factual basis for a crime against a child was satisfied.

¶5 This case also involves a shooting at which both a child and others were present. In this ease, however, it is disputed whether the offense was a crime “against” a child. Although defendant’s conduct placed a child at risk of injury, the others present were placed at equal risk by defendant’s conduct. All persons who were present were victims of the reckless discharge of a firearm, and the risk was no greater to the child than to the others. Neither a judge nor jury specifically found that defendant had “targeted” the child, and defendant has not conceded that he did so.

¶ 6 Defendant Castaneda, aged nineteen, was driving his ear in which a juvenile was a passenger. Castaneda pointed out a person nicknamed “Dice” on the street as Castaneda drove by. Castaneda told his passenger that Dice had been responsible for several drive-by shootings of Castaneda’s home and vehicle. Dice was standing near the victim A.G., who was thirteen years of age, and also next to another young person. Castaneda stopped the vehicle, leaned across both the front seat and the body of his passenger to discharge a firearm out of the passenger’s window several times in the direction of Dice and the others. The bullets struck Dice once and A.G. twice. Castaneda was convicted of aggravated assault against A.G. based on reckless conduct. He was also convicted of two other counts of aggravated assault and one count of drive-by shooting.

¶ 7 No finding was made that defendant targeted a child. The evidence fails to indicate that A.G. was targeted as a victim. The recklessness of Castaneda’s assault endangered all three persons present, not A.G. solely, individually, or particularly. A.G. was not exposed to danger in any different kind or greater degree than the other victims. Because defendant’s conduct was not focused on or aimed at A.G., the additional punishment provision does not apply.

¶ 8 The outcome would be different if the assault conviction involving A.G. had rested on an intentional shooting of A.G. In such a case, the defendant by definition targets the victim. See Sepahi, supra. See also State v. Carlisle, 198 Ariz. 203, 206-07, 1112, 8 P.3d 391, 394-95 (App.2000) (attempted sexual conduct with a minor). If a defendant intended to injure the victim, it would be clear that his conduct targeted that victim. If the victim were a child, the sentence for the crime would be subject to the special sentencing statute.

¶ 9 But even intentional conduct against one victim may constitute unfocused conduct as to another victim injured fortuitously. For example, a defendant can intend to shoot one victim but commit assault on another victim by recklessly firing the weapon in the second victim’s presence and striking him or placing him in fear of injury. See A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1), (2) (2001). See also Williams, 175 Ariz. at 101, 854 P.2d at 134 (a case of “transferred intent” would not target the child as a victim). Fortuitous injury to a child cannot be punished under the special sentencing provision. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. at 323, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d at 734 (quoting Williams, 175 Ariz. at 103, 854 P.2d at 136).

¶ 10 Although an intentional assault against A.G. would have qualified for special sentencing, intentional conduct is not invariably required. Our supreme court in Williams rejected any notion that the defendant must act intentionally. 175 Ariz. at 101, 854 P.2d at 134. “A child could be the target of a reckless crime. For example, a driver ... who harasses a well marked school bus and recklessly injures a child passenger can be said to have the focus sufficient to satisfy [the sentencing statute]. Such a reckless crime would be ‘against children’ because it manifests a conscious disregard of a risk to children ... as opposed to the general public.” Id. In contrast, a reckless driver who does not harass the bus but nevertheless collides with it would not act with the requisite focus. State v. Mirandor-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, 225, ¶ 22, 99 P.3d 35, 40 (App.2004).

¶ 11 Reckless conduct does not always involve targeted victims, however. Reckless conduct can imperil more than one person, and indeed can place everyone present in danger of injury. Therefore, the fact that one person was injured by such an assault does not necessarily mean that defendant’s conduct was directed against that victim. “[Ajggravated assault can be committed without targeting anyone. A child could be the unintended and unknown victim of someone’s generalized unfocused conduct. The victim could just as well be an adult.” Williams, 175 Ariz. at 101, 854 P.2d at 134. See also A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1) (assault can be committed by reckless conduct).

¶ 12 The issue therefore must be resolved by analysis beyond the culpable mental state required for the offense. See Williams, 175 Ariz. at 102, 854 P.2d at 135 (court must distinguish mental state and “committed against a minor” requirement of sentencing statute). To determine whether the assault involving A.G. qualifies for special sentencing, we must apply the rule, announced by our supreme court in Williams and expressly reaffirmed in Sepahi that “the defendant’s conduct must be focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target a victim under the age of fifteen.” Sepahi 206 Ariz. at 323, ¶ 12, 78 P.3d at 734 (quoting Williams, 175 Ariz. at 103, 854 P.2d at 136).

¶ 13 Applying that test, we find no evidence that A.G. was targeted. Instead, all the evidence indicates that defendant intended to harm Dice. No evidence showed that defendant aimed at A.G. or intended to hurt A.G. Defendant aimed in the direction of Dice, and the two others happened to be standing next to Dice. The evidence shows no more than that the child victim was “fortuitously injure[d]” in the attempt to harm Dice. Id. at 323, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d at 734 (quoting Williams, 175 Ariz. at 103, 854 P.2d at 136).

¶ 14 This case is therefore much like Williams, in which the supreme court held that special sentencing did not apply. Williams was convicted of aggravated assault based on recklessness. While driving drunk, Williams rammed his truck into a passenger vehicle, injuring a child. But he did not target the child, who was merely a passenger in the vehicle. 175 Ariz. at 104, 854 P.2d at 137. Similarly, A.G. was merely present when defendant fired at Dice.

¶ 15 The State nevertheless argues that defendant’s conduct qualifies as a dangerous crime against children. It relies on two evi-dentiary facts to support its position: the proximity of the victims to the shooter, and the fact that the child victim was struck twice. From this evidence, the State argues that defendant “focused his criminal conduct directly” upon A.G.

¶ 16 The mere fact that defendant fired in Dice’s direction and that A.G. was standing nearby does not establish that he targeted this victim in particular. See Williams, 175 Ariz. at 104, 854 P.2d at 137. Nor does the fact that defendant struck A.G. allow special sentencing. His conviction for the aggravated assault of A.G. is fully consistent with a determination that he either discharged his weapon with reckless disregard of the safety of all present, or that he fired it with the intent to hit Dice but instead struck A.G. All of the evidence that related to the focus of defendant’s conduct suggested that the target was Dice; none of it hinted that A.G. was the focus of the shooting. Our supreme court has already decided that if a defendant intends to harm an adult but instead strikes a child, the defendant does not target a child victim. See Williams, 175 Ariz. at 101, 854 P.2d at 134 (person aiming at adult but striking child does not target child).

¶ 17 Our dissenting colleague argues that defendant is subject to special sentencing, reasoning that defendant consciously disregarded a specific risk of harm to a child, A.G., as opposed to the general public. Infra ¶ 32. Our supreme court has already stated in dictum that such conscious disregard “can be said to have the focus sufficient to satisfy” the sentencing statute. Williams, 175 Ariz. at 101, 854 P.2d at 134. The question, however, is not whether some reckless conduct can target a child, but whether defendant’s conduct in this case did target A.G.

¶ 18 The State makes a related argument: It contends that the victim need not be individually targeted. It argues that the special sentencing provision applies because defendant fired “at” the group including A.G. In other words, the State contends that defendant’s firing “in the direction of’ a victim is enough.

¶ 19 In Sepahi, however, our supreme court indicated that such facts do not satisfy the legislative requirement of a “dangerous crime against children” under A.R.S. § 13-604.01. (Emphasis added.) The statute applies only if the “defendant’s conduct ... [was] focused on, directed against, aimed at, or targeted] a victim under the age of fifteen.” 206 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 19, 78 P.3d at 735 (quoting Williams, 175 Ariz. at 103, 854 P.2d at 136). Moreover, Sepahi expressly reaffirmed the court’s prior decision in Williams. In Williams, the defendant, a drunk driver, crashed his truck into a passenger vehicle, injuring a child. The court held that the statute did not apply because “the legislature did not intend to apply [the provision] to persons like Williams, who ‘fortuitously injure children by their unfocused conduct.’ ” Sepahi, 206 Ariz. at 323, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d at 734 (quoting Williams, 175 Ariz. at 103, 854 P.2d at 136). Like Williams, who collided with a vehicle containing both child victims and others, this defendant did not target a child by firing in the direction of a group that included a child. The risk of harm to which the child victim was exposed was no greater than the risk to all persons present. It is simply not enough that a person under the age of fifteen was injured by criminal conduct because the Legislature has required that the crime be “against” the child. See Williams, 175 Ariz. at 101, 854 P.2d at 134.

¶ 20 The State therefore did not establish that the special sentencing statute applied. “[I]n order to prove that a defendant has committed a dangerous crime against a child, the State must prove that the defendant committed one of the statutorily enumerated crimes and that his conduct was focused on, directed against, aimed at, or targeted] a victim under the age of fifteen.” Sepahi, 206 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 19, 78 P.3d at 735 (quoting Williams).

¶ 21 Our dissenting colleague errs by asserting that special sentencing applies merely because A.G. was present and at risk of being harmed by defendant’s conduct. A person who directs reckless conduct toward a group of children can be punished under the statute, because the conduct sufficiently targets children. See Williams, 175 Ariz. at 101, 854 P.2d at 134 (school bus hypothetical). In contrast, if a child is only one among several persons present, more is needed to satisfy the statute than showing that the defendant subjected the child to some risk of harm and that the child was injured. See id. For example, a defendant who fires a weapon into the air at a crowded gathering does not commit an offense “against” a child even though a child is injured. Nor would a defendant commit the offense by firing on a busy street, striking a child down the block when the bullet ricochets off a building. No principled difference exists between those situations and this case. In all of these cases, “[t]he victim could just as well be an adult.” Williams, 175 Ariz. at 101, 854 P.2d at 134.

¶ 22 The dissent would expand the reach of the statute, contrary to our supreme court’s opinion in Williams. As we understand it, the dissent would apply the statute in all eases in which the victim happens to be a child unless the child were unperceived by the defendant and the defendant engaged in generalized unfocused conduct that targeted no one at all, merely creating a risk to the general public. Our supreme court’s reading of the statute precludes such an expansive interpretation.

¶ 23 Accordingly, we vacate the sentence for the aggravated assault as a dangerous crime against a child and remand for resen-fencing. Pursuant to our prior memorandum decision, the remainder of the convictions and sentences are affirmed.

CONCURRING: CECIL B. PATTERSON, JR., Presiding Judge.

HALL, Judge,

dissenting.

¶ 24 The majority holds that § 13-604.01(L)(1) is inapplicable in those situations when a person recklessly injures a child while targeting someone else or when he fires a weapon in the direction of a group that includes a child. According to my colleagues, such a child is an unfortunate but nonetheless “fortuitous” victim. Thus, the majority determines that Castaneda did not commit a dangerous crime against children because the evidence does not show that he “solely, individually, or particularly” targeted A.G. as a victim. Supra ¶ 7. In so holding, the majority impermissibly narrows the reach of the statute as it applies to reckless crimes, particularly in cases involving multiple victims, by making the application of the statute hinge on a person’s intent rather than his conduct See Williams, 175 Ariz. at 102, 854 P.2d at 135 (“[T]he language ‘committed against a minor’ ... suggests that the conduct aims at, targets or focuses on a victim under the age of fifteen regardless of culpable mental state.”) (emphasis added); Samano, 198 Ariz. at 512, ¶ 24 n. 8, 11 P.3d at 1051 n. 8 (“In light of the legislature’s clear intent to protect children, conditioning designation of an offense as a dangerous crime against children upon the ultimate criminal objective of a defendant, rather than his actions, is wrong.”) (Timmer J., dissenting). Castaneda’s “reckless” conduct manifested his conscious disregard of a risk to A.G. as opposed to the general public; he did not merely “fortuitously injure [A.G.] by [his] unfocused conduct.” Sepahi, 206 Ariz. at 323, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d at 734 (Sepahi II) (quoting Williams, 175 Ariz. at 103, 854 P.2d at 136), vacating and remanding Sepahi, 204 Ariz. 185, 61 P.3d 479 (App.2003) (Sepahi I). Therefore, I would hold that his conviction for aggravated assault upon A.G. qualifies for designation as a dangerous crime against children.

¶ 25 The imposition of an intent requirement in cases involving multiple victims is inappropriate. First, as observed by the supreme court in Sepahi II, the court of appeals went awry in construing § 13-604.01 by “stretch[ing] that statutory language beyond ordinary bounds to read it as also necessitating proof of some sort of special continuing dangerous status on the part of the defendant.” 206 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 16, 78 P.3d at 735. By limiting the application of the statute, the majority repeats the error in Sepahi I by “in effect amending] the statute to require proof of elements not set forth by the legislature[.]” Sepahi II, 206 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 15, 78 P.3d at 735.

¶ 26 Second, the majority’s approach will inevitably lead to inconsistent and unpredictable application of § 13-604.01. For example, constrained by the school bus hypothetical in Williams, which it refers to as dictum, the majority concedes the possibility that a defendant may target children by reckless conduct. Supra ¶ 21. Compare the Williams hypothetical to a situation involving a husband engaged in a bitter custody battle who enters an elementary school classroom full of children and, even though intending to target only his schoolteacher-wife, sprays the classroom with gunfire with the result that several children not specifically targeted are also seriously injured. Under the majority’s interpretation of the statute, the husband’s conduct would not qualify as a dangerous crime against children because he was not specifically targeting, aiming at, or focusing on the children even though his actions posed as much, if not greater, harm to children than in the school bus hypothetical. Surely, the legislature could not have intended — and neither Williams nor Sepahi II compel — that the statute be applied in such an illogical manner. See Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 499, ¶ 12, 990 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1999) (statutes should be interpreted in a way that avoids illogical or absurd results).

¶ 27 The question still remains — why does Castaneda’s conduct fall within the scope of § 13-604.01? The answer requires a closer examination of Williams and Sepahi II.

¶ 28 The aggravated assault in Williams involved a drunk driver who rammed his truck into the back of a station wagon, resulting in serious injuries to a fourteen-year-old boy. 175 Ariz. at 99, 854 P.2d at 132. In rejecting the state’s argument that § 13-604.01 is satisfied whenever the victim is under the age of fifteen, the supreme court repeatedly characterized Williams’ actions as “unfocused,” using that word to convey the notion that his reckless actions posed a risk to the general public and targeted no one in particular, not that his conduct was unfocused with respect to a particular victim. Id. at 101, 854 P.2d at 134 (referring to Williams’ act as “generalized unfocused conduct.”); id. at 103, 854 P.2d at 136 (“The spirit and purpose of § 13-604.01 are not well served by applying it to people like Williams ... who fortuitously injure children by their unfocused conduct.”); id. at 104, 854 P.2d at 137 (“The issue we resolve only arises in that rare case when, as here, an enumerated offense can be committed by unfocused actions, whether intentional, knowing or reckless in nature.”).

¶ 29 In the Sepahi cases, there was no question that the child victim was the target of the defendant’s criminal conduct. Sepahi II, 206 Ariz. at 323, ¶ 13, 78 P.3d at 734. Instead, the issue was whether something more was required, namely, that the conduct posed some sort of “peculiar” risk to children. Id. at 322-23, ¶¶ 8, 13, 78 P.3d at 733-34. In Sepahi I, the court of appeals, relying on language it lifted from Williams, held that § 13-604.01 is inapplicable unless the defendant is “peculiarly dangerous to children” or poses “a direct and continuing threat to children.” 204 Ariz. at 189-90, ¶¶ 14-15, 61 P.3d at 483-84. In Sepahi II, the supreme court rejected the imposition of this additional requirement. 206 Ariz. at 323, ¶ 13, 78 P.3d at 734. Because there was no dispute that Sepahi pointed his gun at the victim from close range and shot her in the stomach, Sepahi II contains no discussion of the circumstances under which reckless conduct may be sufficiently focused to satisfy the requirements of § 13-604.01. Accordingly, as already noted in ¶ 25, supra, the principle restated in Sepahi II relevant to this ease is that courts should avoid construing a statute in a manner that limits its intended scope.

¶ 30 In contrast to the “unfocused” conduct of the drunk driver in Williams, Castaneda’s conduct manifested a conscious disregard of a substantial risk to the two children standing alongside Dice — one of whom was under the age of fifteen — as opposed to the general public. While stopped at a traffic light in broad daylight, Castaneda recognized Dice as one of three young individuals grouped closely together on the sidewalk. When the light changed, Castaneda pulled forward and stopped in the middle of the intersection, leaned across in front of the passenger and fired multiple shots from a .22 revolver in the direction of the three young victims, striking Dice once and A.G. twice.

¶ 31 This conduct is analogous to the example set forth in Williams of a reckless crime that would satisfy § 13-604.01:

A child could be the target of a reckless crime. For example, a driver, like Williams, who harasses a well marked school bus and recklessly injures a child passenger can be said to have the focus sufficient to satisfy § 13-604.01. Such a reckless crime would be “against children” because it manifests a conscious disregard of a risk to children, A.R.S. § 13 — 105(6)(c), as opposed to the general public.

175 Ariz. at 101, 854 P.2d at 134 (emphasis added). The limited principle that the majority apparently draws from this hypothetical is that a “person who directs reckless conduct toward a group of children can be punished under the statute, because the conduct sufficiently targets children.” Supra ¶ 21. But the majority then reasons that, if adults are interspersed amongst the children, no dangerous crime has been committed against a child because “ ‘[t]he victim could just as well be an adult.’ ” Id. (quoting Williams, 175 Ariz. at 101, 854 P.2d at 134). Thus, Castaneda “did not target [A.G.] by firing in the direction of a group that included [A.G.]” because “[t]he risk of harm to which [A.GJ was exposed was no greater than the risk to all persons present.” Supra ¶ 19. However, the point of the school bus hypothetical is to distinguish between unfocused reckless conduct that poses a risk to the general public (§ 13-604.01 inapplicable) versus focused conduct that demonstrates a conscious disregard of a specific risk to children (§ 13-604.01 applicable). See Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. at 224, ¶ 22, 99 P.3d at 39 (reckless conduct by defendant in leaving family marooned in desert was “sufficiently focused” even if specific harm to child victim not intended).

¶ 32 The relevant inquiry is whether the defendant’s conduct manifests a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of harm to a child, not whether, as suggested by the majority, any child is exposed to a greater risk of harm than any adults that are present. Por example, a defendant who recklessly fires a weapon in the direction of spectators at a youth baseball game — where one would expect both adults and children to be present — would be guilty of a dangerous crime against children because such conduct manifests a conscious disregard of a risk to young children. However, a defendant engaged in the same conduct in a strip club generally could not be said to have targeted a child.

¶ 33 Castaneda’s conduct manifested a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of harm to the children standing next to Dice; thus, A.G. was not merely a fortuitous victim of generalized unfocused conduct as was the child victim in Williams. Because Castaneda’s conduct clearly posed a particular risk of harm to A.G. as opposed to the general public, his conviction for aggravated assault qualifies as a crime against children within the meaning of § 13-604.01. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary holding. 
      
      . The remainder of our memorandum decision, unaffected by today’s opinion, affirmed defendant’s convictions and in particular upheld a juty instruction on accomplice liability. The State's petition for review principally attacked the court of appeals’ opinions in State v. Sepahi, 204 Ariz. 185, 61 P.3d 479 (App.2003), vacated by 206 Ariz. 321, 78 P.3d 732, and State v. Samano, 198 Ariz. 506, 11 P.3d 1045 (App.2000). Our prior memorandum decision in this case expressly disavowed any reliance on the court of appeals’ opinion in Sepahi. And although our decision cited Samano approvingly, our holding rested on the core of the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 854 P.2d 131 (1993), and the supreme court's opinion in Sepahi reaffirmed its prior decision in Williams. The remainder of the State’s petition for review challenged our application of the Williams test to the facts of this case, and it is that matter that we revisit here. As in the supreme court's Sepahi opinion, this opinion does not discuss Samano: We need not rely on it to apply the correct principles of law to the facts of this case.
     
      
      . In Sepahi, too, a jury found that the victim was under the statutory threshold age of fifteen. The jury was asked to determine neither that the offense was a dangerous crime against a child, nor the predicate fact that defendant have directed his conduct at the child victim. See Blakely v. Washington, — U.S. —, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (jury must find facts that increase punishment beyond the sentence authorized by verdict alone). In view of our disposition, we need not decide whether that omission constituted reversible error.
     
      
      . The jury did determine that the victim was less than fifteen years old, the statutory definition of a child for sentencing purposes. The judge sentenced defendant under the special sentencing provision, but made no specific finding that the facts satisfied the requirement that the conduct targeted that victim. Instead, the sentencing judge appeared to rely solely on the victim's age, although that fact alone is insufficient to qualify for special sentencing. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 18, 78 P.3d at 735.
     
      
      . The remaining holding of Sepahi has no application here. Our supreme court rejected the notion, advanced in the lower court opinion, that defendant Sepahi could not be sentenced under the statute "because there was no evidence that he was 'peculiarly dangerous to children' or that he 'pose[s] a direct and continuing threat to the children of Arizona.’ " 206 Ariz. at 321, ¶ 1, 78 P.3d at 732 (quoting Sepahi, 204 Ariz. at 189, ¶ 14, 61 P.3d at 483). Our prior memorandum decision imposed no such requirements, and indeed we expressly disavowed reliance on the court of appeals' decision in Sepahi.
      
     
      
      . Although Williams was unaware that one passenger in the other vehicle was a child, such awareness is not required. Sepahi, 206 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 17, 78 P.3d at 735. It is enough that the conduct is directed at a particular person, and that person "turn[ed] out to be a child, even if the defendant quite reasonably believed to the contrary....” Id.
      
     
      
      . Because it concludes as a matter of law that § 13-604.01(L)(1) is inapplicable, the majority does not reach the question whether the trial court committed fundamental error by not submitting the issue to the jury. See Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536-37; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Neither do I, except to note that the remedy for any reversible Blakely/Apprendi error that may have occurred in this case is a remand for redetermination of the sentence. See United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 983-84 (9th Cir.2004) (determining Blakely requires a jury determination on a defendant’s firearm enhancement and remanding for a jury trial on the aggravating factor); State v. Gross, 201 Ariz. 41, 45-46, ¶¶ 19-21, 31 P.3d 815, 819-20 (App.2001) (determining Apprendi requires a jury determination on a defendant’s release status and remanding for a jury trial on the enhancement issue).
     
      
      . Likewise, in State v. Jansing, we concluded that § 13-604.01 was inapplicable to an intoxicated defendant who ran a stop sign and drove her truck into another truck, severely injuring her own child, because the risk created by her actions "was no different than the risk she imposed upon the general public when she chose to drive a car after consuming the equivalent of ten beers.” 186 Ariz. 63, 70, 918 P.2d 1081, 1088 (App.1996) (citing Williams, 175 Ariz. at 104, 854 P.2d at 137), overruled on other grounds by State v. Bass, 198 Ariz. 571, 12 P.3d 796 (2000).
     
      
      . The majority also hypothesizes two examples of reckless crimes committed upon children that it asserts would not be dangerous crimes against children. Supra ¶ 21. With only minor modification to these hypotheticals, I would agree with the claim that there is no "principled difference [ ] between those situations and this case.” Id. Take the first hypothetical for instance and alter it slightly by assuming that the defendant, in response to taunts, discharges a firearm into a crowded gathering at a location where children might be expected to be present but does not target anyone in particular. I would have no trouble concluding that such a person found guilty of a reckless aggravated assault upon one of the children in the crowd had also a committed a crime against that child for purposes of § 13-604.01.
     
      
      . A defendant assumes the risk that a victim may be under the age of fifteen. “[A] defendant who intends to direct his criminal conduct only at adults can nonetheless be subjected to the special sentencing provisions of § 13-604.01 when his victim turns out to be a child, even if the defendant quite reasonably believed to the contrary at the time the crime was committed.” Sepahi II, 206 Ariz. at 324, ¶ 17, 78 P.3d at 735 (citing Williams, 175 Ariz. at 102-03, 854 P.2d at 136).
     