
    John L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-4041-cv
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    October 18, 2016
    FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: John L. Johnson, pro se, Staten Island, New York.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Candace Scott Appleton, Assistant United States Attorney (Varuni Nelson and Arthur Swerdloff, Of Counsel, on the brief), for Robert L. Capers, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York.
    PRESENT: Jon 0. Newman, Gerard E. Lynch, Christopher F. Droney, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant John L. Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment on the pleadings, which dismissed his action seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s (“the Commissioner”) denial of his benefits application. The district court concluded that the Commissioner’s decision applied the correct legal standards and was supported by substantial evidence. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s judgment on the pleadings. See Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010). When the judgment upholds a benefits determination by the Commissioner, we conduct a de novo review of the administrative record “to determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The substantial evidence standard is “a very deferential standard of review—even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard,” and means that “once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

Upon review, we affirm for substantially the same reasons stated in the district court’s well-reasoned and thorough memorandum and order. We agree with the district court that the administrative law judge complied with the applicable legal standards and reached a decision that was supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ did not err in deciding the weight to give various medical opinions in the record, as ALJs are not required to give controlling weight to opinions that are not consistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Here, as the ALJ explained, Dr. Whittaker’s opinion was not supported by the medical evidence and was at times internally inconsistent, R. 316, and Dr. Goldstein relied primarily on Johnson’s self-reported symptoms, R. 317.

We have considered Johnson’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  