
    Argued May 31,
    affirmed June 11,
    rehearing denied September 17, 1929.
    W. M. DAVIS v. I. H. VAN WINKLE, Attorney General, et al.
    (278 Pac. 91; 280 Pac. 495.)
    
      For the plaintiff and petitioner there was a brief over the names of Mr. W. Lair Thompson, Mr. James B. Kerr and Mr. E. K. Oppenheimer, with an oral argument by Mr. Martin L. Pipes.
    
    For respondents there was a brief and oral arguments by Mr. I. H. Van Winlde, Attorney General, in pro. per., and Mr. Clarence E. Yeager.
    
   COSHOW, 0. J.

This is an appeal from the Attorney General’s rule on a ballot title for House Bill No. 330, enacted by the 1929 legislature, for the purpose of providing two additional circuit judges for the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Oregon, comprising Multnomah County. A petition to refer said bill to tbe people has been duly filed. Tbe Attorney General described tbe purpose of tbe bill as follows: “To provide for two additional judges of tbe Circuit Court of tbe State of Oregon for tbe Fourth Judicial District, comprising Multnomah County.” No objection bas been or could be taken to tbe statement of tbe purpose of tbe bill as prepared by tbe learned Attorney General. Tbe objection is to tbe short ballot title which is as follows: “Two Additional Circuit Judges Bill.” Tbe intent of tbe law is to prepare a short ballot title sufficient to attract tbe attention of tbe voter, and to identify tbe bill on tbe ballot with tbe law enacted by tbe legislature. It would be difficult for any person to prepare a short ballot title free from criticism. Different people look at everything from slightly different angles. A short ballot title is not supposed to be a substitute for tbe title of tbe bill. It is a means for identifying tbe measure referred or initiated and is sufficient if it does that. Tbe only bill passed by the last legislature providing for two additional judges is tbe one referred and described as House Bill No. 330. Tbe short ballot title prepared by tbe Attorney General is not misleading. It is fair. It can refer to only one act of tbe legislature because there was no other act providing for two judges in any part of tbe state. The purpose of tbe bill as expressed in tbe petition fully informs those solicited to sign tbe petition.

It is urged that tbe titles are insufficient because they allude to tbe act of tbe legislature sought to be referred to tbe people as a bill. In this language tbe learned Attorney General bas strictly followed tbe Constitution of tbe state: Art. IV, § 1. Tbe model petition set out in tbe statute also designates the act of tbe legislature sought to be referred as a bill: Or. L., § 4095. In fact the measure enacted by the legislature, which is referred to the people, is not a law. It will never become a law unless a majority of voters voting upon the referred bill vote in favor of the bill. The bill enacted by the legislature does not become operative until ninety days after the adjournment of the legislature. During that period if it is referred to the people, it is again reduced to a bill.

For the petition, Mr. Martin L. Pipes, Mr. James B. Kerr, Mr. W. Lair Thompson and Mr. Eugene K. Oppenheimer.

Contra, Mr. I. E. Ycm Winkle, Attorney General, and Mr. Clarence E. Yeager.

Other matters are discussed in the petition. The only thing properly here, however, is the sufficiency of the titles. We decline to review other matters ably argued by appellant. The titles as certified by the learned Attorney General are affirmed and will be certified to the Secretary of State as required by the 1927 General Laws, p. 323, Chapter 255.

Affirmed.

Brown, J., absent.

Rehearing denied September 17, 1929.

On Petition for Rehearing.

(280 Pac. 495.)

Plaintiff has presented a petition for rehearing supported by very convincing and logical argument. Most of the contentions are repetitions of the argument in chief. If the matter of arranging petitions and other procedure for referring acts of the legislature to the voters by petition were regulated by the courts, we could accept without hesitation the views so ably presented by plaintiff. No doubt the act referred to as a “Bill” in the title prepared by the learned Attorney General is a completed and finished act so far as the legislative assembly is concerned. The Bill as introduced in the House passed into an Act when signed by the proper presiding officers and the Governor. But the question now presented is the name of the measure from the angle of the voter. The petition for referring the act to the people being sufficient the act as passed by the legislature does not become effective as a law until it shall have been passed by the people also. The matter of terms is not important. There can be no confusion because the measure is called a “Bill” when a more accurate technical term would be an “Act.”

The matter is not open to doubt because the form prepared by the legislature refers to the measure as a Bill. It was the duty of the Attorney General to follow the language of the statute which he has done. According to the argument of the learned plaintiff and his attorney a large percentage of the voters would not know the difference between an “Act” and a “Bill.” That being the case such cannot be misled by the term applied to the measure. Others will not be misled because the ballot will clearly state that the measure was referred to the people: Or. L., § 4103.

“Measures referred by any governmental body shall be designated by the heading ‘Referred to the people by the (here name governmental body) ’; measures referred by petition shall be designated ‘Referendum ordered by petition of the people’; * * ” Or. L., § 7199.

The court must take judicial notice of the required form of the ballot. Over the number submitting the Bill providing, for two additional judges will be the legend: “Referendum ordered by petition of the people.” There can be no confusion of the initiative with the referendum. In the light of these requirements any person desiring to be informed about how to cast his ballot cannot be misled by the short title.

Petition denied.

Brown, J., absent.  