
    John Hooker Judge &c., versus Clarissa Bancroft et al.
    
    Where an administratrix, having commenced an action against a supposed debtor to die intestate’s estate, was informed by him that he did. not owe any thing, and that she could not maintain the action, but that to prevent her from incurring a large bill of costs, and to save himself the trouble and expense of a trial, he would pay her a sum towards the costs, and would give a gratuity to the heirs, and he accordingly did so, and the suit was withdrawn; and in an action on the administration bond, it was found by the jury, that there was no just claim or debt in favor of the estate against the supposed debtor,—it was held) that the administratrix had not broken the bond, by not accounting for the sum so paid to the heirs.
    Although an administrator is bound to account for all the property which comes into his hands, yet, if after he has returned an inventory to the judge of probate, he should come to the knowledge and possession of property not included in it, he is not required to return a second inventory
    Debt on an administration bond. Plea, general performance. Replication, setting out that the administratrix fraudulently received a promissory note from T. Sheldon for 25 dollars, in payment of a debt due to the deceased, and a note against J. Palmer for 60 dollars, the goods &c. of the estate of the deceased, and did not include them in any inventory, nor account for them in the court of probate. Issue was taken on these allegations.
    At the trial, before Morton J., Sheldon testified, that the administratrix commenced a suit against him; that he told her he was not indebted to the estate, and she could not recover in the suit, but to prevent her from incurring a large bill of costs, and to save himself the trouble and expense of a trial, he would pay her 15 dollars towards the costs. He testified also, that the deceased having complained of sustaining a loss upon notes which the witness had assigned to him, the witness told him he would malee him a present; and further, that although he would not pay the estate any thing, he was willing to malee a present to the heirs, and that when he paid the 15 dollars to the administratrix, he also gave a note to the heirs for 25 dollars, which had been paid since the commencement of this suit.
    
      Sept. 26th.
    It further appeared in evidence, that the right of the deceased to redeem certain mortgaged estate was, in his lifetime, sold on execution to Palmer for 215 dollars, for which sum Palmer gave his note to the officer. Palmer paid the officer 170 dollars, which was more than sufficient to satisfy all the executions in his hands against the deceased, and this sum was indorsed upon the note. After the appointment of the administratrix, the officer sent her the note and a small sum of money. Within a year from the sale of the equity of redemption, the administratrix sold her right to redeem the same, and by agreement of Palmer, it was sold subject to the incumbrance of 170 dollars, instead of 215. Palmer’s note was given up to him, and the receipts of the sale were ac counted for in the settlement of the estate.
    The estate of the deceased was insolvent.
    The jury were instructed, that if the Sheldon note was given in discharge of any debt due to the estate, or any just claim in its favor, the receipt by the administratrix of a note payable to the heirs, was a fraud upon the creditors, and she was bound to account for the 25 dollars, in the same manner as if that sum had been paid to her:—that if she received the Palmer note before she returned the inventory, she was bound to include the note therein; but that if she did not receive it until afterwards, and fairly made the arrangement by which it was given up, so as not to diminish the receipts from the sale of her right of redemption, it was not a breach of the condition of her bond.
    The jury returned a verdict for the defendants ; and thereupon the plaintiff filed his exceptions to the instructions of the judge.
    Bliss, and Bliss junior, in support of the exceptions.
    According to the books, the representative of a deceased person is under rigid rules in regal’d to accounting. If he releases a debt, he becomes responsible for the amount, even though it could not have been collected. If he compromises a doubt fui claim, he must account for the sum which he receives. Dawes v. Boylston, 9 Mass. R. 352; Wentw. Off. Ex. 71 159; Tollen, 424, 425; De Diemar v. Van Wagenen, 7 Johns. R. 404; Norden v. Levit, 2 Lev. 189; Bac. Abr. Executors &c., H, 2. In the present case, if by means of any dioses in action belonging to the estate of the deceased, the administratrix was enabled to obtain any money, she ought to have accounted for ix in the probate office. It will not be pre tended, that she held the receipt of Sheldon, except in her representative capacity. She brought her action as administratrix. The value of this receipt was what Sheldon was willing to give for it. If an administrator may thus settle with a debtor, upon receiving a gratuity, it will be a constant source of collusion. [Morton J. It did not appear that any discharge was given to Sheldon. There was only an order to withdraw the action.] That is not material. Either by a violation of her "duly, or from the circumstances of the estate, the administratrix received a sum of money or a note, or improperly suffered a note to be given to the heirs, for which she was bound to account.
    
      Sept. 29th.
    
    In respect to the note of Palmer, we had supposed, that if, after an administrator has returned an inventory to the probate office, other property comes to his knowledge, a second inventory should be returned. But if that is an error, as three months from the time of taking administration are allowed for returning an inventory, the instruction should have been, that the administratrix was bound to inventory all the property which came to her knowledge within that period. St. 1817, c. 190, § 14; Bac. Abr. Executors &c., E, 11. At any rate, by the condition of the bond, she ought to account for all the property received after, as well as before the return of the inventory. The creditors knew from the officer, that he had delivered to her the Palmer note, and the manner in which it had been disposed of should have appeared in the probate office. It is by her fault that the creditors have been obliged to incur the expense of having recourse to a jury, to ascertain how the estate had been settled.
    
      E. H. Mills and Ashmun, for the defendants.
   Per Curiam.

With respect to the Sheldon note for 25 dollars, if it was received on account of the estate, or if it was received as a compensation for relinquishing the action, without doubt the administratrix ought to account for it; but this was a matter to be tried by the jury, and the instruction of the judge, we think, was sufficiently liberal for the plaintiff, — “if the note was given in discharge of any just claim in favor of the estate, it was a fraud upon the creditors.” The administratrix would have been answerable for the whole amount of the debt discharged, on an allegation of waste.

In regard to the Palmer note, there seems to have been nothing fraudulent or unfair. The administratrix has accounted for as much or more than she would have had to account for, if she had kept that note and sold the equity of redemption with the whole incumbrance of 215 dollars The suggestion, that from her not accounting specifically for this note, the creditors may have been led into' expense by supposing that this sum was not accounted for, has some weight; but this respects only the mode of accounting, and if a reasonable and just account is rendered, she is not bound to any particular form.

The statute provides only that one inventory shall be returned. For all property received subsequently to such return the administrator is bound to account, but not in the form of an inventory. This is required neither by the statute, nor by the condition of the bond.

Judgment on the verdict. 
      
       See Revised Stat. c. 65, § 1.
     
      
       See White v. Swain, 3 Pick. 365; Dexter v. Arnold, 3 Mason,-284; Potter v. Titcomb, 7 Greenl. 315.
      If after an order of distribution further assets come to the hands of the executor or administrator, the judge of probate shall make such further de cree or decrees for the distribution thereof, as the case may require. Reviseá Stat. c. 68, § 18.
     