
    The Kinnear Manufacturing Co. et al. v. Beatty.
    
      Vacation of street or alleys — Vacated portion reverts to abutting lot owners — Right of property owner to access through reverting property — Injunction of obstruction — Respective rights of adjacent lot owners — Right of way granted by council — Section 2654, Rev. Stat.
    
    1. Where a street or alley is vacated by a city, the vacated portion reverts to the abutting lot owners, subject, however, to such rights as other property owners on the street or alley may have therein, as a necessary means of access to their property.
    2. A property owner on a street or alley, a portion of which. other than the part on which he abuts, is vacated by the city-council, has no right to enjoin the obstruction of the vacated portion by the owners to whom it reverted, where he has reasonable access to his property by other streets and alleys, although the distance he may have to travel in some directions may be greater than before the vacation. To entitle a party to any relief in such cases, the inconvenience he suffers must differ in hind from that of the general public, and not only in degree.
    3. The rights of the lot owners in an addition, on the plat of which the streets and alleys are indicated as dedicated to public use, are no greater than, nor different from, the rights of other lot owners upon other streets of the city.
    4. The provision in Section 2654, Revised Statutes, that when a street or alley is vacated by a city council, “the right of any lot owner shall not be impaired thereby,” simply preserves such rights as the lot owner had in the street or alley by existing law. It creates no new rights.
    (Decided November 19, 1901.)
    
      Error to the Circuit Court of Franklin county.
    The plaintiff below, Julia Beatty, brought suit in the common pleas to enjoin the erection of a certain building by the Kinnear Manufacturing Company upon the vacated portion of a certain alley in the city of Columbus. Her petition is as follows :
    Plaintiff says that William A. Neil, in his lifetime, platted and laid out a subdivision of real estate bounded by Lincoln street on the south, Fourth street on the east, Hamlet street on the west and Warren street on the north, in Columbus, Ohio, a copy of which plat is hereto attached marked “Exhibit A'5 and made a part hereof.
    That on said plat there is an alley known as Cedar alley, running from Hamlet street on the west to Fourth street, formerly known as Lazelle avenue, in the east, immediately in the rear of plaintiff’s premises and is designated and delineated on said plat of the width of 22 feet and six inches.
    That the said William A. Neil, during his lifetime, and the defendants, Walter N. P. Harrow, Theodore 31. Livesay and Charles S. Hamilton, as trustees under his will, since his decease, have sold and conveyed various lots to various parties, according to said plat of said addition and in reference to the location of the various lot lines and streets and alleys as thereon designated on said plat; that among the parcels so sold and conveyed by the defendants to Coleman and by said Coleman conveyed to this plaintiff, lot number 63 of W. A. Neil’s subdivision, which was conveyed to this plaintiff, as the same is numbered and delineated upon the recorded plat thereof of record in Plat Book number (3), page 258, above referred to; that this plaintiff was put in possession thereof and has erected valuable improvements therec¡n to the amount of about $3,500.00; that said improvements were erected by this plaintiff thereon with reference to the lines of the streets and alleys as designated and delineated on said plat; that the said prem ises of the plaintiff are drained by a sewer which runs on the south side of said premises and located ir Cedar alley, running thence eastward in said alley to Fourth street; that said sewer is a valuable and lasting improvement and appurtenance to plaintiff’s property; that the defendant, The Kinnear Manufacturing Company, a corporation, has taken possession of the east one hundred and nine feet of said alley and are now erecting a large building thereon, the exact nature of which plaintiff is unable to state; that said defendant company has a large force of men who are engaged in laying the foundation and erecting said building, completely and permanently obstructing said alley and that the said defendant, its agents and employes, have dug the cellar and are now laying the foundation of stone and brick and that said defendant, its agents and employes, unless restrained will continue to erect said building; that said defendant company is now erecting a large manufacturing building across and over and on and through said alley ; that said alley will, unless the said company are restrained, be permanently closed and the ingress and egress of this plaintiff to and from her premises will be materially and irreparably interfered with; that the premises of said plaintiff will be irreparably damaged and that the amount of said damage cannot be ascertained in law;.that the said alley, known as Cedar alley, has been in public use by the citizens of the vicinity and at large for eighteen years; that all the streets within said plat aforesaid have been improved with reference to the location of said alley and the access to and from the same; that said defendants, its agents and employes, threaten to permanently close the same and deprive this plaintiff and the adjoining lot owners and the traveling public from using the same and traveling over it, for the purpose of reaching the lots of said, addition and the improvements thereon; to give notice to the defendants for an application for a restraining order would materially increase the damage to this plaintiff caused by such delay.
    Wherefore plaintiff prays that the said defendants and each of them, and their unknown agents and employes or any claiming by, through or under them, be restrained from enclosing said alley and the ingress and egress thereto, and that they be required to restore said alley to its former condition, and that on a final hearing a permanent injunction be granted this plaintiff forever, and that the said defendants be forever enjoined from interfering with the use and enjoyment of said public highway, and for all other and proper relief.
    “Signed by attorneys.”
    
      EXHIBIT “A.”
    W. A. Neil’s subdivision of ground lying between Lincoln and Warren streets and Hamlet street and Laz elle • avenue.
    ■WARRBN ST.
    
      
    
    The Kinnear Manufacturing Company and the trustees of the will of William A. Neil, deceased, filed separate answers. These answers are substantially the same. That of the manufacturing company is as follows:
    Now comes The Kinnear Manufacturing Company, one of the defendants herein, and says that it is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of West Virginia.
    
      Further answering said defendant admits that William A. Neil, now deceased, in his lifetime platted and laid out the subdivision of real estate, as alleged in the petition and according to the plat, a copy oí which is attached to said petition.
    Further answering this defendant admits that the said William A. Neil, during his lifetime, and after his death the trustees, as hereinafter set forth, sold and conveyed various lots in said addition to various parties and among the same conveyed to the plaintiff lot 63 in said addition, and that said plaintiff is in possession of said lot’ 63 and has erected buildings thereon.
    Further answering this defendant admits that ir has taken possession of the east 109.80 feet of what was formerly Cedar alley, as appears on said plat, running west from Fourth street said distance, and is now excavating for the foundations of a building and intends to erect thereon a building.
    Further answering this defendant denies each and every fact and allegation in the petition contained, not herein admitted.
    Further answering this defendant says that the sewer in the east 109.80 feet of Cedar alley is a private sewer, beginning at Fourth street and drains west toward Hamlet street. Defendant further says that the erection of a building upon said portion of said alley will in no wise interfere in the use by plaintiff of said sewer or any part thereof.
    This defendant, further answering, says, that on or about the third day of January, 1897, William A. Neil, died testate, and that on the sixth day of January, 1897, his will was duly admitted to probate in the probate court of Franklin county, Ohio, and that by said will he appointed as his trustees the defendants, Walter N. P. Darrow, Theodore M. Live-say and Charles S. Hamilton, which trustees on the eighth day of January, 1897, were duly qualified and appointed as such trustees.
    By the terms of said will the said William A. Neii devised all of his real estate, including all of the land, a plat of which is attached to the petition, to said trustees in fee simple, with full power to contract with, convey the same and subdivide the same.
    Among the property devised by the said William A. Neil, deceased, to said trustees, were lots 64, 65, 66, 73, 74, 75 and 76 of the property so platted.
    That on or about the twentieth day of November, 1899, the defendant trustees, being the owners in fee simple of the last named lots, filed with the city council o.f the city of Columbus, Ohio, a petition praying for the vacation of that portion of Cedar alley extending through said premises and bounded on the north and south by said lots for a distance of 110 feet west from the west line of Fourth street.
    That notice of the pendency and prayer of said petition was published for six consecutive weeks prior to the nineteenth day of February, 1900, in the Ohio State Journal, the Columbus Citizen and the Columbus Express, three newspapers published in and of general circulation in the city of Columbus, Ohio, and of which the Columbus Express is a newspaper published in the German language.
    That on the nineteenth day of February, 1900, the board of public works of said city of Columbus, recommended to the city council of said city an ordinance vacating said portion of Cedar alley, as prayed for in said petition, which ordinance was on the nineteenth day of February, 1900, duly passed by said city council, which ordinance, being number 16,524, provided that besides vacating said portion of said alley that the said city reserved the right to use and maintain the sewer located therein.
    That thereafter said ordinance was on the first day of March, 1900, duly approved by the mayor of said city, and was filed and recorded in the office of the clerk of said city.
    That thereafter publication was had of said ordinance in said three newspapers for the time and in accordance with the statute in such cases made and provided.
    In said ordinance said city council found that it was satisfied that there was good cause for such vacation, and that the same would not be detrimental to the general interest, a copy of which ordinance is hereto attached, marked Exhibit “A,” and made a part hereof.
    Thereafter said trustees made a subdivision of said lots 64, 65, 66, 67, 73, 74, 75 and 76, including in such subdivision the vacated portion of Cedar alley, as aforesaid, which plat was duly signed and acknowledged by said trustees, was duly approved by the chief engineer of the city of Columbus, Ohio, and an ordinance accepting the same was duly recommended by the board of public works of said city and duly passed by the city council, and thereafter signed by the mayor of said city and publication made thereof in said three newspapers according to law. That the plat of said subdivision has been recorded with the recorder of Franklin county, Ohio, a copy of which plat is hereto annexed, marked Exhibit “B,” and made a part hereof.
    By said last plat said trustees dedicated for street purposes an alley fifteen feet in width and running from Warren to Lincoln streets on a line 109.80 feet west of Fourth street and parallel with the west line of Fourth street, a copy of which plat, marked Ex-Mbit “B,” is hereto attached and made a part hereof. Said alley runs from Lincoln street to Cedar alley and on the east line of said lot 68 to Warren street.
    This answering defendant further says that the lot, as aforesaid, owned by the plaintiff, is bounded on the south by Cedar alley and on the north by Warren street, on the east by said fifteen foot alley, on the west by lot No. 62 on the plat of said William A. Neil, deceased.
    Further answering this defendant says that the plaintiff has egress and ingress to and from her said property on Warren street on the north and Cedar alley on the south; said fifteen foot alley on the east, and that egress and ingress to and from Cedar alley on the south of the lot owned by plaintiff may be had by the said fifteen foot alley dedicated by said trustees, both to and from the east portion of said Cedar alley, north to Warren street and south to Lincoln street, and on the entire east line of said lot 63 by said fifteen foot alley.
    This answering defendant says that the plaintiff does not own'any lots abutting upon or adjoining to the portion of said Cedar alley so vacated, and that said plaintiff has no rights or interest in and to the portion of Cedar alley so vacated.
    This answering defendant further says that by reason of the bounding of plaintiff’s lot by said Lincoln and Hamlet streets and Cedar alley and by the dedication of said fifteen foot alley on the east line of lot 63, as aforesaid, said plaintiff has reasonable means of egress and ingress to and from her said premises in all directions.
    This answering defendant further says that on the fifth day of February, 1900, said trustees agreed to convey by warranty deed all that real estate in the city of Columbus, Ohio, beginning at the northwest corner of Fourth, and Lincoln streets in the city of Columbus, Ohio; thence west on the north line of Lincoln street 109.80 feet to a point; thence north on a line parallel with the west line of Fourth street to a point in the south line of Warren' street; thence easterly on said line to the northeast corner of Warren and Fourth streets; thence southerly upon the west line of Fourth street to the place of beginning, containing said vacated portion of said alley and lots 65, 66, 67, 74, 75 and 76, and parts of lots 64 and 73 of said William A. Neil’s addition.
    Said property was purchased by said defendant for the purpose of erecting buildings thereon and was. agreed to be conveyed by said trustees to said defendant for that purpose.
    Thereafter this answering defendant took possession of said premises so agreed to be conveyed by said trustees and proceeded to make the excavations and prepare for the erection of buildings thereon as heretofore stated.
    Further answering this defendant says that it has made a contract for the erection of the buildings upon said premises so agreed to be conveyed; that materials for said building have been ordered, and that great and irreparable injury will result to it if any restraining order or injunction is granted as prayed for by the plaintiff; that said contract for such building amounts in the aggregate to about the sum of twelve thousand dollars.
    Wherefore, this answering defendant prays that it may go hence and recover its costs.
    Signed by attorneys.
    
      Part of Exhibit B, referred to in answer, necessary to an understanding of the case :
    
      
    
    The plaintiff demurred to both answers; the demurrers were overruled; and the plaintiff not desiring to plead further, judgment was entered by the 
      common pleas dismissing the petition. On error to the circuit court, the judgment was reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings; and error is prosecuted here to reverse the judgment of the circuit court and affirm the common pleas.
    
      Arnold, Morton &\ Irvine and Watson, Burr & Live-say, for plaintiffs in error.
    1. The rule is now well established in Ohio that upon the vacation of a street the title to the vacated portion reverts to the abutting lot owners. Stevens v. Shannon, 3 Circ. Dec., 386, 6 C. C. R., 142; Kerr v. Commissioners, 51 Ohio St., 593; West v. Atcheson. 34 W. L. B., 36, 37.
    2. It is also settled in Ohio that upon such vacation the duty of the public to maintain and keep in repair such vacated street ceases. McQuigg v. Cullins, 56 Ohio St., 649; Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St., 459; Jackson v. Jackson, 16 Ohio St., 163.
    3. The rule is also established that after vacation, while the public duty to maintain and repair ceases, there is a private right of way or easement in certain lot owners which remains. Furniture Co. v. Railroad Co., 9 Dec., 674; 7 N. P., 640; Elliott on Roads and Streets (2 ed.), Secs. 703 and 877.
    While it is recognized that there is this private right of way or easement, existing after vacation, none of the reported decisions of the Supreme Court oí Ohio undertake to define the limitations of this right or the circumstances under which it exists.
    4. The . statutory enunciation, in section 2654 of the Revised Statutes, providing that upon vacation of a street the right of way or easement therein of any lot owner shall not he impaired is to all intents and purposes a reiteration of the common law rule, and is to be construed with the limitations and effect of that rule.
    5. The general rule is universally recognized that the injury to the lot owner must be different both in degree and kind from that to the general public, and that mere proximity to the vacated or obstructed portion of the street, while the injury resulting may Da different in degree, is not different in kind from the injury to the general public, and gives no rights different from the general public. Elliott on Roads and Streets (1 ed.), p. 662; 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (1 ed.), 121; Houck v. Wachter, 34 Md., 265; Davis v. Commissioners, 153 Mass., 218; Quincy Canal v. Newcome, 7 Met., 283; Chicago v. Association, 102 Ill., 379; Railway Company v. Thompson, 34 Fla., 346.
    This doctrine is enunciated or recognized in the following cases and authorities: Littler v. Lincoln (City) 106 Ill., 353; East St. Louis v. O’Flynn, 119 Ill., 200; Parker v. Bishop, 146 Ill., 158; Shaw v. Railroad Co., 159 Mass., 597; Smith v. Boston, 7 Cush., 254; Brakken v. Railway Co., 29 Minn., 41: Shaubut v. Railway Co., 21 Minn., 502; Bailey v. Culver, 84 Mo., 531; Heller v. Railroad Co., 28 Kas., 625; Railway Company, In re, 10 Circ. Dec., 286; 19 C. C. R., 308; Jones on Easements, Secs. 546 and 550; Stanwood v. City of Malden, 16 L. R. A., 591 (Mass.); Buhl v. Depot Co., 23 L. R. A., 392 (98 Mich., 593); Whitsett v. Railroad Co., 10 Col., 243.
    This rule requiring an injury to be different both in kind and degree from the general public is well established, and the only question about the rule is in its application by the courts and the limitations placed upon it.
    The Supreme Court of Ohio, in no reported case, has had occasion to consider this rule nor the limitations to be placed upon it. It has been recognized by the circuit court of Hamilton county in Railway Co., In re, supra.
    
    6. It is fully established that no matter how near the abutter’s property may be to the obstruction, the fact that he suffers greater inconveniences than the general public or that he is required by reason of the obstruction to take a more circuitous route to reach a given point, while different in degree is not different in kind, from the injury suffered by the public generally. Jones on Easements, Sec. 550; Patton v. Railroad Co., 55 Ohio St., 659; Heller v. Railroad Company, 28 Kas., 625; Stanwood v. City of Malden, 16 L. R. A., 591 (Mass.); Polack v. Trustees, 48 Cal., 490; Coster v. Mayor of Albany, 43 N. Y., 399; Cassell v. Berkshire, 11 Gray, 26; Kimball v. Homan, 74 Mich., 699; Bailey v. Culver, 84 Mo., 531; State v. Elizabeth (City), 54 N. J. L., 462; Glasgow v. St. Louis, 107 Mo., 198; Fearing v. Irwin, 55 N. Y., 486; Barr v. Oskaloosa (City), 45 Ia., 275.
    The above rules will apply equally to any private right of way or easement.
    7. The right of a lot owner to object to the vacation of a portion of a street depends upon whether his lot is abutting upon or in physical contact with the vacated portion, or whether his access is entirely or substantially cut off by reason of the vacation; that he may be inconvenienced, or that he may have to go by a more circuitous route to reach a given point, does not make the injury to him different in kind from the general public. Elliott on Railroads, Sec. 1086; Morgan v. Railway Co., 64 Ia., 589; LeClercq v. Gallipolis, 7 Ohio (pt. 1), 217; Aram, Trustee, v. Shallenbarger, 41 Cal., 449; Hawley v. Baltimore, 33 Md., 270; Berkshire, 11 Gray, 26; Insurance Co. v. Stevens, 101 N. Y., 411; Smith v. Boston, 7 Cush., 254.
    
      8. There is a class of cases which hold that the right of property owners abutting on a street, a portion of which is obstructed or vacated, to object to such vacation or obstruction, does not extend beyond the next connecting street or way. Elliott on Railroads, Section 1086; Jones on Easements, Sec. 550; Dantzer v. Railway Co., 141 Ind., 604; Coster v. Albany, 45 N. Y., 499.
    9. The rule, supported by reason and the best authority, is that lot owners have no greater rights than the general public in the streets in a subdivision in which their lots are situated, excepting within the general rules and limitations thereon, herein set forth. Railway Co., In re, 10 Circ. Dec., 286; 10 C. C. R., 308.
    10. In the opinion in the case of McQuigg et al. v. Cullins, 56 Ohio St., 649, Spear, J., said: “Where, however, another road, reasonably suitable to answer the needs of the complaining party has been established, the chancellor might properly refuse the order of injunction against closing up the old road.”
    11. Some cases hold that the remedy of the property owner is in damages and not by injunction. Sully v. Schmitt, 147 N. Y., 248.
    
      W. M. Thompson and Frank T. Glarke, for defendant in error.
    Now, we contend that when this lot was conveyed to the defendant in error, she took an easement in the whole of this alley as it furnished the only means of ingress and egress to the rear of said lot from Hamlet and Lazelle streets; that said easement was a valuable appurtenance to said lot and was, and is, as much property as the ground bounded by the lot itself, and that this property right can not be taken without first compensation being paid therefor.
    
      It is further admitted that the defendant in error has erected lasting and valuable improvements thereon with reference to the streets and alleys as designated on said plat. The easement in this alley is a continuous easement, but that fact is immaterial, as continuous and discontinuous easements do not obtain in Ohio. Baker v. Rice, 56 Ohio St., 463; Lewis on Eminent Domain, See. 114.
    Streets and alleys thus platted in connection with the lots sold assume much the character of township roads, as to their character of private ways. Foster v. Wheeler, 5 Ohio St., 286.
    When Wm. Neil platted this subdivision Cedar alley became a private way for all the lot owners as an entrance to the rear of their lots, and the vacation of this alley by the council of the city of Columbus did not in any way impair this private way or easement. Revised Statutes, sections 2652, 2654.
    It is a well known fact that access to the rear of lots adds very materially to their value. Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St., 459.
    That which is appurtenant to a lot is part of the lot itself and an injunction will be granted to restrain a deprivation thereof. If the contention of the plaintiffs in error are true then the city of Columbus might vacate a portion of the alley connecting with Hamlet street and thus deprive the defendant in error of all access to the rear of her lot.
    If a plat is exhibited upon which a way is laid down and a contract of purchase is entered into, the purchaser may claim a right of way according to the specifications of the plat. Giauques Laws of Roads, Sec. 502 and note.
    Proceedings to vacate were not regular and were not such as is provided for in sections 2654,2655,2656, ■2657, Revised Statutes. Stevens v. Shannon, 3 Circ. Dec., 386; 6 C. C. R., 142; Railway Co. v. Elyria, 7 Circ. Dec., 312; 14 C. C. R., 52.
    Cedar alley was a public street and had been for eighteen years duly accepted by the city and used by the public, and plaintiff purchased her lot with reference to said streets and made valuable improvements thereon, and by so doing acquired an easement in said street, and the same cannot be taken from her without compensation. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 19.
    If the taking of an easement without compensation is attempted injunction is the proper remedy. Hays v. Jones, 27 Ohio St., 218; Lewis on Eminent Domain, Sec. 114; Dillon on Municipal Corporations (4 ed.), Sec. 656a; Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St., 459; Le Clercq v. Trustees of Gallipolis, 7 Ohio (pt. 1), 217; Cincinnati v. Commissioners, 12 Dec. (Re.), 451; 1 Disn., 4; McQuigg v. Cullins, 56 Ohio St., 649; Field v. Barling, 149 Ill., 556 (41 Am. St. Rep., 311).
    The general doctrine is stated and many of the cases reviewed in the recent case of Dantzer v. Railway Co., 141 Ind., 604 (50 Am. St. Rep., 343).
    The general rule is followed in Railway Co., In re, 10 Circ. Dec., 286; 19 C. C. R., 308, sub nom.
    
   Minshall, C. J.

The case involves the right of a property owner in a street or alley, a portion of which, other than the part on which he abuts, has been vacated by the city.

William A. Neil, deceased, having in his lifetime made an addition to the city of Columbus, recorded a plat, with lots, streets and alleys indicated thereon -as shown by an exhibit to the petition. Afterwards the city council vacated a part of one of the alleys, known as Cedar alley, the vacation including the part of the alley between lots 64, 65, 66 and 67 on the north side, and lots 73, 74, 75 and 76 on the south side, of the al-. ley; the plaintiff at the time being the owner of lot 63 on which she had erected a building and otherwise improved the same, before the vacation. Afterwards his trustees made a subdivision of the lots on either side of the vacation, including in the same the vacated portion of the alley, as shown by Exhibit “B” to the answer, and dedicated an alley running north and south from Warren street to Lincoln street, on which alley the lot of the plaintiff abuts on its east side its entire length from Warren street to Cedar alley. The part of the alley south of the plaintiff’s lots is not vacated, is intersected by the new alley, and the unvacated portion extends from the new alley on the east to Hamlet street on the west. This dedication was accepted by the city and the subdivision recorded.

Afterwards the trustees sold and conveyed the lots in the new subdivision, including the vacated portion of the alley, to the manufacturing company, who was proceeding to construct its building upon it, when the suit was brought. It will be observed that the lot of the plaintiff does not abut upon any portion of the vacated alley; and that she has public access to her lot with its improvements, on the north, by a street (the front of her lot); on the east by the new alley, the entire length of the lot; and on the south by the unvacated portion of Cedar alley, the entire width of the lot. In other words she has public access to her lot on every side but one.

There seems to be no ground for questioning the validity of the proceedings whereby a portion of Cedar alley was vacated by the city council. The regularity of the proceedings is averred in the answer and admitted by the demurrer. Nor is there any for questioning the title of the manufacturing companv to the vacated portion of the alley. The trustees owned the property on each side of the vacated portioñ, and on vacation it reverted to them as the abutting owners, subject to such necessary rights of way as others may have therein. Stevens v. Shannon, 6 C. C. R., 142, affirmed by this court, Kerr v. Commissioners, 51 Ohio St., 593; and the manufacturing company by its purchase acquired all the rights of the trustees in and to the property. The question then we have to consider is, whether upon the facts admitted by the pleadings, the plaintiff, Mrs. Beatty, has such an interest in. the vacated portion of the alley, as a means of ingress and egress to her lot, as entitles her to an injunction against its being so closed, or, obstructed as to prevent its use by her as a means of access to her property. The decisions in this state have clearly established that an abutting lot owner has such an interest in the portion of the street on which he abuts, that the closing of it up, or the impairment of its use as a means of access, or the addition of a new burden, is a taking of private property for a public use, and cannot be done without compensation. McCombs v. Akron, 15 Ohio, 474; Crawford v. Delaware, 7 Ohio St., 459; Street Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 Ohio St., 523. The principle of these cases, and they have been frequently followed, applies with like justice and force where a portion of a street is obstructed or vacated, that affords the only reasonable access to the property of an owner, although his property does not abut immediately upon the obstructed portion. Abutting owners on a vacated portion of a street, would not have the right, by reason of the vacation, to isolate an owner of property on the unvacated portion. Such an owner would still have an easement, or right of way, over the vacated portion to a point where he could have reasonable access to other public ways. McQuigg v. Cullins, 56 Ohio St., 649, 654. In this case the vacated portion was the only reasonable means of access which the plaintiff had to his farm; and this fact constituted the ground of the relief granted. But where the party complaining is not an abutter upon the obstructed or vacated portion of a street, or way, and has ample means of access to his property by other streets and public ways, a very different case is presented. In such case he is simply one of the general public, suffering an inconvenience common to all, though he may by reason of proximity, suffer a greater inconvenience than others, he is in no way distinguished from them except in degree. To give the individual a right in such cases to be heard, either in a suit for damages or by injunction, he must aver and show, that the injury he suffers is different in kind from that of the general public. This he may do by showing that his easement in the street, as a means of access to his property, is impaired or destroyed. His easement, however, is limited to the portion of the street on which he abuts, or a street which affords him the only means of access to his property. Where his property is not in physical contact with the vacated portion of the street, and he has other reasonable means of access, the individual has no right of action by which he can enjoin the obstruction, or recover damages. The authorities are numerous in support of this proposition. Jones on Easements, sections 546 and 550, Smith v. Boston, 7 Cush., 254; Littler v. City of Lincoln, 106 Ill., 353; Kimball v. Homan, 74 Mich., 699; Bailey v. Culver, 84 Mo., 531; Jackson v. Jackson, 16 Ohio St., 163; Elliott on Railroads, section 1086; Buhl v. Depot Company, 98 Mich., 596. The reason is thus stated by Chief Justice Shaw in Quincy Canal v. Newcome, 7 Met., 276: "Where one suffers in common with all the public, although from his proximity to the obstructed way or otherwise from his more frequent occasion to use it, he may suffer in a greater degree than others, still, he cannot have an action, because it would cause such a multiplicity of suits as to be itself an intolerable evil.” The general principle is recognized in Jackson v. Jackson, supra, where it is said in the syllabus: “A claimant for damages in ,the alteration of a road is not entitled to recover where such alteration merely renders the road less convenient for travel, without directly impairing his access to the road from the improvements on his land.”

In all the cases in this state, where an owner of land is recognized as having such a property interest in a road' or street, as entitles him to an action for damages, or to restrain its obstruction, relate to the cases where, there was a direct physical connection between the portion of the street interfered with and the land of the complainant; or the part vacvated, furnished the only means of access to his property. In the latter case he is regarded as having an easement in the road or street, and its vacation or obstruction, affecting as it does his private rights, the injury to him is regarded as different in kind from that of the public. McQuigg v. Cullins, supra, is an instance of this kind. Where closing up a portion destroys the owner’s easement in the part not closed, and deprives him of any access to his land, the result to him is the same as if the entire way had been closed; and, in such case, he may properly be said to have an easement to his lands in the entire way, thoxigh his lands are connected with, or abut only upon a part of ir,. The other cases relate to the instances where, a city having established a grade, with reference to which the owner has improved his lot, subsequently changes it, making the access to the owner’s lot, as improved, less convenient, Crawford v. Delaware, supra, or, where, as in Street Railway v. Cumminsville, it is proposed to add a new burden to the street making access to his property by the abutting owner less convenient. In these and all similar instances, the owner is regarded as having an interest in the street in the na ture of property, that by “the justice of the constitution” cannot be taken from him against his consent until compensation has been made. It is plain to be seen that the case of the plaintiff falls within the principle of none of these decisions. Her lot is not located upon the vacated portion; and access to it is hardly in any appreciable degree impaired, is, in fact, by the new alley, increased.

We see no good reason for holding, as seems to be contended, that the rule is different as to the streets and alleys of an addition to the plat of a city; that in such case there is an implied covenant that the streets and alleys, indicated on the plat, are to remain open for public use, and that each owner of a lot in the addition may insist on this covenant. In our view the streets and alleys of every addition to a city become a part of its general system of public ways, over which the city through its council and other agents has the same control that it has over each and every part of the system; and that the rights of lot owners in the addition to the use of the streets and alleys, indicated on the recorded plat, are the same, but not greater, than are the rights of any lot owner upon a street or alley.

We are cited to some cases which seem to hold, that the right of a lot owner, in case of vacation, to the use of the street upon which he abuts, extends to the next intersecting street. This would be so, consistently with what has heretofore been said, if without such extension Ms property would be substantially isolated; otherwise we see no reason whatever for such a claim.

The provision in section 2654, Revised Statutes, that where a street or alley is vacated by a city council, “the right of way of any lot owner shall not be impaired thereby,” creates no new right — it simply preserves such right as the lot owner had in the street or alley by existing law. These have already been adverted to in this opinion. They are such rights as the owner, has in the portion of the street on which his property abuts, or may have in the street as the only reásonable access to his property. The provision was doubtless inserted to avoid the possible contention, that under the power conferred, such rights might be destroyed by its exercise. But such rights would have been preserved without this provision, as it would not have been in the power of the legislature to have authorized the city council to destroy vested rights.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversedand that of the common pleas affirmed.

Williams, Bubket, Speak, Davis and Shauck, JJ., concur.  