
    Gore v. Buzzard’s Adm’rs.
    February, 1833.
    Liability of Master for Transactions Carried on by Slave. — A person sends raw hides to a tanner, and receives tanned leather in return, by his slave: Heed, he is responsible to the tanner for the difference between the value of the raw material and the manufactured article, notwithstanding-the dealings were conducted on his part wholly through the agency of the slave, it appearing that the slave acted by verbal directions of his master.
    Assumpsit-- -Declaration — Allegations—Proof.—In as-sumpsit, there are two counts; one for the agreed price of goods sold; the other, quantum valebant for the same; on the general issue, the proof is, that plaintiff, being a tanner, received raw hides from defendant, ana credited him for the value, and senlhim in return tanned leather, and debited him with the value thereof, and the debt claimed is the balance appearing due the tanner on these dealings: Hki.d, the. proof is properly applicable to, and sustains the declaration.
    Assumpsit by Buzzard’s administrators against Gore, in the county court of Frederick. The declaration contained, 1. the common count of indebitatus assumpsit for the agreed price of goods sold and delivered by the plaintiffs’ intestate to the defendant, and 2. a count of quantum val-ebant for 'x'the same goods. The defendant pleaded non assumpsit, and the statute of limitations ; but, it seemed, no effort was made to sustain the latter plea.
    A.t the trial, the defendant filed a demurrer to evidence, in which the plaintiffs joined. The evidence therein stated, was —That for some four or five years preceding the death of Buzzard, who was a tanner, Gore was in the habit of sending raw hides to Buzzard’s tannery, and getting tanned leather from him; but he never transacted any part of these dealings in person, his raw hides having been alwaj’s brought to the tannery, and the tanned leather always sent to him, by his slaves, without any written order from him, and indeed without a word passing between him and Buzzard on the subject; that since Buzzard’s death, Gore had dealt with two other tanners in the neighbourhood, in the same manner, through the agency of his slaves ; he always sending his raw hides and the tanners sending back tanned leather, by the slaves, without written orders from Gore, or a word said by him to the tanners; and the accounts of these tanners for the debts so contracted by Gore through the agency of his slaves, had been settled by him without dispute: that the items of Buzzard’s account, namely, the charges for tanned leather sent Gore by his slaves, and the credits for raw hides brought by them, were first set down on a slate, and thence posted in a book by Buzzard himself; but Gore’s dealings with Buzzard, as charged in those accounts, amounted to about the same per annum, as his dealings with the other two tanners afterwards: that, in fact, it was the habit of Gore, to send his raw hides to some tannery, and to receive tanned leather in exchange, by his slaves, only giving verbal directions to them, to deliver the raw hides, and bring back what tanned leather he wanted: that, after Buzzard’s death, Gore desired a witness to apply to his administrators for his account; which being sent him, he examined it, and said, he would not pay interest (which the administrators had charged) but that if they would give him the credits he was entitled to, he would pay the principal, *if any should be due: and that Gore procured the assignment of a bond of one of Buzzard’s administrators, saying, he expected the amount of that bond would be enough to meet the claim of Buzzard’s estate against' him.
    The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the court on the demurrer to evidence. The county court gave judgment on the demurrer for the defendant. Buzzard’s administrators appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the judgment of the county court, and gave judgment for them. And then Gore appealed to this court.
    Nicholas, for the appellant.
    1st, The evidence did not sustain either count of the declaration. If it proved any contract, it was not a contract for the sale of tanned leather by Buzzard to Gore, either for a price certain and agreed, or for the reasonable value, but a contract for the exchange or barter of raw hides for tanned leather, from time to time. The customer or the manufacturer, as the case might be, was only bound to make good the difference be-tw.eea the value of the manufactured articles furnished by the one, and the raw material furnished by the other, if and whenever such difference should occur, by the delivery of like articles. 2ndl3r, The law of Virginia, 1 Rev. Code, ch. Ill, § 19, p. 426, provides, that “no person whatever shall buy, sell or receive, of, to or from, a slave, any commodity whatever, without the leave or consent of the master,, owner or overseer of such slave,” and imposes a penalty on any person dealing with a slave without such leave or consent. It would defeat the policy of this statute, and be of mischievous consequence, if a person may be allowed to carry on (as Buzzard did in this case) dealings for a series of years, with the slaves of his neighbor, receiving raw materials from them, and delivering the manufactured article they ask for, without a word said by or to the owner on the subject, before, during, or after such dealings, and then to recover from the owner what may be due on the transaction, *upon the implied leave or consent of the owner to the dealings of his slaves. The policy of the statute cannot be effectuated, but by requiring a person who deals with a slave, to have the express leave or consent of the owner, before or at the time of the dealings. Therefore, the evidence is insufficient in law to prove, that the agency of Gore’s slaves in these dealings with Buzzard, was authorized by Gore; and the judgment of the county court was right, —as the judgment of a county court will generally be found to be, in all cases involving a question of police.
    Johnson, contra.
    Supposing the objection arising from the agency of the slaves out of the way, the dealings fairly to be inferred from the evidence, consisted in sales of raw hides by Gore to Buzzard, and sales of tanned leather by Buzzard to Gore; for there is evidence, that Buzzard gave Gore credit for the value of the raw hides, and charged him with that of the tanned leather, in money; and that this account being rendered to Gore, he made no objection to the items of debit, but only claimed credits beyond what were allowed him, of which however, he never adduced any proof. And this evidence, moreover, suffices to prove a distinct admission by Gore, that the agency of his slaves in these dealings, was authorized by him; that his slaves received the tanned leather he wanted, which constituted the items of debit in the account, by his leave and consent, or rather by his express direction previously given to them. The authorized agency of Gore’s slaves in his dealings with Buzzard, is also proved by the evidence of his dealing in that manner with two other tanners, and of his habit of dealing through the agency of his slaves, — of giving verbal directions to them to deliver his raw hides at the tannery, and to receive the tanned leather he wanted. The statute referred to, does not prohibit the receiving of goods from the owner by the hands of his slaves; nor does it require that the leave or consent of the owner to the dealings of his slaves, even on their own account, shall be in writing. The just inference from the evidence in this case, is, that Gore’s slaves acted *in these dealings by his directions and for him; in other words, by his leave and consent expressly and previously given: but, certainly, such leave and consent might have been implied from his-subsequent conduct, without direct positive-proof.
    
      
      Assumpsit. — See monographic nota on “Assump-sit” appended to Kennaird v. Jones, 9 Gratt. 183.
    
   CARR, J.

A demurrer to evidence is always a dangerous course; and here, I think it was particularly ill-advised. Tor the evidence stated in the demurrer, giving' it only fair play, and drawing the inferences which a jury should reasonably have drawn from it, is quite sufficient to establish the appellee’s claim to recover. The facts proved furnish the strongest grounds, to infer, that for a series of years Gore was in the habit of getting his leather from Buzzard’s tannery ;■ that though his slaves were his agents, or rather his instruments, for carrying raw hides to the tanner, and bringing back tanned leather, yet it was he who sent the raw material and received the manufactured article; and that he was to pay the difference, if any, between the values of what' he thus bought and sold. When Buzzard’s administrators rendered the account, at Gore’s instance, he examined it, and did not object to any of the charges against him; he only objected to the charge of interest, and said that if they would give him the credit she was entitled to, he would pay the principal. This was a plain admission of the justice of the account, except as to the interest, and as to the credits he claimed, which, however, he never attempted to prove; and this admission alone, affords a decisive answer to the whole argument for the appellant. The judgment of the circuit court is right.

The other judges concurred. Judgment affirmed.  