
    John Motley v. David Montgomery.
    The vendor of a slave promised to return the purchase monev, if the purchasershonld discover, that the vendor knew the slave to be unsound, at the time of the sale. Held, that the staiute of limitations commenced ta run from the time of the promise, and not from the time of an alleged discovery of the vendor’s knowledge of the unsoundness.
    Against a promise to pay upon a contingency, which does not suspend the right of action, the statute of limitations runs from the making of the promise, and not from the happening of the contingency.
    Tried before Mr. Justice Evans, at Kershaw, Spring Term, 1831.
    This was an action of assumpsit upon the implied warranty of soundness of a slave. Pleas, general issue, and statute of limitations. The character of this case will be sufficiency understood from the report of a former appeal, at page 11, ante. But little additional evidence was introduced on the present occasion. Daniel Motley testified, that about the 1st of October, 1822, the defendant called on the plaintiff for payment of his notes, on which occasion, the latter said to him, “Suppose I find out that you put off this negro upon me, knowing that she was unsound.” To which the defendant replied, “ 1 forever warrant that, and if yon ever discover that I did so, I will pay the money back.” This conversation occurred, confessedly,, more than four years before the commencement of this action ; but it was insisted for the plaintiff, that the statute did not commence to run against the promise, until his discovery of the defendant’s knowledge of the unsoundness of the slave. The presiding Judge was of opinion, that the case came within the principle settled in Lance v. Parker, 1 Mill, 168, and M’Dow-ell v. Goodwyn, 2 Id. 441; and that the statute commenced to run from the time when the promise was made: so that the plaintiff was barred before the commencement of this action.
    The jury, under the charge of the Court, found for the defendant ; and the plaintiff now moved to set aside the verdict for misdirection.
    W. and C. Mayrant, for the motion.
    Blanding, contra.
    
   Johnson, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

.We concur in the opinion of the presiding Judge, that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the statute of limitations. The statute begins to run, at the instant, that the plaintiff has a compíete cause of action against the defendant. If the defendant’s warranty in the sale of the negro was falsified, a cause of action arose immediately to the plaintiff; and the subsequent promise was nothing more than a re-assumption of his liability, so that the statute would operate from that time. This case is not analogous to that of a promise to pay on a contingency, as was suggested at the bar; for on reference to those cases it will be found, that there the liability itself depended on the contingency, so that no cause of action arose until it happened, and according to the rule the statute would not,run until then. Here the cause of action existed at the time, or arose, instantly, out of the promise; and according to Lance v. Parker, no undertaking of the defendant would have prevented the operation of the statute.

Motion refused.  