
    Jerry Wayne JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David L. RUNNELS; Attorney General of the State of California, Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 08-16737.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 14, 2010.
    
    Filed July 7, 2010.
    
      Alister Davidson McAlister, Alister McAlister, Attorney at Law, Wilton, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Brian R. Means, Deputy Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, Brian G. Smiley, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of The California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, Attorney General State of California, Brian R. Means, Deputy Attorney General, Brian G. Smiley, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents-Appel-lees.
    Before: RYMER and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and PALLMEYER, District Judge.
    
    
      
      The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. 
        See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jerry Wayne Johnson appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition for an alleged violation of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). We affirm.

The California Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent. First, the state court correctly identified the governing rule of law, stating that a timely motion for self-representation must be granted. Second, the facts of Johnson’s case are materially distinguishable from those in Faretta because “there was no suggestion in Faretta that the defendant’s request was made for the purpose of delaying the trial.” Hirschfield v. Payne, 420 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir.2005).

The state court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. See id. (“The requirement imposed by the [California] courts that the request not be for the purpose of delay is virtually identical to that imposed by this court, and we therefore cannot call it objectively unreasonable.”). Our decision in Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 264 (9th Cir.1997), upon which Johnson relies, is distinguishable because in that case “the trial court made no finding that [petitioner’s] request was a tactic for delay.”

The state court’s conclusion that Johnson brought his self-representation motion for purposes of delay is not “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Johnson made the motion only a week before trial, even though his case had been pending for more than a year. He offered no meaningful explanation for wanting to represent himself; nor did he explain why he had not brought the motion earlier. He sought not only a continuance of the trial but also permission to hire an investigator. The trial had been continued several times previously, including one four-month delay that arose when, on the day of the scheduled trial, Johnson’s lawyer had questioned Johnson’s mental competence.

Finally, Johnson’s contention that the state court failed to seriously consider his self-representation motion does not establish a basis for relief. Johnson relies on state, rather than federal, law in challenging the scope of the inquiry conducted by the trial court in response to his motion. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”). He points to no clearly established federal law requiring that the trial judge make an inquiry more searching than the one conducted in this case.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     