
    Woodrow FLEMMING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of NEW YORK, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-2928-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 29, 2011.
    Woodrow Flemming, Malone, NY, pro se.
    Present: ROBERT D. SACK, PETER W. HALL, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Woodrow Flemming, pro se, appeals the district court’s (Hurd, J.) post-judgment order denying his motion to vacate the underlying judgment, in which the court had sua sponte dismissed his second amended complaint asserting claims against the State of New York and numerous individual state correctional officials and employees. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

In a civil case, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107 require an appellant to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the judgment or order being appealed unless the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, in which case a 60-day filing period applies. The United States Supreme Court has made “clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007). Therefore, this Court is “obliged to examine the question sua sponte.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 411 F.3d 323, 328 (2d Cir.2005). District courts, not the courts of appeals, have the authority to extend the time for filing an appeal, if certain statutory conditions are met. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5)-(6); see also Fed. R.App. P. 26(b)(1) (providing that “the court [of appeals] may not extend the time to file ... a notice of appeal (except as authorized in Rule 4)”). A notice of appeal by a prisoner appealing pro se is deemed filed the moment he or she delivers it to prison officials to be transmitted to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988); Fed. R.App. P. 4(c)(1).

In this case, because the challenged order was entered on May 24, 2010, Flem-ming had until Wednesday, June 23, 2010 to file a timely notice of appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Although there is no indication in the record that Flemming filed a document that he himself labeled as a notice of appeal, we may construe Flem-ming’s motion to vacate, which he dated June 24, 2010 and sent to this Court, as a notice of appeal. However, even if the construed notice of appeal is deemed filed on Thursday, June 24, 2010 pursuant to the prison mailbox rule under Houston, it was still untimely. Accordingly, because the notice of appeal was untimely filed, this appeal must be, and therefore is, DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
      
      . The Appellees were not served in the proceedings below, and have not appeared in the instant appeal.
     