
    James Reynolds et al. v. Samuel M. Green.
    An ordinance of the city of Cincinnati, making an assessment for grading and paving a street, provided that the owners of lots on which the assessments were made should severally pay the same within twenty days from the date of the ordinance, or he subject to the interest and penalty allowed thereon by law: Seld — that an action to enforce the lien of such assessment against a lot, commenced more than six years-after the date of the ordinance, hut within six years after the expiration of said twenty days, is not barred by the statute of limitations.
    Error to the Superior Court of Cincinnati.
    The original action was brought to enforce the lien of an assessment on real estate of the defendant, situated on Front-street, in the city of Cincinnati, for grading and paving. The petition was filed on March 11, 1867, and a demurrer thereto was sustained. An amended petition was filed November 16, 1869, to which a general demurrer was filed and sustained. Judgment was rendered for the defendant, which was affirmed on error in the general term.
    On the day of the filing of the oiiginal petition, a summons was issued, and returned “ not found.” Service was-then made by publication, the first notice being published November 30, 1867.
    The amended petition statedkhat, on the recommendation of the board of city improvements, the city council, on the-13th day of March, 1861, duly passed an ordinance for the paving and grading of Front street, and authorized a contract therefor with parties who duly assigned the same to-the plaintiff; that the work was done; that the assessment was made November 20, 1861, and it was provided in the-ordinance.that the owners of the lots on which the assessments were made should pay the amounts severally due to the contractors, within twenty days from the date of the-ordinance, or be subject to the interest and penalty allowed thereon by law.
    
      To reverse the judgments rendered at both the special and general term, a petition in error was filed in the Supreme Court.
    
      S. A. Miller, for plaintiff in error.
    
      W. Van Hamm, for defendant in error.
   Day, J.

Two points are made in the case : 1. The action is barred by the statute of limitations; 2. The work for which the assessment was made was not recommended by the board of city improvements. • Both points arise on demurrer to the petition.

The assessment ordinance was passed November 20,1861; but, by the terms of the ordinance, the defendant can not be regarded as in default until the expiration of twenty days thereafter; a right of action, therefore, to enforce the assessment, did not accrue until December 10, 1861.

The defendant was served by publication, and the first publication was made November 30, 1867. By section 20 of the code, the action must be deemed as commenced on that day. No shorter period of limitation can be claimed than that of six years. The action was commenced ten days before the expiration of that period; and, therefore, whatever may be determined to be the period of limitation to actions founded on municipal assessments, the action in this case was not barred.

As to the second point in question, it is only necessary to say, that though the point were well taken to the original petition, in the amended petition it is averred that the board of city improvements reported and recommended to the city council the passage of the ordinance for the work in question, thus making a prima facie case, good on general demurrer.

Judgment reversed,, and cause remanded.

Scott, Chief Judge, Wright, Johnson, and Ashburn, JJ., concurred.  