
    The State vs. E. B. Farrow.
    In an indictment for perjury, it is enough to allege, that the defendant was “ duly sworn” &c. : it is not necessary to allege, that the oath was taken on the Gospel of God, or Holy Bible, or according to the ceremonies of any particular religion.
    The indictment need not allege, that the court at which the oath was taken, had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, or of the discount — it is sufficient to allege, that the action, to which the discount was set up, was by summary process.
    In an indictment for perjury, the prosecutor, unless he has a direct, certain and immediate interest in the record, is a competent witness.
    BEFORE WITHERS, J., AT FAIRFIELD, FALL TERM, 1856.
    Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows:
    “ Tbe defendant.was tried for and convicted of perjury. I never beard tbe indictment read, but tbe course of tbe case developed that tbe perjury was assigned of an oatb taken before Judge Wardlaw, at Fairfield court bouse, when trying a summary process, brought by E. A. Yongue, against this defendant, upon a note given by bim to Yongue for a watcb; in wbicb case tbe defendant filed a discount for eigbty-one dollars and fifty cents (being about tbe sum of wbat was due on tbe note) appeared with bis book of entries as a physician, testified to bis -account, was closely cross-examined, and finally withdrew bis discount before a decree was rendered for tbe plaintiff Yongue. I suppose, since no question was or is raised as to it, that tbe evidence sustained tbe peijury as it was assigned
    “ Whether tbe perjury has been sufficiently assigned in tbe indictment, that is to say, whether tbe motion in arrest of judgment, wbicb is set down in tbe notice of appeal, be well founded, is a matter upon wbicb I can make no observation as it was not submitted to me, and can be understood and adjudged only upon inspection of the indictment.
    
      “ Touching the grounds for a new trial, the following statement will suffice:
    “The solicitor and the defendant’s counsel defined the offence of perjury to the jury. I perceived no conflict in their views; and when I came to charge the juay, I so said to them; and but repeated what I supposed was quite agreed upon as a definition of the offence. But when speaking of circumstances to be proved as corroborating, I did not omit the word strong, which I observe is not used in that ground which purports to report my definition.
    
      “ If Yongue was not a competent witness, I have only to report, that I have no recollection, or memorandum, that he was objected to, on the trial.”
    The defendant appealed and now moved this Court, in arrest of judgment, and for a new trial, on the grounds, inter alia:
    
    In arrest of judgment.
    1. Because the indictment does not allege or state that defendant’s oath was taken on the Cospel of Cod, or Holy Bible, or from religious persuasion, with uplifted hand; nor in what form or manner the oath was taken.
    2. Because the indictment does not allege or charge, that the Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit of the prosecutor, nor of the discount of the defendant; and further because the amount of the discount offered by the defendant at the suit of the prosecutor was not stated or charged in said indictment, thereby preventing his Honor who tried the above case from knowing judicially whether the discount was not under or above the summary process jurisdiction, in either of which cases the subject matter would not have been within tbe jurisdiction of tbe Court; and no perjury could bave been committed:
    Eor a new trial.
    2. Because tbe evidence of tbe prosecutor, E. A. Yongue, was admitted, when be was directly interested in procuring tbe defendant’s conviction, thereby getting freed from judgment of defendant’s discount still banging over him, which interest made tbe prosecutor an incompetent witness.
    Buchanan, for appellant.
    Melton, solicitor, contra.
   Tbe opinion of tbe Court was delivered by

MuNBO, J.

In reference to tbe defendant’s first ground in arrest of judgment, it is a mistake to suppose, that in an indictment for perjury, it is necessary to allege, that tbe oath upon which tbe perjury is assigned, was taken upon tbe Gospel of God, or Holy Bible; or that it was administered to tbe defendant according to tbe ceremonies of any particular religion. In tbe indictment in this case,, it is alleged that “ the said E. B. Earrow was then, and there, offered and appeared, as a witness, to establish and prove tbe discount so offered by him, in the plea aforesaid, and was then and there duly sworn, &c.” So far from this manner of stating tbe oath being objectionable, it is on tbe contrary in strict conformity with tbe most approved precedents, (see 3 Chit. Or. L. 309,) and infinitely less liable to objection, than tbe mode of stating it, as suggested in tbe defendant’s ground of appeal, as will be seen by reference to tbe case of tbe State vs. Porter, 2 Hill, 611.

As regards tbe defendant’s second ground, because tbe indictment does not allege that tbe Court bad jurisdiction of tbe subject matter of tbe prosecutor’s suit, or of tbe defendant’s discount — it is sufficient to say, tbat tbe allegation in tbe indictment, tbat tbe action to wbicb tbe defendant set up bis discount was on a summary process, is sufficiently specific, without setting out, either tbe amount of tbe plaintiff’s demand, or of tbe defendant’s discount — for if tbe discount bad not been within tbe summary process jurisdiction, it would have been wholly inadmissible.

Tbe only other ground we deem it necessary to consider, is tbe second ground for a new trial, wbicb questions tbe competency of tbe prosecutor to testify, because, as is said, be was interested in procuring tbe defendant’s conviction. Tbe rule as to tbe competency of tbe prosecutor to testify in a prosecution for perjury, is thus stated in tbe 3d Vol. of Greenleaf’s Ev., sec. 390. “Tbe modern rule places tbe prosecutor in tbe same position as any other witness, rejecting him only where be has a direct, certain, and immediate interest in the record.”

Testing tbe prosecutor’s competency by this rule, and assuming him to have been really indebted to tbe defendant, there was certainly nothing in tbe mere fact of bis indebtedness tbat could extend to bis competency; however it might affect his credibility, and'wbicb by tbe way, was a question, not for tbe Court, but for tbe jury.

■ As regards tbe remaining grounds of appeal, we have been unable to discover any thing in either of them, tbat can avail tbe defendant, without trenching upon tbe province of tbe jury-

Tbe motion is therefore dismissed.

O’Neall, Waedlaw, Withebs, WhitNEe, and G-loyeR, JJ., concurred.

Motion refused.  