
    
      State vs. Giles Bowers.
    
    1. On an indictment under the Act of 1817, for trading with a slave for corn, without a permit, evidence that the slave, at the instance of the defendant, carried the corn into his kitchen, and there left it, is not the less competent to go the jury for their consideration, together with all the other facts and circumstances to prove the illegal trading, because the Act of 1834 has provided that similar evidence in certain cases,' shall, of itself, be sufficient for conviction.
    
      Before Richardson, J. Edgefield, Spring Term, 1844. •
    Giles Bowers was indicted for trading with Adam, the slave of Mr. Yancey, for corn, without a permit, &c.
    
    Yancey employed and directed Adam to test the dispositions of the defendant — he and Butler watched, and heard the conversation of the defendant with Adam — ten o'clock at night. Defendant finally told Adam to take the corn into the kitchen. Adam did so, and went away. Yancey ■ and Butler then went into the kitchen, and found the corn there — called out the defendant, who denied that he had bought the corn, and said that he had told Adam to take it away — this was denied by Yancey. Mr. Yancey said that he had told Adam to sell corn to defendant if he could. Yancey, with two other persons, followed the slave, Adam, who left the corn at defendant’s kitchen door. The defendant, on being aroused, spoke to Adam in an under tone, and told him to take the com into the kitchen, which he did, and went away. Witness saw the bag of corn in the kitchen, and one of the persons with him knew the bag as the same that had been given to Adam, and the same corn. A witness in the defence said that defendant had said he did not want the corn, and told the slave sent to take it out of the kitchen.
    The presiding Judge charged the jury to decide-for themselves, whether the charge for unlawful trading with Adam had been made out by the evidence. That leaving the corn was competent evidence to go to them. But they were to decide, under all the circumstances of the case, whether there was satisfactory proof that the defendant unlawfully bought the corn. If satisfied of this, the defendant ought to be convicted ; if otherwise, he ought to be discharged. They found him guilty.
    The defendant appealed for a new trial, on the following grounds:
    1. That his Honor, the presiding Judge, erred in charging the jury that a defendant might be convicted of a trading, &c., with a slave, upon evidence shewing that the slave carried a bag of corn to the house of the defendant, and was seen to leave the house without such bag. The defendant in this case being indicted under the Act pf the General Assembly of 1817, could not be subjected to the provisions of the Act of 1834, against trading with a slave.
    2. Because the verdict was contrary to law and the evidence.
    
      Mr. Gray, for the motion. Edwards, Solicitor, contra.
   Curia, per

Richardson, J.

The question is, whether the evidence that Adam, at the instance of the defendant, carried the corn into the kitchen and there left it, was competent evidence to go to the jury for their consideration, together with all the other facts and circumstances, in order to prove the illegal trading of Giles Bowers with Adam, when indicted under the Act of 1817, and not under the Act of 1834.

There was and could be no objection upon general principles of law to such facts; they must go for what they are worth'. But the objection is this, that as under the Act of 1834, where shopkeepers, (fee., are indicted for such illegal trading, it is enacted, “that,” (fee., “it shall be sufficient for the conviction of such person, to prove,” (fee., “that the slave entered such shop,” (fee., (fee., “with the article charged in the indictment, and left the said shop,” (fee., “without the same.” it follows, such is the objection to the present verdict, that this provision cannot apply to prosecutions for illegal trading under the Act of 1817 ; that is, to prosecutions against other persons than such as are enumerated in the Act of 1834. And assuredly this may be very possibly true. But it does not follow that such evidence, thus made, of itself, “sufficient for the conviction,” in certain cases, may not go to the jury, to induce them to convict in any case.

Before the Act of 1834, such evidence was competent and good for what it might be worth. It remains so still, certainly not the worse, because the Act of 1834 makes it very good, and even “sufficient for conviction,” of itself, in certain particular cases. The severe policy of this enactment against certain traders and traffickers, is very intelligible. But it leaves the Act of 1817, and the rules of evidence as applicable to prosecutions under it, as before the Act of 1834. These were properly applied to the present case. Therefore, the motion is dismissed.

O’Neall, Evans, Butler, Wardlaw and Frost, JJ. concurred.  