
    Scoville against Canfield.
    NEW-YORK,
    October, 1817.
    An act of the he ticut prohibits, nal/ tiíer purchose in action by an attorney or counsellor at law, sheriff, de* onDstahferilf,exc/e3 i"/d p/" any action,1 tiÍ“ nonsuited/i/it opon a c/tóra hi edTmtraryhato st/ute!”1 /n''a this state" on "a judgment rendered^in Con-that the judgpurchased by ofSAaroa’inuíe timt,°contrary of thePact/and jn/h/name'of forphe”benefit a bar; because, fuff effect istbto be given, here to that inv/uiate1 the and/heapMntlif suited6,’"Is ”n°t w"r'disaffirming MngingVne™ Statute, without riimy1” or’e the only onperi‘the makes the assignment penal, the doctrine of the lex loci does not apply. Justice is to be administered in our courts according to our own laws and forms of proceeding, although the action be founded on a contract made in another state or country: the lex loci applying only to the construction* and eiTect of the contract. A penal law is strictly local, and cannot have any operation beyond the jurisdiction of the country where it'
    THIS was an action of assumpsit, The declaration contained a count on a judgment for 488 dollars and 32 cents, recovered by the plaintiff against the defendant, in the Superior Court of the state of Connecticut, hoi den at Litchfield, in Fe- . . . bruary, 1815. It also contained a count on an msimul compuv . ■* taSsentf and the common money counts.
    The 'defendant pleaded, 1. The general issue ; and, 2. Á special plea to the count on the judgment, stating, that by the first section of an act of the legislature of the state °f Connecticut, passed in 1809, entitled, “An act to prevent unlawful maintenanceit is enacted, as follows: “ that no attorney or counsellor at law, sheriff, deputy sheriff, .or constable, shall directly, or indirectly, buy, or be, in any way or man- . , . , . -, , , , ner, interested, in buying any bond, bill, promissory writing, book debt, or other chose in action, unless in payment for estate, either real or personal, or for services rendered; or for a or debts antecedently contracted, without intent to evade or violate this act, on pain of forfeiting a sum equal to the amount of the bond, bill, promissory writing, book debt, or other chose in action so unlawfully bought, to be recovered, in any proper action, by any .person who may sue for the same before any proper court, or by complaint or information or any informing officer: Provided, that this act shall not be construed to ^ , , the buying of any bill of exchange, draft, or other c^ose 'n action purchased for the purpose of remittance, and not t0 evade this actThat by the second section of the said 3ct ^ *s further enacted, as follows: “ That it shall be lawful f°r any defendant, in any suit brought on any bond, bill, proniissory writing, or other chose in action, to file his motion before any city court, assistant, or justice of the peace, at the time of his appearance; and if before any court of common pleas, on the second day of the session thereof, alleging that Be verily believes that the bond, bill, promissory writing, book debt, or other chose in action, hath been bought contrary to the provisions of this act, and praying the court, assistant, or justice, to inquire into the truth thereof, by common law proof, or by the oath of the plaintiff, if a resident within this state, or by the oath of the attorney in such suit, if a resident without this state, which the court, assistant, or justice, is hereby authorized to do; and if the plaintiff or attorney in the cases aforesaid shall refuse to disclose, on oath, regarding the facts alleged in such motion, or if on such disclosure, it shall appear that such bond, bill, promissory writing, book debt, or other chose in action, hath been bought in violation of this act, the plaintiff shall be nonsuited.’’ The plea further stated, that at the lime the judgment was rendered against the defendant, he was an inhabitant of the state of Connecticut, and that the plaintiff then was, and ever since had been, an inhabitant of that state : that on the 1st of April, 1816, before the commencement of this suit, at Sharon, in the said state, one Amos Beecher, an inhabitant of Sharon, bought the judgment of the plaintiff, and all his interest therein ; that this suit is prosecuted by Beecher in the name of the plaintiff, but for his own use; that Beecher was, at the time of purchasing "the judgment, and still is, a constable in and for the town of Sharon, in the state of Connecticut, duly and legally appointed, and that the judgment was bought by Beecher while he was constable as aforesaid, contrary to the intent and meaning of the said act, and not in payment for estate either real or personal, &c., but to prosecute a suit thereon against the defendant, in the name of the plaintiff,, for his own use and benefit.
    To this plea there was a general demurrer, and joinder.
    
      Swift, in support of the demurrer.
    
      P. Ruggles, contra. He cited 3 Johns. Rep. 263. 1 Johns. Cas. 411. 12 Johns. Rep. 343. 2 Caines’ Cas. in Error, 322.
   Spencer, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court. (After stating the pleadings.)

The plea caunot be sustained. Were we to give full effect to the statute, and consider it as attaching on the debt assigned, we could not say that the assignment extinguished, or even invalidated, the original judgment. The act pleaded contains nothing which, in any way, impairs the force and effect of the debt or chose in action assigned; the penalty inflicted operates merely on the person offending against the act, by buying; it could not be the intention of the legislature to annihilate the debt assigned. This is rendered very manifest, when it is noticed tha^t the effect of its being proved or admitted that the buying the chose in action was in contravention of the act, is, that the plaintiff shall be nonsuited; this not being a bar to another suit, the parties, even in Connecticut, might disaffirm the contract of sale, and then- a new suit might be maintained for the debt before assigned.

But there is a greater difficulty still; although we notice the lex loci, in construing and giving effect to the contract between the parties, we must administer justice to them, according to our laws, and the forms prescribed by our legislature, or the usages of our courts of justice. This principle was distinctly recognised and adopted in the case of Lodge v. Phelps, (1 Johns. Cas. 139.) and in Ruggles v. Keeler. (3 Johns. Rep. 263.) That part of the statute of Connecticut set forth in the plea, which, under certain circumstances, authorizes their courts to nonsuit the plaintiff, if it shall appear that the chose in action has been bought contrary to its provisions, was not addressed to the courts of other states; and had it been so, it would have been nugatory and unavailing.

There is another decisive answer, as regards the act pleaded. The plea admits the validity of the judgment declared on, and we are called on by the defendant not to apply the lex loci in the construction of the contract; but we are required to give effect to a law which inflicts a penalty for acquiring a right to a chose in action. The defendant cannot take advantage of, nor expect this court to enforce, the criminal laws of another state. The penal acts of one state can have no operation in another state. Penal laws are strictly local, and affect nothing more than they can reach. (1 H. Bl. 135. Foliot v. Ogden, Cowp. 343.)

Judgment for the plaintiff.  