
    Henry E. WELLER, Appellant, v. Christine A. WELLER, Appellee.
    No. 97-1443.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    May 1, 1998.
    
      Robert G. Murrell of Sam E. Murrell & Sons, Orlando, for Appellant.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
   COBB, Judge.

The issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in awarding permanent periodic alimony to a healthy, 46 year old wife upon dissolution of the couple’s nine year, childless marriage. The wife is fully capable of working and supporting herself. We hold that the award of permanent periodic alimony in these circumstances constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Stewart v. Stewart, 696 So.2d 1237 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) The trial court failed to identify any extraordinary contributions of the wife to the marriage in support of its permanent alimony award. Furthermore, the husband’s alleged misconduct relating to a purported affair was not shown to have caused any material depletion of the parties’ marital assets. See Siegel v. Siegel, 564 So.2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). See also Haley v. Haley, 649 So.2d 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

We have considered whether remand for consideration of an award of rehabilitative alimony would be appropriate but conclude that such an award could not be made given the ex-wife’s failure to present below any plan for rehabilitation. See Glazner v. Glazner, 693 So.2d 650 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Register v. Register, 690 So.2d 750 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). See also Martin v. Martin, 582 So.2d 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).

Nothing in our opinion should be read as disturbing paragraph E of the dissolution judgment to the extent it requires the husband to provide health insurance for the wife until she becomes employed and has a health program available to her.

The alimony award is REVERSED.

ANTOON, J., concurs.

W. SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.

W. SHARP, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The fact findings of the trial court, in this case, were not specific enough in order to provide us with a meaningful review of an award of either permanent or rehabilitative alimony. See § 61.08(1), Fla. Stat. In such cases we most often remand to the trial court in order to afford it the opportunity to make adequate fact findings. See, e.g, Miller v. Miller, 625 So.2d 1320 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Turner v. Turner, 529 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). I think we should follow that procedure in this case. This does not appear to me to be an open-and-shut ease for a no permanent alimony award.

Nor do I think we should foreclose the possibility that on remand an award of rehabilitative alimony might be proper, if sustained by sufficient fact findings. This was not a short-term marriage — nine years. The former wife is 46 years of age. Although she worked to support herself and the former husband’s household, in Florida, she may have suffered a decline or loss of earnings potential when she moved with the former husband to Florida shortly after the marriage, at his request and insistence, and gave up her job as supervisor in a manufacturing business.

Further, there was evidence that the former husband caused the former wife to lose the job she held in Florida because he came to her place of employment and “everybody was concerned for their safety.” At the time of the dissolution, the former wife was unemployed and the former husband was earning $38,000.00 gross per year or higher. The former wife’s highest gross earning potential was $20,000.00 per year.

An award of rehabilitative alimony under these circumstances would be within the trial court’s discretion, designed to provide support until the former wife can re-establish herself as selfsupporting. See Hann v. Hann, 629 So.2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Siegel v. Siegel, 564 So.2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Contogeorgos v. Contogeorgos, 482 So.2d 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).  