
    THE CUNARD STEAM-SHIP CO. v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 16643.
    Decided June 9, 1890.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    Coal is Imported in June, 1886, the importers then having the right to use it for fuel on foreign-built vessels and be allowed a drawback. The subsequent act, June, 1886, provides that on and after the 1st of July the right shall extend only to .vessels of the United States. The importers do not take it out of bond until after the 1st of July.
    I. The Act 3d March, 1883 (22 Stat. L., p. 511), providing that a drawback of 75 cents per ton be allowed upon “ coal imported into the United States whieh is afterwards used as fuel on hoard vessels” confers a privilege not in the nature of a contract, liable to be withdrawn at any time.
    II. The Act 19th Jume, 1886 (24 Stat. L., p. 81, § 10), whieh provides that from the 1st of July ensuing the right to the drawback given by the Act 3d March, 1883, shall “apply only to vessels of the United States” is not retroactive, but nevertheless is applicable to importations made before its enactment if the privilege of withdrawal was not exercised before the 1st of July.
    
      The Reporters'1 statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of this case as found by the court:
    I. Plaintiff was at the date of the transactions hereinafter mentioned a steam-ship corporation, created by the laws of Great Britain, having its principal office in Liverpool, England; the principal officers reside in England; it has an office in the city of Boston, State of Massachusetts. Plaintiff ’s business is the transporting of freight and passengers upon the ocean, and among its lines is one between Liverpool, England, by way of Queenstown, Ireland, to Boston, Mass., and return. It is not, and has not been, engaged in the coasting trade between ports of the United States.
    II. The following importations of bituminous coal into the United States were made at the port of Boston, Mass.:
    On the 1st day of June, 1886, in the schooner L. W. Smith, 542 tons, on the 14th day of June, 1886, in the schooner General 8. B. Mirwin, 500 tons; on the 14th day of June, 1886, in the schooner General 8. JE. Merwin, 157 tons; on the 14th day of June, 1886, in the schooner General 8. UJ. Merwin, Q79 tons; on the 22d day of June, 1886, in the schooner L. B. Jones, 265 tons; on the 22d day of June, 1886, in the schooner L. B. Jones, 150 tons. All of the said bituminous coal was imported for the purpose of withdrawal for use on board plaintiff’s steam-ships sailing from Boston to Liverpool. Said coal was duly entered for warehousing under bond, to be withdrawn at various time.s by plaintiff for use as fuel on board its steamships engaged in said trade, but none of it was actually withdrawn for such use until after the 1st day of July, 1886. The duties paid upon said coal importéd amounted in the aggregate to the sum of $1,700.95. The warehouse entries were liquidated and all subsequent proceedings took place after July 1, 1886.
    III. Said coal was entered in bond prior to July 1, 1886. After July 1, 1886, plaintiff made application by presenting warehouse entries for the withdrawal of the said coal, and the same was refused; plaintiff was informed that it would be obliged to pay the duty under a recent law; it thereupon paid the same and again presented the entries for withdrawal, and they were again refused; it then made entry for consumption, and paid the duty of 75 cents per ton; it then presented its entries for a drawback, which were rejected, whereupon it filed protests and appeals.
    IV. The drawback on said coal at the statutory rate of 75 cents per ton amounted to the sum of $1,720 95. Defendant has not paid the same, or any part thereof, although it has been demanded from the Secretary of the Treasury.
    V. The following is the condition of the warehouse bonds given when the coal was entered :
    “Now, therefore, the condition of the above obligation is such, that if, within one year from the said date of original importation, the said goods, wares, and merchandise shall be regularly and lawfully'withdrawn from public store or bonded warehouse on payment of the legal duties and charges to which they shall then be subject; or if, after the expiration of one year, and within three years from the said date of original importation, they shall be so withdrawn upon the like payment, with ten per centum added upon the amount of such duties and charges; or if at any time within three years f*om the said date of original importation they shall be so withdrawn for actual export beyond the limits of the United States, then the above obligation to be void; otherwise to remain in full force.”
    
      Mr. John Goode for the claimant:
    It will be observed that the act of March 3, 1883, makes no distinction on account of nationality between vessels upon which imported bituminous coal might be used with benefit of drawback. Our contention is that, the said bituminous coal having been imported into the United States under the act of March 3,1883, the right of the claimant to demand and receive the drawback was complete before the passage of the act of June 19, 1886, which did not take effect until July 1,1886. There is nothing in the act of June 19, 1886, to indicate that Congress intended to disturb or interfere with the rights of any claimant which had already been acquired under the act of March 3, 1883. The position assumed by the Treasury Department cannot be sustained unless it is made clearly to appear that Congress intended the act of June 19,1886, to have a retroactive effect. Such an intention is not expressed in the terms of the act, and unless it clearly appears that such was the intention,the construction given to it by the Treasury Department will not be favored by the courts. (Chew Heong v. The United States, 112 U. S. It., 559.)
    Any construction of the act of June 19, 1886, which would impair rights already existing is not only forbidden by Art. I, sec. 9, of the Constitution of the United States, but has been repeatedly discountenanced by the decisions of the Supreme Court. It is an established rule of interpretation that every statute should be confined strictly in its operation to the future. We submit that Congress intended the act of June 1.9,1886, to apply only to importations of bituminous coal made after the 1st of July, 1886, and that the claimant is entitled to recover the drawback claimed.
    
      
      Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Cotton for the defendants.
   Davis, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Drawback is claimed in this case upon bituminous coal imported for use upon plaintiff’s steam-ships plying from Boston to Liverpool. The act of March 3,1883, provided, in Schedule U. thereof, that a drawback of 75 cents per ton should be allowed upon “all bituminous coal imported into the United States, which is afterwards used for fuel on board vessels propelled by steam which are engaged in the coasting trade of the United States, or in the trade with foreign countries, to be all ,wed and paid under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe.”

In June, 1886, the following act was passed, to take effect upon the 1st of July following:

“ Sec. 10. That the provisions of Schedule U of 'An act to reduce internal-revenue taxation, and for other purposes,’ approved March 3, 1883, allowing a drawback on imported bituminous coal used for fuel on board vessels propelled by steam, shall be construed to apply only to vessels of the United States.”

This act the Secretary of the Treasury applied to coal imported prior to July 1, 1886, upon which the drawback had not been paid at that date. Plaintiff had imported several cargoes of bituminous coal during the month of June. The coal was duly entered in bond for warehousing, to be withdrawn for use as fuel upon steam-ships, but the warehouse entries were not liquidated, nor were other proceedings taken, nor was the coal withdrawn until after July 1. Acting upon the construction given the act of 1886 by his superior officer, the collector at Boston collected the duties upon the coal, which were paid under pro-t est, and refused to pay the drawback.

A similar question was presented to this court in Kennedy v. The United States (23 C. Cls. R., 361), and the court held •that 1'ongress intended the act of 1886 to “ apjily only to reshipments thereaiter made.” In Kennedy’s Case the reshipments were made prior to July 1, and all that remained to be done after that date was the payment of the drawback. In the case at bar the coal had been imported prior to July 1,1886, but was not reshipped until after -that date. Upon these facts the question is presented whether plaintiff’s rights are to be measured by the law as it existed when the coal was imported or as it existed when the coal was reshipped.

The case is analogous to that of an importer who, upon the faith of an existing- tariff, imports goods from a distance and finds that during transit the tariff has been changed, and that he is bound to a higher rate of duty than the one upon the faith of which he had ordered the goods from the foreign producer or manufacturer.

In the case at bar there was no increase of duty upon the-coal; there was merely the withdrawal of a privilege to obtain a return of the duty paid should the coal be exported for a certain purpose. The statute, we have held, was not retroactive, and we are still of that opinion, so the question remains whether plaintiff’s right to the benefit of the act of 1883 accrued at the date of importation of the coal or at the date of withdrawal for reshipment.

The right of the G-overnment to impose taxes, duties, imposts, and excises is not a right sounding in contract with the individual. A tax may at any time be increased or diminished or a new tax or a new duty may be at any time imposed without founding any right in contract upon the part of the individual against the Government. The tariff is always subject to change, and the owner of the goods in transit at the time has no rights because of this change, but must pay the duties imposed by the law as it exists at the time the goods arrive. If the duty shall have been increased he will suffer; if it shall have been lowered he will be the gainer, and those will lose who have on hand goods imported under the former and higher tariff. (United States v. Benzon, 2 Cliff., 512.)

The right to the drawback under the act of 1883 did not arise until the coal was withdrawn for reshipment, and when so withdrawn in this case the privilege no longer existed. The act of 188G was not retroactive, but it did operate upon coal reshipped after July 1, when it came into effect.

The petition is dismissed.  