
    Saul Ruben OCHOA-BENITEZ, aka Saul Ochoa, aka Saul R. Ochoa, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-3285.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 15, 2015.
    
      Julie A. Goldberg, Bronx, N.Y., for Petitioner.
    Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director; Channah F. Norman, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, RICHARD C. WESLEY, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Saul Ruben Ochoa-Benitez, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of an August 14, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming a June 26, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Ochoa-Benitez’s motion to rescind his removal order entered in absentia. In re Saul Ruben Ochoa-Benitez, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (BIA Aug. 14, 2014), affg No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig.Ct.N.Y. City June 26, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We have reviewed the agency’s denial of Ochoa-Benitez’s motion to rescind for abuse of discretion. See Alrefae v. Cher-toff, 471 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir.2006). An order of removal entered in absentia “may be rescinded only — (i) upon a motion to reopen filed within 180 days after the date of the order of removal if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances ...; or (ii) upon a motion to reopen filed at any time if the alien demonstrates that the alien did not receive notice ... and the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C). Ochoa-Benitez’s motion to rescind was subject to the 180-day time limit because he admitted that he received notice of his hearing and asserted that exceptional circumstances should excuse his failure to appear. See id. It is undisputed that Ochoa-Benitez’s 2013 motion to rescind was untimely filed because the IJ ordered him removed in absentia in 2006. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i).

In order to warrant equitable tolling or establish exceptional circumstances, even assuming that prior counsel was ineffective, an alien is required to demonstrate “due diligence” in pursuing his claim during “both the period of time before the ineffective assistance of counsel was or should have been discovered and the period from that point until the motion to reopen is filed.” Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.2008); see also Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2006). Ochoa-Benitez failed to demonstrate due diligence. He did not take any action to pursue reopening in the approximately six years that passed between his unauthorized reentry to the United States in 2007 and his retention of current counsel upon his arrest in 2013. See Jian Hua Wang v. BIA, 508 F.3d 710, 715-16 (2d Cir.2007). Accordingly, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Ochoa-Benitez’s motion, and we need not consider his alternative arguments challenging the agency’s decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  