
    Lisa SUAREZ v. Shawn M. BARNEY, the Honorable Kimberly Williamson Butler and the Honorable Fox McKeithen.
    No. 2005-CA-0671.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    May 9, 2005.
    
      Salvador Anzelmo, Thomas W. Milliner, Brian J. Burke, Michael J. Laughlin, New Orleans, Counsel for Lisa Suarez.
    Ernest L. Jones, Lolis Edward Elie, Elie, Jones & Associates, New Orleans, Counsel for Shawn Marcel Barney.
    Court composed of Chief Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge CHARLES R. JONES, Judge PATRICIA RIVET MURRAY, Judge JAMES F. McKAY III, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS Sr., Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge MAX N. TOBIAS, Judge DAVID S. GORBATY, Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge LEON A. CANNIZZARO, Jr., Judge ROLAND L. BELSOME.
   11 KIRBY, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, which sustained an objection to the candidacy of Shawn M. Barney for the office of State Senator for the Third Senatorial District of Louisiana. We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 19, 2005 Mr. Barney filed a notarized notice of candidacy for election to the office of “State Senator, 3rd Senatorial District” in the primary election scheduled for May 21, 2005. That form lists his “domicile address: as 4490 DeMontluzin Street, New Orleans, LA 70122.” That form also shows that he is a qualified elector of Orleans Parish in Ward 8, Precinct 21.

Subsequently, on April 7, 2005 Lisa Suarez filed suit in the Civil District Court objecting to Mr. Barney’s candidacy. One basis alleged for the objection was that despite the assertion in the sworn notice of candidacy, Mr. Barney was not registered to vote in Ward 8, Precinct 21, but that, according to official records of Lthe Orleans Parish Registrar of Voters, Mr. Barney was in fact registered in Ward 9, Precinct 44 at an address of 11900 Morrison Road. The other basis asserted for the objection was that, contrary to the information in the notice of candidacy, Mr. Barney was domiciled at the 11900 Morrison Road address, which is not physically within the boundaries of the Third Senatorial District. Ms. Suarez prayed for judgment disqualifying Mr. Barney as a candidate for the Third Senatorial District seat. Trial was held May 2, 2005 before The Honorable Carolyn W. Gill-Jefferson.

FACTS

At trial Mr. Barney testified that he provided all of the information on the notice of candidacy form, except the ward and precinct data, to a clerk who typed it into a computer. He did not know the ward and precinct designation for the place he voted and the typist asked someone else in the clerk’s office to get the appropriate numbers. That person used the address he gave on the form to find the ward/precinct information. Mr. Barney admitted reading the data as it was being entered into the computer and he signed the form when it was complete.

The testimony reveals Mr. Barney lived for most of his youth with his parents at the Morrison Road address. After graduating from high school in New Orleans, he attended college at Howard University in Washington, D.C. and upon graduation traveled to various temporary job assignment locations for his | ^employment. Mr. Barney decided to return to New Orleans shortly after the 9-11 disaster in 2001 and moved in with his parents at the Morrison Road address. He resided there until June of 2003.

Mr. Barney entered into an unrecorded lease for the DeMontluzin address. It expired in May 2004, but Mr. Barney has been paying the rent on a month-to-month basis. He testified that it was his intention to establish his first adult home by moving out of his parent’s house and into the DeMontluzin Street apartment. There was corroborating testimony from his roommate, his family, his neighbor, landlord and his gardener.

Several documents were at issue at the trial. These documents include Mr. Barney’s driver’s license, car registration and voter’s registration card. All of these documents list Mr. Barney’s address as Morrison Road, which is outside the Third Senatorial District. With regard -to these documents, Mr. Barney stated that when he renewed his driver’s license, after having entered into the lease for the DeMont-luzin Street property, he did not change the address to reflect his new, current address. In December 2003 he purchased a new automobile and financed it through his bank. It is registered at the Morrison Road address. Mr. Barney testified the bank must have done that, although he admitted that he would have given the bank the information it used to register the vehicle. Further, Mr. Barney admitted to having voted in Ward 9, Precinct 44 as recently as the presidential election of November 2004. It was not until April 28, 2005 that he changed his voter’s registration record to reflect the DeMontluzin address.

\4tiie trial court judgment

In its judgment, the trial court declared Mr. Barney ineligible and disqualified as a candidate for State Senator, Third Senatorial District. It also ordered the defendant election officials to remove his name from the ballot if the ballots had not been printed. Alternatively, if they had already been printed, then said officials were to void any votes east for Mr. Barney. In Reasons for Judgment the court indicated it reached this result because it, relying upon an Opinion of the Attorney General and a 1990 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, understood the word “elector” on the notice of candidacy to mean “voter;” that Mr. Barney was not an elector/voter of Ward 8, Precinct 21 thereby making his qualifying form incorrect; and that an incorrect qualifying form is sufficient to disqualify a candidate.

On the domicile/residency issue, the court below found there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Mr. Barney is domiciled in the Third Senatorial District. The court noted the lease at the DeMont-luzin Street address, but the lease is not recorded and that Mr. Barney stated that he used the property to conduct his business affairs. The court was also aware of an application for a line of credit with Liberty Bank that gave Mr. Barney’s address on DeMontluzin Street. She further observed that the application was not recorded anywhere and that it was not a part of the public record. It is evident from the Reasons for Judgment that the court was impressed with the fact that the driver’s license, car registration and voter’s registration card all listed the Morrison Road address. It specifically called attention to the fact that even after having entered into the lease for DeMontluzin Street, Mr. Barney renewed his driver’s license at the Morrison Road | ¡¡address. The court concluded: “Considering all of the above, the court finds that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Mr. Barney is domiciled within the district.” DISCUSSION

We affirm the judgment of the court below because it is undisputed that at the time he filed his candidacy papers Mr. Barney was not an elector of the Third Senatorial District that he sought to represent in the Louisiana Legislature.

Although the learned trial judge said in her Reasons for Judgment “there are no published cases which define elector,” We note Gossen v. Registrar of Voters, 59 So.2d 461 (La.App. 1 Cir.1952), to wit:

Black’s Law Dictionary defines an elector as: “a duly qualified voter; one who has a vote in the choice of any officer, a constituent.” Thus an elector is a person duly qualified to vote, regardless of whether he has exercised his right to vote or not. Id. at 463. See also: State v. Dauzat, 2002-1373 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/2/03).[,] 843 So.2d 526.

Article III, § 4(A) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides:

An elector who at the time of qualification as a candidate has attained the age of eighteen years, resided in the state for the preceding two years, and been actually domiciled for the preceding year in the legislative district from which he seeks election is eligible for membership in the legislature.

The sentence structure impels the conclusion that the word “elector” applies to each of the subsequent clauses or phrases setting forth essential qualifications.

We are reinforced in this view by reference to the Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, Vol. V (17th Days |fi[sic] Proceedings — July 19, 1973) at [316], hereinafter more simply “Transcripts.” As originally introduced to the delegates, the provision read:

Section 4(A): Every elector, who at the time of the general election shall have reached the age of 18 years shall be eligible to membership in the House of Representatives. Every elector who at the time of the general election shall have reached the age of 21 years shall be eligible for membership in the Senate. B. No person shall be eligible for membership in the legislature unless at the time of the general election he shall have been a resident of the State for two years and actually domiciled within the legislative district from which he seeks election for one year immediately preceding his election

[Emphasis added.]

* * *

It cannot be gainsaid that there is a distinction between the word “elector” and the word “person”. It is thus readily apparent that as originally proffered to the delegates, the section would have linked the “elector” requirement only to the minimum age requirement. Had this language remained, it would be reasonable to construe the section such that any elector, regardless of the situs of his voter 17registration, would be eligible to run for the legislature from the district in which he had actually resided for the preceding year. However, since the convention amended the provision into its present form, it is quite plain that it made a substantive change: “Elector,” i.e., registered voter, now applies to all of the qualifications, not just the minimum age requirement. Under the unambiguous language of the adopted constitution, in order to be eligible for membership in the legislature, at the time he or she files his notice of candidacy, the candidate must be an elector who:

1) Is at least eighteen years of age;
2) Has resided in Louisiana for the preceding two years; and
3) Has been actually domiciled for the preceding year in the district he wants to represent.

Therefore, we conclude Mr. Barney lacks an objective, constitutionally mandated qualification for office: Being a qualified voter in the district he seeks to represent.

Having thus resolved the cáse it is unnecessary for us to consider the subjective factors of whether the incorrect ward and precinct information on the notice of candidacy was Mr. Barney’s error or the clerk’s error; whether it was simply a mistake or an intentional falsehood; or even whether the errors are subject to correction by reforming the notice of candidacy. These are all irrelevant inquiries under our view of the case

Likewise, it is unnecessary for us to go into the correctness of the domicile/residency issue. We note in passing, though, that if this were the only basis for the ruling of the court below, we would be hard-pressed to find it | Rmanifestly erroneous. It is evident from her Reasons for Judgment that the judge considered all the evidence on both sides of the case, weighed it and made credibility calls, giving more weight to the objective documentary evidence. It is obvious she found the plaintiff made out a case sufficient to shift the burden to defendant to show he was properly domiciled in the district and that he failed, in her view, to carry that burden. Perhaps this court or others would have weighed the evidence differently, but under our manifest error rule we cannot find on this record that the court below was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.

For these reasons the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

CANNIZZARO, J. — dissents with reasons.

MURRAY, J. — dissents for the reasons Assigned by J. CANNIZZARO and assigns additional reasons.

TOBIAS, J. — dissents for reasons assigned by J. CANNIZZARO.

LOMBARD, J. — dissents for reasons assigned by J. CANNIZZARO.

McKAY, J. — concurs with reasons.

JONES, J. — dissents.

GORBATY, J. — concurs with reasons.

|, CANNIZZARO, J.

dissents with reasons.

I respectfully dissent from the majority.

The majority opinion concludes that the trial court judge did not err in finding that Mr. Barney was disqualified from running for a seat in the Third Senate District. Their finding is based on the following: (1) Mr. Barney was not an elector in the ward and precinct listed on his Notice of Qualification; and (2) the trial court judge was not manifestly erroneous in finding that Mr. Barney was not domiciled in the district that he sought to represent.

ISSUE OF BEING AN ELECTOR IN THE DISTRICT

The criteria to qualify as a candidate for the Louisiana legislature is set forth in La. Const. Art. Ill, § 4(A). It provides:

An elector who at the time of qualification as a candidate has attained the age of eighteen years, resided in the state for the preceding two years, and has been actually domiciled for the preceding year in the legislative district from which he seeks election is eligible for membership in the legislature.

The majority states that “[ujnder the unambiguous language of the adopted constitution, in order to be eligible for membership in the legislature, at the time he or she files his notice of candidacy, the candidate must be an elector who: 1) Is at least eighteen years of age; 2) Has resided in Louisiana for the preceding two ¡¿years; and 3) Has been actually domiciled for the preceding year in the district he wants to represent.” (Emphasis in original.) The majority then concludes that Mr. Barney lacks a constitutionally mandated qualification for office, because he is not a qualified voter in the district he seeks to represent.

What the majority does, however, is take an unambiguous constitutional provision and add additional qualifying language to it to reach the conclusion that Mr. Barney must be a qualified voter in the district he seeks to represent. There is no dispute that the word “elector” means a person who is a qualified voter. Therefore, the majority rewrites La. Const. Art. Ill, § 4(A) to read as follows:

An elector qualified to vote in the district he seeks to represent, who at the time of qualification as a candidate has attained the age of eighteen years, resided in the state for the preceding two years, and has been actually domiciled for the preceding year in the legislative district from which he seeks election is eligible for membership in the legislature.

By adding this additional qualification, the majority has changed the clear, unambiguous meaning of La. Const. Art. Ill, § 4(A).

In doing so, the majority has violated one of the basic rules of statutory construction. La. C.C. art. 9 states this rule as follows:

When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.

I find that La. Const. Art. Ill, § 4(A) is clear and unambiguous in its meaning. Quite simply, it means that at the time a person qualifies to be a candidate for the legislature, that person must meet all of the following criteria:

1. The person must be registered to vote;
2. The person must be at least eighteen years .of age;
| ?i3. The person must have resided in Louisiana for the two years preceding his qualification for the legislature; and
4. The person must have been domiciled for the year preceding his qualification in the district he seeks to represent.

These are the simple, straightforward requirements that are stated clearly and unequivocally in the state constitution. There is no requirement that the candidate be a registered voter in the district he seeks to represent. A candidate is simply required to be a registered voter. I find that the majority erred in reading additional qualifying language into the constitutional provision.

The majority opinion severely limits or restricts an elector’s right to qualify as a candidate for the legislature by interpreting La. Const. Art. Ill, § 4(A) as they do. This is a consequence that I do not think that the framers of the constitution intended. If they had intended to restrict electors to electors qualified in the district they sought to represent, they would have expressly stated this in the constitutional provision. This is not something that can be inferred from the language absent a clear expression of the framers’ intent.

ISSUE OF DOMICILE

In discussing the facts of this case, the majority does not give the appropriate consideration to the essential elements of the testimony that were presented in the trial court. Adequate discussion of the domicile issue requires a more thorough explanation of the witnesses’ testimony. Because I believe the trial court judge was manifestly erroneous in her consideration of the facts, and because the majority opinion does not sufficiently discuss the facts, it is necessary to give a detailed recitation of what was presented below.

| ¿Testimony of Mr. Barney

Mr. Barney testified that he had lived in his parents’ home at 11900 Morrison Road in New Orleans during his childhood, that he had attended college in Washington, D.C., and that after college, he had lived in a number of places because of his job. He was “gradually coming back spending more time” in New Orleans. On these occasions, he stayed with his parents on Morrison Road. He moved back to New Orleans permanently in the fall of 2001, and he lived with his parents in their home. He moved out of his parents’ home in June of 2003, after he signed a lease to rent one-half of a double house at 4490 DeMontluzin Street. At that time, he signed a one-year lease, had all of his furniture moved from an out-of-state storage facility to the DeMontluzin Street house, and then moved with his personal belongings to that house.

He testified that he moved to his new residence, because he liked the Gentilly area of town where the residence was located. He also wanted to have a home of his own and ultimately planned to buy a home in Gentilly. He had, in fact, considered purchasing the double house on De-Montluzin from his landlord, but she wanted to retain it as an investment property.

Mr. Barney further testified that he had never changed his voter registration from his parent’s home address on Morrison Road, which is where he registered to vote when he was eighteen years old. Mr. Barney also stated that he voted at a polling place in the Second Senate District, most recently in the November 2004 presidential election.

Additionally, Mr. Barney testified that the telephone number that he listed on his Notice of Candidacy was a number for a telephone located at the DeMontluzin Street address. The telephone number, however, was in his roommate’s name.

| ¿Testimony of Mr. Barney’s Landlord

Diana Parsons, the owner of the De-Montluzin Street house, testified at trial that she had leased the premises at 4490 DeMontluzin Street to Mr. Barney and that when she had done so, she had understood that Mr. Barney and a friend of his would be living there. She also said that the lease was a one-year lease beginning in June of 2003, and ending July 2004, but that the lease contained a provision providing that it would automatically convert to a month-to-month lease after the original term expired.

Ms. Parsons also testified that Mr. Barney resided at 4490 DeMontluzin Street. She based this testimony on the following facts: (1) Mr. Barney periodically called her to make repairs to the house; (2) she had seen him at the house when she had been there; and (3) when she had recently gone to the house to collect the rent check, Mr. Barney was there. Finally, she testified that she knew that Mr. Barney conducted a business on DeMontluzin Street, because he had asked her permission to have a computer placed on the back porch of the house for the business operated by him and his roommate.

Testimony of Mr. Barney’s Neighbor

Diana Woods, the tenant who lived in the other half of the house on DeMontluzin Street, testified that Mr. Barney had been living on DeMontluzin Street as her next-door neighbor since June of 2003. She said that they frequently left for work at the same time, that he used the water hose on her side of the house to wash his car, and that he was “always parking right in front of my car.” She said that Mr. Barney resided in half of the double house where she lived.

Testimony of Mr. Barney’s Parents

Mr. Barney’s mother, Marie Barney, testified that she and her husband, Mr. Barney’s father, had lived at the Morrison Road address for approximately thirty years. She testified that Mr. Barney had lived with them during his childhood, that |fihe had gone away to college, and that, in the fall of 2001, he had returned to New Orleans to live. At that time he moved into her home on Morrison Road. She further said that in the late spring or early summer of 2003, her son moved out of her home. She testified that “[h]e wanted to move out on his own and he found a place; he’s gotten himself situated in New Orleans and decided to find a place for himself.” After he moved to his new home, Mrs. Barney visited him there frequently. She specifically testified that he purchased a bed for his DeMontluzin Street home. She also identified his roommate. She said that Mr. Barney had been living continually at his DeMontluzin Street home since he moved out of her home, that he had removed his clothes and personal effects from her home, and that whenever he traveled out of town, he returned to his home on DeMontluzin Street. Finally, she stated that he did not receive any money for living expenses from his parents and that he did not contribute to their household expenses.

When she was asked whether Mr. Barney had a change of clothes at her address, she said that there were some old clothes of his from grade school that were still at her home. She further said that she did not think that he even had a toothbrush or shaving equipment at her house. Although she testified that Mr. Barney sometimes received mail at her home and had a key to her house, she said that Mr. Barney made his residence at the house on DeMontluzin Street.

Mr. Barney’s father, Clarence Barney, did not testify at the trial. It was stipulated, however, that his testimony would be substantially the same as Mrs. Barney’s testimony.

Testimony of Mr. Barney’s Gardener

Neil Hamilton, the gardener who maintained the lawn at Mr. Barney’s home on DeMontluzin Street, testified at the trial. He said that he had taken care of Mr. Barney’s lawn for approximately a year and that he also maintained Mr. Barney’s parents’ lawn on Morrison Road. He testified that Mr. Barney paid him in cash |7and that he had gone to Mr. Barney’s home on DeMontluzin Street once a week in the summer and once every two weeks in the winter. He said that he had seen Mr. Barney on the premises on DeMont-luzin Street and that they sometimes spoke when Mr. Barney came home and he was there.

Testimony of Mr. Barney’s Roommate

Corey Wilson, Mr. Barney’s roommate, testified at the trial. He said that he and Mr. Barney had been friends since they met at school in the seventh grade. Mr. Wilson attended college in Atlanta, Georgia, and he graduated from Harvard Law School. After graduating from law school, Mr. Wilson practiced law in Houston, Texas, but he wanted to return to New Orleans. After Mr. Wilson returned to New Orleans, he stayed at a friend’s house. Mr. Wilson planned to pursue a business venture with Mr. Barney, and when Mr. Barney asked Mr. Wilson if he would like to be his roommate at the DeMontluzin Street residence, Mr. Wilson said yes.

Mr. Wilson testified that he moved to the DeMontluzin address before Mr. Barney did, because Mr. Barney did not yet have a bed for the new residence. By the end of June in 2003, however, Mr. Barney had also moved to DeMontluzin Street. Because Mr. Wilson had moved there before Mr. Barney, Mr. Wilson had the utility services put in his own name. Both roommates shared the expenses, however.

Mr. Wilson testified that he had lived on DeMontluzin Street continuously since he had moved there at the end of May of 2003, and that Mr. Barney had lived there continuously since the end of June of 2003. He further testified that Mr. Barney kept his clothes, his toiletries, and shaving materials at the residence on DeMontluzin Street. Finally, he testified that he knew that Mr. Barney did not live at his parents’ home, “[b]eeause he lives with me at the DeMontluzin address.”

IsElection Law and Domicile

Because election laws are to be interpreted to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates, a person objecting to the candidacy bears the burden of proving that the candidate is disqualified. See Landiak v. Richmond, 2005-0758 (La.3/30/05), 899 So.2d 535. If a particular domicile is required for candidacy, then the burden of showing lack of domicile rests on the party objecting to the candidacy. Becker v. Dean, 03-2493, p. 7 (La.9/18/03), 854 So.2d 864, 869; Pattan v. Fields, 95-2375 (La.9/28/95), 661 So.2d 1320. Any doubt as to the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of the candidate. Russell v. Goldsby, 00-2595, p. 4 (La.9/22/00), 780 So.2d 1048, 1051; Dixon v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 679, 680 (La.1991).

La. C.C. art. 38 defines domicile as follows:

The domicile of each citizen is in the parish wherein he has his principal establishment.
The principal establishment is that in which he makes his habitual residence; if he resides alternately in several places, and nearly as much in one as in another, and has not declared his intention in the manner hereafter prescribed, any one of the said places where he resides may be considered as his principal establishment, at the option of the persons whose interests are thereby affected.

(Emphasis added.)

Louisiana law allows a person to have more than one residence. However, a person can only have one domicile. La. C.C. art. 38; Messer v. London, 438 So.2d 546, 547; Villane v. Azar, 566 So.2d 645 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990). Cases resolving conflicts of domicile have found that two elements are necessary to establish a person’s domicile, namely, residence and intent to remain in the place. Becker, 03-2493, at p. 10, 854 So.2d at 871; Russell, 00-2595 at p. 5, 780 So.2d at 1051.

__[c|Proof of a Candidate’s Domicile

La. R.S. 18:451 relative to “qualifications of candidates,” specifically requires that when “the qualifications for an office include a residency or domicile requirement [in this case, it is a domicile requirement], a candidate shall meet the established length of residency or domicile as of the date of qualifying.” La. Const. Art. Ill § 4(A), as previously stated, provides that a candidate for legislative office shall be 18 years of age, be an elector, have been a resident of the state for two years, and have been domiciled in the district in which he seeks to run for one year. In view of these requirements, the plaintiff in this case bears the burden of proving that Mr. Barney was not domiciled in the Third Senate District for the one year immediately preceding the date of qualifying.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Landiak, supra, set forth the burden of proof as follows:

Generally, the legal term “burden of proof’ “denotes the duty of establishing by a fair preponderance of the evidence the truth of the operative facts upon which the issue at hand is made to turn by substantive law.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed). Under Louisiana’s civil law, the “burden of proof’ may shift back and forth between the parties as the trial progresses. Therefore, when the burden of proof has been specifically assigned to a particular party, that party must present sufficient evidence to establish the facts necessary to convince the trier of fact of the existence of the contested fact. Stated another way, the party on which the burden of proof rests must establish a prima facie case. If that party fails to carry his burden of proof, the opposing party is not required to present any countervailing evidence. On the other hand, once the party bearing the burden of proof has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to present sufficient evidence to overcome the other party’s prima facie case.

Landiak, 2005-0758, at p. 4, 899 So.2d 539.

In an effort to carry her initial burden of proof by establishing a prima facie case that Mr. Barney was not domiciled in the Third Senate District for the one-year period preceding the date of qualifying, April 19, 2005, the plaintiff [^introduced into evidence the following: (1) the Notice of Candidacy qualifying form completed by Mr. Barney and (2) records from the Office of Registrar of Voters for Orleans Parish. These records listed Mr. Barney’s residence and address as 11900 Morrison Road, listed his voter registration in Ward 9, Precinct 44, and showed that he most recently voted at Ward 9, Precinct 44 in the November 11, 2004 election. The plaintiff additionally relied on Mr. Barney’s testimony that the Notice of Candidacy qualifying form executed by him contained the wrong ward and precinct numbers of his voter registration.

Mr. Barney acknowledged that he had listed his address as 4490 DeMontluzin Street, but that Ward 8, Precinct 21, which was entered on the form by a person in the clerk of court’s office, was not, in fact, where he was registered to vote. Rather, he was registered to vote at his parents’ house on Morrison Road in Ward 9, Precinct 44, which was not in the Third Senate District. Mr. Barney also admitted that he did not change his voter registration to the DeMontluzin address until April 28, 2005, after executing the qualifying form. His driver’s license and vehicle registration contained the Morrison Road address. He also acknowledged that he still continued to receive some mail, such as alumni mail from his high school and college alma maters, mail from a church to which he once belonged, and other miscellaneous items, at the Morrison Road address. Most of his mail, however, was delivered to his DeMontluzin Street address. He had two bank accounts, and he received mail regarding one account at the Morrison Road address and mail regarding the other at the DeMontluzin Street address.

The totality of this evidence, in my opinion, is not sufficient to establish a prima facie ease that Mr. Barney’s domicile, his principal establishment, was not on De-Montluzin Street for the one-year period preceding qualifying. The fact that Mr. Barney received some mail at the Morrison Road áddress is of no import. Mr. Barney also received mail at the DeMont-luzin Street address. In addition, Mr. luBarney’s driver’s license and vehicle registration were renewed prior to April 19, 2004, the operative date for domiciliary purposes. The fact that these documents contain the Morrison Road address does not show that he was domiciled at that address or that he was not domiciled at DeMontluzin Street during the pertinent time period. Finally, the fact that Mr. Barney voted in the November 11, 2004 election in Ward 9, Precinct 44, where he had been registered to vote at that time, does not prove that he was not domiciled at the DeMontluzin address. The law does not require that a person register to vote at his domicile.

Considering that actual residence (at least part of the time) at a place is one prong of the test to establish domicile, conspicuously absent from the plaintiffs case is any evidence that Mr. Barney did not physically reside on DeMontluzin Street. A review of the record discloses that not only did the plaintiff not prove that Mr. Barney was not domiciled at the DeMontluzin address the year preceding his qualifying but she also failed to prove that his domicile was anywhere other than DeMontluzin Street. Notably, the plaintiff failed to offer testimony from any witness to contradict Mr. Barney’s claim that his domicile or principal domestic establishment was on DeMontluzin Street. Nobody testified that Mr. Barney lived, slept, and kept his personal effects anywhere other than DeMontluzin Street.

Trial Court Judge’s Opinion

The trial court judge stated in her per curiam “subjective evidence, i.e., an individual’s testimony alone will not suffice to establish an individual’s domicile.” In the instant case, however, not only Mr. Barney testified that he lived at the DeMontluzin Street house, his landlord, his neighbor, his gardener, and his roommate, as well as his parents, testified that he had lived there during the one-year period prior to his qualification to run for the senate seat in the Third Senate District. On the other hand, the only evidence presented by Ms. Suarez was that of |12Mr. Barney, as an adverse witness. No witnesses, objective or otherwise, testified that Mr. Barney lived at the Morrison Road address.

In her per curiam the trial court judge also relies on some legally incorrect premises. She notes that Mr. Barney’s lease is not recorded anywhere and that he has not executed a written, formal notice of change of domicile. The fact that the lease is not recorded is irrelevant to the inquiry in this case. There is no requirement that the lease be recorded for Mr. Barney to be domiciled at the leased premises. Also, although La. C.C. art. 42 provides that an intention to change domicile may be proved by “an express declaration of it before the recorder of the parishes, from which and to which he shall intend to remove,” this article refers to a change in the parish of domicile, which is not at issue here. The issue in this case is a change in the political district of domicile. Additionally, the declaration permitted by La. C.C. art. 42 is in no way required for a change in domicile; it is a means to prove such a change.

In discussing Mr. Barney’s application for a line of credit with Liberty Bank, the trial court judge states that “[hjowever, like the lease, this was not recorded anywhere and it is not part of any public record.” I am aware of no legal or other requirement that a personal loan application be registered or recorded for any purpose in any public record.

The trial court judge also relies on certain documents, such as “Mr. Barney’s driver’s license, car registration and voter’s registration card,” all of which have the Morrison Road address, to support Ms. Suarez’s contention that Mr. Barney was domiciled on Morrison Road. Because the overwhelming weight of the | ^evidence at trial showed that Mr. Barney has lived on DeMontluzin Street for the past year, has lived nowhere else during that time period, and has his furniture, clothing, and personal effects at the house on DeMontluzin Street where he was physically present and where he slept at night, there is no need to show by documentary evidence that Mr. Barney intended to change his domicile when he moved himself and all of his property almost two years ago to what has been his principal establishment on DeMontluzin Street.

As discussed above, it is well settled that the laws governing the conduct of elections are to be liberally construed so as to promote rather than to defeat a candidacy and any doubt concerning the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of allowing the candidate to run for public office. Therefore, I would find that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the plaintiff established by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Barney was not domiciled in the Third Senate District for the one-year period preceding the qualifying date.

Based on the foregoing discussion, I would find that the trial court judge made consequential legal errors in this case. Therefore, I believe this court should review the entire record de novo and render a judgment. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989), 844, n. 2, citing Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So.2d 163 (La.1975). Determination of Domicile

In the instant case, it is clear from the testimony that Mr. Barney has had his residence at 4490 DeMontluzin Street since June of 2003. The uncontradicted testimony in this case is that Mr. Barney has lived on the premises at that address for a period of at least one year prior to his qualifying for the Third District Senate seat. Domicile is defined in La. C.C. art. 38 as “the parish where he has his principal establishment.” That article then defines “principal establishment” as “that in which he makes his habitual residence.” Therefore, if a person has only [ 14one residence, his domicile is at that residence. If, however, a person has more than one residence and resides nearly as much time in one as in another, any of the places where he resides may be considered his principal establishment at the option of a person whose interest is affected by the location of the domicile. La. C.C. art. 38. There was no evidence to show that Mr. Barney physically or actually resided anywhere other than 4490 DeMontluzin Street during the one-year period preceding his qualifying for the Third District Senate seat.

Because Mr. Barney has only one residence, the question of where he intends to reside is not an issue. His sole residence is, by definition, his principal establishment under La. C.C. art. 38. Because a person’s domicile is where he has his principal establishment, Mr. Barney’s domicile is where he resides. That is 4490 De-Montluzin Street and has been so since June of 2008. That domicile is in the Third Senate District. Therefore, he is domiciled in that district.

Landiak, supra, is distinguishable from the instant case, because, the issue in Landiak was which of the two residences maintained by the candidate was the candidate’s domicile. In that case, because there was evidence that he physically resided in both places, the Louisiana Supreme Court looked at the objective indications of his intent to determine his domicile, such as a sworn statement on a notice of candidacy that he had executed in connection with his candidacy for a Louisiana state house of representatives seat and other documentary evidence. In the instant case, however, it is uncontro-verted that Mr. Barney has only one residence. Therefore, there is no need to consider documentary evidence to determine in which of multiple residences he intends to make his domicile.

|,,CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing discussion, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court declaring that Mr. Barney is ineligible and disqualified as a candidate for the Third Senate District senate seat.

| MURRAY, J.,

dissents for the reasons assigned by J. CANNIZZARO and assigns additional reasons.

I agree with the recitation of the facts and the legal conclusions reached by J. Cannizzaro in his dissent. I additionally disagree with the majority’s opinion in the following respects.

I do not agree that the meaning of the word “elector” as used in Article III, § 4(A) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 is restricted to an elector registered in the legislative district from which the candidate seeks election. “Elector” means “registered voter.” Even accepting the premise of the majority that the word elector applies to each of the three subsequent requirements in the sentence, “[a]n elector .. .who has been actually domiciled for the preceding year in the legislative district from which he seeks election” means only a registered voter who meets that domiciliary requirement, not a voter registered in the district who meets the domiciliary requirement. For this reason, I would hold that the error on the candidacy qualification form as to the ward and precinct in which Mr. Barney was registered to vote, even assuming that form legally cannot be amended, is immaterial to the determination of whether Mr. Barney is eligible to be a candidate for the Third District seat.

^Regarding the issue of Mr. Barney’s domicile, I find that the text of Article 88 of the Civil Code, when read in its entirety, unequivocally indicates that if there is only one place in which a person habitually resides, that place is his domicile. In the alternative situation that a person “resides alternately in several places, and nearly as much in one as in another” and has not formally declared his intention as to which of those places is his domicile, and only in that situation, can a fact finder determine domicile by considering both objective and subjective evidence of the person’s intent. Therefore, in the instant situation, to make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff had to introduce evidence indicating that Mr. Barney physically resided somewhere other than the DeMontluzin Street address at least part of the relevant time period. Because the plaintiff failed to introduce any such evidence, I believe that the trial court committed legal, error by finding that the plaintiff met her burden of proof. Because there was no evidence that Mr. Barney actually resided anywhere other than De-Montluzin Street, this case is completely inapposite from Landiak v. Richmond, in which the issue was which of two residences should be considered the candidate’s domicile. When, as here, a person has actually lived in only one place during the relevant time period, the fact that certain documents still list a former address as his residence is irrelevant because that person can only be domiciled where he resides.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority.

| TOBIAS, J., dissents.

I respectfully dissent for the reasons assigned by Judge Cannizzaro.

| LOMBARD, J., dissents.

I respectfully dissent for the reasons assigned by Judge Cannizzaro.

hMcKAY, J.,

concurs with reasons.

I concur and would affirm the judgment of the court below. In an election suit, an appellate court should not substitute its own fact findings, credibility calls, and reasonable inferences for those made by the trial court in the absence of manifest error. See Villane v. Azar, 566 So.2d 645, 648 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990).

It is well settled that the terms residence and domicile are not synonymous, and, while a person can have several residences, he can have only one domicile. La. C.C. art. 38; Russell v. Goldsby, 00-2595 (La.9/22/00), 780 So.2d 1048, 1051; Messer v. London, 438 So.2d 546 (La.1983). An individual’s domicile is the principal establishment wherein he habitually resides. Russell at 1051. Domicile consists of two elements, residence and intent to remain. Id. The question of domicile is one of intention as well as fact, and where it appears domicile has been assumed in another location, the party seeking to show it has must overcome the legal presumption that it has not been changed. Id. The opposing party must overcome this legal presumption “positive and satisfactory proof of establishment of domicile as a matter of fact with the intention of remaining in the new place and of abandoning the former domicile.” Id. (emphasis added). When there is no declaration that a person has changed his domicile, proof of his intention depends 12upon circumstances. Id. There is a presumption against change of circumstances. Id. See also Becker v. Dean, 2003-2493 (La.9/18/03), 854 So.2d 864.

In the instant case, Mr. Barney’s driver’s license lists his address as 11900 Morrison Road; he was also registered to vote at the Morrison Road address and did so as recently as November 2, 2004. He also received some of his mail at this address. It does not appear that he has abandoned this domicile. Based on the official documentation as well as other facts, there is nothing manifestly erroneous with the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JONES, J. Dissents.

BGORBATY, J.

concurs with reasons.

I respectfully concur. La.R.S. 18:463(A)(l)(a) states as follows:

A notice of candidacy shall be in writing and shall state the candidate’s name, the office he seeks, the address of his domicile, the parish, ward, and precinct where he is registered to vote, and the political party, if any, with which he is registered as being affiliated....

A defect in the Notice of Candidacy disqualifies that candidate from running for office. See Senegal v. Obafunwa, 1999-1449 (La.App. 3 Cir.9/27/99), 745 So.2d 74. In that case, a candidate was disqualified where his Notice of Candidacy failed to list his domicile, even though the candidate claimed he did not want to disclose his street address for safety reasons.

In Edwards v. Patterson, 94-1672 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/18/94), 641 So.2d 219, the plaintiff attempted to amend her Notice of Candidacy for a school board position in Livingston Parish. The defendant filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action that was sustained by the trial court dismissing plaintiffs suit. In Mrs. Edwards’ Notice of Candidacy, she alleged she resided in Precinct 16 and School Board District 5, when in fact she resided in Precinct 16 and School Board District 8. The trial court determined that statutory law governing elections provided no procedure to amend a Notice of Candidacy after qualifying. Alternatively, the trial court treated the petition to amend as one to withdraw and |grequalify and found that La.R.S. 18:469 afforded no remedy under the facts alleged by Mrs. Edwards. The First Circuit affirmed the trial court finding that Mrs. Edwards’ Notice of Candidacy did not identify the position she actually sought so clearly that any opponent or the electorate would be aware of her intent to qualify for office in Precinct 16 School District 8.

In Madden v. Edwards, 436 So.2d 759 (La.App. 1 Cir.1983) writ denied, 437 So.2d 287 (La.1983), suit was brought contesting the candidacy of R.E. Edwards for Governor of Louisiana. The plaintiff alleged that the Notice of Candidacy of R.E. Edwards lacked the necessary certificate and financial statement as required by La.R.S. 18:463(A)(2) and (B)(1). The trial court and the Court of Appeal found that since Mr. Edwards failed to attach a financial statement to his Notice of Candidacy, he did not qualify in the manner provided by law and the trial court was correct in disqualifying him from running for the office of Governor of Louisiana.

In his Notice of Candidacy, Mr. Barney swore that he was a duly qualified elector for the Parish of Orleans, Ward 8, Precinct 21. However, the official records of the Registrar of Voters for the Parish of Orleans show that Mr. Barney is presently registered to vote only in Ward 9, Precinct 44. Because Mr. Barney’s Notice of Candidacy wrongly states the “ward and precinct where he is registered to vote,” it is fatally defective, and Mr. Barney did not qualify in the manner prescribed by law. As stated in Senegal v. Obafunwa, 1999-1449, 1999-1450, 745 So.2d at 76, “the Election Code does not provide for an amendment of the Notice of Candidacy, and an error by the Clerk of Court does not excuse a candidate from his obligation to provide the correct information needed on the form.” As such, the trial court was correct in finding that Mr. Barney did not qualify in the manner prescribed by law because his Notice of Candidacy wrongly states the ward and precinct where he is registered to vote.

[aThe instant case is distinguishable from Roe v. Picou, 361 So.2d 874 (La.1978). In Roe, the Supreme Court held that even though the candidate designated the wrong ward number for the school board position, his notice of candidacy for school board position was not deficient. Confusion existed as to the proper ward number designation because of a federal invalidation of parish regulation. Both the candidate and his opponent were clearly aware of the candidate’s intent to qualify for the office he sought, which was described with sufficient particularity as to unmistakably designate it as the sole position available to the candidate. In the case at bar, no such confusion existed. Mr. Barney knew where he was registered to vote, as evidenced by the fact that he voted there as recently as November 2004.

I note that I do not share views espoused by Judge Kirby regarding the meaning of the term “elector.” However, because I conclude that the Notice of Candidacy is deficient on its face, it is not necessary to reach the issue of the definition of “elector.” 
      
      . This matter was heard by the Court en banc pursuant to La. R.S. 18:1409(A). Judge Terri F. Love recused herself from this matter.
     
      
      . In addition to Mr. Barney, made defendants were election officials Kimberly Williamson Butler, Clerk of the Criminal District Court for Orleans Parish, and Fox McKeithen, Secretary of State of Louisiana.
     
      
      . Although the record before us does not contain a transcript of the testimony at the trial, a transcript of the testimony taken in the trial of a companion case challenging Mr. Barney’s candidacy in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District for the Parish of Jefferson was admitted as a joint exhibit at the trial of this case and, therefore, is contained in this record. That transcript contains the relevant facts regarding this case. It was stipulated at oral argument of this appeal that the only testimony taken during the trial of the instant case was that of Mr. Barney, which was substantially similar to his testimony in the Jefferson Parish case. Therefore, all references to the trial testimony in this opinion refer to the testimony in the trial of the Jefferson Parish case.
     
      
      . The punctuation here ",” appears in the Transcripts. However, in the committee report there is no punctuation. See: Official Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1973 of the State of Louisiana, Eleventh Day's proceedings, July 6, 1973 at page 6, hereinafter simply, Official Journal.
      
     
      
      . The word "for” appears in the Transcripts. In the committee report the word is "to.” See: Official Journal, July 6, 1973 at page 6.
     
      
      . At this juncture it is worthy of note that the delegates to the convention were aware of the definition of the word "elector.” It was defined for them by delegates DeBlieux and Nunez as "a registered voter.” See: Transcripts, supra, at [322], This definition, of course, comports with the Louisiana jurisprudence on the subject, quoted above.
     
      
      . The debates reveal a concern on the part of some delegates that the minimum voting age, which at that time had only recently been reduced, could be reduced further in the future. See Transcripts at [317]:
      
        Mr. Bollinger Delegate Tobias, in your opinion, or from the arguments you are presenting in favor of the proposed amendment, wouldn't you consider a better provision to be simply state the elector can run since it might be in twenty or thirty years the U.S. Constitution might provide for an elector say of seventeen or sixteen and this same argument would prevail.
      * * *
      
        Mr. A. Landry ... Isn't it true that Mr. Roy’s amendment sets it at 18 so if the Louisiana legislature wants to reduce the age of an elector from 18 to 17 that it would be locked in at 18 and that 17 would not be eligible and would not be an elector under the present constitution as Mr. Roy so advocates .... Id. at [325].
      It is thus clear that under the final, adopted, version of this section the convention decided that even if the voting age was reduced, the "elector” would still have to be at least eighteen years of age in order to be eligible for membership in the legislature.
     
      
      . This date was before the one-year domicile period began.
     
      
      . The only testimony that the trial court judge heard was that of Mr. Barney. All of the other testimony she had to consider was the transcript from the Jefferson Parish district court case. At oral argument it was stipulated that the testimony that the trial court judge heard from Mr. Barney was substantially the same as his testimony in the Jefferson Parish case. Therefore, we were in the same position as the trial court to determine the facts in this case, because the credibility of the Jefferson Parish witnesses could not be evaluated by the trial judge.
     
      
      . I note that La. C.C. art. 38 refers to a parish of domicile. There is no law that addresses the issue of a political district of domicile. I have, therefore, extrapolated from La. C.C. art. 38 to find that the domicile of each citizen is the place where he has his principal establishment.
     
      
      . La. C.C. art. 38. Although this article refers to domicile as being a particular parish rather than a particular district, I agree with J. Can-nizzaro that it is appropriate to apply the principle it embodies to the instant situation.
     
      
      
        . Landiak v. Richmond, 2005-0758 (La.3/30/05), 899 So.2d 535.
     
      
      . I note that had this court's en banc vote differed slightly such that the dissenting judges had prevailed, this court would have reached the opposite result from our brethren on the Fifth Circuit as to the eligibility of the defendant to be a candidate in this election. Currently the Election Code permits the filing of multiple lawsuits in different jurisdictions by different plaintiffs objecting to the same person's candidacy, and there is apparently no requirement that such suits be consolidated or that lis pendens be asserted. I believe that the legislature should address this issue to eliminate the potential for confusion that could result from parallel conflicting decisions.
     