
    HUDSON v. STATE.
    (No. 10965.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    June 22, 1927.
    1. Criminal law &wkey;>394 — In prosecution for burglary admitting evidence of seizure of goods without warrant in room not occupied by defendant or coindictee held not error.
    In prosecution' for burglary, admitting testimony of police officers that they entered house of third person, and at invitation of another person entered room not occupied by defendant or his coindictee, and found trunk containing certain dry goods, was not error, on ground that officers possessed no search warrant.
    2. Criminal law <@=>1169(2) — In prosecution for burglary, admitting testimony of finding revolver in defendant’s automobile, after admitting similar testimony without objection, held harmless.
    In prosecution for burglary, admitting testimony of finding revolver in defendant’s automobile was, if error, harmless, in view of fact that similar testimony had been previously admitted without objection thereto.
    3. Criminal law <&wkey;982 — In prosecution for burglary, on application for suspended sentence, excluding testimony of defendant’s good reputation at time of trial held error.
    In prosecution for burglary, in which defendant asked for suspended sentence, where state admitted defendant’s reputation prior to charge of present offense was good, excluding testimony as to his good reputation at time of trial was error.
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from District Court, Stephens County; C. O. Hamlin, Judge.
    Clyde Hudson was convicted of burglary, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Saunders & Bounds, of Breekenridge, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., and Robt. M. Lyles, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.
   BAKER, J.

The appellant was convicted of burglary, and his punishment assessed at 2 years in the penitentiary.

The record discloses that the appellant was jointly indicted with one Lono Lee for burglarizing a store and taking therefrom money, clothes, and merchandise, and that, upon motion for severance, the appellant was tried separately. The record contains 6 bills of exception.

In bill No. 1 complaint is made to the action of the court in permitting the state to prove by A. J. Carey and Chief of Police E. T. Anderson that they entered a house in the possession of and belonging to a Mr. Presnall, and went into a certain room occupied by three young men, neither of whom was appellant nor his coindictee, Lee, and there seized a certain trunk, which, upon examination, was found to contain a quantity of dry goods. The objection urged to this testimony was the state’s witnesses did not have a search warrant authorizing the search of said house and trunk. This bill is qualified by the court to the effect that a young man, whose name is not disclosed, invited the state’s witnesses into-the room where the trunk was found. This bill, as presented, shows no error, since the bill discloses that the house belonged to Presnall, and there is nothing to show that the trunk in question belonged to appellant. Under such circumstances, the appellant is not in a position to ' invoke the law relative to search and seizure. Dozier v. State, 105 Tex. Cr. R. 413, 289 S. W. 45; McFarlan v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 292 S. W. 885.

Bill No. 2 complains of the action of the court in permitting the state’s witness Carey to testify to finding a pair of trousers and a six-shooter in appellant’s automobile; the contention being that the admission of the testimony relative to the six-shooter was prejudicial. The court qualifies this bill by stating that Deputy Sheriff Deason had testified to practically the same facts without objection upon the part of appellant. Under such circumstances, the admission of the testimony complained of, if error, became harmless.

Bill No. 3 complains of the action of the court in refusing to permit appellant to prove by Deputy Sheriff Crenshaw and seven other witnesses that his general reputation was good at the time of the trial. • It appears from this bill that, after the appellant had introduced one witness on this issue, the county attorney, representing the state, admitted that the appellant’s general reputation was good up to the time when he was charged with the commission of the instant offense, and that he had never been com victed of a felony. The court, upon hearing this admission, refused to permit appellant to show by the remaining witnesses that his general reputation was good at the time of the trial. It is apparent from the bill and the court’s qualification thereto that both the trial judge and the county attorney were of the opinion that the appellant’s general reputation should be limited to the date of the offense charged against him. In this they were in error. In a case of this kind, where the suspended sentence law is applicable and a suspended sentence is applied for, as was done in this ease, the rule is well established by the decisions of this court' that it is proper to inquire into the general reputation of the defendant up to the date of the trial, and that such inquiry should not be limited to the date of the offense. Mason v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 560, 236 S. W. 93; Bayer v. State, 96 Tex. Cr. R. 310, 257 S. W. 242.

Bills 4, 5, and 6 complain of the argument of the state’s attorneys, but in view of the disposition we have made of this case, and the likelihood that the .same questions will not be raised upon another trial, it becomes unnecessary to discuss these bills of exception.

For the error above discussed, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded.

PER OURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court. 
      <g=>For other eases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER In all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     