
    Suzannah B. TROY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, New York City Commissioner Raymond Kelly, Internal Affairs Bureau Chief Campisi, Deputy Inspector Edward Winski, New York Police Department Lieutenant Angelo Burgos, New York Police Department Sergeant Chen, New York Police Department Detective John Vergona, Detective Andy Dwyer, New York Police Department Internal Affairs Bureau Agnes, Internal Affairs Bureau Sergeant Mary O’Donnell, in their Official and Individual Capacities (Badge Numbers Requested Withheld For Det. Vergona, Sgt. Chen, Det. Dwyer), Defendants-Appellees.
    
    No. 14-4000-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 25, 2015.
    Suzannah' B. Troy, Brooklyn, NY, pro se.
    Jonathan A..Popolow, Special for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY.
    PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, REENA RAGGI and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . The Clerk of Court respectfully is directed to amend the official caption as shown above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Suzannah B. Troy, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1988 complaint, which charged the City of New York and numerous members of the city’s Police Department with violating her First Amendment and Equal Protection rights by failing to investigate an alleged assault that she had reported and by threatening her with arrest. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, “construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

An independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly dismissed Troy’s claims, and we affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned decision. See Troy v. City of New York, No. 13-cv-5082 (AJN), 2014 WL 4804479 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2014).

On appeal, Troy argues that the district court should have construed her complaint as raising a claim of racial, as well as sexual, discrimination because she is of a different race than her alleged assailant. She failed, however, to allege any facts supporting a plausible claim that defendants’ treatment of her criminal complaint and that of her alleged assailant differed “based on impermissible consideration[ ]” of their races. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 357 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Troy also faults the district court for failing to consider that a detective directed her to report for arrest on a Saturday, after she informed him that she was Jewish. The point merits little discussion because, as the district court correctly observed, Troy’s resolution of her dispute with the alleged assailant obviated the need for her to surrender for arrest on any day. Thus, she fails plausibly to allege' injury resulting from the assigned date.

We have considered all of Troy’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  