
    Thorn v. Blanchard, 5 J. R, 508.
    Not reported in S. Ct.
    
      Libel; Privileged Communication.
    
    This was an action for a libel contained in a petition to the council of appointment, praying the removal of the plaintiff from an office he held under the council, and preferring certain charges, in words admitted to be actionable in themselves, and false.
    
   The Supreme Court held, the communication not a privileged one, and that an action was sustainable for such an abuse of the right of petition. The Court of Errors reversed the decision; the court held, that no action will lie for charges against a public officer, contained in a petition to the appointing power praying his removal from office, although the words used in the petition are false, and actionable in themselves, without proving express malice ; or that the petition was actually malicious and groundless, and presented merely to injure the plaintiff's character.

£0= It would seem necessary, therefore, in a declaration for such a libel, to aver express malice, and the groundlessness of the charges, and that they were presented merely to injure the plaintiff’s character.

The reporter adds a semble to this case, which does not appear to be authorized by any thing in the decision as reported ; as follows:

“ It seems, that where a person addresses a complaint to persons competent to redress the grievance complained of, no action will lie, whether his statement be true or false, or his motives innocent or malicious.”  