
    PATTERSON and HAMBURGH TURNPIKE CO. against VAN ORDEN.
    Judge’s order to strike a jury to assess damages, need not set out prior proceedings. Nor need the application therefor be sealed. Nor can one freeholder complain for irregularity as to others, or of excessive damages allowed himself. On certiorari in turnpike cases, the prosecutor’s name must be indorsed.
    An order had been made under the turnpike act, by one of the justices of this court at his chambers, for striking a jury, to assess the damages done to several landholders, by running the turnpike road through their land. This had been done, and an inquisition [*] returned; and on motion, in behalf of the Turnpike Company to affirm the inquisition,
    
      Mr. Van Arsdale, for Van Orden, one of the landholders, objected,
    , 1st. That it ought to appear that the application to the judge was made under the seal of the corporation. That an aggregate corporation was an ideal invisible body, existing only by legal intendment, and spoke only by its seal; that it could do no act except under its corporate seal; for which he cited, 2 Bac. 13; Gwillim Edi. Kid on Corp. 259, 263; 1 Blac. Com. 475.
    
    2d. That in case of proceedings under a special authority, the authority must be strictly pursued; and this ought to appear on the face of the proceedings. That all the anterior acts of the company, required to be done previous to making the order for striking the jury, ought to appear on the order itself, to have been done.
    3d. That the inquisition did not follow either the words of the law or the order. The law and the order were the same, and directed the jury to estimate the injury and disadvantage the landholders sustained by reason of the road running through lands. The inquisition sets forth that the jury assess the damages which the said Andrew Van Orden sustained bv the occasion of the operations of the said Patterson Turnpike Company, their servants and agents, as well in the viewing, laying out, and working the said road, as well as in occupying and appropriating of the land of the said Andrew Van Orden for the said road, as also all other damages; that this variance, although it might not be injurious to the landholder, yet in the execution of a special authority, it was an error that must vitiate the proceedings.
    4th. That the law and the order of the judge required [403] but one jury to estimate the damages done to all the landholders, yet a separate jury had acted as [*] to different landholders; the fact as to this was, that the sheriff, under the advice of the directors of the company, took the jury from the top of the panel certified by the judge, in the case of Van Orden; but in the ease of the other landholders from the bottom of the panel.
    
      A. Ogden, for the company.
    The order itself, states that application was made by the president and directors of the company, and is at least prima faeie evidence, that it was duly and regularly made. It does not appear but that the application was made in writing and under the seal of the corporation. But supposing it was not, the act does not inquire it; it was not necessary : the act requires the corporation to advertise certain matter proper to be made public. Must this be done mb pede sigilli ? It would be absurb to require it. But if this was even a sound objection to the proceedings, it is now too late to take it. It should have been taken at the time of striking the jury. And this last observation applies to the second objection. As to the third objection, it could not lay in the mouth of Van Orden to complain that the jury had assessed damages in his favor for more, or greater injuries than the law and the order required of them. He has got more than he ought to liave; and yet complains. As to the fourth objection, admitting that there was an irregularity, yet Van Orden could not take advantage of it. The right jury assessed. the damages as to him; he Ayas not injured, and therefore need not complain of Avrongs done to others.
   By the Court.

The application to the judge for an order to strike a jury to assess the damages in this case, is not such an act as is essentially requisite to be done under the seal of the corporation. It appears to have been made by the head of the corporation, Ayhich Aye think sufficient. Nor do Ave think it necessary that all the previous acts required by the laAv to be done by the Turnpike Company, need be set out in the order for striking the jury. It is sufficient if [*] they are proved on the motion to confirm the inquisition. The jury have estimated the damages done Mr. Van Orden. As to the points required of them by the law, that they have gone further, and taken other injuries done him into the estimate, is what he cannot complain of. As to the fourth objection raised by the counsel for Van Orden, the court are of opinion, that although the proceedings of the sheriff respecting the selecting the jury from the panel certified by the judge were irregular, [404] yet as the proceedings, so far as it respects Van Orden, were correct, and the proper jury estimated the injury done to him, and have made a proper inquisition as to him, we do not perceive the propriety of his complaining of injuries done to others, with whom he has not any privity or connection.

Inquisition affirmed.  