
    * John Heard, Assignee of Frederick W. Geyer and Son, versus Gamaliel Bradford.
    Money paid pursuant to the award of the commissioners under tne treaty of 1794. between the United States and Great Britain, was to he paid over according to the interests of the concerned; and where a sum was awarded nominally to one, the interest of which was in another, that other is entitled to the benefit in tended, and may recover the money in an action for money had and received.
    This was an action of assumpsit, for money had and received, and upon trial before Parker, J., a verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the whole Court, upon a report of the case by the judge who sat on the trial.
    From that report it appeared, that on the 26th of November, 1793, the defendant chartered his brigantine, Jerusha, to F. W. Geyer 8f Son, for a voyage from Boston to the West Indies, and back to Boston, or from the West Indies to any port or ports of .Europe, (the straits excepted,) and back to Boston, where she was to be discharged, dangers of the seas excepted. In consideration of which, Geyer Son agreed to pay, in full, for the hire of said brigantine, 1001. lawful money per month, so long as she should be continued in the aforesaid service, in thirty days after her return to Boston, and they were to pay light money and other port charges during said voyage, and to deliver said brigantine, on her return tc Boston, to the owner or his order. The brigantine was loaded, and sailed, December 5th, 1793, for Guadaloupe, where she arrived on the 27th of the same month, and was discharged of her cargo on the 8th of January, 1794. Part of the outward cargo having been sold, and part of another cargo laden on board for Hamburg, on the 12th of April, 1794, the vessel and what cargo was on board, were taken by the British fleet, under Admiral Jarvis. The defendant demanded of Geyer fy Son, and in January, 1795, they paid to him the hire until the capture, which for four months and a half, the time she had been in the service of the charterers, amounted to 1500 dollars.
    Before the commissioners in England, sitting under the treaty of London, the said Bradford’s agent claimed compensation for his brigantine and freight, according to the charter-party ; and Geyer Sf Son claimed for the cargo. Both claims were al[*327] lowed, viz., to Bradford 4000 dollars for *his vessel, and 1500 dollars for the freight; and to Geyer &f Son the value of her cargo on board at the time of the capture, with interest on the several allowances, through the instalments. But said Geyer &f Son lost a great part of their said cargo, which was on shore, by means of the capture of the said island, for which no allowance was made by the commissioners. The compensation for the freight was claimed by the agent of Bradford without his knowledge, he apprehending that he had only claimed for his vessel.
    This action was brought to recover the money received by Bradford on the first payment or instalment of the award of said commissioners made for the freight aforesaid, for which sum and interest the verdict was rendered.
    The judge instructed the jury that Bradford, in consequence of the above capture, had a just claim on the British government under said commission, for the freight of his vessel due to him at the time of capture, according to the charter-party ; and that it was probable that he and said Geyer if Son conceived that they, the said Geyer Son, were also liable under the charter-party to pay for the same, and that under that idea they accordingly paid it; that Bradford’s claim on the commissioners had probably gone forward prior to his receiving the money from Geyer if Son ; that when Bradford had obtained the money under the commission, he must be considered as having received it to the use of Geyer if Son.
    
    It appeared on the trial to be the rule of the commissioners to estimate the net value of the cargo at the port of destination, meaning the value there after deducting the freight, and it was agreed that Geyer & Son’s cargo was so settled.
    The judge observed further that it was presumable that the commissioners considered parties and claims as they stood at the time of capture; at which period the defendant had a right to claim for his own use, but afterwards, on payment by Geyer if Son, he must be considered as maintaining his claim in trust for them.
    There was also a letter from Bradford, dated October 7th, 1803, in these words: “Mr. F. W. Geyer, — I have just received letters from Mr. Williams, in London, stating the amount of award decreed me in the case of the Jerusha, * with [*328] permission to draw on him for the first instalment; but as there is nothing in the statement respecting freight, and I never having claimed any thing of that kind, I presume the award is only for the vessel. I am, sir,” &c.
    Upon the whole, the judge gave his opinion to the jury in fav.or of the plaintiff. The defendant now moved for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection.
    
      In support of the motion, it was contended that this money, although it might be paid to the defendant by a mistake on the part of the British government, could not be considered as received for the use of Geyer if Son, but of the British government. The money paid by Geyer if Son to Bradford was legally due, pursuant to the stipulations of the charter-party. If they now receive thia money, they will have had their goods transported in the defendant’s vessel free of any expense, which has certainly never beeji contemplated by any of the parties.
    
      For the plaintiff, it was argued that Geyer Son were not legally held to pay the hire to Bradford. the voyage not having been performed, which was the stipulated condition on which it was to become due.  But to suppose it otherwise, there can be no pretence for the defendant to receive and hold twice the amount of his charter. If the defendant had received the compensation from Great Britain immediately upon the capture, could he afterwards have maintained a legal demand against Geyer &r Son for the money "r Certainly not. What pretence, then, has he to hold the money thus paid ?
    
      
      
        Abbot on Shipping, 208.
    
   The opinion of the Court (the Chief Justice excepted, who had been of counsel in the cause) was afterwards thus delivered by

Sedgwick, J.

[After particularly stating the facts.] Whether the defendant was, or was not, entitled to freight for the hire of his vessel, antecedent to the capture, is of no importance in deciding this case. He certainly was not entitled to both the sums which he has received. He cannot be authorized to retain it from the plaintiff, for the reason alleged, that he is responsible for it to the British government. The award of the commissioners [ * 329 ] was in pursuance of a national * convention between the United States and Great Britain, to compensate for illegal captures. Such an award must be decisive, from the nature of the subject, against any claim which the government of Great Britain can set up to recover the money out of the hands of the defendant. The right of the defendant to retain the money, founded on the supposition that it belongs to the government of Great Britain, and may be recovered against him, is wholly groundless. Nothing can be more fanciful than the doctrine that the awards of the commissioners are revisable by courts of law, and that wherever they were made on a mistake of the merits of the claimant, the king of Great Britain can maintain indebitatus assumpsit for money received to his use ; and I may add that nothing could be more mischievous than an attempt of courts of justice to carry such a doctrine into effect. We are, then, bound to say that the award in favor of the defendant is a valid act, authorizing him to receive the money. The only remain ing question is, to whose use the money was received.

Keeping it in mind that the award conclusively decides that Mr. Bradford was entitled to receive, and the British government bound to pay, this money, the question of his right to retain it against the plaintiff is, in my opinion, of easy solution.

Previous to the award, the defendant had received of the bankrupts, whose assignee the plaintiff is, the identical sum awarded, and for precisely the same subject. Now, I cannot distinguish this from a common case, which may be supposed: — A pays to B the debt of C, which is afterwards demanded and received by B of C. Equity and good conscience manifestly require that it should be paid over to A, to whom in justice it is due. C has no claim to it, for he has only paid what he owed. B cannot retain it, for he has been twice paid all that was due to him; and by paying it to A, all the parties have good justice, and no more.

In this case, Bradford, having ratified the act of his agent, in claiming the freight, by receiving the money, cannot be permitted to say that it was not received for a just debt; and as the money so received had been previously paid by Messrs. * Geyer & Son, it must be considered as received by the [ * 330 ] defendant to their use.

It is believed that, in all cases, the awards of commissioners must be conclusive against the government of Great Britain, and that, as they relate to the interests respectively of those who are to derive a benefit from them, those interests must depend on the existing state of facts. The awards operated on the subjects themselves, and conveyed an interest, as a relation to those subjects might deter- • mine. In many instances, the commissioners did not know, and could not know, the interests of those who ought to receive the money awarded, either for the vessel, the cargo, or the freight; as must frequently happen in cases of insurer and insured, and in other cases. We all think, therefore, that the rights of the parties must depend upon their interests; and that whenever an award was made nominally to one, where the interest was in another, that other would be entitled to the benefit intended; and that, according to this principle, the money, which in this case was awarded, was for the benefit of Messrs. Geyer & Son, and ought to be paid over to .them.

We therefore think that the direction of the judge was right, and that the verdict ought to stand.

Judgment according to the verdict.  