
    Artemas Young versus Walter R. Mason.
    Where on a trial a witness is examined respecting a matter which is irrelevant to the issue, by both parties without objection, one of die parties cannot afterward object to the witness’s further examination with regard to the same subject.
    Trespass for taking, carrying away, and destroying two hundred gallons of French brandy. Trial before Morton J. on the general issue.
    Francis D. Kidder, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that he was a clerk in the store of Mason & Brooks : that the defendant, one of the firm, sold the plaintiff a pipe of brandy at 1 dollar 12 cents a gallon, which he represented to be pure French brandy ; that it was charged to the plaintiff on the books of the firm and his name was put on the head of the cask, but that it was left in the store for a few days by the defendant’s consent, until the plaintiff should send for it; that before the brandy was removed, the defendant drew out about 40 gallons, and supplied its place by American brandy worth 40. or 50 cents a gallon ; and that Brooks, the defendant’s partner, was present at the time.
    Brooks, being called as a witness for the defendant, contradicted the material parts of Kidder’s statement. On cross-examination the plaintiff’s counsel inquired of him, whether he, or his partner, ever had, in any instance, adulterated brandy or other spirits. This question he answered in the negative. Many questions on this subject were put by the counsel on both sides, the defendant’s counsel making no objection to the inquiry. The Court having adjourned to the next day, the plaintiff’s counsel, on the opening of the Court, proposed to inquire of the witness, whether in particular cases, which were named, and in sales to certain persons who were then in court as witnesses, the defendant or the witness had not adulterated brandy or other spirits. The defendant’s counsel stated that the defendant did not object to the questions, but that he thought them irrelevant and that they ought not to be put or answered. But the judge permitted the plaintiff’s counsel to put them and required them to be answered. The defendant’s counsel excepted to this decision, and, a verdict having been found for the plaintiff, moved for a new trial for this cause.
    
      T. Fuller, for the defendant,
    cited 1 Stark. Ev. 134; Spencely v. De Willott, 7 East, 10S; Rex. v. Watson, 2 Stark. R. 156.
    
      Hoar, for the plaintiff, did not wish to be heard.
   Per Curiam.

We do not think the defendant entitled to object to the verdict on the ground that improper questions may have been put to a witness, and that he was required to answer them, under the circumstances which occurred at the trial. The defendant would avail himself of a willingness on his part to have the questions put, but would reserve the right to object to them as improper. There was in truth no objection made at the time, and it is now too late to object.

Judgment according to verdict.  