
    The Davis Sewing Machine Company of Watertown New York v. Emeline Barnard et al.
    
      Equities based on insanity.
    
    A bUl to set aside a deed as against a subsequent bond, on the ground that it was made by a person who was insane at the time, and continued so until he died, establishes no equity greater than that of the grantee, and should be dismissed.
    A bond made by an insane person is void and a claim thereon should not be allowed against his estate, but while a probate decree allowing it might conclude the estate from questioning the bond, it cannot estop the widow from resisting a proceeding in aid of an execution thereon by a bill to set aside for the grantor’s insanity a prior deed made to her by her husband.
    Appeal from Eaton.
    Submitted and decided April 22.
    Bill to set aside deed. Defendants appeal.
    
      A. E. Cowles for complainant.
    
      McPeek & Tinkham for defendants.
   Per Curiam.

This is a bill to set aside a conveyance of lands made by Daniel Barnard to Emeline Barnard, Ms wife, in August, 1870, on tbe ground that tbe grantor was insane at tbe time be made it. Tbe supposed equity of complainant arises out of a bond executed by Daniel Barnard to complainant in December, 1871. Daniel Barnard died in June, 1873, and complainant bas proved a claim under tbe bond against tbe estate. There being no assets of tbe estate to pay tbe claim, tbe bill is filed to reach this land.

It is claimed by complainant that Daniel Barnard was insane when tbe deed was given, and continued to be so until bis death. If this was so, tbe bond was void as well as tbe deed. But complainant seeks to avoid this conclusion by relying upon tbe adjudication in the probate court as determining finally and conclusively tbe right to recover the amount awarded. But that adjudication is shown by the bill itself to establish no equity in favor of complainant as against this deed. It was upon a void demand, and ought not to have been rendered as it was. Complainant by means of it may have concluded the estate from questioning the bond, but a technical estoppel cannot be relied upon as raising an equity against Mrs. Barnard. If the bond was valid, the deed was, and if the deed was invalid, Mrs. Barnard has as- good an equity to retain it as complainant has to set it aside. In any view that can be taken of the facts, the bill should be dismissed.

Decree reversed and bill dismissed with costs.

The other Justices concurred.  