
    Thos. D. Simpson vs. T. J. Jones.
    Judgment. Who are affected by it? A judgment or decree, is binding only on the parties to tbe suit, or those in privity with them; its operation must be mutual, both parties must be alike concluded, or the proceedings cannot be set up, as conclusive against either.
    JTBOM JACKSON.
    This action of ejectment was submitted to a jury of the county of Jackson, before Gaut, judge, presiding, by interchange, at the November term, 1854, of the circuit court of said county. Tbe plaintiff claimed under a deed from one David Johnson, and his wife, Maria, in the latter of whom, the fee simple' was vested before her intermarriage with Johnson. This deed was executed on the 8th of January, 1846, and duly recorded on the 22nd of the _ same month. The plaintiff, for the premises in question, was to pay $225, of which, $150 was paid in cash, and his note for $75 given for the balance. The Bank of Tennessee, at Sparta, recovered a judgment against Johnson in the circuit court of Jack son county, on the 15th Nov. 1845, upon which execution was issued on the 27th December, 1845, which was levied upon the premises on the 9th of January, 1846, and the land was sold to one Merlin Young, for a less amount than the bank’s judgment. Milton Draper bought the balance of said judgment, and redeemed from Merlin Young. He then advanced his bid to the amount of the balance of said judgment, and received from the sheriff a deed for the premises. On the 6th of March, 1847, the plaintiff filed his bill in chancery at Gainesboro?, setting forth these facts, and charging a fraudulent concealment on the part of Johnson as to the lien upon the land, and praying for an injunction against the collection of the note of $75, for the unpaid pruchase money then in the hands of Draper, and a decree against Johnson for the amount paid. To this bill Johnson and Draper alone were made defendants. This bill was answered by Draper, and an order pro confesso regularly 'taken as to Johnson, who had left the State. Draper’s answer admitted the general allegations in the bill, but denied all fraud, and insisted that the $75 note was transferred to him, although "overdue, yet for a bona fide consideration; and to an amended bill of Simpson, be answers and sets up Ms lien upon the land by virtue of said note for tbe purchase money and the sheriff’s deed. Draper also files his cross bill, asMng the court to declare Ms title to the land. To this Simpson answers, reiterating his prayer for injunction, and reimbursement, and compensation for improvements, in the event the court should decree title to Draper. Chancellor Bidley decreed the land to Draper, and an injunction against the collection of the note, with a decree against Johnson in favor of Simpson, for the amount of purchase money paid. From this decree no appeal had ever been taken. In the whole proceeding, Maria Johnson is no where made a party. The court charged the jury, that by these proceedings in chancery, the plaintiff was estopped from setting up Ms title under the deed from Johnson and wife. There was verdict and judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed in error to this court.
    Murray, GardeNhibe and TubNey, for the plaintiff.
    They cited 3 Wend., 27. 2 Johns, 24. 7 id., 20. 12 Wend., 399. 3 Hill, 215. 6 Bac. Ab., 319. 3 BL, 308. Steph. PL, 197-240. 1 Chitty PL, 603. 9 Yerg., 463. 2 Phil. Ev., 9.
    Savage and W. H. Botts, for defendant,
    cited, Pin-son <& Hawldns vs. Joy, 1 Yerg., 349-50, and authorities there cited, and 1 Greenl. Ev., § 531.
   McKiNNey, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

We think the court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff was estopped from maintaining this action upon the deed from Johnson and wife, by force of the proceedings and decree in the chancery suit exhibited in the record.

It is an obvious principle of justice, that a judgment or decree is binding, in general, only on the parties to the suit, or those in privity with them! And in the application of this principle, it is essential in order to avoid injustice, that its operation be mutual; both the parties must be alike concluded, or the proceedings cannot be set up, as conclusive upon either. In the present case, Mrs. Johnson, in whom the fee simple estate was vested, was not a party to the suit; the validity of the contract, or the efficacy of the conveyance to vest the bargainee, Simpson, with the interest in fee, so far as Mrs. Johnson is concerned, is not questioned in the record of the cause. This matter was not only not in issue, but the record no where discloses the fact, that Mrs. Johnson was a party to the deed, or that the interest in fee, in the land conveyed, was vested in her. In this view, the proceedings and decree, which are extremely irregular, if not invalid, cannot have the legal effect assumed in the charge of the court.

The judgment will therefore be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.  