
    Bruce L. BLUM, Appellant, v. DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY, Americas as Trustee, Unknown Spouse of Bruce L. Blum, if any, Any and All Unknown Parties Claiming By, Through, Under, and Against the herein Named Individual Defendant(s) Who Are Not Know To Be Dead or Alive, Whether Said Unknown Parties May Claim An Interest As Spouses, Heirs, Devises, Grantees Or Other Claimants, John Doe and Jane Does, As Unknown Tenants In Possession, Appellees.
    No. 4D13-4271.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    March 4, 2015.
    James A. Bonfiglio, Boynton Beach, for appellant.
    Manuel S. Hiraldo of Blank Rome LLP, Boca Raton, for Appellee-Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas As Trustee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this appeal from a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of Deutsche Bank Trust Company, we reverse the final judgment because Deutsche Bank failed to prove that it complied with the mortgage and note’s contractual requirement to mail a notice of default to appellant as a condition precedent to foreclosure. The “breach letter” admitted into evidence did not meet the requirement in the mortgage to deliver the default notice to appellant at the “notice address,” defined in the mortgage as “the property address.” Paragraph twenty of the mortgage provides in pertinent part that “[njeither Borrower nor Lender may commence ... any judicial action ... that arises from the other party’s actions pursuant to this Security Instrument or that alleges that the other party has breached any provision of, or any duty owed by reason of, this Security Instrument, until such Borrower or Lender has notified the other party ... of such alleged breach and afforded the other party hereto a reasonable period after the giving such notice to take corrective action.” Deutsche Bank’s failure to comply with the condition precedent to filing suit requires a dismissal of the case. See Holt v. Calchas, LLC, 155 So.3d 499, 507 n. 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (reversing for a dismissal because there was insufficient evidence that notice of default was sent). Because we are reversing and remanding for a dismissal, we need not address appellant’s other arguments on appeal.

Reversed and Remanded.

GROSS, TAYLOR and LEVINE, JJ., concur.  