
    The Oswego Falls Bridge Company vs. Fish and others.
    Where an act of the legislature, incorporating a bridge company, left it to the discretion of the commissioners, appointed by such act, either to purchase and repair an existing bridge, or to erect a new one at some other point on the river; Held, that the court of chancery had no power to control the exercise of that discretion ; in the absence of proof that it had been exercised corruptly, or dishonestly, by the commissioners.
    The grant to a corporation of the right to erect a toll bridge across a river, without any restriction as to the right of the legislature to grant a similar privilege to others, does not deprive a future legislature of the power to authorize the erection of a free bridge across the same river, so near to the first as to divert a part of the travel which would have crossed the river on the first bridge if the last had not been erected.
    This was an appeal from a decree of the vice chancellor of the fifth circuit, dismissing the complainants’ bill with costs. The object of the bill was to restrain the commissioners appointed by the act of April, 1838, to build a free bridge across the Oswego river, between the falls and the north line of the village of Fulton, from proceeding to erect such bridge.
    The following opinion was delivered by the vice chancellor:
    Gridley, V. C.
    Upon an attentive consideration of the facts of this cause, I cannot see any distinction between the principle involved in it and the principle upon which the Charles River Bridge case, (11 Peters, 42,) was decided. It would be an act of pedantry for me to go into a consideration of the reasons for the decision, after the full and elaborate discussion of them by the judges whose opinions are reported at length in that cause. I feel bound to say, undex the decision in that case, that the act under which the defendants were proceeding, when arrested by the injunction, are valid. A distinction is attempted, by the learned counsel for the complainants, that the public interest required a new bridge to be built on Charles river, but that in this case it is apparent from the facts that this public interest will not be promoted by the erection of a free bridge. I think, however, if the legislature have a right to authorize the building of a free bridge when the public interest demands it, they are of necessity the judges of the fact whether it is demanded by the public interest or not. And after the passage of the act, that is no longer an open question. It is also insisted that the commissioners are bound, by the 7th section of the act appointing them, to purchase and appraise the Oswego Falls bridge, instead of building a new bridge, provided it can now be established that the public interest would be promoted by it. It seems to me, however, that the commissioners have a judicial discretion vested in them, either to build or purchase; and in the exercise of that discretion this court cannot revise their acts except in case of very gross abuse of such discretion, if at all. {See 19 Wend, 56.)
    
      T. Jenkins, for the appellants.
    
      H. Spencer, for the respondents.
   The Chancellor.

The question whether the commissioners should purchase and repair the bridge of the complainants, or erect a new bridge at some other point on the river, was one which was left by the legislature to the discretion of the commissioners. And this court has no power to control the exercise of that discretion. There is np pretence, in this case, for charging the defendants with a corrupt or dishonest exercise of their powers in this respect. The only question, therefore, is whether the legislature had the right to authorize the erection of a free bridge, across the Oswego river, so near to the bridge which the complainants had erected, under their charter, as to diminish their tolls and materially impair the profits of the company. I had occasion, incidentally, to consider the power of the legislature in this respect in the case of The Mohawk Bridge Company v. The Utica and Schenectady Rail-Road Co. (6 Paige’s Rep. 554,) and I then came to the conclusion that the grant to a corporation to erect a toll bridge across a river, without any restriction of the power of the legislature to grant a similar privilege to others, would not deprive a future legislature of the power to authorize the erection of another bridge which would divert a portion of the travel from the bridge which had been previously erected. Since that decision we have been furnished with the reported case of The Charles River Bridge Co. v. The Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, (11 Peters’ Rep. 420,) decided by the supreme court of the United States a few months before, but not then reported. That case cannot be distinguished in principle from the present; and as the question was fully considered there, in the very able opinion of Chief Justice Taney, who delivered the judgment of the court, it would be useless to go over the same ground.

The decision of the vice chancellor was therefore right in this case; and the decree appealed from must be affirmed with costs.  