
    Jimmy Nathan MOODY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Eric ARNOLD, Acting Warden; California Dept. of Corrections, Ironwood State Prison, Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 15-56768
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted October 6, 2017 Pasadena, California
    Filed February 20, 2018
    
      Lori-Ann C. Jones, Esquire, Law Office of Lori-Ann C. Jones, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant
    Kenneth Charles Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Xiomara Costello, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent-Appellee
    Before: RAWLINSON and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Petitioner-Appellant Jimmy Nathan Moody (Moody) appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Following a jury trial, Moody was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and shooting at an inhabited dwelling. Moody asserts a claim of actual innocence. Moody’s claim is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and habeas relief may be granted only upon a finding that the last reasoned state court decision rejecting his claim “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956, 962 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

The last reasoned decision addressing Moody’s actual innocence claim was the California Superior Court decision denying habeas relief on this claim. In denying Moody’s habeas petition, the Superior Court of California held that Moody had failed to make a sufficient showing to warrant relief. Specifically, the Superior Court found that the declarations provided by Moody did not “point unerringly to the innocence of Petitioner.” In re Richards, 55 Cal. 4th 948, 959, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 84, 289 P.3d 860 (2012).

Assuming, without deciding, that a freestanding claim of actual innocence is cognizable in a federal habeas petition, see Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), the Superior Court’s determination was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law. See id. (observing that a successful actual innocence claim would have to meet an “extraordinarily high” “threshold showing”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     