
    REES v. STATE.
    (No. 8283.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Nov. 4, 1925.)
    Criminal law &wkey;>507(l) — One who receives money to pay poll tax an accomplice of party giving money, and his testimony against giver must be corroborated.
    In prosecution under Acts 29th Leg. 1st Called Sess. 1995, c. 11, §§ 157, 170, for furnishing another with money with which to pay his poll tax, where party testified to alleged receipt of money from accused, court should-have given instruction on corroboz-ation of accomplices, in vie.w of sections 161, 162, making such party guilty of a felony, despite section 165, which grants immunity from prosecution to party to illegal act testifying thereto.
    Appeal from Bee County Court; J. J. Carmichael, Special Judge.
    Stafford Rees Was convicted of furnishing another with money with which to pay latter’s poll tax, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    EV G. Chambliss and J. R. Dougherty, both of Beeville, B. D. Tarlton, of Corpus Christi, and John Baker, of Beeville, for appéllant.
    Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.
   HAWKINS, J.

Conviction is for furnishing to W. G. McCollom money with which to pay the latter’s poll tax. The punishment assessed was a fine of $200.

Section 157, chapter 11, Acts 1st Called Sess. 29th Leg. 1905, reads: v ,

“Any one who gives money to another to induce him to pay his poll tax is guilty of a misdemeanor.”

Section 170 provides that — ■

“Any person who loans or advances money to another knowingly to be used for paying the poll tax of such other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”

The punishment prescribed for violation of misdemeanors under said act (section 148) is by fine of not less than $200 nor more than $500, "or bard labor upon tbe public roads of tbe county in wbicb tbe offense was committed for any period of time not less than 60 days, nor more than one year, or to both sucb penalties.

Tbe prosecution is based upon tbe two sections quoted. Tbe indictment contains many counts, charging in various ways a violation of sucb law. We find no vice in tbe manner in which tbe offenses are chárged. Tbe pleader seems to have followed tbe language of tbe statute, which, ordinarily, is sufficient. We see no reason for more specific pleading than that resorted to in tbe present instance.

We find in tbe record a great many bills of exception, but discuss only one point. Tbe court did not charge upon' accomplice testimony as related to the witness W. G. Me-Collom, who said be received tbe money from appellant with wbicb be paid for and obtained bis poll tax. Appellant properly excepted to tbe failure of the court to instruct tbe jury upon this issue,' and requested two special charges, one advising tbe jury that as a matter of law said MeCollom was an accomplice, tbe other defining an accomplice witness, and calling upon tbe jury to determine the issue. In the very act wbicb denounces as offenses the matters charged against appellant, another section is found wbicb fixes upon MeCollom tbe status of an accomplice witness as a matter of law. Section 161 denounces certain acts, enumerated as felonies, fixing tbe punishment therefor at confinement in the penitentiary for not less than three nor more than five years. Section 162 (deleting tbe portions not pertinent here) reads as follows:

“The penalty prescribed in the last preceding section against those who violate any of its provisions shall be imposed on any one who receives or agrees to receive any money, gift, loan or other thing of value, * * * for refraining or agreeing to refrain from obtaining his poll tax receipt * * * or for obtaining or agreeing to obtain the same. * * * ”

By tbe peculiar provisions of the various sections referred to, one who gives or loans money to another with wbicb to pay bis poll tax is denounced as being guilty of a misdemeanor only, while be who receives tbe money for obtaining bis poll tax is denounced-as a felon. Both the giver and receiver of tbe money become guilty of an offense differing only in degree. This being true, a paral-' lei case arises to that existing at tbe time our present liquor laws were first enacted by wbicb tbe purchaser of intoxicating liquor was made guilty of a felony as well as tbe seller of tbe same. Tbe purchaser under those circumstances was held to be an accomplice. Many announcements t<5 this effect were made by this court prior to tbe amendment of tbe statute relieving tbe purchaser. from tbe provisions of tbe former law. Franklin v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 342, 227 S. W. 486; Franklin v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 414, 227 S. W. 487; Chandler v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 300, 231 S. W. 105.

Tbe court should have instructed tbe jury that MeCollom was an accomplice, and that a conviction could not be bad upon bis evidence without corroboration. This conclusion is not in any way affected by tbe provisions of section 165 of tbe act heretofore referred to, which provides that, when two persons are parties to tbe same act, in violation of any provision of tbe election law of this state, either party may be required to testify regarding tbe same, but tbe one testifying shall not thereafter be prosecuted for sucb illegal act. Tbe section just referred to in no way undertakes to relieve tbe purchaser or other party who may be called as a witness from tbe onus of an accomplice; but protects him only to tbe extent that be may not be prosecuted for tbe illegal act regarding wbicb be testified, and thereby precludes him from refusing to testify on tbe ground that be might criminate himself.

Eor tbe error pointed out, tbe judgment must be reversed and tbe cause remanded. 
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