
    Richard Lee TABLER, Petitioner-Appellant v. William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 12-70013.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Jan. 27, 2015.
    Marcia Adele Widder, Atlanta, GA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Fredericka Searle Sargent, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Respondent-Ap-pellee.
    Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Christeson v. Roper, 574 U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 891, - L.Ed.2d -, 2015 WL 232187 (2015) (per curiam), we VACATE IN PART our previous opinion denying Richard Tabler’s petition for a Certificate of Appealability, Tabler v. Stephens, 2014 WL 4954294 (5th Cir.2014) (unpublished). We now hold that the equitable rule established in Martinez v. Ryan, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), that “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial,” logically extends to ineffective assistance of habeas counsel that prevents an initial-review collateral proceeding from ever taking place. Because Tabler’s attorneys for his state habe-as proceedings were also his attorneys for his federal habeas proceedings, they faced a conflict of interest that could have prevented them from arguing that their performance in Tabler’s competency hearing was deficient, and, accordingly, Tabler’s statutory right to counsel was violated. See Christeson, 574 U.S. at-, 135 S.Ct. at-. We hereby VACATE IN PART the district court’s judgment and REMAND the case to the district court solely to consider in the first instance whether Tabler, represented by his new counsel Widder or other unconflicted counsel, can establish cause for the procedural default of any ineffective-assistanee-of-trial-coun-sel claims pursuant to Martinez that he may raise, and, if so, whether those claims merit relief. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     