
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Jose RUIZ-CHAVEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 06-1063.
    United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
    March 28, 2007.
    
      Michael A. Macdonald, Asst. U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Michigan, Grand Rapids, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Kenneth P. Tableman, Grand Rapids, MI, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: SILER, GIBBONS, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM.

Defendant Juan Jose Ruiz-Chavez appeals the imposition of his seventy-eight month sentence. He raises issues concerning disparities between his sentence and sentences in “fast-track” districts, the reasonableness of his sentence, and whether the district court sufficiently articulated the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors relevant to his case. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.

I.

In October 2003, Ruiz-Chavez pled guilty to illegally reentering the United States following deportation for an aggravated felony conviction, 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Ruiz-Chavez appealed his seventy-eight month sentence on the ground that it violated the Eighth Amendment. We rejected the Eighth Amendment claim but remanded for re-sentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).

The Presentence Report (“PSR”) for the re-sentencing noted that Ruiz-Chavez had been convicted six times since 1990, warranting a criminal history category of V. The PSR calculated Ruiz-Chavez’s base offense level at eight, but recommended a sixteen-level enhancement because he had previously been deported for a crime of violence. It also recommended a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The PSR established the sentence range from seventy to eighty-seven months incarceration. The district court accepted the PSR’s calculation, dismissed Ruiz-Chavez’s fast-track argument, and imposed a seventy-eight month sentence. The district court noted that it did not find that any of the § 3553(a) factors warranted a departure from the Guidelines.

II.

Ruiz-Chavez contends that his sentence was unreasonable in light of similarly-situated defendants in fast-track districts who enter a plea bargain with the government and forfeit their right to appeal in exchange for a maximum four-level sentence reduction. However, we have already rejected the fast-track argument on the ground that fast-track sentence reductions were “specifically authorized by statute due the unique and pressing problems related to immigration in certain districts” and therefore any “disparity does not run counter to § 3553(a)’s instruction to avoid unnecessary sentencing disparities.” United States v. Hernandez-Fierros, 453 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir.2006). To the extent that fast-track programs have been implemented in districts not overwhelmed by immigration dockets, Ruiz-Chavez is not similarly situated to fast-track defendants because he retained his right to appeal.

Ruiz-Chavez further contends that the district court erred by failing to articulate why the § 3553(a) reasons he set forth did not warrant a departure from the Guidelines range. Our review is limited to plain error as Ruiz-Chavez failed to raise this objection before the district court. See United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872-73 (6th Cir.2004). Here, the district court clearly set forth its approach to sentencing. It went on to explicitly reject the fast-track argument and also stated it had considered the other § 3553(a) factors relevant to this case. However, the district court was not persuaded to depart from the Guidelines range, noting that Ruiz-Chavez’s case was “within the heartland of cases of this type.” Contrary to Ruiz-Chavez’s assertion otherwise, the district court was not required to explain why it was rejecting variance under each of the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 709 (6th Cir.2006) (“The court need not recite [the § 3553(a) ] factors but must articulate its reasoning in deciding to impose a sentence in order to allow for reasonable appellate review.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Ruiz-Chavez’s seventy-eight month sentence was reasonable. See id. at 708 (crediting a properly calculated sentence under the Guidelines with a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness).

AFFIRMED. 
      
      . For the same reason, Ruiz-Chavez’s Equal Protection claim based on fast-track program disparities also fails.
     
      
      . The district court stated:
      I begin by looking at a correctly calculated guideline range. It’s a beginning point.... I do that recognizing that the guidelines ... are only recommendatory.... I also want to consider the other factors listed in [§ 3553(a)(l)-(7) ] and listen to the parties’ arguments with respect to whether any of those factors may persuade the Court that ... some sentence outside of that range ... would be a more appropriate sentence.
     