
    Johnston and Henderson against Dilliard.
    gro girl slave to e;o with his daughter on tTremah’i^Te-tenvards18 in ^se7onun5 married cou-pie ; tins is to be considered in aiaw°;d *al-he°no deecTof lor^any lfor-oTsuci^stove' Any deed of manumission, therefore, of terwards^0 by der ^pretence of its being only a loan to the married couple, to be deemed null and toid. A parent permitting a ne-
    SPECIAL action on the case, in nature of ravishment of ward, to try the freedom of a negro female slave called ' Miley, and her children.
    The plaintiffs in this action were of the society of the People called Friends or Quakers, and had taken uncommon Pains to procure this wench and sundry others, their freedom. It was stated and admitted at the trial, that _ Johnsons zeal on this and other like occasions, had induced him to ride near 10,000 miles at different times, in 01'der to establish the freedom of a number of negroes, held ^11 slavery in this state and in Georgia; and that he was suPPorteci in this arduous undertaking, by a society, or societies, formed in the northern states for that purpose.
    _ , , , . In support of the action, a deed was produced from one Charles Moorman, formerly of Virginia, deceased, who was one the Society of Friends in that state, bearing date the 28th of May, 1778, in which he manumits or sets free, a . . ’ number of his negroes, and among others, the wench Miley, . . ... r after she should arrive at the age of 18 years. His last will ancl testament was next produced, bearing date the ad of September, 1778, proved and authenticated under the great seal of the state of Virginia, in which he lends to his children, his male slaves until they should arrive at 21 years of age ; and the females, until they should arrive at 18 years of age; then to be free. An act of the state of Virginia 
      was next produced, under the great seal of that state, passed the 27th of August, 1788, giving a legal sanction to the deed of manumission, and last wiil and testament of old Moorman ; saving, nevertheless, the 'rights of individuals, who might have a legal claim on any of the negroes in question.
    Several witnesses were called on behalf of the defendant, who in substance proved, that in the year 16G9, one fames Taylor married Mary, one of the daughters of Moorman ¡ and that soon after, when they left her father’s house and went to house-keeping, the wench in question, then a girl, was permitted to go along with his daughter Mary, who took her home with her. That he also gave to his other children as they married, a negro each. That after remaining several years in their possession, to wit, till some time in the year 1778, Taylor and his wife sold the wench in question to the present defendant.
    
      Eamsay and Carnes, for the plaintiffs,
    argued in substance, that although Moorman permitted this girl, Miky, to go with his daughter, in the manner staled by tbe witnesses ; yet, he never made any gift of her. That to constitute a gift in law, one of three things was requisite s first, either a. formal instrument of writing, giving away the property i or a parol gift, in the presence of witnesses; or a personal delivery over, of the property to the use of the donee ; neither of which had been done in the present case. That the property still remained the property of Moorman, and subject to his disposal, although he had lent the services of the girl to his daughter for several years. That no property ever vested in Taylor and his wife; consequently, they could not sell; of com se, it followed, that Moorman always retained the property, and a controlling power over the wench, and had a right to set her at liberty, or otherwise dispose of her, as he thought proper.
    
      Calhoun and Desaussure, for the defendant,
    contended, that this gift was in consideration of marriage ; and as such, the highest consideration known in law. That whereve?: property of any kind, had been permitted to go along with a new married couple, upon théir marriage, it had always been held sacred; therefore, any attempt by a father after-wards, to reclaim such property, was an act which came with an ill grace indeed into a court of justice ; and particularly, when it had remained near nine years in the possession of Taylor and his wife. There could be no doubt but that Moorman had a right in 1778, to manumit all such negroes as he held at that time ; but surely, none that he had previously disposed of, or suffered to go along with his children. And the wisdom of the Virginia assembly was- obvious, in their act to confirm the manumission, by inserting a clause, reserving to individuals their rights ; which evidently referred to any disposition of those negroes, previous to the act of manumission.
    It had, however, they said, been objected on the part of the plaintiffs, that there had been no formal gift, either by deed, parol, or- delivery, in this case ; therefore, the property never vested in Taylor and wife. To this they answered, that it had been a uniform rule of law in this country, from time immemorial, that whatever property went to a woman upon her marriage, by and with the consent, know» ledge and approbation of her father, was considered as given to her as her marriage portion, or part of her portion; and our courts of justice had never permitted it to be called in question. This consent and' approbation of the father, was as good as a thousand deeds of gift; for it could not be conceived that a father would permit the property to go along with his daughter, unless he intended to give it her; otherwise it would be a kind of fraud on the husband,, who might contract debts, and upon others, who might be induced to give him credit, on the faith of such property being the’ property he gained in marriage.
   Bay, J.

in charging the jury, told them, that marriage was certainly the highest consideration known in law ; and whatsoever passed to a daughter on her marriage, by the consent and approbation of her father, was not only considered in law as a good gift or transfer, but it was so even against creditors, unless done with a fraudulent intention. No gift could be more forma!, than to permit property to go off with a daughter on marriage ; and our courts had uniformly given such gifts the highest possible sanction. In the present case, the wench in dispute had not oniy gone over on the daughter’s marriage, but had afterwards been nine years in her possession, before Moorman made the deed of manumission, offered in evidence. This was certainly such a confirmation of the original gift, as would not permit the property to be called in question at this distant day. The length of possession alone, independent of the consideration of marriage, was such an acquiescence on the part of Moorman, that under our act of ¡imitation, it would have barred him of any claim to the wench. That under these circumstances, therefore, the deed of manumission was utterly void in law, as far as it related to the wench now in question.

Verdict for the plaintiff.

N. B.

This point has been ruled over and over again in our courts of justice, and therefore may be considered as She settled law of our state.  