
    Jacob Ramsdall v. W. B. Craighill et al.
    By marriage the husband becomes the owner of his wife’s personal property? and if they unite in selling her realty, and receive the money, that is his-also; and if it is invested in real estate, and the title taken to himself, the-estate is his.
    The debts of a deceased person are a lien on the land of-which he died seized, in default of personal assets, whether devised or east by descent, which can only be removed by tbe payment of the debts or the lapse of time.
    An injunction operates from notice to the defendant, or its service.
    In chancery. From Huron. This bill seeks to quiet the complainant’s title to two hundred acres of land, in Danbury, Huron county. The facts of the case, as they appear in the pleadings,, exhibits, and evidence, appear (as well as they can be extracted from a mass of loosely drawn papers), to bo substantially these: Gabriel Yillard died intestate, leaving a widow, Josette, and three daughters, his heirs at law. The widow took out administraiion, and managed the estate for herself and children. She realized from the estate $900, $200 of which were adjudged to her under the law for her year’s support.
    After this, Mrs. Yillard and one Charles Bebo, went together to the land office in Bucyrus, and each purchased a tract of sixty acres of land adjoining, near Port Clinton. Shortly after this-they intermarried. Bobo and his wife sold these two tracts to General Lytle, in 1827, for $1,100, and Bobo then bought of tho complainant the tract in controversy for $900, and received a deed for it in presence of his wife and others. The deed remained in Bebo’s possession without being recorded at his death. Mrs. Bebo, though she expressed no dissatisfaction with the deed when interpreted to her, yet expressed some dissatisfaction before his death; and afterward’set up a claim, that the land sold to Lytle was in part purchased with *hcr money, and the avails applied to purchase of the complainant, the land in dispute, and should belong to her. She kept the deed in her possession till she died ; when John Yalicot, who had married one of her daughters, by Yillard, got possession of it, and delivered it up to the complainant. Mrs. Bebo, by will, devised all her real and personal ■estate to Yalicot and his wife, and they, claiming this land under the will, released to the complainant.
    
    The defendant, Craighill, was administrator of Bebo, and the heirs of Yillard obtained a decree against him in chancery, for their portion of their father’s estate, which' came into Bebo’s hands upon his marriage with their mother. The debts due by Bobo, with the amount of this decree, exceeded the amount of Bebo’s personal assets; and upon the administrator’s application, the court of common pleas ordered him to sell the land in controversy, for the payment of these debts. In pursuance of which order he sold to the defendant, Gallagher, who now sets up that 'claim. This sale took place two days alter the bill in this case was filed, and upon notice that Craighill was in possession claiming title; but it does not appear that process had been served. 'The sale has been approved by the court, a deed ordered, and the money paid.
    Boalt and Worcester, for plaintiff,
    insisted that he had good title and possession to the land, and .should be quieted. -They cited 8 Ohio, 1 pt. 170; 22 Ohio L. 130.
    D. Higgins, for the defendants,
    contended the estate was in Bobo, at his death, and that Craighill acquired no title by the release of Yalicot and wife, under Mrs. Bebo’s will. As to the sale 'to Gallagher, it must be hold valid, as the court, having jurisdiction of the subject, have ordered and approved. But, however that may bo, the plaintiff is a stranger to Bebo’s estate, and can ■not call the proceedings in question. If there were any trust in the land resulting to Mrs. Bebo, from her having paid part of the purchase money, it is only to one-half; and in that event, Bebo’s estate should be credited with advances for Mrs. Bebo’s debts, to her children.
   By the Court,

Wood, J.

The first question arising in this case is, what title has the plaintiff to authorize him to invoke the aid of this court to quiet him by injunction? When Bebo married Mrs. Yillard, he became immediately entitled to all her personal property. When he and his wife united in selling the land they held at Port Clinton, *the proceeds being personalty, by like operation of law, were his. With the money he purchased •of the complainant the land in dispute, and took a title to himiself, as he had a right to do. The legal estate being thus vested in him, he died seized, and it passed by descent to his heirs at-law, subject to the payment of his debts, and it made no difference, in this respect, whether the descent was cast upon his or any other heir. But it is said Bebo defrauded his wife in taking-a deed in his own name, and that, inasmuch as Tier money entered into the purchase, equity will declare the estate hers, or so much of it as was purchased with her means. The answer to the allegation of fraud is, that she was present when the deed was executed and received, heard it explained, made no objection to it, and must be presumed to have assented to its form. No objection from her was heard till some time afterward, when it was too-late to affect the right. It is true, Bebo, when she complained, said it should be conveyed to her, but nothing was done. This does not show fraud, nor does it evidence any original understanding, that she was to keep any portion either of the personal or real property. The plaintiff, then, must resort to some other ground to sustain his right; and he avers that Bebo left no heirs but-aliens, and as they did not appear to claim the estate, it vested in Ms widow, and by her will was passed to Yalicot and wife, and to-him by their release. This does not aid the plaintiff in the least, if Bobo’s estate was in debt beyond his personal assets; because-the debts are a lien on the land, let it be cast upon, or transferred to whomsoever it may, which could only be extinguished by their payment.

Fraud is also charged upon the administrator and the purchaser, Gallagher, in the sale by order of the probate court, but. there is no evidence to support the charge, nor in any way to impeach the fairness of these proceedings. It is further alleged that these probate proceedings were irregular and void, among other things, because the preliminary injunction in this case was allowed before the sale. Although that is true, yet as it was not served until two days after the sale, it could only operate upon the administrator from the time he received notice.

In any view we can take of this case, it seems to us very clear that the plaintiff has no ground for relief in equity, and the injunction must be dissolved. Bill dismissed.  