
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Domingo SALAZAR, Defendant-Appellant, Norma Mendez, Defendant.
    No. 11-2220.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 17, 2012.
    Lawrence Gerzog, New York, N.Y., for Appellant.
    Michael H. Warren (Susan Corkery, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, N.Y., for Appellee.
    Present: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, GUIDO CALABRESI, and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.

Domingo Salazar appeals from a judgment of conviction, following a guilty plea to one count of sex trafficking, one count of illegal reentry following deportation, and five other counts also related to his conspiracy with his wife to smuggle a minor into the United States for the purpose of forcing her to engage in prostitution.

The government offered Salazar an agreement pursuant to which he could have pleaded guilty to sex trafficking and illegal reentry. Although Salazar himself would have gained little by accepting, the government was also offering that if Salazar pleaded guilty by July 1, 2010, his wife could plead guilty to sex trafficking conspiracy and avoid the fifteen-year mandatory minimum attached to the substantive sex trafficking charge. Considerable discussion over the factual bases of some of the allegations, and over Salazar’s claim that he had not had a chance to “study” the plea agreement, followed. During all of this time, however, Salazar never wavered from his desire to plead guilty. In due course, he did plead guilty, but without the benefit of a formal agreement.

Before us, Salazar asks that his plea be declared involuntary for several reasons. He cites his limited English-language ability and lack of education. However, Salazar had the benefit of an interpreter; he told the court that he understood the proceedings; and his lawyer expressed “no reason to doubt [Salazar’s] competence.” Salazar also emphasizes that he was under “enormous pressure” because the government’s offer to his wife was conditioned on his guilty plea. We have held, however, that this kind of pressure does not necessarily render a guilty plea invalid. “The inclusion of a third-party benefit in a plea bargain is simply one factor for a district court to weigh in making the overall determination whether the plea is voluntarily entered.” United States v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir.1990); see also id. (“Since a defendant’s plea is not rendered involuntary because he enters it to save himself many years in prison, it is difficult to see why the law should not permit the defendant to negotiate a plea that confers a similar benefit on others.”). And finally, Salazar argues that the court participated in plea discussions in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1).

Because Salazar failed to raise these claims before the district court, he must show plain error. United States v. Torrellas, 455 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir.2006). To satisfy that standard, Salazar must demonstrate “that (1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error prejudi-cially affected his substantial rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Salazar “has the further burden to persuade the court that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have examined the record with care and conclude that Salazar cannot meet these stringent requirements. Finding no merit in Salazar’s remaining arguments, as well, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  