
    Daniel B. Griffin v. Jacob Ing.
    A general jurisdiction is not ousted, except by plain words or a necessary implication ; and notwithstanding' the act of 1828, c■ 9, giving’ a justied of the peace jurisdiction in cases where the debt and interest exceed one hundred dollars, and the act of 1826, c. 12, authorizing the courts to dismiss a suit for less, yet as there are no words in those acts ousting the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts, in cases of debt for one hundred dollars and interest, it remains.
    Debt upon a single bond, for g 100, payable the 1st of January, 1828. executed by the defendant to the plaintiff. The writ was sued out the 21st of May, 1829, returnable to the ensuing term of Wake Superior Court. At the. return term, the defendant pleaded in chief. The cause came on to be tried on the last Spring Circuit, before bis Honor Judge Danted, when the counsel for the defendant moved that it be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. His Honor sustained the motion, and the plaintiff appealed.
    The Attorney General, for the plaintiff.
    
      Badger and JBevereux, for the defendant,
    cited Crisp v. Bunbury, (21 Eng, O. L. Rep, 333.)
   Ruffin, Judge.

The act of 1820, eft. 1045, extends the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace to all sums not exceeding one hundred dollars : and by the third section enacts, that all suits in the Superior or County Courts, on any band &c. for a less sum than g 100 shall be abated on the plea of the defendant. Before that act, the courts had jurisdiction of all the sums not under £ 30. There is nothing contradictory in the possession, by two courts, of jurisdiction of the same matter. In most respects, the jurisdiction of the Superior and County Courts is concurrent in civil cases. Nor can a general jurisdiction be ousted but in plain words or as plain implication. Such an implication I should deem to arise, if a special court were constituted to try conclusively and finally, a particular set of controversies. Perhaps this would be so, although such controversies were not then, existing ; though, if they were, the argument would be the stronger, that the cognizance was exclusive. But the inference is the other way generally ; because it is for the benefit of the citizen to give him the choice of his forum. We cannot go beyond the words of the legislature in destroying the jurisdiction. It may possibly have been the purpose of the acts enlarging that of a justice of the peace, absolutely to exclude all others ; but we must say, that it is only exclusive as far as it is expressed. Under the act of 1820, both the justices and the courts have jurisdiction of the sum of g loOi the former, because it is raised to ail sums not exceeding that, and the latter, because the act takes it away in all cases for a less sum. At the point of g 100 they meet, and their jurisdiction is concurrent. The act of 1826, c]lt igf repeals the section giving a plea, and substitutes an authority to the court to dismiss the suit, if brought for a sum under $ 100. This left the concurrent jurisdiction as it was, in respect of the sum ; but changed the mode of taking advantage of the want of it by a court. Then comes tiie act of 1828, ch. 9, which confers on a justice of the peace, jurisdiction, in cases where the principal money may not exceed § 100 } altho’ that and the interest together may. In this act, no plea or motion to dismiss is given, if a suit be brought in such case. The bond on which this suit is brought is of the character described in the act of 1828 — it is one of which jurisdiction is thereby given to a justice of the peace ; but there is nothing to deprive the courts of jurisdiction, even by remote implication — we are authorised to dismiss only when the sum is under one hundred dollars ; and the plea being taken away, and the motion to dismiss being the only mode given by the statutes, as to suits for sums above £S0, the jurisdiction of the courts, upon the purview of all the statutes, is concurrent with that of a justice of the peace, as to suits for the sum of $ 100, or exceeding that sum, in cases where that sum is the principal money clue. If the contrary was the intention of the legislature, it is yet to be expressed; and without their sanction, the complaint of a citizen cannot be dismissed unheard.

The judgment must therefore be reversed and the cause removed to the Superior Court, to be tried on the issues joined.

Per Curiam. — Judgment reversed.  