
    FRANCIS A. WOOD Et Al. vs. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Et Al.
    1. Whenever an invalid tax is sought to be enforced, certiorari is the proper remedy to review the proceedings.
    2. While the writ may be denied where the petitioner is shown to have been guilty of culpable laches in applying for it, yet when nothing appears to show that the petitioner by silence has inflicted injury upon others; or occasioned public or private inconvenience; or that others have acquired rights which will be impaired; and that as soon as assailed he complained, a hearing ought not to be refused by a denial of the writ.
    At Law.
    No. 26,832.
    Decided October 21, 1887.
    The Chief Justice and Justices Hagner, James and Merrick sitting.
    This was a motion to quash forty-three writs of certiorari which had issued to the Treasurer of the United States and the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, on the prayer of the respective petitioners alleging the invalidity of certain taxes assessed against their property. The writs commanded the respondents to certify to the Court the papers and records of proceedings in each case. The motion to quash was certified to the General Term to be there heard in the first instance.
    Messrs. Birney & Birney, for petitioners:
    
      Certiorari is the proper action. This ’ common-law writ has been the ordinary one used in this District, by the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court, for the review of proceedings of inferior tribunals charged with exceeding their jurisdiction. See cases in Cranch’s C. C. Reports, passim. Our practice follows the common law.
    In Stone vs. Mayor etc. of New York, the Court of errors (Senator Paige’s opinion), 25 Wend., 167, says of the common-law writ:
    
      “A certiorari lies upon all final adjudications of an inferior court or officer, invested by the Legislature with power to decide on the property or rights of the citizen, and which court or officer acts in a summary way or in a new course different from the common law.”
    Quotes Tidd Pr., 1051, 1148; Co. Litt., 288 b; 2 Salk., 504; 1 Salk., 144, 146; 3 Bl. Comm., 32-34; 20 Johns., 180. See also Ex parte Mayor of Albany, 23 Wend., 287.
    Our practice is sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court. In Ewing vs. St. Louis, 72 U. S.; 5 Wall., 418, the Court says: “If the statutes and ordinances invested the mayor with authority, when new streets in the city were to be opened, to render judgments for the amount of benefits assessed against the owners of adjoining property, and in this instance he failed to follow their provision, or exceeded the jurisdiction they conferred, the remedy of the complainant was by certiorari at law, and not by bill in equity.”
    This is the general and well established doctrine. Examples in which this is asserted are found in Mayor etc. of Brooklyn vs. Meserole, 26 Wend., 132, and in Heywood vs. Buffalo, 14 N. Y., 534.
    The same principle is asserted in Dows vs. Chicago, 78 U. S; 11 Wall., 108.
    Our practice accords with that in the States generally.
    
      Certiorari lies to municipal corporations, upon assessments for. grading avenues. 5 Barb., 43, 607; 9 Barb., 535; Barb., 656; 1 N. J. Law, 400; 23 N. J. Law, 532, and to Supervisors, 8 Cal., 58.
    The proper process is by certiorari. Baldwin vs. Bangor, 36 Maine, 518; 16 Cal., 208; 2 Mass., 489; 7 Mass., 158; 8 Pick., 440; 2 Ohio St., 228; 3 Ohio, 383; 8 Vt, 271; 2 Binn., 250.
    In New York,.it is a matter, of course on street assessments. 20 Wend., 685; 15 Johns., 537.
    None of the petitions at bar show grounds of equity juris- ' diction; but if they did, a court of law having clear jurisdiction of a case will not dismiss it, because there is concurrent jurisdiction in equity.
    The writ of certiorari has three distinct uses: a, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, to remove a case for trial in the Supreme Court; b, to perfect a record where diminution has been suggested; and c, to bring up a case for review where the proceedings in the lower tribunal are charged with illegality. People vs. County Judge, 40 Cal., 479. See also Lynde vs. Noble, 20 Johns., 80; 37 Barb., 126; Bacon Abr. certiorari; State, Eldes, vs. Medical Society of Hudson Co,, 35 N. J. Law, 200; People vs. Comrs. of E. Hampton, 30 N. Y., 72; People, Marsh vs Delaney, 49 N. Y., 655.
    Laches is defined as “a neglect to do something which by law a man is obliged to do.” Sebog vs. Abitbal, 4 M. & S., 463.
    In Wagner vs. Baird, 48 U. S.; 7 How., 258, the Court says that length of time “ operates by way of presumption in favor of the party in possession. Long acquiescence and laches by parties out of possession are productive of much hardship and injustice to others and cannot be excused, but by showing some actual hindrance or impediment caused by the fraud or concealment of the party in possession,” etc.
    A definition founded on the cases would be: “A neglect by a party out of possession to sue within a reasonable time.”
    ■ In our examination of cases we have been unable to find one in which laches has been imputed to a man in possession of property, because he had not brought suit against a claimant out of possession.
    Although no laches can be imputed to petitioners, we admit that the Court, in the exercise of a sound judgment, may quash a writ of certiorari, for potent reasons of public policy. This power is taken out of the realm of whim and caprice by numerous precedents of high authority.
    
      The doctrine on this point is stated in Cooley on Taxation, 530, as follows:
    “ The common-law writ is not one of right, but is granted oí: the special facts; and the Court has a discretion to refuse to grant it in any case when great mischief might be likely to follow the setting aside the proceedings complained of.” See also Hancock vs. Boston, 1 Met., 122; Re Lantis, 9 Mich., 324; Fractional School District of Owasso vs. School Inspectors, 27 Mich., 3.
    The decision in Mattingly vs. D. C., 97 U. S., 687, has no application because — “curative laws may heal irregularities in action, but they cannot cure a want of authority to act at all.” Cooley, Taxation, 227.
    “The legislature cannot legalize a void judgment.” Slocum vs. Slocum, 17 Wis., 150; Rankin vs. Adams, 18 Wis., 292.
    “The act of a judge or tribunal having no jurisdiction cannot be validated by retroactive law.” Welty, Assessments, 231; 2 Allen, 361.
    For defects curable, see Cooley, Const. Lim., 382.
    For cases where curative statutes were held not effectual to reach defects in tax proceedings see; Allen vs. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 508; Smith vs. Cleveland, 17 Wis., 556; Abbot vs. Lindenbower, 42 Miss., 162.
    Assessments upon the real estate not lying within the taxing districts would be void. Cooley, Const. Lim., 500; Wells vs. Weston, 22 Mo., 385; Covington vs. Southgate, 15 B. Mon., 491; 3 Bush., 271.
    An assessment cannot be made by a municipal corporation outside of the city limits, even when benefited. Baltimore vs. Horn, 26 Md., 206.
    An assessment made against a person without his domicile cannot be cured by after legislation. Cooley, Const. Lim.., 382.
    The proprietor must be notified. Section 2 of the Act of August 10, 1871, provides for notice to the proprietor of property adjoining of the amount assessed against the same.
    
      The petitions charge that the record shows no notice.
    ' The burden of the proof is upon the city, a party desiring to sustain the assessment. Re Second Ave. M. E. Ch., 66 N, Y., 398.
    When the acts to be done are for the protection of the taxpayers, they are mandatory; when they are for the security of the Government, they are directory. Welty, sec. 319.
    No suit necessary to enforce lien; hence, the necessity of notice.
    A right to a notice and an opportunity to be heard is a constitutional right where such apportionment is to be made. Griswold College vs. Davenport, 65 Iowa, 633.
    Affirmed in subsequent case. Welty, sec. 412.
    When notice is necessary. Welty, sec. 252.
    Notice of the means of knowledge is an essential element of every just proceeding which affects the rights of persons or property. Id.; Brown vs. Dawes, 7 Colo., 305.
    Saloon tax, no notice. Dool vs. Cassopolis, 42 Mich., 547; Thomas vs. Gain, 35 Mich., 155; 24 Am. Rep., 540. ,
    If the law has afforded a party an opportunity to be heard, when it might have been dispensed with, he has a right to rely upon this for his protection, and we should doubt the right of the legislature to take it away by retroactive law. Cooley, Taxation, 229. See also Stuart vs. Palmer, 74 N. Y., 188.
    Due process of law, in every system of assessment and taxation, requires that the person assessed, at some stage of the proceedings, must have an opportunity to be heard. Cooley, Taxation, 266; Overing vs. Foote, 65 N. Y., 263; Santa Clara Co. vs. S. Pac. R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep., 385; quoted from by Welty, p. 411; Gatch vs. Des Moines, 63 Iowa, 718; French vs. Edwards, 80 U. S.; 13 Wall., 511.
    The same rales apply to any notice required of subsequent proceedings; if required to be given within a certain time, or in any prescribed mode, it must be so given. Cooley, Taxation, 1st ed., 218, 365; 2d ed., 365.
    All statutory provisions respecting these special assessments must be strictly observed. Cooley, Taxation, 2d ed., 353, 609.
    The right to a hearing must in all cases be preserved to the property owner. Id., 361, 366.
    Municipalities, in particular, must keep closely to the authority conferred in making these assessments. Id., 656, and notes 1, 2, 3.
    Observance of every substantial requirement is necessary; none of the steps are directory merely. Id., 659.
    Mr. H. E. Davis, for the District:
    The office of the writ of certiorari and the extent of the inquiry to be made under it are variously determined, according as the writ is or is not that known at the common law, or one provided by statute. Too much care cannot be exercised in the examination of authorities to discover whether in the particular jurisdiction the writ is one or the other of the two kinds. Equal caution is necessary in the case of those jurisdictions in which, as in North Carolina and Tennessee, the use of the writ has been enlarged by local practice so that it has become in effect the general substitute for an appeal.
    Thus in New York and New Jersey, in which States it is quite.safe to say the writ has been as often used as in all the other States of the Union combined, the remedy has from an early day been regulated by statute. The several statutes are not always mentioned by the courts in their decisions, but no series of cases in either State, extending over even a comparatively' short period, can be examined without discovering the statutory foundation of the remedy in much the great majority of cases. It would serve no useful purpose to trace the growth of statutory provisions in those States on the subject, as the distinction between the common law and statutory writ so often and so clearly appears as to put the court on its guard in dealing with cases from those jurisdictions.
    As to New Jersey, evidence of this is seen in the case of Ludlow vs. Ludlow, cited below, and State, Evans, vs. Jersey City, 35 N. J. Law, 383.
    In New York the distinction between the two sorts of writ is constantly coming to notice. See People vs. Lawrence, 54 Barb., 589, 615, 616; Lawton vs. Comrs. of Cambridge, 2 Cairns, 179; Lynde vs. Noble, 20 Johns., 82; and Le Roy vs. Mayor etc. of N. Y., 20 Johns., 438.
    . In Maryland and this District the remedy by the writ has never been enlarged, by either statute or practice; and in considering its application here we have to deal exclusively with the common-law writ in its simplicity.
    The limitations upon the use of the remedy by the common-law certiorari are clearly recognized in Illinois.
    “ The Circuit Courts have power to award a writ of certiorari at common law to all inferior tribunals and jurisdictions, wherever it is shown either that they have exceeded the limits of their jurisdiction, or in cases where they have proceeded illegally and no appeal is allowed, and no other mode of directly reviewing the proceedings is provided.” People vs. Wilkinson, 13 Ill., 660, 663; Doolittle vs. Galena etc. R. R. Co., 14 Ill., 381, 383; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. vs. Whipple, 22 Ill., 105, 108.
    The same principle is recognized in Iowa. Smith vs. Supervisors, 30 Iowa, 531.
    So in California. Whitney vs. Board of Delegates, 14 Cal., 479, 499, 500.
    So even in New York, notwithstanding the confusion encouraged by the frequent use of the statutory writ, the limitations on the use of the writ in general are still well observed. The writ will not issue where assessors act upon persons and a subject matter within their jurisdiction, although they commit errors in the discharge of their duties. Me parte Mayor of Albany, 23 Wend., 277; Owners of Ground vs. Mayor, 15 Wend., 374.
    Upon certiorari to commissioners, whose work in making assessments is complained of as unconstitutional, only the legality and regularity of their proceedings can be brought up. People, Cook, vs. Nearing, 27 N. Y., 306.
    The office of a common-law certiorari, unaffected by any statute, is not to review erroneous legal decisions, but to set proceedings aside for an entire want of jurisdiction. People vs. Rochester, 21 Barb., 656.
    Recognition of the same limitations will be observed in certain of the New Jersey cases cited below.
    Granting the writ is discretionary. The writ does not issue ex debito justitice, but it will be granted only in the sound discretion of the Court and when no other remedy exists. Re Mt. Morris Square, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 14; Witkowski vs. Skalowski, 46 Ga., 41; Libby vs. West St. Paul, 14 Minn., 248; Re Lantis, 9 Mich., 324; Bath Bridge etc. Co. vs. Magoun, 8 Maine, 292; State, Hall, vs. Snedeker, 42 N. J. Law, 76; State vs. Hudson City, 29 N. J. Law, 115, 116; Gaither vs. Watkins, 1 Md., 409; 66 Md., 576.
    This discretion will be exercised at any state of the proceedings. The fact that the writ was allowed with the same matters which are urged for its dismissal, apparent to the Court at the time of its allowance, cannot deprive the Court of its discretionary right, and it may dismiss at any stage of the cause. State, Weart, vs. Jersey City, 41 N. J. Law, 510.
    It lies only to review exercise of judicial power. The writ lies only to inferior tribunals and officers exercising judicial powers. It will not lie to those exercising legislative or ministerial functions. And the fact that judgment and discretion are involved in the exercise of power does not make the power or actions in exercise of it judicial within the meaning of this rule. Pedple, Corwin, vs. Walter, 68 N. Y., 403.
    
      Sufficiency of petition. In all cases it is held that the petition must make a clear case for the issue of the writ.
    Thus the averments must not be too general. Cunningham vs. Superior Ct. of Santa Cruz Co., 60 Cal., 576.
    Sufficient reason must be shown. Menzies vs. Board of Equalization of Mono Co., 62 Cal., 179.
    It must show that no appeal was possible. Wilson vs. Banks, 71 Ga., 862; Galloway vs. Corbitt, 52 Mich., 460; State, Banblits, vs. County Court of Nodaway Co., 80 Mo., 500.
    The writ will be refused after unreasonable delay. Laches is fatal to an application for the writ of certiorari.
    
    The granting of a certiorari in cases of public interest is a matter of discretion, and after the party in interest has slept long over his supposed wrong, the Court will not grant him relief. State vs. Hudson City, 29 N. J. Law, 115, 116.
    The same rule ajiplied where the delay was five years. State, Wetmore, vs. Elizabeth, and State, Weart, vs. Jersey City, 41 N. J. Law, 152, 510; State, United N. J. R. R. & C. Co. vs. Binninger, 42 N. J. Law, 528; State, Bowne, vs. Logan, 43 N. J. Law, 421.
    “ This wise rule stated in State vs. Hudson City, State vs. Jersey City, and other cases, should be enforced. Such delay manifests laches for which the writs should be dismissed without considering the alleged grievances over which the prosecutors have slept so long.” State, Jersey City L. & R. Co., vs. Love, 42 N. J. Law, 355, 356.
    The writ can no more be granted to one who is dilatory in asking for it than it can to one who has neglected to pray an appeal when in his power. Erwin vs. Erwin, 3 Dev. L. (N. C.), 529; Brown vs. Williams, 84 N. C., 116.
    Numerous applications of this rule are to be found. Thus the writ was refused after eleven months, although the statute limited its issue to two years. Re Lantis, 9 Mich.; 324.
    After fifteen months. - Fractional School Dist. of Owasso vs. School Inspectors, 27 Mich., 3.
    
      After fourteen months. McMurray vs. Noyes, 72 N. Y., 523.
    After four years. Davison vs. Assc. of Jersey Co., 71 N. Y., 333.
    After three years. People vs. Mayor of N. Y., 2 Hill (N. Y.), 9.; Trustees of School vs. School Directors of Union Township, 88 Ill., 100.
    After three and a half years. Elmendorf vs. Mayor of N. Y., 25 Wend., 693.
    After two and a half years. People vs. Board Fire Com’rs of N. Y., 77 N. Y., 605.
    After two years. People, Davis, vs. Hill, 53 N. Y., 547. See Taber vs. New Bedford, 135 Mass., 164.
    After time limited for appeal by analogy. Reynolds vs. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Co., 64 Cal., 372; People vs. Mayor of N. Y., 2 Hill, 13; State vs. Milwaukee Co., 58 Wis., 4.
    In Tennessee the writ is not allowed after the term succeeding the action complained of, unless sufficient cause be shown for the delay. Mason vs. Hammons, 7 Cold., 132; Tipton vs. Anderson, 8 Yerg., 222.
    . That the petitioner has lately been made aware of the matter of which he complains is not sufficient cause to excuse delay. Gillam vs. Looney, 1 Heisk., 319. See McDowell vs. Keller, 1 Heisk., 449.
    The writ in tax cases. The writ will not lie to bring up tax proceedings under general laws. Whitbeck vs. Hudson, 50 Mich., 86.
    . A certiorari obtained- to remove all and singular the assessments of the land tax in a given district for the year 1787 was on motion quashed, on the ground that the assessments were public proceedings, of which everybody was entitled to take copies, so that no injury could arise to anyone by the refusal of the writ. Rex vs. King, 2 Term Rep., 235.
    The writ was refused when asked to issue to the supervisors of a county to remove the assessments for the county charges. People, Church, vs. Allegany Co. Supervisors, 15 Wend.., 198.
    Even in Tennessee, where the use of the writ was largely extended in practice, the principle of these cases was recognized. Thus the Court, while holding that in that State where the writ had been adopted as the almost universal method by which the circuit courts of general jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, exercise control over all inferior jurisdictions, however constituted, and whatever their course of procedure, it would lie to remove a tax distress warrant and the proceedings under it into the Circuit Court; yet granted that the authorities relied on establish very clearly that iii England the certiorari would not lie in a case like this. Mayor vs. Pearl, 11 Humph., 249, 250, 251.
    This case is the foundation of the jurisdiction in such cases in Tennessee. See note to the syllabus in Cooper’s edition of the report. The jurisdiction in tax cases was taken away by statute in 1873. 8 Heisk., 663.
    Even when allowable at all in tax cases it will be refused when the assessment falls upon a considerable number of persons. Re Mt. Morris Square, 2 Hill, 14.
    Or where only part of all affected by the tax apply. Libby vs. West St. Paul, 14 Minn., 248.
    Or where the party complaining had notice and opportunity to make his appeal and proofs before commissioners on appeal. State, Hall, vs. Snedeker, 42 N. J. Law, 76. See State, Banblits vs. County Court of Nodaway Co., 80 Mo., 500.
    Or where the issue of the writ will occasion public inconvenience. People, Vanderbilt, vs. Stilwell, 19 N. Y., 531.
    Or where a tax originally invalid has been validated. State, Sharp, vs. Apgar, 31 N. J. Law, 358. See Mayor ads. State, 32 N. J. Law, 453.
    Or where the duties of the officers complained of have been fully performed. People, Walter, vs. Walter, 68 N. Y., 403. As where the assessment roll has been perfected and delivered. People vs. Com’rs of N.Y., 43 Barb., 494; People, Buffalo State Line R. R. Co., vs. Fredericks, 48 Barb., 173; People, Huntting, vs. Highway Com’rs, 30 N. Y., 72. Although there has been clear error in the proceedings. People, Raplee, vs. Reddy, 43 Barb., 539.
    The writ has, however, been held to lie in certain cases of assessment, independent of statute; as to commissioners of sewers, for improperly rating a given place. Anon, 2 Chitty, 137.
    And to a municipal corporation professing to have made certain local improvements by means of an ordinance, its power to pass which depended upon a special state of facts. Swann vs. Mayor of Cumberland, 8 Gill., 150. But see Dixon vs. Cincinnati, 14 Ohio, 240; in which the cases are reviewed at large by counsel, pp. 243-248.
    And to county commissioners, in respect to their action, which was special,'in opening a road. Gaither vs. Watkins, 66 Md., 576.
    But in every such case in which the writ issued, the action sought to be brought under review was special, on the particular circumstances of each case, and was limited in application to those persons and places affected by the special exercise of power in the premises. This does not affect the proposition above noticed; that where the law under which the action is had is general, or a large number of persons affected, the writ will be denied.
   Mr. Justice Hagner

delivered the opinion of the Court:

Five specific reasons are assigned by the attorney of the District, in support of the motion, two of which we will notice:

1. It is insisted that certiorari is not the proper form of remedy to be invoked by the petitioners.

We are of the opinion that this objection cannot be sustained. In Ewing vs. St. Louis, 73 U. S.; 5 Wall., 413, a bill in equity was filed to enjoin the collection of an assessment

made by the city for benefits adjudged against the plaintiff from the opening of a street through his property. The Supreme Court held that equity could not grant relief in such a case. Referring to the charges of the bill the Court says: “ Of these grounds the principal are that the proceedings were taken without notice to the complainant, or any appearance by him; that the notice provided by law was not published as required; that no provision was made for compensation for the property taken; th at no power to render the j udgments was vested in the mayor by any act of the legislature, or could be vested in him by the city authorities by any clause of the city charter; and that the statutes under which the proceedings purported to have been taken were repealed before the proceedings were' completed. These grounds are by the demurrer admitted to be true; and, being true, no reason exists upon which to justify the interposition of a court of equity.

“If the statutes and ordinances under which the mayor undertook to act did not invest him with any authority to render the judgments against the complainant, the judgments were void, and could not cast a cloud upon his title, or impair any remedies at law provided for the protection of his property or the redress of trespass to it.

“On the other hand, if the statutes and ordinances invested the mayor with authority, when new streets in the city were to be opened, to render judgments for the amount of benefits assessed against the owners of adjoining property, and in this instance he failed to follow their provisions, or exceeded the jurisdiction they conferred,' the remedy of the complainant was by certiorari at law, and not by bill in equity.

. “With the proceedings and determination of inferior boards or tribunals of special jurisdiction, courts of equity will not interfere, unless it shall become necessary, to prevent a multiplicity of suits or irreparable injury, or unless the proceeding sought to be annulled or corrected is valid upon its face, and the alleged invalidity consists in matters to be established by extrinsic evidence. In other cases, the review and correction of the proceedings must be obtained by the writ of certiorari. This is the general and well established doctrine. Examples in which this is asserted are found in Mayor etc. of Brooklyn vs. Meserole, 26 Wend., 132, and in Heywood vs. Buffalo, 14 N. Y., 534, and in cases there cited.”

The decision in Gaither vs. Watkins, 66 Md., 577, cited on behalf of the District, recognizes this doctrine. The precedents in this jurisdiction referred to by the counsel of the petitioners abundantly show the exercise of the power of review by our courts of the proceedings of inferior tribunals, in cases like the present; and we adhere to that practice.

2. It is insisted, however, that if the writ of certiorari can be resorted to in such cases as these, yet as that writ is granted only in the sound legal discretion of the courts and cannot be demanded as matter of right — that the courts should not award it in the cases like the present, where the petitioners have been guilty of culpable laches in making their application.

There is no doubt of the correctness of the first proposition. It is distinctly affirmed in Ex parte Hitz, 111 U. S., 768, and in 66 Md., 577, and Cooley on Taxation, 530.

But the cases cited do not show that the petitioners here have been guilty of laches in such wise as to induce the Court to refuse them an opportunity of urging their objections to the assessments complained of. The petitioners all declare that the proceedings were conducted throughout without any notice to them, as was exacted by the statute; and although the assessments are claimed to have been made many years ago, yet no certificates were issued until many years subsequently; and no attempt was made to enforce the collection of the certificates until a still more recent period.

If the courts of law are to apply in these proceedings at law the equitable defense of laches peculiarly belonging to courts of equity, they should also apply the reasons out of which the doctrine arises. Nothing appears, thus far, in these proceedings to show that the petitioners by culpable silence have inflicted injury upon others, or occasioned public or private inconvenience; or that others, thus lulled into hurtful security, have acquired rights which will now be impaired by sustaining tardy objections to these assessments. They were under no such positive obligation to speak before they were attacked by an attempt to disturb their possession, as would enable us to ascribe to them such neglect as should disentitle them to receive a hearing from the Court. According to their allegation, they complained as soon as they were assailed. Even if they had known of the assessments, that knowledge would not necessarily apprise them that the attempt would be made to collect the certificates subsequently issued. As to the effect of any culpable delay on their part, if such should be shown, we cannot now undertake to decide, although it might, perhaps, be fitly considered hereafter, in the further progress of the cases.

The other reasons assigned in support of the motions to quash would more properly be examined in the future. The two we have been considering appear to be the only objections properly examinable on this motion.

The motions to quash are overruled, and the cases are remanded to the Circuit Court and the respondent ordered to malee, without delay, the returns in each case.  