
    Gregory Wilkinson, Appellant, v. Albert Skinner et al., Respondents.
    Argued February 15, 1974;
    decided May 2, 1974.
    
      
      Herman Schwartz, David C. Leven and Edward I. Koren for appellant.
    I. A prisoner may not be punitively confined in solitary confinement for five days without due process, especially if he is a pretrial detainee. (Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128; Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375; Anderson v. 
      Nosser, 438 F. 2d 183; Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134; Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565; Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254; Hudson v. Hardy, 424 F. 2d 854; Krause v. Schmidt, 341 F. Supp. 1001; Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014.) II. A pretrial detainee is entitled to basic due process safeguards before being punished, including written notice, counsel, an impartial tribunal, confrontation, cross-examination, the right to present testimony and a reasoned decision. (Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254; Stewart v. Jozwiak, 346 F. Supp. 1062; Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767; Colligan v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1233; Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F. 2d 853; Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257; United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F. 2d 1079; Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128; People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 27 N Y 2d 376.) III. The conditions under which plaintiff was confined constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
    
      Joseph C. Pilato, William J. Stevens and Michael K. Consedine for respondents.
    I. Segregation of a person held in a county jail for five days is not substantial discipline and thus does not require a minimal notice and hearing. (Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d 178; Indig v. Finkelstein, 29 A D 2d 851; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471; Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621; United States ex rel. Robinson v. Mancusi, 340 F. Supp. 662; Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375; Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411; Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266; Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F. 2d 1376.) II. The conditions under which appellant was confined do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
   Wachtler, J.

While confined in a county jail, appellant was placed in punitive segregation for a period of approximately five days. He brought this action, seeking monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging, inter alia, that this' segregated confinement, without a hearing, was violative of his constitutional rights.

A close reading of appellant’s papers discloses that the gravamen of his complaint is that he had the right to a full hearing, with all of the traditional trial safeguards, that he was denied such a hearing, and that his confinement amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.

The legal weakness and sparsity of facts presented to the court in the pleadings and affidavits of both parties were so infirm as to virtually invite summary judgment. However, before granting this relief, a court must search the record to determine if any facts are alleged which do state a cause of action. In so doing ‘ ‘ any other form of evidence, documentary or otherwise, may also be used ” (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 7B, CPLR 3212.15, p. 436).

In his complaint, appellant asserts that The placing of plaintiff in a solitary confinement cell was done intentionally, and maliciously * * * thus entitling Plaintiff to compensatory and punitive damages ”. This allegation does not state a cause of action for intentionally and maliciously punishing appellant without legitimate reason. However, in a supporting affidavit executed in connection with a motion for a preliminary injunction appellant stated: “ I believe that I did not violate any rule or regulation of the Monroe County Jail or commit any violation of the law prior to being placed in the solitary confinement cell ”,

In his affidavit, the respondent Sheriff implicitly asserts that appellant somehow violated the discipline of the jail, but he fails to state in what manner this was done. The Sheriff contends that: “ Your deponent has a constitutional right to place prisoners in solitary confinement if a prisoner violates the good discipline and order of the jail.” To the extent that the foregoing statement can be interpreted as asserting a right of detention officials to mete out discipline or withhold privileges without having to give a reason therefore, it is as overblown and untenable as the assertion by appellant of his rights.

In the Second Circuit case dealing with the right of prisoners to bring civil suits (Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d 178, cert. den. 404 U. S. 1049), the defendants (i.e., prison officials) were careful to spell out the offenses allegedly committed by the inmate which underlay the discipline, including specific breaches of the rules spelled out in the Prisoner’s Handbook (pp. 183-184). The inmate appellant prevailed on that issue because the fact finder concluded that the discipline was meted out for illegitimate reasons rather than for the reasons alleged by the prison officials (p. 184).

If detention officials did not have to give reasons for their actions in punishing or withholding privileges from an inmate, they could in effect, act in an unconstitutional manner safely screened from court or administrative review. (See, e.g., Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546; Lee v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333.)

Since we can construe the Sheriff’s affidavit to aver that he acted in a legitimate manner, “ to maintain the discipline and order of the jail ”, that question of fact will have to be resolved at trial by the fact finder.

Appellant’s main complaint appears to be that he was denied a hearing before being sent to the isolation cell. He asserts he had a constitutional right: to notice; to present witnesses; to testify on his own behalf; to cross-examine witnesses; to be represented by counsel, or counsel substitute; to an impartial hearing examiner; and to a decision based on the evidence. Both parties concede that appellant had been afforded none of these alleged rights.

Appellant’s asserted constitutional right to the panoply of protections cannot be sustained by current case law on the facts of this case. However, respondents’ apparent assertion that appellant is not entitled to any due process safeguards is equally without merit.

The trial court recognized the minimal due process requirements spelled out in the Sostre case {supra) but felt the case at bar was distinguishable in that here there was no ‘ ‘ substantial ” (Sostre, p. 202) discipline involved. The punitive segregation imposed in this case lasted for only five days as opposed to the punishment in Sostre which lasted for over one year. However, the punishment here is nevertheless substantial in juxtaposition to the broad range of minor punishments that could be and are meted out short of punitive segregation.

We do not wish nor intend to make due process safeguards turn on whether a court chooses to define a particular punishment as substantial ” or not. Suffice it to say, that the punishment meted out in this case must carry with it at least the minimal safeguards afforded by the due process of law. Confining someone in a segregation cell is not a minor punishment. Equally important, an inmate’s prison record may have a great effect on the future punishment he will receive and may even affect his chances for parole. (See Hudson v. Hardy, 424 F. 2d 854, 856.)

The requirements of due process are not static; they vary with the elements of the ambience in which they arise. (See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263.) In Sostre the court held that there the plaintiff had the right to know the charges and evidence against him and to explain his action (442 F. 2d, at p. 198). Whatever the intended scope of Sostre, the minimum (id.) due process requirements spelled out are sound. They help guard against the possibility of an inmate being sent to punitive segregation for illegitimate reasons. They also provide a record of at least the substance of the charges and denials for reviewing bodies to study should the detention official’s actions be questioned or the inmate’s past record become pertinent. To require detention officials to write out the charges against a prisoner does not seem to impose too heavy a burden; nor is it an undue burden to allow the prisoner to" defend himself against those charges. The fact finder need not be from outside the detention facility however he should be someone who is not likely to prefer charges against prisoners as part of the normal course of his duties (accord In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136). The hearing should be simple, quick, and should take place as soon as practicable.

In any event, on the fact pattern alleged in this case, appellant was entitled to a rudimentary administrative hearing at least. Although the rights he claimed may have been greatly over-exaggerated, a cause of action does lie for the denial of the rudimentary rights spelled out in this decision.

Appellant asserts correctly in his complaint, that he has the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. That such cruel and unusual punishment can occur within the four walls of a prison cannot be gainsaid. (See, e.g., Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F. 2d 449,451.) It is also now evident that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution is binding on the States. (See Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660.) Nevertheless, even taking appellant’s assertions as true, we hold that he did not state a cause of action for the abridgement of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

Punitive segregation is utilized in every State in the Nation. (See President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice: Task Force Report: Corrections [1967], pp. 50-51.) Merely confining an inmate in a segregated cell does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. There are, of course, some cells that are so subhuman as to constitute such punishment even for a very brief confinement. (See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F. 2d 519; Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786; Holt v. Sarver, 310 F. Supp. 825; Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674.) One day in some cells might be constitutionally intolerable (see Sostre, 442 F. 2d, at p. 193, n. 2). Short of a situation such as existed in Wright {supra) the determination of when a punishment becomes cruel and unusual involves a balancing process.

In Sostre, the inmate was kept in punitive segregation for over one year but the confinement conditions, although “ severe ” (Sostre, 442 F. 2d, at p. 192) were not so intolerable as to shock the conscience (see Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165,172). In the case at bar, the time spent in confinement was considerably shorter than in Sostre, but the conditions of confinement were worse. In Sostre, the inmate was not kept from contacting fellow inmates; he had a normal sized cell, all legal materials were available; and he could exercise (Sostre, p. 186). Appellant in this case allegedly was not allowed to converse with other inmates and the cell appeared to be more uncomfortable than in Sostre: “ The ventilation is very poor and the only good source of air is through a feeding slot located in the door. The trap door remained closed during the time that the Plaintiff was in solitary confinement. Lighting in the cell is provided by two (2) high intensity lamps which generate a great deal of heat making it extremely hot in the cell. There is cold water only in the cell making personal hygiene almost impossible.”

As unappealing as the cell appears, it hardly compares to the condition of the strip cell in La Reau v. MacDougall (473 F. 2d 974) the salient features of which included a “ Chinese toilet ” (i.e., hole in the ground flushed out with water from an outside control) and no sink (p. 977).

The time spent in the punitive segregation, the underlying offense, the conditions of the cell, and the physical and mental health of the inmate all are factors to be weighed in determining whether punitive segregation in the questioned instance is cruel and unusual. However, it should be kept in mind that conditions must be “ barbarous ” or “ shocking to the conscience ” (La Reau, supra, at p. 978) before they can be termed cruel and unusual punishment. The criteria are the standards of society. Merely confining a man to imprisonment of any type may seem barbarous to some Judges, but it clearly not so to society at large.

Even assuming the facts to be as appellant has alleged, he has fallen far short of stating such facts as would give rise to a cause of action for cruel and unusual punishment in a constitutional sense. The cell conditions, though spartan, were far from subhuman; the term of confinement was brief; and there is no allegation that prison officials knew or should have known that appellant was suffering from some substantial mental or physical affliction. Even though we still do not know what appellant was being punished for, we hold that five days confinement under the conditions spelled out would not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment and it is evident, that the trial court was correct in dismissing this cause of action. The conditions of confinement will be a factor in determining damages, if any, should it be found that appellant was intentionally and maliciously put in punitive segregation for illegitimate reasons.

The lower courts also dismissed appellant’s cause of action bottomed on respondents’ alleged interference with attorney-client mailings. In his affidavit, the Sheriff points out that appellant does not allege that any detention official ordered the permanent seizure of any mail going between appellant and his attorney. However, appellant does allege that several letters sent to several different people failed to reach their destination. It may be that at trial appellant can build a strong enough case on circumstantial evidence to prevail on this cause of action (see Matter of Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N Y 2d 433). Equally important is the Sheriff’s admission to censoring the letters that were written by appellant to his attorney .(see Ex Parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546). The Second Circuit appears to have severely circumscribed the right of prison officials to edit letters flowing from an inmate to his lawyer or the court. (See Sostre, p. 200; Wright v. McMann, 460 F. 2d 126,131, cert. den. 409 U. S. 885.) Although detention officials have the right to censor letters to attorneys (see Matter of Brabson, supra, p. 437) this cannot be done in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Detention officials must have good cause before censoring an inmate’s letter to an attorney. From the papers before us, we cannot determine what the Sheriff had his men delete and why. Those facts will have to be developed at trial.

In sum, appellant has stated a cause of action for intentional and malicious action on the part of respondents in (1) subjecting appellant to punitive segregation for no legitimate reason (2) failing to give appellant the rudimentary protections of due process and (3) capriciously censoring and perhaps destroying letters sent by appellant to his attorney.

If it becomes appropriate to award damages in this case, the court should keep in mind that the wrongs if atiy, were committed by officials performing the most dangerous of jobs where occasional lapses of judgment are understandable if not excusable. In a case such as this, courts should be careful to limit monetary damages to those that are closely and directly related to the wrong perpetrated — speculative damages should not be allowed. Punitive damages should be awarded only where the action of the respondent is particularly egregious or where there has been a pattern of wrongdoing (cf. Sostre, p. 205; see Wright v. McMann, 460 F. 2d 126, 129-130, supra). Injunctive relief should be granted more readily, and, in many cases will be the only appropriate remedy.

It is apparent that appellant seeks to have this court lay down some generic and far-reaching guidelines for conduct of detention officials and the conditions of prisons. We do not believe this to be our role. (Accord Knight v. Ragen, 337 F. 2d 425, cert. den. 380 U. S. 985.) We would but observe that a prison cannot be run by unbridled ukase; by the same token we recognize that it can not be run as a fledgling democracy. We may disagree with many of the actions taken by detention officials. But it is not up to this court to choose from conflicting penal sociological theories. Even detention officials’ activities which are universally condemned will not be terminated by this court if they do not transgress some law or pertinent rule or regulation. The role of the courts is not to put a stop to practices that are unwise, only to practices that are unconstitutional or illegal.

In this, respect, we should point out that it would be of great benefit to both the courts and the detention centers themselves if the officials within were guided by a comprehensive set of carefully drafted and closely adhered to rules and regulations relating to prisoners’ rights, conditions of detention centers, and activities of prison officials. Closely adhered to comprehensive rules and regulations drafted by a competent body will not insulate the detention officials from court review (see Nieves v. Oswald, 477 F. 2d 1109, 1113, 1114), but they will have the effect of limiting the intensity and scope of that review.

Chief Judge Breitel (concurring).

I agree that there should be a modification but on a limited ground. On summary judgment, as this is, the court is not confined to the pleadings.

In the pleading and the rather inadequate papers submitted by appellant on the motion, there is the bald assertion that he was punished with solitary confinement without cause and without cause being assigned. The bald assertion is never answered by respondents with evidentiary facts; there is only a general denial. I suppose that the bald assertion by plaintiff, if true, almost incredible though it may seem, could not be amplified by further evidentiary facts. The same could not be said of defendants’ bald assertions. There must be at least a description of the punishment imposed, and if imposed, the reasons for the imposition, and whether and how plaintiff was so advised.

I agree that even a prisoner, especially one detained awaiting trial, may not be punished without being advised of the cause and being given some opportunity to respond to the accusation, at least on a summary and informal appearance before an or the administrative prison supervisor not directly involved in the accusation.

Accordingly, I would modify, without costs, and deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but with leave to renew their motion on proper papers setting forth the evidentiary facts relevant to plaintiff’s solitary confinement.

Gabrielli, J. (dissenting).

The majority, in language written with an overly broad pen, has today placed upon all penal institutions including the several hundred village, city and county lockups, both large and small, two burdens which will effectively retard well-accepted and necessary prison discipline. First, they have announced a cause of action for money damages against jail personnel necessitating a trial based, as it is in the case before us, upon the prisoner’s bald, unsubstantiated and factless assertion that he has been denied due process. In their view nothing further is required to cast all jail personnel in the role of defendants in civil money damage claims. Second, on the barest fact situation, as depicted by the pleadings and record in this case, they have set in motion a whole new series of hearing, court and appeal procedures that will run the gamut of our entire court structure, beginning with the formalistic hearings mandated by their decision and running through proceedings brought under CPLE article 78 in the Supreme Court to review the original determination, with the attendant appeals to the Appellate Divisions and even to the Court of Appeals; and the possible net effect of all of this could well result in the curtailment of necessary and proper penal discipline because of the threat of civil suit and attendant procedures, throughout which demands may well be made for assigned counsel and other ancillary services to aid prisoners in the disposition of their suits for money damages as well as the proceedings brought to review determinations made by custodians of all such penal institutions and lockups. In all of this, we are required to realize that in many of the places of detainment, particularly in the smaller areas, jail personnel are, limited in number, to. say the very least.

Our disagreement with the majority is not to be considered as a holding that a prisoner is not entitled to due process rights. On the contrary, we subscribe to the theory that he is no less entitled than any other person. But, to predicate possible civil liability by way of money damages against jail personnel on the less than flimsy factual claim made in this case is exalting fiction over reality. If a substantially new area of civil liability is to be fashioned out of the manner of operation of a place of detention, certain it is, it should not be created upon the record in this case. The documents before us are not pro se pleadings by any means. The case has been presented to us by experienced counsel. Appellant’s complaint sets forth two causes of action; the first assertedly arising from an alleged improper detention; the second being founded on the purported censoring of his mail. Beading appellant’s pleadings and supporting papers in the most liberal light, his claim arising from his allegedly unlawful segregation from the prison populace is based upon two separate theories, (1) cruel and unusual punishment and (2) a violation of due process guarantees.

The majority correctly conclude that appellant’s cause of action resting on the Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishment was properly dismissed, but they then hold that appellant ‘ has stated a cause of action for intentional and malicious action on the part of respondents in (1) subjecting appellant to punitive segregation for no legitimate reason [and] (2) failing to give appellant the rudimentary protections of due process ”. Certainly, the record in this case, relevant policy considerations and even precedent cannot account for or sustain the result which the majority have reached.

It has been consistently held that there is no constitutional infirmity in segregated confinement per se (Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d 178, 192, cert. den. 404 U. S. 1049, and cases cited therein). When and to what extent procedural due process guarantees are mandated in any set of circumstances is not, of course, susceptible of easy application. However, it is generally recognized that procedural due process is required whenever an individual will be “ condemned to suffer grievous loss ” (Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 [Frankfurter, J., concurring], quoted in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481). Even where a grievous loss ” is charged, the rights of the individual must still be considered in light of its consequences. ‘ ‘ [A] s a generalization, it can be said that due process embodies the differing rules of fair play, which through the years, have become associated -with differing types of proceedings. Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account.” (Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420,442.) This balancing approach was further refined and consolidated by the court in Goldberg v. Kelly (397 U. S. 254) where the Supreme Court observed that the extent of procedural due process which must be afforded individuals (in that case welfare recipients) threatened by substantial losses depends upon whether the recipient’s interest in avoiding * * * loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication ” (Goldberg, supra, p. 263). In Sostre (p. 198) the court explicitly held that rudimentary due process would only arise in instances where substantial deprivations are to be visited upon a prisoner ”.

Appellant’s complaint simply alleges that he was placed in solitary confinement for a period of five days in a cell without hot water, too much heat and not enough ventilation. It must be remembered that appellant was in custody and even if the claimed facts of this case could be factually substantiated, we do not view his allegations as rising to the level of 1 ‘ substantial deprivations” evident in Sostre (where there was segregated confinement for 372 days), and other similar cases, or the presence of truly severe treatment in some cases which have been viewed as constituting cruel and unusual punishment.

Although speaking in terms of the Eighth Amendment, the court in Sostre noted the limitations on the judiciary and the appropriate scope of any inquiry into penal discipline and maintenance of order. Judge Kaufman there pointed out that: “ For a federal court, however, to place a punishment beyond the power of a state to impose on an inmate is a drastic interference with the state’s free political and administrative processes. It is not only that we, trained as judges, lack expertise in prison administration. Even a lifetime of study in prison administration and several advanced degrees in the field would not qualify us as a federal court to command state officials to shun a policy that they have decided is suitable because to. us the choice may seem unsound or personally repugnant (Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d 178, 191, supra.) Our scope of reviewability should not be any more extensive. With the unquestioned discipline problems in penal institutions, appellant’s confinement for a period of five days was not a substantial deprivation ” within the contemplation of the court in Sostre.

Recognizing our judicial limitations in these areas as well as the rights imposed by the majority upon any prisoners incarcerated in solitary confinement as against the tremendous burdens placed on municipalities by this decision, unlike the majority, we cannot conclude that procedural due process guarantees, to the extent of requiring a hearing, attach under the facts of this case. This is not to say that there are no cases involving solitary confinement where a hearing would be mandated. The purported deprivations do not rise to the level of grievous loss ” or “ substantial deprivations ” which in balance outweigh the governmental interest in maintenance of discipline which will be necessarily impaired if not obstructed by the blanket holding of today covering all prisoners transferred for whatever duration to solitary confinement.

Turning to the only remaining cause of action, the alleged censoring of appellant’s mail, we would find as did Special Term that this issue has been rendered moot and that there is no justiciable money damage claim spelled out. Appellant has not demonstrated any direct damages or loss which might entitle him to recovery. By his second cause of action, appellant also sought an injunction “ enjoining Defendants, their agents and employees, from prohibiting Plaintiff to correspond by mail with his attorney ”. As a consequence of his guilty plea to a felony on May 11,1972 resulting in a sentence to a State prison, appellant by his own acts has rendered moot his request for an injunction against the County of Monroe.

The order should be affirmed.

Judges Jones, Rabin and Stevens concur with Judge Wachtler; Chief Judge Breitel concurs in a separate opinion; Judge Gabrielli dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judge Jasen concurs.

Order modified, without costs, in accordance with opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed. 
      
      . We use the term “ detention officer ” and “ detention facility ” in this decision to refer to both State and local detention facilities and their employees.
     
      
      . Even if the Sheriff had spelled out the facts supporting his reason for administering the discipline, there would have been a question for the fact finder to determine. The mere allegation by a prisoner that he did not violate any jail regulations or do anything else to warrant punishment is enough to make out a cause of action since it would be virtually impossible to allege all of the possibly punishable acts he did not commit. It would have been more prudent of respondents to allege the specific acts underlying the punishment; however, the Sheriff’s allegation that appellant did commit a breach of prison discipline is harely enough to pose a triable issue of fact and avoid summary judgment for the appellant on this issue.
     
      
      . The Sostre court did not reach the issue of whether or not there had to be an impartial trier of fact. (See Nieves v. Oswald, 477 F. 2d 1109, 1113.)
     
      
      . It has been persuasively argued that detention officials should not be able to open letters flowing from an inmate to his attorney at all (23 Stan. L. Rev. 473, 479, 480).
     
      
      . The fact that the letter may contain false information or allegations attacking detention officials would not constitute good cause. (See Wright v. McMann, 460 F. 2d 126, 132.) There must be somé threat to the security of the prison or some illegal scheme before letters sent from an inmate to his attorney, the court, or a public official may be censored.
     
      
      . We are aware and wish to emphasize that the courts are often a poor vehicle to use to air and resolve prisoner complaints. An effective internal grievance procedure, such as the one now being utilized by the Bureau of Prisons for Federal institutions, has the salutory effect in many instances of both providing a satisfactory grievance-solving mechanism short of inflammatory litigation and keeping down the significant flow of prisoner complaints into an already overburdened court system.
     
      
      . Our decision spells out only the minimal legal requirements that detention officials must follow. Of course, rules and regulations may be promulgated which go heyond these minimal requirements. (See, e.g., Minimum Standards and Regulations for Management of County Jails and Penitentiaries of the State Commission of Correction, § 5100.5, subd. [a], par. [6] [7 NYCRR 5100.5 (a) (6)] [outgoing special correspondence cannot be read or censored by detention officials].)
     
      
      . E.g., Ford v. Board of Managers (407 F. 2d 937) (no running water or wash bowl; bread and water diet except one regular meal each third day); Knuckles v. Prasse (302 F. Supp. 1036) (400 days segregation).
     
      
      . E.g., Wright v. McMann (387 F. 2d 519, 521) (plaintiff entirely naked for 11 days; windows open throughout subfreezing night; cell encrusted with excrement; prisoner slept on concrete floor; no soap, towel or toilet paper); Hancock v. Avery (301 F. Supp. 786) (virtually no light or ventilation; hole for wastes flushed irregularly by guards; no soap, towel or toilet paper; two meals of bread, one full meal); Jordan v. Fitzharris (257 F. Supp. 674) (prisoner slept naked on concrete floor; no facilities except for bole to receive bodily wastes).
     