
    John J. Mack, Resp’t, v. Rochester German Insurance Company of Rochester, N. Y., App’lt.
    
    
      (Court of Appeals,
    
    
      Filed October 4, 1887.)
    
    1. Insurance (Fire)—Construction op conditions in policy.
    A policy of fire insurance contained the following provisions: “ The working of carpenters, roofers, gas fitters, plumbers and other mechanics in building, altering or repairing any building covered by this policy, will cause a forfeiture of all claim under this policy, without the written consent of this company indorsed hereon.” It was, also, provided, that the policy should be void, “ if the risk be increased by any means within the control of the assured.” H Id, that such instruments should receive a reasonable construction, reference being had to the object sought to be attained by the parties. That such conditions are not to be extended by implication, so as to include cases not clearly or reasonably within the words as ordinarily used and understood.
    8. Same—Alteration op building—Increasing risk—What amounts to.
    After the said policy was issued the premises were leased to a new tenant, with permission to make alterations. The alterati ns made pursuant to such permission, required the removal of large portions of two doors, and the roof, and the introduction therein of two flues constructed of inflammable materials,and extending through the entire height of the structure, affording every means for the spread of conflagration and constituting a large increase of combustible material. While these alterations were in progress of being made, the building was destroyed. Held, that the trial court was justified in directing a verdict for the defendant. That it would have been the duty of the court to have set aside a verdict for the plaintiff, if the jury had found one.
    3. Practice—When court must direct verdict.
    Courts are under no obligations to yield their assent to verdicts, which deny signification to language or violate the plain meaning and intent of an unambiguous contract.
    Appeal from an order of the supreme court, general term, fourth department, reversing a judgment in favor of the defendant entered on a verdict directed at the Oswego circuit, and also reversing an order directing a new trial, with costs to abide the event. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.
    
      Geo. F. Yeoman, for app’lt; Wm. H. Kenyon, for resp’t.
    
      
       Reversing 35 Hun, 75.
    
   Ruger, Ch. J.

—The policy of insurance, upon which this action was brought, contained the following provisions: The working of carpenters, roofers, gas-fitters, plumbers and other mechanics in building, altering or repairing any building or buildings covered by this policy will cause a forfeiture of all claim under this policy without the written consent of this company endorsed hereon.” It was also provided that the policy should be void “if the risk be increased by any means within the control of the assured.”

At the circuit a verdict was directed in favor of the defendant upon the ground that the loss occurred during the violation of the conditions of the policy by the plaintiff, and while the building was being occupied by carpenters in making alterations therein without defendant’s written consent. •

The general term was of the opinion that the evidence presented a question of fact for the jury, and that the trial court erred in directing a verdict.

We differ with the general term. There was no material conflict in the evidence, and the following facts were undisputed. The policy in question was issued January 29, 1881, and, the fire occasioning the destruction of the building took place on October 11 thereafter. At the time of the insurance the building was occupied as a grocery store by a tenant of the plaintiff, and continued to be so occupied until about October 1. On September 29, 1881, the plaintiff executed a lease of the building to other tenants, who contemplated using it for the purpose of carrying on the business of drying fruit therein, and the lease provided that they should have the privilege of putting the machinery needed for their business into the building. This business^ required some alterations in the structure of the building, and the introduction therein of a furnace and wooden shafts or boxes running from the cellar to the roof, and constituting the driers in which fruit was intended to be cured by heat.

These driers required in their formation the cutting of large holes through each floor of the building and its roof, five feet square, and the removal of the timber, boards, scantling and plastering, constituting the flooring and roofing, and the rebracing of the joists or sleepers of the several floors.

They also required the introduction of wooden boxes or shafts running from the cellar to six feet above the roof, divided into compartments several feet apart, for holding the fruit while it was in process of being dried. These boxes were made of boards securely fastened to pine scant-lings at each corner of the box, and forming a well or shaft from cellar to roof. From about October 1 to the time of the fire, carpenters were engaged in making these changes in the building as well as making tables and other conveniences for carrying on the business of drying fruit* and these improvements had not been completed when the building was destroyed.

The general term assumed that the making of ordinary and necessary repairs to a building to preserve it from decay, or the cutting of a stovepipe hole in a partition, or other similar acts, would not be a breach of the conditions of the policy, and, therefore, the question here presented could not be held as a question of law to constitute such an alteration of the building by carpenters as would violate the conditions of the policy. These illustrations do not seem to us to be applicable to this case, or to afford any authority for the proposition that a jury were authorized in such a case as the present to find that the covenants were not violated by the plaintiff.

The general term properly laid down the rule by which such instruments should be construed, and held that they should receive a reasonable construction, reference being had to the object sought to be attained by the parties. It was also said that “such conditions are not to be extended by implication so as to include cases not clearly or reasonably within the words as ordinarily used and understood.”

We have no difficulty in agreeing with the roles of law laid down by that court, but we are quite unable to concur in the view taken by it of the evidence. The provision of the policy governing the case is framed in plain, unambiguous language, and its object and design are reasonable and free from any doubt. Certain conditions are very generally regarded by the underwriters as largely increasing the hazards of insurance, and they, unless corresponding premiums are paid for the extra risks, are usually intended to be excluded from the obligation of. the policy. Such are the conditions in reference to unoccupied houses, changes in the occupation from one kind of business to another more hazardous, the use of inflammable substances in building, and their occupation by carpenters, roofers, etc,, for the purpose of making changes and alterations.

These conditions when plainly expressed in a policy are binding upon the parties and should be enforced by courts, if the evidence brings the case clearly within their meaning and intent.

It tends to bring the law itself into dispute, when by astute and subtle distinctions a plain case is attempted to be taken without the operation of a clear, reasonable and material obligation of the contract. There can be no reasonable question but that the evidence here showed a clear and deliberate attempt to change the character of the occupation of the insured building from a comparatively safe to a hazardous one, and a substantial alteration of the structure by carpenters.

These alterations required the removal of large portions of two floors and the roof, and the introduction therein of two flues constructed of inflammable materials and extending through the entire height of the structure, affording every means for the spread of conflagration and constituting a large increase of combustible material. The case is brought clearly within the spirit as well as the letter of the contract, and if it does not show a violation of the conditions, we can conceive of no situation which would have effected the result.

In case there had been a submission of the facts to the jury, and it had found that carpenters were not engaged in making alterations of this building within the meaning of the policy, it would have been the clear duty of the court to have set aside the verdict.

Courts are under nó obligation to yield their assent to verdicts which deny signification to language or violate the plain meaning and intent of an unambiguous contract.

The order of the general term should be reversed and the judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury affirmed, with costs.

All concur.  