
    * Matthias B. Talmage, Administrator, &c versus Richard Chapel and Others.
    In debt by an administrator upon a judgment recovered by him, he need not de clore as administrator.
    The plaintiff declares as administrator of the estate of George Clinton, in debt upon a judgment recovered by him in his said capacity, against the defendants, in the Court of Common Pleas for the county of Oneida, in the state of New York.
    
    The defendants plead in bar, that the parties, at the time of rendering the said judgment, were all inhabitants of the state of New York, and that the plaintiff was appointed administrator in that state, and has not been so appointed within this commonwealth. To which the plaintiff demurred, and the defendants joined in demurrer.
    
      Gold, sen. and Gold, jun. for the defendants,
    relied on the case oí Goodwin vs. Jones 
      , in which it was solemnly decided that an administrator appointed under the authority of another state could maintain no action in the Courts of this state, under the authority of such appointment.
    
      Howe, for the plaintiff, agreed to the general principle, but con tended that the rule extends only to actions that are transitory in their nature, and which accrued to the deceased in his lifetime .
    If this action cannot be supported, there must be a complete failure of justice, so far as this judgment is concerned. It cannot be enforced in New York, because the defendants are not within the jurisdiction of the Courts of that state.
    It cannot furnish a ground of action to an administrator appointed here, for want of privity between the two administrators  ; and the statute of 1812, c. 105, extends only to administrators who die or are removed from office.
    An action could not be maintained upon the originial cause of action, for it has passed in rem judicatam; and * the letters of administration in New York being unre- [ * 72 ] yoked, the judgment is now in full force.
    The debtors, having been rendered accountable to the representative of the deceased in another state, could not afterwards be charged here .
    The pla'ntiff brings this action for an injury done to himself, in withholding the judgment recovered by him in New York; he need not have described himself as administrator, and his having done so b mere surplusage. When money is received after the death of the testator, the executor may sue in his own right; because “ the testator never had a specific cause of action, to recover that sum against the party receiving it” . The same principle has been applied to contracts, entered into with the executor personally, after the testator’s death .
    
      So in trover for the goods of the testator converted after his decease, the plaintiff need not describe himself as executor ; and his having done so is said to be surplusage . In an action against a sheriff for an escape upon execution, which issued upon a judgment recovered by the plaintiff as administratrix, it was holden not to be necessary for her to describe herself as such ; “ for the instant she recovered a judgment against the original debtor, it became a debt due to her upon record, and was assets in her hands, foi whit. Ii it was not necessary for her to declare as administratrix” . In indebitatus assumpsit as administrator, on a judgment recovered against the defendant in the Mayor’s Court at Calcutta, by the plaintiff as administrator, it was holden that no profert of letters of administration was necessary ; that the plaintiff need not have described himself as administrator ; and his having done so was mere surplusage ; which cannot be distinguished from the case at bar.
    The right of the plaintiff to sue has been determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a sister state ; and “ full faith and credit ” cannot be given to this judgment, according to the _ * 73 J constitution and the law under * it, but by supporting this action. The judgment is as conclusive upon the rights of the parties, as upon the subject matter of the suit. The only question, which can arise in an action upon such judgment, is as to the jurisdiction of the Court .
    No plea can be pleaded to a judgment recovered in a sister state, which could not have been pleaded, if the action had been commenced in the state where the judgment was rendered . As this plea could not have been sustained in New Yorlc, it ought not to be sustained here.
    
      
       5 Mass. Rep. 514.
    
    
      
       11 Mass. Rep. 314, Langdon vs. Potter.
    
    
      
       4 Mass. Rep. 611, Grant vs. Chamberlain, and the cases there cited,.
      
    
    
      
       11 Mass. Rep. 256, Stevens vs. Gaylord.
      
    
    
      
       2 D. & E. 477. Smith vs. Barrow.
      
    
    
      
      
         11 Mass. Rep. 329, Mowry vs. Adams.
      
    
    
      
       Latch, 214, Hudson vs. Hudson.
      
    
    
      
       Latch, 220 —Cro. Car. 450, Cleeve vs. Veer.
      
    
    
      
       2 D. & E. 128, Bonafous vs. Walker.
      
    
    
      
      
        Doug. 4, Crawford vs. Whittal, n. [1.]
    
    
      
       9 Mass. Rep. 462, Bissell vs. Briggs.
      
    
    
      
       1 Penn. N. J. Rep. 399, Curtis vs. Gibbs. —2 Dall. 302, Armstrong vs. Carson —7 Cranch, 481, Mills vs. Duryee.
      
    
   Curia.

We think the plea in bar bad. The case of Goodwin vs. Jones, cited by the counsel for the defendants, does not apply. The action there was brought for money due to the intestate on a contract made with him ; here the action is on a judgment already recovered by the plaintiff, and it might have been brought by him in his own name, and not as administrator. For the debt was due to him, he being answerable for it to the estate of the intestate; and it ought to be considered as so brought, his style of administrator being merely descriptive, and not being essential to his right to recover. It is important to the purposes of justice that it should be so; for an administrator appointed here could not maintain an action upon this judgment, not being privy to it. Nor could he maintain an action on the original contract; for the defendants might plead in bar the judgment recovered against them in New York. The debt sued for is in truth due to the plaintiff in his personal capacity. For he makes himself accountable for it by bringing his action; and he may well declare that the debt is due to himself. There are many cases which show that, where the debt becomes due after the death of the intestate, the administrator may sue for it in his own name; some of which have been cited by the plaintiff’s counsel. •

Defendants’ plea bad.  