
    Tracy MASSOP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 11-4816-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 29, 2012.
    Tracy Massop, Brooklyn, N.Y., pro se.
    Scott R. Landau, Assistant United States Attorney, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, for Defendant-Ap-pellee.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, RICHARD C. WESLEY, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Tracy Massop, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order denying her construed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of her complaint brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Massop’s complaint primarily concerned alleged deficiencies in her postal service; the district court ruled that her claims fell under the “postal matter exception” to the Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (providing that the Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

As an initial matter, we must determine the scope of our appellate review. Here, because Massop appeals only from the district court’s November 2011 order denying her Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration, we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the district court’s original judgment of dismissal. See Malik v. McGinnis, 293 F.3d 559, 561 (2d Cir.2002) (“An appeal from an order denying a [motion for reconsideration] brings up for review only the denial of the motion and not the merits of the underlying judgment.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Accordingly, we do not address Massop’s challenges to the merits of the district court’s judgment.

“The decision whether to grant a party’s Rule 60(b) motion is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, and appellate review is confined to determining whether the district court abused that discretion.” Stevens v. Miller, 676 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A district court has abused its discretion if it has (1) based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, (2) made a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or (3) rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Lynch v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A Rule 60(b) motion may not be used “as a substitute for an appeal [a party] failed to take in a timely fashion.” Stevens, 676 F.3d at 67. “The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked ... that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995). Moreover, such a motion will not be granted absent the demonstration of “extraordinary circumstances.” See Stevens, 676 F.3d at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mas-sop’s motion for reconsideration. As the court correctly noted, Massop did not provide the court with any controlling case law or data that it had overlooked, nor did she allege facts demonstrating extraordinary circumstances warranting relief from the judgment of dismissal. Additionally, if the motion were construed as one brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) (allowing for relief from judgment based on, inter alia, “mistake,” including judicial mistake), it would have been untimely. See Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 670 (2d Cir.1977). Finally, to the extent Massop was using the motion for reconsideration to challenge the merits of the district court’s judgment, she was improperly using the motion as a substitute for appeal. See Stevens, 676 F.3d at 67.

Massop’s arguments on appeal do not affect our conclusion. First, we find Mas-sop’s challenge to the district court’s construction of her “Rule 60(a)” motion as a Rule 60(b) motion to be without merit for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its November 2011 decision. To the extent that her arguments can be construed as a challenge to the district court’s denial of her motion for an extension of time to file her appeal from the original judgment, we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of that motion, as Massop did not file a notice of appeal from the denial of that motion. See Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(1)(B); Gonzalez v. Thaler, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 641, 651-52, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012).

We have considered Massop’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.  