
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, for Plaintiff-Appellee. v. Ivan A. CERMAK; et al., Defendants, and Tim Richardson, as Trustee of JI Foundation Trust; et al., Defendants-Appellees, v. Eric Lighter, Movant-Appellant.
    No. 12-36020.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Jan. 21, 2015.
    
    Filed Jan. 30, 2015.
    Carol Barthel, Esquire, Quinn P. Harrington, Jeremy Hendon, Trial, Thomas J. Clark, Supervisory, Bruce R. Ellisen, Bridget Maria Rowan, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.
    Steven R. Anderson, Esquire, Brian Frederick Huebsch, Esquire, Anderson & Jahde PC, Littleton, CO, Terrance L. McCauley, Law Office of Terrance L. McCauley, Estacada, OR, Defendants-Ap-pellees,
    Eric Lighter, San Jose, CA, pro se.
    Before: CANBY, GOULD, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Eric Lighter appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion to intervene in a lawsuit to foreclose upon federal tax liens on'real property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the denial of intervention as of right, and for an abuse of discretion the denial of permissive intervention. Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 953-54 & n. 6 (9th Cir.2006). We affirm in part and dismiss in part.

The district court properly denied Lighter’s motion for intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) because Lighter failed to meet his burden to show that all requirements for intervention were met. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 24(c) (a motion to intervene “must state the grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought”); United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir.2004) (setting forth four-part test for determining intervention as of right and explaining that “[t]he party seeking to intervene bears the burden of showing that all the requirements for intervention have been met”); see also Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th Cir.2001) (when deciding a motion to intervene, courts need not take as true allegations that are a sham or frivolous).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lighter’s motion for permissive intervention because Lighter failed to show that the requirements for permissive intervention were met. See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir.2002) (listing “threshold requirements” for permissive intervention). Accordingly, we dismiss that portion of Lighter’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. See Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir.2005) (“[W]e allow appeal of the denial of a motion for permissive intervention only if the trial court abused its discretion.”).

Lighter’s motion to take judicial notice, filed on April 16, 2013, is denied.

AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part. 
      
      
         This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     