
    Driskill vs. Cobb et al.
    
    Where the equity of the bill, if any, rests upon the allegation that a counsel of the defendant in the bill and the plaintiff in judgment at law entertained some of the jury who tried the cause at law, and there is conflict on the point that the person who entertained the jurymen was of counsel at all, this court will not control the chancellor in refusing to enjoin the judgment at law from proceeding to collect the debt — the conflict of testimony before him being matter for his discretion. In all cases equity should hesitate to interfere with a judgment at law by the stem process of a writ of injunction.
    Practice in the Superior Court. Jurors. Equity. Injunction. Before Judge Stewart. Carroll county. At Chambers. February 8th, 1881.
    Driskill filed his bill against Cobb et al. to enjoin the issuing of a fi. fa. and making of a levy under a judgment obtained by Cobb against him, and to set aside such judgment and obtain a new trial. The gist of the allegations in the bill was that the case was tried on the last two days of court, and that on the night intervening Mr. Cole, of the firm of Cobb & Cole, attorneys of the plaintiff, entertained two of the jurors empanneled in the case at his house; and that the fact was not known to defendant or his attorneys until after the adjournment of court.’ Discovery was waived.
    The answer denied that Mr. Cole in any way was connected with the case, and alleged that while one of the jurors boarded with Mr. Cole and another, who was a relative, remained at his house without pay during the term of the court, nothing passed between them concerning this case.
    There were affidavits sustaining both the bill and answer.
    The chancellor refused an injunction, and complainant excepted.
    Reese & Adamson ; Austin & Harris, by Harrison & Peeples, for plaintiff in error.
    J. L. Cobb; R. L. Richards; W. W. & G. W. Mer-RELL, for defendants.
   Jackson, Chief Justice.

It is true that the law sacredly protects trial by jury, not only from evil but “ all appearance of evil.” No party or attorney or agent of a party must approach this place or the men who occupy its altars for the time except through the presiding judge, the high priest, enrobed with ermine as pure as the robes which Jehovah directed should enfold the person of Aaron with “ holiness to the Lord” inscribed upon it. From the time the juror is sworn until he returns his verdict, he is sanctified — separated from all touch or attempt to touch him in the conscientious discharge 'of duty to the law; and all entertainment given him while thus separated is unclean meat which he may not eat, and none, however innocently in intention, may offer to his lips. But in the case before us, without considering whether equity would interfere at all to enjoin the judgment at law and its enforcement by execution at law in order to grant a new trial, when courts of law have full authority in extraordinary as well as ordinan- cases to grant new •trials, it is enough for this case to say that a much -disputed point was whether the person who entertained some of the .-jury was of counsel at all. Over that •disputed point the chancellor had the legal power to pass, and his judgment thereon concludes the issue. Over and' over again that has been ruled by this court, and the principle is so rooted in our jurisprudence that it is vain to try to eradicate it now. Nothing short of the long arm •of the Legislature can pull it up and cart it out. The refusal of the chancellor to grant the injunction will not, therefore, be interfered with in this case for that reason ; and in all cases the facts should be clear and the equity settled and assured before the solemn and final judgment of a court of law is stayed by chancery.

Judgment affirmed.  