
    Skinner’s Appeal. [Skinner’s Estate.]
    A son entered into business with his father, the entire capital of the firm consisting of money which belonged to the son’s mother; subsequently the father transferred the business to the son, taking a judgment note. When the father attempted to collect the judgment, the son resisted on the ground that the money was part of his mother’s estate and his father had no right to it. The son then proposed to give his father a receipt acknowledging that he had received from him the money on account of his share in his mother’s estate. This proposal was acquiesced in by the father, who made no further attempt to collect the judgment. On the distribution-of the mother’s estate, the auditor found, as a conclusion of law, that the agreement of the son would operate as an estoppel, and that the amount must be treated as an advancement from the mother’s estate and not a debt due the father. Held, not to be error.
    In this case, it appeared, by the auditor’s findings of facts, that the son had acknowledged that his mother had said to him that he was to have the money, but the auditor did not find that the money was converted into an advancement. On exceptions to the findings of the auditor, the court found that there was an advancement. Query, whether the supreme court, on appeal, would consider the question of advancement.
    May 29, 1888.
    Appeal, No. 23, May T. 1887, from a decree of the O. 0; Franklin Co., dismissing exceptions to the report of an auditor appointed to distribute the proceeds of sale of the real estate of Elizabeth Skinner, deceased. Trunkey, J., absent.
    The auditor, "W. II. Brewer, Esq., reported the facts substantially as appears by the opinion of the court below. Exceptions were filed to his findings of facts and conclusions of law. The court confirmed the distribution of the auditor but did not otherwise dispose of the exceptions. As the assignments of error are to the findings of facts and conclusions of law by the court, the opinion of the court is given as follows, by Bowe, P. J.:
    “ I am of opinion that the distribution made by the auditor is correct and must be confirmed.
    “ The exceptions go to his findings of fact as well as to his conclusions of law, and therefore I must first ascertain the facts. I shall, as far as possible, follow a chronological order.
    “1. In 1867 the family of Elizabeth Skinner consisted of Morrow B. Skinner, senior, her husband, and five children, one of them named Stephen M. Skinner.
    “ She then owned the Bowman farm, worth $7,836 ; the Morrow B. Skinner, Jr., tract, worth $10,500; the Jennie E. Deck, worth $6,000; the Mary C. Stitt, worth $2,200; lands of the value of $9,323.17 of which she died seized; in all $35,859.
    “In April, 1867, she sold the Bowman farm for $7,836, of which $5,236.55 was paid on April 1, 1867, and the remainder in subsequent payments.
    “2. [In the fall of 1867, Morrow B. Skinner, senior, and Stephen M., his son, bought John B. Mateer’s hardware store in Newville for about $4,000.00. This stock of hardware was paid for with the money of Elizabeth Skinner. The additions to the stock amounting to, say, $2,850, were also paid for with her money.] [1]
    “ This finding is of such consequence that I shall refer to the evidence on which it is based:
    
      “ I. The sale of Elizabeth’s farm in the spring and the purchase of the store in the fall.
    “II. The testimony of O. C. Bowers, Esq., every word of which is to be accepted, because Stephen M. Skinner did not take the stand to contradict him in any particular. He says that Morrow R. Skinner told him, in 1880, that he had some time before, £ sold a farm lying in Cumberland Co., near Newville, which belonged to his wife Elizabeth Skinner; that, with the proceeds of the sale of that farm, he had bought a hardware store in Newville, which he and his son Stephen for a time carried on as partners.’ That, on communicating this to Stephen, he did not deny it, but said that the store £ never belonged to his father at all, but that it was part of his mother’s estate,’ and proposed to give his father a paper acknowledging that he had received from him $6,500 on account of his share of his mother’s estate.
    “ Stephen’s whole conduct and all his declarations go upon the supposition that it was his mother’s money that was invested in the store.
    “ Here, then, we have Morrow R. Skinner and Stephen M. in accord about this fact; and other facts support it and there is nothing against it.
    “ III. James A. Stitt, in the last paragraph of his testimony, as far as his evidence touches this point, corroborates Mr. Bowers.
    “ 3. [It may be fairly gathered from the evidence that Morrow R. Skinner did not borrow this money from his wife, but that he simply used her money in buying the stock. He had evidently vague notions about his rights in his wife’s property, and seems to have thought that what was his wife’s was his own.] [2]
    “ 4. On October 16, 1872, Morrow R. Skinner sold his son Stephen M. his interest in the hardware store, which seems to have been the entire interest, for $6,850. In this sale, both parties treated the stock of goods as belonging to Morrow R. Skinner, in his own right. Stephen gave his father a judgment note for $3,850, and a paper showing that the remaining $3,000 was an advancement toward his share of his father’s estate, but promising to pay his father the interest, to wit, $180 annually, during his father’s life.
    “ 5. On February 4, 1876, Elizabeth Skinner, by conveyances of land, advanced several of her children, viz : Morrow R. Skinner, Jr., in the sum of $6,000, Jennie E. Deck, $6,000, Mary O. Stitt, $2,200.
    “ 6. On January 12, 1879, Elizabeth' Skinner died. At this time, Morrow R. Skinner, senior, still held the judgment note for $3,850, and the other paper of Oct. 16, 1872, about the $3000 advancement; which, we have seen, represented the moneys of his wife invested in the store.
    “Now, Mr. Bowers testifies that Stephen told him, at Roxbury, that his mother had said that he was to have the sixty odd hundred dollars and a $1,000 more. £ I understood him on account of his share in her estate.’
    
      “7. On September 27, 1879, Morrow B. Skinner caused judgment to be entered in his favor against Stephen for $3,850, with interest from October 16, 1872, on the judgment note Stephen had given him. On October 16, 1879, this judgment was satisfied by Morrow B. Skinner. It had not been paid, as is clearly shown, but was satisfied at the request of Stephen, because it was injuring his credit in the city, and upon his promise to give his father such evidence of or security for the debt as he should deem satisfactory.
    “ 8. In 1880, Morrow B. Skinner employed O. O. Bowers, Esq., attorney at law, to obtain from Stephen a new judgment for the $3,850 judgment which had been satisfied, and also the arrears of interest on the annuity of $180.
    " Stephen declined to accede to this request, for the reason that the store was part of his mother’s estate, but [£ proposed that if his father would not seek to collect any of the money from him he would give his father a paper or receipt acknowledging he had received from him $6,500 on account of his share of his mother’s estate.’] [3] Mr. Bowers says that this proposal£ was accepted by his father and acted upon, and no further effort was made to collect the money.’ James A. Stitt says: £ His father agreed to that proposition.’ It does not appear that he gave his father such a paper, and it is not shown that his father communicated to him his acceptance of his proposal. [But from the fact that no further effort was made to collect the money, I think it a fair inference that Stephen knew that his father was acting on his assertion that the money was his mother’s and his proposal.] [3]
    
      “9. Morrow B. Skinner, Sr., died in 1882. Mr. Brewer was appointed auditor in Elizabeth Skinner’s estate in June, 1884. The evidence was closed on September 25, 1884. His report was filed April 25, 1885.
    
      “ From the foregoing facts I deduce the following conclusions of law:
    “ I. [That Morrow B. Skinner held the stock of goods bought with his wife’s money as her trustee; that what was done and received by him upon the sale to Stephen was so done and received as her trustee. That as between her and her husband and Stephen, all of whom had knowledge of the facts of the case, the judgment note and the $180 annuity was in equity hers, except so far as actually paid to her husband.] [4]
    “ II. [That a parent, with the assent of the child, can convert a debt due from the child into an advancement. And inasmuch as Stephen had received on October 16, 1872, $3,000, derived from his mother’s property, upon agreement with her husband, her trustee, that it should be by way of advancement out of the father’s estate (she being under the power of her husband and her assent not shown), and as, in equity, the judgment note for $3,850, and the promise, under seal, to pay the annuity, was hers, her declaration to Stephen that he was. to have the sixty odd hundred dollars, on account of his share in her estate, assented to by him and afterward by her husband, the debt to her not being afterward paid by Stephen, all this taken together made the sixty odd hundred dollars an advancement. For this I need only cite Levering v. Eittenhouse, 4 "Wharton, 138. The $3,000 was really an advancement by her and could be justly made to take on that character; the debt was a subsisting debt at the time of her declaration of her intention to make it an advancement.] [5]
    “ III. [Stephen having received from his mother’s estate over $6,500, for part of which he was indebted to her, namely for the judgment note and arrears of annuity, amounting, in 1880, to $-, and having, when this debt was demanded, refused to pay it, and offered to acknowledge the receipt of $6,500 as an advancement, which was acquiesced in and no effort made to collect the debt, is now estopped, when he is sought to be charged with it as such, to assert that it was a debt due to his father, and not an advancement by his mother.] [6]
    “ IY. [There was due from Stephen, at the close of the audit on September 25, 1884, on the sum secured by the judgment note and on account of arrears of annuity $7,060. The, instrument securing the annuity was a specialty. The judgment was satisfied on October 16,1879, but the debt evidenced by the judgment note was not paid, and Stephen then promised to give a new obligation, and five years only had elapsed up to the close of the audit, and not six years at the filing of the report. If the debt was, in equity, due to his mother, the amount of it was chargeable against his share and exceeded it. On the judgment note alone there was due $5,000; at least it would seem so from the credits entered on the record.] [7] “And now, January 26, 1886, [the distribution reported by the auditor is confirmed, and payment ordered accordingly.”] [8]
    The 12th and 13th findings of fact by the auditor, referred to in the opinion of the supreme court, were as follows:
    “12. The auditor finds, as a fact, that no payments were shown to have been made on the $3,850 debt, except the sums of money stated on the record. In the year 1880, Morrow E. Skinner, Sr., employed O. C. Bowers, Esq., an attorney of the Franklin county bar, to collect the interest due on the $3,000 and to collect, or to arrange in some more satisfactory way, the $3,850 debt. In accordance with the instructions of Morrow E. Skinner, Sr., O. C. Bowers, Esq., called upon Stephen M. Skinner and informed him he desired a new judgment note for the $3,850 debt. Stephen M. refused to give a new judgment, not on the ground that the debt was paid; but he refused because the property for which the notes and papers were given never belonged to his father at all but that it was part of his mother’s estate and that his father had no right to it. Stephen M. finally agreed that, if his father would not seek to collect any of the money from him, he would give his father a paper or receipt acknowledging he had received from him six thousand five hundred dollars, on account of his share of his mother’s estate.
    
      “ 13. The auditor finds, as a fact, that Morrow B. Skinner, Sr., accepted the arrangement proposed by his son Stephen M. and acted upon it and made no further effort to collect the balance of the $3,850 debt, and made no effort to collect the interest due on the $3,000 named.”
    The auditor further found as follows:
    “ 15. The auditor finds, as a fact, that Stephen M. afterward told Mr. Bowers that his mother said he was to have this sixty odd hundred dollars and one thousand more.”
    The auditor’s conclusions of law were, inter alia, as follows:
    “ 2. While the arrangement between Stephen M. and his father did not, technically speaking, turn the debt due the father into an advancement, and make it chargeable against him in the distribution of his mother’s estate, yet it was such an arrangement as father and son could make, and the father in making it surrendered his $3,850 debt, as well as all accrued interest on the $3,000, and his right to interest in the future.
    “ 3. The arrangement is such a family arrangement, supported, as it is, hy a full and adequate consideration, as the son, in equity and good conscience, is bound to carry out.
    “ 5. Viewing the whole of the transactions between Stephen M. and his father, and their final adjustment, as testified to by Mr. Bowers, the auditor holds that Stephen M., in the settlement of his mother’s estate, is chargeable with the sum of $6,500. That is to say, he has already received that much on account of his share in her estate.”
    
      The assignments of error specified, 1-8, the portions of the opinion of the court included within brackets, quoting them.
    
      S. Hepburn, Jr., with him Wm. Alexander, for appellants.
    This court will set aside a report of an auditor, as to matter of fact, when the matter complained of is manifestly against the evidence. Biddle’s Est., 19 Pa. 431.
    An advancement is an irrevocable gift by a parent, with the intent that the value of it should be charged against the recipient on the distribution of the donor’s estate. Scott’s Intestate Law, page 264; Christy’s Ap., 1 Grant, 369; High’s Ap., 21 Pa. 283; Merkel’s Ap., 89 Pa. 340; Eshelman’s Ap., 74 Pa. 42.
    It is “ purely a gift,” and consequently is not chargeable with interest unless, perhaps, when expressly given and received on such terms. Miller’s Ap., 31 Pa. 337; Scott’s Intestate Law, 271.
    Taking an obligation for repayment is inconsistent with the idea of advancement. An advancement, in its legal sense, does not involve the idea of obligation or future liability to answer. Yundt’s Ap., 13 Pa. 575; High’s Ap., 21 Pa. 283; Haverstock v. Sarbach, 1 W. & S. 390.
    Advancement is a question of intention — intention of the parent in making the gift; and this intention must be proven to have existed at the time of the transaction and by the contemporary acts and declarations of the parties. They must be shown to be part of the res gestae and accompany the acts done. Scott’s Intestate Law, 211; Merkel’s Ap., 89 Pa. 340; Storey’s Ap., 83 Pa. 98 ; King’s Est., 6 Wh. 310; Riddle’s Ap., 19 Pa. 431.
    An intention to give may be changed, for good reasons, before it is carried out, and therefore should not be tortured by courts into a present donation. High’s Ap., 21 Pa. 283.
    The evidence shows that the debt, if any, was due the father, not the mother. Such is the clear import of all the written evidence in the case, and it is not materially contradicted by the oral evidence offered.
    The testimony of the appellees on this point is vague, indefinite and unsatisfactory. It consists of loose, equivocal and exceedingly general declarations of the father that are contradicted by every fact and circumstance of the case, as well as by the papers, and would not, of themselves, be sufficient to sustain a finding that would alter the course of descent. Hause v. Grilger, 52 Pa. 412.
    
      John Stewart, with him T. M. Mahon and O. C. Bowers, for appellee. — The subject of advancements assumes a variety of aspects, and has different operations according to the circumstances. In what instances, and to what extent parol evidence is proper to show an advancement must depend very much on the manner in which the case is presented. Haverstock v. Sarbach, 1 W. & S. 392.
    Hpon Stephens’s assertion that the money here was an advancement from his mother and his offer to give a paper to his father as evidence of that fact, the father accepted the proposal, treated the debt as Stephen contended for, forbore to collect any part of it, and it is now barred by the statute of limitations; so that Stephen, having reaped the advantage of his contention and proposal, is estopped from disavowing it now.
    But again : At the time of the distribution, this was either an advancement or a subsisting debt due from Stephen to his mother’s estate. It was not then barred by the statute, and, beyond all question, the money came from and was part of his mother’s estate. In the absence of affirmative proof that she gave it to her husband, the presumption is conclusive that he was handling it as her trustee. If it- was advanced, it was advanced from her estate. If it was a debt it was a debt due to her estate, and the result would be precisely the same in either case.
    If one of the heirs of an estate is in debt to it, he may be treated, in its distribution, as having an advancement to the amount of his debt. Springer’s Ap., 29 Pa. 210.
    The uncontradicted evidence in the case is amply sufficient to sustain the findings by the auditor and the court below, and to fix upon this money- the character of an advancement to the son out of his mother’s estate. Levering v. Rittenhouse, 4 Wh. 138.
    Oct. 1, 1888.
   Per Curiam,

An examination of this case leaves no doubt in our minds of the rectitude of the conclusions reached by the learned master and court below. The 12th and 13th findings of the auditor have not been impeached, and they settle the equitable status of the appellant with reference to his mother’s estate. He must be held to his agreement with his father. He alleged that the money which he owed the latter, in whole or in part, came from her, or her property ; and this seems to have been acquiesced in by the elder Skinner: hence the agreement that it should be regarded as an advancement from her estate. From this contract he cannot now be justly allowed to escape on technical constructions which, however potent they might at one time have been at common law, cannot be entertained in a court of equity.

Appeal dismissed and decree affirmed at the costs of the appellant.  