
    LARDNER’S APPEAL.
    Where a testatrix devised her estate absolutely to her husband, and then goes on with “Should, however, my husband die before me,” I give &o., and then in a subsequent olause gives $3,000 to her grandson, such bequest is •contingent upon the death of the husband before the testatrix.
    Appeal from the Orphans’ Court of Montgomery County. No. 122, January Term, 1880.
    Appellant filed a petition for a citation to his grandfather to file an inventory and account of the estate of Anna B. Lardner of which he was sole executor. The will of Anna B. Lardner was as follows :
    I give and bequeath to my sister, Elizabeth M. Tenant, of ' London, England, an annuity of $270, to be paid to her in •equal half-yearly payments of $135.
    • The rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal .and mixed, and all estates, whether real, personal or mixed, which I have the right and power to dispose of, I give, •devise and bequeath unto my most affectionate and beloved husband, Richard Penn Lardner, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns. Should, however, my husband die before me, then, in that case, I give and bequeath the sum of $10,000 unto and to the use of my friends, John Welsh and J. Somers Smith, of Philadelphia, Esquires, and to the survivor of them, and to the executors, administrators and assigns of such survivor, upon the trusts and uses following ; that is to say, to invest the same and to collect and receive the interest and income thereof, and after deducting therefrom the expenses of the trust, to pay the net income for the maintenance and education of my granddaughter, Virginia Lardner, during her minority, and from and after that period, to pay • the same to my said granddaughter for her sole and separate use during her natural life. And in case my said granddaughter should die in her minority, or after attaining her full age, leaving issue, then, I direct my said trustees, oi* %e survivor of them, or any successor in the trust, to divide 1 the said sum of $10,000 into two'equal parts and to pay or transfer one of the sAd equal parts to the issue of my granddaughter, Virginia, in equal portions.
    And the other equal part of the said $10,000, I direct my said trustees, or the survivor of them in the trust, to hold' and pay the net income arising therefrom, for the maintenance and education of my grandson, Richard Penn Lardner, Jr., during his minority, and upon his attaining the age of 21 years, to pay the principal to him. But should my grandson die in his minority, leaving issue, then, I direct my trustees to pay or transfer the share which would have been payable to my grandson, Richard, had he attained his majority, to hjs issue in equal portions. It is my wish, and I direct my trustees, or the survivor of them, as aforesaid, in the event of my granddaughter, Virginia, dying without issue, or of my grandson, Richard, dying during his minority without issue, or of both of them so dying, to hold either the one-half or the whole of the said sum of $10,000 as the case may be, in trust to pay the net income thereof for the maintenance and education of every other child, which my son, William, now has, or may hereafter have, during his, her or their minority, respectively, and when, and as, such other child or children shall attain the age of 21 years, respectively, to pay the said principal sum absolutely, or in equal shares, and so that the said sum shall, in the contingency last above provided for, be paid to the child or children of my son, William, (other than Virginia or Richard) when, and as, he, she or they shall severally attain the age of 21 years.
    THE BEQUEST IN CONTROVERSY.
    I give and bequeath the sum of three thousand dollars ($3,000) unto and to the use of the said John AVelsh and J. Somers Smith, and to the survivor of them, in trust, to invest the same, and to collect the interest arising therefrom, and after deducting the expenses of the said trust, to pay the net income for the support and education of my said grandson', Richard Penn Lardner, Jr., during his minority, and upon liife attaining the age of 21 years, to pay the principal to him.
    The rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal, and mixed, and all estates, whether real, personal or mixed, which I have the power to dispose of, I give, devise and bequeath, in case my husband shall die beíore me, unto the use of the said John Welsh and J. Somers Smith, and the survivor of them, and to the heirs of such survivor, upon the trusts, and to the uses following; that is to say, in trust to collect the rents, issues and profits, interest and income, of the residue of said estates, and after deducting the expenses of said trust, and of and upon said estates, to pay three-fourths of the entire net income arising therefrom to my son, William Miller Lardner, during his natural life, in quarterly payments as far as may be practicable, and to pay the remaining one-fourth, etc., to his children.
    But if my son, William shall not survive me, or should he die after me, leaving his present wife and also children surviving him, then in either case I- direct that one-fourth of the net income from my residuary estate shall be paid to his said wife during widowhood ; and the remaining three-fourths to be applied to the maintenance and education of any child or children which my said son may leave surviving- him, or the issue of any such child or children who may die in his, her or their minority, for and during the minority of such child or children, and issue respectively, such issue taking the parent’s share. And upon further trust, after the decease of my son, and of the interest hereinbefore given to his present wife, in case of her surviving her husband being determined, to pay, transfer and convey in equal shares, the whole of my residuary estate, to my grandchildren, as they shall severally attain the age of twenty-one years, but not otherwise ; and in. case of any of my grandchildren dying in their minority, leaving issue, I direct my said trns'ees to pay to such issue the part which his, her or their parent wouhl have taken.
    
      And I authorize my trustees, if they shall deem it expedient^ 'to set apart a full fourth part of my residuary estate, and pay the income thereof to the present wife of my son, William, in the event of her surviving her husband, during widowhood, in order that the remaining three-fourths of my residuary estate may be paid by my trustees to my grandchildren, as they attain the age of twenty-one years, etc.
    And upon the determination of the interest heretofore given to the present wife of my son, in case of her surviving her husband, to pay the one-fourth of my residuary estate, which may be set apart, in the discretion of my trustees, as heretofore authorized, in like manner to my grandchildren, as they attain the age of twenty-one years, as well as the issue; who may die in their majority.
    And I further direct my trustees, if the interest given to my son’s wife be determined during the minority of my grandchildren, to pay the whole net income of my residuary estate for the maintenance and education of my said grandchildren during their minority, as well as to their issue.
    Then follows, power to trustees to change all investments, and to invest in stocks, public loans, etc., and to sell, without liability, to see to the application of the pu. chase money, and to lease the real estate, etc.
    Lastly, I nominate and appoint my husband, Richard Penn Lardner, to be the executor of this, my will, but should he hot survive me, I then appoint my said friends, John Welsh and J. Somers Smith, to be executors thereof.
    The appellee, R. P. Lardner, Sr., filed an answer setting forth that R. P. Lardner, Jr., had only a contingent interest in the estate at the time the will was made ; the contingency being the death of the appellee before the testatrix; and as appellee survived the testatrix he had no interest. The Court refused the citation in the following opinion, per :
    Ross, P. J.
    This record involves the construction of a will; and that ■const' uc ion in this case is wholly dependent upon the intention of the testatrix. Of course, this is measurably true in construing every will, but it is peculiarly so liere, where no technical words, either of purchase or limitation ; no construction of the terms, “heirs,” “children,” “or issue,” and no-limitations upon “definite or indefinite failure of issue” arise.
    The grand cardinal rule for the construction of wills must-govern liere ; which is, that the intention of the testratrix shall be gathered from the four corners of the will, taken as a whole. It is unnecessary to pause-to cite authorities for this position, the cases will be found collected in Brightly’s Dig.,, vol. 2, p. 2387, pi. 193.
    In every will there is a general design, a central idea, that is a general intent. When this is clearly ascertained, every other clause in the will , however much in conflict with this-central idea or general intent, is, and must be subordinate to it; Middleswarth vs. Blackmore, 74, Penna. St. Bep., 414 ; Doebler’s Appeal, 64, Penna. St. Bep., 9; Schott’s Appeal, 78, id. 40. So imperative is this, that even all purely technical rules of construction must yield to the expressed intention of the testatrix, if such intent be lawful; Beck’s Appeal, 78, Pa. St. Bep., 432.
    This being the rule, the first inquiry is, what was the central idea ; the general intent of the testatrix. It was to make-her husband, if he survived her, her beneficiary. The testatrix and her husband were both aged people, and it is apparent, that after-a-moderate provision-for her sister, he was first in her mind. Her language is broad and comprehensive. She says (after having made the bequest to her sister), the rest, residue and remainder “of my estate, real, personal and “mixed, and all estates, whether real, personal or mixed, which “I have the right or power to dispose of, I give, devise and “bequeath to my most affectionate and beloved husband, “Bichard Penn Lardner, and to his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns.” Larger or more comprehensive language than this cannot well be imagined; clearly, as far as the first and general intent is involved, the will ends here. The grand central idea is to give her husband everything, if lie should survive her. He did so ; he is now living, and the will need not be perused further. It is a complete and perfect document, excepting only the appointment of an ■exe.cutor. In the last clause she does this, and here again she expresses the same thought, and as it were, illustrates her general intent. She says, lastly, “I nominate and appoint my “husband, Richard Penn Lardner, to be the executor of my “last will and testament, but should he not survive me, I then ■“constitute my said friends, John Welsh and J. Somers Smith, “to be the executors thereof.” Here then in these clauses is a full, perfect and complete will.
    Having thus fulfilled her first intent, the testatrix comes to her secondary scheme, which is conditional upon his death before she herself had departed life. If he survived her, he knew what she desired to be done. She trusted him to fulfill her wishes, but if he died first, it became necessary for her to express those wishes, and to appoint persons to see that they were carried out. As she had appointed executors other than her husband if he died before her, so she nominated trustees to execute her wishes, which she desired to be executed upon that contingency. Therefore, she begins with what may be termed her “secondary” will. She says, “should my husband die before me, then and in that case, I give and bequeath the sum of $10,000 unto and to the use of my friends, John Welsh and J. Somers Smith, of the City of Philadelphia, Esquires, and to the survivor of them, and to the executors, administrators and assigns of such survivor, * * * upon the uses and trusts following, that is to say.” How does this springing use, or trust, come into existence ? Clearly it is conditional upon the death of her husband. If the English language can condition a bequest upon a contingency, surely it has been •done here.
    In this conditional bequest of $10,000, she provides for the education of her grandson, Richard Penn Lardner, Jr., upon the contingency of Virginia dying before her majority, or in the event of her dying without issue. It then occurs to her that the - contingency may not happen, still in the event of her husband’s death, to provide for the education and maintenance of her grandson, in these words she says, (and it is said in a separate paragraph), “I give and bequeath the sum oi “$3,000 unto and to the use of the said John Welsh and J. “Somers Smith, and to the survivor of them, in trust, to invest “the same, and to collect the interest therefrom, and after deducting the expenses of the said trust, to pay the net income “for the support and education of my said grandson, Richard “Penn Lardner, Jr., during his minority and upon attaining “the age of 21 years, to pay the principal to him.”
    Is this more than a separate provision for him, subject to the survivorship of her husband, and also to provide for the non-happening of the contingency expressed in the trust. It is said the two bequests are irreconcilable. I am at a loss to see why. Virginia might live to be an old woman, whether a maiden or a wife with children, the term of whose life might end before her. The education of her grandson was a mattei that must be accomplished in his minority. His support, during that period of comparative helplessness, was most material, and both were there provided for in any event, if her husband died before her. If he survived her, she treated him as her “most affectionate and beloved husband.” After having made these bequests, indicating that they were preferred benefits, she goes (on ?) she says, still preserving her first general and central intent, “the rest, residue and remainder of my estates, “real, personal or mixed, which I have the power to dispose of, “I give, devise and bequeath, in case my husband shall die “before me, unto the use of the said John Welsh,” etc.
    It is a broad, palpable fact that these trustees are not evoked to perform any act, to execute any intention, or to discharge any trust, save in the event of the death of her husband before her will became operative. It is, therefore, ruled that the testatrix intended to bequeath no interest and to vest no benefit upon any of her legatees, save only her husband, unless he died before herself. If he lived to survive her, he was to be master absolutely of all, in that event she thought and believed he would protect her contingent beneficiaries. If he died first, she protected them by her trusts. The Court does not believe that the construction of other wills, based upon the intention of the testator, can, or does throw much light upon any other testament. Each will is a law itself, and must be construed from itself as a whole. Different minds will apprehend, devise meanings, and construction will be as varied as the several instruments themselves. Still the ruling here is-in very complete accord with Biddle’s Est., 4 Casey, 59.
    It is said, however, that the $8,000 bequest to Richard Penn Lardner, Jr., is an independent bequest, and that in construing the will, it should be read, as if placed before the bequest of the rest, residue and remainder. Why should it be so ? It is true, clauses in a will may be transposed. True it is that a codicil may bequeath a sum after the will has disposed of the rest, residue and remainder, but in these cases, the intention, as in the case of a codicil, is clear; and in all others must be transposed. A separate paragraph, such as this is, of itself alone, is no demonstration of such an intent; and when it is remembered that the will gives all to the husband in the event of his survivorship, that it is full; complete, and perfect in that event, that other executors are not created save upon the contingency of his death ; that no trustees are evoked save upon the same condition; and finally, that trustees are the legal takers under this will of the bequest invoked, the conclusion is irresistible, that it is conditional upon the death of her husband. As he survived her, and is still living, Richard Penn Lardner, Jr., took nothing under her will.
    The conclusion has been reached with regret, but it is so obvious that it is imperative. And now, December 1, 1879, after argument and due consideration, citation is dismissed.
    R. P. Lardner, Jr., then appealed to the Supreme Court,, complaining of the decision of the Court below that he had no intei’est in the estate.
    E. Warn, Esq,., for appellaxxt,
    discussed Biddle’s Estate, 28, Pa. 59 ; axxd argued that the devise of the residuary estate to R. P. Lardner, Sr., carried what was left, after the devise, to R. P. Lardner, .Jr.
    W. W. Montgomery, Esq., contra.
   The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Orphans’ Court on April 1st, 1881, in the following opinion :

Per Curiam :

The will of Anna B. Lardner, after a legacy to her sister, gives not only the rest, residue and remainder of her estate, but all estates, real, personal or mixed, which she-had the right and power to dispose of, to her husband. It is very evident that all the subsequent dispositions of the will were only to take effect in case he died before her. Biddle’s Estate,' 28 Pa. 59, is entirely in point.

Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at tlio costs of the appellant.  