
    STEWART v. CHEW.
    An injunction granted to stay trespass, there being no then depending suit to try the right, dissolved on the coming in of an answer which denied the trespass, and alleged that the acts complained of were done on' his the defendant’s own land.
    ■ This bill was'filed on the 5th of May, 1831, by William Stewart against John Chew; it stated, that at a sale made under a decree of this court, the plaintiff had purchased a part of the.tract of land called Elkton Head Manor, and was then in possession of it; and that the defendant had committed, and was then committing great waste by cutting down timber trees and doing acts injurious to the land. Whereupon he prayed for an injunction to stay waste, for relief, &e. An injunction was granted as prayed.
    3d October, 1831.
    The defendant in his answer admitted, that the plaintiff had made the purchase as stated; but specially denied, that he had or was then committing any waste as charged; and averred, that he, the defendant, had purchased another part of the same tract of land called El/cton Head Manor, adjoining to that purchased by the plaintiff, on which he had cut a large quantity of wood ready for market; and that by a survey which had been made, laying down the boundaries, as admitted, between the lands of this defendant and the plaintiff, it clearly appeared, that the defendant had committed no manner of waste or trespass whatever on the lands of the plaintiff. Upon this answer, the defendant gave notice of a motion to dissolve the injunction.
   Bland, Chancellor.

The motion to dissolve the injunction standing ready for hearing, and having been submitted on notes by the solicitors of the parties, the proceedings were read and considered.

It is not intimated in this bill, that the plaintiff had instituted a suit of any kind which was then depending, to establish his right to the lands upon which the alleged wrong had been committed. It is therefore quite clear, that this cannot be considered as one of those cases in which an injunction is granted to stay waste and preserve the property pending a suit to try the title, or to ascertain the true location of the land to which the alleged injury has been done. And as it is not stated, that there is any privity of title or estate between these parlies, this can only be regarded as a mere injunction to stay trespass alleged to have been committed by a stranger; and hence, according to the well settled course of this court, in relation to cases of this kind, where the defendant, as in this instance, positively denies all the facts of the imputed wrong and injury as charged in the bill, the injunction must be dissolved,

Whereupon- it is Ordered, that the injunction heretofore granted in this case, be and the same is hereby annulled and dissolved. 
      
       Duval v. Waters, 1 Bland, 569.
     