
    John Brown vs. E. Wilcox et al.
    It is an established rule, in the construction of statutes, not to give a retrospective effect to a law, unless it is the manifest intention of the legislature that such construction should be placed upon it.
    In construing, therefore, the act of limitations of 1844, the 8th section of which provided, that no person should “ sue out an execution on any judgment or decree after seven years from the time the last execution issued on said judgment or decree,” while the 18th section declared, that the “ periods of limitation established by this act shall commence running from the date of the passage thereof: ” it was held, that in cases of judgments rendered prior to the passage of the act, the period of time anterior to its passage, in which an execution issued, was not to be computed ; to constitute a bar in such ‘cases, seven years must have elapsed from the time of the passage of the act.
    A different construction would conflict with the last clause of the act, which contemplates the application of the previous laws to those cases, in which the limitation had commenced running at the time of the passage of the act.
    In error from the circuit court of Yalabusha county; Hon. Francis M. Rogers, judge.
    On. the 13th day of March, A. D. 1838, E. Wilcox and J. Welsh recovered a judgment against John Brown and Isaac Yanzant, for $429-13, upon which an execution issued in 1838, returnable to the March term 1839; no other execution issued on the judgment until the 20th of March, 1849, when one issued and was levied on two slaves as the property of Brown, who executed a forthcoming bond for the delivery of the property on the 30th day of April, A. D-, 1849. On the 28th of that month Brown filed his petition, and obtained an order for a sz^ei1SíJaeffiá'-a-gafñ-St-,further action upon the judgment, last execution and bond, on the ground that the statute of limitations had barred the plaintiff’s right to its issuance. At the April term of the court then in session, the court dismissed the petition upon the facts stated, and Brown sued out this writ of error.
    
      A. C. Leigh, for plaintiff in error,
    insisted,
    1. In construing a statute, an interpretation must never be adopted which will defeat its own purpose. 9 Wheat. 381. A statute must be construed so that it will have a reasonable effect. 3 Mass. R. 523; 5 lb. 380; 15 lb. 205.
    An examination of the statute will show, that the general provision of the 18th clause would defeat the object of the legislature, as manifested in the body of the act; and to construe the 18th clause so as to make the period of limitations commence running from the passage of the act, would not only prevent “a reasonable effect ” being produced, but would make the operation of the act absurd and ridiculous.
    The act was passed on the 24th of February, 1844. Now suppose Á. contracts a debt on the 1st of January, 1850, or that the last execution issued on B.’s judgment against A. on the 1st January, 1850, according to the wording of the 18th clause, the limitation would commence running from the 24th of February, 1844, instead of from the 1st of January, 1850, the time of the last issuance, which is the time prescribed in the 8th section. So that the general provision of the 18th clause is so inconsistent with the manifest intention developed in the body of the act, and renders its operation so absurd, that, upon a reasonable principle of construction', we submit that it cannot be enforced.
    2. Again : “General words in one clause of a statute may be restrained by particular words in a subsequent clause.' But if a particular thing be given or limited in the preceding part of a statute, this shall not be altered or taken away by any subsequent general words.” See Swift’s Dig. p. 12, § 15, and authorities cited. In the 8th section of our act, the time is expressly fixed for the limitation to commence running. Norcanjhis-fegf altered or taken away by the general proyisioA'oTa subsequent clause. ^
    
      3. But the principle of construction, “ut res magis valeat quam pereat" requires that some operation should be given to the 18th clause, provided it can be reasonably done. There is one class of cases to which the clause may apply. The legislature had no right to deprive a party of an existing right at the passage of the act. For instance, if seven years had already elapsed on the 24th of February, 1844, from the time of the issuance of the last execution, then the effect of the 8th section would be to deprive a party altogether of the right of enforcing his judgment by the issuance of his execution. This the legislature could not do. We think, therefore, that the 18th clause, fixing the running of the limitations from the passage of the act, can only apply to that class of cases in which the periods fixed by the act had expired at the time of its passage, subject, of course, to the proviso in the latter part of said section.
    
      Snider and Fisher, for defendants in error.
    Under the 18th section, the judgment is not barred for seven years after the passage of the act of 1844, unless it was barred by the previous statute of limitations, which was sixteen years, on judgments.
    The plain meaning of this section is, that if the old statute had comenced running, and the judgment would have been barred in less than seven years, then it would be barred by the old statute. But if a party wishes to avail himself of the seven years, contained in the statute of 1844, he must be content to allow the statute to run seven years after its passage, before the judgment will be barred.
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion of the court.

The controversy in this case grows out of the eighth and eighteenth sections of the act of limitations of 1844. By the former it is provided, “ That judgments shall not be revived by scire facias, nor actions of debt be maintained thereon, nor executions issued, after the expiration of seven years next after the date of such judgment.” The latter provides, “ That the periods of limitations established by the act, shall commence running from the date of the passage thereof.” It also provides, “ That its passage shall not stop the running of the limitations contained in any other act, when the same may have commenced before the passage thereof.” Hutch. Code, 831, 832.

In this case more than seven years had elapsed, between the issuance of the present execution and the one next preceding, and of consequence more than seven years had transpired after the judgment But the execution in controversy was issued in less than seven years after the passage of the law.

It is an established rule not to give a retrospective effect to a law, unless it is the manifest intention of the legislature, that such construction should be placed upon it.-/-No such intention is evinced in this instance. On the contrary, the declaration is express, that the period of limitation shall commence from the passage of the act. We should extend its operation beyond its plain provisions, if we were to make the law relate back and affect judgments rendered previous to its passage, and make it constitute a bar as to them by computing the time, between the rendition of the judgment and the passage of the law. This would also interfere with the last clause of the section, which contemplates the application of the previous laws, to those cases in which the limitation had commenced running at the time of the passage of this act.

It seems to us, therefore, that the law under consideration is only applicable where the period of limitation has elapsed subsequent to its passage. This was the view taken in the court below, and the judgment is affirmed.  