
    John Coble v. The State of Ohio.
    1. On the trial of a person charged with an assault with intent to rob, it is-error to admit testimony on behalf of the state tending to prove the defendant guilty of other assaults about the same time.
    2. The credibility of a witness can not be affected by showing his former-conviction of an offense under a city ordinance against disorderly eon-duct. A conviction, which may be shown to affect the credibility of a witness, under section 139 of the criminal code (66 Ohio L. 308) is such only, as, independent- of the section, would have rendered the convict incompetent to testify.
    Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Clarke county..
    At the January Term, 1877, of the Court of Common Pleas of Clarke county, the plaintiff in error was convicted of the crime of an assault upon one Georgiana Runyan with intent to rob.
    On the trial, testimony was offered tending to prove that the offense was committed by the defendant, on the evening of Saturday, the 6th of January, 1877, at about twenty minutes past eight o’clock, on a street in the city of Springfield.
    Thereupon the state offered other testimony, showing' that about five minutes after the offense charged in the indictment had been committed, the defendant assaulted another person, in the vicinity of the place where the assault, charged in the indictment had been made.
    A portion of the testimony objected to was given by Ida Garver, as follows: “ Was on south- Center street-(Springfield) going south with my sister Lillie Easier, Miss Anna Anderson and Miss Jennie Anderson, between eight and nine o’clock, Saturday evening, January 6th.” Whereupon the defendant asked the witness, “Did you see John Coble attack Mrs. Runyan?” Witness answered, “I did not.” Defendant then objected to the witness testifying further, which objection the court overruled, and the defendant excepted. “We were right opposite Mrs. Runyan’s house when I saw John Coble coming north on Center •■street. When first saw him, he seemed to be standing under the gas light in front of Mr. Aron’s house, at the •alley. He came toward us walking fast and straight. He had no appearance of drunkenness. We were walking .single file. One of the girls said, ‘ There is the man that .attacked us on New Year’s night.’ I said, ‘It is John ■Coble then.’ He was about a foot and a half from us, and, .as he passed, he sprang and caught me. We screamed and called him John Coble when he let go of me and ran away.”
    On behalf of the defense, the defendant offered himself as a witness and testified that he was not present at the time- or place of the alleged offense, and upon cross-examination was asked, “How many times have you been under arrest?” An objection to this question was overruled, whereupon the -defendant answered, “Was arrested once. Was not arrested twice.”
    In rebuttal, the state offered the docket of the mayor of •the city of Springfield, to prove that the defendant had been arrested and convicted for violations of the ordinances •of the city, for the sole purpose, as was stated by the prosecutor, of affecting the credibility of the defendant as a witness. To the introduction of this testimony the defendant objected, but the objection was overruled, whereupon •the prosecutor read the record of an arrest and a conviction of the defendant for disorderly conduct in violation of an ■ordinance of the city on the 30th of October, 1876, and also the record of another arrest and conviction for a like •offense on the 10th of January, 1877. To all of which the •defendant excepted.
    Upon these several rulings error is now assigned, for which, it is claimed, the judgment below should be reversed.
    
      Wolfe $ Giliett, for plaintiff in error.
    
      G. G. Rawlins, prosecuting attorney.
   McIlvaine, J.

The judgment below must be reversed. The admission of the mayor’s record of former convictions-of the defendant below for violations of the city ordinance was clearly erroneous. If it be claimed by the state that-this record contradicted the testimony of the defendant below, it is enough to say, that the state was concluded by the-answer of the defendant to the question, How many times-have you been arrested ?” Although, on cross-examination, such question is admissible, an answer thereto can not be-enforced, and, if it be voluntarily given, the state is bound by the answer.

We suppose, however (being without a brief for the state), that this testimony was offered and admitted, in the court below, under a false construction of section 139 of the criminal code (66 Ohio L. 308), which provides that “ no person shall be disqualified as a witness in any criminal prosecution by reason of bis interest in the event of the same, as a party or otherwise, or by reason of his conviction of any crime; but such interest or conviction may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility.” The conviction referred to in this section, which may be shown for the purpose of affecting credibility, is such, and such only, ¿is before the enactment of the section would have-disqualified the person from testifying as a -witness.- Convictions for violations of city ordinances never disqualified a person from testifying in any cause, and, therefore, such convictions can not be shown under favor of this section for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the witness.

For error in admitting this testimony the judgment must-be reversed.

To the admission of the testimony tending to prove the defendant guilty of other assaults, no exception was saved; but, as the cause is remanded for a new trial, we-think it proper to say, that, upon the trial of a person charged with an assault with intent to rob, it is not competent for the state, in aid of the prosecution, to prove other assaults committed by the defendant, whether with or without like intent. In so far as the testimony admitted tended to show that the defendant was in the vicinity at the-time the offense charged in the indictment was committed, it was clearly admissible; but, in so far as it tended simply to show an attack of like character committed by him upon another person, and at another time and place, it was clearly inadmissible.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.  