
    Ellen M. RUMSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTHEAST HEALTH, INC. and St. Peter's Health Partners, Defendants-Appellees.
    
    No. 15-833.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 28, 2016.
    Corrected Jan. 29, 2016.
    Carlo A.C. de Oliveira, Cooper Erving & Savage LLP, Albany, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Matthew H. Woodard, Jackson Lewis P.C., White Plains, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.
    
      PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, AMALYA L. KEARSE, Circuit Judge, and LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as indicated above.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Loma G. Schofield, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Ellen M. Rumsey appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Northeast Health, Inc. and St. Peter’s Health Partners entered on February 25, 2015, by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Sannes, /.), dismissing all of Rumsey’s claims against the defendants. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

“We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against which summary judgment was granted and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Sec. Plans, Inc. v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y, 769 F.3d 807, 815 (2d Cir.2014) (quoting Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 661 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir.2011)). “Summary judgment is appropriate [if] ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Kwan v. Andalex Grp., LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a)). “A genuine dispute of material fact ‘exists for summary judgment purposes where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that a reasonable jury could decide in that party’s favor.’ ” Id. (quoting Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir.2007)).

We review Title VII retaliation claims under the three-step burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See id. at 843. “Un-. der the first step ..., the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing 1) ‘participation in a protected activity’; 2) the defendant’s knowledge of the protected activity; 3) ‘an adverse employment action’; and 4) ‘a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.’ ” Id. at 844 (quoting Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir.2005)). The burden then “shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the employment action.” Id. at 845. “[A]fter the defendant has articulated a non-retaliatory reason for the employment action, the presumption of retaliation arising from the establishment of the pri-ma facie case drops from the picture. The plaintiff must then come forward with [evidence that the defendant’s proffered,] non-retaliatory reason is a mere pretext for retaliation.” Id. (citation omitted).

The district court concluded that Rum-sey failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII because she failed to establish a causal connection between any protected activity and her termination. Alternatively, the district court concluded that, even if Rumsey had established a prima facie case of retaliation, defendants articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Rumsey’s termination and that Rumsey failed to point to evidence showing that the proffered, non-retaliatory reason was a mere pretext for retaliation. The district court also dismissed Rumsey’s claim for breach of contract, which was based on her contention that the defendants violated their own disciplinary procedures governing employee conduct, because there was an absence of evidence indicating that Rumsey’s employment was anything other than at will. Upon review of the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal, we affirm for substantially the same reasons provided by the district court.

The district court also granted summary judgment dismissing Rumsey’s claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”). Although we agree with the district court’s ultimate disposition, we conclude that these claims, as defendants correctly point out, were not properly before the district court to begin with. Before initiating this action, Rumsey filed her NYHRL claims in the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”), and under New York law, “NYHRL ... claims, once brought before the NYSDHR, may not be brought again as a plenary action in another court.” York v. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, 286 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir.2002). Because “a state law depriving its courts of jurisdiction over a state law claim also operates to divest a federal court of jurisdiction to decide the claim,” Moodie v. Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 58 F.3d 879, 884 (2d Cir.1995), we affirm the dismissal of Rumsey’s NYHRL claims on the ground that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear them.

We have considered all of Rumsey’s contentions on this appeal and have found in them no basis for reversal. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  