
    *Henry Pelton v. Solomon Platner, who sues for the use of James E. Chapman.
    No presumption is raised here, that a justice’s court in Michigan is, or is not a court of record; if material to the issue, the laws of Michigan must he proved.
    Courts, not of record, arc not within the act of Congress, providing for the authentication of judicial proceedings.
    Courts, not of record, are within the provisions of the constitution of the United States, and their proceedings may he proved hy the certificate of the justice and the clerk of the county, with the seal, etc., or by an examined or sworn copy.
    A judgment against property must show the property of the defendant was attached; service on the property of a stranger gives no jurisdiction.
    In Ohio, a judgment in rem converts the property; beyond this, it is not even evidence of debt.
    Poreign judgments, where there was personal service, are only prima facie evidence of indebtedness, and the defendant may contest their justice.^»
    ^Judgments of other states, whether in rem or in personam, have the same " force and effect here as where rendered.
    This is a writ of error to the court of common pleas of Lake county.
    Tho judgment sought to be reversed was in an action of debt, founded on the certified transcript of a judgment by a justice of the peace, in the State of Michigan. All the material facts are disclosed in the following bill of exceptions:
    “Be it remembered that, on the trial of this cause in the court of common pleas of Lake county, at the June term thereof, 1844, the said Solomon Platner, for the use of James Chapman, to maintain the issue on his part, offered the following paper in proof, to wit:
    “ In Justice’s Court — Before Henry Hewitt, Esq., a Justice of the Peace. Solomon Platner v. Henry Pelton. Attachment issued, December 20,1837; returnable, December 31, at one o’clock,
    P. m. Summons returned duly served, by 0. Hatch; fee, $1. Served on one drag-tooth and one pair of hames, one iron bolt, etc. Plaintiff declares against defendant in assumpsit, for goods, ware» and mei’chandise, house rent, fire-wood, stabling horse, grain, etc., as per bill in court. To plaintiff’s damage, $100, or under. Defendant not in court, and, according to statute, cause continued to March 27, 1840, at one o’clock p. m. At the adjourned day, plaintiff in court; defendant not appearing, cause for trial. The court, after hearing the evidence for plaintiff, found for him damages, $38 62, with costs. Court fees, $1.69; constable, O. Hatch, $1; constable, on garnishee, 87 cents; printer’s bill, $3, etc.”1 *Then follow, in the bill of exceptions, the certificates of the justice and the clerk of the county, thus:
    
      “ State of Michigan, County of Calhoun:
    
    I do hereby certify that the above is a correct transcript from the judgment rendered by Henry Hewitt, Esq., a justice of the peace of said county, at the time of the rendition of said judgment. That the docket of said Henry Hewitt is new in my possession, in pursuance of the statute in such cases'made and provided; that the said Henry Hewitt having died, while holding the office of justice of the peace, the books and papers of said Hewitt were duly transferred to me, a justice of the peace, according to the laws of the state, in such case made and provided, and that the said books and papers are now in my possession, in pur-# suance of said law.
    “ Francis W. Sherman, Justice of the Iteace.”
    
    “ State of Michigan, Calhoun County Cleric’s Office:
    
    I, Jno. W. Van Horne, clerk of said county, do hereby certify that Francis W. Sherman, whose name is subscnb«d to the cer* tifieate of the proof or acknowledgment of the annexed instru. ment, and thereon written, was, at the time of taking such proof or acknowledgment of the annexed instrument, an acting justice of the peace, in and for Calhoun county, sworn and duly authorized to take the same; and, further, that I am well acquainted with the handwriting of said justice, and verily believe that the signature to the said certificate of proof or acknowledgment is genuine.
    In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and affixed the seal of said county, the 8th.day of December, 1843. [seal.] “ Jno. W. Yan Horne, Clerk.’
    
    The plaintiff in error objected to this evidence, but the same was admitted by the court; and, no other proof being given, the court gave judgment for the defendant in error.
    It is assigned for error:
    1. That the transcript set forth in the bill of exceptions ought not to have been received in evidence.
    2. That the judgment was given for the defendant in error, when it ought to have been given for the plaintiff in error.
    Lapham & Sterling, for plaintiff in error:
    We contend, on the part of the plaintiff in error, that the transcript, admitted in evidence on the trial of the cause in the court below, being a record of proceedings in attachment, in the State of Michigan, against a non-resident who had no notice of the pendency of the suit, ought to have been rejected.
    Admitting the proceedings to have been strictly conformable to the statute of Michigan, the judgment has no further *effect than to bind the property attached, and is no evidence of indebtedness; it does not operate, in any measure, in personam. No action can be sustained upon the judgment in another state, because the defendant was not personably amenable to the jurisdiction. The following authorities, we think, fully sustain this position:
    Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Teilbun v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37; Taylor v. Phelps, 1 Gill & Johns. 492; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 447; Jacobs v. Hull, 12 Mass. 25; Story’s Conflict of Laws, 461; Serg. on Attachments, 112-114; 1 Dall. 375 ; Bells v. Death. Add. 265; 3 Mason, 151; 4 Wash. C. C,; Kilby e. Kilby, Kirby, 119; 6 Conn. 508; 2 Yerg. 484; 2 Vt. 263; Rogers v. Coleman, Hardin, 413; 1 Paige, 299, 305; 1 Dev. 488.
    But if we admit the rule of law to be otherwise, the proof should have been rejected, because it does not appear by the transcript that any service was made of the writ; that is, it does not appear that any property-belonging to the defendant was attached; and no other service could have been made but by attaching property, and that the property of the defendant. The notice of an attachment should state to whom the property belonged. 3 Moore (Ky.), 293; Iron v. Allen, Hardin, 44.
    It will readily be seen that a rule, admitting the legality of proceedings under such a return as this transcript shows, would enable designing persons to establish doubtful, or even groundless claims against non-residents, by proving nominal attachments on property which might be any other person’s property than the defendant’s, or even the property of the plaintiff himself, and, in the absence of the defendant, easily make out a prima facie case, and thereby obtain record evidence of indebtedness against any person whom he might choose to make defendant. I/aw, justice, and sound policy are against such a rule.
    And, further, the transcript does not show any disposition made of the property which the officer returned that he did ^attach, and we think that a further suit can not be sustained on the judgment, were there no other objection, until the property shall have been disposed of, and the proceeds applied on the judgment.
    The transcript ought not to have been admitted as evidence antil the statute of Michigan had been produced and proved, to enable the court to determine whether the proceedings were conformable thereto, the court before which the proceedings were had being of limited jurisdiction. See 19 Johns. 33; 9 Mod. 95; 2 Wils. 16; 1 Saund. 73, 74; 5 Cranch, 173; S. C., 1 Pet. C. C. 30; 8 Cow. 311.
    E. Hitchcock and Wilder, for defendant in error:
    The authorities in the different states are numerous and conflicting, but we believe the correct rule is, and ought to be, that when there has been personal service upon the defendant in the original action, the decision is final and conclusive, and the evidence of indebtedness furnished by the record conclusive evidence in any other state. But in those cases where no personal service is made the defendant does not appear, and the cause is commenced and process served, in no other manner than by attaching property, that the adjudication of the court upon the cause of action furnishes, by its record, prima facie evidence of indebtedness, throwing the burden of proof upon the defendant, and leaving him to impeach it, and the original demand, by competent testimony, if be seeks to avoid it.
    It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that this was a judgment in attachment; that there was no personal service upon him; but this we deny. We say the record shows there was personal service upon him. There is no pretense in the case that the plaintiff in error did not, at the time the original suit was commenced, reside in Michigan, and within the jurisdiction of the court.
    *The language of the record in this particular is: “Attachment issued December 20, 1837; returnable December 31, at one o’clock, p. m. Summons returned served, by O. Hatch; fee, $1.” There was, then, not only an attachment, but a summons issued and served. It must have been for and upon the defendant. It would bo a singular position to assumo that the property, after it was attached, was summoned. Summoned for what? To appear in court and defend? There are many of the states in which an attachment for property is ordinarily a part of the mesne process accompanying the summons, and in which the sorvice consists in seizing property and summoning the defendant. This we suppose is the law of Michigan, and was the course pursued in the case before us.
    If we are correct in this position, here is an end of the case. But if we aré wrong, and this is said to be a judgment in attachment only, then we say that the record is, in itself, admissible, and prima facie evidence of indebtedness. We are aware that the decisions in New York and Massachusetts are against us.
    The doctrine, however, for which we contend has, as we understand it, received the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States, and in Vermont, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio. Betts v. Droth, Addison, 265; Rogers v. Coleman et ux., Hardin, 413; Prim v. Higgins, 1 Litt. 274; King v. Van Guilder, 1 Chip. 59; 1 Pet. C. C. 74; 1 Ohio, 260; Curtis v. Gibb, 1 Pennington399, 406.
    So, in Tennessee, they have held that a decree in chancery from another state may be inquired into when there has been no actual notice. Note in 1 Star. Ev. 215.
    Of course,-the decree was not regarded as a nullity.
    
      We understand this to have been the uniform doctrino in Ohio-In the case cited from 1 Ohio, 260, the court say: “In such cases we have considered, the record as prima facie evidence, and permitted the defendant to impeach its justice,” etc.
    We claim no more; and why now, alter the rule has been thus settled and acted upon for so many years, in this state, seek to change it?
    *But to present the case in another view. Wo submit that this judgment has the same force and effect here that it has in the state where rendered.
    The constitution of the United' States provides, “full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state; and the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.”
    The act of Congress of 1790 provides for the manner in which records shall be authenticated, and then says they “shall have such faith and credit given to them, in any court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.”
    It would be difficult to use language more clear, distinct, and less likely to bo misconstrued; but, until it had received a construction from the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases in 7 Cranch, 481, and 3 Wheat. 234, its construction in the different states was as various as the states are numerous. Since these cases, now decided, however, there has been more uniformity in the state courts, all, with the exception of perhaps New York, now holding that no plea to a suit upon a judgment from another state is good, unless it be such as would be allowed to the same judgment in the state whore rendered, “thus,” to use the words of Chief Justice Parker, “establishing an identity in operation and effect between judgments rendered in the courts of the same state and courts in other states. There can be, therefore, while these decisions stand, no further doubts as to the effect of the judgments of the courts of our state in those of another.” 17 Mass. 546; 5 Ohio, 545; 6 Ohio, 43; 7 Cranch, 481; 3 Wheat. 234; 2 Dallas, 302.
    Our own court, in 5 Ohio, 545, say that nil debet is a good plea in that case, which was upon a justice’s judgment from Pennsylvania, because it is a good plea in Pennsylvania. This, and this only, is the ground upon which they sustain the plea. They then say, farther, that, although a justice’s judgment *is not embraced in the act of Congress of 1790, it is embraced within the provisions of the constitution. “ It is a judicial proceeding, to which full faith and credit are to be given.” See also Wright, 127; Ib. 347; Ib. 349; in each of which cases the same doctrine is maintained.
    Of what the law is, then, in Ohio, as to the force and effect here of judgments from other states, there’ can be no doubt if oft-repeated uniform decisions of the Supreme Court, not only upon the circuit, but in bank, could settle it, and not only that this question is at an end, but that it is also in like manner decided that the rule applies to the records of the court that rendered the judg ments and made the records before us.
    This judgment has the same (orce and effect here that it has iu Michigan; and what is that ? At least- that it is prima facie evidence of indebtedness.
    This precise point was decided in Kentucky, as we claim the law to be. 5 Litt. 349, 350. See also 1 Pennington, 399, 406; 2 Leigh, 175, 176.
    It is urged by the plaintiff in error that no action can be sustained on the record until it is shown that the property attached is legally disposed of, and the proceeds applied upon the judgment. No authorities in support of this position are cited; we therefore presume none could be found by the counsel.
    But in the case in 6 Wend., cited by the plaintiff to another point, the original action was commenced in Massachusetts, by attachment of property; the defendant afterward appeared; judgment was rendered against him; execution was issued and not returned ; suit was then brought on the judgment in New York. The question now.under consideration was thus raised, strengthened by the issue of the execution; but the objection was overruled, and judgment rendered for plaintiff.
    It is further urged by the counsel opposed to us, that the record was not admissible in evidence, because it does not say, in so many words, in the form of an allegation in pleading, that the property attached was the property of the defendant. *It is not believed that it is necessary for the officer, in his return, to aver that fact as a part of his return. In practice, it is not done in this state, either on attachment or on execution; but even if necessary, it is clear it is not the custom in this state, nor in any other, so far as we know, for the justice to transcribe into his docket the full return of the officer. If the property attached was not the property of Pelton, he should have plead and proved that fact, and that by the law of Michigan, if it be so, that the court, for that reason, had not jurisdiction of the cause. The mistake into which the counsel have run in all this case is, that they seek to throw upon us the burden of proof, when the law casts it upon them.
    P. Hitchcock submitted an argument on the same side.
   Wood, J.

The first assignment embraces the whole ground of inquiry. The second is a mere corollary. Under the first assignment two questions naturally arise : 1. Is the transcript of the Michigan justice properly certified? 2. Is it prima facie evidence of debt?

As to the mode of authentication of the records and judicial proceedings of other states, they are provided for by an act of Congress, passed A. D. 1790; but it has been decided in our own court that neither the act of Congress, nor*the provisions of the constitution of the United States, as to authentication, extend to any other than courts of records. In 5 Ohio, 545, it is said by this court that other evidence of the official character of the person who certifies the transcript of the justice than his own certificate, has invariably been required — usually the certificate of the clerk of the county, with the seal of the court; and it is held in that case, that, although justice’s courts in Pennsylvania are not of irecord, and are consequently not within the act of Congress, that they are within the provisions of the constitution of the United States, as judicial proceedings, and admissible in proof, when duly certified by the justice, with the additional certificate *of the clerk of the county. The transcript would appear, in the ease at bar, to bo fully within the principle decided in 5 Ohio, 545, provided a justice’s eourt in Michigan is not a court of record. In some of the states they are, and in others not, and no presumption can be legitimately raised that they are either the one or the other. This court is not bound to take notice, ex officio, of the laws of other states, and it is no enviable task to keep paco with the Solons of our own. When a question depends on the laws of a sister state, in our courts, such laws are a part of the e ridence in the case, and, like another fact, must be proved by him who holds the affirmative.

When the plaintiff below offered this evidence, it was a fact incumbent on him to show that the court of a justice of the peace in Michigan was not a court of record, and that the papers offered were duly certified within the adjudication referred to in 5 Ohio, 545. As no such evidence was given, the transcript was improperly received.

Was the transcript prima facie evidence of debt? On this question there have been numerous adjudications, by no means always consistent with each other. At Westminster foreign judgments, where there has been personal service or notice, are held to be prima facie evidence merely of indebtedness, and the defendant is let in to contest their justice and propriety. 3 Sim. 545. The same rule prevails in the United States. Story’s Conflict of Laws, 508; 3 Cow. 520; 5 Wend. 148; 6 Ib. 447.

Foreign judgments, in rem, in regard to personal property, are held to be conclusive in eases where the court have jurisdiction, so far that the same question can not be again litigated. 7 Cranch, 433; 4 Ib. 141, 434; 7 Wheat. 471.

Judgments in the courts of our sister states, under the constitution of our federal government, are not, however considered foreign judgments, but as having the same credit, validity, and effect in any other state they have in the state where rendered. Spencer v. Brockway, 1 Ohio, 259; 13 Peters, 312. And where the defendant is shown by the ^record to have had full notice, in an action upon the record in another state, nil debet is a. bad plea, for the record imports absolute verity. Whether proceedings are in personam or in rem, if there was jurisdiction over the person in one case, or over the thing in the other, and such jurisdiction be proved, the same effect will be given, in Ohio, to a judgment rendered in Michigan, that would be given to it there. 13 Peters, 312.

In Ohio, we are of the opinion that a judgment before a justice of the peace against property, and no service on the person, appropriates the property only. That execution can not issue on such judgment against the other property or person of the defendant for any implied balance, nor could an action be sustained upon it as being prima facie evidence of debt. When it has converted the property it is functus officio, and vitality remains to it no longer for any purpose. But in such judgments, rendered in the common pleas, our statute has made express provision that the judgment shall stand, and execution issue thereon as in other cases. Swan’s Stat. 93, sec. 11.

It is laid down in several cases of high authoi’ity that, if a creditor attach the goods of his debtor, in the hands of the bailiff, factor, trustee, or garnishee of such debtor, on recovering judgment, the goods may be lawfully applied to satisfy it, and the bailiff, sued, shall be protected by the judgment; but if the goods are insufficient to satisfy the judgment, and the creditor bring suit upon it in any other state, ho must fail, because the defendant was not personally amenable to the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment. 9 Mass. 462; 5 Johns. 3, 85, 86; 1 Gill & Johns. 492; 6 Wend. 447; 12 Mass. 25. And to give jurisdiction of the person to the court, in any case, the defendant must have had due notice of the suit. 1 Caine, 466; 2 Dall. 302; 6 Pick. 232.

But if the court here or elsewhere have not jurisdiction of the person, nor of the subject matter, its proceedings are wholly void. Such judgments are as waste paper. They are no protection to those who seek to enforce them; nor are they prima facie evidence of debt. Evans v. Instine, 7 Ohio, 275.

*The record of a judgment must show service or it will not be presumed, either in our own courts or elsewhere. Let us look at the service in the record in question, and see whether any jurisdiction over the person or property was acquired by the Michigan justice. Tho constable returns that ho has made service by attaching a drag tooth, one pair of hames and bolt, but it is nowhere returned that they were the property of the defendant in the attachment; and without such return, and without such were the fact, there is no service, and on valid judgment can be rendered upon it. At least such is the law here, and if such judgment has any greater effect in Michigan the plaintiff, in the court of common pleas, utterly failed to show it.

In Evans v. Instine, 7 Ohio, 275, the court say, “without inquiring as to the effect of a judgment in foreign attachment where the property of a defendant has been taken by virtue of the writ, we are clear in the opinion that where the property of a stranger has been levied upon, such services does not so far give any court jurisdiction, as that a judgment rendered can be of any effect.”

But it is insisted a summons was issued, and that the record shows it was duly served; and therefore it is shown the defendant below had personal notice. The words of the record are, “ attachment issued,” etc.; “summons returned duly served,” etc.; and “costs on garnishee, fee eighty-seven cents.”' This summons was, therefore, I presume, a garnishee-process served od some debtor of the defendant, in attachment, to compel his attendance and answer; but no further notice is taken of either the summons or garnishee in the record. If such judgments bind property in Michigan, we would give them the same effect here. If they would bo prima facie evidence of debt there against the defendant, wo would hold them to be so here; but before the courts here can give them any such effect, the law of Michigan must be proved. Thomas v. Robinson, 3 Wend. 367; 10 Ib. 75; 2 Mass. 45; 8 Ib. 35. We are, therefore, of the opinion the court of common pleas erred in admitting the transcript in evidence.

Judgment reversed.  