
    Nelson F. Kyle vs. Alexander W. Stinson.
    The circuit courts have a discretionary power in the allowance of parties to give security for costs after the expiration of the sixty days allowed them on the motion for such security ; it will not therefore be error for the circuit court, at the term succeeding that in which the sixty-day rule was taken, to permit the plaintiff to give the security, although he allowed the sixty days to elapse without doing it; such permission is in conformity with the object and spirit of the law.
    Ín error from the circuit court of Monroe county; Hon. Francis M. Rogers, judge.
    The opinion states the facts.
    
      Coopwood, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Davis, for defendant in error,
    Insisted, 1. That the whole subject was in the discretion of the court below, and could not be revised. 2. If revised, the discretion was properly exercised.
   Mr. Justice Smith

delivered the opinion of the court.

The only question in this case arises on the motion of the de'fendant in the court below to compel Stinson, the defendant in error, to give security for the costs of the suit.

The motion was predicated on the provision of the statute in regard to actions at law commenced in the name of any person not a resident of this state.

At the return term of the writ in this case, the sixty-day rule was taken against the plaintiff, who failed to give the security required. At the succeeding term, the defendant entered his motion to dismiss the cause, on the ground of this failure; which motion was overruled, the plaintiff tendering the requisite security.

In this there was no error. The object of the statute was to secure the payment of the Costs which might be adjudged to the defendant, in case the plaintiff failed to obtain judgment, and the fees which were or might become due to the officers of court. In this, as in all similar cases, the circuit courts are vested with a discretionary authority. The purpose of the statute was fully attained by the giving of the security, and that discretion was properly exercised in disallowing-the-motion, and permitting the security to be given.

Judgment affirmed.  