
    ANDREW J. MATTHEWS AND THOMAS GUNN v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [32 C. Cls. R., 123; 173 U. S. R., 381.]
    
      On the defendants’ Appeal.
    
    Deputy marshals seet to recover a reward of $500, offered for the arrest of one McNeil for violating the revenue laws in Florida.
    The court below decides:
    1. The pay of United States deputy marshals is not fixed hy law, nor are they paid out of the Treasury of the United States for services.
    2. A deputy marshal is not an officer “or any other pei'son whose salary,pay, or emoluments are fixed 6y law or regulation,” as provided in Revised Statutes, § 1765; nor is he a civil officer receiving “a salary and compensation allowed l>y law,” as provided by the Act June 20,1874 (18 Stat. L., 109).
    
      3. The purpose of section 1765 and of the act 20th June, 1874, was that officers receiving a salary or compensation allowed by law should not receive other compensation, except as stated in the several acts not applicable to this case.
    4. The payment of a reward to an officer for services within the scope of his official duties is contrary to public policy.
    5. Under the common law “hue and cry” could he raised by any private citizen, and a constable and his attendants had the same power, protection, and indemnification as if acting under the warrant of a justice of the peace.
    6. All duties devolving on a deputy must be x>erformed in the name of his principal; he has no official character.
    7. A deputy is not the prescribed official agency for making arrests. His actions depend not on the law, but on his employer.
    8. Where a reward is offered in general terms for the arrest of an offender and the arrest is made by a regularly appointed deputy, assisted by a special deputy for the purpose, they are properly joined as claimants and are entitled to the reward.
   The decision of the court below is affirmed, though on somewhat different grounds.

The opinion of the Supreme Court was delivered by Mr. Justice White March 6,1899.

Mr. Justice Brown read an opinion concurring in the result only.

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Peckham: dissented.  