
    Isaac Walker et al., Respondents, v. William C. Beecher, Appellant. (Two Cases.)
    (New York Common Pleas—Additional General Term,
    December, 1895.)
    1. Insurance — Metropolitan Lloyds—Notice op loss.
    The provision of the policy issued by the Metropolitan Lloyds requiring notice and proofs of loss to be served on the attorneys of the underwriters, and stating that the phrase “ attorneys of the underwriters” shall be held to mean their attorneys in fact, “to wit, Beecher & Co.,” is intended to mean that such service is to be made on the attorney in fact, or agent,'of the' underwriters, and not to require that 'it he made on the particular firm named in all events, and even though their agency might be renounced or revoked.
    S. Same—Estoppel.
    An underwriter who withdraws from the Metropolitan Lloyds without ndtice to one who has dealt with him while the connection lasted is estopped from claiming that its agent did not represent him, and that the proofs of loss were not received by any one having authority to represent him.
    Appeals from judgments rendered in the First District Court by the justice without a jury.
    
      W. C. Beecher, in person.
    
      Blumenstiel & Hirsch, for respondents.
   Bookstaver, J.

These are appeals from judgments against the defendant as an underwriter upon two fire insurance policies issued respectively, as appears in the caption of the policies and from the testimony, at Metropolitan Lloyds and at Union Lloyds of New York city. The cause's of action are similar in all respects, and, by stipulation, the testimony, exhibits and all evidence in action No. 1 are to be considered as taken in action No. 2, subject to all exceptions, save that the policies and proofs of loss differ in dates and, amounts. The questions raised are the same, and both appeals are argued ■upon the same brief. The particular facts of the Metropolitan Lloyds policy are made the basis of the opinion, which is, however, equally applicable to the essential facts of both cases.

The appellant’s position, that the action was not properly brought against him asdefendant in the first instance, is' untenable,- as decided by this coiirt. in Knorr v. Bates, 12 Misc. Rep. 395.

This substantially leaves but one- question to be decided; viz.: Whether .the notice and "proofs of loss were properly served. . The policy provides that if fire occur the insured shall give immediate notice of any loss thereby, in writing, to the attorneys of the underwriters,” and. also provides that “ various written statements in proof of the loss shall be rendered to the attorneys of the underwriters.” It further provides that wherever the phrase ‘ attorneys of the underwriters ’ .occurs, it shall be held to mean their attorneys.in fact," to wit, Beecher & Co.” . -

The notice and proofs of loss were sent to Edwards & Co., - who, at the time of the fire and subsequently, were the attorneys in fact of the Metropolitan Lloyds, having offices at the same address. -.There was evidence that this change -of attorneys was well known among insurance men from notices in the newspapers and from the circulars that had- been sent out by Edwards & Co., announcing their succession'to Beecher & Co. as attorneys and managers of that insurance company. •

The appellant claims, however, that he is -not- liable because of th.e-plaintiff’s failure to send the notice and proofs to Beecher & Co. in strict compliance with the provisions of the insurance contract. I think this construction of .the clause above quoted is, in view of the facts, unwarranted. The meaning is that attorneys should be understood not as "legal counselors, but as the attorneys'in- fact, or the agents, of the-underwriters; and the addition “ to wit, Beecher & Co.,” was used to make the intent more unmistakable by designating the. then holders of the office, and not to require that service-should be made upon that particular firm in .all.events, and' even although they might renounce their agency or their principals might, revoke the same.

The fact that tile group of underwriters, of .which the defendant was one, withdrew from the Metropolitan Lloyds at the time Edwards & Co. succeeded Beecher & Oo. as managers, and the consequent fact that, the latter company never actually represented the defendant, is, therefore, immaterial, or rather the defendant is estopped from showing it for the purpose of escaping liability. Having withdrawn from the. Metropolitan Lloyds without notice to the plaintiff, who had dealt with him whilé the connection existed, and who, in reliance upon the continuance of that connection, had sent proofs, of loss to the attorneys in fact of the Metropolitan Lloyds, the defendant cannot now be heard to say that neither he nor anyone having authority- to represent him: ever received those proofs. The principles applicable to the retirement of a partner without notice to those having dealt with the firm are- not without analogy to this case.

The above view of the sufficiency of the service of the notice and the proofs of loss renders it unnecessary to discuss the alleged errors in the admission of evidence.

Judgments affirmed, with costs.

Bisohoff, J., concurs.

Judgments affirmed, with costs.  