
    Bruce MINGO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rick RAEMISCH; Cynthia Coffman, Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 16-1115
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    FILED July 14, 2016
    (D.C. No. l:14-CV-03282-RBJ), (D. Colorado)
    Bruce Mingo, Ordway, CO, Pro Se.
    Ryan Crane, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Denver, CO, for Respondents-Appellees.
    Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Nancy L. Moritz, Circuit Judge

Bruce Mingo, a Colorado state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) so he can appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application for habeas relief. We deny his request for a COA and dismiss this matter.

A jury convicted Mingo of first-degree murder, and the state trial court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed Mingo’s conviction and sentence, on direct appeal, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari. The state district court denied Mingo’s motion for postconviction relief under Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c), the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, 'and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari. Mingo then applied for § 2254 habeas relief. The district court denied Mingo’s habeas application and also denied Mingo’s requests for a COA.

Mingo now asks us to issue a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). But we can do so only if Mingo makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). This means Mingo must “show[] that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner , or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Mingo asserts three claims: (1) his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in several respects violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, (2) the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process when the trial judge offered inducements to the chief prosecution witness, and (3) the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process when the trial judge failed to ensure that Mingo knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to testify.

The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected each of these claims on the merits when it affirmed the state district court’s denial of Mingo’s motion for postconviction relief. Thus, Mingo had to demonstrate to the district court that the Court of Appeals’ rejection of these claims was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)-(2). In its 74-page order denying Mingo’s habeas application, the district court thoroughly considered the Court of Appeals’ treatment of each of Mingo’s claims and determined Mingo wasn’t entitled to habeas relief.

We have reviewed Mingo’s combined opening brief and COA application, the appellate record, the Colorado Court of Appeals’ decision, the district court’s order denying habeas relief, and the applicable law. Based on this review, we conclude Mingo hasn’t demonstrated that reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of the district court’s resolution of his habeas application. Thus, we deny Mingo’s request for a COA and dismiss this matter. 
      
       This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
     
      
      . Because Mingo appears pro se, we liberally construe his combined opening brief and COA application. Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009). But we don't assume the role, of his advocate. Id.
      
     
      
      . Mingo asserted a fourth claim in his habeas petition—that the State violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights when it failed to consider certain evidence in postconviction proceedings. The district court determined that claim wasn’t cognizable in a federal habeas action. Mingo doesn't challenge that determination or reassert the fourth claim in his combined opening brief and COA application.
     