
    The People ex rel. The Peerless Manufacturing Co., Resp’t, v. Patrick J. Gleason, Mayor of Long Island City, App’lt.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,
    
    
      Filed February 10, 1890.)
    
    Municipal corporations—Mandamus.
    Where the common council of Long Island City overrules the veto of the mayor to a resolution awarding a contract, which is performed, such action of the common council binds the city, and mandamus will lie to compel the mayor to sign the warrant for the discharge of the indebtedness.
    Appeal from order allowing peremptory writ of mandamus. After advertisement for proposals and receipt of bids, the common council, by resolution, directed a contract with the relator, whose bid was accepted
    This resolution the mayor vetoed and the common council unanimously passed the same over the veto. (The common council is composed of seven aldermen. See chap. 100 of Laws of 1879.)
    Upon the refusal of the mayor to enter into formal contract with the relator, the common council directed the city clerk to execute the same in behalf of the city, and directed him or the-chief engineer to receive the fire hose contracted for and distribute the same among the several fire companies.
    The contract having been fulfilled by the delivery of the hose, the common council audited and allowed to the relator the price of the same under the contract, and directed the mayor to issue his warrant upon the treasurer for the payment of the amount.
    This the mayor also vetoed (unauthorizedly), and the common council unanimously passed the same over the veto.
    Upon the application for an alternative writ of mandamus, the court at special term decided that an alternative writ was unnecessary, and directed a peremptory writ
    
      W. J. Foster, for app’lt; A. T. Payne, for resp’t.
   Dykman, J.

This appeal is entirely destitute of merit. The common council of Long Island City is the controlling, governing power of the city. The mayor is in possession of the veto power, but the common council may overrule the veto and objection of the mayor, and pass a resolution and make a contract notwithstanding such veto. That was done in this case, and the action of the common council concluded and bound the city, and it was the duty of the mayor to sign the warrant for the discharge of the indebtedness.

The order should be affirmed, with costs and disbursements.

Pratt, J., concurs.  