
    Paula Arnson, Appellant, against Max Abrahamson et al., Impleaded with Wolf Gekowsky, Respondents.
    (Decided April 7th, 1890.)
    It is no defense to an action against an indorser of a promissory note that the maker’s or prior indorser’s signature is a forgery, for he impliedly warrants the genuineness of such signatures.
    Appeal from a judgment of the District Court in the City of New York for the Fourth Judicial District.
    The facts are stated in the opinion.
    
      A. JET. Sarahson, for appellant.
   Larremore, Ch. J.

This was an action brought upon a promissory note against the defendant Gekowsky, the maker, and the defendants Max Abrahamson and Nathan Storm, two indorsers upon the note. It was insisted, as a defense that the note was a forgery; upon which an issue was -framed and tried, and a verdict rendered in favor of the defendants. The indorsers claimed that they were discharged from liability on account of said alleged forgery.

It is a well settled legal principle that an indorser impliedly warrants that the instrument is not forged; and if it is he is liable upon this warranty; he cannot question the signature of the maker or previous indorser, or take advantage of the fact that the signatures of the maker or previous indorser were forged (Turner v. Keller, 66 N. Y. 66; Herrick v. Whitney, 15 Johns. 240 ; Shaver v. Ehle, 16 Johns. 201; Morrison v. Curry, 4 Duer 79). The acceptor of a bill is presumed to know the signature of the drawer; and if the bill is accepted upon the faith of his indorsement he is liable to a bona fide indorsee or holder for value, even though the bill proves to be a forgery (National Park Bank v. Ninth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 77; Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 N. Y. 230. See also Coggill v. American Exch. Bank, 1 N. Y. 113.)

It has been decided that where a note is indorsed for the accommodation of the maker or payee and is negotiated to a third person who pays value for it, the party receiving it and who pays value, is entitled to recover upon it against such indorser notwithstanding the purchaser took it with full knowledge, that it was accommodation paper (Ross v. Bedell, 5 Duer 462; Grant v. Ellicott, 7 Wend. 227; Commercial Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill 501).

This case comes within the rule of Fassin v. Hubbard (55 N. Y. 465), as there was no limitation of the indorsers’ liability upon the contract.

The judgment appealed from should be reversed as to the defendants Max Abrahamson and Nathan Storm ; and judgment should be ordered against them in favor of the plaintiff, with costs.

Bischoff, J., concurred.

Judgment accordingly.  