
    Maurice Branch v. Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc., et al.
    Maltbie, C. J., Brown, Jennings, Ells and Dickenson, Js.
    Argued December 3, 1947
    decided January 9, 1948
    
      
      Julius B. Schatz, with, whom were Joseph P. Kenny and, on the brief, Arthur D. Weinstein, for the appellants (defendants).
    
      Dennis P. O’Connor, with whom was John W. Joy, for the appellee (plaintiff).
   Jennings, J.

The plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck at an intersection in Hartford by the truck of the named defendant, driven by the other defendant, its agent Raymond Audet, hereinafter referred to as the defendant. The defendants have appealed from the denial of their motion to set aside the plaintiff’s verdict and from the judgment.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts: Asylum Street in Hartford is one way for westerly traffic and thirty-two feet wide. Ann Street is forty feet wide and intersects Asylum Street at right angles. There was a bus station at the northeast corner. At the time of the accident the only ears definitely placed a.t the scene were a Greyhound bus parked on the north side of Asylum Street, its front even with the east curb of Ann Street, and the truck driven by the defendant. The date was July 29,1945, the time 2:30 a.m. and the weather rainy.

The defendant drove a small truck west on Asylum Street at a fast rate of speed and turned right on Ann Street. The plaintiff had been driven to Ann Street by Charles Walker, who parked on the west side of Ann north of Asylum. The plaintiff got out of the car, took his wife’s bag from the trunk, walked on Ann Street to the corner of Asylum and stopped. The traffic lights were blinking yellow. He then started east to cross to the station where his wife was preparing to take a bus. He was struck on the crosswalk about six or seven feet from tbe east curb as the truck rounded tbe bus and turned into Ann Street. He did not see tbe truck before it bit bim.

This situation creates a typical jury case on liability. From tbe respective positions of tbe parties just before the impact, tbe bus may well have prevented tbe plaintiff from seeing tbe lights of tbe truck, and even if be bad be might not have anticipated tbe turn into Ann Street. Precedent is of little assistance in such cases since each must be decided on its own facts. Lutzen v. Henry Jenkins Transportation Co., 133 Conn. 669, 672, 54 A. 2d 267; see also tbe following illustrative cases: Russell v. Vergason, 95 Conn. 431, 434, 111 A. 625; Perry v. Haritos, 100 Conn. 476, 479, 124 A. 44; Skidmore v. Dann, 102 Conn. 756, 129 A. 640; Sinkus v. Stein, 112 Conn. 677, 152 A. 135; Nevulis v. Wentland, 124 Conn. 116, 118, 197 A. 883.

It was undisputed that tbe plaintiff’s principal injury was a comminuted fracture of tbe tibia extending into tbe knee joint and causing bemartbrosis. He was hospitalized for over one month, was out of work nearly a year and a half and incurred bills, not including bis loss of wages, of $855. His wages before tbe injury were $44 a week when be worked five days and $53 when be worked six days. The jury reasonably could have found that tbe condition of his knee has prevented bim from getting steady work and that be has a permanent disability there of 25 per cent. Tbe verdict of $7500 was not excessive. Other cases are not particularly helpful, but Briggs v. Becker, 101 Conn. 62, 124 A. 826, is strikingly similar as to tbe character of tbe injury, tbe permanent disability and the damages awarded. There was no error in tbe denial of tbe motion to set tbe verdict aside.

The statement of facts is sufficient to test the charge. Charles Walker, who drove the plaintiff to Ann Street, did not testify. The plaintiff said that he did not see Walker after he left the car, nor does it appear that Walker even saw the accident. Be that as it may, the plaintiff gave the defendants Walker’s address in his statement to their investigator so that he was equally available to them. Under such circumstances the court was not required to comply with the defendants’ request that it charge that Walker’s testimony, if produced, would be antagonistic to the plaintiff’s claims. Fierberg v. Whitcomb, 119 Conn. 390, 397, 177 A. 135.

At the close of the charge, the defendants excepted on the ground that the court should have commented on the fact that a witness testified that the truck was going fast. The court might well have complied but its failure to do so was not error. “It is not incumbent upon a court to define words in ordinary use when used in their ordinary sense.” State v. Enanno, 96 Conn. 420, 427, 114 A. 386; Conn. App. Proc. § 50. The charge adequately covered the defendants’ remaining requests insofar as they were entitled to them. The reason for the objection to the plaintiff’s testimony with reference to his earnings was not given nor is it apparent.

There is no error.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.  