
    In re GRAY.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
    November 5, 1915.)
    Attorney and Client <@=»58—Misconduct—Penalty.
    Where an attorney, who received money in settlement of his client’s claim, of which he was entitled to one-half as a fee, converted the entire amount to his own use, but made restitution and frankly admitted his fault, his punishment will be limited to censure.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. §§ 76-78; Dec. Dig. <§=>58.]
    <§c^>For other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered. Digests & Indexes
    Proceeding by the Association of the Bar against James A. Gray, an attorney and counselor at law, for professional misconduct. Respondent censured.
    See, also, 160 App. Div. 929, 145 N. Y. Supp; 1125.
    Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J„ and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGH-LIN, CLARKE, and SCOTT, JJ.
    Einar Chrystie, of New York City (Charles O. Maas, of New York City, of counsel), for petitioner.
   PER CURIAM.

The respondent, a lawyer of mature age, who has been a member of the bar for over 20 years, is charged by the Association of the Bar with professional misconduct. The facts are undisput-. ed, and are as follows:

In October, 1912, the firm of Gray & Gray, composed of respondent and his son, were retained by Miss Sonia Bertin, otherwise known as Mrs. Sarah Saltzman, to prosecute a claim against the Pullman Car Company and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company for damages for an assault. On August 18, 1913, the respondent, as one of the attorneys for Mrs. Saltzman, received from the Pullman Car Company $500 in settlement of the aforesaid claim for damages. Under his agreement with his client he was entitled to retain one-half of the recovery. The check for $500 he caused to be cashed, and retained and used the whole amount for his own purposes until the day he was served with the affidavit of his client and a letter from the attorney for the Association of the .Bar, which was October 30, 1913.

The respondent frankly concedes that his conduct was improper, but he alleges that he could at any time have raised, by borrowing, the money necessary to pay his client what was due her. The respondent’s frankness in acknowledging his error, without any such attempt as we too often meet in these cases to offer false excuses commends him to our favorable consideration. At the same time such grave misconduct as the conversion to his own use of his client’s money cannot be entirely overlooked.

The respondent is severely censured for his unprofessional conduct.  