
    Grand Gulf Bank vs. Curtis Wood et al.
    While it has been held, that the trustees appointed under the act of 1843, to take charge of the assets of dissolved corporations, may revive suits pending in the name of the corporation at the time of its dissolution, in their own name, the legal title being cast on them by their appointment; yet where a bank, previous to proceedings against it for a forfeiture under that act, had by deed of assignment transferred its notes and other choses in action to assignees for the benefit of creditors, suits at law upon such assigned notes, in the name of the bank, pending at the time the judgment of forfeiture is rendered against the bank, cannot be revived in the name of the trustee of such bank appointed under the law ; as that trustee has neither a legal nor an equitable interest in these notes.
    A suit cannot be revived by any species of amendment in the name of persons having no interest whatsoever in the matter in litigation.
    A deed of assignment, by which notes, bills receivable, and other choses in action, are assigned, passes but the equitable interest to the assignee, and is equivalent to transfer by delivery.
    In error from the circuit court of Claiborne county; Hon. Stanhope Posey, judge.
    On the 16th of October, 1840, the president and directors of the Grand Gulf Rail Road and Banking Company brought suit in the circuit court of Claiborne county against Curtis Wood and William H. Hamer, on a note dated March 29, 1838, for $6160, due four months after date, for money loaned Wood. Pleas were filed and issue joined.
    At the April term, 1848, the defendants made a motion that the suit be abated, and at the same time Alfred Ingraham and George Read moved to revive the suit in the name of Ephraim A. McLean, William M. Randolph, and David M. Massie, for the use of said Ingraham and Read. The court overruled the motion of Ingraham and Read, and sustained the motion of the defendants, and ordered the suit to be abated, to which judgment Ingraham and Read filed a bill of exceptions; from which it appears that on the hearing of the two motions, it was agreed that the plaintiff, by a deed of assignment executed the 31st of December, 1842, transferred with the great mass of its effects, the note which is sued on in this case to said Ingraham and Read. That at April term, 1846, of Claiborne circuit court, judgment of ouster from all its corporate franchises was rendered against the plaintiff, and McLean, Randolph and Massie appointed trustees of said bank; from which judgment the plaintiff appealed; and on the trial of the appeal in the high court of errors and appeals at January term, 1848, it was adjudged that the judgment of the circuit court of Claiborne county, so far as it related to the forfeiture of charter by the plaintiff, should be affirmed; but that the judgment of said circuit court, so far as it related to the property vested in the trustees appointed by said circuit court, should be reversed ; and it was by said high court adjudged that said trustees should only take into possession such property, effects, dioses in action, bills receivable, &c. which were not previous to said judgment assigned by said president and directors of the Grand Gulf Rail Road and Banking Company to Ingraham and Read.
    Ingraham and Read sued out this writ of error.
    
      Jas. H. Maury, for plaintiff in error,
    Cited Baldwin v. Payne, 6 How. S. C. Rep. 301; How. & Hutch. 585; 6 S. & M. 528; Commercial Bank of Natchez v. Chambers, 8 lb. 17; 5 Yerg. 280; 6 lb. 493; 11 Wheat. 280; 7 Mass. 291; 1 Pick. 224 ; 18 lb. 257; 4 S. & M. 357; Dent v. Coleman, 10 S. & M. 83; and argued at length upon the right to revive, in the name of the trustees of the bank, under the law for the benefit of the assignees.
    
      H. T. Ellett, for defendants in error,
    Argued contra, and cited 6 S. & M. 613; Commercial Bank of Natchez v. Chambers, 8 S. & M. 43-51; Act of 1843, p. 55, sec. S; 6 S. & M. 530; 10 lb. 428; 3 Bos. & Pull. 40; 3 East, 317; l.Chit. PL 10; 2 How. (Miss.) R. 647; 9 S. & M. 510; Planters' Bank v. Sharp K 4 S. & M. 25, per Sharkey, C. J.; 4 Yerg. 202; 5 lb. 320; 4 Mass. 611-613; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. 392, § 1056, 1057, 1057a.
   Mr. Justice Thacker

delivered the opinion of the court.

In 1840, the Grand Gulf Bank instituted a suit upon a promissory note against Wood and another. In 1842, the bank by deed assigned the promissory,note upon which the action was founded, together with other of its assets and effects, to Ingra-ham and Read, or their survivor. In 1846, a judgment of ouster of the corporate franchises of the bank was rendered in the circuit court of Claiborne county, and McLean, Randolph and Massie appointed its trustees under the statute. In 1848, this judgment was amended in this court so “as to embrace only the property, estate and effects of the bank, not contained in the deed of assignment.” Grand Gulf Bank v. The State, 10 S. & M. 428. Subsequently to this amended judgment, and in 1848, the defendants in this cause entered their motion in the circuit court of Claiborne county that the suit be abated, and concurrently, Ingraham and Read moved that court to revive the suit in the name of McLean, Randolph and Massie, for the use of said Ingraham and Read. The latter motion was overruled, and the former sustained by the circuit court.

It has been held in this court, that upon a general judgment of forfeiture of the franchises of a corporation under the statute of 1843, in such case provided, suits theretofore instituted by the corporation dissolved may be revived in the names of the trustees appointed by the court upon the rendition of such judgment. This has been put upon the ground that the trustees take a legal interest in the assets of the dissolved corporation by operation of law. But by the judgment rendered against the Grand Gulf Bank, the assets of that corporation which had been previously made over and assigned by the bank to assignees, including the promissory note upon which this action was founded, were expressly excepted from the operation and effect of the judgment. These assignees took the equitable interest in the note, as the deed of assignment was equivalent to transfer by delivery. The trustees, therefore, appointed under the judgment against this corporation, took no interest either legal or beneficial in the note sued upon, and hence were not entitled to be made parties. There is no doctrine of amendments in this court or elsewhere, that we are informed, which does authorize a suit to be revived in the name of persons having no interest whatsoever in the matter in litigation.

It is unnecessary in this case to consider the point raised under the statute of 1846, as to whether trustees appointed upon a judgment of forfeiture against a corporation by virtue of that statute, are permitted to prosecute suits for the recovery of the assets of such dissolved corporations.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.  