
    Isaac Pierce versus Elisha Woodward.
    Where the defendant sold the plaintiff a grocery store for a sum of money stated in the deed, and agreed verbally not to carry on the same kind of business within a certain distance, it was held to be a sufficient consideration for this agreement, that the plaintiff was thereby induced to make the purchase, if eld also, that such agreement was consistent with the deed and did not relate to the conveyance of land, and so might be proved by paroi evidence.
    The jury may be asked by the judge upon what grounds they have returned their verdict, and if by their answer it appears that they have proceeded upon an erroneous principle, the verdict may be set aside.
    This was an action upon a paroi contract, not to set up the ousiness of a grocer within a certain limited distance in the city of Boston.
    At the trial, before the Chief Justice, it appeared in evidence, that the plaintiff had purchased of the defendant a parcel of land, with a store and dwellinghouse upon it, in Hanover street, the consideration expressed in the deed being 2500 dollars, which sum was paid. There was much paroi evidence tending to prove that a principal inducement for the plaintiff to purchase, was the succeeding to the business which had been carried on in the same store by the defendant; and it was proved to the satisfaction of the jury, that in order to induce the plaintiff to purchase, the defendant agreed not to engage in the same business within the limits alleged. This paroi evidence was objected to as being inconsistent with the terms of the deed, and as relating to the conveyance of land.
    It was proved that soon after the plaintiff had made the purchase, the defendant did openly carry on the same business in a store nearly opposite in the same street, within the limits described.
    It was contended by the plaintiff, that 500 dollars of the purchase money was given for the agreement not to carry on the business as before stated, but there was contradictory evidence as to this, and it was not considered as proved.
    The jury found for the plaintiff and gave 100 dollars in damages. The defendant insisted that they ought not to give damages for the injury except for the time between the defendant’s setting up the business and the commencement of the action ; and they were so instructed ; but on inquiry upon w^at principle they proceeded, the foreman stated that they could not ascertain the damages for that precise time, it being very difficult to get at a knowledge of the degree of injury done, and that they gave the sum of 100 dollars, upon an expectation that it would settle the whole matter, and that no other suit would be commenced.
    
      March 31st.
    
    
      April 5th.
    
    The defendant moved for a new trial, because the jury computed damages for the time subsequent to the commencement of the action, intending that their verdict should be in full for the plaintiff’s claim for damages for the breach f the contract.
    
      Morse supported the motion.
    He also objected that the verbal contract was invalid, being in restraint of trade and not founded upon a valuable consideration. Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. R. 223; Perkins v. Lyman, 9 Mass. R. 522; Palmer v. Stebbins, 3 Pick. 188. As to the inadmissibility of the paroi evidence, he cited 3 Dane’s Abr. 500, § 40 ; 3 Stark. Ev. 1004 ; Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 283 ; Meres v. Jlnsell, 3 Wils. 275.
    S. D. Parker, for the plaintiff,
    to show that the paroi evidence was rightly admitted, cited 3 Stark. Ev. 1048 ; The King v. Scammonden, 3 T. R. 474 ; The King v. Laindon, 8 T. R. 379 ; Jeffreys v. Walton, l Stark. R. 267 ; Shephard v. Little, 14 Johns. R. 210. To show that after a verdict has been recorded, the declaration of a juror should not be received to impeach it, Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. R. 358 ; Grinnell v. Phillips, 1 Mass. R. 542 (2d ed.) note.
    
      Morse, in reply,
    said the inquiry made of the jury was proper, inasmuch as the object was not to prove misbehaviour, but merely that they had proceeded upon an erroneous principle.
   Per Curiam.

Though the verbal contract, upon which this action is brought, was not a specific part of the bargain for the land, and did not affect the price, yet it appears that it was an inducement for the plaintiff to make the purchase ; it is then founded upon a sufficient consideration. The defendant objects that it is illegal, being in restraint of trade ; but such agreements, where the restriction is confined to small limits, are not against the policy of the law. The admission of paroi evidence to prove the contract was likewise objected to, but we do not consider the evidence as inconsistent with the deed or as affecting the conveyance of real estate.

A new trial must however be granted, because the jury, in assess,g damages, did not confine themselves to the' period before the action was commenced. It is said that we cannot interfere with the verdict, upon the declarations of jurors in regard to their proceedings, but that the evidence should come aliunde. The Court are not disposed to disturb verdicts by making unnecessary inquiries, but where the judge is surprised by the verdict, it is not unusual to ask the jury upon what principle it was found. Here the principle upon which they proceeded was incorrect.

New trial granted. 
      
       See 1 Story’s Comm. Eq. 289, 290; Palmer v. Stebbins, 3 Pick. (2nd ed.) 193, note 1, and cases there cited; Mger v. Thacker, decided in Suffolk, March term 1837; Nobles v. Bates, 7 Cowen, 307; Pyke v. Thomas, 4 Bibo, 486.
     
      
       See Powers v. Ware, 4 Pick. (2nd ed.) 107, note 1.
     
      
      
         See Dorr v. Fenno, 12 Pick. 526; Parrott v Thacker, 9 Pick. 426; State v Hascall, 6 N. Hampsh. it. 361; Hix v. Drury, 5 Pick. (2nd ed.) 302, note 1.
     