
    Blakely against Bradford
    A magistrate has iu* right, under the sure of assembly, to issue an attachment against the goods, See. of a person,who, at the time of issuing it, is actually out of the state ; Imt only again SC the goods, of those who are in trail-aitu9 or in the act of ltimoving.
    THIS case was, that the defendant, who was a cabinetmaker in Charleston, and carried on an extensive trade in that line, had gone to Philadelphia to engage journeymen. While he was absent, Blakely, the plaintiff, applied to a magistrate, and obtained from him a writ of attachment, under the act of 1788, amending the attachment law; and by virtue thereof, had attached goods and wares to a large amount, and by that means, had drawn upon the defendant divers other creditors, who otherwise would have waited till his return.
    
      Taylor now moved to have this attachment quashed, on two grounds : First, because the clause in the county court act to which the law of 1788 refers, and which gives juris•diction to magistrates to issue attachments, is confined to persons in transitu, and does not extend to those who had previously left the state. Secondly, because it was signed by a magistrate, and tested by the Chief Justice, which he alleged was irregular ; as no writ could be tested by the Chief Justice, unless under the seal of the court.
   The Court,

however, waived going into the irregularity of the attachment; but took it upon the first ground, and were clearly of opinion, that the proceedings ought to be quashed; because, the clause in the county court act, ob« viously related to those only who were in the act of remo- . J J ving, or who concealed themselves ; and did not extend to those who had notoriously left the state previous to the issuing of the attachment; and that the very intention of this clause was to give the party speedy relief, where the defendant -was going off and had not time for obtaining the ordinary process of law. That this power was a deviation from the common law, and in derogation of the powers vested in the court of common pleas, given to a single jus» tice of the peace. And that in cases where new and ex», traordinary powers are given to justices of the peace, they shall be strictly construed to be applicable only to the cases specially mentioned.  