
    SHAN LANG YAU, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-4013-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 9, 2009.
    
      Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Michael F. Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Anh-Thu P. Mai-Windle, Senior Litigation Counsel; Lynda A. Do, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, JON O. NEWMAN and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Shan Lang Yau, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 28, 2008 order of the BIA, affirming the April ,4, 2007 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Noel A. Ferris, which denied his motion to reopen. In re Shan Lang Yau, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 28, 2008), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 4, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

When the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ and supplements the IJ’s decision, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). Where the agency considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008). We find that the agency did not err in denying Yau’s untimely motion to reopen.

Yau argues that the agency erred by relying on its precedential decisions to summarily conclude that he failed to demonstrate either material changed country conditions sufficient to excuse the time limitation for filing his motion to reopen or his prima facie eligibility for relief. However, these arguments fail where we have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no error in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish material changed country conditions or an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. See id. at 169-72 (noting that “[w]e do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the agency”); see also Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as “the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”). Further, there is nothing in the agency’s decisions compelling the conclusion that it failed to take into account all of Yau’s evidence as we “presume that [the agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.” See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006).

Yau also asserts that the agency erred in failing to consider whether the U.S. Department of State’s 2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices indicated that he would be subject to excessive fines amounting to persecution. However, that report does not indicate that such fines constitute changed country conditions or that they would amount to economic persecution to someone in Yau’s economic circumstances. See Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir.2002).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).  