
    John Aldridge vursus Peter G. Stuyvesant.
    Oct. Term, 1828.
    An action lies in favour of a landlord, against any person, who so wrongfully and maliciously disturbs his tenants, that they abandon his premises, and the landlord thereby loses his rent.
    The declaration in this case set forth, that the plaintiff was possessed of the unexpired term of a house, which he demised to certain'jpersons, who entered, and were in the quiet possession of the same. That the defendant, knowing^ that they rightfully held possession as tenants of the the plaintiff, and wrongfully and maliciously intending to injure him, “ so disturbed his said tenants” that they were obliged to abandon the premises: whereby the plaintiff lost his rent, and the premises became injured for the want of occupation.
    Upon demurrer to this declaration it was held, that the plaintiff wasfen titled to judgment.
    This was a special action on the case for disturbing the plaintiff’s tenants.
    The declaration contained three counts. The first set forth, that the plaintiff was possessed of an unexpired term of a house in the city of New-York, which he had rented to certain tenants for one year. That the tenants entered upon the premises, and were in the quiet possession thereof; when the defendant well knowing that they rightfully held and enjoyed the same as tenants, but contriving wrongfully and maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff, came to the premises and threatened the said tenants and their families, that he would levy and seise their goods. By means of which wrongful and malicious threats the defendant coerced said tenants to remove from the premises; thereby causing the plaintiff to lose his tenants, and the premises to remain vacant and unproductive for the space of eleven months : during all which time the plaintiff lost the rents and profits of said house and premises.
    The second count set forth, the possession of the term by the plaintiff, and the letting of the premises to tenants, as in the first count. That the defendant, knowing that the premises were rightfully held and enjoyed by the tenants, but maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff, threatened said tenants, that he would levy and seize their goods, « unless they loould move out of 
      
      said house and depart therefrom.” By which threats the defendant caused the tenants to abandon the premises, whereby the plaintiff lost the rents, which he otherwise would have received from his said tenants, was unable to procure other tenants, and the premises " became greatly dilapidated by reason of their untenanted state,” 8ic.
    
    The third count stated the possession and letting of the premises, as in the preceding counts, and that the defendant contriving and wrongfully intending to injure the plaintiff, to deprive him of his tenants, and prevent the occupation of his house, “ so disturbed his said tenants” “ that by the mere force of such disturbance, they were obliged by the defendant to abandon the premises. By means of which disturbance, the plantifflost his tenants, his rent, &c. and the premises became greatly injured fot the want of occupation.
    To this declaration, the defendant demurred generally.
    
      Mr. Jay, for the defendant, and in support of the demurrer.
    This is an action brought by a landlord against a stranger, for disturbing his tenant, and the question is, whether it can be sustained 1
    
    No precedent for such a case can be found and it is very doubtful whether the action can be supported by any principles of law. To lay the foundation of such an action, there must be “ damnum et injuria,” and the only ground upon which it can be sustained in the present case, is the injury to the plaintiff arising from the loss of his tenants.
    Now, the tenants could not have been lost, for the relation of landlord and tenant, existing between them and the plaintiff could not be dissolved by the act of the defendant; but they continued to be tenants of the plaintiffs, as much, after leaving the premises as before. They remained liable upon their agreement after their departure, and the conduct of the defendant would have formed no defence to an action brought against the tenants by the plaintiff to recover the rent.
    The only authority which has any bearing upon this subject, is in Rolle’s Abridgment, (p. 108,) where it is said, that "if a man, menace my tenants, by which they depart from their tenures, an action upon the case lies.” Upon referring to the Year Book, [9 Hen, VII, p. 8.] it will be found that the tenants spoken of were tenants at will; and the injury to the plaintiff consisted, not in threatening the tenants, but in causing them to depart from their tenures. But that case cannot support the present, because the tenants here, being tenants for years, cannot “ depart from their tenures :” they remain bound by their contract with the landlord, and he has a perfect remedy to enforce a performance of the contract.
    II. The rent from the tenants to the plaintiff could not have been lost by any act of the defendant, because it was not due at the time of the disturbance, and there is no averment in the declaration, that the tenants were rendered unable to pay then rent. Neither is there any thing to show that the plaintiff could not have enforced his rights by distress. The action lies in favour of the tenant, rather than the landlord; for all the injury in the case falls upon the tenant, and the declaration alleges, that the wrong was done to him.
    If the reversion were injured by the acts of the defendant, then the plaintiff might sustain an action ; for the wrong, in that case, would be done to the landlord; but there, the injury comes merely by remote consequence, and if the action can be sustained, there may be a double satisfaction, or a double punishment rather, for the same injury. Extend the principle a little, and the consequences of sustaining this action will at once be perceived. Suppose a tenant puts his rent into his pocket, to carry it to his landlord, and on his way is met by his enemy, beaten, and so much injured, that the landlord is, by that means, for a long time kept out of his money : would an action lie in favour of the landlord against the wrong-doer, to recover damages for the remote injury received by him, in consequence of the immediate wrong done to the tenant 1 So in this case, the direct injury is done to the tenant, the remote consequences of which may fall upon the landlord ; but there is no rule of law which can give damages to the landlord in an action like the present;
    
      
      Mr. Mulock, contra, for the plaintiff.
    . It is a principle of our law, that for every wrong done to an mdividual, there are means of redress, and for every injury an appropriate remedy may be found. If the declaration in this case sets forth an injury done to the plaintiff'by the defendant, it follows almost as a matter of necessary consequence, that the action is well founded in law.
    The declaration, in each of the counts, alleges a direct injury to the plaintiff; from the wrongful and malicious acts of the defendant. It states, as a matter of fact, that the injury complained of, has fallen upon the plaintiff, through the malice of the defendant, and the demurrer admits, that the facts are correctly stated. It is no excuse for the defendant, therefore, that the tenants may have acted precipitately or unwisely : it is enough, for the purposes of this action, that the wrong has been done. Even if the positions assumed by the counsel for the defendant were all of them correct, there is enough stated in this declaration to bring the plaintiff’s claims within those principles ; for it is expressly averred, that in consequence of the defendant’s unlawful interference, the tenants abandoned the premises, which became thereby “ greatly dilapidated, by reason of their untenanted stated If, therefore, the plaintiff had received all his rent from the tenants, his premises were injured by the wrongful interference of the defendant; and it cannot be, that he can admit that fact by the pleadings, and also admit that he has acted maliciously, without giving a cause of action to the plaintiff.
    But in this case, the wrong done to the plaintiff is of a more extensive character. It appears, as a matter of fact, before the court, in this stage of the cause, that the plaintiff, in consequence of the wrongful and malicious acts of the defendant, has lost his rent. It was not necessary to state the want of a distress; for it being admitted that the rent is lost, the want of a distress will be inferred.
    The case then comes down simply to this: the defendant admits that he has, by a wrongful and malicious disturbance, deprived the plaintiff of his tenants, whereby his rent is lost, and the premises are greatly injured. And yet, it is said, that the plaintiff is left by the law, without redress !
    By what right can any man maliciously interfere between land’ lord and tenant, to the prejudice of either 1 If there be a wrong, shall there not be a remedy 1
    
    It is no objection to this action, that no express precedent can be found for its support. It is well founded in principle, and cannot be objected to in point of form. It rests upon the foundation which upholds this whole class of cases : that for every wrong there is redress, and for every injury, an appropriate remedy may be found. The injury here (if that were an objection) is not by remote consequence. It is immediate and direct; it has fallen upon the plaintiff through the malice and wrong of the defendant, and the law will make him answerable for the consequences. [3 T. R. 51. 2 Vin. Abr. A. 1. and the cases there cited. 3 Mod. R. 53. Ashby v. White, 1 Com. Dig. A. 2. “ Action on the case for misfeasance,” A. 6. “ Malicious misfeasance,” Cro. Jac. 606.]
   Oakley, J.

This is a special action on the case. The first count of the declaration sets forth, in substance, that the plaintiff was possessed of the unexpired term of a certain house, and demised the same for one year to certain persons, who entered, and were in the quiet possession of the same as the tenants of the plaintiff: that the defendant knowing that they rightfully so held possession, as tenants of the plaintiff, and wrongfully and maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff, came to the premises, and threatened to seize the goods of the tenants then lying on the premises : that by means of such wrongful and malicious act of the defendant, he caused the tenants to remove from the premises, whereby the plaintiff lost his tenants; the said premises became vacant and unoccupied for a long period, and the said plaintiff lost the rents and profits of the said house during such period.

The second count states the letting of the premises, as in the first; and the entry and quiet possession of the tenants, and the knowledge of the defendant that they were rightfully in possession, and that the defendant wrongfully and maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff, threatened to seize the goods of the tenants living on the premises, if they did not remove from the same : by means of which he caused the tenants to abandon the possession, and the plaintiff thereby lost his tenants and his rents, which he would otherwise have received from the tenants : that he was unable to procure other tenants for the premises, and that they remained vacant and unoccupied, and were greatly dilapidated by reason thereof.

The third count sets forth a malicious disturbance of the tenants by the defendant, with the intent to deprive the plaintiff of his tenants, and prevent the occupation of the premises, and then avers, that by means thereof the tenants were obliged to abandon, and did abandon the premises; that the plaintiff thereby lost his tenants and his rents, which be would otherwise have received, and that the said premises remained vacant for a long period, during which they were greatly injured by means of their being so vacant.

To this declaration there is a general demurrer, and the question is whether, in either of the said counts a sufficient cause of action is disclosed.

It is believed that this is an action of the first impression; but that is no objection to maintaining it, if it appears to fall fairly within established principles.

In Com. Dig. (tit. Action on the Case for Misfeasance, A. 6.) it is laid down, that if man threatens the tenants of another, whereby they depart from their tenures, an action lies. On referring to 1 Rol. Abr. which is cited in Comyns, and to the Year Book, [9 H. VII. p. 8.] it appears that the tenants spoken of were tenants at will, who could dissolve their tenancy, or depart from their tenures at pleasure.

In the present case, the tenants, being tenants for years, could not, in judgment of law, depart from their tenures, though they might abandon the possession of their premises. The averment in the declaration, therefore, that the plaintiff lost his tenants, does not seem to set forth such an injury or damage as the law can notice. The case, however, in Comyns seems to establish the principle, that if a man, by interference with the tenants of another, or by disturbing or threatening them, causes damage to the an action will lie against him.

jn Pasley v. Freeman (3 D. & E. 51.) it was held, that a false affirmation made by the defendant with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff receives damage, is the ground of an action, though the defendant is in no way benefited by it, and does not act in collusion with the person who is.

In Yates v. Joyce (11 Johns. Rep. p. 136.) the second and third counts of the declaration set forth in substance, that the plaintiff had a judgment against A., which was a lien on a certain lot of land; that A. had no other property to satisfy the judgment, and was insolvent; and that the plaintiff caused the said lot to be taken in execution on the judgment. It was then averred, that the defendant knowing the premises, but intending to defraud the plaintiff of the recovery of satisfaction of the judgment, demolished certain buildings on the lot, whereby the lot became of less value, and the plaintiff lost the benefit of his judgment to that amount. To these counts in the declaration, there was a general demurrer: but the action was sustained. The court said, that the declaration showed, that the plaintiff had sustained damage by the act of the defendant, which he alleged was done fraudulently, and with the intent to injure him. Trespass, say they, will not lie, for the plaintiff was not in possession. If, then, there is any remedy for him, it is in this form of action; and they go on to lay down the general principle as a sound one, that where the fraudulent misconduct of a party occasions an injury to the private rights of another, he shall be responsible in damages."

In that case, it will be remarked, that the immediate injury done by the defendant, by the destruction of the buildings, was to the owner or possessor of the land, who might clearly have had his action for the trespass. But the court count on the fraud, that because, the defendant knew the plaintiff’s right, and the interest he had in the land by virtue of his judgment, and intended an injury to him, he should be responsible.

It seems to me, that the facts set forth in the declaration in this case, and particularly in the third count, bring it fairly within the principles established in tire cases abo'vb alluded to. The plaintiff’s allegation substantially is, that the defendant, knowing that he was the rightful possessor by his tenant of the premises in question, and wrongfully and maliciously intending to injure him, so disturbed his tenants, that they abandoned the possession, whereby he lost his rent, which he would have received if they had continued in possession, and the premises sustained injury and dilapidation, by reason of being vacant and unoccupied for the remainder of the year. Here is certainly damage to the plaintiff, and it is alleged to have been caused by the wrongful and malicious act of the defendant, committed with a full knowledge that he was violating the plaintiff’s rights, and with the intent to injure him. The case seems in all respects to come within the general principle laid down by the court in Yates v. Joyce.

It is said, however, that the tenant had no right to abandon the possession of the premises on account of the disturbance by the defendant; and that if the plaintiff bad sustained the injury complained of, it is owing to the wrongful act of the tenants, and the plaintiff’s remedy is against them. It does not follow, in my judgment, that because the tenants had violated their contract with the plaintiff, and are liable to him for the rent, that the defendant is to be excused from liability. The defendant has wrongfully, and with the intent to injure the plaintiff, caused the tenants to abandon the premises, and the damage, which is the gist of the action, is charged directly to his wrongful act towards the plaintiff.

Thus there are in the case damum et injuria, and where these are found united, they always constitute the ground of an action. I am of opinion, that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the demurrer.

Judgment for the plaintiff on the demurrer, with leave to the defendant to withdraw the same on payment of costs.

[W. Mulock, Att'y for the plff. P. A. Jay, Att'y for the def’t.]  