
    Sidney, a man of color, vs. Thomas & Newton White.
    1. Fugitive Slates. Act of Congress. Character of the remedy intended. The provision of the Federal constitution and the act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof in 1793, for the extradition of fugitives from labor, escaping from one State into another, contemplate a summary proceeding of a ministerial character, and not a judicial trial according to the course of the common law. On establishing a prima facie claim of ownership, the claimant is entitled to have the fugitive delivered up to him; leaving the question of right to bo decided, in the appropriate form of proceeding, in the proper tribunal.
    2. Jurisdiction 01? Statu Courts. When fugitive delivered to claimant under act of Congress of 1793. When a proceeding, regular in form, has been instituted under the act of Congress of 1793, in the Federal court, to recover a fugitive from labor escaping into this, from another State, and said fugitive has, by the order of said court, been delivered up to the claimant, with the certificate required by said act, the judicial tribunals of this State have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the purpose of trying the right of said fugitive to freedom.
    3. Pleading. Suit for freedom. Demurrer. Where a suit was instituted in this State, by a man of color, to recover his freedom, against parties who claimed him as a fugitive slave from another State, and the defendants, after issue joined on the plea of not guilty, plead specially that the plaintiff had been taken by them prior to the institution of his suit in a proceeding regular in form, under the act of Congress of 1793, before a Judge of the United States Court, by whom they had been adjudged entitled to the possession of said plaintiff as a fugitive slave, and that they had received from said Judge a certificate to that effect, as required under said act of Congress ; to which plea the plaintiff replied that such proceeding was ex parte and in fraud of his rights: Seld, that said plea goes to the entire cause of action alleged in the declaration, and being valid, is a bar to the action, and the replication was demurrable ; and upon a demurrer to such replication final judgment in favor of defendant was proper.
    from knox.
    Sidney, a man. of color, instituted this suit in the circuit court of Knox county, at the February Term, 1849, to recover his freedom. Prior to the institution of this suit he had been arrested by the defendants as a fugitive slave from the State of Alabama, and taken before the Judge of the Federal court for the Eastern district of Tennessee, who, upon investigating their claim, ordered him to be delivered up under the act of Congress of 1J93, to the defendants, who claimed him as agents for the owner in Alabama. This fact was specially plead by the defendants in bar of the action; to which the plaintiff replied that the proceeding before the Federal Judge was ex %>aA'te and in fraud of his rights. To this replication the defendants demurred, which being sustained by the court below, with final judgment that the defendants go hence, &e., the plaintiff appealed to this court.
    Lyon, Swan and OeozibR, for plaintiff.
    Sneed and Welokee, for defendants.
   McKinney, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff "brought this action for the purpose of establishing his right to freedom. And it is clear, upon the facts in this record, that he was freeborn, according to the uniform course of decision in this State. But, in the view in which we are to consider the case at present, the question of the right of freedom need not be discussed.

The only question properly presented for our determination upon this record, is that arising on the demurrer to the replication to the - amended plea of the defendants. The circuit court sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment that the defendant go hence, &c.; and in this we think there is no error.

The plea sets up and relies upon, in bar of the action, a proceeding regular in form, under the act of Congress of 1793, before the Judge of the Federal court for the district of East Tennessee, prior to the institution of the present action, in which a certificate was given by the Judge, in conformity with the act referred to, authorizing the removal of the plaintiff to the State of Alabama, where he had runaway from the service of the alleged owner.

The act of 1793, in express terms, declares that the certificate of the judge or magistrate “shall be sufficient warrant for removing the fugitive from labor, to the State or territory from which he or she fled.” This law is obligatory upon the States; and it follows of necessity, that the judicial tribunals of the State in which the fugitive may be found, have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the purpo'se of trying his right to freedom, after the delivery of the fugitive to tide claimant under the act of Congress. The provision of the Federal constitution, and the act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof, for the arrest and return 'of fugitives from labor, intend - only a summary proceeding of a ministerial character; and not a judicial trial according to the course of the common law. On establishing a prima facie claim of ownership, the claimant is entitled to have the fugitive delivered up to him; leaving the question of right to be decided, in the appropriate form of proceeding in the proper tribunal.

The plea in this case goes to the entire cause of action alleged i'n the declaration; and being valid, is a bar to the action. The court, therefore, did not err in giving judgment on the demurrer, that the defendants go hence, &c., notwithstanding the issue joined on the plea of not guilty.

Judgment affirmed.  