
    JIN ZHAO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Susan C. WARNOCK, Movant-Appellee, Health Science Center at Brooklyn Foundation, Inc., Defendant, State University of New York, State University of New York Downstate Medical Center, Olcay Batuman, Doctor, Defendants-Cross-Defendants, Research Foundation for the State University of New York, Defendant-Cross-Claimant.
    No. 11-3690-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 24, 2014.
    Jin Zhao, Brooklyn, New York, pro se.
    Susan C. Warnock, Esq., New York, New York, for Movant-Appellee.
    PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges, EDWARD R. KORMAN, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Edward R. Korman, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Jin Zhao, proceeding pro se, appeals from an award of attorney’s fees to her former counsel. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review the district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion, see Cabala v. Crowley, 786 F.3d 226, 229 (2d Cir.2013), and we identify no such abuse in this case. Contrary to Zhao’s argument, the retainer agreement does not violate public policy. Its provision that, if Zhao discharged counsel without cause before a settlement was reached, counsel would be entitled to a lien on the proceeds of any settlement commensurate to the time she spent on the matter, provides a remedy identical to that permitted under New York law. See N.Y. Jud. Ct. Acts Law § 475; Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 148 (2d Cir.1998) (“It is undisputed that it was proper to determine the amount of [an attorney’s] § 475 charging lien on a quantum meruit basis, ascertaining the reasonable value of the legal services rendered up to the date of the ... substitution of new counsel.”).

Moreover, Zhao did not demonstrate either the “impropriety or misconduct” required to discharge counsel for cause. Garcia v. Teitler, 443 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir.2006). The deficiencies Zhao identifies in counsel’s representation “consist solely of dissatisfaction with reasonable strategic choices regarding litigation,” and these “choices do not, as a matter of law, constitute cause for the discharge of an attorney.” Callaghan v. Callaghan, 48 A.D.3d 500, 501, 852 N.Y.S.2d 273, 275 (2d Dep’t 2008).

Zhao’s contention that counsel’s recovery is limited to one-third of the settlement is unsupported. Under New York law, attorneys who are retained under a contingency fee agreement are entitled to compensation in quantum meruit if they are discharged without cause. See Universal Acupuncture Pain Servs., P.C. v. Quadrino & Schwartz, P.C., 370 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir.2004). There is no merit to Zhao’s argument that counsel acted improperly by initially offering to accept one-third of the settlement Zhao had received from the defendants, and then moving for compensation in quantum meruit. Zhao rejected counsel’s settlement offer, and counsel was entitled to pursue her available remedies. See Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 454, 457-58, 541 N.Y.S.2d 742, 744, 539 N.E.2d 570 (1989) (“When a client discharges an attorney without cause, the attorney is entitled to recover compensation from the client measured by the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered whether that be more or less than the amount provided in the contract or retainer agreement.”).

Nothing in the record supports Zhao’s claim that the district judge and magistrate judge were biased. See Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218, 227 (2d Cir.2009) (“Generally, claims of judicial bias must be based on extrajudicial matters, and adverse rulings, without more, will rarely suffice to provide a reasonable basis for questioning a judge’s impartiality.”).

As to the remainder of Zhao’s claims, after having reviewed her contentions on appeal and the record of proceedings below, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its memorandum and order.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the district court’s order is AFFIRMED.  