
    Simpson v. McKay. McKay v. Simpson.
    
      Presumption of'icm—of correctness of judgment from lapse of time—Practice.
    
    In 1855 plaintiffs brought a cross-action, and in their complaint, which was verified, alleged the existence of a judgment. In 1861, discovering that such judgment could not be-found, upon an affidavit that they could disprove the facts supposed to be established hy the judgment, they obtained an order to strike the allegation of the existence of the judgment from the complaint. Held, that the order should not be construed as opening the question further than to permit plaintiffs to make good their affirmation, and having failed on the evidence to do so the one on whose favor the judgment was given was entitled to invoke the repose of time upon its conclusiveness, and freedom from technical errors.
    Appeal by John B. Simpson from a judgment entered upon the report of a referee.
    The cross-actions were brought, one by John B. Simpson, administrator, etc., against Alexander McKay and others, and the other by McKay and others against Simpson. The facts relating to the matters in controversy will be found in full in a report of the case. 3 N. Y. Sup. 65.
    
      E. W. Paige, for appellant.
    
      H. Smith, for respondents.
   Landon, J.

The head-note states sufficiently the point passed upon in the opinion.

Countryman, J.,

dissented.

Judgment affirmed.  