
    Paul REINHARDT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BENEFIT TRUST LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, A Mutual Legal Reserve Company; Seaboard Systems Railroad, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 86-3642.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued April 8, 1987.
    Decided June 2, 1987.
    John Bertram Mann, Richmond, Va., (Levit & Mann, on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
    H. Aubrey Ford, III, Richmond, Va., (Phillip B. Morris, Browder, Russell, Morris & Butcher, on brief), David G. Shuford (John F. Kay, Jr., Russell V. Palmore, Jr., Mays & Valentine, on brief) for defendants-appellees.
    Before WIDENER and HALL, Circuit Judges, and HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge.
   K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

Paul Reinhardt appeals from the district court’s order granting the motion of the defendants, Benefit Trust Life Insurance Company (“Benefit Trust”) and Seaboard Systems Railroad, Inc. (“Seaboard”) to dismiss Reinhardt’s suit brought pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 60 and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985. We affirm.

On November 3 1981 Reinhardt was hired by Benefit Trust to sell insurance policies to members of various unions in cluding employees of Seaboard. While per forming these duties Reinhardt distributed a pamphlet entitled "How to Protect your Rights When Injured on the Job to Sea board employees. The pamphlet contained advice regarding employee rights under FELA. Learning of his actions Seaboard demanded that Benefit Trust discharge Re inhardt. Benefit Trust complied.

On July 3 1986 Reinhardt filed suit against Benefit Trust and Seaboard con tending that both companies had violated � 60 of FELA and � 1985 of the Civil Rights Act. The district court dismissed the suit concluding inter alia that the conduct which prompted Reinhardt's dis missal was not protected activity under � 60. The district court also found that neither Benefit Trust nor Seaboard was a proper defendant in a � 60 violation suit involving the conduct of an employee of an insurance company.

In this appeal Reinhardt argues that the district court erred in concluding that only common carriers violate � 60 of FELA and that � 60 is violated only where (a) the defendant common carrier disciplines its own employee and (b) such employee was engaged in distributing factual information relating to a specific common carrier acci dent. Reinhardt also contends that the court erred in dismissing his � 1985 claim for lack of racial animus.

We cannot agree that the district court erred in dismissing the FELA claim. This claim was dismissed in part because the activity that prompted Reinhardt's dis charge was not activity that was protected by � 60. Section 60 prohibits the discipline of an individual who engages in "furnish ing voluntarily information to a person in interest as to the facts incident to the inju ry or death of any employee." Rather than furnishing facts related to a specific acci dent Reinhardt had distributed information describing general legal rights.

We also find no error in the district court's dismissal of appellant's claim brought pursuant to � 1985 of the Civil Rights Act. Reinhardt asserts that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to deny him his freedom of speech rights un der the First Amendment. Although the Supreme Court.held in Griffin v. Breckenridge 403 U.S. 88 91 S.Ct. 1790 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) that § can be used to reach conspiracies of private individuals it may do so only where there are allega tions of racial or class-based discriminatory animus. There were no such allegations in this case.

For the foregoing reasons we according ly affirm.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Throughout this suit appellee has not protest ed the application of this criminal statute in a civil context. The Fifth Circuit has held that the civil application of � 60 is proper. Gonzalez v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 773 F.2d 637 640 (5th Cir.1985) Hendley v. Central of Georgia Railroad Co. 609 F.2d 1146 1152-53 (5th Cir.1980).
     
      
      . Because we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the � 60 claim on the above reasoning we need not decide whether the court erred in concluding that only common carriers violate � 60 or that � 60 is violated REINHARDT v. BENEFIT TRUST LIFE INS. CO. Cite as Although we leave this tion for another day, we suggest that the plain language of the statute is not as restrictive as the district court suggests. In Cavanaugh v. ern Maryland Railway Company, 729 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.1984), this Court stated that 60 "was intended to prevent the railroad from making inaccessible to an injured employee other road employees whose testimony might be inaccessible to an injured employee other rail road employees whose testimony might be help ful However that statement does not pre clude the regulation of other persons under � 60.
     