
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel B. KARRON, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-1924.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 26, 2012.
    Daniel B. Karron, pro se, Long Beach, NY, Appellant.
    Michael J. Byars, Sarah Shelve Normand, Assistant United States Attorneys, New York, NY, for Appellees.
    Present: JON O. NEWMAN, RALPH K. WINTER, and ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Daniel B. Karron, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the Appellee on its claims for relief under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a), awarding the Appellee principally $4,036,500 in treble damages and a $5,500 civil penalty, less any amount that Karron has paid or will pay in restitution. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

This Court reviews orders granting summary judgment de novo and focuses on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, the Court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999) (citing Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir.1995)). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

After an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that the district court properly found that Karron was liable under the FCA for $4,036,500 in treble damages and a $5,500 civil penalty for substantially the same reasons articulated by the district court in its well-reasoned order and by this Court in its recent decision in United States ex rel. Feldman v. van Gorp, 697 F.3d 78, 87-91 (2d Cir.2012) (stating that in an FSA case where “contracts entered into between the government and [a][d]efendant[] did not produce a tangible benefit” to the government because it did not get the research training program it bargained for at all, “the appropriate measure of damages ... [was] the full amount the government paid based on materially false statements” (citation omitted)).

We have considered Karron’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby

AFFIRMED.  