
    Swartzer, Appellant, vs. Gillett, Appellee.
    (IN CHANCERY.)^
    'tyhere.a conveyance is made in avoidance-of,and to compound &;4 felony, a Court of Equity will not interfere, to set aside such con- . veyanc.e, if it is. fully executed.
    Blit if not executed, either party may resist and .avoid it. The fixed and well-established legal principle is, that the Court will not lend.", its aid to enforce the execution of an agreement made in defiance., of law, nor will it interfere to annul it if already executed.
    Ip; such a case, the parties are in pari delicto, and the Court will not ■ stain its ermine by aiding either, thus making itself a party to the., guilt of others.
    This bill was -filed in the .county of Fopd du Lac by the appellant, to procure to bp annulled a conveyance of real, estate by him to the appellee, upon the ground that, the conveyance was made to compound a. felony committed, by the appellant, and alleging that the appellee was a party to such illegal act. The facts are sufficiently detailed in, the opinion of the Court for an understanding of the. case..
    
      The Court below dismissed the bill, and the cause came here on an appeal by the complainant.
    
      Jl. L, Williams for appellant.
    
      J. M. Gillett for appellee.
   By the Court.

Larrabee, J.

The question Upoil which this cause must be decided, is, was the conveyance of the lands, described in the bill, made with a view to the compounding of felony! Was such the intention and end of the parties! If it was, there is an end of this cause; for it is manifestly repugnant to the duty of every Court of Justice, to lend its aid to enforce, or annul, such a contract. The authorities upon this point are too numerous; and the doctrine too plain and well settled, to be even referred to.

In May, 1847, an indictment was found against Swartzef the complainant, in the District Court of Fond du Lae County, for forging the name of John Slaven, upon a draft for the sum of $159 68, and passing it to the defendant, Gillett. In October following, the complainant wa-s' arrested in Easton, in Pennsylvania, by the Sheriff of said County, and brought to Fond du Lac. The defendant accompanied them on their journey, and as far as the present inquiry is concerned, it is immaterial in what capacity he acted. He had repeatedly declared both be-fofé and after the arrest that he should endeavor to procure the complainant’s lands as security or payment for the money obtained on the draft, together with his costs and charges; and according to the testimony of the Sheriff, and Simmons, was willing, in the event df success, to let the complainant go clear. This obtaining the land as payment, seemed to be the1 main object of the defendant; and he seemed entirely ■ to disregard the means used; nor was the complainant apparently less anxious to compound his felony in this way. He had admitted the forgery and the receipt of the money from the defendant, and that he had wronged and injured him. No where, either in the bill itself, or in the proofs, is this denied. The bill alleges that defendant promised, if complainant conveyed his land, he would not appear against him upon his trial; that it would be a settlement of the whole matter, and complainant might return to Easton in the fall. The testimony • of Clock, sustained by corroborating circumstances, is conclusive as to this. Frequent conversations of this character were had betwe'en the parties on theft journey. Within two days after the arrival at Fond du Lac, the conveyance was made; and although there is no proof that conversations of a like character were had at the time the deed was executed, still, from the whole testimony in the cause, there can be but little doubt but such inducement were held out by defendant as part consideration of the conveyance. Should this Court annul a contract — cancel a deed— made under such circumstances'! Would a Court of equity enforce a similar cobi tract, if executory! Most certainly not. It will not, then, annul a contract already executed, especially where the parties are in pari delicto, unless in cases where ‘ public policy would be thereby promoted^

“ The suppression of illegal contracts is far metre likely, in general, to be accomplished, by leaving the parties without remedy against each other, and by thus introducing a preventive check, naturally connected with a want-of, confidence and a sple reliance upon personal honor.” — «, iSfáryls ■ Bquit /. “ The law leave? the parties to such a contract-just as it-found them. If either has sustained a loss b^fthe-bad f?iith of a, partieses criminis., it is but a just infliction for a-pre,meditated and deeply- practiced fraud. He roust.not expect-that a judicial tribunal will degrade itself by, an exertion of its powers, to shift the loss from one to, Hie'oiher; or to equalize the benefits, or burthe.ns which may have resulted from the violation of every principle of morals-and of law.” Battle v. Coleman, 4 Peters 184.

a The rule as now clearly settled, is, that where the contract grows' immediately out of,, or is connected with, .-■«illegal or immoral act, a Court of justice will not lend its.iaid to enforce it; and if the contract be in part, only,, connected with the illegal transaction, and growing immediately out of it, though it in part- be a, new contract, d'ijsmqually tainted by it.” — 4 Wash.C. C. R., 297.

The conveyance in question, if made solely as a discharge of complainant’s civil liability, would, be valid if made in .good faith, and with equal means of knowledge j hüíút.is strongly to be inferred from all the facts in the cause, that this was not the whole consideration;, and, although the inadequacy of price is not so great as to raise a presumption of fraud, still as connected with, other facts, 1 think «no .candkhmind could fail to perceive that the con-, vcyance was in part, at least,,, connected with a design to, compound a felony.

At the time the deed was executed, although the com-plaip&ntwas in-custody, yet the evidence is clear that he acted freely and- voluntarily. He was allowed to wprk m-m open fie!dnatid go to and, from the town, unattended.. Under such circumstances it. would be difficult to imply that be acted under any unlawful constraint, and I cannot see that the contract can in any way be avoided by duress. It was argued by the counsel for the complainant that the fact that, the defendant, was deputy Sheriff at the. time of the arrest and until the arrival at Fond du. Lac, should have much weight in raising a suspicion of fraud in obtaining the conveyance. It is undoubtedly true that, the law holds ministerial officers to a strict responsibility and prompt discharge of their duties; and a Cour,t of.equity will set aside a contract, where official power.is made the instrument of extortion. But in this case there was an .acknowledged felony committed, and the complainant was in the immediate custody of the Sheriff from the time of the arrest, up to the time of arrival at Fond du Lac. There is no evidence that the defendant acted as deputy after the arrival; and iporeover it is not to be presumed that the fact of his so acting had any influence beyoqd that of the fear of his appearing as a witness on the trjial. This was apparently the motive which operated upon the complainant.

tinder this view of the cause, it does not become material to notice the other points raised in the argument. The whole cause presents unmistakeable evidences of a settled design to violate the law. The pretended ignorance of Swartzer in endorsing the draft by his mark, and after-wards writing his name legibly both in German and English; the declarations of Gillett to the Sheriff, and his repeated conversations with Swartzer, all show this design; and now the complainant coming into a Court of justice with all these evidences of moral turpitude arid asking its aid to relieve him from the - consequences of his guilt, presents a cause which needs only to be stated to be-decided.

The decree'is affirmed with costs.  