
    Peggy MORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sheldon J. ROSEN, Esq., Maribel Tejada Bolivar, Rochdale Village, Inc., Sheldon J. Rosen, P.C., Michael J. Motto, Defendants-Appellees, Michael J. Pinckney, Gilbert O. Badillo, Anne Katz, Lisa Peterson, Marshall & Sheriff Bureau, Department Of Social Services, Adult Protective Services, Alan Barnes, Bruce A. Smith, Leroy Comrie, Ruben Wills, Gregory Meeks, Malcolm Smith, Shirley Huntley, John Doe, 1 To 10, Jane Doe, 1 To 10, Jonathan Lippman, Chief Administrative Judge, Fern A. Fisher, Deputy Chief Administrative Judge, New York State Division of Housing And Community Renewal, New York City Department of Investigation, New York City Human Resources Administration, George G. Essock, New York City Marshal, Linda Gibbs, Deputy Mayor, Defendants.
    
    
      No. 12-3143-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 28, 2014.
    Peggy Lee Morris, pro se, St. Albans, NY, for Appellant.
    A. Michael Furman, Eric Daniel Mercu-rio, Furman Kornfeld & Brennan LLP, New York, NY, for Appellees Sheldon J. Rosen, P.C., Sheldon J. Rosen, Esq., and Maribel Tejada Bolivar.
    Robert Louis Bernstein, Jr., Baker Greenspan & Bernstein, Bellmore, NY, for Appellee Rochdale Village, Inc.
    Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General; Jason State of New York: Harrow, Assistant Solicitor General, for Eric T. Schneid-erman, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, NY.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, REENA RAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption as shown above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Peggy Morris, who sued for alleged due process violations in her eviction, appeals from the sua sponte dismissal of her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Rook-er-Feldman. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.2005). We assume familiarity with the facts and underlying proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over certain claims that seek review of adverse state court judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (“[A] United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.”); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) (holding that “no court of the United States other than [the Supreme Court] could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify [a state court’s] judgment for errors”). Specifically,

Rooker-Feldman directs federal courts to abstain from considering claims when four requirements are met: (1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites district court review of that judgment, and (4) the state court judgment was entered before the plaintiffs federal suit commenced.

McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir.2010); see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).

On independent review, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that Morris’s claims were barred by Rooker-Feldman because (1) Morris lost in a state court holdover proceeding; (2) her alleged injuries stem directly from the state court’s adverse judgment in that proceeding granting possession of the apartment occupied by Morris to defendant Rochdale Village, Inc. (“Rochdale”); (3) Morris’s federal complaint invited review of the state court judgment because her claim— that her due process rights were violated when she was evicted from her Rochdale apartment — was expressly rejected by the state court; and (4) Morris filed this action in the district court after the adverse state court judgment had been rendered.

In sum, because Morris’s claimed injury stems from the adverse state court holdover judgment, review of that judgment is precluded by Rooker-Feldman. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d at 87 (stating that Rooker-Feldman precludes federal consideration of claim “complaining of an injury caused by the state judgment and seeking its reversal”).

We have considered Morris’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  