
    The Portage County Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. William T. West and Abel K. West.
    The seventh section of the act of the general assembly inem’porating the Portage County Mutual Fire Insurance Company, by which a time is limited for commencing actions against the company for loss by fire, applies 600] *to cases where the directors, after examining a claim for losses, wholly disallow it.
    W. and W., members of the company, suffered a loss by fire, and duly notified the company thereof, and the directors refused to pay it, and gave due notice of their determination in October, 1852; and a court of common pleas was held in Portage county in February, 1853, and W. and W. neglected to commence their action against the company for their loss, until after the close of said February term of the court. Held, that their right of action is barred by said seventh section of the act of incorporation, which declares that the insured party may bring an action against the company for loss or damage, at the next court held in Portage county, unless said court shall be held within sixty days after the disallowance of the loss but if heid within that time, then at the next court held in said county thereafter.
    This is a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the district court of Portage county.
    The defendants in error brought an action on a policy of insurance to recover damages for loss by fire of certain buildings owned by them, and insured by the plaintiff in error. The insurance was effected August 21, 1848, and the loss occurred August 26, 1852. Notice of the loss was given to the plaintiff in error within thirty days, and payment requested. On the 5th of October, 1852, the directors of the company rejected the loss, and duly notified the insured of their refusal to pay it.
    The seventh section of the charter of the company provides “that in case of any loss or damage by fire happening to any member, upon property insured in said company, said member shall give notice thereof in writing to the directors, or some one of thorn, or to the secretary of said company, within thirty days from the time such loss or damage may have happened; and the directors, upon a view of the same, or in such other way as they may deem proper, shall ascertain and determine the amount of said loss or damage ; 601] and if the party suffering is not satisfied *with the determination of the directors, the question may be submitted to referees, or the said party may bring an action against said company for loss or' damage, at the next court to be holden in and for the county of Portage, unless said court shall bo holden within sixty days after said determination; but if holden within that time, then at the next court holden in said county thereafter.”
    A term of the court of common pleas was held in Portage county on the 12th of October, 1852, another on the 24th of February, 1853, and another on the 14th of June, 1853. The action to recover' the rejected damages was commenced August 12, 1853. The question of damages was not submitted to referees.
    The defendant below set up in its answer the neglect of the insured to bring suit until after the February term of the court, 1853, as provided for in said 7th section of the charter, in bar of a recovery, and requested the court to instruct, the jury that if they found there had been such failure to sue within the time aforesaid,, that the company was discharged from liability. The court refused" to give such instruction, but charged the jury that the plaintiffs below were not barred by said 7th section from maintaining their action, and that they might, notwithstanding any limitation contained in the company’s charter, or otherwise, under the facts supposed, bring their suit at the time they did, and in this regard maintain the same.
    The plaintiff in error tendered its bill of exceptions, which was allowed, and the refusal of the court to instruct the jury as requested, is assigned for error.
    
      Mc Clure & McKinney, for plaintiff in error.
    
      L. S. Beecher, for defendants in error.
   Bowen, J.

The only question raised in argument is ^whether [60S' the plaintiffs below were barred from maintaining this action by the 7th section of their charter, which is above set forth.

The claim for loss was rejected by the company on the 5th of October, 1852, and the insured parties duly notified of such rejection. A term of the court of common pleas was held in Portage county in February, 1853. The plaintiff in error claims that a failure by the defendants to sue at or before that term of the court, is a bar to any action afterward commenced by them to recover' the aforesaid loss. ’ ■

This court, at a former term, in the case of the Portage County M. F. Ins. Co. v. Stickey, 18 Ohio, 455, held that a suit against the ■ company, by one of its members, can only be brought in Portage ■ county. A construction of the 7th section was thus given as to the place where the action must bo brought. The words, “ may bring an action in Portage county,” were held to determine and limit the place of suing; and now it is contended that the remaining portion of the sentence, “ at the next term of the court,” should be held to determine and limit the time in which suit may be brought. It is difficult to perceive any reason which can authorize the former construction that will not with equal propriety sanction the latter.

But it is said this is a disabling statute, and in violation of the general law of the limitation of actions, and should receive a restricted construction, and not such an one as w-ill exclude the party injured from the right of suing within the term fixed by the general act. To this it is only necessary to reply that the clause of of the 7th section in question is founded on public policy, and not like ordinary statutes of limitation, upon presumption of payment, and affects not the remedy merely, but the right of the party to sue. .The case is analogous to those contracts in which there is a positive 608] stipulation to do some act, provided specific ^demand bo made within a specified time, or provided some other precedent condition be performed. The limitation is contained in the very act of incorporation ; it is, in effect, a part of the contract between the whole company in the aggregate, and every individual member. In the • event of a loss which is not adjusted by the corporation to the satisfaction of the sufferer, and if no reference shall be agreed on, the former becomes liable to a suit at law, provided such suit be instituted within a short but definite period, adjusted to its business exigencies. If the prescribed time be suffered to elapse without suit, ■there remains no longer a legal liability in any form. 20 Vt. 222.

The reasons why all claims for loss or damage against a mutual insurance company should be adjusted as speedily as is consistent, are quite obvious. All the individuals who become interested in the company, by insuring therein, become members thereof during the terms of their respective policies, but no longer. It is impossible for the directors to settle and determine the distinct sums to be paid by the several members of the company as their respective proportions of the losses, until they have been liquidated in some one of the wavs- pointed out in the 7th section. In the construction of a statute we must always have regard to the intention of the makers of it; and this intention, many times, is to be collected from the occasion, object, or necessity of making it, or some particular provision in it. When the intention is once discovered, it should with reason be followed in giving effect to it, even though such construction seem somewhat opposed to other general legislative enactments. 7 Vt. 369.

The act in question, containing as it does a limitation of the right, to sue, as among the members of the association, can not be treated as unmeaning or idle legislation in *that respect. The object [604 of the provision, as we have already shown, rests upon sound policy, and grows out of, and is peculiar to, the nature of the corpora-’ tion, and its mode of doing business. Such being the construction which we feel constrained to give the 7th section, it follows that the district court was at fault in its instruction to the jury, and that the plaintiff’s liability to a suit, by what we have seen should be treated as terms of the contract, which the insured accepted for-their protection against the loss, was limited to a period of time clearly specified, and that it could not, after that limitation expired, be held answerable to the defendants on their policy of insurance.

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause remanded.

Bartlet, C. J., and Swan, Brinkerhoee, and Scott, JJ., concurred.  