
    STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Edwin Thomas CURTIS, Appellant.
    A17-0373
    Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
    Filed January 16, 2018
    Review Granted Mar. 28, 2018
    
      Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
    Mark Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Karl G. Sundquist, Assistant County Attorney, Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)
    Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
    Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Stauber, Judge.
    
    
      
       Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.
    
   OPINION

SCHELLHAS, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the district court erred in determining that he was competent to participate in the proceedings because the court erroneously shifted the burden of' proof from respondent to appellant. We affirm.

FACTS

In March 2015, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Edwin Curtis with fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. The complaint alleged that Curtis touched an incapacitated woman on her breasts and genitals over her clothing at the St. Louis County Detox Center. Curtis moved for a competency examination under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, and a mental examination under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.02. The district court ordered simultaneous examinations of Curtis under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.04. The court also ordered that Curtis be examined by Dr. Craig Stevens, who had examined Curtis in 2008 and 2012.

Following his examination of Curtis, Dr. Stevens reported that Curtis “suffer[s] from a significant mental illness (schizoaf-fective disorder),” but that he “seems to be using that disorder through exaggeration to try to escape consequences for his alleged misdeeds.” Dr. Stevens also reported that because of Curtis’s “proclivity to exaggerate his condition it is unfortunately not possible to determine his capacity at this time.” Dr. Stevens determined that “[sjince, as this examiner understands it, an individual is viewed by the court as competent unless demonstrated to be otherwise, the only outcome from the present evaluation is that ... Curtis has not demonstrated incompetence and thus may by default have to proceed at trial as a competent defendant.”

In July 2015, the district court conducted a contested competency hearing at which Dr. Stevens testified. The court found that “as a result of [his] examination, Dr. Stevens stated that he believes the Court should find [Curtis] to be competent as there is no evidence ... [Curtis] is incompetent.” The court determined that “the greater weight of the evidence indicates [Curtis] is competent.”

In November 2015, Dr. Gerald Henkel-Johnson examined Curtis. Dr. Henkel-Johnson reported that Curtis “does appear to have adequate understanding of the charges and proceedings against him,” but Curtis’s “deficits in concentration and communication skills to assist his attorney or otherwise adequately participate in his defense are concerning.” Dr. Henkel-Johnson initially found Curtis to be competent, but later supplemented his report with an addendum, stating that Curtis’s difficulty in answering “open-ended” questions “may result in compromising [his] ability to assist in his defense.” Dr. Henkel-Johnson determined that “[,sjhould this be the case, then [Curtis] indeed is not competent to stand trial.” (Emphasis added.)

Based on Dr. Henkel-Johnson’s report, Curtis moved for an order finding him incompetent under rule 20.01. The district court found that the results of the tests administered to Curtis by Dr. Henkel-Johnson “are indicative of a person attempting to produce a false result.” The court concluded that despite Dr. Henkel-Johnson’s belief that Curtis may be incompetent to stand trial, “the greater weight of the evidence indicates [that Curtis] is competent.”

In June 2016, Dr. Henkel-Johnson testified at a contested competency hearing in a separate criminal case pending against Curtis in St. Louis County District Court. At that hearing, Dr. Henkel-Johnson opined that Curtis would have a difficult time answering open-ended questions, which would hinder defense counsel’s ability to present a defense. Dr. Henkel-John-son testified that he therefore believed that Curtis was incompetent to stand trial.

Based on Dr. Henkel-Johnson’s June 2016 testimony, Curtis moved to vacate the district court’s previous finding of competency in this file. Noting that “throughout these proceedings, [Curtis] has demonstrated the ability to coherently communicate with the court and answer questions,” the court found that “based on the record before the court, including the Rule 20 reports, and Dr. Henkel-Johnson’s addendum and testimony, the greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that [Curtis] is competent.” The court denied Curtis’s motion to vacate the previous finding of competency.

Curtis waived his right to a trial by jury and stipulated to the state’s case. The district court found Curtis guilty of the charged offense, stayed imposition of sentence, and placed Curtis on probation for seven years.

This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court apply the correct legal standard in determining . Curtis’s competency to stand trial?

II. Did the district court clearly err by determining that the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Curtis is competent to stand trial?

ANALYSIS

“A defendant has a due process right not to be tried or convicted of a criminal charge if he or she is legally incompetent.” Bonga v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011). A criminal defendant is incompetent to stand trial if the defendant lacks the ability to (a) rationally consult with counsel or (b) understand the proceedings or participate in the defense due to mental illness or deficiency. Minn. R. Crim. P. 21.01, subd. 2. The district' court must determine whether “the greater weight of the evidence” supports a finding of competency. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 5(f). On appeal, this court “independently review[s] the record to determine if the district court gave proper weight to the evidence produced and if its finding of competency is adequately supported by the record.” State v. Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted).

I.

Curtis argues that the district court determined competency “based on an incorrect legal standard that shifted the burden to the defense.” To support his claim, Curtis refers to the report in which Dr. Stevens states that, as he “understands it, an individual is viewed by the court as competent unless demonstrated to be otherwise,” and that the “only outcome from the present evaluation is that ... Curtis has not demonstrated incompetence and thus may by default have to proceed [to] trial as a competent defendant.” Dr. Stevens echoed this reasoning at the competency hearing when he explained that the “only conclusion [he] could come to” was that the court should view Curtis as competent because Dr. Stevens had no evidence that Curtis was incompetent.

Curtis argues that the state has the burden to demonstrate his competence and that Dr. Stevens’s analysis shifted that burden to Curtis to produce some evidence of incompetence. Curtis argues that because the “district court adopted Dr. Stevens’s conclusion, and the erroneous legal standard on which it rested,” this court must reverse his conviction and vacate the order of competency. We disagree.

Citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd: 3(6), the supreme court in Ganpat articulated that the “state must show the defendant’s competence by a fair preponderance of the evidence.” 732 N.W.2d at 238. But the rule specifically provides:

If upon consideration of the report and the evidence received at any hearing, the- court finds by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant is competent, the court shall enter an order finding that the defendant is competent. Otherwise, the court shall enter an order finding that the defendant is incompetent.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3(6). Later, ■ the Minnesota Supreme Court amended the language in Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3(6), which is now contained in Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 5(f). That rule, entitled, “Burden of Proof and Decision,” provides: “If the court finds by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant is competent, it must enter an order finding the defendant competent. Otherwise, the court must enter an order finding the defendant incompetent.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 5(f).

Neither Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3(6), as cited in Ganpat, nor the current rule—Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 5(f)— includes language that assigns to the state the burden of proving a defendant’s competence. Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d at 238. Moreover, in Ganpat, the supreme court cited State v. Mills, 562 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. 1997), for authority that the state has the burden of proving a defendant’s competence. Id. But Mills does not stand for that proposition; without addressing burden of proof, the Mills court merely stated that “[t]he standard of proof in a competency hearing is a preponderance of the evidence.” 562 N.W.2d at 281.

In Bonga, following Ganpat, the supreme court stated that the “prosecutor, defense attorney, and the court share the duty to protect the right of a defendant not to be tried or convicted while incompetent.” 797 N.W.2d at 718 (emphasis added). That the prosecutor, defense counsel, and court “share the duty,” as stated in Bonga, id., is consistent with the following language in Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3: “If the prosecutor, defense counsel, or the court, at any time, doubts the defendant’s competency, the prosecutor or defense counsel must make a motion challenging competency, or the court- on its initiative must raise the issue.” The rules of criminal procedure do not assign a “burden of proof’ in competency proceedings to either the prosecutor, defense counsel, or court to prove a defendant’s competency or incompetency. Rather, a district court determines competency under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 5(f), based on the greater weight of the evidence without regard to burden of proof.

Here, the district court determined that, under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 5(f), the “greater weight of the evidence indicates [Curtis] is competent.” The court also applied this standard in its subsequent orders, rejecting Curtis’s request to reconsider its competency determination. We conclude that the district court applied the proper legal standard to determine that Curtis was competent to stand trial.

II.

Curtis contends that even if the district court applied the proper legal standard, we must vacate the court’s order of competency because an independent review of the evidence shows that Curtis’s “psychosis and cognitive delays prevented him from effectively participating in his defense.” Curtis’s contention is unpersuasive.

We acknowledge that Dr. Henkel-John-son’s opinion may support a determination that Curtis was incompetent. But the supreme court has stated that “the factfinder is not bound by expert psychiatric testimony and may reject it entirely, even when the only experts who testify support the defendant’s assertion of a mental-illness defense.” State v. Roberts, 876 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 2016). Here, in rejecting Dr. Henkel-Johnson’s opinion that Curtis was incompetent to stand trial, the district court relied on the testimony of Dr. Stevens, who opined that Curtis was malingering.

In Ganpat, the supreme court affirmed a district court’s finding that the defendant was able to rationally consult with counsel when two psychologists found the defendant to be malingering. 732 N.W.2d at 238. Of the three psychologists who examined Ganpat, two found that the defendant was malingering and exaggerating the severity of his intellectual disabilities, and one determined that the defendant was not competent to stand trial after finding that the defendant was intellectually disabled. Id. at 236-37. The supreme court affirmed the district court’s competency determination because testimony and conclusions of two of the psychologists supported the determination. Id. at 238.

Similar to Ganpat, based upon the-results of Curtis’s Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST), Dr. Stevens reported that he was “quite confident that ... Curtis was exaggerating symptoms,” by “reporting symptoms that rarely if ever occur in the population of genuine psychiatric patients” and “trying to make himself appear more impaired.” Dr. Stevens testified that although he examined Curtis in 2008 and 2012, and then found him to be incompetent to stand trial, he suspected that Curtis was exaggerating his symptoms at that point, but felt “there was enough legitimacy to what he was presenting to discount that” at that time. Dr. Stevens opined that Curtis “does suffer from a significant mental illness (schi-zoaffective disorder),” but that he “also seems to be using that disorder through exaggeration to try to escape consequences for his alleged misdeeds, possibly as a function of his anti-social personality disorder.” Dr. Stevens believed that Curtis’s exaggeration of his symptoms “appears to have benefitted him in several previous situations where he was charged with a crime and escaped prosecution by being deemed incompetent to stand trial.” Dr. Stevens testified that the “only conclusion” that he could reach was that “the Court should view [Curtis] as competent because I have no evidence that he is incompetent.”

The record also reflects that Dr. Henk-el-Johnson evaluated Curtis six months after Dr. Stevens interviewed him. Dr. Henkel-Johnson reported that because Curtis’s “high scores on the M-FAST indicated the possibility of strong exaggeration or malingering,” Curtis was administered the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SRIS), “which is a more extensive/thorough test of malingering of psychiatric/psychotic symptoms.” Dr. Henkel-Johnson reported that Curtis “achieved strongly elevated scores, in the definite feigning range, on three of the seven scales, and four of the remaining scales were in the probable feigning range.” But Dr. Henkel-Johnson stated that “in the interview,” Curtis “denied having psychosis, and thus this examiner will not give a malingering diagnosis.” Dr. Henkel-John-son added that “[a]n arguable point could still be made” that Curtis “is malingering cognitive/concentration deficits, but that is difficult to disentangle from his negative symptoms of schizophrenia and his antisocial personality disorder.” Dr. Henkel-Johnson then concluded that Curtis is competent because he “appear[s] to have adequate understanding of the charges and proceedings against him.”

In addition to the opinions of the psychologists, the district court found that “throughout [the] proceedings, [Curtis] has demonstrated the ability to coherently communicate with the court and answer questions.” This evidence, along with the initial report from Dr. Henkel-Johnson, as well as Dr. Stevens’s testimony, provides substantial evidence to support the district court’s determination that Curtis was competent to stand trial. Although Dr. Henkel-Johnson later added an addendum to his report, changing his position on Curtis’s competency, and subsequently testified that Curtis was incompetent, the district court was free to reject Dr. Henkel-John-son’s opinion. See Roberts, 876 N.W.2d at 868 (stating that the “factfinder is not bound by expert psychiatric testimony and may reject it entirely, even when the only experts who testify support the defendant’s assertion of a mental-illness defense”). Our independent review of the record reveals that sufficient evidence supports the district court’s determination that the greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that Curtis was competent to stand trial.

DECISION

A district court determines competency under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 5(f), based on the greater weight of the evidence without regard to burden of proof. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Curtis was competent to stand trial.

Affirmed.  