
    Wells against Lane.
    NEW YORK,
    May, 1812.
    Parol declarations made more than 20 years ago, by the owner of a slave, that he purchased her to make that hemeant were he we to be a manu. missionofsucb slave. Parol declarations made more than 20
    Whether, since the aln^theTta°f lien (sess. 24. o. c. 188.) a slave can n’L^nanuou? some'in-writing? Quiere.
    
    IN error, on Certiorari, from a justice’s court.
    
      Lane brought an action of debt against Wells, before the just for two penalties of 12 dollars and 50 cents each, under the concerning slaves, for harbouring the slave of the plaintiff, named Betty, on the 8th and 9th days of November. The plaintiff, who was a free black, proved that he purchased Betty and ^er mother, about 24 years ago, and that he married the mother when Betty was about a year old. Betty and her mother were .X, boro slaves. The plaintiff declared to one witness, that he had purchased, his wife and child from bondage, and that they were ^ceived among their society (quakers) as free persons; that he had paid a trifling sum for them, because he had purchased them from bondage into freedom. The plaintiff knew that neither slaves, nor slaveholders could be admitted in the society, and w^e the plaintiff and his family were in the society, they were considered as children and not as slaves. To another witness he expressed a determination to have a free family, and said that his wife had assisted in procuring her and her daughter’s freedom,, and that he always called Betty his child.
    The only proof, as to the harbouring, was, that the witness was requested by the plaintiff to warn the defendant from detaining Betty; and the defendant replied, that he considered her free; and that .the defendant admitted that Betty was in his house or family, or something to that effect; that when the defendant was warned not to keep Betty, he said she might go, but he could not conscientiously turn her away. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, for 25 dollars, on which the justice gave judgment.
   Per Curiam.

In determining whether the negro woman, Betty; is to be considered the slave of the plaintiff below, we must look, at the law, as it stood at the time of the purchase, which appears to have been upwards of twenty years since. Our present statute relative to manumissions, would seem to require a certificate* or some instrument in writing, for that purpose. And such was the construction intimated by the court, in the case of Keteltas v. Fleet. (7 Johns. Rep. 330.) The words of the statute are, that it shall be lawful for the owner of any slave, to manumit such slave by last mill or testament, or by any certificate or writing for that purpose. (1 Rev. hams, 612.) These terms are more limited than those used in the statute of 1788, (2 Greenleaf’s edit, hams, 88.) which are, that if any person shall by last will or otherwise, manumit or set free his slave, such slave shall be considered as freed from such owner. And the provision, in the 3d section of the present statute, was intended to confirm manumissions informally made. It declares, that all the manumissions of slaves made by the people called quakers, and others, before the 9th day of March, 1798, although not in strict conformity to the statutes then in force, relating to such manumissions, shall be valid from the time they were made. It would not be giving to this provision its due effect and operation, to consider no manumission valid, unless it was in writing. And if parol manumissions were binding, the plaintiff’s declarations fully show that he never considered Betty as his slave, nor did he purchase her as such. He declared that her former master would not give him a bill of sale of her or her mother, for fear he might abuse or sell them. That he gave a trifling sum for them, because he purchased them from bondage into freedom. That they were received among their society, as free persons; and that he had always called Betty his child. After such declarations and such a lapse of time, to authorize the plaintiff to claim her as Ms slave, would be extremely unjust j and unless she was Ms slave, there is no ground upon which he could maintain the action; for she certainly was not a servant, in any other respect, within the meaning of the statute. The judgment must, therefore, be reversed.

Judgment reversed.  