
    Bank v. Cook.
    The character of the liability of the drawer of a bill of exchange must be determined from the instrument itself; and the addition of the word “ agent ” to his name, without anything else on the instrument indicating his principal, does not relieve him from personal liability as drawer of the bill.
    Error to the District Court of Cuyahoga county.
    The action was brought in the court of common pleas by the plaintiff, upon three several bills of exchange, substantially alike except as to date, amount, and acceptors. The following is a copy of the first described :
    “ $723.25. Cleveland, Ohio, Aug. 31st, 1876. « 'á “ Forty-five days after date, pay to the order of 3 ^ o W. P. Cook, Treas., seven hundred and twenty- | 43 three 25-100 dollars. Yalue received, and charge á § the same to account of “ g § “ W. P. Cook, Treas. | 8 3 “ , H. C.” f o « f “ To A. S. Mair & Co., | o “ Austin, Texas.”
    
      Indorsed as follows:
    “ Horace Wilkins. W. P. Cook, Treas. :
    “ Pay Poster, Ludlow & Co., or order, for collection, on account of The Ohio National Bank, Cleveland, Ohio.
    “John McClymonds, Cashier.”
    The action was brought against W. P. Cook as drawer, and Horace Wilkins as indorser.
    It is averred in the petition, and not denied, that each of the bills was presented for payment when due, and, payment being refused, each was protested for non-payment, of which the defendants were duly notified.
    Horace Wilkins answered, averring that said bills' of exchange were given by W. P. Cook as principal, and him as indorser. “ That said Cook was in fact the only person interested in obtaining the proceeds on said bills of exchange, and that this defendant was accommodation indorser and surety for said Cook, and indorser and surety for him alone.” There is no reply to the averments of this answer.
    W. P. Cook filed his separate answer, averring therein that he was the treasurer of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Tank Line Company, a corporation duly organized under the laws of the state of Missouri, and as such was authorized to draw drafts and bills of exchange, and that the several drafts described in the petition, were by him drawn as such treasurer, for and on behalf of said company, as the plaintiff knew, and that the plaintiff had full knowledge that said drafts were by the defendant so drawn, solely on behalf of said company, as its said treasurer, etc.
    A demurrer was filed to this answer, which was sustained by the court. Thereupon the court rendered judgment against Cook and Wilkins.
    The defendant Cook, thereafter filed his petition in error in the district court to reverse said judgment, and the same was reversed by said district court; and to reverse said judgment of reversal, this petition is filed.
    
      
      Estep, Dicleey c& Squire, for plaintiff in error,
    cited: 1 Daniels on Neg. Inst. §§ 301, 303, 305; Hayes v. Mathews, 63 Ind. 412; Prather v. Ross, 17 Ind. 495; Sturdivant v. Hull, 59 Me, 172; Hayes v. Brubaker, 65 Ind. 27; Hayes v. Crutcher, 54 Ind. 260; Orchard v. Binninger, 51 N. Y. 652; Collins v. Ins. Co., 17 Ohio St. 215; Titus v. Kile, 10 Ohio St. 444. The liability of a drawer is fixed by liis contract. Miser v. Frovinger, 7 Ohio St. 281; Barnet v. Young, 29 Ohio St. 7. The contract cannot be varied by parol evidence. Anderson v. Shoup, 17 Ohio St. 125. There is no difference, in this respect, between the drawer of a bill of exchange and the maker of a promissory note. Bank v. Hooper, 5 Gray, 567; Bass v. O’Brien, 12 Gray, 481; Slawson v. Loring, 5 Allen, 342; Barlow v. Cong. Society, 8 Allen, 460; Arnold v. Sprague, 34 Verm. 402; Hypes v. Griffin, 89 Ill. 134.
    
      Henderson <& Kline and W. H. Gaylord, for defendants in erroi’,
    cited: Hicks v. Hind, 9 Barb. 528; 1 Wait’s Act. and Def. 528; Edwards on Bills, 81; 1 Parsons Notes & Bills, 96 ; Babcock v. Beman, 11 N. Y. (1 Kern.) 200; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cow. 513; 17 Wend. 41; 3 Gray, 334-341; 36 Ind. 288; 7 Cal. 535; 89 Ill. 134. There is a well-defined distinction between the maker of a promissory note and the drawer of a bill of exchange. Collins v. Ins. Co., 17 Ohio St. 224.
   White, J.

The judgment of the district court must be reversed', and that of the common pleas affirmed.

The character of the liability of the drawer of a bill of exchange must be determined from the instrument itself; and the addition of the word “ agent ” to his name, without anything else on the instrument indicating his principal, does not relieve him from personal liability as drawer of the bill.

The name of the alleged principal of Cook, — the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Tank Line Company, — nowhere appears on the bill as a party to it. Parol evidence is not admissible to add a party to the instrument who does not appear upon its face. Anderton v. Shoup, 17 Ohio St. 125; Arnold v. Sprague, 34 Verm. 402. Whoever takes negotiable paper enters into a contract with the parties who appear on? the face of the instrument, and can look to no other persons for payment. Bass v. O'Brien, 12 Gray, 481; Slawson v. Loring, 5 Allen, 341, 342; Beckham v. Drake, 9 Mees. & Welsb. 92, 96. Hence the only drawer of the bills in question is Cook, the defendant in error. The addition of the word “ agent ” to his name does not relieve him from personal liability. That is merely descriptio personas. Anderton v. Shoup, supra; Collins v. Insurance Co., 17 Ohio St. 215.

It is true, as claimed by the defendant in error, that the case last cited is where the word agent ” was added to the name of the maker of a promissory note; but there is no distinction In this respect between the drawer of a bill of exchange and the maker' of a promissory note. Tucker Manufacturing Co. v. Fairbanks, 98 Mass. 104.

Judgment of the district court reversed, and that of the common pleas affirmed.  