
    * James Sample v. The Administrator of Phebe Ross.
    An injunction can not be issued by the court of common pleas to restrain an execution of the Supreme Court, upon a decree for alimony.
    The remedy is by application to the Supreme Court, on the return of execution.
    This is a bill in chancery, reserved in the county of Butler.
    The facts arc substantially these :
    Phebe Ross obtained a divorce from her husband, Daniel Ross, in the Supreme Court in Butler county, in 1832. The court granting the divorce reserved to her the payment of $100 in 30 days, besides $37.50 semi-annually during the joint lives of the said Phebe and Daniel, and gave a lien for the several installments, upon a certain tract of land belonging to said Daniel, situated in Butler county. Before applying for the divorce, said Phebe Ross employed one John W. Milliken as her solicitor, to prosecute for the divorce, and executed a written agreement to pay him one-fourth of the amount to bo recovered as alimony. Soon after the decree, the complainant purchased this tract of land of Daniel Ross, and of said Milliken his right and interest in the contract and payments reserved by the decree. Complainant afterward sold the land and executed a deed to the purchaser, with a covenant of warranty therein. He regularly paid the three-fourths of the semi-annual installments, and retained the one-fourth. This he continued to do from 1832, the time of rendering the divorce, till some short time before the filing of this bill in 1845, when said Phebe took out an execution upon the decree. In this execution, the clerk of the Supreme Court, by her direction, embraced all the parts of the several installments retained as aforesaid, with interest *upon each, down to the time of issuing the writ, amounting altogether to somewhat more than $400. This execution was levied upon the land charged as aforesaid in the decree.. To enjoin the said Phebe from proceeding to sell the land upon that execution, the present bill was filed in the common pleas, and an injunction allowed to restrain further proceedings. The case-was taken into the Supreme Court of said county, by appeal, and-was reserved for hearing in bank.
    L. D. Campbell and Henry Stanbery, attorney-general, for complainant, cited the following authorities :
    15 Mass. 30; Story on Cont. 45 ; 2 Kent’s Com. (5 ed.) 153, 154, and notes; 1 Pet. 105; 6 Pick. 39; 4 Met. 478; 1 Am. Ch. Dig. 534.
    Y. Chase, for respondent, submitted the following authorities:
    1 Story’s Eq. 657, 658; 1 Mad. Ch. 127; 2 Story’s Eq. 837; Story on Prom. Notes, 203; Walker’s Int. 227, 363, 394; 1 Str. 94; 2 Kent’s Com. 235, 236; 15 Mass. 30; 6 Pick. 89; 1 Story’s Eq. 229-236, and notes.
   Avery, J.

Questions like these have been discussed in this-case: How far are a married woman’s contracts binding upon her? What is the effect of her repeated recognition of the contract after becoming a feme sole, and of her acceptance of the successive payments as they fell due according to the terms of the-agreement? The question, besides, has been put, whether this is-a valid contract aside from the alleged incapacity of a married woman to contract. In support of the case made by the bill, it is-claimed that nothing is due upon the decree, or that, at all events, the execution has been irregularly issued, after the lapse of so-many years, at least for the old installments.

These questions, and any others looking toward an exemption from the effects of this execution, will probably arise *upon a future occasion. They may all be heard and determined in the county by the Supreme Court, whose process, it is said, has been improperly used. The court can see in the case, no such danger of serious injury, from what is alleged to be an abuse of its process, as to justify an injunction from the court of common pleas. The action of the Supreme Court upon this execution will become-indispensable, before it can work any very serious injury. On the return of that execution the whole subject will be within the power of the Supreme Court, and they can furnish to the parties all proper •relief.

Since, then, ample remedy may he had, upon a motion to set ¡aside the execution in that court, or by some other form of applioation; and as at the time of filing this bill, there was no such •evil existing or threatened, as to call for the injunction, it will, for •¡that cause, be dissolved, and the bill dismissed.  