
    Russell PEELER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey E. McGILL, Warden, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-4430-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 31, 2014.
    Russell Peeler, pro se, Somers, CT, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Ann E. Lynch and Colleen B. Valentine, Assistant Attorneys General, for George Jepsen, Attorney General, Connecticut Office of the Attorney General, Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellees.
    PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., JOSÉ A. CABRANES and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Russell Peeler, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants, a group of state corrections staff. The District Court concluded that Peeler had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, “‘resolving all ambiguities and drawing all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.’ ” Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir.2009)). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 ..., or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 238 (2d Cir.2012). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). The Supreme Court has also held that the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion, “which means using all steps that the agency holds out ... so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (internal quotation marks and parentheses omitted) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir.2002)). That is, “prisoners must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules — rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that the District Court did not err in finding that Peeler failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies properly before filing his federal complaint, and that this failure should not be excused. We therefore affirm for substantially the same reasons stated in the District Court’s thorough decision.

We have considered all of Peeler’s arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.  