
    Eastman vs. Schettler.
    A purchaser of land at a sheriff’s sale, under a judgment, has a right to impeach the validity of a conveyance of the land made by the judgment debtor, before the judgment was rendered, with intent to hinder and defraud creditors.
    Whether a judgment is a lien on land previously conveyed by the judgment debtor, depends upon whether the conveyance was fraudulent or not as to creditors.
    
      APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for Brown County.
    Action to recover land. The complaint alleged that the 2d day of March, 1839, Dominique Brunette, being then seized of the land in dispute, conveyed it to his son, Augustine, in trust for the grantor and certain'of his children; that said conveyance was made without consideration, and with intent to hinder and delay creditors; that at the time it was made, a suit was pending in the circuit court for Brown county, in favor of Meade and others,; the executors of one Lawe, against said Dominique, in which a judgment was afterwards rendered against him, and- under an execution thereon, the land was sold to the plaintiff, and conveyed to him by the sheriff; that the defendant is in possession under a deed from said Dominique and Augustine, dated in June, 1856, and unlawfully withholds the same. An answer was filed.
    On the trial, the plaintiff, after offering proof to show the title of Dominique Brunette to the land in dispute at the date of the conveyance to Augustine, offered in evidence the record of the judgment in favor of Meade and others against said Dominique, rendered on the 2d of October, 1849. This evidence was objected to, and the court sustained the objection, holding that the judgment was not admissible, because, the premises having been conveyed by Dominique Brunette before the judgment was rendered, it was no lien upon them, and because the plaintiff did not stand in the place of a creditor of said Dominique, and therefore could not controvert the bona fides of the conveyance from him to the defendant.
    
      Howe & Bechwith, for appellant.
    
      John G. Neville and E. H. Ellis, for respondent. [No argument on file.]
    January 8.
   By the Court,

Cole, J.

It appears to us there is no ground for saying that the appellant was not in a situation to attack the validity of the sale from Dominique to Augustine Brunette.* He claimed as a purchaser at the sheriff's sale under a judgment against Dominique, and stands in reference to the property precisely in the place of the judgment creditor. If for any reason, as, for instance, fraud in that conveyance, tbe creditor could reach tbe property, and subject it t0 tbe payment of his judgment, then, clearly, tbe appellant could assail tbe conveyance for a like reason. He represented tbe judgment creditor and was clothed with bis rights, by virtue of bis purchase at tbe sheriff’s sale. This appears to us very obvious.

Tbe circuit court further held that tbe judgment recovered against Dominique Brunette in favor of Lawe’s executors, never became a lien upon tbe property. But it is manifest that whether tbe judgment became a lien or not, depended entirely upon tbe question as to, whether tbe conveyance from Dominique to bis son was valid or not. Tbe appellant contends that this conveyance was made with intent to binder and delay creditors. That is bis case. If be establishes that proposition, and shows that tbe conveyance was fraudulent and void as to creditors, then tbe judgment became a lien. It is worthy of remark, that tbe conveyance was made during tbe pendency of tbe suit in which judgment was recovered ; or at all events, tbe deed from Dominique to Augustine bore date March 2d, 1849, while it appears tbe suit was commenced a few days before that time. Tbe pendency of tbe suit, with other things, would undoubtedly be relied on by tbe appellant to establish tbe bad faith of tbe transaction. And if be made out bis case, and showed that tbe conveyance was void as to tbe creditors of Dominique Brunette, then it would be void as to him.

Of course we lay out of view entirely all questions which may arise upon tbe matters set up in tbe answer, if they should be established by tbe evidence, and also all questions growing out of tbe subsequent conveyance made by Dominique and Augustine in 1856 to tbe respondent. These matters will undoubtedly be relied upon by tbe respondent in bis defense to tbe action. But tbe circuit court did not reach tbe defense at all. It held that the appellant did not stand in tbe place of a creditor of Dominique Brunette, and therefore could not controvert tbe bona fides of tbe conveyance from him; and this view of tbe case we deem erroneous. If any authority were necessary to support tbe views webave expressed, we think they will, in effect, be sustained, by tbe cases cited upon tbe brief of tbe counsel for tbe spondent. Sands vs. Hildreth, 14 J. R., 492; Jackson vs. Terry, 13 id., 471; Jackson vs. Myers, 18 id., 425; Anderson vs. Boyd, id., 513; 4 Wis., 268; 7 id., 197; Reynolds vs. Vilas, 8 Wis., 471; 1 Smith’s Lead. Cases, 1.

Tbe judgment of tbe circuit court is therefore reversed, and a new trial ordered.  