
    HARRIS v. VILLAGE OF HIGHLAND PARK.
    Taxation — Special Improvements — Paving Tax.
    Complainant’s bill to restrain defendant village of Highland Park from collecting a special improvement tax in excess of five per cent, of the value of the premises assessed, containing an offer to pay so much of the tax as was valid, was not demurrable, though the property was benefited by such improvement. Act No. 707, Local Acts 1907, authorizing the tax, has been held invalid and no authority remains for an assessment in excess of five per cent, in said village.
    Appeal from Wayne; Van Zile, J.
    Submitted November 24, 1914.
    (Docket No. 24.)
    Decided December 19, 1914.
    Bill by Albert S. Harris against the village of Highland Park for an injunction to restrain the levy of a special assessment. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    
      Seth J. Wicker, for complainant.
    
      Edwin S. Bartlett, for defendant.
   Ostrander, J.

It appearing that complainant’s premises were taxed for a special improvement a sum equaling 25 per cent, of its value, that there is no authority of law for a tax exceeding 5 per cent, of the value of the property to pay for such an improvement, except Act No. 707, Local Acts of 1907, that this act has been held to be invalid (Cote v. Village of Highland Park, 173 Mich. 201 [139 N. W. 69]), notwithstanding which a special roll has been prepared for the purpose of collecting the third installment (5 per cent.) of the said 25 per cent, tax, that the property has been returned delinquent for the first and second installments of the tax, of 5 per cent, each, that complainant is willing and offers to pay a tax of 5 per cent., that he became owner of the property while the improvement was being made, and is not by his conduct, appearing on the face of the bill, estopped to deny the validity of the tax, a demurrer to a bill filed to restrain the action of the village officers and of the village in proceedings to collect any tax exceeding 5 per cent, of the value of the premises was properly overruled. The case presented by the bill is not one of irregularity in the proceedings, nor is it denied that the property was benefited, and that complainant ought to pay such sum as the law permits the municipality to demand. It is the excess, the demand for a sum for which there is no warrant of law, that complainant objects to.

Decree affirmed, with costs to complainant.

McAlvay, C. J., and Brooke, Kuhn, Stone, Bird, Moore, and Steere, JJ., concurred.  