
    Cornelius Cruser vs. William Duryea and Peter Voorilees, Overseers of the Poor, &c.
    An appeal will lie, to the Court of Common Pleas, from the judgment of a justice of the peace, rendered on the verdict of a jury in a case where the debt, demand, or other matter in dispute, does not exceed three dollars.
    This case was submitted to tho court without argument upon the following state of the case agreed upon by the counsel of the parties.
    ' The plaintiff brought an action of debt before James D. Stryker, Esquire, one of the justices of the peace in and for the county of Somerset, and on the return day of the summons filed his statement of demand, amounting to one dollar and forty-nine cents. The defendants filed no plea or offset. The cause was tried before a jury of six men, and a verdict found in favor of the plaintiff for one dollar and forty-nine-cents of debt, with six cents costs; and the justice gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants for the sum of one dollar and forty-nine cents of debt, with two dollars and'fifty-six cents costs of suit. The defendants demanded an appeal, tendered an appeal bond accompanied with the proper affidavit, and the justice accepted of the same. The appeal bond, with the other papers, was sent up by the justice to the Court of Common Pleas next after rendering the judgment. On motion made to enter the appeal the Court of Common Pleas refused the motion, and would not permit the appeal to be entered, on the ground and for the sole reason, that the debt or demand in dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants did not exceed three dollars.
    It is agreed by and between the parties in the suit, and with the assent of the said Court of Common Pleas, that if the Supreme Court shall be of the opinion, that an appeal *16] will lie to the Court of *Oommon Pleas from the judgment of a justice of the peace rendered on the verdict of a jury in a case where the debt, demand or other matter in-dispute, does not exceed three dollars, that then a writ of mandamus shall issue out of the Supreme Court directed to-the said Court of Common Pleas of the county of Somerset, commanding the said court to enter the'appeal aforesaid, iind to proceed to its hearing and determination.
    James S. Green, Att’y for Def’ts.
    
    Peter D. Vroom, Jr., for Pl'ff.
    
   The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the court as follows:

Cornelius Cruser, brought an action against William, Duryea and Peter Yoorhees, in the court for the trial of ■small causes, aud demanded the sum of one dollar and forty-nine cents. No set-off was claimed, and upon the verdict of a jury lie obtained a judgment for that sum. An appeal was taken by the defendants, and the Court of Common Pleas being of opinion that there could be no .appeal where the debt or demand in dispute did not exceed three dollars, overruled an application for the entry of the appeal. A mandamus being here sought, it is agreed by the parties that a peremptory writ be ordered if this court is of opinion that an appeal may, in such case, be taken.

Prior to the statute of November, 1820, an appeal could not be made from a judgment given upon a verdict. By that statute it is enacted that from any judgment obtained before any justice of the peace, in any of the courts for the trial of small causes, upon the verdict of a jury, either party may appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of the county within the same time, in the same manner and upon the same terms, as in other cases where an appeal is granted. The language of the statute is of the most broad and comprehensive, as well as clear and explicit character. The right of appeal is- made to extend to all judgments upon verdicts. The reference of time, manner and terms to ■other cases of appeal, is directory of the mode of procedure, and not restrictive of appealable judgments to any particular class or sum. We have no warrant to introduce, by constructive interpolation, a limitation into the statute not sanctioned by its unambiguous phraseology.

The objection to the construction of this statute so plainly indicated by its words, is founded on the 36th section of the .act of February, 1818, which excepts from appeals, judgments founded upon verdicts, on reports of referees, and whore the debt, balance, demand *or other matter in [*17 ■dispute, does not exceed three dollars, and the argument is that as the present act only authorizes appeals after verdicts, the restriction as to sum remains. But the statute of J820 gives an appeal from any judgment, founded upon a verdict, including thereby, most evidently, judgments below, as well as above, three dollars ; and if there be any conflict between, the two statutes, the latter, on common law principles, abrogates the former; and more plainly to effect such purpose the act of 1820 repeals all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with its provisions. If any doubt existed as to the operation of these acts, we ought rather to sustain the right of review, a right so just in itself and so sedulously cherished in every part of our judicial system.

Whether an appeal ought to be given where the sum in controversy is so small, or after verdict in cases not exceeding three dollars where, by the undisturbed operation of the act of 1818, an appeal could not have been taken if there-had been no trial by jury, are subjects of legislative, not of judicial consideration.

Let a mandamus issue..  