
    JIA CHAO WENG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-993 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 21, 2013.
    Farah Loftus, Century City, CA, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Senior Litigation Counsel; David H. Wetmore, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: PETER W. HALL, DENNY CHIN, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Jia Chao Weng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February 27, 2012, decision of the BIA affirming the September 2, 2010, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Javier E. Balasquide, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jia Chao Weng, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (BIA Feb. 27, 2012), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig.Ct.N.Y. City Sept. 2, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented and modified by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

For applications such as Weng’s, governed by the amendments made to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on the applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam). We will “defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable factfinder could make” such a ruling. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Here, the IJ reasonably based his adverse credibility determination on inconsistencies between Weng’s testimony and both the testimony of his friend and his documentary evidence, including the following: (1) Weng’s testimony that he arrived at church prior to his friend, though his friend testified that Weng arrived second; (2) Weng’s testimony that his church service started fifteen minutes later than the time to which his friend testified; and (3) Weng’s testimony that he visited the doctor on March 25, 2008, due to vomiting caused by a cold, though his medical records reflect that he visited the doctor on March 27, 2008, for vomiting resulting from contaminated food. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (providing that an IJ may support an adverse credibility determination with “any inconsistency or omission”). Moreover, the IJ reasonably rejected Weng’s explanations for these inconsistencies, specifically that he was nervous and forgot minor details, because they did not explain how he gave detailed yet contradictory testimony. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005).

Given these inconsistencies which call into question Weng’s documentary evidence and his practice of Christianity, the totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Because the only evidence of a threat to Weng’s life or freedom, or that he was likely to be tortured, depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility determination in this case necessarily precludes success on his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  