
    JUN ZHANG, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 05-61126
    Summary Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Dec. 20, 2006.
    
      Wei Vicky Wang, Alhambra, CA, for Petitioner.
    Thomas Ward Hussey, Director, Norah Ascoli Schwarz, John S. Hogan, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Sharon A. Hudson, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, Houston, TX, Caryl G. Thompson, Attn: Joe A. Aguilar, New Orleans, LA, for Respondent.
    Alberto R. Gonzales, Washington, DC, pro se.
    Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals, BIA No. [ AXX XXX XXX ].
    Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, circuit judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Jun Zhang, a native and citizen of China, petitions this court for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings based on changed circumstances in China and new evidence. Zhang concedes that his motion to reopen was not filed until after the 90-day deadline in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) had passed, but Zhang argued before the BIA — and argues again here — that his late filing is excused under § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii) because country conditions changed in China when government officials there communicated threats against Zhang to his father in response to Zhang’s Falun Gong activities in the United States. The BIA rejected this argument and denied Zhang’s motion to reopen, reasoning that China’s repressive policy toward Falun Gong practitioners does not- represent a change in country conditions that was not available or discoverable at the time of Zhang’s previous hearing because the policy existed at that time.

We have jurisdiction to entertain Zhang’s petition for review. Panjwani v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 626, 632 (5th Cir.2005). This situation is analogous to cases affirming the denial of motions to reopen where, for example, the birth of another child in the United States raised for the first time the spectre of persecution under China’s already-existing “one child” policy. See Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-131 (2d Cir.2005). Like those cases, the policy at issue here was discoverable prior to Zhang’s first hearing even if it only became material for the first time at a later date. Therefore, the BIA’s finding that the threats communicated to Zhang’s father do not reflect the kind of change in country circumstances that is contemplated by § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) was not an abuse of discretion. See Lara v. Trominski, 216 F.3d 487, 496 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Gomez-Arevalo v. Gonzales, 161 Fed.Appx. 354, 357 (5th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).

Accordingly, Zhang’s motion for judicial notice is GRANTED, but his petition for review is DENIED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     