
    PARK'S CASE. Harrison Park v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      A special agent of the Post- Office, liable to be stationed in any part of the country, whose labors are not confined to the place xohere stationed, is called -to Washington in November, 1866, and assigned to the duties of superintendent of route-agents by order of the Postmaster-G-eneral. As superintendent he is assigned an office in the Post-Office building. He remains thus on duty during the remainder of the fiscal year. He now brings his action for the additional compensation given by the Twenty per cent. Resolution, on the ground that he was employed “ at Washington.” Sis suit is not broughtuntil the 28ih June. 1873.
    
      A special agent of the Post-Office, called to Washington in November, 1866, and assigned by the Postmaster-General to the duties of superintendent of route-agents, with an office in the Post-Office building, is “employed in the civil service of the United States at Washington,” and entitled to the benefits of the Twenty per cent. Besolution. (14 Stat. L., p. 569.)
    
      Mr. W. Burris for the claimant:
    This case is not analogous to the cases of Marche and Pearson. Prior to November 1,1866, claimant’s official position may have been analogous to those cases, but he does not claim the twenty per cent, for the time prior to that date, but only for the.remaining eight months of that fiscal year, during which he was employed at Washington.
    It is clearly shown by the statement of the Postmaster-General, and admitted by the defendants in the “ stipulation of counsel” in the case, that the claimant was ordered to Washington, and that on the 1st of November, 1866, he reported and immediately entered upon duty here, and was assigned a desk in one of the rooms of the building of the Post-Office Department, where he remained in the discharge of his duties during the remainder of that fiscal year. Being sometimes called away from Washington in the discharge of his official duties did not place him outside of the provisions of the Joint Besolution. It is well known that clerks and officers of the Departments are often called away from Washington on official duties. During that fiscal year many of such clerks and officers were thus sometimes called away from Washington, all of whom should have been refused the twenty per cent, if the defendants’ objection in this regard against this claimant is well taken. But surely the Joint Beso-lution should not be thus unfairly and narrowly restricted. Defendants admit that claimant was “ most of the time at his office in Washington.” During the whole of the time for which he claims the twenty per cent, his duties required him to reside at Washington, where he was subjected to the increased expenses of living incident to those times, to meet which, in part, the twenty per cent, was provided. He was a third-class clerk, assigned to the duty of superintending the work of route-agents, who reported to him at Washington, where he had his office, and where he was necessarily employed examining those reports and writing the official instructions to those agents. As shown, he was called to Washington from Chicago, where it is well known the expenses of living were then fully twenty per cent, less than they were here, and he is, therefore, very manifestly entitled to this additional compensation.
    In relation to the plea of limitation, the law does not provide for monthly salaries, nor for the monthly payment of annual salaries. The Act July 2, 1836, under which the salaries were paid for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1867, and all the other acts relating to salaries, provide for “ annual salaries.” (5 Stat. L., p. 89.) Hence claimant’s salary was not legally payable monthly, but annually. The custom of paying those salaries monthly was adopted voluntarily, for the convenience of the parties, and is not required by law. The admission of the claimant in regard to this is, that his salary was u paid ” (not payable) monthly. In most of the Departments the employés are now paid semi-monthly. Even if the law did provide for the monthly payment of salaries, it would not follow that the statute commenced to run in relation to the twenty per cent, before the close of that fiscal year; because the Joint Eesolution made provision for the twenty per cent. “ on the salary for the year,” and made no provision for the time of payment, and hence it was not legally due, and he was not entitled to commence his action to recover it until the close of that fiscal year; and, therefore, the statute could not commence to run until then. In open and running accounts statutes of limitation do not commence to run until after the date of the last item.
    illr. J. S. Blair (with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendants:
    This is a claim for $213.33 additional compensation, under Joint Resolution of February 28, 1867, being one of the Twenty per cent. Oases. Claimant demands twenty per cent, on $1,066.66, which was the amount of salary drawn by him during the eight months of his employment.
    Under the ruling of this court in Marche’s Case, (5 O. Cls. E., p. 525,) and in the case of Pierson, recently decided, Park is not within the meaning of the Joint Eesolution. As special agent his duties were not local, nor was his residence at Washington in anywise essential to their faithful discharge. He was one of a class of officers who were liable at any moment to be called into any part of the country, and the functions of his office did nofc lie within the Post-Office Department, at the seat of Government, within the meaning of the Joint Besolution more than any other special agents in the country. This was merely his headquarters, and the place from which he started and to which he returned after the performance of his work. This salary, though fixed by the year, was payable and also paid, monthly. On the last day of May, 1867, Park was entitled to receive all of his salary which at that time was due and unpaid. If he was entitled to this twenty per cent, allowance, the time when he had a right to demand it was when he received, or was entitled to receive, the whole or any part of his salary. It follows, then, that on the 31st May he could have demanded not only all arrears of salary up to that time, but also twenty per cent, additional on such arrears, together with twenty per cent, additional on what had been already paid him. If this additional allowance had been refused him, he could at once have commenced his action for the recovery of the same. Having failed to do this for six years after his right of action accrued, he cannot now claim for any sum or sums which he might have demanded previous to 28th June, 1867.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This case is presented upon the following agreed statement of facts:

1. That prior to November 1,1866, claimant was one of a class of special agents who were stationed in different parts of the country, but whose labors were in nowise confined to the place where they were stationed; but by order of the Post-Office Department he was called to Washington and assigned to the duties of superintendent of route-agents, and was thus employed from the 1st of November, 1866, to the 30th of June 1867; and for the performance of that duty he was assigned an office and a desk in the Post-Office building in Washington, at which place the route-agents, whose duties he superintended, made their reports to him, and at which place he corresponded with those agents and wrote the letters of instruction and information to them, as shown by the press-copies of the letters-written by him to said route-agents during that period.

2. That in the discharge of his dutiés he was sometimes called away from Washington, bat most of the time be was at bis said office in Washington.

3. That bis salary was paid monthly, as were the salaries of all the employés and officers of the Department.

Upon these facts two objections are founded: 1st, that, tinder the decision of this court in Marche’s Case, (5 C. Cls. R., p. 525,) the functions of the claimant’s office did not lie within an Executive Department at the seat of the G-overnment; and, 2d, that his suit, which was not brought until the 28th of June, 1873, is, with the exception of one month’s pay, barred by the statute of limitations.

As to the first objection, it appears to the court that the case is distinguishable from that of Marche. The claimant was indeed one of a class of officers whose duties were not confined to the place where they were stationed; but on the 1st November, 1866, 11 by order of the Post-Office Department, he was called to Washington and assigned to the duty of superintendent of route-agents.” Therefore the question is not whether a special agent of the Post-Office, casually stationed at Washington, was entitled to the twenty per cent., but whether a person performing the duties of “superintendent of route-agents” was,, in the language of the Joint Resolution, “ employed in the civil service of the United States at Washington.” The agreed statement of facts answers this question, and shows that the functions of this office, or quasi office, were actually at the seat of the Government and within the Post-Office Department. Whether such an office existed de jure it is not necessary to-inquire; for Congress based the increased compensation not upon the office, but úpon the employment, and expressly provided that where no salary was fixed by law, the allowance should be made upon the pay actually received.

As to the second question, it has been determined in the lioenty per cent. Gases, recently decided, in favor of the claimant.

The judgment of the court is that the claimant recover-$213.33.

Drake, O. J., declined to take part in the decision, for the-reason stated by him in the Twenty per cent. Oases.  