
    North-Eastern Railroad Company vs. Josiah Payne. Same vs. S. G. Barker.
    The charter of a railroad company authorized them to construct their road “from Charleston,” &c.: — Held, that the company had no authority to enter the city, but that the boundary of the city was the terminus a quo.
    
    BEFORE O’NEALL, J., AT CHARLESTON, SPRING TERM, 1853.
    The report of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows:
    
      “ The question in these cases arose on the return of rules issued at the instance of the North-Eastern Bailroad Company to property holders on their line of road, to show cause why their land should not be assessed by commissioners appointed for that purpose, according to the Act, and conveyed to the use of the Company. All those, on whom the rules were served, with the exception of the appellants, acquiesced and joined in the appointment of commissioners. Messrs. Payne and Barker resisted the appointment,' on the ground that their lands lie within the city, and that the charter of this Company does not provide for their entrance into Charleston, relying, first, on the force and signification of the words ‘ from Charleston to,’ &c., as used in the charter; and, secondly, that no corporation or person can build a road into the City of Charleston, without the consent of the City Council being first had. I overruled their objections, being of opinion that, whatever conclusion may be derived from a strict construction of the charter, justice and policy demanded a more liberal construction; and that under such a construction, the Bailroad Company have full authority to run their road from any point within the city that to them may seem most advantageous.”
    The respondents appealed on the grounds:
    1. Because (it is respectfully submittéd) his Honor erred in deciding that the charter of the North-Eastern Railroad authorised the company to run their track within the limits of the City of Charleston.
    2. Because his Honor erred in deciding that the word from • the City of Charleston, used in the said charter, can be construed as from within the city.
    8. Because his Honor erred' in holding, that this Company could construct their road within the corporate limits of the City of Charleston, without the consent of the City Council, or without the plainly expressed sanction of the Legislature.
    
      Blliott, Barlcer, for appellants.
    
      Yeadon, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Glower, J.

In considering the first objection interposed by the appellants to the appointment of commissioners, we must ascertain the intention of the Legislature, defining the southern terminus of the North-Eastern Railroad. The fifth section of the Act incorporating the company, (12 Stat. 129,) provides that the road shall be constructed from Charleston, or from any point on the east bank of the Cooper river, within three miles of Charleston, to such point on or near the Wilmington and Manchester Railroad, west of the Great Pee Dee, as may be selected,” &c. The appellants contend, that “from Charleston,” restricts the southern terminus to the corporate boundary of the city. On the other side it is argued, that the words are not exclusive, and that the Company is authorized to commence their road at any point within the city. The commencement of a traveller’s journey may, as was suggested, be referred to some point within the corporate limits, but when the Legislature authorizes and directs that a road shall be made “ from Charleston,” the boundary of the city is indicated as the terminus a quo. For the public convenience, streets and ways are provided by tbe corporation, and within their jurisdiction the extension of the road is superseded. When it is proposed to extend a railroad within the corporate limits of a city or town, the intention to do so is not left to conjecture, as in the Statute 6 and 7 Wil. IV., ch. 106, where the Eastern Counties’ Railway Company are empowered to make a road, commencing in London and ending in, at or near Norwich and Great Yarmouth. Unless the Legislature had, by a late Act (December, 1854,) granted to the NortlnEastern Railroad Company the right to extend their road to the appellants’ land, (which, in the opinion of this Court, they could not do under the fifth section of the Act of 1851,) some embarrassment may have ensued; but such considerations cannot aid or influence the Court in the construction of charters conferring large and important powers, affecting both the public and individuals. Corporations will be protected in the exercise and enjoyment of their chartered rights, and must be restrained in the unauthorized extension or abuse of the powers delegated to them. Speaking of their powers, duties and liabilities, Lord Eldon says, “ I apprehend that those who come for these acts of Parliament, do in effect undertake, that they shall do and submit to whatever the Legislature empowers or compels them to do, and that they shall do nothing else; that they shall do and forbear all that they are thereby required to do and forbear, as rvell with reference to the interests of the public, as with reference to the interests of individuals.” (1 Myl. & K. 162.)

We are of opinion that the fifth section of the Act of 1851, confines the terminus of the North-Eastern Railroad “ from Charleston” to the corporate boundaries of the city, and that the appellants showed sufficient cause against the appointment of commissioners to assess their lands.

Motion granted.

Wae.di.aw, Withers, and Whitner, JJ., concurred.

Motion granted.  