
    Morris Pechesky, Respondent, v. The Metropolitan Street Railway Co., Appellant.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Term,
    February, 1900.)
    .negligence — Voluntarily placing one’s self in a danlgerous position.
    A person who, after seeing a street car 250 feet distant from him, drives on the car track and makes no further attempt to observe the car, although it was continually approaching him from the rear, must be considered to have voluntarily placed himself in a dangerous position, is guilty of negligence, and can recover no damages for a collision which occurred as he was turning out of the track.
    Appeal by the defendant from a judgment rendered in favor -of the plaintiff, in the Municipal Court, second district, borough ■of Manhattan.
    Henry A. Robinson, for appellant.
    Isaac Marks, for respondent.
   Freedman, P. J.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover ■for personal injuries and damages to his horse and wagon occasioned by a collision with one of the defendant’s cars. The plaintiff was driving a covered wagon, and, coming out of Delancey ■street in the city of New York, drove a short distance up the Bowery in the direction of Spring street, intending to cross the Bowery from east to west. As he was driving out of Delancey street he saw a car at Broome street, coming uptown at a distance •of about 250 feet away. After proceeding northerly upon the track of the approaching car for some distance, he turned west, and as a portion of his wagon got off the car- track it was struck by the car and the injuries complained of were received. There was no testimony to show that, from the time the plaintiff went upon the ear tracks at or near Delancey street, and then saw the car near Broome street, he again looked or made any attempt to ■observe the approaching car. He voluntarily placed himself in a dangerous position by going upon the track conscious of the approach of a car, and thereafter relied wholly upon the vigilance of the employees of the defendant to enable him to escape danger. Under such circumstances it cannot be said that he was free from negligence. The judgment must, therefore, be reversed.

MacLean, J., concurs; Leventritt, J., taking no part.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.  