
    WILLIAM W. CARSON and LOGAN CARSON, Administrators' with the will annexed of John Carson, v. GEORGE CARSON.
    A. devised as follows : “1 give and bequeath all my estate, real and personal, to my son L. C. to the support of him and his brother G.; that is,that G. gets no more than what support him equal to L. C. should hai not be extravagant.” Held that the legal estate in all the property vested in L. C. but a moiety of the beneficial interest belonged to G.
    This was a bill filed at March Term, 1841, of Burke Court' of Equity by the complainants, as administrators with the' will annexed of John Carson, dec’d, praying the court to pu¿ a proper construction on the said will, that they might he governed thereby. The bill alleged that the said John Carson had duly made his last will and testament, and that the same was duly admitted to probate, both as to real and personal estate, in the following words,- to-wit: “In the name' of God, amen. Í, John Carson, do make this my last will and testament. I give and bequeath all my estate, real and personal, to my son, Logan Carson, to the support of him and his brother George; that is, that George gets no more than what support him equal to Logan — should he not he' extravagant.” The bill then alleged that the testator died seized and possessed of a very large real and personal estate; and that doubts had been entertained, and claims interposed 
      in consequence of those doubts, as to the proper construction ^le > Cst, whether the whole of the said property vested in the said Logan, subject only to the charge of supportjng t]2e ggjd George; 2d, whether the said Logan and George are tenants in common of the said property, or whether the said Logan holds a moiety thereof in trust for tiie said George; 3d, whether the said Logan and George are mere trustees and hold said property for the next of kin of the deceased; 4th, whether the said Logan is a trustee and holds said property in trust for the next of kin, subject to his and George’s support; and 5lh, whether the said Logan and the said Georgeare entitled merely to their support out said of property during their lives. And the bill prayed the advice and direction of the court in these matters. The answer of George Carson, who was alone made a party defendant, filed at the same term, admitted all the facts stated in the bill and submitted to any decree the court might make therein. The cause was set for bearing by consent upon the bill and answer, immediately, and also by consent transmitted to the Supreme Court.
    
      D. F. Caldwell, for the plaintiffs,
    contended that Lo-gars took the whole estate, subject only to the support of George during his life, and cited the following authorities:— Holdfast v. Martin, 1 Term Rep. 411. Powell on Devises, 20 voi. Law Lib. 379. 4 Cruise, 237, 238. Loveacre v. Blight, Cowp. 352. 4 Cruise, 158. Bean v. Halley, Sth Term Rep. 5. 3 Peters, 117. 4 Kent’s Comm. 535, note.
    
      W. J. Alexander, for the defendant,
    insisted that one moiety of the beneficial interest in the whole property was devised to George Carson, and cited 5th Cruise, c. 11, s. 9. New-land v. Shepherd — Peat v. Powell, Amb. 387. Challenger v. Shepherd, 8 Term Rep. 597 —Cruise, c. 11, s. 21.
   Gaston, 3.

The object of this bill is to obtain a judicial construction of a will, so obscurely expressed, that it is impossible to pronounce with confidence upon the intention of 1 he testator. It is, indeed, sufficiently manifest that the whole legal interest in the testator’s property was given by the to his son Logan. It is also apparent, that the beneficial interest in this property was, to some extent and in some mode, designed to be apportioned between bis sons Logan and George. The legal estate was not given to Logan for his benefit only, but for or to “ the support of him and bis brother George.” This was the end and purpose of the donation. So far, therefore, it would seem, that George was as much the declared object of the testator’s bounty as Logan, and if nothing else can be found in the will, to contradict this inference or to shew a different intent, the will must be so construed as to secure to each an equal share of this bounty. The part of the will, which follows, purports to be explana, tory, but unfortunately the attempted explanation is the part, of all others, the least intelligible. It is thus expressed, “that is, that George gets no more than Logan if he be not extravagant.” To whom do these latter words refer? If to George, is he to have more than Logan, provided be be extravagant? If to Logan, in what degree is George’s-share to be enlarged, because of Logan’s extravagance? It is impossible to collect, with reasonable assurance, from the explanation subjoined, any information as to the purpose of the testator in the previous part of the will; and therefore the inference, already drawn therefrom, remains unaffected by that attempted explanation. It must be declared that the defendant George is entitled to a moiety of the beneficial interest in alL the testator’s property.

Per Curiam, Declared accordingly.  