
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Delfon Lebrew HARE, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-6732
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: April 28, 2017
    Decided: May 18, 2017
    Delfon Lebrew Hare, Appellant Pro Se.
    Deborah A. Johnston, Assistant United States Attorney, John Michael Pellettieri, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Before DUNCAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
   Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Delfon Lebrew Hare appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to reconsider the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. We previously granted a certificate of ap-pealability on the question of whether Hare’s claims about the existence of documents, including a state writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum allegedly demonstrating that he was first arrested on federal charges, are relevant to his Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim. We have reviewed the record, including the parties’ informal briefs following the issuance of the certificate of appealability, and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order as to the claim on which we granted a certificate of appeala-bility and dismiss the claims on which we previously denied a certificate of appeala-bility. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART 
      
      . Although the Government raised the defense for the first time on appeal that this claim is waived by Hare’s guilty plea, we have reviewed the claim out of an abundance of caution, as did the district court.
     
      
      . Although the district court’s order is somewhat unclear as to whether the court fully considered Hare’s true Rule 60(b) claim that the court had not reviewed Hare’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim in light of documents casting doubt on which governmental entity first took custody of Hare, we are satisfied that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim was sufficiently reviewed based on facts in the record. It does not appear on appeal that the court erred in denying the Rule 60(b) motion, in light of the state and federal court records demonstrating that approximately eight and one-half months elapsed between filing the federal criminal complaint and Hare’s guilty plea and considering the factors to be weighed in a balancing test outlined in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972),
     