
    Jane DOE, elderly, disabled woman, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF PORTLAND, a public municipal corporation, dba Home Forward; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-35246.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 24, 2016.
    
    Filed March 3, 2016.
    Jane Doe, Portland, OR, pro se.
    Steven W. Abel, Stephen H. Galloway, Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jane Doe appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her action alleging various claims, including that defendants failed to accommodate her disability in violation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Doe’s FHAA and Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) claims because Doe failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether her requested accommodations were reasonable, or necessary for the equal use and enjoyment of her apartment. See id. at 1119 (elements of a failure-to-accommodate claim under the FHAA); Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1148-49, 1157 (9th Cir.2003) (for purposes of the FHAA and RA, an accommodation is reasonable “when it imposes no fundamental alteration in the nature of the program or undue financial or administrative burdens” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.405(a), 982.551(d) (requiring that public housing agencies inspect units at least annually and that Section 8 voucher recipients allow such inspections). We reject as unsupported by the record Doe’s contention that defendants failed to conduct an interactive process.

Contrary to Doe’s contention, the district court provided her a final warning of her deadline to file an opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009).

Doe’s request to supplement the record, set forth in her opening brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     