
    The State of Ohio v. Allen.
    (No. 33107
    Decided October 29, 1971.)
    Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County.
    
      Mr. Leonard P. Zdara, assistant county prosecutor, for plaintiff.
    
      Mr. William P. Clinard, for defendant.
   Bice, J.

This cause came on to be heard upon the motion of the defendant, through counsel, for an order of the court quashing the indictment in the captioned cause.

The defendant is indicted under E. C. 2923.56, a section, which, in pertinent part, prohibits certain persons from possessing, or having under their control, a firearm, if such a person is * # # under indictment or has been convicted of any felony of violence and involving moral turpitude.

The indictment in question, charging the defendant with a violation of E. C. 2923.56, states that the defendant is under indictment on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon.

Upon due consideration, it is the opinion of the court tliat the defendant’s motion for an order quashing the indictment is well taken and same is hereby sustained in its entirety and the capitioned cause ordered dismissed:

1. The pertinent part of the statute which must be interpreted contains the words: “Under indictment or has been convicted of any felony of violence and involving moral turpitude.” The issue raised is whether or not the pending indictment must be one for a felony of violence and involving moral turpitude or may simply be an indictment for any felony charge.

2. In the opinion of the court, the problem involved herein can be resolved with reference to the age-old Latin legal maxims of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis. The thrust of these maxims is that a word is known from its associates. The meaning of a word is, or may be known, from the accompanying words. The doctrine likewise means that general and specific words are associated with and take color from each other. The maxims also refer to words of- the same kind, class or nature. Where general words follow an -enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

3. Thus, the court feels, by process of statutory construction and the use of the foregoing maxims, that in order for a person to come within the purview of R. C. 2923.-56, the indictment under which he stands charged, must be one for a felony of violence and involving moral turpitude. The words “of violence and involving moral turpitude” are held to modify the word “indictment” as well as the word “convicted.”

4. A glance at the scant legislative history of this newly enacted (1969) Eevised Code Section bears out the foregoing contention. The substitute House Bill No. 484 (from which the bill finally enacted was drawn after conference with the Senate) carried the following pertinent language: “Is under indictment for a felony of violence and involving moral turpitude, or has been convicted of any felony. * * *” In the court’s opinion the change from this language to the language in the bill as finally enacted was for the .sole purpose of having the crucial words “of violence and involving moral turpitude” modify both the terms “indictment” and “convicted.”

5. The court holds that carrying a concealed weapon, while a felony, is not one of violence and involving moral turpitude.

TheeefoRe, it is the order of the court that the indictment in the captioned cause be quashed and the cause dismissed.

Indictment quashed.  