
    WARD v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 24, 1912.)
    1. Criminal Law (§ 10991 — Appeal—Statement of Facts.
    A statement of facts must be approved and signed by the trial judge in order to be part of the record.
    [Ed. Note. — Por other cases,, see Criminal Law, Cent.Dig. §§ 2866-2880; Dec.Dig. § 1099.1
    2. Criminal Law (§ 1091) — Appeal — Bill of Exceptions — Sufficiency.
    A bill of exceptions to a ruling excluding an answer which did not show what witness’ answer would have been, and contained no ground of objection to the ruling, will not be considered.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2823; Dec. Dig. § 1091.]
    3. Criminal Law (§ 1091) —Appeal—Bill of Exceptions — Admission of Evidence-Sufficiency.
    A bill of exceptions to the admission of evidence that did not show the ground of objections will not be considered on appeal.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2S19, 2823; Dec. Dig. § 1091.]
    4. Criminal Law (§ 1091) — Appeal—Bill of Exceptions.
    A statement of grounds of objection to the admission of evidence in a bill of exceptions is not a certificate of the judge that the facts stated are true; it being necessary for appellant to incorporate enough of the evidence in the bill to verify the truth of the objections.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2823; Dec. Dig. § 1091.]
    5. Criminal Law (§ 1144) —Appeal—Presumption.
    In the absence of a showing in the appellate record to the contrary, it must be presumed that the trial court properly admitted an alleged confession in evidence.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2736-2781, 2901, 3016-3037; Dec. Dig. § 1144.]
    6. Homicide (§ 171) — Admission of Evidence.
    A physician was properly allowed to testify in a homicide case that he arrived at the scene of the killing shortly thereafter, and that neither the attitude of the body nor the clothing indicated a struggle; the case being one of circumstantial evidence.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 351-358; Dec. Dig. § 171.]
    7. Witnesses (§ 359*) — Impeachment—Evidence — Indictment foe Crime.
    The best evidence of whether a witness had been indicted for rape, which was sought to be shown by way of impeachment, was a copy of the indictment; and, though witness could be asked that question, another witness could not testify that he had heard that such witness had been indicted for rape.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1153; Dec. Dig. § 359.]
    8. Homicide (§ 163) —Evidence—Charac- ' TER.
    Evidence was not admissible in a homicide action that accused was “a good worker”; that not being an issue.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 310-317; Dec. Dig. § 163.]
    9. Criminal Law (§ 1092) — Appeai>-Bill of Exceptions — Approval of Trial Court.
    A bill of exceptions, not approved by the trial court, cannot be considered.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2829, 2834-2861, 2919; Dec. Dig. § 1092.*]
    10. Criminal Law (§ 1144) — Appeau—Pre-sumption.
    In the absence of a statement of facts in the record, it must be presumed on appeal in a homicide case that the judge submitted the issues as made by the evidence; the charge having fully submitted the issues of first and second degree murder.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases', see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2918, 2921; Dec. Dig. § 1144.]
    Appeal from District Court,' Nacogdoches County; James I. Perkins, Judge.
    Johnson Ward was convicted of first-degree murder, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    A. T. Russell, J. F. Perritte, and W. A. Wade, all of Nacogdoches, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   HARPER, J.

In this case, the appellant was found guilty of murder in the first degree, and his punishment assessed at death.

There is what purports to be a statement of facts sent up with the transcript; but the same does not bear the approval of the judge trying the case. It does not even hear the signatures of the attorneys for the state or the appellant, nor any agreement that it is a correct statement of the evidence adduced on the trial. It has been held by this court that, to be of any validity whatever, the statement of facts must be approved and signed by the judge who tried the case; and that a document purporting to be a statement of facts, not approved and signed by the judge, constitutes no part of the record, even though agreed to by counsel for the state and defendant. In this case, the document has not even been agreed to by counsel; so, under the decisions, we cannot consider it for any purpose. Lawrence v. State, 7 Tex. App. 192; Bennett v. State, 16 Tex. App. 236; Johnson v. State, 29 Tex. 492; Baldwin v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 245, 45 S. W. 714; Bowen v. State, 42 S. W. 994; Green v. State, 43 S. W. 1005; Bailey v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 579, 40 S. W. 281; Loakman v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 563, 25 S. W. 22; White v. State, 9 Tex. App. 41. And see authorities cited in section 1169, White’s Ann. C. C. P., and section 40, Branch’s Crim. Law. This has been the unvaried rule since the organization of this court and in the Supreme Court, when it had jurisdiction of criminal cases. However, we have read the document attached to the transcript (this being a death penalty case), and the evidence recited therein would show that appellant killed his mother-in-law by shootiDg her, without just cause or provocation. We can, because we cannot consider the document filed, only pass on the ease as if we biad not read the document, and only review such matters as are presented by bills of exceptions.

In bill No. 2, it is not shown what the answer would have been, had appellant’s counsel been permitted to answer the question; and no grounds are stated of objection to the ruling of the court. In bill No. 4, it is shown a witness was asked a question and was permitted to answer, to which appellant “objected”; no grounds of objection being stated. Other bills are in the same condition. These cannot be considered. Tweedle v. State, 29 Tex. App. 586, 16 S. W. 544; May v. State, 25 Tex. App. 114, 7 S. W. 588; Green v. State, 43 S. W. 1003. And see authorities collated in section 1123, White’s Ann. C. C. P., and Branch’s Crim. Law, § 46.

In one bill, appellant objected to the confession, made by appellant, being introduced in evidence, the grounds of the objection being that it was not freely and voluntarily made; that defendant was not warned and cautioned as required by law; and that defendant was under arrest at the time it was made. These are the grounds, and it has been held that a mere statement of grounds of objection in a bill is not a certificate of the judge that the fact stated is true; it merely shows that such an objection was made. Defendant should incorporate so much of the evidence in the bill as would verify the truth of the objections made. Marsden v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 36, 126 S. W. 1161; Eulshear v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 376, 128 S. W. 135; Hunter v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 439, 129 S. W. 136; Douglas v. State, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 122, 124 S. W. 935, 137 Am. St. Rep. 930; Eerguson v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 205, 122 S. W. 552, and authorities cited in section 46, Branch’s Crim. Law, and section 1123, White’s Ann. C. C. P. However, the confession which is attached as an exhibit to the bill shows: “I, Johnson Ward, after being duly warned by W. B. O’Quinn, the district attorney, first, that I do not have to make any statement at all, and, second, that any statement made by me can be used against me on my trial for the offense concerning which my statement is made, do here and now make the following voluntary statement to the said W. B. O’Quinn.” Thus it is seen that the confession on its face renders it admissible, unless some fact was stated in the bill which would render it inadmissible; and, there being no statement of evidence in the bill, and we having no statement of facts that we can consider, we must presume that the court acted properly in admitting it in evidence.

It was not improper to permit the physician to state that he arrived at the scene of the homicide shortly thereafter, and there was nothing in the attitude of the body or the clothing to indicate a struggle. It was a case of circumstantial evidence, outside of the confession of defendant and his testimony adduced on the trial.

It was not error to refuse to permit a witness to state that he had heard that another witness had been indicted for rape. The best evidence was a copy of the indictment, or the witness could have been asked the question while he was on the witness stand; but another witness could not be interrogated in regard thereto.

Neither was it permissible to prove that defendant was a “good worker”; that was not an issue in the case.

Bill of exception No. 7 is not approved by the court; therefore we cannot consider it.

There being no statement of facts, and the charge of the court submitting fully murder in the first and second degrees, we must presume that it submitted the issues as made by the evidence; and we cannot, therefore, pass on the questions raised in the motion in regard to the charge of the court. We say again that when the death penalty is assessed we regret exceedingly that a record gets to us in such condition that we are not permitted to pass on each and every question suggested in the motion for new trial; but the rules of law bind us, as they bind the district judge, and as they bind one charged with an offense.

There being no error pointed out in the record as presented to us, the judgment is affirmed.  