
    The State v. David Westfield.
    Columbia,
    Dec 1828.
    One, wlio lias the general superintendence of a plantation, is “ a person having charge or government ” of the slaves attached to the plantation, within the meaning of the 20th section of the act of 1740, commonly called the negro act1, and is liable to an indictment, under that act, for concealing or conveying away one of the slaves, who has been accused of a capital crime, although the owner reside on the plantation, and is capable of personally superintending and directing its management.
    A person having tile charge or government of a slave, who has been accused of a capital crime, is liable to the penalties of the act of 1740, tor concealing or conveying away such slave, if he employ an agent, who removes the slave from the State, although he may not have personally aided the slave in effecting his escape.
    Whatever constitutes one an accessary in a capital offence renders him liable as principal in a misdemeanor.
    Tried before Mr. Justice Richardson, at Greenville, Spring Term, 1828.
    This ivas an indictment, under the 20th section of the act of 1740, commonly called the negro act, P. L. 1(58, for concealing and conveying away a slave, who had been accused of murder. The slave belonged to the defendant’s mother, who resided on a plantation to which the slave was attached, and who w as proved to be capable of managing and directing her property. The defendant, however, resided on the plantation, and had a general superintendence over its business and management. The slave, it appeared, had been removed beyond the State, so as to escape punishment ; and there was evidence that his removal had been effected by the agency of a person, who was employed by the defendant for the purpose : but there was no proof that the defendant had aided, or facilitated the escape of the slave, by any personal exertions of his own.
    The jury rendered a verdict of guilty; and the defendant now moved in arrest of judgment, or for a new trial on the following grounds. 1. That the defendant stood in no such relation to the slave, as to be subject to the penalties of the act. 2. That there was no evidence of the defendant’s having “ concealed, or conveyed away ” the said slave.
    W. Thompson, for the motion.
    Earle, Solicitor, contra.
    
   Nott, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The words of the act are, “ In case any master, or other person having charge or government of any slave, who shall be accused of any capital crime, shall conceal or convey away any such slave, so that he cannot be brought to trial and condign punishment, every master, or other person, so offending, shall forfeit the sum of two hundred and fifty pounds, &c.” P. L. 168. There are two descriptions of persons embraced within the provisions of this act; the master, and any other person having the charge or government of such slave. The owner of the slave in question was an elderly lady, and it is admitted, that the defendant, her son, had the general superintendence and management of her plantation and slaves. He therefore conies within both the terms and the policy of the law; and the act might be evaded upon any other construction. The owner of slaves might give general instructions to their oveersoers, to have them conveyed away on such occasions; and so the offence might be committed, without the owner having any knowledge of the fact having existed. The act, in all probability, was intended to be adapted to tire habit in this country of employing overseers, and others, to take charge and management of slaves ; and the latter words were introduced for the purpose of providing for such a case.

On the second ground it is contended, that as the defendant ii- . cud not convey away the slave in person, but employed another as h*s agent, he was merely an accessary, and could not Ihere-fore be convicted as principal. But it will be recollected, that whatever constitutes one an accessary in a capital offence, renders him liable as principal in a misdemeanor: and a person may even subject himself to capital punishment, by making another the innocent instrument of his criminality. The defendant therefore is not the less guilty, because he effected his purpose through the instrumentality of another. He was the efficient cause, while the agent may have been ignorant of the object, and innocent of the offence. The act would become a dead letter, if it could be defeated by a subterfuge of that sort.

The defendant was properly convicted ; and the motion must be refused on both grounds.

Motion refused.  