
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, CHARLESTON,
    JAN., 1811.
    S. H. Pratt v. Tunno and Price.
    A master may charge the owner for necessary supplies for the usual em. ' ployment of the vessel, but not for superfluities or luxuries.
    
      Quere. Whether he can bind the owner, even for necessaries, if the owner resides at the place where the necessaries are furnished.
    Motion for a new trial. Assumpsit to recover the amount of cer. tain groceries supplied by the plaintiff to the master of a brig he-longing to defendants, tried before Brkvaiíd, J., in Charleston, in which the plaintiff obtained a verdict. The plaintiff had been accus. tomed to furnish supplies necessary for the use of defendants’ vessels in the port of Charleston ; but the defendants had usually sent a clerk to direct the delivery of the articles. In the present case, the master of the brig had obtained the articles on his own application. Both the parties, plaintiff and defendants, lived in Charleston at tho time. Many of the anieles were such as are not usually considered necessaries, such as wines, coffee, &c.
    It was objected at ihe trial, that the master of a vessel, in the port where the owner resides, has ño authority to Lind tire our.or for necessary supplies for the vessel. Also, that under the circuit stances of this case, at all events, the master had no .-uch authority.And also, that the articles iuruhbed wete luxuries, and not noces, saries.
    
      
      Note. See Abbot, 86, 83, 92, 94, 302. 103, 104. 111. 2 Vera. Cowp 639. Kich, executor, v. Cox and al. Whoever supplies a ship with necessaries, has a treble security. 1, The person of the master. 2. The specific ship, if in foreign port. 3. The personal security of the owners, whether they know of the-supply or not. The owners are liable in consequence of the master’s act, because they choose him, &c. Cown. 636. See 2 Cainer, 77. Abbot, 104. 1 H. Bl. 116. 1 T. R. 108.
    The presiding judge left it to the jury to determine whether the articles furnished were reasonable and proper for the use cf the vessel or not. That if they were, the owners were liable, otherwise not; unless the understanding of the parties on the subject, established a different rule than that which is in general inferred, where the master obtains necessary supplies for his vessel. The general rule he stated to be this: That delivery to the master of a ship' of necessaries for the use of the ship, binds the owner of'theship to pay for the same, without any direct order, or promise of the owner, to deliver the same, or pay for the same. The character and situation of the master furnish presumptive evidence of authority from the owner. He is held up as the agent of the owner} as worthy of trust; and authorized to bind the owner for necessaries for the usual employment of the vessel. It was left to the jury to determine whether the parlies had contracted to abide by a different rule, or whether it was their mutual understanding that they were to-be governed by a different rule, or not. If it was the understanding of the parties that the master could not bind the owners in the usual-way, then plaintiff was not entitled to recover, although the supplies were reasonable and proper; otherwise be was entitled to recover, provided the articles were reasonable and proper.
   The court,

after hearing Ward, for the defendants, and Cross, for the plaintiff, determined that defendants should have the benefit of a new trial, on the ground that many of the articles appeared to be luxuries, and not necessaries; and that the amount of the supplies-was extravagant and unreasonable. Some of the judges were of opinion the general rule does not authorize masters in the porff where the owner resides, to bind the owner for necessaries.  