
    *Stevenson v. Singleton.
    February, 1829.
    Contracts -Between Master and Slave — Validity.— Contract between master and slave, whereby the master agreed to emancipate the slave, for $1000 to be paid by the slave to him. of which the slave paid 8560. Held, that the chancellor cannot, on a bill by the slave against the master, enforce such contract so partly performed.
    Same — Same.—Held, generally, that the chancellor cannot enforce any contract between master and slave, though It be fully performed on the slave's part.
    Robert Gibbon, on the 11th December 1818, agreed with his slave Richard Singleton, the appellee, that he would sell him to himself, or in other words, that he would emancipate him, in consideration of the sum of a thousand dollars to be paid to him by the slave. Of this sum, 400 dollars were to be paid in cash, 300 were to be secured to be paid on the 1st January 1820, and the other 300 on the 1st January 1821. The 400 dollars were paid accordingly, in cash, by the appellee; and William E'oushee and Andrew Stevenson, as his friends, executed their joint notes or bonds to Gibbon, for the two sums of 300 dollars each, payable as aforesaid. But no deed of emancipation was executed by Gibbon. On the contrary, E'oushee and Stevenson required, as a security for their indemnification, that Gibbon should convey the slave to them, by bill of sale in due form; which was done accordingly. The intention of the parties, however, was that the slave should be emancipated whenever he should pay to his former master, or to his sureties, the amount of the notes. He was thereupon permitted by E'oushee and Stevenson to go at large and act as a freeman, for the purpose of raising the funds necessary for the completion of his right to freedom. It appears, that he paid to Gibbon at different times, in part of the first note, the sum of 166 dollars, which with the 400 paid at the commencement of the transaction, amounted to S66 dollars. He contended, that he also paid to William E'oushee other sums, in the confidence that he would pay them over to his former master: but this was denied by E'oushee. In January 1821, after both notes had become due, Gibbon insisted on immediate ^'payment; and as the appellee was unable to pay the money, and E'oushee and Stevenson were unwilling to advance it for him, an arrangement was made with Gibbon, by which they re-conveyed the slave to him, in consideration of his delivering up their notes. Gibbon appears to have been still very willing to give freedom to the appellee, provided he could have got the balance of the money. The appellee commenced this suit, in forma pauperis, in the superiour court of chancery of Richmond against E'oushee, Stevenson and Gibbon: and that court decreed, that the appellee was free, and entitled to all the immunities of a free man of colour; and that E'oushee and Stevenson should pay to the administrators of Gibbon (who had died pending the suit) the money due on their notes, with interest thereon. From this decree Stevenson appealed to this court.
    Leigh for the appellant, and Nicholas assigned counsel for the appellee,
    submitted the case, without argument.
    
      
      Contracts — Between Master and Slave — Validity.— It Is -well settled that a contract between a master and his slave, for the future emancipation of the slave cannot be enforced against the master, although It may have been fully performed outlie part of the slave. Shue v. Turk, 15 Gratt. 265, 275, citing Sawney v. Carter. 6 Rand. 173; Stevenson v. Singleton, 1 Leigh 72. To the same effect the principal case is died in Bailey v. Poindexter, 14 Gratt. 193. and note: Williamson v. Coalter, 14 Gratt. 397; Woodland v. Newhall, 31 Fed. Rep. 438; Wood v. Ward. 30 Fed. Cas. 482. See monographic note on “Contracts,” appended to Endevs v. Board of Public Works, 1 Gratt. 364.
    
   CABELL, J.,

delivered the opinion of the’ court. In the case of Sawney v. Carter, 6 Rand. 173, this court refused, on great consideration, to enforce a promise by a master to emancipate his slave, where the conditions of the promise had been partly complied with by the slave. It is impossible to’ distinguish that case from this. The court proceeded on the principle, that it is not competent to a court of chancery to enforce a contract between master and slave, even although the contract should be fully complied with on the part of the slave. The decree of the chancellor must be reversed and the bill dismissed.  