
    John Eubanks v. Randolph Peak.
    S’ an adult contract with an infant, the former will be bound by the contract, although it may not be binding on the latter. And where an agreement, in writing, intended to bean indenture of apprenticeship, was entered into with an adult, by an infant and his parent, but was not executed, as prescribed by the act of 1740: held, that as a contract between the adult and She infant, alone, it was binding on the Former, at common law ; and that the infant, on performing the services stipulated on his pan, might maintain an action for a breach of the agreement on the part of the adult.
    If a parent contract for the services of his child, during his minority, in consideration of a remuneration to be bestowed on the latter, the contract is valid, and will enure to the benefit of the childj who may maintain an action for a breach of it, in his own name.
    An infant released a contract with an adult, on receiving a consideration agreed on between them: and on his becoming afterwards dissatisfied with the settlement, the matters in dispute were submitted to arbitrators, who made an award confirming the release. After coming of age, the infant frequently declared that he was satisfied with the settlement; and he retained the property, which he had received in consideration of the release : but subsequently brought an action on the contract. Held, that his declarations, and 'emining the property, amounted to a confirmation of the release, and barred his action on the contract.
    Tried before Mr. Justice Earle, at Union, Spring Terra, 1831.
    This was an action of assumpsit on a written agreement, in the forra of an indenture of apprenticeship, but not under seal, as prescribed by the act of 1740, P. L. 176, which had been entered into by the mother of the plaintiff, and himself, with the defendant. The terms of this agreement were, that the plaintiff, who was then under age, should serve the defendant faithfully, as his apprentice in the business of farming, until he attained the age of 21 years ; and the defendant, on his part, agreed to give the plaintiff one year’s schooling during the apprenticeship, and at the end of the term, to give him a horse, saddle, and bridle, worth $75, and a suit of store clothes. The plaintiff lived with the defendant, as his apprentice, until about two months before the expiration of the period of the apprenticeship ; when tl».'y separated, upon an agreement entered into by them, with the consent of the plaintiff’3 mother, by Which, in consideration of a'horse, saddle, and bridle, and a share of his crop, which the defendant promised to give the plaintiff, the latter released all his claims on the defendant, under the original contract. This agreement was indorsed on the indenture, and was-signed by the plaintiff, and his mother, and by the defendant. The plaintiff received the stipulated share of defendant’s crop, and a horse,saddle, and bridle, which were valued, by different witnesses, at from $47, to $72. Whilst he lived with the defendant the plaintiff bad been sent to school for three months: and the defendant wished him to go for riiné months more,.to make up the period stipulated in the indenture ; but the plaintiff, refused to go, and threatened, if he were sent, to ru n away. After leaving the defendant, the plaintiff became dissatisfied with the. terms of the settlement between them ; and the matters in dispute were referred to arbitrators, who made an award confirming the settlement. It was doubtful from the evidence, whether the plaintiff was, or was not, of age, at the time of the reference to arbitration ; but it was fully proved, that after he came of age, and more than twelve months after the arbitration, he frequently declared himself perfectly satisfied with his settlement with the defendant. It was also admitted, that the plaintiff still retained the property, which he had received from the defendant, on the settlement between them.
    The defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the grounds : 1. That the indenture, not having been executed, as prescribed by the act of(1740, was absolutely void. 2. That the plaintiff’s evidence shewed, that the matters in dispute had been finally settled by arbitration ; and if the plaintiff was then under age, it lay upon him to prove it, which had not been done.
    
    The presiding Judge refused the motion; but instructed,the jury, that if the plaintiff was of age at the time of the submission to arbitration, the award was a bar to the claim now set up by him. That it. was doubtful, whether, under any circumstances, lie could maintain this action, without proof of his having offers-.d to return the property, which he had received as an equivalent for his claims; and the jury would be justified in finding a verdict for the defendant. The jury, however, found for the plaintiff one hundred dollars.
    
      The defendant now renewed his motion for a nonsuit; and ¡failing that motion, moved for a new trial, on the ground, that the verdict was contrary to law, and the evidence.
    A. W. Thomson, for the motion.
    Herndon, contra,
    
   O’Neall, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

There is no doubt that if an adult contract with an infant, She adult will be bound by the contract, although it may not be binding.on the infant. In the case before us, the contract was not legally executed as an indenture of apprenticeship ; but regarding it as made between the plaintiff and the defendant, alone, it was still a binding contract on the defendant, at common law, if the plaintiff performed the services which were-the consideration of the defendant’s undertaking. But the mother, during the minority of the son, was intitled to his services ; and if she chose to place him with the defendant, and to contract that the plaintiff should serve him until he was of She age of twenty-one years, and that for his services the defendant should remunerate him by schooling, and the delivery of property; it was a valid contract, which enured to the benefit •of the plaintiff, and on which he could maintain this action.

If the plaintiff’s case rested here, therefore, there could be no doubt that he would have been intitled to recover, for his services, the price agreed to be paid. But it appears, that just before maturity he compounded with the defendant, and released, or discharged the contract. Subsequently too, the matters which are now in dispute were referred, by the parties, to arbitration, and an award was made in favour of the defendant; and at this time it is at least questionable, whether the plaintiff was not of full age. But after he had attained to maturity, he expressed himself satisfied with the settlement which he had made with the defendant during his minority : and he still retains the property which he received from, the defendant, as a satisfaction for the price agreed to be paid for his services. The question which arises out of these facts, is, whether they do not amount to a confirmation of the settlement, and discharge, made during infancy.

j If an adult, not bound by a contract made while an infant, j promises, nevertheless, to perform it; or if he retains property purchased during infancy ; either of these recognitions of his contract will confirm it, and render it legally binding upon him. See Bobo v. Hansell, decided December Term, 1830, at Columbia, (ante, p. 114.) Cheshire v. Barrett, 4 M’C. 241. Alexander and wife v. Heriot, Commissioner, on an appeal in Equity, at Charleston, February Term, 1831. The facts stated, make out both the express and the implied confirmation of the contract of settlement: and upon them the jury should have been instructed, that, if they were proved to their satisfaction, they should find for the defendant. It is true, the plaintiff did not receive the schooling which the defendant, had agreed to give him, and on the settlement received nothing which was an equivalent to it in value. But it was his own fault that he did not receive the schooling. He refused to go to school: and although the defendant, exercising the power of a master, might have whipped him, and thus have coerced him to go ; yet it is most likely, that if this had been done, he would now be complaining more loudly of the stripes which he had received, than he does for the loss of the little education, which his own folly rejected. It is, I think, difficult to compute how much an education commenced, and perfected, against the will, and by force, is worth. Generally the time thus devoted to an ignorant, and unwilling schollar, is thrown away ; and neither information or good habits result from it. But at all events, if the defendant offered to send the plaintiff to school, and he refused to go; and after he was of full age declared himself satisfied with a settlement, in which he received a supposed equivalent for it; he ought not now to be permitted to complain on that account. The motion for a new trial is granted.  