
    Butler vs. Duval.
    A promissory note was made at Jackson, Tennessee, payable at the Bank of the United States at New Orleans to As (who resided at Jackson,) who endorsed it to B. of Nashville, who endorsed it to C. of Ger-mantown in Pennsylvania, who endorsed it for collection to the Cashier of the Bank of 'Germantown, who endorsed it for the samp purpose to the Cashier of the Bank of the United States at Philadelphia, who endorsed it to the Cashier of the United States Bank at New Orleans., for collection, where it was deposited: the note was not paid. Held, that for the purpose of charging the fiist.endorser, it m.ade.no difference whéther the Bank acted as owners or agents. 'Held, also, that each endorser is entitled to notice from'his endorsee, and that the notices travelling by circuity, from last to first, is sufficient to charge the first endorser. Held, also, that noti any one party to the preceding parties, will be sufficient notice. '
    This was a suit brought by Duval against Butler as endorser upon a promissory note. The note was executed by Chester and Dulany at Jackson, Tenn. payable to said Butler, who lived in Jackson, or to his order at the office of discount and deposite of the Bank of the United States at New Orleans. Butler endorsed the note to Robert Armstrong of Nashville, and Armstrong endorsed it to the plaintiff, who resided in Germantown,'Penn.- Duval deposited the note for collection in the Germantown Bank; the latter deposited it in the Bank of the United States, by which latter Bank it was transmitted to the branch at New Orleans, where -it was payable. ’ The note was duly presented for payment; payment was refused, and the note protested. The protest, note and notice of the non-payment, were transmitted to the Bank at Philadelphia. The latter Bank sent them to the Bank at Ger-mantown. Notice of the non-payment was given by the latter Bank to Duval, and Duval notified Butler and Armstrong. The notices were all sent by the different parties, by the first mail after they were received. Duval was the owner of the note, and-knew the place of residence of the maker and endorsers. He was also in-^ormec^ Butler was the only responsible man upon the
    
    The jury under the charge of the circuit court returned a verdict for the plaintiff, upon which judgment was entered.
    
      J. P. Clark for the plaintiff in error.
    1st. The no-» tice to Butler in this case is insufficent to charge him with the payment of this note. The contract of an endorser is only conditional, depending upon the fact whether the holder has made demand of the maker, and duly notified the endorser. Chitty on Bills, 315-16, (notes:) 2 John. 'Cases, 75: 9 John. Rep. 121: 12 John. 423: 7 Term Rep. 581. And so strict is the law in this requirement, that known insolvency will not excuse or dispense with it. Douglass’ Rep. 497: 11 East 114: 2 Bos. and Pul. 279: Chitty on Bills, 271, 57.
    2d. Notice must be direct and not circuitous: it must be direct to the place of residence or to the post office nearest to the residence of the endorser. The object of the law is to give the endorser the earliest information so that he may if possible secure himself. Chitty on Bills, 272, 282, 285: 12 Modern Rep. 309: 7 East’s Rep. 359: 5 Burrow’s Rep. 541: 10 John. Rep. 490: 11 John. Rep. 187, 231: 7 Mass. Rep. 483: 3 Hawkes’ Rep. 453: 3 Kent’s Com. 73.
    If the note had passed to the Bank at Germantown, and the Bank at Philadelphia in a due course of trade, by being negociated for value, then the law, by way of extending favor and encouragement to such paper, for commercial purposes, would say that notices in the same channel through which the note was negotiated, would be good, but not otherwise. Chitty on Bills, 291, 295,271, 274 : 2 Camp. Rep. 373 and 208: 6 East’s Rep. 3: 3 John. Cases, 89.
    In this case Duval being the holder and owner of the pote, the Bank at New Orleans was his agent, and as such was bound to give direct notice. Chitty on Bills, 37: Hall vs. Barker, M. and Yerger’s Rep. 184: 18 John. Rep. 230: 20 John. Rep. 372: 1 Peter’s Rep. 25.
    
      F. jB. Fogg, for the defendant in error,
    contended that the notice was in conformity with the universal practice in England and America, and referred to the case of the Bank of the United States vs. Goddard, 5 Mason’s Rep. 366, and the cases there cited. Also Mead vs. Young, 5 Cowan’s Rep. 203: Chitty on Bills, 315, 404; Colt vs. Noble, 5 Mass. Rep. 167.
   Catson, Ch. J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

The question in this cause is, whether due diligence was used to notify Butler, the first endorser, of the nonpayment of the note by the makers.

The paper sued on was made payable at the Branch Bank of the United States at New Orleans; of course as the contract was to be there performed, the laws of that place governed it. No local legislation of Louisiana has changed the general commercial law of America and Europe; which law must determine the rights of these parties.

To see what the duties of Duval were, we must look to the contract and the parties to it at the time it was dishonored ; it is as follows:

“$3060 50. — On the first day of May, one thousand eight hundred and thirty, we or either of us promise to pay William E. Butler, or order, three thousand and sixty dollars and fifty cents, payable at the office of discount and deposite of the Bank of the United States at New Orleans, for value received. Witness our hands and seals.

Jackson, 24th March, 1828.

Jno. K. Chester, (Seal.)

F. C. Dulaney, (Seal.)

Endorsed — Wm. E. Butler, R. Armstrong, James S.

Duval, Jno. F. Weison, Cashier, pay S. Jaudon, Cash» ier, or order, J. Andrews.

The p0te Was made at Jackson, Tennessee, where the makers, and Butler the first endorser, resided, it was passed off to Robert Armstrong of Nashville, who transferred it to James S. Duval of Germantown, Pennsylvania. Duval endorsed it for the purpose of collection, and deposited it in the Germantown Bank. The cashier of that Bank, Weison, endorsed it and deposited it in the United States Bank at Philadelphia, for collection. Andrews, an officer of that Bank, endorsed it to Jaudon, Cashier of the Branch Bank at New Orleans for collection. The court below charged the jury, “That it made no difference whether the Banks acted as holders or agents for plaintiff; the principles of notice being the same in either case.”

On the matter of law expressed by the charge, the cause depends. Is it true, that the agents for collection, whose names are on the note, must be treated as holders for value, so far as regards Butler, the previous endorser? Had he paid the note to Jaudon when due, or to Andrews when returned to Philadelphia, or to Weison when returned to him at Germantown, would not Duval have been estopped to deny the power of either to receive the money? The payment would have been a discharge to Butler, and Duval could not be heard to say, a holder in fact, had no authority to receive payment.

Estoppels are reciprocal and bind both parties. 4 Com. D. Estoppel (B.)

If Duval would have been estopped to call in question the character in which the endorsees subsequent to him held, had Butler paid, so is Butler estopped when Duval is attempting to enforce payment. Every endorser in fact, and every holder in fact, must be treated as a party to commercial paper, passing as current cash. Were it otherwise, the community would be cheated every day, by persons who passed banknotes, bills of exchange, and promissory notes, payable to bearer and endorsed in blank. Very often the holder in fact has no title, and sometimes is a common thief; but the purchaser m the ,. . . . . , . 1 . , . course or trade cannot inquire alter his title, more than he can take time to trace the holder’s title to the guinea or dollar, nor need he enquire how or why the endorser’s name came on the paper, so it be there in fact. Jaudon, Andrews and Weison might have brought this suit, and no enquiry could have been made by Butler, what were the responsibilities as between the endorsees posterior to him. It was therefore, truly charged by the circuit court, that it made no difference whether the Banks acted as owners or agents. Such is the settled commercial law in England and America. Haynes vs. Hicks 3 Bos. and Pull. 597: Longdale vs. Trummer, 15 East, 291: Colt vs. Noble, 5 Mass. R. 167: U. S. Bank vs. Goddard, 5 Mason’s R. 366.

This rule being settled, the next is, and one of thq oldest governing commercial paper, that on its dishonor by the maker or acceptor, the holder applies to his immediate endorser for payment, the latter notifies the endorser immediately preceding him, and so on to the first, the notices by circuity tracing, from last to first, the parties liable. If in this manner, the first endorser of a' note, (or drawer of a bill,) gets notice, his liability is fixed as to him to whom he endorsed, which was the making of a new note or bill; and being liable to one, is so to every subsequent endorser. See authorities above, and 2 Camp. 373: 1 Starli/e7 34: 18 Johns. 327.

Truly, any party to the paper may notify all the previous parties to it, of its dishonor directly, and this is due diligence as is1 seen by the foregoing authorities; and this is the practice in Tennessee; still circuity of notice is the older rule, and equally well settled. The court thinks there is no doubt in this case, and orders the judgment to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  