
    Shirley Jean HARDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 83-1581.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    July 5, 1984.
    Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Anthony Calvello, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Andrew N. Altman, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Reversed on authority of Hicks v. State, 452 So.2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

DOWNEY, J., concurs.

GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs only in reversal with opinion.

HURLEY, J., concurs specially with opinion.

GLICKSTEIN, Judge,

concurring only in the reversal.

I concur in the reversal because it was error for the trial court to proceed as it did. However, I disagree with the analysis and “per se” rule adopted in Hicks v. State, 452 So.2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), for all of the reasons recited in my concurring and dissenting opinion in Hooper v. State, 452 So.2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), which I need not repeat here.

Whatever the Supreme Court of Florida decides, I hope it will resolve the conflicts between the district courts of appeal at an early date becaue of two important concerns. First, there is an ongoing lack of uniformity which affects a growing number of probationers as well as trial judges, prosecutors and defense counsel who are caught up in the conflict. Second, the taxpayers’ resources are involved. If the Supreme Court adopts the view of the Second District Court of Appeal in Smith v. State, 427 So.2d 773, 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), and of this court in Hicks, then (a) the cases in the First District Court of Appeal including Sanderson v. State, 447 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) and any subsequent thereto will have to be reprocessed; and (b) it would seem appropriate for the Legislature as the people’s surrogate, after specific focus and debate, to consider response to any decision not only in a constitutionally permissible manner but, more important, as the people’s spokespersons making statutory expressions of our citizens’ social value judgments.

HURLEY, Judge,

concurring specially.

In addition to the compelling policy considerations set forth in Hicks v. State, 452 So.2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), it is important to note that in Florida imposition of sentence is withheld when a defendant is placed on probation. See § 948.01(3), Fla. Stat. (1983). Consequently, Florida’s method of processing probation revocations is factually indistinguishable from that described in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967), and, therefore, I believe that appointment of counsel is constitutionally mandated. See In re Wentworth, 17 Wash.App. 644, 564 P.2d 810 (1977).  