
    Labinot KRASNIQI, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-3200.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 15, 2012.
    
      Joshua Bardavid, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Russell J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel; Jennifer R. Khouri, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Labinot Krasniqi, a native of the former Yugoslavia and a citizen of Kosovo, seeks review of an August 5, 2011 decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Labinot Krasniqi, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Aug. 5, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). The BIA “ordinarily will not grant [a motion to reopen] unless the mov-ant has met the ‘heavy burden’ of demonstrating a likelihood that the new evidence presented would alter the result in the case.” Li Yong Cao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir.2005). In other words, where a movant seeks to reopen removal proceedings involving the denial of asylum, the BIA may deny relief based on “the movant’s failure to make a prima facie case of eligibility for asylum.” Id. (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)).

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Krasniqi’s motion to reopen on the ground that he failed to establish that the evidence presented in his motion would likely alter the result in the case. The evidence at issue did not suggest that the government in Kosovo was or would be unwilling or unable to protect him from his alleged persecutors — Stan-kon Reskovich, a private citizen, and former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (“KLA”). See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (“[P]rivate acts may be persecution [for asylum purposes] if the government has proved unwilling to control such actions.”). Moreover, the evidence at issue did not undermine the agency’s conclusion that Krasniqi failed to establish that he was persecuted, or had a well-founded fear of future persecution, on account of a protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Because the BIA reasonably concluded that Krasniqi failed to establish prima fa-cie eligibility for asylum, it did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen. See Li Yong Cao, 421 F.3d at 156. In light of this conclusion, we decline to reach the issue of whether the evidence presented with Krasniqi’s motion was previously available within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  