
    The State of Ohio ex rel. William H. Bates v. The Trustees of Richland Township, Vinton County. The State of Ohio ex rel. William H. Boyer v. The City of Circleville.
    1. The act of April 0, 1868, to amend “An act to provide a bounty for' veteran volunteers” (63 O. L. 188), and the “Act to authorize and require the payment of bounties to veteran volunteers,” passed April 16, 1867 (64 O. L. 232), cannot, by fair construction, be limited as applying onlj to cases where the enlistment was made on the faith of a promise of bounty by the public authorities of the locality receiving credit for the enlistment on its quota.
    2. The duty imposed upon the municipal subdivisions of the State by these acts, does not arise out of any contract relation supposed to exist between them and the volunteers, but is devolved upon them by the legislature in the exercise of the taxing power of the State, and of the power of apportioning taxation.
    3. The counties, townships, and cities are public agencies in the system of the State government; and, in the class of laws above referred to, they are employed by the legislature as mere instruments to raise a tax for a public object, and to effect its equitable distribution among those for whom it was intended.
    4. Said acts, therefore, are not retroactive laws within the meaning of seo.. 28, art. 2, of the constitution.
    Mandamus.
    Tbe cases are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion of tbe' court.
    
      H. C. Jones for Bates, tbe relator:
    A peremptory mandamus is asked under the act of April 13, 1865, and tbe amendatory act of April 6, 1866 (63 O. L. 188, 189).
    These acts are not retroactive. They are merely explanatory of prior acts, and cure defects and omissions in them.. No obligation is impaired; no vested rights are divested; no new obligation is created for a consideration passed. The obligations existing, the amendatory act of 1866 only directed the trustees to perform their duties. Lewis v. McElvain, 16 Ohio, 347; Atcheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203-7; Bartholomew v. Bently, 1 Ohio St. 37.
    
      Alfred Yaple for respondents :
    1. The act of April 6, 1866 (63 O. L. 188), and the amendatory act of March 7,1867 (64 O. L. 35), “ to provide a. bounty for veteran volunteers,” so far as they seek to make it obligatory upon the respondents to issue to the relator a veteran volunteer bond, as prayed for, are in clear violation of sec-. 28, art. 2, of the constitution of Ohio, which provides that “ the general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws.” Rairden & Burnet v. Holden, Adm'r, 15 Ohio St. 207; The Society v. Wheeler, 2 Gallison, 139.
    These acts present no case of contract, express or implied,, to do what the legislature might authorize, and, therefore, enforceable. They simply seek “ to create a new obligation, to impose a new duty, in respect to transactions and considerations already past.” They are, therefore, retroactive.
    2. The question presented in this case has never been decided in Ohio, and is not touched by the decisions in Cass Township v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St. 39; and The State ex rel. Anderson v. Harris et al., 17 Ohio St. 608.
    When the relator re-enlisted as a veteran volunteer, and' had himself credited to Richland township, there was no-contract or understanding between him and the township,, or any one authorized to contract for it, that it should pay him any bounty bond. There was no law requiring it to-do so.
    Can the legislature, out of a past transaction, amounting, to nothing when it took place, by a future law, create an obligation in favor of one person against another, or against a* quasi corporation, municipal in its character, without the consent, and against the expressed will, of the latter ? I think not. Such a law would savor somewhat of retroaction. That is this case.
    These respondents claim that if this and some thirteen or fourteen other veteran bounty claims, now depending on the issue of this case against them, are valid, they will have furnished actually more men to the army than ever were liable to military duty in their township.
    If private property cannot be taken for a public use with•out compensation, can people be forced to contribute their money for the private use of individual persons %
    
    
      Henry F. Page (with J. A. Lutz) for Boyer, the relator:
    The Constitutional question made in this case by the respondent is settled by the decisions of this court in the eases of Cass Township v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St. 39; and The State ex rel. Anderson v. Harris et al., 17 Ohio St. 608.
    If any further argument is necessary, it will be found in -the following cases: Booth v. Woodberry, 32 Conn. 118; Freeland et al. v. Hastings et al., 10 Allen, 570; Weiser et al. v. Hade et al., 52 Penn. St. 474; Howell v. The City of Buffalo, 37 N. Y. 267.
    
      R. A. Harrison (with C. J. Delaplane, city solicitor) for the city of Circleville :
    Ten acts were passed by the legislature of Ohio, on the .subject of bounties, prior to the act of April 16, 1867. S. & S. 476 et seg. These acts merely authorized offers of local bounty to be made, and the levying of taxes to raise bounty money. The main feature of the Ohio system of paying local bounties to volunteers, was what has been decided by the supreme court of Pennsylvania to have been the principal feature of the same system in that State. The whole •system was pervaded by one prominent feature, to wit: the voluntary action of the people, through their public authorities, in offering the boimties to the acceptance of those who would volunteer for the proffered sum. Washington County v. Berwick, 56 Penn. St. 466.
    Hence, in giving a proper construction to several bounty acts of Pennsylvania, that court held, in several cases, with-entire unanimity, that no one could compel payment of the bounty unless he volunteered upon the faith of an offer bj the public authorities, authorized by law to offer bounties for the locality from which he enlisted and to which he was credited; in short, that a recovery could only be founded, upon a contract relation.
    Now, the act of April 16,1867, if the construction given to it by the relator’s counsel be the correct one, is inconsistent with all the preceding bounty acts. Por it not only authorizes, but imperatively requires cities, etc., to pay bounties to persons to whom such city did not make any promise or give any pledge to pay bounties. If the act is to receive that construction, then it assumes to and does create debts where none existed before, and it coerces the payment of such debt by taxation. I submit that this is not within the constitutional power of the legislature. Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 76, 84.
    The fact that Boyer “ credited ” himself to the city of Circleville did not create a debt in his favor against the city. Washington County v. Berwick, supra; Brecknock School District v. Frankhouser, 58 Penn. St. 380.
    See Musser v. Ferguson Tp., 55 Penn. St. 475; and soldier’s bounty cases, in 53 Penn. St. 180; Ib. 214; Ib. 217; Ib. 221, which are to the effect that in this class of cases no obligation arises except on contract, express or implied; and that while a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for an express promise, it is not a legal consideration, and no promise can be implied from it.
    If the statute in question is so broad as to embrace the relator’s claim, a city that wholly or partially filled its quota may be burdened with an onerous debt by “ credits ” given to it against its consent, and largely in excess of the amount of indebtedness it was willing to incur, and when it was under no legal or moral obligation to incur the same.
    If one saves another’s property from destruction by fire, this, of itself, affords no ground for an action. Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 28.
    
      Rules of construction, applicable to the statute upon which the relator asserts his claim, have been adopted, and enforced in numerous cases.
    It is well settled, that several acts in pari materia, and relating to the same subject, are to be taken together in construing them; because they are considered as having one object in view, and as acting on one system. The object of the rule is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention; .and it is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious. See Hirn v. The State, 1 Ohio St. 15, 20; Callender v. P. & H. R. R. Co., 11 Ohio St. 516, 523; Northern Bank of Ky. v. Roosa, 11 Ohio, 334, 366; Smith, Ex'r, v. Smith et al., 13 Ohio St. 532, 540; The State, etc., v. Marlow, 15 Ohio St. 114, 135. The general system of legislation upon the subject-matter may be taken into view, in order to aid the construction of one statute relating to the same subject; and it is proper to consider other statutes in pawi materia, whether they be repealed or unrepealed. Sedgwick on Stat. & Const. Law. 247; 3 Mass. 17, 296, 418; 1 Pick. 248; 10 Pick. 235; 2 Bailey, 541, 544; Cooke, 258; Brevard, 185, 213, 243; 2 Scammon, 144; 9 Cowen, 507; 5 Monroe, 157; 15 Johnson, 380; 1 Kent, 433; 2 Bibb, 80, 96; 1 Kelly, 32; 2 Zabriskie, 143; 2 Gilman, 221; 19 Vermont, 230; 4 Florida, 445; 3 Howard (U. S.), 516; 12 N. H. 284.
    It frequently becomes the duty of courts, in giving effect to the intention of a statute, to restrain, enlarge or qualify the ordinary and literal meaning of the words used. See Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 469: 1 Bacon’s Abr. pp. 38, 45, 50.
    To give the statute any other construction than that which I have endeavored to show is its proper construction, would render it obnoxious to the objection that it violates the first clause of section 28, article 2, of the constitxition of this State, which declares that “the general assembly shall have mo power to pass retroactive laws.”
    Every statute which takes away or impairs vested right» acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, is retroactive. Rairden et al. v. Holden, Adm'r, 15 Ohio St. 207; The Society v. Wheeler, 2 Gallison, 139; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 386.
    It must be admitted, that prior to the statute under consideration, the city of Circleville was under no obligation to pay a bounty to the relator; that but for the passing of that act he could not have coerced the city to pay to him a single dollar on account of his re-enlistment. Therefore, if the statute has the effect of creating a binding obligation on the part of the city of Circleville to pay the relator one hundred dollars, on account of his re-enlistment, without any contract, express or implied, between him and the city, its operation is plainly and wholly retroactive.
    According to the principles laid down in Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 83 (supra), the legislature had no power’, independently of the constitutional prohibition, to create the obligations which it attempted to create, by passing the act under consideration.
    Even where a moral obligation may be fairly said to rest upon a municipality, the legislature cannot convert it into a legal demand, and coerce its payment, notwithstanding it may be held that the legislature can empower the citizens of the municipality to assume the burden and discharge it, if they elect to do so. Hasbrook v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37.
    The questions involved in this case did not arise and were not decided in the cases of Cass Township v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St. 39, and The State ex rel. Anderson v. Harris et al., 17 Ohio St. 608. The principles upon which they rest do not sustain the demand of the relator in this case.
   White, J.

The relators in these cases re-enlisted as veteran volunteers, under requisitions of the President of the United States during the late rebellion. Bates was credited upon the quota of Richland Township, and Boyer upon the quota of the city of Circleville. Neither received any local bounty; and tbe object of these suits is to compel the defendants by mandamus to pay the bounty to which the relators respectively claim to be entitled under certain acts of the' general assembly.

The claim of Bates is founded on .the act of April 6, 1866,. entitled “ An act to amend an act to provide a bounty for veteran volunteers,’ passed April 13, 1865” (63 O. L. 188);; that of Boyer on “An act to authorize and require the payment of bounties to veteran volunteers,” passed April 16, 1867. 64 O. L. 232.

So far as affects the question in these cases the acts are substantially alike. The first section of the act first named provides : “ That the commissioners of the several counties, the trustees of the several townships, and the city councils of the several cities of this State, are hereby authorized and required to issue to each re-enlisted veteran volunteer, who has been heretofore credited upon the quota of such county,, township, or city, or any ward of such city, under any requisition of the President of the United States for volunteers, during the late rebellion, and who has not received any local bounty upon said re-enlistment, a bond for the sum of one hundred dollars, bearing six per cent.-interest, redeemable,” etc.

This act is imperative in its terms, and cannot be limited,, as contended for in argument, as applying only to cases where the enlistment was made on the faith of a promise of bounty by the public authorities of the locality receiving the credit on its quota.

Under the authority of the act of Congress, the military force required was apportioned to the several localities; and. where the quotas were not furnished by volunteers, the deficiency was to be supplied from the inhabitants by draft.

The plain intent of the acts in question is to provide a bounty of a hundred dollars for all those who, by re-enlisting, had contributed to relieve the locality from draft, and who' had not otherwise received a local bounty, irrespective of assurances by the local authorities inducing the enlistment.

The only remaining objection to granting the writs of. mandamus is, that the acts of the legislature on which the applications of the relators are founded are in violation of sec. 28, art. 2, of the constitution, which prohibits the passing' of retroactive laws.

This objection was made to another statute belonging to-the same class as those now in question, in the case of The State ex rel. Anderson v. Harris et al. (17 Ohio St. 608), and was held by the court to be invalid. It was said in that case that the validity of the law did not depend on the existence of power in the legislature to create a contract between-the county and the volunteers; nor was it an act which impaired vested rights, or the validity of contracts. The authority for the act was found in the general grant of legislative power, which includes taxation in all its forms, botbi general and local, unless restrained by other parts of the constitution.

The duty imposed upon the municipal subdivisions of the State does not arise out of any contract relation supposed to* exist between them and the volunteers; but is devolved upon them by the legislature in the exercise of the taxing power of the State, and of the power of apportioning taxation.

The only question is whether the legislature in exercising this power transcended their authority.

A law designed to raise money by taxation for a public-object, and in the performance of what the legislature, from, a sense of justice, regard as a public duty, and which operates equally upon all, cannot be regarded as a retroactive law-

This is apparent from a consideration of the section of the-constitution already referred to, in connection with the 29th section of the same article.

The inhibition contained in section 28, against the passing: of retroactive laws, is absolute. “ The general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws.” Yet, notwithstanding this denial of power to pass retroactive laws, the power of the legislature to pass laws to provide for and pay claims, which have no legal foundation, is clearly recognized in section 29; provided such laws receive the assent of the requisite number of members of the legislative body.

The tax provided for in the laws in question is to be raised for a public object, and in the discharge of what the legislature regarded as a public duty towards those who had, by voluntarily entering the military service, contributed to fill the quota of the State and save it from the consequences of a forced draft.

A large proportion of this class had received bounties in various sums, while many had received nothing; and as all had rendered equal service, it was regarded as but just that some rule of uniform operation should be adopted on the subject.

It certainly would have been competent for the legislature, with the concurrence of the requisite number of members, to have levied the tax to pay these bounties, by a general law, on all the property of the State, and to have made the payment directly from the State treasury.

This was held by this court in Cass Township v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St. 39.

The same principle has been decided in regard to similar laws by the supreme court of Massachusetts in the case of The City of Lowell v. Oliver (8 Allen, 247), and in Freeland et al. v. Hastings et al. (10 Allen, 579); also by the supreme court of Connecticut, in the case of Booth v. Town of Woodberry (32 Conn. 118).

Instead, however, of exercising the power directly, the legislature imposed the duty upon the several municipal subdivisions of the State, on which the burden of furnishing the necessary military force had been devolved.

The object of adopting this mode of apportionment was the better to equalize the burden of the tax. In some places the men credited to that locality had been paid bounties from voluntary contributions, and it was not deemed equitable to tax such localities to raise money to pay bounties to the men credited to others.

That such was the purpose of these statutes, is apparent from their provisions. Where the credit was to the State, the bounty is required to be paid from the State treasury; •where it was to the county, township, or city, the bounty is to be raised from the locality receiving the credit.

The counties, townships, and cities are public agencies in the system of the State government; and, in the class of laws now under consideration, they are employed by the legislature as mere instrumentalities to raise a tax for a public object, and to effect its equitable distribution among those for whom.it was intended.

We cannot say that the legislature, in adopting this course, transcended their constitutional authority.

We may remark that the decision in the case of Washington County v. Berwick (56 Penn. St. 472), cited in argument, turned on the construction of the statutes of Pennsylvania, under which, as the court held, no one was entitled to bounty Unless he volunteered upon an offer of bounty by the public authorities — which offer, though without authority ©f law when made, had by subsequent legislation been legalized.

As already stated, we do not think the statutes now under consideration can be so limited.

The answers to the alternative writs disclosing no legal defence, a peremptory writ is now granted in each case.

Scott, C.J., and Welch, Day, and McIlyaine, JJ., concurred.  