
    Moses Eldred v. James H. Sexton.
    Tax collector justifies as such, proof of acting and general reputation sufficient.
    This cause came before the court upon a writ of error to the court of common pleas of Lorain county.
    The defendant in error brought an action' of trespass against the plaintiff in error for taking and converting a yoke of oxen; judgment for the defendant by the justice, and appeal. In the common pleas a declaration in trespass was filed, and Eldred, the defendant there, on the plea of the general issue, filed a notice, that at the trial he would prove that before the alleged trespass, he was treasurer of school district No. 3; that a majority of the ■directors of the school district called a meeting of the householders and others liable to pay a tax for building and repairing .school-houses, at which meeting it was decided to raise money to repair the school-house, etc. Setting forth'a regular assessment *of tax for that purpose, and that a certain amount of tax was assessed upon Sexton, and put in Eldred’s hands, as treasurer, to collect; that Sexton refused to make payment, and that the seizure and sale was made, according to law, to make the amount.
    At the trial, Eldred under his notice offered to prove by parol that at .the time .of taking the property he acted as treasurer of the school district named, and was reputed to be treasurer and •collector. To this testimony the plaintiff objected, and it was overruled by the court. The defendant took his bill of exceptions. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for fifty-one dollars and five cents and costs, to reverse which this writ of error was brought.
    No argument was submitted, for the plaintiff.
    Willey, for defendant.
   By the Court :

The question raised in the case seems.to have been settled by this court, in the case of Johnson v. Steadman, 3 Ohio, 94. In •that case it was decided that a person who has justified an act, upon the ground that he was a constable, might establish his official character by general reputation, and proof that he acted as such. We are not disposed to change the principle established in that case. In fact, we are satisfied that it is more consistent with the end of justice, than to establish a contrary rule of evidence. We do not say that such evidence is conclusive; but that, it is prima facie, and, unless contradicted, must be conclusive.  