
    Alexander MCLAREN; et al., Appellants, v. Peter H. ARKISON; et al., Appellees.
    No. 15-35849
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted August 9, 2017 
    
    Filed August 14, 2017
    Alexander McLaren, Pro Se
    Thomas McLaren, Pro Se
    Ruth Edwards, Pro Se
    Peter H. Arkison, Esquire, Attorney, Pro Se
    Craig E. Cammock, Esquire, Attorney, Skagit Law Group, Mount Vernon, WA, for Appellees
    Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Alexander McLaren appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to prosecute his appeal of a bankruptcy court order. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed McLaren’s appeal for failure to prosecute because McLaren had failed to file the opening brief more than 17 months after the appeal was filed. See id. at 1384-85 (discussing factors to be considered before dismissing a case for failure to prosecute); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (although dismissal is a harsh penalty, the district court’s dismissal should not be disturbed absent “a definite' and firm conviction” that it “committed a clear error of judgment” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Contrary to McLaren’s contention, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his untimely motion for an extension of time to file the opening brief because McLaren failed to establish extraordinary circumstances. See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258-62 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and factors to be considered before denying an untimely motion for an extension of a deadline).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied McLaren’s motion for reconsideration because McLaren failed to demonstrate any grounds for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and identifying circumstances when reconsideration is appropriate).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     