
    Edward Sumner versus Aaron Gay.
    
      Nov. 3d.
    
    In assumpsit on a promissory note payable to the plaintiff or order on demand, signed by P and indorsed in blank by the defendant, the plaintiff declared against the defendant as original promisor and grantor, and the action was maintained.
    This was assumpsit on a promissory note, payable to the plaintiff or order on demand with interest, signed-by W. Pratt and indorsed in blank by the defendant. The declaration contained two counts, the first charging the defendant as maker, the second, as guarantor.
    On a case stated it appeared, that Pratt delivered the note to the plaintiff in its present form, for a valuable consideration ; that the money due on it was frequently demanded of Pratt, but that notice of his default was not given to the defendant until a short time before the commencement of this action ; and that for three or four months after the note was given, Pratt had visible property by which it might have been secured by a suit.
    
      Rand
    
    contended that the defendant must be considered as an indorser, and not as an original promisor; Tillman v. Wheeler, 17 Johns. R. 326; Huntington v. Harvey, 4 Connect. R. 124; and he said that the note in Moies v. Bird, 
      11 Mass. R. 436, was erroneously described in the report as being payable to order. He cited also Carver v. Warren, 5 Mass. R. 546; Palmer v. Grant, 4 Connect. R. 389; Waynam v. Bend, 1 Campb. 175; Brush v. Adm. of Reeves, 3 Johns. R. 439; Jackson v. Richards, 2 Caines’s R. 345 * Hodgkins v. Bond, 1 N. Hamp. R. 284.
    
      Leland and D. A. Simmons, contra,
    
    cited Moies v. Bird, 11 Mass. R. 436; White v. Howard. 9 Mass. R. 314; Nelson v. Sanborne, 2 N. Hamp. R. 413; Herrick v. Carman, 12 Johns. R. 159; Nelson v. Dubois, 13 Johns. R. 175; Campbell r. Butler, 14 Johns. R. 349; Allen v. Rightmere, 20 Johns. R. 365.
    
      Judgment for the plaintiff.
      
    
    
      
       Where such an indorsement is made at the time of making the note, it seems that the indorser will be considered as a surety, without any other evidence. Baker v. Briggs., 8 Pick, 122. See Wylie v. Lewis, 7 Connect. R. 301; Herrick v. Carman, 12 Johns. R. 159. But where the indorsement is made after the making of the noté, a consideration for the indorsement must be proved. Tenney v. Prince, 4 Pick. 385, and 7 Pick. 243. See Neelson v. Sanborne, 2 N. Hamp. R. 413.
      If A execute to B his promissory note, and C indorse his name in blank on the same, paroi evidence is admissible to show the understanding that C was to be holden only collaterally. Barrows v. Lane, 5 Vermont R. 161.
      See Bayley on Bills, (Phil, and Sewall’s 2d ed.) c. 2, § 5, p. 46 to 49.
    
     