
    Ronda K. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 09-35194.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Jan. 14, 2010.
    Filed Jan. 26, 2010.
    
      Michael A. Bliven, Esquire, Anderson & Bliven, Kalispell, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Dorrelyn Kay Dietrich, Social Security Administration General Counsel’s Office, Region VIII, Denver, CO, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Billings, MT, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: KLEINFELD, TASHIMA, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Ronda Williams appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Social Security Commissioner in Williams’ action challenging the denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383C. Williams contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding her not credible and in giving no weight to a medical assessment by her treating physician. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review de novo the district court’s order upholding the denial of benefits. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 855-56 (9th Cir.2001).

1. We conclude that the ALJ’s credibility assessment was supported by clear and convincing reasons, including that Williams’ failure to follow treatment advice and Williams’ testimony about her daily activities were inconsistent with a finding of disability. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.1995). An ALJ may properly consider both of these factors in assessing how much credibility to afford the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008).

2. We also conclude that the ALJ properly discounted Williams’ treating physician’s opinion that she could perform only sedentary work. The ALJ reasoned that the treating physician’s opinion was inconsistent with other medical evidence in the record and with Williams’ own testimony about her activity level. These amount to “ ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record.” See Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856 (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir.1998)).

Affirmed. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.
     