
    Miller et al. v. Hesseldon.
    
      Negligence — Charge to jury — Court digressed and addressed automobile drivers in audience — Permissive maximum speeds and avoiding injuring or killing pedestrians — Prejudicial error not cured by cautioning jury to disregard remarks.
    
    (No. 19619
    Decided June 15, 1926.)
    Error to the Court of Appeals of Richland county.
    Hesseldon, a youth about 15 years of age, while riding a bicycle, collided at a street crossing with an automobile driven by Wentland and owned by Miller. ' He brought suit against these two, as defendants, and recovered a verdict and judgment against both in the sum of $8,000. The verdict of the jury found the issues in favor of plaintiff and assessed “the amount of recovery due to the plaintiff” at that sum.
    The record discloses that in the midst of its charge to the jury, “the court digressed — turned from the jury to the audience and said:
    “ ‘I note that there are a number of taxi and other drivers who are not parties to this case, who by attendance, throughout this trial have evidenced an interest, and it may be for your welfare and for that of other drivers and pedestrians that you give special attention to what I have now to say to the jury as to other statutes which limit that read and to the holdings of our courts on the application and construction to be given to the part of the statute just read as it pertains to the so-called permissive maximum speeds. By so doing you may avoid the injury or killing of people who are in the exercise of their rights to cross and be upon the streets.’
    “Turning back to jury the court continued: ‘Now, ladies and gentlemen, perhaps I should not have digressed, but you are cautioned, because thereof, that what the court said to other drivers has no reference to the parties in this case, and must not be considered by you in any way in your consideration and determination of the rights of the parties to this case.’ ”
    To this charge general exceptions were taken by defendants, and special exceptions were also made to the language of the court above quoted.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and a reversal of the judgments of the lower courts is sought in this court, by this proceeding in error.
    
      Mr. C. H. Workman, for plaintiffs in error.
    
      Messrs. Mansfield & Black, for defendant in error.
   By the Court.

The petition had alleged, as one of the acts of negligence, that Wentland, the driver of the colliding car, was operating it “at an excessive rate of speed of not less than 30 miles per hour” at the time of the accident. That was one of the chief issues of the case, Wentland testifying that he was driving but 15 miles at the time. The evidence had been fully submitted on that and other issues touching the negligence of the defendants. In the midst of its charge, while commenting upon the speed laws of the state, the trial court temporarily digressed from its charge and addressed the taxi and other drivers in the audience, calling their attention to such speed statutes, and cautioning them to “avoid the injury or killing of people who are in the exercise of their rights to cross and be upon the streets.” It is impossible to arrive at any other conclusion than that remarks of this character, made in a case where defendants were charged with violation of the speed laws, were highly prejudicial to the defendants, and that error intervened thereby; the effort of the trial court thereafter to minimize the prejudice, by cautioning the jury that such remarks should not be considered by them in their consideration of the rights of the parties on trial, did not, under the circumstances prevailing at the trial, cure the error so committed.

For the reason stated, the judgments of the lower courts will be reversed, and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings according to law.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Jones, Matthias, Day, Allen, Kinkade and Robinson, JJ., concur.  