
    Sharon LISSAUER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANIES, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 11-169-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 16, 2012.
    Alan C. Milstein, Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, Rose & Podolsky, P.A., Moorestown, N.J., for Appellant.
    Evan H. Krinick (Stuart M. Bodoff, on the brief), Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale, N.Y., for Appellee.
    PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges, ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, District Judge.
    
      
       Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Kaplan, J.), which granted Appellee Fireman’s Fund Insurance Companies’ motion for summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Appellant Sharon Lissauer invested with Bernard Madoff Investment Securities for almost twenty years. When Madoff s Pon-zi scheme unraveled in the fall of 2008, Lissauer suffered significant losses. Lis-sauer sought coverage for those losses under a homeowner’s insurance policy issued to her by American Insurance Company, one of the Fireman’s Fund Insurance Companies. The carrier denied coverage, but offered and did pay the policy’s money sublimit of $2,000 for each of three policy years, totaling $6,000, under a full reservation of rights.

Lissauer then sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for, among other things, a declaration that her Madoff losses were covered under the policy. The district court granted the carrier’s summary judgment motion, finding that even if Lissauer’s investments constituted personal property within the meaning of the policy, coverage was unavailable because her property did not suffer a “direct physical loss.” Lis-sauer now appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurance company.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Brod v. Ormya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir.2011). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003).

We find no error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Even assuming that Lissauer suffered the loss of an intangible “account,” Lissauer cannot demonstrate that the account suffered a “direct physical loss,” as required for coverage under the policy. See 10A Couch on Insurance § 148:46 (3d ed.2011).

After a thorough review of the record, we find Lissauer’s remaining arguments to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  