
    *JACKSON COUNTY,
    APRIL TERM, 1832.
    JUDGES — COLLETT AND WRIGHT.
    DOUGHERTY v. MILLER.
    Slander — cabbaging—new trial — costs.
    The jury may infer from all the facts in evidence, whether the slanderous words spoken were uttered in a slanderous sense, and when the proof is such that such inference may be drawn, the court will not grant a new trial.
    If a plaintiff in slander do not recover more than five dollars damages, he can recover no costs.
    Slander. The plaintiff counted, 1st. upon the words: “You stole cloth arid sold a waistcoat off it to Doctor Rathbone.” “You stole my cloth and took a waistcoat off it, and sold it to Doctor Rathbone.” 2d. For the following words, spoken of him as a tailor: “You have secreted customers’ cloth, and sold waistcoats made up out of it to Dr. Rathbone: You have taken a waistcoat off my cloth, and sold it to Dr. Rathbone.”
    Plea, not guilty, with a notice that the plaintiff did secrete and steal a waistcoat pattern of the defendant’s cloth, made it up, and sold it to Dr. Rathbone.
    It was proven by several witnesses, that the defendant had charged the plaintiff with taking, or stealing his cloth, enough for a waistcoat pattern, &c., and on plaintiff’s asking him if he intended to charge him with stealing, he repeated it, and when told by the plaintiff that he would sue him, replied he did not know whether it was stealing, or cabbaging, or breach of trust. On one occasion he said to a witness, “ You know Dougherty has stole my cloth,” &e. No evidence was offered for the defence.
    Verdict for the plaintiff on thefirst count, for two dollars and fifty cents,' and upon the second count, that the defendant is not guilty.
    
      Brazee, for the defendant,
    moved for a new trial, because the verdict was contrary to evidence.
    
      T. Scott and Allen, contra.
   BY THE COURT.

It is insisted that the evidence does not warrant the verdict, because there is no proof that the words were spoken before the suit ivas brought; and because the whole evidence showed that the words were not spoken in a slanderous sense. The evidence submitted to the jury tended to prove both these points. It was competent for the jury to deduce from that evidence proof of both points, and having done so, we cannot disturb the verdict.

37] *The statute 29 O. L. 70, provides that where a plaintiff in slander shall have his damages assessed at any sum under five dollars, he shall not recover any costs. The judgment in this case is therefore without costs.  