
    DAVIS v. STATE.
    (No. 9000.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    March 11, 1925.
    Rehearing Denied April 15, 1925.)
    1. Criminal law <&wkey;6271/2 — Refusal to permit defendant to inspect confession at beginning of trial held not erroneous.
    Court’s refusal to permit defendant at beginning of trial to inspect confession that he had made held not erroneous, defendant being entitled to inspect it when offered in evidence for purpose of making his objections thereto.
    2. Criminal law <&wkey;!09l(ll) — Any error as to admission of defendant’s confession held' not presented for review.
    1 Any error as to admission of defendant’s confession held not presented for review, where bill of exceptions was in form of questions and answers, and stated that state read a “portion of statement” to jury, without stating .what part was read or omitted.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    3. Burglary &wkey;>42(3) — Offense of burglary held established.
    Offense of burglary held established, where evidence showed defendant and others entered owner’s storehouse, which was locked, without his consent, and a portion of stolen property was recovered in defendant’s possession, and defendant in his confession stated they entered by removing a window pane.
    4. Burglary <&wkey;9(i/2) — Offense not changed by opening of door to carry off plunder.
    That defendant and his companions opened door of storehouse to afford them easy means of carrying off plunder did not change their offense of burglary by force, applied to building when they took out a pane of glass and thus entered.
    Appeal from District Court, Wichita County; H. R. Wilson, Judge.
    Ifrank .Davis was convicted of burglary, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    W. Jj. Scott, of Olney, and T. E. Robertson, of Wichita Falls, for appellant.
    Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.
   HAWKINS, J.

The offense is burglary; punishment two years in the penitentiary.

Appellant had made a confession. Bill. No. 1 recites that at the beginning of the trial appellant, through his counsel, advised the court that he understood the state was relying in part upon this confession, and requested permission to inspect the same at that time, and asked the court to direct counsel for the state to turn it over to appellant’s counsel for that purpose. This the court declined to do, and appellant complains of this ruling. We are advised of no law which would require the court at that stage of the proceeding to command counsel representing the state to deliver the confession to counsel for appellant for inspection. When .the state offered it in evidence, counsel for the defense was entitled to inspect it, in order that he might offer objection, if any he had, to its introduction. There is no complaint that he was deprived of such privilege. The bill presents no error.

Bill No. 2 might be disposed of by stating that the same is in question ana answer form, and for this reason is not entitled to receive consideration. It is with reference to the admission of appellant’s confession, and recites that, after the matters occurred which are set out in the questions and answers, the state read a “portion of the statement” to the jury. The bill is silent as to what part was read or what part was omitted.

It is seriously urged that the evidence does not support the conviction, on the ground that the offense of burglary is not shown to have been committed by any testimony offered by the state, unless it be by the confession of appellant, and that the burglary cannot be proven by the confession alone. A storehouse belonging to Emmet Archer was entered at night and certain articles of merchandise taken therefrom. Some of it was later recovered in an outhouse on premises where appellant lived with his mother. Mr. Archer testified that the store was locked when he left it that night; that whoever entered it came through the rear door; that no one had his consent to make such entry, nor to take- the things which were removed from the house. Appellant’s confession recites that he and two other parties “broke into the hardware store” that they took several pocket knives, four flash lights, and a S2 target rifle therefrom. Appellant lived at Wichita Falls. The store burglarized was situated at Eleetra. The confession continues to the effect that they brought the articles back to Wichita Falls, hid some of them on the river, and took the rest to his (appellant’s) house, and hid it in a chicken house on, as he says, “our premises.” This is where some of the stolen goods were found; however, they had been discovered before the confession was -made. The confession further states:

“All three of us broke into the hardware store. We didn’t have any one’s permission to go in there. We took out a window pane to get in.”

We regret that we cannot agree that the offense is not shown save by the confession of appellant. It is made clear that the entry of the house occurred at night. The owner testified that the store was locked at the time he left, and that the entry was made without his consent through the back door. It is true appellant says the entry was made by removing a pane of glass from the window. Whether the door was opened from the inside after this was done, and the parties came in through the door, would, in our judgment, be immaterial. If the door was locked, it would be burglary, nevertheless, if the entry was made by unlocking the door and entering. Many cases are cited by appellant in which the court .has held that the offense of burglary could not be established alone by the confession of appellant, but we think they have no application here. We think the testimony of the owner of the building shows a burglarious entry. The state does not rely upon the confession of appellant alone to show that a burglary was committed. We do not think it necessary to review, the cases cited by appellant. Our conclusions here, and the holdings expressed in them, are not thought to be in conflict.

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

EATTIMORE, T.

Appellant insists in his motion that, if our opinion stand, it will be taken as establishing the doctrine that force is not necessary when a burgla-rious entry at night is charged in the indictment. We do not so understand our opinion, but will try to make clearer the point. Mr. Archer owned a store, which he testified was entered on the night of May 18, 1924. He said:

“They came through the rear door. The house was locked when I left that night. ■ * . * * I did not give any one my consent to enter it.”

Mr. Archer testified that a great deal of the property was recovered. In addition to the matter of the discovery of certain of the stolen property, appellant’s confession was in evidence. Examining same, we observe that he not only said in terms that they broke into the store, but appellant further stated that they took out a window pane to get in. It would appear plain that one could not take out a window pane for the purpose of effecting an entry into a building without thus using force to the building. Mr. Archer’s statement that they 'entered through the rear door was but a conclusion on his part, evidently reached because of the fact that he found the rear door open. That appellant and his companions opened the rear door, in order to afford them easy means of carrying from the store the plunder and loot which they took with them, would not change or affect the proposition that they committed, burglary by force applied to the building when they took out the pane of glass and thus entered.

Being unable to agree with appellant’s motion, and thinking the case correctly decided, the motion for rehearing will be overruled. 
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