
    Lynch and Wife v. Hill and Wife.
    Decided, Feb. 10th, 1818.
    1. Wills — Construction—Supplying Words. — In supplying words in a Will, it is the most correct course to supply such only as it is evident the testator intended to use, and not such, also, as would be necessary to effectuate the supposed intention of the testator.
    2. Same — Same—Same—Case at Bar. — Wherefore, the words of a contingent limitation being, “in case S. N. G. without issues of body lawfully begotten, then,” &c. the words “die,’’and “her,’’may be supplied, as evidently intended by the testator; but not the word "leaving.” which he might not have known to be necessary in law to give the limitation effect, and therefore might not have intended to use. ñ
    3. Same — Same—Remote Limitation. — Certain real and personal estate being devised to S. N. C., “her heirs and assigns forever; but, in case she should die without issue of her body lawfully begotten, then and in that case, to be equally divided between S. C. and S. II. to them and their heirs and assigns forever;” this limitation over was too remote, and could not take effect.
    
      Armistead Hill and Sally his wife filed a bill in the Superior Court of Chancery for the Richmond district against Francis Lynch and Sally his wife, who, at the same time, filed their answer, to which the plaintiffs replied generally; which bill and answer, with the exhibits, were by consent presented to the said Court, for it’s opinion and decree thereupon.
    The question between the parties, depended upon the construction of the following clause in the codicil to the Will of John Cogbill, established by the judgment of this Court in May 1808; (reported in 2 H. and M. 467, 525;) a full copy of which codicil is inserted in page 472- -3 of the same book. “But, in case Sally Nelson Cogbill, without issues of body' lawfully begotten, then and in that case I give and bequeath the whole estate, given to Sally N. Cogbill, to be equally divided between Sally Cogbill her mother and my niece Sally Hill, daughter of my brother Jesse Cogbill deceased, to them and their heirs and assigns forever.” It was contended on the part of the plaintiffs, that Sally Cogbill, widow of Thomas N. Cogbill, and first legatee in the codicil, having married the defendant Francis Lynch, her particular interest in the personal estate, which was bequeathed to her only so long as she remained T. N. Cogbill’s widow, ceased and determined, and the remainder given to Sally N. Cogbill took effect; that the limitation over, on the death of the said Sally N. Cogbill without issue, &c., *to her mother Sally Cogbill and the plaintiff Sally Hill, was a good executory bequest, and therefore that the plaintiffs were entitled to one moiety of the said personal estate, and of the profits thereof which had accrued since the marriage of the said Sally Cogbill with Francis Lynch. The defendants insisted, that the said limitation over was too remote, and therefore void; and that Sally N. Cogbill, by the bequest to her, took an absolute estate, to which the said Sally Lynch, her mother, became lawfully entitled upon her dying an infant, unmarried and childless.
    Chancellor Taylor was of opinion, that, “the contingency' being so expressed by the testator, as to manifest that some word, or words, were inadvertently omitted by him, which he clearly intended, the Court must intend some word, or words, to complete the sense of that passage; and, in so doing, this Court will intend such words as will give effect to the manifest intention of the testator and the executory bequest, rather than such as will defeat such his intention and bequest. This Court, then,' reads that passage of the Codicil, thus; “in case Sally Nelson Cogbill die without leaving issues of her body lawfully begotten, then &c. which intendment being admitted, the Court is of opinion that the said executory bequest “is good and valid.” The decree therefore was, that the slaves and their increase be equally divided between the parties; that the defendants render an account of the profits of the said slaves accruing between the date of their intermarriage and the date of such division, and also an account of the other personal estate bequeathed by the said Codicil, before a Commissioner of the Court; &c.
    From this decree, the defendants appealed.
    
      
       See monographic note on “Wills” appended to Hughes v. Hughes, 2 Mnnf. 209.
    
   The following was the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

The Court is of opinion, that, in supplying words in a testament or last Will, it is the most correct course to supply such only as it is evident the testator intended to use, and not such, also, as would be necessary to effectuate the supposed intention of the testator. Acting on this principle, the Court dissents from the decree of the Chancellor, so far as it supplies the word “leaving,” in the clause in question.

*The result of this opinion is, that the decree is to be reversed with Costs, and the bill dismissed.  