
    The State ex rel. v. Turnpike Company.
    The acts of March 27tb, 1875 (72 O. L. 85), and of June 12th, 1879 (76 O. L. 153), amendatory of the act of March 16th, 1875 (S. & S. 147), dividing all turnpike companies within the state into separate and distinct classes, have a uniform operation upon all the members of each' class and are not in conflict with article 2, section 26 of the constitution of the state. ’
    Application for the writ of quo warranto.
    
    The petition recites that the defendant, the Portsmouth and Columbus Turnpike Railroad Company, is a corporation under the laws of this state, owning and operating a turnpike road running from Chillicothe through Ross, Pike and Scioto counties to the village of Portsmouth. It further alleges that, for more than four years, it has misused its franchise to collect tolls by charging a higher rate than is allowed by law.
    The defendant, by an amended answer, avers that it was. incorporated under a special act of the general assembly of Ohio, passed February V, 1834 (29 Ohio L. 34), and subsequently accepted the provisions of the act of March 16, 1865, entitled “ An act to fix the rates of toll on turnpike and plank road companies ” (S. & S. 147); and has ever since charged and collected the tolls in this last act allowed and specified, and no more.
    The amendments to this act, passed March 27,1875 (72 Ohio L. 85) and June 27,1875 (76 Ohio L. 153), defendant declares' violate the organic law of the state, and are unconstitutional and void. To this answer a general demurrer is interposed.
    By these amendments the rates of toll which turnpike companies are authorized to collect are reduced. The first, however, contains a proviso that its terms shall not apply “ to companies which are in debt for the original construction of said turnpike until five years from the passage of tins act.” The second excepts from its operation “ turnpike roads constructed of and kept in repairs with two-thirds broken limestone,” which are permitted to charge the same rates as formerly.
    It is claimed by the defendant that these amendatory statutes do not operate uniformly upon all incorporated turnpikes, and are, therefore, in conflict with article 2, section 26, of the constitution, which provides that “ all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state.”
    
      Converse, Booth & Keating, for plaintiff:
    The question in this case is, whether the acts in question operate uniformly throughout the state, within the meaning of the constitution. As to when a law operates uniformly, see McAunich v. Railroad Co., 20 Iowa, 338; Const. of Iowa, art. 1, § 6 ; Railroad Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 112; Haskell v. City of Burlington, 30 Iowa, 232; Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 163 ; Smith v. Judge Twelfth Judicial District, 17 Cal. 554; California Const. art. 1, § 11; McGill v. State, 34 Ohio St. 24.
    As to whether the classification of turnpikes under the said acts works an injustice, see Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 164.
    For acts of the legislature classifying corporations, see Revised Statutes, §§ 3232, 3234, 3235, 3240, 3244, 3274,3275, 3276, 3277, 3285, 3299; 72 Ohio L. 85, § 1; act of April 25, 1873 (70 Ohio L. 161); Railroad Co. v. Cole, 29 Ohio St. 126.
    
      M. A. Daugherty, Huston James, and Okey & Throckmorton, for defendants:
    We maintain that the acts of 1875 (72 Ohio L. 85,) and 1879 (76 Ohio L. 153,) are unconstitutional.
    The constitution provides: “Art. 2, § 26. All laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the state.”
    “Art. 12, § 1. The general assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers.”
    “Art 13, § 2. Corporations may be formed under general laws.”
    Assuming that the acts in question are of a general nature,’ have they a uniform operation throughout the state ? .
    The subject matter to which they relate is corporate turnpikes. It is clear that they do not operate uniformly upon all corporate turnpikes, because the first excepts from its operation those in a certain financial condition, and the second attempts to classify them accdrding to certain peculiarities of construction and repair. They do not equally affect all turnpike corporations. They grant privileges to companies in debt or whose roads are constructed and kept in repair with limestone, which are not granted to other companies. It is a mere evasion to say that they act uniformly upon each class, because, if corporate turnpike companies may be divided into two classes by means of any such description, it would not be a difficult thing to have as many classes as there are turnpike companies in the state, and thus specially legislate for each company. In that way every constitutional limitation upon legislative power might be evaded.
    If the power to classify corporations created for the same specific purpose be admitted, then the general assembly is the sole judge of the propriety and extent of such classification. Such admission is, in effect, to declare that the safeguards inserted into the constitution, upon the subject of corporations, are directory, and to throw open the door to special legislation. •with all its attendant evils. Under such a construction, railroad companies, whose roads run east and west, could be granted privileges not accorded to those running north and south. Those carrying the heaviest mortgages might charge the highest or lowest rates of fare and freight. Those having through connections might enjoy exclusive benefits. Those having steel rails, air brakes, sleeping cars, hotel cars, and each or all of the modern improvements might severally charge more or less according to the whim of the legislature.
   By the Court.

The classifications of all turnpike companies, adopted by the amendments to the act of March 16,1865, are not unreasonable or arbitrary; and, -inasmuch as their provisions have a uniform operation upon all the individuals comprised in each class, they do not fall within the inhibition of article 2, section 26 of the constitution.  