
    [Philadelphia,
    December 27, 1824.]
    KEAN against RICE.
    IN ERROR.
    A printed copy of an Act of Assembly, published under the authority of the legislature of another state, may be read in evidence.
    The record of condemnation of a vessel, by two justices of the peace, under an Act of Assembly of JVew Jersey, proved by the oath of a witness, to be the original record, accompanied by evidence, that the signatures of the justices were of their hand-writing, and that the Justice’s Court had no seal, is admissible in evidence.
    The Acts of Congress, prescribing the mode of authenticating records, do not ex. elude all other evidence.
    Although a state may not have a right of absolute property in oysters^ it may pass regulations for their preservation.
    This Court has no right to decide, whether a court of another state has misconstrued an Act of Assembly of that state, or whether such act is constitutional or not.
    
      It seems, that the cove opposite the mouth of Maurice river, is within the jurisdiction of the state of Mew Jersey, and forms part of the county of Cumberland.
    
    From the record of this case, returned on a writ of error to the District Court for the city and county of Philadelphia, it appeared, that it was an action of trespass, brought by John Kean, the plaintiff in error, against Philip Rice, the defendant in.error, for forcibly seizing him and his vessel, called the Hiram, imprisoning him, and converting the vessel to the defendant’s use.
    The material facts proved on the trial were, that the plaintiff being on board the Hiram, taking oysters, in Delaware Bay, off the mouth of Maurice river, and within Maurice river cove, at a place, variously stated by the witnesses, to be at the distance of from half a mile to six miles from the shore, was forcibly captured by the defendant, assisted by many other persons, in another vessel, who took possession of the Hiram, having the plaintiff on board, and conducted her into harbour, in New Jersey; where, under certain proceedings, for an alleged breach of the laws of that state, the Hiram was condemned, and converted under the condemnation.
    The defendant justified, under an Act of Assembly of New Jersey, which he offered to read, from a printed volume, said to contain the laws of New Jersey, and to have been published under the authority of the legislature. The plaintiff’s counsel objected to the reading of the law, contending, that it ought to be proved, according to the provisions of the Acts of Congress, prescribing the mode of authenticating records, &c. But the court permitted it to be read, and an exception was taken to their opinion.
    This act, which was passed on the 9 th of June, 1820, in the first section, prescribes the time during which oyster beds may not be raked, and for every offence, imposes a penalty of ten dollars, to be recovered, with costs, by action of debt, by any person who shall prosecute for the same, in any court of record in the state, having cognizance of that sum; one moiety thereof to the use of the prosecutor, and the other moiety to the county collector, for the use of the county in which the offence was committed. The second section declares, “That, in case any person residing in, or without this state, shall at any time hereafter rake for, or gather oysters, in any of the rivers, bays, or waters of this state, with a dredge, or instrument so called, or shall be on board of any canoe, boat, or vessel employed in raking, with such implement, such person, so offending, shall forfeit and pay the sum of fifty dollars, to he recovered in the manner, and for the use mentioned in the next preceding section.”
    The sixth section enacts, “ That it shall not be lawful for any person, who is not at the time an actual inhabitant and resident of this state, to rake, or gather clams, oysters, or shells, in any of the rivers, bay, or waters in this state, on board of any canoe, fiat, scow, boat, or other vessel, not wholly owned by some person or persons, inhabitants of, and actually residing in, this state; and every person who shall offend herein, shall forfeit and pay ten dollars, to be recovered and applied in manner directed by the first section of this act; and shall also forfeit the canoe, flat, scow, boat, or other vessel, used or employed in the commission of such of-fence, with all the clams, oysters, shells, clam-rakes, oyster-rakes, tongs, tackle, furniture, and apparel, in and belonging to the same.” And ih&'seventh section declares, “That it shall be the duty of all sheriffs and constables, and may be lawful for any other person or persons, to seize and secure any such canoe,- flat, scow, boat, or other vessel, as aforesaid, and immediately thereupon give information thereof to two justices of the county, where such seizure shall have been made, who are hereby empowered and required to meet at such time and place as they shall appoint for the trial thereof, and hear and determine the same; and in ease the same shall be condemned, it shall be sold by the order, and under the direction of the said justices, who, after deducting all legal costs and charges, shall pay one half of the proceeds of said sale to the collector of the county, in which such offenee shall have been committed, and the other half to the person who shall have seized and prosecuted the same.”
    The record of the condemnation of the Hiram, under this law, was then offered in evidence by the defendant, on the oath of a witness, that the paper produced was the original record; that the signatures to it were the genuine handwriting of the persons whose names were signed; that they were at the time justices of the peace; and some evidence having been given, that the justice’s court had no seal. The recoi’d, thus supported, was objected to by the counsel for the plaintiff, on the same ground which was taken in reference to the Act of Assembly; but the court admitted it, upon which a second bill of exception was tendered.
    The evidence and arguments haying dosed, the Couiit delivered to the jury the following
    
      Chaege. There are three questions. First, as to the facts; secondly, as to the law; and thirdly, as to the damages. The facts the jury will determine. The defendant owned the boat. — When applied to, to let her, he refused. — But afterwards, certain measures were taken, as it is said, by-the township, to enforce the'law against the oyster-boats, and a common fund raised for the purpose. The defendant’s boat was taken, to perform this service, and he was present when she was about to sail. If he assented, and his vessel was used, then he is a trespasser, unless justified by the law, or unless he authorized his boat to be lawfully used, and it was used unlawfully by those who received it from him, to be used for none but lawful purposes. The jury will ascertain from all the circumstances, and decide this point on these principles.
    The second inquiry is not without considerable difficulty. No doubt Neto Jersey is a sovereign state, and the general rule is, that states divided by water boundaries, have jurisdiction ad filum aquas; to the middle of the river, which separates them. The#compact of 1783, between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, adopts this rule, but improves upon it, by a reciprocal concession of concui'rent jurisdiction over all the Delaware, in each state, for certain purposes. It is not denied, that New Jersey was empowered to enact the law of June, 1820; the only question made is, as to the construction of it. And it appears satisfactorily, that causes of complaint existed for some time, concerning the destruction of oysters, which are a valuable article of food, bestowed upon us by Providence, and for the preservation of which laws are generally enacted by states. Although, perhaps, they may -not have a right of absolute property in this article, they do, and may, nevertheless, pass regulations for their preservation. The first sections of the act in question regard personal punishments, by fines; the others, some of them, subject the boats to seizure, and condemnation. The sixth section speaks of the waters, rivers, and bays, in the-state of New Jersey ; and it has been argued, that the word in, thus substituted for the word of, in the other sections, shows the sense of the legislature to have been, that personal punishments might be inflicted in New Jersey, on individuals found there, for offences against this law, committed any where, but that confiscations of property, of the boats, was to be executed only when they were seized and secured in that state. The opinion .of the court is, that in and on are synonymous terms, in this law. The record of condemnation which we have admitted, is at least prima facie evidence of what it imports, and we can hardly consider it a misconstruction of the law, on which the Jersey court was acting. In the opinion of the court, the whole cove of Maurice river is clearly within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of New Jersey. The question is, then, was the Hiram taken in the cove ? The place is in controversy, as regards the distance from the land, or the mouth of the river, the several witnesses varying from half a mile to five or six miles. But there is no doubt, that the place of capture was within the cove; if so, the defendant is justified, unless, in executing a law, thus construed, he went beyond its provisions and au-thorisation; of that the jury will judge. With respect to the person of the plaintiff, as contradistinguished from his boat, the law does not, to be sure, authorise the arrest of a person, such as the plaintiff. A warrant is requisite for that. But, if the law justifies seizing the boat, the detention of the person, on board of the boat, seems to be implied, as a necessary and unavoidable consequence. Seizing and securing the boat, implies the right of taking it from the oyster-beds, to the place of prosecution and condemnation. If the defendant is justified for taking the Hiram, in the cove, we think the law authorises the proceeding, as it took place; and we have said, that we consider the cove of Maurice river to be within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of the state of New Jersey.
    
    The counsel for the plaintiff excepted to the charge, and removed the causb by writ of error to the court, where the following errors were assigned in the record.
    1. A law of New Jersey was permitted to be read in evidence, without authentication, agreeably to the Acts of Congress.
    2. A record of the Justice’s Court of New Jersey, was permitted to be read in evidence, without proof according to law.
    3. The court below, misdirected the jury, as to the construction of the New Jersey law in question.
    4. The court below, misdirected the jury, as to the constitutionality of the said law.
    5. The court misdirected the jury, as to the right of property in the oysters, ungathered from the sea.
    The questions arising out of these exceptions were very fully argued by J. R. Ingersoll, and C. J. Ingersoll, for the plaintiff in error, and by MfIlvaine and Condy, for the defendant in error;
    but, as the court gave no opinion upon the points principally discussed, a sketch of the argument is omitted.
   Tilghman, C. J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is action of assault and battery, and false imprisonment, in which the defendant is also charged with a trespass, in forcibly seizing the plaintiff’s vessel, called “the Hiram” and converting it to his own use use. The material facts are, that the plaintiff, being on board the Hiram, taking oysters, in the bay of Delaware, off the mouth of Maurice river, opposite to the county of Cumberland in the state of New Jersey, was forcibly captured by the defendant and others, who took possession of the Hiram, having the plaintiff on board, and conducted her into a harbour in the said county of Cumberland, where, under certain proceedings, before two justices of the peace of the said county, by virtue of a law of that state, she was condemned, for a breach of an Act of Assembly, and converted by the defendant, under the condem nation.

The defendant justified, under the law of New Jersey, and the judicial proceedings founded thereon. This gave rise to two questions of evidence, in which bills of exceptions were taken by the counsel for the plaintiff. 1. The defendant offered in evidence, a copy of the Act of Assembly in question, entitled, “an Act for the preservation of clams and oysters,” printed and published under the authority of the state, to which the plaintiff objected, because it was not authenticated according to the provisions of the Act of Congress, made on that subject; but the Court admitted the evidence.

It is unnecessary to take up much time on points which have been decided, and considered as settled. And such, I think, is this question. It was decided by this court, in Biddis v. James, 6 Binn. 321., that the copy of a private Act of Assembly, printed under the authority of the Commonwealth, was evidence, and it had been before decided, in the case of Thompson v. Musser, that the copy of a public Act of Virginia, printed under the authority of that state, was evidence. In the opinion delivered by me, in Biddis v. James, in which all the Judges concurred, it was said, that we should be for admitting the printed copies, authorised by the legislature of this or any other of the United States, whether the acts be public or private. In the United States v. Johns, in the Circuit Court of the United States, held at Philadelphia, before Judges Washington and Peters, (4 Dall. 412.) a copy of an Act of Assembly of Maryland, for incorporating “The Baltimore Insurance Company,” printed and published by authority of the state, was admitted in evidence, to prove the incorporation of the company. And in Young v. The Bank of Alexandria, 4 Cranch, 388, the question being, whether an Act of Assembly of Virginia, incorporating the Bank of Alexandria, printed by the public printer of the state, was evidence; and the only objection to the evidence being, that it was a private act, Chief Justice MaRshall said, that a majority of the court were strongly of opinion, that it was o public act; but that, even if it were not, yet, being printed by the public printer, by order of the legislature, it must be considered as sufficiently authenticated. lie declared, at the same time, that they were willing to hear an argument, if the counsel thought they could support the contrary opinion — but the counsel declined the argument. So that, although the point was not absolutely decided, it has all the authority of a decision. It is time, therefore, that this point should be at rest.

2. The record of condemnation of the Hiram, was next offered in evidence by the defendant, after having proved, by the oath of a witness, that it was the original record, and that the signatures of the parties were of their handwriting, and evidence having also been given, that the Justice’s Court had no seal. This evidence was also objected to by the plaintiff, and admitted by the Court.

The courts of Pennsylvania have always supposed, that the mode of authenticating the acts of the legislatures of the several states, and their other records, and judicial proceedings, prescribed, by the Acts of Congress, did not exclude all other evidences — that records, authenticated according to the Acts of Congress, were evidence every where throughout the United States; but still, other evidence, good according to established principles, independently of the Acts of Congress, might be admitted. The cases before cited come up to this point, where acts of the legislature are in question — and I can perceive no reason, why the same rule should not hold, in other cases; because Congress had the same right to prescribe the mode of authenticating an act of the legislature, as any other record. Supposing, then, that the Act of Congress is not exclusive, what stronger evidence could be given, than was offered in this case ? The original record was produced, and sworn to — the handwriting of the parties, whose signatures were affixed was proved. — Evidence was given, also, that the court had no seal. I really do not see how it could have been proved in a more convincing manner. Indeed, it rather appears, that the Act of Congress, even if it were exclusive, did not provide any mode of authenticating a judicial proceeding of this kind. It directs, that the judicial proceedings of the courts of any state, shall be proved “ by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the Judge, Chief Justice, or presiding magistrate, as the case may be, that the said attestation is in due form.'” Now, the proceedings under the law of New Jersey, might have been carried on before any two justices of the peace of the county, where the seizure was made. I know not whether these justices have a clerk. If they have not, it would be impossible to comply with the requisitions of the Act of Congress, and it would, therefore, be a case omitted. Be that as it may, under the law,' as the courts of this state have held it, the evidence was properly admitted, because good, independently of the Act of Congress.

Besides these two points of evidence, three exceptions were taken to the charge of the court — 1. That the jury was misdirected, as to the construction of the diet of Assembly of New Jersey. 2. That the said Act of Assembly was unconstitutional and void,. and so the jury ought to have been directed. 3. That the jury were misdirected, as to the right of property in oysters lying in the bay of Delaware. Some of these points are of very great magnitude, indeed, but I do not consider it as the duty of this court to decide them. No w'rit of error lies from the courts of New Jersey to this court. The defendant stands upon a judicial proceeding of another state, to which, by the Constitution of the United Slates, (art. 4. sect. 1.) we are bound to give full faith and credit; we have no right, then, to decide, whether the Court of Justices misconstrued their own Act of Assembly, or whether it was constitutional or not. The cause was decided, and if the de» 'cisión was complained of, it should have been carried before a higher tribunal, according to the law of that state. I must observe, moreover, that the cause being brought before us, on exceptions to the charge of the judge of the District Court, we must take that charge as we have it on the record. Now, I find it expressly asserted in the charge, “ that it was not denied, that Neto Jersey was competent to enact the lato of June, 1820; — the only question made, was, as to the construction of it.” It will not do, to concede a thing first, and deny it afterwards. An exception cannot properly be taken to the opinion of a judge, which was delivered according to the consent of the party. As to the right of property in the oysters, while lying in the Bay of Delaware, that seems to have been a misapprehension by the plaintiff in error, of what the judge really did say. He did not say, that the property was in the state of New Jersey. His words are these: — “ It appears satisfactorily, that causes of complaint existed^ some time, concerning the destruction of oysters, which are a valuable article of food bestowed upon us by Providence, and for the preservation of which, laws are usually made by states. Although, perhaps, they may not have a right of absolute property in these articles, they do, and may, nevertheless, pass regulations for their preservation.” To the law, thus laid down, certainly no objection can be made. The right of preventing the destruction of fish and oysters, is a most salutary one, and has been exercised-by all states and nations. There was but one ground, on which the proceedings of the Court of Justices could have been controverted; and that is, that they had no jurisdiction of the case. But that ground is not tenable. Very laborious researches into ancient records have been made, to show that New Jersey was bounded on the west by the Bay of Delaware, and .therefore could have no jurisdiction below the low water mark. Such a doctrine would come with an ill grace from the courts of Pennsylvania, which is bounded by her charter on the east by the river Delaware, and yet has always claimed, and exercised, jurisdiction, at least to the middle of the river, and finally settled, by a solemn compact with New Jersey, the right of navigation and jurisdiction, as to the whole river. In the construction of the colonial charter, ancient claim and usage, are entitled to very great weight. Not long before the American revolution, Lord Rochford attempted to obtain a grant from the crown of England of some valuable islands in the Delaware, opposite and near to the Pennsylvania shore, under pretence that the charter to William Penn was bounded, on the east, by the river. The argument seemed plausible. But the proprietaries of Pennsylvania, having obtained a hearing before, the king in council, and proved that they had always exercised jurisdiction on the river — always claimed those islands, and granted some of them for a valuable'eonsideration, which had been improved at great ex-

expense by the purchasers, and were then very valuable, the claim of Lord Rockford was relinquished. The witnesses differ, as to the distance from the Jersey shore, of the locus in quo of the trespass complained of, in this action. But the weight of evidence was, that it was in a cove opposite to the mouth of Maurice river. I do not see, how this court can say, it was out of the jurisdiction of New Jersey. So far as the fact was material, the jury have passed on it. And if it was within the jurisdiction of New Jersey, it was either in the county of Cumberland or in no county at all. Cumberland county runs to the Bay, and then up the Bay. The legislature of New Jersey supposed, that at least some part of the water was included in the counties adjoining, and bounded by the Bay; because they have given jurisdiction to the justices of the county in which the seizure should be made, and these seizures, from their nature, must generally be made while the boats are fishing in the Bay, below the low water mark. It is' enough, however, that it does not appear on this record,, that the seizure was out of the county of Cumberland; and the Court of Justices have expressly affirmed that it was within it. Upon the whole, I perceive no error, and am therefore of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  