
    WILSON v. TOWNSHIP OF COE.
    1. Municipal Corporations — Defective Highway — Evidence — Question For Jury.
    Id. an action against a township for personal injuries caused to plaintiff when the automobile in which she was riding in the nighttime slid into a ditch five deep when it was turned to the right to within six inches of the edge of the embankment to allow another car to pass, evidence that the roadway ■ was 15% feet wide, that it was only six feet from the center of the wrought portion to the edge of the embankment, that it was undermined about a foot, that this condition had existed about a year, and wasi obscured by the growth of grass over it, held, sufficient to carry to the jury the question as to whether the highway at said point was reasonably safe and fit for public travel, although there was room for two cars to pass easily had the drivers known, the condition of the road.
    
    
      Imputed negligence of passenger riding in automobile driven by another precluding recovery against third person for injury, see note in L. R. A. 1915B, 953.
    
      2. Negligence — Contributory Negligence Imputable to Passenger in Automobile.
    Negligence, if any, of the driver of an automobile, is imputable to an adult passenger injured through a defect in the highway.
    
    3. Municipal Corporations — Negligence—No Contributory Negligence Where Danger Unknown — Defective Highway — Notice.
    Although there was no necessity for the driver of the car to drive as close to the edge of the embankment as he did, his conduct in that respect did not constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law, since he could have driven where he did in safety but for the fact, of which he had no notice, that the roadway at that point was undermined.
    
    4. Same — Contributorily Negligent Where Danger Could Have Been Foreseen.
    To render the driver negligent, the danger must have been so apparent that it could have been foreseen by him by the exercise of ordinary care.
    
    Error to Isabella; Hart (Ray), J.
    Submitted October 20, 1925.
    (Docket No. 98.)
    Decided December 22, 1925.
    Case by Lilly Wilson against the township of Coe for personal and other injuries caused by a defective highway. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.
    Affirmed.
    
      Dodds & Dodds and Virgil W. McClintic, for appellant.
    
      F. H. Dusenbury and James E. Ryan, for appellee.
    
      
      Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. p. 1504;
    
    
      
      Negligence, 29 Cyc. p. 548;
    
    
      
      Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. p. 1425;
    
    
      
      Id., 28 Cyc. p. 1424.
    
   Sharpe, J.

We will consider the assignments in the order discussed by counsel.

Was Defendant" Guilty of Negligence? Plaintiff’s proofs tended to show that the width of the embankment at the place where the car was stopped was 15*4 feet, of which several feet was covered with quite tall grass; that on the west side, where the car stopped, it was but 6 feet from the center of the wrought portion of the road to the edge of the embankment; that the ditch at that point was nearly 5 feet deep; that a drain or ditch from land to the west led into that alongside the road at the place the car stopped, and had undermined the bank about a foot, and that this condition had existed for about a year, and was obscured by the growth of the grass over it. While defendant had proof that the roadbed was wider and that it had been traveled in safety, we are impressed that the situation was aptly described by the witness George Lesh, who carefully examined it .soon after the accident:

. “There would have been room for two cars to pass ' easily if they had known the condition of the road.”

We are satisfied that the proof carried the question to the jury as to whether the highway at that point was reasonably safe and fit for public travel.

Was Plaintiff Guilty of Contributory Negligence? Under our decisions, the negligence, if any, of the driver is imputable to plaintiff. Geeck v. Luckenbill, 215 Mich. 288, and cases cited. It is urged that there was no necessity for Ruthruff to drive his car so near the edge of the embankment, and that his doing so was negligence on his part. While, it is true that the cars might have passed without his driving so close to the ditch, we are unwilling to say as a matter of law that it was negligent for him to do so. There was nothing to indicate to him that the bank where he stopped had become undermined by the water flowing into the ditch from the west. Had it not' been so, he could doubtless have stopped where he did with safety. To render him negligent in this respect, the danger must have been so apparent that it could have been foreseen by him by the exercise of ordinary care. Newman v. City of Ann Arbor, 134 Mich. 29.

These are the only errors discussed. We have, however, examined the other assignments, and find them to be without merit.

The judgment is affirmed.

McDonald, C. J., and Clark, Bird, Moore, Steere, Fellows, and Wiest, JJ., concurred.  