
    Bradley SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nester LOPEZ; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-16838
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 8, 2017 
    
    Filed March 21, 2017
    Bradley Smith, Pro Se
    Krystal Joy Rosse, Attorney, USLV— Office of the U.S. Attorney, Las Vegas, NV, Elizabeth Olson White, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USRE—Office of the US Attorney-Reno, Reno, NV, for Defendants-Appellees
    Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges
    
      
      
         The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Bradley Smith appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), alleging claims arising from a workplace dispute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Smith’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim because Smith failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (elements of “class of one” equal protection claim).

The district court properly dismissed Smith’s First Amendment retaliation claim because Smith failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he attempted to engage in protected speech. See Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003) (to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, plaintiff must show he spoke on a matter of public concern; speech that concerns individual personnel disputes and grievances is generally not of public concern); see also Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[Ajssocia-tional rights only extend to groups engaged in expressive activities.”).

The district court properly dismissed Smith’s Ninth Amendment claim because the Ninth Amendment “has never been recognized as independently, securing any constitutional right, for purposes of pursuing a civil rights claim.” Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986).

We reject as unsupported by the record Smith’s contention that the district court was biased against him.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     