
    Benjamin Landon Hood versus The Proprietors of Dighton Bridge.
    The proprietors of Dighton bridge are bound to raise the draw of the bridge for the passage of loaded lighters, whose masts cannot conveniently be taken down, without delaying or interrupting their passage.
    Debt for two penalties of ten dollars each, for detaining the plaintiff’s vessel more than five minutes two several times, without raising the draw of the bridge, as the plaintiff says the proprietors by the provisions of the act incorporating them, were bound to do.
    Upon the general issue pleaded, a verdict was taken, at the last October term, for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court, upon a case agreed by the parties, in substance as follows:—
    The plaintiff’s vessel was of that description commonly called lighters, ol twenty tons burden, without a deck, and with a movable mast so large as to require more than one man to take it down. At the times mentioned in the declaration, the said lighter was deeply loaded witli bricks taken on board below either of the ancient bridges hereafter mentioned, and could not pass said draw with the mast standing, unless the draw was raised. At the times mentioned t was inconvenient to take down the mast; the wind was fair, and it would have been convenient to the plaintiff to pass the draw with the mast standing. There are divers small vessels which pass up and down the river, without decks, and without fixed masts, commonly called lighters, and not commonly called vessels. Above the bridge, mentioned in the declaration, there are, and for a long time before said bridge was built, were two ancient bridges [ * 264 ] over the same rivér, not * furnished with draws. Lighters used upon the river are made with movable masts, to take down when there is occasion to pass the said ancient bridges, or when the wind is contrary. These lighters seldom pass out of the river. There are also a number of decked vessels which navigate the river, for which the draw is taken up when they have occasion to pass the bridge; and these are called vessels, and not 'ighters.
    If, upon these facts, the Court should be of opinion that the plaintiff’s lighter was a vessel, within the meaning of the third section of the act authorizing the defendants to build the said bridge, judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff according to the verdict; otherwise he is to be nonsuit.
    The third section of the act  incorporating the proprietors, authorizes them to build a bridge over Taunton Great River, at a place described, with a convenient draw for the passing of vessels, at least twenty-eight feet wide, with strong abutments, and a sufficient pier on each side to secure all such vessels as may attempt to pass through said draw, free of wharfage or expense of any kind : “ And the said proprietors shall constantly keep some suitable person or persons at said bridge, who shall raise said draw for any vessel that may be passing up or down the river aforesaid, without toll or expense; and in case any vessel about to pass said bridge shall be detained, at the draw more than Jive minutes before the same shall be begun to be raised, the proprietors of said bridge shall forfeit and pay to the owner or owners of such vessel, the sum of ten dollars for each and every such detention, to be recovered by action of debt in any court proper to try the same.”
    
    The cause was argued at the last term, and continued nisi for judgment.
    
      For the plaintiff, it was contended that by vessel, in this statute, the legislature must have intended those in common use upon the river. The term includes all such vehicles as are furnished with masts, and calculated for the conveyance of goods and pas- [ * 265 ] sengers. If a man were to bequeath all his vessels, * and to die possessed of a lighter, together with other vessels of a different description, it cannot be doubted that the lighter would pass.
    The operation of this statute being to deprive the citizens of the use of a highway, as every navigable river is, to which they are entitled by common right, it will receive from the Court a strict construction, and nothing but what is expressly granted, will be presumed to be granted. The navigation of this river is immensely important to those who inhabit its banks or their vicinity.
    The smallness of the penalty imposed in this case, shows that small and inconsiderable vessels were principally in the contemplation of the legislature. It would be a Very inadequate compensation for the detention of a large vessel. Owners of lighters are in the daily practice of making them fast to the piers adjoining the draw, and this is as necessary for them as for vessels of another and larger kind. But if they are not vessels within the meaning of this statute, they have no right to such easement, and are, in fact, trespassers whenever they avail themselves of it.
    The inconvenience of taking down a mast, in such a lighter as the plaintiff’s, is much greater than that of .raising the draw of the bridge, and the free navigation of the river is more important to the general interests of the country than the passing upon the bridge.
    
      For the defendants, it was said, that if the word vessel was to have the extended construction contended for by the plaintiff, the inconvenience to travellers passing over the bridge, and to the proprietors, would be intolerable. The legislature, in authorizing his bridge, had principally in view the accommodation of travellers ; and this they contemplated as a balance for the inconvenience to vessels and lighters passing the river; to the former, the detention of a few minutes, and to the latter the trouble of striking their masts, as they had for a long time been used to do, when passing the two ancient bridges on the river, which were never furnished with draws. This last circumstance affords strong presumption that :he legislature contemplated another kind of vessels than lighters, and that if these had been the only * species [ * 286 ] navigating the river, a draw would not have been required. That the distinction between the two kinds of vessels was well, understood by the legislature, is apparent from another act passed at the same session, requiring boats and lighters to have their burden or capacity marked upon them; thus classing lighters with boats, instead of considering them as vessels.
    It is true that the word vessel may be, and often is, applied to any thing capable not only of conveying, but of containing any substance; but it is very clear that, in the use of the term in this act of incorporation, no such extensive signification can apply. The most proper way to attain to the meaning of a word is, to inquire how the people, among whom it is "used, understand it. Now the case expressly finds that upon this river these lighters are not called vessels, and that there are a number of decked vessels, which also navigate the river.
    
      
       1800, cap. 53.
    
   And now, at this term, the opinion of the Court was delivered by

Parsons, C. J.

The question submitted to the Court depends on the construction of the statute authorizing the proprietors to erect Dighton bridge. The words of the statute relating to this subject are, “ And the said proprietors shall constantly keep some suitable person or persons at the said bridge, who shall raise said draw for any vessel that shall he passing up or down the river aforesaid, without toll or expense.” A penalty is also added for delaying any vessel more than five minutes before the draw shall oegin to be raised.

The proprietors contend, that the plaintiff's vessel is not a vessel within the intent of the statute; because it is a lighter, which is not in Taunton river commonly denominated a vessel; and because lighters are furnished with a movable mast conveniently taken down and set up again, to enable them to pass other bridges on the river which are not furnished with draws, and, for that reason, this bridge is no obstruction to the convenient passage of them up and down the river, when the draw is not raised.

On the other side, the plaintiff insists that a lighter is a vessel; that the letter of the statute includes all vessels; and | * 267 J *that the penalty for not raising the draw is incurred if the proprietors refuse to raise it for a lighter.

In deciding this question it is necessary to consider the rights of the public before the bridge was erected. Taunton river, where the bridge is erected, is a navigable river, and as such is a common highway for all people to pass and repass with their vessels of all descriptions at their pleasure; and the bridge, erected without the sanction of the legislature, would have been a nuisance. In construing the statute, we ought not to extend the authority of the proprietors, to restrain the rights of others, further than is necessary to give the statute a reasonable construction. The legislature, in providing a draw, must have contemplated the bridge as an obstruction to the navigation of the river, and must have intended to lessen that obstruction, as far as it could be lessened, by raising the draw. The reasonable construction therefore is, that the draw shall be raised for the passage of all vessels of every description, if the* cannot otherwise conveniently pass. To small lighters with movable masts, so circumstanced in their passage to the bridge, that their masts can conveniently be taken down, and be replaced after their passage, the bridge without the draw would not be an obstruction contemplated by the statute. Such lighters should make their w'ay by striking their masts. Loaded lighters, so circumstanced in their passage to the bridge that their masts cannot be conveniently taken down, and which cannot with their masts up pass the bridge unless the draw be raised, are obstructed by the bridge, and for their reasonable accommodation the draw ought to be raised.

Sproat and Tillinghast, for the plaintiff.

Wheaton and Whitman, for the defendants.

From the case it appears that the plaintiff’s lighter was of the burden of twenty tons, and that she, being loaded with bricks, could not conveniently strike her mast. The case does not state the nature of the inconvenience ; but at the trial it was proved that a parcel of bricks, part of her lading, lay round the step of the mast, which prevented the taking it down, and when the raising of the draw was refused, she was run on the flats, and the bricks removed before the mast could be struck. It is, however, agreed that it was inconvenient * to lower the mast. [ * 268 j For the accommodation of this lighter the draw ought to have been raised, as, without raising it, the bridge was an impediment to her navigation. And because the dravy was refused to be raised, the penalty of the statute was incurred, and the verdict must stand.

We wish it to be understood that our opinion does not include the case of a lighter so circumstanced that her mast, without delaying or interrupting her passage, may conveniently be taken down. For such a lighter the raising of the draw might create unnecessary trouble to the proprietors, and would not materially facilitate the navigation of the river.

Let judgment be entered according to the verdict.  