
    Albert Walton vs. Joseph Frost.
    PROVIDENCE
    JUNE 9, 1900.
    Present: Stiness, O. J., Tillingliast, and Rogers, JJ.
    (1) Slander. Words AetionaMe per se.
    
    In an action, for slander, tlie statement “I will go tell tlie superintendent and overseer about your taking that sleeve-lining out of the mill ” is not actionable per se, it not necessarily implying' larceny. To make the words a foundation for an action of slander, facts must be set forth, in a colloquium, which would show that the words could only have been understood to apply to a felonious taking.
    Trespass on the Case for slander. The declaration charged the defendant with uttering the words concerning the plaintiff: i£I will go tell the superintendent and overseer about your taking that sleeve-lining out of the mill,” meaning and intending that the plaintiff stole certain sleeve-lining out of the mill where he was employed.
    Heard on demurrer to declaration, and demurrer sustained.
    
      Thomas F. Vance, for plaintiff.
    
      Lellcm J. Tuck, for defendant.
   Per Curiam.

The declaration in this case, which is an action for slander, does not set out words which are actionable per se. They were, in substance, that the defendant would tell the superintendent about the plaintiff’s taking sleeve-lining out of the mill. These words might only refer to a violation of the rules of the mill. They do not necessarily imply larceny. To make the words a foundation for an action of slander, facts must be set forth, in a colloquium, which would show that the words spoken could only have been understood to apply to a felonious taking. Richmond v. Loeb, 19 R. I. 120; Blake v. Smith, 19 R. I. 476, 481.

The cases relied on by the plaintiff are those where the words were actionable per se, or where they were explained by a colloquium.

Demurrer sustained, and case remitted.  