
    John Boose v. The State of Ohio.
    The record of a judgment in a criminal case, which shows that the jury, upon being “ impaneled and sworn the truth to speak upon the issue joined between the parties," and after having heard the evidence and charge of the court, upon their oaths did say that the defendant is guilty as charged, etc., is sufficient without the addition of the words “according to the law and the evidence," in connection with the oath, to render a verdict on the issue joined.
    A count of an indictment for the crime of robbery, under section 15 of the statute for the punishment of crimes, charging the taking of the personal property by the words “ feloniously and violently did seize, take, and carry away,” without any allegation of the intent to steal or rob, is defective. Where an indictment, in a count charging a burglary, under section 14 of the statute, avers the intent to steal the “personal property,” of a person named, without an express allegation that the property is of any value, the count is sufficient; the term “ property,” ex vi termini, importing value.
    A judgment on a general verdict of guilty on an indictment containing some good and some bad counts, is not erroneous because not rendered with express reference to the good counts.
    Whit of error to the common pleas of Butler county. Beserved -in the district court.
    *At the February term, 1854, of the court of common jileas of Butler county, John Boose was indicted for robbery and burglary, in different counts of the same indictment. These crimes are charged to have been committed January 22, 1854, The indictment contains four counts ; the first and second for rob bery, and the third and fourth for burglary.
    Both counts for robbery charge the crime to have been committed upon one Abraham Werner in his dwelling-house; and that said Boose, certain bank-bills of a. specified denomination and value, “ of the personal property of the said Abraham Werner, from the person and against the will of the said Abraham Werner, in the dwelling-house aforesaid, then and there feloniously and violently did seize, take, and carry away, contrary to the form of the statute,” etc.; there being no allegation, in either count, of an intent to steal or rob.
    In the counts for burglary in breaking and entering the dwelling-house of said Werner, the intent charged is, in one of them, to' steal “ the personal property” of said Werner; and in the other, to rob him of his “personal property.” There is no express allegation that the property is of any value.
    At the same term, the plaintiff in error pleaded not guilty, and went to trial; “ and a jury being impaneled, and sworn the truth to speak upon the issue joined between the parties,’’ and “ having’ heard all the evidence of the parties, the arguments of counsel,, and the charge of the court, upon their oaths do say that the said John Boose is guilty in manner and form as in said indictment is alleged against him.”
    Thereupon the plaintiff in error moved to set aside the verdict, and for a now trial, for the alleged reasons that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the law. This motion, was overruled, and a judgment and sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary was entered on the verdict against the plaintiff in error. To reverse this ^judgment and sentence, the plaintiff in error procured the allowance of a writ of error to the common pleas, returnable to the district court, in which the case was reserved for decision in this court.
    
      Clark, Christy, Thomas Millikin, and Alexander F. Sume, for plaintiff in error.
    1. We claim that the first two counts of the indictment-are defective in not alleging that the property described was taken from the person of Werner “ with intent to rob or steal."
    
    
      2. In regard to the third and fourth counts, we claim that the property therein mentioned should have been averred to be of some-value. It is true that in Spencer v. The State, 13 Ohio, 401, the •court hold that the term goods and chattels, ex vi termini, implies value; yet in the same case the court intimate that had the word property been used instead of goods and, chattels, the decision would have been different; “ for,” say the court, “ a man may have a bare property in dogs or animals which, by the common law, are cf no intrinsic value.” See also Wharton’s Amer. Or. Law, 553. In using the words “ property of any value ” in our statutory definition of burglary, the legislature evidently intended to discriminate those species of property which are, in the eye of the law, valuable, •and those which are intrinsically of no value. As the term “ personal property ” is broad enough to cover both species of property, it is necessary that there should be an averment that the property was of some value.
    3. We claim that the oath administered to the jury who tried the case was insufficient. The jury should have been sworn to well and truly try the issue joined between the parties, and a true verdict render according to the evidence; whereas they were simply sworn “ the truth to speak upon the issue joined between the parties.” This left the jury to determine the issue upon their own. private knowledge *of the facts, or upon any grounds outside ■of the evidence, to them satisfactory.
    4. Should the court be of opinion that some of the counts are good, and some bad, then we claim that, as judgment was rendered alike upon the good and bad counts, that it is erroneous. Turk v. The State, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, 240. See also Rex v. O’Connell, 11 Clark ,& Fin. 156; Wharton’s Amer. Cr. Law, 976, note.
    
      J. Robertson, prosecuting attorney, for the state.
   Bartley, J.,

announced the opinion of the court:

1. The record of a judgment in a criininal case which shows that the jury, upon being “ impaneled, and sworn the truth to speak upon the issue joined between the parties,” and after having heard the evidence and charge of the court, upon their oaths did say that the defendant is guilty as charged, etc., is sufficient, without the .addition of the words “according to the law and the evidence,” in. •connection with the oath to render a verdict on the issue joined.

2. A count of an indictment for the crime of robbery, under the-15th section of the statute for the punishment of crimes, charging the taking of the personal property by the words “feloniously and violently did seize, take, and carry away,” without any allegation of the intent to steal or rob, is defective.

3. Where an indictment in a count charging a burglary under the 14th section of the statute, avers the intent to steal the “personal property ” of a jierson named, without an express allegation that the property is of any value, the count is sufficient, the term property, ex vi termini, importing value.

4. A judgment on a general verdict of guilty on an indictment containing some good and some bad counts, *is not erroueousbecause not rendered with express reference to the good counts.

Judgment of the common pleas affirmed. 
      
       See Matthews v. The State, 4 Ohio St. 539
     
      
      See Spears v. The State, 2 Ohio St. 584.
     