
    Ex parte SNEED.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Oct. 30, 1912.
    On Rehearing, Nov. 9, 1912.)
    Appeal from District Court, Potter County; James N. Browning, Judge. Application of John Beal Sneed for a writ of habeas corpus. From a judgment remanding him to the custody of the sheriff, he appeals.
    Reversed.
    McLean, Scott, McLean & Bradley, of Ft. Worth, Madden, Trulove & Kimbrough and F. M~ Ryburn, all of Amarillo, and W. F. Ramsey, of Oleburne, for appellant. H. S. Bishop, DIet. Atty., and Cooper, Merrill & Lumpkin, all of Amarillo, Odell & Turner of Ft. Worth, and 0. EL Lane, Asst. Atty. óen.. for the State.
   HARPER, J.

Relator was indicted by the grand jury of Potter county, charged with murder. He sued out a writ of habeas corpus before Hon. S. N. Erowning, judge of the district court, praying that he be granted bail. After hearing the evidence the court remanded relator to the custody of the sheriff, from which judgment he prosecutes this appeai. Able counsel appeared in this court in behalf of the relator and for the state, and have filed briefs evidencing research, study, and thought, and to each of which we have given much attention. However, after a careful study of the record, we have arrived at the conclusion that the court was in error in refusing relator bail, and the judgment is reversed. Bail is aranted in the sum of $20,000.

PRENDERGAST, J.

(dissenting). I have reached a different conclusion, from a careful and thorough study of all the evidence and the briefs. I am of the opinion that the district judge was right in refusing bail, and that his judgment should be affirmed. X therefore dissent from the judgment reversing the judgment of the court below and admitting relator to bail. In the event relator is granted bail, it should in no event be less than $35,000.

On Rehearing.

PER CURIAM.

Rehearing denied.

PRENDERGAST, J.

(dissenting). It is the practice of this court in habeas corpus cases before final trial not to discuss the evidence. I believe that is the proper practice. I cannot write my views in full, nor can my Brethren theirs, with any degree of satisfaction without quoting and commenting at length on the evidence. Hence I am constrained to desist from writing my full views in this case. Yet I think it not improper to say that, after a most careful study of this case and the law, the judge of the lower court was not only justified, but, in my opinion, required, by the law to refuse bail. As presented by this record, it is my opinion that the killing was shown to be murder in the first degree, and only that, and the proof of that was evident; that originally, and up to about a month before the killing, the relator had, without doubt, _ adequate cause as great as can be well conceived, so that, if the killing had then occurred under the circumstances as prescribed by our manslaughter statute, manslaughter might have been raised, and it might not under such contingency have been improper to grant bail. But in my opinion the record demonstrates that the passion aroused by this adequate cause fully passed out and away before the killing, and the passion of revenge completely took its place. Again, the record demonstrates, in my opinion, that at the time of the killing there was no “meeting,” either first or any other, such as is clearly meant and intended by our manslaughter statute, so as to raise the question of the offense of manslaughter. I therefore believe a rehearing should be granted herein, and the judgment of the lower court be affirmed, and renew my dissent to the action of the court in reversing this cause and in allowing bail.  