
    FIRST MAGNUS FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tyson RONDEAU, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 09-17845.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted May 10, 2011.
    Filed May 24, 2011.
    Lawrence E. Palles, Esquire, Farhang & Medeoff, PLLC, Scottsdale, AZ, Collin Taylor Suit, Farhang & Medeoff, PLLC, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Cara Maria Gudelis, Henderson, NV, pro se.
    Panther Investments, Henderson, NV, pro se.
    Randolph Straat, Henderson, NV, pro se.
    Shane William Clayton, Esquire, Terry Allen Coffing, Esquire, Marquis & Aur-bach, S. Don Bennion, Jr., Esquire, Nicholas Wieczorek, Esquire, Morris Polich & Purdy LLP, Marilyn Fine, Glenn F. Meier, Esquire, Meier & Fine LLC, Melissa L. Alessi, Esquire, Eric Taylor, Esquire, Derek H. Wojciak, Alverson, Taylor, Morten-sen & Sanders, David Chris Albright, Esquire, Dustin Andrew Johnson, Esquire, Albright, Stoddard, Warnick & Albright, James E. Murphy, Esquire, Laxalt & No-mura, Ltd., Spencer Harold Gunnerson, Mark M. Jones, Esquire, Kemp Jones & Coulthard LLP, Timothy S. Cory, Timothy S. Cory & Associates, Joseph P. Garin, Esquire, Senior, Lipson Neilson Cole Seltzer & Garin PC, Marc Steven Cwik, Esquire, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, John J. Egbert, Michael R. Palumbo, Jennings Strouss & Salmon, PLC, James B. Ball, Esquire, Poli & Ball PLC, Phoenix, AZ, Steven R. Bailey, Ogden, UT, Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: GOULD and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and MARBLEY, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Algenon L. Marbley, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case, we do not recount additional facts except as necessary to explain the decision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We remand to the district court to conduct a Henderson factor-based analysis to determine whether the Appellant’s case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b). See Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir.1986).

By not applying the Henderson factors, the district court abused its discretion in granting the Appellees’ motion to dismiss the Appellant’s complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b). Because the Appellant in this case was managing parallel bankruptcy proceedings in Arizona, some delay in filing a Second Amended Complaint is reasonable. Further, the district court did not include a date by which it expected the Second Amended Complaint to be filed when it granted the Appellant leave to amend. With these considerations in mind, the district court should have properly weighed all of the Henderson factors before exercising its discretion to dismiss the Appellant’s action. These factors include: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423. Upon remand, therefore, the district court should analyze whether the five Henderson factors weigh in favor of dismissal when deciding whether to grant the Appellees’ motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 41(b).

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     