
    Aaron Levy v. S. M. Boas.
    The limitation of actions is of the lex fori, not of the lex loci contractus: Therefore, to an action in the Courts of this State, on a contract made in another State, the statute of limitations of this State is a bar, although the action would not be barred by the statute of limitations of the State, in which the contract was made.
    Tried before Mr. Justice Richardson, at Georgetown, Spring Term, 1831.
    Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered in Philadelphia. Pleas, general issue, and statute of limitations. The goods were sold and delivered in 1819; acknowledgments of the debt by the defendant, as late as the 22d of January, 1823, were in evidence ; and the writ was lodged on the 23d of October, 1828. The statute of limitations of Pennsylvania, in which actions on open account are not barred until after six years, was also introduced in evidence.
    His Honor, charged, that the lex loci contractus followed and governed the contract; and therefore, the statute of limitations of Pennsylvania, must avail the plaintiff. The jury found for the plaintiff; and this was a motion to set aside their verdict, and for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection on this point,
    
      Mazyck, for the motion.
    Cited 3 Dallas, 373. Bae. Abr. Limitation of Actions, D. 3. Nash v. Tupper, 1 Caine, 402. Buggies v. Keeler, 3 Johns. 263. Pearsall v. Dwight, 2 Mass. 84, in which the question had been very fully considered, and statutes of limitations settled to be only part of the lex fori.
    
    King, contra.
    
    Cited Hall v. Little, 14 Mass. 203. Wilson v. Appleton, 17 Id. 180. and Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 3(^1. The passage in 3 Dallas, is merely a citation from Huberius. But the point was very fully examined in Nash v. Tupper, and though the decision of the Court was the other way, the arguments of Emott, one of the counsel, and of Livingston J. are very strong, and it might almost be said, conclusive.
    J. L. Wilson, same side.
    Whatever enlarges or restricts the liability of the party, is a part of the contract, and the lex loci contractus, as it is universally agreed, follows and governs it. The lex fori only interferes as to the means of enforcing it, but does not affect the liability of the party. In Melan v. Duke de Fitz James, 1 Bos. & Pul. 138, in the case of a contract made in France, by which under the laws of that country, the property only, and not the person of the defendant, were liable, it was held that he could not be held to bail in England, and he was accordingly discharged on common bail. That case is directly analogous to the case of statutes of limitations; and is better intitled to consideration, than the cases decided inNew-York.
    Mazyck, in reply.
    If there were no statute of limitations in Pennsylvania, could the plaintiff be permitted to bring his action in this State at any indefinite period 1 The statute of limitations was intended to spare our Courts the labour and responsibility ofinvestigating transactions of so remote a date, that there could be no certainty in the conclusion, to which the testimony might lead. In the case supposed, the utmost that could be contended for is, that the contract being made in a countiy, where there was no limitation of time to bring the action, it amounted to an undertaking not to set up lapse of time as a defence. But by a well settled rule such a contract would be unavailing, for the statute would run against it. Lance v. Parker. 1 Mill, 168.
   Harper J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The only English authority which I have found apparently applicable to this case, is that of Duplein v. De Roven, 5 Vern. 540. In that case it was held, that a judgment recovered in, France, was only a simple contract debt, and that the English statute of limitations would run to bar it. The question has been fully considered in the cases of Nash v. Tupper, 1 Caine, 402, and Pearsall v. Dwight, 2 Mass. 84, in which it was held, that where a contract was made in one State, and an action afterwards brought upon it in another, the law of the State, in which the action was brought, must govern with respect to the limitation, and not that of the State in which the contract was , made.

The principle is, that the lex loci contractus is to be observed in deciding on the nature, validity and construction of the contract: but the form of the action, the course of judicial proceedings, and the time when the action must be commenced, must be directed exclusively by the laws of the State, in which the action is brought. The doctrine is recognized in Ruggles v. Keeler, 3 Johns. 261. It is supposed to have been drawn from Huber Præl. Tom. 2. Lib. 1. Til. 3. “ De Conjlictu Legumand in general I suppose it is not questionable. Wo should not be at liberty, I think, to depart from the doctrine thus settled on admitted general principles, though cases of individual hardship might be the result of adhering to it. In Pearsall v. Dwight, Chief Justice Parsons observes, that by going into New-York, and making the contract there, the defendants must be considered to have been inhabitants of New-York for the time; yet he held that the statute of Massachusetts must govern. 2 Mass. 89. In the present case it does not appear whether the defendant went to Philadelphia to purchase the goods or not: all that we know of him is, that he is now a resident of the State of South-Carolina. Dealing with a resident of this State, I see no hardship in requiring the plaintiff to take notice of the laws of the State, limiting his remedy for breach of contract. The motion for new trial must therefore be granted.  