
    Fredric SANAI, Plaintiff-Appellant.
    No. 14-35039
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 7, 2016  Seattle, Washington
    FILED June 30, 2016
    Cyrus Mark Sanai, Solicitor, Sanais, Beverly Hills, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Fredric Sanai, McMinnville, OR, Pro Se.
    Before: PAEZ, BYBEE, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Appellant Fredric Sanai seeks reversal of the district court’s imposition of reciprocal discipline, following his unanimous disbarment by the Washington Supreme Court. We affirm.

“[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007). Final judgment was entered in Sanai’s case on July 30, 2013. His notice of appeal was filed January 16, 2014. Moreover, Sa-nai’s Rule 59 motion, filed September 5, 2013, was filed “later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b),(e). On this basis, some of our precedent holds that the district court was “without jurisdiction to consider” the untimely Rule 59 motion, Tillman v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Ewa Apartments, 234 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000), despite the district court’s attempt to toll “the 28-day filing period mandated by FRCP 59(e) ... for 9 days.”

Developments since Tillman suggest that the district court may have had the ability to toll the deadline for filing a Rule 59 motion because Rule 59 is a court-promulgated rule untethered to a statutory timeline. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210-11, 127 S.Ct. 2360; Vaught v. Scottsdale Healthcare Corp. Health Plan, 546 F.3d 620, 626 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, because of the non-adversarial nature of this appeal, we decline to consider whether our pre-Bowles precedents are still good law. Ultimately, it makes no difference to the outcome of Sanai’s appeal: he loses either because the district court lacked jurisdiction or because Rules 6(b)(2) and Rule 59, working as “claims-processirig rules,” Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210, 127 S.Ct. 2360, denied the district court the discretion to entertain a late Rule 59 motion, Carter v. United States, 973 F.2d 1479, 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he district court has no discretion to consider a late rule 59 [motion].”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (“A court must not extend the time to act under Rule[ ] [59(e) ].”); Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 261 n.5, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (“Rule 6(b) prohibits enlargement of the time period prescribed in [Rule 59(e)].”).

The judgment is AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . Moreover, even if we reached the merits of the Rule 59 motion, we would affirm the district court.
     