
    WALKER v. THE STATE.
    
      No. 15166.
    June 7, 1945.
    
      
      Phillip Sheffield and A. H. Gray, for plaintiff in error.
    
      T. Grady Head, attorney-general, B. A. Patterson, solicitor-general, Hooper, Miller Head, and Maud Saunders, contra.
   Duckworth, Justice.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) On the subject of good character the court charged the jury as follows : " Where a defendant has been placed on trial, he has a right to put in issue his good character, and when he puts that character in issue, he'has a right to, have the jury to consider it. It is the duty of the jury to consider that testimony of good character along with all of the other evidence in the case. The fact that a man might have borne a good character, if the evidence shows his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then that fact would not warrant the jury’s acquitting the defendant. Whereas, if the jury, taking that evidence of good character along with the other evidence in the case, and if there is any doirbt in their mind as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, then that good character alone would of itself give sufficient probative value as to generate in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt and operate as an acquittal. That is a question for you to sajr and determine in considering the defendant’s good character, but it is your duty nevertheless to consider the statement along with the other evidence, and if that generates in your minds a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant it becomes your duty to give the defendant the benefit of thar doubt and acquit the defendant.” Four special grounds of the motion for new trial complain of excerpts from this portion of the charge, the substance of the criticisms being that the court failed to add in connection therewith a charge prescribing the weight to be given the defendant’s statement; that the charge was misleading; that it caused the jury to believe that they would be authorized by proof of good character to entertain a doubt sufficient to acquit the accused only in the event that the other evidence was unsatisfactory; and that the charge was confusing in that in one instance it directed the jury to consider the proof of good character, together with the other evidence, in determining whether or not there existed a reasonable doubt, and in another instance it directed them to consider the defendant’s statement along with the other evidence to determine if there existed a reasonable doubt; and that each of the excerpts excepted to is an unsound abstract principle of law.

A correct charge upon one principle of law is not rendered erroneous because of the failure to charge in immediate connection therewith some other correct principle of law. Therefore it was not incumbent upon the judge to add to the charge here involved an instruction as to the weight to be given the defendant’s statement. Elsewhere in the charge the court had fully instructed the jury concerning the weight to be given the statement of the accused. See Roberts v. State, 123 Ga. 146 (8) (51 S. E. 374); McCrary v. State, 141 Ga. 4 (80 S. E. 305); Morris v. State, 177 Ga. 365 (3) (170 S. E. 217). The movant, relying upon Shropshire v. State, 81 Ga. 589 (8 S. E. 450), strongly insists that the charge complained of is erroneous in that it instructed the jury that, if the other evidence proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then proof of good character would not authorize an acquittal. The case relied upon involved a charge which thus restricted the consideration of the evidence of good character, and it was held to be error. The charge there instructed the jury that, in the event they were doubtful of the defendants’ guilt they might take into consideration their character; but, that, on the other hand, if the jury believed that the case had been made out and that the defendants committed the crime, it made no difference what their characters were and it was the duty of the jury to convict. The charge here does not contain the error pointed out in the Shropshire case. This charge instructed the jury that the accused had the right to have the jury consider the evidence of his good character, and that it was the duty of the jury to consider that evidence along with the other evidence in the case. It thus identified the proof of good character as “evidence.” This having been done, the charge then correctly stated that, if the “evidence” showed the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then the fact that the accused might have borne good character would not authorize the jury to acquit him. What was meant by “evidence” had been clearly explained to the jury, and they could not have understood that the evidence relating to good character was not involved in that instruction. Thus it is clear that the court’s instruction was that, if the evidence, which included proof of good character, showed guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then the jury should convict, and that the fact that the accused bore a good character would not authorize an acquittal. The charge simply means that good character under our law is not a license for committing crime. This is a correct statement of the law. Proof of good character as evidence may generate a doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, but when such evidence, considered as it must be along with the other evidence in the case, fails to generate a doubt of guilt, then it will not authorize an acquittal. Hathcock v. State, 88 Ga. 91 (13 S. E. 959); Brazil v. State, 117 Ga. 32 (3) (43 S. E. 460); Henderson v. State, 120 Ga. 504 (48 S. E. 167); Jeffers v. State, 145 Ga. 74 (2) (88 S. E. 571); Williams v. State, 170 Ga. 886, 891 (154 S. E. 363). Nor is this charge subject to the criticism that in one portion it directs the jury to consider the evidence of good character along with the other evidence in the case, and if there is generated a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury, they should acquit; and thereafter it instructs the jury that it is their duty to consider the defendant's statement along with the other evidence, and if this generates a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury, they should give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and acquit him. This portion of the charge is neither confusing nor incorrect. It is not subject to this criticism. Nor is the charge subject to any of the criticisms made under the special grounds of the motion for new trial.

There is evidence in this record showing that the accused stated that he killed Emma Walker, without further explanation. There is also evidence, together with his statement, showing that she was killed with a rifle belonging to the accused at a time when he said they were scuffling. The sheriff testified that the accused told him that the deceased was trying to take a rifle from the defendant. Other witnesses testified that he told them that he was trying to take the rifle from her. The circumstances surrounding the killing, together with this evidence, authorized the verdict of guilty, and the general grounds of the motion for new trial are without merit.

Judgment affirmed.

Bell, G. J., Jenkins, P. J., Atkinson and Wyatt, JJ., concur.  