
    Thomas Hundley vs. Charles E. Mount.
    The registration laws of the several states do not operate extra-territorially; nor do those of one state operate upon conveyances executed in another, unless express words to that effect be inserted in the statute.
    P. in 1836, executed a deed of trust, which was regularly recorded, on a slave to M. to secure certain debts to creditors of P. ; in 1838, the slave was levied on under judgments against P. junior to the deed of trust, and sold to "W. who had knowledge of the deed of trust; W. removed with the slave to Missouri, where he was afterwards attached by H. a creditor of W. as the property of "W., and sold as such and bought by H., who had no knowledge of the deed of trust, and who subsequently brought the slave to . Mississippi; where the slave delivered himself up to M., the. trustee ; H. brought an action of replevin against M. for the slave; held, that the legal title of the slave being in M. by the deed of trust, the subsequent proceedings had not divested it; and that he was entitled to the slave.
    In error from the circuit court of Yazoo county; Hon. Morgan Li Fitch, judge.
    ..Thomas Hundley sued Charles E. Mount in replevin for a •slave named Isham. On the trial the following facts were agreed, viz.: ‘-1 It is agreed that the negro Isham in controversy is the same with the one named Isham, in a certain deed of trust, dated 20th September, 1836, duly executed in Yazoo county, where the negro was at the time; and acknowledged and recorded in the probate office of'Yazoo county, Mississippi, November 3d, 1836, by which said deed, Samuel W. Punchard duly conveyed said Isham to J. R. Creecy in trust for the use of Briggs, Lacoste & Co.; and it is agreed that the amount of money secured to be paid by the said deed still remains unsatisfied in part, several thousand dollars being unpaid. It is agreed farther that on the 21st of June, 1838, Charles E. Mount, the defendant, was, in pursuance of the power vested in said Briggs, Lacoste & Co., by them duly substituted as trustee in lieu, of said J. R. Creecy; that in ful-filment of his duties as trustee, the said negro having come voluntarily into his said Mount’s possession before the commencement of this suit; and said negro being at the time of bringing the said suit, to wit, on the 28th July, 1843, still in said Mount’s possession; and in pursuance of his power as trustee, said Mount having complied with the requisitions of said deed, did duly sell said negro at public sale at Benton, to Samuel S. Griffin on the 31st of July, 1843, who subsequently sold said Isham to defendant; and farther it is agreed that said negro Isham was sold at sheriff’s sale at Benton, by Parham Buford, then sheriff of Yazoo county, on the 5th day of March, 1838, under various executions against the said' Samuel W. Punchard, emanating upon judgments upon forfeited forthcoming bonds, bearing date October, 1837; that one Eli West, became the purchaser of said negro Isham, for the sura of two hundred dollars or thereabouts, at said sheriff’s sale, he being fully apprized of the existence of said deed of trust aforesaid, by proclamation at said sheriff’s sale, by Edward J. Pinkerton and Charles E. Mount, both special agents of Briggs, Lacoste & Co. for that purpose, said James R. Creecy, who was then the trustee, being absent from the county; that without such proclamation, said negro would have sold for $1000 or 1200; that West, when so notified, re-* plied that when recovered by lawful authority he would give him up; but thought he should get the worth of his money paid for Isham before he could be recovered by law.
    That some twelve or eighteen months after said Eli West purchased said negro as aforesaid, said West left the county of Yazoo, and departed beyond the jurisdiction of this state, and removed to Missouri, carrying said Isham with him; that subsequently the plaintiff, Thomas Hundley, a creditor of West, sued out of the circuit court of the United States, at St. Louis, state of Missouri, a writ of attachment against the property of West; and the marshal of the United States, levied an execution, c»n a judgment upon the attachment, on the negro Isham, as the property of West, and sold him thereunder in May, 1843, to the plaintiff Hundley; said deed of trust was never recorded in the state of Missouri, and Hundley had no notice of its existence. Afterwards the negro was brought to the state of Mississippi by Hundley, and escaped from the possession of Hundley and came to the possession of Mount, trustee as aforesaid, voluntarily, who then having possession, sold him as stated. On this state of facts, the court below instructed the jury that if they believed from the evidence that the slave Isham was included in the deed of trust; and that he was afterwards sold thereunder to Griffin and by Griffin to the defendant, they must find for the defendant. The jury having found for the defendant accordingly, the plaintiff prosecutes this writ of error.
    
      W. R. Miles, for plaintiff in error.
    There is but a single point to which the court’s attention is directed.
    It will be seen, from the agreed state of facts, that West took the boy to Missouri, some twelve or eighteen months after his purchase; that, at the utmost, would make the date of his removal from this state to Missouri, take place as early as the autumn of 1839. Hundley purchased the boy in the spring of 1843, three years and a half afterwards. Now it is respectfully insisted, that the principle of the decision in the case of Davidson v. Moss, settles this ; for the same, or similar facts occur to destroy title under the trust deed here, as were then regarded sufficient to annihilate the title of Davidson and wife: the only difference consisting in the fact that the property in this case was moved out of the state, whereas in the other it was moved from one county to another in this state. 1 S. & M. 112.
    
      George IS. Yerger, for defendant in error.
    1. The only question is, who is entitled to the slave? The legal title was passed by the deed of trust to the trustee, a large amount being still due on the deed of trust; the boy was sold by the trustee, and purchased by the defendant.
    
      Upon this case I can make no argument. The law of Mississippi, where the property was situate, vested the legal title under the deed of trust. The deed of trust was legally proved and registered. There can therefore be no doubt, as the deed of trust was good and passed the title, being older than the judgments under which West purchased, that West acquired no title or right. He of course could communicate no right to others.
    His carrying off the boy to Missouri, cannot alter the title or rights of the party. He could have been recovered in Missouri, as well as in Mississippi.
    2. This case has been in fact settled by the court, in the case of Palmer v. Cross, 1 S. & M. 66, 67. See Judge Clayton’s opinion in that case, p. 67, and in other states, see cases cited by Judge Clayton, in his opinion.
    As there is no statutory provision in Missouri requiring deeds of slaves made in other states to be recorded, it is manifest the judgment must be affirmed.
   Mr. Justice ClaytoN

delivered the opinion of the court.

Had the slave in controversy never been carried out of this state, no possible doubt could exist as to the preferable right of the defendant in error. The circumstances make no difference in point of law, in this respect. By the sheriff’s sale West obtained no title, except one subordinate to that of Mount and subject to it. Hundley, by his purchase of West’s title at marshal’s sale in Missouri, got no other or better title than West had. We therefore see no error in the decision of the court below.

The case of Moss v. Davidson, 1 S. & M. relied on by the plaintiff in error, establishes no principle’ at war with this conclusion. The statute of registration there referred to, is a law ■ of this state, and relates to the removal of personal property from one county to another in this state. No statute of this state in regard to registration, relates to the removal of property from the state, and its subsequent return to the same county in the state.

The registration laws of the several states do not operate extra-territorially. Nor do those of one state operate upon conveyances, executed in another, unless express words to that effect be inserted in the statute.

The judgment is affirmed.  