
    People ex rel. Hutchinson et al. v. O’Brien et al., Village Assessors.
    
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Fourth Department.
    
    July 20, 1889.)
    1. Taxation—Exemption—Property of Religious Societies.
    A lot owned by a religious society, upon which is a “parsonage” occupied by the pastor as a dwelling-house, the same being furnished for his use by the society in addition to'his salary, is not, as to the portion thereof occupied by the parsonage, exempt from taxation, under 1 Rev. St. N. Y. c. 13, tit. 1, § 4, subd. 3, as amended by Laws 1883, c. 397, exempting “every building for public worship,” though another portion of the same lot is occupied by the society’s church building.
    2. Same—Assessment—Validity.
    An assessment against “Trustees First Congregational Church,’’the property assessed being described as “Parsonage, ” is not misleading, and the absence of a statement of the quantity of land assessed, if material under the charter of the village, is not a source of any injury to the society.
    Appeal from special term, Onondaga county.
    Belators, as trustees of the First Congregational Church of the village of Phoenix, appeal from an order affirming an assessment against the relators and dismissing a writ of certiorari obtained, under the provisions of chapter 269 of the Laws of 1880, to review an assessment upon certain real property .belonging to said First Congregational Church, known as the “Parsonage.” The facts, as stated in the opinion of the special term, {ante, 771,) are as follows: The relators are the trustees of a religious corporation which owns a parcel of land situate in the village of Phoenix, 132 feet wide on Bridge street, and 150 feet deep on Jefferson street. At the time the assessment in question was made there stood upon the said lot, fronting on Bridge street, a brick church used by said society exclusively for public worship; and also fronting on the same street, and separated from said church by “a narrow space,” a wooden building, erected and used by said association exclusively for a parsonage, and occupied by the pastor of said church as a dwelling-house. The pastor receives an annual salary, the parsonage being furnished for his use by the society. Upon the rear of said lot are “sheds for horses, and a barn erected and used for the accommodation and comfort of the teams and horses of those who may attend public worship at said church.” The greater portion of the entire parcel of land is covered by the erections aforesaid.
    Argued before Hardin, P. J„ and Martin and Merwin, JJ.
    
      Avery & Murry, for appellants. C. M. Reilly, for respondents.
    
      
       Affirming ante, 711.
    
   Merwin, J.

Two propositions are presented by the appellant: First, that the lot upon which the building denominated a “parsonage” stands is exempt from taxation under subdivision 3, § 4, tit. 1, c. 13, pt. 1, Bev. St., as amended by chapter 397, Laws 1883; second, that the assessment is void for not containing a description nor giving the quantity of land to be taxed. The first proposition is fully discussed by Mr. Justice Vann in the opinion delivered by him at special term upon malting the order appealed from. There is no occasion for any further discussion of the subject. We agree with him in his view that the parsonage was not exempt. The second proposition does not seem to have been raised at special term. It is not stated in the writ of, certiorari as a ground for relief, nor does it appear to have been raised before the assessors, although upon grievance day the relators appeared before them, and asked for relief on the other ground. It is, however, stated in the petition upon which the writ was granted. The assessment was against “Trustees First Congregational Church,” the property assessed was described “Parsonage,” and the valuation was entered “$1,600.” The description did not mislead the relators. Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y. 66. There was no doubt about the identity. Presumptively it was so much of the lotas was covered by the parsonage. It was understood to be a real-estate assessment; so alleged, in substance, in the petition. The absence of a statement of the quantity, if important under the charter of the village, (chapter 639, Laws 1868, as amended by chapter 257, Laws 1888, tit. 4, § 6,) is not a source of any injury to the relators. As said in People v. Parker, 45 Hun, 432, injury must be shown, or the alleged illegality will be unavailing under the act of 1880. Ho question is made about the valuation. We think there is nothing in the form of the assessment that presents here any good ground for disturbing the order. The order should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.  