
    DROZDA v. STATE.
    (No. 5669.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 11, 1920.)
    1. Libel and slander <S»152(2) — Information SHOULD CONTAIN TRANSLATION OF ALLEGED LIBEL PRINTED IN FOREIGN TONGUE WITHOUT INNUENDOES.
    Where an alleged libel was printed in a foreign tongue, the information charging the offense of libel should, after setting out the alleged libelous article, contain an English translation thereof according to the tenor of the article, which should not be interspersed with in-nuendoes or explanatory statements.
    2. Libel and slander <⅜^152(2) — Purpose of “innuendo” in information.
    An innuendo in an information charging libel is to explain, not to extend, what has gone before, and it cannot extend the meaning of words, although in a particular case it may more precisely fix the moaning either of preceding or subsequent words.
    [Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Innuendo.]
    S. Libel and slander <§=al52(2) — Information CHARGING LIBEL INSUFFICIENT.
    An information setting out an alleged libelous article published by -defendant in a foreign tongue which related to the Bohemian National Alliance held insufficient to state an offense, not showing to what particular persons the libelous statements were directed.
    Appeal from McLennan County Court; James P. Alexander, Judge.
    J. Drozda was convicted of the offense of libel, and he appeals.
    Reversed, and order dismissed.
    
      Pat M. Neff, of Waco, and Thomas B. Lewis, of Houston, for appellant.
    Alvin M. Owsley, Asst. Atty. Qen., for the State.
   LATTIMORE, J.

This appellant brings before us for review a conviction in the county court of McLennan county for the offense of libel.

Reviewing the various errors- complained of, we first note that it is urged that the information is insufficient, because the same does not contain a translation into English of the alleged libelous article. The defamatory article which appeared in appellant’s paper was printed and published in the Bohemian language, and while said information sets out said article in hcec verba as printed in said foreign language, it nowhere sets out the English translation thereof. Examining said complaint and information, we are constrained to agree with this contention. Said pleading set out the article fully, as it is supposed to have been printed, in Bohemian, immediately following which occur these words, “which said malicious statement is in the Bohemian language, and which translated from the Bohemian language to the English language is to the tenor as follows,” and then follows an English translation of said article which to our minds is numerously interspersed and mingled with innuendo averments, none of which appear in the original, and which this court can know to be innuendo averments only from the frequent parentheses used and the further use Of many names in the translation which do not appear in the original. It is manifest that what purports to be a translation of the Bohemian article “to the tenor as follows” is in fact not a literal translation, or even a substantial translation thereof.

We are next confronted with the question as to whether a libelous article published in a foreign language, and as such copied into an information or indictment, must be accompanied by a substantially correct translation' thereof into English. Let us first here note the well-known rule in our practice that the alleged libelous matter must be set out in hasc verba when possible. Coulson v. State, 16 Tex. App. 196; Edgerton v. State, 70 S. W: 90.

In 25 Cyc. p. 378, discussing indictments for libel and slander, it is said:

“Words spoken in a foreign language should be set out in such language, and followed by a proper translation.”

In section 564 of Mr. Bishop’s New Criminal Procedure, vol. 2, under the head of “Alleging Words from a Foreign Language,” that distinguished author says:

“The tenor * * * is set out by giving an exact copy in the original, and adding an English translation.”

In Stichtd v. State, 25 Tex. App. 420, 8 S. W. 477, 8 Am. St. Rep. 444, the case turned upon the question, if a slander be pleaded in the information only in English, whether same could be supported by proof of a slander uttered in German. This court answered in the negative, and quotes with approval the rule in civil cases, which requires where the slanderous words were spoken in a foreign language, that they be so set forth, together with a translation into English. This holding is reaffirmed and emphasized in Dunn v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 25, 63 S. W. 571. To our minds the rule applies with equal force to cases of libel, and we hold that the setting forth of the libelous article in Bohemian in the information should have been followed by substantially a literal translation into English,’ which should in turn have been followed by another translation in English when necessary to make clear the meaning of said article by explanatory or innuendo averments.

It is also contended that the alleged libelous article was of such indefinite and general character as that it could not by averment be made to support a charge of libel. If we be correct in this opinion as to what we suppose to be the English translation of the alleged libelous article, stripped of its explanatory averments, we are of opinion that the innuendoes, as used, are not sufficient. The purpose of the libel law is to punish him who maliciously imputes to others in writing, etc., disgraceful conduct, bad character, crime, etc., and, unless there be that in the alleged libelous publication per se which would tend to indicate the person or persons aimed at or meant to be attacked, it is difficult for us to conceive how innuendo could impart to the language used the specific personal criminal intent necessary. A government or other body politic, a corporation, religious system, race of people, or a political party, are not subject to criminal libel. Nor could a publication referring generally to any of these be made specific or li"belous merely by inserting in the indictment at the dictum of the pleader innuendoes stating that particular persons, members of such a party, religious system or body politic were meant. In our view, it is necessary that in such publication there be matters which 'to the persons to whom the same is communicated would fairly tend to particularize qnd thus affect the persons alleged to be so libeled.

A man who scurrilously attacks the Smiths, Johnsons, Joneses, or the Jews, Gentiles, or Syrians, Democrats, Republicans, Populists, or office holders in general, could not be successfully haled into court and convicted of libel of any particular person, unless there be something in such article which by fair interpretation thereof tended to bring into disrepute some ijarticular person or persons. In the instant case the reference in the alleged libelous article is to “those people whom you call leaders.” There is nowhere any allegation that the parties alleged to have been libeled were known among the people referred to as “you” as leaders, or that any of the persons seeing such publication could know or conclude that those particular persons were meant. It is further stated in said article that such leaders “have recognized the G. N. S.” (meaning the Bohemian National Alliance). It is not stated what the letters O. N. S. stood fo'r, nor how the same meant or could have meant the Bohemian National Alliance. Nor do we see anything in the article as published which would justify the innuendo averment that the first word “they,” as used therein, means the parties whose names follow such words in parentheses, and who are alleged by the pleader to be meant and referred to by the use of said word “they.” We are not holding that it could not be sufficiently alleged that the. paper of appellant was a Bohemian paper, circulated among and read by Bohemians and others in certain territory, and that such people or persons alleged to be libeled were 'known and recognized as the leaders, and that the Bohemian National Alliance was an organization among Bohemians for certain purposes, among others, to collect and receive gifts, and that one Yojta Benes had by some authority appointed said named persons to collect such gifts and donations, etc., but we do intend to say that the innuendo averments in the instant case do not so sufficiently allege. As said by this court in Atehley v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. R. 569, 120 S. W. 1010:

“The office, of an innuendo is to define the defamatory meaning which the party seeks to put upon the words complained of, to show how they come to have the particular meaning claimed for them, as well as to show how they relate to plaintiff, whenever that is not clear from the face of the words, but an innuendo must-not introduce new matter or enlarge the ⅜ * * meaning of words.”

The explanatory averments in the instant case do not show how the language used relates to the alleged injured parties, and does not attempt to explain, but merely asserts, and asserts facts not suggested by the publication in any way, as we see it. In Squyres v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 96, 45 S. W. 147, 73 Am. St. Rep. 904, this court said:

“An innuendo helps nothing unless the words precedent have a violent presumption of the innuendo. The business of an innuendo is, by reference to preceding matter, to fix more precisely the meaning. The office of an innuendo is to explain, not to extend, what has gone be* fore, and it cannot enlarge the meaning of words, unless it be connected with some matter of fact expressly averred.”

We approve these expressions, except that we think innuendo may in a particular case point forward as well as backward. See, also, Potter v. State, 216 S. W. 886.

Believing that the complaint and information in the instant case do not charge any offense against the laws of this state, the ease is reversed and ordered'dismissed. 
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