
    Peter Cosack vs. Descoudres & Crovat.
    On a sale of lands, the following receipt was held sufficient to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds, viz. “Received of C. g20, being on account of a plantation on the Cypress, sold to him this day for two thousand two hundred dollars, payable in different instalments, as per .agreement.” (Signed) Ü, & C.
    m X HIS was a special action on the case, brought for a breach of the following agreement:
    “ Received of Mr. Peter Cosack, twenty dollars, being on account of a plantation on the Cypress, sold to him this day, for two thousand two hundred dollars, payable in. different instalments as per agreement. Charleston, August 1st, 1816. ■
    £>20. Descoudres Sí? CrovatP
    
    
      J. Stewart proved that on the 6th August, 1816, the defendant said that the plaintiff was to have met him, in order to make the first payment of £5500, and to receive titles for the land, but that business would carry him f Cro-vat ) out of town, and the titles could not be made in bis absence. He said that he would make another appoint-» ment with the plaintiff whom he knew to be a punctual man. Crovat added that he had been offered £>2500 for *he land. He further stated that the plaintiff was to pay §§500 in cash, and the balance in three payments. Mr. ¡Stewart also said, that Mr. Stevens afterwards purchased, and took possession of the same land. The witness valued it at §2500 by general opinion. He thought that the plaintiff had suffered inconvenience and loss in not getting the place, &c. That he had formerly lived there, and his stock would stray back to it.
    
      Enos Easter proved that on the 13th August, 1816, he was at Crovafs, and heard the plaintiff demand titles of Crovat and said, he was ready to comply with his contract, at the same time taking out his pocket book ; but Crovat, refused to give titles. The witness saw no money, but the pocket hook was laid on the counter ; Mrs. Crovat observed, that she would not assign her dower ; and said, “ return the money received and take up the agreement but the plaintiff refused to receive the money he had advanced, and insisted upon the bargain, and declared, he would take possession of the place; when Crovat observed, he could do no such thing.
    Upon this testimony, the jury found a verdict of §300 and for §20 more, with interest upon the latter sum from the date of the agreement.
    Upon this finding, the defendants moved for anew trial, and for a nonsuit upon the following grounds:
    1st. Because, the agreement relied on, was not executed within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds.
    2nd. The evidence was insufficient to establish the case, even though it should be thought that the agreement, for the sale of lands, under such circumstances as existed in this case, need not be in writing.
    3rd. Tlie plaintiff proved no money tendered under the' alleged agreement; nor was there any proof of a demand to execute titles, nor any satisfactory evidence to shew that the plaintiff had sustained any real damage, or when, or for how long a time; and the jury gave excessive dam - áges.
   Mr. J ustice Richardson

delivered tbe opinion of the court.

That the defendants contracted to sell to the plaintiff a tract of laird for $>2200, and that they received $20 in part payment, are unquestionable facts. That the plaintiff very soon after, demanded titles, after tendering the first in-stalment, or at least was offering to tender the money, when he was stopped by Crovafs expressly refusing to make titles, are equally certain. The plaintiff having offered to perform his part of the contract, and the defendants refusing to do Ihe'like on their part, gives a right of action ; provided the contract was originally binding in law.

The objection to the contract is, that it is not according to the Statute of Frauds, See. (29 Charles, 2, C. 3. P. L. 82,) in not having been reduced to writing, &c.

This Statute enacts, &c. “ that no action shall be brought, &c. — upon any contract or sale of land, &c. — unless the agreement, &c. — or some memorandum or note, &c. — shall be in writing, and signed by the party so charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully' authorized.”

In the case before us, the receipt was an intelligible note in writing, and signed by the defendants. It imports the assent of both parties, both in its terms, and by the acts set forth; which is what the statute requires. It is enough that the writing signed by one, imports an agreement and has been accepted by the other. It need not be signed by both. (See 1 Vesey, Jun. 326. Roberts, 109.) This is indeed well illustrated by an ordinary mesne conveyance, which is signed but by the donor. No particular form is required by the statute. (2 Vent. 361. 1 Vern. 110. Peake, 217.) It is enough, if intelligible. I apprehend that there can be no question, that in such a case, the court of equity would specifically enforce the contract. (3 Taunton 175. 3 Wooddeson 468. 1 Vesey, Jr. 326, &c.) And where that court ought to give specific relief, this court, under the same testimony, will-give damages : for though the courts differ in the mode of proof, and in the manner of giving relief to the injured party, yet in a ques tion of right and for the enforcement of law, which,, is the end of both courts, they agree.

King, for the motion.

Cogdell, contra,

But besides the receipt in writing, it appears well settled, that the payment of a substantial part of the purchase jnoney is such a part performat3ce as to take a case out of the statute. (Roberts 153. 1 Vernon, 472. 3 Atk. 4. Vesey 82. 4 Vesey, Jr. 720. Now upon this point, the' receipt is plain. “ Received on account of a plantation, &c.” sold to him for S2200, &c. The twenty dollars, by the literal import of the receipt itself, is plainly a payment.

I need not notice at large the objections to the verdict, arising out of the facts in evidence. The plaintiff’s case was very well made out. Justice is on his side; as the defendants had wilfully broken their contract, and, that too, most evidently for gain. In such a case, seeing that the plaintiff’s claim was legal, the jury must have given very heavy damages before a new trial would be granted. But they appear to have taken as a measure of damages, the probable gain to the defendants, arising from their breach of the contract, which is a rational measure of the amount of the loss to the plaintiff from the same cause.

The motion is therefore refused.

Justices Johnson and Huger, concurred»

Mr. Justice Gantt, dissented.  