
    *Chapline v. Overseers of the Poor &c.
    February, 1836,
    Richmond.
    (Absent Cabell, J.)
    [30 Am. Dec. S04.]
    Overseers of Poor — Right to daintain Suit. — The overseers of the poor are a corporate body who can maintain a suit.
    Same — Right to Motion against Predecessor. — They may maintain a motion against a predecessor in office, for moneys officially received by him, and unaccounted for.
    Same — Submission to Arbitration. — They may submit such a claim to arbitration.
    Same — Expiration of Term Pending Motion — Effect — And, if pending such a motion, the plaintiffs’ own term of office expires, their motion does not abate, but they may proceed in the prosecution of it, being themselves accountable to their successors for the money they shall recover.
    The overseers of the poor for the county of Ohio for the year 1827, made a motion in the county court against Chapline, who had been an overseer of the poor for the county for the years 1823, 1824 and 1825, for a balance of moneys by him officially received and unaccounted for. Chapline, in his defence, produced three several accounts of his transactions for the three years, settled by commissioners appointed by the ■county court, shewing, it seemed, much smaller balances against him than those which the plaintiffs claimed: and he insisted, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover in this motion, because it did not appear that they were duly elected and appointed overseers of the poor; that if the plaintiffs could maintain their motion, they were precluded by the accounts so settled, from shewing errors therein ; and that overseers of the poor could not maintain a motion against their predecessors in office, without first having their accounts regularly settled, and thereby ascertaining the balances. The county court dismissed the motion. The plaintiffs filed a bill of exceptions, and appealed to the circuit court; which reversed the judgment, and remanded the cause to the county court for further proceedings.
    *Upon the second hearing of the motion in the county court, Chapline shewed, that no specific appropriation had been made of the moneys in his hands as an overseer of the poor, to his successors in office; and, on this ground, he again objected, that the plaintiffs could not maintain this motion. The plaintiffs insisted, that they were entitled to the motion, because the statute gave it to them, and because the circuit court had decided the point. The county court overruled this objection of Chapline, and entertained the motion; to which Chapline excepted.
    Then, by consent, “all matters in dispute between the parties in the cause were referred to arbitrators,” whose award should be entered as the judgment of the court. The arbitrators made and returned a general award, that the defendant should pay7 the plaintiffs 1026 dollars, with interest &c.
    The plaintiffs prayed judgment upon the award. Hut the defendant shewed that the plaintiffs were not now overseers of the poor, their term of office having expired pending the motion, and successors having been regularly elected and appointed; and he moved the court to enter an abatement of the plaintiff’s motion. But the court overruled the objection, and gave judgment for the plaintiffs according to the award. Chapline again excepted. And he took an appeal from the judgment to the circuit court, which affirmed it; and then he appealed to this court.
    Campbell, for the appellant.
    Johnson, for the appellees.
    
      
      Arbitration and Award. — See monographic note on “Arbitration and Award” appended to Bassett v. Cunningham, 9 Gratt. 684.
    
    
      
      See 2 Rev. Code, ch. 239, § 22, 23,24, pp. 270, 271.— Note in Original Edition.
    
   TUCKER, P.,

delivered the opinion of the court. The first point to be established in this case, is the character of the overseers of the poor. By the act of May 1780, ch. 22, 10 Hen. stat. at large, pp. 288-9; the overseers of the poor were commanded to be elected, *and were declared to be a body politic and corporate, to sue and be sued, and were invested with the powers and duties of former churchwardens and vestries. This character they still retain. Next, if we advert to the law as to churchwardens, we find that they are a quasi corporation with power to sue and be sued, 1 Blacks. Comm. 394, and that succeeding churchwardens may bring an action of account against their predecessors at common law, 1 Bac. Abr. Churchwardens, IQ. p. 604. Moreover, though churchwardens cannot commence a suit in their own names after their year is out, yet if a suit was begun within their year, they might proceed with it after their year was out; 1 ‘it being ex necessitate to prevent people from delays in order to wear out the year;” Dent v. Prudence, 2 Stra. 852. Thus an answer is at once afforded to most of the questions in this case. The overseers of the poor can sue their predecessors; and the statute gives them the summary remedy by motion. The proceeding does not abate by the expiration of their office, but may go on in their names to a recovery, for the amount of which they in turn will be accountable to their successors. Being a corporation capable to sue, they moreover have power to submit to arbitration; for it is a general principle, that whoever can contract can submit; and, indeed, in general, whoever can sue is entitled to submit except those who cannot contract. As to the errors i« judgment of the arbitrators, I perceive none upon the face of the award; and even if there were any, it is well established, that where a matter of law is referred, the parties must a bide by the decision though erroneous; Smith v. Smith, 4 Rand. 95; 6 Ves. 282; 9 Ves. 364. And as to the facts, the court by the reference is divested of all judgment as to them; per lord commissioner Eyre in Dick v. Milligan, 2 Ves. jr. 24.

Judgment affirmed.  