
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Paulette M. GABBIDON, a/k/a Paulette Hibbert, a/k/a Paulette Webb, a/k/a Alliyah Adstroy, a/k/a Alliyah Hibbert, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-4808.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 7, 2014.
    
      Laurie S. Hershey, Manhasset, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Rebecca Mermelstein, Brent S. Wible, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, PETER W. HALL, and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-appellant Paulette Gabbidon appeals a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Karas, J.) on December 20, 2013. Following her guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and thirteen counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2, the district court sentenced Gabbidon to ninety months’ incarceration and thirty-six months’ supervised release and required her to pay restitution. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our ruling.

Gabbidon challenges only the substantive reasonableness of the ninety-month term of imprisonment imposed by the district court. “[O]ur substantive review of a sentence is akin to review under an ‘abuse-of-diseretion’ standard,” United States v. Park, 758 F.3d 193, 199 (2d Cir.2014) (per curiam), under which “[w]e will ... set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions,’ ” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir.2007)). “The length of a sentence is outside the range of permissible decisions when ‘affirming it would damage the administration of justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.’ ” Park, 758 F.3d at 200 (quoting United States v. Douglas, 713 F.3d 694, 700 (2d Cir.2013)).

The district court imposed its below-Guideline sentence after weighing each of the mitigating factors that Gabbidon raises on appeal and concluding that her request for a non-incarcerative sentence would be insufficient in light of her role in this serious and large-scale fraud. In particular, the district court accepted the defendant’s proposition that her medical condition is highly relevant for sentencing, but noted that her conditions are either treatable within the prison environment or are exacerbated by her own noncompliance with doctors’ orders. In light of the district court’s appraisal of Gabbidon’s leadership role in the offense, the seriousness of the fraud, and the need for general deterrence, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s sentence.

Moreover, we discern no clear evidence in the record that the district court misapprehended the scope of its authority to further depart from the Guidelines range in light of potentially overlapping enhancements. See United States v. Lauersen, 348 F.3d 329, 344 (2d Cir.2003). Consequently, the district court’s decision not to depart from the Guidelines range on the basis of overlapping enhancements is not subject to review on appeal. United States v. Stinson, 465 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam).

We have considered Gabbidon’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  