
    William Jones v. The State of Mississippi.
    1. Larceny: recent possession. — The possession of goods recently stolen, is a presumption of guilt in the possessor; hut this is a mere presumption, and liable to be rebutted by the other circumstances of the case.
    2. Same : conduct op accused. — The possessor of goods recently stolen, must account for his possession; yet, as from the nature of the goods — as where the article stolen is small, and easily transmissible — and the circumstances of the case, this cannot always be done by legal evidence, it is a matter of no little weight, that the conduct of the accused is consistent with the account given by him of . the manner in which they came into his possession. See (Roscoe, Crim. Ev. 20; 2 East, P. C. 665.)
    3. Same. — That the possessor of stolen goods does not conceal them, but on the contrary, openly exposes them, where they are subject to apprehension by the owner, or others interested in them, is a circumstance tending strongly to destroy the presumption arising from recent possession.
    
      4. Same. — Where a person, in whose possession property recently stolen is found, gives a reasonable account of it, the prosecutor must show that the account is false; but it is otherwise, when the account given is unreasonable and improbable. (See Regina v. Orowlmrst, 1 C. & K. 4Y; Eng. 0. Law B.. 3Í0.)
    IN error from the Circuit Court of Lauderdale county. Hon. John Watts, judge.
    
      Freeman and Dixon, for plaintiff in error.
    
      jD, 0. Grlenn, attorney general, contra:.
    
   HaNDY, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error was indicted and convicted of larceny in the court below. A motion for a new trial was made, on the ground that the verdict was contrary to' the evidence, which being overruled, the case is brought here; and the only matter for consideration is, whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.

Several witnesses were examined in behalf of the state, but the material facts proved were, that the knife stolen was the property of one Bartle, who loaned it to one Winningham, who placed it under the counter in a store, and in a few days thereafter went to an adjacent county, and when he returned the knife was gone; that it was about three weeks from the time it was loaned before it was found. When it was found, it was in Jones’s possession, in his room, lying openly on the bed, the room being frequently visited by persons of the village; that Jones made no attempt to conceal it, and was not at all disconcerted when the witness took up the knife; and he said that he had got it in North Alabama. Another witness stated that he found the knife in Jones’s box, who showed the box willingly, and invited the witness to examine what he had in it. The articles in it were exposed willingly to persons interested in making the examination; and the room in which the knife lay openly exposed, was near to the store where it had been deposited, and only about seventy yards from the place where Bartle and Winningham resided.

Upon this evidence, we do not think that the mere possession of tbe article by tbe accused, was sufficient to justify bis conviction. It is true, that tbe possession of goods recently stolen, will create a presumption that sucb possessor is tbe tbief. Yet this is a mere presumption, and tbe real state of tbe case may be entirely different, and yet tbe party be unable to show bis innocence by any positive testimony. It is held, that the person in whose possession tbe stolen goods are found, must account for bis possession; yet, as from tbe nature of tbe goods and tbe circumstances of tbe case, this cannot always be done by legal evidence, it is held to be a matter of no little weight, that tbe conduct of tbe accused is consistent with tbe account given by him of the manner in which tbe goods came to bis possession. Roscoe, Cr. Ev. 20; 2 East, P. C. 665. As where be makes no attempt to conceal them, and, on tbe contrary, openly exposes them, where they are subject to apprehension by tbe owner or others interested in them. These are circumstances tending strongly to destroy tbe presumption arising from recent possession; and they fully appear in tbe conduct of tbe accused in this case.

It is also held, that where a man, in whose possession stolen property is found, gives a reasonable account of bow be came by it, it is incumbent on tbe prosecutor to show that tbe account is false; but if tbe account given by him be unreasonable ox improbable on its face, tbe onus of proving its truth, lies on him. Regina v. Crowhurst, 1 C. & K. (47 Eng. C. Law R.) 370. Tbe reasonableness of bis account must necessarily depend, in a great measure, upon bis deportment in relation to tbe article found in bis possession, and upon tbe time and circumstances under which it is found. If tbe article be small, and sucb as is easily and quickly transmissible from one person to another, and when it is found in the possession of the accused, it is openly exposed where tbe owner may readily find it, and will probably discover it, and be makes no effort to conceal it, but gives an account of bis possession, which is probable from tbe nature of tbe article, these circumstances would be sufficient to destroy tbe presumption arising from mere possession, and to raise tbe presumption of innocence. These circumstances are shown to have existed in this case, and accordingly we are of opinion that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the verdict.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, for a new trial.  