
    E. Pohl & Son vs. Edward Lynah, same vs. James Lynah.
    Under the 7th clause oí the insolvent debtors act, requiring certain creditors to come into court and prove their claims, a judgment creditor is not included.
    The act is confined to “ conveyances, hills of sale, assignments and mortgages.”
    Tried before Mr. justice Bay, in October Term, 1825, who made the following report, containing the opinion he delivered below.
    “ The seventh clause of the insolvent debtors’ act enacts, that “ in case any debtor at any time before being taken into custody, shall have made any conveyance, bill, or assignment, of any lands, tenements, goods, or chattels whatever to any person or persons whatever, all and every such person or persons to such mortgage, bill of sale, assignment, or other conveyance, that is, or shall be made as aforesaid, or if his or their attorney, agent, executors or administrators shall not appear before the said court, at the time appointed for the creditors to appear, or in case of sickness or other lawful impediment shall fail to transmit an affidavit and at* te-ted account as is directed, and then and there make oath, that such mortgage, bill of sale, assignment or other conveyance was made to the best of th-ir knowledge and belief for a valuable consideration actually paid, or tha^ such judgment was for a debt bona fide due, then .every such person or persons his or their attorney, agents, executors and administrators shall be deemed to have taken it from the petitioner upon a false or feigned trust, with intention to defraud the creditors of said petitioner:” ‘ and every such mortgage, bill of sale, judgment, assignment, or conveyance shall be and are hereby declared null and void to all intents and purposes.” Now it is very evident, that in the former part of the enacting clause of this act, judgments are not mentioned; it is confined to conveyances, bills of sale, assignments and mortgages, and although judgments are mentioned in the sebsequent part of the clause, yet they are clearly words of reference only, and as there is no antecedent document mentioned to support such reference, there is no rule of construction, that can justify the court in extending it to a class of securities not mentioned among those specifically and particularly enumerated. It is true, that from the latter part of this cl-suse there is some room to conjecture that judgments were intended to be included as well as conveyances and bills of sale &c. but as they are entirely omitted, it appears to have been a casus omissus in the act, which nothing but the legislature can supply. Defects of this nature cannot be cured by the construction of courts of justice; they must depend upon the legislature alone ; and what confirms this opinion is, that, in no instance since the 1759, when the insolveut debtors act was passed, to the present day, have the courts of common pleas in this State, ever allowed of judgments to come in and be allowed to be proved with mortgages and other conveyances; a strong presumption that the courts of justice never considered them as included in this clause of the act: For these reasons, I refused the plaintiff in this case, and all the other judgment creditors, the liberty of proving their judgments, as 1 did not consider them as coming under the terms of the act; and I was the rather induced to refuse these motions as it has been determined in the constitutional court that judgments retain their liens on the estate and effects of insolvent debtors according to their seniority, so that no injury was done to the plaintiffs by leaving them iff the situation where the law had placed them.”
    
      Pepoon, for the motion.
    
      Petigru, attorney general, contra.
   Nott, J.

The court in this case, concur with the presiding judge in opinion, and the motion is therefore refused.  