
    The Paterson Bank vs. John R. Ludlow.
    A replication to a plea of the statute of limitations staling “ that the defendant before, and at the time the cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs, was out of the State of Now Jersey, to wit, in the State of New York, and that tho defendant hath not been resident in the State of New Jersey for the term of six years, nor for so great a term as six years since the cause of action accrued and before the commencement of the suit;” is bad on demurrer.
    The supplement (to the statute of limitations) passed 21st February, 1820, liev. Laws, 670, describes two classes of persons, first, ill oso who are not resident in the state when the cause of action accrues; second, those who remove from the state after the cause of' action accrues and before the time of limitation expires. To entitle a plaintiff by reply to avail himself of the* benefit of this supplement and thereby to save his remedy from the limitation and bar of the principal statute, he must in his replication shew the defendant to belong to one or the other of these classes ; he must aver the’ facts which constitute the description of the one or the other of them.
    This was a writ of error to the Court of Common Pleas of the county of Essex, and was submitted to this court upon the following state of the case agreed upon by the' counsel of the parties, together with their briefs, viz. The-declaration was in the usual form, on a note, &c.
    Note made by defendant, dated April 10, 1816,/at Paterson, payable eighty days after the date thereof, to one Peter Jackson, for 304 dollars 94 cents, payable at the Newark Banking and Insurance Company, without defalcation or discount, and by said Peter Jackson assigned to plffs. Pleas, 1. Non assumpsit, &c., 2. Actio non accrevit infra sex annos.
    
    *355] * Replications. 1. Issue upon first plea. 2. And the said, The President, Directors and Company of the Paterson Bank, as to the said plea of the said John R. Ludlow, by him secondly above pleaded, say that they by reason of any thing in that plea alleged, ought not to be barred from having and maintaining their action aforesaid against him the said John R. Ludlow, because they say that the said John R. Ludlow before and at the time when the said causes of action accrued to the said the President, Directors and Company of the Paterson Bank, was out of the State of New Jersey, to wit, in the State of New York, and that the said John R. Ludlow hath not been resident in the State of New Jersey for the term of six years, nor for so great a time as six years, since the causes of action in the declaration mentioned accrued, and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, at Newark aforesaid; and this the said The President, Directors and Company of the Paterson Bank are ready to verify. Wherefore they pray judgment and their damages by them sustained, on occasion of the non-performance of the said premises and undertakings of the said defendant in the declaration mentioned, to be adjudged to them, &c.
    General demurrer to above replication and joinder.
    Judgment for defendant.
    Writ of error to May, 1829.
    Afterwards, to wit, on the twelfth day of May, in the year •of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-nine, in the same term, before the justices of the Supreme Court of Judicature of the State of New Jersey, came the aforesaid, The President, Directors and Company of the Paterson Bank, by Ph. Dickerson, their attorney, and say that in the record and proceedings aforesaid, and also in giving the judgment aforesaid, there is manifest error, in this, to wit, that by the said record and proceedings, it appears that the replication of the said The President, Directors, &c., of the Paterson Bank, was adjudged to be insufficient in law, when by the law of the land, the said replication is sufficient for the said, The President, Directors and Company of the Paterson Bank to have and maintain their aforesaid action against him the said John B. Ludlow. And also, that there is error in this, to wit, that by the record aforesaid, it appears that the judgment aforesaid, *in form aforesaid, was [*356 given for the said John B. Ludlow; whereas, by the law of the land, it should have been given for the said The President, Directors and Company of the Paterson Bank against the said John B. Ludlow.
    
      JE. Vanarsdale, Jr., for defendant, and in support of the ■demurrer.
    An act for limitation of actions, passed 7th Feb. 1799, says actions upon the case shall be sued and commenced within six years, Rev. Laws 410, see. 1.
    This suit was commenced 1st January, 1827. The plea is aetio non aecrevit infra sex annos.
    
    
      The replication is, that defendant was out of the state when cause of action accrued, and not a resident of this state six years, or for so long a time as six years since.
    There is a demurrer to the replication and joinder.
    If meant as a replication under the old law, it should aver that defendant was not only out of the state when the cause of action accrued, but that he had never returned, and still was out of the state, or that suit was brought within six years after his return. 2 Ch. pl. 606; 3 Went. 205; Story 51; Pat. L. N. J. 352, sec. 8.
    Defendant has brought himself within the act, and this-replication does not take the case out of it; it impliedly admits (for such is the fact, and the plaintiff dare not take issue upon it) that the defendant returned into the state more than six years ago and within the meaning of the act.
    If a debtor comes within the state publicly, and so that the creditor with ordinary diligence and due means might arrest him, it is a-return within the meaning of the act and the statute begins to run from the time of such return. 10 J. R. 464.
    This defendant was here frequently, carrying on a suit with Ab. Ackerman; was, with Peter Jackson, a director of the bank (the plaintiffs) and who is the endorser upon the note on which this action is founded, and the real plaintiff in this cause.
    Defendant always has had property in this state.
    If the statute had begun to run as is impliedly admitted in the plaintiff’s replication, it would continue to run, notwithstanding any subsequent disability, either voluntary or involuntary. 4 T. R. 310; 1 Wils. 135; 1 Wheat. 296; 1 J. R. 176; 15 Ibid. 171.
    *357] *The plaintiffs knowing this, attempt to avail themselves of a supplement to said act passed 21st Eeb.r 1820. Rev. Laws 670.
    This act is passed nearly four years after the note was-given.
    
      Two questions arise upon this supplement.
    1. Does it extend to this case ?
    2. If so, had the legislature a right to pass a law including prior contracts ?
    Admitting for the sake of argument only, upon this point, both the above questions, the replication is still defective.
    The replication does not state that the defendant -was a resident out of this slate when the cause of action accrued, or that he removed from this state after the same did accrue; it merely says that he was out of the state, to wit: in the state of New York, but does not say he was not a resident in this state, which the act requires. What does the word resident mean ? What the difference between the two acts ? But the supplement does not extend to this case. It is altogether prospective and was not intended to have a retrospective effect. This is evident from the words of the act itself; but if there was a doubt whether it extended to this case or not, how should the act be construed.
    Consider the situation of the parties.
    The statute is not to be so construed as to work the destruction of a right previously attached. 6 J. R. 103; 7 J. R. 493, 4, 503.
    An act of the legislature is not to be construed to operate retrospectively, so as to take away a vested right. 7 J. R. 477, 504, 8; 4 Burr. 2462.
    It is a principle of universal jurisprudence, that laws, civil or criminal, must be prospective and cannot have a retrospective effect. 7 J. R. 477; 12 Wheat. 148, 260; 3 Dal. 294; 1 Adams 214.
    No statute is to have a retrospective operation beyond the time of its commencement. 4 Bac. Ab. 636, stat. C.; 4 Wheat. 57, 8; 4 T. Rep. 2; 7 J. R. 480, 4, 503, 7; 3 Swans. 664.
    All laws are to commence in future and operate prospectively. 7 J. R. 495.
    It is a good general rule that a law should have no retrospect. Ibid. 499.
    
      The statute of frauds says no action shall be brought from and after a certain day, whereby to charge any person, &c.; *358] yet it *has been held that it would not retrospect so as to take away a right of action to which a party was before that time entitled, but applied only to promises made after. Rev. Laws 152; 2 Show. 17; 2 Mod. 310; 2 Lev. 227; 4 Burr. 2460; 3 Swans. 664; 7 J. R. 496, 503; 4 Wh. R. 122; 1 T. Rep. 267; 1 Halst. 394.
    An insolvent law discharging a debtor from all liability for a debt contracted previous to his discharge would not be good for a defence to such debts, but only to those contracted subsequent to the passing of the act. 4 Wh. 122; 2 South. 466 ; 12 Wh. 260.
    Statutes of limitations are laws operating prospectively. 12 Wh. 326.
    Words in a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear, strong and imperative, that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. 3 Cranch 412, 13.
    A statute is not to have an equitable construction to overthrow or divest a right. 2 Dall. R. 316.
    Every statute derogatory to the rights of property or that takes away the estate of a citizen ought to be construed strictly, lb.
    
    There is neither policy or safety in retrospective laws and they neither accord with sound legislation nor the fundamental principles of the social compact. Ib. 397, 3 vol. 391.
    This contract was made in reference to, and is to be governed by the laws in existence at the time of entering into it, and there is a tacit consent that the contract shall be governed and regulated by such laws. 7 J. R. 390; 16 J. R. 233, 7; 242, 9; 250, 1; 12 Wh. 259, 60; 297, 8; 1 Wash. C. C. R. 340; 1 Peters 74; 3 Conn. R. 9, 225; 13 Mass. 16.
    
      Suppose the first statute had been repealed without any supplement to the act. Then the contract made under the old law, would still be governed by it. 12 Wh. 260, 1.
    A law by which a person is allowed, at the time of lending his money, seven per cent, a contract made under that law would carry seven per cent, interest, even if the law was afterwards repealed or a supplement passed allowing but six per cent. 4 Wh. 190, 207; 12 lb. 297, 8.
    So if land is exempt from taxes the legislature could not afterwards tax them. 4 T. R. 2; Serg. Cons. L. 350.
    The replication is bad, if attempted to be sustained under the old *law, being defective in form. The same [*359 under the supplement, if the law applies to this case. The act is prospective and not retrospective. The contract is to be governed by the laws in existence at the time it was entered into / and the supplement was not then passed. If the act is retrospective and extends to this case, it is so far unconstitutional and void.
    
      Dickerson, for plaintiffs,
    and in support of the replication.
    -This demurrer brings up the question as to the extent of the operation of the supplement to the act of limitations, &c. passed Feb. 21, 1820. Rev. Laws 670. By the original act it is enacted, that all actions of debt without specialty, &c. “shall be commenced and sued within six years next after the cause of such action shall have accrued and not after.” Sec. 1, Rev. Latos 410. If any person shall be out of the state at the time such cause of action shall accrue, then an action may be brought within the time limited, &c. after return. Sec. 8, Rev. Laws, Feb. 7, 1799. By the 1st section of supplement it is enacted, that if any person shall not be in the state when cause of action accrues, or shall remove out of the state after cause of action accrues, the time he shall be absent, not to be taken into the account, &c. Rev. Laws 670, Feb. 21, 1820. This supplement is remedied, and therefore ought to be so construed as to suppress the mischief. 3 Inst. 381.
    
      The mischief to be remedied arose from the construction of 8th section of original act, that a return into the state,, even for a short time, or passing through the state, would avoid the operation of the said 8th section.
    The remedy proposed was, that there should be a continued, residence for six years, or successive terms of residence equal to six years. At the time of passing the supplement, there were three classes of cases which may have been the object of this supplement.
    1. Contracts made when the cause of action had accrued prior to the passing of the supplement, but six years not expired, defendant being out of the state.
    2. Contracts made when the cause of action had not accrued at the time of passing of the supplement.
    3. Contracts to be made.
    The supplement was intended to embrace all these cases.
    *360] *1. Because the'remedy would not be complete without that construction.
    2. Because the 8th section of the original action was repealed, and unless the supplement embrace all those classes,, those which were excepted from its operation, would not, have the benefit even of the said 8th section.
    3. The 8th section of original act would not have been repealed, if there had been any class of contracts for it to' operate upon.
    4. Because by the express terms of the supplement, it applies to these defendants against whom there is or shall be any such cause of actions, &c.
    A statute should be so construed that no clause, sentence or word, should be superfluous, void or insignificant. 1 Show. 108.
    When terms of statute are plain, &c., no room for construction. 2 Cranch, 386, 399. But if upon view of whole law, or other laws, “pari materia,” the evident intention is different from the literal import, then the intention should prevail. Statutes of limitations form no parts of contracts and they are governed in that respect by lex fori.
    
   The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the court.

This cause comes before us on a writ of error to the Court of Common Pleas of the county of Essex, on a judgment rendered upon demurrer in favor of the defendant below, now also the defendant in error.

The action was brought on a promissory note drawn by the defendant in favor of Peter Jackson or order, and by him endorsed to the plaintiffs, payable eighty days after date, at the Newark Banking and Insurance Company, and dated at Paterson on the 10th day of April, 1816. The defendant pleaded that the cause of action did not accrue within six years next before the commencement of the suit. The plaintiffs replied that the defendant before and at the time the cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs, was out of the state of New Jersey, to wit, in the state of New York, and that the defendant hath not been resident in the state of New Jersey for the term of six years, nor for so great a term as six years since the cause of action accrued and before the commencement of the suit. The defendant demurred.

By the first section of our statute of limitations, Rev. Laws 410, the action of the plaintiff, as set out in the declaration, is required *to be commenced within six [*361 years next after the cause of such action shall have accrued, and not after. By a supplement enacted on the 21st February, 1820, Rev. Laws 670, it is provided, that if any person or persons against whom there is or shall be any such cause of action, as is specified in the first and some other sections of the principal act, shall not be resident in this state when the cause of action accrues, or shall remove from this state after the same shall accrue, and before the time of limitation, mentioned in the said sections, is expired; then the time or times during which such persons shall not reside in this state, shall not be computed as part of the said limited period within which such action or actions are required to be brought; but the person having, or who may have, such cause of action, shall be entitled to all the time mentioned in the said' several sections exclusive of the time or times during which the person or persons liable to such actions shall not be resident in this state.

To what cases does this supplement apply ? What persons are thereby precluded from the operation of the first section of the original act and of the limitation it contains ? In respect to what persons is the time they shall not reside in the state to be computed as no part of the limited period ? Against whom shall the persons having cause of action be entitled to all the time mentioned in the first section ? The supplement describes two classes of persons; first, those who are not resident in the state when the cause of action accrues; second, those who remove from the state after the cause of action accrues and before the time of limitation expires. To entitle a plaintiff by reply, to avail himself of the benefit of this supplement, and thereby to save his remedy from the limitation and bar of the principal statute, he must in his replication shew his case to be within the purview of the supplement; he must shew the defendant to belong to one or the other of these classes ; he must aver the facts which constitute the description of the one or the other of them. The extension of time in favor of the plaintiff is upon contingency. If the person agaiust whom there is cause of action be not resident in the state when it accrues, or if such person shall, after the accrual, remove from the state, then the period of non-residence shall not be computed. The length of time is prima facie a bar. The party suing must *362] shew the facts which form the existence of the Contingency on which he is entitled to greater time, and to be protected from the bar. In the replication before us, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant was out of the state when the cause of action accrued. To be out of the state, and to be not resident in the state, are essentially different predicaments. A person may be out of the state and yet resident in the state. His house, his family, his place of business, his business in progress, may be all within the state, and yet when the day of payment of his note arrives, he may be out of the state for a month or even for a much greater time. Process may, nevertheless, be served here; and the statute was manifestly designed to apply and operate only in cases where process could not bo served. To such only do the reason and motive of the statute extend. In Ruggles v. Keeler, 3 John. 267, C. J. Kent contradistinguishes him who is a resideut of the state and only absent for a time, and him who resides altogether out of the state. Taking then the facts alleged in the replication to be true, the plaintiffs have not thereby made a case entitling them to the extension of time afforded by the supplement. The replication is defective. The demurrer was well taken. It is unnecessary for us, therefore, to examine or decide the other important questions proposed by the defendant’s counsel, whether the statute was intended to operate on antecedent contracts ; and if so, whether it is consistent with the constitution of the United States.

Let the judgment be affirmed.  