
    G. & D. Headman v. Edmund O’Neil.
    The surety to a bond for the prison bounds, under the act of 1788, becomes liable for the debt, if the schedule, rendered in by the debtor, is declared fraudulent by the verdict of a jury: And his liability is not discharged by the creditor’s causing the debtor to be remanded to prison.
    Tried before Mr. Justice Evans, at Charleston, January Term, 1831.
    Debt, on a bond for the prison bounds, under the act of 1788, P. L. 456, against the defendant, as surety of one Williams, a debtor in execution at the suit of the plaintiffs. The declaration set out the condition of the bond, which was in the usual form, that Williams should “ remain within the rules, bounds, and limits of the gaol of Charleston District, as established by law, and within forty days from the date render a schedule, on oath, or affirmation, of the whole of his estate, real and personal, or so much thereof, as would pay and satisfy the ca. sa. of the plaintiffs.” The breach alleged, that Williams filed a schedule purporting to be of his whole estate, which plaintiffs impeached for fraud, and an issue having been made up, the jury found the schedule fraudulent, and Williams was remanded to the body of the gaol.
    The defendant demurred; and for the demurrer it was urged that defendant had not undertaken for the honesty of Williams; but simply that he would render a schedule, the truth of which might be put in issue, so that if disqualified to take the benefit of the Act, he might be deprived of the bounds, and left to the energetic operation of ihe ca. sa. And the case of Dixon &• Co. v. Vanezara, 1 M‘C. 373, was relied on as having decided the principle, that the surety was discharged by the rendering in a schedule, true, or false.
    His Honor observed, that in Dixon v. Vanezara, the breach assigned, was the escape of the prisoner after he had been remanded. The question now made, was not raised in that case, although it might have been, and he regarded it as still open for consideration. The condition of the bond was in conformity with the provisions of the act. It was, first, that Williams should keep within the bounds; secondly, that he should, within forty days, render in a schedule of his whole estate, or so muck 
      
      thereof as would satisfy the plaintiffs’ debt. Now a schedule, which contains neither the one nor the other, is no fulfilment of the second condition. It is said that the surety did not undertake for the honesty of Williams,; but in fact that was all that he did undertake for. The law required of Williams nothing that was impossible, or even difficult; the only difficulty was his willingness to do it fairly. And if the surety did not undertake for that, his obligation was useless and unmeaning.
    His Honor, therefore, overruled the demurrer, and the plaintiff had a verdict for the amount of his debt. The defendant gave notice of appeal, and now moved to reverse the decision of the Circuit Judge.
    T. Martin, and Seymour, for the motion.
    Urged the grounds relied on in the Court below; and contended, that admitting the defendant to have been liable, when Williams’ schedule was ascertained to be false; yet his liability was discharged, when plaintiff caused Williams to be remanded to prison. He could not have a higher satisfaction than the body of the debtor, and he was bound to make his election between that, and his recourse upon the surety ; having done so, and chosen the higher satisfaction, he had lost his hold upon the latter. This was expressly decided in Osborne v. Bowman, 2 Bay 208; and it was doubtless in consequence of that decision, that the point was not again made in Dixon v. Vanezara.
    James H. Smith, contra.
    
    Cited and relied upon the case of Miller v. Bagwell, 3 M‘C. 429.
   Johnson, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

There is no question that by the common law, the arrest of the body of the defendant on a capias ad satisfaciendum, was a satisfaction of the judgment: but the Legislature was competent to alter it. The prison bounds act expressly provides, that, if the defendant break the condition of his bond, to keep the prison limits, and render a schedule of his whole estate, or so much thereof as will satisfy the debt to the plaintiff, he shall no longer be intitled to the bounds; but that his bond shall be forfeited, and assigned to the plaintiff: thus giving to the plaintiff, in the language of the Court, in Miller v. Bagwell, 3 M‘C. 429, the double security of the body of the defendant, and the liability of his security for the bounds. The motion to reverse the decision of the Circuit Judge must therefore be refused.  