
    Tryon and another v. Rankin and others.
    An averment that a note was made payable in the State of New York, and that the legal rate of interest of that State, when the note was made, was seven per cent, per annum, is sufficiently certain to admit proof that, according to the laws of New York, the note bore interest at the rate alleged. ,
    The rate of interest of another State cannot be proved by parol, unless it be expressly proved as a usage, having tho force of law.
    Error from TPalker. Suit by the defendants in error against the plaintiffs in error on the promissory note of the latter. The note was payable in Hew York, and the petition averred that tho legal rate of interest at the time the note was made, in the State of Hew York, was seven per cent, per annum. Tho court admitted parol proof of the legal rate of interest in Hew York, to which the defendant excepted. The only facts proved were the note, one witness as to the legal rate of interest in the State of Hew York, and the admission that Hew York is in the State of Hew York.
    It was assigned for error that tho court erred—
    1st. In admitting any evidence of the rate of interest in the State of Hew York on promissory notes, there being no allegation in the petition that such instruments bear interest according to the laws of that State, where the note is payable.
    2d. Tlie court erred in admitting oral testimony to prove the legal rate of interest in the State of Hew York, where the note was payable.
    3d. The court erred in rendering judgment for interest on the note after maturity upon the allegations and proof.
    
      Wiley 8f Baker, for plaintiffs in error.
    I. The petition in this case, as well as the note on which it is founded, shows that payment was to be made in Hew York, and the proof shows that Hew York is in the State of Hew York. To authorize a judgment for interest, the petition should show the debt to he such as by the law of Hew York carries interest. (Cook v. McG-real, 3 Tex. R., 487.) Tiie right to interest rests either upon a contract express or implied to allow it, or upon law giving it as compensation by way of damages for default. (1 Am. Lead. Cas., 345.) The notes containing no agreement to pay interest, the petition should have alleged that by the laws of How York promissory notes hear interest after maturity, and this averment should have been proven as any other fact by the best evidence.
    II. In absence of such averment and proof, it was error to admit any kind ■of testimony as to the rate of interest in Hew York. But more particularly was there error in permitting parol testimony to prove it. The rate of interest on promissory notes in How York is fixed either by written law or by custom and usage. If by the former, it “ must be proven like any other fact, “ by the best evidence which can be produced.” (Burton v. Anderson, 1 Tex, It., 93; Cook v. Crawford, 1 Id., 9.) This, in most cases of foreign law, has been held to be by an authentic copy under the great seal of the State. But “the peculiar relationship of the several States to each other, as members
    of the sumo confederacy, lias produced a relaxation of this rule of evidence ■“ upon this subject,” and it is now held that a collection of the acts, printed and published in a book, purporting' to be by the authority of the State, after being proven by some person supposed to bo well informed on this subject to be the written law, is sufficient proof of the statutes of other States. (Vide Burton v. Anderson, supra; Ilcndricks v. Andrews, 9 Port. B., 10; Thompson v. Muper, 1 Dali. B., 402 ; Biddis v. James, G Binn. It., 321; Young v. The Bank of Alexandria, 4 Cr. B., 3SS.) And the rule is thought not to have been further relaxed.
    III. But if tlie interest of New York is supposed to be founded on custom and usage, then the testimony of one witness is not enough to prove it. (2 Greenleaf on Ev., p. 241, sec. 252; Wood v. Ilickok, 2 Wend. B., 501; Par-rott v. Tliraclior, 9 Pick. It., 42G; Tilomas v. Graves, 1 Const. B., 150.)
   HEMPinnu, Ch. J.

In relation to the first ground assigned, we are of opinion that, there is sufficient certainty in the allegations, as to the rate of interest and to the fact that the cause of action bore interest, to admit of proof to that (‘licet. The petition shows that the note was payable in New York, and charges that the defendants are indebted in its amount, with interest, and by amendment avers that the legal rale of interest in the State of New York at the lime of the making of the note was seven per cent. The necessary inference from and plain meaning of these averments is, that seven per cent, was the legal rate of interest on the cause of action at the time of its accrual.

Wo are of opinion that the second ground of error was well assigned. The right to recover interest on claims for money was not recognized at common law; and in countries where that system is the basis of their jurisprudence interest is generally the creature of the statute. The plaintiff had averred that there was a legal rate of interest in New York, evidently meaning that the rate was established bylaw; and if so, parol evidence was inadmis- ■ sible to establish the fact. If the rate of interest depended upon usage which had the force of law, it was susceptible of proof by parol, but it should have been proven as a usage. The evidence does not conduce to prove any fact from which a legal conclusion might be deduced as to the rate of interest. It does not prove either the existence of a law or of a usage by which such rate is established. It is in itself a conclusion of law, and not the proof of a fact, ■and the objection to its admission should have been sustained.

Beversed and remanded.  