
    Toliver and another, Adm’rs, v. Hubbell.
    Where the Probate Court in 1845 ordered a claim to be paid in due course, and upon petition of the creditor, in 1849, for settlement and payment, ordered the claim to be paid after the payment of all claims presented and allowed within the year, from which order the administrators appealed, the District Court decreed that the claim should be paid in due course: Held, That the proceeding of 1849 was collateral to the judgment of 1845, and that in such a proceeding that judgment could not be impeached, and the judgment was affirmed. (Note 25.)
    Appeal from Colorado. The appellee recovered a judgment in tlie District Court of Galveston county in May, 1843, against Hughes and Peters. Peters died and administration was taken out on his estate in Colorado county. The transcript of the judgment obtained in the District Court of Galveston was i)led in the Probate Court of Colorado county, and an order was made by the jridge o.f the Probate Court on the 24th of November, 1845, that tlie judgment should ]>e allowed against the estate of Peters, and that the administrators should pay the same in due order of administration; “to which tlie administrators iiled their bill of exceptions.” On the 3d of February, 1849, Hnbbell filed his petition in the Probate Court, alleging that tlie administrators of Peters, notwithstanding tlie order of the probate judge made in November, 1845, had not paid the said judgment, and praying that the administrators should he compelled to make a settlement with the Probate Court and compelled to pay the judgment to the petitioner. The administrators resisted this application, on tlie ground that tlie claim had never been presented to the administrators. But tlie Probate Court ordered them to make the settlement and to pay the judgment after the payment of ail claims that’had been presented and allowed within tlie year. Prom this judgment the administrators appealed to tlie District Court. In the District Court a.jury ' was waived, and tlie court ' rendered its decree (October Term, 1850) to the effect that the claim was valid, and that thb administrators should pay it in due course, as ordered bj the judgment of the Probate Court of November 25, 1845. The administrators appealed. There was no statement of facts nor bill of exceptions.
    Note 25. — The approval of a claim by the Probate Court is a quasi judgment, which cannot ,be set aside except by a regular proceeding instituted for that purpose. (Jones v. Underwood, 11 T, 116; Moore v. Hillebrant, 14 T. 312; Eccles v. Daniels, 10 T., 136; Baker v. Rust, et al., 37 T., 242; Smith v. Downes, 40 T., 67.) The presumption is in iavor of the judgment, and he who attempts to impeach it must assume the labor of distinctly and clearly showing its vices. (Hillebrant v. Burton, 17 T., 138.) And it will be set aside only where the allowance or approval was based upon ignorance, mistake of fact, or fraud. (Lott v. Cloud, 21 T,, 254; Griddings v, Steele, 28 T., 732.)
    The only error assigned was that the court erred in sustaining the judgment of the Probate Court 'that was rendered in November, 1845, because the judgment was barred bj not having been presented within twelve months after letters of administration on Peters’s case.
    
      J. Rivers, for appellants.’
    The Probate Court had no jurisdiction of the claim till an acceptance by the administrators.
    
      J. B. Jones, for appellee.
   Lipscomb, J.

The assignment .presents the single question, Can the judgment of the Probate Court be set aside and held to be invalid on a collateral inquiry into its sufficiency? The negative of this proposition was laid down by this Court in Sutherland v. De Leon, (1 Tex. R.,) and in Lynch and another v. Baxter and wife, (4 Tex. R., 431,) and Neill v. Hodge, (5 Tex. R., 487,) so that the doctrine is now finally settled that such judgment is binding until it has been reversed or set aside by a proceeding having that object directly in view. The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  