
    XUMANII INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS CORP., a Nevada corporation, Petitioner, v. U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Respondent.
    No. 14-73103
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted October 19, 2016 Stanford, California
    Filed November 3, 2016
    Conrad Crispin Lysiak, Esquire, Attorney, The Law Office of Conrad C. Lysiak, P.S., Spokane, WA, for Petitioner
    Michael Andrew Conley, Solicitor, Dominick V. Freda, Senior Litigation Counsel, Jacob Loshin, Attorney, Securities & Exchange Commission, Washington, DC, for Respondent
    Before: CALLAHAN, HURWITZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Xumanii International Holdings Corp. (“Xumanii”) petitions for review of an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) suspending trading in Xumanii’s stock for ten days. We dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.

1. Xumanii did not exhaust its claims before the SEC. An SEC rule, 17 C.F.R. § 201.550(a), provides for post-deprivation review of trading suspensions. But, Xuma-nii did not avail itself of this process, and thus failed to exhaust the non-constitutional claims raised in its petition for review. Because the exhaustion requirement in 15 U.S.C. § 78y(c)(1) is jurisdictional, Sacks v. SEC, 648 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2011), we dismiss Xumanii’s petition for review insofar as it raises non-constitutional claims.

2. Xumanii also contends that it was denied due process of law because it was not provided a pre-suspension hearing. Assuming without deciding that § 78y(c)(1) does not require exhaustion of this constitutional challenge, we hold that Xumanii’s due process rights were adequately protected by the availability of a prompt post-deprivation review of the trading suspension. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). We deny Xumanii’s petition to the extent it asserts constitutional claims.

PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     