
    The Inhabitants of Quincy versus The Inhabitants of Braintree.
    A notice from the overseers of the poor for the town of A. to the overseers of the poor for the town of B., stating that a pauper has his settlement in B., that he is resident in A., and requires support, which has been afforded him by the overseers of A., is sufficient, within the statute of 1793, c. 59. § 13. to estop the town of B. from contesting the settlement of the pauper in B. in an action Sir such support.
    Assumpsit for the expense of supporting Hannah White, a pauper, alleged by the plaintiffs to have her legal settlement in Braintree The action was pending in Norfolk, and at the term of [ * 87 ] this Court in that county, * holden on the week preceding the present term, it was submitted to the opinion of the Court on an agreed statement of facts, in substance as follows:—
    The pauper was, on the 7th of July, 1807, a resident in Quincy, and in need of relief; and on application to the overseers of the poor for that town, was furnished with the supplies, payment for which is demanded in this action. On the 7th of October in the same year, the overseers of Quincy, believing her legal settlement to be in Braintree, gave notice to the overseers of the latter town in writing, as follows:—
    
      “Quincy, October 7, 1807.
    “ Gentlemen,
    “ The widow Hannah White, an inhabitant of your town, is now in our care, and we conceive it necessary tp give you this information, that you may order her removal as soon as possible. The said Hannah has been boarded at an expense of one dollar and twenty-five cents per week, for three months past, and her expenses will now be more, which we shall continue to charge to your town. We are, with much respect, gentlemen, your humble servants,
    By order of the overseers of the poor of Quincy,
    
    
      Noah Curtis, Chairman.
    “ The Gentlemen Selectmen or Overseers of the town of Braintree
    
    To this notice no answer was returned in writing, nor was the removal of the pauper effected, nor objected to by the overseers of Braintree, within two months from the receipt of the notice.
    If, upon these facts, the Court should be of opinion that the defendants were precluded from contesting the settlement of the pauper in this action, they agreed to be defaulted, otherwise the plaintiffs were to become nonsuit.
    
      * The action was continued nisi for argument, and now [ *88] at this term, Dexter for the defendants objected to the sufficiency of the notice in this case. 1. That it was not subscribed by the overseers of the poor, but by one only. But this objection was not urged. 2. There is no fact stated in the notice from which the defendants should conclude themselves liable to the support of the pauper. The 12th section of the statute of 1793, c. 57, which authorizes and gives effect to a notice of this kind, prescribes a written notification stating the facts relating to the pauper. What those facts are may be understood from the preceding section, to which the 12th is a provisio. They are the facts upon which a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas for the removal of a pauper may be founded — the facts which show the town called upon to be liable. If they are such as to satisfy the town, they will make no reply, and will thus be estopped. But if the notice contains no facts, which the town charged has need to deny, why should they be estopped ?
    T. B. Adams, for the plaintiffs.
    The facts required by the 11th section of the statute to be stated may become the foundation of the process and judgment in error given by the statute. They ought, therefore, to show every thing necessary to support the judgment. But in a notice under the 12th section, it is enough to state such facts as will naturally call the attention, and excite the inquiry of ihe party to whom the notice is given. Thus, in the present case, the notice alleges the pauper to be an inhabitant of Braintree, and to be under the care of the overseers, and at the expense of the town of Quincy, and suggests the propriety of her removal, with an additional reason, that “ the expenses will be more.” This was abundantly sufficient to lead to an inquiry, and the reason of the thing, as well as the express provision of the statute, estops the defendants from contesting the settlement .
    
      
       Vide Freeport vs. Edgecomb, Ante, Vol. 1. 459. — Bridgewater vs. Dartmouth, An , Vol. 4. 275. — Topsham vs. Harpswell, ibid 518.
    
   *The opinion of the Court ("except the Chief Justice, [*89 ] who did not hear the argument) was afterwards delivered as follows, by

Sedgwick, J.

The only question, which- arises in this cause, is on the sufficiency of the notice given by the overseers of the poor of Quincy to the overseers of the poor of Braintree; no answer having been made to it by the latter. If it be such notice as to comply with the intentions of the statute, there is no question but that the defendants are concluded by it, and that judgment must be rendered against them.

Two objections are made to its sufficiency. 1. That it has not the signature of a majority of the overseers of Quincy, but was signed by their chairman only . Without determining whether this objection could, under any circumstances, prevail, it is a sufficient answer in this case that it is expressly agreed that this notice was given “by the overseers of Quincy.”

The 2d objection is, that the statute requires that in giving such notice as shall conclude the defendant' town, the facts should be stated therein; by which, it is said, must be intended more than is contained in this notice.

In the case of an appeal from an adjudication of the Court of Common Pleas to this Court, the statute requires all the material facts to be stated; and it is necessary, for otherwise this Court would not have the competent means of determining whether the adjudication was correct. In that case, all the material facts must be stated, which are necessary to attain the object for which they are to be stated; and to the same effect, in relation to its purpose, must be the notice in this case.

We cannot, however, perceive that all such facts are not stated in this case. Those facts are, that the pauper has her settlement in Braintree; that she was, at the time of the notice, resident [ * 90 ] in Quincy; that she required * support; and that it had been afforded her by the overseers of that town. To require, as it was said the law intended, that the notice should contain an allegation of the means by which the settlement was obtained, could, on the one hand, answer no purpose of utility, and might, on the other, be inconvenient and productive of embarrassment. We are, therefore, of opinion, that the defendants should be defaulted, and judgment rendered against them, according to the agreement of the parties .

Defendants defaulted. 
      
      
        Westminster vs. Bernardston, 8 Mass. 104. — Bridgewater vs. Dartmouth, 4 Mass 275.
     
      
      
         Vide Needham vs. Newton, 12 Mass. 452. — Sudbury vs. Waltham, 13 Mass. 460 —Shutesbury vs. Oxford, 16 Mass. 102. — Paris vs. Hiram, 12 Mass. 262. — Sidney vs. Augusta, 12 Mass. 316. — Emdem vs. Augusta, 12 Mass. 307.
     