
    Josephine Smalls MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Suzanne B. SUTTON, Individually and in Official Capacity, Karyl Carrasquilla, Individually and in Official Capacity, Michael P. Bowler, Individually and in Official Capacity, Defendants-Appellees, Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, State of Connecticut, Beth L. Balwin, Individually and in Official Capacity, Defendants.
    16-2896
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    September 1, 2017
    FOR APPELLANT: Josephine Smalls Miller, pro se, Danbury, Connecticut.
    FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Michael Skold, Assistant Attorney General, for George Jepsen, Attorney General, Hartford, Connecticut.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges, BRIAN M. COGAN, District Judge.
    
      
       Judge Brian M. Cogan, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Josephine Smalls Miller, an attorney proceeding pro se, appeals from the dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Miller sued attorneys from the Office of Chief Disciplináis Counsel of the State of Connecticut and the Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee (“SGC”), alleging constitutional violations based on three ongoing state disciplinary proceedings against her. The district court dismissed Miller’s complaint as barred by the abstention doctrine from Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and determined that no exception to Younger applied. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo dismissals based on Younger abstention. Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir. 2002). “Younger generally requires federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings.” Id. at 198. In Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, the Supreme Court clarified that Younger applies to certain state civil proceedings. — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 584, 592, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013). State-initiated attorney disciplinary proceedings for violations of state ethics rules were explicitly contemplated as an example of such civil proceedings. Id. (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 433-34, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982)).

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Miller’s complaint, and we affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned decision. The district court properly abstained under Younger, and Miller has not shown that any exception to Younger applies. The bad faith exception does not apply because the defendants had legitimate purposes for pursuing the disciplinary proceedings against her. See Diamond “D,” 282 F.3d at 199 (“[T]he federal plaintiff must show that the state proceeding [providing the basis for federal abstention] was initiated with and is animated by a retaliatory, harassing, or other illegitimate motive.”). Two of the disciplinary proceedings were initiated based on referrals made by state court judges. And in the third, an independentlocal grievance panel made a finding that there was probable cause that Miller had engaged in misconduct. The exceptional circumstances exception does not apply because the likelihood of immediate harm is speculative, and Miller may challenge an unfavorable resolution of the disciplinary proceedings through the state review and appeal process. See id. at 201.

We have considered all of Miller’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court and DENY Miller’s motion to supplement the record on appeal.  