
    Bruton vs. Rutland, et als.
    
    i. The bill prays: — 1st. That complainant’s right to an undivided interest in the real estate of Bruton deceased, by virtue of a lost and unregistered deed, be set up. 2d. That partition be made between himself and the owners of the other shares. 3d. Thai a sale of his interest in the estate made by sheriff as the property of another, and of which defendant Rutland became the purchaser, be declared void for want of twenty clays’notice to the tenant in possession. 4th. That a suit of forcible entry and de-tainer, instituted against him by Rutland be enjoined, and that Rutland account to complainant for rents and profits; Held, that this bill was multifarious.
    
      % In a case of petition in chancery for partition, the legal title must be clear of dispute.
    
      Kimble, for complainant,
    1. The complainant has a right to call upon a court of chancery to set up a lost or destroyed deed. This it will do where the destruction or loss of the deed is an obstruct#
    Story’s Eq. 101,102.
    2. The complainant has a right to renlí man’s Dig. 460; 2 Yer. 384.
    3. Complainant can have partition. Hay. 295; Allnatt on Partition, 32. Law!
    4. If a courl'of chancery acquire jurisdicti^fef will afford relief on the discovery. 1 Story, 438; 3 John. Ch. R. 351. And if it acquires jurisdiction for one purpose it will retain the bill generally. 10 John. Rep. 587.
    5. A court of chancery will entertain a bill when by it a multiplicity of suits may be prevented. 1 Story, 438. The great ends of justice willbe subserved by the settlement of the matters involved in this bill, which can be done without confusion or embarrassment as all the claims in conflict arise on the same piece of property.
    
      W. B. Johnson, for defendants,
    cited 2 Hump. 237, and the authorities therein referred to..
   GREEN, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

In this case the bill alledges that complainant, heretofore, in 1S35, purchased the shares of several of the heirs of G. Bruton deceased, of a tract of land, of which said G. Bruton died seized. That said heirs conveyed to him their said shares, but that the deed was never registered and has been lost; that one of the shares so purchased by him, has been levied on by virtue of an execution against his vendor and sold, and has come into the hands of Rutland; that said sale was void for want of twenty days’ notice to the tenant in possession; but that Rutland went into possession, and occupied said land for several years — when he quit the possession thereof and complainant went into possession — that Rutland has sued him for a forcible entry and de-tainer, and has had a verdict against him on the premises; that complainant has removed the cause to the circuit court by certiorari, where it is now pending, and prays that the heirs from whom he has purchased, be made defendants, and the legal title be decreed out of them, and vested in complainant; that the other heirs, and Rutland who claims title as aforesaid, be made defendants, and that partition between them and complainant be decreed; that Rutland be enjoined from further prosecuting his action of forcible entry and detainer, and that he account for rents and profits while he had possession of the land.

To this bill defendantRutland demurred, which was allowed by the chancellor. The bill in this case is clearly multifarious. 1. It sets up the complainant’s equity against a portion of the defendants, and seeks to get a decree vesting their legal title in him. 2. It seeks to investigate the validity of a sale, by the sheriff, of the share of one of the heirs under whom complainant claims. 3. It seeks to investigate the question arising upon the forcible entry and detainer. 4. It asks for an account; for rents and profits.

Besides, the statements of the bill show that Rutland is entitled to the possession, and independent of all this, in a case for partition, the title must be clear of dispute. Hickman vs. Cooke.

Allow the demurrer, and dismiss the bill as to Rutland, and remand the cause to the chancery court.  