
    PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. P. Kellie C. BRIMBERRY, Defendant/Cross-Claimant-Appellant, and Fiduciary Trust International of California; Franklin Templeton Companies, LLC; Fiduciary Trust Company International; Franklin Templeton Companies, LLC Group Contract G-50408-CA, Defendants-Cross-Defendants.
    No. 14-56209
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted June 9, 2016 Pasadena, California
    FILED June 30, 2016
    Charles Kelechi Chineduh, Linda M. Lawson, Attorney, James J. Moak, Esquire, Attorney, Meserve, Mumper & Hughes LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Jaclyn DiLascio Malyk, Attorney, d’Arcambal Ousley & Cuyler Burk, LLP, Parsippany, NJ, Amanda A. Sonnebom, .Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Chicago,. IL, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.
    John Arthur Belcher, John A. Belcher Law Offices, Pasadena, CA, for Defen-danUCross-Claimant-Appellant.
    Before: REINHARDT and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges and KORMAN, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Edward R. Korman, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

P. Kellie Brimberry appeals the district court’s ruling that she is entitled to only $375,000 in basic accidental death coverage as the beneficiary of her deceased husband’s ERISA life-insurance plan. On appeal, she contends that Prudential was obligated to pay $1 million in basic accidental death coverage, the sum of her basic term life and optional term life awards, because of various alleged ambiguities in the plan. The district court correctly interpreted the language of the provision in the plan governing basic accidental death. On de novo review, we affirm. See Babikian v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 63 F.3d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1995).

The explicit language of the contested provision states, in relevant part, that the amount payable for basic accidental death benefits is “equal to the amount for which you are insured under the Basic Employee Term Life Coverage.” The parties have stipulated that the amount payable for basic employee term life coverage is $375,000. Because this contractual language is “clear and explicit and does not lead to an absurd result, we ascertain [the parties’] intent from the written provisions and go no further.” See Helfand v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cal.App.4th 869, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 299 (1992). Thus, Brimberry is entitled to only $375,000 in basic accidental death benefits.

All of Brimberry’s attempts to inject ambiguity into this provision are without merit. Adopting her interpretations of the phrases “as determined above” and “your amount of insurance” would either render portions of the accidental death provision superfluous or be contrary to how the average reader would interpret the plan based on its unambiguous language and logical organization. Nor is the provision at issue an ambiguous and unenforceable policy exclusion. Prudential is not denying coverage, but merely contesting the amount owed. See Haynes v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 32 Cal.4th 1198, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 68, 89 P.3d 381, 385 (2004).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R, 36-3.
     