
    MEDLOCK v. STATE.
    (No. 10383.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    June 24, 1927.
    Rehearing Denied. Nov. 23, 1927.
    4.Intoxicating liquors @=3238(5) — Refusal to instruct for acquittal was proper, where evi- ■ deuce of possession of tincture of ginger for sale as beverage was for jury (Pen. Code 1925, art. 674).
    Refusal of peremptory instruction to find ■defendant not guilty was not errQr, where evidence whether he possessed tincture of ginger containing more than one per cent, of alcohol by volume for sale as a beverage, contrary to Pen. Code 1925, art. 674, was for jury.
    2. Criminal law @=>42 — To exempt from prosecution person testifying before grand jury, he must have been “required” to testify (Pen. Code 1925, art. 694).
    To exempt from prosecution any person who has testified as witness before grand jury, under Pen. Code 1925, art. 694, such person )' : have been "required” to so testify, and tes-
    timony given or statement made before court or grand jury, which is free from elements of demand, command, or compulsion, and is voluntarily made, with knowledge that it is not demanded, is admissible against party making it.
    3. Criminal law @=>42 — Defendant voluntarily testifying before grand jury, after being warned of rights, could not claim imimiunlty from prosecution (Pen. Code 1925, art. 694).
    Under Pen. Code 1925, art. 694, defendant was not entitled to immunity from prosecution for possessing prohibited liquor because of having testified before grand jury, where he was not subpoenaed to attend, and on appearance in grand jury room was warned that he need not make statement, that, if made, it would be used in evidence against him if he were indicted, and thereafter his statement was reduced to writing and signed by him.
    4. Criminal law @=>823(5) — Intoxicating liquors @=> 131 — Refusal of charge to acquit, if defendant kept tincture for sale, believing it accorded to legal formulas, held proper considering other instructions, and because incorrect (Pen. Code 1925, art. 674).
    In prosecution for possession of prohibited liquor, refusal of defendant’s charge that, if from evidence jury believed he kept tincture of ginger, believed by him to accord with formulas prescribed by United States Pharmacopeia, or if jury had reasonable doubt thereof, they should acquit, held not error in view of other instructions thereon, since, under Pen. Code 1925, art. 674, keeping of forbidden liquor for sale for beverage would be violation of law, no matter what formula defendant believed liquor was made under.
    5. Criminal law @=>844(1)— Excéption to charge on possession of tincture of ginger as .placing too great burden on defendant held too general.
    In prosecution for possessing prohibited potable liquor, exception to charge that, if jury believed defendant possessed tincture of ginger for medicinal purposes only, or had reasonable doubt thereof, they should acquit, which exception stated that charge placed too great a burden on appellant, was too general to be considered.
    6. Criminal law @=3406(4) — Admission of part only of statement voluntarily made by defendant before grand jury held not error.
    In prosecution for possessing prohibited liquor, admission in evidence of only a part of statement voluntarily made by defendant before grand jury as to the sales by. him of tincture of ginger was not error, since it was open to him to introduce the balance of such testimony.
    
      7. Criminal law <g==>406 (3) — That statement, voluntarily made before grand jury, was in answer to questions, would not make it incompetent in subsequent prosecution against witness.
    That part or all of statement voluntarily made before grand jury was in answer to questions would not render it incompetent in subsequent criminal prosecution against person making it.
    8. Intoxicating liquors ©=5233(1) — Evidence of finding tincture of ginger bottles in toilet and back of defendant’s drug store held admissible in prosecution for possession.
    In prosecution for possessing potable liquor containing more than one per cent, of alcohol by volume, evidence that tincture of ginger bottles were found in defendant’s toilet and in an alley back of his drug store, and that bottles would be hauled off, but would accumulate again, was admissible as circumstance affecting quantity of liquor sold and question whether he sold it for medicinal or beverage purposes.
    9. Intoxicating liquors ©=>236(61/2) — Evidence held to' sustain conviction of possession of potable liquor containing over one per cent, alcohol.
    In prosecution for possessing potable liquor containing more than one per cent, of alcohol by volume, evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction.
    (0. Intoxicating liquors ©=»239(4) — Charge to convict if defendant unlawfully possessed prohibited liquor for sale “as a beverage,” held proper (Pen. Code 1925, art. 674).
    Charge to convict, if evidence showed defendant unlawfully possessed for purpose of sale “as a beverage” potable liquor containing in excess of one per cent, of alcohol by volume, was not vitiated because of words “as a beverage,” but such words made it applicable to the facts of the case; sale as beverage being element authorizing conviction under Pen. Code 1925, art. 674.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    II. Criminal law ©=529< — Confession before grand jury and statement made under oath, if voluntary, are admissible.
    Confession of accused, when taken before grand jury by summons, or taken before it while under arrest, and his, statement made under oath, if voluntary, and after proper warning is given, and other formalities complied with, are admissible.
    Appeal from District Court, Nolan County; W. P. Leslie, Judge.
    L. L. Medloek was convicted of possessing potable liquor containing more than one per cent, of alcohol -by volume, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Jno. J. Ford and Geo. W. Outlaw, both of Sweetwater, and Roy L. Duke and Stinson, Coombes & Brooks, all of Abilene, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., and Robt. M. Lyles, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.
   LATTIMORE, J.

Conviction for possessing potable liquor containing more than one per cent, of alcohol by volume;' punishment, two years in the penitentiary.

Appellant was proprietor of a drug store in Roscoe in Nolan county. The liquor he sold was tincture of ginger. In a signed statement he admitted he had been selling the Sunset and Murphy brands of said liquor, and that same contained 92 per cent, of alcohol. He further said:

“I sell about two cases a month, each case containing 72 bottles; I don’t average that much all the time, but have sold' that much in the last 30 days. * ⅜ * In my opinion it could be drunk in sufficient quantities to intoxicate.”

No witness affirmed that the Sunset and Murphy brands of tincture of ginger were put up in accordance with formulas prescribed by the United States Pharmacopeia, except as same appears in the general statement made by appellant while a witness, when he said that the tincture of ginger he sold was double strength, according to the United States Pharmacopeia. Conceding that it was a liquid so prepared, the issue would then arise as to whether same was possessed by appellant for sale as a medicine or for sale as a beverage, it being provided in article 674, P. C., that nothing in that chapter should prevent the keeping and storing for sale of any medicinal preparation manufactured in accordance with the formulas prescribed by the United States Pharmacopeia, which were manufactured and sold for legitimate and lawfpl purposes, and not as beverages. On the point of whether appellant sold the liquor as a beverage, there appears other evidence beside the statement of the accused showing the purchase and use of the liquor in question by a number of people, also the quantity and number of bottles found in the rear of appellant’s place and in his toilet. Appellant admitted that he had made a rule that he would not let this liquor be drunk in his store, though he had no such rule relative to other articles sold as medicine.

The "first bill' of exceptions was taken to the refusal of peremptory instruction to find appellant not guilty. Passing the question as to the sufficiency of the bill, we see no error in the refusal of the charge requested.

There is a bill to the refusal of the court to instruct the jury that if appellant was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury as a witness, was sworn, and was asked about and testified before said grand jury to the transactions and sales of tincture of ginger made by him, and gave the names of witnesses who appeared on the trial of this case and testified against appellant — that by reason of such facts the defendant would be immune from prosecution, and therefore the jury should be instructed to find him not guilty.

We have carefully examined the facts and the law applicable. Article 694, P. C., is as follows:

“No person shall be excused from- testifying .against persons who have violated any provision of this chapter for the reason that such testimony will tend to incriminate him, but no person required to so testify shall be punishable for acts disclosed by such testimony.”

It will be observed that, to exempt from punishment any person who has testified against those supposed to have violated the provisions of the chapter including said article, such person must have been required to so testify. This phase of the statute seems not to have been-before this court for interpretation in any other case. In fact, we have been unable to find in any Texas decision a meaning ascribed to the word “require,” when used as in article 694, supra. Prom the decisions of other jurisdictions, the textbooks and lexicons, we note that it has been often construed according to the different contexts and places used. The definitions most used and seemingly in all statutes such as the one before us are, to compel, to demand, to command, to make necessary. Mattingly’s Heirs v. Read, 3 Metc. (60 Ky.) 524, 79 Am. Dec. 565; Meagher v. Van Zandt, 18 Nev. 230, 2 P. 57; State v. McCord, 8 Kan. 232, 12 Am. Rep. 469; Kennedy v. Falde, 4 Dak. 319, 29 N. W. 667; Lippineott v. Ridgway, 11 N. J. Eq. 526; Brewster v. Brewster, 52 N. H. 52; People v. Central Pac. Ry. Co., 76 Cal. 29, 18 P. 90; Park v. Candler, 114 Ga. 466, 40 S. E. 523; McKeever v. Iron Co., 138 Pa. 184, 16 A. 97, 20 A. 938; 34 Cyc. p. 1626. Prom these and other authorities we conclude that testimony given, or a statement made before a court or grand jury, which is free from the elements of demand, or command or compulsion, and appears to have been made voluntarily, and with knowledge that it is not demanded or compelled, would be admissible in evidence against the party making it, under a statute such as this, and such party could not claim immunity for having given such testimony.

In the case before us appellant affirms that he was told by a deputy sheriff to come to the grand jury room, and went. No effort was made by him to show that any subpoena was issued for him. Moreover, it appears that, when he came into the grand jury room, he was distinctly and specifically warned by the district attorney that he need not make any statement unless he wanted to, and that any statement he might make could and would be used in evidence against him, if he was indicted; that such statement, if made by him, would be reduced to writing. After being told these things, he made a statement, some questions being asked him by the district attorney, and when the statement was reduced to writing, and the statutory warning theretofore given him had Been inserted, same was exhibited to him, and by him signed. 1 Nowhere in his testimony as given on the trial does he affirm or suggest that he was overreached, compelled, or required in any sense to make such statement. It is undisputed that same was not required or compelled. We are of opinion that he does not show himself entitled to claim immunity from prosecution because of having made said statement.

Appellant sought to have the jury told that, if he appeared before the grand jury at the request of the deputy sheriff, and made the statement offered in evidence, he.should be acquitted. We do not regard same as the law.

Bill of exceptions No. 4 complains of the refusal of a charge that, if from the evidence the jury believed that appellant kept for sale tincture of ginger, believed by him to have been made according to the formulas •.prescribed by the United States Pharmacopeia, or if the jury had a reasonable doubt thereof, they should acquit. We do not understand this to be the law. It is expressly provided by article 674, P. C., that, if one who keeps such preparation as this tincture, even though put up according to the formulas of said Pharmacopeia, for sale for beverage purposes, and it is a liquor forbidden to be kept or sold for beverage purposes, he would be guilty of violating the law, no matter what formula he might believe the liquor to have been made under. In this connection we observe that the learned trial judge told the jury in the charge that, even though they found from the evidence that the liquor possessed by appellant was intoxicating, and that it was possessed by him for the purpose of sale, yet, if they found from the evidence that he believed same was not an intoxicating liquor, when taken in reasonable quantities, or if they had a reasonable doubt of this fact, they should acquit. Again, the court charged the jury that, if they found from the evidence that'appellant did not possess potable liquor, as alleged in the second count, for sale as a beverage, or if they had a reasonable doubt of his so possessing such liquor for said purpose, they should acquit of the charge in the second count. The court also told the jury that, even though they found that appellant possessed for sale potable liquor containing in excess of one per cent, of alcohol by volume, yet if they found that same was not possessed for sale as a beverage, or if they had a reasonable doubt as to its possession for that purpose, they should acquit. The court also told the jury that, if they believed appellant possessed the tincture of ginger for medicinal purposes only, or they had a reasonable doubt as fo his so possessing same, they should acquit on both counts submitted. This latter charge was but the completion of the presentation from all different angles of the theories of the defense. Exception was taken to paragraph 10a, containing the last-mentioned charge, but the exceptions are too general to be considered; it being stated that said charge placed too great a burden on the appellant.

Appellant objected to the offering of only a part of the statement made by him before the grand jury, asserting that, if any of said statement was introduced, all must be. This is not sound. Early v. State, 9 Tex. App. 477; Giles v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 561, 67 S. W. 411; Shaw v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 337, 165 S. W. 930; Davis v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 15, 209 S. W. 749. When any part is offered by one party, all relating to the same subjects may be offered by the other party. The writing offered in evidence contained in full the statutory warning, which the testimony showed was first orally given to appellant before he made any statement. That part or all of such statement was in answer to questions would not render it incompetent. Bailey v. State, 26 Tex. App. 715, 9 S. W. 270; Tidwell v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 40, 47 S. W. 466, 48 S. W. 184.

Two bills of exception complain of the reception of evidence that numbers of tincture of ginger bottles were found in appellant’s toilet and in an alley back of the store; that said bottles would be hauled off, but would accumulate again. We think this testimony presented circumstances affecting the quantity of such liquor sold by appellant, and that the jury had the right to receive and consider same as shedding light on whether appellant was selling the tincture of ginger only for medicinal purposes or as a beverage.

We are not able to agree with appellant’s contention that the evidence does not support the verdict. The admission of appellant, the rapidly accumulating quantities of bottles of tincture of ginger, the testimony ©f the parties who bought from him — all' seem enough to justify the jury in their conclusion.

Appellant files an able brief and argument, which we have examined. Many authorities are cited in support of some of the propositions above discussed, but none of them are deemed applicable. Appellant cites Dunagan v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. R. 404, 278 S. W. 432; and Douglas v. State, 99 Tex. Cr. R. 413, 269 S. W. 1041, as supporting his proposition that the statement made by him before the grand jury was incompetent. As we view said cases, both are wholly aside from the point deemed controlling by us. Douglas was brought from jail, and Dunagan was sub-jpcenaed, and neither were told when brought before the grand jury that he need make no statement unless he wished to, and that, if he did, it would be used against him. So also in Lewis v. State, 103 Tex. Cr. R. 64, 279 S. W. 828, in which case the accused was brought before the grand jury, and carried from there to the jail repeatedly for his refusal to testify, and hé finally did testify in order to keep out of jail, we held the statements made by him incompetent.

Appellant urges that a part - of the court’s charge, while not excepted to, presented fundamental error. His contention was that paragraph 6 of the court’s charge, wherein the jury were told as follows: “Or if you find and believe from the evidence in this cáse, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, L. L. Medlock, on or about September 25, 1925, in Nolan county, Tex., unlawfully possessed, for the purpose of sale, as a beverage, a potable liquor, containing in excess of one per cent, of alcohol by volume, etc., then you will find the defendant guilty,” is erroneous. Appelant’s contention seems to be that the use of the exepression “as a beverage” in said charge vitiates same. In our opinion, this is the portion of the charge which makes it the law applicable to the facts in this case. There was no question but that appellant sold a potable liquor containing in excess of one per cent, of alcohol by volume. Unless he sold it as a beverage, he could not be convicted under article 674 of our Penal Code. If he sold it as a beverage, he was guilty of violating the law.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

HAWKINS, J.

Appellant has filed a forceful motion insisting that the statement made by him before the grand jury should not have been received in evidence because he was summoned before that body, sworn, and made the statement under oath in response to inquiries by the district attorney, it being appellant’s contention that under such circumstances article 694, Pen. Code 1925; renders him immune from prosecution. The article' in question is in the chapter relating to violations of the intoxicating liquor laws, and reads as follows:

“No person shall be excused from testifying against persons who have violated any provision of this chapter for the reason that such testimony will tend to incriminate him, but no person required to so testify shall be punishable for acts disclosed by such testimony.”

It has long been the settled law of this state that the confession of accused is admissible when taken before a grand jury, even though accused was summoned before that body, or taken before it while under arrest, and his statement made under oath, provided the statement was voluntary, the proper warning given, and other formalities complied with. Thomas v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 178, 32 S. W. 771; Wisdom v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 579, 61 S. W. 926; Grimsinger v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 69 S. W. 583. An examination of tlie two cases last cited makes it apparent tliat the question was exhaustively considered, and that Judge Henderson, then a member of this court, did not unqualifiedly assent to the holding, but the majority opinion prevailed, and, so far as the writer knows, has been uniformly followed. Appellant’s contention is that the effect of article 694, supra, renders inoperative the law announced in the opinions cited, where the statement made by accused before the grand .jury is with reference to the subject referred to in said article. It is conceived to be true that one accused of violating the law relating to intoxicating liquors may confess thereto the same as if charged with the commission of any other offense, and that such confession, if made under the proper formalities, be usable against him. In the present case appellant was warned by the district attorney that he did not have to make any statement at all, but that, if he did make one, it could be used against him. It is apparent that the officers representing the state were not proceeding to an examination of appellant under the provisions óf article 694, which would have permitted an inquiry of him even over his protest, but by the warning given pointedly advised him that the state was not so proceeding, and imparted knowledge to him that he could decline to make any statement whatever, with a/warning that, if he did make one, it was at his peril. If in response to the warning appellant had signified a desire to remain silent, and the.state had forced from him a statement, because article 694 granted immunity, the element of a voluntary confession would have been destroyed.

Appellant again urges other matters considered in our original opinion, but we think no further discussion of them is necessary.

The motion for rehearing is overruled. 
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