
    John Brown and others vs. A. McB. Peeples, Adm’or.
    
      Foreign Judgment — Satisfaction—Presumption—Foreign Statute.
    
    A statute of Georgia providing that if no entry be made by the proper officer, on an execution, for seven years, the judgment shall be null and void — in an action in this State on the judgment, satisfaction will be presumed if the proper entries have not been made.
    The construction given to a statute by the Courts of the State which enacted it, is binding upon other Courts. I
    
    BEFORE WARDLAW, CH., AT BEAUFORT,
    FEBRUARY, 1858.
    Wardlaw, Ch. This suit was instituted by plaintiffs, February 19, 1856, to obtain satisfaction of a judgment in the Inferior Court of Wayne County, Georgia, from equitable assets, which have lately come into the hands of the representative of one of the debtors.
    On March 2, 1835, William Lane was appointed guardian of Margaret Smith and Bryant Smith, then infant children of Charles Smith, lately deceased, and on the same day he, with Rebecca Smith and Cornelius Geiger, as his sureties, entered into a joint, and several bond to the Judges of the Court of Ordinary of Wayne County, and their successors in office, in the penalty of eight hundred dollars, with condition that he well, and truly demean himself as guardian according to law. The ward Bryant soon afterwards died, and the guardian Lane in his return of January 3, 1837, charged himself as owing to the surviving ward Margaret, the sum of $443.62-}. On May 2, 1838, in said Court of Ordinary for Wayne, the plaintiff, John Brown, “ having given bond and security in terms of the law,” was appointed guardian of said Margaret in place of said Lane. In the course of the same month, Brown as guardian, filed a petition to the Justices of the Inferior Court, setting forth the foregoing facts, and that William Hornsby had taken Rebecca Smith to wife, “which makes him liable in his wife’s stead, as far as assets in his hands,” and that Lane had refused payment on demand, wherefore the petition prayed that process might issue to compel Lane and his sureties to appear and answer the premises in said Inferior Court. Such process was issued May 29, 1838, and returned by the Sheriff “served a copy on Cornelius Geiger and others, November 23, 1838.” A verdict was found and judgment entered up in favor of the petitioner against Lane, Geiger and Hornsby, on December 30, 1839, for $443.62J, with interest from January 3, 1837, and $12.50 for costs, and a fi. fa. in execution was lodged, January 4, 1840. On the fi. fa. are the following endorsements: “ Levied on five hundred acres of land in Wayne county, household and kitchen furniture, one lot of land, No. 156, in Wayne county, 28th December, 1842, James Causey, S. W. C., sold for $8, May 7, 1823. Received on the within execution from the hands of William Lane, eight dollars, this 22d September, 1845, James C. Smith. No property to. be found this 9th April, A. D., 1852, Thos. Beckham, S. W. C., Ga.”
    William Lane died in 1845 or ’7; Cornelius Geiger died September, 1851, in Florida, and William Hornsby died in September, 1855. All of them were reputed to be insolvent at their deaths respectively, and for some years before; but since Geiger’s death, defendant Peeples, as the administrator of his estate, has received a considerable fund from the estate of one Mary Ann Roberts, of which Geiger was a distributee.
    Defendant has paid a portion of this fund to the distribu-tees of his intestate, but ih a suit in this Court by them against him, he was ordered to invest $1,200 by May 26, 1856, or pay interest thereon from that day, to provide the means for satisfying plaintiffs’ claim if it should be established. Plaintiffs at first proceeded for redress in the Common Pleas, but abandoned their suit there, and now seek the aid of this Court.
    Defendants contest the original validity of the Georgia judgment; insist that the judgment, if valid, is not properly exemplified for judicial notice here; that it is barred by the statute of limitations, or by lapse of time, fortified by the imperfect account given of the disposal of the levy, and by other circumstances; and that this Court has no jurisdiction of the cause.
    The judgment is certainly very informal according to the notions of procedure prevailing in South Carolina. It is not in the name of the Judges of the Court of Ordinary who are the obligees of the bond, but in the name of John Brown, who shows no legal title to the bond. This, however, is, at most, an irregularity, which, while the judgment is unvacated by the Court which rendered it, must be pretermitted in any other tribunal where the matter is considered. Every State may prescribe for itself rules and doctrines for the transfer of obligations and the conduct of causes, and in this case, a Court in Georgia, having the parties before it, and competent to consider all the questions between them,recognized Brown’s right to sue. Wadsworth vs. Letson,2 Spears, 277 ; Arnold vs. Frasier, 5 Strob. 33.
    A defect in the exemplification was suggested, but not urged in argument. The Act of Congress provides,that “the records and judicial proceedings of the Courts of any State shall be proved and admitted in any other Court within the United States by the attestation of the Clerk and the Seal of the Court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the Judge, Chief Justice, or Presiding Magistrate, as the case may be, that the attestation is in due form.” The attestation in the present instance, by the Clerk, satisfies the requisitions of the Act, and the objection is confined to the certificate of the Judge. The judgment was rendered in the Inferior Court of Wayne County; and the certificate is by the Judge of the Superior Courts of the Eastern District of Georgia. By the clear intendment of the Act, the certificate of judicial proceedings should be by a Judge of that Court in which they were had. Such is not the case here; nor does it even appear that Wayne county is within the jurisdiction of the Judge certifying. At the hearing, it was agreed that, reserving the right of the plaintiff's to use the evidence which was taken, defendant might avail himself of any advantage which would be attainable by him on demurer, and as the exemplification is an exhibit of the bill, I suppose he may object to the sufficiency of the exemplification.
    My impression is, that the judgment is not properly certified to the Court here, but I consider it unsafe to dismiss the bill for informality in an instrument of evidence which might probably have been corrected, if notice of objection had been given, especially as the point was not argued.
    Our statute of limitations prescribes no bar of foreign judgment; and it is settled by the cases of Hinton vs. Towns, 1 Hill 216, and Napier vs. Gidiere, Spears Eq. 215, that in the absence of express bar, the judgments of the Courts of record in our sister States are to be treated as records, and exempt from the bar applicable to simple contracts. It appears by Prince’s Digest, which was in evidence that the Inferior Court of Georgia is a Court of Record. In Georgia, the statute of limitations bars actions on the judgments of another State, not brought within five years after judgment rendered, and in McElmoyle vs. Cohen, 13 Peters 312, the Supreme Court of the United States held the bar to be applicable to a judgment obtained in South Carolina. I suppose that without express mention of judgments, in our State, actions on judgments of Courts not of record in our sister States, as on our judgments of magistrates, must be prosecuted within four years; and if it were res-integra, it would be a grave question whether the Federal Constitution and the Act of Congress in pursuance of it, as to the effect to be given in all the Courts of the United States to a judgment in any State, have created an exemption from this doctrine; but I repeat, the question is settled.
    
      Considering the Wayne judgment as a judgment of record, the lapse of time has been insufficient to create the presumption of satisfaction. It was said in this connection, that a statute of Georgia, Prince’s Dig. 458, Sec. 165, declares that a judgment shall be void when no execution is issued upon it for seven years, and that the reasons of the enactment are applicable to renewals of executions. The present case is not within the terms of avoidance in the statute, for an execution was promptly issued on the judgment; and there is neither reason or authority for extending the enactment so as to nullify what would be good at common law, and under our own procedure and legislation, A siriiilar statute of Alabama was considered in the case, Carlton vs. Felder, 6 Rich. Eq. 58. Defendant further urges, that conceding the lapse to be in itself inadequate to preclude the plaintiffs, yet, as more than, sixteen years expired after judgment before plaintiffs filed their bill, the lapse, in connection with the suspicious circumstances about the levy and sale, renders the claim stale and inequitable. A levy raises the presumption of satisfaction of an execution, when there is no satisfactory evidence ~of the disposal of the levy. Here, two tracts of land, and furniture of house and kitchen, are seized for the satisfaction of the plaintiff, and the only account given as to the disposal of the property is the return of the Sheriff, four months afterwards, “sale for $8,” without giving any of the particulars of sale, not even the name of the purchaser. This leaves room for unfavorable conjecture. It may be that there was collusion between Lane and Brown and Smith, to cheat Lane’s sureties, but this is not very likely, as the Sureties were then regarded as insolvent. It may be, that the plaintiffs took the property at its nominal price in full satisfaction of the judgment; but this is a matter susceptible of proof, which defendant was bound to make. We have the same proof of the sale, as that of the levy — by endorsement on the execution. It may be that Lane’s title was defective, and that his interest brought a fair price. We should not presume fraud where, if it existed, defendant was bound to establish it by evidence.
    The jurisdiction of the Court was impugned. Defendant urged that plaintiffs should have obtained judgment at law, and exhausted their legal remedy before coming into this Court. ' Plaintiffs reply, that they had no remedy at law, for that the survivor only of those bound by the Georgia judgment could be sued, and Hornsby survived Geiger. It is not clear, at least it was not shown by authority, that this limitation of the legal remedy to survivors, applicable to joint bonds, obtained as to judgments, especially when all the defendants in judgment are dead. But plaintiffs present another view, which is more satisfactory. The only estate of Geiger, out of which plaintiffs can obtain satisfaction, is the sum reserved in the hands of the administrator by the order of this Court, made with special reference to this claim. If the plaintiffs had, at needless expense, got judgment at ipw, they must have applied to this Court for satisfaction, and in avoidance of expense and circuity of action, they were entitled primarily to apply for relief here.
    The amount due on t]ie Georgia judgment .is, principal................................................. $443 621-
    Interest at 8 per cent, from Jan. 3, 1837, to Feb. 3, 1858.............?.........'............................... 748 25
    Costs — original $12 50; on Fi. Fa. $0 62-|-......... 13 12J
    $1,205 00
    Deduct payments.......................................... 16
    $1,189 00
    with interest on $443 62-J from February 3, 1858.
    The Commissioner, misled by an endorsement on the execution not justified by the judgment, makes the sum larger, although allowing interest on the payments too small.to extinguish interest accrued, which seems to be unauthorized. The sum due considerably exceeds the penalty of the bond on which judgment is founded, but in an action on a. judgment, obtained on a penal bond, interest may be recovered beyond the penalty. McClure vs. Dunkin, 1 East, 436; Bonsale vs. Taylor, 1 McC. 503: Smith vs. Vanderhorst, Ibid. 328.
    
    Some of the questions in this cause are doubtful and embarrassing, and an appeal would be proper. It is ordered and decreed that the defendant, from the estate of Cornelius Geiger in his hands, pay to the plaintiffs, James C. Smith and wife, the sum of $1,189 00, with interest on $443 62j from Feb. 3, 1858, and the costs.
    The defendant appealed on the grounds:
    1. Because the Court of Equity has no jurisdiction of the cause; the plaintiffs having a full and adequate remedy at law.
    2. Because the judgment which the bill seeks to enforce is void against this defendant.
    3. Because the said judgment is barred by the statute of limitations.
    4. Because the said judgment is rendered null and void by an Act of the State of Georgia.
    5. Because the said judgment is barred by the lapse of time, and the attendant circumstances, which raise a presumption of payment.
    o. Because the evidence of the complainants exhibits badges of fraud, which forbid the interposition of a Court of Equity in their behalf.
    
      Tickling, for appellants.
    
      Hudson, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Dunkin, Ch.

The judgment, which the plaintiff’s seek to render available, was entered against the defendants intestate in the Inferior Court of Wayne County, Georgia, on 30th December, 1839, and execution lodged 4th January, 1840 — a levy was made 28th December, 1842, which was exhausted 7th May, 1843, by sale, for the sum of eight dollars. No further action was taken on the execution until 9th April, 1852, when the Sheriff indorsed thereon “no property to be found.” In the' meantime, to wit, on 22d September, 1845, James C. Smith (one of the plaintiffs) indorsed on the execution a receipt in the following words: “Received on the within execution, from the hands of William Lane, eight dollars, this 22d September, 1845, (Signed) James C. Smith.” In Wardlaw vs. Gray, Dud. Eq. 85, it was ruled that a creditor could not prevent the bar of the statute of limitations by indorsing upon his demand a payment of a very considerable part of it. In the view, however, taken by the Court this becomes not Very important.

By an Act of Assembly, of the State of Georgia, passed in 1822, and amended by the Act of 1823, it is declared, that “all judgments, on which no execution shall be sued out, or on which execution, if sued out, no return shall be made by the proper officer for executing and returning the same within seven years from the date of the judgment, shall be void and of no avail.” These statutes came under the consideration of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia in the case of Booth vs. Williams, 2 Kelly, 250, and it'was there determined that, according to the proper construction of these statutes, a return must be made by the proper officer on such execution every seven years, “not” (in the language of the Court) “ within seven years from the date of the judgment, but seven years from the date of the last entry,” otherwise it will be presumed to be satisfied. After the elaborate consideration of the subject, in Johnston vs. S. W. R. R. Bank, 3 Strob. Eq. 300, it is deemed only necessary to say (in the words of Chief Justice Marshall) that “we receive the construction given by the Courts of a State as the true sense of the law, and feel ourselves no more at liberty to depart from that construction than to depart from the words of the statute.” No entry was made on this execution by the proper officer from 7th May, 1843, till 9th April, 1852, a period of nearly nine years, and the judgment must therefore be considered as satisfied.

It is ordered and decreed that the decree of the Circuit Court be reversed, and that the bill be dismissed.

Johnston and Wardlaw, CC., concurred.

Decree reversed. 
      (d)In South Carolina there is no statute fixing a period within which actions of debt on judgment shall be brought; and presumption of satisfaction from mere lapse of time does not arise until the full common law period of twenty years has elapsed. Now whatever may be the language of the Georgia statute, it would seem plain that it can only be regarded as a statute of limitations, or a statute altering the common law in relation to the presumption of satisfaction arising from the lapse of time — the validity of the judgment as a contract of record, or as evidence of indebtedness, imposing an obligation to pay, is not affected by it. As a statute of limitations it is well settled that it can have no operation beyond the limits of Georgia; Story, Confl. of Laws, § 576, and it would seem that as a law fixing a shoVt period for presuming satisfaction, it must stand upon the same footing. Story Confi. of Laws, g 582. Suppose instead of declaring that seven years should be the period for presuming satisfaction, it had declared that the common law period was too short, and had fixed sixty years as the time; would it have been anything more than a rule for the Georgia Courts? Laws affecting the validity and binding obligation of contracts follow them into other countries, but it is not so with statutes of limitation, and it may well be questioned whether a law altering the period for raising presumptions, or establishing other rules of evidence, can have any effect beyond the limits of the power which enacted it. This point does not appear to have been considered by the Court. R.
     