
    Submitted February 18,
    portion of judgment requiring defendant to pay attorney fees reversed, otherwise affirmed March 30,
    petition for review denied July 14, 2016 (360 Or 26)
    STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KARRIE LOUISE BUTCHER, Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Josephine County Circuit Court
    14CR0097; A156800
    370 P3d 562
    Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, and Laura A. Frikert, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, and Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
    Before Duncan, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and Flynn, Judge.
    PER CURIAM
   PER CURIAM

In this criminal appeal, in which defendant seeks reversal of her convictions for first- and second-degree robbery, we write only to address defendant’s contention that the trial court plainly erred in requiring her to pay court-appointed attorney fees of $440. The state concedes that the trial court erred, because the record is silent as to whether defendant “is or may be able” to pay those fees. See ORS 151.505(3) (“The court may not require a person to pay costs under this section unless the person is or may be able to pay the costs.”); ORS 161.665(4) (“The court may not sentence a defendant to pay costs under this section unless the defendant is or may be able to pay them.”); see also State v. Coverstone, 260 Or App 714, 716, 320 P3d 670 (2014) (holding that it is plain error for a trial court to require a defendant to pay court-appointed attorney fees in the absence of legally sufficient evidence that the defendant has the ability to pay the amount imposed). We agree that the trial court plainly erred and, for the reasons set forth in State v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 264 Or App 346, 349, 332 P3d 338 (2014) (exercising discretion to correct erroneous imposition of $400 in court-appointed attorney fees because the amount was “substantial” in light of defendant’s circumstances), we exercise our discretion to correct the error.

Portion of judgment requiring defendant to pay attorney fees reversed; otherwise affirmed.  