
    Diego Armando SEGUNDO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 06-70398.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued June 13, 2011.
    Resubmitted Oct. 31, 2012.
    Filed Nov. 23, 2012.
    Helen B. Zebel, Esq., Law Office of Helen B. Zebel, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.
    Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, David V. Bernal, Regina Byrd, Esq., Ari Nazarov, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Before: SCHROEDER, RIPPLE, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Diego Armando Segundo, a native and citizen of Mexico, has petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal from an immigration judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal for failure to meet the ten-year continuous presence requirement. We previously referred his petition to the court’s mediation office, along with those of his co-petitioners. Their cases in this court have been terminated, and we are asked to decide only Armando Segundo’s petition.

Petitioner seeks relief from the ten-year continuous presence requirement under the equitable-tolling doctrine due to the bad advice he received from prior counsel, and he argues that the BIA’s failure to grant such relief violated his due process rights. As a result, he argues that the end date of his continuous presence should be equitably tolled, or extended, from the date on which he received his Notice to Appear to the date on which he retained competent counsel.

It is clear that Petitioner’s original counsel misadvised him to apply for relief when he had not yet met the ten-year period of continuous presence required for cancellation of removal. Equitable tolling, however, cannot be applied in cases such as this one, where the unfairness stems from the conduct of counsel, which is “exterior to immigration procedures themselves.” Hernandez-Mancilla v. Holder, 633 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir.2011) (citing Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.2004), as amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005)). We have also held that such conduct by counsel does not constitute a due process violation. Lara-Torres, 383 F.3d at 973.

PETITION DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     