
    HOGG v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 10, 1912.)
    1. Receiving Stolen Goods (§ 7*) — 'Vajsiance — Ownership of Property.
    There is not a variance between an indictment for receiving stolen property, alleging ownership of the property in M., and proof that it was part of the stock of a business, which, while owned by him, was conducted under the name of City Lumber Company.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Receiving Stolen Goods, Cent. Dig. §§ 9-14; Dec. Dig. § 7.*]
    2. Receiving Stolen Goods (§ 7*) — Indictment— Ownership of Property.
    The indictment for receiving stolen' property properly alleges its ownership in M., owner and manager of the business, part of the stock of which it was, and not in his employs, I who, as yardman, had control of the property in the yard from which it was stolen.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Receiving Stolen Goods, Gent. Dig. §§ 9-14; Dec. Dig. § 7.*]
    3. Receiving- Stolen .Goods (§ 8*) — Evidence — Knowledge of Theft.
    Evidence, on trial for receiving stolen property, hela to authorize a finding that defendant knew it was stolen.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Receiving Stolen Goods, Gent. Dig. §§ 15-18; Dec. Dig. 8.*]
    Appeal from McLennan County Court; Tom L. McCullough, Judge.
    Robert Hogg was convicted of receiving stolen property, and appeals.
    Affirmed.
    J. W. Taylor, of Waco, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   HARPER, J.

Appellant was prosecuted under information and complaint charging him with receiving and concealing stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen. He was convicted, and his punishment assessed at imprisonment in jail for 30 days and by fine of $25.

In the trial of this ease, it was admitted that the property was stolen from the City Lumber Company of Waco by Howard Deckard, who delivered it to appellant. The information alleges that the property was stolen from C. H. Machen. From the evidence, it appears that C. H. Machen was in business in Waco, actively in control of his own business; that he had, among others, employed his brother, Frank Machen, who was termed the yardman, and looked after and had control, under his brother, of the property in the yard, including the cement stolen. C. H. Machen was doing business under the style and name of City Lumber Company, and was the sole owner of the lumber yard. Appellant insists that there was a fatal variance in the proof and the allegations in the information, in that the evidence shows that the cement stolen was the property of the City Lumber Company; and, further, that it shows the property was in the control and custody of Frank Machen, and therefore the information should have alleged ownership in the City Lumber Company, or in Frank Machen. We do not think these contentions are well taken. It is not questioned that C. H. Machen, in whom ownership was alleged, was the real owner of the property, and, though he might have been doing business under a given name, it was proper in the information to give the name of the real owner. Frank Machen was working for his brother, and had his peculiar duties assigned to him, but, inasmuch as C. H. Machen was in actual control and management of all the property, the fact that he, as yardman, had control of the property in the yard, was not that exclusive control and management of the property which rendered it essential to allege ownership in him. It would not be contended that Frank Machen would be responsible to his brother for the property stolen, under the circumstances proven in this case, and it has been held that the possession of a servant is the possession of the master; and likewise, where he is but an employe in a store, lumber yard, etc., and has control of a given department, the allegation is properly laid in the owner, when the owner attends to and looks after the entire business himself.

The only other serious contention is that the proof is insufficient to show that appellant knew the property was stolen at the time he received it. The court, in addition to his main charge, gave appellant’s three special charges on this phase of the case. While there was no direct testimony that appellant knew the cement was stolen, yet the circumstances proven were such as would-support a finding of the jury to that effect. Appellant in his testimony admitted he had known Deckard for two years, and knew he drove a small express wagon, and did not deal in or handle cement, and yet he admits he contracted with him for cement before its delivery, and knew that it was delivered between sundown and daylight. These, with other circumstances, and his contradictory statements about from whom he obtained the cement, would be strong circumstances upon which a jury could base such a finding.

There are no bills of exceptions in the record. The evidence supports the verdict; and, this being a misdemeanor conviction, the judgment is affirmed.  