
    [Lancaster,
    May 26, 1823.]
    REIGART and another, Terretenants, against ELLMAKER, President of the Orphans’ Court of Dauphin County, for the use of ALRICKS, now for the use of WILLIAMS.
    IN EUROS.
    An act of the^vendor after selling lands, is admissible in evidence to explain the whole of. a transaction, respecting winch, the opposite party has given partial evidence.
    An assignment of the cause of action after action brought, is admissible in evidence, where it is referred to in the record, and the jury are sworn in the name of the cestui que use, as plaintiff.
    Error to the'Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin, county, in a scire facias, brought in the name of the plaintiff below, dimos Eli-
      
      maker, President of the Orphans’ Court of the county of Dauphin, for the use of James Jilrichs, now for the use of James Williams, against Daniel Reigart and Nicholas Sweyer, terretenants of a brick house in Harrisburg, defendants below, and plaintiffs in error, in which a verdict and judgment were rendered in the court below, in favour of the plaintiff.
    The scire facias was on a recognizance, entered into by John Kean, who intermarried with a daughter of John Hamilton, deceased, who died intestate, to secure the payment of the shares and purparts of the children, out of the premises taken by the said Kean, at the appraisement, under a decree of the Orphans’ Court, among which was this house. Kean transferred the house to Henry Orth, under whom the defendants claimed, in July, 1806. This scire facias was originally brought by James Jilrichs, who married one of the daughters of the intestate, for her share, and was subsequently assigned to James Williams, and in the action entitled Jilrichs for the use of Williams, the jury was sworn. The parties went to trial, on the plea of payment, with leave to give the special matters in evidence.
    There was no attempt to prove a direct payment. Other estate of the intestate had been taken by several of his children. Jllricks and Kean took one estate, and Jilrichs alone, another in Mifflin county. Kean likewise took a farm in Dauphin county, valued at £3,125, part of which he sold to Mr. Fisher,• the residue was sold by the sheriff, as the estate of Kean, at the suit of Moses Mc Lean, who had married a daughter of the intestate, and had obtained a judgment for his purpart out of the tract. A feigned issue was directed by the Court of Common Pleas to ascertain what was due on the recognizance binding this tract, to each of the distributees; in which Jilrichs was made a party. He disclaimed of record, and disavowed the authority to make him a party.
    The defendants on the trial in the court below, contended, first, that Jilrichs had permitted this property to be sold without any notice to the purchaser. Second, that he and Kean took land in Mifflin, and he conveyed his interest to Kean. Third, that he released to Kean all his interest in the farm in Dauphin county. Fourth, that suit was brought by Mr. McLean, for his wife’s distributive share in the farm, and Jilrichs disclaimed on record, all interest in that recognizance. The defendants, after giving a variety of evidence, gave in evidence the record of the action brought by MiLean against Kean, the feigned issue, and the disavowal of Jllricks. This action was brought to May, 1812: the feigned issue was entered of May, 1818. The plaintiff then gave in evidence a release of the 26th October, 1806, from Jllricks to Kean, of all the Dauphin tract, and offered a letter from Kean to Jilrichs, dated in 1805, requesting him to release his interest in the land sold to Mr. Fisher, as he would not pay the purchase money without releases, and stating that there was some other property to make him safe. This evidence was objected to by the defendants, and admitted by the court, who sealed a bill of exceptions.
    The plaintiff offered in evidence an assignment of his claim in this action to James Williams, dated 19th June, 1807. This was also objected to by the defendants, and admitted by the court, and an exception taken.
    
      Fisher, for the plaintiffs in error, contended,
    1st. That the letter was not evidence, because it was written after Kean had conveyed the property: and the declarations or acts of the vendor, after parting with the property, are not evidence to affect the purchaser. 5 Johns. 412, 426. Packer v. Gonzalus, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 536.
    2. The assignment after the action brought, was inadmissible. It was an act of the party himself, and in no respect relevant to the merits of the cause. It may have had an improper effect on the jury, as it brought forward the claim of a party as assignee instead of the original party to the transaction.
    
      Elder, contra.
    1. Before the letter was offered, , the defendants had given evidence of sundry matters, from which they inferred that Jllricks had received full payment of his wife’s share. They proved that Jllricks had disclaimed taking any share of the money raised by the sale of the Dauphin farm, and we had shown a release. The evidence was offered to explain the cause of this release. It was all part of one transaction.
    2. The evidence on the other point went only to show who was the real plaintiff. The jury were sworn in a suit entitled for the use of Williams.
    
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Duncan, J.,

after stating the facts. The objection is, that as this title was subsequent to the conveyance from Kean to Orth, no acts or declarations of Kean could affect a purchaser. It is to be observed, that Orth bought with full notice of this recognizance. The title to Kean could only be deduced through these proceedings in the Orphans’ Court.

The decision of this court, when the cause was brought up on a former occasion, that no declaration of Kean, subsequent to his conveyance, could be given in evidence to affect a put chaser, has no relation to the question now raised. For one of the grounds of defence is, the disclaimer on record of Jllricks to any thing out of the Dauphin farm: and evidence of this was given by the plaintiffs in error, to raise a presumption that Jllricks had been paid all his claims on all the estate of John Hamilton taken by Kean. With no other view .could this evidence have been given. Now, it would be most unjust, to preclude Jllricks or his assignee from explaining this transaction, from showing why this release' had been given,- and why he disclaimed of record, and that so far from his receiving his wife’s share out of the whole estate of her father taken by Kean, he had not even received her portion of this tract, but relied on Kean’s declaration, that there was othér property sufficient to pay him. This would fully account for .the entry on the record, and show that it was quite consistent with his retaining his lien on the’ house. The plaintiffs in error gave evidence of a transaction subsequent to the conveyance to Orth, between Kean and Mricks* To deny to' Mricks all means of rebutting the presumption of payment from this circumstance, by evidence of the whole transaction, its origin, the leaving notice, and the consideration, would have been a perversion of justice, and every rule of evidence. It would be suffering one party to select one link in the chain of a transaction, while it was denied to the other to produce the whole chain,to show what the transaction really was. It was evidence direct, to do away all indirect inference which a partial statement might have raised, and which a full disclosure would dissipate. The assignment to Williams was proper evidence. It was -referred to in-the record of the action; a paper in- the cause. The jury was sworn-in a cause in which Williams had been substituted as the real party in interest, and the assignment became a part of his title. If it was attempted to be used for any other purpose, to give to Williams an additional equity, by means of this assignment, superior to what Mricks had, at the time of the assignment, the court should have been called on to instruct the jury, that Williams stood in the shoes of Mricks. The abuse of evidence, after it has been read, can be no objection to its admission. If it was evidence.for any thing it was properly admitted. And though afterwards, an attempt might be made, in argument, to use it to prove that for which it was not competent eyidence, this could not, by relation, affect the exception, nor by matter ex post facto, vitiate that which was properly received, though improperly used. It was notvery important evidence, but it was not impertinent. The evidence was properly received in both instances. The letter being important to the defendant in error, rendered necessary by the introduction of evidence relative to a transaction between Kean and Mricks, subsequent to the grant by Kean, which by garbling the circumstances, giving evidence of what was done, thus raise the presumption, that from the act so done, another act might reasonably be inferred, which a full disclosure would remove. The assignment, though not necessary to be given in evidence, to support the claim of Williams as the substitute of Mricks, yet was not so totally irrelevant, as to justify its rejection, referred to, as it was, in the record, and sworn as the jury were, in the cause.

Judgment affirmed.  