
    Edward W. Wilcox v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      There is a dispute between the Quartermaster-General and the contractor as to the value of certain horses delivered under an express contract. The Quartermaster-General directs payment of apart of the contract price as a compromise ; but his officers neglect to carry out their instructions, and they pay the part without exacting any release from the contractor for the balance. He brings his action on the contract for it. The defendants insist that the Government’s disbm-sing officers being authorized only to pay in full, acceptance of payment of itself constituted a compromise.
    
    A general rule of compromises by implication in favor of tlie Government, to the effect that where there has been a dispute, payment in part must be accepted as payment in full, would preclude the Court of Claims fro.m awarding legal justice where legal contracts have been violated and compel every man to whom the Government is debtor to refuse payment in part when proffered or forego his right of action. As the Government does not pay interest upon its debts pendente lite, it is less deserving of such a rule than the ordinary defendant.
    
      Mr. Thomas Wilson for tbe claimants :
    The fourth section of the Act July ith, 1864, (13 Stat. L., 396,) provides “ that when an emergency shall exist requiring- the immediate procurement of supplies for the necessary movements of any army or detachment, and when such supplies can-hot be procured from any established depot of the Quartermaster’s Department, or from the head of the division charged with the duty of furnishing such supplies within the required time, then it shall be lawful for the commanding officer of such army or detachment to order the chief quartermaster of such army or detachment to procure such supplies during the continuance of such emergency, without advertisement.” * *
    Acting under this law, Major-General David Hunter, commanding the Department of West Virginia and the army of West Virginia, ordered—
    “Captain A. V. Barringer, chief quartermaster of department, to purchase one thousand horses, provided it can be done immédiately, at a price not to exceed $165 per head.”
    Under this order the quartermaster purchased a certain number of horses at the stipulated price, and- gave vouchers therefor, which ou presentation to the Quartermaster-General for payment he reduced to $150 per horse, and paid the claimants that amount. This action is brought to recover the balance due of $15 per horse. The horses were received and accepted by the United States, and used up in the service.
    The Quartermaster’s Department- in West Virginia being without money for the payment of these vouchers, the owners presented them to the Quartermaster-General for payment. The action taken by him in this matter was to ignore the contracts, and refuse to pay the price stipulated.
    This the Quartermaster-General had no right to do.
    The Attorney-General insists that these claims, having been disputed by the Quartermaster-General, the payment and receipt of part of the money, accompanied by a receipt in full, is a bar to a recovery of the balance.
    He says that the receipts signed by these claimants, at the foot of the vouchers, cannot be contradicted. I take it no rule of law is better settled than that a receipt for money is only evidence of payment, and may be explained or contradicted by parole or extraneous testimony. (Maze v. Miller, 1 Wash., 0. 0., 328 ; Weed v. Snow, 3 McLean, 265; Lawrence v. Selmylldll Nav. Co., 4 ibid., 262; Bebee v. Moore, 3 ibid., 387; Beeside v. The United States, 2 C. Gis. R., p. 56.)
    In the matter of contracts and the payments made thereon, the Government stands in the same position before the law as any other contractor. (United States v. Thompson, Gilpin Rep., 614; Leming’s Case, 1 0. 01s. B., 190; Jones &- Broton’s Case, ibid., 385.)
    The plaintiff contends that General Hunter had the jiroper authority to order these purchases; that he authorized his quartermasters to pay $165 for each horse ; that the horses, fairly worth that amount, were delivered by the plaintiffs and received by the United States, under the promise to pay that amount for each horse; and that it is'a legal, valid, and binding contract upon the United States.
    That a receipt can be evidence of a defense in the following modes only: As a payment, a release, or accord and satisfaction.
    The receipt to be found at the foot of each voucher in this ease cannot be proof of either of the above defenses; not as a payment, because tlie whole amount was not paid,• nor a release, because it is not under seal ,• nor as accord and satisfaction, because there was no consideration to support a new promise, and because there was no agreement that it should be in satisfaction of the whole demand.
    A payment of part of a debt is no satisfaction of the whole debt, even where the creditor agrees to receive a part for the whole, and gives a receipt for the whole demand. (2 Parsons on Contracts, 130 ; 2 C. Gis. B., p. 56.)
    
      Mr. Alexander Johnston (with whom was the Assistant Attorney:General) for the defendants:
    The Act Juky 4dh, 1804, sec. 4, (13 Stat. L., 396,) made it a condition precedent to General Hunter’s authority to issue orders Nos. 122 and 125; that the necessary supplies could not have been procured “from the head of the division charged with the duty of furnishing such supplies within the required time.” Not even an attempt was made to fulfill this prerequisite. And here the law under which General Hunter acted was public, and the claimant was bound to know its provisions. He is bound by Hunter’s want of authority to issue the. orders in question.
    The order being null, the contract, if in writing, was made without previous advertisement, and is therefore void. (Henderson’s Case, 4 O. Cls. B., p. 75; McKinney’s Case, 4 ibid., 537.)
    On the quantum valebat the evidence establishes that one hundred and fifty dollars per horse, as paid by the defendants, was a full and liberal price.
    The defendants here submit that the purchase of these horses at exorbitant prices and their inspection in violation of the orders, and in a manner grossly irregular and under suspicious circumstances, disclose a combination to defraud the Government in the purchase and sales under Huuter’s orders Nos. 122 and 125.
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney- General McMiehael for the defendants.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The action is brought to recover a balance withheld from a number of quartermaster vouchers given for horses bought for the military service, and the balance is alleged to be $1,845.

The case is a part of the general transaction which formed tbe subject of a previous suit. (Wilcox’s Case, 5 O. Cls. R., p. 386.) And tbe evidence upon wbicb it is presented is substantially tbe same. It differs, however, as to tbe ground upon which tbe defense is rested.;'

Tbe learned Assistant Attorney-General now argues — 1st, that there was a dispute between the parties, and that tbe dispute went directly to tbe price of tbe horses; 2d, that, tbe price being in dispute, it was tbe subject of controversy and of compromise ; 3d, that tbe disbursing officers of tbe Government are only authorized to pay claims in-full, and that, it being tbe general practice of tbe Government to pay in full. and not in part, tbe claimant’s acceptance of payment with knowledge of tbe dispute made him chargeable with notice that tbe payment was by way of compromise, and constructively assent to its being taken as payment in full.

Tbe argument is an ingenious and forcible attempt to establish a general rule of compromises by implication, and not by agreement; but it is apparent that such a rule must be followed by one general result, viz, that no man to whom tbe Government is debtor could accept payment in part when proffered without foregoing bis right of action. As tbe Government does not pay interest upon its debts pendente lite, it is less deserving of such a rule than tbe ordinary defendant who suffers in damages for bis delay. Such a rule, consequently, would defeat one great object of this court, wbicb is to awqrd legal justice where legal contracts have been violated, and, we think, is in consistent with tbe decisions of tbe court in a groat number of cases. Apart from this proposition tbe case seems to be ruled ■by tbe previous decision of tbe court in the case before referred to.

Tbe judgment of tbe court is that tbe claimant recover, to tbe use of tbe First National Bank of Pomeroy, Ohio, tbe sum of $1,845.  