
    UPPER SOUTH EAST COMMUNITIES COALITION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS; Thomas P. Bostick, Lt. General, in his official capacity, Chief of Engineers and Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Michael J. Farrell, in his official capacity, District Commander, Sacramento District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Michael S. Jewell, Chief, Regulatory Division, Sacramento District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Defendants-Appellees, and Regional Transportation Commission of Washoe County, Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-16205.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Oct. 19, 2015.
    Filed Nov. 2, 2015.
    Winter King, Joseph David Petta, Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Peter Kryn Dykema, Erika B. Kranz, Martin Francis McDermott, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for De-fendanh-Appellee.
    Before: WALLACE, D.W. NELSON, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Upper South East Communities Coalition appeals from the district court’s denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction to halt construction on the South East Connector highway project, for violation of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332, and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we affirm.

“The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction lies within the discretion of the district court and we may reverse a district court only where it relied on an erroneous legal premise or abused its discretion.” DISH Network Corp. v. F.C.C., 653 F.3d 771, 776 (9th Cir.2011) (citing Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 686 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir.1982)). Review at the preliminary injunction stage is “much more limited than review of an order involving a permanent injunction where all conclusions of law are freely reviewable.” Sports Form, 686 F.2d at 752. “Because of the limited scope of our review of the law applied by the district court and because the fully developed factual record may be materially different from that initially before the district court, our disposition of appeals from most preliminary injunctions may provide little guidance as to the appropriate disposition on the merits.” Id. at 753.

The record before us does not suggest that the district court here relied on an erroneous legal premise, made clearly erroneous factual findings, or abused its discretion in concluding that appellant failed to show a probability of success on the merits.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This-disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     