
    Commonwealth vs. Lafayette Carpenter.
    Threatening to complain to a police officer against a man for committing a crime is indictable as a threat to accuse him of it.
    An indictment on the Gen. Sts. c. 160, § 28, for maliciously threatening to complain to a police officer against a man for committing adultery, with intent to extort money from him, is sustained by proof that the defendant found him on a bed with a woman, and after some conversation about their committing adultery took his promissory note for fifty dollars, and threatened to have him arrested for adultery if it should not be paid in three days.
    Indictment on the Gen. Sts. <?. 160, § 28, averring that the defendant on February 20,1871, at Worcester, “knowingly, wilfully and maliciously did verbally threaten George P. Martin to accuse him, the said Martin, of having committed the crime and offence of adultery, by words then and there knowingly, wilfully and maliciously spoken of and to the said George P. Martin, substantially as follows : ‘ I will enter a complaint against you to the city marshal for committing the crime of adultery with Julia F. Williams, unless you pay me fifty dollars; ’ with intent thereby, then and there, knowingly, wilfully and maliciously to extort money from the said George P. Martin.”
    In the superior court, before the jury were empanelled, Dewey, J., overruled a motion of the defendant to quash the indictment “ because the words set out therein as having been spoken by the defendant do not of themselves amount to a threat to accuse one of a crime, or a threat to take preliminary steps or means necessary to cause a person to be proceeded against for a criminal offence.”
    At the trial, there was evidence tending to show that during the evening of February 20,1871, the defendant entered a bedroom in his house, which was occupied by Julia F. Williams as a ¡odger, and there found her and Martin upon the bed; and that some conversation occurred between the three, relating to the commission of adultery by Martin with her, which resulted in his taking Martin’s promissory note for $50.
    “ The defendant contended that the note was given by Martin voluntarily, that the defendant should not complain of Martin for an alleged adultery. The government contended that the note was extorted from Martin by threats of said accusation; and that, after the note was given and delivered, the defendant said to Martin that if the note was paid in three days it would be all right, if not, he would have him arrested for adultery. The defendant requested the judge to rule that, if this was the threat the defendant made, it would not support the charge contained in the indictment. The judge refused so to rule; but instructed the jury that, if the defendant made it with intent thereby to extort money from Martin by compelling him to pay the amount of the note, that would be sufficient and would authorize a conviction.” The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant alleged exceptions.
    
      F. A. Caskill, ( (t. F. Ferry with him,) for the defendant.
    1. Threatening to complain to a police officer that a man has committed a crime is not a threat to accuse him of the crime, within the meaning of the Gen. Sts. c. 160, § 28.
    2. Proof of threatening to have a man arrested for a crime does not sustain an averment of a threat to accuse him of it.
    3. A threat uttered by the holder of a promissory note, voluntarily made, to compel the maker to pay it, is not a threat uttered to extort money from him, within the meaning of the Gen. Sts. c. 160, § 28. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 12 Allen, 449.
    
      O. Allen, Attorney General, for the Commonwealth,
    cited Whitney v. Smith, 13 Pick. 364; Rex v. Hill, Russ. & Ry. 190.
   Ames, J.

It appears to us that there was no substantial variance between the allegation and the proof. The indictment does not purport to set out the exact words in which the threat was expressed. The note was given because Martin had been discovered in an equivocal or suspicious position, and was upon no other consideration. If in that state of things the defendant said to Martin “ I will have you arrested for adultery unless you pay this note in three days,” he must have conveyed the same idea as if he had used substantially the words set out in the indictment. A man who says that he will enter a complaint for a crime must be understood to mean that he will take the first step for the commencement of a criminal prosecution with its ordinary incidents ; and when the crime in question is adulteiy the arrest of the party accused is a part of the regular course of proceeding. ■ It is none the less an attempt to extort money by threats, because the party had been induced to give his note for the sum in question ; and there is nothing to show that the discovery, the conversation, the delivery of the note, and the utterance of the threat, were not all parts of the same transaction. An indictment, charging that “the defendant on,” &c., “at,” &c., “ knowingly, wilfully and maliciously did verbally threaten George P. Martin, to accuse him, the said Martin, of having committed,” &c., “ by words then and there knowingly, wilfully and maliciously spoken of and to the said George P. Martin, substantially as follows,” &c., is not open to objection on the ground that it does not sufficiently allege a malicious threatening of another, by words spoken by the defendant, or that it does not charge that the defendant threatened that he would make such accusation.

Exceptions overruled.  