
    Reck versus Clapp.
    1. A purchaser of land who examines th.e records is protected by them as far as they can protect him, but he necessarily takes the risk of having the actual state of the title correspond with that which appears of record.
    2. A. being seised of a tract of land, the same was taken into execution under a judgment against A. and sold by the sheriff to B., a bona fide purchaser, on August 6th 1875. On December 20th 1875, A. conveyed tlie said land to O. by deed. Subsequently the date of said deed was fraudulently altered from ‘‘1875” to “ 1874.” On February 1st 1877, C. conveyed the property by deed back to A. The deeds from A. to C. and O. to A. were recorded March 29th 1877, the former being so recorded as to bear date “ 1674,” and not “ 1875.” On June 9th 1877, A. conveyed the tract to D., a bona fide purchaser for value, who did not see the original deed from A. to C., and had no notice of the fraudulent alteration in the date thereof. In ejectment by B. against D. for the tract of land, Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment.
    October 17th 1881. Before Sharswood, O. J., Mercur, Gordon, Paxson, Trunkey, Sterrett and Green, JJ.'
    Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Ola/i'ion cownty : Of October and November Term 1881, Nos. 249 and 250.
    Two actions of ejectment by W. R. and E. M. Reck against E. E. Clapp, to recover tlie undivided one-fourth of two tracts of land in Clarion county. The cases involved the same question of title, and, by consent of the parties, were tried together before tlie same jury.
    On tlie trial, both parties claimed under James W. Guthrie, wbo acquired title to tlie premises in question September 6th 1872. The plaintiffs claimed title nnder a sheriff’s sale in executionupon a judgment obtained by tbe plaintiffs against James W. Guthrie, in the Common Pleas of Clarion county, August 6th 1875.
    The defendants offered in evidence exemplifications of the record of three deeds : the first purporting to have been dated and acknowledged December 20th 1874, recorded March 29th 1877, from James W. Guthrie to Hugh Maguire; the second, dated and acknowledged February 1st 1877, recorded March 29th 1877, from Hugh Maguire to James W. Guthrie; the third, dated February 3d 1877, acknowledged February 15th 1877, recorded June 9th 1877, from J. W. Guthrie to the defendant, all for the premises in question.
    The plaintiffs, in rebuttal, produced in evidence the originals of the said three conveyances, which were all attached together. They then gave in evidence a deposition of John Beatty, a justice of the peace, before whom the deed from Guthrie to Maguire, and the re-assignment from Maguire to Guthrie were acknowledged, in which lie testified that both these deeds were acknowledged before him at the same time, viz., in February 1877; that J. W. Guthrie said that one of the assignments “ought to have been acknowledged at a certain time and Guthrie dated the acknowledgment back to the time he mentioned.”
    The plaintiffs also proved by two experts that the figure “ 4 ” in the date December 20th 1874, in the assignment from Guthrie to Maguire, and also in the acknowledgment to the same, was certainly written upon an erasure, and that the original figure, so far as the indistinct outline could be seen, appeared to be either 5 or 6.
    The plaintiffs alleged there was a forgery and fraudulent alteration in the date and acknowledgment of the conveyance of Guthrie to Maguire, made for the purpose of making it appear that Guthrie had parted with his title prior to the date of the plaintiffs’ judgment.
    The plaintiffs presented, inter alia, the following point:—
    2. “If the jury find from inspection, and other evidence that the date of his assignment or transfer by Guthrie to Maguire of his title deed for the land in controversy, and also the date of the acknowledgment thereof, were erased, mutilated and changed on the paper itself, from December 20th 1875, to December 20th 1874, it would render such assignment or transfer fraudulent and void; and being in the direct line of his title, defendant was bound to take notice of it, and if he failed to do so, he is not an innocent purchaser without notice, and the verdict of the jury should be for the plaintiffs for the land in controversy.”
    
      Answer. “ If the date of the assignment was fraudulently changed as stated in this point it would destroy the validity of the paper as affecting all interests intended thereby to be prejudiced, but we do not think that such- change would affect the defendant, as stated in the last part of- said point, if he used due diligence in obtaining correct information, and was unable to do so. The proposition is divisible, the point is double. One part.of it declares, as a result of the facts hypothetically stated, that the assignment would be void. We state if this change was fraudulently made it would be void and not prejudice any right or any parties intended to be defrauded. But the other part of the point asserts that this alteration was in the direct line of the title of the defendant, and that he was bound to notice it, and if he failed to do so, he was not an innocent purchaser without notice. To that part of the point we have already said that if he examined all the papers that he had access to or could by reasonable diligence obtain, if he examined the titles on the record and fouud them fair, and did all that he could reasonably do to find out all about this claim of title, and after having used such diligence was unable to get hold of this paper ; the fact that the paper he could not thus get was altered, would not affect him with the consequences stated in the last part of this point.” (Fourth assignment of error.)
    The defendants presented, inter alia, the following points:
    3. That a bona fide purchaser for value takes a title discharged of every fraud or secret equity on part of his predecessors in title of which he had no knowledge or notice. Answer. — We answer this point in the affirmative. (Seventh assignment of error.)
    7. “That if J. M. Fleming, in 1870, by Guthrie, as his agent, executed the paper of the 28th June 1870, and in 1872, to carry out the purposes of that paper, Fleming conveyed to Guthrie, and Guthrie conveyed the land to Maguire in pursuance of the trust reposed in him by Fleming, the date of the deed of Guthrie to Maguire, or the date of its acknowledgment under the evidence are immaterial in this case, and, if the jury so find, their verdict should be for the defendant.”
    
      Answer. — •“ Gentlemen, now be careful on this point, because here is the second general view of the case. It is referred to by both parties in their arguments — referred to in several of the points. In some measure by the points put by the plaintiffs because this is a summing up of the second general line of defence set up by Clapp. (Defendant’s seventh point read.)
    “We answer this point in the affirmative. That is the second general point. Now, this is denied by the plaintiffs. It is affirmed by the defendants. They say that the property was conveyed as a mortgage to Maguire in Í870 ; that he held that paper; they say that Guthrie testifies that the deed made by administrators to him was made for the purpose of enabling him to carry out in good faith to the mortgagee the trust that he liad in the land, and they say, if that be so, that there was a mere trust relation between Guthrie and Maguire and the Flemings, and that a judgment would not attach to it, and the sale would be good for nothing and pass no title. We say that is the law if the facts be so found. But the plaintiffs in the case say that is not so. They say that is not so and that the evidence does not justify the jury in forming that conclusion. Taking the evidence and all the papers in the case, they say that Guthrie is mistaken about that. Now we leave you to determine under the evidence which has the right of the issue.” (Ninth assignment of error.)
    Verdict for the defendant and judgment thereon. The plaintiffs took this writ of error, assigning for error, inter alia, the answers to the above points.
    
      W. L. Corbett (Boggs & Weidner with him), for the plaintiffs in error.
    A bona fide purchaser of real estate is not protected from a forgery in a link in the title under which he claims. The doctrine that a bona fide purchaser acquires title discharged from all secret equities, does not apply to this case. The plaintiffs’ judgment became a valid lien on Guthrie’s title, August 6th 1875, before the forged deed from Guthrie to Maguire was placed on record, and the latter was ineffectual to divest the plaintiffs’ legal right. Iu such case, a purchaser under the void deed acquires no title, even though the record did not disclose anything to put him on inquiry. The purchaser’s innocence will not protect him: 2 Sugd. on Vend. 738; Van Amringe v. Morton, 4 Whart. 382; Arrison v. Harmstead, 2 Barr 191; Wallace v. Harmstad, 3 Harris 462.
    
      Wilson & Jenks, for the defendant in error.
    The defendant used diligence and purchased in good faith on the strength of the record title. The evidence was insufficient to show a fraudulent or even material alteration, and the jury so found. It was proved that Maguire had in fact held title two or three years before he re assigned to Guthrie, but it was claimed that the alteration of the deed operated retrospectively and made the deed absolutely void. This does not follow, if the title was in Maguire, any more than if the conveyance to Maguire, originally made in good faith, had been then physically destroyed. Neither its destruction nor its fraudulent alteration would operate to re-vest the estate in Guthrie prior to such destruction or alteration.
    November 7th 1881.
   Mr. Justice Green

delivered the opinion of the court

Tim second point of the plaintiffs was in the following words :

“If the jury find from inspection and other evidence that the date of the assignment or transfer by Guthrie to Maguire of his title deed for tlie land in controversy, and also the date of the acknowledgment thereof, were erased, mutilated and changed on the paper itself from December 20th 1875 to December 20th 1874. it would render such assignment or transfer fraudulent and void, and being in tlie direct lino of bis title, defendant was bound to take notice of it, and if be failed to do so he is not an innocent purchaser without notice, and the verdict of the jury should he for the plaintiffs for the land in controversy.”

’ The hypothetical facts of this point were an absolute obliteration of the actual date of an instrument conveying title to land, and the substitution, in place thereof, of an anterior and false date. Beyond all question, such an alteration of such an instrument would be a forgery as against any person affected by the change, and who was not a party or privy to it. The plaintiffs claim to be, and apparently are, such persons. They acquired title by purchase at sheriff’s sale under a judgment entered August 6th 1875. "Whatever title Guthrie, the defendant in that judgment, had on that day, in the land in controversy, passed to the plaintiffs by their-purchase. This gives them a sufficient interest to question the condition of Guthrie’s title. Now the legal effect of the alleged alteration was to divest Guthrie’s title as of August 6th 1875, by subjecting it to the operation of a transfer dated December 20th 1874. lie held title by a deed in fee simple dated September 6th 1872, which on its face contained no conditions or qualifications. But the defendant Clapp claims to have been, and apparently is, an innocent purchaser for value of Guthrie’s title as it stood on the record. Tested by tlie record alone, bis claim would be good because that afforded no evidence of the forgery. In this condition of things the plaintiffs’ second point was put in order to charge the defendant with the effect of the forgery, for the reason that the forged instrument was itself a link in his chain of title. He does, and must claim title directly through that paper. The question is reduced to one of the plainest and simplest character, to wit, does a forged deed pass the title which it assumes to convey, as against one who has no participation in, or knowledge of the forgery % Of course it can accomplish no such result.

The second point of the plaintiffs was answered by the court below by their saying, in effect, that tlie defendant would not be affected by tlie forgery, because lie could assert the rights of an innocent purchaser without notice if he used reasonable diligence to obtain access to the original papers, but without success, and the title, as recorded, was fair and free from blemish. The consequences of such a doctrine would be of a most seiious character if it received the sanction of the courts. For then it would only be necessary for the forger of a deed or mortgage, after having it placed on record, to lose or destroy the original instrument and convey his title to an innocent third person for value, pretending to him that the original paper was mislaid and would be subsequently delivered. Of course, a purchaser who examines the records is protected by them as far as they can protect him, but he necessarily takes the risk of having the actual state of the title correspond with that which ■appears of record. The language of this court in the ease of Arrison v. Harmstead, 2 Barr 191, fully illustrates this subject: A deed, good in its creation, may become void by matter ex post facto, as by interlineation, erasure, or by alteration in a material part. But a deed may be good in part and void in part. It may be good against one person and void against another.” . . . “ It is said that Mrs. Lewis is a bona fide purchaser without notice, and that the action may be sustained on that ground. But conceding that she is, her situation is no better than the fraudulent grantor’s. Although the title of the grantor was, in its inception, good, it became entirely void by matter ex post facto. At the time of the assigm&eut, the title being avoided, tile assignor had nothing to convey; of course nothing passed to the assignee. It may be, and perhaps is, a a hard case. Fraud may be committed on an innocent pui chaser, who may find it difficult to guard against imposition. This is conceded; but it is far better to encounter this risk, than to give the least countenance to any alteration whatever of a solemn instrument of writing, which would certainly be the result, if the guilty party could escape the consequences of his fraud by a transfer to a person who might assume the garb of an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration. We cannot lay too many restraints upon trick, artifice and fraud.” In Van Amringe v. Morton, 4 Wh. 382, it was held that if a deed which has been executed and acknowledged by the grantor with a blank for the grantee’s name, be surreptitiously and fraudulently taken from the grantor’s house, and the blank filled up, no title passes thereby; and a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration from the person holding the deed stands in no better situation than such fraudulent holder. In the case of Wallace v. Harmstad, 8 Wright on p. 494, Woodward, J., speaking of the cases of Arrison v. Harmstead, 2 Barr 191, and Wallaces. Harmstad, 3 Harr. 462, said: “The stern ruling in those cases was applied without hesitation to a bona fide purchaser of the ground rent without notice of the fraud, so that, as far as concerns Arrison and all persons claiming under him, the part of the deed which was intended to enure to his benefit, may indeed be said to be dead. It was not merely a voidable instrument, it was void. It was called a forgery and treated as sucb, and neither law nor equity would tolerate it even in the hands of an innocent purchaser.”

We are clearly of opinion that the learned court below was in error in the answer to the defendant’s second point, and for that reason the judgment must be reversed. The views we have expressed require a modification of the answers given to the defendant’s third and seventh points, and the case is also reversed on the seventh and ninth assignments, in which those answers are complained of. As to the other matters presented by the various assignments, we forbear discussing or deciding them, for the reason that the case goes back for another trial and these questions maybe affected by testimony to be then delivered.

Judgment reversed, and venire facias de novo awarded.  