
    Rafael Robledo ARROYO, aka Rafael Arroyo, aka Rafael Robledo, aka Maximilian Robledo Alvarado, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-72732
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 5, 2016  Pasadena, California
    Filed December 08, 2016
    Zulu Ali, Law Office of Zulu Ali, Riverside, CA, for Petitioner
    Brendan Paul Hogan, Esquire, Attorney, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
    Before: PREGERSON and D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judges, and OWENS, Circuit Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

16-1883Rafael Robledo Arroyo (“Arroyo”), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010), and we DENY the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because Arroyo failed to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought. See Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In order to prevail on his motion to reopen the proceedings on the basis of changed country conditions, Toufighi needed to clear four hurdles: (1) he had to produce evidence that conditions had changed in Iran; (2) the evidence had to be ‘material;’ (3) the evidence must not have been available and would' not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding; and (4) he had to ‘demonstrate that the new evidence, when 'considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.’ The Board could thus deny the motion to reopen for failing to meet any of these burdens.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986 (“The BIA can deny a motion to reopen on any one of at least three independent grounds,” including “failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In light of this conclusion, we do not reach Arroyo’s remaining contentions.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     