
    Rhode Island Society for the Encouragement of Domestic Industry vs. Town Council of Cranston.
    PROVIDENCE—
    OCTOBER 4, 1890.
    Present : Durfee, C. J., Matteson and Stiness, JJ.
    (1) Certiorari. Pleading and Practice. Remonstrance of Owners of Land within 200 feet against granting License for Sale of Lntoxicants.
    
    In computing the land within 200 feet of the building or place for which a license for the sale of intoxicating liquors is requSsted, under the provisions of Pub. Laws R. I. cap. 816, § 2, providing for the filing of remonstrances by the owners of the greater part of the land so situated, public highways should be excluded.
    Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to a town council who had granted a petition for a license to sell intoxicating liquors. According to the plat of the land within two hundred feet of the building for which the license was requested, which was admitted as evidence, the petitioner owned 16,868 feet; Anthony Corcoran owned 17,563; and the Cranston Print Works owned 7,él6 feet, a total of él, 8é7 feet. The total area, exclusive of streets, was 103,052 feet. Inclusive of the area of the streets the petitioners owned a majority of said area. Heard on motion to quash writ, and writ quashed.
   Per Curiam.

The court, at the former hearing, in overruling the motion of the respondents to dismiss the petition, recognized the petitioner as a proper party to prosecute the same because of the allegation contained therein that the petitioner, the Cranston Print Works,. and Anthony Corcoran were the owners and occupants of the greater part of the land within 200 feet of the building and place for which the license was requested, and as such, owners and occupants had filed'their objections with the town council to the granting of the petition. The testimony introduced by the respondents at the present hearing shows that said petitioner, said Print Works, and said Corcoran do not own the greater part of the land within said 200 feet. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner cannot be regarded as a proper party to prosecute the petition any more than any other person who might see fit to object to the granting of the license could be so regarded. The petition must, therefore, be dismissed.

Bradley & Angelí, for petitioner.

George J. West and John Palmer, for respondent.  