
    William D. WEBSTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of WASHINGTON, doing business as State of Washington Department of Retirement Systems, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 11-35014.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Sept. 10, 2012.
    
    Filed Sept. 25, 2012.
    William D. Webster, pro se.
    Kathryn Christine Wyatt, Ann C. Essko, Assistant Attorney Generals, Office of the Attorney General, Olympia, WA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      
         The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

William D. Webster appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action arising from a state court’s property division order in his marital dissolution. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir.2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Webster’s action as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the action is a “forbidden de facto appeal” of the state court’s order regarding Webster’s pension benefits. Id. at 1050-51 (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claims seeking to enjoin state family court orders regarding pension benefits); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir.2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because alleged legal injuries arose from the “state court’s purportedly erroneous judgment” and the relief he sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     