
    THE HOT SPRINGS CASE.
    John C. Hale v. The United States. Henry M. Rector v. The United States. McKay and Gitt v. The United States. John H. Russell v. The United States. William H. Gaines et al. v. The United States.
    
      On motion for Receiver.
    
      The court renders a decision in favor of the defendants {ante, p. 289) under the Hot Springs Act, which provides that the court “ shall order such lands into • the possession of a receiver” if the final decision he in favor of the United Slates. The claimants, intending to appeal, object to the decree providing for a receiver. The defendants move that a receiver he immediately appointed, and insist that an appeal ivill not operate as a supersedeas.
    I. The Hot Springs Act (16 Stat. L., 149) directs that, “ upon the final hearing ” the decision be in favor of the United States, the court “ shall order such lands into the possession of a receiver.” The case contemplated is that, if the defendants succeed, they shall have affirmative relief through the instrumentality of an officer termed a receiver. Therefore the decree should contain such a provision. But theperson tobe appointed receiver need not be declared by the decree, and may be appointed by a subsequent order.
    II. An appeal by a claimant from a judgment rendered in favor of the Government under the Hot Springs Act (16 Stat. L., 149) will operate as a supersedeas, and suspend the right of this court to appoint a receiver; for the receiver designated by tho act is only such in name, and is in fact a special administrative officer, intended to act exclusively for one party in case of its final success. If he should take possession and collect rents and pay them into the Treasury as directed by the act, and the judgment should be reversed, .the court would be without power to decree restitution or order the rents out of the Treasury, and the claimant would be without judicial redress.
    
      The Reporters’ statement:
    On the settlement of the decree in this case at chambers, and on the defendants’ application for the appointment of a receiver, the parties were represented by their counsel, respectively, (see p. 289 ante.) The court filed the following opinion at the.time of filing the decree:
    Nott, J., for the court:
    The solicitude which the parties have evinced with regard to the appointment of a receiver and the effect of an appeal to the Supreme Court render it desirable that the court should express the conclusions which have been reached. They are these:
    I. Ordering the property in litigation into the possession of a receiver is an essential part of the decree. The Sot Springs Act expressly directs that, “ upon the final hearing,” the court “ shall order such lands into the possession of a receiver ,” if the decision be in favor of the United States. The case as contemplated by the statute is not simply one where the claimants seek relief and fail to obtain it, but is one in which the defendants succeeding are to have affirmative relief. This affirmative relief ■consists in being decreed the immediate restoration of possession in the lands through the instrumentality of an officer termed a receiver. To omit this from the decree would be to refuse an affirmative decree in their favor. But the selection of the person who shall act as receiver is not necessarily a part of the decree. It does not affect in any way the rights of the parties litigant. Neither is naming him in the decree essential to his appointment. After appointment he may die, ■or resign, or be removed, and then an order of the court, and not the original decree, will be the only means for appointing his successor. Furthermore, time is essential, to select a receiver, to await 'his acceptance, to examine his sureties, and to approve his bond; and there can be no propriety or reason for delaying the entry of judgment while these formalities, which relate only to its execution, are transpiring. The object of a decree is to judicially determine the conflicting right's of the parties; and the object of a receiver is to give effect to the decree in favor of only one of the parties. The decree is necessary to create the office, but the appointment to it may be by subsequent order.
    H. The second conclusion of the court is that an appeal will operate as a supersedeas, suspending the appointment of a receiver if he be not appointed when the appeal is taken, and suspending his operations under the decree if his appointment has previously been made.
    The idea that the receiver can be appointed under the Sot Springs Act to hold the property pending the appeal, and collect the rents for the use- of the ultimately-successful party, arises entirely from the misuse of the word “receiver ” in the statute. A receiver is an officer of a court of equity, appointed to take charge of property during the pendency of legal proceedings, to bold it for whom it may concern, and subject to tbe future order or disposal of tbe court. Tbe receiver designated by tbe 1Tot Springs Act is not to be appointed until a final decree is rendered; he is not to take possession of tbe property until it has been adjudged to be the property of the defendants ; be is to pay its proceeds into their Treasury; and be is to bold the property until Congress — that is to say, until tbe defendants — “ direct bow it shall be disposed of.” There is not a single provision in tbe act which gives tbe slightest support to tbe suggestion that tbe receiver was intended to bold tbe property for the safety of all parties pending tbe.appeal. On tbe contrary, if the receiver, after an appeal taken, should take possession of tbe land, and collect tbe rents, and pay them into the Treasury, as directed by tbe statute, and the Supreme Court should afterward decide that one of tbe claimants is tbe rightful owner, both that court and this would be without authority to order a repayment of tbe rents from tbe Treasury, or even to decree a restitution of tbe lands to tbe successful party. Tbe only power given to tbe court over tbe receiver is to pass upon bis accounts and punish him for bis misconduct. Tbe • disposition of the property which be bolds is directed by statute, and is beyond the j udgment of tbe court. He is in fact the special administrative officer of tbe court, designated by Congress, to give effect to a final decision in favor of tbe Government : and if be bad been termed a master, a referee, or a marshal, no question would probably have arisen as to the legislative intent concerning the powers and functions of tbe office.
   Tbe court thereupon ordered the following decree to be entered :

UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS.

John G. Sale, Henry Ml. Beetor, George Mle-~] Kay, William W. Gitt, John H. Bussell, William H. Gaines, Miarla Gaines, Albert Belcling, Henry Belcling, ancl George Belding, v. The United States. J

This cause having come on to be beard at this December term, 1874, and having been argued by counsel for tbe respective parties claimant and for the defendants, now, upon consideration thereof, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows:

That the claimánt John 0. Hale and the claimant Henry M. Hector, and each of them, have no title either legal or equitable, in their own right or in that of either of them, or as the assigns or representatives of John Percifull, deceased, or of Sarah M. Percifull, his widow, to the whole or any part of the following-described piece, parcel, or tract of land, to wit:

The southwest quarter of section number S3, in township 2 south, of range 19 west, of the fifth principal meridian, according to the surveys of public lands of the United States, lying and being in the State of Arkansas and in the county of Hot Springs, and including the springs known as the Hot Springs of Arkansas.

And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the said claimants Henry M. Rector, George McKay, William M. Gitt, John H. Russell, and John C. Hale, and each of them, have no title, legal or equitable, either in their own right or the right of either of them, or as the assigns or representatives of Francis Langlois or of Joseph Story, his assignee, to the following-described piece, parcel, or tract of land, to wit:

All that certain square tract of land of which the Hot Springs of Arkansas form the center, containing two hundred arpents of land, or one hundred and seventy and fourteen on'e-hundredth acres, being the premises surveyed by James S. Conway, deputy surveyor, by survey number two thousand nine hundred and three, and filed in the office of the surveyor-general of the United States, at Saint Louis, July 16, 1820, being more particularly described in said survey as follows: Beginning at a post, from which a pine ten inches in diameter (marked thus, H & E) bore south 47° east, 8 links; thence south 7 chains; a creek 15 links wide east; at 41 chains 25 links set a post, from which a pine 15 inches in diameter bore north 47^° east, 23 links; thence east 19 chains 25 links to Hot Springs Creek — 25 links wide, runs south; at 41 chains 25 links set a post, from which a post-oak 10 inches in diameter bore south 62° west, 16 links; thence west, 41 chains 25 links, to the beginning.

And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed as follows, viz:

That the claimants "William H. Gaines, Maria Gaines, formerly Maria Belding, Albert Belding, Henry Belding, and George Belding, and each of them, have no title, legal or equitable, either in their own right or as the heirs and legal representatives of Ludovicus Belding or of Lydia Belding, his widow, to the whole or any part of the piece, parcel, or tract of land thereinbefore first described, to wit, the southwest quarter of section 33, in township' 2 south, of range 19 west, of the fifth principal meridian, as before more specifically described.

And is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the title, legal and equitable, to the foregoing tracts or parcels of land, and each of them, is vested wholly and absolutely in the defendants, the United States; and that they be taken, held, and possessed by a receiver to be appointed by this court, who shall take charge of and rent out the same for the United States until Congress shall by -law direct how the same shall be disposed of; and that the said receiver shall, before entering upon the duties of his office, execute and file with the clerk of this court a sufficent bond, in the penal sum of one hundred thousand dollars, to be approved by the court, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties as such receiver, with two or more sufficient sureties, who shall attend and justify before a judge of this court at chambers, or before any district judge of the United States in whose district they may reside, to an amount in the aggregate of two hundred thousand • dollars, and that such receiver shall render a strict account of the manner in which he shall have discharged said duties and of all the moneys received by him as receiver as aforesaid, up to and including the thirtieth day of June, and up to and including the thirty-first day of December in each year, or as often as he shall be directed so to do by the court, and to make such further reports as may be directed, and that he deposit all moneys collected by him as such receiver with the nearest designated depositary of the Treasury or assistant treasurer of the United States so soon as the same may be collected, and that he pay all such moneys into the Treasury of the United •States, after deducting therefrom his expenses and compensation, to be first audited, approved, and allowed by this court.

»And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the before-named claimants, and each of them, and all persons claiming to hold the said tract of land hereinbefore described, or any part or parcel thereof, under the before-named claimants or any of them, or otherwise, be and they are hereby commanded •and required to surrender and deliver up the same, with all the buildings, fixtures, improvements thereon, of whatsoever kind, to the said receiver, to be possessed and held by him for ■and on behalf of the defendants, the United States.

And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that none of the before-named claimants in this action, nor any other person whomsoever, has any title, legal or equitable, to the piece, parcel, or tract of land hereinafter described, or to any portion thereof, to wit, the four sections or parts of sections oí land immediately around the Hot Springs of Arkansas, as reserved for the future disposal of the United States by the Act 20th April, 1832, (4 Stat. L., 505,) which premises are more particularly described as follows, to wit: The whole of sections 32 and 33, .township 2 south of the base-line, range 19 west of the fifth principal meridian; also the south half of section 28, and the south half of section 29, of the same township and range; and also the north half of section 4, and the north half of section 5, of township 3 south of the base-line, range 19' west of the fifth principal meridian, as laid down in the surveys of public lands of the United States in the State of Arkansas and county of Hot Springs.

And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the title, legal and equitable, to the foregoing four sections or parts of sections of land last described, and each and all of them, is vested wholly and absolutely in the defendants, the United States, and that the said four sections or parts of sections be taken, held, and possessed by the receiver to be appointed by this court as hereinbefore provided, who shall take charge of and rent out the same for the United States as before directed.

And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the before-named claimants, and each of them, and all persons claiming to hold any portions of the said four sections or parts of sections of land hereinbefore described, either under the-before-named claimants or otherwise, be and they are hereby commanded and required to surrender and deliver up the same to the said receiver, to be possessed and held by him for and on behalf of the defendants, the United States, as hereinbefore provided.

And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the petition of the said claimants, and each of them, be dismissed.  