
    COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Edward Evans MAURER, Respondent.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    Oct. 30, 2014.
   ORDER

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 30th day of October, 2014, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is hereby GRANTED, the order of the Superior Court is VACATED, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17, 19 (1987); Commonwealth v. Provenzano, 50 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa.Super.2012) (“[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question exists.”); and Commonwealth v. Felix, 372 Pa.Super. 145, 539 A.2d 371, 377 (1988) (“[Gjleaning through the entire argument section of appellant’s brief for indications of the appearance of a substantial question was precisely the practice Tuladziecki condemned.”), and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for reimposition of sentence. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Justice SAYLOR files a Dissenting Statement.

Justice TODD dissents.

Justice SAYLOR,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to grant, vacate and remand on the stated terms of its order, since I foresee such terms as likely to cause confusion. In this regard, I am of the view that per curiam, merits-based orders disposing of cases should issue under only limited circumstances, as reflected in this Court’s internal operating procedures. See Supreme Court IOP § 3(C). More specifically, such an order generally should not issue if the Court seeks to apply an established rule of law to a novel fact situation. See id. § 3(C)(1). Additionally, where a reversal is involved, the order must cite to controlling legal authority or, if necessary, provide a full explanation of the grounds for the holding. See id. § 3(C)(2).

In my opinion, the order in this case does not satisfy these requirements, as the only cited controlling authority, Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki 513 Pa. 508, 512-13, 522 A.2d 17, 19 (1987), is factually distinguishable, since the appellant in that case altogether failed to submit a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal for its discretionary sentencing claim, as required by Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f). Furthermore, to the extent the majority construes the cited Superior Court decisions as adequately extending Tuladziecki to the present factual scenario, it does not fully develop this rationale. More important, the majority’s citation to these decisions suggests that this Court is placing its imprimatur on the reasoning of those cases, without the benefit of advocacy and a developed opinion.  