
    Hebron against Marlborough.
    Where it was provided in the act incorporating the town of M., taken partly from the town of H., that M. should take its full proportion of the then poor of H., and it was afterwards agreed between the two towns, that M. should take A. and B. as its full proportion of such poor; it was held,thatJtf. was not thereby made liable for the support of A.'s wife, after his death.
    
      November 3.
    This was an action of assumpsit for the support of Ruth Hutchinson, a pauper, founded on the following agreement: “ At a meeting of the select-men of Hebron and Marlborough, at the dwelling-house of Elisha Buell in said Marlborough, for the purpose of dividing the poor of the town of Hebron, according to an act of the general assembly of October session, 1803, we, the subscribers, have made the following agreement, viz. That the town of Marlborough shall support Moses Hutchinson and Phebe Davis as and for its full proportion of said poor : said town of Marlborough is to take the said Moses and Phebe on the 17th day of January instant. In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands, this 6th day of January, 1804.” [Signed by the select-men of Hebron and Marlborough, respectively.] The provision, referred to, in the act of incorporation, was as follows : “ And said town of Marlborough shall pay its proportion of all charges, expenses and debts, already accrued by, and now due from, the towns of Glastenbury, Hebron and Colchester, and take all its proportion of the present poor of said towns.” At the date of the agreement, Moses Hutchinson was married to, and lived with Ruth Hutchinson ; both being inhabitants of the town of He-bron. They continued, to live together, until his death, about six years afterwards. On the 1st of January, 1818, she went to Hebron; where she resided, became poor and sick, and was supported by that town, not having married again, or changed her place of settlement. A case embracing these facts, was stated for the opinion of all the Judges, on the question whether the plaintiffs were entitled to recover.
    Tolland,
    
      Goddard, for the plaintiffs,
    contended, that the agreement of the town of Marlborough to take the husband, as one of their paupers, and to provide for his support, extended, by necessary implication, to the wife.
    
      Stearnes, for the defendants,
    remarked, that by the act of incorporation, the town of Marlborough were made liable for the support of no paupers belonging to the town of Hebron, except such as were then paupers; and the agreement created no new liability, its object being merely to ascertain the proportion. Ruth Hutchinson might then have been in good health, and capable of providing for herself, although her husband was a pauper. He contended, that in relation to support, husband and wife are not one ; that an agreement to support one person, could not be construed as an agreement to support two persons. Admitting, however, that the agreement extended to the wife, as a part of the husband’s family, during his life, yet it could not operate after his death.
    
    Further, the act of incorporation subjected the town o {Marlborough for the support of only their proportion of the paupers. They agreed to take Moses Hutchinson and Phebe Davis, as the full amount of that proportion. Now, can another pauper be superadded ?
   Hosmer, C. J.

The society of Marlborough, in October,

1803, comprising a part of Hebron, Colchester, and Glastenbury, were incorporated as a town,; and were to take their proportion of the present poor of the said towns. The select-men of Hebron and Marlborough, to effectuate this object, entered into an agreement; and the defendants, stipulated to “ support Moses Hutchinson and Phebe Davis as and for their full proportion of said poor.” Moses Hutchinson is dead, and his widow, Ruth, is a pauper, and has occasioned expense to the plaintiffs ; for the reimbursement of which, they have brought their action on the above agreement. It is self-evident, that Moses Hutchinson was not Ruth Hutchinson, and that the agree - ment, in the words of it, did not stipulate for her maintenance. 'lam at a loss to conceive on what principle it can plausibly be contended, that she was within the object or spirit of the agreement. If Ruth was to have been embraced in it, she would have been named. The principle of construetion, which extends the contract to Ruth, must equally comprise the children of Moses Hutchinson, in opposition to the plain expression of the agreement, which declares, that Moses Hutchinson and Phebe Davis were the full proportion of poor, which Marlborough ought to support.

In short, the agreement of the defendants, neither in its words nor object, extends to Ruth Hutchinson ; and the supposition is opposed to its explicit provisions. The support of Moses and Ruth may have been, and undoubtedly was? more than the proportion of the poor devolving on Marlborough ; and there is no more ground to construe the contract as extending to her, than if an individual had agreed to maintain Moses Hutchinson.

The other Judges were of the same opinion, except Peters, J. who gave no opinion, being interested as the owner of real estate in the town of Hebron.

Judgment to be entered for defendants.  