
    Lucy A. Rouse et al. v. George Chappell et al.
    Under the statute allowing appeals from the Superior Court of the city of Cleveland to the District Court, passed January 30, 1875 (72 Ohio D. 189), an appeal was properly taken from a judgment rendered by the Superior Court at the term during which the act was passed, although the judgment was rendered before the date of its passage.
    
      Motion for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the District Court of Cuyahoga county.
    This action was brought by the plaintiffs, who are the children and only heirs at law of George Rouse, deceased, in the Superior Court of the city of Cleveland, to set aside a contract made and entered into by George Rouse, in his lifetime, with the defendant, George Chappell, for the sale and conveyance to Chappell of a certain lot in the •city of Cleveland, of which Rouse was then the owner in fee-simple, in consideration of the payment by Chappell to Rouse of $5,000.
    The petition alleges incompetency to make a contract on the part of Rouse, fraud and undue influence on the part ■of the defendant, Chappell, and inadequacy of price.
    The answer of the defendant, Chappell, denies these allegations of the petition.
    At the January term, 1875, the cause was submitted to the court on the pleadings and evidence, on consideration whereof the court fouud that the equities of the case were with the defendants, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition.
    The plaintiffs thereupon filed a motion for a new trial, for reasons therein set forth, which was overruled by the court, and the ruling excepted to by the plaintiffs.
    Afterward, on the 30th day of January, and during, the same term of the court, the plaintiffs gave notice of their intention to appeal to the District Court of that county; and on the 24th day of February thereafter perfected their appeal by filing their bond in -the sum fixed by the court, with sureties to the approval of the clerk.
    At the August term, 1875, of the District Court, on motion of the defendants, the District Court dismissed the appeal at the costs of the plaintiffs, to which they excepted; and they now move this court for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the District Court, on the grounds that the District Court erred in dismissing their appeal, and in rendering judgment against them.
    
      
      S. J. Andrews, for the motion.
    
      II. M. McKinney, contra:
    The defendants in error, upon the rendition of the decree-in the Superior Court, acquired a property therein that could not be impaired by subsequent legislation.
    "When shall we know that a judgment is final, if subject to subsequent legislation? Judgments will lose much of their value if subject to such uncertainty. Nor does it matter whether the act was passed one day or one year' after the rendition of the judgment.
    The case of Sapp v. Langhead, 6 Ohio St. 174, is' distinguishable from this in that, at the time of the trial and rendition of the decree in this case by said Superior Court,, there was no law authorizing appeals therefrom to the District Court or any other court.
    The decree was final, and the rights of all the parties-thereto were fixed and settled.
    In the Sapp ease it was simply a transfer from one court to another, without adding or attempting to confer any new rights or privileges upon the parties.
    When the plaintiffs instituted suit in the Superior Court, they knew there was no appeal from its judgment. Knowing this, they elected that tribunal in which to litigate the-said action. They have lost nothing by this legislation, and why not be left without its advantages ?
   Rex, J.

The only question in this case is: Did the District Court err in dismissing the appeal ?

The appeal was taken from a judgment in an action in which the Superior Court of Cleveland had original jurisdiction, and in which the parties had not the light, by virtue of any law of this state, to a trial by jury. The appeal was therefore authorized by the act of January 30, 1875, to-amend an act to establish the Superior Court for the city of Cleveland (72 Ohio L. 189), unless the provisions of section 2 of the act “ concerning the enacting and repealing of statutes,” as amended by the act of February 19,1866 (S- .& S. 1), prevent the act allowing the appeal from taking effect upon actions pending in the Superior Court at the time of its passage.

It has been uniformly held by this court that statutes which merely affect the manner of trying or conducting an action are remedial in their character, and apply as well to cases pending and causes of action existing at the time they take effect as to future cases and causes of action, and therefore do not affect pending actions within the meaning of section 2 of that act. Westerman et al. v. Westerman, 25 Ohio St. 500.

The act in question is, in our opinion, of that character, and is properly applicable to this case, notwithstanding the -fact that under the provisions of the act of May 5, 1873, to establish a Superior Court for the city of Cleveland (70 Ohio L. 297), a judgment rendered at a regular term could not be reviewed except upon proceedings in error at a general term.

In Sapp v. Langhead et al., reported in 6 Ohio St. 174, it was held that notice of an appeal given March 12, 1852, the time of the rendition of the judgment in the Court of Common Pleas, and entered on its journal, was a sufficient compliance, as to notice of the intention of the party to appeal, with an act passed on the 23d day of the same month, authorizing appeals from the Court of Common Pleas to the District Court.

The proceeding in Sapp v. Langhead was an action of assumpsit, and at the time notice of appeal was given, under the provisions of the act of March 12,1845, to regulate the judicial courts and the practice thereof (2 Curwen, 1139), then in force, no appeals were allowed from the Court of Common Pleas to the Supreme Court in actions or proceedings at law, so that the act of March 23, 1852, did not merely change an existing remedy from one court to another, as is urged by counsel for defendants, but furnished to parties litigant in the Courts of Common Pleas of this state a new remedy, by appeal to a court which was unknown to our judicial system prior to the adoption of the present constitution.

In this ease the act authorizing the appeal from the Superior Court to the District Court was passed and took effect during the regular term of the Superior Court at which the judgment was rendered, and the requisites of the statutes regulating appeals having been complied with by the plaintiffs, we are of opinion that the District Court erred in dismissing the appeal.

The motion is granted, the judgment of the District Court reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Judgment accordingly.

WsLcn, C. J., White, Gtlmore, and McIlvaine, JJ.,, concurred.  