
    King et al. v. The Greenwood Cemetery Association.
    
      Act to enable cemetery associations — To secure land by appropriation for entrances — Invalidity of act, passed April 6, 1893 — Section 357//.-1, Revised Statutes — Contravenes section 19 of article 1 of constitution — Method of appropriation employed not legal — Right of appeal curtailed — Constitutional law.
    
    The act of the general assembly entitled “An act to enable cemetery associations to secure land for entrance to their grounds, or, for the improvement of entrances already made” passed April 6, 1893, 90 O. L., 153, and now Section 3574-1, Revised Statutes, is incompatible with section 19 of article 1 of the constitution of Ohio, and therefore void, for the reason, that by the provisions of said act, private property may be taken from the owner at a value placed thereon by .three freeholders appointed by the commissioners of the county, without providing therein for the right and means of an appeal by the landowners to some competent tribunal where he can have his compensation assessed by a jury.
    (Decided December 2, 1902.)
    Error to the Circuit Court of Belmont county.
    The plaintiffs in error, William King, Isaac K. Kirkland, Samuel F. Trimble and George Workman are trustees of the Presbyterian church of Bethel, in Belmont county, and as such hold the legal title, in trust, for said church, in the real estate which is the subject of this controversy, being over an acre of land whereon the church building is situate.
    A part of this ground adjacent to the church is used by said church as a place of burial, which use is within the terms of the grant to-said trustees.
    The Greenwood .Cemetery Association, defendant in error, for the purposes of a cemetery, own lands adjoining the above described lands, and on or about August 6, 1900, the trustees of the association desiring to appropriate to its possession and use as an entrance to its grounds a strip thirty feet wide belonging to and forming a part of said church property, made application to the commissioners of said Belmont county for the appropriation of said strip, under the provisions of Section 3574-1, Revised Statutes. The county commissioners acting under said statute, appointed three disinterested freeholders of the county to yiew and appraise the “value” of said strip, and they appraised the same at $30.00, which sum was thereupon tendered by the cemetery association to plaintiffs in error, and it was about to enter upon and take possession of said strip when restrained by an injunction issued on a petition containing the foregoing as the material facts. The plaintiffs in that petition alleged that Section 3574-1, Revised Statutes, under which the appropriation proceeding was had, is unconstitutional and void for two reasons:
    First — That it does not provide any mode by which the landowner shall obtain any compensation, except the value of the land taken, making no provision for allowance of damages to the remaining land.
    Second — That it does not provide a jury for the assessment of compensation and damages, either before the commissioners or by appeal to any other tribunal.
    The case was heard and submitted in the court of -common pleas on the petition as the only pleading in the case. That court vacated the temporary injunction and dismissed the petition. On appeal the case was heard in the circuit court in like manner and' with like.result. The plaintiffs below prosecute ror in this court.for a reversal of the judgment of the «circuit court.
    
      
      Mr. C. L. Weems, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Mr. James C. Tallman, for defendant in error.
   Price, J.

This proceeding calls in question the validity of Section 3574-1 of our Revised Statutes., The section was enacted by the legislature on April 6,1893, and is entitled “An act to enable cemetery associations to secure land for entrance to their' grounds, or, for the improvement of entrances already made.” See 90 O. L., 153. The entire provision is as follows:

“Section 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of the state of Ohio, that Avhenever in the judgment of the officers of any cemetery association within this, state, it is necessary to secure additional land for the purpose of malting an entrance to its grounds, or to improve an entrance already made, said officers may make application to the county commissioners of the county in Avhich said cemetery is located, for the appointment of appraisers. The county commissioners, shall, upon such application being made to them, appoint three disinterested freeholders of the county as. appraisers, whose duty it shall be to view the land sought to be obtained, appraise its value, and make' due return of said appraisement to the county commissioners; and when said cemetery association shall have made payment of the amount of said appraisement, together Avith the costs thereof, then the title of said land shall vest in said association. An appeal may be taken from the appraisement made by said appraisers to the probate court of the county in which, said cemetery, or such entrance, may be located, in manner provided in chapter 4, title 6 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio.
“Section 2. This act shall take effect and he in force from and after its passage.”

It is apparent that this process of obtaining title to the property of another is made exceedingly simple, if it does lack the qualities of fairness. In this case the trustees of the cemetery association concluded more land was needed for an entrance to the. cemetery, and made application .to that effect to the commissioners of the county who appointed three freeholders of the county to appraise the desired strip. They appraised its “value” at $30.00 and filed the appraisal with the commissioners. The statute says, that on payment of the amount to the landowner the title vests in the applicant association. Compensation for the land taken and injury to the remaining lands, which is contemplated by our state constitution, is not made a condition precedent to the passing of the title and right of possession. We need not stop to argue that this method of appropriating real property and awarding compensation is clearly unconstitutional, unless a right and means of appeal are given, whereby the landoAvner, in some appellate tribunal, can have his compensation and damages assessed by a jury. If such right and means of appeal are provided for the law may be sustained. See Lamb & McKee v. Lane, 4 Ohio St., 167; Reckner v. Warner, 22 Ohio St., 275; Chesbrough v. Commissioners, 37 Ohio St., 515.

The statute under consideration attempts to confer the right of appeal but limits it to the provisions of chanter 4, title 6 of the Revised Statutes, and if the right and means of appeal are not found there, clearly none exist. When we look to the statutes embraced in chapter 4, title 6, we find that they pertain to the construction of levees on proceedings commenced and conducted to completion in the probate court, and we look in vain for any method of appeal that could have applied in this case. In fact there seems to be no right of appeal conferred on any party connected with the proceedings authorized by chapter 4, title 6; and yet Section 3574-1 refers plaintiffs in error to that source to get a jury to assess their compensation and damages.

However, counsel for defendant in error says, the legislature intended to say chapter 4, title 7 instead of title 6, the latter figure being used by mistake. How does counsel ascertain the legislative intent? And how can we say that the general assembly intended to say title 7 rather than title 6?

It is true that the statutes in chapter 4, title 7 provide for appeal in road cases, but it seems to us we have no power to amend the legislative enactment. If the legislature made the mistake suggested, it alone can amend and correct it. The intent of the legislature is determined from what it says, and if its language is clear and unambiguous, the courts have no authority to change it. On this point it is sufficient to cite two recent cases decided by this Court: Hough v. The Dayton Manufacturing Co., 66 Ohio St., 427 ; Slingluff et al. v. Weaver et al., 66 Ohio St., 621.

We conclude that the act in question is incompatible with section 19 of article 1 of our constitution, and could not furnish the foundation for the proceedings taken by the defendant before the county commissioners. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and a decree of perpetual injunction is granted on the petition of plaintiffs in error as therein prayed for.

Judgment reversed and judgment for plaintiff in error.

Burket, C. J., Spear, Davis, Shauck and Grew, JJ., concur.  