
    Marcelo PALADINI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAPOSSELA, COHEN, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-3624-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 25, 2013.
    
      Douglas E. Spelfogel, Foley & Lardner LLP, New York, NY (Stephen A. Aschetti-no, Naomi D. Johnson, Aschettino Struhs LLP, New York, NY, on the brief), for appellant.
    Sophia Ree (Jennifer Wu, on the brief), Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford P.C., New York, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., RICHARD C. WESLEY, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Marcelo Paladini (“Paladini”) appeals the August 15, 2012 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Preska, C.J.) dismissing his claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Paladini argues that Defendant-Appellant Capossela, Cohen, LLC (“Capossela”) completed faulty corporate audits and made negligent representations that caused an overvaluation of his companies’ worth. Paladini claims the overvaluation led him to take out two loans on behalf of his companies, which he personally guaranteed, to facilitate a buyout of the companies’ then co-owner. He contends that inflated distributions were made to purchase the co-owner’s overvalued shares, and that the companies then defaulted on their loans and filed for bankruptcy. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Paladini sued Capossela for auditor malpractice, general malpractice, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, indemnification, and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court dismissed the auditor malpractice claim because Paladini failed to plausibly plead that Capossela’s alleged wrongful acts proximately caused any harm. The district court then dismissed the remaining claims as duplicative of the auditor malpractice claim and, in the alternative, for failure to plausibly plead proximate cause.

We affirm the dismissal of the auditor malpractice claim for substantially the same reasons as the district court. The wrongful acts that Paladini pleads with requisite specificity occurred after his companies undertook the loans and made the distributions. Those acts could not have proximately caused Paladini’s harms. Contrary to Paladini’s assertion, a district court can dismiss an action based on proximate cause at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d 147, 157 (2d Cir.2007). Paladini’s opening brief waives the district court’s dismissal of the remaining claims as dupli-cative. See Tolbert v. Queens College, 242 F.3d 58, 75 (2d Cir.2001).

Paladini also claims that the district court erred by considering documents neither attached to the complaint nor incorporated by reference into that pleading. Those documents, however, were integral to the complaint and the district court was free to consider them. See Int’l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir.1995).

We have considered all of Paladini’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  