
    GUO YING CHEN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-1544-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 17, 2011.
    
      Theodore N. Cox, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Anthony C. Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel; Jesse M. Bless, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: WALKER, PIERRE N. LEVAL, and ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Guo Ying Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April 13, 2010, decision of the BIA, affirming the January 7, 2009, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Robert D. Weisel, which denied her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Guo Ying Chen, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 7, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008); Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 289 (2d Cir.2007).

In denying Chen’s asylum application on the basis that she had not proven that she suffered past persecution, the BIA relied on three alternative rationales, finding that Chen failed to: (1) establish that her symptoms were caused by the intra-uterine device (“IUD”) she was required to use; (2) demonstrate aggravating circumstances sufficient to establish persecution; and (3) establish a nexus between any aggravating circumstances she suffered and a protected ground. Because each of these decisions was tainted by error, remand is required for the BIA to reconsider whether Chen is entitled to relief.

First, the BIA erred by stating that the IJ had found “that [Chen] did not establish that her dizziness and other symptoms were caused by the IUD[.]” As Chen correctly points out, the IJ actually found that “[Chen] did establish that the [IUD] may have caused these symptoms” (emphasis added). Because the BIA misread the IJ’s factual findings, remand is required for it to reassess Chen’s asylum claim if there is no independent basis for affirming the IJ’s decision. Xiao Kui Lin v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 217, 223-24 (2d Cir.2009).

The BIA further found that Chen was not entitled to asylum because: (1) the harm she suffered could not be considered aggravating circumstances to establish persecution; and (2) she failed to establish a nexus between any aggravating circumstances she suffered and a protected ground. In light of Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64 (2d Cir.2011), these findings are insufficient and remand is required.

As an initial matter, Chen argues that she is entitled to asylum because the required insertion of an IUD is, per se, the equivalent of forced sterilization. We have previously rejected this argument. See Mei Fun Wong, 633 F.3d 64, 71 (“[T]he BIA’s conclusion that involuntary IUD insertion did not constitute involuntary sterilization was reasonable.... ”); Xia Fan Huang v. Holder, 591 F.3d 124, 128-30 (2d Cir.2010).

Chen’s next argument, however, that the BIA erred in finding that she did not establish aggravating circumstances or a nexus to a protected ground, warrants remand to the BIA in light of Mei Fun Wong. Chen argues that she suffered from aggravating circumstances in that family planning officials destroyed property in her home, detained her mother for three days, and did not use anesthesia during the IUD insertion. Because Chen, like the petitioner in Mei Fun Wong, alleged that a cumulative series of harms constituted aggravating circumstances, “we cannot review the Board’s decision that [her mistreatment did not constitute aggravating circumstances] without a clearer understanding of how [the BIA] weighed the [IUD insertion] itself consistent with its obligation to consider all alleged harms cumulatively.” Mei Fun Wong, 633 F.3d 64, 76-77.

Likewise, remand is required for the BIA to determine whether Chen can establish a nexus between the harm she suffered and a protected ground. Although the BIA found that Chen “d[id] not contend that the IUD was inserted in response to any resistance to China’s family planning policy,” Chen argued before the BIA that family planning officials destroyed property in her home and detained her mother. As we have now directed the BIA to “clarify whether aggravating circumstances designed to compel submission — e.g., detention, threats, fines, use of force, etc.,- — -can not only elevate a routine practice to the level of persecution, but can also demonstrate the requisite nexus between that persecution and an applicant’s opposition to the state’s population control policy[,]” Mei Fun Wong, 633 F.3d 64, 80, remand is required for the BIA to reevaluate its adverse nexus determination in this case as well.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED, the order of removal is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the BIA for proceedings consistent with this decision. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  