
    Jaqueline Maritza Marron DE AGUILAR, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-71408.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Sept. 13, 2010.
    
    Filed Sept. 21, 2010.
    Jaqueline Maritza Marrón de Aguilar, Phoenix, AZ, pro se.
    Marion Guyton, Esquire, Trial, Daniel Shieh, Esquire, Trial, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald E. Le-fevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    
      Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jaqueline Maritza Marrón de Aguilar, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law and due process claims, and for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir.2005). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Marrón de Aguilar participated in alien smuggling as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)®. Her sworn statement reflects she assisted two Mexican nationals in an attempt to enter the United States illegally. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)® (an alien is inadmissible if she has “knowingly encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law”).

Marrón de Aguilar’s due process rights were not violated by the admission of her sworn statement because the document was probative, and its admission was not fundamentally unfair. -See Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310-11 (9th Cir.1995) (noting that “[t]he sole test for admission of evidence [in a deportation proceeding] is whether the evidence is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair”). Marrón de Aguilar had the opportunity to cross examine the preparer of her statement and she produced no probative evidence that cast doubt on the document’s reliability. See id.

Marrón de Aguilar’s remaining contentions are not persuasive.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     