
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
    MAY, 1810.
    The State v. Joseph Thornton.
    Indictment for trading with a slave contrary to act of assembly, 1796. On motion, in arrest of judgment, after conviction, it was adjudged, that-trading for an iron band is within the act, being within the mischief.
    Such indictment need not lay the offence to be committed with force and arms ; and need not state the value of the article traded.
    Motion for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment. The defend* ant was tried, in Kershaw district, before Brevard, J., on an indictment founded on an act of assembly, 1796, to prevent dealing,' and trading with slaves, without permission in writing from the' owner, or persons having the care or management of such slave'. The indictment charged the defendant with trading with a negro1 slave named George, belonging to Z. Cantey, for an iron band, &c.The evidence to support the charge was circumstantial only, but the presumptive proof was very strong. The band, the subject' of the trade, was the iron band of a mill shaft, which had been stolen, from the mills of M’Ra and Cantey, near Camden.
    The Court of Appeals, considering the nature of the evidence,, and all the circumstances of the case, were clearly of opinion th& defendant was not entitled to a new tria!. The exceptions taken to the 'indictment on the motion in arrest of judgment, were also in-teisted on at the trial, and were overruled; the opinion of the court being, that whatever is an object of trade, or traffic, was intended to be included in the prohibition of the act of assembly, 1796, whether expressly mentioned or not, and whether comprehended among the enumerated species of articles, or not. Every article whatever, which can be the subject of trade, being forbidden to be traded by a slave without a written licence; and that the article in question was within the mischief meant to be prevented by the act. That the offence need not be stated to be done with force and arms; nor was it necessary to state the value of the thing traded, though to maintain the indictment, it might be necessary to prove it to be of some value, to prove it to be a trading within the purview of the act.
    The exceptions, on the motion in arrest of judgment, were ; 1st. That the article mentioned in the indictment as the subject of the trade, was not such an article as was intended to be comprehended in the act of assembly on which the indictment was founded. 2d. That the value of the said article was not stated. 8d. That the of-fence charged, is not charged to have been done with force and arms.
    Riohajibsou, in support of the motion, was heard the last of April, 1810,
    Blandins, and WitiieRspoon, for the State, were stopped by the court.
   Per curiam.

Waties, J.

delivered the opinion, May 5th, 1810. As to the first exception, “iron,” is within the letter of the act, The article in question is within the spirit of it — within the mis* chief. Cotton is not within the letter, yet clearly within the mischief. As to the second objection, if the article be of no value, it cannot be a subject of trade; and in that case there can bo no trading within the intent of the act of assembly ; therefore, it seems immaterial to express the value in the indictment. The ariicle must be of some value to constitute the offence; but the precise value need not be stated. In an indictment for larceny, the value of the thing stolen must be expressed, in order to determine the degree or species of crime, whether grand, or petit larceny.

As to the third exception, it does not appear necessary to state in an indictment on this act of assembly, that the offence was committed with force and arms. 2 Haw. P. C. 241.

Motion rejected,  