
    (77 South. 854)
    No. 22907.
    JOYCE v. NONA MILLS CO., Limited. In re JOYCE.
    (Jan. 28, 1918.)
    
      (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
    
    1. Master and Servant ®^411 — Employers’ Liability Aoi^-Vacation oe Judgment.
    Code Prac. art. 547, provides that judgments may be amended by the court until after having been signed for certain purposes, and that in other cases courts cannot alter their judgments, but that they may ex officio direct a new trial in order to revise their judgments. Article 560 provides that a new trial shall be granted if the judgment appear clearly contrary to law and evidence, etc. Employers’ Liability Act (Act No. 20 of 1914) § 18, provides that on defendant’s failure to answer within seven days after service upon him, the court shall immediately enter judgment in favor of plaintiff. Held, that by setting aside a judgment so entered and granting defendant time to answer, the court in effect merely granted a new trial, which could properly be done within the three days allowed for application for a new trial.
    2. Appeal and Error <&wkey;82(3) — Decisions Appealable — Order Vacating Judgment —“Interlocutory Order.”
    An order vacating a default judgment for plaintiff within three days after its entry, and granting defendant time to answer in a suit under the Employers’ Liability Act, was an interlocutory order, and not appealable.
    [Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Interlocutory Order.]
    Suit by William Martin Joyce against the Nona Mills Company, Limited. A default judgment for plaintiff was set aside, and an appeal from the order setting aside the judgment was denied, and plaintiff applies for writs of mandamus and prohibition.
    Application denied.
    I. C. Boyd and S. C. McGarrity, both of Leesville, for applicant. Lyles & Thompson, of Leesville, for respondent.
   PROVOSTY, J.

This suit has been brought under Act 20, p. 44, of 1914 (Employers’ Liability Act), section 18 of which provides, that when such a suit is filed “the judge shall fix by order a time and place for the hearing thereof”; that a copy of this order shall be served on the adverse party; that within seven days after such service the adverse party shall answer, failing which, “the court shall immediately enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff in accord with the facts set forth in his petition,” and that the petition must be verified by oath. In the instant case the petition, duly verified by oath, was filed on October 30, 1917. The judge fixed December 5, 1917, for the hearing. Service was made on defendant on November 3, 1917. On November 13, 1917, defendant not having answered, plaintiff asked for judgment; and the judge gave judgment, as prayed in the petition. On the next day, on application of defendant, the judge set aside the judgment, and granted the defendant until November 27, 1917, to answer. The plaintiff then took a rule on defendant to show cause why the setting aside of the judgment should not be itself set aside; and this rule was made returnable on December 5, 1917, the day fixed for the hearing of the case. On that day the court dismissed the rule. From this judgment dismissing the rule, the plaintiff applied for an order of appeal; and the court denied the application. Plaintiff then filed the present application in this court, asking that the trial judge be ordered to grant an appeal.

By setting aside the judgment the judge in effect merely granted a new trial. This he could do within the three days allowed for application for new trial. C. P. arts. 560, 547; Shreveport Cotton Oil Co. v. Blackman, Judge, 110 La. 266, 34 South. 438. The granting of a new trial within the legal delays for new trial is simply an interlocutory order, not appealable from. McWillie v. Perkins, 20 La. Ann. 168; Wheeler v. Maillot, 15 La. Ann. 659.

This application for a mandamus is therefore denied at the cost of the applicant.  