
    Batsaihan PURVEEGIIN, Appellant v. USCA 3RD CIRCUIT COURTS, Corrupt Administratives; Marcia M. Waldron, USCA 3rd Cir. Court; Lynn Lopez, USCA 3rd Cir. Legal Aid; Bradford Baldus, USCA 3rd Cir. Legal Aid; USCA 3rd Cir. Clerk Administration, USCA 3rd Cir. Clerks Office.
    No. 06-4686.
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) March 29, 2007.
    Filed April 30, 2007.
    Batsaihan Purveegiin, pro se.
    Joel M. Sweet, Office of United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for USCA 3rd Circuit Courts, Corrupt Administratives.
    BEFORE: RENDELL, SMITH and , „T . ’ ircm u ^es'
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Batsaihan Purveegiin, representing himself, sued this Court, or at least its “corrupt administratives” and “administration,” as well as members of the Court’s staff. In his complaint, Purveegiin expressed dissatisfaction with how pending appeals were being handled. He took issue with an instruction that he communicate in writing with this Court in lieu of expressing his concerns in abusive telephone calls. Also, as the District Court accurately and diplomatically summarized, Purveegiin alleged that his counsel in another case had seduced, or been seduced ^ Q0Urt personnel.

_ . _ The Distnct Court denied Purveegims request to proceed m forma paupens and dismissed Purveegiin’s complaint as legally frivolous. Purveegiin appeals and re<luests appointment of counsel. Also, in a “motion to strike,” he moves to quash the appearance of Appellees’ counsel, arguing, among other things, that Appellees’ counsel unlawfully colluded with Purveegiin’s former counsel and seduced, or was seduced by> a district court judge.

As the District Court acknowledged, „ .. , . ’ Purveegiin was entitled to proceed m for- . , , , , , , ma paupens. as he was absolutely without TT _ .. , , . , assets. However, Purveegnns complaint, „ „ „, , , . , , ^ ... ’ full of baseless complaints and not without malice, could not proceed. The District Court properly dismissed it as meritless. Purveegiin’s appeal is likewise without merit in fact or law. Accordingly, we will dismiss Purveegiin’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and deny his motion for appointment of counsel. Without dallying with the spurious accusations in his “motion to strike,” we deny that motion as wejj 
      
      . Furthermore, to the extent that Purveegiin requested that the District Court superintend the activities of this Court, the District Court was without jurisdiction to proceed, as the District Court noted.
     