
    CAMPBELL v. STATE.
    (No. 6814.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 26, 1922.
    Rehearing Denied May 31, 1922.)
    1. Larceny <©=564(8)—Evidence held to bring case within rule relating to possession by accused of recently stolen property.
    Evidence of transactions occurring very soon after the property was stolen held to bring the case within the rule which permitted the conclusion of guilt to be drawn by the jury from the possession by the accused of property recently stolen.
    2. Larceny <©=>23—Theft of $50 Liberty Bond, with coupons, felony.
    Theft of a $50 Liberty Bond, with coupons attached, was a felony, although without the coupons, .which represented interest and were a part of the bond, it was worth less than $50.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    3. Criminal law <®=>l 186(4)—Unless fault fundamental, charge not assailed after verdict.
    By Acts 1913, c. 138, §§ 1, 2 (Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, arts. 735, 737), unless the fault in a charge is fundamental, it is too late to assail it after verdict.
    Appeal from Criminal District Court, Dallas County; C. A. Pippen, Judge.
    R. W. Campbell was convicted of theft, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    E. B. Freeman and J. T. Kelly, both of Dallas, for appellant.
    R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

Conviction is for theft; punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period' of two years.

The stolen property was a Liberty Bond. Murphy, the alleged owner, had in his safe three Liberty Bonds. Some one entered his safe and removed them. One of them was a $50 bond with coupons' attached, and there was a smudge of green ink on the outer edge of the bond. The bond was missed about the first day of August, but had not been seen for several days prior to that time. Soon afterwards Murphy identified the bond among a great number which were in possession of the Dallas- National Bank.

Carnes, an employee of the bank, was present when Murphy identified the bond, and accounted for its presence there with the statement that a man from Dreyfuss & Sons, accompanied by another fellow, came to the bank and inquired the price ofl the’ bond, and that about 40 minutes later the same fellow came in the bank with another salesman from Dreyfuss & Sons, and Carnes bought and paid him the cash for the bond. Carnes said:

“X paid the money to the gentleman that came in with the salesman from Dreyfuss & Sons. I could not say that this person was the defendant. I remember Mr. Ackerman of Dreyfuss & Sons bringing some man in with the bond.”

Cooper, an employee of Dreyfuss & Sons, testified that—

The appellant came to the store and “offered Liberty Bonds in exchange for the goods he desired to purchase. I don’t remember the denomination of the bond. I didn’t go with him to the bank.,”

Ackerman, another employee of ’Dreyfuss & Sons, testified that the appellant came into the store and asked whether he would take a $50 Liberty Bond1 for merchandise; that he told him it would be taken at its market value. The witness said:

“I took him to the bank next door, where I got a price on the bond. It was a little over $50, with tip coupons. * * * I did not go back with him, but walked back to the store and had the underwear man wait on him.”

This testimony, as we comprehend it, shows that the appellant offered to sell Dreyfuss & Sons a Liberty Bond which he exhibited; that in company with one of the employees of- said firm he did sell to the bank the particular Liberty Bond which was afterwards identified by Murphy as the one which had been stolen from him. This, as we gather from the evidence, occurred very soon after the bond was stolen and apparently brings the case within the rule which permits the conclusion of guilt to be drawn by the jury from the possession by the accused of property recently stolen. The record furnishes no explanation of his possession of the stolen bond, and therefore, in our opinion, is sufficient to support the finding of the jury that appellant was the thief.

The bond, without the coupons attached, was of a value less than $50, but, with the coupons attached to it, was worth more than $50. The coupons were but evidence of the fact that the interest which the government was obligated, on the face of the bond, to pay, had not been paid. The interest was a part of the bond. The evidence was sufficient to characterize the offense as a felony.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

In his motion appellant criticizes the court’s charge. Unless the fault in the charge is fundamental, it is too late to assail it after verdict. Such has been the law since the enactment of chapter 138, p. 278, Laws of 1913, embraced in articles 735 and 737, Code of Crim. Proc. See, also, Gerard v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 238 S. W. 924.

It may be stated, however, that we have examined the charge in the light of appellant’s motion for rehearing, and express the opinion that it adequately presented the issues arising from the evidence and fully protected the rights of the appellant.

The motion for rehearing is overruled. 
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