
    SHULTZ’S LESSEE v. MOORE.
    Acknowledgment a deed — mayor of Cincinnati — civil and criminal cases — division of the court.
    The mayor of Cincinnati under the act incorporating the city of 1815, had no authority to take acknowledgments of deeds — such act was neither a civil nor criminal case. Quere.?
    A civil case is a suit at law to redress the violation of some contract, or to repair injury to property, or to the person, or to the personal rights of individuals.
    A criminal case is a public prosecution for a crime or misdemeanor.
    On motion for a new trial, when the court is divided, the motion fails.
    Ejectment. The plaintiff offered in evidence a mortgage deed to his lessors, dated the 12th of August, 1818, acknowledged before W. Corry, mayor of Cincinnati.
    
    
      J. Woods, for the defendant,
    objected that the act of the 30th of January, 1818, provided for taking acknowledgments of deeds before a judge of the Court of Common Pleas, or a justice of the peace. The act incorporating the city of Cincinnati which was also in force at the execution of this deed, 13 O. L. 67, authorized the mayor to exercise, within the limits of that corporation, in all civil and criminal cases, the same powers as are, or may be delegated to justices of the peace by the laws of this state. The taking an acknowledgment of a deed, is not the exercising of any power in a civil or criminal case, within the meaning of the law, any more than the performance of the marriage ceremony, or the taking of depositions would be. The act was intended to confer upon the mayor authority to take jurisdiction of civil controversies and dispose of them as a justice of the peace could, and in like manner to hear criminal complaints. The act of 1821, is the first act of the legislature which directly allows mayors, notaries public, &c. to take acknowledgments of deeds.
    
      Fox, contra,
    contended that it was the usual practice in Cincinnati, for the mayor to take acknowledgments of deeds; many casés of that kind have occurred, and the Supreme Court has sanctioned it.
    
      T. Corwin,
    
    in reply, thought civil cases meant suits at law, and criminal cases, prosecutions for crimes. The solemnization of marriage may be a civil act, but such act is not in legal contemplation a civil case — neither is the acknowledgment of a deed. He cited Webster’s Dictionary.
    
   Wright, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court. It seems clear to us that power is not conferred upon the mayor of Cincinnati by the 10th section of the act incorporating that city, to take acknowledgment of deeds. When the general assembly speak of civil and criminal cases, we understand them to employ legal terms in their legal sense, and to describe suits at law. A civil case is a suit at law to redress the violation of some contract, or to repair some injury to property or to the person or personal rights of individuals —a criminal case, is a public prosecution for a crime or misdemeanor. In such cases the mayor of Cincinnati was authorized to exercise the same powers as justices of the peace. The authority does not embrace any other case, act, or duty of a Justice. The case in 2 O. R. 212, does not bear on the question. The deed cannot be received as an operative conveyance. If the plaintiff wishes to use it as a license to enter or for any other purpose, that may raise another question.

Yerdict for the defendant. Motion for a new trial reserved to the Court in Bank.

The Court in Bank divided on the question of the authority of the mayor to take the acknowledgment of the deed. Judges Hitchcock and Wright, being of opinion the mayor had no power: Judges Collett and Lane being of opinion he had. Judgment was rendered on the verdict.  