
    Celestin Njibeck NGWA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-2263.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: July 8, 2011.
    Decided: July 28, 2011.
    Danielle L.C. Beach-Oswald, Beach-Oswald Immigration Law Associates, PC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Luis E. Perez, Senior Litigation Counsel, Kathryn L. Moore, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
   Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Celestin Njibeck Ngwa, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions for review an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s order denying his applications for asylum, withholding from removal and withholding under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2006). The INA defines a refugee as a person unwilling or unable to return to his native country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). “Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one of the enumerated grounds.... ” Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2011), and can establish refugee status based on past persecution in his native country on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). “An applicant who demonstrates that he'was the subject of past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.2004).

Without regard to past persecution, an alien can establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected ground. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 187. The well-founded fear standard contains both a subjective and an objective component. The objective element requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution. Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir.2006). “The subjective component can be met through the presentation of candid, credible, and sincere testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution.... [It] must have some basis in the reality of the circumstances and be validated with specific, concrete facts ... and it cannot be mere irrational apprehension.” Qiao Hua Li, 405 F.3d at 176 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an alien must show a clear probability that, if he was removed to his native country, his “life or freedom would be threatened” on a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006); see Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir.2004). A “clear probability” means that it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984). Unlike asylum, withholding of removal is mandatory for anyone whose establishes that there “life or freedom would be threatened ... because of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006).

A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony on credibility grounds must offer “specific, cogent reason[s]” for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir.1989). “Examples of specific and cogent reasons include inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony[.]” Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court accords broad, though not unlimited, deference to credibility findings supported by substantial evidence. Camara, 378 F.3d at 367.

Credibility determinations are to be made based on the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors, including the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s written and oral statements, the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii) (2006).

A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). Administrative findings of fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA and any attendant regulations.” Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir.2008). This court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence ... presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-Za-carias, 502 U.S. at 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n. 14 (4th Cir.2002). Furthermore, “[t]he agency decision that an alien is not eligible for asylum is ‘conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.’” Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir.2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D)).

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility finding. The inconsistencies noted by the immigration judge were not minor errors, but were critical to Ngwa’s claim that he suffered past persecution. See Camara, 378 F.3d at 369. The immigration judge was not obligated to accept Ngwa’s explanations for the inconsistencies. Dankam v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 122 (4th Cir.2007). We further conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that Ngwa did not establish eligibility for relief based on independent evidence. We also conclude that the immigration judge properly considered the independent evidence in finding that Ngwa was not eligible for relief under the CAT. We find the evidence does not support a different conclusion.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED.  