
    EVANS v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 2, 1913.)
    Larceny (§ 33) — Indictment—Sufficiency.
    An indictment for theft of a horse by conversion, alleging that the horse belonged to R., that accused acquired possession of it under a contract of hiring with T. thereunto duly authorized by R., that T. was then and there the agent, clerk, and employé of R., etc., sufficiently, alleged T.’s authority to make the contract of hiring.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Larceny, Cent. Dig. § 93; Dec. Dig. § 33.]
    Appeal from District Court, Travis County; .Chas. A. Wilcox, Judge.
    O. E. Evans was convicted of horse theft, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For otner cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   DAVIDSON, P. J.

This record is before us without a statement of facts or bill of exceptions. It is contended the indictment is not sufficient in that it fails to sufficiently allege the authority of Thompson, as the agent of Rankin, to make a contract of hiring with appellant. The indictment charges theft of a horse by conversion. After alleging that the horse was the property of Julian Rankin, the indictment thus avers: “And the possession having theretofore been acquired by the said O. E. Evans by virtue of a contract of hiring and borrowing made by him (the said O. E. Evans) with one Jim Thompson, who was thereunto duly authorized by the said Julian Rankin, the said Jim Thompson then and there being the clerk, agent, and employé of the said Julian Rankin, and the said O. E. Evans did then and there, without the consent of the said Julian Rankin, and without the consent of the said Jim Thompson, etc., fraudulently convert said horse to his own use.”

The case is submitted without brief or authorities to sustain the contention made by appellant. We are of opinion that this is sufficient to allege that Jim Thompson was the agent and employé, etc., of Rankin, and sufficiently charges that he made a contract of hiring and borrowing as alleged; and, if the evidence sustained the allegations in the indictment in this respect, it would be sufficient. There can be no doubt, we think, under the allegations, that Thompson was alleged to be the agent and employé of Rankin, and that he had authority to make the contract alleged to have been made between himself as agent of Rankin and appellant in regard to hiring the horse.

The judgment is affirmed.  