
    Turney vs. Wilson.
    A common carrier is liable for all losses not occasioned by tlie act of God or the enemies of the country, and the burden of proof is thrown upon him to show that the loss was occasioned in a manner that will exempt him from liability.
    Where the carrier, by contract, exempts himself from liability for loss-eaoccasioned by the “dangers of the river,” he will be responsible, except for losses which could not have been prevented by human skill and foresight; and it is incumbent on him to pro.ve that the loss, did occur from such cause.
    In such case all proof will be irrelevant, except such as tends to prove that the loss was occasioned by the act of God, the enemies of the country, or from causes which could not have been prevented by human,skill and foresight.
    Evidence of the custom of merchants of a particular place,, is inadmissible, to contradict, or in any wise affect the written contract of the par-, ties, as contained in the bill of lading.
    Proof by a carrier, that the loss happened from some unknown cause,, is not sufficient to exempt him from liability.
    
      ' The owner of the articles lost or injured may maintain an action, notwithstanding they are consigned to a third person.
    The words “dangers of the river,” in a bill of lading, mean, “all hidden obstructions in the river, as rocks, logs, sawyers, and the like, and which could not be foreseen or avoided by human prudence or foresight.”
    This was an notion upon the case, brought by the defendant in error, Wilson, against Turney. The latter undertook to transport for the former, seventeen bales of cotton, to New Orleans., which were delivered on board his flat boat, on Duck river. The following bill of lading ■was signed by Turney: “Shipped by B. W. Wilson, in good order and well conditioned, on board the flat boat Columbia, No. 1, whereof is master for the present voyage James M’Bride, now lying at the bridge, at Columbia, and bound for New Orleans: to say, seventeen bales cotton, marked and numbered as in the margin, and fo be delivered, in like good order, at the aforesaid port of pew Orleans, (the dangers of the river only excepted,) ginto Dicks, Booker & Co. &c. they paying freight, &c.
    | The boat was sunk'in the Mississippi, below Memphis, land the cotton greatly damaged.
    m Upon the trial of the cause in the circuit court, the defendant offered to prove that there was a general custom in Maury county, in regard to the liability of persons conveying cotton in flat boats from Columbia to New Orleans, amounting to an implied contract, by which the carrier was exempted from liability for all loss, unless it proceeded from negligence or dishonesty on his part; and also offered to prove, that this custom was universally known and recognized by the usages of all boaters, freighters, merchants, traders andi planters, and that it had prevailed from the first settlement of the country. This evidence was objected to by the plaintiff, and the court sustained the objection, to which exception was taken.
    A number of witnesses vvere examined during the trial; those, on the part of defendant, mainly, to prove that the loss happened by no negligence on his part, and was occasioned by a leak in the boat, and that every exertion on his part was made to prevent the loss, &c.; and that the' leak happened from some unknown cause. The proof showed that the cotton belonged to the plaintiff.
    The court charged the jury, that the plaintiff must show the legal right of the cotton to be in him; that the bill of lading was prima facie evidence that the cotton belonged to the consignees, but this might be rebutted by proof showing that Dicks, Booker & Co. were merely their factors or agents, to whom the cotton was consigned for sale, &c. The court also charged, that boatmen, who carried goods for freight, were liable as common carriers, unless, by contract, they were exempt from such liability; that in this case, the defendant, by his contract, exempted himself from all liability on account of the “dangers of the river,” and that the “dangers of theriv-ev ” as defined by the law, means, “all hidden obstruc-| tions m the river, as rocks, logs, sawyers, and the like,I which could not be foreseen or avoided by human prn-l dence; and before the carrier can be excused, incase of loss, he must show that the loss happened from some] cause which human foresight or prudence could nOt| avert.”
    The jury found a verdict for plaintiff, upon which judgment was rendered.
    -for plaintiff in error.
    
      F. B. Fogg, for defendant in error.
   Green, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

It has so frequently been holden by this court, that “one who undertakes, for a reward, to convey produce, or goods of any sort, from any place upon the river to another, becomes thereby liable as a common carrier,” that it is unnecessary to do more here than to refer to the cases. Craig vs. Childress, Peck’s Rep. 270: Johnson vs. Friar, 4 Yerger’s Reports, 48: Gordon and Walker vs. Buchanan and Porterfield, 5 Yer. Rep. 71. Sustaining the character of a common carrier, the boatman is liable to the owner of the goods for all losses not occasioned by the act of God, or the enemies of the country, and the burthen of proof is thrown upon him to show that the loss was occasioned in a manner that will exempt him from liability. Peck’s Rep. 271: 3 Munf. Rep. 239. And it is not enough for him to prove, that the navigation is attended with such danger, that a loss may happen, notwithstanding the utmost endeavors of the boatmen to prevent it. He takes the goods and engages to carry them, with a knowledge of these dangers, and is supposed to havé that in view in fixing the compensation he may demand for the carriage. Indeed, the carrier is regarded as being in the nature of an insu-Ter. Forward vs. Pittard, 1 T. Reports, 27. But cerlain events may be specially provided against m the contract, and then the carrier will not be liable for them. Peck’s Rep. 271. So in the case'before us, the exception of the “dangers of the river” exempts the carrier from liability for those losses which could not have been prevented by human skill and foresight. 5 Yerg. Rep. 82. But it was incumbent upon the defendant to prove that the loss in this case did occur from such cause. Peck’s Rep. 271. All proof on his part was irrelevant, except that which would conduce to show that the loss was occasioned by the act of God or the enemies of the country, or the “dangers of the river. ” The legafsignification of these terms was correctly stated by. the circuit court? and the testimony which was offered to prove the custom of the merchants of Columbia was rightfully rejected. Such custom could not affect or in any wise alter the written contract of the parties, as contained in the bill of lading. The language employed in this instrument has a definite legal meaning, which the custom of Columbia could not change. Proof that the loss occurred from an unknown cause would not excuse the carrier. The loss having happened, he would be chargeable with it, unless he could show by proof, that it was produced by some cause which is within the exceptions made in his favor by the law, or contained in his contract. ■ Plainly, therefore, he could not have been excused by proving that it resulted from an unknown cause.

It was proved that the plaintiff was the owner of the cotton, therefore, the interest of the property being in him, he was entitled to the action. 2 Starkie, 331, 2, 3, 8. Let the judgment be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  