
    SAU LAN NG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-3016.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 13, 2015.
    Chunyu Jean Wang, Flushing, New York, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant Director; Karen Stewart, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for Respondent.
    Present: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RICHARD C. WESLEY, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Sau Lan Ng, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a July 24, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming the April 2, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denying her motion to rescind her in absentia removal order. In re Sau Lan Ng, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 24, 2013), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 2, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland See., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.2006). We review the denial of a motion to rescind an in absentia removal order for abuse of discretion. Alrefae v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir.2006).

An in absentia removal order may be rescinded upon a motion to reopen filed within 180 days after the date of the removal order if the alien demonstrates that his failure to appear was due to “exceptional circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). “Exceptional circumstances are defined as ‘circumstances (such as battery or extreme cruelty to the alien or any child or parent of the alien, serious illness of the alien, or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien, but not including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the alien.’ ” Alrefae, 471 F.3d at 358 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(l)). The agency did not abuse its discretion in determining that Ng failed to demonstrate such circumstances.

Ng does not dispute that she received oral and written notice of the February 2, 2012, hearing. As the agency concluded, her misreading of that notice did not constitute exceptional circumstances beyond her control. See In re S-M-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 49, 51 (BIA 1998); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(l). The record does not support her contention that the agency failed to consider the totality of ■ the circumstances. She does not point to any evidence that the agency failed to consider that would have supported a finding that her failure to appear was beyond her control.

Ng failed to exhaust before the BIA her argument that the IJ erred in finding that she had conceded removability. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 107 n. 1, 122 (2d Cir.2007). Nevertheless, we note that she stated under oath that she entered the United States without inspection or admission as charged in her Notice to Appear. We do not consider her argument that she should have been granted a continuance because she did not raise that argument before the IJ, and the BIA declined to address it on appeal. See Lin Zhong, 480 F.3d at 122.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the. Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  