
    TRANSITION, INCORPORATED; James W. Triplett; Janet C. Triplett; William S. Bell, Plaintiff-Appellees, v. Thomas W. HOFLER, Jr., individually and as an officer of Freedom Financial Company, L.L.C., Defendant-Appellant, and Clyde Austin, individually and as an officer of International Financial Opportunities and other associated entities; Lamont Knight, individually and as officer of ADAR, Incorporated; ADAR, Incorporated; Richard Hertz, individually and as an officer of Moredoe, Incorporated; Moredoe, Incorporated; Freedom Financial Company, L.L.C.; Keith Highsmith, individually and as an agent of Freedom Financial Company, L.L.C., Defendants. Transition, Incorporated; James W. Triplett; Janet C. Triplett; William S. Bell, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Lamont Knight, individually and as officer of ADAR, Incorporated, Defendant-Appellant, and Clyde Austin, individually and as an officer of International Financial Opportunities and other associated entities; ADAR, Incorporated; Richard Hertz, individually and as an officer of Moredoe, Incorporated; Moredoe, Incorporated; Thomas W. Hofler, Jr., individually and as an officer of Freedom Financial Company, L.L.C.; Freedom Financial Company, L.L.C.; Keith Highsmith, individually and as an agent of Freedom Financial Company, L.L.C., Defendants.
    Nos. 03-1870, 03-1871.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted Oct. 8, 2003.
    Decided Oct. 29, 2003.
    
      Thomas W. Hofler, Jr., Lamont Knight, Appellants Pro Se. James Broome Thor-sen, Craig Juraj Curwood, Thorsen & Seher, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
    Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
   PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals, Thomas W. Hofler, Jr., and Lamont Knight appeal the June 12, 2003, district court order denying their motions to reconsider. Knight also appeals from the March 15, 2002, district court judgment. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.

We have reviewed the record and the June 12, 2003, district court order and find the district court did not abuse its discretion denying the motions to reconsider. Accordingly, we affirm. We dismiss as untimely Knight’s appeal from the March 15, 2002, order.

Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t ofCorr., 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960)).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on March 15, 2002. The notice of appeal was filed on July 10, 2003.

Accordingly, because Knight failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss his appeal from the March 15, 2002, order. As for Hofler’s and Knight’s appeals from the district court’s order denying the motion to reconsider, we affirm. We deny Hofler’s motion to clarify and the motions by Hofler and Knight for a copy of the transcript produced at government expense. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.  