
    Nancy Jane GEIGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHINO, a municipal entity; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-56865
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted August 16, 2016 
    
    Filed August 24, 2016
    Nancy Jane Geiger, Covina, CA, Pro Se.
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      
         The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Nancy Jane Geiger appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying her request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that Geiger’s action is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), Beets v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2012), and for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of leave to proceed IFP, O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that Geiger’s action is Hec/c-barred because success on her claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of her infraction conviction, and she failed to allege that her conviction had been invalidated. See Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 583-84 (9th Cir. 2007) (irrespective of the relief sought, Heck bars § 1983 claims which would necessarily imply the invalidity. of a conviction, unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction has been invalidated); see also Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1190-92 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding plaintiffs claims were Heck-barred where they necessarily called into question his infraction conviction and he failed to challenge the conviction prior to filing the § 1983 suit). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Geiger leave to proceed IFP. See O'Loughlin, 920 F.2d at 617.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precédent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     