
    Lessee of Joseph Shepherd v. Commissioners of Ross County.
    A decree of the circuit court of the United States, made in that court sitting for the district of Ohio, directing the conveyance of lands, does not operate as such conveyance under the laws of Ohio.
    This case was reserved in the county of Ross.
    It is an action of ejectment for the recovery of a small parcel of ground at the south' end of the bridge over the Scioto river, near Chillicothe. The case was submitted to a jury at the last term of the court in Ross county, and by consent of parties, a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court, upon an agreed statement of facts, in substance as follows, to wit:
    “ The premises in controversy are covered by a patent granted by the United States to the children of Nathaniel Massie, deceased, in whose name the entry and survey is made, upon which the patent is based; said Massie, in his lifetime, conveyed the premises to Thomas James, who afterward conveyed the same to Humphrey Fullerton, and Fullerton, by article of agreement in writing, permitted the bridge company to occupy the same, so long as said bridge continued to be used as a toll bridge, under which article the defendants are in possession and claim title
    “A decree was rendered in the seventh circuit court of the United States and district of Ohio, in a suit in chancery, prosecuted by John Watts against said Fullerton and others, by which decree Fullerton was ordered and directed to convey the premises in question to Watts; but it is not, however, believed that any conveyance was ever made in pursuance of said decree.
    *“Watts afterward obtained a patent covering the premises, which patent is junior to the one granted to the heirs of Massie as aforesaid, and subsequently conveyed to the lessor of the plaintiff.
    “If, upon investigation, the court shall be of opinion that the plaintiff is vested, with the legal title, judgment is to be entered’ upon the verdict; but, if otherwise, the verdict is to be sot aside, and a new trial ordered.”
    
      Douglass, for plaintiff.
    Scott, Creighton and Bond, for defendant.
   Judge Hitchcock

delivered the opinion of the court:

The agreed case shows that the legal title to the premises in controversy, or-more properly speaking, the right of possession, is in the defendant, unless that title was vested i'n Watts by the decree of the circuit court. When this decree was made we know not, as it is not before us in the form in which it was entered. It directed Fullerton to convey certain lands, including the premises in controversy. Whether this decree was complied with is not, however, known ; but it is supposed that it was not. The simple question, then, presented for determination is, whether a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the conveyance of land, operates as a conveyance; whether by the decree alone, without any further act performed, the title is changed.

Previous to the act of February 19, 1810, “ directing the-mode of proceeding in chancery,” all decrees in chancery rendered by the courts of this state were to be enforced by sequestration or execution ; but by section 41 of that act (1 Chase’s Stat. 689), it is provided “that where a decree shall be made fora conveyance, release, or acquittance, in either of said courts, sitting as a court of chancery, and the party against whom said decree shall pass shall not comply therewith by the time appointed, then such decree shall be considered and taken in all courts of law and equity to have the same operation and effect, and be as available as if the conveyance, release, or acquittance had been executed conformably to such decree.” This same principle has been continued in the statutes to the present time. It is contended by the plaintiff’s counsel, that a decree of the circuit court of the ^United States must have this effect when made within the district of Ohio. But is it so? Section 1 of the act of 1810, 1 Chase’s Stat. 685, gives to the court of common pleas jurisdiction “in all cases properly cognizable by a court of chancery.” Section 2 gives the Supreme Court concurrent jurisdiction with the court of common pleas in all cases in chancery where the title to land is called in question, or the matter in controversy exceeds one thousand dollars, and absolute jurisdiction in all cases originating in the court of common pleas. Through the whole law no other courts are referred to. These are, in fact, the only courts of equity acting by authority of the state. Section 41 refers specifically to the decrees of these courts. The words are, “when a decree shall be made for a conveyance, release, or acquittance in either of the said courts’’ etc. We think that the principle can not, by any rule of construction, be extended beyond those courts.

We know of no law of the United States, giving to the decree of the circuit court thi's effect; and certainly there is no law of this state for that purpose. The decrees of that court operate upon the person, and will be enforced,' as we suppose, like the decrees of the high court of chancery in England, by attachment and sequestration. In the opinion of this court, the decree referred to in the agreed facts did not vest in -the lessor of the plaintiff a legal title to the premises; of course a new trial is ordered, the costs to abide the event of the suit.  