
    Rixey v. Bayse.
    March, 1833.
    (Absent Tucker, p.)
    Slander — Discrediting Witnesses — Evidence of Particular Acts of Hostility — Admissibility,—In trial of' action of slander, defendant, to discredit testimony of two witnesses of plaintiff’s, offered evidence of particular acts of hostility of those witnesses towards him: Heed, such hostility could only be proved by proving- acts of hostility, and therefore the evidence was proper. '
    Witnesses — Impeachment — Particular Instances of Falsehood — Admissibility.—But when the general reputation of a witness for veracity is in question, the party impeaching his veracity, cannot go into evidence of particular instances of falsehood.
    Upon the trial of an action for slander, brought by Bayse against Rixey, in the circuit court of Culpeper, two bills of exceptions were filed by the defendant, to-opinions of the court excluding evidence which he wished to adduce.
    *The first stated, 1. that, the plaintiff having examined two witnesses on his part, named Mershon and Benier, and a witness introduced by the defendant being under examination, his counsel, with a view to shew that the plaintiff’s witnesses, Mershon and Benier, entertained ill feelings towards the defendant, asked the defendant’s witness, whether Mershon and Benier had not, before this trial, written and circulated papers derogatory of the defendant? The plaintiff’s counsel objected to the inquiry, and the court thinking it improper, would not suffer it to be answered. 2. The defendant’s counsel (with the same view) asked the witness, whether Mershon and Benier had done any thing evincing ill feelings towards the defendant, and if so, what they had done? The witness having answered the first part of this question in the affirmative, and going on, in answer to the latter, to speak of the papers referred to in the first question above mentioned, the plaintiff’s counsel objected to the evidence, and the court stopt the witness, and would not suffer him to speak of those papers. 3. The defendant (still with the same view) asked the witness, whether he had ever heard Mershon and Benier repeat certain words, which they or either of them acknowledged they had written and published concerning the defendant, and which he offered to prove were violently abusive of him? The plaintiff’s counsel objected, that the question was improper, and the court sustained the objection. And then, 4. the defendant offered testimony to prove the fact, that Mershon and Benier had written and published papers very derogatory from his character and abusive; but the plaintiff’s counsel objected to the evidence, and the court excluded it. To which opinions of the court, the defendant excepted.
    The second bill of exceptions stated, that, the defendant intending to impeach the credit of the plaintiff’s witness Mershon, on the ground of his hostility towards the defendant, the plaintiff to sustain Mer-shon’s credit, introduced a witness named Tutt, who testified that he was well acquainted with Mershon, that his character for veracity was *fair, and that his testimony in a court of justice was worthy of credit. On cross examination, Tutt said, that having heard, •shortly before, that Mershon had been making some statements concerning himself, for which he determined to call him to account upon sight, he had accordingly called upon Mershon, who denied having ever made such statements, with which denial he, Tutt, was satisfied. Whereupon, the defendant’s counsel put this question to Tutt —“Did you derive the information of Mer-shon’s having made the statements about you, which he afterwards denied having made, from gentlemen in whose veracity you placed the most implicit confidence?” The plaintiff’s counsel objected to the question, and the court sustained the objection ; to which the defendant excepted.
    Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for 300 dollars; from which Rixey appealed to this court.
    Stanard for the appellant.
    Briggs for the appellee.
    
      
      Slander. — See monographic note on “Libel and Slander” appended to Bourland v. Eidson, 8 Gratt. 27.
    
    
      
      Witnesses. — See monographic note on “Witnesses” appended to Claiborne v. Parrish, 2 Wash. 146.
    
   BROOKE, J.

The court is of opinion, that the circuit court erred in excluding a portion of the evidence, stated in the first bill of exceptions, the object of which was to prove particular facts, shewing that the witnesses, who had been examined by the plaintiff, had ill feelings towards the appellant. It is true, particular facts are not permitted to be proved, to impeach the credit of a witness when supported by general reputation; but hostility towards one of the parties is ndf, in its nature, a matter of general reputation ; and if proved at all, must be proved by particular facts or circumstances. The objection to the opinion of the circuit court stated in the second bill of exceptions, is not well founded. The court was right in refusing to permit the witness Tutt to answer a question intended to prove a particular fact, in order to discredit a witness, to whose general character for veracity he had before borne testimony. The credit of a witness can be impeached by general evidence x'only, and not by evidence as to particular facts. Stark. Law Ev. part 2, f 28, vol. 1, p. 14S; 3 Id. part 4, vol. 3, p. 1753.

The judgment is to be reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court for a new trial, upon which the appellant is to be permitted to give evidence of particular facts or circumstances, shewing that the plaintiff’s witnesses entertained ill feelings towards him.  