
    Ex parte CITY OF PARRISH. (Re Jeff Lolley and Pamela Lolley v. City of Parrish).
    1990226.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    May 26, 2000.
    Thomas S. Hale and Van D. McMahan of Lamar, Burgess, Hale, Miller, Norris & Feldman, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner.
    Joe L. Tucker, Jr., and Elisabeth Roberts of Law Office of Joe L. Tucker, Jr., Birmingham, for respondents.
   COOK, Justice.

The petition is granted to the extent it seeks a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Parrish, and a writ is issued to that effect. See §§ 11-47-190; 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975.

The petition is otherwise denied.

PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT ISSUED.

HOOPER, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.

MADDOX and BROWN, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.

MADDOX, Justice

(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur in the judgment issuing a writ directing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Parrish, but I must dissent from the Court’s failure to revisit this Court’s decision in Ex parte Franklin County Department of Human Resources, 674 So.2d 1277 (Ala.1996), as the City requests us to do. In Ex parte Franklin County Department of Human Resources, this Court refused to adopt the collateral-order doctrine employed by the federal courts in cases presenting the issue of governmental immunity. I dissented in Ex parte Franklin County Department of Human Resources, because I thought that this Court should adopt the collateral-order doctrine. Therefore, I would accede to the City’s request and revisit our decision in Ex parte Franklin County Department of Human Resources, and I would vote to adopt the collateral-order doctrine, based on the reasons I expressed in my dissent in that case.

BROWN, Justice

(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur in the judgment to the extent it directs the trial court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against the City of Parrish.

I dissent, however, from this Court’s failure to adopt the collateral-order doctrine. See Justice Maddox’s dissent regarding this issue.  