
    * [Philadelphia, May 5, 1838.]
    MUSTIN against VANHOOK.
    APPEAL.
    The act of the 30th of August, 1831, which provides, that after the passage of the act, no claim of a mechanic, filed in pursuance of the act of 1806 should continue to be a lien for a longer term than five years from the day of filing the same, unless a scire facias was sued out within that time, did not apply to claims which had been filed before the passage of the act.
    This was an appeal from a decree of the District Court for the City and County of Philadelphia, in the matter of the distribution of the proceeds of a sheriff’s sale of certain real estate of the defendant Vanhook.
    The facts, as they appeared in the report of the auditor below, were as follows:
    On the 2d of June, 1827, John Naglee filed a claim against the building, for lumber furnished. A scire facias issued on this claim, on the 10th of August, 1833. This was the first lien on the property.
    After the filing of this claim, Mustin, the plaintiff, who was the brother-in-law of Vanhook, took a mortgage of the premises from him with full knowledge of the existence of the lien.
    The property was sold under proceedings on the mortgage.
    The District Court decided, that the claimant, Naglee, was entitled to be first paid out of the fund. Whereupon the plaintiff appealed to this Court.
    Mr. C. Ingersoll, for the appellant,
    referred to the act of the 30th of March, 1831, which provides, that from and after the passage of the act, all claims shall continue to bind the buildings, &c., against -which the same are entered, for the term of five years from the day of filing the same; and no claim so as aforesaid filed shall bind any building for a longer period than five *tbe same, unless within that _____ &c. He cited Eakin v. Raub, (12 Seg. & Rawle, 336).
    Mr. M‘Call, contra, was stopped.
   Sergeant, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

There is nothing in the language or apparent design of the act of 30th March, 1831, to justify tho idea that it was designed to operate retrospectively. 'Had the legislature intended this, they would no doubt have prescribed a limit for existing liens, to commence with the date of the law, as has been done in many other limitation acts. To apply the present limit, which commences with the time of entering the lien, to liens then entered, might give to some only a month or a day; or even if the five years had expired, abolish them entirely — an injustice which certainly ought not to be imputed to law-makers, in any case, without the most explicit language. Existing liens have never been supposed to be within the purview of the act of 1831, but only liens that should be filed or entered after the passage of the act.

Judgment affirmed. 
      
       See 5 Casey, 117 7 P.F. Smith, 211.
     