
    Pike vs. Hayes.
    Declarations by a deceased owner of land, made during tbe time of the ownership, relating to its boundary, are evidence against persons claiming the land by title derived from him.
    A husband owned land in his right, and his wife owned land adjoining in her own right. The parties to the suit were their children; and after the death of the parents the plaintiff became the owner of the land of the husband, and the defendant became the owner of that of the wife. In an action of trespass qu. cl. fr.—held, that the declarations of the wife, before and after the death of her husband, showing whore the boundary was between the lands, were admissible in evidence against the defendant.
    Statements by a married woman, where the boundary is between her land and that of her husband, are not presumed, after their decease, to have been made under coercion by him, in the absence of any proof to that effect, and there being at the time no controversy about the boundary.
    
      Semble, that a woman may testify to facts affecting the interest of her deceased husband, her knowledge of which was not derived from her position as his wife.
    Trespass quare clausum fregit. Plea, the general issue.
    The plaintiff and defendant were children of Elihu and Betsy Hayes, both deceased, who lived on a farm, part of which belonged to the husband in his right, and a part of it belonged to the wife in her right. The plaintiff owned the land of the husband, and the defendant owned that of the wife, and the question in controversy was, whether the acts were done on the land of the wife, or on that of the husband. In connection with other testimony to show the boundaries of the respective lots, the defendant introduced evidence of the declarations of the wife, made at various times, and to different persons, during the lifetime of her husband and since his death, showing that her land did not extend far enough to comprehend the locus in quo, but that it was on the land of her husband. There was no evidence of any controversy or difference of opinion about the boundary at the time, or that her declarations were made in the presence of her husband, or that she was in any way influenced by him to make them.
    The plaintiff objected to the evidence of the declarations, hut they were admitted by the court ; and the verdict having been returned for the defendant, the plaintiff moved that it be set aside on account of the admission of the evidence.
    
      Hale, for the plaintiff.
    
      Christie, for the defendant.
   Gilchrist, J.

As all the declarations went to the jury without discrimination, it is necessary to inquire whether those made during coverture were admissible. It did not appear that they were made in presence of her husband, or that in making them she was influenced by him. That she was not under i s influence in respect to them, appears from the fact that she made the same declarations after his death. If they should be rejected, it must be on the ground that a wife, in all her statements which could by possibility affect the interests of her husband, must be presumed to act under coercion. It has been held that a wife, accompanying her husband in the commission of a crime, is presumed to act under his coercion, and consequently without any criminal intent. Rex vs. Knight, 4 C. & P. 116; People vs. Davis, 1 Wheeler’s Cr. Cas. 230. But we do not understand that the presumption of coercion extends far enough to embrace a case like this. Professor Greenleaf states that the rule excluding the testimony of a wife is analogous to that which excludes confidential communications made by a client to his attorney. Section 338. Such seems to have been the opinion of the court in the case of Coffin vs. Jones, 13 Pick. 213, although the point was not necessary to the decision of the case. There is no reason why the wife, after the death of her husband, should not state facts which came to her knowledge from other sources, and not by means of her situation as a wife; and her knowledge of the boundary in this case she did not procure from her husband. But it is enough for this case to say that her declarations are like the declarations of any other owner of land, and binding upon her privies, there being no presumption that they were made under coercion ; and if there were, it would be sufficiently rebutted by the fact that she repeated them after the death of her husband.

Judgment on the verdict.  