
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TaJuan Carvell BROOKS, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 15-3199.
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    Feb. 5, 2016.
    James A. Brown, Office of the United States Attorney, Topeka, KS, Annette B. Gurney, Office of the United States Attorney, Wichita, KS, Gregory Hough, Office of the United States Attorney, Topeka, KS, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    TaJuan Carvell Brooks, Fort Worth, TX, pro se.
    Before BRISCOE, GÓRSUCH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

NEIL M. GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.

Nearly two years after his federal conviction for felony drug and firearm offenses became final, TaJuan Brooks filed a motion seeking to have his conviction and sentence set aside. But as the district court recognized, a federal habeas petitioner normally has only one year within which to seek collateral relief like this. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). And while that deadline can be tolled for equitable reasons, the district court found that the exceptional circumstances required for such relief were absent and dismissed his case as untimely.

Mr. Brooks now seeks to appeal that holding. To do so, he must first obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) from this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). And to do that, he must show that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

This much Mr. Brooks hasn’t done. In his submission to this court, he puts forward no argument whatsoever for why his motion was timely or why the district court’s careful analysis and decision not to apply equitable tolling was in error. Neither can we identify any flaws in the district court’s determination on either score. Mr. Brooks’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied, his request for a COA is denied, and this appeal is dismissed. Mr. Brooks is reminded of his obligation to pay the filing fee in full. 
      
      This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
     