
    PEOPLE v GEZELMAN (ON REHEARING)
    Docket No. 151457.
    Submitted April 13, 1993, at Grand Rapids.
    Decided June 30, 1993.
    Submitted on rehearing August 3, 1993. Decided on rehearing October 19, 1993, at 9:00 A.M.
    Keith R. Gezelman pleaded guilty in the Allegan Circuit Court, George R. Corsiglia, J., of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and child sexually abusive activity. He was sentenced to three to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the former conviction and eight to twenty years’ imprisonment for the latter. He appealed. The Court of Appeals, Neff, P.J., and Mackenzie and Weaver, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished memorandum opinion, decided June 30, 1993 (Docket No. 151457). The Court of Appeals thereafter granted the defendant’s motion for rehearing.
    On rehearing, the Court of Appeals held:
    
    1. The eight-year minimum sentence for the child sexually abusive activity conviction does not violate the principle of proportionality.
    2. The defendant’s failure to challenge at sentencing the accuracy of the information contained in the presentence report precludes appellate review of the issue.
    3. The child sexually abusive activity statute, MCL 750.145e(l)(d),(2); MSA 28.342a(l)(d),(2), is not unconstitutionally overbroad. The statute’s definition of "erotic nudity” is narrowly drawn so that protected forms of free speech are not punished.
    Affirmed.
    1. Sentences — Presentence Investigation Reports — Appeal.
    Alleged inaccuracies in a presentence investigation report must be raised before or at the time of sentencing in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.
    References
    Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 553, 557; Constitutional Law §§ 460-463, 496 et seq., 507; Infants § 16.5; Trial §§ 395, 405, 406.
    See ALR Index under Appeal and Error; Children; Constitutional Law; Sentence and Punishment; Sex and Sexual Matters.
    
      2. Constitutional Law ■— Child Sexually Abusive Activity — Erotic Nudity.
    The child sexually abusive activity statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad; the statute’s definition of "erotic nudity” is narrowly drawn so that protected forms of free speech are not punished (MCL 750.145c[l][d],[2]; MSA 28.342a[l][d],[2]).
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Andrew J. Marks, Prosecuting Attorney, and Douglas E. Ketchum, Chief Assistant Prosecutor, for the people.
    State Appellate Defender (by Anne Yantus), for the defendant on appeal.
    ON REHEARING
    Before: Neff, P.J., and Mackenzie and Weaver, JJ.
   Per Curiam.

Defendant pleaded guilty of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1) (a); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(a), and child sexually abusive activity, MCL 750.145c(2); MSA 28.342a(2). He was sentenced to three to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the former conviction and eight to twenty years’ imprisonment for the latter conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm. This case has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E)(1)(b).

Given the circumstances of the offense and the offender, we hold that defendant’s eight-year minimum sentence for his child sexually abusive activity conviction does not violate the principle of proportionality. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).

Defendant’s failure to challenge the accuracy of the information contained in the presentence report at sentencing precludes appellate review of this issue. People v Sharp, 192 Mich App 501, 503-504; 481 NW2d 773 (1992).

Likewise, defendant’s failure to challenge the constitutionality of the child sexually abusive activity statute before the trial court also normally would preclude appellate review. See People v Ghosh, 188 Mich App 545, 546; 470 NW2d 497 (1991). However, because an important constitutional question is involved, we will review the issue. Id.

Defendant claims the child sexually abusive activity statute, MCL 750.145c(2); MSA 28.342a(2), is unconstitutional because it is overbroad. Specifically, he asserts that the statute’s prohibition against "erotic nudity” involving children is over-broad because it could encompass protected forms of free speech, such as the innocent photograph of a nude child by its parents. We disagree. The statutory definition of erotic nudity does not encompass the depiction of all child nudity. Rather, it is narrowly defined to exclude those depictions that have a "primary literary, artistic, educational, political, or scientific value” and that do not appeal to the prurient interests in sex. MCL 750.145c(1)(d); MSA 28.342a(1)(d). Because the definition is narrowly drawn so that protected forms of free speech are not punished, the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad. New York v Ferber, 458 US 747; 102 S Ct 3348; 73 L Ed 2d 1113 (1982); Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601; 93 S Ct 2908; 37 L Ed 2d 830 (1973).

Affirmed.  