
    (92 South. 301)
    No. 24671.
    HAMILTON et al. v. TEXAS CO.
    (May 1, 1922.
    Rehearing Denied by Division A June 5, 1922.)
    
      (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
    
    1. Master and servant <&wkey;388 — Parents, though entitled to minor’s wages, may be “dependents” within Compensation Act.
    That a minor’s parents were entitled to receive, and that he turned over to them, his entire wages, did not show that he was dependent on the parents, rather than the parents dependent on him in view of the reciprocal duty of support imposed by law on parent and child. ,,
    2. Master and servant &wkey;>388 — Parents of minor child held “dependent” within Compen- ■ sation Act.
    Where decedent 20 years old earned $4.75 a day, his father $5.25 a day, and a younger son $4.50 a day as laborers, and they pooled their earnings for payment of family living expenses, and one-half or more of deceased’s earnings were used to pay grocery bills, bills for clothing, etc., for other members of the family, the parents were dependent on deceased to some extent, within the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
    Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; J. R. Land, Judge.
    Action under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, by Louis A. Hamilton and another against the Texas Company, for compensation for the death of plaintiffs’ minor son Mark Hamilton. Judgment awarding compensation, and defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Hampden Story, J. S. Atkinson, and Alex F. Smith, all of Shreveport, for appellant.
    Robert A. Hunter and J. M. Grimmet, both of Shreveport, for appeilees.
    By Division C, composed of Justices DAWICINS, ST. PAUL, and THOMPSON.
   DAWKINS, J.

Plaintiffs sue under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act No. 20 of 1914) for ■ the death of their minor son Mark Hamilton.

Defendant pleaded the exception of no cause of action, based upon the allegation that the said minor gave to his said parents all of the wages which he earned in its employ, and from which it was argued that the said son thereby became dependent upon them for his support, in view of the fact that it was further alleged that-they had the right under the law to demand and receive his wages. The exception was overruled, and the defendant answered denying that plaintiffs were dependent to any extent upon the deceased.

There was judgment for plaintiffs as prayed for, and defendant appealed.

Opinion.

Exception of no cause of action.

The petition does affirmatively allege that plaintiffs were dependent upon the earnings of their said son for support; and, while it is also alleged that they were entitled to receive and that he 'did turn over to them his entire wages, we do not think that, in view of the other allegations, this disclosed a condition of dependency of said son upon the parents. It might easily be that a son, who would give all of his earnings to his father or mother or both, would be the sole support of the entire family, and certainly this could not be said to create a condition of dependency of the son upon the parent or parents, either in fact or law. In fact, the law imposes reciprocally upon parent and child the duty of support where their circumstances require it; and we think the petition, as a whole, does allege facts showing a condition of dependency by the plaintiffs upon the earnings of the deceased.

On the Merits.

The only remaining issue is the one of dependency.

The deceased was about 20 years of age, and, at the time of his death, was receiving $4.75 per day, working as a laborer around a well of the defendant. He was killed by being caught in a “bull rope” and dashed against the bull wheel of the well machinery which broke his neck. He was living with his father and mother, together with five other brothers, consisting of one who was nearly 17, one 15, another 12, the fourth 10, and the youngest between 8 and 9 years old.

The father was earning $5.25 per day, also as a laborer in the oil fields, looking after boilers, and the second son was earning, at similar work, the sum of $4.50 per day. The family occupied a rented house which cost $25 per month, and, while some extra rooms were fitted up for taking roomers, the returns from that source were negligible, probably not amounting to enough to cover the expense of maintenance. The mother also occasionally took orders for ladies’ corsets, but the amount earned from that source was very small, and not enough to affect the family fisc materially. The family owned no property save their personal wearing apparel, and some $200 or $300 worth of household effects.

The father and his two sons pooled their earnings, and the same were spent in paying the family living expenses, one-half or more of 'the deceased, Mark Hamilton’s, earnings going to pay grocery bills, market bills for clothing, etc., for other members of the family. In the summer prior to Mark Hamilton's death in November, the father and sons had bought, on terms of credit, a Ford automobile to be used in going to and from the oil fields some five miles distant, in order to save the expense of hiring some one else to take them there and back, or to avoid the long walk to their work. At the time of Mark’s death, a good part of the wages of the second son, Troy, was being applied to the installments on the automobile.

While it is true that, at the rate of wages which the father and his two sons were earning, the total would amount to something over $400 per month, yet it is also true that at that time, November, 1919, the cost of living was abnormally high, especially in an oil field; and that sum would purchase less than half what it would have in anything like normal times. All that was earned was used for the support of the family, and, notwithstanding a most searching cross-examination and inquiry into the minutest detail of the family expenditures, it did not appear that they lived extravagantly or beyond what was reasonably appropriate and necessary to their station in life. Of course a family of eight could have existed on less than that which was earned, but we do not believe it was intended under the compensation statute that dependents should be denied its benefits, except in cases of actual want and suffering. If it were not for this statute, in the circumstances of this case, it is probable that defendant would have to pay a larger sum in damages. Those entitled to compensation under the Act do not have to be wholly dependent upon the deceased, but are allowed to recover if they are dependent “to any extent.”

We think dependency clearly existed both in law and fact, and the judgment is affirmed at appellant’s cost.

Rehearing refused by Division A, composed of Chief Justice PROVOSTY and Justices OVERTON and LECHE.  