
    Amandeep KAUR, et al., Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-71853.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted May 14, 2014.
    
    Filed May 21, 2014.
    Maleeha HAQ, Rai & Associates, Har-deep Singh Rai, Hardeep S. Rai, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioners.
    OIL, Susan Bennett Green, Trial, U.S. Department Of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: GRABER, W. FLETCHER, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Amandeep Kaur, along with her husband and son as derivative applicants, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their application for asylum and withholding of removal, and their request for relief under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Because substantial evidence supports the BIA and IJ’s adverse credibility determination, we deny the petition. See Jie Cui v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir.2013).

1. The BIA permissibly relied on the IJ’s findings related to Kaur’s demeanor as a basis for the adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii) (establishing that an IJ may “base a credibility determination on the demeanor ... of the applicant”); Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir.2010) (explaining that where the BIA defers “to the IJ’s demean- or determination, we ... look to the IJ’s decision as a guide to what lay behind the BIA’s conclusion” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). A credibility determination based on demeanor deserves “special deference” because the “IJ has an opportunity to make a first-person evaluation of all of the subtly conveyed factors that, together, can be evidence of a petitioner’s credibility.” Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir.2005). Here, the IJ explained that she doubted Kaur’s testimony, in part, “because of her demeanor that was not evidencing conviction in her own statement.” The IJ also stated that, when confronted with a particular discrepancy in her story, Kaur became “evasive and defensive.” These statements illustrate that, as required, the IJ “specifically and cogently refer[red]” to the aspects of Kaur’s demeanor that undermined her credibility. See Arulampalam v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 679, 686 (9th Cir.2003).

2. The BIA also permissibly relied upon inconsistencies and irregularities surrounding a letter of support from the president of the Gur Aasra Trust, the Sikh organization with which Kaur was purportedly associated. When confronted with the discrepancies in the letter, neither Kaur nor her counsel offered an explanation. Instead, Kaur steadfastly disavowed the letter and denied having knowledge of how it entered the record. Although the discrepancy in spelling of the president’s name may be, without more, an “utterly trivial inconsistency” attributable to difficulties in Punjabi-to-English translation, the “total circumstances” surrounding the letter allowed the IJ to draw an adverse inference as to Kaur’s veracity. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1043-44 (9th Cir.2010).

PETITION DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     