
    SAMUEL NORMENT vs. GEORGE FASTNAGHT ET AL.
    At Law.
    No. 3134.
    1. An expert cannot give Ms opinion whether upon the face of a conveyance of real estate it covers the premises in controversy.
    STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
    This action was brought by the plaintiff under the land, lord and tenant act of July 4, 1864, on the 12th day of March, 1873, before a justice of the peace, to recover possession of certain premises situated on Sixth street, northwest, in the District of Columbia, and upon the trial before said justice the defendant pleaded title to the premises in James Edward Fastnaght; whereupon the said justice certified the case to the circuit court.
    Plaintiff claims title by purchase at trustee’s sale on the 6th day of February, 1869, by J. N. Oliver, trustee, under a deed of trust made, by George Fastnaght, and Mary Ellen Fastnaght, under a deed executed to him by said trustee, dated March 25, 1871. Mary E. Fastnaght, one of the grantors in said deed of trust, obtained title to the said premises from Margaret Fastnaght by deed dated May 12,1856, under whom all parties claim.
    Upon the purchase of said premises, under deed of trust by plaintiff, an agreement was made between the plaintiff and defendant, George Fastnaght, to rent said premises at eight dollars per month, payable monthly; pursuant to which said George Fastnaght commenced the occupation of said premises on or about the first day of June, 1869, and continued to occupy the same as tenant of the said plaintiff up to the present time, paying rent therefor twenty-three months, to May 1,1871, without objection; since then no rent has been paid.
    Plaintiff also proved that a suit was commenced by him before Justice Weaver for the recovery of two months’ rent, commencing May 1,1871; a judgment in said suit for $80. Also, an appeal from said judgment to the supreme-court of the District of Columbia; a trial of the same upon the merits in said supreme court, and an affirmance thereof.
    In the deeds introduced by the plaintiff to prove his title,, the description of the premises in question reads as follows:
    “ All that certain piece or parcel of ground, viz: The south sixteen (16) feet front on Sixth street west, being a part of the north part of lot four, (4,) in square four hundred and seventy-seven, (477,) described as follows: Beginning on Sixth street, at the northwest corner of said part of lot four, (4,) in aforesaid square, running thence south sixteen (16) feet, thence east ninety-three (93) feet four and one-half (4J) inches, thence north sixteen (16) feet, thence west ninety-three (93) feet four and one-half (4J) inches to beginning.”
    When the plaintiff rested his case, one of the defendants, by his counsel, introduced William H. Ward, who proved that he had been an examiner of titles in this city for twenty-live years, and offered to prove by him that the deed from Margaret Fastnaght to Mary E. Fastnaght, dated the 12th day of May, 1856, and read by the plaintiff to the jury, did not cover the lot in dispute, but by its specific boundary covered another lot or piece of ground, to which testimony as offered the plaintiff objected, and the court sustained the objection, and decided, as a matter of law, that the deed, by its description, metes, and bounds, covered or applied to the piece of ground in dispute; whereupon the counsel for the defendants made his exceptions to the said ruling.
    The defendants also offered to prove by the said witness, Ward, and to explain by him, the ambiguity which appears upon the face of thesaid deed, and to show that it was intended by the parties thereto that it should apply to another and different piece or parcel of ground, and not to the piece of ground in controversy; to which testimony offered the plaintiff, by his counsel, objected, and the court- sustained the objection; which ruling was also excepted to.
    The defendants offered no further testimony. The court instructed the jury that, as matter of law, the said deed from Margaret Fastnaght to Mary E. Fastnaght covered the premises in controversy, and they must find for the plaintiff. Yerdict accordingly.
    
      
      Stilson and Hawes for plaintiff:
    1st. If the description is obscure, the whole should be read together, and so read as to give effect to the whole instrument, and if one or two readings is consistent as a whole, and the other is inconsistent, the consistent one will of course be adopted. Redfield on Wills, pp. 438, 439. So when the description admits of two constructions, one of which will give force and effect to it, and the other will not, the former is the proper one.
    2d. Ambiguities may be patent or latent; the former appear upon the face of the instrument, while the latter do not.
    Patent ambiguities cannot be explained by parol evidence, and will render the instrument to that extent inoperative, 4 Mass. Reports, 205 ; 7 Cranch, 267; Jarman on Wills, 315. Redfield on Wills, pp. 438 and 439, note “ d,” and cases there cited, decided that even the testimony of the party who drew the instrument cannot be resorted to in order to determine the particularintent in cases of patent ambiguities. Also, see 1st Greenleaf's Evidence, sections 298 to 302 inclusive.
    3d. In this case the description contained in the deed is, first, a general one, and then follow the courses and distances, which are definite and unambiguous, unless as to the beginning point, which point, if construed as is claimed by plaintiff and decided in the court below, is entirely consistent with the general description which precedes it.
    It commenced by the words “the south 16 feet,” which evidently means the south 16 feet of the north half or part of said lot 4, as the words “ the north part ” (half) of lot 4, square 477, admit of no other meaning.
    Then follow the words: “ Beginning on Sixth street at the northwest corner of said part (south 16 feet of north half) of lot numbered 4, in the aforesaid square, and running thence,” Sac.
    
    Now, had it been intended to commence at the northwest corner of lot 4, instead of the northwest corner of the south part of said lot 4, the words “part of” would have been omitted. Any other construction would be forced and unreasonable, and render the deed inoperative and void.
    
      . 4th. All parties have recognized and adopted this view of the case; borrowed and loaned money upon it; occupied under and paid rent for it, and are estopped from now claiming otherwise, by their own acts and all the circumstances in the case.
    
      Moore & Newman for defendants:
    If the description of ground in a deed is ambiguous or doubtful, parol evidence of the practical construction given by the parties, by acts of occupancy, recognition of monuments or boundaries, or otherwise, is admissible in aid of the interpretation. 1 Green, on Ev., p. 350, latter part of note 2; Atkinson vs. Cummins, 9 How., 479; Stone vs. Clark, 1 Met., 378; Crafts et al. vs. Hibbard et al., 4 Met., 438.
    Where there is an ambiguity which impedes the execution of the contract, it is first, if possible, to be resolved on a view of the whole contract or instrument, aided by the admitted views of the parties, and if indispensable, parol evidence may be admitted to clear it. 2 Bouv. Law Dic., 286, (Construction;) Jackson vs. Wilkinson, 17 John., 146.
    Where the language of a deed is doubtful in the description of the land, conveyed, parol evidence of the practical interpretation, by the acts of the parties, is admissible, to remove the doubt. 1 Green, on Ev., s. 293, and authorities; Stone vs. Clark, 1 Met., 378; 1 Sngden on Vend., (6th edition,) 211, note 1; Godman et al. vs. Winslow, 10 Mass., 149.
    If the premises be described in general terms and a particular description be added, the latter controls the former. 1 Green. on Ev., sec. 301.
    In the description of property in a deed, specific boundaries, or metes and bounds, control courses, distances, and quantity, and if a description contains all three, and the course and distance, or quantity, be incompatible with the specific boundaries, the latter prevails.
   By the Court:

The defendant offered Ward as an expert to testify that upon the face of the conveyance of real estate it did not apply to or cover the premises iu controversy. We think the objection was properly sustained. Experts cannot be called to give their opinions on a subject of this character. Witnesses are competent to show lines and measurements, but the construction of written instruments is for the court alone.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice Humphreys dissenting.  