
    PEOPLE v. HANLEY
    Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Withdrawal of Plea.
    Once a plea of guilty has been entered, there no longer exists an unfettered right on the part of the accused to withdraw the plea and the plea should not be set aside where defendant and his attorney requested probation at sentencing which the court stated would be inappropriate and defendant then claimed his innocence for the first time; on appeal defendant offered no reason why he originally pled guilty; and the record shows that the request to withdraw the plea is merely a dilatory tactic.
    Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, George W. Crockett, Jr., J.
    Submitted Division 1 June 15, 1970, at Detroit.
    (Docket No. 5,312.)
    Decided July 30, 1970.
    Leave to appeal denied December 31, 1970. 384 Mich 791.
    Ammon Hanley was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of breaking and entering an unoccupied dwelling with intent to commit larceny. Defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cabalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Arthur N. Bishop, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
    
      Gerald David White, for defendant on appeal.
    References for Points in Headnote
    21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§491, 503-506.
    Plea of guilty or conviction as resulting in loss or privilege against self-incrimination as to crime in question. 9 ALR3d 990.
    
      Before: McGregor, P. J., and J. H. Gillis and O’Hara, JJ.
    
      
       Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.
    
   Per Curiam.

On September 11, 1967, the defendant was charged with breaking and entering an occupied dwelling, with intent to commit larceny. MCLA § 750.110 (Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp § 28.305). The accused appeared before the court on October 20, 1967, and, with the assistance of counsel, pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of breaking and entering an unoccupied dwelling with intent to commit larceny. At the sentencing, defendant and his attorney requested rehabilitation (apparently meaning probation) and the court stated that it felt that this would be inappropriate. Defendant then, for the first time, claimed his innocence; the court proceeded to sentence the defendant to prison.

Although neither the defendant nor his counsel made any motion to withdraw the plea of guilty, we shall for purposes of this appeal treat the defendant’s protestations of innocence as a motion to withdraw his plea.

Once a plea of guilty has been entered, there no longer exists an unfettered right on the part of the accused to withdraw a plea of guilty. People v. Zaleski (1965), 375 Mich 71; People v. Whitmer (1969), 16 Mich App 703; People v. Pulliam (1968), 10 Mich App 481.

In the instant case, defendant offers no reason why he originally pled guilty; furthermore, our examination of the record reveals that this request is merely a dilatory tactic. Defendant’s reference to and reliance on People v. Hollman (1968), 12 Mich App 231, is misplaced. The Court therein stated that permission to withdraw a plea of guilty must be liberally granted, wherein no trial had commenced and the record showed circumstances that cast grave suspicion upon the veracity and voluntariness of the guilty plea. The trial court properly inquired into the facts and circumstances surrounding the instant ease, for determination of the truthfulness and voluntariness of the plea, and any alleged error has not resulted in a miscarriage of justice. People v. Winegar (1968), 380 Mich 719; People v. Stearns (1968), 380 Mich 704; People v. Dunn (1968), 380 Mich 693.

Trial court is affirmed.  