
    *Lane v. Mason.
    December, 1834.
    Richmond.
    (Absent Cabbia, J.)
    Mortgage of Slaves — Recordation—Case at Bar. — A mortgage of slaves is recorded in the county of A. the slaves being at the time of the execution and recording of the deed, in the county of B. and after the recording of the deed in A. the slaves are removed to A. but the deed is not recorded anew there, after such removal; and then the mortgagor mortgages the same slaves to another person, and this mortgage is recorded in A. where the slaves are at the time of the execution and recording thereof: Held, upon the construction of the statute, 1 Rev. Code, ch. 99, § 11, the first mortgage was not duly recorded, and so is void as ' against the second mortgagee.
    Detinue for two slaves, by Mason against Dane, in the circuit superiour court of Sussex. Plea, the general issue. The facts were stated in a case agreed by the parties, as follows:
    James Cooper, by deed, dated the 18th May 1828, but in fact executed in 1829, conveyed the two slaves in question (among others) to Mason, the plaintiff, in trust, for the purpose of indemnifying Brown and Harris from loss by reason of a suretyship they had incurred for him. This deed was recorded in the county court of Southamption, in May 1829. Cooper resided in the county of Southampton, at the time the deed was executed and recorded, but the slaves were then in the county of Sussex, in the possession of Cooper’s father, under an agreement by which the father was to hold the possession for two years; before the expiration of which two years, though after the deed had been recorded in Southampton, Cooper’s father died, and he thereupon took possession of these slaves, and removed them to Southampton, where the deed had been recorded. It was never recorded in Sussex. After the slaves had been removed to Southampton, Cooper, by another deed, dated the 4th May 1830, mortgaged the slaves in question to Dane, the defendant: this deed was duly recorded in Southhampton : *and under it, Dane claimed and got possession of the slaves, and they were sold for his benefit. And the question referred to the court, was, Whether the plaintiff upon this state of the case had right to recover the two slaves?
    The circuit superiour court held, that the law on the case agreed was for the plaintiff, and gave him judgment: to which this court upon the petition of Dane, allowed a supersedeas.
    The cause was argued here by Shands for the plaintiff in error, and Robinson for the defendant.
    It turned on the construction and effect of the provision of the statute of conveyances, touching the registry of deeds of trust of personal chattels, 1 Rev. Code, ch. 99, § 11, p. 364.
   BROCKENBROUGH, J.

The statute provides, that every deed of trust of personalty, which ought to be recorded, shall be recorded in the court of that county in which such property “shall remain.” It is clear, that at the time the deed was recorded in Southampton, and between that period and that in which the slaves were carried to Southampton, the deed was void as to purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, and as to all creditors, because the slaves were remaining in a different county, namely, Sussex. Did the subsequent removal of them to Southampton, give life and energy to the deed which had been void before? I think not. In what clerk’s office would a purchaser of these slaves, or a creditor of Cooper, look for a deed passing the title to some one else? Certainly, he would examine the Sussex office, because in that county the slaves were abiding. When, at a posteriour period, they were removed to Southampton by the visible owner of them, he would not look to the registry of deeds in that county, at_ any prior time; because, during such prior time, the slaves were not there, and he could not expect to find any deed for slaves that were not then remaining there; that is, residing or abiding there. The recording of the deed in Southampton ^'before the slaves were removed, was not constructive notice to purchasers and creditors. I am of opinion, that the judgment is erroneous, and must be .reversed, and a judgment entered for the defendant in the court below.

The other judges concurred. Judgment reversed.  