
    GUILD v. STATE.
    (No. 4089.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    June 7, 1916.
    Rehearing Denied June 23, 1916.)
    1. Criminal Law <&wkey;>l’092(16), 1099(13) — Bills on Exceptions—Time por Filing— Statute.
    In a prosecution for violation of the pure feed law, a misdemeanor, where the bills of exceptions and statement of facts were filed in the lower court after the adjournment of the term at which a conviction was had, without an order authorizing the filing, the court will not review them on appeal.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig-. §§ 2847, 2876; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 1092(16), 1099(13).]
    2. Indictment and Information <&wkey;110(2)— Information—Stjfficien cy.
    Under Acts 29th Leg. c. 108, as amended by Acts 30th Leg. c. 131, relating to pure feed-stuff and making a violation of its provisions a misdemeanor; and using terms “concentrated «ommercial feeding stuff” and “concentrated feed stuff” interchangeably, not attempting to make any difference between them so far as the offense is concerned, an information naming the cotton seed cake described therein as “concentrated feeding stuff,” omitting the word •'commercial,” was sufficient.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 290-294; Dec. Dig. &wkey;110(2).]
    3. Adulteration <&wkey;2—Statutes—Validity —Constitutionality—Public Policy.
    Acts 29th Leg. c. 108, as amended by Acts 30th Leg. c. 131, relating to pure feeding stuffs and prescribing as a punishment for its violation a fine and imprisonment, is not void as against public policy because it makes the agent of a principal guilty of an offense instead of making the principal so only, since the person who actually commits a crime will be punished therefor whether he is acting on his own initiative or is an agent for a principal, and it is with rare exceptions that a corporation is punished for violation of a criminal statute.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Adulteration, Cent. Dig. §§ 1, 2; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;2.]
    Appeal from Hemphill County Court; J. L. Jennings, Judge.
    Frank Guild was convicted of violating the pure feedstuff law, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Hoover & Dial, of Canadian, for appellant. C. C. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   PRENDERGAST, P. J.

Appellant was convicted of violating our pure feedstuff law, and the lowest punishment assessed.

The record shows that what purports to be bills of exceptions and a statement of facts were filed in the lower court some time after the adjournment of the term at which the conviction occurred without any order authorizing this to be done. The statute and the uniform decisions of this court are clearly to the effect that under such circumstances in misdemeanor eases 'this court can consider none of them. Hence the Assistant- Attorney General’s motion to strike them out must be, and is, sustained. Some of these cases are collated in 2 Vern. Crim. Stats, p. 827.

Appellant’s contention in his motion in arrest of judgment that the information is insufficient because he named the cotton seed cake described therein as “concentrated commercial feeding stuff,” when the statute makes it “concentrated feeding stuff,” omitting the word “commercial,” is untenable. The original act of 1905 (page 207), with certain sections of it amended by the Act of 1907 (page 243), uses the terms “concentrated commercial feeding stuffs” and “concentrated feed stuffs” rather interchangeably. At least under the terms of this statute, there is no difference between the two. The statute does not attempt to make any difference between them, so far as the offense is concerned, but, as stated, treats them as if they were the same.

Neither is there anything in appellant’s contention that said law is unreasonable, against public policy, and void for the reason that it makes the agent of the principal guilty of an offense instead of making the principal so only. It is the general principle of law in this state that the person who actually commits a crime shall be punished therefor, whether he be acting on his own initiative or is an agent for a principal, and especially is this.true in misdemeanor cases, as this case is. It is with rare exceptions our law provides for the punishment of a corporation for the violation of a criminal statute. In some instances it does so by prescribing a penalty to be recovered by suit in contradistinction from a fine or imprisonment therefor. In this case appellant’s principal was a corporation as he claimed. The statute prescribes as a punishment for its violation a fine, or imprisonment in the county jail, or both. If a corporation was insolvent, there would he no way whatever of enforcing a conviction of it. It could not be imprisoned either as a part of the punishment or for failure to pay the money fine. Hence, in order to enforce the law, it is essential that the agent who commits the crime shall be punished therefor instead of his principal, a corporation.

The judgment is affirmed.  