
    McCoy's Heirs v. Crawford and another.
    The mode of obtaining personal service of process upon the defendant in 1839 was by delivering to him a copy of the writ and petition; and, therefore, where the sheriff’s return was served by reading the within,” it was held that all the subsequent proceedings, including a sale under execution, were null, notwithstanding that the defendant was represented by a curator ad litem.
    
    No person is bound by any decree or judgment to which he has not become a party in some of the modes known to law. '
    
    Where an administrator purchases land at a judicial sale made to satisfy a claim in favor of the estate which he represents, and canses the purchase-money to be credited on the claim,the purchase inures to the benefit of the estate, and, after the close of the administration, the heirs may recover the land, notwithstanding the administrator may have accounted for the purchase-money in the final settlement of his accounts, and sold the land to a third person having notice of the facts.
    It seems that the objection of nullity, when apparent on the record, may be taken at any time1 and by any person.
    Appeal from Gonzales. The appellants brought suit against the appellees on the 17th of February, 1S46, to establish their title to a third of a league of land granted to their ancestor. The ancestor, Samuel McCoy, in his lifetime sold the land to one Grigsby for .$1,111, of which Grigsby, at the time, paid $239.50, and gave his promissory notes for the balance, payable when McCoy and his wife should make to him a title, they, at the same time, giving their bond to make title upon payment of the notes.
    The petition sot forth that the administrator of McCoy recovered judgment against Grigsby on the notes given by him for the purchase-money; that the defendant, Crawford, afterwards intermarried with the widow of AicCoy, and was appointed administrator da bonis non of the estate; that he and his wife executed to Grigsby a conveyance of the land, but without the authority of an order or decree" of any court of competent jurisdiction, and that the conveyance was ineffectual and void; that Crawford, while acting as administrator, took out execution on the judgment in favor of the estate against Grigsby; caused the land to he levied on and sold as the property of Grigsby to satisfy the judgment, and became himself the purchaser, taking the deed in his own name, but pretending to purchase for the benefit of the heirs of McCoy, the now plaintiffs; that he paid nothing to the estate, and that whatever he may have pretended to pay was the money of the plaintiffs; and that lie afterwards sold the land to the defendant, Threadgill, who purchased with a knowledge of the facts.
    Tiie prayer of the petition was that the levy and sale of the land he annulled ; that tiie defendants he decreed to convey to the plaintiffs; and for general relief.
    The answer to Crawford admitted the contract of sale between McCoy and Grigsby; tiie conveyance by himself and wife; tiie levjr and sale to satisfy the judgment against Grigsby, and that ho (Crawford) was the purchaser, hut said he had fully accounted to the estate for the amount of the purchase-money. The defendant, Threadgill, admitted his purchase from Crawford; averred that it was made in good faith for a valuable consideration, and denied that he knew, of any defect in the title of Crawford.
    
      Tlie plaintiff gave in evidence tlie record of tlie proceedings in tlie suit by the administrators of McCoy against Grigsby for the residue of the purchase-money contracted to be paid for the land, from which it appeared that the suit was instituted in July, 1S39, in Gonzales county; citation issued to Jefferson county, where the defendant resided, on which the sheriff of that county made tlie following return : “Served by reading the within, August “ 2d, 1S39.” At the Fall Term thereafter, the defendant not having appeared, the court appointed a “ curator ad litem,” who pleaded to tlie jurisdiction. The court overruled the objection, and gave judgment- that the contract between the intestate and Grigsby be specifically performed; that the plaintiffs recover of the defendant the residue of the purchase-money, and that, they execute to him a conveyance of the laud. It was in proof that Crawford, having- intermarried with the widow of McCoy, was appointed administrator de bonis non of the estate in September, 1841, and in November thereafter, jointly with his wife, executed the conveyance to Grigsby, in conformity to the decree of the Gonzales District Court", and filed it among tlie papers in that case; that ho thereupon took out execution upon the judgment, which was levied on the land. There was a sale, at which Crawford was the purchaser, in December, 1S41. He, being at the time administrator of the estate, had the amount of his bid credited on the execution. There was no evidence that Grigsby ever accepted or had any knowledge whatever of the conveyance to him by Crawford and wife. Crawford sold the land to Tlireadgill at more than double the amount at which he purchased, and in his account for final settlement as administrator credited the estate with the amount at which ho had purchased.
    It was in evidence that Tlireadgill was present at the sheriff’s sale; that, he made inquiries whether Crawford could make a good title by virtue, of his then purchase. He was apprised of the facts, and advised that if he bought he would take his title subject to litigation. The material averments of the petition, not admitted by the answer, were proved substantially as averred. The case was submitted to the court (a jury being waived) upon the petition, auswer, and evidence. Whereupon it was adjudged by the court that the petition be dismissed, and that the defendant, Tlireadgill, bo quieted in his possession, &c. The plaintiffs appealed.
    
      jL. Neill and J. Sayles, for appellants.
    
      A. II. Philips and Q. W. Paschal, for appellees.
   Wheeler, J.

The plaintiffs rested their claims to relief on two grounds :

1st. The nullity of the judgment against Grigsby and the invalidity of the proceedings thereon.

2d. A trust resulting to them upon the purchase by Crawford.

The mode of obtaining personal service of process upon the defendant in 1839, when the citation in the suit against Grigsby purports to have been served, was by delivering to him a copy of tlie writ and petition. There was no authority of law for serving process by simply reading it. There was, therefore, no legal service of process upon Grigsby. He had not legal notice of the suit, and, consequently, was not affected by the judgment. No person is bound by any decree or judgment to which he has not become a party in some of the inodes known to tlie law. (3 U. S. Cond., 312; 9 How. R., 350; 15 J. R., 142; 1 Hill (N. Y.) R., 139, 141; 1 Barb. R., 289; 2 B. Mour., 455; 11 N. Hamp., 191.) The judgment as to Grigsby was void. Ills rights were in noway affected by it or by the proceedings under it. Those proceedings neither invested him with the title to the land nor did they divest that of the heirs of McCoy. But the acts of the defendants were calculated to cast a cloud upon the piaintiff’s title, and they might well maintain the action to remove tlie adverse claims asserted and to lie secured in the possession and enjoyment of their property. (Hatch v. Garza, 7 Tex. R., 60.)

Moreover, flic administrator, Crawford, purchased with the funds of the estate ; and if the, judgment against Grigsby had been valid and the sale legal, still the purchase would have inured to the benefit of the estate. It. is well settled that where one buys land with the money of another and takes the deed in his own name, a trust results in favor of the person whose money was employed in making the purchase. The latter is the equitable, owner of the land, and tlie purchaser is a mere trustee aud holds for the benelit of him who paid tin* pnrehasei-nioney. (Neill v. Keese, 5 Tex. R., 23.)

The defendant, Threadgill, bought with a knowledge of the facts. lie is chargeable, with notice of'the, title'of the plaintiffs, and his purchase was subject to their rights. He acquired no better title than his vendor possessed. The conduct of the administrator was a fraud upon the rights of the. heirs of the estate, which he represented; and Threadgill, by his purchase from the administrator, with a knowledge of the facts, becameparticeps criminis in the fraud. As between the parties to this suit, the title to the land, both legal and equitable, appears to be in the plaintiffs. They clearly were entitled to maintain the action, aud the court erred in giving- judgment for the defendants. The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Beversed and remanded.  