
    (*) Doe versus Scribner.
    It is a general principle in the law of evidence, that copies are inadmissible to prove the contents of deeds.
    The exception made by the 34th Rule of the Court to that principle, does not authorize the introduction of office copies, except in actions “ touching the realty.”
    To show that a debtor obtained a discharge of tbe debt fraudulently, original deeds of conveyance made by him. about the same time are admissible in evidence. But, for such a purpose, Copies are not admissible, unless the originals are lost.
    In a verdict, which was prepared by the jury, there was an accidental omission to insert the amount of damage which they had agreed upon. Held, that in taking the verdict, it was rightful in the Court to authorize the jury to insert the amount, though, after sealing it up, they had separated for the night by leave of the Court.
    On Exceptions from Nisi Prius, Rice, J., presiding.
    Assumpsit, upon a promissory note made to the plaintiff. The defendant relied on a release of the cause of action, contained in an instrument under seal, purporting to he an assignment by him for the benefit of his creditors, bearing date Nov. 16, 1850, and executed by the plaintiff and others. The plaintiff insisted that this assignment was void by reason of fraud on the part of the defendant,, and because it required of the creditors, who should become parties thereto, a release of “ all manner of actions, demands, and claims whatsoever, against the said Scribner,” and not a simple release of debts.
    To establish the charge of fraud, the plaintiff offered. to read office copies of sundry deeds conveying real estate, purporting to be excuted by the defendant to third persons, previous to the 16th of Nov. 1850, without offering any proof of diligence to produce the originals. To the introduction of these copies as evidence, the defendant objected ; but the Judge overruled the objection and the copies were read. The plaintiff also introduced witnesses whose testimony tended to establish the fraud.
    On Friday evening, the Judge, after charging the jury, instructed them to retire, seal up their, verdict, and bring it into Court the next morning. In the morning, (the jury, having in the meanwhile agreed, and sealed up their verdict and separated,) they came into Court, and delivered to the clerk their sealed verdict, which was for the plaintiff, generally, but contained no assessment of damages. On inquiry by the Judge, the foreman stated that the jury had computed and agreed upon the damages on a separate paper. The Judge then directed the foreman to insert the-amount of damages in the verdict. Whereupon, (the defendant objecting,) the Judge ordered the verdict so amended to be accepted, affirmed and recorded.
    To the aforesaid ruling and order of the Judge the defendant excepted.
    The counsel submitted the point as to the admissibility of the office copies without argument.
    They then discussed the question, of the validity of the release. Upon this question however, the Court found it unnecessary to give an opinion.
    
      Paine, for the plaintiff.
    
      Bradbury, for the defendant.
   Howard, J.

On general principles of the law of evidence, copies are inadmissible in proof of the contents of deeds. Under the 34th Rule of this Court, office copies from the ¡registry of deeds may be read in evidence, without proof of their execution, only in actions touching the realty, and in tracing titles, and “ where the party offering such office copy in evidence is not a party to the deed, nor claims as heir, nor justifies as servant' of the grantee or his heirs.” Kent v. Weld, 11 Maine, 459; Woodman v. Coolbroth, 7 Maine, 181; Hutchinson v. Chadbourne, 35 Maine, 189.

Damages, it appears, had been duly assessed by the jury before they separated, but were not inserted in the verdict, as first presented. Inserting the amount thus ascertained, and which constituted an element of the finding, by direction of the presiding Justice, was an authorized amendment of the verdict before it was accepted or affirmed. It was but reducing it to form, in order to render it available and effective. Blake v. Blossom, 15 Maine, 394; Root v. Sherwood, 6 Johns. 68 ; Blackley v. Sheldon, 7 Johns. 32; Snell v. Bangor Steam Navigation Co. 30 Maine, 337.

But as the office copies of deeds were inadmissible for the purposes for which they were offered and received, the exceptions are sustained.

Shepley, C. J,, and Wells and Hathaway, J. J., concurred.  