
    William E. Summers, Appellant, v. The Phenix Insurance Company, Respondent.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Term,
    March, 1906.)
    Master and servant — The relation — Duration of employment and termination of relation—Renewal or continuance of employment — General or indefinite hiring; actions for wrongful discharge — Instructions.
    A hiring at so much a year, no time being specified, may be terminated at any time by either party.
    Where plaintiff entered defendant’s employ May 29, 1893, under a distinct agreement that the hiring was for one year, and, in ar action for a wrongful discharge under an allégation of employment for one year from May 29, 1904, at a salary of $1,200, there is evidence that his salary was increased from time to time, usually on the first of January, a request to charge that under the original agreement there was a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that “ the plaintiff and • defendant agreed to a continuation for another year ” is properly refused as such a request calls for a finding, not as to the alleged implied contract sued upon, but to an alleged contract for one year from May 29, 1894.
    The. last increase of salary, which was to $1,200, began January 1, 1902, for which plaintiff receipted monthly in a book in defendant’s office which, as he knew, contained an entry to the effect that his compensation was to be at the rate of $1,200 per annum by order of the executive committee; held, that this acknowledgment of what constituted the contract of the parties from the date of the last increase of salary superseded the previous arrangement and made plaintiff’s request to charge as to an implication of a renewal of the original employment wholly immaterial.
    Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment - of the City Court of the city of ¡New York, rendered in favor of the defendant
    Job E. Hedges (Richard Ely, of counsel), for appellant.
    Fred Ingraham (James W. Treadwell, of counsel), for respondent
   O’Gorman, J.

Action for wrongful discharge, under an allegation of “employment for one year from May 29, 1904, at a salary of $1,200.” Concededly there was no express agreement of employment on this date. Plaintiff’s theory is that, as he entered the defendant’s employ on May 29, 1893, under a distinct agreement that the hiring was for one year, there was a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, “ that the plaintiff and defendant agreed to a continuation for another yearand the ruling complained of by the plaintiff was the court’s refusal to so instruct the jury. This rule of law has no application to the facts in this case. The request called for a finding, not as to the alleged implied contract sued upon, that of May 29, 1904, for the succeeding year, but to an alleged contract for - one year from May 29, 1894. Moreover, there was “.evidence to the contrary.” His salary was increased from time to time, not on May twenty-ninth of any year, but usually on the first of January, which is quite inconsistent with the plaintiff’s contention that, on the twenty-ninth of May of each year, there arose a new agreement for another year upon the same terms. His last increase, which was to $1,200, began on January 1, 1902; and, thereafter, plaintiff’s receipts of his monthly salary were signed by him in a book in the defendant’s office which, as plaintiff knew, contained an entry to the effect that plaintiff’s compensation was to be “at the rate ” of $1,200 per annum, by order of the executive committee. This acknowledgment of what constituted the contract of the parties from January 1, 1902, supersedes the previous arrangement and makes the request of the plaintiff as to the implication of a renewal of the original employment wholly immaterial. A hiring at so much a year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring; and such a hiring is a hiring at will and may be terminated at any time by either party. Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 117.

Scott and Hbwburg-er, JJ., concur. .

Judgment affirmed, with costs. ' " .  