
    Bank of the Metropolis v. Joseph Walker.
    A judgment upon a special verdict, or upon a verdict subject to tlie opinion of the Court upon a case stated, does not relate hack to the date of the verdict so as to overreach an intermediate judgment against the same defendant in another cause.
    The plaintiffs (the Bank of the Metropolis) obtained a verdict against the defendant at October term, 1821, subject to the opinion of the Court upon a case stated. Before any argument upon the points reserved the cause was continued to April term, 1822, and argued on the 2d of May, and also on a subsequent day.
    The Couet, on the 7th of June, 1822, rendered judgment for the plaintiff upon the case stated.
    In the intermediate time, viz. on the 24th of April, 1822, King and Langley recovered a judgment against the same defendant (Joseph Walker) and the marshal levied the fieri facias upon the defendant’s land, and made the money.
    The Bank of the Metropolis obtained a rule upon the marshal to show cause why he should not pay over to that bank the money which he had thus made out of the defendant’s real estate upon the fieri facias in favor of King and Langley, upon the ground that the judgment, in favor of the bank upon the case stated, related back to the time of the finding of the verdict at.October term, 1821, and overreached the judgment in favor of King and Langley, rendered on the 24th of April, 1822.
    In support of this idea, Mr. Asliion, for the bank,
    cited the case of Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. Rep. 395, where a ease was ordered by the court to stand over for advisement and the defendant died. The court said that they would take care that the plaintiff should not suffer by the delay of the court, and ordered the judgment to be entered as of the preceding term.
    
      Mr. Morfit, contrd,
    
    cited Taylor v. Harris, 3 Bos. & Pul. 549, and Welsh v. Murray, 4 Dal. 320.
   The CouRT

discharged the rule, being of opinion that the judgment did not relate back to the verdict; no argument having been had upon the ease stated, nor had it been submitted to the Court before the cause was continued, by consent, from October term, 1821, to April term, 1822. It was not continued under cur. ad. vult.  