
    Dinorah MILLAN-PORTELA, aka Dinorah A. Millan-Portela, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-73352.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 4, 2013.
    
    Filed April 2, 2013.
    Chanpone Pone Sinlapasai-Okamura, Esquire, Marandas & Okamura LLP, Lake Oswego, OR, for Petitioner.
    David Schor, Trial, OIL, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    
      Before: FERNANDEZ, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Dinorah Millan-Portela (Millan-Porte-la), petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision finding her statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because she was convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT). We deny the petition.

1. Millan-Portela failed to establish that any ineffective assistance of counsel was prejudicial because her two theft convictions rendered her statutorily ineligible for relief. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 903 (9th Cir.2003). Although Millan-Portela’s attorney was required to inform her of the immigration consequences of her guilty plea pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), that case does not apply retroactively to Millan-Portela’s claims. See Chaidez v. United States, No. — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1104-05, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013).

2. The IJ’s failure to correct any errors made by counsel during the removal proceedings did not render those proceedings “fundamentally unfair,” as the IJ’s only responsibility is to advise the Petitioner of available relief. See United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 900-01 (9th Cir.2010) (explaining that an IJ is not responsible for advising a petitioner of relief that is not reasonably available).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     