
    George HEATH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUSTICES OF SUPREME COURT, New York County, Justices of Appellate Division (1 Dept), Justices of N.Y. State Court of Appeals, Justices of United States District Court (E.D.N.Y.), Justices of U.S. Court of Appeals (2D Cir.), Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-2133-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 16, 2014.
    George Heath, pro se, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Andrew W. Amend, Assistant Solicitor General of Counsel, (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Michael S. Belohlavek, Senior Counsel, on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, NY, representing the State Defendants.
    Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York (Varuni Nelson, Margaret M. Kolbe and Matthew Silverman, Assistant United States Attorneys of Counsel, on the brief), Brooklyn, NY, representing the Federal Defendants.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, CHESTER J. STRAUB and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant George Heath, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action against several state and federal judges, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

A district court has the inherent authority to “dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee.” Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir.2000). Although we have not resolved whether such dismissals are reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion, we need not reach that issue to affirm the district court’s decision “because [it] easily passes muster under the more rigorous de novo review.” Id. at 364 n. 2. The district court properly dismissed Heath’s claims as barred by absolute judicial immunity. Judges when “acting in a judicial capacity[,] are entitled to absolute immunity.” Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir.1999). Because all the actions taken by the judicial defendants and complained of by Heath were actions taken in their judicial capacity and in connection with Heath’s federal and state court proceedings, Heath’s claims are foreclosed by absolute immunity.

We have considered Heath’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  