
    *Beall v. Silver.
    March, 1824.
    Fraudulent Con veyances- — Suit to Impeach — Prayer for Genera! Relief — Interest  — A creditor having obtained judgment against his debtor, without running interest, his execution is obstructed by a fraudulent conveyance made by the debtor, of his property. A suit in Chancery is then brought to remove the obstruction oi the conveyance, and for general relief. The Chancellor ought to decree the interest, as well as to set aside the conveyance ; the prayer for general relief being sufficient to cover the demand of interest.
    
      In an action of debt for 3521. 3s. brought in the General Court of Maryland, in 1791, by Charles Carroll against Zephaniah Beall, the appellant Nathaniel Beall and one Richard Gatrell became jointly bound as special bail of Zephaniah. Zephaniah Beall, and the joint bail Gatrell, both removed to Berkeley county, Virginia, pending the suit; and Carroll coerced satisfaction of his judgment for the debt, of Nathaniel Beall. Nathaniel brought a suit against Zephaniah, in the District Court of Winchester, to recover the amount which he had been thus compelled to pay for him; obtained judgment in 1807 for $1,695 51, damages, and $12 49, costs; and sued out execution without effect, being-defeated by the fraudulent conveyance herein-after mentioned. The judgment did not give running interest. Some years after-wards, Nathaniel Beall exhibited his bill in the Superior Court of Chancery of Winchester, against Zephaniah Beall’s widow and children, and one Francis Silver ; charging, that Zephaniah had made a fraudulent conveyance of slaves to Silver, in order to prevent the recovery of this just debt, which had actually been used to prevent the Sheriff from levying the execution; 'and praying, that the pretended conveyance might be set aside, and - that so many of the slaves might be sold as would satisfy the amount of the judgment. The imputed fraud was denied, and some objections made to the jurisdiction of the Court, and for want of parties : the Chancellor over-ruled these objections; held the conveyance clearly fraudulent; decreed, that the ^defendant Silver should pay the plaintiff the principal due on his judgment, and the costs of this suit, within two months from the date of the decree; and directed that the Marshal, in default of such payment by Silver, should sell as many of the slaves as would suffice to satisfy the decree: and dismissed the bill as to the other parties. The plaintiff, after-wards in the same term, asked the Chancellor to amend _ the decree, and allow him interest on his debt. This was denied. From so much of the decree as withheld interest, the plaintiff prayed, and the Court granted, an appeal to this Court.
    Leigh, for the appellant.
    Tucker, for the appellee.
    The question turned upon the propriety of the decree, in omitting to give running interest, under the circumstances of the case.
    It was said for the appellant, that the plaintiff being driven into a Court of Equity by the .fraudulent conduct of the defendant, that Court had cognizance of the whole case. It was not confined to the removal of the hindrance, but should go on and do complete justice between the parties. The Chancellor, therefore, did right in decreeing a sale of the property, thus fraudulently conveyed, but should also have decreed the running interest on the judgment.
    For the appellee, it was said, that the decree properly refused interest; for, all the party had a right to ask, or the' Court to grant, was, to put the fraudulent conveyance out of his way, and to decree that the property, and the rents and profits of it, (if necessary,) should be subject to the payment of the debt. The Court could only have decreed against Beall, what he could have been compelled to pay *under the execution, viz: the amount of the judgment, without the running interest. Otherwise, there would be one measure of justice at law, and another in equity.
    March 2.
    
      
      Fraudulent Conveyance. — See monographic note on "Fraudulent and Voluntary Conveyances” appended to Cochran v. Paris, II Oratt. 848
      Same — lOonee as Executor de Sosa Tort. — Tf a. man makes a fraudulent deed, and die, the fraudulent doner will be liable as exeeutor de son tort. Shear-man v, Christian, 6 Rand. 49, citing principal case.
    
    
      
      Chancery Practice — Interest on Judgment. — In this state, interest is generally recoverable on a judgment -botti at law and in equity. Tazewell v. Saunders. 13 Gratt. 368.
      That a court of equity will under circumstances give interest on a judgment sounding only in damages and not carrying interest in terms, cannot Re denied. Mercer v. Beale, 4 Leigh. 196, citing principal case. To the same effect, the principal case is cited in Laidley y. Merrifield. 7 Leigh 357, 358. 360. See further, monographic note on “Judgments” appended to Smith v. Charlton, 7 Gratt. 425: mono-graphic note on “Interest” appended to Fred v. Dixon. 27 Gratt. 541. The principal case is also cited in Bank v. Good, 21 W. Va. 461.
    
   JUDGE BROOKE,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The conveyance, which is sought to be set aside, was too obviously fraudulent, to require any comment on the facts in the record, to p'rove it; and, the only real question in the cause is, whether the interest on the judgment ought to have been decreed, as well as the principal. In the case of Chamberlayne v. Temple, (ante,) the ground on which a creditor, after the death of the debtor, may come into a Court of Chancery, to charge the donee holding the property of the debtor under a fraudulent deed, was. fully explored. This case is much stronger than that case. Here, there was a judgment in the life-time of the debtor, and an execution which bound the property. In that case, the judgment was against the administrator only, and the property was not bound, otherwise than as the property of every debtor is bound, by the trust for the payment of debts. In this case, there is actual and gross fraud; in that, the fraud was only in construction of law. In .this case, there is no legal executor or administrator, and the debtor died insolvent, except as to the property fraudulently conveyed. In that case, there was a legal administrator, into whose hands a large amount of property came to be administered; and the donees were held to be chargeable as executors de son tort. In this case, the appellee, though not so charged in the bill, must be considered as virtually an executor de son tort, though not sued in that character, as in the case referred to; and is liable, in the same manner, and to the same extent, to creditors, as a rightful executor. It would be strange, indeed, if this executor, in *his own wrong, who has obtained the possession of the debtor’s goods, by actual and not constructive fraud only, and_ who is entitled to the surplus after paying debts, should escape the payment of interest, when a rightful executor, bound to distribute the surplus, would be bound to pay it. The prayer for general relief, in the bill, being sufficient to entitle the appellant to an allowance of interest, the Court, on the ground stated, is of opinion to reverse the decree, and to send the cause back for further proceedings, according to the principles of this decree; m which, a decree is to be entered for principal with interest, to be paid out of the property, its proceeds and profits, on the terms of payment usual in such cases. 
      
      Judge Cabelx., absent from indisposition.
     