
    Moore and M’Clung v. Fitzwater.
    
    May, 1824.
    Compromises — Binding—Nature of — Case at Bar.— Where two parties claim title to lands, and they compromise the dispute, by one party paying a sum of money, and the other conveying the land with warranty, such agreement will be binding, if there be no fraud or imposition in obtaining the agreement.
    This was an appeal from the Greenbrier Chancery Court.
    The controversy related to a body of land on Gauley river, which Moore and M’Clung had located. Fitzwater located land on the north-western side of the same river, supposing that Moore and M’Clung’s patent only extended to the south side of the river; and supposing himself to be lawfully entitled to the laud on the northwestern side, sold one hundred acres of it. Moore and M’Clung afterwards claimed the said land on the north-western side, as being included in their patent; and made a proposition of compromise to Eitzwater; and the latter agreed to purchase the 400 acres in question, at a dollar per acre. Accordingly, he executed penal' bills, for $400; *5300 of which, he after-wards paid; and the remaining $100 were recovered by judgment.
    The bill was filed by Eitzwater to enjoin the $100, last mentioned, and to recover back the $300 that he had actually paid; alledging, that Moore and M’Clung had no tille to the lands on the north side of Gauley river: that his ignorance was imposed upon by Moore, to induce him to make the compromise: that he was at a considerable distance from any counsel whom he could consult; and that the compromise was obtained by fraud and imposition.
    The injunction was granted.
    Moore answered, stating, that the land in question was included within his grant: that he sold 400 acres, as above alledged, to the complainant; and paid one-fourth of the money received to M’Clung, who was entitled to that proportion for locating and directing the survey. He denies any unfair dealing, or attempt to deceive the complainant, or any other person; and affirms that he sold the land for less than half its value.
    M’Clung answered to the same effect.
    Depositions were taken; and, at the hearing, the Chancellor decreed, that the injunction should be made perpetual: that the contract entered into between the parties should be cancelled; and that Moore should pay to the complainant $300, with interest, &c.
    The defendants appealed.
    Wickham, for the appellants.
    Nicholas, for the appellee.
    May 30.
    
      
      For monographic note on Compromise, see end of case.
    
    
      
       Compromises — Binding—Nature of. — Where a compromise of a doubtful right is fairly made between the parties, the compromise is binding and cannot be affected by any subsequent investigation or result; and this is so, whether it is a compromise of a doubtful question of law or fact. Korne v. Korne, 30 W. Va. 9, 3 S. E. Rep. 19, citing Moore v. Fitzwater, 2Sand. 442, to sustain the proposition. So, where parties have a dispute or difference, and they enter into a compromise, the compromise cannot be disturbed, though it appear that it took place under a mistaken impression of the law. Por a party shall not be permitted to set aside a compromise, on the ground that the right of the case was on his side, since if this were permitted there could be no valid compromise, as on this principle one or the other would always have a right to call it into question. Richmond v. Judah, 5 Leigh 320, citing principal case.
      Same — Consideration,—In Lydick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 17 W. Va. 449, it is said: "It is well settled, that the compromise of even doubtful rights, whether legal or equitable, and their surrender would be a valuable consideration, which will sustain a promise, and of course the compromise of a valid claim and its surrender would be a valuable consideration, though the surrender, of a claim which was clearly wrODg would not be (according to some of the authorities at least), but perhaps even the surrender of a claim clearly wrong might be a valuable consideration, if such claim was bona dole believed by the plaintiff to be a valid claim. See Longridge v. Dorville, 5B. & A. 117; Keer v. Lucas, 1 Allen 280; Moore v. Fitzwater. 2 Sand. 442; O’Keson v. Barclay, 2 Pen. & Watts 531; Allen v. Backhous. 3 M. & W. 652; Stapleton v. Stapleton, 1 Atkins 10; Morey v. Newfane, 8 Bard. 645; Edwards v. Burgh, 11 M. & W. 641; Jarvis v. Sutton, 3 Porter 292; Wilbur v. Crane. 13 Pick. 289; Long v. Towl. 12 Md. 550.” To the effect that the compromise of a disputed claim is not only a valuable but a favored consideration, the principal case is also cited in Williams v Lewis. 5 Leigh 690; Jarrett v. Luding-ton, 9 W Va. 337.
      See further, monographic note on "Consideration” appended to Jones v. Obenchain, 10 Gralt. 259.
    
   JUDGE CABETE,

delivered the opinion of the Court'.

*The Chancellor seems, from his written opinion in the record, to have thought this case distinguishable from the case of a doubtful title. But, we see no ground for such an opinion. The contract between the parties is not to he considered less a compromise, because it terminated in an agreement, that one party should convey the land with warranty, in consideration of money to be paid by the other; for, that frequently occurs in compromises of contests about the title to lands. Moore and M’Clung claimed the land by patent, bearing date in If95, and Eitzwater claimed it by patent, dated in 1800. . He had sold a part thereof, as his own, for valuable consideration; and was in actual adverse possession of the residue, at the lime, of the contract. Although it is alledged by Eitzwater, that he was induced to enter into the contract by fraudulent misrepresentations on the part, oi Moore and M’Clung, and by an ignorance of his own rights, yet, the allegation as to the fraud is denied by the answer, and unsupported by testimony; and it is apparent, i hat every important fact, necessary to the formation of a correct opinion as to the title, was known to both parties, at the time of entering into the contract; and Eitzwater, with this full knowledge, agreed to purchase the land from Moore and M’Clung, at a price far less than its value, lie subsequently expressed to several persons, his satisfaction at the bargain he had made; and, about two years afterwards, he paid to Moore three-fourths of the purchase money, without objection. Whether the title, at the time of the contract, really was in the appellants or the appellee, we do not deem it material to enquire. It is sufficient that the parties themselves have settled the question; and as there was no fraud, or undue advantage, we would not now disturb it, even if assured that Moore and M’Clung had no title. In the case of Penn v. Eord Baltimore, 1 Yesey, 444. Eord Hardwicke said: “The settlement of boundaries, and peace and quiet, is a mutual consideration on each side, and in all cases, make a good consideration to support *a suit in this Court, for settling boundaries.” in Cann v. Cann, 1 P. Wms. 737, Eord Macclesfield said: “Where two parties are contending before this Court, and one releases his pretensions to the other, there can be no color to set aside this compromise, because the man that made it had a right; for, by the same reason, there can be no such thing as compromising a suit, nor room for any accommodation; every release supposes the party making it to have a right, but this can be no reason for its being set aside; for, then every release might be avoided.” In Stapleton v. Stapleton, 1 Atk. p. 10, Eord Hardwicke said: “An agreement entered into, upon the supposition of a right, or of a doubtful right, though it after comes out that the right was on the other side, shall be binding, and the right shall not prevail against the agreement of the parties; for, the right must always be on one side or the other; and, therefore, the compromise of a doubtful right is a sufficient foundation for an agreement.” That the question of the right in this case was doubtful, the Chancellor himself has declared; and we think with him, that it is also a difficult one.

The decree is to be reversed, and the cause remanded to the Court of Chancery, where the injunction is to be dissolved, so soon as a deed for the land shall be made, pursuant to the contract between the appellants and the appellee. 
      
       Judge Coauteu, absent.
     