
    GABE F. BYRD v. BEN W. SOUTHERLAND.
    (Filed 3 October, 1923.)
    Appeal and Error — Objections and Exceptions — Rules oí Court — Dismissal of Appeal — Instructions—Grouping Exceptions — Briefs.
    Tbe rules of practice in the Supreme Court regulating appeals are mandatory upon all appellants alike, and are necessary for the proper and expeditious consideration of the Supreme Court, requiring that evidence excepted to be stated in its exact words, and also requests for instruction refused, with such accuracy of reference to the pages of the record as not to require the Court to search generally through it in order to understand the .questions of law involved; and appellant’s counsel will be deemed to have waived all exceptions omitted from their grouping thereof, etc., and not properly discussed in their briefs.
    Appeal by defendant from Calvert, J'., at March Term, 1923, of SAMPSON.
    
      
      Stevens & Stevens and Butler & Herring for plaintiff.
    
    
      A. McL. Graham for defendant.
    
   PbR Ctteiam.

This is an action to recover commission for selling land. Tbe jury responded, giving tbe plaintiff tbe amount of commissions asked for. -There are 13 assignments of error of wbicb tbe first is an example:

“1. Tbat bis Honor erred in permitting tbe plaintiff Byrd to testify wbat be told one Grady West. Tbis assignment covered by first and second exceptions.” (B., p. 5.)

There are eight exceptions to evidence, all in tbis phraseology.

Exception 9 is: “Tbat bis Honor erred in refusing defendant’s fourth prayer for instructions. Tbis is co.vered by 21st exception.” (E., p. 16.)

There are four other exceptions of exactly tbe same tenor.

Under tbe rules of procedure in tbis Court, which we have often printed in tbe Beports, it is necessary for tbe proper consideration of exceptions tbat they- shall state tbe exact words of tbe evidence refused tbat tbe Court may see and pass upon it without groping through tbe entire record.

In like manner in tbe exceptions for refusing prayers for special instruction, tbe special instruction should be set out tbat tbe Court may see if there was error therein, and not be left to find it in tbe body of tbe record.

Counsel are presumed to know their own case, and readily know where tbe exceptions can be found and tbe extent and tenor of tbe same. These exceptions must be grouped and set forth in regular order in tbe list of assignments of error.

In doing tbis, counsel can omit all unnecessary matters excepted to or wbicb they wish to abandon, leaving tbe Court to pass only upon those matters wbicb are material. Those wbicb on reflection are not set forth and not brought forward in tbe assignments of error and in tbe brief will be deemed to be abandoned.

In tbis way tbe scope of our inquiry is narrowed to tbe identical points wbicb tbe appellant thinks are material and essential, and tbe Court is not sent scurrying through tbe entire record to find tbe matters complained of.

Tbe necessity of rules of practice, and our power to prescribe them, and tbe necessity of our uniformly enforcing these rules so there may be no waste of time (wbicb should otherwise be given to tbe argument of causes), by discussing whether counsel was excusable in tbe neglect to observe tbe regulations, has been repeated by tbis Court so often tbat it ought not to be necessary for us to repeat it.

In Lee v. Baird, 146 N. C., 361, Mr. Justice Hohe fully discussed tbe rules of practice, stating tbat tbe Court bad power to prescribe tbem; that they were mandatory and not directory, and pointing out tbe necessity of tbeir observance by those wbo would present tbeir cases on appeal. Tbat case cites many others, and itself is cited by other cases in tbe annotated edition of tbat volume, and it was repeated by Mr. Justice Hohe in Thompson v. R. R. at next term, 147 N. C., 412, and has often been cited since in cases which are grouped also in tbe annotated edition. There have been other cases citing tbe above since, though less often owing to the understanding that the Bar has of the necessity of the rule for the dispatch of business and the easier examination of the questions presented for our consideration, and for saving time by not debating the degree to which counsel think they are excusable for not observing the regulations prescribed for hearing appeals.

Not one of these thirteen exceptions throws the slightest light upon the questions upon which we are asked by this appeal to pass, without the Court going through the record, page by page and line by line, to ascertain of what the appellant is complaining.

The reasonableness of the rules, which are for the sole purpose of facilitating the discussion of appeals and the necessity which the Court is under to enforce them impartially in all cases, is generally appreciated, and we are now rarely called upon to pass upon failure to observe these regulations, and when this does occur, the appeal is dismissed without more than reference to the fact.

In this particular case we have, however, carefully examined each of the assignments of error at some expense of time, and find that there is no ground on which error can be asserted.

We trust that our brethren of the Bar, in justice to themselves and as a saving of time, and also out of consideration for the fact that as far as possible the attention of the Court should be given solely to substantial errors alleged to have occurred in the trial, and which are sufficiently and clearly assigned, will not .occupy our time or theirs in the discussion of how far counsel may think he is excused in not following the regulations necessary for the orderly presentation of the points evolved as ground of error on the appeal. '

The rules have been modified from time to time, as experience has dictated to us or the suggestions of the brethren of the Bar that modification might make the practice on appeal simpler, or facilitate in any way the hearing of causes.

The rules of practice, both of the Supreme and Superior Court, have been carefully reexamined and all modifications incorporated and are printed in 185 N. C., 785 to 813.

Appeal dismissed.  