
    *Walter S. Landon v. Conrad Reid.
    "Where a nunc pro tuna judgment is entered in C. P., at July term, to taka effect at the April term preceding, an appeal bond filed •within thirty days after the July term, is not within time.
    This is a motion to dismiss an appeal from the county of Lorain.
    This suit was brought to the November terip. of the common pleas, 1838, and was continued, by regular entries, until April term, 1840.
    At the April term, 1840, the transcript shows that a jury was called, impaneled, and sworn, and “upon their oaths do say - there the entry stops; no verdict, no judgment, or continuance.
    At June term, 1840, the record recites, “ that the parties came, by their attorneys, and the plaintiff moved that the verdict, and the judgment on the verdict, be entered," nunc pro tunc, as of the last term; whereupon it appearing to the court that the case was duly submitted to a jury, who found the defendant not guilty, and that the court had considered the defendant should go hence, without day, and recover his costs; and that, thereupon, the plaintiff had given notice of appeal — all which, through inad- ‘ vertenee, had not been entered, the entry thereof was ordered upon the journals as of the last April term.
    The appeal bond was filed on July 29, 1840.
    Benedict and Leonard, for the motion.
    Hamlin and Bliss, contra.
    The appeal was perfected by filing the bond within thirty days after the nunc pro tunc judgment at the June term. Section 109 of the practice act requires the bond to be in ^double the [208 amount of the judgment rendered. There was no record by which the amount of the judgment could be ascertained until the June term. In Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 Ohio, 553, this court say, “By entering such a judgment the party against whom it was rendered would be deprived of his right of appeal. This right is secured by statute, the party appellant giving bonds, within thirty days after the term, in double the amount of the judgment. The bond could not be given before August; for there would be no judgment of record, no means of ascertaining the amount. And if given after August term it would be too late, more than thirty days after the May term, of which the judgment is to be considered, 'having expired. This consideration induced the court, in the case of Goforth’s Adm’rs v. Hezekiah Flint, to decide, that so far as respects the right of appeal, at least, a nunc pro tunc judgment must be considered as a judgment of the term when actually entered.”
   Lane, C. J.

The question now before us is, whether the appeal can be sustained.

The authority to enter this nunc pro tunc order at a subsequent term, after a complete discontinuance, will be properly made on. certiorari. But taking for granted the power to enter the judgment, and that a valid judgment exists from which an appeal may be taken, the filing the bond and entering the appeal is evidently too late; for no judgment of June term is in being. The judgment exists and takes effect at April term, and the bond is filed in the following July.

The case differs from that of Moore v. Brown, decided at this term, ante, 197, in this respect, that here the appeal bond is not given until within thirty days after the term in which’ the order is made for entering a judgment, as of a former term; there the appeal bond was given within the thirty days after the term to which the nunc pro tunc judgment, by relation, belongs.

The authority to make nunc pro tunc entries, and their effect, has been often before the court, yet the principles upon which they depend are not laid down very plainly. Cases frequently 204] *occur, in which the power is undoubted, as when they relate to the amendments of returns, rules, and interlocutory orders. 3 Ohio, 553; 4 Ohio, 45; Wright, 495. And the power of setting aside final judgmnts for irregularity is admitted. 3 Ohio, 16, 519. In one case on the circuit, cited in 3 Ohio, 576, the court seem to recognize the same authority over final judgments, and admit, as a consequence, the right of taking the appeal at the term in which the last entry was made. But this court has denied any such authority of the common pleas to amend any of its final judgments, except in matters of form only, because the rjght of appeal is lost by lapse of time. 1 Ohio, 375 ; 3 Ohio, 16, 523.

Appeal dismissed.  