
    (14 C. Cls. R., 125; 104 U. S. R., 687.)
    The Chicago, Milwaukee and Saint Paul Railroad Company, appellants, v. The United States, appellees. The United States, appellants, v. The Chicago, Milwaukee and Saint Paul Railroad Company, appellees.
    
      On both parties’ Appeals.
    
    • Congress grant lauds to the State of Wisconsin in trust to aid in the construction of a railroad, upon condition that the mail he transported, over the road at such price as Congress may prescribe. The State passes a statute authorizing its officers to deed the lands to a railroad company when certain conditions shall he complied with. The lands are never deeded to the company, but are diverted to reimburse certain, farmers who mortgaged their farms to aid, •in the construction of the road. The enterprise having failed, the claimants purchase the rights of the prior corporation and construct theroad. The diversion of the land is with their consent and that of Congress. The claimants having carried the mail, the Post-Office Department insists that theirs'ie a ‘‘ land-grant road,” and the compensation subject to the deduction made in such cases. Also, that the contract rate is subject to a general reduction of 10 per cent, made by a subsequent act of Congress.
    
    The court below decides : (1) That when Congress grant land in trust for a specific purpose, viz, to aid in the construction of a railroad, and subsequently pass a statute authorizing the land to be diverted to an entirely different purpose, the government will be estopped from claiming the benefit of a condition annexed to the original grant; (2) That wheie a in ail contract authorizes the government to discontinue the service at any time, in whole or in part, allowing the conti actor one month’s-extra pay, and Congress during the term, of the contract enact that the Postmaster-General shall deduct. 10 per cent, from the compensation allowed to all railroads for carrying the mail, and the contractors continue to carry the mail without objection, it will be held that the statute was in effect a notice under the contract that the service would be discontinued under the old rates, and continued, if at all, under the new rates.
    The court agree with the court below upon the first point, but reverse the judgment on the ground that the Act July 12, 1876, was not intended to apply to the ease of contracts previously made for a term of years not expired when it took effect.
   Mr. Justice Matthews

delivered the opinion .of tbe Supreme Court, March 6, 1882.  