
    MASON vs. ROGERS.
    
      0dm- the Montgomery Circuit Gourfc -the'Him: Silas' W. & 7 > Robbins sole Judge. < •- ' , ''
    
      ffiiplett,>Hagg{h"'á&d~Bibb, for Masón; IVickliffe.,, for ”• Rogers. ' '
    
    This ca^e was, decided at the Fall Term ,18|^; a .petition, for ,rg* ' bearing wás presented, Jhé case suspended, and on the 3LstofMay 1824, th‘p;former opinion was renounced, and this adopted in its place.' The Reporter could see no necessity'for publishing either the former opinion or petition for, re-hearing, and has omitted both.
    A writ of fieri facias cannot directed to° the sheriff of any other or removes himself or ef-’ the county where the Jjbt!inedtWaS
    The act of *1^ori'e not wr;ts 0f capi-asarl satisfa-ciemlum or °t0 sue to other-counties, in by^^those6]^ which they might then byTheact of
    con, ° tains the “° on ¿1¡9 subject.
   Opinion op the Court, §y

Ch. J. BcSyle.

Rogers obtained a judgment against Mason, in the circuit court for Montgomery county, where the latter resided'and bad a large real and personal estate, and Trad neither removed himself nor his effects out of, the, county, but Rogers caused an execution of fieri fadas tó be issued upon the judgment, directed to the sheriff o^Fayette county, who, in virtue of the .execution, took a" slave belonging to Mason, which happened to he there; and the only question worthy of notice, is, whe-flier the execution so issued was authorised by law, or ri'ot.' •

In the former opinion delivered in this case, we decided that the emanation of the execution to Fayette coun-. ty, was'authorised by an act of Virginia of 1772; but,. having entertained serious doubts whether we had not rtyiscónsfrued that 'act, we were induced to grant a re-Ifearing, and it now becomes our indispensable duty to rS-examine the subject.

The jurisdiction of our circuitcourts, though gener-ai with respect to the persons an’d subjects within their respective circuits, is circumscribed by their territorial limite^ ai)d it is plain, that process cannot be issued them beyond tbos(e limits, except in cases expressly au-thoriséd by law. That there is any act of the legisla-túre'of this state, which authorised the emanation of the execution in this case to Fayette county, is not tended; but the, county courts of Virginia were, our circuit courts, of a limited territorial jurisdiction, aM Jpe laws which governed those courts ad’ÓDtéd by this state, and. made th,e, rules for the gov-ernmqgt of the quarter session courts at their. erection, a¿d^w^rg 't^nsfereqd to .l]he„qi|rcu|t. courts .on their fabljflimpnt, .tii’qre js an.obvious propriety in-resorting to those laws, so far.as they have, not been altered or repealed, for the purpose of ascertaining the rules -of proceeding in our circuit courts.

Rules for construing statutes.

Theintcntion of the legislature must be b^o'ther'cVi-denco besides the words of t.he act.

The want of power in the county courts of yirginia, to send their process beyond their territorial limits, must, no doubt, have often resulted in a failure ofjus-ffce; but there does not appear to have been any at* tempt to remedy this defect, untiUhe passage of. the act 0p x748. By the 20th section of that act it is pro-vicled, “ that where judgment shall be obtained in any county court, for any debt or damages, and the person against whom such judgment shall he obtained,-shall remove himself and his effects, or shall reside out of the limits of the jurisdiction of such, court, it shall be lawful for the clerk of the court where judgment was given, at the request of the party for whom the same was rendered, to issue any writ o ifieri facias or capias ad satisfacien-dum, and direct the same to the sheriff of any county where the defendant or his goods shall be found..”. Body of Laws, 196.

This act manifestly authorised only writs offufa, and ecu sa. upon judgments for debtor damages, to be sent from one’county to another, where the defendant re* moved himself and effects, or resided out of the county where the judgment was obtained; and, of course, there were other writs of execution which might, with propriety, be issued upon judgments, decrees in chancery and final orders, within the county, but which could not be sent beyond its limits; and for want of the power to send these out of the territorial jurisdiction of the courts, there might still be a failure, in some cases, to attain the ends of’justice. It became necessary, therefore, that further provision for these cases should he made, and this was done by the act of 1772, which, together with its preamble, is as follows:

“ Whereas the laws concerning executions, are de* ■ fective, in not authorising the clerks of county courts to issue ail manner of legal and proper writs of execution, upon judgments, decrees in chancery and final orders, duly recovered and obtained in such county, into other counties, as is done in writs of capias ad satisfacienduyn or fieri facias: Be it therefore enacted, that the clerks of the several county courts in this colony, shall be, and they are hereby empowered and required, upon the application of any party who hath obtained or shall obtain •any judgment, decree or final order, in such courts, to issue any legal or proper writ or attachment thereupon, as the case’may require; as also, to issue attachments against executors, administrators or guardians, who shall fail to account, when ordered so to do by such court, directed to any sheriff of the same or any other county, provided there be fifteen days at the least, and not more than ninety days, between the teste and return.”

The body of this act would, no doubt, according to the literal import of the words employed,' apply to' writs of ca. sa. an&fi.fa. as well as to all other writs of execution, and would authorise their emanation in all cases, from the county where the judgment was obtained to any other county, regardless of the circumstance whether the defendant had removed himself or effects, or resided out of the county where the judgment was obtained, or not. But is this the true construction of the act? The literal interpretation of an act is certainly not, in all cases, the interpretation which either reason or law requires to be given to it; for it is not the words of an act, but the will of the legislature, which constitutes the law, and although words are the most common, they are not the only signs of the legislative will. The context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law, are often all called in to aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature. No language is, indeed, so perfect, as to afford words to express every idea, upon all subjects, with perspicuity and precision; and even when words are not wanting, those, that are most-happily adapted to the purpose in view, do not always occur to the mind of the legislature. Hence it is, that words are employed which sometimes go beyond the legislative will, and sometimes fall short of it; which sometimes are too general and comprehensive, and sometimes too particular and restricted; and it is, therefore, an-established rule ■of construction, applicable to all remedial statutes, that cases within the reason, though not within the letter of a statute, shall be embraced by its provisions, and Cases not within the reason, though within the letter, shall pot be taken to be within the statute. In Stradling vs. Morgan, 1 Plow. 200, and Eyston vs. Studd, 2 Plow. 463, the general rule is laid down and supported' by arguments of the most conclusive character. In the former case, page 206, after illustrating the latter branch of the ru^e by numerous examples, it is added in conclusion, “from which cases it appears that the sages of (he law .heretofore have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in some appearance, and those,statutes which comprehend all things in the letter, they have expounded to extend but to some things, and those which generally prohibit all persons from doing such an act, they have interpreted to permit some people to do it, and those which .include every person in the letter, they have adjudged to reach some persons only5 which expositions have always been founded upon the intent of the legislature, which they have collected sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of making the. act, sometimes by comparing one part ofthe act with another, and sometimes by foreign circumstances.”

It must be admitted, that to resort to foreign or extrinsic circdmstances to ascertain the reason of a statute, and thereby to limit the literal import of its words, ■requires the utmost caution and discretion; but, happily, the necessity of resorting to extrinsic circumstances •for that purpose, in regard to the act of 1772, does not exist; for we have only to look beyond the body of the act, to its preamble, to see at once the reason of the passage of the act, and the limits within which the itñ-port.of the general terms employed, should be confined. It is yery obvious, that theca, sa. and fi.fa. would be liable 'to great abuse, if they were permitted, to be issued to any county in the state, at the pleasure of the party; and the legislature, aware of this, at the same time that they saw, and intended to remedy the defect of justice, which must, no doubt, have resulted from not permitting those writs of execution to be sent from the county in any case, by the act of-1748, gave authority to do so, only in the cases where the defendant had removed himself and effects, or resided out of the county where the judgment was obtained. Now, it is apparent from the preamble of the act of 1772, that the legislature did not consider the laws concerning executions defective,because theydid not authorise the emanation of writs of ca. sm.and fi. fa. to any county in the state, ad libitum; on the contrary, the preamble states the laws to be defective only, “ in not authorising the clerks ofthe county courts to issue all manner of legal and proper' writs hfi execution- upon judgments, decrees, &c. into other counties, as is done in writs of capias ad satisfaciendum or fieri facias.’’’’ Thus plainly indicating the rcasqn for passing the act, and the extent to -which it was intended to go; for the expressions used'with reference to writs of ca’. sa. and Jii fa. show clearly that the legislature was satisfied with-what they had already done with respect to. those writs,, and'that they only intended to-place other writs of execution upon the same footing.. If, then, according to the general rule already mentioned,. of construing remedial' statutes, cases not within the reason, though within the letter of a statute, cannot be considered as embraced'by its provisions, it is evident that the act of 1772 ought not to be construed to-authorise the emanation of writs of ca. sa. and filfa, to any county in the state, at the pleasure of the party,. and it follows, that those writs, since, as well as before the passage of the act of 1772, can be sent out of the-county, according to the provisions of the act of 1748,-, only where the defendant removes himself or effects, or resides out of the county.

This is in fact the construction given to the act of' 1772 by the court of appeals of Virginia, as is apparent from t-he-case of Brydie vs. Langham, 2 Wash. Rep. 72; for in that case the writs of ca. sa. which had issued up-, on judgments recovered in the county court of Flu vana, directed' to the sheriff of Henrico county,-where the defendant was taken and-committed to jail, were quashed’ by the inferior court, because-the defendant was a rési-dent of Fluvana, and had not removed his effects out of that county, and on an appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals. The act of 1772 is not, in-deed, mentioned in the report- of that case, and the question appears to have turned; exclusively on the construction of the act of 1748; but that'very circum- - stance proves that it was considered- a settled* point,.' that the act of 1772 did not authorise the emanation of the' writs of ca. sa. to the county of Henrico;' for,-.other- ■ wise, the- decision quashing- those writs would have; been erroneous, and the acknowledged learning andi abilities of the court, as well as of the counsel concern-.ed, must repel every suspicion that the act-of 1772, if it had applied to the- case, would- have- escaped their attention. This accords, too, with what is believed to have been, until recently, the generally, if not the u-m*-versally received opinion with respect to the act of 1772. In the casé of Scott vs. Maupin, Hard. Rep. 122,. this court itself seems to have entertained that opinion:;for they assume the position, that- the plaintiff is permitted, only in some cases, to send an execution out of the county, and' (he position would not be correct, if the act of 1772 authorised executions to be sent out of the county in all cases. That case, it is true,, is not in point, and the court only assumed the position arguendo but the assumption of it in that way is sufficient to show that it accorded with the settled opinion of the court.

1 Litt. 137.

1 Dig. 484,

As a further proof that it was the generally received construction of the act of 1772, that it did not authorise writs of ca. sa. and fi. fa. to be sent from the county in all cases, we may refer to the repealed acts of the legislature of this state upon the subject. By an act of 1792, entitled “an act concerning executions and for the relief of insolvent debtors,” the legislature re-enacted, in substance, the same provision as is contained in, the act of 1748; and again, in an act o*f 1796, entitled “ an act to reduce into one the several acts and parts of acts concerning executions, and for the relief of insolvent debtors,” they have included the same provision,, but extended it to all other writs of execution, as well as to writs of ca. sa. and fi. fa. These acts, we think, clearly indicate the opinion of the'legislalure, that the act of 1772 did not authorise writs of ca. sa. and fi. fa. to be sent out of the county in all cases; for, otherwise! we cannot suppose that they would have passed over the act of 1772, and have gone back almost the half of a century, to the act of 1748, and revived and re-enacted its provisions, which only authorise those writs to be sent out of the county in particular cases. To suppose that they had done so, would be not only supposing that their acts were idle and useless, but would, in effect, be ascribing to them the most glaring inconsistency, in authorising, by their acts, executions to be sent out of the county in particular cases only, when at the same time they knew that by the act of 1772. executions might be sent out of the county in all cases.. Such absurdity and inconsistency we cannot decently impute to the legislature, and we must therefore take their acts to amount to a virtual recognition of the construction which we haye here given to the act tíf 1772.

l¥e are constrained, therefore, to say, (Jodge. Mills dissenting,) that the construction- which we gave, in the former opinion, to that act, was incorrect, and that the act did not authorise the emanation of the-execution in this case to Fayette county.

The court below, therefore, erred in not quashing the execution; and, consequently, the judgment of that court must be reversed with costs, and the cause be remanded to that court, that a judgment quashing the execution may be there, entered.

Dissent op

Judge Mills.

í cannot concur with the majority of the court in the opinion just delivered; and as the question is one of some importance, I have thought proper to state my reaSons for that dissent.

First, on the construction of the statute of 1772. Construction, it is true, is a-necessary part of our language. When our laws are so plain as to need no construction, then human language will cease to possess the defects of those who speak it, and will become perfect. Still, however, construction is more necessary in fixing the meaning of a statute, and in settling what it includes, than it is in curtailing the fixed and well know meaning of words. In the first case, it may always b.e applied beneficially; in the latter, it ought to be used sparingly, if ever used at all. In this case, there is scarcely room for any. The party who may issue his execution, is any one that has “ obtained any judgment, decree, or jinal ord'erd’ He may issue “ any legal or proper writ of executionor attachment thereupon, as the case' may required’ To what place or officer directed?' “To the sheriff of the same, or any other county.” Can it be possible, that the words “any judgment, décree or final' order,” include only judgments in detinue, where a distringas must issue, or those which authorised an elegil only? But more still, can the words “any legal or proper writ of execution,' or attachment, which the case may require,” include only attachments, "elegil and dis-tringas, and absolutely exclude writs oí fieri facias and ca. sa. ?. Certainly the exclusion must fix an amendment to the act, as clearly as a legislative proviso, in express words, cdftld do. Tbis, I conceive, is taking ioo great liberty with a legislative act. The direction of the writ, or the county to which it goes, is equally dear, either to the sheriff of the county or that of any other; giving the destination of the writ and1 the election of the county, completely to the holder of the judgment. But it is contended for the appellants, that this election-of, and this destination to, any other county, could not be exercised except in such cases as are prescribed by the act of 1748; that is, the debtor must have-removed himself or his effects out of the county, and then, and not until then, could such election be made.. Apply this to an elegit or a distringas, for a specific chattel, and the reason fails, and: the legislature must be accused of acting unwisely, and to have done nothing by the rule,. A person is sued, who finds it his interest' to live in another county than that where his estate lies; judgment is obtained, and he has not removed himself or his effects. The distringas, in that case, is defeated, the-chattel-recovered, and that on which the writ can operate, is in another county, and there the writ cannot go. Where is the reason for restraining an elegit, which operates on land only, from passing to another county, because the chattels and person are not removed, and permitting it, where they are removed, when the writ itself has no operation upon either person or chattels?' A gentleman, who has an estate, lives at another coun- . ty seat to exercise his profession, or fill an office at the-seat of government; if the construction 'contended' for is correct, then all such are excepted, when it is believed these and such like cases, are those for which the legislature intended to provide.

But the preamble of the act is relied on as fixing the-©onstruction of the enacting part of the statute. It is admitted, that a preamble may be used as shedding light on any ambiguities in the body of the act; and if the-body has relative words to those used in the preamble, then the preamble must be used. But where the enacting part uses terms broader than the preamble, as-this does, it is denied that the preamble can be used to-limit it. Indeed, the converse of this proposition is laid down in all thb books which treat of the subject. The preamble shall not restrain and abridgethe enacting part,, noryetenlarge it, beyond the natural meaning of the expressions, as must be done here. It is true^, the legisla^ tur,a recites in tbe preamble, that tbe law as itaforetime stood, did not permit other writs to go to other counties, 4s,it did writs of/L fa. and ca. sa. in some cases. Buí'in me enacting part, it.places all on the same footing, and allows them to go to any other county or not, at the absolute election of the plaintiff. It did more, then, than remedy the evil which the preamble mentioned.

The second question is one still more intricate, and that on which great reliance was placed in argument. It is contended that the act of 1772, be it broad or narrow in its terms, is repealed by the act of 1792, 1 Litt. L. K. 137. That act did no more than re-enact the act of 1748, and is thus expressed: “ When judgment shall be obtained in any court of record, for any debt or damages, and the person against whom such judgment shall be obtained, remove himself and his effects, or shall reside out of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court, it shall be lawful for the clerk of the court where judgment was given, at the request of the party for whom the same was rendered, to issue any writ oi fieri fiadas or capias ad satisfaciendum, of other legal judicial writ, and direct the same to the sheriff of any other county in this state, where the defendant or debtor, his goods or lands, may be found.”

If the enacting this statute has repealed that of 1772, what becomes of judgments for costs, for a specific chattel in detinue, and judgments for other things? Where are the cases of residence in one county, without an estate there, but with an estate elsewhere, as in the cases before stated? The answer must be, that such case? have remained wholly unprovided for in Kentucky,for upwards of thirty years. Before this conclusion is drawn, the effect which the act t>f 1792 has upon the act of 1772, must be critically examined. The act of W48 was found tobe too narrow. It did not meet all necessary cases. The act of 1772 enlarged it, and embraced, not only the cases provided for by that of 1748, but also every possible case. After we became a state, and the legislature thought proper to transcribe tbe existing Virginia code into our own, they transcribed that of 1748, and omitted that of 1772. The former provided for some cases, the latter for all; but they used no expressions restricting the act of 1772, or directing that executions should go in those cases onljq pointed out in the act of 1792., The real question then-is, as there was an affirmative statute in force, providing f°r every case, and the legislature re-enacted another affirmative statute, providing only for some cases, without any negative words, does the latter act repeal the former? It is a well settled principle, that repeals by implication are not favored in law. Statutes on the subject, áre construed together, as one body of law, and if they can be made consistent with each other, all shall stand, and nothing less than an actual inconsistency or conflict in operation and effect, will warrant an implied repeal. Hence, it is necessary that the latter statute -should contain some negative expressions, such as, in no other case, or not otherwise, or words of that and such like import; or the affirmative proposition contained in tjhe latter statute, must be contrary in its directions, to the affirmative matter of the‘first. F or instance, if one shall direct an office to be kept at a certain place, and the other shall direct it to be kept at another place, as keeping it at the latter place is incompatible with keeping it at the former, and it cannot be kept at both, the latter repeals the former. But this is not.the case here. There is nothing incompatible, and no negative words. Take that of 1772, all -cases are embraced; take that of 1792, part only are embraced, but the residue are not affected,

The only apparent reason, then, that can be given for construing the latter statute as. a repeal of the former, is, that if this be not done, the latter act can have do operation. It would be passing' too high an encomium on the legislative department of government, or, indeed, any other, however learned and respectable it may be, to say that it never did an useless act. And it is denied, that any rule exists in our code, and it is believed that no case can be -found, where, to save a latter statute from the imputation of being unnecessary,, a former, w'hich includes it and embraces much more, -must be held to be repealed by implication only. Words negative, or provisions absolutely inconsistent with each other, arc necessary, and less will not do.

Such will be found to be the law, as laid down in Foster’s case, 10th Rep. 61, which, it is believed, has collated more, both of the rules and cases on this subject, than can’ be found in any one of the reports besides.

It is not, however, admitted, that if a statute or law does exist already, and a case is provided for by it, re-enaction is unnecessary. The common law provides, in most cases, if not in every case, for rights and remedies; yet it is not unfrequent, to find statutes adopted enacting the same things. Statutes often exist, broad in expression and comprehensive, in terms, embracing almost every possible case, and in looking over our code, subsequent ones will be found, providing for only some of those cases. This is frequently the case in our penal code, as will be seen by a minute examination of the statutes at large, and not as abridged in our Digest. In all this mass of legislation, it has not .been once determined that the latter repeals the former. And if such a principle’ should assume existence, it would not be easy to foresee all ;i£s consequences. The truth is, statutes are frequently passed declaratory of the common law, to preserve the principles of the latter. Statutes are repeated by enactment, for the purpose of republication, and to give new effect to their provisions. The last frequently does not include.all the ■ provisions, or provide for all the cases of the first; yet the first remains. If the last includes more than the first, there is only an addition of so much.

It is, however, said, that there is a repealing clause' in the act of 1792. This is true; but it is not a repealing clause of the act of ’1772, in terms, but only of such acts and parts of acts as come within the-purview of the act. This seldom or never amounts to more than what results in an implied repeal. The purview of a statute, is the enacting part, according to the sense given to it by writers, on law; and acts directing matters to be done differently, it is true, from the way they are directed to be done by that statute, are generally repealed by such clause, so far as they differ. But there must, be a real difference and conflict. If one directs a matter to be done in one manner,’ and the latter in another, then thé first is taken from the code; but if the first directs a thing to be 'done in the same mode, and in the same cases as the latter, it is evident the law is unaltered. If the last directs that on certain events,' a thing shall be done, when the first has. directed the same thing to he done, not only en the occurrence of these events, but also on the happening of others, it cannot follow, that on these latter events the thing cannot be done, or that it Can be done on the existence of the former only; and this is the case that has happened here.

But the impolicy of this construction, and arguments ab inconvenienli, have been urged on the re-argument of this question. It has been said, that great sacrifices might be produced by clandestinely passing executions to other counties, and property might be there taken, or even the body, at great inconvenience. ' This latter argument supposes that a defendant may be ignorant of a judgment, or that he has a right to disregard it, until he is reminded of.it by execution. This certainly is an untenable proposition. A defendant is.not only a party to a judgment, but the party convict, and is bound to prepare for, and to notice every step in its execution. By paying it, he can avoid the consequences. By observing the records of the clerk, he can find whither the execution is gone. If he doe's not pay it, and has estate in another county, sufficient, he is bound to surrender it, and it cannot be either just or politic to screen him from doing so. It will be found, by such a protection, evils will result, some of which have been noticed, more than sufficient to counterbalance the evils supposed on the opposite side.

Besides, as to the policy, it is denied that a country like ours can exist without such a provision as the act of 1772, for a length of time, without great evils. Just so much estate as a debtor chooses to keep in the county where he resides, will be subject to' his debts, and no more. This may, and in many cases will be a greater exemption of estate from execution, than would be the reservation of lands or negroes. The county where he lives may be ransacked, and when that is cleared of his estate, although across the line of a neighboring county, he may possess an estate affording immense revenues, yet it is secure, and his debt is unpaid. A great evil this, wdiere estates are much divided, as great estates usually are; and the greater the estate, so much greater is the protection afforded. In England, from whence we drew our jurisprudence, all important controversies are drawn into, and decided by the courts of Westminster Hall, from whence the process could reach every part of the kingdom; hence, these evils could not exist. Here; we have found it not only convenient, .but necessary, that our judgments should be rendered by local courts, near the doors of everyone; henee, it became necessary that the process t.o execute the judgments of these iocal courts should run beyond the territorial limits ofthe county; otherwise, what appeared to be a convenience, would amount, in numerous instances, to injustice; and to remedy this, the legislature of Virginia adopted the act of 1772, and its provisions ought not to be given up, except by an unequivocal expression of the • legislative, will.

1 have been thus lengthy ijn discussing this question, because I suppose the effects of a contrary doctrine will be momentous, and may shake many rights which have been supposed to be stable, under a contrary practice, lam aware, that the execution books of the different courts will furnish numerous executions which have been sent abroad and expended their force in other counties, until they have gleaned enough to pay the judgments. And so long as I have been conversant with the courts of the country, I never recollect of hearing the question-made, successfully, more than once, and that in the case of a ca. sa. levied under circumstances of peculiar hardship, before a tribunal not well skilled in either common or.statute law. Such motions are not limited. The residence of the debtor at a former day, may .be easily proved, while the removal of himself or his goods may bé more difficult, by lapse of time and death of witnesses.. As observed in argument, the onus probandi, in ail such cases, must lie on the bolder of the execution; hence, their destruction may often be certain, and also fatal to those who have purchased estates under them. Indeed, according to the doctrine contended for, it may be plausibly urged, that the removal of the debtor or his effects are necessary prerequisites, to authorise the clerk to send the execution abroad, and that as he had no authority where these did not exist, the executions are- void', and ought to be so decided, when used to establish any right or title collaterally. Not only the avoidance of these- consequences, but the cotemporaneous exposition, of. the-laws as they have stood heretofore, furnish strong persuasive arguments, not tp adopt such aprinciple^unless; compelled by the imperious rules of law.

I still contend that the case of Brydie vs. Langham does not contravene this doctrine, except by implica^ lion. It is impossible to read that case, and the argu? nients of counsel, the Court not having given its reasons, and to believe that the act of 1772 was considered by the court. The only fair inference from it, is, that if the act of 1772 was entitled to a different construction, it would have been noticed. It cannot be a strong inference, which, draws from silence strong conclusions. We well know, that acts have, and will, when numerous, escape the attention of both courts and counsel, and this was true in the case cited.

Note_That the subject discussed in -the preceding opinions, is involved in groat difficulties, admits of no doubt.. I submit to the consideration of the reader, whether the phraseology of a part of the first constitution, will give any aid in removing them. The clause I refer to, is in the following words: “ All laws now in force in the state of Virginia, See. shall be in force, until they shall be altered or repealed by the legislature.” I Litt. 31. The question Í would propose, is not, what efféct shall be given to the word, altered; but whether-arey effect shall be given-to it. Every lawyer will see the consequences, and I may add, the difficulties, which will result, in a vast number of oases, from giving it any effect.

By the act of 1792, the Virginia law on this subject was certainly altered, though less materially than it washy the act of 1796. In the latter act, the word or, is substituted in place of and; consequently, although before the piffesage of that act, viz. by the acts of 1748 and 1792, execution could not go into another county, unless a man removed both himself and his effects, yet now, under the act of 1796', a removal of either, gives the plaintiff that privilege.

, Admitting the act of 1796 to be the only law in foroe on the subject, it is hoped the following queries will show the necessity of legislative interference: 1. Must a man remove ail his effects, before he is liable under it, or will the removal of a part subject him ? 2. If the removal of a part will subject him, what part will be sufficient? 3. If he is not subjected until be shall removo the whole, and this is know» to be the law, will any man ever remove the whole ? 4. What will be the effect on purchasers, as well as parties, if it shall appear, ex post fado, at any indefinite period of time, that an execution had issued to another county, when no fact existed which could justify the measure ?

Although I have referred to the first constitution in this ease, because the act of 1796 was passed under it, it may not be improper to observe, that the same questions, as to other lavys, may arise under our present constitution. Vide 1 Litt. p. 51,  