
    Ernst’s Estate.
    Argued January 14, 1935.
    Before Simpson, Kephart, Schaffer, Maxey, Drew and Linn, JJ.
    
      February 4, 1935:
    
      Louis 8. Mag, with him E. Russell Shockley, Deputy Attorney General, and Wm. A. Schnader, Attorney General, for appellant.
    
      S. Richard Harr, Bernard J. Myers, of Zimmerman, Myers & Kready, Paul A. Mueller, of Wmdolph & Mueller, J. Roland Kimer and Charles C. Baker, for appel-lees, Nos. 289,292,295-9, were not beard.
    
      Owen P. Bricker and John A. Coyle, for appellees, Nos. 290, 291, 293 and 294, were not beard.
   Pee Curiam,

Tbe decree is affirmed on tbe following extracts from tbe opinion of Judge Appeu, president judge of tbe court below:

“The decedent died March 2, 1932, testate, and letters testamentary were duly granted to tbe executors named in tbe will. On March 15, 1932, H. J. Taylor was duly appointed appraiser by tbe auditor general of Pennsylvania ‘to make a fair and conscionable appraisement of tbe said estate, and to assess and fix tbe cash value of all annuities in life estates growing out of said estate,’ for tbe purpose of assessing and fixing tbe transfer inheritance tax. Tbe appraisement was filed April 28,1932, and, there being no appeal within tbe statutory period fixed by law, became absolutely confirmed. Tbe personal estate consists of three classes of items. Tbe third class consists of tbe accrued interest due on certain annuity contracts created by tbe decedent in bis lifetime upon tbe occasion of donations made to various churches, hospitals and homes. It is in respect to these items that the present controversy arises. There would be no controversy at all except for the fact that, nearly eight months after the tax appraisement had been filed and confirmed, the state tax appraiser filed, on December 12, 1932, what he called a supplemental appraisement, in which he undertakes to value and appraise for tax purposes the principal of the various annuity contracts. From this appraisement all of the donees took appeals, as did also the executors of the estate.

“Appellants contend, first, that the supplemental ap-praisement filed December 12, 1932, is a legal nullity, no appeal having been filed to the appraisement of April 28, 1932, which became absolutely confirmed, and no fraud, accident or mistake of legal merit having been shown. Inasmuch as we have concluded that the first contention of appellants must be sustained, namely, that the supplemental appraisement, filed December 12, 1932, is a legal nullity, no appeal having been filed to the appraisement of April 28, 1932, which became absolutely confirmed, and no fraud, accident or mistake of legal merit having been shown, it is not necessary to consider the second contention, that the principal of the so-called annuity contracts is not legally subject to a transfer inheritance tax under any of the acts relating to the imposition and collection of such tax.

“We find as a fact that a full disclosure of the contracts was made by the executors to the tax appraiser; that they were before the field appraiser for examination and appraisal ; that he had full opportunity to and did examine them; that when he appraised the annuity on each contract, but not the principal, he did so in the exercise of his deliberate judgment that the principal was not liable for the tax. We find also that due report of the appraisement was made to Taylor, the chief appraiser, adopted and filed by him with a full knowledge of all the facts. After the expiration of the time for appeal, the question was not an open one and the appraisal was conclusive on all parties. The outstanding authority on the immediate question under consideration is Moneypenny’s Est., 181 Pa. 309, [where it was held that] in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, there cannot be a second appraisement of property for the purpose of the collateral inheritance tax. The only remedy for an erroneous exercise of judgment by the appraiser is an appeal. A second ap-praisement to revise the judgment of the appraiser is without authority of law.”  