
    Patulski and wife, Respondents, vs. Bellmont Realty Company and another, Appellants.
    
      October 5
    
    October 23, 1917.
    
    
      Principal and, agent: Conveyance of land to agent: Confidential relations: Burden of proving good faith: Evidence: Transactions ivith person since deceased: Appeal: Harmless errors.
    
    1. Where the chief owner of a corporation to which land was conveyed was the agent and confidential adviser of the grantor, such owner must show affirmatively that no advantage was taken of such confidential relation, that in making the deed the grantor acted with full knowledge, upon proper advice, that no deception was practiced, and that the consideration was adequate.
    2. A finding of the trial court that such owner of the grantee corporation had failed to establish his claim that the grantor was indebted to him and that a warranty deed of . the land in question to the corporation was given in consideration of such indebtedness, and a further finding that a subsequent quitclaim deed was not delivered toy tlie grantor with any purpose to pass the title to the property, are held to toe in accordance with the evidence.
    3. The fact that a defendant was examined adversely, under sec. 4068, Stats., as to transactions had by him with third persons relating to business done toy him for a deceased person under whom he or the other defendant (a corporation controlled toy him) claimed title to the land in controversy, did not render him competent to testify as to transactions had directly with the deceased.
    4. Error in permitting a witness for plaintiff to testify to a conversation with a deceased person, under whom tooth parties claim title to the land in controversy, at a time when defendant was not present, was not a material error where the trial was before the court without a jury and there was competent evidence to support the court’s findings.
    Appeal from a judgment of tbe circuit court for Milwaukee county: W. J. TueNes, Circuit Judge.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    Action to quiet title. Tbe plaintiffs are residuary legatees of one Anna E. Bours, wbo died May 7, 1916. From the evidence it appears that in 1910 tbe defendant Bradshaw was a real-estate dealer in tbe city of Milwaukee and that at or about that time be became tbe confidential adviser, agent, and manager of tbe business affairs of Mrs. Bours; that between that time and tbe day of her death be transacted a large amount of business for her relating to real estate which was owned and acquired by tbe deceased during tbe course of these transactions, and tbat practically throughout the entire period the title to property was taken in her name, some of which belonged to her and some of which belonged to Bradshaw and some of which belonged to the defendant Bell-mont Realty Company, a corporation of which Bradshaw was the chief owner. It is admitted that the relationship which existed between Mrs. Bours and Bradshaiu was confidential and of an intimate character and imposed upon him the duty to exercise the utmost good faith. ■ At the time of her death' Mrs. Bours owned certain residence property on Clark street in the city of Milwaukee. She acquired title to this property by deed from the Bellmont Realty Company. On July 3, 1914, she executed a warranty deed of this property to the Bellmont Realty Company, the consideration for wbicb was expressed as one dollar and other good and valuable consideration. Subsequently and on December 18, 1915, she executed a quitclaim deed of the same premises to the Bell-mont Really Company, and the question is whether or not these deeds were valid and conveyed title to the Bellmont Realty Company. Upon this the trial court found:
    “That from 1910 to May 17, 1916, defendant Bradshaw had from time to time made certain disbursements and advances to said Anna R. Bours relative to said business.
    “That the defendant Bradshaw did not establish his contention of a claim and demand against said Anna R. Bours for services, advancements, and disbursements, or that he had settled with her for said sum, or that the said deed of July 3, 1914, was made in consideration of such indebtedness.
    “On the other hand, the court finds that the said Anna B. Bours did not intend, by such deed, to convey the said premises to the said Bradshaw or the Bellmont Realty Company.
    
    “The court further finds that the house upon the premises was built with the money of the deceased, and part of the cost of such building was paid for at the direction of the deceased by the said Bradshaw after the deed of July 3, 1914, and that the said house was erected as and for the homestead of said Anna 37. Bours, and she did from the time of the alleged execution of said deed continue to keep the same as her homestead and believed that she was the owner of the same; that there was no consideration whatever passing from the Bell-mont Realty Company to Anna R. Bours for the conveyance of the title of said property from her to it,” and further found that the quitclaim deed had not been delivered.
    Upon the findings of the court judgment was entered for -plaintiffs quieting their title to the premises in question. From this judgment the defendants appeal.
    Nor the appellants there was a brief by F. J. Jennings and Quarles, Spence & Quarles, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by W. C. Quarles.
    
    
      Eor the respondents there was a brief by Bloodgood, Kem-per & Bloodgood, attorneys, and Emmet lloran, Jr., of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. lloran.
    
   RoseitbeRRY, J.

Appellants contend that the judgment should be reversed (1) because the findings set out are against the clear preponderance of the evidence, and (2) be•cause the court erred in rejecting testimony offered by the defendants and in admitting evidence offered by plaintiffs.

Under the rule laid down in Armstrong v. Morrow, ante, p. 1, 163 N. W. 179, when the plaintiffs established, as it is admitted they did, the fact of the confidential relationship between the deceased Anna R. Bours and the defendant Bradshaw, her agent and adviser, they established a prima facie case, and it was then incumbent upon the defendant Bradshaw to show affirmatively that no advantage was taken ■of the confidential relationship which existed between himself and the deceased and that in making the deeds of the property in question the deceased acted with full knowledge, upon proper advice, that no deception was practiced, and that the consideration was adequate.

The evidence is not stated in' detail. • To do so would extend this opinion to great length. Such statements are of no value in cases such as this, except as they may convince counsel that the matter has been fully considered. Each ■case must rest upon its peculiar facts. The facts are never .alike in two cases. Long statements of the facts are quite .as likely to lead to confusion as they are to lead to certainty in the application of general principles in subsequent cases. This court, realizing the burden cast upon the profession by unnecessarily long opinions, endeavors to conform to the demand for shorter opinions. All cases are thoroughly and carefully considered, and the brevity of the opinion is not ■evidence to the contrary. We are of the opinion that tho trial court was right in its conclusion that the defendant Bradshaw failed to establish his contention that he had a just claim and demand against the deceased, that he had settled with her for said sum, and that the deed of July 3, 1914, was given in consideration of such indebtedness. We are further of the opinion that the finding of the court to the effect that the quitclaim deed of December 13, 1915, was not delivered to the defendants or either of them with any purpose on the part of said deceased to convey title to the property described therein, is in accordance with the clear preponderance of the evidence.

The court excluded evidence offered by appellants, on the ground that it related to transactions between the deceased and the witness Bradshaw and that the witness was therefore incompetent under the provisions of see. 4069, Stats. We have carefully examined the record, particularly the parts called to our attention in briefs of counsel. It appears that the witness Bradshaw was examined as an adverse party under sec. 4068; that upon his examination he was asked by respondents to testify as to many transactions which he had with third persons relating to the business which he did for the deceased, but it does not appear that he was examined as to transactions had directly with the deceased, testimony as to which, when offered by defendants, was excluded by the trial court. The trial court properly excluded the testimony offered.

A witness was permitted to testify to conversation with the deceased when Bradshaw was not present. While this should not have been permitted, nevertheless its admission does not constitute reversible error where the trial is before the'court without a jury, as in this case, and there is competent evidence to ^support the court’s findings, as there is here.

By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.’  