
    *Steamboat Champion v. Frederick Jantzen.
    Under the act “providing for the collection of claims against steamboats and other water-crafts, and authorizing proceedings against the same by name,” an action for assault and battery, committed by one of Us officers while the craft is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this state, can not he maintained.
    This is a writ of error, directed to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county.
    The action below was for an assault and battery. It was commenced in the court of common pleas of Hamilton county, under the law “providing for the collection of claims against steamboats and other water-crafts, and authorizing proceedings against the same by name,” and was submitted to the jury on the plea of the general issue. On the trial, a verdict was returned by the jury in favor of the then plaintiff, and the damages assessed at $325. A motion was made by the plaintiff in error for a new trial, which was overruled by the court, and a judgment rendered upon the verdict.
    A bill of exceptions was then tendered by the plaintiff in error, and allowed by the court, which is as follows:
    
      Be it remembered, that on the trial of this cause in the court, and at the term above named, the plaintiff offered to prove to the jury, that in the month of June, 1844, while the steamboat Champion was on a voyage from Cincinnati, Ohio, to New Orleans, Louisiana, in the trade between which ports she was then employed, the mate of said boat committed an assault against the plaintiff at the town of Hawesville, íd the State of Kentucky, where the boat had been temporarily landed for a supply of fuel; that at the time of said assault, the plaintiff, who had shipped on said steamboat at Cincinnati aforesaid, in the capacity of a fireman, was on a wharf-boat assisting to carry coal aboard said steamboat.
    ♦The plaintiff further offered to prove that the said mate committed another assault against him.on board said boat while the same was in the Mississippi river, at the city of Yicksburg, in the State of Mississippi, where the said boat had been landed for the purpose of discharging freight; and that, said second assault was committed while the plaintiff was performing the duty of a fireman. And also that the said mate compelled the plaintiff to leave the said boat at a plantation in the State of Louisiana, where the said boat had been landed for the purpose of discharging some freight.
    Which said acts of said mate constituted the trespasses complained of by the plaintiff; and all of which occurred without, and not within the jurisdiction of the State of Ohio.
    To the admission of all testimony as to the said trespasses, the defendant, by her attorneys, objected at the times when the same was offered, but which objections were overruled by the court, and said testimony was admitted; to which ruling of the court and admission of testimony, the defendant, by her attorneys, excepted.
    
      Be it also remembered, that on said trial of this cause, the evidence on both sides being closed, the .defendant, by her attorneys, moved the court to instruct the jury :
    1. That the statute under which this suit was instituted (Swan’s Stat. 209), has no extraterritorial operation.
    Which instruction the court refused to give, and instructed the jury, that as to contracts, the statute was intraterritorial in its operation, but as to torts the rule was different, and an action could be maintained under the statute for a tort committed without the jurisdiction of the state.
    2. That an injury inflicted by the mate of a, steamboat, upon a hand of said boat, can not be given in evidence against said boat in an action under the said statute, where the infliction of the injury took place without the jurisdiction and far from the limits of the State of Ohio.
    This instruction the court refused to give.
    3. That the waters of the Mississippi river are not “ waters within or bordering upon the State of Ohio ; ” and *that an injury inflicted by the mate of a steamboat upon a hand of said boat, while said boat was navigating the Mississippi river, can not be given in evidence against said boat in an action under the aforesaid statute.
    The court instructed the jury that the waters of the Mississippi were not “waters within, orbordering upon the State of Ohio,” and refused to give the remainder of the instruction ; but charged the jury that in such an action, a recovery might be had for torts committed on the Mississippi river.
    
      4. That the mate of a steamboat is an agent of the owners of the said boat, who are liable for his acts only so far as they fall within the scope of his agency. That willful assault and battery of a hand is not such an act as falls within the scope of such an agency, unless directed or approved by the owners themselves.
    5. That the torts complaned of having been committed without the jurisdiction of the State of Ohio, the defendant, the steamboat “Champion,” can not be held liable in this action, unless the owners of the said boat would be liable in an action by the plaintiff against them for the same injuries.
    The court refused the above instructions, and charged the jury that the mate of a steamboat is an agent of the owners, and that the owners of the boat are each liable for a willful assault and battery committed by such mate against a hand of said boat, while such mate was exorcising the authorit}'- of a mate over such hand, although such boat was, at the time of such trespass, without the jurisdiction of the State of Ohio.
    The court further charged the jury that any violent laying on of hands is an assault and battery; and that the mate of a steamboat, when such boat is navigating waters without maritime jurisdiction, can not lawfully use any force toward a hand of such boat to compel obedience to his orders.
    The court also charged the jury that, in determining the ^measure of damages, they would consider not only the actual injury received by the plaintiff, but also the character of the assault as to malice or otherwise, and all the circumstances connected with the trespass complained of.
    To all which refusals and opinions of the court, the defendant, by her attorneys, excepted.
    The defendant, by her attorneys, therefore prays that this bill of exceptions in her behalf may be allowed, which is accordingly done; and on motion of defendant’s attorneys, the same is ordered i'o be made a part of the record in this cause.
    “ William B. Caldwell, [l. s.] Presiding Judge. Robert Moore, [l. s.]
    John A. Wiseman, [l. s.] James Safein, [l. s.]
    
      Associate Judges.”
    
    
      Upon this record the following errors are assigned:
    1. The court erred in admitting testimony objected to by the plaintiff in error, as set forth in the bill of exceptions.
    2. The court erred in refusing to give to the jury the instructions prayed for by the plaintiff in error, as set forth in the bill of exceptions.
    3. The court erred in giving the instructions which were actually given to the jury.
    4. The general error, that judgment was given for the plaintiff when it should have been given for the defendant.
    Tart, Net & Mallon, and Walker & Nebler, for plaintiff in error.
    Strait & Hart, for defendant in error.
   Hitchcock, J.

The decision of this case depends entirely upon the construction which shall be given to the act under which the

original suit was brought, to wit, “the act providing *for the collection of claims against steamboats and other water-crafts, and authorizing proceedings against the same by name.” Without that act, no one would ever have thought of commencing an action of trespass for an assault and battery, in a common-law court, against any water-craft by name. But by the act referred to, this mods of proceeding seems to be authorized in some, if not in all cases,. Section 1 of the act is in these words : “ That steamboats and water-crafts, navigating the waters within or bordering upon this State, shall be liable for debts contracted on account thereof, bj the master, owner, steward, consignee, or other agent, for materials, supplies, or labor in the building, repairing, furnishiug, or equipping the same, or due for wharfage; and also for damage arising out of any contract for the transportation of goods or person»,; or for injury done to persons or property by such craft; or for any damage or injury done by the captain, mate, or other officer thereof, or by any person under the order or sanction of either of them, to any person who may be a passenger or hand on said steamboat or other water-craft, at the time of the infliction of such injury.”

Counsel for the plaintiff in error contend that in order to obtain redress for an injury to the person, the injury must have been inflicted while the craft was actually navigating the waters within or bordering upon the state; while, on the other hand, it is insisted that it matters not upon what waters the injury was inflicted, so that the craft is subsequently found “ navigating the waters within or bordering upon this state.” Of this latter opinion, it would seem, were the court of common pleas.

Which is the true construction? It will be seen that the statute has no reference to the place whore the craft was built or where she may bo owned. It is not designed to apply to boats, the property of our own citizens, and to no other. The only words used as descriptive of the craft is, “steamboats or other water-crafts navigating the waters within or bordering upon the state,” such craft, under such circumstances, so navigating, is by the statute made liable for ^certain torts of the master, mate, or other officer. Water-craft navigating other waters, waters entirely beyond or without the jurisdiction of this state, would not be reached by any legislative enactment of this state.. Nor can any legislative act with propriety be construed as intended to effect any such object, unless such intention is clearly and explicitly expressed. As we understand the statute, the intention of the general assembly was to render boats liable for the torts of its officers, committed while such boats were upon our own watersfo?4upon waters bordering upon the state—to make the boat liable civilly for the tort, where the officer committing it would be liable criminally within our own jurisdiction. Perhaps the last remark is not precisely correct. A boat or vessel upon the Ohio, or upon Lake Erie, within the limits, where those waters are boundaries of the state,- would be within the statute, although the act complained of may not have been committed within the actual jurisdiction of the state.

In the case before the court the trespasses complained of were committed entirely beyond the territory of this state, and not while the boat was navigating the waters bordering upon or within the state. It is not a case within the meaning of the statute. The plaintiff might have had an action at common law in our courts for the injury, but he can not obtain redress by a proceeding under the statute.

Such being the construction, which this court give to the statute, it follows that in our opinion the court of common pleas erred. The judgment of that court is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.  