
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Joseph CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-2451-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 2, 2014.
    Joseph Clark, pro se, Loretto, PA, for Appellant.
    Monica J. Richards, Assistant United States Attorney, for William J. Hochul, Jr., United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY, for Appellee.
    
      PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, CHESTER J. STRAUB and REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

In April 2010, Joseph Clark pleaded guilty to using an interstate facility to entice a minor into sexual activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The district court entered a judgment of conviction on January 19, 2011, sentencing Clark principally to a 180-month prison term. On May 17, 2013, acting pro se, Clark moved the district court to vacate his conviction. His papers cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d) as the rule that authorized his motion. The district court denied the motion on June 12, 2013, on the ground that “[t]he provisions of Rule 60 are contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... [and] have no bearing whatsoever in this criminal action.” Gov’t App’x 109. Clark now appeals that decision and argues that the district court should have treated his motion as one filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Assuming without deciding that it may constitute reversible error for a district court to deny such a motion on the ground that the pro se litigant cited the wrong statute or rule where his factual allegations would otherwise entitle him to relief, this is not such a case. If the district court had treated his motion as one under § 2255, it would have been untimely.

Section 2255(f) imposes a one-year limitation period. That period runs from the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. Id. § 2255(f)(1). Clark filed his petition over two years after his conviction became final.

Clark contends that the limitations period should not bar his petition because the limitations period was tolled by fraud on the court of which he was unaware, of. id. § 2255(f)(2)-(4) (tolling limitations period in certain situations where movant cannot be expected to discover basis for motion), and because credible and compelling claims of actual innocence may be considered even through an otherwise untimely petition, see McQuiggin v. Perkins, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1928, 185 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2013). But Clark’s motion did not assert facts, which, if true, would even suggest that he is actually innocent of the charged offense. And to the extent he asserted facts purportedly constituting a fraud on the court, those facts would not entitle him to relief.

We have considered all of Clark’s arguments and conclude that they are without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court denying Rule 60 relief is hereby AFFIRMED.  