
    LOWER CREEK DRAINAGE COMMISSIONERS v. F. B. MITCHELL and Wife.
    (Filed 8 December, 1915.)
    1. Evidence — Statutory Powers — Prima Pacie Case — Drainage Districts.
    It is within the power of the Legislature to change the existing rules of evidence so as to give to proof of certain facts the effect of establishing prima facie a fact in issue, if there is a reasonable relation between the two; and the enactment of sec. 5, ch. 287, Public-Local Laws 1915, amendatory of ch. 46, Public Laws 1911, known as the Drainage act, giving, the itemized statement, verified by the tax collector of the district, the effect of prima facie evidence of the . existence and legality of the taxes assessed as well as of the amount, is a valid exercise by the Legislature of its authority.
    2. Same — Constitutional law — Federal Constitution.
    Sec. 5, ch. 287, Public-Local Laws 1915, known as the Drainage act, making the itemized statement, verified by the collector of the district, prima facie evidence of the existence and legality of tbe tax assessed, as well as of the amounts, etc., affords the taxpayer opportunity to rebut this evidence with his own evidence, before being called upon to pay, and does not deprive him of his property without due process of law contrary to the inhibition of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
    Appeal by defendant from Adams, J., at May Term, 1915, of Caldwell. '
    Action to recover assessments levied against tbe defendants' in Lower Creek Drainage District in Burke and Caldwell counties.
    Tbe district was organized under cb. 96, Public Laws 1909, and it is provided therein tbat tbe collector shall collect tbe assessments by civil action, with tbe right of appeal to tbe Superior Court, if tbe action is instituted before a justice of tbe peace. Tbe original act was amended by cb. 46, Public-Local Laws 1911, which granted additional powers, including tbe right to levy larger assessments, and, again by cb. 287, Public-Local Laws 1915, tbe part of tbe last act which is material to this appeal being as follows:
    . “Sec. 5. Tbat in all actions now pending or hereafter to be instituted for tbe collection of taxes under tbe provisions of said chapter ninety-six,- Public Laws of one thousand nine hundred and nine, as amended, tbe introduction in evidence of a sworn itemized statement of tbe amount of taxes due to said district, verified by tbe oath of tbe collector for tbe time being, shall be prima facie evidence of tbe existence and legality of tbe taxes assessed against tbe party by such statement charged, as well as tbe amount of taxes due by such party.”
    On tbe trial tbe plaintiff introduced tbe itemized statement of tbe amount of tbe assessment verified by tbe oath of tbe collector, and tbe defendant excepted. Tbe defendant offered no evidence. There was a verdict and judgment for tbe plaintiff, and tbe defendant appealed, assigning tbe following error:
    1st Assignment. In tbat tbe bolding of tbe act of 26 February, 1915, constitutional violates tbe letter and spirit of tbe 7 th section of tbe Bill of Rights of tbe Constitution of North Carolina.
    2d Assignment. It violates tbe 8th section of tbe Bill of Rights.
    3d Assignment. It violates tbe 17th section of tbe Bill of Rights.-
    4th Assignment. It violates tbe 19th section of tbe Bill of Rights.
    5th Assignment. It violates tbe 35th section of tbe Bill of Rights.
    6th Assignment. It violates tbe 14th amendment of tbe Constitution of tbe United States.
    
      Squires & Whisnant and M. W. llarshaw for plaintiff.
    
    
      M. V. Wolfe, W. 0. Newland and Edmund Jones for defendant.
    
   Allen, J.

Statutes similar to tbe one before us, providing for tbe drainage of lowlands, have been sustained as a valid exercise of legislative power in several recent decisions. Adams v. Joyner, 147 N. C., 83; Sanderlin v. Luken, 152 N. C., 738, and others. It is also settled in this State and elsewhere tbat it is permissible for tbe General Assembly to give to proof of certain facts tbe effect of establishing prima facie a fact in issue, provided there is a reasonable relation between tbe two. The same rule prevails as to civil and criminal causes, and was very fully considered in S. v. Barrett, 138 N. C., 630.

Tbe Court, in tbat ease, quotes from McLain’s Criminal Law as follows: “Laws-which prescribe tbe evidential force of certain facts by enacting tbat upon proof of such facts a given presumption shall arise, or which determine tbat facts shall constitute'a prima facie case against tbe accused, casting tbe burden of proof upon him of disproving or rebutting tbe presumption, are not generally regarded as unconstitutional, even though they may destroy tbe presumption of innocence. An accused person has no vested right in this or any other presumption or law of evidence or procedure tbat tbe lawmaking power cannot, within constitutional limits, deprive him of. Tbe existing rules of evidence may be changed at any time by legislative enactment”; and adds: “Tbe Legislature of this, and, we presume, every other State, has frequently changed tbe rules of evidence and declared tbat certain facts or conditions, when shown, shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt. Tbe power to do so has always been sustained.”

Tbe rule lias been applied in this State as to crimes in tbe statute against carrying concealed weapons (Rev., see. 3708), which makes tbe possession of a deadly weapon named in tbe statute, about one’s person, prima facie evidence of concealment; in tbe statute making tbe possession of inore than one gallon of intoxicating liquors prima facie evidence of having the liquor for sale (S. v. Wilkerson, 164 N. C., 431), and in other statutes, and in civil matters, notably as applied to this case, in the statute (Rev., sec. 1625), making a verified, itemized statement of an account prima facie evidence of its correctness, which has been sustained in several decisions. Knight v. Taylor, 131 N. C., 84; Claus v. Lee, 140 N. C., 552.

It will be observed that the statute only makes, the itemized statement, verified by the oath of the collector, prima facie evidence of the existence and legality of the taxes as well as of the amount, and this permits the introduction of evidence to prove the contrary, and thus gives to the defendant the opportunity of being heard before he is called upon to pay, and, therefore, he is not deprived of his property without due process of law. Kinston v. Loftin, 149 N. C., 257; Kinston v. Wooten, 150 N. C., 298; Tarboro v. Staton, 156 N. C., 508.

In the first of these cases, which is approved in the others, the action was to collect an assessment for street improvements under a statute requiring a suit to be instituted to collect the assessment, and the defendant objected that he had not had notice prior to the levying of the assessment; but it was held that as the assessment had to be enforced in the courts, and as he could be heard when the action was instituted, he was not deprived of his property contrary to the law of the land, the Court saying: “The order for the improvement was formally made, the work has been well done at a reasonable cost, and the amount assessed well within the limit allowed and established by the law; and, in the present suit, instituted as provided by the statute, the defendants have been afforded opportunity to assert and establish every defense available to them, either by reason of irregularity or on the merits. In Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S., 104, Miller, J., delivering the opinion of the Couid, said-: ‘That whenever, by the laws of a State, or by State authority, a tax assessment, servitude, or other burden is imposed upon property for the public use, whether it be for the whole State or for some more limited portion of the community, and those laws provide for a mode of confirming or contesting the charge thus imposed in the ordinary courts of justice, with such notice to the person or such proceeding in regard to the property as is appropriate to the nature of the case, the judgment in such proceeding cannot be said to deprive the owner of his property without due process of law, however obnoxious it may be to other objections.’ The objection of defendant, therefore, urged on the ground that no proper notice was provided for, cannot be sustained.”

We find

No error.  