
    GLEASON v. STATE.
    (No. 3913.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 2, 1916.
    On Motion for Rehearing, March 1, 1916.)
    1. Seduction <§=w45 — Sufficiency of Evidence.
    In a prosecution for seduction, evidence held sufficient to sustain a conviction.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. §§ 80-S2; Dec. Dig. <§=>45.]
    2. Seduction ⅞=>34 — Promise—Baboain and Sale.
    It is only in eases where no previous relations existed that would suggest love and confidence existed, if prosecutrix yielded solely in consideration of defendant’s promise to marry her if she would yield to him, that an issue of bargain and sale can arise.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. §§ 58-60; Dec. Dig. <§=s>34.]
    3. Witnesses <§=>410 — Impeachment — Cor-BOBORATION.
    In a prosecution for seduction, where the defendant introduced the testimony of prosecu-trix on the former trial to impeach her as to a prior existing promise of marriage, the state in corroboration might show by her mother that prior to the alleged intercourse she had told her that she and defendant were. engaged, and by testimony of another witness that she helped her in making the wedding clothes.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1284; Dec. Dig. <§=>410.]
    4. Witnesses <§=240 — Leading Questions— Permissibility.
    In a prosecution for seduction, it was not improper to permit such questions as: “State whether or not you loved the defendant.” “State whether or not you would have submitted to the defendant that night if you had not loved him.”
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 795, 837-839, 841-845; Dec. Dig, <§=>240.]
    5. Seduction <§=>40 — Evidence—Promise.
    In a prosecution for seduction after prose-cutrix had testified to meeting defendant several times after she was aware of her pregnancy, and that he always promised that he would marry her, it was not improper to permit her to testify that shortly before the birth of the child he said that he was not going to marry her, and “that she could go to hell, or any other damn place,” and then fled the country and was gone for some six or eight months.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. §§ 72, 76, 79; Dec. Dig. <§=>40.]
    6. Criminal Law <§==>361 — Evidence—'Whole Conversation.
    In such prosecution, where a witness testified that defendant, when asked if he “used any preventative or anything to protect the girl, said he didn’t, he took it straight,” and that “he would not mind marrying her if he could get a divorce, and that if he had to marry her and live with her he would rather go to the pen,” it was proper to permit the entire conversation, amounting to a confession of intercourse, to be put in, to make defendant’s statements intelligible.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 802, 803; Dec. Dig. <§=> 361.]
    7. Seduction <¾=46 — Corroboration—Promise.
    Such statement of defendant, read in the light of the entire conversation, amounted to an admission that he felt obligated to marry the prosecutrix and was corroborative of her statement that they were engaged.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. §§ 83-86; Dee. Dig. <§=46.]
    8. Criminal Law <§==>1120(3) — Bill of Exceptions — Evidence.
    A bill of exceptions, not stating what the answer of a witness would have been to question propounded, or that it went to any material fact in the past, presented nothing for review.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, _see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2931, 2932; Dec. Dig. <§=> 1120(3).]
    
      9. Witnesses @=393 — Credibility—Inconsistent Statements.
    In a trial for seduction, where the testimony of a witness for defendant tended to show that prosecutrix was not a virtuous and chaste female, it was proper to allow testimony showing that witness had made contrary statements on the former trial; nor was it necessary to limit such impeaching testimony having no tendency to show defendant’s guilt and bearing only on the weight to be given the witness’ testimony as affecting the reputation of the prosecutrix.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1252-1257; Dec. Dig. @=393.]
    10. Witnesses @=414t-Cross-Bxamination —Credibility:
    In a trial for seduction, where defendant cross-examined the prosecutrix, and introduced her testimony on the former trial to impeach her, and asked what the attorneys had said to her since the former trial to create the impression that her additional testimony on the second trial was a recent fabrication, it was proper to permit the state’s counsel to ask her in rebuttal to state whether he told her the case had been reversed and wanted to know if there was anything she had forgotten.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1287, 1288; Dec. Dig. ©=414.]
    11. Seduction @=48 — Tbia:i>-Pbesence oe Child.
    In a trial for seduction, the fact that the prosecutrix, when called as a witness, came into the courtroom with her child in her arms, but as soon as the court’s attention was called to that fact the child was taken out of the courtroom, it not appearing that the jury saw more than that she merely carried the child, presented no error.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. § 87; Dec. Dig. @=348.]
    12. Seduction @=>42 — Corroboration—Character.
    In a prosecution for seduction, where defendant had severely attacked the chastity and virtue of the. prosecutrix to show that he would not be guilty even if he had promised to marry her, evidence that she was a church member, that her reputation was good, that she attended church, parties, etc., and associated generally with the young people of the community, was admissible.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. §§ 73-75; Dec. Dig. @3=42.]
    13. Seduction @=34 — Oeeense — Reliance on Promise.
    To constitute a case of seduction, the pros-ecutrix must have implicit faith in, and rely on, the promise of marriage.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. §§ 58-60; Dee. Dig. @=34.]
    14. Seduction @=49 — Trial — Peremptory Instruction.
    In a trial for seduction, where the testimony of a witness as to the admissions of defendant corroborating prosecutrix as to both a promise of marriage and an act of intercourse, a peremptory instruction for defendant on the ground that there was no evidence corroborating the testimony of prosecutrix, as to those 'matters, was properly refused.
    [Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. § 88; Dec. Dig. ⅞=49.]
    15. Criminal Daw @=829 — Requested Instruction-Given Instruction.
    In a prosecution for seduction, where the court gave approved charges on accomplice testimony, it was not necessary to give the special charge requested on that issue.
    [Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Daw, Cent. Dig. § 2011; Dee. Dig. @=829.]
    16. Criminal Daw @=829 — Requested In- ■ structions — Given Instructions — Reasonable Doubt.
    In a prosecution for. seduction, where the whole defense, outside of the plea of not guilty, was based on evidence that the prosecutrix was not a virtuous and chaste girl, and where the court fully instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, there was no necessity to give the special charges requested thereon.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Daw, Cent. Dig. § 2011; Dec. Dig. @=829.]
    17. Seduction @=46 — Instructions — Corroboration — “Accomplice.”
    In a prosecution for seduction, the prosecu-trix was in law an accomplice, and defendant could not be convicted upon her testimony alone, unless it was believed to be true, to connect him with the offense, and was corroborated by evidence tending to connect him with the offense, which corroboration could not be supplied by the prosecutrix.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. §§ 83-86; Dec. Dig. @=46.
    For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Accomplice.]
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    18. Witnesses @=414^0orroboration.
    In a prosecution for seduction, whore defendant attempted to show that the additional testimony given by prosecutrix on the second trial was a recent fabrication, the testimony of prosecutrix might be supported by the testimony of her mother and sister that she had made statements prior to the prosecution agreeing with her testimony on the trial; such testimony bearing upon whether she was telling the truth on the trial, and not permitting her to corroborate herself.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1287, 12S8; Dec. Dig. @=414.]
    19. Seduction @=36 — Defenses—Scope.
    In a prosecution for seduction, the defense that the transaction was a bargain and sale would be included in the defense that prosecu-trix was not virtuous and chaste.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. § 62; Dec. Dig. @=36.]
    20. Seduction @=34^-Elements oe Oeeense —Promise.
    In a prosecution for seduction, it is the yielding relying on the promise and defendant’s conduct that authorizes a conviction.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. §§ 58-60; Dec. Dig. @=34.]
    21. Seduction @=45 — Sueeiciency oe Evidence.
    In a prosecution for seduction, the fact that the child was born in about eight months from the time prosecutrix fixed as the date of intercourse would not render the testimony wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction, in view of testimony that children who are born in eight months from conception frequently live.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. §§ 8CP-82; Dec. Dig. @=45.]
    Appeal from District Court, Jack County; F. O. McKinsey, Judge.
    Wilburn Gleason was convicted of seduction, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Stark & Stark, of Jacksboro, and Fitzgerald & Cox, of Wichita Falls, for appellant. C. C. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   HARPER, J.

Prom a conviction for the offense of seduction with punishment assessed at two years’ confinement in the penitentiary, appellant prosecutes this appeal. This is the second appeal, the opinion on the former appeal being reported in 178 S. W. 506.

The case on the former appeal was reversed because the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The state on this trial developed its case more fully, and the prosecutrix testified to many additional facts. On direct examination this time she testified:

“My name is Maggie Davis. On the 28th of November, 1912, I was 20 years old. I know the defendant. Pie used to come to. see me. I have been knowing him all my life. We have been raised together; played together when we were children. He had been coming to see me about two years before November, 1912. He came as my regular suitor. He went out in public with me, to church and singings and parties, and called on me at my house. lie courted me. He proposed marriage to me, at my home, about six months before November, 1912. We became engaged at that time. He had mentioned marriage to me before that, about a month before, and I did not accept him then; but we became engaged about six months before the 28th of November, 1912. The defendant went with me continuously after he became engaged to me. I was with defendant on the night of November 28, 1912. We went to a little entertainment that night at his brother’s. The defendant came to my house after me. Going over there, the defendant tried to get me to show him a good time. He put his arm around me. He took me home that night after the entertainment. Just as soon as we left the party _, he began to insist on me showing him a good time, and he begged me until we got about a mile of home, and he promised that he would marry me if I would show him a good time. He says, ‘You know we intend to marry, and what will this amount to?’ And he kept on begging me to show him a good time, that he was a man of his word and knew that he would marry me, and so I submitted to him. We were in the buggy when I submitted to him. I mean, he had sexual intercourse with me. I believed at that time we would become man and wife. I would not have submitted to him if I had not thought that, and if he had not promised it. That operation gave me pain. The defendant and I were sweethearts when we were boy and girl together.-
“After that occurrence, I next saw the defendant Christmas week. He came down to our house to use our telephone. I didn’t talk to him of my condition. I afterwards told him of my condition, on the 13th of January, at my house. I reminded him of his promise at that time. He said he would see me out; that he would fill his promise. I bore a child by the defendant. He is the father of the child I bore. After I talked to the defendant, on the occasion last mentioned, I next saw him in about two weeks, I guess; something like that. He was at our house at that time, after water. I saw the defendant at Hamilton’s. That was in February, if I am not mistaken. I told him then about my condition. He said, T will see you out.’ I made preparations to get married to the defendant. I did part of my sewing, and my sister helped me, my sister Etta Stewart. The defendant never did marry me. About a month before the child was born, the defendant, Wilburn Gleason, refused to marry me. He was at our house, and I reminded him of it and asked him what he was going to do, and he said, ‘Nothing.’ He said he wasn’t going to do anything; that I could go to hell, or any other damn place I wanted to. Before that he had at all times said he would carry out his promise. At the time I had intercourse with the defendant in the buggy, I was not married to him nor to any one. This act of intercourse that I have testified about,' with the defendant, took place in Jack county, state of Texas.”

By reading this evidence and her evidence on the former trial, quoted in the opinion on the first appeal, it will be seen she testifies to many facts and circumstances which go to make a case of seduction that she did not testify to on the first trial. In the first ease, from her testimony, it would appear that the promise of marriage took place at the time of the alleged act of intercourse. On this trial she testifies that they had been engaged some six months prior thereto, and appellant had been coming to see her and courting her for two years next preceding the date of the alleged act of intercourse. Such additional facts furnish grounds for her reliance on his promise, and that she was led away from the path of virtue by the deceitful promises, acts, and conduct of appellant. Young people who have associated together from childhood, and who while children are “sweethearts,” as she testifies in this instance, ordinarily trust each other and place more reliance in promises made than they do in a person whom they have only casually met since becoming grown. If appellant had been “courting” the girl for two years, became engaged to marry her some six months prior to the first act of intercourse, the fact she testified she yielded to him because of the promise of marriage, and but for such relation existing she would not have yielded to him, does not raise the issuo of “barter and sale,” where other facts are detailed as the prosecutrix détails them on this trial. It is only in eases where no previous relations existed that would suggest love and confidence existed, if she yielded solely in consideration of the man telling her he will marry her if she will yield to him, that such an issue can arise. No such state of case is presented on this trial. The evidence on the former trial, not being fully developed, did present such a state of case; but, as before said, the case was more fully developed on this trial, and this led appellant to give the girl a most severe and rigid and cross-examination as to what she had sworn to on the former trial; that she had not testified to him courting her for two years prior to the alleged act, and had not testified to the engagement to marry being of six months’ standing at that time. This cross-examination might not, in and of itself, have authorized the 'state to support the girl by proof of prior statements made before the date of the alleged act of intercourse; but, where appellant introduced her testimony on the former trial to impeach her as to a prior existing promise of marriage, then the state could support her testimony and prove by the mother that, some two or three months prior to the alleged act of intercourse, the witness had told lier about she and appellant being engaged to be married. Whenever the opposite side seeks to impeach a witness as to any statement material to the case, then the party calling the witness can support the witness by proving that she had made statements consistent with her testimony on the trial, prior to the time any occasion had arisen for her to testify falsely. This rule of law also renders admissible the testimony of Mrs. Etta Stewart, who testified she helped the prosecu-trix in making her wedding clothes. This testimony supported the girl that an engagement to marry existed prior to the date of the alleged seduction, and, appellant having sought to impeach her on that issue, she could be supported. Williams v. State, 24 Tex. App. 665, 7 S. W. 333; Jones v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 103, 40 S. W. 807, 41 S. W. 638, 70 Am. St. Rep. 719; Keith v. State, 44 S. W. 849; English v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 200, 30 S. W. 233; Reddick v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 469, 34 S. W. 274, 60 Am. St. Rep. 56; Mitchell v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 278, 33 S. W. 367, 36 S. W. 456.

A number of questions to the prosecuting witness, such as, “State whether or not you loved the defendant,” “State whether or not you would have submitted to the defendant that night if you had not loved him,” were objected to by appellant as leading. Under the record in this case it was not improper to permit such questions to be propounded. Hinman v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 29, 127 S. W. 222; Fine v. State, 81 S. W. 723; Snodgrass v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 211, 36 S. W. 477. And after Miss Davis had testified to meeting appellant several times after she became aware she was pregnant, and he always promised that he would carry out his promise and marry her, it was not improper to permit her to testify that, shortly before the birth of the baby, appellant was at her home, and at that time said he wasi not going to marry her, and “that she could go toi hell, or any other damn place,” and then fled the country and was gone for some six or eight months.

Walter Hamilton was testifying to a conversation he had with appellant, and appellant objected to the witness stating what he (witness) said to appellant, as it was necessary to render intelligible the statements of appellant on that occasion, the court committed no error in permitting the entire conversation to be testified to. On that occasion, appellant, when asked if he “used any preventative or anything to protect the girl, appellant said he didn’t; he took it straight.” This expression would not be intelligible without the entire connection being stated; but, when the whole conversation is related, it amounts to a confession of illicit intercourse. Likewise, the statement of appellant when he said “he would not mind marrying her if he could get a divorce, if he would not have to live with her. He said if he had to marry her and live with her he would rather go to the pen.” This statement, when read in, the light of the entire conversation, amounted to an admission that he felt legally obligated to marry the girl and is corroborative of her statement that an engagement to marry existed between the parties. Davis v. State, 3 Tex. App. 91; Stockman v. State, 24 Tex. App. 387, 6 S. W. 298, 5 Am. St. Rep. 894; Gaither v. State, 21 Tex. App. 527, 1 S. W. 456.

As in bill No. 9 it is not stated what the answer of Dr. Key would have been to the question propounded, the bill is incomplete, and presents nothing for review. The testimony expected to be elicited must always be shown, and that it is as to some material fact in the past. May v. State, 25 Tex. App. 114, 7 S. W. 588; Schoenfeldt v. State, 30 Tex. App. 695, 18 S. W. 640.

As defendant introduced Tom Allen as a witness on this trial, and the said witness testified to a state of facts material to his defense, it was not improper to permit witnesses to testify that they had talked with Allen at the former trial, and he had then stated he knew nothing derogatory to Miss Davis, the prosecuting witness. On this trial he testified to a very damaging state of facts, which, if believed, would have a material tendency to show that she was not a virtuous and chaste female, and it was proper to permit testimony to be introduced showing that he had made contrary statements at the time of the former trial. Nor was it necessary to limit this impeaching testimony, as it had no tendency to show appellant’s guilt of the charge. All it would and could be used for by the jury was in passing on what weight they would give Allen’s testimony as affecting the reputation of the girl. Brown v. State, 24 Tex. App. 170, 5 S. W. 685; Poyner v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 640, 51 S. W. 376; Schwartz v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 451, 111 S. W. 399; Thompson v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 120, 113 S. W. 536.

As hereinbefore stated, appellant was severe in his cross-examination of Miss Davis, introduced her testimony' on the former trial to impeach her, and on his cross-examination asked what the attorneys had said to her since the former trial, etc. Thus it is seen that an effort was made to create the impression that her testimony was of recent fabrication, and the attorneys at least had suggested to her wherein it was necessary that her testimony be added to. Under such circumstances, there was no error in permitting state’s counsel to ask her, in rebuttal of such cross-examination:

“Miss Maggie, state whether or not it is a fact that Mr. McComb and I told you the case had been reversed, and we wanted to know if there was anything you had forgotten; that we wanted to know the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”

And in permitting her to answer the question. The defendant in his cross-examination had already brought out the fact that the case had been reversed on appeal. The court in approving the bill says:

“Approved with the explanation that the pros-ecutrix was asked about a number of matters that she was not asked about on the former trial, and her doings and relations with the defendant were, by questions propounded by state’s counsel, much more fully developed than had been done on the former trial. She was severely cross-examined by defendant’s counsel on the difference between her present and former testimony, and the impression sought to be made that the new facts testified to by her were fabrications suggested to her by state’s counsel.”

'When Miss Davis was called as a witness, she came into the courtroom with her baby in her arms. As soon as the court’s attention was called to that fact, he had the baby carried out of the courtroom. As it does not appear that the jury saw more than she merely had a baby, and that fact was testified to by a number of witnesses, the bill presents no error.

The court did not err in refusing to give peremptory instructions to acquit. The facts on this trial will and do sustain the verdict of the jury.

The fact that Mrs. Davis, the mother of the prosecutrix, was permitted to incidentally state that she was a member of the church, without stating what church, or any fact connected with her membership, is not a matter that could have had any bearing on the issues in the ease. The severe assault appellant made on the character of the girl, in an effort to show that she was lacking in chastity and virtue, and therefore he would not be guilty, even if he had had intercourse with her, certainly rendered testimony admissible that the girl’s reputation for virtue and chastity was good; that she moved in the best circles of "society, attended church, attended the singings, dances, and parties, and associated generally with the young people of the community, and if in connection therewith it was shown her mother was a member of the church, if error, it was not such error as would call for a reversal of the ease. The mother, in a measure, was attacked as well as the girl, by the witness Allen.

If the young lady had submitted her person to appellant without relying on a promise of marriage, there could be no case of seduction; therefore the court did not err in refusing the special charge asking him to instruct the jury:

“If you find that the prosecutrix, Miss Maggie Davis, submitted to appellant wholly on account of his said promise to marry her, you will acquit him.”

This is not the law, but, on the contrary, she must have implicit faith in and rely on the promise of marriage to constitute a case of seduction.

Appellant asked for peremptory instructions on the ground that there was no evidence corroborative of her testimony as to a promise of marriage, and on the ground that there was no testimony corroborative as to her testimony as to an act of intercourse, and then asked a charge that, if she was not corroborated both as to promise of marriage •and an act of intercourse, they would acquit. As hereinbefore shown, the testimony of Walter Hamilton as to admissions of appellant would corroborate her as to both a promise of marriage and an act of intercourse, for he told that witness he used no preventative, but took it “straight,” and said he would not mind marrying her if he did not have to live with her, but rather than live with her he would go to the pen. In addition to this testimony, there are other facts and circumstances in evidence tending to corroborate the girl’s testimony. The court gave the charges on accomplice testimony approved by this court in the case of Campbell v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 301, 123 S. W. 584, and it was not necessary to give the special charges requested on that issue.

As the court fully instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, there was no necessity to give the special charges requested on this matter. The court instructed the jury:

“The term ‘seduce,’ as used in this charge, means to lead a woman away from the path of virtue. Now, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Wilburn Gleason, did in Jack county, Tex., on or about the 28th day of November, 1912, by promise of marriage, seduce the witness Maggie Davis and did have carnal knowledge of her, and that said Maggie Davis was at the time an unmarried female under 25 years of age, you will find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment and assess bis punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than ten years.
“Before you can convict the defendant, you must believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: (a) That said witness Maggie Davis was at the time in question under 25 years of age; (b) that the defendant had carnal knowledge of her on or about the 28th day of November, 1912; (c) that up to the time that the defendant had carnal knowledge of Miss Maggie Davis, if he did have carnal knowledge of her, she was a chaste female; and (d) that the defendant had carnal knowledge of said Maggie Davis by promise of marriage. And if you have a reasonable doubt as to either one of the matters submitted and designated in this paragraph as ‘a,’ ‘b,’ ⅛,’ and ‘d,’ you will acquit the defendant, and say by your verdict ‘not guilty.’ ”

After having thus instructed the jury, it was wholly unnecessary to give the special charges requested by defendant. Outside of his plea of not guilty, his whole defense was based on evidence introduced by him that the girl was not a virtuous and chaste girl, and this defense was fully presented in the charge above. In addition to the above paragraphs, the court instructed the jury:

“I instruct you that the witness Miss Maggie Davis is what is known in law as an ‘accomplice,’ and I further instruct you that you cannot convict the defendant upon her testimony alone, unless you first believe her testimony to be true, and that it connects the defendant with the offense charged, and then you cannot convict him upon the testimony of said witness unless you further believe that there is other testimony in the case corroborative of such accomplice’s testimony, tending to connect the defendant with the offense charged, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense charged; and in passing upon this issue you may look to all the facts and circumstances in evidence in this case. You are further instructed that the witness Maggie Ha-yis cannot corroborate herself.”

The criticisms of this charge present no error, and the judgment is affirmed.

DAVIDSON, J., not present at consultation.

On Motion for Rehearing.

HARPER, J.

This case was affirmed at a former day of this term, and appellant has filed a motion for rehearing in which he assigns five grounds in which he thinks the court erred in the original opinion, conceding that the court was perhaps correct in passing on the other propositions presented. Owing to the earnest insistence of appellant’s counsel, we have again reviewed the five questions presented.

The first contention is that the evidence of the young lady would not make a case of seduction, hut shows a case of barter and sale. Her testimony on direct examination is copied in full in the original opinion, and we think it shows a case of seduction, and not barter and sale, and would justify a conviction if corroborated.

The next contention is that the court erred in holding that the testimony of the prosecuting witness could be supported by the testimony of her mother and sister. If appellant had made no attack on the witness, his contention would be sound; but it has always been the rule in this court that if defendant’s case is that the witness testified under corrupt motives, or where it is sought to show that the testimony is of recent fabrication, state may sustain witness by proof of similar statements in harmony with her testimony, made before any motive existed to testify falsely. English v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 200, 30 S. W. 233; Reddick v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 469, 34 S. W. 274, 60 Am. St. Rep. 56; Mitchell v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 278, 33 S. W. 367, 36 S. W. 456; Williams v. State, 24 Tex. App. 665, 7 S. W. 333; Jones v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 103, 40 S. W. 807, 41 S. W. 638, 70 Am. St. Rep. 719; Ballow v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 266, 58 S. W. 1023.

Appellant certainly cannot contend that he was not endeavoring to show that the additional testimony she gave on this trial to what she had given on the former trial was not of recent fabrication, and cannot contend that he was not insisting that it was conceived by her after a conference with attorneys representing the state. And certainly this was the purpose of appellant introducing, in rebuttal of her testimony on this trial, her testimony given at the former trial, and that she had made contradictory statements. Certainly, under such circumstances, the state could support its witness by showing that she had made statements prior to the institution of this prosecution in conformity with her testimony on this trial. It was not permitting a conviction by allowing her to corroborate herself, but such testimony was admissible to aid the jury in determining whether or not she was speaking the truth on this trial. The court in his charge instructed the jury that “the witness Maggie Davis could not corroborate herself.”

The next contention is that we erred in holding that the testimony of Walter Hamilton corroborated the prosecuting witness both as to promise of marriage and sexual intercourse. Appellant concedes that the testimony of this witness does corroborate the prosecutrix as to an act of intercourse, but earnestly insists that it does not corroborate her as to a promise of marriage. We have again read this witness’ testimony, and, while the witness does not use the words “he told me he promised to marry her,” yet no other deduction could be drawn from the testimony of the witness.

He insists we erred in stating that appellant’s defense, in addition to a plea of not guilty, was that the girl was not a virtuous and chaste girl, and that he had the additional defense that the transaction was one of barter and sale. This would be included in the statement that she was not virtuous and chaste. But we did not hold that such an issue was not in the case, but, if raised, it was sufficiently presented in the court’s charge, and the jury found against such contention. It was not proper to charge the jury, as requested by appellant, that if the prosecutrix relied solely on the promise of marriage in yielding to appellant, he should be acquitted. It is because of the yielding, relying on the promise, and appellant’s conduct, that a conviction is authorized.

The fifth contention is that we did not pass on the assignment that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We certainly thought that it could be gathered from the opinion that we thought the evidence ample to sustain the verdict. It is true that the baby was born in about eight months from the time the young lady gives as the date of the act of intercourse, but this fact would not render the testimony wholly insufficient. As testified to by the doctor in this case, children who are bom in eight months from conception frequently live. The fact that it was born in eight months, its size, condition, etc., are to be considered with all the facts in the ease, and we suppose appellant’s able counsel presented this circumstance to the jury with the same force and ability that they present it in their brief and in this motion; yet the jury found adversely to their contention, and we cannot say they were not authorized under all the evidence to do so.

The motion for rehearing is overruled. 
      <§=>For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     
      @=For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     