
    WILLIAM H. SIMPSON vs. WILLIAM HIATT.
    Although a venditioni exponas is not a part of the record, so as to carry absolute verity with it, yet it is the authority under which an officer acts and his only authority to sell, and is therefore a necessary part of the evidence, to support the title of a purchaser at a sale under such an execution.
    So, the return of a Sheriff on such venditioni being an official act, is also competent evidence.
    In this'case, the evidence as in the case of the Sheriff’s deed, is only prima faeie, and may be rebutted by other evidence.
    Although a plaintiff who obtains a judgment in an attachment levied on land, may have taken judgment against the garnishees, he still has a right to have the land sold, under the levy and the order founded thereon.
    If a Sheriff levies an execution upon land, when there is sufficient personal property to satisfy the debt, any injury inflicted is a matter between the Sheriff, and the owner of the property, the defendant in the execution.
    The cases of Smitliv. Love, 5 Ire. 197, Patterson v. Britt, 11 Ire. 380, and Mordeccd v. Pandeen-, 3 Dev. 345, cited and approved.
    Appeal from the Superior Court of Law'of Mecklenburg County, at a Special Term in June, 1851, his Honor J.udge Ellis presiding.
    
      Craig, Alexander and Wilson for the plaintiff.
    Boyden, Osborne and Hutchinson for the defendant.
   Nash, J.

We concur with his Honor, both in the reception of the testimony objected to, and in his charge. The lessor of the plaintiff and the defendant both claimed the premises in dispute, under Allen Cheyne, who was a citizen of Georgia and resident there. Allen Cheyne claimed to be a devisee under the will of his father Henry Cheym, and, being largely indebted to the estate, the executors took out an attachment against him and caused it to be levied upon the land in question, and other property, and such proceedings were had, that a regular judgment was obtained against the defendant, Allen Cheyne, at the November Term, 1847, of Union County Court; and, at same Term, one Williams and Milton Ohing, who had been summoned as garnishees, upon the examination, confessed, that each was indebted to Allen Cheyne and the debts were condemned to the satisfaction of the plaintiff’s debts and judgments were rendered against each of them, to the amounts severally admitted to be due. These garnishees were solvent, and are still so — a venditioni exponas issued ; and at the sale the lessor of the plaintiff, it is alledged, became the purchaser, and, to show that fact, he offered in evidence the venditioni exponas and the Sheriff’s return thereon. This was objected to by the defendant, upon the ground, that the venditioni exponas, and the Sheriff’s return constituted no part of the record and were not admissible as evidence to establish the sale by the Sheriff, and, the purchase by the lessor. The objection was overruled, and the testimony admitted by the Court, as proof that the execution was in the hands of the Sheriff, at the time of the sale, that there was a sale by him, and that the lessor of the plaintiff was the purchaser at such sale. The defendant claimed the land, under a deed from Allen Cheyne, bearing date April, 1847, before the attachment issued, and it was contended by the lessor of the plaintiff that it was made to defraud the creditors of Allen Cheyne, and therefore void — on the part of the defendant, it was insisted, that the plaintiff could not recover, for that a sum .sufficient to pay the debt in the attachment had been condemned in the hands of the garnishees, and that the plaintiffs in the attachment, of whom the lessor of the plaintiff in this case was one, could not 'sell the land in controversy, until he had collected the sums so condemned or showed that he could not collect them. The objection was overruled by the Court and the jury were instructed, that, if the deed from Allen Cheyne to the defendant was made to defraud his creditors it was void, and the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict. The objection of the defendant to the venditioni and the Sheriff’s return is two-fold; first, that it was no part of the record ; and secondly that the return was but the certificate of the Sheriff, of what he had done under the precept. It is certain that the venditioni is not apart of the record, so as to carry absolute verity with it, but it was the authority, under which the officer acted, and his only authority to sell; it was, therefore, a necessary part of the evidence, in making out the plaintiff’s title, and for the purpose for which his Honor admitted it, it was clearly competent; as to there turn on the venditioni, it is an official act, rendered necessary by the law, which compels the Sheriff to make due return of every precept which comes to his hands, and this return is a notification to the Court, of what the officer has done under the precept. It is not conclusive evidence, being not a judicial, but a ministerial, act, so neither is the conveyance by the Sheriff to the purchaser. In both cases the opposing party may show, that no sale did take place, or that the land specified in the deed was not levied on or sold. But they are both prima facie evidence and stand effective until rebutted. This position is sustained by the cases of Smith v. Love, 5 Ire. 197, and Patterson v. Britt, 11 Ire. 389.

The second objection urged by the defendant is equally untenable. The plaintiff in the venditioni exponas, so far as the defendant is concerned, had a right to have the land sold under it, although he had judgments against the garnishees at the time. This objection is founded on the general principle, that a debtor’s personal property is first to be made subject to an execution. It is unnecessary to investigate that doctrine here. For we hold, that if an injury has been inflicted by a Sheriff’s departing from this order, it is a matter between him and the owner oí the property, the defendant in the execution. Mordecai v. Parker, 3 Dev. 435. In this case the jury have found that the conveyance from Allen Cheyne to the defendant was made to defraud his creditors ; it is, therefore, void, as to the latter, and, as far as they are concerned, conveyed no title to the defendant b,ut left it still in Cheyne, who is no party in this suit.

Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.  