
    Taylor & Warren vs. Ferguson & Robertson.
    A tau¡n Smptanííiit'/l'y Setter, instructed she ?* rat’sc an insurance them on a vessel then on .a voyage, &o. which ihc’tif-fondant negltcted sei‘wo*HiostlieTÍÜe wasí7hj>lfthe íie-iToaUh kBowic<iKc,m'&T. íá’4ht bS’rtecrc¡5 pinmUis 'Ihcalm t»cm0"iirectcd 'to vessel, wiiii ime-the relief jprujed ty the lull is a nmtief not Jy cognizable in a comt iif chancery, inttScr “thánMo '"™>’wh'ohe f“°’s ofthe biir.ard the cinapiawS Sew'wm¿í&n it 1!‘w’
    Appeal from a decree of the Court of Chancery. The jj-jj 0p qle complainants, (now appellants,) stated, that they on the 30th of March 1802, being then engaged in com- and shipping in li pifo l/c, in the state of Virginia, and possessed in their right of a ship called The Fox, of the . ~ , , . . value of §4000, and supposed by them tope on a voyage from Ifingston, in the Island of Jamaica, to Fort Repvbli-can from thence to Norfolk, and wishing to make in- } ' o surance on the said ship to the amount of her said value, * • 7 Taylor, one of the complainants, wrote a letter of the above ¿“te to the defendants, (the appellees,) who then carried on in the city of Baltimore, and were the complainants8 regular agents and correspondents in that city, for making insurance, and every other business of a commercial na-fu rc which they had occasion to transact there, containing this' request, viz. UI wish to have insurance effected from Jamaica to Port Republican, and from thence to Norfolk-p which letter was duly received by the defendants, and ac-J , by them. That having, soon after the date of 23 - • J ° . the said letter, received intelligence, as the fact ivas, that sbip» instead 0f going to Jamaica, had proceeded to Jeremie, and was about to return from thence to Norfolk, the way of Cape Francois, and wishing to accommodate the insurance to be made on her to this new voyage, the said Taylor did, on the 6th of April 1802, address to the defendants, and put into-the post office at Norfolk, a second letter of that da;e, as follows, viz. “I wrote you on the SOíh ultimo, directing insurance on the ship Fox, from Ja-rnaica to Fort Republican. I find, instead of proceeding to that port, they went to Jeremie, where I have heard of their arrival.’ From thence they will proceed to Cape Francois, at which port she has a cargo to discharge, which was taken in at Jeremie. You will therefore please to have these things mentioned in the policy. From Gape Francois she will come tó Norfolk.” The bill then charged, that the defendants received the said last mentioned letter ill due course of post, but as the receipt of it by them is a matter resting in their private knowledge, which they always avoided acknowledging, and pow deny, the complainants have no method of establishing the fact of the-said receipt, except „y a discovery, by the defendants, oa oath. That the defendants wholly neglected and omitted to procure insurance on the ship, according to t’ne directions contained in said letters: and also omitted and wholly . , , . . ... J aeglected to give the complainants any information respecting such omission and neglect, or in any manner respecting the said insurance, so as to enable them to apply lor and procure it through some other channel; whereby they 11 ere prevented from making, or procuring to be made, any insurance on the ship; being well satisfied, from all the circumstances stated above, that it had been procured by the defendants pursuant to their said directions. That the ship teas cast away, and wholly lost, during her said voyage from Jeremie to Norfolk, through stress of weather, and the danger of the seas, of which event they received the first Intelligence on the 15th of April 1802. That they well Sloped, ami frequently requested, in a friendly manner, of the defendants, that they, having taken on themselves the insurance of the ship, by their aforesaid neglects ami omissions, would forthwith, on receiving information of the loss, pay to the complainants the amount of the insurance so by them directed to be made, after deducting the Usual premium at that time paid for insurance on such a voyage. But the defendants utterly refused to comply and pajr to the complainants ary part of the said insurance — -falsely pretending that they did not receive the complainants’ said letters. Prayer for a discovery, on oath, of matters resting in tiie knowledge of the defendants, &c. and that they may be decreed to pay to the complainants the sum of money so by them directed to be insured on the ship, with interest, &c. and for further relief, &c. The am*x er of the defendants admitted the receipt on the 6th of April 1802, of the letter of ths^TSjth «f March 1802, and that on the Tih of April 1802, they applied to the Baltimore insurance Company to make insurance ori the said ship for the voyage stated in that letter, but no insurance was effected on said voyage, because it was then known to the said office that the ship had sailed from Kingston, and had arrived at JeremU, of all which they informed Naylor, one of the complainants, by letter, hearing date on the fth of April 1802. They admit the receipt of the letter of the 6th of April 1802, but they cannot ascertain the precise period at which it was received, but suppose it to have been about the 13th of that mouth. That the said letter, immediately after its receipt, waa mislaid, and was not found or remembered until about the beginning of May 1802. and not until ac-C0UDÍS had keen received of the ioss of the ship. They averred that the ship was not lost on the voyage from Jeremie to Norfolk, but that she was lost at Jeremie, and before she had completed her lading at that port. Thai the ship whs not wholly lost to the complainants, but that materials to the amount of S1000 were saved to the owners. That Taylor, one of the complainants, was indebted to the defendants in the sum of §!6r2 £9. That after the receipt of the letter of the 6th of April 1802, the de~ fendants admit they did not apply for insurance on the said ship, but this omission was the effect of accident, and not of any intention to injure the complainants; and the defendants insisted, that the complainants had not been injured by such omission. That the letter of the 6th of April 1802, referred to a policy supposed to be effected on the voyage described in the letter of the 13th of March 1802. No such policy had been effected; and there was nothing in the letter of the 6th of April 1802, which ordered the defendants to insure the ship at Jeremie. If, therefore, the defendants had caused insurance to be effected on the. ship from Jeremie, to Cape Francois, and thence to Norfolk, a loss at Jeremie would not have been covered by the policy. The defendants consider thems.elves well warranted in availing themselves of this objection, which would have protected the underwriters if a policy had been effected. That the letters of the 30th of March, and 6th of April 1802, were written by Taylor, one of the complainants, and the defendants did not know, neither did they believe, the said ship was (he joint property of the complainants. They deny that the order was in effect an order to insure the interest cf both the complainants, or that it ought to have been, or was so understood, at the time of receiving it by the defendants; but on the contrary it amounted only to an order to insure the interest of Taylor. That if the insurance had been effected according to the order, and 4 loss had accrued, which was covered or protected by the policy, nothing more than Taylor’s interest could have been recovered.
    It was admitted by an agreement between the parties, that the ship was at the time of the voyage and loss, of the value of S4C00, and was lost at Jeremie, 
      as stated in the answer of the defendants, by the dangers of the sea. The account of the defendants against the complainant, Taylor, was admitted to be just. The materials saved from the ship, after deducting expenses, amounted to 8!93. The cause was submitted to the chancellor on the bill, answer, exhibits and admissions.
    Kilty, Chancellor, (September term 1809.) The object of the bill is to compel the defendants to pay to the complainants the amount of insurance directed to be made, but which they had neglected to make. It is obvious that this is a matter proper for an action on the case at law. The reasons assigned for coming into this court are, that the complainants had no evidence of the delivery of their second letter of the 6th of April 1802. That the receipt thereof rested in the private knowledge of the defendants, which they always avoided acknowledging, and then denied. The prayer of the bill is, that they may set forth and discover whether they did not receive the letters as charged, and that they may be decreed to pay the sum directed to be insured, after deducting for premium of insurance. The greatest objection to the jurisdiction of this court arises from the nature of the claim, which is not founded upon any agieemsnt, or any matter which can be made the subject of an account, but which can be supported only by establishing that there was a breach of orders, negligence or fraud, on the part of the defendants. If the jurisdiction can be sustained, it must be from the equity founded on the second letter, (on which the remedy at law depended,) being concealed or denied by the defendants, so as to entitle the complainants, not only to a discovery, but to relief by payment of the sum due, although this discovery might have been obtained here in aid of a suit at law. And it is further to be observed, that this point is not contested by the defendants, as will be seen by the agreement to submit the ease. But the right of the complainants to relief, if it is to be established in this court, must depend on the decision of the questions of law, and the establishment of matters of fact, which do not appear to be properly determinable by a court of equity, but are proper for the determination of a court and jury; which may be obtained by the trial of issues sent from this court. Decreed, that there be tried in Baltimore county court the following issues, &c. If the counsel for the complainants should be unwilling to have these issues, or any others, tried for the support of the case, and would prefer to risk the dismissal of the bill, the chancellor will proceed to decree accordingly.
    The chancellor having been requested by the complainants’ counsel to proceed to decide and decree upon the bill, answer and proofs, at December term 1811, he decreed, that the bill be dismissed with costs. From which decree the complainants appealed to this court, where the cause was argued before Buchanan, Nicholson, Earle, Johnson, and Martin, J.'
    
      Harper, for the Appellants.
    There were two objections made by the defendants in the court of chancery — d. The right of recovery generally. .2. The right of Warren, one of the complainants, to recover, because he was not mentioned in the letter ordering the insurance. He contended that both of the letters were to be taken together. The last letter referred to the first, and they are to be connected. There was no new order for insurance given, but only that new facts were to be stated — to substitute Jere-mie and Cape Francois, instead of Port Republican. The true meaning was, that it should be on a voyage from Jamaica to Jeremie, to Cape Francois and to Norfolk, so as to cover the vessel during the whole of the voyage from Jamaica to Norfolk, to and at all the different places where she was to stop. Jeremie and Cape Francois were substituted as intermediate ports, instead of Port Republican, first mentioned. The vessel was covered at Je-remie — at all events an insurance from her arrival there-Ile referred to Gregory v. Christie, 1 Marsh. 273. Thompson v. Taylor, 6 T. R. 478. Ilorncasfle vs. Stuart, 7 Bast, 400. Marsden vs. Reid, 3 Bast, 572.
    2. It may be said that the chancellor had no jurisdiction of the case, except to grant the discovery. He contended, that the practice of the court of chancery in this state is different from, that of the English courts. It tends to prevent litigation, and the multiplicity of suits. Unless it be some very peculiar case, the party need not carry it on in tivo courts. It is a maxim, that a court having jurisdiction in part, has it in the whole; and the practice is, that when the court of chancery once takes a case under its cognizance, it goes on to give the relief required, prevents the confounding of two jurisdictions. It
    
      Pinkney, for the Appellees.
    The decree Of the chancellor dismissing the bill, is perfectly correct on two grounds — 1. A court of equity is incompetent to give relief in tin's case, the matter being exclusively at law. 2. The complainants have no case on theirown showing.
    1. This is a claim against agents for breach of orders, and a special action on the case in a court of law' only gives the party remedy. Every question involved in the case is a question of law, aud involves no one princi-pie with which the court of chancery has cognizance. No case can be shown where chancery has interfered in a case of this nature — breach ofduly — breach of orders. The jury are to assess the damages. They are first to ascertain the order for insurance — the extent and injury sustained. It cannot be said that a court of equity has original cognizance of a case like this. There are many cases where the court of chancery has concurrent jurisdiction with a court of law; but there are cases exclusively cognizable in a court of law, and such is the present case. There was no demand in the bill, except the discovery, which the court of chancery has any thing to do with. The complainants alleged that they could not prove the receipt of the letters, and called on the defendants, in chancery, to state whether they had not been received. This gave them no pretence to proceed on in their case there. All they had a right to ask was for a discovery of the fact of the receipt of the letters. The question then is, that in a case exclusively applicable to a court of law, and where a discovery is wanting, whether the party can transfer the case from a court of law to a court of equity, and ask for relief? There never was such a case in chancery. The practice is to bring the suit at law, and then apply to ehancery for a discovery, to be used in the trial at lawr- There can be no relief in equity where there is full and adequate remedy at lav»'. There is a single exception — for the specific performance of a contract, but the relief, is different. In the one court the contract is to be specifically performed, but in the oilier damages are given. But here there is no pretence that the relief would be different in equity from what it would be at law. Here the claim sounds altogether in damages; and to ascertain the damages, must be by the verdict of a jury. 'How could the chancellor assess the damages? He must send issues to be tried by a jury in a court of law, otherwise it would be drawing from the jury 'that which exclusively belongs to them, and which would be attended with dangei’ous consequences. There is no ground alleged for the jurisdiction ofchancery, but the defect of evidence; but that may be remedied by the discovery. .It is supplied on the coming in of the answer. The moment- the fact is disclosed, the object is attained, and that court is functus officio, and the case is for a court of law. The case is so clear, that it is wholly unnecessary to refer to any authorities. This point was fully discussed in this court in West vs. Beanes, 3 Harr. & Johns. 568. The agents have failed to perform the complainants orders. They may have mislaid the letters. There is no fraud alleged, and it is a case strictly at law, and wouid be a most, extraordinary subject for a court of equity. It is a case that at law relief would with reluctance be granted. How then iri chancery can there be relief?
    2. From the letters, the insurance could not be made— .no valid policy could be effected. If it had been effected under the first letter, it would have been void-^-the deviation from Port Republican to Jeremie would have annulled the policy. The letter from the defendants, in answer to that first received, stated that the insurance could not be effected. The vessel was lost at Jeremie; and the question is, whether if the insurance had been effected under the last letter, (which was very ambiguous,) it would have covered the property at Jeremie? It is an equitable rule that written orders should be clear and explicit. If they are ambiguous, a court of equity cannot be called on for relief. They must not be susceptible of different constructions, so as to bind an agent and benefit the writer. It must be shown that the orders were so clear as not to be misunderstood, so that the agent would be in fault by not giving them a true construction. The first order was for insurance from- Jamaica — not at Jamaica. The second order directs no insurance at emú from Jeremie There are no precise directions except in the first letter, which says it must be on the vessel from Jamaica to Port Republican, and from thence to Norfolk — not at and from. The second order places the insurance, with reference to Jeremie, as the first order did when the vessel was at Jamaica, 
      which was to insure from that place. The conclusion is, that the agents were to insure from Jeremie in the manner they were directed to insure from Jamaica. The policy, if it had been made under the first order, could not be changed by substituting Jeremie for Jamaica, and Cape Frán- • cois for Port Republican. The policy would have been void. There must have been a new policy. When the first order was received, a part of the voyage had been performed — from Jamaica to Jeremie. Would it have been justifiable in the agents to make their principal pay a premium on a performed voyage? They might well construe the order to be, that all that part of the voyage which was performed was out of the case. This was such a construction which they might give without making them liable under such an order. If they were mistaken, it was such a mistake as an honest man might well fall into. They were as much bound to save premium as they were to insure. Who is to suffer by an ambiguity? Surely he who uses it. The agents were not bound to comply with the orders, because of their ambiguity. Moore vs. Morgue, Cowp. 479. The second order does not prescribe how the insurance was to be effected. Facts were to be substituted; and suppose they had been substituted, what effect would they have? It is not a clear case that the first order was to insure the vessel at Jeremie. The cases cited were cases for freight, and they do not go clearly to decide that if the insurance was from one place to another, and then to another, without saying at, and the loss was at one of the places, that the insured could recover. To recover against the defendants it must be shown, that if the insurance had been effected, the complainants could have recovered against the underwriters.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Buchanan', J.

It is the opinion of the court, that the relief prayed for in the bill of complaint in this case, is a matter not properly cognizable in a court of chancery, and that that court had no jurisdiction further than to compel the discovery which forms one of the objects of the bill; which being obtained, the complainants ought to be left to' their remedy at law. And therefore, without inquiring into the correct interpretation of the letters, which are alleged to have been written to the defendants by one of the' complainants, or expressing any opinion as to their legal effect and operation, in which them would- be no propriety, being a subject proper for the consideration of another tribunal, the decree of the chancellor is affirmed.

DEGREE AIEIRMED.  