
    Spalding v. Huntington.
    In the Court below,
    SoloMon HusrrlKfGTóN, Jun. and Anna, his wife, late Anna Jones, Plaintiffs; John Spalding, Defendant,
    
    The intent ot the testator to give a fee-simple to A. being apparent on the face of the ■will, evidence dehors the will is inadmissible, to shew a different intent.
    A CTION of ejectment, demanding the seizin and possession of a piece of land, lying in New-Haven, containing three acres, purchased by Timothy Jones, late of New-Haven, deceased, of John Payne. Said Anna claimed as sole heir at law of William Jones, son of said ‘Timothy. The defendant claimed under a title from Jsauc Jones, Jun. first grand-son of said Timothy, by the name of Jones.
    
    1802.
    The question arose on the following, clause in the will of said Timothy: “ I will to William Jones three acres “ of land I bought of John Payne, [the lot in question! “ and four acres in my pasture ; [with several other pie- “ ces] also, my house, and home-lot, and barn, and the lot I bought of Enos Ailing, after his mother shall have “ done with it, shall be William, during his life, and af- “ ter, to hi.s son; but if he should have no son, then it “ shall be the first son bearing the name of Jones, his for- “ ever, if my grand-son,*”
    The plea of the defendant, after reciting the will, set forth certain facts, as explanatory of the testator’s intent, the principal of which was, that said William Jones was a bankrupt, and known to be such to the devisor, and that, therefore, it was not to be presumed, that he meant to give an estate to go to the creditors of William.
    
    The pleadings terminated, in a demurrer; andjudg-Blent was for the plaintiffs.
    The general error was assigned.
    
      Daggett and W. Hillhouse, for the plaintiff in error,
    contended, that a life-estate only was given, by the will, to William Jones, in the demanded premises. They also urged, that as the phrase in the will was doubtful, it was proper to resort to circumstances dehors the will, to explain the intent of the testator. In support of the last position, the authorities cited in the margin were relied on.
    
    
      Baldwin and Smith., (of New-Haven) for the defendants in error,
    claimed, that as to the land in question, the will vested a fee-simple in William ; and that the limitation ½ the clause respected only the house, etc. and not the former pieces of land.
    
      
       3 Keble 49.
      3 Burr. 1898, Oates and Wigfall v. Brydon.
      6 Rep. 16, Collier's case.
      
      2 Ld. Raym. 831, Cole v. Rawlinson.
      
      1 Bro. Ch. Ca. 472, Fonnereau v. Byntz.
      
      
        Goldsb. 99.
      
        Prec. Ch. 71. Cooper v. Williams.
      
      
        Pow, on Dev. 518.
    
   The Court

decided, that the interest of the testator, apparent on the face of the will, was to give a fee-simple to William in the land in question; and, therefore,

Affirmed the judgment.  