
    Brian MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, John or Jane Doe, Defendants-Appellees.
    
    No. 11-865-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 28, 2011.
    
      Brian Moore, pro se, Long Beach, N.Y.
    Jamie L. Nawaday (Benjamin H. Torrance, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, Of Counsel, on behalf of Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for Southern District of New York, New York, N.Y., for Appellees.
    PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges, LAWRENCE E. KAHN, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as shown above.
    
    
      
       Judge Lawrence E. Kahn of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Brian Moore appeals, pro se, from the sua sponte dismissal of his complaint alleging a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) violation, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a), by the U.S. Department of Education (the “Department”) and an unnamed defendant. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

In reviewing a dismissal of a pro se plaintiffs claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), or for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we review a district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations therein as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2008); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002).

As defendants concede, the dismissal of Moore’s case pursuant to Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), cannot be reconciled with our decision in Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87-88 (2d Cir.2005). No matter. We are free to affirm a district court’s decision on any grounds supported in the record. See Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir.2006); cf. Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (discussing court’s inherent authority to dismiss meritless claims and appeals). As we observed in Hoblock, even where Rooker-Feldman does not apply, a plaintiffs claims may still be “barred by ordinary preclusion principles.” Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d at 88 n. 6; see also Skinner v. Switzer, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1298 n. 11, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011) (reversing Rooker-Feldman dismissal but remanding for consideration of potentially outcome-determinative preclusion issues). This is such a case.

Moore sued his student loan program, the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program (“Direct Loan”), a U.S. Department of Education program, in state court for the same FCRA violation he alleges here. The state court dismissed the claim sua sponte, holding that the FCRA did not grant Moore a private right of action. Although Moore filed — but failed to pursue — an appeal, the trial court’s judgment qualifies as final and on the merits. See DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 182-83 (2d Cir.2003).

The preclusive effect of a state court’s judgment is a matter of state law. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d at 92-93. New York law recognizes the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion as “rigid rules of limitation.” People v. Evans, 94 N.Y.2d 499, 503, 706 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681, 727 N.E.2d 1232 (2000); see also Pike v. Freeman, 266 F.3d 78, 90 n. 14 (2d Cir.2001) (“[Tjhere appears to be no significant difference between New York preclusion law and federal preclusion law.”). Under the claim preclusion doctrine, a valid final judgment bars future actions between the same parties (or their privies) on the same cause of action. See Ferris v. Cuevas, 118 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir.1997); Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 343, 347, 690 N.Y.S.2d 478, 481, 712 N.E.2d 647 (1999). Issue preclusion further prevents a party from relitigating in any subsequent action an issue actually and necessarily decided against a party who had a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision in the first instance. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d at 94; Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d at 349, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 482, 712 N.E.2d 647.

Here, claim preclusion bars Moore from relitigating his FCRA claim against the Department, the real party in interest before the state court. Because Moore could have pursued an appeal from the sua sponte dismissal or moved for leave to reargue, issue preclusion bars relitigation of identical issues against the Department and the unnamed defendant in any event. See Curry v. City of Syracuse, 316 F.3d 324, 331 (2d Cir.2003); see also Dieffenbach v. Attorney Gen. of Vt., 604 F.2d 187, 199-200 (2d Cir.1979) (finding opportunity to move for reargument following state court’s sua sponte dismissal “more than sufficient to safeguard ... due process rights”). In urging otherwise, Moore suggests that he did not know that the Department was the real party in interest in the state court action, and further that the state court may not have had subject matter jurisdiction due to the involvement of the federal defendant. These arguments warrant little discussion because they cannot as a matter of law defeat issue preclusion. See Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d at 349, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 482, 712 N.E.2d 647; cf. Corbett v. MacDonald Moving Servs., Inc., 124 F.3d 82, 88-89 (2d Cir.1997) (finding as matter of federal law that federal court judgments have preclusive effect notwithstanding lack of subject matter jurisdiction in rendering court).

We have considered Moore’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. In light of our conclusion that New York preclusion principles bar Moore’s claims, his challenges to the district court’s denials of his motions for reconsideration are moot, even though Moore correctly argued in those motions that the district court’s Roofcer-Feldman analysis was flawed.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 
      
      . While this court has not addressed the issue, a number of our sister circuits as well as district courts in this circuit have similarly concluded that 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) affords no private right of action. See Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 34—35 (3d Cir.2011); Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir.2009); Perry v. First Nat’l Bank, 459 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir.2006); Barberan v. Nationpoint, 706 F.Supp.2d 408, 427 (S.D.N.Y.2010); Prakash v. Homecomings Fin., No. 05-CV-2895(JFB)(VVP), 2006 WL 2570900, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006); Jonas v. Int'l Airline Emps. F.C.U., No. 03 Civ. 3374(JGK), 2006 WL 1409721, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2006); Trikas v. Universal Card Servs. Corp., 351 F.Supp.2d 37, 44 (E.D.N.Y.2005); O’Diah v. New York City, No. 02 Civ. 274(DLC), 2002 WL 1941179, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.21, 2002).
     