
    The Administrators of Barnwell against Bryan Hussy.
    Charleston,
    May, 1817.
    a Tsk?p“erSteivhof tho carry^írcei plaintiff’s over-vessel,0bu”gavé' rame ’süanded' ™ge!ucbu™tt¿ •vessel being pro-¶6“t0 and sufficiently manned, the carrier who undertook held not liaMe for the loss.
    This was a special action on the case tried he-fore Mr. Justice <SWVA, at Coos.awhatehie, in — =- Term, 1.81 — , to recover the value of fifteen bales of long staple cotton, delivered to the defendant, to be shipped by him from Beau-to Charleston. The defendant commanded a schooner called the Planter, and was in the „ habit of carrying between Beaufort and Charles-^ ’ ton. He came to the landing where the cotton was stored, but his vessel being full, he stated to the overseer of the plaintiff who had charge of it, that it was impossible he could fake it on hoard his vessel, but by his. direction it was put on board a vessel then in company with him, and commanded by Captain Ives, and he, the defendant, gave a receipt for the delivery of it in Charleston. Ives’s vessel was inferior in size and strength to the Planter, hut in every respect sufficient for the voyage,' and navigated by a competent crew. This vessel was stranded in a gale on her passage. to Charleston, and the cotton was so much damaged that it was afterwardscarried up to Savannah and sold for the benefit of all concerned, and brought a very inconsiderable sum. The Jury, under the direction of the Court, found a verdict for the plaintiff for the full value of the cotton, and a motion was made for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection: in the Judge.
   Johnson, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

I am unable to discover, in the evidence of the case, any proof of an undertaking to carry the cotton previous to its being put on board, unless it is to be inferred from the circumstance of the defendant’s landing at the place where if was stored, and declaring his inability to take it in: give the plaintiff then the benefit of this inference, and it amounts to no more than a general undertaking to Cany; for there is no proof of a usage or general understanding peculiar to this-particular navigation. By a general agreement to carry, the carrier undertakes for no more than that he will furnish a sufficient vessel and á competent crew to navigate her. If thé vessel and the crew are sufficient for the voyage, and a loss happen, the carrier is discharged, although' a stronger vessel would have withstood the shock. 1 Strange, 128. I will not, however, go so far as to say that the usage of a particular navigation, when the choice of a vessel and crew may be an' important consideration, might not alter the cáse; but in this case there was no evidence of such usage. ,

Divesting this case, however, of the inference that there was a previous general undertaking to cany the cotton; which I am inclined to think is rather strained, and it amounts to no more than an undertaking to carry on board of Ives’s vessel, which, without an extraordinary accident, was sufficient for the voyage, and navigated by a . competent crew: and as the loss in this case happened by the perils of the sea, the defendant is discharged from all liability.

Hayne, for the motion.

Yancey, Contra.

The circumstance of the defendant’s having given a mere formal receipt for the delivery of the cotton in Charleston, I do not think sufficient to charge him in all events ; for it amounted to no more than a general undertaking, subject to all the legal implications applicable to a parole contract for that purpose, unless it contains some express stipulation to charge him as insurer; and not having had a view of this receipt to enable me to determine whether it contains such stipulations or not, and more especially as it was not stated in the argument that it did, I feel warranted in presuming that it does not.

I am, therefore, of opinion, that the motion for a new ught to be granted.

The otli^r Judges concurred, except Colcoch, J. who gave no opinion, not having heard the ar~ .gument.  