
    Jackson ex dem. Ramson & Roe, against Shepard.
    Jands lying in county,Sduiy jlnCMayV‘mt cd' waVnot íü" lowedtobe denetvwithout execution? A deed made in 1793, for
    This was an action of ejectment, for lot number 17, in the, town of Sem/pronius, in the county of Cayuga, and was tried at the circuit in that county, before Mr. Justice TompJdns, the 28th June, 1805.
    suPPort of his title, the plaintiff produced an exemplification ofthe letters patent from the people of the state ofNew-York, forthe premises in question to Ramson, one ofthe lessors ofthe plaintiff, dated the 8th July, 1790, and a deed from Ratnson to Roe, the other lessor ofthe plaintiff.
    The defendant offered in evidence, an instrument in writing, dated the 12th May, 1783, from Ramson to Elisha Millard, duly executed and acknowledged and recordedin the office of the clerk ofthe county of Cayuga. The purport of this instrument'was, that Ramson, for the consideration of $30, constituted and appointed Millard to receive the hounty lands from congress, and the gratuity of 500 acres of land, from the assembly of this state, to which Ramson was entitled as a soldier, in the second New-Yotrlc regiment; and he bound himself under a penalty oflOOpounds, “ if Millard did not receive the lands, and appropriate the same to his own use.”
    The defendant offered to prove, that the purchase, made by Roe from Ramson, on the 5th March, 1784, was made with a knowledge of the above instrument of writing from Ramson to Millard. All which evidence was objected to on the part of the plaintiff, and overruled by the judge.
    The defendant then offered in evidence a deed for the premises in question, from Roe,' one of the lessors of the plaintiff, to Nathaniel Davis, dated the 20th August, 1793; which deed was acknowledged the 30th May, 1794, before one of the judges of the supreme courtofthis state, who indorsed his certificate: Be it remembered, &c. before me, &c. personally appeared, James Roe, grantor to the within indenture of release, and acknowledged, that he had signed, sealed, and as his act and deed, delivered the same, for the uses and purposes therein' mentioned ; and finding no erasures, I do allow the same to be recordedit was indorsed duly filed, pursuant to the statute in such case made and provided, but not recorded. The counsel for the plaintiff objected to the reading of this deed in evidence, and it was rejected by the judge.
    The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. A motion was now made to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial.
    
      Root, for the defendant,
    contended that the deed was duly recorded, according to the law existing at the time, and it might have been read in evidence. The act of 1794, did not require that the officer or judge, before whom the deed was acknowledged, should, have a personal knowledge of the grantor.
    
      Gold, contra.
    The act of the 12th February, 1797, was made expressly to prevent the. recording of such deeds, in the county of Onondaga. Deeds duly acknowIedged, and entitled to be recorded, have sometimes beeu allowed to be read in evidence ; at other times they have rejected. The practice at nisi prius has, in this respect, varied. This case particularly concerns lands in the county of Onondaga, in regard to which the act of 1798 was passed.
    
      Cady, in reply.
    If the construction of the act of 1794, be, that the judge, or officer, should know the grantor, or have satisfactory evidence that the person named in the deed, is the person who executed it, there is in this case, evidence tantamount; for the certificate of acknowledgment 's> that the grantor within named, appeared, &c. The act of the 6th April, 1801, merely provides for future deeds ; it does not retrospect.
    
      
       jv. F. ¶. 3.p. 480-
    
   Tompkins, J.,

after stating the facts in the case. The propriety of rejecting the power of attorney, and the proof of notice thereof by Roe, when he purchased of Ramson, was conceded by the defendant’s counsel, on the argument, and the rejection of the deed from Roe to Davis alone relied upon in support of the motion for a new trial.

The act of 12th of February, 1788, permitted the reading in evidence deeds duly acknowledged, or proved and recorded. By an act of the legislature of this state, passed 12th of February, 1798, it is provided, that no deed, conveyance, or instrument executed before the first day •of May, 1797, relating to any lands in the county of Onondaga, should thereafter be registered or recorded, unless» the same should be acknowledged or proved in the manner directed by the act of 11th of February, 1797. The deed in question related to such lands, was executed antecedent to the 1st of May, 1797, and was not acknowledged pursuant to the statute relative to the acknowledgment of deeds, passed in that year. The deed, of course, could not, by virtue of the acknowledgment, be put oh record; neither does the statute authorising deeds aoknowledged to be read in evidence, without being recorded extend to this deed. If before such statutory provision, conveyances not recorded have been received in evidence, when acknowledged or proved only, such admission of them must have been upon the principle, that what a party has the power of immediately doing, might be'regarded as already performed. That reason, as respects this deed, ceased with the act of 1798, which prohibited its being recorded. As the statute which authorises the reading in evidence conveyances acknowledged, though not recorded, does not extend to deeds acknowledged like the deed in question, it was, in my opinion, properly excluded, and the motion for anew trial ought, therefore, to be refused.

Kent, Ch. J. Thompson, J. and Spencer, J. con€*dired.

Livingston, J.

I concur in the opinion delivered, pot, however, because the act prevented the recording the deed from Roe to Davis; for, notwithstanding the practice which has prevailed at nisiprius, I do not think that any deed unrecorded could be evidence without proof prior to the act of the 6th of April, 1801, which is not retrospective, 
      
      
         An old deed of thirty years standing cannot be read in evidence without proof of the execution, or of the hand writing of the subscribing witnesses, unless it be first shown that possession accompanied it.— Thompson v. Bullock. Bay, 364. See also 2 Nott & M'C. 55.
      Possession of thirty years under a will entitles it to be read as an ancient will, without further proof, of the same as a deed.—Jackson v. Luquere, 5 Cow. 221.
      A lease of a large tract of land, purporting to be the foundation for a conveyance by lease and release being produced, with proof that the lease was found among the papers of the lessee at bis death, and also proof of a corresponding possession of a small part of the premises for forty years, and the release of a rent and reversion of another small part by persons claiming under the lessee with payment of rent; held, that the lease itself was sufficiently proved as an ancient deed. 7 Cow. 431.
     