
    Cole v. Clayborn.
    April Term, 1794.
    Wills — Residuary Clause —Reversion in Slaves — Case at Bar. — The testator (after devising1 to his wife two negroes over and above her dower) devises all the rest and residue of his negroes to his children, equally to be divided between them; and then directs his executors to work all his negroes (except those particularly bequeathed) on his lands, till his sou W. shall come of age. The dower slaves pass under the residuary clause, after the death of the widow.
    The appellee brought an action of detinue to recover a number of slaves. Upon the pleas of non detinet, and the act of limitations, the jury found a special verdict as follows.
    That William Cole the elder, by his will dated in 1729, made the following devises, viz: “I give to my wife, for ever, two negroes named Will and Sarah, above and besides her *dower in my lands and negroes; as also one ninth of my personal estateAfter which he devised as follows, viz. “All the rest and residue of my negroes and personal estate, of what nature or kind soever, to my children for ever, equally to be divided amongst them, the survivors or survivor, share and share alike: My will also is, that my executors shall work all my negroes, (except those particularly bequeathed) on my lands, until my son William shall come of age, and the profits of the said lands and slaves, to be equally divided amongst my children; and in case my son William, should molest, sue, or demand account of my executors for using the entailed lands, then the said residue of negroes and personal estate to my other children.”
    That the slaves, in the declaration mentioned, are the descendents of a female slave allotted to Mary Cole, the widow, as part of her dower.
    That William Cole the younger, father of the defendant, was son and heir at law of the said William the elder, and died in the year 17 having by his will devised all his personal estate, of what nature or kind soever, to his son William and his heirs for ever, subject to certain charges and conditions.
    That after the death of Mary the widow of William Cole the elder, which happened before the year 1752, Bridget, one of the slaves in the declaration mentioned, and the mother of the others, was, on a division of the estate of William Cole the elder, allotted to Martha, one of his daughters, the wife of one Leigh, as her share of the dower slaves of the said Mary.
    That the present defendant is the son and heir at law of the said William Cole the younger, was born in June 1744, and in the year 1769, commenced suit against the said Leigh for the slave Bridget, in the declaration mentioned, who at that time had no children: That this suit abated in 1779, by the death of Leigh, who had retained the possession of the slaves ever since the death of the widow, and the present defendant became possessed in February 1783.
    That the said Leigh, by his will, devised the negroes in question to his daughter Mary, and her husband William Clayborn the plaintiff, during their lives, and the life of the survivor, remainder over to their children ; that immediately after the death of Leigh, the plaintiff got possession of the slaves in the declaration mentioned, and continued to hold them until February 1783, when they came to the possession of the defendant. That Mary the wife of the plaintiff died in April 1783. And if, &c. &c.
    *Upon this verdict the Distrit Court gave judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed.
    Marshall for the appellant.
    The principal question in this case is, whether the slave in the declaration mentioned, from whom all the others have descended, passed under the residuary clause in the will of William Cole the elder? if they did, then the appellant has no title; if they did not, he has a complete title as heir at law.
    I admit, that the residuary clause is sufficiently comprehensive to include the rever-sionary interest in the dower slaves; but if the whole of this clause be connected together, the intention of the testator may require a different construction. When he speaks of all his slaves, it is improbable that he meant to include the dower slaves, because he directs that all his slaves be worked on his lands by his executors, flow it would be improper to extend the generality of this clause to the dowtír slaves, which the testator knew he had no power over during the life of the widow. And if he could not mean to include those slaves in this part of the clause, it is not probable that he had them in view in the preceding part of the clause, which respects the disposition of them. — The clause is an entire one connected together by an evident continuation of the same idea, without any interruption, and must be supposed to embrace the same subject, throughout.
    It would therefore seem to be a very strained and unnatural construction to break the clause, and make the testator mean, only a part of his negroes, when he speaks of the whole of them in one instance, and the whole of them, when he mentions them in another place, but in the very same sentence.
    Duval for the appellee.
    The devise of the residue of the negroes, though coupled in the same clause with the direction to the executors concerning the temporary employment of them, is nevertheless a distinct part of the sentence from that, and may with propriety receive a different exposition. It is not unusual, in the construction of wills, and even of deeds, to enlarge or limit the meaning of particular words, so as to fit them to the subject on which they are meant to operate, and to avoid contradiction or absurdity. Thus, though the word all would if unrestrained comprehend the dower slaves, yet, as the testator could exercise no dominion over them during the life of his widow, it is not probable that he meant to Include them in that part of the’ sentence, which directs his negroes to be employed on the plantation. But if he did intend it, he mistook the extent *of his power but he meant to pass all his slaves in the former part of the sentence is evident: 1st, Because the plain and natural import of the words include them; and 2dly, because it is a residuary devise, which from the very nature of it is intended to leave nothing undisposed of. The court always inclines against such a construction, as tends to produce a partial intestacy. But what strengthens this exposition in the present case is, that the heir at law is provided for by an estate entailed upon him, which is noticed by the testator, and operates 'strongly to repel a presumption that the testator intended to leave any part of his estate to descend upon the heir.
    As to the possession, it is found to have been in Leigh from the year 1752 till 1769, before any suit was brought.
    
      
      See Read v. Payne, 3 Call 228.
    
   LYONS J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

There is no difficulty in this case. A testator may carve out as many particular estates, from the fee simple interest in the property disposed of, as he pleases; and, whatever part is not specially given away, remains with him: If he disposes of the rest and residue of his estate, such remnant will pass, unless restrained by other parts of the will. There are no words in this will which limit the general operation of the sweeping clause. — All the rest of his estate, means every thing over which he had a power; and his intention, so far from appearing to controul these general expressions, seems to favor the operation of them in their greatest latitude. The testator had no doubt an equal affection for all his children. They are all equally provided for by the will, and can hardly be presumed that he would leave a part undis-posed of in order that it might descend to the heir at law, who was otherwise provided for.

This case is not like that of Kennon & M’Roberts in this court. In that, the intention was very clear.

Judgment affirmed.  