
    The State ex rel. The Town of El Paso, Respondent, vs. The Board of Supervisors of Pierce County, Appellant.
    
      March 2
    
    
      March 27, 1888.
    
    
      Towns: Bridges: County aid: What valuation governs: Mandamus: Pleading: Objection to evidence.
    
    1. Under ch. 187, Laws of 1885, providing for county aid to towns in building bridges whose cost exceeds one fourth of one per cent, of all the taxable property in the town il according to the last equalized valuation,” the valuation of 1885 governs as to bridges authorized at the annual town meeting in April, 1886, although the county board was not called upon to act in the premises until after the assessment roll of 1886 had been made.
    2. The petition on behalf of a town for a writ of mandamus failed to show that the proceeding had been authorized by the electors. On the trial, when the town records were offered in evidence to show that fact, the whole record was objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. Held, that the objection was too broad and general.
    , APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Pierce County.
    This was a proceeding by mandamus to compel the Board of Supervisors of Pierce Bounty to appropriate one half of the cost of the construction and repair of certain bridges in the town of El Paso in said county, and to cause the same to be levied upon the taxable property in said county subject thereto. The facts so far as they differ from those in the case of State ex rel. Spring Lake v. Pierce Go., ante, p. 321, are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The board appeals from a judgment in favor of the relator.
    For the appellant there was a brief signed by J. S. de F. M. White, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. J. S., White.
    
    
      P. H. Start, for the respondent.
   LyoN, J.

This case involves substantially the same questions determined in the case of State ex rel. Spring Lake v. Pierce Co., ante, p. 321, and, notwithstanding certain differences between the cases, which will presently be stated, is ruled by it.

The construction and repair of the bridges here in question were authorized by the town of El Paso, the relator, at its annual town meeting, in April, 1886. It is not denied that the estimated cost of such bridges and repairs exceeded one fourth of one per cent, of all the taxable property in said town according to the equalized valuation thereof in 1885. It is claimed, however, that because the county board of supervisors was not called upon to act in the premises until after the assessment roll of 1886 had been made, that roll governs, and it is alleged that the cost of such bridges and repairs does not exceed one fourth of one per cent, of the assessed valuation of the town in that year. We think the term employed in the act of 1885, “ the last equalized valuation,” relates to the last valuation before the annual town meeting in April, 1886, and hence that it refers to the valuation of 1885.

The only remaining difference in the two cases which it is deemed necessary to notice is that while no objection was made to the introduction of testimony showing that the electors of the town directed the case of the town of Spring Lake to be brought, in this case when the plaintiff offered the town records, which showed, among other things, the same direction, the whole record was objected to on behalf of the county board as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. We think the objection too broad and general to be available to the county board. Had the objection to this, particular portion of the town records been made on the ground that there is no averment in the relation that any such direction had been given, the objection should have been sustained, but with leave to the relator to amend the relation by inserting such an allegation. It would be unjust to allow the objection to prevail and thus defeat the action, when the action could have been saved by amendment had the objection been made specifically.

Ye conclude that the differences between the two cases do not take this case out of the rule of the Spring Lalte Case.

By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.  