
    
      The Treasurers (for Richard Goldsmith) v. Andrew M’Dowell.
    
      Triedbefore Mr. Justice Richardson, at Charleston— Spring Term, 1832.
    The authority judgment is 1™“ he’ * after-money, hTmay M-aSio^on record, but he will not be permitted to com-promit his cli cut’s rights by an executory contract, or any voluntary act of bis own.
    
      This was anaetion against the defendant as surety, on the official bond of N. G. Cleary, late sheriff of Charleston district, under the following circumstan-Goldsmith, the real plaintiff in this case, lodged C0. sa, against John Howard in the sheriff’s office, on which Cleary arrested Howard. Whilst he was under arrest, Mr. Thompson the attorney on record, of How-was sent for to the sheriff’s office. An arrangement being there made, by which Howard placed eer-tain claims due him, in the hands of Cleary as an indemnity. Mr. Thompson consented to Howard’s discharge, but he looked to Cleary for the plaintiff’s money. Howard was accordingly discharged. Howard was then insolvent, and since then he has taken the benefit of the insolvent debtor’s act, and his entire estate has been applied to prior liens. The counsel for the defendant contended, that the attorney on record has authority to discharge a defendant in execution, and having done so in this case, the sheriff was not liable. That at all events under the act of 1815, an attorney has the power to consent to a defendant’s discharge ; that there was no proof that Cleary had received the money on the execution, and that Howard being at the time insolvent, and having continued so ever since, the plaintiff sustained no injury by the discharge.
    The presiding judge overruled these grounds, and under his charge, the jury found for the plaintiff.
    The defendant appealed on the grounds taken below.
    Where a sheriff, having a defendant in custody, receives an indemnity, acknowledges satisfaction on the execution, & discharges the defendant, he becomes liable for the debt, whether he ever received any money or not.
    Hunt, for the motion,
    cited acts of 1815, p. 22. 3 Starkie on Ev. 1087.
    See Poole Gist & Roddy, 4 M'C, 259.
   Johnson J.

delivered the opinion, of the Court.

The general rule is, that the authority of an attorney at law, is determined by the judgment, Com. Digest, Attorney, B. 10. But upon the receipt of the money he may aknowledge satisfaction on the record, not however without the actual receipt of the money, for he is not permittedto make any executory contracts in relation to his client’s rights, nor will he be permitted to compromit them, by a voluntary act of his own, 1 Roll, 291, Jackson v. Bartlet, 8 John. 366, Kellog v. Gilbert, 10 Johnson 220. The authority of an attorney, when considered with a view to the duties which he is required to perform, is confined to the conduct and management of his client’s cause, in which his skill and learning only is put in requisition, and the right to receive his client’s money without special authority, is an interpolation, the policy of which may well be questioned, however convenient it may be in practice, and ought not to be extended.

According to this rule, the consent of Mr. Thompson that Howard should be discharged, did not justify or excuse the sheriff; but apart from this consideration there is no foundation for this motion. From the judge’s notes of the evidence, it seems that Howard assigned to Cleary, a demand against the State as an indemnity to him, and that confiding in that security he had entered satisfaction on the execution, so that the assent of Mr. Thompson was founded on Cleary’s liability as sheriff.

This view of the facts supercedes altogether the necessity of examining the question whether the attorney had authority to discharge Howard under the act of 1815, by which the arrest would only have been suspended ; for it was intended by all the parties that it should operate as a final discharge. The same circumstances are an answer also to the ground on the subject of damages, Cleary has fixed the amount by an undertaking to pay the debt, and acknowledging satisfaction on the execution.

Motion dismissed.

O’Neall & Harper Js. concurred.  