
    Jorge URBANO-BARRIGA, aka Jorge Barriga, AKA Jorge Urbano, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-71090.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Sept. 10, 2013.
    
    Filed Sept. 24, 2013.
    Holly Stafford Cooper, Esquire, UC Davis Law School Immigration Law Clinic TB-30, Davis, CA, for Petitioner.
    
      OIL, Don George Scroggin, Esquire, Blair O’Connor, Assistant Director, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: SCHROEDER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and TIMLIN, Senior District Judge.
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
      
    
    
      
      
         The Honorable Robert J. Timlin, Senior United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Jorge Urbano-Barriga, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s decision finding him removable due to a conviction that qualified as an aggravated felony theft offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(4S)(G). His conviction was for violation of California Penal Code § 496d(a).

This court in Alvarez-Reynaga v. Holder, 596 F.3d 534, 536-37 (9th Cir.2010), held that California Penal Code § 496d(a) categorically qualifies as an aggravated felony. Relying on our previous decision in Verdugo-Gonzalez v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1059, 1061-62 (9th Cir.2009), we observed that California’s general receipt of stolen property offense matched the generic theft offense, and concluded that California Penal Code § 496d(a) was an aggravated felony for the same reason. Alvarez-Reynago, 596 F.3d at 536-37. Our decision in Alvarez-Reynaga is controlling.

The petition is DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     