
    John H. Warren et al., complainants-appellants, v. James A. Warren et al., defendants, Thomas Warren et al., defendants-respondents.
    [Submitted December 6th, 1915.
    Decided March 6th, 1916.]
    On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Learning, whose opinion is reported ante p. 346.
    
    The bill states that by deed dated March 16th, 1844, Richard Warren, in consideration of natural love and affection for his wife Susan and his children Richard, George, William, Emeline, John, Robert and Mary, and of the sum of fifty cents, did grant, bargain, sell and convey unto Frederick Knighton certain described lands in the county of Merc'er, together with the buildings, * * * hereditaments, &c.
    “In trust nevertheless that he, the said Frederick Knighton, his heirs and assigns shall and will permit the said Susan D. Warren, Richard H. Warren, George W. Warren, Emeline Warren, John H. Warren, William Warren, Robert D. Warren and Mary Warren and the survivors of them to possess and enjoy the same and receive the rents, issues and profits thereof, and to rent the same to any tenant or tenants, for their own separate use, and the use of the survivors of them. And in further trust that upon the joint request of the said Richard Warren, Susan D. Warren, Richard II. Warren, George W. Warren, Emeline Warren, John II. Warren, William Warren, Robert D. Warren and Mary Warren or of the survivors of them to convey the same in fee-simple to the said Richard Warren, his heirs, or, heirs-at-law according to the laws of the State of New Jersey for the time being.”
    The bill further states that no other children were born to said grantor; that the said wife and children possessed and enjoyed the described lands after the making of the deed, and upon the death of any of them the survivors continued in the enjoyment of the property; that the said wife and children as well as the trustees are all dead, and that no new trustee has been appointed. The bill contains further statements showing who are the descendants of said children and the heirs-at-law of said original grantor (all of whom appear to be parties either complainant or defendant) and pray the appointment of a trustee or trustees in the place of said Frederick Knighton, deceased, and that such trastee or trustees be directed to convey the legal title to the lands in question to the heir¿-at-law of said Richard Warren (the grantor) or that such title be vested in said heirs by decree of the court, according to their several interests, and for further relief. To this bill there was a demurrer on the ground that complainants have an adequate remedy at law; that the bill does not show any trust now existent or capable of being enforced, or for the execution of which a trustee should be appointed, and that no trust was created by said deed, and if created, has terminated, and the interests of the parties themselves are not cognizable or determinable in equity.
    The cause was heard by Vice-Chancellor Learning, who filed the following memorandum;
    “I am convinced that the averments of the bill disclose that this court is without jurisdiction to either execute the trust or appoint a trustee for that purpose.
    “Should it be assumed, as contended by complainant, that the words of inheritance as used in the deed in question were adequate to convey the fee, and that the duty of the trustee to convey upon the joint request specified in the deed rendered the trust, which but for the existence of that duty would have been a simple trust, a special trust and thereby removed it from the operation of the statute of uses, it yet seems clear that upon the death of all persons who were by the terms of the deed authorized to execute the ‘joint” request'-' the trust became a simple trust and equally subject to the operation of the statute of uses. Lew. Tr. *686. In whom the fee then vested would be a question to be determined by the courts of law.
    “I entertain the view, however, that the words of inheritance used in the trust deed cannot be pi’operly construed as creative of a fee in the trustee. The words of inheritance occur only in that part of the instrument which directs the trustee to permit tlie life beneficiaries to possess and enjoy -until the decease of the survivor, and when considered in connection with the entire instrument suggest no intention to create an estate of greater duration either in the trustee or the beneficiaries. It is urged that the performance of the duty of the trustee to convey to the donor upon the joint request referred to in the deed contemplates a conveyance of the fee; but the conveyance, if required, would necessarily arise during the continuance of an estate pur aider vie and would require the existence of no greater estate to support it. I am satisfied that at the decease of the surviving life beneficiary the trust estate terminated.
    “I will advise a decree allowing the demurrer.”
    
      Messrs. Wescoit & Weaver, for the appellants.
    
      Mr. Gilbert Collins and Mr. Charles B. Bradley, for the respondents.
   Per Curiam.

The decree of the court of chancery is affirmed, for the reasons ■stated in the memorandum opinion of Vice-Chancellor Learning.

For affirmance—The Chief-Justice, Garrison, Swayze, Trenchard, Parker, Bergen, Minturn, Ivalisch, Black, White, Teri-iune, Heppenheimer, Williams, Taylor—14.

For reversal—None.  