
    A. W. Washburn vs. Washington Dorsey.
    After letters of administration have been revoked, the probate court has no longer authority or jurisdiction over the discharged administrator, and cannot therefore entertain a petition by him touching his administration account, to have additional items of credit allowed him therein ; it is only while the relation of administrator exists that the probate court can adjudicate upon the administration.
    On appeal from the probate court of Yazoo county; Hon. Thomas B. Woodward, judge.
    A. W. Washburn filed a bill against Washington Dorsey in the court below, in which he alleges that in 1841 letters of administration de bonis non were granted to him by the probate court of Yazoo county on the estate of John Martin.
    That he took into his possession the personal estate, and found the estate greatly embarrassed; a number of suits depending against it, and large pretended debts outstanding against it. That a crop had been pitched; through the persuasion of others, and especially Rhoda Martin, one of the heirs and distributees, (who was of lawful age) that it would be for the benefit of the estate, he finished the then growing crop, and in so doing was compelled to expend large sums of money. That he was compelled to employ counsel to defend the estate against the various suits depending against it, and to lay out other sums of money for medical services and medicines for the negroes while in his charge, to buy food and ciothing for the negroes, and pay the taxes on said estate, and to expend various other sums of money for the protection and preservation of the estate. That at the March term, 1842, the probate court revoked the letters of complainant without his having an opportunity or being permitted to make a settlement with the court, and before he could settle the business of the preceding year, and before he had sold the crop, which went into the hands of Andrew Murdock, his successor. That the estate was indebted to him for personal services and money paid out for it in the sum of two thousand" dollars. That distribution of said estate has been made, and one-third part paid over to complainant in right of his wife, one-third paid to Washington Dorsey, guardian to Joseph Martin, and one-third to Dorsey, guardian to Adaline Martin, the distri-butees of the estate. The bill prays to be allowed to make settlement with the court according to the rules of law. That what is due him may be decreed him, the one half to be paid by Dorsey, guardian to Joseph, and the other half to be paid him by Dorsey, guardian to Adaline Martin, and for general relief, &c.
    The defendant Dorsey filed a demurrer to the bill, which was sustained, and the bill dismissed, from which judgment the complainant appealed.
    
      William E. Pugh, for appellant.
    Does this bill not show sufficient on its face to entitle the complainant to redress ? If so, the court erred in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill.
    If the administrator had been indebted to the estate, would it not have been the duty of the court to have made him account before revoking his letters, and if the court neglected or refused to do its duty, would not the guardian, or those interested in the estate, have had the right to have filed their bill to compel him to have accounted, and would not the court have entertained the bill? Most clearly it would. Then will the court not grant to the administrator that relief which it would have compelled him to have yielded?. If the administrator does not account voluntarily, it is the duty of the court to compel him to it. Here he asks to account, and the court refuses to let him do it. In point of law what difference can it make whether it should turn out that the estate is indebted to the administrator or the administrator to the estate ? I apprehend it can make none, and in either event the court is bound to audit and settle the account. To do .this is the exclusive province of the probate court.
    This court has repeatedly said that the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of estates. Blanton v. King, 2 How. Rep. 856 ; Carmichael v. Browder, 3 How. Rep. 252. The constitution gives to that court that power. Const, of Miss., sec. 18, How. & Hutch. 26.
    It may be urged, that the letters of administration being revoked, the administrator is no longer an officer of the court, and hence the court has no jurisdiction over him, and on that account cannot entertain his bill. As well might you call every suitor in court an officer of court as an administrator; and as well may it be said that an- administrator, who had resigned with funds in his hands, could not afterwards be made to account, because he was no officer of court. If this be law, in such a case those entitled to the estate would be without remedy. But if the jurisdiction over the administrator is gone by the revocation of his letters, it still remains over the estate, and the administrator does not object to the jurisdiction. If there is a want of jurisdiction over him, he alone could plead, or urge it before the court. Here the administrator is seeking a settlement- with the estate of his intestate, and claiming balances alleged to be due him. Most assuredly he cannot be in a worse condition than any other creditor, who asks the court to pass upon him his claims, and either to allow or reject them. But I cannot think this position will be seriously urged before' this court.
    If the estate is indebted to the administrator, he has a right to ask, and receive payment, and the probate court is the only power to which he can apply for due adjudication of his claims.
    
      R. S. Holt, for appellee.
    1. The bill is defective in not stating with sufficient certainty the amount and nature of the charges, in reference to which the desired account should be stated. It should have shown the amount of money expended, and the purpose for which it was expended. The services rendered and the occasion upon which they were bestowed. The court could not know from the bill that any of the proposed charges against the estate of Martin were legitimate. The bill is also defective'' in not stating whether the crop which Washburn completed, had been commenced before the death of Martin. The court in ignorance of this could not sanction the course of the administrator in completing the crop. Such vagueness and uncertainty was good ground of demurrer. Story’s Eq. PI. 207 — 211; Shepard v. Shepard, 6 Conn. R. 37; 2 A. K. Mar. 317; 3 J. J. Mar. 284.
    2. The bill is further defective in seeking an account when it shows that the charges would all be on one side. If Wash-burn performed services or expended money on account of the estate, his case has nothing to distinguish it from the ordinary one, in which an action of assumpsit is the appropriate remedy.
    3. It is alleged in the bill that the court revoked the letters of Washburn without permitting him to render an account. If so, it was an error for which he should have sought redress in an appellate court. In view of this fact, this bill is but an application to the probate court to revise, and correct the errors of its own decree; the answer to the application is, that it has no power to do so.
    4. But it is insisted by the appellee, in addition, that the probate court has no jurisdiction to audit the account of an administrator after the revocation of his letters; and more especially not, after the distribution of the estate. The power of the probate court to examine, allow or reject his account, under the statute, arises exclusively from his relationship to that court as one of its officers, and terminates with that relationship. After the distribution of the estate, it would be worse than idle for the probate court to have, or' exercise, the power of auditing the account of a discharged administrator. It could not decree a payment of the balance found on either side, because the funds of the estate would have passed beyond its control.
    If its decision had any effect at all, it could only be as proof in aid of proceedings in some other court. But it is obvious that for this purpose the bill should not have been entertained.
    5. The power of the probate court to audit the account of an administrator arises exclusively from his relationship to that .court as its officer. It commences with that relationship and terminates when it ceases to exist. After much examination, I have been unable to find in any elementary treatise or in the decision of any judge, an intimation of a different doctrine. But even though the probate court ordinarily possessed such a power, it could not for any rational or useful purpose exist .or be exercised in a case like this, where the estate has been distributed and the only fund upon- which the decree of the court could operate had thus passed beyond its reach. The court could not render a decree against the defendants for the payment of money and enforce it by execution, it must be conceded. What purpose then would the allowance of the account serve ? If only to perpetuate testimony or furnish evidence in aid of another court, the bill could not of course be entertained by the probate court.
    6. We insist further, that if the demands set forth and sought to be enforced in the bill be valid, the ordinary action of as-sumpsit in the circuit court would be'the proper remedy for their enforcement. The bill presents no reason for the interposition of any other court. The indebtedness is of the simplest description, arising from services rendered and money paid for the use of the defendant. And the proofs must be such necessarily as would be adapted to the forms of proceeding in courts of common law jurisdiction.
    
      Q. D. Gibbs, on the same side.
    The court below properly sustained the demurrer. The record does not show that any application was made to the probate court by appellant Washburn, to make the desired settlement during his official relation to the court; and if he had, upon refusal of the court to entertain it, the error could have been corrected by a different remedy. I cannot see the propriety of such application after the party has ceased to occupy the attitude of an officer of the court; the statute (H, & H. 403,) empowers the court to audit accounts of “ executors and administrators.” The act (How. & Hutch. 399,) which, under certain circumstances, provides for the revocation of letters, makes no provision for any settlement; in the absence of any legislative provision, I am at a loss to know upon what principle the application could be based; it cannot be derived from the ecclesiastical court of England, no such practice was tolerated in that court. If the probate court could entertain this application because the appellant had been an administrator, they could as properly determine any, and all other rights collaterally connected with the administration of an estate,— could as well give judgment for heirs and creditors as against them — it would create a most inconvenient confusion of jurisdiction. In the case of Green v. Tunstall et al. 5 How. 638, the court say “ it never could have been designed to confer upon the court the right to call in third persons who have no official relation to the court.” There is nothing in the cases of Blanton v. King and Carmichael v. Browder, authorizing such proceeding.
    The demurrer was properly sustained too, for the vague and uncertain character of the allegations in the bill. Story Eq. PI. 208, 209, 210, 211, &c.
   Mr. Justice ThacheR

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from the probate court of Yazoo county.

Washburn, whose letters of administration, de bonis non, of the estate of Martin, had been recalled without permitting him to render an account thereof, petitioned at a subsequent term of the. court for leave to render an account in order to charge the estate with certain claims of his own originating out of alleged, payments made by him for necessary expenses in carrying on his administration. A general demurrer to his petition was allowed, and the petition directed to be dismissed.

The petition in this state of the case could not be entertained, and the demurrer was properly allowed. The petitioner shows that he had ceased to sustain the relation of administrator, and a probate court has no authority or jurisdiction over him but while that relation exists. Smith et al. v. Hurd et al. 7 How. 200 ; Bell v. Suddeth et al. 2 S. & M. 532. The letters of administration of the petitioner having been revoked, the court could no longer adjudicate upon the accounts of an administration which no longer existed.

Judgment affirmed.  