
    Israel LINARES-AQUINO, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-73555
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted August 16, 2016 
    
    Filed August 24, 2016
    Ian Silverberg, Esquire, Attorney, Law Offices of Ian Silverberg, Reno, NV, for Petitioner.
    Patricia Bruckner, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Israel Linares-Aquino', a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

In his opening brief, Linares-Aquino does not challenge to the BIA’s denial of his claim based on a social group comprised of family members of police officers, or the BIA’s denial of his CAT claim. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are waived).

We lack jurisdiction to consider any contentions based on social groups Linares-Aquino proposes for the first time in the opening brief. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Linares-Aquino failed to establish past persecution or a fear of future persecution on account of an enumerated ground. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2009) (the REAL ID Act “requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”); see Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”). Thus, his withholding of removal claim fails.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     