
    David Williams versus David Woodman.
    An indenture whereby a party agrees to furnish money for the purpose of “carrying on the general business of brokerage, embracing, as time and opportunity shall give, the vending of lottery tickets,” is illegal on the face of it.
    Where in an action of covenant broken, on such indenture, the defendant, after oyer, pleaded that the object and intent of the indenture was the buying and selling of lottery tickets, against the form of the statute, and issue was taken thereon, it was held, that evidence to prove that the plaintiff did, subsequently to the contract, buy and sell lottery tickets, was pertinent to the issue and properly admitted.
    Held, that after a verdict for the defendant on such issue, the plaintiff could not deject that the plea attempted to put in issue before a jury the construction of * sealed contract, but that such objection should have been taken by demurrer
    This was an action of covenant broken. The contract was an indenture made between these parties, whereby the defendant agreed to furnish 2000 dollars, for the purpose of “ carrying on the general business of brokerage in Boston, embracing, as time and opportunity shall give, the vending and selling of lottery tickets.” The defendant pleaded ;— 1. JVon est factum ; — 2. After oyer of the indenture, “that the object and intention of the writing obligatory and the covenants therein contained, and the money therein covenanted to be paid, were the buying and selling of lottery tickets, against the form of the statute,” &c. Issues were joined on these pleas.
    At the trial, the defendant, to support bis second plea, offered evidence to prove, that after the execution of the indenture the plaintiff did buy and sell lottery tickets in the shop occupied by him. To this evidence the plaintiff objected, because it related to matter posterior to the execution of the indenture, and also, because the object of the indenture could not be proved by paroi evidence ; but it was admitted.
    The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff on the first issue ; and for the defendant, on the second.
    The plaintiff moved for a new trial, on the ground that the evidence ought not to have been admitted. He likewise ex-cepl&d to the defendant’s second plea, as bad in substance, because it attempts to put in issue to the jury the construction and intent of a sealed contract.
    
      T. Fuller, for the plaintiff,
    cited Harmer v. Rowe, 2 Chit. Rep. 334; Milbourn v. Ewart, 5 T. R. 381 ; Holman v. Jackson, Cowp. 343.
    
      A. W. Fuller, contra,
    
    cited Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 341; Lightfoot v. Tenant, 1 Bos. & Pul. 551; Huggins v. Bambridge, Willes, 241.
    
      March 13 tk
    
    
      March 23d
   Per Curiam.

Joining issue was a waiver of any objection to the second plea for want of form ; and we are of opinion that the plea is sufficient in substance. The indenture, on the face of it, is void.

Issue having been taken on the object and intent of the covenant, the evidence admitted was pertinent to the issue. Acts done under the contract were proper evidence to show that the intent was illegal.

Judgment according to verdict. 
      
       See Chitty on Contr. (4th Am. edit.) 536c, et seq. and notes.
     