
    WILLIAM DICKSON v. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
    No. 298
    May 28, 1883.
    Tho claimant sues on a certificate of indebtedness of the District of Columbia, signed by the auditor, the secretary, and treasurer of the Board of Public Works.
    I.An “improvement certificate” of the Board of Public Works is within the jurisdiction of this oourt under the Jot of June 16, I860, oh. 243 (21 Stat. L., 284; Suppl. Rev. Stat., 562).
    Being signed by the auditor of the Board, it is an “ Auditor’s certificate.”
    II.It is also a “ claim against the District of Columbia, arising out of a contract made by the late Board .of Public. Works.”
    III. It was the intent of Congress to give this court jurisdiction over the floating debt of the District contracted for improvements.
    IV. Statutes must be construed so as to execute the legislative intent.
    The following are the facts found by the court:
    I. The claimant is the bona fide holder and owner of four certificates, duly issued by the Board of Public Works of the District of Columbia, each for $100, each duly indorsed, and ■each of the form following :
    Ho. —.] - [.$100.
    Board of Public Works,
    
      Washington, D. C., April — , 187
    This is to certify that for work done under tho Board of Public Works •of the District of Columbia, agreeably to acts of the Congress of the United States and of the legislative assembly of the said District, there is due W. A. Wilson the sum of one hundred dollars.
    This certificate will be received in payment of special assessments prior to issuing certificates of indebtedness against individual property for improvements made in the District of Columbia under contracts with the Board of Public Works, ■when, the are amount of the certificate.
    order
    P. Brows', Secretary. A. Magruder,
    
      Hoard of Public Works.
    
    (Printed on back:) Improvement certificate. —. -. received, - assign this certificate to-.' Witnesses: -
    (On margin:) The bolder of this certificate will not be entitled to the difference between the certificate and assessment. Any excess of assessment over certificate must be paid in money.
    The numbers and dates of the said certificates were as follows : No. 273, dated April 1, 1873; and Nos. 3025, 3044, and 3046, each dated April 12, 1873.
    II. The defendant has cates or any of them, and the same are all outstanding and unpaid.
    
      Mr. Woodbury Blair for the claimant:
    
      The District of Columbia Claims gives the court jurisdiction óf “all certificates of the auditor of the Board of Public Works” and of “all claims now existing against the District of Columbia arising out of contracts made by the late Board of Public Works.” The claimant’s cause of action comes within both provisions.
    
      Mr. André Brewster (with whom was Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendant:
    1. The certificates submit, are well known to the court, and the form of one of them is set out in the opinion of the court in the case of Neii-ehatel Co. v. The District of Columbia (17 O. Oís. R., 394), and differs materially from those in question. The form of those in issue shows a certificate of the Board rather than of the auditor, though it bears his signature in addition to thosfe of the secretary and treasurer, and as another distinctive feature is receivable in payment of special taxes imposed by the Board of Public Works.
    
      2. Instruments so different in form and purpose cannot be presumed to have been known to Congress under a common designation. Certificates of the auditor of the Board of Public Works were not receivable in payment of taxes, nor was there any other way of redeeming them except by conversion into 3.65 bonds. They are described specially as certificates of the auditor of the Board of Public Works in the above-mentioned acts, while these were always known and described as “ improvement certificates.” - For these reasons we contend the court have no jurisdiction over this claim.
   OPINION.

Davis, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant admits that if the court has jurisdiction the claimant has made out a good case for a recovery on the facts. It contends that this suit is brought under that clause of the District act which gives the court jurisdiction over “ all certificates of the auditor of said Board of Public Works.” In the counsel’s brief it is said: .

The certificates of .the auditor intended by the act are well known to the court, and the form of one of them is set out in the opinion of the court in the case of Neuchatel Company v. The District of Colunibia (17 C. Cls. R., 394), and differs materially from those in question. * * * Instruments so different in-form and purpose cannot be presumed to have had a common designation.

The claimant’s certificates are what are known as “ improvement certificates.” They are signed by the auditor of the Board of Public Works, by order of the Board, and are further attested by the secretary and the treasurer of the Board. Of their genuineness there is no question; it is equally well settled that being genuine they constitute claims against the District of Columbia. (Fendall v. The District of Columbia, 16 C. Cls. R., 106.) Being signed by the auditor they are certificates of the auditor; none the less so that they are further certified by two other officers of the Board. Even if they are not technically “auditor’s certificates,” they are undoubtedly “claims arising out of contracts made by the late Board of Public Works,” and as such come within the strict letter of the act.

To hold otherwise would set aside the manifest intent of Congress. In giving us jurisdiction over these classes of claims, and in barring; all .that are not prosecuted in this court, the Legislature intended to enable us to give the District a clean bill of health against floating debt contracted for improvements prior to March 11, 1876, whether contracted by the Board of Public Works, by the District Commissioners, or. by the old levy court, and whether certified by accounting officers or not. The rights of claimants in pending suits in the District courts were preserved, and the rights of the District in'.cases adjudicated by the Board of Audit in its favor were also preserved. These were the only reservations. If claims like those now in suit are not within the scope of the act, then one of the manifest purposes of Congress is defeated by its own carelessness. If the language of the statute were doubtful or obscure, it would be our duty to resort to the intention of the Legislature, in order to find the meaning of the words used in the acts. (United States v. Freeman, 3 How., 557.) We think the language of this act is plain; but if it be doubtful, the purposes of Congress are clear; and in any event the judgment of the court must be that the claimant recover of the defendant the sum of $100, as of ApriL12, 1873.  