
    Renee BELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lisa SYKES, Representative U.S. Bank, Douglas C. Zahm, Dianne Grant, Janet Thorpe, U.S. Bank National/Leader Mortgage, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-15568 Non-Argument Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    (March 13, 2017)
    Renee Bell, Pro Se
    
      Michael Timothy Gelety, Law Offices of Michael D. Gelety, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant-Appellee
    Before HULL, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Renee Bell, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint.

We review “dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009). A court must dismiss an action if it “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). We also review de novo the district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 713 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 (11th Cir. 2013). “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Although we show leniency to pro se litigants, we will not rewrite a deficient pleading in order to sustain an action. Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1273 (quotation omitted); see Exxon Mobil Co. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). It applies when issues presented to the district court are “inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.” Alvarez v. Att’y Gen., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012). An issue is “inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment when “(1) the success of the federal claim would effectively nullify the state court judgment” or “(2) the federal claim would succeed only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” Id. at 1262-63 (quotations omitted). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine only precludes federal court review of federal claims that the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise in an earlier state proceeding. See Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).

Bell filed a complaint essentially seeking appellate review of a state foreclosure judgment that went against her. Bell is the type of state-court losing party that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine covers. See Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1273. Bell’s complaint is not a distinct federal action and she makes no argument indicating that she did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise her constitutional claims at an earlier state proceeding. Her complaint is an attempt to gain appellate review from the federal district court of a final state judgment. See Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1270. Any success by Bell would require a holding that the state court was wrong and would nullify the state judgment. See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 1262. Therefore, the federal district court had no jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED. 
      
      . See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82, 103 S.Ct, 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).
     