
    BERGER v. BERGER.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
    December 16, 1910.)-
    Divorce (§ 182)—Alimony and Counsel Fees Pending Appeal.
    Every presumption being in favor of the validity of a divorce judgment, alimony and counsel fees pending appeal should not be granted a-wife appealing from the judgment, unless strong reasons appear for believing that the appeal will be successful.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 641, 657; Dec. Dig. § 182.*]
    Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
    Action by Edward W. Berger against Caroline Desel Berger.. From an order granting alimony and counsel fees pending appeal,. plaintiff appeals.
    Reversed.
    
      Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, SCOTT, .LAUGHLIN, and CLARKE, JJ.
    Edo E. Mercelis, for appellant.
    Franklin Bien, for respondent.
    
      
       For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
    
   SCOTT, J.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order awarding defendant alimony and counsel fee pending appeal.

The action is for an absolute divorce. The defendant appeared and answered, and the cause was referred. Upon the trial the defendant, although represented by counsel, offered no evidence, not ■even denying the adultery, but elected to stand on the supposed weakness of the plaintiff’s case. The referee reported in favor of plaintiff, his report was confirmed by the court, and a decree of ■divorce granted. The defendant has appealed and the proposed case on appeal is a part- of the printed papers now before us. The order appealed from requires the plaintiff to pay to defendant a counsel fee, the cost of printing the case on appeal, and alimony until the decision of the appeal from the judgment.

That the court has power to award an appellant in a divorce suit alimony and counsel fee in order to enable her to prosecute her appeal is not doubted, but it is a power which should be seldom exercised. Every presumption and intendment is in favor of the validity of the judgment, and to warrant the extreme measure of ■awarding counsel fee and expenses to the appellant strong reasons must appear for believing that the appeal will be successful. It would be inappropriate to now express an opinion as to the probable result •of defendant’s appeal from the judgment against her, but an examination of the papers on this appeal fails to persuade us that a case is presented to justify the granting of counsel fee, expenses, and •alimony pending appeal.

Order appealed from reversed, and motion denied. All concur.  