
    
      BREEDLOVE & AL. vs. FLETCHER.
    
    Appeal from the court and parish and city of New Orleans.
    Thejnrisdic-tíon of the court of the parish and city ofNew-Qrieans does not extend : o contracts or torts, originating out „Qf the parish.
    
      Turner, for the plaintiffs.
    This case originated by attachment sued out, under the acts of assembly of 1805, § 11. and of the second session of the same year, pa. 46, § 8. and of 1811, i^Martin’s Digest, 512, n. 1, 516, n. 2, 518, n. ⅜, 5, 8£ 6, by which the courts are autho-rised to issue attachments, directed to the si e ff of the county where the defendant hath lands, &"c. when he is a non-resident, &c.
    Tlie objec t of the suit was, to recover from the defendant as endorser of a bill of exchange, the sum of 88300, with the damages, interest, ánd costs.
    The bill of exchange was drawn at Nashville, in Tennessee, by C. Stump, on the house of Stump, Eastland & Cox, at Nevv-Orleans, in favour of Thomas H. Fletcher; and by him, endorsed to the plaintiffs, then residing also at New-Orleans, to whom he remitted it. The bilí was duly accepted, and when at maturity, was dSly protested had notice thereof forwarded by mail to the defendant.
    The defendant being absent, and permanently residing at Nashville, but having property to a large amount fouthe city of iNew-Orleans, anti . . i ••iv* being in failing circutnstances, the plaintiff in order to secure themselves* canned the attach-Blent to be levied on 80 fiOgsheél&, of tobacco, and summoned as garnishees, Messrs: MPNeili' Ifisk Sf Rutherford. The property attached, Was released by the appearanCef4of5 file fefen-dant’s agents, who bonded the same.
    The defence sfet up is a general denial and a plea to the jurisdiction of the Court.
    On the trial, the plaintiffs’ case waá fully established by the proofs.
    The court overruled the pléa to the jurisdiction, and gave jud ment for the plaintiffs for the amount of the debt, with damages, interest and costs,'
    From that judgment, the defendant appealed.
    If the parish court had jurisdiction of this' case, then the judgment must be confirmed,
    There is no dispute about the facts Of the case* the merits are manifestly with the plaintiffs.
    The question,, therefore, which-1 am to exa-‘ miné is that of jurisdiction. And upon this,.I-should have as little doubt of sifecess, as I have-on the merits, if I was not met by a decision pronounced some time ago, in the case of Job#*.; eon xs. -Jjmmoudy, quoted by the defendants counsel and by them relied upon in the corn* , , . ,, ilt „ below. 6 Martin, 9.
    That caseis distinguishable from this in fact, if not in principle, But whatever may be the si-» militude of the two cases, I do not think that case deserves the weight attempted to be given to it, by the defendant. It was a decision given by the court without argument, in a cáse of email moment, and without anv plea to the jurisdiction of the court; and I may venture to suppose without any Very great deliberation, research or analysis of our judicial system : this, 1 think, may he presumed from what appears on the case itself. It is not easy to see on what principle that case was decided : the decree is so, vague, and uncertain, that one does not know whether the action was supposed to be local by being on a judgment rendered at Mobile, or because it was for an assault and battery committed there, or whether the court did not consider it a criminal case, for indeed no other reason is assigned for the reversal, but that the case was eorarn non judice, as appeared on the record. Now all that was apparent on the record is this, “ that it was a suit brought in the parish court, to recover the balance of a judgment obtained by the plaintiff at Alabama, in ah action of assault and battery, committed in the town of Mobile.”
    Such a decision as this, made without plea, without argument at the bar, and in a case of such small moment, the value only of a few hundred dollars, scarcely worthy the notice of any one, surely can never be considered as settling the law, on the maxim of stare decises.
    
    Cases, which pass without argument and debate, are never considered as affording a precedent, 4 Co. Rep. 91; nor is a single case deemed of much more effect. One case does no# establish the law on the principle óf stare deci-sis. This has been often held in courts elsewhere, and lately by the supreme court in the case of Dehart vs. Berthoud §* al. ante, li t. But where a long succession of cases have been decided and tío objection made, they do form precedents, and will not be disturbed, 4 Coke’s Mep. 04. But if Johnson vs. Dunwoody Was decided on the principle that it was a criminal case, and that the cause of action originated at1 Mobile and was local to that place, I have nothing more to say about it than merely to remark, that it is not a precedent in point.
    But if it was intended to establish as law; that ⅜0 civil suit can be instituted in the parish court, whemthei contract was made out of the oafish. although the defendant or his property be within- it» then I contend, the decision gies farther^. than the sound construction of the law will an-thoriise : and is directly contrary to the practice of that court, ever sume its establishment, and contrary to the course of decisions df the supreme court, in appeals from that court.
    The parish judge in his reasoning, in this ©ase,says thousands of suits have been instituted in his court, upon contracts made abroad; and .1 may venture to assert, that most of the important cases, which have been prosecuted ia that court, have been those where the contract was made out of the parish: and those suits have beeft prosecuted and defended by the ablest lawyers at the bar ; such has been the usage ever since the establishment of that court.
    Even the sub silentio case, of Johnson vs, JWunwpoiy, has not prevented even this court; from deciding, as they were accustomed to & before, as will be shewn hy citing a number of cases, which have gone through ,⅛® supreme court, from first to last, in which the jurisdiction has been sustained.
    The first, was that of Smith vs. Elliott; a», attachment case, on a not® mad®, at Gibson Port, in the Mississippi territory,.--*-.here. the parties resided, buygi££vvards:,woeu Aad property in Orleans, it was attached and , . ' . , . the jurisdiction sustained. 3 Martin, 366.
    
      Las Cargas vs. Larionda’s syndics. This was a case from Trinidad, in the island of Cuba. 4 Martin, 288.
    
      Rion vs. Rion’s syndics. This was a case of dowry, on a contract made at Bordeaux in France. 4 Martin, 34.
    
      Forsyth ⅜* al. vs. Nash. This was a case, where the rights if any existed, in the plaintiffs, to the Services of the defendant, wrs on a contract made at Detroit, Territory of Michigan. 4 Martin, 385.
    
      Cooley vs. Lawrence. This was a contract made at Pointe Coupee. 4 Martin. 639.
    
      Ralston vs. Pamar. This was a case of goods purchased by plaintiff and shipped from ¡Liverpool in England to the defendant. 5Mar* tin, 3.
    
      Perry vs. Flower 8C Finly. This was a case for freight from Louisville. Kentucky, for the benefit of Wilkins, &c. at Lexington in that state. 5 Martin, 388.
    
      Ferry vs. Le Gras. This was a case where all the parties resided at Cape Francois, and on a contract made there. 5 Martin. 893.
    
      Johnson vs. Runwoody,, This was a case tp recover the value of a judgment rendered ia jAlabama ip an action of assault and battery committed in the town of Mobile, being that, in which the judgment was reversed, because the case appeared to be corarn non judice. 6 Mar• ' tin, 9.
    
      Smith vs. Flower. This .was a case on a contract of affreightment made at Louisville, Kentucky- for a voyage from thence to New-Orleans, and ⅛ which the jurisdiction was called in question, but sustained. 6Martin t 12.
    
      Harvey vs. Fitzgerald. It. is not easy to say where the contract was made, or where the defendant received the plaintiff’s goods, or where they were sold, or how disposed of; as, therefore, the cause of action did not clearly appear to have originated in the parish of Orleans, if there be any thing in the case of Johnson vs. Dunwoody as applicable to contracts, this case must have fallen within its principles, and certainly it was a case, in which such a plea would have been resorted to by the counsel, if it could have availed. But neither was there any objection made by counsel, nor was any defect of jurisdiction perceived by the court. 6 Martin, 530.
    These cases are sufficient to shew what has been the practice. To reverse the judgment in this case, would be to overturn all the cases. that have. evé'f Keen decided ⅜ the1 datfsli court, where the contract on which the suit Was founded was made out of the parish, a*ncf Would1give ground to the'anomalous proceeding of overthrowing the very cases heretofore decided on and confirmed in this court. Hundreds of suits must be dismissed from the docket of that court, and hundreds which have been decided upon and fully executed1 must bé stirred up, and' the money refunded where' it has been paid: all the floodgates of litigation Which had been for years closed, are again to be opened, and the district court overwhelmed in the turbid stream: consequences too mischievous to be even thought of!
    I beg leave to be permitted to quote the words of that great judge, the lord chief justice Parker, as Applicable to this case. He says, ⅛ pronouncing a judgment in the court of king’s bench : “ We are all of opinion; that this clause (meaning a clause ih the statute) might have been extended to a case of this kind had the objection come earlier; yet the cbnstartt practice ever since the making of the act, having been otherwise, and all the precedents both in the crown office, and in the exchequer, (ih cases not expreésly excepted) being dk vicinkto; fb make' a’? contrary retso%fibtt itf tKi#efcii* would be, in some measure to overturn the . ' . justice of the nation, for sgveral years past; besides we consider that it is matter of no great consequence ; since it only gives the defendant a priviledge of challenge, which otherwise he would not have.”
    
      u It is a rule indeed, that precedents sub silentio are of little or no authority: but that is to be understood of cases, where there are judicial precedents to the contrary. But here there are none on the one side or the other' (how applicable this reasoning when Johnson'* case was under consideration ! but it was no discussed.)
    His lordship proceeds, «The chief baro» mentioned a case in exchequer, which I remember: it was an information about the drawback upon salt, and there (as also in some other* both here and in that court) all the exception* were taken that the wit of man could invent But this was not so much as mentioned ; we did not think fit to break in upon an entire practice, and shake so many judgments, upon a matter of so small moment, and therefore are all of opinion that the venire is well awarded.” Peer Williams, 223, 4.
    The reasoning of this, judge is so lucid and, sp cogent, and withal so strictly applicable to the present investigation, that I cau add nothing ' of my own to it.
    I have therefore done with the case of John-so n vs. Dunwoody, and shall take up this case on its merits, as one of the first impression, and consider it upon the law, and evidence as presented by the record.
    By taking a retrospect of the laws made under the territorial government, we shall find the true reason of the practice in the parish court being general in all civil matters.
    The law of 1805, c. 25, $ 3, for establishing courts of inferior jurisdiction, enacts “ that the Said judge (county judge) shall hold a court ⅜ each county, for the trial of all civil cause* under the restrictions and limitations therein after contained. In § ⅜, * the jurisdiction o the county judge is in these words: “ that the said county courts shall have jurisdiction lit. all cases, to the value of fifty dollars and upwards, which shall arise upon contracts where the debtor resides, or is found in the county,-— and also shall have exclusive jurisdiction pf ail causes for personal wrongs or injuries to real or personal property where the damages demanded do not exceed one hundred dollars.’*
    By this law it seems civil causes have., refer* ence puly to those actions which arise on tracts, and' those which arise from wrong! doflé . , . , , , to property or to the person, without regard to the placfl where’ the contract was made, or the , -x • wjury done1. Civil causes here mean, suits in j „ . . , . - court ;' and1 these causes may arise upon* contracts; or upon torts.
    In the year 1807, ch. 1, county courts were abolished, and parish courts were created with anular jurisdiction.
    By § IT of that act it is enacted “ That the jurisdiction of the said parish courts shall extend to- all kind of contestations arising on contracts, notes, bonds, covenants and agreements, &c. and’generally to all civil matters, which may be originally brought before their court,” &c.
    By the 28th §. the court for the parish and of New-Orieans is established to consist ⅜⅜ one' judge, “ who shall have the jurisdiction, power and authority, and shall perforin ⅜11 and singular the* same duties, and the terms Of session and’rules oT proceeding shall be in all respects in, and in relation to, the said parish, the same as by law are now possessed, performed and observed by the county court, of 'the county of Orleans.”
    That jurisdiction power aftdJ authority of the cOuaty cOttrts, here spoketr of, extended té all Causes of the value of fifty dollars, and upwards» ?" '• * ! J ■ 7 * í •* which should arise upoo contracts where the debtor resided in the county, or was found tbere.
    Thus stood the law in relation to the parish, court, of the city and parish of Orleans, when the state government was formed. No matter where the contract was made, no matter ⅞⅛⅜⅞ the tort was committed, if the defendant resided or was found in the parish, the court had.jurisdiction of. the case.
    At that time, the superior court of the territory had jurisdiction over the whole state, j*s well civil as criminal, without regard to tlie circumstance of the venire of the contract^ and within the city and parish of Orleans^ the parish court had jurisdiction, concurrent in civil matters. ,
    Under the state government, it became necessary to organise the courts, and it was done-in á manner so similar in principle, to that system which before existed, that no room is left - to doubt, that any change of jurisdiction was intended to be made, but such as was required by the constitution, in regard to the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court.
    And yet we find the legislature have us$Jl Words less precise, more vague, ^nd ijad#%tf# a%d less technical and scientific, than those df , . . .... the law of ISOS : and hence has arisen the doubt's'if, any really exists, upon a hasty view of the wording, of the law of 1813.
    In creating the district courts, it was necessary ¾° as®igo them jurisdiction ; because they Acére necessarily to be inferior courts. And in •⅜6%"¾ of the act of 1813, 2 Martin’s Digest, lS8j it is enacted, that a court shall be held id each parish by the district judge, for the trial if all civil cases which may arise in the parish. But the court of the first district, shall be held in thé city of New Orleans every month : whereas, in the other districts, the courts are to »be held three times a year.
    By the $ 15, of that act, pa. 28, the district courts are invested with jurisdiction in criminal Walters.
    By the § 19, of that act, parish judges are to be appointed with the sa ne functions as^then existed by law to that officer, but whose juris* diction ilpjml cases is reduced in jjersonal ac* lions to $⅜⅛ dollars.
    The legislature during the same session, no doubt recollecting that it had been found expedient to have a parish court for the city and pá, rish óT jSTéw Orleans, with concurrent jurisdic* lion with the district courts in civil matters ; af- > . terwards h an act in page 114, enlarged the jurisdiction of the parish court which had been previously established, with a jurisdiction of only 300 dollars, to a concurrent jurisdiction in the limits of the parish with that of the district corn*’, in civil cases originating therein.
    But, under the latitude of construction, whiclj was given to the words of these laws, all cases of a personal and transitory nature, were supposed to be cognizable before any of the district courts, or the parish court of the city and parish vof New-Orleans, and persons were sued, when they went from home, on contracts and obligations. The legislature the next year, 1814, §, 1, 2 Martin’s Digest, §04, enacted “ that no person or persons having a permanent residence, shall be sued in any civil action in any other parish, but that wherein he, she or they 9hall habitually reside, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.”
    This last act proves two things : first, that persons might before its passage, be sued out of fhe parish of their residence; — and secondly, that since the act, they cannot be sued elsewhere than in the parish of their habitual residence, where they have one, whether the cause of action originated there or elsewhere.
    
      Now, if it be a sound rule of law that, all courts of inferior jurisdiction must see, on ne face of the record, that the case conies within the li nits of their jurisdiction, it follows that no ci* vil case can be cognizable before any of the district courts unless it appears expressly, in the first district that the case did arise there, and in the other districts, that it did arise in the parish where the suit is commenced. But if, perchance, the defendant should not reside in the piare Where the case did arise, he cannot be sued at all. He cannot be sued out of his parish, nor can he be sued but where the case does arise : these are the effective words of the law as it regards the district courts.
    But as it regards our parish court, the words are different, but their signification is the same. They are “ a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the court of the first district in all civil cases orrsrinativg in the parish.” These latter words became necessarv from the manner in wh;ch the sentence is constructed, and not with any intent to limit the court to the locality of the contract, or of the tort complained of. When the sentence is analysed and compared with the jurisdiction of the court, of the first district, this will be very evident. That court has jurisdiction over five parishes, though it sits only in the pity. It bad also unlimited jurisdiction in criminal . ‘ matters. When, therefore, it was said “ the parish judge should have a jurisdiction concurrent with the court of the first district,” if no more had been added, he must have had both civil and criminal powers ; and that over the whole district. But, it was dot intended to give him criminal jurisdiction ; and therefore, they used the words “ civil cases.” Nor was it intended to give him jurisdiction territorial over the district, and therefore they added the words, “ originating in the parish.”
    I contend, therefore, that there is no differ* ence, certainly none, in the legal sense of the phrases “civil cases arising in the parish,” and “ civil cases originating in the parish.” They are both loose modes of expression. Adopting* therefore, that mode of expression as allowable we may say, this suit arose in the parish, oí we may say this case originated in the parish, or this case arose in the parish, and when we so express ourselves whether by using the words “ arising” or “ originating” we mean precisely the same thing.
    It therefore follows, as a necessary rule of construction, that whatever civil cases «nay be sued on in the court of the first district, tnay be sued on in the parish court, subject in both cases to the restriction of the act of 1814 in favor of. actual residents.
    But unless we adopt the principle which judge Blackstone says, "prevails all over the s . world, that actions transitory follow the person of the defendant,” neither the parish court nor the district court have jurisdiction or can take cognizance of any debt contracted out of the parish in the one case, and out of the district in the other. 3 Bl. Com. 884.
    But there is no truth better known, nor any legal maxim better established, in every country in the world, where law has the semblance of science, than that pecuniary obligations and personal torts are transitory: my debtor owes me the debt wherever he is. The wrongdoer owes me damages wherever be is; and unless he is protected by some such law as that of 1814, he may be sued wherever he may be found, and in any court whose jurisdiction is not restricted to sums of less amount than that due me. '
    This rule is as well-known in the Roman civil law, and in the Spanish law, as in the common law of England.
    "An action,” say Justinian’s Institutes, "is nothing more than the right of sueing in a court of law for our just demands.” " Actio nihil 
      
      atiud est, quam jus perseguendi in judicio, quod sibi dehptur.” According to that definition my action arises in that jurisdiction where I find my debtor: and so I say the case originates, when I commence my suit, on my action, which attendstme w'herever T am, that is my right of sueins: my debtor wherever 1 can find him.
    By the laws of Spain there is a provision in favor of the domiciliated debtor similar to that contained in our act of assembly of 181 ⅜. In the 3 Partida, title 2, and law 3S, it is declared that, the suits must be brought before the court which has jurisdiction over the defendant.” But there are several exceptions to this rule, the first of which is, “that vagrants and transient persons may be sued where they may be found.”
    This exception clearly shews, that in Spain actions are transitory and attend the person, blit where a person has a fixed domicile, he is so far priviledged as to be sued there rather than elsewhere.
    Without the existence of such a principle, of what avail would be our attachment laws? Without it, how could debts ever be recovered^ or obligations enforced, when the debtor removed out of the place where he contracted the debt? Upon what principle would bills of exchange have a credit, of circulate in co mmerce, and pass by new endorsements m every city and in every state, through which they circulate, unless the holder could have recourse against . all and every one, wherever they were to be found in case of protest? Sure it never before was doubted. Having said so much on general principles supposed to be involved in the consideration of this case, I now come to apply them : and here I shall be under no necessity to detain the court but for a few minutes.
    The facts are as follows : — -The plaintiffs reside in the city of Vew-Orleans ; the defendant resides at Nashville. He being the payee of a bill uf exchange drawn at that place by C. Stump, on Stump, Eastland Sf Cox, at New-Qrieans, endorsed it in blank, and transmitted it to the plaintiffs in payment of a debt. The bill was ‘presented for acceptance — accepted—* and when at maturity not being paid, was duly protested. Notice of protest was sent by the ensuing mail.
    Thus it will be seen that the plaintiffs received the bill at New-Orleans : it was payable here. It could not be even demanded any where elsé. No action on it existed, until it was dishonored^ The ostani it was protested for non-payment, the plaintiffs, being the holders, were invested with the right of action against the drawee, ens s dorser and acceptors. That right accrued here at New-Orleans, and no where else. It origi 7 nated here in the parish of New-Orleans. Had the defendant been here at the time, he might have been arrested and sued in the ordinary mode. But being absent, his' property being in the parish, under our attachment laws, is made to represent him. It was attached, but it has been released by bond and security. Cbithj an Bills, 88, 107, 8, 9.
    Upon such a case as this, what in reason, in law, or common sense, can be offered against the plaintiffs’ right of acfion in the parish court ?
    That court sustained its jurisdiction, for reasons so strong, that I might have spared myself the labour of this argument. But the importance of the subject to the plaintiffs is such, as tp require all mv attention to the maintenance of this suit. Thev have fen thousand dollars at stake upon it. The whole of which will be lost if the judgment is not affirmed. Thg drawer, the acceptors and the endorser, are all believed to be insolvent: even the property, which was attached, is gone. It was bonded for the defendant, and removed from this city.
    These are considerations which, it is hopédjj Will not only induce the court to pardon the counsel for detaining; them so long;, on so plain , , ... . a case, on the merits : but likewise, to excuse him from the solicitude he has manifested in the discussion of the general principles, which he has brought into review in the course of the argument.
    The case is of the utmost importance as it regards the extent of injury it will produce to hundreds of others, who have judgments and suits depending on the same principles, before that court; should it be now decided that cases depending on contracts made out of the parish, are not cognizable in the parish court.
    I believe, and I trust confidently, that thére is no good ground on.which to rest the plea interposed to the jurisdiction in this case¿ that it is one, on principle and fact, as well as by long and constant practice, which may as well be brought in the parish as in the district court.
    
      JEustis, for the defendant.
    It is to be regretted, on*our part, that the opinion of Chief justice Parker, cited by the plaintiffs’ counsel, was not stronger than it is ; and that it decided a question of no great consequence, since it only gives the defendant a privilege of challenging, which otherwise be would not have. We con-¿carl that the precedent is in our favor. This court decided fifteen months ago, that the juris* diction of the parish court extended only to ci- «... * vil cases originating in said parish ; which Ae-cisión has been considered since that time as law and has been acted upon in this court and by the parish judge, in deciding on pleas to the jurisdiction of his court. On the trial of the cause of Dun wordy vs. Johnson, the arguments of precedents might have been urged with some little plausibility (if they ever could he annlied to a question of the jurisdiction of an inferior court) but now they are against the plaintiffs..
    The case cited of Dunwoody vs. Johnson, (i Martin, 9, settled the law' as to the jurisdiction of the parish court. Before the decision of that case, appeals bad been brought before this court from judgments of the parish court, in civil cases which may have originated out of the parish ; but the question of jurisdiction was not raised. There w as no plea to the jurisdiction in the court of the first instance ; no assignment of error or suggestion of counsel on that point, in this court. And the court, not having the subject brought before them in the manner which the rules of court and of law prescribe, «lid not ^-give an opinion on it, until called upon in the case cited. .
    
      In the case of Delisle vs. Gaines, .4 Martin, 666, an objection was made to the jurisdiction, but was overruled ; the contract having been made at the Bayou St. Jean. The court then decided incidently, what they afterwards recog-nised by a positive decree.
    The gentleman has cited two cases which this court has decided, since that of Dunwoody vs. Johnson, which he supposes would have failed for want of jurisdiction in the court below, had this court considered their decision in the case cited as binding.
    The first is the case of Smith vs. Flower, et al. 6 Martin, IS, which was heard on an appeal from the parish court; thequestion of jurisdiction was there raised and the court sustained the jurisdiction ; because the obligation on which the suit was brought, was contracted by the defendant, by receiving the merchandize, which was proved to have been delivered, in New-Orleans, Per Curian⅜. “ They further offered to plead that the case having originated out of the limits of the parish of New-Orleans, that court has no jurisdiction over it. The answer to both these positions is, that, by taking the tobacco, the defendants impliedly contracted to pay the freight; and this is the obligation on which they are sued.” Is not this answer to the objection made to the jurisdiction an express and positive recognition of the principle heretofore established in the case of Dunicoody vs. Johnson.
    
    The other case is equally unfortunate for the plaintiffs. Harvey vs. Fitzgerald, 6 Martin’s Feports, 530. It was an action brought against the defendant, to recover the price of a quantity of merchandize which was consigned to him by the plaintiff; and the contract was expressly alledged to have taken place in the city of New-Orleans.
    The suggestions of the gentleman, that the principle was established without any very great deliberation or research, and that it is. entitled to less weight because the amount in dispute was small, and the action savoured of cii%. minality, we do not pretend to answer; but content ourselves with shewing that the law and the decisions, which he has cited in favor of .the plaintiffs, are the best possible arguments on our behalf.
    II. Of the construction of the act under which the jurisdiction of the parish court is maintained, we must first observe, that the parish court is an inferior court of limited jurisdiction. After the organization of the state government, it was limited as to the amount of the matters in die-between the parties; but the limitation , . .. j now extends only te the origin of the cases, ana is taken away as to the amount. It surely cannot be pretended that the former laws organizing parish courts can be adduced to explain an anjibiguity or doubt in the present law, for this reason, that these laws confined the jurisdiction of the court within ,a certain amount, which certainly can afford no light in explaining a limitation as to mere locality. The jurisdiction is not claimed under these law's, which are, as it respects the parish court of New-Orleans, repealed by the law cited.
    But there is no ambiguity in the law; it is couched in the most positive terms; its import cannot be mistaken or perverted.
    “ The court of the parish of New-Orleans shall consist of one judge, learned in the law, whp shall have and exercise within the limits of the said parish a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the court of the first district in all civil cases originating in the said parish/’ Law of March, 181 .
    The law organizing the district court provides that (i there shall be a court in each pariah tobe held, except,for the parishes composing the first district, at such times as shall be hereafter provided for the trial of ,all civil cases which may arise in the said parish. . Section 2 of law of February 10,1813.
    “ The proceedings of the said district courts in civil as well as in criminal cases, shall be governed bj tí e acts of the territorial legislature regulating the proceedings of the late superior court of the territory of Orleans; and that they shall have the same powers, when not inconsistent with this act, which were granted to the said superior court by the said act.” Sect. 6.
    The intention of the legislature was evidently to give the district court general and original jurisdiction of all cases, which could be brought before them. Out of the first district, the parish judges have only jurisdiction of cases to the amount of three hundred dollars ; and if we adopt the rule of construction, which common sense and law requires, we shall find that tío evil can possibly result from the principle for which we contend, and that the powers pf the courts are defined with sufficient accuracy for us to ascertain their extent; that the jurisdiction of the parish court is limited, and that of the district general. The consideration of the circumstances under which these courts were established, leads to this opinion. On the formation of state government, the state was divided into dis-Mctsj courts were organized, and were reqtiii%&; to be held in each parish for the trial of all ... , ■ civil cases which should arise there; or, in other words, of all suits which should be brought there. Any other construction leads to this preposterous conclusion,, that no remedy could be had in the courts of this state'but in ca-es which originated within its limits. So local in its organization is this court, that the judge’s salary is not paid from the public funds of the state, but from those of the parish : the judges of the other courts are paid from the public treasury. As this court was exclusively limited to cases originating in the parish, as it w as created solely for the recovery of those debts, which should be contracted within its limits, and for the benefit of its inhabitants, the legislature could not injustice tax, the people of the state with the charge of supporting it.
    Parish judges had, by the law of February 10, 1813, their jurisdiction limited “in civil cases, to personal actions where the matter in dispute shall not exceed three hundred dollars, subject to an appeal to the district court above the sum of one hundred dollars, &c.”
    The jurisdiction of the parish court of New-Orleans was by a subsequent act extended, and concurrent jurisdiction with the district court given, in civil cases originating in said parish. This was done for the accommodation of the _ Trench population of New-Orleans: a French gentleman was appointed as judge, and most of the cases originating among those who speak that language in New-Orleans have been brought there.
    If we admit that the words of the statute are* ambiguous or uncertain, we must endeavor to learn the intention of the legislature. The English text is the law: but as the statutes are written in both languages, what sounder rule of construction can be imagined, than that, when one text is ambiguous, it may be explained by the other? Perhaps half of the members of the legislature intended to give effect to the law as it was wraten in the French language; and it is conceived that nothing can be more just or politic, than the adoption of this mode of construing statutes, of furnish a better key to the intentions of the legislators.
    The French text warrants the construction which we have attempted to establish ; the district courts have cognizance in the parishei where they are held of all civil actions qui pourront se presenter; the parish court of the parish and city of New-Oleans of all civil cases qui prendront naissance dans tes limites déla dite paroisse — in the one case the courts have a general original. jurisdiction, in the other it is limited to cases originating within the limits of the parish.
    We deem further comment on this head as entirely useless, as we have shewn, from the na* ture of the courts and from the strictest construction of the statutes, that the parish is a court of limited and the district court of general jurisdiction; and that the limitation relates exclusively to the place where the case originates. Much more might be urged in favor of the principle which we support, but under the present view of the subject, it would not be respectful to waste the time of the court in advancing these arguments to prove a point so simple, and which has already been decided.
    III. To the objection, which the gentleman has made to the inconveniences which would result to his clients and the public, if our construction of the statute be adopted by this court, we answer : if any person after the decision of this court in the case of Dunwooiy vs. Johnson, should commence a suit in the parish court on a foreign contract, he did it willingly, and can-, not complain if this court maintains its former opinion 5 caveat jzctor is the rule for him.
    The parish court resembles, in the extent of its i<irI⅜⅛ic⅜i⅞⅜⅜, wne of ⅛6 ihféríw courts in •' ' •■ . , . • -⅝ ' Engl ao d itj, vvhich it is necessary that yivary part of that, which is the gist of the action,. sh««W appear to he withiii their jurisdiction ; the consideration as well as the promise,v must he labl iu the declaration within the jurisdiction. 4 Saunders, rotes by Williams. Cases cited i Levy:, 50.Aimrnsy vs. Atkinson,Little* bay vs. Wright, et malt. al.
    
    To the same point, % Bacon’s Abridgment., 'tit.^C^ñrts/’B.nó.^.
    
    .There i» hut little danger of “the floodgates of litigation being opened” by the court giving, in this case the same decision, wbicli, they havis-i hitherto girtfrMti similar ones. The case hf JMisle vs. Gaines, in which the question now under discussion first came before this court,' Wasi determined in March Í8C7. Three years have elapsed^since the bar and the judge of the court of the city and parish of ííew-Orleans Were infortoed that the supreme court considhr-ed it as a Court oí limited jurisdiction : yet no judgment heretofore given was sought to be re-térsed. Those' vüiich were rendered before that cash, or have been so for the year that fof-jlowed-ít, are beyond the reach of an appeals More tHiftfflfteen months have elapsed since the case of Dnnwoady vs, Johnson, wás determined: the judgment there put the opinion of this court -ont Qjp possibility of being mi^t^ken : yet no anterior judgment of the parish court has been brought up to be reversed- The case of Smith vs. Flower ¿¡¡* al. was pronounced a few days after. If. notwithstanding these repeated warnings, gentlemen have obstinately continued to institute ⅜⅛⅛ before a court, which the supreme tribunal of the country had declared to to be without jurisdiction, and the defendants have obtained bajl or security, to regain their property illegally attached, pn the assurance which their counsel have given to their friends, •that the supreme court would relieve, if the inferior one erred so far as tp sudta|p'cases illegally brought before it, \yill these friends be taught that the decision of the" highest court of this country is not to be considered as a beacon, by ¡he aid of which their course may be directed with safety, but as a decoy that will lead thpm into the snare ? But, wh/ do I use such -$a argument? Considering the case, as one novae impressionis, the usual rules of construction, the expressions, the apparent meaning of the legislature, independently ol the repeated decisions of this tribunal, forbid its members to adopt the interpretation for which the piaintifiV counsel contends.
   Martin, J.

delivered the opinion of the court. ¿ . The defendant’s counsel urges that the princi pal question in this case lias been settled by tlus court, in the cases of Dunwoody vs. Johnson, and Smith vs. Flower & al. while the plaintiffs’contends, that we have pronounced opinions impliedly #in diametrical opposition with the decision in these cases^-which, he Relieves, to have been decided hastily, and ,with little consideration.

The case of Dunwoody vs. Johnson received/ from this court all the attention which we are accustomed to bestow on those in which we have to, pronounce without the aid of counsel. As in sugh cases we are more exposed to err, we are ir# the habit of submitting them to a more severe scrutiny. In that, however, the question to be determined had been agitated two years before, in the case of Delisle vs. Gaines, in which, neither any member of this court, nor any of the counsel engaged, appear to have entertained any doubt of the law being as it was finally settled in that of Dunwoody vs. Johnson. In this latter case, the cottnsisl’ of the plaintiff did not apply for a reconsideration of the question, and in a subsequent case, Smith vs. Flower & al. no doubt occurred of the law being as it had been settled. The court, whose judgment was reversed in the case of Dunwoody vs. Johnson, informs us in its opinion in the present case, that it “thought and said repeatedly it had no jurisdiction, ⅛4 the jury in spite thereof gave a verdict for one of the parties, and the court thought itself hound to give, judgment.” *

%e cases, which the plaintiffs’ counsel cites, go but a very little -way, indeed, to establish the position he contends for. Those of L s Caygas vs. Larionda’s syndics & Rion vs. Rion’s syndics are merely, what the Spanish law calls incidentes of the main cause, of these insolvents against their creditors; collateral suits, exclusively cognizable in the court seized of the principal ones, and which would have been cumulated thereto, had they been instituted in any other court, before the inception of these principal cases. Those of Ralston vs. Pamar, Perry vs. Flower & al. and Harvey vs. Fitzgerald, were cases in which the cause of action originated in this city: the goods, payment of which was asked in the first, for the preservation or conveyance of which compensation, was claimed in the two next, and an account of which was demanded in the last, had been delivered to the respective defendants in New Orleans. The case of Smith & al. vs. Elliot came up on a bill of exceptions, and the attention of this court was necessarily confined to a review of the opinion excepted to. Ferry vs. Legras, and Forsyth vs. Nash, are cases in which the plaintiff's failed to establish their claims, and the defendants’ counsel thought it more fór the interests of their clients to have judgment on the merits, than to stir the question of jurisdiction. Cooley vs. Lawrence is the only one, among the cases presented to us, in which a plaintiff succeeded in an action brought up from the court of the parish and city of New-Orleans, on a contract made out of that parish! The question of jurisdiction not hálnig beep raised, nothing can be inferred from this court not having withdrawn its attention, from the points to which the parties called it, to arrest it on one, of which neither of them saw fit to avait hiniself Of.

We have, however, examined the question, raised by th% plaintiffs’ counsel, without any prepossession fróm forüier upinions.

The legislature has givein fif the Court, 1⅛ which the present suit was instituted, jurisdic* tion of all civil cases oiifijiñatíttg in the parish. The*plaintiffs’' counsel contends that the w ;rí caiei iSjhere synonimous with the word actions, the defendant urges that it is gynotti-mons with the words contracts or

If With the plaintiffs’ counsel we read, jurisdiction of all dril actions originating in the we will arrive at a senseless result: fot the expressions will include nqy action .which a suitor may see fit to originate in the court, and tile object of a section, intended to describe the jurisdiction of a court, is badly: answered by a declaration fhat it extends to all suits which may be brought in it.

We are told that the pnly restriction intended was to prevent the inhabitants of the parishes of 8⅜⅛ John the Baptist, St. Charles and St. Bernard, which, with that of Ne\\ -Orleans, constitute the first judicial district, being dragged chit of their parishes before the new court. While it is admitted that these inhabitants may be dragged out of their respective parishes before, the district court, which sits in the samé pity, and generally in the same buil jing, it is ppt easy to conceive that the al-i fedged restriction Would be of, any' avail to them.

we read with the defendant’s counsel ju-$i$dipfion of all contracts, pR torts, originating in the parish, we arrive,at,.a correct,,:^ snlt. The exclusion of contracts ©r torts, originating, out of the parish ajipears congruous * * . » ' _ ' « with the provision, that the salary ot the pa-rishjudge shall not bé a state charge, hut shall be paid out of the parish treasury, an»! we per* ceive the wisdom of the provision,¿that a court held at the expense of the inhabitants of a parish shall exclusively attend t%the concerns of that parish.

But, it is said, that if- we give the meaning supported by the defendants counsel to the word cases in this act, we must give the same meaning to the same word in the fpaTth section of the act establishing the district court* and then, in the latter act, we will arrive at an incongruous result. It does not necessarily follow, that a word must invariably hate the same meaning ⅛ every statute in which it is found. But the jurisdiction of the district court is not* as the counsel for the plaintiffs states^ established, by the 4th section of the act of 1813, but by the 15th and l6tb, which provide that it shall have the same powers as the superior court tiff the late territory. The 4th section •. provides for the place of trial: we may, therefore, conclude, that the cases, spoken óf, are sudrff& which the word trial is, applicable, viz. ..⅛⅜⅝ tims,. '

That the wdrd is to be understood in a dif* „ . V. ' • „ , ferent sense in the two acts is apparent from it* tranStasted by. different words in the French pitrts of-'these acts.

Another feattsideration is that the limitation, of the jurisdiction of the court of die parish and city of New-Orleans, is precisely the same, which is given to corporation courts, mayor’s Courts, fee. which is confined to cases in which the cause, of action originates within the limits of the corporation.

After the most mature consideration the court is of opinion, that the view of the suoject, taken by this court whenever it has come under their consideration, is uot an erroneous one.

But it is contended, that, as the hill of ex* Change endorsed by the defendant was payalde in New-Orleans, the cause of action accrued, there. This suit arises on* a contract of en* dorsement ; the defendant entered in no other with the plaintiffs; they do not pretend that this action is grounded on a tort.

An endorser undertakes that, if the drawee cannot be found at the place mentioned, or re* fuses to hotter the bill, and the endorsee, afteif fulfilling all the formalities which the law re^ quires, gives timely notice to the endorser, he will pay the amount of the bill, with such costs and damages as the law allows. The endorsement is a conditional promise, which when the condition is performed, is to be kept in the same manner as an absolute promise, at the domicil of the promisor, or where he may be fomsd. Now, in the present case, the endorsement was made at Nashville, and the notice,pf non-payment was sent there: on receiving it the defendant was bound to pay. He was sua-ble instantly, and on the spot; and if Nashville has an incorporated court whose jurisdiction is limited to cases, in which the cause of action arises within the limits of the town, he was suable in it. So, if an insurance company in New-Orleans insured goods on board a steamboat, on a voyage from Natchez to Nashville, in case of a loss, the company could be sued in the court of the parish and city of New-Orle*as: for the contract, which is the cause of action originated there; although no part of the contingency on which the payment depended was to happen there.

We conclude, that the parish court erred in overruling the plea in abatement. — It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed (Derbigny^ J. dissenting) that the judgment of the parish court be annulled, avoided and reversed, and that the SU^ be a^ated at the plaintiffs’ costs in both courts.

See April term, an application for a rehearing.  