
    (63 South. 390.)
    No. 19,937.
    STATE v. BROUSSARD.
    (June 9, 1913.
    On Rehearing Nov. 17, 1913.)
    
      (Syllabus by the Oourt.)
    
    1. Criminal Law (§ 1159*) — Appeal—Findings of Fact.
    This court is without jurisdiction to review the finding of a jury, in a criminal case, on a question of fact.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3074-3083; Dec. Dig. § 1159.*]
    On Rehearing.
    2. Criminal Law (§ 1159*) — Appeal—Sufficiency of Evidence.
    Whether the evidence offered to prove a particular element of the offense charged was sufficient to convict is a question of fact over which this court has no jurisdiction.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3074-3083; Dec. Dig. § 1159.*]
    3. Criminal Law (§ 1144*) — Organization-Presumptions.
    Where the minutes show that the indictment was presented by the grand jury in open court and ordered filed and made of record, it will be presumed that the grand jury was duly impaneled and sworn.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2736-2764, 2766-2771, 2774-2781, 2901, 3016-3037; Dec. Dig. § 1144.*]
    4. Criminal Law (§ 1032*)—Appeal—Objec-tion Below—Indictment.
    Formal objections to the sufficiency of the indictment cannot be urged for the first time on appeal.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2627, 2628, 2642; Dec. Dig. § 10Í52.*]
    Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; Thos. F. Bell, Judge.
    J. M. Broussard was convicted of violating the Vagrancy Act (Laws 1912, No. 226), and appeals.
    Affirmed.
    H. C. Fisher, of Shreveport, for appellant. R. G. Pleasant, Atty. Gen., and W. A. Mabry, of Shreveport, Dish Atty. (G. A. Gondron, of Donaldsonville, of counsel), for the State.
   MONROE, J.

Defendant was convicted, under Act No. 226, of 1912, of being a male person, without visible means of support, who is feloniously living with a prostitute, and was sentenced to imprisonment for six months. He has made no appearancé in this court, in person or by counsel, and the only bill of exception that we find in the transcript is one reading, in part, as follows:

“Be it remembered that * * * the defendant * * * filed a motion for new trial *. * * on the ground that the verdict of the jury * * * was contrary to the law and the evidence, in that the state failed to'prove that the party with whom the defendant was alleged to have lived was a prostitute, at and during the time that defendant is alleged to have lived with her.”

The question thus presented being merely one of fact, this court is without jurisdiction to review the finding of the jury thereon. The verdict and sentence appealed from are, accordingly, affirmed.

On Rehearing.

LAND, J.

The defendant was indicted under Act No. 226 of 1912, entitled “An act to define and punish vagrancy and providing penalties for the violation thereon.”

As stated in our previous opinion, the only bill of exception found in the record is one to the overruling of defendant’s motion for a new trial. The only basis for such motion was an allegation:

“That the state failed to prove that the party with whom defendant was alleged to have lived was a prostitute at and during the time that the defendant is alleged to have lived with her.”

The trial judge in his per curiam sums up the evidence tending to show in his opinion that “the party” was a prostitute. We have no jurisdiction to review the ruling of the trial judge on the question of fact presented by the motion.

The objection, made for the first time on appeal, that the record does not show that the defendant was indicted by a grand jury duly impaneled and sworn, is without merit. The indictment is in due form, and the minute entry recites that it was presented by the grand jury in open court and ordered filed and made of record. That the grand jury was duly impaneled and sworn will be presumed.

The further general objection that the indictment does not sufficiently follow the verbiage of Act No. 226 of 1912 is too vague for consideration, and, moreover, comes too late.

It is therefore ordered that our former decree herein be reinstated and made the final judgment'of the court.  