
    
      Elizabeth P. Gist vs. Maurice Toohey.
    
    The plaintiff’s slave, William, made money over and above his wages, and placed it in the hands of the defendant, to be used in purchasing his (William’s) children. The children were purchased by the defendant; held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the money from the defendant.
    Notwithstanding any promise, by the master, that his slave shall have certain acquisitions, all the acquisitions of the slave in possession, are the property of his master.
    No executory contract with a slave, not acting as the agent of his master, can give a right of action, either to the slave or master/
    
      Tried in the City Court of Charleston, October Term, 1845.
    This was an action of assumpsit, for money had and received, money paid, (fee. It appeared that in April, 1841, William, a slave of the plaintiff, who had earned one hundred dollars over and above his wages, placed that sum in the hands of the defendant, under an agreement that the defendant should purchase, for William, two of his children, for three hundred and fifty dollars ; and that when William should repay to the defendant the balance of the purchase money, with an additional sum of fifty dollars for each year that the balance should remain unpaid, he, the defendant, would execute a bill of sale to William, of the children. In pursuance of this agreement, the defendant bought the negroes for three hundred and fifty dollars.
    The Recorder charged the jury, that if the defendant acted in good faith, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the one hundred dollars advanced by William, unless the balance of the money paid by the defendant to accomplish the purchase, had been tendered to him, and a conveyance of the children required to be made, either to William or the plaintiff. The jury found for the plaintiff one hundred dollars, with interest from April, 1841.
    The defendant appealed, and now moved for anew trial, on the following grounds :
    
      1. Because the contract with the negro William was exe-cutory, and, therefore, the plaintiff had no cause of action.
    2. Because the contract proved, was a special contract, and the plaintiff could not waive the same, and recover upon the money counts.
    3. Because the contract was with a slave, in connection with money earned by the slave above the wages which his owner required, and which were paid regularly, and this gave no cause of action to the owner.
    
      A. G. Magrath, for the motion.
    
      Moise, contra.
   Curia, per Waedlaw, J.

This verdict may have been found upon the conclusion of the jury, formed from the evidence, that the defendant had not acted in good faith ; but even upon a contrary supposition, this court thinks it must stand. The promises of a master to a slave, are binding only in conscience and honor; at law, notwithstanding any such promise, that the slave shall have certain acquisitions, all the acquisitions of the slave in possession, are the property of the master. A dealing or trafficking with the slave concerning such acquisitions, without the license of the master, is as much contrary to our statutory regulations, as other unlicensed dealings with a slave. Sometimes an executed contract with a slave might transfer a title to a third person, upon the ground of the master’s implied consent; but an executory agreement with a slave, (not the agent of the master therein) can give no right of action, either to the slave or master. (See Fable vs. Brown. 2 Hill Ch. 378 ; Carmille vs. Carmille, 2 McM. 454 ; Inglesby vs. Beamer. Then the $100 in William’s possession, belonged to the plaintiff; the defendant violated the law in receiving it from him under a bargain ; or, to say the least, acted with great imprudence in resting his justification for dealing with the slave to such an amount, when the owner was near, upon the implied permission of the owner, and not obtaining express license. Such assent of the plaintiff as would make William her agent, cannot be presumed against the verdict; and the defendant must refund the $100, as money received in an unlawful transaction, wherein the plaintiff did not participate- — or as money received upon consideration of an agreement which the law regards as worthless.

The motion is therefore refused.

Richardson, O’Neall, Evans, ButleR and Feost, JJ. concurred 
      
      
        Joseph S. Inglesby vs. Deidrick Beamer. This was a sum. pro. in trover for a batteau, tried in the City Court, in November, 1844. The batteau was built by a slave of the plaintiff, named Titus, on a lot in Charleston, occupied by the defendant. The defendant claimed the right to retain the batteau, under the lien of an account for seven or eight dollars due by Titus to the defendant, for money lent to buy materials for the batteau, and for materials and groceries furnished by the defendant to Titus. The batteau was proved to be worth $35 or $40.
      The Recorder, in his report to the Court of Appeals, stated that he ruled as follows:
      
        
        ‘‘ There is no evidence, whatever, to give any lien for the grocery bill. Under the contradictory statements of the defendant’s witness, I felt constrained to reject belief in his pretence of the pledge of the boat, for the advances of cash. This left the remaining question : had the plaintiff established his right to recover the boat as owner?
      “ Whatever chattels a slave acquires, he acquires for his master, and the master may maintain an action for them in the hands of a stranger. (Fable vs. Brown, 2 Hill Ch. 397.) A slave is incapable of holding property in his own right, and the possession ana title must be referred to the master. (Ib. 396), A master may maintain trespass for his slave’s property. (Hobson vs. Perry, 1 Hill, 277.)”
      Decree for the plaintiff for $35.
      The case came before the Court of Appeals, in January, 1845, when Richardson, J. delivered the opinion of the court.
      The point of law m this case, is fully expounded and supported by the Judge’s report. The liability of the defendant to the plaintiff, for the boat built by his slave Titus, is evident; and the failure on the part of the defendant to shew that his credits to Titus were as credits to the plaintiff, or liens on the boat, are equally plain.
      The motion is therefore dismissed.
      O’Neall, Evans, Butler, Wardlaw and Frost, JJ. concurred.
     