
    (85 Tex. Cr. R. 275)
    MORRIS v. STATE.
    (No. 5369.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    May 7, 1919.)
    1. Witnesses <⅞=372(1) — Cross-Examination —Bias o« Interest.
    A witness may be cross-examined to develop any facts showing his bias or interest or motive.
    2. Witnesses <§=»372(2) — Cross-Examination — Interest in Prosecution.
    In forgery trial, accused had the right to cross-examine witness to develop the fact that the latter had an interest in the prosecution, in that ho had offered to forego prosecution if accused would pay the alleged forged check, and that, failing in this, the witness desired to bring about accused’s conviction to obtain possession of property which witness claimed had been delivered by him to accused in consideration of such check:
    Appeal from Criminal District Court, Tar-rant County; George E. Hosey, Judge.
    J. L. Morris was convicted of forgery, and appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Mays & Mays, of Ft. Worth, for appellant.
    E. A. Berry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, J.

The appeal is from a conviction for forgery.

The alleged forged instrument was a check purporting to hear the signature of Port Harris. The state’s theory was that the appellant forged the check and passed it to a witness by the name of Persky, who was a junk dealer, in payment for an automobile motor. Persky testified for the state, identifying the appellant and the check and fully supporting the state’s theory. The appellant' testified in his own behalf, denying any connection with the check and denying that he had purchased the motor of the witness Per-sky. Appellant’s first bill of exceptions, after the preliminary statement, contains the following:

“Be it remembered, therefore, that defendant asked said prosecuting witness if he had any interest in said prosecution; that the county attorney interposed objection thereto, merely stating that the state objected to said question and answer, and without stating any reason or ground therefor; that the court sustained said objection, and would not allow said question to be asked or answered; that said witness would have testified that he had an interest therein and that they, he and son, offered not to prosecute defendant if he would pay said check.”

This bill is signed without qualification or explanation and sufficiently presents for decision the question whether the appellant had a right under the law to have the jury informed that the witness who had given important testimony against him, the truth of which he controverted, had an interest in the matter which would or might, in the judgment of the jury, disclose a motive for giving the testimony which would tend to discredit its truth.

The right to make inquiry on cross-examination of a witness, which inquiry will develop any facts showing his bias or interest in the subject of the controversy, we understand to be a well-defined rule of evidence. Wharton’s Crim. Ev. § 477. A list of numerous decisions of this court will be found in Branch’s An. Texas P. O. § 163. We understand from the preliminary statement in the bill that the appellant desired to show that the witness had offered to fore-go any prosecution of the appellant to induce him to pay off the check, and, failing in this, he desired to bring about his conviction in order to obtain possession of the motor which the witness claimed had been delivered by him to the appellant. Among the cases listed by Mr. Branch are several to the effect that testimony of this specific character should be received. Watson v. State, 9 Tex. App. 237; Trimble v. State, 16 Tex. App. 115; Hill v. State, 18 Tex. App. 673; Jenkins v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 202, 29 S. W. 1078; Richards v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 278, 30 S. W. 229.

State’s counsel suggests that an examination of the statement of facts will show that the appellant was permitted to ask the witness sundry questions touching his interest in the case, and that thereby the error disclosed by the bill of exceptions was cured. We have made this examination, but fail to find therein the evidence which the court certifies in the bill the witness would have given had he been permitted.

We regard the error material, and because of it the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded. 
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