
    Alan VAN ORDEN, personal representative of the Estate of Crystal Rhea Bannister; Robert Bannister, a legal heir of Crystal Rhea Bannister; Michelle Waleske, a legal heir of Crystal Rhea Bannister, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Heath S. DOWNS, Detention Deputy assigned to the Caribou County Jail; Judy Probart Long, Dispatcher employed by Caribou County, Defendants-Appellants, and Caribou County; Caribou County Sheriff Dept., an Office controlled and directed by Caribou County; Ric L. Anderson, Sheriff of Caribou County; Michael Haderlie, Commander of the Caribou County Jail; Brock Lopez, Detention Sergeant of the Caribou County Jail; Brandy Bredehoft, Detention Deputy assigned to the Caribou County Jail; Jodi Suter, Dispatcher employed by Caribou County; Brett Smith, Physician Assistant employed by Caribou County and assigned to the Caribou County Jail, Defendants.
    No. 14-35904.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted June 17, 2015.
    Filed July 8, 2015.
    Shawn Bailey, Brandon Baxter, Shaun L. Peck, Peck Hadfield Baxter & Moore, LLC, Logan, UT, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
    Bruce Castleton; Kirtlan G. Naylor, General, Tyler D. Williams, Naylor & Hales, P.C., Boise, ID, for Defendants-Appellants.
    Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Defendants Heath Downs and Judy Long (together, “Appellants”) appeal from the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. In an earlier appeal, we held that genuine issues of material fact existed on the issue of whether Appellants and other defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Crystal Bannister’s serious medical needs. Van Orden v. Caribou Cnty., 546 Fed.Appx. 647, 649 (9th Cir.2013). In this appeal, Appellants contend that they are immune from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity because the law at issue was not “clearly established” at the time of Bannister’s death on August 25, 2009. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment.

“ ‘To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’ ” Taylor v. Barkes, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044, 192 L.Ed.2d 78 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012)). This standard does “not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). It was “clearly established,” at least as early as 2005, “that the Eighth Amendment protects against deliberate indifference to a detainee’s s'erious risk of suicide.” Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1102 (9th Cir.2010), judgment vacated, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1812, 179 L.Ed.2d 769, and opinion reinstated, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Appellants did not need a more detailed standard to be aware that their indifference violated Bannister’s constitutional rights, and no subsequent case has undermined the deliberate indifference standard in the context of custodial suicide. As we held previously, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, shows that Appellants were subjectively aware that Bannister posed a serious suicide risk but failed to take protee-tive actions. Van Orden, 546 Fed.Appx. at 649.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     