
    CURTIS RICHARDSON et al. v. FLORENCE CHEEK et al.
    (Filed 24 November, 1937.)
    1. Wills § 31 — Cardinal rule for construction of wills is to effectuate intent of testator as gathered from instrument as a whole.
    To effectuate the intent of the testator as gathered from the four corners of the will, considering for this purpose the will and any codicil or codicils as but one instrument, is the cardinal rule for the interpretation of wills, to which all other rules must bend, unless contrary to some rule of law or public policy.
    a. Wilis § i—
    A will is the duly expressed mind of a competent person as to what he would have done after his death with those matters and things over which he has the right of control and disposition.
    3. Wills § 31—
    Since the intent and purpose of no two testators can be exactly alike, each will must be separately construed to effectuate the particular intent and purpose therein expressed.
    4. Wills § 38 — Residuary clause held to leave money derived from payments by devisees to named beneficiaries and only personal chattels to residuary legatee of personalty.
    The will in this case provided for the payment of funeral expenses and just debts out of the first moneys coming into the hands of the executors, then made several devises covering all the real estate and required the devisees to pay designated amounts to the estate, and from the sum thus accumulated, directed a number of legacies to be paid in cash, and then contained a residuary clause directing that the “remainders of my estate, if there be any, is to be equally divided between” named sons, and that “all of my personalty is to go to” another son. Held: The “remainders of my estate” referred to the remainder of the sums paid to the estate by the devisees, and the legacy “of all my personalty” referred only to personal chattels owned by the testator.
    5. Wills § 31—
    Each clause of a will should be harmonized with other parts of the will and given effect unless the effect is inconsistent with the general intent and purpose of the testator, as gathered from the entire will.
    Appeal by plaintiffs from Alley, Jat February Special Term, 1937, Of RANDOLPH.
    Civil action for construction of will.
    The record discloses that John W. Richardson, late of Randolph County, died in August, 1933, seized in fee of several tracts of land situate in Randolph and Orange counties, and personal property consisting of approximately $400.00 in cash and certain farming tools, household and kitchen furniture.
    
      By bis will, provision is first made for tbe payment of funeral expenses and just debts “out of tbe first moneys” coming into tbe bands of bis executors.
    He tben proceeds to divide bis lands among bis several children, requiring four of tbem “to pay to my estate” sums aggregating $2,601. Tbe devise to bis son Pearl is typical: “I give and devise to my son Pearl Richardson my borne tract of land in Randolph County . . .
    but be is to pay to my estate the sum of $1,380.”
    To other children be gave “in cash” sums aggregating $1,020.
    Tbe clause which gives rise to tbe present controversy follows :
    “Tbe remainders of my estate, if there be any, is to be equally divided between my sons, Curtis, Clay, Bryan, and Jesse Richardson. All of my personal property is to go to my son Pearl Richardson.”
    Tbe trial court being of opinion that tbe residuary clause contained “two apparently contradictory clauses” and that tbe “last one of said clauses governs,” entered judgment awarding to Pearl Richardson all the residuary personal estate.
    Plaintiffs appeal, assigning errors.
    
      J. V. Wilson and M. M. Robins for plaintiffs, appellants.
    
    
      Moser <& Miller for defendants, appellees.
    
   Stacy, C. J.

Tbe guiding star in the interpretation of wills, to which all rules must bend unless contrary to some rule of law or public policy, is tbe intent of tbe testator, and this is to be ascertained from tbe four corners of tbe will, considering for tbe purpose tbe will and any codicil or codicils as constituting but one instrument. Ellington v. Trust Co., 196 N. C., 755, 147 S. E., 286; 28 R. C. L., 211 et seq.

Our first concern, tben, is with tbe intention of tbe testator. What did be intend by bis will? To find this is to solve tbe problem. Heyer v. Bulluck, 210 N. C., 321, 186 S. E., 356.

A will is tbe duly expressed mind of a competent person as to what be would have done after bis death with those matters and things over which be has tbe right of control and disposition. Payne v. Sale, 22 N. C., 455; In re Edwards’ Will, 172 N. C., 369, 90 S. E., 418; In re Deyton’s Will, 177 N. C., 494, 99 S. E., 424; In re Seymour’s Will, 184 N. C., 418, 114 S. E., 626; 68 C. J., 410. As no two people are situated exactly alike, we would hardly expect to find identical wills or wills expressing tbe same intent and purpose. For this reason tbe aid to be derived from adjudicated cases is comparatively small in tbe administration of tbe law of wills. Every will, like every tub of Macklinian allusion, “must stand on its own bottom.” (Charles Macklin, “Tbe Man of tbe World,” Act 1, Scene 2) ; Patterson v. McCormick, 181 N. C., 311, 107 S. E., 12.

In tie instant case two questions arise out of tie conflicting views of tie parties:

1. Is tie fund created by charges imposed against devisees, after tie payment of testator’s just debts, pecuniary legacies and costs of administration, to be equally divided among iis sons, Curtis, Olay, Bryan, and Jesse Richardson, under tie residuary bequest to them of “The remainders of my estate, if there be any,” or does tie residue of this fund go to Pearl Richardson under tie gift to iim of “All my personal property ?”

2. Is tie gift to Pearl Richardson of “All my personal property” limited to personal chattels, i.e., to the farming tools, household and kitchen furniture?

Tie testator begins iis will by providing for the payment of funeral expenses and his just debts out of tie first moneys coming into tie hands of iis executors. He then makes several devises requiring tie devisees to pay to-his estate certain designated amounts. From the sums thus accumulated he directed a number of legacies to be paid in cash, and “if there be any remainders of my estate,” i.e., if there be any remainders of tie sums paid into the estate by the devisees after the payment of debts, pecuniary legacies, and costs of administration, provision is made for the residue of these remainders to be equally divided among Curtis, Clay, Bryan and Jesse Richardson. If this be the true intent of tie testator, and we think it is, then only the farming tools, household and kitchen furniture were intended to go to Pearl Richardson under tie gift to iim of “All my personal property.” Such interpretation harmonizes tie different clauses and gives effect to tie whole will. Pilley v. Sullivan, 182 N. C., 493, 109 S. E., 359.

To hold that Pearl Richardson takes all of the residuary personal estate under tie last clause would not only nullify tie residuary division intended for iis brothers, but also in effect remit part of tie $1,380 charged against the devise to iim of the home place. This would produce two clashes in tie will, whereas tie rule is to construe a will so as to give effect to every part and clause thereof, and to harmonize tie several clauses, provided tie effect is not inconsistent with tie general intent and purpose of tie testator, as gathered from tie entire will. Reid v. Neal, 182 N. C., 192, 108 S. E., 769; Herring v. Williams, 153 N. C., 231, 69 S. E., 140.

“It is the approved position here and elsewhere, in tie construction of wills, that unless in violation of law tie intent of tie testator, as expressed in the will, shall prevail, and in ascertaining this intent the entire will shall be considered, giving to each and every part significance and harmonizing apparent inconsistencies where this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation, and that the language of tie instrument stall be given its natural and customary meaning unless it clearly appears tbat some otter permissible meaning is intended.” Hoke, J., in Goode v. Hearne, 180 N. C., 475, 105 S. E., 5.

Tte conclusion we have reacted gives effect to every part of tte will, harmonizes tte different clauses, and apparently makes tte intent of tte testator fair and reasonable. It eliminates any conflict and does away witt tte necessity of ruling out any part of tte will as repugnant to any otter part. “If possible apparent repugnancies must be reconciled for, as suggested in Dalton v. Scales, 37 N. C., 521, it is not- to be admitted, unless tte conclusion is irresistible, ttat tte testator tad two inconsistent intents.” Adams, J., in Williams v. Best, 195 N. C., 324, 142 S. E., 2.

Tte cause will be remanded for judgment in accordance witt this opinion.

Error and remanded.  