
    LAURA V. ROBINSON vs. JOHN F. COOK, COLLECTOR OF TAXES.
    In Equity. —
    No. 4157.
    I. The ordinance of the late corporation of Washington City, relating to the assessment of taxable property, and providing that no new building should be assessed until the same was completed and made ready for occupancy, has been repealed by subsequent legislation.
    II. If there has been an error in the valuation, the proper remedy is before the board of appeals.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
    The defendant is the collector of taxes for the District of Columbia, and the complainant sets forth in her bill that she was the owner of certain premises in the city of Washington, on which was a new dwelling-house in process of erection but not completed, occupied, nor ready for occupancy. That, between January 1 and April, 1874, the assessor of taxes, erroneously supposing that said dwelling had been completed, assessed it, as an improvement to said premises, at a valuation of $3,000, and returned the same as a taxable improvement •, whereupon a tax, on account thereof, to the amount of $90, was laid upon said premises, in addition to the $31.56 laid on account of the value of the premises exclusive of the said unfinished building; that complainant tendered the said, tax-collector the whole amount of tax due on said premises, not including the aforesaid tax of $90, but the collector refused to receive any portion of the tax unless the entire amount of $123.99 was paid, and in default of such payment declared that he should sell the property for taxes. The bill concludes by praying that the said collector of taxes be required by order of the court to receive the amount of tax assessed upon the property, aside from the said unfinished building, and that he be restrained from offering the property for sale for default of payment of the $90 tax illegally assessed.
    The defendant demurred to the bill as not setting forth facts entitling the complainant to relief in the premises.
    
      The tax in question is that for the year ending June 30,1875, and its illegality is sought to be established by reference to an ordinance of the late corporation of Washington, passed on the 30th day of May, 1849, which declared that “ No new building shall be assessed until occupied, or actually completed and made ready for occupancy.” Webb’s Dig., p. 15, section 10.
    The defendant contends that this ordinance was not in force at the time of assessing the property in this case, under the subsequent legislation of Congress and of the late legislative assembly. The act of Congress of February 21, 1871 (16 Statutes at Large, 419) created a single government for the District of Columbia, and vested legislative power.in a legislative assembly. This latter body, by an act approved August 19, 1871, (Laws of First Assembly, 25,) declared that all real estate should be taxable and assessable, except houses of public worship, hospitals, orphan and other asylums, and burial grounds, belonging to the United States. No express reference was made to the ordinance of the corporation above cited, and it contained no other' exemptions than those named.
    A subsequent act of the assembly, approved August 23, 1871, (Laws of First Assembly, 155,) made it the duty of the assessors of taxes for the District to annually assess all real property, taxable at the time of the passage of the act, or thereafter made taxable; and a board of appeals was created to hear and determine any and all appeals made from the valuations of the assessors.
    Finally, the act of Congress, approved June 20, 1874, entitled, “An act for the government of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes,” levied a tax upon “all real estate in said District,” except that belonging to the United States and to the District, and that used for educational and charitable purposes, at a rate of 3 per cent, of the then assessed value thereof, and provided that said taxes should be assessed and valued as then provided by law for the assessment and collection of general taxes in the District. This is the tax the collection of which complainant seeks to enjoin. The ordinance of the old corporation of Washington was not expressly repealed by these laws, nor did they, in express terms, prescribe exemption of unfinished buildings.
    
      •The justice presiding at the special term ordered that the case be heard by the court in general term in the first instance.
    
      William A. Meloy for complainant:
    It will be conceded that under this provision the property in question, in the case at bar, would not have been taxable property, or liable to any assessment whatever, prior to the organization of the District government, under the act of February 21,1871, a period of more than twenty years. No law has since been enacted, either by Congress or by the legislative assembly of the District, repealing this law, or inconsistent with its provisions.
    It is the duty of the court to so construe the several acts that all may stand together, if possible to do so, unless the former is clearly within the operation of a repealing clause. United States vs. Tynen, 11 Wall., 91; Sedgwick on Stats, and Const. Law, 123, (1st ed.) The intention of the legislature is to control; but the later expression of the legislative will must clearly be irreconcilable with the continuance of the former law to effect its repeal, and the burden of establishing the later legislative intent, and such irreconcilability also, lies upon that party which affirms the abrogation of the former law.
    
      Edwin L. Stanton for the defendant:
    Neither the acts of Congress nor the laws of the legislative assembly prescribed exemption of unfinished buildings; but, on the contrary, the enactments both of Congress and the legislative assembly include unfinished buildings within taxable property.
    2. Unfinished buildings being taxable as real estate, if the valuation on complainant’s property was excessive, her remedy was before the board of appeals. The chancellor does not sit to revise the valuations lawfully put upon property by the assessors.
   Mr. Justice Wylte

delivered the opinion of the court substantially as follows:

Mrs. Robinson, the complainant, was the owner of the property at the time the assessment was made, and the dwelling-house thereon was not then completed. It was, however, included in the valuation of the property. By an old law of the corporation of Washington, relating to the assessment of taxable property, it was provided that no new building or addition should be assessed, and valued, and returned until it was actually completed and ready for occupancy. That ordinance was disregarded in this case, and we think properly so. Subsequent legislation superseded that ordinance. The' act of Congress under which this tax was levied adopted the then assessed value of the property, and entirely omitted to exempt unfinished buildings. We are also of opinion that as the complainant had an opportunity to appeal from the assessment, if there was any error in the valuation, to the board of appeal, she ought to have pursued that course.

The bill must be.dismissed.  