
    Gerard V. SUNNEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-465-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 6, 2013.
    
      Gerard V. Sunnen, New York, NY, pro se.
    Rebecca S. Tinio, Benjamin H. Torrance, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee, Charles Schumer.
    Larry A. Sonnenshein, Andrew J. Rauchberg, Diana Lawless, for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Defen-danh-Appellee, Michael Bloomberg.
    Valerie Figueredo, Assistant Solicitor General, for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee, New York State Department of Health.
    PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., JOSÉ A. CABRANES and BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Gerard Sunnen, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s December 27, 2012 judgment dismissing his complaint and January 9, 2013 order denying reconsideration. Defendant-Appellee New York State Department of Health (“DOH”) requests that we vacate the dismissal of Sunnen’s state-law claims against it for the limited purpose of permitting the District Court to enter an order remanding those claims to state court. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court decision dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). See Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997). Dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1987, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While pro se complaints must contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the plausibility standard, see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.2009), we look for such allegations by affording the litigant “special solicitude” and “interpreting the complaint to raise the strongest claims that it suggests,” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principals, we find that the District Court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Sunnen’s claims against Senator Sehumer and the DOH, and that Sunnen’s allegations against Mayor Bloomberg failed to state a claim that was plausible on its face. Accordingly, we affirm those conclusions for substantially the reasons set forth by the District Court in its well-reasoned opinion and order dated December 21, 2012. See Sunnen v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 12 CIV. 3417 CM, 2012 WL 6645942 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2012). To the extent Sunnen now attempts to raise new claims on appeal, we decline to consider those issues because they were not presented to the District Court. See Paese v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 449 F.3d 435, 446-47 (2d Cir.2006) (“In general we refrain from passing on issues not raised below.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Finally, although the DOH did not make a timely request before the District Court that Sunnen’s state-law claims against it be remanded to the state courts rather than dismissed, we find that such relief is appropriate in this instance. Sunnen’s claims against the DOH consist of, inter alia, state-law claims against a state agency that were removed to the District Court pursuant to the Court’s pendent removal jurisdiction. In situations where the removed federal claims have been dismissed, we have noted that “concerns of comity and of federalism ... encourage remanding to the state courts cases in which state court adjudication can properly claim primacy of interest.” See Naylor v. Case & McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 557, 562-63 (2d Cir.1978); see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988) (“Because in some circumstances a remand of a removed case involving pendent claims will better accommodate the[ ] values [of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity] than will dismissal of the case, the animating principle behind the pendent jurisdiction doctrine supports giving a district court discretion to remand when the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is inappropriate.”). Accordingly, we vacate the District Court’s judgment of dismissal only as to those state-law claims against the DOH and remand for the limited purpose of permitting the District Court to enter an order remanding those claims to the state courts, which the District Court has indicated it is inclined to do.

We have considered all of Sunnen’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the December 27, 2012 judgment and January 9, 2013 order of the District Court IN PART, VACATE the judgment and order IN PART, and REMAND the claims against the DOH for the limited purpose of permitting those claims to be remanded to state court.  