
    Mary DOE, a human embryo “born” in the United States (and subsequently frozen in which state of cryopreservaton her life is presently suspended) individually and on behalf of all other frozen human embryos similarly situated; The National Association for the Advancement of Preborn Children, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Donna E. SHALALA, in her official capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services; U.S. Department of Health & Human Services; Harold Varmus, in his official capacity as Director of the National Institutes of Health; National Institutes of Health, Defendants-Appellees. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR EMBRYONIC LAW, Amicus Curiae.
    No. 01-1298.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted Jan. 23, 2002.
    Decided Feb. 7, 2002.
    R. Martin Palmer, Jr., Martin Palmer & Associates, Hagerstown, Maryland, for Appellants. Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Thomas M. DiBiagio, United States Attorney, Larry D. Adams, Assistant United States Attorney, Mark B. Stern, Thomas M. Bondy, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. Clifford J. Stevens, National Organization for Embryonic Law, Virginia Dale, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae.
    Before WIDENER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Mary Doe, a human embryo “born” in the United States (and subsequently frozen in which state of eryopreservation her life is presently suspended), individually and on behalf of all other frozen human embryos similarly situated, and the National Association for the Advancement of Preborn Children (collectively “Appellants”) appeal the district court’s order administratively closing their civil lawsuit challenging the Clinton Administration’s policies regarding federal funding of human stem cell research. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable.

This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 387 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order nor an appeal-able interlocutory or collateral order. It merely removes the case from the district court’s active docket until the issue of federal funding for stem cell research is settled by the Bush Administration.

We therefore dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED.  