
    Manuel Antonio RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. SC18-1042
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    December 13, 2018
    Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Marie-Louise Samuels Parmer, Special Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Marta Jaszczolt, Staff Attorney, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rachel Kamoutsas, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, for Appellee
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Manuel Antonio Rodriguez's appeal of the postconviction court's order denying Rodriguez's motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Rodriguez's motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), and our decision on remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst ), 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2161, 198 L.Ed.2d 246 (2017). Rodriguez responded to this Court's order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock v. State , 226 So.3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 513, 199 L.Ed.2d 396 (2017), and Rodriguez v. State , 237 So.3d 918 (Fla. 2018), petition for cert. filed , No. 18-6505 (U.S. July 2, 2018), should not be dispositive in this case.

After reviewing Rodriguez's response to the order to show cause, as well as the State's arguments in reply, we conclude that our prior denial of Rodriguez's postconviction appeal raising similar claims is a procedural bar to the claim at issue in this appeal, which in any event, does not entitle him to Hurst relief. See Foster v. State , No. SC18-860, 258 So.3d 1248, 2018 WL 6379348 (Fla. Dec. 6, 2018) ; Rodriguez , 237 So.3d at 919 ; Hitchcock , 226 So.3d at 217. We previously affirmed the postconviction court's denial of Rodriguez's claims for Hurst relief pursuant to Hitchcock . See Rodriguez , 237 So.3d at 919. In this case, relying on Hurst and the Legislature's amendments to Florida's capital sentencing scheme in response to Hurst pursuant to chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida, Rodriguez contends that the elements of "capital murder" have existed since before Hurst and denying him relief amounts to a due process violation because he has not been found "guilty" of "capital murder." However, chapter 2017-1 codified the Hurst requirements, and, as we have previously explained, Rodriguez's three sentences of death were imposed following a jury's unanimous recommendations for death and became final in 2000. See Rodriguez , 237 So.3d at 919. Therefore, because Rodriguez is not entitled to relief under Hurst or the legislation implementing the rights recognized in Hurst , we affirm the denial of Rodriguez's motion. See Rodriguez , 237 So.3d 919 ; Hitchcock , 226 So.3d at 217.

The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Rodriguez, we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

CANADY, C.J., concurs in result.  