
    HA LE QU, aka Hong Shan Jin, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-5096-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 25, 2011.
    Peter Lobel, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Richard M. Evans, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation; Virginia Lum, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROGER J. MINER, ROBERT D. SACK and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Ha Le Qu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 22, 2010, order of the BIA, affirming the November 12, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“LJ”) Steven R. Abrams, which denied Qu’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re He Le Qu, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Nov. 22, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 12, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA’s decision. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

For asylum applications, such as this one, governed by the REAL ID Act, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his or her account, and inconsistencies in his or her statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii) (2006). Analyzed under the REAL ID Act, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

In finding Qu not credible, the agency reasonably relied in part on his demeanor, finding that Qu’s testimony was often evasive, vague, and non-responsive. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005). The IJ’s demeanor findings were supported further by specific examples of Qu’s contradictory testimony, particularly with respect to the location of the underground church services and the time period when Qu began attending services after arriving in the United States. See Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008). A reasonable fact finder would not be compelled to credit Qu’s explanations for these inconsistencies. Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80-81. Furthermore, the IJ reasonably relied on Qu’s failure to present adequate corroboration to support his claims that he attended an underground church in China and that he started attending church in the United States shortly after his arrival in 1999. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam) (holding that the agency may rely on a lack of corroborative evidence where an applicant’s testimony is not otherwise credible).

Ultimately, because a reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled to conclude to the contrary, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-66. The agency’s denial of Qu’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief was not in error as all three claims shared the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 155-56 (2d Cir.2006) (withholding' of removal); Xue Hong Yang, 426 F.3d at 523(CAT).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2) and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  