
    Willie D. RANDLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. L. V. FRANKLIN, Correctional Officer; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-16018.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 19, 2012.
    
    Filed Jan. 2, 2013.
    Willie D. Randle, Lancaster, CA, pro se.
    Diana Esquivel, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of The California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2)'.
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Willie D. Ran-dle appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment following a jury trial and its order denying his motion for a new trial in his 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action alleging excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial, Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 728 (9th Cir.2007), and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Randle’s motion for a new trial because substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. See Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir.2001) (“Substantial evidence is evidence adequate to sup- ' port the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion from the same evidence.”); see also id. .(when the jury is presented with conflicting testimony, we “must disregard evidence favorable to [plaintiff] that the jury is not required to believe” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Randle’s request to question or disqualify a juror for alleged bias because Randle did not challenge the juror for cáuse or adduce sufficient evidence that this juror exhibited bias during the trial. See Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1220-21 (9th Cir.1997) (explaining the trial court’s broad discretion in dealing with matters of juror bias). Randle also failed to 'show'.how the jury selection process denied him a fair and impartial jury. See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991) (explaining the trial court’s broad discretion in conducting voir dire).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen discovery or compel defendants to produce copies of documents. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir.2002) (noting the trial court’s broad discretion in discovery matters).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     