
    
      W. A. Rosborough, administrator of Daniel G. Cabeen, vs. John L. Albright.
    
    A prisoner, arrested under ca. sa., was jailer, and shortly afterwards escaped, covered against him — the amount ofl years after the escape, but within fou: him was recovered and paid, commence! his right of action accrued at the time statute of limitations. custody of the nd judgment re-ore than four judgment against er. Held, that as barred by the
    In actions for official negligence, the cause o'f^ctionü^Bsffi’ded on the breach of duty which actually injured the plaintiff, and not on the consequential damage.
    
      Before Wardlaw, J., at Chester, Fall Term, 1849.
    This was an action of assumpsit brought to recover from the defendant $>881, paid by the plaintiff, under the following circumstances. Kelsey & Halsted recovered judgment against John Polly and William Castles, and on the 29th of April, 1839, issued their ca. sa., and placed the same in the hands of D. G. Cabeen, then sheriff of Chester. On the 20th May, 1839, Polly was arrested and put in jail, in custody of the defendant, as jailer; and in July, 1839, he made his escape out of said jail, defendant be-being jailer.
    Kelsey & Halsted brought their suit against the plaintiff, as administrator of Cabeen, the late sheriff, to recover the amount of their judgment against Polly and Castles, and on the 30th March, 1847, recovered a verdict for $850. This amount, with $31 costs, the plaintiff paid on the 6th April, 1847. This suit was commenced on the 14th March, 1849. The picas were the general issue and statute of limitations.
    His Honor was of opinion that the right of action accrued tc the plaintiff’s intestate upon the escape of Polly from the jail; and as more than four years had elapsed before the commencement of the action, he held the statute to be a bar, and ordered a nonsuit.
    The plaintiff appealed, and now moved this Court to set aside the nonsuit, on the ground that the right of action did not accrue until the payment of the money by the plaintiff; and the statute was no bar.
    
      M. Williams, for the motion.
    
      Gregg Sp McAlilly, contra.
   Curia, per

Withers, J.

In this case, as in all others that rest on the plea of the statute of limitations, the inquiry mus first be what was the cause of action, and when did that cause exist. In the present instance it is especially necessary to determine what it was that constituted cause of action by the sheriff, Cabeen, against Albright, his jailer; for if the recovery against Cabeen was the sole event upon which he had the right to sue, the statute does not bar this action — whereas, if the escape of a prisoner, when he did escape, afforded cause of action, then the statute of limitations does bar the action. We do not know how the cause of complaint was in fact set forth in the declaration, and it would be more satisfactory to know it; but according to decided cases in England and here, the breach of duty, when that breach was committed by the defendant, was a good cause of action, and we suppose was the cause set forth in the present case, though special injury might and may have been-alleged, with a view to the standard of damages.

In the case of Howell vs. Young, (11 Eng. C. L. R. 219) the cause of action set forth in the declaration was the misconduct of the defendant, in character of attorney, in ascertaining the sufficiency of certain specific securities proposed to the plaintiff upon a contract of loan to a third person. It was ruled that a sufficient cause of action was set forth in such allegation, and that it was, in fact, the gist of the action; and the additional matter, also alleged, that the plaintiff had, by reason of the premises, lost the interest on his loan, constituted no part of the cause of action. The statute of limitations was made to have reference to the period of committing the misconduct. For that doctrine, as well as the immateriality of the knowledge of the act by the suffering party, and the developement of its injurious consequences, our own case of the Executors of Thomas vs. Executors of Ervin, (Cheves, 22,) is sufficient warrant.

The doctrine is thus laid down by Mr. Greenleaf, in the second volume of his work on Evidence, sec. 483: “ and in actions for official or professional negligence, the cause of action is founded on the breach of duty which actually injured the plaintiff, and not on the consequential damage.”

It is not perceived how the principle shall be less applicable in the relation of sheriff and jailer, where official fidelity is due to the sheriff, than in the case of a third person against the sheriff, where the like official fidelity is due from the sheriff. ■ Nor does it appear that any difference can arise whether the obligation grows out of contract express or that implied.

We think the statute of limitations barred the action in the present case; and the motion is, therefore, dismissed.

O’Neall, Wardlaw and Frost, JJ., concurred.

Motion dismissed.  