
    Herman against Freeman.
    m^¡tto8refer all matters in variance between A. and®->to certain persons,«who, °fwhom,’shall mafo! an their hands and seals, under a rule, un?®Lthe,JKtof makes an fereesas bind-is sufficient to authorise the entry of an action and a rule of reference, without being attested by subscribing witnesses, or accompanied by an affidavit that it was duly executed 5 and the docket entry of such an agret.-u.ent, is evidence of its having been filed. If a party deny the existence of such a submission, he should apply to the Court in which the action was entered, to strike it off.
    On such a submission, it is not necessary to file a declaration, or to state the cause of action in the agreement to referwhich embraces all causes of action between the parties.
    If the rule does not state the time and place of meeting, or the notice to be given, the Courtwilt set aside the report, if reasonable notice be not given, or if it be shewn that no notice was given of a particular meeting 5 but these exceptions, being founded in fact, are not proper for the decision of a Court of Error.
    In Error.
    ERROR to the District Court for the city and county of Philadelphia. ' ‘
    An award of referees was made and returned in the Court below, in favour of Christopher Freeman against William Herman for the sum of 131 dollars, under the following submission, which appeared in the docket entries returned with the record.
    “ Amicable action, entered by agreement filed, June 3d, 1819. It is agreed, that all matters invariance, between Christopher Freeman and William Herman, be referred to Sylvester Roberts, Benjamin Martin, and Joshua Ray bold: they or a majority of them, shall make an award under their hands and seals, under a.rule, under the Act of 1705, which makes an award of referees as binding as a verdict of a jury.”
    The defendant filed the following exceptions to the award in the Court below.
    1. The ageement filed, does not authorise the entry of an action.
    2. There was no subscribing witness to the agreement, nor any affidavit exhibited to the prothonatory, that it was duly executed. ■
    3. It does not appear what was the nature of the action, when or where the referees were to meet, nor what notice was to be given.
    4. The award is not according to the submission.
    5. The defendant had no notice of the meeting of the 18th of June.
    
    6. The plaintiff’s cause of action was an unsettled partnership account between the plaintiff and defendant.
    The Court below overruled these exceptions, and entered judgment on the award in favour of the plaintiff.
    
      Kittera, for the plaintiff in error,
    suggested diminution, in the original agreement, not being sent up with the record. A certiorari issued, and it was returned, that no such paper was to be found ; whereupon,
    
      Kittera, insisted, that the judgment was erroneous.
    It did not appear that the parties agreed to enter this action in the District Court, of in any Court, and there must be a suit depending, to justify a reference under the Act of 1705. Nor does it appear whether the cause of action for which the suit' was brought, was case, debt, ejectment or otherwise.
    
      King and T. Sergeant, answered,
    that the agreement to refer under the Act of 1705, authorised the entry of an action : and that where all matters in variance are referred, it is unnecessary to specify any form of action. They cited Massey v. Thomas, 6 Binn. 333.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Duncan J.

The determination of causes by referees, under a rule of Court, has been so frequent, and is so useful a practice, that Courts of justice favour them, and do not lend a ready ear to formal objections, when no substantial rule of justice has been violated.

The submission in this case is expressly under the Act of 1705, and is different from the three species of awards in England, which are, First, Arbitration bonds out of Court. Second, Submissions in causes depending in Court. Third, Bonds of arbitration under stat. 9 and 10 W. 3. C. 15. Williams v. Craig, 1 Dall. 313. The reference under the Act of 1705, is where the plaintiff and defendant consent to a rule of Court,-for the adjustment of their controversies by persons mutually chosen by themselves.

The paper filed affords such evidence of consent. It is the entry of an amicable action, designating the parties as plaintiff and defendant, and a submission of all matters in variance between them under the Act of 1705; specially referring to that Act, and stating its provisions as to the binding effect of the award to be made. The docket entry pursues the agreement; it required not the ceremony of-subscribing witnesses.. If the plaintiff had denied the existence of such submission, the Court below should have been moved to strike it off.

The docket entry is the full entry of a submission. The record, we must take as absolute verity. No such objection was made when the report was filed, but the objections in fact were, that the defendant had not notice of last meeting of the referees, and that the cause of action was a partnership account. It is true that the entry does not state what.was the cause of action, but the act does not require it, nor would it have comported with the views of the parties, which were, not the submission of any particular cause of action, but of all matters in variance between them; not of the matters confined to one particular cause of action, but comprehending all the matters in controversy between them; all causes of action.

In cases of compulsory arbitration, no pleadings are necessary; neither declaration, nor statement nor plea. 6 Binn. 177, Brown v. Scheaffer. And in delivering his opinion in that case, the Chief Justice thus expresses himself, “Before the system of arbitration had b'een introduced, it had been decided by this Court, that in cases of voluntary reference, judgment might be'entered on a report of referees without declaration. So in Maryland; judgment on an award on a reference by consent, affirmed on writ of error, though no declaration was hied in the cause. Dorsey v. The State, 3 Harris & Henry, 388. The ru][e here did not stipulate any time'of notice. In such casé, the Court would have set aside the report unless reasonable notice had been given, and the plaintiff in error had excepted that no notice had been given to him of the last meeting of the referees. This was an exception in point of fact, which does not c®me up for the decision of this Court. It must be taken- for granted that he failed in this exception. The plaintiff in error has not made good any of his exceptions to this record, and the judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  