
    The Executors of James S. Hopkins vs. Mary Mazyck, and others.
    P. R. M. a young man of intemperate habits, was prevailed on to execute a deed of his property to his mother and brother and sisters, reserving a life estate to himself, with the understanding on his part, and promises on their’s, that the object was to protect his property, and not to deprive him of the right to control and dispose of it by will; but the deed contained no power of revocation, nor was there any undue influence exercised ; P. R. M. afterwards made a will by which he disposed of his property, and died: Held, that the deed was valid and irrevocable. [*242]
    The decision in Lawrence v. Beaubien, considered and adhered to. Distinction taken between ignorance and mistake of the law; the first is not susceptible of proof, and cannot therefore be relieved ; but mistake may be proved, and when proven relief will be afforded. [*250]
    The bill states that Paul Ravenal Mazyck, being possessed of considerable property, on the 4th of October, 1816, executed a deed to certain trustees, whereby, for certain good causes and considerations, he conveyed his whole estate in trust for his own use, during life, and at his death to his mother, brothers and sisters, to be equally divided between them. That on the 5th November, 1816, the said Paul R. Mazyck, by his last will and testament, devised and bequeathed his whole estate to his sister Jane, (now Mrs. Elfo,) subject to a legacy of $200, to his brother Benjamin ; and requests his mother and brothers and sisters to take nothing under the deed, which he declares was executed at their instance, and intended solely for his own protection ; and should they claim under it, he enjoins it on his executor to institute proceedings to set it aside; and shortly afterwards died. The defendant, George Elfe, has lately proved the will, and undertaken the execution thereof; and claims to hold the property disposed of under it. That, Margaret Mazyck, (one of the sisters of Paul R. Mazyck,) in contemplation of marriage with James S. Hopkins, the plaintiff's intestate, bj marriage settlement of the 24th February, 1824, conveyed her whole estate, as set forth in a schedule annexed, to trustees, in trust, among other things, *that if the said James S. Hopkins survived her, and there should be no child of the marriage, the said estate should become the absolute property of her said husband. The schedule contained the following words, “under the trust deed of 'Paul R. Mazyck, one-sixth of all his estate, real and personal, conveyed in trust to his mother, brothers and sisters, should the deed be adjudged irrevocable.” The marriage took effect — Mrs. Hopkins died, never having had issue, her husband surviving became, therefore, entitled to her estate, under the marriage settlement.
    The plaintiffs, on behalf of their testator, claim the benefit of the deed executed by Paul R. Mazyck, and aver that although it was voluntary, he executed it in the exercise of his best judgment, and when he was fully competent to do so, in order to protect himself from want, and to secure the property after his death to his relations.
    The bill prays for partition of the property, and an account of the rents and profits.
    The only question at this time made in the case, was whether the deed cf Paul R. Mazyck was absolute and irrevocable, or was executed under such persuasion and undue influence, and mistake of the law, as to render it void.
    The answer of Mrs. Mary Mazyck, (the mother,) among other things, says, that the said deed was made without any consideration whatever; but she cannot say that it was not made by over-persuasion, and the exercise of the influence of his family, and of at least one of his best friends ; for such was the fact, though she denies that it was an undue influence in any improper sense of that word. The only object of herself and that friend, (Dr. Gough, now deceased,) was to save him from squandering his property, and to prevent its falling into the hands of unprincipled creditors who might, and as experience had shown would, draw him in by his dissipated habits, to waste it all. The plan originated with herself— to secure the property to the family,of the said Paul, viz., his mother, sister and brothers, was the principal part of the design. The said Paul, being then a resident at Byrd’s Hotel, was sent for to her house, and was broughtún a chair with considerable difficulty, and after much persuasion; that after he came, the *object of his being sent for was made known to him, and it was then distinctly declared to him that the sole motive was to save him and his property from the arts of unjust and unprincipled creditors ; that she employed all the influence she had as a mother to induce him to sign the deed ; that he signed it with manifest reluctance, but not without repeated and solemn promises from herself and others, present that the deed should never at all interfere with his control of the property, nor with his disposition of the same by will, in any way that he might please, and she never did consider herself entitled at all to claim any benefit under the said deed, against any will he might have. That after the execution of the deed, he lived continually till his death at her plantation, except in summer, when he lived at her house in town, and became a much less dissipated, though not entirely a sober man. She was not aware of the existence, and’still less of the contents, of the will of Paul Ravenal Mazyck, until after his death.
    
      Solomon Legare, the surviving trustee under the deed, by his answers, says, that he had been for several years the intimate friend of the family, and was often consulted by the said Mary Mazyck respecting the affairs of herself and her children; that he well knew the said Paul R. Mazyck from his childhood; that as he grew up he acquired habits of dissipation and intemperance, which were the occasion of much concern and anxiety to his mother, and his family and friends generally. But however inconsiderate the said Paul R. Mazyck may have been at periods of indulgence in liquor, yet in the intervals when he abstained from it, his mind was clear and good, and he was as competent to the judicious management of his affairs as men in general. He further says, that some short time previous to the execution of the deed of trust, above spoken of, he was sent for to see the said Paul R. Mazyck, who was suffering under a severe illness produced by his habits of intemperance. That on his becoming convalescent, Dr. Gough, the attending physician, a disinterested friend of the family, advised the said Paul R. Mazyck to make some conveyance of his property, by which it might be secured from any future acts of improvidence he might be led into. That the said Paul R. Mazyck approved of such *arrangement, and Dr. Gough, by his request, and in compliance with the general opinion and wishes of his mother and family, actually drew a paper of similar-import with the said deed, which was signed by the sai'd Paul Ravenal Mazyck ; but that he, the said Solomon Legare, on examining the paper so prepared by Dr. Gough, thought it informal and insufficient for the purposes which it proposed, and advised the said P. R. M. to employ a professional gentleman to draw such an instrument of writing as would carry his objects fully into effect. And the said Solomon Legare saith that it was at the suggestion, and under the advice so given by him, that the deed aforesaid was drawn and executed. That he was present and saw the deed executed, as well by the said P. R. M., as by Mr. Gadsden, (the other trustee, since deceased,) and at the same time executed it himself; that he well remembered that it was said at the time, and understood among the family, that if the said P. R. M. reformed and became a temperate man, none of them could claim under the deed ; but he did not understand that this was a condition of the deed, or that it was said to persuade P. R. M. to execute it: for, in fact, the said Solomon Legare is not aware of any reluctance on the part of the said P. R. M. to execute the deed, and the whole understanding appeared to be, that P. R. M. was in the mind to make such a deed, and was more willing to trust his mother, brother and sisters, than to trust himself. And he further says, that Mrs. Mazyck, the mother of the said P. R. M., and the family generally, approved the-execution of the deed in question. He felt assured they did so from considerations of regard towards the said P. R. M., aware of his proneness to drink, and his consequent liability to squander his property; and not with any view to benefit themselves ; and he says, as far as the circumstances under which the deed was made, are known to him, he can confidently state that no undue influence or persuasion whatever was made use of, by any one, to secure its execution ; but that it was the voluntary, free and deliberate act of the said P. R. M., at a period when he had for S0lne weebs left off drinking, *and when his mind was as strong and unclouded as it ever had been. He further says, that he was in the habit of frequently visiting P. R. M. after the execution of the said deed, up to the time of his death, and that he never heard him express the slightest regret at having made it, or any wish to revoke it; nor did he ever have any intimation of the kind from the family, until very recently; but on the contrary, always regarded the said deed of full force, and unrevoked. That he, the said Solomon, never knew nor heard of the will which the said P. R. M. afterwards executed, till it was deposited in the Ordinary’s office, by a gentleman, now deceased, who, this defendant believes, had possession of it without even the knowledge of its existence by the family. That not many weeks after the executing of the deed, and, as well as he can recollect, about the period of the date of the said will, the said P. R. M. resumed his habits of intemperance, which became more inveterate, and eventually produced his death.
    The answer of George Elfe and- Jane his wife, sets forth, that the said deed was voluntary, so far as regards a consideration for the same ; and denies that it was irrevocable, but, on the contrary avers, that it was revocable, and was so understood and intended to be, by all the parties concerned therein.
    Jane Elfe, for herself, separately answering to the actual transactions preparatory to, accompanying, and subsequent to the execution of the said deed of the 4th -October, 1816, says : that she well remembers how anxious and distressed her mother was, at the habits and conduct of the said Paul, and at the prospect of the whole of his property being squandered by him, as the Queen-street lot had been. That under these circumstances, the said Paul, being a resident and constant boarder and lodger at Byrd’s Hotel, was sent for, to his said mother’s house. That he was accordingly brought, after much persuasion and difficulty. That the deed had been previously prepared; nor did he know anything about it until he came to his mother’s. That he was then informed that he had been sent for in order to execute that instrument; on which he became evidently* distressed and embarrassed, and walked about the room, much disturbed in mind. That he expressed great unwillingness to sign the paper, as not understanding its contents — and he undertook to read the paper, when his mother and the said Jane Elfe, being both of them-present, expressly assured him that the only object of the deed was to save the property for his own use and benefit, from the injustice and rapacity of fraudulent creditors taking advantage of him ; and that it was not, in any manner, intended to deprive him of the use of the property, or of a control over it. That, under these assurances he became calmer, and executed the deed — and having done so, asked emphatically whether he would be debarred of the privilege of making his will, and disposing of his property thereby. Whereupon he was assured by his mother and the said Jane Elfe, that he would not; that they had already told him so, and that they never would claim anything under the deed. That these declarations satisfied him, and he left the house. After the execution of the deed he lived entirely at the residence of his mother on Goose Creek, became a reformed man, lived such the rest of his life, and died at his mother’s, on Goose Creek, between three and four years afterwards. Said Jane, and she believed, the whole family likewise, were totally ignorant of the ldnd intentions of her brother towards her, and of the preference he had given her as the sole object of his bounty, for she most certainly, and she believes no one else of the family suspected, much less knew, of the existence of any will of the said Paul, and still less had they any idea of its contents. These defendants, therefore, from the foregoing facts, within the knowledge of one of them, the said Jane, expressly denying that the said Paul was not induced by over-persuasion and undue influence to execute the said deed, but that, on the contrary, he was induced to do so by the solicitations and influences already set forth at large ; they accordingly insist on said will, by way of plea, in their answer, in bar to the account sought for by the plaintiff; but should the same be overruled, they will be ready to account.
    The answevs °f the trustees under the marriage settlement* is immaterial, and the answers of the other defendants, the sisters of Paul R Mazyck, and their husbands, insist on the validity of the deed— they were all under age at the time of its execution. Benjamin and Alexander, the brothers of Paul, are dead, and Mrs. Mazyck administered on the estate of the former.
    In addition to the above, it was proved that the marriage settlement of Mrs. Hopkins was drawn by Arthur O’Harra, the former husband of Mrs. Elfe.
    The examination of Mrs. Mary Mazyck was offered, on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Elfe, but objected to, on the ground that she was interested, and could not impeach the deed to which she was a party. The objections were overruled.
    The following extract from the schedule annexed to the marriage settlement of Mrs. O’Harra, now Mrs. Elfe, was proved. “Hnder the will of Paul R. Mazyck, all his estate, real and personal, (subject to a legacy of $200 to his brother Benjamin) devised and bequeathed by Paul to his sister Mary Jane Mazyck, should the same be adjudged a legal and valid will. If not, one-sixth of his real and personal, conveyed in trust for his mother, brother and sisters, should the deed be adjudged irrevocable.” Mrs. Mazyck testified that she did not know whether Mrs. Hopkins was present when the deed was executed; but she after-wards told her of what had passed, and more than once expressed her agreement to it. Paul, in summer, lived in town with the family. He often said, “ remember, mother, I depend on you, that it is mine and I will do as I please with it;” and she thinks Mrs. H. must have been present on some of these occasions. It was no secret in the family — all looked upon it as his, and so did Mrs. H. After Mrs. Desil grew up, she was acquainted with the particulars of the execution of the deed, and never objected ; and witness had no reason to believe she was not present at the conversations of Paul, above mentioned.
    On the above state of facts, Chancellor JOHNSTON, at Charleston, January term, 1833, decided that the deed of P. R. M. of 4th October, 1816, was irrevocable, as it declared the trust property was to be subject none °ther, and it *reserved no power of revocation — without deciding whether parol evidence was admissible to establish stipulations not contained in the deed; the Chancellor held, that the evidence contained none such. That no such stipulation was made by the trustees ; and all of the cestui que trusts, except Mrs. Mazyck, being under age, there was not sufficient proof of ratification by them after they had attained twenty-one. That Mr. Hopkins was a purchaser'for valuable consideration, to wit, marriage; and the notice to him m the schedule was not sufficient. That the executor, devisee and legatee of Paul, are bound, because he was, and they cannot, because he could not, aver' any other trust not in the deed ; and his will does not pretend any stipulation, but merely insists on the motives. The Chancellor also decided, that the deed had not been executed under any mistake of law, as contended by Mr. and Mrs. Elfe ; for that P. R. M. had good ordinary understanding, and his will does not pretend to any mistake, nor did he take that ground in his lifetime; and he questioned the correctness of Lowndes v. Chisholm, and Lawrence v. Beaubien. The decree therefore established the deed.
    An appeal was taken upon the grounds following :
    1. That under language of the deed of P. R. M. stating it to have been made “for divers good causes and considerations,” and also for one dollar, the evidence of his motives and expectations declared at the time, was admissible.
    2. That the evidence was not offered to alter the trusts in the deed, but to establish a palpable mistake at the time of execution, as to the effect of the deed in controlling the power of disposing of the property by will — a power which the grantor meant to reserve, and believed he had reserved.
    3. That the assent of the trustees and of the minor cestui que trusts was unnecessary, because the deed was plainly voluntary, and all the grantees and cestui que trusts were volunteers ; and as the grantor was led into a palpable mistake by the declarations of his mother, speaking for all concerned, and as it were, actually contracting with him *on behalf of all others, the silence of the trustees, and the minority of the other cestui que trusts, are immaterial.
    4. That the mistake is sufficiently made out by the proofs in the cause, to entitle Mr. and Mrs. Elfe to relief against the deed. That the mistake was such a mistake in law as is relievable in a Court of Chancery; and that Lowndes and Chisholm, and Laurens and Beaubien, are unquestionable law, and cover the whole ground under controversy here.
    5. That although Mr. Hopkins was a purchaser for valuable consideration, yet he had notice by the very terms of the schedule. That the will of P. R. M. of record in the proper office, was notice to him— and, had he inquired of Mrs. Mazyck, or of Mr. O’Harra who drew his settlement, he would have found what was meant by the clause ; and as he chose to marry with notice of the doubts unexplained, he must take the consequence thereof.
    6. That the Chancellor has erred in saying that the executor, devisee and legatee of P. R. M. cannot set aside the deed, because he, himself, if alive, could not do it — whereas, it is insisted, that if P. R. M, were himself alive, he could, on the existing state of facts, be relieved, on a bill filed by himself, to establish the mistake in law, just as Beaubien and. Chisholm were relieved
    L That the deed, therefore, must be declared null and void, and the will established; and the decree for account and settlement modified accordingly.
    
      Grimke and Dunkin, for the appellant.
    
      King and Pettigru, contra.
   Johnson, J.

We concur with the Chancellor, that the trust deed executed by Paul Ravenal Mazyck is good and must stand, and therefore that the decree of the Circuit Court should be affirmed ; and that would be sufficient for the case itself, but the observations of the Chancellor are calculated to shake the rule in Lawrence v. Beaubien, 2 Bail. 623, and Lowndes v. Chisholm, 2 M’C. Ch. 455, and the Court have thought it necessary to use the occasion to express their adherence to it.

Lawrence v. Beaubien was decided upon much consideration, and the more I have reflected upon it since, the more I am confirmed in its correctness; and I feel persuaded that fall doubts about it proceeded from misapprehension of the principle on which it is founded. There is, as I understand it, a very obvious distinction between ignorance and mistake of law. Ignorance cannot be proved— (who can enter into the heart of man, and ascertain how much knowledge dwells there ?) and for that reason the Courts cannot relieve against it. But not so with regard to a mistake in law. That is sometimes susceptible of proof. In relation to the general rules of property and of common honesty, which every one of common understanding must necessarily be taught by their intercourse with society; as that we have no right to the property of another — and that when, as in this ease, one has parted from his property either voluntarily or for a good or valuable consideration, his dominion and power of disposition over it ceases; no one will obtain credit for the pretence of being mistaken. But who that has had any experience in the profession of the law, does not know that a whole life of intense application is insufficient to develop all its mysteries, and that the most untiring zeal and ardent pursuit must leave many of the secret recesses unexplored; and shall it be said that those whose pursuits in life are inconsistent with the study'of the law, shall understand its most subtle and intricate distinctions by intuition, and that at the price of their fortunes ? I trust not — mistakes as to matters of fact have always been regarded as relievable upon clear, full and irrefragable proof, and mistakes in law ought to be upon the same footing, when the proof is equally certain. Suppose a party claiming the benefit of a contract founded upon a mistake of law, should, when put to answer it, admit the fact and be base enough to insist on it.' Where is the conscience so seared against the claims of justice and common honesty, as not to revolt at it ? Is not a mistake of this sort as susceptible of proof as a mistake in a'matter of fact. Lawyers are the professional advisers of the community, they are looked up to as oracles in this department, and when, as in Lawrence v. Beaubien, their client is misled by them and makes a contract against his interest, what higher evidence can be wanted of the fact of mistake ? Is it not as satisfactory as the admission of the party benefitted by the contract ? *This is only one mode of proof, and I doubt not that there are others which would be equally satisfactory. But we regard the question as definitely settled, and have only thought it necessary to say this much, to vindicate it from the doubts in which the opinion of the Chancellor was calculated to involve it.

It is ordered and decreed, that the appeal be dismissed, and that the decree of the Circuit Court be affirmed.

O’Neale, J., concurred.

Harper, J., absent.  