
    ARRINGTON v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    May 17, 1911.)
    1. Criminal Law (§ 1095*) — Bill of Exceptions — Time of Filing-.
    Where there is in the record on appeal an ■order extending the time for filing the statement of facts, but none extending the time for •the filing of bills of exception, a bill of exceptions filed more than 30 days after the adjournment of the term of court at which accused was tried must be stricken from the record.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. § 1095.*]
    2. Receiving Stolen Goods (§ 8*) — Evidence— Sufficiency.
    Where, on a trial for the larceny of a horse, and for receiving the horse, knowing that it was stolen, and concealing it, there was no evidence that accused received or concealed the horse in the county, unless he stole it in the county, and the circumstances justified a finding that he committed the larceny of the horse in that county, a conviction of receiving and concealing the horse in the county,' but acquitting him of the larceny thereof, was unwarranted by the evidence.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Receiving Stolen Goods, Dec. Dig. § 8.*]
    Appeal from District Court, De Witt County; John M. Green, Judge.
    Willis Arrington was convicted of crime, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    J. P. Parris, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   HARPER, J.

The indictment in this case eontaini two counts — one charging appellant with theft of a horse, and the other charging him with receiving the horse, knowing it was stolen, and concealing it, in De Witt county, Tex.

The term of court at which appellant was tried adjourned February 3, 1911. The bills of exception and statement of facts were not filed until March 11, 1911, more than 30 days after the adjournment of court. There is in the record an order extending the time for filing the statement of facts, but none in regard to the bills of exception. Therefore that part of the motion filed by the Assistant Attorney General is sustained, and the bills of exception are stricken ‘from the record.

The charge of the court submitted to the jury both counts in the indictment, and the jury returned a -verdict finding defendant guilty under the second count, in which he was charged with receiving and concealing stolen property in De Witt county.

The evidence shows defendant was in possession of the stolen horse, and sold it to J. W. Moore in Fayette county, Tex., and the circumstances would be sufficient to sustain the finding that he knew it was stolen; but the record fails to disclose where he obtained possession of the horse, except in so far as his testimony relates to the matter. He testifies that he got the horse from Jones & Rogers at Flatonia, Tex. Flatonia is in Fayette county, also. The jury, under the circumstances in this case, could have found the defendant guilty of theft of the horse under the first count in the indictment; and, had they done so, the evidence would have sustained it.' But they did not do so. In fact, by their verdict they find he did not steal the horse; and, if he did not, there is no evidence in the record which would show the horse ever to have been in possession of defendant in De Witt county, Tex. We have searched the record carefully, for, if there was any evidence in the record that he had received and concealed the horse in De Witt county, Tex., this judgment should be affirmed; for it is shown that defendant was in possession of three horses at West Point, all of which were stolen, and afterwards recovered by their owner. However, no matter how guilty we might judge the defendant to be, yet we cannot sustain a verdict against the defendant- for receiving and concealing a stolen horse in De Witt county, Tex., when there is no evidence or circumstance in the record that he received or concealed the horse in that county, in the face of the finding of the jury that he is not the person who stole the horse.

We are loath to reverse a case on account of the insufficiency of the evidence; but, when there is no evidence upon which to base a finding, it cannot be sustained.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.  