
    (12 Misc. Rep. 79.)
    HOWARD v. MOLLER.
    (Common Pleas of New York City and County, General Term.
    March 15, 1895.)
    Pleading—Amendment—Exercise on Discretion.
    A statement in the opinion of the general term of the New York City court on appeal from an order allowing an amendment of the complaint that a certain case “is decisive upon the question of terms,” and that the amendment should be allowed on payment of costs, is not a holding that the court had no discretion in regard to terms, but merely indicates that such case should be followed on a similar state of facts. ■
    Appeal from city court, general term.
    Action by John Howard against John A. Holler. From an order of the city court (31 N. Y. Supp. 1129) affirming an order allowing an amendment and imposing costs, plaintiff appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Argued before DALY, C. J., and BISOHOFF and PBYOB, JJ.
    Spellissy & Gray, for appellant.
    Johnston '& Johnston (Edward W. S. Johnston, of counsel), for respondent.
   DALY, C. J.

The city court at special term allowed an amendment of the complaint on payment by plaintiff of $30 costs, and upon appeal the general term of that court imposed as terms of amendment the payment of all costs to date. This appeal is argued upon the assumption that the general term held that it had no discretion as to terms of amendment, and the argument is based upon the opinion of the court as follows: “We think the case of Walton v. Mather, 10 Misc. Rep. 216, 31 N. Y. Supp. 111, is decisive upon the question of terms, and that the order appealed from should be reversed, with costs, and amendment allowed upon payment of all costs to date.” ■ Nothing, however, contained in the order appealed from indicates that the court did not exercise the discretion conferred by the Code (section 539), which permits amendments of pleadings in the discretion of the court upon such terms as it deems just; and, if we are permitted to search the opinion of the court for error upon which to reverse, we nevertheless are unable to say that the phrase used by the general term fairly implies a surrender of discretion. The appellant is quarreling with a mere mode of expression, which, after all, does not necessarily bear the construction he contends for. The expression, “We think a certain case decisive upon the question of terms,” simply states an opinion that upon the same state of facts the decision as to the propriety of terms should be the same, which is a very fair exercise of discretion by the court in disposing of the case, as tending to the greater certainty of practice, and consequent safety of litigants. The order is affirmed, with costs and disbursements. All concur.  