
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
    APRIL, 1806.
    Teasdale v. Atkinson.
    The stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4, does not extend to goods and chattels, because the possession of these is evidence of title, and is sufficient to guard subsequent purchasers from the danger of suffering by prior voluntary conveyances. And even a subsequent bona fide purchaser cannot avoid a prior voluntary conveyance of goods and chattels, on the ground that it was made ta defeat creditors.
    Motion for a new trial. Trover, in Sumter district, tried before Tkezevant, J. Plaintiff bought the negro girl, (the object,of.the suit,) at sheriff’s sale, under an execution, against his father, John Teasdale, senior, who had purchased the negro from Hugh O’Pry, from whom he took a bill of sale, dated January, 1800.
    The defendant claimed under a bill of sale from Agnes O’Pry, the daughter of said Hugh O’Pry, dated in August, 1803. Agnes O’Pry claimed under a deed of gift from hersaid father, dated 2d May, 1799. It was contended at the trial, that the gift to Agnes O’Pry was made with a fraudulent view to .avoid the payment of a claim against the the esid Hugh QTry, which one Sarah Peoples, as it was expected "would bring against him. It was proved that Agnes was an infant at the time of the gift, and for several years after, and that she lived with her father : and that after the negro was sold to Teasdale, the negro went with Teasdale, but soon returned.
    It was proved that money was paid at the time of the sale to Teasdale; but there was evidence of the money being returned, and other circumstances to shew that the sale to Teasdale was colorable only, and to hinder or defeat the creditors of O’Pry.
    Old Teasdale was released, and examined as a witness. He swore, that the purchase made by him was bona jide, and that he paid three hundred dollars and upwards, in cash. But it was proved by another witness that old Teasdale had declared the sale - was a sham.
    
    Verdict for the defendant.
    Ellison, in support of the motion,
    referred to the case of Rear-born v. Teasdale, m this court, where the sale to Teasdale of this very same negro was held good, as he said, upon the same evidence. He insisted that there was sufficient evidence to prove clearly, that the voluntary conveyance to the daughter was fraudulent, and that the subsequent sale to old Teasdale was bona fide; and that the conveyance, or gift, to the daughter was, at all events, void, being to the prejudice of a subsequent purchaser.
    Richaedson, and Blanding, for the defendant.
    In the case of Rearborn v. Teasdale, the plaintiff claimed under a fraudulent deed, and, therefore, was not entitled to recover, whatever might be the merits of the defendant’s claim, or title.. In the present case the defendant has shewn a good title, and the present plaintiff is not entitled to recover in opposition to it, even if he was able to shew a bona fide purchase from O’Pry. But this he has been unable to do; and, therefore, claiming under a covinous sale, he is in the same situation that Rearborn was in the other- case, and ought to share a like fate. The evidence of fraud to impeach the validity of the sale to old Teasdale, given in this case, was much stronger than the evidence given for the same purpose in the case of Rearborn v. Teasdale ; and, therefore, on that ground-the cases may. be distinguished. The following authorities were cited : Cowp. 710, 713. Fonbl. 289, 279. Eq. Ca. 3. 3 Co. Twine’s case. 1 Fonbl. 77.0. 1 Term R. Statutes of Eliz. Purchasers of lands are favored, and may avoid precedent voluntary conveyances; but not purchasers of goods. Bona fide transfers of goods are always accompanied with a transfer of possession, and every subsequent purchaser must necessarily have notice of a prior gift, or transfer. As to creditors, they are not in question in this case. The plaintiff does not claim as a creditor.
   28th April, 1806.

Brevard, J.,

delivered the unanimous opinion of all the judges, as follows. The rules and principles of the com-mQn jaw. are strong against fraud in every shape, and would be, perhaps, sufficient without the aid of the statutes of Eliz., to avoid the operation of contracts entered into with a fraudulent end in view, as being in their nature essentially vicious and corrupt, so far as they may be in their nature calculated to prejudice the rights of others ; innocent and bona fide creditors, or purchasers. The statutes of Eliz. are explanatory of, and assistant to, the common law. The stat. 13 Eliz. declares, that every alienation of lands, tenements, goods, and chattels, by writing, or otherwise, as to creditors, who shall be disturbed, hindered, or delayed, by such alienation, shall be utterly void ; but as to the parties themselves, the contract remains valid. This statute extends not to purchasers who shall claim as such, by purchases subsequent to such fraudulent alienations. The stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4, was passed to explain and establish the principles of the common law on the subject of fraudulent aliena-tions of lands, to the prejudice of subsequent purchasers. This statute extends not to goods and chattels, because the possession of these, which is ever supposed to accompany the transfer of them, is a notorious evidence of title, and sufficient to guard subsequent purchasers from the danger of suffering by prior voluntary conveyances of them. But this is not the case with respect to estates in land ; and, therefore, the statute declares void all covinous aliena-tions to the prejudice of purchasers of estates in fee, for life, or years. In the present case, the voluntary conveyance to Agnes O’Pry cannot be set aside, or avoided, without shewing that the transaction was collusive, and covinous, as well on her part as on the part of her father, in order to defraud subsequent purchasers generally, or Teasdale in particular. Creditors who were liable to be prejudiced by the gift at the time it was made, may avoid it so far as it affects their interests, whether they were particularly in view or not, if the doiior had an intention at the time to delay or defraud any of his creditors. But this doctrine, as to creditors, has no application in the present case. A subsequent bona fide purchaser cannot avoid a prior voluntary conveyance of goods and chattels, on the ground that it was made to postpone or defeat creditors. In the present case, the plaintiff, whose right must stand or fall with the right claimed by his father, as whose property the negro was sold by the sheriff, does pot stand in the light of a fair bona fide purchaser. There is strong reason to believe the sale to him was merely co-lorable, with a fraudulent end in view, and accompanied with a secret trust. On the other hand the daughter of O’Pry, under whom the defendant claims, appears to have been, entirely innocent of any participation in the fraud, if any were intended by her father, by the gift to her, and there is nothing to impeach her title.

Note. The deed, if Iona fide on the part of the daughter, not invalid, though intended by the father to defraud a subsequent purchaser.

New trial refused.  