
    D. S. RICE, Respondent, v. J. M. COOK, Appellant.
    St. Louis Court of Appeals,
    July 6, 1909.
    COVENANT OF WARRANTY: Judgment, Effect of: No Notice Necessary, Where Covenantor is Party to Suit. In an action for the breach of a covenant of warranty of title to real estate, a judgment in a suit to quiet title against covenantor and cove-nantee sufficiently establishes the paramountcy of the title under which covenantee was evicted to warrant a recovery by him, notwithstanding he did not give covenantor notice of that suit. Covenantor being a party defendant, such a notice would be superfluous.
    Appeal from Stoddard Circuit Court. — Hon. James L. Fort, Judge.
    Affirmed.
    
      Henry 8. Shaw for appellant.
    (1) The notice to a warrantor of land of tbe adverse suit therefor, in order to conclude him by the judgment therein, must be distinct, unequivocal, and expressly require him to defend such adverse suit. Wheelock v. Overshiner, 110 Mo. 100; McCrillis v. Thomas, 110 Mo. App. 699. (2) Cook .was a necessary party as to the tract claimed by him and was bound to defend that. An appearance for one purpose is not, necessarily, an appearance for all purposes. Anderson v. Brown, 9 M'o. 646. (3) Where one is bound to protect another from liability he is bound by the result of a litigation to which such other is a party, provided he had notice of the litigation and an opportunity to control and manage it. Koontz v. Kaufman, 31 Mo. App. 397; Strong v. Insurance Co., 62 Mo. 289; 2 Black on Judgments, sec. 570. (4) Rice and Cook were not adversary parties in the Mott case, hence the judgment in that case is not res judicata as between them. McMahon v. Geiger, 73 Mo. 145; Bank v. Bartle, 114 Mo. 276; Comstock v. Keating, 91 S. W. 416. (5) Rice waived his right to require Cook to defend the title to the land by employing counsel and defending on his own theory. Williams v. Railroad, 153 Mo. 487; 29 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), p. 1103, notes 2 and 3. (6) The sheriff’s deed was competent to show color of title in defendant and his grantee. Hickman v. Link, 97 Mo. 482. (7) Where a deed is dated subsequent to the date of the acknowledgement, the latter date will be regarded as the date of the deed. Gorman v. Stanton, 5 Mo. App. 595. (8) In the absence of a statutory requirement, a date is not essential to the validity of a deed. 9 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, pp. 150, 151, note 5.
    
      George W. Murger an.d E. H. Larimore for respondent.
   NORTONI, J.

Tbe judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered.

Reynolds, P. J., and Goode, J., concur.  