
    L. G. CALDWELL AND J. A. DUNWODY, COPART-NERS, TRADING AS CALDWELL & DUNWODY, v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [53 C. Cls., 33; 250 U. S., 14.]
    Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants in the court below. On appeal the judgment was affirmed,, and the Supreme Court decided:
    The provision of the general railroad right of way act of Mare-h 3, 1875, granting a beneficiary railroad company the right to take from the public lands adjacent to its line timber necessary for the construction of its railroad, must be strictly construed and does not permit that portions of trees remaining after extraction of ties be appropriated either as a means of business or profit or to compensate the agents employed by the railroad to do the tie cutting.
    
      A grant of “ timber ” for purposes of railroad construction is not a grant of “ trees.”
    Section 8 of tbe act of March 3, 1891, chapter 561, 26 Statutes, 1099, enacting that, in proceedings growing out of trespasses on public timber lands in Colorado and some other States, it shall be a defense that the cutting or removal was by a resident of the State for agricultural, mining, manufacturing, or domestic purposes, under rules of the Interior Department, but providing that nothing in the act contained shall operate to enlarge the rights of any railway company to cut timber on the public domain, gives no protection to persons who, having cut ties as agents of a railroad company under the act of March 3, 1875, supra, seek to appropriate the remaining tops of the trees cut, for the purpose of sale.
    The right to take timber granted by the act of March 3, 1875, supra, can not be enlarged by a permission from an official of the General Land Office.
   Mr. Justice McKenna

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court May 19, 1919.  