
    William W. GILMAN, Edward J. McNenney, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIES, INC., Marsh Inc., Marsh USA Inc., Marsh Global Broking Inc., Michael Cherkasky, Defendants-Appellees.
    15-0603
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 16, 2016
    For Appellants: David I. Greenberger (Jeffrey L. Liddle, Blaine H. Bortnick, James W. Halter, on the brief), Liddle & Robinson, LLP, New York, NY.
    For Marsh Appellees: Jonathan D. Polkes (Gregory Silbert, Nicholas -J. Pap-pas, on the brief), Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, NY.
    For Cherkasky Appellee: James 0. Hey-worth (Andrew W. Stern, on the brief), Sidley Austin LLP, New York, NY.
    PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, RALPH K. WINTER, DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

William Gilman and Edward McNenney, Jr. appeal from the order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Oetken, J.) dismissing their claims for (i) abuse of process against their former employer, Marsh (La, Marsh & McLennan Cos., Marsh Inc., Marsh USA Inc., and Marsh Global Broking Inc.), and the CEO of their former employer, Michael Cherkasky, and (ii) misconduct against Cherkasky as an attorney. As explained in an opinion filed simultaneously with this summary order, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Gilman and McNenney’s claims for employment benefits against their former employer. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accept as true all factual allegations, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 740—41 (2d Cir. 2013).

1. Gilman and McNenney cannot make out a claim for abuse of process against Marsh and Cherkasky. As we recognized in Cook v. Sheldon, “[t]he gist of abuse of process is the improper use of process after it is regularly issued.” 41 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (internal marks omitted). To the extent Gilman and McNenney allege any “abuse,” it unquestionably came before the process in question (their respective indictments), not after. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of their abuse of process claim.

2. Gilman and McNenney’s claim of misconduct by an attorney under New York Judiciary Law Section 487 also fails. Such a claim must allege that the attorney committed the misconduct while acting in the capacity as an attorney. See, e.g., Barrows v. Alexander, 78 A.D.3d 1693, 912 N.Y.S.2d 831, 832 (2010). To the extent Gilman and McNenney allege any misconduct by Cherkasky, it was without a doubt in his role as the CEO of Marsh, not as an attorney. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of their misconduct by an attorney claim.

Accordingly, and finding no merit in Gil-man’s or McNenney’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  