
    Medley vs. Davis.
    1. A vendor asserting his lien for purchase money by sale of the real estate, is not entitled to rent for the land whilst occupied by vendee.
    2, In this case real estate was sold by decree for the payment of the purchase money, and the proceeds did not satisfy the decree. During the pendency of the suit the land was in possesion of the court, and rents were paid over to a receiver. Jt was held, that such rents should be appropriated to the satisfaction of the decree.
    Medley owed Davis $5,500, and on 31st dayof January, 1839, she conveyed to Davis 264 acres of land, lying in Williamson county, in consideration of which, Davis gave up the note of $5,500, andhanded to her one noteon Walsh&Harris for $3289, and one on Davis & Grant for $1400. Medley urged that Davis had agreed to guaranty the collection of the note on Walsh & Harris, and on Davis & Grant, and to -secare the payment by mortgage on -real estate, and that he had failed to do .so, and she retained possession of the land.
    This bill was filed in the Chancery Court at Franklin, in 1839, by Medley against Davis, charging that Davis had failed to give the mortgages, and enter into the guaranties agreed upon at the time of the sale, and that he had illegally, and without a valid delivery, obtained possession of the deed of conveyance.
    The defendant answered.
    At the October term, 1840, the Chancellor, on motion of complainant, appointed a receiver to rent out the land and collect the proceeds. At the April term, 1841, the case having been arbitrated, the award -was entered as the decree of the court. The land was decreed to be sold to satisfy the note of Walsh & Harris. The land -was sold by the Clerk and Master, and did hot satisfy the note.
    The land duringrthe pending of the suit rented for $350.
    The presiding Chancellor, at the April term, 1842, ordered the Clerk to pay over the rents to complainant.
    From this decree the defendant appealed.
    
      Fogg, for complainant.
    Alexander, for defendant.
   Reese, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

The only question before us is, to whom properly belongs a certain fund in the hands of the receiver,.the proceeds of the' rent accruing pendente lite, upon a tract of land, the subject of controversy in the suit, which had been conveyed by the complainant to the defendant, and which was decreed to be sold, to pay to the complainant the consideration or price to be given for the same. And this question of rent is not a general one, as whether a vendee in possession shall be held, upon a sale to raise the consideration, to account for rents received by him. If it were, there would be little difficulty in the case. For we take it, that a mortgagor remaining in possession cannot be called on to refund to the mortgagee, upon the sale of the premises, the rents previously received by him; and still less, perhaps, could a vendor, asserting his lien upon the premises for the consideration of land sold by him, insist that the vendee in possession should account to him for the amount of rents he might have received.

At the time of the bill filed in this case, the vendee had no possession of the land, nor by the terms of the contract, a right to the possession, the period not having yet arrived at which he was to enter into the possession. One object of the bill was, to prevent the defendant from obtaining the possession, and this upon the ground, that he had failed to give certain mortgages and guaranties stipulated to be given in order to secure the consideration. A receiver was appointed, on motion of the complainant, and no motion on the other side was made to discharge him. During the time the possession was so in the Court of Chancery, the rent accrued, and the fund was created. Under these circumstances, the land having been sold by the Clerk and Master in pursuance of the Chancellor’s decree, and the complainant’s demand not having been satisfied thereby, the simple question is, whether the fund created by the order and action of the court, and in its custody, shall upon equitable principles, be handed over to the complainant or to the defendant?

And we are constrained to say, that we can perceive no proper ground upon which we can refuse to hand it over to the former.  