
    JOHN M. BLACK, Administrator, &c. of HUGH BLACK v. JOHN and DANIEL RAY.
    A bequest by a testator to bis wile, of a “ girl named Hannah, and my horses, &c. and my plantation, with all the lands adjoining to it, during her life-time,” passes but a life estate in the negro girl.
    The assent of an executor to a life estate in a slave, extends no further than such life-interest, and the reversion remains in the executor, which he may assert after the death of the life owner.
    Where a demand was read aloud from a written paper, any person who heard it may prove the demand, without the production of the paper from which it was read.
    This was an action of detinue brought by the administrator de bonis non, with the will annexed, of Hugh Black, for the recovery of certain slaves; and tried before his Honor Judge Strange, at Moore, on the last Circuit.
    The defendants claimed the slaves in question, by virtue of a purchase of the entire interest in them, from the widow of the testator, to whom he had bequeathed them in the following clause of his will: “ To my dearly beloved wife, Effy Black, I bequeath my negro fellow Toney, my negro wench Jean, and a girl named Hannah; and my horses, and one half of my cattle; my hogs, sheep, and household furniture ; my plantation, with all the lands adjoining to it, during her life-time.” Under this bequest, it was contended for the plaintiff, and so decided by his Honor, that the wife took only a life estate in the slaves. For the defendants it was then objected, that by the assent of the executors to the legacy of the wife, all the interest which they had in the slaves was divested, and that no suit could be sustained by them, nor by the administrator de bonis non after their death, for the said slaves; and that if any action lay at all, it must be by the next of kin; but this objection was overruled. The defendants next insisted, that the plaintiff must prove a demand for the slaves, prior to the commencement of his action; whereupon the plaintiff, reserving to himself any right he might have to recover without such proof of a demand, introduced a witness, who stated that the plaintiff read aloud to the defendants, a demand for the slaves in question, from a paper which he held, and then gave to each of the defendants a copy, and another to the witness. The witness stated further, that without the aid of such copy, he did not know whether he should have been able to have remembered the words of the demand, but that with its assistance he could state them from memory, without any reference to the written paper. The defendants’ counsel objected, that although the demand was read aloud, yet as it was from a written paper, the paper itself must be produced, or its absence accounted for; but this objection was also overruled by his Honor, and plaintiff had a verdict and judgment; from which the defendants appealed.
    
      W. II. Haywood, for the defendants.
    
      Mendenhall and Winston, contra.
   Ruffin, Chief Justice.

— We think the judgment must be affirmed. The gift of the slave and land, and all the other articles, is in the same sentence. There is but a single disposing word, “ bequeath,” in the beginning of the clause, which extends to each thing given; and there is but one expression directing the quantity of estate, “ daring her life-time” which is in the end of it, and neces-arily controls the interest in each subject of the gift. The only estate given, being for the life of the widow, the assent of the executors could go no further, and consequently the reversion remained in them. The Anonymous case in 2 Hay. Rep. 161, is an authority upon both points, if one were needed on either. We suppose the last objection was not seriously taken.

Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.  