
    Deborah PACE, Individually and on behalf of Daniel Pace, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dana TALLEY, etc.; et al., Defendants, Dana Talley, Individually and in her official capacity as a teacher at Ruston High School; Glenda Howard, individually and in her official capacity as a counselor at Ruston High School; Glenda Douglas, Individually and in her official capacity as an administrator at Ruston High School, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 05-30528
    Summary Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Nov. 21, 2006.
    Jack Wright, Jr., Monroe, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    James Huey Gibson, Allen & Gooch, Lafayette, LA, Jon Keith Guice, Hammonds & Sills, Monroe, LA, S. Andrew Shealy, Ruston, LA for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Deborah Pace, individually and on behalf of her minor child Daniel Pace (collectively, Pace), appeals the summary judgment in favor of the defendants Talley, Howard, and Douglas in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Pace does not challenge the dismissal of any other defendants. Pace also does not challenge the district court’s rulings in favor of Talley, Howard, and Douglas regarding Daniel Pace’s detention, Pace’s official-capacity claims, and Pace’s state-law claims. These issues are thus deemed abandoned. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.1987).

Pace contends that Talley and Douglas violated Daniel Pace’s constitutional rights. They did so, Pace contends, by reporting to the police a threat suggesting school violence purportedly made by Daniel, without having first afforded Daniel an opportunity to respond to the accusation. It is clear, however, that Pace’s contentions do not establish the violation of a clearly established constitutional right on such grounds. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975).

Pace also asserts that Howard violated Daniel Pace’s constitutional right to privacy by disseminating confidential information. Pace has not shown that the public interest in school safety was outweighed by Daniel’s expectation of privacy. See Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 805-08 (5th Cir.1996).

Pace thus has not established that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories Corp., 936 F.2d 805, 809 (5th Cir.1991). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

The defendants move for costs on the basis of their expenses in defending this appeal. This motion is DENIED. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1912, 1927; Fed. R. App. P. 38; Edwards v. General Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir.1998). 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     