
    Milton H. Miller v. J. T. Sullivan & Co.
    1. "Where the vendor of property gives to the purchaser’s agent, through whom the purchase was made, a receipt in full for the purchase money, and the purchaser, in good faith, relying on the truth and validity of the receipt, pays the amount to the agent, the vendor is estopped, as betweén him and the purchaser, from denying the truth of the receipt, and can not recover the money from the purchaser, or reclaim the property.
    2. Where the judgment of the Superior Court of Cincinnati, in special term, in an action triable by a jury, but which is submitted to the court, is reversed by that court, in general term, on the ground that the court, in special term, erred in overruling a motion for a new trial, for the reason that the finding of the court was against the evidence, it is title duty of the court, in general term, to order such new trial, and remand the cause, and it is error to render a final judgment therein. 25 Ohio St. 360.
    Error, to the Superior Court of Cincinnati.
    The original action was brought by plaintiff in error against defendants in error, in the Superior Court of Cincinnati, to recover damages for the refusal to deliver certain hogsheads of tobacco, alleged to have been sold by the-defendants to the plaintiff. The defendants, in their answer, denied the alleged contract of sale.
    On the trial, at special term, a jury being waived, the-court, upon the testimony, found in favor of the plaintiff, and rendered judgment for $8,394.07 and costs.
    A motion for a new trial, on the ground that the findings were contrary to the evidence, being overruled, the defendants excepted, and, by bill of exceptions, placed all' the testimony on the record.
    On petition in error, prosecuted by the defendants, the-court, in general term, reversed the judgment rendered at special term, and proceeded to render a final judgment against the plaintiff in the original action. This proceeding seeks the reversal of the judgment of reversal, as also the-final judgment rendered in general term.
    From the testimony, it appears that one Robins bought of defendants the tobacco in question, but whether he bought on his own account, or for the plaintiff, or for a co-partnership composed of the-plaintiff and himself, were-matters in controversy. It also appears that a bill of sale of the tobacco, made out in the name of the plaintiff as purchaser, and marked “ paid,” was delivered by the defendants to Robins, whereby it is claimed that the plaintiff was induced to pay the amount to Robins.
    
      Alfred■ Yaple, with Standish $ Brown, for plt’ff in error.
    
      Kebler § Whitman and E. S. Throop, contra.
   By the Court.

While the law undoubtedly is as claimed by plaintiff, to wit, that where a vendor of property gives-to a known agent of the purchaser a receipt in full for the purchase-money, and the purchaser in good faith, relying on the truth and validity of the receipt, pays the amount to the agent, the vendor is estopped from denying the truth of the receipt, to the prejudice of the purchaser, still we think the case before us does not turn on this question of law, but rather upon question's of fact as to the true relations and knowledge of the parties. The case therefore falls within the rule laid down in Hammond v. Hammond, 21 Ohio St. 620, and the judgment of reversal must be affirmed.

¥e think, however, that the court, in general term, after reversing the judgment below, erred in proceeding to render final judgment on the merits. After reversal, the case should have been remanded to special term for a new trial, in accordance with the principle stated in Emery’s Sons v. Irving Bank, 25 Ohio St. 360.

Judgment of reversal affirmed, final judgment on the merits reversed, and cause remanded.  