
    Anthony PRICE, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Edward REILLY, Kim Edwards, RN III, Perry Intal, Mary Sullivan, RN, Dr. Benjamin Okonta, MD, and Nassau University Medical Center, Defendants.
    No. 07-CV-2634 (JFB)(ARL).
    United States District Court, E.D. New York.
    March 8, 2010.
    
      Anthony Price, pro se.
    Edward J. Troy, Law Office of Edward J. Troy, Greenlawn, NY, for the Defendants.
   MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Pro se plaintiff Anthony Price (hereinafter “Price” or “plaintiff’) alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, that Sheriff Edward Reilly, Kim Edwards, RN, Perry Intal, Mary Sullivan, RN, Dr. Benjamin Okonta, and Nassau University Medical Center (hereinafter “defendants”) violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs while plaintiff was incarcerated at the Nassau County Correctional Center (hereinafter “NCCC”). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants: (1) prescribed an incorrect dosage of medication for his renal disease; (2) failed to get him tested for a kidney transplant list; and (3) failed to adequately treat him for shoulder pain. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiffs’ claims. For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, defendants’ motion is granted with respect to plaintiffs claim regarding the dosage of his prescription medication and with respect to all of plaintiffs claims against Sheriff Reilly. Defendants’ motion is denied in all other respects.

I. Facts

The Court has taken the facts set forth below from the parties’ depositions, affidavits, and exhibits, and from the defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement of facts. They are not findings of fact by the Court, but rather are assumed to be true for the purposes of deciding this motion. Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court shall construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party — here, the plaintiff. See Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005). Unless otherwise noted, where a party’s 56.1 statement or deposition is cited, that fact is undisputed or the opposing party has pointed to no evidence in the record to contradict it.

A. Arrival at NCCC and Medication

Plaintiff was .incarcerated in the Nassau County Correctional Center from January 7, 2007 to December 11, 2007. (Price Dep. at 6, 35.) Plaintiff has end stage renal disease and has been on dialysis since 2004 related to kidney failure. (Id. at 10; Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff takes two daily medications, Renagel and PhosLo, for this condition. (Price Dep. at 10.) Before arriving at the NCCC, plaintiff was taking two 800 milligram pills of Renagel three times a day and two 667 milligram pills of PhosLo three times a day. (Id. at 12-13.)

When plaintiff arrived at the NCCC, he was interviewed by Perry Intal, a nurse practitioner in the medical intake department. (Id. at 21-22.) Plaintiff told Intal about his medical history, including that he was a dialysis patient and that he took medications. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff was given a prescription for one 800 milligram pill of Renagel two times a day and one 667 milligram pill of PhosLo two times a day. (Id. at 23-24.) Two or three weeks later, plaintiff went to dialysis treatment and a blood test revealed high phosphorous levels. (Id. at 25-26.) As a result, plaintiff was given an increased dosage of medication. (Id. at 25-27.) Thereafter, plaintiffs phosphorous levels decreased and about one month later (id. at 30-31), his dosage was decreased to one 800 milligram pill of Renagel three times a day and two 667 milligram pills of PhosLo three times a day. (Id. at 31-33.) This was the dosage plaintiff received for the rest of his incarceration at the NCCC. (Id. at 32-33.) Plaintiff believed that the dosage he was receiving was “wrong” and that it was “hurting” him. (Id. at 59-60.) However, the more plaintiff complained about the dosage hurting him, “the more it seemed like the people got aggravated.” (Id. at 60.) In addition, plaintiffs prescriptions for Renagel and PhosLo indicate that the medications were to be taken with meals. (See Defs.’ Ex. E.) Plaintiff alleges, however, that the medications were sometimes given to him without food or at times that interfered with his meals. (Price Dep. at 23, 60.)

Besides receiving medication, plaintiff also received dialysis treatment three times a week at the Nassau University Medical Center. (Id. at 30.) On some occasions, plaintiff refused dialysis treatment because he “was feeling good” and “wanted to take a break” from treatment. (Id. at 56.) Plaintiffs regular medical treatment at the hospital also included a blood test every 30 days. (Id. at 27-28, 30.)

B. Kidney Transplant Request

In February or March 2007, plaintiff spoke with a social worker named “Susan” about getting tested for a kidney transplant. (Id. at 76.) A test was required before an inmate could be placed on a waiting list for kidney transplants. (Id. at 80-81.) Only two hospitals in the area dealt with such matters: Stony Brook and a hospital in Westchester County. (Id. at 75-76.) Susan tried to contact Dr. Benjamin Okonta (hereinafter “Okonta”) at Nassau University Medical Center in or about February or March 2007 (id. at 76-77), but Susan told plaintiff that Okonta did not get back to her. (Id. at 65-66, 74-78.) Susan also submitted a letter to Okonta in July 2007, stating: “As per our conversation on 7/27/07,1 am re-submitting for your review my request [for] your medical services on behalf of our renal dialysis pt., Anthony Price.” (Id. at 77-78; Defs.’ Ex. K.) Plaintiff never received a response from Okonta. (Price Dep. at 82.)

Susan also submitted a letter to Nurse Mary Sullivan (hereinafter “Sullivan”), the day supervisor at the NCCC medical center, stating: “As per our telephone conversation, I am submitting in writing Anthony Price’s request for referral and evaluation to a kidney transplant center ... Stony-brook Univ. Medical Ctr.” (Def.’s Ex. K.) At some point in time, plaintiff was called down to the NCCC medical center and was told by Sullivan that defendants knew about plaintiffs request to get on the kidney transplant list but that they had “other priorities right now.” (Price Dep. at 70.) Plaintiff believed Sullivan was referring to his other health issues. (Id. at 70.) Plaintiff did not ask when he would be tested for the kidney transplant list. (Id. at 71.)

On September 25, 2007, plaintiff filed a formal grievance regarding his request to be tested for the kidney transplant list. (Id. at 85.) Plaintiff stated on his grievance form that he had “been waiting to take the test I need to take to get on the kidney transplant list” and that his social worker had told him that she had forwarded the paperwork to the jail, but could not get a response. (Defs.’ Ex. F.) Plaintiff requested that he be “given the test to see if I’m a candidate for possibly a kidney transplant.” (Id.) By interdepartmental memorandum dated September 27, 2007, the Inmate Grievance Coordinator informed plaintiff that the medical grievance “is being discussed with and turned over to the Health Services Administrator. The medical unit will evaluate you. A Grievance Unit Investigator will contact you at a later date to conduct an evaluation of your status and to closeout the paperwork.” (Id.) In another memo dated October 5, 2007, defendant Kim Edwards, informed plaintiff:

The social worker can only inform you of treatment options that are available for your medical problem. If you are in need of a “test”, documentation must be provided by the attending physician that is responsible for your renal treatment.

(Id.) Plaintiff interpreted this response from Edwards to mean that the matter was now in the hands of the medical department, and so he did not further proceed with the grievance and “did not feel it was necessary.” (PL’s Opp. at 3.) Therefore, plaintiff “signed off on the grievance,” saying that he had “read it and accepted it.” (Price Dep. at 88.)

Plaintiff did not get the requested test during the remainder of his incarceration at the NCCC. (Id. at 90.) Defendants have submitted evidence that they made efforts to get plaintiff tested and, in fact, scheduled plaintiff for a test at Stony Brook University Hospital on November 29, 2007, but that the test had to be can-celled due to “unforeseen circumstances”; the test was re-scheduled for January 10, 2008. (Defs.’ Ex. G, Reschke Aff. ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff was not informed about any scheduled test (PL’s Opp. at 2), and he was transferred to a different facility in December 2007. (Price Dep. at 85; Reschke Aff. ¶ 7.)

C. Shoulder Pain

Plaintiff began complaining about shoulder pain to the medical department at the NCCC on January 17, 2007, stating that his right shoulder was “extremely hurting.” (Price Dep. at 36; Defs.’ Ex. E, Sick Call Request, Jan. 17, 2007.) Plaintiff had received treatment for shoulder pain in the past, including a shot of Cortisone while at the Elmira facility (Price Dep. at 38, 53-54; Defs.’ Ex. E, Sick Call Request, Apr. 14, 2007.) After the January 17 complaint, plaintiff was seen a couple of days later and given medication to rub on his shoulder. (Price Dep. at 41.) The medication did not help with the discomfort, and so plaintiff complained again later in January. (Id. at 42-43.) Although defendants gave plaintiff Motrin and Naprosyn for the pain, no x-rays were taken for several months. (Id. at 44, 55; Defs.’ Ex. H, Edwards Aff. ¶ 4.) The pain medication continued to be ineffective, and plaintiff continued to complain. (See, e.g., id. at 45, 51.) For instance, in June 2007, plaintiff complained that his right shoulder “hurts really bad.” (Def.’s Ex. E, Sick Call Request, June 12, 2007.) Plaintiff never refused medication for his shoulder. (Price Dep. at 56.) When plaintiff eventually was given x-rays, in April and November 2007 (Edwards Aff. ¶4), plaintiff was told that nothing was wrong with his shoulder. (Price Dep. at 44; see also Defs.’ Ex. J, Discharge Summary, November 2007 (“Although no definite evidence of venous thrombosis is seen with Rt. upper extremity, • short segment acute thrombosis cannot be reliably excluded, Ultrasound might provide additional information....”).) Plaintiff states that, with respect to his right shoulder, he currently wears a brace for carpal tunnel syndrome, has a separated shoulder, and takes shots for the pain. (PL’s Opp. at 4.)

II. Procedural History

On June 28, 2007, plaintiff filed the initial complaint in this action. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 20, 2007 alleging, pursuant to Section 1983, that defendants Sheriff Edward Reilly, Kim Edwards, Perry Intal, and Nassau University Medical Center violated his Eighth Amendment rights with respect to his medication dosage, kidney transplant request, and shoulder pain. Oh November 14, 2007, plaintiff filed another complaint in a separate action (No. 07-CV-4841) making substantially the same allegations and expanding on his allegations regarding the kidney transplant request. This complaint named Mary Sullivan and Dr. Benjamin Okonta, as well as the Nassau University Medical Center, as defendants. By Order dated July 11, 2008, the Court consolidated both actions (Nos. 07-CV2634 and 07-CV-^4841) because the allegations in the two actions were “factually intertwined.”

Defendants moved for summary judgment on May 29, 2009. Plaintiff submitted an opposition to the motion on August 3 and August 11, 2009. Defendants replied on August 20, 2009. Plaintiff submitted a surreply on October 6, 2009. This matter is fully submitted.

III. Standard of Review

The standards for summary judgment are well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate only if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir.2010). The moving party bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to summary judgment. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir.2005). The court “is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir.2004); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (summary judgment is unwarranted if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party “ ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (emphasis in original)). As the Supreme Court stated in Anderson, “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). Indeed, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties” alone will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original). Thus, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere eonelusory allegations or denials but must set forth “ ‘concrete particulars’ ” showing that a trial is needed. R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir.1984) (quoting SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.1978)). Accordingly, it is insufficient for a party opposing summary judgment “ ‘merely to assert a conclusion without supplying supporting arguments or facts.’ ” BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d at 33).

Where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must “construe [the complaint] broadly, and interpret [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 145-46 (2d Cir.2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir.2000)). Though a pro se litigant’s pleadings and other submissions are afforded wide latitude, a pro se party’s conelusory assertions, completely unsupported by evidence, are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Shah v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 653 F.Supp.2d 499, 502 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“Even a pro se party, however, ‘may not rely simply on conclusory allegations or speculation to avoid summary judgment, but instead must offer evidence to show that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful.’ ” (quoting Auguste v. N.Y. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 593 F.Supp.2d 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y.2009))).

TV. Discussion

To prevail on a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and its laws; (2) by a person acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir.1993).

There is no dispute for purposes of this motion that defendants were acting under color of state law. The question presented, therefore, is whether defendants’ alleged conduct deprived plaintiff of his Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when defendants: (1) prescribed him an incorrect dosage of medication for his renal disease; (2) failed to get him tested for the kidney transplant list; and (3) failed to adequately treat him for his shoulder pain. For the reasons set forth below, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of plaintiff, the Court concludes that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim regarding the dosage of his medication and on all of plaintiffs claims against Sheriff Reilly. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied in all other respects.

A. Exhaustion

As a threshold matter, defendants argue that plaintiff is barred from raising any Eighth Amendment claim with respect to his kidney transplant request because plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies. For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees and cannot conclude from this record that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

1. Legal Standard

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) states that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “The PLRA exhaustion requirement ‘applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.’ Prisoners must utilize the state’s grievance procedures, regardless of whether the relief sought is offered through those procedures.” Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002)). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). Therefore, the exhaustion inquiry requires a court to “look at the state prison procedures and the prisoner’s grievance to determine whether the prisoner has complied with those procedures.” Espinal, 558 F.3d at 124 (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) and Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88-90, 126 S.Ct. 2378).

Prior to Woodford, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006), the Second Circuit “recognized some nuances in the exhaustion requirement: (1) administrative remedies that are ostensibly ‘available’ may be unavailable as a practical matter, for instance, if the inmate has already obtained a favorable result in administrative proceedings but has no means of enforcing that result; (2) similarly, if prison officials inhibit the inmate’s ability to seek administrative review, that behavior may equitably estop them from raising an exhaustion defense; (3) imperfect exhaustion may be justified in special circumstances, for instance if the inmate complied with his reasonable interpretation of unclear administrative regulations, or if the inmate reasonably believed he could raise a grievance in disciplinary proceedings and gave prison officials sufficient information to investigate the grievance.” Reynoso v. Swezey, 238 Fed.Appx. 660, 662 (2d Cir.2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Davis v. New York, 311 Fed.Appx. 397, 399 (2d Cir.2009) (citing Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686, 691 (2d Cir.2004)). However, the Second Circuit has not decided whether the above-discussed considerations apply post-Woodford. See, e.g., Reynoso, 238 Fed.Appx. at 662 (“Because we agree with the district court that [plaintiff] cannot prevail on any of these grounds, we have no occasion to decide whether Woodford has bearing on them.”); Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir.2006) (“We need not determine what effect Woodford has on our case law in this area, however, because [plaintiff] could not have prevailed even under our pre-Woodford case law.”).

As the Supreme Court has held, exhaustion is an affirmative defense: “We conclude that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007); see also Key v. Toussaint, 660 F.Supp.2d 518, 523 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“Failure to exhaust remedies under the PLRA is an affirmative defense, and thus the defendants have the burden of proving that [plaintiffs] retaliation claim has not been exhausted.” (citations omitted)).

2. Application

Defendants argue that plaintiff did not appeal the resolution of his grievance request, i.e., the memo from Edwards dated October 5, 2007, stating that: “If you are in need of a ‘test’, documentation must be provided by the attending physician that is responsible for your renal treatment.” (Defs.’ Ex. F.) Therefore, defendants argue, plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA. (Defs.’ Br. at 25.) Plaintiff argues in response that he did not believe any further action on his grievance was “necessary” because the matter was put into the hands of the medical department. (PL’s Opp. at 3.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that, on this record, defendants have not met their burden of proving that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

As discussed above, the PLRA requires exhaustion only with respect to “such administrative remedies as are available.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Therefore, in order to determine whether plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court “must first establish from a legally sufficient source that an administrative remedy is applicable and that the particular complaint does not fall within an exception. Courts should be careful to look at the applicable set of grievance procedures, whether city, state or federal.” Mojias v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 606, 610 (2d Cir.2003); see also Espinal, 558 F.3d at 124 (holding that, when considering exhaustion, courts must “look at the state prison procedures and the prisoner’s grievance to determine whether the prisoner has complied with those procedures” (citations omitted)). “Whether an administrative remedy was available to a prisoner in a particular prison or prison system, and whether such remedy was applicable to the grievance underlying the prisoner’s suit, are not questions of fact. They are, or inevitably contain, questions of law.” See Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 113-14 (2d Cir.1999). However, “the existence of the procedure may be a matter of fact.” Id. at 114.

On the record before the Court on this motion, the Court is unable to establish from any legally sufficient source that an administrative remedy was available to plaintiff. Defendants have made no submissions to the Court regarding the applicable grievance procedures at the NCCC. See, e.g., Abney v. County of Nassau, 237 F.Supp.2d 278, 281 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (noting that the “Inmate Handbook” for the Nassau County Correctional Facility procedure was “annexed to Defendants’ moving papers”). Specifically, defendants have not submitted any evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, that NCCC procedures offer a remedy to address the particular situation in this case. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude from this record that plaintiff had an available administrative remedy that he failed to exhaust.

B. Plaintiffs Claims of Deliberate Indifference

1. Legal Standard

“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment” and therefore “states a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). As the Second Circuit has explained,

[t]he Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates in their custody. Moreover, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, prison officials are liable for harm incurred by an inmate if the officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the safety of the inmate. However, to state a cognizable section 1983 claim, the prisoner must allege actions or omissions sufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference; mere negligence will not suffice.

Hayes v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir.1996) (citations omitted). Within this framework, “[deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bellotto v. County of Orange, 248 Fed.Appx. 232, 236 (2d Cir.2007). Thus, according to the Second Circuit,

[defendants may be held liable under § 1983 if they ... exhibited deliberate indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty, and their failure to perform the duty or act to ameliorate the risk or injury was a proximate cause of plaintiffs deprivation of rights under the Constitution. Deliberate indifference is found in the Eighth Amendment context when a prison supervisor knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety .... Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.

Ortiz v. Goord, 276 Fed.Appx. 97, 98 (2d Cir.2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir.2000) (“Deliberate indifference will exist when an official ‘knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’ ”) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)); Curry v. Kerik, 163 F.Supp.2d 232, 237 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“ ‘[A]n official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference when that official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’ ”) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In particular, the Second Circuit has set forth a two-part test for determining whether a prison official’s actions or omissions rise to the level of deliberate indifference:

The test for deliberate indifference is twofold. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant prison officials possessed sufficient culpable intent. The second prong of the deliberate indifference test, culpable intent, in turn, involves a two-tier inquiry. Specifically, a prison official has sufficient culpable intent if he has knowledge that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the harm.

Hayes, 84 F.3d at 620 (internal citation omitted); see also Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 185-86 (2d Cir.2002) (setting forth two-part deliberate indifference test).

In Salahuddin v. Goord, the Second Circuit set forth in detail the objective and subjective elements of a medical indifference claim. 467 F.3d 263 (2d Cir.2006). In particular, with respect to the first, objective element, the Second Circuit explained:

The first requirement is objective: the alleged deprivation of adequate medical care must be sufficiently serious. Only deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Determining whether a deprivation is an objectively serious deprivation entails two inquiries. The first inquiry is whether the prisoner was actually deprived of adequate medical care. As the Supreme Court has noted, the prison official’s duty is only to provide reasonable care. Thus, prison officials who act reasonably [in response to an inmate-health risk] cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and, conversely, failing to take reasonable measures in response to a medical condition can lead to liability.
Second, the objective test asks whether the inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently serious. This inquiry requires the court to examine how the offending conduct is inadequate and what harm, if any, the inadequacy has caused or will likely cause the prisoner. For example, if the unreasonable medical care is a failure to provide any treatment for an inmate’s medical condition, courts examine whether the inmate’s medical condition is sufficiently serious. Factors relevant to the seriousness of a medical condition include whether a reasonable doctor or patient would find [it] important and worthy of comment, whether the condition significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, and whether it causes chronic and substantial pain. In cases where the inadequacy is in the medical treatment given, the seriousness inquiry is narrower. For example, if the prisoner is receiving on-going treatment and the offending conduct is an unreasonable delay or interruption in that treatment, the seriousness inquiry focus[es] on the challenged delay or interruption in treatment rather than the prisoner’s underlying medical condition alone. Thus, although we sometimes speak of a serious medical condition as the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim, such a condition is only one factor in determining whether a deprivation of adequate medical care is sufficiently grave to establish constitutional liability.

467 F.3d at 279-80 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Jones v. Westchester County Dep’t of Corr. Medical Dep’t, 557 F.Supp.2d 408, 413-14 (S.D.N.Y.2008).

With respect to the second, subjective component, the Second Circuit further explained:

The second requirement for an Eighth Amendment violation is subjective: the charged official must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. In medical-treatment cases not arising from emergency situations, the official’s state of mind need not reach the level of knowing and purposeful infliction of harm; it suffices if the plaintiff proves that the official acted with deliberate indifference to inmate health. Deliberate indifference is a mental state equivalent to subjective recklessness, as the term is used in criminal law. This mental state requires that the charged official act or fail to act while actually aware of a substantial risk that serious inmate harm will result. Although less blameworthy than harmful action taken intentionally and knowingly, action taken with reckless indifference is no less actionable. The reckless official need not desire to cause such harm or be aware that such harm will surely or almost certainly result. Rather, proof of awareness of a substantial risk of the harm suffices. But recklessness entails more than mere negligence; the risk of harm must be substantial and the official’s actions more than merely negligent.

Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Jones, 557 F.Supp.2d at 414. The Supreme Court has stressed that

in the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute “an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or to be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (internal citations omitted); see also Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir.2003) (“A showing of medical malpractice is therefore insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim unless the malpractice involves culpable recklessness, i.e., an act or a failure to act by the prison doctor that evinces a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.” (internal quotations omitted)); Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir.2000) (a medical practitioner who “delay[s] ... treatment based on a bad diagnosis or erroneous calculus of risks and costs” does not evince the culpability necessary for deliberate indifference).

2. Application

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by: (1) prescribing an incorrect dosage of his renal disease medication; (2) failing to have him tested for the kidney transplant list; and (3) failing to properly treat his shoulder pain. The Court considers each claim in turn and, for the reasons discussed below, concludes that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim regarding his medication dosage and on all of plaintiffs claims against Sheriff Reilly. Defendants’ motion is denied in all other respects.

a. Medication Dosage

Defendants concede that plaintiffs kidney condition is serious (Defs.’ Br. at 21), but argue that the dosage of Renagel and PhosLo prescribed for plaintiff did not result in any injury. Defendants also argue that, even if the dosage was incorrect, it was at most “an error in medical judgment.” Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff cannot show deliberate indifference because defendants continually tested plaintiff and twice changed the dosage of his medication depending on his phosphorous levels. (Defs.’ Br. at 22.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees and concludes that no rational jury could find that defendants acted with deliberate indifference with respect to the prescription of medication for plaintiffs renal disease.

i. Objective Prong

Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that the allegedly incorrect medication dosage posed an objectively serious risk to plaintiffs health. As a threshold matter, the mere fact that plaintiffs underlying renal disease is a serious medical condition does not mean that the allegedly incorrect treatment for that condition poses an objectively serious health risk. See Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 186-87 (2d Cir.2003) (“As we noted in Chance [v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698 (2d Cir.1998) ], it’s the particular risk of harm faced by a prisoner due to the challenged deprivation of care, rather than the severity of the prisoner’s underlying medical condition, considered in the abstract, that is relevant for Eighth Amendment purposes.”). Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that his medication dosage at the NCCC caused him any objectively serious harm. Instead, plaintiff testified merely that the prescribed dosage was “wrong” and was “hurting” him. (Price Dep. at 60.) Plaintiffs belief that the medication dosage was incorrect is insufficient to establish the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test. See Fox v. Fischer, 242 Fed.Appx. 759, 760 (2d Cir.2007) (“[T]he fact that [plaintiff] was provided Claritin as a substitute for Allegra fails to establish deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, because there is no allegation that the change in medication caused harm, if any, sufficiently serious to establish the objective prong of a deliberate indifference claim.... ”); Reyes v. Gardener, 93 Fed.Appx. 283, 285 (2d Cir.2004) (“[Plaintiff] has offered no evidence ... showing that the prescribed medication regimen deviated from reasonable medical practice for the treatment of his condition.”). Although there is evidence that plaintiffs phosphorous levels increased when he was prescribed a lesser dosage of medication upon arriving at the NCCC (see Price Dep. at 23-26), that is not by itself enough to support a finding of an objectively serious condition. See Smith, 316 F.3d at 188-89 (“Although [plaintiff] suffered from an admittedly serious underlying condition, he presented no evidence that the two alleged episodes of missed medication resulted in permanent or on-going harm to his health, nor did he present any evidence explaining why the absence of actual physical injury was not a relevant factor in assessing the severity of his medical need.”) (affirming denial of motion for new trial). Thus, plaintiffs medication dosage claim must fail because he cannot show that the complained-of dosage posed an objectively serious health risk.

ii. Subjective Prong

Plaintiffs claim with respect to his medication dosage also fails because plaintiff cannot show that defendants acted with subjectively culpable intent, i.e., that they were aware of, and consciously disregarded, plaintiffs serious medical needs. Plaintiffs claim is based on his assertion that the prescribed dosage was “wrong.” However, mere disagreement with a prescribed medication dosage is insufficient as a matter of law to establish the subjective prong of deliberate indifference. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir.1998) (“It is well-established that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim. So long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.”); Sonds v. St. Barnabas Hosp. Corr. Health Servs., 151 F.Supp.2d 303, 312 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“[Disagreements over medications ... are not adequate grounds for a Section 1983 claim. Those issues implicate medical judgments and, at worst, negligence amounting to medical malpractice, but not the Eighth Amendment.” (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107, 97 S.Ct. 285)); see also, e.g., Fuller v. Ranney, No. 06-CV-0033, 2010 WL 597952, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2010) (“Plaintiffs claim amounts to nothing more than a disagreement with the prescribed treatment he received and his insistence that he be prescribed certain medications. Without more, plaintiffs disagreement with the treatment he received does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.”); Covington v. Westchester County Dep’t of Corr., No. 06 Civ. 5369, 2010 WL 572125, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2010) (“[Plaintiffs] claims that Defendants failed to change or increase his medication and counseling sessions amount to negligence claims at most, which is insufficient.”); Hamm v. Hatcher, No. 05-CV-503, 2009 WL 1322357, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2009) (“Plaintiffs unfulfilled demand for a larger dosage of [the medication] represents a mere disagreement over the course of Plaintiffs treatment and is inconsistent with deliberate indifference .... ”).

The fact that defendants adjusted the dosage of plaintiffs medication in response to plaintiffs phosphorous levels (see Price Dep. at 25-27) is also inconsistent with deliberate indifference. See Bellotto v. County of Orange, 248 Fed.Appx. 232, 237 (2d Cir.2007) (“The record also shows that mental health professionals responded to [plaintiffs] concerns about his medications and adjusted his prescription as they believed necessary.”) (affirming summary judgment for defendants); see also Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir.2000) (“[Defendant’s] actions in this case cannot reasonably be said to reflect deliberate indifference. The only relevant evidence in the record indicates that [defendant’s] actions were aimed at correcting perceived difficulties in [plaintiffs] dosage levels [in response to blood tests].”); Fuller, 2010 WL 597952, at *11 (“Moreover, a subsequent decision to prescribe plaintiff a certain medication does not indicate that the medication should have been prescribed earlier.”). Thus, there is no evidence in the record sufficient for a rational jury to find that defendants acted with deliberate indifference regarding the prescription dosage of plaintiffs renal disease medication.

In sum, based on the undisputed facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor, no rational jury could find that defendants were aware of, and consciously disregarded, plaintiffs objectively serious health needs regarding his medication dosage. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to this claim.

b. Kidney Transplant

Defendants also argue that plaintiff cannot proceed with his deliberate indifference claim regarding his request to be tested for a kidney transplant. Defendants do not dispute the objective seriousness of plaintiffs underlying condition or the requested transplant, and instead argue only that defendants lacked subjective culpability. Specifically, defendants argue that they made reasonable efforts to get plaintiff tested. (Defs.’ Br. at 23.) However, construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a rational jury could find that defendants were aware of, and consciously disregarded, plaintiffs serious medical needs.

Plaintiff began requesting a kidney transplant test as early as February or March 2007 and still had not received one by the time he left the NCCC in December 2007. (See Price Dep. at 76-77, 90.) Requests were sent on plaintiffs behalf to Dr. Okonta at the Nassau University Medical Center and to Nurse Mary Sullivan at the NCCC medical department. (See Defs.’ Ex. K.) The record indicates that plaintiff received no response from Okonta. (See Price Dep. at 82.) When plaintiff asked Sullivan about the test, Sullivan told him that defendants had “other priorities right now.” (Price Dep. at 70.) Even after plaintiff filed á formal grievance in September 2007, he still did not receive the requested test. (See Defs.’ Ex. F.) On these facts, where there was a delay of at least nine months in arranging a kidney transplant test for plaintiff despite plaintiffs repeated requests, and where defendants do not dispute the necessity of the test, a rational jury could find that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiffs serious medical needs. See Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir.2000) (holding summary judgment inappropriate where there was evidence that, inter alia, plaintiff was delayed dental treatment for a cavity for one year); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 841 F.2d 48, 50-51 (2d Cir.1988) (“[Plaintiffs] affidavit in opposition to [defendants’] motion for summary judgment alleged that a delay of over two years in arranging surgery ... amounted to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We believe this is a sufficient allegation to survive a motion for summary judgment under Archer [v. Butcher, 733 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.1984)] because it raises a factual dispute .... ”); see also Lloyd v. Lee, 570 F.Supp.2d 556, 569 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (“A reasonable jury could infer deliberate indifference from the failure of the doctors to take further steps to see that [plaintiff] was given an MRI. The argument that the doctors here did not take [plaintiffs] condition seriously is plausible, given the length of the delays. Nine months went by after the MRI was first requested before the MRI was actually' taken.”).

Defendants point to evidence in the record that they were, in fact, attempting to get plaintiff tested throughout the time in question, but were unsuccessful in their efforts. (See Defs.’ Br. at 23; Reschke Aff. ¶ 3.) However, defendants’ proffered explanation for the delay, i.e., the difficulty of finding a hospital because of transportation and security concerns, raises questions of fact and does not, as a matter of law, absolve them of liability. See Johnson v. Bowers, 884 F.2d 1053, 1056 (8th Cir.1989) (“It is no excuse for [defendants] to urge that the responsibility for delay in surgery rests with [the hospital].”); Williams v. Scully, 552 F.Supp. 431, 432 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (denying summary judgment where plaintiff “was unable to obtain treatment ... for five and one half months, during which time he suffered considerable pain” despite defendants’ “explanations for the inadequacy of [the prison’s] dental program”), cited approvingly in Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir.2000). Thus, whether defendants’ efforts were reasonable over the nine month period at issue is a question of fact for the jury.

In sum, on this record, drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor, the Court concludes that a rational jury could find that defendants acted with deliberate indifference regarding plaintiffs request for a kidney transplant test. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is denied.

c. Shoulder

Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted on the claim relating to the alleged shoulder injury because plaintiffs complained-of shoulder pain was not objectively serious and plaintiff has failed to show subjectively culpable intent by defendants. For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees and concludes that a rational jury could find that defendants acted with deliberate indifference regarding plaintiffs shoulder pain. Thus, summary judgment on this claim is denied,

i. Objective Prong

Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot satisfy the objective element of the deliberate indifference test regarding his shoulder because plaintiff alleges only that he had pain in his shoulder and not that he had “a condition of urgency, one that might produce death, deterioration or extreme pain.” (Defs.’ Br. at 22.) However, plaintiff did complain to the medical department that his right shoulder was “extremely hurting.” (Defs.’ Ex. E, Sick Call Request, Jan. 17, 2007.) Furthermore, plaintiff states that he now has a separated shoulder and wears a brace for carpal tunnel syndrome. (Pl.’s Opp. at 4.) In any event, chronic pain can be a serious medical condition. See Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir.2003) (“We will no more tolerate prison officials’ deliberate indifference to the chronic pain of an inmate than we would a sentence that required the inmate to submit to such pain. We do not, therefore, require an inmate to demonstrate that he or she experiences pain that is at the limit of human ability to bear, nor do we require a showing that his or her condition will degenerate into a life-threatening one.”); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir.1994); see also Sereika v. Patel, 411 F.Supp.2d 397, 406 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (“[Plaintiffs] allegation that he experienced severe pain as a result of the alleged delay in treatment, together with his allegation that the alleged delay in treatment resulted in reduced mobility in his arm and shoulder, raise issues of fact as to whether his shoulder injury constitutes a sufficiently serious medical condition to satisfy the objective prong of the deliberate indifference standard.”) (denying summary judgment). Thus, the Court cannot conclude at the summary judgment stage that plaintiff did not suffer from a serious medical condition.

ii. Subjective Prong

Defendants also argue that plaintiff cannot meet the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test because plaintiff was seen repeatedly by the medical department and was given pain medication. (Defs.’ Br. at 22.) Defendants also point to the fact that when x-rays were ultimately taken, they were negative. However, construing the facts most favorably to plaintiff, a rational jury could find that defendants were aware of, and consciously disregarded, plaintiffs serious medical needs. Plaintiff repeatedly complained to defendants over a period of several months, beginning in January 2007, about the pain in his shoulder (see Defs.’ Ex. E), and further complained that the pain medication he was being given was ineffective. (See, e.g., Price Dep. at 45, 51.) In June 2007, for instance, plaintiff was still complaining that his right shoulder “hurts really bad,” and that he had been “complaining of that for months.” (Def.’s Ex. E, Sick Call Requests, June 12 and June 17, 2007.) Thus, it is uncontroverted that defendants were aware of plaintiffs alleged chronic shoulder pain.

Despite plaintiffs complaints, however, plaintiff was not given an x-ray exam for several months (Price Dep. at 44; Def.’s Ex. J), and was not given any pain medication besides Motrin and Naprosyn. (Price Dep. at 55.) Although defendants argue that the treatment for plaintiffs shoulder pain was reasonable under the circumstances, there are factual questions in this case that preclude summary judgment. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir.1998) (“Whether a course of treatment was the product of sound medical judgment, negligence, or deliberate indifference depends on the facts of the case.”) (reversing grant of motion to dismiss). Drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of plaintiff, a rational jury could find that defendants acted with deliberate indifference by not changing plaintiffs pain medication despite his continued complaints that it was ineffective, by failing to take x-rays for several months, and by failing to follow-up on a November 2007 x-ray report indicating that further tests might be needed (see Defs.’ Ex. J, Discharge Summary, November 2007). See Brock, 315 F.3d at 167 (“It is not controverted that [defendant] was aware that [plaintiff] was suffering some pain from his scar. The defendants sought to east doubt on the truthfulness of [plaintiffs] claims about the extent of the pain he was suffering and, also, to put into question DOCS’ awareness of [plaintiffs] condition. But at most, defendants’ arguments and evidence to these effects raise issues for a jury and do not justify summary judgment for them.”); Hathaway, 37 F.3d at 68-69 (holding that, inter alia, two-year delay in surgery despite plaintiffs repeated complaints of pain could support finding of deliberate indifference). The fact that defendants offered some treatment in response to plaintiffs complaints does not as a matter of law establish that they had no subjectively culpable intent. See Archer v. Butcher, 733 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir.1984) (“[Plaintiff] received extensive medical attention, and the records maintained by the prison officials and hospital do substantiate the conclusion that [defendants] provided [plaintiff] with comprehensive, if not doting, health care. Nonetheless, [plaintiffs] affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment does raise material factual disputes, irrespective of their likely resolution.... [Plaintiffs assertions] do raise material factual issues. After all, if defendants did decide to delay emergency medical-aid— even for ‘only’ five hours — in order to make [plaintiff] suffer, surely a claim would be stated under Estelle.”). Specifically, given the factual disputes in this case, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that defendants did not act with deliberate indifference when they allegedly declined to change their treatment for plaintiffs shoulder pain despite repeated complaints over several months that the pain persisted. See, e.g., Lloyd, 570 F.Supp.2d at 569 (“[T]he amended complaint plausibly alleges that doctors knew that [plaintiff] was experiencing extreme pain and loss of mobility, knew that the course of treatment they prescribed was ineffective, and declined to do anything to attempt to improve [plaintiffs] situation besides re-submitting MRI request forms.... Had the doctors followed up on numerous requests for an MRI, the injury would have been discovered earlier, and some of the serious pain and discomfort that [plaintiff] experienced for more than a year could have been averted.”). Thus, there are factual disputes that prevent summary judgment on defendants’ subjective intent.

In sum, on this record, drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of plaintiff, a rational jury could find that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiffs shoulder pain. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is denied.

C. Individual Defendants

Defendants also move for summary judgment specifically with respect to plaintiffs claims against three of the individual defendants: Sheriff Edward Reilly (hereinafter “Reilly”), Edwards, and Okonta. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants defendants’ motion with respect to Reilly, and denies it with respect to Edwards and Okonta.

1. Legal Standard

“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under Section 1983.” Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir.2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In other words, “supervisor liability in a § 1983 action depends on a showing of some personal responsibility, and cannot rest on respondeat superior.” Id. Supervisor liability can be shown in one or more of the following ways: “(1) actual direct participation in the constitutional violation, (2) failure to remedy a wrong after being informed through a report or appeal, (3) creation of a policy or custom that sanctioned conduct amounting to a constitutional violation, or allowing such a policy or custom to continue, (4) grossly negligent supervision of subordinates who committed a violation, or (5) failure to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.” Id. at 145 (citation omitted).

2. Application

Although plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Reilly was aware of plaintiffs condition and failed to assist, there is no mention whatsoever of Reilly in plaintiffs deposition or in any of the parties’ evidentiary submissions. Because there is no evidence in the record that Reilly was personally involved in any of the alleged constitutional violations or that there was a custom or policy of allowing such constitutional violations (and that Reilly allowed such custom or policy to continue), no rational jury could find Reilly liable for any of plaintiffs deliberate indifference claims. See Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir.2003) (“[M]ere linkage in the prison chain of command is insufficient to implicate a state commissioner of corrections or a prison superintendent in a § 1983 claim.”); see also Mastroianni v. Reilly, 602 F.Supp.2d 425, 438-39 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (“[T]he plaintiff cannot establish that Sheriff Reilly was grossly negligent in failing to supervise subordinates because the medical care of inmates at the NCCC was delegated to the Nassau Health Care Corporation and plaintiff provides no evidence that Reilly was otherwise personally involved in his treatment.”). Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs claims against Sheriff Reilly is granted.

With respect to plaintiffs claims against Edwards and Okonta, however, there are disputed issues of fact that preclude summary judgment. Defendants argue that Edwards was not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations because she did not treat plaintiff and merely responded to his grievance request. (Defs.’ Br. at 24-25.) However, plaintiff testified that, although Edwards never physically treated him, she “takes care of appointments and makes sure you get to certain specialists” and that “she was in a position to make sure that I get the adequate care that I needed.” (Price Dep. at 61-62.) Plaintiff also testified that he submitted a grievance request to Edwards in order to be tested for the kidney transplant list, but that Edwards failed to get him on the list. (Price Dep. at 62-63.) Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, a rational jury could find that Edwards was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations because she was in a position to get plaintiff tested for the kidney transplant list and failed to do so. See McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 437-38 (2d Cir.2004) (“Although it is questionable whether an adjudicator’s rejection of an administrative grievance would make him liable for the conduct complained of, [defendant] was properly retained in the lawsuit at this stage, not simply because he rejected the grievance, but because he is alleged, as Deputy Superintendent for Administration at [the prison], to have been responsible for the prison’s medical program.” (citation omitted)). Thus, plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence of Edwards’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Edwards is liable for the alleged Eighth Amendment violations.

Defendants also argue that Okonta was not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations because he did not actually treat plaintiff. (Defs.’ Br. at 24-25.) This argument misses the mark. It is plaintiffs allegation that Okonta violated plaintiffs constitutional rights precisely by not treating him. Plaintiff has presented evidence that he received no response from Okonta regarding his requests to be tested for the kidney transplant list. Where a prison doctor denies medical treatment to an inmate, that doctor is personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation. See McKenna, 386 F.3d at 437 (finding “personal involvement” where medical defendants were alleged to have participated in the denial of treatment); see also Chambers v. Wright, No. 05 Civ. 9915, 2007 WL 4462181, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2007) (“Prison doctors who have denied medical treatment to an inmate are ‘personally involved’ for the purposes of jurisdiction under § 1983.” (citing McKenna, 386 F.3d at 437)). Although defendants argue that they were in fact making efforts to get plaintiff tested (Defs.’ Br. at 25), the reasonableness of those efforts, as discussed above, is a factual question inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment.

In sum, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claims against Reilly is granted. Defendants’ motion with respect to Edwards and Okonta is denied.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court grants defendants’ motion with respect to plaintiffs claim regarding the dosage of his renal disease medication and with respect to all of plaintiffs claims against Sheriff Reilly. Defendants’ motion is denied in all other respects. The parties to this action shall participate in a telephone conference on Monday, April 5, 2010 at 3:30 p.m. At that time, counsel for defendants shall initiate the call and, with all parties on the line, contact Chambers at (631) 712-5670.

SO ORDERED. 
      
      . The Court notes that plaintiff failed to file and serve a response to defendants' Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts in violation of Local Civil Rule 56.1. Generally, a "plaintifffs] failure to respond or contest the facts set forth by the defendants in their Rule 56.1 statement as being undisputed constitutes an admission of those facts, and those facts are accepted as being undisputed.” Jessamy v. City of New Rochelle, 292 F.Supp.2d 498, 504 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (quoting NAS Elecs., Inc. v. Transtech Elecs. PTE Ltd., 262 F.Supp.2d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y.2003)). However, "[a] district court has broad discretion to determine whether to overlook a party’s failure to comply with local court rules.” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir.2001) (citations omitted); see also Giliani v. GNOC Corp., No. 04 Civ. 2935(ILG), 2006 WL 1120602, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006) (exercising court's discretion to overlook the parties’ failure to submit statements pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1). In his opposition papers, plaintiff identifies defendants' arguments and factual assertions with which he disagrees. In the exercise of its broad discretion, and given plaintiff's pm se status, the Court will deem admitted only those facts in defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement that are supported by admissible evidence and not controverted by other admissible evidence in the record. See Jessamy, 292 F.Supp.2d at 504-05. Furthermore, the Court has carefully reviewed all of the parties' submissions, including plaintiff’s deposition, to determine if plaintiff has any evidence to support his claims.
     
      
      . Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Elmira correctional facility in 2005 and 2006. (Price Dep. at 7-8.)
     
      
      . Plaintiff testified that, at the time of his deposition, he was receiving two 800 milligram pills of Renagel three times a day and two 667 milligram pills of PhosLo three times a day at the Fishkill correctional facility. (Price Dep. at 11-12.)
     
      
      . Plaintiff never interacted with Okonta except through Susan, the social worker. (Price Dep. at 73-74.)
     
      
      . This was the only formal medical grievance filed by plaintiff. (Price Dep. at 85.)
     
      
      . Edwards never wrote medical orders for plaintiff or examined plaintiff. (Price Dep. at 61.) Plaintiff had no interaction with Edwards except her written response to plaintiff's grievance. (Id. at 67.)
     
      
      . Although plaintiff does not offer this explanation in his deposition, the Court construes the pro se plaintiff's sworn "verified rebuttal” to defendants’ motion for summary judgment as an evidentiary submission. See Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir.2004) ("[A] verified pleading, to the extent that it makes allegations on the basis of the plaintiff’s personal knowledge, and not merely on information and belief, has the effect of an affidavit and may be relied on to oppose summary judgment.”); see also Hailey v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 136 Fed.Appx. 406, 407-08 (2d Cir.2005) ("The rule favoring liberal construction of pro se submissions is especially applicable to civil rights claims.”).
     
      
      . Plaintiff testified that he stopped complaining about his shoulder at some point because he was frustrated that defendants were not helping. (Price Dep. at 54-55.) There is evidence that plaintiff complained about his shoulder at least as late as June 2007, and again complained in November 2007, which resulted in the taking of additional x-rays. (See Def.’s Ex. E, Sick Call Request, June 21, 2007; Defs.’Ex. J.)
     
      
      . Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, defendants also served plaintiff with the requisite notice for pro se litigants opposing summary judgment motions. See Irby v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 262 F.3d 412, 414 (2d Cir.2001) ("And we remind the district courts of this circuit, as well as summary judgment movants, of the necessity that pro se litigants have actual notice, provided in an accessible manner, of the consequences of the pro se litigant’s failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 56.”).
     
      
      
        . Plaintiff submitted his two identical oppositions and a sur-reply to the instant motion not only in this action, but also in the now-consolidated action (No. 07-CV-4841). The Court has considered all of plaintiff's submissions in both actions in deciding the instant motion.
     
      
      . Defendants raise exhaustion only with respect to plaintiff's kidney transplant request, and so the Court does not consider exhaustion with respect to plaintiff's other claims.
     
      
      . The Court notes that the October 5, 2007 memo from Edwards is unclear as to which party bore the responsibility of obtaining plaintiff's medical records. (Defs.' Ex. F.) Edwards explains in an affidavit that she advised plaintiff that “it would be necessary for his doctors to provide the selected facility with his records before a request for testing would be considered." (Edwards Aff. ¶ 2.) It is unclear whether plaintiff had access to these records or whether the prison would need to obtain them. Thus, there appears to be a factual question as to the implementation of this grievance resolution. A similar situation arose in Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663 (2d Cir.2004), in which the Second Circuit held that where a prisoner achieved favorable results in several grievance proceedings but alleged that prison officials failed to implement those decisions, that prisoner was without an administrative remedy and therefore had exhausted his claim for purposes of the PLRA. See id. at 667-68, 669 ("Where, as here, prison regulations do not provide a viable mechanism for appealing implementation failures, prisoners in [plaintiff's] situation have fully exhausted their available remedies.”). The Court recognizes that Abney, 380 F.3d 663, was decided before Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006), and that, as discussed above, the Second Circuit has not decided whether the various nuances to the exhaustion requirement apply post-Woodford. However, the Court need not decide the applicability of any such nuances to the exhaustion requirement because, as discussed above, defendants have failed to establish the procedural framework for grievance resolution at the NCCC and the availability of any administrative remedies.
      Although there may be administrative remedies for such a situation under the New York Department of Corrections regulations, see 7 N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 701.5(c)(4) ("If a decision is not implemented within 45 days, the grievant may appeal to CORC citing lack of implementation as a mitigating circumstance."), it does not follow that the same procedure applies at the NCCC. See, e.g., Abney v. County of Nassau, 237 F.Supp.2d at 283 ("The flaw in Defendants' argument, however, is that the cases relied upon were all decided under the New York State administrative procedure — none were decided in the context of the procedure relied upon — the Nassau County Inmate Handbook procedure.”).
     
      
      . Plaintiff does not distinguish between the initial dosage he received at the NCCC and the later dosages he received, instead arguing generally that all of the dosages he received at the NCCC were incorrect.
     
      
      . Plaintiff's conclusory testimony that the dosage was “hurting” him also is insufficient to establish the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test. To the extent plaintiff claims that the medication caused him pain, there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff suffered from chronic pain or, indeed, any other objectively serious symptoms in connection with the medication dosage. Although not mentioned in plaintiff's deposition or in his opposition to the instant motion, plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that the lesser dosage put him at risk of "itching” and "breaking of bones.” (Amended Complaint, No. 07-CV-2634, at 4.) There is evidence that plaintiff suffered from a rash and/or itching while at the NCCC and that plaintiff was told at one point that he had eczema. (See Price Dep. at 45-51.) However, there is no evidence to connect those symptoms with the medication dosage for his renal disease. (See, e.g., id. at 46 ("Q. Did anyone ever tell you what was causing a rash? A. I kept going to the — I had went to the dermatologist at Bellevue. To me, the doctor had an attitude like it ain’t nothing wrong; like it was acne or something.”).) Furthermore, there is no evidence that the rash and/or itching was an objectively serious condition. See Lewal v. Wiley, 29 Fed.Appx. 26, 29 (2d Cir.2002) (affirming summary judgment and holding that plaintiff's alleged "persistent rash” was not a “serious medical condition”); see also Benitez v. Ham, No. 04-CV-1159, 2009 WL 3486379, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2009) ("[T]he evidence shows that Plaintiff suffered from a severe body itch. While this condition was undoubtedly unpleasant, it simply does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.”). In any event, even if plaintiff did suffer from an objectively serious condition because of the medication dosage, he cannot prove that defendants acted with a subjectively culpable state of mind, as discussed infra.
      
     
      
      . In any event, as discussed infra, defendants adjusted plaintiff's dosage in response to the increase in phosphorous levels, and there is no evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that defendants acted with deliberate indifference in prescribing plaintiff’s medication.
     
      
      . Although he does not raise it in any of his pleadings or in his opposition to the instant motion, plaintiff testified at his deposition that he had to take the medication with meals but that sometimes he was given the medication without food or at times that interfered with his meals. (Price Dep. at 23, 60; Defs.’ Ex. E.) The record is unclear as to how often this occurred. The Court assumes, as it must on this motion for summary judgment, that on some occasions plaintiff was given his medications not at meal times or at times that interfered with meals. However, plaintiff points to no evidence whatsoever of any harm caused by defendants’ alleged conduct in this regard, and, therefore, no rational jury could find that the provision of medication without food on some occasions was objectively serious. See Gillard v. Kuykendall, 295 Fed.Appx. 102, 103 (8th Cir.2008) (affirming summary judgment for defendants where defendants, on some occasions, "were late in giving [plaintiff] his medications and did not always administer them with meals as [plaintiff] apparently desired" where there was no evidence of any adverse consequences). Thus, any deliberate indifference claim based on these allegations would fail as well.
     
      
      . To the extent plaintiff also argues that that defendants acted with deliberate indifference because he has received different prescriptions at different facilities, the Court rejects that argument as well. See, e.g., Cole v. Goord, No. 04 Civ. 8906, 2009 WL 1181295, at *8 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2009) (‘‘[Plaintiffs] reliance upon the fact that subsequent medical providers have provided him with a different course of medication or treatment ... does nothing to establish that [defendant] violated [plaintiff’s] Eighth Amendment rights. Physicians can and do differ as to their determination of the appropriate treatment for a particular patient; that difference in opinion does not satisfy the requirements for a constitutional claim of deliberate indifference.” (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97, 97 S.Ct. 285)).
     
      
      . The November 2007 x-ray records indicate that “short segment acute thrombosis cannot be reliably excluded, Ultrasound might provide additional information (See Defs.’ Ex. J, Discharge Summary, November 2007.) Defendants point to no evidence in the record that they followed up on that x-ray report.
     
      
      . Plaintiff also informed defendants that he had been given a Cortisone shot for his shoulder at his previous place of incarceration. (See Price Dep. at 38, 53-54; Defs.’ Ex. E, Sick Call Request, Apr. 14, 2007.)
     
      
      . Plaintiff actually refers in the complaint to “Sheriff Edwards,” but the Court determines, liberally construing the complaint, that this allegation refers to Sheriff Reilly.
     