
    Commonwealth vs. Warren Billings.
    It is not an absolute rule of law that if the jury find that a witness has wilfully sworn falsely in relation to any matter material to the issue on trial, they shall wholly disregard his testimony except in those particulars in which it is corroborated.
    On a trial at which one has testified as a witness, evidence is admissible of his general reputation for truth eighteen months previously.
    Indictment for adultery with one Mary F. Spruce. At the trial in the superior court, before Reed, J., she was a witness for the government, and there was evidence tending to show that several matters asserted as facts in her testimony were not true, and that she had at other times made other and contrary statements ; and the defendant introduced evidence tending to show that her reputation for truth was and long had been bad. It was admitted by the government that she was to be considered as an accomplice; and the defendant asked the judge to instruct the jury that if they should find that she had deliberately sworn falsely in relation to any matter material to the issue, they would be bound to discard her testimony wholly, except in so far as it was corroborated. But the judge declined so to rule ; and after giving the jury instructions, to which no exception was taken, concerning the testimony of an accomplice, as such, he further instructed them that if they should find that the witness had wilfully sworn falsely in some material particular, yet there was no role of law which would forbid them to believe other portions of her testimony.
    The government contended, on the evidence in the case, that the illicit intercourse between this witness and the defendant began thirteen months before the trial; and the district attoríey asked certain witnesses, whom he called in rebuttal of the testimony introduced by the defendant concerning her reputation for truth, what her general reputation for truth was eighteen months before the trial. To this question the defendant objected, but the judge overruled the objection, and the witnesses replied that it was good.
    The jury returned a verdict of gnilty; and the defendant alleged exceptions on various points, all of which except the foregoing were waived at the argument in this court.
    
      C. G. Davis, for the defendant
    arguing that the maxim falsut in uno, falsus in omnibus, is a rule of law, cited 1 Stark. Ev 515, 525; Bermon v. Woodbridge, 2 Doug. 788.
    
      G. Allen, Attorney General, for the Commonwealth
    cited, to the point that there is no rule of law that an accomplice or any other witness who has testified falsely in one particular should be wholly discredited, Regina v. Stubbs, Dearsly, 555; Commonwealth v. Bosworth, 6 Gray, 481; Commonwealth v. Price, 10 Gray, 472; Commonwealth v. Graves, ante, 114; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 380 : and, arguing that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, is not a rule of law, cited further, State v. Williams, 2 Jones, (No. Car.) 257; State v. Noblett, Ib. 418 ; Letton v. Young, 2 Met. (Ky.) 558; Terry v. State, 13 Indiana, 70; McCrary v. Crandall, 1 Clarke, (Iowa) 117; Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408; King v. Teal, 11 East, 307; and on the point of the admissibility of evidence as to the reputation of the witness for truth eighteen months before the trial, cited Parkhurst v. Ketchum, 6 Allen, 406, 408.
   Bigelow, C. J.

These exceptions cannot be sustained.

1. It is not an absolute and inflexible rule of law, that the testimony of a witness is to be wholly disregarded and rejected, except in those particulars in which there is corroboration by other credible witnesses, if the jury find that the witness has deliberately sworn falsely in relation to a material matter. This question was distinctly raised and adjudicated by the court in a recent case. Commonwealth v. Wood, 11 Gray, 86, 89, 93. On a reconsideration of the point in the light, of the very clear and forcible argument of the learned counsel of the defendant, we are satisfied that that decision was correct, and that the reasons on which it rests, clearly and tersely stated in the opinion of the court, are satisfactory and decisive against the adoption of the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, as an established rule of the law of evidence. The cases cited on the brief of the attorney general show that this conclusion is supported by a very great weight of authority. The instructions on this part of the case were accurate and embodied the necessary suggestions to guide the jury in weighing the testimony of the impeached witness.

2. The testimony offered to prove the reputation of the government witness for veracity a year and a half previous to the trial, was competent. It was not too remote in point of time. Facts and circumstances in their nature continuous may always be shown to exist anterior to the precise period when it is necessary to show their existence, unless the interval is too great to afford a reasonable inference that the same state or condition of things has remained unchanged.

Exceptions overruled 
      
       In this case, after the foregoing decision, a new trial was granted in the superior court, for newly discovered evidence, and thereupon the district attorney entered a nolle prosequi.
      
     