
    QIAO YONG ZHANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-2040-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 7, 2010.
    Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Senior Litigation Counsel; Jason Wisecup, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, GUIDO CALABRESI and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Qiao Yong Zhang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April 29, 2009 order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Qiao Yong Zhang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 29, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). When the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

There is no dispute that Zhang’s motion to reopen was both untimely and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA reasonably found that Zhang’s motion to reopen did not qualify for such an exception.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Zhang failed to establish changed country conditions in China based on her baptism and “continued practice” of Christianity in the United States. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that a change in personal circumstances in the United States does not constitute a change in country conditions, and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen). Moreover, the BIA reasonably declined to reopen based on the country conditions evidence in the record, including the State Department’s 2008 Religious Freedom Report for China. See U.S. Department of State 2008 Religious Freedom Report for China; see also 2007 Annual Report of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Although it did not discuss that evidence in detail, it was not required to do so. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (presuming that the agency has taken into account all evidence presented, unless the record “compellingly suggests otherwise”). This is particularly so because the evidence Zhang submitted was the same the agency is asked to consider “time and again.” See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the BIA does not abuse its discretion by giving summary consideration to evidence presented in a motion to reopen, particularly when dealing with evidence which the BIA is asked to repeatedly consider). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhang’s motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).  