
    Charles Deonte PATTEN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    Case No. 5D16-2102
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Opinion filed December 2, 2016
    
      Charles Deonte Patten, St. Augustine, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Marjorie Vincenfc-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
   EVANDER, J.

Petitioner, Charles Deonte Patten, seeks certiorari review of a trial court order denying his request for investigative costs. Petitioner was charged with attempted second-degree murder of a law enforcement officer with a firearm (Count I); carrying a concealed firearm (Count II); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Counts III and IV). He was initially assigned court-appointed counsel. However, Petitioner subsequently executed a waiver of counsel following a Faretta inquiry. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to incur costs for private investigative funds, alleging he was indigent and needed the assistance of a private investigator to prepare his defense. The trial court entered an order denying Petitioner’s motion, concluding that the waiver of Petitioner’s constitutional right to court-appointed counsel “necessarily include[d] a waiver of the expenses court-appointed counsel would have been entitled, such as investigative services and other personnel.” The State properly concedes that the trial court’s order constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law and that the petition should be granted.

The Florida Legislature has expressly authorized a pro se litigant, who is eligible to be represented by a public defender, to seek payment for the provision of due process services:

A person who is eligible to be represented by a public defender under s. 27.51 but ... who is proceeding pro se, may move the court for a determination that he or she is indigent for costs and eligible for the provision of due process services, as prescribed by ss. 29.006 and 29.007, funded by the state.

§ 27.52(5), Fla. Stat. (2016). Accordingly, a criminal defendant is not required to accept the services of a public defender in order to obtain reasonable costs. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 525 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Price v. Mounts, 421 So.2d 690, 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

Section 27.52(5) sets forth those factors that are to be considered by a trial court in determining whether a defendant is indigent for costs and eligible for the provision of due process services. On remand, the trial court is to apply those factors when reconsidering Petitioner’s motion.

PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED; CAUSE REMANDED.

LAWSON, C.J. and SAWAYA, J„ concur. 
      
      . Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).
     