
    Isham H. Clayton et al. Members of the Board of Police of Attala County, vs. Samuel C. Heidelberg et al.
    The office of a writ of prohibition is to restrain and prevent a court of peculiar, limited or inferior jurisdiction from taking cognizance of cases not within its jurisdiction ; it issues from a superior court; is founded upon a suggestion that the cause originally, or some collateral matter arising therein, does not belong to the jurisdiction of the inferior court; and on the application for the prohibition, the superior court will not inquire whether the inferior court acted right or wrong, if it has acted within its jurisdiction.
    Whether or not the circuit court in any case may grant a writ of prohibition to the board of police,— Quare ?
    
    It cannot do so for the purpose of preventing the levy and collection of a special tax in a particular county, for the payment of a contract for the building of a court-house; the jurisdiction of the board of police over such matters is unquestionable, and therefore there is no room for the interference of the circuit court by writ of prohibition.
    In error from the circuit court of Jasper county.
    Samuel C. Heidelberg, James Donald, Archibald McCullum, C. S. N. Newell, John Cooper, Samuel Thomas, and William Hartfield, citizens of Jasper county, filed their petition to the May term, 1844, of the circuit court of that county, before the Hon. Henry Mounger, judge ; in which they allege, —
    That the board of police of that county, on the 26th July, 1843, levied a tax on the citizens of the county, of whom the relators were seven, in these words: “ Ordered by the court, that a special tax, for the purpose of paying for the court-house of said county, be levied at 175 per cent, on the state tax for the year 1843.” That the sheriff was about to collect it; that it did not appear of record what the court-house cost, or what was due for it, nor did it appear by any report of commissioners, or written document, so as to authorize the tax; that the board did not prescribe the dimensions of the court-house, or direct it to be of brick, as would appear from the transcript of the proceedings of the board, annexed to the petition; they therefore prayed a writ of prohibition to prohibit the board and sheriff from levying or collecting such tax, “ or any other for said purpose.”
    The petition was not verified. The fiat of the circuit judge directed the writs to issue as prayed for, and is dated January 19, 1844.
    A writ was issued by the clerk of the circuit court, reciting the order levying the tax of June 26, 1843, and prohibiting all further action of the board as to such tax, and enjoining the sheriff from collecting it.
    It is not deemed necessary to set out the proceedings of the board of police, as exhibited in the transcript annexed to the petition.
    At the May term, 1844, the board moved to dismiss the writ of prohibition, because improvidently issued. The court overruled the motion, and ordered a declaration to be filed, which was done, and ordered the board to plead to it.
    The declaration filed by the petitioners, suing for the state and themselves, impleads the president and members of the board, naming them, wherefore they levied a special tax — quoting the order of levy — after the state’s writ of prohibition to the contrary thereof first directed and delivered to them. It enumerates some of the statutes concerning the erection of courthouses ; avers there is no record of the board prescribing the dimensions of a court-house, and no record or return showing what amount said court-house cost; yet the defendants, combining, &c. to vex and oppress the plaintiffs, levied the said tax in contempt of the state’s sovereignty, and proceed further in the premises, notwithstanding the writ of prohibition directed and delivered to them on January 25th, 1844. This was the-substance of the declaration.
    To this declaration, under the order so to. do, the defendants pleaded: —
    1. That one Kirk had contracted and built for the county, a brick, court-house, under a contract entered into with him by certain commissioners authorized and empowered by the board so to contract; and it having been completed and received by the board, the county became indebted to him therefor $5000 ; that Hartwell and Tirrell, two of the commissioners, on the 22d August, 1840, after the completion of the building, gave certificate that Kirk, or the holder, was entitled to receive that sum out of the moneys levied specially, &c. with interest from its date; which remaining unpaid, the levy in the declaration mentioned was made to pay it by the board, as was lawful; and that the tax is not more than sufficient to pay it.
    2. That the county being indebted to Kirk $5000 for building a court-house for the use of the county, the board laid the tax to pay it, as was lawful; and that the tax is not more than sufficient.
    A demurrer to both these pleas was plead, because it was not stated that the board ordered the court-house, or prescribed its dimensions and materials, nor who were the contracting commissioners, nor that the facts are of record, nor that the statutes were pursued. These demurrers were sustained; when the board of police plead the following pleas, viz.:
    3. That they levied the tax to pay for a court-house, built and received for the county, and adopted by the board, as they lawfully might.
    4. That they had full and exclusive jurisdiction over the matter of complaint, and did not transcend it.
    5. That the board, on March 9th, 1840, appointed Watts, Hartfield, and Tirrell, to plan and superintend the erection of a court-house; who, on May 4, 1840, reported it to the board as built and completed on the county site ; when the board received it from them, and adopted it as the court-house of the county.
    A demurrer to the 3d, 4th, and 5th pleas was filed because it was not averred that the board ordered the building, or prescribed dimensions and materials; it was not stated»- that the facts pleaded are of record, nor that the mode required . by the statute was pursued. The demurrer to these last pleas - was sustained, and judgment final rendered, awarding a peremptory writ of prohibition.
    The members of the b^ard of police prosecuted this writ of error.
    
      
      Foote and Hutchinson, for plaintiffs in error.
    1. The writ of prohibition lies only to restrain an encroachment upon, or abuse of jurisdiction, about to be enacted, and is to be exerted by the superintending over an inferior judicial tribunal; as where an inferior court is about to take cognizance of a case between parties of which it has not jurisdiction, or, having cognizance, is proceeding to do something contrary to the laws. He tvho complains proceeds by suggestion to the superior court, which grants the writ or refuses it. If the point be too nice and doubtful to be decided on motion, the writ quousque, or a rule is granted, and the party is required to declare, by way of fiction as on a prohibition disobeyed, — a fiction not traversable — and the declaration is qui tam on a supposed contempt of the state ; but still the result depends upon the matters suggested. If the inferior court have jurisdiction, but give a wrong judgment, it is to be corrected by appeal or error, and not by prohibition. The writ of prohibition is never awarded after action or judgment below, tinless the proceeding is coram non judice. 3 Black. Com. 112, 113, 114; 7 Bac. Abr. tit. Prohibition F. A prohibition against injuries is not allowable; but the party must proceed by indictment or in chancery by injunction. 2 Chi tty’s Prac. 355-359.
    2. The remedy then seems to have been limited entirely to encroachments of one judicial tribunal on the jurisdiction of another, or of an attempt to exert a jurisdiction not given by the laws to any court. The board, by the Constitution IT. 20, was invested with full power over the matters, as well as by the following acts of the legislature : The act of 1833, H. & H. 444, 445, § 1, 2, 3; the act of 1822, H. & H. 466, § 82; and the act of 1838, I-I. & H. 454, § 49.
    Heyfron, for defendants in error,
    Argued, that the petition and proceedings for the prohibition were sufficient; the prohibition properly granted; andhhe pleas filed by the board properly overruled. He cited H. & H. 446, § 6 ; 2 Mass. Rep. 529; Walker’s Rep. 76 ; 2 Pick. Rep. 162; 1 Chitty’s PI. 558; Com. Dig. tit. Pleader, E. 29; H. & H. 466, §82.
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a prohibition issued by, the circuit court of Jasper county, against its board of police and sheriff. The objecUin view is to prevent the levy and collection of a special tax in that county, for the payment of a contract for the building of a courthouse.

The law in regard to the writ of prohibition is very plain. Its purpose is to restrain and prevent a court of peculiar, limited or inferior jurisdiction, from taking judicial cognizance ot cases not within its jurisdiction. It is founded upon a suggestion that the cause originally, or some collateral matter arising therein, does not belong to that jurisdiction. 3 Bl. Com. 112. Beyond these two grounds, a superior court will not interfere. When the matter is within the general jurisdiction of the court below, and in the conduit of the trial they have not exceeded their authority, the court above will not, on an application for a prohibition, inquire whether they have decided right or not. Grant v. Gould, 2 H. B. 100; Washburn v. Phillips, 2 Met. 296; People v. Seward, 7 Wen. 518.

There is nothing in these principles, which warrants the interference by writ of prohibition in this case, even if such writ can be issued, under any circumstances, by the circuit court to the board of police — a matter which we do not now undertake to determine. The law confers upon the boards of police power to levy and collect a special tax, sufficient to build or repair any court-house, or jail, or other county buildings, for their counties respectively. H. & H. 454. Their jurisdiction over such matters is unquestionable, and hence there is no room for the interference of the circuit court by writ of prohibition. Whether there be any mode to correct a wrongful exercise of the power, we need not now determine; it is sufficient to say, that this is not the remedy.

Judgment reversed, and petition dismissed.  