
    The Pennsylvania Company v. Loftis.
    
      Railroad company selling coupon ticket — To passenger over its own.and connecting line — Makes itself liable for passenger over entire route, when — Question of contract by railroad company — Presumption that selling company is agent for the connecting line, when — Competency of parol evidence — Railroad corporations — Contracts.
    1. While a railroad company selling a coupon ticket for the transportation of a passenger over its own and a connecting line, may, by contract either express or implied, make itself responsible for the safe carriage of the passenger over the entire route covered by the ticket sold, yet the mere sale of such coupon ticket does not of itself import a contract or undertaking on the part of the company selling the same to become responsible for the safety of the passenger beyond its own line.
    2. Where a railroad company issues and sells a coupon ticket with coupons attached good over a connecting line, in the absence of other evidence the presumption is, that as to. such coupons the company issuing and selling the same, in ■making such sale, acts as the agent of the connecting carrier.
    3. It is competent to prove by parol evidence, aside from the ticket sold, the contract made between the carrier and the passenger.
    (No. 9088
    Decided April 11, 1905.)
    Error to the Circuit Court of Stark county.
    Catharine Loftis, who was the wife of the defendant in error, John Loftis, on May 9, 1898, purchased from the plaintiff in error, the Pennsylvania Company, at its ticket office in Alliance, Ohio, an excursion ticket from Alliance to Columbus and return. The ticket issued to her was a special excursion coupon ticket containing four coupons, and was in form as follows:
    
      
      
    
    
      After procuring the ticket she -boarded an excursion train at Alliance on the Pennsylvania lines and entered upon her journey to Columbus. The Pennsylvania Lines extended only from Alliance to Orr-ville. When the excursion train reached Orrville the coaches of said train, including the one in which said Catharine Loftis was a passenger, were switched to the track of the Cleveland, Akron & Columbus Railway, a connecting line, over which line they were then run from Orrville to Columbus. As the train was entering the city of Columbus it was, by reason of the spreading of the track, derailed, several of the coaches were overturned and broken and several of the passengers were injured, one person being killed. Among those injured was Catharine Loftis. Thereafter, to-wit, on April 22, 1902, her husband, John Loftis, the defendant in error herein, brought an action in the court of common pleas of Stark county, Ohio, against the plaintiff in error, the Pennsylvania Company, to recover damages for the loss of the services of his said wife, Catharine Loftis, and to recover for doctor bills incurred and paid by him for her in consequence'of the injuries sustained by her in said accident. The petition filed by him in said action contained the following averments with respect to the contract to carry, alleged to have been made by the Pennsylvania Company with said Catharine Loftis, to-wit:
    On or about the eighth day of May, 1898, one Catharine Loftis, then and now the wife of this plaintiff, entered into a contract with the defendant, whereby the defendant, in consideration of the sum of two dollars ($2.00), to it paid, thereby agreed to accept said Catharine Loftis as a passenger on its cars and convey her as snch passenger the entire distance, from the city of Alliance, Ohio, to the city of. Columbus, Ohio, and return, Over the lines of the defendant,, the Pennsylvania Company, and said 0 Catharine Loftis was to. he conveyed the entire route in the cars of the defendant without any change of cars whatever.
    On or about the eighth day of May, 1898, in pur-. suance of said contract, said Catharine Loftis, purchased and paid the defendant for a ticket for the entire trip from Alliance, Ohio, to Columbus, Ohio, and return, over the defendant’s lines, and on said date Catharine Loftis took passage in defendant’s cars as designated by the defendant for the purpose of said trip, and the defendant thereupon undertook to convey plaintiff from said city of Alliance to said city of Columbus and return in its cars, and over its lines.
    For answer, the Pennsylvania Company, after admitting its corporate capacity and that it was a common carrier of passengers, denied each and every other allegation in plaintiff’s petition contained. The case was submitted to a jury and resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, John Loftis, for $300. This judgment was affirmed by the circuit court. To reverse this judgment of affirmance the Pennsylvania Company prosecutes error.
    
      Messrs. Carey & Mullins and Mr. C. C. Bow, attorneys for plaintiff in error.
    A railroad company which sells a coupon ticket over its own and connecting lines to a point on one of such connecting lines and collects fare for the entire distance is regarded as acting agent for each of the connecting lines. The coupons are regarded as distinct tickets over such lines, and the selling company is not liable for an accident occurring' beyond its own lines. 2 Redfield on Railways (3 ed.), 227; (4 ed.), sec. 401; 2 Rorer on Railways, 974; Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 152; 4 Elliott on Railroads, sec. 1596; 25 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (1 ed.), 1085; Knight v. Railroad Co., 56 Me., 234; Railroad Co. v. Connell, 112 Ill., 295; Railroad Co. v. Mulford, 162 Ill., 522; Young v. Railroad Co., 115 Pa. St., 112; Hood v. Railroad Co., 22 Conn., 1; Railroad Co. v. Sprayberry, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.), 857; Milnor v. Railroad Co., 53 N. Y., 365.
    A clear distinction is made by the authorities between carriers of goods including baggage, and carriers of passengers.
    
    In the case of the former it is held that a carrier who bills goods to a point beyond its own terminus or who issues a through check for the baggage of a passenger who has paid fare to a point on a connecting line is liable for loss or damage to such goods or to the passenger for loss or damage to his baggage, and in that case the connecting carriers are held to be the agents of the carriers issuing the through check. The rule being exactly opposite to that in the case of passengers themselves. 2 Redfield on Railways (3 ed.), 227; 2 Wood’s Railway Law, 1033, 1034; Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 464; 2 Rorer on Railways, 1001; 4 Elliott on Railroads, sec. 1658; Railroad Co. v. Weaver, 9 Lea (Tenn.), 38; Hartan v. Railroad Co., 114 Mass., 44.
    Ohio has adopted, the same distinction and holds that the issuance of a through check for baggage makes the carrier liable for loss on connecting lines. Railway Co. v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St., 647.
    
      Messrs. Craine & Snyder, attorneys for defendant in error.
    Whatever difference there may be between the authorities on other questions, it is settled that a common carrier may contract to carry the entire distance, both over its own and connecting lines. Shear-man & Redfield, sec. 503.
    In the absence of any testimony or circumstances, excepting the bare sale of a ticket, the authorities are somewhat in conflict as to whether or not the law implies a contract to carry the entire distance or not. The authorities which hold, as we think, that the law implies a contract to carry the entire distance under such circumstances, are: Railroad Co. v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St., 647; Railway Co. v. Pontius, 19 Ohio St., 221; Chech v. Railroad Co., 12 Dec. Re., 146; 2 Disn., 237, 245; Shearman & Redfield, 503; Railroad Co. v. Roach, 35 Kan., 740; Railroad Co. v. Copeland, 24 Ill., 338; Candee v. Railroad Co., 21 Wis., 593, 594, 595; Wheeler v. Railroad Co., 31 Cal., 46; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y., 306; 2 Redfield on Railways, 228; Najac v. Railroad Co., 7 All., 329; Talcott v. Railroad Co., 66 Hun, 459; Washington v. Railroad Co., 101 N. C., 239.
    The fact that the passenger has baggage can make no wholesome distinction, as the baggage is simply an incident and is carried by reason of the passenger’s ticket and his contract for carriage.
    But after all, was not the question whether or not there was a contract, in this case, for carriage the entire distance, one for the jury to determine under all the circumstances and surroundings?
    
      Whether or not the contract of carriage is for the entire distance is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, under all circumstances and surroundings. Weed v. Railroad Co., 19 Wend., 534; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y., 221; Gary v. Railroad Co., 29 Barb., 41, 42; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 29 Barb., 491; Van Buskirk v. Roberts, 31 N. Y., 661.
    The ticket was not the contract, but simply a token. Railway Co. v. Mortal, 8 Circ. Dec., 134; 18 C. C. R., 562; Burdick v. People, 149 Ill., 600; Railroad Co. v. Mulford, 162 Ill., 531; Prank v. Ingalls, 41 Ohio St., 563.
    In addition to the sale of the ticket, the fact that the plaintiff in error advertised in such a manner as to induce the plaintiff to believe that it would carry the entire distance, is an important piece of evidence. Railroad Co. v. Walrath, 38 Ohio St., 466; Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S., 451.
   Crew, J.

The two principal contentions of the plaintiff in error in this ease are: 1. That it was not shown by competent evidence that there was any contract or undertaking on the part of the Pennsylvania Company to become responsible for the transportation of Catharine Loftis beyond the terminus of its own line, and therefore that it is not liable for the injury received by her through the default or negligence of the Cleveland, Akron & Columbus Railway, a connecting line. 2. That the court of common pleas erred in refusing to give to the jury certain instructions requested by counsel for the railway company. If counsel for plaintiff in error are right as to either of these contentions, it follows, that the judgment of the circuit court was wrong and should be reversed. As to the first of the above propositions counsel would seem to rest tbeir claim upon the assumption that the coupon ticket issued to Catharine Loftis by the Pennsylvania Company was and is itself the only proper evidence in this case of any undertaking or agreement on its part to receive and carry said Catharine Loftis as a passenger from Alliance to Columbus and return, and that therefore, as a common carrier, it is not shown to have assumed towards her any other or different duty or obligation than such as the sale of said ticket would itself imply. As to a common carrier of passengers, as distinguished from a carrier of goods or baggage,' the doctrine would seem now to be generally well settled that the mere issuance and sale by the former of a coupon ticket good over its own and connecting lines, does not of itself import an undertaking or agreement on the part of the issuing or selling company to become responsible for the safe carriage of the passenger to whom such ticket is sold beyond its own line. Yet it is equally true, and not less well settled, we think, that a railway company selling a ticket for the transportation of a passenger beyond its own line of road, may by contract either express or implied make itself responsible for the safe carriage of such passenger over the entire route covered by the ticket sold. Hutchinson on Carriers, secs. 577, 578; 4 Elliott on Railroads, sec. 1596; Young v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 115 Pa., 112; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Cornell, 112 Ill., 295; Hartan v. Eastern Railroad Co., 114 Mass., 44; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Jones, 155 U. S., 333; Van Buskirk v. Roberts, 31 N. Y., 661; 3 Thompson on Negligence, sec. 3352. And where, as in this ease, the scope and extent of the contract made, or the duty and obligation assumed by the railway company, is a fact in issue, the ticket sold is not itself the only evidence that may be introduced and considered upon such issue, but the fact may be shown or proved by any competent parol testimony. In the present case it was alleged by plaintiff in his petition that the Pennsylvania Company “in consideration of the sum of two dollars to it paid; thereby agreed to accept said Catharine Loftis as a passenger on its cars and convey her as such passenger the entire distance from the city of Alliance, Ohio, to the city of Columbus, Ohio, and return, over the lines of the defendant, the Pennsylvania Company, and said Catharine Loftis was to be conveyed the entire route in the cars of the defendant without any change of cars whatever.” As tending to prove the particular agreement and undertaking so alleged, evidence was introduced by plaintiff showing that, sometime prior to May 8,1898, the Pennsylvania Company caused to be inserted in the Alliance Daily Leader, a newspaper published in the city of Alliance, the following advertisement: “Special Sunday excursion to Columbus via Pennsylvania Lines, May 8th, next Sunday; two dollars round trip. Excursion tickets will be sold to Columbus from Alliance, via Pennsylvania Lines, special train leaving at 6:45 A. M. central time, returning, leave Columbus 6:30 P. M. All day to see the Capitol City. Ohio National Guards are encamped at'Columbus.” The obvious purpose of this notice was to advise and inform the public that on the day and at the time named therein, a special excursion train would be run from Alliance to Columbus and return over or “via” the Pennsylvania Lines, and that round trip tickets would be sold by the Pennsylvania Company,for said excursion good for the round trip. This notice came to the attention of Catharine Loftis and the matter of said excursion was talked over by her with members of her family before she procured her ticket. This advertisement contained no information or notice that said excursion train would be run over any line other than the Pennsylvania Lines; and Catharine Loftis had no notice of any limitation on the responsibility of the Pennsylvania Company, or that said company would not be in entire charge and control of said excursion train from Alliance to Columbus and return. Evidence was also given showing that for the ticket sold to said Catharine Loftis a single charge was made for the entire trip and that payment therefor was made to and received by the ticket agent of the Pennsylvania Company at its office in Alliance. It was further shown that this was a special excursion train, and as made up when it left Alliance, was composed entirely of coaches belonging to the Pennsylvania Company and that these coaches were intended to be and were run through from Alliance to Columbus without change. These with other facts and circumstances proven in this ease, while not of themselves conclusive upon the question of the contract made or obligation and duty assumed by the Pennsylvania Company, were nevertheless, we think, competent to be given in evidence as bearing upon that question, and as tending to show on its part, an entire contract or undertaking to carry from Alliance to Columbus and return. Being competent as evidence, their probative force, and the weight and effect to be given them, in the light of all the facts and circumstances proven, was a question, to be determined by tbe jury under proper instructions from tbe court.

2. On tbe trial of tbis cause in tbe court of common pleas, counsel for tbe railway company submitted to tbe court certain requests to charge among wbicb were tbe following:

■ “1. A railroad company wbicb sells a coupon ticket over its own and a connecting line is presumed, in tbe absence of evidence to tbe contrary, to act as tbe agent for tbe connecting line, and is not liable to tbe purchaser of such ticket, for injuries sustained by reason of tbe negligence of such connecting line.

“2. If tbe jury find that in selling plaintiff’s wife a ticket to Columbus and return — if they do find that such a ticket was sold — tbe defendant was acting as agent for tbe Cleveland, Akron & Columbus Railway Company, so far as passage over that .road was concerned, tbe plaintiff cannot recover in tbis action.

“3. Tbe fact that tbe defendant at tbe time it sold plaintiff’s wife her ticket to Columbus (if tbe jury find that it did sell such ticket), and collected fare for tbe entire distance, is not, of itself, sufficient to warrant tbe jury in finding that defendant bad contracted to carry tbe plaintiff’s wife any further than tbe end of its own line, wbicb tbe testimony shows was at Orrville. ’ ’

These requests were all of them pertinent to tbe issues involved, and each correctly states tbe rule of law applicable to tbe particular state of facts to wbicb it was intended to apply. They should therefore have been given to tbe jury. As hereinbefore stated the sale by a railroad company of a coupon ticket containing coupons entitling the person to whom it is sold to transportation as a passenger over a connecting but independent line, does not necessarily import a contract or undertaking on the part of the company selling such ticket to become responsible for the safe carriage of such passenger for the entire distance, or beyond its own line, even though such ticket contains no express provision limiting the liability of the company issuing or selling the same to its own line of road. Unless the contrary appears the presumption is, that a railway company selling such coupon ticket over connecting but independent lines, in making such sale acts as the agent of the connecting line in the sale of the coupons and said coupons are regarded as in the nature of separate tickets on behalf of the connecting carriers, and binding upon them in the same manner as if issued or sold by themselves, and in the absence of evidence showing a different undertaking or obligation each will be responsible only for the safe carriage of the passenger over its own line. The above instructions asked by the railway company, merely called for the application of these rules of law to facts which there was evidence in the case tending to prove or establish, and we think therefore the trial court erred in refusing to give them. Other special requests were submitted by counsel for the railway company, but these we think were either properly refused or sufficiently covered by the general charge. The refusal of the court of common pleas to give to the jury the requests above designated, being one of the errors assigned by the railway company in the circuit court, that court erred in affirming the judgment of said court of cotutu on pleas. ■ The judgment of the circuit court in this case will therefore be reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Davis, C. J., Shauck, Price and Summers, JJ., concur.  