
    SQUIRES v. BROOKS.
    Damages; Negligence; Proximate Cause.
    Where the owner of an automobile, by his agent, leaves the automobile unlocked and unattended in violation of a municipal regulation, and another person making use of the automobile drives it at such a reckless and unlawful rate of speed as to damage the automobile of a third person, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of the driver of the car, and not the negligence of the owner’s agent in violating the ordinance; and consequently there can be no recovery against the owner for the injury.
    No. 2844.
    Submitted December 7, 1915.
    Decided January 3, 1916.
    Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sustaining a demurrer to the declaration in an action to recover damages for injury to an automobile.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:
    This action is based upon the alleged negligence of defendant, Leo O. Brooks, in that his agent left defendant’s automobile standing on a street in the city of Washington, unattended, without first removing the switch-pin, or locking the “lever, throttle, or switch,” as required by sec. 4, art. 24, of the Police Regulations of the District; that, while the automobile was so unattended, some person to plaintiff, Mary L. Squires, unknown, appropriated defendant’s automobile to his own use, and, while driving at a reckless and unlawful rate of speed, collided with plaintiff’s automobile, inflicting the damage for which an award is sought.
    Prom a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the declaration, plaintiff appeals.
    
      Mr. J. H. Ralston and Mr. W. F. Richardson for the appellant.
    
      Mr. Henry F. Woodard for the appellee.
   Mr. Justice Van Orsdel

delivered the opinion of the Court:

The demurrer was properly sustained, since the declaration clearly failed to state a cause of action against defendant. The act of defendant’s agent in leaving tbe automobile on the street unlocked and unattended, in violation of tbe Police Regulations, was not tbe proximate cause of tbe accident. Defendant bad no privity with tbe person wbo appropriated to bis own use bis automobile, and, while so unlawfully using tbe vehicle, inflicted tbe alleged injury. Between plaintiff and defendant an agency intervened, for which defendant was not responsible, and to which tbe accident is directly attributable. It is charged that tbe accident would not have occurred bad defendant’s agent not left tbe automobile unlocked on tbe street. Neither would it have occurred bad not tbe unknown person unlawfully appropriated tbe automobile to bis own use. Tbe first unlawful act was only á remote cause of tbe accident, while tbe second unlawful act was tbe proximate cause. However negligent defendant may have been in violating tbe Police Regulations, be was in no way a party to tbe alleged reckless and unlawful, acts which caused tbe accident.

Tbe judgment is affirmed, with costs. Affirmed.  