
    Polina GERTSKIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NYC D.O.H.M.H., Peter Backman, DC-37 Local 375, American Federation of State, County and Municipal, District Council 37, Civil Service Technical Guild, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 09-2458-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 30, 2010.
    Polina Gertskis, pro se, Brooklyn, N.Y.
    Ivan A. Mendez, Jr., Sharyn Michele Rootenberg, New York City Law Department, New York, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees N.Y.C. D.O.H.M.H. and Peter Backman.
    Maureen M. Stampp, Lewi's Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, New York, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees DC-37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, and Local 375.
    PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, CHESTER J. STRAUB, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Polina Gertskis, pro se, appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Griesa, J.), granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appel-lees on her discrimination claims, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; the New York State Human Rights Law; and the New York City Human Rights Law; and on her duty of fair representation claims under New York state law. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and focus on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003).

We analyze discrimination claims under the burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Cotp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 140-41 (2d Cir.2003) (applying McDonnell Douglas to Title VII claims). The burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas also applies to employment discrimination claims brought under §§ 1981 and 1983. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107,123 (2d Cir.2004); Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep’t, 888 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir.1989); Choudhury v. Polytechnic Inst. of N.Y., 735 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.1984).

Before bringing suit in federal court, a private plaintiff under Title VII must file timely administrative charges with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and receive a right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1). Where, as here, Gertskis had already filed the charge with the New York state agency, the charge needed to be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1996). We conclude, for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court, that Gertskis’s claims based on conduct occurring before February 24, 2006, were time-barred.

Having conducted an independent and de novo review, we further conclude that Gertskis’s sexual harassment claim fails because the record evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of her. See Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 61-62 (2d Cir.1998). Likewise, Gertskis’s Title VII, §§ 1981 and 1983 claims fail because she did not demonstrate that Defendants-Appellees’ non-discriminatory, legitimate business reasons for the alleged discriminatory employment actions were a pretext for discrimination. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817; see also Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he plaintiff must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s stated reason is a pretext for discrimination” by establishing “both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Finally, the District Council 37 and Local 375 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees is a municipal union organized pursuant to the New York State Fair Employment Act. Under New York state law, “a claim against a union for violating the duty of fair representation is subject to a four-month statute of limitations.” Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir.2006); see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 217(2)(a). The four-month limitations period begins to run when: (1) the plaintiff knew or should have know of the union’s breach of its duty of fair representation; or (2) the plaintiff suffered harm from that breach, whichever is later. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 217(2)(a); see Schermerhorn v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 156 F.3d 351, 353 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Gertskis filed her complaint on March 15, 2007, and thus we conclude for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court that her duty of fair representation claims based on conduct occurring before November 15, 2006, were time-barred.

We have considered Gertskis’s remaining claims and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED and Gertskis’s motion for a stay of city administrative proceedings, pending appeal, is DENIED.  