
    Roberts and Wife vs. Jackson’s Heirs.
    Lands acquired by descent from the father, do not, upon the death of the child intestate and without issue, vest in the mother for life, under the provisions of the acts of 1784, ch. 22, sec. 7, and 1784, ch. 10, sec. 3.
    Craven Jackson died seized and possessed of the land in controversy, in 1821. It was purchased by him of John Deatherage. He died intestate, leaving Mrs. Roberts, then Mrs. Jackson, his widow, and Carroll Jackson, an infant child by her, his heir at law. Shortly after the death of Craven Jackson, Carroll Jackson died intestate, without issue, or brother or sister, leaving Mrs. Roberts, his mother, him surviving, and the lessors of the plaintiff his uncles and aunts on his father’s side.
    Upon the trial in the circuit court, the jury, under the instruction of the court, found a verdict for the lessors of the plaintiff; the court being of opinion that the mother was not entitled to a life estate under the act of 1784. From the judgment rendered upon this finding, Roberts and wife appealed in error to this court.
    
      J. iS'. Yerger, for plaintiff in error.
    The only question that arises in this case, is, whether the mother of the child takes the estate for life in the land, under the acts of 1784, ch. 22, sec. 7, and 1784, ch. 10, sec. 3.
    At and before the passage of these acts, the common law rule prevailed in N. Carolina, by which the land descended to collaterals, in preference to a parent. 4 Kent’s Com. 391, 392. This was the evil to be remedied, as is pointed out in the preamble to the seventh section of the act of 1784, ch. 22, which preamble and section is in these words:
    “And whereas, by the law of descents as it now stands, when any person seized of a real estate in fee simple, dies intestate without issue, and not having any brother or sister, such estate descends to some collateral relation, notwithstanding the intestate may have parents living, a doctrine grounded upon a maxim of law not founded in reason, and often iniquitous in its consequences: Be it therefore enacted by the authority aforesaid, That in case any person dying intestate, possessed of an estate of inheritance without leaving any issue, or not having any brother or sister, or the lawful issue of such, who shall survive, the estate of such intestate shall be vested in fee simple, in his or her parent from whom the same was derived; or if such estate was actually purchased, or otherwise acquired by such intestate, then the same shall be vested m the lather of such intestate, if living; but if dead, then in the mother of such intestate and her heirs; and if the mother of such intestate should be dead, then in the heirs of such intestate on the part of the father, and for want of heirs on the part of the father, then to the heirs of the intestate on the part of the mother.”
    The third section of the act of 1784, ch. 10, converts the estate of a mother from a fee simple under the seventh section of the act of 1784, ch. 22, to an estate for life; to prevent an alteration of the descent, “by the accident of death, from the paternal to the maternal line,” as is shown by the preamble to said third section, which is in these words:
    
      “ And whereas, by the seventh section of said act, real estates actually purchased or otherwise acquired by any intestate, are to descend to the father, if living, but if ‘dead, then to the mother of such intestate and her heirs, by which the descent may be altered by the accident of death, and the paternal heir which is favored in all other instances, may be deprived of the inheritance by such accident; for remedy whereof, Be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, That in case of the death of any person intestate leaving any real estate actually purchased, or otherwise acquired, and not having any heirs of his body, nor any brother or sister, or the lawful issue of such, then such estate shall be vested in the father of such intestate, if living, but if dead, then in the mother for life; and after the death of the mother, then in the heirs of such intestate on the part of the father, and for want of heirs on the part of the father, then in the heirs of the intestate on the part of the mother forever. ”
    The words used in both sections are the same, with the exception mentioned, and they will be considered together in endeavoring to give them their true meaning and construction.
    It is of much importance to the community that the rule by which the title to property under these acts is to ~ x x */ be acquired, should be carefully and prudently laid down.
    These are enabling statutes, changing the rule of the common law, as it existed at the passage of the first,. which by that act is pronounced4‘iniquitous and unjust,” and for that reason should receive a liberal and enlarged construction.
    In order to the correct construction of these acts, the meaning of the words “actually purchased or otherwise acquired,” is necessary to be ascertained. The legislature is presumed to enact laws with a knowledge of the common law, and where they use words already used, the meaning of which, in the common law, is well known, they are presumed to use the words in reference to that known meaning.
    The common law, at the passage of the act of 1784, ch. 22, sec. 7, knew of but two ways of acquiring lands; these were “by purchase” and “by descent.” 2 Blac. Com. 201: 4 Kent’s Com. 369. The words “actually purchased,” used in the act of 1784, ch. 22, sec. 7, and the act of 1784, ch. 10, sec. 3, narrow the meaning of the word “purchase,” as known at the common law. That word at the common law would embrace under its mantle, gifts, devises, and all other modes of acquiring lands, other than by descent. Under the 7th section of the act, the words “actually purchased” would be construed to mean, when the value of the land had been paid either in money or some other valuable consideration, by the agreement of the party himself, entirely excluding such acquisitions of lands as were made upon good considerations; such, for instance, as lands acquired by gift, devise, &c. This not being the present case, the lands in controversy cannot pass under that portion of the statute, but must be governed and controlled by the words “ otherwise acquired. ” This would seem to be the plain and unambiguous meaning of the legislature, as to the words “ actually purchased,” and must so be considered by the court.
    
      If the words in the act had been “ whether acquired by purchase or descent, then they should go, &c.” there could be no doubt upon the question whatever, because by the meaning attached to these words at the common law, the present case would he embraced. The legislature, instead of using the exact words of the common law, restrain them in part, and use others of a much more enlarged meaning, to wit, “otherwise acquired,” which words, from their natural and genuine import, embrace much more than the words “by-purchase” or “by descent,” as used at the common law; and are used to embrace every and all modes of acquisition of land, in contradistinction to ^ that of acquisition by “ actual purchase.”
    The words “otherwise acquired,” are general and unrestricted as to the mode of acquisition, are plain and unambiguous in their meaning, and in their natural import embrace the case before the court.
    The general rule is that where the words of a statute are unambiguous and plain, whether expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have expressed. 2 Cranch, 386, 399.
    Another rule in the construction of statutes is, that a legislative act is to be interpreted according to the intention of the Legislature apparent on its face. Every technical rule, as to the force or construction of particular terms, must yield to the expression of the paramount will of the legislature. 2 Peters’ Rep. S. C. U. 662.
    It is also a rule in the construction of statutes, that they' should be so construed'that no clause, sentence or word should be superfluous or void. 6 Bac. Abr. 380.
    When words in a statute are express, plain and clear, • the words ought to be understood according to their genuine and natural import. 6 Bac. Abr. 380.
    It is dangerous for judges to launch out too far in construing a statute and searching for intention, when the legislature have expressed themselves in plain language. Willes’s Rep. 397: 4 Dallas’ Rep. 30, in note.
    
      It is contended that m view of the rules and principles P , , i • i i mi • , oí law above laid down, no sensible construction can be given to the words “otherwise acquired,” used in the statute, other than the one contended for, without construing some clause, sentence or word as superfluous, or without going directly against the plain and unambiguous words of the statute, and against their natural and genuine import, which the authorities above cited show to be inadmissible.
    The words of the 7th section of the act of 1784, if taken in their plain and natural import, operate to pass the lands acquired by the child in several modes.
    1. The first mode of his acquirement, pointed out for the beneficial operation of the statute in the first clause of the section, is, that “if any person dies intestate, possessed of an estate of inheritance without, &c.,” such estate shall vest in fee simple in his or her parent, from whom the same was derived. This clause can and does only apply to cases of donations and gifts, from either father or mother, in their lifetime, and when the child dies before the parent giving the estate, the child having paid no consideration for the gift. This may be seen from the fact that the legislature make no provision in favor of those who would be heirs to the parent, if he or she should be dead from whom the estate was derived.
    2. But this would not embrace all the cases in which great injustice would be done under the common law rule; the legislature, therefore, created another class upon which the act shall operate, and in using words in the disjunctive, say, not only incases of gifts shall it vest in the parent from whom derived, but if the intestate die seized of land “actually purchased,” it shall descend to the father or mother as the case may be. This is putting it in contradistinction to acquiring by gift from them in their lifetime, and does not mean purchase in its extended and common law sense; or if it did, it would embrace all cases of acquisitions of real estate, except descents, and would leave them for the operation of the words “otherwise acquired” alone, and would be repugnant to the first clause of the section, which need not be- by adopting this construction.
    3. Yet these provisions wéré too limited for the extended operation the Legislature intended to give the act; were not sufficient to embrace evéry class of cases, such as devises, gifts, descents, &c. they then put in use the words “otherwise acquired,” which are so enlarged as to embrace all. and every description and manner of acquiring real estate. The words of a statute should be so construed that they may he satisfied. This cannot he done, unless the words of the act are extended to such cases as the present, when the intestate acquired the lands by descent from the father, and dies seized in the lifetime of the mother.
    In the provisions of this section the Legislature seemed to intend to pass the lands to the parent living, no matter how acquired. In this view, it was only necessary that the intestate should he seized or possessed at his death, no matter how, to give the father, if living, the estate, or if'dead, the mother an estate-for life. It was the seizin of the child, not the mode of acquiring that seizin, that was to give to the parent this benefit. The law considers that the mother, who aids in the building up and procuring an estate which goes to her child, shall, in case of his death without heirs or father, have or preference over strangers.
    The words “otherwise acquired,” used in the 7th and 3d sections of these acts, embrace gifts from third persons, grants and devises. These.are only some of the modes of acquiring lands, but are not all. It is said in Blackstone’s Commentaries, .201, that “descent” is a mode of acquiring lands. The words of this statute are so general that this mode of acquiring lands by the intestate come within them; and why should this mode not be embraced as well as any other mode not particularly named and specified, especially when we see, from the preamble and the wording oí the act, the seizin oí the m-testate, and the benefit to be conferred upon the parents, were more looked to than the mode of acquisition? The acquisition of lands by descent is not so obnoxious to censure, as to make it necessary to except it by construction, from general words embracing it.
    It would seem that the legislature intended to give to both parents a reward for their care and attention, and if the father lived, that he should have it as the head of the family; if he died, and part of his lands should go to the child, and he died without heirs, &c., then the mother, presuming that she had aided in building up the estate to the father, from which the intestate’s inheritance came, and so if the lands descended from the mother. The preamble to the 3d section of the act of 1784, ch. 10, shows clearly that such is the meaning of the 7th section; it says the inheritance “actually purchased or otherwise acquired,” by the accident of death, may be made to pass , from the paternal to the maternal line, when the paternal is always to be preferred; and enacts that the estate given under the 7th section of the preceding act, shall only be a life estate in the mother. It would seem from this provision, that a life estate was considered an adequate reward to the mother, and that the benefit conferred upon her was only intended to be personal, not to extend to her heirs. To exclude the plaintiffs in error from this life estate under these acts, the construction must be extended to the cutting off all descents to the child; it cannot be partial and limited, because there are no words used which will justify such construction. 4 Kent’s Com. 393. If the lands had descended to the intestate from his only brother or sister, who had acquired them by an actual purchase, or gift, or devise, from a third person, or by gift from the father or mother, and such child died in the lifetime of the father or mother, seized of the lands so descended to him from his brother or sister, according to the construction contended for on the part of the defendants m error, by excluding descents from the operation of the words “otherwise acquired,” the father or mother would be cut off in this case from the advantage of survi-vorship intended to be given them under the acts of assembly. This would seem monstrous when the legislature evidently intended to provide for this very case; and to place the parent in the place of collaterals in all cases of intestacy by a child-without heirs or brothers and sisters, giving them a preference in the use over strangers or persons not so nearly related in blood.
    The construction contended for by the defendants in error would be making the Legislature quite as absurd in the rule they lay down, as was the rule of the common law which they were then modifying and changing. It would be preventing the father or mother from inheriting from the child directly, though nearest of blood to the child, but allowing them to inherit from the uncles or aunts, to whom the same descended, which would be indirectly inheriting from the child. This rule, all the authors when treating of the law of real property, pronounce absurd; and surely when construing acts made to change it, this court will not fall into the same absurdity, by excluding descents altogether. 3 Kent’s Com. 390, 391.
    These statutes are not changing the mode of acquiring lands; tins is not the matter to be remedied and regulated; it is the mode and manner of descent after acquired, that the legislature were endeavoring to remedy, no matter whether the lands were acquired by the intestate by “actual purchase or otherwise. ” To descend in the manner by them pointed out, it was only necessary that he should be seized and possessed of them in his own right, without regard to the manner or mode by which that seizin was communicated: this seems to me the only fair and legitimate construction that can be given to the words used in these two acts of the Legislature,
    
      
      Washington, for defendant m error. °
    
    1. The estate , , 1 . , . r , , . which a mother can inherit from a child, does not mean one which has descended from the father. 2. Hay. 115, 246, Swann vs. Mercer: North Carolina Law Repository, 2 Yol. page 406: University vs. Holsten, 1 Murphy, 4Q3: Wilsey vs. Sawyer.
    The mother’s claim is entirely bottomed upon the acts of 1784, ch. 22, sec. 7, and ch. 10, sec. 3. At common law, or by the English statute of descents, she could not have inherited from her son at all. In this position, both parties will concur; and from it, each must set out in his examination of the subject.
    If Craven Jackson had died without a child, this property would have gone to the defendants in error. 1784, ch. 22, sec. 3.
    Had Carroll Jackson died, leaving no mother, this property would equally have gone to the defendants in error. Vide same act.
    The 7th section of the act of 1784, ch. 22, and the 3d section of the subsequent act of the same year, ch. 10, contemplate several cases, in which a parent shall succeed to his or her child. The first is, when the estate has been “derived,” not descended from such parent. Sec. 7. This must mean, where the estate has been given or conveyed, by the parent in his or her lifetime; for, if it included an estate descended from, or devised by the parent, the parent must be dead, before the descent cast, or the devise would take effect, and the parent in such case, being dead, could not take.
    The second case contemplated by the sections referred to, is when the child “actually purchased.” This being a case of property acquired by descent, is not within the meaning of that part of the clause.
    The last case-is, where the land was “otherwise acquired” by the child, that is, otherwise than is mentioned in the two first cases. Does this embrace the case of property descended from either parent? It does not.
    
      l. Because the act contemplates an equal chance for either parent to be alive, and take. The property is to go to the father if living, if not, to the mother, &c.
    
      2. Because, if property descended from either parent was meant, the expression “derived from such parent,” as referred to in the first class of cases, was entirely superfluous and unnecessary. “Actually purchased,'” or “otherwise acquired,” would here embrace any possible case.
    3. Because, if the property descended from the mother, and the father be dead, it would go to the heirs of the child, on the part of the father, in exclusion of them on the part of the mother; and would be repugnant to the third and fourth sections of the act of 1784, ch. 22.
    
    4. Because, the third section of act of 17S4, ch. 10, which controls the seventh section of chapter twenty-two, contemplates such an acquisition of property by the child, as, without the corrective influence of the former section, would make it depend upon the accident -of the father’s death before that of the child, whether the property so acquired by the child, would not be transferred to the mother’s family, and the paternal line thus be defeated. An estate descended from either parent, could not, therefore, be meant, as by the whole spirit and tenor, and the express provisions of both acts, the line of that parent from which an estate decends, is to be preferred to the line of the other parent.
    5. Because, the mischief recited in the preamble to the third section of chapter ten, and which the enacting clause of the section undertakes to remedy, is the accident of the death of the father, in the lifetime of the •child, and of the mother, whereby the descent might be altered, &c. If the expression “otherwise acquired,” includes ‘ an estate descended from the father, then it could not aptly be termed an accident that the father died before the son, ‘or a grievance that the estate, in that event, took a direction whereby the paternal line might be deprived of it, as in such case, that would be the very destination which the act intended.
    6. Otherwise acquired, does not mean an estate descended from the mother. For, if the estate descended from her to the son, she must necessarily be dead before the son. And yet the provision under consideration contemplates that she may be alive at the death of the' son, and undertakes to qualify the estate which she shall take from him.
    7. Otherwise acquired, does not mean lands descended from either parent; for these words have reference to a case in which the heritable line might be altered by the accident of one person dying before another, and that consequence is guarded against by the third section of chapter ten. If the case of a descent be included, the consequence, as regards the deprivation of the paternal line, is avoided; but that same consequence, as regards the maternal line, is in some cases most certainly and inevitably incurred. Take the case of a descent from the mother. If the child die before the mother, and then she die, the father is tenant by the courtesy after her death, and upon his death, the inheritance goes to the-the heirs of the mother. ■ But if, by accident, (the very thing which the act meant to guard against,) the mother die before the child’, and then the child die, the estate goes to the father and his heirs. If the father die before the mother, and then she die, her estate goes to the child, and if he die without child, then the estate goes to the relations of the mother. So that we see, if property descended from either parent be included in the words “otherwise acquired,” the act effectually guards against the transfer of the father’s estate, into the mother’s family, by the accident of his dying first; but it causes when-the mother dies first, and then the son, living the father, her estate to go with absoluté certainty into his family. Before the passage of the third section of chapter ten, if the father might succeed to the mother’s estate, so might she t0 his, if the words, otherwise acquired, and in the seventh section of chapter twenty-second, mean property descended from either parent. But, by giving them this meaning, the chance of her ever succeeding to the father’s estate, is entirely taken away, while her own estate remains subject, in certain cases, to fall into the father’s family, according as the accident of death may happen in the order of time.
    8. These words are not intended of a descent from the father. On the death of the husband, without a child, the widow is entitled to a third for life, as dower, and the brothers and sisters of the husband, and for want of such, the uncles and aunts of the husband, to the fee simple. Then, why give her the whale for life, if the child die after the husband, when, by the occurrence of the death of the child posterior to that of the husband, the mother is left in the same situation precisely as if there had been no child originally?
    9. These words are not intended of a descent from the mother. If the child die before the mother, the father would be tenant by the courtesy, for life. If the child die after the mother, the father would, but for the construction of these acts against which I am contending, be still tenant by the courtesy, and only entitled for life. Then, why should the. accident of the child’s death, happening before or after that of the mother, as the case might be, make such an important difference in the destination of her property, when the situation of the father, let this accident fall out as it might, would be in all respects the same? If arguments drawn from political considerations, are to have any weight, it cannot be perceived what argument of that description could have influenced the Legislature, if they intended the construction insisted on by the plaintiffs in error.
    10. Upon the whole, then, the words “otherwise acquired,” in application to this case, mean an estate acquired by the child, not by derivation from a parent, (as contradistinguished from a descent,) nor by descent from * , , , ' J x a parent, nor by actual purchase irom any one else; but they mean an estate acquired by gift and conveyance, or by devise, or perhaps by descent, from some person other than the parent. This construction would comport with the spirit and intention of the acts, and would reconcile those discrepancies between their different parts, which would inevitably arise from a contrary interpretation.
   Geeen, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

In the passage of the act of 1784, ch. 22, the Legislature manifestly intended, first, that those nearest in blood to the intestate, should inherit his estate in preference to those more remote; second, that the blood of the father should inherit preferably to that of the mother; and third, that the line from whence the estate descended, should inherit it.

They intended to favor the paternal line, in casting upon it the inheritance, where the estate was acquired by purchase, in preference to the maternal line; but in cases where the estate descended upon the intestate, from his mother, and there be no children, or brothers and sisters of the whole blood, then thé paternal line, so far from being favored, is excluded altogether, and the estate is cast upon the relations of the mother.

With this view, let us consider what is the meaning of the act of 1784, ch. 10, sec. 3. This section recites, that “whereas, by the seventh section of the said act, (1784j ch.. 22,) real estate actually purchased or otherwise acquired, by any intestate, are to descend to the father, if living, but if dead, then to the mother of such intestate and her heirs, by which the descent may be altered by the accident of death, and the paternal line, which is favored in all other instances, may be deprived of the inheritance by such accident: for remedy whereof,” &c. Now this recital is inconsistent with the construction that the words otherwise acquired, are intended to include estates descended from either parent. We have seen that it was the policy of the act of 1784, ch. 22, that the mother’s estate' should go to her relations, and that in such case, the paternal line was not only not preferred, but it is absolutely excluded from the inheritance. How could the Legislature then say, (if otherwise acquired, meant estates descended from either of the parents) that the paternal line was favored in . all other instances except the one enumerated, when the fact was, that the paternal line was only favored in instances where the estate was acquired otherwise than by descent from the parents? The language used in this recital, indicates strongly to my mind, that they intended to use the words otherwise acquired, in a limited sense, and not as embracing acquisitions by descent from the parents.

Again: this third section provides that the estate shall vest “in the father of such intestate if living, but if dead, then in the mother for life, and after the death of the mother, then in the heirs of such intestate on the part of the father,” &c. If the words “otherwise acquired,” be taken to mean lands descended from the parents, then if the mother be dead and the father living, the lands descended from the mother would vest in the father and descend to his heirs; thereby taking the mother’s estate from her family, and casting it upon the family of the father exclusively. This would be directly contrary to the provision of the third and fourth sections of 1784, ch. 22, and would be so repugnant to the feelings of society, that it would not be tolerated.

The truth is, the Legislature have not attempted to use technical language in either 1784, ch. 22, sec. 7, or 1784, ch. 10, sec. 3. Technically, estates are only acquired by purchase, and by descent. But here, they used the words, actually purchased, as contradistin-guished from the extended technical sense of the word purchase. They mean, acquired by actual payment of consideration for the lands; thus leaving the words, otherwise acquired, ample operation, without involving these acts in the absurdities and contradictions which would result from a contrary construction. I therefore think that lands descended from either parent, are not within the provisions of the sections under consideration. In this opinion I am fortified by the uniform adjudications of the courts of North Carolina. 2 Taylor’s Rep. 406: i Mur. 493: see also the able argument of judge Haywood, in 2 Hay. 246.

We are therefore for affirming the judgment.

Judgment affirmed.  