
    Karmel ROE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-55471
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 14, 2017 
    
    Filed February 23, 2017
    Karmel Roe, Pro Se ,
    Evan Forrest Anderson, Akerman Sen-terfitt LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Justin Donald Balser, Melissa L. Cizmorris, Attorney, Akerman LLP, Denver, CO, for Defendants-Appellees
    Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Karmel Roe appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Roe’s action because Roe lacks standing to challenge any assignment of her loan into a securitized trust. See, e.g., Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 245 Cal.App.4th 808, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 790, 796 (2016) (holding that an assignment of a loan into a securitized trust that was allegedly forged or untimely was merely voidable and, therefore, the borrower lacked standing to challenge its validity).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Roe leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that denial of leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

We reject as without merit Roe’s contentions that the district court violated her right to due process, incorrectly analyzed relevant case law, and neglected to address any of Roe’s claims.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     