
    SIEW LENG CHEONG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General , Respondent.
    No. 14-50.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 13, 2015.
    Jon E. Jessen, Stamford, CT, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Senior Litigation Counsel; Andrea N. Gevas, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, RICHARD C. WESLEY, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted for former ■ Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Siew Leng Cheong, a native and citizen of Malaysia, seeks review of a December 16, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming the July 1, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge denying her applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Siew Leng Cheong, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Dec. 16, 2013), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 1, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues presented for review.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D), we lack jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who, like Cheong, is removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony unless the petition raises constitutional claims or questions of law. See Ortiz-Franco v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir.2015); see Santana v. Holder, 714 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir.2013).

With regard to withholding of removal, Cheong challenges only the agency’s con-elusion that the past harm she endured did not rise to the level of persecution. Her challenge raises a reviewable question of law. See Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.2012).

The record supports the agency’s conclusion that, when viewed either as isolated events or in the aggregate, Cheong was not harmed to the degree necessary to reach the high threshold of persecution. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006)(elaborating on the meaning of persecution). Cheong testified that on approximately three or four occasions in Malaysia, during school, after school, or when she was on the bus, Muslim boys touched her body with their hands. She was never subjected to serious physical or mental harm to the degree that her life or freedom was actively threatened, and the three or four incidents, considered in the aggregate, do not rise to the level of persecution. See id.; cf. Manzur v. Dep’t of Homeland Sea, 494 F.3d 281, 290 (2d Cir.2007) (“[Ajccumulation of harm from the individual incidents may rise to the level necessary for persecution even though an individual incident may not.”).

Assuming jurisdiction to review Cheong’s CAT claim, see Abimbola v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir.2004), substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that she did not establish that she would be more likely than not tortured if removed. Cheong presented no evidence that anyone sought to harm her specifically, and there is no evidence of conduct that would rise to the level of torture. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17; Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119-20 (2d Cir.2010); Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir.2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  