
    Tallman, Kellogg, and Collins against Woodworth.
    under the ten pound act, a constablewho acts as such ,n the cause, ought not to aWoi°noyBforr either party, constablcivbo was counsel for the plaintiff, served a watswornato r.itcnd ti.c^ ju— trial, and the In a suit before a justice defendant knew of bis being'counsel for the plaintiff, and made no objection to liim, the court would not reverse the judgment on that account; it appearing also, that no injustice had been done, nor was any abuse shown.
    IN error on certiorari* ' The constable who summoned the jury acted as counsel for the plaintiff. The defendant, though he knew that fact, gave the venire to the constable to serve* After the trial, the same constable was sworn to attend the jury, but the 'defendant made no , , . . . . . objection'to his going out with them*
    qnjie on]„ question raised, on the return to the ccriio-J 1 rari, was, whether the fact of the constable’s being coun^ se^ f°r the plaintiff under the circumstances of the case, rendered the judgment below erroneous.
    
      Sedgwick, for the plaintiff in error*
    
      Ford, contra.
   Per Curiam.

There was no form of proceeding viota-te<l in the present case; nor is it pretended that any iu-justice has been done. The constable had no interest in the verdict, though he had boon counsel for one of the parties. The defendant below must have had confidence in him, since, after knowing that he was counsel for the plaintiff, he delivered the venire to him for summoning the jury. The practice of allowing a constable, who acts as such officer in the cause, to appear also as attorney for either party, is certainly not to be approved of, since it may lead to great abuse; but in the present case no abuse is shown, and we may fairly infer that both parties consented to his going out with the jury.

Judgment affirmed..  