
    Ismael RUIZ-SOLIS, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 16-71539
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 18, 2017 
    
    Filed December 20, 2017
    
      John Carlos Barrera, Attorney, Acción Legal, PLLC, Nampa, ID, for Petitioner
    Susan Bennett Green, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
    Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Ismael Ruiz-Solis, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s determinations of credibility and continuous physical presence. Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011); Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 2006). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Singh, 643 F.3d at 1180 (court must uphold agency’s credibility finding unless evidence compels a contrary result). Absent credible testimony or other evidence to the contrary, the agency properly relied on the signed Form 1-826, Notice of Rights and Request for Disposition, as evidence that Ruiz-Solis’s acceptance of voluntary departure in 2009 was knowing and voluntary. See Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1995) (“information on an authenticated immigration form is presumed to be reliable in the absence of evidence to the contrary presented by the alien”).

Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Ruiz-Solis did not establish the required continuous physical presence and was therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(A); Ibarra-Flores, 439 F.3d at 618 (voluntary departure interrupts physical presence).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     