
    David Preston OUTZEN, Appellant, v. Lois Jenkins BOWEN, York C. Bowen, IV, International Service Insurance Company and Jack Eckerd Corporation, Appellees.
    No. UU-37.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Nov. 7, 1980.
    Woodburn S. Wesley, Jr. of Cotton, Wesley & Pouche, Shalimar, for appellant.
    J. Dixon Bridgers, III of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Pensacola, for Jack Eckerd, appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Outzen appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee, Jack Eckerd Corporation, urging there are genuine issues of material fact to be resolved by a jury. We agree and reverse.

The facts as presented give rise to a jury question on the issue of whether Ms. Bowen was within the scope of her employment when she had the automobile accident. Although the facts themselves are not in conflict, they will permit of different reasonable inferences. Jacobi v. Claude Noian, Inc., 122 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960), Ham v. Heintzelman’s Ford, Inc., 256 So.2d 264 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). We cannot agree that movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cohen v. Sloan, 190 So. 14 (Fla.1939), Swartzer v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 175 So.2d 36 (Fla.1965), Thurston v. Morrison, 141 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), Whetzel v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 266 So.2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).

Accordingly, the summary judgment is reversed and remanded for a full trial on the issue.

MILLS, C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.

THOMPSON, J., dissents.

THOMPSON, Judge,

dissenting:

There was no issue as to any material facts and no different reasonable inferences could be drawn from those facts. The trial judge correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Jack Eckerd Corporation holding as a matter of law the accident did not arise in the course of and the scope of her employment.

Accordingly, I would affirm the summary judgment entered by the trial judge.  