
    MARY J. GLYNN v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 17758.
    Decided January 11, 1897.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    Claimant takes out a license to manufacture sugar. She produces 165 hogsheads of cane sugar, in which production all the provisions of the act October 1, 1890, applicable thereto and all the rules prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue are complied with to his satisfaction. Subsequently 20 hogsheads of the • sugar are selected promiscuously, weighed and inspected by the proper revenue officer. The remaining 145 hogsheads are d estroyed by fire. The claimant files a claim for bounty on all of the sugar produced. It is allowed and paid on the 20 hogsheads which were inspected. As to the rest, it is referred to the court under section 1063, Revised Statutes.
    I.The purpose of the Act 1st October, 1890 (26 Stat. L., 567), was to encourage the production of sugar by payment of a bounty, and the only purpose of the notice, application, bond, and license required is to prevent fraud.
    II.The bounty provision of the act of 1890 in regard to the production of sugar is to be liberally construed.
    III. Where defendants issued a license for the manufacture of sugar under which a claimant invested time and caqdtal, they are estopped from denying the sufficiency of the application, notice, and bond upon which the license was granted.
    IV. The object of the test required by the statute was to ascertain with reasonable certainty the grade and quality of the sugar; and if the test is made to a sufficient extent to ascertain the quality it is a substantial compliance with the statute.
    V.Where a claim allowed by the accounting officers of the Treasury and approved by the Secretary, was subsequently referred to the court by the Secretary, under section 1063, Revised Statutes, such reference suspends the legal effect of the award and subordinates it to the jurisdiction of the court.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of tbe ease:
    The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
    I. The claimant filed, prior to July 1,1891, under section 232, Act of October 1,1890 (26 Stat. L., 567), with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a notice of the place of production, with a general description of the machinery and methods to be employed by her, with an estimate of the amount of sugar pro-posed to be produced in the next ensuing year by her, and an application for a license to so produce, which notice and application were accompanied by a bond in a penalty with sureties conditioned that she would faithfully observe all the rules and regulations that should be prescribed for such manufacture and production of sugar, as hereinafter shown.
    “NOTICE.
    “Notice is hereby given that Mrs. Martin Glynn, Martin Glynn, agent, resident of parish of Pointe Coupee, county or parish of Pointe Coupee, State of Louisiana, intends, under the name or style of Mrs. Martin Glynn, to carry on or engage in the business of producing sugar from beets, sorghum, or sugar cane grown within the United States during the year from July 1,1891, to July 1,1892, at the sugar factory owned by Francois Brun, at the place and with the machinery, and by the methods, hereinafter described.”
    II. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue received such application and bond, approved the penalty and sureties thereof, and issued a license to the claimant, No. 252, authorizing her to engage in business as sugar producer under the provisions of the act of Congress approved October 1, 1890, at the revenue factory, Island Post-Office, district of Louisiana, with machinery and by the methods and at the place described in her notice and application as hereinafter shown. License as follows:
    “279.
    “UNITED STATES TREASURY DEPARTMENT, OEEICE OE INTERNAL REVENUE.
    “ License for sugar producer, No. 252.
    
    “ This is to certify that Mrs. Martin Glynn is authorized to engage in business as sugar producer under the provisions of the act of Congress approved October 1, 1890, at Revenue Plantation, Island P. O., district of Louisiana, with the machinery. and by the methods and at the place described in her notice and application dated June 22, 1891.
    “This license will expire June 30, 1892.
    “G. W. Wilson, Acting Commissioner.
    
    “Dated at Washington, D. C., July 24,1891.”
    
      III. During tbe months of October, November, and December of 1891 claimant, being licensed as aforesaid, produced at tbe said revenue factory, in tbe State of Louisiana, 165 bogsbeads of sugar, testing between 80° and 90° by tbe polariscope, containing 184,871 pounds, from sugar cane grown by ber on her plantation, Eescue, in tbe said State in tbe said year. Said test was made as shown in. finding v.
    IV. Tbe claimant in tbe growing of tbe said sugar cane and in tbe production of tbe said sugar complied, to tbe satisfaction of tbe Commissioner of Internal Eevenue, with tbe provisions of tbe act of October 1,1890, applicable thereto, and with all the rules and regulations prescribed by tbe Commissioner of Internal Eevenue, with tbe approval of the Secretary of tbe Treasury.
    V. On tbe 30th December, 1891, tbe said sugar was ready to be inspected and weighed by tbe officers of tbe United States Treasury and verbal application made to the said officers to have tbe same weighed and inspected, which tbe said officers agreed to do; that on December 30 and 31 the weighing and inspection oí tbe said 165 bogsbeads of sugar was begun by the proper officer of tbe internal revenue and was completed as to 20 hogsheads thereof, which averaged in weight 1,120.25 pounds each of sugar, testing 86° by tbe polariscope; that on January 7,1892, before tbe remaining 145 bogsbeads of tbe said sugar bad been inspected and weighed, tbe same was destroyed by fire without fault of tbe claimant. Tbe said 20 bogsbeads were taken promiscuously from tbe lot and subjected to tbe test of tbe polariscope, which produced tbe said result. The rest of said sugar was produced from tbe same kind and quality of cane, raised on same laud, at tbe same time.
    Tbe claimant has received bounty for tbe said 20 bogsbeads. Nothing has been paid by tbe United States by way of bounty on tbe balance of said sugar. Tbe 20 bogsbeads on which bounty was paid were sampled one day and weighed on the next.
    VI. Tbe claimant applied to tbe Secretary of tbe Treasury to be paid a bounty of If cents on each pound of the said 145 bogsbeads of sugar, in accordance with section 231 of tbe Act approved October 1, 1890 (26 Stat. L., 567).
    
      YII. On tbe 10th day of May, 1892, the Gommissiouer of Internal Revenue certified the examination and allowance of ' f lie said claim in the following form:
    Schedule No. 296.
    
      Schedule of claims for bounty on sugar which have been examined and dllotved.
    
    
      
    
    (See letter to the honorable Secretary of the Treasury of this date.)
    I hereby certify that the foregoing claim for bounty on sugar has been examined and allowed.
    John W. Mason, Commissioner.
    
    Office of Inteenal Revenue, May 10.1892.
    
    Letter of May 10,1892, from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Secretary of the Treasury:
    “ I have the honor to transmit herewith the claim of Mrs. Martin Glynn for bounty on sugar which was destroyed by fire [before being weighed and inspected]. The amount of the claim is $2,843.01, being the bounty of If cents per pound on 165 (145) hogsheads of sugar weighing 162,458 pounds.
    “ The Solicitor of Internal Revenue has filed an opinion in the case, in which he states that he can see no objection to the allowance of the claim, in which opinion I concur.
    “As this is the first claim of this kind which this office has approved for payment, I forward it to you, before sending it to the Fifth Auditor, for your approval, with a request that if the claim is approved it may be referred for payment in the usual manner and this office be informed of your action.
    [Indorsement.]
    “$2,843.01.]
    “Treasury Department, May 13,1892.
    
    “Approved for $2,843.01 and referred to the Fifth Auditor for examination and settlement.
    “ O. L. Spaulding-, Acting Secretary.”
    
    Till. On the, 21st of May, 1892, the First Comptroller of the Treasury certified to the Register of the Treasury the sum of $2,843.01 as due by the United States to the claimant as a bounty on the said sugar under the provisions of the said act.
    
      IX. On the 23d of September, 1892, the Secretary of the Treasury referred the claimant’s above claim to this court under section 1063 of the Revised Statutes, saying the reference of this claim, together with all the vouchers and papers, documents, and proofs pertaining thereto, is made on the recommendation and request of the First Comptroller and Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
    X. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the power and authority vested in them by the act of Congress approved October 1, 1890 (26 Stat. L., 583, 584), made rules and regulations for the manufacture of sugar from sugar cane grown within the United States, which, during the period in controversy and during the fiscal year ending June 30,1892, were in full force and eifect, and among which were the following, viz:
    “All producers of sugar who intend to apply for the bounty on sugar produced during the year from July 1,1891, to July 1, 1892, in order to entitle themselves thereto must, after April 1 and prior to July 1,1891, file a notice and make application for a license.
    “This notice should be in duplicate, and be filed with the collector of internal revenue of the proper district, who will retain one copy and forward the other to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The application for license will be on the same form as the notice.
    “Producers of sugar from * * * sugar cane will use Form No. 287 for giving the notice and making the application required.
    “The blanks in these forms should be properly filled, and in case of any change in the methods of manufacture, location, or otherwise occurring subsequently to the date of the notice, a supplemental notice should be immediately given to the collector of the district or the deputy collector of the division. The notice and application for license will be required annually hereafter prior to the 1st day of July.” (MS. Rec., p. 164.)
    Said Form 287 has certain instructions printed thereon^ among which are the following, viz:
    “No. 8. The producer will state the mode of boiling, whether by vacuum, evaporation, open kettle, or steam train. If the sirup produced is to be worked into sugar at another factory the fact should be stated under this head, and the name of the person who is to make the sugar. The terms of the contract should be stated, but the amount to be paid by the producer need not be stated. Enough of the contract should be given to show its general character, to enable the Internal Revenue Bureau to determine who is in law the producer and entitled to the bounty.
    “If a planter or farmer sell the cane which he has raised, or sirup which he has produced, at any period before the manufacture of the sugar is completed, he will have no right to the -bounty on the completed product.
    “It will be necessary under the law to classify the sugar for payment of the bounty according to the polariscopic test.
    “The claims (for bounty) must be made by the sugar producer,' and the drafts issued in payment of the claims will be made payable to his order.
    “The form of the sugar-producer’s bond will be substantially as follows [prescribing Form 278].
    Said Form 278 has certain instructions printed thereon, among which are the following, viz:
    “The Christian name must be written in the body of the bond in full, and so signed to the bond.
    “When cane is purchased the book should show the name of the person or persons from whom purchased, and the amount from each. When sirup is purchased the books must show the quantity purchased and its average density, the name and address of persons from whom purchased, and the quantity in tons and acres of cane from which the sirup was produced, so that the sirup purchased can be traced back directly to the cane.
    “If a planter or farmer sends the sirup produced by him from cane to another factory to be made into sugar, still retaining the ownership of the sirup and the product, his books must show full details of amount of sirup shipped, date of shipment, route, etc., as well as the quantity of cane ground and sugar produced, and the manufacturer of the sugar must keep such sirup and the product distinct from any other, and make such additional entries in his books as will enable the Government officers to trace each lot of sugar made to the sirup and to the cane from which it was produced. * * *
    “ Every producer of sugar from * ■ * * sugar cane is required to make a monthly return, in duplicate, on Form No. 29(5; stating the quantity of materials used for the production of sugar, the quantity and kind of sugar produced, the quantity shipped or removed, etc. * * *
    “ When sugars are officially weighed and inspected at the factory, the producer must furnish the scales required for such purpose, and the same must be kept to conform with the United States standard. The packages must be removed from the factory as soon as practicable after being weighed and inspected. If intended to be held for storage, they should be removed at once to a storeroom or warehouse subject to control of an internal-revenue officer. A failure to comply with this regulation will be sufficient cause for withholding draft for payment of bounty. (MS. Rec., p. 190.)'
    “If the sugar producer does not desire to ship the sugar to a central place where a weigher is located, but desires to remove it from the factory for shipment to other points, or for sale at local points, or for consumption, or for storage in a warehouse, in case there is no weigher stationed at the factory, he will make an application to the collector or proper deputy collector of the division to have it weighed at the place of production.
    “ The application should be in the following form:
    “FORM 300.
    “united states internal revenue.
    “ Sugar producer’s notice and application for toeighing sugar at factory.
    
    (To "be made in duplicate to the collector or deputy collector of the division when there is no officer located at the factory.)
    “-,-, 189-.
    “ To-=-, Esq.,
    “ Collector Internal Revenue.
    
    “ Sir : You are hereby notified that the following-described packages of sugar produced by - at Factory License No. —, upon which bounty will be claimed, are intended to be removed from the factory for-, and I request that the same may be weighed and inspected at the factory:
    
      
    
    
      Sugar Producer.
    
    “Upon receipt of this application by the collector or deputy collector of the division, he will give instructions to the proper officer, directing him to examine, weigh, sample, and mark the packages at the factory, delivering to him a copy of the application of the sugar producer.
    
      ‘‘Theorder will be in the following form:
    
      “Collector’s insinuations to deptity collector to weigh sugar at the factory.
    
    (To be returned to the collector and died with, tlie weigher’s report.)
    “Oeeice Collector Internal Revenue,
    “-District oe-,
    “-, 189 — .
    “To-,
    
      “Deputy Collector.
    
    “Sir: You will proceed to the factory of-, at-, and examine, weigh, sample, and mark, according to the regulations, packages of sugar produced by him and intended to be removed for-, and described as follows in his notice dated-, and make your return in triplicate on the prescribed form attached to this order.
    
      
    
    Collector.
    “ Upon the receipt of this order, the officer will proceed to the factory and weigh, sample, and mark the packages, after making such examination as may be necessary to identify the packages with those described in the sugar producer’s notice, and to satisfy himself that the requirements ot' the regulations have been complied with, reporting on the prescribed form, as in the case of sugar weighed at a central place.
    “ If there is an officer stationed at the factory to weigh sugar, no written or printed notice of intended shipment or application for weighing is required.
    “ Samples must be taken at the time of weighing by a deputy collector or other officer acting under instructions of the collector.
    “ The classification of the sugar will be made by the inspector or the experts who examine the samples and make the polari-scopic tests, under direction of the inspector or collector.
    “ Samples of sugar which are required to be submitted to a polariscopic test to determine their classification shall be tested by the inspector or by experts in the use of the polariscope. The expert who makes the polariscopic test wifi report on the prescribed form to the inspector or other officer who is to determine the classification.
    “ When the weighing and inspecting is performed at a factory where there is no resident inspector or weigher, such officer being deputed to visit the factory for the purpose of weighing and inspecting sugar upon notification of the producer, samples will be taken from packages after they are packed and weighed. * * * In sampling the packages of a lot the proper percentage to be sampled will be determined by the inspector or other officer according to the directions given above under the head of ‘ Sampling at central place.’ (MS. Bee., p. 202.)
    u When samples of sugar for classification are taken at a central place the following instructions will be observed:
    “ ‘ Of open kettle or other sugars packed in hogsheads belonging to the same lot, 50 per cent, or every other package, shall be sampled.’ (MS. Bee., p. 233.)
    “ Claims for bounty will be made on Form Bo. 301, and presented to the collector of internal revenue, accompanied with the certificates of the proper officers showing the weights and classification of the sugar.”
    XI. The notice and application for license, on which the claimant relies, are not signed by the claimant herself, but as follows: “ Mrs. Martin Glynn, per Martin Glynn, agent.” They are each dated Ju^e 15,1891, and are upon Form 287.
    XII. The sugar cane from which the sugar was produced on which bounty is claimed in this case was grown upon a plantation owned by claimant, called Bescue Plantation, in Iberville Parish, La.; but all of said sugar cane was ground into sirup, and all of said sirup was worked into sugar at a sugar factory on plantation owned by Francois Brun, called Bevenue Plantation, in Iberville Parish, La., by the claimant and her employees.
    XIII. The power of attorney from claimant to Martin Glynn which he had in the year ending June 30,1892, is as follows:
    “ From -- — - -, State of Louisiana, to-, parish of Pointe Coupee: •
    “ Be it known by these presents that I, Mistress Mary Jane Wilson, wife of Martin Glynn, residing in Pointe Coupee Parish, have nominated, constituted, and appointed, and by these presents do nominate, constitute, and appoint, Martin Glynn, residing in Pointe Coupee Parish, my true and lawful agent and attorney in fact, express and special, giving and granting unto my said agent, for me and in my place and stead, authority to do and perform any and all acts necessary for the management, cultivation, etc., of my sugar plantation situated in this parish of Pointe Coupee and in the parish of Iberville. I further give unto my said husband, Martin G-lynn, express and special power to sign any and all acts, bonds, or obligations of any sort whatever which may be necessary for the purpose of obtaining a sugar bounty under the provisions of the act of Congress of the United States bearing date October, 1891, hereby binding myself, heirs, and assigns to ratify and confirm all that my said agent may do by virtue of this procu-ration, filling, and to all intents aud purposes, with the same validity, as if said acts were done by me personally.
    “ This done and signed at Pointe Coupee Parish on this 19th day of June, 1891, in the presence of the witnesses whose names are hereunto subscribed.
    “ Mary J. Glynn.”
    Said power of attorney was signed by two witnesses and acknowledged before a notary.
    XIV. The bond required by section 232 of the act of October 1,1890, on which claimant relies, was upon form 278. Claimant’s Christian name is not written or given in the body of said bond or signed thereto. The name as given in the body of the bond is “Mrs. Martin Glynn, Martin Glynn, agent,” and said bond is signed as follows: “Mrs. Martin Glynn, per Martin Glynn, agt.” It does not appear that a license was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to said Francois Brun to produce sugar at the Revenue Factory, Iberville Parish, La., for the year ending June 30, 1892.
    XV. There was no weigher or inspector at said Revenue Sugar Plantation, and no written or printed notice or application was made by or in behalf of claimant or of Mrs. Martin Glynn, Martin Glynn, agent, to the collector or deputy collector of the division in which her factory was located to have weighed or inspected at the place of production — that is to say, at Revenue Factory, Iberville Parish, La. — either the 20 hogsheads of sugar on which bounty was paid or the remaining 145 hogsheads of sugar which are claimed to have been destroyed by fire, or any sugar whatsoever, produced or claimed to have been produced under said license No. 252 during the fiscal year ending June 30,1892, except as shown in finding V.
    XVI. Exhibits D, E, and F are the reports made of the monthly production of sugar.
    
      “ Exhibit D.
    “Account of materials used for tbe production of sugar at the sugar factory carried on by Mrs. Martin Glynn, producer of sugar from under license No. 252 on the Revenue Plantation in the parish or county of Iberville, State of Louisiana, during the month of October, 1891.
    “Cane delivered at factory grown on plantation: Tons, 471 ; pounds, 229
    “Number of hours mill was in operation, 53.
    “ Juice obtained:
    Gallons. Density.
    22,661 10
    23. 994 9
    23', 994 9
    Total, 70,649
    “Sugar produced and packed during the month, 17 hhds. Gane grown on plantation and delivered at factory, 472f§|5 tons. Acres, 26.
    “Exhibit E.
    “During the month of November, 1891, cane delivered at factory grown on plantation: Tons, 705; pounds, '430. “Number of hours mill was in operation, 135.
    “ Juice obtained:
    Gallons. Average density.
    14, 663 10
    15,996 10
    17,329 10
    15,996 91
    23,994 91
    23.994 91
    19.995 91
    23,994 91
    23,994 91
    189, 955
    “ Sugar produced and packed during the month, 40 hhds. “Cane grown on plantation, cut, and delivered at factory, 705.43 tons. Acres, 39.
    “Exhibit F.
    “During the month of December, 1891.
    “Cane delivered at the factory grown on plantation: 978 tons, 1,500 lbs.
    “Number of hours mill was in operation, 147.
    
      “ Juice obtained:
    Callous.
    21, 328 18) 662 23, 994 21, 328 17,329 19, 995 18, 662
    21, 328 17,329 19, 995
    22, 661
    222, 611
    Average density.
    91
    94
    9*
    91
    94
    94
    94
    94
    “Sugars produced and packed, 108 bhds.
    “Total, 165.
    “Skipped or removed, 20; weigh, 22,405.
    “Sugars on hand at close of month, 145.
    “IX. Exhibit G, above mentioned, is (page 57) endorsed:
    “Duplicate certificate of polarization of certain sugar to substantiate the average test of sugar destroyed by fire produced by Mrs. Martin Glynn, license Ño. 252, upon which bounty is claimed.
    “United States Internal Revenue. Report of polariscopic test of sugar, U. S. Laboratory, New Orleans, La., Feb. 10, 1892. Serial No. of sample, 5327; first test, .8610; test used for classification, .8610. Duplicate report for sample, No. 5327. License, 252. Lot No. 1, which was originally polarized Jany. 6th, 1892.
    “F.E. Maghjir,
    “ Chemist in Charge.”
    
    
      Mr. Ward Thor on (with whom was Mr. James Lowndes) for the claimant:
    The law does not make the existence of the right depend upon an official weighing and testing. On the contrary, the law creates the right upon the existence of a state of facts.’ The methods of procedure to be adopted in determining these facts are a matter of administrative detail, which the Commissioner of Internal Eevenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may regulate as he may deem proper or necessary to secure the Government against fraud. (Camp-hell v. United States, 107 U. S., 410.)
    The court, having jurisdiction of this case, is in no way bound by the forms of procedure which the ministerial officers of the Government may adopt to assist them in determining the facts. The claimant, having clearly established the facts upon which her rights depend, is entitled-to judgment. (Campbell Case, id.)
    
      Mr. Conway Robinson (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney- General Dodge) for the defendants:
    So far as the weighing, sampling, inspecting, and testing by the polariscope of the 145 hogsheads of sugar in controversy is concerned, these things can not now be done because, as alleged, this sugar was destroyed by fire on January 7,1892. So far as the evidence shows, this was an inevitable accident. It was certainly not caused by or due to any act or fault of the Government. It effectually prevented the claimant, however, from thereafter complying with such provisions of the statute and of the rules and regulations as required that the sugar should be tested by the iiolariscope, and as related to its being weighed, sampled, and inspected, which, as just stated, were conditions precedent to any right of recovery. What, then, is the effect of an inevitable accident in such a case?
    It has already been shown that the performance of these conditions was not prevented by any act, or fault, or negligence of the Government, but by the fault of the claimant herself, and that she has not done the things which she was required to do. (Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall., 7, 8.)
    There is an important feature of this case to which the court’s attention should.be called. If the claimant, instead of violating the rules and regulations from first to last, as pointed out, had complied with them in every particular, so far as there was anything which she herself was called upon to do, yet still there would remain an insuperable barrier to her recovery in this case, viz: This 145 hogsheads of sugar in controversy was never tested by the polariscope. It will probably be argued on behalf of claimant that this test by the polari-scope was something to be done after the production of the sugar was completed, and that if claimant had up to that time fully complied with all the rules and regulations, so far as anything was required by them to be done by her, she should not be deprived of the bounty merely because the officers of the Government had not so tested the sugar. Had the statute been silent upon the subject, had there been nothing in the act of Congress requiring the polariscopic test, had it been required merely by the rules and regulations and not by the statute, it w ould have been only a ministerial act. But such is not the case. By the very terms of the law it is made an essential prerequisite, and so it becomes a condition i>recedent to any right to bounty that the saccharine strength of the sugar on which such bounty is claimed should be established, not by its color, or its taste, or its grain, or its dryness merely, or by any such crude tests, but by the polariscopic test.
    So, where work doné by the Government was,'by the contract, not to be paid for until an agent of the Government certified that it was in all respects as. contracted for, and after completion of the work the agent refused to give the certificate, the Supreme Court held that “ the agent’s certificate is a condition precedent to payment.” (Sweeney v. United States, 109 U. S., 618; S. P. B. B. Go. v. March, 114 U. S., 552, 553.)
    The fact, therefore, that without any fault or negligence on the part of the Government the saccharine strength of the sugar in controversy has not been, and can not be, determined by the polariscopic test would of itself be sufficient to defeat this claim, even if claimant had in all other respects complied with the rules and regulations; and when it is remembered that in various ways she has from beginning to end violated the rules and regulations in numerous matters required to be done, not by the Government’s agents, but by the claimant herself, it is respectfully submitted that she most unquestionably must be held not to be entitled to any bounty.
    The case of Campbell v. United States (107 U. S., 410), cited in claimant’s brief, has not been overlooked, but that case really has no application to the case at bar. In that case the acts which were held to be merely ministerial were not acts which the claimant was required to do or which the law required to be done, but exclusively acts which (after the claimant had done all that the law required to perfect the claim) were required, not of the claimant, but of the Government’s own agents, and were required, too, not by the statute, but merely by the rules and regulations. In the case at bar the things which are complained of as not having been done in accordance with the rules and regulations are things which the claimant herself was thereby required to do, and the omission of any polariscopic test is the omission of what not only the rules and regulations but the statute itself required.
    
      By tbe express provisions of tbe act of October 1,1890, sections 231 and 234 (supra), it was with tbe approval of tbe Secretary of tbe Treasury that tbe Commissioner of Internal Bevenue was authorized to make tbe rules and regulations in question. It was only by tbe joint action of these two officials that they could be made, and when once so made tbe Commissioner alone could not by bis separate action change them, depart from them, or waive them; and, as be could not do so-himself, neither did any of bis subordinates have any right, authority, or pow.er to depart from or waive any of tbe requirements of these rules and regulations, and all sugar producers, were unquestionably bound by them.
   WeldoN, J.,

delivered tbe opinion of tbe court:

On September 23,1892, tbe honorable tbe Secretary of the Treasury referred to this court tbe claim of Mrs. Martin Glynn, “ a licensed sugar producer of the district of Louisiana, for a bounty on sugar which was destroyed by fire before being weighed and inspected, the claim having been made under the provisions of the Act of October 1,1890 (26 Stat. L., 583).”

It is stated in the letter of transmittal that the reference is made upon the recommendation and at the request of the First. Comptroller and Commissioner of Internal Bevenue.

• In pursuance of the right given the claimant by the action of the Secretary, a petition was filed on the 30th day of September, 1892, in which, in substance, it is alleged that during October, November, .and December, 1891, the claimant was a producer of sugar from sugar cane grown in the United States, in the State of Louisiana, duly licensed under the said act of Congress; that during three months she produced at her factory “Bevenue,” from cane grown on her plantation “Bes-cue,” in said State, under license No. 252, as follows: In October 17 hogsheads, in November 40 hogsheads, in December 108 hogsheads — in all, 165; tha’t in the production of which she complied with all the rules and regulations prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Bevenue; that on the 30th of December, 1891, claimant called upon the deputy collector of the district in which the factory was situated to inspect and sample and weigh said sugar; in compliance with said request-he sampled and weighed 20 hogsheads, promised to return on the 2d of January and complete weighing; he did not return,, and'on tbe 7tb day of January, 1892, tbe factory and said 145 bogsbeads of sugar were destroyed by fire; tbat said sugar so destroyed amounted to 162,458 pounds, testing between 80° and 90° by tbe polariscope; tbat claimant is entitled under said act to If cents on eacb pound of sugar, and bas made application to tbe Commissioner of Internal Revenue for tbe same.

To tbe petition, by leave of tbe court, an amendment was made on tbe 18tb of December, 1896, as follows: “Which claim was examined and allowed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue May 10,1892, and referred to tbe proper accounting officers for settlement; tbat tbe proper accounting officers settled tbe account, and on May 21 tbe First Comptroller admitted and certified to tbe Register of tbe Treasury a balance of $2,843.01 as due claimant.”

Tbe original petition counted upon the liability of tbe defendants because of a substantial compliance with tbe act of October 1, 1890, entitling tbe claimant to a bounty of If cents on eacb pound of sugar produced and destroyed; and the amended petition counts upon a liability on tbe part of the defendants based upon tbe allowance of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on May 10, 1892. Tbe amendment to the petition is substantially tbe allegation of an award upon tbe part of tbe Commissioner, which in law, as it claimed, constitutes tbe basis of a right of recovery on tbe part of tbe claimant.

To these contentions tbe defendants reply, as to tbe first, tbat upon tbe facts alleged and to be found from tbe evidence there is no liability uj)on the part of tbe defendants, because such facts are not a compliance with tbe requirements of .the law; tbat tbe law must be strictly construed, and in order to entitle a party to recover a strict compliance with tbe statute must be shown; tbat as to tbe amended petition there was no consummate allowance on tbe part of tbe Commissioner amounting in legal effect to an award, and tbat, whatever may have been done in tbe Department by tbe Commissioner, tbe reference of tbe claim to this court with tbe concurrence of tbe Commissioner of Internal Revenue invalidated and suspended bis action as a final award.

It is also contended by counsel for tbe defendants tbat tbe reference by tbe Secretary was improper, inasmuch as this court is without power to render a judgment as required by the proviso to section 1063 of the Bevised Statutes, which is as follows:

“That no case shall be referred by the head of any Department unless it belongs to one of the several classes of cases which, by reason of the subject-matter and character, said court might, under existing laws, take jurisdiction of on such voluntary action of the claimant.”

The counsel for the defendants takes exceptions to the application filed by the claimant for a license, the form of bond, and to the general sufficiency of the acts of the claimant -in attempting to comply with the'requirements of the law entitling persons to the bounty provided by section 231 of the statute of October 8, 1891, entitled “An act to reduce the revenue and equalize duties on imports, and for other purposes.” (26 Stat. L., 567.)

The substance of sections 231 and 232 of said act, which have particular reference to the issue presented in this case, may be stated as follows: Section 231 provides a bounty of 2 or If cents per pound on all sugar prod need from sugar cane grown in the United States, depending upon the quality as ascertained and determined by a polariscopic test under such rules and. regulations as may be prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Bevenue', approved by the Secretary of the Treasury.

Section 232 prescribes what shall be done upon the part of the producers in order to entitle them to the benefits of the statute. They shall before July 1 in each year file with the Commissioner a notice of the place of production, general description of the machinery, methods to be employed, estimate of the sugar to be produced, and an application for a license to so produce, accompanied by a bond to be approved by the Commissioner conditioned that all rules and regulations prescribed shall be faithfully observed; and section 233 provides that the Commissioner, upon receiving such application and bond, shall issue a license to produce sugar from various products, including sugar cane.

By section 235 the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to draw warrants on the Treasurer of the United States for such sums as shall be necessary in the payment of bounties, which sums shall be certified to him by the Commissioner of Internal Bevenue, by whom the bounties shall be disbursed.

The sections cited provide in substance the requirements by which the manufacturers can avail themselves of the bounty provided by law for the manufacture of sugar. The purpose of the act of 1890 was to encourage and protect persons engaged in the production of sugar by the payment of a bounty to them of a certain amount for sugars of a certain grade, and the only purpose Congress had in view in providing notice, application, bond, and license was to guard the defendants from the perpetration of fraud in compelling them to pay a bounty on sugar that had not been produced.

No question is raised as to the constitutional power of Congress to pass the act of 1890 providing the bounty sued for, that question having been settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Field v. Clark (143 U. S., 649) and the cases of United States v. Realty Company and The United States v. Gay Company (163 U. S., 427).

In the latter cases if is said:

The production and manufacture of sugar in the Southern and some parts of the Western States from sugar cane and from sorghum and beets had become at the time of the passage of the act of 1890 an industry in which a large number of the citizens of this country was engaged, and its prosecution involved the use of a very large amount of capital. The. tariff theretofore had been very high upon imported sugar, and the native industry had thereby been encouraged, fostered, and greatly increased. The subject how to treat this industry was under discussion in Congress while the tariff act of 1890 was before it, and it finally decided the question by enacting the bounty clause of that act.”

Eeference is made to the last decision for the purpose of showing what Congress had in view, from the standpoint of judicial interpretation, in the passage of the bounty sections in the act of 1890, and from that interpretation it is safe to assume that the act is to be liberally construed in giving to the citizens the relief intended by the act. Revenue laws are to be construed liberally to carry out the purposes of their enactment.” (Smith v. Fiske, 23 Wall., 380.)

The very term bounty implies liberality for the purpose of inducing persons to engage in enterprises or perform individual acts which the Government desires to encourage.

The findings show that the claimant made application under the statute to be licensed as a manufacturer of sugar, and that the Commissioner, after an examination, as it is presumed, of sucb application and bond, issued a license to claimant as contemplated by the statute, and under that license'the claimant proceeded to manufacture a large quantity of sugar, upon which no bounty has been paid.

The sugar was produced during the months of October, November, and December, 1891, after the date of the license.

On the 30th of December, 1891, the sugar was ready to be inspected and weighed by the officers of the Treasury, and verbal application was made to said officers to have the same weighed and inspected, which they agreed to do; that on December 30 and 31 the weighing and inspection of the said 165 hogsheads was begun by the proper officer of the internal revenue and was completed as to 20 hogsheads, which averaged in weight 1,120.25 pounds each of sugar testing 86° by the polariscope; that on January 7,1892, before the remaining 145 hogsheads had been inspected and weighed, the same were destroyed by fire without fault on the part of claimant. The 20 hogsheads which were weighed and tested were taken indiscriminately from the lot, and subjected to the polariscope with the said result. The sugar not tested was produced from same kind and quality of cane, raised on the same land and at the same time.

The claimant made application to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment of a bounty of If cents on the sugar destroyed, and the proceedings thereon are shown in findings vn, yin, and is.

While in the notice and bond there may be technical defects in not complying with the strict letter of the law and regulations, the substance of the statute was complied with to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, who upon the faith of such application, notice, and bond issued a license, which in good faith was accepted by the claimant and upon the authority of which she invested her time and capital in the production of sugar. The defendants are estopped from denying the sufficiency of the application, notice, and bond after the license has been granted and upon the faith of which the claimant has acted. u Where a responsible officer of the Government gives a construction to a statute upon the faith of which a contractor renders a service and receives his pay, the Government can not subsequently open the transaction and recover back the money upon a different interpretation of the law. (Alabama R. R. Case, 25 C. Cls. R., 31.)

“If the agents of the Government allow a contractor to believe that he is complying with his contract at the time of performing and thereby prevent him from supplying a defect which he might remedy, the Government can not afterwards claim a reduction intended to apply when the contractor was in fault.” (Merriman's Case, 20 C. Cls. R., 291.)

As to the quality of the sugar not weighed and absolutely tested, as were the 20 hogsheads, it may be said, “that is sufficiently certain which can be made certain.” This one of the maxims of the common law and one of the rules of logic, which, being applied to the question of the character of the sugar of the 145 hogsheads in suit, establishes the fact or presumption that they were of the same quality of sugar which was tested according to the strict requirements of the statute. The 20 hogsheads were taken indiscriminately from the general lot raised on the same land, of the same crop, and manufactured at the same time as the 145 hogsheads. It would be doing violence to every rule of reason to doubt for a moment the presumption that the 20 hogsheads and the 145 hogsheads were of the same kind and quality.

The object of the test prescribed and required by the statute was to ascertain with reasonable certainty the grade and quality of sugar, and if that test is made to a sufficient extent to ascertain the quality it is a substantial compliance with the statute and subserves every purpose of a detailed and minute examination and inspection.

The court therefore determines that the facts shown in finding v establish a sufficient test upon the quality of the sugar and bring it within that classification which entitled the producer to If cents per pound under the statute.

We do not fail to note the position taken by counsel for the defendants that the destruction of the sugar without the fault of the claimant will not absolve her from the performance of the conditions upon which her right to a bounty rests.

It is undoubtedly the law that “where a contract is to do a thing which is possible in itself the performance is not excused by the occurrence of an inevitable accident or other contingency, although it was not foreseen by the party nor was within his control.” (Jones v. U. S., 96 U. S., 29.)

It is not necessary from the view which we have taken of the law in this case to encumber the discussion of the question of the liability of the defendants with an examination of the authorities upon what will and what will not excuse parties from the obligation of their undertakings to engage in enterprises or perform individual acts which the Government desires to encourage.

The counsel for defendants insist that the subject-matter of the reference is not within the jurisdiction of the court under the proviso to section 1063 of the Revised Statutes, and that no judgment can be rendered in favor of claimant; that it does not belong to one of the several classes of cases which by reason of the subject-matter and character of the claim the court might take jurisdiction under existing laws on the voluntary action of the claimant. If that point is well taken, it is fatal to the proceedings in this court, and the petition must be dismissed.

That contention raises a most serious contention, going as it does to the Jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the claim.

The record of the proceedings in the Treasury Department presents rather a novel condition of the claim. Every officer having any connection with the claim, except the Secretary of the Treasury in the drawing of the warrant, who has acted, passed favorably on its allowance; but in the end and before the final consummation of the claim in the form of a warrant upon the Treasury, the Secretary, at the instance of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Comptroller, sends the matter here for judicial determination under section 1063 of the Revised Statutes.

Whatever may be said as to the legal effect of the allowance of the claim by the Commissioner and the approval of the Secretary and other official acts, the reference of the claim by the Secretary at the instance of the Commissioner and Comptroller suspends the legal effect of the finding in the Department and subordinates the award to the judicial power and jurisdiction of this court. Out of abundant caution, in which they are to be commended, the officers of the Department have remitted to the jurisdiction of this court the legal rights of the claimant, to be dealt with according to the law and rules of judicial investigation.

It may not be necessary for us to determine tbe legal effect of tbe allowance of tbe claim in tbe Department, as shown by tbe findings; whether it is sufficient as an award upon which a suit can be successfully maintained, as alleged in tbe amendment to tbe original petition, is purely abstract in its importance if upon tbe general subject-matter there is sufficient to determine and adjust tbe legal rights of tbe parties.

Tbe case of United States v. McLean (95 U. S., 750), cited by counsel for defendants, was a suit by a postmaster for an alleged salary, which was dependent upon tbe readjustment of an executive officer, which was not readjusted at tbe time of tbe suit. Tbe Supreme Court held in substance that, inasmuch as tbe claimant’s rights arose from tbe act of an executive officer in tbe readjustment of bis salary, no right of action existed until such officer acted and afforded tbe basis upon which to predicate tbe right.

. Tbe counsel for claimant in their briefs and in oral argument rely upon tbe case of Campbell v. The United States (107 U. S., 407) as an authority to maintain tbe jurisdiction of tbe court in tbe right to adjudicate tbe subject-matter of tbe controversy and tbe rendition of a judgment.

That case originated in tbe Court of Claims and may be taken as tbe leading case upon the question of tbe jurisdiction of the court applicable to tbe kind-and quality of claim made in this proceeding. Tbe controversy arose in tbe construction of tbe fourth section of tbe act of August 5, 1861, cb. 45, which is as follows:

“That from and after tbe passage of this act there shall be allowed, on all articles wholly manufactured of materials imported, on which duties have been paid, when exported, a drawback equal in amount to tbe duty paid on such materials, and no more, to be ascertained under such regulations as shall be prescribed by tbe Secretary of tbe Treasury: Provided, That ten per centum on tbe amount of all drawbacks so allowed shall be retained for tbe use of the United States by tbe collectors paying such drawbacks respectively.”

Upon tbe facts of that case this court held that it was not within our jurisdiction; but tbe Supreme Court decided otherwise, sustaining tbe jurisdiction of the court and ordering a judgment for tbe amount of tbe claim.

Under tbe act of 1861 tbe Secretary of tbe Treasury established certain regulations, tbe substance of tbe first being that the exporter to be entitled to a drawback was required to do certain acts, and upon such acts being done it became tlie duty of the collector to issue a certificate of the' amount to which the party was entitled as a drawback; the exporter did iu substance all he was required to do, but the certificate was never issued by the collector and in that connection the Supreme Court say:

“The argument of the counsel for the United States is, that until the officers of the customs comply with all the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury and the collector issues the drawback certificate the law imposes upon the United States no obligation to pay anything for such drawback; that the law conferred upon the Secretary the right to make the regulations and the collector the power to make the certificate for payment of drawback, and that the refusal of the collector to perform the duties imposed upon him preliminary to making his certificate, and then refusing the certificate, totally defeats the claim of the party, who, by the law, is guaranteed a right to his drawback and who has complied with all' that the law requires of him to secure and enforce it.”

The court after a further discussion of the law in the same direction say:

“We think the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of such a claim (1) because it is founded on a law of Congress, and (2) because the facts found in this case raise an implied contract that the United States will refund to the importer the amount he paid to the Government. * * *
“ It is the law which gives the right, and the fact that the customs officers refuse to obey these regulations can not defeat a right which the act of Congress gives.” (Durant Case, 28 C. Cls. R., 356; Tide Water Co. Case, 31 C. Cls. R., 90.)

It is said in the Durant Case:

“Where the right of a party rests on a statute and does not require the action of a revenue officer to determine the right or to fix the amount the case is not a revenue case within the intent of the decision in Nichols. (7 Wall., 122.) Being founded on a law of the United States, it is within the jurisdiction of this court.”

In the case of Nicoll it was held, “cases arising under the revenue laws are not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.”

That was a suit to recover duties improperly and illegally assessed, as alleged by the claimant, and the court decided not only that the plaintiff was without remedy because he had not pursued the requirements of the law in relation to protest, but also that tbe court iu which he sought redress was without jurisdiction.

That case preceded the Campbell Case, and whatever difference in law may exist between the decisions must be decided in favor of the Campbell Case, that being the last expression of the Supreme Court.

The drawback in the Campbell Case, bearing a close analogy to the bounty in this case, differed in the opinion of the Supreme Court from the alleged payment of illegal taxes in the Nicoll Case, and upon that difference (if the cases are to be harmonized) the court held the Government not liable in one and liable in the other.

The demand in this proceeding is founded on a law of Congress, which obligates the defendants to pay a certain fixed bounty on all sugar produced from cane in the United States, in compliance with the requirements of the statute.

The right springs directly from the provisions of the law in the form of an express obligation to pay a certain compensation for certain productions on the part of persons engaged in the industry of sugar making. It is the duty of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to disburse the appropriation to such persons as bring themselves within the provisions of the law providing for the payment of the bounty. He has ascertained and reported the amount due the claimant, but has suspended the execution of the award until more fully satisfied upon the legal question of the right of the claimant to recover. The facts have been ascertained and settled by the finding of the Commissioner in the allowance which he reported to the Secretary and which was approved by the Secretary.

The warrant was not drawn, but every act antecedent thereto to consummate the right of the claimant to the bounty was substantially done upon the part of the officers intrusted with the execution of the law. As has been said, the legal effect of the allowance may be suspended by the reference at the iustance of the Commissioner and Comptroller, but the fact of the allowance remains as an ascertainment of facts indicating a compliance with law on the part of the claimant.

Without determining the exact legal effect of the allowance in connection with the amended petition, the court decides upon the facts.found that the claimant is entitled to recover the sum of $2,843.01, as indicated m the conclusion of law.  