
    Travis v. Travis et al.
    
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.
    
    May 14, 1888.)
    "1. Appeal—Requisites—Bond—Execution by Surety Company.
    Laws 1886, c. 416, amending Code Civil Proc. § 811, provides that a bond executed by a guaranty or surety company shall be equivalent to one signed by two sureties, provided the same shall be approved by a judge of the court in which such bond is given. Hence when a plaintiff, on appeal from the supreme court to the court of appeals, without objection on the part of defendant, files a bond given by a surety company as sole surety, but without approval by a judge of the court, a motion made by defendant, 14 days afterwards, to dismiss the appeal for want of proper bond, must be granted. Pratt, J., dissenting.
    ■ 2. Same—Bond—Approval.
    But the court will grant the appellant in such case leave to apply to a justice of the court for the approval of the bond, with the right thereafter to the respondent to except to its sufficiency.
    Appeal from special term.
    John Travis brought this action against Bernard Travis and Jesse Travis for a partnership accounting. Judgment was entered upon the report of a referee in favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendant Bernard Travis, for §10,117.11, and in favor of the defendant Jesse Travis for §20,447.20. This judgment was reversed by the general term, Second department, and a new trial ordered, and from that decision the plaintiff and the defendant Jesse Travis appealed to the court of appeals. The notice of appeal, together with an undertaking in due form signed by two sureties, was filed, and copy served July 11th—in due time. The undertaking was excepted to, and the sureties were required to justify. The sureties did not justify at the time fixed, • and the time for justification or service of a new undertaking was extended by various orders to November 5th, when a new undertaking was served, executed by the American Surety Company alone. Section 811 of the Code • of Civil Procedure, as amended by chapter 416 of the Laws of 1886, provides that the execution of an undertaking “by one surety is sufficient, although the word ‘ sureties ’ is used, unless the provision expressly requires two or ■ more sureties; and the execution of any such bond or undertaking by any fidelity or surety company authorized by the laws of this state to transact • business shall be equivalent to the execution of said bond or undertaking ■ by two sureties, provided the same is approved by a judge of the court in which such bond or undertaking is given, and such company, if excepted - to, shall justify through its officers or attorney in the manner required by law.” Section 1334 of the Code provides that the undertaking on appeal to the court of appeals “must be executed by at least two sureties.” The • orders extending time to justify were all obtained ex parte except one. On ■ October 26th the time was extended by an ex parte order to November 29th. Upon the respondent’s motion to shorten the time thereby granted, the appellants were, by order made October 31st, given until November 5th to justify, and on the latter date the new undertaking was served. The new un- ■ dertaking was received without objection, and no exception noticed, but 14 ■ days after the respondent moved to dismiss the appeal, which motion was .granted upon the ground that the undertaking was invalid, because not approved by a judge of the court before filing. -From the order dismissing the Appeal to the court of appeals this appeal is taken by the plaintiff and the defendant Jesse Travis.
    Argued before Barnard, P. J., and Pratt, J.
    
      Charles H. Machín, for John Travis. D. Crawford, for Jesse Travis. Martin J. Keogh, for Bernard Travis.
   Barnard, P. J.

An ordinary undertaking, with two sureties, need not be approved. -The respondent could except to the sureties, and if, on notice. they were found sufficient, the judge before whom the justification took place-was to indorse his allowance on the undertaking. Section 1325, Code Civil Proe. By chapter 416, Laws 1886, surety companies authorized by the law of' the state could undertake for the two sureties when two were required, “provided the same is approved by a judge of the court in which such bond or undertaking is given; and such company, if excepted to, shall justify through its officers or attorney in the manner required by law.” We think it was the-design by this act to make the surety company equal to the sureties upon an apppeal to the court of appeals. It is true that the act only purports to amend, section 811, and to be limited to those cases where an approval is needed by the judge. There is great doubt on the question whether the amendment covers an appeal to the court of appeals, but, if it does, then the approval-must be indorsed on the undertaking before it is filed, and without this the undertaking is entirely null. ■ The act of 1886 only makes the company equal to two sureties when it is approved by the judge. This approval is entirely separate and distinct from the certificate given to the sufficiency of sureties, on exception to them. The surety company also justify, if excepted to.

The order should be therefore affirmed, with costs and disbursements. But' it is not right that the appeal should be lost. Leave is therefore given for-the appellant to apply to a justice of the court for the approval of the bond,, with the right thereafter to respondent to except in the usual way.

Pratt, J.,

(dissenting.) The service of notice of appeal on July 11th, accompanied by an undertaking in due form, appealed the case. Jurisdiction fully attached. If thereafter any mistake or irregularity occurred, the proceeding does not become void, but the court has power to grant relief, and. may permit amendments or supply omissions. Sections 724,1303,1326, Code Civil Proc. Iron-Works v. City of Brooklyn, 85 N. Y. 652, is exactly upon, the point, and is decisive. Ordinarily these amendments are allowed very-much as matters of course. No court that is conscious of having attempted to do its duty will shrink from submitting its determinations to review bytlie tribunals constituted for that purpose; and no case is cited where the right of appeal has been forbidden to a suitor who has been willing to supply the defects or errors in his proceedings. In the case at bar the sureties upon the original undertaking, which is conceded to be in due form, did not attend to. justify on the day appointed, and the time for justification and for service of new undertaking to perfect the appeal was extended by various orders until November 5th, when the undertaking of the surety company was served. It is contended that some of the extensions of time are void, as having been obtained ex parte, not upon notice. We are not of that opinion. The time previously allowed had in no case expired, and the universal practice has been that in such case notice of motion is not required. When a default has occurred, and not otherwise, notice of motion has been exacted, and properly; but it would be intolerable were a formal notice required for an extension of the time within which to take the usual and ordinary steps of a cause. The extension of time to answer is a case in point; and, were a motion upon notice requisite, the danger to suitors would be extreme. The appeal having been already taken in due time, and no default having occurred, the orders, extending the time to perfect the appeal were regular. Were it otherwise,, the order granted October 31st, on motion of defendant’s attorney, extending-the time to November 5th, was a waiver of any previous irregularity, and an undertaking filed on November 5th was not too late. Further question is made that the undertaking of the surety company, not having been approved by a judge before filing, was not regular, and upon this ground the order appealed from proceeds. The question is by no means free from doubt. The rule has been that, where security is required against some injurious act like-the granting of an attachment, an arrest against the person, or an injunction,. the security exacted as a condition should be in advance approved by the court. Until the order now appealed from, we are not aware that such approval has ever been required upon appeal-bonds, unless the respondent rendered it necessary by signifying his dissent to the security tendered. As no active interference with his rights is contemplated, there would seem to be no reason for such preliminary approval, but the contrary. Ample protection is secured by the power to compel justification in open court, by giving notice of exception. But whether in'strictness the undertaking should or should not have been approved before filing, it is clear that the objection, if well founded, should have been pointed out at once, and, if not so pointed out, was waived. The surety company is organized by law for the purpose of giving such undertakings. Suitors must give ample security to the company before their guaranty can be obtained. No judge would hesitate to approve their bond at once. ISio attorney would fail to obtain the approval, if it were deemed important. Had objection been made it would have been remedied at once. Where the bond is merely for costs on appeal, it is hardly to be supposed that any litigant would except to the undertaking unless for vexation. Under these circumstances, where the bond has been received without objection, no exception noticed, and the time therefor expired, we are satisfied that the objection, if any existed, was waived. The right to appeal should not be thus denied. Such was the decision of the court of appeals in IronWorks v. City of Brooklyn, swpra, although the notice of appeal was not accompanied by any bond. The order appealed from must be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, with leave to appellants to present the undertakings for approval nuno pro tune if so advised. 
      
       It appears by the order entered upon the appeal that the order appealed from was affirmed, with leave to appellant to apply for the approval of the undertaking, as directed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Barnard, Mr. Justice Pratt thus concurring in the final result.
     