
    FIREMEN’S INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. G & M CONSTRUCTION COMPANY et al., Defendants and Appellants.
    No. 5863.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
    April 13, 1977.
    Rehearing Denied May 10, 1977.
    Writ Refused July 1, 1977.
    Lewis & Lewis by Seth Lewis, Jr., Opel-ousas, for defendants and appellants.
    Allen, Gooch & Bourgeois, Ltd. by Michael Harson and William L. Johnson, Jr., Lafayette, for plaintiff and appellee.
    Before CULPEPPER, WATSON and STOKER, JJ.
   CULPEPPER, Judge.

The plaintiff, Firemen’s Insurance Company, carried collision insurance on an automobile owned and driven by James C. Bor-delon, which was involved in an intersec-tional collision with a vehicle driven by Julian Shuman. Firemen’s paid to Borde-lon the amounts due under its policy and took a subrogation against the parties who caused the accident. Named as a party defendant is G & M Construction Company, whose 18 wheel tractor-trailer unit is alleged to have been parked at the intersection in such a way as to obscure a stop sign, in violation of a State statute. The district judge found the truck obscured the stop sign and that this was a legal cause of the accident. From an adverse judgment, G & M Construction Company and its liability insurer, Zurich Insurance Company, appealed.

The issues are: (1) Was the truck parked in such a manner as to “obscure or obstruct” the stop sign, in violation of the statute? (2) If the truck was illegally parked, was this a legal cause of the accident?

The collision occurred at the intersection of North Fourth Street, which runs north and south, with Vine Street, which runs east and west, in the City of Eunice. Vine Street has the right of way, and there are stop signs for both north bound and south bound traffic on North Fourth Street. On the day in question, G & M Construction Company’s large 18 wheel tractor-trailer was parked on North Fourth Street at the curb about eight feet south of the stop sign on the southeast corner of the intersection. Mr. Shuman was driving in a northerly direction on North Fourth Street. He testified he was not very familiar with the intersection, and that he could not see the stop sign at Vine Street because it was obscured by the large parked truck. He had been going about 25 miles per hour, but he slowed down to about 16 miles per hour and entered the intersection. In about the northeast quadrant of the intersection, the front of Mr. Shuman’s vehicle struck the left front of the Bordelon automobile, which was traveling in a westerly direction on Vine Street.

The trial judge stated in written reasons: “I conclude that the parking of the truck-trailer so obstructed the stop sign as to constitute a violation of R.S. 32:143 prohibiting parking which obstructs traffic-control devices, and that such obstruction was a substantial causative factor in the collision.”

We find the evidence fully supports these factual conclusions of the trial judge. There is no question that the truck was parked eight to ten feet south of the stop sign in such a manner as to obscure or obstruct the visibility of the stop sign by a motorist approaching from the south on North Fourth Street. Shuman testified that because of the truck he could not and did not see the stop sign. He proceeded into the intersection where he struck the vehicle of plaintiff’s insured.

The defendants argue that since the truck was parked eight to ten feet south of the stop sign, it did not obscure visibility of the sign. The trial judge held to the contrary and we agree. Photographs filed in evidence show clearly that the truck did obscure visibility by a motorist approaching from the south on North Fourth Street, even though the truck was eight to ten feet from the sign.

Defendants also argue that the truck was pulling a flatbed trailer which was empty, and that a motorist could see the sign over the trailer. The trial judge held to the contrary, and photographs filed in evidence support a finding that visibility was at least obscured, if not completely obstructed.

Finally, defendants argue that even if the truck was illegally parked, this was not a legal cause of the accident. They say first that Shuman was familiar with the intersection and knew the stop sign was there. Shuman admitted that his father-in-law lived in Eunice about six blocks from the intersection in question. Nevertheless, Shuman testified he was not very familiar with the intersection and that the parked truck caused him to fail to see the stop sign. Defendants also argue Shuman had time, after passing the truck, to see the Bordelon vehicle and stop. Shuman denied this. The testimony by Mr. Shuman is sufficient to support the finding of fact by the trial judge as to causation.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the defendants-appellants.

AFFIRMED.

WATSON, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

WATSON, Judge,

dissenting:

The majority affirms the trial court’s decision on. the theory that a parked truck was a “legal cause” of an intersectional collision.

None of the witnesses, except driver Shu-man, who ran the stop sign, testified that the sign was hidden by the parked truck. Some doubt arises as to Shuman’s lookout since he approached the apparently unmarked intersection, reduced his speed (according to his testimony) to 16 m.p.h., traveled past the front of the truck which was about eight feet from the sign, passed the sign which was set back from the corner, crossed a traffic lane and hit another vehicle. The Bordelon vehicle was approaching from the right and had the right-of-way, if at an uncontrolled intersection. Shuman had ample opportunity to stop or swerve after he passed the parked truck; his negligence was the sole cause of the accident. The only hard evidence which supports the idea that the truck blocked the sign are two photographs, apparently taken with a wide-angle lens, which has the effect of causing nearby objects to appear larger and distant objects to appear smaller. In one, photograph P-2, the stop sign on the opposite side of the street is readily apparent, showing up well because of its red color.

The truck was legally parked. It is an over-extension of the statute to hold that a driver, who legally parks, is obliged to scout around to see that he is not partially obscuring a traffic control device. A driver is entitled to rely on the authorities who plan parking to make that determination.

The parked truck was not shown to be a cause in fact of this particular accident, and, with respect, I therefore disagree with my colleagues of the majority and with the esteemed trial judge.  