
    John Johnson vs. Milton Pyles, surviving executor of John Colglazier, deceased.
    The statute of limitations begins to run, whenever the cause of action accrues; the time limited is to be computed from the day upon which the plaintiff might have commenced an action for the recovery of his demand.
    
      An attorney at law, who has been employed to collect by suit certain demands due his client, is entitled to his fees so soon as he obtains the judgments, if there be no special contract to the contrary ; and the statute of limitations will commence running against his demand from the date of the judgments.
    Where therefore an attorney at law brought suit, in 1815, for certain fees due for obtaining judgments at law, which were rendered in the year 1838, and the defendant plead the statute of limitations of six years, to which the plaintiff replied, that the collections of the judgments had been restrained by injunction, and the suit had been brought within six years after its dissolution, and the court below, on the trial, instructed the jury, that if the suit were so brought, the plaintiff was entitled to recover; it was held, that the instruction was erroneous, in the absence of proof, that the fees were by agreement, express or implied, not to be demanded until the money was collected, or the injunction dissolved ; and also in the absence of proof, that the attorney had been retained to attend to the injunction suit, thus constituting one continuing transaction, not complete until the money was collected, or the injunction made perpetual, or the insolvency of the judgment debtor ascertained ; the attorney, as soon as the judgments were obtained, was entitled * to his compensation, and the statute commenced running against him from that time.
    In error from the circuit court of Yazoo county; Hon. Robert C. Perry, judge.
    Milton Pyles, surviving executor of John Colglazier, deceased, sued John Johnson in assumpsit, on the 13th of October, 1845, in an open account, according to the indorsement on the writ, for ¡$382, for fees due the testator “in the institution and prosetion of two suits, wherein John Johnson was plaintiff, and Henry Holmes defendant, judgments rendered on the L7th and 18th of May, 1838.” The declaration claimed $500 for the work and labor, care and diligence and attendance of his plaintiff’s testator in his lifetime, done, performed, and bestowed as the attorney and solicitor of and for the said defendant, and upon his retainer, in and about the prosecuting, defending, and soliciting of divers cases, suits, and business for the said defendant, and for fees due, and of right payable to the said plaintiff’s testator, &c.
    A bill of particulars was filed, claiming $>382-01, being five per cent, on the amount of the two judgments.
    The defendant plead, 1, non-assumpsit; 2, non-assumpsit infra sex annos. The plaintiff to the last plea replied, “ that the amount claimed in plaintiff’s declaration is for the work and labor of complainant in prosecuting two suits against Henry Holmes in favor of said defendant; and the said plaintiff avers, that after the rendition of (judgment in said suits, execution thereof was enjoined by the said Holmes, and that said suits were not finally determined until the of , within six years next before the commencement of the suit,” &c.
    The defendant rejoined the statute of limitations again, as to the indebtedness set up in the replication, and issue was taken.
    On the trial the plaintiff proved, that his testator was employed by the defendant as an attorney at law, in instituting the suits and obtaining the judgments in the bill of particulars mentioned ; the judgments were obtained at the time specified; and that five per cent., the commission charged, was fair and reasonable ; that after the judgment was obtained, the heirs of Charles Floyd, by‘bill in chancery, claimed the judgments as their property, and enjoined Johnson from their further enforcement; the injunction continued in full force until the year 1842, when the suit in chancery was decided in favor of the heirs. This was all the proof.
    The court, at the instance of the plaintiff, instructed the jury, that if they believed from the evidence, that John Colglazier was employed by the defendant to institute, and he did institute the suits mentioned, and recovered the judgments, and after the recovery, Holmes enjoined the judgments, and the suit in this cause was instituted within six years after the dissolution of the injunction and the collection of the judgments, the law is for the plaintiff.
    The defendant asked these instructions. 1. That unless the jury believe from the evidence, that it was agreed between Johnson and Colglazier that the latter should not be paid for his services in obtaining the judgments, until the injunction against their enforcement had been' dissolved, the law was for the defendant, and they must so find. 2. If they believe, from the evidence, that more than six years intervened between the date of the judgments and the commencement of this suit, the law is for the defendant, and they must so find.
    
      The court refused these instructions. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the defendant sued out this writ of error.
    
      R. S. Holt, for plaintiff in error.
    1. We think that the instruction given for plaintiff, was clearly erroneous. There was no proof that the injunction was ever dissolved, or the money ever paid. And as the success of the heirs of Floyd, in claiming the judgments as their property, rendered the dissolution of the injunction, or the collection of the money by Johnson impossible, it is difficult to conceive how Col-glazier’s claim for his services rendered in obtaining the judgments, could have been affected in any way by these events. It is well established, that the statute of limitations commences running as soon as there is a complete right of action.
    When then did Colglazier’s right of action accrue? Most clearly upon the rendition of the judgments. It was then that He performed his last services for Johnson.
    The statute commences running from the time when there is in fact a right of action, not from the time when the existence of that right is discovered or established by proof, except where it has been fraudulently concealed, of which there was no pre-tence in this case. Bishop v. Little, 3 Greenl. (Me.) R. 405 ; Mather v. Green, 17 Mass. R. 60; 4 Moore, R. 508; 2 B. & Bing. R. 73; 5 Barn. & Cres. 259; 3 Ibid. 288.,
    These considerations show that the instruction asked by the plaintiff should not have been given, and that the second instruction of defendant, which the court refused, should have been given.
    2. The first instruction asked for by the defendant, was predicated upon the same principle, and should have been given. It assumes that the right of action commenced with the date of the judgments, which assumption is abundantly sustained by the facts proved.
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was .an action of assumpsit to recover' for services performed as an attorney, in recovering certain judgments. The defence interposed by plea was the statute of limitations. The plaintiff replied, that the collection of the judgments had been restrained by injunction, and that this suit was brought within six years after its dissolution. Upon the trial, the court instructed the jury, that if the suit were brought within six years after the dissolution’ of the injunction, the law was for the plaintiff, and a verdict was rendered in his favor.

The law on this subject is very plain, though its application in this case is not very clear. The statute of limitations begins to run, whenever the cause of action accrues. In other words, the time limited is to be computed from the day upon which the plaintiff might have commenced an action for the recovery of his demand. Angell on Lim. 181.

In this case the declaration is very general in its terms. The demand is “for work and labor, in prosecuting, defending, and soliciting divers cases, suits,' and business, and for fees due the testator of the plaintiff from the defendant.” The proof was, that the decedent was employed, &c., by the defendant, as an attorney, in instituting the suits and obtaining the judgments described in the bill of particulars; that the judgments were obtained by him in May, 1838, and that five per cent, on the amount was the usual compensation. It does not appear in proof that the attorney collected the amount of the judgments, or attended to the suit in chancery. The services for which the suit was brought, were therefore the procuring of the judgments. It does not appear that the testator of the plaintiff had any thing farther to do with the cases, after the judgments were . obtained. It follows that’the statute commenced its operation in May, 1838, when the services were rendered, and this suit was not brought till October, 1845.

The defendant asked the court to "instruct the jury, “that unless there was an agreement between the parties, that Col-glazier should not be paid for his services in obtaining the judgments, until the injunction was dissolved, then the law is for the defendant.” This charge was refused, and the jury instructed, “ that if the suit were instituted in six years next after the dissolution of the injunction and the collection of the judgments, the law is for the plaintiff.”

The instruction asked by the defendant should have been given. It was a correct exposition of the law, if there were no agreement, express or implied, that the compensation for obtaining the judgments was not to be demanded until the money was collected, or the injunction dissolved. Had Colglazier been retained to attend to the suit in chancery, the whole might have been regarded as one continuing transaction, tending to one end, the collection of the debts; and no part of the services deemed complete until that period, or until the insolvency of the party was ascertained, or the injunction made perpetual. But the connection of Colglazier with the suits, so far as the record shows, terminated with the judgments, and he might immediately thereafter have demanded his fees.

For the error in the instructions of the court, the judgment will be reversed, and a new trial granted.

Judgment reversed, and new trial awarded.  