
    D. H. HART v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 22672.
    Decided May 25, 1903.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    The only question in the case is whether the clerk of a court is. entitled to fees for his “ duplicate ” account.
    I. The clerks of courts of the United States are not entitled to fees for the “ duplicate ’ ’ of their accounts to be retained in their offices as provided by thedcí 28d February, 1876 (18 Stat. L., 333) which requires that “accounts and vouchers of clerks, marshals, and district attorneys shall be made in duplicate.’’
    
    II. The burden, of making out an account is on the creditor; and in the case of a public officer, his accounts must be in the form prescribed by law. Until a clerk, marshal, or district attorney has made his account in duplicate, he has not made it.
    
      The Reporters' statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
    I. From January 1, 1896, to June 30, 1901, the claimant was clerk of the United States Circuit and District Courts for the western district of Texas, duly appointed, qualified, and acting.
    II. That during said period the claimant made his accounts in duplicate for fees earned by him as clerk for each quarter fi’om January 1, 1896, to June 30, 1901, and marked them, respectively, “original” and “duplicate,” the latter containing, in the aggregate, 3,333 folios. Said duplicate accounts were retained in the office of the clerk of the court, as required by law. (18 Stat. L., 333.)
    TU. The claimant forwarded his “ original ” accounts to the proper accounting officer of the Treasury, for fees earned, verified by his oath, and approved by the United States court as just and in accordance with the law, and the orders of approval were entered of record. Said accounts were finally acted upon by the accounting officers of the Treasury, and part thereof was allowed and paid to the claimant, but part thereof, amounting to $583.50, was disallowed, and the same remains unpaid.
    IY. The items disallowed by the accounting officers consist of 3,333 folios, at 15 cents per folio, ‘‘for making the duplicate of his fee account,” and were disallowed on the ground that the services performed by the clerk in making the “ duplicate” of his accounts are “ not making records”' within the meaning of section. 828, Revised Statutes.
    
      Mr. E. E\ Oolladay for the claimant. Mr. E. B. Orosth-waita was on the brief.
    
      Mr. P. M. Ashford (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attornc.ij-Oeneral Pradt) for the defendants.
   Wright, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, as clerk of the Circuit and District Courts for the western district of Texas, made his accounts in duplicate for fees earned for the period between January 1, 1896, and June 30, 1901, as required bj1, the statute (18 Stat. L., 333), and marked them “original” and “duplicate,” respectively, and forwarded the former to the proper accounting officer of the Treasury, and the latter he retained in his office, as required by, and for the purposes specified in, the act to which we have referred. Claimant charged for 3,333 folios, contained in the “duplicates” of his accounts, at 15 cents per folio, as for making a record under the provisions of section 828, Revised Statutes, which was disallowed by the accounting officer, and this suit is for the purpose of a recovery of that item.

The statute (18 Stat. L., 333) requires:

“Accounts and vouchers of clerks, marshals, and district attorneys shall be made in duplicate, to be marked, respectively, ‘original’ and ‘duplicate.’ Audit shall be the duty of the clerk to forward the original accounts and vouchers of the officers above specified, when approved, to the proper account ing officers of the Treasury, and to retain in bis office the duplicates, where they shall be open to public inspection at all times.”

There is a well-defined distinction, pointed out in several cases decided by the Supremo Court, between services performed by the clerk in obedience to an order of the court and. the mandate of a statute; in the former case, he is as much entitled to compensation as if he were able to put his finger upon a particular clause of a statute authorizing compensation for such services. (United State v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S., 177.)

The question here, however, is one of rights under the statute, and unless compensation for the services performed is given by the statute none can be allowed. It was said in United States v. Jones (147 U. S., 673) that the labor of preparing one’s own accounts for services or fees is a mere incident to the rendition of the service, and is universally assumed by the creditor as his own burden. It is also familiar law — almost axiomatic — that a person who accepts an office takes it with all its burdens. It is for the clerk to ■make his own accounts if he would be paid. The statute prescribes how they shall be made. They shall be made in duplicate, to be marked, respective^", “original” and “duplicate,” the one for the Treasury officer, the other to be retained. The purpose of each is declared by the statute. The claimant is no more entitled to compensation for the “duplicate” than he is for the “original,” for his accounts are not made in conformity to the statute unless made in duplicate. The statute does not require, the “duplicate” to be entered or recorded upon the records of the court, and hence no record is made thereof in any proper or legal sense, nor within the meaning of the statute giving compensation for such a service. A duplicate, to be retained by the officer in his office, open to public inspection, without recording upon the records of the court, is not a record. It is merely what its name implies, that which is doubled or twice made — an original instrument repeated. “A document which is the same as another in all essential particulars.” (Burrill’s Law Dic., vol. 1, 526.) Until the officer had made his accounts in duplicate he had not made them at all in a legal sense. He is given no compensation for making his accounts, and hence an order will be entered dismissing the petition.  