
    JANUARY TERM, 1844.
    James S. Pritchard v. Thomas Myers.
    In a case of the trial of the right of property, the jury must assess the value of each specific article or thing in controversy.
    Error from the Circuit Court of Leake county.
    Thomas Myers recovered a judgment against George S. Fitch, Robert E. Halford, and Edwin Fox, on the 9th day of April, 1839, for the sum of $¡101.50, and costs ; on which judgment execution issued on the 16th day of January, 1843, and was levied on the same day, on two negroes and one wagon, as the property of Robert E. Halford. The property levied on, was claimed by James S. Pritchard, who made affidavit, and gave bond, to try the right thereto. At the April term, 1843, an issue was made up, a trial had, and the property found subject to the execution. The jury assessed the whole value of the property at $600, in solido, and the judgment of the Court was entered accordingly. On the trial of the issue, the defendant in error produced and offered in evidence two executions and a forthcoming bond, taken in a case of Loyd, Bobbitt & Co. for the use of Eli B., Warren v. Philip R. Pearce and Robert E. Halford, based on a judgment for $705 debt, and $14.19 damages, besides costs. To the reading of which, Pritchard’s counsel objected ; his objection was overruled by the Court, and the executions and bond were admitted as evidence to prove that the judgment mentioned in the executions took date and operated only as a judgment from the time of the forfeiture of the forthcoming bond.
    The case is now brought to this Court by Pritchard, by writ of error. The errors assigned, are stated in the argument of Mr. Lawson.
    
      Lawson, for plaintiff in error.
    
      First Error. “ Said Court-erred in permitting said fi. fads (they both having issued on the original judgment) and forthcoming bond to go the jury, to prove that a forthcoming bond had been given and forfeited, and that the judgment operated only from the breach of the condition of the bond.”
    It will appear, from an examination of the bill of exceptions, that the pretended forthcoming bond is based upon the execution first issued, because the forthcoming bond bears date before the second one issued ; both are returnable'to the October term, 1839. Then we will see if it have any of the qualities of-a judgment under the statute. 1st. The execution was not, as appears from the execution itself, levied upon anything. 2d. The execution does not show •that any bond was taken. Then there is nothing to connect this bond with the execution, except the accident of its being found in the clerk’s office. Again, the-execution recites a judgment in favor of Loyd, Bobbitt & Co., for the use of Eli B. Warren, for the sum of $705 debt and $14.19 damages. The bond is payable to Stephen Loyd, R. R. Bobbitt, and Eli B. Warren, and recites a judgment for $705 only. Surely, a judgment in favor of Loyd, Bobbitt & Co., for the use of Eli B. Warren, cannot be satisfied by a bond given to Stephen Loyd, R. R. Bobbitt, and Eli B. Warren. It is a familiar rule, that records import verity, and nothing is to be presumed in their favor ; then, this bond stands unconnected with the fi. fa., and, if forfeited, could be no satisfaction thereof. 3d. By an inspection of the fi. fa. and bond, it will appear that there is no return, either upon the fi- fa. or bond. It is true there is a memorandum upon the bond, but it wants all the requisites of a return, to wit, the signature of a sheriff. Would a promissory note, written out, promising to pay one hundred dollars, without any signature, be binding upon the person who wrote it ? Certainly not. By a parity of reasoning, anything written upon &fi. fa. without being signed, is not binding upon him who wrote it. ■
    Then, we think, we have established that a fi. fa. in favor of Loyd, Bobbitt & Co., for the use of Eli B. Warren, could not be satisfied by a forthcoming bond, payable tó Stephen Loyd, R. R. Bobbitt, and Eli B. Warren, and ev.en if it could, that there is nothing to show a forfeiture of that bond. If we are correct in this, it follows that the original judgment continued in force, and then the. title of the plaintiff in error to the property would have been perfect, because he held under a sale under this judgment.
    There is a well founded distinction between that which must be stated in a bill of exceptions, on a motion for a new trial, and when the exceptions are taken in the first stage of the proceedings. In a new trial, all the testimony must be set out; not so in the other case. In the last it is sufficient to show the particular thing to which you except.
    If it be an error, as stated in the exceptions, the judgment will be reversed. It is laid down, 3 Cow. Rep. 361, and 16 Johns. Rep. 89, “ That if improper testimony be given, although it may be cumulative only, the judgment must be reversed. For we cannot say what effect such testimony may have had on the minds of the jury.” We think these authorities are applicable to the case at bar, and if the bond and ft. fads were erroneously admitted, that the judgment must, for this cause, be reversed.
    The other ft. fa. which is recited in the bill of exceptions, after the bond, is not based upon the bond, nor is the bond upon it. It was returnable to the same term of the Court as that under which the bond is pretended to have been taken ; we therefore consider this as in no way affecting the cause.
    
      Second. “ Said judgment is erroneous in not assessing the sep--arate value of each piece of property.” There were two negroes and one wagon levied on, and the whole property is valued at §600 in the verdict of the jury, and the Court rendered judgment in solido, and not for each separate piece. That this is error for which the judgment will be reversed, and a venire de novo amended, was decided by this Court, in the case of Penrice v. Cocke, 1 How. Rep. 227.
    
      Wm. G. Thompson, for defendant in error.
    On the 16th day of January, 1843, the defendant in error sued out an execution from the Circuit Court of Leake county, on a judgment recovered against Robert E. Halford and others, for the sum of §101.64, on the 9th day of April ,1839. This execution was levied on two slaves and a wagon, as the property of Halford. The plaintiff in error made claim to the property, and gave bond according to the statute. At the April term, 1843, an issue was made up, and the cause was decided by a jury in favor of the plaintiff in the execution. The aggregate value of the property was assessed, in the verdict, at $600.
    By a bill of exceptions, presented in the record, it appears that the plaintiff in the execution offered ip evidence, on the trial of the cause, an execution issued 9th day of April, 1839, in favor of Loyd, Bobbitt & Co., against Robert E. Halford and P. R. Pearce, for the sum of $705 ; also a forthcoming bond given on said execution, with Robert Yinson surety ; also an execution, issued on said bond, dated 29th July, 1S39. The claimant objected to the introduction of said bond and executions, “ to prove that a forthcoming bond had been taken and forfeited, and thereby the judgment took date from the breach of the bond, and not from the date of the original judgment,” which objection the Court overruled, and permitted the bond and executions to be offered in evidence. The bill of exceptions does not state what other testimony was offered, nor that this was all the testimony. The Court gave judgment that the plaintiff recover the property, if to be had ; ]f not, the value -assessed by the jury, viz., $600.
    It is admitted, that the jury should have assessed the separate value of the slaves, and other property ; but it is contended, that the verdict should not on that account be set aside and the judgment reversed, but that the cause can only be remanded, with direction for a writ of inquiry, for the purpose of ascertaining the separate values of the property. According to our statute, an issue in a trial of the right of property is to be governed by the rules which apply to a case of detinue, and the judgment is to have the same effect as in case of detinue. How. & Hutch. And by the statute, if in a case of detinue the jury fail to find the value of the property, the cause is to be remanded, simply for the purpose of ascertaining the value under a writ of inquiry. How. & Hutch.
    In the case of Bakery. Beasley, 4 Yerg. 570, which arose upon a statute similar to ours, it was decided, that if the jury assess only the aggregate value of the different articles of property, it is to be regarded as though they had failed to assess the value, and the cause is to be remanded, with direction for a writ of inquiry, for the purpose of ascertaining the value, as required by the statute. Similar decisions in Virginia are cited in that case by the Court. See the case of Walker v. The Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, decided by this Court at last term.
    The record shows, that the plaintiff’s execution was levied upon the property in dispute ; that an issue was regularly made up to try the right, and that the jury found in favor of the plaintiff. The bill of exceptions does not purport to set out the evidence on which the verdict was based. It does not 'appear, by the bill of exceptions, that the bond and executions therein mentioned were impertinent to the issue, and even if they were, they could have had no bearing on the finding of the jury. It is possible that the plaintiff in error may have claimed under a subsequent judgment and execution sale ; and these documents were introduced to show that the plaintiff below had the older and better claim, by virtue of the levy of his execution. But this can only be conjectured. If it be the fact, the bond and executions were properly introduced as evidence. .
    The bill of exceptions certainly shows no error in the finding of the jury. It is evident that there is only so much of the testimony set out, as would suffice to show upon what the particular objection taken by the claimant’s counsel was based.
    This Court will presume, generally, in favor of the correctness of the proceedings in the Court below ; and so, that all the testimony adduced on the trial was properly admitted,' until the contrary was shown. t .If the claimant’s counsel desired to show that a portion of the .testimony was impertinent, or erroneously admitted, all the testimony admitted on the trial should have been spread upon the bill of exceptions, in order that this Court might be enabled to form a judgment on that point; which could not be done except upon a view of the whole case. But it is manifest that all the testimony in the case is not presented by the record. The bill of exceptions does not purport to do that.
   Per Curiam.

Myers, it seems, had an execution levied on two negroes and a wagon, as the property of one Halford, the defendant in execution. The plaintiff in error claimed the property, and gave bond to try the right, and a verdict was found against him. The judgment was rendered on the 9th day of April, 1839. On the same day, Loyd, Bobbitt & Co. recovered judgment against the same defendant, and having issued their execution, the defendant gave a forthcoming bond. On the trial, the executions of Loyd, Bobbitt & Co. and the forthcoming bond, were read, to show, as it is said, that a bond had been given, and that the lien of Loyd, Bobbitt & Co. would only therefore date from the forfeiture of the bond. It is impossible to perceive from the record what influence this question was designed to exert in the case. Pritchard has given no evidence whatever of his title. It does not appear that he even had possession of the negroes. For anything .that appeal's in the record, he is a mere stranger.

In assessing the value of the property levied on, however, the jury omitted to assess the separate value of each specific thing. This was error for which the judgment must be reversed. The Court might, under the statute, have awarded a writ of inquiry, but this was not done. 1

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.  