
    Thornton v. Tison.
    
      Bill in Equity by Judgment Creditors, to set aside Conveyances as Voluntary and Fraudulent.
    
    1. Parlies to soil for distribution and settlement of trust fond; decrees in favor of persons no) parties of record. — Any number of the beneficiaries of a trust fund may maintain a suit to bring the trustee to a settlement, without joining the others; and any judgment creditor may file a bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance executed 'by his debtor, without joining other creditors as complainants with him; and the court may, in either case, render decrees in favor of persons who are not named as complainants in the bill.
    
      2. Jurisdiction of Federal courts, as affected by amount in controversy and residence of parlies. — When a bill is filed in the Circuit Court of the United States, to compel a settlement and distribution of a decedent's estate, the value of the estate is the amount in controversy, and a decree may be rendered in favor of each distributee for his share, though less than $500; and if some of the complainants are non-residents, itis immaterial that other distributees are not.
    Appeal from the ChanceryCotirt of Jefferson.
    Heard before the Hon. Thojias Cobbs.
    The bill in this case was filed on the 12th July, 1890, by Mrs. Elizabeth Tison and Mrs. Martha L. Agee, distributees of the estate of John Shackelford, deceased, on behalf of themselves and other distributees of said Shackelford’s estate, and as judgment creditors of R. H. Abercrombie, the admistrator of said estate, and of R. J. Thornton, the surety on his administration bond; against said R. J. Thornton, R. L. Thornton, and Annie T. Hudman, who was a daughter of said R. J. Thornton. The complainants claimed to be judgment creditors of said R. J. Thornton, under and by virtue of a decree rendered by the Circuit Court of the United States at Birmingham, under a bill filed by some of the distributees against the administrator and Thornton as his surety, to compel a settlement and distribution of the estate; and they sought to avoid and set aside two conveyances executed by said R. J. Thornton to said R. L. Thornton and Annie T. Hudman. The deed to Annie Hudman was dated April 24th, 1888, and was executed pending the chancery suit in the Eederal court; and the consideration expressed being love and affection, the complainants sought to set it aside as fraudulent in law. The conveyance to R. L. Thornton was dated April 10th, 1887, pending said chancery suit, and recited a valuable consideration; and the complainants assailed it on the ground that the consideration was entirely fictitious, or was greatly exaggerated, and that it was executed with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors. The bill, as amended, alleged that the chancery suit in which the decrees were rendered was instituted by “said Martha L. Agee and others of the dis-tributees and heirs at law, of said John Shackelford, who were citizens and residents of California and Arkansas;” and the transcript of the record of the decree, which was made an exhibit to the bill, showed that the amount in the hands of the administrator to be distributed, or for which he was. liable, was ascertained to be $17,234.78, and a decree was rendered in favor of each distributee for his proportionate share, the decree in favor of Mrs. Tison being for $1,541.87, and that in favor of Mrs. Agee $68.18.
    
      Tbe defendants demurred to tbe bill, jointly and severally, (1) because it showed tbat all tbe distributees were not made parties to said chancery suit; (2) because decrees were rendered in favor of persons who were not parties to tbe suit; (3) because tbe decrees in favor of Mrs. Agee and others were for a less sum than tbe court bad jurisdiction of; and (4) because Mrs. Tison and others were shown to be residents of tbe State of Alabama. Tbe chancellor ovverruled tbe demurrer, and bis decretal order is assigned as error.
    WALKER, Hewitt & Porter, and M. J. Gregg, for appellants,
    cited Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Wise v. Turnpike Go., 7 Crancb, 276; U. S. Bevised Statutes, § 629; Turner v. Bank, 4 Dali. 8 ; Gray v. Larramore, 2 Abb. U. S. 540 ; Ford v. Babcock, 1 Denio, 158 ; 6 Oowen, 221; 14 Wall. 253; Poster’s Ped. Practice, 104, § 60.
    Alex. T. LondoN, contra,
    
    cited Preeman on Judgments, § 124; Black on Judgments, § 285, notes; 12 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 272-75 ; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425; Handley v. Stultz, 137 TJ. S. 366; Í29 U. S. 206; 138 TJ. S. 1.
   STONE, O. J.

It has been long and well settled tbat a part, less than tbe whole, of tbe beneficiaries in a trust fund, may maintain a bill to bring tbe trustee to a settlement. And tbe same rule prevails when creditors have tbe right to proceed in equity to subject to their demands effects of their debtor held by an equitable title, or fraudulently attempted to be placed beyond tbe reach of bis debts. In such cases, it is not necessary tbat all tbe beneficiaries or creditors shall be made complainants. A part may proceed to coerce a settlement of tbe trust, or the utilization of tbe fund or effects in tbe liquidation of bis or their demands ; and in tbe one case must, while in tbe other be or they may, so frame tbe bill and proceedings as tbat tbe entire litigation and tbe entire administration may be bad and accomplished in one suit. This, because in tbe settlement of a trust, in which there are many beneficiaries, tbe court will not, as a rule, administer partial relief, but will take tbe entire account and distribute tbe entire fund. Por this purpose tbe suit, in legal effect, is instituted. It results tbat, in many cases, decrees for their respective distributive shares are rendered in favor of many persons who are not named as complainants in tbe bill. And tbe same thing frequently occurs in what are known as creditors’ bills. Brown v. Bates, 10 Ala. 432; 3 Brick. Dig., 340, § 136; Bank of St. Mary's v. St. John, 25 Ala. 566; Sto. Eq. Pl., §§ 97, 99, 100, 104, 105 ; Lehman v. Meyer, 67 Ala. 396; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425.

. _ _ _ When a suit is instituted, and rigbtly instituted, in either of'the categories stated above, there can be no question that any decree rendered within the purview of the bill, although in favor of a person not named as a party complainant, is a binding personal judgment in the particular case. And we do not hesitate to hold that, in the suit in the Circuit Court of the United States, every individual decree rendered, irrespective of its amount,- and irrespective of the fact that the person in whose favor it was rendered was or was not a party complainant in that suit, has all the -elements of a personal judgment against the defendants in that cause. — Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640.

In the said suit of Agee et al. v. Abercrombie, adm’r et al., in the U. S. Circuit Court, the sum ascertained to be in the hands of the administrator de bonis non for distribution was in excess of seventeen thousand dollars. That was the amount in controversy in that suit, and not the separate sums decreed to the several distributees. That litigation was a single suit, not a multiplicity of suits between the several next of kin and the administrator de bonis non. Handley v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366.

Affirmed.  