
    Harris vs. Bradley.
    The endorsee of a bill or note, is entitled to a recovery against the last endorser, notwithstanding it was an accommodation endorsement, and the’ prior endorsement lorged.
    The last endorsement of a note or bill is a guaranty of all preceding endorsements; it admits the hand writing of the drawer and all prior-endorsers; the last endorser is consequently liable, although the preceding endorsements were forgeries.
    An endorser for the accommodation of the drawer or maker of a note is liable to a bona fide holder for'value, although he received no consideration for his endorsement.
    Where A agrees with B, his debtor, that he will permit his, B’s note-to be renewed, provided he procures the endorsement of C, which B accordingly obtained: Held, that this did not constitute B the agent of A in the transaction, nor is A liable for any fraud practised by B in obtaining the endorsement of C.
    This was an action brought by Bradley against Harris,, upon a note for $200, upon which he was the last endorser. The note was executed by Peter R. Rison, and payable to William C. Anderson, and the names of Anderson and C. M. Ratcliffe were upon it as endorsers; but their names were forghries.
    It appeared in evidence, that Rison, in March 1832, borrowed $200 from H. H. Hobbs, and to secure the payment, gave him a note drawn by said Rison, payable ' at U. S. Bank at four months, to Anderson, and the names of Anderson and Ratcliffe were endorsed upon it. Hobbs obtained the $200 from Bradley, with whom he deposited the note a§ security. Rison applied to Hobbs to renew the note, who declined doing so, unless Bradley would take the responsibility. They went to Juradiey, who agreed to permit the renewal of the note, if Rison would get an additional endorser, and upon Harris being mentioned, Bradley agreed if his endorsement were obtained, he would permit the note to be renewed. This was accordingly done, and the note, with the endorsement of Harris, upon which this suit is founded, was delivered by Rison, to Bradley, who gave a check for the old note.
    J. Marshall and Alexander, for plaintiff in error.
    
      A. Hays, for defendant in error.
   Green, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

It is insisted by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, that he is not bound by his endorsement, because he was imposed on, and induced to endorse the note, on account of the supposed genuineness of the other endorsements.

This proposition is altogether fallacious. The holder of a bill or note has nothing to do with the preceding endorsements, and whether genuine oir not, his immediate endorser is liable to him. The last endorsement, is in fact, a guaranty of the preceding endorsements, and admits the hand writing of the drawer and prior endorser, although the bill be forged. Chitty on Bills 197-8: 3 Kent Com. 60: 2 Salk 127. The judge, therefore, properly admitted the note, with its endorsements, to be read to the jury, upon proof having been made of the endorsement by the defendant.

- It is next insisted, that there was no consideration for the endorsement of the defendant. It is not necessary that a consideration should be received by the endorser, in order to bind him. Although the note was made for the accommodation of Rison, and the defendant endorsed ¡t without receiving any consideration himself, yet, as Rison received the money upon it, and the plaintiff is a .bona fide holder, for a valuable consideration, the defendant is bound and liable, as though he had received the consideration himself. Chitty on Bills 68: See also note to same page: Brown vs. Watt 7 John. Rep. 361. Rison owed Hobbs, and a like sum being due from Hobbs to Bradley, it was mutually agreed, (in effect,) that Bradley should look to, Rison alone for his debt, on condition that the defendant’s endorsement was procured on the note. The note then, upon which the defendant was an endorser, was an extinguishment of Hobbs’ claim upon Rison, and of that of Bradley on Hobbs, and constituted as good a consideration as if Bradley had advanced so much money to Rison.

It was insisted, that as Bradley told Rison he would permit the note to be renewed, if he would obtain the endorsement of the plaintiff in error, that thereby Rison became the the agent of Bradley, and that he ought tobe answerable for the fraud which was committed on Harris. Upon this subject the court correctly told the jury, that Bradley was not answerable for the fraud of Rison, and that unless he waá guilty of fraud himself, Harris was liable upon his endofsement, and that the mere circumstance, that Bradley told Rison that he would renew the note, if it were endorsed by Harris, would not be evidence that Rison, in procuring that endorsement, acted as Bradley’s agent.

Upon the whole, we are of opinion there is no error in this record, and order the judgment to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  