
    LILLIE CULLIFER v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY.
    (Filed 3 March, 1915.)
    1. Courts — Clerks of Court — Trials—Instructions—Appeal and Error.
    Where, in accordance with an agreement previously entered into, the clerk receives the verdict of the jury in the absence of the court, it is his duty to do so without comment thereon and to keep it until the reconvening of the court; and where the clerk hands the answered issues back to them and tells them they should retire to their room and reconsider the issues to see if the answers were not in conflict with the charge, but refusing to say in what respects, he has exceeded his authority in assuming to instruct the jury, and a verdict differently rendered will be set aside and a new trial ordered.
    
      2. Negligence — Contributory Negligence — Last Clear Chance.
    Where in an action to recover damages for a personal injury received by being run upon by the train of defendant railroad company, contributory negligence of the plaintiff is shown, under evidence justifying it, an issue as to the last clear chance should be submitted to the determination of the jury, and it is error for the trial judge to so modify an issue tendered by the plaintiff that it limits the inquiry to the time after the perilous condition of the plaintiff was discovered.
    3. Issues — Trials—Instruction, Correct in Part — Appeal and Error.
    Where the trial judge has submitted an erroneous issue upon the last clear chance, to the plaintiff’s prejudice, the error is not cured by the charge of the court which lays down the correct principle applicable to the evidence, in one part, and in another part erroneously states it.
    Appeal by plaintiff from Ferguson, J., at November Term, 1914, .of Edgecombe.
    Civil action, tried upon these issues:
    1. Was the plaintiff injured by the negligence of the defendant, as alleged in the complaint ? Answer: “No.”
    2. Was the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, which brought about her own injury ? Answer:_
    3. Notwithstanding any negligence on the part of said plaintiff, could the defendant by the exercise of due care and prudence have prevented the injury after the perilous condition of the plaintiff was discovered? Answer: “No.”
    4. What damages, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover? Answer:
    From the judgment rendered the plaintiff appealed.
    
      Fountain & Fountain, Glande Kitchin, G. M. Fountain & 8on for plaintiff.
    
    
      F. S. Spruill for defendant.
    
   BeowN, J.

Exception No. 3 of the plaintiff is based upon the following facts: After the case was given to the jury by the judge, it was agreed by counsel, with the approval of the court, that the clerk should take the verdict. The clerk went to the courtroom to receive the verdict and, without asking them whether or not they had agreed upon their verdict, he asked them to hand him the issues, and the issues were handed to him, answered as follows by the jury: The first issue, “Yes”; second issue, “Yes”; third issue, “No”; fourth issue, “$2,500.” That the clerk thereupon handed the issues back to said jury and said to them that they had better retire to their rooms and reconsider the issues and see if answers were not in conflict with the judge’s charge. That one of the jurors asked, “In what respect?” The clerk salid to him that he could not instruct him as to that; that they could retire and see for themselves; and the jury immediately retired to their room.

Tbe next morning, wbieb was Sunday, about twenty minutes after 10 o’clock, tbe jury returned tbe verdict of record. To tbis tbe plaintiff excepted for tbat tbe verdict of record- is not tbe proper verdict, and before judgment moved for a new trial and tbat botb verdicts be set aside. Tbe court, being of opinion tbat tbe defendant was entitled to judgment on tbe verdict as returned to tbe clerk, overruled tbe plaintiff’s motion, and tbe plaintiff excepted.

It was error upon tbe part of tbe clerk to bave given any instructions whatever to tbe jury. It was not for bim to say whether they bad followed tbe charge of tbe court or not. When tbe jurors tendered to bim tbe issues, on Saturday night, it was bis duty to bave accepted them under tbe instructions of tbe court and tbe agreement of counsel, and not bave undertaken to advise tbe jury as to their attitude. In so doing be overstepped bis authority.

Tbe plaintiff tendered an issue as follows: “Notwithstanding any negligence on tbe part of said plaintiff, could tbe defendant, by tbe exercise of due care and prudence, bave prevented tbe injury?” Tbe court refused to submit tbis issue as tendered, but submitted it, modified so as to read: “Notwithstanding any negligence on tbe part of said plaintiff, could tbe defendant, by tbe exercise of due care and prudence, bave prevented tbe injury after the perilous condition of the plaintiff was discoveredV’ Tbe plaintiff excepted, and tbis is her second exception.

His Honor erred in refusing to submit tbe issue as tendered by tbe plaintiff. It is well settled in tbis State tbat where tbe plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence tbe defendant must exercise ordinary care and diligence to avoid tbe consequences of tbe plaintiff’s negligence, and if by exercising due care and diligence tbe defendant can discover tbe situation of tbe plaintiff in time to avoid injury, tbe defendant is liable if it fails to do so. Denmark v. R. R., 107 N. C., 189; Willis v. R. R., 122 N. C., 906; Pierce v. R. R., 124 N. C., 85; Powell v. R. R 125 N. C., 371; Bogan v. R. R., 129 N. C., 155; and many other subsequent decisions of tbis Court

Tbe defendant seeks to avoid tbe consequences of tbis error upon tbe part of tbe court by attempting to show tbat bis Honor charged tbe law correctly, and tbat tbe jury must bave understood tbat tbe answer to tbe third issue was not to depend solely upon whether tbe engineer did actually discover tbe plaintiff’s condition, but whether tbe engineer by exercise of ordinary care could bave discovered it.

Ve bave examined tbe charge with great care, and we find tbat bis Honor did instruct tbe jury once to tbat effect, but be instructed them otherwise and erroneously in other parts of bis charge. In view of tbe language of tbe issue, together with the conflicting charge, we think tbe jury were most probably misled.

New trial.  