
    King v. King.
    1. An allowance of temporary alimony by a judge at chambers is a final order which may be reviewed on error.
    2. The allowance by a judge of the court of common pleas, as a judge of the district court, of temporary alimony, pending an appeal as to permanent alimony, is not a bar to another allowance by such judge pending such appeal; and the signature of the judge to the order, or journal entry thereof, is not essential to the validity of the order.
    3. A divorce, alimony and custody of a child having been decreed to a woman, her removal from the state and subsequent marriage, pending an appeal to the district court as to alimony, will not deprive the latter court of power to decree alimony.
    Error to the District Court of Huron county.
    On June 28, 1870, Charles King and Julia Singer were married. She was twenty years of age, and he thirty years her senior. They lived together until 1877, when they finally separated. Three children were the issue of the marriage, the youngest born in 1875. On July 17, 1878, she obtained from him a divorce, by the. decree of the court of common pleas of Huron county, Ohio, on the ground of extreme cruelty. The custody and education of the youngest child were awarded to the mother, and that of the other children to the father. As alimony the court decreed to her $2,000, besides various articles of personal property, and also decreed to her the further sum of $1,500, on condition that she would release dower in Charles King’s lands. From the decree for alimony, Charles King appealed to the district court.
    Pending the appeal, on November 2, 1878, Hon. T. P. Finefrock, one of the judges of the court of common pleas in the judicial district embracing Huron county, and ex officio one of the judges of the district court of that district, allowed Julia King, as temporary alimony, $350, and on December 28, 1878, he allowed to her, as temporary alimony, tho sum of $200. These orders were made at chambers, and entered on the journal of the district court by its clerk, but were not signed by the judge making the same, nor was the journal so signed. Charles King filed in this (the supreme) court petitions in error to reverse these orders, and stayed their execution by undertakings.
    Subsequently to the granting of the divorce, and pending the appeal, Julia King removed to Michigan, where, on April 13, 1879, she was married to Romeo King, with whom she continues to live in that state.
    In the district court, on hearing the appeal as to alimony, the marriage of Julia King and Romeo King was shown, and the fact was relied on as a bar to the allowance of aliqiony; but the court, nevertheless, awarded to her the sum of $1,000 in gross, in addition to the temporary alimony. It was shown on that hearing, that Julia King brought to her husband Charles no property, and that beside a few hundred dollars in personal estate, Charles owned during the coverture, and still had, real estate worth between ten and fifteen thousand dollars, and it did not appear that he was in debt. Whether Romeo King had money or other property does not appear from the record.
    
      G. T. Stewa/rt, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Wickham c& Wildmcm and T. R. Strong, for defendant in error.
   Okey, O. J.

A judge of the court of common pleas is ex officio a judge of the district court, and as such is empowered to grant temporary alimony pending an appeal with respect to permanent alimony. 72 Ohio L. 145, § 9; 75 Ohio L. 749, § 13; Rev. Stats. § 5701. The order thus made in such special proceeding (75 OhioL. 726; 2 Rev. Stats. 1361), is in its nature final, and may be reviewed on error. 75 Ohio L. 804, § 1; Rev. Stats. § 6707; O'Donnell v. O'Donnell, 1 Disney, 299; Brigel v. Starbuck, 34 Ohio St. 280; Carpenter v. Canal Co. 35 Ohio St. 307, 315; Foss v. Foss, 100 Ill. 576; 2 Bishop’s M. & D. § 406. While the better practice is for the judge making such order to sign it, this is not essential to its validity, where, as here, it was entered on the journal by direction of the judge as required by statute (Rev. Stats. §§ 4963, 5331; Osburn v. The State, 7 Ohio, pt. 1, p. 212); and the provisions as to signing the journal which the former .practice act contained (Sheehan v. Davis, 17 Ohio St. 571), was not carried into the code. Nor can there be any doubt as to the right to increase the temporary alimony, from time to time, as justice may require (2 Bishop’s M. & D. § 429); and this suit having been properly brought where both parties were domiciled, it is obvious the right to alimony cannot be affected by the removal of the petitioner, pendente lite, to another state. See Keerl v. Keerl, 34 Md. 21.

The remaining question is as to the effect of the marriage of Julia Ring on the orders for temporary alimony, and on the power of the district court to award permanent alimony. With respect to the orders for temporary alimony, we are unable to say, from this record, that the marriage should have any effect whatever. It does not appear, that by such marriage her condition has been so changed as to render the orders unjust or inequitable. And while the question as to the power of the district court, under such circumstances, to award permanent alimony, may not be wholly free from doubt, we are all of opinion that the power existed. A decree for alimony is not affected by the subsequent marriage of the woman to whom it is granted, in the absence of a provision in the decree that it shall have such effect, although such marriage may, in some cases, afford sufficient ground for reducing the amount. See Rev. Stats, pt. 3, tit. 1, div. 7, ch. 6; Stillman v. Stillman, 99 Ill. 196; s. c., 20 Am. L. Reg. 667, 673, note; 9 West. L. Jour. 548; Lockwood v. Krum, 34 Ohio St. 1; 2 Bishop’s M. & D. § 429. Here, alimony was awarded in the common pleas, and although the decree was in form vacated by the appeal, the object sought by the appellant was not to escape from the payment of any alimony, but simply to obtain a review and reduction as to the amount. In determining the amount, the change effected by the marriage of the petitioner was evidently considered, and properly considered, by the district court,' and hence the amount awarded in the common pleas was materially reduced. Moreover, while designated as alimony, the sum was awarded, not strictly as alimony (2 Bishop’s M. & D. § 553), but doubtless with a view to the support of the appellant’s own child. Whether the amounts of the temporary and-permanent alimony were too great or too small, we are unable to determine from the record. We deal simply with questions of power in deciding this case, and do not find there has been such abuse of authority as to call for a reversal of either of the judgments.

Judgments affirmed  