
    *Bowman v. McChesney.
    August Term, 1872,
    Staunton.
    1. Confederate Honey.—In October 186B M executes his bond by -which he promises to pay B $4,000, at any time called for. after three months' notice, said money to bear no interest. It was given fora loan of Con federate treasury inotes, and the provision for three months' notice was inserted at the instance of M. Nothing was said as to the hind of money in which it was to be made. It was not called for until after the war closed. Heed :
    i. Same.—The bond, according to the true understanding and agreement of the parties, was tobe paid in Confederate currency, and therefore should be scaled, as of the date of the bond.
    2. Note Payable “On Demand”—“On Call.-There is no legal difference between a bond payable when “demanded,” or “on demand,” and one payable “on call” or "at anytime called for.” In each case the debt is payable immediately.
    3. Waiver of Notice.— The provisions for three months’ notice having been inserted at the instance and for the benefit of M, he may waive it.
    This was an action of debt in the Circuit court of Augusta county, brought in August 1866, by Jacob Bowman, Sr., against William S. McChesney, to recover the amount of a bond for four thousand dollars. The cause came on to be tried in November 1868, when the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $285.71, with interest from the 23d of October 1863, till paid. The plaintiff thereupon moved the court for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. But the court overruled the motion; and rendered a judgment upon the verdict; and the plaintiff excepted.
    The facts certified are substantially as follows: The bond on which the action was brought is as follows: $4,000.—Por value received, I promise and bind myself, my heirs, &c., to pay to Jacob Bowman, Sr., at any *time called for, after three months’ notice, the just and full sum of four thousand dollars, said money is, io no iutete&t. Witness, my hand and seal, October 23d, 1863. William S. McChesney, seal. It was proved that the defendant, who was a surgeon in the Confederate service, a short time before the date of the bond applied to William Bosser-man for the loan of some Confederate notes. That Bosserman not having the money let the plaintiff know that the defendant wished to borrow. That the plaintiff put into Bosserman’s hands, $4,600 of Confederate notes; and the bond for $4,000 was then prepared by Jacob Bowman, Jr., a son of the plaintiff; the stipulation for three months’ notice having been inserted at the instance of Bosserman, who had been requested by the defendant to have it arranged that he should have some notice to pay. That Bosserman took the said sum of $4,600, and brought back the bond and handed it to Jacob Bowman, Jr., to be given to the plaintiff; which was done. The plaintiff did not see the defendant or have any understanding with him, in respect to the kind of currency in which the bond was to be discharged. When Bosserman met the defendant after getting the money from the plaintiff, Bosserman informed him he had some money to lend him belonging to the plaintiff. Defendant objected to giving his bond to the plaintiff, as he had not seen him; but after some hesitation he agreed to give it, and sat down to write the bond; but Bosserman thereupon produced the bond already prepared, which the defendant signed, and handed it back to Bosserman, who sent it to the plaintiff as before stated. The consideration of said bond was Confederate States treasury notes, which at the time bore to gold the ratio in the market of fourteen to one. Bosserman made no special agreement with the defendant as to the currency to be paid back. The defendant proved by his own evidence, that as for himself he thought of nothing but Confederate notes in the transaction; ’‘that he did not contemplate paying in good money, and that he had faith in the success of the Confederate cause.
    Jacob Bowman, Jr., a witness for plaintiff, says after the suit was brought, in a conversation between himself and the defendant about it, he heard the defendant say, that he had borrowed the money in good faith and expected to pay it back in good faith; but the law entitled him to scale it, and he intended to take the benefit of it. Plaintiff proved that nothing was said by him to the defendant, until after the war was ended. That some time after Lee’s surrender, he met the defendant, and asked him if it would be convenient for him to pay plaintiff some money; that defendant said he had none; that plaintiff then asked him if he would pay him in the following spring (1866) ; that he had to raise as much as $500; and defendant said he thought he could help plaintiff, and promised to do what he could. Plaintiff said he did not have much faith in the Confederate success, and was anxious to get rid of his Confederate money.
    Upon the application of the plaintiff a supersedeas was awarded him by a judge of the District court of Appeals at Charlottesville ; and the case was afterwards sent to this court.
    Pultz, for the appellant.
    Baldwin & Cochran and Hanger, for the appellee.
    
      
      Note Payable “On Demand”—“On Call.”-—The court, in Bacon v. Bacon, 94 Va. 686, 27 S. E. Rep. 576, citing the principal case among others, said: “A note or bond payable 'on demand' or ‘on call' (which is the same thing) is payable at once, and interest and the statute of limitations commence to run from its date. ” See also, Moon v. Richardson, 24 G ratt. 222.
    
   BOULDIN, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case cannot be distinguished, in principle, from the case of Stover, assignee, v. Hamilton & others, 21 Gratt. 273. The contracts in both cases are, in substance, the same. In this case, as in that, the obligation was entered into within the period embraced by the statute for the adjustment of Confederate liabilities, and was given for a loan of Confederate States treasury notes. In neither case was the debt to bear interest *until payment should be demanded, and in both alike—but for the stipulation in the one case for a “reasonable time,” and in the other for “three months notice”—the debts would be payable on demand; for this court is unable to appreciaté the distinction attempted to be drawn at the bar between an obligation payable “on demand” or “when demanded,” and one payable “on call” or “at any time called for.” In each case, under the laws of Virginia, the debt is pay•able immediately, and the obligors, without formal demand, are bound—unless otherwise provided on the face of the bond—to pay interest from the date of the obligation, and are entitled to make payment at any time after the execution of the bond.

But it has been very earnestly contended that, by reason of the words “after three months’ notice,” inserted in the contract in this case immediately after the words “at any time called for,” this'obligation has been wholly withdrawn from the influence of the general rule, and is only payable at the pleasure of the obligee. There might be some force in the argument, had that provision, as was the case in Boulware v. Newton, 18 Gratt. 708, been inserted at the instance and for the benefit of the obligee. But such was not the case here. On the contrary, the stipulation for a short notice was, as was a similar provision in the case of Stover, assignee, v. Hamilton & others, inserted at the instance and for the benefit of the obligor, so as to make it operate not as a restriction upon him, but as a privilege secured to himand it is a familiar rule of law, that a party may always waive a condition or stipulation in a contract inserted solely for his benefit. Accordingly in Stover v. Hamilton & others, which in this respect is not distinguishable from the case before us, it was the unanimous judgment of the court that, notwithstanding the stipulation for “a reasonable time,” the debt as to the obligor was payable instan ter (that stipulation being inserted for *his benefit), and was properly scaled as of the date of the contract. That judgment is fully approved by this court.

The court is of opinion that the contract in this case was, according to the true understanding and agreement of the parties, to be fulfilled and performed in Confederate States treasury notes; that as to the obligor, it was payable at any time from its date, and therefore, that the jury was right in scaling the debt as of the date of the obligation.

The judgment must be affirmed, with costs and damages to the appellee.

Judgment affirmed.  