
    Buch et al. v. Long.
    A married woman who has complied with the requirements of the Act of April 3,1872, in regard to separate earnings, may borrow money upon her own credit, and goods purchased upon such credit are not liable to he seized for her husband’s debts.
    
      Query, whether the fact that a married woman has a separate estate, proportionate to the credit given to her, is sufficient to support the credit, although the vendors did not know of the separate estate.
    March 4, 1889.
    Error, No. 41, July T. 1888, to O. P. Berks Co., to review a judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff on a feigned issue under a sheriff’s interpleader between Susan Long as plaintiff and Jacob A. Buch et al., trading as Jacob A. Buch & Bro., as defendants, at May T. 1885, No. 20. Green and Clark, JJ., absent.
    The facts appear by the following charge of the court, by Hagenman, J.:
    “ It seems, from the evidence, that sometime in March, 1885, an execution was issued against John M. Long, and the sheriff levied upon this property. Mrs. Long made claim to the property, and thereupon the court granted a rule upon her, requiring her to appear in court and enter into a bond for the forthcoming of this property, after the court had awarded an issue.
    “Now, what are the facts? Sometime in January, 1884, John M. Long was carrying on the cabinetmaking business in 'Womelsdorf, and Knoll & Kinzer, two of his creditors, having judgments against him, issued executions on them, levied upon his property, and sold it out by the sheriff. They bought the property, and, on the 11th of February, 1884, they sold this property to Susan Long for $514. The household goods probably may be the same that were there in 1884; but the jury will be relieved from considering the ownership of the household goods, because the defendants’ counsel have said to you, in their argument, that they make no claim for them. The other property which they claim, is amply sufficient to pay them their judgment, if they are entitled to recover. The cabinetware, furniture and materials, which were there, were purchased by Mrs. Long, and while probably all the property in 1884 had passed out of Mrs. Long’s hands, it was supplied by new furniture. One of the witnesses stated that the greater portion at least of the property which was purchased from Knoll & Kinzer had been sold. Some of it was in an unfinished state, and was finished and sold. It is claimed, upon the part of the defendants, that this purchase which Mrs. Long made from Knoll & Kinzer, was not her property, but was that of her husband, and, therefore, any additional property which she may have purchased, or any of the property which was there, was liable to pay the debt of John Long.
    “ It seems that the defendants, Jacob A. Buch & Bro., have a judgment against John Long, and they levied upon this property for the purpose of satisfying their judgment out of the sale of this property. At the time when Mrs. Long made this purchase, she paid no money. She gave her individual note, a judgment note, waiving the exemption. Where a married woman buys property, as against her husband’s creditors, the burden of proof is on her to show, by clear, satisfactory, preponderating evidence, that she purchased it on the credit of her own separate estate, or paid for it out of her separate funds, not derived from her husband. It is claimed by the defendants that, at the time when she made this purchase, she had no separate estate, and that the purchase which she then made on credit was not her property, but was the property of her husband. A case somewhat similar to this was tried in this court a few years ago. It was tried before me, and in that case I probably went pretty far to sustain the earnings of a married woman. The supreme court laid down the law differently from what I had laid it down, and they said that goods purchased by a married woman, on her own credit, are not her separate property. Her credit is nothing in the eyes of the law. When she does contract, the law assumes her the agent of her husband. A married woman must have had a separate estate to protect her purchase upon her credit, an estate available and proportionate to the credit it supports. The purchase must, in fact, be made not upon her credit, but upon the credit of her separate estate; upon her ability to pay out of her own funds. That is the law which the supreme court laid down, and it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show by clear, satisfactory, preponderating evidence, that at the time when she purchased this property from Knoll & Kinzer she had a separate estate proportionate to sustain this credit. Otherwise the property was her husband’s when she bought it, and would be liable for his debts.
    “Now, what is the evidence?- What ]3roof has she shown you of a separate estate that she owned ? The first portion of her claim is that she had two hundred dollars in cash, that she kept it in a chest at home, and had it there for a number of years. By the testimony, we learn that in 1872 or 1873, or along there, she was engaged in the cabinetmaking business in Womelsdorf. She presented her petition to this court in January, 1873, for the purpose of acquiring the right to her own separate earnings. Before the Act of 1872, the earnings of a wife belonged to the husband. But the Act of 1872 authorized a woman to come into court, present her petition, and in that way acquire the right to her own separate earnings. She says she engaged in business in 1872 or 1873, along there, and that her brother gave her the money to enable her to begin that business and carry it on. She states that that business was carried on some two or three years, probably longer; the jury will recollect the evidence. Her brother was examined here in court. She first stated that he had given her upward of three hundred dollars. He stated that at one time he had given her two hundred dollars, and subsequently had given her upward of one hundred and twenty dollars more, so that she had over three hundred dollars which she had received from him. She says she continued in business some couple of years, and when she ended her business she had two hundred dollars in cash, and that she put it away and kept it.
    “ It is for the jury to say whether that testimony is believed by them. Do the jury believe this testimony? If they do, then she has shown that she had two hundred dollars of money laid away as her own separate property. What' other estate has she, if any ? She states that the household furniture belonged to her. You have heard her testimony in regard to it. You have heard how she has accounted for her ownership of that. If the jury believe her statement in regard to it, then the furniture, whatever it was, belonged to her. She states that the value of that furniture was about two hundred dollars. If the jury find that she was the owner or the possessor of two hundred dollars in cash, and that she was the owner of these household goods, which were worth two hundred dollars, then she had property of her own separate estate amounting to about four hundred dollars. If she had that property at the time, it is for the jury to say whether that was not sufficient and proportionate to sustain the credit of the property which she purchased from Knoll & Kinzer.
    
      “ The defendants take the ground that Knoll & Kinzer knew nothing at all about any separate estate which she had, and that when they sold to her they sold upon the credit of the property which she purchased from them, and upon her honesty. They have put a point to the court, asking the court to say that that will not protect this property in the hands of Mrs. Long; in other words, that it is liable for the debts of her husband, being the husband’s property.”
    
      “ The first point is this:
    
      “ ‘ 1. It being the uncontradicted evidence in this case, that the sale made to the plaintiff, Susan Long, by Knoll & Kinzer, was not made on the credit of any separate estate belonging to her, but, on the contrary, it was made on the credit of the property then sold to her, and a belief in her honesty, the verdict should be for the defendants, the execution creditors of her husband, as to the property so sold to her by said Knoll & Kinzer.’ Ans. The court decline so to instruct you. Although Knoll & Kinzer sold on the credit of the property sold to Mrs. Long, and on her honesty, yet if Mrs. Long had a separate estate proportioned to the credit which Knoll & Kinzer gave her for the property sold, and she bought on the credit of that separate estate, the property belongs to her and cannot be seized by the creditors of her husband for his debts.
    “ ‘ 3. If the jury believe, from the evidence in the case, that Knoll & Kinzer, at the time they sold to Mrs. Long or took her note, were not aware that she possessed any separate estate, they could not have sold to her on the credit of a separate estate, and if the jury so find, the verdict should be for the defendants.’ Ans. The court decline so to instruct you.
    
      “ ‘ 5. The plaintiff in this case has not submitted such evidence in proof of her claim of title to the property in controversy here as the law requires in a contest between a married woman and her husband’s creditors; and, under all the evidence in the case, the verdict should be for the defendants.’ Ans. The court decline so to instruct you.
    
      “ Now, gentlemen, you will have to ascertain whether Mrs. Long has shown you by clear, satisfactory, preponderating evidence that she was the owner of a sufficient separate estate at the time when she made this purchase from Knoll & Kinzer. She paid no money; therefore, it is necessary that she satisfy you from the evidence that she had a sufficient estate, proportionate to the credit which she received from Knoll & Kinzer when she bought this property. It is not necessary for the court to go over all the evidence that was produced further. It is now for the jury to say from this evidence whether this property was hers. For we say to you, that if she had this separate estate, and the jury find it was proportionate to the credit which was given to her by Knoll & Kinzer, then the property belonged to her at the time when she purchased on the 11th of February, 1884, and any of the .product of that business, which it has been testified was carried on by her, would belong to her and not to her husband, and would not be liable for her husband’s debts. But if the jury find otherwise, that she had no such separate property to sustain this credit, then your verdict would be in favor of the defendants.
    “ The first point submitted by the plaintiff is :
    “ ‘ 1. If the jury believe the testimony of Samuel S. Geist, that he gave his sister, Susan Long, about three hundred dollars in money when she went into business in 1812 or 1813, and the testimony of Susan Long that she had two hundred dollars left over of the proceeds of said business at the time she purchased the goods of Knoll & Kinzer, then she had a separate estate which, in connection with the household goods belonging to her, and her honesty and integrity, was sufficient to base a credit for such purchase, and the goods so purchased and their proceeds will not be liable for the debts of the husband.’ Ans, Instead of the court .ruling that it is sufficient to sustain this credit, the court leave that question to the jury to ascertain whether this is sufficient or not sufficient.”
    The proceedings under the Act of 1812 were given in evidence.
    The evidence as to the credit given for the goods in dispute, was, inter alia, as follows:
    
      Mrs. Long testified : “ Q. You kept it [$200] in your chest or in your book during these nine years? A. Yes, sir. Q. Then you bought this stock and gave your note and never said anything about your having the money to Knoll & Kinzer? A. Yes, sir. . . . ■Q. You say you did not say anything to Knoll & Kinzer about having $200 ; you never mentioned that ? A. No. Q. Then you bought this property on this note ? Is that the note ? A. I think it is. Q. Is this a judgment note ? A. Yes, sir; that is a judgment note. Yes, sir ; I bought it on that note.”
    Mr. Kinzer testified: “ Q. At the time you sold to her, did you know whether she had any separate estate, any property belonging to herself or not ? A. I did not particularly. I had heard she had, but I had no particular knowledge of it. Q. I suppose you sold then on the credit of the goods that you sold ? A. As I said, I thought that we would be likely to realize more than we could by •ourselves. Q. In other words, I presume you sold the goods to her really upon their own credit, taking a note with a waiver, and feeling that the goods themselves would be security for the payment of the note ? I suppose that was about the way of it. A. The goods and her honor. . . . Q. I believe you have said that the credit that you gave was based upon the value of the property that you •sold to her and her honor, you say? A. Yes, sir.”
    Isaac Knoll testified: “ Q. There was nothing said about any separate estate of hers at the time ? A. No, sir. . . . Q. On whose credit did you sell these goods to Mrs. Long ? A. Simply •on her own credit of course. Q. So far as you know, of course, she had nothing but the property you sold to her ? A. No, we sold to her expressly on her honesty, and expected to get paid for it. Q. Out of all the proceeds of this .property that you sold ? A. Yes, sir.”
    Yerdict and judgment for plaintiff.
    
      The assignments of error specified, 1-3, the answers to defendants’ points, quoting them; and, 4, the answer to plaintiff’s points, quoting the point and answer.
    
      D. N. Schaeffer, with him H. W. Bland, for plaintiffs in error.
    A married woman is not precluded from buying upon credit, provided it be upon the credit of her separate estate. It is incumbent upon her to establish the fact that the purchase was so made, to protect her title against the creditors of her husband. Seeds v. Kahler, 76 Pa. 267; Blum v. Ross, 116 Pa. 163.
    The mere fact that she has a separate estate, does not suffice to show that the purchase was made on the credit thereof. Lochman v. Brobst, 14 W. N. C. 134.
    
      Henry D. Green and A. G. Green, who were not heard, for defendant in error.
    Where a feme covert owns property of value sufficient to serve as the foundation of a credit, direct proof that the credit was based upon it may not be necessary, as the jury may infer that from the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
    
      In Spearing v. Laughlin, 113 Pa. 209, a separate estate of $1,000 was held sufficient on which to base a credit of $14,000. In purchasing for $14,000 she paid down $1,000 in cash, and gave her judgment notes for the balance. And the court further hold, on page 213, that “if she is shown to own a separate estate, it is a question for the jury whether she bought on the credit of it,” and that “ known integrity and business qualifications of a wife may be recognized as an element in obtaining credit.”
    March 4, 1889.
   Per Curiam,

Judgment affirmed.

Cf. Wayne v. Lewis, supra, page 305, and Orr v. Bornstein, 23 W. N. C. 356, referred to in note to that case.  