
    In the Matter of Josef Meisels, Respondent, v Alexander Uhr, Also Known as Chaim Uhr, et al., Appellants, and Tzvi M. Ginsberg et al., Respondents. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter of Alexander Uhr et al., Appellants, v Josef Meisels, Respondent. (Proceeding No. 2.)
    Argued March 31, 1992;
    decided May 12, 1992
    
      POINTS OF COUNSEL
    
      Richard A. Finkel, George S. Meissner, Ronald M. Klein-berg, Peter D. Close and Marc H. Gerstein for appellants. I.
    The agreements by the parties to arbitrate "all the disputes between them and as well on the three buildings” are valid arbitration agreements under CPLR 7501. (Matter of Bohlinger [National Cash Register Co.], 305 NY 539; Matter of Weinrott [Carp] 32 NY2d 190; Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 NY2d 623; Matter of 166 Mamaroneck Ave. Corp. v 151 E. Post Rd. Corp., 78 NY2d 88; Matter of Baime [Martin’s] 88 AD2d 595; Bowmer v Bowmer, 50 NY2d 288.) II. The rulings of the courts below, that the arbitration agreements were invalid under Judaic law are incorrect and constitute an infringement on freedom of religion and hence, are unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the US Constitution. (Presbyterian Church v Hull Church, 393 US 440; Matter of Silverman [Benmor Coats] 61 NY2d 299; Watson v Jones, 13 Wall [80 US] 679; Knight v Presbytery of W. N. Y., 26 AD2d 19, 18 NY2d 868; Serbian Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 US 696; Gonzalez v Archbishop, 280 US 1; Natal v Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F2d 1575; First Presbyt. Church v United Presbyt. Church, 430 F Supp 450; Thomas v Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 US 707; Berman v Shantes Lab., 43 AD2d 736.) III. Respondent’s willing participation in the arbitration proceedings precludes any review as to the validity of the agreements to arbitrate. (Matter of National Cash Register Co. [Wilson] 8 NY2d 377; Rochester City School Dist. v Rochester Teachers Assn., 41 NY2d 578; Matter of United Liverpool Faculty Assn. v Board of Educ., 52 NY2d 1038; Matter of Silverman [Benmor Coats] 61 NY2d 299; Matter of Darman [Lustgarten] 105 AD2d 1028; Aigen v Giannone, 49 AD2d 562; United Buying Serv. Intl. Corp. v United Buying Serv., 38 AD2d 75.) IV. The award rendered by the Beth Din was consistent with the authority granted to it by the arbitration agreements and should therefore be confirmed. (Matter of Long Is. Lbr. Co. [Martin] 15 NY2d 380; Sisters of St. John 
      
      the Baptist v Geraghty Constructor, 67 NY2d 997; Matter of Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v Investors Ins. Co., 37 NY2d 91; Matter of Wilaka Constr. Co. [New York City Hous. Auth.], 17 NY2d 195; Matter of Mikel v Scharf, 105 Misc 2d 548, 85 AD2d 604; Shuffman v Rudd Plastic Fabrics Corp., 64 AD2d 699; Matter of Tilbury Fabrics v Stillwater, Inc., 81 AD2d 532, 56 NY2d 624; Matter of Raisler Corp. [New York City Hous. Auth.] 32 NY2d 274; Matter of Port Washington Union Free School Dist. v Port Washington Teachers Assn., 45 NY2d 411; Matter of Lentine [Fundaro] 29 NY2d 382.) V. Neither the forfeiture provision nor the provision waiving the right to appeal render the Beth Din arbitration agreements void as against public policy. (Matter of Associated Gen. Contrs. [Savin Bros.] 45 AD2d 136, 36 NY2d 957; Bogatz v Case Catering Corp., 86 Misc 2d 1052; Educational Beneficial v Reynolds, 67 Misc 2d 1052; Rymer v Leider, 122 Misc 2d 873; Sirlin Plumbing Co. v Babylon Country Club, 10 AD2d 995; People v Cox, 71 AD2d 798; Matter of Neirs-Folkes, Inc. [Drake Ins. Co.] 75 AD2d 787.) VI. The June 23, 1988 award of the Beth Din was a final award. (Volpe v Incognito, 23 Misc 2d 236; Howland v Howland, 15 AD2d 122; Najean Bldrs. v Harbor Bay Realty Co., 15 AD2d 580; Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v Solow, 114 AD2d 818, 68 NY2d 779; Matter of Mole [Queen Ins. Co.] 14 AD2d 1; Matter of Eisenstein [Rednick] 8 AD2d 794; Lentine v Fundaro, 29 NY2d 382; Dahlke v X-L-O Automotive Accessories, 40 AD2d 666; Matter of Wolff & Munier [Diesel Constr. Co.] 41 AD2d 618; People v McGrane, 17 Misc 2d 1004.) VII. Assuming this Court finds the Beth Din award partially invalid, it should still confirm all other portions of the award. (Matter of Wolff & Munier [Diesel Constr. Co.] 41 AD2d 618; Matter of Weiss [Metalsalts Corp.] 15 AD2d 46; Matter of Kozlowski v Seville Syndicate, 64 Misc 2d 109.)
    
      Stuart M. Fischman, Bernard Bronner, Jill F. Hunter and Laurence S. Margolin for Josef Meisels, respondent. I.
    The agreement to arbitrate was violative of the CPLR and case law and was entirely invalid. (Matter of Silverman [Benmor Coats] 61 NY2d 299; Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.] 51 NY2d 1; Schubtex, Inc. v Allen Snyder, Inc., 49 NY2d 1; Matter of Marlene Indus. Corp. [Carnac Textiles] 45 NY2d 327; Matter of Riverdale Fabrics Corp. [Tillinghast-Stiles Co.] 306 NY 288, 307 NY 689; Matter of Doughboy Indus. [Pantasote Co.] 17 AD2d 216; Sisters of St. John the Baptist v Geraghty Constructor, 67 NY2d 997; Shuffman v 
      
      Rudd Plastic Fabrics Corp., 64 A.D2d 699; Matter of Hellman [Wolbrom] 31 AD2d 477; Matter of Colwell Worsted Mills [Glass], 228 App Div 150.) II. The awards and modifications themselves were not properly made, issued and delivered to the parties. (Matter of Wolff & Munier [Diesel Constr. Co.] 41 AD2d 618.) III. An arbitrator may give evidence relating to the improprieties of the underlying arbitration proceedings. (Matter of Weiner Co. [Freund Co.] 2 AD2d 341, 3 NY2d 806; Matter of Big-W Constr. Corp. [Horowitz], 24 Misc 2d 145, 14 AD2d 817; Rembrandt Indus. v Hodges Intl., 38 NY2d 502; Lorillard v Clyde, 122 NY 41; Dodds v Hakes, 114 NY 260.) IV. The statements of one of the arbitrators undermines any statements to the contrary by appellants herein. V. The arbitration agreement and the proceedings were violative of public policy. (Glen Mfg. v Perfect Fit Indus., 299 F Supp 278, 420 F2d 319, 397 US 1042; Stahl v Stahl, 16 AD2d 467; J. M. Deutsch, Inc. v Robert Paper Co., 13 AD2d 768; Muller Constr. Co. v New York Tel. Co., 40 NY2d 955; Williams v Macchio, 69 Misc 2d 94; Roosevelt Hosp. v Orlansky, 92 Misc 2d 525; Matter of Goldfinger v Lisker, 68 NY2d 225; Matter of Wolff & Munier [Diesel Constr. Co.] 41 AD2d 618.) VI. The courts in the State of New York have the power to vacate arbitration awards which are made in contravention of public policy. (Matter of Neirs-Folkes, Inc. [Drake Ins. Co.] 75 AD2d 787, 53 NY2d 1038; Weinstein & Sons v City of New York, 264 App Div 398, 289 NY 741.) VII. The cases cited by appellants are wholly inapplicable to the instant action. (Kingsbridge Center v Turk, 98 AD2d 664; Matter of Kozlowski v Seville Syndicate, 64 Misc 2d 109; Matter of Bohlinger [National Cash Register Co.] 305 NY 539; Matter of Silverman [Benmor Coats] 61 NY2d 299; Matter of Newmeyer [Bill Chan’s Inc.] 23 AD2d 836; Rochester City School Dist. v Rochester Teachers Assn., 41 NY2d 578; Lentine v Fundaro, 29 NY2d 382; Matter of Weiss [Metalsalts Corp.] 15 AD2d 46, 11 NY2d 1042.) VIII. There was absolutely no infringement of the constitutional rights of appellants and this issue was not properly preserved for this appeal. (Matter of Shannon B., 70 NY2d 458; Thomas v Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 US 707; Watson v Jones, 13 Wall [80 US] 679; Avitzur v Avitzur, 58 NY2d 108, 464 US 817; Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v Leggett, 48 NY2d 430.) IX. There are determinations as a matter of fact and of law in the courts below which demonstrate that the proceedings and awards were violative of the CPLR. (Farr v Newman, 14 NY2d 183.) X. The improper and irrational awards of the arbitration panel rendered the awards void. (Neiman v Springer, 71 AD2d 854.) XI. The arbitration panel was not empowered to alter their awards and to render improper substantive modifications, without notice and in the absence of a party. (Matter of Lewis v County of Suffolk, 77 AD2d 599.) XII. There is no partnership termination issue. (Phillips v Village of Oriskany, 57 AD2d 110; Mayer v McBrunigan Constr. Corp., 123 AD2d 606.) XIII. The awards and modifications of the arbitration panel were not final and definitive. (Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v Solow, 68 NY2d 779.)
    
      David Zwiebel, Morton Avigdor, Aaron Twerski and Martin Bienstock for Agudath Israel of America, amicus curiae. I.
    It weis reversible error for the courts below to nullify the Beth Din proceeding on the ground that the arbitration agreement did not specify the issues to be arbitrated. (Matter of National Cash Register Co. [Wilson], 8 NY2d 377; Rochester City School Dist. v Rochester Teachers Assn., 41 NY2d 578; Matter of Silverman [Benmor Coats], 61 NY2d 299; United Buying Serv. Intl. Corp. v United Buying Serv., 38 AD2d 75, 30 NY2d 822; Aigen v Giannone, 49 AD2d 562; Sisters of St. John the Baptist v Geraghty Constructor, 67 NY2d 997; Matter of Hellman [Wolbrom] 31 AD2d 477; Kingsbridge Center v Turk, 98 AD2d 664; Matter of Kozlowski v Seville Syndicate, 64 Misc 2d 109.) II. It was reversible error for the courts below to rule that the Beth Din had no authority to issue a compromise judgment. (Matter of Kozlowski v Seville Syndicate, 64 Misc 2d 109.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Chief Judge Wachtler.

In these proceedings petitioner seeks to vacate and respondents seek to confirm an arbitration award rendered by a Beth Din, a religious tribunal that adjudicates disputes according to Jewish law and custom. Supreme Court granted the petition to vacate the award for several reasons enumerated in a lengthy opinion (Meisels v Uhr, 145 Misc 2d 571) and the Appellate Division affirmed for the reasons stated by Supreme Court (173 AD2d 542). We conclude that the award should be confirmed and therefore reverse.

For a number of years the parties engaged in business as a partnership which owned and operated three improved parcels of real property. After disagreements arose, they entered into negotiations for the dissolution of the partnership and allocation of the assets among the partners. According to petitioner, these negotiations culminated in an agreement that respondents would convey their interest and title in the three properties to petitioner in exchange for approximately $660,000, representing respondents’ equity interest in the properties less amounts owed to petitioner. According to respondents, however, this purported agreement was the result of duress and coercion, not negotiation. They claim that the agreement was signed by them only after they were subjected to physical abuse and economic blackmail during a late-night meeting in the office of petitioner’s former attorney.

The terms of this agreement were not carried out and the parties eventually agreed, in writing, to submit "all the disputes between them and as well on [the] three buildings” to arbitration by a Beth Din. The Beth Din panel was to consist of Rabbi Abraham Meisels (no relation to petitioner) and two other rabbis to be chosen by him. The agreement, which was written in Hebrew and signed on January 21, 1988, further provided that refusal to obey the Beth Din or resort to secular courts would result in forfeiture of any right in "these assets”, presumably meaning the assets of the partnership.

On February 22, 1988, at the first session of the Beth Din, the parties signed a second agreement, denominated a "Bill of Arbitration”, by which they accepted the authority of Rabbi Meisels and the two other members of the panel appointed by him, Rabbis Silber and Ginsberg. This agreement was also written in Hebrew. According to the translation submitted to Supreme Court, in a provision which that court found to be a significant limitation on the Beth Din’s authority, the parties undertook to fulfill the judgment to be granted by the Beth Din "either by judgment or by settlement according to Jewish law, as the said judges will see fit”. On the same day, the panel ordered petitioner to deposit $500,000 (later increased to $600,000) with the Beth Din, the purpose of which the parties also dispute. Petitioner contends that the deposit was made only to insure his appearance before the Beth Din; respondents contend that it was also intended as security to be available to satisfy any judgment that might be rendered against petitioner by the panel. The deposit was finally made in a form acceptable to the Beth Din on June 9, 1988, after more than a dozen hearing sessions had taken place. At that time, the panel issued a written memorandum stating that it intended to issue a verdict within two weeks and that, if it failed to do so other than because of hindrance by petitioner, it would return petitioner’s deposit.

The final session was held on June 12. On June 23, a written award was issued which provided that petitioner would retain full ownership of the two remaining buildings (the third building had apparently been sold with the consent of all parties) and would pay to respondents the sum of $875,000, of which $600,000 was payable within two weeks and the remainder was payable in a three-month note. In addition, the award gave respondents the option to purchase one of the two buildings from petitioner within two months for a stated price.

On June 28, the Beth Din issued an appendix to the award, apparently at the request of both parties, which clarified certain aspects of the award. For example, the appendix provided that, with respect to the building subject to the option, petitioner would be entitled to the income and would be responsible for all normal expenses until the closing, but that any unusually large expenses that might be required before the closing would be passed on to respondents by adjusting the purchase price.

Also in the record is a document dated August 31, the source and nature of which is unclear. According to the translation from Hebrew, this document is a copy made by petitioner of a document shown to him by Rabbi Meisels. The translation indicates that the document was signed by all three members of the Beth Din panel. It sets forth a date and place for the exchange of releases and the payment of the sums due under the award, and notes that respondents will be accorded six weeks from that date to exercise the option. The document was never served upon the parties; according to the affidavits of two members of the Beth Din panel, it was an internal memorandum that merely reflected information imparted to the panel by the parties’ advocates concerning their plan to implement the award.

On September 8, however, petitioner commenced a proceeding to vacate the award pursuant to CPLR 7511 and seeking the return of the $600,000 deposit. Among the grounds for vacatur asserted by petitioner were that Rabbis Ginsberg and Silber were selected at the insistence of respondents and that those two members of the panel were biased and engaged in improper ex parte contacts with respondents. In addition, petitioner claimed that the award was irrational, based in part on the Beth Din’s alleged failure to give due consideration to certain evidence offered by petitioner. These grounds for vacatur were all correctly rejected by Supreme Court, which noted that petitioner’s allegations of improper conduct on the part of the arbitrators were conclusory and unsubstantiated.

Petitioner’s primary contention was that the award should be vacated pursuant to CPLR 7511 (b) (1) (iv) on the ground that his rights were prejudiced by the failure of the Beth Din to follow certain procedures set forth in CPLR article 75, in particular the requirements of CPLR 7507 and 7509. This argument was also correctly rejected by Supreme Court.

CPLR 7507 requires, in part, that an arbitration award be in writing and be delivered to each party personally or by registered or certified mail unless the arbitration agreement provides for some other method of delivery. CPLR 7509 provides that an award may be modified by the arbitrator upon certain enumerated grounds and only upon an application by a party with written notice to the other parties.

Petitioner’s claim that the Beth Din did not comply with these procedures rests on a single fragile premise — that the Beth Din’s initial award was made on June 12, not June 23. According to petitioner, this supposed June 12 award directed that petitioner would retain title to both remaining properties and that respondents would receive the sum of $875,000. Thus, the argument goes, the June 23 award, which included the additional provision granting respondents an option to purchase one of the properties, constituted a modification of the original award. Because this modification did not satisfy the requirements of CPLR 7509 — there was no written application by respondents, no notice to petitioner and none of the enumerated grounds for modification — petitioner contends that the award must be vacated.

The weak link in this argument, of course, is the absence of any documentary evidence that the Beth Din in fact rendered an award on June 12; if it did not, then the June 23 award was not a modification, the requirements of CPLR 7509 do not apply and the entire argument collapses. Petitioner’s explanation for his inability to produce the June 12 award is that he was never notified of the award and that it was never delivered to him as required by CPLR 7507. This procedural defect, petitioner contends, not only excuses his inability to substantiate the premise of his argument, but also establishes a further ground for vacating the award. We disagree.

Assuming for the sake of argument that there was some attempt to issue an award on June 12 — though Rabbis Silber and Ginsberg submitted affidavits denying that any decision had been reached on that date — petitioner’s contention that such an award was not delivered to him would, at most, vitiate that award. We must agree with the lower courts that either there was no attempt to issue an award on June 12 or, if there was, it was ineffective. In either case, the only viable award is the one dated June 23. This award, then, was not a modification of a prior award and petitioner’s arguments attacking it on that basis are without merit.

Petitioner also contended that the award was improperly modified by both the June 28 appendix to the award and the August 31 document which described a timetable for satisfaction of the award. Because these documents concern the terms of the option, the argument that they modified the award rests on the premise that the award in question is the so-called "missing award” of June 12, which did not include such an option. Our conclusion that there was no viable June 12 award largely disposes of this argument. The June 23 award is the relevant benchmark for determining whether the award was modified and, when compared with that award, the later documents did not work a modification, but at most merely clarified the terms of the option. Moreover, even assuming that a modification occurred and that the requirements of CPLR 7509 were not followed, vacatur is not required unless petitioner can demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the defect (see, CPLR 7511 [b] [1]). Petitioner has not met this burden. Indeed, the major provision of the June 28 appendix— an allowance for an upward adjustment in the option price to reflect unusual expenses — favored petitioner.

Finally, petitioner also claimed that vacatur of the award was required because "a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made” (CPLR 7511 [b] [1] [in]). This claim is based upon provisions in the June 23 award, the June 28 appendix and the August 31 memorandum indicating that the Beth Din would resolve disputes that might arise between the parties concerning the execution of the award. For example, the June 28 appendix provided that the Beth Din would decide whether unusual operating expenses required an adjustment in the option price. Supreme Court’s decision to vacate the award was based in part on the conclusion that these provisions deprived the award of finality and definiteness. We reach a different conclusion.

The Beth Din’s reservation of jurisdiction to resolve disputes that might arise as the parties undertook to satisfy the award does not necessarily mean that the award is indefinite or nonfinal for purposes of CPLR 7511 (see, Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v Solow, 114 AD2d 818, affd 68 NY2d 779). An award is deficient in this regard and subject to vacatur only if it leaves the parties unable to determine their rights and obligations, if it does not resolve the controversy submitted or if it creates a new controversy (see, Hiscock v Harris, 74 NY 108, 113; Matter of Guetta [Raxon Fabrics Corp.], 123 AD2d 40, 44). The award in this case sufficiently set forth the parties’ rights and obligations with respect to the partnership assets and left no pending dispute unresolved. The Beth Din’s reservation of jurisdiction concerned only potential disputes that might arise, not because of any indefiniteness in the award, but because of the nature of the assets in issue or because of the parties’ intransigence. For example, there was no way for the panel to foresee at the time the award was made what expenses might arise in connection with the operation of the real property between the time of the award and closing if the respondents chose to exercise the option. And, given the history of the dispute and the behavior of the parties, it was reasonable for the panel to expect that the parties would not be able to agree between themselves whether any unusual expenses were necessary. In these circumstances, the Beth Din’s retention of jurisdiction to resolve these matters if they should arise did not render the award fatally indefinite or nonfinal.

The discussion to this point disposes of all of the arguments raised by petitioner as grounds for vacating the award. Supreme Court, however, did not confine itself to these issues, but ruled in addition that the arbitration agreements were invalid because they did not specifically identify the disputes that were being submitted and that the Beth Din had not been granted the equivalent of equitable powers and therefore exceeded its authority in granting respondents an option to buy one of the properties. Because these grounds for vacatur had not been raised by petitioner, following Supreme Court’s decision respondents moved for reargument to answer these arguments.

Particularly at issue on the motion for reargument was whether the Bill of Arbitration had given the Beth Din authority to fashion an equitable compromise judgment. As noted earlier, the translation of this document submitted by respondents in opposition to the petition, when the question of the Beth Din’s equitable powers had not been raised, indicated that the Beth Din could resolve the dispute "either by judgment or by settlement according to Jewish law”.

Supreme Court, after reviewing general principles of Jewish law, had concluded that a Beth Din acquired equitable powers only by a grant of "peshara” authority — authority to reach a "compromise related to the law” as opposed to a judgment strictly according to law. Relying on the translation submitted by respondents, which referred to "settlement according to Jewish law”, the court held that the Beth Din lacked peshara authority in this case. In support of the motion for reargument, respondents submitted an affidavit from the translator noting that the Bill of Arbitration in fact used the word "peshara”. He asserted that he had chosen the word "settlement” rather than the literal translation "compromise nearest to the law” because it seemed less awkward, and that no distinction between the terms was intended.

Supreme Court granted reargument but adhered to its original determination, rejecting respondents’ attempt to clarify the translation, essentially on the ground that respondents had submitted the original translation and were therefore bound by it. The court referred to the respondents’ "hindsight attempt to substitute a different translation” as "tantamount to 'changing horses in mid-stream’ upon finding themselves 'hoisted by their own petard.’ ”

The court’s indignation was misplaced. Respondents’ need to clarify the record was no fault of their own; it was occasioned by the court’s decision to delve into issues not raised by either party. No one had raised any question about the Beth Din’s authority to reach a compromise and there was no need for respondents to be concerned about whether the translation reflected such authority until the court raised the issue sua sponte.

We have no need to resolve whether the Beth Din had authority to render a compromise judgment. Whether or not the panel was specifically granted peshara authority, the arbitration agreements were broad enough to encompass disputes concerning title to the properties owned by the partnership — in fact, the first arbitration agreement specifically identified those buildings as subjects of the arbitration.

Supreme Court’s conclusion that, in the absence of peshara authority, the arbitrators could not grant an option to respondents rested on the premise that the arbitration was in the nature of an accounting, limited to resolving disputes arising under the agreement dissolving the partnership, and that the arbitrators could not change the terms of that agreement. The arbitration agreements, however, do not support such a limited view of the scope of the arbitration. They are broad enough to bring within the purview of the arbitration respondents’ claim that the dissolution agreement was unenforceable because it was the product of duress and coercion and that, therefore, the partnership assets should be distributed in some other manner.

We also disagree with Supreme Court’s conclusion that the arbitration agreements were impermissibly vague. We note first that this issue, too, was raised by the court sua sponte. Petitioner did not challenge the validity of the arbitration agreements, and for good reason. CPLR 7511 (b) (2) (ii) recognizes such a challenge as grounds for vacatur only by one "who neither participated in the arbitration nor was served with a notice of intention to arbitrate”. Petitioner participated in the arbitration, however, thus waiving any claim that the agreement to arbitrate was invalid (Matter of Silverman [Benmor Coats], 61 NY2d 299, 307). For this reason alone, vacatur of the award cannot be justified on the basis of a supposed deficiency in the arbitration agreements.

Nevertheless, because the decision of the lower courts in this case casts doubt on the validity of broad arbitration agreements in general, and these particular agreements, which apparently are widely used in Beth Din arbitrations, we consider it appropriate to reaffirm that broad arbitration agreements are permissible. We have never required that arbitration agreements identify with specificity those disputes which are being submitted. As we noted in Matter of Weinrott (Carp) (32 NY2d 190, 196), "[s]uch a demand for specificity as to which particular issues should be submitted to the arbitrators would make the drafting of arbitration agreements burdensome, confusing and often impossible.”

The final point concerns the provisions of the arbitration agreements under which any rights in the partnership assets would be forfeited as a penalty for resorting to civil courts. Supreme Court held that these provisions violated public policy and were therefore void and unenforceable. Petitioner contends that these provisions taint the arbitration agreements to such a degree that the agreements are void in their entirety. We find it unnecessary to pass on the validity of the forfeiture provisions, inasmuch as this record reflects no attempt by the Beth Din to enforce them. Whether or not the forfeiture provisions are enforceable, however, the remaining portions of the agreements are nonetheless valid.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, the petition in proceeding No. 1 to vacate the arbitration award denied, and the petition in proceeding No. 2 to confirm the arbitration award granted.

Judges Titone, Hancock, Jr., Bellacosa and Yesawich, Jr., concur; Judges Simons and Kaye taking no part.

Order reversed, etc. 
      
       Proceeding No. 1 was commenced by petitioner Meisels to vacate the award. In that proceeding, respondents Alexander and Moses Uhr asserted a counterclaim for an order confirming the award. In addition, as a protective measure, since petitioner Meisels contended that the counterclaim was not properly asserted, the Uhrs commenced proceeding No. 2 also seeking to confirm the award. In this second proceeding, the Uhrs are petitioners and Meisels is the respondent. For ease of reference, however, this opinion will refer to the parties according to the caption in the first proceeding — i.e., Meisels is the petitioner and the Uhrs are the respondents.
     
      
       Designated pursuant to NY Constitution, article VI, § 2.
     