
    FRIEDLING v. FREEDMAN.
    Equity; Ixjunction.
    Equity is without jurisdiction to restrain, at the instance of the plaintiff in a pending action of tort, the conveyance by the defendant in that action of his property for the alleged purpose of defeating the collection of a possible recovery in the tort action. (Distinguishing Droop v. Ridenow, 9 App. D. C. 95.)
    No. 2839.
    Submitted November 5, 1915.
    Decided November 29, 1915.
    Hearing oil an appeal by tbe plaintiff from a decree of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, sitting as' an equity court, dismissing- a bill for an injunction.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    Tbe Court in tbe opinion stated tbe facts as follows:
    Appellant, Harry Friedling, plaintiff below, instituted a suit against appellee Louis Freedman, otherwise known as Louis Fridman in tbe supreme court of tbe District of Columbia to recover damages for tbe alienation of tbe affections of bis wife. Tbe suit is still pending, awaiting trial. Plaintiff, thereafter, filed tbe present bill in equity to enjoin defendant from disposing of bis real estate to defeat recovery on tbe prospective judgment. It is averred in tbe bill as follows: “Plaintiff is informed and believes that tbe said defendant is justly apprehensive that in said action at law a large recovery of damages may be bad, and is also, as plaintiff is informed and believes, anxious to convey away or otherwise secrete and dispose of bis aforesaid real estate in order to defeat plaintiff’s recovery in said action.” A motion to dismiss tbe bill was sustained, and from tbe decree of dismissal this appeal was taken.
    
      Mr. John Bidout and Messrs. Tepper & Gusack for tbe appellant.
    
      Mr. Wilton J. Lambert and Mr. Frederick B. WMppler for tbe appellee.
   Mr. Justice Van Orsdel

delivered tbe opinion of tbe Court:

This is not a creditor’s bill to subject tbe property of an absconding debtor to tbe satisfaction of an alleged indebtedness, as in Droop v. Ridenour, 9 App. D. C. 95, tbe case relied upon by counsel for appellant. It is an attempt by tbe plaintiff in a pending action in tort for damages to restrain the defendant from selling or disposing of his real estate. A court of equity is without jurisdiction to enjoin such a conveyance by a possible debtor to await the future possibility of a judgment in favor of a creditor whose status, as such, depends upon the outcome of a pending suit. Before such equitable relief in an independent action can be invoked, there must be an existing judgment at law or a fixed and definite claim, which either is or can be made a lien upon the specific property. Griffin v. Nitcher, 57 Me. 270; Brown v. Long, 36 N. C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 190, 36 Am. Dec. 43; Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521, 21 L. ed. 687.

The rule is elementary that a creditor cannot assail as fraudulent' an assignment or transfer of property by a debtor until the debt has been established by a judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction. Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106, 35 L. ed. 358, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 712; Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451, 37 L. ed. 804, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 883, 977. Much less will the mere probability of such a conveyance by an undetermined debtor sustain an action on the complaint of a possible creditor. The decree is affirmed, with costs. Affirmed.  