
    Cecilio FERNANDEZ and Aleida Fernandez, Appellants, v. Maria A. COLSON, Appellee.
    No. 85-115.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    July 16, 1985.
    Richard R. Snyder, Coral Gables, for appellants.
    Steven L. Frischer, Miami, for appellee.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

The order denying the defendant’s motion to set aside a default judgment is reversed because the stipulation of counsel for the respective parties agreeing to a mutual restraining order which was filed as part of the record constituted a “paper” within the meaning of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b). Thereafter, it was incumbent upon the movant to give notice for the application of a default. Due to this deficiency, it was not necessary for the movant, in seeking to vacate the default judgment, to establish either excusable neglect or a meritorious defense. See Kiaer v. Friendship, Inc., 376 So.2d 919 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

The order denying the motion to set aside the default is reversed.  