
    WIRELESS WAREHOUSE, INC., a Georgia Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOOST MOBILE, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company doing business in Irvine, California, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 11-55217.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted May 8, 2012.
    Filed June 12, 2012.
    Mary Lee, Mary Lee Law Offices, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Allen Brooks Gresham, II, McGuire-woods LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: WARDLAW, PAEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Wireless Warehouse, Inc. (WWI) appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Boost Mobile, LLC (Boost) in WWI’s diversity action alleging false promise, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, promissory estoppel, and unfair competition in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code. § 17200, et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by overruling WWI’s evidentia-ry objections to the amended Attachment J to the Prepaid Wireless Product Agreement (PPA). The record supports the district court’s determination that the amended Attachment J was authentic because its contents “appear[ed] to be sufficiently genuine.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 778 n. 24 (9th Cir.2002); see also Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(4). The record likewise supports the admissibility of the amended Attachment J under the residual hearsay exception. Fed.R.Evid. 807(a).

2. The district court properly concluded that WWI’s claims are governed by Virginia law. Because Boost was a third party beneficiary of the PPA, Bugna v. Fike, 80 Cal.App.4th 229, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 164 (Cal.Ct.App.2000), it is entitled to enforce the PPA’s choice of law clause. Cal. Civ.Code § 1559. The choice of law clause, in turn, provided that the PPA was “governed by” Virginia law. In light of this broad provision, Virginia law applied to all causes of action related to the PPA, including the contract and tort claims alleged in this action. Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.4th 459, 11 Cal. Rptr.2d 330, 834 P.2d 1148, 1155 (Cal.1992).

3. The district court also correctly concluded that Boost was entitled to summary judgment on the only two claims alleged by WWI that are cognizable under Virginia law. Boost was entitled to summary judgment on WWI’s false promise claim because WWI failed to show that it reasonably and justifiably relied on the alleged oral promise made by Boost, that Boost intended to mislead WWI with that representation, and that WWI suffered resulting damages. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Remley, 270 Va. 209, 618 S.E.2d 316, 321 (Va.2005). We likewise agree with the district court that WWI failed to establish a genuine factual dispute as to whether Boost improperly interfered with WWI’s relationship with sub-dealers and that WWI suffered resulting damages, both of which are required in a cause of action for interference with prospective economic advantage. See Commercial Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Halifax Corp., 253 Va. 292, 484 S.E.2d 892, 896 (Va.1997). Consequently, WWI is not entitled to any damages, let alone punitive damages. Cal. Civ.Code § 3294.

4. Finally, the record is devoid of any evidence that the district court abused its discretion in denying WWI’s motion to compel additional discovery.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . Boost’s motion for leave to supplement the excerpts of record is denied as moot.
     