
    No. 8497.
    The State of Louisiana vs. George Moultrie.
    An indictment charging the accused with feloniously and knowingly receiving the property, and that “ he well knew the same was stolen property,” is in sufficient conformity to tbe statute.
    Sfor is it necessary that tbe indictment should state who stole the property, or from whom the accused received it.
    The charge that the accused stole the goods is sufficient, without the further averment that he took and carried them away.
    Xor does the statute make any formal requirement as to tbe mode of expressing ‘the criminal intent of stealing the property.
    APPEAL from the Twenty-fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Vermillion. Clegg, J.
    
      Jos. Á. Breaux aud P. L. BenUmlet, for the Defendant and Appellant:
    1. The defendant being charged, with having received stolen property, to sustain the charge it was necessary to allege and prove that tbe property liad been feloniously stolen. The information should allege that the property was received with intent to deprive the owner of it. Other essential averments have been omitted. Waterman, p. 535, Hos. 28 and 34.
    2. Section 832 of the Revised Statutes, it is contended the defendant has violated, reads j “ Whoever shall receive or buy any goods or chattels that shall be feloniously taken or stolen.” It was necessary to allege that the property had been feloniously stolen. J3y the omission of the word feloniously, the information is null and void. State vs. Thomas. 29 A. 601 j and cases: State vs. Kennedy, 6 R. l>90 5 State vs. Hess, 10 A. 19Ó $ Wharton, Volume I, Section 399.
    J. C. Egan, Attorney General, for the State, Appellee:
    1. A refusal by the Judge a quo to charge the jury as requested is right and proper, when the charge requested is not applicable to the state of facts before the jury, and it is calculated, in liis opinion, to mislead them,
    
      2. lu an indiotment for knowingly receiving stolen goods, it is not neoessary to charge any individual by name with the laroeny, nor is the thief in any such prosecution to be considered as principal. Bishop on Crim. Procedure, 2d Ed., Yol, II, Seo. 782; Waterman’s U. S. Crim. Digest, Seo. 33, p. 535.
    3. Hor is it necessary to allege that the goods were received “with intent to deprive the owner thereof,” beoause the statute defining the offense doos not make said clause one of the ingredients thereof. Sec. 832, B. S.
    4. Por the foregoing reason it is unnecessary to allege “that the goods said to have been received, had boon taken and oarried away by the pretended thief.” It is not a necessary averment at common law. Waterman’s U. S. Crim. Digest, Sec. 36, p. 535; Cora. vs. Lakeman, 5 Gray, 82.
    5. Bor is it necessary to oharge that the goods received had boon feloniously stolen. 25 A. 526.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Fenner, J.

The defendant appeals from a conviction and sentence for receiving stolen property, as denounced by Section 832, R. S.

The errors assigned are embodied in a motion in arrest and in hills of exception to rulings of the Judge in charging the jury.

We will first consider the grounds presented by the motion in arrest, viz:

1. That the indictment does not charge that the goods had been feloniously stolen. The indictment charges that he did feloniously and knowingly receive, etc.,” the property, and that he well knew the same was stolen property.” This brings tlio case precisely under the authority of State vs. Allemand, 25 A. 526, where the same objection was overruled.

2. That the indictment does not set forth who stole the property or from whom defendant received it, nor does it allege that the thief was unknown.

It seems to be well settled that such averments are not essential. Waterman’s U. S. Cr. Dig. p. 535, Sec. 33; 2 Bishop Cr. Proc. § 982.

3. That the indictment does not charge that the goods had been taken and carried away,” as well as stolen ” by the thief.

The charge that they had been stolen, is sufficient. Com. vs. Lakeman, 5 Gray, 82.

4. That it does not allege that the property was received with intent to deprive the owner thereof.”

Criminal intent is, of course, of the essence of the crime, but the Statute makes no formal requirements as to the mode of expressing the same. We think it is sufficiently expressed here by the charge, that lie did feloniously receive and convert to Ms own use the property.

The bill of exceptions is taken to the refusal of the Judge to give two charges.

As to the first charge asked, touching the effect of the possession of stolen property as an element of proof, we tliink the Judge stated the law correctly and completely when he charged that possession of stolen property was not conclusive proof, either of larceny, or of receiving goods, knowing them to be stolen by the possessor, but was a fact to be passed on by the jury in the light of surrounding facts and circumstances.”

The second charge asked and refused was this: If it should appear on the trial of the defendant that the offense with which the principal is charged did not amount to a felony, and if felony is not charged, the prosecution cannot be maintained.

The Judge refused this charge as being a legal proposition not in any way applicable to the case; because a felony toas charged under the indictment; and because there is no principal in the crime charged except the defendant, the original thief not occupying that relation to the offense.

We cannot say the Judge erred.

Judgment affirmed.  