
    Jonathan E. SAMUELS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-56322.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Jan. 20, 2016.
    
    Filed Jan. 29, 2016.
    Jonathan E. Samuels, Rancho Cucamon-ga, CA, pro se.
    Robert A. Bailey, Elizabeth Christine Hehir, Robert Collings Little, Esquire, Yaw-Jiun Wu, Anglin Flewelling Rasmussen Campbell & Trytten, LLP, Pasadena, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    
      Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jonathan E. Samuels appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir.2010). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that Samuels’ action was barred by the California Superior Court’s earlier judgment in Wells Fargo’s unlawful detainer action against Samuels. See City of Martinez v. Texaco Trading & Transp., Inc., 353 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir.2003) (setting forth requirements for application of res judicata under California law); Malkoskie v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 188 Cal.App.4th 968, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 821, 825-27 (Ct.App.2010) (judgment in unlawful de-tainer action brought under Cal.Civ.Proc. Code section 1161a necessarily resolves validity of title).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Samuels’ leave to file a third amended complaint because amendment would have been futile. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir.2000) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court may deny leave to amend where amendment would be futile); see also Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., Inc., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir.2002) (“[W]hen a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is particularly broad.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     