
    Packard v. The Illinois Central R. R. Co.
    Railroad; stock killed on depot grounds. A railroad company, in tlie absence of negligence, is not liable for stock killed on depot grounds. Chapter 169, Laws of 1862, has no application in such cases. Following Davis v. The B. & M. R. R. Co., 26 Iowa, 549.
    
      Appeal from, Butler Circuit Court.
    
    Friday, January 27.
    Action to recover double the value of a bull killed by the defendant’s engine and train. The answer is in denial; it also avers contributory carelessness in plaintiff, and that the animal was killed on defendant’s depot grounds. Trial to a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $100. The defendant appeals.
    
      Crane & Rood for the appellant.
    
      A. Corverse and Powers & Heminway for the appellee.
   Cole, Ch. J.

The plaintiff in his petition averred the value of the animal hilled to be $50, and his affidavit of the hilling accompanying the notice of it, served upon the defendant’s tichet agent thirty days before bringing the action, as a basis for a claim for double damages under the statute, also stated the value of the animal at $50. The jury found a verdict for plaintiff for $100; and also found specially that the animal was not hilled on the defendant’s depot grounds. This latter finding is clearly against the evidence and must be .set-aside. It is in the face of the testimony of plaintiff’s own witnesses.

The defendant ashed the court to instruct the jury that, “if the plaintiff’s bull was injured or hilled upon the depot grounds of defendant at New Hartford, then your verdict should be for the defendant, unless the plaintiff has proved to your satisfaction that the defendant’s employees did not use ordinary care and diligence to prevent the injury.” This was refused. Such refusal was error, as we have heretofore decided. Davis v. The Bur. & Mo. R. R. Co., 26 Iowa, 549; Rogers v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., id. 558; Durand v. C. & N. W. R. R. Co., id. 559. For the same reason the defendant’s second instruction should have been given; and the second one given by the court should have been modified so as to state where defendant had a right to fence, as ruled by the cases cited supra.

Reversed.  