
    Clarence V. KNIGHT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. M.S. EVANS, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 09-15323.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Aug. 10, 2010.
    
    Filed Aug. 26, 2010.
    Clarence V. Knight, pro se.
    Steven Grant Warner, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Clarence V. Knight appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging the loss of good time credits following prison disciplinary proceedings for possessing inmate-manufactured weapons. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Knight contends that his due process rights were violated when he was denied the opportunity to call his cellmate as a witness at the prison disciplinary hearing. The California court’s determination that the denial of this witness did not violate Knight’s due process rights was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1273-74 (9th Cir. 1989).

Knight also contends that his due process rights were violated when he was denied the opportunity to present photographic evidence, pose questions to the hearing officer, call a staff member as a witness, and pose some of his questions to two adverse witnesses at the prison disciplinary hearing. The California court’s denial of these claims was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566-68, 94 S.Ct. 2963.

Finally, the California court’s determination that sufficient evidence supported the disciplinary decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-57, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . We certify for appeal, on our own motion, the issue of whether the April 21, 2003 prison disciplinary hearing violated due process.
     