
    
      Elizabeth H. Pyles and others vs. Noah R. Reeve.
    
    
      Prima fade, he who enters upon land, under a contract to purchase, admits the title of the vendor to be good; and if he fails to comply with the terms of the contract, he, or any one holding under him, cannot, in an action by the vendor to regain possession of the land, put the vendor to proof of his title,
    
      Before O’Neall, J., at Abbeville, ¡Spring Term, 1851.
    This was an action of trespass to try title to a piece of land, of about thirty acres, in possession of defendant.
    
      In 1830, under proceedings in equity for partition of the estate of Benjamin Mattison, deceased, a tract of land, of 206 acres, part of which was the piece in dispute, was sold by the commissioner, and purchased by William Pyles, the ancestor of the plaintiffs. In the descriptive part of the commissioner’s deed to Pyles, these words occur: “ 30 acres in dispute to be referred to arbitration.” Pyles took possession of the. tract and cultivated it in 1831. It appeared that one George W. Reeve had claimed "the “ 30 acres in dispute to be referred to arbitration” in the lifetime of Benjamin Mattison, deceased. On the 8th of February, 1832, he bought from William Pyles the whole tract of land which he bought at the commissioner’s sale, on the terms, paying him then,, in cash, the costs paid by William Pyles, on his purchase, to the commissioner, an,d agreeing to pay the bond of the said William Pyles to the commissioner. ■ This appeared verbally at first on the part of the plaintiffs, and subsequently by the receipt of William Pyles, given in evidence by the defendant. On that occasion William Pyles delivered to George W. Reeve the commissioner’s deed, and gave him the receipt above mentioned, but did not execute titles. George W. Reeve, on the 5th day of Janu--ary, 1833, paid to the administrators of Mattison $429, in part of the bond of Pyles to the commissioner. Still, however, there remained a balance due on the purchase, and of course on the bond of William Pyles. William Pyles died in ’35, leaving the plaintiffs his heirs, one of whom was a minor until within five years before suit was brought. George W. Reeve sold the land in dispute to his brother, the defendant, in ’36, delivering to him the receipt of William Pyles, and of the administrators of Benjamin Mattison, herein before spoken of, and the commissioner’s deed to William Pyles.
    It further appeared that the administrator of William Pyles had been sued for the balance on his bond to the commissioner, after allowing the payment made by himself on account of costs and that made by George W. Reeve to the administrators of Mattison, and a recovery 'was had, which had been paid and satisfied by him. The plaintiffs then demanded of the defendant the land in dispute; he refused to give it up, and thereupon this suit was brought.
    The defendant, by his counsel, announced his defence to be title to the land in dispute: first, under a grant to William Dodson ; secondly, under, the purchase from Pyles. He produced an old grant to Dodson for 750 acres, a deed from Dodson to George W. Reeve, dated in 1816, for 206 acres, and a deed from George W. Reeve to the defendant, dated in 1836, including the tract Pyles had purchased from the commissioner, and other lands; and he attempted, but wholly failed, to locate either the grant to Dodson, or the deed from Dodson to George W. Reeve.
    “ I overruled,” says his Honor, in his report, “ the defendant’s motion for a nonsuit, because the plaintiffs had shewn that he had entered under this title, and therefore,.at least prima facie, could not dispute it.
    “I instructed the jury on the whole case, and told them that George W. Reeve, under whom and by whose title the defendant entered and claimed,. having contracted'to purchase from William Pyles, the plaintiffs’s ancestor, and thus having obtained his possession, could not be allowed to set up an antecedent claim which he had against the title of the party with whom he contracted. That not having complied with his purchase, he could not now be allowed to dispute the title under which he entered. That this was also the case with the defendant, who, from his own shewing, had the contract of George W. Reeve with" William Pyles, and the commissioner’s deed, delivered to him as. part of his title. I thought, therefore, that the' defendant could derive no benefit from the Dodson grant and conveyance to George W. Reeve, if they could be located. For the claim thus derived was anterior to the contract to purchase from William Pyles, and by it was impliedly waived or abandoned;”
    The plaintiffs had a verdict; and the defendant appealed.
    
      Jones) for the appellant.
    McGoioen, contra.'
   Curia, per

Whitner, J.

The defendant renews here his motion for a nonsuit, on the ground “that plaintiffs had not shewn title to the land in dispute; and' defendant, being in possession, should have been protected.”

The plaintiffs did not produce any, grant from the State, or offer proof that would justify the presumption of one. The- premises aré well laid by the defendant’s counsel, as to the general principle of obligation, resting on plaintiffs in trespass to try titles, to make out a good title,- and thence the general necessity of deriving from the source only that can grant. ‘ But this obligation is not without exception. When parties litigant derive title from the same source, no end of justice is to be attained by tracing beyond.- Hence, as between lessor and lessee, the rule is universal. The latter,- having gained possession'by his' acknowledgment, is estopped from his denial of the title under which he entered. How stands the case where one enters ás a purchaser under the title of another, and a contest subsequently arises„between the vendor and vendee ?

William Pyles, the ancestor of these plaintiff^, purchased the land in dispute under proceedings' in Equity, when sold for partition amongst the heirs, of Benjamin Mattison, deceased. He obtained a deed, took possession, .and cultivated, the land. The year after, Gr. W. Reeve bought from William Pyles, paid to him the cash he had advanced, and agreed to discharge the bond of Pyles to the commissioner; and the year after this did pay a large portion of the bond, and in about three years after sold the land to his brother, the defendant in this suit, who thus acquired possession. The'plaintiffs in .possession surrendered to defendant, under his -agreement to purchase ; and shall the defendant be allowed to turn the advantage, thus gained by permission of plaintiffs, to their injury, perhaps defeat, and that, too, by holding out false colors? Melior est conditio possidentis, and the defendant relies on it; but with what propriety, or fairness, may he who has acquired this better condition, by the favor .of another, be allowed to convert the favor to the disadvantage of the latter, at least until by long acquiescence it has ripened into right under presumptions which might arise, and which it cannot be pretended have arisen here, on account of minority ?

Under the authority of adjudged cases, we are of opinion a plaintiff is never compelled to go further back than the source whence the parties before the Court derive title, if the source is the same. In this case, therefore, we think the motion was properly refused on the circuit. In the further progress of the case other facts were presented to confirm this view, and to these facts we are not only at liberty, but bound to look, when the motion is here renewed.

That “moral policy of the law,” of which Chief Justice Marshall spoke, is well vindicated in such a case, by holding that, prima fade, he who enters upon land as a purchaser, thereby admits the title under which he entered to be good. I would refer to the cases of Blight vs. Rochester (7 Wheat. 535); Thomas & Ashby vs. Jeter & Abney, (1 Hill, 380,) and Hill vs. Robertson (1 Strob. 1). The opinion now pronounced is but the reiteration of principles held and affirmed in these cases.

As to the legitimate effect of a better title also existing in the party defendant, derived from another source, questions of far greater difficulty may present themselves. Whether the vendee shall be held to have waived all future objection thereto, or to be precluded from any after opposition thereby, or may be regarded merely as having bought his peace, and in his attempt thus to protect his quiet enjoyment should not thence suffer prejudice, but still be permitted to shew another and better title in his de-fence, and as to the extent to which his right may be affected by the time and circumstances at and under which possession was obtained, are questions reserved for a fitter occasion.

In the defence, the defendant stated his title as relied on, ali-unde than through Pyles, and was permitted, in fact, to go into his title, but in this wholly failed to locate his deed or grant upon any satisfactory proof, or according to any known rules regulating questions of location; and hence the prima facie shewing of plaintiffs became conclusive, and as to this case must be final.

The proper result was reached, in our judgment, upon the case made, and the motions for nonsuit and new trial are dismissed.'

O’Neall, Evans and Withers, JJ., concurred.

Frost, J., absent at the argument.

Motions dismissed.  