
    Gejza SABO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-1990-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 4, 2011.
    Elyssa N. Williams, New Haven, CT, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Carl H. McIntyre, Jr., Assistant Director; Jacob A. Bashyrov, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, ROBERT D. SACK, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Gejza Sabo, a native and citizen of Slovakia, seeks review of an April 22, 2010, decision of the BIA affirming the April 4, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Douglas Schoppert, which denied Sabo’s application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Gejza Sabo, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 22, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 4, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.2008); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008). For asylum applications such as this one, governed by the REAL ID Act, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on the plausibility of an asylum applicant’s account or inconsistencies in his statements without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii). Contrary to Sabo’s position, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. The agency reasonably relied on Sabo’s inconsistencies and implausibilities in Sabo’s testimony and applications in arriving at its decision. See Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 166-167 (2d Cir. 2008). As the IJ noted, Sabo’s original asylum application provided that he was a lifelong Jehovah’s Witness and was married to Marta Ivanova, but he testified that the application was completely false. That original application described several incidents occurring in Slovakia in 2003 and 2004, but Sabo later admitted that he had been living in the United States since 2000. With Sabo having admitted to these falsehoods, it was reasonable for the IJ to find him not credible. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that even a single false statement may reasonably “infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence”). The IJ also reasonably found it implausible that Sabo would leave his home country over the two relatively minor incidents listed in his second application, as Sabo himself testified that the incidents were not serious. See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that this Court will not disturb the inherent implausibility finding so long as an IJ’s finding is “tethered to record evidence, and there is nothing else in the record from which a firm conviction of error could properly be derived”). Given these inconsistencies and implausibilities, the agency’s adverse credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166, 167 (holding that “[w]e defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling”). Because Sabo’s claims all were based on the same factual predicate, the agency’s adverse credibility determination was a proper basis for the denial of both withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  