
    Khalida SCHEIDELMAN and Ronald Scheidelman, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Clinton B. HENDERSON and Renata Henderson, Defendants-Appellees, James Collins, Trustee.
    No. 09-5322-bk.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 1, 2010.
    Khalida Scheidelman and Ronald Scheidelman, pro se, Oxford, NY, for Appellants.
    Peter A. Orville, Peter A. Orville, P.C., Binghamton, NY, for Appellees.
    Present: ROBERT D. SACK, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs-Appellants Khalida Scheidelman and Ronald Scheidelman, pro se, appeal from the December 14, 2009 judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Hurd, J.) affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion to recuse. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), this Court has jurisdiction to review “final” district court decisions stemming from a bankruptcy action. However, the “district court’s own decision of an appeal from the bankruptcy court is not a final decision for purposes of appeal to the court of appeals unless the order of the bankruptcy court was final.” In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 982 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir.1992). Since the finality requirement is jurisdictional, this Court must consider the issue sua sponte, even if it is not raised by the pax-ties. In re Lomas Fin. Corp., 932 F.2d 147, 150 (2d Cir.1991).

In this case, the Appellants appealed to the district court from the bankruptcy court’s denial of their motion for recusal. The denial of a motion for recusal ordinarily is not a final order. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir.1991). Because the bankruptcy court’s order was not final and there was not a judgment on the mex-its at the time of the recusal motion, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the district court’s judgment affirming that order. See In re Lomas Fin. Corp., 932 F.2d at 150 (“There is thus no court of appeals jurisdiction over non-final orders originating in the bank-x-uptcy court.”); cf. Dubnoff v. Goldstein, 385 F.2d 717, 723 (2d Cir.1967) (finding Coux-t lacked jurisdiction over appeal from bankruptcy court’s denial cf motion to re-cuse).

Although this Court may construe an appeal from a non-final order as a petition seeking a writ of mandamus, see Caribbean Trading & Fid. Corp. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 948 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir.1991) (“We have often deemed it appropriate to treat an appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as a petition for a writ of mandamus.”), the Scheidelmans have not demonstrated that the lower court’s refusal to recuse was a clear and indisputable abuse of discretion, see In re Basciano, 542 F.3d 950, 955-56 (2d Cir.2008). They are therefore not entitled to the issuance of the writ.

Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED.  