
    Means v. Robinson and Wife.
    'The rights of infants and persons claiming under them, in respect of contracts made and acts done before the introduction of the common law. must be determined by the principies of the laws of Spain, which were then in force in this country.
    'The privileges and disabilities of infants under the Spanish law discussed, and the conclusion applicable to this case attained, that the written assent of the curator and the authority of the judge were essential to a valid alienation of the real estate of the minor: but if there was no curator, and the minor was over fourteen years of age, the sale was valid without such assent, provided there was no lesion, and provided the authority of the judge was obtained.
    The void contract of an infant might, under the Spanish law, be ratified by him. either expressly or tacitly, after arriving at full age, without any of the formalities required by law to give validity to a minor’s contract; and acts done after majority, from which approbation might be inferred, was a sufficient ratification. (Note 70.)
    Vnder our former laws, as at common law, minors attained majority at the age of twenty-one years. Note 70. — Hunt v. Turner, 9 T., 385; Wills v. Abbey,27 T.,202; Clay v. Olay, 35 T., 609; Jones u. Hn'T, 36 T., 678.
    
      Appeal from De Witt. The appellees sued fortlie recovery of a tract of land, and claimed under a conveyance from Charles M. Lockhart to .the plaintiff Solena, executed on the 16th March, 1846. The defendant claimed under a ■conveyance from the said Charles and Iiis mother, Winncy Lockhart, dated May 15, 1837, t.o one Thomas T. Clmmney, and by deed from the said Chum-ney and his wife to the defendant, dated 24th April. 1847.
    The land in controversy was the upper half of a league lying on the Guatla-loupG river, granted to Samuel Lockhart, as a colonist, by the authorities of the State of Coahuila and Texas. The said Samuel departed this life in 1836, leaving as sole survivors his widow, the said Winne.y, and their son, the said Charles M. Lockhart. The questions in the case grew out of the minority of /Charles M. Lockhart at the date of his conveyance to Chumney.
    One of the witnesses testified that the father, Samuel, removed to Texas between 1820 and 1831, his son Charles being then ten or eleven years old ^another, that Charles became o£ age in August, 1840; that he had seen the record of his age in (he family Bible; that Charles had told him in 1842 that he and his mol her had sold the upper half of the said league to Chumney; that the said Charles told him that the said league of laud was divided, and that the upper half belonged to Chumney; and that the said Charles also informed witness that (he consideration paid, by Chumney was $200 in money and a certificate for 1,280 acres of land located on the Sandies ; that tlie said Chumney liad been very kind to him. and his mother by buying said land, as it kept them from starving at tlie time; and that he, Lockhart, was well satisfied with the sale. made, to Chumney. The witness also slated that he purchased part of the lower half league, in 1839, from Charles M. Lockhart and his mother, amounting to 1,2G0 acres.
    A letter dated 5th June, 1840, from Charles >1. Lockhart to the said Chum-uey, was read in evidence. A portion of this letter was as follows: “You requested me to inform you concerning your laud you bought of me, the Government dues, &c. I know of no dues to he paid more than taxes, with an exception, perhaps, of some few dollars to be paid for dividing the land. As that is coming to only one individual, who paid the surveyor, and is also a very small matter, I know not how much, it is of little consequence. One half only is to be paid by you. If lie, Mr. Friar, should want his money, 1 will satisfy him. I sold 1,209 acres to Daniel Friar, who now resides on it. I still retain 937 aeres of tlie same tract. Yon also wished to know something of a power of attorney to make to mé. You empowered me all that was necessary to obtain tlie patents. You gave a power of attomej-, together with your bond, which is all that is necessary,” &c.
    There was also evidence (the admissibility of which was excepted to by the defendant) that Che upper was, by five hundred dollars, more valuable than the lower half of the
    league. The following instructions were given by the court:
    “I. If the jury believe from the evidence that the. deed from Charles M, Lockhart and Winney Lockhart to Chumney was made before he was twenty-one years of age, then such deed may be avoided by him after lie arrived at the age of twenty-one years.
    “ 2. That if the jury believe from tlie evidence that Charles M. Lockhart was twenty-one years of age when he executed the deed to Solena Robinson, and that he was a minor when lie made the deed to Chumney, then the conveyance to Robinson was an avoidance of tlie deed to Chumney.
    “3. That a mere, recognition of the sale and conveyance made to Chumney by Charles M. Lockhart, or acknowledgment Hint such a sale lias been made, is not such an act as amounts to a confirmation of the. conveyance.
    “4. That if the jury believe from (lie evidence that the deed to Chumney was made while Charles M. Lockhart was a minor, and there was not any act of confirmation equal in solemnity with the original conveyance, then the deed to Robinson was an avoidance of'the contract with Chumney, and the defendant has no title so far as Charles (M. Lockhart) was concerned or interested.”
    The jury found for the plaintiffs one half of the tipper half of the league of land set forth in the petition ; and a motion by the defendant for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict, was contrary to evidence and that there was error in the instructions to the jury, tras overruled.
    The errors assigned were—
    1st. Tn allowing deed of plaint ill's to he read to the jury.
    2d. In permitting evidence to bo given of the relative value of the half league in controversy.
    3d. In instructions to tlie jury.
    4th. In overruling the motion for a new trial.
    
      A. II Phillips, for appellant.
    I. The court erred in allowing tlie following question to be asked the witness Friar: “ Which half of said league of land was the most valuable?” It was totally irrelevant to the issue made by the pleadings.
    II. The court erred in the instructions to the jury. The first instruction is objectionable, as tending, by its absolute and unrestricted terms, to withdraw the minds of the jury from all consideration of any evidence that may have been adduced as to acts done by Citarles M. Lockhart after he became of age.
    The second instruction charges on the weight of the evidence. (Hart. Dig., art. 753.) It effectually decides upon, and instructs them to disregard, all the testimony introduced tending to prove acquiescence, approval, confirmation, • or laches in disaffirming on the part of Lockhart. (Cobb v. Beal, 1 Tex. K., 342.) The instruction could be correct only in the event that a minor’s deed was incapable of confirmation. But the doctrine is well established to the contrary. (Lynch v. Parsons, 2 Burr.. 2G3; Boston Bank in Chamberlin, 15 Mass. It., 230; 1 Story’s Eq., sec. 241; 2 Kent’s Comm., 233; 11 Johns. R., ■ 538; 14 Id., 124; 5 Ham. E., 251.)
    The third instruction also decides on fhe testimony.
    The fourth instruction is clearly erroneous. (10 Pet. R., 75; 3 M. & Selw., 482; 11 Johns. E., 542; 3 Bac. Abr., 145, n. 8; 2 Kent’s Comm., 236, 237, 238; 6 Conn. E„ 404; 5 Yerg. R., 41.)
    III. A new trial should have been granted. The verdict was contrary to the evidence. It appears from the testimony of Friar, and from the letter of the 5th June, 1840, that Lockhart actually approved the conveyance after his :majority. In his conversation with Friar, two years after he was of age, he expressed his satisfaction with the contract and his gratitude to Chumney, who, by his timely consent to the contract, “had saved himself and his mother from starvation;” also, that “the third of a league he had received in exchange, apart from the §200, was worth more than the land held by Chum-ney.” Here we have an admission, 1st, of a full price; 2d, that part consid- • oration was for necessary subsistence; 3d, of entire satisfaction two years after majority; 4th, of acts done respecting the division line; and, lastly, it shows that there were mutual conveyances, and that he, Lockhart, was then in possession of the land received from Chumney, and, for aught that appears, holds it still. Lockhart, then, is a purchaser as well as vendor, under one and the same contract. His remaining in possession of his purchase after his majority fixes his responsibility as to the entire contract. (10 Petdf. Abr., p. •569, note; 11 Johns. E., 538; 2 Kent, 240; 11 Wend. R., 85.)-
    But by his letter of the 5th June, 1S40, in connection with Friar’s testimony, it is clear he writes io Chumney respecting the land he conveyed and received; • or, in other words, he speaks of their exchange of lands, and offers to pay on behalf of Chumney for running the division line. Is not this an. act in favor of the contract? Was it not an assent after he had been of age for a reasonable time; not tacit, but express, and under circumstances that must fix his responsibility? (2 Kent, 238.)
    IV. Thus far I have considered this case (as maintained by the opposite •counsel and the judge in the court below) under the common-law rules of decision.
    The court., however, will recollect that the contract with Chumney was .made in 1837, under the civil law. The controversy, then, must be determined by the civil-law rules of decision. (Dallam, 550.)
    By the act of 1840, (I-Iart. Dig., art. 3225,) relative to the mode of trying titles to land, it is provided—
    “ That it shall not bo necessary to prove an actual trespass on the part of the defendant to support this action; nor shall this act be so construed as to :alter, impair, or take away the rights of parties under the laws in force before the introduction of the common law; bnt'the same shall be decided by the principles of the law or laws under which the same accrued, .or by which the same were regulated or in any manner affected.”
    What, then, were the rights of these parties under the civil law which was ■la force in 18£7 when, tljp ccair'Mfi; ’.’••as trad».?
    
      1st. As to the minor, lie could demand a rescission. (2 Part., p. 1152, 1.1 1 Domat, p. 50, b. 1, tit. 1, sec. 5, No. 7; also p. 55, b. 1, tit. 1, sec. G, No. 2.)-
    2d. As to the other party, he could demand proof, first of minority;, second of the damages sustained by the minor. (2 Part., p. 1153, 1. 2, 5, 6; 1 Dom. B., 4, tit. 6, sec. 1, Nos. 1 to 15; 1 D., sec. 2, Nos. 1 to 29; 2 Part., p. 1157, 1. 8.)
    3d. These authorities show that, on a recission, “each of the parties retained his rights unimpaired as lie formerly possessed them.”
    There could be no rescission except on the terms here stated. These terms-required the intervention of a court. There were charges to'be made and facts to be proved. There must necessarily be a judicial investigation, so that all the rights of the respective parties could be secured by one sentence or judg-mentj and each be restored to the “ condition in which he was before.” These were some of the rights of the parties under the laws in force when the contract was made. These were the “ principles by which they were regulated.” The complaining party could not be a judge in his own cause. He could not use his privilege as a sword, but as a shield only. Mutual restitution was inseparable from rescission.
    Now, how are these rights secured by the “common-law remedy,” as this avoiding deed of 1846 is named by the opposite counsel and by the court below? This pretended “remedial process ” of avoidance without notice, without a tender of restitution, without an offer to place the other party in “ statu quo,” is directly in the face of the law of the contract. It not only “alters and impairs” but “takes away” the rights of the other party, and so in every particular contravenes the law of 1840. It is useless to say that the other party can bring his action. When and where is he is to bring it? And for what purpose against an insolvent? And how can the infant establish right to avoid his contract except by proof before a tribunal that could pronounce judgment on ils sufficiency or insufficiency? And it is by action only that the other party is secured against any alteration or deprivation of his rights.
    This regulation of the civil law commends itself as the more equitable plan in all cases where the contracts of the infant are voidable only. Indeed it has been held that in this class of cases notice of disaffirmance of the con-(raet in a reasonable time is necessary at common law. (2 Kent, 237; 8 Taunt. R., 35.)
    
      A. S. Cunningham, for appellees.
    I. The point raised in the second assignment of error is immaterial, as it proved on trial. From appellant’s answer, alleging a division of the league of land between his mother and C. Lockhart, it might have become so. Hence the court.did not err in allowing the question.
    H. Error in court’s instructions. The sale to Chumney purports to have been made in 1837, whilst the Spanish law controlled in contracts. The sale was void. (1 Domat, tit. G, sec. 2, p. 537; Febrero, Mexican Edition, 5 vol.r p. 372; 10 Mart. R., 72G.)
    By the civil and Spanish law restitution was allowed to minors in all contracts, made by themselves or tutor, where there was no fraud by minor. And the term of four years after maturity, i. e., twenty-five years, was allowed to prosecute the suit. (X Domat, 527; Partidas, tit. Itesiitution in Integrum.)• This remedy was allowed even in all cases where the tutor or curator were allowed by law to sell property. Such acts were voidable only.
    But tiie sale of a minor’s real property was void, unless made for good cause and with proper solemnities. (1 Domat, 537; 5 Feb., 372 ; 10 Mart. R., 72G.) Not only is the sale void, but the minor need not resort to the remedy of restitution. (5 Feb., 373.)
    The sale to Chumney was, then, void and not voidable, and the remedy of restitution was not necessary, and the limitation of four years does not operate in the case.
    But if the only remedy was restitution in integrum the remedy was entirely changed by the act of 1S40, introducing the common law. The right remained, because the law of 1S40 could not abrogate a right. The remedy of restitution was repealed, and the limitation. Nor could the appellant be benefited by the section of the act of limitations of 1841, because the statute had not even commenced to run in his favor, nor would it have commenced to run. until 1844 or 1845, the period when Lockhart would have arrived at majority.
    The common-law remedies were introduced in Texas in ¡1840, which are erafry, suit to recover the land, or a deed to another person. Now, tire instructions of the judge of the District Court wore strictly in accordance with this-law. Lockhart might avoid his deed to Chumney by liis conveyance to another party, (Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. K., 66, reported also in American Leading Cases; Kent’s Comm., 238, 239,) provided it were done in a reasonable-time. In Jackson v. Carpenter, (11 Johns. R., 539,) twelve years were deemed a reasonable time. In the case at bar the land was wild, and never occupied-until long after the sale to Robinson.
    III. And in the case before the court there is no evidence of any consideration passing to young Lockhart; even the small amount given was to his mother, and not a fair equivalent for her interest, which appellant is entitled to.
    IY. It is contended by appellant’s counsel that the letter written by youmg Lockhart, six months after mature age, was a confirmation of the deed to Chumney. In this he does not speak of any particular land, or confirm or ratify anything. He may have meant other lands in that county, or even the quarter league sold by Iris mother. There was not oven a promise to ratify the sale. A mere acquiescence, or even an acknowledgment that lie liad sold the land, would not amount to a ratification. (10 Pet. R., 66; 11 Johns. R., 539.) Ratification should be by an act equal in dignity and equivalent to a new contract. (3 Wend. R., 479; 10 Pet. R., 66; 11 Serg. & Rawle; 15 Mass. R.)
    If these authorities be correct, the court did not err in its instructions to the jury or in overruling the motion for a new trial.
   Hemphill, Ch. J.

The first ground was not insisted upon in the argument, and the irrelevancy of the evidence objected to in tire record will appear in the course of the discussion.

The principal questions arise upon the exceptions to the instructions given the jury. These instructions I do not propose to consider separately, but will proceed to state the principles of law applicable to the facts of the case; and-from these it will appear that all the charges were cither intrinsically erroneous, or, if true, they were such only as abstract propositions, unmodified by the facts of the particular ease.

The arguments of counsel evince a commendable degree of research into the doctrines, as well of the Spanish as of the common law, illustrative of the rights and privileges of minors, of the effects of their disabilities upon their acts done during 'minority, and what acts of recognition or acquiescence after the infant attained majority shall be deemed a confirmation of their acts during nonage. But as at the date of the deed to Chumney the laws of Spain were-in force, the rights of the infant and the plaintiffs claiming under him must be determined by the principles of that system of jurisprudence. This is an acknowledged general principle. It lias, however, the additional sanction of legislative authority, which, by the 6th section of the act to provide the mode of trying titles to lands, declares “that this act shall not be so construed as to-alter, impair, or to take away the rights of parties, as arising under the laws in force before the introduction of the common law, but the same shall be decided by the principles of the law or laws under which the same accrued, or by which the same were regulated or in any manner affected.” I shall not, therefore, extend my inquiries beyond that system of laws. An investigation into and a comparison of the rules which pervade both systems is not necessary to the decision of this case, although such collation would be wanting neither in interest nor instruction. One fact would be abundantly evident on such inquiry, viz: that the rules of the Spanish monarch, whether we consider the sound philosophy on which they are founded or their intrinsic quality, would, to say the very least, not suffer in comparison with those which in the common law are sanctioned by judicial wisdom and authority.

The property in controversy is real, or immovable, and a sale of such property belonging to a minor, without just cause and the legal formalities, is, in general, deemed in law null and void. By law 18th, tit. 16. Partidas Gth, it is declared “that guardians ought neither to give away, sell, or alienate any immovable thing belonging to' the minor, unless to pay the. debts left by his father, or to marry one of liis sisters or the minor himself, or for some other legal indispensable cause; and even then not without the authorization of the judge, which the latter ought t.o grant if. he conceive that the alienation is to be made for any of the above, purposes.” Thus far the law is translated by Moreau and Carleton. The original contains further regulations, one of which prohibits the house in which the minor was born and 'in which his father or .grandfather had lived, and also family servants, from being sold. The law GO, tit. 18, b. 3 recognizes the assent of the curator and the authority of the judge as essential to a valid alienation of the real estate of the minor, and gives tlie proper form-of a conveyance. The previous law, or law 50, gives tlie form •of a conveyance where a sale is made by the minor himself, being over fourteen years of age. The substance of the laws in relation to the incapacities of minors, and the manner in which a valid alienation of their property can be affected, is briefly expressed by Febrero, lib. 2, tit. 4, cap. 2, paragraph 26, or 23 of the Mexican edition. The following is substantially his language : minors can neither sell nor piurchaso without the assent of their curators. That a sale of the real or valuable (preciosos) personal property of the mino.r may be valid, the curator must give liis assent, and the sale must receive judicial sanction, founded on proof of its utility or grave necessity. For the sale of all other movable property, the assent of the curator will be sufficient; and without the intervention of this solemnity the contract will be null, and the minor can recover the property from any possessor. (Vide Sala, lib. 1, tit. 7, sections 37, 38.) In lib. 2, tit. 4, cap. 29, or 28 of the Mexican •edition, section 2, the author, Febrero, extends his observations on the subject, and after treating of the necessity of the curator’s assent to the validity of a •minor’s acts, the effect of the minor’s oath, &c., he continues: “But if there !be no curator, the contract made by the minor himself shall be equally valid, whether it be with or without oath, and he shall enjoy the like benefit. If he desire to sell his movables, not valuable, (preciosos,) although they may not be •of his patrimony, and there be a curator, the latter must, in writing, assent to the alienation; but if there be no curator, and the minor is over fourteen years •of age. the sale will be valid without such assent, provided there be no lesion; but the intervention of judicial sanction is essential to a valid alienation of the minor’s real or valuable personal property,” &c.

In lib. 3, tit. 4, cap. 2, from paragraph 30, (vol. 5, p. 371, of the Mexican edition,) the same subject is more copiously treated by Ihe author. In the appendix to this chapter, under the head o£ third privileges enjoyed by minors, it is said.“ that the contract of adult minors, without the assent of their curators, is. ipso jure, null if it be prejudicial to the minors, but if beneficial it is valid, .and the other adult contracting party will be bound. If there be no curator the contract of the minors will be valid, although if they suffer lesion they may demand restitution.”

* It will not be necessary to cite authorities further on this point. There is no evidence that the minor had any curator or guardian, and the act of sale to •Chumney is not affected by tlie want, of his assent. If the assent of the guardian were not a totally immaterial circumstance in this controversy, it might, with great plausibility, be contended that the minor’s act acquired strength .and support, from tlie assent of liis mother, a guardian, who, by the laws of nature, would feel the deepest solicitude for his welfare, whose vigilant affection would not slumber, and who might mistake but could not betray the interests of her child.

But the, act of the minor is wanting in the formalities of law, viz, the sanction of a court, which is requisite in the sale of his real estate, aiul is, consequently, null and void; though I do not understand that by the laws of Spain the acts of minors, wanting in legal formalities, would in all cases be, ipso jure, void. For instance, if a minor represent himself to be of age, and from his person he appear to be so, any contract made witli him will be valid ; for the law protects those who are defrauded, and not those who commit fraud. (Law 6, tit. 19, Partidas 6th.) The terms of the proposition embraced in this law necessarily exclude the idea of the intervention of either curator or judge in such contract.

Having determined that the sale to Chumney was invalid, so far as it was the act of the minor, we will now inquire whether the acts of the latter, after at tabling full age, were such as amounted to a confirmation of the contract. For though the act be deemed null in law, yet it is susceptible of validation, by either the express or tacit approbation of the minor after attaining majority. That such is the rule of law, will be manifest from the authorities. Febrero, in treating of the privilege of restitution, states that such privilege cannot be claimed by a minor when he has either expressly or tacitly approved the contract made in his minority; that is, when, being apprised of the lesion, he has permitted the term of prescription to expire without demanding restitution, or by doing acts after liis majority repugnant to the nullity or lesion in the contract, or such as necessarily involve its ratification ; for the intention to be inferred from an act is more powerful than that which is expressed in words.

Another observation of the author is, that “if the minor, having arrived at majority, ratify the contract made in minority, none of the formalities required by law to give validity to the minor’s contract will be necessary for ils confirmation, as well against the vice of nullity as of lesion; but if the ratification lie made in minority, it will not avail without the observance of such formalities; for the ratification of a void contract is a new contract.” And he further says, that if the minor during nonage or after majority ratify the contract which contains lesion and nullity combi lied, the vice of nullity will he cured by such ratification, but his right for lesion in the contract will still remain, unless after majority this be renounced. (Febrero, vol. 5, Mex. ed., p. 380.)

From these citations it appears that acts of the minor after majority, from which approbation may be inferred, will be a sufficient recognition of the contract. Now, what are the acts of the minor in the case under review? ne became of age in 1840; and his deed, in disaffirmance, was not made until nearly six years afterwards. This long acquiescence (irrespective of any other fact in the case) is strong if not conclusive evidence of assent to iiis first conveyance. Whether it be so"or not, it is not, material in this case to decide. There are other acts of botli express and tacit approbation and assent. The letter of the minor, written nearly a year after he became of age, very clearly recognizes tile contract. He speaks in it of the land he sold to Chnmney, gives him all ihí information he desires as to charges on the land; offers to satisfy out of his own pocket a small claim to pay the expenses of division; states that he has sold another portion, but still retains 937 acres of the same tract; and informs Mr. Chumney that the documents which lie, Chnmney, liad furnished the writer would enable him to procure a patent. This portion of the letter is ob-. score, but is explained by reference to the testimony, which proves that a portion of the consideration received by Lockhart from Chumney was a certificate for 1,280 acres of land. There was no evidence that Lockhart lias not disposed of or that he does not still own the said certificate; at least none that lie offered to restore it to his vendee, Chnmney. The retaining of such certificate after attaining majority is evidence of approbation ‘ of the contract by the minor. The witness Friar also testifies to an express approval by the minor, one or two years after the sale. He then spoke of the purchase by Chumney as an act of kindness; that the money thus received saved himself and his mother from starvation ; and that lie was well satisfied with the sale. The minor has, therefore, both by acts and words, tacitly and expressly ratified the. sale made in minority.

In Chesneau’s Heirs v. Sadler, (10 Mart. R., 726,) a case which is full of instruction, and in point upon the questions raised in this record, the sanction oE the minors to an illegal alienation oE their property their tutor was deduced from the act of their having claimed property which liad been received in exchange on such illegal alienation. (3 Mart. R., 457; 6 N. S., 18.)

It will be seen from the principles adduced from tiie authorities that tiie instructions were erroneous. The first, as an abstract proposition, may be deemed consistent with law, but it was not applicable under the facts of the case.

The evidence as to the comparative value of the land was totally irrelevant. No allegation of fraud or unfairness was set up by petitioner, if there liad been a division between mother and son, and this was unequal, such inequality may be the subject of compensation between themselves, hut cannot inflict loss upon others. Had the best half of the league been sold by mother and son to Chumney, how can the rights of Chumney he affected by such circumstance ? The vendors liad the right to sell or retain any portion they pleased. They have since sold a large portion of the balance to other vendees; and these latter might refuse payment of the purchase-money on tiie ground that tiie best half of the land iiad been previously sold to some third person, and this with as much propriety as the vendors themselves can claim a rescission of tiie first sale on the same ground.

How far the rights and powers of the minor may have been affected by such portions of the Louisiana codes as were then in force, was not discussed in tiie argument. The doctrinos held by the courts of that State on the subject of ratification of acts done during minority, coincide with those found in Spanish codes and commentators. (Vide 6 La., 601.) In Vaughan v. Christie, (3 Annual R., 328.) it was held that a sale made of a minor’s property without the formalities prescribed by law was absolutely mill, but may be ratified by the minor after majority, expressly or by implication; that absolute nullities resulting from defects of form are embraced within the general provisions of article 3507 of the civil code; that absolute nullities were of two kinds, those resulting from stipulations derogating from the force of laws made for tiie preservation of public order or good morals, and those established for the interest of individuals. The former are not susceptible of ratification, and the prescription of five years, under article 3507 of the code, is inapplicable to them; but if by subsequent dispositions of law or by the succession of time such stipulations cease to be illegal, the}' may from that time be ratified and become subject to the prescription of article 3507. Thus the partition of a succession made before tiie succession is open may become valid by ratification or by lapse of time after tiie opening of the succession. But in relation to .absolute nullities established for the interest of individuals, tiie rule is as to onerous contracts, without exception, that the party in whose favor they are established may ratify the contracts, either expressly or impliedly; and that in all cases of executed contracts susceptible of tacit ratification, a presumption of ratification Juris et de jure results from silence and inaction during the time fixed for prescription.

Tiie judgment is ordered to be reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.

Judgment reversed.

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