
    Shelby BYRD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Eric ARNOLD, Acting Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 11-16366
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 8, 2017 
    
    Filed March 17, 2017
    
      Shelby Byrd, Pro Se
    David N. Sunada, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Respondent-Appellee
    Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Shelby Byrd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging a 2009 decision by the Board of Parole Hearings denying parole and deferring his next parole hearing for three years in accordance with California Penal Code § 3041.5 (“Marsy’s Law”). We dismiss.

This court issued a certificate of appeal-ability (“COA”) on whether application of Marsy’s Law to delay Byrd’s next parole hearing for three years violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, and whether Byrd’s membership in a class action precludes his individual litigation of this claim in habeas. We vacate the COA as improvidently granted and dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding that claims fall outside “the core of habeas corpus” if success will not necessarily lead to immediate or earlier release from confinement), cert. denied, 580 U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 645, 196 L.Ed.2d 542 (2017); Phelps v. Alameda, 366 F.3d 722, 727-28, 730 (9th Cir. 2004) (merits panel has the power to rule on the propriety of a COA).

The dismissal of this appeal does not preclude Byrd from pursuing conditions of confinement claims in a properly filed civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

DISMISSED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     