
    XIAO PING GUO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-1991.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 13, 2014.
    Hui Chen, Flushing, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Edward J. Duffy, Senior Litigation Counsel; John M. McAdams, Jr., Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RICHARD C. WESLEY and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Xiao Ping Guo, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of an April 17, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“U”) November 29, 2010, denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Xiao Ping Guo, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 17, 2013), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 29, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this ease.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision minus the portions of the ruling not affirmed by the BIA. Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. DOJ, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513-14 (2d Cir.2009).

For asylum applications, like Guo’s, governed by the REAL ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on inconsistencies in the applicant’s statements and other record evidence “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163 n. 2 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam). Furthermore, for purposes of a credibility determination, “[a]n inconsistency and an omission are ... functionally equivalent.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166. We “defer to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact finder could make” such a ruling. Id. at 167.

The IJ reasonably based her adverse credibility determination on inconsistencies in Guo’s evidence and the lack of plausible explanation for those inconsistencies. Guo claimed that (1) she had a second intrauterine device (“IUD”) forcibly placed, which she then had removed prior to her departure from China to the United States, and (2) she told the asylum officer about adverse health effects she suffered from IUDs and about the placement of the second IUD. The IJ found, however, that the asylum officer’s assessment did not reflect this information, and neither Guo’s asylum application nor a letter from Guo’s husband indicated that the second IUD had been removed. The agency rejected Guo’s explanation that the removal of the second IUD was “a matter of privacy,” finding that removal of the IUD went “to the heart of a marital relationship,” and Guo’s husband had “intimate knowledge regarding the first IUD” and “apparent knowledge that a second IUD had been placed.”

The IJ also found Guo’s testimony regarding her opportunity to leave China inconsistent. Guo initially testified that she had no opportunity to leave China until 2008. When confronted with tourist visas on her passport from 2005, however, Guo admitted that she had travelled to Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand in 2005. As a result, the IJ found that Guo’s testimony was “not plausible” because “[h]er testimony that she did leave China in 2005 and returned undercuts her initial claim that she was unable to find a smuggler to help her leave that country until 2008.” Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, and a reasonable fact finder could have found Guo not credible in view of the totality of the circumstances. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163 & n. 2,166.

We have considered all of petitioner’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  