
    A. Orive Jr. v. A. J. Rabel and Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company.
    No. 6701.
    Decided May 16, 1934.
    
      Raphael Cowen, of Brownsville, for plaintiffs in error.
    
      Seabury, George & Taylor, of Brownsville, for defendants in error.
   PER CURIAM.

— “This cause was brought under the terms of, and for the purpose of obtaining relief under Chapter 102, Acts of the Regular Session of the 43rd Legislature, which became effective May 1st, 1933. The Act by its terms is effective in no event beyond May 1, 1934. Since the statute is no longer operative, the cause is deemed moot and is, for that reason, dismissed; and any injunctive or restraining order heretofore entered by this, or any lower court, is hereby dissolved.

“The views of Chief Justice Cureton, concurring in the dismissal of the cause, are expressed in a memorandum this day filed.”

Mr. Chief Justice CURETON

concurring:

“I concur in the dismissal of the above named cases, not because I think they are moot — for as to that I am not convinced — but because I am of the opinion that the statute under which the actions were brought is violative of Sections 16 and 19 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Texas, which render void any law impairing the obligation of contracts.

“I refrain from elaborating my views at the present time, for the reason that it is quite likely that cases involving a somewhat similar constitutional question may be presented to this Court under another and more recent legislative enactment, relating to the same subject as the statute which was made the basis of action in the cases named above.”  