
    Joseph A. SHERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DAVIS, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 08-16136.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Jan. 11, 2010.
    
    Filed Jan. 19, 2010.
    Joe Sherman, Davis, CA, pro se.
    Carrie Anne Frederickson, Cori Rae Samo, Esquire, Angelo Kilday & Kilduff, Sacramento, CA, Scott J. Smith, Esquire, Racine Olson Nye Cooper & Budge, Chtd., Pocatello, ID, for Defendant-Appellee.
    
      Before: BEEZER, TROTT, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Joseph A. Sherman appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations arising from several arrests. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir.2008) (failure to state a claim); Arpin v. Santa Clam Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.2001) (summary judgment). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the false imprisonment and false arrest claims because these claims necessarily implied the invalidity of Sherman’s convictions, which had not been overturned. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

Similarly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the excessive force claim as barred by Heck. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 699 n. 5 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (explaining that a jury-trial conviction for resisting arrest, pursuant to CaLPenal Code § 148(a)(1), “necessarily determines the lawfulness of the officers’ actions throughout the whole course of the defendant’s conduct, and any action alleging the use of excessive force would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the claims that police lacked probable cause to arrest Sherman, because Sherman failed to raise a triable issue as to whether probable cause was lacking. See Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775-76 (9th Cir.1991).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sherman’s motion to amend his complaint a second time because amendment would have been futile or caused undue delay. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc).

Sherman’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

Sherman’s “motion for decision for plaintiff’ is denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     