
    DUNCANSON v. MANSON.
    Equity Pleading; Infants; Guardians Ad Litem; Judicial Sales ; Decrees, Collateral Attack upon ; Jurisdiction.
    1. Non-resident infant defendants may be brought before a court' of equity and subjected to its jurisdiction, by the appointment of guardians ad Kiem by commissioners appointed by the court for that purpose, and the taking of answers by such guardians.
    2. If a sale of real estate is made under a decree, one of the defendants sued as an infant, cannot, successfully, in a subsequent proceeding, collaterally attack the validity of the decree, on the ground that he was not a minor when his answer was taken, especially when he was present in person before the commissioners and did not question their right to appoint a guardian ad litem for him or the guardian’s right to act for him.
    3. It is the policy of the law to maintain judicial sales, and every reasonable intendment will be indulged to uphold them.
    4. A decree by a court having general jurisdiction over the subject-matter of decreeing the sale of real estate of a deceased debtor to pay her debts, which directs such a sale, although erroneous for the reason that the interest of the decedent in the land sold was not such as to be subject to the payment of the debts, cannot be collaterally impeached for want of jurisdiction, but can only be reversed on direct appeal.
    No. 244.
    Submitted January 18, 1894.
    Decided May 7, 1894.
    Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a decree of an equity term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, establishing the rights of the complainant to a fund in the registry of the court.
    
      Reversed.
    
    The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:
    This case has arisen upon the conflicting claims of the parties appellant and appellee, Charles C. Duncanson and Frederick L. Manson, respectively, to a fund paid into the registry of the court below by the United States, as directed by the act of Congress of June 25, 1890, Ch. 6x3, upon condemnation of real estate for the site of the new postoffice building for this District, in square No. 323 of this city.
    The questions necessary to be decided are much involved in certain judicial proceedings that have taken place, and it becomes necessary to state with some fullness those proceedings, and the contents of the title papers upon which such proceedings were founded, in order that it be made clear as to whether there was jurisdiction in the court and what has or has not been definitely and conclusively decided in regard to the rights of the parties, and to what extent they are bound' thereby, if at all.
    It appears that Sarah J. Manson, wife of William L. Manson, being possessed of separate estate in her own right, with her husband’s consent, entered into a contract with one Barker to purchase the property located in square No. 323 for $ix,ooo, of which $1,500 was to be paid in cash, and for the balance she was to give her notes payable out of her separate estate, as they became due. The cash payment was made, and the notes were given and ultimately paid by the wife, S. J. Manson. On August 2, 1862, Barker and wife and Manson and wife united in a conveyance of the property to one W. R. Woodward in fee, in trust to secure the notes for the payment of the deferred installments of the purchase money; and, upon the further trust, to permit Sarah J. Manson to occupy and enjoy the premises, and to receive the rents and profits thereof to fier separate use; and upon full payment of all of said notes, to convey said property upon the trust and for the purposes declared for the benefit of said S. J. Manson, in and by a certain other deed or declaration of the parties, of the same date, and a certain Erastus Poulson, trustee.
    This deed of trust to Erastus Poulson, referred to, declared that, after the notes secured by the deed to Woodward were fully paid, he, Poulson, his heirs and assigns, should stand seized of the property upon the following trusts, to-wit: in trust for S. J. Manson for and during her life, and to permit her to occupy said premises and to receive the rents and profits thereof for her own sole and.separate use, free from the interference of her then or any future husband, without any liability for or on account of such husbands.
    It was further declared that it should be lawful for the said S. J. Manson, at any time, and from time to time, during her life, to dispose of the said premises, either by absohite sale, or by mortgage thereof, as she might think proper; in which conveyance the trustee should join; and such conveyance to be made as if Sarah J. Manson was sole and unmarried.
    And in default of any such sale or mortgage, or so far as the same shall not extend, upon further trust for such person or persons, and for such estate, and in such parts, shares and proportions as she, the said S. J. Manson, should or might, from time to time, by any deed or instrument of writing, or by her last will and testament, under her hand and seal, limit, direct or appoint, give or devise the same; and in default of any such limitations, directions or appointment, gift or devise, in trust for such child or children as she should leave surviving her and the issue of any deceased child or children equally, share and share alike; and in default of all such children or issue, then in trust for the right heirs of the said Sarah Jane Manson forever.
    And it was further declared, that all moneys that should or might be raised by sale or mortgage of said premises, or any part thereof, should be paid to the said S. J. Manson, and be disposed of as she should or might think best, her receipt being a valid discharge therefor.
    It is not denied or controverted, that S. J. Manson paid out of her own separate estate, as she was required to do, the notes mentioned in the deed of trust to Woodward; and that it was upon such payment that Woodward and Barker' joined in the deed of release to Poulson, trustee, to hold the estate upon the same trusts as those set forth in the deed to the latter of August 2, 1862.
    Mrs. Manson, in her lifetime, sold a part of the property embraced in these deeds; and in September, 1870, she died in Bucks county, in the State of Pennsylvania, leaving a will, dated April 20, 1865, which was duly admitted to probate in Philadelphia, on September 12, 1870. By this will she directed her debts to be paid; and then she devised and bequeathed all her estate, real and personal, as follows: that her husband, William L. Manson, should take and receive all the rents and profits of her estate, during his life, to use and apply the same for his support, and the support and education of her three children, namely, Frederick L. Manson, William Henry Walters and Cecilia M. Manson; but if her husband should marry again, he should surrender the control of the children; and on the death of her husband, she devised and bequeathed all of her estate, real and personal, to be equally divided, share and share alike, between her said three children, when the youngest of them should reach the age of twenty-one years, and not before. Upon the admission to probate of this will, letters of administration, with the will annexed, were granted to William L. Manson, the surviving husband of the deceased; and the will, not being attested by more than two witnesses, and therefore not sufficient to pass real estate under the law in force in this District, has never been admitted to probate here, and there has been no administration in this District upon the estate of the deceased.
    The administrator appears to have fully administered the estate in Philadelphia, and according to the auditor’s report of the assets of the estate, and the debts proved against it, there was a deficiency of assets to pay the debts, to the extent of $2,051.26. This report of the auditor was approved and ratified by the court; and the administrator paid the amount of the deficiency thus shown, and became a subro-gated creditor of the estate to that amount.
    The surviving husband, thus becoming a creditor of the estate of his deceased wife, on the 18th of June, 1874, filed in the Supreme Court of this District a creditor’s bill, asking for the sale of the real estate mentioned and described in the deeds of trust heretofore referred to, for the purpose of paying the debts of the estate. In this bill the property is described and treated as real estate, of which the wife had died equitably seized to her sole and separate use. She is also alleged to have died intestate as to this particular property. The deeds are specifically referred to as parts of the bill; and the letters of administration and a copy of the will annexed are also referred to and filed with the bill. The property is specifically described in the bill by metes and bounds; and the bill prayed that the property might be sold for the payment of the debts of the deceased; and for such other and further relief as the nature of the case might require.
    
    The bill was filed against Poulson as trustee, and the three children of Mrs. Manson as her heirs-at-law, namely, William H. W. Walters, Frederick L. Manson and Cecilia M. Manson, the two latter being alleged and described as infants, under the age of twenty-one years. They were all sued as - being residents of Philadelphia. Process was prayed, and was issued to and returned by the marshal of this District “ not found.” Thereupon orders were made by the court appointing commissioners to appoint guardians ad litem for the infant defendants, and to take the answers of such infants by the guardians so appointed. Commissions were issued, guardians appointed and answers taken, whereby all interests and rights of the infants were claimed but submitted to the court. Poulson, the trustee, answered the bill, admitting that he, as trustee, was seized of the legal estate in the property as charged, and admitting all other facts charged in the bill, he submitted himself to the court. Walters, the other adult defendant, answered the bill, claimed all such interest in the premises as he might be entitled to, and submitted his rights to the court.
    Upon this state of the case, the court, on the 19th of March, 1875, by its decree ordered and adjudged that the claim of the complainant set forth in the bill was, and should be, “recognized as a valid lien against the property described in the bill, and that said property be sold, and the proceeds of such sale be applied in satisfaction, first, of all proper taxes and assessments, or other prior incumbrances due and unpaid, upon said property; and, secondly, out of the balance, the claim of the complainant to be paid and satisfied, and the remainder, if any, be distributed pro rata between the heirs of Sarah J. Manson, deceased.” A trustee was appointed to make the sale, and he was required to advertise the property for saie, and after sale to report the same to the court, and upon final ratification by the court, he was authorized and required to “ convey to the purchaser or purchasers, by good and sufficient deed, all the right, title and interest of said defendants, or any of them, and of said complainant, in and to said property.”
    The sale was duly made, reported and finally ratified, and the terms of sale being complied with, the property was conveyed to the purchaser as directed by the decree. The proceeds of sale were distributed in accordance with the terms of the decree; but there does not appear to have been any remainder for distribution among the children or heirs of Mrs. Manson. The purchaser at the trustee’s sale was Frederick Volk, who subsequently conveyed the property, with covenant of general warranty, to Louis, Edward, and Alexander Schmid, and the latter conveyed the property, with covenant of general warranty, to the present appellant.
    Subsequent to the equity proceedings just referred to, William L. Manson, the complainant in that proceeding, and father of the present appellee, died, and it is not shown who represents his estate.
    The condemnation proceedings, upon the application of the United States, took place in October, 1890, and the property in question,was condemned as parcel No. 15, in square No. 323; and the value of the parcel was estimated at $17,-000, and a United States Treasury draft for that sum was, on the 9th of October, 1891, deposited in the registry of the court below, and remains subject to the order of the court.
    The present bill was filed by the appellee on June 20, 1892, against the appellant alone, and without making either Poul-son, the trustee, or the purchaser of the property, parties. In this bill the appellee claims the entire and exclusive right to the whole fund arising from the condemnation of the property, upon the ground that the proceedings and decree for the sale of the property for the payment of his mother’s debts were wholly void, as being without jurisdiction to support them, and that, as he alleges, his brother and sister had died intestate, leaving him alone entitled.
    By this bill he prays that all the proceedings on the bill filed by his father as creditor, and. the decree directing the sale of the property for the payment of his mother’s debts, be declared utterly null and void for the want of jurisdiction, and that all decrees, orders and proceedings had and passed in that cause be decreed to be without any effect whatever, because of the want of jurisdiction in the court, of either subject-matter or of parties. Also that all deeds made of the property under said decree be declared null and void; and that the appellant be enjoined from claiming the fund deposited in the registry of the court, as stated in the bill; and that the appellee be decreed to be entitled to the entire fund.
    In answer to this bill the appellant denies all the material allegations thereof, and insists that there was jurisdiction in the court to decree the sale of the prop'erty, and that he acquired under the decree a good and valid title to the property by the conveyance made to him; and he prays that he may have full benefit of all objections to the bill that could be raised and availed of upon demurrer thereto.
    Replication was entered and proof taken, and the cause was brought on to final hearing; and upon such hearing the court; below decreed, that the decree for sale of the property, of the 19th of March, 1875, passed in cause No. 3796, and all decrees and orders in that cause, were and are null and void, and of no effect; and that each and all deeds made to convey title under said decree were and are void, and passed no title to the land and premises condemned as parcel No. 15 in square No. 323; that the plaintiff, the present appellee, was and is entitled to the entire fund in the registry of the court, the proceeds of condemnation of parcel No. 15, and that the same be paid over to him, his solicitor of record, or assigns. It is from this decree that the present appeal is taken.
    
      Mr. Wm. F. Mattingly and Mr. Henry Wise Garnett for the appellant:
    1. The property was liable for the debts of Sarah J. Manson. It was her separate estate. She was the donor and the donee of the power, with the absolute right of disposal, and did dispose of one-half of it. The chancellor holding the equity court so decided and even if his decision was erroneous, the decree cannot be collaterally attacked. 2 Pom. Eq., Sec. 1123. See also Brandies v. Cochrane, 112 U. S., 352 ; Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N. H.r 298.
    2. The appointment of guardian ad litem to the infant defendants gave the court jurisdiction of their persons. The manner of appointment by commission was in conformity with the common law practice, and proper and usual in this District. Cooper’s Eq. PI:, 108; Bank v. Ritchie, 8 Pet., 128.
    3. The court having had jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, its decree was valid and the purchaser under it took a good title. Joyce v. McAvoy, 31 Cal., 273 ; Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet., 162 ; Grignon v. Astor, 2 How., 340 ; Thaw v. Ritchie, 136 U. S., 548; Davis v. Gaines, 104 U. S., 386 ; Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S., 435 ; Schley v. May- or, &c., 29 Md., 34 ; Whiting v. Bank, 13 Pet, 6 Long v. Long, 62 Md., 33; Newbold v. Schloss, 66 Md., 583; Cockey v. Cole, 28 Md., 276; Hunter v. Hatton, 4 Gill, 115 ; Porter v. Robinson, 13 Am. Dec., 153 ; Cuyler v. Cuyler, 5 Mack., 568 ; Vooihees v. Bank, 10 Pet., 449. .
    4. The proofs are insufficient to authorize the presumption of death of the alleged brother and sister of complainant; and the interest of the adult defendant unquestionably passed. It is also apparent that the complainant had notice of the property and suit in 1874, and is guilty of laches.
    
      
      Mr. C. H. Armes for the appellee:
    1. The court, in decreeing a sale of the real estate, inadvertently assumed that the decedent died seized in fee of the real estate in question, and that it descended to her children as her heirs-at-law, whereas the record shows the fact to be that the interest of the decedent ceased at her death and the title vested in her three children as purchasers by the deeds, which were in ample terms (i Dan., Ch. 367) made part of the bill and record.
    A noticeable feature of the creditor’s bill is the omission of the statement, which so clearly and repeatedly appears in the deeds referred to, that the interest of Mrs. Manson was for her life only. It is obvious from the face of the record of that cause that the proceeding was one to sell the real estate of third persons, in which the dead woman had in her lifetime only an equitable life interest, and that such record placed nothing before the court upon which its jurisdiction could rest. The alleged debtor having left no estate that was liable for the debt, the purchaser took nothing.
    The creditor’s bill-avers a seizin as appears in the deeds referred to. Admitting that to be true, and referring to the deeds to ascertain the extent of that interest, there was nothing before the court that was subject to its jurisdiction, for those deeds show that the decedent had only an equitable interest in the property for her own lifetime. Real estate which has descended or has been devised can be sold to pay the debts of a deceased person by.a court of chancery, but only such as has been devised or has descended. Hinkley’s Test. Law, Sec. 1847; Thom. Dig. Laws D. C, 128; Robertson v. Parks, 3 'Md. Ch., 66.
    2. Jurisdiction must appear upon the face of the record. Numerous instances of the application of the rule are referred to in the case of Noble v. Union River Co., 147 U. S., 173. See also Shriveds Lessee v. Lynn, 2 How.,- 43 ; Williamson v. Berry, 8 How., 493 ; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall., 466; Dowell v. Mitchell, 105 U. S., 430 ; Day v. 
      Micou, 18 Wall., 156 ; Burbank v. Conrad, 96 U. S., 293 ; Waples v. United States, no U. S., 63.
    At the time the decree was entered the land was no more subject to the power of the court than any other tract in the District. The Supreme Court, in the case of Williamson v. Berry, 8 How., 495, referring to the subject of the validity of a decree, said: “Jurisdiction may be in the court over the case, but there may be an excess of jurisdiction asserted in its judgment.” That was Shriver’s Case in 2 How., 43. See Williamson v. Berry, 8 How., 495 ; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall., 466 ; Dowell v. Mitchell, 105 U. S., 430 ; Palmer v. Fleming, 1 App., D. C., 528 ; Day v. Micou, 18 Wall., 156.
    3. There was no jurisdiction of the non-resident infants. The act of Congress of February 22, 1867 (Rev. Stat. D. C., Sec. 787), provides for service of process by publication where parties are beyond the jurisdiction and should be strictly followed. Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall., 350.
   Mr. Chief Justice Alvey

delivered the opinion of the Court:

Upon this somewhat involved and complicated record, three principal questions are presented: 1st. Whether, in the passage of the decree for sale of the 19th of March, 1875, the court had competent jurisdiction of the parties to that cause to bind and conclude them by decree; and if so,

2d. Whether the court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a nature to render its decree unimpeachable in a collateral proceeding. And if either of these questions be determined in the negative and that none of the parties defendants were bound by the decree, then,

3d. Whether there is proof sufficient in this case to show that the brother and sister of the appellee are dead, and if dead, that they died unmarried, or if married, without children or intestate?

1. With respect to the first of these questions, we think it clear that all the parties defendants to the creditor’s bill filed by Wm. L. Manson were properly before the court to render them subject to its jurisdiction. There is no question as to the want of jurisdiction over any. of the parties except the two infants — the present appellee and his sister. And it is only upon the assumption that the sister is dead and that she died childless and intestate, that the appellee is in a position to raise a question as to the effect of the decree upon her interest in the property. It is true there was no service of subpoena upon either the appellee or his sister; but there was what the law recognizes as a substitute for such service, and that is the appointment of a guardian ad litem by commissioners appointed by the court, and the taking of an answer by such guardian. And in the case of a non-resident infant defendant, that would appear to be the most feasible method in practice,' both in England and in this country, of bringing the infant defendant before the court and rendering him subject to its jurisdiction. This is fully shown by Chancellor Bland in the case of Snowden v. Snowden, 1 Bl. Ch., 550, 552, 554, and the precedents cited by him. The decree sought by the creditor’s bill was not a personal decree against the infant defendants, but was a decree to affect and charge real property in which they were supposed to have an interest; and that being the case, it would seem to be fully covered and concluded by the decision in the case of Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S., 435, 440, and cases there cited. Moreover, Poulson, the trustee, was before the court, and he represented all the interests of the beneficiaries in the trust property. Kerrison v. Stewart, 93 U. S., 155, 160. And in the absence of any charge or proof of fraud or collusion between the trustee and those adversely interested, it may even be doubted whether the children of Mrs. Manson were necessary parties. 93 U. S., 160.

However, it is insisted that, at the time of the taking of the answer of the appellee by guardian he was over twenty-one' years of age, and he should not, therefore, be bound by such answer. The appellee himself admits in his testimony that he cannot pretend to be accurate in regard to his age; and his father seems to have regarded the appellee as a minor, for he so alleged the fact in his bill and he swore to it. The commissioners appointed to take the appellee’s answer, treated him as a minor, and though he was personally present before the commissioners, according to their return, and the testimony of the guardian, it does not appear that he made any question of their right or power to appoint a guardian for him, or of the right of the guardian to answer in his behalf. There would seem to be no ground whatever for the pretense that he was not present when the guardian was appointed; the evidence shows clearly to the contrary.

But however the fact as to his age, in point of truth, may be, if he was of age at the time of his answer taken, as he conteñds he was, he could have put in an answer for himself, and it was his duty to do so, 1 Dan. Ch. Prac., 116, and he cannot be heard now to impeach the jurisdiction of the court by attempting to prove that he was not a minor when his answer was taken. The court, acting upon the proof before it, concluded that the appellee was a minor, and no proof now offered, as to that fact, can affect the validity of the decree by way of collateral attack upon it. Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet., 157, 163 ; Day v. Kerr, 7 Mo., 426.

2. The'most material question in this case is, whether or not the court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the decree for sale of a nature to render that decree free from impeachment for want of jurisdiction in the court to pass it, in a collateral proceeding.

This is not a bill of review filed in the former cause for the correction of errors occurring in the record of that cause, but it is an original, independent bill, setting up claims to property as being in reality unaffected by the proceedings and decree in the former case, under which the defendant claims, and seeking to have that former proceeding declared null and void as a mere cloud upon the appellee’s title, created by such proceeding, because taken in a court without jurisdiction of either person or subject-matter. It is, in other words, a proceeding wholly collateral, and the attempt is to attack and have declared null and void the decree of sale of the 19th of March, 1875, and all the titles acquired there-' under, and that too without having the parties interested in those titles before the court.

The question is, not whether there were errors in the proceedings; there may have been very gross errors; but whether there was jurisdiction. The law has provided the ways and means for the correction of errors in judicial proceedings; but, if jurisdiction exists, the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction binds and protects all parties concerned with it until duly reversed on direct proceeding for review. Upon any other theory of judicature, the judgments and decrees of courts, instead of being the highest and the most conclusive evidence of rights, would be the sure means of deluding and ensnaring the unwary.

Now, it is certainly true, that the Supreme Court of this District has jurisdiction and power to decree the sale of the real estate of a deceased debtor, whether the title be legal or equitable, for the payment of debts; and upon the allegation that the deceased was seized either legally or equitably, and died indebted, there would be furnished a foundation for a decree of sale of such real estate for the payment of the debts. The bill of the creditor upon which the impeached decree for sale was founded, would seem to have been inartificially drawn, but we think there was enough alleged to show that the case was within the jurisdiction of the court. For notwithstanding the allegation that deceased was equitably seized of the real estate, that allegation should be construed with reference to the well established principle which holds that where a person has a general power of appointment, such as was held by Mrs. Manson, and he actually exercises his power, whether by deed or will, the property appointed will, in the contemplation of a court of equity, form part of the assets of his estate, so as to be subject to the demands of his creditors, in preference to the claims of his devisees, legatees or appointees. 2 Sug. on Pow., 27; 4 Kent. Com., 339, 340; Brandies v. Cochrane, 112 U. S., 334, 352; Clapp v. In graham, 126 Mass., 200. It is true, in order to raise this equity, the power must be actually executed, for the technical reason that equity never aids or supplies the non-execution of a power. But this has been the subject of some contrariety of opinion, whether the equity did not attach as well in cases of non-execution as in cases of the actual execution of general powers. Holmes v. Coghill, 7 Ves., 499, 507. In this case the equity is very strong in favor of the creditors of the donee of the power. She purchased the estate and paid the full price therefor out of her own separate funds, and the reservation of the general power of appointment enabled her to dispose of the estate to whom she pleased— to herself or to any other person; and hence the property, the subject of such general power, has been regarded, both by legislatures and the courts of equity, as a proper fund for the payment of the debts of the donee of such power. 2 Crabb, Real Prop., 743; Wms. Real Prop., 200. If the will of the donee of the power had referred to or embraced the property, showing an intent to execute the power, and had been properly executed, or even defectively executed, so that a court of equity would have aided its execution, it would seem clear that the property would have been treated as assets for the payment of the debts of the donee; and, in such case, it would be simply a question of construction of the will of the donee. 4 Kent Com., 339, 340. All that, however, was for the court to determine when called upon to pass the decree for sale of the property to raise a fund for the payment of debts of the donee, and other incumbrances, provided for by the decree.

If the court was in error, as it would seem to have been, in passing the decree, it was the right, as it was the duty, of the defendants, if they desired to avoid the operation and effect of the decree, to have appealed therefrom, or to have the errors corrected by bill of review filed within the time allowed by law. But no such proceeding was taken, and the decree was allowed to stand; and it was not until after the lapse of more than seventeen years, and the rights of third parties had intervened, that an attempt is made to annul the decree and destroy all the rights acquired thereunder. This attempt ought not to be allowed to succeed, if there be any principle that can be fairly invoked to defeat it, and to preserve the rights of parties acquired upon the faith of the decree.

It is certainly the policy of the law to maintain judicial sales, and every reasonable intendment should be indulged to uphold them. Otherwise the public would "become distrustful, and fair prices for property sold under judicial authority would seldom be obtained. Purchasers, while they are required to take notice of the existence and terms of the decrees or judgments under which they purchase, and as to the parties bound thereby, cannot be required to become judicial critics, and to pass in review, at their peril, upon the correctness of the proceedings upon which the judgments or decrees may be founded. As was pertinently said by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet., 168: “ After a lapse of years, presumptions must be made in favor of what does not appear. If the purchaser was responsible for the mistakes of the court, in point of fact, after they had adjudicated upon the facts, and acted upon them, these sales would be snares for honest men. The purchaser is not bound to look further back than the order of ‘the court. He is not bound to see whether the court was mistaken in the facts of debts and children. That the decree of an Orphans’ Court in a case within its jurisdiction is reversible only on appeal, and not collaterally in another suit.” It was further said, “that when a court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question that may arise in the cause; and whether its decisions be correct or not, its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court.” These principles apply in all respects and with special force in this case. It was for the court whose decree is attempted to be impeached, not only to decide upon the facts before it, but upon the construction and legal effect of all deeds and muniments of title upon which the proceeding was based. The court having general jurisdiction over the subject-matter of decreeing the sale of real estate of a deceased debtor for the payment of debts, had the right and was required to determine the question as to the liability of the property for the debts, and whether the case was within its jurisdiction; and though its decision may have been erroneous, it could only be reversed upon a direct appeal. This question has been treated with great clearness and force by Mr. Justice Brewer, in the case of Cooke v. Bangs, 31 Fed. Rep., 640, and much of the reasoning of the opinion in that case applies with peculiar force to this. And without an extended review of the authorities, we do not deem it necessary to do more than refer to the leading, and, as we think, conclusive cases upon this subject, of Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet., 157 ; Voorhees v. Bank, 10 Pet., 449 ; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How., 319 ; Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall., 210, 216; Hall v. Law, 102 U. S., 461, 464 ; White v. Crow, 110 U. S., 183, 188 ; Long v. Long, 62 Md., 33, 62 ; Newbold v. Schlens, 66 Md., 585, 591. Upon the reasoning and authority of these cases, we think it clear that the decree for sale of the property of the 19th of March, 1875, is not void, and therefore not subject to collateral impeachment, for want of jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter of the suit.

The case of Shriver's Lessee v. Lynn, 2 How., 43, has been much relied on by counsel for appellee as supporting his contention. But we fail to perceive the application of the decision made in that case to the facts and conditions of the present. In that case, the trustee appointed by the decree, with authority to sell the land therein specifically mentioned and directed to be sold, proceeded to sell and report to the court for ratification, a parcel of land not embraced by the decree, and therefore never ordered to be sold; and of course the decree could not be invoked to protect the purchaser. As said by the court, the parcel of land then in controversy was not asked to be sold in the original equity cause, and it was not liable to be sold, and the decree did not refer to it. It was clear, therefore, said the court, “ that this sale was not made in pursuance of the decree. Neither in the petition nor in the decree was the tract of 100 acres named or referred to. This proceeding, then, by the trustee was without authority. It could derive no sanction from the decree.” 2 How., 59.

3. With respect to the question as to the sufficiency of the proof of the death of the brother and sister of the appellee, unmarried, without issue, and intestate, after the conclusions we have reached on the two preceding questions, this third question becomes unimportant to be considered; though if it were necessary to decide it, we should be compelled to hold that the proof in this record is far from satisfactory upon the question of such supposed deaths. The proof at best is exceedingly meagre and indefinite, and not such as would afford a sáfe basis for a final decree.

■ There are other questions that would have been important in the consideration of the case, if our conclusions on the questions of jurisdiction had been different; such as the questions of laches, and the want of necessary parties. These questions, however, have become, in view of our conclusions on the main questions of jurisdiction, immaterial, and therefore unnecessary to be decided.

It follows that the decree appealed from must be reversed, and the bill of the appellee be dismissed, with costs to the appellant ; and it is so ordered.  