
    SUNRAY LAMP COMPANY, Inc., and C. F. Leonard, Defendants Appellants, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiff Appellee.
    Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    July 16, 1928.
    No. 3770.
    Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; Joseph L. Bodine, Judge.
    Charles J. Holland, of New York City, for appellants.
    Howson & Howson, of New York City (Hubert Howson, of New York City, Albert G. Davis, of Schenectady, N. Y., and Frederick P. Fish, of Boston, Mass., of counsel),for appellee.
    Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
   WOOLLEY, Circuit Judge.

In this suit, the third in a group of four suits, the General Electric Company charges the defendants with infringing the two patents involved in the first suit against the Desmond Incandescent Lamp Co. (C. C. A.) 27 F.(2d) 590, namely, the Just and Hanaman patent No. 1,018,502 and the Langmuir patent No. 1,180,159, the first covering a substantially pure tungsten filament for an incandescent lamp bulb and the second covering such a filament within an atmosphere of inert gas. The court entered a decree for a preliminary injunction and from that decree the defendants took this appeal, which we have considered and shall dispose of according to the principles applicable to such cases which we have stated in the opinion filed in the Desmond Case.

The main difference between this case (Sunray lamp) and the Atlas Specialty Co. Case (C. C. A.) 27 F.(2d) 593, is that the defendant Sunray Company was not a manufacturer of the alleged infringing lamps but was a dealer engaged in selling lamps made by others than the plaintiff, the sole owner of the patents. The particular infringement consisted, as alleged, in the sale. of gas-filled tungsten filament lamps intended for ordinary house circuits, the filaments being made chiefly of tungsten in combination with other chemicals and placed within the bulb-enclosed atmosphere of dry nitrogen.

The motions made to the District Court for preliminary injunctions in the Atlas Specialty Co. Case and in this ease were supported by substantially the same affidavits, raising the same issues, stating the same facts and the briefs filed on this appeal are correspondingly similar. We have given the two eases the same consideration and have found that in this ease as in the former the evidentiary affidavits are of a character that justified the learned trial judge in entering the decree for a preliminary injunction. Grushlaw v. Phœnix Knitting Works (C. C. A.) 183 F. 222.

The decree is affirmed.  