
    Bobby NELSON, Appellant, v. DAVY McKEE, INC., Appellee.
    No. AU-495.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 8, 1984.
    Theodore N. Taylor, Plant City, for appellant.
    J. Allen Bobo of Holland & Knight, Tampa, for appellee.
   MILLS, Judge.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, Nelson contends that the deputy’s finding that his right to wage-loss benefits terminated as of 6 April 1982 was not supported by competent substantial evidence. We do not agree and affirm.

It is undisputed that on 16 October 1980, while employed by McKee, Nelson injured his shoulder; that he was treated by Drs. Sklenicker and Williamson; that he reached MMI on 1 October 1981; that he sustained a four percent physical impairment; that he was paid TTD benefits for the periods of 28 October 1980 through 2 February 1981 and 28 February 1981 through 9 September 1981; that his medical bills were paid by the employer/carrier (E/C); that on 6 April 1982, while employed by Buccaneer, he injured his back; that he was treated by Dr. Martinez; and that Dr. Martinez found no connection between the shoulder injury and the back injury.

Nelson stated that after recovering from the back injury in June 1982 he was forced to leave three jobs because of shoulder problems; however, Dr. Martinez found no disabling abnormalities. In fact, Dr. Martinez saw him in January 1983 and at that time he complained of back pain only.

The testimony of Nelson and Dr. Martinez was conflicting. The deputy resolved the conflict against Nelson. This was his function. We will not disturb the deputy’s finding because it was supported by competent substantial evidence.

Our decision in this case does not intend to cut off future wage loss claims which may be permitted by the act and not barred by the statute of limitations.

AFFIRMED.

McCORD, GUYTE P., Jr., (Ret), Associate Judge, concurs.

WENTWORTH, J., concurs with written opinion.

WENTWORTH, Judge,

concurring.

I agree that the record supports affirmance of the denial of wage loss benefits between April 6, 1982, and the date of hearing upon this claim for a 1980 accident. The order awarded benefits only for the earlier periods in question and therefore, in one sense, the claimed benefits were properly “terminated as of April 6, 1982.” In affirming the determination against proof of causal relation for those wage losses, however, we need not and should not approve the absolute terms of the deputy’s further broadly stated conclusion that the April 6 accident in another employment “cut off any further duty owed by” appel-lee. That conclusion is properly applied only to the specific wage loss periods in question, so as to preserve, as noted by the majority, for future resolution any further wage loss claims permitted under the law for the accident on which this claim against appellee was based.  