
    James Benjamin BARSTAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS STATE OF WASHINGTON; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-35338.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 22, 2015.
    
    Filed July 1, 2015.
    James Benjamin Barstad, Walla Walla, WA, pro se.
    Douglas W. Carr, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office, Olympia, WA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Washington state prisoner James Benjamin Barstad appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUI-PA”) claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir.2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Barstad’s free exercise claim because Barstad failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ religious diet policy was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (a prison regulation that “impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights” is valid “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”); Resnick v. Adams, 348 F.3d 763, 768-71 (9th Cir.2003) (applying four-part Turner test to prisoner’s free exercise challenge to prison policy requiring prisoner to submit an application to receive kosher meals and granting summary judgment because policy was reasonably related to the prison’s interest in the orderly administration of its religious diet program).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Barstad’s Establishment Clause claim because Barstad failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ religious diet policy had the primary or principal effect of advancing religion. See Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 n. 7 (9th Cir.2007) (setting forth test for Establishment Clause violation).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Barstad’s RLUIPA claim because Barstad failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ religious diet policy substantially burdened the exercise of his religious belief. See Greene v. Solano Cnty. Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir.2008) (under RLUIPA, the prisoner bears the initial burden of showing that the prison’s policy imposes a “substantial burden” on his religious exercise; only then will the burden shift to the prison to demonstrate that the policy furthers a “compelling governmental interest” by the “least restrie-tive means” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir.2004) (under RLUIPA, a “substantial burden” exists if it imposes “a significantly great restriction or onus” on a religious exercise).

We do not consider documents or arguments that were not presented to the district court. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per cu-riam) (declining to consider arguments not raised below); United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir.1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”). Nor do we consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett, 587 F.3d at 985 n. 2.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     