
    Woodbridge v. Raymond.
    The same degree of relationship between a Juror and the party interested in the suit, as would by statute, exclude a judge from sitting in a cause, is sufficient cause of arrest.
    ActioN of disseisin. Yerdict for the defendant.
    Mr. R. Griswold and Mr. Spalding, for the plaintiff,
    moved in arrest of judgment, and principally for this cause: — That one of the jurors who tried the case is brother-in-law to the person who gave bond in said action for the defendant, and was thereby liable to pay the cost of suit, had the plaintiff recovered, the defendant being a bankrupt, and unable to pay any part.
    Judgment arrested.
   By the Court.

Tbe first exception in tbe motion, that one of tbe jurors was brother-in-law to tbe person wbo was bound for tbe defendant’s prosecuting tbe appeal in this action, is tbe only reason for arresting judgment in tbis case. It appears on examination of tbe juror, that be knew his brother was surety for tbe defendant before tbe jury gave their verdict; and a judgment for tbe defendant would exonerate tbe surety from bis bond. Tbe case comes within tbe reason of tbe statute which excludes a judge from giving bis opinion in any case, wherein be stands in so near a relation to either party as tbe juror does to tbe surety.

Dyer, J.,

dissenting. I think tbe relation between tbe juror and tbe surety would not have been a principal challenge— if so, it ought not to be taken advantage of, to set aside tbe verdict.  