
    CONCORD TOWNSHIP’S APPEAL.
    Where a railroad company raised the bed of a public highway crossing its track, but refused to repair the road where it had been raised; a Court of Equity has not jurisdiction to compel the company to repair the road.
    
      Appeal from the Court' of Common Pleas of Delaware County. In Equity.
    The Township of Concord filed a bill in equity against the Philadelphia and "Baltimore Central Railroad Company to restrain the defendant from permitting the approaches to the' railroad crossing, on a public road in said township to remain out of repair.
    The following extract from the report of H. G. Howard, Esq., Master, .sets forth the facts in the case as follows:
    “About, the year 1855, the defendant, under a charter from the Commonwealth, and under the provisions' of the General Railroad Law of 1849, constructed its road through the Township of Concord, the plaintiff, and, in doing so, crossed over a public road in said township known as ‘Marshal’ road, which had been laid out and opened long anterior to the construction of the railroad. The bed of the railroad at this point being higher than that of the public road, the latter was filled in by the defendant on each side of the railroad, thus changing the grade of the road, and making approaches by which it crosses the railroad at grade.
    “The draft marked ‘A’ shows the present grade of the public road, and that attached to the defendant’s answer shows the change in the bed-line. It appears to have been filled in some seven or eight feet, and the grade thus changed from a descending one of about three degrees to an ascending one of about five or six degrees on the northeasterly side of the railroad.
    “The approach on the northeast is now out of repair, and the defendant, being notified to make the necessary repair, refuses to do so, on the ground that it is the duty of the supervisors to keep this part of the road in order as much as' any other portion, and that there is no legal obligation on the company, defendant, to maintain the approach.
    “The plaintiff asks to have the defendant enjoined from permitting such approaches to remain longer out of repair, and to pay the plaintiff all expenses to which it has been, or may be, subjected, by reason of the necessity imposed on it to put said approaches in good order, and in a safe condition for public travel.
    “The defendant insists, first, that the plaintiff has mistaken his remedy, and that it is not entitled to any relief in a court of equity, because it has a full and adequate remedy at law ; and second, that there is no legal liability on the defendant to maintain repairs on these approaches.
    “Upon a careful consideration, the master is very clearly of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for, and that its bill should be dismissed. It hence becomes unnecessary to examine the merits of the controversy, or to determine the legal obligations of the defendant with respect to the matter in dispute. Equity does not interfere where there is a remedy at law; Pusey vs. Wright, 7 Cas., 387; Gallagher vs. Eayette County, 2 Wright, 102.
    “It is not attempted to be shown that the plaintiff has sufferéd or is about to suffer, any irreparable injury. Damages will fully compensate any injury which it can possibly suffer, and it must therefore- resort to the proper tribunal to ascertain what they are ; Richards’ Appeal, 7 S., 105 ; Grey vs. Railroad, 1 G., 412.
    “The supervisors, representing their plaintiff $ have as undoubted control over this portion of the public road as any other. It is their duty to see that it is kept in repair, and if there is an obligation resting upon the railroad company to keep the approaches in proper order, which it fails to fulfill, the supervisors can certainly put on the necessary repairs, and recover the cost thereof from the defendant in a suit at law.
    “Whenever a person or corporation, bound to repair a public highway, refuses to do so, when necessary, on notice from the proper officers, they may make the necessary repairs and recover the expense thereof in an action of assumpsit; P. R. R. Co. vs. Duquesne Borough, 10 Wr., 228 ; Woodring vs. Forks Township, 4 C., 355.
    
    “The defendant declines to waive this defence to the plaintiff’s bill, and the master therefore reports that it should be dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff.”
    November 4th, 1878, the Court confirmed the master’s report and dismissed the bill. The Township of Concord then appealed, complaining of the action of the Court in confirming the report and dismissing the bill. '
    
      
      Messrs. Darlington and Cornwell, Esqrs., for appellants argued.
    The defendant being a private corporation is subject to the control of the Court in equity. Act of June 16, 1836, Sect. 13, P. Laws 789. Act of February 14, 1857, Sect. 1, P. Laws, 39.
    Over corporations the jurisdiction of equity is general and unlimited; Commonwealth vs. Bank of Pennsylvania; 3 W. & S., 193; Baptist Congregation vs. Scannel, 3 Grant, 48; Hottenstein vs. Clement, 5 Wright, 502; Big Mountain Improvement Company’s Appeal, 4 P. F. Smith, 372; County of Crawford vs. Pittsburgh and Erie R. R. Co., 8 Casey, 142.
    It is not necessary that the plaintiff should sustain irreparable damage to entitle him to relief; Commonwealth vs. Pittsburgh and Connellsville R. R. Co., 12 Harris, 160; Commonwealth vs. Rush, 2 Harris, 196; Scheetz’s Appeal, 11 Casey, 95; Brightley’s Eq. Sec. 295.
    A bill will lie to compel defendant to observe its charter obligations, Buck Mountain Coal Company vs. Lehigh Coal and Nav. Co., 14 Wright, 91.
    The railroad company was bound to build the approaches; Act of February 19th, 1849, Sec. 13, P. Laws 85, and the obligation to build includes the obligation to repair; Woodring vs. Forks Township, 4 Casey, 355; Phœnixville vs. Phœnix Iron Co. 9 Wright, 135; Rex vs. Inhabitants of Kent, 13 East, 220; Rex vs. Inhabitants of Lindsay, 14 East, 317; Penna. R. R. Co. vs. Duquesne Borough, 10 Wright, 223.
    The cases of Pusey vs. Wright, 7 Casey, 387, and Gallagher vs. Fayette County R. R. Co., 2 Wright, 102, were attempts to restrain only an attempted breach of contract.
    
      John J. Pinkerton, Esq., contra.
    
    The township should repair the road and sue the railroad company for damages. It therefore has a full and complete remedy at law; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. vs. Duquesne Borough, 10 Wright, 228; Woodring vs. Forks Township, 4 Casey, 361; Pottsville Borough vs. Norwegian Township, 2 Harris, 543; Phœnixville vs. Phœnix Iron Company, 9 Wright, 135: Bean vs. Howe, 4 Norris, 260; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. vs. Borough of Irwin, 4 Norris, 336; Township of Newlin vs. Davis, 27 P. F. S., 319.
    
      There being an adequate remedy at law, equity will not interfere; Parker vs. Winnipiseogee Cotton Co., 2 Black, 545; Kerr on Injunctions, *338, *200; Pusey vs. Wright, 7 Casey, 396; Brightley’s Eq., Sec. 295; Bispham’s. Eq., Sect. 440; Kerrison vs. Sparrow, 19 Vesey, 449; Garstin vs. Asplin, 1 Madd, 151.
    Where damages will compensate, equity will not interfere; Mayor vs. Commissioners, 7 Barr, 366; Attorney General vs. Nichol, 16 Vesey, 338; Grey vs. Ohio Penna. R. R. Co., 1 Grant, 412; Richard’s Appeal, 7 P. F. S., 113.
   The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Court below on May 5, 1879, in the following opinion:

Per Curiam.

We think the appellants had a full and adequate remedy at law, which was a sufficient reason for the dismissal of the bill by the Court below. The report of the learned master and examiner very succinctly and clearly states this reason, and supports it by a recurrence to authority, whenever a person or corporation, bound to repair a public highway, refuses to do so, when necessary, on notice from the proper officers, they may make the necessary repairs and recover the expense thereof in an action of assumpsit; Penna. R. R. Co. vs. Duquesne Borough, 10 Wr., 228.

Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellants.  