
    Timothy E. Ellsworth v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      A warehouse is provided and used by a railroad compamy as a bonded warehouse at Suspension Bridge, N. Y.' It is constructed cmd secured as such in the manner prescribed by law, and the government holds the Iceys; but the bond given by the company does not in all respects comply with the statute. The building, nevertheless, is entered on the Treasury “Register of Warehouses,” a record-boolc containing an official list of bonded warehouses. The railroad company pays to the collector of the port the salaries of the inspectors on duty in the warehouse and he pays the money into the Treasury ; but he neglects to claim that it shall be talcen into account as “receipts for storag'e” in determining his compensation on the settlement of his accounts. Se now brings his action to recover so much of it as he would have been entitled to if it had been treated as “receipts for storage” and allowed to him.
    
    I. It is -well settled that all moneys received by collectors from the owners of bonded warehouses for half-storage or for the attendance of an inspector shall be accounted for as “receipts for storage” and allowed to the collectors of the non-enumerated ports in determining the amount of their compensation.
    
      II.Where the owner of a bonded -warehouse pays to the collector of a non-ennmerated port the full salary of the inspectors on duty in the . warehouse and he properly accounts for the money, it should be allowed to him as “receipts for storage” in the settlement of his accounts and in determining the amount of his compensation.
    III. Though the bond given by the owner of a warehouse does not in all respects comply with the requirements of the statute concerning . bonded warehouses (Rev. Stat., § 2961), yet if there be a substantial-compliance and the building is constructed, secured, and used as a bonded warehouse, and is entered as such on the Treasury “Registry of Warehouses, Customs,” it must be deemed a bonded warehouse in the settlement of the collector’s accounts and the ascertainment of the compensation due to him.
    IV. Where the Treasury gives to a collector of customs a peremptory admonition to deposit all moneys received by him in the Treasury, a deposit of “receipts for storage” will not be deemed a voluntary payment, though the collector bo entitled to them as a portion of his compensation.
    V.An order of the Treasury directing a collector of customs to deposit in the Treasury all moneys received by him is equally obligatory upon bis successor.
    VI.The common-law maxim Xgnorantia legis neminem excusai is a principle of universal application in criminal jurisprudence, but is qualified by many exceptions at the civil law, and its misapplication in com mon-law jurisprudence in most instances arises from a disregard of those qualifications.
    VII.The statute of limitations begins to run against a collector of customs from the end of each fiscal year for compensation due to him (on the settlement of his accounts) during the year.
    
      The Reporters' statement of the ease:
    Tke following are the facts as found by the court:
    I. The claimant was collector of customs at the port of Suspension Bridge, N. Y., from March 5, 1870, to January 25, 1878.
    II. There are located at Suspension Bridge two freight depots of the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Com-jfany. Said depots were entirely inclosed with lochs and fastenings upon all the doors and were fitted with interior compartments doubly secured by United States customs lochs. In order to gain access to any of these apartments the locks of the railroad company and of the United States customs service had both to be passed.
    
      III. From tbe time claimant became collector up to June 15, 1877, said apartments were constantly and exclusively used for tbe storage of goods and merchandise in bond, seized goods, and unclaimed goods.
    IY. On tbe 4th day of August, 1868, tbe New York Central Railroad Company, by its proper officers, executed tbe following bond:
    “ Know all men by these presents that we, tbe New York Central Railroad Company, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and Horace F. Clark, are held and firmly bound unto tbe United States of America in tbe sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, for tbe payment of which, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our successors, heirs, executors, and administrators, jointly and severally, by these presents. Sealed with our seals this fourth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight.
    “ The condition of this obligation is such, that if the above-bounden the New York Central Railroad Company shall indemnify the Government of the United States of America, the collector of the port of Suspension Bridge, and any other officer or officers of the customs of the said port against any claim upon said government collector or other officer or officers for the loss of, or any decay, waste, or damage that may happen to .any goods, wares, or merchandise that now are or hereafter may be stored under the warehouse acts of the Cth of August, 1846, and 28th of March, 1854, and Treasury regulations under said acts, in the depots or premises at or near either terminus ■of said road and in the cars whilst in transit over or at stations along the line of said road, natural decay or unavoidable waste or damage and loss by fire alone excepted, then this obli.gation to be void; otherwise to remain in full force and virtue,
    i seal N. y. ) “The New York Central Railroad Co.,
    ( O.R.R.oo. j “By C. VANDERBILT, President.
    
    “0. VANDERBILT. [seal.] “H. F. CLARK.” [SEAL.]
    And said bond is verified, as shown in the- following communication :
    “Treasury Department,
    “ Washington, Z>. 0., February 16, 1878: .
    “ Sir : In answer to the rule of the Court of Claims in the causg ■of Timothy E. Ellsworth, No. 11826, allowed on the 5th instant, I have to state that Exhibit A, attached to the deposition of James McFeggan, in said cause, taken at Suspension Bridge, New York, on the 30th day of November, 1877, purporting to be a copy of a bond of the New York Central Railroad Company, dated August 4, 1868, has been compared with the copy transmitted to this department February 12, 1876, by tbe collector of customs for tbe district of Niagara, New York, wbo is tbe custodian of tbe original bond, and said Exbibit A appears to be a literal copy.
    “ I have further to state that in tbe ‘Register of Warehouses,. Customs,’ a record-book containing a list of bonded warehouses, now on flle in this department, appears tbe name of tbe New York Central Railroad Company at Suspension Bridge.
    “ Respectfully,
    “H. F; FRENCH, Assistant Secretary.
    
    “ JOHN Randolph, Esq.,
    
      • Assistant Cleric United States Court of Claims.”
    
    
      V. From tbe time claimant became collector up to June 15, 1877, two inspectors of customs were constantly in charge of ■the goods and merchandise stored in said depots; and tbe amount of their salaries was annually reimbursed to the United States, through the collector, by the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company and tbe Great Western Railway Company; tbe part payment by tbe latter company being in pursuance of a private arrangement between tbe said companies.
    Tbe amounts so actually reimbursed by tbe said companies during tbe fiscal years 1872,1873, 1874, 1875,1876, and 1877 were as follows:
    During fiscal year ending June 30, 1S72. $2,178 00
    “ “ “ “ “ 1873. 2,190 00
    “ “ “ ' “ ' “ 1874 . 2,190 00
    “ “ “ “ “ 1875. 2,190 00
    “ “ “ “ “ 1876. 2,196 00
    “ “ “ “ “ 1877. 2,100 00
    YI. All these amounts were accounted for in claimant’s quarterly returns under tbe bead of “Servicesof United States Officers,” and were turned over by tbe claimant to tbe Treasurer of tbe United States in. compliance with instructions which claimant found on assuming tbe office of collector, and contained in the following letter:
    “ Treasury Department,
    “Opt-ice oe Commissioner op Customs,
    
      “December 21, 1866.
    “ Sir : Your account of disbursements expenses of collection,, commencing- July 1st and ending September 30, 1866, has been adjusted at the Treasury, and a balance of $1,081.93 found to be due to you.
    On account of expenses of collection .... 1,103 85
    Less tax retained due U. States. 21 92
    -$1,081 93
    The balance due U. S. per your account is. 361 23
    The balance due you per Treasury adjustment is ... 1,081 93
    Difference .. $1,443 36
    Arising thus :
    Commissions on $48,105.46, not charged by you ... $1,443 36
    “ Note. — You will please deposit the sum of $615, collected by you for services of United States officers, and also all previous sums received for a like purpose. You will also bear in mind that all moneys of every description not received by you by warrant on the Treasury must be actually deposited, as [they] will be credited in your account.
    “Very respectfully, your ob’t ser’t,
    “N. SAKGENT.
    “ Commissioner.
    
    “To Fbaniclin Spalding, Esq.,
    “ Collector of Customs, District of Niagara,
    
    “ Suspension Bridge, Neto York.”
    
    VII. The total compensation received by claimant from all sources during the years in question was as follows:
    For the year ending June 30, 1872.$2,513 00
    
      a u u « “ “ “ “ “ 1873. 2,512 87
    
      ti u u u u u 1874. 2,519 40
    
      u u u a u u 1875. 2,500 00
    
      a u u u u u 1876. 2,500 00
    
      a a u u u it 1877. 5,500 00
    (p. 42.)
    And the additional amount necessary to make $4,500 in each year is as follows:
    For the year ending June 30, 1872...$1,987 00
    1873. 1,987 13 u u u u u u
    
    1871. 1, 980 60 a a u u u u
    
    1875. 2, 000 00 cc u u u u u
    
    1876. 2, 000 00 u a a u a u
    
    1877. 2, 000 00 u u u u u a
    
    Total.. ..11,951 73
    no portion of which has ever been received by claimant.
    
      YIII. The name of the New York Central Railroad Company at Suspension Bridge was duly entered in the register of customs warehouses, a record-book containing an oficial list of bonded warehouses, and on file in the Treasur3 Department.
    IX.By the following letter of the Treasury Department, dated June 15, 1877, the use of said depot “ as a bonded warehouse” was discontinued:
    “ Treasury Department,
    “ Washington, D. G., June 15, 1877.
    “Sir: Referring to the opinion of the Solicitor of the Treasury, dated May 14,1877, copy of which was transmitted to you by the Acting Commissioner of Customs on the 24th ultimo, relative to your claim for compensation from storage, under section 2647 Revised Statutes, upon the hypothesis that the depot of the New York Central Railroad Company at your port is a bonded warehouse, you are now instructed to inform the proper officers of said company that the bond of the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, as common carriers of appraised goods in bond, approved December 3,1874, supersedes the bond of the New York Central Railroad Company, approved October 27,1868, and that the privilege of using the depot of said company at your port as a bonded warehouse will hereafter not be allowed.
    “Respectfully,
    “ By order:
    “II. F. FRENCH,
    
      “Assistant Secretary.”
    X. Subsequently to June 15,1877, proceedings ivere taken by the said railroad companj to have one of the said depots again bonded for the storage of goods, wares, and merchandise; that • said proceedings have since been completed and said depot is again used for storage in the sainé manner (or of the same kind) as prior to June 15, 1877. Two officers are now employed in the custodj' of such goods and merchandise; the amount of their salaries is reimbursed by the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company and the Great Western Railway Company, and the present collector receives compensation at the rate of $2,000 per annum therefrom.
    XI. The claimant rendered his accounts as collector for settlement and adjustment, quarterly, from March 5, 1870, the commencement of his term, until the commencement of this suit,, and such accounts so rendered were settled and adjusted at the Treasury Department quarterly and yearly, and claimant notified of each of said settlements from time to time. Claimant made no objection to tbe manner of rendering his accounts or of settling them, or suggested any different manner of doing so till February 12,1877.
    
      Messrs. J. IK é Geo. L. Douglass for the claimant:
    The case clearly falls within the well-settled exceptions to the rule in regard to payments made in mistake of law:
    “ Money paid under a mistake of law, with a full knowledge of the facts, is not recoverable. But the rule is liable to a qualification if the party to whom the money has been paid has been accessory to the error of the other party.” (Kerr on Mistakes, 402; 1 Pet,, 15.)
    In this connection it will be remembered that the claimant was the official subordinate of the defendants during all the time that the claim was accruing, bound under oaths and bonds to obey "the orders of the defendants, and liable to dismissal and disgrace, and criminal indictment in some instances, if he failed to obey; that the letter of the Commissioner of Customs of December 21, I860, instructing the collector at Suspension Bridge to “bear in mind that all moneys of every description not received by you by warrant on the Treasury must be actually deposited, as they will be credited in your account,” was the authoritative instruction of the defendants to the claimant during the whole of the claimant’s term of office. This is a clear . case of the “ other party” being an “ accessory to the error.”
    “Relief will be given in the case of a money demand by one person against another on the ground of mistake, there being a fiduciary relation between them or an equity supervening by reason of the conduct of either.” (3 Law Reports, Eng., Ch. Div., 356.)
    A payment made to a public officer in compliance with a demand is in no sense a voluntary payment, but is collected by legal duress; and when the claim is unlawful and made under the color of office, an action lies for its recovery. (2 B. & C., 735; 20 Eng. L. and E., 319; 11 C. Cls. R., 679; 12 id., 551, 552; Deady, 400; 9 How., 55; 9 Johns., 376; 21 Mich., 483; Hance Lawson’s Case, opinion by Gh. J. Drake, April 28,1879, ante, p. 332.)
    
      The rule that “when money is due ex cegtio et bono it may be recovered in an action of assumpsit” applies with significant force in this case. There is no view of the case under the facts as proved and the law as cited that the defendants can retain the claimant’s money in “good conscience”; and that has all through the decisions been held to be an important and com trolling consideration.
    
      Mr. A. D. Bobinson (with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendants:
    The claim is for money voluntarily paid over by claimant to the government without protest, and it cannot be recovered baclr. (Córlele v. Maxicell, 3 Blatch., 413.) Collectors’ accounts shall be settled at the Treasury, like other public accounts. (Brightly’s Dig., 327, sec. 48.)
    If an account be rendered and not objected to for three years, the jury may infer it correct. (White v. Macon, 3 Cranch Cir. C., 250.)
    Long acquiescence in an account makes it a settled one. (Baker v. Biddle, 1 Bald., 418, bottom of page.)
    These accounts having been all settled and paid without objection, it is against the policy of the law to open them. (Folsom’s Case, 4 O. Cls. K., 371.)
   Hunt, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant held the office and performed the duties of collector at the port of Suspension Bridge, N. Y., from March 5, 1870, to January 25,1878. His petition asks for judgment for the sum of $14,535.23. This sum is claimed as compensation for his official services due to him under the acts of Congress regulating such compensation. He alleges that section 5 of the act of March 3,1841, provides that “ every collector of customs * * * shall render a quarter-yearly account under oath to the Secretary of the Treasury *' * * of all sums of money * ' * * received or collected for rent and storage * * * or for custody of goods in bonded warehouses; and if from such accounting it shall appear that the money received in any one year by the collector * * * on account and for rent and storage and for fees and emolument shall in the aggregate exceed the sum of two thousand dollars, such excess shall be paid by the collector * * * into the Treasury as public money.”

The manifest purpose of this provision was to award to every collector $2,000 per annum as compensation when the moneys thus received equaled or exceeded that stun.

Section 40 of the act of July 18, 1866, provides further “that all moneys received by collectors for the custody of goods, wares, and merchandise in bonded warehouses shall be accounted for as storage under the provisions of the fifth section of the act of March 3,1841.” This act was intended to be merely explanatory of the existing law. It leaves no doubt that all receipts from the sources mentioned were subject to the provisions of the act of 1841 and to the collector’s rights there established.

The claimant proceeds to state that from the time he became collector of the port of Suspension Bridge up to the 15th June, 1877, there have been constantly employed at that port certain insi>ectors of the customs, who have had charge of the depots of the Hew York Central Bailroad Company, portions of which were established as a bonded Avarehouse, and Avho had custody of the goods, Avares, and merchandise stored in it; that the claimant has received, in his official character of collector, from the NeAv York Central Bailroad Company, and from the Great Western Bailroad Company of Canada, or their agents, certain sums of money, paid to him as collector of customs to reimburse the United States for the salaries of such inspectors ; that the Great Western Bailroad Company have enjoyed the benefit of the use of the employment of these inspectors jointly with the NeAv York Central Bailroad Company, and under an agreement between themselves; that the sums thus paid in each year, from the year ending June 30,1871, up to and inclusive of the year ending June 30, 1877, have exceeded the sum of $2,000 annually; that in accounting to the Treasury Department from time to time he has placed the sums so received to the credit of the government, under the head of “ Services of United States officers,” and has thus accounted for them erroneously, AAhereas he should have accounted for them under the head of storage, as provided by the fortieth section of the act of July 15,1866, and by the fifth section of the act of March 3,1841, already cited.

The petitioner claims that he is entitled to recover back the moneys thus accounted for, amounting to $14,535.23. This sum is arrived at by deducting the compensation actually received by him from all sources in each year from the maximum annual compensation to which he is limited by law, $4,500; the difference in each year, if covered by the receipts from storage in that year, and not exceeding $2,000, representing the balance to which he is entitled for such year, and by adding the balance for all the years from the fraction of the year ending June 30, 1870, up to and inclusive of the year ending June 30, 1877.

The allegations of fact which the petitioner sets forth are fully substantiated by the findings of the court on file.

The questions of law presented for consideration have been definitely determined by the Supreme Court, by this court, by the opinions of the Attorney-General; and by the practical interpretation at present given to the subject by the Treasury Department.

In commenting upon the sections of the statutes already quoted, in a case identical with that now before us, the Supreme Court said:

!l Regulations provide that all moneys received by collectors from owners or occupants of private bonded stores in payment for half-storage, or for the attendance of an inspector at the premises, will be accounted for as receipts for storage in their accounts with the department. Evidence is not wanting to show that the department has constantly recognized the subsisting operations of the provisions under consideration in relation to storage. Throughout the period since its passage, the department lias required collectors to include the sums received from storage in their quarterly accounts, and if the provision is in force for that purpose, it is difficult to see why it is not also in force as authorizing the allowance to collectors.”

And the court proceed to decide that—

“ Sums received for storage not exceeding two thousand dollars in any one year, if duly included in their quarterly accounts, are as much due to the collectors of the non-enumerated ports as to the incumbents of the larger offices, and their right to the same rests on the same foundation.” (United States v. McDonald, 5 Wall., 659; 6 C. Cls. R., 31; Ops. Attys. Gen., 37; Id., 313.)

These authorities would seem decisive of this controversy; but the learned counsel for the government has presented in his brief and oral argument several objections to their applicability, wMcli, although they do not command our concurrence, are nevertheless worthy of consideration.

It is urged that the warehouse described in the findings of the court was not a bonded warehouse within the meaning of the statute. The bond given by the railroad company, it is said, does not in all respects comply with the requirements of the statute. The language of the bond is that the company “ shall indemnify'the Government of the United States of America, the collector of the port, * * * aud any other officer and officers of the customs of said port” against any claim, &c., for the loss of,- or any decay, waste, or damage that may happen to, any goods, wares, or merchandise that now are or hereafter may be stored under the warehouse acts of the 6th of August, 1846, and 28th of March, 1854, and Treasury regulations under said acts in the depots or premises at or near either terminus of said road and in the cars whilst in transit over or at stations along the line of said road, natural decay or undavoidable waste, &c., excepted.”

We think these terms are a substantial compliance with the ’statute. The language of the act of 28th March, 1854, is that the party “ shall enter into bond, in such sums and with such sureties as may be approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, exonerating and holding harmless the United States and its officers from or on account of any risk, loss, or expense of any kind or description connected with or arising from the deposit or keeping of the merchandise.” (Rev. Stat., § 2961.) The words of the bond, shall indemnify the government, &c., for the loss of, or any decay, waste, or damage that may happen,” &c., are both apt and ample to afford the government and its officers the very protection and security contemplated b3 the statute. The words of the bond and the words of the statute are not identical, but to all intents and purposes they are tantamount to one another. The sureties on such a bond would be as much bound and in the same manner by the use of either set of phrases.

The bond purports expressly to be given for goods stored “under the warehouse .acts of 6th August, 1S46, and 28th March, 1854, and Treasury regulations under said acts.” A copy of it was transmitted to the department and is now on file there. The warehouse was entered in the “ Register of Warehouses, Customs,” oil the list of bonded warehouses of record in the department.

It is true, as the counsel for the defendants urges, that this bond is for a double purpose: of the nature of a bond for warehousing and of a bond for carrying dutiable goods. But if it be good and valid as a warehouse bond, we are unable to perceive how its force and effect can be vitiated or even weakened by its being also good for any other lawful purpose besides.

The department is shown to have called and considered the warehouse “ a bonded warehouse.” In June, 1877, it ordered the discontinuance of the use of the premises as “ a bonded warehouse”; and subsequently it re-established them as such. They are still used and regarded as a bonded warehouse; they are constructed and secured in the manner required by law, and the government holds the keys to their doors.

The defendants next contend that the claimant cannot recover because his accounts have been duly rendered, audited, and settled, and cannot rightfully be opened and readjusted; and that even if they could be opened, the claim is for money voluntarily paid over by claimant to the government without protest, and it cannot be recovered back. •

The first inquiry suggested by this objection is whether the sums in dispute have been voluntarily paid over by the claimant. The facts, as shown by the findings, are that the claimant, upon being appointed collector and on taking possession of his office, was at once confronted with an order from the Treasury Department, addressed to his predecessor, in the following terms:

“Treasury Department,
“ OPEICE OE COMMISSIONER OE CUSTOMS,
“Dee. 21,1866.
“You will please deposit the sum of $615, collected by you for services of U. S. officers, & also all pi’evious sums received for a like purpose. You will also bear in mind that all moneys, of every description, not received by you by warrant on the Treasury, must be deposited, as [they] will be credited in your account.
“ Very resp’y, «fee.,
“N. SARGENT, Comm'r.
“To Franklin Spalding, Esq.,
uOoWr of Gmtoms, Nist. of Niagara,
Suspension Bridge, N. Y.”

It is impossible to read this peremptory admonition without noting the threat that underlies its imperative command. You will also hear in mind” that all moneys must he actually deposited.” It is too plain for argument that payment made by a subordinate under such an order can by no strain of interpretation be deemed voluntary. We can but repeat the doctrine recently laid down by the Chief Justice in the case of Ilance Lawson v. The United States, before this court: “It was demanded of him by his official superior, as now appears, without warrant of law, and it would be a reproach to the government to hold it unlawfully, merely because he submitted, without protest, to an order which he was not legally bound to resist; and resistance to which might not only have cost him his office, but involved him in expensive and injurious conflict with the government.”

There is nothing in the argument that the order in this case was addressed to Franklin Spalding, esq., collector, &e., and was therefore not binding upon the claimant. It was an order to the officer and not the individual. It was a rule to govern the official conduct of every collector who might hold the office after its promulgation. It seems to have been warranted by the statute of Congress on the subject. The section (3617 Eev. Stat.) declares: “The gross amount of all moneys received, from whatever source, for the use of the United States, except as otherwise provided in the next section, shall be paid by the officer or agent receiving the same into the Treasury at as early a day' as practicable, without any abatement or deduction on account of salary, fees, costs, charges, expenses, or claim of any description whatever.”

The next inquiry for our consideration is whether the claimant is precluded by the several settlements of accounts between the department and himself from now urging his demand. The fact is found by the court that the claimant made no objection to the manner of rendering his accounts or of settling them, and suggested no different manner of doing so till February 12, 1877.

The general rule at common law in this country and in England, that money paid in mistake of law cannot be recovered back, when all the facts are known to the parties and there is no fraud, lias been found to be too broadly stated to meet the demands of justice in determining the rights of individuals in all cases. It is founded on the maxim of the civil law, Ignoran-tía legis neminem excusat. It is a x>rinciple of universal application in the administration of criminal jurisprudence; but, in the language of Judge Richardson in the case of McKee v. The United States, “ when made the foundation of a rule that money paid in mistake of law can in no case be recovered back unless fraud is proved, its application seems to be extended far beyond justification.” (12 C. Cls. R., 551.)

It is i>roper here to add that the civil law most unequivocally qualified the general rule by admitting many exceptions to it, and that its misapplication in the common law has in most instances arisen from a disregard of these qualifications. It is a familiar principle of that system, applicable to this case, “ Juris ignorantia non prodest aegidrere volentibus, suum vero petentibths non meet.” (Dig., lib. xxii, tit. vi, 1. 7; 2 Evans Pothier on Ob., 393.)

Whilst by that system a contract formed for the purpose of avoiding litigation cannot be rescinded for error of law, it is equally true that such error can never be alleged as a means of acquiring. An error of law may be invoked as a means of preventing a loss or of recovering what has been paid under such error.

In the case of Hance Lawson, already cited, the court had occasion to examine and interpret the application of this rule to a condition of facts similar to the features presented in this record. We there held, “that where, under the authoritative requirement of the Treasury Department, the claimant had paid balances into the Treasury without protest, that fact gives no right to the government to hold the money. It was not in the eye of the law a voluntary payment.” (See De Bow v. United States, 11 C. Cls. R., 079; 13 id., 526.)

The statute of limitations is invoked by the government against the claimant’s demand. His petition was filed in this court on 20th October, 1877. A portion of the claim is barred. In the case of Bachelor v. The United States, this court held that in a case like the present the statute begins to run from the end of each fiscal year, and cuts off all compensation not falling due within six years before the institution of the suit. (8 O. Cls. R., 239.) His claim must therefore be reduced, according to the findings, to the sum of $11,954.73.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the claimant do have and recover the said sum of $11,954.73.  