
    David Beatty, et al. vs. Jordan Smith, et al.
    A court of chancery will not interfere to prevent a sale of personal property, unless it be of some peculiar character, as slaves, or have some particular value, by reason of which damages might not afford an adequate compensation for its loss ; the remedy is at law.
    The proceeds of the separate property of the wife held under the married woman’s law, (How. & Hutch. 332) belong to the husband, and are subject to executions against him.
    Appeal from the decision of the vice-chancellor of the district chancery court, at Carrollton.
    The bill in this case, was filed by David Beatty and Elizabeth Beatty, his wife, to enjoin the sale of cotton, alleged to be the wife’s, which was levied on by virtue of an execution against the husband and others, and also for the purpose of settling the rights of Beatty, the husband. The bill charges that the wife bought a tract of land,' and negroes, upon a credit, and that it was part of the contract of purchase, that the crops should be applied to the payment of the purchase money. That upon obtaining a deed she, with her husband, executed a mortgage, and that the crops were not included, because the draftsman informed her that the crops would be as matter of law included in the mortgage of the property by which they were produced. She prays a perpetual injunction, and that her. creditor be made a party, <fcc. David Beatty denies his liability upon the execution. .He states that he was a mere surety on a forthcoming bond, for the principal debtor, and that the plaintiff, for a valuable consideration, had given, without his consent, to the principal debtor, two years additional time to pay in, which he claims discharges him from the payment of the debt. The injunction was granted to stay the sale of the cotton, and was dissolved upon motion by the vice-chancellor, and the cause brought directly, by appeal, to this court, by agreement in writing, between the attorneys of record.
    
      Landsdale, for appellants.
    The vice-chancellor decided that the injunction bond was void, because the name of the security did not appear in the body of the bond. This I will neither answer, or argue, except to state that the bond is fully executed by the security named in the fiat of the judge who granted the injunction.
    The second point decided by him, was, that the remedy was complete at law. This was palpably wrong, as will be seen by an examination of the attitude of the parties. The act, (commonly called the woman’s law) Howard & Hutchinson, 332, provides “ that all suits to recover the property or possession of such slaves, shall be prosecuted, or defended, as the case may be, in the joint names of the husband and wife.” This provision, it is presumed, applies equally to all the personal property she is authorized to acquire under the act. It will be remembered that it was an execution against the estate of the husband that was levied. To have made him a party in a court of law would have placed him in the ridiculous attitude of being both plaintiff and defendant, in the same cause. In a chancery suit, he may be either complainant or defendant, as the case may require, not so in a court of law. The law will not suppose that he does not wish to have his debts paid, and whether he owed it or not could not be investigated in a trial of the right of the property levied upon.
    The next point relied upon by the couhsel for the defendant in the court below, was, that the wife could not dispose of the crops. In this case it will be remembered that it is distinctly alleged, that the pledge of the crops was part and parcel of .the purchase, and that that was one of its conditions. So that he had no other interest in them than to see they were applied to the extinguishment of the debts for which they were pledged. Let it be borne in mind, that their appropriation to that purpose is not an after-contract, but directly charged to be part and parcel of the purchase. I see nothing, either in the statute, or in the policy which prevents a feme covert from making a conditional purchase. Surely, if she can purchase absolutely, she can do so with the right to pay for the property purchased out of its proceeds. The motion to dismiss admits the truth of every statement in the bill as upon demurrer.
    The -last ground is that the bill is multifarious. To that I -• answer, the same relief must be had in favor of both parties,
    • though .not to the same extent, to .wit, a perpetual injunction. As to the property levied upon, David Beatty being a necessary party, I contend may well set up any equity he may have against the judgment sought to be enforced against him. It is the dissolution of the injunction that is complained of, and that was only granted to restrain the sale of the property levied upon. All the parties to the execution were certainly necessary parties to this suit, in some shape.
    
      Wilkinson and Miles, for appellees.
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a bill filed in the vice-chancery court at Carrollton. Its object seems to be twofold; first, to set up a separate right in the wife to the property in question; and secondly, to show .that the execution was improperly issued.

The bill states that the crop of cotton which had been seized under the execution of the defendants, was grown on a plantation which was the property of the wife, and which was cultivated by her slaves. That this estate had been purchased by her upon credit, and that she had given a mortgage, both upon the land and slaves to secure the payment. That it was also their intention to appropriate the crops to the payment of the debt, and to embrace them in the mortgage, but that they had been omitted by mistake. And that the execution of the defendants had been levied upon the crop of cotton raised upon the plantation in 1842.'

The bill also stated, upon the part of David Beatty, that the execr/tion was issued upon a forfeited forthcoming bond, on which he was surety, and that he was discharged from, all liability thereon, because the plaintiffs in the execution had, without his knowledge or concurrence, entered into an agreement .with his principal, by which they had extended the time of payment for two years. That this agreement was valid between them, and founded on a sufficient consideration. An injunction was obtained to restrain the sale of the cotton, and the bill prayed that it might be made perpetual, and that David Beatty might be released and discharged from the judgment.

The defendants moved to dissolve the injunction, for want of equity upon the face of the bill. The motion was sustained, and the injunction ordered to be dissolved, from which order an appeal was taken to this court.

This order was entirely correct. A court of chancery will not interfere to prevent a sale of personal property, unless it be of some peculiar character, as slaves, or have some particular value, by reason of which damages might not afford an adequate compensation for its loss. The plain reason is, that the party injured has an ample and abundant remedy at law.

,' The purchase was made in ,1840. The bill does not state that the conveyance was to the separate use of Elizabeth R. Beatty, the wife, and in argument her right to sustain this suit, is placed upon the married woman’s law. ■ We have already decided that the proceeds of the wife’s property, as regulated by that law, during the coverture, belong to the husband. \The wife was therefore improperly joined as a party in this case, as she has shown no interest in the subject-matter of the suit. That affords another sufficient rpason for the dissolution of the injunction, since it is only as to her right that the injunction was obtained. As to David Beatty the bill is an original one for relief, without any injunction as to him.

The cause is not before us, except as to the order of dissolu- " tion, there having been no final decree. Of course we do not take into view the other matters of controversy, or give any opinion in regard to them. The cause may still proceed in the court below, if it be the wish of the complainant, upon the bill as an original one, as distinguished from a bill of injunction. The decree dissolving the injunction is affirmed.  