
    Golam MOWLA, Nasima Khan, Nusrat Mowla, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-5218-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 15, 2010.
    Alexander J. Segal, New York, NY, for Petitioners.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Lyle D. Jentzer, Senior Litigation Counsel; Jeffrey L. Menkin, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, GUIDO CALABRESI, and ROBERTA. KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioners, natives and citizens of Bangladesh, seek review of a November 20, 2009, order of the BIA denying their motion to reopen. In re Golam Mowla, Nasima Khan, Nusrat Mowla, Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/327/328 (B.I.A. Nov. 20, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). An alien ordinarily may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that petitioners failed to establish changed country conditions in Bangladesh sufficient to excuse the untimely filing of their motion to reopen. The BIA properly noted that, “the record as it existed at the time of the Immigration Judge’s August 31, 1998, decision ... is void of any evidence of conditions in Bangladesh at that time.” Therefore, because petitioners submitted evidence demonstrating only recent conditions in Bangladesh, as opposed to evidence establishing a change in conditions between the initial proceedings and the motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h), the BIA reasonably found that petitioners failed to show changed conditions in Bangladesh sufficient to warrant reopening. See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, we compare the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”); see also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107, 110, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (describing motions to reopen as “disfavored” and noting that “the moving party bears a heavy burden” in demonstrating that reopening is warranted on the basis of newly discovered evidence). Furthermore, contrary to petitioners’ argument, the BIA was under no obligation to take judicial notice of country conditions evidence not in the record. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv); cf. Chhetry v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 490 F.3d 196, 199-200 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 179, 186 n. 5 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (recognizing the permissive nature of the BIA’s authority to “exercise independent discretion” in taking notice of commonly known facts)); Yang v. McElroy, 277 F.3d 158, 163 n. 4 (2d Cir.2002) (finding it “well-settled that the BIA has the authority to take administrative notice of current events”).

Moreover, although, as petitioners point out, the BIA acknowledged that the record included evidence “indicating that Islamic fundamentalist[s] and militants in Bangladesh have increased their influence over the political process, attacked religious minorities and moderate Muslims, and directed their ire against any individuals or groups that profess secularism,” the BIA nevertheless reasonably found that the general rise in Islamic fundamentalism was not material to petitioners’ specific claim that they would be targeted as “Americanized Bangladeshis” or that petitioner Nusrat Mowla would be forced into marriage. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 n. 3 (2d Cir.1999) (“General violence in [a country] does not constitute persecution, nor can it form a basis for petitioner’s well-founded fear of persecution”). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as petitioners failed to demonstrate their prima facie eligibility for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (3)(ii); see Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  