
    Constance Jones SCHWARB, Appellant, v. F. Allan SCHWARB, Appellee.
    No. P-480.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 16, 1972.
    Rehearing Denied April 14, 1972.
    Lacy Mahon, Jr., of Mahon & Mahon, Jacksonville, for appellant.
    James E. Hodge, of Jones, Foerster & Hodge, Jacksonville, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff in an action for divorce has appealed from a final judgment limiting the award of alimony to a six-months period.

The basic question presented for our determination in this appeal is whether the chancellor abused his discretion in so limiting the award of alimony.

In the final judgment, granting the divorce to the plaintiff, the chancellor included the following alimony award to the plaintiff:

“Alimony in the sum of $200.00 commencing July 15, 1971, and continuing thereafter for six consecutive months, terminating on January 15, 1972. . . .”

We have examined the evidence adduced before the chancellor and find insufficient evidence from which the chancellor could reasonably conclude that the need of the plaintiff wife for the alimony payments, or the financial ability of the defendant to make such payments, would, or were likely to, terminate on or about January 15, 1972. In fairness to the chancellor, however, we mention the fact at the end of the judgment he reserved the jurisdiction “to enforce and modify” the above-quoted provision.

We hold, therefore, that the chancellor erred in limiting the award of alimony to a six-months period, so the judgment appealed from herein must be, and it is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views hereinabove expressed.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C. J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.

WIGGINTON, J., specially concurs.

WIGGINTON, Judge

(concurring specially).

I concur in the opinion of reversal rendered herein. I would direct, however, that alimony for appellant wife be extended until each of the two minor children whose custody has been awarded to her has reached school age so that appropriate arrangements can then be made for her to engage in some form of gainful employment. By the terms of the decree appealed herein appellant will be forced to almost immediately seek employment in order to survive. Such requirement will inevitably result in her neglect of both the home and her preschool children who are more in need of her constant care and attention now than they will be after they become enrolled in school.  