
    Long’s Adm’rs v. Steiger.
    Where the title of certain «laves was in question, the court said there is no doubt of the general principle that where the purchase-money is paid by one and title taken m the name of another, a resulting trust arises in favor of the former, or that one buy as the agent,of another, the title, though taken in the name of the agent, vests not in him but in his principal.
    ,W1iitc the o\ idonco is conflicting, it is the province of the jury to decide. If the verdict be without or contrary to evidence, or if there be a great preponderance on the other side, it will be set aside, but not where there is a conflict or where evidence in support of the verdict may be contradicted by evidence adverse to it. (Davidson v. Edgar, 5 Tex. R.f 492.) The verdict must clearly appear to be wrong to induce the court to set ib aside. (Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex. R., 340.) (Note 88.)
    'Where interrogatories merely point to such facts as will direct the attention of the witness to the matters in relation to which his testimony is desired, they are not leading.
    Where answers to certain interrogatories were erroneously excluded by the court, but all the material facts stated therein were testified to by the witness in answer to other interrogatories, which were admitted: Held, That the appellant was not injured by the erroneous ruling of the court, and therefore it formed no ground for a reversal of the judgment.
    Appeal from Harrison. This suit was brought for the recovery of certain negro slaves, named Willis and Clancy, and also some other articles of property. It is alleged by the appellants that the slaves were purchased by Robert Long, the deceased intestate, in 1841, at an official sale in Mississippi, and that they continued until his deatli to be his property. There is no doubt, upon the pleadings and the evidence, that the purchase was made as stated; but the appellee contends that although the hill of sale was taken in the name of Robert Long, yet that the slaves were in fact purchased by one Howell Hobbs, the purchase-money being paid by him, and that they were placed by the said Hobbs in the possession of the appsllee and her husband, John B. Steiger, now deceased, with instructions to retain them until called for or otherwise directed by the said Hobbs, and in the absence of further instruction they were to remain for the benefit of Mrs. Steiger, the appellee, during her natural life, and then to go to the benefit of the children of H. Long, deceased.
    Robert Long, the deceased intestate of the appellants, was the son of Mrs. Steiger, the appellee, and lived with her, even after marriage, until his death, the slaves also remaining on the premises.
    
      B. Goode, for appellants.
    
      O. M. Adams and J. B. Mahone, for appellee.
   Hemphill, Ch. J.

Several points are raised in this case, which, if necessary to be examined at length, would require considerable discussion. There is no doubt of the general principle that where the purchase-money is paid by one and title taken in the name of another, a resulting trust arises in favor of the former, or that if one buy as the agent of another, the title, though taken in the name of the agent, yet vests not in him but in liis principal. The defendant in this case is in possession; and proof that the title was not in the deceased, but in herself or some other person, would defeat the action. The evidence is quite conflicting, but it is the province of the jury to decide, and that irrevocably, in such cases oE conflict. If the verdict be without or contrary to evidence, or if there be a great preponderance on the other side, it will be set aside, hut not where there is a conflict, or where evidence in support of the verdict may he contradicted by evidence adverse to it. (Davidson v. Edgar, 5 Tex. R., 492.)

The verdict must clearly appear to he wrong to induce the court to set it aside. (Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex. R., 340.) In this case, though there he contradictory evidence, yet there is abundant testimony adduced for its support, and it would he beyond the province of the court to disturb the verdict on til is ground.

There may have been and there was error in excluding the answers of the witness Cook to one of the direct interrogatories. These interrogatories, or the principal portion of them at least, were not leading. They pointed, it is true, to such facts as would direct the attention of the witness to the matters in relation to which his testimony was desired, hut this constituted no objection to the questions, and the answers should have been admitted; but the plaintiffs were not injured by their exclusion. All the material facts in favor of the plaintiffs, stated in the depositions which were excluded, were testified to by tlie witness in answers to other direct interrogatories and to the cross-interrogatories. The error, therefore, could not have misled the jury or influenced their verdict;

Hon 88. — Russell e. Mason, ante, 226.

[463] consequently it forms no ground for the reversal of the judgment.

The plaintiffs, in their motion for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, have not brought themselves within the scope of the rule, nor shown the facts on which such motion will be sustained, (vide Watts v. Johnson, 4 Tex. R., 311,) and there is no error in the refusal of the motion on that ground.

Upon the whole, we are of opinion that there was no such error in the proceedings or the judgment as would authorize its reversal, and it is ordered,, therefore, to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  