
    Naveed YOUSUF, aka Shafqat Khan, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-540 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 11, 2015.
    
      Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Senior Litigation Counsel; Nicole N. Murley, Trial Attorney, Kamille Go, Law Clerk, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, GERARD E. LYNCH, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Naveed Yousuf, a native and citizen of Pakistan, seeks review of the BIA’s February 10, 2014, decision denying his motion to reopen. In re Naveed Yousuf, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Feb. 10, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

The applicable standards of review are well established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir.2008). An applicant may file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Yousufs motion to reopen was untimely because it was filed in December 2013, more than one year after his June 2012 final removal order. However, the time limitation does not apply when a motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); accord, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

As observed by the BIA, the record evidence was replete with examples of increased violence in Pakistan. However, as the BIA ruled, such evidence did not constitute a material change in country conditions because general violence and civil strife are, standing alone, insufficient to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution or a likelihood of torture. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 n. 3 (2d Cir.1999) (“General violence in [a country] does not constitute persecution, nor can it form a basis for petitioner’s well-founded fear of persecution.”); MuXing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir.2003) (concluding that country conditions evidence demonstrating some incidents of torture is insufficient to establish an applicant’s eligibility for CAT relief absent evidence that someone in the applicant’s “particular alleged circumstances is more likely than not to be tortured”). And, Yousufs conclusory assertion that there is evidence of violence against similarly situated individuals with perceived connections to the United States is not supported by the record.

Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Yousuf failed to show a material change in country conditions, and therefore it did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 168-69.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, Yousufs pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  