
    George L. ANDERSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jane C. CAMERON, et al., Defendants.
    
    No. 13-3676-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 4, 2014.
    George Anderson, Jr., Frewsburg, NY, pro se.
    No appearance for defendants.
    Present: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption to conform to the listing above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Appellant George Anderson, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals from a district court order denying his motion for temporary injunctive relief. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

A temporary restraining order is not a final order and is generally not appealable. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Walsh, 618 F.3d 218, 225 n. 3 (2d Cir.2010). However, while the district court characterized Anderson’s motion as a request for a temporary restraining order, we may entertain an otherwise unappealable order denying a temporary restraining order when it amounts to a denial of a preliminary injunction. See Huminski v. Rutland City Police Dep’t, 221 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam). Affording the necessary liberal construction to Anderson’s motion for temporary injunctive relief, we consider it as having requested a preliminary injunction, which the court denied.

Ordinarily, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; and (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation, with a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the movant’s favor. Doninger v. Niehojf, 527 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir.2008). We review the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. See Lynch v. City of N.Y., 589 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir.2009). A district court has abused its discretion if it has: “(1) based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law; (2) made a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence; or (3) rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Anderson’s request for injunctive relief, as neither Anderson’s general statements in his motion nor his various attachments relating to his state court proceedings were sufficient to establish that a preliminary injunction should issue. See Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir.2005) (noting that preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion”); Tom Doherty As-socs., Inc. v. Soban Entm’t, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 37 (2d Cir.1995) (stating that, to warrant injunctive relief, a litigant must show, inter alia, irreparable harm that is “not remote or speculative[,] but actual and imminent”). We also construe Anderson’s assertion that the court lacked evidence upon which to base its decision as arguing that the court should have held an eviden-tiary hearing. However, where, as here, there were no factual disputes, an eviden-tiary hearing was not necessary. See In re Rationis Enters., Inc. of Panama, 261 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir.2001) (“On a motion for an injunction, where essential facts are in dispute, there must be a hearing and appropriate findings of fact must be made.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); see also Republic of Philippines v. N.Y. Land Co., 852 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir.1988) (“It is not a rigid requirement that oral testimony be taken on a motion for a preliminary injunction.”).

We have considered Anderson’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court. Anderson’s motion for “res judicata jurisdiction” is DENIED as moot.  