
    Thornton & Hodges v. John Ferguson.
    Ten days notice must be given by a prisoner of his intention to apply for his discharge under the Prison Bounds Act.
    Before Mr. Justice Bay, in Chambers, 18th February, 1831.
    This was an application by the defendant, to be discharged from confinement under a ca. sa. at the suit of the plaintiffs, conformably to the provisions of the prison bounds act. The notice through the clerk was dated on the day previous to the application : and' his Honor held, that the application was premature. Ten days notice had always been required by the practice under the act; and the practice itself was reasonable. He therefore refused the application.
    The defendant now moved to reverse his Honor’s decision.
    
      Haig, for the motion.
    The act requires the Clerk to give no{|ce within ten days after the schedule is filed : P. L. 456. It is a restriction of the time allowed to the prisoner to prepare for his application ; not a'restraint of the application itself. It is similar to the provision, that- the prisoner shall render in his schedule, within forty days after his arrest: the object of both is obviously to deprive the prisoner of the privilege of going at large within the bounds, unless he will within a reasonable time make surrender of his estate. It is true the practice has been to require ten days notice; but the practice is without sanction from either the letter or the spirit of the act. It is unreasonable in itself, and in restraint of the liberty of the citizen ; and ought to be abolished. If the prisoner is suspected of fraud, the creditor is intitled under the fourth section of the act, to demand time for bringing forward his charges. But where no such charge is made, or insinuated, it is opposed to the spirit of the act to keep a debtor imprisoned for a single moment, to gratify the spleen of his creditor.
   Johnson, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The prison bounds act requires that the Clerk of the Court shall, within ten days after a defendant shall have filed his petition praying for the benefit of the act, give public notice of such application, but does not prescribe the length of time the notice shall run. The object of requiring notice, obviously was to give the plaintiff or other persons interested, an opportunity of showiug cause against the application, and for this purpose a reasonable time ought to be allowed. An usage of longstanding, and perhaps founded on analogy to the notices prescribed by the rules of Court in other cases, has prescribed ten days notice in this case; which appears to us reasonable, and is usually found short enough, where any contest arises. Any other limitation must be arbitrary,- and we are unable to discover any good reason for changing this. The parties interested might consent to waive it, but it does not appear that they have done so here.

Motion refused.  