
    BRADSHAW v. STATE.
    (No. 11812.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    May 30, 1928.
    Rehearing Denied June 28, 1928.
    1. Infants <&wkey;l6 — Court could not extend time for filing bills of exception more than 90 days from notice of infant’s appeal from conviction of delinquency (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 760, subd. 5).
    Under Code Or. Proc. 1925-, art. 760', subd. 5, court was without authority to extend time for filing bills of exception more than 90' days from notice of infant’s appeal from conviction of delinquency.
    2. Infants &wkey;>l6 — Bills of exception filed after time granted by trial court cannot be considered on infant’s appeal from delinquency conviction (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 760, subd. 5).
    Under Code Cr. Proe. 1925, art. 760', subd. 5, where court granted infant 80 days after order overruling motion for new trial, in proceedings resulting in conviction of delinquency, within which to file bills of exception, and no further extension of time was allowed, bills filed after the 80 days were too late, and could not be considered by reviewing court; Rev. St. 1925, art. 2246, authorizing bills of exception to be filed within 90 days after final judgment referring to civil cases only, and being inapplicable.
    Appeal from District Court, Comanche County; Joe H. Eidson, Judge.
    Johnnie Bradshaw wag convicted of being a delinquent child, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    A. B. Haworth, of Comanche, for appellant.
    A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   LATTIMORE, J.

Conviction for being a delinquent child; punishment, four years’ confinement in the State Juvenile Training-School at Gatesville.

Appellant was indicted for burglary, but upon a hearing on an affidavit of juvenility filed by his father, the case was transferred to the juvenile docket, and there heard before a jury upon a full presentation of the facts. The jury found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at four years’ confinement in the Juvenile Training School for Boys.

There is in the record but one bill of exceptions, and same appears to have been filed too late. The order overruling the motion for new trial bears date of December 15, 1927, and in said order appellant was allowed 80 days from said date within which to file bills of exception. This time expired on March 5, 1928. The bill of exceptions re-, ferred to appears to have been filed on March 7, 1928. This is too late, and we are unfortunately deprived of the right to consider said bill. Benson v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 126, 210 S. W. 538.

No error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

HAWKINS, J.

Appellant relies on article 2246, R. C. S. 1925, as authorizing bills of exception to be filed within 90 days from final judgment. The statute in question refers to civil cases only. We must be controlled by article 760, subd. 5, C. C. P., as governing in criminal matters, under which the bills of exception cannot be considered. Holden v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 592, 267 S. W. 275; Courser v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. R. 146, 291 S. W. 236. Sentence was pronounced and notice of appeal given on the 15th day of December. Under article 760, C. C. P., tl^e court was without authority in any event to extend the time for filing bills more than 90 days from notice of appeal. In the present case the court granted only 80 days and no further extension of time was allowed. Hence a bill filed after the 80 days was too late.

The motion for rehearing isi overruled. 
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