
    Yaroslav Alekseevich PATERKO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-155-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 3, 2012.
    Justin Fappiano, New Haven, CT, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Emily Anne Radford, Assistant Director; Arie A. Anderson, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RICHARD C. WESLEY and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Yaroslav Alekseevich Paterko, a native and citizen of the Ukraine, seeks review of a December 17, 2010 order of the BIA affirming the July 16, 2009 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Michael W. Straus, which denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. In re Yaroslav Alekseevich Paterko, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Dec. 17, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. Hartford, CT Jul. 16, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Because the BIA’s opinion closely tracks the IJ’s reasoning, we consider both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir.2008).

The agency reasonably concluded that Paterko failed to establish that he was persecuted on account of his political opinion. “[O]pposition to endemic corruption or extortion, no less than opposition to other government practices or policies, may have a political dimension when it transcends mere self-protection and represents a challenge to the legitimacy or authority of the ruling regime.” See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 547-48 (2d Cir.2005). Although Paterko established that he was abducted and beaten after he demanded payment on a contract from an official in the Ukraine, Paterko failed to demonstrate that his opposition to the official’s monetary demands and refusals to make promised payments were political, rather than motivated by his personal desire to recover the money he lost. Unlike the petitioner in Zhang, Paterko did not organize local business leaders in opposition to corruption or demonstrate other political opposition to corruption. He demonstrated merely that he was opposed to the activities of a corrupt government official.

The BIA also concluded that Paterko had established neither past persecution nor a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his membership in a particular social group as “someone who witnesses political corruption.” Paterko argues for the first time on appeal that he belongs to a social group consisting of “[o]wners of Ukrainian construction companies that have challenged a government official’s extortion and suffered persecution as a result.” We are precluded from considering this argument because the government raises issue exhaustion as an affirmative defense. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 107 n. 1 (2d Cir.2007). Finally, there is no support in the record for Paterko’s suggestion that the agency misconstrued the “social visibility” argument, see In re A-M-E & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (BIA 2007), by requiring Paterko to identify a particular social group unified by a visible physical trait.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  