
    CRAIN v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Jan. 8, 1913.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1913.)
    1. Criminal Law (§ 313) — Presumptions— Knowledge of Law.
    No one is excused by his ignorance of the law; knowledge of the law being conclusively presumed.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 746; Dee. Dig. § 313.]
    2. Weapons (§ 8) — Unlawful Carrying.
    It is illegal to carry a pistol, though the cylinder is carried in one pocket and the frame is carried in another.
    [Ed. Note. — For, other cases, see Weapons, Cent. Dig. § 7; Dec. Dig. § 8.]
    3. Weapons (§ 7) — Offenses.
    The fact that accused claimed to have received a pistol by pledge, erroneously believing that he could carry it into a public assemblage for the purpose of meeting the pledgor and having it redeemed, would not be a defense to a charge of unlawfully carrying a pistol; he having in fact intended to carry the weapon on his person, and merely having 'been ignorant of the legal consequences.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Weapons, Cent. Dig. § 6: Dec. Dig_. § 7.]
    4. Criminal Law (§ 1172) — Appeal—Harmless Error — Instructions — Weight of Evidence.
    That an instruction was upon the weight of the evidence would not be reversible error, where the facts recited therein were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, both by accused and all of the other witnesses. <
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal I/aw, Cent. Dig. §§ 3128, 3154-3157, 3159-3163, 3169; Dec. Dig. § 1172.]
    5. Criminal Law (§§ 763, 764) — Instructions — Weight of Evidence.
    A charge which applies the law to the admitted facts ,is_ not objectionable as on the weight of the evidence.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1731-1748, 1752, 1768, 1770; Dec. Dig. §§ 763, 764.]
    6. Weapons (§ 17) — Unlawful Carrying-Evidence.
    It was not error to permit the officer, who arrested accused for unlawfully carrying a pistol, to state that he heard shooting in a certain direction and went there and found accused with á pistol; the officer being entitled to state what attracted his attention.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Weapons, Cent. Dig. §§ 20-33; Dee. Dig. § 17.]
    Appeal from Nacogdoches County Court; F. P. Marshall, Judge.
    Will Crain was convicted of unlawfully carrying a pistol, and appeals.
    Affirmed.
    V. E. Middlebrook, of Nacogdoches, for appellant O. B. Lane, Asst Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig.. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   HARPER, J.

Appellant was prosecuted and convicted of unlawfully carrying a pistol ; his punishment being assessed at imprisonment in the county jail for 30 days and a fine of $100.

A witness for the state testified that defendant had a pistol at a gathering at Red-land Church; that he saw defendant with the pistol in his hands, and saw him load and unload it. Deputy Sheriff Strode says that night he heard some shots fired and went in the direction he heard the shooting; that, when he arrived at 'Monroe Johnson's (where they were having a party), he took a pistol off of defendant; that the cylinder was in his jumper pocket, while the remainder of it was in his pantaloons pocket; that it had two empty shells in it. Defendant then took the stand and admitted he had the pistol, both at the gathering at Redland Church in the evening, and at the party at Monroe Johnson’s that night, claiming that, while at Redland Church, one Dan Clark approached him and wanted to borrow 30 cents, agreeing to pawn him the pistol and pay the money back that evening or night. He denies loading and unloading the pistol at the church, claiming that, as soon as Clark delivered it to hiru, he took the cylinder out and put it in one pocket, and the remainder of the pistol in another pocket; -saying he did not think it was a violation of the law to carry the pistol when in this condition.

Ignorance of law excuses no one, and it is a violation of the law to carry a pistol, even though one should place one part of it in one pocket and another part in another pocket. One could soon put the parts together, and the intent and purpose of the law is to keep one from carrying deadly weapons on or about his person. The pistol was in no way out of repair; it would shoot when put together, as shown by all the testimony; and those cases cited by appellant, where the pistol was so ouirof repair it could not be fired, have no application. McCallister v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 393, 116 S. W. 1154.

Appellant gives, as a reason for carrying the pistol with him from Redland Church to Monroe Johnson’s, that, as Clark had stated he would redeem it that evening or night, he wanted to have it with him in case Olark came to redeem it. Appellant had no right to carry the pistol at Redland Church and from Redland Church to Johnson’s, and there have it on his person at a public gathering. The evidence shows that, in going from the church to Johnson’s, he necessarily passed near his home, where he could have deposited the pistol; or if he did not desire to do this, when he got to Johnson’s, if he really carried it there to give Clark an opportunity to redeem it, he could have deposited it somewhere at this place. Instead of doing this, he elected to go into a public gathering with the pistol on his person and keep it there. This in law he had no right to do; and, as this was a violation of the law, the fact that he did not know it was a violation furnishes no justification for his act. The question of his intent does not enter into the case, for he intended to do the very .thing he did do; the only excuse offered being that he did not know it was against the law to thus carry a pistol. This was simply ignorance of the law, and excuses no man. Cordova v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 353, 97 S. W. 87.

Defendant requested the court to charge the jury: “You are charged, further, intent is an element to be considered in this case; and, if you believe from the' evidence that the defendant took the pistol apart and disassembled it for the purpose and with the intention of so fixing it that he would not be violating the law while he was carrying it, then under such conditions he would not be guilty; and, if you so find, you will acquit the defendant; or, if you have a reasonable ■doubt as to whether he so carried it, you will acquit him.” This is not the law, and the court did not err in refusing to give it. If appellant only did the acts he intended to do, believing that same was no violation of law, yet, if in fact such acts were prohibited by law, he would be punishable, for all persons are presumed to know what the law prohibits one from doing. Medrano v. State, 32 Tex. Ct. R. 216, 22 S. W. 684, 40 Am. St. Rep. 775; Thompson v. State, 26 Tex. App. 97, 9 S. W. 486. The question involved in this ease is discussed by this court in Chaplin v. State, 7 Tex. App. 89, in which it was held that one who carried a pistol under the belief that it was not a, violation of the law to carry it under given circumstances, was a mistake of law and not of fact, and we merely refer to that opinion and the cases following it.

The other special charges requested by appellant also relate to the “intent,” and should not have been given under the facts of this case. The court instructed the jury: “The defendant had the right to obtain possession of the pistol at Redland Church as 'set up in his admission; but the defendant, while he would not violate the law in getting the pistol, as admitted, and carrying same home within a reasonable time and along his way to his home by the ordinary or accustomed route of travel, still the defendant would not have the right to deflect from his accustomed route home and proceed beyond his home more than a mile and retain a pistol on his person at a party for some five or six hours. The fact that the pistol, which was intact, in shooting order, and partially loaded at the time defendant received it, was separated by the defendant’s taking the partially loaded cylinder from the pistol and carrying the barrel of the pistol in one pocket and the cylinder, as described, in another pocket would not excuse the defendant in thus carrying said pistol beyond his home and at the party at Monroe Johnson’s.”

The objection made by appellant is that this charge is upon the weight of the testimony. As the record shows the facts recited were proven beyond doubt, in fact testified to by defendant himself and all other witnesses, even if upon the weight of the evidence, such fact would not present reversible error.

However, the charge was but applying the law to the admitted facts, and this character of charge has been approved by this court in Cordova v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 353, 97 S. W. 87, and Zollicoffer v. State, 43 S. W. 993.

There was no error in permitting the officer to state he heard shooting in a certain direction and went there, where he found appellant in possession of a pistol. The officer could state what attracted his attention, and this would not be injurious. Appellant was permitted to state, and introduce other witnesses to prove, that he did not fire the pistol after it came into his possession. It may be that this defendant carried this pistol to the party at Monroe Johnson’s under an honest belief that the owner would redeem it that night; yet this would not authorize him to mix and mingle with the crowd until 11 or 12 o’clock at night with the pistol on his person.

The judgment is affirmed.  