
    Joseph Regan, Administrator of Eleazer W. Haring, deceased, vs. Thomas Stone.
    Where claims against the estate of a decedent were 'referred by the probate court to referees, who made a report, which was received and confirmed, and the parties, by an agreement entered of record in the probate court, agreed that the former order, appointing referees, and also their report, he set aside, and the claims in controversy referred to other referees, and the last named referees reported in favor of the claims, and their report was approved and confirmed by the court; it was held, that if any objection existed to the original appointment of referees, the party waived it by agreeing to set aside their appointment and report, and to the appointment of other referees.
    Appeal from the probcate court of Claiborne county; Hon. William M. Randolph, judge.
    The record in this case shows the following facts, to wit: that the estate of Eleazer W. Haring was declared insolvent, and commissioners appointed to audit claims against it; that the commissioners made a report refusing to allow the claims of Thomas Stone; that Stone filed exceptions to their report, and his claims were referred to referees, who reported in favor of allowing his claims, to the amount of $4488, which report was received and ordered to be recorded. At a subsequent term Joseph Regan, administrator of the estate of Haring, filed a petition praying that the report of the referees be set aside, and the claims referred to other referees ; the court refused to grant the prayer of the petitioner, and ordered the petition to be dismissed, to which Regan filed a bill of exceptions, and set out in his bill of exceptions Stone’s exceptions to the report of the commissioners of insolvency, the order referring the claims to referees, their report, and the confirmation of it by the court, and prayed an appeal. Afterwards, he dismissed his appeal; and the parties, by an agreement entered of record, agreed that the order appointing referees, and ateo their report, be set aside, and, by consent of both parties, the claims of Stone were referred to other referees. The last named referees made a report, allowing Stone $>5511 70, which was received and confirmed by the court. The administrator, by his counsel, appeared in open court, and excepted to the report of the referees last named, and to the confirmation of the same by court,
    “ because the court erred in the rejection of the report of the commissioners of insolvency, and the appointment of referees, without good cause being shown by the claimant why his said claims should be referred,” and then prayed an appeal to this court.
    
      J. H. Maury, for appellee.
    The claims of Stone on the estate of Haring having been rejected by the commissioners, he filed exceptions to their report, which were sustained by the probate court; and the claims were referred to referees. The referees decided in favor of Iris claims; and, their report being approved and confirmed by the court, Regan entered exceptions to the decision of the court; and takes the ground, not that the decision of approval was wrong, but that the claims ought not to have been referred. His objections, if true, might have been taken to the order of reference; but, if applicable only to the-order of reference, they came too late, when raised on the question of confirmation.
    It was decided by this court in a case between these same parties, (4 S. & M. 691,) that an appeal could not be taken from the order of reference; and it is clearly inferrible from the decision, that this court will regard the order as having been properly made, unless it is shown by proof to have been wrong. But whether right or wrong, and though an appeal cannot be taken until after a final decision on the claim, yet the party asking for a reversal must depend on his exceptions; and exceptions to the final decision cannot extend back to interlocutory orders, to which no exceptions were taken at the time; because, unless exceptions are taken at the time of making the orders, the record can furnish no means of showing whether they were right or wrong. But, to obviate all these questions, the parties, after the decision of this court, entered into an agreement that the order of reference so much complained of, and the report of the referees, should be set aside ; and that the claims should be referred to the decision of new referees, selected and named by the parties. The confirmation of the report of the referees, thus appointed by his own agreement, is the judgment of which the appellant complains; and he excepts to it on the old ground that the first order of reference ought not to have been made.
    When the new referees, appointed by agreement of the parties, made their report, allowing the claim, it was not competent for the party, in the face of his own agreement, to object to their report on the ground that the reference should not have been made.
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion of the court.

This cause was once before in this court, and is reported 4 S. & M. 691. When it went back to the probate court of Claiborne county, at the December term, 1843, it was agreed between the parties, and .so entered upon the record, that the former report of the referees should be set aside, and the claims in question referred to other referees therein named. These last referees, at the February term, 1844, reported in favor of the claims of Stone, and their report was approved and confirmed by the court.

The record then states “that the administrator excepted to the appointment of the referees, without good cause being shown why the claim should be referred, and to the confirmation of the report. If any objection existed to the original appointment of referees, the party has waived it by agreeing to set aside their appointment, and by farther agreeing to the appointment of others.

There is no bill of exceptions, nor anything in the record, to show any error, if any exist, either in the report of the referees, or in the order confirming it.

The same is therefore affirmed.  