
    Emanuel Hahn v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      On the 13th June, 1872, the olaimcmt is appointed surveyor at Troy, a port of delivery. Me continues to act as such til the 28th May, 1876. At the same time there are three other surveyors in the collection district, one of whom is the surveyor of NeiuTorh, aport of entry, and Wee-wise surveyor of the district. Dines, penalties, and forfeitures 'incurred at the port of New Tor It are collected and paid into the Treasury. Distribution by the Secretary of of the Treasury is made to the collector, naval officer and surveyor of the port of Neiv Torlc, and nothing is awan'ded to the claimant. Se submits and allows the money to be paid to the surveyor of New Torlc without notice that he will contest the decision. Ne now sues for Ms proportion as one of the surveyors within the district.
    
    I.The official status of customs officers, aucl their relations to each other, and the course of legislation in regard to the distribution of fines, penalties, and forfeitures, from the first act, of 1789 to the last, of 1867, considered and reviewed.
    II.Where the Secretary of the Treasury gives a certain construction to a statute concerning- the distribution of fines, penalties, andforfeitnres, and officers interested adversely apparently acquiesce in the decision through a long period of time, and vast sums are accordingly distributed and paid out of the Treasury, the court will not interfere by giving a different construction to the statute, especially where that adopted by the Secretary is not unreasonable.
    III.Under the construction given by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Act 2d March, 1867 (14 Stat. L., 546; Kev. Stat., $ 30, 90), the surveyors of different ports of delivery within a collection district are not entitled to a distributive share in fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred at the port of entry in such district, but only the surveyor of the district; and this construction is adopted by the court.
    
      
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The following are tbe facts as found by the court:
    I. On the 13th of June, 1872, the claimant was appointed surveyor of customs at the port of Troy, N. Y., and continued to act as such officer until May 28,1876.
    II. During the period from June Í3,1872, to June 22,1874, Alonzo B. Cornell was surveyor of customs at the port of New York to March 31,1873, and George H. Sharpe from March 31, 1873, to June 22,1874; Isaac N. Keeler was surveyor of customs at the port of Albany; and from April 28,1874, Frank P. Norton was surveyor of customs at the port of Port Jefferson; all in the collection-district of the city of New York.
    III. There was collected and paid into the Treasury of the United States, from the proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred at the port of New York, between June 13,1872, and April 28, 1874, the sum of $839,819.40 and more, and between April 28 and June 24,1874, $14,604.11 and more, after •making the deductions required by law; of which sums, in the distribution made by the Secretary of the Treasury, one-fourth part was paid to the collector, naval officer, and surveyor at the port of New York as such officers, and not as informers or seizing officers, and none thereof was paid to the claimant, which distribution was made in accordance, with the uniform practice of the Treasury Department, under the Act March 2,1807, ch. 188, (14 Stab L., 546).
    IY. During the same period, between June 13,1872, and June 22, 1874, there was paid into the Treasury, from fines incurred at the port of Troy aforesaid, on persons for not surrendering licenses of canal boats as required by law, the sum of $1,000, of which, in the distribution thereof by the Secretary of the Treasury, one-fourth was paid to the claimant as informer or seizing officer, and no other share was allowed to him.
    Y. Letters, copies of which are annexed, passed between the parties therein named as alleged by the claimant.
    “Trot, New York, March 3,1877.
    “Hon. Secretary oe the Treasury: '
    “ My Dear Sir : I have received from the collector of the district a draft for' the money due to me, as per statement from the'Cqmmissioner of Customs,'dated February 2.7, 3.877. I also received’ á check from the collector for cases Nos. 762 and 763, which were lately distributed. (‘ Share of fines, penalties, and forfeitures.’)
    “ I am of the same opinion, and my mind had not been changed relating to ‘fines, penalties, and forfeitures,’ that they have not been distributed according to law, as provided in section 1, act of March 2,1867,14 statute, page 546, and I would respectfully call the attention of the department to a letter sent by me to the department, dated March 20,1874.
    “ I hold the twenty-five dollars sent to me, as above mentioned, and also the amount mentioned in my letter of March 20,1874, Subject to further direction or decision, according to law, as the letter sent to me in reply to my letter, dated March 20,1874, does not cover the ground as to fines, penalties, and forfeitures.
    “I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
    “EMANUEL HAHN,
    
      "JEx-Survey or?
    
    “ Custom-House, Trot, New Yoeic,
    1874.
    RICHARDSON,
    
      “Seereta/ry of the Treasury, Washington, D. O.:
    
    “HONORABLE Sir: I have received, on the 13th day of this month, from the collector of customs of the district of New York (General C. A. Arthur), one-fourth of the sum realized by ‘fines, penalties, and forfeitures,’ for violations of the revenue laws in collector’s cases Nos. 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 808, and 809, which were lately distributed.
    “I do not think I am entitled to the whole of ‘one-fourth’ of such moneys, and therefore write you for a decision in the matter, as I understand there are two cases yet to, be distributed, to wit, Nos. 762 and 763, andwoidd like a decision before their distribution is made; and if it be proper, I would like an opinion from the Attorney-General in regard to it. In the mean time I hold the money I have received subject to your decision.
    “My position is this:
    “I am a surveyor of customs for the district of New York, residing at the port of Troy; I was regularly appointed, and took the oath of office before the collector of this district (General Arthur), as required by law (Act March 2,1799, section 20), and I am under his supervision, and report to and receive my salary from him.
    “Now, I claim that I am none the less a surveyor for the district of Mew York because residing at Troy, Troy being one of the ports in said district.
    “ Section 1 of the Act March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. L., 546), after disposing of three-fourths of the moneys realized for fines, penalties, and forfeitures, provides for the disposition of the remaining one-fourth, as follows: ‘ and the remaining one-fourth to be equally divided between the collector, naval officer, and surveyor, OK SUCH OK THEM AS AKE APPOINTED POK THE DISTRICT in which the seizure has been made or the fine or penalty incurred.’
    “While I am the only one of such officers residing at the port of Troy, yet it by no tneans follows that I am the only one of such officers ‘appointed for the district’ in which said port is located; hence, I do not think I am entitled to the whole of one-fourth of the moneys realized from the cases above enumerated, but only to an equal share thereof, with ‘the collector, naval officer, and surveyors appointed for the district in which the seizures were made or ñnes and penalties incurred.’
    “Under the mode of distribution provided by the law previous to the act of 1877, above referred to, the money be ‘divided equally between the collector and naval officer of the district, and the surveyor of the port, &c.; but under the present law, I can see no reason why not only the collector and naval officer, but all the surveyors ‘ appointed for the district,’ &c., should not be entitled to share in the distribution.
    “ It is this belief that has led me to ask a decision in this matter, as I think that justice to all concerned requires a settlement of the question.
    “ Hoping for immediate attention to my request, I am, sir,
    “ Yery respectfully, your obedient servant, .
    “EMANUEL HAHN,
    
      “Surveyor of Customs of the Port of Troy,
    
    
      uin the District of Pew York.”
    
    “Treasury Department,
    “ Washington, D. C., June 16,1874.
    “ Sir : Referring to your letter relative to distributive shares of fines and forfeitures accruing in the district of New York, I am directed by the Secretary to transmit to you the inclosed copy of a letter to Hon. Eli Perry, relative to the claim of Mr. Keeler, surveyor of the port of Albany, New York. “Respectfully, yours,
    “J. F. HARTLEY, ‘•Assistant Secretary.
    
    “To Emanuel Hahn, Esq.,
    
      “Surveyor of Customs, Troy, Peto York.”
    
    “Treasury Department,
    “ Washington, D. C., June 15,1874.
    “ Sir : The two letters of the surveyor of customs at Albany, filed by you, were duly received, and his claim has been considered.
    “The claim is substantially that, under the law of March 2, 1867, the surveyors at ports of delivery are entitled to share in the proceeds of customs fines, penalties, and forfeitures equally with the collector, surveyor, and naval officer of the port of' entry of the district; and he asks that the question thus raised may be referred to the Attorney-General.
    “I am fully disposed to ask the instruction and advice of the Attorney-General on doubtful questions of law in regard to which no positive rule of action has been adopted and adhered to by my predecessors.
    “But, in my judgment, this is not such a question. The-‘surveyor’ mentioned in the act referred to has ever been supposed by the department to be the surveyor of the port of entry the placeat which the fraud or offense was committed or discovered, and on this supposition very large sums have been distributed.
    “This construction seems to me to be a reasonable one, and having been acquiesced in ever since the passage of the law, cannot, with justice or propriety, be reversed. The application of Surveyor Keeler is therefore declined.
    “Yery respectfully,
    “B. H. BBISTOW,
    “ Secretary,
    
    “Hon. Eli Perry,
    
      11 Souse of Representatives.”
    
    
      Messrs. Paine <& Grafton for the claimant:
    The true explanation of the act 1867 seems to be this: The legislature, considering that one collector, and only one, was appointed for each district; that naval officers were appointed for some but not for all the districts; that surveyors were appointed for some, but not for all the districts; and that for some districts several surveyors were appointed, provided that in any district for which only a collector should be appointed, the collector should receive the whole of the officers’ share of the fine, penalty, or forfeiture; that in those districts in Avhich only a collector and a naval officer should be appointed, the officers’ share should be divided equally among them; that in those districts in which only a collector and surveyor should be appointed, the officers’ share should be divided equally between them; that in those districts in which a collector, naval officer, and two or more surveyors were appointed, the officers’ share should be equally divided among all these officers; that in those districts for which a collector and two or more surveyors were appointed, the officers’ share should be divided equally between all of them. As to any districts for which no collector was appointed, no provision was made in this act, because the law-maters contemplated no sucb case. For while the law did not require a naval officer or a surveyor to be appointed for every district, it did require a collector to be appointed for every single district, without exception. It is true, that the executive might, in disregard of duty, permit a collectorship to stand vacant; but the law did not anticipate or provide for any such disregard of duty on the part of the President.
    If all the surveyors of the district are not the distributees, then there is no distribution designated by the statute. If one surveyor is to monopolize the surveyors’ share, it is not possible to say which surveyor shall enjoy the privilege; whether it shall be the surveyor of the port where the penalty is incurred, or the surveyor of the port of entry, or the surveyor of some other port.
    There was only one kind of surveyor of customs known to the law when this cause of action accrued. There was no such officer as a surveyor of the port in contradistinction to a surveyor of the district. The surveyor of customs, whether styled a surveyor of the port, a surveyor of the district, or simply a surveyor, found his duties and powers defined in sections 21, 68, and 70 of the act of March 2,1799. These duties and powers were the same for all surveyors.
    Forfeitures could be incurred or detected elsewhere than at ports of entry. Every surveyor had jurisdiction, so far as detection and seizure were concerned, throughoutthe entire collection district (1 Stat. L., 677, 678); and it was obviously the policy of the law to encourage all surveyors in the detection of frauds upon the revenue and in the seizure of goods and vessels liable to forfeiture.
    The distributions under the act of 1799 were neither made nor supervised by the Secretary of the Treasury, but were made by the several collectors. It does not appear that they adopted any uniform rule of construction of the law, nor could their decisions be entitled to any great, weight in this court.
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Simons for the defendants :
    It may reasonably be required of the proponent that his construction be shown to be more consonant with the abstract justice or equity of the case, or with the principles and course of public policy, or with legislative practice or usage iu other like cases.
    The theory of such a distribution must be that a share in the forfeiture is awarded to an officer for some service in connection with and commensurate to the reward. It is notorious that the revenue officers at a port of entry are under a vastly greater weight of responsibility than attaches to those employed at ports of delivery only. By far the greater portion of offenses against the revenue laws are committed at the ports of entry, and substantially all the revenue is collected thereat. When seizures are made at the port of entry or prosecutions instituted for fines or penalties accruing there, all the labor of detection, investigation, and preparation for prosecution and trial is borne by the officers of that port, who are reasonably entitled therefore to the distributive share allowed by law. The surveyors of the outports in such case have no labor or responsibility in the matter and no just right to participate in the allowance. It follows that the jnactical construction given to the law is consonant with reason and the right of the case.
    The surveyor at a port of delivery only holds a position so insignificant as compared with the surveyor at a port of entry, that the act of 1789 failed to recognize his existence in connection with the distribution of moieties. Is it reasonable to suppose that the act of 1790, in recognizing the possibility of his earning a right to a distributive share, intended to give each such surveyor iu a district a share whether by reason of service rendered in earning it or not, and thus to put each of these petty local officers on an equal footing with the district officers at the port of entry in the distribution of fines, &c., accruing there %
    
    The third clause of the act of 1789 is transferred without material change, and the claim here would have nothing to rest upon but for the addition of the words or surveyors ” in the re-enactment of the proviso. On this slender basis the whole argument of claimant is constructed.
    Although the body of the section apparently admits of but one surveyor sharing in the distribution, it is urged that this language of the proviso shows that a distribution to more than one was intended. If the body of the section is so framed as to exclude such a construction, the words “ or surveyors” should be rejected as surplusage and without meaning; but this is not necessary.
    
      We submit there is no occasion to search for a meaning of the words in question. It is enough to point to the plain text of the law and ask a claimant: Were you collector or naval officer of the district? Were you surveyor of the port wherein the penalty was incurred ? If he was not of these, he can show no title, and it is needless to inquire further.
    If it could be admitted that the language of the acts of 1790 and 1799 on this point is so ambiguous as to call for judicial construction, it is enough to say that it does not appear that such a claim as this was ever suggested since 1790 until 1874, nor does it appear that such a claim has ever been admitted or a distribution made in accordance therewith. On the contrary, the practice in the collection district of the city of New York under the act of 1799 is shown to have been to distribute the proceeds of fines, &c., incurred in said port between the collector, naval officer, and surveyor of that port. The practice under the act of 1867 is shown also to be the same. In such a case this contemporary and uniform construction and usage for eighty-nine years should be conclusive.
   EichakdsoN, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

On the 13th of June, 1872, the claimant was appointed surveyor of customs at Troy, in the customs collection district of the city of New York, under the provisions of the Act March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 5 (1 Stat. L., 631), which authorized the President, “if he judge it expedient, to appoint one other surveyor, to reside at such other place in said district as he shall appoint,” in addition to one at New York City and one at Albany. This provision was omitted in the revision of the statutes, and as part of the act in which it stood was incorporated therein, it was repealed (Rev. Stat., § 5596) by the passage of the Revised Statutes, June 22,1874, at .which date the repeal took effect. Section 5595 of those statutes declares that they embrace the laws in force on the 1st da3 of December, 1873, as they do where no alterations were made thereby, but alterations did not go into operation until the statutes were passed, June 22, 1874. This omission appears not to have been discovered by the officers of the government for nearly two years afterwards, and the claimant continued to act as surveyor until May 28,1876.

While he legally held the office, the Act March 2,1867, ch. 18& (14 Stat. L., 546, Eev. Stat., § 3090), regulating tbe disposition of tbe proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred under tbe laws relating to customs, was in force, and so much as provided for tbe distribution of any part to informers and officers of tbe United States was repealed on tbe same day tbat tbe Eevised Statutes were enacted, June 22,1874, cb. 391, §§ 1, 2 (18 Stat. L., 186). Within tbat time fines, penalties, and forfeitures were incurred under tbe customs laws at tbe' port of New York, wbicb were paid into tbe Treasury as required by law, to tbe amount of $839,819.40 between June 13,1872,(and April 28, 1874, while there were in tbe district a collector and naval officer at New York, and a surveyor at each of tbe ports of New York, Albany, and Troy, and $14,604.11 between April 28, and June 24, 1874, when tbe law was- repealed, while in addition to said officers there was a surveyor at Port Jefferson, in said district.

In tbe one-fouxth part of such fines, &c., wbicb by tbe act of 1867 was required to be equally divided between tbe collector, naval officer, and surveyor, or such of them as are appointed for tbe district,” tbe claimant sets up in this action a right to share equally with each of those officersthat is, one-fifth of. one-fourth of tbe first-mentioned sum and one-sixth of one-fourth of tbe last sum. Tbe Secretary has distributed and’ paid said quarter to tbe collector, naval officer, and surveyor of tbe port of New York in equal portions, according to tbe uniform practice of tbe Treasury Department since tbe passage of that act.

Tbe case will be better understood if we consider tbe official status of tbe customs-officers and their relations to each other,, and review tbe course of legislation on tbe subject of tbe distribution of fines, penalties, and forfeitures from tbe first act of Congress in 1789 to tbe last in 1867.

.For customs purposes collection districts are established, each territorially described, embraacing towns, cities, waters, or shores; ten of wbicb are in tbe State of New York (Eev. Stat., § 2535). In each district there is a port of entry, wbicb is also, a port of delivery (Eev. Stat., § 2770). In most of tbe districts there are ports of delivery wbicb are not ports of entry. Each district has one, and only one, collector, who is required to reside at a port of entry; some few districts have respectively one, and none more than one, naval officer, and some have each one, and only one, surveyor, required in like manner to reside at a port of entry. There are, moreover, surveyors appointed to. reside at ports of delivery in districts where there áre also surveyors at the ports of entry, as in the claimant’s district he was a surveyor required to reside at Troy, while there was one at Albany and another for part of the time at Port Gibson, in addition to the one at New York City (Rev. Stat., § 2536).

The Act July 31, 1780, ch. 5, § 38 (1 Stat. L., 48), to regulate the collection of duties, &c., provided:

“That all penalties,¿fines, and forfeitures recovered by virtue of this act (and not otherwise appropriated) shall, after deducting all proper costs and charges, be disposed of as follows: One moiety shall be for the use of the United States, and paid into the Treasury thereof; and the other moiety shall be divided into three equal parts, and paid to the collector, naval officer, and surveyor of the district wherein the same shall have been incurred ; and in such districts where only two of the aforesaid officers shall have been established, the said moiety shall be divided between them; and in such districts where only one of the aforesaid officers shall have been established, the said moiety shall be given to such officer: Provided, nevertheless., That in all cases where such penalties, fines, and forfeitures shall be recovered in pursuance of information given to such collector by any person other than the said naval officer and surveyor, the one-half of such moiety shall be given to the informer, and. the remainder thereof shall be disposed of between the collector, naval officer, •and surveyor in manner and form as above limited and expressed.”

That section was soon superseded by the Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 69 (1 Stat. L., 177) to provide more effectually for the collection of the duties imposed by law, &c., which provided:

“That all penalties, fines, and forfeitures recovered by virtue of this act (and not otherwise appropriated) shall, after deducting all proper costs and charges, be disposed of as follows: One moiety slialL be for the use of the United States, and paid into the Treasury thereof; the other moiety shall be divided into equal parts, and paid to the collector and naval officer of the district and surveyor of the port wherein the same shall have teen incurred, or to such of said officers as there may be in the said district; and in districts where only one of the aforesaid Officers shall be established, the said moiety shall be given to such officer : Provided,, nevertheless, That in all cases whore such penal-, ties, fines, and forfeitures shall be recovered in pursuance of information given to such collector by any person other than the naval officer or surveyor of the district, the one-half of such moiety shall be given to the informer, and the remainder thereof shall be disposed of between the collector, naval officer, and surveyor or surveyors, in manner aforesaid.”

The Act March 2,1799, ch. 22, § 97 (1 Stat. L., 697), while it made some additional provision not material to be considered in this case, substantially, and in almost the identical language, re-enacted section 69 of the act of 1790, above quoted, so that it is unnecessary to repeat it here.

Thus the doubt which the first act presented, as to which surveyor was entitled to share in the proceeds of fines, &c;, under the words surveyor of the district, was removed by the next two succeeding acts on the subject, the true construction of which, and the intention of Congress expressed thereby, are clear. The second moiety was to be paid in equal parts to the collector and naval officer of the district and the surveyor of the port wherein the fines, &c., were incurred, there being but one such officer in any port, nnd not, as before, to the surveyor of the district, a designation which might apply with equal propriety, in some cases, to several such officers of different ports. The proviso adds an exception, that when the fines, &c., were recovered upon information of any person other than the naval officer or surveyor of the district, one-half of the second moiety was to go to the informer, and the other half to the collector, naval officer, and surveyor or surveyors “ in manner aforesaid,” that is, in equal parts to each. This proviso, contained in both the later acts, in connection with the other provisions wherein the word surveyor is used in the singular number, shows that Congress intended that all the surveyors of a district should share in the distribution only in cases where there was no informer other than one of the officers named, and that in other cases the surveyor of the port where the offenses were committed should alone, of all the surveyors, be entitled to share in the proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures.

Thus the law stood until 1867, when the Act March 2 of that year, chapter 188, was passed (14 Stat. L., 546), wherein the following provisions (now Bev. Stat., § 3090) were enacted, superseding the sections of former acts, which we have before set forth:

“ That from the proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred under the provisions of the laws relating to the customs, there shall be deducted such charges and expenses as are by law in each case authorized to be deducted, and, in addition, in the case of the forfeiture of imported merchandise of a greater rmlne than five hundred dollars, on which duties have not been paid, or in ease of a release thereof upon payment of its appraised rmlue, or of any fine or composition in moniey, there shall also be deducted an amount equivalent to the duties in coin upon such merchandise (including tlie additional duties, if any) which, shall be credited in the accounts of the collector as duties received, and the residue of the net proceeds aforesaid shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States and distributed, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, in the manner following, to wit: One-half to the United States; one-fourth to the person giving the information which led to such seizure or to the recovery of the fine or penalty, and if there be no informer other than the collector, naval officer, or surveyor, then to the officer making the seizure; and the remaining one-fourth to he equally divided between the collector, nmal officer, and surveyor, or such of them as are appointed for the district in which the seiztore has been made or the fine or penalty incurred, or if there be only a collector, then to such collector

This act made extensive changes in the law, among which was a transfer of the duty of making the distribution of the proceeds of fines, penalties, and forfeitures to the Secretary of the Treasury, from collectors of customs, who had previously performed that service (Act 1799, ch. 22, § 89, 1 Stat. L., 695; Bradley’s Case, 12 C. Cls. R., 578), and who were thereafter required to pay the whole net' proceeds into the Treasury. The shares for distribution were changed from moieties to fourths, and the last fourth was to be divided between the collector, naval officer, and su/rveyor of the district; returning to the language of the first act of 1789, where the sam.e term, surveyor of the district, is used, and departing from that of the next two acts, by which the surveyor of the port where the fines were incurred was designated as the surveyor who was to share therein, and by which, in case there was no informer, all the surveyors in the district were to share equally with the collector and naval officer.

The question at once arose as to who was intended by the words surveyor of the district in this act, where there were several surveyors in the same district, one at the port of entry and delivery and others at ports of delivery only. The language was inaccurate in its application to such a case, and the proper construction to be given to it could not be determined beyond all doubt from the words of the act alone. One view was that siwveyor in the singular was to be taken in the plural signification where there were several in the district, and that all were entibiled to share alike, as is now urged by the claimant; but the plural form had been used, apparently with care, in the proviso in each of the next two preceding acts as to a certain class of cases, and its omission here seemed to indicate an intention not to allow more than one surveyor to share in the distribution. Another view was that the surveyor of the port where the fines were incurred was intended, as expressed in each of the two former acts; but the change from that form of expression to surveyor of the district seemed to preclude the inference that Congress did not intend to mate a change in that respect.

The only other view which could be presented was that the surveyor at the port of entry alone was designated or intended to he designated; and this was supported by the fact that he had a position of much greater importance and responsibility than that of surveyors of ports of delivery, and was regarded as the principal surveyor of the district; and that nearly all fines, penalties, and forfeitures were incurred at the ports of entry. In this view the words or such of them as are appointed for the district,” following “ collector, naval officer, and surveyor,” were not supposed to enlarge the meaning of surveyor to the plural sense, as it could not so enlarge the meaning of collector or naval officer — because there was but one of each in any district — but were used rather to express the same meaning in more concise language, as the words in the act of 1789, to wit: “Where only two of the aforesaid officers shall have been established, the said moiety shall be equally divided between them, and in such districts where only one of the aforesaid officers shall have been established, the said moiety shall be given to such officer;” recognizing in no case more than three — one collector, one naval officer, and one surveyor; and as nearly the same words in each of the next two succeeding acts, “ or to such of said officers as may be in the said district ” — following “ collector, naval officer, and surveyor of the port ” — were manifestly used, to refer in no case to more than one surveyor, since there was never but one surveyor at any oneport. The Secretary of the Treasury adopted the latter construction, and held that the surveyor of the port of entry was intended, to the exclusion of the surveyors of ports of delivery, and that the former alone was entitled as such to share in the fines, penalties, and forfeitures. This was the contemporaneous construction made by the high executive officer appointed to execute the law, who we may presume understood the working of the previous acts and the circumstances under which the law was changed.

With this construction Congress never interfered while the law was in force; and all parties concerned seem to have acquiesced therein until its correctness was drawn in question by the claimant and tlie surveyor at Albany, a few months before the repeal of all provisions on the subject. On the 20th of March of that year the claimant addressed a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, a copy of which is annexed to his petition in this case, asking a reconsideration of the question, and that the opinion of the Attorney-General might be taken thereon. It was reconsidered, and the claimant was notified by letter of June 15, 1874, a copy of which is also annexed to the petition, wherein the Secretary says that the construction adopted seemed to him to be a reasonable one, and, having been acquiesced in ever since the passage of the law, cannot with justice or propriety be reversed.” The claimant appears to have made no further objections until March 3,1877, and he never gave notice that he intended to have the matter contested in court, nor asked the Secretary to retain the money in his control until a judicial determination could be had, but rather submitted to the adverse decision against him, until May, 1877, when he filed his first petition in this case. The letter of March 20, 1874, which his counsel calls a protest, in fact protested only against the award of money to himself alone as informer or seizing officer, which he was clearly entitled to, and the proper disposition of which was not involved in the question raised, although he no doubt supposed it was.

Under these circumstances we are all of opinion that the construction adopted has become the one which must govern all distributions under that act, and that it is now too late, after such vast sums of money have been paid out in accordance therewith, and the provisions of the law itself have been repealed, and can further operate only upon the few remaining cases of distribution on account of collections made for fines, penalties, and forfeiture incurred before June 22,1874.

In the recent case of the United, States v. Pugh (99 U. S., 265), the Chief Justice, in giving the opinion of the Supreme Court therein, says: It is a familiar rule of interpretation that in the case of a doubtful and ambiguous law the contemporaneous construction of those who have been called upon to carry it into effect is entitled to great respect (Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat., 210). While, therefore, the question is one by no means free from doubt, we are not inclined to interfere, at this late day, with a rule wbieb bas been acted upon by tbe Court of Claims and tbe Executive for so long a time.”

Tbe present case is one to wbieb that principle applies with peculiar force, especially as tbe construction of tbe law adopted by tbe Secretary of tbe Treasury does not appear unreasonable, .and might well bave been reached in tbe exercise of a sound judgment. We are therefore justified in dismissing tbe claimant’s petition, and such is tbe order of tbe court.  