
    Lawrence Arthur TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-5113-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 16, 2012.
    
      Lawrence Arthur Taylor, New York, NY, pro se.
    Kathryn M. McKinney (Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant Director), Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, RALPH K. WINTER and REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Lawrence Arthur Taylor, a native and citizen of Jamaica, petitions for review of the BIA decision affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), finding him removable due to a conviction for a controlled-substance offense, Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). See In re Lawrence Arthur Taylor, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Nov. 19, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 17, 2009).

We have reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decision. See Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008) (per cu-riam ). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

[1] We lack jurisdiction to consider a petition for review of “any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 1182(a)(2),” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), unless the petition raises “constitutional claims or questions of law,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), that are “colorable,” see Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir.2008). Taylor was found removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), and his petition fails to raise a colorable constitutional claim or question of law.

[2] Taylor’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for lack of any compliance with the procedure for raising such a claim provided in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A.1988). Although we do not require “slavish adherence” with that procedure, we do require, at minimum, “substantial compliance” with that procedure, Yang v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 133, 142-43 (2d Cir.2007).

In any event, Taylor’s counsel was not ineffective. Taylor must establish that he suffered prejudice from his counsel’s concession that his conviction was a controlled substance offense. See Cekic v. I.N.S., 435 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir.2006). An alien is inadmissible if he was convicted of “a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) a[ ] law or regulation of a[s] tate ... relat[ed] to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II); see also 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), Schedule I(c)(10) (listing marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic). Taylor was convicted of “knowingly ... [p]os-sess[ing] marijuana for sale” under Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 13-3405 — a crime related to a controlled substance.

Finding no merit in Taylor’s remaining arguments, we hereby DISMISS, in part, and DENY, in part, Taylor’s petition for review.  