
    Lewis Shapp & Co. v. William Porterfield.
    The record of a suit brought by attachment against a supposed owner, in which the thing seized was released upon bond by such supposed owner, is not admissible as evidence of real ownership in an action between other parties, where the question relates to title, — but a judgment changing the ownership of the property would be admissible, in the same manner as a private writing, although the plaintiff in the suit pending had no connection with the former action.
    from the Sixth District Court of New Orleans, Howell, J.
    
      J. M. Chilton, for plaintiff. B. Egan, for defendant and appellant.
   Merrick, C. J.

This suit was commenced by attachment. The steamboat John Strader was seized as Poríerfield’s property. H. Devine intervened and claimed to be owner of the boat. His pretensions being sustained, plaintiff appealed.

Plaintiffs complain of the ruling of the District Court, and they have taken two bills of exception.

It seems, in a case instituted by another party against Porterfield and owners of the Strader by attachment, Porterfield released the boat upon bond. This suit was res inter alios acta, as to II. Devine, and was properly excluded.

The steamboat was under seizure at Vicksburg, Miss., in the suit of Shaw & Zunts v. A. C. Brown et al. It was there ordered to be sold, and II. Devine became the purchaser, Poríerfield and two others signing his bond as sureties for the price.

The court did not err in receiving the record to show title in Devine. It is true, that the plaintiff was no party to the suit, but then he had no interest in the matters in controversy in that suit, and if he was not bound by the admissions and judgment, still the change of the ownership of the steamboat Strader from Brown to Devine operated through the agency of that suit, was a result and fact which was admissible in evidence in the same manner as would have been the transfer by private writing from Brown to the same party.

As plaintiff does not claim title to the steamboat through Brown but through Porterfield, the want of registry of Devine's title cannot avail plaintiff. If the boat were to be considered the property of Brown, it would be equally fatal to plaintiff’s case.

The fact that Porterfield was captain of the boat, and on some occasions called the boat his, cannot defeat II. Devine’s title.

Judgment affirmed.  