
    Charles STEPHENS, Petitioner v. Eric H. HOLDER, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-60390
    Summary Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    March 15, 2013.
    Shauky Michael Musa-Obregon, Mas-peth, NY, for Petitioner.
    Remi Da Rocha-Afodu, Esq., Trial Attorney, Tangerlia Cox, Lindsay Brooke Glauner, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    
      Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Charles Stephens is a citizen of the United Kingdom, a native of Guyana, and a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) of the United States. This court is now presented with Stephens’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding the Immigration Judge’s order finding him removable due to his prior conviction for an aggravated felony. Consistent with his position before the BIA, Stephens argues that he is entitled to a waiver of inadmissibility and that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) does not preclude him from seeking such relief because he achieved LPR status after he first entered this country. Under Stephens’s view, his ease is substantially similar to Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 582 (5th Cir.2008).

We typically lack jurisdiction to review a decision of the BIA ordering an alien removed due to his prior conviction for an aggravated felony. Larin-Ulloa v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 456, 460-61 (5th Cir.2006). However, we retain jurisdiction to consider legal questions such as the issue whether Stephens is eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under § 1182(h). See Martinez, 519 F.3d at 541. We conduct a de novo review of the BIA’s legal determinations, and its factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Carranza-De Salinas v. Holder, 700 F.3d 768, 772 (5th Cir.2012).

To the extent that Stephens contends that his case is squarely on point with, and thus controlled by, Martinez, we disagree. In contrast to Martinez, 519 F.3d at 536, 543-44, the record in the instant case shows that Stephens obtained LPR status outside of the United States and was admitted to this country as an LPR. This distinction is material and dispositive. Additionally, as explained in Molina-Ramirez v. Holder, 362 Fed.Appx. 387, 393 (5th Cir.2010), counsel conceded that Stephens was admitted as an LPR, and “the BIA may reasonably have concluded that [Stephens] could not satisfy Martinez’s requirements for a § 212(h) waiver because of [this] concession.” Although nonbinding, Molina-Ramirez is nonetheless “highly persuasive.” See United States v. Pino Gonzalez, 636 F.3d 157, 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 178, 181 L.Ed.2d 88 (2011).

Further, Stephens does not advance a persuasive argument to show that he is entitled to the relief sought. Rather, he simply cites Martinez and insists that his case should have the same result as that one. This is not enough for Stephens to show that he should receive § 1182(h) relief. See Opie v. INS, 66 F.3d 737, 739 (5th Cir.1995). Accordingly, his petition for review is DENIED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     