
    Vannessa LUU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 13-15118.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted March 12, 2015.
    Filed March 23, 2015.
    William Thomas, Boise, ID, Michael Timothy Welch, Law Offices of Michael Welch, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Heather Sager, Esquire, Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: McKEOWN, MURGUIA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Vannessa Luu appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Hewlett-Packard Company on her California and federal law retaliation claims. We affirm.

Reviewing de novo, Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir.2000), we conclude that the evidence presented to the district court was sufficient to establish “a causal link between” her protected activities and her termination. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir.2000). Under both federal and California law, a prima facie case can be established by “circumstantial evidence, such as the employer’s knowledge that the [employee] engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory employment decision.” Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir.1988) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69-70, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 652 (2000).

Luu’s declaration states that she lodged complaints with her supervisors about gender discrimination, racial discrimination, and accounting irregularities shortly before Hewlett-Packard terminated her employment. In light of the close proximity between these claims and the termination, these allegations are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination. See Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir.2003) (noting that, “[d]e-pending on the circumstances,” an adverse employment action “three to eight months” after the employee engaged in a protected activity “is easily within a time range that can support an inference of retaliation”).

The district court correctly concluded, however, that Luu failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Hewlett-Packard’s “legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason[s]” for her termination were “pretext.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The record developed in the district court does not include “specific and substantial circumstantial evidence” that Hewlett-Packard’s “true cause for firing [Luu] was unlawful retaliation.” Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     