
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose R. SEGOVIA-AYALA, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 15-30600.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    May 12, 2016.
    Carol Mignonne Griffing, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Cytheria Dawn Jernigan, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.
    Betty Lee Marak, Esq., Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Shreveport, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, PRADO, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Louisiana state police stopped Jose Segovia-Ayala’s van for a traffic violation. A search of the van revealed several pounds of heroin. Segovia-Ayala was arrested and indicted for possession with intent to distribute. He moved to suppress the evidence from the search and from his responses 'to questions after he was arrested. The district court denied the motion. Segovia-Ayala conditionally pled guilty, and now appeals the denial of the motion to suppress on two grounds. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed below.

Segovia-Ayala first claims that the search of his van was unlawful. Although the search was warrantless, Segovia-Ayala consented to it. He now contends his consent was invalid because it came only amidst “the prolonged detention of the road side stop,” which he asserts was a “constitutional violation.” Segovia-Ayala appears to argue both (1) that because the detention was unconstitutional, his subsequent consent to search and the evidence that resulted were fruit of the poisonous tree; and (2) that the prolonged detention amounted to coercion, rendering his consent involuntary. Having heard the helpful arguments of counsel and reviewed the relevant record, we find no merit in either theory. The district court correctly found that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified extending the stop of Segovia-Ayala’s vehicle, and it did not clearly err in determining that his consent was voluntary and valid.

Second, Segovia-Ayala claims that his post-arrest statements should have been suppressed because he did not understand his Miranda rights. A state trooper recited Segovia-Ayala’s Miranda rights to him in English. Although he speaks some English, Segovia-Ayala’s first language is Spanish, and he argues he did not understand the recital. Again, having carefully examined the record before the district court, we do not find clear error in that court’s determination that Segovia-Ayala understood the Miranda warning given to him.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     
      
      . United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir.), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.2010); see Jauch v. Nautical Servs., Inc., 470 F.3d 207, 213 (5th Cir.2006) ("The clear error standard precludes reversal of a district court's findings unless we are ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985))).
     
      
      . See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (a search pursuant to consent does not require a warrant).
     
      
      . See United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir.1998) ("Under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, all evidence derived from the exploitation of an illegal search or seizure must be suppressed, unless the Government shows that there was a break in the chain of events sufficient to refute the inference that the evidence was a product of the Fourth Amendment violation.”).
     
      
      . See United States v. Blevins, 755 F.3d 312, 326 (5th Cir.2014) (consent to a warrantless search must be voluntary).
     
      
      . See United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc) ("[A] detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, unless further reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, emerges.”).
     
      
      . See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
     
      
      . See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S, 370, 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) ("If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given and the accused made an uncoerced statement, this showing, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate ‘a valid waiver’ of Miranda rights. The prosecution must make the additional showing that the accused understood these rights.” (citation omitted) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602)).
     