
    Caroline Veit, Appellant, v. Elvira Dill, Respondent.
    
      Husband and wife — title to land — not as tenants in common — conveyance of the entire estate of the grantor.
    
    A husband and wife are not seized of land as tenants in common, where they are both named in the deed thereof as grantees, in the absence of any words therein showing an intent on their part to hold the same as tenants in common.
    A deed conveyed “ all the dower and thirds and right and title of dower * * * and all other right of me, the said Mary Doyle, in and to all,” etc., etc.
    
      Held, that such language was appropriate to vest in the grantee named in the deed all of the estate that the said Mary Doyle then had in the property conveyed.
    Appeal by the plaintiff, Caroline Yeit, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of tbe clerk of tbe county of Kings on tbe 18tb day of July, 1893, upon a decision of tbe court rendered after a trial at tbe Kings County Special Term, dismissing tbe plaintiff’s complaint upon the merits and directing tbe plaintiff to complete her contract for the purchase of certain real estate.
    
      Thomas H. Williams, for tbe appellant.
    
      Wm. JB. Hurd, Jr., for tbe respondent.
   BeowN, P. J.:

This action was brought in form for tbe specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, but really to recover tbe expense incurred in tbe examination of tbe title on tbe ground that tbe defendant, who was the vendor, could not convey a marketable title.

Tbe defendant acquired title to tbe land in question from John Moore.

Moore’s title came from Mary Doyle and seven children of herself and her husband, John Doyle.

Tbe Doyle title was acquired in 1867 under a deed made to John and Mary, in which there wrere no words showing any intent on their part to bold as tenants in common. .

John Doyle died in 1881.

The case presented is one where the parties appear to have been misled by tbe case of Meeker v. Wright (76 N. Y. 262).

Mrs. Doyle, after her husband’s death, contracted to sell the land to Moore. Upon tbe authority of tbe case cited it was assumed that Doyle and bis wife held, as tenants in common, and that tbe husband’s estate, upon his death, descended to his children, subject to tiie wife’s dower. Two deeds were accordingly executed and delivered to Moore; one conveyed the estate of Mrs. Doyle and three adult children in and to ten-fourteentlis of the land, and the other conveyed four-fourteenths assumed to be vested in four infant children, and in this share Mrs. Doyle released her dower.

The decision of this case, rests upon the construction to be placed upon the latter instrument. The appellant claims it is a conveyance of the dower only, while the Special Term has decided that it was a conveyance of all her estate, whatever it might be. We agree with the trial court.

The conveyance grants, releases, conveys and quit-claims-“all the dower and thirds and right and title' of dower * * * <md all other right of me, the said Mary Doyle, in and to all,” etc., etc. The intent of Mrs. Doyle under the contract to convey the whole land is clear, and she received the consideration expressed in' the agreement. It is equally clear that she intended, by the instrument from which I have quoted, to convey not only her dower but all other rights she had in the land. The instrument was, in effect, a quit-claim deed, and the language used was appropriate to vest in the grantee all estate she had in the land.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Peatt and Dykmaet, JJ\, concurred.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.  