
    HAVANATUR, S.A., a Panamanian corporation, Appellant, v. 747 TRAVEL AGENCY, INC., a Florida corporation; Esperanza Valdez and Intercontinental Bank, a national banking association, Appellees.
    No. 84-1395.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 29, 1985.
    Rehearing Denied March 5, 1985.
    Cesar R. Camacho, Miami, for appellant.
    
      Rubinstein & Kornik and Jeffrey D. Rubinstein, Miami, for appellees 747 Travel Agency, Inc. and Esperanza Valdez.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUB-BART and JORGENSON, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

The final order denying the appellant Havanatur, S.A.’s motion to intervene below is affirmed because no showing has been made that the trial court abused its discretion in rendering this ruling. The motion to intervene was filed during the final stages of the litigation below, just three days prior to the entry of the final judgment, with no explanation given as to the reason for the untoward delay. At that time the appellant had a pending lawsuit against the interested parties herein which adequately protected its rights. Under the circumstances, we cannot fault the trial judge for denying the motion to intervene and requiring the appellant to pursue his remedies elsewhere. Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So.2d 759, 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) and cases collected.

Moreover, the motion to intervene was denied after the entry of final judgment; “the general rule — universally—is that intervention may not be allowed after final judgment,” save ‘in the interests of justice’ ”, Dickinéon v. Segal, 219 So.2d. 435, 436-37 (Fla.1969) (emphasis omitted) and cases collected; and there is no showing that the interests of justice required this intervention.

Affirmed.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge

(dissenting).

The appellee, 747 Travel Agency, purchased a certified check from the Intercontinental Bank payable to the appellant. After the check was lost or stolen and was thus not redeemed, the present action was brought by 747 against the bank alone to recover the amount of the check. The bank admitted it owed the funds to someone and did not resist the entry of judgment against it. In these circumstances, I find no basis for precluding the payee-appellant, which was the only actually adverse party involved, from intervening so that its rights to the proceeds could be adjudicated below. E.g., Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp., 141 Fla. 538, 194 So. 783 (1939), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 655, 59 S.Ct. 251, 83 L.Ed. 424 (1938) (intervention by interested party matter of right); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230; 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties §§ 27-30 (1982).

Moreover, since the motion was filed and heard before the entry of the final judgment, I do not understand the majority’s invocation of the rule, reflected in both cases it cites, Dickinson v. Segal, 219 So.2d 435 (Fla.1969) and Idacon, Inc. v. Hawes, 432 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), that intervention may be denied if it is applied for after final judgment. Cases collected, 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties § 30. (“A person claiming an interest in pending litigation may be permitted to intervene at any time. However, as a general rule it is too late to apply for intervention after a final decree is entered.”) Under the court’s view, a motion made immediately after the commencement of an action may be denied if the court simply fails to rule on it until after the litigation is over.

I would reverse. 
      
      . “The fact that an intervenor has some other and adequate remedy for the protection of his property and rights is not a bar to his right to intervene.” 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties § 29.
     