
    BARNETT v. McCREA.
    (Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department.
    February 13, 1894.)
    Statute of Frauds—Sufficiency of Writing.
    Defendant offered, in writing, to rent mares of one D. at a certain price. D. ■ replied that he had none at that price, but named plaintiff as one who had, and he showed defendant’s communication to plaintiff. He also advised defendant that he had made arrangements for him. Thereupon defendant wrote to D., referring to the mares “you have rented for me.” 'Held a sufficient memorandum of a contract with plaintiff to charge defendant under the statute of frauds.
    Appeal from special term, St. Lawrence county.
    Action by Cornelius A. Barnett against Augustus L. McCrea. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. The opinion of Mr. Justice BUSSELL at special term is as follows:
    This action is brought to recover for the use of a mare bred to a stallion selected by the defendant, and for the keeping of the colt after it became four months old. The agreement was plainly not to be performed in a year, and was therefore void by the statute of frauds, unless a writing properly subscribed was made, taking the case out of the statute. The negotiations were begun by Mr. McCrea in the nature of a proposition in writing by letter, dated April 6, 1891, sent to Jeremiah Donovan, offering to furnish a stallion free, and pay $75 for the colts from each mare when they were three months old; Donovan to keep the colts until four months old if McCrea wished. He names the stallion Elial G. as the one to breed the mares to, and says that he has made arrangements with the proprietor of that stallion for the service. Donovan cannot write, but through an amanuensis advised McCrea that he had no mares to rent at that price, but mentioned the plaintiff and one other as having mares, and showed the communication of Mr. McCrea to the plaintiff. He also .advised McCrea, in that or another letter, that he had made arrangements for breeding two mares, and gave such terms and details as enabled the defendant, McCrea, on the 26th of May, 1891, to write to Donovan the following letter:
    “Jeremiah Donovan—Dear Sir: Breed the 2 mares you have rented for
    me at $75.00 each to Elial G., and your mare to Van Valkenburg’s horse by Pancoast. I will pay $100 for use of your mare and service. Van understands I made arrangement for several mares.
    “Yours, truly, A. L. McCrea, Jr.”
    In pursuance of this letter, plaintiff’s mare was bred to Elial G. at a cost of $25, and a consequent lien upon the mare for ihat sum. A colt was foaled from such service, and has been since kept by the plaintiff. No testimony was given on the part of the defense, and the only point relied upon is the want of a proper writing subscribed by the party- to be charged. The letter of May 26, 1891, furnishes ample evidence that Donovan had made an agreement with Barnett for the use of the mare, which, though not in writing, was communicated to the defendant, McCrea, by a letter of Donovan duly signed in his behalf. This furnished a perfect memorandum of the terms of the contract, was properly subscribed by Donovan for Mc-Crea, and was supplemented by McCrea’s answer and letter accepting and acknowledging the contract. The only object of the statute of frauds is to prevent a reliance upon oral contracts in certain cases, and to obtain satisfactory written evidence, by some memorandum subscribed by the party to be charged, or his agent, of the terms of the contract itself. The statute itself does not require the contract to be signed, but provides that a note or memorandum of it suffices for the purpose upon which the statute itself is based. Following this undoubted object, it has been frequently held that ¡letters signed by a party’s agent, and sent to the principal, are ample evidence to satisfy the purpose of the statute; and there is no reason why this should not be so. The statute of frauds is not a trap, but a wholesome law for the production of written evidence, and is satisfied if that evidence exists. The whole contract may be evidenced by such a writing as a letter by an agent to a principal; or, where there are partial writings, exhibiting portions of the terms of the contract, such a letter may furnish the additional information necessary to complete the contract, and to charge the party sued upon such an obligation. In Peabody v. Speyers, 56 N. Y. 230, our court of appeals held that a letter written by the agent to his principal, even though the principal was undisclosed as a principal to the plaintiff, of which the plaintiff had no knowledge, was sufficient to perfect the memorandum of sale. In Welford v. Beazely, 3 Atk. 503, Lord Chancellor Hardwiclce held that a letter to a man’s own agent has been deemed a signing, within the statute, even though the party never intended to bind himself by it. This is approved by Sugden in his work on Vendors, marg. p. 129. See, also, Fowle v. Freeman, 9 Ves. 351, 355; Story; Eq. Jur. !i§ 755-757; Jervis v. Smith, 1 Hoff. Ch. 470; Williams v. Bacon, 2 Gray, 391; Gale v. Nixon, 6 Cow. 445. Within the principle of these authorities, the letters of Donovan and McOrea afforded ample evidence of the contract made. Viewing Donovan either as an agent of McCrea or as the mutual source of method of communication to give information between the parties, a letter signed for him, with the communications of McCrea, justify the assertion that a note or memorandum of the contract with Barnett was signed by the party to be charged, or his agent, and renders a judgment for the plaintiff necessary. The case of Haydock v. Stow, 40 N. Y. 363, does not militate against this result. The paper referred to in that case was not designed as a proposal, was not a narration of what had been done, and, therefore, neither as a proposition to be acted upon, nor a memorandum of what had been done, did it suffice. I have taken some pains to examine authorities not referred to by either counsel to see if my impressions produced upon the trial were incorrect, but such examination has only tended to confirm them. Judgment for plaintiff for the rental price, the service fee of the stallion, and the cost of keeping the colt.
    Argued before MAYHAM, P. J., and PUTNAM and HERRICK, JJ.
    Cleason & Johnson, (A. T. Johnson, of counsel,) for appellant.
    Theo. H. Swift, for respondent.
   MAYHAM, P. J.

Upon the facts found by the learned trial judge, which seem to be supported by the evidence, we think he reached a correct conclusion, and that the judgment should be affirmed upon the opinion at special term. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.  