
    Monte Cato Little COYOTE, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lori Anne Harper SUEK; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-35820
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted September 13, 2016 
    
    Filed September 22, 2016
    Monte Cato Little Coyote, Jr„ Pro Se.
    Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Federal prisoner Monte' Cato Little Coyote, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), alleging constitutional violations arising out of his criminal conviction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Little Coyote’s action because Little Coyote’s conviction has not been invalidated and his habeas petition was denied. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”); Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (order) (applying the rationale of Heck to Bivens actions). Because the district court did not specify whether the dismissal of Little Coyote’s action was with or without prejudice, we treat the dismissal as being without prejudice. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissals under Heck are without prejudice).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Little Coyote’s complaint without leave to amend. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “a district court may dismiss without leave where ... amendment would be futile”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to recuse the magistrate judge because Little Coyote failed to establish any ground for recusal. See United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for recusal).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We lack jurisdiction to consider the district court’s order denying Little Coyote’s motion to alter or amend the judgment because Little Coyote failed to amend his notice of appeal or file a separate notice of appeal. See Whitaker, 486 F.3d at 585.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     