
    Benjamin Estes et al., Resp’ts, v. Robert J. Dean, App’lt.
    
      (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department,
    
    
      Filed January 14, 1896.)
    
    Reference—Compulsory.
    The fact that the services consist of distinct steps and proceedings, which may be stated in numerous separate items, does not make an attorney’s bill a long account within the meaning of' the" statute which authorizes a compulsory reference.
    Appeal from an order of compulsory reference.
    Lyman E. Warren, for app’lt;
    Benjamin Estes, for resp’ts.
   BARTLETT, J.

The respondents are quite right in their contention that the claim of an attornéy for legal services, if it involves the examination of á long account, may be sent to a referee for trial, just the same as a claim in behalf of any other person. In an action by an attorney against his client, however, to recover the value of professional services on a quantum meruit, it is settled by authority that the fact that the services consist of distinct steps and proceedings, which may be stated in numerous separate items, does not make the attorney’s bill a long account within the meaning of the statute which authorizes a compulsory reference. Randall v. Sherman, 131 N. Y. 669; 43 St. Rep.. 923; Spence v. Simis, 137 N. Y. 616, 618; 51 St. Rep. 167. The services rendered upon one retainer constitute a single cause of action. There are four such causes of action set out in the complaint herein. In regard to each the plaintiffs have itemized the work done in their bill of particulars, but the cases cited distinctly hold that a claim is not rendered referable by reason of the fact that it is thus capable of itemization.

The order appealed from should be reversed, with costs.

All concur.  