
    Michael Tyran MARSHALL, Petitioner—Appellant, v. Joe SMITH, Warden, Respondent—Appellee.
    No. 05-6062.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: April 14, 2005.
    Decided: April 20, 2005.
    Michael Tyran Marshall, Appellant pro se.
    Deana A. Malek, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM:

Michael Tyran Marshall seeks to appeal the magistrate judge’s order dismissing as untimely his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000), and denying his objections to the magistrate judge’s dismissal order. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certifícate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Marshall has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certifícate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED 
      
      . Because the petition was untimely, we do not address the other reasons for dismissal discussed in the district court’s opinion.
     
      
      . Marshall consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge to enter a final order in this case. See U.S.C. § 636(c) (2000); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73.
     