
    A. J. & G. W. Huntington, vs. Henry Shultz & M'Kenna.
    
      The service of a writ of capias ad respondendum, by delivering a copy, is not an arrest, within the meaning of the act of 1791, exempting from arrest persons necessarily attending on courts.
    
    
      A writ of capias ad respondendum was issued against the deiendants, returnable to March term, 1824, which was personally served upon one of them (Henry Shultz) during his attendance as a party toa suit in the court of equity, at February term, 1824- There was no affidavit to hold to bail. Henry Shultz, at March term, moved to set aside the service of the writ, on the ground that he was privileged from the service of this writ during.his attendance on the court. The court granted the motion. The plaintiff appealed from this order on the following grounds:
    ist. That the privilege claimed by the defendant applies only to cases where bail is required, and where the body is liable to be taken into custody; and not to cases where the writ is served by delivering a copy to defendant, with notice to appear, and where there is no arrest:
    
      2d. That even if a, defendant be privileged in such cases, while attending a court of law, the same privilege does.not extend to parties attending the courts of equity.
   The opinion of the Court ivas delivered iy

Mr. Justice Richardson.

The question in this case depends upon the act of 1791; 1 Faust, 44; 1 Brevard, 223; which'enacts that “ all persons necessarily going to, attending on, or returning from the same,” (referring to the superior courts) “ shall be freed from arrests in any civil action.73

Now what does the term “arrest” mean? Wood (see Institutes, 595) defines it“ a detention of tlie person”: and Blackstone, (3 vol. p. 288) says “ an arrest must be by corporal seizing the defendant’s body; after which the sheriff may justify breaking open the house, in order to take him;33 and inp. 289, he says “ when the defendant is arrested, he must cither go to prison or put in special bail to the sheriff.”

These authorities show that an arrest is synonimous with actual detention of the person of the party arrested; and does not mean merely a.summons or citation.

The scope and object of the act of 1791 too, evidently require no more than that the person of the party attending court shall be free from detention; and he may be cited or summoned without any detention of his person. Blackstone gives an apt illustration of the distinction, when he says (p. 288,) Sec. “ that in the civil law, for the most part, not so much as a corn-' mon citation or summons, much less an arrest, can he exercised apon a man within his own walls.”

And our act of 1794, exempting militia men, when at muster, from the service of any writ, equally points out the same distinction. The motion is granted.

Johnson, Huger, and Colcock, Justices, concurred.  