
    Samuel Walker, administrator of Stacey Walker, appellant against John Smith, appellee.
    One died in 1798 intestate, unmarried, without father, mother, brother or sister, leaving uncles and aunts on the father’s and mother’s side, and the issue of some who were dead, the whole estate goes to such uncles and aunts and the issue representing such as are dead, equally.
    This was an appeal from the decree of the Orphans’ Court of Philadelphia county, and came before the Supreme Court on a case stated as follows : • ■
    Joseph Walker, senior, and Stacey Walker his son, both died in the month of September 1798, the former on the 18th and the latter on the 25th September. Stacey was the only child his father ever had. They both died intestate. Stacey, by the death of his father, became entitled to all his real and personal estate.
    The personal estate, after payment of debts, amounted to $6008-AY) and a house and lot of ground in the Northern Liberties of Philadelphia, since sold for $800, descended to him from his father.
    Stacey Walker, at the time of his death, was possessed in his own right of personal estáte, after payment of his debts, to the value of $3124,^, independent of what descended to him from his father’s estate as above mentioned.
    Joseph Walker, the father of Stacey, had been a widower for many years preceding his death.
    Stacey Walker was never married, and at the time of his death had the following kindred on the part of his father, viz. an uncle, Robert Walker; the children of another deceased uncle, named George Walker, two in number; the children of another deceased uncle, named Emanuel Walker, five in number; and three aunts, all of which uncles and aunts were of the whole blood of Joseph, the father.
    And at the time of the death of the said Stacey Walker, there were alive the children of an aunt on his mother’s side, who had married Tristram Smith, and her husband is now alive, but she died before Stacey Walker; and one brother of his mother, viz. Stacey Beakes, who died about six months since. The place of his late residence is uncertain, but it is supposed he left children.
    * a 1 *The questions submitted to the opinion of the court 4 J are,
    i st. Whether the uncles and aunts of the said Stacey Walker, on the part of the father of the said Stacey, under the intestate laws of Pennsylvania, are not entitled, in a course of distribution, to the whole of the real and personal estate descended to the said Stacey Walker from his father Joseph Walker, and also to all the personal estate he was possessed of in his own right, independent of that which descended to him from his father, to the exclusion of the brothers and sisters on the part of Stacey’s mother, or the children who have survived them ?
    2d. If Stacey Walker’s uncle and aunt, (or her husband or children,) on the part of his mother, are entitled to any part of the real or personal estate so descended to him from his father ? Also, what proportion, if any, of the personal estate he had independent of his- father’s estate ?
    John C. Wells, in behalf of those claiming on the part of and as kindred of the father of Stacey Walker.
    Jared Ingersoll for the kindred on the part of his mother.
    The Orphans’ Court decreed, that the uncles and aunts surviving, and the children of such as were dead, as well on the part of the mother as on the part of the father, should inherit the whole estate of Stacey Walker equally.
    The appeal was now argued by Messrs. Rawle and Wells on the part of the appellant, and by Mr. Ingersoll on the part of the appellee.
    For the appellant. By the old aci of 1705, “ for the better “ settling of intestates’ estates,” it is provided by § 2, that in case the intestate leaves no wife nor child, then the surplusage of his estate shall go to the next of kindred in equal degree of or unto the intestate, and their legal representatives, and in no other manner whatsoever. 1 Dali. St. Laws Append. 44.
    This law was repealed by the act of 19th April 1794, 3 St. Laws 521, which introduces many alterations in the former code, by taking away (amongst other things) the double share of the eldest son of the intestate, and letting in the half blood to inherit the real estate. It drops in § 3 the words next of kindred used in the old law, and introduces the words all of equal degree of consanguinity. The 7th section is highly material. Where there is no widow, issue, nor father, but a mother, the whole of the real estate shall be enjoyed by the mother of the intestate *during her life, and the personal estate be absolutely r* .o2 vested in her, unless they, or either of them, came to the L 4 intestate from the part of his or her father, in which case it shall descend and be enjoyed as if the intestate had survived his or her mother. This section points to the source from which the estate, real or personal, is derived, and makes a correspondent provision. But would it not be monstrous to suppose, that Stacey Walker’s mother, if living, was interdicted from taking any part of the real or personal estate which descended to him under his father, and yet that her sister, who derived her claim under and through her, should take a share thereof ! Can the legislature have intended so gross an absurdity !
    By § 11, where the intestate leaves no children, nor lawful issue, father or mother, brothers or sisters, or their lawful issue of the whole blood, then brothers and sisters of the half blood and their issue shall inherit their estate, in preference to the more remote kindred of the whole blood, unless where the inheritance came to the person so seized by descent, devise or gift of some one ancestor, in which case, all those who are not of the blood of such ancestor, shall be excluded from such inheritance.
    The whole law must be taken together, to avoid absurd inferences therefrom. The introduction of sections is not absolutely necessary to the exposition of statutes, though they have their advantages. The last words of § 11 must be considered as running through the whole act, and shew the intention of the legislature that the whole blood shall exclude the half blood. It is practically easier to find out the relations on the part of either of the father or mother than of both.
    The words next of kindred are introduced for the first time in § 12 of the act. Where there are no widow, lineal descendant, father or mother, brothers or sisters of the whole or half blood, or their lawful issue, then the real and personal estate of the intestate shall be divided among the next of kin of equal degree, but this does not take away the force of the preceding sections. If it was otherwise, the consequence would be that a mother would be excluded, while her sister, brother, nieces or nephews would be let in. But it must be admitted, that if § 12 is to be considered as-detached from and unexplained by the preceding sections, then we fail in our appeal.
    The § 5 of the supplementary act of 4th April 1797, 4 St. Laws 158, keeps up the distinction in § 7, of the original law; If any intestate shall die seized of real estate in fee simple, and leave no widow, issue, father, brother, sister or their represen tatives, then the said estate shall be vested in fee simple’in the mother, unless where the estate has descended on the part of the father, and § 7 further preserves the distinction.
    o 1 *The succession to estates is a creature of civil polity. 4 2 Bl. Com. 211. But statutes made in pari materia, shall explain each other. 4 Bac. 646. In doubtful cases, the construction of a statute may be extended, according to the reason and sense of the law makers either expressed in other parts of the act itself, or guessed at by considering the frame and design of the whole. 11 Mod. 161. 1 Dali. 434. -Judges have expounded the words of an act contrary to the text to make it agree with reason and equity. 19 Vin. 514. 1 Dali. 478. In the supplementary intestate act of 23d March 1764, awdwas construed or. 1 Dali. 178. The true intention and meaning of the legislature must be consulted; and to form a correct idea of it in the present instance, the whole of the'two last intestate laws must be considered as a system.
    For the appellee. Stacey Walker died intestate unmarried, without father, mother, brother, or sister; and the question is who shall inherit his property ?
    The law is its own best expositor; and we apprehend, has legislated for the particular case. But if it was casus omissus, it is not the province of the court to supply the defect. They can construe, but not make laws. The legislature meet annually ; and if the intestate act requires amendments, they only are competent to make them.
    The different provisions of the two late intestate acts, so far as they relate to the present subject shall be examined. The title of the law of 19th April 1794 is “an act directing the de- “ scent of intestate’s real estates, and distribution of their personal estates, and for other purposes therein mentioned.” § 1, directs the talcing of bonds on granting letters of administration. § 2, directs, how long the debts of deceased persons shall be a lien on their estates.
    § 3. Prescribes the descent and distribution, in cases, where the intestate leaves a widow and lawful issue.
    § 4. Where there is no widow, but issue; and where there is a widow, but no issue.
    § 5. Where there is no widow or issue, but a father; in which case the whole of the real estate goes to the father during life, and the personal estate absolutely. But if either estate shall come from the mother, then the father shall take no part thereof.
    § 6. Where there is no widow or issue, but a father and brothers and sisters, or the issue of such brothers and sisters, then after the death of the father, the brothers and sisters and # o -1 *their issue shall hold the lands. But where there are no 4 41 brothers or sisters, or their representatives, but a father, then the estates shall go to the father in fee simple, unless where the estate has descended from the part of the mother, as aforesaid.
    § 7. Where there is no widow, or issue, or father but a mother, the whole of the real estate goes to the mother during life, and the personal estate absolutely; but if either estate shall come from the father, then the mother, shall take no part thereof.
    This provision is in totidem verbis with that made for the father in § 5. And the legislature must naturally have contemplated the case to arise, when the intestate would have near relations, as brothers and sisters ; and that the estate in the usual course of things, would not go to distant relations. The event was to be in the life of the mother.
    § 8. Where there is no widow, issue, or father, but a mother and brothers and sisters, then after the death of the mother, the brothers and sisters and their issue shall hold the lands.
    This corresponds with § 6, (which respects the father) in every particular, imitatis mutandis, except the last clause of that section, giving the lands to the father in fee simple, where there are no brothers or sisters, or their representatives.
    § 9. Respects advancements made to children, and
    § 10. Respects posthumous children.
    § 11. Has been fully detailed by the adverse counsel.
    The concluding words have been much relied on, and are said to run through the whole law, and must be incorporated therewith. The slightest inspection will evince that this was not the intention of the legislature. They are preceded by the expressions, “in which case.” What case? The law furnishes the answer. “ Where the inheritance came to the said person “so seized, by descent, devise or gift of some one of his or “her ancestors,” the more remote kindred of the whole blood shall take in preference to brothers and sisters of the half blood and their lawful issue. The provision is confined to the case enumerated in the very section.
    § 12. Is a general clause providing for distant relations, and clearly embraces the principal case before the court.
    Where the intestate leaves no widow, lineal descendant, father, mother, brothers or sisters of the whole or half blood, nor their issue, the real and personal estate shall go to and be divided among the next of kin of equal degree; the lawful issue of such deceased kindred to come in and take loco parentis, with the surviving kindred.
    These words admit of no ambiguity. “Next of kin” have a certain, defined, legal meaning.
    It will be found, that the supplementary law of 4th April * 1797, also enumerates cases, without laying down any . o - general rule. t*485
    § 1. Points out the proceedings, to compel executors and administrators to give security, &c.
    § 2. How their sureties shall be made liable.
    
      Overruled in 7 S. & R. 397. See also Shippen v. Izard, 1 S. & R. 226.
    § 3. How executors and administrators may settle their accounts and be discharged.
    § 4. Limits the time during which the debts of deceased persons shall remain a lien on their lands.
    § 5. Prescribes the descent of real estate and distribution of personal estate of intestates in the following cases :
    Where intestate leaves a widow and no issue; where a woman dies without and with a husband; where there is no widow, issue, father, brother, or sister, or their representatives, but a mother; where there is no widow, issue, father or mother, but brothers and sisters of the whole blood, or their issue, living some brother or sister.
    § 6. Enumerates the last case again, as to real estate, where there is no brother or sister of the whole blood living, but lawful issue of deceased brothers or sisters.
    § 7. Where there is no widow, issue, father ,or mother, but brothers and sisters of the whole and half blood, or their representatives ; and where there are no brothers or sisters of the whole blood, or their representatives, but brothers and sisters of the half blood, such half blood shall inherit the real and personal estate, except such parts of the real estate as came to such intestate by descent, devise or gift of some ancestor, &c. with the like words as are inserted in the close of section 11, of the act of 1794, and which have been before remarked on.
    The remaining sections of this supplement throw no light on the subj ect before the court; and it will appear, that as to the intestate’s uncles and aunts, or their issue, this last law is wholly silent, and leaves them on the footing they were placed by the act of 1794.
    As to what Stacey Walker, the son, acquired by his own industry, independent of what he took under his father, the argument has been in a great degree abandoned by the appellant’s counsel. And it is apprehended, there can be no legal ground of discrimination between such parts of his estate, and what descended to him upon his father’s death. Circumstanced as the case is, the 12th section of the act of 1794, vests the real and personal estate in the next of kin of Stacey Walker; and his relations on the part of the mother, as well as on the part of the father, constitute such kindred.
    Viewing the case in the strongest light for the appellant, we * cannot go further than to say, it was casus omissus ; and 4 -I then the well known remark as to last wills are applicable, vohát sed non dixit.
    
   The court unanimously affirmed the decree of the Orphans’ Court.  