
    PEOPLE v SHANNON
    Docket No. 69661.
    Submitted January 3, 1984, at Lansing.
    Decided April 17, 1984.
    Leave to appeal applied for.
    Phillip Shannon, pursuant to a plea bargain, pled guilty in Jackson Circuit Court to a charge of assaulting an employee of a place of confinement and was sentenced, Charles J. Falahee, J. Defendant appeals, contending that his conviction should be reversed because the trial judge misinformed him that the maximum sentence for the offense to which he was pleading was five years. In fact, the maximum is four years. Defendant was sentenced to a consecutive term of two and one-half to four years. Held:
    
    A failure of a trial court to impart information concerning the maximum possible sentence which can be imposed on a defendant pleading guilty generally requires reversal. However, such failure should not be regarded as reversible error per se where there is a sentence bargain and the defendant has been sentenced in accordance with the bargain. The error in informing defendant that the maximum possible sentence was greater than it actually was does not require reversal since defendant was not prejudiced thereby.
    Affirmed.
    1. Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Sentencing.
    The failure of a trial court accepting a guilty plea to inform the defendant personally of the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense to which the plea is offered generally requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction; however, such a failure should not be regarded as reversible error per se where there is a sentence bargain and the defendant has been sentenced in accordance with the bargain (GCR 1963, 785.7[l][b]).
    2. Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Nolo Contendere — Court Rules.
    Whether a particular departure from the requirements of the court rule concerning pleas of guilty and pleas of nolo contendere justifies or requires reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of the noncompliance (GCR 1963, 785.7).
    
      References for Points in Headnotes
    [1-3] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 778.
    21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 472 et seq.
    
    
       21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 492 et seq.
    
    
      3. Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Sentencing.
    Reversal of a conviction based on a guilty plea is not required where the trial court misinformed the defendant as to the maximum sentence possible for the offense to which the defendant was pleading if there is no possibility that the defendant was prejudiced thereby.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Edward J. Grant, Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph A. Greenleaf, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.
    State Appellate Defender (by P. E. Bennett), for defendant on appeal.
    Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and Allen and R. S. Hoffius, JJ.
    
      
       Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
    
   Per Curiam.

On his plea of guilty, defendant was convicted of assaulting an employee of a place of confinement, MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3). A plea bargain in the case resulted in the dismissal of two assault charges and dismissal of a fourth-felony offender charge. MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. Defendant appeals as of right.

On appeal, defendant claims that his conviction should be reversed because the trial judge misinformed him of the maximum sentence for the offense to which he was pleading. Defendant was told twice that the maximum sentence for his offense was five years; it is, in fact, four years. See MCL 750.503; MSA 28.771. Defendant was told that the sentence would run consecutively to the sentence he was serving at the time of the offense. He was sentenced to a consecutive term of two and one-half to four years in prison.

GCR 1963, 785.7(l)(b) requires a judge accepting a guilty plea to inform the defendant personally of the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense to which the plea is offered. A failure to impart the information concerning the maximum possible sentence generally requires reversal. Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 118; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).

The failure to advise a defendant pleading guilty of the maximum sentence which could be imposed should not be regarded as reversible error per se where there is a sentence bargain and the defendant has been sentenced in accordance with the bargain. People v Jackson, 417 Mich 243, 246; 334 NW2d 371 (1983).

In this case, the trial judge did n'ot fail to impart information concerning the maximum sentence, but informed the defendant that the maximum possible sentence was higher than it actually was. We do not regard such an error as coming within the per se rule requiring reversal adopted in Guilty Plea Cases, supra. Instead, this issue must be decided by applying the general rule that the nature of the noncompliance with the court rule determines whether reversal is required. See Guilty Plea Cases, supra, p 113, where it is stated as follows:

"Noncompliance with a requirement of Rule 785.7 may but does not necessarily require reversal.

"Whether a particular departure from Rule 785.7 justifies or requires reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of the noncompliance.”

The foregoing statement from Guilty Plea Cases, supra, has been cited in People v Rogers, 412 Mich 669, 671; 316 NW2d 701 (1982).

The decision in Jackson, supra, suggests that reversal is not required where no possibility exists that a defendant has been misled to his prejudice.

We believe that the error in informing the defendant that the maximum possible sentence was greater than it actually was does not require reversal. The rule requiring that a judge inform a defendant of the maximum possible sentence for the offense to which he is pleading was intended to inform the defendant of the most serious consequences he faces if he pleads guilty. This purpose was fully served in the present case, despite the fact that defendant was misinformed as to the maximum penalty.

Misinformation concerning a maximum possible sentence could mislead a defendant to his prejudice if he is informed that the maximum is less than it actually is. We conclude, however, that defendant was not misled to his prejudice. Reversal is not, therefore, required.

Affirmed.  