
    FLORES v. STATE.
    (No. 11369.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 22, 1928.
    Rehearing Denied March 28, 1928.
    I.Homicide <3=332 — That act, providing saving clause for amendatory act, became effective before amendatory act, did not result in repeal of former when latter became effective (Acts 40th Leg. [1927] c. 274, § 3a; Acts 40th Leg. 1st Called Sess. [1927] c. 8).
    Where Legislature, after enactment of Acts 49th Leg. (1927) c. 274, abolishing offense of manslaughter, and before such amendment became effective, passed emergency act amending section 3a to take place of saving clause Act June 9, 1927 (Acts 40th Leg. 1st Called Sess. [1927], c. 8), saving clause so enacted was not repealed by original amendment at time it took effect, though effective date of original amendment was subsequent to that of the additional act.
    2. Statutes <3=5 — Legislature, having omitted saving clause from amendatory act, had authority to pass as emergency measure further amendatory act during special session (Acts 40th Leg. [1927] c. 274, § 3a; Acts 40th Leg. 1st Called Sess. [1927] c. 8).
    Legislature, after passing amendment which abolished offense of manslaughter (Acts 40th Leg. [1927] c. 274), had power to pass an act amending section 3a at subsequently called special session, which act approved June 9, 1927 (Acts 40th Leg. 1st Called Sess. [1927] c. 8), provided saving clause, and to pass such act as an emergency measure, though by so doing it became effective before original amendatory act, and, under such circumstances, both acts were considered in determining status of offenses committed prior to passage of original amendment.
    3. Homicide <3=32 — Conviction for manslaughter on June 10, 1927, held sustained, notwithstanding act abolishing offense of manslaughter, in' view of amendment (Pen. Code 1925, art. 14; Acts 40th Leg. [1927] c. 274, § 3a).
    Conviction for manslaughter on June 10, 1927, held sustained under Pen. Code 1925, art. 14, notwithstanding Acts 40th Leg. (1927), c. 274, which abolished offense of manslaughter and became effective on June 15, in view of Act of June 9, 1927 (Acts 40th Leg. 1st Called Sess. [1927], c. 8), amending section 3a to exclude offenses committed prior to the taking effect of the amendment.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    4. Statutes <3=129 — Legislature may amend Its own laws, passed at same or previous session.
    Legislature has right and power to amend its own acts in their passage from the introduction of the bill to its final passage, and may change laws passed at the same or any previous session, as well as those passed by prior Legislature.
    Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; W. W. McCrory, Judge.
    Miguel Flores was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Hogan & Matthews and Dave Watson, all of San Antonio, for appellant.
    A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   LATTIMORE, J.

Conviction for manslaughter ; punishment, five years in the penitentiary.

Against the correctness and justness of the conviction and th.e punishment therefor, appellant makes but one point. He,was put on trial June 6, 1927, for murder alleged to have been committed in November, 1925, arid on June 10th was convicted of manslaughter. On June 24th he filed a motion in arrest of judgment, setting up that by the Act of the Fortieth Legislature (chapter 274, Acts Regular Session) the offense of manslaughter -was abolished, which act became effective 90 days after the adjournment of the Legislature, or on June 15, 1927. Further it is claimed that said act had no saving clause relating to cases of manslaughter theretofore committed, whether pending in the trial courts or appellate courts. He also set up that the first called session of said Legislature was convened on May 9, 1927, and that same attempted to enact a law amending section 3a of said chapter 274, supra, so as to provide that no offense committed prior to the taking effect of said chapter 274 should be affected by the provisions of said chapter, but that in such case the offender should be proceeded against and punished under the law as it existed before the taking effect of said chapter. This act (Acts 40th Leg. [1st Galled Sess.] c. 8) amending said section 3a, was approved June 9, 1927, and, having passed with the emergency clause and a sufficient vote, became effective as of that date. Against the effectiveness of the amending act of the special session, for the purpose intended, it is urged that in some way, because the amending act was made to take effect prior to the time of the taking effect of said chapter 274, of which the amending act was an amendment, that the subsequent taking effect of said chapter 274 on June 15th operated to repeal the amending act, as well as the old law on the subject of manslaughter. We are cited to no authorities so holding, and find ourselves unable to follow the involved reasoning offered in support of appellant’s contention.

Chapter 274, supra, after its final passage by the Legislature and its approval by the Governor, might have been amended or repealed during the same sitting of the Legislature which passed it, and we think the argument—that the change made in said chapter by the amending act of the special session was beyond the powers of the lawmakers—has no support in precedent, reason, or authority. We are of opinion that, when chapter 274, supra, became effective June 15, 1927, the act of the special session amending section 3a became a part of the amended law of murder by which the offense of manslaughter was repealed and that the law so passed did not affect offenses theretofore committed against the old law.

At the time appellant was convicted on June 10, 1927, the amendment of the special session had been approved and was effective as such amendment. When the; motion for new trial was acted upon, and appellant was seh-tenced on June 24, 1927, chapter 274 as amended had become effective and was the law.

We find nothing in the record leading us to conclude that the trial, judgment, and sentence of appellant were not regular, and, no error appearing, the judgment will be affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

HAWKINS, J.

Appellant predicates his motion for rehearing on two propositions: First, that the Acts of the Regular Session of the Fortieth Legislature expressly abolished the offense of manslaughter. Said act became effective after this conviction, and therefore this proceeding would have to be dismissed. Second, that the Acts of the Special Session of the Fortieth Legislature, amending the acts of the regular session relative to murder, did not revive the offense of manslaughter, and same therefore no longer exists upon our statutes.

There seems no question as to the proposition that the offense of manslaughter no longer exists under our statutes. It might also be conceded that, unless the Legislature correctly inserted a saving clause in the act abolishing manslaughter, then under all the authorities, and under the provisions of article 14, P. G. 1925, this conviction would have to be reversed, and the proceedings dismissed.

It seems trite to say that the Legislature has the right and power to amend its own acts in their passage from the introduction of the bill to its final passage. It need not be debated that the Legislature may amend and change its own laws passed at any session, either at that or any subsequent session. It is equally true that one Legislature may amend or change the acts of a prior Legislature.

The law relative to murder, as passed by chapter 274 of the Regular Session of the Fortieth Legislature, did not contain any saving clause by which parties who had theretofore been guilty of the offense of manslaughter, or who might be guilty of such offense subsequent to the passage of the bill but before its taking effect as a law, might be proceeded against. After the passage of the bill and the adjournment of the Legislature, this defect was apparently discovered and in a special session of the Legislature an amendatory act was passed in entire accordance with the mandates of our Constitution in reference to such matters. Chapter 274, Acts of the Regular Session of the Fortieth Legislature, was amended by chapter 8 of the Special Session, and the amenda-tory act manifests no effort to amend any section or part of the law by reference to its title only, but section 3a of chapter 274 was specifically amended by the insertion of a saving clause, the amended section 3a being set out fully in chapter 8, and we observe no reason whatever for appellant’s complaint thereat. He cites the case- of Hazelrigg v. Hazelrigg, 169 Ky. 345, 183 S. W. 933, but same seems entirely inapplicable. We quote from the opinion in that case:

“The act of 1914 [chapter 20] states in its title and in the body of the act that its pur-' pose is-to amend and re-enact sections 1833 to 1851, inclusive, of the Statutes [Ky. St. 1909], but it does not re-enact or publish at length the law it seeks to amend, except in subsection one which amends section 1849 of the statutes. It results, therefore, if said act is, in fact, an amendment of the existing law, as it says it is, that the Legislature, in the enactment of this act, except in subsection 1, entirely disregarded the plain provisions of this section of the Constitution.”

Plainly an act purposing to amend eighteen sections of a former law, which actually set out at length only one of said eighteen sections, would be deemed definitely violative of the Constitution which requires the amenda-tory act to republish and set out in full the proposed amendments. We see no sort of reason for discussing the proposition again advanced, that, because the amendatory act took effect before the taking effect of chapter 274, supra, of which it was an amendment, when chapter 274 did take , effect, it repealed the amendatory act. We get nothing out of such proposition. It is clear that section 3a was properly amended, and, by reason of such amendment, became a part of the original chapter 274, and that, when chapter 274 became effective, amended section 3a was a part thereof. This law took out of our statutes the offense of manslaughter, but did so with the saving clause, which makes appellant’s contention without merit. His offense was committed before the taking effect of said general law. He was and will be correctly proceeded against as under the old law.

The motion for rehearing is overruled. 
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