
    QIUYUN ZHENG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-1465.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 24, 2013.
    
      Farah Loftus, Century City, CA, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Francis Fraser, Assistant Director; Kate D. Balaban, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Present JON O. NEWMAN, GERARD E. LYNCH and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Qiuyun Zheng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 15, 2012, decision of the BIA affirming the May 11, 2010, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Mary M. Cheng, denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Qiuyun Zheng, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (BIA Mar. 15, 2012), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig.Ct.N.Y. City May 11, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

For applications such as Zheng’s, governed by the amendments made to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on the applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the ... claim.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008). We will “defer to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make” such a ruling. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

Although the IJ based her credibility finding on some portions of Zheng’s testimony that were inconsistent and some inconsistencies between his testimony and the documentary evidence, she also relied on two related inconsistencies in his testimony that are trivial. First, she noted that at the hearing on May 11, 2010, Zheng testified on direct examination that his fíancée’s abortion occurred on October 18, 2008, and on cross-examination that it occurred on October 19, 2008. Second, the IJ noted that Zheng testified on direct examination that his fiancée came home from the hospital on October 20, and on cross-examination that she came home on October 18. When confronted with these inconsistencies, he testified that the October 18 date for both events was correct.

These one- and two-day inconsistencies, which Zheng promptly corrected, in testimony given more than a year and one half after the events, are too trivial to lend support to a finding that Zheng lacked credibility. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 (“We must assess whether the IJ has provided specific, cogent reasons for the adverse credibility finding....”) (internal quotation marks omitted). In view of the fact that the other inconsistencies noted by the IJ are at best of only marginal significance, we conclude that a remand is warranted for reconsideration of Zheng’s credibility, without regard to the two items concerning the October dates. And, al- ■ though we have no doubt that the IJ could reconsider the matter impartially, putting these two items out of her consideration, we believe there is a risk of an appearance of partiality if the same IJ reconsiders the matter. We therefore direct that reconsideration occur at a new hearing before a different I J.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED, and the matter is remanded for reconsideration before a different IJ.  