
    HUSTED v. McINTOSH.
    1. Automobiles—Directed Verdict—Imputed Ñegligence—New Trial.
    In married woman’s action against defendant motorist for injuries sustained in collision between defendant’s car and one driven by plaintiff’s husband, where trial court directed verdict for defendant on the ground that the husband was guilty of contributory negligence which was imputable to plaintiff and Supreme Court later abandoned the long-established doctrine of imputed negligence, new trial is granted to determine questions of defendant’s negligence and the contributory negligence, if any, of plaintiff herself.
    
      Plaintiff is not barred from recovering by the negligent act or omission of the third person, see 2 Restatement, Torts, §§485, 490.
    
      2. Costs—Reversal on Abandonment op Doctrine op Imputed Negligence-New Trial.
    Upon reversal of judgment because of abandonment of doctrine of imputed negligence and the granting of a new trial to plaintiff, costs of both courts abide the result of a new trial.
    Appeal from Shiawassee; Collins (Joseph H.), J.
    Submitted January 9, 1946.
    (Docket No. 30, Calendar No. 43,196.)
    Decided March 4, 1946.
    Case by Goldie Hnsted against Alex McIntosh for damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Directed verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
    Reversed and new trial granted.
    
      V. 0. Braun (Kenneth B. Kelly, of counsel), for plaintiff.
    
      Milton O. Bchancupp, for defendant.
   Starr, J.

This case involves an automobile accident which occurred about 1 o’clock in the morning of November 5, 1944, on highway M-21 near the city limits of Owosso. .Plaintiff’s husband was driving his automobile west on said highway. Plaintiff was riding in the front seat with him, and another couple occupied the back seat. At that time and place defendant was driving east, and a collision occurred which resulted in severe injuries to plaintiff.

In January, 1945, she began the present suit, alleging that defendant was negligent and that her driver was free from contributory negligence. Defendant answered, denying the charge of negligence and alleging that plaintiff’s driver was guilty of contributory negligence, which was imputable to her. At the conclusion of all proofs the trial court granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the ground that plaintiff’s driver was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, which was imputed to her and barred recovery. Judgment was entered on the directed verdict, plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was denied, and she appeals.

In our opinion in Bricker v. Green, ante, 218 (163 A. L. R. 697), filed subsequent to the entry of judgment in the present case, we overruled the long-established doctrine of imputed negligence. Therefore, in the case now before us the negligence of plaintiff’s driver cannot be imputed to her. The judgment for defendant must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial to determine the questions of defendant’s negligence and the negligence, if any, of plaintiff herself.

Judgment reversed and new trial granted. The allowance of costs of both courts shall abide the result of a new trial.

Btjtzel, C. J., and Carr, Bushnbll, Sharpe, Boyles, Reid, and North, JJ., concurred.  