
    Benoni DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sharon SWEETING-LINDSAY, City of New York, Defendants-Appellees.
    
    No. 09-4319-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 12, 2010.
    Wale Mosaku, Law Offices of Wale Mosaku, P.C., Brooklyn, NY, for Appellant.
    Ellen Ravitch, Assistant Corporation Counsel (Stephen J. McGrath, of Counsel, on the brief), for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Appellees.
    
      PRESENT: B.D. PARKER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges, and BARBARA S. JONES, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the official caption in this action to conform to the caption in this order.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Barbara S. Jones, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Benoni Dixon [“Appellant”] appeals from portions of a pre-trial order on evidentiary motions in limine, issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Wolle, J.) as well as from the subsequent jury verdict in favor of Defendant Sharon Sweeting-Lindsay [“Defendant”] and the City of New York [collectively “Defendants”]. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Appellant contends that the District Court erred in precluding evidence concerning the criminal records of both Defendant and Defendant’s husband. Appellant also contends that the District Court erred in allowing evidence concerning allegations that Appellant had threatened and otherwise acted inappropriately towards his co-workers. Further, he contends that the District Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury using language preferred by Appellant, and in denying his oral motion to set aside the jury’s verdict.

Evidentiary decisions, including rulings on motions in limine, are reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Marcic v. Reinauer Transp. Cos., 397 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir.2005). We “will reverse only if an erroneous ruling affected a party’s substantial rights.” Id. In precluding evidence concerning Defendant’s and her husband’s criminal records, the District Court reasoned that any probative value of that evidence was outweighed by the prejudicial effect the evidence would have on Defendant. We see no abuse of discretion here.

The District Court allowed evidence of allegations that Appellant had intimidated and otherwise acted inappropriately towards co-workers on the grounds that, by complaining about events in the workplace, Appellant had opened the door to evidence concerning related workplace occurrences. This evidence was admitted, not for the truth of the matter, but to establish Defendant’s state of mind when she took allegedly retaliatory actions against Appellant. Again, we see no abuse of discretion here.

This Court will find a jury instruction “erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law.” United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir.2004) (internal citation omitted). Appellant has shown no defect in the instruction received by the jury. We find no reversible error in the jury instruction as given by the District Court. We have considered Appellant’s remaining objections to the proceedings below and find them without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the rulings of the District Court and the verdict rendered in favor of Defendants are hereby AFFIRMED.  