
    THE LA ABRA SILVER MINING COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [32 C. Cls. R., 462; 176 U. S. R., 423.]
    
      On the elaioncmfs Appeal,
    
    The treaty with Mexico, 1868, provides instead of a sum in gross that individual claims shall be investigated by a commission and the awards of the umpire be final and conclusive. The defendants present a claim, the umpire makes an award, and Mexico pays the amount of it to the United States, but alleges that it was procured bj fraud and perjury. Before the money is paid over to the claimants Congress pass an act conferring jurisdiction on this court to hear and determine the allegations of fraud with power to vacate and set aside the award. The United States file a bill and the defendants demur. The court passes upon the constitutionality of the statute and holds that the bill sets forth a sufficient cause of action (29 C. Cls. R., 432). Leave is given to plead and the case is now heard on the proofs. The evidence is of great length, consisting of the ex parte affidavits of both parties which were before the umpire, and of the newly discovered evidence upon which the complainants rely to establish the fraud. The latter consists of a letter-book and books of account kept by the company’s agents in Mexico, and of other letters and of testimony taken in this court and by a committee of the Senate.
    The court below decides:
    1. Congress by the Act 28 December, 1892 (27 Stat. L., 409), conferring jurisdiction on this court to hear this ease, determined the legal question as to whether there should be a reexamination of the claim and a retrial of the cause.
    
      2. The examination authorized by the act of 1892 embraces the inquiry as to whether the defendants’ company was compelled to leave Mexico because of the acts of the authorities and the people, and if so, the value of the property abandoned.
    3. Though the fourth section, which relates to the decree, is not as broad as the sections which give the court a right to inquire into the alleged fraud, the purpose is that the court shall determine as to whether all or any portion of the award was procured through fraud and false swearing.
    4. An agent’s declarations and admissions must be within the scope of his authority and his letters a part of the res gestee. In this case the res gestae of the controversy was the condition of the company while doing business in Mexico, so far as the same was affected by the people of Mexico and the acts of the public authorities.
    5. The superintendents of a mining company in Mexico were necessarily general agents with relations of responsibility, confidence, and trust commensurate with their powers, and were the embodiment of the company in the field of its active operations, although it was organized under the laws of New York and had its principal office there. Their statements as to the condition of affairs in Mexico, made at the time and in the ordinary course of business, must be regarded as the statements of the company.
    6. No legal or equitable right of a corporation is violated by the use of letters in a judicial inquiry passing between the responsible and confidential agents of the corporation dealing with matters within their knowledge and authority.
    7. Letters found in a letter-book are admissible if complete in themselves, though some letters may be missing from the book when it is produced by the complainants and offered in evidence against the respondents.
    8. Letters written by an agent after his departure from the mines do not come within his authority as superintendent, and are not competent.
    9. Where a suit is a proceeding in equity this court is not required to find the ultimate facts for the consideration of the Supreme Court. The whole of the record goes up.
    10. The court may decree, under the jurisdiction of the statute, that the whole of the award made by the umpire in favor of the defendants was procured by fraud and perjury, although the Secretary of State decided that the case was one of “fraudulent exaggeration,” and the President retained only a sufficient amount to cover the charge of fraudulent exaggeration and paid the remainder of the award to the present defendants.
   The decision of the court below is affirmed on the same grounds.

Mr. Justice HarlaN

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court December 11, 1899.  