
    Darling v. Lewis.
    1. War. Agency not Revoked. A purchase of land at execution sale being made in the name of H. C., agent of plaintiffs, in 186 , and the redemption money paid to him in February, 1862, the plaintiffs being residents and citizens of Indiana. Held: The war did not revoke the agency.
    2. Deed. Word “Agent” descriptive of the person simply. The title by the purchase vested in H. 0. and not in the plaintiffs, the word “agent" being a mere description of the person. H. C., therefore, was the proper person from whom to redeem.
    FROM KNOX.
    Appeal from Chancery Court at Knoxville, March Term, 1872. O. P. TEMPLE, Ch.
    WashburNE & Prosser, for complainants, said:
    The original bill alleges that on the 22d of October, 1859, complainants recovered seven separate judgments before a justice of the peace,- upon which executions issued, and was levied upon the lands of defendant. . That said lands were condemned, sold by the sheriff, and purchased for complainants by one Henry Chiles in satisfaction of their judgments. That afterwards, on the 17th February, 1862, and during the war, the said Lewis attempted to redeem said lands, by paying to the said Chiles a certain amount in Confederate notes.
    The bill prays that the pretended redemption be set aside and the cloud removed from the title of complainants.
    . Afterwards, an amended bill was filed, alleging the foregoing facts, and also, that the said Chiles had no authority to receive the redemption money; nor, if such authority could be implied, had he any authority to receive anything but gold and silver. Both bills allege that complainants never ratified the transaction, nor received any part of the money.
    The answers to both the original and amended bills admit the judgments, the levy and sale, and purchase by Chiles for complainants, but insist that the redemption was legal; that the payment to Chiles was made in bank notes, and willingly received by him.
    The weight of proof is, that the land was attempted to be redeemed by the defendant, and that the whole amount, or the larger portion of it, was paid in bank notes, and that it was in the spring of 1862. .
    It is not denied that the complainants were at the ■ time all citizens of Indiana, a State loyal to the Government of the United States. The court will take judicial notice, that in February, 1862, the war was flagrant in East Tennessee.
    
      1.The Chancellor erred in declaring the levy and sale void for uncertainty. Such a position is not assumed in the answers; but, on the contrary, the validity of the same, is tacitly conceded. But as the complainants have not appealed, it is presumed that they can take no advantage of this error.
    2.The sale being declared void, and the satisfaction of the judgments by said sale being set aside, was the Chancellor right in rendering a decree against the defendant for the amount of the judgments and interest?
    To answer this question, we must inquire into the •effect of the delivery to Chiles of the bank notes, in February, 1862. If not a redemption of the land, was the payment a satisfaction of the judgments?
    1. A state of war existed. _ The , complainants were citizens of Indiana, and the defendant a citizen of Tennessee. They were enemies to each other in law, and the complainants were alien enemies. It was unlawful for them- to trade with each other. Griswold v. Wad-dington, 15 John., 80-84; Graham v. Merrill et als., 5 Col., 622. And equally so to trade through an agent. 1 Heis., 149.
    2. But the complainants had no agent. Chiles was their agent to obtain judgments and'bid off the land, but no further. Story on Agency, sec. 98. The burden of proof is on the defendant to show the authority to receive the' redemption money, and this he has failed to do.
    3. But all the authority conferred upon Chiles as agent, was revoked by the war, and the payment to Chiles was no more than a deposit for the use of defendant, for which the estate of Chiles is liable to defendant.
    This is substantially the language of the court in Conly, adm’r, et al. v. Benson et ál., 1 Heis., 145. And so in Bice, Chase & Co. v. O’Keefe et als., (manuscript), decided at the last term, the same principle being applied; but in that case the complainants were citizens of Maryland, a slave State; and the court held that they were excepted from the application of this doctrine.
    4. If the payment was intended as a redemption of the land, as it certainly was, whether it was made in Confederate notes, or in depreciated bank paper, it was void as to complainants, even though the agency continued. The law at that time authorized only gold and silver as a legal tender in redemption of lands, and although the creditor might waive this, and accept whatever he saw fit, his agent, without specific instructions, could not. Stewart v. Donelly, 4 Yer., 177; Story on Agency, secs. 181, 215; SImrer et als. v. Green, 3 Col., 419.
    It follows, then, that the payment to Chiles was no satisfaction of the judgments of complainants, and that the decree of the Chancellor is right and should be affirmed.
    Cooke & Hendeeson, for defendants, said:
    1. The charge, that the redemption was obtained by duress, made against defendant Lewis in the bill, is positively and directly denied in his answer. Only one witness was examined to prove the allegation, viz: Richard Harrison. This witness was impeached by the following citizens: T. A.’ Gault, Levi McCloud, Thomas K. Coffman, D. B. Coffman, D. Gammon, William Ledgerwood, Richard Mynatt, and W. R. Lamnie. No attempt was made to sustain him. The contrary was established- by the evidence of two un-impeached witnesses, Levi McCloud and William Led-gerwood.
    2. The position, that the authority of Henry Chiles as agent, was revoked by the breaking out of the civil war, cannot be maintained.' There is no issue in the record upon the fact, and not a particle of reliable evidence to prove it. There was no exception to the answer, and no evidence could be received upon the point. 1 Meigs’ .Dig., 410.
    3. This is a bill to remove a cloud from the title of complainants. The first step, of course, is to establish their title to the land from which the cloud is to be removed. The complainants have wholly failed to do so. A levy seems to have been made in one case only, and that levy is wholly insufficient — in fact void.
    The case of Helms v. Alexander & Wallace, 10 Hum., 44, is decisive of the question. And this case is in full accord with Pound v. Pullen, 3 Yer., 338; Brown v. Dichson, 2 Hum., 395; Huddleston v. Garrett, 3 Hum., 629, and Brigance v. PJrwin, 1 Swan, 375. And his Honor, the Chancellor, so held. But after denying the relief prayed, he decreed that Lewis should pay the judgments over again. We insist that he had no power to grant such relief. It was not consistent with the relief prayed by the bill, nor with the ease made by N. Lee v. Gone & Adler, 4 Col., 392. Daniel Ch. Pr., 434-5; Story’s Eq. PL, sec. 42.
    It is very clear that this relief should not have been granted; because, if it had been specially prayed, the bill would have been demurrable, and would have been demurred to.
    The judgments of complainants were at the common law satisfied by the sale of the land. By statute, this satisfaction may be set aside. See Code, sections 2990-6. The jurisdiction to do so is not conferred on courts of equity.
   Tueítey, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

On the 22d day of October, 1859, Henry Miller, Abram Devault, Noah Chiles, Gr. P. Reeder, W. R. Tinker and Nancy lessee, severally recovered judgments against William Lewis, before a justice of the peace of Knox county, for sums amounting in the aggregate to about $875.00.

Executions issued, and there being no personal property, were levied on lands of Lewis, which were condemned by the Circuit Court, sold by the sheriff, and purchased by Henry Chiles.

So much of the return of the sheriff as is necessary to this opinion, is in the language; “After giving the notice required by law, I sold the within named tracts of land to Henry Chiles, agent for the plaintiff.” As we see the case, we need discuss but two questions.

It is insisted that complainants, being citizens of Indiana, had employed Henry Chiles to recover the judgments and collect the money; that as such agent he was authorized to bid off the land, but the war intervening, the complainants, being citizens of a loyal State, and the defendant and Henry Chiles citizens of Tennessee, a State in rebellion at the time of the redemption by Lewis from Henry Chiles, in February, 1862, that therefore the authority of Chiles, if it ever existed under his agency, to receive, the money in redemption, was revoked by the war, and his act in so doing is not binding on complainants. To support this proposition, the case of Conley v. Burson, 1 Heis., 148, is relied on.

There is a ' marked distinction in the cases. In the case cited, the parties were dealing freely and voluntarily, without any pressing constraint of statutes or rules of law, a non-compliance with which would have been ruinous; nor had the complainants in that case done anything from which the defendant would have sustained loss or injury by this - non-action; nor had they done anything bringing into operation any statutes or rules limiting the rights of defendants, the nonobservance of which would work irreparable hurt.

In this case complainants, by their conduct, brought^ about such a state of things as we have described ; they had invoked the aid of the law, and through it brought to sale the defendant’s lands. The defendant must redeem within two years, or his title is gone . absolutely. To do the one and avoid the other, he applies to the party through whom and by whom the law has been invoked, that party in his fiduciary capacity being the creature of complainants, and with, whom the ' defendant had nothing to do except as compelled by the law, manipulated by the agent at the-instance -of his principals. Under this condition of the relation of the parties, when complainants ' have-driven the defendant to the wall, it would be inequitable to allow them to .say to him: “Although we-have sold your land, and one-half of the short time-allowed you to redeem has elapsed, we will take advantage of a war' flagrant in the land, that makes it impossible for you to communicate with us and revokes all agencies made by us. We have put the law in active oppressive motion, the war comes to our relief,, defeating your limited legal right.”

Neither of the parties could have foreseen the war and its consequences. To have commenced legal proceedings at a time when they must- in their cause-complicate with war, was the misfortune of complainants and not the fault of defendant; it was their action that brought about the results,, and. they must sustain the loss.

Again: The return of the sheriff, by which the-defendant was to be governed' in this case, when he came to redeem, shows Henry Chiles to have been the purchaser in his own right; true, the words,. agent of the plaintiff,” appear, but they are merely descriptive of the person and create no interest in-complainants. But if we admit that the purchase was .made as agent, still, from all we see in the record, the legal title was in him, and complainants. could ■only have bad it divested out of him by bill in chancery. Being the owner . of the legal title, he was the proper person to redeem from. His agency by the purchase was converted into a trusteeship.

Reverse the decree and dismiss the bill.  