
    Harjit SINGH, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    16-2462
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    September 8, 2017
    FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, New York, NY.
    FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readier, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director; Brendan T. Moore, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
    PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Harjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a June 23, 2016, decision of the BIA affirming a January 12, 2015, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Harjit Singh, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 23, 2016), aff’g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 12, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant ..., the consistency between the applicant’s ... written and oral statements ..., the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record ... without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh was not credible as to his claim that police in India had twice detained and beat him on account of his membership in the Akali Dal Amritsar (Mann).

The IJ reasonably relied on Singh’s demeanor, finding that he was evasive and unresponsive at times and that his testimony appeared rehearsed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). That finding is supported by the record.

The demeanor finding and the overall credibility determination are bolstered by record inconsistencies regarding whether Singh’s political party knew of his arrests, when he was arrested and released from detention, and whether he was hospitalized for two weeks. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-67 & n.3. Singh did not provide compelling explanations for those inconsistencies. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80 (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his claim with corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Indeed, Singh’s wife’s affidavit was inconsistent regarding the date of his first arrest, his political party’s letter did not corroborate his arrests, and his medical evidence did not corroborate his hospitalization.

Given the demeanor and inconsistency findings, as well as the lack of corroboration, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii). That determination is dispositive of Singh’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  