
    Irwin vs. State.
    1* Upon tho return of a warrant for bastardy issued upon legal affidavit, the justice need not enter up judgment that the defendant is the reputed father. It is sufficient if he recognize him to tho county court, for its action. The law adjudges him to bo the father upon the facts stated in the affidavit*
    2. The county court is the only tribunal authorised to fix tho amount of allowance to the mother of bastard child, and if that court fail to assess it, and an appeal is taken, the'case must be remanded to the county court for its action.
    Elizabeth Willis appeared before Greer, a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, and declared on oath, that “on the 14th day of November, 1844, in the county of Washington and state of Tennessee, she was delivered of a bastard male child, which is likely to become chargeable to the county, and that Valentine Irwin is the father of said bastard child.”
    This statement was signed by her, and thereupon the justice issued a warrant, and Irwin was apprehended, and the justice entered on the warrant the following: “Defendant appeared and entered into recognizance, with security, to appear at the •next county court, to be held on the first. Monday in April, ’45.” At the term of the county court to which the defendant was recognized, he appeared and made an affidavit that he was not the father of the bastard child as was charged in the warrant:. and on issue being made up, the court heard the proof, and it was entered that “said Valentine Irwin be, and is hereby adjudged the deputed father of the female bastard child, begotten of the body of the said Elizabeth Willis, and the court ordered that said Irwin be charged with tfie maintainance of said bastard child, and that he enter into security in the sum of five hundred dollars, for the maintainance of said child, and to keep said child from becoming chargeable to the county; and that said defendant be ordered into custody, and be confined in the jail of Washington county until the judgment of the court be complied with.” Prom this judgment the defendant appealed to the circuit court. The facts were -reexamined by the circuit judge, Lucky, who affirmed the judgment of the county court, except so much thereof as stated that the child was a female, and “proceeeding to give such further judgment as should have been given by the county court,” ordered, “that said defendant pay to the said Elizabeth Willis the sum of forty dollafs for the first year, thirty dollars •for the second, and that the question as to the allowance for third year be open for further action on the part of the court. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the supreme court. \
    
      Arnold, for the plaintiff in error.
    
      Attorney general, for the state.
   Tuhley J.,

delivered the opinion'of the court.

On the 24th day of March, 1845, Elizabeth Willis, a single woman, of the county of Washington, declared on oath before-Samuel Greer, a justice of the peace for said county, that she was delivered on the 14th day of November, 1844, in said county, of a bastard male child, and that Valentine Irwin was the father thereof. Upon which said justice issued a warrant for the apprehension of said Irwin, which was duly executed and returned. Whereupon he appeared before the justice and entered into recognizance for his appearance at the next term of the county court at Washington, to answer said charge according to law.

At the April term of said court, the defendant filed his affidavit, stating in substance that the charge was untrue, and that he was not the father of said bastard child, and asking an issue to try the fact, which was allowed him.

At the July term, 1845, the county court tried the issue upon proof, and adjudged thereon that he, Valentine Irwin, was the father of the child, that he should be charged with the main-tainance thereof, and enter into recognizance for the maintainance, and to keep it from becoming chargeable upon the county, in the penal sum of five hundred dollars.

From which judgment the defendant appealed to the next term of the circuit c.ourt for the county of Washington, entering into recognizance with security for his appearance at said court.

At the October term, 1846, of the circuit court aforesaid, the defendant appeared and the issue was tried by the circuit judge, and found against him, and the judgment of the county court affirmed. Whereupon the court proceeded to adjr ’ that the defendant should pay to Elizabeth Willis, the mother of the child for its maintainance, the sum of forty dollars for the first year, thirty dollars for the second year, leaving the allowance for the third year open; commencing on the 14th November, 1824, and ending on the 14th November, 1847, and that he should enter into bond and security to keep the child from becoming a charge upon the county.

From all which the defendant appeals to this court. In. argument in support of the appeal, it is contended: 1st, That the justice of the peace should have adjudged that the defendant was the reputed father of the child before he recognized-him to appear at the county court to answer for the same.

This, in our opinion, was not necessary. The 10th section of the act of 1741, chap. 14, provides, “that when a woman shall-, upon oath before a justice, accuse any man of being the father of a bastard child, begotten of her body, such person so accused, shall be adjudged the reputed father, and stand charged with the maintainance of the same, as the county court may direct.” Upon the affidavit then, the law adjudges the fact, and there was no necessity for the justice to adjudge it. 2d. It is urged with earnestness that the issue made up to try the question of paternity, should from the weight of proof have been found in favor of the defendant. We do not think so; but on the contrary, that it well warranted the finding, both by the county and circuit court against him. But we furthermore think that the county court is the only tribunal authorized by law to assess the amount of allowance to the mother, for the maintainance of bastard children. This authority is given expressly to this court by the act of 1741, chap. 14, and 1822, chap. 29, and is no where given to any other. We then think that the circuit judge erred in attempting to make such assessment to supply the omission. Reverse the judgment.  