
    I. Newton Williams, Respondent, v. Isabella H. Fisher, Appellant.
    (New York Common Pleas—General Term,
    May, 1894.)
    The rule prohibiting the reception of parol evidence to vary or modify a written agreement does not apply where the original contract was verbal and entire, and part only reduced to writing, nor to a collateral agreement, nor to a stranger to the contract.
    An action was settled without the consent of the plaintiff’s attorney, and a release given in consideration of the payment of a certain sum “and the costs and disbursements of” the plaintiff's attorney. In an action brought subsequently by said plaintiff’s attorney against the defendant in the former action to recover the value of his services in-said action, held, that evidence to show that the defendant agreed to pay his charges was admissible.
    Appeal from a judgment of the District Court in the city of Hew York for the eleventh judicial district.
    Action to recover the value of plaintiff’s services as attorney in an action brought against this defendant, which was settled without his consent. Upon such settlement a release was executed in consideration of the payment of $550 to the plaintiff in said action, “ and of the payment of the costs and disbursements of I. Hewton Williams, attorney.” The costs and disbursements of the action have been paid.
    
      Fra/nk L. Ora/wford, for appellant.
    
      I. Newton Williams, in person, for réspondent.
   Bookstaver, J.

This action was brought to recover attorney’s fees for services rendered in an action in the Supreme Court, which was settled between the parties without the consent of the plaintiff’s attorney in that action, being the respondent herein. Upon the trial the release so executed between the parties was given in evidence, and thereafter respondent introduced oral testimony tending to show what his charges were, and that the appellant herein, being defendant in the Supreme Court action, undertook to pay them. This was objected to by appellant on the ground that no oral testimony could be given to vary, enlarge or define the written release. This contention is undoubtedly good as between the parties to the contract itself, but not as to strangers to it, as the respondent in this case was. The rule prohibiting the reception of parol evidence to vary or modify a written agreement does not apply where the original contract was verbal and entire, and a part only reduced to writing ; nor does it apply to a collateral undertaking, or to a stranger to the contract. Besides, where a promise is made by a party as a condition of compromise of a litigation for another’s benefit, that other can maintain an action upon it. See Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181; Rector, etc., v. Teed, 120 id. 583; Gifford v. Corrigan, 105 id. 223; Brooks v. Wilson, 125 id. 257.

The judgment must, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.

Bischoff and Pryor, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.  