
    *Erasmus D. Peck v. George Weddell.
    The plaintiff by his petition sought to enjoin the defendant, as clerk of the court of common pleas of Wood county, from recording the abstract of the vote in said county upon the question of the removal of the county-seat from Perrysburg to Bowling Green, under the act of March 29, 1866. 63 Ohio L. 58, 59. Upon demurrer to the petition: Held—
    
    1. That allegations of fraud and illegality in conducting the election, constitute no sufficient ground for such injunction. Wrongs of such a nature can be inquired into and redressed only by means of a contest of the election, pursuant to the provisions of the act of April 18,1857. S. & C. Stat. 1389.
    2. Though said act, in terms, removes the county-seat to the town of Bowling Green, it is not rendered invalid or inoperative by the fact that Bowling Green is, under the towns and cities act of 1852, an incorporated village. The legislature is to be understood as using the word town in its popular sense.
    3. Looking to the substance, rather than to the form of this act, it is clear that its fifth section is in the nature of a proviso, qualifying the terms of the second; and, reading both these sections together, it is apparent that the legislative intent was, that the first section should not so take effect as to remove the de facto county-seat from Perrysburg until suitable buildings for the transaction of the public business should be erected at Bowling Green.
    4. The first section enacts that the removal shall take place, after effect shall have been given to its terms “ as hereinafter provided!’ By this reference to the second and fifth sections, which prescribe when the first shall take effect, those sections are virtually incorporated into the first, so that the adoption of the first section by the electors of the county necessarily implies an approval and adoption of the terms and conditions contained in the sections thus referred to.
    ■5. The fifth section is not, therefore, repugnant to that provision of the constitution which requires that all laws for the removal of county-seats shall, before taking effect, be submitted to tbe electors of tbe county, and be adopted by a majority vote of such electors; nor is the act invalid, though by its terms the first section only was required to be thus submitted.
    <5. The validity of the act is not affected by the fact that it is to take effect upon a specified contingency, and at a time not definitely fixed.
    Appeal. Reserved in the district court of Wood county.
    The plaintiff, by his petition, filed originally in the court of common pleas of Wood county, prays for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, as clerk of that court, from recording, in the journal of the court, the abstract of the vote in that county, upon the question of the removal of the county-seat from Perrysburg to Bowling Green, under the act of March 29,1866. 63 Ohio L. 58, 59.
    In his petition the plaintiff states, in substance:
    That he is a citizen and elector of the county, a resident and owner of real estate, and merchant, etc., in Perrysburg, and greatly interested in having the seat of justice remain there.
    *Thak the defendant is clerk of the court of common pleas of the county.
    That the electors of the county, at the general election held October 9,1866, voted on the question of the removal of the seat of justice of the county, from Perrysburg to Bowling Green, under the provisions of the act of March 29,1866, and that the defendant, as clerk, has in his hands an abstract purporting to show the number of votes so cast upon the question; and that he is about to record the abstract, in the journal of the court, whereby it will be made to appear that a majority of all the electors voting at said election cast their votes in favor of the removal of the county-seat. That the majority was not in favor of such removal, but against it. That plaintiff is informed by counsel and believes that the legal effect of such record will be conclusive to show and settle beyond further question, by evidence or otherwise, that such majority was in favor of such removal.
    That the general assembly have made no provision, either by general statute, or in said act, for contesting the validity of said election, and that he is entirely remediless, unless through the intervention of the court, and that without such intervention he will suffer great and irreparable injury and damage.
    That the poll-books returned by the judges of the election in showing a majority of the votes to be in favor of removal, are false- and fraudulent in the following respects :
    1. The judges of election returned, as cast “ for removal,” a number of ballots, to the extent of two hundred, upon which the word “removal ” only was indorsed.
    2. The judges returned, as cast “for removal,” a number of ballots, to the extent of three hundred, upon which the words “for removal” had been printed twice — -once at the bottom in large characters, and again surreptitiously interlined among the names of the candidates in the place of the designation of the office for which the candidate was running, the voters tearing off or erasing the words “for removal” at the bottom, intending to vote against removal, but were thus deceived and defrauded, and their votes should have been counted against removal.
    *3. The judges returned, as cast “for removal,” a number of ballots, to the extent of three hundred, upon which the words 11 for removal” had been fraudulently printed, in very fine type, among the names upon the state ticket, and that the electors were thereby deceived in voting such tickets, when they intended to vote against removal.
    4. The judges received, counted, and returned votes, to the number of three hundred, of persons not qualified to vote.
    That the whole majority appearing, even from these false and-fraudulent returns of the judges, in favor of the removal of the-county-seat, is only two hundred and seventy-eight. That a large majority of the valid votes is against removal. That the plaintiff has no means of legally showing or judicially establishing the facts, and has no other resort but this application for an injunction.
    That the frauds mentioned were perpetrated by persons unknown to the plaintiff, but who, he is informed and believes, were interested in the removal; that he believes the votes against removal were fairly and honestly cast; that the opponents of removal neither attempted any fraud themselves, nor permitted any fraud or illegal voting at the election ; that the plaintiff does not believe any fraud was practiced or illegal voting done by or with the connivance of the opponents of removal.
    That, as plaintiff is informed and believes, the said act of the. general assembly is unconstitutional and void.
    That there is, in fact, no such’town in Wood county as Bowling.. Green; that the only place of that name in the county is an incorporated village, and that there is no law authorizing the removal of the county-seat to such village, or authorizing any vote on such question.
    The plaintiff, therefore, prays for an injunction as stated.
    To this petition the defendant demurred.
    The court of common pleas sustained the demurrer and dismissed the plaintiff’s petition.
    The plaintiff, by appeal, took the case to the district court, where, upon an equal division of opinion, it was reserved for decision here.
    *22. P. JRanney, for plaintiff:
    I confine myself to the single question, whether the act under which the proceedings for the removal of the county-seat of "Wood ■county, is consistent with the constitution of the state ? If it is found not to be, I do not suppose any one would deny that it was the right of this court to arrest its execution, by injunction, at any stage.
    By the express provisions of the 30th section of article 2 of the ■constitution of the state, “ all laws ” for removing county-seats “shall, before taking effect, be submitted to the electors of the several counties to be affected thereby,” and be adojffedby a majority voting at a general election.
    The act of March 29, 1866 (63 Ohio L. 58), is unconstitutional •and void. No part of this act, except the first section, was required to be, or in fact was, submitted for adoption to the electors of Wood county. By the 5th section it is enacted, that if a majority vote “ for removal,” the public business of the county shall continue to be transacted in the buildings now occupied for holding •courts, and for other county purposes, until such time as new buildings shall be erected at the proposed new seat of justice, as provided by law.
    This section, read in connection with the first — the one submitted to the electors — is open to but one of two constructions: ■either, 1. That the county-seat should continue at Perrysburg, and the officers remain and the courts be held there, until the happening of the event specified in the section, the erection of new buildings at the proposed new seat of justice, should occur; or, 2. That the courts should be held and the offices be kept at a •place other than the county-seat of Wood county, for an indefinite •time in the future.
    Upon either construction, the section is unconstitutional.
    If the first is the true one, as I have no doubt it is, then the law is only to be executed upon the performance of a condition expressed in the law itself; and only a part of the “ law ” has been submitted to the electors, and no one can say how they would have voted upon the whole law, relating to the removal of the ■county-seat. An act for the instant and unconditional removal of ■the county-seat, is one thing; and an act for the removal to take effect when public buildings *are erected at another place, is quite another. The one is absolute and the other conditional, and the approval of the one by no means necessarily approves the other. People v. Russel (Mich.), 6 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 315.
    But suppose this is not the true construction of the act, and that the 1st section should be construed alone, and held to provide for an instant removal to Bowling Green; the 5th section is still unconstitutional, and, from its connection in the statute, avoids the whole enactment.
    By the 26th section of the second article of the constitution, it is provided that “ all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform •operation throughout the state.”
    Upon this construction of the 5th section, it has plainly provided, that the piiblic offices in the county of Wood shall be kept, and the public business be done, and the courts be held at a place other than the county seat, for an indefinite time in the future.
    There are many general statutes relating to the public business of counties. Such a construction would repeal, in their application to Wood county, the 8th section of the county commissioners’ act, 1 S. & C. 245; the clerks’ act, 1 S. & C. 233, sec. 6; the.act defining the jurisdiction, etc., of probate judges, 2 S. & C. 1214, see. 13; the act of March 13, 1844, 2 S. & C. 1278, sec. 20, providing that certain county officers shall keep their offices at the county-seat, etc.
    
    How have these general laws been abrogated in Wood county, so that the commissioners may there lawfully hold their sessions, the probate court be held,- and the. other county offices be kept, at a place other than at the seat of justice? The returns of elections must be made to the clerk’s office, and the clerk’s office must be kept at “the seat of justice in his proper county.” May such returns still be lawfully made to the clerk at Perrysburg, althought that town is no longer a county-seat? If these things are still lawful, they are only made so by the special and local enactment contained in the 5th section of the act in question, operating as an amendment of these various statutes, so as to exempt Wood county from their operation. Now, laws of a general nature can no longer *be made or repealed by special or local legislation. Kelley v. The State, 6 Ohio St. 270.
    If the 5th section, as I think, was designed to postpone the removal of the seat of justice from Perrysburg to Bowling Green,, until new buildings were erected at the latter place, it then operates as a proviso to, or limitation upon, the 1st section, and is unconstitutional and void, because no provision is made for its ratification by the electors. If that is not the true construction, then it can be nothing less than an attempt to amend or repeal half a dozen general statutes by a special or local enactment, and is a plain violation of the 26th section of the second article of the constitution.
    The remaining question is, can this section fall and the residue of the act be enforced ?
    Upon this point, the case of Huston v. Comm’rs of Perry county, 5 Ohio St. 497, is most expressly in point and. decisive.
    The general rule is stated to be, that “one part of an act will not be held constitutional and another part unconstitutional,-unless the respective parts are independent of each other.” And the court characterizes as a fraud upon the electors, the device of influencing the vote by unconstitutional provisions, and then carrying into-effect those which would not have been adopted without such influences.
    . O. J. Shaw says, that in order to hold a part constitutional while-another part is held unconstitutional, they “ must be wholly independent of each other.” Warner et al. v. Mayor, etc., 2 Gray, 84.
    Now, are the 1st and 5th sections of this act wholly independent of each other? So far is this from being the case, that hardly any consideration could have been presented so potent in obtaining a vote in favor of removal. Without it, it is undeniably clear, that no suitable - place for holding the courts and keeping the public offices would have existed, and the necessity for an immediate-resort to taxation to provide them, would have been apparent. With it, every voter could see that no such immediate necessity would arise; that the public business of the county would not be-interrupted; and that the business, might be done for an indefinite period at *Perrysburg. Indeed, the legal effect of an immediate removal of the county seat, without anything further being said, would be to take all the offices and courts to Bowling Green. This would be the case if only the 1st section were in the law, while, with the 5th in it, no such consequence ensues. When that is the case, to hold the two sections “ wholly independent of each other,” would be simply absurd.
    To mitigate the effect of this consideration, it is insisted that it became the immediate duty of the commissioners to levy taxes and build buildings at Bowling Green, and that they may be forced to do this by a writ of mandamus. But this is not so. Ex parte Black, 1 Ohio St. 34.
    It is very evident that Bowling Green must wait the discretion of the commissioners of Wood county as to building the “new buildings,” spoken of in the 5th section, and just as evident that, without this unconstitutional section, the act would never have been passed or adopted.
    If this section, therefore falls, the whole act falls; and that this section is a plain invasion of the constitution seems to me so plain as to leave no doubt upon my mind.
    James R. Tyler and IT. II. Bodge, also for plaintiff:
    The demurrer admits the truth of the allegations of the petition.
    The voters being deceived by the fraudulent practices of persons-interested in Bowling Green, and the fraud being prejudicial to the plaintiff’s interests, he may allege the same and stay the proceedings by which the fraudulent vote is sought to be made operative. Any one who has a pecuniary interest in the matter, and who will meet with “ irreparable injury,” if the result of the fraudulent voting be rendered effective, ought not to be required to await the-slow process of contesting the validity of the election in the ordinary way, but may restrain, by action founded on proper allegations,, the recording of an illegal result — a result obtained by fraud — or may stqy any proceedings connected therewith at any stage of the same.
    If recording the result of the vote does not make the *record conclusive evidence of such result, but only prima facie, still the burden of proof would be changed.
    The remedy by injunction, provided in the code (sec. 238), is applicable in such a case as this, and the-statute authorizing a contest (S. & C. 1389) does not abrogate or interfere with this remedy under the code. The new remedy is merely cumulative. Jackson v. Bradt, 2 Caines, 169 ; Farmers’ Turnpike Co. v. Coventry, 10 Johns. 389; Wheaton v. Hibbard, 20 Johns. 290; Crittenden v. Wilson, 5 Cowen, 165; Witmore v. Tracy, 14 Wend. 250; Turnpike Company v. People, 15 Wend. 267; Stafford v. Ingersoll, 3 Hill, 38; Semvick v. Morris, 7 Hill, 575; Waterford v. Turnpike Co., 9 Barb. 161.
    'The recording of avote changing the seat of justice from Perrysburg to Bowling Green, throws a cloud over the value of property in Perrysburg. Norton v. Beaver, 5 Ohio, 178; Bank of United States v. Schultz, 20 Ohio, 471, 495.
    Even if the interest of the defendant — the clerk — be identical with that of the plaintiff, yet it is no reason why an injunction should not lie against his acts.
    It is proper to determine the constitutionality of this law (63 Ohio L. 58) upon this hearing.
    ■ The act is unconstitutional. The first section only is submitted to the people (sec. 30, art. 2, of the constitution), and on its adoption in the manner prescribed by the other sections, the county-seat is removed at once, if the vote be legal, from Perrysburg'to Bowling Green. But the 5th section requires the public business to be transacted at Perrysburg in the county buildings until new ones are provided, at the discretion of the county commissioners, at the new seat of justice. The several laws requiring the public business to be transacted at the county seat are, by the act in question, abrogated as to Wood county, and not elsewhere in the state. But “all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state.” Const., sec. 26, art. 2.
    The law in question is of a “ general nature. Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 608; Kelley v. The State, 6 Ohio St. 269.
    The 5th section of this act of 1866 is, therefore, unconstitutional, and must fall.
    But the 1st, 2d, and 5th sections are mutually dej)endent in *terms and in effect one upon the other, and must fall together. Warren et al. v. Mayor, etc., 2 Gray, 84. See People v. Russel, (Mich.) 6 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 315.
    The petition sets up that there is no such town in Wood county as Bowling Green. If it be true that there is, away out in the swamp, such a place, this fact at least does not appear on the papers.
    
      James Murray, also for plaintiff:
    1. The petition is properly filed. The plaintiff has such an interest as entitles him to maintain the suit. Thomas v. Board, etc., 5 Ind. 4.
    2. The act (63 Ohio L. 58) is unconstitutional:
    (1.) It provides for retaining the county seat at Perrysburg until such period in the future as suitable buildings shall be erected at Bowling Green. This material part of the act was not submitted to the electors. Const., sec. 30, art. 2.
    (2.) The act is invalid in fixing no definite period in the future when it is to take effect.
    (3.) The 26th section of article 2, constitution, provides that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.
    If, then, the removal took effect immediately upon the result of the vote being ascertained, the act is unconstitutional in not only' permitting, but requiring the public business of the county to be done, and the public offices kept, at a place other than the county-seat, for an indefinite period, entirely dependent upon the discretion of the county commissioners. Ex parte Black, 1 Ohio St. 34.
    As to the nature and effect of general laws, see Kelley v. The State, 6 Ohio St. 270; People v. Russell — Mich. —.
    3. The sections of the act are so intimately connected, that the unconstitutionality of one voids the whole act. Warren v. Mayor, etc., 2 Gray, 84.
    4. The common-law remedy, and that given by the statute, are cumulative — the one does not supersede the other. S. & C. Stat. 1389
    
      Asher Cook, also for plaintiff:
    1. The act of the general assembly in question is unconstitutional. *The 5th section provides, that notwithstanding a majority of the electors of Wood county vote for the removal of the county-seat, still the public business of the county shall continue to be transacted at Perrysburg until suitable buildings shall be provided at Bowling Green. This is in direct conflict with the reserved rights of the electors and their vote on the subject. What is the removal of a county-seat, but the removal of the county business ? If the legislature can limit the .rights of the voters, by one-condition, why not wholly?
    All acts of the general assembly which infringe upon the rights reserved to the people by the constitution, are void.
    2. The 5th section is so intimately connected with the remaining parts of the act, that it can not fall without destroying them. The general assembly would not have passed the act without that section, and the people would not have voted' for the adoption of the-law without the provisions of the 5th section.
    
      J. S. Reid and JBissell & Gorrill, for defendant:
    As regards the question of unconstitutionality, we waive all objection to the form of action, and say:
    1. The burden of proof is upon plaintiff to prove clear discrepancy between the law and the constitution. Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 244.
    2. The 5th section can not be part of the question of removal to be submitted to the voters, for it relates to something that is not to happen until after the vote has been taken and removal effected.
    3. Said 5th section does not declare that the public business-shall be transacted at Perrysburg for an indefinite period. It is only until new buildings are erected at Bowling Green, as provided by law.
    As soon as the county-seat is removed, it becomes the duty of the county commissioners to provide there the necessary buildings- or rooms for public purposes. See Commissioners of Trumbull Co. v. Hutchins, 11 Ohio, 368.
    In the absence of all evidence to the contrary, the court are-*bound to presume that the legislature had ascertained that the only way in which the commissioners could discharge this legal, obligation, would be by the erection of new buildings.
    4. This is not a law of a “general nature ” in the sense in which, the words are used in the constitution. It is merely a permission to the people of Wood county to transact their public business at Perrysburg, during a temporary lack of proper facilities at the county-seat, Bowling Green.
    The county-seat is the place where the county offices must be permanently located. But when from casualty, sudden change of county-seat, or other cause, the proper accommodations do not exist at the seat of justice, the legislature have full power .to provide* that the public business may be transacted at any other place in said county having proper facilities, until such defects are remedied. This can not well be done through a general law. Each contingency must be met as it arises, in a manner adapted to the requirements of the particular case. See Ruffner v. Hamilton Co., 1 Disney, 196; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 616.
    5. Were said section 5 unconstitutional, it can be declared void without affecting the remainder of the law. The invalidity of one part of a statute never affects another part, unless the whole is so connected as to raise the presumption that the legislature, could they have foreseen the action of the court, would have refrained from passing the balance of the law as an independent enactment. Ex-Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1; State v. Commissioners of Perry Co., 5 Ohio St. 497, 507.
    The primary object of the legislature in this act was to provide for the removal of the county-seat. This provision for a temporary contingency, consequent upon such removal, is a mere secondary affair.
    It can not be doubted but that they would have passed the balance of this law as an independent enactment, could they have foreseen that section 5 would be declared unconstitutional.
    6. If section 5 means that the public business shall be transacted at Perrysburg for an indefinite period, it could not influence the vote in favor of removal. * The elector votes to take the county-seat to Bowling Green because he desires *to transact his county business there. It is a matter of no consequence to him that Bowling Green is declared upon the common pleas record the county seat, if he must still, for an indefinite period, go to Perrysburg to transact public affairs. He certainly would not expend time, money, and effort to brings about a mere “ paper ” removal.
    7. Our opponents in fact claim that the legislature should, by omitting section 7, have thrown the weight of their influence in favor of Perrysburg — should have said to the voters desiring the location of the county-seat at Bowling Green — “Tote for the removal, if you will, but do so under the knowledge that you will have no suitable place for the transaction of public business while the new building are being erected.”
    The Perry county case, already cited, is expressly in our favor. It decides that the question of removal must be left to the free «hoice of the electors.
    
      ■ The legislature, in the first four sections of the law now under consideration, provide for submitting the question of removal to such free choice.
    ■ In section 5 it but fulfills its constitutional obligation to see that the public interests receive no detriment during the time required for constructing new buildings, in case the vote should result in favor of removal.
    8. The case of Noble v. Commissioners of Noble Co., 5 Ohio St. 524, is in principle directly with us.
    See Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573.
    9. It will be presumed that the word “ town ” is used in its ordinary popular signification as a collection of population. Since 1852, as appears by section 1 of our towns and cities act (S. & C. 1493), we have had in this state no municipal organization known as a town. What were towns before, are now either cities or incorporated villages.
    The use of the term may also be treated as surplusage; as a mere misnomer. It can not invalidate, the law. See Fosdick v. Village of Perrysburg, 14 Ohio St. 472.
    10. To the consideration of the question of fraud, we interpose an objection founded upon the form of the action. The only relief sought is to enjoin the clerk from recording the abstract. The *writ of injunction can not be applied for, unless the thing about to be done will work the party great and irreparable injury.
    Courts have repeatedly decided, that a mere statement by the pleader that a certain thing will work the plaintiff such injury, is a mere statement of opinion, amounting to nothing. The petition must set forth facts sufficient to inform the judge that the act to b© enjoined is of the character complained of.
    No injury is considered irreparable for which the law provides an adequate remedy. Such a remedy the legislature has furnished. 2 S. & C. Stat. 1389. See Ingerson v. Berry, 14 Ohio St. 315.
    The statute says that the. abstract shall be made without any regard to defects in the form of the poll-books, and that it shall then be recorded.
    An ample remedy is then given every citizen for contesting its validity. This abstract lies at the very foundation of this proceeding. It ought to be preserved in a recorded form; not subject to the chances of loss or mutilation among the loose files in the clerk’s office.
    
      A contest under the statute is now pending in the court of com* mon pleas. We expect to meet this question of fraud there.
    11. We rest our ease upon two principles, vital to the success of a republican government: The submission of the minority to the will of the majority; and the harmonious action of the legislature and judiciary.
   Scott, J.

In so far as the plaintiff, by his petition, grounds his right to an injunction upon alleged frauds in the preparation of tickets, the counting of ballots which ought not to have been counted, or the reception of illegal votes by the judges of the election, or any other frauds or illegalities occurring in the ascertainment of the popular will on the question of the removal of the-county-seat, we think the demurrer to the petition is well taken. For all such alleged grievances the statute provides a specific and adequate remedy, by contest, in the act of April 18, 1857 (S. & C. 1389). The contest there provided for, is a proceeding in rem, which may be instituted *by any elector of the county, and in which any citizen of the county may appear as contestee (sections 1 and 8).

The present proceeding is against the clerk of the court of common pleas alone, whose interest may be identical with that of the plaintiff, or who may have no interest whatever in the question, and who ought not to be subjected to the trouble and expense of contesting the allegations of the petition. The real parties in interest are ignored by the petition, and have no opportunity of vindicating their rights.

It is evident that this mode of inquiring into alleged frauds in elections, and of ascertaining the will of the majority of the electors, as expressed by the legal ballots, would be very illy adapted to accomplish the end proposed, and would be as likely to facilitate the perpetration, as the correction, of frauds against the public. But the remedy by contest under the statute is speedy, appropriate, and adequate; it affords an opportunity of being fully heard, to every one interested; and the decision of such contest, is by a judgment which binds all the world. This specific remedy having been given by statute, and being the sole remedy adapted to the ends of speedy justice, there is no reason why a court of equity should intervene, by injunction, until the facts alleged in the petition have been found, upon such contest.

It was held by this court in Ingerson v. Berry (14 Ohio St. 315), that a contest is the specific and sole remedy provided by statute for the correction of all frauds, errors, and mistakes which may occur in the process of ascertaining and declaring the public will, as expressed through the ballot-boxes.

That remedy has, we understand, been resorted to in this case, and such contest is now pending; and to the adjudication of the proper court, upon the hearing of that case, the question of frauds practiced in the conduct of the election must, and we doubt not. may safely, be left.

As a further ground on which an injunction is prayed for, it is alleged that the act under which the vote for the removal of the county-seat of Wood county was held, authorized its removal to the town of Bowling Green, when, in fact, the only place in the county known as Bowling Green is not a town, *but an incorporated village only. This objection is not substantial. It is true, that the “towns and cities” act of 1852, converted all our towns into “ cities ” or “ incorporated villages,” but the word town has, nevertheless, not passed out of use, nor changed its popular sense ; and in this popular sense we must understand it to have been used by the legislature.

Having thus disposed of the minor grounds on which the plaintiff .asks an injunction, we come to the consideration of the constitutionality of the act of March 29, 1866, “to provide for the removal of the seat of justice of Wood county” (63 Ohio L. 58). This is the only law purporting to authorize such removal, and if it be unconstitutional and void, .public officers may be restrained from all action under it, looking to such removal. It is upon this alleged unconstitutionality that counsel for plaintiff mainly rely in argument.

The first two sections of that act read as follows:

“ Section 1. Be it enacted, etc., that from and after the taking effect of this section of this act, as hereinafter provided, the seat of justice, in the county of Wood, shall be removed from the town of Perrysburg, and shall be permanently fixed, until otherwise provided by law, at the town of Bowling Green, in said county.
“ Section 2. That the foregoing section of this act shall take effect and be in force, when and so soon as the same shall be-n.dopted by a majority of all the electors of said Wood county, voting at the next general election after the passage thereof, as hereinafter provided.”

The 3d section prescribes that the electors shall indorse on their tickets the words “ for removal,” or “ against removal,” and if a majority are found to have voted for removal, the first section of the act shall be considered to have been adopted, etc.

The 4th section prescribes the duties of the judges and clerks of election.

The 5th section is as follows: “That in case a majority of electors in said county of Wood shall vote ‘for removal,’ as herein-before provided, the public business of the county shall continue to be transacted in the buildings now occupied for *holding eourts, and for other county purposes, until such time as new buildings shall be erected at the proposed new seat of justice, as provided by law.”

The 6th section makes it the duty of the sheriff to give notice of the election by proclamation, etc.

The 7th and last section provides, that the several sections of the act, subsequent to the first, shall be in force and take effect on the passage of the bill.

The 30th section of the 2d article of the constitution of this state, provides, among other things, that “all laws removing county-seats, shall, before taking effect, be submitted to the electors of the county to be affected thereby, at the next general election after the passage thereof, and be adopted by á majority of all the electors voting at such election, in said county.” And the 26th section of the same article, declares that “ all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state.”

Now, it is' objected by the plaintiff, that the act for the removal of the county-seat of Wood county is repugnant to the constitution, in this: that the 5th section forms an important part of the scheme proposed by the act, for the removal of the county-seat, and could not, therefore, constitutionally, take effect till adopted by a vote of the electors of the county; whilst the act provides for the submission of the 1st section only to such vote of the electors, and that no other part of the act was in fact ever submitted to the electors for their approval. But is this objection well taken ?

If we look to the substance, rather than to the form of this enactment, we can not fail to see that the 5th section, though in a different part of the act from the second, is intimately connected with it> was intended to qualify it, and should be read as though it were added to the 2d section by way of proviso. Reading both these sections together, it is very clear that the legislature has provided that the 1st section, which enacts the removal, shall only take partial effect upon its adoption by the electors; that is to say, it shall take effect so far as to settle the question of removal, and determine the site of the permanent seat of justice, but shall not operate, or take effect, so as to remove the de facto seat of justice from its ^present location, “ until such time as new buildings shall be erected at the proposed new seat of justice, as provided by law;” when the 1st section shall take full effect and accomplish the actual removal.

It is conceded by counsel that the legislature might, at its discretion, pass an act for the removal of a county-seat, to take effect immediately upon its adoption by the electors, or to take effect when public buildings are- erected at the new seat of justice; and that either form of enactment would be valid, when submitted to and adopted by a mojority of the electors. But it is said that the first section only was submitted, by the terms of the act, to the vote of the electors, and that that section imports an immediate removal. We do not so understand it. The second and fifth sections prescribe, as we have seen, when, and upon what contingencies, the first shall take effect. And the language of the first is, that the seat of justice shall be x*emoved from Perrysburg and permanently fixed at Bowling Green, “from and-after the taking effect of this section of this act as hereinafter provided.” These words “ as hereinafter provided.,” clearly refer to the provisions of the second and fifth sections, and thus, by reference, incorporate those provisions into the first, so that its adoption necessarily implies an approval and acceptance of the terms and conditions to which it refers.

In voting to adopt the first section, the electors necessarily voted to give that section effect as px*ovided in the second and' fifth sections ; for its own tex’ms are, substantially, that it shall operate only after it shall take effect as provided in the subsequent parts of the act.

We are clearly of the opinion, therefore, that the submission of the first section of the act to a vote of the electors of Wood county, was a submission of the whole scheme of removal contemplated in the act, and was substantially a full compliance with the requirements of the constitution.

It is, therefox’e, not necessary to consider whether the fifth section would not be valid, as an enactment of the legislature, independent of any sanction by the electors of the county.

It is further objected to this act, that it purports to effect a removal of the county-seat at an indefinite time, upon a *contingency uncertain, and depending upon the discretion of the county commissioners. But we do not see the force of this objection. Many laws can only operate upon the happening of certain contingencies ; yet they are nevertheless valid. We think it is clearly competent for the legislature to provide that a county-seat shall not be removed till suitable buildings shall have been provided for the public offices at the new county-seat. Such a provision has been contained in many prior laws in similar cases: as in the act of 1851, to remove the county seat of Perry county from Somerset to New Lexington (5 Ohio St. 498), and in the act to remove the county seat of Noble county (5 Ohio St. 524). But in none of these cases has a provision, so reasonable in itself, and conducive to the interests and convenience of the public, been held to vitiate the law. The electors of Wood county have it in their power to secure the erection of suitable public buildings at Bowling G-reen within a reasonable time, if they so desire. The same majority which ordains a removal, can give full effect to the act, if in no other way, by the election of county commissioners who will respect the will of their constituents.

No other points have been made in argument, which require special notice.

The demurrer to the petition will be sustained, the injunction originally allowed in the case be dissolved, and the petition dismissed at plaintiff’s costs.

Day, C. J., and White, Welch, and Brinkerhoee, JJ., concurred.  