
    Chandler Dow versus James Tuttle.
    Where the promisee of a note, payable at a day certain, contracts, at the time the note is given, not to demand payment of it until a certain time after its maturity, such contract is a collateral promise, for the breach of which, if there be a legal consideration, an action may lie; but it will be no bar to an action on the note, when due by the terms of it.
    Assumpsit by the endorsee against the maker of a promissory note, dated February 16, 1804, payable, in one year from the date, to Benjamin Dow, and by him endorsed to the plaintiff, on the 12th day of July, 1805.
    Upon non assumpsit pleaded, the action was tried at the last September term in this county, before Thatcher, J., and a verdict being found for the plaintiff, the defendant filed his exceptions to certain directions and opinions of the judge, upon which the cause now came before the Court.
    From the exceptions it appears that, after the note declared on had been read to the jury, the defendant offered to prove that, at the time of making the note, it was agreed between the promisor and promisee, and was the condition on which the note was given, that payment should not be demanded until the expiration of five years, and. that the promisee would not sell or part with the note. The defendant also offered to read to the jury a paper, in the following words, viz.: “ Cornville, February 15, 1804. These lines may certify that I, the subscriber, agree with James Tuttle to wait on him for the money due me, ’till he turns his property to the best advantage. Benjamin Dow; ” and to prove by witnesses that the said writing was made and signed at the same time with the note declared on, though bearing different dates, and constituted part of the same contract; and, further, to prove that said Tuttle should be allowed five years to turn his property, as mentioned in said writing ; that the plaintiff was present, and had full knowledge * of all the agreements aforesaid; and that the [ *415 ] defendant refused to sign the note, until the above condition and agreement were made. The plaintiff’s counsel objected to the admission of this evidence, and the judge refused to admit it, and directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff.
    
      Bridge, for the defendant,
    contended that, from the privity of the plaintiff to the agreement stated, and from the note’s being dishonored before its negotiation, the' defendant was entitled to every advantage of the agreement, in the same manner as if the action had been brought by the promisee; and the different agreements constitute but several parts of one entire contract.  Suppose a covenant to pay money in a year, and, in the same instrument, a covenant of the payee not to compel payment under five years ; this would be a condition not repugnant to, but consistent with, the first covenant
    
      Rice, for the plaintiff,
    insisted that this agreement made no part of the original contract, which was a plain, explicit, and unconditional promise to pay the money at a day certain; and to show that paroi evidence cannot be received to contradict an agreement in writing, he cited the case of Meres &f Al. vs. Ansell 8f Al. 
      
    
    
      
      
        Gold vs. Eddy, 1 Mass. Rep. 1,
    
    
      
      
        2 Wils. 275.
    
   The opinion of the Court was afterwards delivered by

Parsons, C. J.

We are satisfied that the agreement, proposed by the deféndant to be given in evidence at the trial, is not to be considered as a part of the contract with the note. That is a promise to pay to the promisee, or his order, a sum of money in one year If the agreement was a part of this contract, it would be repugnant to the note, and destroy its effect. The agreement, although made at the same time, must be considered as a collateral promise of the promisee’s, for the breach of which, if there be a legal consideration, an action would lie. In chancery, it would be a sufficient ground for an injunction against the plaintiff, proving his knowledge of it' before he purchased the note. And at law, perhaps, it may support a motion to stay proceedings, by granting imparlances, [*416] until the plaintiff could put *it in suit consistent with the agreement. But, on this last point, it is not now necessary to decide.

As we consider the agreement as collateral to the note, the evidence was properly rejected, and a new trial cannot be granted.

Judgment according to verdict, 
      
       [From the evidence, it seems that the two paper writings should, between the original parties, and between the maker and an assignee with notice, have been treated as parts of one entire transaction. — Ed.]
     