
    Steven M. O’HARA, Kathleen R. O’hara, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BECHTEL CONSTRUCTION, INC., Bechtel Environmental Safety & Health, Bechtel Group Inc., Defendants, AMEC Construction Management, Inc., AMEC Earth and Environmental, Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc., f/k/a Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., Tully Construction Co., Inc., Turner Construction Company, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-182-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 25, 2013.
    Appearing for Appellants: Alexander Wulwiek (Stephen M. Cantor, on the brief), New York, N.Y.
    Appearing for Appellees: James E. Tyr-rell, Jr. (Joseph E. Hopkins, Alyson N. Villano, on the brief), Patton Boggs LLP, Newark, N.J.
    Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, REENA RAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Steven M. O’Hara and Kathleen R. O’Hara (collectively, “O’Hara”) appeal from the January 2, 2013 judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Hellerstein, /.), granting a motion for summary judgment brought by Defendants-Appellees AMEC Construction Management, Inc., AMEC Earth and Environmental, Bovis Lend Lease LMB Inc., Tully Construction Co. Inc., and Turner Construction Company, Inc. (collectively, “AMEC”). At issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly determined that O’Hara’s claims were time-barred. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

The parties agree on the legal framework applicable in this case. Section 408(b)(2) of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act mandates that New York substantive law governs O’Hara’s personal injury claims. The claims are therefore subject to a three year statute of limitations. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Further, because O’Hara’s claims are brought pursuant to his allegation that the injuries that he suffers from are the result of exposure during his work at the World Trade Center site in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks, “the three year period within which an action ... must be commenced shall be computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c(2). New York’s Court of Appeals holds that the date of discovery of an injury is the “discovery of the condition on which the claim was based and nothing more.” Matter of New York County DES Litig., 89 N.Y.2d 506, 513, 655 N.Y.S.2d 862, 678 N.E.2d 474 (1997). Finally, O’Hara’s claim was brought on June 22, 2011, meaning that for O’Hara’s claim to be timely, O’Hara must not have discovered, or could not have discovered with reasonable diligence, the injuries on which his claim is based prior to June 22, 2008.

We affirm the district court’s determination that O’Hara was aware of the conditions on which his claim was based prior to June 22, 2008. As the district court noted, O’Hara was diagnosed numerous times with respiratory problems prior to 2008. Significantly, O’Hara also conceded that he began experiencing symptoms including shortness of breath, wheezing, and nonproductive coughing before 2008 as well. On appeal, O’Hara has apparently abandoned any claim not associated with his respiratory problems.

We have considered the remainder of O’Hara’s remaining arguments and find they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  