
    AMY SLADE DALE, PROSECUTOR, v. BOROUGH OF BAYHEAD, RESPONDENT.
    Argued November 10, 1916
    Decided February 27, 1917.
    By virtue of, the act of 1916 (Pamph. 1p. 525), an ordinance for the issue of municipal bonds is conclusively presumed to have been duly and regularly passed and to comply with the provisions of the statutes; and its validity cannot be questioned except in a suit, action or proceeding commenced prior to the expiration of the twenty days after tile first publication of the statement required by the act. Held, in an action commenced after the expiration of the twenty days, that the conclusive presumption applies to a case where the municipality had lawful authority to make the improvement at the time proposed for the issue of the bonds although not at the time of the first publication of the ordinance and that the, validity of the ordinance could not be questioned.'
    On certiorari.
    
    Before Justices Swayze, Minturn and Kalisch
    For the prosecutor, Charles E. Scribner.
    
    For the defendant, Clarence, H. Murphy.
    
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Swayze, J.

The question is the validity of an ordinance providing for the issue of bonds for the construction of a sever system. The ordinance for the bonds vas passed by the council July 17th, 1916. It was published July 21st. The statement published therewith as required by statute gave notice that the bonds vould be issued and delivered after August 18th; but vould not be issued if protest was filed under section 9, chapter 252 of the lavs of 1916, unless a proposition for the issuance was adopted at an election under that section. There was no protest. Thereupon, by virtue of section 2, paragraph 3 of the act of -1916 (Pamph. L., p. 525), the ordinance was conclusively presumed to have been duly and regularly passed and to comply vith the provisions of that or any other act. It is said, however, that this conclusive presumption is not applicable tp a case where the borough is not lawfully authorized to issue bonds. We do uot doubt that proposition. The answer is that it is not applicable; in this case, on the day fixed for the issue of bonds, August 18th, the borough had the authority,- by virtue of an election hold ’August 1st, pursuant to section 90 of the Borough act. Comp. Slat., p. 273. It is urged that the ordinance for the issue of the bonds was passed before that election and that the borough had no authority to construct severs at the time the ordinance was passed and the statement published. This fact; however, shows only a failure in the proceedings for the bond issue, and in the absence of the protest provided for by the act we are compelled to the conclusive presumption that the ordinance was duly and regularly passed and complied vith the statutes; by express statutory provision the validity of the ordinance cannot be questioned, since no action or proceeding was commenced prior to the expiration of the twenty days. Oases decided prior to the act of 1916 are not applicable. The writ is dismissed, with costs.  