
    Bryan, Respondent, vs. Mundy’s Administrator, Appellant.
    1. An administrator cannot avail himself of the lapse of three years as a bar to a demand against the estate of his intestate, unless he has given notice of his letters, in the manner, and within the time prescribed by law.
    
      
      Appeal from Washington Circuit Court.
    
    This was a demand founded upon a judgment, exhibited in the county court for allowance against the estate of Felix Mundy, at the December term, 1851. Letters of administration on said estate, were granted to Patrick Mundy, on the 28th of October, 1844, more than seven years before the exhibition of this demand. The administrator did not publish notice o'f his letters until December 6, 1844, more than thirty days after they were granted. His only defence to this action was the bar of three years. The county court allowed the demand, and the administrator appealed to the Circuit Court, where the judgment was affirmed, and an appeal taken to this court.
    
      M. Frissell, for appellant,
    urged the court to review the decision in the case of Wiggins v. Lovering s Administrator., 9 Mo. Rep. 262, and subsequent decisions to the same effect.
    
      T. C. Johnson, for respondent.
    This court has repeatedly decided that an administrator cannot plead the special limitation of three years against a demand, without showing that he has given notice within thirty days, as required by law. 11 Mo. Rep. 287. 18 ib. 125.
   Gamble, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The question presented for consideration in this case is, whether an administrator can rely on the bar of three years provided in our administration law, against a demand which has not been presented for allowance for more than three years after the grant of letters of administration, when the administrator has failed to commence the publication of notice that administration has been granted on the estate, within thirty days after the letters are issued.

It has been repeatedly held by this court, that this bar of three years, which is independent of the general statute of limitations, can only avail the administrator when he has given the notice in the manner and within the time prescribed by law. Wiggins v. Lovering’s Administrator, 9 Mo. Rep. 262. Montelius & Fuller v. Sarpy, administrator of Chouteau, 11 Mo. Rep. 237. Blackwell’s Administrator v. Ridenhour, 13 Mo. Rep. 125. It is not proper to consider this question longer open.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.  