
    
      William Kinsler and others vs. M. M. Clark.
    
    A mother, by deed duly recorded, in consideration of natural love and affection, and of past labor and services, and of future care and attention, gave and granted, after the term of her natural life, a tract of land to her two sons and their heirs, with the understanding expressed in the deed, that no right or title was to vest in her sons during the full term of her natural life. Held to he a good covenant to stand seized to the use of the sons, and that they became entitled to the land on the death of their mother, 
    
    If a deed conveying a freehold to commence in futuro, express both good and valuable considerations, it will be a good covenant to stand seized to uses. (Yide opinion in Chancellor vs. Windham andLam, ante.)
    
      Before Butler, J. at Lexington, Fall Term, 1844.
    This was an action of trespass, to try titles to a tract of five hundred acres of land, on the road from Lexington Court House to Columbia. The land m dispute is. the one-half of a tract of one thousand acres, which belonged originally to Zilpha Eddins, who, on the 20th day of February, 1816, conveyed the same to her two sons, James A. and Wm. D. Eddins, by deed, of which the following is a copy.
    “State op South Carolina.
    “ Know all men by these presents, that I, Zilpha Eddins, of Lexington District, in the State aforesaid, widow woman, for and in consideration of the natural love an d affection which I have and do bear towards my two sons, James A. Eddins and William D. Ed-dins, both of the District and State aforesaid, and for the further consideration of making them compensation for the labor and services they have rendered me since they have been.able to labor, and in order to make their lot, as nearly as possible, equal to the part which my elder children have had, and for their future care and attention to me during the remainder of my natural life, have given and granted, and by these presents do freely give and grant, unto the said James A. and Wm. D. Eddins, after the term of my natural life, ail that plantation, .&e. Together with all the buildings and appurtenances to the said premises belonging, or in any wise incident or appertaining ; to have and to hold all and singular the said premises, unto the said James A. and William D. Eddins, their heirs and assigns forever; and it is well understood by the parties to these presents, and such is the particular of this agreement and gift, that no right or title whatever, is to vest in the said James A. and Wm. D. Eddins, during the full term of my natural life; but at my death the aforesaid plantation, with the appurtenances, shall vest in the said Jatnes A. and Wm. D. Eddins, to be equally divided between’them and their heirs, share and share alike. And I do hereby bind myself, my heirs, executors or administrators, to warrant and forever defend all and singular the right and claim which I have, or shall have at the time of my death, to the premises above mentioned, unto the said James A. and William D. Eddins, their heirs and assigns, against myself and my heirs, and against every person or persons whomsoever, lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any part thereof. Witness my hand and seal,” &c. It was attested by two witnesses; proved before a magistrate by one of the witnesses on the same day, and recorded the 22d February, 1816.
    Zilpha Eddins died in 1831, and the case turned upon the validity of her deed to her two sons. There was no doubt about the fairness of the transaction, nor any pre-tence of fraud. She evidently intended to convey the land to her sons,, and the question was whether, by the terms of the deed, she succeded in carrying that intention into effect. The presiding judge thought, and so charged the jury, that the deed was void, because it attempted to convey a freehold commencing in futuro. His opinion was based mainly upon the clause immediately succeeding the habendum, in these words: “And it is well understood by the parties to these presents, and such is the particular of this agreement and gift, that no right or title whatever is to vest in the said James A. and Wm. D. Ed-dins, during the full term of my natural life.” Without this clause, he thought the deed might be construed as a covenant to stand, seized to the use of the two sons. The jury found for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed, on the following ground.
    Because the deed from Zilpha Eddins to her sons, James A. and Wm. D. Eddins, is good and valid, and it is respectfully'submitted that his Honor, the presiding Judge, erred in charging the jury that the same is void.
    
      Boozer, for the motion,
    contended that the deed was good as a covenant to stand seized to uses, under the stat. 27 H. 8, c. 10; and cited 2 Wils. 75 ; Willes, 682; Shep. Touch. 85 ; 2 Yes. Sr. 252 ; 4 Taunt. 20; Riley’s Law Cases, 204 ; 2 Hill Ch. 617; 4 M‘C. 12 ; 1 Bay, 107.
    
      Gregg, contra,
    cited 2 Speers R. 225.
    
      Pope, in reply,
    cited Watk. on Conv. 232; 18 Law Lib. 79 ; 2 Cruise 311.; Tit. Remd. 16 ; 4 lb. 115, chap. 10 ; 3 Mad. 237; 1 Mill. 48; '3 Bac. Abr. Tit. Grant, 348, D. 3; Prest, on Conv. 173 ; 1 H. Bl. 534; Cruise Dig. Deed 32, 255 ; 2 Yes. Jr. 204, 226.
   Curia, per

Wardlaw, J.

The opinion which has just been pronounced in the case of Chancellor and others vs. Law and Windham, shows the reasons upon which this case has been decided ; and in some parts is exclusively applicable to this. Here, as there, the intention is clear, the deed has been recorded, and the subsequent acts of the parties have been conformable to the effect they intended to produce. Here considerations both good and valuable are expressed in the deed ; and the clause which in the opinion of the Judge on the Circuit prevented the deed from being construed as a covenant to stand seized, does not appear to this court to have any such influence.

If it was understood' that no right or title should vest in the sons during the mother’s life, it was equally understood that it should vest in them at her death, without any contingency by which the vesting might be prevented. How could this be, unless a remainder to take effect at the death, was to be in them by the deed? The plain meaning of the parties was, that the use, the possession and profits, which we call the legal estate, should be in her during her life, and in them at her death. To effect the intention, the deed must be construed as a covenant by .the mother to stand seized for herself during her life, and for her sons at her death; under which, by force of the statute of uses, the uses arising were instantly converted into a life estate in her and a vested remainder in her sons. -

A new trial is therefore ordered.

Richardson, O’Neall, Butler, and Frost, JJ. concurred.  