
    ENSIGN YACHTS, INC., Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant, v. Jon ARRIGONI, Defendant-Counter Claimant-Cross Claimant-Appellee, Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, Subscribing to Policy Nos. R704230/112 & R704390/010, Defendant-Cross Defendant-Counter Claimant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellee.
    
    No. 12-474-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 20, 2014.
    
      Frederick A. Lovejoy, Lovejoy & Associates LLC, Easton, CT, for Appellant.
    Kate J. Boucher, LeClair Ryan, Hartford, CT, for Appellee Jon Arrigoni.
    D. Lincoln Woodward, Moukawsher & Walsh, LLC, Hartford, CT, for Appellee Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, Subscribing to Policy Nos. R704230/11 & R7034890/10.
    Present: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption as above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Ensign Yachts, Inc. (“Ensign”) appeals from January 3, 2012 amended judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Bryant, J.) awarding Ensign Yachts compensatory damages on its claims against appellees Jon Arrigo-ni and Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London, Subscribing to Policy Nos. R704230/11 and R7034390/10 (“Lloyds”), and awarding appellees compensatory and punitive damages on their counterclaim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

We review discovery rulings for abuse of discretion, including the denial of a motion to reopen discovery. DG Creditor Corp. v. Dabah (In re DG Acquisition Corp.), 151 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir.1998) (“[A] trial court enjoys wide discretion in its handling of pre-trial discovery, and its rulings with regard to discovery are reversed only upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We reviewed the record with respect to each of the discovery rulings Ensign appeals from, and find no abuse of discretion. With regard to Ensign’s argument that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that James Ross Sr. was ill and medicated, we note that we find no evidence in the record that such an instruction was requested, and thus no error can be assigned.

We also find that Arrigoni and Lloyds presented sufficient evidence of fraud to support the jury’s verdict on the counterclaim. Pursuant to Connecticut law:

The essential elements of an action in common law fraud ... are that: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury.... The party to whom the false representation was made must claim to have relied on that representation and to have suffered harm as a result of the reliance.

Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 548, 69 A.3d 880 (2013) (ellipses in original) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Ensign argues that to prevail on their counterclaim for fraud, Lloyd’s and Arrigoni had to prove the fraud accomplished the desired objective. It relies on Billington v. Billington for the proposition that

[fjraud consists in deception practiced in order to induce another to part with property or surrender some legal right, and which accomplishes the end designed.

220 Conn. 212, 217, 595 A.2d 1377 (1991) (quoting Alexander v. Church, 53 Conn. 561, 562, 4 A. 103 (1886)). In the very next line, however, Billington recites the same elements for a cause of action set forth in Simms, to wit:

The elements of a fraud action are: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) the statement was untrue and known to be so by its maker; (3) the statement was made with the intent of inducing reliance thereon; and (4) the other party relied on the statement to his detriment.

Id. Our review of the record demonstrates ample evidence to support the proposition that both Lloyds and Arrigoni relied on Ensign’s claims that the vessel was sold to a buyer at the time the damage occurred to their detriment, and thus we affirm the judgment entered against Ensign.

We have examined the remainder of Ensign’s claims and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.  