
    SMITHSON v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
    District or Columbia; Municipal Corporations; Penalties; Building Regulations; Statutes.
    1. The commissioners of the District of Columbia have only such powers as have been delegated to them by Congress.
    2. The imposition of a pecuniary penalty is included within the power of enforcement given the commissioners of the District of Columbia by the act of Congress of June 14, 1878, authorizing them to make and enforce building regulations.
    No. 2643.
    Submitted March 5, 1914.
    Decided April 6, 1914.
    In Error to the Police Court of the District of Columbia to review a judgment convicting defendant of erecting a frame shed within the fire limits in violation of building regulations.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:
    This case is before us on a writ of error to the police court.
    Clinton 0. Smithson, plaintiff in error, was tried on an information charging him with erecting a frame shed within the fire limits, in violation of the building regulations. Plis demurrer and special plea were overruled, and upon hearing he was adjudged guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of $5; and that in default of said fine he be committed to j ail for fifteen days.
    Though raised in several forms, there is but a single question involved. Was it within the power conferred upon the commissioners of the District to enact building regulations and to provide penalties for their violation ?
    The act approved June 14, 1878, is that the commissioners are hereby “authorized and directed to make and enforce” building regulations, etc.
    
      
      Mr. George O. Gertmwn, and Mr. J ohn Ridout for the plaintiff in error.
    
      Mr. Conrad H. Syme and Mr. Robert L. Williams for the District of Columbia.
   Mr. Chief Justice Shepard

delivered the opinion of the Court:

Undoubtedly, the commissioners have such powers only as have been delegated to them by Congress. But in this case the delegation seems intended to be complete. Congress, in legislating for the District, sometimes enacts a regulation looking to the public safety, and provides the penalty for its enforcement. Sometimes it may provide a penalty for the enforcement of regulations which it authorizes the Commissioners to make. In the matter of the enactment of building regulations, which require technical knowledge and intimate acquaintance with the many local conditions, Congress expressly delegated to the commissioners not only the power to make the regulations, but also to enforce them.

The law of implied powers, generally, is thus stated by Judge Dillon in his treatise on the law of Municipal Corporations (vol. 2, 5th ed. sec. 610) : “Implied power to annex pecuniary penalties.—Since an ordinance or by-law without a penalty would be nugatory, municipal corporations have an implied power to provide for their enforcement by reasonable and proper fines against those who break them. So, the right to make by-laws gives to the corporation, without any express grant of powrer, the incidental right to enforce them by reasonable pecuniary penalties. What is reasonable depends upon the nature of the offense and the circumstances.”

See also Tiedeman, Mun. Corp. sec. 154; Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137, 143, 36 Am. Dec. 441; Goldsmith v. Huntsville, 120 Ala. 182, 185, 24 So. 509; State v. O’Neil, 49 La. Ann. 1171, 1173, 22 So. 352; Bearden v. Madison, 73 Ga. 184, 186; Winooski v. Gokey, 49 Vt. 282.

Tbe section quoted above, and which is supported by tl^e cases cited, goes farther than the conditions of this case require. Here the power is given not only to enact regulations, but also to enforce them; and, without affirming or denying the broad proposition, we are of the opinion that the power to enforce clearly included the power to enact all reasonable regulations to secure the enforcement with which the commissioners are charged. The provision of a pecuniary penalty is a reasonable mode of enforcement.

The judgment is right and is—Affirmed.  