
    Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Respondent, v. County of Nassau, Appellant.
    Submitted April 22, 1971;
    decided May 26, 1971.
    
      
      Morris H. Schneider, County Attorney (Seymour S. Ross, Irving I. Lesnick and William D. Siegel of counsel), for appellant.
    I. The liens contained in the 1964 and 1965 agreements between the county and LIRE have matured and LIRE is thereby indebted to the county for the sum of $651,451.61. II. Under its liens, the county is entitled to repayment of the full amount paid pursuant to the voluntary station maintenance agreements. III. The MTA statute is an unconstitutional attempt to erect a new super government with broader powers than ever before granted by the Legislature to a public authority or public corporation which violates constitutional safeguards intended to prevent the creation of such an entity. (Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474.) IV. The power to determine and collect charges for passenger station maintenance, operation and use purportedly granted by section 1277 is a power to tax. (People ex rel. Nassau Elec. R. R. Co. v. Grout, 119 App. Div. 130; Bush Term. Co. v. City of New York, 152 Misc. 144.) V. The MTA statute unconstitutionally fails to provide for review of the tax imposed by section 1277. (Matter of Leeds v. Board of Educ., Union Free School Dist. No. 23, 19 Misc 2d 860, 9 AD 2d 905.) VI. By granting MTA both the power to borrow and the power to tax, the MTA statute violates section 3 of article VIII of the State Constitution. (Salzman v. Impellitteri, 203 Misc. 486, 281 App. Div. 1023, 305 N. Y. 414.) VII. The MTA statute unconstitutionally established MTA as a legislative body in violation of section 1 (subd. a) of article IX of the State Constitution and provided a method of selecting members in violation of the “ one man, one vote ” rule. (Shanker v. Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 27 A D 2d 84, 19 N Y 2d 951; Matter of County of Nassau v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 57 Misc 2d 1025, 32 A D 2d 647, 25 N Y 2d 738; Matter of Trustees of Vil. of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 191 N. Y. 123; Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U. S. 105.) VT3I. If MTA is not an unconstitutionally created super-local-government, it is a State agency granted unconstitutionally broad powers. If MTA is an administrative body, legislative powers are delegated to it without adequate standards, thereby violating State and Federal due process guarantees. (Packer Collegiate Inst. v. University of State of N. Y., 298 N. Y. 184; Matter of City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N Y 2d 164; Noyes v. Erie & Wyoming Farmers Co-Op. Corp., 281N. Y. 187.) IX. If MTA is an agency of the State, the failure to provide for appropriations of its funds violates section 7 of article VII of the State Constitution. (Saratoga Harness Racing Assn. v. Agriculture & N. Y. State Horse Breeding Development Fund, 22 N Y 2d 119; Williamsburgh Sav. Bank v. State of New York, 243. N. Y. 231.) X. The contractual rights of Nassau County have been unconstitutionally impaired by the retroactive amendment to section 1277. (Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182; Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co., 250 U. S. 394; Worcester v. Street Ry. Co., 196 U. S. 539; Tobias Tile Co. v. Topping Realty Co., 114 Misc. 500; Matter of New York State Employees’ Retirement System v. Board of Supervisors of County of Tioga, 157 Misc. 87.) XI. Section 1277 is violative of the Home Rule provision (art. IX, § 2, subd. [b], par. [2]) of the State Constitution; a special law may not compel a municipality to pay out funds from its treasury. (Matter of Holland v. Bankson, 290 N. Y. 267; Salzman v. Impellitteri, 203 Misc. 486, 281 App. Div. 1023, 305 N. Y. 414.) XII. If the MTA act is constitutionally valid in all respects, then the county is entitled to a credit for certain nonstation costs charged by MTA and is further entitled to offset certain revenues from fare increases instituted by MTA to compensate for station charges not paid by the county. (Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. City of New York, 32 AD 2d 197, 26 N Y 2d 817.)
    
      John R. Hupper, Bruce Bromley, Robert S. Rifkind and James C. Hansen for respondent.
    I. The county is not entitled to any payment under the 1964 and 1965 agreements. II. The MTA act is constitutional. (Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. City of New York, 26 N Y 2d 817.) III. Section 1277 does not confer on MTA the power to tax in violation of section 3 of article VIII or section 1 of article XVI of the State Constitution. (Darlington v. City of New York, 31 N. Y. 164; Salzman v. Impellitteri, 203 Misc. 486, 281 App. Div. 1023, 305 N. Y. 414.) IV. The appointment of MTA’s members under subdivision 1 of section 1263 is constitutionally permissible. (Lanza v. Wagner, 11 N Y 2d 317, 371 U. S. 74; Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate & Apportionment of City of N. Y., 232 N. Y. 377; City of Rye v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 24 N Y 2d 627; Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U. S. 105; Oliver v. Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 306 F. Supp. 1286; Shanker v. Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 19 N Y 2d 951; Hadley v. 
      Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U. S. 50.) V. The MTA act does not involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. (Black Riv. Regulating Dist., v. Adirondack League Club, 307 N. Y. 475; Matter of City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N Y 2d 164; Matter of County of Nassau v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 32 A D 2d 647 ; 25 N Y 2d 738.) VT. MTA’s revenues are not State funds which can be disbursed only pursuant to legislative appropriation under section 7 of article VII of the State Constitution. (Saratoga Harness Racing Assn. v. Agriculture & N. Y. State Horse Breeding Development Fund, 22 N Y 2d 119.) VII. Section 1277 does not violate the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. (Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182; Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co., 250 U. S. 394; Worcester v. Street Ry., 196 U. S. 539; New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U. S. 79; Black Riv. Regulating Dist. v. Adirondack League Club, 307 N. Y. 475.) VIII. Section 1277 does not violate the Home Buie provision of the State Constitution. (Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N. Y. 110; Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate & Apportionment of City of N. Y., 232 N. Y. 377; City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N. Y. 429; Adler v. Deegan, 251 N. Y. 467; Bugeja v. City of New York, 24 A D 2d 151, 17 N Y 2d 606.) IX. The costs of liability insurance and flagging crews are part of the ‘ ‘ total cost of * * * operation, maintenance and use ” of LIBB’s passenger stations within the meaning of section 1277. X. The county is not entitled to an offset as a result of MTA’s approval of LIBB’s fare increase.
   Per Curiam.

The County of Nassau contends that the statute which created the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) is unconstitutional, particularly insofar as it empowers the MTA to certify and collect from the county the cost of maintenance and operation of Long Island Bail Boad (LIBB) passenger stations in Nassau. More specifically, the county urges that (1) the statute created the MTA as a “ super-local-government,” and should be declared unconstitutional for the reason that the Authority has been given the power to tax in violation of section 1 of article XVI, and section 3 of article VIII, of the State Constitution and for the further reason that its members are appointed in violation of the one man-one vote principle; (2) if the MTA is not a “local government,” it is either an administrative body established without constitutionally adequate standards to govern its operations or a state agency with the power to disburse funds without legislative appropriation as required by section 7 of article VII of the Constitution ; and (3) section 1277 of the Public Authorities Law, by retroactively altering the county’s obligation to the railroad ánd the MTA, violates the Constitution’s Home Rule provision (art. IX, § 2, subd. [b], par. [2]). We find these submissions to be without merit.

The ‘ ‘ super-government ’ ’ argument must fail, since the MTA does not have the power to tax. In assessing costs upon the county for station operation, the Authority simply determines the amount of, and requests payment for, charges which the Legislature has empowered it to collect. There is no levy of taxes by the MTA. And, certainly, there is no constitutional requirement that the members of the Authority be elected rather than appointed. (See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U. S. 50, 58; Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U. S. 105, 110.)

As to the county’s second contention—that the MTA is an improperly created State agency—it is sufficient to note that the statutory standards under which the Authority operates are “as detailed * * * as is reasonably practicable” (Matter of City of Utica v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N Y 2d 164, 169), providing as they do only a limited discretion in the process of fixing costs to be charged to the county. Nor is there basis for the contention that the MTA has been authorized to disburse its revenues in violation of constitutional strictures (art. VII, § 7), since these moneys are not a fund under the management of the State contemplated by the Constitution. (See, e.g., Saratoga Harness Racing Assn. v. Agriculture & N. Y. State Horse Breeding Development Fund, 22 N Y 2d 119, 123.)

The county’s Home Rule argument is predicated on the fact that section 1277—which allows the MTA to charge the costs of station operation to the county-—-superseded a contract between the county and the LIRE calling for smaller payments than the MTA requests. The county claims that such action can only be taken pursuant to a “ general ’ ’ law, and that section 1277 is not such a law. We disagree. The legislation transcends the concerns of Nassau County alone and affects a sizable portion of the State as a whole. (See, e.g., New York Steam Corp. v. City of New York, 268 N. Y. 137; Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N. Y. 52.) As such, it is sufficiently “ general ” within the sense of the constitutional provision (art. IX, § 2, subd. [b], par [2]).

The county also makes several nonconstitutional claims, namely, that certain cost items are improper and that it is entitled to an offset in the amount owed. These, too, are without substance and are adequately discussed and disposed of in the opinion below.

The order appealed from should be affirmed, without costs.

Chief Judge Fuld and Judges Burke, Scileppi, Bergan, Breitel, Jasen and Gibson concur in Per Curiam opinion.

Order affirmed. 
      
      . Public Authorities Law, art. 5, tit. 11, § 1260 et seq. (L. 1965, ch. 324).
     
      
      . These same points were advanced by Nassau County in the brief which it submitted as amicus curiae in Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v. City of New York (26 N Y 2d 817).
     