
    Chamberlin and others vs. Graves.
    If no demurrer be interposed to pleadings in a justice’s court, they are to be con- , strued liberally in reference to the known legal principles at which the pleader obviously aimed.
    Accordingly, in an action before a justice upon a promissory note given to secure the rent reserved in a lease containing a covenant to defend the lessee in the possession &c., a plea averring a want of title on the part of the lessor at the time of the leasing, and that the title was in one S. who took possession of the premises by virtue thereof, and lawfully prevented the tenant from enjoying the same, was regarded as a plea of legal eviction of the tenant by S. under paramount title; and the replication being that the tenant was not prevented from enjoying the premises during the term, held, that a mere forcible dispossession of the tenant by S. in virtue of his better title, or a voluntary surrender of possession to S. Upon ascertaining that his title was paramount, would not support the issue on the defendant’s part.
    Error to the Ontario common pleas. Graves sued the plaintiffs in error before a justice of the peace, and declared upon a promissory note payable to Samuel Case or bearer for $45, dated April 15th, 1833. The defendants pleaded, that the note was given by them to secure the payment of rent reserved in a lease bearing even date therewith, executed to the defendant, Chamberlin, by Case, the payee of the note—that by the lease Case let to Chamberlin, • for one year, a certain farm in Canandaigua, and covenanted to deliver possession of the same to him free of all incumbrances, and to defend him in the possession thereof against all persons lawfully claiming the same—that when said lease was executed, the title of the farm was in one Seymour, who took possession of the same by virtue of his title, and lawfully prevented Chamberlin from enjoying the same during the said term—by means whereof the consideration of the note had failed—and that it was transferred by Case after it fell due. The plaintiff replied, that Chamberlin was not prevented from enjoying the premises during the said term. The justice rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed to the C. P. On the trial in that court, it appeared that Chamberlin went into possession of the farm under the lease, and continued to occupy it as lessee of Case till July, 1833, when he voluntarily surrendered possession to Seymour on being served with a written notice to quit. It further appeared that Seymour was the owner of the farm and had the right of possession, and that the only claim of title which Case ever had was derived from a contract to purchase the farm of Seymour, executed in March, 1832, but which had been forfeited by the omission on the part of Case to pay according to its terms.
    The court charged the jury, that the question presented upon the. issue was, whether the tenant had been lawfully evicted by Seymour from the possession of the premises—that in order to sustain the plea, it was necessary to show a breach of the covenant of warranty contained in the lease from Case, by proving an eviction in due course of law; and that until such an eviction was shown, a defence under the pleadings could not be made out. The defendants excepted to the charge, and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount of the note and interest, $58,94. After judgment, .the defendants sued out a writ of error.
    
      W. Hubbell, for the plaintiffs in error,
    insisted, that to support the issue, it was not necessary to show, an eviction by legal proceedings. The plea does not aver that any such proceedings were had, but simply alleges that Seymour prevented Chamberlin from holding the farm during the term specified in the lease; and upon this allegation alone the defendant took issue. He cited Hamilton v. Cutts and others, (4 Mass. Rep. 349,) and Stone v. Hooker, (9 Cowen, 154.)
    
      
      A. Worden, for the defendant in error.
   By the* Court,

Nelson, Ch. J.

The counsel for the plaintiff in error seeks to distinguish this case from numerous others in this court which determine that a breach of the covenant of warranty can be proved only by an eviction in due course of law, on the ground that the issue here joined does not call for any such proof. The plea avers title in Seymour at the time of the execution of the lease, which is not denied ; it also avers that, by virtue of such title, he took possession of the premises, and lawfully prevented the lessee from the enjoyment of them: this is denied by the replication.

It is said, that inasmuch as the plea does not aver that the tenant was evicted by legal proceedings, proof of that character was not required by the issue; that the evidence as given clearly established the right of Seymour to the possession as against the lessor at the time of the execution of the lease, and that the subsequent entry of the former fully made out the issue in favor of the defendants, namely, that the tenant was in fact lawfully prevented from the enjoyment of the premises during his term.

But the argument is founded rather upon a criticism of the words and particular phraseology of the issue, than upon a sound legal interpretation of its meaning as a whole. The question is not, whether the plea is drawn in the technical and scientific language of a good pleader according to established precedents—because, where no demurrer is interposed, such accuracy and precision are not expected or exacted in justices’ courts —but what is the good sense and fair import of it, construed with reference to the known legal principles at which it obviously enough aimed. In this respect, we cannot help seeing that it is an informal, untechnical plea of a legal eviction of the tenant by Seymour under paramount title; and extending to it, therefore, the liberality with which pleadings before justices are viewed, the court below were right in so regarding it, and trying the issue accordingly. If the court had excluded evidence of a legal eviction offered by the defendant under this issue, on the ground that it was not sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the proof, the decision would have been erroneous, and a new trial must have been granted. Besides, the defendants would have gained nothing if they had succeeded in the views urged as to the nature of the issue; for it would then have been altogether immaterial, and the plaintiff entitled to the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If the plea meant simply that Seymour entered forcibly upon the tenant, and dispossessed him by virtue of his better title, or that the tenant surrendered upon ascertaining that A was paramount, then the issue presented no legal defence to the payment of the rent; and had it been admitted, still the court would have been bound to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff upon the whole record. (The People v. Haddock, 12 Wend. 475. Tidd, 830.)

Judgment affirmed. 
      
      
        а) See Lansing v. Van Alstyne, (2 Wend. 563, 565, note;) Webb v. Alexander, (7 Wend. 281, 285.)
     
      
       Parties may, however, by demurrer, insist upon the same strictness in regard to pleadings in justices’ courts as are exacted in other courts. (Van Hoesen v. Van Alstyne, 3 Wend. 78. Stone v. Case, 12 id. 283.)
     