
    Matt P. JACOBSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HSBC BANK USA, N.A.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-15498
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 13, 2018 
    
    Filed February 26, 2018
    Matt P. Jacobsen, Pro Se
    Laura Ellen Browning, Esquire, Attorney, Kelly Harrison Dove, Esquire, Attorney, Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, Erica J. Stutman, Attorney, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
    Laura Ellen Browning, Esquire, Attorney, Kelly Harrison Dove, Esquire, Attorney, Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants-Appellees HSBC Mortgage Corporation (USA)
    Kristin A. Schuler-Hintz, McCarthy & Holthus, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, Melissa Robbins Coutts, Esquire, Attorney, McCarthy & Holthus LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Quality Loan Service Corporation
    Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Matt P. Jacobsen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Ja-cobsen’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim because Jacobsen failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants were debt collectors. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (excluding from the definition of debt collector a creditor collecting debts on its own behalf); Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[Ajctions taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure ... are not attempts to collect 'debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.”).

The district court properly dismissed Ja-cobsen’s Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act claim because “letters challenging only a loan’s validity or its terms are not qualified written requests that give rise to a duty to respond under § 2605(e).” Medrano v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 704 F.3d 661, 666-67 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 12 U.S.C, § 2605(e) (loan servicers only need respond to requests for information related to the servicing of loans).

The district court properly dismissed Jacobsen’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim because Jacobsen failed to allege facts sufficient to show a predicate act. See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Bldg. & Const. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 770 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 2014) (elements of a civil RICO claim).

The district court properly dismissed Ja-cobsen’s quiet title claim because Jacobsen failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he paid the debt owed on the property. See Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 112 Nev. 663, 918 P.2d 314, 318 (1996) (per curiam) (“In a quiet title action, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to prove good title in himself.”), abrogated on other grounds by Delgado v. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 125 Nev. 564, 217 P.3d 563 (2009).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of the title documents. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard review and explaining the circumstances in which the district court may take judicial notice of documents extraneous to the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Jacobsen’s complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 770 F.3d at 845 (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion if amendment would be futile).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     