
    Aortense LEWIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARYLAND TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-2107.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: Feb. 24, 2016.
    Decided: March 31, 2016.
    Aortense Lewis, Appellant Pro Se. Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General, Thaddeus Byron Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Eric Scott Hartwig, Maryland Transit Administration, Baltimore, Maryland.
    Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
   Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM.

Aortense Lewis appeals the district court’s orders dismissing or granting summary judgment on her claims of race, age, and disability discrimination and unlawful retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2012 & Supp.2015), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 to 7961 (2012), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (West 2012 & Supp. 2015). On appeal, Lewis raises a number of arguments challenging the district court’s disposition of her claims. Because Lewis did not raise these arguments — or, in fact, any legal arguments in opposition to the Maryland Transit Administration’s dispositive motions— in the district court, her challenges to the district court’s disposition of her claims are not properly before this court. See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir.2014) (“Our settled rule is simple: absent exceptional circumstances, we do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 4th Cir. R. 34(b) (limiting appellate review to issues raised in informal brief).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Insofar as Lewis’ argument that the district court should have granted her leave to amend her complaint to raise a state law claim is properly before us, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant such leave sua sponte. Cf. Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharms. Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 630-31 (4th Cir.2008) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court "declining to grant a motion [for leave to amend] that was never properly made,” particularly where amendment would have been futile).
     