
    *Garland v. Agee's Adm'r.
    (Absent Brooke, J.)
    Partnership — Dissolution—Account Rendered by Active Partner — Effect as to Retiring Partner. — Though a partnership is dissolved, and one partner sells his interest to the other, who undertakes to pay the partnership debts, an account rendered by the acting partner or his clerk, after the dissolution, shewing a balance due from the partnership, is binding on the retiring partner.
    Assumpsit, in the county court of Amherst, by Agee’s administrator against Garland & Ereeland, late merchants and partners transacting business at Bent Creek. There were two counts in the declaration ; one for the price of tobacco sold by the plaintiffs intestate to the defendants; the other on an insimul computas-sent. The suit abated as to the defendant Freeland, by the return on the writ that he was no inhabitant. Plea, the general issue, put in by the defendant Garland alone. At the trial the defendant demurred to the evidence, which was as follows:
    1st, An account between the estate of Agee, the plaintiff’s intestate, and Garland & Freeland which had been filed with the declaration, and in which five hogsheads of tobacco were credited to Agee at the price of 456 dollars, reduced by debits to a balance of 298 dollars, and it appeared by a debit in the account dated the 25th October 1823, that it was rendered after that date. 2ndly, The testimony of a witness, (who had been retained as the defendant’s counsel since the institution of this suit) that the account above mentioned was wholly in the handwriting of one Ferguson, who had' been for many years previous to May 1823 the clerk of Garland & Freeland; that the partnership of Garland & Freeland was dissolved about the 27th May 1823, the dissolution to take effect from the 1st of that month; and at the ‘same time, Garland sold all his interest in the concern of Garland & Freeland, and in another firm of Freeland, Wingfield & Co. to Freeland, who undertook to pay all the debts, and was entitled by contract to all Garland’s rights: that after Freeland had thus bought Garland’s interest, Freeland took possession of all the books, papers &c. and it was understood that Garland was to have nothing further to do with them : that the witness supposed he had seen the dissolution of the partnership of Garland & Freeland published, immediately after it took place, in the Lynchburg newspapers, since he had been under that impression ever since, and the dissolution was matter of notoriety in the neighbourhood where the plaintiff’s intestate lived: that Ferguson (in whose handwriting the account, offered in evidence by the plaintiff, was) continued to be the agent of Freeland for many months after the dissolution of Garland & Freeland, but was not the agent of Garland as a partner of Garland & Freeland, or otherwise, for Garland had no confidence in him: that Ferguson was now a resident of Missouri: that the witness, since he had been retained as counsel for the defendant in this suit, as well as before, had had access to the books of Garland & Freeland, and there was an account in the books in the name of the plaintiff’s intestate, but the witness did not remember how the balance stood or what the items were [the books were not produced] : and that Freeland, who was the acting partner of Garland & Freeland, was extremely careless about making entries on the books; and, in a great many instances, the balances shewn by the books were incorrect for want of proper entries of the transactions, such as entries of debits and credits, which were often supplied, when called for, from memory or loose memorandums, and, sometimes, no accurate information of them could be obtained in any way. And 3rdly, the testimony of another witness, that notice of the dissolution was published in the Lynchburg *Virginian, shortly after May 1823 [but no newspaper containing the publication was produced]. And this being all the evidence on both sides, the defendant demurred thereto, and the plaintiff joined in the demurrer.
    The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for 298 dollars, with interest &c. subject to the opinion of the court on the demurrer to evidence. The court gave judgment on the demurrer, for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the judgment; and then he applied to this court for a supersedeas, which was allowed.
    Garland, for the plaintiff in error.
    The account rendered in Ferguson’s handwriting, appears, on its face, to have been rendered five months after the dissolution of the partnership of Garland & Freeland. The agency of Ferguson for that house ceased upon the dissolution, and he had no authority to do any act binding upon it. And if it may be inferred that Freeland authorized Ferguson to render this account, the act was nowise binding on Garland, because Freeland himself could not, after the dissolution, make any promise or settlement, or any entries on the books, that could bind Garland, without his assent. Shelton v. Cocke, Crawford & Co., 3 Mnnf. 191; Rootes v. Welford & Co., 4 Munf. 21S; Simonton’s assignees v. Boucher & al., 2 Wash. C. C. Rep. 473; Hockley v. Patrick & al., 3 Johns. Rep. 528; Sanford v. Mickels & al., 4 Id. 224; Walden v. Sherburne & al., IS Id. 409, 424.
    Johnson, contra.
    There was no good proof, that the notice of the dissolution of the partnership of Garland & Freeland was duly published: the publication itself, if it existed, might easily and therefore ought to have been produced. But admitting the dissolution, and due publication of the notice of it, yet the account shewing the debt due to Agee from Garland & Freeland, though rendered by Freeland or (which is the same thing) by Ferguson his clerk, after the dissolution, was competent ^evidence of the debt. For even after the dissolution of a partnership, the partnership must in legal contemplation have an existence, so far as respects the winding up of its affairs, until they are settled, and outstanding engagements made good. Brown’s ex’or v. Higginbotham & Co., 5 Leigh 583, 588. An admission made by one partner after dissolution, concerning joint contracts made during the partnership, is evidence to charge the other partner: for when a partnership is dissolved, it is only dissolved with regard to things future; with regard to things past, the partnership continues, and must always continue. Wood &c. v. BradSick, 1 Taunt. 104; Brockenbrough v. Hackley, 6 Call 51. Besides, the jury might fairly have inferred from the evidence stated in the demurrer, and therefore the court must infer, that when, upon the dissolution of Garland & Freeland, Garland left it to Freeland to settle and pay the partnership debts, he gave him full authority to render accounts of, or otherwise acknowledge, such debts as were due from the partnership.
    
      
      See monographic note on “Partnership.”
    
   PRR CURIAM.

The judgment is to be affirmed.  