
    UNITED STATES of America, v. Leonardo MELENDEZ a/k/a Leonard Melendez a/k/a Jimmy Lopez Leonardo Melendez, Appellant.
    No. 02-2661.
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 25, 2003.
    Decided April 28, 2003.
    Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO, and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION

GARTH, Circuit Judge.

Leonardo Melendez appeals from his judgment of sentence, arguing that the application of the “career offender” sentencing enhancement violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Our precedent holds otherwise. We will affirm.

I.

Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, it is unnecessary to recite the facts of this case in detail. Melendez pled guilty to two counts of possession with intent to deliver controlled substances (heroin and cocaine base, respectively) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); two counts of possession with intent to deliver heroin and cocaine base, respectively, within a school zone in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860; and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(B)(l). The District Court sentenced Melendez, inter alia, to 308 months imprisonment.

Melendez’s timely appeal followed.

II.

• We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

On appeal, Melendez argues that the career offender sentencing enhancement that the District Court imposed violated the principle of Apprendi v. New Jersey because his prior convictions were neither pled nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt. As we have previously explained, however, in Apprendi the Supreme Court “singl[ed] out ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ as the exception to the rule that ‘any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231, 250 (3d Cir.2001) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1152, 122 S.Ct. 1118, 151 L.Ed.2d 1011 (2002). In Weaver, we indicated that, in the absence of further direction from the Supreme Court, we would continue to follow the Court’s earlier holding that “no due process violation occurs when prior convictions are used to increase a statutory maximum without being charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 289-41, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998)).

Indeed, Melendez acknowledges that our precedent forecloses the success of his appeal. See Appellant’s Br. at 8 (“Mr. Melendez seeks in the instant appeal to preserve his right to relief should this Court en banc or the Supreme Court reconsider and overrule the contrary precedent that governs this issue.”).

We will therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
      
      . Melendez had previously been convicted on three separate occasions for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (twice for crack and once for PCP).
     