
    William Knobb v. Stephen Lindsay and Nathan Lindsay.
    ¿Person arrested and in prison upon a criminal charge conveys to a third person, in fee, real estate worth two thousand five hundred dollars, renting for eighty dollars per annum, in consideration of the grantee becoming bail, and agreeing to pay the grantor an annuity of one hundred dollars per annum during life, not relieved against in equity, though grantor is aged and intemperate, there being no proof of fraud in the case.
    This was a suit in chancery, reserved from the Supreme Court •'in the county of Hamilton.
    The bill states that the plaintiff is an old man,'ignorant and ■Imperfectly acquainted with the English language. That in the beginning of March, 1830, he was committed to prison, upon the accusation of an infamous crime, and that Lindsay, pretending to -assist him, agreed to become his bail if he would execute an agreement to mortgage his farm, containing two hundred and eleven acres, and worth about *two thousand five hundred ■dollars, for his indemnity. That the agreement was made, the bail for five hundred dollars entered, and that on March 9, 1830, he executed and delivered to Lindsay what he supposed was the mortgage,-and departed for Pennsylvania. That on his return he "first learned the deed was absolute. That Lindsay took possession of the farm during his absence, and by collusion with his tenants, procured them to aceeptf new leases from him.
    The bill proceeds to state that at the date of the above deed Lindsay gave to Knobb an agreement, secured by a mortgage on the land, to pay him an annuity of one hundred dollars during his ■life; and a further instrument of writing was made, in which, after reciting'the conveyance to Lindsay, the liability of Lindsay to pay the sum of five hundred dollars as bail, and the mortgage securing the payment of the annuity to Knobb, it is stipulated <by Lindsay that if he will yet pay to Knobb one hundred dollars per annum for the first five years, and that he will afterward pay ■fifty dollars per annum, retaining fifty dollars per annum only until his advancements, as bail, shall be repaid.
    The bill proceeds to aver that no bill of indictment was found' against him, so that the recognizance of bail was never forfeit, that .he is a man of feeble intellect, and at times insane. That the •writings were not read to him at the time of their execution j that tbe conveyance of the land was obtained under such circumstances that he is entitled to the aid of the court in setting it aside. He therefore prays that the deed may be canceled, and for general" relief.
    The answer of Stephen Lindsay admits the deed and the time of execution. It avers that he found Knobb lying under arrest, upon a criminal charge, by the procurement of his son, and that-he became bail, at Knobb’s solicitation. That Knobb was much exasperated at the steps taken by his son, and unwilling that his-property should ever descend to him; and he therefore proposed to Lindsay to convey his farm for an annuity upon his life of one-hundred dollars, which Lindsay agreed to give.. The writings named in the *bill were designed to carry this purpose into effect. They were read and explained to Knobb; they received some modifications at his instance, and were executed with his-’ entire understanding and assent. - Possession of the land and oí the title papers was delivered by Knobb to Lindsay, and it wasKnobb himself who canceled and destroyed the outstanding leases. He admits that he purchased the farm for less than its value, but avers that its price was materially affected by the general want of repair in the fences, and by the doubts upon-its title, in consequence of a claim set up by Lemuel Taylor. The land was leased, at eighty dollars per annum. He insists that Knobb, although, not well acquainted with English, was a man possessing a strong mind and good sense; was sane; duly sober, and perfectly competent to contract, and that no fraud or ill faith was practiced to-lead him into this arrangement.
    Nathan Lindsay answers that he is a purchaser of a part of the land from Stephen Lindsay, and knows nothing of the original transaction.
    The pleadings-were closed by a general replication. Yoluminous testimony was taken, which is noticed as far as necessary by the court in the opinion below.
    Stor.br. and Fox, for plaintiff.
    Strait and Hawes, for defendants.
   Judge Lane

delivered the opinion of the court:

The precise ground upon which relief is claimed in the present-case is not very specifically pointed out in the bill. It is hardly insisted that the duress is such as to avoid the contract. Although the'agreement to convey was executed while the plaintiff was in prison, yef it was a lawful imprisonment, and not produced by Lindsay, and a bond to procure a discharge, or for any other honest purpose, is not void. 2 Inst. 481. It was not unreason.able for Lindsay to annex to his offer of bail the condition that ICnobb should secure him against the risk. And it seems that this ground *of relief is wholly taken away by the execution of the stipulated conveyance, after his discharge from prison, when .all restrictions upon his liberty were at an end.

Is it sufficiently proved that he was incapable of contracting ? He is represented to be at times-intemperate. Burdieh says that while under arrest and on his way to prison he seemed depressed, cast down, and intoxicated, so much that he should not have deemed it right to have made a contract with him. Picklehamer alone represents him as having lost his senses after his liberation, “sometimes crying,'sometimes preaching, sometimes cursing and swearing, during which he appeared sober.” To explain this we need not raise the harsh presumption that he was following the advice he said he had received, “to act foolish that he might regain his land.” The testimony fully shows that none of his acquaintance ascribe to him any other insanity than occasional intoxication.

There is no sufficient evidence that fraud was practiced upon the plaintiff. The arrest did not arise from the defendant, nor did he officiously pi’ess his aid upon the plaintiff; he lent his assistance at the solicitation of the plaintiff at an accidental meeting.

No false pretenses are shown as inducements to lead the plaintiff into this agreement. But it is said that he intended not to ■ convoy the land, but to mortgage it for Lindsay’s-indemnity. The proof to support this is of the slenderest description, consisting merely of the fact that while in jail, and before the agreement was made, Lindsay and Knobb told Mr. Fox that Lindsay had agreed to become the bail, and to take a mortgage on the land for indemnity. May it not be presumed that the parties changed their arrangements ? The answer alleges that he designed to disinherit his family, and his situation renders this in the highest degree probable. That the agreement was not truly written is fully denied in the answer, and fully disproved by testimony. The bill shows that on the day when the land was conveyed by Knobb, Lindsay gave to him a bond for the annuity, the payment of which was secured by a mortgage of the same land to Knobb by Lindsay. Can it be possible -that this arrangement should have been made ^unless the land had been conveyed; that Knobb should have taken a deed from Lindsay unless he had transferred to him? What other consideration did Lindsay receive for the annuity? But the direct proof is full. Dennis, a subscribing witness, knows the deed was read and explained to Knobb, and he appeared satisfied. Foster, likewise present, says -that on learning its terms he hesitated to sign the deed, but afterward consented. He told Eickleberger he had sold the land for the annuity ; and Peter Knobb proves that before his father went to Pennsylvania he spoke of the sale to Lindsay, that possession was yielded, and the outstanding leases were destroyed by- his consent..

There remains the question upon the inadequacy of consideration only. An estate worth two thousand or two thousand five hundred dollars, and producing eighty dollars per annum, although in bad repair, is sold for the annuity of one hundred dollars for the life of an intemperate man, who has passed the age of •sixty. Efforts are made to show the difference of value is not so strikingly great; that a shade hang's over its title from the claim of Taylor; that a part of the value has been added since the contract by the general rise of property, yet we can not hesitate to believe, from the proof, that Lindsay acquired it for much less than its worth.

But this fact affords the plaintiff no ground for relief. It is a point well settled that mere inadequacy of price, although it may lead courts to abstain from executing agreements, is not a suficient cause for rescinding, unless it be so gross as to afford proof of actual fraud. 2 Johns. Ch. 1; 14 Johns. 527; 3 Cow. 590; 3 Cow. 445; 2 Des. 636; 3 Des. 292; 4 Des. 651.

That degree of inadequacy does not exist in the present case. The parties were dealing upon a most obscure subject of traffic, the value of the life of an intemperate old man. Some of the witnesses, who seem honest, calculated its probable duration at twenty or thirty years. If witnesses entertain such extravagant opinions the parties may be excused in mistaking without the imputation of fraud. Besides, we may as well presume that Knobb would then have preferred to bestow the benefit of his-property upon the friend who delivered him from prison rather than upon *the son who placed him there. The facts do not authorize the conclusion of actual fraud. If the contract had remained executory, perhaps we might not have decreed a performance, but there is no ground toxescind.

Bill dismissed.-  