
    JOHNSON v. STATE.
    (No. 7549.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 18, 1923.)
    1. Criminal law <&wkey;4l9, 420(3) — Testimony as to statements of another out of presence of accused held Inadmissible as hearsay.
    In a prosecution for robbery, testimony of an officer that an accomplice who turned state’s evidence had given him a description of the accused as the other man who had assisted in the offense and gave the first name of the accused, upon which description the officer made the arrest, was hearsay as to the accused and inadmissible; the statement having been made out of the presence of the accused.
    2. Criminal law <&wkey;510½ — Testimony of identification of accused by alleged accomplice held inadmissible.
    In a prosecution for robbery, testimony of an officer that one who had turned state’s evidence identified the accused without hesitation as being one who had assisted him in the offense was inadmissible to corroborate accomplice’s testimony and support the state’s theory.
    3. Criminal law <&wkey;424(3) — Admission of tes-, timony as to statements of an alleged accomplice held error.
    In a prosecution for robbery,' admitting testimony by an officer that one who had' turned state’s evidence told him where the accused and the state’s witness had changed the money taken from the victim, and what the witness had said in this conversation, which occurred after the conspiracy, if any, between the witness and the' accused, and out oí the hearing and presence of the accused, was error.
    Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County; W;- H. Davidson, Judge.
    Paul Johnson was convicted of robbery, and he appeals.
    Reversed.
    , Howth & O’Eiel and Lamar Hart, all of Beaumont, for appellant.
    R. G. Storéy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   LÁTTIMORE, J.

Appellant was convicted in the district court of Jefferson county of the offense of robbery, and his punishment fixed at 10 years in the penitentiary. ■

An extended statement of the facts is , not thought necessary. Terrell, the alleged injured party, was held up by. two men at the point of a pistol and robbed. The robbers had handkerchiefs .over their faces. They took from him his money, including a $20 bill. . Buster Hadnot turned state’s evidence arid testified that he and the appel-íánt were the robbers. There was evidence corroborative, of his testimony, but also evidence tending to establish the defense of alibi interposed by appellant. He took the witness stand and testified denying his presence at the place of the robbery and participation therein. He was supported by other witnesses. On rebuttal the state called Of-* fleer Whitlock, who swore that, upon hearing of the robbery and after a conversation with Hadnot, he arrested appellant. The state asked him the question, “Upon whose information did you arrest the defendant?” Appellant objected to this, and also to’the testimony of said witness that Hadnot gave him a description of appellant as the other man who was with him at the time of the robbery, and said that the other man’s name was Paul, and that with this .description he arrested appellant. The objection was that it was out of the presence and hearing of the appellánt and was hearsay so far as he was concerned. We find ourselves unable to escape the conclusion that the objection should have been sustained'. We also think that the testimony of said officer to the fact that Hadnot identified appellant after his arrest as being the man who was with him, and that there was no hesitation in his identification, was inadmissible. Reddick v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 467, 34 S. W. 274, 60 Am. St. Rep. 56; Clark v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 159, 45 S. W. 696; Murphy v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 126, 51 S. W. 940; Bowen v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 146, 82 S. W. 520; Turman v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 12, 95 S. W. 533; Ripley v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 132, 100 S. W. 943. These authorities support the proposition that testimony of identification is not admissible to corroborate the accomplice or to support the state’s theory in a case like this.

Said witness was also allowed to testify over objection that Hadnot told him where they changed the money and what Hadnot said in this conversation. This occurred after the consummation of the conspiracy, if any, between Hadnot and appellant, and out of the presence and hearing of the appellant, and was clearly inadmissible. Similar testimony to the above from another officer was also admitted over objection.

For the admission of said evidence, a reversal is ordered. 
      cgraoFor other oases see same topic and KEV-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests,and Indexes
     