
    Honglan JIN, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS, III, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    
    No. 15-3533
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 16, 2017
    FOR PETITIONER: Thomas D. Barra, Esq., New York, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director; Russell J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, REENARAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions, III is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch as Respondent.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Honglan Jin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the BIA’s affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re Honglan Jin, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Oct. 20, 2015), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. May 22, 2014).

Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness,” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006), applying well established standards of review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 2009). In so doing, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to deny the petition for review.

The agency did not err in finding that Jin failed to satisfy her burden of proof because she did not submit corroborating statements from fellow Falun Gong practitioners or evidence that Chinese officials are aware or likely to become aware of her practice of Falun Gong.

“The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii); see also Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d at 196-97.

Here, the agency reasonably required corroboration because Jin’s testimony about her practice of Falun Gong lacked detail. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii) (“Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”); see also Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d at 196-97. Specifically, the agency properly identified the missing evidence, noting that Jin had not proffered testimony or written statements from any Falun Gong practitioners with whom she has practiced or protested. Moreover, even if such witnesses were unavailable to attend a hearing as Jin contended, she failed to compellingly explain why they could not submit affidavits. See Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d at 198 (“[T]he alien bears the ultimate burden of introducing such evidence without prompting from the IJ.”).

Alternatively, even assuming Jin established her practice of Falun Gong, the agency reasonably concluded that she failed to demonstrate a well-founded, fear of persecution on that basis. “[T]o establish a well-founded fear of persecution in the absence of any evidence of past persecution, an alien must make some showing that authorities in h[er] country of nationality are either aware of h[er] activities or likely to become aware of h[er] activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008).

No evidence compelled the conclusion that Chinese officials are likely to become aware of (or take an interest in) Jin’s protest activities in the United States based solely on the publication of her picture and name in 2011 and 2012 print and online publications, some of which she admitted were not circulated in China. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334, 336-37 (2d Cir. 2013). Indeed, we have rejected as “most unlikely” the suggestion “that the Chinese government is aware of every anti-Communist or pro-democracy piece of commentary published online” and found speculative claims that the Chinese government may discover a few articles published on the internet years earlier. Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d at 334 (citing Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the record ..., [an applicant’s] fear is speculative at best”)).

Because Jin failed to satisfy her burden of proof that she practices Falun Gong or, alternatively, that authorities are aware, or likely to become aware, of her practice, the agency did not err in concluding that she failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(i); see also Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d at 197-98; Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d at 142. That finding was dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based on the same factual predicate. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  