
    THE STATE vs. JOHN CLARK.
    In an indictment for larceny, the goods, alleged te be stolen, may be described by the names, by which they are known in trade, and tho same principle extends to articles known by particular names, in all the arts, pursuits and employments of life.
    Where a man was indicted for stealing a !! bull tongue,” and It appeared in evidence that he had stolen a particular kind of plough share, usually known in the neighborhood, in which he resided, by that name, held that the allegation of the indictment was well supported by the evidence.
    Tho case of the State v. Godet, 7 Irad. Rep. 210, cited and approved.
    Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Randolph County, at the Spring Term, 1848, his Honor Judge Pearson presiding.
    The defendant was tried at Randolph, on the last Spring circuit, before his Honor Judge Pearson, on the following bill of indictment:
    “State of North Carolina, ) Superior Court of Law, Randolph County. [ Spring Term, A. D. 1848.
    The Jurors for the State upon their oath present that John Clark, late of said county, on the first day of May now last past, with force and arms in the county aforesaid, one bull tongue of the value of six-pence, and one piece of iron, of the value of six-pence, of the goods and chattels of one Thomas Winslow, then and there being found, felo-niously did steal, take and carry away against the peace and dignity of the State.”
    The testimony on the part of the State proved that the defendant had stolen a plough share belonging to the prosecutor ; that the plough share in question was a long piece of iron, sharpened at the point and widened and flattened in the middle, so as to be in the shape of the tongue of a bull, and that it was usually called a “ bull tongue,” though it was sometimes also called a gopher.
    Upon this testimony, the defendant’s counsel moved the Court to instruct the jury, that the allegation of the article stolen, being a piece of iron, was not supported by the evidence : and that the allegation of its being “one bull tongue” was too vague and indefinite, to justify a conviction, for the reason that “ bull tongue,” as applied to a species of plough share, was a mere local term. His Honor instructed the jury as requested, upon the first point, saying that although the article stolen “was made of iron, yet when it was shaped, and formed into a distinct article, such as a ring, or clevis, or plough share, it was no longer a mere piece of iron.” Upon the second point, he charged, “ that if the jury believed from the evidence, that the defendant had stolen a plough share, which was usually called a bull tongue, the charge in the indictment was sufficiently specific to justify a verdict.” The jury found the defendant guilty, when he moved for a new trial, which was refused. He then moved in arrest of judgment, which was also refused and judgment being pronounced, he appealed.
    
      Attorney General, for the State.
    No counsel for the defendant.
   Battle, J.

In an indictment for larceny, the article, charged to be stolen, must be properly and sufficiently ■ described, so that there may be no doubt of its identity. This is required for the purpose of enabling the Court to see that the article is of value; and also for the protection of the accused, by informing him df the distinct charge against him, and furnishing him with the means of showing, if subsequently indicted for the same offence, that he has already been convicted or. acquitted of its commission. State v. Godet, 7 Ired. Rep. 210. And the evidence must correspond with the description of the property laid. Ibid. Many nice questions have been raised on this subject, and some of the cases have turned upon distinctions savouring of almost too much refinement. See the note to the case of the King v. Halloway, 1 Carr, and Payne 127, (11 Eng. C. L. Rep. 341.) Goods may be described by the name by which they are known in trade. King v. Nibbs, R. and Ryan 25, Arch. Grim. PL 170. The same principle must extend to articles known and used in all the arts, pursuits, and employments of life. In the note to the case of King v. Halloway, above referred to, the reporter, after stating that it is particularly necessary to be precise in an indictment, with regard to the descriptipn of stolen property, says that it is best, at least in one count, to call the thing by the name, by which the witnesses will, call it in their testimony. This is certainly in furtherance of th© main purposes for which a definite description is necessary, that is, to inform the accused of the' precise charge against him, and to enable him to defend himself against a subsequent indictment for the same offence.

in the case before us, it would have been better undoubtedly to have described the stolen article, as one plough share, commonly called and known by the name of a bull tongue. But we think, that the appellation simply of bull tongue” is sufficient. A certain species of plough share, made in the shape of the tongue of a bull, was, as the witnesses stated, usually called a bull tongue, and though it appeared that it was sometimes called by another name, yet the defendant could hardly have been mistaken as to the article, with the stealing cf which he stood charged.

The counsel indeed objected that the name applied was a mere local one, but it does not appear that the name of the article stolen is less extensive than its use. We think therefore,, that there was no error in the charge of the Court upon this point, which is the only one necessary for us to decide.

The reasons for the motion in arrest of the judgment, are not stated, and as we see none, it must be so certified to the Superior Court.

Per Curiam. This opinion ordered to be certified to the Court below.  