
    
      John P. Kinard, administrator of Wm. T. Moore, v. Elizabeth Moore.
    
    The exemption of certain articles from “levy and sale," in all cases of debt, provided for by the 4th section of the Act of 1823, entitled “ An Act to prohibit sheriffs and their deputies from purchasing executions lodged in their offices, and for other purposes” — held to cover every sale by operation of law, which, directly or indirectly, is necessary for the payment of a party’s debts.
    Acts of 18-23 p. 50. ’
    
      Before O’Neall, J. at Newberry, Fall Term, 1848.
    In this case the late William T. Moore, the intestate of the plaintiff, and the husband of the defendant, was indebted, at his death, to insolvency. There were judgments against him and executions, in the hands of the sheriff, to the sum of $2,771 11. The tangible property would more than pay the executions. The administrator was selling the personal estate, and the widow claimed to retain two beds, bedsteads, and furniture, one cow and calf, the ordinary cooking utensils, and ten dollars worth of provisions. She had kept these in her possession, and the administrator had brought trover for their recovery. The case, stated by consent, was submitted to his Honor Judge O’Neall.
    The 4th section of the “ Act to prohibit sheriffs and their deputies, under certain penalties, from purchasing executions lodged in their offices, and for other purposes,” passed the 20th December, 1823, provides, “ that from and after the first day of March next, the following articles shall, in all cases of debt, contracted after that period, be exempted from levy or sale, for the same, to wit, to each family: two beds, with necessary bedding; two bedsteads; one spinning wheel, and two pair of cards ; one loom; one cow and calf. If a farmer, the necessary farming utensils — if a mechanic, the tools of his trade, the ordinary cooking utensils, and ten dollars worth of provisions.” . .
    “ This enactment,” said his Honor, “ I very well know, was intended to exempt the property mentioned from levy and sale, under execution. For it became a part of" the Act of 1823, by the joint instrumentality of my excellent friend, the late Judge Prioleau, and myself. But on recurring to the words used, I find they are broader than 1 supposed; they exempt the property mentioned from levy, or sale for debts, contracted after the first of March, 1824. These words are certainly broad enough to cover every sale by operation of law, which, directly or indirectly, is necessary for the payment of a party’s debts.
    P. L. 493.
    4 McC. 378.
    The sale by the administrator, here, is not for distribution. If it were, then, plainly, the articles were not exempted.— But it is for payment of debts, and was, I presume, so ordered by the Ordinary; for according to the 19th section of the Act of ’89, he has only authority to order a sale of the goods and chattels of an intestate in these cases: 1st. for division ; 2d. for payment of debts; 3d. to prevent the loss of perishable articles.
    Regarding the administrator as claiming here, for the purpose of sale for the payment of the debts of the intestate, it comes clearly within the equity of the statute, and the words used will cover the case; I am’ therefore, constrained to take that view, for I very well know my construction of the Act must be on its words, and not what was actually intended.
    The decree must Ire, therefore, for the defendant.”
    The plaintiff appealed, on the ground that his Honor erred in-holding that the property sued for, was not liable to be sold by the plaintiff, for the payment of his intestate’s debts.,
    
      Fair, for the motion.
    Pope, contra.
   O’Nuall, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case the Court is satisfied with the construction, given by the Judge below, to the 4th section of the “Act to prohibit sheriffs and their deputies from purchasing executions lodged in their offices, and for other purposes.”

The case Of Canfield v. McAlister is an analogous case, and may well be appealed to, to sustain the reasoning in the report.

In that case the goods were distrained for rent — they were held to be exempt from sale under a distress.

Speaking of the words of the section, “ levy or sale,” Judge Nott says: the word “sale appears to have been introduced as if the Legislature, apprehensive that the word levy might admil too nanow a construction, intended to extend the exemption to every kind of sale for debt.” ,

The motion is dismissed.

The whole Court concurred.

Motion refused.  