
    J. F. McMURRAY v. THE CHOCTAW NATION OF INDIANS AND THE CHICKASAW NATION OF INDIANS
    [No. 33996.
    Decided July 1, 1926]
    
      On the Proofs
    
    
      Indian claims; jurisdiction; section $103, R. 8.; services rendered.— In a suit brought under section 18, act of May 25, 1918, and section 8, act of July 19, 1919, tlie technical defense of section 2103, Revised Statutes, is not available, and where beneficial services have been rendered to defendant Indian nations by the plaintiff, and payment therefor has been made to him in a fair amount, from appropriations for regular and necessary expenses of the government of the respective tribes, and no fraud attaches to the transaction, the payment so made can not be recovered.
    
      
      Same; contingent fees of attorneys; from, what date interest thereon to he calculated. — Under the Indian jurisdictional acts of May-25, 1918, and July 19, 1919, interest on fees due the attorneys, which were contingent upon recovery, is to be calculated from the date that the amount recovered was appropriated by Congress, and not from the date of the court’s judgment.
    
      Same; general retainer; reimbursement for expenses. — Where attorneys for Indian nations have received compensation therefrom under a general retainer, and an act of Congress provides that in certain litigation, wherein said attorneys appear, the expense thereof shall be paid by the Secretary of the Interior out of tribal funds, the said attorneys can recover, under the special jurisdictional acts of May 25, 1918, and July 19, 1919, only their necessary court expenses, and not their own overhead.
    
      Same; unmerchantable coal-mining leases; payment of royalties; cancellation. — The plaintiff entered into certain coal leases with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, which required him to operate the mines and provided for the payment of advance royalties, and tonnage royalties on coal actually mined, the leases to he void in case of failure to make any of the stipulated payments. The plaintiff paid certain of the advance royalties, and upon his refusal to make further payments thereof was sued therefor in a circuit court of the United States and judgment recovered against him, which he did not satisfy. The coal could not be mined at a profit, and he did not mine any of it. Held, that under the special jurisdictional acts of May 25, 1918, and July 19, 1919, the said leases should be canceled, the said unpaid judgment against the plaintiff for advance royalties to be allowed as a counterclaim against him, the advance royalties actually paid to stand, and no tonnage royalties to be allowed.
    
      The Reporter's statement of the case:
    
      Messrs. John F. MeCarron, Cecil H. Smith, and Melvin Cornish for the plaintiff. Messrs. Emmett E. Melnnis and George E. Hamilton, and Head, Dillard, Smith, Maxey do Head were on the briefs.
    
      Mr. Hampton Tucker for the Choctaw Nation.
    
      Mr. G. G. McVay for the Chickasaw Nation.
    
      Mr. George T. Stormont, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Herman J. Gcdloway, for the United States.
    The court made special findings of fact, as follows:
    I. The plaintiff, J. F. McMurray, is a loyal citizen of the United States, and has never given aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States Government or to rebellion against said Government.
    II. From February, 1899, to March 4, 1907, the plaintiff, J. F. McMurray, was a member of the law partnership of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, composed of George A. Mansfield, the said J. F. McMurray, and Melvin Cornish, which partnership or firm was during that time engaged in the practice of law at South McAlester, Indian Territory. Said firm during the greater part of this period of time acted as attorney for the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations of Indians, and performed a large amount of legal service for said nations of Indians, out of which services have arisen the plaintiff’s claims involved in this suit.
    III. On May 5, 1909, the said firm of Mansfield, McMur-ray & Cornish was dissolved, and the following instrument was executed by the plaintiff and his said partners, Mansfield and Cornish:
    “ MEMORANDUM OF TRANSFER
    “Whereas George A. Mansfield, J. F. McMurray, and Melvin Cornish have, for several years last past, been engaged in the practice of law generally, and as general and special counsel for the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, at McAlester, Oklahoma, under the firm name of £ Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish,’ and on account of the removal of the said George A. Mansfield from the State of Oklahoma, as well as other considerations, a settlement of the affairs of said partnership has become necessary, said firm having on hand a large amount of unfinished business of great importance and valuable assets, including contracts with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations involving large sums, some of which require services in order to complete them, and accounts now in process of settlement for services performed for said nations and accounts for expenses incurred in connection with said services, as well as many other varied interests and matters relating to the assets of said firm too numerous to mention.
    
      “ Now, therefore, this memorandum witnesses that the said firm has this day been dissolved by mutual consent and the said George A. Mansfield and Melvin Cornish have this day, for a valuable consideration, sold, conveyed, transferred, assigned, and made over to the said J. F. McMurray all and singular the interests which the said Mansfield and Cornish have in the said business of the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish of every kind and description, including all of said accounts, judgments, unfinished business, contracts, book accounts, and effects of every kind and description (excepting lot six (6) block three hundred and fifty-nine (359), official map of South McAlester, Indian Territory, now McAlester, Oklahoma, and buildings and improvements thereon situated, the same being owned individually by the parties hereto and not being involved in this transfer) , this instrument bearing witness to such sale and transfer thereto wherever exhibited, and the said J. F. McMurray is authorized to collect and receive all moneys that may be due said firm in the settlement of the assets hereby conveyed and to receipt for the same in the name of said firm. “
    “ The language employed in the preceding paragraph for the purpose of describing the assets of said firm hereby transferred is thought by the parties hereto to be entirely sufficient for all purposes; but by way of special information to any persons or officials who may be called upon to pass upon any questions growing out of the settlement of such assets, special reference is hereby made to the expenses incurred by said firm in the trial of citizenship cases by the Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court created and acting under the act of Congress approved July 1, 1902, known as the Choctaw and Chickasaw supplementary agreement, and also to the fee due said firm for legal services rendered in the suit of the United States versus the Choctaw Nation and the Chickasaw freedmen instituted in the United States Court of Claims under the act and agreement above referred to.
    “ Witness our hands this 5th day of May, 1909.
    “ Geoege A. Manseield.
    “ Witnesses:
    “ I. D. Beent.
    “ W. E. Babbbth.
    “Melvin Coenish.
    “ I. D. Beent.
    “ Leta Davis.
    
      “ N. BeegeRAn.”
    IY. After the termination of the services of the said firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish for the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations and the dissolution of said firm, the plaintiff, failing to secure allowance by the Secretary of the Interior of certain claims being made by him against said Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations growing out of said services, applied to Congress for relief; and by section 18 of the Indian appropriation act of May 26, 1918 (40 Stat. 661), it was provided as follows:
    “ That the Court of Claims is hereby authorized and directed to hear, consider, and adjudicate the following matters of J. F. McMurray, as assignee of the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, against the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations of Indians, or either of them, for professional services rendered for said nations in the case of ‘ The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations vs. The United States and the Chickasaw Freedmen,’ under act of Congress approved July first, nineteen hundred and two, entitled ‘An act to ratify and confirm an agreement with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes of Indians, and for other purposes,’ and for expenses incurred under sections thirty-one, thirty-two, and thirty-three of the same act of Congress and for payment of two unpaid Chickasaw warrants issued by tribal authorities under act of legislature of the Chickasaw Nation approved by the governor of the Chickasaw Nation on September twentieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and afterwards by the President of the United States; and to render judgment therefor in such amount or amounts as may be found to be due thereon, together with interest from the date of such services or payments at the legal rate of interest prevailing at the time and place of such transactions ; which judgment, if any, against said nations or either of them shall be paid by the Treasurer of the United States out of the funds of said nations as their interests may appear : Provided, That as to any such claims so sued upon the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, or either of them, shall be permitted to interpose all proper defenses by way of counterclaim or set-off against either the assignors or the assignee of said claim, all statutes of limitations against said set-offs or counterclaims being hereby waived, and all amounts found due to said Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, under the above provisions, shall bear interest at the legal rate: Provided further, That any amount found to be owing, calculated upon a fair and equitable basis, by the said J. F. McMurray to the said Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations upon coal-mining leases held by him may be offset against any judgment that may be rendered in his favor upon such claims: Provided further, That if any of such leases are found not to be underlaid with merchantable coal and all of said leases upon which royalties are not paid within thirty days after the final settlement of these matters, the same shall be canceled; and notice of filing of such suits by the said J. F. McMurray shall be served upon the principal chief of the Choctaw Nation and the governor of the Chickasaw Nation, and said nations shall be represented therein by attorneys for said nations, respectively, and by the Attorney General of the United States: Provided, That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to adjust, by mutual agreement with the interested parties herein under the terms hereof and within sixty days after its approval by the President of the United States, any or all of the matters covered by the above provisions, and should such agreement be made by the Secretary of the Interior he is hereby authorized and directed to make requisition upon the Treasurer of the United States for the payment of the same out of any funds of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians as their interests may appear, and the Treasurer shall pay the same: And provided further, That the Court of Claims shall require the said J. F. McMurray, upon filing suit in pursuance hereof, to give a sufficient bond, with two or more good and sufficient sureties, to abide the judgment of such court in said suit, and in case the Secretary of the Interior should arbitrate such claims and counterclaims he shall require the said McMurray to give sufficient security to abide the award of such arbitration.”
    V. Pursuant to said provision of the act of May 25, 1918, the plaintiff requested of the Secretary of the Interior the settlement and payment of plaintiff’s said claims. The Secretary, in view of certain claims being made in behalf of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations against the plaintiff, decided that it was inadvisable for him to consider and settle the plaintiff’s said claims; and the plaintiff thereupon, on September 23,1918, filed his petition in this court, the items claimed therein being in substance as follows:
    1. For legal services rendered by the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish in excluding the Chickasaw freedmen from citizenship property rights in the Choctaw and Chick.asaw tribal property, $27,500, with interest.
    2. For certain expenses incurred by the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish in the trial for the Choctaws and Chickasaws of certain citizenship cases known as the “ Court claimant ” cases, which resulted in the exclusion of a large number of citizenship claimants from the Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship rolls, the sum of $25,544.07, with interest.
    
      3. For legal services rendered the Chickasaw Nation by said firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, under contract with said nation, in payment for which services warrants had been issued to said firm amounting to $10,589, but which warrants had not been paid, the claim being for said sum of $10,589, with interest.
    VI. On October 30, 1918, the defendants filed a general traverse to the plaintiff’s petition and a counterclaim against the plaintiff’s claim in the sum of $216,348.30, with interest, of which sum $33,500 is for delinquent royalties claimed to be due defendants from the plaintiff on account of certain coal leases made to plaintiff during the year 1899; and the sum of $182,848.30 is for. the amount of certain payments that had been made to the said firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish for legal services rendered and expenses incurred by said firm for the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, which payments are claimed by defendants to have been made contrary to law.
    VII. Following the filing of the defendants’ said counterclaim the plaintiff appealed to Congress and secured the enactment, in section 8 of the act of July 19, 1919 (41 Stat. 163, 234), of the following amendment to the original jurisdictional statute of May 25, 1918, set forth in Finding IV:
    “ That chapter eight, Laws of 1918, page 583, third paragraph, in line 16 of said paragraph, after the words ‘ United States,’ be amended by inserting the following:
    “ ‘And with jurisdiction also to hear, consider, and adjudicate any and ail other claims or demands by or against either party to said litigation, to the end that a complete and final adjustment may be had between said parties as to outstanding matters of controversy or account between them: Provided, That nothing in this amendment shall be construed to include claims by J. F. McMurray or Mansfield, McMur-ray & Cornish relating to the sale of the Choctaw-Chickasaw coal lands or claims relating to the leased district, or claims relating to proceeds arising from the sale of timber lands, unallotted or other lands or any other claim where the services were not actually rendered and finished and resulted to the benefit of said people: Provided, further, That the said J. F. McMurray shall be limited in presenting such additional claims to such matters as may have or shall hereafter be set up by way of set-off or counterclaim by the defendants.’ ”
    
      VIII. Pursuant to the said amendment of the jurisdictional statute of May 25, 1918, the plaintiff on September 25,1919, filed a supplemental petition setting forth a number of additional claims against the defendants; and on February 2, 1923, an amended petition was filed by plaintiff setting forth all of the claims included in the original and supplemental petitions except the claim of $10,589 in the third count of the original petition on account of unpaid warrants of the Chickasaw Nation, which warrants had in the meantime been paid by said nation; and the claim in the ninth count of the supplemental petition claiming for services in drafting and securing the approval and adoption of treaties between the defendants and the United States, which claim has been abandoned.
    IX. The act of Congress of June 28, 1898, familiarly known as the Curtis Act, and containing what is known as the Atoka agreement between the Choctaws and Chickasaws and the United States (30 Stat. 495), provided, among other things, for the allotment in severalty of the lands of the said Indians in the Indian Territory; and upon the enactment of this statute the question of citizenship and right to enrollment as citizens of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations became a prominent and important question before the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, known as the Dawes Commission, and in the courts of the Territory, as thousands of persons outside of the recognized citizens of the nations, attracted by the value of the tribal lands and other property of the Indians, made claim to citizenship and applied for enrollment as such citizens.
    X. By the Indian appropriation act of June T, 1897 (30 Stat. 62, 84), it was provided:
    “ That on and after January first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, all acts ordinances, and resolutions of the council of either of the aforesaid Five Tribes passed shall be certified immediately upon their passage to the President of the United States and shall not take effect, if disapproved by him, or until thirty days after their passage: Provided, That this act shall not apply to resolutions for adjournment or any acts or resolutions or ordinances in relation to negotiations with commissioners heretofore appointed to treat with said tribes.”
    
      And by section 29 of the said act of Congress of June 28, 1898 (30 Stat. 495, 505), known as the Atoka agreement,, between the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations and the United States, it was provided (p. 512) :
    “ It is further agreed that no act, ordinance, or resolution of the council of either the Choctaw or Chickasaw Tribes, in any manner affecting the land of the tribe or of the individuals after allotment, or the moneys or other property of the tribe or citizens thereof (except appropriations for regular and necessary expenses of the government of the respective tribes), or the rights of any persons to employ any kind of labor, or the rights of any persons who have taken or may take the oath of allegiance to the United States, shall be of any validity until approved by the President of the United States. When such acts, ordinances, or resolutions passed by the council of either of said tribes shall be approved-by the governor thereof, then it shall be the duty of the national secretary of said tribe to forward them to the President of the United States, duly certified and sealed, who shall, within thirty days after their reception, approve or disapprove the same. Said acts, ordinances, or resolutions when so approved shall be published in at least two newspapers having a bona fide circulation in the tribe to be affected thereby, and when disapproved shall be returned to the tribe enacting the same.”
    XI. By act of the Choctaw general council of October 19, 1899, approved by the President of the United States January 10, 1900, the principal chief of the Choctaw Nation was authorized and empowered to employ an attorney for the Choctaw Nation in citizenship cases at a salary of $5,000 per year, payable quarterly on the certificate of the principal chief, upon which the national auditor should issue his warrant and the national treasurer should pay the same, the services of said attorney to continue until the rolls of Choctaw citizens should be completed, unless such attorney should sooner be dismissed for cause.
    Pursuant to said act, the principal chief of the nation, by contract, employed the said firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish as such attorney for the nation, at a salary of $5,000 per year, under which contract of employment the firm was paid for services and for expenses incurred therewith up to May 23, 1905, as hereinafter more fully set forth.
    
      Said contract of employment was never approved by either the Commissioner of Indian Affairs or the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the provisions of section 2103 of the Revised Statutes; and said payments to the firm thereunder are included in the defendants’ counterclaim.
    XII. On January 10, 1900, the President of the United States also approved an act of the Chickasaw legislature ratifying a contract entered into by the governor of the Chickasaw Nation and the said firm of Mansfield, McMur-ray & Cornish, dated July 20, 1899, for the employment of said firm as attorney for the Chickasaw Nation in citizenship matters before the Dawes Commission and the Secretary of the Interior, at a salary of $5,000 per year and actual necessary expenses not exceeding $2,700 per year, the services of the firm to continue until the final completion of the Chickasaw rolls, subject, however, to annulment of the contract by the Chickasaw legislature after two years from the date thereof. Under this contract said firm acted as citizenship attorney of said nation, and was paid therefor, and for expenses incurred in connection therewith, up to about July, 1905, as hereinafter more fully set forth.
    This contract was never approved either by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs or by the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the provisions of said section 2103 of the Revised Statutes; and the payments made to the firm thereunder are included in the defendant’s counterclaim.
    XIII. A controversy having arisen between the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations on the one hand and the Chickasaw freedmen on the other as to the rights of the freedmen in the Choctaw and Chickasaw lands, Congress in an act of July 1, 1902, embodying what is known as the supplemental agreement with the Indians (32 Stat. 641), provided for allotments to said freedmen from said lands, and for the institution of a suit in the Court of Claims by the Attorney General in behalf of the United States against the Choctaw and the Chickasaw Nations and the Chickasaw freedmen, requiring the defendants therein to interplead and settle whether the Chickasaw freedmen had any legal rights in the Choctaw and Chickasaw lands. It was further provided by said act that if it should be determined in said suit that the Chickasaw freedmen had no legal rights in said lands, the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations should recover from the United States the value of the lands allotted to said freedmen as determined by appraisal thereof by the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, the said Dawes Commission. Said act also provided for the employment of counsel by the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations to represent them in said suit, and for appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States by any party to the suit aggrieved by the judgment of the Court of Claims.
    On October 16 and November 6, 1902, the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, respectively, by contracts in writing, employed the said firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish to represent them in said suit, it being stated in the contracts that the purpose of the contracts was to secure the services of said firm in behalf of said nations for the purpose of securing from the United States compensation for the lands allotted to the said freedmen, and that the special thing to be done by said firm was to represent the said nations to that end. The contract provisions as to the firm’s compensation for its services in the matter were, as agreed upon by the parties, that the compensation should be 6 per cent of the “ interest ” of the Choctaws and Chickasaws “ in whatever sum or sums of money may be received from the United States as compensation for. the lands to be allotted ” to said freedmen, and that such compensation as should be due the firm under said contracts should “ be payable out of such moneys, and at the Treasury of the United States.” Said contracts were approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior, but with the provision that the combined compensation under the two contracts should in no event exceed $27,500, which provision was accepted by said firm. Copies of said contracts are appended to the plaintiff’s amended petition as Exhibits B and C, which are by reference made a part of this finding.
    Pursuant to their said employment, Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish filed bills of interpleader in the Court of Claims for the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in the suit instituted by the Attorney General, being suit No. 23115 on the docket of the court, and briefed and presented the case in the court; and in the decree of the court, entered April 27, 1903, it was held that the Chickasaw freedmen had no legal right or interest in the Choctaw and Chickasaw lands, and that the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations should therefore recover from the United States the value of the lands allotted to said freedmen, the amount of the judgment to be determined and entered by the court upon the coming in of the roll and appraisal to be made by the Dawes Commission.
    Appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States from the decision of the Court of Claims were taken by the United States and by the Chickasaw freedmen, and Mansfield, Mc-Murray & Cornish represented the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in the trial of the case in the Supreme Court, in which court the judgment of the Court of Claims was on February 23, 1904, affirmed.
    Upon the final coming in of the roll and appraisal made by the Dawes Commission the Court of Claims on January
    24, 1910, entered final judgment in said suit in favor of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations for the sum of $606,936.08, which amount was appropriated by act of Congress of June
    25, 1910 (36 Stat. 809), for the payment of said judgment and was placed to the credit of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in the United States Treasury on July 1, 1910.
    On June 25, 1910, Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish made application to the Department of the Interior for payment of their fee in said freedmen case; and on July 25, 1910, the Acting Secretary of the Interior advised them that in view of certain provisions for the investigation of their contracts with the Indians, it was not deemed advisable at that time to take any steps toward the payment of said fee. Upon a subsequent presentation of the matter to the department by the plaintiff, the Acting Secretary of the Interior, by letter of August 23, 1911, notified plaintiff that in view of claims of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations against him and against the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, payment of said fee should not be made, and refused to approve the fee for payment. Similar action was taken by the department upon a subsequent presentation of the claim by the plaintiff after the enactment of the jurisdictional statute and prior to the filing of plaintiff’s petition in this suit, and said fee has never been paid either to the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish or to the plaintiff. Said fee with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum from July 1, 1910, to July 1, 1926, would amount to $53,900.
    XIV. By act of Congress of June 10, 1896 (29 Stat. 321, 339), the Dawes Commission was authorized and directed to make citizenship rolls of the members of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians in Indian Territory; and an appeal to the United States courts in the Territory from the decision of the commission upon the application of any person for enrollment as a citizen of any of said tribes was authorized by said act. Appeals from decisions of the Dawes Commission to the said United States courts were taken in a large number of Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship cases, involving the citizenship of about 3,600 persons, known as “ court claimants,” about 2,300 of whom were held by said courts to be entitled to citizenship. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations contended that most of these persons were not entitled to citizenship and that the court decisions holding them entitled to citizenship had been fradulently procured; and under the advice of their said attorneys in citizenship matters, Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, set about to secure a review of said court decisions.
    On January 17, 1901, a written agreement was entered into between said attorneys, Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, acting by their respective executives pursuant to authority granted by acts of their legislative bodies, the general councils of said nations, employing said attorneys to represent said nations, in preventing allotment or distribution of tribal property to the said “court claimants,” and providing for a contingent compensation to them of 9 per cent of the value of the tribal property that would be saved to said nations by the denial of citizenship to any or all of said claimants, said compensation to be for both past and future services of said attorneys to the end in view.
    
      Said attorneys, Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, used their best endeavors toward the accomplishment of the purpose of their employment as set forth in said agreement of January 17, 1901; and in the said act of July 1, 1902, a Choctaw and Chickasaw citizenship court was created to determine the validity of the court decisions in the said “ court claimant ” cases, such determination to be by the retrial of said cases before the said citizenship court, the tenure or life of which court was at first limited to expire December 31, 1903, but which was subsequently extended to December 31, 1904.
    The said agreement of January 17, 1901, was submitted by Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish to the Department of the Interior on or about February 10, 1903, for . approval and was approved by the Secretary of the Interior on or about February 20, 1903, on condition that the percentage of the fee should be 5 per cent instead of 9 per cent, with a further limitation of the fee to a maximum of $250,000. This modification of the agreement was not accepted by Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, and a provision was secured by them in the Indian appropriation act of March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. 982, 995), vesting the said citizenship court with authority to fix the amount of said fee.
    Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish represented the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in the suits in the said citizenship court, amounting in all to 263 suits, and involving the citizenship rights of about 3,403 applicants for citizenship, of which number all but about 156 were excluded from citizenship, and the allotments they would otherwise have received were saved to said nations. Upon the completion of its work in December, 1904, said citizenship court fixed the fee for the said services of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish at $750,000, which was about 52 per cent of the 9 per cent fee provided for by the said agreement of January 17, 1901, with said nations. The language of the court in fixing the amount of the fee was as follows:
    “ In our opinion the compensation fixed by the contract would be excessive, but the sum of $750,000 would be a reasonable compensation and should be allowed the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish for all services connected with citizenship matters under the contract dated January 17, 1901, and in lieu of all expenses save and except such as are provided for by law, as set out in section thirty-three of the act of Congress approved July 1, 1902, and said-amount is hereby fixed and allowed as a reasonable compensation to said attorneys in this behalf.”
    Said fee was subsequently paid Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish by or in behalf of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations.
    XY. Section 33 of the said act of July 1,1902, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to pay, out of the joint funds of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, such expenses in behalf of said nations in the “court claimant” cases in said citizenship court as were in his judgment reasonable and necessary; and on or about March 18, 1903, the Secretary promulgated the following regulations relative to such expenses, said regulation being the first regulations issued by the department in the matter:
    “ REGULATIONS
    “Prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior to govern the expenditure of tribal funds of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in suits as authorized by section thirty-three of the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. 641)
    “1. Section thirty-three of said act provides, in part, that—
    “ ‘All expenses necessary to the proper conduct, on behalf of the nations, of the suits and proceedings provided for in this and the two preceding sections shall be incurred under the direction of the executives of the two nations, and the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, upon certificate of said executives, to pay such expenses as in his judgment are reasonable and necessary out of any of the joint funds of said nations in the Treasury of the United States.’
    “ 2. The duly authorized attorneys representing the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in said suits and proceedings may incur, under the directions of the chief executives of the two nations, all expenses necessary to the proper conduct of the same.
    “ 3. Said attorneys shall, on the fifteenth and last days of each month, or as soon thereafter as practicable, submit to said chief executives of the two nations itemized statements under each of such items of expense as have been incurred by them prior thereto, furnishing vouchers for items where the total sum amounts to one dollar or more. The said chief ■executives shall thereupon examine the accounts and transmit them to the Secretary of the Interior through the United States Indian inspector for the Indian Territory, recommending that the Secretary cause to be paid such expenses appearing therein as in their judgment are reasonable and necessary, and if in their opinion any item or items of expense submitted by said attorneys are not considered reasonable and necessary said chief executives, or either of them, shall so indicate and recommend that such item or items be disallowed or reduced. The United States Indian inspector shall upon receipt of said accounts examine the same and forward' them to the Secretary of the Interior through the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with such recommendation as he deems proper, to be transmitted by the commissioner to the Secretary with his report thereon. The Secretary of the Interior shall examine said accounts and allow all the expenses which in his judgment are reasonable and necessary, disallowing such items which in his judgment are not properly incurred, and he shall thereupon cause payment to be made to said firm of the amount so allowed out of any of the funds of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. The accounts when acted upon by the Secretary of the Interior shall be forwarded to the United States Indian inspector for the Indian Territory through the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to be forwarded to the United States Indian agent for the Union Agency.”
    XYI. At some time prior to June 26, 1903, Mansfield, Mc-Murray & Cornish transmitted to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs their expense accounts in said “ court claimant ” cases for the months of October, November, and December, 1902, and January, February, March, and April, 1903, aggregating $3,540.64, said accounts being verified by the affidavits of a member of said firm and accompanied by joint certificates of approval of the chief executives of the said nations. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs recommended the allowance and payment of said accounts; but the greater part of the items of said accounts were refused approval by the Secretary of the Interior on or about July 11, 1903; some items, such as expenses incurred for clerks and stenographers, and for office furniture, stationery, rent of typewriter, :and purchase of typewriter, on the ground that they could not be regarded as coming within the purview of said section 33; others, such as expenses in connection with searching, examining, and copying records, including traveling expenses incurred in such work and in interviewing witnesses, on the ground that they were not satisfactorily shown to have been necessary or were not otherwise satisfactorily established; and generally on the ground that the vouchers did not show the particular cases in which the expenses were incurred.
    Said accounts were thereupon returned by the department to Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish with a statement of the Secretary’s reasons for refusal to approve them. Said firm not having taken any further action in the matter of such expenses in “court claimant” cases, the Secretary of the Interior on December 12, 1905, some time after said cases had been finally disposed of in the citizenship court, wrote Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, stating that inasmuch as considerable time had elapsed since the said citizenship court had ceased to exist, it was considered desirable to dispose of the matter of said expenses, and requested that they submit to the department, with proper vouchers, an itemized statement showing the expenses incurred by them under said section 33 of the act of July 1, 1902, for which they deemed themselves justly entitled to payment. No further action appears to have been taken in the matter by Mansfield, Mc-Murray & Cornish, or by the plaintiff, until on or about August 12, 1909, when the account was resubmitted to the department with additional items, bringing the total expenses claimed up to $25,537.75, but without the vouchers called for by the department in support of the various items of the claim.
    On March 21,1911, the Secretary of the Interior wrote the plaintiff stating what showing should be made to establish the claim and saying:
    “ In their present state the accounts can not be allowed because unaccompanied by proper vouchers, as required by the regulations, and also because unsupported by any showing that the respective items come within the requirements of the statute, except items aggregating $2,700, for services of process, publication of notices, depositions, witness fees, printing record, etc., which, if accompanied by proper vouchers, it is believed are properly allowable.
    “The foregoing general observations are made that the claimants may, should they be so advised, make such additional showing as the facts may warrant, whereupon the account will be given further consideration.”
    No further vouchers or other evidence having been submitted to the department in support of the items of the claim, the Acting Secretary of the Interior, on August 23, 1911, following personal interviews with the plaintiff at the department in the matter of the claim, wrote plaintiff that in addition to the greater part of the claim being for expenses not properly chargeable by Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish against the Choctaws and Chickasaws, and to the lack of vouchers in support of the claim, including $2,700 of the claim, which might be allowable if properly supported by vouchers, it had been decided that no payment whatever should be made on the claim in any event, because of certain claims of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations against the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, amounting to more than $182,000, and no part of the said expenses has been paid to said firm or to the plaintiff.
    XVII. In the preparation for trial and the trial of said “court claimant” cases, the said firm of Mansfield, Mc-Murray & Cornish necessarily incurred and defrayed a large amount of expense. Investigating and the securing of testimony and other evidence had to be done throughout a large part of the United States, including some twelve or fifteen of the States. This work was necessarily done largely by employees of the firm, such as investigating agents, clerks, stenographers, and attorneys, and at great expense in the way of salaries, or other compensation of such employees, traveling and subsistence expenses, and various other expenses incident to the securing of evidence, the preparation for trial and the trial of said cases. These expenses were incurred under the general direction and with the approval of the executives of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, and the monthly accounts thereof rendered by said firm were each approved and certified to by said executives prior to their presentation to the Secretary of the Interior for payment, as required by the regulations set forth in Finding XY. The expenses so incurred and paid by the firm, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum from December 31, 1904, to July 1, 1926, were as follows:
    1. For services of subpoenas, writs, and summonses and for fees and mileage of witnesses, $2,218.53, which with interest thereon would amount to $5,080.43.
    2. For publishing notices and warning orders, under section 31 of said act of July 1,1902, $85.88, which with interest thereon would amount to $196.66.
    3. For services of stenographers and typists in the offices of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, $1,083.15, which with interest thereon would amount to $2,480.41.
    4. For service of stenographers and typists in the “ field,” $438.10, which with interest thereon would amount to $1,003.25.
    5. For services of stenographers and typists in both “ office and field,” such services not being apportioned between the office and the field, $896.12, which with interest thereon would amount to $2,052.11.
    6. For service of stenographers and typists in said citizenship court, and also elsewhere, but the places of which services are not shown, $832.29, which with interest thereon would amount to $1,905.94.
    7. For services of clerks in the offices of Mansfield, Mc-Murray & Cornish, $70, which with interest thereon would amount to $160.30.
    8. For services of clerks in the field, investigating and securing evidence, $622.10, which with interest thereon would amount to $1,424.61.
    9. For clerks rendering services in both “ office and field ” in investigation and securing evidence, such services not being apportioned between the office and the field, $8,431.84, which with interest thereon would amount to $19,308.91.
    10. For attorneys performing legal services in securing evidence, $891, which with interest thereon would amount to $2,040.39.
    11. For copying of records for use in preparation and trial of cases, $1,071.62, which with interest thereon would amount to $2,454.01.
    
      12. For telegrams and postage, $848.42, which with interest thereon would amount to $786.43.
    13. For stationery and typewriting supplies, $723.40, which with interest thereon would amount to $1,656.59.
    14. For services in examination of State papers and court records, $250, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $572.50.
    15. For books, maps, etc., for use in cases, $18.13, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $41.52.
    16. Miscellaneous expenses in securing evidence, $947.01, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $2,168.65.
    17. Traveling expenses of members of the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish and their agents, including railroad fare, livery hire, subsistence, and incidental expenses, in investigating and securing evidence in said cases, $5,100.98, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $11,681.24.
    18. Traveling and subsistence expenses incurred for conferences with the executives of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, $138.50, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $317.17.
    19. Travel, subsistence, and miscellaneous expenses incurred by members of the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish on trips to Washington, D. C., in connection with ■said “ court claimant ” cases, $694.80, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $1,591.09.
    20. Travel and subsistence expenses of members of the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish on trips to Tisho-mingo, Indian Territory, to attend the said citizenship court in the trial of said cases, $97.40, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $223.05.
    21. Cost of office quarters for the firm of Mansfield, Mc-Murray & Cornish in Tishomingo during the trial of said cases, $69.50, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $159.16.
    22. For janitor services for extra office quarters required by said firm for use in connection with said cases, $96, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $219.84.
    23. For office furniture for use in the handling of said “ court claimant ” cases, $84.85, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $194.31.
    
      24. For rent and repair of typewriters for use in said cases, $71, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $162.59.
    25. For purchase of typewriters for use in said cases, $200, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $458.
    26. Expenses in preparing and securing approval of the firm’s accounts for the foregoing expenses, $56.34, which, with interest thereon, would amount to $129.02.
    No part of said expenses has been paid to the said firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish or to the said J. F. Mc-Murray, the plaintiff in this case.
    XVIII. By act of Congress approved March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 989, 1025), the sum of $2,991,450 was appropriated to pay the Choctaw Nation for a part of certain territory that had been claimed by it, known as the “leased district.” Serious opposition to the payment of this appropriation arose, its payment being actively opposed by leading Government officials, and it was not paid until on or about June 2, 1893. In the course of the effort of the Choctaw Nation to secure the payment of this appropriation, a Choctaw delegation in Washington employed one J. Hale Sypher to aid in procuring such payment. After the appropriation had finally been paid, the said J. Hale Sypher made claim for a .large fee for services alleged to have been rendered by him in the procuring of said payment; and a bill was introduced in Congress providing for the payment to him of approximately $220,000 for such services out of the funds of the Choctaw Nation. The firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish was verbally requested by the principal chief of the Choctaw Nation to look after the matter and make the proper defense against the claim, the said principal chief stating at the time that he had no definite authority to pay for such services, but that said nation would pay reasonable compensation for the services rendered.
    The said firm thereupon proceeded and took up the matter with the committees of Congress in which it was pending; and upon a reference of the claim to the Court of Claims for a determination and report of the material facts in the case, the firm defended the Choctaw Nation against the claim in said court. The Court of Claims found the value of Sypher’s said services to have been $5,000, the findings of fact in the case being reported to Congress, and the case finally disposed of on or about February 20,1905.
    The fair value of the services of the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish to the Choctaw Nation in connection with the said Sypher claim was $3,000, which with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum to July 1, 1926, would amount to $6,845.
    No payment has been received by said firm or by the plaintiff, McMurray, on account of said services by the firm. No written or other formal contract was ever entered into for the performance of said services, either with or without, the approval of the Secretary of the Interior or the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. No claim for this item of the plaintiff’s claim was ever presented to the Choctaw Nation either by the firm of Mansfield, McMurray &■ Cornish or by the plaintiff, McMurray.
    XIX. In 1903, and for a number of years prior thereto, there was pending before Congress a claim of the heirs of one Eli Ayres, deceased, against the United States and the Chickasaw Nation on account of certain lands of the Mississippi Chickasaw Reservation, claimed to have been obtained from the Indians by the said Eli Ayres during his lifetime, but which had been converted to the use of said Indians or of the United States, the amount claimed being about $199,000. In 1902 or 1903 the governor of the Chickasaw Nation, upon being notified of the pendency of said claim before Congress, verbally requested the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish to investigate the claim and protect the interests of the Chickasaw Nation in the matter, stating that the firm would be paid for such services.
    Pursuant to said request the firm of Mansfield, McMurray. & Cornish appeared before committees of Congress in which the claim was pending in defense of the Chickasaw Nation, against the claim, and upon the reference of the claim by Congress to the Court of Claims by act of February 24,1905, said firm represented the Chickasaw Nation in the trial of the case in said court, which was concluded by the judgment-of the court rendered December 14, 1908, holding the plaintiffs in the case not entitled, to recover against either the Chickasaw Nation or the United States.
    The said firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish had, during the fall of 1900, been employed by the governor of the Chickasaw Nation as general counsel for the nation in all matters other than citizenship matters at a compensation of not to exceed, in the aggregate, $5,000 per year for its services, the expenses incident to such services to be paid by the nation. This employment of the firm was in effect at the time the governor of the nation requested the firm to investigate and protect the interests of the nation in the matter of the said Ayres claim, and continued on until on or-about March 4, 1907.
    No claim for this item of the plaintiff’s claim was ever presented to the Chickasaw Nation either by the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish or by the plaintiff, Mc-Murray ; and it does not satisfactorily appear that the said services were outside of the services of said firm as general counsel for the nation for which the firm received compensation from the nation.
    Nor does it satisfactorily appear that the governor of the nation, when he requested such services, understood or intended such services were to be paid for independently of the compensation the firm would receive yearly for its services as general counsel for the nation.
    All expenses incurred and paid by said firm in connection with such services were refunded and paid to the firm by the nation, but no payment, independent of payment for services as general counsel, was made to the firm for its said services in the matter of the Ayres claim.
    The value of said services of the firm of Mansfield, Mc-Murray & Cornish was $4,000, which with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum to July k, 1926, would amount to $8,211.83.
    XX. By said act of Congress approved June 28, 1898 (30 Stat. 495), an appropriation of $216,679.48 was made and placed to the credit of the Chickasaw Nation on account of interest over a long period of time on a certain principal sum known as the incompetent fund, due and theretofore appropriated and paid to the heirs of “incompetents” of the Chickasaw Tribes. The governor and other authorities of the nation contended this $216,679.48 should be distributed per capita to all members of the nation, while those members of the nation claiming to be heirs of such “incompetents ” contended its distribution should be limited to themselves.
    During the latter part of the year 1899 the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, which was then under a contract with the Chickasaw Nation to represent the nation in citizenship matters at a salary of $5,000 per year, was requested by the governor of the nation to represent the nation in trying to have said appropriation distributed among all the members of the nation, stating compensation would be made for the services rendered, but no agreement or understanding was had as to the amount of such compensation. Pursuant to said request, the firm proceeded in the matter both in the way of securing legislation and in combatting the claims of alleged heirs of said “ incompetents,” and the said appropriation was finally distributed among all the members of the nation.
    The services of said firm in the matter terminated during the year 1901, and the firm was paid by the nation the sum of $2,500 on account of such services. No other or further payment appears to have been made on account of said services, nor does it satisfactorily appear that there was any contract or agreement for a greater amount of compensation than said $2,500.
    From and after the fall of 1900 the firm’s said services in the matter of the “ incompetent ” fund were performed while the firm was under employ and pay as general counsel, as shown by Finding XIX.
    At the time the firm’s said services in the “ incompetent ” matter were being rendered the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs knew of the rendition of said services and that the firm expected to be compensated therefor, the firm having during the early part of January, 1901, received and acknowledged notice from the department that there was no objection to its appearance in behalf of the Chickasaw Nation in the matter, with the understanding, however, that such appearance did not give the firm, so far as the Government was concerned, any claim for compensation for such services.
    It does not appear that the fair or reasonable value of the said services of the firm was more than the said sum of $2,500 received by the firm on account of such services, and no claim appears to have been presented to the Chickasaw Nation either by the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish or by the plaintiff McMurray for compensation for said services in addition to the said sum of $2,500 paid the firm therefor.
    XXI. After the passage of the said Curtis Act of June 28, 1898, embodying the said Atoka agreement, it became more difficult to collect the taxes imposed upon noncitizens by the tribal laws of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, from which taxes were derived much of the funds for maintaining the tribal governments; and during the latter part of the year 1899, after the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish had been employed by each nation as its attorney in citizenship matters, the principal chief of the Choctaw Nation and the governor of the Chickasaw Nation requested said firm to aid the officials of said nations in the collection of said taxes. It being recognized that there were no provisions of law for the compensation of the firm for such sérvices, the governor of the Chickasaw Nation suggested that the official collectors of the taxes pay the firm as compensation for its services a portion of the collection fees allowed the collectors under the law, and this course was pursued. The firm rendered active and valuable services in the work of collecting said taxes, representing the nations in various suits and proceedings for the enforcement of the tax laws, it being at the time suggested by the said governor of the Chickasaw Nation and principal chief of the Choctaw Nation, and hoped by the firm, that said nations might make some general provision for further compensation for such services.
    Beginning early in the year 1900 the firm was employed by said governor and principal chief as general counsel for said nations, and was thereafter paid by said nations for services rendered by it in connection with the collection of the tribal taxes.
    No claim appears to have been presented to the Choctaw Nation or to the Chickasaw Nation either by the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish or by the plaintiff, McMur-ray, for compensation for such services in addition to the compensation received by the firm therefor. With the exception of compensation due the firm from the said collectors who were to compensate it for such services, as set forth above, it does not appear that said firm has not been fully compensated for the services rendered by it in the collection of said taxes.
    The officials of the Interior Department had knowledge at the time of such services being rendered by said firm in connection with the collection of said taxes, but no written contract was ever entered into for such services either with or without the approval of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior.
    XXII. On February 10, 1905, the Assistant Attorney General for the Interior Department, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, promulgated certain opinions and rulings for the government or guidance of the Dawes Commission in the enrollment of Choctaw and Chickasaw citizens, which opinions and rulings were such as to permit the enrollment of a large number of persons who were believed by the executives of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations and by Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, the citizenship attorneys for said nations, not to be entitled to enrollment.
    Under direction of the executives of said nations the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish contested said opinions and rulings, and finally secured their reference to the Attorney General of the United States for his opinion thereon, upon which opinion they were subsequently reversed by the Interior Department.
    As a result of this reversal of the rulings of the Interior Department, enrollment was denied by the Dawes Commission to a large number of persons who otherwise would have been eligible for enrollment, and some of whom had already been enrolled. Subsequently, however, a great part of these persons were, under decisions of the courts, held to be entitled to enrollment, and were enrolled, as citizens of said nations.
    In addition to the aforesaid services of the firm in this matter, the members of the firm, in the few days remaining between the rendition of the opinion of the Attorney General, on February 19, 1907, and the formal closing of the citizenship rolls on March 4, 1907, rendered active service in the correction of the rolls to conform to said opinion and the changed rulings of the Interior Department.
    During the time said services were being rendered by Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish said firm was in the regular employ and pay, at $5,000 per year, of the Chickasaw Nation as its attorney in citizenship matters, such employment being under contract with the nation authorized by an act of the Chickasaw council approved by the President of the United States, and no claim is made by the plaintiff for further compensation from said nation. At the time said services began, about June 1, 1905, the employment and pay of said firm as citizenship attorney for the Choctaw Nation had been discontinued, and the only authority the firm had for the rendition of such services for the Choctaw Nation was a request by the principal chief of said nation therefor, with his statement that the services would be paid for. The expenses of the firm incident to the rendition of said services were paid by the Choctaw Nation, but no payment for said services has been made. The officers of the Interior Department had knowledge at the time of the performance of these services by the firm, but no written contract was ever entered into by the parties for such services either with or without the approval of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior.
    Said services terminated on March 4, 1907, and were of a fair and reasonable value of $8,770, which with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum to July 1, 1926, would amount to $18,938.82.
    No claim for compensation for said services was presented to the Choctaw Nation either by the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish or by the plaintiff, McMurray.
    
      XXIII. Under the said act of June 28, 1898 (30 Stat. 495), eight coal leases, numbered from 1 to 8, were entered into on March 15, 1899, between the mining trustees of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, as parties of the first part, and the plaintiff, J. F. McMurray, as party of the second part, said leases being for the sole purpose of prospecting for and mining coal for a term of 30 years, and being approved by the Secretary of the Interior on April 27, 1899. These leases were identical in substance and form except as to descriptions of the different properties covered by them, and contained, among others, the following provisions:
    “ In consideration of the premises the party of the second part hereby agrees and binds himself, executors, administrators, or assigns, to pay or cause to be paid to the United States Indian agent for the Union Agency, Indian Territory, as royalty the sums of money as follows, to wit: On the production of all coal mines developed and operated under this lease, the sum of ten cents per ton for each and every ton of coal produced passing over a one-inch screen. * * * * -x-
    “And all said royalties accruing for any month shall be due and payable on or before the twenty-fifth day of the month succeeding.
    “And the party of the second part further agrees and binds himself, his executors, administrators, or assigns, to pay or cause to be paid to the United States Indian agent for the Union Agency, Indian Territory, as advanced royalty on each and every mine or claim within the tract of land covered by this lease the sums of money as follows, to wit: One hundred dollars per annum, in advance, for the first and second years; two hundred dollars per annum, in advance, for the third and fourth years; and five hundred dollars per annum, in advance, for the fifth and each succeeding year thereafter, of the term for which this lease is to run, it being understood and agreed that said sums of money to be paid as aforesaid shall be a credit on royalty should the party of the second part develop and operate a mine or mines on the lands leased by this indenture, and the production of such mine or mines exceeds such sums paid as advanced royalty as above set forth, and, further, that should the party of the second part neglect or refuse to pay such advanced royalty for the period of sixty days after the same becomes due and payable under this lease, then this lease. shall be null and void, and all royalties paid in advance shall become the money and property of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes of Indians, subject to the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior aforesaid.
    “ The party of the second part further covenants and agrees to exercise diligence in the conduct of the prospecting and mining operations, and to open mines or sink wells for oil, and operate the same in a workmanlike manner to the fullest possible extent on the above-described tract of land; to commit no waste upon said land or upon the mines that may be thereon, and to suffer no waste to be committed thereon; to take-good care of the same, and to surrender and return the premises at the expiration of this lease to the parties of the first part in as good condition as when received.
    “ That he will not at any time during the term hereby granted assign or transfer his estate, interest, or term in said premises and land or the appurtenances thereto to any person or persons whomsoever without the written consent thereto of the parties of the first part being first obtained, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
    “And the said party of the second part further covenants and agrees that he will keep an accurate account of all mining operations showing the whole amount of minerals mined or removed, and that there shall be a lien on all implements, tools, movable machinery, and other personal chattel used in said prospecting and mining operations, and upon all such minerals, metals, and substances obtained from the land herein leased as security for the monthly payment of said royalties. ’
    “And the party of the second part agrees that this indenture of lease shall be subject in all respects to the rules and regulations heretofore or that may be hereafter prescribed under the said act of June 28, 1898, by the Secretary of the Interior relative to mineral leases in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations; and, further, that should the party of the second part, his executors, administrators, or assigns, violate any of the covenants, stipulations, or provisions of this lease, or fail for the period of thirty days to pay the stipulated monthly royalties provided for herein, then the Secretary of the_ Interior shall be at liberty, in his discretion, to avoid this indenture of lease and cause the same to be annulled when all the rights, franchises, and privileges of the party of the second part, his executors, administrators, or assigns, hereunder shall cease and end without further proceedings.
    
      “ The party of the second part is firmly bound for the faithful compliance with the stipulations of this indenture by and under the bond made and executed by the party of the second part as principal and James M. Lindsay, Fisher A. Tyler, jr., and John L. Simpson as sureties entered into the 15th day of March, 1899, and which is on file in the Indian Office.
    “ In witness whereof the said parties of the first and second parts have hereunto set their hands and affixed their seals the day and year first above mentioned.”
    By a regulation of the Interior Department effective March 1, 1900, the royalty of 10 cents per ton provided for by the leases was reduced to 8 cents per ton; and by another regulation of the department, effective April 27, 1900, it was provided that the lessee should “ operate and produce coal from each and every lease, in not less than the following quantities: 3,000 tons during the first year from date of approval of lease, 4,000 tons the second year, 7,000 tons the third year, 8,000 tons the fourth year, and 15,000 tons the fifth and each succeeding year thereafter.”
    By a regulation of the Interior Department of December 6, 1907, it was provided with reference to lessees of such leases:
    “Lessees shall pay advanced royalties, beginning from the date of approval of each lease, on each mine or claim, whether developed or not, such payments to be a credit on royalty when said mine is developed and operated a/nd its production is in excess of such guaranteed annual advanced payments, as follows, viz: One hundred dollars per annum in advance for the first and second years, two hundred dollars per annum in advance for the third and fourth years, and five hundred dollars per annum in advance for each succeeding year thereafter, and that, should any lessee neglect or refuse to pay such advanced royalty for the period of sixty days after the same becomes due and payable on any leas'e, the lease on which default is made shall become null and void, and all royalties paid in advance shall be forfeited and become the money and property of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations.
    “ Each lessee shall produce coal equal to the aggregate of three thousand tons for each lease held by him during the first year from date of approval thereof, four thousand tons during the second year, seven thousand tons during the third year, eight thousand tons during the fourth year, and fifteen thousand tons the fifth and each succeeding year during the term of such lease, or pay royalty as if such amounts had been produced: Provided, That any amount paid in excess of that required by actual production shall be held as a credit to be applied in payment of royalty on subsequent actual production, and a failure to meet this requirement will subject the lease or leases as to which default shall occur to cancellation.”
    XXIV. At some time about 1905 or 1906 the plaintiff executed an assignment of leases Nos. 5, 6, and 8 to the Indian Coal & Mining Company for a consideration of $25,000, plus the royalties that had been paid on them up to that time, amounting to about $4,800. This assignment was approved by the Interior Department for leases Nos. 5 and 6, hut was disapproved for lease No. 8.
    During or about the year 1914 the plaintiff, with the approval of the Interior Department, sold and assigned lease No. 4, the consideration therefor being the cancellation of certain debts owing by plaintiff to the purchaser, amounting to approximately $47,000.
    XXV. The plaintiff paid the advance royalties on leases 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8, as provided for therein, for the years up to April 27,1905, amounting to $8,000, but has paid no further advance royalties on said leases. The advance royalties on said leases for the years from April 27, 1905, to the present time, together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum from the due dates of said royalties to July 1, 1926, amount to $84,904.03.
    XXVI. On Ocober 24, 1910, suit was commenced by the United States, for the use of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, against the plaintiff herein, J. F. McMurray, in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of 'Oklahoma, for advance royalties due at that time on leases 1, 2, 3, and 7, in which suit judgment was on February 14, 1913, rendered against said McMurray in the sum of $14,238, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum until paid. Said judgment has never been paid or satisfied by the plaintiff herein and at the present time amounts, with interest thereon, to July 1,1926, to $25,668.74.
    The unpaid advance royalties on leases 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8 up to the present time, which are not included in said judgment, together with interest thereon from their due dates at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum to July 1, 1926» amounts to $57,574.43.
    XXVII. No coal has been mined by the plaintiff on the said leases 1, 2j 3, 7, and 8. Tonnage royalties, if chargeable against the plaintiff under said leases on the quantities required by the said Interior Department regulation of April 27, 1900, to be mined during the years up to April 27, 1907, would amount to $31,600, which, with interest on said royalties from the time they became due to July 1, 1926, would amount to $72,305.05. If the plaintiff be entitled to a credit against said royalties of the $8,000 of advance royalties paid by him on said leases, as shown by Finding XXV, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum to July 1, 1926, amounting in all to $19,527.10, there would be left an unpaid balance of $52,777.95 due from the plaintiff on account of said tonnage royalties up to April 27,1907.
    Tonnage royalties on said leases under the said Interior Department regulations of December 6, 1907, from April 27, 1907, to April 27, 1926, would amount to $63,000, which, with interest on said royalties from the time they became due to July 1,1926, would amount to the sum of $100,581.94.
    XXVIII. The plaintiff has never formally applied by written application to the Interior Department for a cancellation of any of his said leases Nos. 1 to 8, inclusive; and in a letter of October 10, 1906, to Mr. J. George Wright, United States Indian inspector for Indian Territory, replying to a letter from Inspector Wright requesting to be advised whether he desired leases Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 7 to be canceled, the plaintiff said:
    “ In reply I will say that I do not desire the leases canceled. On the contrary, I desire now, as I always have, and. as my correspondence with you shows, to carry out the term® of my contract, as evidenced by my leases, and to pay the advanced royalty as contemplated by law and as suggested in your letter of this date. This I have heretofore offered to do, and I hereby offer to pay the sum of $4,000 as specified in your letter, provided this amount is accepted as the full amount of advanced royalty due by me on these leases. Kindly advise me by return mail and I will forward you St. Louis exchange for $4,000 in full settlement.”
    In 1917 and 1918 the plaintiff was negotiating for the sale,, by him, of leases Nos. 1,2, and 3 to other parties, which sale, however, was not effected.
    XXIX. Large parts of the areas of said leases 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8 appear to have underlying veins of coal of sufficient thickness for working the'm, but the mining of which coal, on account of the inferior quality of some of it, and the depth below the surface and other conditions increasing the cost of the mining of the remainder of it, has never been commercially practicable, because of inability to compete with other coal on the market; and these conditions, so far as can be determined at the present time, will continue to render the mining of said coal commercially impracticable during the remainder of the 30-year terms of said leases.
    XXX. Payments were made as follows by the Choctaw Nation to the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish for legal services rendered the nation between January 1, 1900, and July 1, 1905, and for expenses incurred by the firm in connection with said services, under employment by the principal chief of the nation authorized by acts of the general council of the nation enacted subsequent to the enactment of the said act of Congress of June 28,1898:
    1. Payments aggregating $26,250 were made to the firm for its services as citizenship attorney for the nation from January 23, 1900, to May 23, 1905, at a salary of $5,000 per year, which employment and payments were authorized by act of the general council approved by the President of the United States. Interest on Said payments, at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum from the time they were made to July 1, 1926, would amount to $36,412.50, making the total of said payments and interest $62,662.50.
    2. Payments were made to the firm aggregating the sum of $8,824.64 for expenses incurred by it in connection with services rendered in citizenship matters, which expenses and payments were authorized by act of the general council approved by the President of the United States. Interest on said payments, at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum from the time they were made to July 1, 1926, would amount to $11,163.16, making the total of said payments and interest $19,987.80.
    3. Payments aggregating $37,260.94 were made to the firm for services rendered and expenses incurred by it as general counsel for the nation in matters other than citizenship matters, by direction of the principal chief of the nation under acts of the general council authorizing the principal chief to secure and pay for such services for “ protecting the interests of the Choctaw Nation in the various matters” arising, which acts of the general council were not approved by the President of the United States. Interest on said payments, at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum from the time of their payment to July 1, 1926, would amount to $50,680.86, making the total of said payments and interest $87,941.80.
    None of the services rendered, expenses incurred, and payments made as set forth in this finding were under or pursuant to a written contract between the parties thereto approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior.
    XXXI. Payments as follows were made by the Chickasaw Nation to the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish for legal services rendered the nation during the period between July 1, 1899, and July 1, 1905, and for expenses incurred by the firm in connection with said services, under employment by the governor of the nation authorized by acts of the Chickasaw national council enacted subsequent to the enactment of the said act of Congress of June 28, 1898:
    1. Payments aggregating $27,500 were made to the firm as salary for services as citizenship attorney for the nation for five and one-half years, from July 20, 1899, to January 20, 1905, at a salary of $5,000 per year, which employment and payments were authorized by act of the general council approved by the President of the United States. Interest on said payments at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum from the time they were made to July 1, 1926, would amount to $39,301.63, making the total of said payments and interest $66,801.63.
    2. Payments aggregating $16,200 were made to the firm for expenses incurred by it in connection with said services as citizenship attorney, which expenses and payments were authorized by act of the general council approved by the President of the United States. Interest on said payments at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum from the time they were made to July 1, 1926, would amount to $23,482.80, making the total of said payments and interest $39,682.80.
    3. Payments aggregating $6,610.88 were made to the firm for services rendered and expenses incurred by it in connection with the removal of intruders from the Chickasaw country and in the collection of the tribal taxes, which payments were authorized by act of the general council approved by the President of the United States. Interest on said payments at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum from the time they were made to July 1, 1926, would amount to $9,861.49, making the total of said payments and interest $16,412.31.
    4. Payments aggregating $52,605.76 were made to the firm for services rendered and expenses incurred by it as general counsel for the nation in matters other than citizenship matters, by direction of the governor of the nation under an act of the general council authorizing the governor to incur and pay such “ regular and necessary expenses ” as were requisite “for protecting the interest of the nation in the various matters that arise from time to time,” which act was not approved by the President of the United States. Interest on said payments at the legal rate of 6 per cent per annum from the time of their payment to July 1,1926, would amount to $74,358.05, making the total of said payments and interest $126,963.81.
    None of the services performed, expenses incurred, and payments made, as set forth in this finding, were under or pursuant to written contracts between the parties thereto approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior.
    
      The court decided that plaintiff was entitled to recover (Finding XIII and Finding XVII, paragraphs 1 and 2) the sum of $59,111.09, less the sum of $25,668.14 (Finding XXVI), or the sum of $33,508.35.
   Booth, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit for a large amount asserted as due the plaintiff for services rendered the defendant Indians as an attorney. The plaintiff was formerly a member of the law firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, of South McAlester, Oklahoma. On May 5,1909, this firm was dissolved. During the existence of the firm it had almost continuously been engaged in representing the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians, and claimed to have at the date of dissolution a number of outstanding and unpaid fees due from either one or both of said Indian tribes. On May 5, 1909, the date of dissolution, Messrs. Mansfield and Cornish assigned in writing all of said outstanding demands to the plaintiff, and by that instrument vested in him the ownership and right to collect the same. The plaintiff thereafter made an effort to settle with the Secretary of the Interior respecting the claims of the partnership, but it failed of consummation. He then went to Congress, where on May 25, 1918, by section 18 of the Indian appropriation act (40 Stat. 561), he secured the enactment of the special jurisdictional act set out in Finding IV. The act is lengthy and somewhat involved. It does, however, confer on the court jurisdiction to consider and adjudicate three claims for which the plaintiff was contending, viz, for services rendered in the case of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians v. United States and Chichasaw Freedmen; for expenses incurred under sections 31, 32, and 33 of the act of July 1, 1902, the act which created the citizenship court and authorized the retrial of what is known as “ court claimant ” cases, and lastly for the payment of two unpaid Chickasaw warrants. With reference to the last item, the two unpaid warrants, the record shows that after the institution of this suit they were paid to the plaintiff, and hence are no longer in issue.

The plaintiff filed his first petition in this court September 23, 1918. This petition followed the jurisdictional act and contained only allegations respecting the three claims mentioned. The total demand then made was $63,633.07, exclusive of interest on the amounts, made up in items as follows: Services rendered in the Free&men case, $27,500; expenses incurred ,in prosecuting the Freecknen case, $25,544.07, and the two unpaid warrants $10,589. The special jurisdictional act gave express authority to the defendant Indians to interpose all proper defenses by way of counterclaims or set-offs, either against the assignors or assignee. All statutes of limitations against the same were waived, and provision was made for the representation of the defendants by their own counsel in conjunction with the Attorney General. The defendant Indians filed a counterclaim in which the allegation is made that instead of an existing indebtedness of the Indians to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is indebted to the defendants in the sum of $216,348.30, exclusive of interest thereon. The items which make up the counterclaim consist largely of warrants for the payment of money to the plaintiff’s law firm which the defendant Indians allege were illegally issued and paid, because the laws governing the issuance and payment thereof were not observed, and a contract for professional services upon which money was paid did not comply with section 2103 of the Revised Statutes. With the pleadings in this court in this status the plaintiff deemed it essential to again go to Congress, obviously believing that under the terms and conditions of the original jurisdictional act he was precluded from asserting claims other than those authorized in the act, and placed at an extreme disadvantage in meeting the defendants’ counterclaim. Congress recognized the situation of the parties, and on July 19, 1919, 41 Stat. 163, 234, amended the act of May 25, 1918, by enlarging the jurisdiction of the court so as to embrace such additional claims as would in their nature meet the set-off and counterclaim of the defendants. Following the passage of the amendatory act the plaintiff, on September 25, 1919, filed a supplemental petition wherein he increased his demands against the defendants to the extent of $312,500, embracing within this petition claims for professional services in a number of contentions as to Indian rights and funds, as well as litigated cases, thereby bringing his total claims to the substantial sum of $376,133.07, exclusive of interest. Finally, on February 2, 1923, the plaintiff by leave of court, filed his last amended petition, by the allegations of which he contends in eight separate counts for a judgment for the sum of $315,544.07 and interest thereon.

We have set forth these facts in tedious detail. Their recitation discloses the wide and acute disputation between the parties, a contest so vigorous that the record in this case is of immense proportions and required an extended time in preparation.

The most perplexing question, the one which engenders the gravest doubt, and extremely vital in its consequences, is the one as to whether the court, in arriving at its conclusions as to sums due pro and con, is authorized under the jurisdictional acts to exercise its judgment independently of section 2103, Eevised Statutes, and the other special acts of Congress regulating and prescribing the exelusive method of dealing and contracting with tribal Indians. Section 2103, Eevised Statutes, is a most stringent and protective enactment. The section points out in precise terms the method of contracting with Indian tribes and individual Indians not citizens of the United States. If this method is not followed, any proceeding contrary thereto is absolutely void. Any money paid upon contracts not executed according to its terms and approved by the Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs may be recovered back by the Indians. With the possible exception of two of the plaintiff’s claims, no written contracts •of employment conforming to section 2103, Eevised Statutes, and existing special laws, obtain. All the items of defendants’ counterclaim are predicated upon a right to recover the same because of funds paid without compliance with the law. So that if Congress intended to restrict the court to observance of Indian laws relating to dealings with ■ the Indians the case would be freed of the many difficulties it otherwise presents.

The plaintiff of course contends that the jurisdictional . acts send the case to this court with jurisdiction granted to consider and adjudicate the same upon the basis of service rendered and results accomplished, and render judgment for what they were reasonably worth. The defendants, on the other hand, challenge the contention and insist upon the elimination of all claims for service where the record fails to establish a contract made in accord with section 2103, Revised Statutes, or other special laws.

The court in arriving at a conclusion is relegated to an application of the usual rules of statutory construction. What was the legislative intent? Taking the transaction as it took shape before Congress and the Interior Department before the acts were passed, it is manifest that the plaintiff was seeking to collect what he believed he was entitled to receive, but without the right to assert his claims in a court. The controversy between him and the defendant Indians was an old and prolonged one, the Indians disavowing any indebtedness at all, and refusing until this suit was brought to pay a single one of his many claims. The Secretary of the Interior declined to intervene and attempt an adjustment of the differences. Congress with plenary authority over Indian tribal lands and funds, with full knowledge of the status of affairs, sends the controversy to this court to adjudicate upon the basis of “ such amount or amounts as may be found to be due thereon.” The Indians may defend, notwithstanding any statutes of limitations. Whatever may be due from the plaintiff to the defendants upon coal-mining leases is to be ascertained upon a “ fair and equitable basis.” Additional claims are authorized under the amendatory act “ to the end,” the act recites, “ that a complete and final adjustment may be had between said parties as to outstanding matters of controversy or account between them.” Such expressions we believe are susceptible to a construction that Congress intended a reference of the case to this court in all its aspects, and from the record render such a judgment as a complete settlement of the disputation warrants upon the basis of service rendered and results accomplished, service which the Indians accepted, and, if beneficial, for which they should pay, taking into account, of course, what the Indians have paid and the circumstances under which payments were made. This position we feel is fortified by the fact that many of the items in the defendants’ counterclaim were paid more than twenty-five years ago, the very latest ones twenty-two years ago. The statute of limitations with respect to them is waived, and the plaintiff given the correlative right to interpose such additional claims as may offset them. This we think is sufficient evidence of a Congressional intention to warrant the conclusion that the interposition of mere technical defenses and assertion was not available to either party. If it were otherwise there would have been no necessity for special legislation conferring jurisdictioin on the court to hear the case. Assuredly Congress did not intend to place the defendants in a more favorable position as to the controversy than the plaintiff, especially so when fully cognizant of the exact situation. What we are to adjudicate are of course legal and not moral claims. This position is expressly fortified by the proviso to the jurisdictional act wherein authority is conferred upon the Secretary of the' Interior to act as arbitrator, and compose, if possible, the existing differences of account. A distinct recognition of the apparent fact that the state of the controversy, old and complicated as it was, involved as the jurisdictional acts attest a final adjustment of all claims and demands predicated upon actual and beneficial service rendered and furnished for the defendant Indians. We have heretofore had cases of a similar nature. Ute Indians, 46 C. Cls. 225; Eastern Cherokees, 45 C. Cls. 104; Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, 42 C. Cls. 518; Butler & Vale case, 43 C. Cls. 497; Winton v. Amos, 51 C. Cls. 284; Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians, 58 C. Cls. 302.

The Ghichasaw Freedmen Case

Subsequent to the adoption of the policy of alloting certain Indian tribal lands in severalty to the members of the tribes, the matter of a proper and legitimate enrollment of those entitled to participate therein became acute. Among others to claim the right of enrollment were the Chickasaw freedmen, a considerable number of the descendants of former slaves of the Indians. On April 23, 1866, the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes agreed by treaty to discontinue slavery. The freedmen so classed contended for enrollment and the right of allotment. The Indians vigorously contested the same. Congress on July 1,1902, 32 Stat. 641, 646-648, by enacting what is commonly designated as the supplemental treaty, proposed to the Indians a method of settlement wherein it was provided that the freedmen should receive allotments as members of the tribes. In the same proposed law the Attorney General of the United States is directed to file in this court a bill of interpleader against the defendant nations and the freedmen, and jurisdiction is conferred upon the court to adjudicate and determine the controversy. If the court sustains the right of the freedmen manifestly they were to continue in possession of their allotments without recompense to the Indians. If a contrary decision is reached, then the lands allotted to the freedmen were to be appraised by the Dawes Commission and the amount of their value to be paid the Indians by an-appropriation from Federal funds. The act provided a referendum and the same was ratified by the Indians September 25, 1902. Among other provisions the act authorized the Indians to employ counsel in the manner prescribed' in sections 2103 to 2106, Revised Statutes. The Indians employed the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish. Contracts providing for a contingent fee equal to 6 per centum of the amount recovered in any judgment they might obtain were entered into by the parties. The Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs limited the compensation of the attorneys to a contingent fee of $21,500 for all services in connection therewith. The attorneys accepted the limitation, and with the contracts so changed they were duly approved in the manner required by law. The firm made repeated efforts to collect the fee, and on each occasion was frustrated by the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The reason assigned for nonpayment was a disputation then existing between the Indians and the firm respecting certain alleged overpay-ments growing out of other and different transactions. The defendants concede a lack of legitimate defense to the allowance of the fee. The only possible controversy respecting this item is as to the date from which interest, allowed under the jurisdictional act, should be computed. The plaintiff insists that interest on the fee should be computed from July 1, 1904, whereas the defendants contend that until the entry of final judgment by the Court of Claims, after the case had been affirmed by the Supreme Court and the appraisal completed by the commission and appropriation made for the amount of the same, there was no obligation to pay. The final sum, $606,936.08, was fixed by a decree of this court on January 24, 1910. Congress appropriated for the same on June 25, 1910, and it was finally placed to the credit of the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations in the Treasury of the United States on July 1, 1910. The fee was contingent upon recovery.

While it may appear somewhat technical, nevertheless it is manifest from the record that the Indians were not under the contracts liable for the fee until funds were available as a result of the service rendered. It is true that when the Supreme Court announced its opinion affirming the decision of this court, the., case of the Indians so far as controverted questions of law were involved terminated, but no funds as a result thereof were available. However, much remained to be done, the lands were to be appraised, and the value thereof appropriated for by Congress. Until this was accomplished, liability for the fee did not attach. As a matter of fact, the contract itself expressly provided for payment of the fee at the Treasury of the United States. The plaintiff seems to have acted upon this view of the matter, for the record discloses the absence of any effort upon his part to collect the fee until June 25, 1910.

We believe the findings of the court are correct, and the claim will be allowed for $27,500, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per centum per annum from July 1, 1910.

Expenses Incident to “Court Claimant” Oases

On June 10, 1896, 29 Stat. 321, 339, Congress, with reference to the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians, inaugurated its policy of dissolving tribal government and allotting the Indian lands to the members of the tribes. This legislation was- the advance step toward the end. By its terms the Dawes Commission was given authority to make up citizenship rolls, a task theretofore most generally performed by the Indians. The statute lodged the authority in a neutral tribunal, and from the decision of the commission an appeal was allowed to the United States courts in the Indian Territory. The property, both real and personal, of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians, was of immense value, and this fact attracted applicants for enrollment from nearly if not quite all individuals who could by any possibility trace through ancestral blood relationship to the tribes sufficient in extent to meet the requirements for enrollment. No single event has demonstrated more pronounced contentions or more vigorous contests than the making of Indian rolls for the purpose of allotments. Appeals were taken from the Dawes Commission involving the right of about 3,600 persons to enrollment. These are commonly known as “court claimants,” a designation we will adopt. When their appeals reached the United States courts they were tried de novo, and the record fails to show service upon the Indian tribes. As a result, there were at least 2,300 persons added to the rolls by the decisions of the United States courts. The Indians, solicitous to reduce their rolls to the minimum number, were not pleased with the decisions. It was asserted by them that much of the testimony brought before the courts was false and that gross fraud and deceit had obtained in practically all of the cases. The plaintiff, i. e., the law firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, seems to have been in accord with the prevailing Indian sentiment. On January 17, 1901, the firm entered into á written contract with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, by the terms of which the lawyers agreed to use their best efforts to prevent the enrollment of the “court claimants.” The fee was contingent upon success and to be nine (9) per centum of the value of tribal property saved to the nations. The Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to whom this contract was presented for approval under section 2103 of Revised Statutes, declined to approve it upon the terms stated therein. Instead, these officials indicated a willingness to approve a contract for five (5) per centum of the value of the lands saved and in no event the compensation to exceed $250,000. The law firm refused to assent to the proposed terms and the contract was of no force and effect. The plaintiff’s firm, ably assisted by the Interior Department, went to Congress and finally Congress, on July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. 641, 646), by sections 31, 32, and 33 of the act to confirm and ratify an agreement with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians, and for other purposes, created a special court, known as the Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, and invested the same with plenary jurisdiction to review and readjudicate and finally determine the question of the right of the “court claimants” to enrollment. On March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. 982, 995), Congress granted to the Citizenship Court the additional juridiction to fix reasonable compensation to be paid the attorneys under their contract of January 17, 1901, irrespective of the amounts stated in the contract. The plaintiff’s firm represented the Indians in 263 suits involving the enrollment rights of about 3,403 claimants, resulting in an almost complete reversal of the decision of the United States courts for the territory, and excluding from the right of enrollment all the said “court claimants” except about 156. It is difficult to estimate with accuracy the value of the landed estate saved to the Indians by this litigation. It must be and is conceded that it ran into the millions.

The Citizenship Court was by the first act required to terminate its existence by December 31, 1903, the subsequent legislation heretofore cited extended the time until December 31, 1904. Section 33 of the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. 649), provided as follows: “All expenses necessary to the proper conduct, on behalf of the nations, of the suits and proceedings provided for in this and the two preceding sections shall be incurred under the direction of the two nations, and the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, upon certificate of said executives, to pay such expenses as in his judgment are reasonable and necessary out of any of the joint funds of said nations in the Treasury of the United States.” The Secretary of the Interior, upon whom the final responsibility for payment of expenses rested under tbe law, promulgated on March 18, 1903, certain regulations with respect to the presentation, audit and allowance of the attorneys’ expense account. These regulations are set out in Finding XV. They are in nowise unusual and simply provide for the authentication of each item of expense in excess of $1 by return of a voucher disclosing in detail the expenditure. On January 26, 1903, the attorneys transmitted to the Secretary their expense accounts for the months of October, November, December, 1902, and January, February, March and April, 1903. The total amount was $3,540.64. The papers making up the submission were duly verified by the lawyers and had the approval of the chief executives of the two nations. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs approved the accounts, but the Secretary of the Interior overruled his approval and declined to allow the greater portion of the items claimed. Items covering expenses for clerks, stenographers, office furniture, stationery, typewriters and rent of typewriters were disapproved by the Secretary as not within the purview of the law. The remaining items of the submission were returned to the plaintiff without express disapproval, but with the admonition that they did not meet the requirements of the regulations as to proper authentication. The attorneys did not again present to the Secretary an itemized statement of expenses incurred until August 12,1909, notwithstanding the fact that on December 12,1905, the Secretary had requested in writing that they do so. On August 12, 1909, the submitted account covered all previous items and additional ones, increasing the demand to $25,-537.15. This submission met the fate of its predecessor. It was disapproved for the same reasons. On March 21, 1911, the Secretary again communicated with the attorneys and advised them as to his objections to the former submissions and pointed out expressly the class of expense he considered within the law. The plaintiff did not comply with the terms of this communication, did not submit additional evidence of accuracy, so finally, on August 23, 1911, following personal interviews at the department in Washington, the Secretary advised the plaintiff that if properly vouchered, $2,700 of the amount claimed might meet Ms approval, but he would not in any event authorize the payment of even that amount in view of the claims of the defendant Indians against the plaintiff for the sum of $182,000.

We have reproduced the items of expense contended for by plaintiff in Finding XVII. The plaintiff, in view of this expense account, apparently assumes the attitude that all incidental expense growing out of the litigation was to be borne by the defendant Indians, and that all that was to be done by the lawyers was to analyze the testimony and try the cases. This position is untenable. The plaintiff hazarded a right of compensation under the contract upon success in the undertaking and manifestly the legitimate expenses under the law were to be paid by the defendants; but this obligation of the defendants in nowise extended to the point of saving the plaintiff from all character of expense. The plaintiff was familiar with Indian litigation and the course of proceeding in contested enrollment cases; he knew the burdens to be assumed by the contestants and the difficulties to be encountered in procuring proper evidence. The magnitude of the undertaking and the risk of loss which he assumed was entirely familiar to him and his associates. What the statute intended as a charge by way of expense was the expense indispensably necessary to set in motion the machinery of the court, such as proper court charges and the fees fixed by law. It would seemingly constitute a most unusual allowance to charge against the defendants the cost of usual and clearly to be anticipated expense of maintaining a law office, sufficient clerks to properly prepare and conduct the case, as well as all other overhead expense. The plaintiff knew of the necessity for all that was done, and as to most of the items claimed — they come within the compensation paid. Of the items claimed we believe but two are allowable, i. e., items one for $2,218.53, and two for $85.88.

The defendant Indians challenge the right of the court to allow the claimed expense account. The contention is predicated upon a lack of jurisdiction and a plea of res adjudicatei. It is true that the statute authorizing the expenditure pointed out the precise way of securing payment of the sums claimed and invested the Secretary of the Interior with final jurisdiction as to allowance and payment. The tribunal thus erected and clothed with jurisdiction was obviously at the time exclusive. The jurisdictional acts, however, under which the case comes to this court alter materially the course of proceeding formerly prescribed and not only vary in important particulars the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior with respect to the subject matter of contention, but clothe him with the optional authority to adjust “ by mutual agreement with the interested parties herein ” not only this item, but all others concerned. It was not until he declined to arbitrate that the case comes here. It would be a meaningless grant of jurisdiction to give authority to an officer to do certain things if the officer had by his previous treatment of the case foreclosed his power to act, for the defense now interposed was available before the Secretary. In addition, the Secretary of the Interior did not disapprove the expense accounts presented to him as to each item on its merits. The final reason for disapproval was the existence of a counterclaim upon the part of the Indians; the Secretary under the statute was not as to this proceeding clothed with jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the counterclaim growing out of other and different transactions. The duty enjoined was to pass upon the plaintiff’s expense account and approve or disapprove it for reasons disclosed upon the face of the submission. There was no authority under the statute which empowered him to go outside the particular record and disapprove the accounts for extraneous reasons.

The Citizenship Court, in fixing plaintiff’s compensation in the “ court claimant ” cases arrived at the sum allowed by reference to the contract of January 17, 1901, and in the order of allowance provided that the same should be “in lieu of all expenses save and except such as are provided by law, as set out in section 33 of the act of July 1, 1902.” There would have been no occasion for an order of this character if all expenses incident to the prosecution of the litigation were to be charged against the defendants. Clearly it was in the mind of the court in fixing reasonable compensation that some expense had been incurred by the plaintiff not allowable under the statute, otherwise the court would not have taken the special care to so particularize. The plaintiff accepted the fee fixed by the court without objection.

The J. Hale Sypher Case

Congress recognized by the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 989, 1025), a governmental obligation to pay the Choctaw Indians for what is commonly designated as the ■“ leased district.” We need not discuss the controversy in detail. It is sufficient for present purposes to say that $2,991,500 was duly appropriated for the intended purpose. Subsequent to the passage of the above act, and prior to the payment and disbursement of the funds appropriated, protest was made by leading governmental officials against the payment of the appropriation to the Indians. The Indians, fearful of losing the funds, employed Mr. J. Hale Sypher to aid them in frustrating the opposition and securing the payment of the appropriation. The appropriation was finally, on June 2, 1893, paid to the Indians, and immediately thereafter Mr. Sypher preferred a claim against the Indians for the sum of $220,000 for having brought ■about the above result. In fact, a bill was introduced in Congress, Sypher having at the time no other jurisdiction or forum to which to appeal for the payment to him of this amount. The bill did not pass. Instead, the claim was referred to this court under section 151 of the Judicial Code. The firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish had been verbally requested to take charge of this matter by the principal chief of the Choctaw Indians. They did appear before ■committees of Congress, and in this court when the case was tried. This court found from the findings returned to Congress that Sypher’s service to the Indians was reasonably worth $5,000. The plaintiff now contends for a fee •of $25,000 for professional sendees rendered in this case.

The petition in the Sypher case was filed in this court April 28, 1904. On this date the firm of Mansfield, McMur-ray & Cornish was under contract to render professional .services to the Choctaw Indians, and whatever may have been the restrictive character of the services to be rendered under this contract, it is manifest from the record that the firm did not present to the Choctaw Nation a fee bill for this particular service, or in any way assert a claim therefor until many years after the case had been closed, and only then in response to counterdemands made upon the part of the nation. It is apparent, a fact we need not emphasize, that the firm was fully cognizant of the statutes which provided the method of contracting with Indian tribes. It knew at the time of its appearance in this case that they could not legitimately collect fees for the service. In all other special cases involving important professional services the plaintiff was solicitous in adjusting its relationship to the Indians in the manner prescribed by law. Just why an oral contract was relied upon in this case finds no explanation, unless predicated upon what has been heretofore adverted to, or due in the last analysis to the counterclaim asserted by the defendants in this case. In addition to this, it is extremely doubtful if we have jurisdiction to entertain the claim. The final proviso to the jurisdictional act of July 19, 1919, amending the act of May 25, 1918, limits the plaintiff to the presentation of only such additional claims as “ may have or shall hereafter be set up by way of set-off or counterclaim by the defendants.” The defendants raise this contention and assert that none of the warrants upon which the counterclaim rests were issued and paid as expenses incident to the prosecution of the Sypher ease. The plaintiff flatly contradicts this statement. The record, in so far as itemization of expense accounts covered by the counterclaim, sustains the defendant’s contention. We are unable to find more in the record than the general statement of the plaintiff, unsupported by any specific account or amount. The burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, and in this respect we believe the plaintiff has failed to sustain the fact and the defendants’ contention should be sustained.

The EU Ayres Claim,

What has been said as to the J. Hale Sypher claim applies with equal force to this item. The jurisdictional act precludes its allowance.

The Incompetent Fund

In reconciling the record with reference to this item we believe Finding XX to be correct. On June 28, 1898 (80 Stat. 495), Congress appropriated $216,679.48 and placed it to the credit of the Chickasaw Nation in the Federal Treasury. This appropriation was supplemental to a former one made in 1889, amounting to $99,000, and originated in a claim made by the incompetents of sums due this particular class of Indians. After the lapse of nine years and the availability of a substantial sum of money for distribution among the Indians, the usual contest to procure its distribution by certain classes to their advantage arose. The heirs of the incompetents contended that they were entitled to the fund exclusively. The tribe insisted that it should be distributed per capita among the tribe. Congress very wisely settled the controversy by legislation. The act of May 31, 1900 (31 Stat. 221), provided for per capita payments of Indian funds under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and this fund for all practical purposes was so disbursed. Happily for the Indians it was not litigated. The plaintiff’s assignors were requested to represent the Indians with respect to the contention and they did so. At the time they were under a general contract of employment to represent the tribe. They received for this service $2,500 in 1901. There is nothing in the record disclosing a further attempt to collect additional fees until after the filing of the defendants’ counterclaim in this case. A claim is now made for $15,000 for this service. The proof fails to sustain it. The proof of an entry of account made contemporaneously with the transaction is cogent evidence of what the plaintiff and his assignors at the time regarded as due them; but it is not sufficient to establish a contract to pay the amount charged in the face of positive evidence to the contrary. The court from the record, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, believe the amount paid, in view of what is to be held hereafter was sufficient to discharge the Indians’ liability for the service rendered.

Tribal Taxes

Findings XXI. The amendatory jurisdictional act of July 19, 1919, contained the following proviso: “That the said J. F. McMurray shall be limited in presenting such additional claims to such matters as may have or shall hereafter be set up by way of set-off or counterclaim by the defendants.” The intent of this limitation appears upon its face. There is nothing to obscure its meaning or engender doubt. The plaintiff, we repeat, had procured a jurisdictional act covering the prosecution of three, and only three, claims. The Indians presented counterclaims in accord with the statute which, if allowable, would not only absorb all that the plaintiff might recover, but leave him indebted to the Indians in a very large amount. Congress by the amend-atory statute granted the plaintiff the additional privilege to meet the alleged claims plead by way of set-off. To this extent, and to this only, does the right extend. As in the Sypher and Ayres eases, no set-off is preferred with reference to this item, and we are without jurisdiction to consider it.

The Bonaparte Opinion

Finding XXII. This claim is governed by what was said with reference to tribal taxes. No warrants for expenses were issued and paid by the tribes with reference thereto, and it is not a part of defendant’s counterclaim.

Coal-Mining Leases

The defendants assert under this item a counterclaim of a large amount. The original jurisdictional act contains the following provision: “That any amount found to be owing, calculated upon a fair and equitable basis, by the said J. F. McMurray to the said Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations upon coal-mining leases held by him may be offset against any judgment that may be rendered in his favor upon such claims.” The plaintiff is not contending for a judgment in his favor as incident to the coal-mining leases. The determination of the question is limited exclusively to the defendant’s counterclaim and the plaintiff’s affirmative defense thereto.

The act of June 28,1898, 30 Stat. 495, was a comprehensive Congressional conception, intended to ultimately dissolve the tribal existence of the Indians, and eventually put them upon their individual responsibility. The vast landed estate recognized as belonging to the Indians was made up in part of coal lands, regarded at the time as of great value and promising prospects. Congress provided in the statute for the leasing of the lands by mining trustees of the two Nations, who should act under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior. On March 15, 1899, approved by the Secretary of the Interior April 27, 1899, the plaintiff entered into eight mining leases, numbered from one to eight, and embracing in each lease a tract of about 960 acres. The term of each lease was 30 years. The leases provided a dual system of royalties, the plaintiff being obligated to pay as advance royalties $100 the first and second years, $200 the third and fourth years, and $500 per annum for the fifth and each succeeding year. Upon the actual production of coal a royalty of 8 cents a ton was finally fixed by the Secretary of the Interior, the latter to be credited upon the advanced royalties as productions materialized, and reach a point in excess of the annual advanced royalties exacted under the leases. Each lease contained a strict forfeiture clause enabling the Indians to nullify the leases in the event of a failure to pay the royalties within sixty days after they became due and payable. The plaintiff might assign his interest in the leases if the Secretary of the Interior approved the transaction, otherwise not. In 1906 and 1914 the plaintiff did assign, with the approval of the Secretary, his interest in leases four, five, and six, and they are eliminated from this controversy. He attempted to assign lease number eight, but the Secretary declined his approval. The plaintiff met the exacting obligations of the leases by paying the advance royalties due on leases one, two, three, seven, and eight, up to April 27, 1905. Since that time he has paid nothing. If under the jurisdictional act the plaintiff is to respond to the payment of advanced royalties provided in the leases, the defendants are entitled under the counterclaim to a judgment for the amounts stated in the findings.

That Congress was cognizant of the coal-mining leases and the situation of the parties with respect thereto is apparent from the provision of the jurisdictional act directing the court to adjudicate the issue upon a fair and equitable basis. Not only are we to proceed as thus directed, but leases found by the court “ not to be underlaid with merchantable coal and all of said leases upon which royalties are not paid within thirty days after the final settlement of these matters, the same shall be cancelled.” The evidence establishes the fact that the plaintiff has not mined any coal on leases one, two, three, seven, and eight. It further appears beyond the possibility of contradiction that while on large portions of the leases involved there exists an underlying vein of coal sufficient in extent to mine, nevertheless, on account of the depth of the veins, and the inferior quality of the deposit, the expense of operation and the market value of the coal when mined renders the venture prohibitive. We say this advisedly, being confirmed by the fact that notwithstanding the positive right of forfeiture upon the part of the Indians, and in the face of a default in payment of royalties that had existed for over twenty years, neither the Indians nor the Government have ever contemplated taking such action. If a contrary situation prevailed, offering great profits from the lands, it is inconceivable that the parties primarily concerned in realizing gains would stand idly by and content themselves with accumulation of enormous unpaid royalties under circumstances when their ultimate collection was, to say the least, extremely precarious. Within the strict letter of the law the royalties are due. Equitably, with the one exception hereinafter discussed, they are not. Manifestly Congress considered this phase of the matter and was unwilling to hold the plaintiff responsible for the payments exacted under the leases if the same were commercially valueless. The leases should of course be canceled.

While we believe that as to the major portions of the advanced royalties due and unpaid on leases one, two, three, seven, and eight the plaintiff is equitably entitled to relief, there does exist a corresponding equity favorable to the defendants’ contention. Congress in authorizing the leasing of the coal lands stringently inserted provisions in the law designed to prevent mere speculators from securing the lands and to obtain for the Indians a class of earnest and sincere prospectors. We need not classify the plaintiff in this respect. It is sufficient to observe that for some reason he vigorously claimed his rights under the leases, even when notoriously in default as to payments, and at a time when he had every reason to be fully apprised as to their commercial value. Some time prior to June 6, 1910, he was successfully defending in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma a suit by the United States for the use of the Indians (181 Fed. 123) to collect tonnage royalties alleged to be due under his leases; and again on October 24, 1910, in the same court, suffered a judgment to go against him for the sum of $14,288 for overdue advanced royalties. This judgment is still of record and unsatisfied. The plaintiff experienced no difficulty from the record in this case in establishing the nonmerchantable value of the leases. His testimony discloses the expense he had incurred prior to this time in ascertaining their worth. Obviously he may not say he was unfamiliar with his legal rights and ignorant of the hazards involved in the undertaking. As a matter of fact, he was negotiating with the Secretary of the Interior for a settlement of his royalty indebtedness and never once applied in writing for a cancellation of the same. As late as 1918 he was attempting to sell the leases, and there is nothing-in this record to indicate that in 1910 the plaintiff had any intention of releasing his title to the lands demised. Under all these circumstances the defendant Indians had a perfect right to assume that the plaintiff contemplated compliance with the terms of the leases. When suit was brought, judgment recovered pud unpaid, the assumption ceased to exist. From that date rorward the defendants had ample notice that a future continuance of the relationship erected by the leases was fraught with no other result except litigation and controversy, that the recovery of unpaid advance royalties was a remote possibility, and the leases should have been canceled then.

Taking into consideration the mutual equities of the parties, we have no doubt that the amount of this judgment for $14,238, with interest thereon, should be charged against the plaintiff’s claims. It has not been paid and no legal reason assigned for failure to satisfy the same. The sum represents, with substantial exactness, the amount of the advanced royalties due at the time; if not so, proper legal proceedings should have been pursued to correct the error. The amount with interest to date totals $25,668.74.

The facts as set forth in Finding XXVII set up a counterclaim predicated upon a legal right to recover so-called tonnage royalties. The leases themselves contained no covenant to pay tonnage duties based upon minimum production of coal. This alleged liability grows out of a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein it is provided that the lessee is to pay a tonnage royalty of eight cents per ton upon a minimum production of 3,000 tons the first year, 4,000 tons the second year, 7,000 tons the third year, 8,000 tons the fourth year, and 15,000 tons the fifth and each succeeding year during the full thirty-year period. The question of the validity of the regulation cited was determined adversely to the contention of the defendant Indians in the case of United, States for use of Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations v. McMurray, 181 Fed. 723. The leases provided in terms what the lessee should pay, and the court held in its opinion that the Secretary was without lawful authority to interpolate covenants contrary to the provisions of the act of Congress fixing the terms of and authorizing the execution of the leases. The defendants in the case accepted this ruling.

The final items of the defendants’ counterclaim are embraced in Findings XXX and XXXI. Defendants’ contention respecting these items is the repetition of an old but persistent conflict of interests which has made its appearance upon more than one occasion, both inside the courts of Oklahoma and the halls of Congress. The pertinent provisions of section 29 of the act of June 28, 1898, 30 Stat. 512, is as follows:

“ It is further agreed that no act, ordinance, or resolution of the council of either the Choctaw or Chickasaw tribes, in any manner affecting the land of the tribe, or the individuals, after allotment, or the moneys or other property of the tribe or citizens thereof (except appropriations for the regular and necessary expenses pf the government of the respective tribes), * * * shall be of any validity until approved by the President of the United States.”

The above findings disclose that during the course of the employment of the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish as attorneys for the defendant Indians, there was paid to them for services and expenses incurred by both tribes the sum of $89,866.70 under acts of the general council of the two nations which did not receive the approval of the President. The amount is not in dispute. The defendants seek judgment by way of counterclaim for this amount with interest and rest the right upon the single contention that the acts of the general council appropriating the various sums at various times were not approved by the President as the law required. The effect which the defendants ascribe to the exception in the law extends only to the payment of salaries of officials of the nation and incidental expense inseparably attached to governmental administration. The employment of attorneys and payment of expenses connected with controversies between the tribes and outsiders, it is said, is governed by section 2103 of the Revised Statutes, or in any event must be in pursuance of an act of the general council approved as required. The argument is not for the first time preferred in this.case. Its origin may have antedated the year 1904 and doubtless did, but the acute agitation of supposed irregularities and unlawful practices seems to have followed the allowance to the firm of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish of a fee of $750,000 in December, 1904, by the Citizenship Court, created by the act of July 1, 1902. This event, following a protracted and acrimonious contest for the right of enrollment and participation in the allotment of the Indians’ vast and rich estate, which the attorneys mentioned had most successfully defended, seems to have furnished an occasion for an attack upon the lawyers from almost every angle of their activity. First, agents of the Indian Office were dispatched in 1905 to Oklahoma charged with investigating alleged irregularities in issuance of tribal warrants. Then followed resort to the criminal courts. A grand jury indicted the firm of lawyers and the governors of the two nations. Investigations looking toward a prosecution of the indictments were made by eminent representatives of the Department of Justice, and finally by the Hon. Charles Nagel, of St. Louis, chosen as special investigator, resulting in an express order from the Department of Justice to nolle the same. On November 16, 1907, civil proceedings were instituted in the United States District Court for the Central District of Indian Territory to recover from Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish all sums theretofore paid the firm under the circumstances put in issue in this case by the counterclaim. This case, after remaining for almost two years on the court’s docket, was finally dismissed by the plaintiff, the department conceding inability to recover. On April 24, 1911, Attorney General Wickersham advised the Secretary of the Interior against preferring as a counterclaim the identical sums here involved as a set-off against the plaintiff’s demand for payment of certain other sums claimed as legitimate expenses due. The House of Representatives appointed a special committee to investigate Indians’ contracts on June 25, 1910, and every detail of each transaction relied upon in this case was carefully gone over and full report thereon duly made. Considering the fact that the services of Mansfield, McMurray & Cornish, rendered for the benefit of the Indians, terminated in March, 1907, nineteen years ago, during which period every available resource of the Government and the Indians was employed in a joint effort to attach .illegality to the transaction involved, it seems almost incredible to find the identical contentions again raised in an effort to defeat a claim for attorney’s fees which the defendants concede to be legal and allowable and in opposition to another which the defendants paid in cash while this suit was pending. We refer to the unpaid Chickasaw warrants paid after the institution of this suit and eliminated herefrom. Whatever of doubt existed as to the legality of the payments made in accord with Indian acts not approved by the President seems to have been resolved in favor of the firm of attorneys receiving the same by the governmental agencies clothed with power and authority to investigate, and conducting the investigation at a time substantially contemporaneous with the transactions involved.

If we are correct in our analysis of the jurisdictional acts in attaching significance to the words “any other claim where the services were not actually rendered and finished and resulted to the benefit of said people,” the items covered by this count of the defendants’ counterclaim are not allowable. The record sustains a contention that the services rendered in connection with which the expenses set up as a counterclaim were incurred were completed and resulted in benefit to the Indians. The greater portion of the amounts paid out was disbursed as incidental to the attorneys’ efforts in enforcing the collection of tribal taxes, expelling intruders from Indian country, protecting the tribes in granting rights of way to railroads, town sites, sale of surplus lands, and guarding the Indian rolls, assuredly part and inseparably connected with the regular and necessary administration of the tribal government. In addition to this it is asserted by the plaintiff, and not contradicted by the defendants, that the funds from which the same were paid were accumulated by the tribes as income from the very sources the attorneys were called upon to protect. It is comparatively easy to minimize the importance of services rendered twenty years after the event, and point to a substantial aggregate made up of innumerable items paid out at different dates for a period of eight years as a weighty reason for ascribing illegality and irregularity. The Indian Nations knew what was going on. Government officials were fully cognizant of the attorneys’ activities, and recognized and dealt and cooperated with them during the whole period of time. The Indian officer never once challenged the proceedings during their continuance. As to the sums disbursed under tribal acts, approved by the President, we feel certain they were authorized. The contracts of the law firm as general counsel of the tribes certainly may not be considered onerous or unusual. Congress, by the act of June 28, 1898, the Atoka agreement, clearly intended to exercise its plenary authority over Indian tribal lands and affairs. The statute pointed out the method of procedure, provided the ways and means of accomplishing its purpose, and if followed in this regard, surely what was done thereunder may not now be challenged as illegal and void. Butler & Vale v. United States, 43 C. Cls. 497, 520; Winton v. Amos, 255 U. S. 373.

The counterclaim of the defendants, except as to the one item, the judgment for $14,238, with 6 per cent interest thereon from date of rendition to date of judgment in this case, is dismissed.

Judgment should be rendered in favor of the plaintiff under Finding XIII for $53,900, and under Finding XVII, sections 1 and 2, for $5,277.09, less the sum of $25,668.74 under Finding XXYI, leaving a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff of $33,508.35. As to all other claims the plaintiff’s petition is dismissed. It is so ordered.

GRAham, Judg&; Hat, Judge; and Campbell, Chief Justice, concur.  