
    The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Lee Lewton, Defendant-Appellant.
    (No. 11570;
    Fourth District
    — January 11, 1972.
    
      Matthew J. Moran, of Defender Project, of Chicago, (Steven Clark, of Champaign, of counsel,) for appellant.
    Lawrence E. Johnson, State’s Attorney, of Urbana, (Robert P. Steigmann, Assistant State’s Attorney, L. Keith Hays, Jr., Law Student, of counsel,) for the People.
   Mr. JUSTICE SMITH

delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant appeals from a sentence of one to eight years in the penitentiary on a charge of forgery and on a plea of guilty previously negotiated and finalized in open court. The defendant’s stance in this court is a request that we reduce his sentence because it is excessive. No other error is alleged. Defendant’s brief can only be characterized as a personally-expressed opinion either of the brief writer or of the defendant unsupported by applicable citations factually applicable or record facts warranting our interference. For this court to alter in any way the sentence imposed would be to judicially abrogate the negotiated plea made and consummated in open court. In the absence of controlling reasons, legal or factual, we see no reason to abrogate the agreement made prior to sentence.

Defendant, his counsel and the assistant State’s Attorney were in court. The record shows that it was stated to the court that the sentence to be imposed would be one to eight years and that no additional charges would be filed that could be filed and prosecuted against the defendant on anything then known to the State’s Attorney. The defendant did not ask for probation. He received a minimum sentence of one year. The defendant affirmatively and squarely declined the opportunity to testify. The court is required to furnish to the defendant the full opportunity to explain his acts and to offer evidence in mitigation. These things the defendant may waive, these things he did waive and through his attorney made the agreement as to the sentence imposed and in consideration thereof received a dismissal of the other counts in the indictment and that he would be prosecuted on no offenses then known to the State. This is the record. The propriety of the trial court’s judgment must be based on that record. (People v. Brown, 107 Ill.App.2d 406, 246 N.E.2d 61; People v. Nelson, 41 Ill.2d 364, 243 N.E.2d 225.) Imposition of sentence is a matter of judicial discretion and unless there is a showing in the record of a substantial and justifiable reason for so doing, we should not and we will not disturb the sentence of the trial court. There is no such showing. People v. Hanserd, 125 Ill.App.2d 465, 261 N.E.2d 317.

The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

CRAVEN, P. J., and SIMKINS, J„ concur.  