
    Jones & Ford v. Anderson and Another.
    March, 1836,
    Richmond.
    (Absent Brooke, J.)
    Partnership — Attachment Bond — Validity — Case at Bar. — An attachment against an absconding debtor is sued out in the name of a partnership, for a debt due the partnership: the bond taken is the bond of F. one of the partners, with surety, reciting that F. has obtained the attachment, and conditioned that if he shall be cast in the suit, he shall pay all costs and damages which shall be recovered against him: Held, the bond is naught, and the attachment is therefore illegal and void.
    Attachment — Must Be Regular on Pace. — An attachment against an absconding debtor must be regular on its face, and a defect appearing thereon cannot be supplied by averment.
    Upon the complaint and at the instance of Samuel Ford, one of the partners of the mercantile house of Jones & Ford, a justice of the peace of Buckingham issued an attachment against the goods and chattels of Josiah Watson, as an absconding •debtor, for a debt of 157 dollars, due by Watson to Jones & Ford. The process *was in the usual and regular form; and there was subjoined thereto, a direction to the sheriff, to summon J. Sears, J. Anderson, D. M’Cormick, and three others, as garnishees.
    Before the attachment was issued, the justice took a bond from Ford, with two others his sureties, in the penalty of 313 ■dollars, payable to Watson, with condition in the following words: “The condition of the above obligation is such, that whereas the above bound Samuel Ford hath this day applied to S. S. M. a justice of the peace for the county of Buckingham, for an attachment against the estate of the above named J. Watson, for the sum of 157 dollars, which attachment hath been granted on previously entering into this bond, returnable to the next county court; if therefore, the said Samuel Ford shall satisfy and pay all costs which shall be awarded to the said J. Watson, in case the said Samuel Ford shall be cast in -the said suit, and also all damages which shall be recovered against the said Samuel Ford, for his suing out the said attachment, then this obligation to be void, else to remain in full force.”
    The sheriff made return on the attachment, that he had attached some furniture (very trivial) belonging to Watson, and that he had summoned Sears and the other garnishees he was directed to summon, except M’Cormick.
    Upon this return, the county court, at its next ensuing term, neither the debtor Watson nor any of the garnishees appearing, gave judgment for Jones & Ford against 'Watson, upon proof adduced by the plaintiffs, for 157 dollars, with interest &c. and costs; and upon further proof, that the garnishee Sears had acknowledged himself indebted by bonds to the defendant Watson, in the sum of 100 dollars with interest ■&c. the court gave the plaintiffs judgment against that garnishee, for the 100 dollars, with interest &c. But upon the same day, Anderson and M’Cormick appeared in court, and offered proof, *that the bonds of the garnishee Sears to Watson had been assigned to them, before this attachment had been sued out; and thereupon, they moved the court to set aside the judgment, and to give them leave to plead that Sears’s bonds to Watson belonged to -them, and to impanel a jury to try the right to those bonds; and the court overruling this motion, they took an exception, and appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed the proceedings, and remanded the cause to the county court, with directions to impanel a jury to try whether the right to Sears’s bonds was in Watson, or in Anderson and M’Cormick.
    When the cause got back to the county court, Anderson and M’Cormick moved the court to quash the attachment, on the ground that the same had been irregularly issued, because the attachment bond was not according to law. And thereupon the court quashed the attachment. Jones & Ford accepted, and appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the judgment; and then they appealed to this court.
    The cause was argued here by Lyons for the appellants, and Johnson for the appel-lees,
    upon the single question, whether the attachment bond was such as the statute requires? The only authority cited was Kyles & Co. v. Connelly, 3 Leigh 719.
    
      
      Partnership—Attachment Bond—Validity.—In McCluny v. Jackson, 6 Gratt. 103, it is said, both the cases of Kyle v. Connelly, 3 Leigh 719, and Jones v. Anderson, 7 Leigh 308, decide that it is competent for one partner to institute a proceeding by attachment for the firm, it being a suit fora partnership demand it must proceed in the name of the firm, and the j udgment for cost, should the plaintiffs be cast in the suit would be against the firm. But in Jones v. Anderson, the attachment was sued out by one partner for a firm debt, but in the bond, the firm was not named, and for this it was held to be defective. See generally, monographic note on "Partnership;” monographic note on "Statutory Bonds” appended to Goolsby v. Strother, 21 Gratt. 107; monographic note on “Attachments” appended to Lancaster v. Wilson, 27 Gratt. 624.
    
    
      
       Attachments—Regularity of Proceeding.—In Reed v. McCloud, 38 W. Va. 704, 18 S. E. Rep. 925, it is said: "The remedy, especially the one by domestic attachment, is harsh; sometimes wrongfully causing the financial shipwreck of some honest business man, without the possibility of indemnity by adequate redress. And as the statute gives so harsh a remedy, it is nothing but fair to the debtor that the plaintiff should pursue the remedy as given, on pain of having his attachment quashed. See the following authorities: Crim v. Harmon, 38 W. Va. 596, 18 S. E. Rep. 753; Altmeyer v. Caulfield, 37 W. Va. 847, 17 S. E. Rep. 409: Cosner’s adm’r v. Smith. 36 W. Va. 788, 15 S. E. Rep. 977; Ruhl v. Rogers, 29 W. Va. 779, 2 S. E. Rep. 798; Chapman v. Railway Co., 26 W. Va. 299, 322; Hudkins v. Haskins, 22 W. Va. 645; Delaplain v. Armstrong, 21 W. Va. 211-213; Capehart v. Dowery, 10 W. Va. 130-135; Rittenhouse v. Harman, 7 W. Va. 380; Gutman v. Iron Co., 5 W. Va. 22; Baking Co. v. Bachman, 38 W. Va. 84, 18 S. E. Rep. 382: Mantz v. Hendley (1808), 2 Hen. & M. 308; Jones v. Anderson, 7 Leigh, 308-311 (1836). Prom these .cases we have a right to Infer that It had become a matter of common observation that the remedy by attachment was sometimes perverted to gratify the ill will of the party against the debtor, and at other times was a contrivance to circumvent and get ahead of other creditors, or for some other mala fide purpose.” See also, citing the principal case on this subject. Long v. Ryan, 30 Gratt. 718; Benn v. Hatcher, 81 Va. 34; McAllister v. Guggenheimer, 91 Va. 320, 21 S. E. Rep, 475. See monographic note on “Attachments” appended to Lancaster v. Wilson, 27 Gratt. 624.
    
    
      
      See 1 Rev. Code, ch. 123, § 7, p. 477. The 7th section provides, “that every justice of the peace, before granting such attachment, shall take bond and security of the party for whom the same shall be issued, in double the sum to be attached, payable to the defendant, for satisfying and paying all costs, which shall be awarded to the said defendant, in case the plaintiff, suing ont the attachment therein mentioned, shall be cast in his suit, and also all damages which shall be recovered against the said plaintiff for his suing out such attachment; which bond shall be, by the said justice, returned to the court, to which the attachment is returnable; and the party entitled to such costs or damages, may thereupon bring suit, and recover; and every attachment, issued without such bond taken, or where no bond shall be returned, is hereby declared. Illegal and void, and shall be dismissed.” — Note in Original Edition.
    
   *BROCKENBROUGH, J.

This case differs from Kyles & Co. v. Connelly, in a very material respect. There, the condition of the attachment bond, after reciting that Campbell one of the firm of Kyles & Co. had sued out the attachment, declared, that if the said Campbell, one of the partners of the said firm, should satisfy all the costs and damages which the debtor should recover against him as one of the said partners, for suing out the attachment, then the bond was to be void, otherwise not. It clearly shewed, that the partner sued out the attachment for and in behalf of the firm, and that the firm, and not the individual partner, was the creditor, and that his liability was to be established on his failure to prove the claim of the firm, and their right to judgment under the attachment. But in' this case, the condition only recites that Samuel Ford had sued out the attachment, and binds him, in case he shall be cast in the suit, to pay the costs and damages. It thus appears from the bond, that he was the creditor, and not the firm of Jones & Ford, whose names are not once mentioned. It varies essentially from the attachment, which was rightly quashed. The judgment should be affirmed.

CARR, J.

This is a case of attachment; which being a summary process, and liable to abuse, ought to be carefully watched by the courts, and kept within the bounds prescribed by the statute. I do not mean, that the party must be held to the very letter, and that the slightest departure irom it is to be caught at, to set aside the proceeding; but that there should be, at least, strictness and ’certainty to what my •lord Coke calls “a common intent in general.” The objection here is, that the bond taken by the justice does not so describe the attachment, as to enable the defendant to recover (in case he should succeed) any costs and damages he may have sustained from suing it out. And the question is, whether the bond is good? whether it is such a bond as *the statute requires? I thought at first, that this bond was substantially good, and that the case of Kyles & Co. v. Connelly governed this; but a comparison of the two cases has changed this opinion. There, as here, the debt was due to a partnership, and one of the partners sued out the attachment: there, as here, this partner gave the bond and security: but there, the condition of the bond was, that whereas H.' Campbell one of the firm of Kyles & Co. had obtained the attachment against the estate of Connelly &c. if, therefore, the said H. Campbell one of the partners of Kyles & Co. should satisfy all costs &c. in case the said H. Campbell one of the partners of Kyles & Co. should be cast in the said suit, and also all damages which should be recovered against the said H. Campbell one of the partners of Kyles & Co. for suing out the attachment, then &c. One question (but by no means considered a prominent one, by the court or bar) was, whether this was such a bond as Con-nelly could recover on, for costs incurred, or damages suffered', by the attachment of Kyles & Co. The court thought it was; and, as I think, with good reason. It did not consider the styling Campbell (wherever named) a partner of the firm of Kyles & Co. a mere descriptio personas, as if he had been called “H. Campbell of Uynch-burg;” but when it said that H. Campbell, one of the firm, had sued out the attachment, and that H. Campbell one of the firm would pay all damages &c. it clearly enough indicated, that it was a debt of the firm for which he was attaching. And if the present case had followed that, in this particular, I should have been for deciding it in the same way; but it varies materially. The attachment is for a debt to Jones & Ford; and the condition of the bond describes it as an attachment sued out by Ford, not as partner of the firm, but individually; at least, such is the natural conclusion. I am not sure, that this might not be supplied by averment; but as my brethren think differently, and this is a summary ^'proceeding, I unite with them in considering the bond not such as the statute requires, and that the judgment must be affirmed.

CABELL, J., concurred.

TUCKER, P.

In Mantz v. Hendley, 2 Hen. & Munf. 308, it was decided, that an attachment irregularly issued ought to be quashed by the court ex officio, and if so, any person as amicus curiae might move to quash it. A fortiori might Anderson and M’Cormick do so, who were permitted to interplead, and who may have been deeply interested in the question of the validity of attachment.

Was the attachment regular? The only objection made to it is the defective character of the bond. The statute requires the bond to be given by the party for whom the attachment issues, but this requisition is satisfied in the case of a partnership demand, by one of the firm giving bond. This was decided by the circuit court of Henrico in the case of Wilson & Co. v. Turpin, (cited Tate’s Dig. 36,) and has since been settled by the case of Kyles & Co. v. Connelly. But it is contended, that this bond is defective, because the attachment was for a demand due to the firm of Jones & Ford; whereas the bond contains no reference to such a firm, but is precisely such a bond as ought to have been executed by Ford, if the attachment had really been for his individual debt. And I think the objection fatal. In this summary proceeding, which is unknown to the common law, it is conceded that great strictness must be observed. It is obvious, that the very jurisdiction of the court depends upon the regularity of the attachment. In ordinary cases, the capias issued according to the accustomed course of the court, gives to it jurisdiction over any cause. But when an extraordinary process, not issued by the officer of the court, but issued *by a magistrate in the country, is made the foundation of the jurisdiction, it is the first duty of the court to see by what authority a justice of the peace has invested it with power over the cause. Hence, it is the duty of the court, in attachment cases, to examine into the regularity of the attachment; hence too, all the papers connected with the issuing of the attachment are properly parts of the record ; and hence, the court may ex officio dismiss an irregular attachment; for it must always be ex officio the duty of every court, to disclaim a jurisdiction which it is not entitled to exercise. To do otherwise, would be to usurp a power not confided by the laws.

"

" If then the court must examine into the regularity of the attachment, and quash it ex officio if it has issued without pursuing the requisitions of the law, I think it follows, that the regularity of the proceeding must appear upon the face of the papers, and cannot be made to depend upon aver-ments and extrinsic evidence. Hooking at' the bond in this light, could the court have pronounced, that a bond had been given according to law on suing out the attachment? The attachment is sued out for Jones & Ford: the bond is given by Ford alone, and not as a member of the firm of Jones & Ford; whereas the law requires, that the bond shall be given by the party for whom the attachment issued. Moreover, it does not recite that an attachment issued for a demand of Jones & Ford, but it would seem to be for a demand of Ford alone; for the company is no where referred to. How could the court judicially know, that there were not two attachments, one for the company, in which there was no bond, and one for Ford himself in which this bond was given? It is impossible. It could only be satisfied of the contrary by proof aliunde, that this bond was designed for this attachment. But such proof would be an anomaly in the proceedings of our courts, where in the much plainer cases of forthcoming 'x'bonds and appeal bonds, misrecitals of the judgment or execution, to the amount of a farthing, are held to be fatal, and incurable by evidence aliunde.

In addition to these considerations, we must look to the difficulties which would beset the obligee, in an action on this bond, in the event of the plaintiffs’ defeat in this attachment. In the estimation of the law, Samuel Ford is a different person from Jones & Ford. Then, attempt to set out a breach of the condition, “that Ford shall pay all costs that shall be awarded to Watson, in case Ford (not Jones & Ford) shall be cast in the suit.” But Ford never can be cast in the suit, for it is not his suit; it is Jones & Ford’s suit and proof that Jones & Ford were cast would not be within the condition of the bond. Moreover, the bond having had no reference whatever to the issue of an attachment by the company, the words of the condition cannot be strained to comprehend any such attachment; and to permit oral evidence to fix a liability which does not. appear upon the face of the bond, would be to charge the sureties beyond their undertaking. Therefore, I do not think that Watson, upon succeeding in this case, can successfully charge the sureties in the bond, though Ford himself may be liable for suing out an irregular attachment.

The case of Kyles & Co. v. Connelly has been cited. I find, by adverting to the argument, that this point was pressed by counsel, though it was not distinctly noticed by the court. We must, however, suppose it to have been decided, and must therefore see if there is any material distinction between that case and this. I confess I am not satisfied that there is. Yet it is possible that the court may, in that case, have been satisfied, that there was enough in the condition of the bond to shew that the attachment was for a partnership demand. The phraseology of the bond in that case and in this, is very different. There the name of Campbell the obligor, is never mentioned without the addition of *the words one of the firm of Kyles & Co. Reciting, therefore, that Campbell one of the firm had obtained the attachment, it may have been considered, that it sufficiently appeared that he obtained it as one of the firm, and of course not for himself but for the firm. If so, then the residue of the condition must have been considered as having reference to the partnership demand, and so the bond came within the requisitions of the law. Supposing the court to have proceeded upon this ground, that case does not rule this, as here the firm is no where named in the bond. I am therefore of opinion, that the judgment be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  