
    Donald CATHERINE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLEAR RECON CORPORATION; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 17-15687
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 13, 2018 
    
    Filed March 6, 2018
    Donald Catherine, Pro Se
    Genail M. Anderson, Pite Duncan, LLP, San Diego, CA, Laurel I. Handley, Al-dridge Pite, LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Clear Recon Corporation
    D. Dennis La, Esquire, Attorney, Robert Collings Little, Esquire, Attorney, Jeremy E. Shulman, Attorney, Anglin Fle-welling Rasmussen Campbell <& Trytten, LLP, Pasadena, CA, for Defendant-Appel-lee
    Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App, P, 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Donald Catherine appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Catherine’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claim because Catherine failed to allege facts sufficient to show that either defendant was a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA); Ho v. Recon-Trust Co., NA, 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[Ajctions taken to facilitate a nonjudicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.”); Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013) (complaint “must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Catherine’s FDCPA and dual tracking claims without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041 (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).

We reject as without merit Catherine’s contention that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to rule on non-disposi-tive matters and to issue findings and recommendations to the district court judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Catherine’s request for leave to add new claims, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     