
    CAMPBELL v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    March 8, 1911.)
    1. Criminal Law (§-27) — Larceny from the Person — ‘ ‘Felony. ’ ’
    By the terms of the statute, any theft from the person is a “felony.”
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dee. Dig. § 27.
    
    For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3,. pp-2736-2744; vol. 8, p. 7662.]
    2. Larceny (§ 31) — Indictment—Value.
    In charging larceny from the person, it is not necessary to allege the value of the thing taken.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Larceny, Cent. Dig. §§ 76, 77;- Dec. Dig. § 31.*]
    3. Larceny (§ 30*) — Indictment —Description of Property.
    An indictment for larceny from the person described the property taken as “corporeal personal property, * * * to wit, $4 in money, two knives, and one ring.” Held, that the description was sufficient.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Larceny, Cent. Dig. §§ 64-75; Dec. Dig. § 30.}
    4. Criminal Law (§ 1094*) — Appead—Neces-sity of Bill of Exceptions.
    Where an appeal in a criminal case is without a bill of exceptions or statement of facts, the judgment will be affirmed, where no error is apparent from the record.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2807, 3204; Dec. Dig. § 1094.]
    Appeal from Criminal District Court, Dallas County; Robt. B. Seay, Judge.
    Ed Campbell was convicted of theft from the person, and appeals.
    Affirméd.
    C. E. Lane, Asst Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For.o.ther cases see same_topic .and s.ection NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   DAVIDSON, P. J.

This conviction was for theft from the person. Appellant made a motion to quash the indictment, because the description of the alleged stolen property is insufficient to put the defendant on notice of what he is charged with taking; that it does not describe the- character of money, or that it passed current as money, and gives no further description, and it falls to charge what .character or kind of knives were taken, and' it gives no description or value of the ring. The indictment, in so far as the motion to'quash attacks it, is in the following language: “Corporeal personal property then and there belonging to the said Tom Harrison, to wit: Four dollars in money, two knives, and one ring.”

It is not necessary, in charging theft from the-person, to allege the value. Theft from the person is different from the ordinary theft in. this, respect: Any theft from the person is a felony, by the terms of the statute, as is theft of a horse, cow, or hog; the value not being a necessary element. It differs from the -general statute of theft in this respect: Under the general statute the value is made the basis or criterion of punishment. Where it is under $50 it is a misdemeanor. Where it is over that amount, it is a felony. Any theft from the person is a felony. Shaw v. State, 23 Tex. App. 493, 5 S. W. 317; Bennett v. State, 16 Tex. App. 236; Harris v. State, 17 Tex. App. 132; Green v. State, 28 Tex. App. 493, 13 S. W. 784.

Under these authorities, the second question may he as well answered, that the description is sufficient. Four dollars in money, two knives, and one ring constitute property. Certainly, $4 in money would necessarily have a value, whether it be money issued under the authority of the United •States, or any other government. While coin or money of foreign governments would not be money in the United States, unless provided so by acts of Congress, yet such money would have a value. It was held in Shaw v. 'State, supra, that the allegation of theft from the person of one certain gold finger ring was sufficient description. The motion to quash is not well taken.

The record is before us without a bill of exception Or statement of facts. As presented, we are of opinion the judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.  