
    Joseph A. MESSINA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 89-992.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 25, 1990.
    
      Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Gypsy Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges his sentence on several grounds. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Appellant’s second issue, involving the sentence which might be imposed if appellant were to violate the conditions of his probation, is not ripe for adjudication, and is therefore disregarded.

As to appellant’s challenge of the legality of the “probationary split sentence” imposed, we find that we are bound by Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1988).

With regard to appellant’s last issue, notwithstanding recent federal decisions, we find that the trial court reversibly erred by imposing court costs on an indigent defendant without giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard, Jenkins v. State, 444 So.2d 947 (Fla.1984); Clark v. State, 560 So.2d 244 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Adair v. State, 558 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

The sentence is AFFIRMED, but the imposition of costs is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

BOOTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.

BARFIELD, J., concurs with written opinion.

BARFIELD, Judge,

concurring:

I concur in the majority opinion, but I think we should continue to certify to the Florida Supreme Court, as a matter of great public importance, the following question:

Will the court reconsider the validity of the probationary split sentence authorized in Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161 (Fla.1988), which has the effect of permitting more than one sentence for the same offense, in light of the fact that the legislature has not authorized that disposition in the sentencing alternatives of section 921.187, Florida Statutes? 
      
      . See e.g., United, States v. Cooper, 870 F.2d 586 (llth Cir.1989).
     