
    American National Bank et al., Appellees, v. Touche Ross & Company; Arthur Young & Company, Appellant.
    [Cite as Am. Natl. Bank v. Touche Ross & Co. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 482.]
    (No. 94-2178
    Submitted September 12, 1995
    Decided February 7, 1996.)
    
      
      Ernst & Young LLP, Kathryn A. Oberly, General Counsel, and Thomas L. Riesenberg, pro hac vice, Assistant General Counsel, for appellant.
    
      Ulmer & Berne, Marvin L. Karp and Richard G. Witkowski, for appellees.
    
      Blaugrund, Sweeney, Gabel, Herbert & Mesirow, Steven A. Martin and Christopher B. McNeil, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Society of Certified Public Accountants.
   Per Curiam.

In Scioto Mem. Hosp. Assn., Inc. v. Price Waterhouse (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 474, 659 N.E.2d 1268, syllabus, decided today, we held that comparative negligence applies to cases involving accountant negligence. In so doing, we rejected the National Surety rule (which in point of fact we had never actually espoused). The rule of National Surety bars the presentation of evidence of a client’s negligence, by an accountant defendant, unless the client’s negligence contributed to the accountant’s negligent audit or interfered with the accountant’s audit. See Natl. Sur. Corp. v. Lybrand (1939), 256 A.D. 226, 235-236, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554, 563.

American National Bank (“ANB”) filed suit against Touche Ross & Company and Arthur Young & Company alleging negligence as stated above. Prior to trial, ANB filed a motion in limine to prevent Arthur Young from introducing evidence that might tend to show negligence by the management of ANB. The trial court granted this motion. Given our holding in Scioto Memorial Hospital, the trial court’s action was error. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court with respect to the motion in limine, and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Moyer, C.J., Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.

Douglas and Cook, JJ., dissent.

Cook, J.,

dissenting. The parties have appealed a preliminary ruling of the trial court, the ruling on a motion in limine. Such is not a final appealable order and, therefore, is not a subject for review on appeal. This appeal should be dismissed as having been improvidently allowed.

Douglas, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.  