
    Amador RIVERO, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 90-651.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Jan. 31, 1991.
    James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Nancy Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
   W. SHARP, Judge.

Rivero appeals from his sentences imposed after a jury convicted him of delivery of cocaine, and possession of a controlled substance. He received concurrent 15 and 25 year sentences, which departed above the permitted range under the guidelines. The reason given for departure was:

Defendant released from DOC on 10/6/88 after serving 2Vh years for delivery of cocaine and committed this offense of delivery of cocaine on 10/29/88, less than 30 days after released.

Although this court has held that the commission of one offense shortly after release from prison may be relied upon as establishing (in part) a persistent pattern of criminal activity, nevertheless, the trial judge must still find a pattern of criminal conduct exists. Here, the trial judge merely finds temporal proximity of the two offenses. That is not enough to constitute a “persistent pattern.” Because we cannot assume that the trial judge found a persistent pattern, we vacate the sentence and remand for the purposes of clarification. Brown v. State, 570 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

VACATE SENTENCE; REMAND.

GRIFFIN, J., concurs.

GOSHORN, J., dissents without opinion. 
      
      . § 893.13(l)(a)(l), Fla.Stat. (1987).
     
      
      . § 893.03(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987).
     
      
      . Lipscomb v. State, 15 F.L.W. 2227, 1990 WL 127340 (Fla. 5th DCA September 6, 1990).
     
      
      . Dodd v. State, 570 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
     