
    Stephen VAOS, Appellant, v. Dorothea E. VAOS, Appellee.
    No. 96-0207.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 11, 1996.
    John G. Shiley of Law Office of John G. Shiley, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
    Ana I. Gardiner of Gardiner and Gardiner, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In response to appellant’s motion to set aside the initial final judgment, the trial court conducted a 3-day evidentiary hearing, resulting in the rendition of the judgment under review. Appellant has not furnished this court with a full transcript of the evidentiary hearing resulting in the judgment on appeal. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1979).

The initial final hearing had been heard on the court’s uncontested hearing calendar, as the parties had entered into a written settlement agreement a few weeks earlier. At the conclusion of the hearing on appellant’s motion to set aside the judgment, the trial court apparently concluded that appellant brought the circumstances about which he complained on himself. There was testimony that appel-lee advised appellant of the hearing before he departed, as well as impeaching circumstantial evidence, though biased, that appellant received written notice of the final hearing before his departure. Appellee testified that the written notice was delivered to his house before he left, not after. In any event, all of appellant’s contentions have actually been heard and decided by the trial court after the 3-day evidentiary hearing.

The resulting judgment under review appears to us to be intended as an amended final judgment. It provides that the court has jurisdiction, that the marriage is irretrievably broken and is dissolved, that the settlement agreement is valid, and that the parties are directed to comply with it. In denying the motion to set aside the final judgment, the court could properly amend the judgment.

AFFIRMED.

STONE and FARMER, JJ., concur.

GROSS, J., dissents with opinion.

GROSS, Judge,

dissenting.

The record reflects that appellant had no notice of the final hearing concerning the dissolution of his marriage. The final hearing was set by former wife’s attorney filing a notice of hearing entitled “final hearing of dissolution of marriage-uncontested calendar.” The notice states that it was mailed on June 21, 1994 for a hearing set on June 30, 1994. Appellant left for Greece on June 22, 1994, without receiving the notice mailed the day before. The hearing went forward on June 30 and a final judgment issued. At that time, appellant was in Greece, visiting his ill, 86-year old mother. Under these circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny appellant’s motion to vacate the final judgment. See Clement v. Marcus, Stowell & Beye, Inc., 516 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Additionally, the attorney’s notice setting final hearing was in violation of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(c). The notice was not sent by the court, nor did it allow at least thirty days from service for the final hearing. Colson v. Scroggins, 606 So.2d 472, 473 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); S.W.T. v. C.A.P., 595 So.2d 1084,1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Rivera v. Rivera, 562 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Nothing in this record demonstrates that appellant waived compliance with rule 1.440(c). See Roggemann v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 670 So.2d 1073, 1075 n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).  