
    Partridge v. Jones.
    To charge one as obligor, who has signed a bond or written undertaking, it is not necessary that his name should appear in the body of such instrument, provided the intention that he shall be so charged appears clearly from its terms, taken in connection with the circumstances attending its execution.
    Error to the District Court of Licking county.
    This action was originally br'ought in the court of common pleas of Licking county, by Edward L. Jones against David H. Ralston, George W. Ralston and Mary Partridge, administratrix of Ebenezer Partridge, deceased, to recover $2,097.16 for the breach of a certain undertaking for a second trial in an action wherein Jones had recovered a judgment against David Ralston, which undertaking was signed by Partridge, and was as follows:
    “ Know all men by these presents: That David H. Ralston and George W. Ralston are held and firmly bound unto Edward L. Jones in the penal sum of $2,600, to the payment of which, well and truly to be made, we do hereby jointly and severally bind. ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators. Signed by us, and dated this 4th day of March, a. d. 1871.
    
      “ The condition of this obligation is such that, whereas the said David IT. Ralston has demanded a second trial in a certain action, wherein, at the January Term, a. d. 1871, of the court of common pleas, within and for the county of Licking and state of Ohio, in a cause then and there pending in said court, a judgment was rendered in favor of .said Edward L. Jones, and against said David Ii. Ralston, for the sum of $2,123.45 and costs, $98.65.
    “ And said David H. Ralston then having been desirous of-a second trial of said cause, duly entered on the records of said court his notice of his demand for the same; and said court then having been of opinion that the case was one in which' a trial by jury might be demanded by either party, did then allow said David Ii. Ralston a second trial thereof, on his entering into an undertaking as provided for by law; and did then fix the amount in which such undertaking must be given, in order to perfect the right of said David H. Ralston to such second trial, at the said sum of $2,600.
    “ Now, if the said David Ii. Ralston, the party obtaining such second trial, shall abide and perform the order and judgment of the court, and shall pay all moneys, costs and damages which may be required of, or awarded against him, consequent upon such second trial, then- this obligation shall be void, otherwise in full force. “ D. H. Ralston,
    G. W. Ralston,
    E. Partrid&e.”
    The case being at issue upon the answer of the administratrix of Partridge, was tried, and the facts found to be as follows:
    “ The court, being fully advised in the premises, find that the second-trial bond in the pleadings mentioned was, at its execution, first signed by David 'H. Ralston and George W. Ralston, and in that condition handed to the clerk of the court of common pleas with their names thereon, but that said clerk did not accept or receive said bond as an accepted second-trial bond or undertaking, but that said clerk refused to receive the same as such until other and better security was obtained thereon.
    “ That thereupon, and within the time limited by law for giving an undertaking for a second trial in' said case, the said David H. Ralston procured Ebenezer Partridge to sign, and he ¡did sign the undertaking for second trial in the petition set forth, and thereby intended to, and did, bind himself as upon sl second-trial bond and for the second trial of said case, and that his name was intended to have been, but was not, inserted, in the heading of said bond, by reason of the neglect of the clerk of the court and of said Ralston.
    “ And the court further finds that after said E. Partridge’s name had been signed to said bond, and said additional security given, and not before, tlie clerk of said court indorsed on said bond that the security thereon was to his satisfaction, and marked the same filed.”
    Judgment for plaintiff was thereupon rendered, but no motion for a new trial was filed within three days thereafter. This judgment was affirmed in the district court.
    
      Charles H. Kibler and J. R. Ramies, for plaintiff in error,
    cited: 2 Tucker’s Blackstone’s Com. (ed. of 1826) 340; Adams v. Hedgepeth, 5 Jones (N. C.) 327; and commented on Tierman v. Fennimore, 17 Ohio, 546; Kelly v. State, 25 Ohio St. 567, and Stevens v. Almen, 19 Ohio St. 485.
    
      Gibson Atherton, for defendant in error,
    cited : Stevens v. Almen, 19 Ohio St. 485; McLain v. Simmington, 37 Ohio St. 484; Parks v. Brinkerhoff, 2 Hill, 663; Exparte Fulton 7 Cow. 484; Decker v. Pedson, 16 N. Y. 439; Kursely v. Shenberger, 5 Watts 193; Leath v. Bush, 61 Pa. St. 395; Ahrend v. Ordione, 125 Mass. 50; Smith v. Crooker, 5 Mass. 538; Dunker v. Atwood, 119 Mass. 146; Schud v. Lubshultz, 51 Ind. 37; Potter v. State, 23 Ind. 552; 4 Haywood 239; Stone v. Wilson, 4 McCord, 203; Martin v. Dorch, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 479; Campbell v. Campbell, Brayt. (Vt.) 38; Joyner v. Cooper, 2 Barley (S. C.) 199; Bartiey v. Yates, 2 Hen. & M. (Va.) 398; Beale v. Wilson, 4 Munf. (Va.) 380; Blakey v. Blakey, Id. 463.
   Longworth, J.

Although differing somewhat in form from the undertaking whose sufficiency was questioned in McLain v. Simington, 37 Ohio St. 484, we think the principle of that decision establishes the character of the undertaking now before us. It is enough in any written contract that the intent of the party clearly appear, though it be not fully and particularly expressed. In Kursely v. Shenberger, 5 Watts, 193, it was said: “ If ever there was a time when courts listened to trivial and verbal inaccuracies in contracts, when the real meaning and intention of the parties was plain, that time has gone by, and the only object of the court is, that, when the meaning and intention of the parties are perfectly plain, no grammatical inaccuracy, or want of the most appropriate words, shall render the instrument unavailing.”

In Ahrend v. Ordione, 125 Mass. 50, it was held, that when one signs a bond, as a party thereto, it is immaterial that he is not named in the bond.

“ A bond was, ‘ I, William Bush, am held, etc. . . , to which judgment, etc., . . I do bind myself, my heirs, etc., and every of them . . Sealed with my seal, etc.,’ with condition ‘the said William Bush’ should account for money received as collector of school taxes, etc. The bond was signed and sealed by Bush and four others. Held, that it was the joint and several bond of all.” Leath v. Bush, 61 Pa. St. 395. See also Shud v. Leibshultz, 51 Ind. 38.

It would be a waste of space to attempt to review the cases upon this subject. Their current is uniform. Those instances in which it has been held that the signer was not bound will be found to be cases in which the language of the instrument was such as was thought to exclude the idea of liability, as where a bond recites that: “We, A. and B. are held,” &e., and is executed by A., B. and C. Here the pronoun “ we ” is declared to refer to A. and B., and there are said to be no words to indicate any intention that C. shall be bound. Such intention must be gathered from the whole instrument, taken in connection with the circumstances of its execution, and cannot be supplied by parol.

The language of Brinkerhoif, J., in Stevens v. Allmen, 19 Ohio St. 485, indicating a contrary rule, has already been commented upon, and disapproved in McLain v. Simington, supra.

Judgment affirmed.  