
    James Mark HINKLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Scott RUSSELL; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-35973.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Aug. 25, 2015.
    
    Filed Sept. 4, 2015.
    James Mark Hinkley, Walla Walla, WA, pro se.
    
      Douglas W. Carr, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office, Olympia, WA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. 
        See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Washington state prisoner James Mark Hinkley appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process violations arising out of a disciplinary hearing and the disposal of his personal property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Nev. Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir.2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hinkley’s due process claim based on the unauthorized deprivation of his property because Hinkley had an adequate postdeprivation remedy under Washington law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (“[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hinkley’s due process claim based on his placement in administrative segregation because Hinkley failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was deprived of a cognizable liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a constitutionally protected liberty interest arises only'when a restraint imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hinkley’s due process claim based on his loss of his good time credits because Hinkley failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was denied any procedural protections that were due. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (setting forth due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings).

We reject Hinkley’s contention that the district court erred in treating his claims as state law claims.

We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985' n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     