
    No. 11,361.
    Citizens Bank vs. Albert C. Janin. Third National Bank of New York, Intervenor.
    Tlie plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the defendant, had the steamboat Uinta seized.
    The defendant had pledged it to the Third. National Bank of New York, but remained in possession for his own account, and never completed the pledge by an actual delivery to the pledgee.
    The act of pledge was drawn up in the common law form, and was intended to operate as a chattel mortgage.
    It contains, as to the form of the act, the essentials of an act of pledge.
    The Third National Bank, as pledgee, claimed the proceeds of the sale. The property, when it was seized, was in the possession of the sub-tenant.
    It is not proved that plaintiff colluded with the defendant, and thereby gained an improper advantage.
    Pledge is not made perfect by the consent of the parties; it requires absolute possession. The alleged pledgee never was in possession during the tenure of the defendant.
    It (the Third National) could not obtain possession through the agency of the sub-lessee, who held possession for his lessor, the defendant.
    A pledge can not be made perfect by the sub-lessee’s delivery of possession without the consent of his lessor.
    The obligation of the lessor to account for the property and whatever revenues were realized therefrom, binding between him and his creditor, the Third National Bank, the property not having been delivered, did not affect his other creditors, who could seize the property in his possession, or in that of his sub -lessee, who held possession for his lessor.
    APPEAL from the Twenty-second Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Bernard. Livaudais, J,
    
    
      Henry C, Miller and Branch K. Miller for Plaintiff and Appellee:
    The Third National Bank of New York is in this cause as a third opponent, claiming to be a creditor of the defendant for a large amount, asserting a chattel mortgage on the dredge Kinta, executed in February, 1890, to secure the indebtedness, and alleging that it, the opponent, was in possession of the dredge as pledgee.
    From 1890, when these pecuniary transactions commenced, down to the fall of 1892, there is a mass of correspondence between the Third National Bank and Janin. In these letters the bank treats the Kinta as its property, or at least as pledged to the bank. Janin, the debtor, deals with the bank in the same spirit.
    
      This whole correspondence shows that Janin, the debtor, was at all times in actual possession of the Kinta, though speaking of his possession as held by the bank. No greater effect can be claimed of all or any of these letters.
    An instrument called a chattel mortgage, executed in a common law State, purporting to sell movable property for a nominal consideration, but really designed to be a security for payment of a debt, will not be treated here as a sale, because there is neither price or consent; nor will it avail as a mortgage, because under our law movables can not be mortgaged. 1 N. S. 528; 4 An. 71; 12 An, 489; Civil Code, Art. 3281.
    If this chattel mortgage is sought to be enforced here as a pledge, it is indispensable that the property, the subject of the mortgage, be placed in possession of the creditor, or that of a third person holding for the creditor, and agreed on by the debtor and creditor. Civil Code, Arts. 3133, 3152, 3162. De Loach vs. Jones, 18 La. 453; 8 Martin, 57; 7 An. 221; 33 An. 973; 39 An. 567.
    There can be no pledge if the property is left in possession of the debtor, even if it is understood he holds for the creditor. The possession under the pledge must be in the creditor, or a third person agreed on by the parties. Civil Code, Arts. 3133, 3152; 3162; Geddes vs. Bennett, 6 An. 516. ■
    
      Farrar, Jonas & Kruttschniit Attorneys for Third National Bank of New York, Intervenor and Opponent, Appellant:
    As security for advances, in February, 1890, the defendant pledged to the intervenor and opponent the dredgeboat Knita, several other small boats, and a saw-mill situated in the parish of St. Bernard. This pledge was executed in New York, and under the laws of that State was placed in the form of a chattel mortgage. It was never recorded in this State as such, and no attempt was ever made to execute it as such, and it is sued upon in this case, not as a chattel mortgage, but as an act of pledge.
    Both parties, in writing, many times subsequent to the execution of this document, have referred to it and spoken of it as a pledge, and the testimony of the president of the bank, and the letters of Janin, show that it was intended by them, at that time, to be a pledge. The bank advanced the money, as it had agreed to do, and Janin was left in possession of the property pledged as the agent of the bank, he acknowledging himself to be such agent both in writing to the bank and verbally to the counsel of the bank.
    A contract of pledge, intended by the parties to be a pledge, executed in New York, in the form of a chattel mortgage on property situated in Louisiana, and propounded as a pledge, will be enforced as’such in Louisiana. Oivil Code, Art. 10; Code of Practice, Art. 13; 3 Martin, 66 and 582; 8 Martin, 132; 2 N. S. 93; 4 N. S. 1; 5 N. S. 587; 11 La. 477; 19 La. 216; 8 Rob. 407; 13 An. 117; Miller vs. Shotwell, 38 An. 890; 8 N. S. 34; 11 Martin, 23 and 730; 2 An. 774.
    The pledge is valid where the debtor himself is in precarious possession as trustee ad hoc. Conger vs. City, 32 An. 1252; Weems vs. Delta Moss Co., 33 An. 973; Jacquet vs. Creditors, 38 An. 863.
    Where a debtor is trustee ad hoc, and makes a lease of the thing, without knowledge of the principal, the latter, when informed of the lease, may ratify it for his own account; and if the lessee consents to attorn to the principal, the lessee’s possession is thereafter, as regards third persons, the possession of the principal.
    The fraudulent conduct of the trustee ad hoc can not be availed of by a third person with knowledge of the facts.
    Same counsel, on application for a rehearing, cite: Watteau vs. Fenwick, Wills, J., Coleridge, O. J., concurring, Law Report Q. B., Div. 1893, Yol. 1, p. 346.
    
      Thos. J. Semmes against the application:
    The case from Q. B., Watteau vs. Fenwick, cited by counsel, merely decides that where the business of a principal is conducted by a manager in the name of the manager, persons who deal with the manager supposing him to be the owner of the business, upon discovering the real owner of the business can hold him liable for the debts contracted by the manager in the course of the business, although such debts were contracted in violation of the secret instructions of the principal.
    
      The New York bank here is not the owner of the property leased, and it had no power to make a lease; indeed, it persistently refused to give its consent to any lease whatever.
    It is to be noticed that the chattel mortgage executed 24th February, 1890, contemplates that the debtor shall remain in possession until default is made in paying the debt, and then it authorizes the creditor to enter upon and take possession of the property and sell it.
    
      So it appears that possession was postponed by agreement to a future day; the instrument promised to give possession in futuro. Therefore, the possession is one thing and the right to obtain it is another.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Breaux, J.

The Third National Bank of New York advanced a large amount to the St. Louis, New Orleans and Ocean Canal and Transportation Co.; the payment of which the defendant undertook to secure by executing a chattel mortgage in New York of property in Louisiana.

The Citizens Bank, another creditor of the defendant, having obtained a judgment, seized the property and had it sold.

The proceeds are claimed by the Third National Bank of New York.

This bank alleged, in its opposition claiming the proceeds, that the chattel mortgage was in effect a pledge, and that it was in possession of the property as pledgee.

At a time subsequent to the date of the “ chattel mortgage ” the defendant executed another obligation for a larger amount, in which the property described in the deed of mortgage is referred to as having been pledged to the opponent bank of New York.

The Citizens Bank denied that opponent had a pledge; because it contends the opponent had no possession of the property pledged.

The issue involves the possession of the pledgee vel non.

The District Court dismissed the opposition.

The opponent appeals.

The correspondence between the defendant and the opponent discloses that the defendant acknowledged that he was the agent of the “Third National Bank,” and expressed himself as quite willing to hold the property as agent for the bank; to lease it and pay that bank the rental, less the costs and expenses of operation.

In an interview with opponent’s counsel it is proved that counsel said to the defendant, Janin, that there were three ways of securing their client.

One of them was to sell the property.

Another was to continue in possession as the agent and attorney of the bank, their client.

The last was that delivery of the property be made to them.

The defendant declined to accede to the first and last propositions, giving as reason that he was unwilling to sell; that delivery of the property to others would occasion expense he was anxious to avoid, but he consented to continue in the possession of the property as agent for the bank; to lease it and account to the pledgee, the bank, for the proceeds.

Counsel for the opponent informed him that it would be satisfactory to them and to their client.

He at one time sought to lease the property from the pledgee, at a rental of one thousand five hundred dollars per year.

The bank was willing to accept the proposal, but required that the contract of lease be submitted to their counsel for their examination and approval.

The defendant did not comply with opponent’s desire in this respect.

Shortly after he made a lease of the boat for five hundred dollars per month, but conveyed no knowledge of this lease to the bank or its counsel.

Two days prior to the expiration of the second month of this lease he inclosed a draft to his creditor, the Third National Bank, for one hundred and twenty-five dollars, and advised its president that it was for one month’s rent of the dredgeboat.

The draft was returned, and he was informed that the bank would not accept a lease without the approval of counsel.

The defendant wrote to the president of the bank that he had received the draft on his return from the interior of the State, where, he stated, the property was; that he intended to use the amount of the draft in paying a portion of the boat’s liabilities; that he would ■devote the most of his time daring the next few months in efforts to pay all claims on the property, provide a new crane, new chains and other articles needed, and pay the bank one hundred and twenty-five dollars per month.

The first lease by defendant to O. S. Burdette, of the property, was transferred by the latter to J. B. Camors, who, with defendant’s consent, became lessee. The latter informed the counsel of the Third National Bank that he was renting the property from the defendant at a rental of five hundred dollars per month.

On December 22, 1892, i. e. immediately after having received the information-, counsel notified the lessee, Camors, that the property leased to him by the defendant Janin belonged to the Third National Bank; that it had been transferred to that bank as security for a large sum of money due by Janin.

They also informed him that the debtor, Janin, was left in possession of the boat as the agent of the bank, and that his possession was precarious, and subject to be terminated at will; that they had informed Janin that his custody of the property as the agent of the bank was terminated, and that the bank ratified for its own account the lease made to him, and directed him to retain possession under the lease as the agent of their client, and pay the rental to them.

The lessee informed the defendant, his lessor, of the notice received from local counsel.

He thereafter consented to hold for the Third National Bank, as its lessee.

The property was seized at the instance of the Citizens Bank on the 6th day of January, 1893, and subsequently sold.

Counsel for intervenor called on the president of that bank, and complained of the seizure and informed him that their client was in possession.

The attorney of the Citizens Bank advised the release of the seizure.

The president persisted in maintaining it. The attorney testifies that he was informed by the president of conflicting claims to the property, and that as he was adverse to the seizure of steamboats by banks when there were claims by third persons, he stated that the bank would release the seizure; that at the time he was not advised of the claim of the Third National Bank. He states it as his impression that the president of the Citizens Bank received his information that the boat was subject to seizure from the defendant; that his communications were not very free in reference to the transactions between him and the defendant.

It is admitted that the Kinta, the property claimed to have been pledged, was a steam shovel, movable property, and not a sea vessel; that it was not registered or licensed under any laws of the United States or of the State, being nothing but a steam spade or floating steam shovel.

Common Law Chattel Mortgage.

The argument for opponent, the New York bank, is that the contract was one of pledge, intended to secure the creditor’s claim by pledging property in Louisiana under the form of a common law chattel mortgage.

That the chattel mortgage did not, as it purports on its face, divest the owner of his property, but that, in so far as it related to form, it contained all the elements of a pledge, and as such was enforceable in Louisiana.

This was not controverted by plaintiff’s counsel, who contended that the pledgee never was in possession, and that, therefore, there was no pledge which could be enforced as such.

The effect to be given to acts such as the one relied upon in this case as being in effect a pledge, has received this Court’s interpretation in several decisions.

It has never been held that they effect a translation of the property ; it not being the intention of the parties to sell the property, though the word “ sell ” or its equivalent is used in the common law deed of mortgage.

The act is given effect as a mortgage if it contains the essentials of a mortgage or of a pledge if it contains as to form the requirements of an act of pledge.

This view has received the sanction of this Court in several decisions. Miller vs. Shotwell, 38 An. 891.

POSSESSION.

The privilege of pledge is subject to unbending conditions.

There must be an actual delivery, in order that those who transact with the pledgor may know that the property is held in pledge.

There should not be any good reason to consider the thing pledged in the possession of the pledgor for his account and benefit.

The possession of the pledgee should be real and effective at all times; it must be apparent and well known.

As between the parties, consent is sufficient to transfer property; as to third persons, there must be delivery.

If there has been no delivery, the innocent buyer from the pledgor of the thing can not be evicted.

He could not be aware of the adverse right in the property not delivered, and in regard to which there is no contract, save that known only to the pledgor and ths pledgee.

Were it otherwise, it would frequently be impossible to buy with any safety that the title to the movable is complete and legal. “It is evident that if the pledge of movables could, without delivery, have effect in regard to third persons it would be the source of great fraud and deception. When the debtor is obliged to surrender possession he can not deceive third parties dealing with him by keeping possession of the pledged articles as part of his estate, and getting credit thereby.” Dalloz Nant. 313.

Possession is essential to complete a real right to movables.

The pledge withdraws the thing from the hands of the debtor and sets it aside as property subject to a pledgee’s privilege.

Possession is the most sure foundation and the most striking index of the privilege. Oasaregis says, preference is accorded to a pledgee on the thing pledged, because he has it in his hands.

This possession should not be equivocal, and so placed as to deceive other creditors and lead them to believe that the debtor always continued the possessor.

With reference to the pledgor’s act, possible without affecting the possession and the pledgee’s right, Troplong illustrates by saying, that merchandise in the creditor’s warehouse may need the care of the debtor; that he may give his attention to it without destroying the right of pledge.

Third persons can not be deceived by this case, for the creditor remains in possession of the property in his own storehouse.

The principle is laid down by the French authorities that “whenever the assistance of the debtor is necessary to the accomplishment of the object of the pledge, it ought to be permitted, provided always that it does not disturb the possession of the creditor in any respect.” Casey vs. Cavaroc, 96 U. S. 484.

The learned judge in the case just cited says: “ That it seems to be evident that in the French law, at least, the text of which, in this regard, is the same as that of Louisiana, a delivery by the owner of securities by way of pledges, followed by a return thereof to him, for the purpose of enabling him to collect them and apply the money to his own use, or substituting others in their stead, and with general liberty of substitution, and to appear as the owner and possessor thereof in his dealing with others (the title of the securities not being transferred do the creditors), is not such a delivery of possession as is necessary to establish the privilege due to a pledge as to third persons. It would be contrary to the very letter of the law to allow such a transaction to have that effect. It would not be mere evidence of fraud, which might be rebutted by counter evidence; but it would be contrary to the rule of law adopted to prevent fraud. In other words, as to third persons, it would not be a pledge at all within the meaning and requirements of the law. We think that the decisions in Louisiana lead to the same conclusion.”

In support of the proposition of opponent that the right of pledge is complete where the debtor himself is in the precarious possession of the thing pledged, as trustee ad hoc, we are referred by opponent’s counsel to the cases of Conger vs. City, 32 An. 1252; Weems vs. Delta Moss Co., 33 An. 973; Jacquet vs. Creditors, 38 An. 863.

In the first case, the pledge was statutory; moreover, the dictum had no reference to the conclusion reached, for it was decided that the pledge had been destroyed by a sale of the property.

In the second case cited, the property had been placed in the possession of an agent.

The court said in that ease: ‘ ‘ Under the provisions of Art. 3162, which allows the possession of the pledgee to be vested in a third person, agreed upon by the parties, we find that these transactions show such a possession in the pledge as the law requires, even under a vigorous construction of its provisions.”

In the last case cited, the property was placed in the hands of an agent, who held the k6y of the building in which it was.

This agent testified that he exiercised control over the property for about ten months, and took care of it and cleaned the machinery. He was paid for his services as keeper. With his permission, and that of the pledgee, the pledgors used the machinery at times.

The keeper at all times, however, retained possession.'

Only in the last case cited there was any reference made to the use of the property by the pledgor.

The occasional use of the property pledged, with the consent of the pledgee, did not dispossess the keeper, who remained in charge, as required (said the court) by Art. 3162 of the Civil Code.

The possesssion of a creditor is not inconsistent with the open well-known co-operation of the pledgor, when the latter’s co-operation is not incompatible with the idea of the possession of the creditor.

In the case at bar, while the defendant Janin was in possession no third person suspected that he was operating the boat for any one’s account save his own.

When it is considered (that the boat was at some distance, in charge of the owner and pledgor, who informed no one of his agency; that it had been leased by him and the rents collected for his account, it becomes manifest that the pledgee, during the pledgor’s active operations, was not in possession.

THE ILLEGAL AND IMPROPER UNDERSTANDING CHARGED.

An understanding between the plaintiff and the defendant, such as charged by the opponent, would operate as a bar to considering the plaintiff as a third person.

If the third person conspired with a pledgor to obtain an advantage, he would not be in the attitude of a person not interested and without notice.

The only testimony introduced was that of plaintiff’s attorney, who gave it as a mere impression that the president of the Citizens Bank obtained his information from the defendant.

A similar question to that presented in the case at bar, at this point, received consideration in the case of Rawlins et al. vs. Sheriff et al., 45 An. 67.

This Court said, in that case, “If they had legal claims — they (the creditors) were entitled to proceed, and were not prejudiced by the mere circumstance that their information came from the debtor.”

In the case at bar, it is not positively shown by whom the creditor was notified of the possibility of making a valid seizure of the property of the pledgor.

The burden of proof to establish collusion between the common debtor and the president of the plaintiff bank rested with the opponent.

“The party having the burden is the party who, if no proof is offered, will be defeated in the suit.”

The fact that the plaintiff’s president did not testify did not have the effect of shifting the burden of proof, and give rise to a presump-- ■ tion of knowledge on his part of the obligation of the defendant to the opponent.

The plaintiff was a third person, against whom it is not shown that it had knowledge of any pledge on the part of the defendant to the opponent prior to the last lessee’s possession, Oamors.

As against Janin the bank had an absolute right to seize the property in his possession or in the possession of his lessee.

AS SUBRÓGEE OE LAST LESSEE IS THE THIRD NATIONAL BANK A PLEDGEE?

This brings us to the consideration of the last point involved in the case.

The opponent, the New York bank, having recognized the lease to Oamors and having through him obtained the possession of the boat it held when the seizure was levied, the important question is presented as to whether it was legally possible for this creditor to obtain possession and control, through Oamors, the lessee of Janin, of property that had been pledged to it.

The principle is well settled that the title of the lessee is in fact the title of the lessor.

He comes in by virtue of the lease, he holds by virtue of the lease, and upon it he relies to maintain and justify his possession. He acknowledges thereby the title of the lessor, and he can not invoke the title of another and change the nature of his possession.

He is not permitted to deny that the lessor had a title to possession at the time that he, the lessee, came into possession. 3 Am. and Eng. Ency. 188.

The law regarding pledge is plain.

“It is essential to the contract, of pledge that the creditor be put in possession of the thing given to him in pledge, and consequently that actual delivery of it be made to him, unless he has possession of it already by some other right.”

Pledge is not made perfect by the consent of the parties. It requires absolute possession.

As to creditors the pledge was not complete when Janin was in possession.

The property was subject to seizure. The lessee, at the end of the lease, owed possession to his lessor, and not to his creditors. They had no claims upon him. Let us assume that the Third National Bank called on Oamors to deliver the property and that he refused to surrender possession.

The Third National never having been in possession, Camors had the absolute right to decline to surrender his possession.

Not having the authority to compel delivery, they were equally without authority to obtain possession by virtue of a contract with the lessee.

Delivery of possession to the pledgee must be given by the pledgor, and not by his lessee.

The obligation to deliver devolved upon the debtor, and not upon the one who held under a lease.

As between Janin and the National Bank, the pledge and its fruits were due by the former to the latter.

This indebtedness could become secured as intended by the creditor only after asserting the right contradictorily with the debtor.

Third persons hav e rights distinct from those of the pledgor.

As to them, there must be actual delivery and no control retained of the property by the owner for his personal account.

In order that there may be no question about the pledge, there must be absolute compliance in this respect.

La loi, says Baudrié-Laeantinerie, se montre pleine de solicitude pour les interets des tiers auxquels ce privilege pourra prejudicier• Vol. S, p. 599.

The property must be placed and remain in the possession of the creditor, or of a third person agreed upon by the parties.

It was not in possession of the creditor, nor in possession of a third person agreed upon by the parties; it was therefore subject to seizure and sale to pay and satisfy other indebtedness of the debtor.

Judgment affirmed at appellants’ costs.

Application fob Rehearing.

Watkins, J.

Third opponent resists a levy by the Citizens Bank under ft. fa. against the defendant on the following grounds, viz.:

That at the time of the seizure the dredgeboat was in its possession, through its tenant, J. B. Camors, who was using and operating the same for account and benefit of the opponent under a lease.

That at the time of said levy under fi. fa. the dredgeboat was in the opponent’s possession, and that he held said property as a pledge to secure a debt of eight thousand four hundred and seven dollars and seventy-three cents, by virtue of a written act of pledge signed by the defendant in execution, of date February 24, 1890, under which the property was delivered; and that opponent has held it in actual possession since that date. That, at various times since, defendant has recognized his rights thereunder.

The answer of the defendant is a denial that the property seized was at date of seizure, or at any other time, in third opponent’s possession, through Camors or any one else — the fact being that the boat was, at time of seizure, in the possession of the defendant, Janin, through Camors, under contract of lease, signed by the defendant as owner; and said boat had been continuously and uninterruptedly in defendant’s possession as owner since it was built in 1889.

The answer of the Citizens Bank was that the third opponent had no pledge or possession of the property seized, etc.

On the trial there was a judgment dismissing the third opposition and sustaining the seizure of the Citizens Bank, and third opponent has appealed.

Our opinion and decree affirm the judgment.

The application for rehearing goes upon the following grounds, to-wit:

1. That the Court erred in holding that the possession of Camors, at the time of the seizure, was not in the possession of the Third National Bank of New York.

2. That the Court erred in holding that the possession of Camors could not be made the possession of the bank.

3. That the Court erred in holding that Camors had the absolute right to decline to surrender his possession.

4. That the Court erred in holding that the intervenor had no authority to compel delivery of the boat to Camors.

5. That the Court erred in holding that the obligation to deliver devolved on the debtor, and not on Camors holding the lease.

6. That the Court erred in refusing to hold that the Citizens Bank was bound by the same estoppels Janin was bound by.

On this application the argument of third opponent is that (1) as the court found as a fact, that Janin had possession of the boat as the agent and representative of the bank under his promise to rent the boat and account for the proceeds to the bank, any lease he made must have been, in law, for the account of the bank; (2) that as the court did find that Janin did lease the boat, and so informed the bank, this finding shows that Janin acknowledged the legal duty which was upon him, and that the lease was for the account of the bank.

Or in other words that while in point of fact the lease was from Janin to Camors, Janin was the agent of the bank as an undisclosed principal; and all that was necessary to put the contract'in shape was that the bank should disclose to Camors, the lessee, that it was principal instead of Janin, and have Camors recognize it (the bank) to put Camors in possession for the bank; and in this manner continue in force and efficacy the act of pledge from Janin to the bank, and defeat a seizure of the boat by one of Janin’s creditors.

It is further claimed that this course was pursued by the bank, and due notice was given to Camors, and same was accepted by him and acquiesced in by Janin. And counsel’s argument is further that the seizing creditor of Janin is bound by the same estoppel that Janin is, and concluded thereby.

The theory of our opinion is that, while it is true that Janin acknowledged himself willing to hold the boat, as the agent of the bank, and account to the bank for the rentals, yet shortly afterward, he made a lease to Burdette, who transferred it to Camors for five hundred dollars per month, yet did not report that fact to the bank.

That the latter, Camors, informed counsel for the bank, that he had leased from the defendant at five hundred dollars per month; and counsel informed him that the boat belonged to the third opponent as security for a debt; and that the boat had been left in Janin’s hands, as agent of the bank; and that his possession was precarious, subject to termination at will. He further stated to him that he had informed Janin that his custody was terminated, and that the bank ratified the lease for its own account and dirfccted him to retain possession for the bank. The lessee gave the defendant notice of the information he had received; and he thereupon consented to hold for the bank.

It is conceded that the defendant, primarily, gave third opponents a chattel mortgage on the property, having the effect of a pledge on the property.

On this state of facts the opinion holds that opponents’ possession of the thing pledged was not real, actual and effectual at all times, or in other words there was nothing to advise the Citizens Bank of Oamors holding, as pledgee of the bank, because his contract of lease from Janin showed that the latter was the owner, entitling them to seize; that there is nothing in the transaction between Janin and Burdette, nor in that between Burdette and Oamors, to put the Citizens Bank on notice of the pledge of Janin to third opponent, nor that the bank was an undisclosed principal in the contract of lease.

Olaim is not made in this ease that the bank and Janin had agreed upon a third person to hold the property; and in that view the opinion concurs. And our opinion still is that third opponent never had physical, actual possession of the thing pledged. But it was always in the actual possession of Janin and his lessee; and while perfectly good as between the parties, it had no effect as to third persons and seizing creditors of Janin.

Rehearing refused.

Miller, J., recused.  