
    YU LIN WENG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-2760-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 22, 2010.
    
      Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Russell J.E. Yerby, Senior Litigation Counsel; Tim Ramnitz, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: REENARAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Yu Lin Weng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 18, 2009 order of the BIA affirming the September 24, 2007 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Steven R. Abrams, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yu Lin Weng, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 18, 2009), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 24, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA decision. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.2008).

The BIA did not err in concluding that Weng failed to demonstrate his eligibility for relief on account of his alleged resistance to the family planning policy that resulted in his wife being subjected to an involuntary abortion. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 313 (2d Cir.2007) (en banc).

Weng argues that his own resistance to the family planning policy was manifested by his refusal to disclose where his wife was hiding from government officials. Further, he submits that the loss of his job due to this resistance constituted economic persecution. We detect no error, however, in the BIA’s conclusion that these circumstances failed to establish the “severe economic disadvantage” required for a showing of persecution. See Shoo v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 161 n. 21 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 173 (B.I.A.2007)). Weng was able to find alternative, albeit less remunerative, work and was not subjected to fines, confiscation of property, or other economic hardship. See Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 174 (noting that “a compulsory change in occupation is least likely [among various economic harms] to qualify as persecution by itself,” and that “[t]he availability of other sources of income has been a key factor in assessing the impact of economic sanctions”). Weng also failed to present evidence concerning any other aspects of his financial situation that would have compelled a finding of severe economic disadvantage. See Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2002); Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 174.

As to Weng’s argument that he established a well-founded fear of persecution based on continuing police efforts to track him down on account of his altercation with family planning officials, the BIA reasonably concluded that Weng’s claim was undermined by the fact that his wife continues to live in China without further problems or harm. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir.1999).

Thus, to the extent that Weng’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief were based on his resistance to the family planning policy, the agency properly denied those applications for relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); cf. Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 567 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]orture requires proof of something more severe than the kind of treatment that would suffice to prove persecution.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  