
    Haskell versus Sumner.
    In foreign attae/iment a person disclosed that he had in his hands certain specified articles belonging to the principal defendant, and he was thereupon adjudged trustee by a court of competent jurisdiction 5 an execution was afterwards issued against the effects of the principal in the hands of the trustee* and the officer levied on these articles. Held, that an action of trespass against the officer, on the ground thai the articles were exempted from attachment and execution, would not lie.
    Trespass de bonis asportatis. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and filed a brief statement, pursuant to the stat ute, in which he set forth that he was a deputy sheriff; that one Langdon recovered a judgment in the Boston Court of Common Pleas against Haskell, and against his goods, effects and credits in the hands of Vandyne, Dickenson & Low ; that pursuant to an execution issued from the same court, he, the defendant, demanded of Vandyne, Dickenson & Low the goods, &c., of Haskell, in their hands, and that, in consequence of this demand, they exposed to him certain chattels as the property of Haskell, which he took and sold according to law.
    The plaintiff replied, that the chattels were tools necessary to him for carrying on his trade as a blacksmith, which were exempted from attachment and execution ; and on this /act the defendant took issue.
    It appeared at the trial, at November term 1821 of this Court, that in the action brought by Langdon, in the Court of Common Pleas, Haskell was defeated, not having entered any appearance, and that Vandyne, Dickenson & Low came into court, and in their answers to interrogatories disclosed that they had m their hands the chattels in question, schedules of which were annexed to their answers, and that they were thereupon adjudged to be trustees of Haskell; and that further proceedings were had as mentioned in the brief statement of the defendant.
    A verdict being found for the plaintiff, the defendant moved the Court to set it aside. This motion was argued at March term 1822.
    
      Hubbard and T. W. Phillips,
    
    in support of the motion, contended that the officer was justified in his doings by the execution against Haskell and his trustees. The court from which it issued had jurisdiction of the question, whether the articles were liable to be taken and sold under the trustee process; Even if the judgment were erroneous, still if the Court had jurisdiction, the officer is justified. Bac. Abr. Sheriff, M. 2 ; The case of the Marshalsea, 10 Co. 76 ; Mackalley's case, 9 Co. 68 ; Nichols v. Thomas, 4 Mass. Rep. 232 ; Sanford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. Rep. 288 ; Warner v. Shed, 10 Johns. Rep. 138.
    The trustees might and should have pleaded, in the action brought by Langdon, that the chattels in their hands were exempted from attachment and execution. Blake v. Jones & Tr., 7 Mass. Rep. 30.
    
      A. Moore, for the plaintiff.
   And now at this term the Court delivered their opinion.

Curia.

The question as to the articles being exempted from attachment and execution has been argued before the jury, but the Court have not considered that question, as there is another point in the case, upon which we are satisfied that the verdict ought to be set aside.

Vandyne, Dickenson & Low set forth' in their answers, that they had in their hands tools of trade belonging to Haskell, and the Court of Common Pleas held them to be his trustees.

We think that judgment conclusive. A person may be a trustee for having in his possession a specific article, or for owing the debtor a sum of money. No appeal was made from the jitdgi tent, and an execution was issued directing the officer to take the goods of the principal in the hands of the trustees. They gave to the officer several articles on which they had been held trustees, and the officer sold them in the ordinary mannei This comes within the common case of an officer protected in his acts done in obedience to a proper authority. The defendant had no right to look behind the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas. All that we decide is, that trespass will not lie under these circumstances.

The Chief Justice said he dissented from the rest of the Court, on the ground that Haskell was not a party to the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, that decision having been made wholly on the answers of the persons adjudged to be trustees.

The verdict was set aside, and at a subsequent term the plaintiff became nonsuit. 
      
       See 2 Starkie on Evid. (Metcalfs ed.) 816 note (i).
      
     