
    Desprang vs. Davis.
    The act of 1824, which exempts females from arrests under a Ca. So. does not exempt them from arrests under a hail writ.
    Tried in Charleston, in January term, 1825, before the city recorder, Judge Drayton, who made the following report:,
    “ In this case the defendánt was arrested by the city sheriff, on the 30th November, 1824, under a writ of capias ad respondendum with an order for bail. The defendant gave bail but was afterwards surrendered by her bail on the 25th January, 1825: under these circumstances the defendants council moved for her- discharge, under the 4th clause ofthe act of assembly, passed oh the 17 th of December, 1824, Entitled, “ an act to amend the law in certain particulars.” Several grounds were relied upon by the counsel in support of his motion, but as the arrest had been made before the act was in force, I decided that the couft could not discharge the defendant. Notice was served upon the recorder that his decision would be appealed from upon the grounds.
    1st. Because the act of 1824, by necessary implication, repeals the law giving power to imprison or hold to bail a female on capias ad respondendum.
    
    2d. Because the said act by providing that no capias ad satisfaciendum against a iemale shall issue, subsequent to its ratification, discharges an imprisonment or order for bail on a capias ad respondendum, issued prior to such ratification.
    
      Memminger for the motion.
    Contended that bail, as to! female defendants was rendered wholly nugatory by the act of 1824; as the bail is not fixed until the return of the ca. sa. (1 JYott & MsCord 295.)
    
    Power of the sheriff to hold to bail was derived from the act of 1769, (Public Laws, 213,) which requires bail to be given for a particular purpose. In this instance no advantage can possibly be derived from it. It was not right to imprison a citizen merely to satisfy a form of law, the reason of which had ceased.
    He argued that the act discharges the order for bail given before the act. Penalty can not be enforced after repeal of the act. (5 Cranch 281. 6 Do. 329.)
    
    
      Gray contra.
    Acts sometimes pass bearing .marks of haste, and the court will be cautious of giving construction to impair previous rights; but will preserve both, unless the latter law is clearly repugnant to the former. On the face of the act it was clearly to be seen the legislature intended to abolish only imprisonment under ca. sa. for if they had intended it generally, in all cases ofdebt,it would have been very easy to have saidso. (3 Blade. Com.414.) Ca. $a. is a distinct thing from the tapias ad respondendum,', the former to obtain satisfaction of a judgment. Admits that ca. sa. could only issue by common law where capias ad respondendum would lie, viz: in actions accompanied by force; but the right was gradually extended, and now the aa. sa. is not founded on the requisition of bail, but, even, now, where service has been by copy left, ca. sa. may be taken out to enforce payment of the judgment.
    When the capias ad respondendum was issued, the plaintiff clearly had a right to it, and to take it away by an act passed afterwards, must be by a retrospective operation^ It takes away a specific remedy, and it requires great latitude to carry it any further.
   Colcock, J.

The foundation of the argument of the appellant’s counsel, is the intimate connexion which subsists between the capias ad respondendum and the capias ad satisfaz, ciendum. This connexion he has clearly shewn, by his learned research, did once subsist; but by following the changes which have taken place in the doctrines of the law on the subject of process and its operation, it will be found that that connexion has long since ceased.

The body is not now arrested by the capias ad respon dendum. It is a mere notice to the defendant that he is sued, and that he is required to defend the action.

If the object be to arrest the body, there must be an affidavit and an order for bail. This being the case, it would not follow as contended, that the abolition of the one process necessarily implied the abolition of the other. If the conclusion were just, however, the argument proves too much; for it amounts to this, that the act must be construed to take away the right to sue a female.

Again, supposing the connexion to be what it once was, yet the conclusion would not follow.

Formerly a ca. sa. could not be obtained, except where a capias ad respondendum had issued^ now the abolition of tbe latter process does not necessarily' imply the abolition of the former. The foundation may remain although the superstructure be raised.

It is contended that without the return of non est inven i ius on a ca. sa. the bail cannot' be fixed', and that therefore it is useless to hold to bail.

Now although it may be useless, as. it regards the bail, the case before us shews that it is not useless in other respects. The legislature may have intended that females should not be subjected to imprisonment under a ca. sa. and yet thought it not improper to suffer! them to be sued and held to bail. If the object had been to relieve them from all imprisonment, they would have used some general language adapted to th,e purpose. They would not have designated a particular process from the operation of which they should be freed. The language of the act is plain and perspicuous. There is no room for doubt; therefore, no room for implication.

Motion refused.

Memminger for appellants;

Cross and Gray contra.  