
    David Ingalls, Appellant, v. George T. Allen, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM MORGAN.
    To say of the plaintiff in an action of slander, “that he, or somebody, had altered the credit, or indorsement on a note, from a larger to a less sum, and that the note would speak for itself,” is not actionable, as the charge is not positive, but in the disjunctive, and for aught that appears, he may have altered the credit or indorsement on his own note and violated no law in doing it.
   Opinion of the Court by

Justice Browne.

This was an action of slander, in which there are several counts laid in the declaration, one of which charges these words: “He, (meaning the plaintiff,) forged the indorsement of a credit on a promissory note made by said defendant to said plaintiff, by which the same was changed from a greater to a less amount.” The other counts are in substance the same. The defendant below, pleaded not guilty. The jury brought in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff below, for fifty dollars, upon which judgment was entered, and to reverse which, an appeal is brought to this court. The following bill of exceptions shows all the evidence given in the trial below: “That upon the trial, Bice Dunbor, the first witness introduced on the part of the plaintiff, stated that he was present when the plaintiff told the defendant that he, the defendant, had charged him, the plaintiff, with forgery, by having altered the signature of a note or the indorsement, but did not recollect which. The defendant replied, that he did not know that he had said so, but that the note would show for itself, and that he would not take back his words. Abram Vance, a witness introduced by plaintiff, stated, that he met with defendant in the street, and that the defendant told the witness that the plaintiff had altered the signature, or the indorsement, on the note, but could not recollect which. Murry McConnell, also introduced as a witness on the part of the plaintiff, stated, he heard defendant say that he, plaintiff, or somebody, had altered the credit or indorsement on a note, from a larger to a less sum; that the note speaks for itself. Charles F. Morgan, who was likewise introduced as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, stated, that he was present at the conversation between plaintiff and defendant, as stated by the first witness, Mr. Dunbor, and stated that Mr. Ingalls said the note had been altered, and that it would show for itself.” This was all the evidence. From the whole of the evidence, the party might have altered the indorsement or credit, and still, no criminalty attach to his conduct. The charge is not positive, but is in the disjunctive; he is charged with being guilty of one thing or another. For aught that appears, he may have altered the indorsement, or credit, on his own note, and violated no law in doing it. The judgment of the court below must therefore be reversed.

McRoberts, for appellant.

Me Connell and Thomas, for appellee.

Judgment reversed. 
      
       In McKee v. Ingalls, 4 Scam., 30, the words were, “you are a damned thief.” “If you have got money you stole it.” “I believe you are a damned thief. I believe you will steal.” The cojrvt instructed the jury, “ That the words ‘If you have any property you stole it; JT believe you will steal;’ and other similar conditional expressions, are not such words as will sustain this action; and the jury can not find a verdict against the defendant for using such words.” The supreme court held the instruction to be correct.
      It is not actionable to charge a man with an intent to commit a crime. Id.
      The words, “I have every reason to believe he burnt the barn,” and “I believe he burnt the barn,” are actionable. Logan v. Steele, 1 Bibb, 593.
      To say, “My watch has been stolen in widow Miller’s bar room, and I have reason to believe that Tiny Miller took it, and that her mother concealed it,” is actionable. Miller v. Miller, 8. Johns., 74.
      To say of a person, “It is the general opinion of the people in J’s neighborhood, that he burnt C’s gin house,” is actionable. Waters v. Jones, 3 Port., 442.
      Charging a person with being a mulatto, and “ akin to negroes,” is not actionable. Barret v. Jarvis, 1 Hammond Rep., 83. Otherwise in South Carolina. Eden v. Legare, 1 Bay, 171. Atkinson v. Hartley, 1 M’Cord, 203. King v. Wood, 1 N. & M., 184.
      Words calculated to induce the hearers to suspect that the plaintiff was guilty of the crime alleged, are actionable. Drummond v. Leslie, 5 Blackf., 453.
      Ambiguous words are slanderous, if the hearers understood them to impute a crime. Dorland v. Patterson, 23 Wend., 422.
     