
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Matthew Black EAGLE, Defendant-Appellant.
    Nos. 13-30050, 13-30292.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 25, 2014.
    
    Filed July 3, 2014.
    Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Billings, MT, Kris Allen McLean, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Missoula, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Robert Henry Branom, Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Defenders of Montana, Great Falls, MT, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: HAWKINS, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

In these companion cases, Matthew Black Eagle appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking probation and its subsequent judgment revoking supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

In Appeal No. 13-30050, Black Eagle contends that the two-year term of supervised release imposed on February 20, 2013, was substantively unreasonable. In Appeal No. 13-30292, Black Eagle contends that the 18-month term of supervised release imposed on October 9, 2013, was substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The terms of supervised release were substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Black Eagle’s history of drug and alcohol abuse. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 cmt. n.3(C); Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

In both appeals, Black Eagle contends that the district court erred by imposing certain conditions of supervised release, including the standard condition that he report to a probation officer and five special conditions related to drug and alcohol use, because those conditions are not reasonably related to his offense of conviction. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the challenged conditions. See United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 619 (9th Cir.2003) (“[A] condition of supervised release need not relate to the offense as long as the condition satisfies the goal of deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation.”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     