
    CLEBURNE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al. v. Lynn PAYNE, et al.
    85-503.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Sept. 25, 1987.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1987.
    
      Larry H. Keener of Floyd, Keener & Cusimano, Gadsden, for appellants.
    Randall M. Woodrow of Merrill, Porch, Doster & Dillon, Anniston, for appellees.
    David R. Boyd of Balch & Bingham, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Ala. Ass’n of School Boards.
   ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

The original opinion is withdrawn and the following substituted:

Lynn Payne, Tommy H. Taylor, and Glen Price, individually and as members of the Pleasant Grove Elementary School Board of Trustees (“trustees”), filed a complaint against the Cleburne County Board of Education (“Board”) and the individual board members (Wayne Skinner, Gerald Robinson, Donald Perry, Richard Zaner, and Glen Robinson) and the superintendent of schools, P. Scott Dennis. The original complaint was one for injunctive relief. The trustees amended their complaint by adding a second count, a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition.

The Board filed a motion to dismiss. In the motion, the Board alleged that the trustees had no standing at law to maintain the action as filed, that the trustees had no recognized cause of action against the Board either by statute or by court decisions, and that the petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition should be dismissed because mandamus or prohibition is not the proper remedy for the relief sought by the trustees. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and set the case for trial. The matter was heard by the trial judge, who granted the writ of mandamus. This appeal followed.

This case involves the following facts: A vacancy in the position of principal occurred at the Pleasant Grove Elementary School in the spring of 1985. A joint meeting between the Pleasant Grove Elementary School Board of Trustees (created pursuant to Code 1975, § 16-10-1, et seq.) and the Cleburne County Board of Education (created pursuant to Code 1975, § 16-8-1, et seq.) was held in July 1985 to begin the process of finding a new principal. During the month following the meeting, the Board and Superintendent Dennis submitted to the trustees a list of approximately 21 candidates for the position of principal. The trustees reviewed the 21 applications submitted and interviewed certain of these candidates. These candidates were not interviewed by the Board. At the conclusion of the interview process, the trustees submitted to the Board and superintendent Dennis, via letter, the name of the individual they recommended for the position.

The candidate recommended by the trustees was never interviewed by Superintendent Dennis or by the Board. On August 6, 1985, Dennis forwarded to Tommy Taylor, a member of the board of trustees, a letter which stated:

“Please be informed of the Cleburne County Board of Education’s appointment of Robert Chambless as Principal at the Pleasant Grove Elementary School.
“This motion was carried at the August 5, 1985, board meeting.
“According to the State of Alabama Public Law, Title 52, Chapter 7, if this does not meet your approval, the trustees, by unanimous consent may refuse to accept the above named person by filing reasons for the refusal with the Superintendent of Education within ten (10) days after date of this receipt.”

Chambless was not the candidate recommended for the position by the trustees.

In response to Dennis’s letter, the trustees on August 12, 1985, mailed, via certified mail, to Dennis, a letter in which the trustees refused the appointment of Chambless as the principal of Pleasant Grove Elementary School. This letter set forth the reasons for the refusal as follows:

1. His prior dual position as teacher and principal prevented him from developing needed office characteristics,
2. Inefficiency at teacher-pupil relations;
3. Inefficiency at teacher-principal relations;
4. Inefficiency at school-community relations;
5. Pleasant Grove Elementary School is twice the size of Mr. Chambless’s prior assignment.

The letter was unanimously approved and was signed by each of the trustees. The trustees also attended the next meeting of the Cleburne County Board of Education. At this meeting, a brief statement was read by the Board which stated that the Board would not appoint any other candidate for the position of principal at Pleasant Grove Elementary School. Following this meeting and the trustees’ letter refusing Chambless as principal, the Board and Dennis refused to appoint anyone else to the position of principal. The trustees then commenced this action for the removal of Chambless and to compel appointment of another candidate for the position of principal of Pleasant Grove Elementary School.

The first issue raised is whether a writ of mandamus would be the proper remedy in this case. The Board argues that mandamus was not the proper remedy against the Board and the superintendent.

Mandamus is an equitable remedy to coerce the performance of an act. This remedy will be granted where there is shown on the part of the applicant a clear, specific legal right to the performance of the act sought. Campbell v. City of Hueytown, 289 Ala. 388, 268 So.2d 3 (1972). Mandamus lies where a party has a “clear, specific legal right to demand performance of a legal duty and no other adequate remedy.” Brown v. Spencer, 292 Ala. 66, 69, 288 So.2d 781 (1974). It is clear that a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy to enforce a duty upon school officials. Several Alabama eases have held that mandamus is appropriate against members of boards of education. See, Shirey v. City Bd. of Ed. of Fort Payne, 266 Ala. 185, 94 So.2d 758 (1957); Brown v. Spencer, supra.

In Brown v. Spencer, this Court held that mandamus was appropriate to compel school officials to appoint a person to fill a vacancy on a local board of trustees. We permitted an individual (a nominee to the board of trustees) to bring the action on behalf of himself and also permitted him to bring the action as a representative of the school patrons. We held that certain statutes, which were the predecessors to § 16-10-1, Code 1975, clearly placed an affirmative duty upon the members of the board of education. The petitioner in that case, as an individual and a representative of the school patrons, possessed the right to petition for mandamus.

It is clear from the facts of this ease that the writ of mandamus was the proper remedy for the trustees against the Board and the superintendent.

The second issue presented is whether the plaintiffs, individually or as the trustees of the school, have standing to maintain this action. The Board argues that the plaintiffs have no asserted right or interest to be protected that is different from that of the public at large.

The plaintiffs in this case were appointed as members of the Pleasant Grove Elementary School Board of Trustees pursuant to § 16-10-1, Code 1975, which states that the trustees are “to care for the property, to look after the general interest of the school and to make to the county board of education, through the county superintendent of education, from time to time, report of the progress and needs of the school and of the will of the people in regard to the school.” Clearly, the trustees possessed standing to redress the wrong alleged in this action. The damages and injuries alleged were peculiar to them and were different from any damages allegedly incurred by the general public. The trustees were not mere members of the general public, but were statutorily bound to care for and look after the general interests of Pleasant Grove Elementary School. Thus, the plaintiffs, as trustees, possessed actual interests in the cause of action and had standing to bring this action.

The third issue presented concerns the scope of the word “teacher” in Code 1975, § 16-10-4. The trustees contend that the word “teacher” in this section includes “principal.” Section 16-10-4 provides:

“In the event a teacher, not already employed in a school, is assigned to such school, the county superintendent of education shall give to the trustees of said, school notice in writing of such assignment, and the trustees of said school, within 10 days from the date of the receipt of the superintendent’s notice of assignment, may by unanimous consent refuse to accept the assignment of such teacher to their school upon written notification to the county superintendent of education setting out the reason for such refusal; and it is hereby made the duty of the county superintendent of education to assign another teacher to such school. (School Code 1927, § 180; Code 1940, T. 52, § 140.)” (Emphasis added.)

Interpretation of a statute begins with the language of the statute itself. Ex parte Jones, 456 So.2d 380 (Ala.1984). “[W]hen the language of the statute is ambiguous, or doubtful in meaning, construction by the court becomes necessary, and in such case the court should endeavor to ascertain the legislative mind and the purpose of the statute, as well as the object to be accomplished.” Jefferson County v. Hawkins, 232 Ala. 398, at 400, 168 So. 443, at 445 (1936). Because the statute does not expressly define the word “teacher,” we must turn elsewhere for guidance.

“A ‘principal’ is defined as a teacher who is intrusted with special duties of direction or management.” 78 C.J.S. Schools & School Districts § 154 (1952). In White v. State, 42 Ala.App. 249, 160 So.2d 496 (1964), a criminal case, the court adopted a similar definition. In White, the court cited statutes and cases involving teacher tenure. The tenure statutes expressly define “teacher” to include a principal. Code 1975, § 16-24-1. The teacher retirement statutes also define “teacher” to include a principal. Code 1975, § 16-25-1(3).

Within Chapter 10 of Title 16 (“Board of School Trustees”), there are some indications that the legislature considered principals to be teachers. Code 1975, § 16-10-3, provides that “[t]he principal teacher of the school shall be the secretary of the board of school trustees.” In the only reported case dealing with this statute, the “principal teacher” involved was the principal of the school. Roberts v. Bright, 222 Ala. 677, 133 So. 907 (1931). More significant is the fact that in § 16-10-9, the board of trustees is given the authority to file “written charges requesting the removal of the principal or any other teacher in said school.” (Emphasis added.) Section 16-10-9 clearly indicates that the legislature considered a principal to be a teacher.

We hold that § 16-10-4 does give the board of trustees the right to reject the appointment of both teachers and principals, because it is our opinion that the legislature considered a principal to be a teacher.

APPLICATION GRANTED; ORIGINAL OPINION WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED.

TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, ALMON, SHORES and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.

MADDOX, BEATTY, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., dissenting.

MADDOX, Justice

(dissenting).

With regard to the third issue in this case, the construction of the word “teacher” as used in Code 1975, § 16-10-4, I still believe the view I expressed in the original opinion is correct, and, therefore, I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the law on this point is as follows:

It is well established law in this state that interpretation of a statute begins with the language of the statute itself. Ex parte Jones, 456 So.2d 380 (Ala.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 1779, 84 L.Ed.2d 838 (1985). Statutes covering related subjects should usually be considered in pari materia. Ex parte Johnson, 474 So.2d 715 (Ala.1985). I cannot apply the in pari materia principle here, however, because of the limiting words “in this chapter” contained in § 16-24-1.

Based on these principles, I would hold that the definition of “principal” found in White v. State, 42 Ala.App. 249, 160 So.2d 496 (1964) is not applicable to this case. White was a criminal case, and the statement made in that case that the principal was a teacher was for the purpose of showing that he was an agent of the county school board, which the indictment alleged owned the building. In that case the principal’s office had been burglarized and the court was dealing with a legal question as to whether the indictment should have listed the principal as the occupant of the office, instead of the county board of education.

The predecessor of Code 1975, § 16-10-4, was Title 52, § 140, Code of Alabama 1940. That section was in Chapter 7 of Title 52, headed “Board of School Trustees,” and Title 52, § 351, referred to in White, was in Chapter 13 of Title 52, entitled “Tenure of Employment of Teachers.” Furthermore, the provisions of § 16-10-4 were part of the 1927 school code, and the provisions of Title 52, § 351, were not adopted until 1939. I am of the opinion that the legislature did not intend for “teacher” in § 16-10-4 to include “principal.”

The brief in this case prepared by counsel for the Alabama Association of School Boards does not attempt to argue that the word “teacher” contained in § 16-10-4 does not include “principal,” but does request and argue for a broad determination of the public policy issue of which agency should control the assignment of teachers, the school board or the school trustees, and argues that if that power of control is vested in the school trustees, then a statement of educationally sound reasons for the trustees’ rejecting a teacher should be required.

The association, in its amicus curiae brief, concludes:

“School trustees can only reject a teacher if they reasonably doubt the teacher’s professional suitability. Any other interpretation of § 16-10-4 violates the rules of statutory construction, is impracticable, and shifts political and administrative power to school trustees at the expense of the officers expressly designated by the Legislature to control county schools. When trustees reject a teacher for reasons founded in anything except sound educational considerations, the superintendent of education has no duty to make a new appointment, and his earlier appointment remains valid.”

I do not believe this public policy issue is presented in this record, because this case deals with the assignment of a principal, not a teacher. In any event, such a public policy issue should be addressed to the legislature, because the provisions of present § 16-10-4, which deals with teachers, requires only that the trustees state their “reason,” and in this case the trustees did give their “reason.”

I would point out that the Cleburne County Board of Education treats this case as one dealing with the power of the Board versus the power of the trustees to the Board’s assignment of a principal. That is the only issue I address in this dissent.

I have examined the sections of the Code which grant powers to the boards of education, and I note that the legislature, in setting out the powers of the boards, made a listing that classified “principals” and “teachers” separately.

In § 16-8-9, Code 1975, the legislature gave boards of education this power:

“The county board of education shall exercise through its executive officer, the county superintendent of education and his professional assistants control and supervision of the public school system of the county. The board shall consult and advise through its executive officer and his professional assistants with school trustees, principals, teachers and interested citizens and shall seek in every way to promote the interest of the schools under its jurisdiction. (School Code 1927, § 98; Code 1940, T. 52, § 74.)” (Emphasis added.)

And in § 16-8-23, Code 1975, a board of education is given the following power:

“The county board of education shall appoint, upon the written recommendation of the county superintendent, all principals, teachers, clerical and professional assistants authorized by the board. The county board may suspend or dismiss for immorality, misconduct in office, insubordination, incompetency or willful neglect of duty, or whenever, in the opinion of the board, the best interests of the school require it, superintendents, principals, teachers or any other employees or appointees of the board, subject to the provisions of chapter 24 of this title. (School Code 1927, § 117; Code 1940, T. 52, § 86.)” (Emphasis added.)

Had the legislature intended for the “refusal” provision of § 16-10-4 to apply to principals, it could have included the word “principal” in that section, as it did in § 16-8-9 and § 16-8-23.

Furthermore, Chapter 8 of Title 16 of the 1975 Code sets out the authority granted by the legislature to a county board of education, and provides that the general administration and control of all educational matters affecting the county are vested in the county board. It further provides that the county board of education shall exercise and control the supervision of the school system of the county.

The courts have been very liberal in construing the power and authority- of county boards of education as far as their actions are concerned. The courts have held that if an action is not prohibited by law, it is permitted, and the courts are hesitant to involve themselves in the internal affairs of a board of education exercising its statutory control over the public schools of the county. In Clark v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 410 So.2d 23, at 27 (Ala.1982), this Court, quoting from Hargett v. Franklin County Board of Education, 374 So.2d 1352 (Ala.1979), stated:

“It is established that the administration of school systems is the responsibility of the county boards of education. Code 1975, §§ 16-8-8 [and] -9. Accordingly, the courts will not seek to control the exercise of the broad discretion given by the legislature to the county boards of education. All legal intendments are indulged in favor of the orders of such boards and the orders are due to be upheld unless the invalidity is clearly shown by those challenging the order. Woods v. Board of Education of Walker County, 259 Ala. 559, 67 So.2d 840 (1953); Mullins v. Board of Education of Etowah County, 249 Ala. 44, 29 So.2d 339 (1947).” (Emphasis added.)

I believe that the legislature has given plenary power to the county boards of education for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of the public schools within the counties and that the trial court erred when it ordered the Cleburne County Board of Education to appoint and assign another principal at the Pleasant Grove Elementary School under the provisions of § 16-10-4. I therefore dissent.

BEATTY and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.  