
    Ex-Parte J. C. H.
    1. The sums which the Circuit Court Is authorized to condemn a party to pay In proceedings In bastardy towards the support of his child, are not debts within the meaning of the organic limitation that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt except in caso of fraud."
    2. The statute regulating this special proceeding authorizing the court to require the father to give bond for the payment of such sums, It Is within the power of the court to direct the party to remain in the custody of the sheriff, and to be Imprisoned until compliance with Its order.
    8. Inability to obtain the bond, insolvency of the party, and other like circumstances not Involving any question as to tbo power of the Circuit Court, are matters of which, upon a habeas corpus, we cannot take cognizance. 11 they justify any action, that action-' must be by the Circuit Court.
    The petitioner, who was held in custody by the sheriff of Wakulla, county, applied to one of the Justices of the Supreme Court on the 27th day of June, A. D. 1879, for a writ of habeas corpus. The Justice issued the writ returnable before the Supreme .Court then in session. The sheriff returned that he detained the petitioner under the following judgment, rendered at the Spring Term, A. D. 1879, of the Circuit Court for Wakulla county, in the case of the State of Florida ex reí. F; H. vs. J. C. H.:
    "This day came the parties in this caSe npone the issue joined, and thereupon came a jury, to-wit: 1. Henry Bell;
    2. T. E. Vause; 3. W. K. Coleman; 4. J. W. Willis; 5 John Register; 6. Wm. Spears; who, being duly sworn and elected to report the truth,upon the issue joined, and having heard the testimony, the argument of the counsel,
    'and the charge of the court, retired to their room to consider their verdict, and afterwards came into court and rendered the following verdict:
    “ We the jury find for the plaintiff.
    ' “ H. 0. Bevell, Foreman.**
    
    “ Therefore, upon the finding of the issue for the plaintiff as aforesaid, ,the court doth adjudge the said defendant J. C. H. to be the father of the bastard child of the said F. H., mentioned in the pleadings in this caso, and it is considered by the court that the plaintiff do recover of the defendant the sum of five dollars for incidental expenses attending the birth of the said child, and that the plaintiff do recover the cost of the suit from the defendant, and execution issue therefor; and it is further considered by the court, that the defendant dp pay into the registry of this court the sum of thirty-five dollars yearly for the space of ten years from this date, to be laid out and appropriated under the special order and direction of this court, from time to time to be made, toward the support and maintenance ‘and education of the said bastard child, in equal quarter annual instalments, from' the date of said judgment. And it is further ordered, that the defendant do enter into bond, with good and sufficient securities, payable to and to be approved by this court, for the due and faithful payment of the said sums annually as aforesaid, and that the defendant, upon failing to comply with the foregoing órder, do stand committed.”
    The part of the statute regulating proceedings for .the maintenance of bastards, which relates to the judgment to be entered in case the issue is found against the defendant, is as follows:
    “]f the issue be found against the defendant, or reputed father, then he shall be condemned, by the judgment of said court, to pay not exceeding fifty dollars, and all necessary incidental expenses attending the birth of said child, at the discretion of said court, yearly for ten years, towards the support, maintenance and education of said child, and the said reputed father shall give bond, with good and sufficient security, to be approved by the court, for the due and faithful payment of said sum of money, at times therein named, which shall be made payable to the said court, and laid out and appropriated under their special order and direction, from time to time made; which said bond shall be, and hereby is, declared to have the same force, validity and effect as a judgment of said court upoó which execution may issue as often as money thereon shall becoine due and payable; provided, however, that if said child should not be bom’ alive, ot being born should die at any time, and that fact suggested upon the record of the* Circuit Court, then, and from that time, the bond aforesaid shall he void ”
    
      The Supreme Court fixed a day lor hearing and ordered that notice thereof be given to the Attorney-General and to the person making the complaint before the Justice of the Peace.
    
      B. C. Long for Petitioner.
    1. The bastardy act attaches no penalty to failure of defendant to comply with order of court to execute bond for maintenance. (Thomp. Dig., 228.)
    2. This action of Legislature based upon the fact that bastards are not, in Florida, a charge on the public, and there being no interest of the State to protect, her summary criminal process is only extended to plaintiff to secure her day in court, and procure her judgment at law.
    3. Supreme Court have held bastardy to be a quasi criminal proceeding. (16 Fla., 354 & 830.)
    If there is to be any civil feature admitted in the premises, it must apply to this very matter of the judgment, as up to that stage the proceedings have, in their nature, been of a criminal order. If the finding of the court means anything by quasi criminal, it must be this. There is no room for any other application of civil rule.
    All authorities contemplating imprisonment of defendant for non-execution of. bond, are adjudications upon statutes especially providing for that alternative. Even then the civil rule applicable to insolvent debtors is recognized, and a surrender of property, &c., releases defendant after a nominal confinement. See doctrine in Harris vs. Sulivan, 15 N. H., 81; Marston vs. Jornias, 11 N. H., 156.
    
      Query: Is there an implied authority vested in courts of law of chancery to enforce an order properly within their jurisdiction?
    We fail to find an authority in point in response to inquiry of the court.
    As a general proposition, within certain moral and political restrictions, this doctrine may be true, but, 1st. the action of the court must be in enforcing compliance with an order clearly within their jurisdiction; 2d. From a recognized rule of propriety and public policy, this voluntary exercise of assumed power must be clearly for the ends of justice to all parties. Without judicial Itnowledge of a contemptuous spirit of disregard in defendant, and in the face of facts tending to show a moral impossibility of compliance, such arbitary exercise of oppressive power would be criminal and a most dangerous infringement of the rights and liberties of litigants.
    
      The Attorney-General, (with whom was F. T. Myers,) for the State.
    This is a habeas corpus for release from imprisonment under judgment in a bastardy proceeding. The statute relating to bastardy proceedings is found in Thompson’s Digest, 228-9, and is discussed by the Supreme Court in John D. C. vs. Julia Y. II., 16 Fla., 559.
    The statute and judgment of the court are not in conflict with Section 15 of the Declaration of Rights. Paulk vs. State, 52 Ala., 427; Lower vs. Walleck, 25 Ind., 68; Ex-parte Teague, 41 Ind., 278; State ex rel.'vs. Hamilton, 33 Ind., 502; Ex-parte Yoltz, 37 Ind., 237, Masser ys. Stewart, 21 Ohio State, 353; People ex rel. vs. Cotton, 14 Ill., 414; Rich vs People, 66 Ill., 513; 2 Blackford, 307.
    The court had power to render judgment of commitment in default of giving bond with security.
    The statute authorizes the Justice of the Peace to issue process for the sheriff or constable to bring the defendant before him. From the arrest of the defendant under this process he is in custody of the court. If he gives bail, then, upon his appearance at the term of the Circuit Court, he is again in the custody of the court, (and to such custody the bail sureties could have surrendered him at any time.) From this custody and imprisonment he can alone relieve himself by complying with the judgment rendered under the statute, i. e. giving bond with sureties. If the court had merely directed that he give the bond with sureties, and said nothing about commitment, this would have left him in the custody of the court, and the officer would be bound to hold him until he had obtained his release by compliance-with the statute. Any other construction operates as an annulment of the statute.
    Again, the power to require the giving of the bond is given by the statute, and the question is the execution of this power. Has the court authority to resort to imprisonment to execute the power ? If it has not, the statute is a failure and its purposes can be defeated by the mere recusance of the offender.
    “ Whenever a power is given by a statute, everything necessary to the effectual execution of the power is given by implication.” Mitchel vs. Maxwell, 2 Fla., 594; State ex rel. vs. Gleason, 12 Fla., 209; Taylor vs. Moffatt, 2 Black-ford, 307; 1 Brock., 159; 1 Ként, m. p. 464.
   Mr. Justice Westcott

delivered the opinion of the court.

The petitioner in this case alleges under oath an illegal restraint of his liberty by the sheriff of Wakulla county. The sheriff in return to the writ of habeas corpus issued, certifies that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a judgment of the Circuit Court, a certified copy of which accompanies his return. Upon this return the petitoner moves his discharge.

Upon an inspection of the judgment, of which a certified copy accompanies the return, it appears that the petitioner is held under an order of the Circuit Court for Wakulla county directing the sheriff to detain him in custody until he gives the security which the court is authorized to require of him for the payment of sums of money which is has been by the court condemned to pay towards the support of a bastard child, under the provisions of the statute regulating the subject. (Thomp. Dig., 228, §3.)

No question is here made of the regularity of the proceedings under the bastardy act, so far as they concern the trial of the issues authorized to be raised under that act; nor is it questioned that the court is by that act authorized to require the bond. It is thus apparent that the general question here is, has the court the right and power -to direct the imprisonment in this case until a compliance with its order to execute the bond, which by the law it is authorized to require the party to give.

Section 15 of the Declaration of Rights provides that “ no person shall be imprisoned for debt except in case of fraud.” This provision of the organic law is, as a matter of course, a limitation upon the powers of each department of the government, Executive, Legislative and Judicial. It is, however, the clear result of the authorities that the sums which the petitioner has here been condemned to pay under the bastardy act, are not debts within the meaning of the provision of the Constitution. 52 Ala., 527; 25 Ind., 68; 33 Ind., 502; 37 Ind., 237; 21 Ohio (State), 353; 4 Ill., 414; 66 Ill., 513. The true question here, therefore, is whether the Circuit Court, a court of general jurisdiction, having been given the express power to require such bond, and having by its judgment directed such bond to be given; has the authority and power to direct the party to remain in the custody of the sheriff and to-be imprisoned until compliance with its order? While this is not the precise language of the order of the- court, it is in contemplation of law its effect, as the discharge of the party would be his right in case of a compliance with the order of the court. We cannot conceive that there is the least room for doubt upon this question. Without such power the order of the court would be nothing more than the act of an individual, so far as the matter of enforcing a compliance therewith is concerned. The order to execute the bond would be simply "vox et praetcrea nihil” and the order to imprison would be a mere "bmtem fulmen■”

From a grant of judicial power to make the order to do a specific act, results the power to enforce its performance by the usual method. " Quando lex aliquid concedit conce-deré videtur et id, per quod devenitur ad illud”

We do not propose to discuss the question at length. The following authorities sustain the - general principle: 25 Ind., 74; 2 Blackf., 307; 2 Fla., 594; 2 Scam., 79-83; 1 Brock., 159; 1 Strob. (Law,) 555; 1 Rail., 606; 1 Virginia cases, 314; 1 Back. Abdg’t Title N.

Disability to execute the bond, the insolvency of the party, and other like circumstances, are matters which we cannot take cognizance of in this proceeding. . The order is within the power of the Circuit Court, and these matters, if their existence justifies any action, about which it is not here (in this collateral proceeding) proper for us to say anything, must be addressed to that tribunal.

The prisoner is remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Wakulla county, there to remain until discharged by due course of law.  