
    Jim vs. State.
    An indictment for obtaining money or goods by false pretences, if charged in the ■words of the 1st section of the act of 1842, ch.- 48, is good. It need no.t charge the money or goods to have been obtained with intent to steal them.
    The first section of the act of 1842, ch. 48, provides, that “whoever shall feloniously obtain the personal goods or choses in action of another, by means of any false and fraudulent pretence, shall be guilty of felony.” Under this statute, the following indictment was filed against the defendant:
    Commercial and Criminal Court of Memphis, March term, 1848.
    The grand jurors of the State of Tennessee, elected, em-pannelled, sworn and charged to enquire for the fifth, thirteenth and fourteenth civil districts in the county of Shelby, upon their oath present, that Jim, a free person of color, late of the civil districts aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, knbwing that one B. A. Massey was desirous of purchasing a wagon and harness, then and there unlawfully, fraudulently and felo-niously did pretend to the said B. A. Massey, that he, the said Jim, had purchased for hitn a wagqn and harness for the sum of fifteen dollars, and that he, the said Jim, had paid ten dollars to confirm and bind the trade, and that it was necessary for him, the said B. A. Massey, to advance to him, the said Jim, the sum of five dollars, in order to complete the payment for the said wagon and harness. By means of which said false, fraudulent and felonious pretences, he the said Jim, did then and there fraudulently and feloniously obtain from him, the said B. A. Massey, one bank note of the denomination of five dollars, and of the value of five dollars, the goods, chattels and money of him, the said B. A. Massey, with the felonious intent then and there to defraud him, the said B. A. Massey: whereas, in truth and in fact, he, the said Jim, had. not at the time of the making the said false and fraudulent representations, or at any time since, purchased the said wagon and harness, or any wagon and harness for him, the said B. A. Massey, nor had he, the said Jim, advanced ten dollars in order to confirm and bind the trade, nor was it necessary for him, the said B. A. Massey, to advance to him, the said Jim, the sum of five dollars in order to complete the payment for the said wagon and harness, or any wagon and harness whatever, which the said Jim pretended to have purchased for him, the said B. A. Massey, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the péace and dignity of the state.”
    The delendant was found guilty on this indictment, and sentenced by the judgment of the court to three years imprisonment in the penitentiary, King, J. presiding.
    From this judgment defendant appealed.
    
      Leigh, for the plaintiff in error.
    
      Attorney General, for the state.
   Green, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error was indicted under the first section of the act of 1842, ch. 48, for feloniously obtaining money by means of false and fraudulent pretences. The indictment charges the offence correctly, in the terms of the first section of the act; but it is insisted by the counsel for the defendant that it should have been laid, to have been committed with an intent, feloniously to steal — in the explanatory words of the third section. The third section of the act, is intended as an explanation of the meaning of the words used in the first section. It declares that the words “false and fraudulent pre-tences” includes all cases of pretended buying, borrowing, hireing, &c., where the party “intended at the time he received the goods, feloniously to steal the same:” thus enumerating the various acts by which, if a party obtain possession of goods with intent to steal, he shall be guilty, under the first section, of feloniously obtaining possession thereof, by means of “false and fraudulent pretences.” But the offence is created by the first section of the act, and is well charged if laid in the words of that section.

This was virtually decided by this court in the case of the State vs. Tate, 6 Humph. R. 424, and Johnson vs. State, 6 Humph. R. 426, note, inasmuch as the indictment was held to be good in Johnson’s case, which could not have been done if the construction of the act contended for, had been sustained.

Affirm the judgment.  