
    William TEZAK, individually, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Geoffrey T. GLASS, individually and in his official capacity; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-56899
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 14, 2017 
    
    Filed February 24, 2017
    William Tezak, Pro Se
    Kevin Michael McCormick, Attorney, Benton, Orr, Duval & Buckingham, Ventu-ra, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Geoffrey T. Glass, Fredrick P. Horn, Derek W. Hunt, Kirk Nakamura, William F. Ryla-arsdam, Raymond J. Ikola, Richard D. Fybel, Kathleen O’Leary
    Jason Michael Fodrini, Esquire, Hickey & Petchul, LLP, Irvine, CA, Jonathan H. Eisenman, Robert Axel Olson, Esquire, Attorney, Greines, Martin, Stein & Rich-land LLP, Los Angeles, CA, David Allen Wankel, Esquire, Iger Wankel fe-Bonkow-ski, LLP, Laguna Hills, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Greenbrook Fountain Valley Homeowners Association
    Kevin E. Monson, Law Office of Kevin E. Monson, Fountain Valley, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Max B. Johnson, Kevin E. Monson
    Jason Michael Fodrini, Esquire, Hickey & Petchul, LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendants-Appellees George Kallas, Cathrine Lesnick, Jimmy Patopoff, Shirley Vogt, Bruce Richardson, Keith Webb
    Kevin E. Monson, Pro Se
    Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

William Tezak appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Tezak’s action as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Tezak’s claims constitute a de facto appeal of prior state court judgments. See id. at 1163-65 (Rook-er-Feldman bars de facto appeals of a state court decision and constitutional claims “inextricably intertwined” with the state court decision); see also Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (a de facto appeal is one in which “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Tezak leave to amend his complaint because amendment would have been futile. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied if amendment would be futile).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     