
    CHARLES M. BRITT v. CHESTER R. HOWELL and HARRIS, GIBSON, HOWELL COMPANY, INC.
    (Filed 9 October, 1935.)
    1. Corporations G i — Complaint held sufficient to state cause of action against corporation for slander.
    The complaint alleged that plaintiff and the individual defendant were organizers and officers of competitive business corporations, that a person seeking to make a connection with one or the other of the corporations called at the office of the corporate defendant, and that while there the individual defendant, acting for himself and his corporate codefendant, said that plaintiff was a thief, and that therefore the prospect would not want to do business with plaintiffs corporation. Jffelcl: The demurrer of the corporate defendant, on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against it, was properly overruled, a corporation being liable oivilvter for slanderous words spoken by its officers or agents in its service with its authority, express or implied, and the complaint being sufficient to support the introduction of evidence of its liability within the rule.
    2." Same: Parties B b—
    A corporation is liable for torts committed by its agents and servants precisely as a natural person, and a corporation may be joined as a party defendant with its officer or agent in an action for slander for words spoken by its officer or agent in the service of the corporation and with its express or implied authorization.
    
      Appeal in civil action for slander by tbe corporate defendant from judgment overruling its demurrer, entered by Warliclc, J., at May Term, 1935, of BuNcombe.
    Affirmed.
    
      Lee & Lee for plaintiff, appellee.
    
    
      lieazel, Shuford & Hartshorn for defendant, appellant.
    
   ScheNCK, J.

Tbe corporate defendant assigns as its first ground for demurrer tbat tbe complaint “does not contain any allegation tbat tbis defendant spoke or caused to be spoken tbe words alleged in tbe complaint to have been spoken by tbe defendant Chester R. Howell, or tbat tbe speaking of sucb words by said Howell was either authorized or ratified by this defendant, and, therefore, tbat the said complaint does not state a cause of action against this defendant.”

The complaint alleges that prior to the slanderous utterance tbe plaintiff Britt and tbe individual defendant Howell were engaged together in tbe general food brokerage business as tbe Charles M. Britt Company, that their company had been put into receivership, and tbat plaintiff, with others, bad organized a new corporation, the Britt, Shiver, Norcom Company, to engage in tbe same business in tbe same locality as tbe old company, and tbat tbe defendant Howell, with other associates, had formed the defendant corporation for the purpose of engaging in the same business in the same locality, and tbat tbe representatives of tbe principal accounts of tbe old company were calling upon both of the new corporations with tbe view of investigating and recommending the appointment of brokers for their respective products in tbe Asheville territory, and that when H. M. Phelps, a representative of tbe C. H. Musselman Company, called on tbe defendant corporation, recently organized by tbe defendant Howell, tbat he, the said Howell, “who was at that time acting for himself and bis codefendant, tbe Harris, Gibson, Howell Company, being at tbat time an officer of said codefendant company, to wit, its vice-president and treasurer, and did, in tbe interest of himself and his said company, solicit tbe brokerage account of tbe C. H. Musselman Company, and at said time, in an effort to and with tbe deliberate intention of discrediting tbis plaintiff, and tbe Britt, Shiver, Norcom Company, the said Chester R. Howell made and uttered, and did falsely and maliciously speak and publish, of tbe plaintiff and of bis said business tbe following words: ‘That Charles M. Britt sold merchandise -from tbe consigned stock of tbe C. H. Musselman Company, collecting for same, and kept the money for bis own personal use, and that tbe Charles M. Britt Company bad to pay for same, and (tbe said Howell) felt sure tbat my company (the company represented by tbe said H. M. Phelps) would not want to do business with a thief! ”

A corporation is liable in an action for slander, or other tort, although the act may have been ultra vires and foreign to the objects of its creation, and this liability extends to the tortious acts of its servants done in its service, and whether such acts were committed by the servants in the service of the corporation or solely for their own purposes, or whether the corporation authorized or participated in the tortious act are questions of fact for the jury, Hussey v. R. R., 98 N. C., 34, and a corporation may be held liable for slander when the defamatory words are uttered by one of its officers or agents either by its express authority or in the course of his employment and under such circumstances as to fairly and reasonably warrant the inference that such words were so authorized. Cotton v. Fisheries Products Company, 177 N. C., 56.

We think the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to permit the introduction of proof of such facts as might support the inference that the alleged slanderous and defamatory words were spoken by the individual defendant in the service of the corporate defendant and by its authority, and that his Honor, in overruling the first ground assigned for demurrer, made a correct application of the principles of the law enunciated by this Court and the text-writers.

The corporate defendant assigns as its second ground for demurrer that it “appears from the face of the complaint there is a misjoinder of parties defendant in this action.” The question here presented is answered adversely to the demurrant by both Cotton v. Fisheries Products Company, supra, and Hussey v. R. R., supra. In the latter case the following is quoted as applicable to an action for slander instituted against a railroad corporation and its general manager: “The result of the modern cases is, that a corporation is liable civiliter for torts committed by its servants or agents, precisely as a natural person; and it is liable as a natural person for the acts of its agents, done by its authority, express or implied, . . . The corporation, and its servant, by whose act the injury was done, may be joined in an action of tort in the nature of trespass.”

Affirmed.  