
    DUNN LUMBER & SUPPLY COMPANY and Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Gary Robert ROY, Appellee.
    No. QQ-57.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 18, 1980.
    On Motion For Clarification April 8, 1980.
    Robert J. Felice of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, Orlando, for appellants.
    
      Sylvan A. Wells of Stern & Wells, Dayto-na Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

This appeal from an order of the judge of industrial claims presents five issues. After carefully considering the briefs and record, we affirm the order to the extent that it found the appellee sustained a compensable accident, and further affirm the award of medical fees, costs, and the appellee’s entitlement to a reasonable attorney’s fee.

However, we do find error in failure to rule on the issue of appellee’s entitlement to temporary disability benefits. The record indicates that temporary disability benefits were claimed, included in the application for hearing, and presented for adjudication at the hearing below. The judge of industrial claims had a duty to adjudicate the issue of appellee’s entitlement to temporary disability benefits since it was properly presented and ripe for disposition. Deauville Hotel v. Weaver, 8 FCR 87, cert, denied, 288 So.2d 565 (Fla.1973).

Accordingly, the order is affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the judge for further consideration and proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SHAW and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.

BOOTH, J., dissents.

BOOTH, Judge,

dissenting.

I dissent from this court’s retention of jurisdiction in this case, which arose outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court. See Crews v. Town of Bay Harbor, 378 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).

On the merits, I would concur in the majority’s opinion.

ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

PER CURIAM.

Appellants’ motion for clarification is addressed to the opinion filed on February 18, 1980, wherein the order appealed was “affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the judge for further consideration. . . .” Such “further consideration” shall be upon the existing record, and the opinion of February 18, 1980, is hereby amended to so reflect.

As amended, the opinion heretofore filed is affirmed and the cause remanded for further consideration upon the existing record.

SHAW and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.

BOOTH, J., dissents.

BOOTH, Judge,

dissenting.

I dissent from this court’s retention of jurisdiction in this case, which arose outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court. See Crews v. Town of Bay Harbor, 378 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).

On the merits, I would concur in the majority’s opinion.  