
    Fnu BENNY, Alice Hariyanto, Dylan Salim, aka Dillon Salim, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-4973-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 24, 2012.
    
      Jack Herzig, Wyncote, PA, for Petitioners.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; James A Hunolt, Senior Litigation Counsel; Sarah L. Vuong, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Fnu Benny, Alice Hariyanto, and Dylan Salim, natives and citizens of Indonesia, seek review of a November 17, 2010, decision of the BIA affirming the March 17, 2009, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying their application for asylum and withholding of removal. In re Benny Fnu, Alice Hariyanto, Dylan Salim, aka Dillon Salim, Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/027/078 (B.I.A. Nov. 17, 2010), aff'g Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/027/078 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 17, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the I J’s decision as modified by the BIA decision. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

As preliminary matters, because Petitioners do not challenge the agency’s determination that their asylum applications were untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), and because Petitioners do not argue that they are eligible for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), we do not address those claims. Accordingly, we address only the agency’s denial of withholding of removal, and conclude that the agency reasonably determined that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating their eligibility for this form of relief. See Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 181 (2d Cir.2006).

Although the agency failed to evaluate explicitly the cumulative impact of the incidents Benny and Hariyanto experienced in Indonesia, we find that remand would be futile. See Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 289-90 (2d Cir.2007) (providing that the agency should evaluate the cumulative impact of an applicant’s experiences, but recognizing that “even if an IJ’s decision contains errors, the decision will not be vacated and remanded if doing so would be futile”). We have recognized that a valid past persecution claim can be based on harm other than threats to life or freedom, “includ[ing] non-life-threatening violence and physical abuse,” Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226 n. 3 (2d Cir.2006) (citing Tian-Yong Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir.2004)), but the harm must be sufficiently severe, rising above “mere harassment,” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006). Furthermore, “[w]e have emphasized that persecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In this case, the agency reasonably concluded Hariyanto’s presence during an incident at her university, in which individuals damaged campus fences and threatened to burn the university, and Hariyanto and Benny’s presence near two bombings, in which they were not injured, did not establish past persecution, as general violence does not constitute persecution. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 n. 3 (2d Cir.1999). The agency also reasonably concluded that the incident in which individuals threw stones at Hariyan-to’s house, rattled fences, and shouted anti-Chinese provocations, and the incident in which individuals damaged the front mirror of Hariyanto’s car, did not establish past persecution, as she did not testify that she was beaten or otherwise physically hurt during these incidents, and because general crime conditions are not grounds for asylum and unfulfilled threats alone are insufficient to demonstrate past persecution. See Melgar de Torres, 191 F.3d at 314; Tian-Yong Chen, 359 F.3d at 128; see also Ci Pan v. U.S. Att’y General, 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir.2006). Finally, contrary to Petitioners’ argument that the BIA failed to consider an incident in which Benny was beaten and cut with a knife, the BIA explicitly referenced Benny’s testimony regarding his physical assault, and reasonably concluded that this incident did not rise to the level of persecution. See Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d at 341; see also Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (Presuming that the agency has “taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). Accordingly, unlike those cases in which we have remanded for the agency to evaluate an alien’s claim of past harm cumulatively, remand here would be futile, as Hariyanto did not testify to having suffered physical, mental, or economic harm, and the harm to which Benny did testify was not so severe as to constitute persecution. See, e.g., Manzur, 494 F.3d at 285-88 (Bangladeshi applicant and her children suffered post-traumatic stress disorder after applicant’s husband was removed from their home and killed during a coup, and she and her children were subjected to twelve years of harm, including house arrest, attempted rape, death threats, economic deprivation, government surveillance, denial of medical care, and restriction on travel); Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 279-80 (2d Cir.2006) (petitioner was detained and beaten by Cameroonian police on five occasions); Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 74-75 (2d Cir.2005) (petitioner’ business was burned down and they were subjected to years of harassment, threats, and beatings in Belarus because they were Jewish). Ultimately, even considering in the aggregate the harm Hariyanto and Benny endured in Indonesia, their experience was insufficiently severe to compel a reasonable fact-finder to conclude, contrary to the agency, that they suffered past persecution, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Cf. Manzur, 494 F.3d at 285-88; Edimo-Doualla, 464 F.3d at 279-80; Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 74-75.

Moreover, because the agency reasonably determined that Petitioners had not suffered past persecution, they were not entitled to a presumption that they would face persecution if returned to Indonesia. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1). Absent a showing of past persecution, an applicant for withholding of removal must show that it is “more likely than not” that she would suffer future persecution based on a statutory ground if returned to the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). As the IJ found, the country conditions evidence in the record indicated that violence against Chinese and Christians in Indonesia had decreased, and the Indonesian government has tried to promote ethnic and religious tolerance. Indeed, the U.S. Department of State’s 2008 Human Rights Practices Report for Indonesia indicates that the Indonesian government “officially promotes racial and ethnic tolerance,” and that “instances of discrimination and harassment of ethnic Chinese continued to decline compared with previous years [as] recent reforms increased religious and cultural freedoms.” Thus, the IJ did not err in finding that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating a likelihood of persecution in Indonesia.

Moreover, contrary to Petitioners’ argument, the agency did not err in rejecting their “pattern or practice” claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). As we have previously determined, a petitioner failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution against Christians in Indonesia, noting that the finding was supported by several U.S. Department of State and organizational reports on conditions in Indonesia. See Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir.2009). Here, similarly, the agency reasonably found that the country conditions evidence in the record, which included several U.S. Department of State and organizational reports, indicated that the Indonesian government generally respected religious freedom, and had instituted reforms intended to promote religious and cultural tolerance. Although Petitioners argue that the agency erred by relying on U.S. State Department reports to the exclusion of other evidence, such reports are “usually the best available source of information on country conditions.” Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 342 (holding that the weight afforded to State Department country reports lies largely within the discretion of the agency); see also Santoso, 580 F.3d at 112 (finding no error in agency’s determination based on U.S. State Department reports). Thus, in light of the record evidence, the agency did not err in finding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution against Christians in Indonesia. See Santoso, 580 F.3d at 112.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stays of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition are VACATED, and any pending motion for a stays of removal in this petition are DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  