
    Robert G Shaw and Others versus Joseph Bradstreet.
    Where one holding land, by virtue of a “possession and improvement,” had made an agreement with the owner of the land to purchase it at a certain price, and afterwards conveyed his possession to another, the grantee was holden to be bound by such agreement, and therefore not entitled to have the value ascertained by the jury, according to the provisions of the limitation and settlement law.
    Entry sur disseizin. Trial upon the general issue, at the last September term, before Thatcher, J.
    The title of the demandants being admitted, the tenant alleged that he, and those under whom he claims, held the demanded premises by virtue of a possession and improvement for more than six years previous to March, 1808, and prayed that the jury should ascertain the increased value thereof, by virtue of the improvements made by him, &c., agreeably to the statute in that case provided ; and the demandants, protesting that the tenant did not so hold, required that the jury should ascertain the value of the premises, had no improvements been made. ■
    It was agreed, that one Daniel Cunningham was in possession of the premises, claiming to hold the same more than six years before March, 1808, and that he continued to hold the same until Apr I, 1814, when he conveyed all his right therein, by deed of quit-claim, for a valuable consideration, to the tenant, who still continued in possession.
    The demandants then produced an agreement, made on the 8th of December, 1807, between themselves on one part, and the said Cunningham and sundry other occupants of lands of which the demandants claimed to be proprietors, in which the demandants engaged to cause the said lands to be surveyed, and to convey to the occupants the lands by them respectively possessed, at a price which should yield them at the rate of $4.50 per acre, upon an average of all the lands. And the said occupants agreed to assist in the survey of the lands ; to adjust the prices of the several parcels, so as to produce the said average price *for the whole ; to give security for the prices so to be ascertained, or, in case of their failure to make such adjustment, for the prices to be ascertained by such disinterested and discreet persons as the demand-ants should appoint for that purpose. The demandants also offered in evidence a certain paper purporting to be an appraisement of the said lands by two persons thereto appointed, in which the lot of Daniel Cunningham is appraised at $6.16 the acre. The admission of these papers in evidence was objected to by the tenant ; but the objection was overruled by the judge. It was in evidence, that Cunningham, when he transferred the demanded premises to the tenant, communicated also to him the terms of said agreement.
    The judge thereupon ruled, that the tenant was bound in this action by the said agreement, and that no other evidence was admissible, to show the value of the premises.
    The jury were directed to find a verdict for' the demandants, that the tenant did disseize them, &c. ; the questions on the admission of said agreement and appraisement, and as to the admissibility of other evidence to vary the value of the land, being reserved by the judge for the opinion of the whole Court. A verdict was returned accordingly for the demandants ; and, if the Court should be of opinion that the said papers were properly admitted, and that the tenant was thereby precluded from evidence to vary the price of the land from the terms of said appraisement, the verdict was to be amended by adding to it the value of the premises according to the said appraisement, and the increased value at-; and, if the Court should be of a contrary opinion on either of the points, a new trial was to be had.
    
      Allen, for the tenant,
    contended, that the papers admitted were a transaction between other parties, to which the tenant had never assented, and by which he was not bound, however Cunningham might have been. The tenant came in by a conveyance not clogged with any condition. * Perhaps the demand-ants may have their action against Cunningham for his breach of engagement; but they have no claim to bind the present tenant to the terms of that engagement, which was a mere personal contract between the parties to it.
    
      Williams, for the demandants.
    The tenant can have no more right in the premises than his grantor had. He is bound by the adjustment, having purchased the land with a full knowledge of it. He holds, not “by virtue of a possession and improvement,” but under the agreement made by Cunningham prior to the transfer, and under that transfer which was made subject to the agreement.
   By the Court.

The demandants might well have objected to the tenant’s availing himself of the provisions of the statute ; this case coming fairly within the spirit of our decision in the case of Knox & al. vs. Hook. The only difference between the two cases is, that, in the present case, the party under whom the tenant claims to hold the demanded premises had taken possession of the land before he made the agreement with the proprietors ; and, in the other case, Hook’s predecessor originally entered upon the land under a contract with the owner. But this difference cannot have any serious effect. By entering into the agreement, Cunningham waived all claims by virtue of his possession ; and he and his grantee are bound by the agreement. The legislature could never intend to interfere with cases situated like this, or with any in which the tenant in possession shall have made an agreement and compromise with the proprietor.

Let the verdict be amended as agreed at the trial; and, the demandants having made their election to abandon the premises to the tenant, let judgment be entered for them to recover, on the terms of the statute, the value of the demanded premises according to the verdict so amended. 
      
       12 Mass..Rep. 329.
     