
    Mark A. STACY v. SUPERIOR COURT DEPARTMENT.
    SJC-12577
    Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
    October 17, 2018
    The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law.
    Mark A. Stacy, pro se.
    Anna Lumelsky, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.
    Mark A. Stacy appeals from a judgment of the county court dismissing as moot his complaint for relief in the nature of mandamus. In 1986 and 1989, Stacy pleaded guilty in the Superior Court to various offenses. In 2016, he filed two motions pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), seeking to withdraw those guilty pleas. In April, 2018, Stacy filed his complaint in the county court, seeking an order directing the Superior Court to take action on his motions. While the complaint was pending, a judge in the Superior Court issued a decision denying both motions. A single justice of this court accordingly dismissed the complaint as moot.
    Stacy has filed what was intended as a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). That rule does not apply, as Stacy "was not challenging any interlocutory ruling of the trial court, but rather the inaction of the court." Santiago v. Young, 446 Mass. 1006, 1006, 844 N.E.2d 610 (2006). Nevertheless, it is clear on the record that Stacy has received the specific relief sought in his complaint, namely, a ruling on his motion. The complaint was properly dismissed as moot. See Rasten v. Northeastern Univ., 432 Mass. 1003, 1003, 731 N.E.2d 1074 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1168, 121 S.Ct. 1133, 148 L.Ed.2d 998 (2001).
    Judgment affirmed.
    
      
      Stacy asserts that no such decision has been made. We have, however, been provided with a copy of the decision in question, and the Superior Court dockets plainly show that the motions have been denied. We express no view as to the merits of that decision. To the extent that Stacy is aggrieved by the denial of his motions, he has not shown that he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary appellate process.
    
     