
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jaime Lopez GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-10090
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 14, 2016 
    
    Filed December 19, 2016
    Michael E, Maffei, Anne M.' Voigts, Assistant U.S. Attorney, J. Douglas Wilson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Daniel Blank, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDCA—Federal Public Defenders Office (San Francisco), San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jaime Lopez Gonzalez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 24-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for illegal reentry following removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Lopez Gonzalez contends that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence on the basis that his prior conviction for willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant under California Penal Code § 273.5 was a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2015). He acknowledges that this claim is foreclosed by our holding in United States v. Laurico-Yeno, 590 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir. 2010). However, he argues -that this holding has been undermined by Johnson v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). We disagree. Johnson held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557. Johnson did not address section 2L1.2’s definition of “crime of violence,” which does not have a residual clause. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.l(B)(iii) (2015). Accordingly, contrary to Lopez Gonzalez’s contention, Johnson is not “clearly irreconcilable” with our circuit precfedent. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (three-judge panel is bound by circuit precedent unless that precedent is “clearly irreconcilable” with intervening higher authority).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     