
    Loftin vs. Espy, and others.
    
    When there is an unembarrassed and complete remedy at law, a court of equity has no jurisdiction.
    If the title to slaves be clear and without doubt m A, a court of equity will restrain their sale to satisfy the debt of B.
    It is not necessary to give a court of equity jurisdiction to restrain the sale of slaves, that there should be any other cause stated in the bill and proved, than a right of property.
    To entitle himself to relief in a court of equity, the complainant must show a title in the slaves, free'from doubt and suspicion; for if there be any doubt or suspicion, equity will send the parties to litigate at law.
    This was an appeal from the decree of the court of chancery, sitting at Jackson, dismissing the bill. The bill charges, that on the 3d of February, 1830, one James A. Edwards, let one Jesse Embry have a certain negro boy belonging to him, námed Joe, for the sum of three hundred and fifty dollars, advanced to Edwards by Embry; that Edwards executed his bill of sale for said negro to said Embry; that said bill of sale was absolute and unconditional upon its face, and for the consideration of three hundred and fifty dollars; that there was a verbal understanding and agreement at the time, that Edwards, by paying Embry four hundred dollars on or before the 1st day of March, 1831, should have the negro returned to him by Embry; that Edwards being unable to redeem the negro, agreed with one John Nelson, that he, Nelson, should have the right to redeem said negro and authorized Nelson to do so, upon his paying Embry the four hundred dollars, and that upon the payment of the $400, he, Nelson, should have the absolute title to said negro; that a short time after this arrangement between Edwards and Nelson, the said Nelson informed the complainant, in the presence of Edwards, of the arrangement, and that he would not be able to redeem the negro, and then proposed, that if the complainant would go to Embry and redeem the negro, that he, Nelson, would refund the money advanced by the complainant, or, that the complainant might keep the negro as his own property, as he, the complainant might think fit; that this arrangement and proposition was made in the presence of Edwards; that Edwards assented to it; that the complainant, upon this, concluded to redeem the negro, and hold him as his own absolute property; that in order to redeem the said negro, he applied to Edwards and obtained from him an order to Embry, to permit complainant to redeem the negro upon paying the four hundred dollars; that before the 1st day of March, 1831, complainant sent his son George B. Loftin as his agent to said Embry, to redeem said negro boy, who did so; that after his son had paid the $400, got the boy into his possession and set out to return to the house of complainant with the boy, the said negro was levied upon as the property of said James A. Edwards, by virtue of an execution in the behalf of one James A. Thomas, against said James A. Edwards and one William Espy, for the sum of $467 50 debt, and $10 90 costs, issued from the county court of Madison county.
    The bill further charges, that the negro was levied upon in favor of said John Thomas, and by the advice, cooperation and assistance of said William Espy, the co-defendant in said execution; that the complainant had offered to said Thomas and to said Espy, that if either of them would pay the money' which he had paid to Embry in the redemption of said negro, that he would abandon his claim; but that they both refused, and insisted upon selling the negro as the property of said Edwards; that the negro is one of peculiar value to the complainant, having been raised by him, and that he has no adequate relief at law, and prays that the sale of the negro be enjoined perpetually upon said execution, as the property of said Edwards, and for general relief; and that-said John Thomas and William Espy be made de-iendants.
    Thg answer of Espy, one of the defendants in this cause, admits that his co-defendant, John Thomas, did recover a judgment against himself and said Edwards, for the sum stated in the bill of complaint; states that he was the security of said Edwards; that Edwards was in embarrassed circumstances; and that he, Espy, was likely to have the debt to pay, without any indemnity from Edwards; that he did advise the execution to be levied upon the negro Joe, mentioned in complainant’s-bill, as the property of said James A. Edwards; and insists that said negro was the property of said Edwards at the time of the levy', and subject to his debts. The answer admits that the negro boy was conveyed by bill of sale to Embry, for the sum of three hundred and fifty dollars, as stated in the bill; that there was a private verbal agreement between Embry and Edwards at the time, that Edwards was to have the right to redeem said negro, by the payment of four hundred dollars on the 1st of March, "1831, but charges, that there was a further agreement between Embry and Edwards, that no other person under Edwards, should have said privilege; that the negro was redeemed by said George B. Loftin, the son of the complainant, for Edwards, and with his, Edwards’ money, and for his exclusive use and benefit, and was so stated by the said George Loftin at the time said negro was delivered to him by Embry; and that said negro was-worth in cash, from 450 to 0500, and prays that the injunction be dissolved.
    The answer of John Thomas, admits that he obtained a judgment against said' James A. Edwards and said William Espy, for the sum mentioned in the bill; that it is true as stated in the bill, that Edwards did convey by• bill of sale to one Embry, the negro boy Joe, subject to redemption upon the payment of four hundred dollars; that he believes the negro was redeemed by n 1 , Loftm, with the money of Edwards, and lor his use, and requires strict proof to the contrary; insists that said negro was the property of said Edwards, and subject to sale upon his execution; and prays that the injunction be dismissed, and he allowed the benefit of his execution at law. To both these answers the complainant filed a replication.
    The complainant proved by James A. Edwards, that Jesse Embry, in the spring of 1S30, advanced to him $350 for the repayment of which he was to have until March, 1831, by paying $50; that to secure this sum of money, he conveyed by an absolute bill of sale to said Embry, a negro boy, named Joe; that it was agreed between himself and Embry, that he should have the right to redeem the negro boy from that time until the 1st day of March, 1831, by paying $400; that there was no further understanding about the matter than what is above stated; nor was there any agreement that Edwards should not authorize any person else to redeem said negro; that he authorized the complainant to redeem the said negro Joe, but advanced him no money for the purpose; that he was not able to redeem the negro himself, and that was the reason he authorized the complainant to do so; that Joe was worth about five hundred dollars. John Nelson states, that he was present when Edwards authorized complainant to redeem the negro Joe; that Edwards was not able to redeem the negro, or advance the money.
    George B. Loftin stated, that he acted for the complainant in the redemption of the negro Joe, from Embry; that as such, he went to see Embry to redeem the negro; that he found Embry at his cotton gin, about half a mile from his house; told him that he had come to redeem the negro Joe; that Embry asked if he had come to redeem him for Edwards; that he informed him he had not; that his object was to redeem -him for Thomas Loftin, the complainant: that shorly after this conversa- . , , _r , ’ % , tion, he paid Embry the money and took possession of the negro, having told Embry that the money belonged to the complainant, and that Edwards had none; that Thomas Loftin furnished him the money to pay to Em-bry, that it was his, and the redemption for his benefit; that at the same time, he delivered an order from Edwards to Embry, requesting ,hhn to deliver the negro to Thomas Loftin and permit him to redeem him, as he was unable to do so himself; that on the day he applied to redeem the negro, which was the last on which it could have been done, Embry insisted that he should stay all night, and said that the business could be done next morning; that the time would make no difference, which induced him to think that Embry wished to delay in order to prevent the redemption of the negro; that he redeemed him on the last day of February, 1831, and started home with the negro, after sunset, when it had became dark; that after he started ho observed that Em-bry followed a short distance behind him, which he noticed as rather a singular proceeding; that he had proceeded but a short distance when he was stopped by some person, who said he had an execution against James A. Edwards and had come to levy upon the negro; that he made some resistance, but that others came up and he desisted, and the negro was taken into possession by the officer; Embry was present and seemed surprised that the negro had been levied on, stating that he did not know of any execution against Edwards, and was sorry the circumstance had taken place; on next day he called and gave a delivery bond for the negro, in which Embry joined; that he paid four hundred dollars redemption money; the negro was worth four hundred and fifty dollars at that time; that the negro was left in the possession of Embry, and has been in the possession of Thomas Loftin since the filing of the bill in this cause; that he never at any time stated to Embry that he redeemed the negro for Edwards and with Edward’s money, but him that Edwards was insolvent; that he did offer Espy $50 to give up the neg-ro and avoid a law-suit, which Espy refused after some hesitation.
    The defendant introduced and read the deposition of Jesse Embry, in which he stated that complainant Loftin came to him and told him that he had an order to him for a negro boy Joe, from James A. Edwards; that Edwards had written to him to pay the money to him, Embry, for Joe, and when he went to Murfreesborough, he should have his money back; that his brother-in-law, Nelson, had also written to him to pay the money for the boy and he would pay it back again, as he had conditionally bought the boy if he could be got then; that he, Embry, refused to give up the boy, because Edwards had conditionally sold him to Nelson; that the contract between Edwards and himself was, that if he, Edwards, could not purchase the negro for himself, no other person was to have him but Embry; that afterwards, on the same day, the complainant came to him again to know what he had concluded to do; that he stated he was willing and would give up the negro if he would pay the money for Edwards, and receive the boy for Edwards and enjoin it on Edwards not to let his brother-in-law have him, but to keep him. He said he would enjoin it on Edwards to keep him and not permit his brother-in-law to have him. Complainant then agreed to pay the money for Edwards’, and receive the boy as Edwards’ property; that he stated to witness that he did not care about the possession of the negro, as he did not want him then, nor would he have him, as he had bought this boy’s father, and his connexion kept a fuss about it and he had io sell him back to him again, and that he never would have any thing to do with any property that belonged to his connexion again; that complainant afterwards came to the house of the witness to get the boy Joe, and refused to pay the money as Edwards money, and refused to receive the boy as Edwards , , " . but wanted the witness to give up the boy and give him a receipt for the money in his own name; that he had taken counsel upon the matter from a lawyer, and was advised to keep him out of the way until he got to Murfreesborough; that he, Embry, agreed to give him a receipt in the name of James A. Edwards, but the complainant refused to take it, saying that it was his own money, and that Edwards had never seen one dollar of it; that he had paid one debt for Edwards and would pay no more; that if he took a receipt in Edwards’ name and received the boy as Edwards’ property, he would be executed and sold in ten days; he then said he intended going to Murfreesborough on the next Thursday, and if James A. Edwards would send the money down, he would pay the money for him and receive the boy as Edwards’ property; then if the boy was executed let him go; let Edwards pay his own debts; that afterwards the witness and George B. Loftin, the son of complainant, met at John M’Farland’s gin on the last day of February, 1831; that Loftin told him that he had come to get the negro boy Joe, from the witness; that he told Loftin, his father had come for the boy sometime before, but refused to pay the money for Edwards, and receive the boy as Edwards’ property; that witness then asked him if his father had got back from Murfreesborough, he replied that he had, and got him to come down for the boy, and pay the money for Edwards, and receive the boy as Edwards’property; that the witness and Loftin then went to the house of the witness; he then presented an order from Edwards for the boy Joe, and paid the money for Edwards, and received the boy of the witness as Edwards’ property; that in a few minutes after-wards the boy was executed as the property of Edwards; that Loftin then claimed him as his father’s, (the complainant’s,) but not until the levy was made upon him as the property of said Edwards.
    
      Wyatt F. Tweedy, stated that he heard Jesse Embry say he would give him up the boy Joe, provided he would pay the money as Edwards’ money, and receive the boy as.Edwards’ property; and Embry stated that he had received the negro as Edwards’, and that he should go back to Edwards, so that he would lay himself liable in no way to Edwards; that Loftin agreed to pay the money as Edwards’ money, for the boy Joe.
    Isaac M. Johnson stated that he heard a conversation between Embry and George B. Loftin, at John M’Far-land’s cotton gin, in relation to the redemption of a negro named Joe; that Loftin told Embry he had come after said negro for Edwards, and Embry told him he could have the negro, provided he redeemed him as the property of Edwards; that his father had been to redeem the negro, but that he would not let him have him unless he was received as the property of Edwards and for Edwards’use, and with Edwards’ money, and that Loftin replied that was what he came for, to redeem the negro for Edwards and with Edwards’money; that Embry then told him under these circumstances he could have the negro. Upon this proof the chancellor dismissed the bill, from which complainant appealed to this court.
    P. M. Miller and W. Stoddart, for the complainant.
    
      A. L. Martin, for the defendant.
   Catron, Ch. J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

It is certainly true as a general rule, that when there is an unembarrassed remedy at law, a court of equity has no jurisdiction. So this court has frequently decided, Hickman vs. Scribbs and Ivey: Smith and Moore vs. Kearney: Gass vs. Malory.

It is also true, that when the sheriff levies on the goods of A. for the debt of B. that A’s remedy is at law; Yet as a general rule,' this has an exception in case of slave property. If the slaves of A. be levied forthe debt of B. and A can show a clear right of property to the slaves, courts of equity have jurisdiction to restrain the creditor and sheriff until the right be tried at law, or determined in equity, if the right be undoubted, in the mind of the court. The servants and slaves constitute a part of the family, entitled to, and receiving, if they be worthy, the affections of the master to a great extent; this disposition towards this unfortunate class of people, it is the policy of the country to encourage and promote; without it, good conduct on the part of the slave, and benevolent and humane treatment on the part of the master, is not to be expected. Otherwise they will live enemies, and in a scene of domestic strife, the slave acting from fear for good, and through revenge for evil; the master protecting himself as well as he may by violence, but too often brutal. That there is no safety in such a state of things to persons or property, is too manifest to need further remark. The slave and the master should never be separated when affection exists between them. In the next place, it often must occur that the mother will be separated from the children, or the husband from the wife, if the sheriff be permitted to sell. Nothing can be much more abhorrent to these poor people, or to the feelings of every benevolent individual, than to see a large family of slaves sold at sheriff’s sale; the infant children, father and mother, to different bidders. To treat them as other domestic animals, would be to declare, that as a people, we had in reference to this class, sunk all feelings of humanity, and that the slave was not elevated in his sensibilities over the lower classes of animals, which are allowed to have none worthy of the protection of man. As a fact, and as a theory, this is untrue. These are some of the considerations why tire courts of equity have protected the slave as well as the master from an unlawful separa-ration. Truly, compensation for the market value of the slave could be had at law, as for the horse or ox, but the mutual feelings of dependence, affection and humanity, existing between master and slave, have no cash price and cannot be compensated in money.

It follows, that for the protection of this species of property, there is often no adequate remedy at law. There was formerly a rule asserted in this court, whilst exercising original chancery jurisdiction, that the affection and attachment of master and slave, must be grounded on some good and particular cause, and that set forth in the bill, and proved, to warrant the interposition of the injunctive powers of the court. This idea, though plausible, was found to be much too uncertain to ground the jurisdiction of the court upon. Every man had his own ideas of meritorious services, growing naturally out of his feelings, and of course was governed by considerations applicable to himself. To form any certain rule conferring jurisdiction under such circumstances, was found to be impossible, the idea of “meritorious services,” was abandoned, and the jurisdiction assumed generally, because the rights of humanity combined themselves with the rights of property, which must be equally true in every case.

It is next insisted for the defendants, that Loftin, the complainant, has not made out a case by his proof, showing an undoubted and clear right of property in himself, and therefore must be left to litigate at law and before a jury, his doubtful right. We think this argument sound, and that for this reason the decree of the chancellor must be affirmed. The court will neither collate or speak of the evidence, but leave the trial at law to proceed uninfluenced by any thing that may have occurred in this court.

Decree affirmed.  