
    Rapheal G. RUSSELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Myong Suk MUELLER; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 17-35697
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 18, 2017 
    
    Filed December 26, 2017
    Rapheal G. Russell, Pro Se
    Kimberlee Walker Olsen, Attorney, Luke Casteel & Olsen, Lynnwood, WA, for Defendants-Appellees
    Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Rapheal G. Russell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his action arising from a property dispute. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Rundgren v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, 760 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Russell’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Russell failed to allege a federal question or jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (conferring jurisdiction on district courts in “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996) (28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) applies only when the state citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from each defendant).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009),

We do not consider documents not presented to the district court because they are not part of the record on appeal. See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3,
     