
    [Philadelphia,
    December 27, 1824.]
    BROOKER against The COMMONWEALTH.
    IN ERROR..
    All indictment can be supported for a contempt of a justice of the peace, which, though not a breach of the peace, amounts to an obstruction of the execution of his office.
    The plaintiff in error, Benjamin Brooker, was convicted in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia county, from which the record was removed by writ of error, on an indictment for an assault and battery, and contempt of Michael Freytag, esq., a justice of the peace, and sentenced to a fine of thirty dollars and one month’s imprisonment, to commence from and after the first Monday in January, 1825.
    The following reasons, were urged in the court below for arresting the judgment, and, in this court, for reversing it:
    1. Because, although the act of assembly of the 22d of February, 1802, enacts, that no justice of the peace shall act as such, unless he shall reside within the limits of the district for which he was commissioned; yet there is no such averment in the indictment.
    
      2. Because no court is mentioned in the indictment, in which it was presented, by which it was tried, or which had jurisdiction of the offence.
    
      S. Because the indictment charging Benjamin Bt'ooker with obstructing Michael Freytag, in the hearing and examination of a certain complaint pending and proceeding before him as a justice of the peace, omits altogether to explain, set forth, or mention, what the said complaint, examination, or proceeding was.
    4. Because the fourth count charges no obstruction of justice, — *» and neither that nor any other of the counts, nor any part of the indictment, specifies, how or in what particulars the justice of the peace was insulted, abused, ridiculed,'threatened, hindered, or obstructed.
    5. Because there is no indictable offence set forth in the indictment.
    
      C. J. Ingersoll, for the plaintiff in error,
    referred to the act of assembly, of the 22d of February, 1802, Purd. Dig. 352. 1 Chilly Crim. Law, 228, 232. Haw. b. 2, ch. 25, seel. 119, 120, 123, 124. Leech, C. C. C. 361. 1 Chilly Crim. Law, 169, 171, 227, 228. Leech, C.C.C. 210. Filler v. Probasco, 2 Browne, 137.
    
      M‘llvaine, for the commonwealth,
    cited 1 Chilly Crim. Law, 71. 1 Russel, 60. Hawk. b. 2, ch. 25, sect. 4. Id. b. 2, ch. 1. sect, 15. Id. b. 1, ch. 21, sect. 10, 11, 13,14. 2 Browne, 142. 1 Mod, 35. 6 Mod. 124. 1 Sir. 421. 1 Barnard, 155. Comb. 45, 69.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

GibsoN, J.

There is a count, in this indictment,, for an assault and battery, which is good in form, and which therefore is, at all events, sufficient to support the judgment; but, as the opinion of the court is desired on a point mooted in the cause, viz. Whether an indictment can be supported for a contempt of a justice of the peace, which, though short of a breach of the peace, yet amounts to an obstruction of'the execution of his office, it is proper to say, we have no difficulty in pronouncing an opinion in the affirmative. It does not follow, that because such a contempt may not be punished by attachment, it may not be punished at all. The proposition is an unreasonable one on the face of it. Every obstruction of an officer, in the execution of his office, is a public injury, and, unless where the legislature has directed otherwise, is indictable. Indeed, were it necesssary to the due administration of the laws, that justices of the peace should have the power of commitment for contempt, I would not hesitate to declare, that the grant of the office carried with it as an incident, all ancillary power which should be necessary to its complete execution. But, as punishment of contempts by indictment, is commensurate with this object, I am content that the law, in this respect, be held here as it is in England. By treating such contempt as an indictable offence, we put it in the power of the justice to hold the offender to bail, to answer to a prosecution and be of good behaviour in the meantime, and to commit him in default of finding bail; which is sufficient to prevent a repetition of the offence. It is, therefore, unnecessary to the administration of justice, that a justice should exercise the high power of punishing by attachment, which, in the hands of many magistrates, might become a public grievance. But that to obstruct a magistrate in the execution of his office is an indictable offence, is a proposition about which it is impossible to doubt; did the cause rest on this point alone, we would still be of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  