
    Haile vs. Lillie, by his next friend, &c.
    The admissions of an infant are competent evidence against him both in civil and criminal cases, where they relate to a matter for which the law holds him accountable.
    And where, in assumpsit by an infant for work and labor, he gives evidence tending to show a settlement between the defendant and himself, his admission that no settlement took place is competent evidence against him.
    Error to the Herkimer C. P., where Lillie, an infant, sued Haile in assumpsit for work, &c. On the trial, evidence was given on the part of the plaintiff below tending to show that a settlement had taken place between the parties; but the defendant insisted that no such settlement had ever been made, and offered to prove the admissions of the plaintiff to that effect. This evidence was objected to on the ground that, as the plaintiff was an infant, his confessions should not be received as evidence against him. The court sustained the objection, and the defendant excepted. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff 5 and, after judgment, the defendant sued out a writ of error.
    
      A. Taber,
    
    for the plaintiff in error, cited and commented on 1 Saund. Pl. & Ev. 50, and the cases there cited ; Mather v. Clark, (2 Aik. 209 ;) State v. Guild, (5 Halst. 163 ;) York’s case, (Foster, 70 ;) Bauerman v. Radenius, (7 T. R. 659 ;) Cowen Hill’s notes to Ph. Ev. 162, 232, 3, and the cases there cited.
    
    
      S. Stevens, for the defendant in error.
   By the Court, Nelson, Ch. J.

The only point in the case is, whether the admissions of the plaintiff, an infant, were admissible in evidence against him. There can be no doubt they were ; though the effect of such admissions may frequently be controlled by the infant’s incompetency to bind himself by contract. It is the daily practice to receive the confessions of infants in criminal proceedings, and in actions for wrongs committed by them for which they are personally responsible—as in actions of trespass, &c. The only privilege of an infant who has arrived at years of discretion, even in civil cases, is an exemption at common law from liability upon most of his contracts. Independently of this privilege he stands in court upon the footing of an adult.

Judgment reversed. 
      
       See M’Coon v. Smith, ante p. 147.
     