
    In the Matter of the Application of R. H. Macy & Co., Relator, to Compel the Granting of a Storekeeper’s License by The Board of Excise, Respondent.
    
      Excise Law ■— a door closed and locked, is still an ‘ ‘ entrance."
    
    A door merely closed and locked is still an " entrance ” witliin tlie moaning of the Excise Law (§ 43 of chap. 401 of the Laws of 1892, ns amended by chap. 480 of the Laws of 1893).
    Certiorari issued out of the Supreme Court and attested on the 27th day of February, 1896, directed to Joseph Murray and others, constituting the board of excise of the city of New York, commanding them to certify and return to the office of the clerk of the county of New York their proceedings in refusing to grant a license to the relator for the sale of strong and spirituous liquors.
    The facts in this case were the same as in the other case argued at the same time as this (ante, page 66), except that the relators had, at the time this application was made, closed and locked the entrance and door to their building on West Thirteenth street. There was an entrance also on Sixth avenue, only 172 feet distant from the entrance of the school on West Thirteenth street, and the respondents assigned an additional reason for refusing this application, that, considering the number of existing licensed places in the neighborhood for which the license was sought, they were satisfied that there was no public necessity or convenience to be served by granting such license.
    
      Daniel G. Thompson, for the relator.
    
      Julius M. Mayer, for the respondent.
   Williams, J.:

We think the license was properly refused upon this application for the first reason assigned, and which was considered in the other case argued with this. The views of the court are fully stated in the opinion in that case, and need not be repeated here The door was not walled or boarded up, but merely closed and locked. It was still an entrance within the statute as fairly construed. This writ should, therefore, be dismissed, with costs.

We have not regarded it as necessary to consider the other reasons assigned by the respondent for refusing the license, because this reason was sufficient, and the other reasons become unimportant in view of the fact that the law ceases to be in force beyond April 30, 1896, and, under the new law, these reasons will be unimportant. The reason we have considered may be important under that law.

Van Brunt, P. J., Barrett, Rumsey and Patterson, JJ., concurred.

Writ dismissed, with costs.  