
    Mingma Dorje SHERPA, Punam Shirpa, Dawa Lhamu Sherpa, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-2942-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 22, 2010.
    
      Khaghendra Gharti-Chhetry, Chhetry & Associates, P.C., New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Michelle Gorden Latour, Assistant Director; Trade N. Jones, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

The Petitioners, Mingma Dorje Sherpa and his daughter Dawa Lhamu Sherpa, both natives and citizens of Nepal, along with his wife, Punam Sherpa, a native of India and a citizen of Nepal, all seek review of a June 11, 2009, order of the BIA affirming the August 27, 2007, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Sandy K. Horn denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Sherpa, Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/700/701 (B.I.A. June 11, 2009), affg Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/700/701 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 27, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA decision, omitting the arguments for denying relief that were rejected by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). “We defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable factfinder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008); see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. In evaluating the Sherpas’ credibility, the IJ found that: (1) Mingma and Punam testified inconsistently regarding when and why they first sought to leave Nepal; and (2) Mingma testified inconsistently regarding the fate of a fellow co-worker who reported similar Maoist threats to the U.S. Embassy. In their brief, the Sher-pas acknowledge the inconsistencies in their testimony, but argue that they are too minor to support an adverse credibility determination. Contrary to the Sherpas’ argument, “an IJ may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’ establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii)) (emphasis in original); see Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260, 265 (BIA 2007). Moreover, although the Sherpas argue that they adequately explained their inconsistent testimony, a reasonable factfinder would not have been compelled to credit their explanations. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005).

Because the Sherpas’ claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief share the same factual predicate as their asylum claim, the IJ’s adverse credibility finding is fatal to those claims as well. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 
      
       Mingma Sherpa was the lead applicant, including his wife and daughter as derivative applicants on his asylum application.
     