
    Mary E. Warren, App’lt, v. The Phœnix Insurance Co., Resp’t.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,
    
    
      Filed July 22, 1892.)
    
    Insurance (fire)—Alteration—Removal oe goods.
    The policy in question was upon household furniture. Plaintiff moved to New Jersey and the goods were, there destroyed. Shortly before the loss plaintiff wrote to defendant's agents that she had moved without paying the premiums and if they would send the amount she would pay, which was done. Meld, that this was insufficient to put the fact before the agents that the insured property had been removed from the building in which it had been insured, and to create an alteration in the contract, and fhat the policy did not cover the loss.
    Appeal from judgment in favor of defendant.
    
      W. F. O'Neill, for app’lt; Wm. Vanamee, for resp’t.
   Barnard, P. J.

—The defendant issued a fire policy of insurance to the plaintiff in 1889 upon her household effects. At the time of the issuing of the policy these insured goods were in a house occupied by plaintiff in Middletown, Orange county, N. Y. The policy contained a clause that the insurance should continue while located as described in the policy and while contained in the frame dwelling No. 21 West street, Middletown. In August following the plaintiff moved to Deckertown, N. J., and on the 2d of September, 1890, the insured property was destroyed there by fire. The policy did not cover the loss by its terms. To show an alteration in the contract the plaintiff proved a letter from herself to defendant’s agents dated August 20, 1890, stating that she and her family had moved to Deckertown without paying the premiums, and that if the agents would send the amount due on the policy she would send it. This was done on August 20, 1890, and was paid by plaintiff a few days thereafter, amounting to $2.10. The notice was insufficient to put the fact before the agents that the insured property had been removed from the building in which it had been insured. It was nothing more than a request for the unpaid premiums. The evidence of the conversation with the agent Taylor was improperly received without proof of an agency which would authorize the agent to waive the contract as inade by the policy. No such proof was given. The policy required all waivers to be endorsed in writing by agents, and that no agent should be deemed to have power or to have waived a condition unless endorsed on the'policy. No waiver was endorsed in writing, and none exists according to the contract. Walsh v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 73 N. Y., 5; Marvin v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 85 id., 278.

The judgment should therefore be affirmed, with costs.

Dykman, J., concurs; Cullen, J., not sitting.  