
    Nevells vs. Sisson.
    On an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, an authentication of his transcript by the following certificate, held sufficient, though informal — “I, A. S. Hicks, justice, &c., do hereby certify that the above is a transcript of a judgment on my docket: this 8th day of October, 1848.”
    As to evidence in a suit for work and labor, &c.
    
      ~Writ of Error to Yell Circuit Court.
    
    In July, 1848, William C. Sisson sued George S. Nevells before a justice of the peace of Yell county, on an account as follows:
    “GEORGE S. NEVELLS,
    
      Nov. 1, 1847. To William C. Sisson, Dr.
    To 5 months work, per self, $10 per month, $ 50 00
    To 5 do do per wife, $8 3l£ do 42 50
    To cash laid out for family, 7 50
    $100 00
    Judgment for plaintiff before the justice for $53 68, and appeal by defendant to the Circuit Court. The justice of the peace authenticated the transcript of the proceedings had before him in. the case, sent up on appeal, by the following certificate: “ I, A. S. Hicks, an acting justice of the peace in and for the Township of Spring Creek, in Yell County, State of Arkansas, do hereby certify that the above is a transcript of a judgment on my docket: this 8th day of October, 1848.
    A. S. HICKS, J.P.”
    
      The" cause was determined in the Circuit Court, at the March term, 1849, before the Hon. William H. Feild, Judge.
    The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal for want of a sufficient certificate to the justice’s transcript, which the court overruled.
    The cause was then submitted to the court sitting as a jury, and finding and judgment for appellee for $40.
    Appellant moved for a new trial, which was refused, and he excepted, and set out the evidence, which is substantially as follows, viz:
    “In the fall of the year 1847, appellant and appellee, who are brothers-in-law, were about starting to South Carolina, to attend the distribution or settlement of an estate, in which both were interested. Appellant’s wife was then in bad health; expressed her unwillingness for both to leave, whilst she continued ill, and proposed to appellee to bring his family to her house and to remain with her until her husband (the appellant) could perform the journey. Appellee, whose family was then residing in Crawford co., assented to the proposition; and it was agreed between them that appellant should go to South Carolina, and attend to the business of both, and that appellee should move his family to appellant’s house and remain there until appellant returned. The time for appellant’s departure was fixed upon, and the ap-pellee was to be at his house on a certain day. The appellee failed to come with his family at the appointed time, and appellant hired one Taylor to remain on his farm to attend to gathering the crop, &c., during his absence from home'. Soon after appellant left for South Carolina, appellee came with his family to appellant’s house, and remained until appellant returned. About one.month after appellee left, his wife died; during the last illness of appellant’s wife, appellee and his wife were daily And nightly attending her bedside, and bestowed all the care and affection that could be expected of affectionate kinsfolk.
    Appellee attended to the gathering of appellant’s crop during his absence, and bestowed all his care and attention to his farm whilst he remained. The appellee executed a power of attorney, appointing appellant his attorney in fact, to attend to his business in South Carolina.
    Appellant left on the 1st November, and returned on the 27th February. Taylor, the man hired by appellant, left as soon as appellee came with his family. The appellee’s family consisted of his wife, two infant children, and a brother-in-law (a boy about 18 years old,) who worked on the farm during appellant’s absence, but who has sued appellant for his services. The services of the appellee and his wife were worth $15 or $20 per month. This is all the proof in the case.
    Appellant brought error.
    W. Walker, for the plaintiff.
    Jordan, contra.
   Mr. Chief Justice Johnson

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The certificate of the justice is not strictly technical, yet it is believed to be substantially sufficient for all the purposes of the law. The Circuit Court very properly refused the motion for a new trial. The facts, which, according to the bill of exceptions, were proved before the Circuit Court, were clearly sufficient to authorize the judgment. The case does not present the slightest conflict of evidence, but fully and conclusively establishes the amount of the finding and judgment against the plaintiff in error.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Yell county herein rendered is, therefore, in all things, affirmed.  