
    UNITED STATES of America v. Tyren ALI, Appellant.
    No. 12-2870.
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAE 34.1(a) Sept. 27, 2013.
    Filed: Sept. 30, 2013.
    
      Mark E. Coyne, Esq., Office of United States Attorney, Newark, NJ, Glenn J. Moramarco, Esq., Office of United States Attorney, Camden, NJ, for United States of America.
    Joseph R. Donahue, Esq., Brickfield & Donahue, River Edge, NJ, for Appellant.
    Before: AMBRO, FISHER and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Tyren Mi appeals the District Court’s judgment of sentence as substantively unreasonable. We will affirm.

I

In December 2011, Mi pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. The District Court conducted a sentencing hearing in June 2012. Because Mi had three prior drug distribution convictions, he qualified for career offender status under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B 1.1. Accordingly, his base offense level was 34. See USSG § 4Bl.l(b)(2). Mter a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see USSG § 3E1.1, the total offense level was 31. Combined with a criminal history category of VI, Mi’s advisory Guidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.

At the sentencing hearing, Mi did not dispute the Guidelines calculation or request a downward departure. Instead, he argued for a downward variance on the basis that the career offender Guideline was overly punitive when applied to him. Specifically, Mi argued that the relatively minor nature of his prior drug convictions made application of the career offender Guideline unjust and greater than necessary to meet sentencing objectives. He also noted that his conviction would have been subject to a ten-year maximum term of imprisonment if charges had been brought in state court and thus a sentence within the Guidelines range would create unwarranted sentencing disparities. Finally, Mi’s mother and fiancée testified to the positive role that Mi played in their lives and the life of his fiancée’s son. After considering these arguments and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the District Court determined that a within-Guidelines sentence was appropriate, and sentenced Mi to 204 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. Mi appealed.

II

On appeal, Mi argues that the Distinct Court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable. Our review is for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). “[W]e will affirm ... unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir.2009) (en banc).

Mthough the District Court acknowledged Mi’s arguments for a downward variance, it cited a number of reasons for its decision that a within-Guidelines sentence of 204 months’ imprisonment was appropriate. It noted that Mi’s long criminal history demonstrated that “even in the face of arrests and convictions and incarceration, [he] is not able to find another way of life.” App. 82. The Court detailed Ali’s numerous drug arrests and convictions, including two arrests for distribution offenses after he had been convicted and was awaiting sentencing on a third distribution charge. It also observed that in addition to the distribution convictions that provided the predicate for the application of the career offender Guideline, Ali had two convictions for possession offenses that did not qualify as predicates. Given this history and Ali’s apparent inability or unwillingness “to do anything with his life other than deal drugs,” App. 82, the District Court found that its sentence provided just punishment for this defendant and this crime, promoted respect for the law, and protected the public from future crimes. These considerations are not unreasonable.

Ill

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
      
      . The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Wehavejurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
     