
    Susan Hillis v. James Wylie.
    Where a witness acquainted with the reputation of another for truth and veracity, testifies that such reputation is bad, he may be allowed to further testify that from such reputation he would not believe the witness sought to be impeached under oath. The object of such testimony is not to introduce as evidence the opinion of the impeaching witness as to the truthfulness of the witness against whom he testifies, but to enable the jury to ascertain the true character of such reputation as the impeaching witness understands it, and thereby determine the extent to which it ought to discredit the witness.
    Motion for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the ■judgment of the District Court of Lucas county.
    On the trial of the original action in the Court of Common Pleas, the plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, ■testified to matters material to the issue. After the plaintifPs evidence was closed, the defendant called J. R. Thomp•son as a witness, who testified that he had the means of knowing the general reputation of the plaintiff' for truth and veracity, and that such reputation was bad. The defendant then asked the witness the following question, From your knowledge of her reputation for truth and veracity, would you believe her under oath ? To this question the plaintiff objected. The court overruled the objection, and the witness answered he would not. To this ruling of the court the plaintiff' excepted.
    The ruling of the Court of Common Pleas was affirmed by the District Court, and the plaintiff now assigns error in this court.
    
      Joshua R. Seney, with whom was E. D. Potter, for the motion,
    on the question of impeaching a witness, cited Knight v. Rouse, 29 Md. 199 ; Taylor on Ev., secs. 507, 510, 517; Bucklin v. The State, 20 Ohio, 18; King v. Wicks, 20 Ohio, 91; Eason v. Chapman, 21 111. 39; Phillips v. King-field, 19 Me. 379; Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 Serg. & R. 337; Tesse v. Huntingdon, 23 How. U. S. 2; State v. Randolph, 24 Conn. 363 ; Commonwealth v. Lawler, 12 Allen, 585; Willard v. Goodenough, 30 Vt. 396; Hayes v. Welles § Babbitt, 34 Md. 518; Carter v. Cavenaúgh, 1 G. Green (Iowa), 171; Eason v. Chapman, 21 111. 36; 1. P. § C. R. R. Co. v. Anthony, 43 Ind. 183; Webber v. Ilanke, 4 Mich. 198; Kimmel v. Kimmel, 3 Serg. & R. 336; Gass v. Stinson, 2 Sum. 610; Wood v. Mann, lb. 321; Greenleaf Ev., sec. 461; Swift’s Ev., 143; Ram on Pacts, 199; Taylor on Ev., sec. 1324; Craig v. State, 5 Ohio St. 605; Perkins v. Mobley, 4 Ohio St. 668.
    
      F. K. Hamilton and Dodge &¡ Raymond, contra:
    It was always the rule of the common law, as held in England, that the impeaching witness, after having shown, his knowledge of the reputation of the witness sought to be impeached, might be asked, if, from his knowledge of such reputation, he would believe the witness under oath. 1 Starkie on Evidence, 182; 2 Phillips km Evidence, 9 Am. Ed., 955, note 598 ; Taylor on Evidence, sec.-1324.
    This rule of the common law is believed to be maintained in every slate of the Union but two. It has been expressly decided to be sound in thirteen states, to-wit: New York—■ People v. Mather, 4 "Wend. 229; People v.'Davis, 21 Wend. 309. New Hampshire—Titus v. Ashe, 4 Poster, 319. Penn-* 
      sylvania—Bogle v. Kreitzer, 46 Penn. St. 488; Lyman v. Phila. 56 Penn. St. 488. Maryland—Knight v. House, 29 Md. 194. California—Stevans v. Irwin, 12 Cal. 306; People v. Tyler, 35 Cal. 553. Illinois—Fason v. Chapman, 21 111. 33. Wisconsin—Wilson v. State, 3 Wis. 798. Georgia— Stokes v. State, 18 Ga. 17. Tennessee—Ford v. Ford, 7 Humph. 92. Alabama—McCutchen v. McCutchen, 9 Port. 650. South Carolina—Anonymous, 1 Hill, 258. Kentucky—Mobley y. Hamit, A. K. Marsh. 590. Michigan— Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173; Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 118. Also, United States v. VanSickle, 2 McLean, 219
   By the Court.

It was held by this court in Craig v. The State, that in impeaching the credit-of a witness, the inquiry into his general reputation or character should be restricted to his reputation for truth and veracity. 5 Ohio St. 605.

The reputation of the witness for truth is a fact which reflects light on his credit. To detex-mine the extent of itsdisci-editing effect, it is matei’ial to know whether the reputation is such as goes to the entire or only partial discredit of the witness. To say that the reputation of the witness is bad, gives but imperfect information. Bad, is a relative-term, and the inquiry at once arises in the mind, how bad is it. Is his reputation so bad that he ought not to be believed under oath ?

Th ;• mode .of inquiry allowed is only a means of ascertaining what the reputation of the witness for truth really is.

The object of the testimony is not to introduce as evidence the opinion of the impeaching witness as to the truthfulness of the witness against whom he testifies, but to-enable the jury to ascertain the true character of his reputation for truth, as the impeaching witness understands it, and thereby enable them to determine the extent to which it ought to discredit the witness.

The question would be the same in effect, if the witness were asked if the reputation of the witness in question was-such as to go to his discredit when under oath.

We think the question was properly allowed.

It is true, Mr. Greenleaf, in his work on Evidence (vol. 1,. sec. 461), intimates the opinion that the weight of authority is now against the admission of such evidence. An examination of the authorities leads us to a different conclusion. The rule in England, as appears from the text-books, as well as from the recent decision in The Queen v. Brown (1 Law Rep. C. C. 70), is clearly in favor of admitting such evidence, and the current of decisions in this country is to-the same effect. Boyles Ex’rs v. Kreitzer, 46 Penn. St. 466; Knight v. House, 29 Md. 195; Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 184; Easton v. Chapman, 21 Ill. 33; Wilson v. The State, 3 Wis. 798; The United States v. Van Sickle, 2 McLean’s R. 219.

The practice in this state, also, has been to allow such questions.

Leave refused.  