
    Millbank vs. Penniman et al.
    
    1. A bill alleged, in brief, that “The Proprietors of the City of Brunswick” were the owners of certain lots, which were sold by the United States maVshal under a fi. fa., and purchased by complainant ; that the fi. fa. and deed were voluminous, covering from 75 to 100 pages of writing, and were not, therefore, copied as exhibits, but they were recorded in tho county of the litigation, in a certain book and pages specified, to which reference was prayed; and it was offered to tender the originals in court at such times and in such places as tho chancellor desired; that, prior- to the marshal’s sale, one Susan Armstrong had purchased from the Proprietors two lots named, under a forfeit contract; that she paid a small part of the purchase money, but incurred a forfeiture as to the balance before the purchase by complainant; that, owing to her age and poverty, she was permitted to remain in possession, first under tho Proprietors, and then under complainant, until her death; that one Armstrong, a non-resident, through one Penniman, of Glynn county, retained possession, claiming to be the heir of Susan Armstrong; that complainant brought ejectment against the tenant in possession; that Armstrong and Penniman have been receiving the rents and profits, and permitting the place to fall into bad repair, so that, upon a recovery in ejectment, the property wouldbedepreciatedin value, anda judgmentformesjieprofits ■ would be worthless, Armstrong-being non-resident, and both he and Penniman insolvent. The contract of Susan Armstrong and the reco'.dof the ejectment suit were exhibited to tho bill; the ■ prayer was for injunction, receiver, accounting for rents, etc.:
    
      Held 1st, that there is equity in the bill, and it prayed for appropriate relief; and in the absence of rebutting evidence, the injunction and receiver should have been granted. 56 Ga., 139.
    2. There was no want of certainty or fullness in the allegations and statements of the bill and its exhibits.
    
      (ís.) The reference and tender as to the voluminous levy and marshal’s deed was a substantial compliance with the fourth rule in equity. The case should not have been disposed of on demurrer until the excuse of the complaint for failing to exhibit this paper had been passed upon and adjudged insufficient, and an opportunity given for supplying it. 71 Ga., 298.
    3. There was no misjoinder of parties or causes of action; the defendants were joint wrong-doers; each one of them contributed to the wrong complained of; and it did not follow, even if the objection had been well founded, that the relief prayed should not be given against such of them as were properly joined.
    4. It being alleged that, after the temporary restraining order had been granted, and pending the application for injunction, the tenant in possession had vacated the premises and another had taken charge, an amendment, making him a party defendant, should have been allowed.
    5. There was jurisdiction of this bill in the county where the land lay on which the trespass was being committed.
    (a.) In such a case, the participants arc, in the eyes of the law, all principals, and the relief prayed against each and all is substantial.
    Judgment reversed.
    April 13, 1884
   Hall, Justice.  