
    TOWNSEND against PEYSER.
    
      New York Common Pleas;
    
    
      General Term, May, 1873.
    Referees’ Fees.—Special Agreement.
    A verbal agreement of counsel, made in presence of thp referee, is not sufficient to entitle the referee to a higher rate of fees than the statute rate, at least unless a memorandum of the agreement be made upon his minutes at the time.
    
    Randolph W. Townsend sued Sigmund M. Peyser and others for professional services.
    The cause was referred ; and after some sixty sessions the referee reported in favor of the plaintiff.
    On adjustment of costs the referee’s fees were allowed at five dollars a day, on the ground of an alleged agreement made between the parties to this effect, which, however, was contradicted.
    The plaintiff appealed from the judgment, in so far as it was in favor of one of the defendants. There was also an appeal from the order as to costs.
    
      A. R. Dyett, for plaintiffs, appellants.
    
      Charles Price, for defendant, respondent.
    
      
       See Brown v. Windmuller, post.
      
    
   By the Court.—Loew, J.

[After reviewing the evidence, and holding that judgment must be reversed because unsupported by evidence.]—In the absence of an agreement in writing, fixing a different compensation, a referee cannot lawfully claim more than three dollars for every day personally spent by him in the business of the reference (Code, § 313; Watson v. Gardner, MSS., Ct. of App.; Shultz v. Whitney, 9 Abb. Pr., 71).

In his affidavit the referee states that before the trial of the action was commenced before him, he informed the parties to it that his fees on the reference would be five dollars for every meeting of one hour, each adjournment to be considered a meeting, and that both parties consented and agreed thereto.

If such was the case, he should have procured their consent to said terms in writing, or at least made a memorandum thereof upon his minutes at the time, which, I think, would have been a sufficient compliance with the requirement of the Code (Philbin v. Patrick, 22 How. Pr., 1).

But it is not claimed that he did either ; and as the three plaintiffs, as well as Mr. Fallon, who acted as their counsel on the trial of this cause, positively swear that no agreement in reference to the compensation of the referee was ever made by them, or either of them, or with their knowledge or consent, the order appealed from should be reversed, and a readjustment of the referee’s fees ordered.

Daly, Ch. J., and J. F. Daly, J., concurred.  