
    Slocum against Taylor.
    A suit may be maintained on a bond con-an aw«rd of though the ayar<i.was tion instituted tiL°oftheUS' Peace>for an ¡seeding his judgv.-rsed on cer-
    In Error.
    ERROR to the Common Pleas of Luzerne county, in •' an action of debt on a bond in the penalty of five hundred dollars, conditioned for the performance of the award of bitrators on certain matters in dispute between the plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff in error, was plaintiff below, The declaration set forth the condition of the bond, averred that the arbitrators had made an award in favour of the plaintiff, for the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars, and assigned as a breach of the condition, that the defendant had not paid the sum awarded. The defendant pleaded, that the plaintiff and himself entered an amicable action fore a justice of the peace, which by the agreement of the parties, was referred to the arbitrators mentioned in the condition of, the said bond; that the said arbitrators made award, that he, the defendant, should pay to the plaintiff the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars, which award was returned to the said justice, who thereupon entered judgment for the plaintiff, for the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars aforesaid; and that the said judgment was removed by certiorari to the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne county, and reversed. To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the defendant joined in demurrer.
    In delivering the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas on the demurrer, the President observed, that “ The principle decided by the Supreme Court, in the case of M'Killip v. M‘Killip, 2 Serg. Razóle, 489, must govern this. That was an action of debt on a bond to recover two hundred and fifty-six dollars fifty-six cents, the amount of an award made by referees in an amicable action before a justice of the peace. It was there determined that the award was not good, either under the Act of Assembly, or at common law. It is true, this case may be distinguished from that, in several particulars. In that case, the award was for the defendant, no judgment had been rendered thereon, nor had the proceedings been quashed on certiorari. But according to the usual mode of reasoning, this case comes more clearly within the rule established than that. The Chief Justice in delivering the opinion of the Court, in illustration of his argument, to shew the propriety of the principle about to be settled, hypothetically puts this precise case, and then affirms, that the conclusion of law to be drawn from it, “ is too plain to admit of a doubt” Thus bound by the opinion of the Supreme Court, we direct judgment to be entered in this case upon the demurrer, in favour of the defendant.
    Mallory, for the plaintiff in error.
    This suit being debt upon an arbitration bond, the reversal of the judgment before the justice, on a certiorari, has no effect upon it. The case of M'Killip v. M'Killip, 2 Serg. & Rawle, 489, which was relied upon by the Court below in deciding this case, was essentially different. It was not a suit on an arbitration bond, but an action of debt on a bond con? ditioned for the payment of money, in which the defendant attempted to set up in bar, an award of referees in his favour, for more than one hundred dollars, made in an action instituted on the bond, before a justice of the peace. The award, being for an amount beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate, was held to be a nullity. But in the case under consideration, the plaintiff has a complete remedy at common law, without resorting to the proceedings before the justice. •The bond was conditioned for the performance of an award which the referees were authorised to make, independently of any authority derived from the justice, and on that bond, this suit is brought.
    Cunningham, for the defendant in error.
    All the proceedings between the parties were before a justice of the peace, and to these proceedings the bond had reference. The condition must be construed to bind the parties to abide a good award. But the award set forth in the declaration wras void, because it was not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal before which the suit was instituted ; for a justice of the peace cannot give judgment on an award of arbitrators, for more than one hundred dollars. M'Killip v. M'Killip, 2 Serg. & Rawle. 489. And the agreement of the parties cannot give jurisdiction, where it does not otherwise exist. The case just referred to, it must be confessed, seems to have been misapprehended by the Court below, who supposed the action to have been debt on a bond conditioned to perform an award. Nevertheless, the rule established by it, is strongly in favour of the defendant.
   Tilghman C. J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is very certain, that the justice had no authority to give judgment for one hundred and twenty-five dollars, because his jurisdiction was limited by law, to the sum of one hundred dollars. But this action is not brought on the judgment^ nor on the award, but on the arbitration bond which is altogether independent of the proceedings before the justice. The parties knew the extent of the justice’s jurisdiction, and therefore entered into a written obligation, on which there might be a remedy in case the arbitrators should award more than one hundred dollars, in favour of either of them. If the award had been for less than one hundred dollars, judgment might have been entered by the justice, and then there would have been no need to resort to the bond. But the award being for more than one hundred dollars, the plaintiff had a right to forsake the tribunal of the justice, and bring suit on his bond. The opinion of the President of the Court of Common Pleas is placed on the record, and it appears, that he was governed by the decision of this Court in M'Killip v. M'Killip, 2 Serg. & Rawle, 489. That cáse is not stated by the reporters with their usual clearness, and therefore the President seems to have misapprehended it. He supposes that it was an action of debt on an arbitration bond, brought to recover the sum of two hundred and fifty-six dollars fifty-six cents, which had been awarded to the defendants in a suit before a justice of the peace. But on an examination of the case, it will be found to have been otherwise. It was an action of debt on a bond conditioned for the payment of money. The plaintiff had brought a suit on it, before a justice, which was submitted to arbitration, and the arbitrators awarded the sum of two hundred and fifty-six dollars fifty-six cents, to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant. The justice could not give judgment on the award, because it exceeded his jurisdiction. The parties had entered into no arbitration bond, and therefore the plaintiff, considering award as void, brought an action on his bond in the Court of Common Pleas. The defendant pleaded the award . . . r . m bar, and the Court gave judgment m his favour. But that judgment was reversed ón a writ of error, by this Court, who were of opinion that the award was void, and therefore no bar to the plaintiff’s action. It is clear that the case before us is distinguishable from M'Killip v. M'Killip, in a very important and decisive particular. Here, the action is on the arbitration bond, which was entered into for the purpose of giving a remedy in case of an award on which the justice could not render a judgment. There, the parties trusted solely to the suit before the justice, and were protected from an award which should exceed his jurisdiction. The award therefore was a nullity. But to say, that it is void, in the present instance, would be to contradict the express intent of the parties, manifested by a written instrument not contrary to law. I am of opinion, therefore, that the defendant’s plea was not good, and judgment ought to have been given for the plaintiff on the demurrer.

The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is to be reversed; judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff on the demurrer and the record remitted to the Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment reversed.  