
    South v. Solomon and Others.
    Decided Oct. 24, 1817.
    i. Slaves — Statute—Application of. — The 2d section of the Act of 1792 concerning slaves, exten ds only to slaves brought into this commonwealth by the absolute owner of them, and not to such as are bro’t in by wrong- doers, or by persons having only alimited interest in them.
    2. Same — Same—Construction.—The Court will not give such a construction to the general words of an Act. as would subject the property of innocent individuals to loss by the acts of third persons; nor such as would favour a partial emancipation during the interest of a particular tenant of slaves.
    The question in this case, arising on a special verdict in a suit for freedom, was, whether the appellees, who were slaves unlawfully brought from North Carolina into this Commonwealth, and kept therein more than a year, by the appellant, who had in them a life estate only, were entitled to freedom under the 2d section of the Act of 1792; (edi. of 1794, 1803 and ’14, c. 103.) The County Court of Eussel decided against them; but the Superior Court of law reversed the judgment, and rendered one in their favour, from which, South, (the importer) appealed to this Court.
    Call for the appellant.
    The act of South, in bringing the slaves into the state, did not emancipate them, as he had only a life estate. He could forfeit his own interest, but not that of those entitled in remainder. The reasonable construction of the law is, that, if the owner brings them in, he shall forfeit, and they shall be free.
    Wm. Hay, Jr. for the appellees.
    The words of the Act are general; there is nothing to justify the Court in restricting its operation. If Mr. Call’s construction were permitted, every evil intended to be guarded against, would be let in. South was the proprietor sub modo, for he had a life estate.
    
      
       The principal case is cited in Sallust v. Ruth, 4 Rand. 71.
    
   The following opinion of the Court was delivered by

JUDGE ROANE.

*The Court is of opinion that the 2d section of the Act of 1792, ch. 103, only extends to cases of slaves brought in by the absolute owner of them, and not to such as are brought in by wrong doers, or by those having only a limited interest in them. We are not disposed to give a construction to the general words of an Act, which would subject the property of innocent individuals to loss by the acts of third persons: and as to a construction favouring a partial emancipation during the interest of a particular tenant, it will not be adopted by the Court, because, in addition to other reasons, it would produce the same result, to the injury of the rever-sioner or remainder man.

The construction adopted by the Court is justified by analogy to the Act of 1806, (R. Code, Edi. of 1808, p. 95,) the present law on the subject, which expressly provides that “all the right” of the person bringing in a slave shall be forfeited, and the slave be sold for the term for which he is owned by the importer. This sale, too, it is to be remarked, will not enable the slave to abscond, as a partial emancipation would, and thus enable him to defeat the interest of the person in remainder. .

On these grounds, the Court reverses the judgment of the District Court, and affirms that of the County Court.  