
    URIAH H. PAINTER vs. J. W. DRANE ET AL.
    In Equity —
    No. 3989.
    A master-builder agreed to erect two dwelling-houses and complete them in six months. The houses were not finished at the time agreed upon, and the owner notified the contractor that his contract was at an end, and he finished them himself,-and, for this purpose, he employed several of the defendants to furnish work and material,, and paid them. The owner paid a large amount to the original contractor and the subcontractors, and claims damages for the breach of contract. The contractor and various subcontractors have filed liens on the property and commenced actions to enforce such liens. Under these circumstances the owner can maintain a bill in equity, bringing all the parties into one suit, to enjoin the proceedings at law, and have all the claims settled in chancery.
    STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
    The bill of complaint states substantially as follows-:
    The plaintiff, on the 15th day of May, 1873, entered into a-contract in writing with the defendant, Drane, by which the-said Drane, in consideration of the sum of $19,118, agreed to erect, within six months from the signing of the contract, two brick dwelling-houses, to the entire satisfaction of the owner and architect, who was to have power to stop all work, when it should appear to him to be to the interest of the-owner so to do, on account of the weather or other cause.
    Drane failed to complete them within the specified time,, and the complainant, on the 20th of November, 1873, notified Drane that his contract'was at an end, and that he, the complainant, would finish the houses himself, to which Draneassented after some objections.
    The complainant then employed, among others, the defendants, Hannan, a plumber, Jackson, a plasterer, Nolan, a; worker in concrete, and Miller, a bricklayer,.to finish said! houses, expressly notifying each of them that he would not be responsible for work done or material furnished to said Drane prior to that date; and the complainant has paid each of the above-named persons, so employed by him, all that is due him. The defendant Veihmeyer furnished certain stone to said Drane before the 20th of November, 1873, to be used in said building. Said Drane claimed to have paid said Veihmeyer for all the stones to be used in the buildings.
    The plaintiff has paid Drane, on account of his contract, $9,200. To complete the houses after Drane gave up the work, he has paid Drane’s codefendants and other mechanics and materialmen, $8,879.76. By reason of Drane’s failure to have said houses completed at the time agreed, and the consequent delay in their being made ready for occupancy, the ■plaintiff sustained a loss greater than the difference between the contract-price of said houses and their actual cost, and for the excess said Drane is justly indebted to the plaintiff.
    The defendant Hannan, on the 30th of December, 1873, filed notice of lien against complainant for $1,408.45; and July 17, 1874, filed his bill in equity, No. 3840, for $744.25. Defendant Veihmeyer filed notice of lien January 31, 1874, for $667.62, and brought suit at law, No. 11901, for $660. On 2d of February, 1874, defendant French filed notice of lien, and commenced suit at law, No. 12054, for $193.20, February 23, 1874. Defendants Nolan and Miller have also filed notices of lien and brought suits at law, No 12245 and 3054; Nolan for $120 and Miller for $300. Defendants Draper & Co. have brought suit at law, No. 12115, for $217.30, and defendant Drane, suit No. 12,347, for $19,643.16. Defendant Jackson filed notice of lien, March 6, 1874, for $410. These defendants in their said suits pretend either that the plaintiff in this suit is personally responsible to them for work and material done for and furnished to said Drane, prior to November 20,1873, or that the work done and material furnished after that date, under special contract with said Drane, was furnished and done for the plaintiff. And the said Drane, in his said suit, claims, among other things, compensation for the identical labor and material included in the suits brought against the plaintiff by the subcontractors, who are made parties defendant thereto.
    The plaintiff prays for an account, an injunction against the several suits at law, and that the liens be declared void, &c.
    To this bill the defendant Veihmeyer demurred, and the court overruled the demurrer, with leave to said defendant to answer. From this decree the defendant Veihmeyer appealed.
    
      
      Edwin L. Stanton, for plaintiff, argued that:
    On the facts, it is clear that the settlement of the account between Painter and Drane necessarily involves the settlement of those between Painter and the subcontractors. Painter, of course, in his suit with Drane, is entitled to credit for the respective amounts which he has properly paid the several subcontractors, or which he is bound to pay them; and as there is a controversy between him and them as to the amount of these several payments or debts, the suit between Painter and Drane can never be settled until the final determination of each of the subcontractors’ suits. Again: If these numerous suits are allowed to go on, Veihmeyer, for instance, may, after a trial, recover judgment against the plaintiff for, say, the amount of his claim, $660. When the case of Drane vs. Painter shall be reached, Painter will.then claim a credit of $660, the amount paid Veihmeyer. But as Drane is not a party to the suit of Veihmeyer against Painter, he will not be bound by the judgment, and will, of course, require Painter to prove the credit, and the case of Veihmeyer will have to be tried over again. The same reasoning will apply to each of the subcontractors.
    But this is not all. At the trials of the subcontractors’ suit against Painter, the evidence may tend to show that Painter is bound to pay them only in case he was indebted to Drane on account of the houses when they were finished. Then, in each of these suits, in order to determine whether Painter owes Drane anything, it would be necessary to go over their account. The result in each suit might be different, and -Drane would not be bound by any of the judgments.
    That under such circumstances a court of equity ought to settle all the intermingled accounts in one suit is plain; for in no other way can justice be done. Story’s Eq. Plead., sec. 271a; Id., sec. 278a; Fitch vs. Creighton, 24 How., 163; The Attorney General vs. Corporation of Poole, 4 Mylne & Craig, 31.
    This is not a bill of interpleader. It is a bill for an account and to enjoin proceedings in other suits. The prayer for an order to interplead is collateral to the principal relief sought. This prayer may be struck out without detracting from the strength of the plaintiff’s claim to relief in equity. To such a bill the unjust rule that the plaintiff in a bill of interpleader must admit his indebtedness to some of the defendants does not apply. 2 Story’s Eq. Jur., 824.
    
      John C. Wilson, for defendant, argued:
    That the allegation upon which it is sought to enjoin the action at law, viz, that the appellant has sued the complainant for money which he never owed, and upon a contract which he never made, constitute, if true, a valid defense to such action at law, and no injunction can be granted under these circumstances. Fuller vs. Caldwell, 6 Allen, 503; New York vs. American, &c., 11 Paige, 384.
    2. As the same objections apply to the cases of the other defendants separately, their joinder with the appellant in the same suit cannot help the jurisdiction. The mere fact that a party is sued by several persons for different and distinct causes does not give him a right to enjoin the suits at law, and compel these independent defendants to litigate their claims together. No one of these defendants has any interest in the claim of any other, and their joinder renders the bill multifarious. Story’s Eq. Plead., sec. 530,538; Campbell vs. Mackey, 1 Mylne & Craig, 617; Carter vs. Treadwell, 3 Story, 48.
    3. The multiplicity of suits to prevent which equity will assume jurisdiction is a multiplicity of suits between the same parties, or parties having a common interest in reference to the same subject-matter, when the decision of one case requires the determination of all the questions involved in the others. Brinckerhoff vs. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch., 155.
    There is no common question involved in the suits of these different defendants. In each there is a distinct issue of fact, to be decided on the evidence applicable to that particular case. The decision of one case earn determine no question involved in any other. It would be necessary to hear each separately, without reference to any other, and the court would be obliged to do precisely what it professedly assumes jurisdiction to avoid — try a number of suits.
    It can avail complainant nothing to say that the bill is not 
      a, bill of interpleader, but a bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader. A court of equity protects one who is sued by two different parties for money which he admits to be due and is willing to pay to the party entitled to it, not because he calls his bill a bill of interpleader, but because it is unjust and inequitable that he should be required to defend two suits, or one suit in regard to a fund in which he has no interest. But where the party sued not only is not willing to pay what is claimed, but denies that he owes any part of it to either of the claimants, there is no injustice in leaving him to his legal remedy, until it can be ascertained whether or not he is indebted to one of their number; a question the decision of which can in no manner affect the right of the others. 2 Story’s Eq., secs. 821 and 824; Story’s Eq. Plead., sec. 297; Bedill vs. Hoffman, 2 Paige, 199; Lozier's Exr. vs. Van Saun's Admr., 2 Green’s Ch., 325.
   Mr. Justice Wylie

announced the decision of the court to the effect—

That the question raised by the demurrer to the bill was whether the equity court had jurisdiction to settle the whole controversy to one suit, instead of having as many actions as there are liens. The liens are upon the same property, and as regards that the parties have a common interest, and they look to the same security for the payment of their claims. This is not to be regarded as a bill of interpleader. But without going into an examination of the facts, or discussing the conflicting decisions upon the subject of multifariousness in pleading, we think that under the circumstances of this case it would be more convenient to unite their claims in one bill, and settle in a simple suit a litigation which, if conducted in separate actions, will prove a very complicated and expensive proceeding. Campbell vs. Mackay, 7 Sim. 564; S. C., 1 Mylne & Craig, 603; Story’s Eq. Plead., sec. 288a and note.

The decree overruling the demurrer is sustained.  