
    Roberts vs. Gibson’s Ex’r. et al.
    
    Appeal from chancery. The bill in this case was filed, on the 6th of September 18C4, in the name of Jacob Gibson, William Ml. Calrop, Nathan Harrington, and Benjamin Willmott, against the devisee and executor of Edward Roberts. On the death of Gibson, his executor was made one of the complainants. The facts were these: John Thomas was a candidate for the office of shei’ilF of Talbot county, at the election held on the first Monday of October 1-797. On the 08th of September 1797, preceding the election, 'Edward Roberts, (the father of the appellant,) and his wife, conveyed to John Thomas, a tract of laud called Farmer's Delight, with a view and intention, as acknowledged by Roberts, the grantor, to qualify Thomasp according to the’42d article of the constitution of this state,’ to hold, said office, in case he should be elected. Thomas failed, in the election, and Edwatd Cox,' having the greatest number of votes, was elected and commissioned as sheriff; but Thomas was returned as having tire next highest poll, to that of Cox. On the 29th of November 1797s Thomas reconveyed the land to Roberts, in consideration of ;S1000, (as .stated in the deed, and in the answer of the, ' defendant,).the possession of'the land having-been always lipid by Roberts from the time of his and his wife’s deed of conveyance to Thomas„ The deed from Thomas to Roberts was acknowledged before Jacob Gibson, the late complainant, as a justice of the peace, on the clay of its date, and was recorded on the Sth of January 1798. In July '1798, Cox died, and Thomas was commissioned as sheriff, and gave bond according to ¡aw, on the 12th of July 1798, with John Nabb and John Thomas, of Wye, as his securities, and acted as sheriff till his death, in February 1802, Omitting to give a bond for his performance for the year Í799, within the period prescribed by law, he gave such a bond, according to the provisions of a special act of assembly, on the 31st of December 1799, with William M. Catrop and Nathan Harrington as his securities. On the 2Pth of November 1799, he gave a bond for his performance of the office for the next succeeding year, (1800,) with Jacob Gibson and Benjamin Wilknott, his securities. The complainants state in their bill, that they entered into the se-. curiiyship by the bond, dated the 26th of November 1799, oo (he faith of the security, which they looked to in the land conveyed by Robertas, and wife, to Thomas, on the 28th of September 1797, and reconveycd by Thomas to Roberts on the 29th of November 1797; and they allege, that the deed from Thomas to Roberts, of the 29th of November 1797, is fraudulent, and that the property therein mentioned is liable for certain debts which they allege they have paid as securities of Thomas,
    
    
      The property qualification' •required by the 42d article of the constitution' of this state, was not intended as a' finid to secure the sheriff’s official creditors in addition to the bond required of him as she*» riff ‘
    Other clauses of the ’ constitution jpay be resorted to 5n aid of the eon atruction of that which may * be doúbtfti) or uncertain . ‘ ’ • ’ »* •
    ' Where the same language is' used in different clauses of the conititu' tion, upon the same- or, similar subjects, it ’must receive the same construction, unless some particu - lar reason to the contrary • can Tie signed.
    
      At in order to wake B -eligible as sheriff, in case he-should be elected, conveyed to him-certain lands, with an agreement that they should be reA conveyed, &c B was not elected, but was returned^ as having the next highest ntimber of
    votes to C.' who was commissioned sheriff. B reconveyed the lands to A, and C dying •within the time for which he was elected, B was commissioned as sheriff, according to the constitution for thé- residue of the term, and gave bond,-and busing become a defaulter, his sureties in his boiid became answerable, and paid considerable, sums of money for bun, and filed a hill against» A. alleging- that the deeds between A and B weie a fraud.upon the law, .and that the sukties, ns ere® diten-s of B, had a right to have the land sold for the - payment of their debt— Held, that although the transaction between A and B may be considered a fraud upon the slaw, it did not nectssaiily follow ’that every subsequent creditor of B could take advantage of it, that if B had refused to rcconvey the land to A the law never would have lent its aid to 4» who was particeps crin,im$f to obtain its restoration; nor would it enforce the performance of a contract made .in violation.oí its policy. But if a third person, a subsequent creditor, attempts to vacate the deed bfReconveyance on account of fraud against the public, he must show either that it was fraudulent against creditors gem rally under the statute ot 33 Eliz.ch, 5, or that it a deception ormisrepruen.iniion practised upon him, by which be was induced to become the creditor of £, and to consider the land a fund for his .security.
    This case is not embraced by the statute of 23 Elizabeth^ ch. 5.
    
    The sureties, having full knowledge oí the deeds, and no imposition or concealment having been practised upon them by .which .they were, fraudulently induced lo^ become the creditors of Bt ñRtltfc consider the lands as his property, and answerabjt? tor his debts, are not. entitled to relíela
    
      £ being dead, whether or not his heirs ought to have bees made parties^
    
      
      ' .Kilty, Chancellor, at February term 1811, the grounds of his decree, stated, “that with respect to the parties, he must consider those originally named as being still the complainants, notwithstanding the writing filed by .Nathan Harrington, and the deposition by Benjamin ffidmolt, inasmuch as they had not applied to the court to be struck out of the bill. As to the merits of the case, it is to be observed, that no suits on asimilar account has been brought in this state, and therefore this must be decided on principles of equity, without the aid of any express authority. He considers the conveyance from Roberts and wife, to Thomas, and the reconveyance from Thomas to Roberts, under the bond for that purpose, to have been made by collusion, and to have been fraudulent, as against subsequent creditors, or at least against those who became so on account of transactions relating to the ofhce of sheriff; and also as against the public or the state, the executive of which was bound to commission Thomas on the return of the judges, who judged of his property from the land conveyed by Roberts. And the statute of 13 Elizabeth, oh. 5, he considered as extending to duties as well as debts. If Thomas had retained the land so conveyed to him, it would have been liable for his debts, and his public creditors, to whom the complainants have been, made answerable, might have resorted to it. And the. chancellor is at present of opinion, that the. complainants were, on payment of such claims, entitled by substitution to stand-in the place of the original creditors; and that the land, must be followed in equity, and made liable to their- claims, the amount of which it is necessary to ascertain, in order,-to ground a decree for the payment thereof, dr a sale, of the, land for that purpose.”- He decreed, that the auditor state, an account. The account which the auditor stated was between Thomas and Gibson, making the former indebted to. the latter $5862 47. To this account objections were, made by the defendants, but they were overruled by the chancellor, who ratified and confirmed the auditor’s report, and decreed a sale of the land, unless, the defendants, should, by a particular day, bring into cou'-t, to be paid to the complainants, the sum of $5862 47, with interest, &c. From this decree E. Roberts, the devisee, appealed to this court.
    The cause was argued before Buchanan, Martin, andBor-sey, J.
    Wirt,'(Attorney General of U. S.) Magrudermé. Kerr, for the Appellant,
    contended, 1. That the deed from 77m-nias to Roberts of the 29th of November 1797, was bona fide, and valid, and not fraudulent, and that the complain pants had no .lien, either legal or equitable, affecting the Ipnd conveyed by it.
    2. That Jacob Gibson, one of the complainants, having had full notice of the conveyance of the 29th of Is'o vein-Per 1797, before be entered into his suretyship, was not deceived or defrauded thereby, and was. not entitled to any relief against that deed.
    3. Th.at the proper parties had not been maife, either as complainants or defendants.
    
      4. That Gibson’s own acknowledgments and declara*1’ iions, as contained in the record, that he would gain by his suretyship, were a bar to his recovery.
    They argued, 1. That the allegations in the bill, and the proof, did not correspond, and referred to Clarke vs. Turton, 11 Ves. 240. Whaley vs. Norton, 1 Vern. 483. Cooper’s Plead. 7, 14, 16. Hayward vs. Carroll, in this court, at June term 1819.
    2. That the 42d article of the constitution did not contémplate that the property qualification, required by that article as necessary for the sheriff to make him eligible as such, should be bound to all creditors, and be a fund to answer for all his defaults, and all demands upon him as sheriff, in addition to the bond required of him. It meant that there should ’ be á bond with sureties, given by the sheriff, before he could act as Such, which bond was iff answer for all defaults by, and demands against the sheriff. The 5th article of the declaration of rights shows' the spirit with which the framers of the constitution were actuated as to property qualifications of persons elected to office, and having a right to vote. It was not intended afc a fund for the payment of debts, hist to narrow down the number of persons to be sclectefl for office, and as’ having a light to vote; and shows that it was to restrain the popular will. They referred to the 2d, 15th, 21st, 37th, and 30th articles of the constitution.
    
    3. To show that, this case was not affected by, and did not come within the statute of 13 Elizabeth, ch. 5, they referred to 1 Fonbl. 26, (note k.) Doe vs. Routledge, Comp. 705. Russell vs. Hammond, 1 Atk. 13. Walker vs. Burrows, Ibid 93, 94. Newl. on Coni. 376, 377, 384, 386. Townshend vs. Windhaw, 2 Ves. 10. Shaw vs. Standish, 2 Vern. 327. White vs. Sansum, 3 Atk. 412. Twyne’s Case, 3 Coke, 80. Nun vs. Wilsmore, 8 T. R. 530. Meux vs. Howell, 4 East, 13; and Lush vs. Wilkenson, 5 Ves. 387. That the allegation, that the public is defrauded, and through the public, the creditors,' and through the creditors, the sureties of the sheriff, had no foundation. This court cannot be called upon by a private individual to redress the wrong done to the community; and Gibsori cannot stand in the place of the public. Relief .is never granted where both parties are equally guilty of a breach of the law. Lowry vs. Bour 
      dieu, 2 Doug. 468. 1 Pow. on Cont. 201. 2 Pow. on Cont. 149. These cases will explain the reason of the decision in Jackinen vs. Mitchell. Gibson was hot a creditor of the sheriff within the constitution. He voluntarily became surety, and did not; as a creditor, trust tlie sheriff; and not being a creditor, he cannotbe relieved. He cannot be placed by substitution in. tlie place of the creditors. 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 203, 252, 255. 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 142. 2 Fonbl. 299, 301, 302. Jackson vs. Ham, 15 Johns. Rep. 261. If the constitution was violated) it was not for the complainants to .bomplain; but if it was, their remedy was at law-and not in equity. Vernon vs. Keys, 12 East, 638. Clifford vs. Brooke, 13 Ves. 132. It must appear that thepárty claiming was deceived and defrauded, and. thereby sustained ati injury. The bill should state that the complainants were deceived, and while under that deception became sureties;
    
      4. There were material and necessary persons who should be parties. The heirs of Thomas should be parties if the deed was null and void. Rob. on Fraud. Convey. 591, 592, 596, 598, 602. Hollins vs. Barney, in this courts at June term 1816.
    
      5. A nían defráuded with notice, if such a thing could be, can have no relief. Cowen vs. Simpson, 1 Esp. Rep. 290. 2 Esp. Dig. 365. Grant vs. Naylor, 4 Cranch, 236. Persons claiming by substitution must come into court with fclean hands. This contest is áolely between Gibson and Roberts, and Gibson, having knowledge of the fraud, has no right to claim contribution or substitution. Cheesbrough vs. Millard, 1 Johns. Chan. Rep. 409. Stevens vs. Cooper, Ibid 425. Gill vs. Lyon, Ibid 447.
    
    
      6: The act of 1809, ch. 198, repealing tlie property qualification for appointments to .office, all rights before acquired aré repealed, the right and remedy thereby ceased, and there is an end of this case. Yeaton vs. The United States, 5 Cranch, 281. The Schooner Rachel vs. The United States, 6 Cranch, 329.
    
      7. The chancellor ha! decreed in favour of oné of the complainants only,- ánd has said nothing with feSpéct to the others.
    
      T. B. Dorsey, (Attorney General,) and Taney, for the Appellees,
    stated,-that it would riot be contended that this ease came within; the statute of 13 Elizabeth, ch 5. That %he variance between the bill and the proof was of no ’in'portancc, as the complainants might resort to ‘hé general statement in their bill, and if enough appeared to entitle 'them to relief, they might obtain it. Cooper’s Plead. 7.
    
    1. It appears by the facts that the fraud commenced with Roberts$ and whether the 42d Article of the Constitution was founded, in policy or not, it roust be carried into effect. The object of the constitution was, that the sheriff should bona fide possess, when elected, real and personal property of the value'of at least £1000. His not being so possessed bona fide of real and personal property to that "amount, biit possessed of property not bona fide, but belonging to another, was a fraud against which the court Vould grant relief. They cited Huguenin vs. Basely, 14 Ves. 273. Eastabrook vs. Scott, 3 Ves. 456. Mawson vs. Stock, 6 Ves. 300. The real and personal property of the sheriff, as well as his bontl> aré answerable for the faithful performance of the duties of his office. Hatcheson vs. Tilden & Bordley, 4 Harr. & M‘Hen. 279. Conveyances in fraud of the law are relieved against. 1 Madd. Chan. 240, 242. Birch vs. Blagrave, Ambl. 266. The principle of the law in respect to fraud, is the same with respect to the public, aá in relation to individuals. Evans vs. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 182, 192. Sadler & Jackson, Ex parte, 15 Ves. 53, 53. Curtis vs. Perry, 6 Ves. 747. Jackman vs. Mitchell, 13 Ves. 581. Where a party enables another to commit a fraud, he is answerable for the consequences. 1 Madd. Chan. 205, 256. Where both parties intend a fraud, and one is not so culpable as the 'other, relief will be apportioned according to the degree ■of their criminally. Austin vs. Winston, 1 Hen. & Munf. 33. No matter, therefore, if Gibson was a parly to the fraud, he will be relieved. Birch vs. Blagrave, Ambl. 264. As between Roberts and Thomas the deeds are valid, but as respects the public they are void. Bedford vs. Coke, 2 Ves. 116.
    2. There was no evidence that Gibson had knowledge of the fraud, although it might be admitted that he had. Sureties paying debts are to be substituted in the place of creditors. Ex parte, Rushforth, 10 Ves. 414, 422. Wright vs. Morley, 11 Ves. 22. Parsons vs. Breddock, 2 Vern. 608. Miller vs. Ord, 2 Binney’s Rep. 382. West vs. Belches, 5 Munf. 187. Brengle vs. Creager, 5 Harr. & 
      Johns, 234. Ghiselin & Worthington vs. Ferguson, in this court at June term, 1819;
    3. That the proper parties have been made, they referred to Lee vs. Rook, Mos. 318, cited in 2 Brid. Index, 460, pl. 5.
    4. That as it respected the parties to the Contract, it was válid, and was only void as to creditors; 3 Bac. Ab. tit. Fraud. Cooper's Plead. 34.
    5. If the decree was erroneous in awarding the whole-bum to only ope of the complainants, this court was competent to correct it in that particular, and say how the inoney was to bé appropriated.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Martin,. J.

.Many points of minor importance word Presented to the court iti the argument of this case, Which tinder different circumstances ought to be duly considered* but as our 'opinion is formed upon the law ¿rising upon the pretended,merits of the case, as disclosed by the evidence, it is riot necessary to take them-into consideration. Although the bill of complaint purports to represent the interest of fouf complainants, three of that number, Catrop, Harrington and Plilmot, expressly disclaim all knowledge of tlié proceedings; that' they were instituted without their consent, and have been prosecuted without their participation; arid indéed it is evident to the most superficial observer, that although their names have been used, rib attention has been paid to their interest. It appears from the evidence, that both Catrop arid Harrington had paid ntofiey on account Of tliéir suretyship for Thomas, yet the aiiditor, in his report, takes ho notice of their claimss He ascertains the amount due to Gibson alone, and seems tó cbrisider him ¿s thé solé complainant in the cause. Thé transaction is represented .by the evidence Very different from the statement iri the bill; indeed thé variancé in detail is SO great as tb make it entirely another case. The bill states a joint cause of action, arising iiptin one bond, signed by ail the complainants! the evidericé is, that there were two bonds, the one by Catrop and Harrington, as securities, the other by Gibson and Wilmot, and given to Secure the faithful performance of the duties of the office for different years. Tlié bill represents the bond to have been executed prior to the reconveyance do Roberts; the testimony proves it to have been nearly two-years afterwards; and to close the climax, the bill declares an entire ignorance, on the part of the complainants, of the views and intention of- Thomas and Roberts, wbqn tlm land was conveyed to Thomas; and the testimony shows, that Gibson knew all, and was perfectly well acquainted with the transaction. The case' presents an anomaly in judicial proceedings, and the court would-not hesitate to dismiss the bill, as containing a case totally different from the testimony in the record. Let us, for 'a moment, inquire, if Gibson stands on firmer ground upon the case a,s, disclosed by the evidence?

In the fall of 1797, Edward Cox and John Thomas were candidates for the office of sheriff for Talbot county % The election took place on the first Monday in October, when Cox had a majority of votes, and was elected sheriff, and was duly commissioned and qualified as such, and; continued to act in the office until the following summer, when he died. Thomas, having the next highest number of votes to Cox, was on the return with him, and after hia. death was commissioned as sheriff for Talbot county. On, the 12th of July 1798, he entered-into an official bond as sheriff, with John Nabb and John Thomas, {pi Wye,) as, his securities. On the 31st day of December 1799, he entered into a second bond with’’ William M. Catrop and Nathan Harrington as securities; and on the 26th day of November 1799, into a third bond, for the due performance of his. office, with Jacob Gibson and Benjamin, Wilmothis securities, Thomas, not being possessed of real and personal property sufficient to make him eligible, as sheriff under the’constitution, Edward Roberts, and his . wife, on the 28th of- September 1797, conveyed to him a tract of land called Farmer's Delight, in order thereby to qualify him for the office, and took from Thomas a bond for the reconveyance of the same.. No money consideration was paid by Thomas, for this land, but it was agreed between him and Roberts, if- Thomas kept the land he. was to pay Roberts one thousand pounds for it. Thomas having failed to be the first on the return at the election, on the 29th day of November 1797, reconveyed the said, land to Roberts, his wife, Henrietta Thomas, being a party grantor in the deed, which was acknowledged before JacobGtibson and James Nabb, justices of the peace, and’ re forded in due time. Gibson, at the, time this acknowledge • ment was taken, explained to Mrs. Thomas the object of) t,he deed, that it was to reconvey certain land that had, been conveyed to Thomas by Roberts to make him eligible as sheriff. ’Thomas, when the land was conveyed to'him, and also when' it, was reconveyed to Roberts, was free from and unincumbered by debt, but died some time in the year 1802, insolvent. ‘ Gibson paid considerable sums, of money as the security of Thomas, on account of his, official misconduct, and filed this bill to have a sale of the land called Farmer's Delight, considering it a fund answerable for Thomas's official debts.

The first question presented for the consideration of-this court, is, the true construction of the forty- second article of the constitution of this state, whether the property qualification required by that article was intended as a. fund to secure the sheriff’s official creditors, in addition to the bond Required of him as sheriff? By that article it is declared, “tljat no person shall be eligible to the office-, of sheriff for a county, but an inhabitant of said county,, above th.e age, of twenty-one years, and having real and personal property in the state above the value of one thousand pounds current money. That bond, with security, be, taken every year as usual, aqd no sheriff shall be qualified-to act, before the same is given.’’, IjVere we left to this, article alone, to infer the intention of the convention in passing it, much difficulty might, arise upon it, although even here, they point out the security they intend to provide for the safety of official creditors, that no act shall fije done as slier iff until that bond be given which is directed for their, protection. But we are not confined to, this article alone, to ascertain their intention. We are to take, the'whole instrument together, and collect, their views front; its general context, and inay call other clauses of the constitution to aid us in the construction of that which" may. be doubtful or uncertain. If this were the only property qualification required by, the constitution, a reference to, other parts for instruction might be hopeless. But that is pot the case. It has required the same kind of qualifications from avariety of. persons, on whom it meant to confer a privilege or bestow an office. It is a rule in. the construction of statutes, and a fortiori, of the constitution, where, the same language is used, in different clause^. of an instrument, upon tlie same or similar subjects, it shall receive the same construction, unless some particular, reason can be assigned to take it out of the general rule, 3?y the second section of the constitution, a property qualification of fifty acres of land, or thirty pounds in money, is required of every person who shall vote for a delegate, to the general assembly, and that the person elected shall have real or personal property above the value of five hundred pounds current money! By the fifteenth article, a senator must have real and personal property above the value of one thousand pounds current money. By the twenty-first article, a member of the council must possess a freehold of lands and tenements above the value of one. thousand pounds. By the twenty-seventh article, a member of congress is required to have real and personal estate, above the value of one thousand pounds; and by the thirtieth article, the governor must have in the state real and personal property above the value of five thousand pounds current money, one thousand pounds whereof at feast to be of freehold estate. For what purpose was the property qualification required in the cases just enumerated? Was it intended as a fund far the security of credi-, tors? The counsel for the appellees have not contended for so wild a proposition. It was to confine the privileges, or offices bestowed, to those who had at least some property at stake in the community, and from which a certain degree of respectability and standing in society might be presumed. Since, then, the same language is used in those articles of the constitution, requiring a property qualification of the governor, members of the council, &c, with that of the forty-second relative to the sheriff', and it is conceded, that in the first cases it was not intended as a fund to secure creditors, it is fair to give all the same construction, unless some reason can be assigned to show the convention did not so intend it. Tp?® counsel for the appellees have attempted to draw a distinction between those clauses, from the peculiar nature of the duties of the sheriff; that as he was an officer into whose hands much of the public money must be placed, it is to be inferred, the property qualification wás required of him for a different purpose than of the other cases mentioned in the constitution. In examining that instrument, nothing is to he found to justify that position- It affords,strong evidence to the co.utrary. Can it be supposed- that the convention should deem a property qualification necessary, as a fund to secure the' creditors' of the sheriff, because public money may be placed in his hands, and yet that no such qualification should be required of the treasurer, who is the great depositary of the public wealth? Yet we find a treasurer is to be appointed by the legislature, and no property, qualification,is required of him.'

If the property qualification was intended as a fund to secure the sheriff’s official creditors, the constitution would, have given them a specific lien upon it; that, like the sheriff’s bond, it shquld be reserved for their benefit, in exclusion to all other creditors; for otherwise it would be useless and nugatory. Yet, it has been admitted, that is not its legal effect; that the official creditors have no lien upon it, and that it is answerable for his private debts, before he performs one official act. He can’ make a bond, fide, transfer of all his property, the day after he is com-,, missioned, and his official creditors have no claim upon it.. If he has one thousand pounds of real and personal property in the state, he is eligible as sheriff, although at the, time’ of his election there may be judgment creditors, against him who have a lien upon his "property, and for whose use it may be sold, to ten times the amount of that sum. How then can it he considered as a fund for the, peculiar benefit pf official creditors, unless it is presumed that the collected wisdom of the state, the framers of the Constitution, when they intended to give them this security, did not know how to carry it into effect?. The creditors of the sheriff, as such, having no lien upon this pro-*, jperty, and that it may be appropriated in many ways, in exclusion of their interest, is strong evidence, in addition, to that afforded by the constitution itself, that it was not intended as a fund for their security, but that the convention had different views, perhaps those before mentioned,, in requiring a property qualification.

It has been contended, that although the property qualification was not intended as a fund to secure the creditors of the sheriff,; yet the deeds between Roberts and Thomas were a fraud upon the law, and Gibson, as, a creditor of Thomas, has a right to have the land sold for the payment, qf his debt. Admit the position to he correct, that this, transaction may be considered a fraud upon the law, i$ does-not necessarily follow that every subsequent creditor ■of Thomas can take advantage of it. If Thomas had refused to reconvey this land to Roberts, the law never would have lent its aid to Roberts, who was particepi 'criminis, to obtain its restoration; it would not enforce the performance of a contract made in violation of its policy; but if a third person; a subsequent creditor, attempts to vacate the deed of re-conveyance on account of the fraud against the public, he must show, either that it was fraudulently against creditors generally tinder the statute of 13 jEliz. eh. 5, or that it was a deception; of misrepresentation, practised upon him, by which he was induced to be5come the creditor of Thomas, and to consider the land b fund for his security.

It would be superfluous to make any remarks on the ope-5 fation of the statute of Elizabeth, for although it is consi>* derecl byr the chancellor as a strong ground to support his decree, it has been disclaimed and abandoned by the counsel for the appellees; they have admitted this case is not embraced by the statute, and therefore it is unnecessary to assign the reason's why the court concur with them in that concession.

Does this record then afford any evidence to show Gibson was in a predicament to complain of the fraud against the law? Was he an innocent creditor, deceived and defrauded by a secret agreement between the parties, of which he had no knowledge, and against which he could not guard himself? YVas any imposition or concealment practised Upon him, by which he was fraudulently induced to become the creditor of Thomas, and to consider this land as his property, and answerable for his debts? So far from it, it appears he was conversant with the whole transaction for more than two years before he became the .security of Thomas; he had a perfect knowledge of the views of the parties from the commencement to the completion of the business. He tells Mrs Thomas the deed to her husband was intended to make him eligible as sheriff; yet he claims relief in his bill, because he did not, know, at the time he entered into the bond with Thomas, there was a secret agreement between the parties.

But is Gibson himself untainted with the fraud against the public, of which he now, so loudly complains? Is he. rectus in curia} and entitled to relief in á court of equity? The degree of moral and legal gfiUt, between Him wild caramelices, and. he who aids, in' thé consummation of á fraud against the públíc, knowing one is intended, is so ■slight; ¿s tó be almost impércéptiblév 5Tis true it does lioi appear that Gilson was a party to the original fraud; biit did he not; with á knowledge of that fraud, lend his aid to the parties to consummate it, arid practice it upon the public? By the constitution Thomas could not have been elected sheriff without possessing property to thé value of one •thousand pounds, arid to make hirii eligible; Roberts conveyed to him this land; this was a fraud upon thé policy of the law. But had it stopped here, the fraud could have, produced no injurious effect, no creditor could have suffered by it; because Thomas could do no act as sheriff, until he gave a bond; with security, for thé faithful performance of iris ófficé; Gibson knéw the fraud had been contemplated, and partly executed-. lie knew it could producé no teffect without a bend and security, arid yet; with'a full knowledge of All the facts; he becomes tlie security in the bond, and thereby enables the party to practice the fraud ripori the public; He was a volunteer with notice, and does not come into a court of equity with cleári hands, when he claims relief against á fraudulent transaction, which could have produced no injury, without his aid to carry it into- effect.

The court think the decree of the chancellor is erroneous and ought to be reversed; .

DECREE REVERSED.  