
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel MORIN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 17-10110 Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Filed December 18, 2017
    James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Kevin Joel Page, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Daniel Morin pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and was sentenced to 70 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He argues that the district court plainly erred in determining that his Texas aggravated robbery conviction is a crime of violence for purposes of imposing the base offense level in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). He argues that Texas robbery is not a crime of violence because it lacks the requisite element of the use of force. However, he concedes that this court has already held that Texas robbery is a crime of violence because it meets the generic definition of the enumerated crime-of-violence offense of robbery, and he raises his argument to preserve it for further review.

Morin’s argument is foreclosed by United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d 376, 380-81 (5th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541, 547-63 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc), in which we held that robbery in violation of Texas Penal Code § 29,02 meets the generic definition of the enumerated crime-of-violence offense of robbery. See also United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 493 Fed.Appx. 557, 558 (5th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, the Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir, R. 47.5.4.
     