
    RAGLAND v. MILAM, Adm’r.
    1. When parties stand on a note in the relation of princidal and surety, the mere fact that both signed the note for the accommodation of a third person, whose name also appears as a surety, will not repel the presumption created by the form of the paper; nor does it vary the case that the nominal principal, at the request of the surety, procured a written aclmoiv-legment from the other surety that he was tho party hound to pay the note.
    Writ of Error to the Orphans’ Court of Talladega.
    Ragland was appointed by the court, in the first instance, as administrator of J. W. Milam, deceased, but afterwards resigned, whereupon J. J. Milam was appointed administrator de bonis non. In the settlement of Ragland’s administration he claimed to retain a sum of money paid under these circumstances, to .wit: Some six or 'seven years previous to the settlement, one William King, (since dead,) came to Rag-land and desired him to go surety on a note to be made payable to the Branch Bank at Huntsville. At the time of this request King had no note with him — Ragland, King, and the deceased Milam resided in the same neighborhood — Ragland told King he was unwilling to go his surety — King asked him if he was afraid to go surety for the deceased Milam— Ragland said he was not afraid — Ragland then understood the object of the note was to raise.money for King’s accommodation — Milam was not present, and King left Ragland, but in a short time returned with a note payable to said bank signed by Milam, as principal, and by King as surety — Rag-land then signed the note as surety — Ragland understood King obtained the money on the note and used it, as well as that the note was made for his accommodation, but he refused, as above stated, to be surety for him — Milam was not present when Ragland signed the note — not long after the note was made, and after King obtained the money thereon, Milam, at the instance of Ragland, took an instrument from King, showing that the note was made for King’s accommo-modation, and was really the party bound to pay it. This note was sued on by the bank, and the judgment obtained thereon was paid by Ragland. Under this state of proof, the court considered Ragland and Milam as joint sureties for King, and refused to allow but one half of the sum paid, as a charge against the estate of Milam.
    The decision on this item is the only matter insisted on in this court as error.
    
      W. P. Chilton, for the plaintiff in error,
    argued—
    1. That the administrator of Milam was estopped by the note, from asserting his intestate was a surety. [Lowry v. Stewart, 8 Ala. Rep. 163 ; Spence v. Bailey, 8 lb. 681.]
    2. But if parol evidence is admissible to show the relation of the parties different from that shown in the note, then it is clear that Ragland was the surety of Milam, whatever Mi-lam’s relation was to King. [Martin v. Baldwin, 7 Ala. Rep. 923; Miller v. Stewart, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 26 ; Harris v. Warren, 13 Wend. 400 ; Blake v. Cole, 22 Pick. 31.]
    F. W. Bowdon and S. F. Rice, contra,
    argued—
    1. The conclusion, from the facts stated, is that Milam and Ragland as between themselves, were joint sureties for King. [Pollard v. Stanton, 6 Ala. Rep. 461; Grafton Bank v. Kent, 4 N. H. 221; 3 Wend. 399; Douglass v. Waddle, 1 Ohio, 191; Beaman v. Blanchard, 4 Wend. 432.]
    2. But if this is not the conclusion from the facts occurring at the time, the circumstance that Ragland acted on such assumption, by causing Milam to procure the declaration from King, that the latter was principal, is evincive of his consent that both should be considered sureties. [Sherrod v. Rhodes, 5 Ala. Rep. 683; Pickering v. Marsh, 7 N. H. 192; 10 Ye-sey, 160.]
   GOLDTHWAITE, J.

The previous decisions of this court háve established the principle, that parties to notes, &c, as between themselves, are permitted to show that different relations exist than is disclosed by the paper itself. [Sherrod v. Rhodes, 6 Ala. Rep. 683; Pollard v. Stanton, Ib. 461.] And the only question here is, whether the facts disclosed constitute, the relation of joint sureties, between Milam and Ragland. From the face of the paper, it is evident the primp, facie intendment is, that the former was the principal in the note, but it is equally so from the extrinsic facts, that it was made solely for the accommodation of King. The disclosure that it was thus made, does not induce the conclusion that the other parties signing the note, intended to become bound between themselves, as joint sureties, as the presumption arising out of the circumstance of the paper being solely for the accommodation of King, is no stronger than when the same fact is disclosed in relation to bills or notes, indorsed by several persons, and with respect to which we have held the liability to be as indicated by the security itself, until the agreement of the parties to be otherwise liable, as be-' tween themselves is made to appear. [Sherrod v. Rhodes, 5 Ala. Rep. 683, and cases there cited.] We must then examine the evidence to ascertain if there is any thing disclosed from which such an agreement can be inferred. The only circumstance relied on is, that Ragland, after the note was made, induced Milam to procure from King a written declaration that the latter was bound as principal. The writing itself is not produced, nor have we the means before us of knowing what admissions of a joint liability were then made by Ragland, if indeed there were any. This circumstance, standing alone, is not sufficient, in our judgment, to outweigh the intendments which must -be drawn from the face of the note, and the declaration of Ragland to King, that he would not stand as his surety,-but would do so for Milam. The cases of Warner v. Price, 3 Wend. 390, and Pickering v. Marsh, 7 N. H. 192, chiefly relied on by the counsel for the defendant in error, do not seem to us to warrant the conclusion, either that Ragland intended to be bound as a joint surety with Milam, or that this relation is to be inferred from his subsequent conduct. In the first of these citations, the contract was obviously one of joint suretyship, and in the other the attempt was to charge an individual as principal, when the evidence made it entirely clear, the plaintiff entered in the transaction as surety for other parties merely, and had so admitted by sueing them, and using the evidence óf the one standing as the nominal principal upon the face of the paper.

Upon the case as shown, we think it clear that Milam was chargeable to Ragland, as the principal debtor, and consequently the latter had the right to retain the whole sum paid on the judgment, out of the assets of the estate of Milam in his hands as administrator. ■ It is scarcely necessary to add, that the court erred in allowing him only one half of that sum.

Reversed and remanded.  