
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT,
    COLUMBIA,
    APRIL, 1805.
    Ordinary of Orangeburgh District v. Geiger and Wife, and others.
    Slaves given to the wife of an intestate (before marriage) by deed, though they never came into the actnal possession of the husband during the coverture, were considered as vesting in possession, and not in interest only, by the marriage: and upon this ground it was held, that upon his death, they ought to have been mentioned in the inventory of his estate, by his administrator.
    This was an action on a bond given with a condition, well and truly to administer the estate of Jacob Geiger, deceased, and was tried before Wilds, J. in Orangeburgh district. The defendants set out the condilion, and pleaded performance. Plaintiff replied, and stated a breach in not returning a true inventory. The case, as it turned out in evidence, was this: The mother of Dorothy, the defendant Geiger’s wife, while sole, made and executed a deed of gift of certain negroes, to her four children, jointly. After-wards, Dorothy intermarried with Jacob Geiger, the intestate, hex ■former husband. Upon this event, one of the negroes, given as aforesaid, was sent with her, upon her going to live apart from her mother, and remained with her ever since. No regular partition, however, was ever made of the property between the donees. After the death of Jacob Geiger, who died intestate, the defendants administered on his estate, and in the inventory of his estate returned to the ordinary, made no mention of the negroes given as aforesaid.
    Winns, J. charged the jury,
    that this omission was a.breach of the condition of the administrador! bond, and the jury found for the plaintiff. The motion in this court was for a new trial, for a misdirection of the judge on that point.
    Egan, for the defendants,
    argued, tolls viribus, that the aped of gift conveyed no right of possession to the donees, but only a chose in action, and that no properly vested absolutely by virtue thereof, in Dorothy, while she was covert of her first husband, and consequently, that none could vest in her said first husband ; and therefore, that his representatives were not intitled to take any notice in the inventory of his estate, of the said negroes ; and that the interest of Dorothy therein, was only a chose in action, which survived to her. Cited Hyn< s v. Executors of Luis, Taylor’s Rep. 44. Blount v. Bestland, 5 Ves. Jun. 515. See 2 Hayw. 183,184.
    Stark, contra,
    
    was stopped by the court.
   The court

(Grimke, Waties, Bay, and Brevard, Justices)

were all clear, that a right of possession vested instantly upon the execution of the deed of gift, and that Dorothy was intitled to the property given as a joint-tenant; and (herefore, that upon her intermarriage with Jacob Geiger, the pioperty, and right of possession which she had, vested in Jacob Geiger, and became part of his personal estate, and ought to have been returned as such in the inventory : and that the direction given to the jury, by the district court, was right.

A new trial was consequently refused.

Note In general, a gift is accompanied with the immediate delivery of possession ; but it is not always done, nor is it necessary. It requires some slight evidence of a delivery, in the case of a parol gift, see 2 Str 955, but not where there is written evidence of the gift, for there a delivery must be presumed. Where a merchant beyond sea consigns goods to a merchant in London, on account of the latter, and. draws bills on him for such goods, although the money is not paid, yet the property of the goods vests in the merchant in London, who is credited for them, and they become liable to his debts. 2 Wooddes. 430. 3 P. Wms. 413. The marriage is an absolute gift of the wife’s chattels personal in her own right, Co. Lit, 351. Co. Lit. 46. If chattels are given to a with, the interest vests in the husband, although he has not possession of them before the death of the wife. 2 Com. Dig. 82, 84. ¡see the next following case.

Qumrc. Whether it would have varied this case, if it had been proved that the right of the donees to the negroes given was disputed, and that the possession ^em was withheld 1 For any thing that appeared, the possession passed to the donees; and the po. session of one, was the possession of all the joint-tenants. But qucere, did the undivided part of Dorothy vest 'n possession of her husband by the marriage ? .f the possession was vested in her, it is to be considered as vesting in her husband by the marriage. In the ease of Speight v. Meigs, see below, the distributory share of tho wife was considered as vesting only ill interest and not in possession. This circumstance distinguishes that case from this. If it vested in possession m Dorothy, it vested ill possession, constructively, in the husband, Co. Lit. 351. 2 Bl Com. 397. 2 Com. Dig 84. 2 Hayw. 184, 185. 1 H. Bl. 535. Plowd. 10, 85, 86, 32, 87, 89, 53.  