
    Fronefield, Appellant, v. Fry.
    
      Affidavit of defense — Action for money loaned — Case for jury-~-Act of April 18, 1874, P. L. 64.
    
    1. In an action by an executor for money loaned by tbe testator to the defendant, an affidavit of defense is sufficient which denies that the money was loaned at the special instance and request of the defendant, and avers that the testator proffered it to the defendant knowing him to be in need of money, that the kindness was accepted, that the defendant gave to testator a valuable ring as security, and that the money was thereafter fully repaid and the ring restored to the defendant.
    2. The Act of April 18, 1874, P. L. 64, authorizing an appeal from an order refusing judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense is applicable to clear cases only. It was not intended to impose on the appellate court the duty of drawing fine distinctions, and to reach conclusions by subtle process of reason. The purpose of filing the affidavit is to prevent summary judgment, and where its terms set forth to reasonable understanding, the matters which if true, would constitute a defense, it is sufficient.
    Argued Dec. 7, 1911.
    Appeal, No. 155, Oct. T., 1911, by plaintiff, from order of C. P. Delaware Co., March T., 1911, No. 4, discharging rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense in case of W. Roger Fronefield, Executor of the last Will and Testament of William L. Mathues, deceased, v. Edward S. Fry.
    Before Rice, P. J., Henderson, Morrison, Orlady, Beaver and Porter, JJ.
    Affirmed.
    Assumpsit for money loaned.
    The affidavit of defense was as follows:
    1. He denies that on October 29, 1907, the said William L. Mathues loaned to the said defendant, at his special instance and request, the sum of $500, but he avers that upon one occasion the said William L. Mathues did proffer him $500 or thereabout, knowing this defendant to be in need of money. At the time this kindness was accepted and this defendant forced the said William L. Mathues, much against his will, to accept as security for the same a diamond ring, the value of which was $600.
    2. The defendant further avers that the said debt upon a day, the exact date of which he is uncertain, but during the month of May, 1908, was fully paid and discharged by this defendant to the said William L. Mathues, who thereupon returned to this defendant the said security which since that time, and still is in the possession of this defendant.
    3. This defendant therefore avers that he is in no way indebted to William L. Mathues, or his estate, that he has positive proof of the discharge of the said debt, that he will be fully able to prove his allegations upon the trial of the cause, and he asks to be allowed his day in court.
    
      Error assigned was order dismissing rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.
    
      Albert J. Williams, for appellant.
    
      Hiram Hathaway, Jr., for appellee.
    October 14, 1912:
   Opinion bt

Henderson, J.,

The Act of April 18,1874, P. L. 74, authorizing an appeal from an order of the court of common pleas refusing judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense is applicable to clear cases only. It was not intended to impose on the appellate court the duty of drawing fine distinctions and to reach conclusions by subtle processes of reasoning. An affidavit of defense should set forth facts sufficient to make out a good defense prima facie. The purpose of filing it is to prevent summary judgment, and where its terms set forth to reasonable understanding matters which if true would constitute a defense it is sufficient. Criticism should not be so rigorous as to make the preparation of an affidavit of defense difficult on a sufficient state of facts. The specific denial of the material averments of the declaration is sufficient though it be open to criticism in some respects. We agree with, the learned judge of the court below that this was not a case for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. The averment of payment with the return of the pledge given by the defendant raises a prima facie defense on which the case should go to the jury where the facts may be developed and the merits of the controversy determined.

The order is affirmed.  