
    Williams v. The State of Ohio.
    
      False representation as to value — Will sustain conviction — For obtaining money by false pretense, when — Whether representation is opinion or statement — Question for jury.
    
    1. When one makes a representation of value as an existing fact, knowing it to be false and intending it to influence another to part with money or property and the other party relying upon such representation is thereby induced to part with money or property to the one making the false representation of value, such facts are sufficient to sustain a conviction for obtaining money or property by false pretense. .
    2. Whether the representation of value is intended to be merely an expression of opinion or whether it was made as a statement of an existing fact which the speaker intends to be an inducement to the other party and which -he knows to be false, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
    (No. 10779
    Decided February 11, 1908.)
    Error to the Circuit Court of Montgomery county.
    The plaintiff in error was indicted for obtaining money and property by certain false pretenses, to-wit: that certain real estate situate in Benton township, Pike county, being one hundred and ten acres in quantity, was then and there of the value of $11,000, and that one Martha M. Williams, then and there believing said representation of value to be true, and relying and acting upon that belief, was induced to and did purchase from the plaintiff in error, the said real estate, and accepted his deed therefor, and gave to him and one Neal Overholser in payment therefor, money and property to the amount and value of $7,700, whereas, in iact, the said real estate was not then and there of the value of $11,000, and was of the value not to exceed three dollars per acre, that is, $330 in all; and that the plaintiff in error then and there knew that the value of said real estate did not exceed the sum of $330, and knew at the time he so falsely represented the value of said real estate that the same was false. To this indictment the plaintiff in error filed a motion to quash and also a demurrer, which were both overruled; and the case coming on for trial, at the close of the evidence introduced by the state, a motion was made by the defendant to instruct the jury to return a verdict of acquittal, which was overruled; and the court thereupon charged the jury, among other things, as follows: “But where the buyer relies entirely upon the representations of the seller and the seller knows that ■the properety he is describing is of such, small value as to be practically worthless, and nevertheless represents it to be worth a specified sum of great amount, and the discrepancy between the real and the represented value is so enormous as to shock the conscience; when the representation is so grossly untrue that it could not be made upon any possible foundation of belief; and when it appears that the seller was plainly seeking by means of such statement to obtain the property of the buyer and practically return no equivalent therefor, the court takes the responsibility of saying to you that you have the right, if your judgment of evidence so convinces you, to regard such representations as one of fact rather than mere opinion.” The jury found the defendant guilty and judgment was rendered accordingly, which judgment was affirmed by the circuit court, and this proceeding in error is to reverse that judgment.
    
      Mr. E. Thompson and Mr. Charles H. Kumler, for plaintiff in error,
    cited and commented upon the following authorities: Dillingham v. State, 5 Ohio St., 280; Smith v. Patterson, 33 Ohio St., 70; State v. Webb, 26 Ia., 262; People v. Gibbs, 98 Cal., 661; State v. Paul, 69 Maine, 215; Commonwealth v. Wood, 142 Mass., 459; Leigh & Caves’ Crown Cases, 425; Bates v. State, 124 Wis., 612.
    
      Mr. Robert R. Nevin, prosecuting attorney; Mr. E. G. Denlinger and Mr. Harry N. Routzohn, assistants, for defendant in error,
    cited and commented upon the following authorities: State v. Paul, 69 Me., 215; State v. Webb, 26 Ia., 262; Wharton on Criminal Law, Section 2102; Bishop on Criminal Law, Vol. 2, Section 454; Commonwealth v. Stone, 4 Metc., 43; People v. Jordan, 66 Cal., 10; Savings Bank Co. v. Miller et al., 14 C. D., 198; Simar et al. v. Canaday, 53 N. Y., 298; Dillingham v. State, 5 Ohio St., 280; Smith v. Patterson, 33 Ohio St., 70; State v. Thaden, 43 Minn., 325; Hughes on Criminal Law, Section 604; Underhill on Criminal Law, Section 414; Commonwealth v. Wallace, 114 Pa. St., 405; Hochheimer’s Criminal Law, 354; People v. Bryant, 119 Cal., 598.
   Davis, J.

A statement of value may be given either as an opinion or as a statement of fact. All the authorities agree that if a statement of value is given as an opinion merely it cannot be regarded as a foundation for an indictment. But if the statement is made as an existing fact, when the accused knows it to be false and intends it to be an inducement to the other party, and it is so understood and relied upon by the other party, then it becomes a false representation of a material fact for which the party making the representation is indictable. Whether the representation of value is intended as an expression of opinion, or whether it was made as a statement of an existing fact which the speaker intends to be an inducement to the other party, is therefore a material question of fact to be determined by the jury.

There is no novelty in this view of the law. In Reg v. Evans, 8 Cox, C. C., 257, it was said by Pollock, C. B.: “As my brother, Crowder, J., has suggested, if the prisoner had represented the note to be of the value of £5 when she knew it was not of that value, she might have been guilty of false pretenses.” In People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y., 576, 591, the court say: “It is insisted that many of the representations to the complainant and her husband, which induced the making and delivery of her deed, were expressions of opinion, and although false and known to be so, no liability resulted. As a general rule, the mere expression of an opinion, which is understood to be only an opinion, does not render a person expressing it liable for fraud. But, where the statements are as to value or quality, and are made by a person knowing them to be untrue, with an intent to deceive and mislead the one to whom they are .made, and he is thus induced to forbear making inquiries which he otherwise would, -that may amount to an affirmation of fact rendering him liable therefor. In such a case, whether a representation is an expression of an opinion or an affirmation of a fact is a question for the jury. The rule that no one is liable for an expression of an opinion is applicable only when the opinion stands by itself as a distinct thing. If it is given in bad faith, with knowledge of it untruthfulness, to defraud others, the person making it is liable, especially when it is as to a fact affecting quality or value and is peculiarly within the knowledge of the person making it. (Watson v. People, 87 N. Y., 561; Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y., 298; Hickey v. Morrell, 102 N. Y., 454, 463; Schumacher v. Mather, 133 N. Y., 390, 595.)” The same view of the question is presented in Holton v. State, 109 Ga., 127, 130; and also in People v. Jordan, 66 Cal., 10, 13, 14.

Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y., 298, was a civil action for damages for an alleged fraud in inducing the plaintiffs to convey certain premises. The court, at page 306, said: “The defendant contends that the representations alleged to have been made by the defendant were not such as to afford a ground for an action. It is first insisted that the statements as to the value of the lands and of the mortgages thereon were mere matter of opinion and belief, and that no action could be maintained upon them if false. If they were such, no liability is created by the utterance of them; but all statements as to the value of property sold are not such. They may be, under certain circumstances, affirmation of fact. When known to the utterer to be untrue, if made with the intention of misleading the vendee, if he does rely upon them and is misled to his injury, they avoid the contract. (Stebbins v. Eddy, 4 Mason, 414-423.) And where they are fraudulently .made of particulars in relation to the estate which the vendee has not equal means of knowing, and where he is induced to forbear inquiries which he would otherwise have made, and damage ensues, the party guilty of the fraud should be liable for the damage sustained. (Medbury v. Watson, 6 Metc., 246, per Hubbard, J.; and see McClellan v. Scott, 24 Wis., 81.)” More recently the cases of Coulter v. Minion, 139 Mich., 200, and Scott v. Burnight, 131 Ia., 507, are to the same effect.

These considerations determine every question raised upon the record and therefore the judgment of the circuit court is

Affirmed.

Price, Crew, Summers and Spear, JJ., concur.  