
    *Elijah Teague, vs. Reuben Griffin.
    The declaration, for a tort should describe the property or thing affected with as much certainty as will enable the defendant to see clearly and distinctly to what he is to answer ; and when that purpose is attained, the object of description will he fully answered.
    In an action of trover for a negro slave, the name is not an indispensable part of the description, ut semble; and after verdict, the omission cannot be made a ground in arrest of judgment.
    When a father, on the marriage of his daughter, permits property to go into her possession, and remain a considerable time, it is sufficient evidence of a gift, 
    
    Tried before Mr. Justice Johnson, at Newberry, October Term, 1819.
    This was an action of trover, brought to recover the value of a female slave. She was described in the declaration as a certain female slave, called and known by the name of --■.
    The evidence in support of the action was, that the plaintiff had married tlie defendant’s daughter, and that, shortly after the marriage, and about the time the plaintiff had settled on his own plantation, the negro-in question was permitted to go into his possession, where she remained about a year, and was generally regarded as the property of the plaintiff; and that at the end of that period the plaintiff being on a visit to the defendant, when about to go away, the plaintiff asked him if the negro was to return with him, to which lie answered, “ 1 reckon not.’’ Plaintiff replied, “ it is as you please and he went off and left her there.
    A witness on the part of the defendant stated that, in a subsequent conversation with the plaintiff, he stated that the negro first went into his possession on the application of the defendant’s wife to him, to know whether the plain-tiif and his wife might carry the negro home with them ; to which the defendant replied, that “ she (his wife) might do as she pleased,” without stating whether it was to be considered as a gift or a loan, and that, under these circumstances, he, the plaintiff, pretended no claim to her.
    ■*941 *The case went to the jury under a charge from the Oourt, on the law J arising in the case, leaving the facts entirely to them; and they found a verdict for the plaintiff, for the value of the negro.
    A motion was now made in arrest of judgment on the ground:
    That the negro was not described in the declaration with sufficient certainty.
    And for a new trial, on the ground :
    That possession alone was the only proof of property in the plaintiff; and the presumption arising therefrom, was rebutted by the circumstances of the case, and his own acknowledgments that he had no claim to her.
    
      
       See ante, Baker v. Avant, vol. 1, 218 ; Banks v. Hatton, Ib. 221; Brashears v. Blassingame, Ib. 223; Davis v. Davis, Ib. 225 ; Reid v. Colcock, Ib. 592. R.
    
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Johnson, J.

The ground taken in arrest of judgment, involves two considerations:

1. Whether the declaration does not describe the negro with sufficient certainty ?
2. If it does not, whether it is not cured by the verdict ?

Every declaration for a tort should describe the property or thing affected with as much certainty as will enable the defendant to see clearly and distinctly for what he is to answer, and when that purpose is answered, the object of description is fully attained. Vide 1 Chit. Plead. 362. In this case, it is objected that the name was omitted. The name, it is true, furnishes one fact, pointing to the identity of the negro ; but that, itself, does not render it certain, for there may be another of the same name, and a description might possibly have been given, which would have pointed at her with more certainty; for instance, her size, age, sex, complexion, marks, parents, &c. It would therefore appear, that the name was not an indispensable part of the description ; but>I think it ought not to have been omitted where it was known ; and it was evidently the intention to insert it here. I am *well satisfied, however, that the -J objection comes too late, after a verdict.

There was no objection made at the trial of the cause, in the Court below, for the want of certainty in the description; and the cause was tried on the merits. The object of certainty was therefore attained, and the defendant comes too late now to complain. See 1 Chitty, 401, where it is laid down, that a defect, imperfection, or omission in the description of the property or thing-, is cured by a verdict. In short, that the Court will presume almost any thing after a verdict.

The motion for a new trial depends upon the evidence; and it would, be a sufficient answer to it, that as there was evidence on both sides, even admitting that it preponderated on the side of the defendant, this Court would not interfere with the province of the jury, by disturbing their verdict. But in this State, permitting personal property to go into the possession of a daughter on her marriage, and to remain there a considerable length of time, has long been regarded as sufficient evidence of a gift ; Bay, 232; and I think with great propriety. Where a parent is able, it is not only usual, but very natural, to make some provision- for their daughters on their marriage; and when this provision is inconsiderable, I venture to affirm, that in ninety-nine cases out of an hundred, that the only evidence that could be furnished of a gift, is the possession of the property. The very delicate relationship which subsists between the father-in-law and the son-in-law, is a complete barrier to the latter’s making any demand upon him, as to the precise terms on which property is put into his possession ; and it is notorious that these things are usually negotiated through the mother, who ascertains the will of the father in relation to it. But when this delicacy is gotten over, they never think of calling in witnesses to attest the gift, when each feels himself secure in the confidence and friendship of the other To oppose this evidence, which we deem satisfactory, are the declarations of the plaintiff. These the jury might have *discredited, p*,,,, although the character of the witness was not assailed by proof; L or they had a right to presume, that they were made when the defendant was ignorant of the right which had vested in him by the delivery to him and his possession, and, in either view, they ought not to have been permitted to defeat his interest, if, indeed, he had any.

O'Neal, for the motion. Stark, Solicitor, contra.

The motion, I think, ought to be discharged.

Coloook, Nott and G-antt, JJ., concurred. 
      
       5 Rich. 473.
     
      
       5 Rich. 532.
     
      
       9 Rich. 73; 7 Rich. 62; 6 Rich. 282 ; 4 Rich. 173; 10 Rich. 332; 5 Strob 462 ; 4 McC. 228; Rice, 73.
     