
    Travis WOODS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ONEIDA COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 13-2727-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 24, 2014.
    David Ferleger, Jenkintown, PA, for Appellants.
    Bartle Gorman, Gorman, Waszkiewicz, Gorman & Schmitt, Utica, NY, for Appel-lees.
    Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges, VALERIE CAPRONI, District Judge.
    
      
       The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend case caption as above.
    
    
      
       Judge Valerie Caproni, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-appellant Travis Woods appeals from the June 14, 2013 order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Hurd, J.), denying plaintiff-appellant’s motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court erred in using a special verdict form for plaintiffs claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act that did not specifically ask the jury whether defendant provided plaintiff with a “reasonable accommodation.” We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

“To preserve for appeal any objection to the form or substance of questions on a special verdict form, a party must object before the jury has retired to deliberate.” Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 340 (2d Cir.2011). Woods failed to raise his present objection to the special verdict sheet prior to submission of this case to the jury. Therefore his objection is unpre-served. Both parties agree as much. However, the parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of review for such unpreserved objections. Plaintiff argues that we should review for “plain error,” while defendant contends that our review should assess only whether the district court committed “fundamental error.” The difference in standards is of no moment here, as plaintiffs challenge fails regardless of whether we apply “plain error” or “fundamental error” review.

In assessing the appropriateness of special verdict questions, “we must read challenged questions ‘in conjunction with the judge’s charge to the jury.’ ” Cash, 654 F.3d at 340 (quoting Shah v. Pan Am. World Servs., Inc., 148 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir.1998)). Athough the special verdict sheet here contains no mention of “reasonable accommodation,” the jury instructions do explain that a “reasonable accommodation” may have been necessary to ensure “safe and appropriate transportation” for the disabled plaintiff. The district court instructed the jury that “[t]he ADA and the Rehabilitation Act impose an obligation on the County to reasonably accommodate disabled persons to ensure safe and appropriate post-arrest transportation.” The district court further instructed the jury to “weigh all of the evidence and use your common sense and experiences to determine whether the County reasonably accommodated plaintiffs disability in order to ensure him safe and appropriate transportation.”

Because of these instructions as well as the “strong presumption that the jury in reaching its verdict complied with [the court’s] instructions,” Bingham v. Zolt, 66 F.3d 553, 563 (2d Cir.1995), we cannot conclude that the district court committed either “plain error” or “fundamental error” by failing to use the specific phrase “reasonable accommodation” in the special verdict sheet. Viewed in the full context of the jury instructions, the omission from the special verdict sheet was not “plain error,” as it was not “[a]n error that ‘deprive^] the jury of adequate legal guidance to reach a rational decision’ on [the] case’s fundamental issue.” Rasanen v. Doe, 723 F.3d 325, 334-35 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d 33, 62 (2d Cir.2002)). Nor do the jury instructions and special verdict form, when taken as a whole, constitute “fundamental error,” that is, an error “so serious and flagrant that it goes to the very integrity of the trial.” Shade v. Hous. Auth. of City of New Haven, 251 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We have found fundamental error where the jury instructions were ‘hopelessly confusing and ... failfed] to provide even the barest legal guideposts to aid the jury in rationally reaching a decision.’ ” SCS Commc’ns, Inc. v. Herrick Co., 360 F.3d 329, 343 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Frederic P. Wiedersum Assocs. v. Nat’l Homes Constr. Corp., 540 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.1976)). While the special verdict form here could have been clearer and the accompanying jury instructions could have been more concise, taken together, these documents provided the jury with sufficient guidance to rationally reach a decision.

Viewing the special verdict sheet in the context of the jury charge, the district court committed neither “fundamental error” nor “plain error” in using a verdict sheet that failed to specifically ask the jury whether defendant provided plaintiff with a “reasonable accommodation.” We have considered the remainder of plaintiffs arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.  