
    In the Matter of the Estate of Hiram M. Forrester, Dec’d.
    
      (Supreme Court, Generad Term, First Department,
    
    
      Filed December 29, 1890.)
    
    Collateral inheritance tax — Exemption—Methodist Episcopal Church Home.
    The original charter of the Methodist Episcopal Church Home contains no provision in relation to taxation, hut the amendment of 1878, chap. 81, which gave it greater property rights, exempted it from taxation on its real estate. Held, that this clearly excluded the personal property from exemption, and, therefore, a bequest to it was not exempt under the collateral inheritance act.
    
      Appeal of the Methodist Episcopal Church Home of the city of New York, one of the legatees named in the last will and testament of Hiram M. Forrester, deceased, from an order of the surrogate of this county fixing the tax on the legacies bequeathed to it.
    
      W. F. Mac Rae, for app’lt; J. H. Maynard, deputy att’y-gen’l, for Theodore Myers, comptroller, resp’t.
   Barrett, J.

The question presented by this appeal is whether the appellant is exempt from taxation under what is known as the collateral tax act, Laws of 1885, chap. 483, as amended by Laws of 1887, chap. 713, upon the legacy bequeathed to it by Hiram M. Forrester, deceased. Section 1 of these acts make an exception in favor of corporations now exempted by law from taxation,” and the appellant claims that it comes within this exception. Under the Revised Statutes an alms-house is exempt from taxation generally, and the appellant’s institution probably comes within this term, as defined by the court of appeals in the case of the Colored Orphans' Association v. The Mayor, 104 N. Y., 581; 6 N. Y. State Rep., 477.

It certainly is performing a work of pure charity. Ho fee is charged for admission, the inmates are supported gratuitously, and all the property of the corporation is appropriated solely to the use of the poor. H the case stood upon the Revised Statutes alone, there would be little difficulty in sustaining the appellant’s position. But, under its act of incorporation, the appellant is only exempted from taxation upon its real estate. It was originally incorporated under chap. 225 of the Laws of 1851. In this act nothing was said about taxation, but the property which the corporation might acquire was limited to $50,000 worth of real estate, and to personal property bringing in an annual income of not more than $10,000. This act was amended in 1878 (chap. 81) and greater rights with regard to the acquisition of property were conferred upon the corporation. By this latter act it was permitted to acquire by purchase, or by bequest or devise, real and personal estate, the annual income from which should not exceed $50,000. This addition to the privileges originally granted was, however, coupled with a provision exempting from taxation the real estate of the corporation. We think that this special statute, prescribing as it did a rule for this particular corporation, takes the case out of the operation of the general exemption coiitained in the Revised Statutes. It will be observed that the legislature originally said nothing upon this subject, but left the corporation free to avail itself, if an almshouse, of the existing general law exempting personal as well as real property. It was only upon the grant of additional privileges that taxation was referred to, and then the exemption was limited to real estate. This clearly excluded personal property from such exemption. If it had been intended to include personal as well as real property, it would have been easy to say so. Indeed, it would only have been necessary to say nothing at all upon the subject Considering the existence of the general law, which was before the legislature when the act of 1878 was- passed, the insertion in the latter act of the exemption of real estate was idle, unless intended as a special rule applicable in future to this corporation.

This view of the case accords with the rule of construction laid down in Exccelsior Petroleum Co. v. Lacey, 63 N. Y., 426. There, Folger, J., speaking for the court, observed that “ where the legislature has once provided a special rule for a particular case, a general statute thereafter enacted, though broad enough in its terms to.be applicable to the case, will not, from that- fact alone, alter the special rule. It is still more reasonable,” he added, “that where there has been a general enactment covering the subject in general, in terms which include the particular case, and there is a subsequent enactment which makes a 'rule for that particular case, that the latter shall, be held to be all that the legislature, at least, meant for the regulation of that case.” This doctrine is conclusive of this case. Taxation is the rule, and one claiming exemption must find plain warrant for it in the law. Doubtful language will not suffice. We think, therefore, that the personal property of the appellant is not now exempted by law from taxation and, consequently, that it is liable to the tax upon the legacies in question.

The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

Van Brunt, P. J., and Bartlett, J., concur.  