
    * Samuel Russell versus The New England Marine Insurance Company.
    If a policy of insurance be effected in the name of A, as agent for B, this latter cannot maintain an action upon the policy, to recover a loss for the use of C, whom he declares alone interested in the property insured.
    This action was brought'upon a policy of insurance made by the defendants upon the schooner Argo and her cargo. The declaration alleges that the policy, being effected in the name of one Israel Munson as agent for the plaintiff, was in fact for the use and benefit of Frederick Eoarts and others, who alone, by the averments in the declaration, appear to have had an interest in the property insured, and that in fact the said policy was effected by the plaintiff at the request of the said Eoarts and others, who, however, are not named in the policy, as a party thereto, or as interested.
    At the last term of this Court, this action was opened to the jury, Parker, J., then sitting, when the plaintiff’s counsel produced the policy, and offered to prove the interest of Eoarts and others in the property insured; whereupon the counsel for the. defendants moved for leave to bring into Court the amount of the premium note, and that then the plaintiff should be nonsuited; which was accordingly done, subject to the opinion of the whole Court, whether the averments in the declaration are sufficient to show a cause of action.
    And now, pursuant to the said reservation, Dexter and Blake, of counsel for the plaintiff, move the Court that the nonsuit be set aside, and the cause stand for trial.
    In support of the motion, it was contended that policies of insurance are a species of contract, wholly distinct in their nature and construction from all others; as an instance of which, it was said that an agent, making insurance for others, and having himself no interest in any thing insured, may still maintain an action on the policy in his own name. This is peculiar to this specific class of contracts. It would be difficult, if not in some cases impossible, to answer the fair and honest purposes of parties to an insurance, if the contract is to receive in all cases the same rigid construction, which the rules of the common law apply to other instruments and contracts.
    [ * 83 ] * It is well known to the Court that formerly the practice in England was to effect policies in blank, without the name of any insured. This producing some inconveniences, the statute ot 25 G. 3, c. 44. was enacted, which required the name of the insured or his agent to be inserted. Some constructions of that statute in the English courts having created greater inconveniences than those which the act was intended to remove, it was repealed by statute 28 G. 3, c. 56. And although, by this last statute, the former practice of blank policies was discountenanced, yet it requires but the name or firm of one person, whether he be consignor or consignee, or the person receiving the order to effect the policy, or the person who shall give the order to the agent employed to effect the policy. The naming of any one of these was sufficient to cover the interest of all those between whom and the person so named there existed any privity. This statute has received a liberal construction, and Marshall 
       says “it ought to receive a construction according to its true intent and meaning.” And he mentions the case of Wolff & Al. vs. Horncastle 
       as in point to show such liberality. In the case of De Vignier vs. Swanson, 
       it was decided that if the name of the agent effecting the policy be inserted, without naming him as agent, it is sufficient.
    It is acknowledged that these statutes have no force here, and they have been cited only to show the necessity that was found of construing them so as almost to prevent their operation in derogation of former decisions of the courts.
    It may be said that the omission of the words “ for whom it doth or may concern,” has a material operation in the effect and construction of this policy. But we apprehend otherwise.
    The case of Graves & Al. vs. The Boston M. I. Company 
       may oe supposed to be in point against this action. But a very material distinction may be taken between that case and the one under discussion. In that case, the policy * was to [ * 84 ] have effect upon either construction ; here, if this action is not supported, the policy is wholly void and inoperative.
    By the policy in this case, Russell, the plaintiff, caused him self to be insured by Munson. It might be that he acted as agent, or in his own right, and by the marine law he may maintain his action according to what shall turn out to be the fact. If he acted as agent, he was under no obligation to name his principal.
    This is brought in the name of the agent, and the declaration avers that the policy was made in his name as agent, for the use of the principal, who is averred to have been interested in the vessel and cargo insured to the amount of the sum insured. Thus it is precisely within the rule laid down by Serjeant Marshall. 
      
    
    
      Phillips and C. Jackson, of counsel for the defendants,
    were stopped by the Court, whose opinion was delivered by
    
      
       Page 214.
    
    
      
       1 Bos. & Pul. 316.
    
    
      
      
        Ibid. 346, in notis
      
    
    
      
       2 Cranch's Rep. 419.
    
    
      
       Page 589.
    
   Parsons, C. J.

The policy in this case was effected in the name

of Israel Munson, as agent for the plaintiff; by which the defendants undertook to insure the plaintiff. He now brings an action on this policy, to recover a loss for the use of Evarts and others, who were alone interested in the property insured ; and it is made a question for our decision whether the action can be maintained. We are all of opinion that the action cannot be maintained. From the natural import of the words of the policy, and from the necessary construction of it, no person is insured from loss but Russell; and the case of Graves vs. The Boston M. I. Company, decided both in the Circuit and Supreme Courts of the United States, is an authority in point. The distinction attempted between that case and the case at bar, is, that Graves had an interest, which the policy might protect; here Russell had no interest, and the policy will be void. That distinction does not appear to us to make any difference. The alteration of the policy from the old form was made, because the assurers would know the persons for whom they would answer. But if any man having no interest, nor [ * 85 ] * calling himself agent, to excite the inquiry of the underwriters, might cause himself to be insured, the intent and design of the alteration of the policy would be defeated, and the underwriters entrapped to insure the property of a man whose property they must suppose they had not insured.

Plaintiff nonsuit.  