
    George Grant, plaintiff in error, vs. The State of Georgia, defendant in error.
    Where, in a criminal case, the Court charges the jury, “ it is my opinion that you can infer from Grant’s [the defendant’s] admission, that the pistol which he shot had a ball in it, inasmuch as he undertook to point out the place where the ball struck, whether that was the place or not,” this Court is required by Revised Code, section 3183, to grant a new trial.
    Criminal Law. Charge of Court. Opinion upon facts. Before Judge Andrews. Hart Superior Court. September Term, 1871.
    In the progress of the charge the Court used the following language : “ I further state to you, gentlemen of the jury, my opinion is that you can infer from Grant’s admission, that the pistol which he shot had a ball in it, inasmuch as he undertook to point out the place where the ball struck, whether that was the place or not.”
    E. P. Edwards and John H. Skelton, by John C. Reid, for plaintiff in error.
    Samuel Lumpkin, Solicitor General, represented by Z. D. Harrison, for the State.
   Montgomery, Judge.

In this case the Court feels constrained, by section 3183 of the Code, to reverse the judgment of the Court below, and therefore renders the following judgment: Where, in acriminal case, the Court charges the jury, it is my opinion that you can infer from Grant’s [the defendant’s] admission, that the pistol which he shot had a ball in it, inasmuch as he undertook to point out the place where the ball struck, whether that was the place or not,” this Court is required by Revised Code, section 3183, to grant a new trial.

Judgment reversed.  