
    Tappan, et als. vs. Harrison, et al.
    
    The levy of a judicial attachment upon land, creates a lien upon such land, which overreaches the lien of a judgment obtained subsequently, though the summons may have been previously issued, and previously executed.
    Benjamin S. Tappan & Co., and Daniel Baugh, procured their respective writs of summons to be issued by the clerk of the circuit court of Williamson county, against Searcy D. Sharp. These writs were executed and returned to the November term,, 1839.
    Brown, about the same time, procured the issuance of a similar writ against Sharp, which was not executed upon Sharp, and returned “not found.” On the 6th day of December, 1839, Brown issued a judicial attachment against the estate of Sharp, which on, the 10th of the same- month was levied by the sheriff on a, tract of one hundred and forty-four acres of land, belonging to Sharp, in, the county of Williamson. At the March term, 1840, (11th) Tap-, pan & Co-, recovered a judgment against Sharp for $678 80. At the same term (27th) Baugh recovered a judgment against-him, for $1460 40, and Brown at the same term (26 th) recovered judgment against Sharp by default for $690 37£.
    Writs of ft. fa. were issued on the judgments of Baugh and; Tappan & Co. and a venditioni exponas was issued on the judgment of Brown. They were all levied by Harrison, sheriff, on the same tract of one hundred and forty-four acres. On the 20th June, 1840, the 'land was sold for the sum of $3000, of which sum, Gentry, the purchaser, paid the sum of $771 71 into the hands of the sheriff, the balance being enjoined in his hands.
    The sheriff produced the writs and money in his hands in court, and asked the direction of the court in the distribution of the same. Tappan & Co. -and Baugh moved the court for a judgment against the sheriff for the said amount in his hands.
    The presiding judge, Maney, being of the opinion, that the lien created by the judicial attachment of James Brown, upon the land of defendant Sharp, was above and superior to the lien acquired by Tappan & Co. and by Baugh, by virtue of their respective judgments, and that the execution of Brown was first entitled to satisfaction, ordered and adjudged that sheriff Harrison pay and satisfy Brown’s execution.
    From this judgment, Tappan & Co. and Baugh appealed in error to the supreme court.
    
      E. Ewing, for plaintiffs in error.
    
      Marshall, for defendant in error,
    cited, acts 1777, ch. 2, sec. 23, 25: 1794, ch. 1, sec. 17,23: 3 Murphy, 63, 67: 3 & 4 Dev. & Bat. 388: 2 Tennessee, 274: Cook, 254: 7 Peters, 464: 10 Pe» ters, 400 : 2 Bay. 277: 1 McCord, 480: 3 McCord, 169, 201; 2 Maryland, (Harris & McHenry,) 264:. 1 Scott, 172 :■ 2 Hawk. 568: 2 Murphey, 144: 1. Murphey, 266.
   Turley, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

It appears in this case, that B. S. Tappan & Co. sued out of the circuit court of Williamson, a writ of summons against one Searcy D. Sharp, returnable to the November term, 1839, which was executed ; that James Brown also sued out of the same court, a writ of summons against the same man, returnable to the same term, which was returned, non est inventus. At the November term, Brown procured an order of court for the issuance of a writ of judicial attachment against Sharp, which was levied upon a tract of land belonging to him. At the March term, 1840, of said court, both Tappan & Co. and Brown obtained judgments against Sharp. Upon the judgment of Tappan & Co. a. writ of fieri facias was issued: upon that of Brown a writ of venditioni exponas : the tract of land was sold, and Tappan & Co. claim a pro rata distribution of the fund produced by the sale. This is resisted by Brown, and the question is whether the service of the'judicial attachment upon the land, created a lien thereon by which Brown acquires the right to have the fund accruing therefrom, appropriated, in the first instance, to the satisfaction of his debt. That it did, is certain. If we had, ás individuals, any doubts on this subject, which we have hot, it has been too well adjudicated to be now unsettled. The argument of the counsel for the plaintiff in error is ingenious, but cannot prevail against the eases in 3d Murphey, 63, 67: 3d & 4th Deveraux & Battle, 388: 7th Peters, 464: Cook, 254. Let the judgment of the circuit court be affirmed.  