
    Marlon Jonathan OBANDO-AYALA, Petitioner v. Loretta LYNCH, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent
    No. 15-60458
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Filed: July 18, 2016
    Nikhil Mahesh Shah, I, Esq., General Attorney, Law Offices of Nikhil M. Shah, Marina Del Rey, CA, for Petitioner.
    Jane Tracey Schaffner, Tangerlia Cox, Joseph D. Hardy, Jr., Esq., Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Marlon Jonathan Obando-Ayala, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions this court to review the denial of his second motion to reopen in absentia removal proceedings. Obando-Ayala claims that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen based on numerous grounds, which can be summarized as follows: (1) the BIA erred in determining that he had not satisfied the requirements set out in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1998), for bringing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) the BIA erred in determining that he had failed to show changed conditions in El Salvador that would warrant reopening to allow him to apply for asylum.

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Obando-Ayala’s motion to reopen. See Barrios-Cantarero v. Holder, 772 F.3d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 2014). The BIA properly concluded that Obando-Ayala had failed to comply with the Lozada requirements because he submitted no evidence that his first attorney had received notice of the allegations against him. Obando-Ayala argues that it would have been futile for him to contact his former attorney because he had been, disbarred by the California Supreme Court. Obando-Ayala has cited no authority from this court holding that an alien is relieved of the notice requirement under Lozada when his former counsel has been disbarred. Indeed, this court has rejected similar arguments for a flexible approach to Lozada. See Lara v. Trominski, 216 F.3d 487, 497-98 (5th Cir.2000).

Furthermore, Obando-Ayala’s evidence does not establish changed conditions in El Salvador that would warrant reopening based on a claim for asylum. Instead, the evidence presented shows only a continuation of the gang violence that existed at the time of his removal, which is insufficient. This court has upheld the denial of a motion to reopen where the evidence of changed conditions showed only a continuance of ongoing violence in the petitioner’s home country. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lynch, 622 Fed.Appx. 432, 433 (5th Cir.2015) (holding that general corruption and violence in Honduras did not amount to changed country conditions); Thomas v. Holder, 396 Fed.Appx. 60, 61 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that political corruption and gang violence that had been occurring in Jamaica since the 1960s did not represent changed country conditions). Moreover, Obando-Ayala’s assertion that he fears for his safety upon returning to El Salvador given the threats and violence experienced by his relatives, amounts to a change in personal circumstances, which is also insufficient. See Gatamba v. Holder, 485 Fed.Appx. 690, 691 (5th Cir.2012).

Based on the forgoing, Obando-Ayala’s petition is DENIED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     