
    Randolph SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Glenn GOORD, Commissioner, Department of Correctional Services, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 08-2228-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 27, 2010.
    Randolph Smith, Beacon, NY, pro se.
    Rajit S. Dosanjh, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General; Andrea Oser, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Andrew M. Cuo-mo, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, New York, for Defendant-Appellee.
    PRESENT: B.D. PARKER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       At the time this case was submitted, Judge Chin was a member of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Randolph Smith, pro se and incarcerated, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Scullin, /.), granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Commissioner Glenn Goord on Appellant’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and denying Appellant’s requests for discovery and for leave to amend his complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues presented for review.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and focus on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We conclude, for substantially the reasons stated by the district court, that Appellant did not demonstrate the existence of a question of fact as to the personal involvement of Appellee in the alleged constitutional violation. See Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1997) (prisoner failed to establish the requisite personal involvement of Department of Correctional Services Commissioner to whom he had written letters of complaint, one of which Commissioner referred for investigation).

We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion. See Nettis v. Levitt, 241 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir.2001), overruled, in part on other grounds by Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 460 F.3d 215 (2d Cir.2006). Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) instructs that leave to amend should be “freely givefn] ... when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Moreover, “[a] pro se complaint is to be read liberally” and a district court generally should not dismiss pro se complaints without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint “gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Shomo v. City of N.Y., 579 F.3d 176,183 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Appellant may have set forth a valid § 1983 claim against individual staff members at Great Meadow Correctional Facility, who he asserts failed to provide him with an alternative means of tuberculosis testing consistent with his religious practices and instead placed him in confinement. Because we cannot determine on the face of the complaint that granting leave to amend in this case would be futile, see, e.g., Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir.2009), we accordingly remand the case to the district court to allow Appellant to amend his complaint. We express no views on whether any potential claims Appellant may have against defendants other than Commissioner Goord would have merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint (which named only Appellee Goord as a defendant) is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to allow Appellant to amend his complaint.  