
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Olaf James HAUGEN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-30137
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 16, 2017  Seattle, Washington
    Filed June 22, 2017
    John David Sullivan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Lori Anne Harper Suek, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Mark S. Werner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Gillian Elissa Gosch, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FDMT— Federal Defenders of Montana (Billings), Billings, MT, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: BYBEE and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and DORSEY, District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
      The Honorable Jennifer A. Dorsey, United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Haugen appeals his jury conviction of aggravated sexual abuse and the sentence imposed by the district court.

1. We affirm a jury conviction if “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). The evidence is adequate to support Hau-gen’s conviction for aggravated sexual assault, which required the jury to find that the defendant knowingly used force to cause the victim to engage in a sexual act. 18 U.S.C. § 2241. Testimony from the victim at trial could have led the jurors to determine both the elements of “sexual act” and “force” were met beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. The district court’s within Guidelines range sentence was “reasonable” and not “procedurally erroneous or substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008). The district court refused to consider a factual and credibility question raised by Haugen at sentencing. The decision not to allow the testimony at sentencing was not a procedural error, as there is no clear error and this court is not “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242, 121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001)). The decision also does not affect the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, because taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the testimony was irrelevant to sentencing and a matter for the jury and imposing the within Guidelines range sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by'Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     