
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sid Edward WILLIS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 17-30057
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 6, 2018  Portland, Oregon
    Filed March 8, 2018
    Scott Kerin, Kelly A. Zusman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, DOJ-USAO, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Tonia Louise Moro, Tonia L. Moro Attorney at Law PC, Medford, OR, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: FISHER, N.R. SMITH, apd HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, See Fed. R. App. P, 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Sid Edward Willis, Jr., appeals a 60-month sentence imposed for violation of the terms of his supervised release. We had previously vacated Willis’s sentence for the supervised release violation and remanded for further proceedings. United States v. Willis, 795 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2015). The panel concluded that Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.220(l)(a) is divisible and comprises two offenses, only one of which—the “attempt” offense—is categorically a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 7Bl.l(a)(l), which defines grades of supervised release violations. Willis, 795 F.3d at 991 n.4, 995. On remand, the district court reviewed the evidence adduced at various evidentiary hearings and found that Willis committed the attempt offense and that he had therefore committed a Grade A violation of his supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

1. Both Mathis v. United States, — U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), and Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 469 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), support a conclusion that Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.220(l)(a) is divisible, because Oregon case law and model jury instructions demonstrate § 166.220(l)(a) is a disjunctive list of elements, not means. See Oregon v. Alvarez, 240 Or.App. 167, 246 P.3d 26, 29 (2010); Oregon v. Cufaude, 239 Or.App, 188, 244 P.3d 382, 383-84 (2010). We therefore adhere to the previous panel’s determination about divisibility, And, Willis does not contend that, if the statute is divisible, the district court was incorrect in finding that he committed the attempt offense.

2. Willis contends that the district court failed to provide an adequate explanation for his sentence. But, Willis does not address the district court’s written resen-tencing order, instead continuing to challenge the district court proceedings in which his initial sentence, now vacated, was imposed. Because he makes no arguments about the insufficiency of the court’s explanation for the renewed sentence, Willis has waived the issue. See Kim v. Kang, 154 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1998). In any event, the court’s written order is sufficient “to communicate ‘that a reasoned decision has been made’ and ‘permit meaningful appellate review.’ ” United States v. Rudd, 662 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).

AFFIRMED. 
      
      
         This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     