
    CASTLE v. STATE.
    (No. 7454.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Dec. 20, 1922.)
    Criminal law &wkey;>369(l), 380 — Evidence that defendant was living in adultery not admissible to impeach his character.
    In a prosecution under Pen. Code 1911, art. 1430, for the fraudulent disposition of mortgaged property, circumstantial evidence introduced by the state to prove that defendant was living in adultery held not admissible either directly or to impeach defendant’s character, since, accused not having put his general reputation as a law-abiding citizen in issue, particular facts’ were not admissible.
    <§r»For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
    Appeal from District Court, Red River County; Austin S. Dodd, Special Judge.
    L. J. Castle was convicted of fraudulent disposition of mortgaged property, and he appeals.
    Reversed, and new trial ordered.
    T. T. Thompson, of Clarksville, for appellant.
    R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

The conviction is for the fraudulent disposition of mortgaged property; punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of two year's. See P. C. art. 1430.

Appellant had mortgaged to Mitchell & Co., an automobile and some household effects. Before the mortgage was satisfied, appellant, in company with his family, went in the automobile 1¿o a point in the state of Oklahoma. He was arrested in Oklahoma. A member of the firm of Mitchell & Co. saw him there and by agreement took the automobile in satisfaction of the unpaid balance upon the debt. If we properly understand the record, this took place before the filing of the indictment.

Appellant testified that being out of work and unable to find work in Red River county, where he lived, he went to Oklahoma in search of employment with no intent to remain there permanently or to defeat the debt which the mortgage secured.

The state, over the objection of the appellant, introduced circumstantial evidence to prove that he was living in adultery; that he had abandoned his wife in Michigan and came to Texas with another woman; and that he was living with her as his wife. These facts apparently were entirely independent of the offense for which the appellant was upon trial. They tended to establish a collateral offense, and under circumstances which we are unable to perceive as coming within any of the exceptions to the general rule excluding evidence of other offenses. Appellant had not p<ut his general1 reputation as a law-abiding citizen in issue, and specific acts, though criminal in their nature, were not admissible for the purpose of impeachment. Johnson v. State, 17 Tex. App. 573; Thompson v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 340, 42 S. W. 974; Branch’s Ann. Tex. Penal Code, §§ 166 and 168. See, also, Holsey v. State, 24 Tex. App. 42, 5 S. W. 523.

The illegal evidence was calculated to prejudice the appellant’s case, and, in view of the record before us, it is deemed of such a character as to require a reversal of the judgment. It is so ordered.  