
    Maribel RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-1082-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 15, 2011.
    Edward J. Cuccia, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Leslie McKay, Assistant Director; Margot L. Nadel, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, ROBERT D. SACK and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Maribel Rodriguez, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, seeks review of a February 25, 2010, order of the BIA affirming the January 20, 2009, order of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Philip J. Montante, Jr., denying her motion to reopen. In re Maribel Rodriguez, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Feb. 25, 2010), affg No. 072 582 811 (Immig. Ct. Buffalo Jan. 20, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the denial of a motion to rescind an in absentia order under the same abuse of discretion standard applicable to motions to reopen. See Alrefae v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir.2006). Our jurisdiction to review orders of removal entered in absentia is generally limited to “(i) the validity of the notice provided to the alien, (ii) the reasons for the alien’s not attending the proceeding, and (iii) whether or not the alien is removable.” Abu Hasirah v. DHS, 478 F.3d at 474, 478 (2d Cir.2007) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(D)). When, as in this case, the BIA issues an opinion that fully adopts the IJ’s decision, we review the IJ’s decision. See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 523 (2d Cir.2007).

Rodriguez’s arguments that her notice of hearing was “facially defective” because it was sent to a non-existent address, “Revelside Drive” instead of “Riverside Drive,” and because it contained a signature that was not hers are unavailing. The record indicates that the notice was sent to the address as Rodriguez had written it, “Revelside Drive,” and the return receipt indicated that the notice had been delivered and signed for. Moreover, Rodriguez bore the burden of providing the agency with her correct address. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229(a)(1)(f), 1229a (b)(5)(B). When a hearing notice is sent via certified mail, we presume “not only that delivery to the alien’s mailing address was effective, but also that the alien personally received the notice.” Alrefae, 471 F.3d at 359; see also Fuentes-Argueta v. INS, 101 F.3d 867, 871 (2d Cir.1996) (“There is no requirement that the certified mail return receipt be signed by the alien or a responsible person at his address to attempt service. So long as there is proof of attempted delivery, there is a presumption of adequate notice.”). A petitioner may overcome this presumption “by the affirmative defense of nondelivery or improper delivery by the Postal Service,” but only if she presents “substantial and probative evidence such as documentary evidence from the Postal Service, third party affidavits, or other similar evidence demonstrating that there was improper delivery.” Matter of Grijalva, 21 I. & N. Dec. 27, 37 (BIA 1995). The IJ did not abuse its discretion in finding that Rodriguez failed to overcome this presumption because the signed certified mail receipt indicated that Rodriguez’s hearing notice had been delivered to the address she provided to the agency. See Fuentes-Argueta, 101 F.3d at 871; Grijalva, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 37. The IJ also reasonably concluded that Rodriguez failed to exercise due diligence in pursuing her case because she failed to offer any explanation for the sixteen-year delay in attempting to obtain information regarding her proceedings. See Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir.2000).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  