
    Jones v. Frosh.
    Where no fraud is alleged, an injunction will not be granted against an execution on an award of arbitrators which has been made a judgment of court under the act. (Note 33.)
    Appeal from Brazoria. The appellant filed his petition to enjoin an execution sued out on an award of arbitrators, chosen by the appellant Jones and the appellee Frosh, in conformity with the act of the Legislature of the State to authorize the settlement of disputes b.y conciliation or arbitration. (Ilart. Dig., p. 80.) The petition showed the reference, and that petitioner bad the evidence of all bis matters of dispute before the referees; it showed the award of the arbitrators, its return to the District Court, and the issue of an execution for the sum awarded; it prayed that. Slringfellow and Purcell, who have made the award, the former being one of the referees chosen by the parties, and the latter an umpire chosen by the referees on their disagreeing, should be made parties. It charged that Strlngfellow had but. little knowledge of business transactions and that Purcell did not allow himself time to become acquainted with the matter in dispute, and that the evidence was not again called before Purcell; it alleged no fraud on the part of the referees or the other party in procuring the award, nor any new equity since the award was made; it prayed for an injunction, &c. The injunction was allowed, hut was dissolved, on motion, after the coming in of the answers of Frosh, String-fellow and Purcell, and the bill was dismissed. The plaintiff appealed.
    
      J. A. Sweit, for appellee.
    The award, being under a general submission of all matters in dispute, is conclusive upon the parties upon all matters within that submission, as a plea, a bar, or as conclusive evidence upon any matter embraced within it. (1 Phillips’s Ev., p. 3S0.) Tt is in its. nature an estoppel, (4 Phillips’s Ev., note C95, p. 1025.) The award in I his case oxliu-gnished the original demand between (lie parties existing at the time of such submission ami award. (4 Phillips’s Ev., note 095, )>. 1020.) Every reasonable intend incut shall be allowed to uphold awards. (Vide Green v. Franklin, 1 Tex. R., 500; 4 Phillips’s Ev., note 095, p. 1027; Kyd on Awards, 72; 1 Pet. C. C. R., 228.) The award could not be attacked for anything but fraud, which will never be inferred but must always be proved. (1 Story Eq., see. 190, p. 215.) To avoid a bond for fraud all facts and circumstances must bo set forth. (3 Ala. R., 310, 375; 1 McLean R., 414.) A general allegation of fraud is bad ; the facts constituting it should be specified. (5 Pike R., 375; 1 Chit. PL, 233; see also Hart. Dig., art. 071.) No improper or fraudulent acts of the arbitrators are at all pretended to be specified in the bill, but on the contrary it is virtually alleged that the arbitration and all its requisites were such as the law required. It nowhere appears that Jones objected either to the award or to the entry of judgment upon it. Fraud is not charged, nor mistake, such as the court will notice, and in chancery a man will be' held to Ills undertaking according to its true intent where neither of these appear. (1 Tex. R., 182.) The defendant should have resisted rendition of judgment after the award, if he had good cause to do so, before the same court and at the term of the court wherein judgment was rendered; and had the court denied him relief, his remedy, if any, would have been by appeal to a higher tribunal, and not by application to the same court, with no additional powers, and no new facts or circumstances having arisen since the decision of the cause. (1 Tex. R., 7.)
    Note 33. — An objection to the award of arbitrators on the ground of fraud, partiality, misconduct, or gross mistake on the part of the arbitrators to the injury of the party complaining, should properly be made before the entry of the award by petition setting forth the facts which constitute the objection. (Payne v. Meta, 14 T., 56.)
   Lipscomb, J.

The bill contains a tedious and detailed narrative of many transactions between the parties running through several years, and the various efforts made by the plaintiff’ to bring the defendant to an honest settlement, most of which would have been impertinent under any circumstances, and particularly so as it relates to the affairs of the parties before the submission and award, as I take it to be an acknowledged rule of law that an award not impeachable with fraud is conclusive of all matters that bad been submitted to the arbitrators. It is as much so as a judgment, and in the language of Chief Justice DeGray in the Dutchess of Kingston’s case, is as a plea, a biir, or as evidence conclusive between the same parties upon the same matters. In this case the appellant was shown by his bill that the matters complained of by him and sought to be again litigated were submitted to the referee, and their award disposed of ail those matters in controversy. The bill further shows that the award had become a judgment of the court. There was then no necessity for either pleading the award and the judgment in bar nor giving them in evidence, and the facts disclosed by the bill showed that he was not entitled to relief, and subjected his suit to be demurred out of court or dismissed for want of equity. And there could be no error in dismissing a bill that showed on its face, affirmatively', sufficient grounds for its dismissal.

Judgment affirmed.  