
    AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PHYSICIAN SPECIALISTS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, New York State Education Department, Brian J. Wing, Interim Executive Deputy Commissioner, Robert W. Barnett, Director, Office of Health Care Quality and Safety, Richard P. Mills, Commissioner, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 09-4325-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 1, 2010.
    Michael H. Sussman, Sussman & Watkins, Goshen, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Steven C. Wu, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Benjamin N. Gutman, Deputy Solicitor General, of counsel), for Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Present: GUIDO CALABRESI, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant the American Association of Physician Specialists, Inc. (“AAPS”) appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Young, J.), entered September 17, 2009, granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and specification of issues on appeal.

In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (per curiam), the Supreme Court recognized “class of one” equal protection claims, in which a “plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” This Court has held that in order to succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that “no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to a degree that would justify the differential treatment on the basis of a legitimate government policy.” Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir.2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). AAPS fails to meet that standard here. The record establishes that AAPS does not require completion of a residency program in the three specialties that comprise the vast majority of its certifications, while the organizations that the New York State Department of Health does recognize as providing valid board certification do impose such a requirement on all physicians now seeking certification. This difference belies AAPS’s claim that it is similarly situated to these other organizations, and it further “justifies] the differential treatment on the basis of [the] legitimate government policy,” id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), of ensuring that physicians practicing in a given field in New York State have demonstrated their competency in an acceptable fashion.

We have considered AAPS’s other arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  