
    *The Lessee of Presley Kemper v. The Cincinnati, Columbus and Wooster Turnpike Company.
    An incorporated road company, which is authorized by its charter to lay out and construct a turnpike road, not exceeding one hundred feet in width, to erect gates and colleot toll, has no right to appropriate, for a toll-house land lying without the line of the road.
    This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Hamilton ■county.
    
      The defendants are authorized by their charter, to lay out, survey, and make a turnpike road, between certain termini, and to take from the land occupied by said road, when surveyed and located, any stone, gravel, timber, or other necessary materials; and in ease sufficient can not be procured on the land located for the road, they are further authorized to enter upon any unimproved lands adjoining, or in its vicinity, and to take so much, stone, gravel, or other materials, as may be necessary to construct' the road. They are directed to open the road, for a width not exceeding 100 feet, thirty of which shall be made an artificial road. And they are authorized to erect gates on said road, and collect toll, upon compliance with certain requisitions in their charter.
    The premises in dispute consisted of a lot of ground, on which a toll-house were erected, outside the strip of ground 100 feet wide. The defendants claimed a right to occupy the ground for a toll-house, by virtue of the powers conferred by their charter. The court below instructed the jury that the charter conferred upon the defendants authority to take and hold the plaintiff’s land for this purpose. And the point is raised on this record, whether the right of the defendants to possess the plaintiff’s land, extended beyond the land covered by the survey of the road.
    Charles Pox, for plaintiff in error,
    insisted that the charter inly authorized the company to survey and take so much *land as is necessary to construct the road 100 feet wide, and that no authority was given for the permanent occupation of the land for any other purpose. That charters should be strictly construed. He cited 9 Pick. 110; 2 Mass. 122; Cooper’s Eq. 77; 2 Dows. Parl. 520; 2 Maule & Selwyn, 32.
    V. Worthington, for defendants,
    maintained that they were authorized, by their charter, to locate a road, erect gates, and collect toll. That, for the exercise of these rights, toll-houses were necessary. They had, therefore, the right to appropriate land for a toll-house, as an incident to the rights expressly granted by their charter. He cited 1 Caine, 179; 10 Johns. 389; 23 Wend. 193; 8 Ohio, 38; 2 Ohio, 112, pt. 2; 4 Ohio, 253; 5 Ohio, 118; 18 Johns. 397; 17 Pick. 434; 12 Conn. 364; 10 Conn. 157; 11 Conn. 467; 2 Johns. 190.
   Lane, C. J.

A corporation created for any lawful purpose, is invested with such powers as are directly conferred, and likewise with such powers as are necessary to execute its lawful functions, and no more. Beyond this, the grant is to be taken strictly.

A turnpike company, being an association formed to accomplish a useful and public object, ma^ lawfully possess powers to occupy another’s land, on making due compensation, when necessary to accomplish its end. 5 Ohio, 488; 7 Ohio, 112, pt. 2. The charter, therefore, very properly confers authority to acquire a right to the land for the road, and to the materials lying upon it; and where these are insufficient to construct it, the authority is given to take them from the adjoining unoccupied lands. The right to maintain toll-houses is undoubted; but the right to place them on any other land than that devoted to the road, is not conferred by the express terms of the charter, nor is any necessity shown oi believed to exist, for subjecting other property to this purpose.

Judgment reversed.  