
    Ramona Monagas de Colón, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Manuel Hedilla Blanco, Defendant and Appellant.
    No. 4982.
    Argued February 21, 1930.
    Decided April 24, 1930.
    
      
      F. Colón, for appellant. B. Hernández Matos, for appellee.
   Me. Justice Hutchisoh

delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff obtained a judgment for five hundred dollars, as the amount of a homestead exemption involved in the sale of certain property as the result of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding.

The first contention of appellant is that the district court erred in overruling a demurrer for want of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. More specifically the objection is, first, that the complaint does not bring plaintiff within the scope of section one of the Homestead Law as “a householder having a family”, and, second, that the alleged homestead is urban property.

Plaintiff does not sue as “a householder having a family”, under section one of the law, but as a surviving spouse under section two. The facts stated show that the property in question was impressed with the character of a homestead during the lifetime of the husband, and, upon his death, vested in the widow, plaintiff herein. The law does not require that the surviving spouse shall be a “householder having a family”, in order to retain the estate or to assert the right so acquired. Nor does the law draw any distinction between urban and rural homesteads. Ubi lex non disti/nguit, neo nos distinguere debemus.

The only other contention of appellant goes, to the sufficiency of the evidence. The argument is that plaintiff failed to prove that she was a “householder having a family”. There was no need of such proof.

The judgment appealed from must he affirmed.  