
    Alice Davol versus Pardon Davol.
    By the statute of 1786, c. 69, no provision was made, in case of a divorce a vinculo, for alimony to the wife; and a decree for alimony bottomed upon that statute may be avoided by plea, the proceedings for divorce, &i not being according to the course of the common law. f
    t See Howard vs. Howard 15 Mass. Rep. 196
    
      This was an action of debt, founded on a decree of this Court made and passed October term, 1804, at Taunton, wheieby the present plaintiff was divorced a vinculo from the defendant, who had been her husband ; and, by the same decree, the sum of $ 50 was allowed her, to be paid annually by the defendant. The plaintiff avers that six years of her said alimony are in arrear.
    The defendant, after reciting the decree in hcec verba, pleads, in substance, that the same is void as it respects the said alimony, for want of authority in the Court to pass it. To this plea there is a general demurrer, which is joined by the defendant.
    
      J. M. Williams, for the defendant.
    By the statute of 1785, c. 69, which was the only law on this subject at the time this decree was passed, there is no authority given to the Court to allow alimony to a woman divorced from the bonds of matrimony.
    
      Basset and Spooner, for the plaintiff.
    This judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, and is valid until reversed by writ of error. It cannot be thus avoided by plea. 
    
    
      Williams, in reply.
    This was- not a proceeding according to the course of the common law ; and, error not lying upon it, it may be avoided by plea.
    
      
      
        Commonwealth vs. Pejepscut Proprietors, 7 Mass. Rep. 399.
    
   Parker, C. J.

It appears very clearly, that, when this decree was passed, there was no statute in force, authorizing the allowance of alimony in cases of divorce. The only question, therefore, is, whether it is void, or voidable only by writ of error. * Generally, judgments which are erroneous stand in force and may be executed, or may be enforced by action of debt, until reversed ; and they cannot be avoided on account of error, collaterally or by plea.

But this doctrine is applicable only to judgments of courts which proceed according to the course of the common law ; for on such only will writs of error lie. With respect to judgments of other courts, they may be avoided for error by plea, as is shown in the case of Smith vs. Rice.

A writ of error could not be sustained to reverse this decree ; because the Court, in passing it, did not exercise their ordinary common law jurisdiction, but proceeded according to the principles of ecclesiastical tribunals, having special authority committed to them for that purpose.

The declaration showing no sufficient cause of action, judgment must be for the defendant.

Defendant’s plea gcod. 
      
       11 Mass. Rep. 514.
     