
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bruce Edward CROSS, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 10-30127.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 10, 2011.
    
    Filed March 15, 2011.
    
      Kimberly R. Sayers-Fay, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Anchorage, AK, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Randall S. Cavanaugh, Kalamarides & Lambert, Anchorage, AK, for Defendant Appellant.
    Before: FISHER, GOULD and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Bruce Edward Cross appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered during an investigatory stop of his vehicle. We review the denial of the motion to suppress de novo, and affirm. See United States v. Jennen, 596 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir.2010).

“Officers have reasonable suspicion when ‘specific, articulable facts ... together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person detained is engaged in criminal activity.’ ” United States v. Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir.2000)). We assess reasonable suspicion in light of the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). The totality of the circumstances here— including the officer’s training, experience and specific knowledge about the woman’s prior arrest, Cross’ location in a known area of prostitution late at night, and the woman’s appearance and conduct — gave the officer reasonable suspicion to believe the occupants of Cross’ vehicle were engaged in criminal activity involving prostitution, thereby justifying the investigatory stop.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Circuit Rule 36-3.
     