
    THE MUTUAL ASSURANCE SOCIETY v. KORN AND WISEMILLER.
    •/i&sent....Washington, J.
    
    The. propriaéfs of buildmgs m Alexandria, insured by the society, thereact°ofd^ isembiy of ginia passed in subsequent018 regulations of pay San'etaád¡tionai puemiof hazard ac-newinreguia‘e lions of isos":
    ERROR to the Circuit Court for the district of Columbia, sitting at Alexandria.
    The Mutual Assurance Society against fire> &c. was incorporated by anact of the legislature of Virginia in
    According to the original plan of- the institution the houses in the towns and country were blended together one general mass, and were mutually pledged to each other, to make good, the losses which might he respecsustained by fire.
    *n JanuaiT> 1805, the legislature of Virginia, at the request of the society, passed a law changing the original plan of the institution, by separating the town buildings from those in the country, and making the town buildings liable only for town losses, and the country buildings for. epuntry losses. This law directed that there.should be' a re-valuation of the buildings which had'been previously insured^ and authorized the society, as in the first instance, to fix the rates of hazard, and make such by-laws, rules and regulations as they might think proper.
    The society was authorized to recover its debts by motion, in a summary manner.
    Under Che act of 1805 the society made a new tariff of rates of hazard.
    The houses of the Defendants were re-valued under the act. The re-valuation was less than the original valuation ; but the rate of hazard, or in other words, the premium for the insurance, was increasrd under the new regulation,
    
      By the third ,section of a by-law of the society made n January, 1805, under the authority of their original act of incorporation and of the act of 1805, it is enacted, “ that if the re-valuation of any building shall prove it “ to be of less value than that at which it was insured, “ there shall be no demand against the society of resti“tution of any part of the premium which may “ been paid, and the proprietor of such. building shall “pay the additional premium (if the materials of which “ his building be erected* or its contiguity require it) “ which according to the new rates of hazard ought to be “ paid.”
    In July, 1805, the Defendants, Korn and Wisemiller, agreeably to a form prescribed by the society, made a declaration, under their hands and sgals, as follows: “ We do hereby declare and affirm, that we hold the “ abovementioned buildings, with the land. on which “ they stand, in fee simple, and that they are not, nor “ shall be insured elsewhere, and that we will abide, ob- “ serve and adhere to the.constitution, rules and regu- “ lations, which are already established, or may he're-after be established by a majority of the insured, pre- <* sent in person or by representatives, or by the ¡majority of the property -insured, represented either by *« the persons themselves, or their proxy duly aútho- “ rized, or their deputy, as established by law, at any general meeting to be held by the said assurance so- « ciety; or which are or hereafter may be established ■«( by the president and directors of the society.”
    To this declaration were annexed a plat, description and new valuation of the buildings insured.
    The buildings had been originally insured by the Defendants in the year 1796.
    The sum now claimed of the Defendants was for the additional premium arising out of the increased rates of hazard according to the new regulations, made in January,. 1805.
    Swann, for the Plaintiffs in error.
    This case differs from that of Mkinson, (ante. vqI. 6, ¶. 202) which was for an additional premium occasion. ed l>y the increased vainatmi of the JmMing — this is for the additional premium upon the. new rates of hazard.
    In the former case between these same parties f ante voL 6, p. 192J it was decided by this Court that the proprietors of houses in Alexandria,, still continued of the society, notwithstanding their separa*, tion from the state of Virginia, and were bound by all the by-laws and regulations of the society.
    . The only remaining question is whether the Defendants are liable for the new rates of premium. It was just that the old members and the new should stand on the same ground and pay the same rates of premium where the risk was the same. This point has never been disputed in Virginia. .
    C. Lee, contra.
    
    The former case has settled' the point that.the Defendants are bound by their original contract in 1796. 'J he legislature had. no right to alter or vacate that contract There was nothing unjust- or har'd in the case. The additional premium ought to be confined to cases of excess upon re-valuation.
    Swann, in reply.
    The. act of assembly of 1805 was passed at the request of the society, of which the Defendants were members, and bound by the acts of the majority.
    
      March 3d....
   Johnson, J.

delivered the .opinion of the Court as follows:

In the case decided between. Atkinson and these Plaintiffs, February term, 1810, the question arose on the construction of the 7th section of the act of 1805, and the additional premium in that case was imposed upon a re-valuation without relation to a change in the rates of premium, but resulting from the increased valuation.

In this case the sum demanded arises from the changes made in the rates .of premium, arising from a variation of risk $ to equalize which the 8th article of the present rules of the society requires an additional per centage to be paid by the present members of the company, in conformity to what is to be imposed upon su,bsequent applicants for insurance. And it is contended that the contract being complete between the parties, the insurers cannot add to the consideration to be for insurance. In general this doctrine is unquestionably correct, but peculiar circumstances except this from ordinary cases. This subject was considered in the quoted case decided between these same parties in February, 1810. It is there laid down, and on reflection we are confirmed in the opinion, that in the capacity of an individual of the body corporate the Defendants are bound by the bylaws of the society as far as is consistent with the nature of its institution.

This case is within the 4th section of the 8th article of those by-laws, and therefore the judgment below ought to have b.een for the Plaintiffs.

Judgment reversed.  