
    Josiah Robinson versus Stephen Mead.
    The action of replevin is local in its nature, and must be brought in the county where the goods and chattels are taken or attached.
    The plaintiff, naming himself of Boston, sued this writ of replevin of a chaise attached by the defendant, a deputy sheriff, of the county of Middlesex, at Cambridge, in said county.
    The defendant pleaded property in a stranger, and, after a verdict, finding the chaise to be the property of the plaintiff, moved in arrest of judgment for the following cause: —
    “ Because the said Robinson, by his own showing in his writ aforesaid, hath alleged that the goods and chattels therein mentioned were taken and attached by said Mead in Cambridge, in the county of Middlesex, and not in the county of Suffolk, in which last county the said writ was sued out and made returnable; whereas, by the law of the land, the said Robinson ought to have sued out his writ of replevin for the said goods and chattels, if any just cause he had, in the Court of Common Pleas, established and holding pleas in the said county of Middlesex, and not in the said county of Suffolk”
    
    The cause was argued at the last March term in this [ * 354 ] * county, by Davis, solicitor-general, and Munroe, for the plaintiff, and Fuller for the defendant.
    
      Fuller, in support of the motion,
    relied on the statute of replevins, (1789, c. 26, § 4,) which provides that “ when any goods or chattels shall be taken, distrained, or attached, which shall be claimed by a third person, and the person thus claiming the same shall think proper to replevy them, in case such goods and chattels are of the value of more than four pounds, he may take out and prosecute his writ of replevin from the clerk’s office of the Court of Common Pleas, in the county where the goods and chattels are thus taken, dis-trained, or attached.” The statute then prescribes the form of the writ; and the plaintiff, having pursued his remedy on the statute and adopted its forms, was bound to conform to its directions, as to the court in which he should
    
      Fuller also cited the observations of Lord Mansfield, in the case of Mostyn vs. Fabrigas, 
       respecting the locality of trials; and the case of Lucking vs. Denning. 
      
    
    
      Davis, solicitor-general, and Munroe, for the plaintiff,
    insisted that the action was not local; and that, if it was, advantage should have been taken in abatement. If the defendant neglects to plead it in abatement, he loses the benefit of the objection, which, after the trial on the merits, cannot support a motion in arrest of judgment. In support of these positions, they cited Carth. 11, 63, 124, 354, 25, 448.— Chitty on Pleading, 421, 430. — Bac. Abr. Courts, &c., D.—4 Mass. Rep. 591, Cleaveland vs. Welsh. — 2 Mass. Rep. 102, Whiting vs. Hollister.—6 Mod. 102, Crosse vs. Bilson__4 Com. Dig. Pleader, 3, K. 13.— 1 Com. Dig. Action, N. 11.— Willes. 431, The Bailiffs, &c. of Litchfield vs. Slater.— 1 Saund. 247, Craft vs. Boite.—2 Lev. 164, Adderly vs. Wise. — 1 Show. 343, Drew vs. Barksdale. — 1 Vent. 263, Jennings vs. Hunkin.—2 Lev. 121. S. C.—3 Keb. 350. S. C.— Comb. 472, Calverly vs. Leving.—* Carth. 448. S. C.—L. Raym. 330. S. [ * 355 ] C.—7 D. & E. 583, Mayor of London vs. Cole.
    
    
      
      
        Cowp. 176.
    
    
      
      
         1 Salk. 201
    
   At this term the Court decided that the action was local in its nature, and the judgment was arrested.

Costs for the defendant.  