
    Neil B. GOLDBERG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James CAMERON; Gale Ann Hurd, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-16827
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted July 12, 2017 San Francisco, California
    Filed July 25, 2017
    Donald Charles Schwartz, Esquire, Attorney, Law Offices of Donald C. Schwartz, Aptos, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant
    Charles Nathan Shephard; Esquire, Trial Attorney, Greenberg Glusker Fields Claman & Machtinger LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee James Cameron
    Bruce Alan Isaacs, Esquire, Attorney, Nicolas Andreas Jampol, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Gale Ann Hurd
    Before: BEA and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ROBRENO, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Neil Goldberg appeals the district court’s order (1) denying his motion to remand this case to the Alameda County Superior Court and (2) dismissing his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on res judicata grounds. In his complaint, Goldberg alleges that defendants James Cameron and Gale Ann Hurd, the creators of the well-known Terminator movie franchise, derived the storyline and soundtrack for the Terminator movies from his copyrighted work without his consent. This is Goldberg’s third lawsuit against the defendants. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court did not err by denying Goldberg’s motion to remand. Goldberg’s original state-court complaint asserted a claim for copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 501, so the action was initially removable on the basis of federal question and copyright jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338. Goldberg claims that before the defendants removed the case to federal court, he filed in state court (1) an amended complaint which omitted his copyright-infringement claim and (2) a “request to dismiss” his copyright-infringement claim. Goldberg concedes that neither filing was served on the defendants prior to removal, however, so neither filing was proper under California law at the time of removal. See Or. Arg. 4:40-4:50; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 471.5 (“[A] copy of [an] ... amended complaint must be served upon the defendants affected thereby.”) (emphasis added); Cal. R. Court 3.1390 (“A party that requests dismissal of an action must serve on all parties and file notice of entry of the dismissal.”) (same). And although the state court entered an order granting Goldberg’s request for dismissal despite his failure to serve notice of that request on the defendants, the district court still did not err by refusing to consider the dismissal in ascertaining its removal jurisdiction, because both the text of the removal statute and our case law suggest that a district court need consider only those filings which have been served on the defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (providing that a defendant removes a case by filing in the district court “a notice of removal ... together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action” (emphasis added)); accord Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “notice of removability under § 1446(b) is determined through examination of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry”).

2. The district court also did not err by granting the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint on res judica-ta grounds. See Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a plaintiffs complaint where “[t]he defendants raised res judicata in their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)” because although “[ojrdinarily affirmative defenses may not be raised by motion to dismiss, ... this is not true when, as here, the defense raises no disputed issues of fact”). Goldberg provides no valid basis to dispute that this is his third action against these defendants or that his first action resulted in a valid and final judgment on the merits. See Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (res judicata bars a claim that “[was] raised or could have been raised in [a] prior action” where “there is (1) an identity of claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) identity or privity between parties” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Moreover, the claims Goldberg asserts in this action all arise out of the same “transactional nucleus of facts” as the claims he asserted in his first action: the defendants’ alleged misappropriation of his work to create the Terminator movies in 1981 or 1982. Id. at 714 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Res judicata therefore bars his claims here.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     
      
      . When asked at oral argument whether the first action resulted in a valid and final judgment, Goldberg’s counsel responded, "I would have to say—I wouldn’t call it valid,” but elaborated no further. Or. Arg. 12:30-40. Goldberg’s briefs also do not address the issue. Thus, any challenge to the validity of the judgment in the first action is waived. See Cruz v. Int’l Collection Corp., 673 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2012) ("We review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
     