
    Commonwealth versus Abel W. Wilgus.
    On an indictment for obtaining money by false pretences, the defendant’s assuming a false name, and delivering spurious quarters of lottery tickets to A. B. for sale on commission, with a declaration that the defendant had in a bank the genuine corresponding whole tickets, were held to be false pretences within St. 1815, c. 136; held also, that those facts were a sufficient evidence of an intent to defraud A. B.
    Indictment on St. 1815, c. 136, alleging that the defendant did knowingly and designedly, with the intent to cheat and defraud one Edward Hammond, get into his possession from Hammond, fifteen dollars of the property of Hammond, by the following false pretences and tokens, viz. — 1. that his name was H. Cleutt; 2. that he was an agent for the managers of the Maryland Grand State Lottery; 3. that the quarters of tickets which the defendant offered to Hammond, signed H. Cleutt, were genuine quarters of tickets in that lottery; and 4. that he had the original tickets, corresponding with the numbers in the quarters, deposited in a bank in Boston.
    On the trial, before Morton J., it was proved, that the defendant delivered to Hammond several quarters of tickets, signed H. Cleutt, purporting to be quarters of tickets in the lottery above mentioned, to sell on commission; that after Hammond had sold some of them, the defendant called upon him and obtained from him all the money which he had then received, deducting the commissions, which was fifteen dollars ; that when the defendant called upon Hammond to employ him to sell the quarters of tickets, Hammond understood the defendant to be Cleutt; that when he called to get the money, he answered to the name of Cleutt. and being asked if that was his name, said it was ; that in fact neither the defendant, nor Cleutt, was possessed, in a bank or elsewhere, of any original tickets in the lottery mentioned ; that the quarters sold by Hammond were signed by a man in Boston, who called himself Cleutt, and not by the defendant; and that the defendant’s true name was Wilgus. But there was no evidence that the defendant pretended to Hammond that he was an agent of the Maryland Grand State Lottery, nor was there any evidence, other than what is above stated of an intent to defraud Hammond.
    
      Oct. 20th.
    
    
      Oct. 21st.
    The jury were instructed, that if they were satisfied that the defendant obtained the money by means of any or all of the pretences stated in the indictment, — that the pretences by which the money was obtained were known by the defendant to be false, — and that he thus obtained the money with an intent to cheat and defraud Hammond, — they should find him guilty.
    A verdict being returned for the commonwealth, the defendant moved for a new trial, because there was no evidence showing that he obtained the money with intent to cheat and defraud Hammond.
    
      Hoar, for the defendant,
    after observing that the statute was copied from St. 30 Geo. 2, c. 24, insisted upon the objection stated in the motion, and also said that there was no evidence of such pretences as were intended by the statute. The quarters of tickets could not deceive, for like other quarters sold by lottery ticket venders generally, they are mere promissory notes, by which the seller agrees to pay the buyer one fourth of such a sum as may be drawn by a ticket of a corresponding number, quarters of tickets being in no case sold under the authority of the legislature or of the managers. He referred to 2 East’s P. C. 828 et seq.; Young v. The King, 3 T. R. 98.
    Davis, Solicitor General, for the commonwealth.
   Per Curiam.

A mere naked lie may not be sufficient to sustain an indictment on this statute, for it is not the policy of government to punish criminally every wrong which is committed. It is difficult, no doubt, to draw the line. We are of opinion, however, that the misrepresentations here are evidently within the statute.

The other point is also clear in favor of the commonwealth. It' was not necessary to prove that Hammond was actually defrauded ; if he might have been, and if there was an intent to defraud him, it is sufficient. He might have had so much confidence in the defendant’s representations, as to make a warranty that the quarters sold by him should be paid accordng to their purport; and if he had done so, he would have been exposed to loss. It is plain then that he might have been defrauded ; and the fact of delivering these false papers to him to be sold as genuine, is sufficient evidence to warrant the jury in finding the wicked intent alleged.*

Prisoner sentenced. 
      
       The statutes of New York on this head extend to every case where a party has obtained money or goods by falsely representing himself to be a situation in which he is not, or by falsely representing any occurrence, that had not happened, to which persons of ordinary caution might give credit. People v. Haynes, 11 Wendell, 565. See 3 Chitty’s Grim. Law (3d Amer. ed.) 998.
     
      
       See Revised Stat. c. 126, § 32.
     
      
       An indictment under the statute of New York for obtaining by false pretences the signature of a person to a written instrument, need not allege that any loss or injury had accrued to the prosecutor. People v. Genung, 11 Wendell, 20.
     
      
       A false representation authorizes the inference of an intent to defraud. People v. Herrick, 13 Wendell, 87.
     