
    Jessica M. PARISI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D14-1955.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    March 2, 2016.
    
      Carey Haughwout, Public Defended, and Amy Lora Rabinowitz, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. ■
   WARNER, J.

We affirm appellant’s Conviction and sentence for burglary of a structure, resisting without violence, and petit theft. Although she claims in her brief that the court erred in admitting lay opinion testimony from an officer, the objection that the trial court ruled on was that the officer’s testimony required expertise. She did not apprise the court that she objected to his testimony as lay opinion. Thus, the issue raised on appeal was not properly preserved. See Filan v. State, 768 So.2d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“An issue or objection" is '‘preserved’ within the meaning of the statute if.it was timely raised and ruled on by the trial judge and if the objection was ‘sufficiently precise that it fairly apprised the trial court of the relief sought and the grounds therefor.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting § 924,051(l)(b), FÍá. Stat. (2013))).

As to her claim that the court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal, appellant maintained that the case was circumstantial,' and the State did not offer evidence to contradict her hypothesis of innocence. We disagree. While appellant claimed that she1'thought she hit a cat driving down an alley and she was in the structure (a shed) looking for the cat, officers had observed her driving and testified that they did not see any animal. They also saw her exit the shed and flee from them, thus establishing her entry into the structure. This was direct evidence contradicting her hypothesis, of innocence. State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 188-89 (Fla.1989). Furthermore, to prove intent, the State could rely on the statutory presumption of section 810.07(1); Florida Statutes (2013), that stealthy entry into a structure presumes an intent to commit an offense therein. We conclude that the State provided direct evidence of a stealthy entry.

Affirmed.

MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.  