
    D. C. Peixotti, v. B. L. M’Laughlin.
    A stage contractor is a common carrier, and liable as such for all loss of baggage, &c.; and the practice of requiring freight for baggage, if over a certain weight, illustrates well, that baggage under that weight is virtually and fully paid for by the personal passage money of the traveller.
    The fact, that stage contractors do not enter the baggage upon the way-bill» which is not a contract, but exparte altogether, and for their own use, does not alter their liability as common carriers, for the loss of such baggage.
    Evidence of the contents of a trunk, lost from a stage coach, though only prima facie, and light, is legal and competent for what it is worth.
    
      Tried before Mr. Justice Wardlaw, at Columbia, Spring Term, 1847.
    The defendant was a mail contractor, and owner of a line of stage coaches, in which, with the mail, passengers and their travelling baggage were carried between Columbia andCheraw. The plaintiff was a passenger from Columbia to Camden, and on the way, without apparent negligence on the part of the contractor or any of his agents, the plaintiff’s trunk was cut from behind the coach, and rifled of its contents By this sum. pro., the plaintiff sought reparation for the loss he had sustained.
    The presiding Judge held, that the defendant was liable as a common carrier.
    In the list which accompanied the coach from one end of the line to the other, called the way-bill, the plaintiff’s name was entered, but no mention made of his baggage. The evidence showed that the baggage of a passenger was never noticed in the way-bill, unless it exceeded a certain weight, and then an extra charge was made. He considered that the passage money paid by the plaintiff, was a compensation for the transportation of ordinary baggage as well as of himself.
    He held evidence of the contents of the trunk when it left Charleston a few days before, as pertinent to the inquiry concerning what the trunk contained when it left Columbia: although it appeared that the plaintiff had opened it in Columbia.
    Decree for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, and moved the Court to reverse the decree on the following grounds:
    1. Because his Honor erred in deciding that a stage contractor was liable as a common carrier.
    2. Because his Honor erred in deciding that, when the waybill named the passenger alone, and there was no mention made of baggage on the way-bill, the stage contractor was liable for baggage lost, as a common carrier.
    3. And for a new trial, because his Honor erred in admitting evidence to prove the contents of the lost trunk when it left Charleston, and when said trunk was not placed on the stage coach of the defendant, until it was brought to Columbia.
    S. Black, for the motion.
    There is no case, in our State Reports, applicable to stage coach contractors, as common car- . riers. Baggage is not named in the way-bill, as a part of the goods contracted for; and the way-bill is the evidence of the contract. If the Court intends to say the}' are common carriers, let it not be under oppressive restrictions. Let them hove some protection. Let the way-bill contain an entry of what baggage they are to carry. In 1 Salk., 282. (Middleton v. Fowler, et al,) it was held, that they were exempt as common carriers, nisi, &c.
    Porcher, contra.
    
    Cited, Wolf v. Somers, 2 Camp., 351; Clark v. Gray, 3 East., 564; Allen v. Seawall, 2 Wend., 327; Pardy v. Drew, 25 Wend., 459; Butler a. Basing, 2 Car& Payne, 12 E. C. L. R., 287.
   Richardson J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The strict liability of common carriers by the common law» has been fully recognized in this State in many cases, and the general doctrine is established. The liability of ferrymen as common carriers, so often adjudged, is very analogous to the present case. The lerrytnan takes over a man—say for ten cents; but the man carries a pack. There can be no doubt the ferryman would be liable for the loss of the pack, al.hough he takes no toll separately for the packs. So if the contents of a wagon or of the load upon a horse be lost; because all must be necessarily placed in the custody of the ferryman. The stage contractor, the ferryman, the boatman, railroad companies and wagoners, are alike carriers over the public highway, and stand all in the same parity of reasoning, i. e., they come within the same necessary and strict legal policy of guarding against robberies or cheats by those, who, having the custody, are enabled to do wrong secretly. Inn-keepers, for the same reason, come under similar law, although not separately paid for the traveller’s baggage. In regard to stage contractors, the practice of requiring freight for baggage, if over a certain weight, illustrates well that baggage under that weight is virtually and fully paid for, by the personal passage money of the traveller. And it would be inconsistent to distinguish the contractor’s liability or exemption, by the weight of the baggage. And I would say, that in the United States, with our very moving and no less migratory people, the law against common carriers are of great practical and every day importance: and apply readily to stage coaches, railroads and all travelling vehicles. Accordingly, in the neighboring States, and especially in New York, where there is great experience, the judicial decisions on such liability of stage contractors are many. There can he little doubt, therefore, that they are liable as common carriers. The case does not require the consideration of ex!reme cases or extraordinary instances of rich merchandize conveyed under the name of travelling baggage. Upon the 2d ground of appeal, the Court cannot perceive how the way-bill, which is merely an entry or record kept of the passengers by the stage contractor, for his own use, can make any difference. It is not like a bill of lading or a contract, but “ex pa-le” altogether. Lastly. The evidence of the contents of the lost trunk may have been only “prima facie,” and light. But it was plainly legal and competent for what it was worth, and sufficienty supports the circuit decision on the fact.

The motion is therefore dismissed.  