
    *Blanton v. Taylor.
    November, 1820.
    Fraud of Husband — Effect of Wife’s Participation.— The participation of a wife in the fraud of her husband will not impair her rights.
    Provisions in Lieu of Dower — Fraud—Effect.—Provisions in lieu of dower will not be disturbed as fraudulent, as far as it is only equivalent to dower.
    This was an injunction obtained from the Chancellor at Richmond, by Taylor, trustee of Banghorne. The deed of trust dated March 1809 recited, that Banghorne had sold to Hobson a tract of land in Cumberland, to which Banghorne’s wife had not relinquished her right of dower; and that Hobson refused to pay the purchase money, unless she would. The deed of trust vested in Taylor, for the use of Lang-horne’s wife for lifremainder to their joint children in fee, nine negroes, in consideration of her relinquishing her right of dower, love and affection &c. The bill stated that Blanton had levied an execution obtained against Langhorne on part of the trust property, and prayed an injunction, &c.
    Blanton’s answer averred, that part of the debt was due prior to the execution of the deed of trust; and charged the deed to be fraudulent as to all creditors, because when executed Langhorne was largely in debt.
    Depositions were taken to prove Lang-horne was largely in debt when he executed the deed of trust; to prove the value of the slaves; that he said they were his, after the execution of the deed; and that he and his wife exercised a joint ownership over them ; and sold some of them by joint bills of sale. The Chancellor perpetuated the injunction.
    xBouldin for the appellant
    insisted, that the deed was absolutely void because made to defraud creditors. If it be voluntar}' it is clearly void as to creditors. But that is not the only badge of fraud. Granting all one’s effects is another badge, as Twine’s case proves: a conveyance for the use of one’s wife and children is another mark of fraud. Selling property for less than its value is certainly no conclusive evidence of fraud; but selling it to a person, and under circumstances, in which it is the interest of the party to get the least sum possible, is suspicions. At least the. deed is voluntary as to all the property beyond the value of the wife’s dower, which is the consideration alleged.
    S. Taylor contra.
    The argument that the deed is void as to the excess beyond the value of the dower, applies only to creditors at the time, ()
    But Bouldin said, if the deed be fraudulent at all, it is as to every creditor whether before or after, and cited Fonblanque’s equity, ()
    
      
      Fraud of Husband — Effect of Wife’s Participation.— where all the parties to a fraudulent transaction are sui juris, it is null and void as to all of them, though it may have been founded on a valuable consideration. It is not valid even to the extent of such consideration. But this is not the case in regard to a feme covert, who may be a party to such a transaction, and have given value, or relinquished a right or interest, or incurred a loss or risk in consideration thereof. In such a case, the transaction is valid as to her, to the extent of affording compensation for the value given, or right or interest relinquished, or indemnity for the loss or risk incurred as aforesaid. The participation of a wife in the fraud by her husband will not impair her rights. Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Gratt. 512, citing the principal case, Quarles v. Lacy, 4 Munf. 251, and Taylor v. Moore, 2 Rand. 563.
    
    
      
      Postnuptial Settlements — Fraud—Effect.—Thus, although a postnuptial settlement in favor of the wife may have been made under such circumstances that it must be pronounced fraudulent and void as to the creditors of the husband, yet if the wife have relinquished her interest in property on faith ot such settlement, it will be held good to the extent of a just compensation for the interest which she may have parted with, and this though the settlement may have been made subsequent to the relinquishment. Nor, in such case, the fraud of the husband, though the wife participated in it, will not be imputed to her by reason of her coverture, william and Mary College v. Powell, 12 Gratt. 385. 387', citing principal case. To the same effect, see the principal case cited in Penn v. Whitehead, 12 Gratt. 81; Taylor v. Moore, 2 Rand. 579, 584, 592: fnot-note to william and Mary College v. Powell, 13 Gratt, 372; Perry V. Ruby, 81 Va. 327; Strayer y. Long. 86 Va. 560, 10 S. IS. Bep. 574; Glascock v. Brandon, 35 W. Va. 90, 12 S. E. Rep. 1104.
    
    
      
      (a) 4 Munf. 251.
    
    
      
      (b) 1 Fonbl. 261.
    
   ROAJSTÉ, Judge.

The court is of opinion, upon the testimony that the deed of March 1809, in the proceedings contained, from Wm. B. Langhorne to Samuel Taylor, is fraudulent and void, so far as it respects the creditors of the said Langhorne; but as the dower interest of Mrs. Lang-horne in the tract of land conveyed to Thomas Hobson by the deed, also among the proceedings, is admitted to have been relinquished by her in consideration of the provision made for her and her children by the deed first mentioned; and as the fraud of her husband in relation to the said deed, if she participated in it, should not be imputed to her, by reason of her coverture, the court is further of opinion, upon the principles settled by the court in the case of Quarles v. Lacy,() that the *provision made by the said deed should not be. disturbed, so far as it does not exceed the value of the dower interest for which it was substituted.

The decree is therefore to be reversed with costs, and the case is remanded in order to have that value ascertained; after which the injunction is to be perpetuated to the extent of that value, and dissolved for the residue. 
      
      CAiitiULi absent.
     
      
      (c)4 Munf. 251.
     