
    Randy HUTTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JACKSON COUNTY, a political subdivision of the state of Oregon; John Vial, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-36135.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted March 9, 2012.
    Filed March 22, 2012.
    Carolyn Alicia Anderson, Anderson Bradley Krant PC, Ashland, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    David John Riewald, Bullard Smith Jernstedt Wilson, Portland, OR, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: W. FLETCHER, FISHER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Appellant Randy Hutton appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to his employer, Jackson County, on Hutton’s claim for breach of contract. We affirm. Even assuming Hutton had an employment contract with the County providing that he could only be fired for cause, the record shows that the County had good cause to discharge him.

Hutton is not a civil service employee whose termination would be subject to procedural due process requirements. See Papadopoulos v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 14 Or.App. 130, 511 P.2d 854, 870-72 (1973). Accordingly, we review the County’s action under the standard set forth in Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 53 Or.App. 205, 631 P.2d 805 (1981), aff'd 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982). Under this standard, a reviewing court “need only find that there was substantial evidence to support the employer’s decision and that the employer believed that evidence and acted in good faith in discharging the worker.” Id. at 808.

It is undisputed that Hutton received multiple reprimands for violating the County’s vehicle policy and that he took firewood from a County park for personal use at his home without permission. These undisputed facts constitute substantial evidence supporting the County’s decision. Hutton does not dispute that the County believed the evidence. To the extent he contends the County’s reliance on these incidents is mere pretext, Hutton failed to set forth facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the County acted in bad faith.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     