
    JOHN ROSS, Plaintiff, v. ELIZABETH HARDEN, Administratrix, &c., and AMOS H. TROWBRIDGE, Administrator, &c., Defendants.
    EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
    Liability of, in their representative capacity.
    A party who has rendered services to the estate after the death of the testator or intestate, but in pursuance of a contract made with the latter during his life, can recover the value of the same, in an action against the executors or administrators.
    Where such an action has been brought, and a jury found the contract to have been made as claimed by the plaintiff, the verdict cannot be disturbed except for errors of law committed on the trial.
    Where exceptions taken on such a trial are ordered to be heard in the first instance at general term, no question of fact can be considered by the general term; nor the point that the verdict is against the evidence; nor can the verdict be set aside on the ground that it is excessive; and the exception to the decision of the motion for a new trial on the minutes of the court, is also unavailable. The only mode for reviewing such decision is by an appeal from the order denying the motion. (See cases cited in the opinion of the court.)
    EVIDENCE.
    Admissibility of, under § 399, Code.
    In the case at bar the court, against the objection and exception of the defendants, permitted the plaintiff to testify on his own.-, behalf to a conversation and interview with the defendant’s - intestate in regard to the services that he was to perform, and':, which were the subject of this action, upon the theory that the • witness could leave out his own personal share of the conver--sation, and testify only to such part thereof as was had between •= the deceased and another.
    
      Held, to be error, as such testimony was within the rule exclud-s - ing such transactions and communications (Code, § 399). Cases-cited and commented upon: Simmons v. Sisson, 26 N. Y. 276; . Lobdell v. Lobdell, 36 JY. Y. 333; Cary ®. White, 59 JY. Yi. 338; Brague v. Lord, 41 Buper. Gt. Reports, 193.
    Before Curtis, Ch. J., Sanford and Freedman, JJ.
    
      Decided May 8, 1877.
    
      The action was brought to recover for services rendered to the estate of George Harden, deceased.
    The defense was a general denial.
    The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff for $7,200, and $1,276.80 interest, total $8,476.80.
    The defendants moved for a new trial on the minutes, on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence and against the charge, and was excessive as to. damages.
    This motion was denied, and defendants excepted.
    The court ordered the exceptions to be heard in the first instance at the general term.
    
      Geo. W. Lord, for plaintiff.
    
      Charles A. Davison, for defendants.
   By the Court.—Freedman, J.

The plaintiff seeks to recover for services alleged by the complaint to have been rendered by him to the estate of George Harden, deceased, at the request of George Harden shortly previous to his death, and also at the request of the defendants in their representative capacity.

Such double request could be legally pleaded and proven in the action as brought, provided the contract was, in fact, made by the deceased (Benjamin v. Taylor, 12 Barb. 328).

If, on the other hand, the contract was not made by the deceased, but by the administratrix and administrator, the action should have been brought against the defendants individually, for the rule is well settled that the contracts of executors and administrators, although made in the interest and for the benefit of the estate they represent, if made upon a new and independent consideration moving between the promisee and the executors or administrators as promisors, are the personal contracts of such executors and administrators, and do not bind the estate, notwithstanding the consideration moving from the promisee is such that the executors or administrators could properly have paid for the same from the assets, and been allowed for the expenditure in the settlement of their accounts (Austin v. Munro, 47 N. Y. 360 ; Ferrin v. Myrick, 41 Id. 315; Cary v. Gregory, 38 N. Y. Super. Ct. 127).

Upon the trial no attempt was made to show a contract by the administrators, nor was any evidence given of any promise on their part. Plaintiff confined himself to the establishment of a contract with the deceased and the rendition of services thereunder.

If, in pursuance of a contract thus made, services had been rendered before the death of the deceased, there could be no doubt that the- action was maintainable for their value against the defendants in their representative capacity.

The general rule has been established from very early times, with respect to such personal claims as are founded upon any obligation, contract, debt, covenant, or other duty, that the right of action on which the testator or intestate might have been sued in his lifetime, survives his death, and is enforceable against his executor or administrator. And the revised statutes expressly provide that actions of account, and all other actions upon contract, may be maintained against executors in all cases in which the same might have been maintained against their respective testators. And that administrators shall answer and be accountable to others to whom the estate was holden or bound, in the same manner as executors (2 R. S. 113 ; 3 Rev. St. [5th Ed.] 201, §§ 2, 3). The executors or administrators so completely represent their testator or intestate, with respect to the liabilities above mentioned, that every bond, or covenant, or contract of the deceased includes them, although they are not named in the terms of it (Wentw. Off Ex. [14th Ed.] ch. 11, pp. 239, 243), for the executors or administrators of every person are implied in himself (By Lord Macclesfield in Hyde v. Skinner, 2 P. Wms. 197; Harwood v. Hilliard, 2 Mod. 265).

The next question, therefore, is whether it makes any difference that the services were rendered after the death of, but in pursuance of a contract with, George Harden.

There are many cases in which a liability may accrue against the executor or administrator, after the death of the testator or intestate, upon a contract made in his lifetime, although the executor or administrator be not named therein.

Thus, the executor is liable upon a bond which becomes due, or a note payable subsequently to the death of the testator.

So, if A. be bound to build a house for B. before such a time, and A. die before the time, his executor is bound to perform this contract.

And upon a contract by the decedent for the purchase of land, where the land has not been conveyed to him, nor the purchase money paid, the land contracted for is, in equity, considered as real estate, and as belonging to the heirs of the decedent-; and the unpaid purchase money is primarily chargeable upon his personal estate, and is to be paid by his executors or administrators for the benefit of such heirs.

It is only in cases where the contract is personal to the testator or intestate, that no liability attaches upon the executors or administrators, unless a breach was incurred in the lifetime of the deceased.

Thus, if an author undertakes to compose a work and dies before completing it, his executors are discharged from this contract; for the undertaking is merely personal in its nature, and by the intervention of the contractor’s death, has become impossible to be performed.

So, a covenant by a master for the instruction of his apprentices is personal to the master, and his executors are not liable upon it.

But the covenant on the part of the master for maintenance of the apprentice still continues in force, and, therefore, the executor is liable, as far as he has assets, if he neglects to maintain him.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the plaintiff is not precluded from maintaining the action as brought by reason of the fact that the services were rendered after the death of George Harden ; nor is there anything in the relations which he sustained to the deceased and the defendants that makes it inequitable or improper to allow him a fair compensation for the services actually rendered. The circumstances under which they wore rendered were as follows :

Mr. George Harden died on the 6th day of March, 1872. He was the owner of a large personal estate, amounting to about $1,250,000, consisting of stocks, securities, and choses in action. These securities were kept by him in a tin cash-box, which was usually kept in the Bank of the State of New York. On the 4th day of March (1872), the plaintiff, who had been for several years the confidential clerk of Mr. Harden, brought the box containing the securities from the bank to his (Harden’s) residence, No. 22- Cornelia-street. The box was opened by Mr. Harden, and then was again locked by him, and thereupon the key of the box was delivered by him to the plaintiff. At the same time, he stated to his wife (the defendant, Mrs. Elizabeth Harden), in the presence of the plaintiff, what his desires and intentions were in reference to the custody and disposition of the box and its contents after his death.

It is claimed on the part of the plaintiff, that the delivery of the key of the box by Mr. Harden to him, and the declarations made by the deceased at the same time, amounted to an express or implied request, that the plaintiff would take the care and custody of the box and its contents until the administrators were appointed.

After the death of Mr. Harden, the plaintiff took the box to his house, No. 337 Bast Ninth-street, where it remained until the next day, when it was taken by the plaintiff to the Safe Deposit Company, where it was deposited and left in a box hired by the plaintiff, until the 14th day of March, when the box and its contents were handed over by the plaintiff to the defendants, who had been in the mean time appointed administrators.

Mr. Harden has no children or relatives residing in this country. His next of kin resided in Ireland, and after his death they or their representatives came over, and the securities were divided among them.

At the time of Mr. Harden’s death, the plaintiff had in his hands checks which had been signed and delivered to him by Mr. Harden in blank ; also a considerable portion of the stocks' contained in the box stood in the individual name of the plaintiff; whilst a considerable portion of the securities were transferable by delivery, and there is no evidence to show that any person other than Mr. Harden and the plaintiff had any knowledge of the value or extent of his estate, or the nature of the securities, or whether the stocks standing in the plaintiff’s name belonged to him or to Mr. Harden.

From these facts and circumstances it sufficiently appears, assuming them to have been established by competent evidence, that a special contract was made between George Harden and the plaintiff, whereby the latter undertook to take charge of the box and its valuable contents, and to become responsible for its safekeeping from the time of Mr. Harden’s death until administrators could be appointed, and that plaintiff’s services were rendered in pursuance of such contract.

Some arrangement for the safe keeping of this immensely valuable and peculiar property up to the time that the personal representatives might be able to take charge of it, was absolutely necessary to the security of the estate ; and if the contract which is alleged to have been made with the plaintiff, though it remained executory during the life of Mr. Harden, had been made with, and subsequently performed by a stranger or an institution engaged in that line of business, it could not be questioned that such stranger or institution might maintain a claim against the estate for the service rendered. Why, therefore, should the mere fact that the plaintiff was the confidential clerk of George Harden, make any difference ? His general employment as such ceased with the death of his employer, and the administrators of the latter could not compel a continuance of his services. The safe keeping of the personal property entrusted to him, in the condition in which it was, involved duties and responsibilities very different from those which he had previously discharged in the service and under the eye and immediate instructions of the deceased. Besides, it involved a heavy responsibility. Consequently as long as plaintiff fully discharged the high trust reposed in him, I can perceive of no reason why he should not, at least, have the same claim and the same right of action against .the estate that a stranger would have possessed. Public policy is not against it. To deny him the benefit of this position, would leave him without any remedy whatever, for he cannot sue the defendants individually, because no contract was made with them either as individuals or as representatives. Besides, it is not disputed that the services for which compensation is sought, were actually and faithfully rendered, and that they were highly beneficial to the estate.

' As a consequence, a dismissal of the complaint would have been error.

The action being maintainable in the form it was brought and the jury having found the contract to have been made as claimed by the plaintiff, the verdict cannot be disturbed except for errors of law committed on the trial. Defendant’s exceptions were ordered to be heard in the first instance at general term, and the entry of judgment was suspended. Upon such a disposition of the case no question of fact can be considered by the general term, nor the point that the verdict is against the weight of evidence (Mason v. Breslin, 2 Sweeny, 390 ; Hotchkiss v. Hodge, 38 Barb. 118). For the same reason, the verdict cannot be set aside on the ground that it is excessive, for that would involve an examination of the facts upon which it is based.

The exception to the decision of the motion for a new trial upon the minutes of the court is also unavailable to the defendants. The only mode for reviewing such decision is by an appeal from the order dedying the motion (Gregg v. Howe, 37 N. Y. Superior Ct. 424).

The questions left to be considered are mainly questions of evidence.

The only witnesses called to prove the contract with the intestate were the plaintiff and the defendant Elizabeth Harden.

The court, against the objection and exception of the defendants, permitted the plaintiff to testify on his own behalf to a conversation and interview with the defendants’ intestate. In so doing, the court acted upon the theory that the plaintiff could testify to conversations between the deceased and another, although the plaintiff was interested in the subject matter of the conversation, and participated therein, so long as the plaintiff left out Ms own personal share of the conversation, so that the conversation and interview were (under the restriction and limitation imposed by the court upon its admissibility) presented in a mutilated shape.

TMs evidence, it is claimed by the defendants, was received in violation of the 399th section of the Code, and upon a most diligent search I have been unable to find any authority in favor of its admissibility.

The fact that the plaintiff was interested in and took part in the conversation, distinguishes the present from the cases of Simmons v. Sisson (26 N. Y. 276), and Lobdell v. Lobdell (36 Id. 333).

An examination of these cases will show that in neither case was the witness interested in, nor did he take part in, the conversation about which he was interrogated. Both cases were likewise decided upon the peculiar language of the 399th section of the Code, in which the word “ personally ” was used, so as to limit the section to transactions or communications “personally had.” Since that time the 399th section of the Code has been amended, not only in enlarging the class of parties who are subjected to its provisions, but also by striking out the words “ personally had,” and inserting the word “personal” before transaction or communication, so that the exclusion of the evidence depends upon the nature of the transaction or communication, and not upon the parties by or between whom it was physically had or made.

The latter case of Cary v. White (59 N. Y. 338), is claimed, however, as an authority in favor of the admission of the evidence. But the report of this case shows that a majority of the court did not concur upon the point upon which it is claimed to have been affirmed, nor does it appear that the witness had, at the time of the conversation, any interest in it, or that the transaction out of which the litigation arose was the subject of the conversation. What the fact was which was sought to be proved, does not appear in the statement of the case, for the reason that the objection was put upon a ground which rendered a statement of the fact to be proved unnecessary; and inasmuch as the appeal in the court of appeals was from an order granting a new trial, and the court affirmed the order and gave judgment absolute against the appellant pursuant to the stipulation required by the code to be given in such cases, no means are left of ascertaining what evidence would have been elicited, had the excluded question been put. From the opinion of Johnson, J., concurred in by Grover, J., it appears, however, that the only two judges who expressed their views, were of the opinion that the evidence, if admitted, would not have shown a personal transaction or communication between the plaintiff and the deceased, and that for that reason it would have made no difference, if plaintiff had participated in the conversation.

The fácts in the case at bar are materially different. It here appears that the conversation to which the plaintiff testified, related to his employment by the intestate to perform the services for which the action was brought, and related, therefore, to a personal transaction with him and in which he was interested at the time. The plaintiff, after being cautioned by his counsel not to testify to anything that took place between himself and the deceased, was asked to state what the deceased stated in his presence to anybody else, and he commenced by saying: “I am going to.” These were obviously not the words of the intestate, but of the witness, who was going to tell what the intestate had said, and who thereupon proceeded as follows :

“ He said for to hire a safe and to put the things in the Safe Deposit Company, and keep them there until James Gray came out. And told Mrs. Harden, too, that a box should be bought for James Gray exclusively, and that his securities should be separated to the extent of $500,000. He made a memorandum when he was not able to speak scarce, except with an effort, for to separate those securities. The conversation was that a safe was to be got in the Safe Deposit Company. That the valuables were to be deposited there, and kept there until James Gray arrived here.
“ Q. Was anything said in the conversation that you heard, as to who was to take charge of those securities, or of Mrs. Harden, or anything of the kind ? A. Yes, sir; I was to take charge.”

All this testimony was objected to as incompetent and improper, and the last answer defendants’ counsel moved to have stricken out, but the court overruled the objection and denied the motion, to which rulings defendants’ counsel duly excepted.

There can be but little doubt that the direction given in the course of the conversation testified to, that plaintiff should take charge of the securities, that a safe should be hired and that the securities should be deposited in the Safe Deposit Co., was a communication addressedo personally to the witness, and not to Mrs. Harden, for Mrs. Harden herself was to be cared for by the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff so understood it, is rendered certain by the fact that he complied with the direction.

It is upon this testimony that the plaintiff’s claim to having been employed mainly rests, and it is manifest that such contract of employment, if made as claimed, was not only a personal transaction between the witness and the intestate, but that it was personally concluded, and hence it is clearly within the mischief of the rule excluding such transactions and communications. It was none the less personal between the witness and the intestate, because Mrs. Harden participated in it, and as a personal transaction or communication it was infinitely more explicit than the nod of Mr. Lord’s head towards the plaintiff, in Brague v. Lord, recently decided by the court of appeals. That action was brought for services rendered by the plaintiff as an attorney at law to Rufus W. Lord, deceased, the defendant’s testator, in relation to the recovery of certain stolen property consisting of a large amount of valuable securities owned in part by Rufus W. Lord and in part by a Mr. Barron. Upon the question of retainer the plaintiff was allowed to testify, among other things, that he was introduced by Barron to Lord as his, Mr. Barron’s, attorney. That on that occasion Mr. Barron and Mr. Lord talked of a power of attorney they had given, and that they agreed to- ' gether, on the advice of the witness, to revoke that power, which was done. On a subsequent occasion the witness testified to an interview between himself, Mr. Lord, and his brother, Thomas Lord, at which he said the subject of payment for his services arose ; that it was during a negotiation as to an amount to be paid in London, and Mr. Ruido W. Lord said to Mr. Thomas Lord, “We cannot tell what we will have to pay until we know what our lawyer’s charges are,” turning to plaintiff, the three being together, turning his head towards plaintiff.

With respect to this testimony, Rapallo, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says : “ Advice given by the plaintiff to Mr. Lord was a personal communication and transaction between them within the meaning of the 399th section, and, connected with the proof that Mr. Lord accepted and acted upon such advice, was material, and tended to maintain the issue on the part of the plaintiff. Mr. Lord’s remark about what he would have to pay his lawyers, turning towards plaintiff, appears to have been addressed to plaintiff, as well as to Mr. Thomas Lord, and may have satisfied the jury that Mr. Lord looked upon plaintiff as his lawyer throughout the transactions, and conceded that he would have to pay him as such. The remark to Mr. Thomas Lord about paying their lawyers, did not of itself amount to much.' It derived its significance wholly from the alleged turning towards plaintiff and thus giving him to understand that he was the party referred to. This, we think, was a personal communication within the intent of the 399th section.”

Entertaining these views, the court of appeals reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, and this notwithstanding the fact that there was other evidence in the case upon which the jury might have found a retainer.

The reception of the evidence above referred to therefore constituted error.

Defendants’ exceptions should be sustained, the verdict set aside, and a new trial 'ordered with costs to defendants to abide the event.

Sanford, J.

I concur in the result, and in so much of the opinion of Freedman, J., as holds that the plaintiff was erroneously examined as a witness in his own behalf in regard to a personal transaction or communication between himself and the defendants’ intestate.

Curtis, Ch. J.

The defendants claim that the evidence wholly fails to establish any employment of the plaintiff by George Harden, the deceased, or by the defendants, to render the services sued for.

George Harden died March 6, 1872, leaving a personal estate variously estimated above $1,200,000, consisting of money, stocks, securities and dioses in action. Many of the stocks and securities stood individually in the name of the plaintiff at the time, and were transferable by delivery. The plaintiff had been for many years his messenger and clerk, at a salary of $60 per monthi The deceased had no children, and his relatives and next of kin resided in Ireland.

On March 4, 1872, two days before his death, the plaintiff brought from the bank to the house of the deceased, the tin box that'contained these securities. The deceased opened the box, in the presence of his wife, the administratrix, and of the plaintiff. A conversation occurred, and when the plaintiff testified, the court excluded his evidence as to what was said to him by the deceased, but allowed him, under defendant’s exception, to testify as to what he said to his wife, Mrs. Harden. The construction given to the 399th section of the Code in Carey v. White, 59 N. Y. 336, and in Brague v. Lord, in the court of appeals, not yet reported, was as it appears to me, adhereá to by the court, as far as the conversation presents anything intellegible, which was very little. The testimony of the plaintiff under this ruling, as to what was said to Mrs. Harden is very obscure, and fails to show satisfactorily any request by the deceased that he should take the custody of his personal estate, and has little if any relevancy to the request and employment alleged by the plaintiff. It amounted in substance to the deceased giving his wife some general statement, as to what he intended to do in' placing and separating his securities, and saying to her, that she would be well taken care of, and that the plaintiff would see to her, and see that she was all'right. It appears that he was scarcely able to speak; but his direction seems to have been that the plaintiff should take charge of his wife. The defendant, Mrs. Harden, testified that the deceased at this interview “ opened the box and was going to separate the securities, he told Ross to ’ get another box made, and put James Gray’s name on the box, and have the securities separated.” She also says that “he then gave the key to Mr. Ross.” On the next day, or the day after, the plaintiff drew the balances in the banks standing to George Harden’s credit, and amounting to over $100,000, in bank notes, and took them to Ms house, when he found him dead on his arrival. These bills he then put in the tin box, and carried it across the city to his own residence a day or two after, about dark, kept it over night, and the next day hired a box in the safe deposit company, in his own name, 'and placed it there. He also telegraphed to James Gray, the nephew of the deceased, in Ireland, who soon reached here.

This box and its contents were delivered to the defendants by the plaintiff, on the 14th of March, when ‘ they received their letters of administration.

The evidence appears to have satisfied the jury, that there was a contract, express or implied, between the plaintiff and the deceased, by which the former was to safely keep and preserve this large personal estate, until the rights of the next of kin could be protected by a proper notification and administration.

The custody of this personal property in the condition in which it was, involved a great responsibility, on the part of the plaintiff, that could only be properly discharged by reticence, and by the exercise of good judgment and integrity. It involved duties and responsibilities very different from those which he had previously discharged in the service, and under the eye and immediate instructions of the deceased.

The jury, if the case came properly before them, had a right to look at what transpired at the interview, when the deceased gave the key of Ms box to the plaintiff, and to put such an interpretation upon that act, in view of the situation of all parties, as expressed the real intentions of the deceased. Taken in connection with what Mrs. Harden testifies he previously told the plaintiff, and his -failing condition, the evidence perhaps warranted the jury in finding that the defendant employed the plaintiff to perform the duty which it is not disputed he discharged in a faithful and commendable manner.

There is another difficulty in these questions of fact. They come before the general term in a case where the unsuccessful party moves for- a new trial, upon exceptions taken by him at the trial, and which have been ordered to be heard in the first instance at the general term, and judgment in the mean time suspended. In such a contingency it is held, that at the hearing, no question of fact can be discussed, nor the point that the verdict is against evidence (Mason v. Breslin, 2 Sweeny, 390 ; Hotchkiss v. Hodge, 38 Barb. 118; Dickerson v. Wason, 48 Id. 412).

Whether the verdict was excessive, is a question not entirely free from embarrassment. The plaintiff valued his services at $10,000. The defendants called no witnesses to show what compensation or commission would be charged by institutions or persons, usually performing similar services, with similar responsibilities. One of the defendants testified, that she had said to the plaintiff, that if it was not paid, she would pay it herself. The other defendant testified, that he found there was very little to be done for the estate ; that it was not an intricate estate, that the affairs were all personal property, and mostly in this tin box, that he thought the estate was worth about $1,200,000, and that the surrogate allowed him for his compensation as administrator $12,000. This was one per cent, on his estimate of the amount of the estate. In every commercial community, where great responsibilities are confided to a person possessing good judgment and strict integrity, the measure of compensation is proportionally increased. The possession and exercise of these qualities, under such circumstances, command the highest appreciation. As to this administrator, who with clerical aid, and legal advice, and under the protection of the law, thus discharged his trust, it is difficult to find that he was more than justly remunerated.

When we see this plaintiff, comparatively unprotected and unaided, and at the most critical time, taking charge of this, great amount of money and securities, for the benefit of these absent relatives of the deceased, and discharging Ms trust and its grave responsibilities, with excellent judgment and with integrity, it is quite possible the jury had some reason for considering that he was entitled to a compensation which they estimated at about one-half per cent, on Ms valuation of this property. It is urged, that considering the character and extent of the evidence placed by the parties before the jury, on this point, there is an absence of controlling reasons to set aside the verdict as excessive, and that it is against the policy of the law to disturb the finding of a jury in this respect, except to remedy some clearly shown wrong or grievance. Yet when we consider the plaintiff’s relations with the deceased, and that a species of moral obligation devolved upon him to discharge this duty irrespective of any question of compensation, we are disposed to think that the verdict is excessive, and that a questionable precedent should not be established.

The exception taken by the defendants to the exclusion by the judge óf the question addressed to one-of the defendants, asking Mm to state the usual range: of salaries to bank-clerks, occupying confidential posiions, in March, 1872, is not well taken. The position they occupy has little if any resemblance to the trust confided to the plaintiff, and executed by him. The court also properly excluded the evidence offered to show that the plaintiff had been for a time subsequently employed by one of the defendants as her.clerk or as such by both of them. Such employments, was foreign to the issues, and totally irrelevant.

The court exercised a just discretion in denying the defendant’s application to amend the complaint at the trial.

If there had actually been any payment for these services to the plaintiff, why should the defendants have served him, before he commenced his action, with a rejection of his claim, and also have omitted to have set up a payment in the answer %

It appeared at the trial, by the administrator’s testimony that he had retained $10,000 to meet this claim. To this the defendants excepted. It was not followed up by further evidence ; and the judge charged the jury, that it was wholly irrelevant, and had nothing to do with the case. This evidence affords no ground for granting a new trial, even if the judge had ' not thus charged, in respect to it. It was a proper course for the administrator to take, for his own protection, and such a course as any discreet business man would ordinarily take, and in no way calculated to lead the jury to consider the circumstance an admission of the plaintiff’s claim. The judge charged, that there was no evidence of a promise by the defendants to pay the plaintiff’s claim. Mrs. Harden in her testimony did not speak for the defendants, but gave expression simply of her individual appreciation of the value of plaintiff’s services, when she spoke of paying the claim herself, if it was not paid.

The plaintiff testified at the trial “ that he had no claim against the estate for any services rendered prior to Mr. Harden’s death.” Consequently, if entitled to recover at all, it must be for services rendered after his death, and either at the request of the deceased, or at the request of his administrator and administratrix. But his employment by Mr. Harden necessarily ceased when death terminated the latter’s capacity to employ any one as the future steward or custodian of his personalty, and when at the same moment all his personal estate became vested in his personal representatives by operation of law (Patchen v. Wilson, 4 Hill, 57). Letters of administration relate back from the time of their issue for some purposes (Priest v. Watkins, 2 Hill; 225 ; In re Faulkner, 1 How. Pr. 207; Vroom v. Van Horn, 10 Paige, 558; Allen v. Eighmie, 9 Hun, 201).

No cause of action is established against the defendants as personal representatives of the deceased, by evidence of what services the plaintiff rendered by the request of the deceased, after his death.

The complaint is against the defendants as administrator and administratrix, both in form and substance. It demands judgment against them as such. It is in no respect against the defendants, individually. It alleges that the plaintiff also rendered services at their request made in their representative capacity.

This presents a serious difficulty in the plaintiff’s case. It is the rule, that for services rendered at the request of an administrator, though for the benefit of the estate he represents, the estate is not bound, and that no recovery can be had against him in his representative capacity, or to be levied de bonis testatoris. (Austin v. Munro, 47 N. Y. 366, and cases cited; Bucklin v. Chapin, 1 Lansing, 450; Cary v. Gregory, 38 Superior Ct. R. 127).

The defendants were entitled to have their motions to dismiss the complaint granted, and their exceptions to the refusals were well taken and should be sustained, the verdict set aside, and a new trial granted, with costs to defendants to abide event.  