
    Helen Huntley, Respondent, v State of New York, Appellant.
    Argued March 29, 1984;
    decided May 15, 1984
    
      POINTS OF COUNSEL
    
      Robert Abrams, Attorney-General CMichael S. Buskus 
    
    called finding of fact of a suicidal ideation on April 5 is erroneous as a matter of law. (Somersall v New York Tel. Co., 52 NY2d 157; Blum v Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 NY 241; Noce u Kaufman, 2 NY2d 347; Fiederlein v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 80 AD2d 821, 56 NY2d 573.) II. The medical judgment rule governs negligence and medical malpractice claims relating to the level of supervision of psychiatric patients. (Topel v Long Is. Jewish Med. Center, 55 NY2d 682; Mossman v Albany Med. Center, 34 AD2d 263; Fiederlein v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 56 NY2d 573; Koenigsmark v State of New York, 80 AD2d 707, 55 NY2d 928; Hirsh v State of New York, 8 NY2d 125; Holtfoth v Rochester Gen. Hosp., 304 NY 27; Sheehan v North Country Community Hosp., 273 NY 163; Flanagan v Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 NY2d 427; Hendrickson v Hodkin, 276 NY 252; Dillon v Rocka-way Beach Hosp., 284 NY 176.) III. Subtraction of collateral source payments is required, both in medical malpractice actions and in negligence actions claiming improper delivery of medical services. (Coyne v Campbell, 11 NY2d 372; Healy v Rennert, 9 NY2d 202; Drinkwater v Dinsmore, 80 NY 390; Rutzen v Monroe County Long Term Care Program, 104 Mise 2d 1000.)
    
      Richard K. Hughes and Frederick F. Shantz for respondent.
    I. This court should not review questions of fact decided by the Court of Claims and affirmed by the court below. (Mangold v Neuman, 57 NY2d 627; Howard v Murray, 38 NY2d 695; 67 Wall St. Co. v Franklin Nat. Bank, 37 NY2d 245; Pfohl v Wipperman, 34 NY2d 597; Láveme v Incorporated Vil. of Laurel Hollow, 18 NY2d 635, 386 US 682; Matter of Farrell v Drew, 19 NY2d 486; Gutin v Mascali & Sons, 11 NY2d 97; Goehle v Town ofSmithtown, 55 NY2d 995; Felt v Olson, 51 NY2d 977; Electrolux Corp. v Val-Worth, Inc., 6 NY2d 556.) II. The lower courts’ determination of negligence is amply supported by the record and should be affirmed. (Topel u Long Is. Jewish Med. Center, 55 NY2d 682; Hirsh v State of New York, 8 NY2d 125; Comiskey v State of New York, 71 AD2d 699; Liddie v State of New York, 190 Mise 347; Zophy v State of New York, 27 AD2d 414; Collins v State of New York, 23 AD2d 898,17 NY2d 542; Callahan v State of New York, 179 Mise 781, 266 App Div 1054; Brown v State of New York, 84 AD2d 644; Cohen v State of New York, 51 AD2d 494, 41 NY2d 1086; Wright v State of New York, 31 AD2d 421.) III. The decision of the Court of Claims, as affirmed by the court below, is not in conflict with decisions of this court. {Topel v Long Is. Jewish Med. Center, 55 NY2d 682; Fieder-lein v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 80 AD2d 821, 56 NY2d 573; Koenigsmark v State of New York, 80 AD2d 707, 55 NY2d 928; Cohen v State of New York, 51 AD2d 494; Bell v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 90 AD2d 270; Centeno u City of New York, 48 AD2d 812, 40 NY2d 932.) IV. The collateral source rule should not be overturned or modified. {Healy v Rennert, 9 NY2d 202; Silinsky v State-Wide Ins. Co., 30 AD2d 1; Cady v City of New York, 19 AD2d 822, 14 NY2d 660; Castleberry v Hudson Val. Asphalt Corp., 60 AD2d 878; Luddy v State of New York, 50 Mise 2d 992; Eichel v New York Cent. R.R. Co., 375 US 253; New York State Thruway Auth. v Civetta Constr. Corp., 62 AD2d 530; Hale v State of New York, 53 AD2d 1025; Twitchell v MacKay, 78 AD2d 125; Gioia v State of New York, 22 AD2d 181.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Where a psychiatric hospital patient with a history of instability communicated her specific suicide plan involving an off-premises location to a hospital staff member, failure to transmit such information to the staff psychiatrist (who controlled the patient’s privileges to leave hospital premises) constituted a breach of duty and rendered the hospital liable for negligence. CPLR 4010, which limits the application of the collateral source rule in medical malpractice actions, has no application to the hospital’s liability for negligence.

At issue on this appeal is the liability of appellant, the State of New York, for injuries sustained by respondent, Helen C. Huntley, a patient at the State’s Hutchings Psychiatric Center, when she left the hospital premises, unsupervised, and jumped from the roof of a nearby parking garage. The Court of Claims determination in respondent’s favor, finding the evidence sufficient to establish appellant’s negligence, was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division.

Given the correct application of legal standards and affirmed findings of fact, our scope of review is limited. Where such findings are supported by evidence in the record, they are conclusive in this court. (Humphrey v State of New York, 60 NY2d 742.) Here, there was ample evidence to support the finding that appellant on the day of the accident failed in its duty to supervise its patient adequately, leading to her injury (see Martindale v State of New York, 269 NY 554; Horton v Niagara Falls Mem. Med. Center, 51 AD2d 152 [Simons, J.]). Apart from respondent’s history of mental instability and her depression, deterioration and unusual behavior shortly before the accident, there was evidence that, one day prior to her jump from the garage roof, respondent had communicated this specific suicide plan to a hospital staff member, and that this information was not transmitted to the staff psychiatrist so that he could consider what impact — if any — it should have on respondent’s privileges to leave hospital premises unsupervised. While a medical judgment might have been reached to continue respondent’s privileges, and an error in such judgment would not have given rise to liability for malpractice (Fiederlein v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 56 NY2d 573; Topel v Long Is. Jewish Med. Center, 55 NY2d 682), here, any opportunity to form a medical judgment was foreclosed by a failure to transmit the information, and no measures were taken to secure respondent’s physical safety.

Nor did the Appellate Division err in refusing to reduce the judgment, in accordance with CPLR 4010, by amounts respondent received from collateral sources. CPLR 4010 is limited to actions for medical malpractice, and is thus inapplicable to reduce this common-law negligence award.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wacht-ler, Meyer, Simons and Kaye concur in Per Curiam opinion.

Order affirmed, with costs.  