
    Case 7 — PETITION EQUITY
    Sept. 11.
    Ketler, &c. v. Thompson.
    APPEAL PROM M’CRACKEN COMMON PLEAS COURT.
    1. A SURETY IN A RENEWAL BOND EXECUTED BY A SHERIPP, as provided by see. 25, chap. 100, General Statutes, is liable in an action for contribution to a surety in the sheriff’s official bond.
    
      It is no objection to the •validity of the renewal bond that the sheriff was in office at the time the General Statutes took effect, nor that he went voluntarily into the court and executed it.
    
      The renewal bond did not retroact, but it bound the sureties to make good any losses that should result from future failures of the sheriff to perform such duties as then rested on him in the collection and return of executions then in his hands.
    
      From the date of the execution of the renewal bond, the sureties in the two bonds were co-sureties, and jointly bound to answer for the acts of their principal.
    BIGGER & REED and Q. Q. QUIGLEY por appellants.
    The bond executed January 15,1873, was under the Revised Statutes, and for the full term of two years; and there being no order of the county court requiring Grundy to renew his official bond, and no notice or motion on the part of his sureties for counter security, the second .bond, dated January 26, 1874, was without warrant of law and void, there being no consideration or legal requirement for its execution.
    The sureties in the second bond, if liable, are only bound for defalcations of the sheriff on process which came to his hands after its execution. (Colyer v. Higgins, 1 Duvall, 6; Revised Statutes, secs. 23, 25, chap. 91.)
    The executions having been placed in the hands of the sheriff before the execution of the second bond, the sureties in that bond were not liable for the sheriff’s failure or default thereon before or after that date.
    L. D. HUSBANDS for appellee.
    The only question in this case is, will the law give to the appellee a judgment for contribution against appellants ?
    The case of Oolyer v. Higgins (1 Duvall, 6) has no application to the question involved in this.
    Different sheriffalties never lap under our statute; their duties are not blended'; every official term is a unit in itself.
    The second bond of the sheriff was executed in compliance with sec. 25, chap. 100, General Statutes.
    The sureties in each bond undertook that the sheriff should perform all the duties of his office of sheriff for his whole term.
    The last bond was co-extensive with the first, except it did not cover any actual existing breach at the time it was executed; but it did cover all the business then in the sheriff’s hands unfinished, and as to which no breach of duty or default had then been committed by him as sheriff; as well as all future business and breaches and defalcations. The sureties in the two bonds are co-sureties. (5 Dana, 510; 1 Mon. 177, 208; 15 Peters, 187; 1 Howard, 104; 17 Howard, 437; 13 B. Mon. 473; 6 B. Mon. 292, 560; 2 Met. 203, 204.)
    The statute directing the county court to require the sheriff to renew his bond annually is remedial, and should be construed liberally.
   CHIEF JUSTICE LINDSAY

delivered the opinion of the court.

Grundy was qualified as sheriff of McCracken County in January, 1873, and Thompson and others became sureties on his official bond. In January, 1874, he appeared in the McCracken County Court, and gave an additional or renewal bond, with' the appellants, Ketler and Billingsly, and others as his sureties. This bond was executed pursuant to section 25, chapter 100, of the General Statutes, which provides that “It shall be the duty of the county court to cause the sheriff annually to renew his bond required by this chapter, and oftener if the court may deem proper;” and it is no objection to its validity that Grundy was in office when the General ■Statutes took effect, nor that he voluntarily came into court, and did that which the court was bound to require him to do. When this bond was executed the sheriff had in his hands ■certain executions theretofore issued, which he had already levied. Afterward he sold the property levied on and collected a considerable sum of money. He failed to pay this money to the persons entitled to receive it, and failed to return the executions for more than thirty days after their respective return-days.

The plaintiffs instituted their actions on the bond executed in 1873. Judgments were recovered, and Thompson, the only solvent surety on that bond, was compelled to pay between $1,600 and $1,700.

The sheriff being insolvent, Thompson sued Ketler and Billingsly, the only solvent sureties on the bond executed in 1874 for contribution. Judgment was rendered in his favor, and they have appealed to this court.

The condition of their bond was that Grundy should, by himself or deputies, well and truly discharge all the duties of his office, and pay over to such persons, at such times as they might respectively be entitled to the same, all moneys that might come to his or their hands as sheriff. The object of the statute under which this bond was taken was to provide additional security to the public. The bond took effect immediately, and operated as well for the benefit of the parties who then had executions in the hands of the sheriff as fox ■those who might thereafter place them in his hands. It did not retroact so as to cover past defalcations or breaches of duty touching such executions, but it bound the sureties to make good any losses that should result from future failures by the sheriff to perform such duties as then rested on him in their collection and return. The breaches of duty for which Thompson was compelled to answer were the sheriff’s failure to pay over the money lawfully collected after the execution of their bond, and the failure to make due return of the executions. These breaches fall within the very terms of the bond and are covered by it. From the date of its execution the sureties in the two bonds were co-sureties, and were jointly bound to answer for the acts of their principal.

In this view of the case there can be no doubt that the judgment appealed from is correct and proper. It is therefore affirmed.  