
    PORTER v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Oct. 19, 1910.
    On Motion for Rehearing, Dec. 21, 1910.)
    1. Criminal Daw (§ 1088) — Appeal—Record —Instructions.
    Special instructions, whether given or refused, must be authenticated by the signature of the trial judge to be reviewable on appeal.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Daw, Cent. Dig. § 2797; Dec. Dig. § 1088.]
    2. Criminal Daw (§ 1120) — Appeal — Evidence-Questions Reviewable.
    A bill of exceptions complaining of the exclusion of evidence which does not state the answer or the expected answer of the witness cannot be considered on appeal.
    [Ed. Note. — For other .cases, see Criminal Daw, Cent. Dig. § 2935; Dec. Dig. § 1120.]
    3. Assault and Battery (§ 83) — Aggravated Assault — Evidence—Admissibility.
    Where, on a trial for aggravated assault on an officer, the evidence showed that a few minutes before the assault there had been a difficulty between accused and a third person, and when prosecutor after the difficulty accosted accused she had a large knife open in her hand and used profane and threatening language, and that prosecutor in endeavoring to arrest her and prevent injury to himself was assaulted by her, the exclusion of evidence relating wholly to the difficulty with the third person and to the conduct of prosecutor after the assault on him was not erroneous.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Assault and Battery, Cent. Dig. §§ 128-130; Dec. Dig. § 83.]
    4. Criminal Daw (§ 595) — Continuance-Absence op Witness.
    The refusal of a continuance on a trial for aggravated assault on the ground of the absence of a witness who would testify only to matters occurring in a controversy between accused and a third person prior to the assault was not reversible error.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Daw, Cent. Dig. §§ 1323-1327; Dee. Dig. § 595.]
    
      5. CRIMINAL Law (§ 1159) — 'Verdict—Conclusiveness.
    A verdict of guilty, supported by the evidence of the state, if believed, will not be disturbed on appeal.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3074-3083; Dec. Dig. § 1159.]
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    6. Criminal Law (§ 830) — -Evidence — Instructions.
    Where the indictment for aggravated assault alleged that the assault was made with a knife, alleged to be a deadly weapon, and that by means thereof there was inflicted serious bodily injury on prosecutor, and that the assault was committed on him while in the discharge of his duties as an officer, and the court submitted all of the issues, and the verdict was general, the failure to give a charge defining a serious bodily injury was reversible error, though the requested charge thereon was not technically correct.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2012, 2017; Dec. Dig. § 830.]
    Appeal from McLennan County Court; Tom L. McCullough, Judge.
    Ida Porter was convicted of aggravated assault, and she appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Taylor & Gallagher, for appellant. John A. Mobley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
       For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dee. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
    
      
       For other eases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes-
    
   RAMSEY, J.

By information filed in the county court of McLennan county appellant was charged with an aggravated assault upon one J. A. Tilley. The grounds of aggravation were, first, that serious bodily injury was inflicted upon Tilley; second, that the assault ivas inflicted with a deadly weapon; and, third, that he was at the time an officer in the discharge of his duty, of which appellant had been informed, and which she knew at the time of said assault. On trial she was found guilty as charged, and her punishment assessed at a fine of $50 and three months’ confinement in the county jail.

The facts are in some confusion, and there is an irreconcilable conflict between the testimony of the witnesses for the state and for the defendant. It is shown by the testimony, however, of all the witnesses that on the night in question, a few minutes before the assault charged, that there had been a controversy between appellant and one Sparks, also an officer, in which, tinder some of the testimony, Sparks was the aggressor. Practically all the testimony, however, shows that the controversy with Sparks had ended; that appellant had moved some considerable distance from the place where such difficulty occurred; and that McGinty, who was with her at the time, and over whom the controversy between herself and Sparks had arisen, had left and was not present at the occurrence of the events forming the basis of the prosecution. Tilley testified that when he ac-cpsted appellant she had a large knife open in her hands, and was threatening to cut some white man, and was cursing and swearing, and using offensive and belligerent language, and that he sought to take the knife from her, advising her of his official position; that she declined to give up the knife, undertook to cut him, and that in endeavoring to arrest her and prevent injury to himself he struck her, and that she returned the blow, cutting him in the eye and cheek.

1. The court gave, as far as it went, a correct charge. This was supplemented by seven special charges given at the request of counsel for appellant in which practically every issue arising in the testimony was submitted in a manner most favorable to appellant. We find in the record a number of special instructions — seven in number — which do not appear by indorsement of the county judge to have been either given or refused. There is in the record a marginal entry that would suggest that these charges were refused, but they are in no manner authenticated as refused by the court. As was said in the case of Smith v. State, 27 Tex. App. 50, 10 S. W. 751: “It is a rule of practice in this state that special instructions, whether given or refused by the trial judge, must be authenticated by his signature, and if the record fails to show that such instructions were refused the appellate court will presume that they were given.” Jeffreys v. State, 9 Tex. App. 598.

2. We find in the record a number of bills of exception to the exclusion of evidence, some of which we cannot consider for the reason that they do not distinctly set out what the answers of the witness would have been. It is well settled in this state that where the bill of exceptions does not state the answer or the expected answer of the witness with reference to the excluded testimony, the same cannot be considered. Roberson v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 297, 109 S. W. 160; White v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 625, 25 S. W. 784; Childers v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 392, 35 S. W. 654; Bailey v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 579, 40 S. W. 281; Adams v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 285, 33 S. W. 354; Rodgers v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 612, 31 S. W. 650. Some of the bills are sufficiently definite, however, to be excepted from this rule, but all of the testimony so offered relates to occurrences in the controversy with Sparks or to conduct of the witness Tilley after the assault upon him, and having relation to a subsequent plea of guilty on the part of appellant for disturbing the peace. This testimony was offered as tending to show motive, interest, and bias, and was probably admissible for this purpose, but in view of the unquestipned attitude of the witness we think could have added little, if any, weight to his evident hostility to appellant, and, if admitted, the testimony could not have changed the result.

3. On the trial an application was made for continuance on account of the absence and for the lack of the testimony of Garfield Lander. The testimony of this witness relates to matters occurring in the controversy with Sparks, which preceded the assault which is the basis of this prosecution. We do not think that this was a matter of such importance as would have justified or required the court to have continued the case.

4. As we have stated, there is a decided conflict in the testimony. If the evidence of' the state witnesses is to be conceded to be true, it cannot be doubted that the state has made out a case. If the testimony of appellant is true, the conviction is an outrage, and the conduct of Tilley and others with him yet more unwarranted and unwarrantable. The jury on a fair submission, however, has seen proper to credit the testimony of the state, and we do not believe, as presented, we would be authorized to interfere.

Finding no error in the record, it is ordered that the judgment of conviction be, and the same is hereby, in all things affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

When the opinion in this case was delivered, it was shown by the record then before us that certain special charges requested appeared not to have been indorsed either given or refused, and as the record then appeared these matters were not the subject of review. By certiorari duly perfected it is made ■ to appear that all of these charges were in fact marked refused by the court.

Among other charges so requested was the following: “A serious bodily injury means in law an injury which gives rise to apprehension — an injury which is attended with danger to life. Now, if you should believe from the evidence that the defendant did cut the witness Tilley with a knife, and did inflict an injury upon him, but have a reasonable doubt whether such injury was one attended with danger to the life of said Tilley, you cannot convict the defendant of aggravated assault and battery under the count of the information charging that the defendant inflicted serious bodily injury upon said Til-ley.” The indictment in the case charged that the assault was made with a knife, which was alleged to be a deadly weapon, and that by means thereof there was inflicted serious bodily injury upon Tilley, and that the assault was committed upon him while in the discharge of his duties as an officer. The verdict in the case was general. The court submitted all of the issues on which the assault was declared to be an aggravated one. There was in the charge of the court no definition at all of what constituted serious bodily injury. While the special charge was not perhaps technically accurate, it was substantially so, and was sufficient to call the attention of the court to the error in his charge, and in substance, at least, should have been given.

For the failure of the court to give an instruction covering this matter so called to his attention, the motion for rehearing will be granted, the judgment of affirmance set aside, and the cause reversed and remanded.

McCORD, X, absent.  