
    William Robertson, Trustee of the Commercial Bank of Natchez, vs. William Hoy et al.
    It is error to dismiss a suit brought by a bank, after the issuance of a quo warranto against it, and injunction under the law of 1843 ; although the injunction may have been violated by the institution of the suit, yet the remedy was not by dismissing the suit, but by a proceeding for a contempt, against the party and the attorney.
    Whether such a suit is properly brought,- or what is.the effect of such an injunction under the law of 1843 —• Query ?
    
    In error from the circuit court of Madison county; Hon. Robert C. Perry, judge.
    The Commercial Bank of Natchez sued William Hoy and others on the 24th day of April, 1845, on a note in favor of the bank, made by defendants, for $1000, due June 13, 1839. Process was issued, and returned executed on defendants. No further steps were taken in the cause until the 21st day of April, 1847, when Mr. Robertson suggested the dissolution of the bank, moved the court to revive the suit in his name as trustee thereof, and proved the judgment of forfeiture against the bank, and his appointment as trustee by the circuit court of Adams county, on the 12th day of June, 1845. This motion was overruled; defendants at the same time moved to dismiss the suit, because the bank was enjoined from the collection of its debts at the time of the institution of the suit; and introduced as evidence to sustain this motion, the writ of injunction, which was issued March Sth, 1844, and executed March 11th, 1844, and the record proceedings, and judgment of forfeiture against the bank, and the appointment of Robertson trustee, &c. June 12th, 1845. Robertson objected to the introduction of this evidence; the objection was overruled. The court sustained the motion, and ordered the suit to be dismissed. Robertson sued out this writ of error.
    
      Tupper, for plaintiff in error,
    Cited Com. Bank of Rodney v. The 'State, 4 S. <fc M. 439; Eden on Inj. 52 ; Ham v. Schuyler, 2 John. Ch. Rep. 140 ; Freem. Ch. Rep. 347; 2 Verm. 519; 3 P. Will. 146; Nevitt v. Bank of Port Gibson, 6 S. & M. 328; 3 How. 78; Com. Bank of Manchester v. Waters, 10 S. & M. 559.
    
      H. A. H. Lawson, for defendant in error,
    ' Cited Hutch. Code, 330 ; Story, Com. Eq. 161, § 868; lb. 164, § 861 ; 2 Madd. Ch. 220 ; Mills v. Cobby, 1 Merivale, 3 ; 2 lb. 222 ; 6 S. & M. 205; 10 S. & M. 559.
   Mr. Chief Justice ShaRkey

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case presents a single point. Suit was brought by the Commercial Bank of Natchez, after proceeding by quo warranto had been commenced against it, and pending the injunction issued under the act of 1843, but before the charter had been judicially declared forfeited. On motion of defendants, the court dismissed the suit because of the pendency of the injunction, and this is the error complained of.

An injunction, operates not upon a cause of action, but as a restraint upon the person. 1 Madd. 126; 2 Story’s Eq. Jur. § 861. And for a violation of injunction after it has been served, or even after notice, the party, as well as his attorney, is liable to be punished for a contempt. An injunction before suit brought has the effect to prevent such a proceeding. Jeremy’s Eq. 341; 2 Madd. 220. But'the corrective is not by dismissing the suit at law, if it should be brought. The decision in the case of the Commercial Bank of Manchester v. Waters, 10 S. & M. 559, is decisive of this question. The bank was under injunction, and, notwithstanding, caused an execution to be levied. On motion to set aside the levy and to supersede the execution, it was held that the remedy Was not by supersedeas at law, but by attachment against the party or his attorney ; and accordingly the supersedeas was discharged.

It is not necessary that we should decide in this case whether the suit was properly or improperly brought; nor do we give any opinion as to the effect of such an injunction as that issued under the act of 1843. We reserve these questions until they shall be properly presented.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.  