
    Bell and another against The Marine Insurance Company.
    the distance The defendants having, upon the ex-]euer°of°he captain of a ship, stating that she was ancf whichis 'rithin the r?ck,°but aT Of about nine miles from surcdThe vesmerickto'1" Philadelphia, cWed^sheTvas at Limerick according to the piahitiffs and stá6 d"d<:P"f the defenCourt refused to set aside the verdict.
    Insurance Pldíadeiphia to Cork and -delphia. The afterwards Ehnerickf On to the under■writers, a new agreement was entered on the margin of the policy in the following words: — «It being represented by the assured, that the Amiable was ordered from Cork to Limerick, and had arrived there, it is hereby agreed that for a further consideration of one per cent., to us paid, -we engageto see the said ship from thence, instead of Cork, back to Philadelphia," A loss having happened while the vessel was in the port of Limerick, it was held, tbat it was covered by the new agreement.
    THIS was an action on a policy of insurance on the ship Qn the 05th September, , Amiable, Erickson, master, u at and from Philadelphia to Cork, and back to Philadelphia.” The ship sailed from Philadelphia on the 10th ¥uh/, 1819, laden with staves, and . , , , , , _ . rT . arrived at the cove or Cork on the 4th September. Having suffcTed damage in getting up to the cove, the consignees sold the cargo deliverable at Limericks and on the 16th September, the ship sailed for Limerick, having on board a cóasting and Shannon river pilot, she entered the mouth of the Shannon, and on the 06th proceeded up to Grass Island, where she anchored. The captain, being informed by the pilot that he could proceed no farther, without lightening the ship, went on the 07th SepMember to .the custom house at Limerick, and entered the ship. He then returned to Grass Island and took out part 4 . , 4 the cargo, after which he proceeded in the ship up the r’ver to the Poole* the safest place for ships of considerable burthen, especially if they are sharp Built, like the Amiable. • At the Poole they cast anchor, and in , a few hours, at facing of the tide, the ship struck upon a rock, by which she received so much iniury that upon a survey she was • J condemned as unfit for sea, and not worth repairing. The f>ort Limerick extends to Torbet, about thirty-five miles below the town of Limerick, and twenty-six miles below Grass Island. The Poole is about two miles below Limerick, seven al:iove Grass Island. On the 27th September the captain wrote to the plaintiffs from Limerick, informing them *bat the ship was lying at Grass Island, where she arrived before; that he was going down with lighters that evening, and should commence the discharge of the cargo the next day ; which was necessary to lighten the ship before she could come up to the port. This letter was shewn to the defendants, who thereupon came to a new agreement with the plaintiffs on the 5th November, 1819, which was entered on the margin of the policy in the following words : —“ It being represented by the assured, that the Amiable was ordered from Cork to Limerick, and had arrived there, it is hereby agreed, that for a further consideration of one per cent., to us paid, we engage to see the said ship from thence^ instead of Cork, back to Philadelphia.”
    The cause came to trial before Tilghm an C. J. at NisiPrius, when two questions arose: — 1. Whether the ship had arrived safe at Limerick, according to the representations made by the plaintiffs at the time of entering into the second agreement ? 2. Whether that agreement covered the ship while she was in the port of Limerick P The first was submitted by the Chief Justice to the jury as matter of fact. The second was reserved as matter of law for the opinion of the Court. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs.
    
      E. Ingersoll, for the plaintiffs,
    opened the facts of the case, and .contended, that if no memorandum had been made to take a new risk, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to a return of premium on the home voyage ; and this might have induced the defendants to take the new risk- at a moderate premium. The intent was simply to substitute Limerick for Cork, and keep the ship covered during her stay at Limerick.
    
    Binney, for the defendants.
    The question in this case must be subdivided. We contend, 1. That the defendants took the risk only from Limerick. 2. That the risk at’ Limerick had not commenced when the policy took effect.
    1. What was the intent of the memorandum must be collected from the words, not from conjecture. The insured might intend one thing, the insurers another: their words therefore- must decide the understanding of both. The captain’s letter, which was laid before the defendants, states the facts which had occurred ; but the memorandum has no1 reference to that letter. The expressions contained in it are, “ from Limerick?’’ A policy from a place, does not include a risk at the place. The difference between these words is well established. The defendants did not mean to take the risk at Limerick• They had run the risk at Cork, and had suffered by it, and did not intend to incur a' new risk of the same kind. This would be doubling the risk at the end of the outward voyage. They meant,-we take up the ship from Limerick, instead of from Cork. The words “ from thence,” are here exclusive,.and take effect from the moment of departure. It is denied that the plaintiffs Were entitled to any return of premium, if the voyage had been terminated at Cork. It was an insurance on the whole voyage, which was-indivisible. The policy is express that there shall be no return of premium after a deviation. The additional premium for the new risk, was but one per cent.
    2. The Chief Justice charged, that the voyage from Cork to Limerick was not covered. Now, we say, that the vessel had not arrived and been twenty-four hours moored in safety at Limerick. She had riot arrived at, and been so long in, the Poole, the ultimate place of- discharge. Suppose the insurance had been from Philadelphia to Limerick, when would the risk have ended ? Not until she had anchored in the Poole, where part' of her cargo was to be discharged. He cited. Dickey v. United Insurance Company, 11 Johns. 358. Garrigues v. Coxe, 1 Binn. 592. Parmeter v. Cousins, 2 Camp. 235. 2 Str. 1243. 1 Marsh. Ins. 264. Kemble v. Bowne, 1 Caines, 75. Horneyer v. Lushington, 15 East. 46.
    
      J. R. Ingersoll, in reply.
    1. The jury have decided the fact that the ship Was at Limerick ; and their verdict ought to stand, unless the Court should thir.k that the weight of testimony was greatly against it.
    .2'. The construction of the memorándum in the policy is matter of law ; namely, whether the risk at Limerick was covered. The intent of the plaintiffs certainly was, to be covered during the whole voyage. When the ship Went from Cork to Limerick, the policy was void by reason of the deviation; but the parties instead of opening a new policy, thought proper to ingraft a new agreement on the. old policy, by putting Limerick instead of Cork: as if the policy'were 
      from Philadelphia to Limerick and back. The printed form of the policy is, at and from ; which would have been adopted, a new policy had been opened. When the memorandum to take a new risk was made, the defendants had the letter of captain Erickson before them, and the memorandum mentions a representation. Now there was no other representation than that of the captain. There was no order of insurance except this letter, and the defendants ought not to be allowed to depart from their own construction of it. It is held, that the written order for insurance controls the policy. Norris v. The Insurance Company of North America, 3 Yeates, 91. The defendants have said, that in their understanding, Grass Island was Limerick. As to the word at, it was not inserted with respect to Cork ; and yet it is conceded that the ship was covered at Cork. Policies of insurance are- most informal instruments, and are liberally construed to effectuate the intent of the parties. 5 Cranch, 335. It is a mistake to say that the risk at Cork had been run. No part of cargo was discharged there. The ship grounded in the harbour of Cork, but before she got to the town, at which she never arrived. She went to Limerick immediately after getting off and being put in proper repair. Had she remained at Cork to discharge her cargo, and take in a homé cargo of passengers, according to the original plan of the voyage, the risk at Cork would have been much greater than it was in the course actually pursued.
   Tilghman C. J.

(after stating the case) delivered the opinion of the Court.

The jury, without hesitation, found for the plaintiffs, and I think they were right. It was not simply a question, whether, supposing the ship to have been insured from Cork to Limerick, she could, within the meaning of such a policy, have been said to have arrived at Limerick, so as to discharge the underwriters, before she had been anchored twenty-four hours in safety, in the Poole.- Supposing the usage of trade to be to lighten, by discharging part of the cargo at Grass Island, and to discharge the residue at the Poole, I should think the underwriters were on the ship until twenty-four hours after she had anchored in safety at the Poole. But the-true question between these parties is, Was the ship at Limerick, according to the representation of the plaintiffs, and the understanding of the defendants? Now there was no other representation than that which was contained in the captain’s letter of the 27th of September, which was shewn to t*le defendants. That letter stated, that the ship was at Grass Island; and Grass Island is within the port of Lime-ft is true, therefore, that the ship was in the port of Limerick, though not at the town of Limerick. Then, when the parties, with this letter before them, called, it a representation that the ship had arrived at Limerick, they must have intended, according to the. letter, the port and notthe town of Limerick. The representation, therefore, was agreeable to the truth, and there is no ground for impeaching the verdict, as being against the evidence.

The second question, is purely matter of law. Does the marginal agreement cover the ship while lying within the port of Limerick ? When she sailed from Cork to Limerick, there was a plain deviation, by which the defendants were discharged ; and they would have remained so, but for this new agreement. Had the policy been cancelled, and a new one made by which'the ship had been insured “ from Limerick to Philadelphia,” no doubt she would not have been covered while lying in the port. The policy would not have attached before .she sailed. But it is not a new policy; it is an agreement written on the margin o.f the policy, and expressly referring to it. It must be construed, therefore, in connection with it. We must attend, in the first place, to the words of the original insurance, — “ at and from Philadelphia to Cork, and back to Philadelphia.” It is not said, at Cork, and yet i'. is .conceded, that the ship was covered, while lying at Cork, because, considering all the expressions, it cannot be doubted, that the intention was, to insure the ship during the whole voyage, from the time she left Philadelphia until her return'. There is no instrument of writing more loosely drawn than a policy of insurance, — none which stands in greater need of good faith and liberal construction. In the present case, there is no reason to suppose^ that the intent was altered, of keeping the ship covered, from Philadelphia to Philadelphia. What was the situation of the ship when the second agreement was made, and what are the words of that agreement ? The ship was. not at Cork, but at Limerick; and the underwriters said, “we will see the ship from thence, instead of Cork, back to PhiladelphiaP Is it straining too hard, to say, it was intended to follow the original insurance, substituting Limerick for Cork, as if it had been from Philadelphia to Limerick, and back to Philadelphia ? I ver fy think that such was the real,meaning, and that the words will bear us out in giving that construction to the marginal agreement. It is a point lying in so narrow a compass, as not to admit of much argument. No general principles are involved. It is a question of construction of this individual policy. I am of opinion that the ship was covered while lying in the port, and therefore judgment should be entered for the plaintiffs. .

Judgment for the plaintiffs^  