
    Chevallier v. Durst.
    The protections and disabilities contained in the statute of limitations do not apply to oases arising after the statute has begun to run, except in cases expressly provided l'or by the statute, (Note 29.)
    Note 39.—Tyson v. Britton, ante, 222; Eliott v. Moore, post, 243.
    Appeal from Nacogdoches. The note sued upon was executed on the 10th of November, 1S37, and was made payable six months after its date. The maker, Joseph H. Durst, departed this life in the mouth of May, 1S43, and the action was commenced on the 2d of November, 184-1. The defendant demurred, and among other causes of demurrer, pleaded the statute of limitations and prescription. The exeeptiou was sustained and the cause dismissed.
    
      J. M. Ardrey, for appellant.
    
      Ochiltree Jennings, for appellee.
   Hemphill, Ch. J.

We are of opinion that there is no error in the judgment. The statute had commenced to run antecedent to the death of the ancestor, and tlie rule is well established that where the statute begins to run it shall continue, notwithstanding either party may fall under any of its protections or disabilities. The death of neither party will impede its course. See the case of Tyson v. Britton decided at this term. (Hart. R., 135; 2 Bibb. R., 537.)

Judgment affirmed.  