
    WEEDIN, Com’r of Immigration, v. CHIN BOW.
    
    Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    August 3, 1925.
    No. 4442.
    Citizens <@=^9 — Rights of citizenship “descend” to minor son of United States citizen, not residing here prior to son’s birth bnt who subsequently became a resident of United States,
    Foreign born son of citizen, who before son’s birth had never resided in United States, held entitled 1o entry as citizen, where father had subsequently taken up residence in United States; liev. St. § 1993 (Coinp. St. § 3047), providing that rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in United States, being satisfied by such subsequent residence, and “descend” meaning “to pass down from generation to generation.”
    DM. Note- -For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Descend.]
    Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the Western District of Washington; Jeremiah Neterer, Judge.
    Habeas corpus by Chin Bow against Luther Weedin, Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of Seattle, Wash. From an order allowing the writ and discharging petitioner, defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Thos. P. Revelle, U. S. Atty., and Donald G. Graham, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Seattle, Wash,, for appellant.
    Henry A. Monroe, of Seattle, Wash., and A. Warner Parker, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
    Fred H. Lysons, of Seattle, Wash., and George A. McGowan, of San Francisco, Cal., amicus euriaa.
    Before GILBERT, HUNT, and RUDKIN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      Certiorari granted 46 S. Ct. 120, 70 L. Ed. —.
    
   RUDKIN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order allowing a writ of habeas corpus and granting a discharge. The appellee applied for admission to the United States as a citizen thereof, and as the minor son of a citizen. His claim of citizenship is based on section 3993 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 3947) which provides: “All children heretofore bom or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or may bo at the time of their birth citizens thereof, are declared to he citizens of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States.”

In the dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice was more specific. At page 714 (18 S. Ct. 482) he said: “Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes provides that children so bom ‘are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States.’ Thus a limitation is prescribed on the passage of' citizenship by descent beyond the second generation if then surrendered by permainent nonresidence, and this limitation was contained in all the acts from 1790 down.”

Again, at page 722 (18 S. Ct. 485.) he •said: “By section 1993 of the Revised Statutes, the citizenship of the children of our citizens bom abroad'may be terminated in that generation by their persistent abandonment of their country ”

In accordance with these views, it would seem that the rights of citizenship of the appellee would only terminate by the death of his father without having become a resident of the United States, and, as the father became a resident of the United States during his lifetime and now resides here, the rights of his son as a citizen of the United States have become fixed, and his right to enter the United States follows therefrom as a matter of course. '

The order of the court below is therefore affirmed.  