
    Thomas Little vs. Matthew H. Cooper and others.
    The Court of Chancery in this state has never adopted the principle, that because its jurisdiction has once rightfully attached, it will retain the cause, as a matter of right, for the purposes of complete relief. See Brown et al. v. Edsall et al., 1 Stockton 258.
    
      All bills in the court are, in their nature, bills of discovery. Some are bills for discovery purely. When the subject matter is one which is properly cognizable at law only, and adequate relief can be given there, a Court of Chancery frequently takes jurisdiction, in order that a discovery may be had on the oath of a party, or to compel the production of papers and documents. The end for which the jurisdiction of the court was invoked having been attained, the party seeks his redress in the proper tribunal at law.
    A mere bill of discovery cannot properly pray for relief. Where, upon the facts stated, the relief prayed for by the bill is proper, the bill is something more than a mere bill of discovery.
    This was a motion to dissolve, upon bill and answer.
    
      M. Ryerson moved to dissolve the injunction, and contended—
    1st. That the answer denies the equity of the bilí.
    2d. That the bill is one of discovery only, and the bill being answered, the injunction must be dissolved of course. The bill, it is true, prays for relief. It might have been demurred to on that account. Cited Eden 134, note 4; 2 Story’s Eq. § 881; 3 Dan. C. P. 1844; Woodcock v. King, 1 Atk. 286; Weymouth v. Boyer, 1 Ves. jun., 416; Burnett and another, adm’rs, &c., v. Saunders, 4 J. C. R. 503; Gelston and Schenck v. Hoyt, 1 J. C. R. 543; 1 S. Eq. P. § 73, 74; S. E. Pl. § 324; 9 Paige 580; W. & D. Seymour and others v. J. Seymour and others, 4 J. C. R. 409; 2 Halst. C. R. 210.
    
      A. B. Woodruff, contra.
   The Chancellor.

The injunction was granted to stay the proceedings of a suit in the Supreme Court, which Matthew H. Cooper, one of the defendants, had commenced against the complainant, as the endorser of a promissory note. There are nine defendants in the suit.

The bill was filed, and the injunction granted, on the 14th of December, 1852. The complainant has answered the bill, and so also has William E. Winans. The answer of Winans was not put on file until March 2d, 1854. This delay vas owing to the fact of the defendant, Winans having left the State of Hew Jersey and removing to St. Petersburg, Russia, prior to the filing the bill of complaint.

The facts upon which the injunction was granted, and which constitute the gravamen of the case, are within the knowledge of the defendant, Winans. They are of a character to make the continuance of the injunction by the court dependant upon his answer. His answer, and that of Cooper, the complainant are before me. I do not perceive that the answer of any of the other defendants are at all necessary. The defendant, Cooper makes this motion to dissolve ; he has a right to be heard upon these answers, on his motion to dissolve.

On behalf of the defendant it is insisted, that the answer being in, the injunction must be dissolved, because the bill is one of discovery merely. Upon the assumption that the bill in this case is purely a bill of discovery, as distinguishable from a hill of discovery and relief, the principal as laid down is correct, according to the established practice of this court. I have had occasion to examine this matter heretofore, in the case of Brown et al. v. Edsall and others, decided in October term, 1852, 1 Stockton 256. I will only repeat -what was said in that case. The Court of Chancery in this state has never adopted the principle, that because its jurisdiction has once rightfully attached, it will retain the cause as a matter of right, for the purposes of complete relief. All hills in the court ire, in their nature, bills of discovery. Some are bills for discovery purely. When the subject matter is one which : - properly cognizable at law only, and adequate relief can be given there, as where damages are to be ascertained or titles to land tried, and in cases of mere trespass, a Court of Chancery frequently takes jurisdiction, in order that a discovery may be had on the oath of a party, or to compel the production of papers and documents. The end for which the jurisdiction of the court was invoked having been attained, the party seeks his redress in the proper tribunal at law.

Where a suit has been commenced at law, the defendant may be entitled to a discovery from his adversary, and may resort to this court to obtain it. But if he seeks to change the forum of litigation, and prays for relief as well as discovery, the subject matter must be one which appropriately belongs to equity jurisdiction. His bill must show a case of manifest propriety in this court’s retaining the cause. Fonblanque and Cooper lay it down, that “ the court, having acquired cognizance of the suit for the purpose of discovery, will retain it for the purpose of relief iu most cases of fraud, account accident and mistake.” So, if it is plain that adequate relief can be given, and at the same time a multiplicity of suits be prevented, the court, having obtained jurisdiction, will go on and give the proper relief.

The present bill was not filed as a bill of discovery merely. It has not the essentials of a pure bill of discovery. It is true it alleges that the ..complainant cannot safely go to trial in the action at law, because the facts constituting his defence are, as far as he knows, or has been able to learn, almost wholly, or the principal part thereof confined to the knowledge of the defendants. But when a bill seeks discovery in aid of a court of law, it must appear that the aid is necessary, and the discovery material to the defence, and that it is not in the power of the party to prove them by witnesses. Gelston and Schenck against Hoyt, 1 J. C. R. 543. In the suit at law, the complainant could have availed himself of the testimony of ‘Winans as well as he can in this court. It was not a discovery from the plaintiff that the defendant in the suit wanted, but the evidence of a third party. The injunction was not granted upon this ground. The bill was filed to be relieved against a fraud, which it alleged the defendant in the suit at law, combining with the other defendants in this suit, was attempting to perpetrate. It prays for a specific relief, which a court of equity only can grant, to wit, that the defendants might be decreed to deliver up to the complainant a certain promissory note, which the bill alleges was paid by the note upon which the suit at law was brought, and which was held by the defendants, or some of them, to be improperly enforced against the complainant. There are other circumstances of fraud charged, more particularly upon Winans, which go to affect the note in the hands of Cooper. If the answers had admitted the facts, the court would have granted the relief by ordering the original note to be delivered up, and a perpetual injunction against prosecuting the suit at law. This shows that the bill was something more than a mere bill of discovery. A mere bill of discovery cannot properly pray for relief. Upon the facts stated, the relief prayed for by this bill is proper.

But I am of opinion that the bill in this ease is fully and fairly answered, and its equity denied. After the very severe criticism upon the answer of Winans by the complainant’s counsel, I feel it my duty to examine the answer with more than ordinary care. It is true the answer is unskilfully drawn. It is not entitled to less credit on that account. In every important particular, it accompanies the denial of the matter alleged with facts and circumstances substantiating the denial. If the answer is true, the amount of the note in suit is due to Cooper, and the complainant has no defence at law or equity against a recovery.

Cited in Hoppock’s Exrs. v. United N. J. R. R. and Can. and Penna. R. R. Co. 12 C. E. Gr. 290.  