
    The CITY OF HALLANDALE, Florida, and the Code Enforcement Board of the City of Hallandale, Petitioners, v. Eileen HEIM, Respondent.
    No. 84-2742.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    July 31, 1985.
    Richard Kane, Hallandale, for petitioner-City of Hallandale.
    Bruce David Green of Levine and Green, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner — The Board.
    Eileen Heim, in pro. per.
   DOWNEY, Judge.

By petition for certiorari, the City of Hallandale (City) seeks review of two orders of the circuit court of Broward County entered in its appellate capacity. In said orders the circuit court 1) granted respondent’s motion to strike a final order of The Code Enforcement Board of The City of Hallandale (Board), and 2) denied motions filed by the City and the Board to strike and dismiss a petition for writ of certiorari filed by respondent.

The City, through the Board, issued an order directed to respondent ordering the removal of gas station signs found to violate city ordinances. Respondent filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the circuit court seeking review of said order. The petition had three exhibits attached thereto: 1) an affidavit of respondent stating she did not do business at the location in question and that she did not receive the notice of hearing until the hearing date, 2) a copy of the notice of hearing before the Board, and 3) the final order of the Board. No record and no briefs were filed in the circuit court. Consequently, the City and the Board filed motions to dismiss and strike the petition. Respondent herein then filed an amended petition for writ of certiorari and a motion “refuting and rebutting” the City and the Board’s motion to dismiss or strike, and a motion to strike the final order of the Board.

In due course, a hearing was held on said motions and the court denied the motions filed by the Board and the City, and granted the respondent’s motion to strike the final order of the Board.

Since the trial court stated no grounds in its order striking the final order of the Board, we are at a loss to know his reasoning prompting such action. Regardless, it is faulty, no doubt due in part to the fact that respondent was acting pro se and is unfamiliar with appropriate appellate procedures.

In a nutshell, we have a petition for writ of certiorari filed in the circuit court. No record and no transcript of the hearing before the Board upon which the final order was based were presented. Petitioner simply filed an affidavit, a copy of the notice and final order, and motions containing statements of. fact and assertions of applicable legal principles. On this record, the trial court struck the final order under review. We take this as tantamount to granting the petition for writ of certiorari and quashing the action of the Board. This was a departure from the essential requirements of law.

Accordingly, we quash the orders of the circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court with directions to give respondent an opportunity to properly present the matter to the circuit court for review and, failing that, to dismiss Heim’s petition for writ of certiorari.

LETTS, J., concurs.

ANSTEAD, J., dissents with opinion.

ANSTEAD, Judge,

dissenting:

While I generally concur in the views expressed in the majority opinion as to the proper procedures ordinarily to be followed in circuit court appeals from administrative actions, I dissent because I believe this case to be different.

The basic claim of the respondent is that the administrative agency, in this case a sign code enforcement board, had the wrong person. She asserts this in her pleadings and also asserts that there was an evidentiary hearing before the circuit court in. which she proved this. However, the petitioners have presented us with no record of that circuit court hearing even though it is alleged, and not challenged by petitioners, that the circuit judge warned the parties that a court reporter should be present or each would face the risk of losing their appellate rights if they lost on the merits. The trial judge did not reverse the agency action in the normal sense, but rather granted the respondent’s request to void the action which request was based upon her claim that the agency had the wrong party. If the respondent submitted the same proof to the trial court that is contained in her appendix, and there is no claim that she did not, it is clear that the trial judge would have had a proper basis to void the administrative order.

I also cannot concur in the majority's allowing the code enforcement board to join in these proceedings well after the time for seeking review of the trial judge’s order had expired.  