
    Eugene Frankel, Respondent, v. Lucian Wolf, Appellant.
    (New York Common Pleas— Additional General Term,
    February, 1894.)
    Where the evidence was conflicting, but there was sufficient to support the judgment if believed by the justice, his decision is conclusive on the appellate court.
    It is not error to exclude a question put to a witness on cross-examination as to whether in malting certain statements in the direct he told what was not true; whether the witness’ testimony was true or not is properly for the determination of the court.
    Evidence of statements made by a witness out of court, inconsistent with his testimony, is admissible for the purpose of contradiction, and the technical objection of incompetency, irrelevancy and immateriality cannot be considered as raising the question of its proper foundation where such objection could have been obviated by proof on the trial.
    To present the question as to the propriety of a denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint, such motion should be renewed at the end of the case.
    Appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff rendered by the District Court in the. city of New York for the fourth^ judicial district after trial before the justice without a jury.
    Action to recover upon defendant’s”alleged promise to pay plaintiff a commission for the sale of chattels.
    
      Hoffman dé Hoffman, for respondent.
    
      Maurice B. Blumenthdl, for appellant.
   Bischoff, J.

This is an action for commissions. No express employment of the plaintiff by the defendant, with regard to this transaction, is shown by the evidence, and the cause of action rests upon a promise claimed to have been made to the plaintiff .by the defendant, at the time when the purchaser was brought to him by such plaintiff, to pay the commission in question. There was no dispute that the sale took place and it was not contradicted that the value of the goods sold was $1,800. Conflict appears upon the questions whether plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale and whether any promise was made by the defendant to pay the compensation to plaintiff as claimed. Upon the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff the justice could well find that the plaintiff was the procuring cause and that the promise in question was made. The plaintiff testified that five per cent had been promised him as commissions, and while he also testified, upon cross-examination, that the defendant .promised “ to do what is right,” it was not incumbent upon the court below to disregard the other parts of his testimony and to base the judgment upon this statement alone. Hor was the defendant’s denial that he made any promise and that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale controlling, being also the testimony of Sm interested party. Wennerstorm v. Kelly, handed down herewith, emite, page 173. The determination of these conflicting questions upon all the evidence submitted was peculiarly within the province of the justice below, and that determination must be conclusive in such a case as the present. Weiss v. Strauss, 39 N. Y. St. Repr. 78. Upon the appellant is the burden of showing that error was made by the justice in determining upon the facts, and we cannot hold that this burden has been successfully sustained.

As appears from the record, the majority of the exceptions relied upon do not present the grounds of the objection, and are, therefore, unavailing on appeal. Malcolm, v. Lyon, 46 N. Y. St. Repr. 921; Myers v. Cohn, 4 Misc. Rep. 185; 53 N. Y. St. Repr. 223. The exceptions to the exclusion of evidence are not pressed and do not present error, most of this evidence having been excluded under general objection and not being material to the issue. Ho proper foundation was laid for the admission of entries in defendant’s books. In excluding the question asked plaintiff upon cross-examination, When you said before that he said he would give you five per cent commission you told something that was not true ? ” no error was made. Whether the witness’ testimony was true or not was properly for the determination of the court. Exception was taken to the admission of the evidence of the witness Kean with reference to the statement made by defendant’s witness Rosenthal, the purchaser in the transaction, out of court. The statement proven was in rebuttal and was inconsistent with the testimony given by Rosenthal to the effect that the plaintiff was not the procuring cause of the sale. The objection was made upon the general grounds of incompetency, irrelevancy and immateriality, the specific ground stated being that it “ was not in the presence of defendant.” This latter ground presented no proper objection (Briggs v. Wheeler, 16 Hun, 583), and the general grounds advanced did not call for the exclusion of the evidence. It was properly admitted for the purpose of contradiction, and the technical objection of incompetency, etc., cannot be considered as raising the question of its proper foundation where such objection could have been obviated by proof upon the trial. Mead v. Shea, 92 N. Y. 127 ; Tooley v. Bacon, 70 id. 37. The motion by defendant to strike out the testimony of the plaintiff brought out' on cross-examination, with reference to his conversation with the purchaser of the chattels in defendant’s absence, was also properly denied upon the ground advanced. It had a material bearing upon the transaction as to plaintiff’s services. Esmond v. Tuttle, 20 Wkly. Dig. 156. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint should have been renewed at the end of the case in order to present the question (Carroll v. O’Shea, 2 Misc. Rep. 437; 51 N. Y. St. Repr. 579), but when made was properly denied, sufficient facts being shown to justify such denial. We find no grounds for disturbing the judgment,, which is, therefore, affirmed, with costs.

Giegerioh, J., concurs.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.  