
    
      Elisha Carson and others vs. James R. Law, William Law and John Robinson.
    
    J. R., a bidder at sheriff’s sales, when a lot of nine negroes was offered, announced to the crowd that he would “ give one thousand dollars for the negroes and send them home to Mrs. L.,” the wdfe of the defendant in execution. No other bid was offered, and the negroes were knocked down to J. R. at that price, which was much below their value. The sales of the defendant’s property did not satisfy his execution creditors. Held that, although the motive of the bidder was one of benevolence towards the debtor’s family, yet the sale was fraudulent, as against his, the debtor’s, creditors, the announcement of the bidder being intended to prevent competition and having produced that effect.
    At the same sale, J. R., who was a large judgment creditor of the defendant in execution, when a tract of land was put up for sale, announced to the crowd, that whoever purchased the land would have to pay the price fortlmithin cash. The biddings proceeded, and J. R. became the purchaser of the land at the price of thirteen hundred and five dollars — the land being worth from three to five thousand dollars. Held, that J. R. being a creditor, had the' right to make it known that he would insist on the price being paid in cash, and, therefore, that the sale was valid.
    
      Before Johnston, Ch., at Sumter,
    
    June, 1845.
    The principal object of this bill was to set aside the sales of a plantation and nine slaves, sold, in January, 1842, by the sheriff of Sumter district, under executions, as the property of James R. Law. The complainants were creditors of Law whose executions were not reached by the sales of his property, and the defendants were John Robinson, the purchaser of the property at the sale, and a member of the firm of Robinsons and Caldwell, James R. Law, the defendant in the executions, and William Law, his brother, who purchased the property from Robinson shortly after the sale. The case turned principally upon the testimony taken at the hearing. The pleadings, however, showed that Robinsons and Caldwell were judgment creditors of James R. Law, — the amount of their judgment being between four and five thousand dollars.— That the property of the defendant, James R. Law, sold by the sheriff, consisted of a plantation and thirty-three slaves ; that the plantation and nine slaves, the sales of which were impeached by the bill, remained in the possession of James R. Law, and continued in his possession up to the trial of this case, and that on the day of the sale and the day after, William Law borrowed from James R. Law five hundred and fifty dollars, three hundred and forty dollars of which he paid Robinson in part payment of the nine negroes. The complainants charged “ that John Robinson had made an engagement that he, Robinson, should allow William Law to have any property which he, Robinson, should be enabled to purchase at a sacrifice at the sheriff’s sale, for the benefit of James R. Law — and that he, Robinson, was to allow William Law to have such property upon a long credit. And your orators expressly charge that thirty-three negroes and the tract of land whereon James R. Law lives, were valued, at the time of the sale, at seventeen thousand dollars — that James R. himself held the plantation aforesaid at between five and seven thousand dollars — that he had asked that price for it, of persons who had applied to him to purchase, but a short time previous. That when the deputy sheriff announced that he would proceed to the sale of the property of James R. Law, he held in his hand a list of the property, designating the different lots, which should be successively put up. That the deputy sheriff formally announced to the crowd, that he would first sell the negroes of James R. Law, and that after the sale of the negroes, he would proceed to sell the plantation aforesaid ; that the sale proceeded — that a lot of nine ne-groes was put up on the table at one time, and your orators expressly charge that this unusual number, not being of the same family, were put up in one lot at the request of James R. Law, John Robinson and William Law. That John Robinson and William Law held in their hands a counterpart of the list and directions which the deputy sheriff had; that when the lot of nine negroes was put up, John Robinson announced to the crowd that he would give one thousand dollars for them, and send them to Mrs. Law. Your orators charge that the market value of those negroes was, then, from twenty-five to twenty-seven hundred dollars; that by this false pretence, announced at the moment of sale, he checked the bidding; that the deputy sheriff did not cry the bid for more than one-fourth of one minute, and knocked them off to the said John Robinson. That the said
    
      Robinson then called out to the deputy sheriff “now put up the land” — that the deputy sheriff obeyed him, and thus, by his interference, he, Robinson, practiced a deception upon the public and the creditors, who were awaiting the sale of the land in its regular order. That as soon as the deputy announced the sale of the land, in obedience to his directions?, he, Robinson, exclaimed in a loud voice “ if any man bids on, or buys that land, he shall pay down the cash instantly,” and that he would give one thousand dollars for it — that the bidding proceeded until he, Robinson, had bid thirteen hundred and five dollars, and that then he cried to the deputy “knock it off,” which he immediately did.”
    “And your orators charge, that by this deviation from the order of sale announced, some of the creditors of James R. Law, and the public, were deceived ; that the land was .worth more than thirty-five hundred dollars ; that there were various persons on the ground that day who would have given that sum — and that the creditors themselves would have run it up to that price, had Robinson’s interference not precluded them. That in the interval of Robinson’s making the announcement “that he would make the purchaser pay the cash instantly,” James R. Law was making private signals to persons not to bid.”
    “ That in accordance with the said understanding between the said James R. the said William, and the said Robinson, made previous to the sale, Robinson made titles to William Law for the said plantation, for the benefit of James R. Law, who has ever since resided upon it, using it in all respects as his own. That on the night following the sale, Robinson transferred to William Law his bid for the lot of nine negroes, and gave to said William an order to the sheriff to have titles made to him; that on that night, James R. Law placed in the hands of the said William, the sum of five hundred and fifty dollars, for the purpose of carrying out the understanding with Robinson, to purchase the property for his benefit, at a sacrifice. That William Law, of the five hundred and fifty dollars placed in his hands, paid John Robinson three hundred and fifty dollars, in part payment for the nine negroes bid off under the circumstances above stated; and paid'the sheriff two hundred dollars of it for some negroes which he, the said William, had bid off for the benefit of James R. Law.”
    “And your orators charge that the property, to wit, the nine negroes transferred by Robinson, and four other negroes purchased by William Law, returned immediately into the possession of James R. Law, and have ever since continued in his possession as his own.”
    “ And your orators charge that by the interference of John Robinson, a fair marketable price was not obtained for the property. Your orators and the public would have given the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars for the nine negroes aforesaid, and three thousand five hundred dollars for the plantation ; and now offer to give that price for them.”
    The defendant, John Robinson, in his answer stated that he attended the sale, solely to look after the interests of Robinsons and Caldwell, as plaintiffs in execution: “ that he met at the sale William Law, a brother of the defendant, and the defendant himself; that he did not agree with William Law to let him have any property which he, this defendant, should be enabled .to purchase at a sacrifice, for the benefit of James R. Law, or of any other person, and that he should have it upon a long eredit. The only understanding that existed previous to the sale, between William Law and this defendant, respecting any of the property in question, real or personal, is as follows, and was to the following effect, viz : Mr. Wm. Law, on the morning of the sale, and previous thereto, expressed his apprehension that the whole of his brother’s property would have to be sold ; that he would willingly assist his brother’s family in this hour of their distress, if he could do so, but that he had no money to enable him to purchase at a sheriff’s sale, and seeing that they would be left entirely destitute, he enquired of this defendant whether, if he became the purchaser of a certain lot of nine negroes, (hereafter mentioned) at a price that might be approved by him (William Law) and Mr. Geo. W. Cooper, he, this defendant, would allow him, the said William Law, to have them, or some of them, for the paper of himself and Cooper, and in that case, what terms of payment would be acceptable ; this defendant answered, that he would do so if he became the purchaser of the negroes aforesaid, upon receiving one half the purchase money in cash, and the.other on the 1st of January following. This defendant certainly did suppose that the object of William Law, in this arrangement; if the same was carried out, was one of humanity and benevolence towards Mrs. James R. Law and her children, and he would feel not less regret than surprise, to find that any principle of jurisprudence in South Carolina shall condeinn the object, or the bona fide execution of it. In the conversation just recited, and the understanding arising out of it, James R.. Law had no participation, so far as this defendant was or is informed. The sale proceeded, and a lot of nine negroes was offered by the sheriif, (being the cook and her family, as this defendant understood at the time,) but he denies the allegation of the bill, that he was any how concerned in procuring the sheriff to offer the whole of them together, which seems to be alleged in the bill as matter of complaint, although this defendant would submit that it could hardly be deserving condemnation, that the sheriff should, of his own accord, or that he should be by others advised, if his own sentiments of humanity did not prompt him, to sell a family of negroes together. This defendant purchased them, and when offered for sale, he did say, that if he purchased them, they would be sent back to Mrs. Law, and then bid one thousand dollars; that the bid was cried long enough to admit several other bids, if any one had desired to make them; how long this defendant cannot state, but whatever the period was, it was not prescribed by him nor the matter influenced by him; this defendant neither meant nor saw any thing unfair, or any indecent haste, in the transaction. After the sale, Mr. Wm. Law received an order from this defendant to the sheriff, to make him (Law) a title to the negroes, he having paid in cash only three hundred and forty, instead of five hundred dollars, and given the note of himself and Geo. W. Cooper, at twelve months, interest from-date, for six hundred and sixty dollars; the negroes in question were in fact, as this defendant has understood, sent back to Mrs. Law, by Mr. William Law and Mr. Cooper, and how, therefore, the announcement, as above stated, that if the defendant bought them they would be sent back to Mrs. Law, was a “ false pretence,” must appear only to the wisdom, as it has been invented by the charity, of some one else. Certainly this defendant did not make a dollar by the transaction, but must have lost a good sum, if the negroes were worth 2500 to 2700 dollars, for the truth is, he merely transferred his bid to the aforesaid friend of Mrs. Law, and gave him a credit for a greater part of the sum. This defendant wholly denies that he did any thing to prevent any one from giving more for the negroes, if so disposed. The sheriff cried the bid as long as he thought proper, and was under no instigation from this defendant to exclude others. How the cash, above mentioned, that was paid this defendant, was procured, he knows not.”
    “ And this defendant further answering, says : that he denies the allegation that he exercised any control, or attempted it, over the sheriff, in the manner, the order, the time, or the parcels of property sold by him: that he saw a paper, and probably occasionally referred to it, handed to him on the day of sale, exhibiting estimates (by James R. Law, as he understood,) of the value of the property to be sold, in parcels, or by classification, made he knows not by whom, probably by James R. Law. He deemed the estimate quite too high, and had no agency in preparing the paper or in procuring the sales to be made according to its classification, if in fact they were so made ; neither did he order the sheriff as to putting up the land, or as to knocking it down, as represented in the bill, nor “proclaim in a loud voice, if any man bids or buys that land, he shall pay down the cash instantly or, (as the charge is afterwards varied) “ that he (this defendant) would make the purchaser pay the cash instantly.” In short, this defendant denies distinctly and specifically all and every variety of imputation and insinuation contained in the bill, that he either individually or in conjunction with any other person or persons, did in fact or sought to deceive, by word or deed, or to use the sheriff or his deputy to deceive or mislead any body, in relation to the sale of the land or any other property. He denies that he made any contract or agreement concerning the land, previous to the sale of it, with William Law or James R. Law, that he should buy it for them, or either of them, or on their account or for their benefit. This defendant said and says, that he should have to rely on the land to cover the balance of his claims in judgment, and stood ready to run the land up to that point, and no farther; that if he bought it for less, he did not want to retain it, but aimed only to secure from it the balance of his demands ; the whole object and purport of this conversation, was to explain his purpose as a creditor, and not to make any stipulation, expressed or implied, with any body, still less to withhold a bidder or prevent the fullest competition. He bid fairly and repeatedly for the land, was opposed by the agents'of other creditors, the competition lasted for some time, he did nothing nor said anything intended to restrain or terminate it, and the property was finally knocked down to him at $1305; still at least a balance of more than one thousand dollars was left unsatisfied on the executions of Robinsons & Caldwell, and after the sale, Robinsons and Caldwell, on receiving the paper of William Law and Geo. W. Cooper, for the amount of the bid aforesaid, and for the balance of their claims on execu-lion, transferred the land to William Law. The result was, that they took the paper of the parties aforesaid, for about three thousand dollars, which remains unpaid, and they have not made a cent upon the transaction. This defendant knows nothing of the private signals between Jas. R. Law and the sheriff, as imputed in the bill, and denies all “understandings,” or concerts, or combination, such as imputed to him in the bill, or any other of an unfair character, or any whatever of any character, except as set forth above, with James R. Law, William Law, or with any other person. He again repeats, that he attended the sale of his own mere motion, for the sole end of endeavoring to save the debts of Robinsons & Caldwell; that he aimed to do this only by fair competition in bidding on the property ; that he employed no other'means ; that he availed himself of circumstances occurring in the fair prosecution of that end, and while he did not contrive to bring it about, to enable a friend of Mrs. J. R. Law and her children, assisted by the name of Mr. Cooper, to endeavor to save something for her and her family, on a resale of property bought by this defendant, by extending a long credit to that friend, for about three thousand dollars; that he sincerely hopes the object of the said friend may be accomplished; and that this is the whole extent of his offence.”
    The answers of the defendants, James R. Law and William Law, in relation to the sales of the property, were substantially the same as that of Robinson. They stated that James R. Law held possession of the property as a loan from 'William Law, and that he, William Law, had the right, at any moment, to control the possession. It was admitted also by James R. Law, that only seven of the nine slaves were of the same family ; — two of them, a girl and boy, being of a different family.
    The evidence taken at the hearing was-as follows:
    
      Plaintiffs’ Evidence,
    
    
      Langdon H. Dinkins — was the deputy who sold the property. On the morning of the sale, Jas. R. Law took him oiit, and pulled out a list of negroes, on which were nine, whom he represented as one family, and said he wished them sold together ; that they were going to be bought in for him — that he wanted witness to favor him in selling the negroes; witness made no reply to that. J. R. L. said he wanted witness to do something for him that day, and he would do something for witness hereafter ; witness said he could not put up the nine negroes in a-lot, unless instructed by the sheriff; J. R. L. then went off. The list shewn by J. R. L. had little stars opposite the nine negroes; witness never sold as many as nine in one lot before or since. The nine were not at the head of the list — thinks the preceding had been sold (thinks all the preceding) when the nine were put up; thinks (is not certain) John Robinson said “mow let us put up the nine;” they were thereupon put up — ^Robinson said “he would give $1000 for them and send them to Mrs. Law.” Col. Moses was standing in front of witness, and S: Mayrant on witness’s right; Moses asked witness ‘ what is that;’ witness repeated Robinson’s words, and Moses turned right.round and left the crowd. Witness spoke loud enough to Moses for the whole crowd to hear, and wanted them to hear him; witness did not cry them long, but long enough for any bids to have been made. Saw clearly after the announcement there were to be no other bids. Cannot say whether he sold the land before the sale of the negroes was completed or not. Thinks (is pretty confident) Robinson called up the land, and said whoever bought the land, should pay the cash down for it. Davis Heriot and several others bid against Robinson ; witness saw James R. Law go up to Heriot and say something to him, and Heriot bid no further. In the morning, thinks J. R. L. said that he was expecting R. (who had not arrived) to be there that day to help him out. If J. R. L. had not said what he did in the morning, and if Robinson had not said what he did at the sale of the negroes, and if witness had not seen the effect it produced on the crowd, witness would have cried the negroes longer. Cross examined. There was a large crowd at the sale. The sale took place in regular hours — before and after 12 o’clock — had large sales to make that day; no one objected to the nine being- put up together; Mayrant bid off two negroes. Thinks Abbott, a creditor, was there at the sale. Witness would not have put up the nine without the sheriff’s direction; does not recollect his directing him, but as witness put them up, infers the sheriff did direct. The negroes were two parents and children, from 12 years downwards ; witness thought them parents and children ; got more for this tract of land than for any other he ever sold at sheriff’s sale.
    
      D. B. McLauien — was present at the sale part of the time, and saw the nine negroes sold ; witness wished to buy a boy, (not one of the nine,) Robinson bought a boy selected by wiL ness; witness went to him to get him from him, and he asked $100 advance. Robinson, when the nine were put up, said he would give $1000 for them and send them to Mrs. Law, or that he bought them for her, not certain which; they were not cried over two minutes. The sale was so rapid as not to admit of a deliberate examination of the property. After the land was put up thinks Robinson used some expression about the payment of the money — does not recollect what it was. Cross examined. The negroes were in the gaol yard some hours before the sale; witness examined them there, and saw others doing so. No one exhibited a disposition to bid for the nine. No one requested time to examine, or that the sheriff should pause. Thinks he heard (after the adjournment of sale from November to January,) that the property would be sold partly for cash and partly for credit.
    
      Re X. — Witness did not bid for the boy he wanted ; preferred to get Robinson’s title, as he had heard of some doubt of Law’s title; some claim.
    
      Geo. Morgan — was at the sale of the 9 negroes ; they were put up and knocked off very soon. It was after 11 or 12 o’clock when they were put up; Robinson said he would give $1000 for them, and send them to Mrs. Law. The crier repeated what Robinson said. The sheriff then said $1000 once, $1000 twice, $1000 three times, and knocked them down. It took him about half a minute to do so. That morning, after breakfast, witness called on James R. Law for a small debt of witness’s father, and he said he had money, but wished to employ it in saving his property: his words were to that effect.
    X. — Thinks no one bid in consequence of Robinson’s expression ; witness (and others who expressed themselves to witness,) regarded it as a gift from Robinson ; did not know of any one who intended to bid, but thought the negroes were worth more. Robinson made his bid after the negroes were put up and offered ; he used the words, I will give $1000, and send them to Mrs. L., without a better bid.
    
      Tyre J. Dinkins — was at the sale ; thinks deputy sheriff announced he would sell the negroes and then proceed to sell the land ; when the nine negroes were put up, Robinson said he would give 1000 dollars, and send them back to Mrs. L. Witness’s impression was, it was to be a gift: they were knocked down very quick, not over half a minute, he thinks, from the time the sheriff began to cry R’s bid till he knocked them down; witness was not attending till R. made his bid. The deputy then repeated what R. had said, and cried $1000 once, $1000 twice, $1000 three times, and knocked down. Never knew as many put up together. If they had been put up separately, would have sold better; upon the nine being sold, is pretty certain Robinson called for the sale of the land. At the beginning of its sale, Robinson said whoever bought the land should pay the cash right down. It was bid up to $1300, Robinson bid $1305, and upon that being cried some time he said “ no more bid, knock it down.” Witness did not see any manifestation of disposition to bid. Either Stuckey or Dixon bid the $1300. Heriot bid at first, but desisted ; the land is worth four or five dollars per acre; said to contain 1300 acres. Moses came back after the land was sold, and asked sheriff when the land was to be sold; sheriff replied, it was already sold. Thinks the negroes worth 2500 dollars. |*S. Thinks that but for R’s interference, the land and negroes would have sold for more. Neither Robinson or either of the Laws told witness or any one else, so far as he knows, that R. was buying for Mrs. L., or intended as a gift. Has seen land bring tall prices at commissioner’s sales. Stuckey, when he bid $1300, said he would give $1 an acre. The nine negroes constituted the 4th or 5th lot, he thinks. Then the land, then other negroes; did not know of any one intending to bid, who was deterred.
    
      John W. Stuckey — was present for a time. The nine ne-groes were despatched very quick.' Mr. R. said when they were put up, he would give $1000 and send them to Mrs. Law. Wit-' ness bid on the land ; was wanting land at the time ; while the land was selling, R. said the person who buys the land will-have the cash to pay; witness, after the bidding had gone on some time, bid $1300, and said it was worth $1 an acre any how. J. R. Law shook his head at him gently ; witness taking it for a sign that some arrangement had been made, bid no further.
    ¡xj. Witness intended to bid more; witness might have misunderstood J. R. Law ; he said nothing to witness.
    
      Re J*j. Desisted from friendly motives.
    
      Defendants’ Evidence.
    
    
      John Bradley — was at the sale ; remembers nothing of the sale of the land ; saw a lot of negroes put up ; when they were put up, Robinson said, “ I will give $1000 for them, and if I buy them at that price, I will send them back to Mrs. Law saw no undue haste.
    
      T. J Wilder — was present at the sale of the nine negroes. They were put on a platform and offered; Robinson said, I will give $1000 for them, and if no one gives more, I’ll send them home (or present them, one or the other,) to Mrs. Law. The sheriff proclaimed it, and asked if any one would bid more; he then cried the bid, and knocked them down.
    
      The Chancellor. I do not ■ deem it necessary to precede the judgment which I am now prepared to deliver in this cause, by a methodical statement of the pleadings and the evidence. The circumstances are well understood by the parties interested, and by all others who witnessed the trial; and in case of an appeal? I shall content myself with a direction that the pleadings and the notes of evidence be made a part of the brief, and be prefixed to the decree.
    The principal subjects of discussion at the hearing, were the purchases made by the defendant, Robinson, at the sheriff’s sale,, and transferred by him to his co-defendant, Wm. Law.
    These purchases were assailed on the ground that, by a combination of circumstances, stated in the bill, and supported, with some modification, by the proofs in the cause, the usual competition of a sheriff’s auction was diminished; so that the property was knocked down to Mr. Robinson at a sacrifice, to the injury of the execution creditors interested in the proceeds'of the sale.
    The questions applicable to such cases were extensively argued in two important cases in the Court of Errors, Hamilton vs. Hamilton, and Martin and Walter vs. Evans,  so recently as co preclude the necessity, and indeed, almost the liberty of investigating them here.
    From the fact, 1 suppose, that I did npt concur in the results of these cases, counsel were encouraged to a more liberal examination of positions supposed to have been ruled in them, than, probably, they would otherwise have made. But though I would rather invite than repress a free investigation of decided cases, it is clear that such examinations are legitimate only when directed to- the object of ascertaining the proper interpretation to be put upon them. . It is needless to observe, that whatever doc* trines and principles are found, upon such review, to be decided in the appellate tribunals, are concluded in this forum.
    For the satisfaction of counsel, however, as well as because it-may serve to exhibit more clearly the grounds upon which I shall decide this cause, I shall as briefly as I can, intimate the leading reasons which forbade my concurrence in the results of the two cases referred to: and when I have done so, it will be seen how far they would have affected such of the principles drawn into discussion there, as are applicable to the ease before me.
    
    Although it does not appear in their judgment, a majority of the court decided the case of Martin and Walter vs. Evans, upon the ground of mala fides. In this determination, I could not concur, because it did not appear from the circuit decision, that any such impression had been produced on the mind of the circuit court, nor could such an inference be fairly drawn from the facts reported in, the decree of the Chancellor. It is true, that in a preliminary stage of the case, I had, myself, made an interlocutory order, founded solely on the ground of fraud. But that was upon the bill alone, and not upon the case, as made out upon the hearing, and if the statements of the bill had been fully sustained by the proofs, there would have been no diversity of judgment among us. In the other case, there was no surmise of intentional wrong.
    
    The two cases presented the naked question of public policy, and should have been decided with reference to that question alone. The allegation was, that fair competition had been obstructed, and that involved the question, “ what is fair competition V’
    
    In every public sale, as there are but two leading interests, so there are but two parties; those engaged in vending, and those proposing to purchase the property. These are necessarily antagonists, because their interests are directly contrary, the one to the other. This is so well understood by all practical men, that all their expectations have reference to it, and no man of the least experience or penetration is surprised when he sees these opposing interests in full play at every public auction. It is the interest and well understood intention of the vending party to sell as high, and of the purchasing party to buy as low as possible. Neither party expects, nor has a right to expect, that his opponent shall make any provision to advance his interests, or forego any bona -fide arrangement calculated to promote his own interests, for the sake of enhancing his antagonist’s, nor in any way to sacrifice any right which he has, in favor of an opposing right, which is neither more just, nor more sacred in the eye of the law than his own.
    It is the function of public policy to secure each of these classes, and not one at the expense of the other. It simply requires that each, in the promotion of his own interests, and in the exercise of his own rights shall act fairly. A fair competition will be enforced for the benefit of the vendors. No trick, no circumvention will be allowed to prevent it. On the other hand, the bidder will be secured against all imposition. All this, public policy requires, but no more.
    It is upon this principle, of leaving each party to the fair exercise of his own discretion for the promotion of his own interests, — and upon no other principle, — that, as the vendors may, on the one hand, put up the property in whatever lots or quantities they please, in order to enhance its price, — so on the other, the bidders may, (as all the authorities acknowledge) combine in any numbers, so as to make the purchases advantageous to them, although it is palpable that in so doing, competition, so far as it might have operated between the confederate bidders, is incidentally destroyed. The amount of the principle is this, and no more: that each party shall be indulged in every means adopted Iona fide for the promotion of his own interests ; but he shall resort to no trick for that purpose. This is really what, among practical men, is meant by fair competition, and it is all that practical men expect can be possibly secured by all the adjudications of all the courts upon earth. You may strait-lace society by rules more sublimated ; but then society will not act. All energy, all enterprise, all commerce cease, where a liberty suitable to our nature, and subservient to our interests, is denied. If a code prescribing the purity and disinterestedness of angels could be devised by human wisdom, men must be transformed into angels, and translated to another sphere of existence, before they could or would fully conform to it.
    In the two cases to which I refer, the acts complained of as diminishing the competition, consisted of a combination of bidders ; an agreement of two bidders to unite against other competitors. Nothing more can be fairly made of the cases. In the case of Hamilton vs. Hamilton, the only offence of the bank was that she provided a bidder with means to attend the auction, who, for aught that appeared, would not have been a bidder without that assistance; unless, indeed, it concerned the other parties, and was an injury to them, that she did this upon terms advantageous to herself. Her only offence was, that so far from obstructing, she added to the competition. Then as to the bidder thus furnished, — he indeed did agree with other bidders to unite with them: — and this was, in truth, the only ground upon which the purchases made by him could be assailed. The facts were these. Adger and North, who were unpreferred, or junior creditors, of the party whose property was to be sold, had determined to run the property up to a certain amount, conceiving that if they could get it within that limit, they might make their debts out of it. Gourdine, the new bidder, conceiving that he could get the property at $30,000, agreed with them to bid to that extent, and that if he got the property he would pay their demands; — but it was expressly a part of the agreement, that .if the biddings were carried beyond the $30,000, they were to attend to their own interests, and bid for themselves. Now,.I was ignorant of the existence of any principle of reasoning, and insensible to the obligation of any principle of law, by which more could be made out of this than a mere union of bidders, within the limit of $30,000. What was the offence 7 Was it the displacing of Adger and North from the list of competitors 7 It will not be pretended, that they were precluded from selling their claim, because by selling it they deprived themselves of their sole incentive to bid. Their debts were as just and as sacred in law, though not as well secured as those to be subserved by the sale ; and there was nothing in justice or in law requiring them to keep up a competition for the benefit of the latter, at the expense of the former. Fair competition is that competition which springs from the interests of the bidders; to such competition alone are vendors rightfully entitled, and although it might be for their interests that it should be carried farther, equal justice, (which is always true policy,) demands no such unreasonable sacrifice. To be sure, it is not quite accurate to say, that Adger and North made a sale of their debts to Gourdine. That is, the safe was only conditional. If he got the property under $30,000, the sale was effected, if not, then there was no sale. But what difference could that make 7 Beyond the limit mentioned, there was no agreement whatever, and of course nothing to disturb the competition. Within the limit, he stood in their place to meet every competitor, actuated by all their motives to prevent any such competitor from getting the property under the $30,000, and impelled by no higher motives than incited them to get it at a lower rate if they could. Thus, with regard to all other competitors, the matter stood in precisely the same situation after this agreement as before it. The only difference was, that the competition which might have existed between these parties, was extinguished by their uniting in their bids, and one of them becoming the bidder on their joint account, within a given limit. Now, there was not an authority quoted from the beginning to the end of the argument, but conceded that they might have combined their bidding to an indefinite amount; and what legal or moral offence they committed by limiting themselves in the exercise of their undoubted right, passes my comprehension.
    In Martin and Walter vs. Evans, there was nothing more than a combination of bids. The agreement was between two co-sureties, that one of them should bid on their joint account, and the profit or loss of the purchases was to be shared between them.,
    Nowin these two cases, I thought thatthe'public policy was inferred from too exclusive a regard to the interests of the vending party. Where a bidder is impelled to his purchase from the benefits he expects to derive from the ownership of the property, or from disposing of it towards satisfying a bona fide debt, — these are interests as fairly entitled to regard as those of the debtor whose property is sold, or those of the creditors selling it; and sound public policy requires that equal allowance be made for them: and, after all, nothing, in my opinion, would have a greater tendency to destroy the fair competition so necessary to vendors, than to disregard the bona fide (though it be the opposing) interest of purchasers.
    But even if my opinion had prevailed in the Court of Errors, still that opinion might have left room for a distinction, which I shall proceed to state with much diffidence, but which, if sound, is calculated to shake the purchase made by Mr. Robinson of the 9 slaves in this case; — and I feel persuaded on the other hand, there is nothing in it nor in the judgment of the court, in the two cases referred to, to shake his purchase of the tract of land.
    I shall attend to each of these in the order in which I have mentioned them.
    There are several grounds taken in the bill, and referred to in the evidence, calculated to affect the purchase of the slaves ; but while I doubt the soundness of the distinction alluded to, I prefer, on the whole, to put my decision upon it, (thus obeying the judgment of the Court of Errors, with the modification necessarily arising from that distinction.) I shall, therefore, put my decision upon the single ground, that Mr. Robinson destroyed the competition to the injury of the selling creditors, and that he did this, not incidentally, and in subservience to his bona fide interests as a purchaser or creditor, but intentionally, and with a view to make a voluntary disposition of this property at the expense of others. Or, to put the position in other words: the end which he designed avowedly to accomplish, was to make a provision for the debtor’s family out of his property. This design was to be accomplished at the expense of creditors, by suppressing compe-' tition at the sale ; and this was to be brought about by appealing to the sympathies of the bidders. When I say that he destroyed competition, I mean that he adopted means calculated to effect that end, and which did effect it. I do not hold that a purchaser is to be deprived of his bargain merely on the ground that his competitors have retired, without regard to his intentional agency in causing them to do so. This would put the most innocent man in peril, and compel every purchaser to abide, not only the bondfides of his own conduct, but to run the hazard of the stupid misconceptions of all around him ; — than which nothing could more effectually destroy all competition and all sales— for no man would dare to purchase under such risques, But while I do not maintain a doctrine so absurd, so dangerous, and at the same time so destructive of the end intended to be secured ; I hold, as all human tribunals must hold, that where a man employs means adapted to an end, he must be presumed to have intended the effect which naturally follows from them ; and if the end be wrong, he should be responsible for it.
    When I say that this defendant suppressed competition, with a view to make a voluntary disposition of the property, at the expense of the creditors, I am as fully persuaded that there was not the least taint of corruption in his motives, as I am very sure every by-stander was, who witnessed and was affected by his conduct at the sale. On the contrary, I venerate his motives, while I am compelled to pronounce them mistaken. While I honor his charity, I cannot exonerate him from the charge, that it conducted him, through the common infirmities of our nature, to an act of injustice.
    He had no more right to make a provision out of the debtor’s property, for the debtor’s family, at the expense of creditors, than the debtor himself; — andthis being his motive, no process by which he impressed upon the transaction tl¿e forms of a purchase for a consideration which was only nominal in order to effect his end, can be effectual in law. There isan infinite difference between this case and the two cases in which I have endeavored to explain my opinion— between the right of a vending creditor to throw off a loss immediately arising from the bona fide efforts of a purchaser or creditor to subserve his just interests and indubitable rights, and to shift that loss upon one as well entitled to protection as himself— between such a case as that, and a case where the wrong to be relieved against, consists in an attempt to secure property against creditors in those very hands, where the law declares it shall be liable to them.
    The testimony of every witness on both sides, seven in number, is substantially the same on this point of the case. According to every one of them, when the nine negroes were put up, Mr. Robinson said he would give $1000 for them, and send them back to Mrs. Law. One of the witnesses remembers his words more distinctly than the rest, and says they were, “ I will give $1000, and send them back to Mrs. Law, without a better bid.”
    Now, it is true that Mr. Robinson neither requested nor compelled any competitor to desist: nor is such a palpable method of obstruction often resorted to, nor if resorted to, effectual: but that there was something in the very announcement by Mr. Robinson, of such a purpose, calculated deeply to affect every one who heard it, we cannot doubt until our nature is changed and generosity is banished from the bosoms of men. Here — surrounded by the austerities of the judicial forum, and all those subduing forms which are supposed to chill our sensibilities, — even here we feel its influence and pay it homage. What, then, must have been its effect when it broke fresh upon the assemblage who heard it ? It is upon such occasions, and under the influence of such appeals, that the vices of our apostate nature are subdued— even avarice and cupidity, the basest and most indomitable of them all. Even the sterner virtues relax and surrender the heart to the sway of the gentler affections. The august functions of justice are supplanted by the sweeter offices of charity. And it is precisely in mixed and unsophisticated assemblies, such as usually attend a sheriff’s market — that such emotions have their fullest scope. They borrow strength as they fly with a ready sympathy from breast to breast, until they become supreme, and bow the multitude as one man.
    And this is precisely the effect which the announcement of Mr. Robinson’s intention did produce. Every witness testifies, ¡that from the moment it was n^ide, its effect was palpable and indubitable. Not the slightest expectation could be entertained, that any counter bid could be got, although it is clear, from the testimony, the property had not reached its marketable value. An universal deference was manifested for the humane intention expressed, and the property was knocked down at once, and so strong was the repugnance to any competition, that one of Mr. Rpbinson’s witnesses, even at the trial, declared that after Mr. Robinson had announced his intention, he would have preferred the imputation of the pettiest of all offences to being caught in bidding against him.
    If I do not mistake the principles applicable to such a case, I may venture the following positions : That except in cases falling within the technical grounds of surprise or accident, (which had no place in either of the cases I have referred to, and have none in this case,) a sale will not be set aside on the score of a mere diminution of competition irrespective of any intention on the part of the purchaser to produce it.-
    That such an intention is not to be abscribed to a bidder, unless his acts bear reasonable evidence, according to the sound apprehension of mankind, of such a motive.
    Nor will it be ascribed to him,’when the diminished competition arises incidentally and naturally from his efforts to promote his own bona fide interests; in which case it should be presumed that he was actuated exclusively by an honest and fair desire to secure his own rights.
    As the interest of purchasers and vendor are equally just, and are always, in the very nature of things, opposed to each other, and no reasonable man can be surprised or entrapped by their conflict: public policy but subserves her ends when she stands indifferent between them, interfering only when there is trick on one side, or imposition on the other. Whatever effort is successfully made by either party to benefit himself, must necessarily derogate from the interests of the other party. Each party has a right, and is expected to act for himself; and when he has succeeded, the true inquiry is, not what loss the other party has sustained, (for there must be such loss incidental in every case,) but whether the success has b.een obtained fairly in the advancement of interests recognized by law as fair and legal interests.
    But when there is proof, as in this case, of an actual destruction of competition, resulting from acts well calculated to produce it, which were designed to accomplish a purpose of charity at the expense of creditors, and were not prompted by the incentives of any real interest in the purchaser as purchaser or creditor, I am constrained (at least, since the. judgment of the Court of Errors,) to avoid the contract of sale.
    It is needless to say that Wm. Law, to whom Mr. Robinson transferred his bid, and who took the sheriff's title, must stand upon the s.ame level with Robinson himself. He will, however, be entitled to put in his claim, when the proceeds of a resale of the negroes come to be distributed, to be reimbursed for the sum advanced by him, or rather by Robinson, on the score of this purchase, and which was applied to the demands of the creditors. 1 incline to the opinion that he will be entitled to repayment, notwithstanding he may have borrowed the money from James R. Law; but as this point was not argued, I prefer to leave it open to further investigation, when the mode of distribution, which I refer to the commissioner, comes to be reported upon.
    The next point relates to the land purchased by Mr. Robinson, and transferred by him at an advanced price to Wm. Law.
    Mr. Robinson is charged with having induced the sheriff to transgress the order in which the property was to be sold, by selling this land before he had closed the sale of the negroes, and there is some evidence of it, but from the doubt expressed by the witnesses of the correctness, of their recollection, I do not feel at liberty to conclude that the sheriff had established such an order of sale as is stated in the bill, or of course that he departed from' it at Mr. Robinson’s instance. Neither do I find evidence of the confederacy charged in the bill between the defendants. I must acquit both Wm. Law and Mr. Robinson of so much of this charge as relates to them.
    The ground upon which this purchase stands is this: that while the land was under biddings, Mr. Robinson observed, that whoever purchased it would have to pay the price forthwith in cash. It is not said in the proofs, that this announcement did,in fact, deter any bidder. One bidder says that he stopped in consequence of a look or shake of the head from James R. Law, which he interpreted into a sign that some arrangement had been made, but not on account of what Mr. Robinson said. The bid-dings were continued after Mr. Robinson’s observation, and were at last closed in his favor, at a very advantageous price, but not remarkably under the selling price of land at sheriff’s sale.-
    I do not feel at liberty to avoid the sale on this ground.- I do-suppose that some of the bidders might have expected or desired the accommodation of a few days to complete the payment ; but the law of the sale was cash, and Mr. Robinson had a right to insist on it. The creditors, of whom he was one, had put up the property under the law, and none of them could alter the terms, without the concurrence of all. None of them (and they are the parties complaining,) have a right to object that their oivn terms were insisted on ; nor to complain, even if the fact had been made out that a competition was excluded, which competition could or would only have taken place upon other terms. In this purchase, Mr. Robinson had all the interests of a purchaser (for he bought for himself,) and of a creditor, and although he may have acted with rigour, I cannot say that he transgressed strict justice. Certainly he did not transgress law, nor did he act for the attainment of an illegal pnrpose, as in the other purchase, but for the advancement of his peculiar interests as a purchaser.
    There is but one point more in the case, and it relates to the slaves, Elsey, Clinton, Cyrus and old Elsey, bought by Wm. Law for $220. From the age and character of the negroes, which rendered them, I suppose, of very little value, this part of the bill was not insisted on, and I shall consider it as abandoned.
    It is decreed that the sale of the nine slaves (Hester, Job, Susan, Ned, Harriet, Maria, Tom, Rose, and Jack,) be set aside, and that they, with their increase after the sale, if any, be sold by the commissioner, after due advertisement, for cash, or upon such terms as may be agreed on in writing by all the creditors, and that the proper distribution of the proceeds be ascertained by him upon a reference, and reported to the Court for its final order. Ordered, that the rest of the bill be dismissed. I understood it to be agreed that the costs should be paid out of the fund, and it is accordingly so ordered.
    The complainants appealed, on the grounds :
    1. Because the Chancellor erred 'in not decreeing that the sale of the real property of James R. Law be set aside.
    2. Because the Chancellor erred in decreeing that John Robinson should be refunded the amount paid by him for the personal property.
    3. Because the Chancellor erred in supposing an agreement amongst parties in regard to the costs, aud in ordering them to be paid out of the fund.
    
      The defendant William Law, also appealed, and moved a reversal of so much of the decree as sets aside the sale of the nine negroes bought by John Robinson, and transferred by Robinson to him.
    
      Preston and Desaussure, for complainants.
    
      Wethers and Dargan, contra.
    
      
      
        Vide these cases reported in the appendix to this volume, R,
    
   Curia, per Johnston, Ch.

This court concurs with the Chancellor, in the result of his decree, upon the merits of the case.

It appears the Chancellor misconceived the counsel with regard to the costs. But for this misapprehension they would have been allowed to follow the decree.

It is therefore ordered that the decree be affirmed; and that the defendants pay the costs,

Dunkin, Ch.

I concur in this result. Subsequent reflection has only served to confirm my conviction of the soundness of the principles settled and announced in Hamilton vs. Hamilton.

The points ruled in this cause conflict, in no manner, with the principles thus established. It is hardly necessary to add that a concurrence in the result involves no concurrence in the reasoning of the Chancellor, either in reference to the matter decided, or on any other questions which he may have deemed it proper to discuss.

Johnson, Ch., concurred.  