
    Scott MYERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles BUCCA, Greg Seeley, Patrolman Rowell, Alan Frisbee, Donna Baeckmann, Michael Spitz, Terry Willhelm, and Bobby Haines, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-277-cv(L), No. 16-471-cv(Con)
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    December 8, 2016
    APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: SCOTT MYERS, pro se, Catskill, New York.
    APPEARING FOR APPELLEES: CRYSTAL R. PECK, Bailey, Johnson, De-Leonardis & Peck, Albany, New York.
    PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, REENA RAGGI, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Scott Myers, proceeding pro se, appeals from the sua sponte dismissal of all claims in his Second Amended Complaint, other than that for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Rowell, and the denial of all related motions. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of pri- or proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction to hear timely appeals from final judgments or from partial final judgments entered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).” Petrello v. White, 533 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2008). A final decision “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y., Inc., 745 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be final, an order must “conclusively determine! ] the pending claims of all the parties to the litigation ... unless the court directs the entry of a final judgment as to the dismissed claims or parties” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Citizens Accord, Inc. v. Town of Rochester, 235 F.3d 126, 128 (2d Cir. 2000).

A district court’s denial of a motion to stay proceedings pending state court litigation is not a final judgment. See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 275, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988). Nor is a denial of a motion to bifurcate. See 9Á C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2392, at 182-83 (3d ed. 2008); cf. In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 528 F.2d 5, 14 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding grant of motion to bifurcate not final order).

Further, the district court’s dismissal, upon recommendation of the magistrate judge, of certain of Myers’s claims was not a final judgment because the court allowed Myers’s malicious prosecution claim against Rowell to proceed and did not enter partial judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). See Citizens Accord, Inc. v. Town of Rochester, 235 F.3d at 128. Even if the “motion to bifurcate” had been construed as a motion for Rule 54(b) certification, the denial of such a motion would not itself be a final judgment subject to appeal. See, e.g., Makuc v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 692 F.2d 172, 173-74 (1st Cir. 1982). Finally, none of the challenged orders qualifies as an appealable interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, or under the “collateral order” doctrine, the latter of which applies only to the conclusive resolution of an important issue, distinct from the' merits of the action, and effectively unreviewable in a later appeal. See United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd., 839 F.3d 227, 235 (2d Cir. 2016).

Because we do not have appellate jurisdiction, we necessarily express no view of the underlying merits of the case. Myers may raise any issues related to his claims when the district court enters a final judgment, if he chooses to appeal at that time.

Accordingly, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and DENY as moot Myers’s other motions filed in this court.  