
    J. B. Kilroy, Appellant, v. Justrite Manufacturing Company, Appellee.
    Gen. No. 23,787. (Not to be reported in full.)
    Abstract of the Decision.
    1. Municipal Court of Chicago, § 18
      
      —when denial of motion for nonsuit is improper. On trial by the court without a jury of an action in the Municipal Court of Chicago, the denial of a motion for a nonsuit made upon indication by the court in remarks, upon a motion by defendant for a finding, in defendant’s favor, that the court was inclined to grant the latter motion, was erroneous, as the decision of the latter motion was not the finding contemplated by section 70, ch. 110, title “Practice” (J. & A. If 8607), providing that a plaintiff may suffer a nonsuit before submission of the case to the court for final decision, and section 30 of the Municipal Court Act (J. & A. U 3342), providing that a plaintiff may suffer a nonsuit before the court states its finding.
    
      Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Hugh R. Stjswart, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the October term, 1917.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Opinion filed March 5, 1918.
    Statement of the Case.
    Action by J. B. Kilroy, plaintiff, against Justrite Manufacturing Company, a corporation, defendant, to recover damages for injuries to plaintiff’s automobile from a collision with defendant’s. From a judgment of nil capiat, plaintiff appeals.
    F. J. Canty and J. C. M. Clow, for appellant.
    Sabath, Stafford & Sabath, for appellee; Charles B. Stafford, of counsel.
    
      
      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
    
   Mr. Presiding Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.

2. Automobiles and garages, § 6*—when violation of ordinance is proximate cause of accident. The failure of defendant in driving his automobile to observe a city ordinance inhibiting any vehicle from driving onto a boulevard without first bringing such vehicle to a full and complete stop was negligence attributable to defendant which was the proximate cause of the accident to plaintiff’s automobile.

3. Automobiles and garages, § 6*—when driver of automobile colliding with another automobile not guilty of contributory negligence. The driver of an automobile has the right to assume that the driver of another automobile, with which it collides, will obey an ordinance prohibiting any vehicle from being driven onto any boulevard without 'first bringing such vehicle to a full stop, and he is not guilty of contributory negligence in acting upon such assumption.  