
    THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 16430.
    Decided April 6, 1896.]
    
      On the claimants Motion.
    
    Both parties appeal. The Supreme Court affirms the judgment in favor of the claimant and reverses the judgment against the claimant. But the form of the mandate is that the judgment in this cause “be reversed,” and that the same he remanded “with directions for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this court.” The claimant moves to amend the mandate “ so that instead of reversing the judgment appealed from the same shall be modified by adding thereto the sum of $39,867.18 and affirming the same as so modified.” The Supreme Court orders that the motion he denied “without prejudice to an application in the Court of Claims in respect to the matter-in question.” The claimant now moves for an allowance of interest on the judgment rendered in its favor.
    I.Under the Act 30th September, 1890 (26 Stat. L., p. 504), which provides that “ on judgments in favor of claimants tvhich have been appealed by the United States and affirmed by the Supreme Court, interest at the rate of four per centum per annum shall be allowed and paid from the date of filing the transco-ipt of judgment in the Treasury Department up to and including the date of the mandate of affirmance,” it must he held that where a judgment is affirmed so far as it is in favor of a. claimant and is reversed so far as it is adverse to him, he is entitled to have interest added hy this court on the former, and incorporated into the final judgment rendered under the-mandate.
    II.Where a mandate declares a judgment to “be reversed,” hut with directions to enter judgment for a larger amount, and the claimant moves in the Supreme Court to correct the mandate and the motion is denied, hut “without prejudice to an application in this court with respect to it,” it must he held that the Supreme Court did not intend to remit the question of right for determination, hut intended that this court should take action hy computing the interest and incorporating it in the final judgment, which may he done since the passage of the Act 1890 (supra).
    III.The allowance of interest is not a matter of discretion with either court, but of legal right.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The following are the facts relating to the claimant’s application as set forth and filed by the court:
    I. June 8,1891, judgment was rendered in this court in favor of the State of New York for $91,320.84, on a claim filed for $131,188.02. August 8, 1891, an appeal was taken by tbe United States to tbe Supreme Court, and a cross appeal by tbe State of N ew York.
    II. Tbe cross appeals were argued, and on January 6, 1896, tbe Supreme Court decided tbe same, bolding in its opinion tbat tbe State of New York was entitled to tbe amount recovered in this court, and also to tbe additional sum of $39,867.13, wbicb bad been disallowed liere. Thereupon tbe following mandate was issued:
    “United States of America, $s: '
    
    “Tbe President of tbe United States of America to tbe honorable judges of tbe Court of Claims greeting:
    “Whereas, lately in tbe Court of Claims, before you, or some of you, in a cause between tbe State of New York, claimant, and the United States, defendant, No. 16430, wherein tbe judgment of tbe said Court of Claims, entered in said cause on tbe 8th day of June, A. D. 1891, is in the following words, viz:
    “‘The court, upon consideration of tbe premises, find in favor of tbe claimant, and do order, adjudge, and decree tbat tbe said claimant, the State of New York, do have and recover of and from tbe United States tbe sum of ninety-one thousand three hundred and twenty dollars and eighty-four cents.
    By the Court.’
    as by the inspection of tbe transcript of tbe record of the said Court of Claims, wbicb was brought into tbe Supreme Court of tbe United States by virtue of an appeal taken by the United States and a cross appeal taken by tbe State of New York, agreeably to tbe act of Congress in such case made and provided, fully and at large appears;
    “And whereas, in tbe present term of October, in tbe year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-five, tbe said cause came on to be beard-before tbe said Supreme Court, on tbe said transcript of record, on appeal and cross appeal, and was argued by counsel:
    “ On consideration whereof it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court tbat tbe judgment of tbe said Court of Claims in this cause be, and tbe same is hereby, reversed.
    “And it is further ordered tbat this cause be, and tbe same is hereby, remanded to the said Court of Claims with directions for further proceedings consistent with tbe opinion of this court.
    “ JANUARY 6, 1896.”
    “You, therefore, are hereby commanded tbat such further proceedings be bad in said cause, in conformity with tbe opinion and judgment of this court as according to right and justice, and the laws of tbe United States, ought to be bad, the said appeals notwithstanding.
    
      “Witness tbe Honorable Melville W. Fuller, Chief Justice of the United States, the third day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-six.
    “James H. McKeNney,
    
      “■Cleric of the Supreme Court of the United States.”
    III. On March 9, 1896, the following- motion and affidavit were presented to the Supreme Court:
    “Comes now the attorney for the State of New York in the two appeals in the above-entitled cause and moves to modify and correct the decision therein made on January 6,1896, so that instead of reversing- the judgment appealed from the same shall be modified by adding- thereto the sum of $39,867.18 and affirming the same as so modified or such other relief as the State of New York may be entitled to in the premises. Such motion will be made upon the transcript of the record on said appeals, the opinion and decision of the court therein, the mandate, and an affidavit of the attorney for the State of New York, verified February 14,1896.
    “David B. Hill,
    “ Attorney for the State of New Yorlc.”
    
    “David B. Hill, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the attorney for the State of New York on the two appeals in the above cause, and resides at Albany, New York.
    “And deponent further says that the judgment appealed from herein was rendered by the Court of Claims and entered therein on June 9,1891, for the sum of $91,320.84, in favor of the State of New York, and that a transcript of the said judgment was duly filed in the Treasury Department on the 19th day of July, 1892, and the interest on such judgment at four per cent from said date until tlie date of the mandate herein, to wit, February 3, 1896, amounts to the sum of $12,926.97, which, as deponent is advised, will be lost to the State of New York unless the decision herein shall be modified by affirming instead of reversing the said judgment, and then addingthereto the further sum of $39,867.18, in accordance with the opinion and decision of this court, made on January 6,1896.
    “And deponent further says that the mandate herein was dated or issued on February 3,1896, but has not yet been presented to or filed in the Court of Claims, but is still in the possession of the clerk of this court.
    “David B. Hill.”
    The following order was entered on said motion:
    “On consideration of the motion to re-form the judgment in these cases.
    “ It is now here ordered that said motion be, and the same is hereby, denied without prejudice to an application in the Court of Claims in respect to the matter in question.”
    
      IY. Subsequently the claimant filed the following motion and application in this court:
    “Motion for allowance of interest on the judgment of the Court of Claims tor #91,320.84, rendered in said court on June 9,1891, to February 3,1896,-amounting to $12,926.97.
    “This motion is made for interest under the provisions of chapter 1126 of the laws of 1890 allowing interest at the rate of 4 per cent on judgments of the Court of Claims affirmed by the Supreme Court. The State of New York claims that the judgment of the Court of Claims was virtually affirmed by the Supreme Court, although in form the judgment was reversed; but the Supreme Court authorized a recovery, not only of the original judgment of $91,320.84, but of an additional sum of $39,867.Í8. The State of New York, on March 9,1896, made a motion in the Supreme Court to correct the form of the judgment so as to enable the State to recover the said interest. Thereupon the court made the following order: ‘It is now here ordered by the court that said motion be, and the same is hereby, denied without prejudice to an application in the Court of Claims in respect of the matter in question.’ Application is now made for the allowance of the said interest preliminary to the application for final judgment herein, in pursuance of the decision of the Supreme Court.
    “Richard R. McMahoN,
    “ Attorney for State of Neto York.”
    
    Upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court decided, as a conclusion of law, that the State of New York is entitled to the sum of $91,320.84, the amount of the original judgment, with interest thereon at the rate of 4 per cent per annum, from July 19, 1892, to February 3,1896, amounting to $12,926.97, and to the additional sum of $39,867.13, making a total of $144,114.94, for which judgment will be entered.
    
      Mr. B. B. McMahon for the motion.
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Bodge opposed.
   RichardsoN, Ch. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is the first case since the passage of the Act of March 3,1863, chapter 92, section 7 (now Rev. Stat., sec. 1090), allowing interest on judgments of this court in favor of claimants, affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal, in which application has been made to have interest included in the judgment on the mandate.

It was the invariable practice of the Treasury Department, upon a transcript of the record of this court that the mandate of the Supreme Court affirming the judgment appealed from was filed, to estimate for and to pay interest, when appropriated for, on judgments affirmed on appeal up to the time of paying the principal until the passage of the Act of 1890, September 30, chapter 1126 (paragraph 4 in Supplement to Revised Statutes, second edition, 811), which not only reduced the rate of interest, but limited the time of- its running, as follows:

“And on judgments in favor of claimants which have been appealed by the United States and affirmed by the Supreme Court, interest at the rate of 4 per centum per annum shall be allowed and paid from the date of filing the transcript of judgment in the Treasury Department up to and including the date of the mandate of affirmance by the Supreme Court:

“Provided, That in no case shall interest be allowed after the term of the Supreme Court at which said judgment was affirmed.”

Before said act of 1890 two actions had been brought in this court for the recovery of interest alone after the Treasury Department had refused to pay the same. (Hobbs’ Case, 19 C. Cls. R., 220; Pacific Railroad Case, 26 C. Cls. R., 564.)

In Hobbs’ Case, the claimant had recovered judgment for $43,113.63, and the sum of $2,660 claimed in his petition had been decided against him. Both parties appealed. The judgment of this court was affirmed for the first amount and it was ordered that an additional specified amount should be allowed the claimant, and a mandate was issued accordingly. Upon the mandate filed in this court judgment was enteredin favor of the claimant for both sums, and on presentation of a transcript of the record to the Treasury Department interest-was refused on either sum because no appropriation had been made therefor.

The claimant brought his action in this court for the interest due him by statute, and it was held that he was entitled to the same on so much- as had been affirmed on appeal and gave him judgment therefor.

In neither of these cases was there an application to include interest in the judgment on the mandate, perhaps because it could not then be known up to what time to compute the same, as it was uncertain when the Treasury Department would be prepared to make payment.

In the Pacific Bailroad Case, the judgment of this court for $44,800.74 was reversed and the case remanded “with directions to enter a judgment for the full amount claimed by the Pacific Railroad Company for its services.” In pursuance of this mandate a judgment in favor of the claimant was entered for the sum of $130,196.98.

Congress made the following appropriation:

“ To pay the judgment of the Court of Claims in favor of the Pacific Railroad, eighty-five thousand three hundred and ninety-sis dollars and twenty-four cents, being in addition.to the sum of forty-four thousand eight hundred dollars and seventy-four cents appropriated by the act of August fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-six, to pay a judgment in favor of said Pacific Eailroad, which two sums shall be in full satisfaction of the judgment in favor of the Pacific Eailroad reported to Congress in the House Executive Document number twenty-nine, Fiftieth Congress, first session.”

The Treasury Department refused to pay more than the amount appropriated, and the claimant accepted the same. An action was then brought to recover the interest providefor by statute and it was held that no recovery could be .had, and judgment was entered for the defendants.

On appeal, the judgment was affirmed, the court saying in its opinion, in substance, that'the claimant did not appeal from the judgment on the mandate, the first judgment was not affirmed, the appropriation act provided that the sums appropriated should be in full satisfaction of the judgment and the claimant had accepted the amount of the principal sum and could not thereafter recover interest thereon. (158 U. S. R., 118.)

In the present case, the mandate differs materially from either of those in the two preceding cases, although substantially like that in Hobbs’ Case. It concludes thus:

“It is now ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said Court of Claims in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed. And it is further ordered that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said Court of Claims with directions for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this court.”

It will be observed that the opinion is made part of the judgment and mandate of the Supreme Court, unlike those in the other cases, and we must examine it to ascertain what was reversed. We find that the judgment of this court was affirmed in point of fact as to $91,320.34 and was reversed only on a separate and distinct cause of action as to tbe sum of $39,367.18, which this court had disallowed, and which by the opinion it was held the claimant was entitled to in addition to the amount here recovered just as was substantially done in the Hobbs Case.

Moreover, we think, the Supreme Court has referred the question of interest directly to this court for determination on tbe mandate. March 9,1890, the claimant made a motion in tbe Supreme Court for a, correction of tbe technical form of its order and mandate so that interest might be recovered on that part of the judgment of this court which, in its opinion, was affirmed, moved thereto undoubtedly by our decisions in the Hobbs and Pacific Railroad cases.

The Supreme Court made this order thereon: “ It is now here ordered by this court that said motion be, and the same is hereby, denied without prejudice to an application in the Court of Claims in respect to the matter in question.”

This significant order must be interpreted to mean, we think, that the court had already substantially complied therewith by the mandate and opinion which were to form the basis of the future action of this court.

The “ matter in question,” in relation to which the claimant was authorized to make application to this court, was not the correction of the technical form of judgment and mandate of the Supreme Court, as to which we could have no jurisdiction, but was the allowance of interest on that part of the judgment affirmed by that court, over which it was assumed we had jurisdiction in the due execution of the mandate in accordance with its whole terms. Since the passage of the act of 1890, above quoted, this might be done, as must have been well understood by the Supreme Court, as the interest had ceased to run and had become only a matter of mathematical computation.

If the Supreme Court had intended to reverse the action of this court in the Hobbs Case, it would undoubtedly have done so by overruling the claimant's motion to amend the mandate. It certainly would not have remitted that question of law as an open one to an inferior court for determination. The point involved no question of fact, for the facts were all on the record of the case in the hands of the Supreme Court. The legal point involved, whether or not the judgment of this court had been affirmed, was tbe only question which existed for determination. The allowance of interest is not a matter of discretion with either court, but of legal right. It seems, therefore, manifest that when the Supreme Court gave the claimant leave to present this matter of legal right to this court, it was not for the determination of a question of law, but for the action of the court in doing that which had been allowed and done in the case of Hobbs. Taking the opinion, mandate, and order of the Supreme Court and reading them together, it seems clear that the Supreme Court intended that this court should enter one judgment which would include all that the claimant is entitled to under the mandate and the statute.

The judgment of the court is that the claimant recover the sum of $91,320.84, the amount of the former judgment of this court, with interest at 4 per cent per annum, from July 19, 1892, when the transcript of record was presented to the Secretary of the Treasury, to February 3, 1896, the date of the mandate of the Supreme Court, $12,926.97, and the additional sum allowed by that court, $39,867.13, amounting in all to $144,114.94.  