
    Washington vs. Johnson.
    1. If a slave be delivered on trial with a view to a sale, the slave must be returned in a reasonable time, or the sale becomes absolute. What is a reasonable time is a qustion of fact for the jury to determine.
    2. An attorney has no right to purchase real estate under his client’s execution, for such cliant, unless* specially authorised.
    Washington for the use of Ashhurst & Sons brought an action of debt in the Circuit Court of Davidson county against Johnson, on a note for $1300 payable to Washington.
    The case was tried on plea of payment before Judge Maney at the January term, 1846.
    It appeared on the trial that Washington as Attorney at Law had claims in favor of Ashhurst & Sons against Vance & Dicks and that he recovered a judgment against them in the Federal Court at Nashville; and that executions were levied on real estate in Clarksville; that Washington became the purchaser. Washington sold the real estate to Johnson, and took his notes payable to himself, and executed a bond to convey.
    In payment of one of the notes, Johnson tendered a negro girl, Henrietta, aged fifteen, at the price of 825 dollars. Washington objected to the price, but took the girl on ¿rial, agreeing to take the girl if she suited him, and he should regard her as worth the money. He obtained possession of the girl in the month of January, 1842. She remained in his possession till the 3d day of October, 1843, when she died of common autumnal fever, without neglect on the part of Washington.
    There was some written correspondence between the parties from time to time on the subject of the slave, which goes to show that Washington had not fully resolved to take the slave; and other evidence which it is unccessary to set forth.
    The presidingjudge, Maney, charged thejury that “the counsel having agreed that the plaintiff was at all events entitled to a verdict, the only question was as to its amount. The defendant insists on a payment in the price of a slave which he says he sold to Mr. Washington, and if so, is the defendant entitled to a credit for the price as he insists. It is a general principle applicable to all personal property, that where goods are delivered on sale or return, they must be returned in a reasonable time, or the sale becomes absolute. Where a wholesale dealer delivers goods to a retail merchant to be sold by the latter or returned, and they are retained for an unreasonable time, the former has a right to insist on the sale and to recover the price. What is reasonable or unreasonable time in such cases is a question of fact for the jury and must depend in a great degree upon the nature of the property.
    So if a slave be delivered by one person to another on trial with a view to a sale, and the latter retains the slave for an unreasonable time the former may regard it as a sale and recover the price. The title, however, which would thus be acquired would not be good against the creditors of thé former owner owner, nor against subsequent purchasers from him. The sale of a slave without writing may be good between the parties, but is not good against the creditors of the vendor or subsequent purchasers from him. An attorney to whom a note is handed for collection has no right to take anything but money in payment, nor can he use his client’s claim to pay his own debt. If the note of a Nashville merchant given to a merchant in Philadelphia should be sent to an attorney here for collection, the attorney would have no right to appropriate the claim or any part of it to the satisfaction of a debt which he might owe the Nashville merchant. An attorney has no right to purchase real estate for his client under the client’s execution unless specially authorized. If in this case Washington bought the house spoken of by the witness under the execution of his client, and without authority from his client to purchase for him, and if he took the conveyance to himself and afterwards sold the house taking notes for the purchase money in his own name, he might contract to take other property than money in payment. If he did thus purchase without authority, then, did he and Johnson contract for the sale and purchase of a slave the price to be credited on one of the notes? or did Washington take the slave of Johnson on trial with a view to purchase and did he retain her beyond a reasonable time under such circumstances as to raise jhe presumption that he had elected to purchase, or under such circumstances, that in your opinion he ought tobe regarded as having elected to purchase.
    If Washington purchased with the consent of Ashhurst & Son to facilitate the transaction of the business, and Ashhurst consented to that, or afterwards ratified the transaction, and Johnson was aware of this, then Washington would not be authorized to take anything but money for the notes.
    If Washington and Johnson contracted for the sale and purchase of a slave, the price to be credited on one of the notes and Ashhurt assented to this, it would be binding on Ash-hurst.”
    The jury rendered a verdict in favor of tlje plaintiff for the balance of debt deducting the price of the slave. A motion for a new trial was made, overruled and judgment rendered, from which the plaintiff appealed.
    
      Meigs, for the plaintiff.
    
      A. Ewing and Moseley, for the defendant.
   Green, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

1st. The plaintiff in error insists the court erred, because his honor did not tell the jury that in a contract of sale, or return, the stipulation of a price is essential to a contract of sale.

We do not think this omission is any ground for reversing the judgment. The judge stated, that “it is a general principle applicable to all personal property, that when goods are delivered on sale or return, they must be returned in a reasonable time, or the sale becomes absolute.” “What is reasonable or unreasonable time, in such cases is a question of fact for the jury, and must depend, in a great degree upon the nature of the property. So if a slave be delivered by one person to another on trial, with a view to a sale, and the latter retains the slave for an unreasonable time, the former may regard it as a sale and recover the price.”

It is not alledged that there is any error in what the judge did say upon this subject; and from the charge of the court, it would seem, there was no controversy as to whether a price was stipulated or not. If the plaintiff had desired it, his hon- or would doubtless have been more explicit. But he told them if the negro were not returned in a reasonable time, the person who delivered her on trial had a right to recover the price. By price, of course, he meant the sum stipulated to be given, in case she was retained after trial.

It is insisted his honor erred, in stating to the jury, that “an attorney has no right to purchase real estate for his client, under the client’s execution, unless specially authorised.”

There is certainly no error in this instruction. It may be very true, as the plaintiff’s attorney argues, that a client’s interest may be often promoted, by permitting the attorney to purchase the real estate of a failing debtor, but to hold that the power to do so, exists, merely by virtue of his agency as attorney for the collection of the debts, would be without precedent, in violation of principle, and of most mischievous tendency in practice. Nor do the circumstances of the country call for the establishment of any such principle. Our facilities of communication are such, that an attorney may easily apprise his client of the circumstances of the debtor, and obtain special authority to act for his interest.

If he has no such authority, he purchases at his peril, and becomes responsible for the debt, at the pleasure of the client.

There is no error in the charge of the court, and counsel do not insist that a new trial should be granted on the evidence.

Affirm the judgment.  