
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Cornelio MORONES-VARGAS, also known as Rigoberto Gonzalez-Zuniga, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 12-40857
    Summary Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    April 18, 2013.
    Renata Ann Gowie, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    
      Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Timothy William Crooks, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Cornelio Morones-Vargas appeals the 70-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for illegal reentry after deportation. He asserts that the district court erred in imposing a 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) based on its determination that his prior Texas burglary-of-a-habitation conviction was a crime of violence. Specifically, he argues that his conviction was not for generic burglary because the Texas Penal Code uniquely includes burglary convictions under a “greater right to possession” theory.

Because he objected to the enhancement in the district court on this ground, we review the issue de novo. See United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir.2008). We agree with the panel that recently rejected this contention, finding persuasive its reasoning that “[mjerely maintaining an inferior possesso-ry interest in a habitation does not extinguish the potential violence that may result when a person enters a habitation with the intent to commit theft.” United States v. Joslin, 487 Fed.Appx. 139, 141-43 (5th Cir.2012). See also United States v. Morales-Mota, 704 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir.2013) (affirming on plain-error review a 16-level sentencing enhancement under Section 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on a Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation under Texas Penal Code Section 30.02(a)(1)). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     