
    Vadim CRETU, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-3270.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 10, 2014.
    Serghei Potorac, Falls Church, VA, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director; Gregory M. Kelch, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, GERARD E. LYNCH, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Vadim Cretu, a native and citizen of Moldova, seeks review of a July 24, 2012, order of the BIA, affirming the February 16, 2011, decision of an Immigration Judge (“U”), which denied asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Vadim Cretu, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 24, 2012), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. New York City Feb. 16, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, ie., minus the arguments for denying relief that were rejected by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005); see also Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009); Xiu Xia Lin v. Muka-sey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir.2008).

For applications such as Cretu’s, which are governed by the REAL ID Act, the agency may base a credibility finding on an applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii). We “defer to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

Cretu does not contest the demeanor finding and testimonial deficiencies that served as the basis for the agency’s adverse credibility finding. He challenges only the agency’s related corroboration finding. However, the agency reasonably determined that Cretu’s failure to submit corroborating evidence further undermined his credibility. We have recognized that an applicant’s failure to corroborate his testimony may bear on credibility, either because the absence of particular corroborating evidence is viewed as suspicious, or because the absence of corroboration makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam). Although Cretu argues that additional corroborating evidence was unavailable because the Moldovan government had repeatedly intercepted his mail, the agency reasonably rejected this assertion because the country conditions evidence did not reflect pervasive mail censorship in Moldova. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168-69 (2d Cir.2007) (“So long as an inferential leap is tethered to the evidentiary record, we will accord deference to the finding.”); cf. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.2005) (stating that agency need not accept an applicant’s explanation unless a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to do so); 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(4) (“No court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the availability of corroborating evidence ... [unless] a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”). Accordingly, Cretu has failed to show that the agency erred in finding that he did not meet his burden for asylum due to a lack of credibility. See Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273; Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  