
    William Tayloe Snyder, Trustee, vs. Adelaide E. Baker et al.
    Equity.
    No. 9,464.
    Decided March 28, 1887.
    Justices Mao Arthur, Maguer and James sitting.
    1. In construing a will the same rules of construction to determine the quality of the estate bequeathed, whether for life or in fee, will be applied
    ' to trust estates as to those which are not, except so far as the creation of . the trust may throw light upon the intention of the testator.
    2. When one undertakes to make a will, it will be presumed that his purpose is to dispose of his entire estate.
    S. The gift of the produce of a fund is a gift of the fund itself, unless there be words of qualification restraining the extent and duration of the interest therein.
    4. So a bequest of personalty without words of limitation passes an absolute estate in the thing bequeathed, unless the contrary intention is plainly expressed or necessarily implied.
    ¡5. A testator bequeathed separate legacies to each of his three daughters, ■ with directions to the trustees to invest and apply the interest to the use of said daughters, and in ease of the marriage of any of them, to hold her share in trust for the maintenance of her and her husband, and the survivors of them, for life, then in trust for such issue as she might leave at the time of her death ; failing such issue, in trust for the surviving daughters, and the issue of any deceased daughter. One of the daughters died . unmarried. Held, that not having married, she died possessed of an absolute estate in the legacy bequeathed by her father, and that her testamentary disposition of it was valid.
    Appeal from a decree in equity, upon a bill of inter-pleader to obtain tbe construction of a will.
    The Facts are stated in the opinion.
    
      Wm. Pinckney Wi-iyte for Virginia T. Lewis, legatee:
    The intention of a testator is to be collected from the words of the will, and the whole of the will is to be considered and compared; and such construction should be made as will gratify every part of the will, if it can be done consistently with the general intent. Bowley vs. Lammont, 3 Harr. & J., 4; Dougherty vs. Monett, 5 Gill & J., 459.
    In the construction of a will, the inte'ntion expressed by the testator, to be collected from the whole instrument, if consistent with the rules of law, and there be apt words to express that intention, shall prevail.
    All parts of a will are to be construed in relation to each other, and so as to form one .consistent whole, if possible. Chamberlain vs. Owings, 30 Md., 454.
    The general rule is, that any words showing the intention of the testator to dispose of his whole interest in the thing devised will have the same effect as a devise to one in fee simple or forever.
    A devise over of personal property must be done by express words or necessary implication. Evans vs. Iglehart, 6 Gill & J., 185 ; Cassilly vs. Meyer, 4 Md., 10.
    In bequests of personal property, without words of perpetuity, the legatee does not take a mere life estate, which can be enlarged by subsequent limitation, but an absolute estate, which is incapable of enlargement. Edelen vs. Middleton, 9 Gill, 161.
    
      “A restriction on absolute ownership may be rejected as repugnant to the nature and incidents of the estate on which it is engrafted, unless there be a valid limitation over, upon the occurrence of some designated event.” 1 J arm. Wills, 251, 184.
    Where there is a trust, however, and a manifest intention to modify the mode of enjoyment, the court will strive to maintain the intent. I do not think that the testator intended to give a life estate to these legatees.
    There is no disposition made of the fund after the death of the legatees, if they remained single. The gift is couched in as broad and unlimited terms as possible; and then follows the direction as to investment, which implies that the property shall remain in the hands of the executors, and the donees shall only receive the income. But it is well settled that a gift of income or produce of a fund unaccompanied by words limiting the duration of the benefaction, confers an absolute estate. Elton vs. Shephard, 1 Bro. Ch., 532; Philipps v. Chambei’laine, 4 Ves., 53; Rawlins vs. Jennings, 13 Ves., 39; Adamson vs. Armitage, 19 Ves., 416 ; Stretch vs. Watkins, 1 Madd., 253; Clough vs. Wynne, 2 Bradf. (N. Y.), 341.
    This being a general devise of the whole residue of his estate, without any words of limitation or perpetuity, devisees will take the entire and absolute interest of the testator, unless it shall appear that the testator intended otherwise.
    There is no devise over of this property, and it is not presumed that the testator intended to die intestate of this portion of his estate.
    The will must clearly manifest an intention to pass only a life estate before his children can be deprived of the fee.
    It being clear that there is no limitation over as to the fortune of the unmarried daughter, Virginia Tayloe, she had power absolutely to leave it to her niece by will.
    Henry Wise Garnett, also for Virginia T. Lewis, legatee:
    A gift of personal estate without words of limitation is sufficient to pass the absolute interest; and a bequest of the income or annual produce of a fund is equivalent to a gift of the principal. Hawk., Wills, p. 123.
    A gift of personalty to trustees to pay the interest to “A” is an absolute gift of the principal. Elton vs. Shephard, 1 Bro. Ch., 532.
    A bequest of stock to trustees, upon trust to pay the dividends from time to time to a married woman (for her separate use) is an unlimited gift of the dividends, and consequently passes the capital. Haig vs. Swiney, 1 Sim. & Stu., 481.
    An indefinite bequest of the dividends gives the absolute property of stock. Page vs. Leapingwell, 18 Yes., 463.
    A bequest of a fund to a woman, with the interest thereon to be Tested in trustees, the income arising therefrom to be for her sole use and benefit, vests the capital for her separate use. Adamson vs. Armitage, 19 Yes., 416.
    A gift of the interest of the capital sum of £1,000 to a wife for her sole use and benefit, free from debts or control of any husband, held, absolute gift of capital. Humphrey vs.' Humphrey, 1 Sim. N. S., 536.
    By a devise of the rents the land itself would pass, unless a contrary intention appeared. Kerry vs. Derrick, Cro, Jac., 104.
    A devise of the rents of an estate is held to pass the fee, 2 Rédf., Wills, 2d ed., 329.
    The gift of the produce of a fund without limit as to time is a gift of the fund; and the interest of each of the legatees is vested and assignable. Manning v. Craig, 3 Green, Ch., 436.
    A bequest of the interest or produce of a fund, without limitation as to the extent of its duration, is a bequest of the fund itself. Garret vs. Bex, 6 Watts, 14; App. of Pa, Co. for Ins. on Lives, 83 Pa., 312 Millard’s Appeal, 87 Pa., 457.
    Ari unconditional bequest of the dividends of the stock is a bequest of the stocks- themselves. Collier vs. Collier, 3 Ohio St., 369.
    ' When the “interest” or “produce” of a fund is bequeathed to a legatee, or in trust for him, without any limitation as to continuance, the principal will be regarded as bequeathed also. Craft vs. Snook, 13 N, J. Eq., 121; Guliclc vs. Gulick, 27 N. J. Eq., 498.
    Where proceeds oí sale are directed to be .invested by executors and interest paid to A, B and C equally, and the survivors of them, without limitation of time, and the will is silent as to further disposition of principal, held, to be a bequest of principal as well as interest. Earl vs. Grim, 1 Johns. Oh., 494.
    A legacy to a. trustee of certain sums for use of B, and to-be used for support and maintenance and no limitation over, is a bequest of an absolute interest to B. McMichael vs. Hunt, 83 N. C., 344.
    ■ A testator gave to A and B “$1,000 each, the interest to be paid to them annually by my executor, who is to be their trustee in this bequest; ” held, that the bequest was of $1,000 absolutely, and not merely the interest on that sum. Sproul’s App., 105 Pa., 438.
    In the construction .of wills the law, in doubtful cases, leans in favor of an absolute rather than a defeasible estate ; of a vested rather than a contingent one; of the primary rather than the secondary intent; of the first rather than the second taker, as the principal object of the testator’s bounty, and of a distribution as nearly conformed to the general rules of inheritance as possible. Smith’s App., 23 Pa., 9; Sheriff vs. Brown, 3 Cent. Law Rep., 772.
    Where the devise over is made dependent upon the devisee dying before he comes of age, or without issue, or any similar event, it is considered that the devise is equivalent to a provision that the first donee shall take an immediate vested interest, liable to be defeated by the happening of the contingency named, or, if it do not happen, the estaté then to become absolute and indefeasible. 2 Redf. Wills, 2d ed., 325, and cases there cited.
    Leigh Robinson, contra:
    
    It does not have to be argued that if a testator gives an absolute interest in lands or personalty and afterwards shows that he means the donee to take a less estate, the prior gift will be so- restricted. Sheet’s Est., 52 Pa., 257; 3 Greenl. Cruise, 343.
    As where the devisees or legatees are deprived of the right of alienation, or the property is directed to remain free for their children or heirs, and they are to have the use or income only for life. Urich’s App., 86 Pa., 386; Terry vs. Wiggins, 47 N. Y., 512; Bell vs. Warn, 4 Hun, 406 ; Collier vs. G-rimesey, 36 Ohio St., 22 ; Baxter vs. Bow-yer, 19 Ohio St., 490; Smith vs. Bell, 6 Pet.,-76.
    
      The limitation in remainder shows that in the opinion of the testator the previous words had only given an estate for life. Id.
    If expressions be used which show with sufficient certainty that a qualified gift was intended, a court of equity will look to the clear intention of the testator and raise a constructive trust where none has been declared. Lucas vs. Lockhart, 10 Smedes & M., 466.
    Thus, where property was bequeathed in trust for the testator’s daughter “and her heirs born and to be born,” held, that the bequest vested in the daughter a life estate in the property, with remainder to her children whenever born. Woodruff vs. Woodruff, 32 G-a., 361.
    In the case under consideration, the legal estate is from the beginning vested in trustees to pay oyer to each daughter the interest as it may accrue, and for the security of the other trusts confided, as the same or any of them might arise. It is quite true that a bequest of personalty, without words of limitation, passes an absolute estate. It is equally true that a bequest of personal property to a trustee, without words of limitation, vests in him the whole estate subject to the trust.
    It is very singular, if the provisions of the paragraph in controversy were only intended to protect the property of these daughters from husbands in futuro, that similar provisions were wholly omitted from the paragraphs which made provision for daughters who had husbands in esse. See Bacon’s App., 51 Pa., 512 ¡.Davis’ App., 100 Pa., 205.
    The creation of a trust, the direction to pay over income and the gift of the remainder after the death of the cestui que trust, control the general words of gift, and are inconsistent with absolute bequests. Bar rus vs. Kirkland, 8 Gray, 514 ¡ Butler vs. Gray, L. R. 5 Oh. App., 26. And see also the cases of Pillow vs. Wade, 31 Ark., 683 ; Baker vs. Riley, 16 Ind., 419 ; Noe vs. Miller, 31 N. J. Eq., 235 ; Dean vs Hart,. 62 Ala., 309.
    A bequest of money for life and then over gives only the interest. Field vs. Hitchcock, 11 Pick.,, 182,
    
      Equally the bequest of interest only gives an estate for life and then over. A bequest of the use of personalty and of the personalty during life has the same effect. 2 Kent Com.,352 ; 2 Story, Eq., sec. 844.
    It is submitted that a bequest of a fund to trustees, with directions to pay over the income as it accrues to the cestui que trust, and upon the trust, equally distinct, to retain the principal during the life and until after the death of the beneficiary, to await and satisfy other trusts which are then expected to arise, does not give to the beneficiary of the income the possession or disposal of the principal.
    In opposition to this view, the following rule was recited in the court below : “A gift of personal estate, without words of limitation, is sufficient to pass the absolute interest. But it might be supposed that a bequest of the income or annual produce of a fund, as opposed to a bequest of the fund itself, would be confined to the life of the donee in the absence of a contrary intention. The rule, however, is otherwise, and it is settled that a bequest of the income of personal estate, without limit as to time, is a gift of the principal. Hawk., Wills, p. 22.
    The language cited virtually admits that an opposite view would be only natural. It is, however, of importance here not to controvert, but simply to explain the rule as stated. It is not desirable to multiply rules whereby a testator is presumed to have used words and forms of expression in the sense which they have acquired by decided cases, although such sense be different from their ordinary and natural meaning.
    The rule is one of construction, founded on the old íéudal law, that a devise of the rents and profits of real estate carries with it the property in the land. But while “a devise of the rents and profits of land will be construed as a devise of the land in order to carry out the testator’s intention, it will not be so construed in violation of such intention.” Bowen vs. Payton, 14 R. I., 257; Collier vs. Grimsey, 36 Ohio St., 21.
    In the case under consideration, the corpus of the estate is fully and distinctly given to the trustees, and the bequest to the daughters is of the income only, to be paid to them as it accrues. It is not the enjoyment of the principal, but the gift of the principal itself which is postponed. The direction to pay is the gift, and this gift is exclusively to surviving children or surviving sisters.
    The conclusion that when the whole interest of a fund is given in perpetuity, without limit or qualification, the fund is given, follows from the inference, in such case, natural enough, that the testator of course intended to give the principal sum under this description: “If, however, from the nature of the subject, or the context of the will, it appear that the produce or interest of the fund only was intended for the legatee, the gift of the interest will not pass the principal.” Roper, Legacies, p 421; Hamilton os. Lloyd, 2 Yes. Jr., 416.
    This is the question to be decided. Is the bequest of income so unlimited as to be tantamount to a bequest of the principal? Is a contrary intention absent? Is there not a discrimination between the income and the principal ? Is not the corpus or pri ncipal vested in the trustees until the death of each daughter, for the ultimate purpose of the will ? Does it not appear that the produce or interest of the fund only was intended for the legatee ? “ Where it appeal’s from the context of the will that no interest in the capital was intended to pass till the determination of the life estate, or other particular period, in such cases the gift of the income and the gift of the capital are considered as distinct gifts.” Williams, Ex’rs, p. 1067.
    “ The rule which gives an absolute interest íd the fund, where there is a general gift of the income, is not a very strong rule.” Blann vs. Bell, 5 De Gr. & Sm., 663.
    The cases which hold that the gift of the income of a fund carries the fund also mean that the donee has the fund as completely as the income. Clearly, in the case at bar, the legatee could not touch the principal at any time during her life. She was entitled to the annual produce only; of this, and this, only, could she dispose as she pleased. The construction contended for would defeat the scheme of the testator’s disposition, by a single provision clearly repugnant to the whole tenor of the will.
    Nothing in the cases cited by Hawkins conflicts with the proposition that the placing of property, whether real or personal, in the hands of a trustee, upon a distinct trust to pay over the income to the beneficiary, but with equal clearness not to pay over the principal, gives to the beneficiary a vested equitable estate for life. Brandon vs. Robinson, 18 Yes., 429; Dick vs. Pitchford, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq., 480; Havens vs. Healey, 15 Barb., 301. See also Blann vs. Bell, 5 De G-. & Srn., 663; Innes vs. Mitchell, 6 Yes., 466; Wetherell vs. Wetlierell, 4 G-iff., 59; Bacon’s App., 57 Pa., 504-514; Ashurt’s App., 77 Pa,, 464; Phillips’ App., 80 Pa,, 472; Heene’s App., 64 Pa., 268; Davis’ App., 100 Pa., 201.
    In short “ where it is the manifest intent of a testator to sever the product from its source, a bequest of the income of an estate will not carry an absolute estate in the principal.” Bentley vs. Kauffman, 86 Pa., 99,
    “In Redfield’s edition of Story’s Equity, sec. 1067, the law is stated in accordance with the late English authorities ; and there can be no doubt that this is the true rule, which, applied to the case before us, gives Mrs. M. a life interest only under her father’s will. The whole fund is given to trustees, who are to pay her monthly the interest of it, to do which they must first collect and receive it; and, therefore, during her life it was a subsisting trust, intended to preserve the principal for those in remainder. Of course Mrs. M. could not call for a transfer of the fund from the trustees or executors; and, if so, there was no error committed by the court below in confirming the report of the auditor.” Myers’ App., 47 Pa., 114.
    The bequest in controversy amounts to no more than a bequest to an unmarried woman and her children, in which case, by a great preponderance of authority, she takes a life estate with the remainder to her children, if any. Morse vs. Morse, 2 Sim,, 487; French vs. French, 11 Sim., 257; Hall vs. Nalder, 22 L. J. J7. -S. Oh., 242; Noe vs. Miller, 31 N. J. Eq., 235 ; Dean vs. Hart, 62 Ala., 309 : Woodruff vs. Woodruff, 32 Ga., 361; Eales vs. Ourrier, 55 N. H., 392; Turner vs. Ivie, 5 Heisk., 222; Perry, Trusts, sec. 364; Le-win, p. 105.
    A bequest of personalty to one for life, remainder to bis issue, does not confer an absolue interest upon the first taker. Sheet’s Est. 52 Pa., 268; Keene’s App., 64 Pa., 268.
    In a conveyance to an unmarried woman and her children “ children ” is a word of purchase, and she takes a life estate with a remainder to her children. Eales vs. Currier, 55 N. ÍL, 392.
    A testator gave his daughter one twelfth of his estate, directing that it should not be subject to the control of her husband, but should be hers and her child’s or children’s. Held, that the daughter took a life estate, with remainder to her children. Noe vs. Miller, 31 N. J. Eq., 234.
    Bequests expressed in the form of the one under consideration have usually been construed to give a life estate to the parent with remainder to the children. Id.
    A testator directed that the legacies given by his will to females, married or single, should be for their own benefit and for that of their children and should never be subject to the control of their respective husbands. Held, that the females took for their lives for their separate use, with remainder to their children. Bain vs. Lescher, 11 Sim., 397 ; Newman vs. Nightingale, 1 Cox, 341; Crawford vs. Trotter, 4 Madd., 361; Jeffrey vs. Honywood, Id., 398; Yaughan vs. Headfort, 10 Sim., 639 ; Crockett vs. Crockett, 2 Phil., 553 ; Ward vs. Peloubet, 2 Stock., 304; Belote vs. White, 2 Head, 703 ; Hollister vs. Shaw, 46 Conn., 248 ; Hatfield vs. Sohier, 114 Mass., 48.
    Another and more familiar principle would be set at naught by the construction herein opposed. The various bequests over directed by the testator, after the death of his daughters and their husbands, are valid as executory bequests, and are of themselves inconsistent with an absolute estate in the first taker, and would be void for repugnancy if such absolute estate had been given. 4 Kent, Com., 270 ; McRee vs. Means, 34 Ala., 368; Hall vs. Robinson, 3 Jones, Eq., 351 ; Weacl vs. Gray, 78 Mo., 59; Hoxsey vs. Hoxsey, 37 N. J. Eq., 21.
    Eor if a legatee possesses the absolute right of property, he certainly has the right of disposing of it in any way he may think proper, and therefore he might defeat the devise or limitation over. Moody vs Walker, 3 Ark., 187.
    Personal property may be limited over after a life estate, but not after a gift of the absolute property. 2 Kent, Com., 352; Keyes, Chattels, secs. 73, 143; Jackson vs. Bull, 10 Johns., 20; Jackson vs. Robins, 16 Johns., 537 ; M’Donald rs. Walgrove, 1 Sandf. CL, 278; Ide vs. Ide, 5 Mass., 504.
    “ The plaintiff’s counsel (in Jackson vs. Robins) attempted to establish a distinction between real and personal property. But they admitted that the doctrine as above stated was well established as to personal property.” Burbank vs. Whitney, 24 Pick., 155.
   M!r. Justice Hagner

delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill in this case was filed by Mr. Snyder as trustee under the appointment of this court, for instructions as to the proper distribution of a bequest of $20,000 under the will of Colonel John Tayloe to his daughter, Virginia.

It avers that Virginia Tayloe died after executing a last will and testament; by which she bequeathed this $20,000 to her niece, Miss Lewis, who demands payment of the entire sum; but that the money is also claimed by the children and grandchildren of the sisters of the said Virginia, who deny the right of the said Virginia to bequeath the said property by her will, insisting that she was only given a life estate in the legacy by her father, and that upon her death, unmarried and childless, it devolved upon her surviving sisters and their children, under the proper construction of the will of Colonel John Tayloe.

The court below sustained the claim of the legatee, Virginia T. Lewis, and from this decree the present appeal is taken in behalf of the grandchildren of Mrs. Carter, one of the sisters of Virginia Tayloe. The clause referred to is as follows:

“ I give and bequeath to my daughters, Catharine, Elizabeth M., Virginia and Anne 0. Tayloe, $20,000 apiece, to be invested in United States bank stock, or in government securities, which stock or securities I do hereby direct that my executors, hereinafter named, shall hold in trust for my said daughters respectively, and shall apply the dividends, interest or profits of said stock or securities to the use and benefit of my said daughters, Catharine, Elizabeth M., Virginia and Anne O. Tayloe, severally and respective!}'-, as the said dividends, interest or profits shall accrue; and from and after the intermarriage of any of them, then my said executors shall hold the said bank stock or other securities, belonging to said daughters so marrying, in trust for the following purposes; that is to say, in trust for the maintenance of her and her husband during their joint lives ; then in trust for the survivor of the said husband and wife during his or her life; and after the death of such survivor, then in trust for such issue as she may leave at the time of her death; and in case she shall die without leaving such issue, then in trust for her surviving sisters (my other daughters), and the issue of any deceased sister, such issue taking such share as the deceased sister, whom they represent, would have taken had she been alive to take; and it is my intention that the stock and securities, as also the dividends, interest or profits thereof, shall be utterly free from the power of control of the husbands of my said daughters.”

Then follows this provision ; “And the better to secure the payment of these my daughters’ portions, I do hereby direct that if the funds hereinafter particularly appropriated for the payment of debts and legacies shall be insufficient for the payment of debts and legacies, my estate generally must be charged to make up the deficiency to my said daughters.”

'Among the familiar principles of law laid down with reference to the interpretation of wills, which it will be well to keep in mind in arriving at a correct construction in the present case áre these:

First. It makes no difference whatever, in construing such a bequest as that to Virginia Tayloe, that the property was left in the hands of trustees. The same rules of construction to determine the quality of her estate, whether for life or in fee, are equally applicable to estates placed in trust and those which are not, except so far as the creation of the trust may throw light upon the intention of the testator. Fairfax vs. Gunn, 60 Md., 55.

Again: It is a recognized principle that when a man has undertaken to make a will, it is presumed that his purpose was to dispose of his entire estate. If Colonel Tayloe intended to leave to his daughters only a life estate, and neither should have married, then the testator would have died intestate of the remainder of the $80,000 so bequeathed for life to his daughters; and this result would have been inconsistent with the legal presumption that the testator intended to dispose of the sum absolutely; and the will must manifest a clear intention that the daughters should have only a life estate, before the court would declare that the testator had only disposed of a life interest in the legacy, and had died intestate as to the remainder.

And, as to personal property, it is held that a gift of the produce of a fund is a gift of the fund itself, unless there be words of qualification restraining the extent and duration of the interest. And a bequest of personalty, without words of limitation or perpetuity, passes an absolute estate in the thing bequeathed, unless the contrary intention is plainly expressed or necessarily implied. Adamson vs. Armitage, 19 Ves., 416.

There are in this will several bequests, which, it is conced'd, give absolute interests, to which no words of limitation > are annexed. For example, the testator gives and bet; uoaths all his slaves, who were tradesmen and mechanics <>f every description, such as smiths, carpenters, joiners, wh- olwrights, ship carpenters, masons, shoemakers, etc., to equally divided among his sons, and all the plate which belongs to the house in Washington wherein he resided, is directed to be equally divided, after his wife's death, among all the sons; and he also directs that all his stock of liquors and spirits on hand at his death should in the same manner be equally divided among all his sons; and these bequests, of course, passed absolute estates in the personalty so bequeathed without any words of limitation.

It is perfectly plain that this will was skilfully and artificially drawn. It is apparent from many items that the testator knew how to frame a devise or bequest for life in apt words ; thus, in proper terms, he gives to his wife an estate for life in what is given to her; the charge upon the estates of several of his sons, in favor of one of his’nieces, is properly limited to her life onlj ; and so in other instances ; all intimating clearly that he knew how to use words properly when he desired to create a life estate. And this circumstance is persuasive to suggest that he would have used similar plain words to limit the interest of his daughters in tlie fund, for life, if such had been bis purpose

The testator provided most munificently for his sons and grandson. His will enumerates upwards of thirty plantations, which are devised to them without exception. The bequests for the daughters are insignificant in comparison, and it would enhance the hardship, if the court should be compelled to cut down to life estates, the slender portions which from his abundance be doled out to his daughters.

Omitting the provision as to marriage from the clause under consideration, there remains not one word to limit the power of disposition on the part of the daughters, or to combat the idea that the testator contemplated the vesting of the property in their personal representatives in case of their intestacy, or their power to bequeath their shares by last will. The language preceding the words “and from and after the intermarriage of’ any of them,” etc., constitutes an ample gift of an absolute estate in the several sums of $20,000 apiece to each daughter, although it declared that the money should be invested in United States bank stock or government securities, and be held in trust “for my said daughters respectively.” Those words as fully confer an absolute estate in the sums designated as the bequests before referred to do in the plate and the wines bequeathed by the testator.

The bequest is first, directly to the daughters, of “$20,000 apiece ” to be invested in stocks which he directs that his executors shall hold in trust for his said daughters respectively; applying “the dividends, interest or profits thereof to the benefit and use of the said daughters” severally and respectively, “as the said dividends, etc., shall accrue.”

Thus far he had made a sufficient bequest of the absolute interest in the fund for the daughters, while single. We have no more reason to suppose that he considered his daughters incompetent, so long as they remained unmarried to be trusted with $20,000 apiece, than that his sons were incompetent to hold the great estates he had devised to them. They were equally his children and as much deserving of their father’s bounty. But he naturally contemplated the probability of their marriage, and he knew that new relations would arise as to the management and ownership of the personalty, from the time they should marry.

From that moment, in the absence of express provisions to the contrary, the legacies would devolve upon their husbands, who might waste it and leave their wives penniless; hence, as a prudent father, he proceeded to impose such limitations upon the gift as should serve to protect it from this risk. The management was first committed to trustees; and this provision would have served as a sufficient safeguard against unwise investments by an unmarried daughter. But the solemnization of a marriage would create new difficulties which it was the sole purpose of the latter part of the clause to deal with; and the testator therefore added the words “ and from and after the intermarriage of either of them,” etc., to provide for this new condition of things.

That these added words were only intended to apply to the daughters after their respective marriages seems plain to us.

If none of the daughters should marry, it is self-evident that the added words could never possibly apply. Everything in the added sentences is predicated only on the marriage of either of the daughters, who in that event only is to be affected by the new provision, since the provision as to husbands and children could have no application to her until marriage. If the entire clause had been four times expressed in the will, each repetition referring to only one daughter separately, how could the added words declaring what should happen from and after the marriage of Virginia hy possibility apply if Virginia should not marry at all ?

It may well be, as was argued in behalf of the appellants, that an unmarried daughter could not have disposed of her legacy at her pleasure during her life; because if she had applied to the trustees to transfer the property, they would have urged the possibility of her marriage and the consequent coming into force upon that event of the provisions contained in the added words. But this possibility could not interfere with her power of disposal by will, since such disposition could only operate in favor of her legatee after the possibility of marriage had disappeared, namely, after her death.

The cases cited by the appellants’ counsel in his careful brief were decided upon the particular phraseology of the will there under examination; and they afford no certain guide where the words are as different as they are in those cases from those before us.

No decision cited comes as near to the present case as that of Gulick vs. Gulick, 27 N. J. Eq., 498, which is singularly like the present case. • The fifth section of the will there considered reads as follows:

‘‘I give and bequeath to my daughter Abby Maria the sum of $10,000, to be placed out at interest, on bond and mortgage, so soon as my estate can be collected without sacrifice; the bonds and mortgages to be taken in the names of my executors or the survivor of them, in trust for my said daughter Abby Maria, and the interest to be paid annually to her by my said executors or the survivor of them, and for her sole and separate use, and in nowise liable for the debts or subject to the control.of any man she may marry.
“ Should she marry and have a child or children, then after her death I give the said $10,000 to such child or children.”

The daughter died, never having married, and her personal representative claimed the fund. It was decided that the daughter died seized of an absolute estate against the contention that she was only entitled to a life estate. The court says:

“The testator, it is perceived, first provides for a gift of the fund itself and then the method of its enjoyment by the legatee. The last is equivalent to a gift of the interest of the fund. It is perceived, also, that until we meet the words ‘should she marry and have a child,’ etc., there is no limitation, express or implied, of the time of enjoyment of this interest. The rule is well established that a bequest of the income of personalty without limit as to time is equivalent to a gift of the property. And the rule applies whether given directly or through the intervention of trustees. This absolute bequest was subject to the concluding clause of the section, ‘ should she marry and have a child or children, then, after her death, I give the said $10,000 to such child or children.’ The legatee never married. The event, upon the happening of which the interest was limited over, never occurred. The rule, therefore, governs that where an absolute gift is made in the first instance, followed by a limitation over on the death of the first taker, the absolute gift is not defeated unless the gift over takes effect.
“ Construing this section as an absolute bequest, limited over upon the happening of an event which has failed, the executor of Abby Maria in entitled to the fund.”

This reasoning of the court is very applicable to the case at bar; and we conceive that under the proper construction of this clause, Virginia Tayloe died seized of an absolute estate in the legacy of $20,000, which she was competent to dispose of by her last will.

Being of the opinion that the decree below was correct, it is accordingly affirmed.  