
    THE PACIFIC COAST STEAMSHIP COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 19531.
    Decided December 6, 1897.]
    
      On the defendants’ Demurrer.
    
    The claimant obtains a judgment. A certified transcript is presented to the Secretary of the Treasury within four days of its rendition, and, no appropriation being available, payment is refused. Subsequently the judgment isx>aid. The amount received is accepted in full of principal only. The claimant now sues for interest.
    • I. Interest was not allowed at common law. It is a creature of statute.
    II.Interest on the judgments of this court is regulated by Bevised Statutes (i 1090) and by the Act 80th June, 1890 (26 Stat. L., p. 537), and not by section 10 of the Tucker Act (24 Stat. L., p. 505).
    III. Conrts in construing statutes may not recur to the views of members expressed in debate or consider motives which influenced votes. But what was done by the entire body as the result of discus- • sion must be looked to; and courts may take notice of circumstances outside of an act which tend to show its meaning, such as public records and documents, general and local history, and matters of public notoriety.
    IV. The act of 1890 directs that interest at 4 per cent be allowed on judgments in favor of claimants appealed by the United States and • affirmed, and provides that it shall run from the date of the filing of the transcrixjt in the Treasury to the dato of affirmance, but in no case shall be allowed after the term of the Supreme Court at which the judgment is affirmed.
    V.The decisions relating to interest and to the interpretation to bo given to certain provisions of the Tucker Act examined and stated.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The allegations of the petition demurred to are set forth in the opinion of the court:
    
      Mr. John W. Trainer (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Dodge) for the demurrer:
    The liability of the Government to pay interest exists only where it is authorized by express legislation. (United States ex rel. Angariea v. Bayard, 127 U. S. It., 251-261. See also Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall., 188; Harvey v. United States, 113 U. S., 243-248, 249.)
    Subsequently to the decision of Angariea v. Bayard (127 U. ■ S., 251) the Supreme Court passed on the case of Morley v. Lake Shore Railroad Company (146 U. S., 162-179). There Mr. Justice Shiras, for the court, pointed out the distinction between interest when provided for in a contract; and when resulting from the operation of law. The legislature of New, York had reduced the rate of interest, and the Court of Appeals of that State having held that a judgment obtained before the passage of the act of the legislature ivas subject to the operation of the act, error was assigned to the Supreme Court of the United States upon the ground that the legislation in question impaired the obligation of the contract. That court held, however, that the judgment creditor had no contract with his- debtor which forbade the State from legislating, within its discretion, to reduce the rate of interest upon judgments previously obtained in its courts, and that interest until payment not expressly provided for by contract is treated as statutory damages for the delay. “ But,” said Justice Shiras, “ the statutory damages for nonpayment of judgment, determined by the statute either in whole or in part, the owner of the judgment will be entitled to receive and have a vested right in the damages which shall have accrued up to the date of the legislative change; but after that time his rights as to interest as damages are, as when he first obtained the judgment, just what the legislature chooses to declare. He has no contract whatever on the subject with the defendant in the judgment, and his right is to receive, and his obligation is to pay, as damages, just what the State chooses to prescribe.”
    Indeed., it is true that the right to recover interest did not exist at common law (11 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 379), and in this country it has been held to be entirely a creature of the statute, only allowed where so authorized. It has been held by the Supreme Court of Mississippi that even where there is a general statute on the subject of interest it does not apply to claims against a county authorized by a special statute which makes no provision for interest. (Board of Supervisors of Warren County v. Klein, 51 Miss., 807; Clay County Supervisors v. Supervisors of Chiclcasaw County, 64 Miss., 534. See also Railroad Company' v. Blaisdell & Co., 72 Ill., 152; Chicago v. Alleock, 86 id., 385, and Commissioners v. Bernleny, 91 id., 54.) It will be seen, therefore, that at common law, in the jurisprudence of the States and of the United States, it has been settled that the rights to interest must exist, if at all, by contract or by express statutory enactment. In this case, since there was no contractual liability, the inquiry follows, logically, lias Congress, in tbe act relied upon or elsewhere, authorized the collection of interest on the judgments rendered by the Court of Claims?
    Section 1090, Kevised Statutes, relating to the judgment of that court, provides: “In cases where the judgment appealed from is in favor of the claimant, and the same is affirmed by the Supreme Court, interest thereon at the rate of 5 per centum per annum shall be allowed thereon from the date of its presentation to the Secretary of the Treasury as aforesaid, but no interest shall be allowed subsequent to the affirmance, unless presented for payment to the Secretary of the Treasury as aforesaid.” Section 1091 provides that “no interest shall be allowed on any claim up to the time of the rendition of the judgment thereon by the Court of Claims, unless upon a contract expressly stipulating for the payment of interest.” The statutes, it will be observed, were expressive of the policy of the Government not to pay interest on judgments of that court save under the exceptional cases mentioned. There was no appeal here, and, as we have seen, no contract expressly stipulating. for the payment of interest.
    The defendant in error insists, however, that his right to interest is found in the act’ of March 3, 1887. He points out that its first section revises the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, its second section confers jurisdiction within certain limits as to the amount sued for upon the district and circuit courts.
    The title of the act of March 3,1887, and the phraseology of the act itself do not seem to import that the National Legislature had in mind that special mischief of the old law which has been impressed on counsel for the defendant in error. It is entitled “An act to provide for the bringing of suits against the Government of the United States.” The mischief which Congress was seeking to redress existed principally we think in the fact that the Court of Claims was remote from the multitude of the people having causes of action against the Government, and was therefore difficult of access; that these conditions were virtually prohibitory of suits, unless the amounts involved were large enough to justify a heavy outlay on the part of suitors. The remedy consisted in the opportunity the q.ct permitted to bring suit to the amount of $10,000 in the circuit courts and to the amount of $1,000 in the district courts, which are courts convenient to the people of the several States. Since this was the primary object of the legislation, the court will not make haste to seize upon an ambiguous clause, which may or may not impinge upon statutes expressing the policy of the Government as to its nonliability for interest on claims against it save in exceptional cases and by construction impose a policy altogether different. This is especially true in view of the fact that if Congress had entertained the intention to repeal sections 1090 and 1091 of the ltevised Statutes it would have done so in express language, as it did in this act with section 1079.
    Indeed, an obvious construction of section 10 of the act of March 3,1887, in connection with other cognate and essential sections of -the same act, will plainly indicate that the contention of the defendant in error is untenable.
    Section 6 provides a method for suits in the circuit and district courts, and that copies of the petition shall be served upon the district attorney of the United States in the district wherein the suit is brought. It prescribes what shall be the duty of the district attorney with reference to said suit, and what the courts of the several districts may do in case the district attorney fails to make the proper defense. These provisions manifestly have no relation to the Court of Claims, for the district attorney and the courts of the several districts, it is needless to say, have nothing to do with that court.
    Section 7 provides that the court shall cause a written opinion to be tiled in the case, setting out the specific findings by the court and its conclusions upon the questions of law involved in the case, and shall render judgment thereon.
    If the suit be in equity or admiralty, the court shall proceed in the same way according to the rules of said court. This language manifestly relates to the circuit and district courts, both of which have jurisdiction in equity and one in admiralty.
    We think it is clear that the term “such final judgment or decree,” as used in the proviso to the statute [just quoted], relates to the judgment or decree of the district or circuit courts with which the district attorney is intrusted with specific duties in other portions of the sections, and the district and circuit courts with other duties, and not the judgment or decree of the' Court of Claims, with which he has no concern whatever, and which has no general jurisdiction in equity or admiralty.
    
      
      Mr. George A. King opposed:
    It clearly appears that shortly before Congress passed the act of March 3, 1887, “to provide for the bringing of suits against the Government of the United States,” the practice had become fully and finally established of making no appropriations in advance for payment of judgments of the Court of Claims, but waiting until judgments had been rendered,'and then at intervals of more or less regularity, generally one year, but sometimes oftener, and sometimes not so often, appropriating in the deficiency appropriation act for the payment of these judgments. It was with reference to such conditions that Congress passed the act of 1887.
    Of course, under such a practice, a successful suitor against the United States might have to wait a long time, a year or more, for payment of a judgment rendered in his favor by the Court of Claims.
    This very case is an example of it. The judgment was rendered by the Court of Claims on the 24th day of May, 188?. The Forty-ninth Congress had adjourned on the 3d day of March, 1887, the Fiftieth Congress did not assemble till the first Monday of December, 1887. When it met, it made no appropriation for payment of judgments of the Court of Claims till the 30th of March, 1888; so that the. earliest date at which by any possibility this claimant could have obtained payment of his judgment was nearly a year after the rendition of the judgment.
    Against such injustice the legislation of Congress had all along carefully guarded. It had always recognized the principle enunciated in the report of Hon. Charles H. Mansur (afterwards Second Comptroller of the Treasury) from the Committee on Claims on the claim of the First National Bank of Newtou, Mass. (House .Report 2014, Fifty-second Congress, first session, p. 5) :
    “After any final judgment by its own Court of Claims, and notice thereof served upon the Secretary of the Treasury, it is right for the Government to pay interest unless it shows that judgment below to be wrong.”
    As long as the Secretary of the Treasury was paying judgments as fast as rendered “ out of any general appropriation made by law for the payment and satisfaction of private claims,” no such delay could occur. But as soon as the Government, for its own convenience or protection, adopted a new policy of waiting till Congress enacted a special appropriation before making payment, and thus delayed the settlement of its judgment obligations for many months, often indeed a year or more, it became necessary to provide some means of indemnifying the judgment creditor for the delay. To have failed to do so would have been as dishonorable as to have neglected to provide for interest on the bonded debt of the (lovernmeut. Debts of record, i. e., judgments, are, indeed, of superior rank to debts by specialty, i. e., bonds, which are merely “the next class of .debts after those of record” (2 Black. Comm. 465).
    The remedy was provided by section 10 of the act of March 3,1887. That act (24 Stat. L., 505, 508) by its first section redefines the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. By its second section concurrent jurisdiction, within certain limits as to amount, is conferred upon the district and circuit courts.
    Some of the remaining provisions of the act relate specially to the Court of Claims, some to the district and circuit courts; while others still are general in their operation. The provision of section 10, here relied upon by the defendant in error, is as follows:
    “That from the date of such final judgment or decree interest shall be computed thereon, at the rate of four per centum per annum, until the time when an appropriation is made for the payment of the judgment or decree.”
    There is nothing in this language which limits it to the payment of interest on judgments of the district and circuit courts. Its language, as well as its manifest spirit and intent, extend to the payment of all judgments rendered by any of the courts named in the act, including the Court of Claims, as well as every district and circuit court of the United States. No reason can be suggested why its language should be thus limited, or why a judgment creditor who has obtained his judgment through the Court of Claims should not recover interest equally with one who has sued in the district or circuit court. The general principle in regard to the payment of interest by the United States, was stated by Mr. Justice Miller with his usual force and accuracy in United States v. McKee, 91 U. S. 442, 450, 451.
    The court, however, in that case allowed interest on the claim, not merely from the date of the judgment of the Court of Claims but from the date of the origin of the claim, on the ground that (p. 451) “ the bill of exchange drawn by Clarke in favor of Yigo is an instrument wliieb, by tbe commercial nsage of all nations, bears interest after it becomes due. It also evidences the claim as a liquidated sum.”
    It needs no argument to show that a judgment against the United Statés is a much higher evidence of a claim as a “liquidated sum” than a mere bill of exchange {Hrsldne v. Van Ars-(lale, 15 Wall., 75).
    And in the case-oí The Nuestra Señora de Regla (108 U. S., 92,107) the court allowed interest against the United States on account of default in complying with a decree of restitution, and Congress ratified (if such ratification were necessary) the action of the Supreme Court in this behalf by passing “An act to carry into effect the decree of the District Court of the United States for the southern district of New York in the case of the Spanish ferryboat Nuestra Señora de liegla” (23 Stat. L., 15).
    Coming from these enunciations of the general principle to the decisions of the Supreme Court on this particular act of 1887, it may be remarked that while the exact point now presented can hardly be claimed to have arisen in any (jase that has yet gone to the Supreme Court, yet sufficient- has been said in several decisions of that higher tribunal to indicate clearly what its construction of this provision of section 10 would be when that question were definitely presented.
    In the case of United States v. Jones (131 U. S., 1) the question was whether the first and second sections of the act of March 3, 1887, gave to the district or circuit courts of the United States or-to the Court of Claims jurisdiction in equity to compel the issue and delivery of a patent for public land as a matter of specific performance embraced by the terms of the act within the equitable jurisdiction thereby conferred. It was held that they did not, and that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and of the circuit and district courts under this act of 1887 were concurrent and identical.
    The fourth and ninth sections of the act of 1887 are expressly declared to be undoubtedly applicable to the Court of Claims as well as to the district and circuit courts. If so, is not the tenth section equally applicable? This question, as we will show by reference to another case, has been directly answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court. So, too, in the last paragraph which we have cited, the court forbids the assumption that any broader jurisdiction is given to the circuit and district courts than that given to the Court of Claims. This equally forbids that the judgments of those courts are to be more liberally treated as to payment than those of the Court of Claims. •
    This decision of the Supreme Court was rendered on the 13th day of May, 1889, the opinion being by Mr. Justice Bradley. Upon the very same day another case under the act was decided, the opinion being delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller. This is the case of United States v. Davis (131 U. S., 36). This was a motion to dismiss an appeal taken by the United States from a judgment rendered by a United States District Court under the act of 1887 in favor of a claimant under the act., the judgment being for the sum of $25. This raised the question as to the construction of section 9 of the act of 1887, above cited. That section provided that the plaintiff or the United States in any suit brought under the provisions of the act should have the same rights of appeal or writ of error as are now1 reserved in the statutes of the United States m that behalf made, and upon the conditions and limitations therein contained. The question was whether the right of appeal given by. the act from the judgment of a District Court was to be the same as that which previously existed in relation to cases between private parties in the District Court, or the same right of appeal which had heretofore existed from the judgments of the Court of Claims. The court held that the latter was the true construction;
    It will be here observed that the court distinctly decides that the period of ninety days, within which by section 708 of the Revised Statutes appeals must be taken from the Court of Claims to the Supreme Court, is enlarged to six months by section 10 of the act of 1887. This is a direct decision of the Supreme Court that section 10 of the act of 1S87 is applicable both to the Court of Claims and to the district and circuit courts. If that portion which provides for an appeal within six months applies to both the Court of Claims and the district and circuit courts, it is as clear as anything can be that the concluding sentence of the same section, under which the present suit is instituted, is applicable to all the courts named in the act.
    Proceedings of the two Houses of Congress are frequently and properly examined by the courts as an aid in the ascertainment of the legislative intent. (Blake v. National Banks, 23 Wall., 307; United States v. Steever, 113 U. S., 747; American Netand Twine Go.v. Worthington,14117. 8., 408,474; Holy Trinity Chureh v. United States, 143 TJ. 8., 457, 464, 465.)
    In the opinions of both the majority and minority of the Supreme Court on the recent question of the income tax, frequent reference was made to the opinions expressed by distinguished statesmen both in and out of Congress on the construction of the various provisions of the Constitution and acts of legislation involved. (Polloelc v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Oo.', 157 U. S., 429; 158 U. 8., 601.)
    The object of this enactment, as clearly appears from the character of the debate, was to reduce the rate of interest on appealed judgments, which had been ñxed by section 1090 of the .Revised Statutes at 5 per cent, to 4 per cent, thus bringing it into conformity with section 10 of the act of 1887, and rendering the rate of interest identical on appealed and unap-pealed judgments. • It shows the distinct understanding of Congress that 4 per cent was the regular rate of interest on all judgments, whether of the Court of Claims or of the circuit and district courts, whether appealed or unappealed.
    At both regular sessions of the Congress which has recently closed — the Fifty-third Congress — this same question came up again in both Houses of Congress, and in both it was distinctly and without contradiction reiterated that judgments of the Court of Claims, whether appealed from or not, drew interest from the time they were rendered till an appropriation was made for their payment at the rate of 4 per cent.
    Thus it plainly appears that the intent of Congress in enacting the last clause of section 10 of the act of March 3, 18S7, was -to allow 4 per cent interest on all judgments against the United States, whether of the circuit or district courts or of the Court of Claims from the time when the same were rendered till the date when an appropriation was made for their payment. This is evidenced by the language of the act itself; by the provision of the act of September 30,1890, hereinbefore quoted, reducing the rate of interest on appealed judgments from 5 per cent to 4 per cent, so as to make it concurrent with the general provision of the act of 1887; by the opinions of individual members of great distinction expressed in debates in both Houses; and by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court, several of them based upon this identical act of 1887, and one upon this very section 10, in which the point of view of the court was throughout that of assimilating, or, so far as possible, identifying the practice and rule of decision prevailing in the district and circuit courts of the United States under the act in question with those of the Court of Claims.
    Sot only this, but when we look beyond the mere letter of the act, at its obvious spirit and intent,nothing can be clearer.
    The judgments of the circuit and district courts are neither more or less binding on the Government than those of the Court of Claims. The circuit and district courts are not, indeed, invested with as high responsibility as the Court of Claims; for no judgments of the former can go beyond the limit of $10,000, set by the second section of the act of 1887, while those of the Court of Claims are unlimited in amount. What reason, therefore, can be assigned for allowing interest on judgments of the circuit and district courts and none on those of the Court of Claims, when both are rendered in the exercise of a jurisdiction identical in kind, though differing somewhat in amount, are sent to Congress in the same manner, and their payment provided for in the very same appropriation act!
    Instead of requiring any very strong arguments to show that interest is allowable on judgments of the Court of Claims, when it is conceded that it is upon those of district and circuit courts, it ought to require very strong argument to convince the court that Congress had any intention of discriminating between the two sets of tribunals. No reason for making such discrimination is apparent, and we are confident none can be assigned.
    The United States allege, as one ground of demurrer, “ that the plaintiff accepted the principal on the judgment rendered by the Court of Claims against this defendant, and can not now recover interest in a separate action brought in this court.”
    A conclusive answer to this position is found in the case of Hobbs v. United States (19 C. Gis. E., 220), which, like this, was a suit to recover interest on a judgment of the Court of Claims after payment of the principal.
    If we are right in our view that the statute give,s interest, then the plaintiff herein can not be deprived of it by acceptance of the principal under an appropriation by Congress insufficient for the payment of the whole.
    See also State of Neio Torh v. United States (26 C. Cls. E., 467), for an action for interest, based upon express statute, sustained after payment of the principal.
    In Stewart v. Barnes (153 U. S. 456), cited for the United States, tliere was no statute allowing interest. It was merely in the nature of incidental damages, and was therefore merged in the payment of the principal. Such a decision has no possible application to a claim like the present, based upon express statutory provision.
    The case of Walton v. United States (61 Fed.Eep., 486), cited for plaintiff in error, is also without application.
    That was a case specially referred by Congress to the Court of Claims by a private act, which act was held by the court in which the suit was brought to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Claims of the claim both for principal and interest as well as to limit the measure of redress to which the party was entitled.
    It is too plain for argument that that decision can have no application to the present case, which is one arising under the general provisions of the act of March 3,1887.
    The objection is further raised, though it does not appear to have been in the district court, that if interest was recoverable on this judgment at all the district court had no jurisdiction to enforce the claim.
    This objection overlooks the fact that the suit for interest on the judgment was a separate and independent suit from that founded on the original claim, and the right of action accrued, if at all, subsequently to the rendition of judgment by the Court of Claims. If we are right in our position that the Oovernment, by a statute having the force and effect of a contract, agreed to pay interest on this judgment, it becomes the subject of a distinct and separate claim against the United States from the original cause of action. A suit founded thereon was necessarily an independent proceeding, in no sense ancillary to the suit in the Court of Claims upon which the original judgment was rendered. By the very terms, therefore, of the first and second sections of the act of March 3, 1887, the plaintiff was given his choice of tribunals for such a suit. By the terms of the first section he could bring his suit in the Court of Claims. By those of the second he was permitted to choose the district or circuit court, within certain limitations as to amount, which limitations include this claim.
    In the case of United, States v. CGtrad/y (22 Wall., 641) the Supreme Court had before it a suit brought in the Court of Claims to recover the unpaid balance of a judgment rendered by that court against the United States in a prior suit. The second suit in the Court of Claims to recover the balance of the judgment was throughout treated as a distinct and independent proceeding. An appeal to the Supreme Court was entertained from, it, and the judgment affirmed on its merits. All this could not have been done had the suit been a mere continuation of the first one in the Court of Claims.
    .The same question was somewhat more elaborately considered by the Court of Claims in the case of Brown v. The United States (6 C. Gis. B., 171), where a new suit against the United States was held to be an appropriate remedy for the detention of a portion of what was recovered in the original suit.
    That question was answered in the affirmative, and the answer thus given is necessarily conclusive of the present case. It is as if the plaintiff herein had recovered a judgment in a State court against a private defendant and then, having obtained part of the fruits of the judgment, had brought a new suit to recover the balance. It is familiar law that an action on the judgment of any court of any State, where the original court had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, may be brought in the courts of any other State, or in a court of the United States.
    This case is even stronger. Here the original suit was under section 847 of the Bevised Statutes fixing the fees of United States commissioners. The plaintiff got his judgment in that case and the principal was paid and accepted in full of the principal, but only of the principal, of the judgment. The G-overnment, by a totally different provision of law, section 10 of the act of March 3,1887, agreed to pay 4 per cent interest on that judgment. That agreement any court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter) as did the District ■ Court for the northern district of Alabama, had the right to enforce by a new judgment.
   Howey, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The question presented for determination in this case is of much general interest and importance not only because of the effect of its final decision upon litigants and judgment creditors in this court, but also because of the conflicting views existing with'respect to the true construction of an act relating to the jurisdiction of the courts invested with power to hear and determine claims against the Government.

Is interest recoverable upon a judgment or decree of this court where the judgment or decree is of the same character as that rendered for plaintiff, and from which no appeal has been taken and the same made final

Some additional importance has attached to the question pending the determination of the matter here because of the conflicting views of other courts on the same subject, the District Court of the United States for the northern district of Alabama having decided that interest is recoverable on judgments of this court, while the Circuit Court of Appeals for the fifth circuit has taken the opposite view, and decided that such interest cau not be recovered.

The Pacific Coast Steamship Company, a corporation having its principal place of business at San Francisco, in the State of California, brought suit in this court under the provisions of the statute, for certain services performed at the request and on behalf of the United States, and on the 1st day of April, 1889, obtained final judgment therein for $14,800.92. A duly certified transcript of this judgment was presented to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment within four days after said judgment; but no appropriation being then available payment was refused. Subsequently, under an act approved September 30,1890, entitled “An act making appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30,1890, and for prior years and other purposes,” Congress provided, among other things—

“That the following sums be, and the same are hereby, appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to supply deficiencies in the appropriations for the fiscal year eighteen hundred and ninety, and for prior years,arul for other objects hereinafter stated, namely * * * For payment of judgments of the Court of Claims. * *• * To the Pacific Coast Steamship Company, fourteen thousand eight hundred dollars and ninety-two cents ($14,800.92): * * * Provided, That none of the judgments provided for shall be paid until the right of appeal shall have expired.”

The principal of the judgment was paid under the appropriation, the plaintiff corporation alleging that the amount was received and accepted in full of the principal only.

The right to claim interest is based, first, upon the liquidated character of the judgment out of which grew interest for the time of the nonpayment of the principal, and secondly, upon the tenth section of the act of March 3, 1887, entitled “An act to provide for the bringing of suits against the Government of the United States.” (1 Supp. Rev. Stat., 559.)

In behalf of the Government it is claimed that the tenth section of the act relied upon by the petitioner applies only to judgments in the circuit and district courts of the United States for the ’limited sums those courts are authorized to render judgment for, and can not be held to apply to judgments obtained in this court against the United States; and nest, that no other authority growing either out of contract or statute can be shown to sustain the demand.

As a right in the nature of property, or as a premium or profit for the use of money, interest was not allowed at common law. Contracts for the payment of interest as an accessory or incident to principal were treated as usurious and punishable as usury. In this country the payment of interest became sanctioned by statute for contracts, express or implied, or by way of damages, either for a default in the payment of a debt or for a use or benefit derived from the money of another. Where such has been the usage of trade or the course of dealing between the parties, or the special custom of one party, known and acceded to by the other, the law will imply a contract. (Williams v. Craig, 1 Dall., R., 313; Meech v. Smith, 7 Wend., 315; Ayers v. Metcalf, 39 Ills., 307; Selleck v. French, 1 Conn., 32.)

Judgments and decrees bear interest from their date, but the statute is the foundation of the right.

Interest, therefore, as a rule, is the creature of the statute. The courts have announced this proposition so often, and text writers have so generally accepted the same as correct, it may now be said to be axiomatic that unless the warrant for the payment of interest be found -in the statute interest can not be collected. The principle is well settled that the United States are not liable to pay interest on claims against them in the absence of statutory direction. This is so whether such claims originate in contract or in tort, or whether they arise in the ordinary course of business with the Government, or under legislation making appropriations for specific relief. The only recognized exceptions are where the Government stipulates to pay interest and where it is expressly given by an act of Congress, either by the name of interest or by that of damages. The practice has long prevailed in the Departments of not allowing interest on claims presented, liquidated or unliqui-dated, except in some way specially provided for. The Supreme Court adopted this rule from a succession of the opinions of the Attorneys-General of the United States in a well-considered case on the subject, from which we know of no settled departure. (Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U. S. R., 251; see also Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall., 188, and Harvey v. United States, 113 U. S. R., 243, 249; United States v. New York, 160 U. S. R., 619.)

That interest has been allowed in some cases where the claim has become liquidated.is true. (United States v. McKee, 91 U. S. R., 442, 450, 451; Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall., 75; The Neustra Senora de Regla, 108 U. S. R., 92, 107.) But the opinion in the first case was by a divided court, where interest was allowed on a bill of exchange, and where the claim had been referred to this court under an act directing’ the examination of the claim to be governed by the same rules and regulations adopted by the Government before that time in the settlement of like cases. While Mr. Justice Miller, for the majority, adverted to the fact that the rule for the payment of interest in adjusting and allowing unliquidated and disputed claims against the Government was not uniform, yet he expressly declared the case to be like those in which interest was to be allowed by the previous direction of Congress. In the second case cited, where an illegal tax had been collected and the .citizen who had paid it had been obliged to bring suit against the collector, the court decreed that such person was entitled to interest in the event of recovery from the time of the illegal exaction. In the last case mentioned the court allowed interest against the Government on account of default in complying with an order of restitution to the time of the decree in the case of the Spanish boat- Neustra Señora de Eegla, declared by the court not to be lawful prize and captured without probable cause. If there be other authorities to sustain the proposition implied from the language used in any of these cases that undisputed and liquidated claims are entitled to interest, our attention has not been called to them.

The cases cited, however, do not establish the rule, but rather exceptions to the rule, declared by the decisions in Angarica v. Bayard and Harvey v. United States (supra), and recently emphasized by the unequivocal language that interest can not be collected from the Government in- the absence of language specially providing for its payment, and that the claim for interest must be clear and beyond question. (District of Columbia v. Johnson, 165 U. S. R., 330, and United States v. Verdier, 164 U. S. R., 213.)

It is not shown, or attempted to be shown, that the contract upon which the original judgment for the plaintiff was based stipulated for tbe payment of interest. The claim not being one of contract stipulating for interest in the outset, the court could not and did not allow interest under the act of March 3, 1863 (sec. 1091, Rev. Stat.), when the judgment was rendered. The demand became liquidated by the judgment, it is true, but there was nothing in the change from its former status as a claim that entitled the creditor to interest unless some specific provision of the general statute authorized it. The judgment itself did not become a contract for interest-bearing purposes, because the most important elements of contract were wanting. The defendants had not voluntarily assented or promised to pay, and in this respect the case resembled that of Morley v. Lake Shore Railroad Co., where the duty to pay interest on a judgment was declared to be no more within the scope of the obligation of the defendant than before (146 U. S. R., 162).

Nor does the case here come within that provision of law relating to judgments of this court appealed from by the United States. Section 1090 of the Revised Statutes provides:

“In cases where the judgment appealed from is in favor of the claimant, and the same is affirmed by the Supreme Court, interest thereon at the rate of five per centum per annum shall be allowed thereon from the date of its presentation to the Secretary of the Treasury as aforesaid, but no interest shall be allowed subsequent to the affirmance, unless presented for payment to the Secretary of the Treasury as aforesaid.”

When rendered, the judgment for the plaintiff was acquiesced in and paid as soon as appropriated for.

Has the act of March 3, 1887, changed the policy of the Government with respect to the payment of interest on the judgments of this court? It is contended for the plaintiff that interest should be paid from the time the judgment was rendered till the date when an appropriation was made for its payment; that this is evidenced by the language of the act itself; by the provision of the act of September 30,1890, reducing the rate of interest on appealed judgments from 5 per cent to 4 per cent, so as to make it concurrent with the general provision of the act of 1887; by the opinions of individual members of distinction expressed in debates in Congress, and by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court, several of them based upon the act of 1887, and one upon section 10 of that act, in which the point of view of the court throughout-was that of assimilating, or, so far as possible, identifying the practice and rule of decision prevailing in the district and circuit courts of the United States under the act in question with those of the Court of Claims.

The act of 1887, commonly called the Tucker Act, reenacted' the jurisdiction of this court and conferred concurrent jurisdiction upon the District Courts of the United States to hear and determine all matters named in the first section of the act where the amount of the claim should not exceed $1,000, and upon the Circuit Courts likewise to hear and determine all cases where the amount of the claim should exceed $1,000 and not exceed $10,000. All cases brought in either of tlie said courts were to be tried without a jury. It may be observed here that in addition to the act of 1887, reenacting the general jurisdiction of this court, numerous other acts of Congress existed then and have been enacted since referring particular cases or groups of cases to the Court of Claims for adjudication. Some of these relate to cases and classes of claims public and general in their nature, while many others cover private or special cases and claims. Among those acts of special importance (and excluding those providing for the reference of claims or matters by a House or committee of Congress and by heads of departments for findings of fact or conclusions of law) may be mentioned the act of January 20, 1885, providing for the determination of the validity and amount of French spoliation claims; the act of March 3,1875, permitting certain land-grant railroads to bring suit in this court; the act of June 16, 1880, conferring jurisdiction over all pending claims against the District of Columbia arising out of contracts for improvements, and the act of March 3, 1891, providing for the adjudication of Indian depredation claims. It is significant of the purpose and intent of Congress that except in those instances of contract by executive officers of the Covernment duly authorized the payment of interest or the award of damages in lieu of interest was excluded by these statutes. It is equally significant of the policy of Congress, after the act of 1887 as well as before, that appropriations for the payment of judgments of this court on claims referred under the statutes mentioned, as under all others, covered the amount of each judgment as rendered and excluded interest except in those cases where appeals ha,d been taken by the United States and the judgments affirmed, or in cases of contracts where interest was authorized.

Deference to the act of 1887 shows that some of its provisions specially apply to this court, while other provisions relate exclusively to suits brought in the District and Circuit courts. It is also manifest that some of the sections of the law apply to all of the courts invested with jurisdiction to hear claims for the amounts mentioned in each jurisdiction. It may be conceded, without disturbing the conclusion we have reached in this case, that certain provisions of the act in question are ambiguous, and some uncertainty exists as to whether they apply to all the courts or to some of them.

Section 6 provides for the service of the petition filed under the preceding section upon the district attorney in the district wherein suit is brought and for notice in these cases to the Attorney-General by registered mail, and prescribes the duty of the district attorney with reference to suits in the Circuit and District courts and the duty of the courts of the several districts where the district attorney fails to make the proper defense. Inasmuch as district attorneys are the officers in charge of the business of the United States in the courts mentioned in section 6, and have no functions to perform in tliis court, it is clear that the provisions of this section do not relate to the business of the Court of Claims.

Section 7 provides that it shall be the duty of the court to cause a written opinion to be filed in the cause, setting forth the specific findings by the court of the facts therein and the conclusions of the court upon all questions of law involved in the case, and to render judgment thereon. If the suit be in equity or admiralty, the court shall proceed with the same according to the rule of such courts. Inasmuch as the Circuit and District courts have jurisdiction in equity and one of them in admiralty, it is clear that section 7 must apply to those courts exclusively.

Section 8 in express terms repeals section 1079 of the Revised Statutes and extends the provisions of section 1080 to all cases under the act. Thus it will be seen that section 1080, which before the act of 1887 related. exclusively to this court, was extended to cover all cases within the new jurisdiction.

In several of its sections the act has been construed by the Supreme Court. In one case it was held that the fourth and ninth sections were applicable to all the courts taking jurisdiction. (Jones v. United States, 131 U. S. R., 1.) In United States v. Davis (131 U. S. R., 30) the period of ninety days provided by section 708 of the Revised Statutes for appeals to be taken was held to be enlarged to six months by section 10 of the act in question. . In United States v. New York (160 U. S. R., 612) Mr. Justice Harlan, for the court, declared it was “ difficult to tell what was intended” by certain words of the twelfth section, but held that section 1063 of the Revised Statutes, the second section of the Bowman Act, and the twelfth section of the Tucker Act may be regarded as parts of one general system covering different states of case and standing together without conflict in any essential particular.” It is argued from the first two cases mentioned that because the fourth and ninth sections of the Tucker Act were held to be applicable to this court as well as to the Circuit and District courts the tenth section is equally applicable here, and that in any event the Davis Case is a direct decision in favor of the equal application of the tenth section throughout to the proceedings and judgments of all the courts taking jurisdiction alike. We can not adopt, these views.

In the first case cited the question was, whether the jurisdiction conferred by the first and second sections gave to the Circuit and District courts or to this court jurisdiction in equity to compel the issue and delivery of a patent for public) land as a matter of specific performance embraced by the act within the equitable jurisdiction conferred, and it was held that these sections did not. It is significant that the court took the occasion to say that sections 1089 and 1090 of the Revised Statutes were, still in force and “ still the law on the subjects to which they relate, being necessary to the completion of the system, and not being supplied by any other enactments.” The question in the Davis Case arose on a motion to dismiss an appeal taken by the Government from a judgment rendered by a District Court, under the act of 1887, in favor of a claimant, the judgment being for the sum of $25. The question was, whether under section 9 the right, of appeal given by the act from the judgments of a District Court was to be the same as that which previously existed in relation to cases between pi'ivate parties in the District Court or the same right of appeal which had theretofore existed from the judgments of the Court of Claims. In holding that the latter was the true construction the court declared that the period of ninety days (within which, by section 708 of the Revised Statutes, appeals must be taken from the Court of Claims to the Supreme Court) was enlarged to six months by section 10 for judgments of the District Courts.

There being nothing to indicate that section 708 of the lievised Statutes was superseded by the proviso to section 10 with respect to the judgments of this court, appeals from our judgments must still be governed by that section of the law antedating the Tucker Act, and consequently, unless appeals are taken in ninety days under such regulations as section 708 prescribes, they can not be taken at all.

Section 10 provides:

“That when the findings of fact and the law applicable thereto have been filed in any case as provided in section six of this act, and the judgment or decree is adverse to the Government, it shall be the duty of the district attorney to transmit to the Attorney-General of the United States certified copies of all the papers filed in the cause, with a transcript of the testimony taken, the written findings of the court, and his written opinion as to the same; whereupon the Attorney-General shall determine and direct rvhether an appeal or writ of error shall be taken or not; and when so directed the district attorney shall cause an appeal or writ of error to be perfected in accordance with the terms of the statutes and rules of practice governing the same: Provided, That no appeal or writ of error shall be allowed after six months from the judgment or decree in such suit. From the date of such final judgment or decree interest shall be computed thereon, at the rate of four per centum per annum, until the time when an appropriation is made for the payment of the judgment or decree.”

The words “such final judgment or decree,” as they are used in the proviso of the section, relate to the judgments or decrees of the circuit or district courts, in which the district attorney is charged with duties designated in other portions of. the sections; and we think it is clear, from the language used, that the proviso does not relate to such final judgments or decrees as shall be rendered by this court.

It is beside the question to ask if any reason can be assigned why a judgment creditor who has obtained his judgment through this court should not recover interest equally with one who has sued in the other courts, when both are rendered in the exercise of a jurisdiction identical in kind though differing in amount, are sent to Congress in the same manner, and their payment provided for in the same appropriation act. It is true that judgments of this court are unlimited in amount, while those of the other jurisdiction are for limited sums, and the higher responsibility rests here because of the magnitude of the claims that may ripen into judgment. Justice would seem to dictate that a judgment for a large sum of money authorized to be rendered against the United States by one court should have the same incidents and privileges as a judgment for a small sum authorized to be rendered by another court; but the discrimination has been made by the law-making power, and for the purposes of this case the statute sufficiently answers the question. We must construe the statute according to what we understand from its language, and not by any views we may have of legislative expediency or policy.

It may be that the omission to provide for interest on unap-pealed and unaffirmed judgments for the large sums authorized to be rendered in this court was accidental, but there are stronger reasons for believing the action of Congress in the premises, as we understand that action, was the result of intention.

Respecting the views and opinions of those who have expressed themselves upon the subject in Congress, we are “not at liberty to recur to the views of individual members in debate, nor to consider the motives which influenced them to vote for or against the passage of the measure. The act speaks the will of Congress, and this is to be ascertained from the language used.” United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S. R., 79.) We must look to what was. done by the entire body as the result of the debates, rather than to opinions expressed pending the discussion of bills resulting in enactments. “Courts take judicial notice of some circumstances outside of an act which go to show its meaning, and in doing so they frequently take a wide range of illustration and investigation from public records, public documents, general and local history, and other matters of such general and public notoriety as may be supposed to have been in the minds of all the legislators when the act was passed, but they never admit the opinions and evidence of individual witnesses for that purpose. (The Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall., 37; Blake v. National Banks, 23 Wall., 317; Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. R., 42; Blake v. United States, 103 id., 235; Wilson v. Spalding, 19 Fed. Rep., 304; State v. New Orleans Pacific Railroad, 30 La. Ann., 980; People v. Stevens, 71 N. Y., 527; Fisher v. United States, 15 C. Cls. R., 323; Fendall v. United States, 16 id., 121; Adam Badeau v. The United States, 21 id., 48.)”

The course of legislation, since the act of 1887, in limiting appropriations to the payment of the principal of judgments of this court, except m cases appealed from by the United States and affirmed, is m line with the views we have adopted. And, as if confirmatory of the previous legislation on the subject, the act of 1890 (26 Stat. L., p. 537) making appropriations to supply deficiencies (and which included provision for the payment to the plaintiff of the principal of its judgment) directed that, on judgments in favor of claimants which had been appealed by the United States and affirmed by the Supreme Court, interest at the rate of 4 per cent per annum should be allowed and paid from the date of filing the transcript of judgment in the Treasury Department up to and including the date of the affirmance by the Supreme Court, except that in no case was interest to be allowed after the term of the Supreme Court at which said judgment was affirmed. This legislation fixed the rate of interest on appealed and affirmed judgments of this court the same as that provided on judgments of the circuit and district courts, but again declared the rule for unappealed and unaffirmed judgments of the Court of Claims that interest should be payable only on judgments appealed and affirmed, and excluded interest on any judgment which might accrue after the term at which the judgment was affirmed.

The opinion of the court is that the demurrer of the United States to the plaintiff’s petition be sustained, with leave to the plaintiff to amend within thirty days; but otherwise it is directed that the said petition be dismissed.  