
    QISING WENG, Aka Qi Feng, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-702.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 14, 2014.
    Gerald Karikari, New York, NY.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director; Stephanie A. Svoren-Jay, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, GERARD E. LYNCH, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Qising Weng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a January 29, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming a May 27, 2011, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Qising Weng, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 29, 2013), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Im-mig.Ct.N.Y.City May 27, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented and modified by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

Weng asserted eligibility for asylum based on his arrest, detention, and beatings for his practice of Falun Gong in China, and his fear of future harm due to his continuing practice of Falun Gong. The agency failed to clearly state its justification for rejecting Weng’s past persecution claim. It is unclear to what extent the IJ’s analysis was based on credibility concerns. And although the BIA assumed credibility, and concurred with the IJ’s decision that Weng failed to meet his burden of proof as to his fear of future persecution, it failed to analyze Weng’s allegations of past persecution.

Where an asylum applicant demonstrates past persecution he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The burden then is not on the alien but the government to rebut the presumption. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir.2006). Only where there has been no past persecution does the burden remain on the applicant to demonstrate a well-founded fear. See Baba v. Holder, 569 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir.2009). The IJ appeared to base his past persecution finding on credibility concerns combined with a lack of evidence regarding Weng’s current practice of Fa-lun Gong, but the BIA assumed credibility and then gave no explanation of how the future fear finding or failure to meet the burden of proof applied to past harm. This lack of clarity with respect to Weng’s allegations of past harm hinders our review. See Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir.2006) (requiring a certain minimal level of analysis from agency decisions denying asylum to enable meaningful judicial review). Accordingly, we remand for the agency to determine whether Weng met his burden of establishing past persecution based on a protected ground and, in turn, whether he was entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution on that basis. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings, and the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.  