
    [Philadelphia,
    March 29, 1824.]
    HUDSON against CAREY.
    IN ERROR.
    Though a slight acknowledgment of a debt will take it out of the act of limitations, yet if the debtor qualify his acknowledgment so as to show a determination not to pay, the act will take effect. Therefore where a debtor on being called on for payment of a promissory note, mbre than six years- after it became due, said, that as there had been no money transactions between himself and the plaintiff previous to or during the year 1812, he -was surprised at the demand; that he owed Mm nothing on the account mentioned, and referred him to his final discharge under the act of 13th March, 1812, it was held, that the debt was barred by the act of limitations, notwithstanding the act of 1812, was unconstitutional and void.
    The operation of the act of limitations was not suspended, while the act of 13th March, 1812, “ for the relief of insolvent debtors residing in the city and county of JPhiladelphiasxiil their creditors,”-was held by the courts of this state tobe con* stitutional and valid. -
    In the District Court for the city and county of Philadelphia, a case was stated for the opinion of the court, which, for the pur* pose of a writ of error, was to be considered as a special verdict It set forth the following facts.
    On the 17th of Jlpril, 1812, Edward Hudson, the defendant below, drew a promissory note in favour of Cornelius 8¡- Jlndrew Conrad, fy Co.' for 500 dollars, payable sixty days after date, which was indorsed by the payees to Mathew Carey, the plaintiff.
    On the 5th of September, 1812, the defendant obtained a corticate of discharge under the act of assembly of this state, passed the 13th of March, 1812, entitled ££an act for the relief of insolvent debtors residing in the city and county of Philadelphia, and their creditors.”
    On the 31st of March, 1817, the Supreme Court of the state of Pennsylvania, decided in the case of the Farmers’ 8? Mechanics’ Bank v. Smith, 3 Serg. 8p Rawle, 63, that the said act of assembly was constitutional; andupon a joinder in demurrer to the defendant’s plea of a certificate of discharge under the said act, judgment was rendered for the defendant. That case having been removed, by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, the said judgment was onthe 13th February, 1821, reversed, on the ground that the said act of assembly of the 13th of March, 1812, was unconstitutional and void. 6 Wheaton, 13.
    
      . On the 13th of December 1818, the plaintiff addressed a letter to the defendant, in which hednformed him that he held his note, and called upon him to pay it; to which the defendant replied, that as there had never been any transactions between himself and the plaintiff, previous to or during the year 1813, he was surprised at the demand; that his answer should beexjflicit, because he was determined it should be final. He then proceeds. “ I owe you nothing on the, account mentioned. Upon this subject you can have no doubt; but should you, persevere after the above declaration I refer you to my certificate of final discharge, given by the. commissioners of the bankrupt law in 1813, after I had delivered to them the whole of my property under the provisions of the law.” Some further correspondence passed which is not material.
    On these facts, two questions were submitted to the court.
    1st. Did the act of limitations run against the plaintiff while the act of the 13th March, 1813, was held by the Supreme Court of this state to be constitutional?
    3d. Does the correspondence between the parties contain evidence of such an acknowledgment of the debt, or a promise to pay it, as will take the case out of the act of limitations?
    
      Randall for the plaintiff in error.
    . The exemption claimed by the plaintiff below from the operation of the act of limitations, is not one of the exceptions mentioned in the act. It is novel in its character, and repugnant to the principles of a great-number of decisions.- The closing of the courts during the existence of a civil war, does not prevent the statute from running in England. Branniori v. Evelyn, 3 Salk. 340. 1 Lev. 111. S. C. Paul v.' Wyburn, Carth. 136. 7. Pridov. Webber, 1 Keble, 157. 1 Lev. 31. S. C. The statute did not run it is true between the abdication of James II, and the accession of William and Mary, bu.t this was by the express provisions of a statute, 1 W. <§- M. ch. 4; which affords an argument in our favour. In this case there was no impediment for a single moment, to the institution of a suit, aqd this suit was actually brought before the Supreme Court reversed the judgment in the case of the Farmers’ 8? Mechanics’ Bank v. Smith. He cited in the course of his argument Presly v. Williams, 15 Mass. R. 193. Act of 31st June 17S1, 1 Sm. L. 78. {note). Act of 13th March 1785, 1 Sm. L. -78. {note.) Stoivell v. Zouch, Ploawd. 360. 371. Mablyv. Oeker, 3 Yeates, 300. Co. Litt.-246. G-odb. 365. 9 Pin. Jib. 376. 3 Sh. 8r Lef. 630. 3 Ch. Ca. 317. 17 Pez. 91.
    The court told Mr. Randall that if was unnecessary to speak to the second point.
    
      Lowber and J. R. Ingersoll for the defendant in error.
    1. Equity has interposed in a variety of cases to prevent the operation of the statute, where the exception was not embraced by the words of the act. Thus where there is a promise to pay within six years, the statute does not prevent a recovery of the debt; and even an admission after suit brought, removes the bar. Jdnony. 1 Vern. 74. Clark v. Cobley, 2 Cox, 173. 2 Ball. $■ Beatty, 129. In a case like this equity would give relief. Its circumstances strongly recommend it to favour. This court had decided, that a discharge under the act of 1812, was valid, and therefore the plaintiff’s hands was tied. It would have been improper to bring an action. Though ultimately pronounced by the Supreme Court of the United States to be unconstitutional, yet while in force and sanctioned by the Supreme Court of this state, it was valid, and acts done in pursuance of it were good. The sheriff would not be liable for discharging a man from arrest, while the law was in operation, and sanctioned by the state courts. The effect of it therefore was to put a practical stop to judicial proceedings, and to prevent the institution of suits. In Richards v. Mary’d. Ins. Co. 8 Crunch 92. certain general principles are stated which regulate cases of exemption from the act of limitations. That upon which we insist, is clearly distinguishable from the case of a civil war. This was an act of the government; an act of the legislature sanctioned by the Supreme Court; while a civil war is in direct op* position to the government. The legislature may by a new law, introduce new savings which may operate retrospectively. The validity of the laws of this state giving a stay of execution has never been doubted; and this act so far as it prevents proceedings, and amounts to a declaration that the act of limitations shall during its continuance be suspended, is constitutional and binding. There is no_ constitutional objection to the establishment of prison bounds by act of assembly. Holmes v. Lansing, 3 John. Ca. 73; and under this act the city and county of Philadelphia may fairly be considered as prison bounds.
    2. The authorities bear out the position that the defendant’s letter amounted to a sufficient acknowledgment of the debt, to take the case out of the statute. The slightest acknowledgment, unless it be inconsistent with a promise to pay will do. Miles v. Moodie, 3 Serg. 8r Rawle, 211. Brown v. Campbell, 1 Serg. 8? Rawle, 180. Fries v. Boiselett, 9 Serg. 8¡'Rawle, 128. Such an acknowledgment may be implied, where the language is ambiguous and the debt is neither admitted nor denied. 2 T. R. 760. It is true the defendant denies that he owes the plaintiff any thing on the account mentioned; which plainly refers to money transactions prior to or during the year 1812; but he does not deny being indebted on the note, which is a. tacit admission that he is indebted. And if a man give a bad reason for refusing to pay a debt, and at the same time acknowledge it, this amounts to a new promise. Thus if he should say that the debt originated in an immoral consideration, and it turned out not to be so, the statute would not protect him. This principle applies forcibly to the present case. If the defendant had merely said, I owe you nothing; the statute would have been a bar; but he refers to his discharge under the act of •1812, as the reason why he owes the plaintiff nothing, thus acknowledging the existence of the debt independently of that act. But that act being void, the reason fails, and therefore the debt is in substance acknowledged. Dunlop v. Ball, 2 Cranch. 180. Delators. Bartley, 1 Stark. 7. Richardsonv. Fern, Lofft. 86. Bull. N. P. 149. Peake N. P. C. 93. Clemenson v. Williams, 8 Cranch. 72. Hellens v. Shaw, 1 Moor. 344. Bailie y. Lord Inchiquin, 1 Esp. N. P. 435.
    
      Binney,
    
    who was to have replied, was relieved by the court, whose opinion was delivered by
   Tilghman, C. J.

Matthew Corey, the plaintiff in the District Court, brought this action against Edward Hudson, the plaintiff in error, on a promissory note for 50Ó dollars, drawn by the said Hudson, payable to Cornelius $• Andrew Conrad fy Co , or order, which came to the hands of the plaiqtiff for full value, in the course of businéss. The defendant was discharged from his debts by virtue of an act of Assembly of this commonwealth, passed on the 13th March, 1812, which has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to be unconstitutional and void. The defence in the District Court turned on the act of limitations, which was pleaded.by the defendant in bar of the action. The facts appear in a case stated, on which two questions arise: 1st.. Was the operation of the act of limitations prevented by the acknowledgment of the defendant, in a written correspondence between him and the plaintiff. 2d. Are there any equitable circumstances in this case, which should' take it out of the act of limitations?

1, On the 12th December, 1818, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant, informing him that he held his note, and requesting payment. On the 14th of the same month, the defendant answered, that he was surprised at his démand, as there had been no money transactions between them. -The defendant then proceeds to express himself as follows. Upon this subject, my answer shall be explicit, because I am determined .it shall be final. I owe you nothing on the account mentioned. Upon this subject you can have no doubt. But should you persevere /after the above declaration, I refer you to my certificate of final discharge, given by the commissioners of the bankrupt law in 1SÍ2, after I had delivered to them all my property under the provisions of the law.” The rest of the correspondence is immaterial. -.As this subject was fully considered in the case of Fries v. Boisselett, decided by this court in December, 1823, it will be sufficient to refer to the principle established in that case, viz.' that though a slight acknowledgment of the debt would take a ease out of the statute, yet if the debtor qualified his acknowledgment in such a manner as to show that it was his determination not to pay, the statute should take effect. Now in the present case, I cannot perceive the slightest acknowledgment of the debt. The defendant said, I owe you nothing on the ac count mentioned. The plaintiff’s counsel has ingeniously argued,' that the account mentioned refers to money transactions, which the defendant had mentioned in the former part of his letter. Suppose it did, where is the acknowledgment of a debt on any other account? It is going quite too far to infer, that the debt on the promissory note was confessed, because the defendant was silent on that subject. But when we consider the latter part of the letter, it is clear, that far from making any promise, or acknowledgment, the defendant was determined to pay nothing. He refers to his certificate under the act of assembly, by virtue of which he was discharged from all his debts. There can be no stronger indication of intention., I am of opinion therefore, that there is nothing in the defendant’s letter which can prevent the operation of the act of limitations.

2. The 2d ground of defence is this. It was decided by this court in the case of the Farmer’s & Mechanic’s Bank v. Smith, that the insolvent law of Pennsylvania, by virtue of which the defendant was discharged, was constitutional and valid, and therefore,'in the interval between that judgment, and its reversal by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was useless for the plaintiff to bring suit against the defendant: because he would be sure to have judgment given against him in the State Court. And therefore, it is contended, that in equity, the statute should not run, during that interval. But, it appears to me, that to stop the running of the statute, would be an assumption of legislative power. It is unnecessary to say, how the case would have stood, if the courts had been shut, so that no action could be brought. It is to be observed however, that the courts having been shut for a short period, in the beginning of the war of the revolution, this state, and I believe all the other states thought proper to pass acts for the purpose of declaring that the statute of limitations should not run during that period. But the courts werenevershutone momentagainst the plaintiff. It was known, that the judgment of this court, inthecase of the Farmer’s and Mechanic’s Bank v. Smith, was carried to the Supreme Court ofthe United States, by writ of error, so that the constitutionality of the insolvent act, was notfinally decided. The plaintiff might have pursued the same course, if judgment had been given against him; or in order to avoid that expense, he might have issued a writ against the defendant without having it served, and continued the process, in that way, from time to time, until the Supreme Court of the United States had decided. On the point of stopping the course of the statute of limitations, the case of M‘Iver &c. v. Rugan, &c. in the Supreme Court ofthe United States, (2 Wheal. 25,) is very strong. There, the plaintiff claimed under a grant from the state of North Carolina, of 40,000 acres, including the land in the possession of the defendant, - for which the ejectment was brought. The defendant had been in possession more than seven years, (the term of limitation prescribed by the law of Tennessee) and the, plaintiff would be barred unless he could stop the running of the statute. He showed, that great part of his 40,000 aero tract lay within the Indian boundary, though that-which was held by the defendant was not within it; that no corner or course of the tract was marked, except the place of beginning, and therefore, without a survey, it was impossible to prove, that it included the land in dispute. But a survey he could not make, because-the laws of the United States prohibited the surveying, or marking, ánylands within the country reserved for the Indians, by treaty. But the court considered this as no cause for stopping the course of-the statute, because the plaintiff was not hindered from bringing his ejectment at any time; and if the court of Tennessee should think a survey necessary, they might order a continuance of the causé, until a survey could be made. The principle of that case cannot be distinguished from the one before us. Indeed there the reason for stopping the statute was stronger, than here. Because, without a survey, the plaintiff in the ejectment could not recover, but the plaintiff in this action might always have recovered by carrying the cause to the Supreme Court of the United States. I am therefore of opinion that the plaintiff was barred by the act of limitations. The judgment of the District Courtmustbe reversed, and judgment entered in this court for the plaintiff in error.

Judgment reversed.  