
    [Philadelphia,
    March, 24, 1823.]
    EVANS, Administratrix of EVANS against TATEM.
    IN ERROR.
    A person taking1 out letters of1 administration in Pennsylvania, may be sued in Tennessee for a debt due by the intestate.
    An action at law is maintainable in Pennsylvania, on a decree of á Court of Equity in Tennessee for'the payment of money.
    In such action the pleas of nil debet, and nul tiel record, are both bad on general demurrer.
    If the defendant mean to deny the existence of such decree, he may frame a plea to meet the averment of the decree in the declaration, and such plea must conclude to the country.
    Error to the District Court for the city.and county of Philadelphia. , — —1
    
      Howell Tatem, the plaintiff below, brought this action of debt against Jinn Evans, administratrix of John B. Evans, deceased, to recover the sum of 6,239 dollars, and 10 cents, including the amount, with costs, decreed in favour of the plaintiff Tatem, against the defendant Ann Evans, as surviving administratrix of J. B. Evans, in the Court of Errors and Appeals, and Court of Equity, for the State' of Tennessee. The decree was made in that court in a proceeding by Tatem, by bill in equity, to which the defendant, Ann Evans, appeared and pleaded, and it was thereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that she the said Ann, administratrix of J. B. Evans, deceased, should pay to the said Tatem, the sum of 5,949 dollars 60 cents; out of the assets belonging to the estate of the said J. B. 'Evans, deceased, which had .come to her hands to be administered, and all the costs o'f the cause out of said assets in her hands to be administered, and if none, then out of her proper goods and chattels. The defendant pleaded nil debet, and nul tiel record: to both which pleas,, the plaintiff demurred, and the court below gave judgment for the plaintiff.- The. defendant also pleaded no assets,'jolene administravit', and payment with leave, &c.: to which the plaintiff replied, assets, not fully administered, and non solvit, and issues were joined thereon, and a verdict was given on each issue for the plaintiff.'
    On the trial of these issues in the court below, the defendant, under a previous notice of special matter, and notice to produce the copy of the order, judgment, and decree, upon which the suit was founded, offered to show by evidence, that neither she, nor the intestate, J. B. Evans-, were at any time indebted, or bound in law or equity, to pay to the plaintiff any sum or sums of money; and also, that the defendant, being administratrix under the law of Pennsylvania, and not under the laws of Tennessee, and the said order, judgment, and decree, being had or made upon matters alleged to have arisen and existed in the life time of the intestate, she was not, as such, amenable to the authority, or power of a court' in Tennessee; and that, therefore, the said order, judgment, and decree, were not had or made by any court having jurisdiction in the matter.
    And the defendant further offered to. show, that from the said decree itself, and the matters therein ■ stated j nothing was due in law or equity, or ought to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff,, and that the same was unjust and unfounded.
    And also, that from the matters stated in the decree,, as inducing the same, it does not appear on the face of the proceeding and decree, that so much is due to the plaintiff, as by the same is-decreed.
    But the court below rejected the whole of the evidence so offered, and were of opinion, that the said order, judgment, and decree, were conclusive evidence of the debt in the plaintiff’s declaration claimed and could not be controverted, and so gave it in charge to the jury. To. which charge the defendant excepted.
    
      Condy, for the plaintiff in error,
    
    contended, that a decree of a Court of Chancery was- hot a record, nor conclusive of the rights of the parties, but mightbe inquired into in another suit, by evidence extrinsic, or by showing from matters intrinsic, that nothing was due in law or equity to the plaintiff, or that so much was not due as was decreed. ' Coke, in 3 Inst. 71, defines a record to be, regularly, a monument, or act judicial, before a judge or judges in a court of record,- entered in parchment in the right roll; and says, speaking of chancery, that as to the proceeding by-English bill, in a course of equity, it' is no court of record, for thereupon no writ of error lieth as in other cases. And again in page 123, the court of equity, in the proceeding in a course of equity, is no court of record, and, therefore, it cannot hold plea of any thing whereof judgment is given, which is a judicial matter of record.. And in 4 Inst. 89, this court of equity proceeding by English bill, is said to be no court of record, and therefore, it can bind but the person only, and neither the estate of the defendant’s lands, nor property of his goods or chattels. The same principios are laid down in 4 Vin. Jib. 382, k. In Doughty v. Fawn, Yelv. 226. Brownl. 117, it was held, that it was issuable and triable by jury, whether there was an ordér of chancery pleaded by the defendant, or not; for their orders there are only in paper, and are not of record, to be tried by the record, but only by jury. Gilbert in his Treatise on Evidence,- 48, says, the proceedings of the court of chancery on the JEnglish side, are not of record; and the reason is, they are not precedents of justice: for the proceedings in chancery are founded only on the circumstances of each private case, and they cannot be rules to any other; and the judgment there is secundum sequum et bo-num, and not secundum leges et consuetudines: and the "reason why any record is of validity and authority is, because it is declarative of the sense of the nation, and is a memorial of what is the law of the nation: now chancery proceedings are no memorials of the laws of England, because the Chancellor is not bound to proceed according to law. To the same effect are Bull. N. P. 235, and 1 Harr. Ch. 20.' Even the court of chancery itself, does not regard a prior decree as conclusive. Where a ..new original bill is necessary to carry a decree into execution, the court will'examine the grounds of the former decree, before they will make a new one: though in their examination," they will confine themselves to the proofs made in the' first decree. 1 Harr. Ch. Pr. 148, cites Lawrence v. Birnie, 2 Ch. Hep. 128. In West v. Skip, 1 Vez. 145, though the general rule is stated to be, that on a bill to carry a former decree into execution, the court can only do that, and not vary; yet there are' several instances wherein the court has considered the directions, and whether there was any mistake; and it was done in that case.. To give this decree in a court of equity, therefore, the conclusive effect contended for, would be to give it a more binding efficacy than a court of chancery, in the same state, would allow it: They would examine into any mistake appearing on its proceedings: but the court below, in this casé, would not allow us to show error on the face of the proceedings.
    2d. No action at law lies on a decree in chancery. That court proceeds on the special circumstances of each particular case, founded on-principles of equity,'which a court of law does not recognize, and it makes specific decrees, which it is out-of the power of a court of law to enforce. A court of equity only can enforce the decree o'f another court of equity, and apply the proper redress. It would be a great hardship if the party pould come into a court of law, and give the decree, by the ■ forms of proceeding there, a conclusive effect, when it would be liable to be opened by a bill of review, in the same court where it was given. For in the same court the decree is never concluded: it is always in fieri, and has no likeness to a judgment at law. Any error in figures may be even corrected by an order: and a bill of review lies on new matter. Cowp. Eq. 88, 91. The plaintiff here was not without a remedy, for he ought to have filed his bill on the equity side of the Circuit Court of the UnitedjStates. In the case of Post v. Neafie, 3 Caines, 22, it is true, it was decided in New-YorJe, that debt lies on the decree of a court of chancery in another state, for the payment of money only by the defendant, without any acts to de done by the plaintiff; but it was against the opinion of Kent,.J., and. by a law of New-Jersey, a decree in chancery has the force and effect of a judgment at law: so that it is no authority in case of a decree of an ordinary character. It is stated, however, in page 37, that Chase, J. had decided in the Circuit Court of Connecticut, that an action at law would not lie on a decree in chancery.
    3d. Nil debet, or mil tiel record, were correct pleas in this action, if it be sustainable. The aid of the jury might be necessary to examine facts, and correct errors. If there were no such.decree, how was the party in any other way to put that in issue? The plea of no such decree is unprecedented. Nul tiel record, was the proper plea for that purpose: and should conclude to the country.
    If there were such decree, then the party ought to be allowed to plead nil debet, by which he would entitle himself to all the rights he would possess in a proceeding in a court of equity in Tennessee. It is the usual and proper plea to debt on a foreign judgment, and under -it want of jurisdiction might be shown. It does not contravene the constitution of the United States, but admits whatever may be given in evidence in accordance with the constitution.
    It is 'a further objection to this action, that it is upon a proceeding in Tennessee, against a person who administered in Pennsylvania. It is different from the case of an administrator plaintiff. In Pennsylvania, by act,of assembly,’ one who administers in another state may bring suit here; but it does not follow that he may be sued. In the case of the Selectmen of Boston V. Ward Nicholas Boylston, 2 Mass. Pep. 384, an administrator with the will annexed of one domiciled in England, and dying there, .came into Massachusetts, and took administration there cum testamento an-nexo: he was held not .liable to account .there for effects received by him in England. This case is recognized in 5 Mass. Rep. 77, and it is held, that an administrator who has not administered in Massachusetts is not liable to be sued there, so as to render the real estate liable. ' One who has obtained administration in another state cannot prosecute or defend an áction in Massachusetts. Goodwin y. Jones, 3 Mass. Rep. 514. It is objected, that the defendant pleaded in Tennessee: but there is nothing in that: consent cannot give jurisdiction. The assets 'were all collected in Pennsylvania, and held in trust for others. The defendant never was in Tennessee. If one administers in another state, and changes his domicil, and comes here, he may be sued here. Bryan v. M‘Gee cited Whart. Big. 277. The decree is for payment out of the assetsj which must be understood of assets in Tennessee.
    
    
      Rawle, contra.
    1. The administrator here was liable in Tennessee. In Swear-ingen v.Pendleton, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 389, this point was decided, and the opinion of the court below confirmed, that an executor is liable in respect to all the assets which come to his hands, whether they arise in the county where the letters testamentary are granted, or elsewhere, in another state, or even in a foreign country, agreeably to Bowie’s case, 6 Co. 46, b., where one administered as executor in Ireland, and received assets there, ■ and then came to England: he was held liable: for if the executors have any goods of the testator’s in any part of the world, they shall be charged in respect to them. No distinction can be drawn between an executor ■ and an administrator in this respect. But it does not appear by the proceedings.in Tennessee, where the defendant administered. The bill and answer merely state, that administration had been granted to Jinn Evans, and Henry Hawkins, citizens of Pennsylvania; the plea put in by Jinn Evans states her to be surviving administrator of J. B. Evans, and does not mention where administration was granted. She appeared voluntarily to the plaintiff’s bill, and thereby admitted the jurisdiction, and she is now estopped to deny it. All the cases referred to on the opposite side occurred in Massachusetts, where there is an act of the legislature, regulating this matter, and under this act the cases- were determined.
    
      2. The plea of nil debet to an action on the judgment or decree of the court of another state, is not. admissible.. This plea opens every thing, even the original cause of action; and would put the plaintiff upon proving that. Chitt. Plead. 476, 7. The constitution of the United States declares, that full • faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every state: and congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved and the effect thereof,' Jlrt. 4. Sect. 1. Congress have accordingly, by the act of May 26th, 1790, Sect. 1. enacted, that they shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken. They have thereby declared the effect of such proceedings: and the result is that the judgment of a state court shall have the same credit, validity, and effect in any state, which it had in the state where it was pronounced: and that whatever plea would be good in a suit thereon in such state and no other can be pleaded. Serg. Const. Law, 381, and cases cited. In Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch. 481, in a suit in the District of Columbia, upon a judgment in the Supreme Court of New YorJe, the pjea of nil debet was held bad on general demurrer. In Hampton v. M‘Connel, 4 Wheat. 234, in debt in the Circuit Court of South Carolina, on a judgment in the Supreme Court of New York, nil debet was held a bad plea. To the same purpose is the case of Armstrong V. Carson’s Executors, 2 Dali. 302. In Burden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 144, and Andrews v. Montgomery, 19 Johns. 162, the Supreme Court of New York have held, that a judgment fairly and regularly obtained in another state is conclusive: though it is-void, if the court had no jurisdiction. And the same principle was adopted by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Bissel v. Brigs, 9 Mass. Rep, ■ 462. The proceedings here were judicial proceedings within the meaning of the constitution and acts of congress, and therefore equally binding with a record.
    3. The plea of nul tiel record was altogether improper. The proceedings of the court of equity in Tennessee are not called a record in the declaration, and the cases cited on the opposite side abundantly prove, that they were not of'the nature of a record. If the defendant meant to deny that there was any such decree, he certainly might plead that there was no such decree: or might plead a want of jurisdiction in the court.
    . 4. Does an action at law lie on a decree of a court of equity? The Court of Chancery in England is termed by Blackstone, one “of the King’s superior and original courts of justice.” 3 Bl. Com. 46. A decree in. Chancery may be proved by an exemplification under the seal of the court. .1 Phill. Ev. 295. Such decree is equal to a judgment at law, so far as concerns the personal estate of the party: and his goods maybe sequestered, although the party is in custody upon an attachment for a contempt. 2 Madd. Ch. 355, If the decree is prior to a judgment at law, it shall have preference in the administration of assets: and the original demand transit in remiudicatam.For. 218. Cas. temp. Talb 217,22-3. The same principle is decided in Thompsons. Brown, 4 Johns. Ch, Cas. 638. In Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, a decree in chancery is said to be as conclusive between the parties as a judgment at law. The inquiry into the merits of an original decree, is but matter of practice: and in New York it can only be done by bill of review, Gel-ston v. Codwise, 1 Johns. Ch. 189. Bennet v. Winter, 2 Johns. Ch. 205. The cases cited to show that in England, on a bill filed to enforce a' decree, the court will inquire into the merits of the original decree, do not prove this to be the general rule; and if it were, it does not prove that the complainant may not have his election to proceed at law. or equity. By the law of Tennessee, the complainant may have an execution on a decree in equity, as on a judgment at common law. Such being the effect of a. decree, there- is no reason why an action at law should not be maintained on it, where it is. simply for the payment of1 money, which then becomes a debt, 3 Lev. 555. Equity js part of our law; and as we have no Court of Chancery, a party recovering a debt by such a decree in another state, would be remediless in the courts of Pennsylvania, if the courts of common law refuse to sustain an action. Such action is not without precedent. In 7 Went. Plead, there is the form of a declaration on a decree in chancery. And iti Post v. Neafie, 3 Caines, 22, the Supreme Court of New York, determined, that'an action at law was maintainable there on a decree in chancery in New Jersey.
    
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Tilg-hmaN, C. J.

This is an action of debt, brought by Howell Tatem the defendant in error, who was plaintiff below, against Jinn Evans, administratrix of John B. Evans, deceased, on a decree in the “ Court of Errors and Appeals, and Court of Equity for the state of Tennessee,” for the sum of 6239 dollars and 10 cents.

The defendant pleaded nil debet, and nul tiel record, to both which pleas the plaintiff demurred, and judgment was given in his favour. The defendant pleaded also, no assets, plene administra-vit, and payment with leave, &c. to which the plaintiff replied, assets, not fully administered, and non solvit; and issues were thereupon joined and a .verdict given on each issue for the plaintiff. On the trial of thp cause in the court below, the defendant offered to prove, that neither she, nor her intestate, were, at the time of the said decree^, or any time before, indebted, or bound,’ in law or equity, to pay to the plaintiff any sum or sums of money. Also, that the defendant being an administratrix under the law of Pennsylvania, and not. of Tennessee, and the said decree being made on matter alleged to have arisen and existed in the life time of the intestate, was not, as such, amenable to the authority of a court in Tennessee, and therefore the said decree was not made in a court having jurisdiction.5’ The defendant also offered to prove other matters which went to the merits of the case, all of which evidence wag rejected by the court. The counsel for the plaintiff in error, argued his case on four points, which I shall now consider.

1. Was the defendant who administered in Pennsylvania, liable to a . suit in Tennessee, for matters which arose in the life time of the intestate? I can perceive no good reason against such a suit, but many in its favour. If a person who administers in one state, and receives assets there, is not sueable on his removal to another state, it would produces the greatest injustice. The removal from state to state, is the act of the administrator, which the creditors of the intestate cannot prevent, and therefore should not be prejudiced by it. The assets are to be administered according to the law of the state, within which the administration was granted, and justice requires that the administrator should be liable, to the amount of the assets which have come to his hands in whatever state he may be found. The counsel for the plaintiff in error, admits that the administrator may be sued in another state, provided he has removed there, with intent to make it-the place of his permanent residence. But it is immaterial what his intent is. Wherever he goes he carries with him the obligation to administer the assets. So has the law been held from 'the time of Lord Coee- to the present day. In Uowdle’s 6 Co. 46, it was decided, that one who received letters testamentary in Ireland, where assets came to his hands, was liable to a suit in England. There is good sense in the following observation of the court, in that case. “If the executors have goods of the testator in any part of the world, they shall be charged in respect of. them; for many merchants, and other men, who have stock and • goods to a great value beyond sea, are indebted here in England; and God' forbid that these goods should not be liable for their debts; for otherwise there would be a great defect in the law.” The.same principle was declared to be law by this court, in the western district in the case of Swearingen’s Executors v. Pendleton’s Executors, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 389. There it was held that a suit might be sustained in Pennsylvania, against an executor who had administered in Virginia. So that this point may be considered as settled,

2. The second question in this case is, whether the plea of nil debet was good? If this plea was good, the merits of the decree of the court of Tennessee, might have been contested. On the issue of nil debet, every thing is thrown open. In an action of debt on a.foreign judgment, the defendant is at liberty to controvert the original cause of action. But, under the constitution of the United States, judgments in one state, are not considered, in another^, as foreign judgments. In art. 4. sect. 1. of that constitution, it is declared, that “ full faith and credit shall be given, in each state, to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every'other state, and the congress may, by general laws, prescribe thé manner in whi.ch such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.” The congress have exercised the power vested in them by this article, by their act passed-the 26th May, 1790, in which, after prescribing the mode of authentication, they declare, “that the said records and .judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them, in every court within the United States, as they have by law, or usage, in the courts of the state from whence the said re» cords are, or shall be, taken.” The question then is, what faith and credit would the courts of Tennessee have given to this decree in chancery. The answer cannot be doubted. The decree would have been held incontrovertible. The- construction of this article of the constitution has been settled by repeated decisions in various courts of various states, as well as in the courts of the United States. A judgment in one state, is conclusive in all other states, provided it was rendered by a court having competent jurisdiction The first decision on this subject, was in the casé of Armstrong v. Carson’s Executors, in the year 1794, in the Circuit Court of the United States, held at Philadelphia. It was an action of debt on a judgment in the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The defendant pleaded nil debet, which was held to be a bad plea. In Bissel v. Brigs, 9 Mass. 462, a suit was brought- on a judgment in New Hampshire, against an inhabitant of Boston, who was arrested in New Hampshire, and appeared and pleaded. It was held by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, that by virtue of the constitution and laws of the United States, the defendant -was concluded by this judgment. It appeared that the court of New Hampshire had jurisdiction, and that ■ was the only matter that could be inquired into. In Mills v. Duryee, 7 Crunch. 481, it was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States,- that nil debet was a bad plea, in an action brought in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, on a judgment of the Supreme Court, of' New York. And the same point was decided in the same manner, by the Supreme Court of the United Slates, in the case of Hampton v. M‘Connel, 4 Wheat. 234, which was an action of the Circuit Court of South Carolina, on a judgment in the Supreme Court of New York. The Supreme Court, of New York, seems once to have been of opinion, that judgments rendered in one state, were to be considered as foreign judgments, and therefore not conclusive, in another. I allude to the case of Hitchcock v. Aiken, 1 Caine’s, 460. But that highly respectable court, on mature reflection has come to the opinion, that a. judgment fairly and regularly obtained in one state, is conclusive in another. This will appear from the cases of Burden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 144, and Andrews v. Montgomery, 19 Johns. 162. I-have no hesitation, therefore, in concluding, that the plea of nil debet, in the case before us, was bad.

3. We come now to the third point, which is, whether the plea of nul tiel record was good?

If proceedings in Courts of Chancery are not records, nul tiel record was not a good plea. ’ And that such proceedings áre not records seems to be well established. In Gilbert’s Law of Evidence, 49, it is said, that proceedings in chancery by bill and answer, are not records, because they are secundum sequum et bo-num, and not according to the laws and customs of the realm. In Buller’s Nisi Prius, 235, we find the same assertion, founded on the same reason. Lord Coke defines a record, to be i( a proceeding in a court of justice which has power to hold a plea according to the course of the common law,” Co. Lit. 260. In the case of Doughty v. Fawn, Yelv. 226, it was said by the court, that ii orders in chancery are not of record, to be tried by the record, but by a jury.” It is to be observed, that in the case before the court, the plaintiff’s declaration does -not call the decree in chancery a record, and if the defendant intended to deny that any such decree existed, he might have framed his plea so as to meet the averment in the declaration; and the tender of the issue should have concluded to the country, according to the case in Yelverton. The court below was right therefore in deciding that the plea of nul tiel record was bad.

4. The fourth and most difficult question is, whether an action of debt lies in a court of common law, to recover a sum of money ordered to be paid by a decree in chancery.

It'is no wonder that little upon this subject is to be found in the English books, because in England, the Court of Chancery having ample power to enforce its' own decrees, there can seldom be occasion to resort to a court of law. The same observation applies to those of our sister states which have courts of chancery. The subject however has sometimes been brought before a court of law in one state, when it has been necessary to proceed on a decree in chancery in another. In Pennsylvania, where there is no Court of Chancery, should there be occasion to proceed on a decree in chancery in another state, it must be in a court of law, or not at all. The great objection to an action in a court of law, is, that in general, decrees in-chancery are'not simply for the payment of a sum of money, but also for something specific, which is ordered to be done, by one party or the other. In such cases there would be great difficulty in supporting an action at law. But the present decree being simply for the payment of money, all other considerations may be thrown aside. It is a general principle, that where a man is under an obligation to pay a certain sum of money, whether that obligation is founded on a contract, or the judgment of a court, an action of debt lies. On that principle, we support actions of debt onforeign judgments. And I confess, I see no reason why a decree in chancery, is not as strong as a foreign judgment. If it be objected, that proceedings in chancery are not according to the course of the common law, the same objection lies against judgments of courts on the continent of Europe, where the proceedings are according to the civil law. To be sure, in case of a foreign judgment, the defendant is permitted to deny the original cause of action. But so. likewise would the defendant in the -present case have been permitted to enter into the merits of the original controversy, were it not for the constitution and laws of the United States, which forbid, it. The objection, therefore, of being precluded from contesting the merits of the decree, does not lie against the action of debt, which in its nature did not preclude it, but against the constitution. And as to that, all that can be said is, that although in some instances the conclusiveness of judgments may be inconvenient, yet upon the whole,, it produces good; and whether it does or not, this court has no power to alter the constitution. I have said that this subject was. not altogether new. It was brought before the Supreme Court of New York, in the case of Post, &c. v. Neafie, 3 Caines, 22. That was an action on a decree in chancery in New Jersey, for the payment of a sum of money, and a majority of the court sustained the action. By the law of New Jersey, a decree in equity has the effect of a judgment in the Supreme Court of law. Whether the state of Tennessee has a law of that kind, I know not; but it appears that an execution may issue there, on a decree in equity, as on a judgment at law. The Supreme Court of New York however, did not decide upon the particular circumstances which I have mentioned in the law of New Jersey, but upon broader and more general principles. It •has been objected, that courts of law are not bound to give effect to decrees founded upon principles of equity. But why not? Granting that the demand did originate in principles of equity, yet after a'fair hearing, and full consideration, it was decided that the plaintiff was entitled to a certain sum of money, to be paid by the defendant; what reason is there which should restrain a court of law from sustaining an action for the sum thus reduced to a certainty? It was also objected, that a decree in chancery, may be opened, altered, or annulled, on a bill of review. True it may; and so may a judgment at law be reversed on a writ of error. But still, an action of debt lies on the judgment, as long as it is in foi’ce. Should it be afterwards reversed, the injured parly would not be without remedy, and the same would be the case should a decree in chancery be reversed. No case has been shown, where it has been • decided on broad principles, that an action at law would not lie for a sum of money .decreed to be paid by the court of equity, and one case, (Post, &c. v. Neafie,) has been shown to the contrary. In Pennsylvania, the courts should be extremely cautious in establishing that principle, because it would be shutting their doors against all- relief in cases where money" has been decreed to be paid by courts of equity in other states. Very urgent cases may arise, where crying injustice would be done, if relief were denied, and, we ought not to rely on the equity courts of the United States, which may be established in Pennsylvania. Our own system of j urisprudence should be complete. In considering this question, we should throw out of view, any redress which may be accidentally obtained, in courts over which the legislature of this state has no controul. Upon the whole, I am of opinion, that the action should be sustained, and this judgment of the District Court affirmed.

“Judgment affirmed.  