
    F. P. STANTON vs. J. O. C. HASKIN AND WIFE, G. T. RAUB, AND A. J. ROGERS.
    In Equity.
    No. 3259.
    E. and S. were attorneys at law, and agreed to conduct a suit in chancery for the recovery of lands claimed by H. and wife, who agreed to give-said attorneys one-third of whatever land or money might be recovered. A decree was obtained in favor of H. and wife for the lands, and also for the rents and profits. The attorneys received one-third of such rents in money, and bring this bill to enforce the execution of the agreement for an undivided third of the land so-recovered. Held—
    I. That the common-law principle of champerty, as relaxed by modern decisions, is in force in the District of Columbia.
    II. That the agreement between E. and S. and the defendants, H. and wife, being for a part of the land in dispute, Was a champertous contract, and therefore void.
    III. That contracts between attorneys and clients are carefully watched by the courts, and will be considered generally as a security for-what the services are really worth.
    IV. That agreements between attorney and client, fairly made for contingent fees, will be sustained both in law and equity.
    STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
    The bill in this case is brought for the purpose of enforcing the specific performance of a contract, which is. expressed in the following words:
    “We have employed A. J. Rogers and F. P. Stanton to institute a suit in chancery for us against Wm. Durr, of' Washington City, for the recovery of 78-1 acres of land in Prince George’s County, Md., under a contract of said Durrwith Jane Hasltin dated 3d September, 1869. And we hereby agree and bind ourselves to give said attorneys, Rogers and Stanton, one-third part of whatever may be recovered from said Durr, whether the same be in land or money. We also authorize our said attorneys to compromise and settle the said controversy ou such terms and conditions as to them may seem proper, and we hereby ratify and confirm whatever they may do in the premises 5 and agree to pay them the amount above specified, whether the recovery shall be by suit or by compromise and settlement as herein authorized.
    Witness our hands and seals, at Washington, D. C., on this the 7th day of May, 1872.
    JANE E. HASKIN.
    JAMES O. C. HASKIN.”
    “AYitness:
    Jane E. Elliott,
    Edward Graves.”
    It appears that, long previous to the foregoing agreement,, the defendant, J. O. O. Haskin, purchased a tract of land lying in Prince George’s County, Maryland, making a cash payment of $2,000, and leaving the unpaid purchase-money secured on the land. Afterward, being unable to meet the deferred payments, he contracted with one William Durr for the latter to take the purchase off his hands, and received as consideration for his so doing, Durr’s agreement in writing to convey to Mrs. Haskin a part of the tract, viz, 78| acres, leaving 200 acres for Durr. In pursuance of this agreement, the county surveyor in the presence of the parties laid off the 78J acres, and prepared a plat and certificate thereof. Haskin placed Durr in possession, he and the family thereupon removing to Washington City.
    So matters rested for a year or so, Durr failing to convey the land as he had agreed to do, when the Haskins became anxious, and proceeded to take steps to compel his compliance. They first laid Durr’s contract and the surveyor’s plat before A. J. Eogers, a defendant in this suit, who in turn consulted the plaintiff, and the latter prepared the contract above set forth.
    After the agreement was signed and delivered to complainant, he commenced a suit in chancery, as contemplated therein, to recover the 78| acres of land for the benefit of the parties with whom he had made the agreement. That suit was prosecuted to a final decree ordering the conveyance, and directing that an account be taken of the rental value of the land while in Durr’s possession, and this item was ascertained to be $1,200. After the confirmation of the auditor’s report, Durr paid the complainant $500 on account, and was allowed a stay of execution for the balance.
    About this time Haskin and wife assigned to the defendant Eaub, who was aware of their contract with Stanton, and Eaub, in order to procure the complainant’s order on Durr for the payment to himself of the two-thirds still due, paid •complainant $11.38, making in all the sum of $511.38 received by Mr. Stanton, which, after indemnifying for the costs of suit which he had paid, left him one-third of the whole amount received. He now demands one-third of the land in addition, and the Haskins refusing to execute a deed, complainant has instituted this suit to enforce the agreement in that respect. Eogers has transferred his interest to Stanton, who is the sole complainant.
    
      James W. Moore, for the complainant, cited—
    
      Childs vs. Trist, ante, page 1; Washburn’s Am. Com., Law, p. 212, sec. 88; Strohecker vs. Hoffman, 7 Harris, p. 227; Ex parte Plitt, 2 Wall., C. C., p. 479.
    
      James E. Williams, for defendants, contended that—
    The contract sought to be enforced by the plaintiff is void for champerty. 1 Bac. Abr., Title Champerty, 575; 4 Kent’s Com., 449, note b. “The case of Berrien vs. McLane, 1 Hoffman’s Rep., 421, contains a strong declaration that every agreement made pending a litigation, to pay counsel or the attorney a part of the property to be recovered, is absolutely void. Hot only every contract, but the actual transfer of part of the property in litigation, is illegal, on the ground of the relation of the parties and of the doctrine of champerty.”— Ibid.
    An attorney or solicitor is not permitted to contract with his client previous to the termination of the suit for apart of the subject-matter of the litigation as a compensation for his services. Merritt vs. Lambert, 10 Paige, 352, 358, and 2 Denio, 607; Simpson vs. Lamb, 7 Ellis & Black., 84, 92, 93; S. C., Am. L. Reg., vol. 1, H. S., p. 410, case of Carpenter vs. Sixth Avenue Railroad Company.
    
    
      Dwight’s notes on the last case, ibid., p. 422, as follows:
    “The lien of an attorney does not extend to a case where he has recovered in equity for his own client land from a defendant. Smally vs. Clark, 22 Vermont, 598. The allowance of such a doctrine would establish an equitable lien or mortgage in opposition to general principles. S. C., overruling a dictum in Barnesby vs. Powell, Ambler R., 102.”
   Mr. Justice MacArthur

delivered the opinion of the court:

The principal ground on which the case is defended is, that the agreement set up in the bill is champertous and void. In the case of Stanley vs. Jones, 7 Bing., 349, Chief-Justice Tindall defines champerty to be the unlawful maintenance of a suit in consideration of some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. This is the generally-received meaning of champerty in this country as well as in England. Thalimer vs. Brinkerhoff, 20 Johns, 386; 9 Met., 489; 18 Ind., 117. Now, by the terms of the contract, Stanton and Rogers undertook to prosecute a suit in chancery against one William Durr, for the recovery of 78J acres of laud, upon an agreement to receive one-third of whatever might be recovered in land or money, and Stanton now claims an undivided third of the property.

The strictness which formerly prevailed in the common-law doctrine of champerty has been considerably relaxed by modern decisions. An action can now be maintained in most, if not all, of the States of the Union for contingent fees. This court has recently decided in favor of a contract for a contingent fee in prosecuting sucessfully a private claim against the United States, where the services were to be rendered in a fair and open presentation of the facts, and where no secret or corrupt means were employed to mislead or deceive the legislative body. Child vs. Trist, ante, page 1.

So relations by blood, and all parties having an interest in the property, however contingent that interest may be, can lawfully maintain each other in actions concerning the land sought to be recovered. With these, and perhaps some other modifications, the common law with regard to champerty, which is supposed to be founded on the statute of 28 Edward I, is generally recognized, except where it has been abolished by legislative enactment. It was the law in Maryland in 1801, and has never been abrogated in this jurisdiction. We must, therefore, hold that, with the qualifications established by modern decisions, the principle prevails in this District. That the contract here, so far as relates to the land in controversy, is affected by champerty at common law, no one can doubt; and, notwithstanding the law is rendered more rational by modern decisions, yet no court of equity has gone the length of enforcing the specific performance of an agreement for part of the land in dispute. While the principle of champerty remains a substantive part of our law, it is clearly our duty to enforce it.

We also think another settled principle is applicable to this case. It is, that all contracts between attorney aud client, by which the fornier gains any advantage, are to be regarded simply as security for whatever he may have advanced or for what his services are worth. Some of the authorities hold that the burdeu of proving the fairness of such contracts is upon the solicitor, and they are to be regarded with suspicion, and with a presumption that they are unfair. Evans vs. Ellis, 5 Denio, 640; 6 Ves., 277; Newman vs. Payne, 2 Ves., p. 199; Mott vs. Harrington, 12 Vt., 199; Berrien vs. McLane, 1 Hoff. Ch., 421; Wheelan vs. Wheelan, 3 Conn., 537; Starr vs. Vanderheyden, 9 Johns., 253; 3 Ves., 740. We doubt the justness of these rules in the present condition of the profession, and we think lawyers may be trusted to provide for their compensation according to the fund that may be collected or recovered by their skill and diligence in conducting an important and valuable claim. All agreements made for mere contingent compensation are generally meritorious, and should be enforced. The most respectable - counsel conduct immense litigations with no other hope of reward. But in this case there is an effort to ¡recover land, not as a measure of compensation, but as a part of the very property in controversy. There is nothing in the evidence to induce a belief that there was any intrinsic difficulty in the case against Durr, or that its prosecution required great diligence or ability. It appears to have been comparatively free from hazard or uncertainty. In view of these facts, we think the complainant has been compensated for his services, and is not entitled, under established principles, to any benefit from the security set out in his bill.

It appears from the testimony that Haskin and wife consulted with Rogers ; that they laid the surveyor’s plat of the lands in dispute before him, and that Rogers, in turn, consulted with the complainant. The contract was then prepared by complainant himself, reciting the fact of their having been retained in the following words: “We have employed A. J. Rogers and F. P. Stanton to institute a suit in chancery for us against William Durr.” By preparing and accepting this agreement we think the complainant is concluded as to the nature of his relations, being attorney to Haskin and wife. It is in that capacity they were consulted, and by becoming a party to this agreement they admit their previous employment.

We do not discover by the proofs in this case anything which will justify the imputation that the complainant, who is a highly-esteemed member of the bar, used any undue influence with Haskin and wife to enter into this contract, and there is nothing in the circumstances attending its execution from which we can infer that they were surprised into it by any influence or device of his. Still, upon the principles already announced, the decree dismissing the bill must be affirmed.  