
    Wallace BOUDREAUX, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
    No. 75163.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 3, 1991.
    
      Barbara M. Linthicum, Public Defender and Lawrence M. Korn, Asst. Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and William A. Hatch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

We have for review Boudreaux v. State, 553 So.2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), based on express and direct conflict with Coulson v. State, 342 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

The question posed by this case is the same as that in Larson v. State, 572 So.2d 1368 (Fla.1991), in which we disapproved a similar analysis used by this district court. Accordingly, the opinion below is quashed and the cause remanded to the district court to determine whether the conditions of probation imposed by the trial court were legal, as required by Larson.

It is so ordered.

SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.

EHRLICH, J., concurs in result only with an opinion.

EHRLICH, Justice,

concurring in result only.

I agree that the decision below should be quashed and remanded for reconsideration to determine whether the conditions of probation imposed in this case were illegal or otherwise “so egregious as to be the equivalent of fundamental error.” Larson v. State, 572 So.2d 1368, 1371 (Fla.1991). However, as noted in my concurring opinion in Larson, I do not believe such a determination is necessarily “tantamount to resolving the case on the merits.” Larson, 572 So.2d at 1370-1371, n. 1. Therefore, although it is unclear from the briefs and opinion below exactly what challenges were raised in the district court, I would not require the district court to reach the merits of all claims raised in order to justify a finding of waiver.  