
    [Sunbury,
    June 21, 1826.]
    WORK and another against The Lessee of MACLAY.
    IN ERROR.
    When this court reverses a judgment, and orders a venire facias de novo, it has a right to impose terms as to costs. But, where no terms are imposed, all the costs abide the final event of the suit.
    Writ of error to a special Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin county, in which the defendant in error was plaintiff, and the plain-tiffsin error defendants.
    .This cause was an ejectment brought in the year 1S01. It was tried several times. The first trial took place in the Circuit Court of Mifflin county, on the 26th of May, 1802, when the jury was discharged by consent, in consequence of not being able to agree. The plaintiff afterwards obtained a rule for a special jury and view, which was withdrawn. On the 29th of May, 1810, the cause was tried again, and the jury not being able to agree, they were discharged by the court. Another trial took place on the 22d of flu-gust, 1811, which was attended by a similar result. On the 23d of August, 1S12, it was tried a fourth time, when a verdict was given for the defendants. The judgment on this verdict was removed to the Supreme Court, who reversed it and awarded a ve-nire facias de novo. On the next trial, which took place on the 23d of April, 1813, the plaintiff obtained a verdict, which, on motion, the court set aside. The plaintiff again obtained a verdict on the 25th of October, 1814, the judgment on which was reversed by the Supreme Court, who again awarded a venire facias de novo. On the 23d of May, IS22, the cause was tried for the last time, when the jury found a verdict for the defendants. The judgment was removed, by writ of error, to the Supreme Court, where it was affirmed.
    The costs of the defendants below, were taxed at one hundred dollars and seven cents.
    To this taxation of costs, several minor exceptions were filed, which the parties agreed to adjust, but the plaintiff’ also excepted “to all the costs which accrued previously to the 17 th of June, 1816, at which time a venire facias de novo was ordered.”
    
    The President of the court below (Reed) gave the following opinion:—
    “ 1. When the jury is sworn in a cause, and cannot agree, and are thereupon dismissed by the court, neither party is eijtitled to costs from the other, but the costs abide the event of the suit, as upon a general continuance.
    
      “2. When judgment is arrested after verdict, or reversed on a writ of error, and no venire facias de novo awarded, neither party is entitled to costs from the other.
    
      
      “3. When judgment is affirmed, on a writ of error, the successful party is entitled to his costs in the court below.
    “ 4. When a new trial is granted, without imposing terms, and another trial is had, the successful party is only entitled to his costs which accrued after the new trial being awarded.
    “ 5. Where one or more verdicts or judgments have been had in the court below, and reversed upon a writ of error, and another trial is had, the successful party is only entitled to his costs from the other party, which accrued after the awarding of the last venire facias.
    
    “ The prolhonotary is directed to correct the bill of costs, according to the principles here stated, and execution only to issue for such sum as shall thereupon be found to be due.
    “I am aware, that some of the above positions do not correspond with the practice heretofore, in the interior of the state. But I am not aware that the practice referred to has been recognized by any judicial decision. Every position stated, is abundantly supported by English authorities, and the last, by the opinion of Judge Wilson, reported in 1 Brown’s Rep. 334. I cannot discover that either policy or principle is much violated by a decision of the last point either way. It is very desirable, that the matter should be brought before the Supreme Court for decision. Important interests, as well as the uniformity of decisions in different districts, would be best settled in that way. This opinion is -directed to be filed, to give the parties an opportunity of revision, if they think proper.”
    The counsel for the defendants excepted to the opinion of the court below.
    
      Burnside and Bellas, for the plaintiffs in error.
    The question is, whether, when this court reverses a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, and awards a venire de novo., without making any particular order as to costs,*the costs of the whole suit abide its final event? The uniform practice has been in accordance with the affirmative of this position, and to alter it now would occasion much confusion, and revive much litigation. It is therefore a question of considerable importance. This practice has never been called in question, except in the case of Havard v. Davis, 1 Brown, 334, the decision of which was founded upon British authorities, which can have no influence upon our practice. That case, therefore, has been very little regarded. The third section of the act of the 21st of March, 1806, 4 8m. L. 327, is applicable to this case. Lyon v. MiManus, 4 Binn. 167.
    
      Hale, for the defendant in error.
    The defendants below were entitled to no costs, except those which accrued subsequently to the last order of this court' for a venire de novo. This was the rule established by the case of Havard v. Davis, which has been followed in the country, though the practice in Philadelphia may have been different. The English authorities are agreeable to the decision of the court ipelow. Where a venire facias de novo is awarded, without any order as to costs, they do not abide the final event of the suit, according to the practice in the Court of King’s Bench, though that of the Common Pleas is different. Hullock’s Law of Costs, 395. 7 Bac. Jib. 423. This question is not affected by the 3d section of the act of the 21st of March, 1806, which does not extend to reversals in this court of the judgments of inferior courts.
   Per Curiam.

This is a question of costs. The cause has been several times in this court before, when judgment was reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded. When this court reverses a judgment, and orders a venire de novo, it has a right to impose terms as to costs. But where no terms are imposed, the understanding has been, that all the costs abide the final event of the suit. This practice has been uniform, and it is just; because the costs ought to fall on the party who is ultimately found to have been in the wrong. English authorities can have no weight, in a case which depends on our own practice. It appears, however, that the Courts of King’s Bench and Common Pleas differ. In the latter, the costs abide the final event. In the former they do not. We held this case under advisement, from the last term, in order to have time to ascertain the practice, and we have ascertained it. All the costs abide the final event. It is our opinion, therefore, that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas be reversed, as to costs only, and judgment entered for the plaintiffs in error, for all the costs which have accrued. As to all the rest, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.  