
    Jose Jesus SALGADO-FRANCO, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-74364
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 14, 2016  San Francisco, California
    Filed December 19, 2016
    Christopher John Stender, Esquire, Attorney, Federal Immigration Counselors, AZ, PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner
    Michael Christopher Heyse, Trial Attorney, Matthew Albert Connelly, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
    Before: HAWKINS, BERZON, and MURGÚIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jose Jesus Salgado-Franco, a Mexican citizen, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal and affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of his request for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo legal determinations regarding an individual’s eligibility for cancellation of removal, Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002), and we review factual findings for substantial evidence, Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny Salgado-Franco’s petition for review.

1. The BIA properly determined that Salgado-Franco was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his deportation was previously suspended. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(6). Although Salgado-Franco argues that he had obtained suspension of deportation relief as a derivative of his mother’s application, reasonable and substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Salgado-Franco received this relief independent of his mother’s claim. The record shows that Salgado-Franco had completed his own application for suspension of deportation. In his application, Sal-gado-Franco described the extreme hardship that he would personally suffer if deported to Mexico; the hardship described was not necessarily dependent on the success of his mother’s application. Because Salgado-Franco previously received suspension of deportation relief, under § 1229b(c)(6), he is not eligible for cancellation of removal. See Garcia-Jimenez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 2007).

2. We lack jurisdiction to review Salga-do-Franco’s contention that he remains eligible for cancellation of removal because he was granted suspension of deportation relief after September 30,1996, because he failed to exhaust this claim before the BIA. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).

PETITION DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     