
    Defrance & Moore, Plaintiffs in Error vs. Hazen, Defendant in Error.
    St is not necessary for a party defendant, in offering his proof, to disclose his whole defence, in order to be entitled to prove any part of' it, especially if it can be seen that the evidence he offers is or can be pertinent to his defence.
    It is only in cases where the proof offered ha^ no seeming- relevancy to the matter in issue, that a party is bound, to disclose the nature, of his ease.
    Error to the Circuit Court for the County of Crawford., This was an action originally instituted before a Justice, of Crawford County, on a promissory note, as follows:
    ‘•‘$2Q, 00 NaNge Two, west, Town fourteen, ) north, December 21, 1846. £
    On or before the sixteenth day of May, 1847, we or either of us promise to pay J. S. T. Hazen or bearer^ the sum of twenty dollars'for standing pine, at the .forks <?f the creek, and up the creek of Kickapoo, at Louise’s^ shanty.
    JAMES M. DEFRANCE.,
    h;ugh H.. MOOJtE.”
    To a declaration,, upon the, foregoing note,, the defend-., ants pleaded the general issue; and that the same was giv-. on without consideration.
    jOn a trial, had upon this issue, the Justice rendered a judgment for the plaintiff, for twenty dollars and the costs,
    • From this judgment, the defendants in the suit before the Justice, appealed to the Circuit Court for Crawford, County.
    
      The appeal was brought to trial before the Circuit Judge of the fifth judicial Circuit, at the November term, 1848.
    On the trial, the defendant in error; (the plaintiffbelow,) introduced and proved the execution of the note before Set out, and rested.
    The counsel for the plaintiffs in error then introduced a witness to prove that the land on which the pine trees, constituting the consideration, for which the said note was given, was, at the time of the sale thereof, and of the giving the said note, the, property of the United'States and unsurveyed; and that the said plaintiff never had any title to the land on which the trees were growing, and which he assumed to sell.
    The admission of this evidence was objected to by the plaintiff below, on the ground that, by the note and the terms thereof, the defendants below were precluded from' showing title out of their vendor, the plaintiff below. -
    The Circuit Judge sustained the objection and rejected the evidence offered; and a judgment was ordered to be entered in favor of the plaintiffbelow, against the defendant below, for the sum of twenty dollars and costs.
    At the same term, the defendant below made a motion for a new trial, on the ground,
    1st. That the Judge had erred in excluding the evidence offered by the defendants below, showing that the plaintiff had no title to the land, on which the pine timber was growing; and
    2d,- That, inasmuch as notice had been given by the defendants below, to the plaintiff below, to produce on the trial, the evidence of title in himself, and, having failed to do so, it was competent for the defendant below, to show1 title-opt of him.
    
      3d. That, under the state of the proceedings, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to show title to the land in himself, in order ,to maintain his action.
    4th. That the said judgment was erroneous, inasmuch .as it affirmed the judgment of a Justice, who had no jurisdiction -over a case, involving the title to .real estate.
    The Circuit Judge overruled the motion for a new trial} -and thd defendant below excepted to -such ruling and decision.
    From the judgment and proceedings of the Circuit Court a writ of error was sued out by the defendants below, and ¡the cause brought into this Court
    
      Mills, for the plaintiffs in error,
    after reading the exceptions taken by the defendant in error, and making a statement of the case, was stopped by the Court upon an intimation that he need not proceed further.
    
      ■Knowlton fy Damn, for the defendant in error,
    contended dhat the evidence offered on the .trial at the Circuit, to-■impeach the consideration of the note, was incompetent to authorize its admission} and that the exception taken was not founded .upon any sufficient specific fact proved, or offered to be proved, of sufficiently substantial matter upon which to found such objection. To this point they cited Sugden on Vendors, 21 Wendell, 131} 24 Wendell, J.02.
    They also asserted -and .argued that the purchaser of -personal or real property, eouM not defend against an action for the recovery of the purchase money, unless .he should-show a recovery against himself by the real owner; and to this point .cited 4 Ohio Rep^¡ 39; 1 Wendell, 185; 19 JoTiusotSs Rep., 77; Graham on Mew Trials, 257.
   By the Court.,

Lakrabee, J.

The witness offered by the defendants, should have been allowed to testify, as the facts proposed to be shown would have tended to prove A want of consideration. It is not necessary for a party To disclose his whole defence, in order to entitle him to the admission of evidence, having a tendency to prove it.

It is only in cases where the proposed evidence has no apparent relevancy, that it is necessary to State the whole ground upon which it is based.

Judgment reversed.  