
    AMOCO CONTAINER COMPANY, Appellant, v. Maria AVILES, Appellee.
    No. AW-160.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 7, 1984.
    
      Lamar D. Oxford of Dean, Ringers, Morgan & Lawton, Orlando, for appellant.
    George J. Adler, Orlando, for appellee.
   MILLS, Judge.

The issue raised by this worker’s compensation appeal is whether Aviles sustained a compensable injury. She did not and we reverse the deputy’s order.

Aviles was working in Amoco Container’s warehouse on 19 August 1982 when a machine exploded and caught fire approximately 50 feet away from her. She was the only one in the area at the time. As she attempted to flee the scene, she struck her head, bruised her arm, and injured her wrist. However, she did not receive any medical treatment for these physical injuries.

Dr. Suarez, a psychiatrist, examined Aviles on 20 August 1982 and found her to be very anxious and disoriented. After the initial visit, Dr. Suarez did not see Aviles again until 9 June 1983. At this time he found that she was still in a state of high anxiety and prescribed medication for the condition. He also testified that Aviles never mentioned any physical trauma to him. The most that Dr. Suarez ever testified to was that Aviles’ psychiatric condition was related to “the incident.”

Approximately one week after the fire, Aviles returned to work. She continued to work for approximately nine months thereafter. She took a leave of absence on 27 May 1983 because of chest pains and has not returned to work since then.

Dr. Leiva, another psychiatrist who examined Aviles, testified that her condition was caused by the fear associated with the explosion.

Dr. Dow whose deposition was used at the hearing never expressed an opinion on the causation issue.

Aviles failed to demonstrate that her psychiatric condition was causally related to any compensable injury. Rather, the evidence shows that her condition was one caused by fright or excitement only, and it is therefore not compensable. Section 440.-02(18), F.S. (1983).

Aviles argues that this case is controlled by Prahl Brothers, Inc. v. Phillips, 429 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Prahl Brothers is distinguishable. In that case, the evidence clearly established that the claimant’s psychiatric impairment was precipitated by the employment-related robbery, and that a gun being placed to the claimant’s head and a ring being physically removed from her finger were significant circumstances in the causal etiology of her mental injury. There was no such evidence here.

The deputy relied on the testimony of Dr. Suarez and Dr. Dow on the issue of causation. Dr. Dow never expressed an opinion on that issue. Moreover, the most that Dr. Suarez ever testified to was that the psychiatric condition as of 9 June 1982 was related to “the incident.”

The facts of this case are more similar to those in Horse Haven v. Willit, 438 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Although the claimant in Horse Haven did suffer a com-pensable back injury, there was no clear evidence showing that claimant’s psychiatric condition was the direct and natural result of the compensable primary injury.

REVERSED.

WIGGINTON, J., concurs.

SHIVERS, J., dissents with opinion.

SHIVERS, Judge,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

If the machine explosion, which caused no direct physical impact or injury, was the only event which caused claimant’s psychiatric condition, reversal would be required under section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes. This, however, is not the ease. The record supports the finding of the deputy commissioner that the claimant, in attempting to flee the scene of the explosion, struck her head, bruised her arm and injured her wrist. Although the claimant never mentioned the physical trauma to Dr. Suarez, on deposition Dr. Suarez was asked the following hypothetical and gave the following answer:

Q Doctor, I’d ask you to assume, if you would, that in the commotion and the fright following the fire and the explosion and while she was still located in the plant where the explosion occurred, that she struck her head, resulting in a bump on the head, and that she also suffered bruises and scrapes on her arms. I’d ask you if these would be important factors in determining why she had such a severe reaction to the explosion.
MR. RINGERS: Object to the hypothetical.
A I think someone, you know, hit the floor and become numb and become overwhelming by pain and confuse and arrive in a hurry to emergency room and there she still disoriented and confused, I think that will contribute anxiety reaction some way, somehow. So I think someone with a traumatic experience like that and she has like this type fall and result of the fall this become very confused, I think she will be more panicky still. Will be a tremendous amount of anxiety due to the fact that she cannot recognize the place where or the time, you know, around her. And the pain also probably will numb that person to, you know, a certain — to know or recognize the places around, you know. That probably will enlarge an amount the anxiety to her. [sic]

I think that this testimony by Dr. Suarez, although not eloquent, constitutes competent, substantial evidence that at least some portion of claimant’s psychiatric condition was causally related to the physical impact of the fall and the non-disabling physical injuries. I deem it legally irrelevant that the major portion of claimant’s psychiatric condition may have been due to her fright and excitement from the explosion. As this court stated in Prahl Brothers, Inc. v. Phillips, 429 So.2d 386, 387 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 440 So.2d 353 (Fla.1983):

As in Watson, in the present case the non-disabling physical trauma was a significant causative factor in the claimant’s ensuing psychiatric impairment. As the deputy in the present case determined, in such circumstances the disability is not due to fright or excitement only, and § 440.02(18) therefore does not preclude compensability for the ensuing mental or nervous injury.

Likewise, in the instant case the disability is not due to fright or excitement only. The record provides competent, substantial evidence to support the findings of the deputy commissioner, and the law supports his conclusion. See Oolite Concrete Co. v. Carver, 145 So.2d 733 (Fla.1962); Prahl Brothers, Inc. v. Phillips, supra; City of Tampa v. Tingler, 397 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Watson v. Melman, Inc., 106 So.2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958), cert. denied, 111 So.2d 40 (Fla.1959).

I would affirm.  