
    In the Matter of the SUCCESSION OF Warren D. FARR.
    No. 82-C-2685.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    May 23, 1983.
    On Rehearing April 2, 1984.
    Rehearing Denied May 7, 1984.
    Carlos G. Spaht, Kántrown, Spaht, Weaver & Walter, Baton Rouge, for applicant.
    Ashton L. Stewart, Stewart & Preis; Harvey H. Posner, Robert L. Roland, Watson, Blanche, Wilson & Posner; F.W. Middleton, Jr., Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips; Charles H. Dameron, Durrett, Hardin, Hunter, Dameron & Fritchie; Paul M. Hebert, Jr., Gerald LeVan, Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson; Robert D. Hoover, John Dale Powers, Pamela C. Walker, Sanders, Downing, Kean & Cazedessus, Baton Rouge, for respondents.
   LEMMON, Justice.

This case involves the interpretation of the provisions of a last will and testament executed by Warren Farr on February 5, 1971. The specific dispute involves the ownership (after the trusts created in the will had terminated) of the shares of stock of General American Oil.

I.

In Article I of his five-page will, Farr left to his wife all of the furniture and corporeal movables in the family home (excluding stocks, bonds and cash) and all automobiles. In Article II (which contains the disputed dispositions), Farr made two dispositions in trust. In Paragraph 2.1, he left one-half of his property in a trust for his wife known as the Alice A. Farr Marital Trust. In Paragraph 2.3, he left the remainder of his estate, if his wife survived him, in a separate trust known as the Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust. In Paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5, he further named his wife as income beneficiary of the Residuary Trust and named various individuals and institutions as principal and successive income beneficiaries, designating some legacies as special (nine legacies of cash, one of immovable property, and one of the disputed stock shares) and some (in percentages of the remainder) as residual.

After Farr’s death in 1976, the succession was completed, and the court rendered a judgment of possession. When Mrs. Farr died in 1980, the Residuary Trust terminated under the provisions of the will. The trustee of the two trusts filed a petition for declaratory judgment, requesting a determination of the rights of the parties under the will. The petition incorporated two exhibits which proposed to distribute the principal of the trusts on the basis that one-half of the shares of General American Oil owned by Farr at his death were included in the Marital Trust and the other one-half of the shares were included in the Residuary Trust, so that the churches were each entitled only to 50% of one-half of the shares (or 25% each). The churches answered, asserting that each was entitled to 50% of the total shares under the plain wording of Paragraph 2.5 e and f. Legatees under Mrs. Farr’s will also filed answers and adopted the trustee’s proposal for distribution.

The matter was submitted on the records of the two succession proceedings, and the trial court rendered judgment declaring that one-half of the shares of General American Oil were included in the Marital ■ Trust, so that the churches were only entitled to divide the other one-half. The court of appeal affirmed. 421 So.2d 941. We granted certiorari. 423 So.2d 1259.

II.

In a dispute over the interpretation of a will, the court should endeavor to determine and carry out the intention of the testator. The court should view the will as a whole and should interpret the language so as to give effect, as far as possible, to every provision in the instrument. Carter v. Succession of Carter, 332 So.2d 439 (La.1976).

In the present dispute, it is impossible to carry out the will according to its literal terms because, as the trustee points out, the testator literally disposed of more than 100% of the oil stock. The churches contend, however, that while the bequest in Paragraph 2.3 is subject to more than one interpretation, the bequest to the churches in Paragraph 2.5 is not. The testator expressly provided in Paragraph 2.5 that each of the two churches, upon the termination of the trusts, was to receive one-half of the total number of shares that he owned at the time of his death, evidencing a clear intent that the churches would together receive the total number of shares of stock. This clear language, the churches argue, should be followed if the remainder of the will can be interpreted so as to give effect to all of its provisions.

Paragraph 2.1, considered alone, may be interpreted as incorporating into the marital trust one-half of each item of property owned by the testator at the time of his death. The provision may also be interpreted as an intention for the testator’s wife to receive one-half of the value of the entire estate at the time of the testator’s death, so that the Marital Trust might be composed of one-half of every item not specifically allocated elsewhere in the will, plus other property sufficient to make up one-half of the value of the entire estate. This interpretation would give full effect to Paragraph 2.1, as well as to Paragraphs 2.3 and 2.5, as long as there was sufficient property to complete the distribution.

The trustee disagrees, however, with this analysis, arguing that the testator clearly intended to bestow the utmost benefit upon his wife and that the churches’ interpretation was contrary to that intent. The trustee’s argument ignores the fact that the testator left his wife all of the income from both trusts, and the income during her lifetime was not affected by the identity of the principal beneficiary. Indeed, the fact that the testator specifically authorized the trustee in Paragraph 3.2 to invade the principal of the Marital Trust to fulfill the wife’s needs and specifically prohibited the trustee under any circumstances from using the principal of the Residuary Trust arguably evidences an intent that the oil stock be maintained intact for his revered churches.

An analysis of the drafting of the overall will also supports a conclusion that the testator intended for the churches to receive all of the shares of General American Oil stock.

The testator apparently experienced difficulty in expressing alternative provisions contingent upon whether his wife survived him or predeceased him. In Article II he provided for his wife’s survival, leaving her one-half of his property in trust and the income for life from the other half that passed to the second trust. The difficulty came in listing the special legacies (other than cash) that were to go to principal beneficiaries of the second trust. Although he had already willed one-half of all his property to the first trust, he willed specific immovable property and stock to certain principal beneficiaries in the second trust. The testator then in Article III provided for his wife’s prior death and willed all of his property to the special and residuary legatees named in Article II.

Thus (if we accept the churches’ interpretation of Paragraph 2.5), the testator intended that, while his wife would receive the income from all the succession property for life, the individuals and institutions listed in Paragraph 2.5 a through l would receive (eventually) the same amount of cash and the same properties, whether or not the testator’s wife survived him, and those listed in Paragraph 2.5 m would receive the same percentage of the residuum in either event (although the residuum, of course, would be different, depending on the order of death). The consistency of these alternative dispositions is an additional persuasive factor for concluding that the testator intended for the churches to receive all of the shares of General American Oil stock, whether or not his wife survived him.

The churches’ proposed distribution of the principal also fulfills every disposition expressed by the testator. The will qualified for the marital deduction, and his wife received all of the income from his succession property during her lifetime. His wife’s heirs and legatees will receive property (through the Marital Trust) which was valued at one-half of the total value of his estate at his death. The principal beneficiaries of the Residual Trust, who were designated by the testator as particular legatees, each will receive the full amount of the particular legacies (in cash or in property) stipulated in the will. The principal beneficiaries, who were designated as residual legatees, each will receive the stipulated percentages of the “remainder of the property” after distribution of the property necessary to complete the foregoing dispositions. The only parties affected by this interpretation of the ambiguous provisions of the will are the wife’s heirs and legatees, and they are affected only because of the phenomenal increase in the stock’s value after the testator’s death, an occurrence which the testator could not possibly have foreseen.

Accordingly, the judgments of the lower courts are reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for rendition of a declaratory judgment in accordance with this opinion.

WATSON, J., dissents with reasons.

WATSON, Justice,

dissenting.

The majority errs in its interpretation of this will. Warren D. Farr predeceased his wife. The overriding concern expressed in his will is provision for that wife, Alice A. Farr. She was given the income of his entire estate and the right to bequeath one-half of the estate. The latter one-half of his property was put in the Alice A. Farr marital trust. As to the marital trust, the will states:

“My wife shall have the full and unrestricted right to bequeath her entire interest in favor of her estate or to whom ever she may see fit, and no person may divert any part of this to any other person than my wife.” (emphasis added)

Clearly, Mrs. Farr was not only given the income from the entire estate, but an unrestricted right to bequeath the property in the Alice A. Farr marital trust.

The other half of Farr’s property was put in the “Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust”. The two churches are named as “beneficiaries” only in connection with the residuary trust. Although the two churches claim fifty percent of the oil stock in the Alice A. Farr marital trust, it is clear from the language of the will as a whole that this was not the testator’s intention. While the enumeration of the residual beneficiaries provides that the churches shall have fifty percent of the total number of General American Oil shares owned at Farr’s death, this language must be read in context. The churches can not benefit from those assets which had previously been placed in the Alice A. Farr marital trust.

The majority errs in relying on the drafter’s careless use of words in delineating the number of shares to be given to the churches. The language of the will as a whole establishes that the word “total” refers to the number of shares in the Warren D. Farr residuary trust rather than the number of shares in the estate as a whole. The shares to go to the churches do not include those shares previously incorporated in the Alice A. Farr trust. The trial court and the court of appeal correctly interpreted the will. As the court of appeal stated:

“If only the ‘special’ dispositions were considered, it might be arguable that the testator intended each church to have 50% of all General American Oil shares at his death. Considering however, the language of the will in its entirety and, including particularly the disposition to the marital trust of one-half of ‘all my property’, it appears to us that Mr. Farr intended that all of his property, of whatever nature, whether community or separate, was to be included within that disposition. Moreover, the testator used the language ‘no person may divert any part of this to any other person than my wife.’ It is clear that Mr. Farr’s wife was to come first in his testament; all other dispositions were subject to her favored treatment, as indicated. To hold otherwise would be to completely ignore the language of the disposition to the marital trust, as well as the language of the will in its entirety, which clearly reflects the intent of the testator that his wife share in all property.” 421 So.2d at 946.
I respectfully dissent.

On Rehearing

CALOGERO, Justice .

The parties whose monetary interests are affected by the outcome of this case are two churches named in the will of Warren D. Farr, and five hospitals and the Recreation and Park Commission of the Parish of East Baton Rouge named in the will of Warren D. Farr’s widow, Alice A. Farr (these six entities will occasionally be referred to hereinafter as “the hospitals”).

The contest is over one-half of certain shares of stock in General American Oil, the separate property of Warren D. Farr, who died on April 21, 1976. All of the pertinent facts and the history of this litigation are amply set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, Succession of Farr, 421 So.2d 941 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982), and in the opinion of this Court on original hearing. They will not be repeated in full here.

The dispositive question before us was, and is, whether Warren D. Farr left all the shares of his General American Oil stock to the two churches (one-half to each church), by naming them “principal beneficiaries and successive income beneficiaries” in a “Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust” and naming them legatees to all of the stock upon the death of Alice A. Farr and simultaneous termination of the Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust, or whether he left the two churches only one-half of the shares of the stock in this manner, having first, in the will, left one-half of those same shares to an “Alice A. Farr Marital Trust”. If it is the latter, then half of the shares vested, at the outset, in the Alice A. Farr Marital Trust, and upon the death of Alice A. Farr, devolved upon the hospitals Mrs. Farr designated in her will as her residuary legatees.

When first we heard this case we decided that the two churches should receive all, rather than just half of the shares of stock in General American Oil. We did so, attempting to give “full effect” to the disputed provisions of the will, and supported our decision with several plausible legal arguments. We concluded that when the testator first in his will left to the trustee for his wife Alice A. Farr, in the Alice A. Farr Marital Trust, “one-half (⅛) of all of my property, both movable and immovable and wherever located, owned at my death,” he intended that the trust for his wife receive one-half of the “value” of testator’s entire estate at the time of his death. We came to that conclusion as a means of making sense out of apparently ambiguous and conflicting provisions of the will. For, while Paragraph 2.1 did indeed first give Alice, in trust, one-half of all his property, Paragraph 2.5 seemed to give all the General American Oil stock to the two churches when it designated the two churches as principal beneficiaries and successive income beneficiaries of a second instituted “Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust”, each church to receive an asset described as “50% of the total number of shares of stock owned by me in General American Oil at my death.” Obviously if Warren were to predecease Alice, as did in fact later occur, the churches could not have all of this stock owned by Warren at his death, if by the same will in an earlier provision he has directed that one-half of that stock go to his wife’s marital trust, as to the assets of which by will Alice was to have “the full and unrestricted right to bequeath her entire interest”.

We granted a rehearing upon application of the trustee and the hospitals simply because we were not convinced that our original opinion, however well conceived and articulated, was correct. Rehearing applicants urged, among other arguments, that contrary to the opinion author’s assertion that his solution would give effect to all provisions of the will, there would not be sufficient assets available for distribution to the principal beneficiaries of the Residuary Trust. We were not especially impressed with that argument which we therefore will not expound upon here. Nevertheless, we did choose to reconsider the strong arguments espoused originally on behalf of the trustee and the hospitals.

Upon reconsideration we now determine that the resolution more in keeping with the intent of the testator and the language he employed in the will, is that the two churches should receive only one-half rather than all of the shares of stock in American General Oil.

One matter upon which we did not focus originally was Paragraph 3.1 of the will. That provision helps us to understand why the central ambiguity in the will came about in the first place. Farr at Paragraph 3.1 said that if my “wife [does not survive me, but rather] predecease[s] me, ... I will ... all of the property owned by me at the time of my death ... to the individuals and institutions named in the Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust in the amounts and properties and proportions and conditions therein set forth.” And, of course, therein, at Paragraph 2.5 under “Special,” he directed at subparagraphs e and / that each of the churches receive “50% of the total number of shares of stock owned by me in General American Oil at my death.” This language, half of all shares owned at my death to each of two churches, a disposition of the entirety of the shares, makes sense in the eventuality that Alice were to predecease Warren, for in that event all of the shares in General American Oil would at his death be owned by him (remember, this stock was separate property of Warren’s).

That same language does not, however, make sense in the first alternative, that Warren should die first. In that eventuality what he provided early on in the will was that his wife should receive all of his right, title and interest in certain corporeal movable property, excluding stocks, bonds and cash. Then he created an “Alice A. Farr Marital Trust” and named Louisiana National Bank of Baton'Rouge as trustee for his wife; and he willed to the bank as trustee for his wife “one-half (¾⅛) of all of my property both movable and immovable and wherever located, owned at my death.” Then at Paragraph 2.3 he also willed to the Louisiana National Bank of Baton Rouge as trustee “all of the residue and remainder of my estate of every nature and description and wherever located owned at my death in a separate trust to be known as the Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust.” With respect to that trust he named his wife Alice A. Farr the income beneficiary for her lifetime and dictated that such trust should terminate at Alice’s death. With respect to that trust he directed that the trustee “shall hold all of the remainder of my estate of every nature and description,” and he instituted as the principal beneficiaries and successive income beneficiaries the two churches and certain designated persons. He thereupon included the ambiguous language that “[t]he said beneficiaries (and heirs) shall take said property in the following amounts and proportions,” and listed in the immediately succeeding paragraph designated “Special” at e and f the two churches and the assets described as “50% of the total number of shares of stock owned by me in General American Oil at my death.”

The arguments which persuade us to rule as we now do are as follows.

First and foremost we are impressed with the intent of the testator, and that is to favor his wife above all else. He left his wife a full one-half of all of the property he owned at his death, admittedly in a trust, where she was the income and principal beneficiary. He provided in the will that “no person may divert any part of this to any other person than my wife.” He made sure that his wife would not have to pay any taxes by providing that the residuary legatees should pay all inheritance, estate or other taxes due upon his death. After giving his wife in trust half of all the property owned at his death he left only the “residue and remainder” to the residuary trust. And in Paragraph 2.5, with respect to the principal beneficiaries of this “residue and remainder” legacy, he recited that the beneficiaries “... shall take as special and residuary legatees of said trust funds ...,” and noted that the “said beneficiaries (and heirs) shall take said property in the following amounts and proportions ...” (emphasis added). “Said property” can only refer to the “residue and remainder”, and that “residue and remainder” included only one-half of the stock since the first legacy to the marital trust had already disposed of half of this stock.

In our original opinion we sought a means of reconciling the ambiguities in the will, and in so doing we read the testator’s outset bequest to his wife (“one-half (V2) of all my property) as being one-half of the value of the entire estate at the time of his death.

That simply cannot have been his intention we now determine, when the testator bequeathed for his wife “one-half (V2) of all of my property, both movable and immovable and wherever located, owned at my death.”

These constitute the reasons why we now conclude that the district court and the Court of Appeal were correct in their judgments in which they favored the hospitals by decreeing that they, and not the two churches, were entitled to the controverted one-half of the shares in General American Oil left by Warren D. Farr at his death. Warren Farr left these shares in trust to his wife, Alice A. Farr, and she in turn left them to the hospitals in her will.

Decree

Accordingly, the original opinion and judgment of this Court are reversed and the judgment of the district court and the Court of Appeal reinstated.

ORIGINAL OPINION REVERSED; JUDGMENTS OF DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEAL REINSTATED.

WATSON, J., concurs with reasons.

DENNIS, J., dissents being of the opinion that the original decision was correct.

BLANCHE, J., recused.

WATSON, Justice,

concurring.

The majority now resolves this matter as I have urged from the outset.

Therefore, I respectfully concur. 
      
       The Honorable Lawrence A. Chehardy participated in this decision as an Associate Justice ad hoc in place of Associate Justice Fred A. Blanche, Jr., who was recused.
     
      
      . Article II provides as follows:
      "2.1 To the Louisiana National Bank of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, as Trustee for my wife, Alice A. Farr, I will one-half (½) of all of my property, both movable and immovable and wherever located, owned at my death.
      "2.2 This trust is to be known as the Alice A. Farr Marital Trust and all of the income from ■ this entire trust shall be paid to my wife during her lifetime annually, or, at the Trustee’s election, at more frequent intervals. My wife shall have the, full and unrestricted right to bequeath her entire interest in favor of her estate or to whomever she may see fit, and no person may divert any part of this to any other person than my wife.
      "2.3 If my wife, Alice A. Farr, survives me, then I will to Louisiana National Bank of Baton Rouge, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, as Trustee, all of the residue and remainder of my estate of every nature and description and wherever located owned at my death in a separate trust to be known as the Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust.
      
      “2.4 My wife, Alice A. Farr, shall be income beneficiary of the Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust for her lifetime. All trust income shall be payable to her at least annually or at the more frequent intervals as agreed between my wife and trustee.
      "2.5 The hereinafter listed individuals and institutions are instituted as the principal beneficiaries and successive income beneficiaries of said Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust, in which trust the trustee shall hold all of the remainder of my estate, of every nature and description, for said beneficiaries until the death of the said Alice A. Farr, at the happening of which event the Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust shall terminate and its assets distributed to said beneficiaries, who shall take as special and residuary legatees of said trust funds, the residuary legatees, however, being distributed any other property I might own at my death. The said beneficiaries (and heirs) shall take said property in the following amounts and proportions, provided, however, that any assets not specifically disposed of, or accuring as a result of the death of any beneficiary or legatee shall be allotted to the residuary legatees.
      “Special:
      “a. My nephew, Walter R. Farr $2,500.00
      “b. My grandniece, Mrs. Virginia S. Tantum 6,000.00
      “c. S. Warren Tantum 15,000.00
      “d. Julia Mae Arbour 4,000.00
      “e. The First Presbyterian Church, Cranbury, New Jersey, in honor of my father, David Farr, and my mother, Virginia Farr; my sister, Lillie Chamberlin, bom Lillie Farr, and her husband, Lewis Chamberlin. 50% of the total number of shares of stock owned by me in General American Oil at my death.
      “f. The First Presbyterian Church, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 50% of the total number of shares of stock owned by me in General American Oil at my death.
      “g. J. B. Arbour 1,500.00
      “h. Robert F. Arbour “i. To Sidney V. Arbour, Jr., 2020 Ramsey Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, as principal beneficiary of the house, improvements, and lot at 2044 Elissale Street, Baton Rouge, La., being Lot No. 44, Zee Zee Gardens Subdivision, subject, however to the right of occupancy in favor of Mamie Smith who is presently occupying this house for as long as she pays twenty dollars ($20.00) per month rent to Sidney V. Arbour, Jr., said right to terminate at her death, or remarriage. 1,000.00
      “j. Mrs. Fred Hannaman 6,500.00
      “k. Eloise Selig 4,500.00
      “1. Mrs. Thelma Holladay 5,000.00
      
        “Residuary:
      “m. All of the remainder of the property owned by me at the time of my death of every kind and description and wherever located, including all my holdings in Standard Oil of New Jersey stock, stock dividends and other proceeds derived therefrom excluding the income therefrom to be used by the Trustee for the benefit of Alice A. Farr, is distributed and bequeathed to the following named principal beneficiaries and successive income beneficiaries in the following proportions:
      Warren David McNeely, 12%
      Kensington, Maryland Warren Lewis Task, 9%
      Miami, Florida Mrs. Simon M. McNeely 10%
      Kensington, Maryland Mrs. Ted Tomney, 10%
      Atlanta, Georgia Mrs. Everette Erickson, 10%
      Dayton, New Jersey David Farr, Buttonwood Farm, 9%
      Marlboro, New Jersey Mrs. Clarence Cambell, 9%
      Highstown, New Jersey Farr Chamberlin, 9%
      Cranbury, New Jersey Richard Christenson, 4%
      Edson, New Jersey Mrs. J. R. Peterson, 4%
      Vineland, New Jersey Lewis Chamberlin, Jr., 4%
      Princeton Junction, New Jersey Mrs. Florence Stults, 4%
      Cranbury, New Jersey Alex T. Farr, 6%’ Miami, Florida (Emphasis supplied.)
     
      
      . In Paragraph 2.2, Farr also made provisions which insured that the Marital Trust qualified for the marital deductions under the Internal Revenue Code.
     
      
      . In Article III, Farr made an alternative provision, in the event that his wife predeceased him, and willed all of his property "to the individuals and institutions named in the above Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust in the amounts and properties and proportions and conditions therein set forth.” He specified that the individuals and institutions listed under the heading Special "are named as special legatees of the properties and in the amounts set opposite their names above” and that the individuals listed under the heading Residuary “are named my residuary legatees in the proportions set opposite their names above”.
     
      
      . The shares were valued at 1167,000 at the time of Farr's death, but had increased in value to over $630,000 by the time of Mrs. Farr’s death.
     
      
      . It was not completely possible, however, to carry out the provision (at the time of the execution of the will) according to this interpretation, because the testator bequeathed certain movables in Paragraph 2.1 directly to his wife and not to the trustee.
     
      
      .Since the wife received all income from both trusts during her lifetime, the composition of the principal of each trust did not become significant until the trusts terminated, at which time the value of the oil stock had increased dramatically.
     
      
      . Paragraph 3.2 provides:
      "Trustee may use the principal of the Alice A. Farr Marital Trust created hereunder for the benefit of my wife, Alice A. Farr, in the event she shall be in need of funds to maintain a respectable standard of living in light of the standard of living enjoyed by her for the five years preceding my death, and to meet extraordinary medical or other expenses. In its determination whether or not to distribute principal, the outside resources of the beneficiary shall be taken into account. However, in no event shall trustee distribute principal from the Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust.”
     
      
      . These legacies were:
      1. The two churches, which were each to receive 50% of the General American Oil stock;
      2. Sidney Arbour, who was to receive the immovable property on Ramsey Drive; and
      3. The residuary legatees, who were to receive "all my holdings in Standard Oil of New Jersey stock", which was to be included in the remainder of the property.
     
      
      . Actually, because the immovable property described in Paragraph 2.5 i was community property, the testator could only will one-half of the property to the named legatee.
     
      
      . The testator, however, knew at the time of execution of the will that there was sufficient property to allocate one-half of the value of his estate to the Marital Trust without utilizing the General American Oil stock.
     
      
       Lawrence A. Chehardy, Justice ad hoc sitting for Associate Justice Fred A. Blanche, Jr.
     
      
      . First Presbyterian Church of Baton Rouge and First Presbyterian Church of Cranbury, New Jersey.
     
      
      . 1) Burden Memorial Hospital, Inc. for the use and benefit of the Ollie Steele Burden Manor, Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
      2) Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
      3) Woman’s Hospital Foundation, Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
      4) Baton Rouge General Hospital, as trustee, in trust to provide for the health and welfare of its patients and their families, through the Baton Rouge General Hospital Auxiliary (Pink Ladies),
      5) Doctors Memorial Hospital, Inc., Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and
      6) Recreation and Park Commission of the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
     
      
      . All of the property of Warren D. Farr except the shares of General American Oil stock belonged at Farr’s death to the community of acquets and gains existing between Warren D. Farr and Alice A. Farr, his wife. Mr. Farr’s will was written on February 5, 1971. He died on April 21, 1976, and at that time the stock was valued at 1167,748.00. At the time of Mrs. Farr’s death on August 19, 1980, the stock was valued in excess of $630,000.00.
     
      
      . Paragraph 2.2 provides in part: ".... My wife shall have the full and unrestricted right to bequeath her entire interest in favor of her estate or to whomever she may see fit, and no person may divert any part of this to any other person than my wife.”
     
      
      . Paragraph 3.1 provides:
      3.1 Should, however, my wife, Alice A. Farr, predecease me, then and in that event, I will and bequeath all of the property owned by me at the time of my death, of every kind and description and wherever located, to the individuals and institutions named in the above Warren D. Farr Residuary Trust in the amounts and properties and proportions and conditions therein set forth....
     
      
      . Paragraph 5.3 reads: "Should there be any inheritance, estate or other taxes due upon my death, I wish such taxes to be paid by the residuary legatees and no such taxes shall be paid or borne in whole or in part by my wife, Alice A. Farr. However, should there he any inheritance, estate or other taxes due because of the inclusion of the proceeds of any life insurance policy in my estate, then I wish the named beneficiary of such policy or policies, if any, to pay the proportionate share of such tax by inclusion of such insurance proceeds in the computation of that tax.”
     