
    Mercy NGEUSANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-1676.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: Feb. 15, 2011.
    Decided: March 7, 2011.
    Edward Neufville, III, Moraisneufville Law Firm, LLC, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner. Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director, Ashley Y. Martin, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
   PER CURIAM:

Mercy Ngeusang, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing her appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of her requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

Before this court, Ngeusang challenges the determination that she failed to establish her eligibility for relief. She argues that the credibility determination was not supported by specific and cogent reasoning and that the Board erred in failing to consider the independent corroborative evidence that she submitted in support of her claims.

A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). Administrative findings of fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the [Boardj’s interpretation of the [Immigration and Nationality Act] and any attendant regulations.” Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir.2008). This court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence ... presented was so compelling that no reasonable fact-finder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84,112 S.Ct. 812; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n. 14 (4th Cir.2002). Furthermore, “[t]he agency decision that an alien is not eligible for asylum is ‘conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.’ ” Maryn-enka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir.2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (2006)).

We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude that substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility finding. We further conclude that Ngeusang failed to present sufficient independent evidence of past persecution, notwithstanding the adverse credibility determination, as discussed in Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir.2004). We therefore uphold the denial of Ngeusang’s requests for asylum and withholding of removal. See id. at 367 (“Because the burden of proof for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum — even though the facts that must be proved are the same — an applicant who is ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).”).

Finally, we find that substantial evidence supports the finding that Ngeusang faded to meet the standard for relief under the Convention Against Torture. To obtain such relief, an applicant must establish that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2010). We find that Ngeu-sang failed to make the requisite showing before the immigration court.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED.  