
    JIAN ZHONG HUANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-0951-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 23, 2009.
    
      Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Alison Marie Igoe, Senior Litigation Counsel; Jeffrey L. Menkin, Trial Immigration Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: Hon. DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, Hon. JON 0. NEWMAN and Hon. PIERRE N. LEVAL, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Jian Zhong Huang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February 8, 2008 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Jian Zhong Huang, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Feb. 8, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). Where the agency considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008). We find that the agency did not err in denying Huang’s untimely motion to reopen or in finding him ineligible to file a successive asylum application.

Huang further argues that the BIA erred by relying on its precedential decisions to conclude that he failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the time limitation for filing his motion to reopen. However, this argument fails where we have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no error in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish material changed country conditions or an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. See id. at 169-72 (noting that “[w]e do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the agency”); see also Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as “the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”).

Huang argues that the BIA abused its discretion when it found that his failure to authenticate the Lantian Village Committee letter diminished the weight of that document. While he correctly asserts that the agency errs when it rejects a document solely based on an individual’s failure to authenticate pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6; see Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 403 (2d Cir.2005), we find no abuse of discretion here, where the BIA also found that the notice was a photocopy that bore no signature, seal, or authenticating information. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (finding that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency).

Similarly, the BIA’s determination that Huang was ineligible to file a successive asylum application was not in error. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 156, 158-59 (2d Cir.2008).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).  