
    Terri HICKLIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
    Nos. 08-55071, 08-55522.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Dec. 8, 2010.
    Filed Dec. 22, 2010.
    Tracy A. Collins, Esq., Tracy A. Collins Law Offices, Agoura Hills, CA, Ronald Dean, Esq., Pacific Palisades, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Daniel W. Maguire, Esq., Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: TROTT and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and MOSMAN, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Michael W. Mosman, United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Terri Hicklin sued Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company (“Hartford”) for discontinuing her life insurance coverage and disability benefits. Ms. Hicklin’s policy with Hartford granted Hartford discretion to determine eligibility for benefits. The district court reviewed Hartford’s decision to discontinue benefits de novo and ordered Hartford to reinstate life insurance coverage and disability benefits and to pay retroactive disability benefits. Hartford appeals, arguing that its decision should have been reviewed only for abuse of discretion.

We review an ERISA administrator’s decision de novo unless the plan grants the administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits; then the review is for abuse of discretion. Metro. Life Ins., Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008). However, if the administrator commits “wholesale and flagrant violations of the procedural requirements of ERISA,” the standard of review reverts back to de novo. Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 971 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc).

The procedural violations cited by the district court are insufficient to justify reverting back to de novo review. But even when reviewed for abuse of discretion, this standard must be “tempered with skepticism” given the structural conflict presented by Hartford’s simultaneous funding of the plan and evaluation of claims. See id. at 959. Reviewing the district court’s findings under the proper Abatie standard, we conclude that the district court was justified in ordering reinstatement of life insurance coverage and disability benefits and retroactive payment. We also conclude, given the evidence submitted by the parties in this case, that the district court did not err in finding Hicklin was a manager, and thus entitled to the higher level of benefits for managers. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by awarding Hicklin attorneys’ fees or in the amount of its award.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     