
    CASE 38 — PETITION EOS DIVORCE
    JANUARY 18.
    Cravens vs. Cravens.
    APPEAL PROM PAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT.
    1. During the pendency of a suit for a divorce by the wife, who has abandoned her husband, whether she is entitled, pendente lite, to an allowance against him for the maintenance of herself and child, essentially depends on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of her abandonment and refusal to return. But as this can only be decided on the final hearing, some allowance in the meantime may be proper.
    3. The annual income of the husband appears to be about one thousand dollars for the support of himself and two children. In the suit of his wife for a divorce, a pendente lite allowance and charge against him of seven hundred dollars for the maintenance of herself and child a year is unreasonable and exorbitant. The maximum shown by the evidence to be needful was five hundred dollars. The allowance is reduced to that sum.
    3. Compensation to the wife’s counsel in her suit for divorce is an ulterior question, which cannot be provided for, pendente lite, and should not be anticipated in making temporary provision for her support, for which alone the statute authorizes any such allowance.
    Kinkead & Darnell and Porter & Greathouse, For Appellant,
    CITED—
    
      Civil Code, secs. 15, 876 ; 15 B. Mon., 48.
    4 Dana, 307 ; Boggess vs. Boggess.
    
    
      2 Kent's Corn., 146; 1 Duvall, 197; Lee vs. Lee.
    
    8 B. Mon., 120; Griffin vs. Griffin.
    
    
      MSS. Opin., Sept., 1857; Taylor vs. Taylor.
    
    
      2 Met., 414; 3 Met., 303.
    4 Paige, 643 ; Germond vs. Germond.
    
    3 Paige, 267; Lawrence vs. Lawrence.
    
    
      
      1Duvall, 198; Quisenbury vs. Quisenbury..
    
    4 Littell, 205; Butler vs. Butler.
    
    
      Rev. Stat., sec. 6, art. 3, chap. 47, and sec. 32, chap. 25.
    3 Edw. Gliy R., 317 ; Worden vs. Worden.
    
    1 Harr. Gliy R., 144; Boyd vs. Boyd.
    
    4 Dana, 30; Lockridge vs. Lockridge.
    
    Kinkead & Buckner and W. C. P. Breckinridge, J Por Appellee,
    CITED—
    
      Revised Statutes, secs. 6, 7, art. 3, chap. 47.
    5 B. Mon., 47 ; 3. Met., 32; Bondurant vs. Apperson.
    
    
      Civil Code, sec. 15; 3 Blackstone, 398.
    1 Bouvier, 525; 2 Ib.> 385, 659, 678, 679.
    
      Barton's Suit in Equity, 148.
    4 Met., 236; Applegate vs. Applegate.
    
    4 Met., 109; Hanson vs. Bowyer.
    
    17 B. Mon., 144; Overby vs. Gay.
    
    
      Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, secs. 603, 604, 612, 608, 569, 581, 590.
    4 Paige, 645; 3 Paige, 267; 4 Littell, 250.
    1 Duvall, 197; 4 Met., 413; 3 Met., 303.
    2 Littell, 337; 4 Littell, 252; 4 Dana, 307.
    8 B. Mon., 50, 120, 178; 4 Eng. {Ark. R.), 507.
    17 Serg., 139.
    5 Halstead, N. J., 355 ; Bray vs. Bray.
    
    4 Sanford, N. Y., 373 ; Lyride vs. Lynde.
    
    1 Barb., N. Y., 241; North-vs. North.
    
    3 Barb., N. Y., 628 ; Williams vs. Williams.
    
    2 Md. Cliy Dec., 335, 341, 393.
   JUDGE ROBERTSON

delivered the omhion op the court:

Each of the parties in this case being peculiarly irascible and signally imprudent, they had cohabited nearly eight years as husband and wife, discordantly and unhappily, when, having three children, the appellee abandoned her appellant husband, and, rejecting overtures for a reunion, she sued him for a divorce a vinculo. That suit is still pending, and its final result cannot be foreseen.

On the appellee’s motion, the circuit court charged the appellant for the maintenance of herself and chil'd (the appellant retaining the other two children) seven hundred dollars for one year, payable in several installments, and he appeals from that judgment..

Whether the appellee was entitled, pendente lite, to any allowance, might essentially depend on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of her abandonment and refusal to return. But, as this can only be decided on the final hearing, some allowance in the meantime may be proper; but the amount allowed is unreasonably exorbitant. The maximum shown by the evidence to be needful is five hundred dollars; and the appellant’s annual income for the support of himself and two children appears to be only about one thousand dollars.

Compensation to the appellee’s counsel is an ulterior question, which cannot now be provided for, and should not be anticipated in making temporary provision for the appellee’s support, for which alone the statute authorizes any such allowance.

It is, therefore, quite clear that too much was allowed in this case. The allowance should not exceed five hundred dollars, and might not unreasonably be less. -

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.  