
    Anthony FALSO, Plaintiff-Appellant, ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 11-1413-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 27, 2012.
    Anthony Falso, Rochester, N.Y., pro se.
    Michael E. Davis, for Charles G. Johnson, General Counsel, Rochester, N.Y., for Defendant-Appellee.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, GUIDO CALABRESI, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Anthony Falso, pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his employment discrimination complaint on the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and consider whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). “In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the district court’s decision for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its March 31, 2011, decision. Falso advances no specific facts or admissible evidence that he was terminated on the basis of his Italian-Ameriean national origin or evidence disputing the Defendant’s showing that he was fired from his substitute teaching position because of complaints about his performance received from four different schools. Instead, Falso simply relied on his allegation that a school administrator told him “we don’t need your kind in our school,” that this remark was directed at his Italian-Ameriean heritage, and offered an alternative theory — unsupported by any evidence — that the Defendant’s automated telephone calling system discriminated against him and other ethnic minorities. These assertions were insufficient to satisfy Falso’s burden of opposing the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 452 (2d Cir.1999) (“Statements that are devoid of any specifics, but replete with conclusions, are insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.”); Kulak v. City of N.Y., 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir.1996) (“[C]onclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment.”).

Falso also argues that he was not afforded adequate discovery prior to summary judgment. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Under this rule, “[a] party must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to establish the facts necessary to support his claim.” In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 103 (2d Cir.2008). Falso received just that-he served the Defendant with a list of interrogatories seeking, inter alia, the number of substitute teachers and other employees of the Defendant who were Italian-Ameriean, and the Defendant disclaimed knowledge because it did not maintain records of employee ethnicity according to that classification. Although Falso now asserts on appeal that the Defendant’s discovery responses were inadequate, he never moved in the district court to compel further discovery under Fed. R.Civ.P. 37(a). Though he mentioned the need for additional discovery in his opposition to summary judgment, Falso did not submit an affidavit in the district court setting forth the additional facts he sought to discover under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). That omission “is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate.” Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir.1994) (addressing former Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(f)).

We have considered Falso’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  