
    James Wright, vs. Woodson Ligon.
    
      Defendant had recovered a judgment at law against complainant, an attorney, for having failed to sue and recover a promissory note placed in his hands. It appeared that the drawers of the note were insolvent; that the agent of defendant, who • placed, the note in complainant's hands, told him to ‘do the best he could with it;' that he exchanged the note with one of the drawers, who fraudulently gave hima note which did not belong to him, but which was made by solvent, parties. Meld that complainant was entitled to rfihef, andperpetual injunction granted.
    
    The defendant, Woodson Ligón, obtained a judgment at law, April 1822, against the complainant, James Wright, for the sum of ; on the ground that Wright, an attorney at law, having received from Ligón a note of hand, drawn by 'North & Hogg,’ partners, for collection, exchanged it fot other notes, and failed to rn.ake collection.
    Wright, the complainant, shortly afterwards filed the pre- • sent bill, alleging that William Ligo71, who brought him the note from Woodson Ligón, was Woodson’s agent, and that before he made the exchange of notes, he consulted said- William, who advised and authorised him to make any trade or ■exchange in order to secure the money: That he could not have made collection of the original note, if he had tried, and that throughout the whole transaction he did nothing but what he at the .time believed would promote Ligon’s interest: That he was prevented from having the full benefit of his defence at law by the removal of one of his witnesses, together with -his own absence, having gone to the state of Virginia and being detained ■there until after the trial by unforeseen circumstances. The bill prayed a perpetual injunction against the judgment at law.
    .The defendant, Woodson Ligón, in his answer, admits that he .deposited said note in the hands of his brother, William Ligón, but merely for the purpose of being forwarded to Wright for Collection, and denies that he ever authorized any exchange, and sayS that it was made entirely without his privity or consent.
   Chancellor Thompson.

It is clear law,, that if an attorney neglects his client’s suit, or,does any other _act which ig>-pairs interest, he is liable to ars.action.

The enquiry in this case therefore is, whether the com-Tnainant has discharged his duties in the manner he ought to have done. 'At the time William Ligón, the agent of Wood-son Ligón, placed the note in his hands, Hogg was notoriously insolvent, and North was dead, and his estate ultimately proved so. It appears from the evidence that this fact was known to William Ligón, and he told Wright to do the best he could with it. Tie must have inferred from this, that his powers were •not merely confined to the bringing suit and obtaining judgment, but if he saw any other mode by which the debt could be secured, he was to exercise his discretion in the adoption of it. -He accordingly went to Hogg’s, to endeavor to make some contract or compromise which might prove beneficial to his client’s interest, and exchanged Hogg and North’s note for one of the Cooks, who were men 'in responsible circumstances. The agent himself declares he considered it an advantageous bargain, and so it would have turned out, had it not been for the ■fraud committed by Hogg; for it appears he had no interest whatever in the note, it having been placed in his hands by -Motes, the payee, for collection. Wright, as the .holder of the note for Ligon’s benefit, instituted an action in the name of Motes, who caused it to be discontinued. He then instituted an action against Hogg, recovered judgment, and issued an execution, bug has never been able to recover a cent, lie could not have sued North’s administrator for a copartnership debt, admitting liis estate to have been solvent, and the reason of his having made the exchange of the notes, was to save Ligón from the expense of an unprofitable law-suit. It appears therefore to the court, that Wright has done nothing but what was intended for and did contribute to Ligon’s benefit, and it would be* establishing a bad precedent to make an attorney responsible for a note of an insolvent person, for an unintentional departure from the strict rule, particularly when his motives were pure and intended to benefit his client.

It is .ordered and decreed that the injunction be made perpetual, and that the defendant do' pay the costs of the suit, and also the costs of the suit at law.  