
    R. Andre KLEIN, on behalf of himself and all other stockholders of Apple Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Timothy D. COOK; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-16230
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted July 6, 2016 San Francisco, California
    July 27, 2016
    Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Bottini & Bottini, Inc., La Jolla, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    George Alfred Riley, Michael Frederick Tubach, Trial Attorney, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, for San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees William V. Campbell, Millard S. Drexler, Arthur D. Levin-son, Robert A. Iger, Andrea Jung, Fred D. Anderson, Apple Inc., Nominal Defendant, a California corporation.
    George Alfred Riley, Michael Frederick Tubacji, Trial Attorney, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Kim William West, Clyde & Co US LLP, for San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Estate of Steven P. Jobs.
    Before: SILVERMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and GARB IS, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Marvin J. Garbis, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

R. Andre Klein appeals from a temporary stay order issued by the district court pursuant to its inherent power to control its docket. Because we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss Klein’s appeal.

1. A stay order is generally not appeal-able under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See, e.g., Stanley v. Chappell, 764 F.3d 990, 993-95 (9th Cir. 2014). Klein argues that the district court’s order puts him “effectively out of court” and is therefore immediately ap-pealable under the doctrine of Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). Unlike the stay order in Moses H. Cone, however, the district court here specifically contemplated ongoing litigation of Klein’s claims in federal court: It expressly stated that it would adjudicate Klein’s claims, repeatedly characterized its stay order as “temporary,” and stressed that the state action “would not preclude [Klein’s prosecution of his federal claim] altogether since [the district court] would retain jurisdiction over it.” (emphasis added). Cf. Silberkleit v. Kantrowitz, 713 F.2d 433, 434 (9th Cir. 1983) (stay order appealable where district court expressly held that “collateral estoppel would resolve or limit the issues to be decided in federal court.”). Given this careful, limiting language and Klein’s failure to establish a substantial possibility that the state proceedings will bar his federal claim in this case, we cannot say that “the sole purpose and effect of the stay” was “to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. 927. Cf. Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing appealable stay order from “situations in which the district court clearly foresees and intends that proceedings will resume after the stay has expired”) (citing Cofab, Inc. v. Phila. Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers’ Union, 141 F.3d 105, 109 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that Moses H. Cone did not apply where the district court had no intention to “ ‘deep six’ the suit”)).

2. The temporary stay is not an ap-pealable collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Klein’s justification for his immediate appeal of the stay is not “sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation concludes.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107, 130 S.Ct. 599, 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009). The substantive claim asserted by Klein implicates an initial state law question that the district court acknowledged may have no effect whatsoever on Klein’s federal claim. Some or all aspects of that claim may yet be decided by the district court, and may ultimately be renewable in this court. On this record, Klein has not demonstrated that the propriety of the temporary stay here is an issue “too important to be denied review.” Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221; cf. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 878, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994) (finding that refusal to enforce a settlement agreement did “not rise to the level of importance needed for recognition under” the collateral order doctrine).

3. Because Klein failed to discuss any of the appropriate factors to decide whether an otherwise non-appealable order should be treated as a petition for a writ of mandamus, we decline to exercise jurisdiction on that basis. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 381, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (petitioner must show right to issuance of a writ is “clear and indisputable.”).

APPEAL DISMISSED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     
      
      . Klein cites to Cottrell v. Duke, 737 F.3d 1238 (8th Cir. 2013), but in that case, the district court’s "stated objective was to surrender complete jurisdiction to [the state court] and allow Delaware to fully adjudicate the controversy.” Id. at 1244. In addition, the appellant there showed that the state proceeding would "have the realistic effect of precluding any future proceedings in federal court.” Id. (emphasis added). Klein failed to make a similar showing in this appeal.
     