
    Bronson v. Oberlin.
    1. The act of March 29, 1882 (79 Ohio Laws, 59), authorizing incorporated villages having within their limits a college or university, to provide against the evils resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquors therein, is not repugnant to the provisions of the constitution.
    2. A village council acting under the authority conferred by this law, exceeds its power when it makes an ordinance which prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquors to all persons and for all purposes except mechanical and medicinal, and the sections of the ordinance so providing are void.
    Error. Reserved in the District Court of Lorain county.
    On the 29th of March, 1882, the General Assembly passed the following act (79 Ohio Laws, 59) :
    “AN ACT
    “ Authorizing Certain Incorporated Villages to Regulate the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors Therein.
    
    “ Section 1. Be it Unacted hy the Greneral Assembly of the State of Ohio. That the following section be enacted as supplementary to chapter 3, division 3, title 12, sec. 1692 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, with sectional numbering as follows:
    “ Sec. 1692 b. That all incorporated villages within this State, having within their limits a college or university, shall have the power to provide by ordinance against the evils resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquors within the limits of the corporation.
    “ Sec. 2. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”
    Attempting to act under the authority conferred by this statute, the council of the village of Oberlin, a village in which a college has been located for many years, on the 6th of September, 1882, passed the ordinance which follows:
    
      “ AN ORDINANCE.
    “ To Provide Against the Evils Resulting from the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors.
    
    “Be it ordained by the incorporated village of Oberlin—
    “Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, by himself or agent, to sell or furnish within the limits of said village any intoxicating liquors whatever, to or for any student or students in any of the departments of Oberlin College or of the Telegraph School or of the Business and Writing Schools, located in said village, except on the written order of the President or one of the Professors of said Oberlin College, presented by or in behalf of any student of said Oberlin College, or except upon the written order of the principal Manager of said Telegraph School, or the principal Manager of said Business and Writing School presented by or in behalf of any student of their respective schools, or except on the written order of the parent or parents of any such students.
    “ Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person by himself or agent to sell or furnish, or keep for sale or furnishing to any person or persons who are not students in the College, or the Schools named in Section One of this Ordinance, within the corporate limits of said village, any intoxicating liquors whatever, except for medicinal or mechanical purposes under the conditions hereinafter provided.
    “ Sec. 8. It shall be, and is hereby made the duty of every person selling or furnishing intoxicating liquors within said village, to keep and preserve a record of every sale or furnishing in a book kept for that purpose, wherein he shall enter at the time said liquor is sold or furnished, the amount and kind of liquor sold or furnished, and to whom sold or furnished, and said record shall be subject at all times to the inspection of such person as the mayor, with the approval of the council, may appoint.
    “ Sec. 4. It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or furnish to any other person or persons within said village any intoxicating liquors whatever, except upon reasonable and satisfactory evidence that such liquors are needed and will be used for medicinal or mechanical purposes aforesaid.
    “ Sec. 5. It shall be unlawful for any person to buy or receive from any other person or persons within said village any intoxicating liquors to be used for other than medicinal or mechanical purposes.
    “ Sec. 6. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not exceeding fifty dollars, or be imprisoned for a period not exceeding thirty days, or both, at the discretion of the mayor.
    “ Sec. 7. If any person called to testify on behalf of the prosecution before the mayor of said corporation upon any complaint or information for any offense defined in sections one to five inclusive of this ordinance, disclose any fact tending to criminate himself in any matter made punishable by said sections, he shall thereafter, and by reason thereof, be discharged from all liability to prosecution or punishment for such matter of offense.
    “ Sec. 8. The ordinance entitled ‘ An ordinance to provide against the evils resulting from' the sale of intoxicating liquors,’ passed April 17th, 1882, and all ordinances amendatory thereof, and July 5th, 1882, are hereby repealed.
    “Sec. 9. This ordinance shall take effect upon its passage and legal publication.”
    On the 25th day of September, 1882, a complaint was filed with the mayor of Oberlin charging that the plaintiff in error, Frank E. Bronson, on or about the 22d day of September, A. D., 1882, at the village of Oberlin, did unlawfully sell intoxicating liquors to one Nathan B. Doane, he not being a student in any of the departments of Oberlin College, or of the Telegraph School located in the village, or of any Business or Writing School located in the village, and the intoxicating liquors were not sold by Bronson to Doane for either medicinal or mechanical purposes. Bronson knew that the intoxicating liquors so sold by him were not intended by Doane to be used for either medicinal or mechanical purposes.
    On this complaint Bronson was convicted. The court of common pleas affirmed the judgment of the mayor’s court. A petition in error was then filed in the district court of Lorain county, and that court, upon motion of the village of Oberlin, reserved the case for the decision of the supreme court. It was partially presented to this court by oral argument on the 31st day of October, 1884; but the last printed brief of counsel for the village was filed November 29th, and the reply of opposing counsel upon the 29th day of December.
    
      E. G. Johnson and S. M. Eddy, for plaintiff.
    Sections 2 and 4 of the ordinance are invalid for the inequality of the privileges conferred and burdens imposed. McGill v. State, 34 Ohio St., 247.
    The ordinance is in conflict with the settled policy of the State, and sect. 1, art. 13 of the constitution and hence void. City of Canton v. Nist, 9 Ohio St., 439; Thompson v. Mt. Vernon, 11 Ohio St., 688; State v. Sinks, 42 Ohio St., 345.
    
      W. W. Boynton, I. A. Webster and C. A. Metcalf, for defendant in error.
    1. The presumption is in favor of the constitutionality. Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St., 591; McGill v. State, 34 Ohio St., 245; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat., 270. The act is within the meaning of the constitution, State v. Brewster, 39 Ohio St., 653; State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St., 63; State v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L., 123; 77 Pa. St., 338; 70 Ill., 388; 31 Ohio St., 592; State ex rel. v. Hammer, 42 N. J. L. 439; 39 Iowa, 112; 94 U. S., 155; 70 N. Y., 350; 92 Id, 4; 85 Pa. St., 401; 20 Kansas, 619.
    2. Whether the legislature can itself, or by delegated power authorize a municipal corporation, to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, see Bliss v. Kraus, 16 Ohio St., 54; 1 Dillon Mun. Corp ch. 12; 70 Ill., 191; 97 U. S., 25-33; 18 Wall, 129; 13 N. Y., 378; 32 Ohio St., 158; Cooley Const. Lim., 581; 12 Cush., 414; 5 Gray, 97; 25 Conn., 290; 8 Iowa, 396; 4 Rich., 244; 26 Conn., 179; 59 Wis., 591; 92 Ill., 559; 58 Iowa, 496; 18 Ga. 586; 36 N. J. L., 72; 44 Id., 605; 36 Conn., 215; 38 N. H., 426; 43 Wis., 488; 4 Denio, 345; 34 N. Y. 666; 74 Id., 520 ; 86 Ill., 33; 11 Ohio St., 542; 15 Id., 591; 21 Id., 207; 39 Id., 410; 14 Id., 590; 16 Id., 54; 20 Id., 308; 39 Id., 651.
   Nash, J.

1. Does the act of March 29, 1882 (79 Ohio Laws, 59), authorizing incorporated villages having within their limits 'a college or university to provide against the evils resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquors therein, contravene the limitations imposed by the constitution upon legislative power?

In considering this question it must be borne in mind that it is well settled that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the law; and it is only when manifest assumption of authority, and a clear incompatibility between the constitution and the law appear that the courts will refuse to execute it. Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St., 77; Goshorn v. Purcell, 11 Id., 641; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Id., 573.

It is contended that a classification of incorporated villages such as is sought to be made in this act, and the clothing of the councils of such villages with powers not possessed by the councils of other villages, are prohibited by the constitution.

The Revised Statutes divide cities into grades and make provisions for each grade so established. Municipal corporations are divided into three classes — cities, villages and hamlets. Cities are divided into two classes — first and second. Cities of the first class are divided into three grades — first, second and third. Cities of the second class are divided into four grades — first, second, third and fourth. This classification depends upon the number of inhabitants within a city. In The State v. Brewster, 39 Ohio St., 653, it was held that sections 1546-1550, of the Revised Statutes, which make the classification referred to are authorized by the constitution. Judge Okey, in the opinion of the court, says: “ The validity of that classification has been repeatedly recognized in this court and the reasons for adhering to that construction of the constitution are cogent and satisfactory.”

The principle seems to be that a law which relates to certain municipal corporations as a class, and having a like effect upon all within the class is general, but one' that relates to a particular municipality of a class is special. Judge Okey, in the case of McGill v. The State, 34 Ohio St., 228, said: “Under the power to organize cities and villages (Const, article 13, section 6), the general assembly is authorized to classify municipal corporations, and an act relating to any such class may be one of a general nature.” Judge Mcllvaine, in the ease of The State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St., 54, said that “judicious classification and discrimination between classes will not destroy the uniformity required by the constitution.” In the case of The State v. Parsons et al., 40 N. J. Law, 123, the principle is well stated as follows:

“ A law framed in general terms, restricted to no locality, and operating equally upon all of a group of objects, which, having regard to the purposes of the legislation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves, is not a special or local law, but a general law.”

The classification must be just and reasonable, and not arbitrary. In the act under consideration the classification is just and reasonable. It groups in a class all incorporated villages in the state having within them a college or university. There are many of these, and they are located in all sections. Large numbers of boys and young men are congregated in them for the purpose of acquiring an education. Many of them are away from home and parental restraints, and at a time when they are acquiring habits which will make them useful men, or will destroy all hopeful prospects for the future. Such villages are small, and do not have the police restraints of the larger cities. They require regulations which are unnecessary in other villages and in larger cities. The value of their property, and their greater value as suitable resorts for the education of youth, depend upon such villages being kept free from the unrestrained traffic in intoxicating liquors. These considerations and many others which could be enumerated, show the just and substantial character of the classification made in this law, and the wisdom of the general assembly in making it.

It is also claimed that the legislature cannot delegate the power to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors to the councils of incorporated villages. This is a settled question in Ohio-. Several years ago the council of the village of McConnellsville provided by ordinance that it should be unlawful for any person to keep in its midst a house, shop, room, booth, arbor or place where ale, porter or beer is habitually sold, or furnished, to be drank in, upon, or about the house,' shop, room, booth, arbor, cellar or place where so sold or furnished. This it did under an authority conferred upon municipalities by statute “to regulate, restrain and prohibit ale, beer and porter-houses or shops, and houses and places of notorious or habitual resort for tippling and intemperance.” This act was a delegation of power by the general assembly. In Burckholter v. McConnellsville, 20 Ohio St., 309, the supreme court held the ordinance to be valid, and in so doing of necessity concluded that the legislature could confer a power possessed by itself upon municipal corporations.

2. The plaintiff in error was found guilty of violation of the second and fourth sections of the Oberlin ordinance. These sections prohibited the sale or furnishing of any intoxicating liquors whatever, or in any quanta, to any person, except for two purposes — mechanical and medicinal. In making these sections did the council exceed the power-conferred by the act of March 29, 1882 ? Whether the legislature. could confer the power to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, or whether the council by ordinance could prohibit with this power conferred, are questions not involved in this case. The question simply is, “What power did this act confer? ” We are of the opinion that it did not give authority to prohibit. As expressed in the body of the law it was a power to provide against the evils resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquors. Section 16, article 2 of the constitution, provides that the subject of a bill pending before the general assembly shall be clearly expressed in its title. In trying to determine what the object of the words of a statute are, we are authorized to loot at its title. The title of the law under consideration is “An act authorizing certain incorporated villages to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors therein.” Considering the words of this act, together with its title, we conclude thatthe power conferred was to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, and to provide against evils resulting therefrom, but not to prohibit. We are confirmed in this conclusion from the fact that in previous legislation the word “prohibit” has been used when that was the object sought, and not alone the words “to regulate” and “to provide against evils.” It follows that sections 2 and 4 of this ordinance are void.

A part of an ordinance may be void and the remainder valid, but the other sections of this ordinance are not involved in this case, and therefore we express no opinion in regard to them.

Judgment reversed.  