
    RAILWAY TICKETS ISSUED WITH NO LIMITATION AS TO TRANSFER.
    Common Pleas Court of Franklin County.
    Benjamin F. Knecht v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co.
    Decided, 1907.
    
      Railways — Ticket With no Limitation as to Transfer- — Good in the Hands of Third Party — Undisclosed Regulations — -Ticket Scalping not Against Public Policy.
    
    1. - The coupon or return ticket of an excursion ticket issued by a railway company, with no limitation as to transfer on its face,- is good in the hands of one who has purchased it from the original hQlder or from an intermediary, when the purchase is made without knowledge of an undisclosed rule or regulation of the company prohibiting such transfer.
    2. Dealing in. railway tickets in the manner commonly known as “ticket scalping” is not -against public policy, and a ticket so sold and purchased is not thereby rendered invalid.
    Heard on demurrer to the petition.
    ■" On May 20, 1906, the defendant company ran an excursion from Cleveland, Ohio, to Columbus, Ohio, and return. For this excursion tickets were sold at the special and reduced rate of two dollars for the round trip. To 'each of these tickets was attached a so-called “return coupon.” Between Cleveland and Columbus the conductor in'charge of the excursion train detached from each of these tickets the part or portion which provided for transportation of the holder thereof from Cleveland to Columbus. This portion or section of each of these tickets the conductor retained ancl returned to each original purchaser thereof the “return coupon,” which coupon called for transportation from Columbus .to Cleveland. One of these detached “return coupons” an original purchaser thereof, upon his arrival in Columbus, transferred to some unknown person, presumably to some “ticket broker,”.-or “ticket scalper,” for a consideration. The following is an exact copy of all the printed matter that appears on the face and back of said “return coupon”:
    79 Account of Sunday Excursion • issued by the Cleveland, Cin., Chi. & St. Louis Ey. Co., Big Four Eoute; one first-class continuous passage, Columbus, 0., to Cleveland,. 0., via Short Line only. Good only on special train, leaving 7 p. m., Sunday, May 20th, 1906. No baggage will be checked on this ticket. C., C., C. & St. L. IT. Ehein, G. P. A. Columbus, 0., and return. On back of ticket: Union passenger station, May 20, 1906, Cleveland. C. L. Gibson, Agt.
    Said coupon ticket was purchased by the plaintiff herein from a ticket broker. ITe took passage upon defendant’s said excursion train, for the purpose 'of being conveyed from Columbus to Cleveland.. He assumed that the return coupon he had purchased as aforesaid gave him the right to ride on said train. Between Columbus and Delaware, en route to Cleveland, the conductor asked plaintiff for his ticket, and thereupon plaintiff produced said return coupon. The conductor refused to accept said coupon from plaintiff, and demanded that the plaintiff produce a ticket or pay the regular fare from Columbus to Cleveland or leave the train at Delaware. Plaintiff refused to do either. At Gabon, Ohio, the defendant company caused plaintiff to be forcibly removed from the train. Upon these facts plaintiff bases his right of action.
    Defendant in its second defense recites that on said May 20, 1906, it ran an excursion train from Cleveland to Columbus and return; that it issued special rate tickets for such excursion; that the purchaser of one of these tickets sold the return portion thereof to a “ticket scalper”; that said return portion or “coupon was not transferable under-the rules and regulations of the defendant”; that plaintiff purchased this coupon from said “scalper”; that it was this coupon that the plaintiff tendered*to the conductor when called upon for a ticket; that the conductor thereupon refused to accept said coupon from plaintiff and demanded that plaintiff produce a ticket or pay regular fare; that plaintiff refused to comply with the conductor’s commands; that the agents of the defendant ejected plaintiff from said train.
    To this second defense plaintiff demurred and cited:
    
      Hoffman v. Railway, 45 Minn., 53; Carsten v. Railway, 44 Minn., 454 (47 N. W. Rep., 49); Nichols v. Southern Pac. Co. 23 Ore., 123 (31 Pac. Rep., 296); Hudson v. Railway, 9 Fed. Rep., 879; Bishop Non-Contr. Law, Section 1077, cited in Spencer v. Lovejoy, 96 Ga., 657, 658, 665; Am. Dig. 1899B, page 770; Maroney v. Railway, 106 Mass., 153, 160, cited in Bishop, NonContr. Law, Section 1079; Watson v. Railway, 194 Tenn., 211; Page, Contracts, 55.
   Dillon, J.

The “coupon” called and designated as such in the second defense provided for transportation from Columbus to Cleveland. While the exact form and wording do not appear in the pleadings, I ani not able to see any legal distinction between it and a so-called “return ticket.,” I assume counsel do not claim a' different' application of principle for the two.

Was it transferable so as .to permit another than the original purchaser to avail himself of the transportation? The cases cited in plaintiff’s brief seem conclusive of the question in the abstract. That is to say, a secret or undisclosed rule or regulation'of the railroad company will not avail the company, if the ticket itself is unrestricted in form and the purchaser is without knowledge of such rule.

As to the recent statutes, 98 O. L., 345-7 (Section 244-11 et seq). 1 am of the opinion the restrictions, limitations and prohibitions are. matters between the public (state) and the company. True a contract by a railroad company in violation-might be. unenforcible under proper circumstances; but if a railroad company does actually issue a ticket transferable according to its face, two questions are presented:

First. Is not the railroad company estopped as between itself .and the purchaser?, The remedy for violating any provision- of law or rule of fhe railroad commission lies not in risk and peril of the passenger, but with the state. The contracting together of the railroad and passenger is not void, but the unlawfulness consists in the breach of the company with the state in doing it.

G. W. Bope, for plaintiff.

Second. Is there anything in Section 8 (which permits excursion rates) that inhibits or restrains the discretion of the company to make such excursion tickets transferable or not at its option? The answer must be in the negative. The restriction lies in the sale of the tickets and does not contemplate the point raised here. The delicate and nice analysis of the effect of two different persons "getting the benefit of the excursion ticket is evidently not in contemplation of the statute. The railroad company is free to permit tranfer or not at its own pleasure.

As to the last point made in defendant’s brief, I find no law or decision to the effect that “ticket scalping” is against public policy. The demurrer to the second defense must be sustained.  