
    Andrew Freedman, as Receiver, Appellant, v. Frank Loomis, Respondent.
    (New York Common Pleas
    —Additional General Term,
    April, 1895.)
    In an action brought by a receiver of a club to recover certain dues from a member thereof, the defendant claimed to set off certain script of the club which, by their terms, were redeemable January 1, 1898, and was permitted on the trial to testify to a parol agreement between him and the officers of the club whereby this script was to be received in satisfaction of indebtedness for dues and house account when tendered. Held, error; that such evidence was inadmissible to alter the time and method of payment as provided.
    Appeal from a judgment of the District Court in the city of New Y orle for the seventh judicial district, rendered in an action tried by the justice, without a jury, in favor of the defendant.
    
      Howard S. Gams, for appellant.
    
      Henry B. Dwyer, for respondent.
   Bischoff, J.

In an action by the receiver of the Manhattan Athletic Club to recover the sum of twenty-five dollars, the amount of certain semi-annual dues alleged to be owing-to that institution from defendant, the cause of action was admitted, and the trial proceeded upon the issue raised by the answer, wherein a set-off was claimed upon certain evidences of indebtedness in the form of script issued by the club.

This script, according to its terms, was to be redeemed on the 1st day of January, 1898, unless the club should exercise-an option to pay the same before that date, and this option was not shown to have been exercised.

It thus appears that the defendant’s claim had not accrued prior to the plaintiff’s appointment as receiver, and, hence,, could not be allowed as a set-off in this action. Fera v. Wickham, 135 N. Y. 230.

Defendant, however, was permitted to testify, over repeated objections and exceptions duly taken, to a parol agreement entered into with him by the officers of the club whereby this script was to be received in satisfaction of indebtedness for dues and house account when tendered.

For the error apparent in the admission of this evidence the judgment must be reversed. The certificates of indebtedness were, upon their face, complete as an expression of the agreement entered into and the obligation assumed, and the testimony admitted was solely for the purpose of showing another and earlier agreement inconsistent with that expressed in altering the time and method of payment as provided. The plaintiff was clearly entitled to its exclusion. Willse v. Whitaker, 22 Hun, 242; Thompson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns. 190; Van Allen v. Allen, 1 Holt, 525 ; Lamson Consol. Store Service Co. v. Hartung, 46 N. Y. St. Repr. 191; Thomas v. Scutt, 127 N. Y. 133 ; Case v. P. B. Co., 134 id. 81.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.

Giegekicii, J., concurs.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.  