
    Tjahjono UNIWATI, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-0806-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 5, 2010.
    
      H. Raymond Fasano, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony C. Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, Colette J. Winston, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOSEPH M. McLaughlin, b.d. parker, and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Tjahjono Uniwati, a native and citizen of Indonesia, seeks review of a January 30, 2009 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Tjahjono Uniwati, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 30, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). However, when the BIA analyzes country conditions evidence submitted with a motion to reopen, “we review the BIA’s fact-finding only for ‘substantial evidence.’ ” Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

An alien who has been ordered removed may file one motion to reopen, but must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). Here, the BIA properly denied Uniwati’s motion to reopen as untimely where he filed it over eighteen months after his February 2007 final order of removal. See id,.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA properly concluded that the evidence Uniwati submitted, including the most recent State Department International Religious Freedom Report for Indonesia, did not “adequately demonstrate[ ] material changed country conditions” that would warrant an exception to the filing deadline.

Uniwati argues that the BIA erred in finding that he did not demonstrate changed country conditions because it did not “explain under what standard” it reached its conclusion. However, while the BIA may abuse its discretion if it gives no indication that it considered “country conditions evidence submitted by an applicant that materially bears on his claim,” Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir.2005), it is not required to “expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner,” Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, presented with evidence it is “asked to consider time and again,” the BIA reasonably found that Uniwati had not shown changed country conditions. See id. Even accepting Uniwati’s assertion that the record contained evidence of both in-terreligious violence and governmental support for religious diversity, the record does not compel the conclusion that the agency erred in finding that there had not been a material change. Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 84(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).  