
    In the Matter of the Appraisal of the Property of Jacob Durscheidt, Deceased.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,
    
    
      Filed July 22, 1892.)
    
    Executors and administrators—Inventory—Property set apart for widow.
    Money is personal property within the meaning of the statute, chap. 157, Laws 1843, in relation to setting apart property for the widow of a decedent.
    Appeal from order of surrogate directing the executrix to deliver to the widow the property named in the inventory, and pay her $150 in cash from the money in her hands.
    
      Fernando Solinger, for the executrix, app’lt; Julius Klamke, for the widow, resp’t.
   Barnard, P. J.

—The testator left a very small estate, consisting of furniture of the value of fifty dollars and $614 cash. He left a widow. The appraisers set apart the furniture of deceased for the use of the widow, and also set apart for her $150 in cash, under chap. 157, Laws of 1842. The words of this act provide the exemption in favor of the widow to be “ necessary household furniture, provisions, or other personal property ” of the value of not over $150. The court of appeals, in Matter of Frazer, 92 N. Y., 239, held that when the husband gave all the household property to his wife, the $150 exemption could be given out of other personal property. The question is thus narrowed to this; whether money is personal property within the meaning of this statute. It has heen so held by surrogate’s court. Lyendecker v. Eisemann, 3 Dem., 72.

In general signification the bank book was personal property.

The law intended to give an exemption in addition to specific-articles named to this amount, $150, and it should be construed so as to carry out the benign intent of the legislature.

The order should be affirmed, with costs and disbursements.

Cullen, J., concurs.  