
    Denison against Hyde and another.
    A former decree of a district court of the United States in another state, in which the title now in controversy was directly decided between the same parties, is conclusive evidence of such title,as established by such decree.
    And if the nature of the title, and the manner in which it was acquired, were in issue, the decree is conclusive upon those points.
    Therefore, where the plaintiff in a libel alleged a title to a vessel, by virtue of certain conveyances in January and February, which the defendant denied ; and the decree found a title in the plaintiff, at the time of filing the libel in August, by virtue of those conveyances; it was held, in a subsequent suit between the same parties, that such decree was conclusive evidence of title in the plaintiff, at an intermediate point of time.
    It is no objection to the conclusive effect of such a decree, that it does not appear from the proceedings of the court, that any monition or citation issued to the defendant, provided he voluntarily appeared, and submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and was heard, with his proofs, upon the point decided.
    So where A., one of two partners, defendants in in the suit, appeared, and signed a claim and answer for himself and his partner B., and after a hearing, costs were decreed against both; it was held to be no objection to the conclusive effect of the decree, that the record shews no appearance, in person or by proctor, on the part of as it will be presumed, that the authority of A. to appear for him, was proved to the satisfaction of the court.
    Though the courts of this state, from comity to the tribunals of a sister state, will give effect to their decisions, when authorized by the established principles of law ; yet this comity will not induce our courts to sanction a judgment irregularly obtained.
    Therefore, a judgment obtained in another state, against a person who had no legal notice to appear, and who did not in fact appear, will be regarded here as of no validity.
    
      
      New-London,
    
    July, 1827.
    No judgment can affect others than parties or privies to it.
    The plaintiff having established his title, by the decree of a district court of the United States, passed on the 3rd of November; it was held, that the judgment of a state court, rendered on a subsequent day, though bearing on the question of title, was of no avail to counteract the plaintiff's evidence.
    Where the plaintiff’s vessel was seized, by the defendants, on the 4th of March, and sold on the 30th, by order of the court, on a process to which the plaintiff was not a party ; it was held that the tort was then complete, and a right of action in the plaintiff existed, which was not affected, by a subsequent claim made by him, and his appearance, in court, to obtain a restoration of the property.
    The judgment of a court in another state, by which property was taken, without causing the owner to be made party to the suit, cannot be supported, on the presumption, that the court exercised its jurisdiction discreetly ; for such laws cannot be presumed without proof; and if proved, yet being opposed to common right, our courts would not give them effect.
    Where it appeared, in an action of trespass for the seizure and detention of the plaintiff’s vessel that the plaintiff, afterwards, but some time before the date of his writ, purchased her under a decree of court, it was held, that damages might be given for the detention, after she was so in the plaintiff's possession, down to the date of the writ, as she was restored only by the substitution of the plaintiff's money for her value as sold.
    In actions of trespass for injuries to property, the law furnishes no precise rule of damages; but the jury are to judge, under all the circumstances attending the transaction, to what damages the plaintiff is entitled.
    It was, therefore, held, in an action of trespass for the seizure and detention of the plaintiff’s vessel, that the jury were at liberty to presume the damage and ex pense, which might occur in the recovery of the properh, and for the forcible invasion of it, as well as for the injury the vessel had sustained, by the trespass alleged, and to give damages accordingly.
    This was an action of trespass vi et armis, against Theophilus R. Hyde and Jedediah Leeds, who were copartners in business at New-Orleans, under the firm of Hyde & Leeds. The declaration contained two counts. The first count was general, alleging a forcible taking out of the plaintiff’s possession, and the detention, on the 4th of March, 1824, of the plaintiff’s sloop Eliza-Ann, at New-Orleans, in the state of Louisiana, together with her tackle and apparel. The second count, after alleging a trespass, in the general manner mentioned, further alleged, that the defendant procured the sloop to be sent to New-York and other places, and caused great expense to the plaintiff in relation to the officers and crew of the sloop, and deprived the plaintiff of her use and earnings. The writ was dated the 8th of October, 1824.
    The cause was tried, on the general issue, at Norwich, January term, 1827, before Daggett, J.
    The taking of the sloop at New-Orleans, by the defendants, was not denied. The plaintiff offered no evidence of his title, except a decree of the district court of the United States, for the Southern district of New-York; although it was admitted, that when the defendant took her, she was in the possession of one peter Rowland, as master thereof, appointed by the plaintiff and one David Leeds, who were the sole owners of her, when she sailed on her voyage from New-York, some months before, for New-Orleans ; and that before she was taken by the defendants, as alleged in the declaration, they, with Peter Rowland, were notified, that David Leeds’ interest in her had been transferred to the plaintiff so that he was then the sole owner thereof.
    The decree was founded on a libel, filed by the plaintiff on the 7th of August, 1824, addressed to said district court; and, among other allegations, it expressly alleged, that until the 14th of January, 1824, the libellant and David Leeds were the sole owners of the sloop; and that, on that day, David Leeds, by a bill of sale, duly executed and delivered, conveyed to the libellant and one George Haley, upon a valuable consideration all his interest in her ; and that, on the 20th of February, 1824, George Haley conveyed all his interest in her to the libellant, so that he then became sole owner of her. The libel stated various matters as grounds of interference, unnecessary here to be noticed, because none of them are the subject of complaint; and prayed, that the defendants Theophilus R. Hyde and Jedediah Leeds, together with Peter Rowland and Phinehas Stanton, all of whom were charged in the libel with being, by force and fraud, in possession of the sloop, within the jurisdiction of the court, and combining fraudulently to send her on a voyage, and present the libellant from gaining possession of her, might be cited in, generally and specially, to appear and answer to the premises, and abide the decree of the court in the premises.To this libel Phinehas Stanton and Jedediah Leeds, for himself and the other defendant, Theophilus R. Hyde, filed their claim and answer, alleging many things not necessary here to be noticed, but in relation to the title of the plaintiff derived from David Leeds and Haley, as before stated, asserting, that they had no other knowledge of it, than what was alleged in the libel, and leaving the libellant to prove it as he could ; averring further, that if the conveyances were made, they believed them to be fraudulent; and they therefore insisted upon strict proof of all the matters in the libel alleged in relation thereto. The claim and answer was signed as follows :
    
      John Anthon, Proctor and Advocate for respondents and claimants.
    
      Phinchas Stanton.
    
    
      Jedediah Leeds, for himself and Theo-philus R. Hyde.”
    
    The sloop had been previously sold, by consent of parties, and by order of the court; and the plaintiff had purchased her, and paid the money into the branch bank of the United Slates, subject to the order of the court, to await the final decree.
    On the 3rd of November, 1824, the district court pronounced its final decree, and found directly, in its decree, that by virtue of the conveyance by David Leeds to George Haley and the plaintiff, and the conveyance by George Haley to the libellant, mentioned in the libel, the libellant was, at the time of filing the libel, the only owner and lawful proprietor of the sloop Eliza-Ann. It was further decreed, that the libellant should recover of Phinehas Stanton, Theophilus R. Hyde and Jedediah Leeds, his costs.
    The defendants, in justification of the taking of the sloop at New-Orleans, offered and read in evidence a record of a judgment of the district court of the state of Louisiana, by which they seized, sold and disposed of the sloop, in satisfaction of a debt in their favour against David Leeds, who was owner of two thirds of the sloop. It appeared, that on the 4th of March, 1824, the defendants applied, by petition, to said district court, alleging, that David Leeds, resident out of Louisiana, viz. in Connecticut, was justly indebted to them in the sum of about 1000 dollars; that the Eliza-Ann, the sloop in question, was the property of Leeds, and was then within the jurisdiction of the court; praying an attachment against the sloop, and that she might be seized and sold to satisfy the claim, and that judgment might be rendered in their favour for the amount due and costs. The defendants accompanied the petition with an affidavit of the debt, and a bond to secure David Leeds against all damages accruing to him by their proceeding. The district court then issued an order to the sheriff to seize all the property of David Leeds to be found within the parish of New-Orleans, and to give notice thereof, by leaving a copy thereof in French and English at David Leeds’ last place of abode, and also causing a copy thereof to be posted on the door of the parish church in New-Orleans, and to make return of his doings to the court, on the second Monday of May then next.The sheriff returned, that on the 4th of March, 1824, by virtue of the above order, he took two thirds of the sloop, gave notice to the captain, and also posted notice on the door of the parish church, and that on the 30th of said March, he sold, at the coffee-house, the sloop, tackle, &c. in pursuance of an order of the court issued on the 17th of March; that Phinehas Staunton became the purchaser for 300 dollars ; and that the defendants gave their bond to abide the judgment of the court. This return was dated the 1st of May, 1824. It further appeared, that on the 9th of March, D. Augustin, Esq. was appointed, by the court, to defend the estate of Leeds ; and that he was allowed ninety days to correspond with him, and file an answer. On the 16th of March, a letter was filed in court from Peter Rowland, the master, appointing D. Augustin, Esq. attorney for David Leeds, and wishing the sloop sold ; and on the 17th, the court issued an order of sale, and directed, that the avails be held by the sheriff On the 8th of June following, a claim to the sloop was filed in court, by P. J. Smith, Esq. of counsel for Pel eg Denison, the plaintiff, praying that the order of sale might be annulled, and the sloop restored to him, as Lceds had no interest or property in her. On the 27th of November, D. Augustin, appointed by court attorney to David Leeds, appeared in court, and denied all the facts stated in the petition of the defendants. On the 14th of December, testimony was heard, by the court, on the petition of the defendants against David Leeds ; and judgment was rendered in their favour for the amount of their debt, and that the proceeds of the sale of the sloop should be applied in part satisfaction of it.
    The judge charged the jury, that the process, record and judgment of the district court of Louisiana, must be laid out of the case, and holden for nothing : That the process, record and judgment of the district court of the district of New-York, was conclusive evidence of the plaintiff’s title to the property, at the time of the seizure, and of the taking by the defendants, in Louisiana, and dispensed with the necessity of any other proof of title : That the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for the detention of the vessel down to the time of the date of the plaintiff’s writ, notwithstanding the restoration of the vessel to the plaintiff, and the sale thereof, by order of the district court in New-York : That the jury were at liberty to presume the damage and expense, which might accrue in the recovery of the property, and for the forcible invasion of it, as well as for the injury the vessel had sustained by the trespass alleged, and to give damages accordingly.
    The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, with 1200 dollars damages ; and the defendant moved for a new trial for a misdirection.
    
      Cleaveland and H. Strong, in support of the motion,
    contended, 1. That the judge was wrong in directing the jury, that the record of the New-York district court, was conclusive evidence of the plaintiff’s title. First, if this was a libel in admiralty, on the instance side of the court, it was necessary to have a citation or monition. There cannot be reus, without his being called upon to appear. His coming in voluntarily, would not make the process good. Hall’s Praxis, 5. Secondly, there was no appearance on the part of Hyde. He did not in fact appear; and Leeds had no authority, as partner, to appear for him. His signing the answer “for himself and Theophilus R. Hyde,” could bind himself alone. Thirdly, had this been a suit at common law, the judgment, having been obtained in a different state from that to which the defendants belonged, against a person who had no legal notice to appear, and who did not in fact appear, would be of no validity. Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. Rep. 380. Fourthly, if the proceedings were regular, no fact is found, which authorized the direction of the judge as to the effect of this record. The decree finds, that “ the libel-lant was, at the time of filing the libel, the only owner and lawful proprietor of the Eliza-Ann.” This is no evidence of the fact, that he was owner on the 4th of March before.
    2. That the charge in relation to the record of the district court of Louisiana, was incorrect. That judgment was of precisely the same nature as the judgment in New-York; both being founded on ecclesiastical or civil law process. Hall’s Praxis, 35. That the court in question had right to proceed in the way it did, we are bound to presume, on the principle, that omnia prœsumuntur rite et solenniter esse acta. 3 Stark. Ev. 1250. By the constitution of the United States, art. 4. sect. 1. the decree is to have the same effect here, as it would have in Louisiana. The plaintiff having voluntarily made himself a party to the proceeding, is bound by it as a party. Hall’s Praxis 77, 8. 
      He has submitted to the jurisdiction. He asked for the decision of the court, and it was had, upon a claim of title filed by him.
    But it will be said, that the New-York court has set this judgment aside. In the first place, one court has no right collaterally to enquire into and overhale the judgment of another. 1 Stark. Ev. 208. sect. 67. Secondly, as the vessel was sold under an order of the court of Louisiana, the title of the purchaser under such sale was good. Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. Rep 462.
    3. That the charge was wrong as to the allowance of damages for detention of the vessel after her restoration.
    4. That the charge was also wrong as to the allowance of damages for the expenses of recovering the vessel. First, no such damages were stated in the declaration, and for that reason, were not recoverable. 1 Chitt. Plead. 333. 386, 7. Secondly, no damages can be presumed, except such as naturally and necessarily result from the acts stated and proved. De Forest v. Leete, 16 Johns. Rep. 122. Lindon v. Hooper, Cowp. 418. The jury cannot presume what the party would not be permitted to prove.
    
      Goddard and Billings, contra,
    contended, 1. That the record of the district court of New-York, was conclusive evidence of title in the plaintiff. First, upon principles applicable to suits at common law. The title of the plaintiff was put in issue in that suit, being specially set forth in the libel; and was directly adjudicated upon. The judgment, therefore, upon this point, is conclusive, in another suit, between the same parties, to establish the same point. 1 Stark. Ev. 182. & seq. 205. Secondly, upon principles applicable to admiralty decisions. These decisions, being of an exclusive jurisdiction, operating in rem, are conclusive evidence upon the matters which they decide, when the same points arise incidentally in other courts. 1 Stark. Ev. 238 Thirdly, the decree establishes the title of the plaintiff to the sloop, by virtue of the conveyances of the 14th of January and the 20th of February. Consequently, he must have had title on the 4th of March. Fourthly, a new trial will not be granted because the decree of the New-York court does not find a title in the plaintiff on the 4th of March. It is sufficient, that it establishes a title in him on the 7th of August.The plaintiff was not bound to prove a trespass on the 4th of 
      March ; the day being immaterial. Non constat that the trespass was not committed on the 7th of August. The finding of the jury establishes the point, that the act complained of was done while the plaintiff had title. Further; the objection as to the lime of the plaintiff’s title, was not made at the trial. That question, therefore, is not properly before this Court for revision.
    2. That the judgment of the court at New-Orleans was not a bar to the plaintiff’s demand. First, there was no service on, or notice to, David Leeds ; nor was there any appearance by him, or by anyone authorized by him to appear. Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East, 192. Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kir. 119. Smith v. Rhoades, 1 Day 168. Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. Rep. 380. There is no difference between enforcing a judgment so obtained, and establishing a title by it. Secondly, the New-Orleans court is an inferior court, and not of concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court of this state. Its proceedings are governed, not by the rules of the common law, but by the civil law. Thirdly, the proceedings in the New-Orleans court were invalidated, by the decree of the district court of New-York; the validity of those proceedings having been submitted, by the defendants, to the latter court, and made the subject of adjudication.
    3. That the charge in relation to the damages, was correct. The plaintiff was, prima facie, entitled to recover for the value of the vessel. It was incumbent on the defendants to reduce the damages, if they claimed a reduction. First, the alleged restoration, relied upon for the purpose, could not have the effect to preclude the jury from giving damages for detention down to the date of the writ. Strictly speaking, the vessel was not restored to the plaintiff but was sold to him. He paid the money for her, and more than any one else would give. It was as injurious to him to be out of his money as of his vessel. Secondly, the jury were properly allowed to give damages beyond the actual injury to the vessel. The declaration alleged special damages, intimately connected with, and resulting from, the principal grievance. But, if this were an action of trespass, in the most general form, the jury would not be restricted to any precise rule of damages, but would be at liberty to give, in addition to the actual damage sustained, a further sum, called vindictive, exemplary or presumptive damages, which, from their nature, cannot be governed, by any precise rule, but are to be assessed, by the jury, upon a view of all the circumstances attending the transaction. At any rate, the result, in this case, is perfectly equitable, and the court will not grant a new trial.
   Daggett,

J. The defendants insist, that the charge of the court to the jury was erroneous on several grounds.

1. In relation to the effect of the decree of the district court of the United States for the district of New-York. And to the opinion expressed on this point, the defendants urge several objections.

First, it is said, that it does not appear, by the proceedings of the court, that any monition or citation issued to these defendants This objection cannot prevail; for if the defendants voluntarily appeared, and submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and were heard with their proofs on the precise question whose was the sloop, they are precluded, upon principles well established, from resorting to this objection. They come too late. The record shews, that they did appear, and were thus heard ; and they are, therefore, concluded by the decree.

Secondly, it is objected, that T. R. Hyde did not appear in person, nor by his proctor. It is stated in the record, that Jed-ediah Leeds appeared for himself and T. R. Hyde. The claim is signed by Leeds, for himself and Hyde, by their proctor ; and the court, in its decree, adjudges, that he shall pay costs. On looking at this record. I cannot see, that there is any force in this objection. The court in New-York must be presumed to have been satisfied, by proof, of the right and authority of Leeds to appear for his partner Hyde ; and in the absence of proof to the contrary, the record affords no countenance to the objection.

Thirdly, it is insisted, that if the decree in question did decide, that the title was in the plaintiff, when the libel was filed, on the 7th of August, 1824, it does not follow, that the title was in the plaintiff, on the 4th of March, 1824, when the trespass was committed, as declared in the charge. Here, it is not denied, that this decree decides the question of title to this sloop, and decides it conclusively and forever, between the parties. That point was directly put in issue; it was affirmed by the plaintiff, in his libel; it was denied by the defendants, in their claim; and it was found by the court, as alleged in the libel. The effect of this finding and decree, then, is to conclude the parties forever, as to that point, howsoever and whenever it may come in question. Swift’s Ev. 17. Phill. Ev. 224. Aslin v. Parkin, 2 Burr. 665. 668. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109.-Betts v. Starr, 5 Conn. Rep. 550.

But the strength of the objection is, that the decree is conclusive only as to the facts found, which are necessary to sustain it; and therefore, that the decree is conclusive only as to the fact of title in the plaintiff, on the 7th of August, 1824 ; whereas it was holden conclusive as to the title of the plaintiff on the 4th of March, 1824, when the trespass was committed. This objection, thus viewed, would be entitled to great weight, and would perhaps be satisfactory, if the record only shewed, that the title generally to the sloop was in question; but it is manifest, that the parties were at issue, on the trial of the libel, as to the nature of the title, and the manner in which it was acquired by the plaintiff In the contestations of the parties on that point, the plaintiff alleged a title, by the conveyances of the 14th of January and the 20th of February, 1824, which the defendants denied, demanding strict proof thereof; and the court finds the title of the plaintiff by virtue of those conveyances ; and therefore, the conveyances are directly in issue between the parties, and directly found to have been made and executed as alleged. By these facts, therefore, and these only, the decree is upheld.

For these reasons, the charge, thus far, appears correct.

2. It is contended, by the defendants, that that part of the charge, which directed the jury to lay out of the case the record of a judgment of the district court of the state of Louisiana, is erroneous. The Court is not informed how this district court is constituted ; nor according to what laws its proceedings are regulated. It is not a court of admiralty; because the admiralty jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the courts of the United States. The Court, however, from comity to the tribunals of a sister state, would give a legal effect to the decisions of their courts, when authorized by the established principles of law. Yet this comity will not induce the Court to sanction a judgment irregularly obtained. This subject was very fully discussed, numerous authorities cited, and an elaborate opinion given, in the case of Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. Rep. 380. With that decision, and the opinion given, I am satisfied. It was there decided, that a judgment obtained in another state, against a person who had no legal notice to appear, and who did not in fact appear, is of no validity. That decision is conformable to all the decisions on the subject in Kirby, Root and Day; to the doctrine of the highest courts in Massachusetts, New-York and other sister states, as well as to that of the courts in Westminster-Hall; and moreover, it accords with the dictates of justice.

In vindication of the charge of the judge in directing that the proceedings in the cause under consideration should be holden for nothing, the following observations are worthy of attention.

First, the record purports to be, and in fact is, of a proceeding and judgment between the defendants and David Leeds. There was no process against the plaintiff Denison. It indeed appears, that on the 8th of June, P. J. Smith, Esq. as counsel for him, filed a claim, that the order of sale might be annulled, and that the sloop might be restored to him. It does not appear, that the claim was ever heard and adjudicated upon; nor that in any mode, the title to this sloop was settled, unless the the judgment in favour of the defendants against David Leeds, and the direction that the proceeds of the sale should be applied in part satisfaction of it, can be decreed to have that operation. But this record, thus far, is res inter alios acta. No judgment can affect others than parties or privies to it. The decree of a court of admiralty, which this is not, binds all the world, only because all the world are, in contemplation of law, parties to it. If, under our law of attachments, A. should seize the property of B., on a process against C., and should, on the process, obtain judgment, and on the execution, sell the property, certainly B. could maintain trespass against A., and the judgment between A. and C. could not be admitted in evidence. These principles are too familiar to need farther illustration.

Secondly, if it be said, that the judgment in New-Orleans, by strong implication, furnishes proof, that the sloop was the property of David Leeds, as it directed that the process should be applied to the. judgment, it may be answered as above, the plaintiff does not, by the record, appear to have been heard on that point, nor to have been made party for the purpose of being heard ; and he, therefore, cannot be affected by it.

Thirdly, this judgment in the court of Louisiana was rendered on the 14th December, 1824; but on the 3rd of November previous, the district court of the United States, on a full hearing of the question of title to this sloop, with the proofs of the parties to the point in issue, the plaintiff and defendants en-deavouring to establish their rights, did decree and adjudge, that the title was vested in the plaintiff. Now, the defendants cannot interpose a judgment of the court of Louisiana, made on a subsequent day, even if it did bear on this question. The decree in New-York cannot be affected, in this indirect manner, by the judgment in New-Orleans.

Fourthly, the sloop was seized in New-Orleans, on the 4th of March, by the defendants, and sold, on the 30th of March, by order of the court, on a process to which the plaintiff in no sense was then a party. The tort was then com, lete ; and an undoubted right of action in the plaintiff then existed. To give the utmost effect to the subsequent claim and appearance of the plaintiff in the court of Louisiana, it could amount only to an attempt to obtain a restoration of the property, which attempt was not prosecuted, and upon which no judgment was ever rendered.

If it be urged, that the court in Louisiana must be presumed to have exercised their jurisdiction discreetly ; that by the laws of that state, the property of one may be thus taken, without causing the owner to be made party to the suit; this doctrine cannot be admitted. There is no proof that laws of that character are in operation ; and if such laws do there operate, it is too much to ask of a court in this state to give them effect. The laws of no other state operate proprio vigore in our courts. Effect is given to them, when they are not contra bonos mores, nor opposed to the safety of the state, nor to sound policy. Any law authorising a process, by which the property of A. can be taken to satisfy a debt against B., or for any other purpose, without giving to A. notice to defend, is opposed to common right, and ought not to be enforced by any tribunal.

In my opinion, then, the charge was correct, in respect to the record of the court of Louisiana.

3. It is insisted, that the charge was incorrect, in instructing the jury, that damages might be given for the detention after the sloop was in possession of the plaintiff, by a purchaser under the decree of the district court in New-York, and down to the date of the writ. It appears, that the defendants urged the restoration of the sloop, on a day previous to the date of the writ, in mitigation of damages. The facts showed, that she was restored only by the substitution of the plaintiff’s money for her value as sold. Had the libel of the plaintiff been dismissed, and had the defendants’ claim prevailed, they would have received the amouut. The sloop, therefore, was substantially withholden from the plaintiff, by the wrongful acts of the defendants; and I discover no reason why they should not respond therefor in damages.

4. Another objection to the charge, is, that the jury were told, that they were at liberty to presume the damage and ex-pence, which might arise in the recovery of the property, and for the forcible invasion of it, as well as for the injury the vessel had sustained, by the alleged trespass, and give damages accordingly.

That there is no precise rule of damages, in actions of this description, is admitted. If the property, by the tort, be wholly destroyed, or only deteriorated, the jury are to judge, under all the circumstances accompanying the transaction, to what damages the plaintiff is entitled. If this sloop had been wrongfully taken from the possession of the plaintiff, in the port of Ston-ington, and conveyed to the adjoining port of New-London, less damages might be sufficient to compensate the plaintiff upon those equitable principles which govern in giving damages in actions of trespass, than if seized at a distance of 3000 miles, and by the trespassers sent on a distant voyage.

In Edwards v. Beach & al. 3 Day 447., it was decided, that in an action of trespass for destroying the plaintiff’s sign, of the value of 20 dollars, and in which 50 dollars damages were given, the value of the property, or the amount of injury done to it, was not the only ground of damages, but that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the force and injury, according to the nature and circumstances of the case, and the aggravation attending at. The same doctrine was laid down in Nichols v. Bronson, 2 Day 211. and afterwards recognized in Churchill v. Watson, 5 Day 140. Not only the direct damage, but the probable or inevitable' damages, and those which result from the aggravating circumstances attending the act, are proper to be estimated by the jury.

In every view of this case, I am satisfied, that the charge was correct; and that the superior court be advised, that the rule for a new trial be discharged,

Hosmer, Ch. J. and Peters and Brainard, Js. were of the same opinion.

Lanman, J, dissented, on the ground that the district court of New-York could not set aside the proceedings of the court in New-Orleans. On the other parts of the case, he expressed no opinion.

New trial not to be granted.  