
    NOBLE vs. STEAMBOAT “ST. ANTHONY.”
    1. The statute of this State concerning boats and vessels, is limited in its provisions to con tracts made within the State, with boats used in navigating the waters of this State,
    ERROR TO ST. LOUIS COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    
      
      Crockett & Briggs, for plaintiff.
    The only question presented in the case is, whether the defendants demurrer to (he plaintiff’s amended complaint, was properly sustained. The cause of action set forth in the complaint is essentially different from that in the case of Raritan vs. Pollard, 10 Bio. R, 683; and fairly presents the queslion whether our statutory lien is strictly to be confined, in all cases, to causes of action arising within the territorial limits of this State. In this case, the complainant alleges that at the time the articles were furnished, the boat had just been completed at Pittsburgh ; had never made a voyage, but was destined for the navigation of our waters, and was then on the eve of her departure for St, Louis ; that she came directly to St. Louis, where she had since continued to be employed in our waters, and that the articles furnished were still on board at the time of the institution of the suit, and that by the laws of Pennsylvania the plaintiff had a iien, &c. In the case of Raritan vs. Pollard, we do not understand the court to decide that the statutory lien is to be confined exclusively to causes of action arising within the limits of this State, but that it was extended to cases where the boatjg plying to our ports, even though she may in the course of her voyages go to otherports, and in such cases it is immaterial whether the debt was in fact contracted in this State or not. The material point is, whether the vessel was one “ used in navigating fhp waters of this State.” If so, then from the very letter of the act the lien attaches. The object of the act seems to have been to give the lien upon all vessels used in navigating our waters, in whatever jurisdiction the debt might have been contracted.
    Gamble & Bates, for defendant.
    We understand it to be settled by the decisions of this court, (as it is fully established in Ohio, and perhaps other western states,) that our boat law is local in its objects, character, andeffects. That such action and lien cannot be maintained heie on a-foreign claim. See1 Í0 Mo. R. 583, S. 3. Raritan vs. Pollard, lb. page 586, S. B. Time vs, Parmalee.
    The allegation in the complaint that this claim hada statutory lien in Pennsylvania, is-nothing to the purpose. The Pennsylvania act, like ours¿ is local; and in no conceivable case-can our courts enforce it. It is not a Pennsylvania, but a Missouri lien that is sought to beset up and enforced here.
    Neither is there any thing in that other allegationjthat this boat was built for the Missouri trade, and destined to navigate our waters. The lien and the right of action cannot depend upon the intention of the party, which may be changed at pleasure, or defeated by accident, but must depend upon the creation of the debt, and its time and place. Under our law, the lien can last but six mouths. When shall it begin? at the creation of the debt, or when ther boat begins to navigate our waters ? If the former, the lien will have a legal existence, when peradventure the boat may never be in our waters. If the latter, the commencement of the lien, and the consequent right of action, must depend upon the will and pleasure of the captain, who may put it off for as many months or years as he chooses.
   Napton, judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a proceeding under the act concerning boats and vessels. The grounds of the action, as stated in the complaint, were the furniture and equipment of a steamboat, procured at Pittsburgh, in the State of Pennsylvania. An allegation was made in the complaint that by the law of Pennsylvania, the plaintiff was entitled to a lien for the articles so furnished. There was a demurrer to the complaint, which was determined in favor of the boat, and this decision presents the only point for our consideration.

We understand our statute to have no extra territorial operation, but that its provisions are limited to contracts made with boats “ used in navigating the waters of this State.” Citizens of other states may resort to our courts to enforce their contracts under the general law applicable alike to our citizens and strangers; but the act concerning boats and vessels was designed to afford a speedy and convenient remedy to our own citizens, and to such others only as are engaged in trade within our jurisdiction at the time of their contracts. The contract in this case was made in Pennsylvania; it was not made with a boat, or the owners of a boat used in navigating the waters of this State, but with a boat lying at Pittsburgh, on the Ohio river; that the boat was designed for our trade can make no difference. This point was fully settled by this court in the case of S. B. Raritan vs. Pollard, 10 Mo. R. 583.

The allegation that, by the laws of Pennsylvania, a lien existed, does not give our court jurisdiction, or bring the case within the remedy given by the act concerning boats and vessels. The Pennsylvania law, like ours, is local, and must be enforced in the mode pointed out in their statute, and in the courts acquiring jurisdiction under it. Our statute does not authorize the lien acquired under the laws of Pennsylvania to be enforced here, and there is no principle of common or international law which will justify such a pretension.

The case of Champion vs. Jantzer, 16 Ohio R. 9, and Goodwell vs. Brig St. Louis, Ib. 178, are in point under a statute of Ohio substantially the same as ours, so far as this matter is concerned.

Judgment affirmed.  