
    Michael HANNON, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SCHULMAN AND ASSOCIATES, Sued in Official/Individual Capacity, Sydney T. Shulman, Sued in Official/Individual Capacity, Scott Semple, Sued in Official/Individual Capacity, Inmate Legal Assistance to Prisoners, Sued in Official/Individual Capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-2132.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 22, 2016.
    Michael Hannon, pro se, Somers, CT, for Appellant.
    No appearance.
    Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, ROBERT D. SACK, Circuit Judges, KATHERINE POLK FAILLA. District Judge.
    
      
       Judge Katherine Polk Failla, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   Appellant Michael Hannon, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Hannon sued Schulman and Associates, Sydney Schulman, Commissioner of Corrections Scott Semple, and Inmate Legal Assistance to Prisoners, alleging that he had been denied legal assistance. The court dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, ruling that only Semple could be held liable under § 1983 because the other defendants were not state actors, and that the complaint did not allege either Semple’s personal involvement or any legal action that had been prejudiced by the alleged unlawful conduct. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal. Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir.1999). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and to “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Upon de novo review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Han-non’s claims and, except as noted below, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough June 1, 2015 decision.

We agree with Hannon that the dismissal of his official capacity claims against Semple was erroneous because Hannon sought declaratory and injunctive relief. See Mary Jo C. v. New York State and Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 166 (2d Cir.2013). This error does not require remand, however, because the district court properly ruled that Hannon did not state a claim for relief.

We have considered all of Hannon’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  