
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carlos RAMOS-SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 14-50026.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Sept. 23, 2014.
    
    Filed Oct. 1, 2014.
    Janet Cabral, Bruce R. Castetter, Office of the U.S. Attornéy, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Alana B. McMains, Esquire, Federal Public Defender, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLÍNSON, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Carlos Ramos-Sanchez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 14-month consecutive sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Ramos-Sanchez first contends that the district court erred by failing to (i) independently calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range, (ii) consider the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, other than deterrence, and (iii) explain adequately the sentence imposed. We disagree. The record reflects that the district court adopted the correctly-calculated Guidelines range provided by the probation officer, adequately considered the applicable section 3553(a) sentencing factors, and sufficiently explained the sentence. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc).

Ramos-Sanchez also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Ramos-Sanchez’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The 14-month consecutive sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f); Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     