
    The Administrators of G. Norwood ads. Mark Manning.
    Interest is recoverable on judgments, 
    
    Where a payment is made, it. goes in the first place to the extinguishment of the interest.
    Though the whole amount appearing on the face of a judgment be paid, yet it must be deducted from the aggregate amount of principal and interest. And the balance is principal.
    
      Debt on judgment, tried before Mr. Justice Gantt, at Sumter, Spring Term, 1820.
    This was an action of debt, brought on a judgment recovered against defendant’s intestate, in his lifetime. After the verdict on which this judgment had been entered up, was first obtained, the defendant appealed to the Constitutional Oourt for a new trial, where the case was suspended for two or three years. The plaintiff nevertheless entered up his judgment, and when the motion was 'dismissed in the Constitutional *Oourt, issued an execution, which was lodged in the sheriff’s hands, but never had been proceeded on. L 6 Whilst the proceedings were in that state, the defendant died, and administration was granted to the present defendant. The plaintiff then commenced an action of debt on the judgment; to which the defendant pleaded in bar, that the plaintiff had taken out an execution on the judgment, which execution was still of full force. To that plea the plaintiff demurred, and the presiding judge sustained the demurrer. The case was then referred to the clerk to assess the damages in the nature of a writ of inquiry. Between the time of entering up the judgment and the commencement of this action, several payments had been made. The clerk calculated the interest on the judgment up to the time of the first payment, and then deducted the payment from the aggregate amount of principal and interest, and then calculated interest on the balance, up to the next payment, and so on, and assessed the damages to the amount which appeared to be due according to that mode of calculation. The presiding judge set aside the assessment, and directed the clerk to deduct all the payments from the original judgment, and to calculate the interest on the balance only.
    The defendant’s counsel mow moved to reverse the decision of the Oourt, which supported the demurrer,- and the plaintiff’s counsel moved to reverse that part relating to the method of assessing the damages.
    
      
      
         See Note, I N. & MoC. 244 ; 3 McC. 503.
    
   The opinion of the Oourt was delivered by

Nott, J.

This case has been submitted without argument; and I am, therefore, at some loss to conjecture upon what ground the defendant’s counsel expected to support his motion. That an action of debt can be brought on a judgment, there can be no doubt. And I am not aware, that merely lodging an execution in the sheriff’s office can be a bar to that action. That motion, therefore, must be dismissed.

The question, arising on the second ground, appears *to me to have been settled by former decisions of this Court. In the L case of Lambkin v. Nance, decided in this Court in the year 1806, it was held, that interest might be recovered on a judgment. In the case of Hamilton v. Tiddy tried in Charleston, in the year 1809, it was determined that the plaintiff might recover interest on a judgment, the whole amount of which, except the interest, had been paid and accepted before trial. In the case of the Executors of Snipes v. Sanders, 1 Nott & M'Cord, 242, several payments had been made, and the balance offered to be paid, though not actually tendered before action brought. The balance, however, was paid into Court, together with the costs ; yet the Court held, that the plaintiff was entitled to interest.

It is a mistaken view of the subject, to suppose, that when a payment is made, it goes in extinguishment of the principal. The rule has always been with us to apply it to the extinguishment of interest first; and, therefore, though the whole amount appearing on the face of a judgment be paid, yet it must be deducted from the aggregate amount of principal and interest, and the balance is principal; and that has been the mode of calculation long established in this State.

Mayrant, for the motion. Blanding, contra.

The last motion, therefore, must be granted, and let the calculation be made according to the method first adopted by the clerk.

Johnson and Huger, JJ., concurred.

ColcoCK, J.:

I dissent to this opinion as it relates to the assessment. The interest is recoverable, but does not follow the judgment as a matter of course; and, therefore, the payments before the recovery of the interest, must be applied to. the original judgment. 
      
       2 Brev. 99.
     
      
       MS. See 1 N. & MeC. 245.
     