
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lorenzo GRANT, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-10329
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 26, 2017 
    
    Filed July 3, 2017
    Kirstin Ault, Assistant U.S. Attorney, J. Douglas Wilson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    
      Ned Smock, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDCA—Federal Public Defender’s Office (Oakland), Oakland, CA, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Lorenzo Grant appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 37-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Grant contends that the district court erred by concluding that his conviction for willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant under California Penal Code § 273.5 was a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2015) and, therefore, constituted a Grade A violation of supervised release. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1)(A)(i) & cmt. n.2. This claim is foreclosed by United States v. Laurico-Yeno, 590 F.3d 818, 821-23 (9th Cir. 2010), which held that a conviction under California Penal Code § 273.5 is a categorical crime of violence under the force clause of the definition of “crime of violence” in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, which is identical to the force clause in the definition of “crime of violence” in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Contrary to Grant’s claim, Johnson v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), does not undermine Laurico-Yeno. See Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2563 (striking down the residual clause in the definition of “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, but declining to call into question the remainder of the definition, including the force clause).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     