
    SOUTHWEST CYCLE SALES, INC., a Kansas corporation, Appellant, v. GOLD KEY MARKETING, INC., Appellee.
    No. 72-612.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 8, 1972.
    
      Radford & Merrill, Miami, for appellant.
    Gerson & Fuller, Miami Beach, for ap-pellee.
    Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and CHARLES CARROLL, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to quash service of process. The appellant, a non-resident of Florida, who was the purchaser under a contract for the sale of goods which included a promissory note for payment of the items purchased, agreed therein that the note would be deemed to have been made in Dade County, Florida, and, in event of the purchaser’s default and action filed thereon, agreed to be bound by service of process made upon the Florida Secretary of State, who was appointed therein by the purchaser as its agent for the service of such process, and by the mailing to purchaser [by seller] of a copy of the papers so served. Service was made on the Secretary of State in accordance therewith, and copies of the papers were mailed to the purchaser.

The Secretary of State could have, but did not refuse the service of the process. Actually the service was made on the Secretary of State as though it was service under the Long Arm statute, which could explain why the Secretary of State did not refuse the “agency appointment” service, as that official could have done. However, the service was made in the manner contracted for by the purchaser.

Therefore the question to be determined was whether the purchaser, having appointed the Secretary of State as the person to be so served as its agent and having agreed to be bound thereby, can disclaim the service when made in the manner for which it had so contracted. The trial court held it could not, and denied a motion to quash the service. We affirm. See National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 L.Ed.2d 354; cf. Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Simari, Fla.1966, 191 So.2d 427.

Affirmed.

PEARSON, Judge

(dissenting).

In the present instance the appellee is alleged to have appointed the “Secretary of State of the State of Florida” as his agent. The Secretary is a constitutional officer. The duties of the office are prescribed by law. These duties do not include responsibilities which may be specified in private contracts to which the State is not a party.

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“The authority of public officers to proceed in a particular way or only upon specific conditions implies a duty not to proceed in any manner than that which is authorized by law. * * * ” White v. Crandon, 116 Fla. 162, 156 So. 303 (1934).
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See cases cited in 67 C.J.S. Officers § 102.  