
    Napoleon PEREA, II, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-16243.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted May 15, 2014.
    
    Filed May 21, 2014.
    Ann M. Cerney, Cerney Kreuze & Lott, LLP, Stockton, CA, Linda Susan Ziskin, Ziskin Law Office, Lake Oswego, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Shea Lita Bond, Special Assistant U.S., Jean Marie Turk, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, Bobbie J. Montoya, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: McKEOWN and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and BOLTON, District, Judge.
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Napolean Perea II appeals the Eastern District of California’s affirmance of the denial of his application for supplemental security income.

The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) did not commit reversible error. The ALJ properly evaluated Appellant’s credibility and determined that the many inconsistencies in his statements and testimony undermined his assertions concerning his ailments’ severity. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir.2005). Because the same reasons undermine Appellant’s mother’s Third-Party Function Report, the ALJ did not commit reversible error by failing to address it. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115, 1122 (9th Cir.2012). The ALJ also properly discounted the opinions of examining physicians Dr. Wakefield and Dr. Kalman because they were inconsistent with Appellant’s stated daily activities. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir.2001). The ALJ did not ignore Dr. Conte’s and Dr. DeSouza’s opinions and properly accepted them and included their limitations in the residual functional capacity (“RFC”). See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-75 (9th Cir.2008). The hypothetical individual the ALJ posed to the vocational expert (“VE”) properly included all the limitations the ALJ included in Appellant’s RFC. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756-57 (9th Cir.1989). Finally, there is no evidence that the VE’s testimony was inconsistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), so the ALJ’s failure to ask whether the VE’s testimony was consistent with the DOT was harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     