
    John Little versus John Hasey and Others.
    Since the statute of 1805, c. 100, a certificate of two magistrates, that a debtor has taken the oath prescribed in the statute of 1787, c. 29, will not protect such debtor from a forfeiture of a bond given by him for the liberty of the yard.
    [# 319 ] * This was an action of debt upon a bond made to the plaintiff by the defendants, dated August 21st, 1811, and conditioned that the said Hasey, then a prisoner on an execution issued in favor of the plaintiff in the gaol at Wiscasset, should continue a true prisoner, &c.
    In a statement of facts, upon which the cause was submitted to the decision of the Court, it was agreed, that, after his commitment, Hasey gave due notice to the plaintiff of his desire of taking the -irivilege and benefit of “an act for the relief of poor prisoners, who are committed by execution for debt ” ; and, on the 21st day of September, 1811, he took, before two justices of the quorum for this county, the oath prescribed in the same act; of which the said justices made a certificate to the gaoler in form prescribed by the said act, excepting a small clerical error stated, but which did not form any ground of the opinion of the Court in the determination of the action. Whereupon Hasey, * knowing [*320 ] that the same certificate was made to the gaoler, went without the limits of the prison, and has not since returned ; and the plaintiff’s said execution remains wholly unsatisfied.
    Upon these facts, so far as the Court should consider them as competent evidence, if the Court should be of opinion that the plaintiff was by law entitled to recover, the defendants agreed to be defaulted, and that judgment should be rendered for the plaintiff for the penalty of the bond declared on, or for his debt, with interest and costs, as the Court shall be of opinion upon the law applicable to the case ; otherwise, the plaintiff agreed to become nonsuit, and that the defendants should recover their costs.
    The cause standing continued nisi for advisement, judgment was pronounced at the September term following, in Berkshire.
    
    
      
      
        Stat. 1787, c. 29.
    
   Parker, C. J.

It has unfortunately happened, that, by a mistake of the justices who administered the oath to the defendant, Hasey, he and his sureties are subjected to the penalty of this obligation. For, being in prison in execution, and having withdrawn himself therefrom, he must be considered as having committed an escape, contrary to the condition of his bond.

It is agreed that the justices administered the oath according to the form prescribed in the first statute on the subject [Stat. 1787, c. 29]. The statute of 1805, c. 100, provides, that another oath be substituted in the place of that prescribed by the former statute. The object of the legislature was, to make the oath conform to the new statute, which provided an exemption from attachment and execution of certain articles of household furniture, &c., not exceeding a certain limited value. In every other respect, the new form of oaths is precisely like the former one.

But we must consider the old form as repealed, and that, after the passing of the last statute, no form but the one therein prescribed could be legally admissible. Nor could the debtor be subject to any punishment for swearing falsely according to the old form ; for the justices were not authorized to administer an oath in that form.

* The certificate of the justices, although it might pro- [ * 321 ] tect the goaler from an action for the escape, yet cannot save the debtor from his bond. For the certificate is only evidence of his having taken the oath ; and, it appearing that the oath which was administered was not a lawful one, the certificate cannot operate to discharge the bond.

But we think that judgment ought not to be rendered for the whole penalty. As the escape was not wilful or designed, but was caused altogether by a mistake of the magistrates, it may well be considered as an escape, “ through accident,” within the words of the statute of 1810, c. 116. For it was altogether accidental that this enlargement, which was intended to be lawful, has become an escape ; and the gaoler and prisoner were both induced by the proceedings of the magistrates, who they presumed knew the law, to discontinue the imprisonment.

The judgment of the Court, therefore, is, that the penalty of the bond is forfeited ; and that the plaintiff recover the amount of the debt, and costs, for which Hasey stood committed, with the interest thereon. 
      
       The statute of 1810, ch. 316, provides only for the case where "the debtor escaped not wilfully, but through accident, or through misapprehension of the limits of the daytime, or of the limits of the gaol-yardThe above case, therefore, does not seem to have come within the provisions of the act. The escape, certainly, was not accidental, nor through misapprehension of the limits. The departure from the prison limits was intentional, and, therefore, wilful; and as to a mistake of the law, the statute does not provide for it, and the maxim,ignorantia legis neminem ezcusatf applies. Every one is presumed to know the law, and is estopped from alleging ignorance of it.
     