
    Joseph Knight, Plaintiff in Review, versus The Inhabitants of Freeport.
    A new trial was granted, because the plaintiff’s son-in-law said to one of the jurors, that the cause was of great consequence to him; that he should have to pay the costs, if the cause should go against the plaintiff; and that the defence of the action was a spiteful thing on the part of the defendants.
    After a verdict at the last October term for the plaintiff in review, and before judgment, the counsel for the defendants in review moved the Court for a new trial, on the ground, that one Abel A. 
      Briggs, who was, a witness for Knight, on the trial of the cause, after the empannelling of the jury and before the trial, applied to Justin Kent, one of the jurors, and stated to him that this cause was of great consequence to him, Briggs; and, if it went against * Knight, he, Briggs, should have to pay the costs; and that the defending the action was a spiteful thing on the part of the said inhabitants of Freeport; the said counsel declaring, that they had no knowledge of the said facts, until after the jury had returned their said verdict. The juror testified to the truth of the foregoing statement; and added, that Knight was not present at the time, nor did the juror know that he, Knight, had any knowledge thereof. And it was admitted, that the said Briggs was Knight’s son-in-law, and did assist him in supporting his cause. The said motion being continued over to this term,
    
      Whitman, for the defendants in review,
    argued, that, if this was not within the technical definition of embracery, it was such an interference with the jury as should give the party, against whom it had been practised, a new trial. 
    
    
      Emery, for the plaintiff in review.
    This is not embracery, which is said to be where one laboreth the jury, or instructs him, or puts him in fear. But this is intended of the party to the suit, and not of a stranger, as Briggs was in this case. The cases cited are all of the paity’s addressing the jury. Here Knight knew nothing of the transaction ; and it will be easy for any party in a cause to employ one to converse with a juror in his antagonist’s favor, and, after a verdict against him, to avail himself of the fact to get rid of the verdict. It ought, at least, to be shown, that the juror addressed was influenced by the communication.
    The severity of the old English law upon this subject arose from the disposition to prevent or counteract the influence of the great men of the kingdom, when contending with the lower orders of the community. But, so far were our ancestors from apprehending a necessity of pursuing the same policy, that, by an ordinance of the colony, whenever any jurors were “ not clear in their judgments or conscience, concerning any case wherein they were to give their verdict, they should have liberty to advise with any * man they should think fit to resolve or direct them, before they should give in their verdict.” 
    
    
      
      
        Bac. Abr. Verdict, 1. — Lord Herbert vs. Shaw, 11 Mod. 111, 118.
    
    
      
      
        Ancient Charters, &c., 145.
    
   By the Court.

Too much care and precaution cannot be used to preserve the purity ol jury trials. The attempt to influence the juror in this case was grossly improper, and ought to be discountenanced. It is not necessary to show, that the mind of the juror, thus tampered with, was influenced by this attempt. Perhaps it is not in his power to say whether he was influenced or not. If he was, there is sufficient cause to set aside the verdict; and, if he was not, and the party who has gained the verdict has a good cause, he will still be entitled to a verdict upon another trial. We cannot be too strict in guarding trials by jury from improper influence. This strictness is necessary to give due confidence to parties in the results of their causes ; and every one ought to know, that, for any, even the least, intermeddling with jurors, a verdict will always be set aside.

Mew trial ordered.  