
    LEMON RACKLEY v. THE ROWLAND LUMBER COMPANY.
    (Filed 12 October, 1910.)
    Domestic Corporations — Residence—Venue—Removal of Causes.
    Section 422, Revisal, fixing the residence of a domestic corporation at its principal place of business, should be construed in connection with see. 424, and a plaintiff may elect to sue the corporation for damages for a personal injury in the county of his residence at the time of the commencement of the action, or at the residence of the corporation, and if in the former county it may not be removed to the latter one, on the ground of improper venue. Propst v. R. R., 139 N. C., 397, and Perry v. R. R., this term, cited and approved.
    Appeal from Coolee, J., at the August Term, 1910, of WayNE.
    The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
    
      W. T. Dortch and Geo. H. Hood for plaintiff.
    
      Stevens, Beasley & Weehs for defendant.
   WalKer, J.

This action was brought by the plaintiff in the Superior Court of the county of Wayne, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff was an employee of the -defendant and was injured while working in its mill in the county of Duplin, where its principal office is. The defendant moved that the place of trial be changed to the county of Duplin, upon the ground that the residence of the defendant, under Eevisal, see. 422, is in that county. The court found the following facts: “1. The original charter of the defendant corporation, dated 28th day of June, 1899, located the principal offices at Golds-boro, in the county of Wayne. 2. The injury complained of by the plaintiff occurred in October, 1909. 3. The principal office was changed, by amendment to charter made by Secretary of State 22 January, 1910, to Bowden, in the county of Duplin. 4. The plaintiff was, at the time of the alleged injury, a resident of the county of Sampson. 5. The alleged injury occurred at Bowden. 6. This action was brought to Wayne Superior Court on the 8th day of August, 1910, and at that time the plaintiff was, and is now, a tona fide resident of the county of Wayne.”

Tbe Court adjudged tbat tbe venue was properly laid in Wayne County and refused tbe motion. Defendant excepted to tbis ruling and appealed.

Tbe contention of tbe defendant is tbat sec. 424 of tbe Re-visal does not apply to tbis case, as by sec. 422 it is specially provided tbat, for tbe purpose of suing and being sued, tbe principal place of business of a domestic corporation shall be its residence, and tbat tbis means tbat an action against a domestic corporation shall be brought in tbe county of its residence. We do not think tbis is tbe proper construction of tbat section. It was merely intended by these words to define what should be tbe residence of a domestic corporation, in determining under sec. 424 where an action, to which it is a party, shall be brought. It is provided by sec. 424 tbat in all other cases, 'that is, cases in which a contrary provision bad not already been made, an action should be tried in tbe county in which tbe plaintiffs or tbe defendants, or any of them, shall reside at tbe commencement of tbe action, or if none of tbe defendants shall reside in tbe State, then in tbe county in which tbe plaintiffs, or any of them shall reside; and if none of tbe parties shall reside within tbe State, then jjhe same may be tried in any county which tbe plaintiff shall designate in bis summons and complaint, subject, however, to tbe power of tbe court to change tbe place of trial in tbe cases provided by statute. It will be seen tbat, by tbis section, an action for personal injuries may be tried in tbe county in which tbe plaintiff or tbe defendant resides. If tbe action is brought against a domestic corporation, tbe plaintiff may elect whether it shall be tried in tbe county of bis residence or in tbe county where tbe defendant resides, and in tbe latter case tbe residence of tbe defendant shall be determined by tbe location of its principal place of business. If a suit is brought by a domestic corporation, it may lay tbe venue or place of trial in tbe county where it has its principal place of business, provided it is such an action as is embraced by tbe provisions of sec. 424. In other words, it is provided by see. 424 tbat an action of tbe class therein mentioned shall be tried in tbe county in which tbe plaintiffs or tbe defendants shall reside at tbe commencement of tbe action, and considering tbis section in connection with sec. 422, as we must do, it is further provided that, if a domestic corporation be either plaintiff or defendant, its residence shall be determined as provided by the latter section. It was not intended by sec. 422 that a domestic corporation must be sued in.the county where it has its residence, even though the plaintiff may reside in another county, but the plain meaning is, that where it is necessary to determine the venue of an action, to’ which a domestic corporation is a party, by its residence, then and in that ease, the county in which it has its principal place of business shall be considered as its residence. If the plaintiff does not sue a domestic corporation in the county of his own residence, he must then bring his action in the county where the defendant has its principal place of business. Sec. 422 (Acts 1903, ch. 803) was enacted because this Court had held, in Cline v. Manufacturing Co., 116 N. C., 837, and Alliance v. Murrell, 119 N. C., 124, that a domestic corporation had no residence within the meaning of sec. 192 of the Code, now see. 424 of the Revisal. "Where, however, the venue of an action depends upon the residence of a party, under sec. 424, and that party is a domestic corporation, the venue should be laid in the county where it has its principal place of business. "We have held at this term in Roberson v. Lumber Co. that the purpose of Revisal, see. 422, was not to change the provisions of sec. 424, or to deny to the plaintiff the right to bring his action against a domestic corporation in the county of his residence. Neither section applies to those causes of action where the venue or place of trial is specially fixed by other sections of the Revisal, such as sections 419, 420 and 421, the sole purpose of sec. 422 being to remedy a defect in our statute law, which was pointed out in the two cases we have already cited. See also Propst v. R. R., 139 N. C., 397, and Perry v. R. R., at this term.

No error.  