
    778 S.E.2d 718
    FARMERS & MECHANICS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner v. Marlon ALLEN, Sr., individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Marcus Allen, Respondent.
    No. 14-0967.
    Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
    Submitted Sept. 22, 2015.
    Decided Oct. 14, 2015.
    Concurring Opinion of Justice Davis Oct. 20, 2015.
    
      Susan R. Snowden, Esq., Martin & Sei-bert, L.C., Martinsburg, WV, for Petitioner.
    Trevor K. Taylor, Esq., Taylor Law Office, Morgantown, WV, for Respondent.
   KETCHUM, Justice:

Petitioner Farmers & Mechanics Mutual Insurance Company (“F & M”) appeals the September 2, 2014, order of the Circuit Court of Mineral County that granted summary judgment in favor of respondent, Marlon Allen, Sr., individually and as administrator of the estate of Marcus Allen (“the estate”).

The issue raised in this appeal is whether a landlord’s insurer has a right of subrogation against a tenant when the tenant causes damage" to the leased premises under the following circumstances: (1) the tenant was not a named or definitional insured of the landlord’s policy; (2) the tenant purchased his own renter’s insurance after being advised to do so by the landlord; and (3) the lease agreement stated that the tenant was solely responsible for any damage he caused to the subject property.

The circuit court concluded that the tenant was an “equitable insured” of the landlord’s insurance policy. It ruled that F & M (the landlord’s insurer) could not maintain a sub-rogation action against the tenant’s estate because of its finding that the tenant was an “equitable insured.” On appeal, F & M argues that the circuit court erred when it ruled that F & M could not maintain a subrogation action against the estate. Upon review, we agree with F & M and reverse the circuit court’s ruling.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Michael O’Connor and Ms adult daughter Shelly O’Connor own real property located at 175 Keys Street in Keyser, West Virgima (“subject property”), as tenants in common. In December 2009, Shelly O’Connor entered into a lease-to-own agreement for the subject property with Marcus Allen. The agreement provided that Marcus Allen would pay Shelly O’Connor $625.00 'per month for fourteen years, and that

[t]he payment of $625.00 is broken down as follows, $555.00 will go for mortgage, insurance and taxes. $70.00. will go to Shelly O’Connor as interest for each month. The payment will go to [sic] in the bank each month until the house is paid in full. When the mortgage payments are paid in full at First United Bank, Shelly O’Connor will receive all further, payments until the house is paid in full, 'wMch is $105,300. At that time, only the deed will be given to Marcus Troy Allen as well as changing [sic] homeowner name.

The agreement also stated that, “if I [Shelly O’Connor] do not receive the payment in full .... within 30 days after the due date, Mr. Allen will be evicted[.]” Further, the agreement stated, “[i]f there are any damages made to said house, after Mr. Allen moves in, he is solely responsible.” Finally, the léase-to-own agreement described the consequences tenant Marcus Allen would face for causing damage to the property: “if the house is being damaged Mr. Allen will be evicted and have thirty days to get all Ms belongings out and return the keys to the landlord (Shelly O’Connor).”

Shelly O’Connor purchased a homeowner’s insurance policy from F & M covering, the subject property. The policy was effective from March 15, 2010, through March 15, 2011. Aceordmg to Shelly O’Connor’s deposition testimony, tMs policy was originally purchased in 2006 and was renewed on a yearly basis thereafter. Shelly O’Connor was the named msured on the F & M policy. Her father, Michael O’Connor, was named as an additional insured. The policy also contained a “defmitions” provision that defined who was covered under the policy. This “defmitional msured” provision of the policy states: ■

DEFINITIONS
A. In this policy, “you” and “your” refer to the “named insured” shown in the Declarations and the spouse of a resident of the same household. “We”, “us” and “our” refer to the Company providing tMs insurance.
5. “Insured” means:
a. You.and residents of your household who are: '.
.(1) Your relatives; or
(2) Other persons under the age of 21 and in. the .care of any person named above; b. A student enrolled m school full time, ■as defined by the school, who was a resident of your household before moving out to attend sehool[.]

The F &‘M homeowner’s policy insured the subject property against various perils includmg risk of loss by fire. The policy did not name' the tenant; Marcus Allen, as an msured, a defmitional Msured, or in any other capacity. Further, F & M was not made aware that the tenant, Marcus Allen, was living m the subject property, nor was it made aware of the lease-to-own agreement that Shelly O’Connor entered into with Marcus Allen. ,

Shelly O’Connor testified that she advised Marcus Allen to purchase renter’s insurance. Marcus Allen thereafter purchased a renter’s insurance policy from State Auto Insurance. Marcus Allen’s rental msurance policy was effective from- March 10, 2010, through March 10, 2011, and provided the following coverage and ■ limits of liability: personal property ($20,000), personal -liability ($100, 000/each occurrence), loss of use ($6,000), and medical pay to. others, ($1,000/each person).

On May 6, 2010, Marcus Allen was cookmg food on the stove m the subject property when a grease fire ensued. Marcus Allen died in the fire and the property sustained extensive damage. . Thereafter, Shelly O’Connor filed an insurance claim under the P & M homeowner’s policy. After reviewing the claim, F & M paid its insureds, Shelly O’Connor and Michael O’Connor, for the property damage caused by the fire.

The decedent’s father, Marlon Allen, Sr., individually and in his capacity as the administrator of Marcus Allen’s estate, filed a wrongful death- claim against Michael O’Con-nor, This complaint alleged that Michael O’Connor, as landlord, was negligent in failing to have a smoke detector installed in the subject property which resulted in tenant Marcus Allen’s death. The complaint asserts, “Defendant O’Connor by renting [the] dwelling in question to the decedent assured him that the dwelling tyas safe, secure and inhabitable.” Michael O’Connor filed an answer to this lawsuit. The answer included a counterclaim filed by his insurance company, P & M, asserting a subrogation claim against the tenant’s estate for the proceeds ,.P & M paid to Shelly O’Connor following the fire.

The tenant’s estate replied to F & M’s counterclaim through counsel hired by State Auto, (the insurer who provided renter’s insurance to the decedent)., It filed an answer to the counterclaim asserting that P & M could not maintain a subrogation claim against the estate, arguing that tenant/decedent Marcus Allen obtained an interest in the P & M policy because a portion of each monthly payment he made to Shelly O’Con-nor under the lease-to-own agreement went to “mortgage, insurance and taxes.” Thus, the estate argued, Marcus Allen was an additional insured under the P & M homeowner’s policy, and under established insurance law, P & M’could not seek subrogation against its own insured.

On October 8, 2013, F & M filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a ruling that tenant/decedent Marcus Allen was not an insúred under the P & M policy. On November 1, 2013, the estate filed a cross-motion for summary judgment arguing that Marcus Allen should be deemed an insured under the P & M pólicy and, therefore, P & M was prohibited from asserting a subrogation claim against the estate.

The circuit court granted the estate’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that tenant/decedent Marcus Allen had an interest in the F & M insurance policy because a portion of his rental payments were allocated to “insurance” pursuant to the lease-to-own agreement. The circuit court did not rule that Marcus Allen was a named, additional, or definitional insured under the P & M policy. Instead, the circuit court concluded that Marcus Allen was an “equitable insured.” The circuit court’s September 2, 2014, order explains:1

As the Court views the facts presented in this case, P & M is not permitted to the equitable remedy of subrogation against Mr. Men’s Estate. As developed during discovery, Mr. Allen had agreed to purchase the insured premises located at 175 Keys Street. The contract between Mr. Allen and Ms. O’Connor required that Mr. Allen- pay to Ms. O’Connor $625 every month. From these monthly payments, it was agreed that “$555.00 will go for mortgage, insurance and taxes.” Ms. O’Connor testified that pursuant to the contract, she did purchase insurance with Mr. Allen’s monthly payments. The insurance that she purchased was the policy provided by F & M. The Court’finds that there is nothing equitable about allowing F & M, based upon a policy purchased with Mr. Allen’s money, to pursue a subrogation claim against Mr. Allen’s Estate to repay it for the loss covered under the F & M policy_
F & M has paid a debt to Ms. O’Connor for the policy covering the property in question. F & M’s right to subrogation is to the extent that Ms. O’Connor, as its named insured, has a right to assert a claim against Mr. Allen for the loss. However, this produces a result that is not equitable. The Court finds that F & M wants to step into the shoes of Ms. O’Con-nor and seek repayment from Mr. Allen under a policy of insurance that Mr. Allen paid for. Consequently, based upon equitable principles, the Court finds that’ there is no genuine issue of fact to argue that F & M has a right t'o subrogation in this case against a person that funded the F & M policy.

Following entry of the circuit court’s order, F & M filed the present appeal.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

F &■ M appeals the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the estate. We have held that “[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.” Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). We afford a plenary review to a Rower court’s order awarding summary judgment: “A circuit court’s entry "of summary-judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

III.

ANALYSIS

The issue- is whether F & M may maintain a subrogation action against the tenant/decedent’s estate. We begin our analysis with a brief discussion of subrogation which has been defined by a leading insurance law treatise as follows:

“Subrogation” is the substitution of another person in place of the creditor to whose rights he or she succeeds in relation to the debt, and gives to the substitute all the rights, priorities, remedies, liens, and securities of the person for whom he or she is substituted..... in other words, a subro-gated insurer stands in the shoes .of an insured, and has no greater rights than the insured, for .one cannot acquire .by subro-gation what another,, whose rights he or she claims, did,,not have.
Accordingly, on paying a loss, an insurer is subrogated in a corresponding amount to the insured’s right of action against any other person responsible for the loss, such that the insurer is .entitled to bring an action against this .third party whose negligent or other tortious or wrongful conduct caused the loss, regardless of whether the insurer would have been entitled to bring such an action in its own right.

Steven Plitt et al., 16 Couch on Insurance 3d § 222:5 (2015) (footnotes omitted).

Our Court has recognized that “[t]he doctrine of subrogation is that one who has the right to pay* and does pay, a debt which ought to have been paid by another is entitled to exercise all the remedies which the creditor possessed against that other.” Syllabus Point 1, Bassett v. Streight, 78 W.Va. 262, 88 S.E. 848 (1916). Further, “[sjubrogation is applicable where a relationship of principal and surety or a relationship of primary and secondary liability exists, and the surety or the person with secondary liability has discharged the debt of the other pursuant to some legal liability.” Ray v. Donohew, 177 W.Va. 441, 449, 352 S.E.2d 729, 737 (1986). We have recognized that subrogation is a derivative right founded upon principles of justice and equity. See Fuller v. Stonewall Cas. Co. of W.Va., 172 W.Va. 193, 304 S.E.2d 347 (1983). This Court has also held that “[n]o right of subrogation can arise in favor of an insurer against its own insured, since by definition subrogation arises only with respect to rights of the insured against third persons to whom the insurer owes no duty.” Syllabus Point 2, Richards v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 W.Va. 244, 455 S.E.2d 803 (1995) (emphasis added).

The essential question in this case is whether tenant/decedent Marcus Allen was an “insured” under the F & M homeowner’s policy. F & M contends that the circuit court’s award of summary judgment to "the estate was improper because tenant/decedent Marcus Allen was not a named or definitional insured under the F & M policy, nor was the lease-to-own agreement he entered into with Shélly O’Connor an insurance contract. ' Further, F & M asserts that Marcus Allen had his own renter’s insurance through State Auto which included liability coverage; that the lease-to-own agreement stated Marcus Allen would be solely responsible for any damage he caused to the property; and that Marcus Allen’s negligence caused the fire and damage to the property. Finally, F & M asserts that “although couched in terms of F & M versus the estate, in reality the ease is F & M versus State Auto.” Under these facts, F & M argues, the circuit court erred by ruling that Marcus Allen was an “equitable insured” under the F & M policy.

By contrast, the estate contends that the circuit court correctly determined that Marcus Allen was an “equitable insured” under the F & M policy because Shelly O’Connor purchased the F & M policy for Marcus Allen, with a portion of Marcus Allen’s reni/monthly payments. The estate asserts that it is of no moment that Marcus Allen purchased renter’s insurance from State Auto. Rather, the estate claims the only insurance policy of importance is the F & M policy, under which Marcus Allen should be considered an “equitable insured.”

After review, we agree with F & M and find that Marcus Allen was not an “insured” under the' F & M homeowner’s policy. Thus, we conclude that F & M may maintain a subrogation action against Marcus Allen’s estate.

The circuit court’s ruling was based on! its finding that Marcus Allen was an “equitable insured” under the F & M policy. Importantly, the circuit court did not conclude, nor is it asserted by the estate on appeai, that Marcus Allen was a named or definitional insured under the F & M policy. This Court has previously recognized that an insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured named in the policy. In Mazon v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n, 182 W.Va. 532, 389 S.E.2d 743 (1990), the Court stated:

An insurance policy and all rights arising from the policy are controlled by principles of contract, rather' than property law.
It is welbestablished that a contract of insurance is a personal contract between the insurer and the insured named in the policy. It is also axiomatic that an insurance policy is a contract of indemnity which pertains to the parties to the contract as opposed to the property being insured. Accordingly an individual who is not a party to the insurance contract cannot maintain a suit on the policy.

Id. at 533, 389 S.E.2d at 745 (internal citation omitted, emphasis added).

Further, this .Court has held that “[wjhere the provisions of an insurance policy contract are clear and unambiguous they are not subject to judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be given to the plain meaning intended.” Syllabus Point 1, Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co., 153 W.Va. 813, 815-16, 172 S.E.2d 714, 715 (1970). The Court explained th.e, reasoning for .its holding in Keffer as follows:

The question of construction of a contract of insurance, as of the construction of contracts generally, can arise only when the language of the contract is in need of construction. If the language employed is unambiguous and clear, there is no occasion for construction. Stated differently, resort to general rules for the construction of an insurance policy is unnecessary where the contract is unambiguous and its meaning is clear. The court is bound to adhere to the insurance contract as the authentic expression of the intention of the parties, and it must be enforced as made where its language is plain and certain. This means that the terms of an unambiguous insurance policy cannot be enlarged or diminished by judicial construction, since the court cannot make a new contract for the parties where they themselves have employed express and unambiguous words.

Id. at 516, 172 S.E.2d at 715 (emphasis added).

Based on Mazon and Keffer, it is clear that an insurance policy and all rights arising from the policy are controlled by principles of contract law. Further, an insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the named and definitional insureds contained in the policy. If a contract unambiguously identifies the insureds, then a court may not, by judicial construction, enlarge the coverage to include other individuals foreign to the insurer.

In the present case, the F & M policy clearly and unambiguously states that the insurance contract is between F & M and Shelly O’Connor and Michael O’Connor. The circuit court failed to apply this clear, unambiguous language. Instead, the circuit court subjected the F & M policy to its own judicial construction and interpretation in ruling that,the tenanVdeeedent, a person who was not a named or definitional insured under the insurance contract, was an “equitable insured” of the F & M policy. This ruling altered the clear, unambiguous provisions of the F & M policy by adding an additional insured to the insurance contract. Under Syllabus Point 1 of Keffer, ■ the circuit court erred by enlarging the terms of the F & M policy instead of giving full effect to the policy’s clear and unambiguous language.

Further, this Court has never held that a person who is not a named or definitional insured of an insurance policy may be considered an “equitable insured.” We decline to' adopt the circuit court’s ruling that the tenant/decedent was an “equitable insured” of the F & M policy for thfe following reasons. First, under the circuit court’s ruling, F &'M became responsible for insuring Marcus Allen, á tenant it had never agreed to insure or was even aware had moved into the subject property. This ruling is patently unfair to F & M because F & M has a right to choose whom it will or will not insure. Under the circuit court’s ruling, F & M was not given the opportunity to assess the risk of insuring the tenanf/decedent before deciding whether to offer him an insurance contract, As one legal insurance treatise addressing whether a tenant should be considered a co-insured of a landlord’s insurance policy noted, “[t]he insurer has a right to choose whom it will insure[.]” 6A J.A. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4055, pp. 188-39 (Cum. Supp. 2014).

Additionally, adopting the “equitable insured” ruling eoúld-make every homeowner’s insurance policy purchased by a landlord subject to side agreements between the named insured (landlords) and third parties (tenants) who, though not named in the policy or known to the insurer, could allege that they had an “equitable” right to be covered under such a policy. This would create uncertainty as to who was covered under .a particular policy and could lead to extensive, costly litigation,

Next, we find that under the circuit court’s “equitable insured” ruling, the tenant/decedent’s insurance company, State Auto, would receive a windfall. In essence, the issue in this case is whether F & M can seek subro-gation against the tenant/decedent’s insurance company, State Auto. State Auto entered intq an insurance contract with the tenant/decedent, providing him with personal liability coverage in the amount of $100,000.00 per occurrence. F & M did not enter into an insurance contract with the tenani/decedent, nor was it given the opportunity to assess the risk associated with the tenant/decedent and decide whether it would offer him any coverage. Yet, under the circuit court’s ruling, the insurance company that agreed to insure the tenani/decedent’s personal liability, State Auto, avoids responsibility for damage caused to the subject property by the tenant/decedent’s alleged negligence. We find that such a ruling is inequitable and would result in a windfall to State Auto at the expense of F & M, who never agreed to insure the tenant/decedent.

Finally, we reject the circuit court’s “equitable insured” ruling based on our recognition of the following principle of law: “the fact both parties [landlord and tenant] had insurable interests does not make them co-insureds.” Appleman, Insurance I¿aw and Practice § 4055, at 138-39. An insurable interest, as it relates to property, has been defined as “any actual, lawful, and substantial economic interest in the safety or preservation of the subject of the insurance free from loss, destruction, or pecuniary damage or impairment.” W.Va.Code § 33 — 6—3(b) [1957]. Our Court addressed this issue in Mazon, stating,

A person who is not either a party to the insurance contract or one for whose benefit it was written is not entitled to a share of the insurance proceeds by the mere fact they, have an insurable interest in property.... [Those who are not the named insured] must establish [that] the named insured intended to cover an interest other than her own insurable ’ interest— The mere fact a co-owner insures the entire property does not preponderate to establish he is acting for another co-owner.

182 W.Va. at 534, 389 S.E.2d at 745 (quoting Hartford Ins. Co. v. Stablier, 476 So.2d 464 (La.App.1985)).

Courts outside of our jurisdiction examining this issue have agreed with Appleman’s conclusion that “the fact that two parties have insurable interests does not make them co-insureds.” For instance, in Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388 Md. 690, 714, 882 A.2d 801, 815 (2005), the court held:

The notion that, barring some express provision to the contrary, landlords and tenants are, as a matter of law, to be treated as co-insuréds under the landlord’s policy has no valid foundation. The supposed basis for that conclusion is that the tenant has an insurable interest in continued possession of the leased premises, and that may be so, but it does not make the tenant a co-insured.

Similarly, in Neubauer v. Hostetter, 485 N.W.2d 87, 90 (Iowa 1992), the Supreme Court of Iowa refused to. accept that “fire insurance on,an entire dwelling includes the interest qf both landlord and tenant as a matter of law.” That argument, it said, “disregards the fact that these are separate estates capable of being separately valued and separately insured.” Id. After reviewing our case law, the Appleman treatise on insurance law, and cases from other jurisdictions, we hold that a tenant who is neither a named nor definitional insured of a landlord’s homeowner’s insurance policy is not an insured under the landlord’s policy by the mere fact that the tenant may have an insurable interest in the leased property.

IV.

CONCLUSION

We find that F & M may maintain a subrogation action against the estate. The circuit court’s September 2, 2014, order, ruling that Marcus Allen was an “equitable insured” under the F & M policy, is reversed.

Reversed.

DAVIS, Justice,

concurring:

I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse the circuit court’s ruling because the insurer is entitled to maintain a subrogation claim against the tenant’s estate under the facts of the case sub 'judice.-\ However, I depart' from my brethren insofar as their resolution of the instant proceeding fails to explain the process'for resolving such subro-gation issues. Rather than providing a clear and definite roadmap of the analysis to be employed in determining when an insurer is . entitled to subrogation from its insured’s tenant, the majority simply ignores this opportunity to provide guidance to the bench and the bar, instead focusing solely upon.whether the tenant in this case was an insured under his landlord’s Farmers & Mechanics insurance policy. I submit that when determining an insurer’s subrogation rights when its insured has leased premises to a tenant, the reviewing court should employ a case-by-case analysis. A case-by-case evaluation of an insurer’s subrogation rights allows a reviewing court to give full effect to the language employed by the parties in the unique contracts governing their particular dispute: the subject lease agreement and the pertinent policy of insurance. Accordingly, -while I agree with the ultimate decision to reverse the circuit court’s ruling in this case, I concur to explain why the Court should- have adopted the case-by-case approach as the method by which to decide subrogation issues that arise when an insured leases premises to a tenant.

The pivotal issue presented by the case sub judice is whether the insurer herein has a right to subrogation against the estate of its insured’s deceased tenant.

The object of subrogation is the prevention of injustice. It is designed to promote and to accomplish justice, and is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who, in justice, equity, and good conscience, should pay it. It is an appropriate means of preventing unjust enrichment. The doctrine of subro-gation is applied to subserve the ends of justice, to do equity in the particular case under consideration, and to prevent fraud or relieve from mistake. But, in general, the original right measures the extent of the new right. The surety is entitled to be made whole for the loss but not to make a profit.

23 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 61:51 (4th ed.2011) (footnotes omitted). In other words, “[sjubrogation is applicable where a relationship of principal and surety or a relationship of primary and secondary liability exists, and the surety or the person with secondary liability has discharged the debt of the other pursuant to some legal liability.” Ray v. Donohew, 177 W.Va. 441, 449, 352 S.E.2d 729, 737 (1986) (citations omitted). Thus, to ascertain whether such a relationship exists in a case of this nature, it is essential to consider the very contractual agreements establishing the insurer/insured and landlord/tenant relationships because “[t]he right of. subrogation depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Huggins v. Fitzpatrick, 102 W.Va. 224, 228, 135 S.E. 19, 20 (1926).” Syl. pt. 3, Ray, 177 W.Va. 441, 352 S.E.2d 729. This analysis also is imperative insofar as “[n]o right of subrogation can arise in favor of an insurer against its own insured, since by definition subrogation arises only with respect to rights of the insured against third persons to whom the insurer owes no duty.” Syl. pt. 2, Richards v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 W.Va. 244, 455 S.E.2d 803 (1995). While the majority correctly answered the preliminary question , of whether the tenant herein was an insured under the insured’s policy of insurance, the majority ended its analysis before it apprised the nature of the contractual relationships of the parties involved in the instant controversy or appreciated the import of whether the tenant’s status as such subjected him to sub-rogation under the terms of the subject contracts.

While several different methods of determining an insurer’s right of subrogation against its insured’s tenant have been developed, the case-by-case approach is the more reasoned and legally sound course. Evaluating each case on its own merits permits a reviewing court to consider the unique contracts establishing the insurer/insured and the landlord/tenant relationships in a given case and to appreciate the nuances that are specific to those particular agreements; by contrast, other methods of analysis employing a blanket'approach and one-size-fits-all standard cannot, by their own terms, give effect to the contracting parties’ intent as expressed by the subject contracts establishing and governing their contractual relationships. Insofar as both an insured/insurer relationship and a landlord/tenant relationship are established by contract, considering the particular language of each such contract is the only way to give full force to the parties’ intent underlying the creation of such relationships. See Mazon v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n 182 W.Va. 532, 533, 389 S.E.2d 743, 744 (1990) (“An insurance policy and all rights arising from the policy are controlled by principles of contract.... It is well-established that a contract of insurance is a personal contract between the insurer and the insured named in the policy.” (citations omitted)). See also Napier v. Napier, 211 W.Va. 208, 212, 564 S.E.2d 418, 422 (2002) (“The relation of landlord and tenant is created by a contract, either express or implied, by the terms of which one person designated ‘tenant’ enters into possession of the land under another person known as ‘landlord.’” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).

The ease-by-case approach “applies basic contract principles.” American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 757 N.W.2d 584, 594 (S.D.2008). “Under this approach, the issue of subrogation is determined by application of contract principles on a ease-by-case basis. Subrogation may be denied under the ease-by-case approach if the lease expressly requires the landlord to maintain fire insurance or the lease exonerates a tenant from losses caused by fire.” Id. “Conversely, subrogation may be appropriate where the lease does not require the landlord to .purchase fire insurance or the lease requires the tenants to purchase their own insurance to cover liabilities resulting from their negligence.” Id. at 593 (citations omitted). In other words, the case-by-case approach allows a reviewing “court [to] examine[ ] the lease as a whole to determine the parties’ reasonable expectations as to who should bear the risk of loss when a tenant negligently damages the leased premises,” thus “eschew[ing] presumptions that a tenant is or is not a co-insured of the landlord.” Underwriters of Lloyds of London v. Cape Publ’ns, Inc., 63 So.3d 892, 895 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2011). Therefore, the tribunal considering the subrogation issue “avoids ... making assumptions and adopting fictions that are largely conjectural, if not patently illogical, and instead applies basic contract principles and gives proper credence to the equitable underpinning of the whole doctrine of subrogation.” Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388 Md. 690, 713-14, 882 A.2d 801, 814-15 (2005). See also 56 Assocs. ex rel. Paolino v. Frieband, 89 F.Supp.2d 189, 194 (D.R.I.2000) (recognizing that court is bound to enforce contract as written rather than reading terms into contract that are not included therein and adopting case-by-case approach because it allows court to consider “the terms- of the-lease between the landlord and tenant to see if the insurer, stepping into the landlord’s shoes, may maintain a subro-gation action against the tenant for the tenant’s negligence”); Rausch v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388 Md. at 714, 882 A.2d at 815 (observing that “courts have no business adding insureds to an insurance policy in order to achieve their perception of good public policy” (citation omitted)). •

In sum, “the case-by-case approach [i]s a better reasoned rule that recognizes the intent of the parties under contract law and the equitable underpinning of subrogation.” American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 757 N.W.2d at 594. The case-by-case approach is the most practical method-of evaluating an insurer’s subrogation rights vis-a-vis a tenant of its insured because it fully appreciates and gives full force and effect to the parties’ contractual’ agreements, and this is the method that the majority should have adopted and employed to fully resolve the subrogation issue presented by the case sub judice. Given that the majority nevertheless reached the correct result absent such an analysis, I concur in the majority’s resolution of this ease. 
      
      . Shelly O’Connor moved into the subject property in 2006 and resided there until she entered into the lease-to-own agreement with Marcus Allen in December 2009.
     
      
      . Michael O'Connor testified that F & M paid $85,000.00 for the property damage caused by the fire.
     
      
      . Shelly O’Connor testified that she removed the old smoke detectors from the residence before Marcus Allen moved in and that she bought new smoke detectors that she gave to Marcus Allen. She testified that "there was probably six different times I told him that we needed — that he needs to let me put them (the smoke detectors) up.” Shelly O’Connor stated that Marcus Allen ' refused because "he wanted to put them up where,.he wanted them, and he didn’t want to ’ keep moving them and have holes all over his walls.” Shelly O’Connor testified thát the new smoke detectors she purchased were found in a kitchen drawer in the subject property following the fire.
     
      
      . F & M filed a motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure for the purpose of resolving "certain questions and disputes which have arisen regarding the status of decedent Marcus Allen as a -potential insured on a policy of insurance issued by F & M[.]”
     
      
      .The estate's brief to this Court argues that Marcus Allen was an "equitable insured’’ under the F & M policy, stating, "it is important to note that [Respondent] acknowledged that Marcus Allen was not a named insured under the policy of insurance issued by Petitioner [F & M].... As is evident 'from the Circuit Court's Order, it looked beyond the mere named insureds- and/or definitional insureds identified by the policy to consider whether any other interests existed in the subject,property,... Under such circumstances, equitable principles dictate that Petitioner [F & M] has no right to subrogation in this case.”
     
      
      . Some courts outside' of our jurisdiction have ruled that absent an express agreement in the lease to the contrary, a landlord and tenant are considered to be co-insureds under a landlord’s fire-insurance policy. See Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478 (Okla.Ct.App.1975). We conclude that Mazon and Keffer compel us not to follow the rule announced in Sutton. In Mazon and Keffer, this Court established that (1) an insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the named insured, and (2) full effect will be given to the provisions of an insurance policy that are clear, and unambiguous. Under the Sutton rule, a court is not required to give full effect to an insurance policy that is clear and unambiguous. Rather, Sutton states that a court should enlarge the terms of an insurance policy by presuming a tenant, who is not named in the landlord's insurance contract, is covered under the landlord's policy unless there is an express agreement between the landlord and tenant to the contrary.
      While followed in some jurisdictions, the Sutton rule has been rejected by a number of courts. For instance, in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Geekie, 179 Ill.App.3d 679, 128 Ill.Dec. 616, 534 N.E.2d 1061 (1989), the court found that traditional landlord-tenant law holds the tenant responsible for his negligent acts. Although the tenant has a contractual right to shift the burden, in the absence of such a contractual.provision, the court would not indulge in the legal fiction of creating such a provision. 179 Ill.App.3d at 682, 128 Ill.Dec. 616, 534 N.E.2d at 1062. The court allowed the landlord’s insurer to seek, subrogation against the tenant, stating that "it satisfies equitable concerns by placing the burden of .the loss where it ought to be-on the negligent party.” Id..; see also Zoppi v. Traurig, 251 N.J.Super. 283, 598 A.2d 19 (1990) (if landlord has claim against tenant, the existence of insurance should not exculpate tenant from his negligent conduct, absent an agreement).
     
      
      . This quote from Mazon comes from a Louisiana case in which the court determined that one sister, who co-owned a piece of real estate along with her three sisters, procured insurance on the property for her own benefit, rather than for the benefit of her other sisters/co-owners. The court’s discussion of an insurance contract extending to one "for whose benefit it [the insurance policy] was written” was in the context of whether an' insurance policy purchased by one co-owner of property extends to cover the Other co-ownérs of the property. In the present case, the tenant/decedent was not a co-owner of the subject property. Rather, the tenant/decedent agreed to a lease-to-own agreement under which he would have been evicted from the property if he failed to make a monthly payment on-time or if he caused damage to the property.
      Further evidence that the F & M policy was not obtained for the tenani/decedent’s benefit can be seen in the language of the lease-to-own agreement. The agreement states that the ten-ani/decedent was "solely responsible" for any damage he caused to the subject property, and that he would be evicted for causing damage to the property. The Supreme Court of Vermont, faced'with a similar factual scenario, held: "The lease here, in express and unqualified language, obligates tenants to pay for the damage caused by their negligence.... [W]e find nothing in the language of the lease that would reasonably lead tenants to-imply a contrary intent.” Travelers Indemnity Co. of America v. Deguise, 180 Vt. 214219, 914 A.2d 499, 502 (2006), Because the lease obligated the tenants to pay for the damage caused -by their own negligence, the Supreme Court of Vermont concluded that the tenants were not co-insureds under the landlord’s fire insurance policy. Id., 180 Vt. at 220, 914 A.2d at 503. The same logic applies to the present case — there is simply nothing contained in the lease-to-own agreement which suggests that the tenant/decedent would be covered under the landlord's insurance policy for damage he caused to the subject property. To the contrary, the plain language of the agreement states that the tenant/decedent would be evicted from the premises and held "solely responsible” for causing damage to the property.
      Moreover, ¡the F & M policy .was- a renewal policy that Shelly O'Connor first obtained in 2006, years before she entered into the lease-to--own agreement'with the tenant/decedent. We also note that the tenant’s estate did not make a claim under the F & M' policy after the fire occurred, despite its present assertion that the F & M policy was written for the tenant/decedent’s benefit. Based on these facts, we conclude that the F & M policy was not written for the tenant/decedent’s benefit.
     
      
      ; See, e.g., Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478, 482 (Okla.Civ.App.1975) (espousing view-that "subro-gation should not be available to the insurance carrier because the law considers the tenant as a co-insured of the landlord absent an express agreement .between them to the contrary”). See also Fire Ins. Exch. v. Geekie, 179 Ill.App.3d 679, 682, 128 Ill.Dec. 616, 617, 534 N.E.2d 1061, 1062 (1989) (expressly rejecting Sutton approach and instead adopting common law view that, “in the absence of an express agreement to the con-traiy, a tenant is liable for damages to the leased premises resulting from his failure to exercise due care” (citation omitted)).
     
      
      . See American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 757 N.W.2d 584 (S.D.2008). For further discussion of the case-by-case approach, see infra.
      
     
      
      . Underwriters of Lloyds of London v. Cape Publ'ns, Inc., 63 So.3d 892, 895 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2011) (citations omitted).
     