
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesus GARCIA, AKA Chuy, AKA Jesus Garza Garcia, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-50350
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted February 15, 2018 Pasadena, California
    Filed February 27, 2018
    L. Ashley Aull, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Carolyn Small, DOJ—Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    David Andrew Schlesinger, Esquire, Jacobs & Schlesinger LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: McKEOWN and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and DONATO, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable James Donato, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jesus Garcia appeals his conviction based on the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Garcia argues that evidence derived from an investigatory stop should have been suppressed because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the car. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recite them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

'The Fourth Amendment permits investigatory stops “only upon a showing of reasonable suspicion: a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion requires specific, articu-lable facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for suspecting that a particular person is engaged in criminal conduct.” United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the officers had a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting that the car’s windows were tinted beyond the level permitted by California Vehicle Code § 26708. During the evidentiary hearing, the officers testified that the car’s windows were tinted so darkly that they were unable to see the occupants inside of the vehicle. Officer Osorio added that this was true even when the headlights of the officers’ car were pointed directly into the car. The officers testified that, given their training and experience, this observation indicated that the tinting was beyond the permissible level. The district court expressly credited the officers, and “afforded greater weight” to Officer Osorio’s testimony given “her additional experience on the job, her consistent description of the circumstances, and her credible demeanor during the hearing.”

Contrary to Garcia’s argument, the facts here are not similar to those in United States v. Caseres. In Caseres we held that a mere observation that the windows were tinted, without additional articulable facts suggesting that the windows were “not factory-installed, legally tinted safety glass,” was too speculative. 533 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, on the other hand, the officers not only saw the tinting, but observed that it was so dark that they were unable to see the occupants even when headlights were pointing into the car, and they had prior experience in these matters. These “specific, articulable facts,” especially when coupled with the credibility finding, were sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     