
    STEVENS v. STATE.
    (No. 8662.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    May 20, 1925.
    Rehearing Denied June 17, 1925.)
    1. Criminal law <S=589(5) — Denial of continuance on ground that sheriff was witness, .whose interest in case might influence selection of jurors, held not error.
    Denial of motion to continue, when only 13 regular jurors appeared on day of trial, on ground that sheriff was witness, whose interest . in- case might influence selection of jurors, held not error, where there was no suggestion, in evidence heard by court, of any prejudice on sheriff’s part, nor any claim that any objectionable juror sat on trial, and appellant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges.
    2. Homicide <&wkey;169(1) — Prosecuting' witness’ testimony as to what he did! after stopping at house near that of defendant, before assault, held admissible.
    In prosecution for assault to murder deputy "sheriff, about to search defendant’s premises for intoxicating liquor, officer’s testimony, in answer to question as to what he did after stopping at house near that of defendant,. that he followed girl, whom he saw running therefrom and saw defendant and another run out of house to which she went, held admissible.
    3. Homicide <&wkey;l82 — Search warrant and testimony of justice of peace and deputy sheriff held admissible, in prosecution for assault to murder latter, to meet contention that he was acting without authority.
    Search war-rant and testimony of deputy sheriff, who attempted to serve it, and of justice of peace, who issued it, held admissible, in prosecution for assault to murder former, to meet contention that he was trespasser acting illegally.
    4. Homicide <&wkey;l69(5) — Evidence of defendant’s possession of still and whisky, and efforts to prevent discovery thereof, held admissible, in prosecution for assault to murder deputy sheriff.
    In prosecution for assault to murder deputy sheriff, about to search defendant’s premises for intoxicating liquor, evidence of defendant’s possession of still and whisky, and what he did to prevent discovery thereof when.officers appeared, was material to show motive and explain defendant’s acts and conduct.
    5. Homicide <&wkey;l82 — Deputy sheriff, assaulted to prevent search of defendant’s premises for intoxicating liquor, held properly allowed to state that he had! no chance to further examine premises' after being, shot, and that defendant did not ask him if he had warrant for his arrest.
    In. prosecution for assault to murder deputy sheriff, ¡ñ>ont to search defendant’s premises for intoxicating liquor, such officer was properly allowed to state that he had no opportunity to further examine premises after being shot, and that defendant did not ask him if he had warrant for defendant’s arrest.
    6. Homicide i&wkey; 182 — That prosecuting witness was deputy sheriff held sufficiently shown by his and sheriff’s testimony.
    In prosecution for assault to murder deputy sheriff, about to search defendant’s premises for intoxicating liquor, such officer’s testimony, corroborated by that of sheriff, held sufficient to show that he was an officer.
    On Motion for Rehearing,
    7. Homicide &wkey;>296 — Charge on right to resist unlawful arrest held properly refused as not supported by testimony.
    In prosecution for assault to murder deputy sheriff, about to search defendant’s premises for intoxicating liquor, charge on defendant’s right to resist unlawful arrest held properly refused, as on theory not supported by testimony.
    Appeal from District Court, Milam County; John Watson, Judge. ,
    Wesley Stevens was convicted of aggravated assault, and appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Chambers, Wallace & Gillis, of Cameron, for appellant.
    ' Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., ancl Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.
   LATTIMORE, J.

Conviction was for aggravated assault under a charge of assault to murder; punishment, a fine of $600 and 6 months in the county jail.

On the occasion referred to, officers armed with a search warrant went to appellant’s premises. He lived about 300 yards from his father. The officers went first to the home of Bob Stevens, appellant’s father. Before Officer Little entered the house, he saw a girl running from Bob Stevens’ home to that of appellant, and pursued her. She entered the house before the officer got there. According to Little’s testimony, immediately 2 men ran out — one- of whom was appellant, the other Jim Brashear. They ran into a little tin or iron house near the barn, from which appellant emerged with a big stone jar from which he poured whisky or strained mash, witness was not sure which. Brashear came out with a copper coil in his hand and ran. The officer pursued and overtook him, and started back with him toward the said little house. A noise as of breaking fruit jars, etc., came from the nearby barn. The .officer started to the barn with Brashear. When in about 8 or 10 feet of the door, Brashear called, “Wesley, come out,” and immediately appellant appeared in the door with a shotgun at his shoulder pointed at witness. Mr. Little said he tried to strike the gun down, and as it exploded it tore 4 or 5 pounds of flesh from the side of his hip. At once Brashear jumped upon him, and, acting with appellant, they took from witness his pistol, and appellant threatened to kill him. Witness said he remonstrated, and appellant then told him he would have to run away. Witness told them that if they would give him his gun he would walk away. They did so. Before leaving, witness asked appellant why he shot him, to which the latter replied that he hated to do it but had to. Witness asked him why, and appellant replied that witness was interfering with his business. Witness then started to walk away, but turned, after going a few steps, and said to appellant,“Wesley, you would not shoot me in the back would you?” to which appellant replied, “G-d'd-n you, I told you to go ahead.” Witness then went on up to the house of Bob Stevens. The gun used by appellant was an automatic shotgun, and later in the day he was arrested, and the gun found to contain No. 3 shot.

Appellant and Brashear both testified, and that was the theory of the defense throughout, that it was an accidental shooting; that appellant came out of the door of the barn holding the gun in his left hand and not presented; that state witness Little tried to grab it away from him; and that in the scuffle that ensued the gun was accidentally discharged. Appellant took the stand in his own behalf, and swore the shooting was accidental, and that he did not intend to shoot. Basing his right to do so upon the fact that he was charged with a violation of the liquor law, he declined to state what he was doing that morning when the officers arrived, and further declined to say that, when Mr. Little saw hirri just before he ran after Bra-shear, Little said, “Wesley,.'you are destroying the evidence.”

When the case was first called for trial, only a few of the regular jurors appeared, and it was postponed, and the officer directed to yaake further effort to obtain said jurors. He had notified them, but afterward telephoned them. Only 13 of the regular jurors appeared on the day of the trial. A motion to continue was made, based on the. ground that the sheriff was a witness and interested in the case, and this might influence the selection of jurors. The court heard evidence. There is not a suggestion therein of any prejudice on the part of the. sheriff. The bill is qualified by the statement that appellant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges. There is no claim or assertion that any objectionable juror sat on the trial. White v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 597, 78 S. W. 1066, cited by appellant, seems to contain nothing in support of his contention.

Bill No. 2 complains that witness Lit-' tie was allowed to state what he did after stopping at Bob Stevens’ house. The answer merely set forth that he saw -the little girl running, followed her, and that two men, one of whom was appellant, were seen to run out of the house to which she went. The matter appears not subject to the objection.

Witness Little testified that he had a warrant for appellant on the occasion, and identified the document, and it was introduced in evidence. The record supports the proposition that appellant was then insisting that Little was a trespasser, and his presence and acts illegal. Later, when appellant took ’ the witness stand and introduced his other testimony, it is plain that he did' not attempt to predicate any theory of his defense upon the ground that Little was illegálly attempting to arrest him, or of his right to resist any such illegal arrest. TO' meet the accusation that the officers were, acting without authority, it was proper to introduce the warrant and the testimony of Mr. Little and that of the justice of the peace-at Buekholts, who issued same. It was also material as showing motive, and as explanatory of appellant’s acts and conduct to-prove that he had a still and whisky in his possession, and what he did relative thereto-when the officers appeared.

We see no error in allowing Officer Little to state that he had no opportunity to make further examination of the premises after he was shot; nor in permitting him to state that appellant at no time asked him if he had a warrant for his arrest. -From the state’s testimony it is clear that all of appellant’s acts in attempting to destroy the evidence, in coming out of the barn with his gun presented, and in what he said about shooting the officer because the latter was interfering with his business, were such acts as-would reasonably appear likely on the part of a man caught in the commission of a crime.

Attempts to show that Mr. Little was-not an officer find no support. He swore that life was deputy sheriff under oath and-deputation. He was corroborated in this by the sheriff. O’Neal v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 42, 22 S. W. 25; Jenkins v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 224, 82 S. W. 1036; Branch’s Ann. P. C. p. 1114.

Being unable to agree with any of the contentions argued at length by able counsel for appellant, and being of opinion that the facts support the verdict, the judgment will be affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

Appellant again urges that the court below erred in failing to charge on his right to make lawful resistance to an unlawful arrest. In our original opinion we stated the facts at some length. There is no need to incumber a charge with instructions on theories not supported by testimony. We regret to say that we find nothing in the testimony offered by either side supporting the proposition that what appellant did was in resistance to an unlawful arrest. The officers, one of whom was the alleged injured party, had gone with a search warrant to search premises of appellant for intoxicating liquor. They made no search, apparently because of the acts and conduct of appellant and Brashear, who, according to the state’s testimony, fled out to the part of the premises where the still and liquor were located and began to destroy same. The state’s testimony shows that when Brashear fled from, this latter point he was pursued and captured by Mr. Little; that appellant had gone into a barn from which came a noise as of breaking bottles or jars. Little did not enter this barn. All parties admitted that Brashear called appellant to come out, and that he did come out. The testimony for the state and the defendant differed, in that the state witness said that appellant came out with a gun in a shooting position, and the testimony for the defense that he did not. There was no claim on the part of any one that Mr. Little then told appellant that he was under arrest. The defensive testimony was in support of the proposition that Little grabbed at appellant’s gun as he stepped down from the door, and that in the scuffle over it it was discharged, and Little was accidentally shot. Nothing in the theory or testimony of either side seems to us to call for the charges, complaint of the refusal of which is again urged.

Our holding that there was no error in admitting in evidence the search warrant, etc., is not at variance with Bryant v. State, 94 Tex. Cr. R. 67, 250 S. W. 169, or Gaunce v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 365, 261 S. W. 577. There was no claim in either of those cases that the officers were trespassers, and no issue based on the use of force in resisting arrest.

Being unable to agree with appellant’s contentions, the motion for rehearing is overruled. ’ 
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