
    Jianan YANG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-4754.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 12, 2016.
    
      Lee Ratner, Law Offices of Michael Brown, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy, Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S. Fer-rier, Assistant Director; Kimberly A. Burdge, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: WALKER, PETER W. HALL, and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Jianan Yang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 17, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming a September 10, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Yang’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jianan Yang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Dec. 17, 2014), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 10, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

The agency may base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor and inconsistencies between his statements and other evidence, “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam). “We defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

Here, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. The IJ reasonably relied on inconsistencies among Yang’s testimony, asylum application, and documentary evidence. For instance, Yang testified that he was one of five people arrested when police officers came to his church in China, and that four others escaped. However, his asylum application stated that all nine people at the church were arrested. Yang’s explanation that he forgot and was telling the truth would not compel a reasonable fact-finder to credit his testimony, as it does not explain the discrepancy. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005).

Yang also stated that he had no visitors while he was in custody, but a letter he submitted from a friend contradicts that claim. Yang’s explanation that the friend may have visited Yang while he was recuperating at home is not compelling because the letter clearly states that the author witnessed Yang in police custody. See id. Further, although Yang testified that he was unfamiliar with the Methodist church, a letter from his mother stated that he attended a Methodist church in the United States.

The IJ also found that Yang appeared to testify from a memorized script. This is a demeanor finding, which is “paradigmati-cally the sort of evidence that a fact-finder is best positioned to evaluate.” Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 129, 140 (2d Cir.2006). The record supports this finding, as Yang’s only instance of nonresponsive testimony during direct examination occurred when the IJ interrupted to ask a question about Yang’s passport, and Yang suddenly became hesitant and vague on cross-examination. The demeanor finding is further bolstered by the inconsistencies discussed above. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.2006).

Yang argues that the credibility finding was unreasonable because it is not logical for an applicant to memorize testimony inconsistent with his application. This argument is without merit, as the IJ clearly found that Yang’s testimony on direct examination was seemingly memorized, while his testimony on cross-examination contained the important .inconsistencies.

Finally, the IJ reasonably relied on Yang’s failure to provide certain corroborating evidence to bolster her finding that Yang was not credible. Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007). Yang failed to provide evidence corroborating his assertion that he received medical treatment after his detention, and further failed to corroborate his alleged practice of Christianity in the United States. See Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198-99 (2d Cir.2009).

Given the IJ’s findings regarding Yang’s demeanor and the inconsistency in and the lack of corroboration of his testimony, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. As his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief are all based, on the same factual predicates, the credibility determination is dispositive of his petition. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.2006). We do not address the agency’s alternative determination that Yang had not established that his asylum application was timely filed. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  