
    CLYMAN v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    March 26, 1913.)
    1. Disorderly House (§ 16) — Use op Property-Evidence.
    In a prosecution for knowingly permitting property to be used as a house of prostitution, evidence of an inmate that she paid defendant $1.50 a day as rent, that she was a prostitute, and that she plied her vocation in the house in question was admissible.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Disorderly House, Cent. Dig. §§ 21-25; Dec. Dig. § 16.]
    2. Disorderly House (§ 8) — Defenses — Segregation by City Ordinance.
    The use of real property for prostitution being contrary to the laws of the state, a city has no authority to set apart and designate any portion thereof for the purposes of permitting prostitutes to resort and reside therein for the purpose of plying their vocation.
    [Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Disorderly House, Cent. Dig. § 8; Dec. Dig. § 8.]
    3. Indictment and Information (§ 130)— Joinder of Counts — Distinct Offenses.
    In a prosecution for knowingly permitting a house controlled by accused to be used as a house of prostitution, the state may allege the offense to have been committed on each of several days in different counts, and sustain a conviction on each count, if the evidence justifies the verdict.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 419-423; Dee. Dig. § 130.]
    Appeal from Dallas County Court at Law; W. F. Whitehurst, Judge.
    Morris Clyman was convicted of knowingly permitting certain real estate of which he was in control to be used as a house of prostitution, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    C. E. Lane, Asst Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other .eases see same topic and section NUMBER in Deo. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   HARPER, J.

The indictment in this case contains three count’s, and charges that appellant on the 8th, 10th, and 12th days of July, 1912, was the owner, lessee, and person in control of a certain house situate in Dallas county, and did unlawfully and knowingly permit said house to be used for the purpose of prostitution, and as a house where prostitutes were then and there permitted to resort and reside for the purpose of plying their vocation. He was convicted on all three counts.

Dorothy Ross was permitted to testify that she rented rooms in this house from appellant and paid him $1.50 per day as rent; that she was a prostitute, and plied her vocation in this house. The court did not err in permitting her to so testify, and the circumstances are such that they authorized the jury to find that appellant had full knowledge of the facts when he rented the house and daily collected the rent.

The court, under the evidence adduced in this case, correctly instructed the jury that the city of Dallas was not authorized to set apart and designate any part of said city for the purpose of permitting prostitutes to resort and reside therein for the purpose of plying their vocation — to do so would be in violation of the laws of the state. Neither was it error for the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict upon each count in the indictment. In this character of case the state can allege the offense to have been committed on each of several days in different counts, and sustain a conviction upon each count if the evidence justified such verdict.

The court’s charge having fully covered all the law applicable to the ease, it was not necessary to give any of the special charges requested. The one which sought to have the court instruct the jury that if the premises were situate in what is known as the “reservation,” and same had been set apart by the city of Dallas for the segregation of prostitutes, is not the law, and should not have been given. This would violate a state law, and the city of Dallas could not pass an ordinance in contravention thereof.

The judgment is affirmed.  