
    Elisabeth Mauarr v. Laura Parrish.
    1. The statute for the sale of infants’ estates hy guardians requires that the petition of the guardian shall contain a description of all the real estate of the ward; and, where the contrary does not appear, it will he presumed that the real estate described in the petition includes all that the ward owns.
    2. In a proceeding under that statute, the property of the ward was described in the guardian’s petition as lots Nos. 73, 74, and 75, in East Ironton, and as having come to the ward by descent. The appraisement and order of sale in the case were of lots Nos. 173, 174, and 175, in said town, the latter being the true description of three lots actually owned hy her, and which came to her hy descent, In an action hy the ward to recover one of these lots (No. 174) from a party claiming title under a sale made hy the guardian in pursuance of this order of the court: Meld, That it is to he presumed that the ward owned hut the three lots actually so sold, and that there was a mere mistake in numbering them in the petition; and that there was enough in the petition to give the court jurisdiction over the subject matter.
    •3. The'failure of the court, in such case, to require new bonds of the guardian, upon making the order of sale, or to appoint appraisers who have the proper qualification, although it may he ground of error, does not render the proceeding void, or the sale invalid.
    Motion for leave to file ¿ petition in error to the District Court of Lawrence county.
    This was an action by Laura Parrish against Elisabeth Mauair to recover possession of lot No. 174 in the town of East Ironton, Lawrence county. Elisabeth claimed title under an alleged sale of the lot by Laura’s guardian, under an order of the Probate Court of Gallia county, made in 1866. In her answer she set forth a copy of the proceedings in said Probate Court. By this copy it appears that the petition of the guardian asked for an order to sell three lots situate in said town of East Ironton, which lots had descended to Laura from an ancestor, and which in the guardian’s petition were described as Nos. 73, 74, and 75. Notice was duly served upon Laura of the pendency and prayer of this petition, and the Probate Court, at the proper time thereafter, made an order for the appraisement of the lots by three freeholders, describing them in the order as freeholders of “ this ” county, apparently meaning Gallia county. 'Whether the appraisers named were residents of Gallia or of Lawrence county the record does not otherwise show; but it shows that an order was subsequently issued to them by the court, directing them to appraise lots No. 173, 174, and 175 in said town of East Iron-ton. In obedience to this order the freeholders named returned to the court their appraisement of said three lots, describing them by number as 173, 174, and 175, and the court thereupon found said appraisement to be in all things regular, approved the same, and duly ordered a sale of the lots so appraised. The sale so ordered was duly made by the guardian and confirmed by the court, and a deed wTas ordered by the court, and executed to the purchaser, under whom Elisabeth claims title. The record does not show that at the time of ordering the sale the court required the guardian to give additional bonds or security, as the statute requires, but instead thereof shows that the court found the bonds already given by the guardian to be sufficient.
    The answer alleges that lots 173, 174, and 175 descended to Laura from an ancestor, and that these were the lots for the sale of which the guardian sought the order of the Probate Court. But the answer does not show whether Laura owned in said town any lots numbered 73, 74, or 75, dr whether she owned other real estate than lots 173, 174, and 175.
    This answer was demurred to on the ground that it showed no legal sale of the lots by the guardian. The court sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment for the plaintiff below, and, on error, the judgment was affirmed by the District Court. Leave is now asked to file a petition in error to reverse the judgments of both courts.
    The grounds on which the sale is impeached are : 1. That the lots sold are not the same as those described in the guardian’s petition; 2. The appraisers did not reside in Lawrence county; 3. The Probate Court did not require any new bond of the guardian.
    
      Leet $ Hamilton, for the motion.
    
      Neal &¡ Gherrington, contra.
   Welch, O. J.

As to the second and third objections to the proceeding in the Probate Court, it is enough to say that they do not go to the jurisdiction of the court, or render the proceeding void, whatever would have been their effect in a direct proceeding to reverse the order of sale.

The question presented by the first objection is, whether the order of sale made by the Probate Court is not void on the ground that the lots so ordered to be sold are not the lots described in the guardian’s petition, and that, therefore, the court acquired no jurisdiction over the lots sold. Had the pleader set forth in the answer all the material facts relating to the ward’s property, there would probably have been but little difficulty in deciding the question. If it be the fact that the wai’d really owned six lots in East Iron-ton, numbered 73, 74, 75,173, 174, and 175, and that they all “ descended to her from an ancestor,” the question presented would have been whether, upon application by the guardian to sell only a part of the ward’s estate, without any description of the ward’s other property, or any disclosure of the fact that the ward had other property, the court acquired jurisdiction over her entire estate. This question, however, we think does not arise in the present case. It seems to us that there is upon the face of this record of proceedings in the Probate Court, taken in connection with the answer setting it forth, sufficient to satisfy any one that the numbering of the lots in the petition of the guardian as 73, 74, and 75, instead of 173, 174, and 175, was a mere clerical mistake of the draughtsman. We come to this conclusion for several reasons: 1. The mistake is one easily fallen into; 2. The extreme improbability that the same person should own six lots happening thus to vary exactly 100 in their numbers; 3. The statute requires the guardian to set forth in his petition a description of all the ward’s real estate, and until the contrary is •shown we must presume that in this respect the petition conformed to this requirement. The petition, therefore, should be viewed as asking for the sale of three lots situate in East Ironton, being lots which descended to the ward, and being all the real estate owned by her, and numbered 73, 74, and 75. Here is simply a case of a description, repugnant with itself, but containing sufficient within itself to enable the court to make the proper correction, by eliminating from it what was false, and supplying what was true, so as to malee it conform to the real intention of the parties. This we must presume the court did, and that it was done upon a proper showing, or proper knowledge of the subject-matter. We are satisfied that the lots really sought to be sold, and the lots so sold, are' identical, and that this mistake in the petition does not affect the jurisdiction of the court, or render the order of sale absolutely void.

Judgments reversed.

White, Rex, Gilmore, and McIlvaine, JJ., concurred.  