
    Abraham Rhine, surviving partner of A. & S. Rhine, v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      The claimant insists on the trial that his fvrm purchased in Texas about forty parcels of cotton, amounting to 1,500 bales. The cotton remained on the plantations where purchased until captured. It was never reduced to possession. The vendors are not called as witnesses. It is not shown whether the deceased partner p urchased in his own riyh t or for the film or aspwrchasing agent of the Confederate government, which he then was. The accidental destruction of papers purporting to be bills of sale of the cotton in favor of the firm is shown, but neither the signatures nor the contents of the bills are proven.
    
    I. In the absence of circumstances casting a doubt on the title to captured cotton, the court is satisfied with evidence of possession or apparent right of control (i. e., prima facie evidence of ownership); but where the facts throw doubt on the title, it is for the claimant to clear up all points.
    II. Where captured property appears to have remained in the possession of a claimant’s vendors and he shows the accidental destruction of bills of sale, it is necessary for him also to prove the contents of the bills and the signatures of the vendors.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The contest in this case was chiefly npon the evidence. The facts deduced from the evidence by the court were as follows:
    I. Prior to the war Samuel Rhine was residing at Clarksville, in Texas', engaged in business as a dry-goods merchant. His brother, Abraham Rhine, the claimant, was at that time residing at McKinney, in Texas, engaged in the same business. The distance between McKinney and Clarksville is one hundred and twenty miles. The business in each place was conducted separately, but the two brothers were in partnership in the general business of purchasing dry goods at the North and exchanging them in Texas for cotton. Soon after the outbreak of the war the partnership dry-goods business was closed.
    II. Samuel Rhine was killed in March, 1863. Prior to his death he was employed by the so-called Confederate States in the purchase or collection of cotton for them. At the time of his death there were stored on. various plantations in Texas, on which the same were grown, about forty parcels of cotton, amounting in the aggregate to 1,500 bales, which the claimant contended were the property of the said partnership, acquired for the firm by the act of Samuel Rhine; but it was not shown whether the said Samuel Rhine, if he became the owner of any of said parcels, became such in his own right, or as a member of said firm, or as the agent of the said so-called Confederate States.
    III. The said parcels remained stored on said plantations until' the summer of 1865, without being reduced to possession by the said Samuel Rhine, or by any one on his behalf, or on behalf of' said firm.
    IV. In 1865, after the cessation ■ of hostilities, one Moses Steinlein was employed by the claimant to look after said parcels. He received from the claimant what purported to be the different bills of purchase thereof and lists of the said parcels, and he found cotton stored as set forth in Finding II.
    V. The original petition in this suit was sworn to on the 23d July, 1868, although by clerical error the certificate is dated as of the 23d July, 1865, and was filed in this court on the 31st day of July, 1868. The evidence of Moses Steinlein, to whom the said papers were confided, as set forth in Finding IV, was not taken by the claimant until March 12,1873. It appears from his testimony that his store in Jefferson, Tex., had been burned about two years before the taking of his testimony, and that the said bills and lists were then and there destroyed. The claimant did not prove the contents of said bills, nor the handwriting or signatures or names of the supposed vendors, nor that the cotton was ever in the possession of the firm ; but he did prove that large dealings in cotton were made' in that part of Texas by said Samuel Rhine before his death (but whether individually, or as a member of said firm, or as agent of the so-called Confederate States, did not appear); and it also appeared that the claimant, after the cessation of hostilities, laid claim to the said parcels as cotton acquired by said Samuel Rhine as a member of said firm.
    VI. From the foregoing facts it is farther found, as a resulting fact, that the said firm was not the owner of any of the parcels of cotton described in the petition except the parcel set forth, in tbe following finding.
    VII. In August, 1865, the claimant, as surviving partner in said firm, was possessed of 31 bales of cotton, stored on. the plantation of Mrs. Record, in Lamar County, Texas. It was transported by his agents to Jefferson, Tex., in that month. There it was seized by an agent of the Treasury named John Reed. Subsequently it was forwarded to Supervising Agent Burbridge, in New Orleans. It does not appear that this cotton was ever sold, or that the proceeds thereof have reached the Treasury of the United States.
    
      Mr. W. Penn Olarlce and ilfr. L. Abrahams for the claimant.
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Simons for the defendants.
   Davis, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

There can be no doubt as to the 31 bales last mentioned. They do not appear to have been sold, and their proceeds are not in the Treasury. Counsel contend that the claimant is entitled to recover their market value on showing that they were taken by an authorized agent of the defendants. The court decides this against him, without thinking it necessary to give a reason for a decision on a point so often decided here and in the court above.

A different question is presented ;by the findings regarding the other bales. At the outset of the case the government denies the claimant’s ownership of this property and calls for strict proof. ■

The court is usually disposed to be extremely liberal on this point. In the absence of circumstances to cast a doubt upon the claimant’s title, it is generally satisfied with that evidence of possession or apparent right of control which, in the ordinary occupations of life, raises the presumption and gives ground for the belief that the person who is in possession of or has the right of control over property is its owner. If no circumstances arouse suspicion and cause the good faith of the claimant to be questioned, great injustice may be done by disregarding 'prima facie evidence of ownership and calling for the strictest proof. Especially may this be so if a claimant’s alleged title is fiduciary or representative.

When, however, the facts throw grave doubt over the claimant’s title to the property demanded, the government is justified in requiring strict proof of it, in order to make sure that the fund it has received reaches the rightful owner, and in order to protect itself against a claim for a second payment.

The claimant maintains that he was a member of the firm of A. & S. Ehine; that the firm was the owner of said cotton; that it took the cotton into possession in the eye of the law; that the firm was dissolved by the death of one of the partners; and that he, as surviving partner, became owner or possessor of all the cotton.

The facts proved on the trial, as found by the court, leave it doubtful, first, whether the firm was not dissolved and its business closed prior to the death of Samuel Ehine; second, whether the alleged jturchases of cotton were not made by Samuel Ehine on his own account; or, third, whether they were not made by him- as agent of the insurgent government.

These are all points which the claimant should be able to clear up. If he leaves them in doubt, we must assume that he does it purposely; and, inasmuch as in the first and second contingencies the proceeds of the cotton might belong to the representatives of Samuel Ehine, and in the third contingency they would certainly belong to the United States, the court would not be justified in lending him the benefits of the presumptions of fact which it might be willing to extend in a different case.

The claimant further fails to show that the cotton was reduced to possession. He contends that the deceased partner of the firm purchased about 1,500 bales in about forty separate parcels ; that such purchases were made of the planters by whom the cotton was grown; that the several parcels were left in the possession of the respective vendors; and that they So remained until they were taken by agents of the United States.

In order to avoid the adverse presumption which might arise from the continued possession of the property by the vendors for so many years after the alleged sale, the claimant relies upon certain alleged bills of sale, which he says were taken of said several parcels in each case at the time of the alleged purchase.

These bills were not produced at the trial. The claimant endeavored to account for their non-production by evidence which, as he maintained, proved their destruction by fire.

It is unnecessary for us to comment on the facts shown in the findings as the result of that evidence, or to express an opinion whether those facts do or do not convince us of the former existence and loss of such bills. The claimant has not attempted to prove the contents of the alleged bills, or to show who were the parties who signed them, or to prove the signatures of any such parties. On these material points the finding of facts is absolutely silent.

The parties who signed those bills may or may not have been the parties owning the cotton. The bills may or may not have passed an immediate title and a possession in law. There may or there may not have been some other act left to be done before completing the transfer of title. When we are left in such entire ignorance of their character and nature by the party who claims the benefit of them, who had the custody of them, and who, if any one, ought to know their contents, we cannot give them such validity, as to make them the foundation of a money judgment against the defendants.

The claimant’s petition must be dismissed.'  