
    Albert M. Kalbfleisch et al., v. Charles H. Kalbfleisch. In the Matter of Receivership of William Brookfield.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,
    
    
      Filed February 9, 1891.)
    
    Receiver—Advances—Corporations.
    A receiver who had among the assets stock of a corporation which was in danger of becoming valueless, was authorized by the co irt to make advances to said corporation on the security of its property, the order also directing him to take possession of such property and operate its business. This was done and the loans repaid. Feld, that the order did not in effect appoint a receiver of such corporation; but was merely an authority to make advances and under the circumstances was not improvident.
    Appeal by judgment creditors of the Bushwick Chemical Works from order denying motion to set aside an order made August 6, 1886.
    William Brookfield was the. receiver of the firm of Martin Kalbfleisch’s Sons and as such held, among other assets, stock of the Bushwick Chemical Works. On his petition made in 1886, showing that there was danger of said stock becoming valueless by reason of the failure of funds for the necessary working of said works, the order in question was made authorizing said receiver to expend and lay out from time to time such sums as might be necessary for the continuance of said works, on condition that said company surrendered its property to such receiver, and the order authorized the receiver to take possession and operate such works until the further order of the court.
    
      C. Bainbridge Smith, for app’lts; A. F. Jenks and Chas. Robinson Smith, for resp’t, Martin Kalbfleisch’s Sons Co.
   Pratt, J.

The appellant contends that the order made August 6, 1886, in effect appointed a receiver of a corporation, and that the court had no jurisdiction to appoint such a receiver.

The answer is that the order did not appoint a receiver, of a corporation or otherwise.

It authorized a receiver, whose appointment is not questioned,, to advance money specified and to which the corporation by its board of trustees afterwards assented.

The loan was made and has been repaid. We are not able to see that it was unwise; so far as we can judge no other course could have been discreetly pursued. And were the wisdom of the order doubtful, the laches of appellants in waiting four years before making complaint would deprive their present application of merit.

We find nothing in the case requiring discussion.

Order affirmed, with costs.

Barnard, P. J., and Dykman, J., concur.  