
    *Purcell v. Maddox.
    October, 1811.
    a. Chancery Practice — Suit for Distribution of Estate —Proceeding Must Be against Ali Parties. — In a suit in Chancery, on behalf of a person who claimed a share of a residuum, as purchaser from one of the legatees, the administrator de bonis non, and all the children of the testator were defendants to the bill, but proceedings were had against two of them only; viz. the legatee of whom the plaintiff purchased, and another, who also claimed the same share by a pretended purchase; it appearing that, by a decree in a suit in beh ali of the administrator de bonis non, a division among certain persons as residuary legatees, had been directed, and one of the defendants now before the Court, had been ordered to pay to the other the share in question. Yet it was determined that proceedings should have been had against all the defendants; and the cause was remanded to the Court below for that purpose.
    See Richardson's Executors v. Hunt, 2 Munford, p. 148. and Hooper and Wife v. Royster and wife, 1 Munford, 119.
    In a suit in Chancery, in the County Court of Prince William, on behalf of John Maddox against Thomas Purcell, administrator, de bonis non, and John Purcell, William Purcell, James Purcell, George Purcell, Charles Purcell, Elizabeth Purcell, and Sarah Purcell, children of William Purcell deceased, the plaintiff claimed the •defendant George Purcell’s share of the decedent’s estate, by purchase for a valuable consideration. The defendant, James Purcell, by his answer, set up a claim to the same share, bj' virtue of a similar bargain; contending that the plaintiff had fraudulently induced the said George to sell his share, when he was drunk, and for a very inadequate consideration; but that his own purchase was fairly made for a reasonable price. The answer of George Purcell supported that of James; and both insisted that, according to the contract between Maddox and George Purcell, either party had a right to recant within a certain time; which, he the said George had offered to do; but Maddox had refused to release him from the agreement.
    A copy was exhibited of a decree in Chancery, in a suit by Thomas Purcell against the said William Purcell’s “representatives,”’ by which a residue of the estate of the said decedent, remaining in the executor’s hands, to the amount of 2131. 15s., was ordered to be equally divided among Thomas Purcell, James Purcell, George Purcell, Elizabeth Purcell, and Sarah Purcell, who (it was said therein) were all the legatees having a right to the said *residue; so that the share of each was 421. 15s. It was stated in the same decree, that the said legatees had become the purchasers of the said estate; and James Purcell was ordered to pay to George the sum of 421. 15s. for the purpose of making an equal division. The right of the plaintiff .Maddox to the benefit of his bargain with George Purcell, appeared established by depositions.
    No process was served on the other defendants, who were stated, in the sheriff’s return, to be “no inhabitants of his bailiwick;” neither was any order of publication entered against them. In what manner the cause was set for hearing is not set forth in the record. But on the 6th of April, 1808, the County Court decreed, “that the plaintiff recover against the said defendant, James Purcell, the sum of 421. 15s., with interest from the 1st of January, 1803, till paid; and that the said defendant pay the costs, &c.” This decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Chancery for the Richmond district; whereupon the said James Purcell appealed to this Court.
    
      
      Note. Who were made defendants, in that suit, as “representatives” of William Purcell, did not appear in the transcript of the decree. — Note in Original Edition.
    
   On Monday, the 3d of February, 1812, the President delivered the Court’s opinion, that the decree of the County Court was erroneous, because proceedings were not had against all the defendants to the bill of the appellee; although, upon the merits of the case, (as now disclosed,) this Court inclined to approve the said decree.

The decrees of both the Courts below were, therefore, reversed; and the cause remanded to the said Court of Chancery, and thence to the County Court, to be finally proceeded in as to all the parties aforesaid.  