
    Watkins against Haight.
    The act reía-e'rror on judg-Courts ofCom-pa°ssedle^n7 ^acif.^ra.Tis peciivt: ret>but prospective
    IN ERROR to the Court of C. P. of Steuben county, On the 20th of June, 1815,- a rule for judgment was entered in the Court below ; and on the 28th oí June, the judgment record was signed, filed, and docketed. The writ of error, was *es£ed J^ay lst> 1820, directed to the Court below, and returnable to this Court on the first Monday of the present term. The writ and return were filed in the office of the clerk of this Court, on the 26th day of June, 1820.
    
      
      Collier, for the defendant in error,
    now moved to quash the writ of error, on the ground of the statute of limitations, passed April 5th, 1817, (sess. 40. ch. 179.) which declares, “ that all writs of error upon judgment, in any Court of Common Pleas or Mayor’s Court, shall be brought within Jive years after rendering such judgments, and not after.” Here the rule for judgment was entered the 20th of June, 1815, and the writ of error was filed the 26th of June, 1820, so that the five years had elapsed after rendering the judgment. Though the English Courts will not, on motion, quash a writ of error, it is because the statute of 10 and 11 W. III. c. 14. contains exceptions of infants and others. {Tidd Pr. 1064, 1065.) But our statute contains no exception whatever; and this Court will not look beyond our own statute. (3 Johns. Rep. 253.) The statute begins to run from the time of rendering the judgment, and not from the time the judgment roll is signed and filed. {Arnold v. Sandford, 14 Johns. Rep. 417. 424.)
    
      M‘Kown, contra.
    The writ of error was tested the 13th of May, 1820, and filed the 26lh of June, and the judgment was docketted the 28th of June, 1815, so that five years had not elapsed. But if the period of limitation had elapsed, we contend that the act is clearly prospective and not retrospective. It was passed in 1817, and was a new enactment; for the former statute of limitations was silent as to writs of error to Courts of Common Pleas. Though the act itself contains no words to show the intent of the legislature in this respect, yet the only rational and sound construction of it, is to consider it altogether prospective, and as intended to operate only on judgments rendered after the passing of the act. By any other construction, it would be manifestly unjust and unequal in its operation. Besides, on the principles recognised by this Court in the case of Dash v. Van Kleeck, (9 Johns. Rep. 493..500.) the statute would be unconstitutional, and void as a retrospective or ex post facAo law.
    
      Collier, in reply, said,
    that the act was intended to quicken suitors and quiet judgments, andas it contained no words to the contrary, it must be construed so as to have effect on all judgments then existing, as well as on those to be rendered afterwards.
   Per Curiam.

The case of Dash v. Van Kleeck, shows that it would be unjust and against the sound principles of legislation, to consider the act as retrospective. It must be deemed prospective merely; and the motion, therefore, is denied.

Motion denied*  