
    FINCH v. STATE.
    (No. 9878.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 17, 1926.)
    1. Witnesses <&wkey;337(5).
    Accused having testified in his own behalf, it was permissible to show as affecting his credibility that at a time not too remote he had served a term in penitentiary.
    2. Witnesses <§=35&wkey;It was error to admit details of transaction out of which former, prosecution and sentence of accused to. penitentiary arose, although testimony was limited to impeaching purposes (Pen. Code 1925, art. 1150).
    In prosecution for driving automobile colliding with another, without stopping to render aid to person injured, in violation of Pen. Code 1925, art. 1150, it was error to admit details of transaction out of which former prosecution and sentence of accused to penitentiary arose, although such testimony was limited to impeaching purposes.
    3. Criminal law &wkey;l 169(6).
    Where penalty assessed was greater than the statutory minimum, error in admitting details of transaction out of which accused’s prior conviction of crime arose, although limited by the court to impeachment purposes, could not be said to be harmless.
    Appeal from District Court, Red River County; R. J. Williams, Judge.
    R. T. Finch was convicted of driving an automobile colliding with another vehicle without stopping to render aid to person injured, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    T. T. Thompson, of Clarksville, for appellant.
    
      Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., of Austin, and Nat G.entry, Jr., Asst. State’s Atty., of Tyler, for the State.
   HAWKINS, J.

Appellant was prosecuted under article 1150, P. O. (1925 Revision), which mates guilty of an offense the driver of an automobile which collides with another vehicle and who fails to stop and render aid to any person injured. His punishment was assessed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for two years.

The punishment prescribed by law is imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five years, or in jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding $5,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Punishment awarded appellant was much greater than the minimum. Attention is directed to this in view of complaint of evidence admitted over appellant’s objection.

Accused ’ was a negro. While driving a car in which was another negro man and several negro girls, he collided with a wagon, resulting in injury to some of its occupants. Appellant did not stop and render aid. Excuse for this failure was based on a claim that the driver of the wagon secured a stick and cursed appellant, which caused .him to fear injury.

The transaction out of which the present prosecution grew occurred in May, 1925. On cross-examination appellant was asked about a transaction which occurred in Lamar county in 1922. He testified it was not a fact that he went to the penitentiary for stealing McGlasson’s car, nor that he got in the car and ran up and down the highway and tried to run over the officers; that he had not run the car into a ditch, but ran it off the road; that he did not steal the car and fill it up with negroes and run up and down the highway as fast as he could, but admitted that officers chased him, and he turned the car over and broke it up. On redirect examination he admitted he had served a term in the penitentiary for his connection with the McGlasson car. Appellant being a witness, in his own behalf, it was permissible to show as affecting his credibility that at' a time not too remote he had served a term in the penitentiary. See authorities collated under section 167, Branch’s Ann. Texas P. O.

It was not permissible, however, to inquire into the details of the transaction out of which that prosecution grew. In rebuttal, the state called an officer who testified, over appellant's objection, that at the time appellant was arrested in connection with the McGlasson car he tried to run over three men, and went up and down the main highway of Lamar county at the rate of 65 or 70 miles an hour; that the officers had their cars across the road; and that witness waved appellant down and tried to stop him; that “he put on all he had and passed an-othef car; and that other officers were waving for him to stop; and that he went around them and hit the sand and turned the car over three times and then got up and tried to run.”

The court instructed the jury that this evidence of the officer could be considered for no other purpose than impeachment of appellant. It was not properly in the record, and could not legitimately be considered for any purpose. In the first instance, the state should have limited its inquiry to proving that appellant had served a term in the penitentiary. The details of the transaction out of which the prosecution grew were entirely immaterial, and furnished no Basis as predicate for impeachment by calling the officer to contradict appellant as to details about which it had no right to inquire. In view of the penalty assessed, it is impossible for us to say that receipt of such evidence did not work to appellant’s injury, regardless of the effort of the court to limit it to impeachment purposes.

Por the error discussed, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded. 
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