
    GREEN against THE NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY.
    
      New York Common Pleas;
    
    
      General Term, July, 1872.
    Common Carriers.—Connecting Lines.—Passengers’ Baggage. —Evidence. —Res Gestee.
    A railroad company is not liable for a passenger’s baggage- lost by a connecting steamboat line, even though the company has given a check for the baggage to the terminus of the steamboat line, unless the company have some interest in or control over the carriage of passengers by such boat line.*
    In order to sustain an action against a railroad company for the loss of plaintiff’s baggage upon a steamboat forming part of a connecting line, the plaintiff must show some community of interest in, or some control over, the carriage of passengers by such boat line.
    Proof that the railroad company checked the baggage to the terminus of the boat line, although there be evidence that they did so for their own convenience, without proof that the passenger paid them his fare for passage by the boat, is not sufficient.
    The statute (Laws of 1847, ch. 270, § 9,)—regulating the liability of a railroad company receiving freight to be transported by it to a point on a connecting road,—cannot be extended so as to cover the case where the connecting route is a steamboat line.
    * The principles applicable in the case of passengers’ baggage are somewhat different from those which govern in the case of freight (see Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt., 421; Hood v. N. Y. & New Haven R. R. Co., 22 Conn., 1). In the former, the liability for baggage is incidental to the contract for carriage of the passenger; and in the case in our text, there was no contract on the part of defendants to carry the plaintiff, except to Albany.
    In addition to the cases referred to in our note to Manhattan Oil Co. v. Camden, &c. R. R. Co., 5 Abb. Pr. N. Y., 289, see Lamb v. Camden & Amboy C.o., 46 N. Y., 271; reversing 2 Daly, 454; and cases cited; Angle v. Miss. & Mo. R. R. Co., 9 Iowa, 487; Ill. Central R. R. Co. v. Copeland, 24 Ill., 332; Same v. Johnson, 34 Id., 389; Same v. Franklinberg, 54 Id., 89; Nashua Lock Co. v. Worcester R. R. Co., 2 Am. Rep., 242.
    
      
      It seems, that a railroad company has not implied power to bind itself by a contract for the delivery of passengers or baggage at a point beyond its route, by means of a connecting line of steamboats.
    An admission by the superintendent of a railroad company, on the o presentation of a claim for lost baggage, that the claim is a good one, is not competent evidence against the company in an action to recover for the loss.
    Appeal from a judgment.
    Andrew W. Green sued the New York Central Railroad, in the New York common pleas, to recover against the defendants, as common carriers, for the loss of plaintiff’s baggage while he was a passenger on defendant’ s road, which the complaint alleged extended from little Falls to New York city.
    On the trial, it appeared that the defendants were a corporation operating a railroad for the transportation of freight and passengers between Buffalo and Albany (Laws of 1853, ch. 76), and also a branch line running from Schenectady to Athens, on the Hudson river. In September, 1867, plaintiff, at Little Falls, applied" for a check for his trunk by way of Albany and the People’s Line of Steamers, to New York-city, that being the way he proposed to go himself. The request was refused, on the ground that the rules of the company would not allow it, which was the fact. On the plaintiff’s inquiring if an exception could not be made to oblige him, the station agent told him he would like to oblige him, but could not on account of the rules of the company; that he would check the trunk to Albany, and the plaintiff could have it rechecked there. The People’s Line of Steamers was running two lines of . steamers. One boat went to Athens, and the other boat went to Albany, but not connecting-with defendant’s road. The plaintiff then consented to checking the trunk to Albany; but, on examination, no Albany check could be found. The agent proposed to mark the trunk for Albany, but the plaintiff declined. The agent suggested that the plaintiff allow the trunk to go by the way of Athens, as it would reach New York the same time as by the way of Albany, to which the plaintiff assented, and he received a check for the trunk to New York by the way of Athens. This check was one belonging to the People’s Line of Steamers, and was stamped as follows: “New York, People’s Line of Steamers, No. 5, Little Falls.”
    It did not appear on the trial that there was any partnership or community of interest between the defendant and the People’s Line of Steamers, but it was shown that the two companies were in the habit of exchanging checks.
    The plaintiff paid no fare or passage money nor engaged any passage at Little Falls for any place, but when on the defendants’ cars, on the way to Albany, paid his fare to that place. Defendants delivered his trunk to the Peoples’ Line at Athens, but it was lost or destroyed the next day by the sinking of their steamboat “Dean Richmond,” on her passege from Athens to New York.
    Plaintiff first presented a claim for his loss to that line, but afterwards made a claim against the defendants for the value of his lost baggage. On the trial he was permitted to testify, against defendants’ objection and exception, that on its presentation to defendants’ superintendent, that person said, “ You (plaintiff) have a very good claim.”
    A motion to dismiss the complaint was made, which was denied, and an exception taken. A verdict was rendered for seven hundred and seventy-seven dollars and eighty-two cents, for the value of the lost baggage, and the exceptions ordered to be heard in the first instance at general term.
    
      Theron R. Strong, for defendant, appellant.
    I. The rule is well settled that independent of statute, a carrier receiving property which is to be transported beyond his own line, discharges his responsibility by carrying it over his own route, and delivering it to the next carrier on the way to its destination (Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157; Hempstead v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 28 Barb., 485; Salinger v. Simmons, 2 Lans., 325; S. C., 57 Barb., 513; M’Donald v. Western R. R. Corporation, 34 N. Y., 497; Dillon v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co., 1 Hilt., 231; Jacobs v. Hooker, Edm. Cas., 472; Pratt v. Ogdensburgh & L. Champ. R. R. Co., 102 Mass., 557; Darling v. Boston & Worcester R. R. Co., 11 Allen, 295; Grass v. N. Y., Providence & Boston R. R. Co., 100 Mass., 26; Nutting v. Connecticut R. R. Co., 1 Gray, 502; Judson v. West. R. R. Co., 4 Allen, 520; Perkins v. Port Saco & Ports. R. R. Co., 47 Me., 573; Brintnall v. Saratoga & Whitehall R. R. Co., 32 Vt., 665; McMillan v. M. S. & N. I. R. R. Co., 16 Mich., 119, 120; Hood v. N. H. & N. Y. R. R. Co., 22 Conn., 1; Bowman v. Hilton, 11 Ohio, 303; Bissell v. Price, 16 Ill., 408; 2 Redf. on Railways, 112, 123). In eases of connecting railroads, it is provided by statute, that “ whenever two or more railroads are connected together, any company owning either of said roads, receiving freight to be transported to any place on the line of either of the said roads so connected, shall be liable as common carriers for the delivery of such freight at such place” (Laws of 1847, ch. 270, p. 298). This statute recognizes the rule at common law as above stated, and was designed to modify it as to connecting railroads, to which alone it is applicable. It has no application to a case of connecting routes of transportation by other modes, or by a railroad and steamboats. Ror is this statute applicable to any case unless the facts requisite to constitute the liability are averred in the complaint (Hempstead v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 28 Barb., 502).
    
      
      Charles M. Da Costa, for the plaintiff, respondent.
    I. Whether or not the defendant’s line extended all the way to Hew York was immaterial, for the rule is now well settled in our State that, when several separate carriers, owning distinct portions of a continuous route, between two termini, employ the same agents to sell passage tickets, and to receive baggage to be carried over the entire route, an action may be maintained as against one of them for loss of baggage received at one terminus to be carried on the whole route (Hart v. R. & S. R. R. Co., 8 N. Y. [4 Seld.], 37; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 Id., 306). See also the article entitled “ The responsibility of common carriers beyond their own lines,” in the Albany Law Journal, vol. 3, p. 485, where all the authorities, English and American, are cited and ably commented on.
    IT. Whether the plaintiff did or did not pay his fare on the day in question, was entirely immaterial. The defendants would still be liable. For the delivery of a trunk into the possession of a railroad station master at his station, for transportation, and his reception of the same for that purpose, imposed upon the corporation the obligation of a common carrier, even thougli the passenger go by another conveyance. In the latter case, however, the carrier receives the baggage as freight, and has a lien for his charges thereon. In the case of the Elvira Harbeck, 2 Blatchf. C. Ct., 336, 339, the court (Helsoe, J.) said: “In cases where the passenger accompanies his baggage, the fare charged for his passage includes compensation for its transportation, and the carrier becomes responsible for its safe delivery. If the passenger does not accompany it, the carrier may claim compensation in advance for its transportation, or may postpone his claim till the delivery, and rely on his lien, or on the personal responsibility of the owner. And I do not see why the rule of responsibility for .the safe-keeping and delivery should not be the same in both cases. The actual payment of the freight in the one case, and the actual liability and lien for its payment in the other, constitute the consideration for the undertaking.” And the above doctrine was cited with approval and followed by the supreme court of Maine, in a case somewhat similar to the case at bar (Wilson v. Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada, 57 Maine, 138).
   By the Court. — Robinson, J.

There was no proof to maintain the issue raised by the pleadings, that defendants were common carriers of passengers and their baggage, between Little Falls and New York, or that they had any authority, as a corpoartion, to contract for the carriage of passengers or their baggage by steamboat, on the Hudson river. Although forming a connecting line with the Peoples’ Line of steamboats, running from Athens to Hew York, there was no evidence of the existence of any agreement between defendants and that line, by which they had any community of interest in, or management or control over, the carriage of passengers on the Hudson river, either from Albany or Athens to Hew York, by force of which, had they been carriers at large, they would, within the principle of Champion v. Bostwick (18 Wend., 175), have been liable for the default of their associates.

As a general rule, the responsibility of a railroad corporation (such as the defendants’), established for the transportation of freight or passengers between certain places, commences when the freight or passenger is accepted for transportation, and terminates by a safe delivery at the end of the route; and it is not liable, except as a forwarder, for goods marked or shipped for a remoter point, unless it is authorized to make a contract extending its liabilities and contracts accordingly (Redf. on Railways, §§ 181, 183; Burroughs v. N. & W. R. R. Co., 100 Mass., 26; Hempstead v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 28 Barb., 485; Dillon v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co., 1 Hilt., 231; Johnson v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 33 N. Y., 610; Sallinger v. Simmons, 2 Lans., 497; Root v. Great Western R. R. Co., 45 N. Y., 524; Straiton v. N. Y. & N. Haven R. R. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 184).

In the absence of any express contract to carry the plaintiff or his baggage to Hew York, or of evidence of defendants being common carriers between Athens and Hew York, via the Hudson river, the mere fact of their affixing to plaintiff’s trunk a baggage check of the Peoples’ Line, furnished no proof by way of implication of any assumption of such duty. Ho fare was received for his passage to Hew York, nor any agreement made to carry his trunk as freight. It was accepted as baggage and as an incident to his becoming a passenger on defendants’ road to Albany, and the undertaking to carry it to Athens and there deliver it to the Peoples’ Line, was a substituted service agreed on by the parties.

Under the general railroad act (3 Rev. Stat., 5 ed., 634, § 34), the plaintiff might have insisted upon a check on- defendants’ road to Albany, but accepted one of the steamboat company, which was only properly issuable when the passenger purchased a through ticket of that line to Hew York, on their steamboats (see subsequent act of 1868, ch. 573; 7 Rev. Stat., Edmond’s ed., 317, which recognized previous practice and obligations). If he became a passenger on their boat at Albany, the liability of that company probably attached ; if not, he became liable to them, and not to defendants, for freight on the trunk from Athens to Hew York.

By the act of 1847 (ch. 270, § 9), “ whenever two or more railroads are connected together, any company owning either of said roads receiving freight to be transported to any place on the line of either of said roads so connected, shall be liable as common carriers for the delivery of such freight at any such place.” But there is no other provision of law authorizing a railroad corporation so to contract for the carriage of a passenger by any steamboat line, or vessel connecting with or starting from any place to which such railroad may run, or have indirect connection by or through other railroads. Such a construction of their ordinary powers would enable them to become common carriers over the whole globe, free from the contracted limitations of their charter, or of the general prohibition of the statute (1 Rev. Stat., 600, § 3) against their exercising other powers than those expressly conferred by their charters, or necessary to the exercise of those enumerated and given. In my opinion, defendants did not, and if they did, had not the power to contract for the carriage of plaintiff’s trunk on the Hudson river, but fully discharged every obligation by its delivery to the Peoples’ Line, at Athens.

The objection to the admission made by defendants’ superintendent on presentation of the plaintiff’s claim for lost baggage (fol. 16), that “he had a good claim,” was improperly overruled. The statement constituted no part of the res gestee, but related to a past transaction, and was inadmissible as evidence against his principal (Baptist Ch. v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 28 N. Y., 153; Mallory v. Perkins, 9 Bosw., 572; Green v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 32 Barb., 25; Luby v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 17 N. Y., 131; Vail v. Judson, 4 E. D. Smith, 165).

The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event. 
      
       Compare, however, Perkins v. Portland, &c. R. R. Co. (47 Me., 573; Noyes v. Rutland, &c. R. R. Co., 27 Vt., 110).
     