
    No. 12,219.
    State ex rel. Dr. James P. Saizan et als. vs. The Judge of the Eleventh Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Landry.
    The District Oourt issued a final injunction, restraining and prohibiting before-they had qualified appointees of the Governor from exercising the duties of the offices to which they had been appointed. The parties enjoined applied to and obtained from the Supreme Court writs of prohibition and certiorari prohibiting the District Judge from further action in the premises.
    
      Held: It was the duty of the judge to obey. If the effect of the writs issued by the Supreme Court was to maintain the status in quo as fixed by the issuance of the-writ of injunction by the District Court — any violation of the writ which either the District Judge or the District Attorney might deem a contempt should be called to the attention of the Supreme Court; if under the circumstances any contempt had been committed, it was of the authority of the Supreme Court, not the District Court. So, where the District Judge, under such conditions, punishes parties as for a contempt of his authority by disobeying the writ of injunction, the judge will be held to have been guilty of a contempt of the authority of the Supreme Court.
    
      The object oí the writ of prohibition is to prevent further action in a case where jurisdictional power and authority to act are denied; the function of the writ of certiorari is to undo matters which had taken such shape as not to he remedied by the writ of prohibition; the writ of certiorari is a substantive and far-reaching correctivewrit, concurrent with and frequently takingthe place of the writ of prohibition.
    In*the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction the Supreme Court is not rigidly tied down to form; when the facts of a given case, being recited,, present a case for relief under its supervisory jurisdiction and the prayer is for such orders and decrees as those facts will justify and for general relief, the Supreme Court will not remit the relator to new, expensive, unnecessary and sometimes fruitless remedies, simply by reason of a mistake in the writ asked for.
    When the question at issue is the power of the judiciary to summarily and positively check by final injunction the exercise of the powers oí the executive department in the appointment of an officer the “ matter in dispute ” is not measured by the amount which is declared to be the value of the office.
    The value of the particular office in question which furnished the occasion from which arises a contest as to the powers of two departments of government, will not in such a controversy, determine the jurisdietionof the Supreme Court.
    It is the bounden duty of the judiciary to give some prima facie force and effect to the acts of the executive; his acts are not to he presumed illegal and utterly wrong
    The court affirms expressly State e# rel. Ivuhlman vs. Judge, 47 An. o3, and State ex rel. Keller vs. Judge, Tb. 61.
    r\N APPLICATION for Writs of Certiorari and ' Prohibition and ^ Rules for Contempt.
    
      Thomas H. Lewis and E, B. Dubuisson for Relators.
    
      Albert Voorhies, amicus eurise, Kenneth Baillio, E. D. Estillette and Clegg & Quintero for Respondents.
    Submitted on briefs November 2, 1896.
    Opinion handed down November 30, 1896.
    Statement oe Case.
    On the 6th of July, 1896, relators J. P. Saizan, Robert Lafleur, Olibe Manuel and E. H. McGee filed in the Supreme Court a petition alleging that on the 30th of June, 1896, they had been appointed and commissioned by the Governor of the State, with the advice and consent of the Senate, under the provisions of Act No. 94 of 1884, respectively police jurors for the first, fifth and eighth wards of the parish of St. Landry. That said appointments were made by the Governor on the representation and showing that said wards were accorded such a population by the census of the United States for the year 1890 as entitled each of them to one more police juror than they had heretofore had or claimed, fortified by a written opinion of the Attorney General to that effect, and that the appointments ought to be made by the Governor; that a vacancy existed in said wards under said act and said census which it was the duty as well as the right of the Governor to fill on the fact being called to his attention; that notwithstanding the fact that relators were appointed and commissioned as police jurors without solicitation on their part, they were enjoined by the District Judge for the parish of St. Landry from in any manner acting or assuming to act as police jurors, and the relator McGee, president of the police jury, was enjoined from recognizing them as such until their right to such offices should have been judicially determined. They averred that said injunction was granted on the petition of the District Attorney for the parish of St. Landry on the simple allegation that the appointments of relators as police jurors by the Governor was illegal and wrongful; that the District Court was utterly without jurisdiction, power or authority to issue the writ of injunction on the showing made. That the petition neither by the allegations nor by the facts set up any right or authority or warrant of law in the District Attorney to intervene in the matter on behalf of the State because it is not charged that relators had usurped or intruded into, or attempted to usurp, intrude into or unlawfully hold, or exercise any public office, and because when there is no contest for the office, as in this case, the right of the District Attorney to proceed of his own motion under Sec. 2593 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 is against “ parties offending ” is by a direct action setting up all the facts constituting the offence and meeting the issue of the right to the office, and not by a simple injunction, which if maintained would make the party claiming the office the plaintiff in a suit to have the right to the office judicially determined. That it was not the intention of the Legislature to confer upon District Attorneys the power to question the rightful exercise by the Governor of the functions of his office as had been attempted in this ease. They alleged that they had pointed out to the District Judge his want of jurisdiction and power to issue the restraining order herein granted and requested him to vacate it and set it aside, but he refused to do so and persisted in his illegal assumption of authority and jurisdiction in the premises. In view of the premises relator prayed that writs of prohibition and certiorari issue directed to the District Judge and District Attorney forbidding the former to take cognizance of the case and the latter to prosecute it further until after due hearing.
    Upon this application Associate Joseph A. Breaux of the Supreme Court issued the following order: “ It is ordered that the judge of the District Court and the District Attorney made respondents show cause on the first day of the next regular term of this court why the writs applied for in the foregoing petition should not be made absolute and perpetual, and that respondents proceed no further in the matter of the injunction, and that they give no recognition to allegations made for an injunction until all parties concerned will have been heard and trial had before this court at said time and the issues between the parties in the premises finally determined after an opportunity is offered for a full and deliberate investigation. That the writ of certiorari issue and needful copies be furnished.”
    On the first day of the present term the District Judge and District Attorney filed in court a certified copy of the documents filed and proceedings had in the District Court for the parish of St. Landry in the matter referred to in relator’s petition, and submitted the issues involved, upon relator’s application, upon the papers and documents filed, accompanied by a brief in support of the correctness and legality of the action taken in the District Court.
    From the record it appears that the injunction which issued in the premises from the District Court was based upon the following petition presented by the District Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial District:
    “The petition of the State of Louisiana on relation of R. Lee Garland, District Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial District of Louisiana, with respect represents: That at the general election recently held throughout the State of Louisiana there were elected, in due accordance with the requirements of law, the following named police jurors in and for the several police jury wards of the parish of St. Landry, to-wit:
    “For the First Police Jury Ward of said parish — Daniel Durio and James O. Chaceré.
    
      “For thé Second Police Jury Ward — Adeline Guidry.
    “ For the Third Police Jury Ward — Jules' Québadeau.
    “ For the Fourth — Robert Burleigh.
    “ For the Fifth — Ozémé Fontenot and W.- M. Prescott.
    “ For the Sixth — Samuel Haas.
    “ For the Seventh — Ertelus Lafleur. -
    “ For the Eighth — Eugene H. McGee.
    “That the aforenamed police jurors, elected as aforesaid for their respective wards, are all the police jurors to which the parish of St. Landry is legally entitled, and they alone are entitled to exercise the functions and powers of police jurors in and for said parish of St. Landry and for said wards respectively; that the parties, aforesaid have been duly commissioned and qualified and as such are in possession of the offices to which they have been elected and are discharging the functions of said offices respectively and. are receiving the perquisites thereto attached, as of. right. .That-.'as your petitioner is informed and believes and so believing avers the following named persons have been illegally and wrongfully appointed and ■commissioned by the Governor of the State to act respectively for the police jury .wards below named, and will, unless enioined, illegally assume to exercise, the functions of police jurors aud to claim the perquisites thereto belonging, to-wit:
    “Dr. Joseph P. Saizan for the First' Police Jury Ward; .for the Fifth Police Jury Ward Robert Lafleur, and for the Eighth Poiice Jury Ward, Olibe Manuel. .
    “ That said appointments are illegal, and said parties, aforesaid are not legally entitled to exercise, the functions or receive the emoluments as police jurors of said wards respectively, and a writ Of injunction should issue, in the name of the State of Louisiana to restrain and prevent said Dr. Joseph P. Saizan, Robert Lafleur and ■Olibe Manuel from exercising the functions of police jurors of said wards respectively until,' after proper proceedings, the disputed right by them to said offices shall have been judicially determined; that E. H. McGee is president of said police jury and he likewise should be enjoined from in any manner recognizing the illegal' appointment of-said Saizan, Lafleur and Manhel as aforesaid, and should be further enjoined from permitting them to exercise .in any-manner the functions of police jurors for the aforesaid First;-Fifth, and .Eighth wards respectively, until their right to said offices . shall have been judicially determined; that the right to the offices above referred to exceed each in value the sum of one hundred dollars. Wherefore, petitioner, in his capacity as District Attorney, and acting herein for and on behalf of the State, prays that writs of injunction do issue in the premises, prohibiting and enjoining the aforesaid Joseph P. Saizan, Robert Lafleur and Olibe Manuel from in any manner acting or assuming to act as police jurors for the above named wards respectively, and that a writ of injunction likewise issue prohibiting the said E. H. McGee, president as aforesaid, from in any manner recognizing the illegal appointment of said parties as police jurors, or permitting them to in any manner act as such until the further orders of your Honorable Court, and that on trial hereof the said writs of injunction be maintained until the disputed rights of said Saizan, Lafleur and Manuel to the aforesaid offices shall have been judicially determined; and petitioner further prays that said Saizan, Lafleur and Manuel be duly cited in the premises, as provided by law; and petitioner further prays for costs and general relief in the premises.”
    This petition was accompanied by the affidavit of R. Lee Garland that the allegations contained therein were correct and true, and that a writ of injunction was necessary to prevent the acts complained of therein.
    The District Judge granted an order upon this petition, as follows:
    “The foregoing petition, affidavit and law considered it is ordered that writs of injunction issue as prayed for and according to law.”
    On the 6th of July the District Attorney filed a petition in the District Court in which, after reciting the petition filed by him as stated, its allegations and its prayer — the action of the District Court thereon ordering an injunction to issue as prayed for and the issuance and service of the injunction on the parties ordered to be enjoined, he alleged that, notwithstanding the issuance and service of the injunction, the parties enjoined, Saizan, Lafleur and Manuel, had each and severally violated the injunction by presenting themselves at open session of the police jury on that day and claiming and assuming to act as police jurors of Wards First, Fifth and Sixth, respectively, and by acting and voting as such, and that McGee, president of the police jury, had likewise violated the injunction and disobeyed the same by recognizing said parties as said police jurors; that in so acting all of said parties had wilfully disobeyed the order of injunction and committed a contempt of the Governor of the State who made the appointments, of the Senate who confirmed them and of the authority of the District Court and should be punished accordingly. He prayed that the court rule these parties to show cause why they should not be adjudged to have committed a contempt of the authority of the District Court and punished accordingly.
    The parties appeared at the time fixed by the court and for answer alleged that they had not been guilty of contempt because the petition for the injunction showed on its face that the court hadno jurisdiction, power or authority to issue the writ of injunction, which was there - fore absolutely null and void, and therefore no contempt was entailed or incurred by its violation. Because notwithstanding the absolute nullity of the injunction, they had observed the inhibitions of the same until they had applied to the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari and prohibition and obtained and had served upon the District Judge and District Attorney the mandate of the Supreme Court. They prayed that the rule be discharged. On the trial of the rule the court ordered and adjudged and decreed that the parties be imprisoned in the parish jail for the space of forty-eight hours, holding that they had been guilty of contempt by wilfully violating the writ of injunction sued out.
    On the 10th of July, the parties so adjudged guilty of contempt and relators herein filed a petition in the Supreme Court, in which they averred that after the restraining order issued by that court to the District Judge and District Attorney had been served, Saizan, Lafieur and Manuel presented their commissions and oath of office as police jurors to the police jury of the parish of St. Landry then in session, and were duly recognized as members of said jury by the president thereof, McGee, without objection from the other members of said body. They then reciting the application of the District Attorney for the rule upon them to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt, their answer thereto and the judgment of the District Judge on the trial of the rule, averred that the action of the District Judge and District Attorney was in contempt of the authority of the Governor and of the Senate and of the Supreme Court. That they had deliberately violated the order of the Supreme Court, and that in ordering them to be confined in the parish prison, the District Judge had committed an act of oppression in office and wantonly violated their right of personal liberty. That the act was tyrannical and oppressive and called for the exercise by the Supreme Court, in the vindication of its authority, of its powers of punishment. They prayed that the court order that the District Judge and District Attorney be arrested and punished for contempt of court; that a peremptory order issue to them to take no further steps against them, in the premises; that they be discharged from prison and that the court should take such .further steps as it might deem advisable and effectual to enforce respect for its authority and obedience to its orders and general relief. The District Judge and District Attorney were ordered to show cause on the 2d of November, 1896, why they should not be punished for contempt as prayed for.
    On the 17th of July, Saizan, Lafleur, Manuel and McGee filed a petition in the Supreme Court, in which they averred that after having obtained from this court the restraining order directed to the District Judge and District Attorney previously referred to, the said District Judge, [when petitioners attempted to take their seats as police jurors and exercise the functions and duties of their office] at the instance of the District Attorney, issued a rule against them to show .cause why they should nob be punished for contempt, and on the trial of said rule the District Judge sentenced them to imprisonment in the parish jail for contempt of court, which sentence they were compelled to serve out because of their inability to obtain timely relief from the Supreme Court. That they obtained, however, a rule on said judge and District Attorney to show cause, on the 2d of November next, whj' they should not be punished for contempt of that court; that this rule was served upon the said parties; that petitioners, relying upon the restraining order and rule for contempt which had been obtained from the Supreme Court, continued to exercise the duties of their office as members of the police jury sitting as a Board of Review, when on the evening of July 15, 1896, they were [at the instance of the District Attorney] again served with a rule for contempt of the District Court for alleged violation of its said injunction. That the District Attorney by applying for said rule and the District Judge in ordering it to issue bad been guilty of another breach of the restraining order of the Supreme Court and another contempt of court, and they should be ruled to show cause why they should not be punished therefor. They averred that the order of the District Judge allowing said rule was illegal, null and void — that the judge was incompetent and without jurisdiction, power or authority to issue it, because of the restraining order of the Supreme Oourt and because the original injunction was an absolute nullity. They prayed that a rule issue against the said judge and District Attorney for contempt of court and for supplemental writs of certiorari and, prohibition, and for such further orders and decrees necessary in the premises and for general relief. They annexed to the petition copies of the proceedings in the District Oourt.
    On the same day the Supreme Oourt at chambers (a quorum being present) set aside the last order of the District Judge [directing that a rule be taken on the petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt] deeming it an infraction of its own restraining order to the said judge and ordered the District Judge to> show cause why he should not be punished for the repeated disobedience of its orders which had been brought to its attention.
    On the 2d of November, 1896, the District Judge and District Attorney answered.
    They averred that in construing and interpreting the writ of prohibition served upon them it was not their intention, purpose or motive, directly or indirectly, to impeach the character, motives or integrity of the members of the Supreme Oourt, individually or collectively, or to east any imputation or reflection upon them, nor was it their ptírpose, intention or motive to disobey said order. That if failure there was to observe the same, it resulted from a misconception on their part of the extent and scope of the order. That they understood said order to mean that all proceedings in the suit in which it had been obtained would be stayed until a final hearing of all parties before the Supreme Oourt as was announced therein -r that they solemnly declare that they never for one moment entertained the idea that the order was intended to operate as a dissolution or suspension of the order of injunction invoked by the District Attorney and issued by the District Judge. That when informed extra-judicially by counsel for relators that they contended for such construction of the restraining order of the Supreme Oourt, they examined the matter carefully and came to the honest conclusion (even though it might be a mistaken one) that the construction contended for was not tenable. ' The District Judge averred that in punishing the parties for contempt he had acted without any feeling whatever other than to secure obedience to the rules of - law and the orders granted by him in virtue of his office. They averred that as soon as the order commanding them to desist from any further proceedings in the matter was served upon the District Judge, they forthwith discharged the last rule against the defendants, and this course they would have pursued in the first instance had they understood the order to mean what the Supreme Court subsequently informed them it did mean. They declared that, “ knowing as they did that a government like ours rested alone upon the obedience to the law, and that its supremacy is the only bulwark and safeguard for every civil right, they never intended to set up so pernicious an example as to place themselves in contempt of the authority of the Supreme Court, and that they reiterated, under the solemn sanctity of their official oaths, the disclaimer which they made in the first part of their answer.” They prayed they be adjudged not guilty of contempt of court, and that the rule be discharged.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Nicholls, C. J.

An argument has been filed in this court touching the legal effect of our restraining order — the object, we presume, being to show that the District Judge had reasonable ground upon which to have placed the construction he did'upon that order.

It is said that “ at the time the order issued relators were effectually enjoined by the decree of injunction. The restraining order of the Supreme Court was issued to sustain the status quo and to restrain the District Court from further cognizance of the case except to maintain the status quo. In order that this be maintained it was the duty of the District Court to let things remain as they were — both parties, plaintiff and defendants, being held in suspense — neither being allowed to do any act which might in any way detract from the status quo. The plaintiff in injunction-was to remain motionless in the position which.he had acquired by the proceedings actually had, and to make no move of an aggressive character against his adversary. On the other hand, defendants, who had been effectually enjoined from proceeding any further, were still left under the operation of the provisional writ of injunction. They were bound to continue to respect the provisional writ of injunction unless the Supreme Court intended by issuing the restraining order to pass at once on the validity of the injunction writ and to dissolve - it ex parte. Did the court intend to pass finally on the merits of the injunction or the validity of the provisional writ of injunction? Did it intend to do so ex parte without hearing what the judge a quo and the party plaintiff had to say in vindication of its issuance? By no means. No restraining order could have such an effect, for then there would be a misnomer in terming it a restraining order, since, instead of restraining for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and preventing all parties from altering it, there would be a retroactive order of an aggressive character amounting to a decree setting aside a judgment already rendered — a provisional judgment of injunction, it is true, but a judgment which, under the well-established jurisprudence, can not be dissolved by the judge without first giving previous notice to the party who obtained the writ. The restraining order accompanying the writ of certiorari is intended simply to maintain the status quo before the date of the issuance of such order. It must not be confounded with the action of the court to dissolve the injunction.”

“ The duty of the District Judge was, under the restraining order, to maintain the cause in the state in which it was at that moment, and this necessitated the maintenance intact of the provisional order, and when the defendants, seeking to take advantage of the restraining order as understood by them, were taking aggressive steps to undo and nullify the writ of injunction it became the imperative duty of the District Judge to prevent them from doing an illegal act forbidden by him. This the District Judge could only do by proceeding on rule to punish for contempt, and in doing so he was far from being in contempt of the' Supreme Court.”

When we set aside the last order issued by the District Court (issued by it after it had itself been served with the restraining order from us), ruling the defendants in injunction to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt, we passed upon and decided adversely to the position taken by the District Judge in- the argument made on his behalf. The petition to the District Court for the injunction called in question the power and authority of the Governor and the power and authority of the Senate. The injunction was granted and the effect of that order was to immediately paralyze the action of the Executive and Senate. The application to this court for writs of prohibition and certiorari called in question the absolute want of power, jurisdiction and authority of the District Judge himself to bring about such a condition of things.

After careful consideration of the matter submitted we issued the restraining order referred to, evidencing the fact that a strong prima facie showing had been presented against the power and authority assumed by the District Judge. The District Judge was notified that his own power and jurisdiction was at issue. The order to him was clear and unambiguous. He was ordered to proceed no further in the matter. It was his duty to obey. There is no question before us [as matters now stand] as to what effect the restraining order had upon the injunction, or as to what the duty of defendants in injunction was in respect to the matters enjoined after our restraining order had issued to the District Judge. We are dealing exclusively now with the duty of the District Judge himself under the latter order. If the restraining order left the injunction intact.as claimed and the action of defendants violated the alleged resulting status quowhich was brought about by it, their act (on that hypothesis) was a contempt not of the District Oourt, but of this court, and was to be punished by ourselVes and not by the District Judge.

If the District Attorney believed that the defendants had been guilty of contempt he should have addressed himself to us and pot to the District Judge, and the latter should have at once declined acting when himself appealed to. This matter we think would have been clear enough had it been coolly, temperately and judicially approached and dealt with. Th9 case is'obviously one in which strong political feelings and antagonisms have been developed, as shown by the pleadings and briefs of the parties — parts - of which on both sides are not to be commended and have not been quoted. We accept as true the declarations made by the District Judge and District Attorney that their course was not actuated by any designed or intentional disrespect of this court or any of its members, but none the less the fact remains that our order was disobeyed. We can not accede to respondents’ prayer that they be adjudged not guilty, and that the rules taken here be discharged. They were unquestionably guilty of contempt of court and we so adjudge them. We can not permit this matter to pass uncensured.

Having disposed of this preliminary question we next direct our attention to the writs of prohibition and certiorari which we ordered to issue. The first proposition advanced by the respondents is that relators invoked a- wrong remedy — that prohibition as its name implies is a writ for the purpose of preventing not of annulling, and that in this ease the matter sought to be prohibited was an accomplished fact — as the relators were already effectually enjoined and they could only be released from the effect of the same by regular proceedings to dissolve in the District Oourt. That the writ of certiorari as applied for is merely an ancillary writ intended to bring up the record for the purpose of passing upon the application for a prohibition. We have ourselves stated that the object of the writ of prohibition was to prevent further action in a case where jurisdiction, power and authority to act is denied, and declared that it was the function of the writ of certiorari to undo matters which had taken such a shape as not to be remedied by the writ of prohibition. It is true that in this instance the injunction asked for had been granted, and that nothing further having been asked for by the plaintiff in injunction that particular proceeding was at an end, but none the less that injunction could well be made the basis of future action by the court itself which granted it. ' The proceeding for contempt taken in the matter before the District Judge, shows that there might be necessity for a prohibition to be directed to him, but granting that the condition was such as not to be properly reached by the particular writ applied for it would not follow that relator should be thrown out of court. There is an idea prevalent in this State arising from the fact that prior to the Constitution of 1879 the writ of certiorari was almost exclusively made use of for the purpose of the correction of errors in transcripts of appeal; that it has no greater scope, but this is a mistake — it is a substantive and far-reaching corrective writ concurrent with and frequently taking the place of the writ of prohibition. In the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction we are not rigidly tied down by form. When the facts of a given case being recited present a case for relief by us under that jurisdiction and there is a prayer for such orders and decrees as those facts will justify and for general relief, we will not remit the relator to new, expensive and unnecessary and sometimes fruitless remedies simply by reason of a mistake in the writ specifically asked for.-

Defendants’ next contention is that the matter in dispute being over one hundred dollars and not shown to be over two thousand dollars a ease is presented where the question of jurisdiction should be primarily determined by the Oourt of Appeals, as it would be one within its appellate jurisdiction, and it should only reach this court after the case had passed through all the different stages of an ordi.nary suit and the ultimate result reached was against the exception nr plea to the jurisdiction.

We have on a number of occasions held that we would not as a general rule detach or split off an exception of jurisdiction from the •case in which it was an incident and decide it in advance of the final judgment in the case, but that proposition was simply the enunciation of a general rule subject to be departed from in exceptional or extraordinary cases. We do not find in the present case any occasion for the application of the rule which respondents invoke. What was the issue raised by the District Attorney in the District Court and what was the result reached on his application? The argument has been made to us on behalf of the respondents that with the application for the writ of injunction and the • granting of the injunction the case of the District Attorney was ended, and that is true. The District Attorney sought to go further in that case than to obtain the injunction itself, and this being granted to force relators into the position of being plaintiffs in a new suit to have themselves recognized as entitled to the positions to which they had been appointed. The District Attorney (even were he authorized to raise such an issue) did not seek to have it decreed in that particular proceeding contradictorily with the defendants that they were not entitled to their offices, nor did he cite them into court for that purpose and to have the appointments declared null as having been made by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate without authority. What he claimed was that the Governor was absolutely without legal power to make the appointments, and that upon his suggestion of that fact to the District Oourt it had the power at once to paralyze the action of the executive until the appointees should themselves have instituted legal proceedings to have themselves declared rightfully entitled to the offices and should have sustained their right thus collaterally attacked. If the defendants had •answered the injunction, what would have been their plea? Evidently that the court was without power or authority to thus summarily, by injunction, set aside the Governor’s action, paralyze it until his appointees should as plaintiffs have been able to have that •action judicially vindicated. The issue involved would be the District Court’s power in the premises, not the powers of the Governor and the Senate. If the District Court, on an exception taken as to its power, had determined that it had such power, and the matter had been appealed tb the Court of Appeals, what issue would have been before that court? Simply the issue of the power and authority of the District Court in the premises, nothing more. There would be no existing suit involving issues in which the question of jurisdiction would be incidentally raised as leading up to the decision of other questions; the very beginning and ending of the suit would be the question of the jurisdiction and power of the lower court. We see under such circumstances no reason to permit this question to be sent primarily for decision to the Court of Appeals. The “ matter in dispute” is not measured by the amount which the District Attorney has declared to be the value of the office of police juror. The question at issue is the power of the judiciary to summarily and positively check by injunction the exercise of the powers of the executive department. A more important question than this can scarcely arise, and is not to be disposed of in determining the jurisdiction of this court simply by reason of the value of the particular office which furnished the occasion from which arises a contest as to the powers of the two departments. The District Attorney does not pretend that in the particular proceeding to which he has resorted, the right of the defendants to their offices was to be therein litigated. The suit is not before us as one in which the rights of private individuals are challenged, and in which the jurisdiction, power and authority of the District Court to deal with those rights is called incidentally in question. We are not asked to dissolve the injunction, but to discharge it.

The next position contended for is that, inasmuch as there is a class of eases in which the judiciary is authorized to pass upon the legality and illegality of particular acts of the executive, and inasmuch as the District Attorney, a constitutional officer, had, under oath, declared that in the matter of the appointments of the three police jurors appointed from St. Landry the Governor’s action was illegal, the District Court had authority to take cognizance of the cause and to grant the order it did. That if there was any want of proper allegation in the petition it was a matter for exception or demurrer, and not for direct and immediate action by this court, as one involving the power and jurisdiction of the lower court.

We had occasion in State ex rel. Kuhlman vs. Judge, 47 An. 57, and State ex rel. Keller vs. Judge, 47 An. 61, to examine into and pass upon an objection of the same character. We see no reason to change the views therein expressed. This case, as to the pleadings of the District Attorney, is as much (in fact more) open to objection as the pleadings in those cases, and the relief asked for is more sweeping and radical than was there asked. Here there are no opposing private interests sought to be protected; the District Attorney does not pretend to have been solicited by any one to institute the proceedings; he declares himself as acting for and on behalf of the State solely by virtue of his office. He has inaugurated, of his own motion, proceedings calling in question the power of the Governor and the Senate — the power of the Governor having been exercised, 'so relator’s petition declares (and the fact is not denied), under an official opinion delivered by the Attorney General, the highest law officer in the State in the prosecution of the interests of the State. It is the bounden duty of the judiciary to give-some force and effect to the acts of the executive. His acts are not to be presumed illegal and utterly wrong, particularly upon a mere conclusion of law announced by a District Attorney. The parties enjoined in this case had not gone into office under their commissions; they had not usurped the office, but before they had taken any steps whatever they were ordered and forced (as we have said), as plaintiffs, to primarily vindicate their rights and the authority of the executive in a new suit. The District Judge reversed the presumptions as to the validity of the Governor’s action and threw the judiciary department into immediate and direct clash with the executive department. Without any bond the exercise of functions of public functionaries has been put an end to. If a District Court can upon a mere declaration by a District Attorney that the Governor has illegally appointed a police juror [before that officer has taken his seat] successfully enjoin him from exercising his functions until he shall have brought suit to establish his right, and shall have established his right, the District Court could with equal propriety, upon a mere declaration of a District Attorney that the Governor had illegally appointed a District Judge or any other officer, enjoin him from qualifying, and thus bring about absolute confusion in the administration of public affairs. In the Kuhlman case we referred approvingly to Beebe vs. Robinson, 52 Ala. 66. The views of the Supreme Court of Alabama, expressed in that case, still command our approval.

The opinion we deliver, to-day does not touch the legality or the illegality of the action of the Governor in appointing the relators to the office of police jurors. That matter is left open. All that we decide now is that the District Oourt was without power or authority by injunction to tie up the relators in the exercise of the functions by anticipation, and to force those parties to remain powerless to act until as plaintiffs they had first affirmatively shown the authority of the Governor to make the appointments. See, on this subject, State ex rel. Cheevers vs. Duffel, 32 An. 653.

For the reasons herein assigned, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the writs which issued herein be perpetuated, and that the injunction granted by the District Judge of the Eleventh Judicial District Oourt in and for the parish of St. Landry, in the matter of the State of Louisiana ex rel. R. L. Garland, District Attorney, vs. Joseph P. Saizan et al., No. 15,853 on the docket of that court, be and the same is hereby set aside and discharged.  