
    *Hall vs. Penney.
    The fleeces, or the yam or cloth manufactured from the fleeces of ten sheep, are exempted from execution while in the hands of a householder, whether he be or be not the owner of sheep.
    
    Error from the Madison common pleas. Penney sued Hall in a justices’ court, in trespass, for taking a quantity of domestic fulled cloth. The defen dant justified the taking as a constable, under a justice’s execution against the plaintiff. In October, 1829, the defendant took from the plaintiff a roll of common coarse home-made cloth, containing 7 3-4 yards, made from wool brought to a factory in 1828, carded that year, but not dressed until 1829, when not only this piece, but another of 22 1-4 yards, were dressed. 25 lbs. of wool is the ordinary produce of 10 sheep, and will make 30 yards of fulled cloth. The manufacturer testified that in 1829 he carded 27 lbs. of wool for the plaintiff, which he took in and manufactured on shares, and that the plaintiff told him that he also had another piece of fulled cloth dressed at Manlius. It was proved that the plaintiff took in wool and manufactured it on shares to clothe his family, and that he paid hired girls for spinning, in cloth so manufactured by him : and it was also proved that the plaintiff did not own any sheep in 1828 or 1829. The defendant produced the execution by virtue of which the cloth was taken. The justice rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff removed the proceedings by certiorari into the Madison common pleas, where the judgment of the justice was reversed. Whereupon the defendant sued out a writ of error.
    P. G. Childs, for plaintiff in error.
    W. J. Hough, for defendant in error.
   By the Court,

Nelson, J.

There is some evidence upon which it is contended that the plaintiff below had more wool in 1829 than the probable produce of ten sheep ; but I think #the facts do not warrant such a conclusion. The wool from which the cloth in question was manufactured, the plaintiff had in 1828, and it does not appear that he had any other wool in that year. The only question in the case is, whether wool or articles manufactured from it, not exceeding in quantity the fleeces from ten sheep, are exempt from execution in the hands of a person not owning any sheep. The statute enacts that “ all sheep, to the number of ten, with their fleeces and the yarn or cloth manufactured from the same,” shall be exempt from execution, 2 R. S. 255, § 169, sub. 4. The object and intent of the statute cannot be mistaken; it is to secure to the family of a householder, wool or the article manufactured from it, equal in amount to that grown on a given number of sheep, and the terms used in the act were intended to effect that intent. No other purpose could have been within the view of the legislature. The exemption of the sheep alone would be a useless boon ; it is the wool grown upon the sheep which gives value to this provision to a poor family. It is a settled rule, that such construction shall be given to a statute as may best answer the intention which the makers had in view. The intention of the makers of a statute is sometimes to be collected from the cause or necessity of making it; and when this can be discovered, it ought to be followed with reason and discretion in the construction to be put upon it, although such construction seems contrary to its letter. Bacon’s Abr. tit. Statute, P. 384. These are familiar principles in construing statutes, and are in point. The judgment of the common pleas therefore is right, and must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  