
    Tom CASAULT, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ONE WEST BANK FSB; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-55494
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted August 1, 2016  Pasadena, California
    Filed August 04, 2016
    See also, 915 F.Supp.2d 1113
    Todd Steven Dion, Attorney, Law Office of Todd S. .Dion, North Providence, RI, Khinh Voury Yam, Attorney, Law Offices of Khinh V. Yam, Long Beach, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants Tom Casault, Ot Bonsynat, Alexander Ros & Ranee Ly, Bill Earn, John Alvino Alva, Jr., Sophy Bonsy-nat, Sopheap Soun, Chanserey Ouk, Lak-hena Chhuon, Chetra Khut
    Khinh Voury Yam, Attorney, Law Offices of Khinh V. Yam, Long Beach, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant Amy Chamreun, Otis Haynes
    James Kevin Snyder, Esquire, Attorney, Dykema Gossett LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Peter J. Van Zandt, LeClairRyan, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appel-lee One West Bank FSB
    Peter Obstler, Esquire, Arnold & Porter LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Chase Home Finance, LLC
    Brent Adam Kramer, Attorney, Robert W. Norman, Jr., Attorney, Houser & Allison, APC, Irvine, CA, Peter J. Van Zandt, LeClairRyan, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Nina Huerta, Esquire, Attorney, Deleyla Lawrence, Locke Lord LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC
    Steven Andrew Ellis, Goodwin Procter LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Bac Home Loans Servicing, LP
    Frederick B. Burnside, Esquire, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Seattle, WA, Steven Andrew Ellis, Goodwin Procter LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Bank of America, N.A.
    Martin Christopher Bryce, Jr., Esquire, Ballard Spahr LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Defendant-Appellee Urbán Lending Solutions
    Justin Donald Balser, Melissa L. Ciz-morris, Attorney, Akerman Senterfitt LLP, Denver, CO, for Defendant-Appel-lee, Aurora Loan Services, LLC
    Debra Bogo-Ernst, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee Citi-Mortgage Inc.
    Irene Claire Freidel, K & L Gates LLP, Boston, MA, Nina Huerta, Esquire, Attorney, Deleyla Lawrence, Locke Lord LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Wells Fargo Bank, NA
    Brian Ming Horn, Esquire, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee U.S. BANK, N.A.
    Tami S. Smason, Esquire, Attorney, Foley & Lardner LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Federal National Mortgage Association
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN, RAWLINSON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Tom Casault and others (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) orders dismissing their second and third amended complaints in their class action against various banking and mortgage lending/servicing entities (the “Servicer Defendants”) and institutional trustees (the “Trustee Defendants”). Specifically, they appeal the dismissal of two causes of action: fraud, as the term is defined in California Civil Code § 3294, and improper foreclosure, arising under California Commercial Code § 3602. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true. Lloyd v. CVB Fin. Corp., 811 F.3d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.

1. Plaintiffs fail to allege a fraud claim against the Servicer Defendants. A plaintiff must sufficiently plead justifiable reliance as part of stating a claim for fraud. City Sols., Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 365 F.3d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 2004); Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.4th 631, 638, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 909 P.2d 981 (1996). Here, Plaintiffs claim that they detrimentally relied on (1) misrepresentations contained in offers of loan modification assistance advertised by these defendants on their websites or communicated through the mail, and (2) the actions of these defendants after commencement of the loan modification process.

With respect to the initial offers, it was not reasonable'for Plaintiffs to rely on the offers because they contained no promise or guarantee of a loan modification. With respect to the Servicer Defendants’ conduct during the modification process, Plaintiffs do not provide a single allegation that the foreclosures they suffered were due to justifiable reliance on an actionable misrepresentation or omission and not due to their own failure to pay their mortgages.

2. Plaintiffs fail to allege a cause of action for improper foreclosure against the Trustee Defendants. Under California law, “an instrument is paid to the extent payment is made by or on behalf of a party obliged to pay the instrument.” Cal. Com. Code § 3602(a)(1). Plaintiffs claim that the Trustee Defendants foreclosed on their properties in violation of this provision because the Servicer Defendants made “advance” payments to the Trustee Defendants' “on their behalf’ when they were delinquent on their loan payments, thus absolving them of default. ■ It is contended that by making these payments, the Servi-cers “took over” Plaintiffs’ mortgage obligations.'

‘ Even if we accept as true that the Servi-cers made advances when Plaintiffs were delinquent on their loan payments, the conclusion that these advances constituted a “taking over” of their loan obligations is not plausible in light of the various agreements referenced in the complaints. The mortgage promissory notes define “default” as failure to pay the full amount of each monthly payment on the date it is due, and the trust agreements and pooling and servicing agreements contemplate borrower default and foreclosure. Moreover, the payments made by the. Servicers were provisional, reimbursable advances made for the benefit of certificate holders of a given trust, not for the benefit of the borrowers.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     
      
      . Plaintiffs do not appeal the district court’s dismissal of the remaining causes of action.
     