
    No. 3507.
    The City of New Orleans v. New Orleans, Mobile and Chattanooga Railroad Company.
    The joint resolution of tlie Legislature upon wliicli defendant relies in this case and the title of which is: “A joint resolution m relation to the New Orleans, Mobile and Chattanooga [Railroad Company, a corporation of the State of Alabama,” sufficiently discloses the object of the resolution. It is not therefore unconstitutional.
    The public servitude along the banks of rivers in Louisiana is under the control of the (General Assembly. The right of that body to grant the privilege to corporations or individuals to make and maintain wharves has long been settled. In this instance the State . granted the right to the riparian owner. This is permissible. The grant was not a donation of public revenues to a private purpose. It was the control by the Legislature of a public servitude.
    APPEAL from the Fourth District Court, parish of Orleans. TMard, J.
    
      George S. Lacey, A. O. Lewis, W. W. King, for plaintiff and appellant. J. A. Campbell, for defendant and appellee.
   Ludeling, C. J.

This is a suit for $764 20, for levee dues charged against the defendant, for barges and flatboats belonging to the company, and lying at the wharves of the company.

It is admitted the charges are correct if due by the defendant. It is admitted that the barges, etc., were moored at the wharf described in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in March, 1869, which is situated in the Delord suburb of this city, and that the company was in possession of said wharf, under said resolution, during the period for which the charges are made; and that the barges, etc., were used in the business of the company.

The defense is that under said resolution of the General Assembly the defendant is exempted from wharfage dues for barges, etc., which land at the said wharf.

The city urges three objections to this joint resolution.

First — Its unconstitutionally, because its title does not declare its-object, and because its provisions create an inequality in taxation.

Second — Because the Legislature has not the power to control the municipal wharves and levees, and the dues and charges arising therefrom.

Third — Because the Legislature transcended legislative power by donating public revenues to a private purpose.

The title of the resolution is, A Joint Resolution in relation to the New Orleans, Mobile and Chattanooga Railroad Company, a corporation of the State of Alabama.” It gave the company the right to inclose and occupy for its purposes and uses, that portion of the levee batture and wharf in New Orleans, in front of the riparian property which the company had acquired. The act further exempted from the payment of wharfage and levee dues, vessels, etc., landing at said wharf with the consent of the company, and imposed the obligation on the company to maintain and keep in repair said wharf.

First — We think the title sufficiently discloses the object of the resolution. See 14 An. 7, Williams v. Paysan; 9 An. 329; 20 An. 196, Police Jury v. Colomb. There is no question of taxation in this case.

Second — The public servitude along the banks of rivers in Louisiana is under the control of the General Assembly. C. C. 453, 455, 458. The right of the General Assembly to grant the right to corporations or individuals to make and maintain wharves has been long settled. 5 An. 661; 15 An. 577 ; 22 An. 545; 6 N. Y. 523; 26 N. Y. 287.

Third — In the ease now under consideration, the State granted the right to the riparian owner. This is permissible. 1 Black. 1.

Nor was the grant a donation of public revenues to a private purpose. The grant is a license to a railroad company to use its property on the river bank for public purposes, to wit: to facilitate the transaction of its business with the public. It was the control, by the Legislature, of a public servitude.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the lower court be affirmed with costs of appeal.

Wyly J.,

dissenting. The defendants resist this demand of the city of New Orleans on an account of $764 20 for levee dues, on the ground mentioned in tlie statement of facts upon which the case was submitted in the court below. And it is as follows: The defendants resist the payment by virtue of a joint resolution of the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana, approved March 6, 1869;” * * * which they claim exempts them from the payment of all levee and wharf dues to the city of New Orleans.

The plaintiff contends that this joint resolution is repugnant to article 114 of the constitution, and is therefore void.

The title is, “A Joint Resolution in relation to the New Orleans, Mobile and Chattanooga Railroad Company, a corporation of the State of Alabama.” The statute provides: “That there shall be and is hereby granted to the New Orleans, Mobile and Chattanooga Railroad Company, a corporation of the State of Alabama, the right to inclose and occupy for its purposes and uses, in such manner as the directors of said company may determine, that portion of the levee batture and wharf of the city of New Orleans, between the street laid out between Pilie street and the Mississippi river, and from Calliope street to the lower line (about three hundred and fifty-five feet below Calliope street) of the batture rights owned by said company, and no steamship or other vessel shall occupy or lie at said wharf, or receive or discharge cargo thereat, except by and with the consent of said company; and all steamships or vessels discharging or receiving cargo at said wharf of said company, or any steamships or other vessels using said wharf by and with the consent of said company, and not receiving or discharging cargo at, or occupying any other wharf in the city of New Orleans, shall be exempt from the payment of all levee and wharf dues to the city of New Orleans; said wharf shall be maintained and kept in repair by said company. That all laws and parts of laws, and all ordinances and parts of ordinances conflicting with the provisions of this joint resolution are hereby repealed, so far as they affect the provisions of this joint resolution.”

There is nothing in the title of the law indicating the object to exempt any ships or other vessels landing at the port of New Orleans from the payment of levee and wharfage dues. In the title no hint or clue is given showing the object of the law to confer any advantage on the defendants over any other persons, in regard to exemption from paying levee dues. Nor does it disclose the purpose of allowing the defendants to inclose and have the exclusive right to occupy a part of the levee and wharf of the city of New Orleans.

I think the exemption claimed should not be allowed, because the law granting it is repugnant to article 114 of the constitution and is void. I therefore dissent in this case.  