
    Mama DIAWARA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, et al., Respondents.
    No. 08-4189-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 13, 2010.
    
      Brian I. Kaplan, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Michael P. Lindemann, Assistant Director; Lyle D. Jentzer, Senior Litigation Counsel; Christopher C. Fuller, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, ROGER J. MINER and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Mama Diawara, a native and citizen of the Ivory Coast, seeks review of a July 24, 2008 order of the BIA affirming the June 16, 2006 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Helen J. Sichel denying Diawara’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mama Diawara, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 24, 2008), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. June 16, 2006). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

“Where the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s findings and reasoning, as it did here, we review the decision of the IJ as if it were that of the BIA.” See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 517, 523 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Chun Gao v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir.2005)). The IJ’s factual findings, including adverse credibility findings, are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009) (stating that “we uphold the IJ’s factual findings if they are supported by ‘reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record’ ” (quoting Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir.2007))).

We lack jurisdiction to consider Diawara’s challenge to the agency’s pretermission of his asylum application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (explaining that no court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General regarding the timeliness of an asylum application under section 1158(a)(2)(B)). Although we retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions of law, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), Diawara raises no such argument, essentially disputing the IJ’s purely factual finding that Diawara’s testimony regarding his date of entry was not credible. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir.2006) (finding that a question of law is not implicated “when the petition for review essentially disputes the correctness of an IJ’s fact-finding or the wisdom of his exercise of discretion”).

With respect to Diawara’s applications for withholding of removal and CAT relief, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. Contrary to Diawara’s argument, the discrepancies that the IJ relied upon in making her adverse credibility determination were not ancillary. To the contrary, the IJ reasonably questioned whether Dia-wara was actually from the Ivory Coast— the country where he was allegedly persecuted. For example, Diawara’s national ID card listed his occupation as mechanic, an occupation Diawara never had. A reasonable factfinder would not have been compelled to accept Diawara’s explanation that his aspiration to one day become a mechanic explained this discrepancy. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Moreover, although Diawara claimed to have lived in the Ivory Coast for twenty-three years and testified that he was persecuted because of his imputed sympathies for the RDR (“Rassemblement des Republieaines” or “Rally of Republicans”) party, he did not know that party’s actual name. These and other discrepancies undermined Diawara’s credibility and constituted the substantial evidence supporting the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.

Because the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, the IJ reasonably denied Dia-wara’s application for withholding of removal and CAT relief, as both claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 155-56 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is dismissed as to Diawara’s asylum claim and DENIED as to Dia-wara’s withholding of removal and CAT claims. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  