
    Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. and Marsushita Electric Company of America v. United States Treasury Department et al.
    (No. 5496, C.A.D. 1086)
    United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
    February 1, 1973
    
      Ira M. Millstein, A. Paul Victor, Marshall 0. Berger, (Weil, Gotshal & Manges), attorneys of record, for appellants.
    
      B. Greg Lewis, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Andrew P. Vanee, Chief, Customs Section, Bredericlc L. Ilcenson for the United States.
    [Oral argument October 4,1972 by Mr. Victor and Mr. Vance]
    Before Market, Chief Judge, Rich, Almond, Baldwin, and Lane, Associate Judges
    
   Per Curiam.

This appeal is from the order and accompanying memorandum of the United States Customs Court, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. The United States Treasury Department, 67 Cust. Ct. 328, C.D. 4292 (1971), granting appellees’ motion to quash and dismiss a summons and civil action on the ground that the jurisdiction of the Customs Court had not been properly invoked. The civil action was commenced by a “Petition for Mandatory, Injunctive and Other Belief,” filed in the Customs Court requesting an order of that court vacating all determinations and findings in the antidumping proceeding entitled Television Receiving Sets, Monochrome and Color, From Japan (ATS 643.3; AA1921-66), dismissing the proceeding, enjoining appellees from taking any further action in connection therewith, and declaring the invalidity and unconstitutional nature of the proceeding, vacating the dumping determination, and requiring appellees to conduct the proceeding in a manner requested. The proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and the Tariff Commission culminated in a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that the television sets are being, or are likely to be, sold at less than fair value within the meaning of section 201(a) of the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, thus making the sets subject to dumping duties. However, no such dumping duties have been levied, and accordingly no protest has been filed or denied. The claim for jurisdiction of the Customs ■Court was made under the All Writs Act, 28 USC 1651.

We have considered the order and accompanying memorandum of ¡the Customs Court and find ourselves in agreement therewith.

The order of the Customs Court is affirmed.

BaldwiN, Judge,

concurring.

The relief sought by appellants is summarized in their brief as ■follows:

[Appellants’] petition sought: (a) an order vacating- all determinations and flnd--ings in the aforementioned antidumping proceeding, dismissing the proceeding and enjoining- defendants from taking any further action in connection therewith, .and declaring- the invalidity and unconstitutional nature of the proceeding; or (b) an order declaring the invalidity and unconstitutional nature of the pro•ceeding and vacating the dumping determination, and requiring appellees to con-■duet the proceeding in the manner required by law and the Constitution * * ®.

Appellants are in effect asking the Customs Court to exercise jurisdiction in the nature of mandamus, similar to the jurisdiction granted the United States District Courts by the Mandamus Act of 1962, 28 USC 1361. A proposal was made during the pendency of the Customs ■'Court Act of 1970 that such jurisdiction should be conferred on the ■Customs Court, but the proposed provision was never enacted. See Hearings on S. 2624 before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, at 254-55 (1970); Hearings on B. before the Bubcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Oomm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 205 (1969).

The Customs Court was clearly correct in holding that the relief sought here is not within the powers granted it under the All Writs Act. I agree with the majority opinion and join in its endorsement of the Customs Court’s well-reasoned memorandum.  