
    SAMUEL D. BRONSON ET AL. v. JACOB COPPICK ET AL.
    (S. C., Thomp. Cas., 150-151.)
    Knoxville,
    September Term, 1858.
    RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS. Not where made during lucid interval, when.
    Where a person subject to occasional paroxysms of mental derangement, during- a lucid interval, makes a conveyance of land, at a fair price, free from any imputation of frauds or unfairness, to a stranger who is ignorant of the conveyor’s previous occasional derangement, and the sale is approved and acquiesced in by several adult members of the vendor, such sale and conveyance will not be set aside, especially where, by reason of thirteen years’ acquiescence and subsequent conveyances by the purchaser, it is impossible to place the parties in statu quo. [Where parties cannot be placed in statu quo. Phillips v. Hollister, 2 Cold., 278. An unconscientious executory contract for the sale of land will be rescinded after seven years, when. Hotchkiss v. Fortson, 7 Yer., 67. A rescission will be made, when. Caldwell v. Palmer, 6 Lea, 658; Lewis v. Brooks, 6 Yer., 184, 185; Scott v. Johnson, 5 Heis., 614; Phillips v. Hollister, 2 Cold., 269. Lapse of time will prevent a rescission, when. Hum-bard v. Humbard, 3 Head, 103; Peck v. Bullard, 2 Hum., 41; Hamilton v. Saunders, cited in Scott v. Johnson, 5 Heis., 636; Enockolls v. Lea, 10 Hum., 577; Barnard v. Iron Co., 1 Pickle, 153; Smith v. Greaves, 15 Lea, 459. A lapse of time will not prevent a rescission for a person who is mentally unsound. Alston v. Boyd, 6 Hum., 505. See Wright v. West, 2 Lea, 85; Hotchkiss v. Fortson, 7 Yer., 67.]
   McKinney, J.,

delivered the opinon of the court:

The decree is against the decided preponderance of the proof, and must be reversed. This clearly establishes that John Moser was subject to occasional paroxysms of mental derangement, with, intermissions of longer or shorter duration, during which his capacity for the transaction of business seems not to have been materially impaired. The weight of the proof is, that at the time of the contract with Coppick, Moser was in the possession of his ordinary powers of mind; that Coppick was a stranger, and ignorant of Moser’s occasional previous derangement; that the price paid for the same was its fair value; that the sale was approved and acquiesced in by the family of Moser, several of whom at the time were of full age; and that the transaction on the part of Coppick was free from any imputation of fraud or unfairness. TJpon this state of facts, leaving out of view the fact of acquiescence for the period of thirteen years before the filing of the present bill, and the additional fact that by reason of subsequent conveyances by Coppick of parts of said land to different parties, the parties cannot now be placed in statu quo, it is clear that the bill cannot be maintained.

Decree reversed and bill dismissed.  