
    *Barker v. Barker’s Adm’r.
    
    October Term, 1845,
    Richmond.
    1. Evidence — Deposition—Objection—What Exception Must State. — If, on the trial of a cause in the Court below, a party objects to the introduction of a deposition as evidence, for any irregularity in taking it, his exception to the opinion of the Court overruling the obj ection, must state the grounds of the objection.
    2. Slaves-Parol Gifts. — A parol gift of a slave, to take effect upon the death of the donor, -who is not then sick, is void.
    This was an action of detinue brought in the Circuit Superior Court for Henrico county, by Benjamin B, R. Barker, administrator of Branham Barker, against Robert Barker, to recover a slave. On the trial of the cause, the plaintiff offered-to introduce in evidence two depositions taken in Kentucky. To the introduction of this evidence, the defendant objected, but the Court overruled the objection, and admitted the evidence; and the defendant excepted. The exception does not state the ground of objection to the evidence; but the objection made in this Court was, that the notice was, that the depositions would be taken at the courthouse of Barren count}', Kentucky ; whilst the certificate of the justices w*ho took the depositions stated that they were taken at the courthouse in the town of Glasgow, in the county of Barren, Kentucky. And there was no proof that the courthouse in the town of Glasgow was the courthouse of Barren county.
    The facts, as they may be collected from the bills of exceptions taken on the trial, were in substance as follows: The slave in controversy had been the property of Bran-ham Barker, who came of age in 1836. The defendant had been the guardian of Bran-ham, and as his guardian, had hired out this slave for a number of years. In January 1837, the defendant, as the agent of Branham Barker, hired out this slave for 100 dollars, and took the bond for the hire payable to himself. This *bond is dated the 12th of January 1837. On the 13th of January, Branham Barker, being about to leave Richmond for the State of Kentucky, in the presence of a third person who he requested to attend to, and remember what he was about to say, said to the defendant, that he wished him to take and use the slave Abel as his own; and if he Branham Barker never returned to Virginia, he wished the defendant to have the slave. Said Branham left Richmond on the same day, and went to Kentucky, where he died in the month of May following; never having returned to Virginia.
    The slave having been hired out by the defendant, as before stated, went into the possession of the hirer, and remained with him until the 22d of the next December, when he was taken into the possession of the defendant, who again hired him out for the year 1838, and took the bond for the hire payable to himself. This bond was for 90 dollars.
    There seems to have been no doubt upon the evidence as to the foregoing facts. The only doubtful fact was, whether the slave went into the possession of the person who hired him for the year 1837, before the 13th of February, or after that day.
    The evidence having been concluded, the plaintiff moved the Court to instruct the jury: “That if they believed the slave was in the possession of the person who hired him for the year 1837, at the time of the parol gift relied upon by the defendant; and that Branham Barker died during the year 1837, whilst the slave was so hired, and in the hirer’s possession ; and that the defendant never got possession of the slave under said gift until after Branham Barker’s death, then such parol gift passed no title to the defendant.”
    On the other hand the defendant moved the Court to instruct the jury, “that upon the facts given above as not doubtful, the parol gift did pass to the defendant the title to the slave.”
    *The Court gave the instruction as asked for by the plaintiff, and refused to give that asked for by the defendant; and the defendant excepted.
    The defendant then asked a second instruction, only varying from the first by adding thereto the words: “If the jury should believe from the evidence, that before the hiring out of the said slave, and in the month of January 1837, the said Bran-ham Barker, in contemplation of a removal from Virginia to Kentucky, made a parol gift.” The Court refused to give this instruction ; and the defendant excepted.
    The jury then found a verdict for the plaintiff for the slave, fixing his value at 750 dollars; and they assessed the damages for the detention of the slave at 190 dollars; the amount of the two bonds taken by the defendant for the hire for 1837, and 1838. After the verdict, the defendant asked for a new trial of the cause, but the Court overruled the motion, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. Whereupon the defendant applied for, and obtained an appeal to this Court.
    Lyons, for the appellant.
    1. The depositions should have been excluded. It is the duty of the party offering to read a deposition, to prove that he has done every thing which it was necessary to do to entitle him to read it; and it is not upon the party opposing it to shew that it has not been done. It was therefore incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that the house at which he took the depositions was the same described in the notice.
    2. The Court erred in giving the instruction asked for by the ptaintiff, and in refusing those asked for by the defendant. The possession of the hirer of the slave from the defendant, who held the bond of the hirer payable to him, was the defendant’s possession; and if the gift was subsequent to the hiring, still the first instruction asked for should have been given. Sydnor v. Gee, 4 Geigh 535. But if this be not true, yet if the gift *was before the hiring, as in the case supposed in the second instruction, then the slave was in the possession of the defendant when the gift was made, and his title was complete ; and the second instruction should have been given. Browne v. Handley, 7 Geigh 119.
    Robinson, Mayo, and Crump, for the ap-pellees.
    If a party intends at the trial to make an objection touching the regularity of a deposition, he should distinctly point out the objection on which he relies. And if such objection is not stated in the bill of exceptions, it must be presumed in the appellate Court that the deposition has been properly taken. Tompkins & Co. v. Wiley, 6 Rand. 242.
    2. There are but two kinds of gifts recognized by the law'. 1. Gifts inter vivos. 2. Gifts causa mortis. There cannot have been a valid gift inter vivos, in this case, because .gift inter vivos have no reference to the. future: if of any effect at all, that effect must be immediate, and absolute. 2 Kent’s Comm. 354.
    ; As a. .donatio causa mortis, it must be made by. the donor in .peril of death, that is, with, relation to his decease by illness affecting him, at the time of the gift. ' 1 Wms. on Ex’ors 499. And to the validity of .a gift of either kind, whether it be inter vivos or causa mortis, delivery is alike essential. 2 Kent’s Comm. 354; 1 Wms. on Ex’ors ; 499; Pearson v. Pearson, 7 Johns. R. 26; Eink ,v. Cox, 18 Id. 415; Pennington •v. Gittings, 2 Gill & Johns. 208; Ewing v. Ewing, 2 Eeigh 337. In all these respects the evidence in this case fails to establish a valid gift to the defendant.
    
      
      For monographic note on Gifts, see end of case,
    
    
      
      Evidence — Deposition—Objection—What Exception Bust State. — The principal case was cited in Steptoe v. Read, 19 Gratt. 8. See also, monographic note on "Depositions” appended to Field v. Brown, 24 Gratt. 74; monographic note on “Bills of Exception” appended to Stoneman v. Com., 25 Gratt. 887.
      Same — Objections to. — It is the duty of a party objecting to evidence to specify and point out such portions as he deems objectionable, and, in the absence of any such specifications on his part, the court will overrule the motion, if any of the evidence thus objected, to en masse should be legitimate or proper. Brown v. Town of Point Pleasant, 36 W. Va. 303, 15 S. E. Rep. 213, citing the principal case and Tompkins v. Wiley, 6 Rand. 242.
      See also, monographic note on “Bills of Exception’* appended to Stoneman v. Com., 25 Gratt. 887.
    
    
      
      SIaves — Gifts of. — In Virginia for more than a hundred years there have been statutes prescribing what is necessary to make a valid gift of slaves. Dickeschied v. Bank, 28 W. Va. 367, citing the principal case; Durham v. Dunkly, 6 Rand. 135; Hunter v. Jones, 6 Rand. 541; Patterson v. Franklin, 7 Leigh 590; Shirley v. Long, 6 Rand. 735; Brown v. Handley, 7 Leigh 119.
      Gifts of Personalty — Delivery.—It is now and always has been held by the courts, that, to make any gift of personalty valid, as a gift inter vivos or causa mortis, delivery is absolutely necessary. Seabright v. Seabright, 28 W. Va. 471, citing the principal case; Ewing v. Ewing, 2 Leigh 387, 341, 344; Miller v. Jeffress, 4 Gratt. 472, 479. See also, foot-note to Lee v. Boak, 11 Gratt. 182; foot-note to Morrison v. Grubb, 23 Gratt. 343; foot-note to Miller v. Jeffress, 4 Gratt. 472; monographic note on “Gifts” at end of principal case.
    
   By the Court.

Affirm the judgment.  