
    Michael T. HAYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kathy RADFORD, Mail Room Supervisor of ICC, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-35899.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Aug. 13, 2014.
    
    Filed Aug. 21, 2014.
    Michael T. Hayes, Boise, ID, pro se.
    Kirtlan G. Naylor, General Naylor & Hales, P.C., Boise, ID, for Defendant-Ap-pellee.
    Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Michael T. Hayes, an Idaho state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging interference with his mail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir.1996) (summary judgment), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir.1998). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to the portion of Hayes’s legal mail claim that was properly exhausted because Hayes failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any legal mail had been opened outside his presence. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1094 (“Mail from the courts, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not legal mail.”).

The district court properly dismissed Hayes’s claim regarding the holding of his mail while Hayes was temporarily housed at Shoshone County Jail because the allegations in Hayes’s complaint and the attachments thereto show that defendant Radford’s handling of Hayes’s mail was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest and constituted an isolated interference. See Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 959-61 (9th Cir.1999) (temporary delay in mail delivery did not violate First Amendment where the record showed that there was a legitimate penological reason for the delay).

The district court properly dismissed Hayes’s claim against defendants Prado and Valdez because Hayes failed to allege facts demonstrating their personal involvement in the alleged violations or a causal connection between their conduct and the alleged violations. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir.2011) (discussing the requirements for establishing supervisory liability).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hayes’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir.2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “[ajlthough leave to amend should be given freely, a district court may dismiss without leave where a plaintiffs proposed amendments would fail to cure the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be futile”).

Hayes’s contentions regarding his motion for review of his first amended complaint and his motion to augment the record are without merit.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     