
    JAMES M. T. GLEESON v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 13900.
    Decided January 24, 1887.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    The claimant is appointed a railway post-office head clerk, at a salary of .$1,400 per annum, in 1871, and serves until 1883. Between 1876 and 1882 his salary is reduced by the Postmaster-General.
    The Postmaster-General has authority to reduce the pay of a railway post-office head clerk prospectively at any time, and his continuation in the service will be upon the terms prescribed.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of tlie case:
    The following are the facts of this case as found by the court:
    I. On the 15th day of November, A. D. 1871, the claimant, J. M. T. Gleeson, was appointed a railway post-office head clerk, at a salary of $1,400 per annum.
    II. That claimant served in said capacity of railway post-office head clerk until May 23,1883.
    III. From the 1st day of August, 1876, to the 3Jst July, 1882, claimant’s salary was reduced from $1,400 per annum to $1,300 per annum, and on. the 12th day of June, 1879, a further reduction was made for one month, as expressly stated, from $1,300 per annum to $1,240 per annum, the total of such deductions being $597.84.
    IY. The claimant was appointed and entered upon his duties as such in pursuance of the following order:
    “ Post-Oeeice Department,
    “Oeeice oe First Asst. P. M. Gen.,
    “ Washington, I). O., November 15, 1871.
    “ J. M. T. Gleeson,
    “ Washington, D. O.:
    
    “ Designated a railway post-office head clerk on cars between Washington, D. O., and Lynchburg, Ya. Pay, $1,400 per annum.
    “ Marr,
    
      “Acting First Assistant Postmaster-General.”
    
    Y. The following printed blank form was used to notify railway post-office head clerks of the reduction of their pay:
    
      “ Post-Oeeioe Department,
    “Washington, D. G., August — , 1876.
    “Sir: The Postmaster-General has changed your pay as
    Ei. P. O. head clerk between-, from $-to $-
    per annum, to take effect on and after August 1,1876.
    VI. On the 24th of August, 1876, blanks in one of said printed forms were filled as follows: The date by the figure “24;” the blank designating the points between which the service was performed by the words “ Washington, D. C., to Lynchburg, Va.;” the blank for the amount by inserting the words and figures “ $1,400 (fourteen hundred dollars), $1,300 (thirteen hundred dollars),” and the signature “ James H. Marr, Acting,” and the address “ J. M. T. Gleeson, E. P. Q., head clerk, Washington, D. C.”
    VII. The following is a copy of an order made by the First Assistant Postmaster-General under date of June 12,1879 :
    
      “Ordered: Seduce the pay of Philip E. Bragg, J. M. T. Glee-son, Winfield S. Waters, and Vinton Wilson Duval, head clerks on the cars between Washington, D. 0., and Lynchburg, Va., from $1,300 to $1,240 per annum from the 1st to the 30th day of June, 1879, inclusive.
    ' “James H. Marr, “Acting First Assistant Postmaster-General.”
    
    VIII. Claimant received the above notices and orders, and received full pay in accordance therewith.
    
      Mr. A. A. Freeman and Mr. William Small for the claimant:
    1. The act of Congress fixed the salary of the claimant at $1,400 per year.
    2. If we are not correct in this, and the court shall be of the opinion that it vested the authority in the Postmaster-General to fix the amount, the power to do so was' exhausted when the amount was so fixed; and., therefore—
    3. The appointment or designation of the claimant as a postal clerk at a salary of $1,400 constituted a contract with the Government and placed it beyond the power of the Postmaster-General to arbitrarily reduce the salary.
    
      Mr. F. P. Dewees (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Howard) for the defendants : .
    It may be stated as a general rule, subject to some modifications, that where it is declared a public officer “ may ” have power to do an act which concerns the public interests “ may ” means “shall.” There can be no question but that in the present instance the provision that the Postmaster-General “may” appoint clerks, &c., is not only directory as to the appointment of such clerks, but also that he shall appoint a sufficient number “ for the purpose of assorting and distributing' the mails.” The act provides that the salaries of the head clerks shall be paid “ at the rate of not more than $1,400 per annum.” He is directed to employ a sufficient number of' clerks, but he is limited as to their payment by the express terms of the statute, and that also by the further limitation that such clerks “ shall be paid out of the appropriation for the transportation of the mail.” The requisite number of clerks must be employed by the Postmaster-General to perform the service — the rate of pay is dependent upon the yearly appropriation.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the following opinion:

It has been the rule and usage of this court, when the determination of a new question will affect a class of cases, in none of which a claimant, by reason of the smallness of his demand, will have a right of appeal, to render a judgment pro forma against the Government in one case to the end that the question may be examined and the rights of all parties determined by the Supreme Court.

In the present instance the question is novel, and the claimants are a deserving class of officials, whose skill, diligence, and honesty affect the entire community probably more than the personal services of any other officers. If this case were to receive a final decision in this court, my own conclusion would probably be adverse to the claimant. To me it seems clear that the Postmaster-General had authority to reduce the claimant’s compensation prospectively, whose continuation in the Railway Mail Service must have been upon the terms prescribed ; but it does not seem more clear than other class cases which have been sent to the Supreme Court in the same way, and in some of which the Supreme Court has thought otherwise. (Twenty Per Cent. Cases, 4 C. Cls. R., 227; 9 id., 103.)

The other members of the court desire to have it understood that their opinion is adverse to the claimant upon the merits, and that if any other case of this class shall be brought to a hearing before the question involved be determined by the Supreme Court, the decision pro forma now rendered will not furnish a precedent for a recovery.

The judgment of the court is that the claimant recover of the defendants the sum of $597.84.  