
    Eelaventhan ARUMAICHSOTHYLINGAM, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-5616-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 8, 2010.
    Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, New York, N.Y., for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director; Lindsay B. Glauner, Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, B.D. PARKER, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner, Eelaventhan Arumaichsothy-lingam, a native and citizen of Sri Lanka, seeks review of an October 28, 2008, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Eelaventhan Arumaichsothylingam, No. [ A XXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Oct. 28, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). When the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.Sd 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

Contrary to Arumaichsothylingam’s argument that the BIA improperly failed to consider his prima facie eligibility for asylum, we have articulated at least three permissible bases upon which the BIA may deny a timely motion to reopen, including: “(1) the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case of eligibility for asylum; (2) the movant’s failure to ... articulate material, previously unavailable evidence that would be introduced at a new hearing; or (3) a determination that even if the applicant were eligible, asylum would be denied in the exercise of discretion.” Cao v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir.2005). Movants submitting material, previously unavailable evidence, bear the “heavy burden” of “demonstrating a likelihood that the new evidence presented would alter the result in the case.” Id.

Here, the BIA reasonably found that Arumaichsothylingam failed to meet this “heavy burden.” The county conditions evidence Arumaichsothylingam submitted with his motion to reopen did not materially differ from the evidence he submitted to the IJ; thus, the BIA reasonably found that this evidence would not alter the conclusions drawn by the IJ in this case. Sanusi v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Matter of Coelho, 20 I & N Dec. 464, 473 (BIA 1992)). This conclusion was particularly appropriate given the IJ’s prior determination that Arumaichso-thylingam was entirely lacking in credibility. Id.

Finally, contrary to Arumaichsothylin-gam’s assertion, he advanced no separate argument in his motion to reopen regarding his new eligibility for CAT relief. Accordingly, the BIA was under no obligation to conduct a separate analysis of his prima facie eligibility for that relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006).

We have considered Arumaichsothylin-gam’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  