
    Ex parte YOSHIDA.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 23, 1913.
    Rehearing Denied May 21, 1913.)
    1. Nuisance (§ 80) — Abatement—Violation op Injunction — “Disorderly House.”
    One who maintained a restaurant in which he permitted lewd women to congregate and drink and to meet men for the purpose of arranging for unlawful sexual intercourse elsewhere is guilty of keeping a disorderly house within the purview' of Penal Code 1911, arts. 497, 498, 499, defining an assignation house as a place where persons meet by appointment for the purpose of sexual intercourse, that it shall be unlawful for any person to use at such place intoxicating liquors, and that any part-of a room or building used for such purposes is a disorderly house, and so his maintenance of such restaurant may be enjoined under the direct provisions of article 503.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Nuisance, Cent. Dig. § 192; Dec. Dig. § 80
    
    Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Vol. 3, pp. 2108-2110.]
    2. Nuisance (§ 86) — Abatement—Violation op Injunction.
    The- complaint calling to the court’s attention the fact that relator bad violated an injunction restraining him from maintaining a disorderly house, when signed by the county attorney officially, is sufficient, though not verified by him.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Nuisance, Cent. Dig. § 200% ; Dec. Dig. § 86.]
    3. Nuisance (§ 86) — Abatement—Violation op Injunction — Contempt.
    Where relator was adjudged guilty of contempt in violating an injunction restraining him from continuing to run a disorderly house, a writ of commitment for contempt, where show--ing that the order was made in the court which had issued the injunction, is not invalid because through a clerical error it was recited that it was given in another court.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Nuisance, Cent. Dig. § 200% ; Dec. Dig. § 86.]
    Original application by Tom Yoshida for writ of habeas corpus.
    Writ denied, and relator remanded to custody.
    Gibson & Callaway, of Dallas, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other eases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes-
    
   HARPER, .1.

Relator had been enjoined from doing certain acts under the provisions of the law which authorizes injunctions to issue in cases where one is running a disorderly or bawdy house. He was cited to appear and show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt of court and punished for violating the injunction. On the hearing of the case the court found: “That the applicant, Tom Yoshida, had violated the order and decree heretofore issued in this: He (the said Tom Yoshida) has permitted prostitutes and lewd women to habitually resort to his said restaurant and has permitted prostitutes and lewd women to meet men in said restaurant for immoral purposes in pursuance of their vocation (not to the extent of actual cohabitation or sexual intercourse on the premises), and has permitted prostitutes and lewd women, known to him to be such, to resort to said restaurant to drink intoxicating liquors with men therein, and has permitted prostitutes and lewd women to indulge in loud, vociferous, and indecent language in said restaurant, and has allowed said women to swear and curse therein.”

No statement of facts accompanies the record, and the relator frankly admits that the evidence heard sustains these findings of fact, but insists that, they are not such acts as the court was authorized under the statute to enjoin. We think the finding of facts in this case, “that applicant has permitted prostitutes and lewd women to meet men in said house for immoral purposes in pursuance of their vocation,” would bring said house within the meaning of an. “assignation house,” as defined by article 497. While it may be said that under the finding in this case the act or acts of intercourse did not take place in this house, the findings would show that it was used as a resort where they would meet for drinking, talking, and perfecting arrangements to such end, and comes within the plain intent and meaning of the Code defining disorderly houses. Articles 498 and 499 add to the definition of disorderly houses other places than those named in article 496; and, construing all these articles together, the facts as found by the court would certainly make the house a disorderly house, and article 503 of the Code authorizes the issuing of writs of injunction to prevent the keeping of such houses, and the judgment originally entered by the court enjoining applicant from keeping that character of house is not void as contended, but a proper construction of the Code fully sustains his action in so doing.

The next contention of applicant is that the complaint calling the court’s atten-. tion to the fact that applicant had violated the injunction was not sworn to by the county attorney. The complaint is full and specific enough to inform applicant of the manner and way in which he was charged with violating the injunction, and is signed by the county attorney officially. This was all that was necessary, and it .was not necessary for the county attorney to swear to. the complaint. Ex parte Emmett Landry, 144 S. W. 962, and cases there cited.

The original judgment enjoining applicant from permitting acts on his premises,, which in law would constitute it a “disorderly house,” was rendered by Hon. E. B. Muse, the complaint charging that he had violated this decree, and information was filed in the court presided over by him, and relator was-cited to appear before him and show cause why he should not be adjudged to be In contempt of court. The matter was heard by Hon. E. B. Muse, and he adjudged relator guilty of contempt, and proper judgment was entered so finding and ordering commitment to issue. The clerk-of the district court of Dallas county, in issuing the commitment, recited that applicant had been adjudged guilty of contempt of court for violating the orders of the Forty-Fourth district court of Dallas county (the court presided over by Judge Muse), but in dating the writ recited, “Given under my hand and the seal of the criminal district court of Dallas county.” This was but a clerical error, and as the writ shows on its face that all proceedings were had in the court presided over by Judge Muse, and the writ is issued in accordance with his order by the clerk of the district court of Dallas county, this clerical error would not vitiate the writ, and relator is remanded to the custody of the sheriff!.  