
    ANDREW L. DRUMMOND v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 21184.
    Decided April 2, 1900.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    In April, 1882, a disbursing officer under arrest for embezzlement and forgery escapes from custody. The marshal for the District of Columbia offers a reward for his apprehension. December 24, 1884, the Attorney-General offers an additional reward. In June, 1894, a private detective in New York, in consequence of a letter from the Secretary of Agriculture, succeeds in finding and arresting the accused and delivers him to the marshal of the District. He is convicted and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.
    I.Where an offer of a reward for an arrest is made by a public officer with authority, the motives of the person who makes the arrest can not be inquired into.
    II.Where an arrest is made ten years after the offer of a reward, the person for whom the reward is offered being still a fugitive from justice, the person making the arrest is entitled to the reward.
    III.The offer of a reward for an arrest ceases when prosecution for the offense becomes barred by the statute, but where a promise is general to anyone who shall make the arrest within the time provided by law for the prosecution of the offender, and the conditions are complied with, a recovery can be had.
    
      
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
    I. On the 10th day of August, in the year 1881, proceedings before a United States commissioner for the District of Columbia were begun upon the sworn information of the Chief Signal Officer of the United States Army against. Henry W. Howgate for embezzlement and forgery committed in 1879 and 1880, while a first lieutenant in the Army and property and disbursing officer of the Signal Service.
    On August 11,1881, a warrant was issued and placed in the hands of a special agent of the Department of Justice, and, it having in the meantime been ascertained that said Howgate was in the State of Michigan, the speffial agent proceeded there with the warrant and arrested Howgate at Mount Clemens on August 13. He was brought to the city of Washington and was held'to bail in the sum of §10,000, which was given August 22, and he then disappeared.
    Another criminal proceeding was instituted against him on August 27, 1881, upon a sworn- information of the Chief Signal Officer. Earnest efforts were made to find and again arrest Howgate, but they were not successful until October 5, 1881, when he again appeared in the city of Washington and was arrested. He was held to bail in the new';,proceeding in the sum of §40,000, but as it was not furpished he was committed to jail. ;
    On the 21st day of November, in the year 1881, the grand jury of the United States for the District of Columbia presented to the supreme court of said District six indictments for embezzlement and one for forgery against said Howgate»'
    On the 22d day of November, 1881, he was arraigned and-pleaded “Not guilty” to all the indictments. •;
    He was then committed to jail to await trial, and so.remained until April 13, 1882, when an order was made by the presiding judge of the criminal court by whicK he was allowed to visit his house in the city of Washington in charge of a deputy United States marshal to examine his papers. While making this Visit he escaped from the house and fled from the jurisdiction of the court.
    II. On the 14th day of April, 1882, the United States marshal for the District of Columbia made and publicly circulated the following offer:
    [Photograph.]
    “ $500 reward will be paid for the apprehension and delivery of Henry W. Howgate, indicted for embezzlement and forgery, who escaped from custody in the city of Washington on the 13th of April, 1882, at 5 p. m.
    “Said Howgate is 46 years of age, 5 feet 10 inches high; weighs about 175 pounds; blue eyes; sandy hair, mixed with gray; sandy complexion (at the time of escape inclined to paleness), and has a slight limp in his walk.
    “ C. E. Henry,
    “ TJ. S. Marshal, Washington, D. 0.”
    On the 24th of April, 1882, the Chief Signal Office, addressed an earnest request to the Attorney-General to take all proper and efficient means to rearrest Howgate.
    On the 12th day of August, 1882, the Attorney-General wrote the following letter:
    “Department of Justice,
    “ Washington, D. O., August 18, 1888.
    
    “ General Hazen?
    
      ‘'‘Chief, Signal Office, War Department.
    
    “Sir: In compliance with your request, a reward of $500 has been offered by this Department for the arrest and delivery to the United States marshal of this district of Henry W. Howgate, late disbursing officer of the Signal Office.
    “ Very respectfully,
    “S. E. Phillips,
    
      “Acting Attorney- General.^
    
    On the 27th day of October, 1882, the Attorney-General wrote the following letter:
    “Department of Justice,
    “ Washington, D. O., October 87, 1888.
    
    “B. G. Jayne, Esq.,
    
      “Wo. 180 Broa&wary, New York.
    
    “ Sir: Replying to your letter of the 21st instant, inquiring if this Department ‘desires the arrest of Captain Howgate; and if so, what will be paid for his arrest and delivery to the proper officer, you' are informed that the United States marshal for this district has offered a reward of $500 for his apprehension, to which sum this Department, at the request of General Hazen, Chief of the Signal Service, has added an additional sum of $500, making a total of $1,000 for the capture of Howgate.
    “If you will cause his arrest and detention until an officer from this district can take him in custody, you will be entitled to the reward above.
    “ Very respectfully,
    “ Bbewsteb, Attorney-General”
    
    On the 14th of February, 1883, the Secretary of War wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, in response to a resolution adopted by the House on the 16th of January, 1883, calling upon said Secretary for “full information in reference to all measures which have been taken by the W ar Department, or the United States Signal Service Bureau, to secure the arrest and trial of H. W. Howgate, late property and disbursing officer of the United States Signal Service.” After stating the facts of the arrest, indictment, and escape in substance as above set forth, he added:
    “On April 24, 1882, the Chief Signal Officer addressed' through this Department an earnest request to the Attorney-General to take all proper and efficient means to rearrest Howgate. In response the Attorney-General sent to this Department a copy of a communication from the marshal of the District, under date of May 3, 1882, in which it was stated that ‘ Immediately upon the escape of H. W. Howgate every effort was made that could be devised to recapture him; a reward offered; cards, with his photograph attached (like the inclosed), were sent to all parts of the country; detectives set to work, and all available means taken to get a clew to his whereabouts and cause his arrest. These efforts are still continued and will be, and it is hoped will eventually be successful.’
    “Subsequently, upon the application of the Chief Signal Officer to the Attorney-General, the Attorney-General offered a reward of $500, in addition to that offered by the marshal, for the rearrest of Howgate. All efforts made for this rearrest have up to this time been unsuccessful.
    “It is not known to this Department why the trial of How-gate was not had in the period between his arraignment and his escape. The Chief Signal Officer had caused the evidence against him to be thoroughly prepared before the arraign - ment. He was at all times ready and anxious to give the necessary assistance at tlie trial. I am advised that the Chief Signal Officer repeatedly urged a speedy trial and expressed Ms regret to the special counsel upon the delay in putting the case on the trial calendar.
    “The Chief Signal Officer has circulated information of the rewards offered and has communicated to the United States marshal all circumstances coming to his knowledge which might possibly be of use.
    “This Department has no funds which can be used in taking measures probably necessary to secure the capture of Howgate.”
    This letter of the Secretary of War was printed at the Government Printing Office, and published shortly after its date as House Ex. Doc. No. 81, Forty-seventh Congress, first ¡session.
    j The above-mentioned offers of reward were matters of general notoriety, and as such came to the knowledge of the ¡claimant in a general way at the time.
    Thereafter, December 22, 1881, the Secretary of War addressed to the Attorney-General a letter, of which the following is a copy:
    [Personal.]
    “War Department,
    “ Washmgton, December 1881¡,.
    
    “Mt Dear Mr. Attorney-General: Referring to your personal note of this date, in which you express a willingness to offer a reward of $1,000 for the capture of a certain fugitive from justice if I so request, I have the honor to ask that formal authority be expressed by you for payment of the sum mentioned to such party or parties as may arrest said fugitive, or who may furnish information leading to his capture.
    “It is believed that public notice of the reward herein indicated would tend to embarrass this Department in the efforts it is now making to arrest the fugitive, and it is suggested that, for the present at least, notice thereof may be .confined to those interested in a private manner.
    “Yery truly, yours,
    “Robert T. LincolN,
    
      “Secretary of War.
    
    “Hon. BenjamiN Harris Brewster,
    
      “Attorney- Genen'dl.”
    
    
      To which the Attorney-General, under date of December 24, 1884, responded as-follows:
    ‘ ‘ DEPARTMENT OE JuSTICE,
    “ Washington, D. (7., December Hip, 188Ip. “Hon. Robert T. Lincoln,
    “ Secretary of War. .
    “Mr Dear Sir: As requested in your letter of the 22d instant, I hereby offer and authorize the payment of a reward of one thousand (1,000) dollars to such party or parties as may arrest Henry W. Howgate, or who may furnish information leading to his capture.
    “Upon your suggestion that public notice of this reward would tend to embarrass your Department in the efforts it is now making to arrest the fugitive, and that for the present, at least, notice thereof may be confined to those entrusted in a private manner, I will not have this letter recorded at this time. But for the information of my successor and also for the protection of anyone who may earn the reward, I will, of course, have to record it before I retire from office.
    ‘ ‘ Y ery respectfully,
    “BeNjamin Harris Brewster,
    ‘ ''Attorney- General. ”
    HI. About June, 1893, while the claimant, Andrew L. Drum-mond, was Chief of the Secret Service Bureau of the Treasury Department, he was asked by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture if he would not locate and arrest Howgate. He answered that there were no public funds that could be used for that purpose. He promised, however, that his men should keep an eye out for him when they were around attending to their other duties, without incurring any expense. A number of conversations on the subject between the Secretary and the claimant ensued, in the course of which the Secretary told claimant at one time that he believed there was $5,000 reward for the arrest of Howgate; that he personally was willing to pay $200 rather than have the man escape. That is the onty knowledge that he could remember, although he remembered away back when the man first escaped that there was lots of talk about a reward, but that is the first positive knowledge he had.
    The claimant became at once active and alert in trying to find out the whereabouts of Howgate, and so continued active until about March 2, 1894, when he left the service of the Government, went to New York City, and opened an office as a private detective. Correspondence thereupon ensued between the Secretary of Agriculture and the claimant, the following being extracts from letters of the former to the claimant:
    “June 12, 1894. It is very important to me, and I think of equal importance to you, that we should catch the rain maker of other days, who is undoubtedly now in New York City.
    “June 23, 1894. It seems to me that you ought to find our distinguished friend from the Weather Bureau. He certainly is there, and he crosses to and fro on the Brooklyn bridge eveiy day. He lives in Brooklyn. If I had time to turn my attention to his case particularly, I think I could catch him.
    “ June 28, 1894. I quite approve of your method of watching the book sales. That is just where that lost lamb is, and if we can only get him back into the fold once, I shall be very much gratified.
    “June 29, 1894. I hope you will attend to the bookseller and be fortunate and skillful enough to at last bring him to the surface.
    “July 23, 1894. Have you found anything more relative to our bookselling friend? Rumor has it that he lives in Brooklyn, and that he sometimes appears as a carpenter carrying carpenter’s tools about with him and pretending to be a journeyman carpenter.’ ”
    Finally, in September, 1894, said Secretary, at the request of the claimant, sent him one of his clerks to identify How-gate. After two mistaken reports of identification, the claimant directed the person sent over to him by the Secretary and the claimant’s son to attend auction sales of books. Upon his being informed by the person so sent over to him that he had at one of said sales positively identified Howgate, he went to Washington and received the following letter of introduction from the Attorney-General, which he immediately presented to the United States attorney for the District of Columbia:
    [Personal.]
    “DEPARTMENT OE JUSTICE,
    “ Washington, D. O., September 26, 189A
    “A. A. Birney, Esq.,
    “ United States Attorney, Washington, D. G.
    
    “ Sir: This will be presented to you by Mr. A. L. Drum-mond, late Chief of the United States Secret Service.
    
      “Please do all in your power to facilitate Mr. Drummond’s business.
    “ Bear in mind above all things that tbe nature of the business is entirely confidential and not to be spoken of to any one except myself or Mr. Drummond.
    “Respectfully, yours,
    “(Signed) Richard Olney,
    ‘ ‘ Attorney- General. ”
    A bench warrant was fhen ordered by the district attorney and issued by the court, and was handed to the claimant, together with certified copies of two indictments. He took the train back to Now York the same night, and the next morning arrested Howgate in the city of New York; brought him before a United States commissioner ; swore out a warrant against him before said commissioner ; delivered How-gate to a deputy marshal for the southern district of New York; and, two days later, with said deputy marshal, brought Howgate to Washington and delivered him to the United States marshal for the District of Columbia.
    IY. Thereafter said Howgate by his counsel withdrew his plea of “not guilty” to each of the indictments against him and demurred thereto. In each of the six cases in which the indictment was for embezzlement the demurrer was overruled and the defendant thereupon renewed his plea of “not guilty.” In the case in which the indictment was for forgery the demurrer was sustained.
    The district attorney, being of opinion that in the case in which the demurrer was sustained the chances of conviction were best, and that the indictments to which the demurrers had been overruled were fatally defective, did not try him upon any of those already found, but caused.him to be rein-dicted. Three new indictments were thereupon found against him in December, 1894, two for embezzlement and one for forgery. Upon one of those for embezzlement and the one for forgery he was thereupon tried and acquitted.
    On the 1st of April, 1895 (Howgate remaining in custody), three further indictments were found against him — one for embezzlement, one for forgery, and one for violation of Revised Statutes, section 5421. The last two were consolidated for purposes of trial. On the 21st of June, 1895, the jury found a verdict of guilty on said two indictments. On tbe 2d of July the prisoner was sentenced to imprisonment, with labor, in the penitentiary at Albany, N. Y., for four years upon each indictment, making a total of eight years.
    Pie thereupon appealed to the court of appeals of said District, who, on the 14th of November, 1895, affirmed the sentence. On the 22" of November, 1895, he was delivered to the warden of said penitentiary and entered upon his term of imprisonment.
    At the trial the facts constituting Howgate’s guilt were scarcely controverted by the defense. (Uowgate v. United States, 7 App. D. C., 217, 225.)
    The question upon which most reliance was placed upon behalf of the defendant was that of the application of the statute of' limitations. (Ilowgate v. United States, 7 App. D. C., 217, par. 4, p. 238.) It was claimed on behalf i of the defendant that the prosecution was barred by Revised Statutes, section 1044, while for the prosecution it was contended that the case was covered by section 1045, “Nothing-in the two preceding sections shall extend to any person fleeing from justice.” The latter contention was sustained by the trial court as well as by the court of appeals. Testimony was adduced both by the prosecution and by the defense to show, on the one hand, that the prisoner was and, on the other, that he teas not a “person fleeing from justice.” (7 App. D. C., 239.)
    Upon the trial of all the indictments the claimant, Andrew L. Drummond, was a witness for the prosecution, and otherwise gave important assistance to the district attorney.
    Y. On the 14th of May, 1895, claimant applied to the Attorney-General without success for payment of the reward offered for the arrest of Iiowgate. He has not received either the reward or reimbursement of his expenses, either in New York or in coming to Washington for the bench warrant, but only his witness fees and mileage for attendance at the trial.
    
      Mr. George A. Kim.g for the claimant:
    1: In the case of Williams v. Oa/rwa/rdine (4 Barn. & Adolph. 621), it did not appear that the plaintiff knew of the offer of reward, and by a special verdict “the jury found that she was not induced by the offer of the reward but by other motives.” It was held -by all the justices of the King’s bench that she was entitled to recover. Mr. Justice Patteson said: “We can not go into the plaintiff’s motives.” This has always been regarded as a leading case. Dawkins v. Sajypmg-ton(2Q Ind., 169); The AudÁtor v. Balla/rd(9 Bush (Ky.), 572).
    This is also the view taken by the SupUme Court of the United States; for in La Peyre v. United States (8 C. Cls. K., 165, 175) it was held that a proclamation of the President is binding from its date upon all persons thereby affected, though they had no means of knowledge thereof. The same had previously been held of statutes in Arnold v. United States (9 Cranch, 104).
    The present case is analogous to the Kentucky case just cited, but is stronger; for here there was not only an offer by the marshal, to which as much publicity as possible seems to have been given, but a report by the Secretary of War to Congress, which was printed and published as an executive document of the House of [Representatives.
    In a note to the case of Hayden v. Souger (56 Ind., 42), contained in 26 American Rep., 1,6, it is said, under the head of “Knowledge of offer:” “ Generally a knowledge of the offer of the reward before the service was rendered is not essential to recovery.”
    The same note cites, in addition to the cases above quoted, Bussell v. Stewart (44 Yt., 170); and Eagles. Smith (4 Houst. (Del.), 293). Further remarks in the same note show that cases apparently holding a different doctrine either do not really do so, or are based upon a misapprehension of the authorities upon which they profess to be founded.
    The claimant was not, however, ignorant of the offer. He remembers “away back when the man had first escaped that there was lots of talk about a reward.” Moreover, he was positively informed by the Secretary of Agriculture that there was a reward. True, the Secretary mistakenly said that it was |5,000, while in reality it was but $1,000. This seems to be covered by the case of In the Matter of Kellai (39 Conn., 159).
    The reward was, up to the very time of the arrest, treated by the responsible officers of the Government as still in force. They gave the claimant all possible encouragement to effect tbe arrest, and not until be applied for tbe reward was it ever suggested that tbe prisoner was not wanted, or tbe reward no longer in force.
    It was at tbe instance of tbe Secretary of Agriculture that tbe claimant first instituted search for Howgat’e. It was on bis direct encouragement and at bis repeated solicitation, both verbal and wxitten, that be continued tbe search after be was out of office. Tbe Secretary instigated bis efforts by stating and even exaggerating tbe amount of tbe reward. In bis letter of June 12, 1891, be uses the significant expression, “It is very important to me, and I think of equal importance to you, that we should catch tbe rain maker of other days,” etc. So, too, when be had at last run down tbe fugitive, tbe Attorney-Gfeneral, by confidential letter, directed tbe United States district" attorney to facilitate tbe claimant’s efforts, and tbe district attorney did so.
    Finally, upon tbe rearrest, tbe prosecution was vigorously pressed by tbe district attorney. Eminent members of tbe District bar conducted tbe defense. A successful attack whs made upon all the pending indictments, seven in number. Tbe district attorney, thereupon, in December, 1894, proceeded to -secure new indictments. Tbe prosecution upon these also proved ineffectual. Finally, in April, 1895, new indictments were found, upon which a conviction and sentence were procured, and tbe sentence was sustained upon appeal.
    Tbe defense of lapse of time was most urgently pressed upon the attention first of tbe trial court and then of tbe court of appeals; and constituted, indeed, tbe main reliance of tbe defense, for tbe facts constituting tbe guilt of tbe prisoner “were scarcely controverted by the defense.” (7 App. D. C., 225.) ‘ ‘All tbe offenses were alleged in the indictments to have been committed in the months of October and November of tbe year 1879 and April of tbe 1880 — that is, about fifteen years before tbe finding of the indictments. ” (7 App. D. O, 219.) Nevertheless, it was held that 'by reason of the prisoner being ‘ ‘ a person fleeing from justice ” he was debarred by Eevised Statutes, section 1045, from claiming tbe benefit of thé lapse of time.
    This brings the case directly within tbe authority of In the Matter of Kelly (39 Conn., 159), already cited.
    In tbe case of Shuey v. United States (11 C. Gis. E., 358) the Supreme Court held — affirming the judgment of this court (9 C. Cls. it., 415), that a revocation of an offer of this character, made with the same publicity as the original offer, was effectual to bar a claim for services rehdered subsequently to the revocation. In this case there was not only no express revocation, but every possible attempt, both by the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Justice, to induce the claimant to act upon the offer.
    
      Mr. K. O. Brandenburg (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Pradt) for the defendants:
    We concede the soundness of the decision in the case of In re Kelly (39 Conn., 159), cited by claimant, upon the facts there stated. In that case a reward was offered to anyone who should make discovery and give information leading to the arrest of a certain person or persons guilty of burning ’a barn. Under the laws of the State of Connecticut the right to prosecute such crimes was limited to three years. In considering this question and in passing upon the right to recover the reward, the court stated that the •“ statute of limitations which is applicable to the crime in question necessarily restricts the offer to the period within which the delinquent must be informed against and prosecuted.” There certainly can be no question as to the soundness of the proposition here announced. After the right to prosecute a crime has become barred, there is no necessity for the apprehension of the criminal. Since there is no necessity for • the apprehension, there is, of course, no reason for paying the reward.
    While the court specifically say that the reward will be governed by the time within which the criminal might be prosecuted, it does not say the converse, that where there is no statute of limitation the right to a reward will not be barred by the lapse of a reasonable time. It would seem, therefore, that the conclusions of this case operate in favor of the defendants.
    In the case of Loring eb al.'y. Gity of Boston (7 Met., 409), the offer of the reward was unlimited in time.
    The language used in the offer is general in its terms and would comprehend incendiary attempts made prior as well as those made within a reasonable time subsequent to its offer. The- object of the offer of the reward, was to prevent the recurrence of this offense, both by arresting the guilty party, and at the same time that his arrest and conviction might have a beneficial effect in restraining other persons with similar inclinations. It can not be seriously contended that, under this offer of a reward, had anyone committed an offense prior to its promulgation and been arrested and convicted within a reasonable time subsequent thereto, he would not have been entitled to the reward. To reach any other conclusion it would be necessary to distort the logical meaning of the words used in a manner entirely unwarranted.
    In passing upon the right to a reward, under this offer, for the arrest and conviction of an incendiary responsible for a disastrous fire which occurred in January, 1841, the court said that the offer of the reward was not to be considered as an “ordinance of the city government of standing force and effect,” but is “an act temporary in its nature,” and “although not limited in its terms it is manifest * * * that it could not have been intended to be perpetual, or at least ten or twenty years or more', and therefore must have been understood to have some limit.”
    It will be seen that the reasonableness in length of time between the offer of a reward and the rendition of the service pursuant thereto is the test by which its duration is to be governed. And while it may be argued that the question involved in this case was one in which the reward claiméd was for an arrest for an offense committed subsequent to the offer, the court decided the case on the broad principle that an offer of a reward would remain in force a reasonable length of time only and would then be considered as having been revoked, and in that case three years and eight months was held to be an unreasonable length of time.
    Upon this point, Story, in his work on contracts, in referring to the question of an offer of reward, says: “It is not, however, to be considered as unlimited in time and continuing until a formal withdrawal is made, but to be restricted to what, under the circumstances, is a reasonable time.” (Sec. 493.)
    The only conclusion to be deduced from the case of Lorwig et al. v. Boston, and In re Kelly (sv/pra;), is that without specific revocation a reward will become inefficient bjr lapse of time, and in each case the reasonableness in the duration of the offer enters.
    It is respectfully submitted, however, that the question is no longer an open one, even should .the court deem the foregoing cases not controlling the one at issue; nor are we left to conjecture in reaching a determination, for the case of Mitchell v. Abbott (86 Maine, 338) must necessarily govern. In this case the offer of the reward was as follows:
    “ 1,000 reward: On the 22d instant, 'Dexter Savings Bank was entered, Treasurer Barron murdered, and an unsuccessful attempt made to rob the safe; less than $100 taken.
    ‘ ‘ The trustees of the bank do hereby offer a reward of $1,000 for the detection of the murderers, or any one of them.
    “ A. F. Bradbury, President. ”
    This offer was published February 23, 1878, and the arrest and conyiction in pursuance thereof was made in March, 1892. In an action of assumpsit to recover this reward, the court said:
    “The offer in this case was unlimited as to time, and, so far as we know, was never withdrawn by the act of those making it. We think that the proper construction of such a proposal is, as contended by the defendants, that it must be accepted by performance within a reasonable time, and that the law will, in the absence of other facts, conclusively presume a revocation after a reasonable time. Otherwise it would be a perpetually continuing offer for all time. The statute of limitations would furnish no relief nor limit the continuance of the offer, provided only that the action be commenced within the statutory period • after performance. Such a construction would be most unreasonable, and one that •could neither have been intended by the persons making the offer, nor contemplated by one who, twelve years later, was instrumental in bringing about the detection of the offender.
    “Our view is fully sustained by the Massachusetts court in the case of Lormg v. Boston (7 Met., 409). In that case a lapse of three'years and eight months was held to be beyond a reasonable time.
    “In this case it is not necessary to decide what would be a reasonable time during which the offer would continue. A lapse of more than twelve years between the time of making the offer and the time of performance is certainly much more than a reasonable time. We are forced to presume, therefore, a withdrawal or revocation of the offer before the time of acceptance.”
    
      It is respectfully submitted that the case of Mitchell v. Abbott should control in this decision. The question was there carefully considered and it was the unanimous opinion of the six judges iyho sat in the case that the offer of the reward was revoked because “a lapse of more than twelve years between the time of making- the offer and the time of performance is certainly much more than a reasonable time.”
    The courts have in many instances held that to constitute a binding- contract to entitle one to a reward there must be a knowledge of its existence, and that the arrest was not made in ignorance thereof. Fnsminger v. Horne (70 Ill. App., 605); Fitch v. Snedalcei' (38 N. Y., 218, 251); Howlands. Zounds et al. (51 N. Y., 604, 605); Chicago a/nd Alton J¿. F. Company v. Sebring (16 Ill. App., 181,184); Sandersons. Lane (43 Mo. App., 158); Stamper v. Temple et al. (6 Humphrey, 113,115); Finlc v. J.i'eyers (4 ICulp., 145); Mahoney v. Whyte et al. (49 Ill. App., 97, 100); Wharton on Contracts, § 24; Story on Contracts, §493.
   Peelle, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In this action the claimant seeks to recover the reward of $1,000 offered by the Attorney-General of the United States under date of December 24, 1884, “to such party or parties as may arrest Henry W. Howgate, or who may furnish information leading to his capture.”

In 1881, on the sworn statement of the Chief Signal Officer of the United States Army, Henry W. Howgate, first lieutenant in the Army and property and disbursing officer in said service, was charged with embezzlement and forgery, committed in 1879 and 1880. The next day thereafter a warrant was issued and placed in the hands of a special agent of the Department of Justice, but in the meantime Howgate had escaped to Michigan, where he was subsequently arrested and brought to the city of Washington and held to bail by a United States commissioner for the District of Columbia in the sum of $40,000.

Soon thereafter another criminal proceeding was commenced against him and he was arrested and held to bail in the further sum of $40,000, but failing .to furnish the necessary security he was committed to jail; and in November, 1881, the gra id jury of the United States for the District of Columbia presented to the supreme court of said District six indictments for embezzlement and one for forgery against him. He was soon thereafter arraigned and pleaded “not guilty” to all the indictments and was then committed to jail to await trial.

In April, 1882, while in the custody of the deputy marshal, with leave of the court to visit his house and examine some papers, he made his escape and fled from the jurisdiction of the court. The next day thereafter'the United States marshal for the District of Columbia offered a reward of §500 for his apprehension and delivery. Soon thereafter the Attorney-General supplemented that reward by offering $500 additional regard.

Various efforts were thereafter made to arrest Howgate, and to that end the Attorney-General of the United States addressed the following letter to the Secretary of War:

“Department op Justice,

“ Washington, D. O., December? &£, 188A

‘ ‘ Hon. Bobert T. Lincoln,

“>Secretary of War.

“My Dear Sir: As requested 'in your letter of the 22d instant, I hereby offer and authorize the payment of a reward of one thousand (1,000) dollars to such party or parties as may arrest Henry W. Howgate, or who may furnish information leading to his capture.

“ Upon your suggestion that public notice of this reward would tend to embarrass your Department in the effort it is now making to arrest the fugitive, and that for the present, at least, notice thereof may be confined to those entrusted in a private, manner, I will not have this letter recorded at this time. But for the information of my successor and also for the protection of anyone who may earn the reward, 1 will, of course, have to record it before I retire from office.

“Very respectfully,

“Benjamin Harris Brewster,

‘ ‘ Attorney- General.

Thereafter, as set forth in the findings, various other efforts were made to locate and arrest Howgate, but were unsuccessful.

In June, 1893, the Secretary of the Department'of Agriculture inquired of the claimant, who was then Chief of the Secret Service Bureau of the Treasury Deparment, if he could not locate and arrest Howgate, and in tbe conversation stated, as set forth in the findings, that he believed the Government-had offered a reward of $5,000 for his arrest and conviction,,.

The claimant at once became active and alert, acting- from time to time on suggestions made by said Secretary, until he left the service of the Government in March, 1894, and opened an office in New York City as a private detective.

In June thereafter, in consequence of sundry letters from said Secretary, extracts from which are set out in the findings, the claimant renewed his efforts to “locate” Howgate, and finally did so, and came to Washington and consulted with the United States district attorney, at whose request a bench warrant was issued by the court and placed in the hands of the claimant, together with certified copies of indictments, and he at once returned to New York, and within a few days thereafter arrested Howgate and brought him to Washington and delivered him to the United States marshal for the District of Columbia.

He was subsequently tried and convicted on two indictments, and on July 2, 1895, he was sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor in the penitentiary at Albany, N. Y., for eight years.

The defendant’s contention is (1) that the claimant had no knowledge of- the reward of $1,000 offered by the Attorney-General, and (2) that the offer so made was revoked by lapse of time before the arrest was made.

The first ground of contention, even if essential to a recovery, is met, we think, by the findings of fact in the claimant’s favor, and little need be said in reference thereto.

The purpose of a reward is, of course, to stimulate persons to make arrests, and while knowledge thereof is essential to effect that purpose, still if the offer be a general pi-omise to anyone, made by a public officer with authority, as in the case at bar, the motives of the person who makes such arrest can not be inquired into. The arrest itself is conclusive of the motives which prompted it.

Williams v. Carwardine (4 Barn. and Adolph, 621); The Auditor v. Ballard (9 Bush (Ky.), 572); Dawkins v. Sappington (26 Ind., 199).

There are some authorities holding that knowledge of a «reward offered is essential to a recovery, but we think tbe " weight of authority is as we have stated it- especially where _ the reward has been offered by a public officer with authority, \s in the'casé'it bar. " .

As to the second ground of contention, we think the result of the arrest effected by the claimant is a sufficient answer thereto. ' ■

The arrest, it is true, was not made until nearly ten years after the offer of the reward, but for more than two years prior to such offer Howgate had been and then was a fugitive from justice, previous rewards offered having failed of their purpose.

After the arrest of Howgate, and certainly after he was delivered into the custody of the marshal of the District of Columbia, the claimant had dqne all that was required to entitle him to the reward, if the offer still held good.

Howgate was under sundry indictments at the time he ’ made his escape and fled froin the jurisdiction of the court, but he appears not to have been tried on any of those indictments; but instead he was reindicted, notwithstanding his absence of twelve years, and was tried and convicted on two of the indictments so returned against him after his arrest by the claimant.

His long absence, therefore, does not appear to im e militated against his conviction, and we can conceive oí no valid j reason why it should against the claimant’s 'right to recover ; the reward offered for his arrest.

The purpose of the reward was to secure his arrest, to the end that he might be tried and jurfiee meted out to him; that has been accomplished through the efforts of the claimant as effectively as though nr had made the arrest the day the reward was offered.

The cause of action did not accrue until the arrest was made, and in the meantime the offer of the reward had not been withdrawn.

Shall the claimant be denied a recovery on the ground that the offer ceased to b* ^alid after a reasonable time? If so, upon what basin or theory shall such reasonable time be ascertained? If the prosecution of the accused had been barred by the statute at the time of the arrest, then of course there could be no question but that such offer would have ceased therewith {In re Kelly, 39 Conn., 159); but such was not the case, for he was under indictment when he made his escape, and besides, under Revised Statutes, section 1045, the period of absence of those “fleeing from justice” is excluded.

It was by reason of that section that the reindictment of Howgate was sustained, his absence while “fleeing from justice” being excluded. On appeal to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia his sentence was affirmed. (7 App. D. C., 217.)

The promise was general — i. e., to such party or parties as may arrest Henry W. Howgate, or who may furnish informa-, tion leading to his capture;” not to such party or parties as shall within a fixed time make such arrest, but to anyone who shall do so within the time provided by law for prosecuting such offender; and such, we think, is the reasonable construction of the language used in the offer made by the Attorney-General.

The arrest was made through the efforts of the claimant, stimulated by the promise made therefor, encouraged by the ^Secretary of theDepartment of Agriculture, and the accused wa,s tried, convicted, and sentenced, so that the offer of the reward accomplished the purpose for which it was made, and the claimant is therefore entitled to recover the amount so promised.

Judgment will therefore be rendered in his favor for $1,000.  