
    Michael R. Butts v. Larry R. Meachum, Commissioner of Correction, et al.
    (6638)
    Dupont, C. J., O’Connell and Foti, Js.
    Submitted on briefs December 15,1988
    decision released February 1, 1989
    
      
      L. D. McCallum, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph I. Lieberman, attorney general, for the appellant (respondent).
    
      James D. Hirschfield, for the appellee (petitioner).
   Per Curiam.

This appeal from the trial court’s granting of a petition for habeas corpus presents the same question as that decided in Plourde v. Liburdi, 207 Conn. 412, 540 A.2d 1054 (1988), which held that a person who has been sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence under General Statutes § 14-227a (h), is not entitled to “good time credit” pursuant to General Statutes § 18-7a (c) or “employment credit” pursuant to General Statutes § 18-98a. In the present case, decided before Plourde, the trial court concluded that the petitioner, sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227a (h), was entitled to such credits.

The ruling in Plourde requires reversal of the trial court’s judgment which granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
      
       General Statutes § 18-7a (c) provides in pertinent part: “Any person sentenced to a term of imprisonment . . . may . . . while serving such sentence, by good conduct and obedience to the rules . . . earn a reduction of his sentence . . . in the amount of ten days for each month served and pro rata for a part of a month served . . .
     
      
       General Statutes § 18-98a provides in pertinent part: “Each person committed to the custody of the commissioner of correction who is employed within the institution ... for a period of seven consecutive days . . . may have one day deducted from his sentence for such period, in addition to any other earned time . . .
     
      
       The petitioner was convicted for the fourth time of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227a, and sentenced to a term of three years imprisonment, execution suspended after one year, pursuant to General Statutes 5 14-227a (h) which provides in pertinent part: “Any person who violates any provision of [General Statutes § 14-227a (a)] shall . . . (4) for conviction of a fourth and subsequent violation within five years after a prior conviction for the same offense . . . [be] imprisoned not more than three years, owe year of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
     