
    The People vs. M. Henry Roberts.
    Where an offense constate of an act combined with a particular intent that intent is just aa necessary to be proved as the act itself.
    A person charged with assault with intent to murder, whose mental faculties, at the time of the alleged assault, were so far overcome by intoxication that he was not conscious o * what he was doing, or if he did not.know why he was doing it, or that his action and the means used were naturally adapted or calculated to endanger life or produce deathi cannot be deemed to have had sufficient capacity to entertain the intent charged.
    Error to Calhoun Circuit.
   Opinion by

Christiancy, J.

Defendant was tried for assaulting with intent to murder one Chas. E. Givble, by shooting at him with a loaded pistol.

The first question presented is whether under this information the jury could properly find the defendant guilty of the assault with the indent charged without finding as matter of fact that the defendant entertained that particular intent.

Held, that where a statute makes an offense to consist of an act combined with a particular intent, and especially where such offense constitutes substantially, as here, an attempt to commit some higher offense thtm that which defendant has actually succeeded in accomplishing, that intent is just as necessary to be proved as the act itself, and must be found by the jury as matter of fact before a conviction can be had; and such paiticular intent must be proved to the satisfaction of the jury, and no intent in law, or mere- legal presumption differing from the intent in fact, can be allowed to supply the place. The Court cannot instruct the jury that as matter of law the intent must be inferred by them from the assault made.

The second question raised is whether the voluntary drunkenness of the defendant immediately prior to and at the time of the assault to a degree that would render him incapable of entertaining, in fact, the intent charged, would constitute a valid defense so far as related to the intent, and leave the defendant liable only for what he actually did, viz.: the assult alone.

Held, that if the defendant had formed the intent while in possession of his mental faculties — entertained it before and at the time he became intoxicated — his subsequent voluntary intoxication, to whatever extent, would not shield him. One who voluntarily puts himself in a condition to have no control of his actions must be held to intend the consequences; but this in-' eludes only the cousequenoes that actually ensue — the crime actually committed — but not such intent as here charged, when the defendant was at the time incapable of entertaining it, and did not,in fact, entertain it. It was natural, therefore, to inquire whether the defendant’s mental faculties were so far overcome by the effect of intoxication as to render him incapable of entertaining the intent. The jury should have been instructed that if defendant’s mental faculties were so far overcome by the intoxication that he was not conscious of what he was doing, or if he did not know why he was doing it, or that his action and the means used were naturally adapted or calculated to endanger life or produce death, then he had not sufficient capacity to entertain the intent charged. That the Court below erred in holding, in effect, that no extent of intoxication could have the effect to disprove the intent, treating the intent as an inference of law for the Court rather than a question of fact for the jury.  