
    Felter against Mulliner.
    The return to certiorari in this, cause stated, that Mulliner in the court below, declared against Felter, for that his horse had killed the plaintiff’s mare, through the negligence of the defendant s servant. The defendant pleaded a former judgmént in his favour, in the same cause of action, before another justice. On the trial, ° # the evidence of the former judgment was, that the jury , „ , , . , returned no cause oj action, and that no judgment was rendered thereon, and the plea was overruled. The jury brought in a verdict of 25 dollars damages, and 6 cents costs, and the justice gave judgment for the same, and for the additional sum of 5 dollars costs.
    
      In an action before a justice of the peace, the defendant plead-jfdgmC™efor the same cause fore another p^ared ¡n*en-<l,en“e that 111 the tormer action, the jury found a ver-dictof nocause uÍJjuá^’eren-dcred.no judgment upon the verdict. The plea having been'overruied on a certio-rari, if was held that the verdict was substantially a verdict for the defendant, and though informal the justice ought to have rendered judgment of course, and though no judgment was rendered,the verdict was a bar to the second suit, lor the justice is bound to give judgment on the verdict, and cannot arrest it,or grant a new trial.
    
      H. Bleecker, for the plaintiff in error.
    
      Story, contra.
   Per Curiam.

The verdict in the former cause, was equivalent to a verdict for the defendant. The intention of the jury was manifest and beyond doubt. They found the issue against the plaintiff, and though the verdict was faulty in point of form, the justice ought to.have entered it according to the substantial finding. We are to overlook matters of form, and to regard proceedings before justices of the peace according to the merits. Being a verdict for the defendant, it was a bar to a farther prosecution by the plaintiff below for the same cause. Nemo debet bis reocari pro eadem causa. The omission by the justice to render judgment according to the verdict, did not prevent it from being a bar to a new suit. The justice was bound to render a judgment thereon, according to the finding. He had no discretion. The reason of the rule, that the verdict of postea is no evidence, until the entry of final judgment, does not apply to the case, because we know that the justice has no authority to arrest a judgment, or award a new trial. The entry of judgment was a thing of course; and in justice and sound policy, the verdict ought to be equally conclusive against a further litigation between the same parties, on the same matter, as if the formal entry of judgment had been made.

Judgment reversed. 
      
      
        Laws of N. Y. vol. 1 p. 491—502.
     
      
       2 Burr. 698. 4 Comyns, 89. Evid. A. 5.
     