
    Louvenia FOSTER v. CHURCH’S CHICKEN OF MOBILE # 1620.
    2980973.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Aug. 20, 1999.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 7, 2000.
    C. Christopher Clanton, Mobile, for appellant.
    Michael S. McGlothren, Daphne; and C. Paul Cavender of Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, for appel-lee.
   THOMPSON, Judge.

AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.

See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(E), Ala. R.App.P.; Hose v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 658 So.2d 403 (Ala.1995); and Richardson v. Kroger Co., 521 So.2d 934, 936 (Ala.1988).

The Supreme Court of Alabama transferred the appeal to this court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

YATES and CRAWLEY, JJ., concur.

ROBERTSON, P.J., and MONROE, J„ dissent.

MONROE, Judge,

dissenting.

I would reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of Church’s Chicken; therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

A plaintiff is not required to prove notice in cases when the defendant created the hazard. Billings v. K Mart Corp., 654 So.2d 530 (Ala.1995); Dunklin v. Winn-Dixie of Montgomery, Inc., 595 So.2d 463 (Ala.1992); and Edwards v. Kroger Co., 681 So.2d 223 (Ala.Civ.App.1996). “In such a situation, notice of the hazardous condition is imputed to the defendant.” Billings, supra at 532. The evidence in this case tends to show that Foster slipped on a wet mop string on an otherwise clean and dry floor in the fast-food restaurant. Who but a restaurant employee would have recently mopped the floor?

I believe that Foster presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of Material fact regarding the creation of the hazard at Church’s Chicken. Therefore, I believe that summary judgment was improper in this case.

ROBERTSON, P.J., concurs.  