
    *Priscilla Cooper against William Vanderbelt, Administrator of Joseph Cooper, Deceased.
    ON RULE TO SHEW CAUSE, &o.
    Where A. enters into articles of agreement, to purchase certain property, and actually takes possession of it under the agreement, but dies before any deed is made to him for it, the heirs of A. cannot be compelled, in a court of law, to receive a deed for the property, or complete the purchase, and pay the purchase money.
    A rule of reference had been obtained in this cause, and all the matters in controversy had been submitted to referees, who had reported against the plaintiff’s claim. Upon the coming in of the report, Sojxton obtained a rule to shew cause why the report of referees should not be set aside, and exhibited, by affidavits, the following, as the statement of facts which were proved before the referees, viz: By articles of agreement made and entered into on the 15th of March, 1816, between Priscilla Cooper and Joseph Cooper, “ Priscilia Cooper, for and. in consideration of twelve hundred dollars, agreed with the said Joseph Cooper, that she would well and sufficiently convey to the said Joseph Cooper, his heirs and assigns, on or before the first day of April next ensuing, all that tract or lot of land lying and being in the township of Alexandria, and being the portion of land that fell to the said Priscilla Cooper from the real estate of her father, deceased; and the said Joseph Cooper, for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, covenanted, promised and granted to and with the said Priscilla Cooper, her heirs and assigns, that ho, the said Joseph Cooper, would, on executing the said conveyance, pay, or cause to be paid, the said Priscilla Cooper, her heirs or assigns, the sum of twelve hundred dolíais, as and for the said tract or lot of land above mentioned, in three equal annual payments. And for the duo performance of all and singular the covenants and agreements aforesaid, the said Priscilla Cooper' and Joseph Cooper bound themselves, their heirs, executors, and administrators, each to the other.” That under this agreement Joseph Cooper actually took possession of the property mentioned therein, and spoke to a conveyancer to write the deed to convey the said property from Priscilla Cooper to him, and the mortgage from him to Priscilla Cooper, for the security of the money; that Joseph Cooper repeatedly urged the conveyancer to complete these writings, and seemed always *willing to fulfill his contract, but died before the writings were finally executed; that Joseph Cooper took possession of the said property mentioned in the articles of agreement, on the 1st April, 1816, and leased it out for three years, and received the rent, and made alterations and improvements in the fences, and took stone from the premises; that since the death of Joseph Cooper, viz., on the 24th August, 1820, Priscilla Cooper had tendered a deed for the property mentioned iu the said articles of agreement, to the guardians of the children and heirs of Joseph Cooper, which they had refused to accept; that an action of debt was then brought by Priscilla Cooper against the administrators of Joseph Cooper, to-recover the purchase money for the property mentioned in the articles of agreement. And the before mentioned report was made by the referees.
    Saxton, in support of the rule,
    cited 2 Com. Dig. title Chan. 2 C. 4; 4 John. 203, 212; 1 Pere Wil. 193; 1 Atk. 12; Sugden on Vend. 131-2.
    
      Swing, against the rule,
    cited Sugden on Vend. 274; 4 Ves. jun. 157, 690; 13 Ves. 288; 2 Sch. & Lef. 684; 1 Halst. 126; 20 John. Rep. 20.
   Rer Curiam.

We are all of opinion, that if the contract can be'executed at all, it cannot be executed in this court; therefore,

.' Let the rule to shew cause be discharged, and the report confirmed.  