
    TAYLOR v. STATE.
    (No. 9642.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 24, 1926.
    Rehearing Withdrawn Dec. 22, 1926.)
    1. Intoxicating liquors <@=3216 — Indictment held to sufficiently describe liquor claimed manufactured.
    Indictment, charging defendant with unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor, held to contain sufficient description of liquor alleged to be manufactured.
    2. Criminal law <@=>510'/2 — Evidence that defendant’s wife broke fruit jars smelling of whisky, and presence of ingredients for making mash, held competent corroborating testimony.
    Evidence, in prosecution for manufacturing intoxicating liquor, that, on officer’s entry of defendant’si house, wife broke two or three fruit jars, contents of which smelled like whisky, and that fruit and sugar were found in garage, held admissible to corroborate testimony of accomplice as to defendant’s guilt, though defendant was not present when search was made.
    3. Intoxicating liquors <@=238(l) — Defendant’s guilt for manufacturing liquor held for jury.
    In prosecution for unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor, peremptory instruction requested by defendant held properly refused, under evidence.
    4. Criminal law <@=780 (4)— Charge that jury should apply exclusion test in determining sufficiency of corroboration of accomplice held properly refused.
    In prosecution for manufacturing intoxicating liquor, charges requesting jury to apply test of exclusion in determining sufficiency of corroboration of accomplice, held properly refused.
    5. Criminal law <@=780(4) — Instruction that corroboration, to be sufficient, must show guilt of defendant beyond reasonable doubt, held properly refused.
    In prosecution for unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor, charge that corroboration would not be sufficient, unless in and of itself it showed defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, held properly refused.
    6. Criminal law <@=829(l) — Refusal of requested charges held not error when correctly covered by main charge.
    Refusal of requested charges seeking to ingraft- slight variations on established charges on accomplice testimony, and corroboration thereof, held not error; correct statement of law on subject being covered by main charge.
    Appeal from District Court, Cottle County; J. H. Milam, Judge.
    Troy Taylor was convicted for unlawfully manufacturing intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Connie C. Renfro, of Dallas, and Chas. D. Black, of .Austin, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., of Austin, and Nat Gentry, Jr., Asst. State’s Atty., of Tyler, for the State.
   ■DATTIMORE, J.

Conviction in district court of Cottle county for manufacturing intoxicating liquor; punishment fixed at one year in the penitentiary.

The indictment contained two counts; only the first being submitted to the jury. In same appellant was charged with the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor. This was a sufficient description of the liquor alleged to be manufactured. Frickie v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 254, 45 S. W. 810; Piper v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 485, 110 S. W. 898; Tucker v. State, 94 Tex. Cr. R. 505, 251 S. W. 1090.

An accomplice testified for the state to facts which, if true and believed by the jury, and. sufficiently corroborated, justified conviction. The accomplice detailed the movements of himself and appellant, and the fact that they made a quantity of whisky and hid 11 gallons of it in a pasture. This whisky was found by officers. The alleged manufacture, as testified to by the accomplice, was shortly before the officers went to appellant’s house. Officer Payne testified that on the date of their visit, October 26th, he and Mr. Patterson went to appellant’s house and as they entered same appellant’s wife broke up some stuff which ran all over the floor— broke two or three fruit jars. He said same smelled like whisky. They also found among other things, three boxes of fruit, one 50-pound box and two 25-pound boxes; also three 100-pound sacks of sugar. The fruit and sugar were in the garage.

The first three bills of exception in the record complain of the introduction of testimony regarding the above matters. In passing, we observe that it was in testimony that fruit and sugar were common ingredients in making mash for the purpose of making whisky. We have examined and considered each of said bills and are not in accord with the contention that this testimony was inadmissible. Same was competent as showing the presence at appellant’s house of a quantity of whisky; also the raw material from which whisky was -made. We think same both corroborative of the accomplice and admissible as facts showing by circumstances appellant’s guilt. That appellant was not immediately present at the house would not make said evidence inadmissible. No objection was offered upon the ground that the acts of appellant’s wife so given in testimony made her a witness against her husband. Bills of exception Nos. 4 and 5 present the identical objection to substantially the same testimony as the above, elicited from witness Patterson.

We have examined the charge of the court and appellant’s exceptions thereto, and do not think said exceptions possess merit or call for any discussion on our part.

Appellant’s special charge No. 1, asking a peremptory instruction in his favor, was properly refused, as were his special charges Nos. 7 and 9, asking that the jury .be told to apply the test of exclusion in determining the sufficiency of the corroboration of the accomplice; so also of special charges Nos. 4 and 8, asking that the jury be told that the corroboration would not be sufficient unless in and of itself it showed appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Special charges Nos. 2,. 3, 5, and 6, in so far as same were a correct statement of the law applicable, were covered by the main Charge. Each sought to ingraft slight variations upon the well-settled, understood, and established' charges on accomplice testimony, and the corroboration thereof. We deem it better to follow the charges that have been often approved in the above regard.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.

On Application to Withdraw Motion For Rehearing.

. Appellant files in this court his written and sworn motion stating that he desires to withdraw his motion for rehearing heretofore filed by him, and asks that his appeal be dismissed. The request to withdraw his motion for rehearing is granted. Mandate will issue on original judgment of affirmance. 
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