
    Linus Tracey v. Skene D. Sacket.
    Mere difference of opinion as to the weight of evidence given in the court below will not justify the reversal of a decree upon a bill of review.
    The acts and contracts of persons of weak understanding, and who are thereby liable to imposition, will be held void in courts of equity, if the nature of the act or contract justify the conclusion either that the party, through undue influence, has not exercised a deliberate judgment, or has been imposed upon, circumvented, or overcome by cunning or artifice. Where there is imbecility, or weakness of mind, arising from old age, sickness, intemperance, or other cause, and inadequacy of consideration; or where there is weakness of mind, and circumstances of undue influence and advantage ; in either case, a contract may be set aside in equity. Buckley v. Gilmore, 12 Ohio, 75, approved.
    This is a bill of review reserved in the county of Ashtabula. The original bill was filed by Sacket against Tracey in the Court of Common Pleas of Ashtabula county, in October, 1843, in which court, at the March term thereof, 1845, a decree was rendered against Tracey, from which he appealed to the Supreme Court. At the September term of the Supreme Court, 1846, a decree was rendered against Tracey, and the cause referred to a master commissioner to state an account between the parties. At the September term, *1847, the master having reported, the decree was made final between the parties. And it is to review and reverse this decree that the present bill is filed.
    The case, as presented by the original bill, answer and testimony, is substantially as follows: Skene _D. Sacket being the owner of an eighty acre tract of land in said county, on which he had resided for many years, and also of personal property to the amount of between three and four hundred dollars, in the month of August, 1841, conveyed by deed his farm to Tracey, and also at the same time delivered and made over to him all his personal property, together with a pension of ninety-six dollars a year for his services as a revolutionary soldier'; in consideration whereof, Tracey gave to Sacket a written obligation to support him and his wife, which Í3 in the following words :
    “Know all men by these presents, that I, Linus Tracey, of Mesopotamia, Trumbull county, and State 'of Ohio, have received of Skene D. Sacket the sum of twelve hundred dollars; and in consideration for which, I, for myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, covenant, grant, promise and agree to and with said S. L. Sacket, that I will faithfully perform all the stipulations following, to wit: I will provide the said S. 1). Sacket, and Lorilla his wife, with food and raiment, and every thing necessary to their very comfortable existence and support during each of their natural lives ; and should any difficulty grow out of this arrangement, any and ail such questions and difficulties are to be decided on principles of equity. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 28th day of August, a. d. 1841. Linus Tracet.”
    In November, 1841, Tracey removed Sacket and his wife to a house near his own residence, where they continued to reside until May, 1843, when they abandoned the house and refused longer to be dependent on Tracey for their support, upon the alleged ground that ho had not faithfully complied with the contract on his part by providing for them a suitable support. *Sacket was, at the time of the arrangement, about eighty years of age, occasionally addicted to intemperance, and had had a severe attack of sickness in 1839. And several witnesses testify that his weakness of mind rendered him incompetent to the management of his own affairs, and easily controlled by others. He had several sons by a former wife living near him, but his present wife was unwilling to live with any of them. Prior to the contract with Tracey, Sacket had made a similar transfer of his property to Charles Davis, a reputed brother of his wife. This arrangement, however, did not last long: the parties having differed, the contract was rescinded by mutual consent. Sacket owed debts to an amount something over three hundred dollars, about the one-half of which was coming to Tracey, who had been receiving Sachet’s pension of ninety-six dollars a year to apply in pajuno nt, And when Davis’ arrangement with Sacket was abandoned, Tracey informed Sacket that, as he had no person then to manage for him, some arrangement must be made for the security of his, Tracey’s, debt; and proposed that, if no other person would do it, he would take his property and engage to support him and his wife. Tracey is not related to Sacket, and claims that he was very reluctant to engage in the arrangement; but his manifestation of reluctance was only such as was calculated to impress Sacket’s mind favorably towai'd his proposition. '
    During tho eighteen months which Sacket lived under the arrangement with Tracey, he occupied a small log house and lived in’a frugal manner. He took charge of a small dairy for Tracey, and a part of the time boarded Tracey’s hired hands. His wife did the work about the house, and he chopped wood and assisted his wife in the dairy. Tracey was unwilling that Sacket and his wife should visit their friends, and refused to furnish them with a conveyance for that purpose. The provisions furnished by Tracey for their support, were supplied in small quantities at a time ; and, if the testimony is to be relied on, the supply was at times wholly insufficient. Tracey neglected to pay the debts of *Saeket in the manner required by his contract. And one witness testifies that in a conversation with Tracey in 1841, Tracey stated that he had told witness’ brother that his mind was so absorbed about making property, that he had, in some measure, neglected his religious duties; and went on to state to the witness, that he had made property fast, and should make a thousand dollars out of Sacket the worst way he could fix it. And upon inquiry by the witness how he could do it he said, that the old man is pretty old and would live but a few years; and that if Mrs. Sacket, who was younger, should outlive the old man, the probability was that she would not live under his care a great while, and that he should be enabled to settle off with her for a small sum.
    The decree, without any special finding of the facts, set aside the conveyance from Sacket to Tracey, required Tracey to account for the amount of the personal property received by him from Sacket, and also the rents and profits of Sacket’s farm while in his possession ; gave him credit for the maintenance he had furnished, and made an adjustment of the accounts between the parties generally:
    The errors assigned as the ground for the reversal of this decree arc substantially the following:
    First. The decree set aside the conveyance from Sacket to Tracey, without any proof of fraud on the part of Tracey in procuring the same, or imbecility of mind on the part of Sacket.
    Second. The court confirmed the master’s report, except as to one exception ; when the report was not only unsupported by the testimony, but directly in opposition to the plainest and most positive proof.
    Third. The court found the equity of the case with Sacbett, when, from the proof, it was clearly with Tracey, and required the dismissal of the bill.
    
      Crowell and M. Hitchcock for complainant.
    
      Simonds & Cadwell for defendant.
   Bartley, J.

The errors assigned are founded in matters *of fact, and this court would not be disposed to disturb a decree resting upon facts which have been once found, except in a very clear case. Mere difference of opinion as to the weight of the evidence would not justify the reversal of a decree upon a bill of review. Buckley v. Gilmore, 12 Ohio, 75.

But we see no difficulty in sustaining this decree upon the facts of the case. The contract between Tracey and Saebet was of such a nature as would be properly regarded by any court of equity with scrutinizing jealousy. It is said by Justice Story that courts of chancery acting upon an enlarged equity flowing from the principles of natural justice, will afford protection to the necessitous and those approaching to an incapacity to bind themselves by a contract, against the designs of calculating rapacity, which the law constantly discountenances. To maintain this contract, on the part of Tracey, in a court of equity, even if divested of all circumstances of fraud or imposition, would require of him the utmost ■good faith in the mabing of the contract, and a strict performance, characterized by a benevolent regard for the welfare of those who were committed to his charge.

The proof of actual fraud upon the part of Tracey, or of insanity ■on the part of Saebet, was not essentially necessary, in order to set aside the contract. It appears to be well settled, as a general rule, “ that the acts and contracts of persons who are of weab understandings, and who are thereby liable to imposition, will be held void in courts of equity, if the nature of the act or contract justify the conclusion that the party has not exercised a deliberate judgment, but that he has been imposed upon, circumvented, or overcome by cunning, artifice, or undue influence.” Gartside v. Isherwood, 1 Brown’s Chan. 560 ; 1 Story’s Eq. Jur. sec. 238. It is laid down in the case of Cruise v. Christopher’s Administrator, 5 Dana, 181, that mental imbecility, not amounting to absolute disqualification, induces a vigilant and strict examination, in chancery, of the contracts made by one laboring under it; and when coupled with inadequacy *of consideration they constitute such evidence of fraud as may be sufficient to set aside a contract.

It is settled in Whitcburn v. Hines, 1 Munf. 557, that where one of weak intellect, though not 'an idiot, was induced to make a deed through the undue influence of one in whom he placed confidence, the deed was set aside. And it is laid down in the case of Buffalow v. Buffalow, 2 Dev. & Bat. Chan. 241, that a conveyance obtained from a man of weak mind, by taking advantage of confidence reposed by him in the grantee, will be set aside, although the grantor is not non compos.

The case of Dunn v. Chambers, 4 Barb. S. C. 376, was a bill in equity for relief against an improvident sale, and the evidence being found insufficient to justify a decree declaring the deed void, as having been fraudulently obtained, yet having been obtained under such circumstances as to render it at least unfair and unreasonable for the defendant to retain the full advantage of his bargain, the court may direct that the deed shall stand only as security for the defendant’s indemnity in respect of the sum actually advanced.

It is said that a court of equity will not measure the size of men’s understandings or capacities, there being no such thing as an equitable incapacity where there is a legal capacity; and that the law will not relieve a man who is capable of taking care of his own interest, except where he is imposed on by deceit, against which ordinary prudence could not protect him. But whatever weight this may be entitled to, and whatever may be its application, it is obvious that weakness of mind may constitute a very important circumstance to prove that a contract has been obtained through fraud, imposition, or undue influence. The strongest minds can not always protect themselves against deceit and artifice. The law requires that good faith should be observed in all transactions between man and man. And those who, from imbecility of mind, are incapable of guarding themselves against fraud and imposition, are under the special protection of the law.

*The rule to be collected from all the authorities, I take to be this: Where there is imbecility or weakness of mind arising from old age, sickness, intemperance, or other cause, and plain inadequacy of consideration, or where there is weakness of mind, and circumstances of undue influence and advantage, in either case, a contract may be set aside in equity.

Applying this rule, there is no difficulty in sustaining this decree on the evidence in this case. There was great weakness of mind on the part of Saeket, arising from extreme old age, increased, perhaps, by intemperance and sickness. There was clearly an inadequacy of consideration, and an overreaching and undue- influence, and an unconscionable advantage on the part of Tracey, which, in a court of equity, fully justified the setting aside of the contract. Besides this, there was not that strict and full compliance with the terms of the contract on the part of Tracey, which good faith and the policy of the law required at his hands in a contract of this nature.

The terms of the contract required him not only to provide Saeket and his wife with food and raiment, “but everything necessary for their very comfortable existence and support.” And the nature of this contract required of him, in the performance on his part, a kind of benevolent regal’d for their dependent situation. He had no right to reduce them to a state of servitude. True, he claims they consented to, and even solicited the services imposed on them. This excuse is easily made by a person having the control ho had, from his position, over aged and weak-minded persons.

The fiduciary situation assumed by him in the contract enjoined upon him an entirely different course of treatment; and instead of having his mind fixed upon the matter of speculating and making property out of the arrangement, to the neglect of his religious duties, his attention should have been directed to the making of a suitable provision for the dependent persons taken by him under his control.

It is the opinion of the court that the decree carried out *the stipulation of the contract, which required all questions or difficulties to be decided on principles of equity.”

The bill is, therefore, dismissed.

Ranney, J., having been of counsel, did not sit in this case.  