
    BLOCK’S CASE. Joseph Block v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      In. September, 1864, the claimant residing in New Orleans, obtains a permit to bring in cotton on the west banlc of the Mississippi. While he is so doing, the military, disregarding the permit, seize the cotton and send it to the Treasury agent in New Orleans. The claimant asserts his right to it wider hispeimiit, but the agent refuses to act until December. Tie then requires the claimant to sell the cotton at three-fourths of its value and repurchase it at its full value and pay the difference to the agent under the Treasury regulations to that effect, and he also requires him to pay the cotton-tax of tico cents per pound, the permit-tax of four cents per pound, and the incidental expenses. The moneys so retained he pays into the Treasury,
    
    
      I. The Treasury Regulations ■which provide for a sale and resale of property under the Act 2d July, 1864, (13 Stat. L., 375, 5 8,) were valid, and the act constitutional, and a party residing in New Orleans bad no legal right to bring in cotton from the west bank of the Mississippi, in September or December, 1864, except upon the terms and conditions imposed by the statute and the regulations.
    II. The fact of duress of goods depends upon' the right of a party to demand them' as his property. Where one had in fact no right to demand cotton except upon the terms and conditions imposed by the Aot 2d July, 1864, (13 Stat. L., 375, 5 8,) it was not duress for a Treasury agent to refuse to deliver it except upon those conditions. A subsequent compliance with the conditions by the owner must be deemed voluntary.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The court found the following facts:
    The claimant applied to the supervising special agent of the Treasury, in New Orleans, for permission to bring in two hundred and fifty bales of cotton owned by him, then in Saint Landry Parish, on the west bank of the Mississippi. The agent issued a permit to that effect on or about the 16th of September, 1864. While the claimant was engaged during the same month in bringing in his cotton, the military forces of the United States, disregarding the permit, seized the cotton and sent it to the Treasury agent in New Orleans. The claimant asserted his right to the cotton under his permit, but the agent refused to act until the 24th of December, 1864. On that day the claimant sold the cotton to the Treasury agent for $43,690.07, and the Treasury agent resold the cotton to the claimant for $58,253.42, and the difference, being $14,563.35, was paid by the claimant to the agent. The agent also required the claimant to pay a cotton-tax of two cents a pound on the cotton, amounting to $1,596.86, and four cents a pound for the permit, amounting to $3,191.72, and $48.40 for incidental expenses. The aggregate of'these items, being $19,399.33, was then paid into the Treasury of the United States. The sale and resale of the cotton was intended by the claimant and the Treasury agent as a transaction under the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, made in pursuance of the Act July 2d, 1864, (13 Stat. L., p. 377, § 8,) and the price agreed upon was fixed by due appraisement, and with reference to the value of cotton in the city of New York, as required by the act.
    
      
      Mr. Frederick Chase for the claimant:
    This was .captured property in the strictest sense. The fact that its owner became finally its purchaser from the United States does not change its character as captured property, nor bar the owner from demanding the proceeds under the law. There is no provision for thus converting captured, property into property voluntarily sold to the Government. The regulations, on the contrary, expressly forbid any such manipulations except by special authority from the Secretary of the Treasury. Even were it otherwise, there is no evidence that the owner ever agreed to the disposition made of his property, much less to the price allowed him. On the contrary, the United States unquestionably got possession by means of a seizure, quite contrary to his wishes; and at the time of the so-called sale and repurchase, which they would make appear to be voluntary on his part, the cotton was still forcibly detained from him. He was not in a condition to exercise his will; he simply yielded to the demands of the United States agent in order to get possession of his cotton. It was a clear case of duress of goods; and the legal presumption in such cases is that he did not consent. The essential element of consent, viz, the power to refuse, was wanting. (See Maxwell v. Griswold, 10 How., 242, 256; Flliott v. Swartwout, 10 Peters, 137, 157, and cases there cited.)
    
      Mr. Alexander Johnston (with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendants.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The Supreme Court must have determined the case of La Feyre (ante, p. 165) that the Treasury regulations which provided for a sale and resale of property under the Act 2d July, 1864, (13 Stat. L., p. 375, § 8,) were valid and the act constitutional. In that case those questions were necessarily involved, and the court, apparently having determined them, ordered a further argument of the case upon the resulting question as to when the Presidents proclamation 24th June, 1865, took effect. We must therefore conclude that the claimant here had no legal right to bring cotton into New Orleans in September or Decem-her, 1864, except upon the terms and conditions imposed by the statute, and the regulations made in pursuance thereof.

It is argued with learning and ingenuity that the transaction between the claimant and the Treasury agent was not a voluntary sale as contemplated by the statute, because his property was then held in duress, and the element of consent, the power to refuse, was wanting. But the fact of duress depended upon the right of the claimant to demand his property. He had, in fact, no such right, and the agent had no legal power to surrender the cotton. The only option which the claimant possessed was to carry out the interrupted transaction of bringing the cotton in under the permit, or to treat the cotton as captured property, and have all of the proceeds thrown into the abandoned or captured property fund. He elected the former course, and received its benefits, and is concluded from saying that his act was not voluntary. The loss which he suffered from needless delay and a declining market cannot affect the character of the transaction.

The judgment of the court is that the petition be dismissed.  