
    Eugene DAVIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON, WARDEN, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 15-17083
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted October 16, 2017  San Francisco, California
    Filed October 18, 2017
    Jason F. Carr, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV, for Petitioner-Appellant
    Heidi Parry Stern, AGNV—Office of the Nevada Attorney General (Las Vegas) Las Vegas, NV, for Respondent-Appellee
    Before: TALLMAN and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and EZRA, District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable David A, Ezra, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Nevada state prisoner Eugene Davis appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for first degree kidnapping and attempted murder. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

1. The district court properly held that none of Davis’ ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims met the “substantial” standard required to excuse procedural default. See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 16, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012). While Davis’ trial and appellate counsel’s representation was far from ideal, their conduct fell “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); Harrington v, Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Elmore v. Sinclair, 799 F.3d 1238, 1251 (9th Cir. 2015). Davis cannot overcome the high bar established in Strickland and the district court properly denied relief,

2. The Nevada Supreme Court reasonably determined that even though defense counsel at trial engaged in little, if any, investigation, his representation of Davis was not ineffective. We apply “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments” regarding the scope of investigation and presume “that counsel’s attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than sheer neglect.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Harrington, 562 U.S. at 109, 131 S.Ct. 770. Under the doubly deferential standard of AEDPA and Strickland, we cannot conclude that the state courts were objectively unreasonable in rejecting the contention that Davis’ counsel was ineffective in his investigation of the case.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       xhiS disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     