
    WEI CHEN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-5764-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 9, 2009.
    
      Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Michael F. Hertz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation; Jessica Segall, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, and JON O. NEWMAN, and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Wei Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 5, 2008 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Wei Chen, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Nov. 5, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). Where the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008). We find that the BIA did not err in denying Chen’s untimely motion to reopen.

Chen argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he failed to demonstrate either material changed country conditions sufficient to excuse the time limitation for filing his motion to reopen or his prima facie eligibility for relief. However, these arguments fail where we have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no error in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish material changed country conditions or an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. See id. at 169-72 (noting that “[w]e do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the agency”); see also Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as “the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”). Contrary to Chen’s assertion, there is nothing in the BIA’s decision compelling the conclusion that it failed to take into account all of Chen’s evidence as we “presume that [the agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.” See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006). Although Chen argues that the BIA failed to accord sufficient weight to his particularized evidence, we decline to find that the BIA abused its discretion. See id. at 342 (finding that the weight afforded to documentary evidence lies largely within the discretion of the agency).

Chen also asserts that the BIA erred in failing to address whether the U.S. Department of State’s 2006 Country Report on Human Rights Practices and a 1988-2007 fine schedule in the record indicated that he would be subject to excessive fines amounting to persecution. However, neither that report nor the fine schedule indicates that country conditions have materially changed or that such fines would amount to economic persecution for someone in Chen’s economic circumstances. See Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir.2002). Contrary to Chen’s assertion that the BIA applied the wrong standard because it rejected several documents probative of his claim, there is no indication that the BIA applied other than the prima facie standard. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2; INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).  