
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. John CIPOLLA, a/k/a Sealed Defendant 1, Frank Boehme, a/k/a Sealed Defendant 2, Anthony Mascuzzio, a/k/a Sealed Defendant 3, Jonathan Mascuzzio, a/k/a Sealed Defendant 4, Defendants, Francis Lacorte, a/k/a Sealed Defendant 5, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 12-3880-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 27, 2013.
    Peter M. Skinner, Michael A. Levy, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
    Ryan Thomas Truskoski, Ryan Thomas Truskoski, P.A., Harwinton, CT, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judge, KEVIN THOMAS DUFFY, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Francis Lacorte appeals from a September 7, 2012, judgment of conviction entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J.). Lacorte pled guilty to one count of misprision of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 4, and the district court sentenced him to time served and ordered him to make $153,725 in restitution. On appeal, Lacorte challenges the restitution payment schedule set by the district court. We presume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts and procedural history of this case.

Lacorte argues that the restitution order is flawed in two respects. First, he contends that the district court erred in requiring him to pay 50% of any of his UNICOR earnings while in the custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) towards restitution because the court failed to consider his ability to pay and because it had no authority to order that restitution payments be made from UNICOR earnings. This argument is plainly without merit. The district court acknowledged the fact that Lacorte would be “spending much of the rest of [his] life” in prison on unrelated state charges, which shows that the court was aware of Lacorte’s limited financial resources. J. App’x 35; see also United States v. Walker, 353 F.3d 130, 134-35 (2d Cir.2003) (district court need not make any particular statement on the record to demonstrate that it has considered defendant’s ability to pay restitution). We have explained that a restitution payment schedule may properly require a defendant to contribute a percentage of income earned while incarcerated. See United States v. Kinlock, 174 F.3d 297, 301 (2d Cir.1999).

Second, Lacorte argues that the portion of the order requiring him to pay $25 per quarter toward restitution from income earned in a BOP non-UNICOR work program should be stricken because the district court did not impose this condition during the oral pronouncement of sentence. Again, Lacorte’s argument is mer-itless. Although a “direct conflict between an unambiguous oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment” must be resolved in favor of the oral pronouncement, the written judgment may properly resolve “genuine ambiguities in the oral sentence.” United States v. Truscello, 168 F.3d 61, 62-63 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Here, the written judgment of conviction merely clarified Lacorte’s payment schedule in the event that he earned income from a non-UNICOR BOP work program.

We have considered all of the defendant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  