
    Ellen M. Crane, Resp’t, v. Albert Crane, App’lt.
    
      (City Court of New York, General Term,
    
      Filed July 1, 1892.)
    
    1. Jurisdiction—City court of New York.
    All causes of action are within the jurisdiction of the city court of New York where the relief is pecuniary only; where the damages do not exceed $2,000, and where the action is one not requiring equitable relief for the complete disposition of the controversy; within these limits the jurisdiction is as broad as that of the supreme court,
    
      2. Same—Action upon foreign judgment for alimony.
    An action upon a judgment of another state, directing the payment of certain sums to plaintiff as long as she remains unmarried, is one upon contract, and within the jurisdiction of the city court.
    3. Pleading—Sufficiency of complaint.
    The complaint alleged the commencement of an action between the parties hereto in a court of general jurisdiction of the state of Connecticut; personal service of process; recovery of judgment for the payment of certain sums monthly to plaintiff so long as she remained unmarried; that plaintiff had not remarried, and failure of defendant to make said payments. On demurrer, Held, that the complaint stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
    Appeal from an interlocutory judgment adjudging that the demurrer of the defendant herein be overruled.
    Complaint alleges the commencement of an action between the plaintiff and defendant herein, on or about December 16, 1889, in the supreme court of the state of Connecticut, a court of general jurisdiction, the personal service of the summons upon the defendant, the recovery of a judgment on February 11, 1890, in favor of plaintiff, adjudging that defendant should pay to the plaintiff, so long as she remained unmarried, the sum of four thousand ($4,000) dollars a year, in equal monthly instalments, viz.: three hundred and thirty-three and 33-100 ($333.33) dollars on the first day of each month, commencing on the first day of March, 1890, and that said sum should be placed to the plaintiff’s credit at the Farmer’s Loan & Trust Company of New York city, or at such other place as plaintiff might thereafter designate.
    That plaintiff has not married since the entry of said judgment.
    That defendant has failed to comply with said judgment, in that he has not paid the amounts directed to be paid, in and by said judgment, on the first days of February, March and April, 1890, or deposited the same as directed by said judgment.
    Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defendant for the sum of nine hundred and ninety-nine, 99-100 ($999.99) dollars .and interest.
    
      Defendant demurs to the complaint:
    
      First. That the court has not jurisdiction.
    
      Second. That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
    Upon the hearing of the issue of law raised by the demurrer herein, an interlocutory judgment was entered, overruling the demurrer, and from this judgment defendant appeals.
    
      Davies, Short & Townsend, for resp’t; George Hill, for app’lt.
   McGown, J.

First. As to the jurisdiction of the court over ' the subject matter of the action.

“ The statutory jurisdiction of this court embraces an action against a natural person or against a foreign or domestic corpor ation wherein the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only." * * * Code Civ. Pro., § 315.

In an action wherein the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only, the sum for which judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff cannot exceed two thousand ($2,000) dollars, exclusive of interest and costs as taxed. * * * Where the-action is brought upon a bond or other contract, the judgment must be for the sum actually due, without regard to the penalty, and where money is payable in instalments, successive actions may be brought for the instalments as they become due. Code Civ. Pro., § 316.

All causes of action are therefore within the jurisdiction of this court, where the relief is pecuniary only; where the damages do not exceed two thousand ($2,000) dollars, and where the action is one not requiring equitable relief for the complete disposition of the controversy, as this court has no chancery jurisdiction or equitable powers; and within these limits the jurisdiction is as broad as that of the supreme court.

No relief other than the recovery of a money judgment is asked for.

And no equitable relief is’necessary. The plaintiff asks for nothing more than a judgment for damages, for nine hundred and ninety-nine and 99-100 ($999.99) dollars, an amount within the jurisdiction of this court.

The cause of action as stated in the complaint is simply a common law action of debt upon the contract of the defendant to-pay to plaintiff certain sums of money, and is a constructive one, which the law implies from the fact of a judgment having been rendered against him directing such payment. In Taylor v. Root, 43 N. Y. (4 Keyes), 344, the court of appeals held that, “ A judgment is a contract of the highest nature known to the law ; actions upon judgments are actions on contract.” Sec. 2, Blackstone’s Commentaries, 465.

The cause or consideration of the judgment is of no possible-importance ; that is merged in the judgment.

When recovered the judgment stands as a conclusive declaration that the plaintiff therein is entitled to the sum of money-recovered.

No matter what may have been the original cause of action, the judgment forever settles the plaintiff's claim, and the defendant’s assent thereto; this assent may have been reluctant, but in law it is an assent, and the defendant is estopped by the judgment to dissent

Forever thereafter, any claim on the judgment is setting up a cause of action on contract

It is strictly an action ex contractu if suit is brought thereon. Mallory v. Leach, 23 How. Prac., 507.

A similar question arose in Howard v. Howard, 15 Mass., 196, and is directly in point upon this question.

In that case the plaintiff had previously obtained judgment for divorce and alimony in the same court, and brought this action to recover arrears of alimony.

The court said: “The only question made in this case is whether an action of debt will lie to recover the sum ascertained to be due by the decree of this court for alimony; and there seems to be no reason why it should not.

“The debt is certain, and it is proved by record; and the decree is, in effect, as much a judgment as if rendered on the common law side of the court.” See also Dubois v. Dubois, 6 Cowen, 494; Springsteene v. Gillett, 30 Hun, 260; McDougall v. Richardson, 3 Hill, 558; Higgins v. Callahan, 2 Civ. Pro., 302.

The judgment of a court of foreign jurisdiction may constiute a contract binding upon the defeated party, as well as though it had been rendered by a domestic tribunal.

But the judgment of a sister state stands upon even higher authority than that of a foreign court, as the constitution of the United States has provided (§ 1, art 4), that “ Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state.”

And it has been held that the judgment rendered in one state may constitute a proper subject of an action in a court of another state. See Hatcher v. Rocheleau, 18 N. Y., 86, 93.

Second: As to the complaint: The Code (§ 481), provides that the complaint shall set forth “ a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting each cause of- action without unnecessary repetition,” and the plaintiff is only required under the system of pleading now prevailing in this state to state concisely those facts which go to make up his cause of action, and which upon a general denial he must prove in order to show himself entitled to a judgment.

The complaint alleges the recovery of a judgment against the defendant in a court of Connecticut, and that that court was a court of general jurisdiction, directing the payment to plaintiff of certain specified sums of money.

The complaint also alleges personal service upon the defendant of the process of that court; thus giving the court jurisdiction of the person; in fact the jurisdiction of the court, of the subject matter of the action, of its jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and of the recovery of the judgment, are admitted by the demurrer, which concedes all the facts stated in the complaint.

The demurrer was therefore properly overruled, and the judgment appealed from must be affirmed, with costs to the

Yan Wyok and Fitzsimons, JJ., concur.  