
    HENRY BUILDERS, INC., Avery Enterprises, Inc., HKL Enterprises, LLC, Stanley Henry, Julie Henry, Emily S. Henry, Julie Ann Henry, Hilda Robbins, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Timothy F. Geithner, in his Capacity as Secretary of the Treasury, J.P. Morgan Chase, Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, Option One Mortgage Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 09-0730-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 23, 2010.
    Emanuel A. Towns, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellant.
    Varuni Nelson, Assistant United States Attorney (Margaret M. Kolbe, Assistant United States Attorney, of counsel), for Benton J. Campbell, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellees.
    Seth J. Lapidow (Jonathan M. Korn, David C. Kistler, on the brief), Blank Rome LLP, Princeton, NJ, for JPMorgan Chase & Co.
    PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges, and RICHARD K. EATON, Judge.
    
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Secretary of the Treasury Timothy F. Geithner is automatically substituted for former Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson, Jr., as a defendant in this case.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Richard K. Eaton, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellants appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Vitaliano, J.), which dismissed their complaint with prejudice. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

There are three threshold showings required in order to demonstrate standing. First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an “injury in fact,” which is defined as “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Second, “there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,” which requires that “the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, there must be a likelihood “that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The appellants have failed adequately to plead causation. They have conceded both in their papers and at oral argument that it was the economic crisis, not any action on the part of the appellees, that caused their injuries. Inasmuch as the appellants’ claims could be construed as arguing that the government exacerbated, rather than caused, their injuries, their claims fail because of the absence of an allegation of an affirmative legal duty on the part of appel-lees to provide appellants with any such funds.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  