
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesus DELGADO-GENCHIS, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 03-40128
    Conference Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Feb. 18, 2004.
    
      Before HIGGINBOTHAM, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Jesus Delgado-Genchis (“Delgado”) pleaded guilty to illegal reentry following deportation after a conviction for an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). The district court sentenced Delgado to 15 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.

Delgado argues, for the first time on appeal, that the sentencing provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (b)(2) are unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). He concedes that this argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), but he seeks to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review.

Apprendi did not overrule AlmendarezTorres. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir.2000). This court must follow the precedent set in Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984.

Delgado also argues that a conflict exists between the district court’s oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment because the written judgment contains a condition of supervised release prohibiting the possession of a dangerous weapon, but at the sentencing hearing, the court did not mention this prohibition. For the reasons outlined in United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 937-38 (5th Cir.2003), we conclude that the district court’s omission of the dangerous-weapon prohibition during the oral pronouncement of sentence did not create a conflict with the sentence set forth in the judgment.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     