
    PRAIRIE OIL & GAS CO. v. CRUCE, Governor, et al.
    
    No. 7024.
    Opinion Filed March 9, 1915.
    (147 Pac. 152.)
    1. TAXATION — Taxing Officials — Time for Performing Duties — Directory Statute. The various provisions of the statute (Rev. Laws 1910) and chapter 152, Sess. Laws 1911, relating- to assessments, levies, extending on the tax rolls, etc., and prescribing the time in which these acts shall be performed, are for the benefit I of the state, providing, an orderly system regulating the conduct \ of the taxing officials, and are, so far as they relate to the time 1 within which such duties are to be performed, merely directory, and are not limitations upon the power of the taxing officials.
    2. TAXATION — Assessment by State Board — Power to Reassess, Where the state board of equalization has assessed property of all railroad and public service corporations, and has equalized the various county assessments and computed the amount of the ■ state levy, and caused the same to be certified by the state auditor to the several county clerks, said state board is without jurisdiction or authority to reconvene and reassess said property, or any part thereof.
    3. TAXATION — Assessment—Omitted Property. If any property, real or personal, of any railroad or public service corporation, [ be omitted in the assessment of any year or years, and thereby escape taxation, when such omission is discovered the state board may assess such property and extend against the same on the tax list all arrearages of taxes properly charged against it in connection with the assessment for the next or some subsequent year.
    4. TAXATION — State Board — Power to Reassess. The Legislature may make provision by law for a reassessment of property of railroads and public service corporations which has been assessed at less 'than its fair value, but, in the absence of such provision by the Legislature, no authority exists in the state board to do so.
    5. PROHIBITION — Grounds—Unlawful Assessment. Where the state board has assessed the property of all railroads and public service corporations and has equaiized county assessments, determined the amount of the state levy, and caused the state auditor to certify the same to the various county clerics, and taken a recess subject to the call of the Governor, and thereafter reconvenes and attempts to reassess any of the property previously assessed, or to add to the assessment already made property which it is claimed had been omitted, prohibition will lie, and is the proper remedy to restran said board from so doing.
    Brown, J., dissenting'.
    (Syllabus by the Court.
    Original action fax writ of probibitioii by the Prairie Oil & Gas Company against Lee Cruce, Governor, and others* as the State Board' of Equalization.
    Writ granted.
    
      W. ,S. Fitzpatrick j Ames, Chambers, Loioe &. Richardson; 'N. A. Gibson and- N. E. Van Tmfl, fox -plaintiff.
    iClmdesi W.est, Atty. Gen., and Ledbetter, Stucu-t & Bell and Stua/rt, Cruce & Cruce, for defendants.
   HARDY, J.

This is an original proceeding against defendant’s as a member of tlie state- board of equalization, praying for a writ of prohibition, prohibiting defendants, as such board, from reassing property -of plaintiff or adding to the assessment previously made the property which it is claimed was omitted. The material facts in plaintiff’s petition, which are admitted by the answer, asre: That plaintiff on the 30th 'day of Mlarch, 1914, filed with the state auditor a sworn statement of its property subject to tax-ation in -this state, -of the approximate value of $31,220,-665.33, -and o-n the-day of August -the state board of equalization raised the valuation thereof to $35,329,904.70, land that thereafter, during -the month of August, said board completed the assessment of plaintiff’s property, and of a-11 public service corporations in the state for said year, -and completed the equalization -of all other property in the state, and on September 3d levied a tax for the fiscal year of 1.3 mills; that on the 28th -day of August the state auditor certified the assessment so made to- the county assessors of the various counties in which taxable property of plaintiff was located, and thereafter said -board took recess subject to the call of tbe Governor; that thereafter, on complaint bf one C. H. Pittman, 'as tax ferret, the board reconvened, and, after various proceedings, on December 10th increased the assessment of plaintiffs property in the sum of $10,500,000.

These facts are admitted by the answer, and defendants seek to justify their action by reason of the fact, as they allege, that the assessment in August of $35,000,000 was induced by fraud of plaintiff in concealing the fact that it had .property of more than $10,500,000 invested in oil and gas leases, and that plaintiff concealed from .the defendants .the true value of its capital stock, surplus, and undivided profits, and .allege that plaintiffs taxable property in the state is approximately the sum of $64,000,000. There is no reply to. the answer, and for tire purposes of this proceeding the material affirmative allegations thereof are to be taken as true.

There are presented to* us for our consideration two questions: (1) If the allegations of plaintiff are true, and defendants were without jurisdiction in tire premises, is. prohibition tire proper remedy? (2) Were defendants, as members, of .the state board of equalization, without jurisdiction to hear .and determine matters considered at the time the proceeding® in question were had?

The right of the. plaintiff to. the relief sought is denied by (the defendants,; and in support of their position they cite the court to, section 7370, Rev. Laws 1910, which is as follows:

“The proceedings before the board of equalization and appeals /therefrom shall be the sole method by which assessments or equalization shall be corrected or taxes abated. Equitable remedies shall be resorted to only where the aggrieved party has no taxable property within tire tax district of which complaint is made.”

Plaintiff contends that the action of the state board in the premises is not governed by tins statute, because the board was not legally in session, and .therefore clothed with no- legal authority, and their acts >a nullity. If this contention be true, section 7370 is not 'applicable, because that evidently has reference to- proceedings when the board is legally in session, and the procedure there provided is for the correction, of assessments so made. If the defendants were not lawfully in session as the board of equalization, their .acts, so far as they affect the rights, of plaintiff, would not be governed by this statute, although they may claim to. have been acting as public officers in the exercise of some legal duty. The right to a writ of prohibition under these circumstances has been determined by this court in the recent case of Osage & Okla. Co. v. Millard et al., ante, 14S Pac. 797, where prohibition was granted restraining the defendant, as county treasurer, from 11 siting for taxation, or extending on the tax rolls, the property of plaintiff in that case. See, also, People ex rel. N. Y. Edison Co. v. Feitner et al., 45 Misc. Rep. 12, 90 N. Y. Supp. 826; Layman v. Iowa Telephone Co., 123 Iowa, 591, 99; N. W. 205, and cases cited there; Hutchinson et al. v. City of Omaha, 52 Neb. 345, 72 N. W. 218; Cooley on Taxation, p. 1391.

The second question involves the considteration of the various statutes of this -state, for the assessment of the property of railroads and public service corporations. Section 21, art. 10, ■Const. (Williams’ Ann. Const, sec. 286), creates the state board of equalization, and prescribes its duties a.s follows:

“The duty of said board shall be to adjust and equalize the valuation of real 'and personal property of the several counties in the state, and it shall .perform such further duties as may be prescribed by law, and they shall assess all railroad and public' service corporations property.”

Section 7373, Rev. Laws 1910, prescribes addirional duties for this board, as follows:

“It -shall be the duty of said [state] board to examine the various county assessments and to equalize; correct -and adjust the te-ame as between the counties by increasing or decreasing the aggregate assessed value of the property or any class thereof, in any or all of them, to conform to' the fair cash value thereof, as herein defined, and to order and direct the assessment noils of any county .in this state to be so. corrected as to. adjust and equalize the valuation of the real and (personal property of the several counties.'5

The manner of exercising the -powers conferred upon said board by the constitutional provision above referred to- is contained in article 4, c. 7£, Eev. Laws 1910, sees. 7336-7349, inclusive. By section 7337 it is provided that the property of all public service corporations- shall be assessed annually -by the state board of equalization in the manner prescribed in said chapter. Section 7338 requires every public service corporation, on or before the last day of February of each year, to furnish! sworn, lists or schedules of its taxable property, as may be required by •the state bo>ard o-f equalization, and makes such property subject -to taxation for state, county, and -o-ther public p-urposeis to- the same extent as the real -and personal property of private persons. Section 7348 provides that the returns so made shall not be conclusive as to the value or amount of said -property, and authorizes -the state board -of equalization ito make 'an -assessment -of such property at its fair ea-sh valuation, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary ¡sale, and givesi the board power to examine the books, records, and papers -and files of any corporation, -to- compel ithe attendance- of witnesses- and -the production of books and -papers so- as to enable it .to- -properly discharge its duties in these matters. Section 7349, is as follows:

“The state board of equalization, after -having valued and lassessed -all the property of public service -corporations in this (Sitíate according to the provisions o-f this article, shal-l cause the same to -be- certified by the state auditor to- the -county clerks- of each and every county in which -any portion of the property of any -such public service corporation may -be located. Such returns shall show the various- portions -of the property o-f such corporation located and taxable in each -county, and in every city, town, township, school 'district -or other municipal subdivision thereof, -and shall include a full and particular -statement of all and every species of property of such corporation located in each, of the said several subdivisions, together wiith the assessed value of every item thereof. Said return shall be certified by the state auditor to the clerks of the several counties wherein such property is located on or before the first Monday of May of each year.”

The constitutionality of this legislation was sustained in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Trapp, 186 Fed. 114, 108 C. C. A. 226, and it was there held that said legislation had the effect of constituting -the state board of equalization a board of assessors for the purpose of assessing the character of property over which they were given jurisdiction.

After the state board bias assessed all of the property of public service corporations in the state, and caused the same to be certified by the state auditor to the county clerks, the said county clerics are required .to do certain things which are prescribed by section 7350, -as follows:

“The county clerk, as soon as he -shall have -received the certificate from the state .auditor of the property of public service corporations -and the valuation -thereof assessed for -taxation in his county, shall certify siame to the proper -officers of the -different school districts, cities, towns and townships in his ■county -in which any portion of the property of any such public service corporation is located, 'and the amount of such assessment shall he 'placed on the tax rolls for tire benefit .of the respective school districts, cities, towns, or townships, and he shall, at the proper time, place such assessment on the proper tax roll of his •county, subject to tire same levy for different purposes, as is other properly.”

The various county -assessors -are required by séction 12, c. 152, Sess. Laws 1911, p. 335, to make an abstract of ¡his assess-’ ments to the state board, -after the sitting of the county board of equalization, not later than Saturday preceding the third Monday in June, and the third Monday in June is fixed as the time of the meeting of the state board of equalization, which is required •by section 7373 to meet in session at the state capital, commencing >on the -third Monday in June of each year, .and requiring it to examine the various county assessments, to equalize, correct, and adjust the same as between the counties. Section 7374 levies an annual ad valorem tax, and prescribes ithe duties of the board in connection therewith. After the board has discharged its •duties under this section, and the same has been certified to the clerks in the several counties in this state, tire county excise board is required by section 7380 to meet at the county seat on the last Saturday of July for the purpose of examining the various estimates and revising and correcting same and ascertaining the assessed valuation of the property in the county, and each municipal subdivision thereof, .and making a levy of taxes required for p-ublic purposes and the levy eo made by them miusifc be certified to the county clerk, who shall extend the same upon the tax rolls.

The foregoing presents the general scheme of taxation in this state, whereby revenues of the state ‘and of its various municipal ' subdivisions .are levied and collected. The various provisions of! the statute' fix the time at which each of the several duties shall be performed by the different officers in the assessment of property and levy of taxes, but we do- not think .these provisions constitute a limitation upon the powers of ■the officials so as to render invalid 'any acts performed by them •after the time so fixed. There is no doubt that 'these provisions were intended to put into, force an orderly .and systematic procedure governing the conduct of the various officers whose duties it is to. see to the assessment of the property and the levy and collection of the revenues of the state; and it seems clear that these provisions1 are not mandatory, but are merely directory; and 'if a -taxpayer has failed to perform his full duty as a citizen by ■disclosing all of his property subject to taxation, and .this fact is discovered by the taxing officers before the time has expired in ■which property may lawfully be assessed, that such officers may proceed, after proper notice and opportunity to be herad, to assess said property so that it may bear its just- proportion of the burdens of the government. It is a matter of no ■material importance to. ia taxpayer whether his property is assessed within the particular .times prescribed by law or thereafter. This aoustruceion of the law is conceded to be correct by counsel for plaintiff in the petition for a rehearing and ¡the oral argument in support .thereof. Wells v. Burbank, 17 N. H. 393; Anderson, etc., v. Mayfield, 93 Ky. 230, 19 S. W. 598; Buswell Respt., v. Board Sup. Alameda County et al., 116 Cal. 351, 48 Pac. 226; People v. Eureka Lake & Yuba Canal Co. et al., 48 Cal. 143; Atlantic & Pacific R. Co. v. Yavapai County, 3 Ariz. 117, 21 Pac. 768; Hort v. Plum, 14 Cal. 149; Barkley v. Dale, 213 Ill. 614, 73 N. E. 325; Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202, 9 Atl. 907.

It is further urged by plaintiff that after the said hoard had assessed the property of .plaintiff and all other public service corporations, and had equalized the assessments of the various counties* and caused the state auditor to certify such action to ithe clerks of the several counties of the state wherein property was located, that the board had exhausted its jurisdiction, and was without authority to take any further action in the premises, and should be held in law to Have adjourned and to be functus officio• We are of the opinion that, when said board had valued and assessed all the property of public service corporations in the state, and had caused the same to' be certified by the state auditor to the county clerks, as required by section 7349, they were withou .authority to reconvene and reconsider -their action by reassessing property already assessed, or by .adding thereto1 property which it was claimed had been omitted, except ‘as we shall hereinafter point out. What we mean by this last statement may he illustrated thus: The board, having completed its assessment and valuation of the property, and certified the same to the county clerks, during the year 1914, could not during that year make an additional assessment and certify the additional amount to the county clerks in the same maimer and with like effect as the original 'assessment and certification was. made. These various provisions of the law, in our opinion, contémplate some finality of action by the board at some time during tire year, so that the result of their labors may be certified to the various county clerks, and so that the various municipal subdivisions of the state, through their proper officers* may make suitable provisions .for revenue to. meet their -current expenses and obligations. If this were not so* the board at any time might reconvene and reconsider their action, ¡and thereby 'disarrange the entire fiscal system of the state and all o-f its subdivisions; 'and if they could do this as to one corporation or as to- one item of property, tire same action could be taken with reference to- -every public service corporation and railroad company,-and as - often as the board in its judgment should determine. the necessity therefor. The powers of the board with reference -to assessing ¡property, and its other duties in relation to the revenues of the state, are statutory, ¡and no .authority exists for any action to he taken by the board unless the same is expressly conferred or included. by clear implication; and in case of -doubt the rule of construction is that the doubt must be resolved -against the existence of the power. McGannon v. State rel, Trapp et al., 33 Okla. 145, 124 Pac. 1063, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 620.

Another reason • why we think this must necessarily be so is that hv section 7368, Rev. Laws 1910, provision i-s m-ade for an appeal in matters .of this' kind, .and it is provided that appeals from the state' board may be taken to- the. Supreme Court within 60 days after the .adjournment of said bo-ard, but n-ot afterward. An appeal necessarily carries with it the idea of some finality to the act appealed from, and, if it he held -that the action of the hoard is not final when the result is certified to the county clerics, and that the board retains jurisdiction in the premises until it shall finally adjourn at its .pleasure, then no right of ¡appeal would accrue from any assessment until the adjournment was* in fact, had; or, if it be held that ¡an ¡appeal must be taken within 60 days from the date the board took final action upon the partieidar matter appealed from, then we would hia,ve this condition presented, or an appeal in a matter which was still within the jurisdiction and under -the control of the board, and, should they see fit to do so> the rnatteT appealed from might be reconsidered and a different result .arrived ait, from which <an additional appeal could be taken, and so on from every order .they might make. This, in our judgment, would lead to. intolerable confusion, and would put it within the power of persons and corporations seeking to dodge their taxes to suspend payment thereof by neglecting to apnea! until payment was sought to. be enforced; when, if it be held the board still had jurisdiction, they could give notice of appeal under the provisions of the sections above referred to, and suspend the payment of taxes.

We have made careful examination of the authorities cited in the brief of counsel for both .parties, 'and have arrived at the conclusion above stated, .that When the board bias, valued and assessed all of the property of public ’service corporations, and bas discharged its other duties, and caused the same to' be ceritified by the state auditor to the county clerks, that said board is without jurisdiction or authority to take any further action in the premises. Cooley on Taxation (2d Ed.) pp. 351, 352; City of Hannibal ex rel. v. Bowman, 98 Mo. App. 103, 71 S. W. 1122; Auditor Gen. v. Sparrow, 116 Mich. 574, 74 N. W. 881; Auditor Gen. v. Sessions, 100 Mich. 343, 58 N. W. 1014; Ferton et al. v. Feller, 33 Mich. 199; Common Council v. Smith, 99 Mich. 507, 58 N. W. 481; Wells v. Smyth et al., 55 Pa. 159; Lewis v. Bishop, 19 Wash. 312, 53 Pac. 165; Bialy v. Bay City, 139 Mich. 495, 102 N. W. 1033; Barkley v. Dale, 213 Ill. 614, 73 N. E. 325; Sullivan v. Peckham, 16 R. I. 525, 17 Atl. 997; Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202, 9 Atl. 907; Downing v. Roberts, 21 Vt. 441; State v. Manhattan Silver Min. Co., 4 Nev. 318; People v. Supervisors of Westchester, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 607; Overing v. Foote, 65 N. Y. 263; City of N. Y. v. Smith et al., 61 App. Div. 407, 70 N. Y. Supp. 702; People ex rel. v. Forrest, 96 N. Y. 544.

The legislature may make provision by law for a re-assessment of property which has already been assessed at less than its fair value, but, in the absence of such, provision by the Legislature-, no authority exists in the bo-ard to- do- so ; -and we find no- provision in the- laws of this state -conferring any authority upon any of the officers of the -state whose duty it -is -to- assess- property to -reassess the same after it h-as once been -assessed. Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 22 Okla. 761, 98 Pac. 1002. By section 7309, Rev. Laws 1910, authority is -conferred upon the assessors to- add property which has escaped taxation in previous years to- the assessment for the current year; and this, we think, is sufficient warrant of -authority for the state board to add to- the fax rolls property which has been omitted and which has escaped taxation. Counsel for plaintiff admit this section authorizes -action by the state board, and we- think thi-s construction is -also sustained by -the decision in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Trapp, supra. This section does not' -authorize the- revaluation -of property w-Mcli has already been assessed, but simp-ly authorizes the- -assessment of property which h-as been omitted and thereby escaped taxation, and directs the,assessor to assess the property and extend against the -same on the tax rolls for the -current year -all -arrearages of taxes properly accruing against it. The defendants urge that under -this section -they have -authority, after having assessed property -for ,a certain year and -caused the state auditor to- certify ■the same to the co-unty clerks, that if they discover during that year property omitted, -they m-ay -assess the- s-ame and cause the auditor to -certify their action to- the county clerks to -be collected in -addition to-, -and in connection with, the valuation already made. I-f we -are -correct in our first proposition — that when the -state board has assessed -and valued tire property o-f all p-ub-lic service corporations and railroad companies, -and the state auditor has -certified the same to the- various county clerks, they are without further authority — then undoubtedly they would have no authority ,to act under this section unitil the time for making 'the assessments in the next or some subsequent year; at which time, and in connection with the assessment for that year, the omitted property may be added, and all arrearages accruing against said property extended against the same on the tax rolls. We think this is the correct construction to be given to this section ; iand if the action of the board in this case is sought to be justified as a reassessment of property already assessed, the same' was without warrant or authority of law; and if it he an addition of property omitted, then they are without jurisdiction, because, having fully completed their labors, they have noi power to further act until the assessment for the succeeding or some subsequent year is to be made, when, by virtue of section 7309, the property so' omitted may be added.

We are of the opinion that the writ should issue as prayed for.

KANE, C. J., concurs. TURNER AND SHARP, JJ., concur in conclusion; BROWN, J., dissents.

TURNER, J.

I concur in that part of the opinion which holds that after the board of equalization had assessed the property of petitioner, and had caused the same to' be certified by the ■auditor to the clerks of each county pursuant to' Rev. Laws 1910, secs. 7349, as he did, that -the board thereby lost jurisdiction of the subject-matter until the time for the next annual assessment 'as required by section 7337. But I dissent from that part of the opinion which holds that section 7309 conferred any grant of power whatever to the board; said section, in my opinion, being applicable to the local assessor only.

I am 'authorized to say that SHARP, J., joins me in these views of the case. •

BROWN, J.

(dissenting). I cannot concur with by Assodates in the final conclusion reached in this case, though with many of .the .propositions announced therein I heartily .agree.

First, I agree thait under section 21, art. 10, of the Constitution, it is the imperative duty of the state board of equalization to assess for taxation .all property belonging to public service corporations in this state subject to taxation.

Second, I agree (that for the purpose of assessing property owned, by public service corporations the state board of equalization is a board of assessors.

Third, I agree .that section 7309, Bev. Laws 1910, -which makes it the duty of tax assessors to cause -to- be placed, on the tax roHs taxable property which -has been omitted and escaped taxation, applies to and includes the state board of equalization, the same as local officers whose duty it is to assess property for taxation, and I believe the board has authority so to do, independent of said statute.

Fourth, I agree that the several statutes stating the time in which the officers who shall act are -directory, and I am in hearty accord with the proposition so- well stated in the opinion of the court and in language which can scarcely be improved on, as follows:

“The various provisions of the statute- fix the time at which each- of the several duties shall be- ©priormed by the different officers in the assessment of property and -levy of taxes, but we do not think these provisions, -constitute a limitation upon the power of -the officials so- -as -to render invalid -any acts performed -by them after the time- so fixed. There is no. doubt that these provisions were intended to- put into- force an orderly and systematic procedure governing the conduct of the various officers whose duties it is to' see to tire assessment of the property and the levy and collection of the revenues of the state, and it seems clear that these provisions are not mandatory, but are- merely directory; .and if a taxpayer has failed to perform his full duty as a- citizen by disclosing .all (his property subject to taxation, and this fact is •discovered by the taxing officers before the time has expired in which property may be lawfully assessed, and that such officers may proceed after proper notice and opportunity to be heard, to assess said property so that it may bear its just proportion of the burdens of the government. It is a matter of no material importance whether his property is assessed within the particular times prescribed by law or thereafter.”

I think the following proposition announced by the court is not applicable to the. facts in this case as disclosed by the record, viz.:

“We are of the opinion that, when said state board of equalization had valued and assessed all property of public service corporations in the state, and caused the same to be certified by (the state .auditor to the county clerks as required by section 7309, that they were 'without authority to reconvene and reconsider their action by reassessing property already assessed, or by adding thereto property which, it was claimed had been omitted except as we shall hereinafter point out. What we mean by this last statement may be illustrated thns: The board, having completed its assessment and valuation of the property, and certified the same to the county clerks, during the year 1914, could not during that year malee an additional assessment and 'certify the additional amount to the county clerks in the same manner and with ■like effect as the original assessment and certification was made.”

The proposition just quoted is based upon conditions and a state of facts difOerepit from those upon which the state board of equalization acted in the instant case. The language of the court is:

“That when said board had valued and assessed all property of public service corporations in the state, and had caused the ■same to be certified by the state auditor to the county clerks,” 'and SO' forth. . ■

In another portion of the court’s opinion, referring to the answer of the defendants, the court say:

“There is no- reply to the answer, -and for the purposes of this proceeding the material averments and 'allegations thereof are to be taken as true.”

In this tire court is, of course, correct. Thus, considering the allegations in defendants’ answer as true, we have this character of case: The extent and v-alue of property owned by plaintiff and subject to taxation in Oklahoma, for .the- year 1914, was peculiarly within tire knowledge of .plaintiff’s officers, and was mot known to the state board of equalization, 'and .that, in making and returning to the .state auditor, the sworn list and schedule required hy statute- of property owned by the plaintiff -corporation, together with a statement of the value thereof, plaintiff fraudulently omitted to include in such lists certain -oil and gas leases o-f the approximate value o-f $10,500,000, and fraudulently stated the value of the property actually listed to he several million dollars less than its -actual value, an-d that tire board in August, 1914, was- induced, by such fraudulent omission -and false statement of values, to- assess tire- property of plaintiff so returned at $35,000,-000, which sum was -more than $10,500,000 less than the taxble value thereof; that thereafter said -assessment was certified to the county clerks as required by law, and the board did not •adjourn, but took a. recess, subject to be reconvened upon call by the Governor; that l-ate-r, about September of the same year, the board Was informed of -the- omission by -plaintiff to- li-st and return its property, tire oils and gas- leases, as well -as other property alleged to belong to it, -and -that said property was not included in tbe August -assessment, and also that plaintiff had concealed the real value -of its property rendered, and that, as a result thereof, the August assessment of said property -at $35,000,000 was greatly less than tire taxable value thereof, -and that therefore, after 'due notice to- plaintiff, -tire bo-ard, over plaintiff’s objections, proceeded to- hear and take evidence upon the questions stated, and that the evidence so- taken -showed plaintiffs had, in fact, failed and omitted to -include in its property lists, oil -and gas leases, and other property belonging to it, 'and subject to taxation in the state of Oklahoma, for the year 1914, .and the. taxable value of such omitted property for said year was at least $10,500,000, and was not included in the board’s previous assessment, and tha-t such evidence further showed $35,000,000, the board’s August assessment of plaintiff’s listed property, wias more than $10,500,000 less than the then taxable value of said property; that after hearing said evidence the board agreed to assess plaintiff for $10,500,000, in addition to its August assessment, and to aidd said additional sum to its previous assessment of $35,000,000, ■as the tax due .and owing by plaintiff for the year 1914, and plaintiff brought this .action to prohibit the board from doing ithe acts above stated. This court, as then composed, on the 5th day of January, 1915, in a decision by Justice Riddle, and concurred in by ail the Justices (the present Chief Justice not .sitting) denied plaintiff’s petition for the writ of prohibition. Now, I submit, if the above facts stated in the answer are to be taken as true, and. they must, then the state hoard had not ■assessed all the property of plaintiff subject to táxation a.t its meeting the - day of August, 1914..

But in this case, if we concede the board of equalization, when it assessed plaintiff’s property at $35,000,000 in August, 1914, understood, as it evidently did, it wás assessing all the property owned by plaintiff and subject to taxation in the state of .Oklahoma, and intended such 'assessment as final, and that the action of the 'state auditor in certifying this assessment down 1» 'the county clerics was without objection on the .part of the board, and that thereafter, when the board took'recess subject to. the call of the Governor, it did not have in mind any further proceedings in connection with plaintiff’s property, even then, in my judgment, it was not precluded, under the allegations in 'tire answer in this case, from further consideration of the matter of its. 'assessment of .plaintiff’s! property. To illustrate: Property owned by public service corporations is peculiarly within the' knowledge of its officers >and servants. The law requires, on or before the last day of February of each year, they shall make and file with the state auditor sworn lists and schedules truly stating -tire property owned by them, and -the cash value .thereof. The purpose- of the statute in requiring these lists- is to enable or 'at least -aid the state board of equalization in arriving 'at a correct valuation -and assessment of a-11 property owned1 by tire corporation. Every person is- presumed to swear -truthfully, and the board of equalization would be- justified in assuming that the sworn lists ■and schedules returned contained a full and complete '.list of its taxable property, and that the valuation -therein stated was, in •truth, the cash value of such property. It is conceded the board may act at any time, within its- -discretion, in assessing corporation property. Then let ns -suppose- that in March, immediately -after the corporation has returned and filed its lists -and schedules as required by law', the board of equalization, upon examination of these -returns, rely upon the sworn statements that they con- , tain- a list -of all property o-wned by the corporation subject to taxation in the state, and that the sworn value- therein stated is oo-rrect, -and, so relying, -p-rocCed to assess plaintiffs property stated in such returns, at the value therein stated, that the assessment is accordingly certified by the state1 -auditor to the different county clerks, as required by law, 'and within the next ten days -the board should learn the corpo-raitio-n and its officers had knowingly and intentionally -omitted from the lists a certain class of its property subject to taxation, and -liad knowingly, and intentionally misstated the value of the property returned, then, if the court’s holding in this case is correct, the board would nevertheless be precluded from a reconsideration of its -assessment, and precluded from adding to the original amount -already assessed -against the corporation the value of the property which had been omitted from the returns and not assessed at all, and thereby the- corporation, as a result of its success in perpetrating a fraud upon the board and -concealing from it taxable property -and values, escape the payment -of taxes for the current year upon the property and values omitted, though the same equated >or exceeded the value of the property actually returned and .assessed, and though, as in this, the omitted property -aggregated millions of dollars of taxable property and thousands of dollars of taxes which the corporation would be required to pay but for - the fraud successfully perpetrated.

Another illustration: Suppose a corporation returns a correct statement and list of all property owned 'by it subject to taxation, but knowingly, with a fraudulent intent to deceive the board and escape payment of taxes, -swore the cash value of the property returned was $31,000,000 (approximately the value placed -by -the -corporation upon the property returned b-y it in this case), when, in fact, it knew the cash value of such property was over $60,000,000 (as some -of the evidence- tended to- sho-w was the cash value of the property returned by plaintiff -in this case), and the -board1, relying upon the sworn valuation stated in the corporation’s return, adopted the same -and assessed the ¡property thereat, and caused their assessment to be certified by the state auditor to- the county clerks, and thereafter the- board took a recess or adjourned, with, no expectation of further consideration of the 'corporation’s taxes, and afterwards, during .the same year, and possibly the -same month, the- fraud is. brought to the knowledge of the board, and it is -discovered the corporation is assessed for even less than, half the -correct v-alue o-f its property, then, notwithstanding this fact, under -the court’s holding, the bo-ard would he fo-rever precluded, under existing laws, from reassessing the .corporation’s property, and from adding to -the already assessed value a sum equal to the 'difference between the already assessed value and the- actual taxable value at which it should have been assessed in the first instance, and- the corporation would, as a reward for the successful perpetration of. the fraud and deceit practiced by it upon the hoard, permanently escape ■payment of one-half the taxes- which in justice it should pay; for the court says:

“The Legislature may make provision by law for a reassessment of property which, has already been -assessed at less than its fair value, but, in 'the absence -of such provision by the Legislature, no authority exists in the board to do- so, and we find no provision in the laws of this -seate, -conferring any authority upon any of the officers of the state whose duty it is to- assess property to reassess the same after it has once been -assessed.”

In my judgment, the law .as it existed in 1914, -and as it exists to-day, was -and is sufficient to confer upon the board of equalization power to 'assess all property of whatsoever kind, of public service corporations, owned by them in tins state, subject to taxation, and -at its full taxable value, whether the same is correctly -stated in the schedules returned by tire corporation or thereafter -discovered by the -board of equalization, and that where the board, by fraud, accident, or mistake, fails to properly tax such property, it may return at any time the- mistake is 'discovered and make a correct -assessment.

In the case of Anderson v. Ritterbusch, Treasurer, 33 Okla. 761, 98 Pac. 1003, this court held, quoting from paragraphs 10 and 11 of the syllabus^ as follows:

“The “taxing po-wer/ when acting within its legitimate sphere, is one which knows no -stopping place until it has accomplished the purpose for which it exists, viz., the actual enforcement and collection from every lawful object of taxation of its pro-portion-late share of the p-uhlie -burdens; and, if prevented by any obstacles, it may return again and again until, the way being clear, the tax is collected.
“In laws for the assessment and collection of taxes due on omitted property, it is uniformity of burden, and not identity of method of enforcement, which . is required by constitutional principles.”

The duty imposed upon the board by the Constitution is mandatory — .that of assessing all .public service corporations in the state. The Constitution prescribes mo. bounds; it does not state when the hoard’s work shall commence or be completed. Amy statute which would so hamper or obstruct the board in the discharge of this duty so. as to prevent the complete consummation. and accomplishment thereof would be unconstitutional. The statutes do not .prescribe any time within which the board is bound to act, or which estops them from acting at any time in the discharge of the dnty imposed upon them. But the effect of .the court’s holding is that, the board having met, and by mistake has .assessed the corporation’s property at less than its valuation, has 'thereby estopped itself from a full and complete discharge of the duties imposed upon it by the Constitution and statutes of the state. The board is a continuing one, and with a. mandatory duty of .assessing -all property of public service- corporations at its fair cash value, and, in my opinion, it cannot by its own act excuse itself from a full discharge of such duty. It must perform the duty of assessing public service, corporations, and, if necessary, it is entitled to -the full term of its office in which so to do-, and, as before stated, where, by fraud, accident, or mistake, it had been prevented or Iras failed .to discharge its full duty, it may at any time during its term of office, upon discovery thereof, proceed to the full performance and discharge of such duty, and it is its duty to do so-.

The court in its opinion appears to construe the action of the ■board in December, 1914, as a reassessment of plaintiff’s, property already .assessed in August, and holding that property once assessed cannot be reassessed by the board, and that ¡the writ of prohibition will lie to. prohibit tbe board from adding to. the amount of its August assessment the $10,500,000, the sum found at the December meeting to be the value of the corporation’s property which was not previously considered by the board nor assessed by it. But I do. not understand the action of the 'board in December to be a. reassessment of tbe property value considered -and assessed in August. The -defendants’ -answer affirmatively -alleges -the- facts hereinbefore stated. It is further alleged that defendants -deny that the statement returned by plaintiff contains -all -of the property in the state -of Oklahoma subject to taxation. It is further -alleged:

“That these defendants deny that said assessment was made with full knowledge by the board of the character, quality, and use of the property -of the plaintiff, -and -affirm that at th-at time, and -on the 1st day -of March, 1914, -and on the 1st day of January, 1914, and on the 1st day of February, 1914, plaintiff had other -additional property in very large amounts not known to these defendants, and which they did not know of on said - day of August, 1914, when they made the- assessment last named”

Again, after admitting in August, 1914, tire board attempted to complete- its assessment of the -property of plaintiff and of all other public corporations for- that particular year, it is affirmatively alleged, at the bottom of -page 2 -and top of page 3 of said answer:

“But that, in fact, these -defendants failed in said attempt, (to the extent at least a© has -appeared at this time, that they failed to properly assess the property of the Prairie Oil & Gas Company, this plaintiff, and several other -p-ub-lic service corporations similarly ©itu-ated and of other corporations -dissimilarly situated.”

It is further -alleged on p-age 3 of the answer, in substance, 'that after tire August -assessment of the property returned by plaintiff ttre board believing it -had fully assessed all public service corporation property, levied an ad valorem tax of 1.3 mills for such fiscal year -on the property of plaintiff, -and that said assessment -and levy was certified by the- -state auditor -down to the proper officers, 'and that thereafter, in September, the board too-k a reces-s subject to the call of tire Governor, -and that on the - day o-f November, 1914, one C. II. Pitman represented ■to the individual members of the board of equalization that certain property belonging to plaintiff bad been omitted and not assessed by the board for the fiscal year of 1914, and that tbe property, which was assessed was -assessed insufficiently; that on or about the 30th day of November, the board was reconvened by the Governor, and, after -due notice to plaintiff, proceeded, over plaintiffs objection, to hear evidence offered by both plaintiff and Pitman for and -against said -allegation of omitted -property and insufficient assessment. It is further alleged, in substance, that the evidence before the board at such December meeting showed such property was of the value of at le'ast $10,500,000, and that the same had been omitted and no-t assessed by the board because of the fraudulent concealment thereof by plaintiff, and that after hearing the evidence the hoard, upon motion and second, agreed to add said sum of $10,500,000 to its previous assessment of plaintiff’s property. These -affirmative allegations in defendants’ answer, if true, and, being undenied, .are to he taken -as true, show very plainly, to my mind, that .the December action of the -hoard does not amount to -a reassessment of the property assessed by it in August, but was an assessment of other -property belonging to plaintiff which was not before the board, -and was not considered or assessed by it at its- August meeting.

It is admitted in the opinion of the court that, under section 7309, Rev. Laws 1910, the state board of equalization have authority to assess property belonging to public service corporations which has been omitted -and not previously -assessed for taxes, but the court holds the board could not do so until -the. following year. I am at a loss* however, to understand how, under this statute referred to, it can -be contended the board must Wait until a subsequent year in which to render and -assess omitted property authorized to be assessed 'by them. Notice the language of s-aid section 7309:

“If any real or personal property he omitted in the assessment of any year or years, 'and the property thereby escape taxation, when such omission is discovered the assessor shall enter such property on the 'assessment and tax books for the year or years omitted and he shall assess the property, and extend against the same on the fax list for the current year, all arrearage of taxes properly accruing against it, including therein, in the case of personal property taxes, interest thereon at tire rate of six per cent, per annum from the time such taxes would have become delinquent, and when the omission was caused by the failure of the owner to' list the same.” '

The statute -is plain and unambiguous, and' by its provisions ■and terms it becomes the duty of the assessing officer, as soon as he discovers property authorized to' be .assessed by him has been omitted and not assessed for taxes either for previous years or for the year in which the discovery is made, to' then and there enter said property on the tax rolls and assess if and extend tire taxes on the tax list for the current year. To wait until the following year, as held by the court he must do, to enter said, property on the tax roll© or to assess the same, would, I think, be in violation of the plain and express terms of the statute. There is also splendid reason for requiring the taxing officer to proceed with the assessment as soon as he discovers tire omitted property: Eirst, the personnel of the taxing officers, which in this case was the hoard of equalization, may sustain a complete change before another year, as ha© been done in the present case at the recent election, and their successors, not having heard the evidence establishing the omission and nonassessment, could not proceed as provided by this section of the statute without again going to the trouble and expense of taking evidence, much or all of which may not he obtainable; and, second, before the following year the unassessed and untaxed property may have been removed beyond .the limits of the state and the owner thereof become insolvent; or, third, the property may have been purchased by another without notice of the nonassessment for taxation thereof. If the law regulating the assessment of taxes in this state is as 'Construed by the court in its opinion, then there is a very serious discrimination between tbe ordinary taxpayer and public service corporations and in favor of the latter. The property of the ordinary taxpayer is assessed according to article or items. If he has ten head of horses, and lists only five for assessment, the omission is easily discovered, and the omitted five head may be readily included in the new assessment. But public service corporations are assessed according to a. unit valuation, and, under the rule adopted by the court in this case, if the board, either by fraud, mistake, or accident, assesses the corporation's property at one-half its valuation, it is precluding from correcting its mistake, and the corporation, instead of bearing its portion of the burden of taxation, pays only one-half of the ■faxes it should pay, and the amount of the taxes so lost to the state 'and the' various municipalities in which .the corporation has property must be paid and contributed by the ordinary and common taxpayer.

In tins case I think it is clearly shown the action of the board at its December meeting simply amounted to an assessment by them of property theretofore omitted and not assessed, of the aggregate value of $10,500,000, and that the board’s action was fully ¡authorized by section 7309. It may be, and I -think if is a fact, that instead of adding said amount -to the original assessment theretofore made by tbe board, it should have entered and extended the same as an independent assessment against plaintiff in said sum, but, if it was authorized to make the assessment, the fact that it is wrongfully added to the previous -assessment was -a mere irregularity, -and cou-ld be taken advantage of by appeal only.

It would seem the court in -this case has overlooked tbe old ■and familiar maxims, almost elementary, that “one cannot take advantage of bis own wrong,” -and that “he who comes into a ■court of equity must come with clean hands.”

The plaintiff appears before us in the attitude of admitting as true the allegations of fraud and deceit in the answer of defendants, and at the ©ame time seeking affirmative equitable relief to stay the correcting hand of the hoard of equalization seeking to right the alleged wrong perpetrated upon it.

I am clearly of the opinion that the former decision of this court, denying tire writ of prohibition was correct, and that petition of plaintiff for rehearing should be refused, - and that the decision of my Brethren herein granting plaintiff a rehearing and allowing a writ of prohibition prayed for is fundamentally wrong.

In view of tire pronounced interpretation by a majority of the court of tire existing laws of this state relating to the assessment and collection of taxes on the property of public service corporations, it is of vital importance to the -common and ordinary taxpayer in the state that the Legislature, now in session, hasten to enact laws by which all classes of taxpayers be required to contribute their share and portion of tire burden of taxation.  