
    PING LIN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-1997-AG.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 27, 2010.
    
      Ping Lin, New York, NY, pro se.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Keith I. McManus, Senior Litigation Counsel, P. Michael Truman, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, REENA RAGGI and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Ping Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 8, 2009 order of the BIA, affirming the September 9, 2002 decision of Immigration Judge (“U”) Roxanne C. Hladylowycz, which denied her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ping Lin, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 8, 2009), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 9, 2002). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the BIA’s decision alone. See Be-lortaja v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 619, 622-23 (2d Cir.2007). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.2008); Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Lin failed to demonstrate her eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal based on her claim that she was forced to use an intrauterine device (“IUD”). As we observed in Xia Fan Huang v. Holder, 591 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir.2010), the BIA’s determination that forced IUD insertion is not a per se form of persecution is entitled to deference. Moreover, the record does not compel the conclusion that Lin demonstrated “aggravating circumstances” sufficient to render the insertion of her IUD persecu-tive. See id.; see also Matter of M-F-W & L-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 633, 639-42 (B.I.A.2008).

No different conclusion is warranted with respect to the BIA’s finding that the fine imposed on Lin following the birth of her third child did not constitute persecution. See Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir.2002). Although imposition of a fine may, under some circumstances, constitute persecution, see Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir.2002), Lin testified that she could afford to pay the fine but simply chose not to do so. On this record, the BIA was not compelled to conclude that the fine placed her at such a “substantial economic disadvantage” as to render the fine persecutive. Id.

Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Lin failed to demonstrate that she suffered past persecution, she was not entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear or likelihood of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R.. §§ 1208.13(b)(1), 1208.16(b)(1). Nor do we identify any basis for concluding that the BIA’s determination that Lin failed to prove a well-founded fear of persecution on account of giving birth to three children was unsupported. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that an applicant’s well-founded fear claim was “speculative at best” when he failed to present “solid support” that he would be subject to the family planning policy upon his return to China); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 162 (2d Cir.2008). Contrary to Lin’s argument that the BIA engaged in impermissible fact-finding in concluding that she failed to prove a well-founded fear of persecution, the BIA was entitled to review de novo whether Lin was eligible for relief based on the evidence in the record. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 162-63 (concluding that the BIA did not erroneously conduct de novo review of the IJ’s factual findings by making “a legal determination that, while [petitioners’] credible testimony was sufficient to demonstrate a genuine subjective fear of future persecution, more was needed to demonstrate the objective reasonableness of that fear”). At the time of the BIA’s decision, the record indicated that Lin (1) had a third child because her first two children were girls; (2) voluntarily used contraception thereafter; and (3) was a 46-year-old widow not actively seeking to remarry. As the BIA noted, the record also gave no indication that Chinese authorities had inquired about Lin in over 20 years. See Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129. In light of the foregoing, the BIA’s conclusion that Lin did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution was supported by substantial evidence.

On this record, the agency properly denied Lin’s application for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). As Lin was unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim, she was necessarily unable to meet the higher standard required to succeed on a claim for withholding of removal because that claim rested on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006).

Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED. The pending motion to proceed in forma pawperis is DENIED as moot because the filing fee has already been paid. The pending motion to file fewer copies and be exempted from submitting a joint appendix is GRANTED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal is DISMISSED as moot. 
      
      . Although the BIA erred in concluding that Lin suffered no repercussions from her failure to pay the fine at issue, remand would be futile because the record does not support the conclusion that the fine or any repercussions from Lin’s failure to pay the fine rise to the level of persecution. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338-40 (2d Cir.2006).
     
      
      . The BIA erred in concluding that Lin did not express a desire to have more children. However, in light of Lin's age and marital status — which the BIA was entitled to consider, see May 25, 2007 Stipulation and Order— we conclude that remand on this basis would be futile. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338-40 (2d Cir.2006). Although Lin also contends that the BIA erred in concluding that her age indicated that she was nearing the end of her childbearing years, the evidence upon which she relies — a news article regarding a Spanish woman who allegedly gave birth to twins at age 69 — was not part of the administrative record and is therefore not properly considered on appeal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (stating that "court of appeals shall decide the petition only on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based").
     
      
      . Lin does not challenge the BIA’s denial of her request for CAT relief in her brief. The argument is therefore waived. See Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1998).
     