
    No. 13,904
    Orleans
    DREYER v. MARTIN
    (November 30, 1931. Opinion and Decree.)
    (January 11, 1932. Rehearing Refused.)
    (February 29, 1932. Writs of Certiorari and Review Refused by Supreme Court.)
    Claude J. de Baroncelli and E. J. McShane, of New Orleans, attorneys for plaintiff, appellant.
    John May, of New Orleans, attorney for defendant, appellee.
   HIGGINS, J.

This is a suit to recover damages fcr personal injuries and loss of earnings alleged to have resulted from an intersectional automobile collision at the corner of South Carrollton avenue and Willow street, this city, at about 1:30 p. m. on May 1, 1930.

There was judgment in favor of defendant dismissing plaintiff’s suit, and he has appealed.

Plaintiff was a passenger in a Ford coupe automobile which was being driven down Willow street, a paved thoroughfare running from uptown to downtown. Defendant was driving his Whippet coupe car from the river towards the lake on South Carrollton avenue, which is a boulevard with a neutral ground in the center upon which are located double street car tracks, and paved thoroughfares on each side. These streets intersect at right angles. The automobiles collided in the downtown lake side of the intersection; the Ford coupe being turned over on the neutral ground pinning plaintiff’s arm and fracturing it, and the other automobile coming to rest several feet past the intersection towards the lake. Both drivers were aware of the approach of each other’s car when about 75 feet away from the intersection, and each was of the opinion that he had the right of way. Both drivers realized that the other one was not coming to a stop when about twenty feet apart, and then it was too late for either driver to do anything which would have avoided the accident.

Plaintiff contends that defendant was operating his car at an excessive and unlawful rate of speed and failed to obey tbe provisions of the traffic ordinance in not according to tbe car, in wbicb plaintiff was riding as a guest tbe right of way, since it stopped on the neutral ground and blew its born.

Defendant contends that be was operating bis, car at a moderate rate of speed on a right of way street, Carrollton avenue, and that tbe driver of tbe car, in wbicb plaintiff was riding, neither stopped nor blew bis horn but continued on across the intersection directly into the path of his car.

Both plaintiff and tbe driver of tbe Ford ear, in which plaintiff was riding, testified that they crossed tbe intersection very slowly and almost came to a stop. Defendant states that tbe Ford car came directly across the intersection without stopping. Therefore the evidence is clear that tbe Ford car did not come to a full stop on tbe neutral ground in compliance with article 1, section 7, subsection d, Traffic Ordinance 7490, C. C. S., wbicb provides:

“On streets and avenues having neutral grounds and carrying, street car lines, vehicles crossing such neutral grounds shall have right of way to complete tbe crossing of tbe roadway of such street or avenue under tbe following conditions:
“Provided tbe vehicle shall come to a full stop when about to leave tbe neutral ground and enter tbe roadway, shall signal with born, and give opportunity for approaching vehicles in tbe roadway to come to a stop; it being tbe intention of this provision to require vehicles in said roadway to stop upon receiving reasonable warning in order that vehicles standing on tbe neutral ground shall be permitted to complete tbe crossing of or turning into tbe roadway.”

We believe that the case of Bannon v. Picou, 15 La. App. 511, 132 So. 390, is directly in point and decisive of tbe issue presented here. In that case there was a collision between a Ford car of plaintiff and tbe Buick car of defendant. Plaintiff was driving her car on Canal street towards tbe river, and defendant was proceeding in bis car uptown on Broad street. Tbe cars collided in the river side intersection of Canal street. We held:

“As we have so often said, a motorist who is crossing a street like Canal street should when he is on tbe neutral ground, bring bis car to a stop, sound bis born, and afford to vehicles approaching on the driveway he intends to enter an opportunity to stop. See Williams v. Lenfant [page 515, herein], 15 La. App. 515, 131 So. 857, decided January 19, 1931. See, also, Dunbar v. Kaul, 12 La. App. 605, 126 So. 705; Breaux v. Cangelosi, 10 La. App. 765, 123 So. 151.
“We are well convinced that the Buick did not stop before entering tbe upper roadway of Canal street, and there can be no doubt that tbe Buick crashed headlong into tbe Ford and not tbe Ford into tbe Buick. Tbe verbal testimony clearly preponderates toward this view, and tbe photographs make any other conclusion impossible.
“It is also very evident that, bad tbe Buick stopped even momentarily while it was on tbe Canal street neutral ground, the Ford would have passed safely ahead of it, and no accident would have resulted
“Since, under the ordinance referred to, it was tbe duty of Bannon to stop on tbe neutral ground, Miss Picou was Justified in assuming that be would do so, and she was, thus, not negligent in proceeding, since she realized that, if Bannon did stop, she could pass before be could again start bis car.”

See, also, Sontheimer v. Littlejohn, 137 So. 219, decided by this court October 19, 1931.

We are of the opinion that tbe sole and proximate cause of tbe accident was the failure of the driver of the Ford car, in which plaintiff was riding, to come to a full stop on tbe neutral ground in obedience to tbe traffic ordinance.

For tbe reasons assigned, tbe judgment appealed from is affirmed.  