
    Barry M. ATKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALYPSO SYSTEMS, INC., a California corporation; Eden Kim, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 17-15125
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 18, 2017 
    
    Filed December 20, 2017
    Barry M, Atkins, Pro Se
    Roy Bartlett, Bartlett Law Firm, Walnut Creek, CA, Lashawn D. Jenkins, Jenkins Law Firm, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees
    Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Barry M. Atkins appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his diversity action alleging state law claims in connection with a dispute over a 'debt-to-stock conversion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C, § 1291. We review de novo, Lukovsky v, City of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Atkins’ contract claims because they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations under California law. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337(1) (four-year statute of limitations for any action upon a contract); Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc., 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 285 Cal.Rptr. 717 (1991) (section 337(1) applies to claims of breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing). The district court properly concluded that Atkins was not entitled to equitable estoppel. See Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991) (a party cannot create an dispute of fact with an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition testimony); Vu v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 26 Cal.4th 1142, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 70, 33 P.3d 487 (2001) (equitable estoppel under California law requires reliance be reasonable).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Atkins’ tort claims because they are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations under Arizona law. See Hullett v. Cousin, 204 Ariz. 292, 63 P.3d 1029, 1034 (2003) (two-year statute of limitations for negligent misrepresentation); Walker v. Walker, 18 Ariz.App. 113, 500 P.2d 898, 899-900 (1972) (two-year statute of limitations for conversion); San Manuel Copper Corp. v. Redmond, 8 Ariz. App. 214, 445 P.2d 162, 166 (1968) (four-year statute of limitations for unjust enrichment).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to its inherent powers. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46, 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (stating standard of review and explaining that a court may assess attorney’s fees when a fraud has been practiced upon it).

Appellees’ request for attorney’s fees on appeal, set forth in their answering brief, is denied without prejudice to filing a motion in accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Ninth Circuit Rule 39-Í.6.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     