
    Potter, Appellant, v. Scranton Railway Company.
    
      Negligence — Street railways — “ Stop, look and listen ” — Contributory negilgence.
    
    In crossing the track of an electric street railway it is a duty to look, listen, and, if necessary, stop. The looking must be done just before entering upon the track, or at the very edge of the track.
    In an action against a street railway company to recover damages for injuries to horses a judgment for the defendant non obstante veredicto is properly entered where it appears from the plaintiff’s own testimony, that at the time of the accident he was driving a team of horses and approached a street on which a single track was laid which was used for travel in both directions and at a steep grade; that when at a distance of twenty or thirty feet from the track he looked up and down and saw no car in either direction; that he proceeded looking down, but not up the track, until the front feet of his horses were across the first rail when he heard a whistle, looked up the grade and saw a car approaching; that he attempted to swing his horses to the left, whereupon the off horse was struck and killed, and the other horse seriously injured.
    Argued Jan. 16, 1902.
    Appeal, No. 36, Jan. T., 1902, by plaintiff, from judgment of C. P. Lackawanna Co., Jan. T., 1902, for defendant non obstante veredicto in case of George W. Potter and Charles M. Potter v. The Scranton Railway Company.
    Before Rice, P. J., Beaver, Orlaly, W. W. Porter and W. D. Porter, JJ.
    Affirmed.
    Trespass to recover damages for the death of one horse and the injury of another. Before Kelly, J.
    
      The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.
    Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $329.10. The court subsequently entered judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto on the question of law reserved.
    
      Error assigned was in entering judgment, for defendant non obstante veredicto.
    
      I. H. Burns, with him George M. Watson and J. W. Browning, for appellant. —
    The case was for the jury: Newhard v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 153 Pa. 417; City of Harrisburg v. Saylor, 87 Pa. 216; Clayton v. Chester Traction Co., 3 Pa. Superior Ct. 107; Evers v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 176 Pa. 376; Conyngham v. Erie Electric Motor Co., 15 Pa. Superior Ct. 573; Schnur v. Citizens’ Traction Co., 153 Pa. 29; Gilmore v. Federal St., etc., Pass. Ry., 153 Pa. 31; Dunseath v. Pittsburg, Allegheny, etc., Traction Co., 161 Pa. 124; Buente v. Pittsburg, Allegheny & Manchester Traction Co., 2 Pa. Superior Ct. 185; Callahan v. Phila. Traction Co., 184 Pa. 425.
    
      E. N. Willard, of Willard, Warren $ Knapp, for appellee. — .
    Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligene: Nugent v. Phila. Traction Co., 181 Pa. 162; Brown v. Pittsburg, etc., Traction Co., 14 Pa. Superior Ct. 597; Trout v. Altoona, etc., Electric Ry. Co., 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 24; Ehrisman v. East Harrisburg City Pass. Consolidated Ry. Co., 150 Pa. 180; Bornscheuer v. Consolidated Traction Co., 198 Pa. 332; Carson v. Federal St., etc., Ry. Co., 147 Pa. 224.
    February 14, 1902:
   Opinion by

William W. Porter, J.,

This judgment was rightly entered non obstante' veredicto on the point reserved. The action was for damages for injuries to the plaintiff’s horses resulting from being struck by a trolley car. The accident took place at or near the intersection of two streets in the suburbs of the city of Scranton. The plaintiff was approaching High street on which a single track of the defendant company was laid which was used for travel in both directions and was at a steep grade. The plaintiff’s testimony relating to what he did immediately preceding the collision is not clear, and in some respects is contradictory. To demonstrate this would require many quotations from-the-testimony, unnecessarily extending this opinion. The.- substance of the matter* is that he, at, a distance of twenty or> thirty feet; from the track, looked up and down, and saw no ear-in. either-direction ; that he proceeded until the front feet of his horses were across the first rail when- he heard a, whistle,, looked up the grade and saw a car approaching; that he attempted to swing his horses to the left, whereupon the off horse was struck on the rump. On, crossrexamination, he says more than once, that from- the point, of: twenty or thirty feet from the- track until his-- horses- were, over the rail, he. looked down but not- up the track until, he heard'the whistle of the motonman.

It-is impossible to escape- the. conclusion that he-was guilty of contributory, negligence. The law of Pennsylvania is-, well settled, that in. crossing the track of a trolley company;it is a duty to look, listen, and, if necessary, stop. It may now be. said to-be also.settled, tliat the looking-must be done» just before entering upon the track, or “ at.tbe very edge-of'the track,” as said in Ehrisman, v. Traction. Co., 150 Pa. 180; in which this doctrine was first announced and which has been followed by numerous cases,: Wheelahan v. Traction Co., 150 Pa. 187; Brown v. Traction Co., 14 Pa., Superior Ct. 594; Trout v. Traction Co.,.13 Pa. Superior Ct., 17 ; Cupps v. Traction Co., 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 630 ; McPhillips v. Traction. Co., ante, p. 223; Darwood v. Traction Co., 189 Pa., 592; Burke v. Traction Co., 198 Pa. 497. The- latest case on the. subject is McCracken v. Traction Co., (not, yet reported), in which the opinion was filed by the. Supreme Court, on January 6* 1902.

There is.- in the case, before us uo testimony on behalf' of the plaintiff which indicates that ,he-complied with the-obligations of: this rule of law. The- testimony excludes- any inference that he looked in the direction; of the approaching car- just, before he- entered upon the track. If he had. so looked “ he could, have seen th.e car ■ and stopped, andl the; accident would have been avoided-: ” Carson, v. Railway Co., 147. Pa. 219. Theinfractiom of-the- rule» of law being- apparent; the? judgment entered by the-court below is-unassailable.

Tbe case; of? Hamilton v. Traction Co., in- which an opinion Wi filed by the Supreme Court, on January 6, 1902 (not: yet reported), is distinguishable from the case at bar, since in the former case, as appears by the- opinion of the court, the plaintiff was looking-just as “his horses were about stepping over the track.”

The judgment is affirmed.  