
    MATSON et al. v. JARVIS.
    (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.
    Dec. 17, 1910.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 1911.)
    1.Alteration of Instruments (§ 16) — Consent oe Parties.
    As a rule, a willful and material alteration of a writing after execution by one of the parties thereto, without the authority or consent of another party, avoids it as to the non-consenting party.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Alteration of Instruments, Cent. Dig. Í14-121; Dec. Dig. § 16.]
    2.Alteration of Instruments (§ 3) — Materiality— Change of Parties — “Material Alteration.”
    As a rule, any change in the personality, number, or relation of the parties to a written contract is a material alteration thereof, so as to avoid it as to the nonconsenting parties, so that the erasure of the name of one of the ob-ligors in a contract is a material alteration.
    [Ed.' Note. — For other cases, see Alteration of Instruments, Cent. Dig. §§ 5-15; Dec. Dig. § 3.
    
    For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 4405, 4406; vol. S, p. 7717.]
    3.Alteration of Instruments (§ 27) — Evidence — Burden of Proof.
    Where a material alteration of a written instrument is apparent on the face thereof, the person claiming rights thereunder must show that the alteration was made under such circumstances that it did not prevent his recovery.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Alteration of Instruments, Cent. Dig. §§ 230-247; Dec. Dig § 27.]
    4.Trial (§ 253) — Actions—Instructions— Applicability' to Evidence.
    In an action by one of the signers of a written contract binding the signers to procure the right of way for a railroad company and to construct the road, against the other signers for- contribution for money advanced to procure a part of the right of way, a requested charge that the undisputed evidence showed that, after the contract was signed, there was a material change therein, in that the name of a signer was erased without the consent or knowledge of another signer, and plaintiff could not recover as against the latter, was properly refused, where there was evidence tending to show that such latter signer consented to or ratified the erasure of the name from the contract.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 612-623; Dec. Dig. § 253.]
    5.Alteration of Instruments (§ 13) — Ratification.
    A party to a written instrument may consent to or ratify an alteration therein, made after its execution, without any new consideration passing to him; ratification of an alteration being equivalent to original authority to make it.
    TEd. Note. — For other eases, see Alteration of Instruments, Cent. Dig. §§ 93-111; Dee. Dig. § 13.]
    6.Alteration of Instruments (§ 29) — Evidence — Ratification.
    A-ratification by a party to a written instrument of an alteration made therein may be shown by circumstances as well as by direct evidence.
    TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Alteration of Instruments, Cent. Dig. §§ 259-263; Dec. Dig. § 29.] •
    7. Alteration of Instruments (§ 29) — Evidence — Sufficiency—Ratification.
    In an action by one of the signers of ⅜ written contract binding them to procure a railroad right of way, against the other signers, for contribution for money advanced to buy a part of the right of way, evidence held, to sustain a finding that one of the signers, after acquiring knowledge of the erasure of the name of another signer from the instrument, consented to or ratified such alteration.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Alteration of Instruments, Cent. Dig. §§ 259-263; Dec. Dig. § 29.]
    8. Trial (§ 260) — Instructions—Requests— Instructions Already Given.
    A requested charge was properly refused, where the issues submitted therein were sufficiently submitted in the court’s general charge.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 651-659; Dec. Dig. § 260.]
    9. Damages (§ 228) — Computation—Error— V erdict — Remittitur .
    Error in calculation by the jury finding a greater amount due plaintiff than he was entitled to under the undisputed evidence was cured by a remittitur filed by plaintiff reducing the amount of recovery to the proper amount, so that judgment was properly entered for the amount as reduced.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 576-579; Dec. Dig. § 228.]
    10. Trial (§ 194) — Instructions—Weight of Evidence.
    In an action by one of the signers of a written contract, binding the signers to procure a railroad right of way for another and to construct the road, against the other signers for contribution for money advanced by plaintiff to buy part of the right of way, the court instructed that, if the jury found for plaintiff against any of the defendants, they should arrive at the verdict in the following manner: They should first ascertain the amount of payments to plaintiff on account of the sum claimed to have been loaned by him to the right of way committee of the signers, deducting the aggregate amount of such credits from such loan, and deducting from the balance $100 paid by a certain defendant, and then prorate the amount of the balance due plaintiff between him and all of the defendants liable therefor, and that the jury should find in favor of certain defendants named, and, “as to the other defendants that you may find against,” they should calculate interest on the pro rata part of the balance due each, stating the amount in their verdict that the jury, might find against each of defendants. Held, that the,charge was not upon the weight of the evidence, as indicating that the court thought plaintiff entitled to recover.
    [Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Trial, Oent. Dig. §§ 439-466; ’ Dec. Dig. § 194.]
    11. Trial (§ 256) — Instructions—Requests —Necessity.
    The charge being correct so far as it went, any insufficiency therein because it did not authorize allowance of interest on the $100 paid by one of the defendants was not affirmative error, as defendants should have requested a charge to that effect if they desired it.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig;. §§ 628-641; Dec. Dig. § 256.]
    
      12. Contribution (§ 7) — Interest — Allowance.
    Where the evidence, in an action for contribution because of advancements made by plaintiff to purchase a right of way which all of the parties bound themselves to purchase, did not show when a payment to plaintiff on account of liis advances was made by one of defendants, but only that it was made after suit .was begun, there was no basis for authorizing the jury to allow interest on such payment in deducting it from the amount advanced by plaintiff.
    [Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Contribution, Dec. Dig. § 7.]
    13. Contribution (§ 7) — Discharge of Common Diability — Share of Insolvent Pasty.
    The share of an amount due by way of contribution of one of the persons liable to contribute, but who died wholly insolvent, should be borne ratably by the others liable to contribute.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contribution, Dec. Dig. § 7.J
    14. Appeal and Error (§ 742) — Assignments of Error — Conformity to Court Rules.
    The statement under an assignment of error to the refusal of instructions, etc., in an action for contribution against several defendants, was that it was the same as under another assignment, except that the charge referred to one defendant instead of another named, and the facts were as stated in the charge “see statement of facts, page-, brief, page —-.” Another statement recited that the special charge requested and refused was “as follows,” setting it out. The statement under another assignment recited that the special charge requested and refused was at certain pages of the transcript and was the same as that copied under another assignment of error contained in the brief, except that it referred to one defendant named instead of another. Held, that the statements under the assignments of error were not in accordance with the court rules.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Dec. Dig. § 742.]
    15. Trial (§ 260) — Instructions Covered by Those Given.
    Special charges requested by defendant, which were sufficiently covered by the court’s general charge, so far as proper under the evidence, were properly refused.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 651-659; Dec. Dig. § 2G0.]
    Appeal from District Court, Hill County; W. C. Wear, Judge.
    Action by E. Jarvis against J. V. Matson and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
    Affirmed.
    Morrow & Smithdeal, for appellants. E. W. Bounds and Vaughan & Hart, for appellee.
    
      
      For other oases see same topic anfl section NUMBER in Deo. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
    
      
      For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dee. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   TADBOT, J.

This is the third appeal in this ease. See 94 S. W. 1079 and 113 S. W. 326. The suit is one for contribution. There is no controversy over the pleadings, and the material facts, among others that will appear in the discussion of the assignments of error, are as follows: On the 21st day of October, 1902, E. Jarvis, the appellee herein, and J. V. Matson, J. M. Carroll, and T. C. Morgan, the appellants, and Dee Frisby, W. R. Bounds, J. S. Davis, M. P. Harwood, Jim Jones* Jr., J. M. Peden, W. A. Putman, and S. R. Boyd, executed a written contract or bond payable to R. H. Baker, in which said parties obligated, and bound themselves to procure for the Trinity & Brazos Valley Railway Company the right of way for a certain distance in Hill county, Tex., and as rapidly as the same was required for the construction of said road. The bond or agreement was transferred ■ by Baker to plaintiff, Jarvis, for a valuable consideration. The signers of this instrument were constituted a right of way committee to procure said right of way, and it was contemplated that the necessary funds with which to secure said right of way would be raised by subscriptions and donations from the citizens of Hill county. The said committee was unable to collect sufficient money, by contributions and subscriptions, to purchase the right of way as rapidly as was required for the construction of said road, and it became necessary, in order to perform their obligations to R. H. Baker as-the representative of said railway company, to secure an advancement or loan of money. The necessary loan or advancement, which amounted to $4,000, was obtained from appellee in two separate amounts, namely, $2,500 on the 17th day of July, 1903, and $1,500 on the 26th day of August, 1903. It was the custom of said committee to execute notes, through such members of the committee as were accessible to sign them, for money advanced to it for the purposes stated, and that sundry such notes were so executed. At the time of advancing the $2,500 referred to above, plaintiff took a note for that amount bearing 10 per cent, interest and falling due November 1st, after its date, which bore the following signatures: If. Jarvis (the plaintiff in this suit), W. R. Bounds, J. M. Peden, J. S. Davis, M. P. Harwood. At the time of advancing the $1,500 above mentioned, plaintiff took a note for that amount bearing 10 per cent, interest and due November 1st after its date, with the same signatures thereto as were attached to the said $2,500 note, except the .name of the plaintiff, Jarvis. The plaintiff, Jarvis, intended to sign the $1,500 note, but through neglect or oversight he did not do so. The money furnished by plaintiff and evidenced by said notes was furnished on behalf of and for the benefit of the right of way committee, and it was contemplated and expected that said sums were to be repaid to plaintiff, Jarvis, out of collections made from time to time from subscriptions and contributions, and was not an ordinary loan to the signers of the notes. About August 17, 1905, all of the money that could be collected by contributions and other sources had been received, and on said date a complete statement of the account on the part of said committee with said funds so received and paid out by it was made, and it was ascertained that appellee had been repaid of said $4,000 the sum of $1,375.45, leaving due him by said signers of said contract and bond referred to the sum of $2,629.55. J. E. Clonch also signed said bond, but his name at liia request was erased; and W. A. Put-man limited Ms liability thereon to the sum of $100. This limitation was not noted on the contract or bond at the time Putman signed the same, but was placed thereon by him the same day he signed the contract and within a few hours, perhaps, thereafter. At the time appellant J. V. Blatson signed the said contract or bond, the name of J. E. Clonch appeared thereon as one of the obligors, but was afterwards erased without Blatson’s knowledge or consent at the time of the erasure. J. S. Davis died, and his widow, Blyrtle Davis, was made a party to the suit. S. R. Boyd died insolvent and without making any payment, and the representative of his estate, if he left any, ■ was not sued. The case was tried before .the court and a jury on Blarch 10, 1909. Upon the conclusion of the evidence, it appearing that the defendants Peden, Davis, Frisby, Jones, Jr., Harwood, and Putman had paid their proportional part of the amount sued for, the court instructed a verdict in their favor and also in Clonch’s favor, and submitted the case to the jury as to Blatson, Carroll, Blorgan, and Bounds. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Jarvis, for $277.95 against each of these defendants, which amount was reduced by a remittitur to $240.39, against each of the said defendants, and from the judgment entered in accordance with such remittitur they have appealed.

The first assignment of error complains of the court’s refusal to give the following requested special charge: “You are instructed that it appears from the undisputed evidence that after the right of way agreement, which is set out in plaintiff’s petition, was executed by J. V. Blatson, there was a material change in the written instrument, in that the name of J. E. Clonch was erased from said instrument without the consent of the said Blatson and without his knowledge. You are therefore instructed that as to the said J. V. Blatson the plaintiff has shown no right of recovery, and you will render a verdict in favor of the said J. V. Blatson.” There is evidence that J. E. Clonch’s name was signed to the contract or bond given to secure the right of way for the railway company as an obligor in said bond when Blat-son signed the bond, and that his name was afterwards erased therefrom without the knowledge or consent of Blatson at the time. To this effect was the positive testimony of Blatson.

Now, the general rule is that a willful and material alteration of a written instrument, made by one of the parties to it after execution, and without the authority or consent of another party to it, will avoid such instrument as to the nonconsenting party. Texas Printing & Lithographing Co. v. Smith (Tex. App.) 14 S. W. 1074; Harper v. Stroud, 41 Tex. 367; Bank v. Pritchard, 2 Wilson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 130; Wilbarger Co. v. Bean, 3 Wilson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 16. It is also a general rule that any change in the personality, number, or relations of the parties to a contract in writing is a material alteration. 2 Daniel on Neg. Inst. § 1387; Harper v. Stroud, supra; Park v. Glover, 23 Tex. 469. And the erasure of the name of one of two or more obligors in a contract, or makers or drawers or payees of a bill or note who have indorsed the paper, or one of several cosureties, is likewise a material alteration. There are authorities, however, to the effect that a material alteration of the instrument made by one of the parties thereto before its delivery vitiates the instrument or renders its nonenforceable against the party not consenting to such alteration. But that an interlineation, erasure or other material alteration in a written contract cannot, as a general rule, affect its validity unless the alteration was made after execution and delivery, is sustained by the decisions of many of the higher courts of the United States, and generally, it seems, by the weight of authority. It is said the policy of the general rules above referred to is to preserve the integrity of legal instruments by taking away the temptation of tampering with them. Whether the name of Clonch was erased from the contract or bond involved in this suit, before its delivery and acceptance by R. H. Baker, the obligee, or by whom such erasure was made, the evidence does not clearly show. Clonch testified: “I signed an article that was a guarantee bond on the road, and this is the same article. Esquire Horton presented it to me for signature. I suppose my name was afterwards erased. Bly instructions were to have it erased. I gave the instructions to S. R. Boyd, who was in Austin at that time. I ’phoned to him. I talked to him about it, ■ and he assured me that my name would come off of it. He said that he had the bond, that he had not presented it to Baker, and that my name would be taken off of it before the bond was approved. I did not consult Blr. Jarvis about taking my name off that document. I did not consult anybody except Blr. Boyd. There were some names on that instrument when it wa£ brought to me. I signed just below the last name that appeared on it.” Speaking of how long it was after he signed the bond before his name was erased, he said: “I suppose it was done the second day afterwards. I don’t know who did it. I did not do it myself. Blr. Boyd assured me that he would do it.”

But whether the general rule stated, or the rule that a material alteration made before the delivery renders the instrument void as to. the party thereto not consenting, is applicable in the present case, need not be decided; nor do we regard it necessary to determine upon whom the burden of proof rested to explain the alleged alteration of the instrument made the basis of the suit It may be said, however, that, when the alteration is apparent on the face of the instrument, the authorities hold with great unanimity that the party offering such instrument in evidence and claiming under it is bound to show that the alteration' was made under such circumstances that it does not affect his right to recover.

The view we take of the case at bar is that the court did not err in refusing the charge made the basis of the assignment of error under consideration for the reason that said charge ignored testimony offered tending to show that the appellant Matson had consented to or ratified the erasure of Cloneh’s name from the guarantee bond or contract upon which appellee’s right to recover is based, and peremptorily instructed a verdict in Matson’s favor. It seems to be well settled that a party to an instrument may ratify or consent to an alteration of it after it has been made, without a new consideration therefor. Grimstead v. Briggs, 4 Iowa, 559; King v. Hunt, 13 Mo. 97; Pelton v. Prescott, 13 Iowa, 567. And a subsequent ratification of the alteration will be equivalent to an original authority to make it. Humphrey v. Guillon, 13 N. H. 385, 38 Am. Dec. 499. Such consent to or ratification of the alteration need not necessarily be shown by positive or direct testimony. It may be implied from, or made to appear by, circumstances.

J. E. Olonch testified: “I have had several conversations with several of these gentlemen whose names are on there (the bond) about it (his name) being erased. My best recollection is that it was in March or April in Waco, Tex., at a restaurant, that Mr. Matson for the. first time asked me about having erased my name from the bond. * * * I think that it was in March or April, somewhere along there, in 1903.”

After stating that Clonch’s name was on the bond at the time he signed it, and that he had not authorized any one to erase it from the bond, and that he did not know it was going to be erased, appellant Matson testified: “I remember being in Waco, Tex., in a restaurant with Mr. J. E. Olonch. I don’t remember the date of that occasion. * * * I think the first time I learned about his signing the document (the bond) and erasing his name afterward was possibly from Mr. Daniel. I know I questioned Mr. Olonch that day about it. I cannot recall the dates as to how long after I signed the right of way agreement before I had conversation with Mr. Daniel. * * * Pri- or to meeting Mr. Olonch at Waco, I had not conversed with him about the fact that he had taken his name off that document. * * * S. R. Boyd and Mr. Davis brought that document to me. They are both dead. I cannot recall any reason why I had not talked to Olonch about it (erasure of Clonch’s name from bond) before I saw him in Waco. I remember distinctly of talking to him at Waco and asking him all the questions about it. I cannot recall the dates or the month or season of the year that I did talk to him at Waco. * * •* After Mr. Daniel told me about the change that had been made in the agreement (the bond), I did not say anything to the committee. * * * I lived there in town, but knew nothing of what they were doing. I saw these different men from time to time to look at them — Jarvis, Bounds, Carroll, and the rest of them. I might have known that they were going ahead and procuring the right of way. I paid my assessment, and at the time I paid it I knew they were going to use it for something. When I paid that, I did not say anything to them then that I did not consider myself liable on that agreement. I never had anything to say to the committee in any way, form, or fashion, nor to any of them. I think they did call on me to pay my part of the shortage.” ■

Jarvis testified as follows: “The money received by the right of way committee on account of those two notes was loaned to the parties signing those notes for the purpose of discharging the obligation of the right of way committee. I think I spoke to Mr. J. V. Matson several times, more than once, in regard to attending the meetings of this committee (right of way committee); but I now call to mind especially one time that I told Mr. Matson in the evening th'at the committee was going to meet. The time was in the evening probably 2 o’clock in the front of the First National Bank when I informed Mr. Matson, and he told me that he was so busy that he could not attend, or did not expect to attend, these meetings at all when he signed the bond, but for me to go ahead and to represent him, and whatever the committee done, whatever we done, that he would acquiesce in it, and that it would be satisfactory to him. The meeting that I spoke to him about at that time was after the railroad had come into or had been running into Hubbard (City), and at the time the means was about exhausted that was in hand, and if my memory serves me right it was in July or August, 1903, possibly July. It was some time after the road had been completed so as to permit trains to run over it. I know that it was in the summer time because those large windows in front of the bank are raised up in the summer time to give ventilation and air, and he was sitting in one of those windows when I was talking to him. I don’t remember how many conversations prior to this one that I had with Mr. Matson from the time the contract was signed up by the 12 parties whose names appear on it. One reason why that impressed my mind is that I went immediately. from the conversation with Mr. Matson to the committee and so informed the committee of Mr. Matson’s message. I don’t remember now of any definite conversation with him before that time. I don’t think Mr. Matson ever did attend any of the committee meetings. I never learned at any time through Mr. Matson himself of any contention on the part of Mr. J. V. Matson that he was not liable on account of this agreement signed by him with the rest of us. What I found out was at the meetings of the committee. I never heard Mr. Matson say anything at all about it until we entered suit; never heard him say anything about being dissatisfied himself. I said that I never heard anything about Mr. Matson claiming that he was not liable on that bond except through the committee men. Those committee meetings at which I heard that were along towards the latter part of the committee meetings and after the railroad had been completed into the town, when funds were running short to meet the obligations of the committee and when we were trying to raise them, and some of them probably, I don’t remember who it was, said that Mr. Matson claimed that he did not regard himself as liable, something of the sort. 1-Ie did not claim to me that the bond had been changed after he signed it.”

In this connection the appellant Matson testified: “I do rememoer of having a conversation with Mr. Jarvis at one time about going to the committee meeting. We had a conversation with reference to the right of way, with reference to procuring the right of way. In that conversation I just told him to go ahead and do the best he could, that I would stay with him. * * * That was about the substance of my reply to him. I don’t remember what all he did say. That was before I learned that Putman’s signature had been modified. I had a conversation with Jarvis before I learned about Putman’s modification. It was after I had the conversation with Mr. Jarvis that I learned that Mr. Clonch’s name had been erased.” Again, referring to the conversation with Jarvis, he said: ‘.T remember these two following questions being propounded to me on the other trial and their answers: ‘Q. Do you say it did or did not happen? A. I don’t remember. If it happened, I cannot recall it. I remember talking at one time about the matter. 1 don’t remember the place. I told him to go ahead and do the best he could and I would stay with him.-’ ”

W. R. Bounds testified: “I remember the conversation between me and Matson at the oil mill after I had signed this article of agreement. Matson came up to the mill where I was at the office of the mill, and as he approached me he said: ‘We have played hell. We have bought us a railroad. If you had not signed that bond, I would not; but, when I saw old W. R.’s name on it, I stuck mine right to it’ — or words to that effect That was on the evening of the signing of the bond, late in the evening getting along towards quitting time. I remember having another conversation with Mr. Matson later on concerning his consulting about his liability on this agreement. He came to me and spoke of some irregularities that had, in some manner, taken place in the manufacture or make up of this bond, and said, ‘We can both get out of it,’ and asked me to go with him and get out of it with him. That was in the crushing season of the oil mill, either right in the first of January at that time, or a little later, while I was manager and secretary of the oil mill during the season of 1902-03, and it was while I was there that he approached me on this subject, and it was between the signing of the bond of October 21, 1902, the date of the bond, and, say, the 1st of April, 1903, because that oil mill season don’t extend any further. I was there at the oil mill. I declined to go in with him. That was while I was working at the oil mill that Mr. Matson came and had the conversation with me in which he said that he had signed the bond, and after-wards he had another conversation in which he told me that he had found out that he was not liable on the bond. That occurred between the time the bond was signed and the 1st- of April, 1903. I fix that time by my working at the oil mill. He told me he could repudiate it and told me for us to go in together. He never has done it until we brought the suit. He did not refuse to pay it. It was after that conversation that I borrowed that money from Mr. Jarvis.”

When asked if he had made the statements imputed to him by the witness, Bounds, Matson said, in effect, that he did not remember to have made either of said statements.

We are of the opinion that, in the state of the evidence, it cannot be said that it was conclusively shown that the appellant Mat-son neither consented to the erasure of Olonch’s name from the contract upon which this suit is based, nor ratified the same, after such erasure; and, unless it was conclusively so shown, the giving of the special charge in question would have been reversible error. It will be noted that according to the testimony of both Olonch and Bounds, quoted above, Matson knew as early as March or April, 1903, that 'Clonch’s name had been erased from the right of way contract or bond, and that, according to the testimony of plaintiff, Jarvis, Matson, when being importuned by Jarvis, in the summer of 1903, probably in July or August, to attend a meeting of the right of way committee, at which means and methods were being devised to raise money to- discharge the right of way obligation, informed Jarvis that he could not or did not intend to attend said meetings, but that for him (Jarvis) to go ahead and represent him (Matson) at said meeting, and that whatever the committee did would be satisfactory to him, and that he would acquiesce in it. Under this testimony, the jury would have been warranted in finding that, even though Matson did not know of the erasure of Clonch’s name from the right of way agreement at the time such erasure was made, and did not then consent thereto, yet afterwards with full knowledge thereof he consented to the alteration or ratified the same. Had a special charge been asked and refused, submitting the issue of such consent or ratification, its refusal would have been error, of which Matson could have justly complained. But his theory seems to have been that want of consent on his part to the erasure of Clonch’s name, before he acquired knowledge of such erasure, was conclusively established by the evidence, which, perhaps, is correct, and that consent to or ratification of the erasure after he acquired knowledge thereof was not raised by the evidence, and hence no special charge submitting the latter question was requested. In this theory of the case we think he was mistaken, and that he is now in no position to insist upon a reversal upon this phase of the case.

The second assignment complains of the court’s refusal to charge the jury as requested by the defendants, to the effect that if the written instrument described' in plaintiff’s petition was signed by W. A. Putman, and that at the time he signed his name thereto there was no qualification placed thereon, and further that after the said Putman signed his name thereto J. V. 'Matson signed his name to the same, and that after said J. V. Matson signed his name to the same the said W. A. Putman, with the consent of the obligee in said bond, or his agent, qualified his obligation on said bond by adding the words after his name, “to the extent of one hundred dollars,” and that the same was done without the consent or knowledge of the said J. V. Matson, and that afterwards .7. M. Carroll signed said obligation in the place of the said J. E. Clonch, whose name had'been erased therefrom, and that at the time the said J. M. Carroll signed the same he was not informed that said qualification after the name of W. A. Putman had been put on said instrument after the signing thereof by the said J. Y. Matson, then said instrument would not be binding upon the said J. M. Carroll, and you will find a verdict in his favor, and so say. There, was no error in refusing this charge, for the reason that the issues embodied therein were fairly and sufficiently submitted in the court’s general charge.

By the third assignment, it is contended that the verdict of the jury in placing the total amount unpaid on the $4,000 alleged to have been advanced by plaintiff at $1,389.75, thereby making and finding the aliquot share due by each defendant to be $277.95, is contrary to the evidence and excessive; that a. correct calculation of the interest on the amount advanced by plaintiff aggregating said sum of $4,000 at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum shows the total balance due thereon to be $1,280.74. The contention that the balance due did not equal the amount found by the jury is doubtless correct. It was so admitted by the plaintiff, but attributed to and shown to be a miscalculation on the part of the jury in arriving at their verdict, and a remittitur filed reducing the amount, for which judgment-was entered, to-the amount claimed by appellants under this assignment to have been shown to be due. This corrected the error in the jury’s finding in this particular, and the court did not err in rendering judgment for the amount so-shown to be due. ,

Nor did the court err in entering judgment upon the remittitur filed by the plaintiff. The remittitur having been made for the purpose of correcting an error in the calculation made by the jury, 'based on the undisputed facts, the same was permissible, and the judgment entered in accordance therewith was correct under the decisions in this state.

At the request of the plaintiff, Jarvis, the court instructed the jury as follows: “You are instructed that, in the event you should find for the plaintiff against any of the defendants, Bounds, Matson, Carroll, and Morgan, you will arrive at the amount of your verdict by the following process: You will first ascertain the aggregate amount of the payments made to the plaintiff, E. Jarvis, on account of said $4,000 claimed 'by him to-have been loaned to said right of way committee prior to the 22d day of August, 1905, the day on which said suit was filed, deducting the aggregate amount of such credits from said sum of $4,000, then, deducting from said balance the sum of $100 paid by the defendant W. A. Putman, you will then prorate the amount of the balance due on-account of said $4,000 on August 22, 1905, between the plaintiff and all of the defendants then liable for said amount; and you are further instructed that as to said defends M. P. Harwood, Mrs. Myrtle Davis, Lee Erisby, J. M. Peden, J. R. Jones, Jr., and W. A. Putman, you will find your verdict in their favor, and, as to the other defendants-that you may find against, you will calculate interest on the pro rata part of the balance due by each of them on account of said $4,000 from August 22, 1905, at the rate of 6 per cent, to this date, stating the amount in your verdict that you may find against each of the' defendants, naming them.” This-charge is objected to on the grounds: (1) That “it is upon the weight of the evidence- and calculated to mislead the jury and indicate to the jury that in the mind of the ■ court the plaintiff had a right to recover; (2) that it is erroneous in that it directs the jury to deduct only the sum of $100 on account of W. A. Putman, when, according to-the undisputed evidence, said Putman, if liable on said bond, was liable not only for $100, but also for interest thereon. We-are of the opinion that neither of these objections to the charge constitute reversible error. The charge is not upon the weight of the evidence, and there is no testimony pointed out, nor have we discovered any, showing when the §100 agreed to be paid by Putman was in fact paid. It does appear that it was paid after the suit was filed; but how long after, whether one day or one year, was not shown. There was therefore no basis upon which by calculation the amount of interest for which Putman may have been liable could be ascertained. But, if the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to arrive at the amount of interest due by Putman, still the charge complained of was not, in our opinion, affirmative error, but seems to be correct as far as it went, and if the defendants desired to more fully present the question to which it related — that is, if they desired to have the jury told that in arriving at the amount unpaid of the money advanced by the plaintiff they should, in dealing with the amount paid by Putman, charge interest thereon — a correct charge to that effect should have been prepared and requested.

Nor did the court err in failing to instruct the jury that, in arriving at the amount each of the defendants was liable for, they should take into account the pro rata share charged against S. R. Boyd, one of the- signers of the right of way agreement. The undisputed evidence showed that Boyd died wholly insolvent before the institution of this suit; that nothing could be realized from his estate, and in such case his pro rata share of the amount due the plaintiff in a suit for contribution must be borne ratably by the other signers of said agreement.

The eighth, tenth, seventh (eighth in the record), and twelfth assignments of error are each submitted as propositions. Neither of them specifies or points out with sufficient definiteness the particular error of the court sought to be presented for review, nor is either accompanied by a sufficient statement, as required by the rules, to enable us to decide the question involved without a resort to the record. None of the facts upon which a decision of the questions turns are given in the statement subjoined to the assignment. Under the eighth the statement made is: “-Same as under twelfth assignment, except that the charge refers to J. M. Carroll instead of T. C. Morgan. The facts were as stated in said charge. See statement of facts page -, this brief, p. - Under the tenth the statement is: “The special charge requested and refused is as follows.” Then follows the special charge covering more than a page of the brief. The statement under the seventh assignment (eighth in- the record) is as follows: “The special charge requested and refused is at Tr. pp. 62 and 63, and is the same as that copied under tenth assignment of error, this brief, p. -, except that it referred to J. M. Carroll instead of T. C. Morgan.” The statement under the twelfth assignment is simply a copy of the charge, the refusal of which is complained of. This manner of briefiing is not in accordance with the rules upon the subject, and the assignments are not entitled to consideration. A reading of the court’s general charge, however, has led us to the conclusion that the special charges refused were, in so far as they were applicable to the facts, sufficiently covered by the second and third paragraphs of said charge, and that the appellants have suffered no substantial injury, if any at all, by the refusal! of their special charges. . ■

The assignments not discussed have either been disposed of adversely- to the contention of appellants by what has already been said, or the special charges to which they relate, in so far as said charges containedi correct propositions of law applicable to the facts, were covered by the court’s main charge, or point out no reversible error.

The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed.  