
    George B. Upham, administrator, vs. Nathan B. Raymond.
    Suffolk.
    January 16. — 23, 1882.
    Lord & Field, JJ., absent.
    The St. of 1879, c. 245, § 4, making a certificate of discharge in insolvency conclusive evidence of the fact and regularity of the discharge, unless annulled by the court which granted it, is applicable to a certificate granted after its passage upon proceedings begun before, although the action in which the discharge is pleaded was begun before the passage of the statute.
    Contract. Writ dated April 24, 1878, returnable at July term 1878 of the Superior Court. On January 5,1880, the defendant filed an answer setting up a discharge in insolvency in bar. From the discharge it appeared that the defendant filed his petition in insolvency on December 27, 1878, and that the discharge was granted him on July 24,1879. The plaintiff thereupon filed in the Superior Court objections to the discharge in insolvency, alleging that the discharge was not valid, and was no bar to the action, because the defendant in the insolvency proceedings had concealed a part of his estate prior to filing his petition in insolvency, and had wilfully sworn falsely in the schedule of his property in the insolvency proceedings, in omitting to include in the schedule, as part of his estate, a certain cylinder press.
    At the trial, before Allen, J., without a jury, the plaintiff offered evidence to sustain said objections. The judge ruled that they were not open to the plaintiff in this action; excluded the evidence; and found for the defendant. The plaintiff alleged exceptions.
    
      H. P. Fellows, for the plaintiff.
    
      I. J. Cutter, for the defendant.
   Morton, C. J.

It was decided in Kempton v. Saunders, 130 Mass. 236, that the St. of 1879, e. 245, § 4, is applicable to a certificate of discharge granted after its passage upon proceedings begun before, and is constitutional and valid; and that its effect was to provide an exclusive method of annulling a certificate of discharge by an application to the court which granted it, and to prevent its validity from being impeached in any other court. This is decisive of the case at bar. The only difference in the two cases is that, in the case at bar, the suit was begun before the passage of the St. of 1879; but this is immaterial. The statute contains no provision exempting pending cases from its operation. It provides that the certificate may be pleaded as a full and complete bar to all suits brought on debts provable against the estate of the insolvent; and is applicable to all certificates granted after its passage. Exceptions overruled.  