
    Cook and Cook v. Crawford.
    Where there is no proof of the locusin quo of a contract, the presumption is that it was made and to bo porformed in the State. Therefore, where a note was dated at‘‘Philadelphia,5' there being no proof that ‘‘Philadelphia55 was beyond the limits of the State, interest was properly computed at the rate allowed by our law at the time. (Note 9U.)
    Error from Harris. Suit on a note dated at “Philadelphia, 21st March, iSSO.” There was no proof other than the note itself of the place where the note, was made. The court instructed the jury to compute interest at the rate of five per cent, per annum, the rate allowed in Texas at the date of the note.
    Note 90.—Andrews v. Hoxie, 5 T., 171; Able v. McMurray, 10 T., 350; Bailey v. Heald, 17 T., 102, overruling 10 T., 350, supra; Whitlock v. Castro, 22 T., 108; Yalo v. Ward, 30 T., 17.
    
      Alexander, for plaintiff in error.
    This cause has already been once before this court, and should now be reversed on the same grounds. (1 Tex. R., 9: Dallam, 522; Id., 530; 1 Tex. II., 93; 2 Id., ISO; Id., 239.)
    
      J. W. Henderson, for defendant in error.
    The court could not judicially know that “Philadelphia” was not in Harrisburg comity in this State. In Cook v. Crawford (1 Tex. R., 9) this court says that it “eaunot judicially know the rate of interest in any other country until proved as any other fact; ” nor can it know where the city of Philadelphia is until proved as any other fact. It says, in IIoikIou v. Crosby, (1 Tex. R., 203,) that, “if the foreign law he not proved, the rights of parties must bo determined by our own laws.”
   Lipscomb, J.

This caso was before us at a former term. It was then discussed and, the court understood, admitted to be fomuled on a note dated and made in the city of Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania; and the record showed that final judgment liad been rendered in favor of tbe plaintiff, without (lie intervention of a jury to find the interest of the State of Pennsylvania, and interest liad been allowed. This was one ground on which the judgment was reversed. There, were, however, errors on which it was reversed independently of the one noticed. The note sued on is dated as follows: “Philadelphia, 21st March, 1830.” In the plaintiff's petition be sets out that it was given in the city of Philadelphia, to wit, in the comity aforesaid, referring to the county of Harrisburg in the caption of tins petition.'

There was no evidence offered on the trial but the note. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, with five percent, interest, which has been generally considered to have been the legal rate of interest before the act of the Congress of Texas of 1840. It is contended that there’ is error in the allowance of interest on the note, because, as it is alleged, the debt was contracted ;in another State, and the interest of that State not being in evidence, no interest could be allowed. If the point taken arose out of the record, my opinion would bo in its favor. But from tiie view we take of the record, it does not sustain the conclusion drawn by the. counsel for the plaintiff in error. IVe cannot, nor could the court below, judicially know that the note sued on was made in another State; and there being no evidence to fix the locus in quo of its creation, we are bound to treat it as a domestic contract, and consequently affirm the judgment. There are no other points made by the plaintiff in error thought to ho worthy of consideration.

Judgment affirmed.  