
    SMITH v. STATE.
    (No. 9628.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    March 17, 1926.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 20, 1926.)
    1. Criminal law <§=3923(1).
    Discovery after verdict that juror was not householder or freeholder is not ground for new trial if no inquiry was made to ascertain fact before accepting juror.
    2. Criminal law <§=923(1).
    Discovery after verdict that juror was not householder or freeholder, though he qualified on voir dire, is not ground for new trial, in absence of showing of probable injury.
    3. Criminal law <§=419, 420(1) — Seduction <§=40.
    Testimony in prosecution for seduction that father of prosecutrix had whipped her half-sister for associating with men at night held properly excluded, as not proper method of showing that half-sister was of lewd character, and as admitting proof of specific acts by hearsay.
    4. Seduction <§=40.
    Refusal in seduction prosecution to permit testimony that prosecutrix’s father had been charged with rape on negro woman eight years previously held proper.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    5. Seduction <§=46.
    Prosecutrix in seduction case held sufficiently corroborated to warrant conviction.
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from District Court, Smith County; J. R. Warren, Judge.
    B. L. Smith was convicted of seduction, and he appeals.
    Affirméd.
    Gentry & Gray, of Tyler, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., of Austin, and Nat Gentry, Jr., Asst. State’s Atty., of Tyler, for the State.
   BHRRX, J.

The; offense is seduction; the punishment is two years in the penitentiary.

Appellant in his motion for a new trial asked the court to grant same on the ground that F. A. Glenn, one of the jurors in said cause, was neither a householder in the county nor a freeholder in the state. The bill of exceptions pertaining to this matter shows that counsel representing the defendant did not know that Mr. Glenn was not a householder or freeholder until after the trial of the case. The bill, however, also fails to show that any inquiry was made of Mr. Glenn on his voir dire examination by the appellant as to whether he was a householder in the county or a freeholder in the state. It is a well-settled rule in this state that the discovery after verdict that a juror was not a householder or freeholder is not ground for new trial if no inquiry was made to ascertain that fact before accepting the juror. Randell v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 64 S. W. 256. It is also true that the rule is well established in this state that, though a juror qualifies on his voir dire as a householder and defendant does not discover that he is neither a householder nor a freeholder until after verdict, it is not ground for new trial, in the absence of a showing of probable injury. Leeper et al. v. State, 29 Tex. App. 72, 14 S. W. 398; Lane v. State, 29 Tex. App. 319, 15 S. W. 827; Mays v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 437, 37 S. W. 721; Martinez v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S. W. 838. The foregoing rule applies in this case, as there is not the slightest showing in this record of probable injury.

Appellant also complains at the court’s action in refusing to permit him to prove by Mrs. John Oliver, the stepmother of the prosecuting witness, that a young half-sister of the prosecutrix lived in the home where the prosecutrix lived, and that a short time before said alleged seduction the father of the prosecutrix, upon learning that said half-sister had been lying out at night with men and promiscuously associating with men, had whipped said half-sister because of her said conduct. This testimony was properly excluded. While it is true that appellant was entitled to show that prosecutrix associated with lewd women, yet appellant was not within his rights in offering to prove that the father of prosecutrix had whipped her half-sister because of her misconduct with men. This was not the proper method of showing that the half-sister of prosecutrix was of lewd and unchaste character. To have permitted this proof would not only have been admitting proof of specific acts, but in addition thereto it- would have been admitting proof of specific acts by hearsay and as an inference to be drawn by the conduct of the father of the prosecutrix.

Neither do we think the court in error in refusing to permit appellant to show that the father of prosecutrix had, eight years before the alleged seduction, been charged "with the offense of rape upon a negro woman. The record discloses that prosecutrix is a young girl 18 years of age, and here it was, not proper to attempt to impeach her reputation by proof of a charge against her father when she was a mere child of 10 years of age.

We have carefully examined the statement of facts, and conclude that the testimony is amply sufficient to corroborate the prosecu-trix both as to the act of intercourse and as to the promise of marriage. Finding no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.

• PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.

On Motion for Rehearing.

HAWKINS, J.

Appellant questions that part of our opinion holding the corroboration of prosecutrix to be sufficient. We have again examined the statement of facts and are confirmed in the conclusion heretofore expressed. Prosecutrix testified that appellant waited upon her constantly and exclusively for about two years; that they became engaged in the summer; and that shortly before Christmas, while calling upon her at the home of her aunt where she lived, he gave her an engagement ring; that on the same night she showed this ring to her uncle and aunt, and in the presence of appellant told them he had given it to her and that it was their engagement ring. Appellant did not deny at this time that it was an engagement ring and admitted having given it to prosecutrix. The uncle and aunt confirmed prosecutrix’s testimony about her showing them the ring and stating that appellant gave it to her and his admission to this effect. The act of seduction, according to prosecutrix, occurred shortly after he gave her the ring. Appellant admitted acts of intercourse with prosecutrix covering many months and occurring on almost every occasion when they were alone together. One of these acts was witnessed by a third party.

He denied that any engagement ever existed between them, and claimed upon the trial that the ring was given as a Christmas present and not to seal an engagement. We think it unnecessary to further detail the evidence. Much produced by appellant was contradictory of that offered by the state. Where such conflicts occurred the jury seems to have accepted the version of the state witnesses. Many cases revealing similar facts to those here found are collated in Polk v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 854, 238 S. W. 934.

The motion for rehearing is overruled. 
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