
    LUO HUANG CHEN, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-699.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 30, 2015.
    
      Thomas V. Massueci, New York, N.Y., for Petitioner.
    Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Linda S. Wemery, Assistant Director; Gerald M. Alexander, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., JOSÉ A. CABRANES and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted for former Attomey General Eric H. Holder, Jr. as Respondent.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Luo Huang Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February 4, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming an April 9, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Chen’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Luo Huang Chen, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Feb. 4, 2014), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 9, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this ease.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, and consider only the single basis on which the BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

For asylum applications such as Chen’s, governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements, so long as they reasonably support an inference that the applicant is not credible. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008). We defer “to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. In this case, the inconsistency the IJ identified does not reasonably support an inference that Chen was incredible.

The agency concluded that Chen was not credible because he claimed that he fled China after his arrest in May 2010, but the documentary evidence revealed prior departure plans — a student visa application approved in March 2010. Although the agency labeled this an inconsistency, there is no contradiction: Chen never stated that the only reason he left China was because he was arrested or that he had not considered leaving China prior to his arrest. Moreover, he testified consistently that his parents and an agent handled the student visa application process, and that he was not involved. He testified that it was not until June or July that he first talked to the agent and received the letter of acceptance from the American university. This testimony is consistent with the certificate of eligibility for a student visa, which was signed by a school- official on March 31, 2010, but not signed by Chen until June 1, 2010. That Chen’s parents began planning his departure prior to his arrest does not, in and of itself, undermine his claim that he was persecuted because of his religion and fears persecution on return.

During cross-examination, Chen testified that neither he nor his parents contacted the agent before his arrest. This testimony conflicts with the date on the approved visa application; but standing alone, it is not enough to support an adverse credibility determination.

Because the case is being remanded, we do not consider whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to remand. See Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 264 (2d Cir.2007).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED.  