
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Paul Frazier, Appellant.
   Judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (John Bradley, J.), rendered March 28, 1986, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of five counts of robbery in the second degree and sentencing him to concurrent prison terms of from 14 years to life on each count, unanimously affirmed.

In this prosecution of the defendant for five counts of robbery in the second degree arising from the robbery of Beverly Hall and Matthew Nored at gunpoint, and the subsequent robbery of Izola Alexander by displaying a gun and taking from her jewelry and her wallet, we are satisfied that the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]). The witnesses had an opportunity to view the defendant from a close distance for several minutes during the robbery, and selected defendant, without difficulty, out of a lineup one week after the robberies. Discrepancies pointed out by the defense are insignificant and do not compel the conclusion that defendant is the victim of mistaken identity. Moreover, the accomplice’s testimony reasonably connected the defendant to the commission of the crimes charged. Finally, issues of credibility are for the trier of fact to determine (People v Mosley, 112 AD2d 812, affd 67 NY2d 985).

Defendant’s display of a concealed gun to give a victim the impression that he was threatening her with the gun is legally sufficient to establish robbery (People v Baskerville, 60 NY2d 374).

Defendant’s contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel is refuted by the record, which establishes that trial counsel made appropriate objections throughout the trial, examined witnesses, and obtained a favorable Sandoval decision (People v Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796 [1985]).

The allegedly improper line of questioning and comments made by the prosecutor in summation were unobjected to and therefore are not preserved as a matter of law. We decline to address these arguments, nor do we believe, in any event, that if we reached these arguments they would warrant a reversal. We are unpersuaded that the sentence imposed was unduly harsh or severe. Taking into account "among other things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the court and the purpose of a penal sanction”, we perceive no abuse of discretion warranting a reduction in sentence (People v Farrar, 52 NY2d 302, 305 [1981]). Concur— Sullivan, J. P., Carro, Wallach, Smith and Rubin, JJ.  