
    
      Murphy v. Barnett.
    IN this ejectment, a verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court upon a case, the material facts of which are: That T. Dixon being seized of the lands in contest, agreed to sell them to W. Dixon, to which end, he made a power of attorney to C. Dixon. W. Dixon took possession of the lands under the agreement, and contracted to sell them to Thomas Barnett, who entered accordingly; upon which, C. Dixon, intending to execute the power of attorney, did, at the request of W. Dixon, seal and deliver a deed of bargain and sale to Thomas Barnett, as assignee of W. Dixon. The deed was signed by C. Dixon, as attorney in fact for T. Dixon. A judgment was recovered against T. Barnett in the County Court, on which a fi. fa. issued, and was levied upon the land, which, at the Sheriff’s sale, was purchased by the plaintiff, who received a deed, which has has been duly registered. A short time before the Sheriff's sale, Thomas Barnett executed to his son Joseph Barnett, the defendant, a deed of the lands. Joseph entered, and was in possession, claiming title, when the Sheriff sold.
    The Jury found that the deed, made by Thomas to Joseph Barnett, was fraudulent against creditors.
    
      On the argument of the case, by Norwood for the plaintiff, and Potter for the defendant, several points were made, on which the Court did not think proper to decide.
   Taylor, C. J.

delivered the Opinion of the Court:

This case has been fully argued and various objections have been made to the plaintiff’s recovery. We think, however, that the decision of the cause rests on a plain principle of law; and that, as both parties claim directly from T. Barnett, they are privies in estate, and it is not competent to either, as such, to deny his title. The defendant has accepted a deed from him, which admits the title and estops him from denying it afterwards; for a person may be estopped by matter in pais, as well as by indenture or writing. The doctrine, as applied to this case, appears highly reasonable, since nothing but the truth ought to be alledged by any man in his defence, and what he has once alledged must be presumed to be true, and he ought not to contradict it.

On this ground, the Court is of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. 
      
       Litt. sen. 677. Salk. 276. 7 Term. Rep. 488.
     