
    No. 11,791.
    The State of Louisiana ex rel. Town of Mansfield vs. Police Jury of De Soto Parish.
    
      It was not in contemplation of the framers of the Constitution in declaring in Art. 202 of that instrument, that the taxing power may be exercised by the General Assembly for State purposes, and by parishes and municipal corporations, under authority granted to them by the General Assembly for parish and municipal purposes, that the General Assembly should authorize or direct the parochial authorities to exercise their taxing power for municipal purposes; on the contrary, it was intended that the taxing power of the State, that of the parishes and that of the municipal corporations, should be kept separate and distinct.
    An act of the General Assembly directing parish authorities to turn over to the towns situated within' their borders a portion of the licenses levied, and imposed by them for parish purposes, is unconstitutional.
    APPEAL from the Ninth Judicial District Oourt for the Parish of De Soto. Hall, J.
    
    
      Elam & Elam for the Relators, Appellants:
    The title of Act No. 165 of 1894, in all respects covers the body of the act, and neither the title nor the body of the act embrace more than one general object, viz.: that of “ giving to incorporated cities and towns the right to demand and receive from the police juries of their respective parishes the licenses collected annually by the parishes from said cities and towns, less the criminal, public school and other expenses paid out on account of said cities and towns, the taxes paid on property in said cities and towns to be first exhausted in paying the enumerated expenses.” New Orleans Taxpayers Association et al. vs City of New Orleans, 35 An. 570; 33 An. 782; 35 An. 1141; 38 An. 620.
    Article 56 of the Constitution of 1879 does not contain any prohibition to the effect that the funds, credit or property of the State shall not be loaned, pledged or granted to any political corporation. In fact the article itself clearly intends to make the distinction between a political and a public corporation.
    “ The taxing power may be exercised by the General Assembly for State purposes, and by the parishes and municipal corporations under authority granted to them by the General Assembly for parish and municipal purposes.” Art. 202, Const. 1879.
    Act No. 165 of 1894 does not levy any'tax, but is merely the appropriation of a tax already levied and collected.
    “The control, administration and disposition of the funds of the State, and the appropriation thereof to the payment of debts, are powers appertaining exclusively to the legislative department.” 42 An. 927.
    If the court should hold that Act 165 levies any tax, then such a tax is levied for a public purpose,^and as such is within the scope of legislative authority.
    “ Under the Constitution of some of the States the Legislature can not impose a tax for corporate purposes, having power only under proper enabling acts, to submit the matter to local officers, or to the people of the municipality, where the purpose is not one constituting a municipal obligation to the general government.” Am. and Eng. Ency., Vol. 25, p. 81; Will County vst People, 110 111. 511; Ibid, 82; Steve vs. Hennepin Co., 33 Minn. 355; Ibid, 82.
    Primarily the Legislature determines what is a public use, “ and when it has declared what may be so regarded, courts will no^ interfere, except in clear cases of abuse or usurpation of authority. What is for the public good, and what are public purposes are for the Legislature to say, and it has a large discretion in determining these questions which will pot be controlled by the courts, unless under the exceptions above noted and such like.” 38 An. 292; 26 An. 661; Cooley Const. Lim. 608, 609; State vs. Shakespeare (41 An.); Cooley Const. Lim. 195; 19 Wis. 624; 88 Amer. Dec. 711; 50 Pa. St. 150; 210. St. 14; 8 Am. Rep. 24; 41 Cal. 173; 22 Mo. 384; 28 Ark. 317; 5 Abb. (N. Y.) Oas. 489; 13 N. Y. 149; 85 Pa. St. 170; 27 Am. Dec. 733; 65 Pa. St. 456; 52 Pa. St. 432; 3 Paige (N.Y.), 73; 22 Am. Dec. 679, Am. and Eng. Ency., Yol. 25, p. 90; 32 Conn. 128; 21-Pa. St. 174; 59 Am. Dec. 759; 25 Pa. St. 128; 65 Pa. St. 146; 3 Am. Rep. 615; 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 344; 20 Wall. (U. S.) 665; 33 Mich. 164; 50 Vt. 178; 46 N. H. 415; 38 An. 292; 57 Tex. 635; 45 Tex. 299; 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 437; 18 N. J. Eq. 519; 90 Am. Dec. 634; 64 N. Y. 91; 21 Am. Rep. 586; 62 111. 628; 14 Am. Rep. 99; 8 Bush. (Ky.) 508; 8 Am. Dec. 480; 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 65.
    
      Farrar, Jonas & Kruttschnitt, John O. Ryan, John Dymond, Jr., Robert Montgomery, O. F. Garland, T. O. Armstrong, 8. T. Bird and W. H. McLendon as amici curise, on same side:
    It is an elementary principle of law that a governmental body should not exercise the power of taxation to an extent notoriously in excess of its needs.
    Each governmental subdivision should bear its proportion of the general governmental expense.
    Act 165 of 1894 does not conflict with Art. 29 of the Constitution. It embraces but one object, to-wit: That the parishes shall not collect from the municipalities, in future, funds in excess of the parish governmental expenses contracted on account of the municipalities, and to this end to require the parishes to return to the incorporated towns any surplus of licenses collected by the parishes- from within the towns, after the .governmental ex - penses of the parish, contracted on account of the town, have been first paid out of the revenues collected by the parishes from within the towns. 32 An. 779; 34 An. 556; 39 An. 455; 46 An. 1031; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 143.
    
      Courts will look to the journals of a convention to ascertain the sense in which which a word was used by the convention in constitutional provision. 5 Sneed, 482; 43 An. 959; Sutherland’s Satutory Construction, Sec. 300.
    Where the word municipal appears in an ordinance then under consideration by a constitutional convention and the word is subsequently omitted from that part of the constitutional article as finally adopted, the courts will hold that it was the intention of the convention to exclude it from the legislation about to be enforced. 43 An. 961.
    Public, as the word appears in Art. 56 of the Constitution, means of a public character. The context of the article shows that the convention considered the municipalites and parishes political corporations.
    Act 165 of 1894 does not conflict with Art. 56 in the inhibition under consideration as to the granting of public funds, because that provision does not affect, as grantees, such political corporations as municipalities. Fisher vs. Auditor, 39 An. 452.
    Courts will not hold laws unconstitutional and declare the acts of the Legislature void where any doubts exist. The opposition between the Constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of the incompatibility with each other. Nor will a constitutional prohibition be extended or enlarged by construction. 39 An. 452; 6 Oranch, 128; 45 An. 935.
    Great respect is entertained by the courts for legislative conclusions, Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 4 Ed., 199.
    The funds which the municipalities are to receive under the provisions of Act 165 of 1894 are virtually the town’s own funds, being collected from within its limits, in excess of the parish needs, and, being the town’s own funds, are not affected by Art. 56. Planting Company vs. Tax Collector, 39 An. 459; 45 An. 1235.
    The revenues of parishes and municipalities, whether taxes or licenses, are subject to legislative control. Tiedeman’s Municipal Corporations, Chap. 2, Sec. 12.
    In all matters, not prohibited by the Constitution, the General Assembly is supreme. 46 An. 844.
    Act 165 of 1894 does not conflict with Art. 202 of the Constitution, because it does not require parishes to levy taxes for anything but parish purposes. It requires that the parishes shall not levy licenses which, with the taxes, shall be in excess of the needs of the parishes arising from or on account of the towns. The parish keeps whatever excess of taxes there may be.
    Nor does the act conflict with Art. 204 of the Oonstitution, for the funds, whether they may be used and expended by the parishes or municipalities, are used and expended for governmental purposes. Both of these political subdivisions are component parts of the State, exercising powers delegated to them by the State.
    It is respectfully submitted that the controlling idea pervading Act 165 of 1894 should prevail when the test of Art. 202 of our Constitution is applied to it, and, for the reasons we have given, the act should be declared constitutional.
    Where there are no vested rights or bonded indebtedness involved, parish revenues arising out of the exercise of the taxing power under the granted authority of the General Assembly are subject to legislative control. This control of the alimony is specially recognized in Art. 202 of the Oonstitution, and is in accord with our American system of government. 42 An. 98; Tiedeman’s Municipal Corporations, Chap. 1, Sec. 12; Dillon’s Municipal Corporations, Chap. 1, Sec. 88, et seq.
    
    
      J. JP. Pierson and Lee & IAverman for Appellees:
    Public corporations have the right to plead the invalidity and unconstitutionality of legislative enactment divesting their alimony, and to have their contention determined by the courts. 42 An. 92.
    Legislative control over a parish is not so absolute that it may not be controlled and restrained by organic law. Legislative limitations imposed by constitutional provision can not be overleaped. Ibid.
    
    Parishes, cities are civil divisions coeval with the State, permanent elements of its frame of government, durable and indestructible, except by organic provision, and though in a great degree subject to legislative control, the State is but the aggregate of these bodies. 15 N. Y. 561.
    The city of New Orleans is a municipal corporation with inherent powers of existence for purposes of its creation, and can not be blotted out of life nor rights of its citizens diverted. 42 An. 100.
    Parishes or civil divisions of the State are the American system of complete decentralization in the vital idea that local affairs shal be managed by local authority, and general affairs only by central power. Cooley’s Const. Lim., 4 Ed. (1878), 228, 229.
    They possess two classes of powers and rights — public and private. In the one it is the State’s agent and subject to its control; in the other, it is the agent for the local inhabitants with the character of individuals, and not subject to absolute legislative control in its right to acquire and dispose of its property, sue and be sued, like private corporations or persons not sui juris, as minors and married women. It may own property which is not under legislative control while the parish exists. N. O., M. & O. R. R. vs. City of New Orleans, 26 An. 478.
    As to their civil, political or governmental powers in their character as governmental agencies, legislative control of parishes is supreme, except as limited by constitutional provision, but in their proprietary or private character they'are a distinct legal personality in their property and contract rights and regard quo ad hoc a private corporation. Dillon Mun. Corp., Sec. 39, p. 151, Ed. 1873. Admitting complete legislative control over parishes (except as limited by constitution), yet some limits exist as to this; some are expressly defined, others spring from usage, customs and maxims of our people, which are part of the State’s history, in view of the perpetuity of which all constitutions are framed, and of which people’s right thereto can not be deprived except by express renunciation. Oooley Const. Lim. 281, Ed. 1878.
    Local community has the right to fix their local burdens as to which legislative control must be limited to control only their civil, political and governmental powers. Cooley Const. Lim., 282.
    The four rules drawn from all the conflicting adjudications in different States on this subject, stated Ibid, 283, ef seq. See Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 694; 26 An. 478.
    Under third rule no legislative power exists to compel contracts for local purposes, or to assume obligations, outside their governmental functions. These must be left to local discretion to determine in local interest. Legislature may authorize but can not compel action as to such local matters. Cooley Const. Lim., 284, 285, Note 1, p. 285.
    Act No. 165 of 1894 is invalid and unconstitutional on the grounds, and for reasons:
    It infringes Art. 29, Const. 1879, in that it embraces more than one object, and embraces objects not stated in its title. 38 An. 626 ; 33 An. 63; 21 An. 480; 5 An. 93; 25 An. 598; 13 An. 434.
    It infringes the taxing powers of the parishes conferred by Art. 202, “ for parish purposes,” by diverting such taxes to other persons and uses, in derogation of the parish’s power to tax “ for parish purposes.”
    It infringes organic prerogatives of the parishes by conversion of their alimony, and bestows it upon cities and towns not in aid of any declared public purpose or use. It imposes obligations upon parishes without consideration in relation to matters not within legislative control, but which belong exclusively to the local powers and authorities. Oole vs. LaGrange, 113 U. S. 6.
    Legislative enactment can not assume judicial function nor exercise judicial powers by determining the rights of parties. State ex rel. McCurdy vs. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664, and authorities there discussed. 9 Am. Rep. 622.
    
      “ It certainly must be admitted that by the principles of every free government, and by our Oonstitution in particular, it is not in the power of the Legislature to create a debt from one person to another, or from one corporation to another, without the consent, express or implied, of the party to be charged.” Oounty of Hampshire vs. Oounty of Franklin, 16 Mass. 76; Atkins vs. Town of Randolph, 31 Vt. 226; Taylor vs. Porter, 4 Hill, 143; State vs. Tappan, 9 Am. Rep. 622 (29 Wis. 664).
    It contravenes the prohibitions in Art. 56 of the Oonstitutton, in that the act aims to “ grant ” the “ funds ” of a political corporation — the parish — toa “public corporation” — the city or town — in violation of the constitutional prohibition. It is in violation also of the prohibition: “nor shall the State undertake to carry on the business of any such corporation,” in Art. 56.
    In parishes with cities and towns reaping the benefit flowing from the act, the uniformity and ratable equality of the taxing powers of the parish over its citizens are destroyed by lessening the burdens of parish taxation on such urban citizens whilst increasing those burdens on all other citizens.
    
      Argued and submitted, May 9, 1895.
    Opinion handed down, June 3, 1895.
    Rehearing refused, June 29, 1895.
    By Act No. 165 of 1894 of the General Assembly of Louisiana it is made the duty of the police jury, on the demand of the mayor, or any other person authorized by the council of any incorporated city or town in this State, made to the police juries of their respective parishes, at its first meeting of each year, to advise its collector and treasurer of such demand, and instruct them that all the taxes, licenses and other moneys collected by the parish on all properties, business, trades, professions and occupations, situated or carried on within said city or town, shall be kept separate from all other funds, and not paid out except as provided in said act.
    Section 4 of said act provides that the clerk of the District Court and the sheriff of the parish shall keep a record of the criminal expenses occurring through their respective offices, on account of said city or town so applying to the police jury as aforesaid.
    • That according to the provisions of said act the magistrates and constables in the city or town so applying to the police jury of their parish are required to keep a separate account of the criminal ex-penses occurring through their respective offices on account of said city or town, and that the clerk of the police jury is also required to keep a separate account of the amounts paid out by the police jury, and also a pro rata of expenses of the city or town for building, maintaining and repairing the jail and court house belonging to the parish, which pro rata is to be fixed by the police jury.
    That in obediance to said act, and with the intention of availing themselves of its provisions in their favor, the relators demanded, through O. O. Egan, a member of the town council of Mansfield, of the police jury of De Soto, at their first meeting on January V, 1895, that the several officers specified in said act should be required to keep a separate account of the licenses, taxes and other moneys collected by the parish, on all properties, business, trades, occupations and professions, situated or carried on in the town of Mansfield during the year 1895, and also to keep a record of the several expenses of said town, as provided in said act, but that the said police jury refused to comply with this demand. That by the provision of said act, after paying the criminal and other expenses enumerated therein, which are occasioned by the town of Mansfield, out of the taxes collected on said town, and paying the balance, if any, out of the licenses on said town, (hat they are entitled to the remainder of said licenses. That the amount which the town of Mansfield would receive from the licenses thus given them by said act would be-twelve hundred dollars.
    They ask for a mandamus, directing and commanding said police-jury to comply with the provisions of said Act No. 165, and directing them to require the collector and treasurer and other officers therein named, to keep a separate record of the taxes, licenses and other moneys collected in said town, and a record of the expenses of said town as is therein specified.
    The police jury, for answer, averred that Act No. 165 of 1894 could not be enforced for the reason (1) that the title to the act embraces more than one object; (2) because said act is in direct conflict with the Constitution of the State, as set forth in Arts. 56, 202 and 204 of said Constitution.
    The District Court was of the opinion that the act in'question was not violative of either Arts. 29 or 56 of the Constitution, but that it was contrary to the provisions of Art. 202. So holding, the prayer for the mandamus was refused, and judgment was rendered, setting aside the alternative writ, and discharging the defendants.
    Relators appealed.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Nicholls, C. J.

The act, the enforcement of which is asked in this proceeding, is entitled: “An act giving the right to incorporated cities or towns of the State, to demand from the police juries of their respective parishes, the licenses collected annually by the parishes from the cities and towns on all business, trades, professions and occupations carried on within said cities and towns, less the criminal expenses and the school expenses, and all other expenses paid out by the parishes, on account of said cities or towns, and providing that the taxes collected by the parishes on the properties situated in the cities and towns be first exhausted in paying these expenses, and providing how these expenses are to be ascertained.”

By the first section, it is enacted that the incorporated cities and towns of the State, through their mayor or any other person authorized by their council, shall have the right to demand and have paid over to them, by the police juries of their respective parishes, all the licenses collected annually by the parishes on all businesses, trades, professions and occupations carried on within said cities or towns, less the criminal and public school expenses, and all other expenses paid out by the parishes on account of the cities and towns.

The second section provides that each city or town taking advantage of the act shall be required to defray all expenses occurring from and growing out of the prosecution of crimes, offences and misdemeanors committed within its corporate limits, also all expenses for running, conducting and maintaining the public schools in its corporate limits, and all other expenses paid out by the parish on account of the cities or towns.

The third section provides that the city or town wishing to take advantage of the act, shall apply through its mayor, or any person authorized by its council for that purpose, to the police jury of the parish, at its first meeting of each year, and the police jury shall grant the demand, and shall, at that meeting, advise its collector and treasurer of the demand; instruct them that all taxes, licenses and other moneys collected by the parish on all properties, businesses, trades, professions, occupations, situated or carried on within said cities or towns, shall be kept separate from all other funds, and not paid out, except as provided in the act.

The fourth section provides: “That the clerk of the District Court of the parish shall keep a record of the expenses occurring through his office to the parish on account of the city or town', and the sheriff of the parish shall keep a record of such expenses occurring through his office. The. president of the school board shall keep a record of the expenses for running, conducting and maintaining the public schools of the city or town.

The fifth section makes it the duty of the collector of the parish to present to the police jury, at its second meeting of the succeeding •year, a statement, certified to by the treasurer, of the amount of taxes, licenses and other moneys collected by him on all properties, business, trades, professions and occupations, situated or carried on within the limits of the city or town for the preceeding year, and the police jury shall order a warrant drawn on the treasurer of the parish in favor of the mayor of the city or town for the amount of the licenses collected by the parish as aforesaid, less the collector’s and treasurer’s percentage on same, which shall be the same as that of the State and parish, and less the amounts of criminal and public school expenses, and all other expenses paid out by the parish on account of said city or town for that year. It directs that the criminal expenses shall be based upon the statement of the clerk of the court, and of the sheriff, made in writing under oath, and that the public school expenses be based upon a statement made in writing under oath by the president of the school board of the parish. The section contains a proviso that all expenses of whatever nature paid out by the parish on account of the city or town taking advantage of this act shall be paid out of the taxes collected on properties situated in said city or town,, and if these amounts be not sufficient, then the license fund collected from city or town, or a sufficient amount thereof, is to be taken to make up the deficiency, and the balance of the licenses is to be paid over to the city or town, provided that any surplus remaining from the taxes, and other moneys other than licenses collected by the parish from the cities or towns shall be used by the parish as they deem proper.

The sixth section provides, that under the head of criminal expenses, under the act, shall be included the fees and charges of the magistrates and constables and other expenses growing out of and attending the prosecution before magistrates of crimes, offenses and misdemeanors, committed within the corporate limits of said city or town, and makes it the duty of the magistrates and constables to keep a separate account of the amounts paid out by the police jury for such services, and on account of all other expenses not before provided for, which should be paid out by the parish on account of the city or town. It also provides that under the head of criminal expenses, shall be included a pro rata of expenses of the cities and towns for building, maintaining and repairing the jails and courthouses belonging to the parish, the pro rata to be fixed by the police juries.

The seventh section declares that if the amounts collected by the parish from the city or town are not sufficient to pay the criminal, public school expenses, and other expenses of the city or town paid out by the parish, the parish would have the right to refuse to grant the city or town the privilege granted under the act for another year, and to. continue to so refuse, until it had been shown by the city or town, to the satisfaction of the police jury, that the taxes, licenses and other moneys-collected by the parish from the city or town on account of accumulation of property and moneys, or otherwise, are sufficient, provided that no parish shall have the right to refuse any city or town applying under the act, until, by an actual test under it of one year, it is shown that the expenses of the city or town to the parish are more than the taxes, licenses and other moneys collected by the parish from the city or town.

It will be seen from an examination of this act that the Legislature has attempted to provide for the opening of a credit and debit account between the towns and the parishes in the parishes in which there are incorporated towns. The towns are to be credited with all moneys arising from taxation upon properties within their limits, and also with the amount of all licenses imposed by the parish which are found to come from persons doing business within the different corporations, and they are to be debited with all amounts paid out by the parish on account of matters from which the towns are supposed to have been directly benefited, or for which they are supposed to be specially responsible.

The moneys standing to the credit of the towns are ordered to be separated from the balance of the moneys in the parish treasury, and the debits with which the towns are to be charged are directed to be ascertained by a complicated system of accounts to be kept by different State and parish officers, and reported to the police jury.

It will be observed that the statute does not contemplate that any portion of the taxes derived from the town properties should ever be turned over to the towns. They are to be applied primarily to the payment of the claims which the Legislature seems to have selected as those for which towns are peculiarly and equitably chargeable, and they are to be freed and to be made applicable for any purpose to which the police jury might see fit to turn them when it is found that there is a surplus over and above the payment of such claims. The moneys, however, drawn from licenses from "persons living within the towns are, under no circumstances, to be applied to general parish purposes, but they are to be held as a sort of reserve fund to make good any deficit which might be found to exist by reason of the taxes from the town being insufficient to meet ' the legal demand upon it from the separate tax fund. If no such deficit is found to exist, then the whole amount drawn from licenses paid by the townspeople is to be paid over to the town without designation as to the purposes for which it is to be subsequently used.

This case has been ably presented on both sides, but the arguments have taken a much wider range than the determination of the issue involved requires. We have to be controlled by the special provisions of our own Constitution, and reasoning drawn from the general relations which the State, the parishes and the cities bear to each other in other jurisdictions furnish us little assistance.

Article 202 of the Constitution declares that the taxing power may be exercised by the General Assembly for State purposes, and by parishes and municipal corporations, under authority granted to them by the General Assembly, for parish and municipal purposes.

Article 206 declares that the General Assembly may levy a license tax, and in such case shall graduate the amount of such tax to be collected from the persons pursuing the several trades, professions, vocations and callings. * * * No political corporation shall im - pose a greater license tax than is imposed by the General Assembly for State purposes.

The District Judge, in rendering his opinion, said: “The only question under this article (202) would seem to be whether the grant of power to the parishes and municipal corporations, for parish and municipal purposes means that they can exercise this power for each other and each for itself. Oan the parishes exercise the taxing power for municipal purposes and municipal corporations exercise it for parish purposes? Such, I think, was not the intention of the framers of the organic law. It is such an extraordinary proposition that each could be authorized by the General Assembly to exercise the taxing power for the benefit of the other, that such a conclusion could only be reached when supported by'a plain and unambiguous provision of the Oonstitntion. It seems to the court that the contrary is the plain meaning of the article above quoted, and that the Legislature is without warrant or right, under the Oonstitution, to require or authorize the police jury to exercise the taxing power for the use of municipal corporations of the parish as is evidently the purpose and effect oi this Act, No. 165, under discussion. The taxing power is a most important one, and should be guardedly kept within the Constitutional limitations, and perhaps one of the best protections, both to the public service on the one hand, and to the taxpayer on the on the other, is the rule firmly imbedded in our constitutions for many years, that the same power should impose the tax and control its expenditure.”

We agree in opinion with the District Judge that the framers of the Constitution intended to keep separate and distinct the taxing power of the State, that of the parishes and that of the municipal corporations; that they never intended, in declaring that this power should be exercised by the parishes and municipal corporations “ under authority granted to them by the General Assembly,” that this authority should extend to empowering either of them to do so for purposes other than those in which each was directly concerned. It is easy to see that through this act the taxing power of the towns could be supplemented by that of the parishes for town purposes.

But we fail to see the authority under and by which the General Assembly can, after the parishes, in the exercise within constitutional limits of their taxing power, have acted for parish purposes, step in and apply the moneys arising from this legal exercise of their rights to purposes other than those which, in the opinion of the parish authorities, made the levy of the taxes and the imposition of the licenses necessary — taxes and licenses which they never would have levied or imposed — if they were to be forcedly taken away from them under orders of the General Assembly. When the police jury exercises its authority to impose licenses through the parish, it necessarily does so by ordinances general in their character, necessarily taking in people within as well as without the towns — its purpose is to utilize the moneys for general parish purposes — and it is difficult to see by what authority it can be prevented from doing so by an arbitrary order from the Legislature that a particular portion of the fund should be devoted exclusively to the interests of one particular portion of the parish, and then only in a certain contingency, which not happen ing, the moneys are not to be held in the parish treasury for other parish purposes, nor to be returned to the parties who paid the licenses, but to be turned over to the towns, who in the meantime may have exercised their power of taxing and licensing their own inhabitants up to the full constitutional limit.

Oounsel for the parish say very pertinently: “The Legislature, under the Art. 202, is restricted to the power to authorize only. The article confers the taxing power on the parishes ‘ for parish purposes ’ just as effectually as it does the power in the Legislature for ‘State purposes,’ except only that the parish must exercise it under authority from the General Assembly. The Legislature is given no power itself to levy taxes for parish purposes, for that power is lodged by the article in the parish.

“It results that the parish must possess, in the power to tax, the same discretionary power over the subject as to the amount of the tax it will levy within the constitutional limit, and as to what are parish purposes, as that exercised by the Legislature in its power to tax for State purposes. Where the Legislature authorizes the parishes to exercise the taxing power to the full limit of the constitutional power conferred, then, necessarily, the exercise of that power in the parishes must reside in the parochial authorities exercising the parish power, to be exercised by them to meet the parish necessities of maintenance and sustenance. And these parochial authorities are only restricted in the exercise of the taxing power by constitutional limitations and legislative authorization, and within those limits it is solely a matter of parochial discretion to judge of the amount of the parish expenses and obligations- they are required to meet by the exercise of the taxing power, and also to judge of what are parish purposes which they are required to meet under their taxing powers. These prerogatives of discretion in the authoiity to which the State has delegaced the use of her taxing powers are inherent and necessary to the exercise of the power delegated.

“The immediate effect of the act is to take off the alimony provided for the support and subsistence of parochial institutions, to confer it upon towns and cities which are alike provided for, under Art. 202 of the Constitution; are endowed with the same powers of taxation for their purposes which are given to the parishes for parochial purposes. Alimony is apportioned to each class to be derived from the power, uniformly, equally and ratably to tax the citizens and property within the respective borders of each, under a system of fundamental principles inherent to American constitutional law, that local affairs shall be governed by the local authorities, and that the burdens of government shall be borne uniformily, equally and ratably throughout the territorial limits of the governing powers. We have been unable to reconcile the aims, objects or effects of Act No. 165 with the great underlying principles of our form of government or with the restriction or prohibition of the present Constitution.”

We are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from is correct, and it is hereby affirmed.  