
    Douglas JAMES, AKA Monsho Abdullah, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jimmy CRUZEN, Correctional Officer; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 17-16008
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 18, 2017 
    
    Filed December 20, 2017
    Douglas James, Pro Se
    Chad Allen Stegeman, Esquire, Attorney, California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, Erin Ganahl, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, AGCA—Office of the Attorney General, Oakland, CA, for Defendants-Appellees
    Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Douglas James, AKA Monsho Abdullah, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action related to congregational prayer. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because James failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted his administrative remedies, or whether there was “something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him,” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (requiring proper exhaustion, which means “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)” (emphasis, citation, and internal 'quotation marks omitted)). James contends that he exhausted under a “continuing violation" theory, but even if this court were to adopt such a theory, it would not apply in this case.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     