
    JIN WU CAO, aka Jinwu Cao, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-3213.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 31, 2013.
    
      Briana F. Isiminger, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Thomas B. Fa-touros, Senior Litigation Counsel; Imran R. Zaidi, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, DENNY CHIN and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Jin Wu Cao, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 31, 2012 decision of the BIA affirming the February 10, 2011 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jin Wu Cao, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jul. 31, 2012), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 10, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the decision of the IJ as modified and supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

Under the REAL ID Act, which applies to this case, “[t]he testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if ... the applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts.... In determining whether the applicant has met [his] burden, the trier of fact may weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of record.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(C). In addition, the agency may require corroboration despite otherwise credible testimony. See Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir.2009); see also Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 252-54 (2d Cir.2011) (per curiam).

To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant like Cao, who did not suffer past persecution, must demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. He must show that he subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir.2006). An asylum applicant can demonstrate that a fear of future persecution is objectively reasonable either: (1) by offering evidence that “he or she would be singled out individually for persecution”; or (2) by proving the existence of a “pattern or practice” in his or her country of nationality of “persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(2), 1208.16(b)(2).

Here, Cao, though credible, failed to establish an objectively reasonable basis for fearing future persecution on account of his religious practice in an unregistered church. Kyaw Zwar Tun, 445 F.3d at 564. Cao’s credible testimony and evidence failed to establish that he would be individually singled out for persecution. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.12(b)(2), 1208.16(b)(2). Cao alleged that he continued to practice his Christian faith in the United States, and as evidence of this he offered a letter from his church and a statement from his aunt. Because the evidence confirmed only three months of church attendance and did not confirm his baptism, however, the agency reasonably concluded that this evidence was insufficient to demonstrate an individualized fear of future persecution. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that determining what weight to afford to an applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings “lies largely within the discretion” of the agency (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In addition, Cao failed to establish that there is a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly situated persons in China. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(2), 1208.16(b)(2); Kyaw Zwar Tun, 445 F.3d at 564. Although the State Department reports submitted as evidence of country conditions advised that Chinese authorities had arrested and detained members of underground churches, the reports also noted that the treatment of unregistered churches varied widely from region to region. In light of these reports of disparate treatment, the agency did not err by requiring Cao to demonstrate that Chinese authorities in his native Fujian Province would persecute him based on his religious practice. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 142, 149 (2d Cir.2008). Thus, the agency did consider Cao’s pattern or practice argument and the evidence he adduced regarding country conditions, but reasonably concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution of house church members in Fujian Province. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that a fear is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”).

Because Cao was unable to establish the objective likelihood of harm needed to make out an asylum claim, he was necessarily unable to meet the higher standard required to succeed on a claim for withholding of removal or CAT relief. See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir.2010).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  