
    David ALEXANDER, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., FKA The Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A., as successor-in-interest to JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, as Trustee, for Pooling and Servicing Agreement for Residential Asset Mortgage Products, Inc., Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2003-SL1-Erroneously Sued As The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A., fka The Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-55069.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 10, 2015.
    
    Filed Feb. 23, 2015.
    Reginald Mason, Esquire, Mason & Associates, Shelly D. McMillan, McMillan & Herrell, Beverly Hills, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Brian S. Edwards, Esquire, Eric D. Houser, Houser & Allison, APC, Irvine, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: KOZINSKI, CHRISTEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

David Alexander appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his claims for quiet title and slander of title pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The appellees’ motion to dismiss this appeal as moot is denied. See Cal.Civ.Proc. Code § 761.020.

2. Alexander acknowledges a valid deed of trust was recorded against the property when he purchased it in 2011. That the subsequent assignment lacked language explicitly transferring an interest in the underlying note does not render the deed of trust invalid. See Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 270 Cal.App.2d 543, 76 Cal.Rptr. 529, 536 (1969) (“[A] deed of trust is inseparable from the debt, ... and an attempt to assign the deed of trust without a transfer of the debt is without effect.”); Shimpones v. Stickney, 219 Cal. 637, 28 P.2d 673, 678 (1934) (“The plaintiff in a quiet title suit is not helped by the weakness of his adversary’s title, but must stand upon the strength of his or her own. The fatal weakness in plaintiffs position is that she ... refused to pay [her debt].”).

3. Because Alexander failed to raise arguments pertaining to the slander of title claim in his opening brief, his challenge to the district court’s dismissal of this claim is deemed waived. See United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir.2005).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . The parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not recount them here.
     