
    Michael Loren SKOOR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James E. TILTON, Acting Secretary, California Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 08-55261.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 6, 2010.
    
    Filed May 6, 2010.
    
      John Owen Lanahan, Law Office of John Lanahan, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Attorney General, Esquire, Lilia Garcia, Esquire, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: SKOPIL, FARRIS and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Michael Skoor, a California state prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Skoor contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to secure discovery to support a claim of prosecutorial discrimination and failed to independently obtain public information of the same nature that could have been presented as mitigating evidence at sentencing. The state appellate court rejected those contentions.

We may not grant relief unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings is clearly established. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prevail on such a claim, a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was both deficient and prejudicial. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

The state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. Skoor’s trial counsel adequately argued the discovery motion and, accordingly, the representation was not deficient. Skoor was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to cite United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), because the trial judge independently identified and applied Armstrong. Counsel’s failure to cite additional cases in support of the request for discovery was not prejudicial because those cases were not analogous to Skoor’s and did not establish a prima facie claim of prosecutorial discrimination. For that same reason, trial counsel’s failure to cite those cases at Skoor’s sentencing was not prejudicial and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9Üi Cir. R. 36-3.
     