
    ALICE C. HAVEN v. ANDREW W. SHAW.
    The day on which the contract declared on was made, must be stated in the declaration, though the precise day may not be material.
    This was an action of assumpsit- for .breach of promise of marriage. The declaration contained four counts. The promise was laid, in the first count, on the first of January, 1851 ; in the second count, on the first of March ; and in the third count, on the first of February, in the same year. In the fourth count; the promise was alleged to have been made “ on the day and year aforesaid.” Special demurrer to the fourth count, because no time was therein specified when the alleged promise was made.
    
      Vroom, for defendant, in support of the demurrer; Hamilton, contra.
    Before the Chief Justice and Justices Nevius and Ogden.
   By the Court.

Every material traversable fact must be alleged in the declaration with convenient certainty of time and place. The rule applies though the precise day be immaterial. No time is specified when the promise set out in the fourth count was made. “ The day and year aforesaid ” may refer, and is equally applicable to either of several days previously mentioned in the declaration.

Judgment for the demurrant, with leave to the plaintiff.to amend.  