
    The State vs. R. S. Moore. Same vs. Same.
    
      Bastardy — District Court — Jurisdiction.
    Under the Act of September, 1866, establishing District Courts and providing that they should “have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases of bastardy arising- -within’' their respective districts: — Held, that Court had jurisdiction of a prosecution for bastardy commenced in 1867, though the child was born before the Act was passed.
    IN THE DISTRICT COURT, YORK, JULY TERM, 1867.
    These were prosecutions for bastardy. In one ease the child was born 5th February, 1863, and the warrant was issued 5th April, 1867. In the other case, the child was born 29th December, 1865, and the warrant was issued 18th January, 1867.
    The Act of September, 1866, p. 388, establishing District Courts, provides that “ the District Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases of bastardy arising within” the district in which it is established, and this was a plea in each case to the jurisdiction, on the ground that as the offence was committed before September, 1866, it was not within the terms of the Act.
    The District Judge overruled the pleas and defendant appealed.
    
      Gr. IF. Williams & Son, for appellant.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

. Wardlaw, A. J.

The offences were committed before the establishment of the District Courts, but the prosecutions have been commenced since. The cases of the State vs. Walker, the State vs. Quick, and the State vs. Garner, heretofore decided in this Court, show that the Superior Court is not ousted of jurisdiction in cases of misdemeanor, bastardy, &c, which arose before the District Court Act of September, 1866, (13 Stat. 388, § 6, see also, Act December, 1866, 13 Stat. 494, § 11,) but that of such cases as arose .after that Act of September, the District Court has exclusive jurisdiction. ' When did the cases now in hand arise ? The warrants were issued in 1867, and no prior proceedings had taken place. The cases then did not arise before 1867, for before that time there was no action, suit, proceeding, or accusation which could constitute a case.

There is no just objection to the establishment of a new ■tribunal for the trial of offences already committed.

The arguments of the District Judge, and the counsel on .the two sides, all submitted in writing to this Court are so full, that it is unnecessary to enter further into the questions of this case.

The motion is dismissed.

DüNKIN, C. J., and Ikglis, A. J., concurred.

Motion dismissed.  