
    John Patrick FLETCHER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jason LENGERICH, BVCF Warden; The Attorney General of the State of Colorado, Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 17-1288
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    Filed November 13, 2017
    (D.C. No. 1:17-CV-01022-LTB) (D. Colorado)
    John Patrick Fletcher, Pro Se
    Christine Cates Brady, Esq., Office of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center, Denver, CO, for Respondents-Ap-pellees
    Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Bobby R. Baldock, United States Circuit Judge

Petitioner John Patrick Fletcher, a Colorado state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certifícate of appealability (OOA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). In a written order, the district court denied .the motion as time-barred under § 2244(d)(1). Because Petitioner has not shown “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling,” we summarily deny Petitioner a COA and dismiss his .appeal. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000).

We need not detail Petitioner’s arguments challenging application of § 2244(d)(l)’s one-year limitation period to his petition. Suffice to say we have carefully reviewed his “Combined Opening Brief and Application for a Certificate of Appeal-ability,” the record on appeal, and the district court’s written order denying his petition as time-barred. Based on our review, we conclude the district court accurately analyzed the statute of limitations issue and properly dismissed the petition. Where -the district court accurately analyzes an issue and articulates a cogent rationale, we see no useful purpose in writing at length. Thus, we reject Petitioner’s 'argument that his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is timely substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court’s written order which ably explains why Petitioner is not entitled to- a COA. '

COA DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED. Motion for IFP DENIED as moot 
      
       This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
     