
    RIGGS AND PEABODY v. VANDEVER AND SHUEY’S ADMINISTRATOR.
    Appeal by one of several defendants — judgment lien — indulgence—effect of a decree — suppression of truth — superior diligence — equity will not correct the errors of a court of law.
    Where there is a decree against several for different sums, and one appeals from the decree against him, he is not bound to give bail for more than double the amount of the decree against him.
    The lien of a judgment is matter of strict law, a creature of the statute; equity cannot cure its defects.
    Where the lien holder, out of compassion, indulges the defendant until he has lost his lien, equity cannot set it up again.
    Proceedings in chancery, concerning any subject, will not conclude any one not a party to them.
    The omission to notify a lien holder of a contract with the defendant, when there existed no privity between the contractor and him, is not a fraudulent suppression of the truth.
    Where a creditor, by superior diligence, has acquired a legal priority, equity will leave him his advantage.
    Equity will not examine into the errors of judgments at law, or reverse them.
    In Chancery. A bill to set up a lien at law, lost by delay.
    Crane, for the complainants,
    moved to quash the appeal, because the bond was not in double the amount of decree below.
    Stoddard, contra,
    cited 1 O. R. 517.
    
   By the Court.

The decree below was against the administrator of Shuey for the debt, and against Yandever for costs. Yandever appealed, and gave bond in more than double the costs. His appeal was from the decree against him, not from that against the other defendants, in which he had no interest. The motion is overruled.

The cause was then subm te to the Court.

By the Court. The bill claims that the complainants recovered judgment at law against Shuey, in his lifetime, as special bail, and as he was old, they left it to their attorney to indulge him. That the judgment was a lien on land mortgaged to a third person, but no levy was made. That Vandever having a claim upon Shuey, left it with Stoddard to collect, who knew of the complainants’ judgment. Stoddard obtained from Shuey a warrant to confess judgment, with a view to obtain a lien prior to that of the complainants, without Shuey’s knowing what it was, entered the judgment and levied. The complainants applied to Shuey, who said, he did not know what it was he signed, or he would not have signed it. The complainants then applied to the court on that state of facts, in Shuey’s name, to set aside the judgment as fraudulent, but the court on hearing, overruled the motion. That the complainants then brought a certiorari, on the refusal of the Court of Common Pleas to vacate the judgment, and while that was pending, Shuey gave Vandever a release, which was pleaded in the Supreme Court on the certiorari, and a judgment had upon it in his favor. The' complainants then filed a bill against Shuey and his mortgagee, and obtained a decree for a sale of the land, the surplus, if any, to be paid to them. They now seek to charge Vandever with that decree, as if he were a party, and to assert their claim to the surplus of the mortgaged premises, as if their lien had been pursued at law.

The answer of Vandever admits the complainants’ judgment, and that his counsel obtained the warrant, and took the judgment to Shuey, to secure a priority of lien, but denies all fraud, &c. .

There is no evidence of fraud in the case. The lien of a judgment is the creature of' the statute, and is matter of strict law. Equity cannot cure its defects. The generous indulgence of the complainant to the intestate, Shuey, by which he lost his prior lien, gives him no claim to the interference of this Court, when, at law, his acts have given another a legal preference. We cannot take from him, what the law has invested him with. The proceedings in chancery, against the parties to the mortgagee, cannot affect Vandever. He was no party to them, and his levy was before that suit was commenced. We do not see any thing in the conduct of Vandever, but the fair pursuit of his claim. He was not bound to disclose to the plaintiff the course. he was pursuing, to enable him to defeat his object. There was no dealing or privity between them, which required him to disclose, that will make the suppressio veri fraudulent. He has been more diligent than the complainants, and obtained an advantage, which equity will not deprive him of. But this whole matter has been investigated at law, and determined; resort is had to us to reverse the judgment of the court of law. That is not our province. Was the warrant, the judgment and release fraudulent? that was a question at law. No collusion is pretended between Shuey and Vandever, to defraud the complainants. The bill is dismissed at the complainants’ costs.  