
    Daniel Clancey against Daniel I. Robertson.
    hiresanroverseer“ by a special conttfrewarf'lstoie one-fourth part of the crop, and Vrhenthe same is growthnShi’m away without just MtitCSto “ooiwhenhuwas when a wustuuy ^
    This was an action of assumpsit, to recover overseer’s wages. It appeared, in evidence, that © r f. ' 7 the plaintiff and defendant had entered into an . • -i i* *1 agreement, whereby the plaintiff was to live with o 7 */ jt defendant, in his house; the defendant to find - . . one negro» aRd every thing necessary tor iarinthe plaintiff to manage and work in the cr0P? and was to he allowed one-fourth part of the crop; that during the month of June, defendant drove plaintiff off Various pretences were alleged for this conduct; such as that plaintiff had threatened to kill defendant’s negro; that he had beaten a creature; and, among other charges, at late hours the plaintiff had come home, and bringing his daughter, (who resided about a mile off,) and would take her to bed with him. It did appear, that, upon one occasion, the plaintiff’s daughter came home with him; and there being but two rooms in defendant’s house, the girl slept with her father. It also appeared, that his object in bringing her there, was to take her from the place where she resided, being apprehensive that it was not a proper place, at that time, for her to be at, on account of some company that was there. No part of the evidence would justify the inference, that the plaintiff was actuated by any improper motives, in the act of carrying his daughter to the defendant’s house. The circumstance from which guilt was inferred, was, that the plaintiff when charged by the defendant with such conduct, did not deny it; but it also appeared that the plain-tiff was a stranger in the neighbourhood, and that he was afraid of the defendant; from which latter circumstance it was presumable that his silence proceeded more from fear than guilt; besides, he was a poor man, whose support depended on his labour, and hence the probability that he was unwilling to contradict defendant in any of the many charges that he occasionally exhibited against him. It appeared that the plaintiff was attentive to the crop, and it was proved that defendant said he never had a more promising one. The corn was about waist high when plaintiff was turned off. There were between twenty and thirty acres planted in corn, potatoes, and peas. The plaintiff called men to view and value the crop. The defendant would not permit this to be done, unless the plaintiff would take a fourth of the then value, which he refused to do. The Jury, upon the evidence, found a verdict equal to one-fourth of the supposed value when it should be gathered. An appeal is made to this Court for a new trial,-
    1st. Because the plaintiff is entitled to no more than one-fourth of the value of the crop at the time he was turned away.
    2d. Because the evidence of improper conduct on the part of the plaintiff was a sufficient justification for turning him off and the verdict ought to have been for the defendant.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Gantt.

On the first ground, it is thought by the Court here, that on a contract of this kind, where an overseer conducts himself with fidelity, and discharges all his duties as such, it is not competent for the employer to indulge a capricious disposition, and without cause to discharge him from his employment. Where a crop is so far advanced as in this case, it would be peculiarly improper, without any sufficient cause, to send the overseer adrift, because at that season of the year it would be almost impossible to meet with employ; and as he was dismissed without any neglect on his part, but, on the contrary, when he was discharging faithfully the trust reposed in him, the Court is of opinion that there is no ground for a new trial on this head, thinking that in such case he is entitled to the full dividend of what might be made.

On the second ground, the evidence, as reported, furnishes no presumption unfavourable to the plaintiff but rather is creditable to him, if his motive was to save the innocence of his daughter; nor can the Court readily conceive, that, situated as the. plaintiff was, and fearful of giving offence to the defendant, he would have perpetrated an act which would so justly have incurred his utmdst displeasure, and which would * have justified the defendant instantly in dismissing him from his house. Upon the whole, the Court can see no reason to disturb the which has been given in the case. The motion is, therefore, dismissed.

Grimké, Colcock, Cheves, JYott, and Johnson, J concurred.  