
    STATE v. RAS TUTTLE.
    (Filed 28 January, 1935.)
    1. Seduction B d—
    In a prosecution for seduction testimony of witnesses that prosecutrix told them she was engaged to defendant is competent in corroboration of prosecutrix’s testimony that defendant promised to marry her.
    2. Criminal Law I e—
    Where testimony is competent as corroborative evidence, the failure of the trial court to so restrict its admission will not be held for error in the absence of a request to that effect by defendant.
    3. Seduction B d — Testimony of prosecutrix as to each essential element of the offense held supported by other evidence in this case.
    In this prosecution for seduction, defendant’s objection to the sufficiency of the evidence on the ground that he could not be convicted on the unsupported testimony of prosecutrix, is not sustained, the testimony of prosecutrix on each essential element of the offense being supported by other testimony, the promise of marriage by testimony of witnesses that prosecutrix told them defendant was going to marry her and by testimony of conversations between prosecutrix and defendant and by the circumstance of their long and constant association, her virtue by evidence of her good character, and the intercourse by defendant’s admission. O. S., 4339.
    4. Criminal I/aw Jj d—
    The requirements of Rule 28, relating to setting out and numbering exceptions and assignments of error with authorities relied on classified under each assignment, and with reference to the printed pages of the transcript, are pointed o-ut.
    Appeal from Clement, J., at April Term, 1934, of Stokes.
    No error.
    The defendant was tried and convicted upon a bill of indictment charging the seduction of an innocent and virtuous woman under promise of marriage, in violation of C. S., 4339. From judgment pronounced upon the verdict the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning errors.
    
      Attorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorney-General Seaiuell for the State.
    
    
      W. Reade Johnson for defendant appellant.
    
   Sci-ieNck, J.

The basis of what appears to be the defendant’s prin-pal exceptive assignments of error is the court’s allowing certain witnesses to testify that the prosecuting witness told them of her engagement to the defendant and of their purpose to be married. These exceptions cannot be sustained. In S. v. Pace, 159 N. C., 462, wherein the defendant was charged under the same statute as is the defendant in this case, it is written: “It is settled that statements to others that the prosecutrix and the defendant were going to be. married are competent for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of the prosecutrix that the defendant had offered and promised to marry her. S. v. Kincaid, 142 N. C., 657; S. v. Whitley, 141 N. C., 823.” Nor was this evidence objectionable because the court did not instruct the jury that it was admitted only for the purpose of corroboration. “. . . Nor.will it be ground for exception that evidence competent for some purpose, but not for all purposes, is admitted generally, unless the appellant asks, at the time of its admission, that its purposes be restricted to the use for which it is competent. S. v. Steele, 190 N. C., 506, 130 S. E., 308; Rule 21, Supreme Court, 200 N. C., 827.” S. v. McKeithan, 203 N. C., 494. The appellant did not ask that the purpose of the evidence be restricted.

The proviso that “the unsupported testimony of the woman shall not be sufficient to convict” is fully met in that the testimony of the prose-cutrix was corroborated in respect to each essential element of the offense charged: as to tbe promise of marriage by evidence of tbe prose-cutrix’ statements to others, and by tbe witness who “beard them talking,” and by tbe further circumstance of tbe long and constant association of tbe defendant with tbe prosecutrix; as to her innocence and virtue by tbe evidence of her good character; and as to tbe intercourse by tbe admission of tbe defendant.

While we have endeavored to ascertain tbe exceptions relied on by tbe defendant, and tbe reasons assigned for such reliance, we call attention to tbe fact that bis brief does not comply with Eule 28 of this Court, 200 N. C., 831, in that it fails to “contain, properly numbered, tbe several grounds of exception and assignment of error with reference to printed pages of transcript, and tbe authorities relied on classified under each assignment; . . .”

On tbe record we find

No error.  