
    Clarke’s Adm’r v. Day.
    May, 1830.
    Judgment of Sister State — Debt on — Nil Debet. — To debt on 1udgments of courts of Kentucky, the plea of nil debet is not a good plea.
    Same — Effect.— Under the provision of const. U. S. art. 4, § 1, judgments of another state of the union, are not to be regarded here as foreign judgments, but have the same effect as j udgments of our own courts.
    Debt by Eitzhugh administrator of Clarke against Day, in the circuit court of Spott-sylvania, for the sums of 694 dollars, 83 dollars 84 cents, 49 dollars 87 cents, and 21 dollars 43 cents, amounting in the aggregate to 849 dollars 9 cents, upon judgments of the circuit court of Jefferson *county in the state of Kentucky and of the court of appeals of that state, recovered by Clarke in his lifetime against Day. And in his declaration, he set forth that Clarke recovered against Day in the circuit court of Jefferson, Kentucky, judgment for the said sum of 694 dollars for damages by him sustained by reason of Day’s non-performance of promises, and the said sum of 49 dollars 87 cents for costs; and that the proceedings in that suit, having been carried by writ of error, sued out by Day, to the court of appeals of Kentucky, the judgment was affirmed, and judgment was moreover given for Clarke, for the said sum of 21 dollars 43 cents for costs, and ten per cent, damages amounting to the said sum of 83 dollars 84 cents; “whereof the said defendant is convicted as by the records and proceedings thereof now remaining in the said circuit court for the county of Jefferson, and the said court of appeals for the state of Kentucky, may more fully and at large appear, which said judgments still remain in full force and effect, not reversed, vacated, annulled, discharged or satisfied; whereby action accrued to the said plaintiff to demand- and have of the said defendant the said several sums of money,” &c.
    Day demurred generally to the declaration, and Fitzhugh joined in the demurrer: And he pleaded, that he did not owe the debt demanded of him or any part thereof, concluding to the country; to which plea Fitzhugh demurred generally, and Day joined in the demurrer.
    Neither the record of the proceedings in Kentucky, nor the laws of that state, ascertaining the court that rendered the judgment to be courts of record, and the legal effects of their judgment in that state, were in any wise made part of the record in this case.
    The circuit court of Spottsylvania held, that the plea of nil debet was sufficient to bar the action, and that the law on the demurrer thereto was for the defendant; and gave judgments for Day accordingly: from which judgment Fitzhugh'appealed to this court.
    *Briggs for the appellant,
    said the plea of nil debet was clearly not a good plea to an action of debt in this state on a judgment of a court of another state in the union. He cited const, ü. S. art. 4, <j 1, Laws IT. S. 1790; 1 cong. 2 sess. ch. 11; 2 Bior. 102; Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481; Hampton v. M’Connel, 3 Wheat. 234.
    Stanard, contra.
    The constitution of the U. States provided, that “full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other sta-te;” and the authorities cited shew, that a judgment of a court of one state is to have the same credit and effect in the courts of every other state, that it has in the state in which it was rendered. This is not controverted. But, in the present case, it does not appear, that the courts of Kentucky which rendered these judgments were courts of record; nor are the laws of Kentucky in any wise made part of this record, so that our courts can judicially know either the character of the courts that rendered the judgments, whether they were courts of record or not, or the legal effect of these judgments, whether or no they are conclusive even in Kentucky, and whether the plea of nil debet would or would not have been a good plea in bar to an action on them there. If the federal courts may judicially take notice of the laws of all the states, their jurisdiction being co-extensive with the union, it does not follow that the state courts may do so too. 'Neither are the records of the proceedings in the courts of Kentucky made part of this record; and for aught that appears, the judgment of the circuit court of Jefferson, Kentucky, may j have been rendered in the absence of Day, and without his knowing that any such proceeding had been instituted against him; a proceeding, which the laws of some of the states touching foreign attachments are understood to allow. It has never been held that judgments of that kind are conclusive against the absent defendant in his own state, or (it is hoped) even in the state where they are rendered.
    '•'’Briggs, in reply.
    The declaration avers, in effect, that the courts of Kentucky are courts of record: it avers that the proceedings are of record there. Day was certainlj' before the court of appeals of Kentucky, for he carried the case thither by writ of error: he was heard, and the judgment affirmed. For the.rest, the state courts of Virginia are to ascertain the effect of a judgment of Kentucky, exactly as a federal court sitting in another state, or the supreme court of the U. States, would do it.
    
      
      judgments of Sister State — Debt on — Nil Debet. — In Kemp v. Mundell, 9 Heigh 12, it was held that the plea of nil debet is not a good plea to an action of debt on a judgment of another state of the Union. Tucker, F.. in delivering his opinion, said (p. 16): “The plea of nil debet, was, in this case, an improper plea, according to the decision in Clarke's Adm'r v. Day, which we are not disposed to disturb, though I do not acquiesce in some of the reasoning of Judge Coalter in that case." And Brooks. J., said (p. 17): “J entirely concur in the opinion of the president, f did not concur in all the reasoning of Judge Coalter in Clarke's Adm'r v. Day, though 1 did in the conclusion to which he came, and I said no more. 1 then entertained the opinion I do now, — that the judgments of our sister states, under the constitution of the U. States and the acts of congress in pursuance thereof, are to be treated as domestic judgments; and that the effect of such judgments in the state from which they came, is a question of law, not a question of fact as in the case of foreign judgments.” See also, Draper v. Gorman, 8 Leigh 628. 640.
    
    
      
      Same — Effect.— it seems beyond controversy that the validity of the contract upon which a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in a foreign state, is established by the judgment, and the judgment must be given the same credit and effect in this state, in'which it is sought to be enforced, as it had in the state where rendered. Vaught v. Meador, 99 Va. 573, 39 S. E. Rep. 225, citing principal case, to the same effect. See the principal case cited in De Ende v. Wilkinson, 2 Pat. & H. 667; Coleman v. Waters, 13 W. Va. 307; Black v. Smith, 13 W. Va. 793; Draper v. Gorman, 8 Leigh 630, 638, 639; foot-note to Kemp v. Mundell, 9 Leigh 12.
      See further, monographic note on “Judgments” appended to Smith v. Charlton, 7 Gratt. 425.
      Judgments — Interest on. — In Virginia, interest is generally recoverable on a judgment, both at law and in equity. Tazewell v. Saunders, 13 Gratt, 368, citing Beall v. Silver, 2 Rand. 401; Roane v. Drummond, 6 Rand. 182; Clarke v. Day, 2 Leigh 172; Mercer v. Beale, 4 Leigh 189; Laidley v. Merrifleld, 7 Leigh 346.
      See further, monographic note on “Judgments” appended to Smith v. Charlton, 7 Gratt. 425.
    
   COALTFR, J.

It was admitted in the argument, that the cases of Mills v. Duryee and Hampton v. M’Connel have correctly decided, that the constitution of the U. States, and the act of congress of 1790, have placed the judgments of the pourts of the other states of the union, when sued on in this state, on the same ground, and to have the same effect, as they would have if sued on in the domestic tribunals of the state where such judgments were obtained.

According to those decisions, a judgment of one state of the union is to be considered in the nature of a domestic judgment in every other state; the tribunals of which are to allow to it the same force and efficacy, which it has in the state where it is pronounced. Whether this broad proposition is subject to anj’ exception, as where the party against whom the judgment has been obtained, has had no notice of the suit, though the judgment may be binding where it is pronounced, is a question, which I wish not at present to decide, or to intimate any opinion concerning, inasmuch as it does not arise in this case.

As the judgments sued on in this case are to have the same effect here as they would have if sued on in Kentucky, it follows, that this court must ascertain what would be the effect of them there. But then the question arises, how this matter of law and usage of another state, is to be ascertained by the courts of this state? It is said, that the federal courts, as well supreme as inferiour, may adjudge the law in such a case, because, considering their relation *to the states, they may be supposed to have judicial knowledge of the laws and usages of all the states; but that in the state courts, notwithstanding the constitution of the CJ. States, and the act of congress of 1790 on this subject, the laws of the other states, in this respect, can only be ascertained as any other matter of fact, and in the way in which foreign laws and usages are usually ascertained. But if such a difference does exist between the two sets of tribunals, in deciding in cases of the lex loci (concerning which I give no opinion) it does not seem to me to have any important bearing on the question before us. It will be conceded, I presume, that but for the provision in the constitution and the act of congress, before referred to, a judgment in the state of Kentucky, when sued on in a federal court of this state, would no more be in the nature of a domestic judgment in that court, than it would be if sued on in a state court: in both, it would be equally a suit of foreign judgment. No question concerning the lex loci arises in the case: it is merely a question of evidence: and although the weight in which it may be entitled, depends on what weight or effect it has in the state where the judgment was pronounced, according to the laws and usages of that state, I cannot see why a different mode of deciding on such a question should prevail in the state and federal courts. The constitution and law having made the states, as it were, domestic to each other, in this respect, as to both tribunals, it would seem to follow, that both tribunals should take cognizance of the case as though founded on a domestic judgment. Indeed, I cannot see under what form of pleading, known to the common law, this matter of law, that is, the efficacy of this judgment as matter of evidence, can be tried as a matter of fact by a jury. The plea of nil debet will not try it. That assumes the matter in dispute, that the judgment is not conclusive; and if issue were taken on that plea, the plaintiff would waive the conclusive effect of his judgment; this he can only assert by a demurrer to the plea, which is an issue of law, and must be tried by that court. If *the plea of nul tiel record would try it (of which I am not satisfied) still that tenders no issue to the country. And if the defendant should plead, that the court pronouncing the judgment was not a court of record, and that the judgment is not conclusive evidence, that would be no bar to the action; for debt lies on a judgment which is not conclusive evidence. Suffice it, however, to say, that in his case the plea is nil debet, which assumes that the judgment is not conclusive evidence; and the plaintiff, who contends that it is, had no course left for him but to demur. This he has done; and the law arising on this issue must be tried by the court, not by the jury; for it is an issue of law.

The constitution and act of congress, then, having made the states domestic to each other, in regard to this matter, the court of the state must try this issue in the usual way, by informing itself of the law of the state of Kentucky, as the federal courts must do, should there be any doubt about it. In this case, the judgment sued on was affirmed on an appeal to the supreme court of that state; and I presume we can safely say, as the federal court said in a similar case, that such judgment must be conclusive on the parties in that state. I am, therefore, of opinion, that the plea of nil debet was bad, and that the demurrer to it ought to have been sustained. The judgment of the circuit court should be reversed, and judgment entered for the appellant.

BROOKE), P.

As it is unnecessary, I am not inclined, to say more in this case, than to concur in the opinion, that the judgment of the circuit court be reversed, and judgment entered for the appellant.

The other judges concurred.

But after the opinion of the court was announced, Briggs suggested, that it would be necessary to have a writ of inquiry in the case, in order to get interest on the debt. Whereupon, this court entered judgment, that the law upon the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s plea was for the plaintiff; therefore the judgment *of the circuit court was reversed with costs: and the appellant’s counsel suggesting a wish to have a writ of inquiry awarded in the cause, the same was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings to be had therein.  