
    *Pleasants v. Lorton.
    January Term, 1856.
    Richmond.
    Absent, Giiaier. J.. and Tyler, J.
    Appeals- Interlocutory Decree- Statute — An appeal does not lie from an interlocutory decree sustaining exceptions to an answer for insufficiency and requiring a defendant to answer over; and such an appeal was dismissed as improvidently allowed, it not falling within the provisions of the act of April 10, 1831, (Sess. Acts 1830 1, ch. 11, p. 51.)
    Richard Lorton filed a bill in 1844, in the Circuit Court of Richmond, against Samuel Pleasants, alleging that said Pleasants had borrowed of him some time before $500, and had also borrowed from his wife, as his agent, the further sum of $450, either at one time or at different times; that he had no evidence or memorandum of the loans, and could not prove them except by an appeal to the conscience of Pleasants; he, therefore, prayed that he might be required to answer and say on oath what sums of money had been so loaned to him, either by the plaintiff or his wife, and that the amount ascertained to be due might be decreed to him, &c.
    Pleasants answered, denying that the plaintiff had ever loaned him $500, or that his wife had ever loaned him, either at one or at different times, $450. He alleged, that neither of them ever had the ability to do so, and denied that he then owed the plaintiff one cent; but was, on the contrary, his creditor.
    The plaintiff excepted to the answer for failure to respond to the interrogatories as to the amounts which had been loaned to him from time to time, and contended that he was entitled to these answers, and that after *they were obtained, it would depend on the evidence adduced by either party, which way the balance was.
    The court sustained the exception, and ordered the defendant to answer over within thirty days.
    Prom this order Pleasants appealed to this court.
    Lyons, for appellant,
    submitted the case on the petition of appeal.
    No appearance for the appellee.
    
      
      Appeals. — -See monographic note on “Appeals.”
    
    
      
      Incorporated into the Code p. 682, ch. 182, § 2.
      
    
   BIELD, P.

The appeal in this case was allowed from an order of the late Superior Court of Chancery for the city of Richmond, by which an exception taken to the sufficiency of the appellant’s answer to the appellee’s bill was sustained, and the appellant ordered to answer the bill more fully and sufficiently within thirty days next after the date of the said order. The appeal was allowed by a judge of the Supreme Court of Appeals on the 10th of March, 1845. At that time an appeal might be allowed from interlocutory decrees, but only in the cases specified in the act of 10th April, 1831. (Acts of 1830-1, p. 51.) By that act it was provided, “That no appeal shall be allowed from interlocutory decrees or orders in chancery of the Circuit Superior Courts of Law and Chancery, to the Court of Appeals, unless by such decree, or order, money shall be required to be paid, or the possession or title of property be changed, or the judge or court to whom the petition for appeal shall be preferred, .shall think such appeal proper to settle the principles of the cause, and to avoid expense and delay.” The order from which the appeal was allowed in this case did not require the payment of money, nor did it require any change to be made in the possession or title to property, nor can it be regarded as settling the principles of the cause. A cause can be decided only upon the pleadings, or upon the pleadings and evidence. And hence the principles of the cause cannot be settled until there is an issue, either of fact or law, or the bill is taken for confessed. The tendency *of the order in this case, was to prepare the cause for a decision, so that its principle might be settled, and was in fact tantamount to a declaration on the part of the court, that the principles of the cause would not be decided upon the pleadings as they then stood. Taking this view of the subject, we are of opinion, that the appeal was improvidently allowed, and must, therefore, be dismissed, with costs.

The other judges concurred.  