
    Thomas Greenwood vs. Joseph Ligon.
    
      A. vendor of land who stipulated by his title bond to make the vendee “ a good and perfect deed ” to the land sold, does not discharge his covenant by the execution of a deed good in point of form; but fully to comply with his covenant, he is bound to make a good and perfect title to the land, and to remove any existing incumbrance or protect the vendee against it.
    And it seems, that the failure of the vendor to procure his wife’s relinquishment of dower, would be a breach of the covenant to make “ a good and perfect deedr
    
    Technical rules are not so much to be consulted in the construction of covenants, as the real meaning of the parties, where it can be gathered from the instrument itself; and that construction should be favored which is obviously most just.
    - In error from the Yalabusha circuit .court; Hon. Francis M. Rogers, judge.
    Thomas Greenwood sued Joseph Ligón in debt upon the latter’s bond, conditioned in the penalty of sixteen thousand dollars, “ to make to the said Thomas Greenwood, his heirs, &c. a good and perfect, deed” to the lands described in the bond. The defendant plead, 1. That the plaintiff had not demanded a deed ; 2. The defendant’s readiness and willingness to make a deed, and the plaintiff’s refusal to receive it; 3. The execution and delivery of a deed to'the plaintiff, which the latter then had; 4. The defendant’s readiness to make a deed, and the tender of one with his plea ; 5. That under the condition of the bond, it was the plaintiff’s duty to tender a deed to defendant, to execute, which he had never done. The plaintiff replied, traversing the pleas. On the trial it was admitted, that the defendant was a married man, and his wife had not joined in the deed he had tendered to the plaintiff, which was his individual warranty deed ; the plaintiff refused to receive it without such relinquishment, and he had never made the effort to procure the relinquishment. The plaintiff tendered him a deed prepared for the wife’s relinquishment; he refused to have it executed. All the purchase-money had been paid.
    The court refused to instruct the jury, 1. That by the expression to make a good and sufficient deed, is meant a deed which conveys good and perfect title to the premises; 2. That if the jury believe the vendor’s wife could be entitled to dower in the land, then for the proper performance of the condition of the bond, the wife of the obligor should join in the deed, and a refusal to execute such a deed jointly with his wife, would be a breach of the covenant.
    The jury found for the defendant, and the plaintiff sued out this writ of error.
    
      Sheppard, for plaintiff in error,
    contended, that the words “ a good and sufficient deed,” meant not merely one good in form, but one that conveyed a good title, date v. Robison, 2 John. R. 595 ; Judson v. Wass, 11 lb. 527; Carpenter v. Bailey, 17 Wend. 247; Jones v. Gardiner, 10 John. R. 268.
    
      Fisher, for defendant in error,
    cited 16 John. R. 268 ; 20 lb. 130 ; 15 Pick. 550.
    
      Acee, for plaintiff in error,
    reviewed the authorities cited by Mr. Fisher, and contended that they were inapplicable. He cited further, Rucker v. Lowther, 6 Leigh, 259; Collins v. McCargo, 6 S. & M. 128.
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion of the court.

There is but a single question presented by this record. Whether a vendor of land is bound by his title-bond, to make the vendee “ a good and perfect deed ” to the land sold, whether a deed good in point of form, is a compliance with the covenant, or whether he is bound to make a good and perfect title to it, and to remove any existing incumbrance upon it, or protect the vendee against it. Or, to come more precisely to this case, whether, if the vendor tendered his own deed, without procuring his wife’s relinquishment of dower, such deed satisfied his covenant.

There is some contrariety in the decisions on this subject, and without going into an elaborate investigation of them, we shall adopt that rule, which most comports with the ends of justice and the intention of the parties. Technical rules are not so much to be consulted, in the construction of covenants, as the real meaning of the parties, where it can be gathered from the instrument itself; and that construction should be favored which is obviously most just. Holloway v. Lacy, 4 Humph. 468; Killian v. Harshaw, 7 Iredell, 498.

In Carpenter v. Bailey, 17 Wend. 247, the court says, “it was the title to the premises which the defendant stipulated for, not a piece of parchment good in form, but waste paper in effect, for the purpose of transferring the title.”

In Gray & Reader v. Darby’s Lessee, Mart. & Yerg. 403, the court said, “ the legislature by the term grant, meant the land covered by the grant, and not merely a paper purporting to be a patent.”

Words are to be taken in that sense, in which they were most probably understood by the person to whom they are addressed, or which is the same in effect, most strongly against the party using them. We cannot doubt, but that the vendee in this case understood by the terms a “ good and perfect deed,” that he was to obtain a good and perfect title for his money, and not merely a right of action on the deed, after the insufficiency of the title had beefi established by suit, and eviction under it. See Liddell v. Sims, decided at this term. 9 S. & M. 596.

The court below refused to give a charge asked by the counsel of the plaintiff, which was in accordance with the principles herein contained. For this refusal, the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.  