
    McBRIDE v. STATE.
    (No. 10011.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    March 24, 1926.)
    1. Criminal law <&wkey;394 — Testimony of officers Intercepting accused while transporting liquor held not inadmissible because failing to report seizure (Pen. Code 1925, art. 692; Codé Cr. Proo. 1925, arts. 4a and 4b).
    In prosecution for transporting intoxicating liquors, testimony of officers intercepting accused with liquor held not rendered inadmissible because they did not report seizure under Penal Code 1925, art. 692; Unlawful Search and Seizure Law (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, arts. 4a and 4b) having no application.
    2. Witnesses <&wkey;337(6) — Cross-examination of one accused of transporting liquor, showing indictment for other violations of liquor laws, held proper to impeach credibility.
    In prosecution for transporting liquor, where accused testified in his own behalf, cross-examination showing that he was under indietment for possessing a still and manufacturing liquor held proper to impeach Ms credibility.
    3. Witnesses &wkey;>360.
    Accused, whose credibility has been impeached by proof of another indictment pending against him, may explain on redirect examination circumstances in connection with such indictment to reinstate credit before jury.
    4. Witnesses <&wkey;>360 — Where' credibility of accused -has been impeached, redirect testimony to reinstate credit may be rebutted.
    Where credibility of accused, testifying in his own behalf, has been impeached by showing of another indictment pending, redirect examination, explaining circumstances of such indictment in order to reinstate credit before jury, may be rebutted.
    Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County; Geo. C. O’Brien, Judge.
    J. A. McBride was convicted for transporting intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Howell & Stephenson, of Beaumont, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., of Austin, and Robt. M. Lyles, Asst. State’s. Atty., of Groesbeck, for the State.
   HAWKINS, J.

Conviction is for transporting intoxicating liquor. Punishment is one year in the penitentiary.

Appellant was coming down a bayou in a row boat towards Beaumont. When intercepted by officers, he threw a sack into the water. The officers recovered it. It contained two and one-half quarts of whisky. Appellant claimed to have purchased the whisky while on his way to Beaumont, and that he intended to use it for medicinal purposes. The jury was pertinently and .correctly instructed that transportation of intoxicating liquor for medicinal purposes was not a violation of the law, and that appellant should be acquitted if such was his purpose. No objection was urged to any portion of the charge. Indeed, it appears to have properly guarded accused’s rights in all respects, and not to be subject to any exception.

Bills of exception 1, 2, and 6 relate'to the same subject, and complain of the reception of the officers’ testimony because they had not made report of the liquor seized, as required by Acts 38th Leg. c. 117 (article 692, P. C. 1925). The omission to make such report did not render the evidence inadmissible. The question is settled against appellant in Austin v. State, 261 S. W. 1035, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 360; Burns v. State, 268 S. W. 950, 99 Tex. Cr. R. 252; Skinner v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 274 S. W. 133. The point in no way involves the “Unlawful Search and Seizure Law” passed by the Thirty-Ninth Legislature, p. 357 (articles 4a and 4b, C. C. P. 1925).

Complaint is made in bill No. 4 because the state elicited from appellant on cross-examination that he was then under indictment for possessing a still, equipment, and mash for manufacturing intoxicating liquor. This charge was in no way connected with the transaction upon which the present prosecution is based. The evidence was admissible as affecting the credibility of accused as a witness, and was properly limited to this purpose by the court. (For collation of authorities, see section 167, Branch’s Ann. Tex. P. C. p. 101).

It is doubtful if bill No. 5 is sufficiently full to authorize its consideration. We gather from it and the record generally that, after appellant had admitted he was then under indictment for another felony, he, on redirect examination, went into great detail explaining the circumstances in connection with such indictment, in order to reinstate his credit before the jury. He had a right to do this. Jackson v. State, 26 S. W. 194, 622, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 286, 47 Am. St. Rep. 30; Tippett v. State, 39 S. W. 120, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 190; Branch’s Ann. Tex. P. C. § 172. The evidence, reception of which is complained of in this .bill, appears to have been in rebuttal of appellant’s explanation. We think the bill shows no error.

The only other bill in the record (No. 3) is without merit.

The judgment is affirmed. 
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