
    Brown vs. The Syracuse and Utica Rail-Road Company.
    An action of ejectment cannot be commenced against a corporation by declaration, but only by summons.
    
    Ejectment. The defendants were a corporation, and the action was commenced by summons served on their president.
    
      H. H. Martin, for the defendants,
    moved to set aside the summons, on the ground that the action should have been commenced by declaration. He cited 2 R. S. 304, § 5.
    
      N. Hill Jun., contra, said
    the statute relied upon by the defendants’ counsel applied only to actions of ejectment against natural persons. By a subsequent provision it is declared that “ the first process for the commencement of a suit against a corporation shall be a summons.” (2 R. S. 458, § 4.) There is no necessary repugnance between the .two provisions, and they should be construed so that both may operate.
   The Chibe Justice

said the action was properly commenced. v

Motion denied,  