
    Hyeonjoo MUNDKOWSKY, (H.M.), Individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a Public Entity; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-56147
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 26, 2017
    
    Filed July 5, 2017
    Hyeonjoo Mundkowsky, Pro Se
    Anita Susan Brenner, Esquire, Leonard E. Torres, Esquire, Law Offices of Torres & Brenner, Pasadena, CA, for Defendants-Appellees County of Los Angeles, Michael Antonovich, Aldo Marin, Deborah Lang, Lisa Whitecrow, Artin Narssiyan, Nancy Bryden, Shannon Saulnier, Patricia Taylor, Angelina Banks . .
    John Tullís, Beach Cowdrey Owen, Oxnard, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Steven Dubin, Hathaway-Sycamores Child and Family
    Kaytee V. Costa, Attorney, Robert L. McKenna, III, Esquire, Attorney, Carroll, Kelly, Trotter, Franzen, McKenna & Peabody, Long Beach, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Paula Kuhlman, Mona Shah, North East Valley Health Corporation (FQHC) Services
    Melinda Cantrall, Thomas Hurrell, Hur-rell Cantrall LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Palmira Anton
    Robert H. Quayle, Esquire, Senior Attorney, Lee H. Roistacher, Attorney, Daley & Heft LLP, Solana Beach, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Stephen Ambrose
    Emahn Counts, Counts Law Firm, PC, Pasadena, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Robert Mundkowsky
    Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed, R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Hyeonjoo Mundkowsky appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 action alleging various federal and state law claims stemming from custody proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1053, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or 12(c)); First Nat'l Bank v. Russell (In re Russell), 76 F.3d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissal based on collatéral estoppel). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Claims 1, 2, and 3 of Mundkowsky’s complaint as barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See In re Russell, 76 F.3d at 244-45 (setting forth elements of collateral estoppel under California law); see also In re Joshua J., 39 Cal.App.4th 984, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 491, 497 (1995) (giving preclusive effect to prior judgment of dependency court).

The district court properly dismissed Claims 4, 6, and 7 of Mundkowsky’s complaint because Mundkowsky failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (plaintiff must plead sufficient factual matter to allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Mundkowsky’s remaining state law claims. See Notrica v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Cty. of San Diego, 925 F.2d 1211, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants should be considered in deciding whether to hear pendant state law claims).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mundkowsky’s applications for entry of default judgment. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth the standard of review and factors for determining whether to enter default judgment).

We do not consider any arguments not specifically and distinctly raised in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     