
    Raja ASHRAF, aka Mohammad Ashraf, aka Mohammad Shafiq, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-2893-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 20, 2011.
    Richard W. Chen, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Jennifer Paisner-Williams, Senior Litigation Counsel; Yedidya Cohen, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, ROGER J. MINER, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Raja Ashraf, a native and citizen of Pakistan, seeks review of a June 18, 2010 order of the BIA affirming the May 29, 2008 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Thomas J. Mulligan, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ashraf, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 18, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immigr. Ct. N.Y. City May 29, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.Bd 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008); Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d 377, 379 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam).

The agency’s adverse credibility finding was based on an accumulation of factors, including Ashrafs demeanor, his return trip to Pakistan, his prior use of a false name during immigration proceedings, and multiple contradictions and inconsistencies in the record. The record supports the inconsistencies noted by the agency, including discrepancies regarding the medical treatment Ashraf underwent after allegedly being detained by the Pakistani government, where he stayed when he returned to Pakistan in 2001, whether the government burned his farm, the circumstances surrounding his sister’s murder, and whether his first wife had passed away. The cumulative effect of these numerous inconsistencies is substantial when measured against the record as a whole. See Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir.2006).

Ashraf explained the inconsistencies in his testimony by claiming that he suffered memory loss as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder. The agency was not required to credit the explanation, as the medical report submitted by Ashraf indicated that he had trouble concentrating and focusing, but did not mention memory loss. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that an agency need not credit an applicant’s explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so).

The IJ’s adverse credibility determination was further buttressed by a finding regarding Ahsraf s demeanor, particularly during Ashrafs testimony about his sister. Ashraf argues that the IJ erred by relying “on his own speculative analysis of [Ashrafs] sobbing to find [his] demeanor incredible.” Pet’r’s Br. 6. However, we give “particular deference” to demeanor findings by an IJ, as the IJ is in the best position to observe a witness and evaluate credibility. See Dong Gao v. BIA 482 F.3d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.2007); Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir.2005). Here, the agency’s adverse credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the form of the numerous inconsistencies in the record, coupled with the IJ’s demeanor finding. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006); Shi Jie Ge v. Holder, 588 F.3d 90, 93-94 (2d Cir.2009). As the only bases for relief depended upon Ashrafs credibility, the adverse credibility determination in this case necessarily precludes asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 155-56 (2d Cir.2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  