
    John Campbell et al. v. Alexander Watson et al.
    A conveyance in trust may be canceled by a decree in equity, so as to bind the interests of all, though the cestuis qui trusts be not made defendants.
    
      This is a suit in chancery reserved from the county of Delaware.
    On August 23, 1816, Samuel P. Campbell, then seized of certain lands in Delaware county, conveyed them to Samuel Campbell,. George Davis, and John Chambers, trustees, etc., to hold upon the-following trusts, viz:
    1. To himself for life.
    2. Remainder to the heirs of his body and their right heirs forever.
    3. Remainder to Robert Campbell for life.
    4. Remainder to the heirs of his body, and their right heirs forever.
    5. Remainder in fee, to the children of Samuel Campbell and Catharine Morton.
    6. And with power in Samuel P. Campbell to charge and jointure of $5,000 upon these lands.
    In 1826, Samuel P. Campbell filed his bill in Delaware common pleas, to set, aside this deed of trust on account of fraud., The-three trustees only were made defendants. In May, 1827, a final decree was passed, finding the fraud, annulling the deed, and directing a reconveyance by the trustees. The deaths of ^'Samuel P. Campbell and Robert Campbell have occurred since the decree, both unmarried and without issue. This bill, is filed by the children of Samuel Campbell and Catharine his wife, formerly Catharine Morton, disclosing the above facts, and demanding the remainder in fee, lastly created by the above deed of trust.
    General demurrer by defendants.
    Wilcox, for demurrant:
    The proceedings in the former case have extinguished the-plaintiff’s interests.
    The trustees and the first tenant in tail were'parties to the decree. The rule is thus laid down in England:
    “ Where real property in question is subject to an entail, it is generally sufficient to make the first person in being, in whom an estate of inheritance is vested, a party with those claiming prior-interests, omitting those who may claim in remainder or reversion after such vested estate of inheritance; and a decree against the person having lhat estate of inheritance will bind those in re» mainder or reversion.” Mit. PI. 174, 231.
    Gifford v. Hart, 1 Sch. & Lef. 386, is a leading case and much in, point. A decree had been taken against the first tenant in tail, under which the lands had been sold by a master. Neither the’ trustees nor any person entitled in remainder, were made parties. The court held the' remainder-men bound. This is the language-of the chancellor:
    “ It has been repeatedly determined, that if there be tenant for-life, remainder to his first son in tail, remainder over, and he is-brought before the court before he has issue, the contingent remainder-men are barred ; this is now considered the settled rule-of courts of equity and of necessity.”
    The same rule is laid down in 2 Jac. & Walk. 133; 1 Atk. 590.
    It seems to be a rule in England that a decree against a. prior tenant in tail binding the lands entailed, can not bo disturbed by a subsequent remainder-man, except on appeal, or by bill of review> The remainder-man seems to be regarded as privy in estate, and therefore, can not sustain an original bill. 1 Sch. & Lef. 386; Mit. Pl. 173, 230, 92, 137.
    This bill, therefore, can not be sustained. The objection well *lies, because the complainants have themselves set forth the decree in their bill.
    W. A. Adams and H. Stanbery, for plaintiffs:
    The principle that a judgment against the first tenant in tail binds the remainder does not apply. Even admitting this was a-direct entailment, and Samuel P. Campbell the first donee in tail, be was not before the court as a party in the attitude to give the principle effect; he was not a party defendant representing or protecting interests in remainder!- It was a suit between trustees- and one of the cestuis que trust; other cestuis que trust, not parties, are not bound.
    They cite Edwards on Parties in Chancery, 161, secs. 48-50; Hopkins v. Bear and Hopkins, 1 Atk. 590; Kirk v. Clark, Rec. Ch. 275; Calverly v. Phillips, 6 Mad. 229; 2 Chitty’s Eq. Dig. 1313, tit. viii; Mit. Eq. Pl. 135, 139, 145, 146.
   Judge Lane

pronounced the opinion of the court:

As Samuel P. Campbell was unmarried at the execution of the deed of trust, the rights created under it consisted, if it took effect, in a legal estate, in fee to the trustees, and a vested equitablo-estate in Samuel P. Campbell, with successive contingent equitable-remainders to the heirs of his body, to Robert Campbell, and the -heirs of his body, and to certain children of Samuel Campbell.

Equitable estates in land are subjected, in courts of equity, to the same rules which govern legal estates in courts of law. 2 Bl. Com. 337; 4 Kent’s Com. 302. The plaintiffs estate created by this deed, being a contingent remainder, depended upon the trustees’ legal fee, and upon the equitable freehold of Samuel P. Campbell, as a particular estate, and it was liable to be defeated by any act which should destroy these estates before the happening ol the contingency. “ Wherever there is an estate for life, and contingent estates depending on it, the tenant for life may not only by death, but by surrender, alienation, and other methods) determine his own estate before the remainder vests, the consequence of which is, he utterly defeats them all.” 2 Bl. Com. 171-A feoffment with lively, in many cases, may work this effect, but the chief instrument is a recovery, whose great value, as a corn-mon assurance, arises from its jiower to defeat ^remainders. The doctrine by which it ojierates is, that a recovery of a judg ment in a real action against a tenant to the precipe seized of the freehold, besides him, all contingent estates depending on his estate, and all vested remainders where owners are made parties by aid prayer. 2 Bl. Com. 171, 362; Co. Lit. 362; 8 Ohio, 106.

A decree operates upon an estate in equity.  