
    *Glasscock v. Smither & Hunt.
    [Wednesday, October 31st, 1798.]
    Will — Personal Property — Revocation.—Will of personal estate revoked by a subsequent will not written or subscribed by the testator; but which was prepared by his directions corrected by him and which he afterwards declared was his last will.
    Same — Probat — Testimony of Draftsman. — [These facts were supported by the testimony of the draftsman; and on his testimony alone, the will was admitted to probat.]
    This was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court, declaring, that a writing purporting to be the last will of George Glasscock deceased, was not in fact his last will: because, ‘ ‘there was produced at ihe same time, another writing, purporting to be the last will and testament of the said deceased; which appeared to have been legally executed.”
    The writing sought to be proved, as the iast will of the deceased, was offered for probat in the District Court on the 6th of September, 1796; and contains' several pecuniary legacies with a devise of all the residue of his estate to his son George. It concludes thus: “This my last will and testament being made this 19th day of October, 1793, I subscribe and thereby acknowledge. So help me God.” But the testator, in fact, never did sign, or subscribe the same.
    The deposition of one witness proves, that the deponent was frequently called on by the decedent to make his will, that at length he made it from notes taken for that purpose; that the decedent had it altered, in several instances (naming them;) that he had it read over a second time with the alterations, and said he was satisfied; that it was his will, and that he had wished it made for a long time before; that the writing produced for probat, is the same will so altered and approved of; and that he did not ask the testator to sign it.
    
      
      Will — Personal Property — Revocation.—The principal case is cited in Dower v. Seeds, 88 W. Va. 141, for the proposition that, formerly a testament or will of personal property could be revoked by a writing not signed by the testator or subscribed by any witnesses. The principal case is cited in this connection in Bates v. Holman, 3 Hen. & M. 515; and explained in Bedford v. Peggy, 6 Band. 336. See Cogbill v. Cogbill, 2 Hen. & M. 467, 510, 522.
    
   PENDLETON, President,

after stating the case delivered the resolution of the Court:

That the will was good as to the personal estate; it being sufficiently proved to pass chattels. That it was a revocation of the former will, as to the personalty; 480 *and ought to have been admitted to record. Consequently, that the District Court erred in rejecting it, and that their judgment was to be reversed.

The judgment was as follows, “The Court is of opinion that the writing aforesaid ought to be established as the last will of the said George Glasscock deceased, notwithstanding the existence of a will legally executed of a prior date, so far as it may concern the devise of chattels, and that the opinion of the said District Court is erroneous. Therefore, it is considered that the same be reversed and annulled, and that the appellant recover against the appellees his costs by him expended in the prosecution of his appeal aforesaid here. And it is ordered that the cause be remanded to the said District, for that Court to admit the will to be recorded; unless the parties shall desire to proceed in the contest, upon other grounds which may be consistent with the opinion of this Court.”  