
    In the Matter of Vanderbilt.
    June 30 and
    July 1
    An endorsement or label, specifying particularly the cause of the attachment, is not necessary, where the writ is issued for a contempt, in disregarding an injunction; for the party attached is not to be bailed by the sheriff, but is to be brought forthwith before the Chancellor, to answer specific charges, who will order him to be bailed to appear, from day to day, until the party complaining has prepared the interrogatories, on which he is to be examined before a master.
    The waters between Staten Island and the Whitehall Landing, in the city of JYew- Yorle, are part of the Bay of JYew- York; and using them. With a steam boat is a violation of an injunction prohibiting the navigating with such boat “ the waters of the Bay of JVew-York, or in the Hudson River, between Staten Island and Powles Hook.”
    
    AN injunction was awarded in the case of John fl. Livz~ngs~om v. .daron Ogdert and Thomas Gibbons, prohibiting the said Gibbons, and his agents and servants, from "navigating with any boat or vessel, propelled by steam or fire, the waters in the Bay of JVew-York, or in the Hudson river, between Staten Island and Powles Hook.”
    
    The injunction was duly served on Vanderbilt, as master of the steam boat Bellona, belonging to Gibbons, and on several of the persons employed in her. On the 21st of June, Hoffinan, the counsel for J. R. Livingston, moved for an attachment "against Vanderbilt, and against John Frost, and John Berbank, on the following affidavits :
    1. The affidavit of William Wood, stating, that the Bellona arrived on Sunday, the 20th of June, at the city of JVew- York, with passengers taken on board at JVew-Rrunswick and Elizabethtown Point, in JVew-Jersey, and from the wharf of H. D. Tompkins, at Staten Island. That the passengers were landed at the Whitehall wharf, near the battery, and that the said Gibbons came in the boat to JVewYork.
    
    
      2. The affidavit of John Carleton, stating, that on the 20th of June, he saw the Bellona, while on her passage from j v * w New-Brunswick, stop at Elizabethtown Point, and take in passengers for New-York. That she sailed in company with .the Olive Branch. That she stopped at the wharf of D. É. Tompkins, on Staten Island, and there took in other passengers, and carried the same to, and landed them and the other passengers in, Neiv-York. That the boat, on the same day, received passengers at New-York, and transported them to Staten Island, and again, on the same day, took in other passengers from Staten Island, and landed them in New-York, and took in other passengers at New-York, and transported them to Staten Island and Elizabethtown Point. That Cornelius Vanderbilt was captain of the boat, and John Frost, engineer, and John Berbank, pilot, during the period aforesaid. That Gibbons came in the boat, on that • day, to New-York.
    
    The attachment was issued, in the first instance, without a previous rule to show cause.
    On this day, Cornelius Vanderbilt was brought before the Chancellor, at his dwelling house in Albany, by the sheriff of New-York, under the above process.
    
      Van Vechten and Henry,
    
    in behalf of the prisoner, moved; for his discharge: 1. Because, the attachment being general in the body of it, did not specify the nature or cause of the contempt, and had no endorsement or label in which the suit or cause of the attachment was • particularly stated. The words of the attachment were, that the sheriff “ attach, &c. so as to have the party before the court forthwith, to answer touching a certain contempt alleged to have been committed.” *
    2. Because, the prohibition in the injunction only extended to the waters between Staten lslp/nd and Bowles Hook,, and not to the navigation charged.
    
      
      Bleecker and Sedgwick, contra.
    
      
       Vide ante, p. 48
    
   The Chancellob.

In the case of ordinary contempts, where an attachment is used to enforce appearance, or an answer, the body of the process is still general, as in this case, but the suit and the cause of the attachment are endorsed on the writ, or appear in a label annexed, so that the party may at once comply, without application to the Court. (Hinde's Pr. 102, 103. 1 Fowler's Ex. Pr. 12S.) But for extraordinary contempts, or wilful and direct violations of the process and powers of the court, where it is necessary that the party should be brought forthwith before the court, and is not to be bailed, there is no need or usé of a label designating the case. The sheriff is not required to take bail upon attachment from Chancery. The case is not within the statute. It is settled at law (Str. 479. Anon. 2 Saund. 59. b. note 3.) that the sheriff cannot take bail on an attachment, though a judge at chambers may. In Chancery there is still less necessity for bail, as the court is always open, and the party may be brought in, at any time. The sheriff, on an attachment from Chancery, ought to bring the party into court without delay, and so it was understood in the case of Studd v. Acton, (1 H. Black. Rep. 468.) where it was decided by the C. B., after argument upon demurrer, that the sheriff was not required to take bail under process of attachment from Chancery, though it had been the usage to take bail in forty shillings. (Danby v. Lawson, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 351.) The old rule in chancery would seem to have been conformable to this decision of the C. B., and to be, that the party was not bailable by the sheriff upon attachment. (Gilbert's Eq. Rep. 84. Prec. in Chancery, 331. S. P.)

Of what possible use would a label be to the party ? It might apprise him generally of the cause of complaint; but on his coming in, he may be bailed by the court to appear, de die in diem, until the party complaining has prepared his ' interrogatories; and he is entitled, as soon as he appears, to know the specific grounds of complaint.

When an attachment issues, after a rule to show cause, (which is the usual and the safer course,) the party is duly apprised of the offence charged. If it be peremptory and absolute in the first instance, the party must appear forthwith, and answer specified charges; so that in any view of the case, the objection to the process appears to be groundless. It alwaj's rests in the discretion of the,court, whether the rule for an attachment shall be absolute, or nisi. If the contempt appears, as it did in this case, on the affidavits, to be direct and palpable, wilful and extreme, the process frequently issues in the first instance. The doctrine at law, on this point, was declared in the Supreme Court, in The Matter of Stacey, (10 Johns. Rep, 328.) and the English authorities were referred to. The power of this Court is the same, and may be exercised more conveniently for the party, seeing that the court is always open.

Nor does there appear to be any weight in the second objection taken to the process. The affidavits stated a clear violation of the injunction which extended to the ivaters in the Bay of New-York; and the waters between Staten Island and Whitehall landing, at the city of New-York, clearly form part of the bay.

These preliminary objections being overruled, the sheriff was directed to bail the party in 100 dollars, to appear, from day to day, and not to depart without leave ; and the plaintiff was directed to exhibit and file interrogatories in four days, and .the party to be examined thereon before a Master,

The case came on to be heard upon the answers to the interrogatories taken before a Master, and was argued by the same counsel who argued the preliminary motion.

The party admitted, that on the 4th of June, he was served with the injunction, and denied that he had violated it, or intended to do so, in any respect. That he had assisted to navigate the steam boat Bellona on Sundays only, (commencing on the 13th or 20th of June,) from the wharf of D. D. Tompkins, on Staten Island, to JYew-York, and back again, “ in consequence of the said D. D. Tompkins having hired the said boat Bellona to run, under his authority, as his boat, and on his ferry and steam boat right, under a charter party or written agreement made and delivered by him to the owner of the steam boat Bellona, in presence of the deponent, whereby the said D. D. Tompkins hired her for Sundays only for one month.” — “ That he understood and believes, that the said D. D. Tompkins owns the sole and exclusive right from the representatives of R. R. Livingston and R. Fulton, deceased, and from J. R. Livingston, the above plaintiff, he. to navigate with boats propelled by fire or steam from Staten Island to JYewYork. That the owner of the Bellona, after receiving the charter party or written agreement, instructed and directed the deponent to run the boat on that route, on Sundays as aforesaid, as the boat of the said D. JO. Tompkins, and subject to his directions, as to hours, route, and passengers. That the deponent had, in no instance, otherwise navigated, or assisted to navigate, the Bellona, since the service of the injunction, on the waters prohibited by it.”

The Chancellor

considered that the defendant had sufficiently cleared himself of the contempt, and that the boat Bellona was, on" the day mentioned, the hired boat of D. D. Tompkins, and not in the employment of Gibbons; and that the defendant was, pro hac vice, the agent or . servant of L). D. Tompkins, and not of Gibbons, against whom the injunction was awarded. That the rights of D. D. Tompkins w'ere not now to be tried, and no fraud or collusion, on purpose to evade the injunction, was averred or suggested.

Ordered, that the defendant be discharged from the attachment, with costs; and that as to the other persons named therein, and not yet taken, the attachment, also, be deemed discharged.

Order accordingly.  