
    Redding v. The State.
    1. The constitutional questions in this case are the same as those ruled upon in Bell v. The State, just decided. Other questions on the indictment are ruled in principle by Garter v. The State, 68 Ga. 826, Hill v. Mayor of Dalton, 72 Ga. 314, and Williams v. The State, 89 Ga. 483, 15 S. E. Rep. 552.
    
      2. The evidence being that the accused, a practicing physician, sold a half-pint of whisky to a certain person who went to his store and said he was sick and thought whisky would help him, there being no evidence that the person was in fact sick, or that he was a patient under treatment by the accused, who did nothing but examine him and then sell him the whisky, the jury were warranted in finding that the transaction was not within the exception of the statute which allows practicing physicians to furnish liquors as medicine to their patients under treatment. There was no error in denying the application for a new trial.
    November 9, 1892.
    Before Judge Boynton. Monroe superior court. August term, 1892.
    Indictment alleging that the defendant, on March 15, 1890, in Monroe county, “ did sell a quantity of spirituous and intoxicating liquor, the same not being furnished as a medicine to a patient under’treatment by him, nor domestic wine raised by him,” etc. To this-indictment defendant demurred; the demurrer was overruled, and he excepted. The demurrer was like that in the Bell case, ante, setting forth, beside the constitutional points, that the indictment fails to allege to whom the liquor was sold, whether to a known or unknown person; and does not allege the quantity sold or what price, if any, was paid'; and fails to set out the ingredients necessary to constitute an offence.
    After conviction the defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the indictment. The motion was overruled, and to this ruling also he excepted. The evidence-at the trial was given by Z. T. Watkins, thus: In 1890 I went to Dr. Bedding’s store in Monroe county to buy some whisky; told him I was sick and thought whisky would help me. He examined me and let ine have a half-pint of whisky. I paid him money for it, but do-not remember how much. — Defendant stated : “ I am a practicing physician. Mr. Watkins came into my store and told me he was sick and wanted some whisky- ' I examined him and thought he needed whisky, and I let him have a half-pint. I had no intention of violating the law, and was acting in good faith as a practicing physician.”
    Cabaniss & Willingham, hy Harrison & Peeples, for plaintiff in error.
    John J. Hunt, solicitor-general, contra.
    
   Bleckley, Chief Justice.

The constitutional questions raised by demurrer to the indictment are ruled by the decision in Bell v. The State, this term. The act on which the indictment is based is not unconstitutional for either of the causes-specified in the demurrer. Other questions on the indictment are ruled in principle by Carter v. The State, 68 Ga. 826, Hill v. Mayor of Dalton, 72 Ga. 314, and Williams v. The State, 89 Ga. 483, 16 S. E. Rep. 552. The indictment was not insufficient by reason of any of the deficiencies imputed to it.

The accused sought to protect himself under the exception in the statute which allows practicing physicians- to furnish liquors as medicine to their patients under treatment. There was no evidence to uphold this theory save that the person to whom the whisky was furnished said he was sick. It does not appear that any prescription or treatment was applied for, furnished or paid for. The patient selected his own medicine, paid for it, received it and administered it-to himself. The accused, doubtless as matter of form, examined him, and then sold him the whisky. A man professing to be sick wanted whisky because he thought-it would help him; the doctor examined him, but what-he thought, either as to the sickness or the remedy, no one but himself knows or ever knew, save from his own statement at the trial and as might be inferred from the fact that he furnished the whisky and received pay for it. The jury could well conclude that this was more like selling whisky than practicing medicine. The exception in the statute does not contemplate that a physician may take a thirsty man under treatment for the sole purpose of supplying him with the desired beverage. But the only ground of the motion for a new trial was that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the indictment. Of course, there was no error in denying this motion. Judgment affirmed.  