
    JONES’S CASE.
    (11 C. Cls. R., 733; 96 U. S. R., 24.)
    George W. Jones, appellant, v. The United States, appellees.
    
      On the claimant’s Appeal.
    
    
      The claimant agrees to furnish Army doth in 1864 at certain specified times. By reason of the hunting of his mill and the absence of such cloths from the mar-Icet, he fails to do so. The Quartermaster Department notifies him and his bondsmen that they will be held liable for the default. He procures, ashe supposes leave to get the cloth manufactured, and cm oral promise that, if offered within a reasonable time, itioillbe accepted. He proceeds with diligence, but about the time the cloth is ready for delivery the war ends and the Quartermaster Department ref uses to aeceptit. It is sold at a heavy loss. The claimant brings suit for his damages.
    
    The court below holds: (1) That timo is of the essence of a contract to furnish Army cloth during war at sx>eciflod times; (2) That the Act 2d June, 1862 (12 Stat. L., 411), requiring such contracts to he in writing, is a statute of frauds, and that the requirement excludes an unwritten alteration of the contract; (3) That as the unwritten alteration remained executory, the contractor could not recover damages for the breach of it. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.
    The judgment of the court below is affirmed. The Supreme Court does not pass upon the main question argued below, viz, whether the unwritten alteration of the contract was void under the statute, but holds (1) That time here was of the essence of the contract; (2) That the, assurances and promises,made to the contractor by bureau officers that reasonable time would be allowed by the officer in charge, did not amount to an alteration of the contract or extension of the time to perform; nor did they estop the defendants from setting up the breach.
   Mr. Justice Clifford

delivered tbe opinion of the Supreme Court, January 21, 1878.  