
    Jeff Aber v. F. M. Warden.
    1. Forfeited bail-bond cases—Appeal.—It has been held by this court that appeals in forfeited bail-bond cases are to be taken to the Court of Appeals, and not to the Supreme Court.
    2. Injunction restraining overcharges by officers.—An injunction to restrain the collection in money of the commissions of tile sheriff and county attorney in a judgment on a forfeited bail bond, the defendant having tendered the amount of the judgment in county scrip of the county where the judgment was rendered, is too closely connected with the judgment on the bail bond to be separable from it. A judgment upon such injunction suit would be revisable only in the Court of Appeals.
    
      Appeal from Montague. Tried below before the Hon. J. A. Carroll.
    This case was submitted on an agreed statement, as follows:
    “ 1st. That at the June Term of the District Court of Montague county, 1877, a final judgment on a forfeited bail bond was rendered against H. C. Hewbury, as principal, and Lee if. Perkins, Jeff Aber, plaintiff, and A. J. Tucker, sureties, for the sum of $150. and costs.
    “ 2d. That on the 11th day of September, 1877, an execution was issued on said judgment, directed to any constable of Montague county, .(said Lee J$T. Perkins being sheriff of Montague county,) which execution was placed in the hands of appellee, who was constable of said county, for collection.
    “ 3d. After the issuance of said execution, and before the levy of the same, appellant paid to appellee all costs of said suit, except the sheriff’s and county attorney’s commissions on the amount of said execution, and tendered to appellee the full amount of said execution in valid county scrip of said county; that appellee refused to accept said scrip in payment of said sheriff’s and county attorney’s commissions, but demanded the payment of said commissions in lawful currency of the United States, which appellant refused to pay.
    “ 4th. That upon said refusal of appellant, appellee proceeded to make a levy upon appellant’s property, in order to collect said commissions in money as aforesaid, whereupon appellant sued for and obtained the writ of injunction which has been dissolved in this case.
    “ 5th. The only issue submitted, is whether said commissions can be discharged in said county scrip, or whether they can be demanded and collected, under the facts, in lawful currency of the United States.
    
      Grigsby & Ellis, for appellant.
    
      Stephens & Matlock, for appellee.
   Gould, Associate Justice.

Appellant was one of several sureties on a forfeited bail bond, against whom judgment final had been entered up in the District Court of Montague county. Execution issued, and was levied on appellant’s property, and he sued out of said court an injunction restraining the sale, alleging that he had paid all the costs, except the sheriff’s and county attorney’s commissions, and had tendered the full amount of the execution in valid county scrip of the county. It appears, from an agreed statement, that the officer who made the levy claimed that the commissions of the county attorney and sheriff were payable in United States currency. The District Court, on the hearing, dissolved the injunction, holding that the statute authorizing payment of bail bonds in county scrip does not apply to the commissions of the officers named. From the judgment dissolving the injunction and dismissing the case, an appeal was taken to this court.

Our opinion is, that the appeal should have been to the Court of Appeals. It has been held by this court, after full argument and on mature consideration, that appeals in forfeited bail-bond cases are to be taken to the Court of Appeals, and not to this court. The enforcement of such bonds was regarded as incidental to the criminal case in which they are given, and our opinion is, that the question presented in this ■ case is too closely connected with the judgment on the bail bond to be separable from it. Indeed, the amount involved being less than four hundred dollars, the District Court would not have had jurisdiction but for the fact that the subject-matter of the suit was connected with, and incidental to, a judgment or proceeding in that court. The question is really as to the construction and legal effect of that judgment and the process issued thereon, and is one which might have been presented to the District Court by a mere motion in the principal case, instead of resorting to a separate suit. If such a motion had been made, the action of the court thereon would be revisable only in the same court in which the judgment itself would be revised, to wit, the Court of Appeals. The mere fact that an injunction was found necessary to protect the appellant, cannot operate to give this court jurisdiction. The proceeding is still, in substance, no more than a motion in a bail-bond case, calling on the District Court to construe its judgment and to regulate the enforcement of its process.

As this court has no jurisdiction of the case, it must be dismissed.

Dismissed.  