
    Joseph C. IPPOLITO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUSTICE SERVICE DIVISION, Court/Pretrial Services Agency; Kurt Pierpont, Court Services Agency Manager, in his official and individual capacities; Leslie Holmes, Court Services Agency Supervisor, in her official and individual capacities; Melinda Rose, Court Services Agency/Pretrial Case Manager, in her official and individual capacities; Intervention Community Correction Services, (ICCS Facility); Christopher Nandrea, ICCS Out Client SVCS Manager, in his official and individual capacities; Ashlea Neal, ICCS Out Client SVCS Manager, in her official and individual capacities; Shawana M. Green, ICCS Out Client SVCS Supervisor, in her official and individual capacities; Norchem Drug Testing Laboratories; A. Fischinger, Sc. Dir., Ph.D: Norchem Labs, in his official and individual capacities; John & Jane Does, et al. X-XL 1-100, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-1079.
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    April 21, 2014.
    Joseph C. Ippolito, Golden, CO, pro se.
    Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER AND JUDGMENT

ROBERT E. BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.

The Plaintiff, Mr. Joseph C. Ippolito, was released pending trial in Colorado. According to the complaint, he was subjected to sobriety testing as part of the release conditions. Based on test results, authorities revoked Mr. Ippolito’s pretrial release. After unsuccessfully seeking ha-beas relief, he sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming denial of due process, invasion of his right to privacy, failure to provide proper disclosure and consent forms, violation of state and federal requirements for the disclosure of personal information, and denial of equal protection. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice based on prematurity under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Mr. Ippolito appeals and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm the dismissal.

Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Mr. Ippolito qualifies to proceed infor-ma pauperis because he lacks the money to prepay the filing fee.

Under federal law,' an appellant cannot proceed in forma pauperis if he is not proceeding in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) (2012). We do not question Mr. Ippolito’s good faith. As discussed below, we conclude that Heck precludes recovery on the claim involving Mr. Ippoli-to’s pretrial detention. But “[t]he Heck rule is not a simple one, nor is its applicability to a complaint filed prior to a conviction immediately apparent.” Webber v. Weaver, No. 00-6093, 6 Fed.Appx. 706, 709 (1 0th Cir.2001) (unpublished). As a result, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

The Appeal

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that a cause of action under § 1983 is premature if an award for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence through a direct appeal, order of expungement, decree of collateral relief, or writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2864. The district court held that Heck applies when a damage award would imply the invalidity of pretrial detention, as well as a conviction or sentence. Ippolito v. Justice Service Division, 2014 WL 459757, at *2 (D.Colo. Feb. 4, 2014) (unpublished). Applying this extension of Heck, the district court concluded that Mr. Ippolito’s claim was barred. Id.

We agree. In an unpublished opinion, we have applied Heck to a civil claim involving pretrial detention. Cohen v. Clemens, No. 08-1394, 321 Fed.Appx. 739, 742 (10th Cir.2009) (unpublished). This opinion is persuasive in the present case. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Mr. Ippolito alleges numerous efforts to obtain habeas relief. Though he did not succeed, this procedure was available for a meritorious challenge to the imposition of sobriety testing or revocation of release conditions. See Yellowbear v. Wyoming Attorney General, 525 F.3d 921, 924 (10th Cir.2008) (stating that pretrial detention can be challenged through a habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). Thus, Heck precludes recovery of damages for Mr. Ippolito’s pretrial detention in the absence of a prior award of habeas relief.

Mr. Ippolito does not present any reason to reject the district court’s application of Heck. Thus, we affirm the dismissal without prejudice. 
      
       The Plaintiff requests oral argument in his appeal brief. But we conclude that oral argument would not materially assist in deciding the case; thus, we decline to conduct oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
      This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment can be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R.App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
     
      
      .Mr. Ippolito later filed a document identified as a first amended complaint. R. at 84-95. Ordinarily, the filing of the first amended complaint would supersede the original complaint, but that would prove inequitable to Mr. Ippolito. The first amended complaint does not list any parties or causes of action. Instead, Mr. Ippolito simply listed provisions that he presumably regards as relevant to his claims. See id. Thus, we assume that Mr. Ippolito intended to keep all of the claims asserted in the original complaint.
     
      
      . The district court alternatively concluded that the action was frivolous and subject to dismissal with prejudice.
     
      
      . The quoted language in Webber is not prece-dential, but is persuasive. See 10 th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
     
      
      . In light of this conclusion, we do not reach the district court’s alternative conclusion that the action is subject to dismissal with prejudice on the ground of frivolousness.
     