
    Wasson et al. v. Commissioners.
    
      Constitutional law — Taxation—General and local laws — Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station — Act of April 28,1891, providing for, unconstitutional.
    
    1, A law which provides for the location and construction of an institution to be controlled wholly by a board appointed by the Governor, and for the furnishing of information to the people of the state at large, as to the work of such institution, exclusively by the board and state officers at the expense of the state, is a law of a general, and not a local, character, notwithstanding incidental benefits may accrue to property near such institution, by reason of its location, and money raised by taxation for the purchase of a site and the construction of buildings, is general revenue for the state.
    2, Under Section 2, of article 12, of the constitution, which provides that “laws shall be passed, taxing b3' a uniform rule, all moneys, credits, * * * and also all real and personal property, according to its true value in money,” all taxes for general revenue for the state must be levied by a uniform rule upon all the taxable property within the state.
    3, The act of April 23,1891, which attempts to authorize any county of the state to raise money to secure the location therein of the Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station, by a tax upon all taxable property within such county, is in contravention of section 2, of article 12, of the constitution, and is therefore void.
    (Decided Nov. 1, 1892.)
    
      ÜKR.OR. to the Circuit Court of Wayne county.
    On the 23d of April, 1891, the legislature of Ohio passed an act, of which the following is a copy:
    “AN Act
    To authorize the several counties of the state to raise money to secure the location of the Ohio Agricultural Bx-periment Station, and to provide for such location:
    “ Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, that the commissioners of any county in this state desiring to secure the location of the Ohio Agricultural Rxperiment Station by making donations therefor, are hereby authorized and empowered to raise money for such donation by tax on all taxable property in such county, as listed on the county duplicate for taxation, the amount of which proposed donation shall be fixed by said commissioners.
    “ Section 2. That such tax shall not exceed one mill on the dollar of the taxable property of the county in any one year, nor shall the aggregate of all levies for such purposes exceed ten (10) mills on the dollar.
    “ Section 3. No such tax shall be levied or donation made until the question as to the amount to be donated has first been submited by the county commissioners to the qualified voters of such county at some special election, a notice of which (specifying the amount to be donated) has been given at least thirty days previous to said election, in one of more newspapers published and in general circulation in the county; which election shall be held at the usual places of holding elections, and conducted in all respects, as far as may be, as other elections, except that the returns shall be made to the county commissioners, at the auditor’s office; and those voting at such election . in favor of said tax, shall have written or printed on their ballots the words “Experiment Station Tax — Yes,” and those voting against the same, the words “ Experiment Station Tax — No.” And said commissioners shall meet at said auditor’s office on the fourth day next after the said election, and canvass the the votes ; and if it appear that said tax is approved by a majority of the qualified electors voting at such election, then it is hereby made the duty of the county commissioners of said county, to levy a special tax on all the taxable property of said county, to raise the sum donated by said vote, in accordance with section two of this act; and the money arising therefrom, when collected, shall be applied to no other purposes but the payment of bonds and interest as hereinafter provided for; and said special tax shall be eptered upon the county duplicate, and be collected in like manner as other taxes are collected.
    “Section 4. That to anticipate the collection of the tax authorized by this act, and the use of the money to be’ raised thereby, the county commissioners, on acceptance of the donation herein contemplated, are hereby authorized and required to issue and negotiate the bonds of such county, in sums'of not less than $500 each (payable within ten years) at such times and bearing interest at a rate not exceeding six per cent., payable semi-annually, as the commissioners shall determine, which bonds shall not be sold or donated at less than their par value; and the proceeds thereof shall, on their receipt, be paid by said commissioners to the treasurer of state to the amount oí said donation.
    “Section 5. Such funds as may be paid into the state treasury under this act shall be held subject to the duly authenticated requisitions of the board of control of said station, such requisitions to be accompanied with vouchers showing the purpose for which the requisitions are drawn.
    “Section 6. The board of control of said agricultural experiment station shall accept such donation as may in their judgment be most advantageous to the station, and it shall then be their duty to select within the borders of the county, the donation of which is accepted, suitable lands for the use of said station, said lands to be as convenient of access from all parts of said county as may be practicable, and also to be accessible by railroad from all parts of the state; Provided, that any member of the board of control who shall accept or receive, directly or indirectly, any money or property on condition of using his influence in favor of locating said experiment station at any particular place, stall be beld to be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction, shall be fined not less than one thousand nor more than ten thousand dollars.
    “Section 7. The board of control shall have power to receive and hold in trust ’for the use and benefit of the experiment station any grant or devise of land, and any donation or bequest of money or personal property, to be applied to the general or .special use of the station, as may be directed by the donor.
    “Section 8. The title for all lands for the use’of said experiment station shall be made in fee simple to the state of Ohio with covenants of seizin and warranty, and no title shall be taken to the state for purposes aforesaid until the attorney-general shall be satisfied that the same is ffee from all'defects and incumbrances.
    “Section 9. The attorney-general of the state shall be the legal advisor of said board of control, and he shall institute and prosecute all suits in behalf of the same, and shall receive the same compensation therefor as he is entitled to by law for suits brought in behalf of the asylums of the state.
    “Section 10. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.” 88 Ohio Raws, 853.
    Under this statute the commissioners of Wayne county determined to enter into competition for the purpose of securing the location of the experiment station in Wayne county. For that purpose they fixed the sum of $85,000 as the amount which Wayne county was willing to donate in the event of its selection by the board of control as the proper place for the location of the station.
    This proposition was afterwards submitted to the voters of Wayne county at a special election held for that purpose, at which election a majority of the electors of the county who participated, voted in favor of the donation. The commissioners of the county thereupon prepared bonds to the face value of $85,000, and proceeded to advertise them for sale; this sale was to take place on the 17th day of December 1891. Before the time of sale the petition in this case was filed, and the defendants duly served with process and notice given at the sale, that the purchaser of the bonds would take them subject to the claim of the plaintiffs, that the same were unconstitutional and void.
    The petition filed in the case avers in substance the above facts, that the bonds were about to be sold to infio-cent purchasers; that a tax had been levied for the year 1892 of five-tenths of one mill on each and every dollar of the property in said county of Wayne for the purpose of paying the principal and interest on said bonds.
    The petition further states, said taxation will be illegal and unconstitutional, because said taxation will not be for public uses and purposes, for which .alone moneys can be raised by taxation; and therefore said act is in contravention of the constitution of the state, which authorizes taxation only for public purposes.
    It is further averred said act is unconstitutional because in contravention of section 19 of the bill of rights of the constitution of Ohio; that if the purposes of said act were in any sense public, the same are for the benefit of all the inhabitants of the state, and not in any sense for the special and particular benefit of the tax-payers of the county of Wayne, who, under such statute, will be compelled to bear the expense of providing a site, location, buildings and improvements for said experiment station. That said institution will be controlled, operated and owned by the state of Ohio, and in which said county of Wayne would have no ownership, control or exclusive right of interest.
    Plaintiffs also aver that said legislation and attempted taxation is in contravention of article 12, section 2, of the constitution of the state of Ohio, and this legislation and attempted taxation is in contravention of article 10, section 7, of the constitution of the state of Ohio.
    The petition further sets forth the qualifications of the plaintiffs to bring the action; that many of them did not consent to the issuing of said bonds nor the levying of said tax, but voted against the proposition so .to do, and that those of the plaintiffs who voted favorably thereto, were misled and deceived as to said legislation, the purpose and nature thereof. The plaintiffs prayed for a temporary and perpetual injunction enjoining the defendants from making, issuing, selling or delivering the bonds of said county, and from doing any act, matter or thing to carry out the provisions of said illegal act, and from levying or certifying any tax for said purpose.
    Afterwards an amendment was-filed to the petition, making the treasurer of the county, in his official capacity, a party defendant, and asking to enjoin the collection of the tax already levied under said act. To this petition and amendment, the defendants other than the treasurer filed a general demurrer. On the hearing of this demurrer in the court of common pleas, a judgment was rendered sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition. This judgment was affirmed in the circuit court. This proceeding is prosecuted to reverse the judgments of both courts.
    
      William A. Lynch, Day, Lynch & Day, and A. H. Walkey, for plaintiffs in error.
    We maintain that this act is in direct contravention of •article 12, section 2, of the constitution, providing that laws shall be passed taxing by uniform rule, all monies, credits, etc. This section has been frequently before the Supreme Court of the state 'of Ohio, and notably in the leading case in the 3d Ohio St., page 1, Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines. Cooley on Constitutional Rimitations, 5th edition, page 494; 5 Ohio St., 243,589; 36 Ohio St., 476.
    We claim furthermore that this law under consideration is beyond the powers conferred, and the limitations expressed and implied, in article 10, section 7, of the Constitution. State ex rel. Crawford v. McGregor, 44 Ohio St., 631; Potter’s Dwaris on the Construction of Statutes, page 272 ; Sedgewick on Statutory and Constitutional Raw, page 423; Session v. Crunkleton, 20 Ohio St., 357; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St., 352; 2d Bouvier’s Raw Dictionary, 348; 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 141; Railroad' Company v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St., 84; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 646; State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St., 199.
    
      That we are -correct in our construction of article 10, section 7, we further refer the court to 2d Debates Ohio Convention, framing the Constitution, pages 565, 644, 747, 748, 755, 794, 805, 838, 838, 862 and 870; Cooley’s Constitutional I,imitations, .5 Edition, bracket page 494, and note 1; Sedgewick on Constitutional and Statutory Daw, 414; Cooley on Taxation, 2d Edition, 144.
    The case much relied upon by defendants in error, is that of Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 500, in which the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held an act to be constitutional authorizing the town of Amherst to aid the Massachusetts Agricultural College, in consideration of the location of the college in that town. The Massachusetts constitution provides that, taxes shall be “reasonable and proportionate.” The Massachusetts constitution does not require taxes to be levied by uniform rule, but permits apportionment according to benefits.
    The case of Callen v. The City of Saginaw, in the Supreme Court of Michigan (5-0 Mich.,-), is a case where a city was permitted to build a court house to secure the location of a county seat, and in the event of its removal, the county to refund the entire expense.
    This is taxation by a municipal corporation and is entirely distinguishable from the case at bar, and is under a constitution which does not contain the limitations which our own does. - Cooley on Taxation, 2d Edition, 190.
    In Gordon v. Carnes et al., 47 N. Y., 612, the Court of Appeals of New York held that in the absence of limitations in the constitution, the Degislature might require taxation in support of a normal school to be located in a village. It appears, however, that in this institution the village was to have, free of expense, a school of its own to be managed by a local board. Here was a direct benefit conferred, and the judge delivering the opinion expressly says, the constitution has no limitations upon legislative power. In Illinois, under a constitution authorizing municipal taxation for “corporate purposes” there have been diverse holdings upon this subject. In Livingstone County v. Welde, 64 Ill., it was held, to provide a location or site for a state institution is not a corporate purpose such as would authorize the authorities, such as municipalities, to impose upon property taxes to pay the expense thereof. This is a strong, well reasoned case in favor of the position we take here; and the iniquity of the attempt to tax a locality for a general state purpose, is strongly commented upon by the judge delivering the opinion.
    We are aware that in Biirr v. Carbondale, 76 Ill., 455, where a city sought to repudiate bonds in the hands of innocent purchasers, which had been issued by the city to secure the location of the Southern Illinois Normal University, the right of the bond-holder to collect his bonds was sustained on the ground that for that particular institution it was a corporate purpose for which local taxation might be authorized. Judges Walker, McAlister and Craig, three of the seven judges, dissented,. and held that the case came within the doctrine of Livingstone County v. Welde, above cited, and that the constitutional provision is not abrogated by an attempt to carry the project through by vote. .These Illinois cases came before the Supreme Court of the United States. Livingstone County v. Darlington, 101 U. S., 407.
    In the case of Marks v. The Trustees of Perdue University, 37 Indiana 455, the Supreme Court of Indiana sustained taxation for the location of a university for general education, upon the ground of the great benefit to be derived by the people who were located near to such an institution, and who could receive its direct benefits for educational purposes, as well as the reflected benefit to their property oi such an institution in their midst.
    The decision of the court below is also sought to be sustained by the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Walker v. The City of Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St., 14. The constitutional provision then under consideration is not involved in the present case. Taylor v. The Commissioners of Ross county, 23 Ohio St., 22 ; Wyscarver et al. v. Atkinson et al. 37 Ohio St., 80; Counterman v. Dublin Township, 58 Ohio St., 515; Pleasant Township v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 138 U. S., &J.
    
    
      It is said that the legislature, an independent branch of the government, has determined that the location of this institution within the borders of Wayne county, is of such a peculiar local benefit that the people of that county can be taxed for its location and maintainance, and that, however,, much the courts might differ with the legislature, that its. decision is binding and conclusive as to the benefits to be derived. It is to be observed that under this act the legislature made no decision. It simply opened a lottery in which any of the counties of the state are entitled to take a. chance; and the institution might be located under the provisions of this act, not within the county best adapted to its purposes, but, in the discretion of the board of control of the institution, in any one of the eighty-eight counties of Ohio, making the most liberal donation, though least adapted to its aims and purposes.
    It seems to us that it was never the intention of the-framers of the constitution to permit counties to tax themselves with the location of a state institution, to be paid for in imaginary benefits to the locality. A perusal of the debates of the convention, as well as a sensible interpretation of the provisions of the constitution, show that counties were to be kept within the legitimate sphere of taxation for such purposes, as were required to promote the welfare, convenience and health of the people. The policy of such legislation as this is all wrong. A great state should locate its public institutions at such places as may be best adapted to meet the wants of the people, and promote the-objects intended in donating its public funds to the various-uses of institutions, such as the state may properly establish and support.
    
      John K. Richards, Attorney General, A. D. Metz, Prosecuting Attorney, McClure & Smyser, and Johnson & Taylor, for defendants in error.
    I. The legislative power of the state is lodged by the constitution in the General Assembly and it embraces all the objects and purposes of state government. Hence the difference between the constitution of the United States and. the constitution of a state, such as ours. In the former we look to see if the power is expressly given; in the latter to see if it is denied or limited. Therefore, when the power of the General Assembly to enact any particular law is drawn in question, the proper inquiry is whether such an exercise of legislative power is clearly prohibited by the constitution. 11 Ohio St., 534, 542; 10 Ohio, 237; Fletcher v. Peach, 6 Cranch, 128.
    II. Does the law in question violate article X, section 7, of the constitution which provides that the commissioners of counties, trustees of townships, and similar boards, shall have such power of local taxation, for police purposes, as may be prescribed by law ?
    The contention of the plaintiffs in error is, that this section is a limitation on the general grant of legislative power contained in article II, section 1, of the constitution, and that, therefore, the General Assembly cannot, without violating the constitution, confer any other powers of taxation on counties than that of local taxation for police purposes. If this be true it would substantially dismantle a county as an efficient auxiliary of the state admistration in accomplishing the objects and purposes of state government. As political subdivisions of the state, originally intended to be active instrumentalities in carrying out the objects of state government, the functions of counties would be greatly narrowed, if the proposition maintained by the plaintiffs in error is tenable. The constitution did not create counties. It found them in existence, exercising immemorial powers. It did not prescribe their offices in the complicated machinery of public administration. Railroad Co. v. The Commissioners 1 Ohio St., 89; Commissioner v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St., 119; Wardv. County, of Hartford, 12 Conn. 406; Boalt v. Commissoners 18 Ohio, 16; 21 Ohio St., 52; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 613, 614; 17 Ohio St., 614; 20 Ohio St., 370; 20 Ohio St., 292; 27 Ohio St„ 103; State ex rel. v. Commissioners, 35 Ohio St., 467, 468; 18 Daw Bulletin, 62; 39 Ohio St., 344; 117 N. Y., 1; 104 N. Carolina, 714; CommonwealtJvv. Alger 7 Cush., 84; Cooley on Con. Dim-, .'714.
    
      III. Does the act in question violate art. XII, sec. 2, of the constitution? This section contains no grant of power, but a limitation on the general grant of legislative power contained in art. II, sec. 1. See 28 Ohio St., 522; 47 Ohio St., 246; Bowles -v. State, 37 Ohio St., 35; Ctillen v. City of Saginaw, 17 N. W., 678; Gordon v. Comes, et al., 47 N. Y., 612;' Burr v. Carbondale, 76 Ill., 455; Marks v. Trustees 'of Perdue University, 37 lad., 465; 101 U. S. Rep., 416, 417; Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst, 12 Allen, 500; Gordon v. Comes et al., 47 N. Y., 608; State ex rel. etc. v. Haben Treasurer etc.t. 22 Wis., 635; Callamv. The City of Saginaw 141ST. W., 678; Hensley County v. The People , 85 Ill., 544.
    We maintain that'the principles announced in the adjudications we have cited are sanctioned by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Walker v. The City of Cincinnati, et al. 21 Ohio St., 47.
    If the contention of the defendants in error, that a political subdivision of the state may voluntarily tax itself,, when authorized by law, so to do, to secure the incidental advantages to be derived from the establishment of a state institution within its limits, is well taken, the question arises, who is to determine whether such advantages .will accrue or not? Is it the courts or the mass of people themselves acting under the sanction of laws? Sharp less v. The Mayor of of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St., 147.
    Can it be successfully contended that an exclusively agricultural county, like' Wayne county, can derive no possible-local advantage from the experiments conducted by the station under the act of congress and of the state of Ohio? Is proximity to the station of no special advantage? Will an institution of this kind, organized under the joint auspices of the National and state governments, supported by their joint appropriations, afford no exceptional benefits to the community residing in its immediate vicinity? Every body is aware of the rivalry that exists in the different counties of the state to secure the location of state institutions within their limits. Is this rivalry grounded on illusory expectations? We think not.
    
      The question may be asked whether the plaintiffs in error have not been guilty of laches in not applying for a restraining order pending litigation. High on Injuctions, vol. I, sec., 28; 70 N. Y. 519, 520; 3 N. J. Equity, 137,141,142; 16 Wis., 693, 696; 5 Johnson’s Chancery, 170, 171.
    Besides, the experiment station has been located and the provisions of the act substantially carried into effect. Every elector who voted for the donation would be estopped from challenging the validity of the act. 17 Am. St. Rep., 411; 15 Ohio St., 64; Cooley on Taxation, 819; Bigelow on Estoppel, 509; Burroughs on Taxation, Section 38.
   Spear, C. J.

To a full understanding it may be well to state further that the Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station was created by the act of April 17th, 1882, vol. 79 Ohio Raws 113. By this act the location, control and general •management of the station are to be committed to a board of control, consisting of five members. The board is to locate the station, and appoint a competent director. These members of the board are to be appointed by the governor, and he, with the directors of the station, is to be ex-officio, a member of the board. This body is to make annual report of its experiments and work to the governor, which shall be published annually in the Ohio Agricultural Reports, and five thousand copies separate in pamphlet form for free distribution, and to be printed and paid for the same as other public printing.

The United States statutes of March 7, 1887, authorize certain sums to be appropriated from the National Treasury to aid such stations as may be established in the states or territories, and provide for the dissemination of information regarding experiments, by bulletins to be published at least once in three months, one copy to be sent to each newspaper in the state or territory where located, and, as far as the means of the station will permit, to such individuals actually engaged in farming as may request them, the same to be transmitted through the mails free. No other means are provided for informing persons interested of the results of experiments, and these are open to all alike.

It will be noted that the board having control of the station, is a state board. Its reports must be made to the executive óf the state, and the contents disseminated among the people of the state at large, by officers of the state, and, save so far as aided by the general government, at the expense of the state. After the county commissioners have passed to the treasurer of state, the proceeds of the bonds as contemplated by the act of April 23, 1891, they cease to have any part or lot in the future of the enterprise. Nor has any citizen of Wayne county, as such, any right to a voice in the location, construction, or management of the station, nor to information regarding its operations other than such as is afforded to the people of every portion of the state. Without question or doubt, then, the station sought to he established in Wayne county is, to every intent and purpose, a state institution.

The question is thus presented, whether or not it is within the legislative competency to entail upon a single county of the state, by a tax upon the taxable property therein, the entire expense of a site for, and the construction of, a state institution, although the burden is sought and approved by a majority of electors voting at a special election called for the purpose.

The affirmative of this proposition is maintained by defendants in error upon the ground, in substance, that if some peculiar local benefit would flow to the people of Wayne county from the location of this institution within that county, even if the benefit be very slight, then the general assembly has the power to grant the people the right to thus tax themselves; while the opposite is contended for by plaintiff in error upon the ground, in substance, that the purpose of the enterprise being essentially a state purpose, not local but general, the tax to accomplish it becomes a state tax, pure and simple, and cannot, for reasons stated in the petition, be imposed upon the tax-payers of a single county against the expressed will of a minority.

It is not doubted that if the object sought to be attained by the act in question were local in its nature and purposes, having for its primary object an improvement peculiarly and specially benefiting the property taxed, the tax complained of might be authorized by the general assembly. Many decisions of this court cited by counsel, and others not cited, giving construction to the present constitution, warrant this conclusion. We do not stop to review these decisions, for no important object would be attained by doing so. It is enough to say that they do not meet this case. Nor is it controlled by decisions upon kindred subjects giving construction to the constitution of 1802.

It is everywhere conceded, as a general proposition, that the right of taxation is an inseparable incident of sovereignty, and that it is delegated by the people to the general assembly by the constitution, and that the right to tax necessarily includes the power to fix the amount and direct upon what property it shall be imposed. But this power is subject to limitations, and important limitations have been placed upon it in this state bj' article 12 of the constitution. Section-2 of that article provides that “la-ws shall be passed, taxing by a uniform rule, all moneys, credits, etc., * * * and also all real and personal property, according to its true value in money.” This section, as has been held again and again by this court, (see Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St., 1, and opinion of Ranney, J., in Hill v, Higdon, 5 Ohio St., 246, and Zanesville v. Richards, same vol. 589), furnishes the governing principle for all laws authorizing taxes for general revenue, to be levied for any purpose, whether state, county, township or corporation. The object intended is to secure equality and uniformity in the imposition of these public burdens. That is, the tax must be uniform upon all the taxable property within the limits of the taxing district. The general assembly, controlled by the section cited, is without power to determine, by its own inclination or caprice, upon what property and in what proportion the burdens shall be laid, or that the burdens of one district may be imposed upon another district. If a county, township, or city tax, it must be uniform throughout the limited territory to which it is applicable; if a state tax it must be’uniform all over the state. Such is the doctrine of the cases above cited, and we are not aware of any holding of this court inconsistent with it.

The character and purpose of a law, not less than its constitutionality, are to be determined by its operation and effect. If, in effect, its purpose is one that concerns, and its benefits are to be bestowed upon the people of the entire state, or the people of a particular class in the entire state, as we have already found to be true of the act in question, then it is a law general in its character, and if it seeks to impose taxation for the carrying out of those purposes, it would seem to follow that such taxes are state taxes. They are for governmental purposes. All such impositions form part of the general revenue as distinguished from assessments which are “special and local impositions upon property in the immediate vicinity” of a local improvement, “and laid with reference to the special benefit which such property derives from the expenditure.” Being,^.therefore, taxes for general revenue, measured by the rule hereinbefore stated, it would follow that in order to make the burden equal and uniform, the taxes should necessarily be imposed upon the taxable property of the entire state.

The precise question presented in the case at bar has not, so far as we are aware, been heretofore passed upon by this court. But it is believed that the principle of Fields v. Commissioniers, 36 Ohio St., 476, sustains the view- above suggested. The holding is that an act to authorize the commissioners of certain counties to locate and construct tnrnpike roads, and pay for the same by a tax to be laid on all the property in the county except such lands as had theretofore been previously assessed for similar improvements, was in conflict with section 2 of article 12 of the constitution, because the act was one intended to create an assessing district bounded by county lines, and therefore, as to that county, a general law, the fund to be raised being for general revenue purposes, and yet sought to exempt a portion of the land therein from the tax imposed, and hence was not uniform. If the commissioners of Highland county, under the statute referred to,could not, for the cost of constructing a road witbin that county, assess a tax resting upon a part only of the taxable property of the county, leaving a portion untaxed, because such tax would be in violation of the rule of uniformity required by section 2 of article 12 of the constitution, it is difficult to see how the commissioners of Wayne county, acting under the act in review, can lawfully assess a tax upon the taxable property of that county, for the benefit of the whole of the state of Ohio, without violating the same rule of uniformity.

Rooking at the question from any standpoint, the conclusion seems clear that the taxation sought in this case is in effect the taking of property of the tax payers of Wayne county for the private benefit of other citizens of the state, and is obnoxious to all the objections against the appropriation of private property for private purposes which could exist in any other case.

Says Judge CoouEY, in his work on Taxation, p. 144: “In cases where the character of the work, as local or general, is plain, the rule of right is clear. If a single locality' were to assume to tax itself, or the state were to undertake to tax it, for the construction of a state work or the erection of a state building, no one could hesitate for a moment in saying there was no such right, and that there could be none so long as taxation by the fundamental law is required tq be laid by fixed rules, and is not subject to the arbitrary caprice of legislative bodies.” In support he cites State Haben, 22 Wis. 661; Livingston Co. v. Weider, 64 Ill. 427, and Sleight v. People, 74 Ill. 47.

We are met with the claim that the people of Wayne county have determined for themselves that the location of the station will be a local benefit to them; that they are content to take the burden, and .hence the court should not interfere. It is true that a majority of the electors voting did so determine. And if the proposed tax would affect them only thej' might be estopped to deny its validity. But the voters are not necessarily the tax-payers, and if they were, there would still remain to consider the rights of the minority who opposed. In the language of Judge Ranney, in Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 646, treating of the power of county commissioners to make subscription to the stock of a railroad company: “The people have not depended upon the legislature for protection. Sad experience had taught them that laws having local application, and imposing local burdens, seldom commanded the deliberate judgment of the whole representation of the state. They have, therefore, deemed it necessary to prohibit that bod}'' from authorizing this evil; and remembering that minorities were as well entitled to protection as majorities, they have given each individual citizen a sure guaranty that his right of property shall not be invaded in that manner, or for such purposes.” It may be added', also, that the submission to a vote of the electors can hardly affect the constitutional, question. A question of constitutional power can not satisfactorily be solved by asking the advice of persons claimed to be specially interested. If it can be maintained that the general assembly may authorize Wayne county to assume this burden, it may, with still less doubt, require it to be done. That this station, if established, would prove of some slight local benefit to the people living immediately near it, and, in a lesser degree, to others within the county residing farther away, we, need not. stop to deny. It is enough for us to know that the principal object intended and authorized was a state institution, to be located, constructed, controlled and managed wholly by the state for the common good of the persons interested throughout the entire state, and that whatever benefit might accrue of a local character, would be merely incidental.

It is insisted that the tax would be justified under the authority given county commissioners, township trustees and similar boards, by section 7 of article 10 of the constitution, to levy taxes for police purposes, inasmuch as the-institution will educate the people of Wayne county how to prevent and cure diseases among domestic animals and plants, such as are used for human food, and thus conduce to the public health and welfare. We think the point not tenable. If such a burden could be fixed upon a county, it could upon a township, or even a lesser territorial division. The section referred to must be held to give power to boards of commissioners, etc. to levy taxes for objects strictly local in tbeir nature. It cannot Have been the purpose of the intelligent body which framed the constitution, nor of the people who adopted it, by this section, to clothe county commissioners, and township trustees and other boards, under the guise of police power, with authority to tax the people of their localities for the establishment of a state institution for the making of experiments as to foods and plants, the benefits of which, in general, are as much to be enjoyed by the people of the state at large as by those of the immediate neighborhood. Indeed, a strong argument is made favoring the proposition that the above cited section is a limitation on the power of those boards, and itself prohibits the levy of the proposed tax. We do not find it necessary to enter upon a consideration of that question.

Authorities from other states have been cited which, it is insisted, sustain the claim of defendants in error. We have examined the cases, but do not esteem it of importance that they be reviewed here. In general, the constitutional provisions involved are not the same as ours, and, in any event, the decisions are not controlling. The Ohio cases relied upon by defendants in error relate to taxation for purposes primarily local. For reasons already stated, they do not control, and can have but' little bearing upon the case under consideration.

To sum up: As conclusion, we are of opinion that the purpose to be accomplished by the act of April 23, 1891, is not a local, but a general, purpose; one common to the state at large. The tax to accomplish it is, therefore, a state tax for general revenue, because the object to which it is to be devoted is the establishment of a state institution, which tax, to be lawful, must, under section 2 of article 12 of the constitution, be levied by a uniform rule, and rest equally upon all the taxable property of the state. And as the act under review undertakes to place this burden upon the taxable property of one county alone/it is in conflict with the section above cited, and therefore void.

It follows that in sustaining the demurrer to the petition, and dismissing the same, the courts below erred. At.the bearing in tbis court it was urged that the plaintiffs, by their conduct, had estopped themselves to deny the legality of the proposed tax. Of course this cannot be determined except by issue joined. The judgments .will, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded, -with directions to overrule the demurrer and for further proceedings according to law.

Judgment reversed.  