
    Thomas THOMAS, Appellant, v. M.S. AND S. TOYOTA, INC. d/b/a Phil Smith Toyota and Professional Business Owner’s Association, Inc., a Florida corporation for profit, and Hon. Mily Rodriguez-Powell, as Judge of Compensation Claims, Appellees.
    No. 98-1643.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 28, 1999.
    Rehearing Denied May 28, 1999.
    
      Stephen Marc Slepin of Slepin & Slepin, Tallahassee, and Mark M. Carroll of Caldwell & Carroll, P.A., Miami, for appellant.
    Edward A. Dion, General Counsel, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Tallahassee for Appellee-The Honorable Mily Rodriguez-Powell.
    Keith J. Lambdin of Kelley, Kronen-berg, Kelley, Gilmartin & Fichtel, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee-M.S. and S. Toyota., Inc. d/b/a Phil Smith Toyota and Professional Business Owner’s Association, Inc., a Florida corporation for profit.
   KLEIN, J.

Appellant sustained a work related injury covered by workers’ compensation. After the employer had paid for more than eighteen chiropractor treatments, it exercised its right under section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), to stop paying for any further chiropractic treatment. The statute limits chiropractic care to eighteen treatments unless the carrier authorizes it or the employee is catastrophically injured. The judge of compensation claims denied appellant’s request for further chiropractic treatment, and appellant did not appeal that order. Instead he filed this action for declaratory relief; arguing that the statute is unconstitutional. We affirm.

In Strohm v. Hertz Corp., 685 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) the first district upheld the statutory limit on chiropractic treatment in a challenge to its constitutionality. Apparently, in order to avoid the same fate as the claimant in Strohm, appellant did not appeal the order denying his claim to the first district, in the hopes that he could get this court to disagree with Strohm and hold the statute unconstitutional.

Final orders in workers’ compensation cases “are subject to the same principles of res judicata as are applied to judgments of courts.” Nelson & Co. v. Holtzclaw, 566 So.2d 307, 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (citing Wellcraft Marine Corp. v. Turner, 435 So.2d 864, 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)). The order of the judge of compensation claims, determining that appellant was not entitled to any more chiropractic treatment, is therefore res judicata as to that issue. There is thus no controversy, because even if the court were to hold the statute unconstitutional, appellant would still be bound by the worker’s compensation order determining that he could get no further chiropractic treatment. We therefore affirm.

SHAHOOD, J., concurs.

POLEN, J., concurs specially with opinion.

POLEN, J.,

concurring specially.

I agree with the majority’s determination as to the finality of the judge of compensation claims’ order relating to the exhaustion of chiropractic treatment. That order, however, does not appear to dispose of the question whether the claimant is in need of, or entitled to, treatment from some other type of health-care practitioner. It would seem to me, although neither party has raised the issue in this appeal, that appellant could still make such a claim before the judge of compensation claims, if not otherwise time-barred.  