
    David CRAMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF AUBURN; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-15234
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 11, 2017 
    
    Filed April 24, 2017
    David Cramer, Pro Se
    Sean D. O’Dowd, Esquire, Attorney, Angelo, Kilday & Kilduff, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee
    Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

David Cramer appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims in connection with his arrest and prosecution for battery. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Whitaker v, Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Cramer’s claims alleging false arrest and imprisonment as iieefc-barred because success on Cramer’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Cramer failed to show that his conviction had been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”); see also Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Heck barred false arrest and false imprisonment claims under § 1983 until conviction was invalidated).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     