
    THE STATE vs. EPHRAIM LANE.
    A free person of color, who is employed to carry a pistol from one place to another, and who claims no right to use the instrument and has no intention of doing so, does not come within the provisions of the Act of 1840, prohibiting free persons of color from having arms in their possession without a license from the County Court.
    Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Perquimans County, at the Spring Term, 1S48, his Honor Judge Settle presiding.
    The defendant, a free man of colour, was indicted under the act of 1840, ch. 30, for unlawfully carrying about on his person, and unlawfully keeping in his house, a pistol, without having obtained a license therefor, from the proper authority. By the special verdict, it is found, that the defendant usually resides in the County of Perquimans, and, at the time the alleged offence was commited, was in the employment of a white man, by the name of Barker, getting shingles in the County of Pasquotank. Barker also lived in Perquimans, and had hired the defendant to carry the pistol with other articles of his, to the County of Pasquotank, where they were pursuing their work. While so employed in carrying the pistol and other property, it was seen in his possession. For this possession, the defendant was indicted, and did not pretend that he had any license therefor, from the County Court of Perquimans. Upon this special verdict the Court pronounced the defendant not guilty, and the Solicitor for the State appealed.
    
      Attorney General, for the State.
    No counsel appeared in this Court for the defendant.
   Nash, J.

It appears to us that a mere statement of the facts is an answer to the charge. At the time the act complained of was committed, the defendant was the servant of Barker, and as a.hireling, was engaged in his business, in carring the pistol and other articles, from the place of his residence to that of his employment. It is not pretended, that this employment was simulated, and intended or used as a cloak to avoid the law. We must presume therefore that the contract was made in good faith between Barker and the defendant, and that the latter in good faith was executing it. Can it be possible, that'under the Act of 1840, the defendant was guilty of a criminal act ? The object of the legislature was to prevent the owning or possessing, by this class of persons, of the offensive weapons enumerated, as dangerous to the peace of the community and the safety of individuals. But that they did not intend, that they should not be owned or possessed by any person of colour, is evident from the fact, that they have rendered the possession lawful in one contingency. Degraded as are these individuals, as a class, by their social position, it is certain, that among them are many, worthy of all confidence, and into whose hands these weapons can be safely trusted, either for their own protection, or for the protection of the property of others confided to them. The County Court is, therefore, authorised to grant a licence to any individual they think proper, to possess and use these weapons. It is an old maxin in the construction of statutes, that he who sticks to the letter, adheres to the bark. Every legislative act ought to receive a reasonable construction; such as carries out the legislative will. The act charged against the defendant does not come within the limit or scope of the statute of 1840. He did carry with him a pistol, but it was not unlawfully carried. He was complying with a ‘ contract, he had a right to make, the mere carrier of the pistol for hire, claiming nof title to the instrument or right to use it, and without any purpose, or intention so to do.

Ordered to be certified that there is no error.

Pee Curiam. Judgment affirmed.  