
    Duncan LAWSON, Jane Doe, a minor child, PPA Duncan Lawson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Timothy HILDERBRAND, Gary Hoffkins, Richard Stook, Joseph Rondini, Frederick Quezada, Defendants-Appellants, Town of Greenwich, Defendant.
    No. 15-653-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 14, 2016.
    Andrew M. McPherson, Goldstein & Peck, P.C. (William J. Kupinse, Jr., on the brief) Bridgeport, CT, for Appellants.
    William S. Palmieri, New Haven, CT, for Appellees.
    Present: AMALYA L. KEARSE, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, and ROBERT D. SACK, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Timothy Hilderbrand, Gary Hoffkins, Richard Stook, Joseph Rondini, and Frederick Quezada (together, “Defendants”) appeal from the February 23, 2015 order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.) denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the theory that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ search and seizure claims in the first count of the complaint. Lawson v. Hilderbrand, 88 F.Supp.3d 84 (D.Conn.2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil suits for damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Ordinarily, an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not permitted as that decision is not a final judgment. O’Bert ex rel. Estate of O’Bert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29, 38 (2d Cir.2003). Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity is immediately appealable where the district court denied the motion as a matter of law. Jones v. Papineau, 465 F.3d 46, 54-55 (2d Cir.2006). However, defendants may only take an appeal if they accept as true plaintiffs version of the facts for purposes of the appeal. Id. We review the district court’s law-based denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity de novo. See Finigan v. Marshall, 574 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir.2009).

When a government official charged with violating federal constitutional rights seeks summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, the Court may first consider whether there was a “violation of clearly established law before turning to the more difficult question whether the relevant facts make out a constitutional question at all.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 239, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). Here, we conclude that the lack of clearly established law barring the police actions entitles the Defendants to qualified immunity for their actions. The police entered the home with Duncan Lawson’s consent, and when that consent was revoked it was objectively reasonable for the defendants-to believe that exigent circumstances made their continued presence in the house, and their, confinement of the residents to the living room, lawful. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). As “the need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for a war-rantless search,” id. at 460, 131 S.Ct. 1849 (internal quotation marks omitted) it follows that the need to prevent the destruction of evidence provides sufficient justification for the less intrusive act of securing the premises until a search warrant is obtained.

We have considered all of the plaintiffs’ arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is REVERSED, and this matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.  