
    Andrew Erickson vs. Jesse G. Jones.
    November 25, 1887.
    Landlord and Tenant — Fixtures—Eight ot Eemoval. — As between landlord and-tenant the right to remove fixtures expires with -the lease, unless a subsequent removal is provided for in the lease, or the lease is of such uncertain duration that no reasonable opportunity for a previous removal is offered.
    Same — Tenancy at Will. — The statutory notice required in the case of tenants at will renders the time limited for the expiration of the lease sufficiently definite to bring such tenants ordinarily within the operation of the general rule. And where such notice has been duly served upon a tenant at will, and he has been-ejected by due process subsequent to the expiration of the time fixed in such notice, his right to remove fixtures is lost.
    Plaintiff brought this action in the municipal court of Minneapolis, to recover the value of personal property, including a building, alleged to have been unlawfully converted by the defendant. The action was tried by the court, whose findings of fact were in substance as follows: On May 1, 1885, plaintiff leased certain premises from defendant as tenant at will; on May 15, 1886, the plaintiff having failed to pay rent, and a notice to quit having been served on him on March 20, 1886, the defendant brought an action of unlawful de-tainer against the plaintiff, to obtain possession of the premises, and recovered judgment for restitution on July 15,1886, and on the same day the plaintiff was ejected by the sheriff under a writ of restitution. At the date of the lease to plaintiff, there was upon the premises a small-frame workshop, which plaintiff purchased from a former tenant, and which building had no permanent foundation under it, and was not in any manner affixed to the soil. The defendant never made any claim to this building until after plaintiff was ejected. On August 14, 1886, the plaintiff undertook to re-enter upon the premises for the purpose of removing this building, but was prevented from so doing by the defendant. The court further found that the plaintiff proceeded to remove the building within a reasonable time after he was ejected. Upon these facts the court directed judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals from an order refusing a new trial. ,
    
      Hooker & Nunn, for appellant.
    
      R. L. Penney and Jordan, Penney & Hammond, for respondent,
    cited Ex parte Hemenway, 2 Lowell, 496; Whiting v. Brastow, 4 Pick. 310; Gaffield v. Hapgood, 17 Pick. 192, (28 Am. Dee. 290;) Wall v. Hinds, 4 Gray, 256, (64 Am. Dec. 64;) Hanrahan v. O'Reilly, 102 Mass. 201; Holmes v. Tremper, 20 John. 29, (11 Am. Dec. 338;) Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137; Warner v. Kenning, 25 Minn. 173; Ewell on Fixtures, 96-100.
   Vanderburgh, J.

As between landlord and tenant, unless the right to remove fixtures after the expiration of the term is specially reserved in the lease, the rule is well settled that such fixtures must be removed by the tenant before his term expires, or at least while he continues to hold possession as tenant. Where, however, his tenure is uncertain, and such that it may be determined unexpectedly to him, this rule is modified so as to allow a reasonable time for the removal of fixtures after the termination of the lease. Ombony v. Jones, 19 N. Y. 234, 238; Loughran v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792, 797.

This qualification is usually applied to leases of uncertain duration, as for life, or at will, or until the happening of some event. But where, as in this state, by statute, leases at will can only be terminated after reasonable notice, it would seem that, in ordinary eases, the time limited for the expiration of the term is rendered sufficiently definite to warrant the application of the general rule. In any event, we see no reason why it should not have been applied in the case at bar. Tyler, Fixt. *453.

The plaintiff occupied certain premises of defendant as tenant at will. The building in controversy, which was placed on the land by the plaintiff’s assignor, and purchased and occupied by the plaintiff, it is conceded was a fixture as between landlord and tenant, and the latter had a right to remove it if such removal was seasonably effected. Whether he had lost such right by delay is the question to be determined here. He was ejected from the premises after due notice to quit, and for default in the payment of rent due. The character of the tenancy, and this defendant’s right to put an end to the lease, and recover possession, were determined in the proceedings, for forcible detainer referred to by the court in its findings, the record of which was introduced in evidence, and is made part of the settled case returned here. In that action, which was between the same parties, it was alleged and found that the plaintiff herein was largely in arrears for rent, and that due notice to quit was served on him as tenant at will, and that he was ejected under process served months thereafter; so that he had ample notice and opportunity to remove the building before he was dispossessed. This action for the alleged subsequent conversion of the same by the defendant cannot, therefore, be maintained.

Order reversed, and case remanded.  