
    COREY v. CITY OF ANN ARBOR.
    Municipal Corporations — Ice on Sidewalk — Citizen’s Negligence — Notice.
    No recovery can be had against a city for injuries due to slipping on an icy sidewalk on other than a business street, where such condition resulted from the leaking of a citizen’s hydrant, and had existed not more than three days, the defendant having no actual notice of such condition, and it not being shown that any officer of defendant had been along the street during such time, or that such condition was a matter of public talk.
    
    Error to Washtenaw; Kinne, J.
    Submitted April 12, 1900.
    Decided May 15, 1900.
    Case by Ratie E. Corey against the city of Ann Arbor for personal injuries. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error.
    Reversed.
    Plaintiff slipped upon an icy sidewalk on Williams street, in the city of Ann Arbor, in the evening of February 4, 1898, and received serious injuries. The ice was opposite the premises of one Rockwell, who had a hydrant in his yard. It is claimed that the pen-stock either leaked or was left partly open, so that the water ran from it across the lawn to the sidewalk; that it extended quite a distance down the walk, and froze. The ice was smooth, and formed no ridge. There were several inches of snow upon the ground, and the weather for several days previous had been very cold. The sidewalks were covered with snow, which was packed very hard, all over the city, and were more or less slippery. Plaintiff gave testimony tending to show that this water flowed from the hydrant on Tuesday preceding the accident, which was on Friday following. Defendant gave evidence tending to show that the water flowed from the hydrant on the night preceding the accident. Plaintiff was a dressmaker, and lived, with her parents, upon the lot adjoining Mr. Eockwell’s. She testified that she went out on Thursday evening, but had not been out of the house since Monday previous until the night she was injured. She is unable to locate the spot where she was injured, and there is some doubt, even from her own statement, whether she fell upon the ice formed by the water from the hydrant. The defendant requested the court to direct a verdict for it upon the ground that no liability was shown. The learned circuit judge stated that, if the case was “to end in his court, he might take a different course about it, but that there was a sort of lingering doubt in his mind that the Supreme Court might hold there was a liability, and he would, therefore, give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt.” Plaintiff recovered verdict and judgment.
    
      O. E. ■Butterfield (John E. Lawrence, of counsel), for appellant.
    
      Lehman Bros. & Stivers, for appellee.
    
      
       As to the liability of municipal corporations for ice on sidewalks, see note to Hausmann v. Madison, (Wis.) 21 L. R. A. 263.
    
   Grant, J.

(after stating the facts). It is conceded that the sidewalk itself was properly constructed, and was in a safe condition for public travel. It was only made unsafe by the ice caused by the water flowing from a private hydrant. Counsel for defendant contend that the statute does not cover this case. Counsel for the plaintiff contend that, since the icy condition was not caused by the elements, the city is liable for the condition. It is unnecessary to determine this question, since there is another fatal objection tó the plaintiff’s right to recover.

It is conceded that the defendant city had no actual notice. Under plaintiff’s own evidence, the ice had been there but three days before the accident. It is not shown that any officer of the city, charged with the duty to see that the sidewalks were kept in safe condition for public travel, had been along this street during that time, or that its condition was a matter of public talk. Nothing had occurred to call the attention of an officer there any more than to any other part of the city. The city officials had the right to assume that no citizen would be guilty of so careless an act as to leave his hydrant open, and let the water flow over the sidewalk. Neither the plaintiff herself, nor any member of her household, though they lived within a few feet, appears to have known anything about its condition. If neither she nor they knew anything about it, why should the officers of the city be presumed to have known it from the fact of its existence for three days ? There had been a snow the night before, and covered it up. The city might lawfully assume that this sidewalk would remain in good condition, and that no private citizen would do any act to render it unsafe. The city was under no legal obligation to eihploy men to patrol the streets to see that such things were not done, or to remedy them when done. The record utterly fails to show a condition of affairs so notorious that a jury might infer notice to the corporation. There are many miles of sidewalk in the city of Ann Arbor. In support of their contention that the city should have known it, counsel for plaintiff say, “The place of the accident was but a few blocks from the business portion of the city.” What do they mean by “a few blocks,”- — -three, four, or five? For all that appears upon this record, it might have been a half mile from the principal business streets of the city. But this cannot make any difference. It was off the business streets, and there was no occasion for any officer of the .city to go there until in some manner notified of the condition. Moon v. City of Ionia, 81 Mich. 635, 642 (46 N. W. 25), is directly in point, and controls this case. The defendant in that case claimed that the walk was repaired August 15th. Plaintiff was injured on the 18th. It was held that, if this was so, actual notice of the defect was necessary. See, also, Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 36 Hun, 224.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial ordered.

The other Justices concurred.  