
    REN YONG GUO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-4230.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 20, 2012.
    Fuhao Yang, Law Offices of Fuhao Yang PLLC, New York, NY, for petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Holly M. Smith, Senior Litigation Counsel; Elizabeth D. Kurlan, Trial Attorney; Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
    PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, GERARD E. LYNCH, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Ren Yong Guo, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 15, 2011, decision of the BIA denying Guo’s motion to reopen. In re Ren Yong Guo, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Sept. 15, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Guo’s July 2009 motion to reopen was untimely, because the BIA issued its final order of removal in April 2002. However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

In this case, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Guo’s motion to reopen as untimely. Guo’s decision to join the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) in the United States constitutes a self-induced change in personal circumstances that did not merit an exception to the time limitation. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006).

Further, although Guo argues that he provided articles and a statement describing the arrest and detention of CDP members and political activists in China, those materials do not describe a change in country conditions since Guo’s September 2000 hearing. See In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (holding that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions, the BIA “compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, Guo’s pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.  