
    No. 1045.
    Alexander Weil vs. A. A. Zodiag.
    Where the parties claim to have leased certain premises from different agents of the owner for the same period of time, it is incumbent on the one who pretends to hold the lease first made, to prove that the agent whom he dealt with had authority to lease for the term that he did lease j that the lease was duly recorded, possibly even if the other party had knowledge of the lease, and acted fraudulently with the owner'or his representative. The ■plaintiff herein having failed in this respect, and the defendant having shown a valid written lease, the judgment of the lower court in Ins favor is affirmed.
    A FPEAL from the Third District Court, Parish of Claiborne. ham, J. (?r«-
    
      N. J. Scott and J. A. Bichardson, for Plaintiff and Appellant:
    The principal is responsible for the acts of his agent and bound by his contracts, if made ‘within tbe scope of his agency. C. C. 3021; 30 An. 587; 18 An'. 535 ; 6 It. 97; 7 li. 400; 4' : An 19; 8 IS. S. 200. ' >
    Tbe principal is hound by tbe contracts of the agent, although the agency is revoked, if the revocation is unknown to the party with whom he contracts. 18 An. 535; 1 An. 80; 2 An. 316. .
    Admissions of any facts made by an agent during-tbe continuance of his agency, relating’ directly to tbe business intrusted to him, is binding upon the principal. 2 An. 890. :
    Where the owner of real estate leases the same to one party and afterwards leases the same, property to a second tenant, tbe second tenant knowing of the first lease, the first lessee should hold the property.
    That where the owner of real estate aids and abets tbe second tenant, both knowing of tbe prior lease, although verbal, they agree to defraud and deprive tbe first lessee of tbe possession, they are co-trespassers and responsible.ia solido. Either can. be sued alone. 29 An. 113.
    A lease does not have to be reduced to writing and recorded, in order to affect third parties, - unless tbe owner transfers tbe property.
    That a party cannot, after be has knowledge of a verbal lease, enter into a written lease and record tbe same and plead such lease and registry against the verbal lease, accompanied by possession.
    Alease of real estate can be made verbally. C. C. 2683 ; 18 An. 90; 25 Ani 229.
    
      McDonald <& McDonald, for Defendant and Appellee:
    Possession nomine proprio is of the essence of the possessory action. A tenant cannot main- • tain the same. 32 An. 192; 2 An. 357; 10 Eob. 407.
    All sales, contracts and judgments affecting immovable property, are null and void, except as between the parties there, unless duly recorded. 30 An. 436, Civil Code, 2264, 2266.
   Tlie opinion of the Court was delivered by

Bermudez, C. J.

This is a suit to eject the defendant from certain premises, and to recover from him five thousand dollars damages for injury alleged to have been sustained, in consequence of his refusal to vacate, when notified to do so, viz: Dec. 31, 1881.

The plain tiif claims that he was the tenant of the premises up to the end of the year 1881, but that he previously obtained (in October) from the landlord’s agent, a renewal of the lease for the’ year 1882, entitling him to possession and enjoyment during that period.

The defense is, that the defendant is entitled to possession of said premisos for the same term, under a written lease from the'duly authorized agents of the owner of the property, which lease was, besides, ratified by the latter. ’ .

The case was tried by a. jury, who rendered a verdict for the defendant. From the judgment thereon, the plaintiff has appealed. .

The agent, to whom plaintiff refers, is a different person from the firm from whom defendant claims to have leased.

The evidence does not show that such agent, D. B. Hays, had authority from the owner, W. H. Chaffe, to lease the property, for the year 1882, to any one.

.His power to do so is not inferrable from the fact that he hadsometimes collected rent drafts of the landlord'on the lessee, or given his own receipt for other rent due, or that he had previously rented the place to tli© plaintiff.

It was incumbent on the party claiming the lease to the premises for 1832, particularly when met by an adverse claim, founded on a lease emanating from the owner himself, to have conclusively established authority in the agent to lease; and further, a lease from him prior to the formation of the second contract. We say nothing of the want of registry of the lease, to bind third persons. Such registry might have been an important ingredient in a controversy of tlio character of the present, one. It may, perhaps, be required, even against one shown to have known of the anterior lease, and to have concocted with the owner or his agent, to defeat rights acquired under it, unless in a suit for damages. 29 An. 213.

At any rate, the present defendant could, however, have had no knowledge of what had never occurred.

Neither does the record sufficiently establish, even if Hayes liad such authority, that he exercised it. Iu a litigated ease like this, in whióh neither the agent nor the owner have testified, the fact of the agency and of the renewal of the lease, should have been fully proved. The pressing testimony of the plaintiff on these points, can hardly be said to be corroborated by the circumstance of the “ nodding ” of. the agent and of the plaintiff, in presence of a witness, inquiring if Mr. Weil had settled tlie store for 1882.

The defendant has produced written authority from Chaffe to Camp, Davidson & Ferguson, to lease the premises; a written lease from the latter to him, and a written ratification by Chaffe of the lease thus made.

Had it been shown that Hayes had authority from Chaffe to lease for 1882, and had exercised that authority, before any contract for the same purpose between the last agents of Chaffe and the defendant, liad been entered into; that the lease had been duly recorded in time; the principles of law invoked by plaintiff’s counsel would certainly apply. SO An. 589; 29 An. 213.

The only remaining question would have been as to the damages claimed; but, in the absence of that material evidence, the plaintiff must fail.

It is unnecessary to pass upon the bills of exception taken to the charges of the District Judge to the jury. The testimony adduced, and the documentary evidence introduced, without objection on the trial, are before us. We can finally adjust the differences of the parties, -without, determining the merits of those bills. Even had the charges been erroneously given, this is not a suit which, on that account, should be remanded.

Judgment affirmed with costs.  