
    Brown against Childs, Gentleman, one of the Attorneys, &c.
    in suits against the same be com-¡"ATor by bill ⅛® service of ⅛⅛» of subsequent pro be personal.
    
    
      FOOT, for the defendant,
    moved to set aside the default entered in this cause and all subsequent proceedings, on the ground of irregularity. The suit was commenced by a capias ed rcsj). The declaration and notice and rule to jalead were served, by putting the same up in the clerk's office, as in or-dinar? cases, there being no notice of any attorney being employed by the defendant, or that he intended to defend the
    
      Foot contended, that the defendant, being himself an attorney of the court, was entitled to be personally served with all notices, &c.
    Clark, contra,
    insisted, that since the act (1 N. R. L. 416. sess. 36. eh. 48. s. 12.) allowed attorneys and other officers of the court to be arrested and held to bail on mesne process, they were put on the same footing with ordinary persons. In the cases in which the court had decided that the service must be personal on the attorney, the proceeding was by bill, not by writ. (Bridgeport Bank v. Sherwood, 16 Johns. Rep. 43. Backus v. Rogers, 8 Johns. Rep. 346.)
   *Per Curiam.

When an attorney is sued by writ, he is entitled to personal service of all notices, &c. in the same manner as if he was sued by bill. We see no reason for any distinction in this respect. We should grant the motion, if a term had not intervened since the default was entered. The application on the part of the defendant ought to have been made at the last term, and we must, therefore, deny the motion.

Motion denied.  