
    William H. Lender v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      A parol contract is made in 1885 bet wet'll a quartermaster and the owner of a sloop, whereby it is agreedby the quartermaster that the sloop shall be returned from the Government service in as good condition as when hired. The sloop is returned in a damaged condition, and the owner seeks to recover on the contract.
    
    ■Where a statute prescribes liow public contracta shall be made, it in legal effect prohibits all contracts made otherwise. Therefore, where a contract for the uso of a sloop was not in writing, as required by the Act ‘Ml June, 1882, (12 Stat. L., p. 411.) Hie owner cannot recover upon it.
    
      Mr. Enoch Totten for the claimant.
    This cause arises on contract.
    This was a charter-party, by which defendants employed the plaintiff’s vessel, at a stipulated sum per month. A charter-party need not necessarily be in writing. (1 Parsons on Maritime Law, 229; Taggard v. Loving, 16 Mass., 385.) And the employment need not be for a specified time; it may be like tenancy at will, {(hitler v. Windsor, 0 Pick., 335.)
    The vessel was to be run at the risk and expense of the defendants, and she was to be kept in repair, and returned in as good condition as when received. A tenant who covenants to keep up the repairs and surrender the premises in as good condition as when he received them is bound even to rebuild if the buildings are destroyed by fire. (Fym v. Blackburn, 3 Xesey, 38; Beach v. Crain, 2 Com., 85; Luxmore v. Robson, 1 B. & A., 585; ifheijfreUn v. Carpenter, 15 Wend., 409.)
    If he neglect or refuse to repair or rebuild, he is liable, and the measure of damages is the sum required to put the premises in the condition in which they should have been returned. {Burly v. Watts, 7 M. & W.Y101.)
    The defendants lost or removed the furniture, apparel, instruments of navigation, &c., and did not replace them, and returned the vessel in bad condition otherwise, and totally unseavmrthy, and have refused to pay, either for repairs, or the contract price for her use. The defendants are bound by the terms of the contract. A charter-party is construed according to the rules which govern other contracts, (1 Parsons on Maritime Law, 267; Airy v. Merrill, 2 Curtis, 8,) as are all special contracts for the hiring of things. (Story on Bail, v. § 426 a, and § 418 a.)
    
    
      Mr. Alexander Johnson (-with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendants.
    On the 24th day of June, 1865, Captain J. E. Scott, assistant-quartermaster, made a verbal contract with the claimant for the hire of his vessel, the Amelia, a sloop or yacht of about five tons burden, to convey supplies from Brazos de Santiago to Point Isabel for a small detachment of troops stationed at the latter place, agreeing to pay therefor at the rate of $225 per month, and keep the vessel in repair. No time was specified during which the vessel was to. be retained in the service.
    In the month of September, 1865, the claimant’s vessel was damaged, while crossing the bar at the Brazos. This bar does not lio between the Brazos and Point Isabel; and it does not appear that the vessel bad any orders to go outside of, or in the direction of, tlie bar. After this injury the Amelia was hauled upon the beach; and afterward she rendered no services to the G-overnment. She was borne upon the rolls of the quartermaster at the Brazos until the 31st day of December, and no longer. No repairs were made to the vessel until after the 11th day of April, 18C6; but she was partially dismantled, and the copper taken from her bottom by the claimant, who was in the-employ of the Government as a bar pilot.
    On the 5th day of April, 1806, a board of survey was ordered by Brevet j\lajor-Geueral Getty, commanding the district of the Ilio Grande, “ to investigate and give their opinion upon the facts and circumstances connected with the alleged use by the United States Government of the yacht Amelia, and the refusal to pay for the same by J. Vj. 0. Amee, assistant quartermaster, depot quartermaster at Brazos;” and the board was directed to “ decide what amount, if any, is justly due the owner of the yacht for her services.” The claimant appeared before this board, and made claim for the services of his vessel at the rate agreed upon up till the 31st of December, 1805, and asked that the vessel be repaired. The board decided that the sum of -■31,402.50 was justly due the claimant for the services of his’ vessel, and that the necessary repairs to put her in a serviceable condition should be made by the Government.
    . It is very clear that there was a settlement in full with the ■claimant. Before the payment he made no claim or pretense that his vessel had been in the service after the 31st day of December, 1S05. At that time she was dropped from the returns of the quartermaster. Whatever may have been the legal rights of the parties, there can be no doubt that the understanding was that the vessel was discharged by Captain Amee on the 31st day of December, 1805. The voucher upon which she was paid was one made out and certified by Captain Amee.
   Boeing-, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The petitioner claims for a breach of contract.

On the facts stated it appears that the contract made between the petitioner and the United States was settled according to the terms of a compromise made between them, and the damage sustained by tlie Amelia fully repaired by tlie United States to the satisfaction of the petitioner at the time, and that therefore he has no claim on the merits. But there is another objection to his recovery; he counts bn the breach of an express-contract to return the sloop in as good condition as she was-when hired, and he must recover on that contract, if at all; but .that contract was verbal, and the statute of 1862 requires such contracts to be in writing. The contract, therefore, does not conform to that statute, and where a statute prescribes how contracts shall be made, it in legal effect prohibits all contracts made otherwise, and no recovery can be had on a contract prohibited by law.

Nott, J., did not sit in this case, and took no part in the decision.  