
    The State of Ohio v. Johnson.
    
      Endeavoring to influence officers of court — By written communications — What constitutes endeavor — Section 6907, Revised Statutes — Indictment thereunder — Requisites and sufficiency.
    
    1. One who addresses a communication to the judges of a court for the purpose of influencing their decision in a case pending therein by disparaging one of the parties or the relator in a suit brought by the state, corruptly endeavors to influence officers of a court in the discharge of their duties within the meaning of Section 6907, Revised Statutes.
    2. An indictment under that section is not defective because it does not charge that the court was in session when the communication was sent or received, nor because the communication does not comment upon the merits of the case, nor because the act charged may be punished as a contempt of court.
    (No. 10662
    Decided January 21, 1908.)
    Exception to a ruling of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County.
    At the January term, 1907, of the court of common pleas of Franklin county, the following indictment was returned:
    
      “Indictment
    “For Endeavoring to Influence Officers in a “Court.
    “The State of Ohio, Franklin County, ss.:
    “In the Court of Common Pleas, Franklin county, Ohio, of the Term of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and seven.
    “The jurors of the grand jury of the State of Ohio, duly elected, impaneled, sworn and charged to inquire of crimes and offenses, committed within the body of Franklin county, in the State of Ohio, in the name and by the authority of the State of Ohio, upon their oaths, do find and present that the Circuit Court of Franklin county, Ohio, is a court in the State of Ohio; that said court is presided over by Judge Harrison Wilson, Judge Charles W. Dustin and Judge Theodore Sullivan; that said Plarrison Wilson, Charles W. Dustin and Theodore Sullivan, and each of them are judges and officers in said court; that in said court and before said judges there was pending and there coming on to be heard a certain cause styled, ‘The State of Ohio on the relation of Mark Slater against John W. Johnson,’ and numbered 2449 on the docket of said court; and that on or about the twenty-eighth day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and six, at the county of Franklin aforesaid, while said ' cause was then and there pending and coming on to be heard, before said judges and officers of said court as aforesaid, the said John W. Johnson, then and there knowing said cause to be pending and coming on to be heard before said judges and officers as afore1'aid, did then and there in the county of Franklin aforesaid, corruptly endeavor to influence said judges and officers of said court in the discharge of their duty in the decision in said cause by divers written words and discourse to the disparagement of the said Mark Slater, plaintiff in said cause, which said written words and discourse were then and there addressed and delivered to said judges and officers in said court in the language following, to-wit:
    ‘Columbus, O., 9-28, 1906.
    ‘Judges Wilson, Dustin and Sullivan, Circuit Court, Columbus, O.:
    ‘Dear Sirs: — I note by the papers that Slater v. Johnson case is up to you. I am a Republican, as you gentlemen are, and I hope I am a good citizen and I would not even suggest to you that you should in any manner violate your oaths of office or in any manner stultify yourselves in this or any cause of action that comes before you. But I would suggest that it is your duty to search very diligently to find a lawful reason to prevent such a man as Mark Slater going back into the office he has abused and disgraced — from which there is not the least doubt in the world he has stolen thousands of dollars. The man has no moral perception and seems to believe that he had a perfect right to graft all he might on the side.
    ‘The Republican party, as you are well aware, has load enough to carry for the present without loading up again with a Slater.
    ‘Yours Resp’y,
    ‘E. T. Ryan,
    ‘Columbus, O.’
    
      “To which above said divers, written words and discourse the said John W. Johnson to conceal his identity or the author of such writing signed the said name ‘E. T. Ryan/ contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio.”
    To that indictment a demurrer was filed upon the ground that “said indictment did not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense under the laws of Ohio.” The demurrer was sustained and counsel for the state excepted.
    
      Messrs. Webber, McCoy, King & Game, prosecuting attorneys, for plaintiff in error.
    At common law, he who attempted to influence the judge would be punished, no matter whether he succeeded or not. 1 Bishop on Criminal Law, Section 468. This thought is well expressed by Chief Justice Lawrence in People v. Wilson, 64 Ill., 214.
    By the commonly accepted doctrine, any publication, whether by parties or strangers, relating to a cause in court, tending to prejudice the party as to its merits, and to corrupt or embarrass the administration of justice, or any publication reflecting upon the tribunal or its proceedings, or on the parties, jurors, witnesses, or the counsel, may be vested as for a contempt; and it makes no difference that the author of the article disclaims such a purpose, or that in fact it has not wrought out its natural results, if it have an evil tendency. Henry v. Ellis, 49 Ia., 205; People v. Wilson, 64 Ill., 195; Myers v. State, 46 Ohio St., 473; Republica v. Oswald, 1 Dallas, 343; 2 Bishop on Criminal Law, Section 259.
    The principle that the statutory provision in Ohio found in Section 6907 is merely cumulative to summary proceedings for contempt is firmly established by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St., 210; 9 Cyc., 32.
    And the converse of the proposition would be equally true — that the power to punish for contempt does not destroy the right to proceed against the person by information or indictment. Steube v. State, 3 O. C. C., 383; Cartwright’s Case; 114 Mass., 230; State, ex rel., v. District Court, 52 Minn., 283.
    The fact that the act may be indictable or punished in some other way does not deprive the court of the essential power to punish it as a contempt. Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 7, 66; United States v. Debs et al., 64 Fed. Rep., 724: Pledger v. State, 77 Ga., 242.
    A conviction on an indictment will not purge a contempt — nor a conviction for a contempt be a bar to an indictment. Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. (N. Y.), 417.
    “Corruption” defined. Worsham, Admr., v. Murchison, 66 Ga., 715; Webster’s Dictionary.
    To “endeavor” simply means “to direct, to strive, to attempt to do” any certain thing. Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, Vol. 3, 2388. And to “influence” is merely “to use a party’s endeavor, though he may riot be able to carry it out.” Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, Vol. 4, 3584. '
    
      
      Messrs. Marriott, Belcher & Connor, for defendant in error, cited and commented upon the following authorities: Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St., 210; Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S., 206; Rapalje on Contempt, p. 25, Sec. 21; Dunham v. State, 6 Ia., 245; Neel v. State, 9 Ark., 259; Section 5399, Revised Statutes of United States; Sections 5639, 5640 and 6907, Revised Statutes.
   Shauck, C. J.

The indictment was returned under Section 6907, whose pertinent provisions are, “Whoever, corruptly * * * endeavors to influence * * * any juror, witness or officer in any court of this state in the discharge of his duty * * * shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than twenty days, or both.” The opinion of the court below is presented to us by counsel for the defendant as presenting a concise statement of the reasons which induced that court to sustain the demurrer. It may be conceded that the words written in disparagement of Slater are the matter written with the corrupt purpose of influencing the judges of the circuit court to a decision adverse to him of the cause there pending, that Slater was not a private party to said suit, but was the relator in a suit brought in the name of the state, and that the delivery to the judges of that court of the letter set out in the indictment was a contempt of court. That the delivery of the letter to the judges was a contempt of court is wholly immaterial, for the same act may be both an indictable offense and a contempt of court. Nor is it important to know whether the judges to whom the communication was addressed dealt with the offender for his contempt or not. We have only to inquire' whether the general assembly has made the act an offense against the public. The scope of the act is indicated by the phrase, “Whoever corruptly endeavors to influence any officer in any court of this state in the discharge of his duty.” Its terms do not permit importance to be attached to the considerations that the court may not have been in session when the communication was delivered, or that Slater was not the plaintiff, or that the attempt to influence the decision of the court was very stupid, or that it was ineffectual. Although the things said in disparagement of Slater constituted the consideration which, it was hoped, would move the circuit court, it does not by any means eliminate the other portion of the communication, for that shows unmistakably that the purpose for which the communication was sent and the disparaging things said obviously was to induce the court to render a decision against Slater. It is of no importance whatever that the representation did not concern the merits of the case. Indeed, that the defendant “corruptly endeavored to influence” the judges of the circuit court is made more apparent by the fact that he presented considerations for a determination of the cause which were entirely apart from its merits. In enacting this section of the statute the legislature must have been prompted by a desire to promote decency and propriety in all things pertaining to the administration of justice, for they used, to qualify the endeavoring, the most comprehensive of adverbs. It is quite in accord with the views of all the lexicographers to say “corruptly imports a wrongful design to acquire or cause some pecuniary or other advantage to the person guilty of the act or to some other person.” The act charged in the indictment is plainly within the terms of the statute.

Exception sustained.

Price, Crew, Summers, Spear and Davis, JJ., concur.  