
    Charles J. BALLAY, et al. v. Amos J. CORMIER, III, et al. Charles J. Ballay in his Official Capacity as The District Attorney of the Twenty-Fifth Judical District v. Amos J. Cormier, III and The Plaquemines Parish Government CDW Services, LLC v. The Plaquemines Parish Government and Mr. Amos J. Cormier, III in His Official Capacity as Parish President of Plaquemines Parish
    NO. 2017-CA-0512, NO. 2017-CA-0515, NO. 2017-CA-0516
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    DECEMBER 13, 2017
    
      Dane S. Ciolino, DANE S. CIOLINO, L.L.C., 18 Farnham Place Metairie, LA, 70005, David C. Jarrell, Charles J. Ballay, District Attorney, OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE PARISH OF PLAQUEMINES, 102 Avenue G Belle Chasse, ..LA,, 70037, Frank A. Milanese, FRANK A! MILANESE, PLC, 650 Poy-dras Street, Suite 2617, New Orleans, LA, 70130-6101, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEES
    Peter Barbee William, S. Culver, Jr., ATTORNEY AT LAW, 8056 Highway 23, Suite 200, Belle Chasse, LA, 70053 -AND-Robert A. Barnett, 19370 Hwy. 36, Coving-ton, LA, 70434, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS
    (Court composed of Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge Marion F. Edwards, Pro Tempore, Judge Tiffany G. Chase)
   Marion F. Edwards, Judge

| tThe three consolidated cases in this appeal involve a dispute between Charles J. Ballay, the District Attorney of the Twenty-Fifth Judicial District, and Amos J. Cormier, III, the Parish President of Plaquemines Parish , regarding a contract with CDW Services, LLC -to renovate a building intended for the future use of the District Attorney’s Office. The construction project was needed because the Plaquemines Parish Courthouse in Point a' la Hache, which housed the District Attorney’s Office, was .damaged beyond repair in a fire caused by an arsonist on January 12, 2002.

Through land acquisitions, block grants and local and federal funding during the administrations of former Plaquemines Parish Presidents Billy Nungesser, Amos J. Cormier, Jr., and interim president, Ed Theriot, the Parish acquired and began developing several acres of land and buildings formerly owned by the State of Louisiana for the purpose of establishing a parish government complex. One of |athese buildings, Building 201, was designated for use as the District Attorney’s Office.

In the fall of 2016, the Parish advertised to receive bids on the renovation of Building 201 in accordance with the process set forth in the Louisiana ■ Public Bid Law embodied in La. R.S. 38 § 2212, et seq. In December of 2016, Interim Parish President Ed Theriot, accepted a bid from CDW Services, LLC (CDW) 'as the -lowest bid, and awarded the contract to CDW. CDW responded timely and completed the necessary paperwork for confection of the contract. However, between the time the project was let out for bids, and the completion of the required documentation process, Amos J. Cormier, III was sworn in as Parish President. On January 30, 2017, Mr. Cormier rejected all bids on the project and refused to certify the availability of funds for the project.

When Mr. Cormier refused to execute the contract with CDW, Mr. Ballay filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus seeking to compel the Parish to execute the contract with CDW, and a Petition for a Temporary Restraining Order seeking to prohibit the Parish from alienating or encumbering the funds previously appropriated for the renovations of Building 201. Additionally, CDW filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Parish to execute the contract for the renovations. Mr. Cormier filed several exceptions to the mandamus petitions, including no cause of action, in which he asserted that the actions taken were ^discretionary, precluding the issuance of a writ of mandamus. In his answer, Mr. C’ormier also asserted several affirmative defenses. All three actions were consolidated in the trial court for consideration.

The trial court considered and denied the exceptions, and ultimately rendered an opinion in which it granted the mandamus and denied the preliminary injunction. All parties have appealed.

FACTS

The pertinent facts are undisputed. A call for bids on the project to renovate Building 201 was properly advertised pursuant to "the Public Bid Law during the Theriot administration, and CDW submitted the lowest responsive bid. Parish officials made certain CDW had a valid contractor’s license and had no issues that would invalidate the bid. Consequently, CDW’s bid was accepted by the Parish, and CDW was awarded the contract. CDW completed the necessary paperwork and secured the required insurance and performance bonds. Parish officials reviewed all documents submitted by CDW, and certified the bid as complete. The final contract was submitted to Mr. Cormier, the newly sworn in Parish President, for signature.

Funding for the projéct came from three sources. $274,000 came from the District Attorney’s office, $1.6 million came from a Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), and $616,000 was provided by the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). Additionally, the parish allocated $60,000 to re-design portions of the building. However, those funds were for design only, not construction.

At the time the bids came in, the Parish was still $712,000 short of the necessary funds. Pursuant to the Public Bid Law, the Parish is required to award |4the contract to the lowest bidder within 45 days or get an agreement from the contractor to extend their bid prices past that day. An extension was obtained, and the Parish was able to secure an additional $800,000 from Sandy Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) money set for use on Building 203, which was under construction. That freed up CDBG money to be moved to the Building 201 project. The CDBG grant was for both buildings, so the funds could be moved back and forth without council approval. Mr. Theriot verbally agreed to the transfer of funds at the council meeting.

Amos J. Cormier III, the current president of Plaquemines Parish, took office in January of 2017. He reviewed the parish finances and the contract with CDW and decided not to sign the CDW contract. Notification of that decision was sent by email to all concerned parties.

Mr, Cormier cited the timing of the contract, which occurred nine days after he was elected president,, parish finances, availability of funding for- the project, and his . determination that the grant funds would be put to better use on other projects in the Parish such as a library for Port Sulphur, as reasons for his decision not to execute -the contract. Mr. Cormier also expressed concerns over the legality of the donation* by the District Attorney’s Office toward the funding for the project, and the lack of an ordinance relating to the project which would authorize the obligation.

Mr. Cormier acknowledged that federal grant money was identified in the bid documents for funding .of the project, but stated that the Parish had not yet received the funds and he did not know whether the funds were actually available. |BHe admitted that his conversations with FEMA were general and he did nothing specific to determine whether the funds were available for the renovation of Building 201. Mr. Cormier also stated that he believed the District Attorney is required by law to be located in the parish seat, although he could not cite the legal support for that belief.

William Poche is a project manager for Hunt, Guillot <& Associates (HGA). He testified that HGA has a contract with Plaquemines Parish to manage grants. He explained that after Hurricane Katrina, Congress approved certain funds. Part of those funds included $616,000 which was allocated to Building 201 to retrofit, - or hurricane-proof the structure, and that money is' still available. The overall grant is for $8 million and works by reimbursement. When the project goes into construction, the grant managers review the invoices for eligibility then pass them on for approval to the State, and eventually on to FEMA.

Mr. Poche stated that the Parish does not pay the invoice before it is submitted to the State and Federal Homeland Security Departments. Rather, the invoices are sent to state and federal agencies and, when approved, the funds are sent to the Parish for payment of the invoices. Mr. Poche testified that it usually takes about 30 to 45 days before the process is completed and the checks are received by the Parish. He stated that he has been doing this job since 2012 and has never seen a problem with payment.

There was similar expert testimony to show that funding from CDBG is managed in a similar fashion. Specifically, there is $4 million in CDBG funds allocated for the Consolidated Government Complex in which Building 201 is located. About $1.6 million of that total was allocated to Building 201. When | ^construction begins and an invoice is received and approved, the Parish can “draw down” the money to pay the invoice.

DISCUSSION

The rulings of the trial court on appeal are the denial of exceptions of no cause of action, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, nonjoinder of an indispensable party, improper venue and no right of action filed by Mr. Cormier and Plaquemines Parish. The trial court granted a writ of mandamus filed by CDW and Mr. Ballay, and made the mandamus peremptory, directing Mr. Cormier and the Parish to execute the contract with CDW for the renovations of Building 201. Additionally, the trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied the request for preliminary injunction , filed by Mr. Ballay seeking to prevent the Parish from spending the funds allocated for the Building 201 project on other projects.

There are appeals, answers and/or cross-appeals filed by all parties. Mr. Cor-mier and the Parish have appealed the ruling denying the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the grant of the mandamus. CDW answered the appeal of Mr. Cormier and the Parish, asserting the judgment is correct as it relates to the denial of the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the grant of mandamus. Mr. Ballay appeals the portion of the judgment denying the preliminary injunction.

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Although several of the assignments of error listed in brief by Mr. Cormier and the Parish assert that the trial court erred in denying the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, in the argument on these, assignments, appellants acknowledge that the trial court has the procedural capacity to hear a petition for [^mandamus. It is clear from the arguments on these assignments that they relate to merits of the issuance of the mandamus, rather than the procedural issue of subject matter jurisdiction. La. C.C.P. art 2 provides that “(j)urisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted.” The actions herein relate to a writ of mandamus and a preliminary injunction. Both actions are within the grant of subject matter jurisdiction contemplated by our legal system.

Accordingly, we find no merit in the assertion that the trial court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the actions filed in this matter.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

La. C.C.P. art. 3861 provides that a mandamus is a writ directing a public officer or a corporation or an officer thereof to perform any of the duties set forth in Articles 3863 and 3864. “A writ of mandamus may be directed to a public officer to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law, ...” “A writ of mandamus may be issued in all cases where the law provides no relief by ordinary means or where the delay involved in obtaining ordinary relief may cause injustice ...” Our Supreme Court has explained that “mandamus will only issue where the action sought to be compelled is ministerial in nature, i.e., where itjs contains no element of discretion.” A ministerial duty is a “simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law.”

The Public Bid Law is intended to advance the interests of the taxpaying citizens and to prevent public officials from awarding contracts on an arbitrary basis to avoid possible exorbitant and extortionate prices. The Public Bid Law allows the governing authority to reject a bid for “just cause”. However, “(o)nce the public entity has exercised its option and accepted a lowest responsible bid, it cannot reject all the bids and re-advertise the project. To provide otherwisé would pérmit the possibility of favoritism in public bidding, which the statute was enacted to prevent.” Once this threshold has been crossed, the entity no longer has the option of rejecting all bids, even for just cause. The public entity is now required to award the contract to the lowest responsible and responsive bidder. Further, La. R.S. 38:2215B provides:

If the lowest responsible and responsive bidder has' timely provided all documents required by R.S. 38:2212, and no injunction or temporary restraining order is in effect, the lowest responsible and responsive bidder and the public entity shall execute the contract not later than sixty calendar days after the date of the public entity’s award of the contract to the lowest responsible and responsive bidder.

The legislative mandates in the Public Bid Law are substantive. There is no discretion afforded the public entity once it accepted the lowest Responsible and | ¡responsive bid. It is at this point-a ministerial .duty. Therefore, a mandamus action is an appropriate vehicle to compel a public entity to award a contract to the lowest bidder under the Public Bid Law.

In the matter before us, CDW was the lowest responsive bidder and there is testimony by Parish officials to show that CDW is a responsible entity with a valid contractor’s license and no issues that would prevent it from completing the contract as bid. Further, the Parish secured an extension of the 45 day period and awarded the contract to CDW, which in turn secured the necessary insurance and performance bonds. There is no indication that an injunction or temporary restraining order is in effect to prevent compliance with R.S. 38:2215B. The Parish cannot avoid its ministerial duty to sign the contract. Thus, any arguments relating to the reasons for the failure to sign the contract in an attempt to establish just cause for rejecting the bid are irrelevant. Since the Parish failed to comply with its obligation pursuant to the Public Bid Law, a mandamus was justified. We find the trial court was correct in issuing a writ of mandamus.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

In his appeal, Mr. Ballay asserts - the trial court-erred in denying his petition for preliminary injunction.

“A preliminary injunction is an interlocutory procedural device designed to preserve the status quo as it exists between the parties, pending trial on the merits.” An injunction is a “harsh, drastic remedy that should only issue where Imthe petitioner is threatened with irreparable harm and has no adequate remedy at law.” “Irreparable injury is an injury or loss that cannot be adequately compensated in money damages, or is not susceptible to measurement by pecuniary standards.”

“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the petitioner must establish by prima facie evidence that: (1) it will suffer irreparable injury, .loss, or damage if the motion for preliminary injunction is not granted and (2) it is entitled to the relief sought’ through at least a showing that it will likely prevail on the merits of the case.” Additionally, the petitioning party must show that money damages cannot adequately- compensate for' the injuries suffered and the injuries cannot be measured by pecuniary standards. Mere inconvenience is not sufficient to support a claim of irreparable injury necessary for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction was recently set forth by this Court as follows:

Trial courts have great discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction, and we, will not disturb their ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion. Of course, this standard is based on the conclusion that the trial court committed no error of law and was not manifestly erroneous in making a factual finding that was necessary to the proper exercise of its discretion. Where one or more legal errors interdict the trial court’s fact-finding process, the abuse of discretion standard becomes inapplicable, and we conduct our own de novo review of the record, (citations omitted)

_jjjln the matter before us, Mr. Ballay seeks to enjoin the Parish from using the funds identified for the renovation project on Building 201 for any other purpose. Mr, Ballay argues the trial court had the legal authority to enjoin Mr. Cormier and the Parish from alienating, encumbering, or otherwise interfering with the funds previously appropriated for the renovations of Building 201. Further, Mr. Ballay argues that, since the court has the authority to compel the execution of contracts under the Public Bid Law by mandamus, it follows that the court would also have the authority to enjoin conduct that would undermine and indirectly circumvent the court’s recognized authority to issue a mandamus. In simple terms, Mr. Ballay argues the preliminary injunction is incidental to the trial court’s order compelling Mr. Cormier to exécute the contract.

Further, Mr. Ballay seeks to take advantage of the jurisprudential exception to the irreparable harm requirement established by the Louisiana Supreme Court for instances when the plaintiff asks for an injunction that seeks only to order compliance with a prohibitory law. The requisite showing of irreparable injury is dispensed with “when the conduct sought to be restrained is unconstitutional or unlawful, ie,, when the conduct sought to be enjoined constitutes a direct violation of a prohibitory law and/or a violation of a constitutional right.” Thus, “(o)nce a plaintiff has made a pri-ma fade showing that the conduct to be enjoined is reprobated by law, the petitioner is entitled to injunctive relief without the necessity of showing that no other adequate legal remedy exists.”

| ia“This jurisprudential rule, however, requires; three findings by the court ■before a plaintiff can circumvent the irreparable harm requirement: -first, that the ■conduct that is sought to be enjoined violates a prohibitory law (whether an ordinance or a statute or the constitution); second, that the injunction seeks to restrain conduct, not order it; and third, that the petitioner has met the low burden of making a prima fade showing that he is entitled to the relief sought.”

The trial court reasoned that the relief sought by the District Attorney is to prevent the Parish from using-the funds identified for .the renovation of Building 201 for any other purpose. The trial court found that the grant of an injunction under these circumstances would, amount to a mandate to the Parish on how to fund a construction project.. The trial court determined that the manner in which the Parish funds the mandated project is discretionary and not appropriate for a mandamus pursuant to the Public Bid Law. We find no legal error in that determination.

The trial judge concluded that the mandamus will require the Parish to. renovate Building 201 for the District Attorney’s use, and that the Parish will be obligated, to fund, the contract. For that reason, the trial judge found no showing of irreparable harm. The transcript shows that the trial court considered, and rejected, Mr. Balky’s assertion that the circumstances of this case fit into the jurisprudential exception to the irreparable harm requirement. The court found that the conduct sought to be enjoined does not constitute a direct violation of a prohibitory law or a violation of a constitutional right. Therefore, Mr. -Ballay is not entitled to an 11sinjunction. Upon review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in that ruling. This assignment is without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED 
      
      . Mr. Cormier represents himself as parish president, and the Parish of Plaquemines as its president in these actions.
     
      
      . It appears that the temporary restraining order was granted. However, that is not clear from this designated record.
     
      
      . La.R.S. 38:2215
     
      
      . La. C.C.P. art. 3863.
     
      
      . La. C.C.P. art. 3862.
     
      
      . Newman Marchive Partnership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 07-1890 (La. 4/8/08), 979 So.2d 1262, 1269.
     
      
      . Landis Const. Co., LLC v. Reg'l Transit Auth., 2015-0854 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/25/16), 195 So.3d 598, 605, (quoting Newman Marchive P'ship, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 07-1890, p. 5 (La. 4/8/08), 979 So.2d 1262, 1266).
     
      
      . Haughton Elevator Div. v. State Div. of Admin., 367 So.2d 1161, 1164 (La. 1979).
     
      
      . La. R.S. 38:2214B.
     
      
      . Wallace C. Drennan, Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 2000-1146 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/3/01), 798 So.2d 1167, 1177 (citations omitted).
     
      
      . New Orleans Rosenbush Claims Service, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 94-2223, (La. 4/10/95), 653 So.2d 538.
     
      
      . Enmon Enterprises, L.L.C. v. City of New Orleans ex rel. New Orleans Aviation Bd., 2011-0459 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/28/11), 76 So.3d 548, 553, writ denied, 2011-2580 (La. 2/3/12), 79 So.3d 1029.
     
      
      . See New Orleans Rosenbush Claims Service, Inc., supra.
     
      
      . Desire Narcotics Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. State, Dep't of Health & Hosps., 2007-0390 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/17/07), 970 So.2d 17, 20.
     
      
      . MST Enterprises Co. v. City of New Orleans, 2015-0112 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/29/15), 174 So.3d 195, 198, (citing, Kruger v. Garden Dist. Ass'n., 00-1135 p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/17/01), 779 So.2d 986, 991).
     
      
      . Easterling v. Estate of Miller, 2014-1354 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/23/15), 184 So.3d 222, 229 (citing Smith v. Brumfield, 2013-1171 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/15/14), 133 So.3d 70, 75).
     
      
      . Id. 184 So.3d at 228.
     
      
      . Saunders v. Stafford, 05-0205 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/11/06), 923 So.2d 751, 754.
     
      
      . Hobbs v. Gorman, 595 So.2d 1264, 1266 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1992).
     
      
      . Easterling, 184 So.3d at 226.
     
      
      . Jurisich v. Jenkins, 99-0076 (La. 10/19/99), 749 So.2d 597.
     
      
      . Id. 749 So.2d at 599.
     
      
      . Constr. Diva, L.L.C. v. New Orleans Aviation Bd., 2016-0566 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/14/16), 206 So.3d 1029, 1035, writ denied, 2017-0083 (La. 2/24/17), 216 So.3d 59, (citing Jurisich v. Jenkins, supra 749 So.2d at 599).
     
      
      
        . Constr. Diva, L.L.C., 206 So.3d at 1035.
     