
    Manjit SINGH, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-3580.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 15, 2016.
    Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director; Gregory M. Kelch, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: RALPH K WINTER, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CHRISTOPHER F, DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Manjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of an August 27, 2014, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reconsider a prior order and to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Manjit Singh, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Aug. 27, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of motions to reconsider and to reopen for abuse of discretion. Nolasco v. Holder, 637 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir.2011) (motions to reconsider); Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (motions to reopen).

Singh’s motion to reconsider argued that the BIA erred in declining to equitably toll the time for filing his first motion to reopen, filed many years after his remand proceeding was terminated, due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Singh argued that counsel’s ineffectiveness was so cleat-on the face of the record that he was excused from his admitted noncompliance with the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A.1988). See Jian Yun Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 409 F.3d 43, 46-47 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that failure to comply with hozada is a valid basis for denial of reopening). The BIA did not abuse its discretion by requiring compliance with hozada. Singh had not explained how counsel was ineffective, and the record showed that Singh had been warned of the consequences of failing to comply with the terms of his voluntary departure.

With respect to his second request to reopen, Singh submitted another affidavit, giving slightly more detail regarding his counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. However, he does not, and cannot, dispute that the immigration judge (“IJ”) informed him of the consequences of failing to depart. In light of the overwhelming record evidence that he understood the requirements for voluntary departure, Singh’s conclusory allegations do not establish that the alleged ineffectiveness is sufficiently “clear on the face of the record” to excuse his noncompliance with the Lozada requirements. Jian Yun Zheng, 409 F.3d at 46-47. Accordingly the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his second motion to reopen. To the extent Singh now argues the changed country conditions exception to the time and number limitations, he neither sufficiently argued the exception below nor applied for asylum, which is the only reason to reopen based on changed conditions. U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  