
    LONDON & PROVINCIAL MARINE & GENERAL INS. CO., LIMITED, OF LONDON, v. SYKES et al.
    No. 9188.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.
    Dec. 6, 1933.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1934.
    L. Hamilton Lowe, of Corpus Christi, Heck & Spence, of San Antonio, and Kleberg & Eckhardt, of Corpus Christi, for appellant.
    Boone, Raymer & Davis, of Corpus Christi, for appellee.
   MURRAY, Justice.

Appellees, P. R. Sykes, Sr., and P. R. Sykes, Jr., doing business under the name of Sykes-Furniture Company, instituted this suit against R> E. Strong and appellant, London & Provincial Marine & General Insurance Company, Limited, to recover upon an insurance pblicy issued by appellant On fur-' niture sold by appellees to Strong', and insured against loss by fire.

Appellant presents but one proposition, which is ,as follows: “Since the Appel-lees brought this suit in their own right1 against the Insurer and Insured jointly, asserting rights against the Insurer' under a written instrument, a policy of insurance," the sainé necessarily is the criterion of "their' right to recover, and said policy, which they1 plead in full, shows that the only 'proper-: ty for which -the-Appellant is‘ responsible to the Appellees as mortgagees, is- ‘build-’ ing items’, and there being no provision.,in the policy giving them any right to bring any suit, or to assert'any direct claim against the Insurer for the loss of anything other-than ‘building items’, they have no right to recover anything in > this suit, ■ which is brought solely and alone for the loss of furniture,- ho mistake being plead and no reformation of the contract sought by the pleadings.” ,

The insurance policy in this case was secured by Strong from appellant on $2,000-worth of furniture, for the benefit and pro-1" tection of appellees, who held a mortgage upon the furniture securing the purchase-' price of the same. The policy does not purport to insure anything other than the fur-' niture. It does not cover any building. -

The policy provides, under the heading, “Loss Payable Clause or Mortgage Clause”': “Loss, if any, on building items payable to Sykes Furniture Company as interest may' appear, subject to the provisions of the Loss Payable or Mortgage Clause (state which) loss payable as elsewhere embodied in this policy.” And under the heading, “Mortgage-Clause With Full Contribution”: “Loss or damage, if any, on building items under this policy shall be payable to Mortgagee (or trustee) namefi in face of policy as such interest may appear.”

The furniture was destroyed by fire, and the jury found its market value to be $1,-400.

If the above clauses be given their literal meaning, it is clear that appellees cannot recover,, as they did not have a lien on any" •building items, nor does the policy insure any building'items.

However, we are of the opinion this policy should be construed- from its four corners, ■ and its real meaning and purpose arrived at from the 'entire instrument It is clear from - the entire instrument that this was a pblicy of ‘insurance covering only furniture. ‘ That it was taken for the protection "of the Sykes' Furniture Company, who were the mortgagees. The words “on building items” should be treated ás surplusage and disregarded. When this is done the true intention of the parties is given effect and appellees’ right to recover is clearly established'. 13 C. J. 535, 538; Trinity Portland Cement Co. v. Lion Bonding & Surety Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 229 S. W. 483; 9 Cyc.pp. 580, 584, 585; Hatt v. Walker (Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S.W.(2d) 489; Gibbs v. Barkley (Tex. Cbm. App.) 242 S. W. 462, 464.

This policy w^-s'prepared by..¿lie agent" of the insurance company, and it is' a well-, established rule of law, thjat a contract will be.construed mqst strongly against the party ‘preparing same, |partículárly' when it isf drawn with the use of 'á printed form pre-, pared by one’ of.the parties, 'as, was shown ti>' be, the case here. Whittington v. Cameron Compress Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 268 S. W. 216, 218; Provident Ins. Co. v. Lemmons (Tex. Civ. App.) 63 S.W.(2d) 392.

The judgment is affirmed.  