
    Joseph A. Harris et ux., Appellants, vs. Louis L. Angell et als.
    
    In the report of commissioners upon claims against the insolvent estate of a decedent, each allowance of a claim is a separate judgment in favor of the claimant, although all the allowances be contained in one report.
    In case of an appeal under Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 186, §§ 13,14, a separate appeal must be taken to each allowance.
    When a single appeal was taken to the report of commissioners allowing three claims against the estate of an insolvent decedent:
    
      ffeld9 that the appeal was void and could not be amended, as there was nothing to amend.
    Appeal from the report of commissioners on the estate of an insolvent decedent. On motion to dismiss the appeal.
    
      October 20, 1888.
   Durfee, C. J.

This is an appeal from a report ofi commissioners allowing certain claims against the estate of Frank D. Earle, deceased, said estate having been represented insolvent. Three different claims. are allowed to three different persons. The appeal is from the report generally, and from the allowances en masse. The appellees move its dismissal on the ground that such an appeal is inadmissible under the statute. Their contention is that, though there is but one report, it nevertheless embraces as many judgments as there are allowances, each allowance being a separate judgment in favor of the creditor, making claim, for the amount allowed. We think this view is correct. See Mowry v. Peck, 2 R. I. 60. The record does not show in what right the appeal was taken, being defective in that particular, but we think we may safely assume that it was taken in the right of the female appellant as next of kin. The statute which gives an appeal to such persons is Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 186, § 13. It provides that any such person who is “dissatisfied with the allowance by the commissioners of any claim . . . may appeal from the judgment of such commissioners in respect of such claim to the Supreme Court.” Clearly it is from the judgment of the commissioners in respect of some particular claim that the appeal is given, each allowance being recognized as a separate judgment. 'The next following section proceeds on the same view. It provides that “the judgment ofjdie Supreme Court respecting such claim shall ascertain the amount of the same to be added to or deducted from the report of the commissioners,” and that “ the costs of the appeal shall be awarded by the court against either party, or divided between them, as justice may require, and execution therefor shall issue accordingly.” The language is appropriate to appeals from separate allowances, not to a single appeal from the report generally, including all the allowances therein. Moreover, it is contrary to legal usage and reason to oblige several persons, having their several claims respectively, to litigate them together, under a single appeal, before either court or jury. Such a confusion of distinct matters would be embarrassing to court or jury as well as to the parties ; and the law makes no provision for a severance of the different claims into different cases, if such an appeal were permitted. Motion granted.

May 4, 1889.

After the above decision this case came again before the court, as the appellants requested leave to amend the appeal.

Per. Curiam. This is a single appeal from a report of commissioners on an estate which had been represented insolvent, allowing three separate claims against the estate in favor of three different persons. At a former term the court declared the appeal invalid, the allowance in each case being in effect a separate judgment, which, if appealed from, should have been appealed from separately. The counsel for the appellants, now moves to amend the appeal by striking out so much as purports to appeal from the allowance of all but one of the claims, thus, as he hopes, validating it. We do not think the amendment would avail. The appeal, being originally void, was without effect. It was as if it had not been taken. There is nothing which warrants our finding it valid as to one and invalid as to the other two, since it purports to extend to all alike. It was not defective merely, but a nullity, so that there is nothing here to be amended.

Edward O. Dubois, for appellants.

Benjamin N. Lapham, for appellees.

Motion dismissed. Proceeding dismissed as void.  