
    Price v. Campbell.
    [April, 1804.]
    Court of Appeals — Decree—Binding Effect upon Lower Court. — The couft of chancery cannot, upon the same facts, alter a decree of the court of appeals.
    The suit, in this case, was brought to foreclose a mortgage given to secure payment of a sterling debt; but, through mistake, the commissioner in stating the account calculated it, as current money; which, of course, greatly reduced the demand. This report however was, without observing the *'erro'r, confirmed, and an interlocutory decree made for a sale of the mortgaged property to satisfy' it. The defendants appealed to the court of appeals; where the decree was affirmed. But, when thé cause went back to the court of chancery, the mistake was discovered; and, by that court, corrected. The defendants appealed from the correcting decree to the court of appeals.
    For the appellants it was insisted, that the court of chancery had not authority' to change the decree of this court. That the precedent would be dangerous, if inferior tribunals should be allowed the decrees of the court of appeals, as there would then be no end to controversies; and no man could say when a suit was ended. That, if the practice prevailed, the decree of this court might be altered after they had been carried into execution by the court of chancery ; the cause put off the docket; and to every appearance finally ended. That in-térest reipublicao ut sit finis litium was a sound maxim; and it was, upon that ground, that White v. Atkinson, 2 Call, 376, was decided: which ought to be adhered to.
    On the other side, it was contended, that, as the decree was interlocutory, it might be corrected: and that no danger could result from it, as the point had never been mentioned, or adverted to by this court at the time of affirming the first decree.
    Cur. adv. vult.
    
      
      Conrt of Appeals — Decree—Binding Effect upon Lower Court. — Upon the question, of the binding-effect of a decree of the court of appeals, upon the lower court, the principal case is cited in the following: foot-note to White v. Atkinson, 2 Call 376; foot-note to Towner v. Lane, 9 Leigh 262; Campbell v. Campbell, 22 Gratt. 666: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmitt, 77 Va. 374; Frazier v. Frazier, 77 Va. 784: Effinger v. Kenney, 79 Va. 553: Findlay v. Trigg, 83 Va. 543, 3 S. E. Rep. 142; W. O. & W. R. Co. v. Cazenove, 83 Va. 751, 3 S. E. Rep. 433; Krise v. Ryan, 90 Va. 713, 19 S. E. Rep. 783; Cady v. Gale, 5 W. Va. 507; Henry v. Davis, 13 W. Va. 252; Harmon v. Bowyer, 15 W. Va. 544, 545. As bearing on this question, see also, Bank of Old Dominion v. McVeigh, 29 Gratt. 554. and note; Blackwell v. Bragg, 78 Va. 529; McCormick v. Wright, 79 Va. 524; Stuart v. Preston, 80 Va. 625; Woodson v. Leyburn, 83 Va. 843, 3 S. E. Rep. 873; Lore v. Hash, 89 Va. 277, 15 S. E. Rep. 549; Carter v. Hough, 89 Va. 503, 16 S. E. Rep. 665; McCullough v. Dashiell, 85 Va. 37, 6 S. E. Rep. 610. See generally, monographic note on ‘ Appeals.”
    
   TUCKER, Judge.

The single question is, Whether the chancellor could, upon the same facts, change the decree of this court? The case of White v. Atkinson, 2 Call, 376, decides that he could not; and I approve of that decision. It makes no difference, that it does not appear that the mistake was noticed at the time of affirming the former decree; for the point was fairly-presented upon the record; and it cannot be admitted that the court did not advert to it. A ^'contrary doctrine would overthrow the whole theory of the law; which supposes every thing contained in the record to have been decided on; and has wisely established the rule that interest reipublicas res judicatas non rescindí. For I cannot conceive of any thing more inconvenient to society, than a power in the courts below to reverse and alter the solemn judgments of the supreme tribunal, as controversies would then be perpetual, and suits become interminable. I think' therefore that the principle established, in the case of White v. Atkinson, ought to be adhered to; and consequently that the decree ought to be reversed.

ROANE, Judge, was of opinion that the' decree should be reversed.

CARRINGTON, Judge.

White v. Atkinson, was a similar case; and there it was decided, that the court of chancery could not, upon the same facts, alter the decree of this court; which decision ought to be adhered to: or there will be no end to controversies; and parties will never be certain as to the result of the suit.

PER CUR. Reverse the decree.  