
    Grubb’s Lessee vs. M’Clatchy.
    The verdict of a jury will not be disturbed in the supreme court, unless there existed a great preponderance of evidence against it.
    Ejectment. The ancestor of the lessor of the plaintiff was a white man, who had married an Indian wife, by whom he had three children. His wife died previous to the treaty of 1817, but his children lived with him, and he resided on the territory ceded by the Indians, when the treaty of 1819 was made. He registered his name for the reservation in dispute, on the 29th June 1819. In the summer and fall of 1819, he lived on, and improved the place in dispute, and then left it and went to Pennsylvania, leaving a man by the name of Thorn, and some of his slaves, in possession. During his absence, Thorn left the place, taking with him the negroes. In 1821, he returned from Pennsylvania, and caused the houses on his reservation to be removed, and put up at a place near Calhoun; at this latter place be lived until his death in 1823.
    The lessor of the plaintiff’s said ancestor, told a man by the name of Bradford, that he was dissatisfied with the reservation, that he did not claim it, and never intended to claim it. He told another witness he intended to abandon the reservation, and move the houses to Calhoun, which he afterwards did.
    The circuit court charged the jury, “that the intention of Grubb to remove from, and finally abandon his reservation, must be made out by clear and satisfactory proof; that if his removal was occasioned by force or fear, and he yet had it in contemplation to assert his right, when a convenient opportunity offered, this was not such abandonment as was contemplated by the treaty of 1817; that the acts of Grubb at the time of removal, as well as his subsequent acts and conduct, were tobe taken into consideration by the jury; and if they believed he had freely and voluntarily abandoned the place in dispute, with a deliberate intention of not returning, the plaintiff could not recover in the action. But if Grubb always intended to insist on his reservation, mere temporary absence would- not be sufficient to deprive him of his right.”
    The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, upon which judgment was rendered; from which a writ of error was prosecuted to this court.
    
      Jamagan and Meigs, for plaintiff in error.
    Two questions arise upon this record. 1. Whether the registry of Grubb’s name in the office of the Cherokee agent, is not conclusive evidence of all the facts necessary to entitle him to a reservation?
    2. Whether the removal here proved, is such a removal as will cause the land to revert to the United States?
    The court declined to charge the jury upon the first question, though requested to do so. This is error. Cooke’s Rep. 289. Upon the second question, the court charged the jury, that the acts and sayings of Grubb, not only at the time of removal, but his acts and sayings afterwards, were to be taken into view to determine whether he intended so to remove as to let the land revert to the United States>
    
      Lea and Churchwell^ for defendant in error.
    The principal point has been the removal from the reservation, and particularly as to the intention connected with removal; and if all other grounds were conceded to the plaintiff, it is difficult to conjecture the ground of hope for reversal, inasmuch as the circuit court administered the law fully, and the jury have as folly determined the facts of removal and requisite intention against the plaintiff.
    Another question might arise on the previous registrations of the reservee; but, particularly, whether he was not fixed under the treaty of 1817, to the south west of Hiwassee river, by virtue of his reservation there, &c. and in questioning his right to take a reservation, it would be necessary to consider how far the register itself may be conclusive. This would create an enquiry into the propriety of continuing the register after the treaty of 1819, and what was intended as to reservations under that treaty.
   Per Curiam.

The question of abandonment upon which this cause turns, is a question of fact for a jury. It is difficult to conceive terms in which the court could more folly and fairly have left this question to the jury, than those used by the judge in this cause; his charge was full, fair and explicit; and having thus fairly left the question to the jury, this court will not disturb their verdict, unless we believed there existed a greatprepon-derance of testimony against it. But we think the evidence in this cause well warranted the finding of the jury. Let the judgment be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  