
    [No. 968.]
    GEORGE SPANGEL v. AMBROSE C. DELLINGER, RICHARD M. TREADWAY, JOSEPH W. REAY, and JOHN S. ELLIS.
    Afpeabanoe of Counsel.—Where counsel appears expressly for certain defendants in an action, his signature to papers in the case after that time as the attorney for the defendants, will be construed as limited to those defendants for whom he expressly appeared.
    Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, City and County of San Francisco.
    The plaintiff sued to have certain deeds from Treadway to Dellinger, and Rom Dellinger to Reay, set aside, on the ground that the first was made with intent to defraud creditors, and that the second was obtained by Reay with full knowledge of such fraudulent intent; and also to enjoin defendant Ellis, as Sheriff, from executing the deed for the property in suit to Reay. The Court found in favor of the plaintiff, and rendered judgment in his favor. Defendants Reay and Ellis moved for a new trial; the motion was denied, and on appeal the order denying the motion was reversed.
    The other facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
    [The former decisions in this case are reported in 34 Cal. 476, and 38 Cal. 278.]
    
      
      E. A. Lawrence, for Appellants.
    
      James B. Townsend and Nathaniel Bennett, for Respondent.
   By the Court, Sprague, J.:

The attorney for Reay and Ellis moves that the appeal in the above entitled cause be considered, and that the cause be determined as to defendants Dellinger and Treadway. On the former hearing it was considered by the Court—and such seems to have been the understanding of counsel—that the motion for a new trial had been made and the appeal taken by Reay and Ellis alone. Upon a reexamination of the record we are satisfied that our former construction was correct. Counsel appeared expressly for Reay and Ellis. His signature to pleadings, etc., after that time, as the attorney for the defendants, will be construed as limited to those defendants for whom he expressly appeared.  