
    Nancy W. MONIHON, Appellant, v. William H. MONIHON, Appellee.
    No. 85-2947.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Aug. 6, 1986.
    
      Marjorie A. Schmoyer of de Manió & Kay, P.A., Sarasota, for appellant.
    Michael L. Resnick of Syprett, Meshad, Resnick & Lieb, P.A., Sarasota, for appel-lee.
   SCHEB, Judge.

The trial court entered a final judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage on August 13, 1983. Paragraph seven of the judgment provided:

7. The husband is to pay to the wife the sum of five hundred ($500.00) dollars per month for a period of twenty-four (24) months as rehabilitative alimony. The Court reserves jurisdiction to extend the rehabilitative period if at the end of the period the facts warrant extension. (Emphasis added.)

On September 23, 1985, appellant Nancy W. Monihon, the wife, filed a supplemental petition seeking continuation of the rehabilitative alimony payments. William H. Mon-ihon, the husband, moved to dismiss her petition contending the court lacked jurisdiction because the petition was filed forty-two days after the expiration of the two-year rehabilitative alimony period.

The trial court determined the wife’s petition was filed beyond the jurisdictional time for seeking an extension of her rehabilitative alimony and dismissed her petition. The wife filed this appeal.

Ordinarily, a request for continued rehabilitative alimony must be made before the expiration of the rehabilitative period. See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 309 So.2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Elkins v. Elkins, 287 So.2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). But here, unlike Lee and Elkins, the trial court expressly reserved jurisdiction to extend the rehabilitative alimony period if, at the end of the period, the facts warranted such an extension. Given this provision, the wife was not required to assess her needs until that period expired. We think the wife, by filing her petition within forty-two days after the expiration of the rehabilitative period, did so within a reasonable time.

In view of our holding, we need not and do not reach the other issues raised by appellant.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial judge’s order and remand for consideration of the wife’s petition on the merits.

GRIMES, A.C.J., concurs.

SCHOONOVER, J., dissents with opinion.

SCHOONOVER, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

Absent a valid reservation of jurisdiction, the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for modification only so long as the spouse’s obligation to make payment of rehabilitative alimony is executory in whole or in part. Lee; see also, Brown v. Brown, 338 So.2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Elkins; § 61.14, Fla.Stat. (1983). Here, the husband had completely performed all that was required of him under paragraph seven of the final judgment. Therefore, a valid clause reserving jurisdiction was required in order for the trial court to entertain a petition for modification filed past the expiration of the alimony period. In view of its critical significance, such a clause “must ... be drafted with the same precision as other provisions in the final judgment; it should not contain patent ambiguities....” Mullins v. Mullins, 409 So.2d 143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). The majority interprets paragraph seven as a reservation of jurisdiction to determine the need for an extension of rehabilitative alimony at or after the end of the period. I would interpret it as requiring a motion for extension to be filed at or before the end of the period.

If the court intended to reserve jurisdiction to consider the wife’s need for additional rehabilitation after the time for it had been terminated by performance, it could have expressly done so. See Wade v. Wade, 484 So.2d 83 (Fla.2d DCA 1986); but see, Durden v. Durden, 137 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962) (provision retaining jurisdiction “to resolve issues between the adult parties litigant” ruled too broad). It instead specifically reserved jurisdiction only, in paragraph four, to rule on who would be awarded specific items of personal property contained in the marital home if the parties could not agree and, in paragraph seven, to extend rehabilitative alimony. “To extend means to stretch out or draw out or to enlarge a thing. It implies something in existence. Extend is a transitive verb, requiring an object.” Schlosser Leather Co. v. Gillespie, 157 Tenn. 166, 6 S.W.2d 328 (1928). The object of the extension in paragraph seven is the two year period for rehabilitation. The two year period having elapsed, there was nothing to extend and no period to prolong.

Considering the nature and purpose of rehabilitative alimony, see, e.g., Cann v. Cann, 334 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), I would interpret paragraph seven to mean that if rehabilitation is not achieved as the prescribed period draws to a close, the wife should seek to have the period extended. I would not interpret the clause to mean that she should wait until the period has totally terminated and then seek within a reasonable time to have it reinstated. The reservation of jurisdiction contained in paragraph seven was nothing more than an attempt, as our supreme court suggested in Kosch v. Kosch, 113 So.2d 547 (Fla.1959), to be cautious and specifically reserve the jurisdiction to modify that is granted to the court by section 61.14.

I, accordingly, would affirm.  