
    Lyman Ives vs. Alfred Finch.
    A judgment rendered for costs in favor of the prevailing party on a writ of error or motion in error, is a final and unconditional judgment, on which the party in whose favor it is rendered has an immediate right of action, and which is not affected by the entry of the original action in the superior court, for further proceedings under the provisions of the statute on that subject, (Rev. Stat., tit 1, § 167,) or by the result of such proceedings.
    The court may, in the exercise of its discretion, reverse a judgment for an error not assigned in the writ of error, but is under no obligation to consider such an error.
    Debt on a judgment. The judgment had been, rendered by the superior court, at its term in the county of New Haven, in October, 1852, and was for costs taxed in favor of the present plaintiff, upon the reversal, by the superior court, of a previous judgment of the county court in favor of the present defendant. The action on which the judgment had been rendered by the county court had been entered in the superior court, after the reversal, under the provisions of the statute on that subject, and was pending in the latter court at the time when the present action was brought. The defendant pleaded the general issue, with notice of the above facts, and claimed that the suit had been prematurely brought. The court found the above facts, and the further fact that judgment was afterwards rendered for the defendant, the present plaintiff, in the action so entered in the superior court, but that no costs were taxed in favor [ *113 ] of the defendant *prior to the time of entering the action in the superior court.
    The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant brought the record before this court by motion in error. The motion contained only the following assignment of errors: “ That upon the facts especially found by the court, judgment should have been rendered for the defendant, 'ajid not for the plaintiff.”
    The present suit was originaly brought before a justice of the peace, and was appealed by the plaintiff to the superior court. By the record it appeared that the sum of $50 was claimed by the plaintiff as damages in his writ, and that the court had rendered judgment for the sum of §53.48 damages.
    
      Doolittle and Platt, for the plaintiff in error,
    contended that, under the statute, the whole costs were to be taxed in favor of the party finally prevailing, (Rev. Stat., tit. 1, § 167,) and that therefore the judgment rendered for costs, at an intermediate stage of the case, was, by the entry of the case after the revei'saí, placed in suspense, to await the final decision, which, if in favor of the other party, would supersede the judgment, and that the present suit, having been brought before such final decision, was prematurely brought. They also contended that the judgment of the superior court was erroneous, by reason of the fact that it was rendered for a greater sum than the plaintiff had demanded in his writ, and greater than the court had power to render, since its jurisdiction, over the case was only appellate.
    
      Ives, for the defendant in error,
    contended that the judgment for costs was a final one, upon which the party in whose favor it was rendered had an immediate right of action, and whiqh could not be affected by any later proceedings in the case; citing Finch v. Ives, 24 Conn., 387; and that the error as to the excess of the damages recovered above the amount claimed, could not be taken advantage of by the plaintiff in error, because he had not assigned it as an error.
   *Sanfok.d, J.

In the case of Finch v. Ives, 24 [ *114 ] Conn., 387, this court decided that the original judgment on which this suit was brought was a final judgment. And in the case of Dennison v. Williams, 4 Conn., 402, it was determined that an action of debt on judgment may be brought at any time, and that no reason for bringing it, other than the non-payment of the judgment, need be stated in the declaration.

In the face of these decisions, it is difficult to .understand how the claim of the plaintiff in error, that the suit was prematurely commenced, can be sustained.

If it be true, as he claims, that the judgment for costs was erroneous, still his only remedy was by writ of error or motion in error, and having suffered the statute of limitations to run against him, he is now remediless.

This is the only error assigned; but the record discloses the fact that the court rendered judgment for §3.48, more than the amount demanded in the plaintiff’s declaration, and to that extent the judgment is erroneous. But the plaintiff in error is not entitled, as a matter of course, to a reversal on that account.

The 13th rule of practice (18 Conn. 572,) provides that “ in every writ of error brought to the superior court or supreme court of errors, and in every motion in error, there must be a special assignment of errors, in which the precise matters of error or defect in the proceedings in the court below, relied upon as grounds of reversal, must be set forth, and no others will be heard or considered by the court.” This rule is reasonable, easily complied with, and salutary in its operation. Its object is to apprise the opposite party and the court of the questions intended to be raised, and the plaintiff ought not to be permitted to defeat that object, and abrogate the rule, while he deludes his adversary by the assignment of only a part, perhaps the least material, of the errors whicli he relies upon for ultimate success.

It is true that the court is at liberty to reverse, when the record discloses a fatal defect in the proceedings of the inferior court, although such defect has not been assigned for [ *115 ] error as the rule requires, if in the opinion of *the court the substantial justice of the case requires such reversal. Crandall v. The State, 10 Conn., 339. But the error suggested in the case before us is trifling in amount, involves no erroneous principle of law affecting the merits of the controversy between the parties, and a reversal on account of it would only enable the plaintiff in error to reduce the recovery to the amount demanded in the declaration. “ The game would not be worth the candle.”

The court ought not to interfere in a case like this. The judgment of the superior court must be affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Judgment affirmed.  