
    Ex parte CARTER.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 19, 1911.)
    1. Criminal Law (§ 42*) — Immunity from Prosecution — Agreements of Prosecuting Attorney.
    An agreement with the district attorney, by one indicted with another for murder, to testify for the state until the case against the other is finally determined, when the case against the ■one testifying is to be dismissed, is valid.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 45-48; Dec. Dig. § 42.*]
    
      2. Bail (§ 42*) — Criminal Prosecutions — Agreements of Attorneys.
    Where C., who was indicted with 6. for murder, agreed with the district attorney to testify for the state on the prosecution of G. until G.’s case was finally settled, and upon G.’s first trial a conviction was had, but it was reversed on appeal, and on the second trial G. was again convicted, and appealed, C. is not entitled to discharge or bail pending the appeal, as until the final determination of G.’s case he stands committed under the indictment.
    [Ed. Note. — F'or other cases, see Bail, Cent. Dig. § 139; Dec. Dig. § 42.*]
    Appeal from District Court, Eastland County; Thomas L. Blanton, Judge.
    Application of Bert Carter to be admitted to bail. From a refusal of application, he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Scott & Brelsford, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   DAVIDSON, P. J.

Relator applied for bail, but this was refused by the trial court.

For disposition of this appeal it is sufficient in regard to the matter at issue to state that relator and Grant were indicted for murder. Relator consummated an agreement with the district attorney, which is fully sanctioned by the trial judge, by which he was and is to testify for the state against Grant until Grant’s case is finally settled, at which time relator’s case is to be dismissed. The agreement is such an one as is recognized by the laws of this state.

The agreement and the evidence which he agrees to give, and to which he has on at least two trials testified, are in writing and set out in the record. We deem it unnecessary to incumber this opinion with details of these documents. Relator has responded to his agreement when called upon to do so, to the satisfaction of the state authorities. Upon Grant’s first trial a conviction resulted ; the death penalty being awarded by the jury. This judgment was reversed. Upon another trial Grant has been again convicted, and has appealed.

Relator’s contention is that under his agreement he is held more as a witness than under the accusation of murder. In a sense this is true, but not in the sense that he is entitled to his discharge, or to be admitted to bail. His agreement is that he is only to be discharged when Grant’s case becomes a finality. This has not occurred. Until that event his status remains under the indictment preferred against him. The evidence is sufficient to refuse bail. It is unnecessary to write further than to say that the questions urged are decided adversely to the relator’s contention in Ex parte Greenhaw, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 278, 53 S. W. 1024.

The judgment is affirmed.  