
    Bhupinder SINGH, aka Kamboj Singh, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-756.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 11, 2016.
    
      Bhupinder Singh, pro se, Floral Park, NY, for Petitioner.
    Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director; Siu P. Wong, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., REENA RAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Bhupinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a February 7, 2014 decision of the BIA affirming a June 12, 2012 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re Bhupinder Singh, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Feb. 7, 2014), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. June 12, 2012). Under the circumstances of this case, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA, see Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005), applying well established standards of review, see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir.2008). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

For asylum applications like Singh’s, the agency may, “[cjonsidering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on inconsistencies in an asylum applicant’s statements and other record evidence “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. We “defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

Here, the' agency reasonably relied on several discrepancies in the record in finding Singh not credible. Singh testified that members of the Shiromani Akali Dal Badal political party beat him while he attended a Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar political rally. When confronted with his inconsistent statements regarding whether this attack occurred during or after the rally, Singh stated for the first time that he was attacked twice that day, a fact not included in his written statement. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n. 3 (“An inconsistency and an omission are ... functionally equivalent.”). The IJ was not compelled to credit Singh’s explanation that he did not remember the second attack when questioned by his attorney. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.2005). Singh’s testimony regarding the extent of his medical treatment after this attack was similarly inconsistent: he testified alternately that the doctor administered medication for pain and released him, and that the doctor hospitalized him for two days.

With respect to an alleged attack in May 2009, Singh repeatedly testified that he suffered pain as a result, but that he was not seriously injured. He later testified that he dislocated two discs in his spine as a result of the attack. Singh also repeatedly testified that the doctor sent him home after giving him medication and that he did not stay at the hospital. His doctor’s affidavit, however, stated that Singh was in critical condition and spent five days in the hospital. Singh failed to provide any explanation for these discrepancies.

Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency reasonably faulted his failure to provide corroborating evidence to rehabilitate his testimony, including affidavits from his mother and sister who witnessed two of the alleged attacks. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007). Given the inconsistency' and corroboration findings, we identify no basis to disturb the agency’s adverse credibility determination, which is dispositive of Singh’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See 8 U.S.C., § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.2006).

Insofar as Singh argues in his reply brief that he also seeks to challenge the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand to the IJ for consideration of new evidence, he failed adequately to raise such a challenge in either his opening or reply brief. Thus, Singh has waived any challenge to the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  