
    R. H. Sipes v. John B. Whitney and Benjamin Bowen.
    1. In an action in this state on the record of a judgment of a sister state, which is duly authenticated as required by act of Congress of May 26, 1780, as the judgment of a court of record of such state, such judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, if it appears that such court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the person, and that it is valid and conclusive in the courts of that state.
    ’2. By a statute of the-State of Pennsylvania, the prothonotary or clerk of a court of record is authorized and required, on application, to enter up judgments in vacation, on warrants of attorney on notes, bonds, and other instruments of writing, for the amount which from the face of the instrument appeavs'to be due, without the agency of an attorney or declaration filed, which judgment must be entered on the docket, with the date and tenor of the instrument. The statute also provides that such judgment shall have the same force and eifect as if a declaration had been filed and judgment confessed by an attorney, or as if obtained in open court, and in term time. In an action on a judgment entered under the provisions of this statute, where the record of the proceedings is entitled and made up as the record of the court at a term of such court next after such entry, the complete record of which is duly authenticated and certified as a true copy of the judicial proceedings of such court in the case: Held, that such judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in a sister state, though the transcript shows that it was rendered upon a confession before the prothonotary in the vacation prior to said term of court.
    3. Under this statute it is not necessary, in order to authorize the prothonotary to enter up a judgment on such warrant of attorney, that there be a formal appearance of an attorney to confess the same, or that a declaration by the plaintiff be filed.
    If, however, an attorney authorized by the warrant of attorney executed by the defendant does appear and confess judgment against him, and at the same time as plaintiff’s attorney files a declaration on which such judgment is confessed, the remedy of the defendant for such irregularity, if it be one under said statute, must be sought in the court where the-judgment was rendered.
    Error to the District Court of Geauga county.
    The plaintiff’s petition contained two causes of action,, on which the issues and points of law and fact were the-same on the trial.
    A statement of the first, and the action of the court thereon, will answer as a statement of the second.
    It was an action to recover a judgment on a transcript of what purported to be the record of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, in the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford county, in the-State of Pennsylvania.
    The petition contained the usual averments and prayer, to which a denial of all its allegations was interposed by the defendants.
    The trial resulted in a judgment and verdict for the defendants. Upon motion for a new trial, a bill of exceptions was taken, containing all the evidence. The district court affirmed the judgment.
    The bill shows that the two transcripts were in terms alike. ¥e copy one.
    Among the records of the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford county, State of Pennsylvania, to No. 38, February-Term, 1872, it is contained as follows, to wit:
    
      
      Docket Entry — Spang &; King.
    
    “R. H. Sipes
    
      v. $200.00. “ J. B. Whitney and B. W. ( D. S. B.
    Bowen-
    “And now, December 11, 1871, defendants by their attorneys, Spang & King, appear and confess judgment to the plaintiff, for the sum of two hundred dollars, payable 19th March, 1871, with interest from 19th November, 1870, costs, without stay and with a waiver of exemption, etc., per statement and confession filed.
    “ Jno. P. Reed, Pro.
    
      Judgment — Docket Entry.
    
    “™enfB. wf ’ j33^8" SiPes’ R- H-’ Plaintiff-
    “No. 88, February Term, 1872. Ent. 11th December,. 1871. Debt, $200.00, interest from 19th November, 1870. Costs, $4.85.
    “R. IT. Sipes i In the Court of Common Pleas of
    
      v. 1 Bedford County, of February
    “ J. B. Whitney and f Term, 1872.
    B. W. Bowen. J Bedford County, ss.
    “ The demand of R. H. Sipes, the plaintiff, is founded on a single bill or writing obligatory, dated the 19th day of November, 1870, signed and sealed by J. B. Whitney and B. W. Bowen, the defendants, in which they acknowledge to owe and stand indebted to the said plaintiff in the sum of two hundred dollars, to be paid as follows: Pour months after date, viz., on the 19th March, 1871, with interest from date. Said single bill having thereon affixed a United States internal revenue stamp of the.proper amount, and containing a warrant of attorney to appear and confess a judgment, without stay of execution, and a waiver of exemptions, and the said plaintiff certifies the said sum of two hundred dollars, to be justly due and owing him from the defendants.
    “Spans & Kins, .
    “Attorneys for Plaintiff.
    
      
      uBy virtue of the power of attorney contained in the single bill above mentioned, I hereby appear for the said J. B. Whitney and B. W. Bowen, defendants, and confess judgment against them and in favor of the said R. H. Sipes, plaintiff, for the sum of two hundred dollars, payable on the 19th day of March, 1871, with interest from the 19th day of November, 1870, cost of suit, release of error, without stay of execution, and waiver of exemption laws.
    “Spang & King,
    “ Attorneys for Defendant.
    “Endorsed No. 38, February Term, 1872.”
    These transcripts are authenticated and certified as required by the act of Congress of May 26, 1790, as “ a full and true copy of the record of the case, ... as the same remains amongst the records of said court,” to which Is affixed the seal of the court, and the certificate of the prothonotary and judge.
    The plaintiff offered in evidence the statute of the State of Pennsylvania, under which these judgments were rendered, as follows:
    “ It shall be the duty of the prothonotary of any court of record within this commonwealth, on the application of .any person, being the original holder (or assignee of such holder) of a note, bond, or instrument of writing, in which judgment is confessed, or containing a warrant for an attorney at law, or other person to confess judgment, to enter judgment against the person or persons who executed the same, for the amount which, from the face of the instrument, may appear to be due, without the agency of an attorney or declaration filed, with such stay of execution .as may be therein mentioned, for the fee of one dollar, to be paid by the .defendant, particularly entering on his docket the date and tenor of the instrument of writing on which the judgment may be founded, which shall have the same force and effect as if a declaration had been filed .and judgment confessed by an attorney, or judgment obtained in open court, and in term time. And the defendant shall not be compelled to pay any costs or fee to the plaintiff’s attorney when judgment is entered on any instrument of writing as aforesaid. (Perdon’s Digest, 577.) ”
    The plaintiff also offered the deposition of Chief Justice Thompson, of the State of Pennsylvania, to whom was exhibited the transcripts here sued on, who testified that he was acquainted with the laws of the state, and that these records contain valid judgments, which were conclusive in any other court of that state as judgments, and, ,as such, would be received in evidence in the courts of that ■state, and entitled to as much faith and credit as if entered upon a trial by court or jury.
    
      Durfee & Stephenson, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Canfield & Hathaway, for defendants in error.
   Johnson, J.

To reverse the judgment of the district •court affirming the common pleas, two points are made:

1. That these records do not disclose the fact that they .are “judicial proceedings,” within the meaning of art. 4, sec. 1, of the constitution of the United States, and the act ■of Congress of May 26, 1790.

2. That the record shows that the attorneys who confessed the judgment for the plaintiff were also his attorneys, and, therefore, these judgments are void.

It is claimed that these transcripts are not a “judicial proceeding,” because they show judgments by confession before a prothonotary, in vacation of the court.

To assume that the record, taken as a whole, is not that ■of the court, but of its clerk, is to contradict the recitals of the record itself.

It is true the docket entry shows that the confession was on the 11th of December, 1871, but it does not appear that the court was not then in session, a.nd that the entry, signed Jno P. Reed, Pro., was not at a term of the court.

These transcripts describe the proceedings as copied from the record of the court, and not of its clerk. They are certified by the prothonotary, and authenticated by the presiding judge, as required by the act of Congress, as “ a full and true copy of the record of the ease, ... as fully and entire as the same remains among the records of said court.” They purport to be taken from the record of the proceedings of the court at the February Term, 1872.

It may now be regarded as settled that the judgments, of courts of record of sister states are entitled to full faith and credit in every other state, when duly authenticated' as required by act of Congress, and that in an action brought thereon in another state the jurisdiction of the court rendering the same over the subject-matter and the person are the only questions open for inquiry. Pennywit v. Foote et al., 27 Ohio St. 600; McElmoyne v. Cohen, 13 Peters, 330; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Rose v. Himety, 4 Cranch, 269 ; Webster v. Reed, 11 Howard, 437 ; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 355; Thompson v. Gas-Light Co., 19 Wall. 60 ; Spencer v. Brockway, 1 Ohio, 261; Goodrich v. Jenkins, 6 Ohio, 44; Paine’s Lessee v. Moreland, 15 Ohio, 445.

■ If the jurisdiction of the court is not impeached in either respect, and the judgment is by the laws and usages, of the state where rendered a valid and conclusive determination of the rights of the parties, it is equally conclusive in every other state, and as a judicial proceeding is entitled to full faith and credit.

It is conceded that, by the law of Pennsylvania, these are valid judgments in that state, but it is claimed that an inspection of the record shows that they are not judicial proceedings of a court of that state, but only judgments in form confessed before the prothonotary or clerk of the court, and not rendered by the court, and therefore not within the purview of section 1, article 4, of the constitution of the United States.

To this we answer, first, that the record purports on its face to be copied from the records of the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford county.

Both the caption and certificate describe them as proceedings of the court.

The determination of this point is to be ascertained by an inspection of the records themselves.

As already stated, they are entitled, certified, and authenticated as the proceedings of the court, and not of theprothonotary, made at a term, of the court.

Although the papers are filed and confession entered the 11th of December, 1871, this action is made as of the February term following, and is conclusive in this action.

To assume that these proceedings are not the solemn adjudications of the court, by one of its officers, duly authorized, is to contradict the recitals of the record itself.

Assuming, however, that these judgments were entered in vacation before the prothonotary, it does not follow that they are not judicial proceedings of a court. As shown, that officer had power to enter on the records of the court judgments by confession on warrants of attorney, without the agency of an attorney or declaration being filed, and it is made his duty to enter on his docket the date and tenor of the instrument on which the judgment is founded, which shall have the same force and effect as-if a declaration had been filed and judgment confessed by an attorney, or as if obtained in open court and in term time.

By this statute a judgment on a warrant of attorney,, rendered in vacation before the prothonotary, is as valid in that state as if a declaration had been filed and a regular1 confession made by an attorney, or as if obtained in open court in term time.

That the rendition of a judgment on a warrant of attorney authorizing the same is a judicial proceeding we-admit, but there is nothing appearing in the record to show that the State of Pennsylvania may not confer this judicial power on the prothonotary as well as upon the judge.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, we will presume that the statute is warranted by the constitution of that state. Indeed, the fact is, under the constitution of that state, it is a valid act, and therefore judgments rendered under it are, in that state, as binding as if rendered in term time and in open court.

The statute gave the prothonotary power to enter up-.such judgments, and the defeñdant’s warrant of attorney gave the court jurisdiction over the person. The record, when made up, became the official evidence of the judicial proceedings of the court, as certified, and not the acts of the clerk.

In accordance with this view, it was held in Harness v. Green’s Adm’r, 19 Mo. 323, and Randolph v. Kuler, 21 Mo. 557, that a judgment of a sister state, which appears to have been rendered by the court on a confession before the ■clerk in vacation is conclusive.

2. It is said the judgments are void, because the record ■shows that the same attorneys appeared for plaintiff and the defendants.

It is true that, as a general rule, an attorney can not accept employment conflicting with the interest of his client. "When once retained in a case, he is bound to it by the highest considerations, and must bestow on it, not only such care as high-toned and competent men, under the circumstances, are accustomed to bestow, but he must permit no other interest to divert him from his allegiance.

Therefore, it is said, he can not act as a commissioner to take testimony, nor as solicitor for the receiver whose appointment he moves, nor as master to execute a decree, nor as administrator of an estate against which he is pressing a hostile claim. ("Wharton on Agency, sec. 573.)

. Rut this does not prevent an attorney from acting as umpire by consent of the opposing party. It is likewise competent for two principals, with separate and independent interests, for the purposes of convenience, to unite and appoint a common agent. If this is done knowingly, with the intention that the agent shall represent each, he is authorized, in the absence of specific instructions, and when there is no opportunity of resorting to his principals for advice, to adjust the relations of the two. (Wharton on Agency, secs. 56, 244, 513, 573, and authorities.) Joslin v. Cowen, 56 N. Y. 626.

If, however, without such knowledge or consent, he acts for an adverse party, he is guilty of a gross breach of trust, making himself personally liable to his principal for the-damage, and vitiating, at the principal’s election, any contract made under the influence of such disloyal engagement. Eor aught that appears or is alleged, these attorneys acted also for plaintiffs in filing the declaration, with-the knowledge and consent of defendants.

But if this were not so, their action would be only void at the election of the party injured. It is an act that maybe ratified. That election can only be made in the court, where the judgment was rendered.

It is unnecessary, however, to determine the effect of such a proceeding, if application had been made to the-court where the judgment was rendered.

It is enough for this case to say that, in the absence off any allegation of fraud in the attorneys, or of want of authority on their part to act in the premises, whatever remedy the defendants may have, must be sought in the-court where the judgment was rendered, and not in that of another state; that as, by the law of Pennsylvania, these are valid judgments there, they are equally so here and that, as judicial proceedings of the court where rendered, they are entitled in this state to as full faith and. credit as by law or usage they have there.

The judgment of the district court and-of the court off common pleas is reversed, and cause remanded.  