
    Joseph B. Heizer vs. David M. Fisher et al.
    In a controversy between judgment creditors, for the appropriation of money made on execution, where ail the judgments were rendered before the act of limitations of the 24th of February, 1844, and the execution sale took place after the 24th of February, 1846, the execution first levied on the property - sold will be entitled to the money, without regard to its date of enrolment.
    If,-however, there be a judgment rendered against the same defendant, subsequent to the 24th of February, A. D. 1844, it will, if duly enrolled, be entitled to prior satisfaction ; inasmuch as the general lien of such judgment will be in full force for seven years.
    Where, on motion of the sheriff in the court below, to appropriate money made on- several executions, that' court awards the sum to a particular one, from which decision only one of the excluded parties appeals, the high court in rd-versing the judgment will order the money to be appropriated, to that creditor entitled to it in the court below, without regard to the fact of his having made no objection to the decision there.
    O.v appeal from the circuit court of Warren county; Hon. George Coalter, judge.
    -At the May term, 1847, Daniel Thomas, sheriff of Hinds county, entered a motion as follows: “Daniel Thomas, sheriff of Hinds county, moves the court to direct him, in the application of $600, remaining in his hands, from the sale of certain property belonging to Letitia Dickson, under and by virtue of various executions, from the circuit court of Hinds county, there being a contest between the plaintiffs in said executions, and he having been notified by them, or some of them, to hold the same subject to the order of the court. The following is the list of executions in the motion: Joseph B. Heizer against Letitia Dickson, officers of- court against same, D. M. Fisher against same, Edmond Moody against same, officers of court against same.”
    On the hearing of the motion, the following facts appeared, viz.: On the 26th of October, 1840, Joseph Heizer recovered a judgment, in the Hinds circuit court, against Letitia Dickson for $656, bearing interest at eight per cent., also $13.62, his costs. He sued out executions from time to time, until at last, on the 14th of August, 1846, a levy was made on a lot in Jackson, which was sold, and the purchasers failing to pay the sum bid, it was returned forfeited.
    On the 17th of April, 1847, Heizer sued out his venditioni exponas, and the property was sold on the 17th of May, 1847, for $600. Heizer’s judgment was enrolled on the 22d of September, 1845.
    David M. Fisher’s case is as follows :
    Judgment on the 31st of March, 1840, for $144.07.
    
      Fieri facias on judgment levied, and forthcoming bond executed and returned forfeited, 1st day of September term, 1840.
    
      Fieri facias on forthcoming bond issued 6th of November, 1840,' and enjoined. The next fieri facias issued 14th of August, 1845, bn which part of the money was made.
    
      On the 26th of June, 1846) he sued out another fieri facias, which was levied on the 14th of August, 1846, the same day on which Heizer’s execution was levied, and on the same property, which was sold, and bid forfeited as in the case of Heizer. He sued out his venditioni exponas on the same day with Heizer, and the property was sold under it also.
    Fisher’s judgment was enrolled 17th of June, 1844.
    The Commercial and Railroad Bank of Vicksburg also claimed the money, though no execution had issued in its favor. Its judgment was rendered 11th of January, 1843, for $418.63.
    
      Fieri facias issued 4th of February, 1843; returned no property found. Judgment enrolled 5th of April, 1844, and no later proceedings had.
    Moody’s judgment was rendered 24th of March, 1840, for • $1044.09. Bonded, and bond forfeited, third Monday of December, 1843.
    
      Fieri facias on bond issued 1st of January, 1844. On this fieri facias, Moody directed that “ the sheriff should let it lie over until further directed,” and it was returned stayed by him.
    On 17th of November, 1846, he issued another fieri facias, which was levied 17th of April, 1847, on the same property that Heizer’s was levied on, and sale under this also. Moody’s judgment vfas enrolled 5th of June, 1844.
    On the 28th of February, 1845, an execution issued in favor of the officers of court against Dickson, for the costs due by her in the judgment of Dickson against Miller, amounting to $168.89. • It was levied by the sheriff on a negro. Dickson gave bond, with C. M. Price as her surety, which was forfeited June 16, 1845; on this forfeited bond, an execution, issued on the bond on the 26th of June, 1846, was levied on the same lot with Heizer and Fisher’s, which was finally sold on a venditioni exponas on this, as well as those judgments. The judgment in favor of the officers was enrolled on the 17th of June, 1846.
    The circuit court decreed the money; first, to Fisher’s judgment, and after that, to the one in favor of the Commercial and Railroad Bank. Heizer excepted and appealed.
    
      
      D. Mayes, for plaintiff’ in error.
    1. The time of enrolment is unimportant, for all the judgments were rendered prior to 24th of February, 1844, and had ceased to be liens on the 24th of February, 1846. Hutch. Code, 832.
    2. The appropriation then depends on priority of levy, and Heizer’s execution and that of Fisher were levied 14th of August, 1846, before any of the others, and are therefore entitled to the money. Robinson et al. v. Green, 6 How. R. 227; and 4 lb. 130.
    
      L. Lea, for defendant in error.
    By the sixth section of the act of 1844, it is provided, that judgments, &c., shall cease to operate as liens until they are entered on the “judgment roll,” and the lien thereof shall be from such enrolment, instead of from the rendition, &c. Hutch. Code, 892.
    As the statute peremptorily directs, that the money shall be applied to the judgment, which, from an examination of the judgment roll, has priority of lien, it is evident that the court should have directed the bank judgment to be first paid, it being the first that was enrolled; and the judgment next entitled is that in favor of Moody, it being the next that was enrolled. For the same reason, Heizer’s judgment should be postponed to that of Fisher.
   Mr. Chief Justice Sharkey

delivered the opinion of the court.

The several parties to this controversy had recovered judgments against Letitia Dickson, and the sheriff having sold certain property under the several executions, for a sum not sufficient to discharge them all, returned the money into court, and moved to be instructed how to make the appropriation. Heizer, one of tt?e plaintiffs in execution, was excluded by the order of the court, and excepted.

The judgments were all recovered prior to the passage of the enrolment law, except the one for costs in the case of Dickson v. Miller, and the liens are barred by the statute of limitations of 1844, more than two years having elapsed before the -levy and sale. The parties, therefore, have no judgment liens, and the question is, By what rule the right of priority is to be ascertained?

The act of 1822 bound the property of the defendant from the delivery of the writ to the sheriff. Revised Code, 197. The delivery of the process under this act, constituted a general lien on all the defendant’s property, real and personal. The act of 1824 substituted a new rule, by declaring that the property should be bound from the rendition of the judgment. The former act was not expressly repealed, but its provisions were entirely superseded by the new one. The lien which had formerly accrued by virtue of the delivery of the writ to the sheriff, was dispensed with, and abolished by implication. The act of 1824 is not repealed; it is still in force with certain modifications; the judgments must be enrolled, and in addition to that, there is a limitation on the duration of the liens. The act of 1822 is not revived. Nor is the common law rule in force. By that the goods were bound from the teste. But that was first changed by the act of 1822. Under either of these rules, the common law, the act of 1822, or the act of 1824, the party had but a general lien. The levy of the execution has always been regarded as giving a specific lien, independent of the general lien,.for. it is an appropriation of the property under legal authority. A sufficient levy is a satisfaction of the execution, and discharges the general lien. Ex parte Lawrence, 4 Cow. 417. Because a superior and more definite right has been acquired in the thing levied on. To be sure, if the levy turn out to be insufficient, the party is remitted back to his general lien, if there be any. A levy must have the same effect where there is no general lien, in conferring right. Apply this principle to the case before us, and the rights stand thus. The executions of Heizer and Fisher were both levied on the 14th of August, 1846. Of course they stand upon equal footing, and must be satisfied before Moody’s execution, which was not levied until the 17th of April, 1847. The Railroad Bank had no execution levied, and therefore has no claim to the fund. The officers of court, however, have the superior claim, and must be first satisfied. They have a judgment iien, acquired by the forfeiture of a forthcoming bond on the third Monday of June, 1845, which was enrolled, and is not barred by the statute, as it was recovered after the act passed, and as to such judgments the limitation is seven years. Their execution was also levied on the 14th of August, 1846. But it is said they are not contending for the fund, and their right is not to be considered. The judgment was rendered on the motion of the sheriff, and their execution is amongst the number mentioned in the motion. It was also levied on the property, and, of course, on a proceeding like this, the rights of all parties must be considered. The court is called on by the sheriff to appropriate money, according to priority of right, amongst those persons mentioned by him. Their right appears on the record, and we could not give a judgment which would conclude them.

Judgment reversed, and judgment to be entéred according to the foregoing opinion.  