
    CITY BANK v. TAYLOR.
    
      (Supreme Court of Iowa,
    December, 1882.)
    
    Negotiable Instruments — Held as Collateral — Payment to Payee. Certain negotiable notes were transferred as collateral security before maturity, and the holder brought suit against the maker, who pleaded payment to the original payee: Held, that, to prevent recovery, the maker must prove that such payment was made with the knowledge and consent of the holder, or was subsequently ratified by him.
    Action (in which an attachment issued) upon seven promissory notes executed by the defendant to the order of Hulbert Bros., and by them indorsed before maturity, and held by the plaintiff as collaterial security for money advanced to Hulbert Bros. The defendant, for answer, averred that the notes were fully paid in money and property to Hulbert Bros., who were authorized by plaintiff to receive such payment. The defendant also averred that the attachment was wrongfully and maliciously sued out, and claimed damages therefor in the sum of $500. The defendant had judgment for $98.60. On motion in arrest, the defendant remitted all damages, and a judgment for costs was entered against plaintiff, who appealed.
   Day, J.,

in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: The evidence shows that the notes were indorsed to the plaintiff before maturity, and were held by it as collateral security for advancements made to Hulbert Bros. Upon this branch of the case the Court instructed the jury, as follows:

“ There is no conflict of evidence as to the fact that plaintiff held the notes before maturity. The law presumes the assignment to plajntiff of the notes was for value, and no proof is offered to show that the consideration was not sufficient to sustain the right of plaintiff to the notes. Unless, therefore, the plaintiff authorized defendant to pay Hulbert Bros., or consented thereto before or after payment made to them, or authorized Hulbert Bros, to receive the pay, or consented thereto after any payment made to them, then the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the notes and interest, and you should so say by your verdict.”

This instruction properly presents the law of the case. The abstract purports to contain all the testimony introduced or offered in the case. We are unable to find in it any evidence whatever that the plaintiff authorized the defendant to pay Hulbert Bros., or consented thereto, either before or after payment. The. only testimony on the subject is that of the defendant, that, about the time the first note matured, she was told by McQuiston, an employee in the bank, that the bank had a note due on her on the organ, to which she replied, “ I will see about itand He said it was all right for me to go and see about it; he said I had better go and see about it. I don’t' remember anything else he said, only I had better see Hulbert Bros.” This statement of McQuiston cannot, in any fairness, be construed to authorize the defendant to pay the notes to Hulbert Bros. The verdict is, in our opinion, altogether wanting in support from the evidence. This view of the case renders it unnecessary to consider the other errors assigned and discussed.

Judgment reversed.  