
    Orson Reed versus Loring Bartlett et al.
    
    IVhere, under an agreement between a debtor and his creditor, the debtor procureü a conveyance to the creditor from a third person of ail his title to land specified in the deed, and the creditor accepted the same as a payment in full, but it subsequently appeared, that the grantor had no title to any such land, it was held, that, in the absence of fraud on the part of the debtor, the claim of the creditor upon him was discharged.
    Assumpsit. At the trial, before Shaw C. J., the defendants relied upon a settlement made on the 29th of October, 1833, as a defence, and produced in evidence a receipt of that date for the sum of $ 5 00, given to them by the plaintiff, in full of all demands. A similar receipt of the same date was given by the defendants to the plaintiff.
    The plaintiff, in order to avoid the effect of this settlement, introduced evidence that the consideration of his receipt was the conveyance to him of a tract of land containing one hundred acres, in Pennsylvania, for which be was to pay the sum of $280; and that in June 1833, the defendants procured of one Holley and his wife, a deed purporting to convey to the plaintiff, in consideration of the sum of $ 250, acknowledged by the grantors to have been received by them, all their right, title and interest, in and to a tract of one hundred acres of land in Pennsylvania, designated as a tract originally entered in the name of James Moore, with covenants of seisin and warranty.
    It appeared that this deed was accepted by the plaintiff; and that no claim had been made by him on Holley. It was conceded that this deed was the consideration upon which the plaintiff’s receipt was given.
    The plaintiff offered evidence to show, that there was no such land as that which the deed purported to convey, and that nothing passed thereby ; and contended, that as the terms of the warranty extended only to the grantor’s right, title and interest in the land, the covenants were inoperative and afforded no remedy.
    There being no proof that any fraud was practised by the defendants, in the transaction, or that they knew of any defect in the title to the land, this evidence was rejected as having no tendency to prove the plaintiff’s receipt tó be void.
    
      
      Sept 22d.
    
      Sept. 19th.
    
    The plaintiff thereupon became nonsuit, subject to the opinion of the Court.
    
      Sumner and Ensign, for the plaintiff,
    cited Spring v. Coffin, 10 Mass. R. 31; Woodward v. Cowing, 13 Mass. R. 216; Shearer v. Fowler, 7 Mass. R. 31; Sugden on Vendors, 206; Mowatt v. Wright, 1 Wendell, 355; Griggs v. Austin, 3 Pick. 20.
    
      Barnard and Hall, for the defendants,
    cited Bree v. Holbech, 2 Dougl. 655; Boyd v. Bopst, 2 Dallas, 91; Oldfield v. Round, 5 Ves. 508; Sherwood v. Salmon, 2 Day, 128; Dyer v. Hargrave, 10 Ves. 507; Baglehole v. Walters, 3 Campb. 154; Pickering v. Dowson, 4 Taunt. 784.
   Wilde J.

The chief justice, who presided at the trial, was of opinion, that the evidence offered by the plaintiff did not affect the validity of the settlement and the receipt, and the evidence was accordingly excluded. And we are all of opinion, that this decision was correct. The plaintiff’s only remedy, if he has any, is against Holley. And it would seem, that upon the facts reported, he would be liable to repay to the plaintiff the consideration money acknowledged by him to have been received. For although he is not liable on his covenants, he may be liable to repay the money he has received without consideration. But however this may be, it seems quite clear that the defendants are not liable for any defect of Holley’s title. They procured from him, in good faith, a deed of the land, according to their agreement with the plaintiff, and paid therefor, according to the evidence, the sum of $ 250. That sum is acknowledged to have been received by Holley ; and this is good prima facie evidence that it was actually paid. But whether it was paid or not, we are of opinion, that the defendants are in no respect liable. In regard to the plaintiff’s claim on them the' maxim, caveat emptor, applies with great weight.

Motion to set aside the nonsuit overruled. 
      
      
         Dewey J. did not sit in this cause.
     