
    KELLOGG against CARY.
    In an action of slander, it is competent to give evidence, in order to rebut the implication of malice, that the suspicions of others, with regard to the truth of the words spoken, were communicated to the defendant; but the abstract opinion of others, not thus communicated, cannot be given in evidence.
    Error to Venango county.
    This was an action of slander in which James Cary was plaintiff, and Isaac Kellogg defendant. The actionable words were, in substance, that Kellogg charged Cary with stealing a five dollar note. The defendant offered to prove that other persons in the neighbourhood spoke of'their suspicions of Cary, before the time when the alleged slanderous words were spoken by Kellogg. This evidence was objected to and over-ruled; the correctness of the opinion of the court, in this particular, was the only assignment of error insisted on here.
    
      Galbraith for plaintiffin error,
    cited Morris v. Duane, 1 Bin, 90.
    
      Pearson for defendant in error.,
   Per Curiam.

The assignment of error in respect to the amendment, is disposed of by the decision in Proper v. Luce, at the present term; and the evidence contained in the bill of exceptions, seems to have been properly rejected. Had the defendant offered to show that suspicions entertained by others, had been communicated to him before the speaking of the words, the evidence might have beenpi-oper to rebut the implication of malice, or to estimate the damages. But the abstract suspicions of third persons, of which he appears to have been ignorant, could form no apology for his accusation of an innocent man, who ought not to be further prejudiced by having his cause subjected, not to the evidence of facts, but the influence of popular impi’essions.

Judgment affirmed,  