
    Gurjeet BHULLAR, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-4416 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 12, 2013.
    Sandro S. Paterno, Michael Kimmelman, PC, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director; Joseph A. O’Connell, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, GERARD E. LYNCH, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Gurjeet Bhullar, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a September 28, 2012 decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Gurjeet Bhullar, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Sept. 28, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Our review is limited to the BIA’s September 2012 order from which Bhullar has filed a timely petition for review. We review the BIA’s decision for abuse of discretion. See All v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Bhullar’s motion to reopen, filed in August 2012, was untimely because the BIA issued a final order of removal in April 2010, and was number-barred because it was Bhullar’s second motion seeking reopening.

Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, as Bhullar’s marriage and the filing of the 1-130 petition constituted changed personal circumstances, not changed country conditions, as is required to excuse the time and number limitations. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir.2006) (making clear that time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen may not be suspended because of a “self-induced change in personal circumstances” that is “entirely of [the applicant’s] own making after being ordered to leave the United States”); see also Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.2008).

Although Bhullar contends that the BIA failed to state why his evidence was insufficient to warrant reopening, the only evidence Bhullar submitted with his second motion was evidence of his marriage and the 1-130 petition. Given the BIA’s discussion of Bhullar’s evidentiary submissions in its denial of his first motion to reopen, the BIA’s treatment of the new evidence was not an abuse of discretion, as proof that Bhullar had married his cousin did not remedy the deficiencies in his evidence the BIA had previously identified, and did not establish “changed conditions arising in” India. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Bhullar has not separately challenged the denial of reconsideration.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  