
    The Inhabitants of Hanover versus Isaac Turner.
    If the overseers of the poor relieve the wants of the wife, whose husband has a legal settlement in another town, an action lies at common law for the town, whose overseers furnished the relief, against the husband, notwithstanding the statute remedy against the town wherein he is settled.
    If a citizen of this commonwealth removes into another state, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce from his wife, on a ground which would not justify a divorce here, a decree of divorce so obtained is considered as merely void in this commonwealth.
    Tins was an action of assumpsit, for sundry supplies furnished by the plaintiffs to Rebecca Turner, the defendant’s wife, for her necessary support and maintenance.
    Trial was had upon the general issue, before Wilde, J., at the last October term at Plymouth. The plaintiffs proved the defendant’s marriage with the said Rebecca, and that they lived together some years in the said town of Hanover, until about the year 1804 or 1805, when the said Rebecca left the defendant, and has since lived separate. They then proved that the defendant had grossly abused and cruelly treated his * said wife while she lived with him, which was the cause of her leaving him; and that the supplies mentioned in the plaintiffs’ declaration were furnished at the expense of the plaintiffs, and at the request of the said Rebecca, who, in her application to the selectmen or overseers of the poor of said town of Hanover, informed them that her husband, who before that time had removed to Townsend, in the county of Middlesex, was of sufficient ability to repay the said town for such supplies, and ought to do it.
    The defendant proved that, previously to the time of furnishing said supplies, he had gained a settlement in said Townsend; and that the overseers of the poor in Hanover, immediately after furnishing the supplies, notified the overseers of the poor in Townsend that the said supplies had been so furnished to the said Rebecca, she being in need of relief, and residing in said Hanover, and having her legal settlement in said Townsend; and they called upon them to refund to the plaintiffs the amount of said supplies.
    The defendant further proved, that, in January, 1808, he removed from said Townsend to Rockingham, in the state of Vermont, where he resided (except that he twice returned to said Townsend for short times) until February, 1809; that, at the January term of the Supreme Court of Judicature, in the county of Rutland, and state of Vermont, he obtained a decree of divorce from the bonds of matrimony between him and the said Rebecca.
    
    
      Upon this evidence the judge instructed the jury, if they were satisfied by the evidence of the defendant’s gross abuse of his wife, and that she could not live with him in safety, that any one had a right by law to furnisli her with necessary supplies and maintenance at the expense of the defendant, and that he was bound by law to pay for the same; that the plaintiffs, having furnished such supplies, might recover the amount of the defendant, notwithstanding their notification to the overseers of Townsend, and although they might also be * entitled to an action against that town; the judge being of opinion that the plaintiffs might maintain their action upon an implied assumpsit at common law.
    As to the decree of divorce, the judge instructed the jury, that, if they were satisfied that the defendant removed to Vermont merely for the purpose of procuring a divorce; and that the pretended cause for divorce arose, if it ever did. arise, within this commonwealth, and not in the state of Vermont; and that the said Rebecca was never within the jurisdiction of said Supreme Court of Vermont; then, and in such case, the said decree of divorce must be considered as fraudulently obtained, and that it could not operate so as to dissolve the marriage contract between the parties.
    If these instructions to the jury were right, judgment was to be entered upon the verdict returned for the plaintiffs; but if otherwise, the plaintiffs were to become nonsuit.
    Thomas, for the defendant,
    contended that the supplies having been furnished since his divorce was obtained, he was not answerable for them ; and that if he was answerable, it was to Townsend, and not to Hanover, whose immediate remedy was against Townsend, the place of his settlement.
    
      Winslow, for the plaintiffs.
    This action is not brought under our statutes for the maintenance of the poor; but for necessaries furnished the defendant’s wife, which he is bound by the common law to reimburse, whether it be a town or an individual that has furnished them. The decree of divorce was wholly fraudulent, and will not be countenanced within the jurisdiction of this commonwealth.
   Putnam, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, the defendant contends that he is not liable,— 1. Because he has been divorced, a vinculo matrimonii, before the supplies were made to the said Rebecca; and, 2. If the divorce was of no validity, the plaintiffs have their remedy against the town of Townsend, where the defendant is settled, and not immediately against him. By the statute of 1793, c. 59, § 9, overseers of *the poor are required to provide for the immediate comfort and relief of all persons residing or found in their town not belong" ing thereto, but having lawful settlements in other towns, when tl,vvv fall into distress and stand in need of immediate relief; and the towns where such persons have their settlement are subjected to the payment of such expenses. The plaintiffs found the said Rebecca in want of the necessaries of life, and supplied her; and we have no doubt but they might have recovered payment from the town to which she belongs.

But we are satisfied that the remedy is cumulative, and that the plaintiffs may also have their remedy against the defendant. It does not appear but that the defendant may defend this action, as well as if it were brought against him by the town where he belongs; and we perceive no benefit, but much inconvenience, which would arise from the proposed circuity of action.

The principal question is, whether the defendant is exonerated, in consequence of the divorce which he has obtained in Vermont.

By the laws of Massachusetts, divorces from the bonds of matri many are not to be allowed, as in Vermont, for extreme cruelty; and it has not been suggested that the defendant had, by our statute, any cause for a divorce against his wife. From what appears, she might have been entitled to a divorce a mensa et thora, for his extreme cruelty. Aware of this, the defendant went to Vermont (as the jury find) for the purpose of obtaining a divorce there. It appears that he sometimes returned, to take care of his affairs here, while the proceedings there were transacting; and as soon as the object was obtained, he returned to his estate in Massachusetts. And it does not appear that his wife was ever within the limits of Vermont. She can be considered a subject of that state merely constructively, in consequence of the residence of her husband.

We are satisfied that his residence in Vermont was temporary, and that his domicile continued here. If * he had been absent for years in a foreign country, or in other states of this Union, for lawful purposes of business, anima revertendi, no question would arise of a change of domicile; a fortiori when his temporary absence was for the purpose of evading the laws of this commonwealth, to which he owed allegiance.

It is a general rule, that the laws of a state apply to all who are within its limits; and those who have a temporary residence are considered as subjected to the laws of the state, while their residence continues.

This applies, however, to laws made for the preservation of the peace of the state, arid does not extend to rights and duties arising from the laws of the' state where such persons have their domicile. These remain obligatory upon the subject, notwithstanding a temporary absence.

If we were to give effect to this decree, we should permit another state to govern our citizens, in direct contravention of our own statutes ; and this can be required by no rule of comity.

We are therefore of opinion that the divorce, thus obtained by the defendant, is of no validity here, and does not exonerate him from his liability to support his wife. Judgment is to be entered according to the verdict. 
      
      
        Hub. De Conflicto Legum, lib. 1, tit. 3, § 2.
      
     
      
      
        Hub. ubi sup. 3d axiom.
      
     
      
      
         [Rex vs. Wm. Martin Lolly, 1 Russ. & Ry. 236. — Beazly vs. Beazly, 3 Hag. Eccl. R. 439. — Barber vs. Root, 10 Mass. Rep. 265. — Jackson vs. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424. — Borden vs. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121. — Bradshaw vs. Heath, 14 Wend. 407.— Toney vs. Lindsey, 1 Dow. 124. — McCarthy vs. De Coix, 2 Russ, & Mylne, 620. — Warrender vs. Warrender,9 Bligh. 89.—Dorsey vs. Dorsey, 1 Chand. L. R. 287.— Pawkins vs. Wilson, 13 Johns. 192. — Story, Confl. Laws, 2d ed. 298—306. — See Revised Statutes, c. 76, § 39. — Harteau vs. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181. — Ed.]
     