
    GEORGE HAMILL against ROBERT PURVIS.
    Two partners having a judgment, one of the partners assigned it to a third person, and guaranteed the payment thereof. Held: That an action could not he supported against the firm, on such guaranty, without proof that both partners assented to the making of it; or knowing it, did not dissent.
    Writ of error to the Common Pleas of Westmoreland county.
    This was an action brought by George Hamill against William Purvis and Robert Purvis: William not being a resident of the county, the writ was served on Robert alone.
    The plaintiff stated his cause of action to be, that on the 6th February, 1819, at Cumberland county, William Purvis exiá Robert Purvis obtained a judgment against Thomas Coffey and John Coffey for $756 65 debt, besides costs. That on the 17th .T.une, 1819, the said William and Robert, by writing, by them duly executed, did, for value received, assign over their right and interest in that judgment to George Hamill, and did thereby guaranty the payment of the same. That Hamill endeavoured to recover the money from the Coffeys, but could not, as they were unable to pay — that Purvis therefore became liable to pay, &c.
    The plaintiff, to support his right of action, offered in evidence a number of depositions, the substance of the evidence contained in all which was this:
    
      William Purvis and Robert Purvis owned a farm and distillery in Cumberland county: they were in partnership; William was the farmer, and Robert the distiller. They sold their property to Thomas and John Coffey, and subsequently obtained a judgment against them, on the docket of a justice of the peace, for $756 65. This judgment was assigned to George Hamill, the plaintiff, by Robert Purvis, by the following indorsement made upon the back of the transcript of the said judgment, which was filed in the prothonotary’s office, for the purpose of creating a lien upon the real estate of the defendants, Thomas and John Coffey.
    
    “I do, for value received, assign over all our right and interest of the 'within judgment to Geo. Hamill, or assigns, and guarantee the payment. June 17, 1819.” .
    . “Wm. SfRob’t. Purvis
    
    
      Ia consequence of the inability of Thomas and John Coffey? the judgment could not be collected' from them.
    This evidence was objected to by the defendant, on the ground, that if true, it did not entitle the plaintiff to recover ; no authority having been shown by William to Robert Purvis to execute such a guaranty, which was not in the course of partnership business.
    The Court (Young, President,) being of this opinion, the evidence was rejected, and a bill of exceptions Sealed.
    
      J. B. Mexander for plaintiff in error.
    The question is, whether one partner, on transferring a judgment, which the partnership held against a person, can guaranty the payment of that judgment.-
    The rule is, that over the partnership effects each partner has-equal authority with all the partners, in the-usual course of business. Ghit. on bills, 41-.. The benefit of a guaranty will run-along with the interest in a bond, to whomsoever it may be transferred. Reed v.. Garvin, 1-2 Serg. & Rawle, 100; which seems to establish the doctrine, that the effect is the same, as that of an indorsement on-,a bill or. promissory note. An agreement by one partner, to refer the partnership accounts, is binding on his co-partner. Taylor v. Coryell, 12 Serg. & Rawls, 248. One partner may enter into a composition for a debt due the firm, and may release- it. Bruen v. Marquand,- 17 Johns. R. 62. One partner may seal a bond for the other. Mackay v. Bloodgood, 9: Johns. R. 286. One may execute, under seal, a bill of sale for the other. Ball v. Dunsterville, 4 Dun. & East. 313. In a partnership between a conveyancer and scrivener, one was held accountable for the receipt of the other of money to be loaned on mortgage. Willett'v. Chambers, Cowper, 814. One partner may guaranty for the debt of a third person, in the name of the firm. Ex parte Gardom 15, Vez. 286.
    An indorsement in the name of the firm, by one of the partners, is good, and ought to be declared on in the name of the firm. Manhattan & Co. v. Ledyard, 1 Caines, 192. If one of the partners sign in the name of the firm, the presumption is, that such is the name of the firm, and that it was a partnership transaction. Drake v.Elwyn,l- Caines, 184. The act of one partner shall be presumed to be the act of the other, unless he shows a disclaimer or refusal to be concerned'. Salk. 292. 4 Ba. Jib. 667. Notes to Green v. Beals. 2 Caines, 255. In every thing which relates to their partnership dealings, one partner is the agent of the other-. Gerard v. Basse. I Dali. 119. See also Tyson v. 
      '{Pollock, 1 Penn. Rep. 375. And that there may be a partner■ship in buying and selling land Campbell-v. Golhoun, 1 Penn. Rep. 140.
    This was a partnership transaction, so far as all the circum-■ces attending it being a joint concern, could make it such.
    
      Armstrong and A. W. Foster for defendant in error.
    The defendants may have been partners in the business of distilling and farming, but the sale of their farm was necessarily a dissolution of partnership. The assignment of this judgment and •guaranty was not the business of the partnership, and therefore it is not binding on the firm. Sutton v. Irvin, 12 Serg. & jRaíale, 13.
    
      Alexander in reply.
    Cited Fell on guaranty, 103, 149, 151»
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Smith, J.

There was no proof offered, to show that Robert .Purvis had any authority from William Purvis to sign the partnership name to the guaranty in question, nor any evidence to show a subsequent recognition of the same by William Purvis. In Sutton and McNickle v. Irwin and another, 12 Serg. & Rawle, 15, the rule applicable to partnerships, is said to be, that in relation to their joint concerns, one of the partners may bind the other. His authority, to the other partner, however, has its limitation, and he cannot enter into any engagement to bind the firm, which is unconnected with the partnership; for the law will intend, that when one deals with a partner, in a matter not within the compass of the partnership, he does this, in his .private and individual capacity. Indeed, an engagement by one partner, to bind the partnership credit, in- a transaction unconnected with, and not fairly and reasonably within, the scope of the partnership, is, as to the other partner, fraudulent and void.

Nor does it appear, in the case before us, that it was usual for William and Robert Purvis, in the course of their business, to give such guaranties. The true criterion, whether the act of one partner makes the other responsible, seems to be, whether the aót was or was not done according to the usual course of business. 1 Salk. 126, 292. As then the plaintiff did not prove, nor offer to prove the assent, or authority, or recognition of William Purvis, that Robert Purvis should sign the partnership name or firm to the guaranty, which it was incumbent on him to ■prove ; nor that it was in the usual course of their business, i?o5-ert could not bind his partner William; so that the evidence, in ¡our opinion, as offered, would not have been made out, or did not mate out, the plaintiff’s case, it was therefore correctly rejected.

HustoN, J, — Dissented.

Judgment affirmed.  