
    Eduardo RODELAS-ORTEGA, a.k.a. Eduardo Rodelas; et al., Petitioners, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 07-73688.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    
      Submitted Feb. 11, 2008 .
    Filed Feb. 15, 2008.
    Eduardo Rodelas-Ortega, Bakersfield, CA, pro se.
    Agustina Cid Tepale, Bakersfield, CA, pro se.
    CAC-District Counsel, Esq., Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Oil, W. Manning Evans, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Before: WALLACE, LEAVY and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

This is a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying petitioners’ motion to reopen.

The BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.2002). The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered, with certain exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

A review of the administrative record demonstrates that petitioners filed their motion to reopen on July 20, 2007, more than ninety days after March 30, 2007, the date on which their final orders of removal were entered. In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen where they did not demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See Mendez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 865, 869-70 (9th Cir. 2003) (“prima facie eligibility for the relief sought is a prerequisite for the granting of a motion to reopen”); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (applicant for CAT relief must prove “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal”). Accordingly, respondent’s unopposed motion for summary disposition is granted because the questions raised by this petition for review are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam).

All other pending motions are denied as moot. The temporary stay of removal confirmed by Ninth Circuit General Order 6.4(c) shall continue in effect until issuance of the mandate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     