
    HANEY v. STATE.
    (No. 4625.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Oct. 17, 1917.)
    1. Seduction <&wkey;46 — Corroboration—Sufficiency op Evidence.
    In a prosecution for seduction, evidence held to justify finding in favor of the state on the issue of corroboration.
    2. Seduction &wkey;>46 — Corroboration—Subsequent Acts and Declarations.
    Acts and declarations of defendant’s accomplice subsequent to the alleged seduction could not be used for corroboration.
    3. Criminal Law <&wkey;825(4) — Triaj>-Duty to Request More Specific Instructions — Corroboration.
    In a prosecution for seduction, embodiment of the law of corroboration in a general way in the charge was sufficient, in the absence of a request for additional instructions.
    4. Seduction <&wkey;50(2) — Instruction as to Corroboration — Statute.
    In view of Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 789, demanding corroboration as a predicate for conviction of seduction, in a prosecution for the offense, the court should have granted defendant’s request for a special charge in appropriate language to inform the jury that acts and declarations of the accomplice subsequent to the alleged seduction could not be used for corroboration.
    Appeal from District Court, Hood County; J. B. Keith, Judge.
    Ira Haney was convicted of seduction, and he appeals.
    Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
    M. L. Arrington, of Granbury, and Moore & Myres, of Cleburne, for appellant. E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, J.

This is a conviction for seduction. Nettie Cheek, an accomplice, testified to promises of marriage, an engagement lasting about 12 months, and one act of intercourse. The appellant thinks there is an absence of evidence of corroboration. The statute, art. 789, C. C. P., demands corroboration as a predicate for conviction. Without going into details, we think the-record discloses evidence upon which the jury would be justified in finding in favor of the state on the issue of corroboration. There was association of the i>arties, proof of the offspring, evidence of flight, and conversations with appellant, and other circumstances in view .of which we would be unwilling to hold that the evidence of corroboration was ■insufficient. It was controverted, however, and there were related acts and conversations of the accomplice occurring subsequent to the offense, which, in the absence of definite instructions to the contrary by the court, may have been treated by the jury as corroboration and may have entered into the verdict. The subsequent acts and declarations of the accomplice could not be used to corroborate her. James v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. R. 155, 161 S. W. 472; McCullar v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 215, 36 S. W. 585, 61 Am. St. Rep. 847; Snodgrass v. State, 31 S. W. 366; article 789, C. C. P.

The court embodied in its charge the law of corroboration in a general way which, in the absence of a request for additional instructions, was sufficient. The appellant requested a special charge, framed in appropriate language, to inform the jury that acts and declarations of the accomplice subsequent to the act of intercourse could not be used to corroborate her testimony. The proper safeguard of appellant’s rights under the statute, considering the state of the record, require that this charge be given on request. In a similar case this court has so held. Barnard v. State, 76 S. W. 475. No other error is disclosed.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.  