
    AIWEI WAN, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    14-1304
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    August 9, 2017
    FOR PETITIONER: Theodore N. Cox, New York, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director; Michael C. Heyse, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    PRESENT: JON 0. NEWMAN, DENNIS JACOBS, PIERRE N. LEVAL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Awei Wan, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of an April 10, 2014, decision of the BIA denying her motion to reconsider and reopen. In re Aiwei Wan, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 10, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

The applicable standards of review are well established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008). Wan filed with the BIA a motion to reconsider the denial of her second motion to reopen as untimely and a third motion to reopen. In support, Wan submitted evidence related to her claim that she fears persecution based on the birth of her children in the United States purportedly in violation of China’s population control program. At bottom, the issue underlying both reconsideration and reopening is whether Wan’s proceedings should have been reopened to allow her to apply for asylum based on a change in conditions in China.

It is undisputed that Wan’s motions to reopen were untimely and number barred because they were her second and third motions filed more than a decade after her deportation order became final. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). These time and numerical limitations do not apply if the motion is to reopen proceedings in order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

For largely the same reasons as this Court set forth in Jian Hui Shao, we find no error in the agency’s determination that Wan failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions or her prima facie eligibility for relief. See 546 F.3d at 158-72. As with the evidence discussed in Jian Hui Shao, Wan’s evidence related to Zhejiang Province is insufficient because it does not discuss the use of force in the enforcement of the family planning policy. See id. at 160-61, 165-66, 171-72.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  