
    JACKSON; APRIL TERM, 1842.
    Campbell vs. The State.
    The act of 1827* ch. 15, authorizing the retailing1 of spirituous liquors on days of mus* ter at the house of the person where such muster takes place, is repealed by the act of 1837-8, ch. 120.
    The grand jury at the May term, 184Í, of the circuit court of Henry county, returned a presentment against John R. Campbell; which charged, that Campbell, on the 9th day of April, 1841, in the county of Henry, did unlawfully vend, sell, and retail spirituous liquors, in less quantities than a quart, and by the quart and in larger quantities, intended to be drank on the premises where sold, contrary to statute, &c.
    The defendant pleaded not guilty, and was put upon his. trial at the September term following,
    It appeared that he sold three bottles of whisky to one Carter, containing each a quart or more, which was drunk on the premises; and that the day this liquor was sold, was the day on which a battalion muster took place at the house of said Campbell according to law.
    The defendant insisted that it was not unlawful to retail liquors at his own house on the days of muster, his house being the appointed place; but Harris, the presiding judge, charged the jury that it was unlawful to retail spirituous liquors by less measure than a quart on any day, and that it was unlawful to sell by the quart or larger measure on any day, if sold with intent to be drank on the premises. The jury rendered a verdict against the defendant. He made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and the defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of twenty-five cents. From this judgment he appealed in error.
    J. B. Williams, for the plaintiff in error.
    The plaintiff in error relies for his defence on the act of 1827, ch. 15, which provides, that “it shall be lawful for any person, at whose house any election or muster is held by the laws of the State, to sell spirituous liquors on the days of holding elections and musters, in any quantity without obtaining a licence therefor, to be drank on the plantation of the person selling.” There is no express repeal of this act,* and if it is repealed at all, it must be by implication. The act of 1837-8, ch. 120, may be operative and effectual, and stand well with the act of 1827, ch. 15. Both can be operative, and where this is the case, a repeal by implication cannot take place. The rule is, that the latter statute shall be construed so as to repeal as little of the former statute as possible consistently with the wording of the two. 10 Modern Rep. 118.
    
      Attorney General, for the State,
    contended that the statute of 1837-8, ch, 120, Repealed all laws authorizing retailing spirituous liquors, and cited Dyer vs. The State: Meigs’ Rep. 237.
   Tuuley, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff in error was indicted and convicted of the offence of retailing spirituous liquors. The proof shows that a battalion muster was held at his house in April, 1841, and that he sold to one John C. Carter, three bottles of whisky, each holding a quart or more, which whisky was drunk upon the premises. The defence set up is, that his house was -the place appointed by law for holding of musters, and that such being the case, the act of 1827, ch. 15, allowed to retail. This act gave the power, and constitutes a good defence, if it be not repealed by the act of 1838, ch. 120.

We do not think it necessary to enter into a minute investi-lion of this subject in this case, as it has been done heretofore in the case of Dyer vs. The State: Meigs’ Rep. 237. There the court say, that retailing is the selling of any quantity of spirits less than a quart, or any greater quantity, if to be .drank at the place where sold. And that the act of 1838, ch. 120, does operate a repeal of all laws authorizing the retailing of spirituous liquors, because the doing so is made a misdemeanor, punishable by fine. This decides the present case — if all laws authorizing the retailing of spirituous liquors be repealed, of course the act of 1827, ch. 15 is — and the ground upon which the defence rests is gone. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the circuit court.  