
    The State vs. Farley.
    A libel is a censorious or ridiculing writing, picture or sign, published with a mischievous and malicious intent, towards government, magistrates, or individuals.
    On an indictment for a libel, words spoken by the defendant cannot be given in evidence, in support of the innuendoes.
    The following words were held not libelous, “As Mrs. Reynal says she has been most cruelly censured without a cause, which is absolutely false, I would advise her, &e.”
    So, “ I would advise her to beware, lest facts, which are stubborn things be brought to light, and you will then see who you keep underyour roof,” was held not libellous.
    There must be a malicious and mischievous intent to constitute a libel.
    
      This was an indictment for a libel. — The writing set out in the indictment was the following letter from the defendant to William Rouse, in whose house the prosecu-trix,Jane Reynal, lived : — “ Dear Sir, as Mrs. Reyna! says she has been most cruelly censured without a cause, which is absolutely false, I would advise her to beware, lest facts, which are stubborn things, be brought to light, and you will then see who you keep under your roof. She need not go among her female friends and say she has been cruelly censured, as from her general character, which is perfectly and universally known, we are sure to hear all she says; yours, &c. John Farley.” The indictment commenced with the usual declarations, as in cases of slander, that the prosecutrix was of good fame and reputation, and beloved by all her neighbours, &c. and not guilty of the crimes of murder, theft and adultery, or any of them; but that she held the good esteem of many good citizens, and among others of William Rouse, the grand-father of the prosecutrix’s husband, William Rey-nal, and that she enjoyed the confidence of the said Rouse to such a degree that he permitted her to live in his house and family, and that the said John Farley, before publishing the writing complained of, and his wife Agnes, had raised and circulated certain false and slanderous reports of, and concerning the said prosecutrix, that she was guilty of adultery, murder and theft, which reports came to the hearing of the said Rouse, among other good citizens, to whom the said prosecutrix complained thereof, and of the conduct of the said Parley and wife, in attempting by such base means to injure her character, the said John, wickedly and maliciously and contriving, &c. to injure, &c and to cause her to be turned out of doors by the said Rouse, and to induce him to believe, &c. on the day, &c. a certain false and libellous writing, &c. the defendant made, framed and published, &c. of, and concerning the said prosecutrix, the writing complained of, (setting out at the same time the letter, with the usual innuendoes,) and that if she denied the reports* that he, the defendant, would prove them, and that she, the prosecutrix, was guilty of a falsehood, and that if the said Rouse knew her crimes he would turn her out of doors.
    On the trial of the case, evidence was offered to prove that the defendant had uttered the verbal slanders charged in the indictment, which evidence being objected to by-defendant’s counsel, was rejected by Richabdson, J. presiding.
    William Rouse was then sworn as a witness on the part of the State. — He said, he believed the paper then shewn to him (the supposed libel) to be in the defendant’s hand writing — that it was sent open — that Mrs. Reynal received it and delivered it to witness — that she lived with witness and had his confidence — that he, the witness, made no answer to the letter, and that the letter related to Mrs. Reynal. This was all the testimonygiven, and his Honour, in charging the Jury, stated to them, that the words, “ as Mrs. Reynal says, she has been cruelly censured without a cause, which is absolutely false,” contained in the paper, necessarily imported that Mrs. Reynal was a liar and were clearly libellous. The Jury under the charge of the Court, found the defendant guilty, and the defendant appealed, and moved to arrest the judgment, or for a new trial.
    Rice, for the defendant,
    contended that the paper charged to be a libel, was not libellous in itself, and that there were no circumstances or facts connected with it, either alleged in the indictment, or proved on the trial, to make the letter libellous. That the indictment was defective in alleging the supposed libel, to be to the great scandal, infamy and disgrace “of the said Jane Farley,” and not “ of the said Jane Reynal.” That there was no sufficient proof on the trial, of the defendant’s having written, or published the supposed libel. That the inuendoes in the indictment referred to the previous averments, and proof of those averments having been decided to be inadmissible, the foundation upon which the paper was by the record proposed to be made libellous was destroyed, and the presiding Judge, on that ground, should have directed the Jury to acquit the defendant; and that the opinion expressed by the presiding Judge to the Jury, that the words, “as Mrs. Reynal says she has been cruelly censured without a eause, which is absolutely false,” necessarily imported that Mrs. Reynal was guilty of falsehood, and “were clearly libellous, was incorrect, as the words were susceptible of a meaning perfectly innocent, and were in no sense, justly imputable to them, libellous.— That the verdict of the Jury was contrary to the evidence, and particularly in finding the defendant guilty of publishing the libel, with the meaning affixed to it in the indictment, when the facts by which that meaning was to have been made out were not proved, and the evidence offered to that point, rejected by the Court. That the circumstances of the case rebutted the presumption of malice in the defendant, and the purposes for which the letter was intended, exempted it from the charge of libel.
    Petigru, attorney-general, contra.
   Curia per

Johnson, J.

The evidence offered in support of the inuendoes contained in the indictment against the defendant, was, and I think very properly, rejected by the Court; but the verdict is, notwithstanding, right, tí the paper writing set forth contains within itself, without the aid of the inuendoes, libellous matter. The inuen-does maybe rejected as surplusage. Such is the rule laid down in the case of Roberts vs. Camden, 9 East. 95, and for the purposes of this motion, it was enough to inquire whether the paper writing here set out did not contain such matter. To ascertain this, it will be necessary, ínsi-to determine what a libel is. In Villars vs. Monsley, 2 Wilson 403. Wilmot, C. J. says, if a man deliberately and maliciously publish any thing concerning another,which renders him ridiculous, or tends to hinder others from associating or having intercourse with him, an action lies. But a more comprehensive and perhaps a more correct definition is given by Counsellor Hamilton in the ease of the People vs. Croswell, 3 Johnson, 334, and is recognized by the Supreme Court of New-York, in Steele vs. Southwick, 9 Johnson, 215. A libel, says he, is a censorious or ridiculing writing, picture, or’Sign, made with a mischievous and malicious intent towards government, magistrates or individuals. We will now proceed to examine this paper with reference to these definitions, and enquire whether it contains any thing which is, per se, libellous. The affirmative rests on the assumptions — 1st. . That it contains a direct and positive charge that the prosecutrix, Mrs. Reynal, had been guilty of telling a falsehood, upon which the. opinion of the presiding Judge turned. But, I think, that conclusion does not necessarily follow from the expressions themselves, nor is there any thing connected with them to aid that con - struction. The language is, “ As Mrs. Reynal says she has been most cruelly censured without a cause, which is absolutely false, I would advise her,” &e. Now, although it may be posssible to torture this expression into a chargea-gainst her,according to its obvious .meaning and natural import, it is a simple negation of a charge made against him, that he had cruelly censured her without a cause; and altho’ the language is not, perhaps, the most courtly, the idea conveyed is, that he had not censured her without a cause. In the case of Steele vs. Southwick, 9 Johnson’s Rep. 416, the Court assume it as a universally admitted and well understood, that a publication' simply denying charges imputed to the author and confined exclusively to that object, is not libellous whatever may be its contents. The malicious and mischievous intent necessary to a libel is wanting. The motive is the vindication of himself, and not to render his accuser ridiculous, or to hinder others from associating or Raving intercourse with him, as in the definition of Chief Justice Wilmot, nor is it censorious according to Counsellor Hamilton.

The second assumption is, that the insinuation that she was an unfit inmate of Colonel Rouse’s house, to whom the letter was addressed, is libellous. Here, again, we have nothing to aid us in the interpretation. The language is, “ I would advise her to beware, lest facts, which are stubborn things, be brought to light, and you will then see who you keep under your roof,” &c. Now, here there is no specific charge against her that is either immoral or criminal, or that would necessarily exclude her from society; but we are left to conjecture the worst, or to fancy some error or foible which the writer might have supposed he had detected in her, but which she herself, and the majority of mankind, might have esteemed a virtue. Let us suppose, for instance, that the insinuation was founded on the belief that she was a prude, or that she' professed the Roman Catholic faith, who but a libertine, or an intolerant bigot, would impute this to her as a crime or immorality, and yet from any thing that appeal’s, this, or something like it, might have been the motive ; but on the contrary, it might have had reference to the most criminal charges, and the objection is not, that it does not, but that it has not been made to appear. Nothing but that which is criminal, immoral or ridiculous, can be lib 11'ous, and it is incumbent on the prosecution to stamp that character on this transaction. There is nothing in: ¿he paper itself, or extrinsic of it, which has been brought to light to fix its character. It contains in itself no specific charge of any thing immoral or criminal, or which is. calculated to render the prosecutrix ridiculous, or to exclude her from society, and is not, therefore, libellous. On these grounds, therefore, the motion must prevail, and the consideration of the other grounds stated, are rendered unnecessary.. New trial granted.  