
    Jane L. JOHNSON v. Taetrece HARRISON and Arthur Morrell, In his Capacity as Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Clerk.
    No. 2014-CA-0932.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Sept. 3, 2014.
    
      E. John Litchfield, Berrigan Litchfield Schonekas Mann Traína & Bolner, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
    Edward R. Washington, III, The Washington Law Group, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.
    (Court composed of Chief Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr., Judge TERRI F. LOVE, Judge MAX N. TOBIAS, JR., Judge EDWIN A. LOMBARD, Judge ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge PAUL A. BONIN, Judge DANIEL L. DYSART, Judge MADELEINE M. LANDRIEU, Judge JOY COSSICH LOBRANO, Judge ROSEMARY LEDET, Judge SANDRA CAB RIÑA JENKINS).
   ROLAND L. BELSOME, Judge.

| T This is an election contest suit in which the plaintiff, Jane Johnson, seeks review of the trial court’s judgment denying her motion to disqualify the defendant, Taetrece Harrison, as a candidate for judge in Domestic Section 1 of Civil District Court. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The defendant was admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana on October 13, 2006. On August 22, 2014, she qualified as a candidate for district judge in Orleans Parish (Domestic Section 1 of Civil District Court), before she had been practicing law for eight years. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Johnson filed a petition to disqualify the defendant alleging that she did not meet the requirements regarding the admission to practice law. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiffs petition, and this appeal followed. The defendant answered the plaintiffs appeal requesting damages, court costs, and attorney’s fees.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in denying her petition to disqualify the defendant from the upcoming election. Therefore, the |2issue before this Court is whether the defendant meets the qualification requirements as a candidate for district judge in Orleans Parish.

The interests of the state and its citizens are best served when election laws are interpreted so as to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates. Becker v. Dean, 03-2493, p. 7 (La.9/18/03), 854 So.2d 864, 869. In an election contest, the person opposing candidacy bears the burden of proving the candidate is disqualified. Id. The laws governing elections must be liberally construed so as to promote rather than defeat candidacy. Id. Any doubt as to the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of allowing the candidate to run for office. Id.

La. R.S. 18:451, which provides general qualification guidelines, states, in pertinent part, as follows:

A person who meets the qualifications for the office he seeks may become a candidate and be voted on in a primary or general election if he qualifies as a candidate in the election. Except as otherwise provided by law, a candidate shall possess the qualifications for the office he seeks at the time he qualifies for that office. In the event that the qualifications for an office include a residency or domicile requirement, a candidate shall meet the established length of residency or domicile as of the date of qualifying, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary [emphasis supplied].

However, La. Const. Art. V, Sec. 24 sets forth explicit domicile and bar admission qualifications for district court judges. La. Const. Art. V, Sec. 24, which was amended pursuant to 2006 La. Acts 860 (Act 860), provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(A) A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for one year preceding election and shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least the number of years specified as follows:
1¾(1) For the supreme court or a court of appeals — ten years.
(2) For a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction — eight years.

As the language in La. R.S. 18:451 defers to more specific election laws, the constitutional article prevails. Moreover, when a statute conflicts with a constitutional provision, the statute must fall. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Comm’n v. Office of Motor Vehicles Through Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. of State, 97-2238 (La.4/14/98), 710 So.2d 776, 780 (citation omitted). Thus, we conclude that the constitutional provisions predominate.

Particularly, at issue here is when the eight-year admission requirement must be met and whether the defendant meets the requirement. It is uncontested that she was admitted to practice law on October 13, 2006; she qualified for candidacy on August 22, 2014. The date of the primary election is November 4, 2014. Thus, she will have been admitted to practice law for eight years on October 13, 2014, between the date of qualifying and the primary election.

The plaintiff contends that since the language of the constitutional article does not provide for a deadline, the admission requirement must be met upon qualifying, as provided by the default language in La. R.S. 18:451. Thus, she concludes that the defendant does not meet the requirement. Conversely, the defendant contends that the language of the constitutional article is ambiguous, thus necessitating interpretation of the constitutional article. She argues that the legislature’s will was to provide that the admission requirement was to be met before the election, not qualification; thus, she is a qualified candidate.

| /‘The function of statutory interpretation and the construction given to legislative acts rests with the judicial branch of the government.” Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 95-2895, p. 3 (La.5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184, 186 (citation omitted). The rules of statutory construction are designed to establish and implement the intent of the legislature. Succession ofBoyter, 99-761, p. 9 (La.1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122, 1128 (citation omitted). Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will and, thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court has often noted the paramount consideration in statutory interpretation is ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or reasons which prompted the legislature to enact the law. State v. Johnson, 03-2993, p. 12 (La.10/19/04), 884 So.2d 568, 575 (citations omitted); Theriot, 95-2895 at p. 3, 694 So.2d at 186.

The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Id. “When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the ■ intent of the legislature.” La. C.C. art. 9; Johnson, 03-2993 at p. 12, 884 So.2d at 575. However, “when the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.” La. C.C. art. 10; Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine Water Dist., 02-439, 02-442, 02-478, p. 7 (La.1/14/03), 836 So.2d 14, 20. Moreover, “when the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole.” La. C.C. art. 12.

Primarily agreeing with the defendant’s interpretation of the constitutional article, the trial court .denied the plaintiffs petition. We find no error. As written, | ¿the constitutional article is ambiguous. Specifically, the language is susceptible to two meanings: 1) both the domicile and the admission requirements must be met “preceding election,” or 2) only the domicile requirement must be met “preceding election.”

An additional provision in Act 860 provided that the proposed amendment to the constitutional article would be submitted to Louisiana voters during a statewide election. See 2006 La. Acts 860, Section 2. It further set forth the language on the official ballot, in relevant part, as follows:

To provide that a person shall have been admitted to the practice of law for ten years preceding election to the supreme court or a court of appeals and for eight years preceding election to a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction ...

2006 La. Acts 860, Section 3 (emphasis supplied). After reviewing Act 860 in its entirety, it is clear that the legislature intended that both the domicile and the admission requirements be met before the election. Further, where there are two viable interpretations of the constitutional article, we must lean towards the interpretation that favors candidacy.

Since the defendant will have been admitted to practice law in this State for more than eight years prior to both the date of the primary and the general election established for the office of district judge, she meets the qualifications established by the Constitution for the office she seeks. Therefore, the petition objecting to her candidacy was properly denied.

\ ^¡ANSWER TO APPEAL

In an answer to the appeal, the defendant argues that the judgment appealed from should be modified to award costs of court, plus a reasonable attorney fee, plus damages of $5,000.00. See La. C.C.P. arts. 2133 and 2164. The trial court denied the defendant’s request for damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, stating that the plaintiffs argument raised a legitimate issue; therefore, the appeal was not frivolous. We agree. Accordingly, the request for a modification is denied.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed; and the defendant’s motion for a modification of judgment is denied.

AFFIRMED; REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT DENIED.

TOBIAS, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

BONIN, J., concurs with reasons.

LANDRIEU, J., concurs with reasons.

LÓBRANO, J., dissents in part and concurs in part.

TOBIAS, J.,

concurs and assigns reasons.

hi agree that Taetrece Harrison is eligible to run for the judgeship for which she has qualified as a candidate for the following reasons:

La. Const, art. V, § 24, as originally enacted in 1974, read:

A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been admitted to the practice of law in this state for at least five years prior to his election and shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for the two years preceding election. He shall not practice law. [Emphasis supplied.]

La. Acts, No. 860 (2006) proposed a constitutional amendment, which the electors accepted. La. Const, art. V, § 24 now reads:

(A) A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for one year preceding election and shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least the number of years specified as follows:
(1) For the supreme court or a court of appeals — ten years.
(2) For a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction — eight years.
(B) He shall not practice law. [Emphasis supplied.]

li>The amendment removed the specific language “preceding election,” with regard to the years admitted to the practice of law. I find, however, that the legislature did not intend to change the law in this respect.

I start with the jurisprudential rule that candidacies for public office are favored and the courts should uphold a candidacy if an interpretation of the laws would promote the candidacy. Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758, p. 7 (La.3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 541; Becker v. Dean, 03-2493, p. 7 (La.9/18/03), 854 So.2d 864, 869; Russell v. Goldsby, 00-2595, p. 4 (La.9/22/00), 780 So.2d 1048, 1051; Ogden v. Gray, 12-1314, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/11/12), 99 So.3d 1088, 1091, writ denied, 12-2041 (La.9/17/12), 98 So.3d 315; Scaglione v. Juneau, 10-1109, p. 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/4/10), 45 So.3d 191, 199, unit denied, 10-1831 (La.8/9/10), 42 So.3d 380; Williams v. Fahrenholtz, 08-0961, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/25/08), 990 So.2d 99, 104, writ denied, 08-1680 (La.7/30/08), 986 So.2d 671, cert, denied, 555 U.S. 1045, 129 S.Ct. 627, 172 L.Ed.2d 609 (2008).

Ms. Harrison was admitted and licensed to the practice of law in Louisiana on 13 October 2006. On both the date of the primary and general election, Ms. Harrison will have been licensed to practice law in Louisiana for more than eight years. It is undisputed that she has been domiciled in Orleans Parish for more than one year at the time she qualified for the office of judge at issue herein.

Our sister courts interpreted § 24, as originally enacted, finding that if a candidate had the requisite number of years of admission to the practice of law on the date of the general election, then the candidate was qualified to stand for that election. Cook v. Campbell, 360 So.2d 1193, 1196 (La.App. 2nd Cir.), writ den., 362 So.2d 573 (La.1978), citing Knobloch v. 17th Judicial Dish Democratic Exec. Com., 73 So .2d 433 (La.App. 1st Cir.1954); Aiple v. Naccari, 454 So.2d 894 (La.App. 5th Cir.), writ den., 456 So.2d 151 (La. 1984). Moreover, regardless of the type or quantity of practice the lawyer has previously handled or specialized in, the latest for determining qualification is the period of time that the lawyer has . been licensed to practice law in Louisiana. Elie v. Karst, 594 So.2d 929, 930 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992); Gamble v. White, 566 So.2d 171, 172 (La.App. 2nd Cir.), writ den. 565 So.2d 923 (La.1990).

The 2006 regular session of the Louisiana Legislature enacted by joint resolution “Act 860,” which reads in its entirety as follows:

A JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing to amend Article V, Section 24 of the Constitution of Louisiana, to provide for the qualifications of office for judges; to provide for submission of the proposed amendment to the electors; to provide for an effective date; to provide for applicability; and to provide for related matters.
Section 1. Be it resolved by the Legislature of Louisiana, two-thirds of the members elected to each house concurring, that there shall be submitted to the electors of the state of Louisiana, for their approval or rejection in the manner provided by law, a proposal to amend Article V, Section 24 of the Constitution of Louisiana, to read as follows:
§ 24. Judges; Qualifications
Section 24.(A) A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for one year preceding election and shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least the number of years specified as follows:
(1) For the supreme court or a court of appeals — ten years.
(2) For a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction-eight years.
(B) He shall not practice law.
Section 2. Be it further resolved that this proposed amendment shall be submitted to the electors of the state of Louisiana at the statewide election to be held on September 30, 2006.
Section 3. Be it further resolved that on the official ballot to be used at said election there shall be |4printed a proposition, upon which the electors of the state shall be permitted to vote FOR or AGAINST, to amend the'Constitution of Louisiana, which proposition shall read as follows:
To provide that a person shall have been admitted to the practice of law for ten years preceding election to the supreme court or a court of appeals and for eight years preceding election to a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction; and
to decrease the requirement that a person be domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish from two years to one year preceding election. Effective January 1, 2008, and applicable to any person who is elected to the office of judge on and after January 1, 2008. (Amends Article V, Section 24)
Section 4. Be it further resolved that the provisions of this Amendment shall become effective on January 1, 2008, and shall be applicable to any person who is elected to the office of judge on and after January 1, 2008. [Emphasis supplied.]

When 2006 La. Acts, No. 860 (“the Act”) was adopted by the legislature by joint resolution of the house and senate, the legislature, as evidenced by Section 3, did not intend to change the law. The Act contains a title and is confined to one object as required by La. Const. Art. XIII, § 1(B). Section 3 of the Act, which | ¡jStates how the proposed amendment shall appear on the ballot submitted to the electors, while not required by the constitution, see Rotará v. City of New Orleans, 213 La. 843, 854-856, 35 So.2d 752, 755-756 (1948); Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 04-2477, 04-2523 (La.1/19/05), 893 So.2d 715, evidences the legislature’s intent to change only the required years to be admitted to the bar to run for a particular judgeship and not to the deadline by which the requirement was to be met.

Section 3 is meaningful because the object of the amendment, i.e., the actual language of the amendment, is ambiguous. I thus respectfully concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s decision holding that Ms. Harrison may run in the 4 November 2014 primary election.

Ms. Harrison is not currently a judge. If elected, she would be a judge as of 1 January 2015. Under § 24 is it now reads, she can serve. If she can serve because she will have been admitted to practice law for more than eight years at the time her service begins, it stands to reason that she can run for the office.
What makes this analysis undesirable is that a literal reading would mean that a person admitted to practice law for several years less than the constitutional eight years could run for a judgeship even though that individual would not be eligible to serve as a judge, if elected, on the first day of the term of office because the person has not been admitted to practice law for eight years.
I don't think the legislature intended that result when it adopted by joint resolution the Act.

I also respectfully concur with the majority’s holding that Ms. Harrison is not entitled to recover costs and attorney’s fees. I note that although Ms. Harrison answered the appeal requesting the relief, she did not brief the issue to this court. Under Rule 2-12.4 B(4) of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, the issue of costs and attorney’s fees is deemed abandoned and should not be considered by this court.

BONIN, J.,

concurs with reasons. Ill concur in the results.

On August '22, 2014, Ms. Harrison filed her qualifying papers as a candidate for the office of district judge of Domestic Relations Division 1 of the Civil District Court. See La. R.S. 13:1138 B(3). The term of such office commences January 1, 2015. See Acts 2011, No. 340 § 4. Her candidacy is objected to on the basis that — as of the date of her filing — she did not possess the eight-year law-practice requirement. Ms. Harrison was admitted on October 13, 2006.

The qualification for office in question is set out in the constitution: “A judge of the ... district court ... shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least ... eight years.” La. Const, art. 5, § 24(A)(2). The plain and unambiguous meaning of these words is that at the time a person assumes the office of judge she shall have been admitted to the practice of law for eight years. Because the provision is unambiguous, we must give it effect, and there is no need for us to resort to the “intent of the voters” or to a statutory “clarification.”

|2On January 1, 2015, Ms. Harrison will have been admitted to the practice of law for eight years. Accordingly, there is no impediment to her qualifying as a candidate for district judge in the upcoming election, and the objection to her candidacy was correctly dismissed.

LANDRIEU, J.,

concurs with reasons.

|, The law providing the qualifications for running for judicial office is not the picture of clarity. However, it is reasonable to conclude that the 2006 constitutional amendment to Article V, Section 24 was designed to do two things: (1) reduce the domicile requirement of a candidate for judicial office from two years to one year; and (2) increase the number of years a candidate is required to have been admitted to the practice of law from five years to eight years. Nothing more. The joint resolution placing this issue before the voters is clear on these points. The law requires us to resolve any doubt as to the qualifications of a candidate in favor of permitting the candidate to run for public office. Dixon v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 679 (La.1991). Therefore, I concur with the majority’s affirmation of the judgment.

LOBRANO, J.,

dissents in part and concurs in part. '

|,1 respectfully dissent. The plaintiff, Jane L. Johnson, seeks the disqualification of the defendant, Taetrece Harrison, a candidate for the office of Judge, Civil District Court, Orleans Parish, Domestic Section 1, asserting that she has not been admitted to practice of law for the required minimum number of years as required by the Louisiana Constitution.

As originally enacted in 1974, La. Const, art. V, § 24 stated as follows:

Section 24. A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been admitted to the practice of law in this state for at least five years prior to his election and shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for the two years preceding election. He shall not practice law. [Emphasis added.]

However, this was changed by the electors in 2006, effective January 1, 2008, to read:

§ 24. Judges; Qualifications
Section 24.(A) A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court hav-

ing solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for one year preceding election and shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least the number of years specified as follows:

(1) For the supreme court or a court of appeals — ten years.

| ¾(2) For a district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction — eight years.

(B) He shall not practice law. [Emphasis added.]

The language of § 24 is clear and unambiguous and consistent with La. R.S. 18:451. The law has been changed to require that a candidate for judicial office must have been admitted to the practice of law for the requisite number of years at the time of qualifying for the office, not at the time of the “election” as was formerly the case. Because the provision is unambiguous, “the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” La. C.C. art 9. Thus, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s decision holding that Ms. Harrison may run in the November 4, 2014 primary election.

I respectfully concur with the majority’s holding that Ms. Harrison is not entitled to recover costs and attorney’s fees.

A person who meets the qualifications for the office he seeks may become a candidate and be voted on in a primary or general election if he qualifies as a candidate in the election. Except as otherwise provided by law, a candidate shall possess the qualifications for the office he seeks at the time he qualifies for that office. In the event that the qualifications for an office include a
residency or domicile requirement, a candidate shall meet the established length of residency or domicile as of the date of qualifying, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary. No person, whether or not currently registered as a voter with the registrar of voters, shall become a candidate if he is under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a felony. 
      
      . Arthur Morrell was also named as a defendant in his capacity as Clerk of Criminal District Court.
     
      
      . The language "except as otherwise provided by law” designates La. R.S. 18:451 to be the default rule for qualification.
     
      
      . We need not reach the issue regarding whether the phrase “preceding election” refers to the primary or the general election.
     
      
      .Technically, the Act is not per se an act. It is a joint resolution of the legislature which requires no signature of the governor. A constitutional amendment is proposed to electors of the state by the legislature. La. Const, art. XIII, § 13 states in pertinent part:
      (A)(1) Procedure. An amendment to this constitution may be proposed by joint resolution at any regular session of the legislature, .... If two-thirds of the elected members of each house concur in the resolution, pursuant to all of the procedures and formalities required for passage of a bill except submission to the governor, the secretary of state shall have the proposed amendment published once in the official journal of each parish within not less than thirty nor more than sixty days preceding the election at which the proposed amendment is to be submitted to the electors. Each joint resolution shall specify the statewide election at which the proposed amendment shall be submitted....
      
        
      
      (B) Form of Proposal. A proposed amendment shall have a title containing a brief summary of the changes proposed; shall be confined to one object; and shall set forth the entire article, or the sections or other subdivisions thereof, as proposed to be revised or only the article, sections, or other subdivisions proposed to be added.... [Emphasis supplied.]
     
      
      . I acknowledge that one may read § 24 literally and reach the same result.
     
      
      . I recognize that this interpretation creates a possible conflict between § 24 and La. R.S. 18:451, which mandates that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a candidate shall possess the qualifications for the office he seeks at the time he qualifies for that office.” However, because (a) § 24 specifically relates to candidates for judgeship and (b) constitutional provisions prevail over statutory provisions, the constitutional provision has primacy. Stated another way, when a statute conflicts with a provision of the constitution, the statute must fail. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371, p. 22 (La.7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 32.
     
      
      . "The starting point in the interpretation of constitutional provisions is the language of the constitution itself.” Ocean Energy, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, 04-0066, pp. 6-7 (La.7/6/04), 880 So.2d 1, 7 (citing East Baton Rouge Sch. Bd. v. Foster, 02-2799, p. 15 (La.6/6/03), 851 So.2d 985, 996). "When a constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, its language must be given effect.” Id., 04-0066, p. 7, 880 So.2d at 7. "Unequivocal constitutional provisions are not subject to judicial construction and should be applied by giving words their generally understood meaning." Id. (citing Cajun Elec. Power Co-op. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Com'n, 544 So.2d 362, 363 (La. 1989) (on rehearing)).
     
      
      . La. R.S. 18:451 states:
     