
    YONG SEN YU, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, JR., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-663.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 19, 2014.
    
      Jay Ho Lee, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney, General; Carl McIntyre, Assistant Director; Christina Bechak Parascandola, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Yong Sen Yu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a January 29, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming the March 3, 2011, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Gabriel C. Videla, denying him asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yong Sen Yu, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 29, 2013), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 3, 2011). .We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

It is undisputed that Yu is not eligible for asylum solely on the basis of his wife’s forced abortion. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 309-310 (2d Cir.2007). Nevertheless, he can still qualify for asylum or withholding of removal by demonstrating that: (1) he engaged in “other resistance” to the family planning policy; and (2) he suffered harm rising to the level of persecution, or he had a well-founded fear or likelihood of suffering such harm as a direct result of his resistance. See id. at 813; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b).

Even assuming that Yu established “resistance,” the agency did not err in finding that he failed to allege harm amounting to persecution on account of that resistance. Indeed, he did not demonstrate that he suffered economic persecution because he failed to provide any evidence establishing that the fines imposed caused him “severe economic disadvantage.” In re T-Z- 24 I. & N. Dec. 168, 170-75 (B.I.A.2007); see also Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir.2002). Furthermore, the agency did not err in finding that Yu’s detention for five hours, during which he was not mistreated, did not constitute persecution. See Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226 n. 3 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that the Court had previously held that two brief detentions without physical mistreatment did not constitute persecution); see also Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir.2006).

Moreover, although the IJ may have erred by failing to evaluate the cumulative impact of these incidents, the BIA reasonably concluded that, considered in the aggregate, the harm Yu experienced did not rise to the level of persecution, particularly when he did not testify to having personally suffered any specific physical, mental, or economic harm. See Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir.2011) (“We have emphasized that persecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the agency did not err in concluding that Yu failed to establish past persecution qualifying him for relief. See Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 309.

Absent past persecution, an alien may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); see also Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004). The agency reasonably concluded that Yu failed to demonstrate that his fear of future persecution was well-founded. Yu paid a fine for having a child out of wedlock and at a younger age than permitted, yet he did not demonstrate that family planning officials would continue to consider him in violation of the family planning policy based on the birth of his one child more than twenty years ago. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 142-43, 160 n. 20, 169-70 (2d Cir.2008); see also Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005). Additionally, as the agency found, Yu failed to submit evidence demonstrating that similarly situated individuals face forced sterilization. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 160-61; see also Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129.

Accordingly, because the agency did not err in finding that Yu failed to demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution, it reasonably denied him asylum and withholding of removal because those claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.2006). Yu does not challenge the agency’s denial of CAT relief.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  