
    SHUIMEI WU, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-2673-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 6, 2012.
    
      Lee Ratner, Law Offices of Michael Brown, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Jennifer Paisner Williams, Senior Litigation Counsel; Lindsay W. Zimliki, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: B.D. PARKER, PETER W. HALL, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Shuimei Wu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 10, 2011, order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Shuimei Wu, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 10, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Although Wu’s motion to reopen was timely, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), because she failed to establish her prima facie eligibility for relief, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

To establish prima facie eligibility for asylum, a movant must demonstrate “a realistic chance that he will be able to establish eligibility” during reopened proceedings. Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotations omitted); see Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008). The BIA found that Wu had not demonstrated an objectively reasonable possibility that she would suffer persecution in China on account of her practice of Falun Gong in the United States, because the evidence she submitted to show that the Chinese government was aware of her practice, a sworn letter from her father and a Village Committee notice, was not entitled to any probative value.

Wu argues that the BIA erred in declining to accord probative weight to the village committee notice and the letter from her father. However, the weight afforded to an alien’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency, particularly where, as here, the affidavit was both vague and strikingly similar to Wu’s own affidavit, and the Village Committee notice was unsigned, did not identify a particular author, and was unauthenticated. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006); see also Matter of H-L-H & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 214 & n. 5 (BIA 2010).

Furthermore, as the BIA noted, neither the village committee notice nor the letter from Wu’s father specified the penalties to which Wu would be subject based on her practice of Falun Gong. As a result, even if they were accorded probative value, they were insufficient to establish that any harm Wu might suffer would rise to the level of persecution. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 162 (2d Cir.2008).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  