
    JOHN McLURE vs. ANTHONY BENCBNI & AL.
    Where a creditor obtains a judgment in another State against a debtor residing there, and the property of the debtor is removed to this State, a creditor, who attaches it in this State, without fraud and for a bona fide debt, shall held it against such judgment creditor.
    A creditor, who has obtained a judgment at law in another State, cannot receive the extraordinary aid of a Court of Equity in this State to enforce such judgment.
    Courts of Equity in this State will only lend their assistance in enforcing the satisfaction of judgments at law obtained in their own State.
    This case w.as brought up by appeals of both the plaintiff and some of the defendants from interlocutory orders made at the Spring Term 1843 of Rowan Court of Equity, his Honor Judge presiding. The following is a summary oí the case :
    The bill was filed on the 8th of January 1843, and states that on the 3d day of that month, the plaintiff recovered a judgment in the Court of Common Pleas for Union District, in South Carolina, against Daniel Thomas, the elder, for a debt of $890 74 centSj besides costs of suit: That the plaintiff was a citizen of South Carolina, as are all the parties defendants except Benceni: That, at the time of rendering the judgment, D. Thomas, the debtor, was in possession of three slaves, which were liable to be sold on execution for the debt and were of value sufficient to satisfy it: and that he had no other property in South Carolina, out of which the debt could be raised. The bill further states, that with the view of defeating the plaintiff of his debt by withdrawing those negroes from the reach of an execution on the plaintiff’s judgment and by covering them with a pretended pri- or incumbrance in this State, Daniel Thomas the elder, Daniel Thomas the younger, James Thomas and Amanda Thomas, (which three last named persons are the children oí Daniel the elder,) and A. 1». Hall, by concert among themselves and with Benceni, who resides in Salisbury, in North Carolina, secretly removed the slaves from South-Carolina into Rowan county, and that Benceni immediately levied an original attachment on them as the property of Daniel Thomas the elder for a large debt alleged therein to be due from him to Benceni. The bill charges, that the pretended debt to Benceni is not a true ohe,. but altogether fictitious, and raised by the joint contrivance of the defendants for the sole purpose of baffling (he plaintiff and hindering him of his debt. It also further states, that the defendants, Daniel the younger, James and Amanda set up a claim to the slaves under some pretended conveyance from their said father, sent them into North Carolina by the defendant Hall, and authorized Benceni to have them seized and held by him under their claim, also, and for their benefit; and thereupon the bill charges, that the pretended conveyance from Daniel the elder to his children was voluntary and made without any valuable consideration, and was made many years past, when the children were in tender infancy, and was not proved or registered or made public; and that the father thereafter continued in the possession of the slaves, using them as his own, up to the time of their removal into this State, a period of twelve years ; and, so, that the same was fraudulent and void as against persons giving credit to the father. The bill then charges several matters tending to impeach the justice of Benceni’s demand, on which he issued the attachment; and it prays a discovery from all the parties, that an account may be taken between Daniel the elder and Benceni, and, if any balance be bound in favor of the latter, that it be paid, and, beyond such sum, that the negroes bo condemned to the satisfaction of the plaintiff’s debt.
    The parties severally answered ; and all of them denied any concert between Benceni and any others of the defendants. The answers of the children of Daniel the elder, 
      state, that the negrees did not belong to their father, bnt were their property, under a written conveyance made by their father, in September, 1829. They state that the con- ’ f ■ , . 1 . , , veyance was not fraudulent, norm any manner intended to hinder or delay their father’s creditors, but was bonajide intended as a reasonable provision for these defendants.— They say that their father had then an ample estate, exceeding by the sum of about $10,000, all the debts he owed, and and a number of other children ; and that he, about that time, advanced some of liis other children, who had come of full age, and, with a view of placing on equal footing with those children these defendants also,who were deaf and dumb, he gave to them the slaves in question, which were not of greater value than the advancement their father might necessarily make to them. They admit that the deed had not been recorded, and give as a reason therefor, that another person, unadvisedly, and without their knowledge, cancelled it by tearing off the donor’s name; but they say that it was a matter of notoriety. And they insist, that the conveyance is, under those circumstances, valid in the law of South Carolina, where all the parties and the slaves resided. They deny that they removed the slaves Tom South Carolina by concert with or without the knowledge of their father; but they admit that they delivered them to the defendant, Hall, as their agent, lo bring them into this State, with the view of avoiding their seizure by the plaintiff, and a tedious and expensive litigation with him. They say likewise, that they have no knowledge of their father’s debt to Benceni: but they deny that the negroes are liable therefor, or that they consented that Benceni should levy on or take them in any way, or suspected that he intended to do so, until they heard that he had done it.
    The answer of Hall disclaims any interest or claim in himself; and states that he was employed, merely as an agent, by Daniel Thomas, the younger, for himself, his brother and sister, to bring the negroes into this State for them.
    The answer of Benceni denies any concert between himself and any of the other parties, and states that he had no suspicion that the slaves were to be removed until he saw them in Salisbury; that he then understood from Hall why they had been brought there, and believing that in law they were the proyerty of Daniel Thomas, the elder, and liable for his debts, he took out an attachment for a debt that person owed him, and had the negroes attached and taken into the custody of the sheriff. The answer then sets forth the account, on which the attachment was founded, on which a balance of $ 1107 964, appears to be due to this defendant ; and, after explaining the matters charged in the bill as impeaching his demand, the answer states that balance to be justly due.
    On the filing of the bill an order of sequestration was made, and a writ issued, under which the sheriff held the negroes.' On the coming in of the answers, and on the motions of the defendants respectively to discharge that order and to set the negroes.at large, the court granted the 'motion on behalf of Benceni and with costs, and refused the motion on the part of the other defendants, but continued the order until the hearing. And thereupon the plaintiff appealed from the former part of the order in favor of Bence-ni, and the children of Daniel Thomas the elder appealed from the residue of the decree.
    
      Alexander for the plaintiff.
    
      Caldwell and Boy den for the defendants.
   Ruffin, C. J.

The question raised by these appeals is, whether the plaintiff has such an interest in the slaves in controversy, or has stated such a case as authorizes the court to interfere with the possession of them by the defendants, or to interrupt legal proceedings between the defendants themselves, for the purposes respectively of asserting a title to the slaves in some of the defendants, or of asserting by another a right to satisfaction out of them for the debt of yet another of the defendants, by laying hold of the property and bringing it into this court.

As between the plaintiff and Benceni separately, there would seem clearly to be no ground for the-interposition of the Court of Equity. They both claim as creditors of the same person, each insisting that the negroes are the property of that person, and liable for his debts. Even if it were true, that the negroes were brought into this State at the instance of Benceni, in order that he might gain a preference over the plaintiff by attaching here before the other could seize in South Carolina, there would be nothing for the cognizance of this court. It would be simply a case of legal priority, obtained by a vigilant creditor, against which equity could not relieve at the instance of a less active creditor, who had no specific title or lien on this property. But all agency on the part of Benceni in getting the negroes here is denied, and it seems he owes his priority -to good luck rather than any foresight of his own. The plaintiff, therefore, has nothing but his own want of diligence to find fault with upon this part of the case. How far the Court of Equity might go in relieving at the instance of a creditor by judgment and execution against an an attachment, upon the ground that the debt therein demanded was not real, and that the process was sned out and kept on foot collusively for the purpose of covering the property and withdrawing it from the reach of just creditors, we do not think it necessary to say definitely. Probably the nature of the debt and the fraudulent purpose might be inquired into, in the same manner and for the same purpose, as if the proofs, instead of being an attachment, were an execution on .a fraudulent judgment. Butin this case the debt appears to be due to Benceni. in the first place, and, in the next, all concert between that party and fill the others is denied; and it is evident that, whether the debt be owing or not, Benceni really claims it as against his alleged debtor, and that his attachment is a Iona fide litigation to obtain satisfaction out of this property, as against all the other parties, plaintiff and defendants. There is then no prin-ple, on.which the jurisdiction can be'changed, oran impedíment thrown in the way of this defendant in prosecuting his legal remedy, and keeping all the advantages which he thereby has at law. Upon this ground alone, therefore, the court would hold, that there was no error in so much of the decree as the plaintiff appealed from, and order it to stand affirmed, with costs to Benceni. But, in truth, the cause, as between these parties, need not be determined on those particular circumstances, but falls within a general principle, on which the whole case must be decided against the plaintiff, as we think.

The general principle alluded to is this : that a creditor, by judgment in another State, against a citizen of the same State, cannot come into this State for satisfaction out of the debtor’s property, situated here. We do not take notice of claim set up to the negroes by the children under the'father’s -gift; because assuming them to belong to the father, the plaintiff cannot reach them in this way. The proceeding is 2trim® imyressionis. We are not informed of any thing,that can be made to serve' as a precedent; though; doubtless, the case has occurred in very many instances, where the debtor had no property in the State, in which the judgment was rendered, but it was removed into, or before was situate in another State; and attempts like the present would have been often made, if they could have been caried through. It is true, the judgment of the court of one State is deemed valid and conclusive in the courts of a sister State. What was done under a judgment in the State, in which it was rendered, is sustained by them, if brought into litigation in the courts of another Stale. So the latter courts will aid in its execution, when necessary to render it effectual. But they give such aid in its execution by receiving if as evidence of a debt, or of property, when it is made the direct subject of action or of defence in those courts;- and in no other manner. At least we are not aware of any case, in which the court of one State has undertaken to give an extraordinary remedy to a creditor, by judgment in another State, merely on-the ground, that the laws of his own State did not furnish an effectual remedy. If such be the fact, he-must look to his own domestic authorities to alter and amend their laws, and not to the tribuíais of another State to supply that want of an effectual remedy. But every country must be presumed a competent judge ot the justice due between its own citizens, and to provide effectual means for administering it. Therefore, if these negroes be the property of Daniel Thomas the elder, and were subject to the plaintiff’s satisfaction, it cannot be supposed that -the law of South Carolina will not, in some manner, compel him to assign them to the plaintiff, or to some officer of the law, to dispose of and apply the proceeds for the benefit, of the plaintiff and his other creditors. So if the children of Thomas have done the plaintiff a wrong in removing the negroes, it is a wrong, made so by the laws of South Carolina, and perpetrated there by her own citizens, who must be taken to be duly amenable to her laws. Hence there is no reason for the interference of our courts between persons, all whom are alien to our laws and tribunals, and. have access to their native institutions. It may be here observed, that in this spirit is our attachment law conceived ; which gives not that remedy against a person residing in another government to another person also residing in another government. We believe, that a similar provision is found in the codes of all the States, which give the process of attachment; and it proceeds on the idea, that it is not incumbent upon one State to administer justice between citizens and inhabitants of other States, but recourse may be had to the country having jurisdiction over the persons. A judgment in another'State cannot be enforced here, by process of execution issued by our courts in the first instance; for the defendant has a right to contest the fact, whether it be a judgment in another State or not. Therefore, it must be made the subject'of an action here, and the demand become due by a judgment of our courts, before the party can have execution here. We entertain that jurisdiction, because the party has come within the State ; and we execute against him our own judgment. But as we cannot execute a judgment abroad by process here at law, so it seems necessarily to follow, that a Court of Equity here ought not to condemn property, that it can lay hold of for the satisfaction of such a judgment. Equity is an-ciliary to the law in aiding; creditors by judgment and execution in our own courts, where it is necessary for- their satisfaction. But then the persons and property are within the State, and no jurisdiction is arrogated over persons or things abroad. The interposition of the court is here invoked upon the same plea of necessity. But it is not a similar necessity ; nor one that can be admitted to exist. The supposed necessity consists in a defect imputed to the law of the country., to which all the parties belong, in not providing against the power of a debtor to- put his property out of the way of his creditor, or in not compelling him to produce it or make it subject to the debt, or in not giving just redress against third persons, who have aided the debtor in such- his wrongful acts. Jt may be, that the Jaw of South Carolina is lame in alb these particulars, and that help from some other quarter is necessary. But we cannot believe, that by process against the body or some other means, the creditor cannot have due redress in his own State. If, however, it should be otherwise, the necessity of the plaintiff’s- case calls for legislative assistance at home, and' cannot instigate the judicial tribunals of this State to enforce a judgment not rendered here, and against a person not resident within our jurisdiction.

Our opinion therefore is, that so-mush of the decree as continued the order of sequestration against any of the defendants was erroneous, and ought to be reversed with costs to the defendants. All which must be certified to the Court of Equity.

Per Curtam. Ordered accordingly.  