
    Overhiser Adm'x v. Overhiser et al.
    
      Divorced wife’may be beneficiary of insurance policy on husband, when.
    
    When a married woman is named' as a beneficiary in a policy of insurance on the life of her husband she is entitled to the proceeds of the policy, notwithstanding a divorce obtained by her before his death.
    (Decided May 22, 1900.)
    Error to the Circuit Court of Hamilton county.
    The plaintiff in error, as administratrix of George P. Overhiser, deceased, brought suit in the court of common pleas against Lena Overhiser and the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, for the recovery of two thousand dollars on a policy of insurance on the life of her intestate. The company, admitting its liability, made affidavit that without collusion with it the money due on the policy was claimed by Lena Overhiser, and asked that it be, discharged. The cause was submitted to the court on the motion of Lena Overhiser, for judgment on the pleadings.
    The material facts alleged in the pleadings are that on the 15th of January, 1895, in consideration of a premium of $97.84 to be paid annually during life the company executed a policy for two thousand dollars on the life of George P. Overhiser, payable “unto Lena Overhiser,- wife of George P. Overhiser of Montrose, in the county of Montrose, state of Colorado, if living, if not living to his executors, administrators or assigns.” At the time of the execution of the policy George P. Overhiser and Lena Overhiser were husband and wife. On the 7th of June, 1895, in a suit voluntarily instituted by her she was absolutely divorced from said George P. Overhiser. He died June 14, 1896, and letters testan) entsiry were issued to the plaintiff. The last premium on said policy was paid by the beneficiary. The court upon these facts alleged, in the pleadings adjudged the proceeds of the policy to Lena Overhiser. This judgment was affirmed by the circuit court.
    
      J. G. Robison, Jr., for plaintiff in error.
    It will be well to refer the court to the terms of the-policy. The policy provided tha.t the same was payable to Lena Overhiser, wife of George P. Overhiser,. if living at the time of his death; if not living, to his executors, administrators or assigns. As this is a demurrer to the answer and cross-petition, it searches the whole record, and nowhere in the answer is it set forth how she claims her right to this money, she only says as Lena Overhiser. Is that sufficient?' The claim is made that if the defendant does not. come under the terms óí the policy she can have no interest in the policy. The policy is made payable to-the wife of George P. Overhiser, if living as his wife at the time of bis death, if not, then to his executors, administrators or assigns. Defendant was not the widoAV of George P. Overhiser at his death, she was a divorced woman. Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St., 298.
    She could receive no pension from the government.
    If the policy in its terms says that the defendant as a divorced woman can recover, when she is neither’ a wife or a widow, then I humbly submit that the j)olicy does not say that a divorced woman is the beneficiary. The decree of divorce provides “that all and. every right, duty and claim accruing to either of said parties, by reason of said marriage, shall henceforth cease and determine.’’
    
      No language in a decree could be stronger, or more to tbe point, and if she recovers the benefits under this policy, she obtains tbe same as one bolding no relation to tbe policy, but as a stranger.
    Prior to the death of George P. Overhiser, and before her interest in the benefit had become a vested one, she obtained, as we have seen, an absolute divorce from her husband. The effect of such an absolute divorce is set forth by the following authorities: Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, section 697A; Bell v. Smalley, 45 N. J. Eq., 478 and note; Barrett v. Failing, 111 U. S., 523; 2 Nelson, Divorce and Separation, section 1024; Ketcher v. Monroe, 43 N. E., 1053; Stewart, Marriage and Divorce, section 430; Weatherford v. McCracklin, 34 S. W., 24.
    When the wife sought the divorce court she knew the terms of the contract of insurance, she was a party to the same, and if she as a beneficiary can not come under the terms of the policy, can she recover said insurance in some other manner than that set forth in said policy?
    “A divorce from the bonds of matrimony is the same as death.” Heyman v. Meyerhoff, 16 W. N. of Cases (Pa.), 212; Funk v. Hake, 6 Watts, 131 Penn. St.; Miltinore v. Miltinore, 4 Wright, 151 Pa. St.; Flory v. Becke, 2 Barr, 470 Pa. St.; Sup. Council Am. Leg. v. Green, 71 Md., 263; American Legation v. Perry, 140 Mass., 589; Shillings v. Mass. Ben. Ass.,, 146 Mass., 217.
    Defendant, in her answer and cross-petition, says, “that to prevent said policy from lapsing, she paid the last premium due thereon.”
    Remarkable! This over zealous defendant, a divorced woman, being neither wife or widow of the assured, pays the last premium due on said policy.
    
      What interest has she to pay said premium? She pays the same as a stranger to said policy, and she now sets forth her claim to recover.
    First. As one holding no relation to said contract ■of insurance.
    Second. On a wagering contract of insurance, and her payment of said premium being voluntary, and the act of a stranger, she having ceased to be a wife. Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass., 564; Bevin v. Ins. Co., 23 Con., 244; May on Insurance, section 117; Life Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind., 117; Ruse v. Life Ins. Co., 23 N. Y., 516.
    A woman engaged to be married, has an insurable interest in the life of her betrothed. Chisholm v. Life Ins. Co., 52 Mo., 213.
    The contract of insurance provided that it was payable at the death of the assured to his wife, and not to some other person who was a stranger to the policy. Ryan v. Rothweiler, 50 Ohio St., 595; Gass v. Life Ins. Co., 3 N. P. 216.
    The written contract controls the intentions of the parties. Greenleaf, sections 277, 278 and 282; Warren v. Wheeler, 8 Met., 97; Bigelow v. Collamore, 5 Cush., 226; Harper v. Gilbert, 5 Cush., 417; Titus v. Kyle, 10 Ohio St., 445; Potts v. Rider, 3 Ohio, 71; Collins v. Ruckeye Ins. Co., 17 Ohio St., 215; Bank v. Cook, 38 Ohio St., 442; Wilson v. Bailey, 1 Handy, 177; Robinson v. Kanawha Valley Bank, 44 Ohio St., 441; Weidman v. Weidman, 57 Ohio St., 101.
    
      Johnson & Levy, for defendants in error.
    The words, “My wife,” mere words of identification.
    Who is entitled to the proceeds of this policy of insurance? Who is the beneficiary? The answer to these questions is all this court has before it, and we almost feel as though we should apologize to the court for taking up its valuable time with even the brief discussion we intend to make in this case, in a point, which we consider settled beyond doubt or peradventure. We would feel safe in contenting ourselves with the citation of but a single authority, which determines this case for all time to come. This authority is the Schaefer case, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States (94 U. S., 457), and is on all fours with the case at bar.
    These words have no more importance in determining who is the beneficiary in this policy than if the policy had read “Lean a Overhiser, seamstress ” or “Lena Overhiser, artist/' or “Lena Overhiser, my sister.”
    More than this. . It is well settled that a beneficiary of a policy of life insurance has a vested interest in it, and such interest can not be divested without the consent of such beneficiary. Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S., 206; Manhattan v. Smith, 44 Ohio St., 156; Bliss, Life Ins., sections 337, 345, 571; Cooke Life Ins., section 121.
    
      The beneficiary need have no insurable interest in the life of the insured. “A” can insure his life and make the policy payable to whomsoever he pleases— to a total stranger if he desires. Insurable interest is only necessary in the life insured by the one taking out the insurance, and the beneficiary may always recover without showing any interest whatsoever in the life insured. Campbell v. Ins. Co., 98 Mass., 381; Life Ins. Co. v. Baum, 29 Ind., 236.
    But even assuming that the beneficiary must have an insurable interest in the life insured, and that such interest between man and wife ceased upon divorce, even that would not affect the right of Lena Overbiser in this case. She certainly bad a insurable interest.in the life of her husband before the divorce, and that was all that was necessary. Cooke on Life Ins., section 64, pp. 103 and 104.
    Contract of life insurance, valid in its inception, is not avoided by the cessation of interest in the life insured. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wallon, 616; Trenton L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 4 Zab., 576; Bliss, Life Ins., section 30; Mutual Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass., 24.
   By the Court:

Lena Overhiser was named in the policy as the beneficiary, and the words “wife of George P. Overhiser” -were descriptive only. The policy defines in express terms the only condition upon which it should be payable to the administrator of George P. Overhiser, viz.: that Lena should not be living at the time of his death. It contains no terms indicating that ber right to the fruits of the policy is conditioned upon her remaining his wife.

The policy was executed to him, and the presumption is that it was upon his application. But if the insurance was effected by her, she had at the time an insurable interest in his life and the contract would not become void by the termination of the marital relation before his death. The conclusion of the courts below is in accordance with settled principles. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S., 457; Central Bank of Washington v. Hume, 128 U. S., 195.

Judgment affirmed.  