
    Wilson and another v. Skaggs.
    “Where tlie suitwas on a promissory note, and the defendant pleaded under oath that the note was not made by him, nor by his authority, and the only proof was that when the note was presented to the defendant he said that his brother had made it without any authority from him. but that lie would pay it in May: Held, That the court below properly charged the jury, that a subsequent promise by the defendant to pay the note was not sufficient to charge him, (in this action.) and that to find for the plaintiffs they must believe the defendant signed the note himself, or authorized some other person to do it for him, or recognized the authority for the person so signing liis name. Judgment for the defendant was affirmed.
    Appeal from Ilamson. The appellants brought suit on a note of hand purporting fo lie jointly made by the appellee and Lemuel W. Skaggs. Process not being served upon t:lie last named, plaint ids discontinued as to hint. The appellee "plead non est factum upon oath. The only evidence offered by the plaintiffs was that when the note was presented to him he said that his brother liad made it without any authority from him, but lie would pay it iu May. lie did not pay it iu May.
    The judge charged the jury “that if tliey believe from the evidence the note “sued on was signed by defendant Marion M. Skaggs, or by any oilier person “by his authority, they would find for the plaintiff; but that a subsequent “promise by said defendant to pay said noto ivas not sufficient to charge him; “and that io find for the. plaintiffs they must believe, the defendant; signed the “note himself or authorized some other to doit for him, or recognized the “authority of the party so signing his name.”
    
      M. J. Hall, for appellants.
    I. Defendant’s promise to pay the debt was tantamount to a ratification of 1ns brother’s act in signing his name to the note, and it then became his debt.
    
      H. Forbearance to sue is a sufficient consideration to support a promise. (See 1 yol. Leigh’s Nisi Prius, pp. 30, 31.) Giving time is a sufficient consideration to support a promise.
    Where a receiver appointed by the court of chancery brought ail action against E for a debt due to E, whose estate he was employed to collect, and the defendant', in consideration that ho would give E a time for payment, promised to pay him in case oE F’s default, held a sufficient consideration to sustain the promise. (21 English O. L., 200.)
   Lipscomb, J.

It is not believed that the court erred in the charge of the jury. If the jury believed that, the evidence amounted to a recognition of the authority to subscribe the defendant’s name to the note, under the charge they would have found for the plain till; but if they believed that it was'a new promise to pay, the court properly informed them that it could not charge, him in the present action, because the suit ought to have been brought on that promise, if it was valid and not a moro naked promise. The charge must be taken in reference to the cause of action set out in the pleadings.- 'Therefore, when the judge says that the subsequent promise could not charge the defendant, lie meant in that action. The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  