
    Grover, appellant, vs. Coon, respondent.
    
    Where a writ of error was pending in the supreme court when the code of procedure took effect, and that court afterwards rendered judgment of affirmance, there is no right of appeal to this court, the determination of the supreme court being final under the provisions of the code.
    A statute, which takes away the right to a future appeal in an action pending and undetermined when the statute takes effect, is not unconstitutional.
    
      C. P. Kirkland, for the respondent,
    moved to dismiss the appeal. Before and on the first day of July last a writ of error was pending in the supreme court, on a judgment of the common pleas affirming a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace, in an action commenced before him. On the 20th of July last, the supreme court, after argument, affirmed the judgment of the justice; and Grover appealed to this court from that determination.
    
      John Clarke, for the appellant.
   Bronson, J.

The 282d section of the code of procedure applies to proceedings subsequent to the first of July, in suits which were pending on that day. (Supp. Code, § 2.) The writ of error in this case was pending in the supreme court on the first of July, and was, we think, a suit within the meaning of the statute. The judgment of affirmance was subsequent to the first of July; and as the action was “ originally commenced in a court of a justice of the peace,” there was no right of appeal to this- court. (§§ 282, 11.) The judgment of the supreme court was final.

We see no force in the objection urged by the appellant’s counsel, that the statute is unconstitutional. The legislature did not take away a right of appeal which had already attach ed: they only said that for the future, no appeal to this court should be allowed in such cases.

Motion granted.  