
    Theodore Reed versus Luther Davis.
    The production by the demandant, of a judgment recovered by him against the tenant’s grantor, and of a promissory note upon which it was rendered, is primé facie evidence that he was a bond fide creditor of the grantor, sufficient to entitle him to contest the conveyance to the tenant as fraudulent against creditors.
    Entry sur disseisin. Plea, the general issue.
    The demandant produced a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in his own favor against his brother Barnard Reed, and an execution thereon, extended upon the demanded premises as the property of Barnard, dated in January 1825. The tenant then produced the deed of Barnard conveying the premises to him before the levy of the demandant’s execution, and proved that he was in possession at the time of the levy. The demandant then produced evidence to show that this deed was fraudulent as against creditors. He also produced the note upon which his judgment had been recovered, but offered no evidence of its having been given for any consideration. The judgment, was recovered by default, at the term at which the original writ was returnable.
    
      The tenant contended, that he being in possession of the demanded premises under a deed valid against all persons except creditors of Barnard, the burden of proof was on the demandant to show himself a boná fide creditor at the time of the conveyance, and that the production of a note signed by Barnard and a judgment rendered upon it as above stated, was not sufficient to establish that fact; but that he was bound to prove that the note was given for a bona fide consideration and was justly due at the time of the conveyance, for which purpose he might have produced Barnard as a witness.
    But Morton J. instructed the jury, that the note and judgment thereon were prima facie evidence that the demandant was a bond fide creditor of Barnard, and were sufficient tc entitle him to show the tenant’s deed to be fraudulent, unless the tenant could prove that the note was not due or had been paid, and that the judgment was collusive or fraudulent.
    The jury found a verdict for the demandant, and the tenant excepted to the instruction of the judge.
    T. Fuller, in support of the exception,
    cited 3 Bl. Com. 371 ; 3 Dane’s Abr. p. 280, § 2; Edmondstone v. Webb, 3 Esp. R. 264 ; Williams v. E. I. Company, 3 East, 192.
    
      Hoar and Keyes, contra,
    
    cited 2 Stark. Ev. 225 ; Thacher v. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. R. 302; Bayley v. Taber, 6 Mass. R. 452 ; Alexander v. Gould, 1 Mass. R. 165 ; 1 Stark. Ev. 241.
   But per Curiam.

The opinion of the judge at the trial was beyond all doubt correct.

Exception overruled.  