
    McCARTY v. ALTONWOOD STOCK FARM et al.
    (Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.
    April 14, 1893.)
    1. Opening Default—Terms—Discretion of Trial Court.
    In an action on contract it appeared that, before the day set for trial, plaintiff requested defendants tv consent to a continuance, which they refused to do: that, because of such refusal, plaintiff was obliged to go from California to New York to attend the trial; that judgment was rendered by default against defendants for $11,350; and that the trial judge was of the opinion that the action was not defended in good faith. Held, that on making an order opening the default, and restoring the cause to the calendar, to be called in one week, it was not an abuse of discretion to impose the conditions that defendants shall pay plaintiff’s attorneys $100 within two days, and that hi case the cause is postponed by the court against plaintiff’s objection, and he returns to California before a second trial, defendants shall pay his reasonable expenses in going from such state to New York and returning thereto, and in remaining in New York to attend the trial.
    2. Same—Construction of Order.
    Such order should not be construed as depriving the judge calling the calendar of the power to grant a postponement to enable defendants to get their testimony, if a proper case is made, and they consent to pay the sums required by the order.
    Appeal from special term, New York county.
    Action by Daniel McCarty against the Altonwood Stock Farm, Samuel Webber Parker, and Charles W. Parker on a written contract for the payment of money, in which there was a judgment against defendants by default for $11,350. From so much of an order as imposes terms for opening such default, defendants appeal.
    Modified.
    The order appealed from is as follows:
    Ordered that the stay granted in and by the said order to show cause why the default should not be opened be, and the same hereby is, vacated, and the plaintiff is hereby permitted to enter judgment upon the verdict of the jury rendered upon the said inquest, and to docket the same, and that the said judgment shall stand as security for the payment of the claim in this action, until the further order of this court in the premises; and it is further ordered that the defendants pay to the plaintiff’s attorneys, within two days after service of this order upon the defendants’ attorneys, the sum of $100; and it is further ordered that this cause be restored to the general circuit calendar of this court, to be called upon Saturday, March 4, 1808, in part HI. of this' court, and the clerk of this court is hereby ordered and directed to place this cause upon the said calendar for the purpose of fixing a day for the trial; and it is further ordered that the defendants must try this action when it is again reached for trial, unless trial thereof is postponed by the trial court for cause, appealing to the court’s discretion, or unless the plaintiff’s attorneys consent to the postponement of the trial; and it is further ordered that if the trial of the cause is postponed by the court against the. obtection of the plaintiff’s counsel, anc^the plaintiff then íetum to Cali'omia before a second trial of this action has been had, the defendants mu t pay the necessary and reasonable expenses of the plaintiff in coming from the state of California to the state of New York for the purpose of attending the said inquest heretofore taken herein, and also the reasonable expenses of the plaintiff in remaining in this city since his arrival, and also the reasonable expenses of the plaintiff in returning to California upon his present trip, the amount of such expenses to be hereafter determined by the court or a judge thereof on notice to the defendants’ attorneys, and to be paid within two days after a service of a cony of the order determining the same; and it is further ordered that, upon the failure of the defendants to comply with any of the conditions specified in the foregoing order, the said motion to open the said default be, and the same hereby is, in all respects denied, with $10 costs, and the plaintiff is at liberty to issue execution upon the judgment without further notice, but, upon full compliance with the terms of this order, the default is hereby opened, and the inquest set aside.
    Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and O’BRIEN and INGRAHAM, JJ.
    Frederick W. Leonard, (James B. Lockwood, of counsel,) for appellants.
    Donohue, Newcombe & Cardozo, (Benjamin N. Cardozo, of counsel,) for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

The terms are no doubt stringent, but, upon the facts appearing, we cannot say that the discretion vested in the court, and which was exercised in imposing such terms, has been abused. The defendants were alone responsible for their situation, which left them without their witnesses upon the trial, and compelled the plaintiff, at great expense and inconvenience, to come from California for the purpose of trying the cause, which could have been obviated by defendants consenting to an adjournment. This would have given them, in addition, time to secure the attendance of their witnesses, or to have their testimony taken. Where, therefore, the fault was entirely on one side, and where, as here, the judge was of opinion that “this action is not defended in good faith,” a situation was presented which might have warranted the denial of the motion to open the default. In granting it, however, the judge was no doubt impressed with the view that the plaintiff should be reimbursed to the extent that he was injured by the favor thus granted to defendants. To, this end the cause was directed to be placed again upon the calendar for trial, and in the event that the defendants should not be ready, and a postponement of the case should result, necessitating the return of the plaintiff to California, provision was made for the expenses which he should incur through defendants’ fault in being obliged to come here, remain, and return to his home. This expense the defendants can save by being ready for trial on the date as provided in the order; but, if they wish further time to procure the testimony of absent witnesses,—which we think should have been given them,—then the plaintiff ought, to the extent provided in the order, to be reimbursed. When we consider the object sought to be accomplished by the calling of the general calendar, and the placing of causes on the day calendar certain for trial, it would be subversive of the whole plan if, as in this case, counsel for the defendants, to the disadvantage of the plaintiff, could consent to the trial of the cause for a fixed day, and then, regardless of the trouble and expense to which,such party and counsel might be put, move for an adjournment, upon the ground that they never had been ready, and had no assurance when they consented to have the cause set down for a day certain that they would be ready. We think, therefore, that we should not interfere with the order; only it should not be construed as depriving the judge calling the calendar from granting a postponement of the time to enable the defendants to get their testimony if a proper case is made out, provided such defendants consent to pay the disbursements referred to in the order appealed from. As thus modified, the order should be affirmed, without costs to either party upon this appeal.  