
    Lynn CARLSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 10-35941.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Jan. 17, 2012.
    
    Filed Jan. 25, 2012.
    Tim Wilborn, Wilborn Law Office, PC, Oregon City, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Adrian Lee Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Portland, OR, Mathew W. Pile, Terrye Erin Shea, Esquire, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Tim Wilborn, the attorney of record for Lynn Carlson and the real-party-in-interest, appeals from the district court’s order granting in part his motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) based on a contingent-fee agreement with Carlson. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion, Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc), and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the fees from the amount specified in the fee agreement based on the court’s assessment of what was reasonable given the risk and complexity involved in this case. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002) (stating that “[i]f the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is ... in order”); Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1152-53 (explaining that courts should assess the complexity and risk involved in the specific case at issue, rather than social security cases in general, when analyzing the reasonableness of the requested fees); see also Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir.2008) (“The district court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct legal standard or rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     