
    Jill THORNSBERRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-55655.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Dec. 5, 2013.
    Filed Jan. 15, 2014.
    Laura Krank, Marc V. Kalagian, Esquire, Rohlfing & Kalagian, Long Beach, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Jeffrey Chen, Jacqueline Anna For-slund, Assistant Regional Counsel, SSA-Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, Thomas C. Stahl, Chief Counsel, Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: D.W. NELSON, WARDLAW, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Jill Thornsberry (Thornsberry) appeals the district court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The district court did not err in concluding that substantial evidence supported the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) to accord the treating physicians’ opinions little weight. The treating physicians’ opinions were conclusory, brief and inconsistent with the record. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 859 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.2004). Moreover, a doctor’s opinion that a claimant is disabled is not itself a medical opinion but an issue reserved exclusively for the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1). The ALJ had no duty to recontact the treating physicians before finding Thornsberry not disabled because the doctors’ reports were neither ambiguous nor insufficient to make a disability determination. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir.2005).

Nor did the district court err in finding that the ALJ properly applied res judicata to Thornsberry’s application. See Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir.1988). Thornsberry did not present any evidence to suggest that her condition deteriorated, or that circumstances changed since the denial of benefits in 2004. Our opinion in Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 512 (9th Cir.2012) (en banc), does not apply, as the matter before us does not involve Chevron deference.

Finally, the district court did not err in concluding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. The ALJ provided “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting Thornsberry’s statements about the intensity, persistence and limiting effect of her symptoms to the extent they were inconsistent with the residual functional capacity assessment. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). The ALJ correctly considered Thornsberry’s daily activities, her unexplained failure to seek consistent treatment and the state medical expert’s opinion that Thornsberry’s subjective complaints of pain and limitations appeared disproportionate to her diagnoses. See id.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     