
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Danny Ray LYNCH, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 08-30999
    Conference Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    April 20, 2010.
    Cristina Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, James G. Cowles, Jr., Assistant, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Betty Lee Marak, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before SMITH, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Danny Ray Lynch, federal prisoner # 13758-035, appeals the district court’s grant of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence based on the amendments to the crack cocaine Guideline. Lynch argues that the district court failed to state that it had considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and to state the reasons for the sentence. He further contends that he was entitled to a greater reduction in his sentence of imprisonment.

We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) for an abuse of discretion, and its interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo. United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir.2009), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 517, 175 L.Ed.2d 366 (2009). “[TJhere are clear and significant differences between original sentencing proceedings and sentence modification proceedings.” United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir.2009) (quoting Doublin, 572 F.3d at 238), petition for• cert filed (Jan. 28, 2010) (No. 09-8939). Whereas original sentencing proceedings are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3553, sentencing modification proceedings are governed by § 3582(c)(2), which requires only that the district court consider the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 673. Lynch submitted a sentencing brief in which he “described in detail why the § 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of a sentence at the bottom of, or below, the sentencing range.” See id. at 673. This court “can assume that [the district court] considered” Lynch’s arguments regarding the § 3553(a) factors and “that it concluded that the § 3553(a) factors weigh in [the defendant’s] favor.” Evan.s, 587 F.3d at 673 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The district court is “not required to state findings of facts and conclusions of law” when granting or denying a motion under § 3582(c)(2). Id. at 674 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Moreover, a defendant cannot successfully challenge a district court’s failure to provide reasons “for granting his [§ 3582(c)(2) ] motion but not providing a satisfactorily low enough sentence within the recalculated range.” Id.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5tii Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     
      
      . Lynch received a substantial assistance reduction upon motion of the Government. Therefore, Lynch was ineligible for Section 3582 relief under the law of this Circuit. See United States v. Carter, 595 F.3d 575 (5th Cir.2010) (per curiam). The Government does not appeal the grant of the Section 3582 motion, however, so we address only Lynch's appeal.
     