
    Glaser against Reno.
    Tuesday, September 26.
    A paper signed by a clerk, stating that at some previous time he had received certain goods, . being more m the natureof a certificate than a receipt, is not evidence.
    In ERROR.
    ERROR to Allegheny county.
    The action in the lower Court, was indebitatus assumpsit, for the Freight of a quantity of iron shipped by- Reno, the plaintiff, from the mouth of Beaver creek to Pittsburgh, for and on account of Glaser, the defendant. To prove the delivery of the metal to a certain Joseph M'Clurg, the plaintiff produced a paper signed by William M‘Laughlin, the clerk of MlGlurg, expressed as follows.
    “ Pittsburgh, May 29th, 1815.
    “ The weight of pig iron delivered to me from John L. Glaser, by the hands of C. S. Reno, at sundry times in the months of October and November, in 1814, is thirty tons, sixteen cwt., three qrs., and sixteen lbs.
    for Joseph M‘Clurg, (signed,) William MiLaughlin.n
    
    It had been previously proved, that Joseph M'Clurg had bought iron from the defendant, about the time mentioned in the receipt, and that M'Laughlin was at that time, and at the date of the receipt, the clerk of M'-Clurg, and authorised to act for him. It did not appear, that any enquiry had been made as to the residence of M ‘Laughlin, nor that any effort had been made by the plaintiff to procure his testimony.
    The admission of this paper in evidence, was objected to by the defendant’s counsel, but the Court overruled the objection.
    
      Hopkins and Baldwin, for the plaintiff in error.
    If the receipts of a third person be admissible at all, they can only be so where they are given in the usual course of business and at the time when the money or goods are received. Such evidence has never been received with greater latitude, even in the case of payments made to officers of the land office and deputy surveyors, whose receipts or certificates after their official character has ceased, of money paid to them while in office,' are not .evidence. Lessee of Cluggage v. Swart, 4 Birin. 150. This is not a receipt which would bind even MiClurg; it is merely a certificate of a fact which occurred a long time before; and the admissions of an agent subsequent to the time of transacting the business, do not operate against the principal. Phill. Ev. 74. There is nothing in this case to exclude the general rule, which requires a witness to be examined under oath, and an opportunity given to the adverse party to cross-examine him. Such evidence has been uniformly rejected. Sterrett v. Bull. 1 Binn. 234. Longenecker v. Hyde. 6 Binn. 1. Lessee of Hubley v. White. 2 Yeates, 134.
    
      Forward, for the defendant in error said,
    it had been proved before the receipt was offered, that the defendant had sold iron to MíClurg. The paper was offered merely as corroborating evidence, and in that character it was admissible.
   Per Curiam.

The paper which was offered in evidence by the plaintiff, and admitted by the Court, was not a receipt by the clerk of MiClurg, but in the nature of a certificate, that a certain quantity of iron had been delivered, long after the transaction happened. The case of Cluggage v. Swan, is decisive against the evidence. The defendant had a right to the oath of M'-Laughlin, and the benefit of a cross-examination. There are other objections to the evidence, concerning which we give no opinion. The judgment must be reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.

Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.  