
    In the Matter of the Petition of The Third Methodist Episcopal Church of the City of Brooklyn to Dissolve the Corporation.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,
    
    
      Filed February 13, 1893.)
    
    
      1. Religious corporations — Dissolution.
    No meeting of the board of trustees of a religious corporation is necessary to authorize an application for dissolution under chapter 424, Laws 1872, as such application may be made by a majority of the trustees.
    2. Same.
    Nor is any meeting of the society necessary to authorize the application, except to show the court that a dissolution is favored by a majority of the society.
    3. Same — Provisions of church discipline.
    P is no objection to an order of dissolution that it is contrary to or not authorized by the rules of church discipline of the denomination, as no church discipline can supersede the Laws of the state.
    Appeal from order for the dissolution of the corporation and the transfer of its property to the Brooklyn Church Society.
    The application for dissolution is signed by five of the trustees, a majority of the board. The evidence showed that there have been no religious services since December 22, 1891.
    
      
      Horatio C. King (Frank Moss, of counsel), for app’lts; W. J. Groo, for resp’ts.
   Pratt, J.

It is not material to consider the motion to dismiss the appeal in this proceeding, as the merits are before us and a decision upon the merits will dispose of the motion.

The questions raised upon this appeal were thoroughly tried below and we think the conclusions there reached were sustained by the proofs.

In fact there is scarcely any dispute about the facts, the only contention being upon the conclusions of law arising therefrom.

It clearly appeared that the society had ceased to act in its corporate capacity and to keep up religious services, and that the petition for dissolution was “ signed by a majority of the trustees thereof,” as required by law, Laws of 1872.

It is plain from a reading of the statute that the petition was in proper form to give the court jurisdiction. It does not say “ upon application of the board of trustees,” but upon application of a majority of the trustees. It is, therefore, clear that no meeting of the board was necessary in order to authorize such application.

Neither was it essential that there should be a meeting of the society to authorize application, except to show the court that a dissolution was favSred by a majority of the society.

Much criticism has been expended upon the motives and conduct of the trustees making the application, but as far as we can gather they seem to have represented the views and feelings of a majority of the members of the society. Inasmuch, however, as no meeting of the society was necessary, it is not material as to the form of the notice calling for a meeting ; even if the meeting must be held for naught as approving the action of the trustees. If there was any great opposition to the dissolution and sale, an opportunity was offered for a hearing in court on the day the matter was tried, when it does appear that quite a number of the society were present, including leading Methodists from surrounding societies.

The objection that the order herein is contrary to or not authorized by § 334 of Church Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church is not well taken, as no church discipline can supersede the laws of the state.

The court below found all the material allegations of the complaint to be true, and we think the proofs justify that finding, and that the conclusions of law as found by the decision are correct.

We have examined all the exceptions raised and find no error sufficient to warrant a reversal of the order.

The opposition had an opportunity to put in any proper proof to the utmost limit of propriety, but failed to impeach in any material effect the allegations of the petition.

Order affirmed, with costs.

Barnard, P. J., concurs; Dykman, J., not sitting.  