
    Terrance RICKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 90-2031.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 1, 1991.
    Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Tanja Ostapoff, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Sylvia H. Alonso, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm appellant’s convictions and sentences, but write briefly on appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in calculating sentencing guidelines points.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by employing a multiplier in calculating legal constraint points. We have previously affirmed this practice in Carter v. State, 571 So.2d 520 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), and do so again. We are aware that our holding conflicts with Scott v. State, 574 So.2d 247 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) and are also aware of the supreme court’s recent opinion in Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Re: Sentencing Guidelines (Rules 3.701 and 3.988), 16 F.L.W. 198 (Fla. March 7, 1991), modified, 16 F.L.W. 221, but note that the proposed amendments are not effective until approved by the legislature.

Because of the conflict, we certify the following question, as previously done in Preston v. State, No. 90-1433 (Fla. 4th DCA April 4, 1991), as one of great public importance:

DO FLORIDA’S UNIFORM SENTENCING GUIDELINES REQUIRE THAT LEGAL CONSTRAINT POINTS BE ASSESSED FOR EACH OFFENSE COMMITTED WHILE UNDER LEGAL CONSTRAINT?

AFFIRMED.

LETTS and DELL, JJ., concur.

STONE, J., concurs specially with opinion.

STONE, Judge,

concurring specially.

I concur in affirming because we are bound by our opinion in Carter v. State. However, I would recede from Carter and would concur with the view of the Second District Court expressed in Scott v. State. I also concur in the certified question.  