
    Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Noble et al.
    
    (Division A.
    May 23, 1927.)
    [112 So. 691.
    No. 26489.]
    Wnxs. “Age of maturity" in mil held to mean maturity in mind, character, and judgment.
    
    “Age of maturity” in will giving testator’s small estate with, negligible income in trust to hold till testator’s youngest child shall have reached the age of maturity, for the use and benefit of his wife and three minor children, held, in the absence of anything in the will to indicate intent to use the words in other than their ordinary and usual sense, to mean maturity in mind, character, and judgment.
    Appeal from chancery court of Jones county.
    ITon. G-. C. Tann, Chancellor.
    Suit between the Commercial Bank & Trust Company and Albert Sidney Noble and others. F'rom adverse decree, said company appeals.
    Affirmed.
    
      Deavowrs & Hilbwt, for appellant.
    This is a friendly suit for the purpose of the construction of the last will and testament of Albert W. Noble, deceased. Appellant is the executor in said will and the appellees are the devisees thereunder.
    Appellees contend that the intent and meaning of the phrase “age of maturity” is synonymous with the age of discretion and capacity and ability to think and reason for one’s self. The appellant contends that the phrase “age of maturity” in this last will and testament means when the infant becomes an adult, over the age of twenty-one years. There are no- disputed facts.
    
      The appellant contends that it was the manifest intent and purpose of said testator that his property should he held in trust by appellant as executor until testator’s youngest child should become an adult, over the age of twenty-one years. 5 Words & Phrases 4418, Qrwkshcmk v. Crmkshank, 80 N. T. Supp. 8, 11, 39 Miss. 401; Carpenter v. Boulden, 49 Md. 122, 129.
    It seems to us clearly to show that by “age of maturity” he intended to mean that the youngest child should reach lawful age. The court erred in its construction ; therefore, said cause should he reversed.
    
      Morris & Wingo, for appellees.
    It is the contention of the- appellees that the testator, having in mind the difference in the ages of his three children, used the phrase “age of maturity” in its ordinary sense and meaning as is commonly understood. The youngest living child was at the time of the trial nearly seventeen years of age, well developed mentally and physically, capable of transacting business for himself, and possessed of reasonably mature judgment generally.
    Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines “maturity” as follows: “The state of being mature, ripeness; a state of perfection or completeness, as the maturity of age or judgment.” Collier’s New Dictionary, 1927 edition, defines the same word as follows: ‘ ‘ The state or quality of being mature, ripeness, full development.” Anderson’s Dictionary of Law defines “maturity” as follows: “Maturity in a will may import maturity of mind and character, the combined result of age and education.”
    This exact question has been decided in Convict’s Executors v. King, 13 N. J. (Eq.) (2 Beasl.) at 380:
    It is well-settled law in this state as well as the general rule of law that the intent of the testator at the time of the execution of the will is controlling in its construction. It was the wise and thoughtful act of this father to provide that at the “maturity,” meaning the state of PP. SSBBggBBSSg^ Q£&2 ZQtrhr&i |=>i i r_i JpPSPP fio <S S £p p p p^. -.o o MpP^-^j^gigoPPpp ^S^PP|ct5®®cpfq Pt>PP PPS2®® ® ®^ ^P Phj hFD. . , w i-t .. Ptciro fflo oS á j&wkey;Ri^nrPfpuIri|',¿ p pp p® ®p rag gpKE crccrqoo ®®Pi±l'-'P hj Kftffo o aP Qj~^ ^O í g^^PPooPí^í^í !PP1 -OO* ^ prpOOcccoc* O ffiü ürKK
    
      
      Corpus Juris-Cyc References: Age, 2CJ, p. 402, n. 17 New; Maturity, 39CJ, p. 1391, n. 43 New; Wills, 40Cyc, p. 1407, n. 96 New.
    
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~.e appellant contends that the phrase ‘.a; , jLi.e, appellant, contends, that tEe phrase ■& tunty;;as used m the wm is synonymous witJ ’ as- used in the, will is synonymous wif majority,;, while the appellees convene mai porfs simp ports simp pineq resi while pellees contend that f and character, me I- and character, tEe o-nrf DiTnfiQTirm ’ ot ma- , of, male term , me. term íaf it unit ím-com-com-Mmaic mea urity ot mu urity of.mniu __ op age, experience, and education.

In me interpretation of mé language ot ever , In tEe interpretation of, the dananage of ever he prime opieet is to ascertain me Tear intention .. lie, mime efrject is -:o ascartain.-fhe, real,intention o estator. The wore s of me will should pe .given .estator., The- words of the will should be given usual and ordinary meaning’. unless the clear intention usual and ordinary;.-meaning; unless the,clear intentjpn to use them in another seimé can pe game * . lang lanf ll one one o; minemin nsec usea.,. j. cepfauon eeptatipn; im' menu tiie’co” an in anot ox the wif e the: age Cju wj age of£tEe m_. prase ,, age of mafurr hrase “age of matur: invariante meaning. Livariable meampg; ,rom the confex :,rpm ‘_A_OT < t x0j-- maturity^ 7 in its or-„..„..„ . .— orts maturity of mind, character, i-rtsmaturity ^ ined r'’°-"l+ ,, as useí: inraawSl,-'i7s not ”, as used m a will; is not ns meaning’ must pe cfeter- . its meaning must, bendeter-e connection in wpicp. if is if ac-..._:_ ac- and judgment, tire .combined result ot a lion, ’ancf is not synonymous w: tipni and ys no ~~ TÍiefi— ' " atuiuty ot mind, character; and Tuü esuft oí age, experience, ánd educ udg-..rience-; and educar igal majority j;; and Wtieh iísedin‘á wil'i;Tirds"Words' sHoulCfle gxvraPfmnt usual when used m a willithes words should.be given their, usual anc ordinary meainng unless mere is something m me irdinary, meaning unless tEere is, sometEing, in the o indicate that the testator intended to use xhem m p indicate that tEe testator intended to use them m perene sense.

In the case of Convict's Executors v. King, 13 N. J. Eq. 375. ,thát the/word “maturity inra c^huse op a w^ was not synonymous in a clause ot a will was not synonymous wit majority,” but merely imported maturity of mind and character, the combined result of age and education; while, in the case of Carpenter v. Boulden, 48 Md. 122, where the will provided that a legacy should be paid to the legatee when she reached lawful age, with a limitation over in the event the legatee died “before maturity without issue,” the word “maturity” was construed to mean the same thing as the testator had expressed by the word “lawful age.”

In the case of Cruikshank v. Cruikshank, 39 Misc. Rep. 401, 80 N. T. S. 8, it was held that the word “maturity,” as used in the will there being construed, meant maturity in law or legal majority; but in that case the word was used in connection with the word “minority” in such a way as to clearly indicate that the testator intended to use it as synonymous with “legal majority,” as shown by the following language of the court:

“Thus we have the word ‘minority’ used in limitation of the term during which the income shall be applied to the ‘support, education, and maintenance of such issue,’ and then, when majority is reached — when minority is passed — such application of the net income shall cease. If the issue shall die before ‘maturity’ — an inapt expression, indeed, but this is the holographic will of a layman — the principal is to go to testator’s remaining children; otherwise to ‘such issue.’ The payment over of the principal is deferred until the time limited for the ‘support, education, and maintenance of’ the issue shall have lapsed, and hence the word ‘maturity,’ as used here, must be held to mean maturity in law, or when such issue shall have reached majority.”

In the case at bar, we find nothing in the will to indicate an intent oh the part of the testator to use these words in the sense of legal majority. There is about ten years’ [difference between the ages.'of the testator’s youngest child and the next oldest; the estate is small, and the income therefrom negligible; .and since there is nothing in the will to indicate an intent to use the words in other than their ordinary and usual sense, we think the court below was correct in construing the phrase to mean maturity in mind, character, and judgment. In the final decree, the court below found as a fact that the testator’s youngest child was seventeen years of age, and by reason of age, experience, and education had reached the age of maturity within the meaning of the phrase as used by the testator. It was further ordered that the property involved should be sold by the trustee, and the shares of the three adult distributees paid to them, and that the interest of the minor should be retained by the appellant in its capacity as guardian of said minor. We think this decree was in all respects correct, and it will therefore be affirmed.

Affirmed.  