
    BRIGGS’S CASE.
    James A. Briggs v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      An official circular in issued by the Treasury offering a reward for the detection of persons riolafing the revenue laws. The claimant furnishes the Commissioner with information. Mis claim for the reward is recommended by the Commissioner and approved by the. Secretary, and an account therefor is slated by the accounting officers. The account remains unpaid until the appropriation from which it is payable has lapsed and is carried to the surplus fund, or until the money then applicable to it has been paid away upon subsequent claims.
    
    I.The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with tlie approval of Uie Secretary of the Treasury, vas authorized by the Aei 6th June, 1S72 (17' Stat. L., p. 230 ), to offer rewards for tlie detection of delinquents against the revenue laws.
    II.The offer of a reward by one party, when accepted and complied with by ilio other, constitutes a valid contract.
    III. When a reward has been properly awarded by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, the party luis a remedy at. law in this court to recover it.
    IV. The fact that a reward cannot be paid at the Treasury because tbe appropriation out of which it should have been paid has lapsed constitutes no defense to a suit in this court.
    V. It) at the time when an account is properly allowed at the Treasury,. there be an appropriation unexpended out of which it may properly be paid, tlie fact that the appropriation was subsequently paid away to other parties constitutes no defense to an action on the account, although a statute limited the total expenditure, io the amount appropriated.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of tbe ease:
    Tbe following are tbe facts of tbe ease as found by tbe court:
    I. That on tbe 31st day of July, 3873, tire Commissioner of Internal Kevenne, with tbe approval of tbe Secretary of f Ik; Treas ury, caused to be published a certain official circular, known and designated as “ Circular No. 99 revised,” containing the following offer:
    
      “ Under and by virtue of the provisions of the thirty-ninth section of an act entitled ‘ An act to reduce duties ou imports and to reduce internal taxes, and for other purposes,’ approved ■June 6, 1872, which authorize the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to pay such sums as may in his judgment be deemed necessary, not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars, for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal-revenue laws, or conniving at violations of the same, in cases where such expenses are not otherwise provided for by law, I do hereby, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, offer for information given by persons other than •officers of internal revenue, that shall lead to the detection and punishment of jmrsons guilty of violating the internal-revenue laws, or conniving at the same, whether such punishment be by fine or other pecuniary mulct or penalty, or by forfeiture of property, such reward as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may deem suitable, but in no case exceeding ten per centum of the net amount of the fines, penalties, forfeitures. and taxes, which, by reason of said information, shall be recovered by suit or otherwise and actually paid to the United States, or of any sum which shall be accepted iu compromise by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and received by the United States.
    “ This offer will apply to cases in which information has been ■or shall be given on or after the 10th day of July, 1873.
    “B. J. Sweet,
    i( Acting Commissioner.
    
    
      u Approved:
    “War. A. Riohakdson, •
    “ ¡Secretary of the Treasury
    
    II. That under date of August 12, 1874, the claimant furnished the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with information of the unlawful withholding of tax due under the internal-revenue laws by the officers and company of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Said information having led to the recovery and collection of certain moneys by the United States, claimant presented his claim for reward to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Said claim was duly recommended and passed by the said Commissioner, June 28, 1877, for the sum of $1,191.04, was approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, the account was stated by the Fifth Auditor, and certified by the First ■Comptroller as due and payable.
    
      III. That under date of August 12, 1874, claimant in like manner furnished information of the unlawful withholding of tax by the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Company. Said information having led to the recovery of a large sum of money by the United States,, claimant presented his claim for reward to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Said claim was recommended and passed by the said Commissioner, October 4,1878, for the sum of $5,000, was approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, the account stated by the Fifth Auditor, and forwarded to the First Comptroller.
    IV. That under date of June 25, 1874, claimant in like manner furnished information of the unlawful withholding of tax by the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railroad Company. Said information having led to the recovery of certain moneys by the United States, claimant presented his claim for reward to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Said claim was recommended and passed by the said Commissioner, February 26, 1878, for the sum of $2,275, was approved by the' Secretary of the Treasury, the account stated by the Fifth Auditor, and forwarded to the First Comptroller.
    V. That under date of December 17, 1874, claimant in like manner furnished information of the unlawful withholding of tax by the Saint Louis, Alton and Terre Haute Railroad Company. Said information having led to the recovery of certain moneys by the United States, claimant presented his claim for reward to the Commissioner óf Internal Revenue. Said claim was recommended and passed by the said Commissioner, November 26* 1877, for the sum of $2,522.53, was approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, the account stated by the Fifth Auditor, and forwarded to the ifirst Comptroller.
    VI. That all the said accounts remain unpaid by reason of the balance of appropriation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1875, from which they were payable, having been carried to the surplus fund of the Treasury July 1, 1877.
    VII. That under date of May 28,1874, claimant in like manner furnished information of the unlawful withholding of tax by the New York Central and Hudson River Company. Said information having led to the recovery, in 1878, of certain moneys by the United States, claimant presented his claim for reward to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Said claim being payable out of the appropriation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1878, was recommended, and passed by tbe said Commissioner, May 20,1878, for tbe sum of $1,818, at wbicb date there was an unexpended balance to tbe credit' of said appropriation amounting to $28,003.78. That said claim was subsequently approved by tbe Secretary of tbe Treasury, tbe account stated by tbe Fifth Auditor and forwarded to tbe First Comptroller, but that tbe claim was delayed in reaching tbe accounting officers through no fault of claimant, and that, pending such delay, tbe appropriation was exhausted by expenditures for other purposes, for wbicb reason tbe said account remains unpaid.
    
      Mr. George L. Douglass for tbe claimant:
    It has been frequently decided, both in England and tbe United States, that an nnrecalled offer of reward, tbe terms of wbicb are accepted and complied with by a second party, constitutes a binding contract. But tbe approval of these accounts by tbe Commissioner and Secretary put tbe claims beyond all discussion of such points.
    On other grounds tbe case is clearly within the principles laid down by this court in Kaufman’s Case (11 O. Ols. B., 659) and Woolner’s Case (13 C. Cls. B., 335).
    
      Mr. A. D. Robinson (with whom was tbe Assistant Attorney-General) for tbe defendants:
    Claimant cannot recover for tbe first four items in the petition, because tbe balance of tbe appropriation has lapsed, and bad so lapsed before tbe commencement of this suit, as admitted in tbe petition. Tbe statute above cited declares that when any part of an appropriation is so lapsed, and is covered into tbe Treasury, it is there to remain as if never appropriated, and shall be deemed to have ceased and been determined, “ and it shall not be lawful for any cause or pretense whatsoever to transfer, withdraw, apply, or use for any purpose any moneys carried as aforesaid.”
    We have nothing to do with tbe propriety of tbe law. Its propriety has been often questioned. We must take tbe law as it is. This law was part of tbe contract. (Curtis’s Case, 2 C. Ols. B., 144.) It was not legally necessary for claimant to have first presented bis claim to tbe accounting officers. He could have commenced a suit without that, Hon constat, he could have done so and obtained judgment before the appropriation lapsed. But whether so or not, has he now any other remedy than Congress'?
    This money is now in the Treasury like customs and internal revenue moneys, and on it the estimates of the Secretary are based, and if thousands of dollars can be taken in this way, so may millions; and such a principle once established may seriously embarrass the Treasury. (Nichols's Case, 7 Wall., 129.) The court say, iu Curtis’s Case, above cited (p. 152), the principal gave the contractor the plainest and the clearest notice that all of its expenditures and liabilities should not exceed a fixed and certain sum, an d that it became to the claim ant notice in law and in fact and was stamped upon and made part of the contract. Hot only was the amount limited in the case of Briggs, but the time in which it should be payable. It is like a statute of limitations, which the Supreme Court says must be enforced like any other law, no matter how unfortunately it may affect individual cases. Did not Congress say in effect “ whatever is not paid out within two years we will take back to ourselves, and if any person has a claim which he considers a proper charge, let him produce it before us, and we will examine and pass upon it” ?
    True, this court has jurisdicton of contracts, express and implied, but Congress has the right to limit the executive departments in the amounts they can expend in all cases, and if an executive department can by making a number of different contracts (no one contractor being known to the others) bind the government to pay all the contractors, although the total would be in excess of the appropriation, because, forsooth, one contractor did not know that so many other contracts would be or were made, thenl cearly an executive department can do just what was so deprecated in the Curtis Case, “ with the aid of this court annul a law of Congress and throw down any limitation which Congress might impose.”
    Congress, as is admitted, limited the amount to be applicable to the payment of such claims, and informers must be on the alert where all cannot be paid.
    This limited appropriation was also a part of the contract, and notice “in law and in fact” to all would-be informers.
    
      
      Mr. George L. Douglass, for the claimant, in reply:
    Under the doctrine in Campbell’s Case (12 C. Cls. B., 470), claimant could not maintain his suit in this court until the Treasury Department had acted upon his claim.
    It is also an absurdity to suppose that the mere carrying of a balance of an appropriation to the “ surplus fund” of the Treasury operates as an abrogation of all outstanding contracts; though it may sometimes interfere with a complete fulfillment of them by the executive branch of government. If the theory advanced be correct, the department officers could abrogate every contract by mere delay, and leave the claimants without remedy. This is a clear case of “ express ” contract over which this court has special jurisdiction. But the theory of the defense would abrogate all the functions of a Court of Claims, by limiting its powers to exactly those possessed by the Treasury officers. It also sets up a new statute of limitations, equally unheard of and unjust. The full opinion in Curtis’s Case, relied upon by defendants, would seem to demolish their defense instead of sustaining it.
    Had Briggs not presented this claim till after the appropriation -was all expended, a different question might be presented here. But in this case as soon as the claim was approved the contract became binding and complete; and the claimant’s rights, having been previously inchoate, thereupon became vested and indefeasible.
    The moment the appropriation was drawn upon»below what was required to pay this claim, it was in derogation of this claimant’s vested rights. If any one should suffer for this, certainly it should not be the claimant, who was not in fault. The court had evidently this principle in view in the Trenton Co.’s Case (12 C. Cls. B., 147).
    It is well settled (Wilson’s Case, 11 C. Cls. B., 513) that “For the acts of its contracting agents, within the scope of their authority, it (the government) is liable as a contracting^ party.” It being conceded that both the contract and the approval of this account were legal and proper, the validity of the official action in reference to other and subsequent accounts need not be discussed.
   Hunt, J.,

delivered the opinion, of the court:

The facts in this case are undisputed. The claimant gave information to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that led to the recovery and collection by the government of certain moneys due as taxes under the iuternal-revenue laws, by five several railroad companies, and unlawfully withheld by them.

The information was furnished in accordance with an offer of reward published by the Commissioner on the 31st July, 1873, in an official circular designated as “ Circular No. 99 revised.” The offer was made by virtue of an act of Congress, approved June 0,1872, authorizing the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to pay such sums as in his judgment might be necessary, not exceeding $100,000, for detecting delinquents and furnishing information leading to the recovery and collection of certain moneys by the United States.

Under these provisions of law the claimant has been awarded the several sums sot forth in his petition, amounting in the aggregate to $12,830.59; and his accounts have been approved by the Commissioner and Secretary for that sum.

It is a familiar principle of law that the offer of a- reward by a party, when accepted and complied with by another, constitutes a valid contract. Hence the right of the claimant to recover the sum thus ascertained to be due to him becomes complete; and his remedy before this court is expressly provided by law. (Rev. Stat., § 1059; see Kaufman v. The United States, 11 C. Cls. R., 659; Woolner v. The United States, 13 id., 355.)

The learned counsel for the government resists the claimant’s demand upon two grounds, which we proceed to consider.

Io. It is said the claimant cannot recover a part of his demand — the first four items — because the balance of the appropriation from which these items were iiayable had lapsed before the commencement of this suit. . This balance it is shown had been carried on the books of the Treasury to the account of the. surplus fund, as alleged. But we are unable to consider that fact as an abrogation of the contract between the claimant and the authorized agent of the government, or as defeating the remedy of the claimant before this court. In the case of Curtis v. The United States (2 C. Cls. R., 151) this court said: “Contracts in excess of an appropriation are held ordinarily void to that extent. That difficulty, however, so far as it relates to cases in this court, Congress has bridged by the general appropriation to meet its judgments. If this were not so, we should be constantly stopped by that obstacle. The Court of Claims was established to meet those cases where a man came before Congress and said I have expended money for or rendered service to the government, for which I could recover in a court of justice if the party with whom I dealt were a citizen or a corporation. I ash a like remedy and a like liability on the part of the government.’” (See also Collins v. The United States, ante, p. 22.)

2°. The second ground of objection presented by the government is to the fifth and only remaining item of the claim. It is said that this item cannot be recovered because Congress limited the amount applicable to the payment of the claims of informers in cases like this, and that this limited appropriation was a part of the contract, and constituted notice to all persons who might become informers under the law; and that the appropriation is now exhausted.

It is conceded that the claimant’s account was properly allowed by the accounting officers at a time when there was still in the Treasury an unexpended balance of the appropriation more than sufficient to meet the claimant’s demand. The liquidation of the claim at such a time had the effect of merging it into a valid award, and of placing it beyond the subsequent control of the accounting officers until impeached for fraud or mistake. (96 U. S. 570.) Besides the obligation to the claimant was created and adjusted under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment. (Rev. Stat., § 3732.) The mere delay in reaching a draft for the amount and in reducing the money to manual possession by the claimant cannot affect his right to a recovery in this action.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the claimant do have and recover judgment for $12,836.59.  