
    WILMERING v. STATE.
    (No. 9572.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Nov. 25, 1925.)
    Criminal law @=>780(3)— Requested charge held properly' refused as insufficient In not enabling jury to determine to whom: It was applicable.
    Requested instruction that, if jury believed that any other witness beside purchaser of liquor had guilty knowledge of transaction, they could not convict on testimony of such witnesses unless corroborated, held, properly refused as directing attention of jury to no witness, especially when evidence did not show witnesses to be accomplices.
    Appeal from District Court, Potter County ; Henry S. Bishop, Judge.
    Walter Wilmering was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, and appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Umphres, Mood & Clayton, of Amarillo, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., of Austin, and Nat Gentry, Jr., Asst. State’s Atty., of Tyler, for the State.
   LATTIMORE, J.

Prom conviction in the district court of Potter county for selling intoxicating liquor, with punishment fixed at two years in the penitentiary, this appeal is taken.

The facts show a sale of five cases of intoxicating liquor by appellant to one Spencer. Spencer testified positively to the purchase of the whisky and the payment therefor. The only complaint in the brief for appellant is of the failure to give special charge No. 2. Same in substance sought to have the jury told that if they believed from the evidence that any other witness in the case besides the purchaser had a guilty knowledge of the transaction under investigation, or participated in same, they could not convict on the testimony of such witness unless there was other testimony in the case corroborative v of his testimony tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed. Such a charge as this is wholly insufficient. It directs the attention "of the jury to no witness and gives them no guide or direction by which they could determine to whom said charge sought application. No other witness in the case testified to any matter in any wise affecting the sufficiency of the testimony of the state witness Spencer. Spencer said that after buying the whisky fronf appellant he took it out and hid it in a pasture. The other state witnesses testified that at different times they saw this whisky in the pasture. None of them claim to be concerned in or to have any knowledge of or connection with the alleged sale. They would not be accomplices in the transaction. We find no witness in the record to whom the rule of accomplice testimony could be applied.

Being unable to agree with appellant’s contention, the judgment will be affirmed.  