
    STATE v. ESLEY EDMONDS.
    (Filed 12 December, 1923.)
    1. Courts — Discretion—Verdict Set Aside — Criminal Law.
    Tbe granting or refusal to set aside a verdict by tbe trial judge in a criminal prosecution on tbe ground that tbe verdict is contrary to tbe weight of tbe evidence is discretionary with him, and not reviewable on appeal.
    21 Intoxicating Liquor — Spirituous Liquor — Statutes—Federal Statutes— Turlington Act — Defenses.
    The legislative purpose in tbe enactment of chapter 1, Public Laws of 1923 (Turlington Act), was to make tbe State statutes in tbe matter of unlawful manufacture or sale and transportation of intoxicating liquor, etc., conform to tbe Federal statute on the subject, and both are liberally construed to prevent, as a matter of public policy, tbe use of intoxicating liquor, as defined, for beverage purposes; and tbe defense is untenable that tbe defendant should not be convicted of violating our prohibition law because tbe Turlington Act became effective on tbe day he was tried» in tbe Superior Court.
    Appeal by defendant from Bryson, J., at February Term, 1923, of MADISON.
    Criminal prosecution tried upon an indictment charging the defendant with violations of the prohibition law.
    From a conviction and judgment pronounced thereon, defendant appealed.
    
      
      Attorney-General Manning and Assistant Attorney-General Nash for the State.
    
    
      Reynolds, Reynolds & Howell for defendant.
    
   S4aoy, J.

Defendant moved to set aside tbe verdict because, be alleges, it was against tbe overwhelming weight of tbe evidence. Motion overruled and exception. Tbe granting of a new trial in a criminal prosecution, or its refusal, on tbe. ground tbat tbe verdict is contrary to tbe weight of tbe evidence, is discretionary with tbe trial court and not reviewable on appeal. S. v. Hancock, 151 N. C., 699.

Defendant moved in arrest of judgment because be was indicted under tbe old law, and tbe “Turlington Act” went into effect tbe very day he was. tried and convicted. This exception is fully met by what was said in S. v. Foster, 185 N. C., 674.

As indicated by its title, “An Act to Make tbe State Law Conform to tbe National Law in Relation to Intoxicating Liquors,” chapter 1, Public Laws 1923, tbe purpose of tbe Legislature, in tbe passage of tbe Turlington Act, was to make tbe State law conform to tbe National law on tbe subject of prohibition.’ Tbe two statutes, as now written, contain, in tbe main, exactly similar or practically similar provisions. And tbe chief purpose of each enactment is to prohibit and, as far as possible, to prevent, except as authorized by each statute, tbe manufacture, sale and transportation, for beverage purposes, of any and every kind of “intoxicating liquor”; and this is expressly "defined to be any spirituous, vinous, malt or fermented liquor or liquid, fit for use for beverage purposes and containing onerbalf of one per centum or more of alcohol. U. S. v. Dodson, 268 Fed., 397. Accordingly, in each statute, Federal and State, tbe courts are enjoined to give a liberal construction to all tbe provisions of tbe act, to tbe end tbat tbe use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented. Rose v. United States, 274 Fed., 245; U. S. v. Crossen, 264 Fed., 459. This is “appropriate legislation,” calculated to aid in tbe enforcement of tbe Eighteenth Amendment to tbe Constitution of tbe United States, and-hence it must be regarded by us as tbe established public policy on tbe subject. S. v. Harrison, 184 N. C., 762.

There is no error appearing on tbe record.

No error.  