
    *Baker, Johnson & Co. vs. Abner Bushnell.
    
    Where an applicant for the insolvent debtors’ Act has been discharged by order of the Circuit Court, and the order for his discharge has been set aside by the Appeal Court, the rights that he acquired by the order, ceased and determined when it was reversed by the Appeal Court.
    A defendant who is a party to an appeal, is bound to take notice of the result of the appeal; and where a defendant, pending an appeal, has left the “prison rules,” so soon as the appeal is decided against him, he should return within the rules ; otherwise his bond is forfeited.
    Before Evans, J., at Edgefield, Spring Term, 1841.
    This was an application for discharge, under the insolvent debtors’ Act of 1758. It appears that the application was made at the preceding term, and the plaintiff had filed a suggestion, alleging certain objections to the discharge. The presiding judge had ordered the discharge, and the schedule was accordingly assigned, and the oath administered. For some cause, this order was reversed by the Appeal Court,
      
       but in the mean time, the defendant, who had given security to remain within the prison rules, had gone without them, and did not return again until within a few days before this application was made at this term. It did not appear that any notice had been given him of a reversal of the former order made for his discharge.
    On the first or second day of the term, an application was made to me, for leave to amend the suggestion, by adding new objections to his discharge. This I refused, as likely to operate a delay prejudicial to the defendant. During the term, the issues on the suggestion were tried by the jury, and all of them found for the defendant, when his discharge was moved for. The plaintiffs objected, that since the last Court the defendant had gone without the prison rules ; the objection was overruled, and the prisoner discharged.
    GROUNDS OR APPEAL.
    Because the defendant, Bushnell, having gone without the prison rules, since the suggestion was filed, and since the October term of the Court, this objection to his discharge could not have been made when the suggestion was filed, and could be made only by an amendment of the suggestion; and because his Honor held that he was entitled to his discharge notwith-standing such absence.
    
      See 5 Rich. 294; Dud. 370. An.
    
    
      Burl, for motion,
    said, tire Court had power to permit an amendment. If so, could the Court then exercise a discretion ? Cited Act of 1759 ; Act of 1788.
    
    Was the defendant, by his being without the prison rules, prevented from his discharge, and did he come within the contemplation of the Act of 1788. 6th Statutes at Large, 491. Briggs vs. Walker, 1 Hill, 118; 3d Chitty’s Gen. Prac. 553.
    Pending an appeal, shall the defendant remain within the rules ?
    Pending an appeal, the proceedings are not complete on the circuit, and it is the Appeal Court that confirms or vacates the proceedings of the Circuit Court. Hence the prisoner is compelled by law to remain within the prison rules.
    If the prisoner was bound to return within the prison rales, after the refusal of his discharge by the Appeal Court, should he have notice of such refusal?
    Was it necessary that notice of the appeal should be given before the order for the defendant’s discharge was made ?
    The defendant was bound to remain within the rules until the time of appeal had elapsed.
    
      Carroll, contra,
    cited 2 Bay’s Rep. ; 3 Chitty’s Gen. P. 563.
    
      Wardlaw, contra.
    Does the law require that any one applying for his discharge, be imprisoned, to entitle him to his discharge? 2 Brev. Dig. 155 ; Id. 160.
    There is no necessity by law for the defendant to be imprisoned at all.
    
      
       S. C. Sup. 66. An.
      
    
    
      
       Sup. 66. An.
      
    
    
      
      
         4 Stat. 56; 5 Stat. 78. An.
      
    
   Curia, per

Evans, J.

The fact was clearly established, that immediately after the order was made for his discharge, at Fall Term, 1840, the defendant went beyond the prison bounds, and remained without them, until at or about the beginning of the next term.

And the only question which I propose to discuss is, whether by this act he forfeited his right to be discharged, under the insolvent Act of 1759. By the Act of 1788, sec. 7, it is enacted* "that no prisoner shall be discharged, if he or she has been seen without tlie prison rules, without being legally authorized to do so.” The defendant did go and remain without, and unless he has shown that he had legal authority to do so, this question must be decided against him. The general rule is, that any order or judgment of a Court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter, is binding and conclusive, until reversed ; and I think the defendant was not bound to go back to prison, there to wait until the plaintiff had decided whether he would appeal. The order conferred on him the privilege to go at large, and this privilege he might lawfully exercise so long as the order was a subsisting one ; during that time it was a shield and protection to him. But when the order was reversed, as to future events, it was as if it had never existed, and all the rights acquired under it, from that time, ceased and determined.

The defendant being a party to the appeal, was bound to take notice of the result of it. When the order was revoked, he no longer had any legal authority to be without the jail bounds. He should have returned, but he did not; and it is the opinion of this Court, that he thereby forfeited his right to be discharged under the insolvent law. The motion to reverse the decision of the Circuit Court is therefore granted.

HichaRDSon, OINeall and ButleR, JJ., concurred.  