
    Cameron G. ROUPE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James STRICKLAND and Adam Veach, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-35063
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted May 19, 2017 Seattle, Washington
    Filed June 08, 2017
    Tomas A. Gahan, Esquire, Trial Attorney, PWRLK, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant
    John Turner Kugler, Turner Kugler Law PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Defendants-Appellees
    Before: HAWKINS, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Cameron Roupe appeals the adverse summary judgment grant to Officers James Strickland and Adam Veach. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1.Summary judgment was correctly granted to Officer Strickland on Roupe’s excessive force claim. Despite a liberal construction of his filings, Roupe did not show that the circumstances of the tasing were genuinely in dispute for summary judgment purposes. See Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2010). Based' on the undisputed material facts, Officer Strickland’s use of force was objectively reasonable, and he was thus entitled to qualified immunity. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2472-73, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015); Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 823 (9th Cir. 2010).

2. Officer Veach was also entitled to qualified immunity because Roupe did not allege or show facts that Officer Veach violated Roupe’s constitutional rights by not reporting the tasing. See Bryan, 630 F.3d at 823. Accordingly, summary judgment was correctly granted to Officer Veach.

3. As for Roupe’s claim that Officers Strickland and Veach unlawfully failed to seek medical attention for him after the tasing, Roupe did not present evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the Officers were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. See Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, this claim fails as well.

4. The panel deems abandoned Roupe’s claim that the district court erroneously ruled on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as if it were a motion to dismiss. See United States v. Loya, 807 F.2d 1483, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Issues raised in a brief which are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”). Finally, Roupe waived his remaining Washington state law claims by not renewing them on appeal. See Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     