
    The town of Strafford, appellees vs. The town of Hartland, appellants.
    Orange,
    
      March, 1830.
    That an appeal from an order of removal must be taken to the next term of the Court in the ¿ame county after service of the order, if there be sufficient time.
    This was an appeal from an order of removal made by two justices for the county of Orange, on the 18th November, 1828, lor the removal of the paupers, Richard Skinner, Rachana, his wife, and Electa, their infant daughter, from Strafford to Hart-land. Hartland was served with a copy of the record of the order, some short time before the setting of the county court, for the county of Orange, December term, 1828. But the warrant of removal was executed, and the paupers actually delivered to the overseer of Hartland, on the 27th of March, 1829, and not before that time. Hartland, soon after appealed to the June term of said court, 1829. At that term, Strafford moved to dismiss the appeal,and the county court ordered it dismissed accordingly. Exceptions were filed, and the case removed to this Court; and tire question was, whether the appeal was taken in due season.
    
      Marsh and Collamer,for the appellants. — The 6th section of the statute, relating to the legal settlement and support of the poor, provides, “ That if any overseer or overseers of any town “ or place, shall think himself or themselves aggrieved by any or- “ der or warrant of removal as aforesaid, he or they may appear “ therefrom to the county court next to be holden within and for “ the county in which such order was made, or from which such “ stranger shall be removed.” — St at. 371. — The very expressions-of this clause seem to show, that the legislature intended that the appe.al should be taken to the next term of the county court after-the order or warrant of removal should be executed. The words “ warrant of removal” give an appeal from the warrant',, that is,, the execution of the warrant by the actual removal of the paupers. Again, the expression, “or from which such stranger shall' be removed,” very strongly indicates the same intention. The legislature by this expression could have intended nothing less than that the appeal should be taken to the court holden next after the actual romoval of the paupers. The appeal is given to the overseer or overseers, who should think himself or themselves aggrieved by any order or warrant of removal, as aforesaid, that is-made and executed in the manner before pointed out in the statute. Aggrieved means injured ; but the party is not injured till-put to actual expense.
    But we are not without authorities on this point. By the-statute 3 and 4 Wm. & Mary, Ch. 2, it is enacted, “ That all “ such persons, who think themselves aggrieved with any such “judgement of the said two justices, may appeal to the next gen- “ eral quarter sessions of the peace, to be held in the county, “ riding, city or town corporate, or liberty, from which the said “ person was so removed.” — 2 Botfs Poor Laws, 819.
    In the construction of this statute it has been repeatedly decided, that the appeal lies to the next sessions of the peace after'the pauper was removed. — See the case of Millbrooh vs. St* Johns, Southampton, 2 Botfs Poor Laws, 834 ; also King vs-Morton,2 Botfs 835. — 2 Stra.S31.-Rex vs. The justices of East Riding, 2 Botfs 840. — Doug. 193. — Rex vs. Justices of Hert-fordshire, 2 Botts, 840. — 3 T. R. 504.
    It is believed, that independent of the statute of 1817, our statute must have received the same construction. It may, then, be enquired how this last mentioned statute can alter the construction of the former act. The statute of 1817, (p. 383,) in the 3d section, transfers the jurisdiction of pauper causes, and directs appeals in them to be taken to the Supreme, instead of the county court; and, in the same section, directs that the appeal shall be taken to the Supreme Court to be holden in the county where Such order shall be made, next aft$r notice of said order shall be given to the adverse party. The 5th section of the same act directs, “ that when any order of removal shall be made,” &c. “ an “attested copy of such order shall be left 'with some one of the “ overseer's of the poor of the town, to which said pauper shall be “ ordered to remove, within thirty days after the making of such •“ order.” It is believed, that, independent of the'5th section, the whole subject, as to the time of appealing, would have been left precisely where it was under the act of 1797; and the expression “ next after notice of said order shall be given to the'ad-versé party,” in the 3d section would be construed to intend such notice as the act of 1797 required : and this view of the subject seems to be confirmed by the last clause in the third section, “subject to the provisions and regulations contained in the sixth and seventh sections of said act”. This being correct, the mere positive enactment in the fifth section directing a copy of the records of the order ofremoval to be furnished to the adverse party, 'within-thirty days of its being made, ought to have no effect on the proceedings. The fifth section does not appear to have been inserted with any view to any bearing bn the third. But it is obvious to remark, that the third section of the act of 1817 is, at least, virtually, repealed by the act of 1824, transferring the jurisdiction in pauper cases from the supreme, to the county court.— Stat. 120. The 3rd section of the act of 1817 certainly regulates only appeals in pauper causes to the Supreme Court; and does not, in terras, embrace appeals in the same class of causes to the county court. The act of 1797 gave appellate jurisdiction in pauper causes to the county court; and this is the general law on the subject of pauperism, to which all the Subsequent acts refer. In 1817, the legislature passed an act transferring the same appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, and regulating the mode, and fixing the term of the Supreme Court, at which the appeal shall be entered. In 1824, the legislature, by general expression, transfered again the jurisdiction to the county court, without saying to what term of the county court the appeal shall be taken. Now, how can it be said, that, because appeals to the Supreme Court aré to be entered at the next term, therefore, they are to be entered at the corresponding term of the county court ?
    
      Mr. Bucle, for the appellees, submitted the case without brief’ Or argument.
   Hutchinson, J.

after stating the case, pronounced the opinion' of the Court. — The question to be decided is, whether the town,_ appealing from an order of removal, must take their appeal to the next court alter they are served with the order required by the-statute of 1817, or whether they may take the same to the 'next: term after actual removal, according to the statute of 1797.

The object of the statute of 1817 is, to create a change in man/ particulars of the pauper system, yet leaves the original statute unrepealed except by contrary provisions. The principal changes are, 1st, in the mode of gaining a settlement; 2d. the giving notice of the order of removal, and requiring this within thirty days, whether there has or has not been a warrant issued and removal made; and 3d. the allowing the appeal to the Supreme .Court. In this the same expression is used as was used in the former statute, with regard to the time ; “ to the next term,” is the expression. The next term in the act of 1797, meant the next term after the actual removal, and the copy of the warrant left as notice. Such copy was the only notice provided in the act. The same expression in the act of 1817 means as it says, “ the next term after notice and notice in this expression means such notice as this statute has directed ; to wit, an attested copy of the order made by the justices. The Court decided this on the present circuit in a suit between the town of Essex and the town of Milton. We there decided, that the order of removal, from which Milton did not appeal after such notice of the order, had fixed the pauper upon Milton, though Essex could not recover for the support of the pauper, after recovery from sickness, till actual removal; especially as the pauper might have been removed had his removal been attempted.

The fair construction oí the statute of 1824, cited by the appellants, is, to make the whole system as it would be, if the word county were inserted in the place of the word supreme, in the statute of 1817 ; thereby allowing theappeal to the county court.

The English statute cited is as definite as possible, giving the appeal to the court next after removal. Our statute of 1797 is not so definite ; yet it must necessarily bear the same construction, for the reasons before given.

The appellants contend, that they were not aggrieved till the actual removal, and cite a case in point. This is truly so Under the English statute, and our statute of 1797 ; but not so under the statute of 1817. The fixing the pauper upon them by an order of removal and notice, is sufficient aggrievance to entitle them to an appeal.

The other authorities cited are in point to show, that the party must not be deprived of an appeal by a removal, or, under the act of 1817, by an order and copy served, before a term, and yet so late, that no appeal could have been taken to the first term by any reasonable diligence. That seems reasonable, for such a case» But, the papers in this case show, that there was sufficient timo in. which to appeal, after the notice served, and before December term of the county court.

Marsh and Collamer, for the appellants.

Suck, for the appellees.

The judgment of the county court is affirmed with additional cost.  