
    Roddy T. Harper, plaintiff in error, vs. Wrigley & Knott, defendants in error.
    (Atlanta,
    January Term, 1873.)
    1. Partnership — Sale of Goods by One Member of Firm in Payment of Individual Debts — When Other Partner Bound. — The-maker of a promissory note, payable to a partnership, at sixty days, cannot set up a defense against the note that it was agreed between him and two of the partners, when the goods were bought and the note given, that it should be settled at a future time by being credited on an account held by the maker on one of those two-partners, the other partner not being a party to such agreement.
    2. Same — Evidence—Sufficiency of to- Sustain Verdict. — The evi-' dence introduced by the defendant was sufficient to show that the partnership was composed of three partners, and to require the charge of the Court and the verdict.
    New trial. Partnership. Set-off. Before Judge PIarrell. Terrell Superior Court. May Term, 1872.
    Wrigley & Knott brought complaint against Roddy T. Harper upon a note dated July 15th, 1868, and due sixty days after date, for $222 and on an account for *$26 34. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and further that at the time said note was given J. W. Knott, of the same firm with plaintiffs, was indebted to the defendant in the sum of $412 08, and it was understood between the plaintiffs and the defendant that said note and said accoijnt sued on should be settled and liquidated by crediting said account against J. W. Knott with the amounts of said note and account.
    Upon the trial the evidence made the following case:
    The firm of Wrigley & Knott was composed of Benjamin H. Wrigley, William L. Knott and J. W. Knott. J. W. Knott was-indebted to the clefendant on an account in the sum of $570 00. The defendant went to Macon to see J. W. Knott about this claim. He was out at home sick. Wrigley'went with him in a buggy to Mr. Knott’s house. Knott said he had no money, but that if defendant wanted any goods he could buy them in the store of Wrigley & Knott, and let them go as a payment on the account, and that he would bring the account as soon as he was able and have a settlement. Wrigley consented to this arrangement. Defendant bought goods to the amount of $222 00 under this arrangement. After the purchase was made Wrigley requested him to give his note for the amount to save the trouble of making an entry on the books, and said that Mr. Knott, when he came down would take it with him and settle it by letting it go on the account. Defendant signed the note to accommodate Mr. Wrigley. William L. Knott was in the store and assisted in selling the goods to defendant. Defendant did not know that he was a partner, or that J. W. Knott was a partner. It was the general understanding that J. W. Knott was a member of the firm. The account sued on had been paid.
    The jury returned a verdict for the amount of the note sued on, principal and interest. Whereupon, the defendant moved for a new trial, upon the following grounds, to-wit:
    1st. Because the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidenc'e.
    2d. Because the Court erred in charging the jury, “That *if William B. Knott was a member of the firm of Wrigley & Knott when said note was given, then the defendant could not set up against.said note the agreement between himself and Wrigley and J. W. Knott.”
    The new trial was refused, and the defendant excepted upon each of the grounds aforesaid.
    C. B. Wooten, for plaintiff in error.
    F. M. FIarpER, represented by Ceark & Goss, for defendants.
    
      
      Partnership. — Principal case cited in foot-note to Wise v. Copley, 36 Ga. 508.
    
   TrippE, Judge.

In the cases of Wise vs. Copley, Stone & Company, and Riddle vs. the same, 36 Georgia 508, the old and well settled rule was reannounced, “that one partner cannot dispose of the partnership property in payment of his individual debt without the consent of his co-partners, either express or by necessary implication.” The reason of this rule is obvious, and that a contrary one would be dangerous and mischievous, is also apparent. In the present case it does not appear that W. B. Knott, one of the partners, was consenting to or cognizant of the arrangement made by Wrigley and the other partner with the creditor of that partner as to the payment of his debt with the partnership assets. Besides, when the creditor got the goods he g£tve his note at sixty days, payable at a bank, and that is the note on which suit is brought, and to which this defense is made. Had the contract between Wrigley, J. W. Knott and the creditor been fully executed by a transfer to the firm of the creditor’s claim on J. W. Knott in payment of the goods purchased, and no note or other credit given on the purchase of the goods, the case might have been different. In such a transaction there would be the purchase by the authority of one disinterested partner, of a debt on another partner, and it might not be obnoxious to the charge of being in violation of the rule above stated. Nor do we mean to decide what would have been the equities of Harper, the ^creditor of J. W. Knott, as against Wrigley & Knott, in so far as he may have had a right to a verdict so moulded as to have limited the recovery to the interest of W. R. Knott, provided a necessity for it had been shown, and the pleadings and evidence would have allowed it.

The evidence was sufficiently conclusive of the fact that W. R. Knott was a partner, so as to have justified the charge of the Court excepted to, and the verdict.

Judgment affirmed.  