
    CITY OF EAU GALLIE, Appellant, v. Leroy E. HOLLAND and Edna M. Holland, his wife, Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Dec. 11, 1957.
    J. William Woodson, Eau Gallie, for appellant.
    Roger F. Dykes, Cocoa, for appellees.
   HOBSON, Justice.

In State ex rel. Holland v. City of Eau Gallie, Fla., 65 So.2d 877, the Hollands attempted to test the constitutionality of an ordinance of the City of Eau Gallie pertaining to trailer parks. We there declined to pass upon the constitutional question because we were of the opinion that it could not be reached in the procedural situation then prevailing.

The Hollands, appellees here, have now brought the ordinance to the attention of the circuit court, in appropriate proceedings, and have obtained a final decree holding the ordinance unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power without adequate standards. The chancellor further held that the action of the city in denying to the Hollands a license to operate a trailer park while, at the same time, granting licenses to others similarly situated was arbitrary and discriminatory, that the Hollands’ property is in an area primarily commercial in character, and that the designation of the area as residential is invalid and void. From this final decree the city now appeals.

We find no error m these rulings. It is true that the trailer ordinance, when read with the main zoning ordinance, permits the use of such an arbitrary discrimination as the chancellor found to be involved. See Drexel v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 64 So.2d 317, and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, Fla., 74 So.2d 544. On the validity of the zoning classification of the area wherein the Hollands seek to operate the trailer park, the chancellor’s determination is supported by City of Miami v. Hollis, Fla., 77 So.2d 834.

Certain procedural points are sought to be raised, but we find them adequately answered in the brief filed in behalf of appel-lees.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

TERRELL, C. J., and THOMAS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.

DREW, J., concurs specially.

DREW, Justice

(concurring specially).

The appeal in this cause was taken in March, 1956. Rule 36(6) (e) of this Court, 31 F.S.A., adopted in effect since March 15, 1955, provides that there shall be attached to the brief “an appendix, which shall contain a copy of the material portions of the order, judgment or decree appealed from or sought to be reviewed or enforced, together with any opinion of the court, board or commission, and any pertinent portion of any report of a master filed in the case.” The appendix “shall also contain a copy of such parts of the original record material to the points presented as the appellant desires the Court to read.” This Court has discussed this rule in several opinions and has pointed out the necessity of complying with it.

The appendix attached to the brief of the appellant in this cause does not comply with the rule. It is wholly insufficient to afford any basis for the Court’s consideration of the factual situation presented in the case.

The decree of the chancellor comes to this Court with the presumption of correctness. The burden is upon the appellant to demonstrate error and the mechanics for doing so are provided in the rules of this Court.

Because of the utter failure of the appellant to meet this requirement, as well as for the reasons set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice HOBSON, I concur in the judgment of affirmance in this cause.  