
    LAURA CAUDLE v. HARIET C. CAUDLE et al.
    (Filed 4 December, 1918.)
    Dower — Widows—Statutes—One Dwelling.
    Tbe widow’s right of dower in her husband’s lands and tenements is allowed to the same extent by oúr statute as theretofore existing, and thereunder she is entitled to but one-third thereof, including the dwelling-house in which her husband usually resided, and to no more, though this dwelling should be the only land or tenement subject to the right. Re-visal, see. 3084.
    PetitioN for dower, beard on exceptions and appeal from tbe clerk by Webb, J., at May Term, 1918, of Rowan.
    Tbe judge sustained tbe exceptions and reversed tbe judgment of tbe ■clerk. Plaintiff appealed.
    
      Rendleman & Bendleman for plaintiff.
    
    
      B. Lee Wright for defendants.
    
   Beown, J.

Plaintiff is tbe widow and defendants are tbe heirs at law of Charles A. Caudle, who died seized and possessed of only one piece of real estate, a bouse and lot, which was bis dwelling at time of bis death. Plaintiff claims that the whole should be set apart to her as dower. The contention cannot be sustained. The dower of a widow, of common right, never did extend to more than a third part of the-lands and tenements of her husband, and our Legislature has never enlarged the right so as to comprehend more than a third.

Section 3084 of the Revisal provides: “That every married woman,, upon the death of her husband, shall be entitled to an estate for life in one-third in value of all lands, etc., of her deceased husband, in which third part shall be included the dwelling-house in which her husband usually resided.” This is substantially the statute law as contained in the Code, sec. 2103. Revised Code, ch. 118, sec. 3, and Revised Statutes, ch. 121, sec. 3.

There is no statute that authorizes the allotment of more than a third' part of the real estate of the husband. Where such estate consists solely of the dwelling-house it follows that only a third in value of that can be allotted. Such is the law as declared in Stiver v. Cawthorn, 20 N. C., 645, and recognized in Campbell v. White, 95 N. C., 494.

In this last case, referring to an allotment of homestead, Chief Justice Smith says: “But it is not improper for us to say that we do not see-why a portion of the house, containing rooms of sufficient value, may not be set apart as an allotment of dower.”

Affirmed.  