
    William Markham et al., plaintiffs in error, vs. Hazen & Sons, defendants in error.
    (Atlanta,
    January Term, 1873.)
    1. Pártnership — Individual Draft — Acceptance by Partner — Effect. —If a draft be drawn on an individual, and the drawee, before its acceptance, form a partnership with others, and the partners agree to use in the business of the partnership the goods, for the payment of which the draft was drawn, and to pay for them, 'and they do so use them, and the partner who is the drawee accept the draft for the partnership, the acceptance is binding on the partners.
    
      2. Same. — Where the name of the partnership is the “Republican Association,” and whose sole business was the publishing of a newspaper, called “The Opinion,” and the acceptance is “accepted May 24th, 1867, for the Opinion newspaper,” (signed) “W. L. S.,” and W. L,. S. is one of the partners, it is a sufficient identification of the partnership to bind the partners.
    *3. New Trial — Sufficiency of Evidence to Sustain Verdict.--Where a case is fairly submitted to the jury, and there is positive evidence to support the verdict, and the Judge trying the case refuses a new trial, this Court will not interfere, unless the verdict be so decidedly against the weight of the evidence as to suggest that the finding was the result of improper or illegal influences or motives.
    
      New trial. Bill of exchange. Partnership. Before Judge Hopkins. Fulton Superior Court. April Term, 1872.
    Hazen & Sons brought assumpsit against William Markham, Miles G. Dobbins, William L. Scruggs and Henry P. Farrow, as joint owners of the “Daily Opinion,” a newspaper published in the city of Atlanta, on the following acceptance:
    “175 00. “Knoxville, May 21st, 1867.
    “Sixty days after daté, pay to the order of ourselves one hundred and seventy-five dollars. Value received.
    (Signed) “HAZEN & SONS,
    “To William E. Scruggs, Atlanta, Georgia.
    “Accepted May 24th, 1867, for the Opinion newspaper.
    (Signed) “W. D. Scruggs.
    “Protested for non-payment, July 23d, 1867.
    (Signed) “D. G. Jones, Notary Public.”
    The defendants, Markham and Dobbins, pleaded the general issue, and no partnership.
    Scruggs having been discharged as a bankrupt was dismissed from the case.
    The plaintiffs introduced the acceptance sued on. Also, the depositions of Scruggs, to the following effect: Witness accepted the draft sued on for William Markham, Miles G. Dobbins, Henry P. Farrow and himself, the stockholders of the Opinion newspaper. The acceptance was for paper, which wasafterwards used in the Opinion office, and for the benefit of the business of the Republican Association. The paper was at the State Road depot at the time of the sale and transfer of the property of the Opinion. The fact was mentioned by him at the time the sale was concluded, and the agreement was *that the Republican Association should use the paper and pay for it when the bill became due. It was after-wards brought up and used under the direction of Mr. Dumble, the cashier and superintendent of the office. When witness sold out to the Republican Association, he stated the indebtedness of the Opinion to be about $225 00, but this sum did not include the draft sued on, which was not then due. The trade between the Association and witness was closed on May 24th, 1868. The draft was accepted after the Republican Association had been organized, and on the aftérnoon of the day before the public announcement of the fact was made through the columns of the Opinion.
    Plaintiffs introduced a copy of the Opinion, bearing date May 26th, 1867, and read therefrom an announcement signed by William E. Scruggs, directed as follows: “To the reader's of the Opinion,” to the effect that on that day was concluded the sale and transfer of the Daily Opinion office to the Atlanta Republican Association, and that his relation as editor and proprietor ceased from the date of that number. That all dues to the office, and all claims against the same will be receipted for or paid by the incoming proprietors, through their accredited financial agent or business manager. That the joint stqck company, which succeeded him, was composed of gentlemen of the highest personal character, both as citizens and as business men. That they possessed ample means to make the company one of the strongest corporate bodies in the State, and that he doubted not but that they would do so.
    The defendant introduced the depositions of William Markham, to the following effect: On May 27th, 1867, defendants entered into partnership under the firm name of the Republican. Association, for the purpose of establishing in the city of Atlanta a newspaper called the “Daily Opinion,” Dobbins, Farrow and this defendant purchasing from Scruggs all of his interest in said newspaper except eight shares, Scruggs formerly owning the entire property. He (Scruggs) was one of the partners, and his duty was to superintend the publishing of the paper. He was not the financier of the company. * Varney A. Gaskill held this position for about one month after the formation of the aforesaid firm. There was an agreement Detween the defendants to pay the liabilities then existing against the Opinion, which were represented by Scruggs to be $220 00 and accordingly paid him $225 00 to cover everything. The. draft sued on was accepted before the formation of said partnership. Said firm did not agree to pay said draft, knew nothing about its existence.
    The depositions of Dobbins were introduced, which substantially corroborated the evidence of Markham.
    The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. Whereupon, the defendants moved for a new trial upon the following grounds:
    1st. Because the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence.
    2d. Because the verdict was contrary to the following charge of the Court: “If the order for the paper was made by Scruggs, and the paper was shipped to him, and before it was actually received, and whilst it was in the custody of the carrier, he accepted the draft for defendants and by their authority, and the paper was received for and used by them, they would be liable; if he accepted the draft for them, but had not authority from them for doing so, they would not be liable unless they subsequently, with a full knowledge of the facts, ratified his act.
    The motion was overruled, and defendants excepted upon each of the grounds aforesaid.
    D. F. and W. R. Hammond, for plaintiffs in error.'
    P. D. Mynatt, for defendants.
   Trippe, Judge.

It is a well recognized principle that if A, for a valuable consideration, agree to pay the debt of B to C, and C accepts the promise of A for said debt, A is bound by the promise. If A give his note on such an undertaking, there is sufficient '"consideration to support the contract. And more particularly would this be so if A himself were, as the consideration of his promise, to accept and appropriate to his own use whatever the consideration was of B’s debt to C. In this case, according to Scrugg’s testimony, he had bought the^ paper, the draft was drawn on him'; the partnership agreed to take the paper, did take it and use it, and by the authority of the partners, he accepted the draft for them, he being one of the firm. The creditors have received the draft so accepted, and ratified the arrangement by bringing suit on it. It is a general principle that there can be no acceptance except by a drawee, or by. a drawee au besom, or by some one for honor, so as to make the party liable technically as acceptor: 1 Parson’s Notes and Bills, 313; Jackson vs. Hudson, 2 Camp., 447. But it is also a rule, stated by the same authorities, that when there is an acceptance by a third person for a consideration he is liable as a guarantor, or otherwise, on his contract. In this case there was one count against defendants as acceptors, one as guarantors, and one for goods sold and delivered.

It is argued for plaintiffs in error that the acceptance is by Scruggs, for the “Opinion newspaper,” and that such was not the name or style of the partnership or association. The whole and sole business of the association or partnership was the publication of- a newspaper called “The Opinion;” the debt was created for paper, on which “The Opinion” was published, and by a partner in the publication. Was not this a sufficient identification of- the partnership. In Faith vs. Richmond et al., 11 A. & E., 339, it was held that when a partner, accustomed to issue notes on behalf of the firm, indorses a particular note in a name differing from that of the partnership and not previously used by them, which note is objected to on that account, in an action brought upon it by the indorsee, the proper question for the jury is whether the name used, though inaccurate, substantially describes the firm, or whether it so far varies that the indorser must be taken to have issued the note on his own account, and not in the exercise of his general authority as partner.” It is true, as a general '"rule, that a partner has no implied authority to bind his co-partners by his acceptance of a bill of exchange, except by an acceptance in the true style of the partnership: Kirk vs. Blurton and Habershon, 9 M. and W„ 284; 1 B. and C., 146; Parson on Notes and Bills, 135. But in these and like cases there was no evidence that there was a valuable consideration for the acceptance received and accepted by the partnership. In such instances, where the consideration exists, there is no reason or justice in the application of the strict rule. If the firm does in fact receive the consideration, there can be no fraud on the part of the partner thus accepting, as was set up in Kirk vs. Blurton, etc., above referred to; and Denman, Chief Justice, said, in Faith vs. Richmond et al., supra, “In this case Richmond had authority to make notes as a partner in this company; but the note in question described a different firm; and the question was whether the evidence raised any exception to the general rule as to the exercise of a partner’s authority,” and further specially mentioned the fact that; “the note was made payable at a place where they (the firm) never kept money.” What stronger ground for an exception to the general rule could be laid, than in the fact that a firm gets the whole consideration for which the acceptance is given. Mason vs. Rumsey & Rumsey, 1 Camp, 384, shows that the general rule does not strictly apply in all cases, and that wherever the reason for it does not exist the rule does not apply. The bill was drawn on “Rumsey & Company,” and T. Rumsey, Jr., wrote on it, “accepted. T. Rumsey, Sr.,” a partnership between the two Rumseys was proven, and it was held that the acceptance bound the firm. And we think, in this case, if the testimony of Scruggs be true, and the jury so found, the association or partnership was bound on this acceptance.

Though the evidence was conflicting on some of the material questions, yet that was a matter for the jury, and there being positive evidence to support the verdict, and the Judge trying the case having refused a new trial, we cannot interfere. The case is not one where the weight of the evidence is so ^strongly against the verdict as to suggest that it was the result of improper or illegal influences or motives.

Judgment affirmed.  