
    Maria M. Salcido QUINTANAR; et al., Petitioners, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 02-71722.
    Agency Nos. [ AXX-XXX-XXX ], [ AXX-XXX-XXX ], [ AXX-XXX-XXX ].
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Nov. 10, 2003.
    
    Decided Nov. 13, 2003.
    
      Maria M. Salcido Quintanar, pro se, Liliana Salcido Quintanar, pro se, Juan Jose Salcido Quintanar, pro se, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioners.
    Regional Counsel, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Laguna Niguel, CA, Los Angeles District Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Legal Officer, Office of the District Counsel, San Francisco, CA, Christopher C. Fuller, Terri J. Scadron, Genevieve Holm, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Before KOZINSKI, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The court sua sponte changes the docket to reflect that John Ashcroft, Attorney General, is the proper respondent. The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the above caption.
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Maria M. Salcido Quintanar and her two minor children, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition pro se for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the immigration judge’s denial of suspension of deportation. Because the transitional rules apply, see Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.1997), we have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). We review constitutional challenges de novo, Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir.2001), and deny the petition.

Petitioners concede that they did not accrue seven years of continuous physical presence before the government served them with an order to show cause, and that they are ineligible for suspension of deportation under the stop-time rule.

We reject petitioners’ equal protection challenge to the application of the stop-time provision because the rule is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See id. at 517-18 (rejecting equal protection challenge to application of the stop-time rule, and noting Congressional motivation for enactment).

PETITION DENIED. 
      
       ■pjjjg disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     