
    George Lowry versus William Russell Junior.
    By a bill of lading expressing that goods are to be carried from one port to another, a direct voyage is primd facie intended ; but this presumption may be controlled by a usage to stop at intermediate ports, or by personal knowledge on the part of the shipper, that such a course is to be pursued.
    Action on the case against the defendant, as owner of the sloop Justicia, for a loss sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of a deviation by the master.
    At the trial, before the chief justice, the plaintiff produced in evidence a bill of lading signed by Seth Anthony, the master of the sloop, whereby Anthony undertook, for freight, to transport eight hogsheads of sugar therein specified, belonging to the plaintiff, from New York to Georgetown in the District of Columbia. The sloop sailed from New York with the sugar, having on board goods for Norfolk, in Chesapeake Bay, which is from twenty to thirty miles out of the direct course to Georgetown. She put into Norfolk, without being compelled by stress of weather or other necessity, for the purpose of delivering the goods she had taken on freight for that place ; and having remained there three days and discharged those goods and taken in goods for Alexandria, she sailed for Georgetown, and on her voyage to that place was lost by the perils of the seas, and the plaintiff’s sugar was destroyed.
    The declaration averred that the property was insured, and that the underwriters refused to pay the loss, on the ground that there had been a deviation.
    The defence was, that the sloop was a general coasting vessel from New York to Norfolk and other places on the Chesapeake, and rivers running into that Bay ; that it was the usage of such vessels to take freight for several ports, stopping at the first port and passing on to the others successively, leaving the goods taken for each, and taking in other goods ; that this usage was general and public ; that the cargo taken on board before the plaintiff’s sugar was shipped, was for Norfolk; that painted signs were put up on the shrouds of the vessel, indicating that she was bound to Norfolk, and that she was advertised in two newspapers printed in New York, one of which was taken by the plaintiff’s agent there, as bound to Norfolk; this advertise ment being published several days before the sugar was shipped, and daily until the vessel sailed. The proof of the usage was contained in certain depositions introduced by the defendant.
    
      Sept. 16th.
    
    The jury were instructed, that if they were satisfied of the existence of the usage, and that it was of long continuance and general and notorious, the defence was sustained ; and they found a verdict for the defendant. If this instruction was wrong, or if the depositions were not legal evidence of the usage, the verdict was to be set aside ; unless the notice by the signs on the vessel and the advertisement in the newspapers was conclusive upon the plaintiff as to knowledge of the destination of the vessel to Norfolk, and with such knowledge he could not support his action.
    
      Davis (Solicitor-General) and Lathrop, for the plaintiff.
    There was a deviation, first in going to Norfolk-; secondly, in remaining there so long ; and thirdly, in taking in cargo there. The deviation being manifest, the burden is on the defendant to prove a usage which will justify it. A usage must be proved by evidence of particular instances within the knowledge of the witnesses, and not by mere opinion or common report. Edie v. East India Co. 2 Burr. 1228; 2 Stark. Ev. 452; Gordon v. Little, S Serg. & Rawle, 551. The usage here set up is, of a right to stop at any intermediate ports and take in or discharge cargo. The evidence relates to coasting vessels generally. There may be a usage of the kind mentioned, between particular ports, and not between others. The particular usage between New York and Georgetown ought to have been proved. Only one witness testified as to this, ami he specified but two instances. Evidence of a usage between other places was irrelevant.
    No information was communicated to the plaintiff of the master’s intention to stop at Norfolk and discharge and take in cargo ; and no evidence wras admissible to prove such intention, as it was not inserted in the bill of lading. The contract was to carry the sugar from New York to Georgetown in the most direct course. Barrett v. Rogers, 7 Mass. R. 297; Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Mass. R. 422; Hunt v. Rousmanier. 
      8 Wheat 211; Pickering v. Dowson, 4 Taunt. 779; Abbott (Story’s ed. of 1829), 212, 213, c. 2, § 2.
    
      Bates, contra,
    
    cited as to usage, Phillips on Ins. 18, 182. The plaintiff is concluded by the notice of the destination of the vessel. 1 Stark. Ev. 165; 2 Stark. Ev. 338; 3 Stark. Ev. 1079; Leeson v. Holt, 1 Stark. R. 186; Jenkins v. Blizard, ibid. 418.
    
      Sept. 17th.
    
   Per Curiam.

The bill of lading, like other contracts, is to be construed according to the intention of the parties. Usage of trade is always presumed to be within the knowledge of the parties, and these contracts are supposed to be made with reference to it. There is nothing in the evidence in the present case, contradicting the express terms of the bill of lading, which are that the goods shall be carried from New York to Georgetown. A direct voyage is prima facie intended, but this may be controlled by usage, or by personal knowledge of the shipper. There was competent evidence of the usage in relation to vessels like this ; and there was also evidence that this voyage was known to be by the way of Norfolk. The plaintiff’s agent knew of it, and his knowledge must be imputed to the plaintiff himself.

Judgment according to verdict. 
      
       See Story’s Comm, on Agency, 131,132.
     