
    Gregory v. Small.
    The local directors of a sub school district, dismissed a person found in possession of the school-house and teaching the public school, under their control, on the ground that he had not been employed, and placed a teacher they had employed, in charge of the school. Held: that they were not liable personally, in damages, for such dismissal, if they acted in their official capacity, in good faith, and in the honest discharge of official duty.
    Error to District Court of Logan county. '
    • In the common pleas, Gregory sued Small, Baldwin, and ■Iioge, who were the local directors of a school district, for wilfully and oppressively dismissing him as a teacher, while he was fulfilling a contract to teach a four-months school, before the expiration of his first month.
    The petition alleges a contract to teach, the commencement of his term, his teaching some three weeks, his discharge, and his readiness to perform, and asks damages for breach of this contract.
    A demurrer to this petition was overruled, and exception noted.
    Two of defendants, Small and Hoge, filed a general denial, Baldwin making no defense.
    The jury rendered a verdict against the answering defendants for $121.66, being the amount of plaintiff’s salary for the entire term, had he taught the school.
    A motion for a new trial was made, on the grounds, among others, that the court erred in its charge, and in refusing to charge as requested.
    From the bill of exceptions it appeared that evidence was offered tending to show a contract for plaintiff to teach the school, made by two of these local directors, acting in their official capacity — also tending to show, there was no such contract, that plaintiff under claim of right took possession of the school-house and taught some three weeks — that the majority of the directors denied his right to teach on the ground that he had not been employed, and at a meeting for that purpose, regularly employed another teacher, and placed him in possession of the school, refused plaintiff in error possession, and refused to pay him. for services rendered.
    In this act, the defendants, Small and Hoge, were guided by .the advice of the prosecuting attorney, and acted in their official capacity. There was no evidence tending to show they acted from corrupt motives.
    The defendants asked the court to charge:.
    “ 1st. That if said defendants, Small and Hoge, at the time of ousting plaintiff from the school, believed plaintiff was not the legally employed teacher thereof, and in so ousting him, were acting in their capacity as local directors thereof, they cannot be held personally liable, unless it is shown to your satisfaction by fair preponderance of evidence that they acted from corrupt motive.
    “ 2nd. That if said defendants, or either of them, in ousting plaintiff from said school, acted in good faith, and in the honest discharge of what they believed to be their duty as school directors, such defendant or defendants so acting is not personally liable to plaintiff.”
    Which instructions the court refused to give the jury; but the court did charge the jury: “that if they find that said defendants, or either of them, employed plaintiff to teach said school, and afterwards discharged him without sufficient reason, such defendant or defendants so employing him, are liable, personally, tó the plaintiff, at. common law, notwithstanding he was not employed by them as directors,” to which refusal and charge said defendants, Small and Hoge, excepted, and prayed that their bill of1 exceptions in that behalf might be allowed, which is accordingly done, and upon their motion ordered to be made part of the record in this case.”
    The district court reversed the judgment of the common pleas, founded upon the verdict rendered under the above charge.
    
      G. W. Emerson and E- J. Howenstine, for plaintiff in error..
    
      McLaughlin & Dow, for defendants in error.
   Johnson, C. J.

This plaintiff sought to hold the local directors personally liable for damages sustained in not allowing him to teach the public school under their control. The plaintiff is not seeking from the school district compensation for his services rendered, as in Case v. Wresler, 4 Ohio-St. 561 j nor to recover against the local school district in its quasi corporate capacity.

In Directors Sub-School District v. Burton, 26 Ohio St. 421, this court held there was no redress against the school directors in their official capacity, or against the district, for dismissing a teacher for insufficient cause. A teacher who is so dismissed is therefore left to his remedy at common law against the officers personally. That is the nature of the present action. It seeks to recover against two of the local directors, damages for dismissing plaintiff as a teacher. The court charged the jury that if they, or either of them, employed plaintiff to teach the school, and afterwards discharged him without sufficient cause, such defendant or defendants are liable personally at common law, notwithstanding he was not employed by them acting as school directors. It refused to charge that if defendants were acting in their official capacity, they cannot be held personally, unless it is shown they acted from a corrupt motive. Also refused to charge, that if the defendants acted in good faith in the honest discharge of what they believed to be their official duty, they are not personally liable.

The averments of the petition show that defendants are sued for acts done in their official capacity. No one, except duly authorized, has the right to employ or dismiss a teacher, or to give to or take from a teacher, possession of the schoolhouse in charge of such authorities.

Hence, the court erred in telling the jury that if the defendants, Small and Hoge, or 'either of them, employed plaintiff, they were personally liable at common law, if they after-wards discharged him without sufficient cause. If there was not a legal contract of employment, the teacher had no right to teach the public school, and the directors in their official capacity might dismiss him, and put a teacher duly employed in possession of the school-house.

The common law right of action for dismissal is founded on a valid contract of employment. When an officer acts within the scope of his authority, he is not responsible personally, unless he acts from a corrupt motive. Stewart v. Southard, 17 Ohio, 402; Ramsey v. Riley, 13 Ohio, 137; Morrison v. McFarland, 51 Ind. 208.

If there was no valid employment, and there could be none except by official action when the salary was payable out of the public funds, the directors acting officially might refuse him possession of the school-house, or to recognize him as teacher. Indeed it was their duty to do so. If there was a valid contract of employment, followed by a subsequent dismissal, for sufficient cause, the plaintiff was without remedy even at common law; but if there was no sufficient cause for such dismissal, the directors are not personally liable when they acted in good faith, in what they'supposed was the honest discharge of official duty. They are,, personally liable, only when they act with-a corrupt intent.

Judgment affirmed.  