
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Humberto RAMIREZ-ARREOLA, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 10-50232.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted April 13, 2011.
    Filed April 18, 2011.
    Anne Kristina Perry, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, Arthur L. Rizer, III, Esquire, Trial, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Shaffy Moeel, Esquire, Trial, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: D.W. NELSON, BYBEE, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Jose Ramirez-Arreola appeals his conviction and forty-one-month sentence for attempted reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He contends that the underlying deportation was invalid because the Immigration Judge (IJ) failed to advise him of his eligibility for voluntary departure. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case, we do not recount additional facts except as necessary to explain our decision. We affirm.

An IJ must inform an alien of his or her “apparent eligibility” for relief from deportation, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2), and “[w]e have repeatedly held that an IJ’s failure to so advise an alien violates due process and can serve as the basis for a collateral attack to a deportation order where ... the order is used as the predicate for an illegal reentry charge under § 1326,” United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). Ramirez-Arreola contends that at the time of his deportation hearing, he was eligible for voluntary departure because he could have shown that he was “a person of good moral character” under former 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (repealed 1996). An alien cannot make that showing, however, if he or she “admits having committed ... acts which constitute the essential elements of ... a violation of ... any law or regulation ... relating to a controlled substance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3). Because Ramirez-Arreola admitted to selling hashish, he could not have qualified as a person of good moral character and therefore was statutorily ineligible for voluntary departure. Accordingly, even if there were a due process violation, Ramirez-Arreola’s collateral attack fails because he has not established prejudice. See United States v. UbaldoFigueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir.2004).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     