
    Thierno DIALLO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-926.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 28, 2013.
    Theodore Vialet, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director; Kimberly A. Burdge, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., ROSEMARY S. POOLER and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Thierno Diallo, a native and citizen of Guinea, seeks review of a February 22, 2011, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Thierno Diallo, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Feb. 22, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of Diallo’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). A motion to reopen proceedings “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered,” unless the movant provides previously unavailable material evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (2). Where, as here, the motion to reopen is untimely, failure to offer such evidence is a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Diallo failed to establish his prima facie eligibility for relief based on his fear that the Guinean military regime was actively pursuing him or would harm him on account of his political activities in the United States. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104-105, 108 S.Ct. 904. In support of his motion, Diallo submitted letters from his brother and friend describing the Guinean military’s suppression of peace demonstrators at a 2009 peace rally, and warning Diallo that his life would be in danger if he returned to Guinea. The BIA, however, reasonably afforded little weight to this evidence because, as the BIA found, the letters were “unauthenticated” and possessed “little indicia of reliability,” particularly in light of Diallo’s underlying adverse credibility determination. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (finding that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency); see also Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-47 (2d Cir.2007) (relying on the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus to conclude that the agency may decline to credit documentary evidence submitted with a motion to reopen by an alien who was found not credible in the underlying proceedings). Moreover, although Diallo submitted evidence in an attempt to demonstrate changed country conditions, the BIA reasonably determined that any potential future harm that Diallo may suffer in Guinea as a result of civil strife and societal violence did not constitute a valid basis for asylum, as the harm would not be on account of a protected ground. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir.1999) (stating that “persecution must be on account of an enumerated ground set forth in the Act, and general crime conditions are not a stated ground”). Thus, we need not decide whether Diallo established materially changed country conditions excusing the time limitation applicable to his motion to reopen.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  