
    Erna E.N. BOLDT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Hardy MYERS, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the Oregon Department of Justice; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 07-35869.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 5, 2010.
    
    Filed April 20, 2010.
    Erna E.N. Boldt, Sandy, OR, pro se.
    
      Greg Rios, Esquire, AGOR — Office of the Oregon Attorney General, Salem, OR, Edward S. McGlone, III, Esquire, Oregon City, OR, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: RYMER, McKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Erna E.N. Boldt appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action alleging that defendants failed to investigate her allegations of elder abuse in violation of federal and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Seven Up Pete Venture v. Schweitzer, 523 F.3d 948, 952 n. 4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 258, 172 L.Ed.2d 147 (2008); Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir.2005), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Boldt’s claims against the Oregon Attorney General because he was entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seven Up Pete Venture, 523 F.3d at 952-53.

The district court properly dismissed Boldt’s section 1983 claims for failure to state a claim. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not entitle Boldt to an investigation of her allegations of elder abuse. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 764-66, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005). Boldt fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim because even assuming defendants decided not to investigate her allegations fully based on her non-indigent status, they had a rational basis to do so. See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179-80 (9th Cir.1999) (financial status not a suspect class).

In addition, the district court properly dismissed Boldt’s claims under the Oregon Constitution, see Hunter v. City of Eugene, 309 Or. 298, 787 P.2d 881, 883-84 (1990), and under Oregon statutes, see Or.Rev. Stat. § § 124.105, 124.110.

To the extent Boldt seeks to reverse the Oregon state court judgment against her, the district court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Carmona v. Carmona, 544 F.3d 988, 995 (9th Cir.2008).

We do not consider Boldt’s contentions raised for the first time on appeal or not supported by argument. See Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 546 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.2008); Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir.1992).

Boldt’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     