
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Uganda NASH, a.k.a. Boo, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 10-0571-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 25, 2011.
    Malvina Nathanson, Law Office of Malvina Nathanson, New York, NY, for Appellant.
    Daniel A. Braun, Avi Weitzman, Katherine Polk Failla, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District, of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, GUIDO CALABRESI, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Uganda Nash challenges the 151-month prison sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York after Nash was convicted of bank fraud and conspiracy to commit bank fraud. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Appellate review of a district court’s sentence has two components: procedural review and substantive review. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008) (in banc). If the appellate court finds no procedural error, the substantive review is done for abuse of discretion. Id. at 187 (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). Under that standard, an appellate court will vacate the district court’s sentence only in “exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’ ” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir.2007)).

“A district court commits procedural error where it fails to calculate the Guidelines range (unless omission of the calculation is justified), makes a mistake in its Guidelines calculation, or treats the Guidelines as mandatory. It also errs procedurally if it does not consider the § 3553(a) factors, or rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190 (internal citations omitted). The district court made no such errors. The district court used the applicable Guidelines range as a starting point in its sentencing decision. And in sentencing Nash to 151 months, the district court did not rely in any way (explicitly or implicitly) on the sentencing enhancement for an offense involving ten or more victims.

In reviewing the substantive fairness of a district court’s sentencing decision, we “take into account the totality of the circumstances, giving due deference to the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion and bearing in mind the institutional advantages of district courts.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190. If a judge locates his sentence within the Guidelines range, it “significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one,” because it shows that both the judge and the Sentencing Commission have reached the same conclusion about the proper sentence. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). We “will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the judge accorded to a given factor or to a specific argument made pursuant to that factor.” United States v. Pope, 554 F.3d 240, 247 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 34 (2d Cir.2006)).

The district court sentenced Nash within the applicable Guidelines range, and it was well within its discretion to conclude that the elimination of the ten-or-more-victims sentencing enhancement should only reduce Nash’s sentence by four months. The fact that the new sentence is at the top of the recalculated Guidelines range while the previous sentence was near the bottom of the prior Guidelines range is irrelevant.

The district court committed no procedural error, and the sentence it imposed was reasonable and certainly within “the range of permissible decisions.” As a result, we hereby AFFIRM the sentence.  