
    Andrew E. WISOFF, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. CITY OF SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee.
    No. 15-3836
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    November 21, 2016
    FOR APPELLANT: Andrew E. Wisoff, pro se, Schenectady, New York.
    FOR APPELLEE: Carl G. Falotico & Ryan P. Bailey, Corporation Counsel for the City of Schenectady, Schenectady, New York.
    PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Andrew Wisoff, pro se, appeals from the grant of summary judgment by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Mordue, J.) in favor of the City of Schenectady on his Fourth Amendment challenge to the validity of the City’s rental certificate ordinance (“RCO”). The RCO generally prohibits owners from renting property without a rental certificate, which can be issued pursuant only to an inspection of the property by a building inspector; a temporary certificate may be obtained upon the owner’s submission of an affidavit of compliance with the RCO if the inspector is unable to inspect the premises within five business days of the owner’s application. The RCO authorizes municipal employees to conduct inspections either with the consent of the owners or, absent consent, pursuant to a search warrant. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of the prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, which is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sousa v. Marquez, 702 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). Upon review, we conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment to the City of Schenectady. We therefore affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court in its decision of October 28, 2015. See generally Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21, 323, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978) (“[pjrobable cause in the criminal law sense is not required[ f]or purposes of an administrative search” pursuant to a warrant that is “authorized by statute” and issued “pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria”).

We have considered all of Wisoff s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.  