
    Charles Fowler, Guardian, vs. John Stuart.
    Where the jury found a verdict, in support of a parol gift made in these words, the court supported it, viz : ‘‘ I beg you to recollect I tar. riven that horse to my son.” 
    
    If the intention of the donor be doubtful, it seems, the delivery ought to be fully proved. If the intention to give be evident, slighter pro'ok of delivery mat be sufficient. If however any proof of the intention and delivery be afforded, itbefcomes a question of fact on which the jury must decide, and their decision will be supported, unless very much against the weight of evidence.
    When the right of property is in the plaintiff’s ward, and the defendant holds over after action commenced, very slight evidence of a conversion is sufficient; therefore where the plaintiff’s ward, who lived with If a uncle the plaintiff, was the owner of ahorse, which horse was demanded of the defendant by th§ plaintiff, before he was legally appointed guardian for his ward, in the name of lijs ward, and the •iCE’iidant replied that Uic horse d'.il not belong to liis nephew, and idused lo deliver him up, the Court Held that the uncle should be regarded as the ag-ent of Ills nephew, and a demand by him as equivalent to a demand by his nephew.
    
    rp JSL i-I7G tvas an action of trover for a horse.
    It appeared that a few days before the defendant was married to the mother of the plaintiff’s ward, she, in the presence of the defendant and several witnesses, whom she requested to hear witness to the gifts she was about to malte, gave to each of her children some property. To her daughters she gave a negro, a piece, and delivered the property at the time. To her son, (the plaintiff’s ward) f he gave the horse in question, and was about to proceed to the stable where he was kept, to make an actual dclivi ry, but was prevented by rain. She then turned to the witnesses and observed, “ I beg you to recollect I have given that horse to my son.” One witness understood her to cay, that the horse was to.be her sons after her death. The son who lived with his mother some time after her marriage, was in the habit of riding this horse, and when he abandoned the house of his'mother, to live with his-uncle, the plaintiff, he took the horse with him. This was done, however, without the knowledge of his mother, or the defendant. Some days after he went to the plaintiff’s to live, he rode to the village of Laurens. He there dismounted and left the horse at the . door ©f a tavern. The defendant accidentally passing by at that moment, discovered the horse and took him away. The horse was afterwards demanded of the defendant by the plaintiff, but this was done before he was regularly appointed the guardian of his nephew. The defendant refused to deliver up the horse; in consequence of which, this action was commenced.
    The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff,
    A motion was now made for a new trial on two grounds i
    
      1. st. That there was no gift proved.
    Cdly. That the evidence of a conversion was not suffi-
    
      
      
         See Brashears vs. Blassingame, 1 Nott & McCord 223. Da. vis vs. Davis, Do. 226. Reid vs. Colcock, Do. 592. Grangiac vs. Arden, 10 Johns. 293.
    
    
      
      
         See ante, 429, Jones vs. Dugan. R,
    
   Mr. Justice Huger

delivered the opinion of the court

A delivery is generally necessary to- perfect a paroi gift of chattels. If the intention of the donor be doubtful, the delivery ought to be fully proved. If the' intention be evident-, slighter proof of the delivery may be sufficient. If however, any proof of the intention and delivery be afforded, it becomes a question of fact on which the jury must decide, and their decision will be supported, unless very much against the weight of evidence.

In this case, the intention to give was manifest, for although one witness thought the gift.was not to take effect, until after the death of the donor, yet all the others understood it differently, and the improbability of the horse surviving the donor, who was young enough to be married, is confirmation of their statement, that the gift was.intended to take effect in presentí. The evidence of delivery in this case is very slight; the jury, however, thought it sufficient when compared with the unquestionable intention of the donor to give, to support the gift, and this court will not disturb the verdict on that ground.

When the right of property is 'in the plaintiff, and the •defendant holds over after action commenced, very slight evidence of a conversion is sufficient. In this case, the horse was the wards. The defendant took possession of him. The uncle, with whom the ward' was staying, demanded the horse for his nephew, and was told that the horse did not belong to his nephew, and therefore would not be given up. Had the ward himself made the demand, it would have been sufficient. The uncle, if not his duly appointed guardian, was at least to be regarded as his agent, and a demand by him as equivalent to a demand by hisijephew. The jury therefore were authorized to find the verdict they did.

McDuffie, for the motion.

O'Ncall, contra.

The motion is refused.

Justices Johnson, Nott, Gantt and Richardson, concur? yed.

Mr. Justice Colcock dissented.  