
    Thomas G. Stone, as Administrator of the Estate of Mary I. Stone, Deceased, Respondent, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Defendant, and Olive Weinstein et al., Appellants.
    Argued March 28, 1963;
    decided May 9, 1963.
    
      
      Sheridan Albert for appellants.
    I. The proof does not establish an agreement to make plaintiff irrevocable beneficiary as a matter of law and of fact. II. The letter of May 25, 1950, written by decedent, does not constitute an agreement. III. Plaintiff fails to set forth essential requisites of a written agreement to take it out of the Statute of Frauds. (Brauer v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 178 N. Y. 339; Friedman & Co. v. Newman, 255 N. Y. 340; Matter of Levin, 302 N. Y. 535; Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 305 N. Y. 48; Papaioannou v. Britz, 285 App. Div. 596; Solin Lee Chu v. Ling Sun Chu, 9 A D 2d 888.) IV. The Personal Property Law (§ 31, subd. 9) imposes a bar to the alleged oral agreement with decedent. (Mitchell v. Mitchell, 290 N. Y. 779; Ward v. New York Life Ins. Co., 225 N. Y. 314; Katzman v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 309 N. Y. 197.) V. The agreement to name plaintiff irrevocable beneficiary could not be completed in a lifetime. (Bayreuther v. Reinisch, 264 App. Div. 138.)
    
      Michael Goldberg for respondent.
    I. The proof established an agreement to make plaintiff irrevocable beneficiary of the policy. (Hull v. Littauer, 162 N. Y. 569; Pease & Elliman v. Weissman, 4 A D 2d 936; Brooklyn Public Lib. v. City of New York, 250 N. Y. 495; Matter of Mencher [Geller & Sons], 276 App. Div. 556; Lowe v. Feldman, 11 Misc. 2d 8.) II. The agreement to maintain plaintiff as beneficiary was enf orcible notwithstanding the continuance in the policy of the provision reserving the right to change the beneficiary. (Zies v. New York Life Ins. Co., 237 App. Div. 367; Salinas v. Salinas, 187 Misc. 509, 271 App. Div. 917.) III. The agreement to maintain the beneficiary provision was based upon consideration. The agreement can legally be spelled out from several documents. The same was not indefinite as to them. (Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88; Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 305 N. Y. 48; Papaioannou v. Britz, 285 App. Div. 596; Ehrlich v. Cohn, 1 A D 2d 1004, 2 N Y 2d 886.) IV. There is no evidence of a breach of the agreements by plaintiff. (Butler v. Butler, 206 App. Div. 214; Woods v. Bard, 285 N. Y. 11.) V. The agreement was enforcible notwithstanding the formal requirements of the policy, and it complied with the Statute of Frauds. (Considine v. Considine, 255 App. Div. 876; Goos v. Pennisi, 10 A D 2d 643; 
      Martocci v. Greater N. Y. Brewery, 301 N. Y. 57; Solin Lee Chu v. Ling Sun Chu, 9 A D 2d 888.)
   Per Curiam.

The writings and parol testimony do no more than show a failure to agree on a separation settlement. While the deceased’s letter of May 25 could be interpreted as an offer to make plaintiff’s intestate the irrevocable beneficiary of the deceased’s life insurance policy, the reply to this letter rejected the offer. There is no further evidence tending to establish an agreement subsequently reached. In any event the Statute of Frauds bars a recovery. (Personal Property Law, § 31, subds. 1, 9.) As we said in Poel v. Brunswick-Balke Collander Co. (216 N. Y. 310): “In order to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds the written note or memorandum must include all the terms of the completed contract which the parties made. * * * If instead of proving the existence of that contract, it establishes that there was in fact no contract or evidenced a contract in terms and conditions different from that which the parties entered into, it fails to comply with the statute ” (p. 314; emphasis added). Here, as there, “If we limit our consideration to the writings it is plain that there was no contract because the offer of the defendant was not accepted ” (216 N. Y., p. 324).

The judgment appealed from should be reversed and the complaint dismissed.

Chief Judge Desmond and Judges Dye, Ftjld, Van Voorhis, Burke, Foster and Scileppi concur.

Judgment of Appellate Division reversed and that of Special Term reinstated, without costs.  