
    Penrod and another against Mitchell.
    In an action the'hnatuie a writ of con-fraudulently ftegoods'of the defendant tion,"from3thb plain’ll the standard of damages is, the value of the goods thus withdrawn, and not the amount of the judgment on which the execution issued.
    In Error.
    ON the return of a writ of error to the Common Pleas Somerset county, it appeared that James Mitchell., the plaintiff below, brought an action in the nature of a writ of conspiracy, against David Penrod and Alexander Morrison, t*le defendants, in which he declared, in substance, that Morrison, having on the 18th of April, 1816, contracted with Stoystoxon and Greensburg Turnpike' Road Company, to ma^e a certmn part of the road, at fifteen dollars fifty cents per perch, entered into an agreement with Mitchell for the execution of a part of his contract, at the rate of thirteen dollars fifty cents per perch : That Mitchell having completed his engagement, brought a suit against Morrison, to recover what was due to him, and the case having been submitted to arbitrators, they awarded in favour of the plaintiff, one thousand three hundred and twenty-one dollars eighty-seven cents, which sum, the declaration averred, Morrison, at the time the award was filed, was able to pay : That a fieri facias was issued, to which the Sheriff returned nulla bona, although the defendant had sufficient effects to satisfy the execution, which he fraudulently concealed. The declaration then proceeded to set forth, that PenrodMorrison secretly, falsely, fraudulently, and corruptly conspired and combined together to defraud Mitchell of the sum of one thousand three hundred and twenty-one dollars eighty-seven cents, which had been awarded to him, and that in pursuance of their conspiracy, Morrison, without any consideration, assigned to Penrod, who accepted the same, all his property and effects, to the amount of more than two thousand dollars, and afterwards corruptly and fraudulently surrendered himself to the jail of the county, from which he procured himself to be discharged under the Act of Assembly for the relief of poor and insolvent debtors, under the false and fraudulent pretence, that he was unable to support himself in prison.
    After recapitulating the evidence given on the trial, the President of the Court of Common Pleas concluded his charge to the jury thus:
    “ If from a candid consideration of the whole case, as disclosed in the evidence, you are satisfied that a conspiracy existed between the defendants to defraud the plaintiff, he is entitled to your verdict. As to the amount of damages which he should recover, it ought to be proportioned to the injury sustained, which seems to be the loss of the debt due to him by Morrison.”
    
    
      A. W. Foster, for the plaintiffs in error, insisted, —
    1. That the standard of damages given to the jury was erroneous. The true standard was not the amount of the judgment obtained by Mitchell against Morrison, but the amount of property conveyed by the latter to Penrod, which amounted to little more than .eight hundred dollars, while the amount of the judgment'was thirteen hundred and" twenty-one dollars.
    2. The judgment obtained by Mitchell against Morrison, was not evidence against Penrod, of the debt due from Morrison to Mitchell, because that judgment was obtained after Morrison had conveyed his property to Penrod, who was at liberty to controvert the amount of the debt in this action.
    Kennedy, for the defendant in error, answered,
    that the evidence proved a conspiracy, and also that Penrod had got all Morrison’s property, which, it appeared, was sufficient to pay Mitchell's debt. But the true construction of the charge is, that the damages should be to the amount of what the plaintiff lost, in consequence of the conspiracy, and so the jury seem to have understood it, for they have not found damages to the amount of the judgment.
    The Court told Mr. Kennedy that he need no„t speak te second point.
    In reply, it was observed, that the amount of the property conveyed to Penrod, was a question for the jury, but the Court put the case on another point, which made the value of the property of no consequence. How far the charge influenced the decision of the jury, it is impossible to say. Some of the jury may have thought themselves bound to adopt it as their guide, while others rejected it ; and if their verdict was the result of a compromise of their conflicting opinions, it cannot be said that, the defendants were not injured by the charge.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Gibson J.. —

There is error in the charge. The true measure of the damages, was the value of the property withdrawn from the reach of Mitchell by Morrison's assignment to Penrod; and not the amount of Mitchell's judgment against Morrison. The action was brought for compensation for an injury ; not to punish the defendant for a fraud. Where there is no measure of damages for an injury attended with moral turpitude in the author of it, a jury may look beyond mere compensation, and assess damages by way of punishment : but where property has been acquired or lost, or there is any ether means of ascertaining the precise quantum of the damages sustained, the injured party can recover a compensation, and nothing more. Without doubt, a conspiracy to enable a debtor to elude the process of the law, is immoral, and pernicious in its consequences to society ; but as it is punishable by indictment, there is no reason that the actors in it should receive castigation for what affects the public, in a civil action whose legitimate object is the redress of a private injury. If the value of the property assigned were not the standard, there would be no reason why damages beyond the amount of the judgment might not be given; which, I apprehend, could not be done, even if the value were of greater amount than the judgment. It is not sufficient to cure the misdirection, that the jury did not act upon the principle laid down, in its whole extent. I have no doubt the misdirection arose from mere inadvertence, by considering this particular matter of no practical consequence in the cause; but we cannot say how far it may have served to enhance the damages ; for, as remarked by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, the sum actually assessed, may have been the result of a compromise, between jurors who adopted the rule of the Court, and those who rejected it altogether. At all events, it is of public concern, that the law should be rightly declared by the proper organ ; and it is not for the jury, but this Court, to correct errors in matter of law.

Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.  