
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jon Lee SABOURIN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-16484 Non-Argument Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    (July 21, 2017)
    Jodi Leigh Anton, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Andrea G. Hoffman, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, Brandy Brentari Galler, U.S. Attorney’s Office, West Palm Beach, FL, Roger Powell, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Robin J. Farnsworth, Daryl Elliott Wilcox, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JORDÁN, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Jon Lee Sabourin appeals the substantive reasonableness of his 121-month sentence, imposed after he pled guilty to distribution of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (b)(1). Mr. Sa-bourin argues that the district court erred because his sentence was “greater than necessary” to achieve the sentencing goals of punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Upon review, we affirm.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). A sentence falls within “a range of choice for the district court, so lohg as that choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citation omitted).

Our review of a substantive reasonableness challenge entails “examining the totality of the circumstances, including an inquiry into whether the statutory factors in [18 U.S.C.] § 3563(a) support the sentence in question.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The district court’s acknowledgment that it has' considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will generally suffice, and “[w]e will defer to the district court’s judgment regarding the weight given to the § 3553(a) factors unless the district court has made ‘a clear error of judgment’ and has'imposed ‘a sentence that lies outside the range' of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’ ” Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324 (citation omitted). The district court need not discuss or state each § 3553(a) factor explicitly. See United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005).

The district court’s sentencé here was not unreasonable. The court explicitly took into account certain § 3553(a) factors it believed justified the sentence imposed. See Tr. of Sentencing Hearing, D.E. 60 at 22-23; The court emphasized that the sentence reflected a need to promote respect for the law and the seriousness of this offense, considered the Sentencing Commission’s report, and reviewed an expert’s report concluding Mr. Sabourin fell “in the low-risk range for the expression of a sexual contact offense with a juvenile.” Id. The district court, moreover, varied downward slightly and gave Mr. Sabourin a sentence below the initial guideline range of 151-188 months. Mr. Sabourin offers no argument for why his sentence was unreasonable, other than a conclusory statement that the sentence was too harsh. See Appellant’s Br. at 12.

Given the record before us, there is no basis to disturb the district court’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.  