
    Edwin Farned vs. John G. Harris et al.
    A creditor who has obtained a judgment in the state of Alabama against his debtor, cannot sustain a bill in the courts of chancery of this state to subject to the satisfaction of his judgment certain lands alleged to belong to the judgment debtor, but the title to which was in a third party.
    A creditor can only resort to a court of equity to reach the equitable assets of his debtor, in aid of an execution at law ; and to that end he must have a judgment in this state, an execution upon which has been returned nulla Iona.
    
    On appeal from the vice-chancellor’s court, held at Fulton, Itawamba county; Hon. Henry Dickinson, vice-chancellor.
    
      Edwin Famed filed his bill against John 0. Harris and Nehemiah Harris, alleging, that at the March term, 1842, of the circuit court of the county of Lawrence, and state of Alabama, the complainant recovered a judgment in the name of Skinner, Mullins & Co., for his use, against Nehemiah Harris, James M. Harris, and'Robert L. Harris, for the sum of $1710-18; that the amount of this judgment, with interest, is still due. A certified transcript of the judgment is exhibited with the bill.
    That about the time of the rendition of the judgment, the defendant, Nehemiah, removed from the county of Lawrence to the state of Mississippi, to avoid the payment of the judgment; that James M. Harris, and Robert L. Harris, are insolvent, and have .been discharged in bankruptcy. Nehemiah Harris had no visible property that could be reached by execution.
    That on the 25 th day of February, 1844, Nehemiah Harris purchased in the name of his son, John C. Harris, at marshal’s sale, the north-east quarter of section number twenty, township ten, range seven, east, at the sum of four hundred dollars; and the marshal executed and delivered to John C. Harris a deed for said land, which had been recorded in Itawamba county.
    That Nehemiah Harris advanced and paid with his own money the sum bid for the land ; no part of said sum was paid by John C. Harris, or with his money, but was paid for with the money of Nehemiah Harris, for his use and benefit. The land was bid off by John C. Harris, at the request of his father, in pursuance of a previous agreement between them, and he took the deed in his own name, with the intent and purpose to hinder, delay, and defraud complainant in the collection of his debt. That at the time of purchase, John C. had no money or means with which to pay for said land ; was a young man residing with his father as a part of his family.
    That since the purchase, Nehemiah had settled on said land, claimed the same as his own property, and-exercised acts.of ownership over it.
    That John C. Harris holds the legal title in trust for the use and benefit of the said Nehemiah; that the land is liable in equity to pay the judgment of complainant; and the bill prays that John C. may be decreed a trustee for Nehemiah ; that the land be sold to pay the judgment of complainant, and for general relief.
    The answer of John C. Harris admits the judgment, and the insolvency of the parties thereto, but denies that the land was purchased by Nehemiah Harris, in the name of respondent; but alleges, that it was purchased by himself with his own money, and the deed taken in his own name, which has been recorded as charged.
    He denies holding the land in trust for said Nehemiah, or any other person, but claims the same for himself alone.
    He admits that Nehemiah Harris is his father, resides with him on the land. He denies that the land is liable, either at law or equity, for the debts of Nehemiah Harris, and demurs to the bill, and claims the benefit thereof as fully as if the- same was formally entered.
    The answer of Nehemiah Harris admits the judgment; that the same is unpaid; the insolvency of James and Robert L. Harris; their discharge in bankruptcy; and that he has no visible property that can be reached by execution; but denies that he purchased the land at the marshal’s sale; states that it was purchased by his son John C., and the deed taken in his name, which has been recorded as charged. That three months before said sale, respondent 'gave to his son, John C., four hundred dollars, with which to provide himself a home; but denies that it was given to purchase this particular piece of land; denies that there was any previous understanding between himself and son, that said land was in any manner to be purchased for his use and benefit; denies having any claim or title whatever thereto, but admits his residence thereon with his son; denies that he has claimed or does claim said land, or exercise any acts of ownership over it, further than to assist in its cultivation; nor does John C. hold said land in trust for respondent; and he demurs to said bill and the relief prayed, and claims the benefit of a formal demurrer.
    Under the view taken of the case by this court, it is not necessary to set out the proof.
    
      The vice-chancellor dismissed the bill, and the complainant appealed.
    
      John Goodwin, for appellant,
    made two points.
    1. That John G. Harris held the land in controversy in trust for the use and benefit of his father, Nehemiah Harris. On this point, Mr. Goodwin reviewed the pleadings and proofs.
    2. If so, does this court possess jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed, and subject the land to the payment of the complainant’s judgment, obtained in the state of Alabama ?
    On this point Mr. Goodwin insisted, that if the trust had been established, it followed, that a court of equity alone had the right to lay hold of the land, and dispose of it for the benefit of the creditors of Nehemiah Harris. John 0. Harris derived title not from a fraudulent grantor, but from a party who had the right to sell and convey. In cases of trust and fraud, courts of equity seem unwilling to set bounds to their jurisdiction, and consequently its powers ought to be so exercised, that no sub-tilty or cunning shall be able to prevent the detection of fraud, or the failure of justice. 1 Madd. Ch. 8.
    By refusing the relief asked for, the strange anomaly would be presented of a man having a right, and no remedy to enforce it. Will a court of equity protect a man in the enjoyment of his property, when he has placed that property beyond the reach of an exec'ution at law "l is a question of some interest to society. The case now before the court raises the question, whether a debtor, who has placed his funds in the hands of a trustee, where they cannot be reached by execution at law, can put his creditor at defiance, and enjoy the benefit of these funds, which ought to be appropriated to the payment of his debts. The injustice and immorality of such a rule cannot be gainsayed, Taylor v. Jones, 2 Atk. 600; 7 Alab. R. 946; 4 Rand. 282.
    W. J. Copp, for appellees,
    In addition to the review of the pleadings and proof on the point, whether John C. Harris held the land chargeable with his father’s debts, insisting that he did not, contended, in the second place, that to entitle a creditor to the aid of a court of chancery to subject the estate of his debtor to the satisfaction of his debt, it is necessary for him to show a judgment at law and return of execution milla bona. 4 Johns. Chan. R. 671, 691; 1 S. & M. Chan. R. 282; 2 Johns. Ch. R. 283, 296, 671; 9 Wend. 548; 1 Paige, 168, 305; Cook, 328; 1 Monroe, 106; 1 Paine, 525; 4 Monroe, 581; 3 Paige, 320; 2 Leigh, 84, 299; 3 Monroe, 157; 2 Dana, 98; 20 Johns. 554; 1 Freeman, Ch. R. 299.
    Is a judgment in Alabama, simply, sufficient to entitle him to the aid of a court of chancery in Mississippi? Judgments of a sister state only rank as simple contract debts out of that state; to give them the force and efficacy of a judgment in another state, they must be made judgments there. 13 Peters, 312; Story’s Conflict of Laws, § 509, and cases referred to. The charge in the bill of the insolvency of all the defendants to the judgment, and its admission, will not supersede the necessity of making it a judgment in the state where it is sought to be enforced. 1 Freeman, Ch. R., pp. 306 and 307 of the opinion.
    3. Where the defendant has answered to the discovery, he may object to the relief at the hearing, if there be no judgment nor execution. 4 Johns. Chan. 677, 682, 687.
    
      Mr. Goodwin, in reply,
    Argued, that even if a judgment and a return of nulla bona were necessary, the judgment and execution in Alabama were sufficient. He contended that the reason of the rule requiring a judgment at law, &c., as given by the courts, is, that the judgment operates as a lien upon the realty, and an execution returned “ no property found,” gives a legal preference, but that the rule ceased with its reason; here there was no conflict between judgment creditors for a priority of lien or a legal preference. He cited McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Peters, 325; Mills v. Durgen, 7 Crancli, 481; Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat. 234; to show the character and force and effect of a judgment rendered.in a sistev state; and insisted they established that under the authority of Brinkerhoff v. Brown, (4 Johns. Ch. Rep. 671,) and McDermutt v. Strong, (41b. 687,) the judgment in Alabama was sufficient to give the court of chancery in Mississippi jurisdiction, to subject the land. And further, that if the court should be of opinion that the bill is premature, and the case shows equitable circumstances, it will retain the bill, with liberty to the party to prosecute the suit at law, and will restrain the party from relying on the statute of limitations. 2 Yesey, 483; lb. 519 ; 6 lb. 73, 688; 5 lb. 794; 13 lb. 444; 2 lb. 100, 371; 2 Swan, 545 ; 1 Story, Eq. Juris. § 512.
   Mr. Chief Justice Sharkey

delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellant filed his bill in the vice-chancery court, in which he alleges that he had recovered judgment in Alabama against R. L. Harris, J. M. Harris, and respondent, N. Harris; that the parties had removed from Alabama to this state; that the two first were insolvent; that N. Harris had purchased a tract of land in this state, and paid for it with his own money, but the deed was made to his son, J. C. Harris, and the prayer is, that this land be made subject to the satisfaction of this judgment. The answer of N. Harris denies that he has any right to the land; but admits that some time prior to the purchase he had given to his son $400, with which he subsequently made the purchase, though the gift of money was not made with a view to the purchase of this particular tract of land, but was a bond fide gift to J. C. Harris. The answer of J. C. Harris is, to the same effect. The proof is mostly circumstantial, and certainly conduces very strongly to establish the allegations of the bill.

The answers were also filed as demurrers, and thus raise the question whether the bill presents such a case as entitles the complainant to the aid of a court of chancery. It will be seen that the complainant does not resort to that tribunal to establish an equitable right, but to have equitable assets subjected to what is confessedly a legal right; in other words, to have what is regarded as an equity subjected to the satisfaction of a judgment. The power of a court of chancery is ample in such cases, but its authority is invoked only in aid of the execution process; hence the general rule is, where the object is to reach mere equitable assets, that an execution must be returned nulla bona. But the judgment in Alabama will not entitle the complainant to relief in aid of that judgment in this state. 1 S. & M. Ch. Rep. 559. It constitutes but a cause of action in this state. When the party obtains a judgment here, and fails to obtain satisfaction, it will then be time enough to call in the aid of a court of chancery, to subject the equitable assets of defendants.

Decree affirmed.  