
    No. 17773
    The Village of Perrysburg v. W. E Ridgeway, a taxpayer, etc.
    Error to the Court oi Appeals of Lucas county.
    MUNICIPAL LAW — (1) Control of streets — (2) Classification of traffic — (3) Conflict of law.
    Art. XVIII, of Const., not dependent upon adoptior of a charter — (5) Power granted to both chartei and non-charter municipalities — Toledo v. Lynch 88 OS. 71, disapproved as to home rule powers— (6) Ordinance denying motor bus station is valid
   WANAMAKER, J.

1. Since the Constitution of 1912 became operative, all municipalities derive all their “powers oi local self-government” from the constitution direct, by virtue of Section 3, Article XVIII, thereof.

2. The power to establish, open, improve, maintain and repair public streets within the municipality, and fully control the use of them, is included within the term “power of local self-government.”

3. The above constitutional grant of power to municipalities is self-executing in the sense that no legislative action is necessary in order to make it available to the municipality.

4. The exercise of “all powers of local self-government,” as provided in Article XVIII, Section 3, is not in any wise dependent upon or conditioned by Section 7, Article XVIII, which provides that “a municipality may adopt a charter,” etc.

5. The grant of power in Section 3, Article XVIII, is equally to municipalities that do adopt a charter as well as those that do not adopt a charter, the charter being only the mode provided by the constitution for a new delegation or distribution of the powers already granted in the constitution. (State, ex rel. City of Toledo, v. Lynch,, Aud., 88 Ohio St., 71, disapproved upon the proposition that a charter is a prerequisite to the evercise of home-rule powers under Section 3, Article XVIII.)

6. A municipal ordinance denying to a motor bus company for hire the right" to use a municipal street for the purpose of a motor bus stop or station to let offi or take on passengers is within the constitutional grant of municipal power and therefore is a valid ordinance.

Judgment reversed.

Marshall, C. J., Day and Allen, JJ., concur. Robinson, Jones and Matthias, JJ., dissent.  