
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alfredo DE JESUS-PEREZ, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-50458
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted September 26, 2017 
    
    OCTOBER 2, 2017
    Michael Emerson Lasater, Esquire, U.S., Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S., Emily J. Keifer, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Benjamin J. Cheeks, Law Offices of Benjamin J. Cheeks, A.P.C., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Alfredo De Jesus-Perez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the above-Guidelines sentence of 34 months imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

De Jesus-Perez contends that the above-Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable. We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and will not overturn a district court’s sentencing determination absent procedural error or substantive unreasonableness, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 56, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

The district court permissibly considered De Jesus-Perez’s prior illegal reentry conviction and determined that a greater sentence for the instant offense was necessary to deter De Jesus-Perez from reof-fending: See United States v. Higuera-Llamos, 574 F.3d 1206, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 2009). The 34-month sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the need to achieve adequate deterrence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51,128 S.Ct. 586.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     