
    HALL AND WIFE v. BRAY, SURVIVING EXECUTOR.
    An .agreement by testator, after the execution of his will, to sell land therein devised, is not a revocation at law.
    John Bray, by his will, dated January 27th, 1764, ordered his executors to sell a certain tract of land, calling it the land he intended to give his daughter Susannah, and directed them to divide the money received from such sale among the children of his daughter Susanuah.
    The testator, after the date of the before mentioned will, entered into an agreement with one Jacob Swallow to sell the land, prepared articles for this purpose, and took bonds for the payment of the purchase money. No money, however, was received during the lifetime of the testator, nor was any deed executed by him for the property. Swallow assigned his right to Peter Haslett,'
    On the 9th of May, 1769, after the death bf the testator, his executors conveyed the lands to Haslett, for ¿£550, and this action being brought by a child of the testator’s daughter Susannah, the question is, whether the agreement amounted to a revocation of the will, or whether the children of Susannah are entitled to the money arising from the sale.
   Per Cur.

Such an agreement is no revocation at law. An intention to sell does hot revoke a will by which the property is devised. In equity, perhaps, it may be considered as an absolute disposition. Powell on Dev. 565, 593 — 4; Abney v. [213] Miller, 2 Atk. 593; Rider v. Wager, 2 P. Wms. 328; Cotter v. Layer, Ibid. 623; Willet v. Sandford, 1 Vesey 177; Vernon v. Jones, 2 Vern. 241 ; Prec, in Chey.32; Archer v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. 148. See 1 Bl. Rep. 349.  