
    Coffin vs. Coffin.
    An attorney at law is liable to an action for money collected by him, in the same manner as any other agent, and without a special demand; and the statute o-á limitations begins to run from the time he receives the money.
    Assumpsit to recover $47,GO which Charles Coffm the defendant, in the course of his practice as attorney and counsellor at law,., had collected for a demand left with him by Paul Coffin, the plaintiff, against one Bean. The demand was left with the defendant prior to the year 1807; and the money was received July 20,1815,. In 1806, David Coffin was appointed guardian to the plaintiff; in which office he continued till the year 1829; and on the 19th day of December 1818, he had a settlement of accounts with the defendant, and thereupon gave him a receipt in full of all accounts and demands to that date; and in full for all-demands left in his office for collection. In this receipt the plaintiff was not mentioned. It was agreed, in a case stated by the parties, that David Coffin, if he were a competent witness to the fact, would testify that this receipt was not intended to include and did not settle the demand in question. And it was further agreed that during the period of the guar ■ dianship the plaintiff resided in New Hampshire, the guardian, during the same time, residing within half a mile of the defendant’s house. The money being demanded of the defendant, March 9 th 1830, he replied that he had paid it over to the guardian, and should not pay it again.
    The defendant pleaded the general issue, and the statute of limitations; to which the plaintiff replied a new promise, on which issue was joined; and the cause was submitted, upon the facts and pleadings, to the decision of the court.
    
      J. & E. Shepley, for the plaintiff,
    contended that the statute of limitations did not begin to run till the plaintiff had a right to maintain an action; Walker v. Bradley, 3 Pick. 261; Wilcox v. Plum •mer, 4 Peters 172; and that here no action could be maintained against the defendant, he being an attorney at law, till the money was demanded, which was not till March 1880. Staples v, Sta pics $ tr,. 4 Greenl. 532. And to the competency of David Coffin as a witness, they cited Bliss v. Thompson, 4 Mass. 488 ; Page Weeks, 13 Mass, ¡99 ; Barstow v. Gray, 3 Greenl. 409 5 Ely •a. Forward, 1 Mass. 25 ¡ Phillips r- Bridge, 11 Mass, 242 ; Gif-ford v, Coffin, 5 Pick. 447-
    
      D. Goodmow, lor the defendant,
    objected to the right of the plaintiff to maintain this action j there being no special request, but only the usual scape, requisitas, alleged in the declaration ; 1 Chittifs PL 322,325 ; l Saund. 33, note 2 ; Wallis a. Scott, 1 Stm. 88, and such request being necessary, on the authority of Staples v. Staples S/-tr. 4 Greenl, 532. Hut he contended that tlio facts in that caso did not call for (he decision of that point, which was extrajudicial, and not supported by the analogies of the law. The right of action boro accrued as early as the year 1818, when the money •vas received and ought to have been paid over.
    He also contended that David Coffin was not a competent witness, as his testimony would go directly to exonerate himself by charging the defendant. Emerton v, Andrews, 4 Mass. 653,” Widgery v, llashdl, 5 Mass, 144.
   The opinion of the Court was read at the ensuing November term in Cumberland, as drawn up by

Mellen C. J.

Some years prior to 1815, the plaintiff placed m the hands of tire defendant, as an attorney at law, for collection, a demand against one Bean; and the same was paid to the defendant cm the 20th of July, 1815, amounting to ,$47,60, The present action is brought to recover that sum. The defendant pleaded and relies on the statute of limitations j the plaintiff replied and relies on a new promise within six years, next before the commencement of the action. On the 9th of March 1830, an agent of the plaintiff demanded die money of the defendant, who replied that he had once paid it to dm guardian of the plaintiff, and that he should -jut pay it again. Whether he ever did or not, is an immaterial in-"dry if the statute oí limitations commenced running when the money was received of Bean by the defendant and he became accountable for it; for if it did, the action is barred, because there is no pretence that any new promise was ever made. Viewing the cause in this light, it is evident at once that the facts deposed by David Coffin are not of the least importance, and therefore it is of no consequence to inquire whether the deposition was admissible or not. Nor is it a subject of consideration whether the pleadings are technically accurate and formal, in the decision of a cause on an agreed statement of facts. This we have often decided. The only qnestion is when the statute of limitations commenced running against the plaintiff’s demand. Unless the defendant stand in a relation to the plaintiff different from that of any other person who has collected a sum of money as agent for the principal who efhploys him, then most clearly the action is barred. On this point no doubt has been raised. The counsel for the plaintiff, however, contends that his right of action did not accrue till after the demand on the defendant in March 1830, and that till then the statute did not commence running; and in support of his position he relies upon the case of Staples v. Staples and Adams tr. 4 Greenl. 532. The only question in that case, as stated by. the court, in delivering the opinion, was “whether at the time of the service, he (Adams) was such a debtor of the principal as to be chargeable in this process,” and that was the only question which it was necessary for the court to decide, and which they formally did decide. The cases there cited clearly show that debts payable at a future day are attachable by our trustee process ; so that on the ground assumed in argument by Adams he was clearly a trustee. In answer to the argument, the court used the expressions we admit the principle to be correct, that until after demand made, the attorney in this case was not liable to the action of the principal, and it appears that no such demand was made j but it does not follow that he was not liable to this process at the suit of the plaintiff under the circumstances disclosed.” By the report of that case it appears that ten minutes after the money had been paid to Mr. Adams, and before he could possibly have had time to pay it over to his client, it was attached. In view of these facts and in reference to them, the observation of the court above quoted, was made, and not in language sufficiently guarded. The expression as to the necessity of demand was incidental, and not necessary, and had no connexion with the point decided. We arc perfectly satisfied with the decision itself, but do not feel bound by any collateral or incidental expression of an opinion, having no necessary connex-ion with it. Any impressions received, as to the necessity of a demand upon an attorney for money collected by him, before he can be considered as liable to an action, will be removed by the present opinion. Indeed we are satisfied on further examination of the subject, that we are not authorized to distinguish an attorney from other agents, and that the languagé used by the court, even if applied exclusively to that case, could not be sanctioned as correct. Still, the case of Staples v. Staples & tr. was properly decided and is fully sustained by settled principles. The result is, that the present action cannot be maintained,

Plaintiff nonsuit.  