
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT,
    COLUMBIA,
    NOV. 1803.
    Woodward v. Andrews.
    Justification, in slander, is an issuable plea, within the rule of court, and may be pleaded on setting aside an order for judgment.
    Motion for a new trial. Action for words, tried before Trezevant, J. in Fairfield district. The plaintiff had obtained an order for judgment, which defendant moved to set aside, and to have leave to “plead not guilty,” and a justification. The judge, however, refused to permit the defendant to plead the last plea, on the ground that it was not an issuable plea, within the meaning of the rule of court. The motion here, was to reverse that decision.
    Egan, for the defendant,
    insisted, that every plea which went to the merits of the cause, and was not dilatory, was an issuable plea, within the meaning of the rule.
    Evans, for the plaintiff,
    cited 2 Wils. 117. Defendant ought not to be allowed to reap an advantage from his delay in pleading, which he would be enabled to do by suffering an order for judgment to go, and then at the court, when the plaintiff has had no notice of his defence, set up a special justification, or other unexpected defence, which will have the effect of a dilatory pk a. An issuable plea, within the meaning of the rule of court, is such a plea as that issue may be joined thereon to the country at once. Such a plea as will speed, and not impede a trial.
   By the court.

The authorities produced shew, that an issuable plea intended by the rule of court from whence our rule of court is borrowed, is not to be confined to the general issue. Barnes, 271. It must not be a dilatory plea, but one which will mei t the merits of the cause, and advance justice. The plea of justification in slander, is an issuable plea, and within the meaning of the rule. The plaintiff ought to be prepared to rebut such evidence, in case the defendant should move to plead, so as to be entitled to offer it. If he is not prepared, he will be entitled to a continuance. The inconvenience to which, he would, by this means, be exposed,, would not be so great as the defendant would be exposed to suffer, in ease' he could not be allowed, after an order for judgment, the benefit of a plea of justification. Barnes, 263, 253, 356, 363, 332. 1 H. Bl. 79. 2 Wils. 253.

Motion granted,

Note. 1 fios. & Pul 288. On motion to set aside interlocutory judgment, it was attempted to restrict the defendant from pleading the statute of dmitatious, and illett v. Atterton. 1 Bl. .\ep. 35, waseitedtbut the court said that the plea of the statute of limitations was not necrssardy unconsciemious, and that of late ii had been considered as a fail plea in the King's Bei eh’, though formerly it had been thought otherwise. 3T.lt. 124, Bee 1 Bellon’s Practice, 308, a. to what are issuable pleas within a judge's order for further time A plea of tenderis 2 Bl Kep. 724. contra, formerly, 1 Bur. 3 '7. General issue, and statute of limitations good 3 T. ii, 124. Aiso, nil debet, and nulúd record, imp K. B. 24o. i demurrer held not to be an issuable rejoinder. Barnes 168, 271. But a demurrer to the merits is an issuable plea. 2 Bl. K. 923. But not a frivolous demurrer. Bayer 88. 4 Bur. 1788.  