
    Jack Levine, Appellant, v. Bowery Savings Bank, Respondent.
    Argued June 6, 1940;
    decided July 24, 1940.
    
      
      Jacquin Frank and David M. Fink for appellant.
    Plaintiff’s presence in the building was that of a business invitee. His use of the fire-escape was at the express invitation of the defendant’s authorized representative and there was also an implied invitation. (Quinn v. Staten Island R. T. Co., 224 N. Y. 493; Heskell v. Auburn L. & P. Co., 209 N. Y. 86; Fleischmann Malting Co. v. Mrkacek, 14 Fed. Rep. [2d] 602; Radoslovich v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, S. A., 72 Fed. Rep. [2d] 367; Quinn v. Power, 87 N. Y. 537; Riley v. Standard Oil Co., 231 N. Y. 301; Gross v. Mertz, 216 App. Div. 728; Reilly v. Connable, 214 N. Y. 586; Kane v. Couch, 254 App. Div. 797; McAlpin v. Powell, 70 N. Y. 126; Malcolm v. Thomas, 207 App. Div. 230; 238 N. Y. 577; Fey v. Wolf, 256 App. Div. 842.)
    
      Clarence S. Zipp, William S. O’Connor and Daniel Miner for respondent.
    Plaintiff was neither in the building nor did he attempt to use the fire-escape by either express or implied invitation of defendant or an authorized representative. (Matter of Marks v. Gray, 251 N. Y. 90; Friedman v. Board of Education, 262 N. Y. 364; Vaughan v. Transit Development Co., 222 N. Y. 79; McAlpine v. Powell, 70 N. Y. 126; Aubrey v. McCarthy, 217 App. Div. 492; Vega v. Lange, 248 App. Div. 521; Roth v. Mitteldorf, 248 App. Div. 608; Ruback v. McCleary, Wallin & Crouse, 220 N. Y. 188; Potter v. Watts, 262 N. Y. 582; Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. 111; Matter of De Voe v. N. Y. State Railways, 218 N. Y. 318; Solomon v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 103 N. Y. 437.)
   Per Curiam.

Plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to present a question of fact whether, upon accompanying his fellow-employee back to their place of employment in defendant’s building on the night of the accident after regular working hours, the plaintiff entered the building as a business invitee or a mere licensee. If it is found that he was present in the building as a business invitee, the further question of fact is presented, did the injuries sustained by plaintiff, when he attempted to leave the building by means of a fire escape in the exigency of having doors and elevators closed and made unavailable to him as means of egress, result from a breach of legal duty owed to him by the defendant.'

The judgments should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.

Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, ’ Finch, Rippey, Sears, Lewis and Conway, JJ., concur. /

Judgments reversed, etc,  