
    MIN JIANG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-2372.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 5, 2016.
    
      Jay Ho Lee, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Carl McIntyre, Assistant Director; Nancy E. Friedman, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, SUSAN L. CARNEY, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Min Jiang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 6, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming an August 30, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Jiang’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Min Jiang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (BIA June 6, 2014), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig.Ct.N.Y.City Aug. 30, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wang chuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

Absent past persecution, an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2), which must be both subjectively credible and objectively reasonable, Ramsamea-chire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004). To establish a well-founded fear, an applicant must show either a reasonable possibility that she would be singled out for persecution or that the country of removal has a pattern or practice of persecuting individuals similarly situated to her. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). “[The] alien must make some showing that authorities in h[er] country of nationality are either aware of h[er] activities or likely to become aware of h[er] activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008).

The agency did not err in finding that Jiang failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account of her religion. As an initial matter, contrary to Jiang’s contention, the BIA did not err in reviewing for clear error the IJ’s factual findings underlying his well-founded fear determination. See Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130,134-35 (2d Cir.2012); see also In re Z-Z-O-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 586, 590 (BIA 2015). And, although the BIA failed to recognize the IJ’s positive credibility determination, that error was harmless given that it assumed Jiang’s credibility for purposes of her appeal. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 339 (2d Cir.2006).

The agency did not err in determining that Jiang failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly situated individuals such that officials are likely to become aware of her religious practice and persecute her on that account. See Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 143. As the IJ found, the country conditions evidence in the record established that between fifty and seventy million Christians practice in unregistered churches in China, and that in some areas their activities, including proselytism, are tolerated without interference. Therefore, despite evidence of sporadic mistreatment of religious practitioners, Jiang failed to demonstrate “systemic or pervasive” persecution of similarly situated Christians sufficient to demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution in China. In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005); see also 8 C.F.R. ¶ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 & n. 1 (2d Cir.2009) (denying petition where agency considered background materials and rejected pattern or practice claim).

The agency also reasonably found that Jiang failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of being singled out for persecution. Jiang did not assert that Chinese officials are aware of her religious practice. And, given the tens of millions of unregistered Christian practitioners in China, she did not demonstrate that Chinese officials are likely to discover her religious activities, a showing required to establish an objectively reasonable fear. See Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 143.

Accordingly, because the agency reasonably found that Jiang failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, it did not err in. denying asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  