
    Loring Winn WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHINO VALLEY INDEPENDENT FIRE DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-57135.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 9, 2015.
    
    Filed Feb. 12, 2015.
    Ben-Thomas Hamilton, Donald Edward Mclnnis, Hamilton & Mclnnis, L.L.P., San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Peter Jay Brown, Melanie Diane Long Chaney, Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Los Angeles, CA, Judith S. Islas, Esquire, Lie-bert Cassidy Whitmore, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    
      Before: KOZINSKI, CHRISTEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

The district court dismissed, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the complaint filed by Loring Williams alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal: Gov’t Code §§ 12900-12996, by his former employer, Chino Valley Independent Fire District. We have jurisdiction over Williams’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.

1. Williams did not state a disparate-treatment claim under California or federal law. The one-year limit on eligibility for requalification in Chino Valley’s Personnel Rules applies to all retirees, regardless of whether they are disabled, and thus is not facially discriminatory. If the one-year bar prevented Williams from seeking open positions, this was the result of his decision to pursue requalification rather than undergo the ordinary competitive process, and not “because of’ his disability. See Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.1999); Wills v. Super. Ct., 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 15 (2011).

2. Williams also failed to state a disparate-impact claim. Williams does not allege any group-based hiring disparity, see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988); Stockwell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 749 F.3d 1107, 1115 & n. 4 (9th Cir.2014), nor does he identify a specific policy or practice that had a disparate impact on disability retirees, see Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir.2002).

3. Williams claims that he was denied a reasonable accommodation in the form of an extension of the one-year eligibility limit. But an extension of the eligibility limit is “not a modification or adjustment to the workplace necessary to enable him to perform the essential functions of his position.” Scotch v. Art Inst. of Cal.-Orange Cnty., Inc., 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 338, 360 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

4. The failure to offer a reasonable accommodation is a prerequisite for an interactive-process claim, see Watkins v. Ameripride Servs., 375 F.3d 821, 829 n. 5 (9th Cir.2004) (citing Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 496 (1999)), and the interactive-process claim therefore also fails.

5. Because Williams offered no new facts and no other basis for amending the complaint, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. See Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051-52 (9th Cir.2008); Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsys., Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir.2004).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     