
    John Q. Adams vs. George W. Bourne.
    One who uses a carriage, hired in his name by another without previous authority or subsequent ratification, without reasonable cause to believe that the carriage was hired on his account, or that he was looked to for pay for its use, is not liable for its use, although the owner had no notice that the hirer procured it on his own account.
    Action of contract by the keeper of a livery stable for the use of a carriage and harness. At the trial in the court of common pleas the plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that the carriage and harness were procured of him by one Mayo on account of the defendant, and were used by Mayo with a horse of the defendant in building and repairing houses for the defendant, and once by the defendant and once by his wife- in his absence. The defendant introduced evidence tending to show that whatever Mayo did for him was done under special directions, and that he was not his general agent; that the plaintiff did not believe at the time of letting the carriage and harness to Mayo that he had any authority to hire them on the defendant’s account; and that the defendant did not know that they were procured on his account until after they had been used as aforesaid.
    The plaintiff contended, 1st, “ that if Mayo was the general agent of the defendant, and procured said carriage and harness of the plaintiff on the defendant’s account for any purpose within the general scope of his authority as such agent, the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the use thereof.” 2d. “ That if Mayo was in the service of the defendant, and procured said carriage and harness of the plaintiff on the defendant’s account, and used them in the defendant’s business, and they were used by the servants or family of the defendant, or by the defendant himself, the defendant was liable to pay for the use thereof, unless the plaintiff had notice that Mayo procured them on his own account.”
    
      Aiken. J. gave the first instruction requested, and declined to give the second; and also instructed the jury as to the distinction between general agents and special agents for particular transactions in a manner not excepted to; and “ that they might find the defendant liable in this case, if he had given Mayo a previous authority to hire a carriage, or if such hiring came within the scope of Mayo’s" authority as agent or servant of the defendant, or if the defendant had subsequently ratified the act of hiring by Mayo; that the use of the carriage by the defendant or by his wife or servants would not necessarily render the defendant liable ; but if Mayo was in the service of the defendant, and procured the carriage on the defendant’s account, and used it in the defendant’s business, and it was also used by the defendant himself or his wife or servants, as proved in this case, they might find a verdict for the plaintiff, if the defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the carriage was 'fired on his account, or that he was looked to for pay for die use of the carriage.” The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
    
      W. F. Slocum, for the plaintiff,
    cited 2 Selw. N. P. 1120; Precious v. Able, 1 Esp. R. 353; Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38; Rimmell v. Sampays, 1 Car. & P. 254; Lobdell v. Baker, 1 Met. 202, 203; 2 Kent Com. (6th ed.) 614.
    The defendant submitted the case without argument.
   The Court

Overruled the exceptions.  