
    Luther G. JAMISON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. R.K. WONG, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 10-17040.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    
      Submitted Sept. 10, 2012.
    
    Filed Sept. 24, 2012.
    Amitai Schwartz, Law Offices of Amitai Schwartz, Emeryville, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Amanda Jane Murray, Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Luther G. Ja-mison appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Jamison challenges the Board of Parole Hearings’ 2007 decision denying him parole. He contends that he is being held beyond his release date of July 22, 2006, in violation of his federal due process rights. The state court’s rejection of this claim is not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The statute on which Jamison relies applies only to certain felonies committed prior to 1977, and Jamison was convicted in 1983. See Cal.Penal Code § 1170.2(a). Furthermore, even if he had committed his offense prior to 1977, the California Supreme Court has held that a sentence like Jamison’s for a term of years to life is not subject to the Determinate Sentencing Act, see People v. Felix, 22 Cal.4th 651, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 54, 995 P.2d 186, 191 (2000), and we are bound by that interpretation of state law, see Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S.Ct. 602, 163 L.Ed.2d 407 (2005) (per curiam).

To the extent Jamison contends he was denied an opportunity to be heard, this contention is without merit because the record reflects that Jamison received all the process he was due. See Swarthout v. Cooke, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 859, 862, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011).

We construe Jamison’s remaining arguments, including his argument that the state court unreasonably determined the facts, and that the district court improperly denied his motion for appointment of counsel and his motion to reconsider, as a motion to expand the certificate of appeal-ability. So construed, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R. 22-l(e); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     