
    WILLIAM GUNTON v. W. C. ZANTZINGER AND JOEL C. GREEN, PETITIONER.
    Equity. —
    No. 995.
    Ail Equity Court does not insure the title to real property sold by a trustee under its decree, and the purchaser at such sale assumes all unpaid taxes thereon, unless express provision is made by the court for their payment.
    STATEMENT 0E THE CASE..
    In this case there was a bill tiled by Gunton for the settlement of his account as trustee under the will of Harriet Fischer, deceased; and in the course of proceedings an order was made directing Gunton, trustee, to sell certain real estate; and at the sale (A. H. 1871) the petitioner, Joel C. Green, purchased some of the land. The price was paid in due time, and the trustee conveyed the land to the petitioner. Some four years after the sale (A. H. 1875) the collector of taxes demanded payment of a tax on the land levied fourteen years before (A. H. 1861). The petitioner paid it, and by this petition seeks to be reimbursed the amount. The ease stands upon petition and answer. No proofs have been taken.
    This is an appeal from the special term dismissing the petition.
    
      Jokn W. Frasee, for petitioner, Joel C. Green.
    The petitioner relies upon the fact that equity will correct mistakes, and make contracts conform to the true intent and meaning of the parties. (See Sugden’s Vend, and Pur., 288, 289; Story on Sales, sec. 145, p. 117; 3 Sandford’s S. C., (N. Y.,) 123, 124.)
    
      John D. McPherson, for Gunton, trustee.
    If tlie sale be a judicial sale, still the court has no jurisdiction. It may be admitted that, if the matter were yet in fieri — -if the price had not been paid, or the purchase-money were yet in court — the court might have jurisdiction. But in this case the land has been conveyed, and the proceeds accounted for by the trustee and paid away under the direction of the court. The court has no longer control of either the land or the money.
    It is true the trustee holds other property of the estate, and may hereafter be in funds to pay the petitioner’s demand, if the court shall so order. But it is submitted that, under the circumstances just stated, the petitioner stands in no better position than any other person having demands against the estate; and this court does not undertake to decide upon the demands of general creditors, but leaves them to establish their demands by recourse to the appropriate tribunals.
    The petitioner, upon the merits, is not entitled to any relief. “The rule of caveat emptor applies in all its rigor to judicial sales of real property.” Borer on Judicial Hales, sec. 459, citing, among other cases, The Monte Allegro, 9 Wheat., 616, and Anderson v. Foulk, 2 H. & G., 346, in which case the chancellor says:
    “In England it would seem to be usual, in sales under the authority of the court, to offer a good title to the bidders; and hence the references to a master, at the instance of a party or of the purchaser, of which we read so often, to ascertain whether a good title can be made or not. But in this State it -has always been the established law of the court in such cases to sell all the right and title of the parties to the suit, whatever that may be, and nothing more. In all judicial sales under orders or decrees of this court, the rule caveat emptor has been applied; and consequently no examination into the title after the sale is necessary, or can be called for bv the purchaser, whatever may be its latent or patent defects. But if the trustee make any promises or representations to the bidder before the sale that the estate shall be or is clear of all incumbrances; and that the title is better or different from that to be traced from the proceedings, and any such claim should afterwards be set up, the sale would be annulled; but the relief would be granted to the purchaser on the ground of misrepresentation or fraud, and not on that ■of a mere defect of title, as in cases between party and party.” (Osterburg v. Union Trust Company, 3 Otto, 428.)
    And again, says Borer, section 462 : “ In the absence of misconception and fraud the buyer must look out for himself. He buys at his own risk, both as to title and as to quality. The rule does not, however, apply in case there be fraud. And it has been hoi den in Pennsylvania that the rule applies only to open defects, and that as against secret' defects in a title a purchaser will be protected.” For the Pennsylvania doctrine, the writer refers to Bank v. Ammon, 27 Penn. St., 172, which, being examined, is found to be a case in which, though the doctrine was involved, the decision was upon a different ground.
   By the.Court:

The petition is presented by a purchaser of some real estate sold in this cause by a trustee under a decree of this court. After a deed had been made and delivered to the purchaser, and the price of the land had all been paid, the purchaser discovered that a tax, assessed upon the property in 1861, was unpaid, and remained a charge against the land. It amounted to about $64, and the collector had advertised the premises for sale to satisfy the tax, when the petitioner paid the same in order to prevent the threatened sale. He now petitions the court to be reimbursed that amount.

We do not see how we can grant him any relief. The Equity Court does not insure the title to property sold under its decree unless express provision is made for that purpose. The purchaser must, therefore, look to the title himself. If there are unpaid taxes at the time of the sale, the purchaser assumes them, unless the court has provided for their payment. In this case there is no fund in court out of which to make an allowance to the petitioner, even if the court have the power to make it.

The decree is affirmed.  