
    Tommasa VILARDI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
    
    No. 10-5097-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 10, 2012.
    Tommasa Vilardi, pro se, Ridgewood, NY.
    Varuni Nelson and Kathleen A. Maho-ney, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, PIERRE N. LEVAL, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption to conform to this order.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Tommasa Vilardi, pro se, challenges (a) the grant, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), of a motion by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) to dismiss Vilardi’s action seeking ju-' dicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner, and (b) the denial of Vilar-di’s Rule 12(c) cross-motion. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal.

“We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).” Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir.2010). “In reviewing a district court’s decision upholding a decision of the Commissioner, we ‘review the administrative record de novo to determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.’ ” Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir.2002)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (providing that, if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s findings, such findings are “conclusive”); Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir.2009) (“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). “We therefore focus our attention on the administrative ruling rather than on the decision of the district court.” Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir.1996). However, “[i]t is not our function to determine de novo whether [a claimant] is disabled.” Id.

Ultimately, the determination of whether a claimant is disabled is “reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e). “While the opinions of a treating physician deserve special respect, they need not be given controlling weight where they are contradicted by other substantial evidence in the record.” Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir.2002) (citations omitted). Likewise, a claimant’s subjective report of her symptoms is not controlling but must be supported by medical evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.

The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that Vilardi was not disabled because, despite her alleged impairments, she retained the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The ALJ cogently set forth his reasons for and the substantial evidence relied upon in discounting both Vilardi’s treating physician’s opinion and her alleged symptoms. On appeal, Vilardi primarily relies on a November 2007 doctor’s report and MRI. Vi-lardi’s reliance on evidence demonstrating a worsening of her condition after that date is of little value, because she was required to demonstrate that she was disabled as of March 31, 2007, the date on which she was last insured. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A); Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.1989). Consequently, her reliance on evidence demonstrating a worsening of her condition after that date is of little value.

Vilardi points to a 1993 MRI and 2001 CT-scan, but both results pre-dated the alleged January 1, 2002 onset date of her disability. Moreover, she identifies no material errors in the ALJ’s factual findings that are relevant to the alleged medical conditions she raises on appeal. In deciding whether substantial evidence exists, the Court must defer to the Commissioner’s resolution of conflicting evidence. See Clark v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 143 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir.1998). So even assuming that Vilardi’s conditions have arguable support in the record, the ALJ’s decision-to accord more weight to substantial evidence that conflicted with Vilardi’s treating physician’s opinion and her alleged symptoms-cannot be disturbed.

As to Vilardi’s request for oral argument, argument is unnecessary to dispose of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED and Appellant’s request for oral argument is DENIED. 
      
      . In her appellate brief, Vilardi does not raise any issue with regards to the ALJ’s findings concerning her chest pains, foot surgery, and toxoplasmosis. Accordingly, such issues are deemed waived. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir.1995).
     