
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stacey T. SPENCER, Sr., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-1914-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 26, 2013.
    Monica J. Richards, Assistant United States Attorney, for William J. Hochul, Jr., United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY, for appellant.
    Edward Earl Key, Law Office of Edward Early Key, Buffalo, NY, for Appel-lee.
    Present: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CHESTER J. STRAUB, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the order of the district court be AFFIRMED.

The United States of America appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Skretny, C.J.), adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate (Scott, M.J.), granting Stacey T. Spencer, Sr.’s motion to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to a search of his car. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

In reviewing a district court’s grant of a motion to suppress, we review the factual findings for clear error, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we review legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Murphy, 703 F.3d 182, 188-89 (2d Cir.2012).

When a search is conducted pursuant to a subject’s purported consent, the government must “demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.” Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). “The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). Here, the magistrate judge made a finding (which the district court adopted) that Spencer “ambiguously consented to search a vehicle he ... did not possess, a truck,” or that Spencer “was making a glib statement not intended to consent to anything.” J.A. 188. Those findings are not clearly erroneous. We therefore cannot hold that Spencer consented to the search at issue, and the government has declined to press on appeal any argument premised on abandonment.

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in the government’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the order of the district court.  