
    Jones vs. Planters’ Bank.
    The act of 1813, ch. 103, sec. 2, requiring notice to be given at four of the most public places in the county, of an intended sale by the sheriff, is a directory statute, and if such notice be notgiven the sale is not void in consequence of such omission.
    The Planters’ Bank recovered judgment against Chalmers and others, in the circuit court of Madison county, for the sum of $2547, on the 16th day of April, 1839. Chalmers appealed to the supreme court, and the judgment was there affirmed on the 16th day of April, 1840. An execution issued and was levied on five acres ofland in the town of Jackson, on the 18th ^lay of June, 1840, as the property of Chalmers, and it was sold and purchased by the Bank and conveyed by sheriff accordingly.
    On the 6th day of May, 1839, Chalmers sold and conveyed the tract in controversy to Jones.
    The Bank instituted this action of ejectment against Jones in the circuit court of Madison county. It was submitted to a jury and the defendant introduced the sheriff, who proved that he did not give notice as required by the act of 1813, at four of the most public places in the county.
    Read, presiding judge, charged the jury that the deed of Chalmers to Jones was a nullity as the land was bound by the lien of the judgment of the Bank, and that the act of 1813, was directory, and that a failure to comply with its provisions did not render the sale void. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, and defendant Jones appealed in error,
    
      Totten, for plaintiff in error.
    The sheriff’s sale of the land in question is void for want of proper notice of the sale.
    1st. In execution sales the office or duty of the sheriff is one of mere agency; he acquires no interest in the land by the levy of an execution; he has a mere naked power, without any interest whatever. See 10 Yerg. Rep. 330.
    His warrant of authority is a regular execution, issued on the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. The law makes him the agent of the creditor in some sense, and com fers on him the power to sell the land of the . debtor. But the law also requires that certain conditions precedent, be performed by him before he shall be allowed to sell the land. He shall give the notices required by the acts of 1799, ch. 14, and 1813, ch. 103. In this case'the notices required by the act of 1813, were not given, and therefore the sale was void.
    2d. The notices required by the act of 1813, are of much more importance and value, in promoting the objects contemplated by the Legislature, than those prescribed by the act of 1799, to prevent frauds, secret sales and the sacrifice of property. The act of 1813, forbids the Sheriff to sell lands, &c., without having given notice at four of the most public places in the county, and imposes a high penalty if he presume to do so.
    Now it is a well settled principle that if a statute forbid any thing to be done, the same if done in violation of the statute is void. 1 B. and P. 272: HaTlet vs. Novion 14 J. R. 290: Bart-let vs. Vinor, Carthew 252: Benely vs. Ringold 5, Barn fy Al-derson 335, in 7 Eng. Gom. Law Rep. 121, and cases there referred to. And where such contract is made in violation of a statute, it is void, although the statute do not say it shall be void; and where a contract is made, which is forbid by a statute under a penalty, or to which a penalty is annexed, the court will sustain the statute and declare the contract void. Ibid See. Chitty on Contracts 231; and 232 and cases there referred to. 14 Mass. Rep. 322: 17 Mass. Rep. 275.
    Here the contract of sale by the sheriff to the plaintiff in the execution, is in direct violation of a remedial and highly penal statute. If the plaintiff’s attorney buy the land, as was the case in the present instance, he is chargeable with notice of every irregularity in the sale. Simons vs. Gatlin, 2 Cains’ Rep. 61. Upon every principle of reason and law, such contract of sale should be declared void.
    3d. In the case of a naked power not coupled with an interest, the law requires that every prerequisite to the exercise of that power should precede it, as where the sheriff is require^ to make certain advertisements before the sale of land for the non-payment of taxes; if he do not make them the sale is void. 
      Williams vs. Peyton, 4 Con. R. U. S. 396: Jackson vs. Sheppard, 7 Cowan’s Rep. 89: 4 Cranch R. 403, 9 Cranch 64.
    And the vendee at such sale is required to see that all those conditions are performed. Ibid. And so conditions precedent contained in a will or deed conferring a power to convey land &c. shall be strictly complied with, otherwise such conveyance is void. Dike vs. Ricks4 Cro. 335: 5 Dane’s Abr. 29.
    And so all the forms and circumstances prescribed by the deed creating the power shall be strictly complied with, otherwise the sale is void. 2nd Thomas Coke 690, and references. As where the execution of the power was to be by will under seal attested by those witnesses, and there was no seal to the will, held void on that account. Dormer vs. Thurland 2 P. Wms. 506. Moodie vs. Reed, 2 Taunton, 361. Much more should a sale be void, where so important a condition or requirement as-ín the present case has been omitted.
    4th. This court has declared sales void for the want of twenty days notice, where defendant was present at the sale. See 10 Yerg. Rep. 491, 8 Yerg. Rep. 179. It is also a well settled principle that the purchaser must look to regularity of the proceeding, and that an irregular sale to an innocent purchaser is void. See Loyd vs. Anglin, 7 Yerg. Rep. 431: Woodcockv s. Ben-net, 1 Cow. Rep. 735.
    It is also a well settled principle in chancery that the sale must be in conformity to the decree, otherwise it is void, and the vendee is bound to look to its regularity.
    Upon every principle then to be found in reason, analogy and precedent, this sale is void, and should be so declared.
    
      Brinckly, for the defendant in error.
   GREEN, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

The question principally discussed in this case is, whether the failure of the sheriff to give the notice-required by the act of 1813, ch. 103, sec. 2, (Nich. & Car. 296,) will render a sale oF land, by virtue of a ji. fa. void. That act provides, that the sheriff shall advertise the time and place of sale, at four places in the county, one at the court house door, another at the most public place in the neighborhood of the party whose property is to be sold, and two others, at the most public places in the county; and if any sheriff shallsellwithoutgivingsuchnotices, by the first section of the act(Nich. &Car. 181,) he shall be removed from office, and shall be liable to an action for damages, by the party injured.

In the case before us, the forty day’s notice in the newspapers, and the twenty days notice to the party in possession of the land, was given as is required by the act of 1799, ch. 14, sec. 1, (Nich. & Car. 292) but the notices required by the act of 1813, were not given; and it is insisted that the land was sold contrary to law, and that the sale is void.

We think the act of 1813, is to be regarded as directory merely, and was not intended by the legislature to make sales void, which might happen to be made without a strict compliance with every requisite mentioned in the act. It does not declare that sales made without a compliance with its provisions shall be void, as the act of 1799 does. It inflicts a penalty on the sheriff and gives the party injured an action for damages.' Now if the sale were void, the party whose land might be sold would sustain no damages. The fact therefore, that the act gives him an action for damages, plainly indicates that the legislature did not understand by the provisions they were enacting, that the sale would be void. Besides three of these notices were to be given at the most public places in the county. If the sale would be void for not giving one of these notices, for the same reason it would be void if the notices were not at the most public places. If this were the law, we should in every case have an investigation as to whether there were not some place in the county more public that some one at which notice was given. This would lead to endless difficulty and uncertainty, and would render the validity of every sale so uncertain, that plaintiffs would fail to collect their debts, and the property of defendants would be sacrificed without a fair equivalent.

It is manifest therefore, that the legislature did not intend that the omission to give the notices required by the act of 1813, should have the effect to make void the sale. The principles stated by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, and the cases cited, apply to a state of things very different from the present. They are either cases where the statute declares the thing shall be void; or where the party doing the thing against law claims a benefit; or when the proceeding is summary, or exparte, or by virtue of a limited authority. None of these cases apply to the one at bar. In the case of Trott vs. McGavock, (1 Yerg. Rep. 469) the court puts the decision expressly upon the ground that the act 1799, declares the sale shall be void. We think there is no error in the judgment of the court below, and order that it be affirmed.  