
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ray COLLINS, Jr., Also Known as Devon Small, also known as Ray Davis, Appellant.
    No. 00-2736.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
    Submitted May 17, 2001.
    Filed June 22, 2001.
    
      Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and BYE, Circuit Judges, and GAITAN, District Judge.
    
      
      . The Honorable Fernando T. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
    
   PER CURIAM.

Following his convictions by a jury for conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine base, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), § 846, and for aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine base with the intent to distribute it, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), Ray Collins, Jr., was sentenced to 360 months in prison. Mr. Collins appeals, and we affirm.

The district court, rather than the jury, determined the amount of drugs that Mr. Collins was involved in distributing, and Mr. Collins therefore argues that he was sentenced in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, held that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the maximum penalty to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be submitted to and determined by a jury. Because his thirty-year sentence exceeds the twenty-year maximum for the offense simpliciter, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), Mr. Collins maintains that he is entitled to be resentenced.

We have held, however, that if the proof at a defendant’s trial was such that no rational jury, if the matter had been submitted to it, could have failed to find the defendant responsible for the quantity of drugs necessary to subject him to the sentence that he received, then an Apprendi error is harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 429 (2001) (per curiam). Our examination of the record convinces us that there is no reasonable likelihood that a properly instructed jury would have found that Mr. Collins was responsible for less than five grams of cocaine base, and thus he would have been subject to a maximum penalty of forty years under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). There was overwhelming evidence at trial that Mr. Collins was involved in a conspiracy that dealt crack cocaine in kilogram quantities.

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.  