
    George D. Glass, Resp’t, v. The United Domestic Sewing Machine Co., App’lt.
    
      (City Court of Brooklyn, General Term,
    
    
      Filed October 23, 1893.)
    
    1. Contract—Employment—Agency.
    In an action for breach of contract of employment plaintiff alleged an employment for a year and testified that the contract was made with defendant’s secretary. The secretary testified that he generally made the arrangements with the different employes, but that there was no agreement with plaintiff for a year. Held, that a motion to dismiss was properly denied, as there was evidence of authority on the part of defendant to employ plaintiff.
    2. Same—Grounds for discharge.
    Plaintiff was requested to go to other cities and take charge of defendant’s agencies at those places at a different salary, which he refused to do. Held, that the services he was requested to perform were not included in the contract in suit, and that his refusal was not sufficient cause for his discharge.
    Appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiff, and from order denying motion for a new trial.
    Plaintiff alleged a contract for a year, and that defendant wrongfully discharged him before the expiration of that period, and asked judgment for salary and commission for the balance of the year. Defendant denied that there was a contract for a year, and justified the discharge on the ground that plaintiff was ordered to remove from New York city, and take charge of one of defendant’s agencies at Boston or Newark, and that he wrongfully refused. Plaintiff testified that he entered defendant’s employ in 1873, and remained in it about nineteen years. About the last of October, 1891, he had a conversation with Mr. Blake, defendant’s secretary, who asked him to take charge of defendant’s retail offices in the east. Mr. Blake .offered him $2,500 a year and one-half of one per cent, on all remittances from the offices for sale of machines, forms, fashions, and merchandise. Plaintiff accepted the proposition, and was told that the contract was to begin at once. Mr. Blake’s testimony was that he generally made the arrangements with defendant’s employes, and employed them. He said there was no agreement to employ plaintiff for a year. In June, 1892, he asked plaintiff to take charge of an agency in Boston, and he refused. He subsequently asked him to take charge of an agency in Newark, which plaintiff also refused. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Blake offered him $3,000 to take charge of either of the agencies mentioned.
    
      Herbert F. Andrews, for app’lt; Boswell W. Keene, for resp’t.
   . Clement, Oh. J.

The plaintiff at the trial, claimed that he was employed by the defendant for a year, and that before its expiration he was wrongfully discharged, and recovered for the unpaid salary after his discharge. The defendant denied that the plaintiff was employed for a year, and contended that he was discharged for good cause. The jury having found on the questions of fact in favor of the plaintiff, the appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment on the grounds: First, that there was no evidence in the case that the secretary of the defendant, Mr. Blake, had authority to employ the plaintiff; second, that the cause proven for the discharge of plaintiff was, on the undisputed testimony, sufficient. On the authorities, the plaintiff was called upon to prove that the secretary had authority to bind the defendant, or to prove a ratification by the corporation of his acts. Alexander v. Cauldwell, 83 N. Y., 480 ; Wilson v. Kings Co. El. R. R. Co., 114 id., 487; 24 St. Rep., 81; Jourdan v. L. T. R. R. Co., 115 N. Y., 380; 26 St. Rep., 138. The plaintiff, before the contract in question, had been in the employ of defendant for a period of about nineteen years, and the latter portion of the time at a yearly salary. The new contract called for services different from the previous employment. Plaintiff worked seven months before his discharge, and was paid for same by the defendant. Mr. Blake, the secretary, testified that he generally made the arrangement with the different employes of the company. The testimony was ample to justify the denial of the motion to dismiss, for the reason that there was evidence of authority on the part of Mr. Blake to employ the plaintiff. The plaintiff admitted that he had refused to comply with the orders of the officers of the company, but claimed that he was not bound to obey such orders under his contract. On this question, as the point was raised on a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict, we will have to assume that the plaintiff told the truth. After carefully reading his testimony, we are satisfied that the defendant requested plaintiff to make a new contract to be performed at Boston, and also a new contract for services at Newark. In fact, Mr. Blake so understood, because he offered a higher salary,—$3,000 per year. The services which plaintiff was requested to perform were not included in the contract in suit.

Judgment and order denying new trial affirmed, with costs.

Van Wyck, J., concurs.  