
    CARTER v. STATE.
    (No. 4303.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Dec. 6, 1916.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1917.)
    Criminal Law <@^1092(7), 1099(6) — Akpeal and Error — Statement—Bills or Exception.
    Where the trial court inadvertently or erroneously allowed accused 90 days after adjournment to file a statement of fact and bills of exception, the order for any additional time after 90 days from sentence was void, and a statement and bills of exception, filed 112 days from sentence, will not be considered.
    DUd. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2S50, 2852-2854, 2877; Dec. Dig. <@=ol092(7), 1099(6).]
    Appeal from District Court, Comanche County; J. H. Arnold, Judge.
    Bill Carter was convicted of murder, and appeals.
    Affirmed.
    S. W. Bishop and J. B. McEntire, both of Gorman, and J. R. Stubblefield, of Eastland, for appellant. C. C. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   PRENDERGAST, P. J.

Appellant was convicted of murder, and his punishment assessed at ten years to the penitentiary.

This is the third appeal in this cause; the others are reported in 75 Tex. Cr. R. 110, 170 S. W. 739, and 183 S. W. 881, respectively.

The court in which he was convicted, by law, could continue more than eight weeks, and as a fact, the term at which he was convicted, did continue longer than eight weeks. It convened April 17th and adjourned July 8, 1916. He was convicted and judgment rendered May 11, 1916. His motion for a new trial was overruled on June 6th, at which time he was duly sentenced, and gave notice of ■ appeal to this court, all of which was then and there duly entered in the minutes of the court. At this time, the court, inadvertently or erroneously allowed appellant 90 days after adjournment to prepare and file a statement of facts and bills of exceptions, when under the statute and all the decisions of this court thereunder plainly and without doubt he could allow only 90 days from the date of sentence. His order, therefore, for any additional time after 90 days from sentence was without power, ineffectual, and void. The decisions of this court so holding are so numerous, certain, and uniform it is unnecessary, and a useless task, to collate and cite them. On this point there has been “no variableness, neither shadow of turning,” by this court or its decisions.

The statement of facts and all bills of exceptions were filed September 26, 1916, which was 112 days after sentence, and 21 days too late. Therefore, the Assistant Attorney General’s motion to strike them out and not consider them must be, and is, sustained, and they cannot be considered. There is nothing we can review without them.

The judgment must therefore be affirmed; and it is so ordered.

HARPER, J., absent. 
      <S=»For other oases see same topic and KBY-NXJMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     