
    Amelia Fahs, Administratrix of Casper Fahs, v. James Taylor and others.
    A judgment against a corporation, where process was served on individuals who are not called officers, can not he impeachod by a stranger, in a suit in chancery in which the corporation, the stockholders, and the individuals served are parties, and who make no objection, no fraud or collusion being charged.
    Chancery will not set up lapse of time against a claim where an action of debt for its recovery would not be barred by the statute of limitations.
    This is a creditor’s bill, from th.e county of Hamilton.
    *In 1831, Frances Carr, administratrix of Henry Hafer, [105 brought a suit, for the use of the complainant, against the bank. The writ commanded the sheriff to summon “ the president and directors of the Farmers and Mechanics’ Bank of Cincinnati.”
    The sheriff returned, “ Summoned, by copies left at their dwellings, Longworth, Cranmer, Wheeler, McFarland, and Williams, Southgate, not found.”
    There was a judgment by default.
    In 1835, the complainant filed this bill, making the executor of Carr, the administrator of Hafer, the bank and such of its stockholders as she can discover, and James Taylor, defendants. She states the bank has no property to satisfy her judgment, and prays that Taylor, whom she avers to be largely indebted to the bank, may be compelled to pay her judgment out of the money he owes the bank.
    Taylor, in his answer, denies the validity of the judgment, and he asserts that the bank ceased to do business in 1822; that he does not and did not owe the bank; and he claims the benefit of the lapse of time and the statute of limitations.
    As to the other defendants, the bill stands for a decree pro confesso.
    
    
      Fox, for the plaintiff:
    It is a settled rule of this court that a judgment of a competent tribunal can not be treated as a nullity. Weyer v. Zane, 3 Ohio, 306; Buell v. Cross, 4 Ohio, 327; Douglas v. McCoy, 5 Ohio, 522.
    Admitting the right to avoid a judgment, by showing that the party was not served with process, yet that is a personal privilege and can not be used by a stranger. This objection is purely technical, and may be answered by technicality. The return, on the writ, shows that the party really was served by copy. The rest may be rejected as surplusage.
    As to the act of limitations, it is enough to say that an action of debt might be sustained; and equity will not interpose a bar where a recovery may be had at law.
    *Starr and Wright & Walker, for the defendant:
    No decree can be rendered against Taylor unless the complainant shows a valid judgment against the bank. No such judgment is shown. The supposed judgment is a nullity. It may be set aside at any time. The bank had no day in court. The service "of process against the bank, upon certain individuals named in the return, no more warranted a judgment against the bank than if it had been returned served on John Doe and Richard Roe.
    Process against a corporation must be served upon its head officer; service upon a private individual of a corporation is not sufficient notice to hold the corporation to trial. Angelí on Corp. 383.
    Lapse of time and the statute of limitations are a protection to Taylor. He can not be deprived of their benefit, because a particular form of action at law (the result of mistake in legislation no doubt) could be adopted by the bank, if it had a legal existence, to recover the supposed debt. It does not follow that the complainant shall have a decree in equity for the debt alleged to be due from Taylor to the bank, because the bank might by possibility institute an action of debt against him, which he could not resist with success, by pleading the statute of limitations.
    It is not necessary for him to make out a technical bar, under all and every statute of limitations, in the same manner as if he were sued in an action at law by the bank, in order to avail himself of the effect of lapse of time against the complainant. He is protected upon the general principles of equity. 1 Story’s Eq. 502, 503; Piatt v. Vattier, 9 Peters, 405.
   Lane, C. J.

The objection to the judgment is, that the process was issued against the corporation, and appears to have been served on certain individuals; and that it nowhere appears that they are officers of the institution.

There is an irregularity in the service of this writ, for which the judgment would perhaps be reversed on error. But in a suit, resting on that judgment, to which the bank as a ^corpora- [107 tion, some of the individuals on whom process was served, and some of the stockholders of the institution, are parties; all of whom acquiesce in the judgment. It seems to us that a stranger, who makes no charge of fraud or collusion, is not permitted to in* termeddle with the relation of the parties, or question the regularity of the proceedings

The ground next taken in defense is, that Taylor is protected by the statute of limitations, or that the lapse of time will, in equity, forbid a recovery of debts due at least in 1822.

This objection admits two answers:

The claim of the bank against Taylor might have been collected by an action of debt, which the statute of limitations has not yet barred; and chancery adopting the statutory time of limitation, would not hold a right of recovery extinguished.

But the transactions of 1833 seem not only to prevent the operation of the statute, but to repel any presumption arising from the lapse of time. For then, in this court, in a suit brought by Byrans against Taylor and the bank, reported in Wright, 245, the indebtedness of Taylor to the bank was found, in the course of judicial inquiry. The bank might well avail itself of this investigation, and the same benefit ought to inure to its creditor, pursuing its rights in its name.

The decree may find that the complainant is entitled to have her judgment satisfied out of any debt which Taylor may owe the bank, and the case may be referred upon the usual terms to the master, to take an account of the extent of his indebtedness.

Decree for the complainant. 
      
      A judgment in the circuit court of the United States can not be made the foundation of a creditor’s hill in a state court. Judgments of the courts of the United States in this respect stand upon no higher ground than the judgments of the courts in sister states. Tarbell v. Griggs, 3 Paige, 207.
     