
    GEO. J. CLEMENT ET AL. v. STATE, FOR USE OF J. F. SCOTT.
    Nashville,
    January Term, 1877.
    (S. C., 1 Leg. Rep., 261, 262.)
    ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. Client may dismiss suit over objection of bis attorneys, when.
    The suit was brought upon an apprentice bond for the use of Scott, but no fund was impounded and held under orders of the court upon which the attorneys might have a lien. Afterwards the parties signed a writing directing the suit to be dismissed. Scott’s lawyers interposed, and the court declined to dismiss. Held, a party has a right to dismiss a suit of this character, to compromise and arrange his own rights, and no agent or attorney of his, he being sui juris, can control his action in such a matter, the attorneys having no lien except on recovery, not before. [In a suit where no property is attached or impounded by injunction, or other process, and nothing is actually brought into the custody of the law or court, the attorney has no lien until it is declared upon the final recovery, and cannot resist his client’s compromise and dismissal of his suit. Sharp v. Allen, 11 Lea, 518, 522, 524. If a fund is impounded by-attachment and injunction, or other impounding process, the client cannot, by a compromise and dismissal of the suit, take from the custody of the court so impounded, and thereby deprive the attorney of his lien for services rendered. Pleasants v. Itortrecht, 5 I-Ieis., 694; Sharp v. Allen, 11 Lea, 522; Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Chy., 621. An attorney is entitled to a lien on the land recovered for his fee, which may be declared in the judgment or decree-. He has an equitable lien on the subject-matter soug-ht to be recovered for his fee, of which lien he cannot be deprived by his client’s disposition of the subject-matter pending the suit, nor afterwards to any purchaser, with notice. The pendency of the suit is, of itself, notice to all persons, and the lien may be preserved and the notice extended, by stating its existence in the judgment or decree, when it will relate to the commencement of the service. Hunt v. McClanahan, 1 Heis., 503, 510; Pleasants v. Kortrecht, 3 Heis., 696, 697; Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Chy., 618, 624; Shacklett v. Polk, 4 Heis., 113; Perkins v. Perkins, 9 Heis., 97; Vaughn v. Vaughn, 12 Heis., 475, 476; McCanay v. Key, 3 Lea, 250; Winchester v. Heiskell, 16 Lea, 565; Garner v. Garner, 1 Lea, 30; Pierce v. Lawrence, 16 Lea, 575; Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co., 9 Piclde, 701; Keith v. Pitzhugh, 15 Lea, 50; Cunningham v. McGrady, 2 Bax., 142; Damron v. Robertson, 12 Lea., 374; Blackburn v. Clarke, 1 Pickle^ 506. An attorney has a lien on his client’s recovery, although he be nominally a defendant in chancery. Damron v. Robertson, 12 Lea, 374. Where a debtor’s land is subjected to the payment of his debts by a decree in a suit for that purpose, the creditor’s attorney has no lien on the land, but has a lien on the fund derived from a sale of the land. Perkins v. Perkins, 9 Heis., 95, 99.]
   'Fbebman, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This was a suit brought by Scott in the name of the state, on an apprentice bond. Several questions have been argued before us, but we need only notice one, which is conclusive of the case.

After the suit had been pending some time, the parties compromised the case, and Scott signed a writing directing the suit to he dismissed. His lawyers, however, interposed, and the court declined to dismiss. The case progressed, when another paper was signed and sent to the clerk, peremptorily directing his suit to he dismissed.

The attorneys again seem to1 have interposed, and the court refused to dismiss the suit. In this he clearly erred. A party certainly has the right to dismiss a suit of this character, to compromise and arrange his own, rights, and no agent or attorney of his, he being sui juris, can control his action in such a matter. It is good public policy that parties shali settle their differences without, the expense and vexation of litigation, if it can be done, and such settlements should be encouraged rather than discouraged by the courts.

Tlie attorneys and court, we suppose, went on the idea of a lien on tlie paid of tlie attorneys for tlieir fees, in case of recovery. JBut tlie lien, in a case like this-, could only exist on tlie recovery, not before. Tlie parties lived in- tlie. state ---no fund liad been impounded by tlie attorneys, and Held under tlie orders of tlie count — in fact, nothing to give the attorneys the right claimed. The plaintiff was examined on the trial, and shows the agreement was fairly entered into, and seemed perfectly satisfied with it. Even if it had not, been fairly entered into, so far as he was concerned, he alone had tlie right to disaffirm his own act. ITis attorneys could not interpose to do it for him.

Without further discussion, let the case be reversed, and this court will enter the judgment which the court below should have entered, dismissing the ease. The defendants below, however, will pay the costs of that court-up to the- time of the trial, as that was the agreement. Costs of this court follow the judgment of reversal.  