
    William R. Taylor vs. Dorcas Wilson.
    The donor conveyed a negro girl to a trustee “for the support of H. C., the daughter of my wife, for the term of twenty-one years, then, at the expiration of that term, to he vested in H. C.,” absolutely. H. C. afterwards married and died before the twenty-one years had expired: — Held, that the marital rights of her husband had not attached on the property.
    BEFORE O’NEALL, J., AT HIGHLAND, SPRING TERM, 1855.
    The report of bis Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows :
    “In this case, which was an action of trover for a negro woman slave named Eliza, the plaintiff claimed under a deed, whereby Middleton Fair bound himself, his heirs and executors, ‘ to warrant and vest the property, the heirship of my wife, Mary Ann Fair, in Hiram Addison for the support of Hester D. Carroll, the daughter of my wife, Mary Ann Fair, for the term of twenty-one years, then, at the expiration of that term, the negro girl, Eliza, with one-half of the money, principal and interest, being a part of my wife’s, Mary Ann Fair’s, heirship of the estate of Joseph Carroll, deceased, to be vested in Hester D. Carroll, her heirs forever.’ The deed bears date 11th July, 1838.
    “ Hester D. Carroll married Wm. R. Taylor, and died before the twenty-one years had expired, and this action was also brought five or six years before the same period.
    “ The defendant, who is the Widow of Hiram Addison, refused to give up the negro woman slave to the plaintiff, who claimed her by virtue of his marital rights.
    “ I held that his wife had no legal estate in the woman, Eliza, upon which his right, as husband, could attach, and ordered a nonsuit.
    “ The plaintiff appeals on the ground, that according to a correct construction of the deed executed by Middleton, the marital rights of the husband attached to the slave in question so as to sustain the action.’ ”
    
      Gfregg, Bellinger, for appellant.
    
      Baushett, contra.
   Curia per O’Neall, J.

In this case, the plaintiff on the plain principles of law, cannot recover. His wife had neither possession nor right of possession. The title, according to the deed, was in Addison, who was to apply the slave for the support of the plaintiff’s wife for twenty-one years. This even in land, and under the Statute of Uses, would not be an use executed. For there was something to be done by the trustee, the application of the trust property for the support of a minor and afterwards a married woman.

In personal property the legal estate under such a deed is beyond all doubt in the trustee. Burnett vs. Rice, Speer’s Eq. 579. The wife dying before the term expired, it was impossible she could have either right of property or possession: and it is therefore idle to talk about the marital rights attaching.

Neither, even if the doctrine of merger applied to personal property, could that help the plaintiff. For there could be no merger of the estate of the trustee, in the ultimate rights of the cestui que trust. They are distinct estates and rights.

The motion is dismissed.

Wardlaw, Withers, Whither, Glover, and Muhro, 'JJ-concurred.

Motion dismissed.  