
    Peter S. Pappalardo, Respondent, v Jerome Meisel, Appellant.
   In an action to recover damages for slander and tortious interference with a contract, defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Buell, J.), dated October 27, 1983, as denied that branch of his motion which was for summary judgment as to the slander cause of action.

Order reversed, insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted in its entirety.

An examination of plaintiffs affidavit in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment indicates that plaintiff has not raised any triable issues of fact. Since defendant made the alleged defamatory statement evaluating the qualifications, fitness and practices of plaintiff, as a physician, to the medical executive committee of the hospital, a qualified privilege attaches to that communication (see, Education Law § 6527 [5]). Malice destroys a qualified privilege; however, plaintiff offers only conclusory allegations that defendant wants to “drive him out of business”, without offering any evidentiary facts to support this allegation. Suspicion, surmise and accusation are not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment (see, Shapiro v Health Ins. Plan, 7 NY2d 56). Brown, J. P., Weinstein, Niehoff and Lawrence, JJ., concur.  