
    Frederick B. CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Jacob J. Lew, Secretary of the Treasury, Defendants-Appellees.
    
    No. 12-3845-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 21, 2013.
    Frederick B. Campbell, pro se, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Christopher B. Harwood, Sarah S. Normand, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.
    PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), to reflect that Secretary of the Treasury Jacob J. Lew has been substituted automatically for former Secretary Timothy F. Geithner.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Frederick B. Campbell (“Campbell”), an attorney proceeding pro se, instituted this action before the District Court seeking a declaration that §§ 106 and 162(1) of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRS Code”) (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 106, 162(0), allowing for certain tax exemptions and deductions related to health insurance, are unconstitutional. In a well-reasoned opinion of July 30, 2012, the District Court found that Campbell had not alleged an injury sufficient to confer standing under Article III of the Constitution and dismissed Campbell’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction. Campbell now appeals that judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) de novo, accepting as true factual allegations made in the complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 F.3d 221, 227 (2d Cir.2012). “[A] court is ordinarily obligated to afford special solicitude to pro se litigants” based on “[t]he rationale ... that a pro se litigant generally lacks both legal training and experience.” Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir.2010). However, as “a lawyer representing himselff,] [Campbell] receives no such solicitude at all.” Id. at 102.

After an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm the judgment of the District Court, substantially for the reasons articulated in its opinion of July 30, 2012. In particular, we note that “to have Article III standing [a plaintiff] ‘must have suffered an injury in fact’ that is ‘concrete and particularized,’ ‘actual or imminent,’ and ‘fairly traceable to the challenged action,’ ” WC Capital Mgmt., LLC v. UBS Sec., LLC, 711 F.3d 322, 329 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)), and that Campbell has not demonstrated that he suffered any such injury in fact.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the July 31, 2012 judgment of the District Court. 
      
      . Section 106 of the IRS Code allows individuals who are employed by third-parties to reduce their tax liability by excluding the cost of health insurance from their income. See 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (stating that "except as otherwise provided ... [the] gross income of an employee does not include employer provided coverage under a[ ] ... health plan”). Section 162(1) similarly allows self-employed individuals to deduct the cost of health-insurance premiums from their income taxes. See id. § 126(1).
     