
    Tyreek PAGE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Daniel MARTUSCELLO, Jr., Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 13-1317.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 9, 2014.
    Richard M. Greenberg, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York, N.Y., for Petitioner-Appellant.
    David M. Cohn, Assistant District Attorney (Eleanor J. Ostrow, on the brief), for Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, Office of the District Attorney, New York, N.Y., for Respondent-Appellee.
    PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, GUIDO CALABRESI and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Tyreek Page appeals from a March 18, 2013 district court judgment denying his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Page challenges the validity of his New York state court conviction for second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, first degree criminal use of a firearm, second degree criminal possession of a weapon, and first degree reckless endangerment. Page was initially sentenced to consecutive prison sentences on various counts, aggregating to a term of 60 years to life; the sentence was reduced on appeal to 25 years to life. After an unsuccessful state court collateral challenge to his conviction, Page timely filed his petition in federal court, contending that his trial counsel had provided him with ineffective representation by failing to properly advise him of the merits of a plea offer. We assume familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case, and recount only those details directly relevant to this appeal.

We review a district court’s denial of a section 2254 petition de novo. Hawkins v. Costello, 460 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir.2006). However, we defer to a district court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223, 108 S.Ct. 1771, 100 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988). Additionally, under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), when a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claim on the merits, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s decision is either “(1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) ... based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Here, the district court concluded that Page’s trial counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). However, constrained by AEDPA’s requirement that it defer to the state court’s factual findings, the district court further held that state court reasonably concluded that counsel’s deficient performance did not prejudice Page. Page testified that he would have accepted a plea resulting in a 12-year sentence had he understood his true sentencing exposure. The state trial court rejected Page’s testimony as “self-serving” and “incredible,” and concluded that Page “failed to establish a reasonable probability that but for [counsel’s] alleged deficiencies, he would have entered a plea of guilty.” J. App’x at 353. While we agree that Page’s counsel provided deficient representation, we cannot reject the state court’s conclusion that Page failed to establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s errors.

Because AEDPA requires us to defer to such state court factual findings, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  