
    DAWSON v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 18, 1914.)
    1. Intoxicating Liquors (§ 233*) — Offenses —Evidence.
    In a prosecution for unlawfully engaging in the business of selling intoxicants in prohibition territory, testimony by express agents of large shipments of intoxicants to accused is admissible.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 293-297, 298%; Dec. Dig. § 233.*]
    2. Intoxicating Liquors (§ 141*) — Offenses — Business of Selling Intoxicants on Prohibition Territory.
    To convict of unlawfully engaging in the business of selling intoxicants in prohibition territory, it must appear that accused was en-' gaged in the selling as a business proposition.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 151; Dec. Dig. § 141.*]
    3. Intoxicating Liquors (§ 236*) — Offenses —Evidence.
    In a prosecution for unlawfully engaging in the business of selling intoxicants in prohibition territory, evidence held to support the conviction.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 300-322; Dec. Dig. § 236.*]
    
      Appeal from District Court, Lamar County; Ben H. Denton, Judge.
    M. C. Dawson was convicted of unlawfully engaging in the business of selling intoxicants in prohibition territory, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Elliott & Larsen, of Paris, Tex., for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   PRENDERGAST, P. J.

Appellant was convicted for unlawfully engaging in and pursuing the business of selling intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory, and his punishment fixed at SYz years’ confinement in the penitentiary.

The evidence in this case was amply sufficient to show this state of facts: That appellant ran a cold drink stand and sold some merchandize and perhaps ran a wood-yard in connection with his business, in Paris, Lamar county, where prohibition was in force. The indictment charges that appellant from January, 1913, down to the filing of the indictment and prior to the filing of the indictment, which was on October 15, 1913, unlawfully pursued the occupation and was engaged in the business of selling intoxicating liquors; and alleged a considerable number of specific sales to have been made on certain dates within that time. One of the agents of the Wells Fargo Express Company produced his records of the entry of intoxicating liquors received by it at Paris and delivered to appellant as follows: One cask (120 pints) of beer on June 7, 1913. Three casks (360 pints) on June 30th. The agent of another express company at Paris produced his record and showed 'the following deliveries of liquors by him from said express company to appellant: On May 5, 1913, one cask (120 pints) of beer; May 15th, the same quantity; May 21st, the same quantity; May 29th, the same quantity; June 2d, the same quantity; June 9th, four quarts of liquor; June 28th, one cask (120 pints) of beer; July 15th, 48 pints of beer; August 6th, one cask (120 pints); August 16th, 48 pints of beer; August 22d, 120 pints of beer; September 13th, one cask (120 pints) of beer; September 29th, 4 quarts of whisky and 48 pints of beer; October 11th, 120 pints of beer. W. H. Oarey, to whom several of the sales were alleged to have been made, testified that on June 28, 1913, he bought two bottles of beer from appellant, about July 1st another two bottles of beer, and at another time on the same day another bottle of beer from the woman who was in charge of appellant’s business at the time he was absent, and later that night on the same day he and Andy Watkins bought two bottles of beer from appellant, and, still later, hé and said Watkins each bought another bottle. Said Watkins testified that on the early part of the night of July 1, 1913, he bought two bottles of beer from appellant, and later the same night he went back and bought two other bottles of beer from him. John How-erton, the chief of police of the city of Paris, and W. A. Lain, the sheriff, both, in effect, testified that just after the latter purchases by said two witnesses they got out a search warrant and searched appellant’s place of business; that they found bottles of beer in the back part of his house and some in his ice cooler, and a wagon load or more of empty beer bottles in his back yard. There was other corroborating evidence of appellant’s sales and that he had and kept beer and some whisky at his said place.

Appellant claimed that he got all this liquor, either for his own personal use, or for various persons for whom he ordered it, and denied that he made any of the sales, or that he kept whisky or beer for sale, during said time.

Appellant objected to the testimony by the express agents of the deliveries of beer and whisky to appellant as shown by their testimony. All of this evidence was clearly admissible. It has been long so held by this court in a uniform holding. It is unnecessary to cite the cases.

Appellant objected to the charge of the court in telling the jury what constituted an engaging in the business. The court gave just such charge as has many times been held sufficient on this question. It is needless to cite the cases again. The court charged: “(4) You are further instructed that to follow the occupation or engage in the business of selling intoxicating liquors means the party must be engaged in that business either as his principal business or in some way as a business proposition.” Appellant’s only objection is to that part of this charge “because it does not sufficiently describe or explain what would constitute an engaging in the business.”

The court’s charge was full, fair, and complete in accordance with the law. The evidence was clearly sufficient to sustain the verdict.

There is no error in the case, and the judgment is affirmed.  