
    LIANFENG LI, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-7-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 23, 2012.
    Man C. Yam, Bernard & Yam, LLP, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Douglas E. Ginsburg, Assistant Director; Judith Roberta O’Sullivan, Trial Attorney, OIL, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Lianfeng Li, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 6, 2010, order of the BIA affirming the May 21, 2009, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Lianfeng Li, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Dec. 6, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 21, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

For applications such as Li’s, governed by the amendments made to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on the applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008). We will “defer to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make” such a ruling. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

The IJ’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. The IJ reasonably based his credibility finding on the following: (1) Li’s testimony that she became interested in Christianity through a pastor in Russia, and the omission of this information in her asylum application; (2) Li’s inconsistent testimony regarding (a) when she was arrested and the number of encounters she had with Chinese officials, (b) who the police asked to sign a guarantee, (c) when she held church meetings, and (d) when she decided to leave China; (3) the inconsistency between Li’s testimony and her husband’s affidavit with regard to whether he participated in the house church meeting; and (4) Li’s “flustered” demeanor. Moreover, the IJ reasonably rejected Li’s explanations for her inconsistent testimony. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005).

Given the omission, inconsistent testimony, inconsistencies between Li’s testimony and her application, and the IJ’s demeanor finding, the totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  