
    THE STATE ex rel. FLENTGE, Collector, v. BURROUGH et al., Appellants.
    Division Two,
    May 19, 1903.
    1. Taxbill: description oe ground: invalid: extrinsic evidence.A taxbill -which describes the ground -as “Pt. Out Lot 54, Survey • 2199,” is not competent evidence and will not support a judgment, because the description therein is too uncertain and indefinite. N.or is the defect remedied by a petition which correctly describes the ground, for an accurate description of the land is necessary to a valid assessment, ana an assessment is the basis of the tax, and if the requirements of the statute as to description are not met in the assessment and taxbill, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to cure the defect.
    2. -: supples® by owner: estoppel. The owner of land is not estopped from questioning the sufficiency of the description of the land in the taxbill, by the fact that he furnished to the assessor lists of his property in which he described the land as it is described in the taxbill. The assessment and taxbill are void without an accurate description.
    Appeal from Cape Girardeau Circuit Court. — How. Henry C. Riley, Judge.
    Reversed.
    
      Robert L. Wilson for appellant.
    The court committed error in admitting extrinsic evidence to cure defective description in the assessment and back taxbill. An accurate description of land is necessary to a valid assessment of a tax thereon. State ex rel. v. Railroad, 114 Mo. 11; Railroad v. Cass Co., 53 Mo. 29; City of Jefferson v. Whipple, 71 Mo. 520; Hughes v. Thomas, 29 So. 74; State ex rel. v. Sanford, 127 Mo. 372; Western v. Flanagan, 120 Mo. 61. The assessment of property and all proceedings thereunder, so far as the property-owner is concerned, are in invitwm and the discharge of the duties of the assessor are to he done in subordination to the law. The assessor is required to assess the land in the smallest legal subdivision, or, if that can not be done, then it must be done by metes and bounds. In this case neither course was pursued by the assessor. In each year “Pt. Lots 54, 55 and 56” were all jumbled together, said lots containing in the aggregate 293 acres. The assessment lists do not show the number of acres assessed to defendant in either lot, or the value of the land in either lot. The assessor completely ignored the statutory requirement that he should assess in the smallest legal subdivision, or, if that can not be done, then with a proper description of the land. R. S. 1899, sec. 9168; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 114 Mo. 1.
    
      John A. Hope for respondent.
    (1) The assessor is required to call on the taxpayer and take from him a list of his property; the taxpayer is required to enter a true and correct statement of his property in the blank furnished by the assessor, and sign and swear to it. Secs. 9144 and -9145, R. S. 1899. The assessor is liable to a fine for each list received not duly sworn to. Sec. 9146, R. S. 1899. The form of the oath to be signed and sworn to by the taxpayer is prescribed, and he shall be subject to indictment and fine of not less than ten nor more than one thousand dollars for refusal to make the oath. Sec. 9147, R. S. 1899. Further penalties for failure to give the assessor a proper list are provided for by sections 9149, 9150 and 2257, Revised Statutes 1899. With the taxpayers’ lists the assessor completes his assessor’s books and then files the list with the county clerk. Secs. 9147, 9170, R. S. 1899. Appellants are sued for taxes for the years 1894, 1895, 1896 and 1897. The statutes mentioned above were in force long prior to these years, and are still in force. (2) In view of the above statutory provisions, the presumption is that the appellants furnished the county assessor the description of their real estate given in the taxbill; especially so' in the absence of proof to the contrary. Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 70; Hartwell v. Eoot, 19 Johns. 345; Lenox v. Harrison, 88 Mo. 496; Long v. Joplin Mining & Smelting Co., 68 Mo. 430. This presumption is strengthened by the positive proof that Judge Burrough furnished the description in his list to the assessor for the year 1897. Having furnished the assessor lists of their property, in which the land was described as it is in the taxbill, appellants are. estopped to object to the sufficiency of the description, and can not dispute the validity of the assessment nor defeat the collection of the taxes. Lake County v. Bank, 68 Cal. 15; City v. Flood, 64 Cal. 504; People v. Stockton, 49 Cal. 414; People v. Atkinson, 103 111. 45; Albany Brewing Co. v. Town of Meriden, 48 Conn. 245; Conwell v. Pres., etc., Connersville, 8 Ind. 358; Scollard v. Dallas, 42 S. W. 640 ; Lane v. March, 33 La. Ann. 554; Jeffries v. Clark, 23 Kan. 448; Moody v. Galveston, 50 S. W. 481; Fulcher v. Fulcher, 29 S. E. 91; Cooley on Taxation, pp. 283, 284, 264 ; 1 Blackwell on Tax Titles, p. 209, sec. 223; 25 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law 209, 451; American Union Express Co. v. St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 675; Mathews v. Kansas City, 80 Mo. 231. ;3) But disregarding the presumption that appellants furnished the description, and laying aside also the sworn list offered in evidence, there was no error in rendering judgment for plaintiff, (a) The purpose of a description is to enable the owner to know that his land is assessed. In this case the evidence shows appellants own only one body of land, consisting of parts of outlots 54, 55 and 56; and that they own only one piece in each of the o.utlots — the three pieces adjoining each other and forming one farm. The 70 acres' being the only land they own in the outlots, they could not have been misled by the description. It makes no difference how much difficulty a stranger or a purchaser at tax sale might have in locating the land; the description must mislead the owner. Fulcher v. Fulcher, 29 S. E. 91; Allen v. lYoodbridge Twp., 42 N. J. L. 401; Shaw v. Orr, 30 Iowa 360; Jones v. Pelham, 84 Ala. 208. (b) There was no error -in admitting parol evidence for the purpose of applying the description to the land and identifying the land described. Brown v. Walker, 11 Mo. App. 226; Brown v. Walker, 85 Mo. 262; 2 Phillips’ Evid., Cowen & Hill’s notes, p. 718, note 510.; p. 738, note 514; Stewart v. Colter, 31 Minn. 385; Ames v. Lowry, 30 Minn. 283; Judd v. Anderson, 51 Iowa 345; Knote v.' Caldwell, 43 Kan. 464; Driggers v. Cassady, 71 Ala. 529; French v. Patterson, 61 Maine 302; Welty, Assessments, 170; Wood-side v. Wilson, 32 Pa. St. 52; Allen v. Woodbridge Twp., supra, (c) The description is sufficient if the land can be identified by a competent surveyor with reasonable certainty, either with or without the aid of extrinsic evidence. Law v. People, 80 111. 268; Fowler v. People, 93 111. 116; People v. Stall, 101 111. 346. (d) The only way to describe such land as appellants’ as definitely as they contend for would be by giving its metes and bounds. If all such land in Cape Girardeau county had to be described definitely in its tax books there would not be room in the courthouse for the books and the physical labor required to do the work would be enormous. It is a fact of universal notoriety, not only in Cape Girardeau county, but throughout the State, that the revenue officers, in describing such land-as appellants ’ for taxation, simply designate it as part of a certain lot or survey. Appellants were not ignorant of this custom; and the assessment of their land by the customary and generally understood method did not mislead them, especially since one of the appellants is a lawyer and had been a county officer for many years. Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 42; 2 Green! Ev., see. 249.
   BURGESS, J.

This is an action by tbe collector of Cape Girardeau county for back taxes for' tbe years 1894, 1895, 1896 and 1897, on certain lands described in tbe .petition, amounting at tbe time of tbe trial to two hundred and seventy-seven dollars and sevenfy-eigbt cents, for wbieb plaintiff bad judgment and tbe enforcement of its lien against tbe land for tbe payment of tbe same. Defendants appeal.

Tbe petition is in tbe usual form, and describes tbe land by metes and bounds.

Tbe answer is a general denial.

Defendants admit that Mrs. Annie K. Burrougb is tbe owner of tbe land described in tbe petition.

Tbe taxbill upon wbieb tbe action is based is as follows:

The case was tried by a jury, and when the taxbill was offered in evidence by plaintiff, defendants objected upon the ground that “the description contained therein is so vague and indefinite and uncertain, it will not support a judgment.” The objection was overruled and exception duly saved. The ruling of the court in this regard is the principal ground relied upon by defendants for a reversal of the judgment.

By section 7555, Revised Statutes 1889, every county assessor is required to make out an assessment book, called the ‘£ real estate book, ’ ’ containing all lands subject to assessment. The third column shall contain an accurate description of the land by the smallest legal subdivisions, or by smaller parts, lots or parcels when sections and the subdivisions thereof are subdivided into parts, lots or parcels; the fourth column shall contain the actual cash valuation of each tract. '

By section 7552, Revised Statutes 1889, it is provided that “each assessment of real estate so made shall be the basis of taxation on the same for two years next succeeding. ’ ’ As the statute requires an accurate description, one that is correct is essential to a valid assessment, in the absence of which a valid tax can not be assessed. [Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162; State ex rel v. Thompson, 149 Mo. 441; State ex rel v. Mission Free School, 162 Mo. 332.]

The City of Jefferson v. Whipple, 71 Mo. 519, was an action by the city to recover city taxes, and to enforce a lien against “part of inlot No. 331 on the plat of said city,” and it was held that the description of the property was so vague that no action could be maintained either to enforce the lien, if one existed, or to recover the taxes. The court said, “How is it possible from the description to ascertain what part of the lot is chargeable with the taxes, or the lien? A deed conveying a part of a lot, or a tract of land, would convey no legql title to any portion of the lot, or tract. The petition in this regard was therefore fatally defective.” To the same effect is the case of the People v. Reat, 107 Ill. 581.

State ex rel. Wyatt v. Railroad, 114 Mo. 1, was an action to enforce the lien of the State for certain taxes alleged to be delinquent and unpaid on certain real estate belonging to defendant in Jackson county. The first three counts were for taxes on property described in the assessment, taxbill and petition as “the undivided half of G-illiss addition to the city of Kansas City, Jackson county, Missouri, except all that part thereof returned to and assessed by the State Board of Equalization.” The fourth and fifth counts were for taxes for the years 1886 and 1887, respectively, on property described in the assessment and taxbill, as, “All lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9' and 10, block 28, lying outside of the right of way, West Kansas addition number 1,” and the petition in the same language with the addition of the w;ords.“of defendant,” after “right of way,” and it was held that as an assessment was the basis of the tax, an accurate description of the land was necessary to a valid assessment of it, and that the description was too indefinite and uncertain to authorize the enforcement of the tax lien, and that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to cure it. Held, also, that a description of “all of lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, block 28, lying outside of the right of way, West Kansas addition number 1,” was likewise fatally defective.

■ It is thus evident that there was no valid assessment of the property in question for either of the years for which taxes are sued, which was absolutely necessary as a condition precedent to the lawful exercise of the power of taxation in. this State. The fact that the petition correctly describes the land does not validate or cure the defective assessment and taxbill.

But the record discloses that the defendant Prank E. Burrough, husband of his co-defendant, furnished, the assessor lists of their property, in which the land in question was described as in the taxbill, and it is insisted by'plaintiff that by reason of. this fact tbey are estopped to object to tbe sufficiency of that description, and can not dispute the validity of tbe assessment, nor defeat tbe collection of tbe taxes. That defendants might be estopped from denying tbe ownership of tbe land described in tbe taxbill by reason of tbe fact that tbey furnished a list of their property including tbe land in question in which it was described as in tbe taxbill, under certain circumstances, is doubtless true, but that tbey are not estopped in this proceeding by reason of that fact from denying that tbe description of tbe land in tbe taxbill is too vague and uncertain upon which to base a judgment and enforce a lien against tbe land for tbe taxes, is equally clear. Tbey could not in this proceeding supply by anything tbey may have said or done that which was essential to a good and valid assessment,. that is, an accurate description of tbe land, for want of which the assessment and taxbill are void.

Por these intimations tbe judgment is reversed.

All of this Division concur.  