
    GEORGE H. DALLAS vs. ATLANTIC, MISSISSIPPI AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY.
    At Law. —
    No. 11073.
    Under section 790, Revised Statutes, relating to the District of Columbia,, an action can he brought in this court against a foreign corporation only when it has an established place of business in the District, and the process can be served upon the agent or other person by it employed to conduct such business as it is engaged in here
    STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
    The declaration contains one count, stating, in substance,, that the defendant is a Virginia corporation, doing business-in the District of Columbia, and operates a railroad for the conveyance of freight and passengers from the city of Lynch-burg to Ohristiansburg, both in the State of Virginia. That, on the 4th day of July, 1873, the plaintiff was received by the defendant into a passenger-car, to be conveyed from said Lynchburg to said Ohristiansburg, and that he offered to pay defendant the full first-class fare usually charged.for such conveyance by the defendant, but that defendant ejected said plaintiff from said passenger-car, whereby he sustained great damage, &e.
    The defendant alleged in the plea that it was a corporation created and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Virginia, and having its habitat, office, and place of business in that State, and in nowise doing or conducting any of its business within the District of Columbia, and having no agent within the District.
    Section 790 of Revised Statutes, relating to the District of Columbia, reads as follows :
    “ In actions against foreign corporations, doing business in the District, all process may be served on the agent of such corporation, or person conducting its business ^ or, in case he is absent and cannot be found, by leaving a copy at the principal place of business in the District, and such service shall be effectual to bring the corporation before the court.”
    
      Upon the trial of the cause, it was proved by the plaintiff that the defendant was a corporation of the State of Virginia, operating a line of road from Lynchburg, in said State, to Bristol, also in same State. That the Virginia and Midland Bailroad Company operated a connecting line of railroad, and habitually, by authority of the defendant, sold through tickets in the city of Washington to transport passengers from said city of Washington to Bristol, in Virginia by way of Alexandria and Lynchburg, and over defendant’s said line of road, during the year 1873, and ever since. That the said Virginia and Midland Bailroad Company maintained a public ticket-office in the city of Washington, to sell passenger-tickets over said route and other routes. That, at the time of the service of process in this cause, John L. Barbour was president of said Virginia and Midland Bail-road Company, and William T. Key was employed by said last company to have charge of said office, and did sell tickets over said route from day to day during the year 1873, and afterward. These are the persons upon whom process was served in this case. That the defendant paid no part of the salary of said Key, and no part of maintaining the expenses of maintaining said ticket-office, and the persons selling said tickets were not in the employ of said defendants, and were not responsible to the defendant. But that the said defendant sold coupon-tickets from said Bristol, at the other end of the route, to the city of Washington, under like circumstances. That the said Virginia and Midland Bailroad Company regularly accounted to the defendants for the pro rata share of the price received for each and every ticket sold over the said route from Washington to Bristol.
    At the close of the testimony, the court charged the jury, among other things,in the following words: “The construction of the statue authorizing actions against foreign corporations is, that this corporation defendant must have had an established place of business here, with subordinates who were responsible to it, to conduct that business, before an action can be maintained against it in this District; and if you find anything in the evidence to convince you that the defendant had an established place of business in this (District at the time of the acts complained of, and at the time of the service of process in this case, with such an agent to conduct this business, your verdict on this issue will be for the plaintiff; otherwise it must be for the defendant.”
    To this instruction the counsel for the plaintiff took an exception, and the verdict was for the defendant. The case is now to be heard upon a motion for a new trial on the exception above noted.
    
      Enoch Totten, for plaintiff, cited 2 Brightly’s Dig., 179 ; 14 Stats, at Large, 403; Pierce on Railroads, 486.
    
      Walter S. Cox, for defendant, cited 8 Abb. Pr. R., 427; 44 Penn. State, 422; 22 Ill., 9.
   By the Court :

It is a familiar principle that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the State which created it. It is, however, provided by our statute that a foreign corporation doing business in the District is amenable to a suit in this jurisdiction, and that process served on the agent of such a corporation conducting its business shall be effectual to bring the corporation before the court. The construction put on this statute by the court below in its instruction to the jury seems to be in exact accordance with its spirit and meaning-

The authority to serve process upon a foreign corporation depends upon the fact whether it is doing business in the District; and we are not left to infer this fact from the circumstance that its tickets are sold here, for the law directs that the process is to be served on the agent of the corporation conducting its business in the District. We think an established place of business is contemplated by the statute, with agents or persons employed to conduct it; and this view is confirmed by the subsequent language of the section, expressly declaring that, if the agent cannot be found, the service may be made by leaving a copy of the process at the principal place of business in the District.

Motion for a new trial denied and judgment affirmed.  