
    PEOPLE v. BESS.
    1. Criminal Law — Parole Violation — Hearing.
    A paroled prisoner who is accused of a violation of Ms parole, other than the commission of, and conviction for, a felony or misdemeanor, is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing of sueh charges (CLS 1961, § 791.240).
    2. Same — Parole Violation — Felont—No Hearing.
    A parolee who is convicted of a felony or misdemeanor is not entitled to a hearing on the parole violation.
    References for Points in Headnotes
    [1, 2] 39 Am Jur, Pardon, Reprieve and Amnesty § 95.
    [3] 8 Am Jur 2d, Bail and Recognizance § 8.
    [4] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 495.
    
      3. Same — Parole Violation — Denial of Bond — Felony—Due Process.
    Denial of bail bond on charge of armed robbery without a hearing where claimed parole violation was the armed robbery charged and defendant pled guilty held, not a denial of due process of law (CLS 1961, § 750.529).
    4. Same — Arraignment—Entry of Plea — Waiver.
    Plea of guilty upon arraignment in circuit court waives all defects in the arraignment proceeding.
    Appeal from Kent; Hoffius (Stuart J.), J.
    Submitted Division 3 June 6, 1967, at Grand Rapids.
    (Docket No. 2,305.)
    Decided April 10, 1968.
    Nelson Bess was convicted of robbery armed. Defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor G-eneral, James K. Miller, Prosecuting Attorney, and Sherwin J. Venema, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for tbe people.
    
      Edward B. Goodrich, for defendant on appeal.
   Wise, J.

Tbe defendant, Nelson Bess, on February 11, 1966, was charged with tbe crime of robbery armed. Bond was subsequently set by tbe court at $5,000, subject to tbe approval of tbe defendant’s parole officer. It was upon tbe advice of tbe parole officer that tbe defendant should not be released that tbe bond was canceled and tbe defendant was retained in custody.

On February 15, 1966, counsel was appointed to represent tbe defendant at tbe arraignment proceedings. On April 1,1966, tbe defendant elected to plead guilty to tbe offense charged. Tbe court examined the defendant and was satisfied that tbe

plea was advisedly and understandingly made and was a result of defendant’s own free will. The plea of guilty was accepted and the defendant was sentenced to a term of 8 to 10 years in prison. The present appeal followed.

On appeal the defendant contends that he was denied due process of law as provided by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Michigan in that he was denied bond on the basis of a parole violation without having been afforded the right to a hearing on said parole violation within the provision of CLS 1961, § 791.240 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.2310), the pertinent part of which reads as follows:

“Whenever a paroled prisoner is accused of a violation of his parole, other than the commission of, and conviction for, a felony or misdemeanor under the laws of this state, he shall be entitled to a fair and impartial hearing of such charges.”

It does not require mental gymnastics to discover the clear meaning of the above provision. When a paroled prisoner is convicted of a felony or misdemeanor, a hearing on that parole violation is dispensed with. Such was the situation in the instant case. The purpose of the statute is to afford an accused parole violator, when the violation involves something less than a felony or misdemeanor, with safeguards to insure that the alleged violation is sufficiently substantiated. In the case of a parole violation involving a crime, similar safeguards attach, but a trial instead of a hearing affords the protection.

Assuming arguendo that the defendant was entitled to a hearing, it is difficult to discern how the absence of a hearing and the denial of a bond in any way affected the voluntariness of the plea of guilty. The defendant makes no such claim and the record of the proceedings reveals nothing that would corroborate such a claim. Further if there were any irregularities in the arraignment proceeding the defendant by electing to plead guilty has effectively waived them. See People v. Robbins (1967), 6 Mich App 633, and cases cited therein.

After thorough review’ of the proceedings below, we find the defendant was afforded every right consistent with due process of law’. Although diligent effort was expended by appellate counsel, the allegations of error are without basis in law or in fact.

Affirmed.

Holbrook, P. J., and Burns, J., concurred. 
      
       CLS 1961, § 750.529 (Stat Aun 1968 Cum Supp § 28.797).
     
      
       GOB 1963, 785.3(2).
     