
    HUANG CHEN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-2782-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 26, 2010.
    
      Yee Ling Poon, Robert Duk-Hwan Kim, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General, Francis W. Fraser, Senior Litigation Counsel, T. Bo Stanton, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.
    
   PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, ROBERT D. SACK, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Huang Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 12, 2008 order of the BIA affirming the April 24, 2002 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Roxanne Hladylowycz, denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Huang Chen, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 12, 2008), aff'g No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City, Apr. 24, 2002). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 2 procedural history of the case.

As an initial matter, because Chen failed to challenge the IJ’s denial of his CAT claim before the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to consider this unexhausted argument. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Karaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir.2006) (citing Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir.2003)). The petition for review is dismissed to that extent.

When the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ and supplements the IJ’s decision, this Court reviews the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence standard, treating them as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.2008). However, we will vacate and remand for new findings if the agency’s reasoning or its fact-finding process was sufficiently flawed. See Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 406 (2d Cir.2005). We review de novo questions of law and the application of law to undisputed fact. See, e.g., Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008).

Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Yuanliang Liu v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 455 F.3d 106, 110-111 (2d Cir.2006). The agency found several aspects of Chen’s testimony implausible; for example, Chen claimed that he did not know the legal age to marry when he had testified that he and his girlfriend had attempted to marry but were denied. While Chen offers explanations for the implausibilities, such explanations — even if rational — “do not defeat a finding that the account is implausible.” See Ying Li v. BCIS, 529 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir.2008). Indeed, “when an adverse credibility finding is based partly or entirely on implausibility, we review the entire record, not whether each unusual or implausible feature of the account can be explained or rationalized.” Id. at 82. Because our review of an IJ’s adverse credibility finding is “especially limited and highly deferential,” id. at 81, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding where, taken as a whole, the IJ could conclude that the picture that emerged from Chen’s story was implausible, see id. at 82-83.

We need not address Chen’s “other resistance” claim in determining whether he is eligible for asylum and withholding of removal because the adverse credibility determination is dispositive in this case. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006); Wu Biao Chen v. INS, 344 F.3d 272, 275 (2d Cir.2003).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part. Having completed our review, we DISMISS the petitioner’s pending motion for a stay of removal as moot.  