
    Beemis vs. Wylie.
    In replevin before a justice, if he finds for the plaintiff he should find the value of the property, and that the plaintiff is entitled to the possession, and should assess his damages for the unjust taking and detention; and should then enter an order on his docket, that the officer deliver the property to the plaintiff.
    Where none of these things appear to have been done, but the docket entry is merely that “ a trial was had, and judgment was rendered against the defendant for * * the property claimed,” there is no judgment which can be either affirmed or reversed on cerUorwi'i, or regarded as valid in a collateral action.
    APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for Walworth County.
    Replevin, for a cow alleged to bave been taken by tbe defendant, April 22d, 1861, from tbe possession of tbe plaintiff, wbo bad levied upon tbe same as a constable on tbe 18tb of tbe same month, on an execution against one Nickerson, under a judgment against Nickerson in favor of one Bullen, rendered by Z. B. Burke, Esq., a justice of tbe peace in said county. Tbe defendant answered that tbe right of possession of said cow bad been adjudged by Lot. Mayo, Esq., a justice of tbe peace in said county, to be in said Nickerson; that defendant as sheriff delivered tbe cow to Nickerson; and that plaintiff bad never acquired a right to tbe possession. On tbe trial, after tbe plaintiff bad made a prima facie case, tbe defendant put in evidence tbe docket entries of said Mayo, in tbe case of Nicherson v. Bulhn and Beemis. Tbe entry of judgment was in these words : “ A trial was bad and judgment was rendered against tbe defendant for tbe one cow, tbe property claimed.” Tbe circuit court instructed tbe jury that tbe plaintiff’s right to recover tbe cow in question seemed to-have been adjudicated in the above named case, and that although the entry of judgment was irregular, still it was evidence to go to the jury showing that the question of title had been adjudicated in that case against the plaintiffs in this action, and it was sufficient to defeat his recovery in this action. Verdict and judgment for the defendant; and the plaintiff appealed.
    
      Geo. B. Smith, for appellant,
    cited Heeron v. Beclcwith, 1 Wis., 17, and Ford v. Ford, 3 id., 399, to show the insufficiency of the entry of judgment.
    
      Fd. Flderldn and F. Waheley, for respondent,
    argued, among other things, that the judgment of justice Mayo, though imperfect, was not void. The defendant in that action should have appealed; but the judgment cannot be attacked collaterally, and held for naught in this action.
   By the Courts

DixoN, C. J.

The decision in the court below turned entirely upon the effect of the judgment of justice Mayo in the action of Nickerson v. Bullen and Beemis; and that is the only question here. The circuit court held that the judgment was valid, and that the plaintiff was estopped. We are inclined to the contrary opinion! It seems to us that such a judgment cannot be sustained and that it is void. The action was replevin, and the statute required the justice to find the value of the property and that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession, and to assess his damages for the unjust taking or detention. This done, he was to enter an order in his docket that the officer deliver the property to the plaintiff. R. S., chap. 120, sec. 144. None of these things were done. The docket entry is in these words: “A trial was had, and judgment was rendered against the defendant for the one cow, the property claimed.” It seems to us that so great a departure from the requirements of the statute ought not to be tolerated. The judgment of a justice of the peace should be as certain in matters of substance as the judgment of a court of'record. Rood v. School District, 1 Doug. (Mich.), 502; Howard v. The People, 3 Mich. (Gibbs), 209. In Monnell v. Weller, 2 Johns., 8, the justice nonsuited the plaintiff but awarded no costs, and the supreme court, upon certiorari, held the judgment incomplete, and incapable of reversal or affirmance, and therefore gave no judgment. And in Nellis v. Turner, 4 Denio, 553, where a justice returned to a certiorari, that on a demurrer to a plea in abatement in the cause before him, he decided that the plea was sufficient, “ and discharged the defendant from arrest, and entered the proceedings in his docket as above stated, and on the margin thereof noted my costs 50 cents,” it was held that there was no judgment which could be affirmed or reversed. And in this case we think the judgment, the whole entry of which is given above, is so defective and ‘incomplete that it could neither be affirmed nor reversed on certiorari; and where such is the case, we think it must be collaterally disregarded.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded.  