
    ISAAC H. BUSH v. THE UNITED STATES AND THE KLICKATAT INDIANS.
    [Indian Depredations,
    2280.
    Decided February 26, 1894.]
    
      On the Proofs.-
    
    In 1885 a treaty is made “ obligatory on the contracting parties as soon as the same shall be ratified." It is not ratified by the United States until 1859. In the interval a depredation is committed by the defendant Indians. The question is, whether they are responsible for this depredation under the obligation of the treaty.
    I.The treaty with the Klickatat Indians, 9th June, 1855 (12 Stat. L., p. 951), did not tate effect until ratified by the Senate, 8th March, 1859.
    II.A treaty which by its terms is to become obligatory “ as soon as the same shall be ratified by the President and Senate of the United States,” is in the interval only a proposition of the other party and creates no liability.
    III.Treaties operating upon purely national rights, in the absence of a provision to the contrary, operate from the date of the signature; but a different rule prevails where the treaty operates on individ-' ual rights.
    
      
      The Reporters’ statement of tbe ease:
    Tbe following are tbe facts as found by tbe court:
    I. Tbe claimant at tbe time of tbe alleged depredation was a citizen of tbe United States.
    II. On tbe 26tb March 1856, at tbe Upper Cascade on tbe Columbia River, now State of Washington, a band of Indians now known as tbe Klickatats burned and destroyed property belonging to said claimant which at tbe time of tbe destruction was reasonably worth more than tbe sum of three thousand dollars; tbe said property consisted of a dwelling bouse, groceries, provisions, beds, furniture, and other property; said destruction was without just cause or provocation on tbe part of said claimant or upon tbe part of any other person in charge of said property. No part of said property has been returned or paid for. Tbe said Indians at tbe time of said destruction were not in amity with tbe United States. On tbe 9th June, .1855, a treaty was made between tbe United States and said tribe, which treaty was proclaimed by tbe President of tbe United States on tbe 18th day of April, 1859 (12 Stat. L., 951).
    
      Mr. Silas JTare for tbe claimant.
    The learned counsel for tbe defense makes tbe first clause of section one, act of March 3,1891, tbe test of jurisdiction. I think this clearly error. This claim is founded upon tbe second clause of said act, which makes tbe test of jurisdiction u treaty,” and not amity.
    If tbe determination of this clause is to be tested upon tbe question of whether these Indians were in amity with tbe United States, then it seems that be establishes they were not. But if it be admitted they were not in amity, what has that to do with it.
    Tbe first clause in section No. 1, of tbe act of March 3,1891, provides that tbe Indian committing tbe depredation shall be in amity with tbe United States, etc.
    This is not tbe section of tbe statute on which this claim is founded; but it is being prosecuted on tbe second clause, which is as follows:
    “ Such jurisdiction shall also extend to all cases which have been examined and allowed by tbe Interior Department, and also to such cases as were authorized to be examined under the act of Congress, etc., for the year ending June 30,1886. * * ' * Approved, March 3,1885, as under subsequent acts, etc.”
    These acts authorized the Secretary of the Interior to investigate all claims for losses by Indians who were under treaty obligations with the United States.
    So it is clear that, in order for a claimant to recover compensation for losses under the first clause of the first section of the act of March 3,1891, it must appear that the Indians who committed the depredation were on friendly terms with the United States. The claims of sufferers by the Creeks in 1836 was decided by this court under this clause, and although under treaty the court found as a matter of fact that they were not in amity, etc., and had not been investigated by Secretary of Interior, etc.
    The second clause authorizes the court to try and determine all claims for losses when the same were committed by Indians under treaty with the United States, without reference to a state of peace or hostility.
    This claim having been investigated by the authority of the Secretary of the Interior (which fact of itself shows the Indians were under treaty, because he was not authorized to do so unless they were) under the acts of 1885 and 1886, clearly, in my judgment, gives the court jurisdiction to hear and determine this cause and enter judgment for the claimant, provided he establishes his loss.
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney- General Howry for the defendants.
   WeldoN, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The findings show that the Indians at the time of the depredation were not in amity with the United States; and the treaty under which it is claimed there is a responsibility on the part of the Indians and the United States did not take effect until after the depredation was committed. The treaty was made on the 9th day of June, 1855, but by the eleventh article it is provided: “This treaty shall be obligatory on the con-' tracting parties as soon as the same shall be ratified by the President and Senate of the United States. ”

On the 8th of March, 1859, the Senate consented to the ratification of the treaty, and on the 18th'day of April, 1859, the President proclaimed the ratification as follows:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, James Buchanan, President of the United States of America, do, in pursuance of the advice and consent the Senate, as expressed in their resolution of March 8,1859, accept, ratify, and confirm the said treaty.’7 (12 Stat.L., p.951.)

The liability of the parties by the terms of the treaty dates from the ratification'of it by the Senate and the President; and whatever may be the legal effect of the treaty on the condition of amity, it can not affect that condition in this case, as it was not operative at the time of the depredation.

• The Indians committing the depredation were not as a matter of law in treaty relations with the United States on the 26bh of March, 1859. It is true they had consented to the terms of the treaty, but those terms had not been formally accepted by the other party. It was only a proposition on the part of the Indians to become bound by the terms of the treaty, subject 'to the acceptance or rejection of the other party.

The Indians and the United States, like all other independent contractors, may agree by the terms of their contract when it shall take effect, and courts will enforce that provision in dealing with the rights and obligations of the parties.

As between nations, treaties operating upon purely national rights operate from the date of signing, in the absence of a provision to the contrary. In the case of the United States v. Beynes (9 Howard, 148) it is said by the Supreme Court: “ The treaty between the United States and the ltepublic of France contains no article or condition by which its operation could be suspended.” In the case of Haver v. Yaker (9 Wall., 34) the Supreme Court makes a distinction between purely national and individual rights. It is said: “It is undoubtedly true, as a principle of international law, that, as respects the rights of either government under it, a treaty is considered as conclusive and binding from the date of its signature. In this regard the exchange of ratifications has a retroactive effect, confirming the treaty from its date. But a different rule prevails where the treaty operates on individual rights. The principle of relation does not apply to rights of this character, which were vested before the treaty was ratified.”

To give the treaty bearing date June 9,-1855, a retroactive operation from the date of its ratification would be doing violence to the express language of the eleventh article which provides that it shall be obligatory from the date of its ratification. In the case of the United States v. Reynes, in 9 Howard, the Supreme Court clearly indicate that, if there had been a provision in the treaty under consideration that it .was to be suspended until its ratification, the law would have been different in that case.

Without deciding in this case what would have been the effect on the rights of parties if the treaty had been in force, it is sufficient to say that the question does not arise, as we hold that the treaty became operative from the time of its proclamation by the President, which, in effect, was the ratification of the treaty by the President. It is the judgment of the court that the petition be dismissed.  