
    (87 App. Div. 81.)
    ROGERS v. POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE OF BROOKLYN.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
    October 16, 1903.)
    1. Attorney and Client—Employment—Contract for Services—Consideration.
    Where an attorney brought a claim due by a city to defendant to the latter’s attention, prepared and filed an affidavit as the basis of its assertion, adjusted the amount with the city officials, and thereby rendered services of some value, facilitating and expediting the collection of the claim, defendant’s contract to pay plaintiff one-half of the amount collected for his services was not void for want of consideration by reason of the fact that the money would ultimately have been paid by the city voluntarily.
    Appeal from Municipal Court of New York.
    Action by John J. A. Rogers against the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn. From a Municipal Court judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
    Argued before JENKS, WOODWARD, HIRSCHBERG, and HOOKER, JJ.
    R. Percy Chittenden, for appellant.
    Fred L. Gross, for respondent.
   HIRSCHBERG, J.

“You are hereby authorized to collect the sum you referred to as due the Polytechnic Institute from the city for upwards of two years (overpaid to the city in the past); it being understood and agreed that the Institute is to be liable to no expense or trouble in the matter, in consideration of which circumstances, and of your services, we agree to pay you one-half the amount you shall collect on the claim referred to.”

The amount collected by the plaintiff and paid to the defendant was $230, but the defendant insists that the plaintiff’s services were wholly unnecessary, inasmuch as the city authorities intended to refund the money in any event, and would have done so without the intervention of a lawyer. The defendant’s president testified that, before he signed the contract, he had a conversation with the plaintiff by telephone, as follows:

“He then told me it was a claim against the city for a refund of water taxes to which we were entitled, and I think he mentioned the period covered and specifically the amount. Then I asked him if that was recovery from, the city which we could not obtain without his services. I said: ‘If this is a claim which will come back to us without your intervention, we ought not to pay you for it,’ and he said that it was a matter which he had learned in the course of his investigation, and that he had other clients with similar claims—‘a number of clients with similar claims.’ I said on that understanding I would sign and forward the agreement, which is embodied to that extent in the letter signed by me.”

It appeared that the plaintiff did have other clients with similar claims, and that he had investigated and ascertained the amounts due them. He denied that his employment by the defendant was based on any assurance by him that the rebate could not be collected without his intervention, nor was it distinctly testified to on behalf of the defendant that he did give any such assurance. The finding of the court below in favor of the plaintiff upon the facts is not one which should be disturbed as contrary to the evidence or the weight of evidence, and no exception was taken by the defendant upon the trial.

It is not claimed that the contract is unconscionable, or that it was procured by fraudulent representations. The appellant’s claim is that, if the money would have been refunded in any' event, the contract is void for want of consideration. The plaintiff concededly brought the claim to the defendant’s attention, prepared and filed an affidavit as to the basis of its assertion, adjusted the amount with the city officials, and in "that manner rendered services of some value in facilitating and expediting the collection; even assuming that the amount would have been paid to the defendant some day without the presentation of a claim. The only defense set up is a general denial. A good consideration is expressed in the contract, and it is very doubtful whether a partial failure of consideration can be established under the general issue. Eldridge v. Mather, 2 N. Y. 157; Dubois v. Hermanee, 56 N. Y. 673. See, also, Runyan v. Nichols, 11 Johns. 547; Rittenhouse v. Creveling (Sup.) 14 N. Y. Supp. 85; Sprague v. Sprague, 80 Hun, 285, 30 N. Y. Supp. 162; Springer v. Dwyer, 50 N. Y. 19; Milbank v. Jones, 127 N. Y. 370, 28 N. E. 31, 24 Am. St. Rep. 454.

The judgment should be affirmed.

Judgment of the Municipal Court affirmed, with costs. All concur.  