
    Bryan SOUSA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Arthur ROQUE, Jr., Robert Kaliszewski, Joanne Driver, William Evans, and Jane Stahl, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-1281-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 22, 2011.
    John R. Williams, New Haven, CT, for Appellant.
    Clare E. Kindall, Assistant Attorney General (Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, Jane R. Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General, and Gregory T. D’Auria, Special Appellate Counsel, on the brief), Office of the Attorney General, Hartford, CT, for Appellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges, JOHN F. KEENAN, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable John F. Keenan, of the United States Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Bryan Sousa, a former employee of the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”), alleges that defendants Arthur Roque, Jr., Robert Kaliszewski, Joanne Driver, William Evans, and Jane Stahl — all former supervisors and/or colleagues of Sousa at the DEP — violated Sousa’s First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for complaints he made regarding primarily workplace violence.

This is the second time we have had occasion to consider this matter on appeal. In Sousa v. Roque, 578 F.3d 164 (2d Cir.2009), we vacated the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to defendants, holding that it was error for the District Court to conclude that Sousa’s speech did not address a matter of public concern “solely because he was motivated by employment grievances.” Id. at 166. We also suggested that, on remand, the District Court “may wish to assume ar-guendo that Sousa’s statements did touch on ‘a matter of public concern,’ and proceed straight to ‘Pickering balancing.’ ” Id. at 175 n. 8. On remand, the District Court adopted this suggestion, and, after analyzing this case in light of the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education, 891 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), once again granted summary judgment to defendants. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, which, in any event, were thoroughly recounted in our earlier opinion. See Sousa, 578 F.3d at 166-69.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, drawing all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Paneccasio v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 532 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir.2008). “Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Sousa, 578 F.3d at 169 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

Sousa contends that the District Court erred in its application of the Pickering balancing test. “The Pickering test ... poses two questions (the first being implicit in Pickering): (1) whether the employee’s speech as a citizen was on a matter of public concern, and if so, (2) whether the employer has shown that the employee’s interest in expressing himself on that matter is outweighed by injury that the speech could cause to the employer’s operations.” Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 269-70 (2d Cir.2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Having conducted an independent review of the record, we hold, for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court in its well-reasoned opinion, Sousa v. Roque, 712 F.Supp.2d 34 (D.Conn.2010), that Sousa’s termination was warranted in light of the significant disruptions the DEP experienced as a result of Sousa’s speech.

We have considered all of Sousa’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.  