
    Brown vs. Newby.
    The act of 1827, oh. 79, sec. 4, 5 and 6, vests the courts therein mentioned, with power'to appoint special terms to do any and every description of business on the docket, and to designate the business to be done at tlie special term, and does not compel the courts.- to appoint the term to try all civil, criminal, and equity business on tho docket.
    When the words of the order appointing a special term were, “for the trial of causes upon the civil docket,” Held, that it excluded all criminal causes, and included all civil suits at law and in equity; and a decree made at such special term in a chaneery suit, is conclusive of the rights of the parties.
    This was a bill filed, praying an injunction and super-sedeas to an execution founded on a decree obtained by the defendant Newby against complainant Brown, and that the decree rendered in this cause be revised, reviewed and corrected. The decree originally made in this cause, and called in question by the present bill, was made in the Smith county circuit court, at a special term, commencing the 5th day of September, 1858. The order to hold the special term was made at the preceding April term, 1828, and is asifollows: “It appearing to the satisfaction of the court that the business standing upon the docket of this court cannot be done at the regular term thereof. It is considered by the court that a special term of the circuit court for Smith county be held at the court house in the town of Carthage, on the fifth day of September next, for the trial of causes upon the civil docket^ and to continue in session two weeks, unless the business be sooner disposed of.” Upon the hearing of this cause in the chancery court, the Chancellor dissolved the injunction and dismissed the bill. From this decree the complainant prosecuted an appeal to this court.
    «5. B. Bradford and B. Gillespie, for the complainant.
    The act of 1827, ch. 79, (Hay. & Cobbs, 188) authori-ses the judge of any of the circuit courts, when the business requires it, to appoint a special terra, and he shall have power to try all causes either at law or in equity, as well civil as criminal, upon the docket, with a proviso that said special terms may he to try equity causes only, or equity and criminal causes only, or generally as above provided for.
    The order made by the judge appointing the special term at which the decree complained of was made, was for the trial of all causes on the civil docket of said court.
    This does not come under the general provisions of the act of 1827, which is for the trial of all causes, either at law or in equity, as well civil as criminal on the docket. Nor can it come under the proviso. So here is an order made, which was no notice to Brown or his counsel that his cause was to be tried; it was taken up in his absence and decided. A decree obtained under such circumstances, so palpably unjust, should not be permitted to remain in force.
    
      C. D. Shrewsbury and H. A. Garrett, for defendant.
    It is objected by complainant that this court have no jurisdiction, inasmuch as the original decree was rendered at a special term of the court, and that the order of the judge appointing a special term only provides for the trial of civil causes.
    To this it is answered, that the order of the judge strictly pursues the act of 1827, ch. 79, sec. 4, (Hay. & Cobbs, 188) which gives the court power to appoint a special termandto try all causes upon the docket, either at law or in equity, as well civil as criminal, and with the same powers as if said special term were a regular term of said court.
    It is contended, that a more appropriate and comprehensive expression could not have been used than the one couched in the order, “for the trial of causes upon the civil docket,” which comprehends every description of civil causes, whether legal or equitable, and is used in contradistinction to criminal causes. The decree is conclusive 1 , . , , , , , upon the parties, being regularly had, and will not now be enquired or looked into by this court.
   Catron, Ch. J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

1. The order for a special term of the circuit court of Smith county was made by virtue of the act of 1827, ch.' 79," sec. 4, 5 and 6. It is insisted the order only extended to the trial of civil causes at law; that the hearing of the cause in chancery was extra-judicial, and the decree is void. If the premises assumed be true, the consequence follows, and the decree is void. But we think the court had power to appoint a special term to do any or every description of business on the docket; that the legislature gave the power unrestricted in this respect, so that courts might designate the business to be done at the special term, having reference to the business on the docket of the court.

2. The words of the order, for the trial of causes upon the civil docket,” excluded criminal causes and included all civil business at law and in equity: the decree then made is conclusive of the rights of the parties; and this being the only question relied on in argument, the decree made by the Chancellor now under review must be affirmed with costs.

Decree affirmed.  