
    Moritz v. Koenig.
    (New York Common Pleas — General Term,
    November, 1892.)
    An agreement for a reduction of rent on an existing lease under seal, cannot "be modified by a parol executory contract.
    Counsel, on argument, may impute error to a judge, but not an intentional perversion of justice, except in a proceeding to punish for official misconduct.
    Appeal from an order of a District Court.
    Proceeding for the summary removal of a tenant for nonpayment of rent. The question in controversy was, whether a tender by the tenant was of all the rent due.
    
      
      F. W. Furhman, for plaintiff (respondent).
    
      Langbein Bros. & Langbein, for defendant (appellant).
   Pryor, J.

We have accorded to the brief of the learned counsel for the appellant, the consideration due to so elaborate an effort, and yet we are unable to perceive any error in the disposition of the case by the court below.

The only plausible proposition advanced by appellant is that, by compromise between the parties, the rent Avas reduced to the sum of which he made tender. But, even assuming that a ten years’ lease under seal may be modified by an executory contract resting in parol, still we fail to find in the evidence sufficient proof of any such agreement. Undoubtedly there Avas a parley between the parties about a settlement of the complicated difficulties in which they Avere involved f, but for all that appears in the record, the negotiation never issued in a definite and consummate agreement. Were there such an agreement, however, it would be of no effect. Coe v. Hobby, 72 N. Y. 141.

Counsel for the appellant indulges in a strain of reflection upon the conduct of the trial justice, for which, on examination of the return, Ave observe no justification.

His rulings were generally in favor of the appellant, and he appears throughout the trial to have borne himself with dignity and with absolute impartiality between the litigants. But, were his conduct open to animadversion, the criticism of counsel should have been couched in terms less replete with insinuation of culpable misbehavior.

Error, of course, may be imputed to a judge, but not an intentional perversion of justice, except in a proceeding to punish him for official misconduct.

We are of opinion that the justice rightly determined the case, and that the reasons upon which he bases his decision satisfactorily sustain it.

Order affirmed on the opinion below, with costs.  