
    Lily Amelia NGO, Lukas Even, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-4432-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 19, 2010.
    Aaron Shapiro, The Shapiro Law Firm, New York, NY, for Petitioners.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Greg D. Mack, Senior Litigation Counsel; Genevieve Holm, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      PRESENT: REENARAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

The Petitioners, Lily Amelia Ngo and Lukas Even, natives and citizens of Indonesia, seek review of a September 29, 2009, order of the BIA affirming the January 18, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) George T. Chew denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ngo, Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/359 (B.I.A. Sept. 29, 2009), aff'g Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/359 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 18, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA’s decision. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). We uphold administrative factual findings unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

The Petitioners do not challenge the IJ’s determination that the harm they suffered based on their Chinese ethnicity and Christian religion constituted mere harassment. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006). Instead, they assert that the IJ failed to consider the aggregate effect of that harm. However, there is no indication that the IJ failed to consider the cumulative effect of the Petitioners’ alleged harm. Cf. Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494 F.3d 281, 290 (2d Cir.2007); Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 79-80 (2d Cir.2005). We therefore find no error in the IJ’s determination that the Petitioners failed to establish past persecution.

In the absence of past persecution, an alien can demonstrate eligibility for relief if he can show that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(I). Here, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that the Petitioners failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of their Chinese ethnicity and Christian beliefs. In support of that conclusion, the IJ reasonably noted that: (1) the Petitioners did not establish past persecution; (2) Indonesia was experiencing a “golden age for Chinese Christians”; and (3) conditions for Chinese Christians in Indonesia had “improved significantly since 1998 during the riots.” See Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 111-12 (2d Cir.2009). The Petitioners do not address, much less challenge the IJ’s country condition findings. Instead, they merely reiterate the incidents of harm they referred to in arguing that they suffered past persecution, asserting that these same incidents show that they have a well-founded fear. In light of the IJ’s findings as to past persecution, the agency reasonably found that the petitioners failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.

Because the Petitioners were unable to meet their burden for asylum, they necessarily failed to meet the higher burden required for withholding of removal. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 
      
       To the extent petitioner now identifies her psychological harm as "enochlophobia,” our review is limited to those issues exhausted before the agency. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir.2007). In any event, we are not persuaded that the IJ failed to consider the harm now so labeled.
     