
    WILLIAM JOHNSON VS. ROBERT MUNRO.
    Although an attorney has no right to dispose of his client’s chose in action,' yet, if it is valueless, no damages can be recovered against him for so doing.
    Where an attorney had received a note for collection on one who was insolvent, and with a view to benefit his client, exchanged the note for another, on a person who was then regarded as solvent, but afterwards, and the note not being paid, became insolvent; held that the attorney was not liable.
    
      Before Earle, J. at Marion, Spring Term, 1835.
    The following is the report of the presiding Judge :
    Assumpsit against an attorney for negligence and misconduct. The plaintiff having demands, by notes; &c.; to the amount of #366, on one A. Marvin, who resided in Georgetown, placed them in the hands of the defendant, who lives in Marion, for collection, as an attorney. His receipt is in these words :
    “ Received, August 19th, 1829, of William Johnson, Esq., three notes for collection, of which the above are copies.
    ’ R. MUNRO.”
    Marvin had failed in January of the same year ; had taken the benefit iff the insolvent debtofs Act,' which was known to plaintiff when' he gave' the papers to defendant; there was no proof that it was known to defendant. He issued a writ, returnable to Fall Term, 1829* and then, as he did not reside or practice in Georgetown, placed the papers in the hands of Solomon Cohen, Esq. to carry on the suit. He filed a declaration, but made an accommodation with Marvin, who had a demand against Johnson of #164. Mr. Cohen allowed the discount, (and there ivas no attempt to prove, nor any allegation, that it was not just,) and accepted from Marvin, in discharge of Johnson’s demand, and of #40 due to himself from Marvin, a note on John W. Durant, living in Horry, for #230. Durant was in good business as a trader, and owned a plantation ; and Mr. Cohen considered the arrangement a fortunate one, the best that could have been made for Johnson and himself. He proceeded with the utmost dispatch to' recover judgment against Durant, but before he effected it, Durant confessed judgment to another creditor for a large amount, which swept all his property, so that nothing has been collected for the plaintiff. Marvin had been ever since, and is now, insolvent, and the original debt could not have been collected from him by execution. Some of the creditors under the assignment of the second class, (specialty debts,) will lose a portion of their demands.
    “ I charged the jury, that when an attorney undertakes a professional business, that the law implies a promise that he will perform it with a reasonable degree of care, skill and diligence ; and that he is liable' to an action, if guilty of a default in either of the foregoing particulars, whereby his client sustains an injury ; that the plaintiff should not only prove the defendant’s default, but that he had sustained some loss ; as, for instance* that he might have recovered his debt, of a portion of it, at least the probability of it, &c. I submitted to the jury whether the defendant had been guilty of such default, such want of care, skill and diligence, as should make him liable, and if so, whether the plaintiff has suffered any* and what, loss. I did not consider the mere change of security, the accommodation by which Durant’s note was taken in discharge of Marvin’s, as itself sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover, especially if the jury were satisfied that it was a judicious and beneficial arrangement at the time. The jury found for the defendant, and I should not have been satisfied if they had found otherwise. I thought the verdict fully sustained by the evidence. I think there was no default; it is clear there was no loss. The plaintiff would have been better entitled to an action, if the defendant had prosecuted to judgment and execution, a suit against an insolvent man, thereby subjecting his client to the payment of costs, unless specially instructed.
    
      The plaintiff moves for a new trial, on the ground of error in the charge of the presiding Judge.
    
      Graham for the motion ; Cargan 8f Harllee, contra.
   Curia, per

O’Neall, J.

We are very clearly of opinion that the verdict is right, and must be sustained.

It is true that an attorney has no right to dispose of his client’s chose in action; but it is equally true, that if such chose in action is valueless, no damages can be recovered against the attorney on account of it. His release of the debt placed in his hands for collection, or his exchange of it for another, is a sufficient prima facie shewing to charge him ; and casts upon him the burthen of shewing that the act which he did was fair, and calculated to promote his client’s interests, and that in point of fact, no injury or damage resulted therefrom.

We agree with the Judge below, that the legal undertaking of an attorney is to discharge the professional business committed to him, with a reasonable degree of care, skill and diligence ; and that when the facts proved in this case were applied to this legal undertaking of the attorney, the defendant, they did not make out such a breach as would subject the defendant to damages.

The motion for a new trial is dismissed.

Johnson and Harper, JJ. concurred.  