
    Giles, a Negro Man, v. Joshua Meeks.
    
      2 St. L. 55.
    ON a writ de homine replegiando, a certificate of the registration of the plaintiff as a slave, on 19th December, 1782, was produced, under seal, from the clerk of the sessions of Washington county.
    
      Brackenridge, for the plaintiff,
    offered evidence, that Hull, the master who then owned him, had confessed, that Giles was not registered, till after January, 1783. The act of 13th April, 1782, requires a registration before January, 1783.
    
      Semple, for the defendant.
    Proof of this kind would destroy the record : and this cannot be done by parole proof.
    
      Brackenridge. This act has been construed liberally in favour of the master ; and, considering the act of registering as a ministerial act, though informal, it has been held sufficient. But it will also be construed liberally in favour of liberty, and considered as a ministerial and not a judicial act ; it may be impugned by proof of fraud. It is not a record against which nothing can be averred ; but resembles the certificate of recording a deed.
    President. Proof of fraud in the entry of Giles is proper. But, as there may be a doubt, whether this proof, as against Meeks, the present master, may be made by declarations of Hull, we will admit the testimony, reserving this point.
    It was then proved, that, after the year 1782, and perhaps in 1784, Hull, being asked whether he had recorded Giles, said no ; that, at a certain time after the year 1782, he said, he was going to Washington to have his Negro recorded, meaning Giles ; and that, when he had returned, he said, he had got it done ; and that perhaps in 1784, having been admonished to have his Negro recorded, he said to Meeks, (the defendant) who also had Negroes, that one or other of them must go to Washington, and have their slaves recorded.
    The defendant produced a witness, who swore, that in 1783, he asked Hull, whether he had recorded his Negro, and he said, he would be very sorry to leave such property in risk ; and, that he and Joshua Meeks both had their Negroes recorded.
    
      Semple, for the defendant.
    The proof for the plaintiff is too inaccurate as to distant dates, to be received to contradict an official act and certificate ; especially when that proof is opposed by contradictory proof.—Hull was under no obligation to give true answers to every impertinent question.
    
      Brackenridge, for the plaintiff
    The entry is impugned by direct declarations with precise dates, ascertained by circumstances. The proof for the defendant opposes not, but confirms, that given for the plaintiff. Hull does not say, that he recorded Giles ; but, by evading a direct answer, seems to admit, that he had not. Notice is also brought home to Meeks, and he is, therefore a mala fide purchaser.
   President.

Though we have said, that proof of fraud in the entry of Giles is admissible, yet such proof ought to be weighed with scrupulous caution, when set up against an official act. Every reasonable presumption ought to be made in favour of the certificate. It was not uncommon for one to enter the slaves of another his neighbour or friend, without the knowledge of this proper matter. You will consider to which of the witnesses Hull spoke the truth. If you disbelieve the testimony on the part of the plaintiff, or have sufficient ground to believe, that Giles was entered before January, 1783, though Hull knew it not ; you will find for the defendant. But if you believe, that Giles was not entered till after December, 1782, you will find for the plaintiff, notwithstanding the certificate of entry in December, 1782.

The jury found a verdict for the defendant.

Mr. Brackenridge moved for a new trial.  