
    Vasile RACHITA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-72671
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted November 16, 2016  San Francisco, California
    Filed November 21, 2016
    
      Seth L. Reszko, Esquire, Reza Athari & Associates, PLLC, Las Vegas, NV, for Petitioner.
    Nehal Kamani, Sabatino F. Leo, Trial Attorney, Suzanne N. Nardone, OIL, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

The record does not compel reversal of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that Vasile Rachita failed to establish a prior admission to the United States and that he is therefore ineligible for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).

Substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination. Rachita has not shown that his testimony described the port of entry at which he was allegedly admitted to the United States with detail, and vague testimony may support an adverse credibility determination. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2010). In addition, Rachita fails to identify evidence that corroborates his account of how he entered the United States from Canada. As the BIA correctly observed, the choir photo that he submitted does not indicate when and where it was taken. The other documents Rachita submitted may corroborate that he was in Canada in 1998, but they do not corroborate the circumstances of his entry into the United States. Corroboration may be required for vague testimony regardless of whether the REAL ID Act applies, see Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000) (pre-REAL ID Act), so we need not decide whether the BIA improperly relied on the Act’s corroboration standards.

We do not reach Rachita’s challenge to the immigration judge’s finding that fa-cilita provided inconsistent testimony. The BIA declined to address the issue because other grounds independently supported the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination, and our review is limited to the grounds on which the BIA relied. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010).

PETITION DENIED IN PART and DISMISSED IN PART. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     