
    Shaw v. Orr.
    1. Taxes! township collector: surrender op tax list. A temporary surrender of the tax list to the county treasurer, by a township collector, for the purpose of having it laid before the board of supervisors, in connection with a question relating to a disputed tax, will not operate to deprive him of the power of resuming his duties in the collection of the taxes, upon a re-delivery of the list to him.
    2.- directory statutes : opficer. The provisions of section 8, chapter 137, Acts Twelfth General Assembly, respecting the return of the duplicate tax list, by the township assessor, by the first Monday in May, are merely directory, and. the collection of taxes by him, or the distress of property by him therefor, after that time, will not be held to have been without authority.
    3. - The rule recognized, that statutes prescribing the manner and time of discharging the duties of public officers are directory, and that a compliance therewith does not render their acts void.
    4.-conveyance of property before November. It seems that the statute (chap. 110, Laws of 1862) providing that as between vendor and vendee of real estate, taxes thereon shall operate as a lien only from and after the first of November, does not exempt the vendor from personal liability to the county for taxes levied on land, though he may have conveyed it prior to the date named in said statute. At all events, this would be so, where the vendor conveyed only a part of the property, the collector having no power to apportion the tax to the different owners.
    5. - VAQUE description. That the property was indefinitely or vaguely described in the assessment will not exempt the owner from liability for the taxes.
    6. -warrant. It is not necessary that a warrant should be attached to the duplicate tax list delivered to the township assessor, in order to authorize him to collect taxes by distress and sale. The list itself is a sufficient authority under the law. Chapter 137, Acts Twelfth General Assembly.
    
      Appeal from Allamakee Circuit Court.
    
    Thursday, December 22.
    Action of replevin; defense, that defendant was the township collector, and, as such, seized the property re-pleaded for the purpose of making therefrom certain taxes assessed against the property of a firm of which plaintiff was a member. Trial to the court' without a jury, and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
    
      L. E. Fellows and Noble, Hatch <& Freese for the appellant.
    Brief not found on reporter’s file.
    
      George W. Camp and Edmonds <& Dayton for the appellee:
    1. The collector was authorized to make the levy in July. The provision of section 8, chapter 137, Laws of 1868, requiring the collector to complete the collection of taxes, and to make his final return by the first Monday in May, is directory and not mandatory.
    “ It is a general rule,” says the supreme court, in Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 112, “that statutes directing the mode of proceedings of public officers, relating to time and manner, are directory.”
    The following language is used in Camender v. Heirs of Smith, 1 Iowa, 306. “In all cases where power to do a particular act is given, and the mode in which it is to be done is prescribed by law, then it is directory.”
    In Torry v. MilTbwry, 21 Pick. 64, the rule is stated that regulations made for the information of officers, and to promote method and uniformity of proceedings, and which do not affect the rights of the tax payers, are directory, and though their non-observance may subject the officer to punishment, it does not affect the validity of the proceedings. Higgins v. Reed, 8 Iowa, 298; Cathren v. Raid, 9 Wis. .595; Miles v. Jóhnson, 17 id. 598; Burlingame v. Burlingame, 18 id. 289; The People v. Cook, 6 Wend. 486; Merchant v. Bongworth, 6 Hill, 646; Strifer v. Kelly, 7 id. 9; McCready v. Sexton c& Son, West. Jur., Sept., 1870, p. 284 (299).
    
      Unless the provision under consideration is excepted by the terms of the act from the general rule, it must be construed as directory.
    II. It is well established that a ministerial officer, acting in obedience to a process fair on its face, is protected against any informality prior to the issue of the process, even though there be a total want of jurisdiction, if it be not apparent on the face of the process. Ea/rl v. Camp et al., 16 Wend. 562 ; Trustees of Rochester v. Symonds, 7 id. 392; Abbott v. Yost, 2 Denio, 86; Samcool v. Bough-ton, 5 Wend. 170; Warner v. Shad, 10 Johns. 138 ; Upton v. Holden, 5 Met. 360; Spn'ague v. Bumcha/rd, 1 Wis. 157.
    In the case of Hershey v. Fry, 1 Iowa, 591, the court says, when, “ upon the face of the warrant, every thing was regular, and the collector was commanded by the proper warrant to collect the several amounts appearing to be due and owing thereon, it was his duty to comply. He had no discretion im, the matterS
    
    In the case of Gaines v. Robb, 8 Iowa, 193, the court, after citing the language of sections 187,188 and 191, Code 1851, remarks: “It would seem that language could not be used to more completely protect the treasurer against the illegality, or illegal proceedings of the officer connected with the levy of the tax, prior to the receipt of the list, or to more clearly define the power and authority conferred by such list and warrant.”
    This court have decided repeatedly that the action of replevin cannot be maintained against a collector who levies upon property to collect a tax which has been imposed by competent authority, however irregular the exercise of such authority.may have been. Higgins v. Reed, 8 Iowa, 292; M'acklot v. City of Dmenpovt, 17 id. 379; Bud v. Ball, 20 id. 282.
    If the tax in question was improperly or informally assessed to the firm of D. L. & S. Y. Shaw, their remedy was to apply to the board of equalization. MacMot v. City 
      
      of JDamenport, 17 Iowa, 379. On this point, we invite the attention of the court to a decision of the U. S. circuit court for the southern district of Ohio, in the case of Pulían et al. v. Kissinger, reported in Am. Law Keg., vol, 9, No. 9, Sept., 1870, p. 559.
    Each individual of a copartnership is liable for the tax due from the firm. § 717, Lev.
    III. The description is such as the firm of D. L. & 8. Y. Shaw gave the assessor, and if it is erroneous the firm should not complain of their own error, nor be allowed to take advantage of it.
    It does not appear that the collector, at the time he made the levy, was aware of any imperfection in the description, or irregularity in the assessment. The only question which appears to have been agitated at that time was as to the amount of tax which should be paid by the firm of D. L. S. Y. Shaw, and by the firm of Hemingway, Wood & Co. For all that the assessor knew, the description “ steam mill property ” might have been according to some recorded plat, and as perfect a description as if it had read.“lot one in block ‘A.’ ”
    But an imperfect description does not invalidate proceedings to collect taxes. B. c& JMJ. M. JR. JR. Go. v. Spearman, 12 íowa, 112; Buel v. Ball, 20 id. 282.
    IY. The duplicate tax list is the collector’s warrant. § 5, chap. 137, Laws of 1868; Parker v. Sexton & Son, 29 Iowa.
   Beck, J.

The objections made by appellant, and the facts of the case, will be noticed in the order in which they are presented in the assignment „ , , . ¿ „ , ° of errors and brief of counsel.

I. The defendant, after having received the duplicate tax list of the county treasurer, on the 10th day of May returned it; it was again delivered to him in July and thereupon he seized the property in controversy, for the purpose of making the amount of taxes charged to the firm of which plaintiff was a member.

It is insisted that under section 8, chapter 137 of Acts 12th General Assembly, it was the duty of the township collector to return the duplicate tax list on the first Monday in May, and that he could acquire no authority to seize property thereon after that day. The evidence shows that the tax list was not returned by the collector with the intention of suspending the discharge of his duties as an officer, or closing them up, but for a different purpose. The plaintiff had claimed that he was not liable for the tax in question, and refused to pay it. Eor the purpose of laying the matter before the supervisors and obtaining their directions, defendant sent the tax list to the treasurer that it could be presented to them when they considered the question relating to the tax in dispute. The tax list was not in fact returned in the sense in which the word is used by appellant’s counsel. It would be quite proper for the collector to suspend his duties and part with the possession of the tax list for the purpose and in the manner shown by the evidence. This of itself would not'deprive him of authority to complete the collection of the delinquent taxes.

It is claimed that, under the statute above referred to, defendant had no authority to act after the first Monday in May; that if the taxes were not at that day copected, the law required the tax list to be returned, and that the defendant could not, thereafter, discharge the duty of collector. In our opinion the language of the law is directory as to the discharge of duty by the collector, and does not limit his power and authority to be exercised within the time named. It is a familiar rule of law that statutes prescribing the manner and time of the discharge of duties by public officers are directory, and want of compliance therewith does not render official acts void See Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa, 218; Higgins v. Reed, 8 id. 298; Cavender v. Heirs of Smith, 1 id. 306. We conclude that the collector had authority after the first Monday of May, upon receiving again the duplicate tax list, to seize plaintiff’s property.

II. The tax was assessed upon certain real estate described as “ mill property.” After the assessment and before the 1st day of November the plaintiff (having acquired title to all of the property) BOid it to another. It is urged that, as the collector had notice of this sale, he coiüd not collect the tax from plaintiff. As between the vendor and vendee taxes become liens upon lands on the 1st day of November (chap. 110, Acts 9th Geni. Ass.), but we are not advised of any statutory provision that releases the vendor from liability on account of taxes levied upon property which he conveys before that day. Under the peculiar facts of the case, a part of the property upon which the tax was levied being undisposed of by plaintiff after November the first, and the collector having no authority to apportion the tax to the different owners, we are of opinion that plaintiff was liable therefor.

It is alleged that a portion of the property assessed consisted of personalty. No objection is raised in the assignment of errors based ' upon this fact. It will not therefore enter into our consideration of the case.

III. The property assessed was described in the tax list as Steam Mill in South Lansing.” The appellant claims that this description is insufficient. For that we know it was the proper description of the real estate as shown by the plat of the town. At all events, it is not denied that it was subject to taxation and was lawfully assessed with the tax charged against it. Under this state of facts plaintiff cannot be relieved from liability for want of a sufficient description of the property to enable a stranger to identify it. B. & M. R. R. Co. v. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112.

IN. The duplicate tax list upon which plaintiff’s property, was seized had no warrant attached to it. Plaintiff claims that without such warrant attached . ^ ^ tax Rst, the collector had no authority to collect the taxes by distress of personal property. The law (Acts 12th Geni. Ass., ch. 137) provides that duplicate tax lists shall be made and delivered to the township collectors which “ may be used as an execution, and shall be sufficient authority for them to collect the taxes therein charged in any township in the county by distress and sale, or otherwise,” etc. There is no requirement in the law directing a warrant to be attached to the duplicate tax list, which shall “ be used as an execution.” As the law plainly dispenses with a warrant we cannot require it and hold the acts of the officer void because of the want of such an instrument.

The foregoing notices all the objections covered by the assignment of errors. In our opinion, they are not well taken.

The judgment of the circuit court is

Affirmed.  