
    E. S. SMITH, BY HER NEXT FRIEND, A. F. MOSER, v. P. J. JARNAGIN ET AL.
    (S. C., Thomp. Cas., 135-136.)
    Knoxville,
    September Term, 1858.
    LAPSE OF TIME. Division of estate not disturbed after thirty years.
    Where an estate was divided without authority of law, while some of the parties were under disability of coverture, and so continued till the bringing- of suit, and the division is acquiesced in for thirty years, it will not be disturbed. [On lapse of time, see Overton v. Bigelow, 3 Yer., 513, 522; Hammonds v. Hopkins, 3 Yer., 525, 528; Bracken v. Martin, 3 Yer., 55; Lewis v. Brooks, 6 Yer., 167, 184, 185; Hotchkiss v. Fortson, 7 Yer., 66; Humbard v. Humbard, 3 Head, 103; Gibson v. Lane, 9 Yer., 475; Townsend v. Townsend, 4 Cold., 82; Yarbrough v. Newell, 10 Yer., 380; Wood v. Jones, Meigs, 517; Gudger v. Barnes, 4 Heis., 581. On family settlements, see Meigs’ Dig-., secs. 497 and 475.]
   Caruthers, J.,

delivered the opinon of the court:

The decree in this case, dismissing the bill, is right, and is affirmed. The divisions of the slaves in 1835 and 1838 are binding on all the parties, as they have since that time acquiesced in it, each holding and enjoying their respective shares. The co-mplainat was then a feme, covert, and so were some of the others at the time of the division in 1835; but after so ecreat a lapse of time, and their enjoyment of the portions assigned to them, respectively, they will not be permitted to gainsay it, although the same may have been done without authority of law, and some of them were under these disabilities. But the bill does not seek to disturb the division, but is based upon the ground that Chany was not included, but remained a part of the estate of Berry Jarnagin. The answer takes the ground that in 1838 Chany was assigned to the widow as her part; and we think this is established by the evidence. From this it follows that the disposition made by her of Chany and her children, is valid and cannot be disturbed by complainant.

Decree affirmed.  