
    In re LIVINGSTON.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
    December 31, 1897.)
    Liquor License—Revocation—Constitutional Law.
    Although liquor tax certificates are property, yet, being made so only by virtue of the provisions of the liquor tax law (Laws 1896, c. 112, amended by Laws 1897, c. 312), their character as property is subject to all the provisions attached to them in their creation, including the' provisions of the act for their cancellation and revocation without a jury trial; and the provision of the constitution prohibiting the taking of property without due process of law has no- application.
    Appeal from special term.
    In the matter of the petition of Caroline A. Livingston to revoke the liquor tax certificate issued to JohA'Shady. From an order revoking the certificate, Shady appeals.
    Affirmed.
    
      Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and WILLIAMS, PATTERSON, O’BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
    James A. Dunn, for appellant.
    Robert. A. B. Dayton, for respondent.
   WILLIAMS, J.

The proceeding was instigated by a citizen residing within 200 feet of the premises licensed, under subdivision 2, § 28, of the liquor tax law (Laws 1896, c. 112, as amended by Laws 1897, c. 312), to revoke the certificate on the ground that the applicant did not file with the application for the license the consent that traffic in liquor be carried on in the premises, signed by two-thirds of the owners of buildings occupied exclusively for dwellings within 200 feet of the place licensed, as required by subdivision 8, § 17, of the liquor tax law. The applicant stated that there were but three owners of such buildings, and he filed the consent of two of the three. The evidence given in this proceeding showed beyond question that this statement in the application was untrue, and that the consent of two-thirds of such owners was not filed with the application; and the court very properly made this order revoking the license for that reason. It is said, however, that, before the applicant could be deprived of his certificate, he was entitled to have a trial by jury, under the constitution; that the certificate was property, and he could not be deprived of such property without due process of law. We have held that these certificates are property. People v. Durante, 19 App. Div. 292, 45 N. Y. Supp. 1073. They were made such by virtue of the provisions of the liquor tax law, but the legislature which gave the certificate the character of property had newer to, and did, by the same act, provide both for their issuance and cancellation, and under what circumstances they should be valid, and when and how they might be revoked. The character given them as property was subject to all these provisions attached to them when they were created. Applicants take them with all their privileges, and subject to all the burdens imposed upon them by the liquor tax law.

The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.  