
    KECK against APPLEBACK.
    Hn an action brought to recover the amount of a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace in another county, a certified transcript of such judgment is prima facie evidence, upon which the plaintiff may recover.
    ERROR to Huntingdon county.
    This was a suit originally brought before a justice of the peace of Huntingdon county, to recover the amount of a judgment which the plaintiff, Henry Keck, had obtained against the defendant, John Jdppleback, before a justice of the peace of Lehigh county.
    Upon the trial of the cause in the court below, the issues being on the pleas of nul iiel record and payment, the plaintiff offered in evidence the transcript of a judgment entered in his favor, against the present defendant, by a justice of Lehigh county, ánd which was regularly certified by the^said justice to be a true transcript of his docket.
    This evidence was objected toby the defendant, because the docket itself was better evidence, but at all events a sworn copy must be produced.
    The court below sustained the objection, and sealed a bill of ex-ceptiqns, which was here assigned for error.
    
      Bell for plaintiff in error.
    The argument derived ah inconvenienti should have weight in the decision of this question; for to require in every case that the docket and the justice himself should be produced, would be requiring more than the claims which are'usually prosecuted before a justice are worth; therefore it was that that section of the act of 1810, made a certified transcript good evidence.
    The certificate of a justice, of the acknowledgment of a deed, is prima facie evidence, because it is made so by the act of assembly, and in terms not stronger than those employed in this act.
    
      Miles for defendant in error.
    The act of assembly referred to, does not prescribe any rules oi evidence, but directs that; the justice shall proceed as in .cases ori ginally brought before him. Cited Wolverton v. Commomoealth, 7 Serg. & Rawle, 273. O’Donnel v. Seybert, 13 Serg. & Raíale 54., Welsh v. Crawford, 14 Serg. & Rawle, 440.
   Per Curiam.

In Welsh v. Crawford the judgment was offered collaterally. Here it was offered as the' foundation of the proceeding, and its competency did not depend on any abstract rule of evidence, but on the provisions of the act of assembly, which gives the remedy, and which directs that a certified transcript of a judgment against one residing in another County, may be delivered to the plaintiff for recovery of the amount, before a justice of the peace, in the county where the defendant resides, “as in cases originally brought before him.” Itis clear, then, that the object wasnot to originate another action for the same cause, in which the existing judgment might be evidence of indebtedness; but to have execution of the existing judgment itself, as in cases originally brought before the justice, who might therefore issue execution on it, without the precaution of a scire facias, although that he a very proper measure. The legislature, then, having pointed out the mode of authentication, by directing the transcript to be certified, it would be going far to say that it is not sufficient in' the first instance. Unquestionably it lies on him who disputes the fact thus certified, to disprove it; and the court below ought to have admitted the certified transcript as sufficient prima facie.

Judgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded..  