
    Auto Transit Company v. Koch, Appellant
    (No. 2).
    
      Bailment — Lease—Contradiction of written instrument.
    
    Where, in. ,an action on a lease, a defendant denied none of the facts set forth in the lease, but offered to prove an oral agreement with a third person, not a party to the lease, the court does not err in directing a verdict for the plaintiff.
    Whatever fraud some third party might have perpetrated upon the defendant cannot be binding upon the plaintiff.
    Argued Oct. 9, 1918.
    Appeal, No. 209, Oct. T., 1918, by defendant, from judgment of Municipal Court of Philadelphia Co., Nov. T., 1917, No. 79, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Auto Transit Co. v. Carl C. Koch.
    Before Orlady, P. J., Porter, Henderson, Head, Trexler and Williams, JJ.
    Affirmed.
    Assumpsit. Before Crane, J.
    The court below in directing a verdict for the plaintiff charged as follows:
    This is an action brought by the plaintiff, Milton .Stern, trading as the Auto Transit Company, against Carl C. Koch, the defendant, to recover the amount due under a written lease between them. That lease, which has been offered in evidence, was admittedly signed by Koch, the defendant.
    That lease provides that he had examined this particular car, which is the subject-matter of the bailment lease; that it was in satisfactory' condition, and he further certified over his written signature and there existed at the time of the execution of this lease no other agreement or understanding of any nature whatsoever, except such as was set forth in the written agreement between the parties. Therefore the rights and liabilities of the parties must be determined by the terms and the conditions of the written agreement entered into between them, which, of course, embraces the transaction covering the Studebaker car.
    
      That lease is in evidence and it has also been testified as to how much credit the defendant is entitled to: The action in this case is to recover the balance due of three hundred dollars with interest from the date of default in rental under that lease, which was November 1, 1917, until the date of your verdict.
    The defendant did not offer any evidence which the court could admit, but denied none of the facts set forth in the lease or in the evidence presented by the plaintiff. Therefore, the court will have to direct you in this case, there being no dispute of fact between the parties, to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of three hundred dollars with interest on the same from November 1, 1917, to date. The calculation of that interest will be sent out, or presented to you, and you may verify its accuracy if you care to. That would make the amount of the verdict, if the calculation is correct, three hundred and nine dollars, and you will accordingly find in favor of the plaintiff.
    Defendant offered to prove no oral agreement with the plaintiff in this case, but with the third party with whom he originally negotiated for the purchase of the car. The only defenses that could be interposed to this action would be payment, an oral agreement with the plaintiff lessor, which was omitted from the written lease by fraud, accident or mistake. Defendant did not offer to prove any oral agreement with the plaintiff and did not plead that any agreement had been omitted from the written agreement by fraud, accident or mistake. There was, therefore, no basis to justify the reception of evidence offered by the defendant. Whatever fraud some third party may have perpetrated upon the defendant cannot be binding upon the, plaintiff.
    The money loaned by the plaintiff to enable defendant to obtain this car was paid by plaintiff to the owner of the car, and the plaintiff then being the o wner, leased the car to the defendant, who stated in writing that he had examined the car and that it was satisfactory to him, and that there were no oral agreements not set forth in the written lease.
    February 28, 1919:
    Defendant admittedly defaulted in the payment of the installments due under the lease and cannot avoid his liability on the ground of what some third person said or did relative to this car.
    The jury found the verdict as directed, for the plaintiff for $309 and judgment thereon. Defendant appealed.
    
      Errors assigned were various rulings on evidence and in giving binding instructions for plaintiff.
    
      Jacob Weinstein, and with, him I. Irwin Jackson, for appellant.
    
      Maxwell Pestcoe, for appellee.
   Opinion by

Head, J.,

The judgment entered upon a warrant contained in the lease executed by the appellant was opened. The cause came on for trial. The assignments of error complain of the action of the trial court in refusing several offers of evidence. Each one of them rested on the proposition that defendant could prove by the witness on the stand that' certain persons, to wit, “Baron and Price” had made representations to him which were not true and which misled him to his injury. In determining whether or not such offers were competent, the learned court below was compelled to rely on the pleadings that made up the issue then to be resolved. The plaintiff, in the case, apparently was not concerned with the dealings between the defendant and Baron and Price. We can perceive nothing either in the petition to open the judgment or in the various offers of testimony which the court below declined to admit, to justify the conclusion that the Auto Transit Company, the plaintiff in this action, was legally responsible for any alleged wrongdoing by persons called Baron and Price. Therefore there is no sound reason for interfering with the conclusion reached by the learned court below.

The appeal is dismissed at the costs of the appellant.  