
    The State v. Ridgell, et al.
    
    The Court of Sessions will prohibit the execution of judgment of death, erre» neoiisly awarded by a Court of magistrates and freeholders against a slave, for an offence not capital.
    A prohibition will be granted, wherever an inferior Court, in handling matters clearly within its cognizance, transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by law. vide Ex Parte Brown, p. 333, ante.
    
    Before Mr. Justice Evans, at Sumter, Fall Term, 1831.
    This was a suggestion for a prohibition, to restrain the execution of judgment of death, which the respondents, who composed a Court of magistrates and freeholders, had awarded* erroneously, as it was alleged, against a slave, for an offence not Capital. A rule to shew cause had been taken out returnable to this term : and upon shewing cause it appeared, that the slave had been guilty of breaking open the store-house o'f one G. J. M’Cauley, and stealing from it certain goods. This store-house was at the distance of 100 yards, and more, from the dwelling house, was separated from it by a public road, and. was not used as a place for sleeping by any person at the time when it was broken open. The respondents had, nevertheless, convicted, the slave of burglary, and passed sentence of death on him accordingly.
    
      
       Judge Harper was absent during the remainder of this term, in pursuance of an act of the Legislature passed for the purpose ; he being one of a committee appointed by the Free Trade Convention at Philadelphia to present a memorial to Congress, vide acts of 1831, p. 46. His seat was occupied, in his absence, by Judges Earle, and Martin, in succession.
    
   Per Curiam.

It is perfectly manifest, from the case of The State v. Ginns, 1 N. & M. 583, that the slave was not guilty of burglary; and that the respondents erred in convicting him of that offence, and awarding judgment of death: and the question submitted is, whether this error, or mistake of law, manifestly appearing, as it does, upon the face of the proceedings, will authorize the issuing of the writ of prohibition. In general the errors of inferior jurisdictions, on matters of law, are corrected by appeal; but in this case there is no possible mode of correcting the error, palpable, and revolting as it is, and so awful in its consequences to the slave, unless a prohibition is granted. I have looked very fully into the cases, and am satisfied, that the authorities will bear me out in deciding, that although the parties and subject matter be within the jurisdiction of the inferior Court, yet if, as is said by Blackstone, in handling matters clearly within its cognizance, it transgresses the bounds prescribed by law, a prohibition will be awarded. 3 Bl. Com. 112. The instances put by Blackstone are, where the spiritual Court required two witnesses to prove the payment of a legacy, or a release of tithes. Ib. To these may be added, the following : Where an inferior Court misconstrued an act of Parliament. Brymer v. Atkins, 1 H. Bl. 164. Gould v. Gapper, 5 East, 364. Or, where the Court has departed from the known and acknowledged rules of the common law, by admitting against the accused illegal testimony; as was said in Hudnall’s case, 2 N. & M. 424. Or, where, in violation of the rules of law, an inferior Court, after punishing a slave by whipping, tried him a second time, and condemned him to death, for the same offence, as in Ex parte Brown, [ante 323.) In all these cases á prohibition issues : and, indeed; if the injured party in such cases-were with-» Qut remec[y5 “ Would,” as is well remarked by Blackstone, be an impropriety, which no wise government can or ought to endure.” 3 Bl. Com. 112. In Gould v. Gapper, Lord Ellen-borough said, “ We cannot feel ourselves warranted in holding, that the grounds of granting prohibitions are so narrow, and limited, as to be confined solely to cases of excess of jurisdiction.” 5 East, 365. On the whole, I am of opinion, that there is sufficient ground for .granting a prohibition, and it is so ordered.

The respondents now moved to rescind the order as contrary to law.

Johnson, J.

We agree entirely in the views expressed- by our brother Evans ; and the motion is therefore dismissed.-

O’Neall, J. and Earle, J. sitting for Harper, J. concurred.

Motion refused.  