
    Thomas WALKER, IV, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Stephen Jacobs, Richard Palazzolo, Defendants-Appellants. United States Marshals Services, Waterbury Police Department, 7th Precinct, 6th Precinct, Suffolk County Police Department Mastic/Selden, New York, Defendants.
    No. 12-847.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 28, 2013.
    Arlene S. Zwilling, Assistant County Attorney, for Dennis M. Cohen, Suffolk County Attorney, Hauppauge, NY, for Appellants.
    Christopher D. Belelieu (Stuart W. Gold, Jacob M. Honigman, on the brief) Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, New York, NY., for Appellee.
    Present: RALPH K. WINTER, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendants-Appellants (“Defendants”) appeal from the district court’s February 8, 2012 denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in a suit by Plaintiff-Appellee (“Plaintiff’) asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an unconstitutional denial of medical care. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

“Qualified immunity protects public officials from liability for civil damages when one of two conditions is satisfied: (a) the defendant’s action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law.” Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 211 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Orders denying summary judgment are generally not immediately ap-pealable ‘final decisions’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir.2010). “Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, however, we have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of orders denying claims of qualified immunity[.]” Id. “[T]o avoid running afoul of the collateral order doctrine’s requirement that a reviewable order involve a claim of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, we may review immunity denials only to the narrow extent they turn on questions of law.” Id. (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). On appeal, we look to “stipulated facts, or on the facts that the plaintiff alleges are true, or on the facts favorable to the plaintiff that the trial judge concluded the jury might find.” Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir.1996).

Defendants make two arguments on appeal: First, they argue that Plaintiff did not have a “serious medical condition” and that, therefore, they did not unconstitutionally deny Plaintiff medical care. See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir.1996) (discussing requirements for a plaintiffs unconstitutional denial of medical care claim). Alternately, Defendants claim that their actions were objectively reasonable, because Plaintiff was not in their custody and there is not a clearly established right to medical care from noncustodial officials. The district court found that there were disputed issues of fact relating to (1) whether Plaintiff had a “serious medical need” and (2) whether Plaintiff was in Defendants’ custody. These factual issues are material. See Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 140-41. As Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity turns not on questions of law but on questions of fact, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal. “[Wjhere the district court denied immunity on summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remained, we have jurisdiction to determine whether the issue is material, but not whether it is genuine.” Bolmer, 594 F.3d at 140-41.

We have considered all of the remaining arguments of the Suffolk County Police Department, Jacobs, and Palazzolo and find them without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and DISMISSED in part for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  