
    *State of Indiana, for the use of Cone, v. Robert John and others.
    Suit upon a bond subjecting the obligors to payment of statutory penalty for misfeasance in office, is an action on a penal statute, and can not be maintained, in Ohio, on a statute of Indiana.
    This cause was adjoftrned from the county of Hamilton. It was-an action of debt, and set out that the defendants, on March 7f 1825, made their writing obligatory, by which they acknowledged-themselves to owe to the State of Indiana five thousand dollars, subject to a defeasance, reciting that Robert John had been duly appointed collector of the county of Franklin, and if he should well and truly perform the duties of his office of collector, obligation to be void, etc. It then averred that Robert John took upon himself the duties of collector, and that he did not well and truly perform his duties, in this, that under color, and by virtue of his-office, he seized and levied upon a quarter section of land, the-property of Charles Cone, on a pretext that a tax of one dollar- and seventeen cents was due on said land, .and unlawfully and-without authority sold the same, in violation of his official duty, and subsequently made a deed therefor to the purchaser. The declaration proceeded to aver, that at the time of such levy and sale no tax was due on said land. It further averred, that by the laws of the State of Indiana goods and chattels, found upon a tract of land, were first liable to seizure for taxes, and that there were goods and chattels on the land so sold sufficient to pay the taxes claimed to be due, which was known to the collector; that-he refused to demand payment of the resident on the land, and. did not, as by law, he was bound to do, return that there were no goods and chattels to make the tax due. It further states, that in consequence of these illegal proceedings, Charles Cone was put to great trouble and expense, in defending an ejectment brought against him by the purchaser at the tax sale, in which defense-Cone finally succeeded. It further averred, that for breach of said bond, the law of Indiana provided that suit should be brought in the name of the state, for the use of the party injured, against the collector and his securities, and that the party injured should recover treble damages and full costs and charges. For these causes-averred a forfeiture of the bond, and demanded to recover, etc.
    *The plea negatived all the allegations and averments of the declaration, upon which issue was joined.
    In the common pleas, the jury found a verdict for three hundred and forty-four dollars. The defendants moved, in arrest of judgment, that the action, as set forth in the declaration, was not-maintainable in the courts of Ohio. The motion was overruled, and judgment rendered for treble the damages assessed by the jury, and costs, and the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.
    Upon the trial in that court, the plaintiff gave in evidence the-bond, with proofs of the seizure and sale of the land, and that a tenant resided upon it, having goods and chattels, of whom tax was never demanded. The return of the collector, the laws of Indiana, and the proceedings in ejectment, were also given in evidence. The plaintiff then offered to give evidence of his expenses and trouble incurred, in consequence of the sale and suit of the purchaser, to which the defendants objected, and moved the court to overrule the evidence given, on the ground that the case made was not one that could be sustained in the courts of Ohio. The evidence was accordingly overruled and rejected, and the plaintiff became nonsuit, with leave to move for a new trial. This motion was made, and the question, whether the decision of the court, overruling and rejecting the evidence, was, or was not erroneous, was adjourned here for decision.
    Caswell and Starr, for plaintiff.
    Hammond, and Morris & Drake, for defendants.
   Judge Wright

delivered the opinion of the court:

On the trial of this cause, all the evidence offered by the plaintiff, in support of the issue on his part, was objected to, and ruled out, upon the ground that the suit was brought to enforce a penal law of Indiana. The plaintiff then became nonsuit, and now moves to set aside the nonsuit and for a new trial, because the ■court erred in rejecting the evidence.

The case presents the single inquiry, whether the plaintiff’s action is founded upon a penal law of Indiana ? No *one can read the declaration without observing that the bill of the plaintiff, as set forth, requires of the court, not only the application of the local law to the construction of the contract, but to give effect to a law of that state inflicting a penalty. It has been frequently ■decided, and is now settled, that the penal laws of on.e state can have no operation in another state, or be enforced by the courts ■of another. Penal laws are strictly local, and affect nothing more than they can reach. 1 H. Blk. 135; Foliot v. Ogden, Cowp. 343; 14 Johns. 340.

The right of the plaintiff to recover, rests upon the matters without the bond. The provisions of the statute laws of Indiana are introduced in the declaration, as the foundation of the plaintiff’s right. He seeks to recover on the bond given to the State of Indiana, because he has been injured by the misfeasance and false return of a public officer of that state. The common method of proceeding in such cases, in this state, is by action on the case. The right once established at law, you may then sue on the official ■bond, if the injury complained of be such that the securities are held for it. The claim here is to resort to the bond in the first instance, and charge the security before any default of the principal is established. This claim to change our law of the remedy on bonds, is sought to be sustained on the statute of another state. ■Can the practice of our courts be controlled by the legislative acts •of a sister state ? The plaintiff sets forth in his declaration, that by the law of Indiana, it is provided that for the illegal and fraudulent acts of a collector, a suit is given to the party injured, to sue upon the official bond; to recover treble damages, full costs and ■charges, by reason of which an action hath accrued to him. The provision of the law relied upon, is this: “That if any person shall be injured, or sustain damage by a false return of any collector, made to any precept under the provisions of this act, or other illegal ■or fraudulent acts of such collector, such individual, upon suit to be brought against such collector and his securities, upon their said bond, for the use of such individual, shall recover, treble damages, .and full costs and charges.” If, instead of an action on the bond, the legislature had provided that these treble damages, costs, *and •charges, should be recovered in'an action of debt, no one would have douhtod hut the action was penal. Is its character changed by .authorizing the suit to be brought on the bond, and against securities as well as the offender? "We think not. A state can enforce its contracts in our courts, the same as an individual suitor; but the remedy must be afforded according to our laws and practice. 1 Ohio, 259; 1 Johns. Cas. 139; 3 Johns. 263; 14 Johns. 340.

The counsel for the plaintiff confidently relies upon the case of Dorrison v. Chaplin, 7 Conn. 244. I have not seen the case, but the state of it, as quoted, does not seem to conflict with our opinion. It merely decides that Congress can not constitutionally confer upon the state courts, jurisdiction to enforce the penal laws of the United States. That court thought there was a broad distinction between such suits and actions to enforce penal statutes; and so we think. Scofield v. Canfield, 4 Johns. 3 40, is also relied upon for the plaintiff. It seems to us an authority for the defendants. The court refused to allow a'defense under a penal law of Connecticut, to affect a contract made in that state, subject to the law, and which, it sued there, it was claimed would have avoided the contract. The United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 261, decided that a state court had no jurisdiction of the criminal or penal laws of the United States; and that Congress had no constitutional right to confer such power.

Upon the whole, it seems to us very clear that this action is founded upon a penal statute of the State of Indiana, whose authority is limited to the territory and courts of that state, and that the nonsuit was properly entered.  