
    Richmond.
    Pollard v. Lumpkin.
    1849. October Term.
    
    (Absent Cabell, P. and Brooke, J.)
    1. An award being in pursuance of the submisson, final in its character, signed by the arbitrators, and read to the parties as and for their award, it is complete and final, though not actually delivered.
    2. There being no mistake on the part of the arbitrators as to the nature or contents of the award, when it was signed and published by them as their award, though one of the arbitrators after the termination of his authority, may think that the principles by which he was governed, should have led him to a different result, such evidence is not of itself sufficient to set aside the award on the ground of mistake, such mistake not appearing on the face of the award, or from any paper or document connected with or referred to therein; and all mistake being denied by the other arbitrator.
    This was a bill filed in the Circuit court of Hanover, by William H. G. Lumpkin against George William Pollard, seeking to set aside an agreement to submit to arbitration certain matters of controversy between them, and also what is called in the bill an imperfect award, that the plaintiff might pursue his remedy at law without obstruction from said agreement and award. The gound of equity set up in the bill was, that the arbitrators had fallen into a mistake in carrying out the principle which they had adopted for the adjustment of the plaintiff’s claim upon the defendant; and that the award had not been delivered, and was not a perfected award. The defendant in his answer denied that there was any mistake, and insisted that the award had been perfected.
    The controversy arose out of an agreement in writing between the parties made in November 1836, by which they united to cultivate a farm of the defendant for four years, upon certain terms specified; and they were to divide the crops made equally between them. About the end of the second year Pollard became dissatisfied. and refused to execute the agreement any further : and on the 19th of December 1838, they entered into another agreement in writing, that Thomas G. Clarke and Carter Braxton should settle and adjust the terms on which their contract for the cultivation of Pollard’s farm, two years of which contract was then unexpired, should be annulled.
    On the same day the arbitrators met, with the parties ; and after hearing them and such witnesses as they chose to examine, they proceeded to consider the matter submitted to them, and made up and signed their award, and then read it to the parties. The award, after referring to the agreement of submission, proceeds to “consider and declare that the said George William Pollard shall pay to said Lumpkin, his heirs or assigns, the sum of 250 dollars on the 1st day of January 1840, and further sum of 250 dollars, on the 1st day of January 1841, for violating and terminating the contract aforesaid with the said Lumpkin; and that the said Lumpkin shall acquit and surrender to said Pollard all claim whatever of every nature, that he may legally or equitably have against said Pollard, by reason of said Pollard's violating, ending and terminating said contract about said land; and the above is given by us as our award.” The award did not state, or refer to any paper which stated, the grounds or principles upon which it was based.
    It appeared from the evidence that when the arbitrators had read the award to the parties as before stated, that Mr. Braxton observed, that it would be necessary for each of them to have a copy of it, but as it was very late in the day, and the night promised to be very cold, Mr. Clarke would take the award to the next Hanover court; and would make out a copy, or write two bonds, one payable on the 1st day of January 1840, and the other payable on the 1st of January 1841, for 250 dollars each, for Pollard to execute to Lumpkin ; either of which courses would answer. That if the bonds were executed by Pollard, he could take the award, and Lumpkin the bonds : And upon enquiry of the parties if either of these courses met their approbation, or what other disposition they wished made of the award, no objection was made by either party.
    It further appeared that Clarke, on thinking over what the arbitrators had done,, on his way home, became satisfied that they had made a mistake in estimating the net value of the crop of hay, by which Lumpkin was allowed less on that account than he should have received; and, therefore, he declined to carry out the arrangement which had been made for the delivery of the copies of the award to the parties. Both the arbitrators, how-over, stated in their evidence, that they considered that when the award was read to the parties, it was final and complete; and that they did not regard the giving a copy of it to the parties as in anyway adding to its obligation or binding effect on the parties.
    Upon the question whether there was a mistake in the amount allowed to Lumpkin on account of the hay crop, the arbitrators did not agree. Clarke states that they agreed on the principle that Lumpkin was to receive one half of the net profits of the land for the years 1839 and 1840 ; and to ascertain that, they properly estimated one fourth of all the crops, except the hay crop, as net profits; but that a larger proportion of the hay crop should have been estimated as net profits; and that he had intended to do so, but had through inadvertence, failed to do it. Braxton says, that to ascertain what Pollard should pay to Lumpkin, we took the data, what would be a fair rent for the farm; but held ourselves bound by no particular result; that is, he did not, he could not speak for Clarke. That they agreed to allow the plaintiff half of a fair rent, which rent, both of them supposed to be one fourth of the crops. That the result from the data assumed, made the amount more than 250 dollars per annum; and it was mutually agreed between us, without any hesitation, that the said sum of 250 dollars was as much under the circumstances detailed to us, as we could possibly make the defendant pay. This amount he thought was fully equivalent, if not exceeding what Lumpkin was justly entitled to; and he would have agreed to no principle or arrangement by which that amount would have been increased.
    The cause came on to be heard in July 1843, when the Court below held that no proper award had been made by the arbitrators, of the matters in controversy between the plaintiff and defendant, which were embraced in the submission; first, because there was a mistake in reducing to the form of an award their determination on the case ; and secondly, because in consequence of that mistake, the paper prepared as an award was not delivered as such. And it being apparent that the arbitrators could unite in no award, that the plaintiff should be relieved from the impediment to the assertion of his rights at law, which the submission and the imperfect award created. It-was therefore decreed that the agreement of the 19th of December 1838, and the imperfect award thereon made, should be set aside and cancelled, with costs to the plaintiff. From this decree Pollard applied to this Court for an appeal, which was allowed.
    
      Young and Robinson, for the appellant,
    insisted:
    1st. That the award had been perfected. And to shew that a delivery of the award was not necessary, they referred to Watson on Part. 79-80, 11 Law Libr. 41; Blundell v. Brettargh, 17 Ves. R. 232.
    2d. That the award having been perfected, it could not be altered by the arbitrators. Henfree v. Bromley, 6 East’s R. 309; Irvine v. Elnon, 8 Id. 54; Brown v. Vawser, 4 Id. 584.
    3d. That the award involving both law and fact, and not stating the evidence, or the principles upon which it was founded, or referring to any paper from which they might be ascertained, the Court had no power to change it or set it aside. Head v. Muir, 3 Rand. 122; Taylor v. Nicolson, 1 Hen. & Munf. 67; Pleasants &c. v. Ross, 1 Wash. 156; Wheatley v. Martin, 6 Leigh 62; Anderson v. Darcy, 18 Ves. R. 446.
    4th. That there was no mistake in fact.
    
      5th. That the Court had no jurisdiction of the case. That either party may revoke a submission in pais at any time before an award is made ; and if the award in this case was imperfect, neither the submission or the imperfect award was an impediment to the plaintiff in maintaining an action at law. Watson on Arb. 14, 11 Law Libr. 7.
    
      Daniel and Lyons, for the appellee,
    insisted :
    1st. That the arbitrators made a mistake in carrying out the principle on which they based their award: which was to carry out. in effect the agreement of the parties.
    2d. That the award was not perfected. That the evidence shewed other and further acts were to be done by the arbitrators: and this could not be if the award was already perfected.
    3d. That although it is true that a mistake of fact must appear from the award, yet that a mistake of one thing for another, or a miscalculation, or an error, not of judgment, but of figures, or a failure to do what the arbitrators intended to do, does not fall within the principle. Underhill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 John. Ch. R. 360; Champion v. Wenham, Amb. R. 245; Wheatley v. Martin, 6 Leigh 62; Lee v. Patillo, 4 Leigh 436.
    4th. That the mistake may be corrected by bill in equity. Newland v. Douglas, 2 John. R. 62; Champion v. Wenham, Amb. R. 245. And a Court of law will correct the mistake. Rogers v. Dallimore, 1 Eng. C. L. R. 329.
   Allen, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Court is of opinion that the award of the arbitrators in the bill and proceedings mentioned, dated the 19th of December 1838, being in pursuance of the submission, and being final in its character, and being completed by the signature of the arbitrators, published to the parties and ready for delivery, the award was compíete and final, and the authority of the arbitrators was at an end. The Court is further of opinion, there was no mistake or misapprehension on the part of the arbitrators or either of them, as to the nature or contents of the award, when the same was signed and published as their final act; and though one of the arbitrators, after the termination of his authority, may upon reflection have supposed that the principles by which he was governed should have led him to a different result, such evidence is not of itself sufficient to set aside the award upon the ground of alleged mistake; it not appearing on the face of the award, or from some paper or document connected with or referred to by the award; and all mistake being denied by the other arbitrator. The Court is therefore of opinion that the decree of the Circuit court is erroneous ; and the same is reversed with costs to the appellant. And this Court proceeding to render such decree as the Court below ought to have rendered, the bill is dismissed, with costs to the defendant.

Decree reversed.  