
    Deborah W. Silliman v. Samuel Cummins and David Cummins.
    A married woman can only be divested, during coverture, of her interest in ber husband's estate, in the manner pointed out by the statute.
    "Where the statute in force, when a deed was executed by a married woman, required that the contents of the deed should be made known to her, she is not barred of dower unless it appear, from the magistrate’s certificate, that such requisition was complied with.
    The curative acts, to render valid such imperfect acknowledgments, are themselves void, and the doctrine of Good v. Zercher, 12 Ohio, 365, is affirmed.
    The defect can not be cured, so as to bar dower, by showing dehors the deod that the woman did know its contents at the time of its execution, and intended to pass her dower.
    
      This is a petition for dower from Muskingum county.
    The complainant seeks to be endowed of certain lands of which her late husband, Wyllis Silliman, was seizod during coverture.
    The defendants set up against her claim a deed executed by Wyllis Silliman and the complainant, as his wife, having the following acknowledgment:
    “ State of Ohio, Muskingum county, ss.
    
    “ Before mo, the subscriber, a justice of the peace in and for said county, personally appeared Wyllis Silliman and Deborah W. Silliman, his wife, the within-named grantors,'and acknowledged ^the within to be their voluntary act and deed, for the purposes therein mentioned; and the said Deborah W., being ex amined separate and apart from her said husband, did acknowledge that she executed the same of her own free will and accord, with out coercion or compulsion from her said husband, and that she also freely and voluntarily relinquished all right and title of dower in and to the premises. Witness my hand and seal, this April 8, 1815.
    “ Christian Spangler, [l. s.]
    
      11 Justice of the Peace.”
    
    The defendants allege that at the time of the execution and acknowledgment of said deed, the complainant was above the ago of twenty-one years; that-the contents of the deed were fully known to her, and that she intended, by such execution and acknowledgment, to convey and bar all her claim or right of dower in the land therein described. And they require her, under oath, to answer the following interrogatories, touching such knowledge and intention :
    
      Interrogatories to Deborah W. Silliman, the Complainant.
    
    Interrogatory 1. At the time you signed the deed, of which exhibit A in defendants’ answer is a copy, did you know the contents of the said deed, or of any part thereof, and, if so, of which part; or did you know the object and purposo of the said deed? State fully and particularly all the circumstances of your signing the said deed, and particularly whether the contents or object and purpose of said deed were concealed from or untruly stated to you, and if so, by whom, and where and when such misstatements were made.
    Interrogatory 2. At the time you acknowledged the deed, of which exhibit A in defendants’ answer is a copy, did you know the contents of said deed, or of any part thereof, and if so, which part? or did you know the object or purpose of said deed? State fully and particularly all the circumstances of your acknowledging the said deed, and particularly whether the contents or object and purpose of the said deed were concealed or untruly stated to you, and if so, by whom, and where and when such misstatements were made.
    *In ter rogatory 3. If, at the time you signed or acknowledged the said deed, you did not know tho contents nor the purpose or the object of said deed, what did you then believe to be the contents or object and purpose of the said deed, and what was your purpose in signing and acknowledging the said deed ?
    The petitioner demurred to.these interrogatories.
    G-. N. Cummins', for petitioner.
    R. Stillwell, for defendant.
    The reporter was furnished with no arguments.
   Read, J.

It is the settled law in Ohio that the interest of a married woman in real estate can only be transferred in the mode, and by full compliance with the statutory requisitions, prescribed to be pursued and be performed to authorize her to convey. Connell v. Connell, 6 Ohio, 358; Brown v. Faran, 3 Ohio, 140; Carr v. Williams, 10 Ohio, 305; Lessee of Good v. Zercher, 12 Ohio, 364; Meddock v. Williams, 12 Ohio, 386.

In the case of Good v. Zercher, this court decided that the curative act of March 9, 1835, could not give effect to the deed of s\ feme covert, void, as to her, for want of a compliance with the requisitions of the statute, and was, to that extent, unconstitutional and void. We reassert the principles of that case to be of binding constitutional obligation.

Tho-ceriificate of acknowledgment, therefore, not showing that she was made acquainted with the contents of the deed, forms no bar to her recovery.

The remaining question is, whether a court of equity will aid the defective execution so as to bar her claim, upon its being shown dehors the deed that she was acquainted with its contents, and acknowledged the instrument with intent to pass her dower.

A married woman has no legal existence or power to transfer her interest in real estate, except through the statutory *channel. The mode of executing the conveyance confers upon her the power to convey. Where the power exists independent of its mode of execution, and has been defectively executed, it is not a case of want of power, but of defective execution, which a court of equity will aid. But where the power and mode of execution are inseparable, the power resulting from, the mode, and that mode has not been pursued, it is not a case of defective execution, but a want of power, which a court of equity can not aid. Hence, when a married woman attempts to convoy, and lacks power from not pursuing the proscribed mode, courts of equity will not relieve, because to amend the mode is to create the power.

Curative statutes must conform to the same principles, and have constitutional validity only within the same limits. A statute may carry into effect a defective execution of a power, by converting an equitable into a legal estate, but can not give validity to that which is void, for want of power.

Neither the legislature nor courts can create powers, because the creation of a power is the assumption of dominion and control over the disposition of property, without the consent of the owner. Legislative enactments, like courts of equity, can only aid the defective execution of power by persons having capacity to convey, but can not operate where, as in the case of married women, the power itself depends upon a prescribed mode that has not been pursued. Whatever, therefore, the complainant may have intended to do, or whatever knowledge she may have possessed, the jtatutory provisions, from whence alone her power to act was derived, not having been complied with, the act itself is void. So that neither her intentions, nor knowledge shown dehors the deed, can give it validity so as to divest her of any rights, or constitute any equitable bar to her dower.

Demurrer sustained, and d'ecree for complainant.

Birchard, J.,

dissented. For reasons of dissont, soo opinion in Good v. Zercher, 12 Ohio, 364.  