
    CURTISS-MANES-SCHULTE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant v. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-2217.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
    Submitted: Jan. 22, 2016.
    Filed: Feb. 9, 2016.
    Duane E. Schreimann, Michael J. Schmid, Schreimann, Rackers, Francka & Blunt, L.L.C., Jefferson City, MO, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Fritzlen, Jr., William H. Meyer, Martin, Leigh, Laws & Fritzlen, P.C., Kansas City, MO, for appellee.
    Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and BYE, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM.

Curtiss-Manes-Schulte, Inc. appeals the district court’s adverse.grant of summary judgment in its diversity action. Upon de novo review of the summary judgment record and the district court’s interpretation of the construction performance bond and subcontract, see Bremer Bank v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 601 F.3d 824, 829 (8th Cir.2010), and careful consideration of Curtiss-Manes-Schulte, Inc.’s arguments for reversal, we conclude that summary judgment was warranted. Specifically, we agree with the district court that because the record showed the default-declaration requirement in the performance bond was not met, Safeco Insurance Company of America’s obligations under the bond were not triggered. See Miller-Stanch Constr. Co. v. Williams-Bungart Elec., Inc., 959 S.W.2d 490, 494 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (under performance bond where subcontractor is principal and general contractor is obligee, surety has option of formally taking over project and contract for its completion, or allowing project to be defaulted and letting general contractor complete or contract for completion of project, in which case surety is responsible for costs in excess of contract price). The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
      
      . The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
     
      
      . We decline to consider matters raised for the first time on appeal as a basis for reversal. See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc., 700 F.3d 1172, 1175-76 (8th Cir.2012).
     