
    STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of R.W. and N.W.
    No. 97-CA-0268.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    April 16, 1997.
    Harry F. Conniek, District Attorney, James J. Kelleher, Assistant District Attorney, Parish of Orleans, New Orleans, for Appellant.
    Montu R. Bashambu, Stephanie A. Carson, Student Attorneys, David R. Katner, Supervising Attorney, Tulane Juvenile Law Clinic, New Orleans, for Appellee.
    Before BYRNES, CIACCIO and JONES, JJ.
   h JONES, Judge.

The State appeals the dismissal of a charge of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling (LSA-R.S.14:62.2) against two juveniles. We affirm.

Sixteen year old brothers, R.W. and N.W, were arrested on November 25, 1996, and charged with burglarizing the residence of Ms. Velma Jean Mayeaux. On the day of trial, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss citing the victim’s desire to drop all charges. The State opposed the motion and called Ms. Mayeaux to testify. Ms. Mayeaux told the court that she no longer wanted to pursue the charges because the defendants “paid their consequences already” and that she believed they should be given a “second chance” to allow them the opportunity to learn from their mistakes.

The court dismissed the delinquency petition noting that the victim testified that she did not wish to proceed in the matter. The court also noted that there was a Family in Need of Services proceeding pending.

|2The State appeals arguing that the victim’s desire that the defendants receive a second chance is not good cause under Ch.C. art. 876 because giving a “second chance” to an individual accused of committing a crime is best left to the trial judge after an adjudication of delinquency. Instead, the State maintains the analysis should focus on the district attorney’s power to prosecute when it is clear a crime has been committed.

Article 876 of the Louisiana Children’s Code provides:

For good cause, the court may dismiss a petition on its own motion, on the motion of the child or on motion of the petitioner. The court shall dismiss a petition on the motion of the district attorney.

The Juvenile Court is vested with broad discretion to arrive at solutions which balance the needs of the child with the interests of society. State In Interest of Davis, 96-0337 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/30/96), 683 So.2d 879. Although neither the Children’s Code nor jurisprudence defines the term “good cause”, in State In Interest of Davis this Court found dismissal of a delinquency petition appropriate after the victim refused to press charges. In State In Interest of Davis, as in this case, this Court noted the pendency of a Families in Need of Services hearing. (FINS) Ch.C. art. 726. The judge in this matter heard Ms. Mayeaux testify she wanted to drop “all charges” against the juveniles and concluded the intervention of FINS would address the needs of the juveniles, while serving the interests of society. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the dismissal of the petition for adjudication and affirm the ruling of the juvenile court.

AFFIRMED.

BYRNES, J., dissents with reasons.

| iBYRNES, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

The juvenile court dismissed the delinquency petition based on a charge of burglarizing a residence, and noted that there was a pending Family in Need of Services proceeding. The majority finds that the juvenile court has discretion to arrive at solutions which balance the needs of the child with the interests of society, citing State in the Interest of Davis, 96-0337 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/30/96), 683 So.2d 879. That case involved a traffic violation, i.e. a charge of reckless driving, whereas the present case involves a burglary, which is a criminal charge. La. Ch.C. art. 876 does not state that the juvenile court has discretion to arrive at solutions which balance the needs of the child with the interests of society. A balancing test of the needs of the child and the interest of society usually are considered in the context of parental rights, child support, child custody, etc. I would interpret that the needs of the child should not be weighed in the context of determining whether criminal charges should be prosecuted. The needs of the child are best considered after an adjudication of delinquency at the disposition sentencing hearing.

La. Ch.C. Art. 876 provides for discretion for “good cause.” In the present case, none of the particular facts enumerated by the juvenile court serve to show |2good cause to exonerate the defendant from the effects of prosecution. I would consider good cause to be where the victim recanted her testimony depending on the totality of circumstances in a particular case.

In the present case the victim did not recant her testimony. Instead, the victim did not want to pursue the charges because the defendants “paid their consequences already” and she thought they should be given a second chance. If the juvenile is found guilty, mitigating circumstances, including the needs of the child, should be weighed with the interest of society at the time of sentencing. If the juvenile court were found to have the discretion to balance the needs of the child with the interest of society and were to dismiss the juvenile criminal charges, in effect, the juvenile court would be taking into account the wishes of the person whose residence was allegedly burglarized.

I would not find that there was good cause to dismiss criminal charges against two sixteen-year-old juveniles. Crimes committed by juveniles have increased immensely. The person whose residence was burglarized is not the only victim. The public is also the ultimate victim. The charged offense of burglary or any criminal offense endangers the public. The State, which represents the people, should be able to prosecute the accused. If the State were to prosecute, and the victim refused to testify, the victim should be held in contempt and should be ordered to pay the costs related to the prosecution.

Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the juvenile court. 
      
      . The names of the juveniles are to be main-tamed as confidential.
     