
    Jolanda QETA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-2578-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 25, 2010.
    Linda C. Flanagan, New York, N.Y. for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director; Manuel A. Palau, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Jolanda Qeta, a native and citizen of Albania, seeks review of a May 20, 2009, order of the BIA affirming the July 12, 2007, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) George T. Chew, which denied her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jolanda Qeta No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (BIA May 20, 2009), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 12, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

The agency’s determination that Qeta did not suffer past persecution is supported by substantial evidence. The IJ reasonably determined that Qeta’s encounters with men who sought unsuccessfully to force her into prostitution and the threatening phone calls she received did not rise to the level of persecution. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the harm must be sufficiently severe, rising above “mere harassment”); Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir.2002) (stating that unfulfilled threats do not constitute persecution).

We also find no error in the agency’s determination that Qeta’s purported social group — young single women in Albania who do not have male relatives to protect them from sex traffickers — was not cognizable under the INA. The BIA has long interpreted the term “social group” to mean “a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.” Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). A cognizable social group must: (1) exhibit a shared characteristic that is socially visible to others in the community; and (2) be defined with sufficient particularity. See Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74-76 (BIA 2007), aff'd by Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir.2007). Qeta advances no argument that would compel us to disturb the agency’s conclusion that the group she proposed was too broad to be cognizable. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233; Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir.1991)(“Pos-session of broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a particular group.”); see also Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that “young (or those who appear to be young), attractive Albanian women who are forced into prostitution” did not constitute a social group under the INA). Moreover, as the BIA observed, to the extent Qeta has married, she is no longer a member of that group.

Qeta’s failure to establish the requisite nexus to a protected ground was fatal to her claims for both asylum and withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b), 1231(b)(3). She does not challenge the agency’s denial of her application for CAT relief.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  