
    Francis Coleman v. Samuel Shelton.
    "Where personal property left in pledge, or subject to an equitable lien, has been taken from the pawnee by the debtor, the creditor may go into equity to enforce his lien. At law the lien incident to a pledge or pawn depends on the possession, and detinue or other action at law cannot afford an adequate remedy where the pawn has been taken from the possession of the creditor.
    The bill stated that Samuel Shelton, being indebted to Robert Chandler in the sum of $200, pledged to him a negro fellow named Hall, who was to work for him until the debt should be paid. Chandler fell in debt to Robert Mobley, and, with the assent of Shelton, transferred his right in Hall to Mobley. Whilst the negro was in possession of Mobley, Shelton insisted on complainant advancing $200 to Mobley, and taking the negro on the same terms as he had been held bv Chandler and Mobley. Complainant advanced the money accordingly, took the negro and had him in possession a few weeks, when Shelton enticed him away, acknowledging that he was insolvent, and threatening at the same time to remove off *with the negro. The bill prayed that the negro might be sold for the money (with interest) advanced by complainant, and Shelton restrained from moving off with him. There was no demurrer to the bill. The plaintiff made full proof of the facts stated. The defendant evaded answering the charges directly, but did not deny them.
    June, 1826. Chancellor Thompson dismissed the bill for want of jurisdiction.
    The complainant appealed.
    Feb. 1827.
    Pearson, for the appellant.
    The only question is, Whether the court has jurisdiction ? Shelton is insolvent, and Coleman, if he sued him at law, could getting nothing but a return of nulla bona. If he sued him in trover, he would likewise fail. 7 Term Rep. 387. 2 Selw. N. P. 1271. He has no remedy at all at law, or at best a doubtful one. In equity he stood in the light of a mortgagee, and could obtain the benefit of such equitable interest. 1 Madd. Cha. 425.
    By our act prescribing the equity jurisdiction, the remedy at law must be plain and adequate; and the act required nothing more than the enforcement of the same principle established in the English courts. 3 Ves. 133. The filing of a bill in equity besides would have been notice to the world not to buy, and Shelton was then threatening to run off with the negro.
    Feb. 1827.
   Curia, per

Johnson, J.

The leading object of this bill is for relief; so that in considering the question of jurisdiction, the case made by the bill will be exclusively regarded, without reference to the matters which arise out of the answer.

In theory the law provides a remedy for any wrong which one man can inflict upon another, and a branch of *equity jurisdiction founded on this theory has grown up, on account of the inapti-tude of the proceedings of a court of law to supply a remedy suited to the precise injury, in a variety of instances: and hence the rule that equity has jurisdiction in all cases where the party injured has not a complete and adequate remedy at Jaw.

There can be no doubt that, by the terms of the contract set out in the bill, the complainant had a right to the possession, and a lien on the negro for the amount advanced; but it is contended, in opposition to this motion, that the complainant has a complete and adequate remedy by an action of assumpsit, or trover, or detinue, and that therefore this court cannot entertain jurisdiction of the cause.

It is amongst the peculiar incidents attached to a pledge or pawn, that the lien created by it depends on the possession of the thing pawned or pledged; and remains so long as the possession continues, and no longer. 1 East, 4. 7 East, 5. 3 Term Rep. 119. 4 Johns. Rep. 112. Nowit is very clear, that neither the action of assumpsit nor trover will restore the complainant to the lien to which he is entitled by the terms of the contract, and of which he has been deprived by the act of the defendant. A recovery would place him on the footing of a general creditor : but his lien is gone ; and in the event of insolvency, he would lose his remedy. The same reasons apply to the remedy by action of detinue, if that action can be maintained : the judgment there is in the alternative, either for the thing in specie or damages; and whether this would or would not prove adequate, would depend on contingencies, about which the court ought not to drive the complainant to speculate, as he must do so at the hazard of an entire loss in the event of insolvency, which is positively alleged in the bill. The wrong complained of in this case is, that the complainant has been, by the acf of the defendant, deprived of a security %which he held, under a contract with him, for the payment of a debt. And it apparent that none of the remedies before alluded to are calculated to restore him fully to his rights; nor am I aware that the courts of law furnish any that will. To the court of equity he must therefore resort.

I have not been able to find any case, nor has any been cited at the bar, which can be regarded as directly in point. The books do however furnish cases which bear, I think, a strong analogy. The case of Kruger v. Wilcox, Amb. 252, is of this class. There lord chancellor Hardwicke remarks, that he had been unable to find any case at law, where a factor who had parted with the possession of goods, on which he had a lien, was allowed to retain it, where the goods had been turned into money; but he adds, “I have no doubt, it would be so in this court, if the goods remained in specie; nor do I doubt its being so, when they are turned into money.” In the case, Ex parte Emery, 2 Ves. Sen. 674, a factor was held to retain a specific lien on goods, although he had parted with the possession. Now although the question of jurisdiction did not arise in these cases, they ascertain rights for which the courts of law furnish no adequate remedy. A court of law could not restore his possession and lien on the goods, nor follow their proceeds, when converted into money, and consequently equity must, according to principle, retain it. The case is therefore ordered back to the chancellor, to be tried on its merits.

Colcock, J. dissented, without assigning reasons.

Decree reversed.  