
    Jose Manuel BARAJAS-PRECIADO, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-73442
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted July 26, 2016 
    
    August 02, 2016
    Jose Manuel Barajas-Preciado, San Fernando, CA, Pro Se.
    Jennifer R. Khouri, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: SCHROEDER, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Júdges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jose Manuel Barajas-Preciado, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s order of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo question of law, Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005), and we deny the petition for review.

Barajas-Preciado does not challenge that his controlled substance conviction renders him statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2); Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are waived).

Contrary to Barajas-Preciado’s contention, the agency was not required to conduct a particularly serious crime analysis or consider the related factors in Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982), in determining his eligibility for adjustment of status, where his controlled substance conviction rendered him inadmissible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2) (status may be adjusted if alien is “eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United State” (emphasis added)); cf. Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 244 (particularly serious crime is statutory bar to asylum and withholding).

Contrary to Barajas-Preciado’s contentions, the BIA reached the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims and properly determined Barajas-Preciado failed to establish that prior counsel rendered ineffective representation. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 793 (ineffective assistance of counsel claims require deficient conduct and prejudice).

Barajas-Preciado’s contention that the agency failed to consider the administrative record is not supported by the record.

In light of this disposition, we do not address Barajas-Preciado’s remaining contentions regarding Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     