
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Mohamed Kassory BANGOURA, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-5308-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 16, 2013.
    Joseph Vizcarrondo, Special Assistant United States Attorney (Sandra S. Glover, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for David B. Fein, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, for Appellee.
    David J. Wenc, Wenc Law Offices, Windsor Locks, CT, for Appellant.
   Present: RALPH K. WINTER, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, the judgment of said district court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

Mohamed Kassory Bangoura appeals from the judgment of conviction entered by the district court on December 20, 2011. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

Bangoura did not raise his instant objection to the jury instruction below, so this Court reviews only for plain error. Fed. R.Crim.P. 30(d), 52(b). Under plain error review, this Court “may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute’; • (3) the error ‘affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means’ it ‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings’; and (4) ‘the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009)).

Bangoura argues that the district court erred in not providing the jury with an instruction that the evidence regarding his sham marriage and submission of fraudulent documents to the Citizenship and Immigration Service — which he argues were subordinate facts — could only be relied upon if the jury first concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Bangoura had committed these acts. The instruction urged, however, does not accurately reflect the law. While each element of a charged offense must obviously be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), this standard “does not operate upon each of the many subsidiary facts on which the prosecution may collectively rely to persuade the jury that a particular element has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Viafara-Rodriguez, 729 F.2d 912, 913 (2d Cir.1984); see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689-90, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (explaining that Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible if the jury could reasonably conclude that it had occurred “by a preponderance of the evidence”).

The jury was repeatedly instructed that each element of the charged conduct had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the law does not require that each subordinate fact offered to prove the charged conduct meet the reasonable doubt standard. Thus, Bangoura has not demonstrated any error in the jury instructions, much less plain error.

We find Bangoura’s remaining arguments to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.  