
    Blythe vs. Peters.
    When an injunction bill has been dismissed, and a decree rendered against the complainant and his securities in the injunction bond, which remains unreversed, a court of equity will not give relief, though the judgment to enjoin the execution of which the bill was filed, may have been set aside by the court of law in which it was rendered.
    If a security, either through ignorance or fraud, combine with a judgment debtor and another in doing an act whereby the judgment creditor is delayed in the collection of his debt, and probably if turned over to the judgment debtor may lose it by his insolvency, this will be such an improper interference and injury to the judgment creditor as will prevent the interference of a court of equity in behalf of the surety.
    The bill stated, that the defendant recovered in the • county court of Henry, a judgment against one Dewitt for two hundred and fifty dollars; that after the adjournment of the court, said Dewitt procured Julian Frazier and Joseph W. Looney to go to the clerk of said court and enter into an appeal bond, in the said case of Peters vs. Dewitt, and that the clerk took upon himself to grant an appeal to the circuit court, and that the circuit court (without noticing the manner in which the cause was brought up,) affirmed the judgment and rendered judgment against said Dewitt, and the said Frazier and Looney his securities, upon which execution issued. That thereupon the said Frazier and Looney filed their bill to be relieved against said judgment and for a pei'-petual injunction, in the chancery court at Paris. That ihe chancellor dismissed said bill and entered up judgment against said Frazier and Looney, and the complainant, who was their security in the injunction bond; upon whieh judgment execution has issued. That af-terwards the said Frazier and Looney moved the said circuit court to set aside said judgment entered up against them, which was done by the said court. Bill prays for relief, and perpetual injunction, &c.
    To this bill the defendant demurred, which demurrer was sustained in the court be'ow, and an appeal prayed and granted to this court.
    
      H. W. Dunlap, for complainant.
    
      A. Huntsman, for defendant.
   Green, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This bill is brought to be relieved from a judgment on an injunction bond, on the ground that the judgment to enjoin the execution of which the former bill was filed, has since been set aside by the court of law in which it-was rendered. The present complainant was the security for Frazier and Looney, for the injunction in that case. Had they any equity against the present defendant? If they had not, it is manifest the complainant in this cause has none. They had entered into a bond, as the security of Dewitt, for an appeal from the county to the circuit court. In the circuit court a judgment was rendered against Dewitt, and against Frazier and Looney as his securities. They say this judgment was void, because the appeal bond was taken by the clerk, after the court adjourned. On this ground jhe former bill was filed to be relieved against it. The chancellor dismissed the bill, and gave judgment-on the injunction bond against them and the present complainant, their security. In this the chancellor was clearly right. Their remedy, if they had any, was at law. This complainant having become bound for Frazier and Looney in the injunction bond, when the decree was made against them, his liability was fixed, and he cannot complain nor obtain relief so long as that decree remains in force agáinst them. No attempt is made to reverse it, by re-hearing, bill of review, or appeal. He undertook for them that they should prosecute their bill with effect. He became liable because they failed to do what he undertook that they should do. His liability being a consequence of theirs, relief to him must be a consequence of, and de-pendant on relief obtained by them.

Frazier and Looney either through ignorance or fraud, combined with Dewitt and the clerk in doing an act whereby the present defendant was delayed in the collection of his debt, and probably, if turned over to Dewitt, may have lost it by his insolvency. By this improper interference of theirs, delaying, embarrassing, and probably defeating the defendant’s remedy against Dewitt, they have done him an injury. Shall this court consummate that injury by giving them relief against his judgment on the injunction bond? Clearly not. To do so would be most unjust. On this ground also they have no right to relief, and consequently the present complainant has none.

Decree affirmed.  