
    Edith Nicole BOSTWICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-55796
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 9, 2017
       Pasadena, California
    Filed February 13, 2017
    
      Lawrence David Rohlfing, Attorney, Law Offices of Lawrence Rohlfing, Santa Fe Springs, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant
    Thomas C. Stahl, Chief Counsel, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, Jeffrey Chen, Attorney, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee
    Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, NGUYEN, Circuit Judge, and AMON, District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
      The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Edith Bostwick appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s determination that she did not qualify for disability insurance benefits. At steps four and five of the sequential evaluation process, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Bo-stwick could not perform her past work as a sales representative, but could perform other work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy and was therefore not disabled. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

1.The ALJ properly weighed the medical evidence before concluding that Bo-stwick had the residual functional capacity to perform light work. The ALJ gave specific reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting Dr. Bronner’s opinion because it is inconsistent with the opinions of the examining doctor, testifying medical expert, and two state medical consultants, as well as inconsistent with the record. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (“When confronted with conflicting medical opinions, an ALJ need not accept a treating physician’s opinion that is conclusory and brief and unsupported by clinical findings.” (citing Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992))).

Substantial evidence also supported the ALJ’s decision to credit the testimony of Dr. Jensen that Bostwick could perform light work, even with her limitations. Dr. Jensen’s testimony comported with the objective medical evidence and with the opinions of the examining doctor and state medical consultants. Although Bostwick argues that the ALJ needed to address Dr. Jensen’s off-the-record comment, an ALJ need not discuss every single piece of evidence. See Howard v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “the ALJ does not need to discuss every piece of evidence,” and the “ALJ is not required to discuss evidence that is neither significant nor probative”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2. The ALJ identified the specific testimony that he did not find credible: Bo-stwick’s account of her limitations to the extent that her testimony was inconsistent with the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment. Her testimony was inconsistent with the lack of evidence that she needed a hand-held assistive device to walk, see Social Security Ruling 96-9p, the extent of her daily activities, see Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2010), and the testimony and opinions of the medical experts, see Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002).

3. Remand is unnecessary to consider the new letter that Bostwick submitted to the Appeals Council. The conclusory letter from one of her treating physicians does not undermine the substantial evidence that supports the ALJ’s decision. See Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Conclusory opinions by medical experts regarding the ultimate question of disability are not binding on the ALJ.” (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927)).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       xhis disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     