
    Frank OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXTRON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 14-2637-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 14, 2015.
    
      Morton I. Baum, Monticello, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Mitchell A. Karlan (Gabriel Gillett, on the brief), Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New York, NY, for • Defendant-Appellee.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CHESTER J. STRAUB, Circuit Judges, LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Loma G. Schofield, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Frank Owens appeals from the District Court’s July 15, 2014 judgment dismissing his amended complaint concerning the loss of his investment in Gaffken & Barriger Fund, LLC, a real-estate investment fund. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Carpenters Pension Trust Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays PLC, 750 F.3d 227, 232 (2d Cir.2014). “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

Upon de novo review'of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed plaintiffs amended complaint, substantially for the reasons stated in its thorough and well-reasoned July 14, 2014 decision — namely, plaintiff has failed to explicitly identify any legal claims aside from a vague reference to “New York public policy.” To the extent plaintiffs claim is premised on fraud, plaintiff has failed to plead such a claim with particularity. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b).

We have considered all of the arguments raised by plaintiff on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s July 15, 2014 judgment.  