
    METTALL v. STATE.
    (No. 6134.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 27, 1921.
    Rehearing Denied June 22, 1921.)
    1. Forgery <⅝»44(|/2) — May be proved by circumstantial evidence in absence of direct evidence.
    In the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence is available to prove forgery.
    2. Forgery <©=>42 — That fictitious name was signed to instrument is circumstance against its genuineness.
    Evidence that a fictitious name was signed to the instrument is a circumstance against its genuineness.
    3. Criminal law <©=>387 — Testimony as to absence of acquaintance with purported signer of forged instrument by persons who probably would know him admissible.
    In prosecution for forgery, persons so situated that they probably would know purported signer of instrument may testify as to the absence of knowledge of, or acquaintance with, purported signer.
    4. Criminal law <©=>517(2) — Written statement held admissible as a confession.
    In prosecution for forgery, defendant’s written statement that he signed another’s name to the check without authority from such other person, and without even knowing him, %eld admissible as a confession, as against contention that it did not connect defendant with the crime.
    5. Forgery <®=>34(3) — Indorsements on check did not authorize its rejection upon ground of variance.
    In prosecution for forgery of check, in-dorsements on check at the time it was offered in evidence did not authorize objection upon the ground of variance; the indorsements not being a part of the document declared upon.
    
      6. Criminal law @=>535(2) — Defendant’s confession available to help establish corpus de-licti.
    In prosecution for forgery, defendant’s confession was available to the state in aid (bf other proof to establish the corpus delicti.
    7. Criminal law @=>517(1) — Identity of accused may be established by his own confession.
    Where the corpus delicti is established, the identity of the accused may be established by his own confession.
    8. Forgery- @=44(l) — Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction.
    Evidence- held to sustain conviction of forgery of check.
    Appeal from Criminal District Court, Tar-rant County; Geo. E. Hosey, Judge.
    Don F. Mettall was convicted of forgery, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Gravesi & Houtchens and C. E. Clark, all of Port Worth, for appellant.
    O. M. Cureton, Atty. Gen., and C. L. Stone, Asst. A tty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

Appellant was convicted of forgery. The instrument declared on was a check on the First National Bank of Port Worth for $22, naming Prank J. Begonia, or bearer, as payee, and purporting to bear the signature of J. W. Dodd. When introduced in evidence, there was written on the back of the check “Prank J. Begonia,” and also, in pencil, “Douglas Maddox.”

The state, by circumstances, sought to show that the signature was forged, and in pursuance of this effort introduced several witnesses who were residents of Port Worth, where the check was purported to have been drawn and presented, who testified that they had extensive acquaintance in the city, but knew of no such person as J. W. Dodd. Proof was also introduced that in the bank upon which the cheek was drawn there was no account in the name of Dodd.

In the absence of direct evidence, that of a circumstantial nature is available to prove forgery. Horn v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. R. 89, 150 S. W. 949; Branch’s Ann. Tex. Penal Code, § 1415.

Evidence that a fictitious name was signed to the instrument is a circumstance against its genuineness, and the absence of knowledge of or acquaintance with the purported signer of the instrument, when testified to by persons situated so that they probably would know him, is properly received. Cyc. of Daw & Procedure, vol. 19, p. 421; Greenleaf on Evidence, § 109; Fry v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 79, 215 S. W. 560.

The complaint of the introduction- of the evidence in question cannot be sustained. The confession of the appellant was introduced. It was in writing, recites warning in compliance with the statute, and contains the following:

“On June 1, 1920, I wrote a cheek payable to Prank Begonia for $22 and signed J. W. Dodd’s name to it on the First National Bank of this city. I did this at Prank’s suggestion. I never had any authority from Dodd to sign his name to the check or to any other written instrument. I do not even know Dodd. I have known Prank about a year, I used to go with his sister.”

Objection that the confession failed to identify the check signed with that declared on was made and overruled; the appellant contending that the confession did not tend to connect him with the offense. Appellant’s position, in our opinion, is not sound. We think the statement is a confession. Austin v. State, 15 Tex. App. 388; Ferguson v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 93, 19 S. W. 901; Wharton’s Crim. Evidence, vol. 2, § 622. It is a definite declaration by the appellant that he, without authority, wrote a check coinciding in all particulars with that declared upon. Even if the statement fell short of a full confession of guilt, its nature was such as rendered it admissible as a circumstance against the appellant. Bloch v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. R. 8, 193 S. W. 303.

The indorsements found on the check at the time that it was offered in evidence did not authorize its rejection upon the ground of variance. The indorsements are not part of the document declared upon. Branch’s Ann. Penal Code, § 1397; Hennessy v. State, 23 Tex. App. 354, 5 S. W. 215; Leslie v. State, 47 S. W. 368; Labbaite v. State, 6 Tex. App. 257; De Alberts v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 508, 31 S. W. 391; Gumpert v. State, 228 S. W. 237.

The confession of the appellant was available to the state in aid of other proof to establish the corpus delicti. Jackson v. State, 29 Tex. App. 464, 16 S. W. 247; Branch’s Ann. Penal Code, § 1890. The corpus delicti being established, the identity of the accused may be established by his confession. Sullivan v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 639, 51 S. W. 375; Gallegos v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 115, 90 S. W. 492.

In the case before us, in addition to the confession to which we have adverted, it is proved that the payee named in the check presented it at the bank upon which it was drawn; that the purported maker had no account in the bank; and there were facts sufficient to justify the inference by the jury that the maker of the check was, in fact, a fictitious person. The evidence is sufficient to show that the document was forged. With the confession, this evidence is fortified, and the. verdict establishing appellant’s guilty connection with the forgery supported.

The evidence, in our opinion,' is of sufficient cogency to sustain the verdict, and in the procedure we have found no departure from lawful methods.

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

HAWKINS, J.

Appellant has filed a motion for rehearing, in which no new propositions are presented to the court. The grounds of the motion are very general, simply reiterating that the court was in error in not having sustained the assignments originally presented upon the first submission of the case.

Believing a proper disposition was made in the first instance, and having found no reason to change or modify the opinion heretofore rendered, appellant’s motion for rehearing will be overruled. 
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