
    Eva M. RHODES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHURCHILL BRIDGE ASS’N INC., Advanced Property Management Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 12-3858.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 16, 2013.
    Eva M. Rhodes, Newington, CT, pro se.
    John B. Farley, Halloran & Sage LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellees.
    
      PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, GERARD E. LYNCH, and RAYMOND J. LOHIER JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Eva M. Rhodes, pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment, entered September 6, 2012, granting summary judgment to the defendants and dismissing her complaint alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604; the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692p; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

As an initial matter, we lack jurisdiction to consider the district court’s denial of Rhodes’s motion for reconsideration, because Rhodes did not file a notice of appeal from that order. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) (“A party intending to challenge an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A) ... must file a notice of appeal, or an amended notice of appeal ... within the time prescribed by this Rule.”).

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[sjummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wol-pojf & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). Upon such review, we conclude that Rhodes’s appeal is without merit for the reasons articulated by the district court in its thorough ruling on summary judgment. We note in particular that Rhodes fails to provide sufficient admissible evidence to permit a jury to find disparate treatment on the basis of race. Rhodes contends the district court overlooked evidence that two similarly situated white owners received preferential treatment in connection with repairs occasioned by the sewage back up at the heart of her grievance. However, Rhodes did not request the drywall replacement received by one of the white owners and thus was not similarly situated, and there was no admissible evidence the other was treated differently than Rhodes.

We have considered all of Rhodes’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  