
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Alexander VELOZ-LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-3101-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 12, 2014.
    Paul D. Silver (Edward P.Grogan, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Albany, NY, for Appellee.
    Mark A. Kaplan, Kaplan and Kaplan, Burlington, VT, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, ROBERT D. SACK and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Defendan1>-Appellant Alexander Veloz-Lopez appeals from a judgment entered on August 13, 2013, by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.), sentencing him primarily to 48 months’ imprisonment on one count of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). On appeal, Veloz-Lopez asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made after he was allegedly stopped by border patrol agent Aaron Carlson. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

We review the denial of a suppression motion for clear error as to the district court’s factual findings and de novo as to its legal conclusions. See United States v. Getto, 729 F.3d 221, 227 (2d Cir.2013). “Under the long-established rule of Terry v. Ohio, police may only stop someone when they have ‘reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.’ ” United States v. Freeman, 735 F.3d 92, 95-96 (2d Cir.2013) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). In evaluating whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, we look only to the facts that the officer knew at the time of the stop. “Any events that occur after a stop is effectuated cannot contribute to the analysis of whether there was reasonable suspicion to warrant the stop in the first instance.” Id. at 96.

A person has been stopped by a police officer if “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person [in the same situation] would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.); see United States v. Simmons, 560 F.3d 98, 105-06 (2d Cir.2009). It is well established that a police officer who merely asks a person questions in a public place has not thereby conducted a stop, since such questioning is “clearly the sort of consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest.” Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (per curiam); see United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002). However, police questions may constitute a stop if the surrounding circumstances “convey a message that compliance with [the officers’] requests is required.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). Factors that might indicate a stop include “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (opinion of Stewart, J.).

Here, Veloz-Lopez contends that he was stopped at the moment when Agent Carlson first approached him. The government, on the other hand, contends that the initial encounter was consensual, and that there was no Fourth Amendment seizure until Veloz-Lopez was explicitly placed under arrest. Because the issue was not fully litigated below, the district court did not explicitly decide at what point Veloz-Lopez was stopped.

Without knowing when Veloz-Lopez was stopped, we cannot determine whether Agent Carlson had sufficient facts at the moment of the stop to establish reasonable suspicion. And the present record does not permit us to decide in the first instance when the stop occurred. We therefore remand this case to the district court to determine the point at which Veloz-Lopez was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment — that is, the moment at which a reasonable person in Veloz-Lopez’s position would not have felt free to leave. See Simmons, 560 F.3d at 105-06. Once the factual record on that issue is adequately developed, we will be able to determine whether the facts known to Agent Carlson at the time of the stop were enough to engender reasonable suspicion.

We therefore REMAND this case for further proceedings pursuant to the procedures set forth in United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir.1994). The parties shall inform the Clerk of the Court by letter once the district court has issued its decision on remand. Following such notification, the reinstated appeal will be decided by this panel without further briefing or oral argument unless otherwise ordered. 
      
      . We reject the government's alternative argument that Agent Carlson already had reasonable suspicion at the moment when he first approached Veloz-Lopez. The government notes that (1) undocumented immigrants have been observed in this area, near the Canadian border, in the past; (2) Agent Carlson had received a report from a concerned citizen about a pedestrian walking along a local road on which foot traffic is uncommon; and (3) Agent Carlson testified that Veloz-Lopez seemed out of place, appeared to be waiting for something, and wore dirty clothes. We conclude that these facts alone were not sufficient to support a reasonable belief that Veloz-Lopez might have been engaged in criminal activity. See Freeman, 735 F.3d at 95-96.
     