
    MAIER v. STATE.
    (No. 5921.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    June 22, 1921.
    Rehearing Denied Dee. 21, 1921.)
    1. Criminal law <&wkey;l 144(3) — No presumption of improper alteration of indictment from interlineation.
    No presumption of improper alteration of an indictment accompanying the record on appeal arose from the apparent insertion of the ■letters “Mrs.,” after an erasure, preceding a name in the indictment of one upon whom accused had unlawfully engaged in the practice of medicine; the inserted letters bearing the appearance of having been written with the same typewriter as the rest of the instrument.
    2. Criminal law <&wkey;l 186(4)— No reversal by reason of faulty instruction not affecting result.
    A reversal of a conviction will not be had by reason of a faulty charge, where a conviction was a necessary result, unless the jury should arbitrarily disbelieve the uncontroverted testimony, in view of Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 743, which is imperative in requiring affirmance, where errors could have produced no prejudicial result.
    3. Physicians and surgeons <&wkey;6(l) — “Chiropractor” one who practices medicine.
    A chiropractor, “offering to treat” and “treating” a certain person, was engaging and offering to engage in the practice of medicine for hire on a human being, within the meaning of Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, tit. 12, c. 6 (articles 750-758e), requiring a certificate to be registered in the office of the district clerk, etc.; the meaning of the term “chiropractor” not being unknown to the law.
    [Ed. Note. — Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Eirst and Second Series, Chiropractic — Chiropractor.]
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    4. Criminal law <&wkey;l 186(4) — Defining practice of medicine held not prejudicial, in prosecution for not registering certificate.
    In a prosecution for unlawfully engaging in the practice of medicine and offering to engage in the practice of medicine without having registered a certificate, as required by Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 750, the failure to register the certificate was the gist of the offense or offenses, and defendant could not be injured because the court defined the practice of medicine in both ways specified in article 755, being harmless if technically uncalled for, in view of Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 743.,
    5. Criminal law <&wkey;829(3) — Charge substantially covered by given charge properly refused.
    In a prosecution of a chiropractor for practicing medicine, it was not error to refuse to give a special charge that, before convicting defendant, the jury must believe that defendant treated or offered to treat diseases or disorders by some'system or method for which, directly or indirectly, be charged money or other compensation, which would have been but a repetition of a part of the main charge.
    Appeal from Hill County Court; R. T. Burns, Judge.
    C. .W. Maier was convicted of unlawfully engaging or offering to engage in the practice of medicine, and appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Dupree & Crenshaw, of Hillsboro, for appellant.
    Alvin M. O.wsley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

The indictment charges that the appellant “did then and there unlawfully engage in the practice of medicine and offer to engage in the practice of medicine for hire upon a human being, to wit, upon Mrs. Guy Hooker, without having registered in the office of the district clerk * * * a certificate,” etc. The indictment was properly drawn under chapter 6, title 12, of the Penal Code. The original indictment accompanies the record in support of the contention that on its face it bears evidence of such alteration or interline-ation as to vitiate it. The instrument is typewritten, and the form suggests that in writing it the letters “Mrs.,” preceding the name “Guy Hooker,” were inserted. No evidence was offered, and we think from the instrument no such presumption arises as would condemn it. The inserted letters bear the appearance of having been written with the same typewriter, and, as the matter impresses us, nothing is disclosed throwing suspicion upon the indictment. It is said:

“Where an interlineation or erasure is in the same handwriting and written with the same ink as the balance of the deed, the presumption, in the absence of any other proof, is that it occurred prior to the execution and delivery, or at least that no inference arises to require explanation.” 12 Cyc. of Law & Proc. p. 255.

Illustrative ■ cases will be found in the note under the text.

The evidence reveals, without conflict, that the appellant was consulted, and, upon examination of Mrs. Hooker, diagnosed her ailment as resulting from misalignment- of certain joints of the vertebrae in her spine; that he was known as a chiropractor; that he treated Mrs. Hooker by using a course of “adjustments,” for which he charged and was paid compensation; that he used no medicine or surgical instruments, and that, following the treatment her condition improved. It was also shown that he had not registered his certificate as required by the statute. Penal Code, art. 750%

Various criticisms to the charge are made, based upon exceptions and special charges presented upon the trial. From'an academic point oí view, doubtless, the charge might have been improved Dy following some of the suggestions embraced in the criticisms mentioned, but to our mind it is apparent that such changes would have produced no practical results. The facts constituting the elements of the offense and its commission by the appellant were testified to by witnesses. They were not controverted by any testimony. No discrediting facts were introduced or suggested which would authorize the jury to disregard the testimony. Without arbitrarily disbelieving the evidence, a conviction was a necessary result. No change was suggested with reference to the charge which would or could, in our judgment, have affected the jury’s assessment of the punishment.

The court, in its main charge, submitted the true issues to the jury in language which we think was unexceptionable. His quoting of definitions given by article 755 of the statute on the practice of medicine may have been superfluous. Both phases of the statute were embraced in the indictment and in the proof, however; that is, “offering to treat” and “treating Mrs. Hooker.” We see no reason why a conviction might not have been had upon either. The circumstances show that he was holding himself out as what is known as a chiropractor, a term not unknown to the law. Hicks v. State, 227 S. W. 302. As such he diagnosed and treated Mrs. Hooker.

Pretermitting a further discussion of details of the charge or the criticism addressed thereto, we will say that, after a careful examination of them and the entire record, we are impressed with the conviction that the record reflects nothing indicating that the trial of the appellant was otherwise than fair and impartial, but that, on the contrary, it seems manifest that such irregularities as are complained of, granting the technical accuracy of the complaint of them, could have produced no result prejudicial to the appellant. Such being our conclusion, our duty to affirm the case is imperative, made so by the statute (article 743, Code Grim. Proc.), as often construed in the decisions noted thereunder in Vernon’s Texas Orim. St. vol. 2.

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

LATTIMORE, J.

In view of the urgent motion of appellant, we have again gone over the matters raised. The original indictment is before us. It is mainly typewritten. The alignment of the machine was such as that the first letter of each typewritten line falls directly under the first letter of the line above. There appears a marginal space of more than an inch at the left of each such line. Under the first letter of the second line appears the letter “G,” the beginning of the name “Guy Hooker,” which appears on the third line. In said line, and to the left of the word “Guy,” plainly appears the abbreviation “Mrs.” The abbreviation “Mrs.,” appears to be written upon the place where something else had been written and erased, such erasure destroying the smooth surface of the paper. Careful scrutiny shows that the abbreviation “Mrs.” seems to have been first typed upon said paper slightly above the level of the other letters on the third line. This appears to have been erased, and by a slight moving of the paper upon which the indictment was written, the “Mrs.,” now appearing in the indictment, was written. There does not appear to have been any erasure of the “Mrs.” which now appears on the face of the indictment. We see nothing in the indictment on which to base any conclusion that same does not with certainty apprise appellant of the fact that he was charged with practicing and offering to practice medicine upon Mrs. Guy Hooker.

Article 755, Vernon’s P. C., defines in two ways those acts which shall constitute practicing medicine under the meaning of that phrase as used in our Medical Practice Act, same being chapter 6, tit. 12, Vernon’s P. C. Irrespective of whether embraced under one definition or the other, a person who practices medicine in this state must register the certificate required by law in the office of the district clerk in the county in which he practices. The failure to so register such certificate was the gist of the offense charged in the instant ease. We regard the complaint of appellant that the trial court gave to the jury in his charge both definitions above mentioned as presenting no possible injury to appellant. There appears no controversy over the fact .that he had not registered any certificate with said clerk, and that what he did was within the inhibition of the said Medical Practice Act. Even if technically uncalled for, the giving of both said definitions was harmless. Article 743, Vernon’s O. 0. P.

The evidence also shows without controversy that appellant treated Mrs. Guy Hooker for misalignment of her spine, which he thought he could relieve; that she took two courses of treatment from him, for which he was paid $70, and that she thought she was relieved. A special charge that, before the jury could convict, they must believe that appellant treated or offered to treat diseases or disorders by some system or method for which, directly or indirectly, he charged money or other compensation, would have been but a repetition of a part of the main charge, which used substantially the same language.

No error appearing, the motion for rehearing is overruled. 
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