
    LEWIS v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    March 12, 1913.
    Rehearing Denied April 16, 1913.)
    1. Physicians and Surgeons (§ 6) — Regulation OF PRACTICE — STATUTES—CONSTRUCTION.
    The medical practice act (Acts 30th Leg. c. 123) does not seek to regulate how any one shall treat diseases, but merely provides that, before any one shall treat, or offer to treat, diseases, he shall show his competency and obtain from the State Board of Medical Examiners authority to practice, and one treating, or offering to treat, without medicine, various diseases for a specific compensation is within the act.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Physicians and Surgeons, Cent. Dig. §§ 6-11; Dec. Dig. § 6.]
    2. Physicians and Surgeons (§ 2) — Practicing Medicine — Statutory Regulation —Validity.
    The medical practice act (Acts 30th Leg. c. 123), requiring one desiring to practice medicine to obtain authority so to do from the State Board of Medical Examiners, is valid, since no one has an inalienable right to practice medicine or treat diseases for pay.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Physicians and Surgeons, Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. § 2.]
    Appeal from Comanche County Court; J. M. Rieger, Judge.
    J. H. Lewis was convicted of practicing medicine without having registered his authority so to do,' and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Sol L. Long, of Nevada, Mo., and Smith & Palmer, of Comanche, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For otuer oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   HARPER, J.

Appellant was convicted of the offense of practicing medicine without having registered his authority so to do, if he had any such authority, from the State Board of Medical Examiners. Appellant earnestly insists that, as he did not prescribe nor give medicine for the treatment of disease, he does not come within the provisions of the medical practice act (Acts 30th Leg. c. 123), or if the act is so drawn as to include one who treats disease, otherwise than by administering medicines, then the act is unconstitutional. Appellant’s counsel have filed an able and extensive brief, but cite us to no authorities as sustaining their contention, and we have found none.

In the first place, we want to call attention to the fact that the medical practice act does not seek to regulate how any one shall treat diseases or disorders; it simply provides that, before any one shall treat, or offer,to treat, diseases or disorders for the human family, he shall demonstrate that he is well grounded in certain studies named in the act. This is to compel a person to show he has a knowledge of the human frame, the organs of the body, and an ability to diagnose diseases, etc. If he shall pass this examination, then the treatment of disease is left to his judgment, and in no way does the act seek to control how any man shall treat disease. The misconception of the terms of the medical practice act has been the basis of much argument.

No one has an inalienable right to follow the occupation of practicing medicine or treating disease for pay any more than one has the inalienable right to follow the occupation of practicing law for pay, or to.prac-> tice dentistry, or any other occupation that requires and demands a certain amount of what might be termed technical knowledge of the subject with which he represents he is competent to practice. .Every question raised by appellant in his brief has been so thoroughly discussed by this court in eases heretofore decided, we deem it but useless to reiterate the law as therein announced, as the argument of appellant’s counsel has not caused us to change our views, as therein expressed. For a complete discussion of every question raised by appellant, see the following cases: Newman v. State, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 223, 124 S. W. 956; Dankworth v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 157, 136 S. W. 788; Germany v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 277, 137 S. W. 130; Ex parte Collins, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 2, 121 S. W. 501; Collins v. State of Texas, 223 U. S. 288, 32 Sup. Ct. 286, 56 L. Ed. 439; Singh v. State, 146 S. W. 891; Collins v. State, 152 S. W. 1047, and cases cited in these decisions.

In this case it was shown that appellant had treated and offered to treat paralysis, rheumatism, asthma, tonsilitis, kidney trouble, cancer, female trouble, stomach trouble, nervousness, abscess, neuralgia, and various other diseases, even to removing cataracts, etc., making specific charges for the treatment.

The judgment is affirmed.  