
    HATCH against FOGERTY.
    
      New York Superior Court, General Term;
    
      January, 1871.
    Attorney and Client.
    
    The fidelity of an attorney to his client’s interests forbids his trafficking, in the smallest degree, with such interests, by collusion or otherwise, with persons who, in respect to such interests, have occupied an attitude of hostility towards his client.
    If he has advised or assisted'the client in proceedings, he cannot afterward use the knowledge he has acquired, to secure a pecuniary benefit to himself, adverse to the client’s interest, by an attack on the proceedings, even should it appear that such proceedings were wrongful.
    Appeal from & judgment.
    
      In August, 1851, the plaintiff’s testator contracted to sell to one Willock certain lots in this city, and agreed to make advances in money to assist Willock in building; and when the buildings were enclosed, Hogan was to convey the lots to Willock, and Willock was to execute a mortgage' to Hogan for the purchase money and advances.
    The contract contains the following provision:
    “It is furthermore agreed and understood, that if the said Willock refuse or neglect to complete the said intended houses, or if the diligent prosecution of the work thereon shall at any time after the date of these presents be suspended for ten days, then, and in such case, said Hogan shall have the right to insist on an immediate repayment of all the advances he shall have made, together with interest thereon; and he also is hereby authorized in such case to sell, at public or private sale, all the right, title, interest, and estate of the said Willock in and to the said premises, and to apply the proceeds of such sale to the payment and satisfaction of the expenses of such sale, and of all claims and demands due, or thereafter to become due, which the said Hogan may have against the said Willock for or upon account of the premises ; and if any surplus should remain, the same is to be paid to said Willock. The said Hogan is, however, to give the said party one week’s notice of his intention to make such sale.”
    Willock took possession of the lots and began building. Subsequently, and in December, 1852, Hogan having claimed that Willock had broken the contract, employed, as was alleged, the defendant, John B. Fogerty, who is an attorney at law, as his attorney, to acquire or extinguish Willock’s interest in the lots, under the provision contained in the contract. For this service Fogerty, as was also alleged, was paid by Hogan.
    Fogerty proceeded to foreclose the contract by a public sale, pursuant to notice to Willock, at the Merchants’ Exchange, of all Willock’s right, title, and interest in the lots held by him under the contract. Hogan became the purchaser at the sale, and entered into and has continued in possession, claiming title under such purchase.
    There was other employment of Fogerty by Hogan, in controversies connected with the lots—such as evicting a person in possession of one of the lots ; resisting the claims of judgment creditors of Willock, and of mechanics' having liens for work or material; and especially, Fogerty was employed by Hogan, as was also alleged, to procure for Hogan from Willock a full release of all claims of Willock against Hogan, under the contract.
    Such a release was procured by Fogerty, but for purposes, as alleged by Fogerty, as hereafter stated. And for his services under these various employments, including, as was alleged, his employment to procure the release, he was paid by Hogan.
    It was alleged by Fogerty, and was found as a fact by the court, in regard to the release, that Fogerty was employed by Hogan, with the concurrence and assent of Willock, to take such proceedings as would be necessary to extinguish the claims of the creditors and lien-holders of Willock against the property; and for that purpose only, and not otherwise, he did procure the release from Willock, and that it was procured upon the express condition that the same should not at any time be delivered to Hogan, and that it should not in any manner affect the claim or interest of Willock to the premises, or against Hogan, npon the contract.
    Hogan continued in the undisputed possession of the premises under this purchase from December, 1852, until some time in June, 1859, a period of nearly seven years, when an action was commenced against Hogan, by or in the name of Willock, by Ga Hun, Jordan & Bain, his attorneys; in which action Willock demanded a deed from Hogan of the premises, pursuant to the terms of the contract, and an accounting by Hogan of the rents or profits of the premises during the nearly seven years he had held possession. ,
    The ground upon which that action was founded was, that the sale at the Merchant’s Exchange, which had been conducted by Fogerty, had not extinguished Willock’s interest in the premises, or his rights under the contract. Hogan appeared in that action, by John M. Hedley, his attorney, and set up in his answer, as a defense, the foreclosure sale, which had been conducted by Fogerty, and also the release which it was claimed that Fogerty had procured from Willock to Hogan, of all his (Willock’s) interest in the premises, and of all claim against Hogan under the contract; and which sale and release he claimed was a bar to Willock’s action.
    Pending that action, and before there had been a trial of the issues, Hogan died, and the action was afterward continued in the name of his executor, and was sent to a referee, to be by him heard and determined.
    On the trial of that action, Fogerty was examined as a witness for, and on behalf of Hogan, and, amongst other things, testified to the purpose, as found by the court, in respect to the release from Hogan, namely, that it was procured for the purpose of defeating the claims of judgment and lien creditors of Willock to the premises, and for no other purpose, and was not intended to be delivered to Hogan,, or in any manner to affect the rights of Willock to the premises, or his interest under the contract. Fogerty upon that examination made no disclosure of any interest in himself in that action, and it was not then known to the plaintiff in this suit that Fogerty at that time, and even before the commencement of that action, had a large interest in the result of the action.
    In ignorance of any such interest, and influenced by the testimony Fogerty had given of the purpose of the release, the plaintiff, in May, 1862, compromised, and settled that suit, paying to Ga Nun, Jordan and Bain, the attorneys, the sum of three thousand dollars in satisfaction of the claim.
    After such settlement had been effected, Fogerty commenced an action in his own name, as plaintiff, against Ga Nun, Jordan and Bain, in which he alleged that he had retained and employed them to prosecute the action of Willock against Hogan, and that they had collected in such action a sum of money, over and above their costs, which they had refused to pay to the plaintiff Fogerty.
    Upon the trial of that action by a referee it was proved, and the referee, in accordance with such proof, found as a fact that the defendants, Ga Nun, Jordan & Bain, were retained by Fogerty to prosecute the claim of Willock against Hogan. That, previous to such retainer, Willock had agreed that Fogerty should receive two-thirds of the amount recovered; that Gfa Nun, Jordan & Bain, took the claim to prosecute upon the retainer of Fogerty with full knowledge of his agreement with Willock, and had received the sum of three thousand dollars upon a settlement of the suit. . And the referee gave judgment in favor of Fogerty, as agent, against Ga Nun, Jordan & Bain, for eight hundred and eighty-six dollars and sixty-six cents, being . the balance in their hands, after deducting their costs and charges, and seven hundred dollars, which had been paid by them, to Willock. For a report of that case, see 2 Robt., 319.
    Under these circumstances Roswell D. Hatch, the plaintiff in this action, as the executor of Hogan, brought this action against Fogerty, to recover the amount he had received from Ga Hun, Jordan & Bain, in his suit against them, on the ground that his relation, to Hogan as his attorney and counsel in foreclosing Willock’s rights and interests under the contract with Hogan, and also in obtaining the release from Willock, would not allow of his becoming, or being interested in an adverse claim of Willock against Hogan, growing out of the contract he had undertaken to foreclose, and which claim had not been extinguished by the foreclosure proceeding.
    Fogerty alleged in his answer in this action, and the court found as facts :
    That after the making of the contract, Willock entered into possession of the lots and proceeded with the erection of the buildings mentioned in the contract,' and that Hogan made certain advances to Willock, as provided for by the contract. That the defendant Fogerty then was, and ever since has been, an attorney and counselor at law in the courts of this State, licensed and authorized as such to practice in the courts of this State, and so holding himself out to the world to practice as a regular profession, and as such was employed and retained by Hogan to do and perform certain acts in regard to said contract, and said premises. That from the fall of the year 1852, Fogerty had also been the attorney and counsel of Willock. That at the time last mentioned, Fogerty was employed by Hogan, with the concurrence and assent of Willock, to extinguish the claims of one Hamilton Hesbitt, and of certain lien-holders in and to the premises, and did so extinguish the same, and for that purpose, and not otherwise, did procure from Willock the release mentioned and set forth in the complaint; but the said release was executed by Willock upon the express condition that the same should not be delivered to Hogan, or affect the claims or interests of Willock in, or to the premises, or as against Hogan ; and Fogerty was not employed or retained by Hogan to extinguish the claims or interest of Willock for any purpose other than as above stated ; and in accordance therewith, and not otherwise, Fogerty took the proceedings mentioned and set forth in the complaint.
    It was further alleged in the answer, and found as facts by the court:—That in April, 1859, Willock was indebted to Fogerty in the sum of twelve hundred dollars, for services theretofore rendered by Fogerty to and for Willock; and Fogerty did thereupon in full payment of said -indebtedness take from Willock two-thirds of Willock’s claim against Hogan, and thereupon, in consideration thereof, did wholly remit and satisfy the said indebtedness of Willock.
    It was further found as a fact:—That Fogerty did not, in violation of his duty and obligations as such attorney and counsel for Hogan, or in contempt of the court, or of the obligations imposed on him as an attorney and counselor of the court, give to Willock advice, or purchase or take from him an interest in his claim against Hogan, or in or to the premises, or instigate Willock to bring said action, or make the purchase from Willock with the intent of prosecuting the said action against Hogan, for his own gain or advantage, or in violation of the statute in that case made and provided.
    Upon these facts the judge rendered judgment in favor of the defendant.
    
      The plaintiff, having excepted to the findings of law and fact, appealed.
    
      E. P. Cowles and Roswell D. Hatch, for the appellant and plaintiff.
    
      William Fullerton and John B. Fogerty, for the respondent and defendant.
    
      
       On May 1, 1871, the judges of the court of appeals promulgated the following
      RULES REGULATING ADMISSION TO THE BAR.
      The judges of the court of appeals, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 486 of the Laws of 1871, ordain and establish the following rules and regulations in relation to the admission of persons hereafter applying to be admitted as attorneys, solicitors, and counselors in the courts of this State:
      
        I. No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney, solicitor, or counselor in any court of record in this State, without a regular admission and license by the supreme court at a general term thereof. To obtain such admission and license, except in cases otherwise provided for by said act, the person applying must be examined under the direction of the court. The time for the examination of persons applying to be admitted as attorneys, solicitors, and counselors, shall be Thursday of the first week of each general term in the several departments; and the time for taking the oath of office shall be on such day thereafter as the court may direct.
      The examinations shall in all cases be public, and, unless conducted by the judges of the court, shall be by not less than three practicing lawyers of at least seven years standing at the bar, to be appointed by the court.
      II. To entitle an applicant to an examination, he must prove to the court:
      I. That he is a citizen of the "United States, and that he is twenty-one years of age, and a resident of the department within which the application is made, and that he has not been examined in any other department for admission to practice, and been refused admission and license within three months immediately preceding, which proof may be by his own affidavit of the facts.
      2. That he is a person of good moral character, by the certificate of the attorneys with whom he has passed his clerkship, but which certificate shall not be deemed conclusive evidence, and the court must be satisfied on this point after a full examination and inquiry.
      3. That he has served the clerkship or pursued the substituted course of study prescribed by the rules, as requisite to an examination. The clerkship may be proved by the certificate of the attorneys with whom the same was served, or, in case of their death or -removal from the State, by such other evidence as shall be satisfactory to the court.
      The proof of any time of study allowed as a substitute for any part of the clerkship required by these rules shall be by the certificate of the teacher or president of the faculty, under whose instructions the person has studied, together with the affidavit of the applicant; the proof must be satisfactory to the presiding judge of the court, who alone shall make the order allowing a deduction from the regular term of clerkship by reason of such studies.
      III. No person shall be admitted to examination as an attorney, solicitor, or counselor, unless he shall have served a regular clerkship of three years in the office of a practicing attorney of the supreme court, after the age of seventeen years.
      IV. It shall be the duty of the attorney with whom the clerkship shall be commenced to file a certificate in the office of the clerk of the court of appeals, certifying that the person has commenced a clerkship with him, and the clerkship shall be deemed to have commenced on the day of the filing of the certificate. A copy of the certificate, certified by the clerk of the court of appeals, with the date of the filing thereof, shall be produced to the court, at the time of an application for examination.
      V. When a clerkship has already commenced, or shall have commenced before these rules shall take effect, the certificate required by the preceding rule, verified by the affidavit of the attorney, stating the time of the actual commencement of such clerkship, may be filed at any time before November 1 next.
      VI. It shall be the duty of an attorney to give to a clerk, when he shall leave his office, a certificate stating his moral character, the time of clerkship which he has passed with him, and the period which has been allowed him for vacation.
      Not more than three months shall be allowed for vacations in any year.
      The term of clerkship will Toe computed by the calendar year, and any person applying for admission, whose period of clerkship shall expire during the term at which the application shall be made, will be admitted to examination at the customary day of the same term.
      VII. Any portion of time, not exceeding one year, actually spent in regular attendance upon the law lectures in the university of New York, Cambridge university, or the'law school connected with Yale college, or a law school connected with any college or university of this State, having a department organized with competent professors and teachers, in which instruction in the science of law is regularly given, shall be allowed in lieu of an equal period of clerkship in the office of a practicing attorney of the supreme court.
      
        VIII Persons who have been admitted and have practiced three years as attorneys in the highest court of law in another State may be admitted, without examination, to practice as attorneys, solicitors, and counselors in the courts of this State. But such persons must have become residents of this. State before applying for admission, and must bring a letter of recommendation from one of the judges of the highest court of law in the State from which they came.
      IX. These rules shall take effect on June 1, 1871
      
    
   By the Court.—Monell, J.

Upon the argument of this appeal the appellant’s counsel was understood to rest his right to recover, not exclusively, but chiefly, upon the ground, that the delicate and confidential relation of attorney and client, which had existed between these parties, would not allow the respondent to take or receive any interest in, or benefit from any claim which Willock might have or assert under his contract with Hogan, which had its foundation in the insufficiency of the proceedings instituted and conducted by Fogerty, for his client.

The counsel, however, was not understood to abandon the ground that the benefit which the respondent had derived from the Willock suit against Hogan, was in consequence of his own lack of skill and correct judgment, in instituting and conducting the proceeding he was employed to institute and conduct, to extinguish the rights and interests of Willock under the contract.

The mode adopted by the respondent to extinguish such rights and interests was by a public sale, after notice, in pursuance of the provisions of the contract.

It is certainly very questionable whether such a sale, although authorized by the contract, was, or could be made effectual to foreclose the contractor’s interests. The question is left open and undecided in the case of Chase v. Hatch (4 Robt., 89), which was upon a similar contract, but with an intimation that the contractor is not shut out by such a sale ; and may upon a sufficient excuse be relieved from the forfeiture.

The contract in this case provided, that, if Willock refused or neglected to complete the houses, or diligently to prosecute the work, or if he suspended the work for ten days, Hogan might demand payment of his advances, and, upon refusal to pay, might sell at public or private sale all of Willock’s interest in the premises.

The forfeiture under the contract on the part of Willock, and the right on the part of Hogan to rescind, rested wholly upon the ten days’ delay. If the delay in fact occurred, Hogan could at once sell. But in what manner, or by whom, was that fact to be determined ? Could Hogan’s saying or claiming that it had occurred be sufficient, and would that conclude Willock, and forever preclude his disputing the fact % Assuredly not. The right to sell was unquestionable; but it was necessarily a sale at the risk of being set aside, if it should afterwards be made to appear that there had in fact been no default, or that it had become impossible to perform, either by the act of Hod, or of the. law, or for any other sufficient reason.

The sale, therefore, under the power contained in the contract, was effectual only so far as it put Willock out and Hogan in possession of the premises, and then cast the burden upon Willock of showing, if he could show it, that there had not been a default, or of excusing it, if there had been. But it left it competent for Willock, at any time afterwards, to apply to the court to investigate the question of default, and to be relieved from the forfeiture consequent upon it.

From such an application Willock would not be, and was not precluded by the sale; nor could he be precluded in any manner, short of a judgment in an action to foreclose Ms rigMs and interests under the contract.

Besides the high and peculiarly responsible duty of an attorney towards his client, and the fidelity which fie owes to his cause and interests, he is required to be learned and skillful in the practice of Ms profession. He must have sufficient learning to be able to determine, with reasonable accuracy, upon the appropriate remedies for enforcing or securing the rights of his client, and sufficient skill to conduct the proceedings appropriate to such remedies.

If an attorney fails in any of these respects, he may and sometimes does not only forfeit all claim for compensation, but renders himself liable to his client for any damage which he may thereby sustain.

But the question of any supposed lack of learning or of skill on the part of the respondent in conducting the proceedings for Ms client, is not necessarily much involved in the consideration of the questions now before us. Indeed, if this were an action by the respondent against Hogan’s representative, to recover his compensation for his services in those proceedings, it is doubtful if we could say that he should not be paid, on the mere ground that such proceedings produced no beneficial result (Bowman v. Tallman, 40 How. Pr., 1).

But the decision must be placed upon another and different ground—a ground which involves not the skill or the learning but the fidelity of an attorney to the interests of his client, and which forbids his trafficking in the smallest degree with such interests, by collusion or otherwise, with persons who, in respect to such interests, have occupied an attitude of hostility towards his client.

Some facts stand out prominently in this case. One is, that the respondent employed the attorneys to bring the action of Wiilock against Hogan. Another, that he was interested to the extent of two-thirds in the result of that suit, having acquired such interest directly, by assignment from Wiilock. Another, that the ground of the prosecution of that action was the insufficient title Hogan had acquired under the foreclosure proceeding, which the respondent had himself conducted for Hogan. And another, that he did receive in that suit, and in consequence of it, a portion ■ of the money which had been obtained by a settlement of it, and which settlement was made in consequence of the adverse testimony of the respondent on that trial.

I am aware that the fact has been found by the court, at special term, that the respondent was employed by Hogan, with the concurrence and consent of Willock, to extinguish the claims of certain lien-holders on the premises; and for that purpose, and not otherwise, he made the sale of the premises under the power contained in the contract, and procured the release from Willock.

So much of this finding of fact as relates to the purpose of the release is probably sustained by the evidence, but I do not find any evidence sufficient to sustain the remainder of the finding ; and a careful examination of the testimony shows, I think, that the respondent’s employment by Hogan was to extinguish all of Wiilock’s rights and interests under the contract,, and that whatever motive the latter may have had in concurring in and consenting to the foreclosure proceeding, whether to defeat and thereby defraud his creditors, who had obtained liens upon the premises, or otherwise, it is very evident that Hogan’ s intention and desire was to rescind the contract, and put an end to all claims and rights of Wiilock under it.

But even if the evidence did establish that the purpose of the foreclosure was to accomplish the defeat of the lien-creditors, and that Hogan, Willock, and the respondent conspired to effect such purpose by a pretended foreclosure, I am unable to see in it any justification for what has since transpired.

Such purpose need not be stigmatized, and it is enough for the present to say that it furnishes no foundation upon which a defense can be raised. A party who has advised or assisted in perpetrating a wrong cannot afterwards be allowed to use the knowledge he has acquired to secure a pecuniary benefit to himself by an attack upon the proceeding he had advised and conducted to consummate the wrong.

I am also aware of the fact, which has also been found by the court, that Willock was indebted to the respondent in a considerable sum for professional services, and that he took from Willock a transfer of two-thirds of his claim against Hogan in satisfaction of such indebtedness.

But such fact does not, in my judgment, change the aspect of the case, or furnish a reasonable excuse for obtaining payment out of his own client of a debt due from Willock, by a resort to an action whose foundation was a defective and useless proceeding, which such client had employed him to conduct, and which he has failed to make effectual.

The action instituted by the respondent, in the name of Willock against Hogan, if it had no foundation in the errors which the respondent had previously committed, must have been brought for the purpose of harassing Hogan, and vexing him into a settlement. In one or the other of those ways only could the respondent have hoped to succeed. Hogan would be advised that the sale at the Merchants’ Exchange was of itself no bar to the action, and the release of Willock the respondent knew, as he afterwards testified, was no barrier. .

There was reasonable ground, therefore, for supposing that the action would be successful, or, that operating upon the fears of Hogan, it would produce a compromise and settlement of the claim.

The latter was the result,; and it is enough to say that the transaction cannot be countenanced or .upheld.

It is fundamental, in respect to the duty of an attorney towards his client, that he shall not use any information that he has derived from his client to the prejudice or injury of his client, and especially that he shall not act in opposition to his client’s interests. And the rule is, as laid down in 1 Ferg. Ir. Prac., 37, that lest any temptation should exist to violate professional confidence, or to make any improper use of information which an attorney has acquired confidentially, as well as upon principles of public policy, he will not be permitted to be concerned on one side of proceedings, in which he was originally in a different interest.

I regret to say that I am obliged to differ from the conclusions of the learned justice who tried this action at the special term. He was doubtless somewhat influenced, as I have found it difficult to resist being, by the fact that the relation of attorney and client had long before ceased to exist between the respondent and Hogan, as well as the fact that he had for several previous years been acting as the attorney for Willock, and that to obtain payment of a hopeless debt for those services, and for no more improper motive, he became a party to, and instigated, the action which was brought in Willock’s name against Hogan.

The law, however, is too regardful of the rights of persons who have fiduciary relations to allow any betrayal of the trust, and confidence. Trustees of all kinds are held to a strict accountability, and the interests of cestui gue trusts are watched with constant care. As was said by the late Vice-Chancellor Sandford (in Poillon v. Martin, 1 Sandf. Ch., 569, *572), '‘It is a great principle of equity, that he who bargains in a matter of advantage with a person placing confidence in him, is bound to show that a reasonable use has been made of that confidence.”

But the duties and obligation^ of mere trustees, whether enjoined by statute or derived from the principles of equity, do not partake of that peculiar and delicate relation which subsists between an attorney and his client. In his case there is more than a legal claim upon his fidelity. The honor of his profession, and the due administration of justice are involved, and any taint upon his honor will cast its shadow in some degree upon the collective body of his associates at the bar.

Happily, and to the credit of the profession, few reported cases are found which involve a departure from professional faith and duty. But such cases are not needed either to illustrate or enforce so obvious a principle as condemns the transaction in this case.

I will, however, refer to a single case, which is somewhat analogous to the one before us :

Case v. Carroll (35 N. Y., 385), was an action to compel an attorney to convey certain premises to the plaintiff, the title to which he had obtained in violation of his duty to his client. And the court says, The general allegation that he was the defendant’s counsel, and undertook to conduct the foreclosure suit for their benefit, is sufficient to create a trust, which a court of ■equity will enforce against him, by requiring him to convey the legal title to the plaintiff.”

The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial had, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.

Jones and Spencer, JJ.,. concurred.

Judgment reversed. 
      
       Present, Monell, Jones, and Spencer, JJ.
     
      
       A case in 1 Tucker's Surr. Rep., 247 (A. B.’s estate), goes so far as to hold him liable for ignorance of a recent statute.
     