
    Job E. Hedges, as Receiver, Respondent, v. Horace G. Polhemus et al., Appellants.
    (New York Common Pleas
    General Term,
    November, 1895.)
    An objection to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial judge is not brought up on appeal from a judgment rendered by the court sitting - without a jury, unless an exception thereto has been taken and filed as prescribed by the statute.
    A note in the clerk's minutes of the trial that “ defendants’ attorney excepts ” to a direction of judgment is not equivalent to the exception required by the statute and raises no question of law.
    The appellate court cannot consider the1 facts where the case does not contain a certificate that it contains all the evidence, or is not certified by the trial judge.
    In an action by a receiver appointed in supplementary proceedings to set aside a chattel mortgage as invalid as to creditors, where the defense is rested exclusively upon the validity of such mortgage, it is not error to refuse to allow the defendant, upon the cross-examination of one of th.e creditors, to show that such creditor subsequently took a chattel mortgage for the indebtedness due to him.
    Appeal from a judgment rendered by the court sitting without a jury.
    
      James Politer, for appellants.
    
      Charles M. Earle, for respondent.
   Bischoff, J.

Unfortunately for the position assumed by the appellants, their appeal fails to bring before the General Term any question either of law or fact touching the merits of the action.

An inquiry as to whether the conclusion of the trial judge was correct, as matter of law,' could only have been called for by an exception taken and filed as prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure (§§ 994,1022 [as amended 1894], 1346), which step the appellants omitted from their practice.

The -result is that the only questions of law presented for our determination are those raised by exceptions taken to rulings upon the trial. Mayor v. Erben, 24 How. 358.

The note in the extract from the clerk’s minutespf jihe trial that “ defendants’ attorney excepts ” to the court’s direction of judgment for the plaintiff is not equivalent to the exception required by the statute, and in an action tried by-the court, without á jury, at all events, no question of Jaw is thereby raised (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 994, 995, 996), even if such an exception were in. any case availing for the assignment of. error. See Grier v. Hazard, 39 N. Y. St. Pepr. 74 ; Dearing v. Pearson, 8 Misc. Rep. 269; Gundlin v. H. A. P. Co., Id. 291.

Further, the facts are not before ús because of the omission ' from the case of a certificate that the evidence, as there-embodied, is complete, Porter v. Smith, 107 N. Y. 531; Aldridge v. Aldridge, 120 id. 614.

There is a further defect in that the case does not appear to be certified by the trial judge in accordance with section 997 of the Code. See Green v. Roworth, 4 Misc. Rep. 141.

The only exception urged by the appellants is that taken to-the exclusion of certain evidence.

The issue in the action was solely as to the validity of a, chattel' mortgage, tire suit being brought by a receiver-appointed in supplementary proceedings, in the interests of certain judgment creditors,of the mortgagor, to set aside the instrument.

Upon" cross-examination of one of these creditors he was'asked by'appellants’ counsel: “Did you not subsequently, take a chattel mortgage yourself for this ■ indebtedness ? ” and an exception wa,s taken to, the exclusion of the question for immateriality.

The claim in suit being based solely upon the judgments, obtained by the creditors, and the defendants’ -position being rested exclusively upon the' validity of the mortgage before • the court, as .was admitted by counsel, the evidence was-certainly immaterial when offered.

' Upon this, appeal it is urged that bad faith on the .part of-the creditors in taking a mortgage similar to that in suit could have been shown, but, be this as it may, there was no error in. the rejection of the evidence called for by the question as framed, regard being had to the attitude of counsel upon the trial:

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Daly, Oh. J., and Bookstaver, J., concur.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.  