
    ZERUI HUANG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-2533.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 29, 2016.
    John Chang, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director; Monica Antoun, Trial Attorney, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, ROBERT D. SACK and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Zerui Huang, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a June 21, 2013 decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Zerui Huang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 21, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, mindful that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322-23, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)).

A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). “To prevail on the motion, the movant must also establish prima facie eligibility for asylum, ie., ‘a realistic chance’ that he will be able to establish eligibility.” Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir.2005).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Huang could have presented most of his submissions at his merits hearing. Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in concluding that the remaining documents failed to make out Huang’s pri-ma fade eligibility for relief.

Huang was required to “make some showing that authorities in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008). The only suggestion on that score was a single unsubstantiated sentence in Huang’s motion to reopen: “Mr. Huang was told by his parents that the church members have to constantly change their gathering places in order to avoid the government’s attention.” A motion to reopen must “be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). “[T]he arguments of counsel are not evidence.” Pretzantzin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 641, 651 (2d Cir.2013) (citing Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 503, 506 (B.I.A.1980)). The agency therefore did not err in deeming the sentence in Huang’s brief “not competent evidence” that the Chinese government will become aware of Huang’s activities.

Huang also needed “to show a pattern or practice in the home country of persecution of persons ‘similarly situated’ to [him].” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir.2013). Only three of Huang’s documents post-date his merits hearing. Two of those documents reported on arrests after an underground church in Beijing held Easter services outdoors. Huang’s motion said nothing about this church or ny ties to Beijing generally. The third document describes he Chinese government’s persecution of leading Christians in 2012. Most of the stories involved prominent lawyers, dissidents and church leaders. Huang never claimed to be any of those. Two stories dealt with proselytizing Christians. Huang’s motion papers said nothing about proselytizing, either in the United States or China. Given this record, the agency was within its discretion to conclude that Huang failed to show that the Chinese government has a pattern or practice of persecuting people similarly situated to him.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot.  