
    Bao Lin HUANG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    15-2013 NAC
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    December 1, 2016
    FOR PETITIONER: John Chang, New York, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Anthony P. Nicastro, Acting Assistant Director; D. Nicholas Harling, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, DENNY CHIN, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Bao Lin Huang, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a June 18, 2015, decision of the BIA, affirming a November 19, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“U”) denying Huang’s applications for cancellation of removal and asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Bao Lin Huang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 18, 2015), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 19, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We address only cancellation of removal. As the Government points out, Huang has not challenged the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief in this Court. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that claims hot sufficiently argued in a brief are abandoned).

For an applicant, like Huang, who is not a lawful permanent resident to obtain cancellation of removal, he must establish, in relevant part, that his “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-dence8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D). Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship is “ ‘substantially beyond the ordinary hardship that would be expected” when a close family member leaves the country, and is limited to “truly exceptional” situations. In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 62 (B.I.A. 2001); accord Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 40-41 (2d Cir. 2008). “[C]onsideration should be given to the age, health, and circumstances of the qualifying family members, including how a lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in' the country of return might affect those relatives.” In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468 (B.I.A. 2002).

The agency concluded that the hardship to Huang’s qualifying relative—his 19-year-old U.S.-citizen son—did not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual. Our jurisdiction to review this decision is limited to “constitutional claims or questions of law.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D); accord Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 38-39. Fact-finding is flawed by an error of law in the hardship context when “facts important to the subtle determination of ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ have been totally overlooked and others have been seriously mischaracterized.” Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 2009).

Huang has not identified any error that rises to the level of a constitutional claim or question of law. He argues that the agency ignored medical evidence of his son’s need for treatment of asthma and a depressive disorder and the testimony of his son’s psychologist that his son’s depression would be exacerbated by either returning to China with Huang or remaining in the United States without Huang. We do not mean to minimize his son’s depression caused apparently in part by the possibility of Huang’s removal, but Huang’s argument is belied by the record. The agency explicitly acknowledged his son’s health concerns and medical evidence (although the IJ noted that many of the medical records were illegible), and discussed the testimony of the psychologist. Accordingly, Huang has not shown an error of law, but is challenging the factual findings, that is, the level of hardship that Huang’s son will suffer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 38-39.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  