
    WHEI CHENG, aka Yone Mun Choe, aka Hui Chen, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 07-4323-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 20, 2009.
    Gary J. Yerman, New York, N.Y., for Petitioner.
    Gregory G. Katsas, Asst. Atty. General; Leslie McKay, Asst. Director; Jason Wi-secup, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: Hon. DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, Hon. JON O. NEWMAN and Hon. PIERRE N. LEVAL, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. is automatically substituted for former Acting Attorney General Peter D. Keisler as respondent in this case.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Whei Cheng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 13, 2007 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Whei Cheng, No. A72 328 135 (B.I.A. Sept. 13, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). Where the agency considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008). We find that the agency did not err in denying Cheng’s untimely motion to reopen.

Cheng argues that the BIA erred in finding that he failed to demonstrate material changed country conditions sufficient to excuse the time limitation for filing his motion to reopen. However, this argument fails where we have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no error in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish material changed country conditions. See id. at 169-72 (noting that “[w]e do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the agency”); see also Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as “the oft-cited Aird affidavit) which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”).

Cheng waives any challenge to the BIA’s finding that he was not eligible to file a successive asylum application based on his changed personal circumstances. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).  