
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Anthony COLEMAN, Defendant—Appellant.
    No. 11-4989.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: April 25, 2012.
    Decided: May 9, 2012.
    James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Meghan S. Skelton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Stacy Dawson Belf, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
   PER CURIAM:

Anthony Coleman pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), and was sentenced as an armed career criminal to the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years prescribed by 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West Supp.2011). Coleman appeals his sentence, arguing that imposition of the fifteen-year sentence was error because mandatory minimum sentences conflict with the mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 3558(a) (2006) to impose a sentence “sufficient but not greater than necessary.” He further contends that a fifteen-year sentence is greater than necessary in his case to achieve the sentencing goals of § 3553(a). We affirm.

The Sentencing Reform Act, of which § 3553(a) is part, dictates that a defendant should be sentenced in accordance with its provisions to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a)(2) “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2006). Courts have generally held that mandatory minimum sentences are “otherwise specifically provided” and thus do not conflict with § 3553(a)’s “sufficient but not greater than necessary” clause. See United States v. Sutton, 625 F.3d 526, 529 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir.2004) (“[T]he mandatory minimum sentences [the defendant] was exposed to pursuant to [statute] clearly fit within the ‘except as otherwise specifically provided’ exclusion of § 3551(a).”). “Courts have uniformly rejected the claim that § 3553(a)’s ‘no greater than necessary’ language authorizes a district court to sentence below the statutory minimum.” United States v. Cirilo-Muñoz, 582 F.3d 54, 55 (1st Cir.2009) (per curiam) (listing cases); see also United States v. Franklin, 499 F.3d 578, 585 (6th Cir.2007) (“[Section] 3553(a) factors do not apply to congressionally mandated sentences”); United States v. Roberson, 474 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir.2007) (although acknowledging the tension between § 3553(a) and statutorily-mandated sentences, holding that § 3553(a) as a “very general statute cannot be understood to authorize courts to sentence below mínimums specifically prescribed by Congress.”). In United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850 (4th Cir.2005), we held that, post-Booker, except in limited circumstances not present here, “a district court still may not depart below a statutory minimum.” Id. at 862. Coleman’s reliance on United States v. Raby, 575 F.3d 876 (4th Cir.2009), is misplaced, as that case provides no guidance on sentencing below a mandatory minimum.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.  