
    Harold Rosenbaum, Appellant, v Boulder Ridge Homeowners Association, Inc., et al., Defendants, and Samuel Ginsburg et al., Respondents.
    [715 NYS2d 318]
   In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for fraud, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nicolai, J.), entered May 21, 1999, as (1) granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Town of Greenburgh which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, (2) granted the motion of the defendants Samuel Ginsburg and Martin Ginsburg to modify an order of the same court, dated December 16,1998, by providing that those branches of their prior motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them are granted, and (3), upon granting reargument, adhered to the prior determination made in the order dated December 16, 1998, granting that branch of the motion of the defendants Samuel Ginsburg, Martin Ginsburg, and Ginsburg & Ginsburg which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Ginsburg & Ginsburg.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

The Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant Town of Greenburgh. The plaintiffs action was time-barred insofar as it was asserted against the Town, as it was commenced more than one year and 90 days after the Town issued a certificate of occupancy for the residence at issue (see, General Municipal Law § 50-i; Greifenberger v Pav, 225 AD2d 731; Merritt v Hooshang Constr., 216 AD2d 542; Pleasant Ridge Townhouses Homeowners’ Assn. v T & D Constr. Corp., 181 AD2d 871, 872). Under the circumstances of this case, the Town was not estopped from asserting a defense based on the Statute of Limitations (see, Safarowic v Dinozzi Bldg. Corp., 206 AD2d 356, 357; Okie v Village of Hamburg, 196 AD2d 228).

The Supreme Court also properly modified an order of the same court, dated December 16, 1998, by providing that those branches of the prior motion of the defendants Samuel Ginsburg and Martin Ginsburg individually which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them were granted. After these defendants made out a prima facie case for summary judgment, the plaintiff failed to raise triable issues as to whether either” of these defendants knowingly made false representations concerning the premises to him, an essential element of his claim for fraud (see, C.P.J. Inc. v 234 High Seas Rest. Corp., 260 AD2d 524, 525).

Upon granting reargument, the Supreme Court also properly adhered to its determination in its order dated December 16, 1998, granting summary judgment to Ginsburg & Ginsburg. In support of the motion for summary judgment, the movants made out a prima facie case by demonstrating that the plaintiff failed to establish all of the elements of his cause of action to recover damages for fraud, in that he did not show that Ginsburg & Ginsburg made material representations to him with knowledge of their falsity (see, C.P.J. Inc. v 234 High Seas Rest. Corp., supra). The plaintiffs opposition to the motion consisted merely of conclusory allegations, which were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Blankman v Incorporated Vil. of Sands Point, 249 AD2d 349, 350; Rosenbaum v Boulder Ridge Homeowners Assn., 276AD2d615 [decided herewith]). Ritter, J. P., Sullivan, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.  