
    Brien, adm’r. vs. Hart.
    The jurisdiction of the county courts, in granting letters of administration, is original,'general and exclusive. It results from this, that the order of the county court granting letters of administration, need not show that decedent died intestate or that his last residence was in the county in which grant was made.
    This is a bill which was filed in the chancery, court at Mc-Minnville, by M. M. Brien, as administrator of Henry Hart, deceased, against L. Hart, the widow of said H. Hart, and others,' for the purpose of obtaining' possession of certain estate of the deceased, alleged to have been secreted by the widow.
    The defendant objected in her answer to the vilidity of the grant of administration to the defendant. This grant was in the following words, made by the county court of DeKalb: “On motion, M. M. Brien came- into court, and showed to the court that he was a creditor of Henry Hart,' deceased; it was therefore ordered by the court that M. M. Brien be appointed administrator of Henry Hart, deceased; whereupon M.- M. Brien was duly qualified, as such, and entered into bond, and ordered that letters issue.” •
    The bill was dismissed by chancellor Ridley, at the hearing on bill, Answer, replication and proof, onthe.ground that the letters of administration granted to complainant were void. The complainant appealed.
    
      Meigs, for the complainant.'
    As to.the point of the validity of the grant-of ..administration to Brien, see the following authorities:. Nelson’s lessee vs. Griffith, 2'Yerg. 624, 632; Brown ns. Wright, 4 Yerg. 57, 66; Feltz vs. Clarfe, 2 Humph.-79.
    In the first of these cases, which was decided right for a wrong reason, Judge Whyte says: “As the probate jurisdiction of the county court is a limited jurisdiction, the order of court granting the administration or probate must show— 1st. That the deceased died intestate'; 2d. That the usual or a fixed residence of the intestate, at the .time of his death, was in the county whose court grants the letters. See act of 1798, c. 23: s.,1.
    
      But the assumption that this jurisdiction of the county-court is a limited one, and therefore liable to the rule applied to it by the court in 2 Yerg., is apetitio princippii.
    
    The jurisdiction of the county court over deceased persons’ estates, is general, exclusive and original; and the court itself, as to these matters, is a superior court, having a jurisdiction precisely analogous to that of every court in the State. And when it exercises ifs probate jurisdiction, all is presumed to be rite acta.
    
    It is precisely analogous to the jurisdiction of the palatine courts in England, which are held to be original and superior courts, and whose records, therefore, need not show all the circumstances necessary to the exercise of their jurisdiction.
    The rule of jurisdiction is — “That nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior court, but that which specially appears to be so; and, on the contrary, nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an inferior court, but that which is so expressly alleged.” Peacock vs. Bell & Kendáll, 1 Saund. 73-75; 2 Murphey, 418.
    
      Savage, for the defendant.
    He cited, and relied on 2 Yerger, 624, as a binding and conclusive authority, sustaining the decree of the chancellor.
   Reese, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

Several questions are made in argument in this case, but as the chancellor dismissed the bill upon the supposed invalidity of the grant of administration to the administrator, the complainant, it is chiefly important to inquire into the legal correctness of that ground. The decision of his honor, the chancellor, was based upon the decision of the court, in the case of Nelson’s lessee vs. Griffin, 2 Yerg. 624-632, which is, that the probate jurisdiction of the county court is a limited jurisdiction, and that, therefore, the order of the court in granting administration, must show that the person upon whose estate the grant of administration may be made, died intestate, and that his usual or fixed residence, at the time of his death, was in the county of the grant. The case in which this decision took place, was probably decided right upon the facts; but the error in the dictum consists in the assumption of the principle that our courts of probate are of special and limited jurisdiction, and not in mistaken deductions or impressions, if the principle had been correct. Our courts of probate are not inferior, in the technical sense of that term, as used upon this subject at common law, nor is this jurisdiction special and limited; on the contrary, it is general, original and exclusive. In the exercise of such a jurisdiction, these courts are entitled to the presumption, that what they do is rightly done, and on just grounds. An inferior court, in the technical sense referred to, exercises a special and limited jurisdiction; and what it does in the exercise of such a jurisdiction, it must show, upon the face of the record, power and authority to do. But when a jurisdiction is granted, original and exclusive, the court exercising it cannot be called inferior, although there may be many other courts, which, in the course of appellate proceedings, may supervise and correct the exercise of its jurisdiction. See the case in 1 Saunders, already referred to during the present term in the case of Kilcrease heirs vs. Blythe, jr., where the rule is laid down on this subject with admirable precision, namely: “that nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a supreme court, but that which appears specially to be so; and, on the contrary, nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an inferior court, but that which is so expressly alleged.” Our courts of probate fall under the first category in this rule set forth. The decision in 2 Yerg. has never been applied and expounded in any case since. See the cases of Brown vs. Wright, 4 Yerg. 57-66, and the case of Feltz vs. Clark, 4 Hump. 79; and see also the cases in N. C., arising upon the same statute of ’89, reported in 4 Devereux, L. R. 226, and 2 Devereux, Law. 360, and 2 Murphey, 418—in all which cases, records of the grant of administration were similar to that in the record before us, and did, not contain the two requisites mentioned in the dictum in 2 Yerger.

The decree of the chancellor, dismissing the bill, must be reversed, and the decree for an account must be had in the case. But the principle of the decision in the case,of Moody vs. Fry, 3 Humph., and other cases, will exclude from the account all property and chóses in action, conveyed and assigned1 by the intestate in his life time.

The case will be reversed, and remanded to the chancery court, to be proceeded in. The complainant and the defendant, Lucretia Hart, will each pay one half of the costs of this court.  