
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RAVENSFORD LUMBER COMPANY et al.
    (Filed 26 June, 1935.)
    1. Judgments M a — Judgment 'held to have adjudicated all claims of respondent in land condemned, and to preclude subsequent motions in the cause in respect thereto.
    Judgment was entered in proceedings in eminent domain that upon payment by petitioner of the sum of money stipulated in the judgment title to the lands should eo instanti pass to petitioner, free from all adverse claims, liens, and encumbrances, and by later paragraph the judgment stipulated that the items of taxes, insurance, and maintenance incurred pendente lite were expressly reserved to be later passed upon by the court. Thereafter petitioner paid the sum stipulated into court and respondent accepted said sum. Meld: Upon tlie payment and acceptance of the stipulated sum the provision of the judgment that petitioner acquire the land free from all claims, liens, and encumbrances immediately took effect, and the reservation in the judgment in conflict therewith was void, and the court was thereafter without jurisdiction to hear a motion in the cause requesting that respondent be restrained from further claiming any amounts from petitioner for the items attempted to be reserved in the judgment, and respondent’s cross-petition asking that said amounts be determined and awarded, since the 'former cannot be regarded as an action to remove cloud from title, not the latter as a suit upon the judgment.
    3. Appeal and Error- A a—
    When the lower court has no jurisdiction of motions made in the cause after judgment, the orders of the court upon such motions do not detei*-mine the rights of the parties, nor can such rights be adjudicated in the Supreme Court upon appeal.
    PetitioN by respondent Ravensford Lumber Company to rebear this case, reported in 207 N. C., 47, 175 S. E., 713.
    This was a special proceeding, instituted under authority of ch. 48, Public Laws 1927, to condemn lands for park and recreational purposes in the Great Smoky Mountains of North Carolina. The jury of view made its award, from which the respondent appealed to the Superior Court, where the issue of damages was tried de novo before a jury at the November Special Term, 1933, Oowper, Special Judge, presiding.
    Judgment was duly entered upon the verdict, it being provided in paragraph five of said judgment that “upon the payment into court by the petitioner of the sum of money aforesaid,” the title to the lands described in the petition “shall eo imslanti pass to and vest in the petitioner, . . . free and discharged of and from all adverse claims, liens, and encumbrances whatsoever, and the respondent and all other persons . . . are forever barred from claiming or asserting any manner of estate or interest in said lands, either legal or equitable, whatsoever”; and further, in paragraph seven, “that the items of taxes, insurance, and maintenance,” incurred pendente lile, “are hereby expressly reserved to be hereafter passed upon and determined by the court.”
    Both sides gave notice of appeal from this judgment, but subsequently abandoned said appeals. On 30 April, 1934, the petitioner paid into court the amount of the award according to the terms of the judgment, which was accepted by the respondents.
    Thereafter, at the May Term, 1934, the petitioner lodged a motion to have the court restrain the respondents from further claiming any amounts from petitioner for the items attempted to be reserved in the judgment. The respondent filed a counter-petition, and asked that the said amounts be determined and awarded. Whereupon, the court found certain facts from “the record of the trial of this cause at the Special October-November Term, 1933, of the Superior Court of Buncombe County,” and granted the prayer of the petitioner. Respondent appeals, assigning error.
    
      Winborne & Proctor and Johnston & Horner for petitioner.
    
    
      J ones & Ward and J ohnson, Rollins & Uzzell for respondents.
    
   Stagy, 0. J.

The parties have assumed that by reason of the attempted reservation in paragraph seven of the final judgment entered at the November Special Term, 1933, the court retained jurisdiction to dispose of said alleged reserved matters by motion or subsequent petition in the cause. Moses v. Morganton, 195 N. C., 92, 141 S. E., 484; 34 C. J., 825. The assumption is a non sequitur. Sloan v. Hart, 150 N. C., 269, 63 S. E., 1037.

In the first place, the attempted reservation is in direct conflict with paragraph five of the judgment, which became immediately operative upon acceptance by the respondents of the moneys paid under the judgment, and thereby cut off any supposed reservation.

Secondly, the court was without authority to entertain either motion of the petitioner or the counter-petition of the respondent, former cannot be regarded as an action to remove cloud from title, the latter as a suit upon the judgment. the The nor

No rights were determined by the proceedings upon said motion counter-petition, and none can be adjudicated here. The appeal again be dismissed. and will

Petition allowed.  