
    Sayiden Hussein MOHAMED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BELLINGER, Nurse Supervisor; Stewart Andrews, M.D., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-35710
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted September 26, 2017 
    
    Filed October 6, 2017
    Sayiden Hussein Mohamed, Pro Se
    Mikolaj T. Tempski, Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney, Everett, WA, for Defendant-Appellee Bellinger
    Thomas Fain, Esquire, Attorney, Edward J. Hynes, Esquire, Fain Anderson VanDerhoef Rosendahl O’Halloran Spillane, PLLC, Seattle, WA, Jennifer D. Koh, Attorney, Favros Law, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee Stewart Andrews, M.D.
    
      Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Sayiden Hussein Mohamed, a former inmate at Snohomish County Jail, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

Summary judgment was proper because under any potentially applicable standard, Mohamed failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Mohamed’s health. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-58 (neither a prisoner’s difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment nor mere negligence in treating a medical condition amounts to deliberate indifference); Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2003) (pretrial detainee’s claim of medical deliberate indifference is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than under the Eighth Amendment, but same standards apply); see also Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-71 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (setting forth elements of Fourteénth Amendment failure-to-protect claim by pretrial detainee).

Denial of Mohamed’s motion for appointment of counsel was proper because ftfo-hamed failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and exceptional circumstances requirement for appointment of counsel).

We reject Mohamed’s contention that he should have been appointed an interpreter because Mohamed did not make such a request before the district court.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     