
    Marco PASTOR, Petitioner, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the UNITED STATES.
    No. 06-5121.
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) Feb. 1, 2008.
    Opinion filed: Feb. 19, 2008.
    Marcia S. Kasdan, Marcia S. Kasdan & Associates, Hackensack, NJ, for Petitioner.
    Richard M. Evans, Joan E. Smiley, United States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Before: RENDELL and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, POLLAK, District Judge.
    
      
       Honorable Louis H. Poliak, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    
   OPINION

POLLAK, District Judge.

Petitioner Marco Pastor appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’ affirmance of a decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to deny a request for continuance of removal proceedings. This court has jurisdiction over the petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Khan v. Attorney General, 448 F.3d 226, 229-33 (3d Cir.2006). We write primarily for the parties, and assume familiarity with the facts, decisions, and records of the case.

Seeking employment-based permanent residency, petitioner submitted an application for Labor Certification (Form ETA-750) to the Department of Labor. Petitioner requested a continuance of his removal proceedings pending resolution of the application. The Immigration Judge had previously granted two continuances on other grounds, and denied this third request. Petitioner argues that this denial was an abuse of discretion and violated his right of due process.

We are bound by precedent to reject these arguments. In Khan v. Attorney General, we held that “[wjhere ... an alien has failed to submit a visa petition, an IJ’s decision to deny the alien’s continuance request is squarely within the IJ’s broad discretion, at least absent extraordinary circumstances____” 448 F.3d at 234. Here, petitioner has neither submitted a visa application nor alleged “extraordinary circumstances” that could nevertheless render the IJ’s decision an abuse of discretion. Petitioner’s due process claim, like that presented in Khan, “merely recasts his abuse-of-discretion argument in constitutional terms and can be denied for the reason[ ] already stated.” Id. at 236.

Accordingly, the petition for review will be denied.  