
    YI TU LIN, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-1730.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 14, 2016.
    
      Richard Tarzia, Belle Mead, NJ, for Petitioner.
    Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy, Assistant Attorney General; Daniel E. Goldman, Senior Litigation Counsel; Todd Cochran, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, JOSÉ A. CABRANES and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Yi Tu Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 1, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming a November 1, 2011, decision of an immigration judge (“U”) denying Lin’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. In re Yi Tu Lin, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 1, 20M), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 1, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). Because the BIA did not adopt or affirm the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, that finding is not before this Court. Id. The 22 applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S..C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

Lin alleges a fear that Chinese authorities will persecute him if he returns to China because of his practice of Christianity, However, the agency did not err in concluding that Lin’s fear was not objectively reasonable. Lin did not allege past persecution, and thus was required either to show that he would be singled out individually for persecution, or that the Chinese government engages in a pattern or practice of persecuting similarly situated persons. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). He submitted no evidence that he would be singled out individually for persecution, that is, he did not assert that Chinese authorities are aware of his practice of Christianity.

Nor did Lin establish a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly situated individuals. A pattern or practice is the “systemic or pervasive” persecution of a group. In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A.2005). The record contains some evidence showing that Christians are persecuted, but it also contains ample evidence suggesting that the targeting is localized and not systemic throughout China. Accordingly, the agency did not err in finding that Lin’s pattern or practice claim failed. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007) (factfinder’s choice between two permissible views of the evidence cannot be clearly erroneous); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 142, 149, 169-72 (2d Cir.2008) (no error in BIA’s evidentiary framework requiring applicant to show persecution in his local area where punishment varies by region). Further, Lin’s testimony that his pastor was proselytizing in China, and had safely made such a trip before, undercuts his claim that the Chinese government generally persecutes people similarly situated to Lin, i.e., members, not leaders, of underground churches.

Since Lin did not meet his lower burden of establishing eligibility for asylum, he cannot meet the higher standard required to show entitlement to withholding of removal. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 156.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  