
    Robert Vincent v. Lessee of Goddard.
    .A purchaser from a judgment debtor, of land actually levied in execution, is not entitled to the benefit of the occupying claimant act.
    This case was reserved from the county of Holmes.
    The plaintiff below recovered judgment in ejectment, against -the then defendant, Robert Vincent, on a sale under execution against A. Dougherty. The defendant claimed, under a sale from Dougherty after the rendition of the judgment, and after the levy, and also under a sale for taxes. He now applies for relief under 'the occupying claimant law.
    Avert and Leadbetter, for the applicant:
    The applicant is entitled to' relief, under either of two distinct -provisions of the statute: 1. Because he holds by deed, according to the terms of the act. 2. Because he holds under a sale for taxes. The act is entitled to a liberal ^construction; the whole course of legislation upon the subject, and the reported decisions show this. The judgment creditor can have no equitable claim to ■satisfy his demand by a sale of what was not levied upon. Although, on this subject, the occupying claimant law, and the law with regard to judgments and executions come into conflict, yet what reason is there why the former should give way, rather than the latter. The law is fully stated in 5 Ohio, 158 ; and in Sellers v. Corwin, 5 Ohio, 398, it is decided that purchasers under execution, must pay for the improvements. But the plaintiff is also entitled •to relief under his tax title.
    Spangler, contra:
    It is not every case in which a claimant may show himself within ■the letter of the statute that will entitle him to its benefits. He must not show a case of fraud and collusion. In Shafer v. Magin, 2 Ohio, 237, the remarks of the court show that the occupying claimant law should be so construed as to bo subservient to the ends of justice. The cases cited by the counsel on the other side have no application. In 5 Ohio, 398, the purchaser under execution was held liable for improvements, under very different circumstances from the present. The claimant bought the land sub* jeet to the lien created by the levy. As to the tax sal es, their date,., the date of claimant’s deed from Dougherty, the fact that claimant permitted the land to be sold for taxes, and afterward bought in-the certificates, show a case too highly tinctured with fraud to-entitle him to the relief.
   Judge Grimke

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an application by a defendant in ejectment, under the* act for the relief of occupying claimants. Both parties deduce title from Andrew Dougherty, against whom a judgment was rendered in 1822. In 1824, an execution issued, and a levy was made on the land; and in 1831, the lessor of the plaintiff, became the purchaser. On December 12, 1826, Dougherty, the judgment debtor, conveyed to the defendant. Is the latter entitled to compensation for improvements? The act declares that he shall have the benefit of all improvements made before receiving actual notice, by the commencement of an adverse suit. And if the right only depended *upon this part of the statute, perhaps it would be difficult to deny him relief. At any rate, it is unnecessary to examine, whether this is to be deemed an adverse suit. Eor there is another provision in the law, which declares that “ a purchaser having obtained title without any fraud or collusion on' his part shall not be turned out of possession without being paid for improvements.” A judgment, where no scire facias is necessary, and, except as between different judgment creditors, is a perpetual' lien on the land of the debtor; only, it is presumed, like a bond at common law, to be paid after a lapse of twenty years. It is, to be sure, a general, and, not like a mortgage, a specific lien on the land. But when this judgment was followed up by an execution, and an actual levy on the land of the debtor, no one, who-afterward received a conveyance from him, could be considered a-purchaser in good faith. It is true a levy on land does not, like a levy on goods, divest the debtor of his property, but it is such a decisive and unequivocal act leading to this result, that no one could mistake it, and no one purchasing afterward can be said to be absolutely exempt from fraud and collusion. The case in 5 Ohio, 398, is a peculiar one, and does not authorize the application in this case.

The defendant also holds under a sale for taxes; but, I suppose,., he does not place much reliance on this part of his case; for the thirty-five acre certificate was produced eight mouths, and the one hundred acre certificate, five years, after the date of his deed.

Application rejected.  