
    Robert R. WATSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Oliver H. QIU, Bretz & Coven, LLP, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-1698-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 5, 2014.
    Robert R. Watson, Manchester, Jamaica, pro se.
    
      Barry Jacobs and Shari Sckolnick, Abrams, Gorelick, Friedman & Jacobson LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants-Ap-pellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Robert R. Watson (“Watson”), proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s judgment dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. We read pro se complaints liberally with “special solicitude” and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that [they] suggest[ ].” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.2011) (first alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the District Court properly dismissed Watson’s claim against the defendants for legal malpractice. With regard to Watson’s argument that the defendants should have filed a timely seventh motion to reopen the deportation proceedings with the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”), we likewise affirm, substantially for the reasons as stated by the District Court— namely, Watson did not plausibly allege that the outcome of his deportation proceedings would have been any different had the defendants timely filed a seventh successive motion to reopen on the same grounds already rejected by the Board.

Watson also advances the argument that the defendants were negligent in failing to file an application for an adjustment of status. Such an application, however, first required the Board to reopen his proceedings, inasmuch as jurisdiction had vested with the Board (the Board having ruled on Watson’s appeal as well as on six prior motions to reopen). See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1). Because the Board was not inclined to grant such relief, this argument similarly fails. Watson responds that the Board would have been required to reopen his proceedings because every adjustment application must be fully adjudicated; however, there is no support for this contention. See, e.g., Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 112 (BIA 2009) (denying an untimely motion to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status).

We have considered all of Watson’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the March 19, 2013 judgment of the District Court.  