
    Daniel M. Towle vs. John B. Kettell & another.
    A charter-party for “ a voyage from Boston to Wilmington, H. C., and from thence to cape Haytien, in the island of Hayti, and from thence to Boston,” for the sum of fifteen hundred dollars, payable, so much in Hayti as the master may want for the disbursements of the vessel, and the residue on the discharge of the cargo in Boston, is a contract for one entire voyage oat and home, and if the vessel is lost hy the perils of the sea, on the voyage from Hayti to Boston, no part of the freight is earned.
    A charter-party provided, that demurrage should be payable for every day, beyond a certain period, during which the vessel should be detained by the default of the charterer or his agents; the vessel, on arriving at her port of discharge, having, sickness on board, was removed from her anchorage hy the competent authority, and put into quarantine, at some distance, where the cargo might he discharged, but at some additional expense to the consignee, and she was thus detained for some days ; she was also further detained for two days, after taking her return cargo on board, in consequence of the master’s not being furnished by the consignee with the necessary papers; it was held that demurrage was not payable for either of these detentions.
    This was an action of assumpsit, containing two counts, first, to recover compensation for transporting a cargo in the brig Pandora, from Wilmington, North Carolina, to cape Haytien, in the island of Hayti, and there" delivering the same safely; and, second, to recover for thirteen days’ demurrage at the latter place.
    The vessel sailed from Boston under a charter-party, executed on the 27th of June, 1846, in the usual form, “ for a voyage,” as described therein, “ from Boston to Wilmington, N. C., and from thence to cape Haytien, in the island of Hayti, and from thence back to Boston,” the defendants engaging to pay the plaintiff “ for the charter or freight of the said vessel during the voyage aforesaid, in manner following, that is to say, fifteen hundred dollars, say, so much in Hayti as the master may want for the disbursement of the vessel, and the balance on the discharge of the cargo in Boston, together with all port charges, lighterage and pilotage in Hayti ”; and the master to have what freight could be got from Boston to Wilmington.
    It was further agreed, that the defendants should furnish the necessary cargoes or ballast required for the safety of the vessel, excepting only to Wilmington, which was to be provided by the captain; that the cargoes should be received and delivered within reach of the vessel’s tackles ; that the defendants should “ be allowed for the loading and discharging of the vessel, at the respective ports aforesaid, lay days, that is to say, twenty-five running lay days in Hayti, and the cargo in Wilmington to be given to the vessel as fast as she can receive it, it being understood only that the vessel shall receive despatch in loading at Wilmington ” ; and in case the vessel should be longer detained, the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff11 demurrage at the rate of twenty-five Spanish milled dollars per day, day by day, for every day so detained, provided such detention shall happen by default ” of the defendants or their agent.
    The vessel arrived at Wilmington, and there received a cargo of shingles and lumber, with which she proceeded to Hayti, where she arrived on the 7th of September, 1846, and on the same day the master reported himself to the consignees as ready to discharge the cargo. On the day after her arrival, there being sickness on board, the vessel was ordered into quarantine, and was removed from the place where she had been brought to anchor by the pilot, opposite to the town, to a smooth and safe place about one mile and a half or two miles off, on the opposite side of the bay, where she lay eight days.
    On the same day, the master went with the consignees, and made entry at the custom-house. The master, having ascertained that he would be permitted by the government to discharge the cargo while in quarantine, offered to do so; but the consignees refused to receive it, saying it would cost them to get it on shore double what it would if delivered where vessels usually discharged. The vessel, having been removed back by the commandant to her original position, commenced discharging on the 15th and finished on the 30th of September, 1846. The consignees were not willing to receive cargo after twelve o’clock in the day, and none was delivered after that horn’. The master commenced at four o’clock to make his raft, and got out what he could till twelve o’clock, when the consignees carried it ashore, and employed the afternoon in hauling it up. The vessel was lying at least a mile from the shore, and it took ten or twelve working days to get the cargo out. The consignees advanced to the master at cape Haytien $ 107.90.
    The loading of the vessel with a return cargo commenced on the 2d of October, and was completed by the 13th, and she sailed for Boston on the 15th, immediately after she had been cleared by the consignees at the custom-house. The delay of two days, after the loading of the vessel was completed, was occasioned by the master’s not obtaining the necessary papers; for which he knew of and could give no other reason, than that the consignees were not ready to clear him. The vessel was totally lost on West Caicos reef, and the cargo was carried by wreckers to Turk’s island and other places, and sold.
    The case was submitted to the court unon the foregoing statement of facts.
    
      B. R. Curtis, for the plaintiff.
    
      C. G. Loving, for the defendants.
   The opinion of the court was delivered at the March term, 1850.

Fletcher, J.

This suit is brought by the owners of the vessel, to recover for the charter or freight of the vessel from Wilmington, North Carolina, to- cape Haytien, and for thirteen days’ demurrage at that place. The first question presented is, whether or not the plaintiff, the owner, can recover upon the charter-party, for the freight of the cargo from Wilmington to cape Haytien, and delivering it there; the vessel having been lost on the voyage from cape Haytien to Boston, and never having reached Boston, the place at which the employment of the vessel, as described in the charter-party, was to terminate. If the charter-party describes two separate and distinct voyages, an outward voyage and a homeward voyage, then as the outward voyage to cape Haytien was completed, the freight was earned for that voyage, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover, though the vessel was lost on the homeward voyage to Boston, and before this latter voyage was completed. But if the charter-party describes but one entire voyage, out and home, to be completed on the return of the brig to Boston, then as the brig was lost and never returned to Boston, the voyage was never completed, and of course the freight was not earned, and the plaintiff cannot recover the freight claimed in this suit.

It is undoubtedly a well-settled principle and rule of decision, in cases of this description, that if one entire whole voyage, or whole service, is stipulated for in the charter-party, the ship-owner cannot sue on the charter-party, unless the whole voyage or whole service is performed. Individual cases, as they arise, are determined by the application of the general rule or principle to the stipulations and provisions of the contract in each particular case. In the case of Brown v. Hunt, 11 Mass. 45, which was relied on by the counsel for the plaintiff, the general principle of law, as before stated, was adopted; but the court thought, that upon the terms and provisions of the charter-party, that was a case of separate and distinct voyages, and of course that the plaintiff was entitled to recover freight up to the conclusion of a particular passage of the ship. So in the case of Locke v. Swan, 13 Mass. 76, also relied on by the plaintiff’s counsel, the same general principle of law is fully recognized; but the court thought that the voyage described in the charter-party was divisible, and that the freight up to a certain period might be recovered. In these cases, the terms of the charter-parties differed widely from the terms of the contract in the present case, and no new rule dr principle of decision was disclosed; bat, in both, the settled general principle of law is adopted, and the cases are therefore important, in reference to the one now under consideration, only so far as they may aid in putting a construction upon the charter-party now under consideration. In the case of Coffin v. Storer, 5 Mass. 252, where a ship was chartered on a voyage from Biddeford to Surinam and a market, and back to Biddeford, and being wrecked on her homeward passage, it was held, that no freight could be earned, under the charter-party, for the voyage was an entire voyage, and the hire was payable only on the completion of the voyage. Decisions similar to the last were made in the following, among other cases, namely, Barker v. Cheriot, 2 Johns. 352; Scott v. Libby, 2 Johns. 336; Liddard v. Lopes, 10 East, 526; Penoyer v. Hallett, 15 Johns. 332; Burrill v. Cleeman, 17 Johns. 72; Hamilton v. Warfield, 2 Gill & J. 482; Blanchard v. Bucknam, 3 Greenl. 1. But it is not necessary to examine particularly these decisions, as they rest upon constructions of the charter-parties, upon which the suits were respectively founded. The question now to be settled is, what is the true and correct construction of the charter-party in the present case. The terms of the instrument are, that the plaintiff agrees on the freighting and chartering of the vessel, for a voyage from Boston to Wilmington, North Carolina, and from thence to cape Haytien, in the Island of Hayti, and from thence back to Boston. Here the employment of the vessel is in terms declared to be for a single voyage, and there is nothing indicating in the slightest manner distinct voyages. One entire round voyage, beginning and ending at Boston, is expressly agreed on. So also, in regard to compensation: the defendants agree to pay for the charter or freight of the vessel, “ during the voyage aforesaid,” fifteen hundred dollars. Here is one entire gross sum to be paid for one entire voyage. The provision for paying the master at Hayti what he might want for the disbursements of the vessel, cannot affect the construction of the instrument. The charter-party, therefore, in the present case, being for one entire voyage out and home, and the vessel being lost while on her return home, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the portion of freight claimed in this suit.

In regard to the claim for demurrage, it does not appear, that the vessel was delayed by the default of the defendants, in which case only the defendants were by the charter-party made liable for demurrage. When the vessel arrived at cape Haytien, there being sickness on board, she was moved by the proper authority from her anchorage and put into quarantine. The consignees were not bound to receive the cargo undei the disadvantages and at the increased expense arising from the remote situation of the vessel. As soon as the vessel was restored to her original place of anchoring, the discharging of the cargo commenced and proceeded, so far as appears, with all reasonable despatch. The delay, to which the master says he was subjected, in obtaining his necessary papers on his return, does not appear to have been occasioned by any default of the defendants. The plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to recover on either count in the declaration.

Judgment for the defendants.  