
    Christopher MUBIRU, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 06-1245.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: Sept. 6, 2006.
    Decided: Oct. 11, 2006.
    
      Edwin K. Fogam, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Carol Federighi, Civil Division, Ellen J. Durkee, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM:

Christopher Mubiru, a native and citizen of Uganda, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) adopting and affirming the immigration judge’s decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding from removal and withholding under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition.

The INA authorizes the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2000). It defines a refugee as a person unwilling or unable to return to his native country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000).

An applicant can establish refugee status based on past persecution in his native country on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2006). “An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject of past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.2004). Without regard to past persecution, an alien can establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected ground. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 187. An applicant has the burden of demonstrating his eligibility for asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2006); Gonahasa v. INS, 181 F.3d 538, 541 (4th Cir.1999).

Credibility findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony on credibility grounds must offer specific, cogent reasons for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir.1989). “Examples of specific and cogent reasons include inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony.” Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir.2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). We accord broad, though not unlimited, deference to credibility findings supported by substantial evidence. Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir.2004).

A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). Administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000). This court will reverse the Board “only if the evidence presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n. 14 (4th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We find the record does not compel a different result. The immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence. In addition, there was no significant evidence supporting Mubiru’s contention he would be tortured were he to return to Uganda.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED  