
    *George White v. John R. Archer.
    Common Order — Confirmation on Same Day Court Sits —Docket—A Capias ad Respondendum was issued, returnable to the Rules, on the first Monday in April, and on that day common order was entered; the first Monday in May was the next Rule Day, on which day the common order was confirmed in the office. On the same day the Court sat. It was not regular to place that Case on the Office Judgment Docket of that Term, because the 76th section of the Act directs, that the Docket shall be made out before every Term.
    The Plaintiff sued out, from the Clerk’s Office of the Superior Court of Law for Amelia county, a Capias ad Respondendum in an action of debt against the Defendant. The writ was made returnable to the Rule Day in April, 1820, which was the first Monday in that month. On that Rule Day, the Plaintiff filed his Declaration, arid obtained his common order against the Defendant and bail. The next Rule Day was the first Monday in May, on which day the Superior Court itself was appointed by Law to sit, and actually did sit. The Plaintiff, however, at the Rules on that day, obtained his common order confirmed, and the Cause was placed by the Clerk on the Office Judgment Docket of that Court. On the third day of the Court, the Defendant having given special bail, appeared, and moved the Court to send the Cause back to the Rules; assigning as a reason, “that the Rule Day in April was the only Rule Day which had intervened from the issuing of the Capias, until the first day of the Term of this Court; that the Defendant was entitled to plead within six days from the said first Monday in May ; that, therefore, the Case cannot be docketed on the Office Judgment Docket, until the expiration of six days from the second Rule Day, which has not yet happened.” The question was adjourned to this Court.
    The following clauses of the Act are applicable to this Case,  The 69th sect, directing the Rules to be held on the first Monday in each month, and that “they may be continued from day to day, not exceeding six days.” The 72d, 73d, and 74th sections, the latter of which says, “All Rules to declare, &.C. or for other proceedings, shall be given regularly from month to month, shall be entered in a book to be kept for that purpose, and shall expire on thesucceeding Rule Day.” Also, the 76th section more especially, *which says, “Before every Term of the — Superior Court of Law, — the Clerk shall enter in a particular Docket, separate and distinct from the Rule Docket — all those Causes, and those only, in which there is — an Office Judgment, which may be set aside, &c.” The common order entered at the April Rules, could not be confirmed until the succeeding May Rules. Until then, it could not be an Office Judgment. On that day the Court sat, and the Clerk could not place on his Court Docket any Office Judgment, except such an one as was confirmed before that Term, that is, before the first Monday in May.
    
      
      Docketing Causes. — In Hale v. Chamberlain, 13 Gratt. 660, it is said: “The law then as now provided that the docket was to be made out before the term, and it followed that no cause could be put on the docket in which there was an office judgment, unless such office judgment had been obtained before the term; and where the office judgment was obtained on the same day the term commenced, the cause could not be put upon the docket at that term. White v. Archer, 2 Va. Cas. 201; Green v. Skipwith, 1 Rand. 460.”
    
    
      
       1 Rev. Code of 1819, ch. 128, p. 506-7.
    
   PER CURIAM.

“The Court is unanimously of opinion, that the Capias in this Case being returnable to April Rules, and a common order then entered, it was not confirmable until the first Monday in May, and that day being the first day of the Superior Court Term, it was not such an Office Judgment as could legally be placed on the Docket of that term.”

Hate (in edition of 1853). See the Case of Green v. Skipwith, in the Court of Appeals, decided since this Case. 1 Randolph, 460.  