
    Ex parte Johnson.
    A retaining fee is not allowed to a solicitor and counsel upon opposing a motion founded upon a petition, for instructions to a receiver in the discharge of his duty.
    Upon a denial of such an application the like cost must be taxed as are allowed for resisting a special motion.
    Upon applications for commissions of lunacy and other proceedings of a like character, if a solicitor is actually employed to conduct the proceedings, he is entitled to a retaining fee.
    But a retaining fee to counsel is only allowed where counsel is actually employed in a cause or suit strictly so called.
    Upon a submission in this case by one of the taxing officers of certain questions in relation to costs,
   The Chancellor

decided that a retaining fee to solicitor and counsel was not allowable upon opposing a motion founded upon a petition for instructions to a receiver in the discharge of his duty. That like costs on a denial of the application must be taxed as are allowed for resisting a special motion. That on applications for commissions of lunacy, and other special proceedings of a like nature, where solicitors are actually employed to conduct the proceedings, a retaining fee ought to be allowed to the solicitor. But that retaining fees to counsel are only allowed where counsel are actually employed in a cause or suit strictly so called, in which ' there are adverse proceeding, or where there is a complainant and a defendant.  