
    (40 South. 581.)
    No. 15,923.
    STATE v. NUGENT et al.
    (Jan. 29, 1906.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1906.)
    1. Weapons—Shooting into Dwelling.
    Motive in another person to commit the crime may be shown; but, where this is sought to be done by proof of a disconnected fact from which to infer such motive, the fact must have a close bearing. Where, on a charge of shooting into a dwelling house, the prosecution has •established facts tending to show that the motive of the accused in doing the shooting was to get rid of a negro camp near the house, "the defendant may show that a notice had been served upon the occupant of the house by the white people of the neighborhood that the negro camp must go.
    •2. Witnesses—Cross-Examination.
    Where one side has gone partially into :a matter on examination in chief, the other ■side may go fully into it on cross-examination.
    [Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 50, •Cent. Dig. Witnesses, §§ 931-948.]
    :3. Witnesses — Examination — Control by Coubt—Number of Counsel.
    Where there are several counsel, the court may limit to one counsel the examination of each witness. It is a matter pertaining to the police of the court.
    [Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 50, Cent. Dig. Witnesses, §§ 789-793.]
    ¡(Syllabus by the Court.)
    Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides; Wilbur Fisk Black-man, Judge.
    James Nugent and Pleas Terrell were convicted of shooting into a house, and appeal.
    Reversed.
    H. L. Daigre, John C. Ryan, Jacques Michel Pincus, arid Frank McGloin, for appellants. Walter Guión, Atty. Gen., and John Ransdell Hunter, Dist. Atty. (Lewis Guión, of counsel), for the State.
   PROVOSTY, J.

Defendant was convicted of “shooting into the house” of Wm. M. Cady.

The first witness put on the stand by the state testified that “he was employed by W. M. Cady at a salary of $60 per month, to take charge of ’ a negro camp near Cady’s house.” On cross-examination the question was propounded to him by the accused: “Were you or Mr. Cady and these negroes notified by the people in the neighborhood that the negroes must go or be removed from there?” This question was objected to as irrelevant. The per curiam says:

“The accused were indicted for shooting into a dwelling house, and whether Cady or Smith or any else had been notified about the negro labor was irrelevant or immaterial. There was not evidence, direct or circumstantial, connecting the accused with thé crime, as this was the first witness. The witness heard the shooting and was testifying as to where he was when it commenced. The dwelling house was some distance from the negro camp.”

It is easily conceived how the evidence might have tended to show a motive in other persons than the defendant to shoot into this house. It was therefore not irrelevant. Wig-more on Ev. vol. 1, §§ 118, 139, 141; 12 Cyc. 399. In the case of State v. Perry, 51 La. Ann. 1074, 25 South. 944, and State v. Baudoin (No. 15,956, this day decided) 40 South. 42, the bearing of the fact sought to be proved was more remote, which distinguishes them from the instant case.

Moreover, the state having interrogated the witness as to this negro camp and its proximity to Cady’s house, the defendant was entitled to go fully into the matter. State v. Pruett, 49 La. Ann. 291, 21 South. 842; State v. Duplechain, 52 La. Ann. 448; 26 South. 1000. The purpose of the prosecution in offering the evidence could not but have been to prove motive on the part of defendant; if so, defendant had a right to go further into the matter to show a similar, or the same, motive in others.

There is no merit in the other bills of exceptions, only one of which we shall notice. The per curiam sufficiently explains the matter:

“The court notified the counsel that only one of the three counsel would be permitted to examine the same witness. This was done in the interest of time, as there was a- very large ■criminal docket to try. I have the power to police the court, and to prevent an unnecessary consumption of time, and which it would have been, with all three counsel going over the •same examination.”

The ruling was correct. Wharton, Crim. Law (7th Ed.) par. 3009; E. of P. & P. vol. 8, p. 111.

Judgment and verdict set aside, and cause remanded, to be proceeded with according to law. 
      
       115 La. 773.
     