
    
      Bevins, Earle & Co. vs. B. Dunham.
    
    B., E., & Co. the plaintiffs, recovered a judgment against P., but previously to the recovery thereof, P. had confessed a judgment to D., for the sum of $10,000. On an issue between the plaintiffs and D. to try the validity of D’s. judgment, the defendant did not attempt to set it up for any greater sum than the debt actually due at the confession, and for money paid and advances made by him for P. P’s. judgment was held good, unless it could have been shewn that the advances were colourable merely, or were made with a view of giving to P. an advantage against his creditors. A judgment confessed to cover present debts and future advances, is good between the parties, and will not be. set aside at the instance of creditors, unless it is calculated to defeat, delay, or hinder them. Livingston mid Tracy vs. M‘Inlay, Austin a/nd Andrews vs. the same, 16 J. R. 165.
    
      Before O’Neall, J., at Greenville, Extra Term, August, 1842.
    This was an issue to try the validity of a judgment.
    The plaintiffs were judgment creditors of A. Patterson, who, previous to the recovery thereof, had confessed with James A. Patterson a judgment to the defendant for the sum of $10,000. When the judgment was confessed before Wm. Choice, Esq., he drew up a written agreement, which was executed by the defendant, whereby it was stated, that a part of the confession, $4,891 13, was to cover future advances, and for it the defendant gave his note to the Messrs. Pattersons. The agreement further declared that Dunham was to wait two years on his execution, but was in no event to lose his lien ; and if the defendant’s property was seized and sold, under other executions, he was to have the right of claiming the proceeds. “If this does not happen,” is the language used, “I am to wait without levying, unless it is apparent a loss will accrue before the expiration of the term of two years.” Mr. Choice stated, that it was also understood by the parties, that if a levy should have to be made under Dunham’s execution, any balance which might be due on Dunham’s note, was to be credited on the judgment.
    James A. Patterson, one of the defendants, said that the defendant, (Dunham,) to obtain the confession, promised to pay the plaintiffs’ debt, and the Philadelphia debt. He also stated that their property, of which the paper mill was the most valuable part, was valued in August, 1839, at $20,000. The paper mill was bought by the defendant, under his execution, for $3,000.
    The defendant (Dunham) paid on his note in accounts for advances made by him, and judgments purchased, $2,600. The balance of his note was credited on his judgment.
    The Philadelphia debt, and a debt to Col. Beattie were, by his vigilance, made to take rank as judgment debts with the defendants; he therefore bought them. His note was about to be transferred in payment of the plaintiffs’ debt. He (Dunham) prevented it. The defendant (Dunham) in February, 1842, believing that the principal debtor and owner of the property, A. Patterson, was about to fly from the state, sold all of his property (and it was principally bought by Dunham) for $6,412 51 1-4. The defendant made an arrangement with A. Patterson, by which he obtained the renunciation of his wife’s dower in the paper mill for $1,000, most of which was paid out of Patterson’s property, for the value of which the defendant credited his cases, or gave receipts on the sheriff’s books. The property bought by Dunham was, his Honor supposed, worth two or three times as much as the defendant gave for it.
    The case was submitted to the jury as a question of fact, whether there was any fraud or not. They found for the defendant. ^
    The plaintiffs now move the Court of Appeals for a new trial on the following grounds:
    1. Because the confession being for a large amount beyond the amount due by the Pattersons, rendered the confession null and void.
    2. Because the original agreement between the Patter-sons and defendant, operated to hinder and delay the other creditors, and was a legal fraud on creditors,
    3. Because the failure to comply with the contract to pay plaintiff’ judgment — the paying to the Pattersons themselves a large amount of money — the purchasing demands against the Pattersons, and refusing to pay the assignees of the note, were all acts of fraud, and fatal to the validity of the judgment.
    4. Because the verdict is contrary to law and evidence.
    
      COPY OF AGREEMENT.
    
      South Carolina — Greenville District.
    
    Benajah Dunham ' vs. A. Patterson & Judgment confessed the 9th October 1839, for $10,000. J. A. Patterson. __
    Whereas, A. Patterson and James A. Patterson have this day confessed a judgment to me for ten thousand dollars, as above stated, and consented that execution may issue and be lodged to bind, with a view to aid the defendants, by making advances of money for them, I have executed and delivered to the defendants my note for four thousand eight hundred and ninety-one dollars and thirteen cents, which is a part of the above stated judgment. Now I have agreed with the Messrs. Pattersons, the defendants, to indulge them on the above judgment at the least two years from this date; provided, however, that in no event am I to lose the benefit of my lien under the execution, but am to have the righi to claim, if the property is levied on and sold by junior executions; and if this does not happen, I am to wait, without levying, unless it is apparent a loss will accrue before the expiration of the term of two years.
    Given under my hand and seal, at Greenville Court House, the 9th day of October, 1839.
    B. DUNHAM, [l. s.]
    In presence of Wm. Choice, Jr.
    Henry, for the motion,
    relied upon the rule, “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.”
    Perry, contra,
    cited the case of J. & C. Lawton vs. Millar, 2 Rice’s Digest, 46; also, 2 Cowen, 246, and 3 Cranch, 74.
    Burt, same side,
    cited 16 J. R. 166.
   Curia, per

O’Neall, J.

The only legal question in this case, is that made by the first and second grounds. In J. & C. Lawton vs. Miller, Mss. Dec. 1820, 2 Rice’s Dig. 46, it was held, that a confession for $2,090, as to which it was understood and agreed that the plaintiffs should furnish to the defendant from time to time goods, and that the payments made by the defendant should be applied to these new contracts, so as to leave the lien of the judgment unimpaired for any balance which might remain due, was good as between the parties. In Livingston & Tracy vs. M'Inlay, Austin & Andrews vs. the same, 16 J. R. 165, where judgments had been confessed to cover present debts and future advances, it was held that they were good and legal. These authorities make it plain that the judgment between the parties is subject to no objection. To make it void against creditors, it must be shewn that it was calculated to defeat, delay, or hinder them. There was in this case no proof justifying this conclusion. Indeed the judgment was not attempted to be set up for any greater sum than the debt actually due at the confession, and for money paid and advances made by the defendant, Dunham, for the Pattersons. So far, there could be no fraud, unless these advances had been colorable merely, or were made with a view of giving to the Pattersons an advantage against their creditors. The questions arising out of this qualification were submitted to the jury, and their finding has negatived them. There can therefore be no pretence of fraud which we can notice.

Every other matter presented by the appeal depends upon the facts, which have been passed upon by the jury, and we perceive no reason to question the correctness of their conclusion. The motion is dismissed.

Richardson, Evans, Butler and Wardlaw, JJ., concurred.  