
    Jackson, ex dem. Lynch, against Hartwell.
    A. granted to Qf^lie^ant^of ■rf^íandf lupon shouklerect^nd buiidononepart of it, lying east of a certain street, & court-house and gaol, and that they should suffer that part lying west of the same street, to be appropriated for building a church and school-house for the use of the inhabitants of Home. It was held that if the supervisors of the county were a corporation, they had no capacity to take and hold lands, as supervisors, for the use of the inhabitants of Home, or for any other use or purpose than that of the county which they represented. Even a regular corporation aggregate, cannot be seised of land, in trust, for purposes foreign to its institution. The supervisors of a county are a corporation with special powers, and for special purposes only; and it is very questionable, whether, prior to the act passed 8th Jipril, 1801, (sess, 24. c. ISO.) they were competent to take a grant of land.
    THIS was an action of ejectment, brought to recover the possession of a school-house, in the village of Lynchvide. The cause was tried at the Oneida circuit, in June laSt’ before Mr* Just=Ce Van NeSS'
    
    The plaintiff gave in evidence a deed, dated the 21st * ° Mav, 1800, from Dominick Lynch to the supervisors of 3 r , the county of Oneida, which recited, that by an act or the legislature, passed the 15th March, 1798, the said supervisors were authorized, and had agreed and determined, to erect and build a court-house and gaol in the town of Rome, in and for the county of Oneida ; and that the lessor was owner of a certain tract of land, situate in the town of Rome, in the village called Lynckviile, and the supervisors had agreed upon the lots or pieces of land thereinafter conveyed to them, as a suitable site for the said courthouse and gaol; therefore, the plaintiff, in order to promote the settlement and embellishment of Lynchvi/le, and in consideration of one dollar, granted to the said supervisors, certain lots of land therein described, to have and to hold the same to the said supervisors, and to their successors in office, and their own proper use and behoof for ever; upon the special trust and confidence, nevertheless, that the said supervisors and their successors should, without delay, erect and complete a court-house and gaol upon part of the premises so granted to them, and allotted for that purpose; and that the said supervisors and their successors in office, shall and will, at all times, for ever thereafter, permit and suffer all that part of the granted premises, situate west of a certain street called James street, to be laid out and appropriated for the building and erecting a church and school-house thereon, which church and school-house shall be established and built according to the direction and appointment of a majority of the freeholders, being inhabitants of the town of Rome, for the time being, for the use, benefit and advantage of all the inhabitants of the town of Rome; and that the said supervisors and their successors in office, should, for ever thereafter, permit and.suffer all that part of the premises thereby granted, situate east of James street, to be laid out and appropriated for the purpose erecting the court-house and gaol; and also that they Shall, at all times thereafter, for ever permit and suffer the Whole piecé or parcel of land and premises thereby ¿nd every part thereof, to tie and remain a pub-lie square; aild provided, also, that the said supervisors and their successors in office, shall not, at any time thereafter, build, ór suffer to be built, or erected, upon any part of the premises thereby granted, any dwelling-houses edifice, or building, upon any pretence Whatever, within fifty feet of any part of the boundary line of the premises, &c.
    The plaintiff thefi offered to prove, that the schoolhouse was originally built on the west side of James street, cm a line with the church, court-house, and gaol, and agreeably to the original plan, agreed on and adopted by the parties* and contributed much to the ornament oí’ the village; that some time before the commencement of this suit, the lessor sold a lot to H. Huntington, on the north side of the square, and that he and others removed the school-house to the opposite side of the square, so as to be distant fO feet from a corner lot .of the lessor, on the south side of the square, and materially to injure the value of the lot, and destroy the beauty and symmetry of the public square, although the lessor opposed and forbade the removal of the school-house; and that the removal was made without any vote or resolution of a majority of the freeholders or inhabitants of the town of Home. This testimony was overruled by the judge, and a verdict was taken, by consent, for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court on a case containing the above ¿acts.
    
      Platt and Lynch, for the plaintiff,,
    
      Clark and Gold, contra»
   Per Curiam.

The grant from Lynch to the supervi - sors of the county of Oneida, was for several purposes. That part of the land which lay east of James street was granted to them for the use of the county, for the erec- . , - . - , 1,1 Sion and accommodation or a court-house and gaol, and that part of the land which lay west of the said street (and which includes the school-house or premises in question j was granted for a church and school-house, 61 for the use, benefit, and advantage of the inhabitants of the town of Some.” Admitting the grant of the first parcel of land to have been valid, prior to the act of 2801, it docs not follow that the grant of the second parcel, for a different use, was valid. If the supervisors were a corporation, it was only for certain special •purposes, declared by the act of the Tth March, 1783. They certainly had no capacity to take and hold lands, as supervisors) for any other use or purpose than that of the county which they represented. They were not competent to be seised as trustees for the use of an individual, or of the inhabitants of a village. Even a regular corporation aggregate, with its usual plenary powers, could not be so seised, for it would be foreign to the purpose of its institution, and the trust could not be duly enforced. (1 Plowd. 103. 1 Kyd on Corporations, 72.) The supervisors of a county are a corporation for special purposes, and with special powers only; and it is very questionable, whether, before the act of 1801, (Laws, vol. 1. p. 561.) they were competent to take a grant of land. There are many instances, in the law, of collective bodies of men, coming undtir one general description, endowed with a corporate capacity in some particulars expressed, but who have, in no other respect, the capacities incident to a corporation. Thus, in England, under the statute of Winchester, the hundred can be sued in its collective capacity. So churchwardens may take goods, and bring actions of trespass, but a feoffment to them would be void, for they have no capacity for such a purpose'. Numerous examples, of the like kind, are mentioned or referred to by Mr. Kyd, in the introductory chapter to his treatise on corporations. (Kyd on Corp. vol. 1. p. 9, 10. 12. 29. 31.) Our laws are full of instances of per-’ , , . , - . . , sons clothed with corporate powers, for certain special purposes. The loan-officers of a county are a corporatjon. an¿ could they, as such, receive a grant of land for the use of a town, or of a church ? Certainly not. Nor can the supervisors of Oneida take a grant of land, for the use of the town of Rome. Such a grant must be-deemed voids upon every principle, whether we consider the special and defined objects of a corporate capacity in the board of supervisors ; whether we consider the power given them by statute, to take conveyances of land, for the use of the county; or, lastly, whether we refer to the incapacity of all corporations, to hold lands in trust, for any other object than that for which the corporation was created.

Whether the court of equity would, or would not, pre-t vent the trust, as to the inhabitants of Rome, from failing, for want of a trustee, is a question net for this court to decide. It is enough in this case, that a court of law cannot supply the want of a sufficient grantee. We are of opinion, that judgment must be rendered for the plaintiff.

Judgment for the plaintiff  