
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eugene Muriell, Also Known as Eugene Murrieo, Appellant.
   Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bonomo, J.), rendered October 6, 1982, convicting him of murder in the second degree (two counts), rape in the first degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification evidence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial, made after the arresting officer testified that when the defendant was arrested he was in a stolen car found to have been used in an armed robbery. The defendant had not been charged or indicted for either of these crimes. While we conclude, contrary to the People’s position, that this alleged error was preserved for appellate review, we do not find that the admission of this evidence, which was relevant to the officer’s motive for placing the defendant under arrest, constituted an abuse of the trial court’s discretion (see, People v Fay, 85 AD2d 512; People v Le Grand, 76 AD2d 706, 708-709). In any event, in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, any prejudice which may have resulted from the admission of this evidence does not warrant reversal (see, People v Johnson, 57 NY2d 969; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230).

Additionally, we find no error in the hearing court’s ruling that both complainants had sufficient opportunity to observe the defendant during the commission of the charged crimes, and thus possessed an independent source for their in-court identifications of the defendant. The hearing court’s conclusion that any impropriety in the pretrial identifications did not taint the in-court identifications is clearly supported by the record and thus will not be disturbed on appeal (see, People v Bookhart, 117 AD2d 739, 740; People v James, 116 AD2d 663).

The defendant’s pro se argument that his arrest was not based on probable cause and was thus illegal is similarly without merit. The officer stopped the car in which the defendant was a passenger after observing it run a red light. Once the defendant’s companion failed to produce a registration and insurance card for the car, the officer ran a check on the license plate and was informed that the vehicle had been reported stolen and was wanted in connection with an armed robbery. Based on this information, the officer took the occupants of the vehicle into custody and brought them to the precinct. Clearly, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant based upon the information received from a radio report (see, People v Lypka, 36 NY2d 210, 213-214; People v Ward, 95 AD2d 233; People v Bowdoin, 89 AD2d 986). The defendant does not challenge the reliability of the transmitted report, and thus the reliability of the information contained therein is presumed (see, People v Ward, supra). The defendant’s further claim that his mere presence in the stolen vehicle did not provide a basis for his arrest is similarly without merit, since Penal Law § 165.05 (1) provides that such conduct constitutes the offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree.

We have reviewed the defendant’s remaining pro se contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Mollen, P. J., Weinstein, Eiber and Sullivan, JJ., concur.  