
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Eric LESANE, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-4273-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 7, 2014.
    Jessica R. Lonergan (Michael A. Levy, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
    Laurie S. Hershey, Manhasset, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Present: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges, and MICHAEL P. SHEA, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Michael P. Shea, of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Eric Lesane appeals from a judgment of conviction entered November 1, 2013 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Gardephe, J.), following Lesane’s guilty plea. Lesane pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (k). He was subsequently sentenced principally to 94 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ supervised release, and now challenges that sentence on appeal, arguing that the district court improperly treated Lesane’s Youthful Offender Adjudications under New York law as adult convictions. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Whether a sentence “did not result from an ‘adult conviction,’ and was thus improperly included in the District Court’s calculation” under the Sentencing Guidelines is “a pure question of law,” which we review de novo. United States v. Driskell, 277 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir.2002). Lesane’s only claim on appeal is that the district court incorrectly treated two New York convictions that were subsequently vacated and replaced with ‘Youthful Offender Adjudications” under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 720.20 as prior adult convictions for the purpose of calculating his base offense level under United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2K2.1(a)(2) and his criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(l). We have previously held that a Youthful Offender Adjudication must be treated as an adult conviction within the meaning of §§ 2K2.1(a)(2) and 4A1.2(d)(l) if the defendant “although under age eighteen was tried in an adult court, convicted as an adult, and received and served a sentence exceeding one year and one month in an adult prison.” Driskell, 277 F.3d at 154 (interpreting § 4A1.2(d)(l)); United States v. Cuello, 357 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2004) (applying Driskell standard to § 2K2. 1(a)(2)). In this case, the district court properly undertook the analysis outlined in Driskell and Cuello, and concluded that Lesane’s Youthful Offender Adjudications should be treated as adult convictions because he “was prosecuted in Bronx County Supreme Court, which is an adult forum. He was convicted of felonies. He received sentences amounting to felony time, and he served those sentences in the New York State Department of Corrections adult facility.” J.A. 80.

Lesane concedes that the district court was required by Driskell and Cuello to perform such an analysis, and does not argue that the court’s analysis was flawed. Neither does he attempt to distinguish his case from Cuello or Driskell. His sole contention is that “Cuello and Driskell failed to give appropriate deference to New York law and to the intent of the Guidelines and should, respectfully, be overruled.” Appellant’s Br. 13-14. “In general, a panel of this Court is bound by the decisions of prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court or by the Supreme Court.” Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 758 F.3d 895, 405 (2d Cir.2014) (quoting In re Zarnel, 619 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir.2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Guidelines commentary to which Lesane alludes and the proper amount of deference to give to New York’s classification of youthful offenders were both considered by the Cuello and Driskell panels, and Lesane identifies no reason for disturbing those conclusions beyond his own disagreement with their outcome. See Driskell, 277 F.3d at 155-56 (concluding that the intent of New York law is best served by treating Youthful Offender Adjudications as adult convictions rather than juvenile adjudications); Cuello, 357 F.3d at 165 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n. 5). And his argument based on 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) — which defines “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” for the purpose of various federal firearms provisions — is inapposite, particularly since this Court has flatly stated in an analogous youthful offender sentencing case that “we do not find [§ 921(a)(20) ] to be persuasive for interpreting the Guidelines or appropriate to import ... into the Guidelines.” United States v. Parnell, 524 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that a New York Youthful Offender Adjudication may be treated as a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” qualifying for sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). Cuello and Dris-kell are part of a well-settled body of Second Circuit sentencing law that permits New York Youthful Offender Adjudications to be considered by courts applying the Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Reinoso, 350 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that New York Youthful Offender Adjudications may be considered in calculating the base offense level under U.S. S.G. § 2L1.2); United States v. Jones, 415 F.3d 256, 263-64 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that New York Youthful Offender Adjudications may be considered for purposes of the Career Offender Guideline, U.S. S.G. § 4B 1.2, cmt. n. 1). We decline Lesane’s invitation to depart from these established precedents.

We have reviewed Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  