
    MRS. MARY E. STRICKLAND, GEORGE STRICKLAND and Wife, LEE STRICKLAND; HERMAN STRICKLAND and Wife, LILLIAN STRICKLAND; GARLAND STRICKLAND and Wife, FLORA STRICKLAND; MAJOR STRICKLAND and Wife, LUCILLE STRICKLAND; BESSIE STRICKLAND (Unmarried); CALLIE STRICKLAND (Unmarried); MARY S. REGISTER and Husband, B. R. REGISTER; EFFIE S. ADAMS and Husband, BRAXTON ADAMS; ESSIE S. HOWELL and Husband, B. D. HOWELL; MAYBELLE S. PRICE and Husband, SIMPSON PRICE; KATTIE S. CREECH and Husband, ROBERT CREECH, v. LIZZIE KORNEGAY and LAMONT KORNEGAY.
    (Filed 13 October, 1954.)
    1. Judges § 2b—
    Where a cause comes on to be beard at a term of court presided over by an emergency judge duly commissioned, and the parties agree that tbe court should find the facts and render judgment thereon out of term and out of the county, judgment so rendered is within the jurisdiction of the emergency judge, since the judge, having acquired jurisdiction in term, had power to sign the judgment out of term and out of the county by consent of the parties.
    2. Boundaries § 6—
    The statutory direction that processioning proceedings be brought originally before the clerk is not jurisdictional, and the parties may agree that the cause be heard and determined in the first instance by the presiding judge.
    3. Appeal and Error § 29—
    Exceptions not brought forward and discussed in the brief are deemed abandoned.
    
      Appeal by defendants from Grady, Emergency Judge, at Mareb Term, 1954, of Wayne.
    Processioning proceeding under G.S. 38-1 et seq., to locate disputed boundaries between adjoining property owners, beard below on waiver of jury trial by tbe presiding Judge, wbo found facts and entered judgment substantially in accord witli tbe plaintiffs’ contentions.
    From tbe judgment so entered, tbe defendants appeal.
    
      J. Faison Thomson $ Son and George B. Britt for plaintiffs, appellees.
    
    
      Jones, Beed *& Griffin for defendants, appellants.
    
   JOHNSON, J.

This cause was beard during tbe second week of tbe Wayne term of court wbicb convened 1 Mareb, 1954. By stipulation of tbe parties, it was agreed “that tbe presiding Judge might sit without a jury, bear tbe evidence, find tbe facts and enter judgment thereon, out of term and out of tbe county, to bave tbe same effect as if entered during tbe term.” Thereupon Judge Grady proceeded to bear the evidence offered by each side. It consisted of tbe testimony of eighteen witnesses and various documents. At tbe conclusion of the trial Judge Grady returned to bis borne at Pine Crest on tbe Neuse, in Craven County, where on 12 Mareb, during tbe week of tbe trial, be prepared and signed tbe judgment.

Tbe defendants, represented in this Court by counsel wbo did not appear below, now contend, notwithstanding their agreement that Judge Grady might enter judgment out of term and out of the county, that be was without jurisdictional power to so enter judgment. Tbe defendants cite and rely upon tbe provisions of Chapter 88, Session Laws of 1951, now codified as G.S. 7-52, which defines and fixes tbe jurisdiction of emergency judges as follows:

“Emergency superior court judges are hereby vested with tbe same power and authority in all matters whatsoever, in the courts in wbicb they are assigned to bold, that regular judges bolding tbe same courts would bave. An emergency judge duly assigned to bold tbe courts of a county or judicial district shall bave tbe same powers in tbe district in open court and in chambers as tbe resident judge or any judge regularly assigned to bold tbe courts of tbe district would bave, which jurisdiction in chambers shall extend until the term is adjourned or the term expires by operation of law, whichever is later." (Italics added.)

Tbe defendants, relying on tbe language of tbe statute italicized above, contend that Judge Grady’s jurisdiction ended with tbe adjournment or termination of tbe term of court wbicb be was assigned to bold. Tbe contention is untenable. True, under tbe language of the statute tbe “in chambers” jurisdiction of an emergency judge extends only until tbe adjournment or termination of tbe term of court he is assigned to hold, but the statute places no such limitation on the “in term” jurisdiction of an emergency judge. In the case at hand Judge Grady acquired jurisdiction in term time. Having so acquired jurisdiction, he, hy consent, had full power to sign the judgment out of term and out of the county. Shepard v. Leonard, 223 N.C. 110, 25 S.E. 2d 445; Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N.C. 181, 22 S.E. 2d 576.

Next, the defendants contend that this being a processioning proceeding brought under G.S. 38-1 et seq., the clerk of the Superior Court had exclusive original jurisdiction, and that Judge Grady was without jurisdiction to hear the cause in the first instance. This contention likewise is untenable. True, the statute directs that a proceeding of this kind be heard first by the clerk. But the direction is not jurisdictional. We have so held. Lance v. Cogdill, 236 N.C. 134, 71 S.E. 2d 918. See also Woody v. Barnett, 235 N.C. 73, 68 S.E. 2d 810. The stipulation by which the parties agreed to by-pass the clerk and have the case heard and determined in the first instance by the presiding Judge will be upheld.

No merit has been made to appear in any of the defendants’ remaining exceptions. We treat most of them as abandoned for failure of counsel to bring them forward in their brief. Rule 28, Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, 221 N.C. 562, et seq.; Dillingham v. Kligerman, 235 N.C. 298, 69 S.E. 2d 500.

The findings of fact below support the judgment. It will be upheld.

Affirmed.  