
    Elizabeth CLARK, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF OAKLAND, a California public entity and Mitch Powell, Officer, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 08-16563.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 18, 2010.
    
    Filed June 22, 2010.
    Stephen F. Henry, Stephen F. Henry, Esq., Berkeley, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Arthur Anthony Hartinger, Esquire, Meyers Nave Riback Silver & Wilson, Christopher Kee, Rachel Wagner, Esquire, Office of the City Attorney, Oakland, CA, Reichi Lee, Esquire, Joseph M. Quinn, Esquire, Meyers Nave Riback Silver & Wilson, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: TASHIMA and BEA, Circuit Judges, and READE, Chief District Judge.
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Court Judge for the Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Elizabeth Clark (“Clark”) appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the City of Oakland (the “City”) and Oakland Police Officer Mitch Powell (“Powell”) (collectively, “Defendants”) on Clark’s claims that Defendants deprived her First Amendment free speech rights and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that Defendants conspired to violate § 1983. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

This court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment to determine “whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Clark claims Defendants violated § 1983 when they demoted her from a lateral police officer to a police officer trainee, in violation of her First Amendment free speech rights and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. Clark’s First Amendment claim fails because her speech addressed a private personnel dispute, rather than a matter of public concern. See Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1234-35 (9th Cir.2001).

Clark’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails because she was a probationary employee with no property interest in continued employment as a sworn police officer with the City. See Bollow v. Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., 650 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.1981). Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Defendants on Clark’s claim of a § 1983 violation.

Because Defendants did not violate § 1983, as set out above, the district court correctly held that Defendants did not conspire to violate § 1983. See Dooley v. Reiss, 736 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir.1984).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . Because the parties are familiar with the facts of the case, we will repeat them here only to the extent necessary to explain our decision.
     