
    
      Assignees of Desbrow vs. Stephen Farrow.
    
    Where a bill of exchange is transferred after acceptance, in an action against the acceptor by the indorsee, the indorsement must 'be proved.
    Where handwriting is to be proved, the witness must be acquainted with it, and must be able to say, by comparing the signature to be proved, with the impression on his memory of the genuine signature, that the signature to be proved is genuine.
    Witness called by A. B. to prove C. D’s signature. Witness had never seen C. D. write, nor any signature of C. D. which he had acknowledged to be genuine, but at the request of A. B. he, the witness, had written in A. B’s name to C. D. and afterwards A. B. had shewn him a letter purporting to be a reply from C. D. and which, from the post mark and the contents, appeared to be genuine. Held, that the letter itself was not competent evidence to prove, by comparison, the signature, and that the witness was not sufficiently acquainted with C. D’s hand-writing to prove his signature.
    
      Before Evans, J. at Georgetown, Spring Term, 1831.
    This was an action on three promissory notes of the defendant, payable to Desbrow. The notes and the assignments were admitted. The defence was a discount, which consisted of three bills of exchange drawn by other persons on Desbrow, and accepted by him, and afterwards indorsed to the defendant. The acceptance by Desbrow was fully proved. To prove the signatures of the indors-ers of these bills, Mr. Dennison swore that, at the request of Farrow, the defendant, he had written letters, in Farrow’s name, to the indorsers in relation to these bills ; that Farrow has since shewn him what he said were answers 
      to these letters, and that the signatures of the answers are in the sárne hand-writing as the indorsements on the notes. The letters were offered in evidence but rejected. His Honor did not consider this evidence as sufficient proof, and overruled the discount. He understood the rule in relation to hand-writing, to be, thct the witness must be acquainted with it, or, in other words, must be able to say, by comparing the hand-writing' to be proved, with his recollection of the genuine signature of the person, that the signature to be proved is genuine.
    If Mr. Dennison could have stated that he knew the signature of the letters to be genuine, by having after-wards conversed with the signers about the letters, then his Honor would have held the evidence sufficient; but the witness knew nothing more of their hand writing than that Farrow had shewn him letters purporting to have been written by these persons in answer to the letters written by him for Farrow to them. He had no knowledge that the fact was so except that Farrow told him so, and the intrinsic evidence the letters themselves bore, with the New York post mark, the time of mailing them, and the entire reply to the letters he had written.
    A verdict was given for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
    
      Wilson, for the motion.
    
      Cohen, contra.
   Curia, per

O’Neall, J.

This court concurs in opinion with the Judge below ; and to the very satisfactory reasons which he has assigned for his judgment, it is only necessary to add a very brief answer to the grounds assumed in the argument of the appeal.

It is true, that proof of the acceptance, in an action against the acceptor of a bill of exchange by the payee, is all the evidence necessary to establish its genuineness. For the acceptance is, for this purpose, an admission of the drawer’s signature. The acceptance constitutes the acceptor’s contract to pay, according to the tenor of the bill to the payee — and therefore, proof of the acceptor’s hand-writing, is proof of his contract, and his liability to pay is established thereby. He may, if he can, in his de-fence prove that the bill is a forgery, and thus -repel the legal presumption arising from his acceptance. But when the bill is indorsed after acceptance, as in this case, it is necessary, in order to shew the indorsee’s title to demand payment, to prove the indorser’s hand-writing. Comparison of hand-writing has long been regarded as insufficient proof to establish the fact that a signature or writing is genuine. In aid of, or to rebut, doubtful proof, it has been allowed to go to the jury, as one among other circumstances from which their conclusion was to be formed. This was the case in Boman vs. Plunkett, 2 McC. 518, and to this extent, and no further, did that decision go.

The motion is dismissed.

Johnson, J. concurred.  