
    David M. CURLEY, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-16695
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted May 19, 2017 San Francisco, California
    Filed June 30, 2017
    Richard A. Canatella, Esquire, Attorney, Cotter & Del Carlo, San Francisco, CA, David R. Olick, David R. Olick, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant
    Thomas N. Abbott, Jon D. Ives, Esquire, Attorney, Mark Douglas Lonergan, Esquire, Attorney, Mark Ian Wraight, Esquire, Severson & Werson APC, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Wells Fargo & Company, Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage
    Thomas N. Abbott, Mark Douglas Lon-ergan, Esquire, Attorney, Mark Ian Wraight, Esquire, Severson & Werson APC, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
    Before: SCHROEDER and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and MCCALLA, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Jon P. McCalla, United States District Judge for the Western District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

David M. Curley, Sr. appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants in his action alleging breach of contract and fraud. Curley argues the district court failed to consider late-filed evidence that created a dispute as to whether Curley properly accepted the Trial Period Plan (“TPP”) offer by submitting all required materials for his loan modification application to defendants. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), we affirm.

1. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s exclusion of late-filed evidence in granting summary judgment. Carpenter v. Universal Star Shipping, S.A., 924 F.2d 1539, 1547 (9th Cir. 1991). At the district court, defendants moved for summary judgment and argued that Cur-ley failed to file an IRS 4506-T form as required by the TPP offer. Curley’s counsel submitted evidence and a declaration on this issue a day after the district court’s deadline. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Curley’s late-filed evidence and declaration because there was no good cause for late filing.

2. Based on the evidence the district court considered, no genuine dispute of material fact remains as to whether Curley filed an IRS 4506-T form within the deadline to accept the TPP offer. We also find the district court did not abuse its discretion in entertaining a second motion for summary judgment. Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 2010).

3. Finally, defendants request dismissal of the appeal because of Curley’s inadequate excerpts of record. “As with briefing inadequacies, the failure to present a sufficient record can itself serve as a basis for summary affirmance.” Cmty. Commerce Bank v. O’Brien (In re O’Brien), 312 F.3d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002). Though we exercise our discretion by not dismissing on this ground, we note that Curley had no justification for failing to comply with Ninth Circuit Rules.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     