
    HUA TONG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-3009.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 14, 2016.
    Mouren Wu, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant, Attorney General; Linda S. Wemery, Assistant Director; Kerry A. Monaco, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted as the respondent in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner, Hua Tong, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 23, 2012, decision of the BIA affirming the April 29, 2011, decision of Immigration Judge (“U”) Alan A. Vomacka, which pretermitted her application for asylum, alternatively denied asylum, and denied withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Hua Tong, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 23, 2012), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 29, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the decision of the IJ as modified and supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). As a preliminary matter, we assume, as the BIA did, Tong’s credibility, and we do not consider the agency’s pretermission of her asylum application as untimely because the agency’s alternative finding that she failed to provide reasonably available corroborating evidence was dispositive of her asylum claim, as well as withholding of removal. See Yan Chen, 417 F.3d at 271. Tong does not challenge the agency’s denial of CAT relief.

Although “credible testimony alone may be enough to carry the alien’s burden of proof,” an IJ may “require that credible testimony of the alien be corroborated in circumstances in which one would expect corroborating evidence to be available and presented in the immigration hearing.” Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 196— 97 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii) (providing that testimony alone may be sufficient if it is credible, persuasive, and sufficiently specific). Here, the agency reasonably found corroborating evidence necessary as Tong made only two vague statements to support her claim that Chinese authorities had threatened to arrest her in 1999 and again in 2009. See Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 196-97.

The agency did not err in finding such evidence reasonably available as Tong submitted letters from her mother, uncle, and friends; however, those letters did not corroborate Tong’s statements. See id. The IJ also reasonably expected a letter from Tong’s father because, according to Tong’s application, he was the only individual with personal knowledge regarding Chinese authorities’ effort to arrest her in 1999. Accordingly, the agency did not err in finding that Tong failed to establish her eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal based on her lack of corroboration. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii); Chuilu Liu, 575 F.3d at 196-97; see also Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir.2011).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  