
    Seth Miller versus Lucy Miller.
    The statute of 1785, c. 62, § 4, which provides that estates which have been con veyedtotwo or more persons, without words clearly showing a joint tenancy intended, shall be held as estates in common, does not militate with the constitution as a retrospective law; since its operation was to make the estate more valuable.
    This was a writ of entry sur disseisin, in which the only question was on the construction of a deed, by which one John Miller, in the year 1775, in consideration of 100/. lawful money, conveyed to Mary Miller and Lucy Miller, “jointly and severally,” a certain parcel of land in Middleborough; habendum to them the said Mary and Lucy, their heirs and assigns forever.
    The demandant claimed a part of the- land as brother and one of the heirs of the said Mary, and the tenant claimed to hold the whole by survivorship. And it was agreed that if, in the opinion of the Court, the said grantees, * at the [ * 60 ] death of said Mary, which happened many years after the passing of the law hereafter mentioned, held the said land as tenants in common, the tenant in this action should suffer judgment by default; and if they were joint tenants, the demandant was to become nonsuit.
    It was also agreed that in October, 1807, the said Mary recovered a judgment in this Court, for possession of an undivided moiety of the said parcel of land; and in May, 1808, the said Lucy recovered a like judgment, both of the said judgments being against William Porter &/■ Al.
    
    By the statute of 1785, c. 62, <§, 4, it is enacted, “ that all gifts, grants, &c., of any lands, tenements, and hereditaments, which have been, or shall be made to two or more persons, whether for years, for life, in tail, or in fee, shall be taken, deemed and adjudged to be estates in common, and not in joint tenancy, unless it has been or shall be therein said, that the grantees, &c., shall have or hold the same lands, &c., jointly, or as joint tenants, or in joint tenancy, or to them and the survivor or survivors of them, or unless other words be therein used, clearly and manifestly showing it to be the intention of the parties to such gifts, grants, &c., that such lands, &c., should vest and be held as joint estates, and not as estates in common.”
    
      Wood, for the demandant.
    
      Thomas and Sampson, for the tenant.
   Parker, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. From the words of the deed in this case, it is not easy to ascertain whether the grantor intended to convey a joint estate or a tenancy in common. The words “ jointly and severally ” would seem to import a’several interest; so that on the death of either of the grantees, the whole estate should not enure by survivorship to the other; but yet we cannot infer, from these words alone, that a tenancy in common was intended, as they are not inconsistent with a technical joint estate.

* It cannot, however, be doubted that this deed would, by [ * 61 ] the operation of the statute of 1785, create a tenancy in common ; for it contains none of the expressions, which are to constitute exceptions. For although the words jointly and severally are strangely introduced, they do not import an intention to create a joint, any more than a separate estate in moieties. The statute, therefore, is decisive ; unless for the objection, that it cannot have a retrospective operation, so as to change an estate, which was vested by the deed several years before the statute passed.

■ The statute, in its terms, applies to estates created before, as well as after its enactment. The principle is nevertheless correct, that the legislature cannot impair the title to estates, without the consent of the proprietors; unless for public objects, when an adequate consideration shall be provided. But there can be no objection to the operation of any legislative act retrospectively, which shall enlarge, or otherwise make more valuable, the title to any estate; for the consent of the holder may always be presumed, to such acts.

Now, it was clearly for the interest of both the grantees in the deed under consideration, that they should hold as tenants in common, rather than as joint tenants; inasmuch as a certain inheritance in a moiety is more valuable than an uncertain right of succession to the whole; and in this view, the objection to the operation of the statute, we think, is avoided. In the case of Holbrook vs. Finney , it is said by Chief Justice Parsons, that “ there seems to be no constitutional objection to the power of the legislature to alter a tenure, by substituting another tenure more beneficial to all the tenants.”

It may be considered too, in the case before us, that both the grantees appear to have assented to the operation of the statute, by bringing their several writs of entry for an undivided moiety ; which they could only do as tenants in common.

[*62] *Upon the foregoing grounds, we are of opinion that Mary Miller died seised of one undivided moiety of the land conveyed by the deed in question, in common with Lucy Miller, the tenant to the writ; and that the demandant, her brother, as one of her heirs, is entitled to recover the portion, which he has demanded in this action .

Tenant defaulted 
      
       4 Mass. Rep. 568.
     
      
       [The reasons given by the Court seem to be very questionable, to say the least. The judgment can only be maintained as it would seem, from the express words of the act, which seems to refer to all conveyances “ which have been or shall be made.” A retro-active law, so far as it affects the remedy only, is unobjectionable. But here, it the words of the act are to have their full force, rights already vested and acquired under conveyances already made are to be affected, altered, and taken away. In this point of view the law, so far as it regards conveyances then made, is void. King vs Dedham Bank, 15 Mass. 447. —Foster & Al. vs. The Essex Bank, post, 245. —Ed.]
     