
    STATE v. CECIL ARNOLD GASKINS.
    (Filed 25 March, 1953.)
    Criminal Law § 67b—
    The denial of defendant’s motion in the Superior Court to remand the cause to the Recorder’s Court of the county is not a judgment final in its nature, and an appeal therefrom is premature and will be dismissed. G.S. 15-180.
    Appeal by defendant from Stevens, J., January Term, 1953, CeaveN.
    A warrant, charging tbat defendant did unlawfully (1) operate a motor vehicle upon tbe public highways of tbe State while under tbe influence of liquor, and (2) have in bis possession a quantity of nontax-paid liquor, issued out of tbe county court of Craven County. When tbe case was called for trial, tbe defendant demanded a trial by jury. Thereafter, at tbe January, 1953, Craven County Superior Court, the defendant appeared and moved to remand tbe cause to tbe recorder’s court. Tbe solicitor agreed not to send a bill of indictment until tbe court first ruled on tbe motion. Tbe motion was denied and defendant appealed.
    
      
      Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorney-General Bruton for the State.
    
    
      Charles L. Abernethy, Jr., for defendant appellant.
    
   Pee. Curiam.

In criminal cases a defendant may appeal to tbe Supreme Court only from a conviction or from some judgment that is final in its nature. G.S. 15-180; S. v. Blades, 209 N.C. 56, 182 S.E. 714; S. v. Hiatt, 211 N.C. 116, 189 S.E. 124; S. v. Inman, 224 N.C. 531, 31 S.E. 2d 641. The order denying defendant’s motion to remand is purely interlocutory. It is in no sense final. Appeal therefrom was premature, S. v. Hiatt, supra, and must be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.  