
    Belknap,
    Dec., 1897.
    Brown v. Clinton.
    By an attachment of real estate, the creditor acquires a lien on all the debt- or’s interest except the homestead right.
    If the homestead right of the debtor has not been set off, it does not pass by. his conveyance subsequent to the attachment.
    Petition, under P. S., c. 138, s. 14, for the determination of the question of the existence of a homestead right. Facts found by the court. The premises in which the right is claimed do not exceed $500 in value, and when attached were owned and occupied by the defendant. After the attachment they were conveyed to one Sanders, who gave a mortgage back, conditioned to support and maintain the defendant and one Banger during their joint lives and the life of the survivor. There was no change in the occupation of the premises prior to the time the levy was begun. The court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to a homestead, and she excepted.
    
      Walter S. Peaslee, for the plaintiff'.
    
      Jewell, Stone, Owen Martin, for the defendant.
   Pike, J.

By the attachment the plaintiff obtained a lien upon all the interest of the defendant in the premises except her homestead right. Bennett v. Cutler, 44 N. H. 69, 71. This right, being inchoate because the homestead was not set off', did not pass to Sanders by the defendant’s conveyance to him, but was waived or released thereby and ceased to exist. P. S., c. 138, s. 4; Gunnison v. Twitchell, 38 N. H. 62, 67; Foss v. Strachn, 42 N. H. 40, 42; Tidd v. Quinn, 52 N. H. 341, 344.

Exception overruled.

Parsons, J., did not sit: the others concurred.  