
    Crockett vs. Campbell, et als.
    
    1. Deeds made after the commencement of a suit, confirming and ratifying deeds made before the commencement of the suit, are admissible evidence.
    2. It is not necessary that the witnesses to a deed confirming a previous deed should say that the person signing the deed of confirmation was the identical individual who signed the deed intended to be confirmed. All that is necessary for them to prove, is, that the person who acknowledged the deed of confirmation was the individual whose name was subscribed to the paper which they were in the act of proving.
    3. Where a power of attorney under which a deed was executed was defectively proven, a deed of confirmation cured such defective probate, and the power of attorney is admissible evidence, (notwithstanding such'defective probate,) for the purpose of showing what acts the attorney was authorised to perform.
    Andrew and Robert Crockett instituted this action of ejectment in the circuit court of Claiborne county, on the 9th day of April, 1829, against W. B. Campbell, A. Campbell, J. Campbell, W. P. Campbell, E. G. and A. Campbell, for the purpose of recovering lands lying in the county of Claiborne. After various continuances, the venue was changed and the trial of the case transferred to the county of Grainger,fin May, 1832. After a mistrial, it was submitted to a jury at the January term, 1835. The jury under the charge of the Judge rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiffs for part of the land claimed. Upon this verdict judgment was rendered. The defendants appealed in error. The cause in the supreme court was reversed and remanded. See 8th Yerger, 228.
    It was again submitted to a jury at the August term, 1839, Judge Anderson, presiding. It appeared that the land in controversy was granted to John Jones in 1787, by the State of Virginia, and lay between Walker’s and Henderson’s line, and was by the compromise in 1803, between the State of Tennessee and Virginia, placed within the jurisdiction of Tennessee. John Jones died having made his will. D. C. Jones, his administrator with the will annexed, made a power of attorney to Richard R. Jones on the 14th day of August, 1823, to sell all the lands of the deceased in the States of Virginia and Tennessee.
    The probate of this power was defective. R. R. Jones made sale of land in controversy under it. The plaintiffs as part of their muniments of title introduced on the trial the above power of attorney and deed confirmatory thereof, executed on the 7th day of February, 183 ’, This deed of confirmation purported to be signed by David C. Jones. It recited that a power of attorney had been executed by him in 1823 to R. R. Jones, authorising said R. R, Jones to sell all the lands which J. Jones, deceased, had claim to in Virginia and Tennessee, and that said R. R. Jones had made sales by virtue of said power of attorney, and that doubts-had arisen as to whether said power had been legally authenticated so as to be evidence out of the State of Virginia, he therefore confirmed all sales made and acts done by virtue of said power, and for greater certainty appended thereto the said power of attorney.
    Two witnesses appeared in court at the April term of the circuit court of Claiborne county, 1832, and testified that a man in the county of Amelia, State of Virginia, called and known as David C. Jones, executed this deed of confirmation for the- purposes therein set forth.
    These deeds were objected to as inadmissible evidence by the defendants, and the objection sustained and the deeds rejected. The jury rendered a verdict for the defendants. A motion for a new trial was made, and being overruled, judgment was rendered, from which the plaintiffs appealed in error.
    
      J. A. McKinney, for plaintiff.
    
      Robert McKinney, for defendants.
   GkeeN, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action of ejectment. On the trial below, plaintiffs offered in evidence as part of their chain of title, a deed of confirmation from David C. Jones, confirming the acts of Richard R. Jones, as attorney in fact for said David C. Jones, together with the power of attorney to said Richard R. Jones. To the reading of said deed, the defendants objected, and the court refused to permit them to be read.

1. It is insisted that this deed was properly rejected, because it is dated after the commencement of this suit. We do not think, that the time of the execution of the deed is material. The power of attorney to Richard R. Jones, (whose acts under that power are confirmed by this deed,) is dated anterior to the commencement of the suit; andas this deed of confirmation does not purport to convey any thing, if the deeds confirmed were executed and properly proved and registered before the suit was commenced, they would pass the title by force of this confirmation, and vest it in the bar» gainee from their date. The deed of confirmation makes the acts of the attorney good at the date they were performed.

9. Objection is taken to the probate of this deed, because the witnesses do not say that David C. Jones, who executed this deed of confirmation is the very identical David C. Jones who executed the power of attorney to Richard R. Jones. This is certainly no part of the proof that witnesses to a deed are called upon to make. How, for instance, could the witnesses to a deed know whether the bargainer was the identical grantee to whom the land, he sells, was granted? All the identity that it is necessary for them to prove, is, that the person who acknowledges the deed before them, was the individual whose name was subscribed to the paper, the execution of which they witnessed, and were in the act of proving. This, they did prove. They say, that a man in Amelia county, Virginia, called and known as David C. Jones, executed the deed of confirmation.

3. It is insisted that the power of attorney should not have been received, because the probate thereof is defective. But the deed of confirmation recites this paper, and confirms the acts which had been done by virtue of the power it purports to confer. It is necessary it should be read, in order that it might be seen what acts Richard R. Jones was authorised to perform, and consequently, whether the deed executed by Richard R. Jones, was made in pursuance of the power, and was confirmed by the deed of the 7th of February, 1831. It was on account of the defect in the probate of the power of attorney, that the deed of confirmation became necessary. This deed of confirmation, therefore, was improperly rejected, and the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for another trial.  