
    Nathaniel Morton vs. David W. Westcott.
    Where the indorser of a promissory note resides in a town in which there are two post-offices, a notice of the dishonor of the note, addressed to him. at the town generally, is sufficient primó facie; though liable to be rebutted by proof that ha was accustomed to receive his letters at one of the offices only, and that the holder of the note might have ascertained that fact by reasonable inquiry.
    This was assumpsit by the assignee in insolvency of Henry W. Coggeshall, on a promissory note, dated June 3, 1847, signed by Charles Richmond, payable in six- months to the defendant, and by him indorsed in blank.
    At the trial in the court of common pleas, before Merrick, J., the plaintiff, to prove his case, called James P. Ellis, a notary public, who testified, that on the evening of the 6th of December, 1847, he received the note from the cashier of the Bristol County Bank, in Taunton, for protest for non-payment ; that he applied at the place of business of the maker, and finding it closed, and no one there to pay the note, he protested it, and put into the post-office a notice addressed to the defendant at Dighton; that he did not know where the defendant lived; that he made no inquiries, but that the cashier directed him to notify the defendant at Dighton.
    In defence, it was proved, that there were two post-offices in Dighton, one called Dighton, and the other North Dighton office; that the defendant lived several miles from both offices, but about one mile nearer to that at North Dighton; that he carried on the White Birch Factory, which was nearer to the North Dighton office; and he produced evidence, that many letters and papers were addressed to him by his correspondents at the North Dighton office, and that he took and received them from that office. The post-master at North Dighton testified, that the persons in the neighborhood of White Birch Factory pretty much all got their letters at North Dighton; that the other post-office was near Dighton lower four corners. But no evidence was offered by either party to show whether letters and papers were or were not addressed to the defendant by his correspondents at the Dighton office; or whether the defendant did or did not receive such letters and papers from that office.
    The defendant also called Henry W. Coggeshall of Taunton, who testified that he owned the note when it became payable and until he became insolvent, and that it was in the bank for collection; that he knew at that time that the defendant was carrying on business at North Dighton, and that if inquired of, he should have directed the notice to him at North Dighton.
    The judge instructed the jury, that the general rule in rela(ion to indorsers was, that seasonably placing a letter containing the notice in the post-office, directed to the town in which the indorser resides, is a sufficient notice ; but if he resides in a town in which there are two or more post-offices, then the letter may be directed to the town, without specifying to which office it should go, unless, upon reasonable inquiry, it could oe ascertained that he was accustomed to receive his letters at one of the offices only in the town, in which latter case it should be sent .to the accustomed office, and not elsewhere. And in reference to this particular case, the judge instructed the jury, that it was a question of fact, for them to consider and determine, upon the whole evidence submitted to them, whether the defendant was accustomed to receive his letters from the North Dighton office only; and that if, upon all the evi dence, it was left in doubt and uncertainty whether the defendant was or was not accustomed to receive his letters from each and both the offices in Dighton, the letter from the notary having been directed to Dighton, without designation of the particular office to which it was to go, the notice must be held to be sufficient. But if they were satisfied that the defendant was accustomed to receive his letters only from the North Dighton office, and that that fact could upon reasonable inquiry have been ascertained, then the notice must be held to be insufficient, and their verdict must be for the defendant.
    The verdict was for the plaintiff, and the defendant alleged exceptions.
    
      H. Williams, for the defendant.
    
      E. H. Bennett, for the plaintiff,
    cited Bayley on Bills, (2d Amer. ed.) 277, note; Munn v. Baldwin, 6 Mass. 316 ; Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401; Story on Notes, §§ 316, 343 ; Bank of Manchester v. Slason, 13 Verm. 334, 340 ; Remer v. Downer, 23 Wend. 620.
   Shaw, C. J.

It seems to the court, that the instruction of the judge was correct, well adapted to the circumstances of the case, and cautiously qualified and guarded. It seems well settled, that when there are two post-offices in a town, notice by letter to an indorser, addressed to him at the town generally, is sufficient, unless the party addressed has been gene* rally accustomed to receive his letters at one of the offices in particular, and to have his letters addressed to him there by his correspondents. Such being the rule, the plaintiff proves his case primd facie, by proving notice by letter addressed to the defendant at the town generally. If then the defendant would rebut this presumption of fact, and bring himself within the exception, it lies on him to prove that he did usually receive his letters at one office only, and that this might have been known by reasonable inquiry at the place where the letter was mailed. Without this proof, it may be true that the defendant received his letters habitually, as well at one post-office as the other, and then the plaintiff’s primd facie proof remains unrebutted, and he must prevail.

Exceptions overruled.  