
    Johnson vs. Billingsley.
    1. On grounds of public policy the proceedings of justices of the peace must be sustain., ed, and objections to alledged defective entries of them overruled if possible.
    2. And, therefore, where the justices docket book was ruled off nearly in accordance-with the form prescribed in the 17th section of the act of 1835, ch. 17, (N. & C. 435,) and the date of the return of a warrant inone column, the statement of the cause by the names of the parties in a second, the amount of the judgment in figures (and that too according to the form prescribed) in a third, and the word confessed, &c. in a fourth: Held, that although the directory mandates of this statute were not entirely and completely carried out by the prefixing of a caption to the docket book, yet such judgment was not void for uncertainty, when attacked by a third person.
    Johnson brought an action of trover against Billingsley in the circuit court of Bledsoe county, for nineteen head of hogs. It was tried at the November term.. 1841, before judge Keith, on the plea of not guilty.
    It appeared that Bridgman had recovered a judgment against Mooneyham for the sum of $43 15 on the 18th October, 1839, before Kirkland, a justice of the peace of Bledsoe county. Fi. fa. issued on the 10th April, 1840. It was placed in the hands of plaintiff Johnson, who levied it on nine head of hogs in the possession of and belonging to Mooneyham. Johnson drove the hogs to his house and confined them. They were after-wards found in the possession of Billingsley. Johnson demanded them, and Billingsley refused to deliver, and by menaces prevented the plaintiff from getting them.
    On the trial, the plaintiff produced and offered as evidence the docket book of justice Kirkland, which, was without caption, ruled in the form following, and various other causes stated on the same page and containing the following memoranda.
    
      
    
    The plaintiff then introduced Kirkland, who proved that the book introduced was his docket of cases tried and determined. That Mooneyham had confessed a judgment before him, and that he had thereupon ordered the above memoranda to be entered on his docket book, which was accordingly done in his presence. The plantiff then produced the fi. fa. which was issued on said judgment, and rep,d it to the jury.
    Keith, judge, presiding, charged the jury, that the record and proceeding of justice Kirkland were informal and irregular, but were not void. That strangers and third persons could not take advantage of errors in judicial proceedings, when the party in interest had acquiesced in them, .unless they were absolutely void, which was not the case in these.
    The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of thirty dollars,- and a motion for a new trial having been made and overruled, and judgment rendered on the verdict, the defendant appealed in error.
    
      Brazeale, for the plaintiff in error.
    
      Jarnagin, for the defendant in error.
   Reese, J.

delivered tire opinion of the court.

The only question in this case is, whether a judgment rendered by a justice, and placed on his docket book, is so defective in substance as to be void. The columns of his docket book are ruled off pretty much according to the form given in the statute. He gives the date of the return in one column, the statement of the cause by the names of the parties in another, the amount of the judgment in cubic figures (that, too, according to the statutory form) in a third, in a fourth the word confessed, &c. But a caption to the columns of his docket seems to be wanting. That docket contained many cases. Shall all these cases go for nothing? The caption may have been lost; but if not, the coincidence of the columnar arrangement with the statutory form, makes these very columns, the very ruling off according to law, legally significant, and supplies much that, under a different system, might require expression in words. Besides, this judgment is attacked, not by any party to it, but by a third person. Our courts have always anxiously sought to support the proceedings of justices, a class of officers, who from patriotism and public spirit merely taire upon themselves functions to the performance of which, in many instances, they bring good purposes and right intentions, rather than skill and knowledge.. On grounds of public policy, of necessity almost, their proceedings must be upheld whenever possible. We affirm the judgment.  