
    W. H. ARRELL v. C. W. DAVIES AND ANOTHER.
    
    June 10, 1927.
    No. 26,089.
    Reduced verdict for personal and property injury sustained.
    A verdict of $17,390, reduced by the trial court to $10,390, is not so excessive as to warrant this court in interfering, it appearing that at the time of the trial, about 16 months after he was injured, plaintiff had lost approximately $3,390 in wages, damage to property, and the expense of medical attention, and that the injuries had greatly and permanently impaired the usefulness of his right hand and had affected the left hand and his shoulders to such an extent as to disable him, up to the time of the trial, from doing any work whatever.
    Damages, 17 C. J. p. 1103 n. 49.
    New Trial, 29 Cyc. p. 839 n. 91; p. 841 n. 92; p. 1022 n. 31.
    See note in L. R. A. 1915F, 30, 8 R. C. L. 674; 2 R. C. L. Supp. 638; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 567; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 480; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 521.
    Defendants appealed from an order of the district court for Henne-pin county, Bardwell, J., denying their motion for a new trial.
    Affirmed.
    
      
      Cobb, Wheelwright, Hoke & Benson, Tracy J. Peycke, and Anthony T. Grotte, for appellants.
    
      Fred A. Ossanna, Edward P. Kelly, Stanley S. Gillam, and T. L. Todd, for respondent.
    
      
      Reported in 214 N. W. 287.
    
   Lees, C.

Injured in an automobile accident, tbe respondent brought suit for damages and recovered a verdict of $17,390. A motion for a new trial was denied on condition that be consent to a reduction of tbe verdict to $10,390. Such consent was filed and tbe case comes here on appeal from tbe order.

Tbe sole reason for asking for a reversal is that tbe verdict is excessive and must have been given under tbe influence of passion and prejudice.

Respondent’s injuries were received when a Ford car be was driving was struck by an automobile driven by one of tbe appellants. Tbe left front side of tbe car was struck in such a manner that a section of tbe rim of tbe steering wheel was broken out as respondent held it. Tbe car was not tipped over and respondent was not thrown from bis seat, but tbe shock of tbe impact was transmitted through tbe steering wheel to respondent’s arms and body. Tbe metacarpal bone of bis right index finger was cracked, and bis left band, chest and one of bis shoulders bruised. At tbe time of tbe trial tbe control of all tbe fingers of tbe right band was somewhat impaired and there was a deformity of tbe wrist and a shrinkage of tbe muscles, and tbe left band was still swollen. Tbe ability to move tbe broken finger was reduced 75 per cent and tbe ability to flex tbe wrist 50 per cent. There was evidence that tbe disability of tbe right band would be permanent. In addition to these conditions, tbe respondent was suffering, at tbe time of tbe trial, from arthritis of tbe shoulders and spine. It was admitted that tbe arthritis of tbe spine bad its origin in an infection of some sort, but it is claimed that tbe accident aggravated tbe disease.

Respondent received medical treatment from tbe time of tbe accident to tbe time of tbe trial, a period of about 16 months. Before the accident he earned $200 a month. Since then he has been unable to do any work whatever. His loss of earnings is about $3,000, and the damage to his automobile and expense of medical attention amount to $390.

This is not a case where the only substantial evidence of injury is the word of the patient. There were external evidences of injury. The fact that the court made so large a reduction of the verdict is some indication that the jury was not in a judicial frame of mind when it awarded the damages. There is little convincing evidence that the arthritis of the back as now manifested is due in any degree to the injury. That may be the reason for the reduction of the verdict. It has been held that when a verdict is excessive and it is probable that the jury were influenced by passion and prejudice in the determination of other issues, a new trial should be granted; but, where the only complaint is that the verdict is excessive, it is within the discretion of the trial court to deny a new trial on condition that the prevailing party submit to a reduction. Larson v. Wisconsin Ry. L. & P. Co. 138 Minn. 158, 164 N. W. 666.

In recent cases we have frequently stated the rule by which we are guided in reviewing a denial of a new trial based on the ground that the verdict is excessive. See Gibson v. C. G. W. R. Co. 117 Minn. 143, 134 N. W. 516, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 184, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1263; Ott v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co. 127 Minn. 373, 149 N. W. 544; Quinn v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 162 Minn. 87, 202 N. W. 275, 46 A. L. R. 1228; Merrill v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. 170 Minn. 332, 212 N. W. 533; Letnes v. Davis, supra, page 399. We think that this is a case in which we would not be justified in interfering with the action of the trial court.

Order affirmed.  