
    THE RIGHT OF FRANCHISE UNDER. THE BRANNQCK LAW.
    [Circuit Court of Franklin County.]
    Robert H. Jeffrey, Mayor, v. The State of Ohio, ex rel James M. Butler, City Solicitor.
    
    Decided, July 1, 1904.
    
      Brannoch Law — Not Unconstitutional Because of a Denial to Any of the Right of Franchise — Courts will Presume that a True Construction of the Law will be Adopted.
    
    The Brannock Law is not rendered invalid by reason of the possibility that certain persons may be disfranchised at an election thereunder by reason of the construction which may be given to Section 2926 of the election law. Courts will presume that the true construction of the statute will be adopted and the elections so conducted as to give every elector an opportunity to register and vote.
    Dustin, J.; Sullivan, J., and Wilson, J., concur.
    
      
      Affirming City of Columbus v. Jeffrey, Mayor, et al, 2 N. P.—N. S., 85.
    
   We concur with the views of the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County as to all the questions raised in the hearing before that court.

James M. Butler, on behalf of the mayor.

Thomas M. Clarke, L. D. Lilley and W. B. Wheeler, for the Brannock Law.

Gumble & Gumble and James Caren, contra.

One new question is presented to this court. It is urged on behalf of the plaintiff in error that the Brannock Law is unconstitutional, because in contravention of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, which provides that every citizen having the qualifications of an elector shall be “entitled to vote at all elections. ’ ’

In the provision for elections under the Brannock Law, it is stipulated that “in municipal corporations having registration, only registered voters shall be entitled to vote. ’ ’

Now it is claimed that there is no provision in the Brannock Law whereby an elector who should move into the residence district wherein a Brannock Law election is about to be held, and become a resident thereof, after the regular days of registration for such election, could be registered and vote, because there is no provision for his obtaining a transfer from his former residence, the election officers therein not being necessarily in session.

We think this point is not well taken, because Section 2926u of the election law makes full provision for such contingencies.

It is suggested in argument that, while Section 2926v may be so construed as to afford every facility for the registration of removals, the secretary of state and the deputy state supervisors have put another construction upon the same, and will issue orders accordingly, thus depriving a removing elector of the right to vote.

This is denied. But, whatever the fact, this court must presume that the election officials will adopt the true construction of the statute and will so conduct the elections as to give every elector an opportunity to register and vote.

The judgment of the common pleas court granting the writ of mandamus upon the mayor of the city of Columbus as prayed for will therefore be affirmed.  