
    *Gwynne and Wife v. City of Cincinnati.
    Widow not entitled to dower in grounds given for market-house or other public uses.
    This was a petition in chancery, for dower in a market-house in the city of Cincinnati, and was adjourned for decision here by the Supreme Court of Hamilton county. The facts were these: John H. Piatt in his lifetime, in conjunction with other owners of the property in the same square, agreed to open a way or street through the square, upon which a market-house was to be erected. This agreement was carried into effect under an ordinance of the city council, and the market-house erected. It stood upon that part of the square given by Piatt, a space for a •street remaining open on both sides of it. Piatt, in his lifetime, conveyed the property he owned in the square, and his wife joined him in the conveyance. It did not appear that any conveyance was made of the ground covered by the market-house by either Piatt or wife. Gwynne intermarried with the widow of Piatt, and brought the bill for dower.
    Este and Stores,, for the complainants, contended:
    That the widow of Piatt was entitled to dower in the ground upon which the market-house stood. That the sale by a husband of land for a market space could not divest his wife of her dower.. That it was not a ease analogous to a road in this country, or of a. castle in England—the one being essential for public transportation,, the other for public defense. It was not a case of land condemned for public use, but a conveyance by private contract, and the estate of dower could not be extinguished. They cited 1 Co. Lit., Thomas’ ed. 370; 3 Co. Dig., Day’s ed. 495; 7 Mass. 14, 291; 15 Johns. 483; 2 Mass. 127; 1 Yeates, 167; 4 Mass. 427; 2 Johns. 357; Perkins on Con. 341; F. N. B. 142; 1 Roper, 340.
    Fox, for the defendants, contended :
    That the widow was excluded from dower in the ground iu question by the grant of the adjoining ground, to which it was an appurtenance, and by the public policy in relation to grants for public purposes. He cited Co. Dig., title Grant, E; 10 Coke, 63; Co. Lit., Thomas’ ed. 239, note 13; 8 Johns. 59; 7 Mass. 6; *6 Mass. 332, 454; 15 Johns. 447; 1 Cruise’s Dower, chap. 3, sec. 24; 6 Bin. 509; 1 Co. Lit., Thomas’ ed. 682.
   By the Court :

The street, including the ground in question, was opened and. the market-house established by an agreement with the owners of the ground, and under an ordinance of the city council of Cincinnati. The whole space became subject to the same public regulations as the grounds originally laid out in streets and for other public uses and purposes. The claim of dower must stand upon the same principles that it would stand in any case to the ground thus appropriated. The counsel for the complainants insist that it is a case to be distinguished from that of public grounds condemned for public uses, but the court are unable to' comprehend the distinction. When a town is laid out, the law requires the plat to be recorded, and by such record the streets become public highways, and the title to the grounds set apart for public uses is vested in the county for the purposes contemplated. The uses thus created are inconsistent with the exertion of any private right while the use remains; consequently all private rights must be either suspended or abrogated. Such has been the general understanding, not only in this state, but, so far as we are informed, in other states also. A claim for dower in the streets of a town, or in the public jail, court-house, or public offices, would be a novel one, and if sustained, could not be enjoyed without defeating the original purpose and present use of the grant. It can not be admitted, for the same reason that it is not admitted to a castle in England. It could yield nothing to the support of the widow, by a direct participation in the possession, without such an interference with the public right to control the whole subject as to render its enjoyment inconvenient and unsafe, if not impossible.

The bill must be dismissed.  