
    The Proprietors of the Canal Bridge versus Gordon.
    Corporations can be bound, without a vote or deed, by implication from corporate acts.
    The corporation A. had a toll-bridge from Boston to Lechmere Point. The corporation B. being authorized to make a dam, with a road upon it, from Charlestown to the same Point, without a right of toll, A. consented that B. should make the dam from Charlestown to the bridge, and should have the use of the part of the bridge between the Point and the junction for part of the dam. B. made a bridge accordingly, as a commencement of the dam, and it was held that part of Ads bridge was virtually part of the dam, and that A. could not exact toll of persons for passing on it in going between Charlestown and the Point.
    Ads consent that a part of its bridge should make part of the dam was inferred from its permitting B. to build a bridge against Ads, and allowing all persons to go between Charlestown and the Point for four years free of toll, B. having previously voted that the free use of the dam should be granted to A. for passing and repassing, provided A. would permit B. to use a part of Ads bridge for part of the dam.
    This was an action to recover toll for passing on the Canal Bridge, leading from Boston to Lechmere Point, in Cambridge.
    
      At the trial, before Parker C. J., the plaintiffs produced two acts of incorporation, one passed February 27th, 1807, the other, February 2Gth, 1808. They also produced their book of records to show their organization.
    The plaintiffs built the bridge in 1808 and 1809 ; and in the latter year opened it for public travel, and placed toll-houses near each end of it. After about twenty months, the toll-house at the westerly end (by Lechmere Point) was shut up, .and the toll was taken at the easterly end (by Boston) except on the days of commencement at Harvard College, when toll was taken at each end.
    Previously to the grant of the Canal Bridge, a charter was granted (June 21st, 1806) to certain persons, by the name of the Prison Point Dam Corporation, authorizing them to build a dam from Prison Point, (which is northward of the Canal Bridge,) in Charlestown, to Lechmere Point. In March 1810, the proprietors of the lands at and about Lechmere Point, who were principally proprietors of Canal Bridge, procured an act incorporating them for twelve years by the name of the Lechmere Point Corporation, by which they held their lands as stock. Some time after they were so incorporated, individuals of the corporation, with the sanction of the body, bought or assumed all the shares in the Prison Point Dam Corporation, and, claiming to act under the right granted to that corporation, built a bridge in 1815 and 1816 (which will be called the cross bridge) from Prison Point to the Canal Bridge, forming a junction with the Canal Bridge at about 780 feet from the westerly end of this bridge.
    In May 1816, the Proprietors of the Canal Bridge raised a committee to equalize the shares in that corporation with those of Lechmere Point and Prison Point Dam Corporations, and from that time, or shortly after, the stock of the three corporations has been owned by the same individuals in the same proportions.
    It was proved, that, for many years past, two of these corporations held their meetings at the same time and place, and chose the same officers for both corporations ; but they voted for the officers of each corporation separately. They also kept separate books of record and of accounts, and separate books for the transfer of shares. It did not appear that there were any recent records of the Prison Point Dam Corporation; That corporation, although originally organized, had not been continued by regular meetings, and for several years no officers had been chosen. A book, however, for transferring shares is kept, and the person who was last chosen clerk of that corporation, in the manner appearing by the books of the other corporations, and who is also the clerk of the other corporations, still continues to issue certificates of stock in thé Prison Point Dam Corporation.
    It appeared by the record books of the Proprietors of the Canal Bridge, that there are proceedings contained in them which relate to each of the other corporations, and that the captions of the meetings sometimes specify that a meeting was of two of the corporations, and sometimes of the three. The clerk testified that these entries were clerical errors, that the orders of the directors were always to keep the records entirely separate, and that when an entry was made in a wrong book, it was always also made in the book appropriated to that corporation to the acts of which it purported to relate.
    The by-laws of the corporations were made to conform to each other, and one of their regulations, made in June 1816, was, that no transfer of shares in either of. the corporations should he made without a transfer of an equal number of shares in the other two corporations.
    The Lechmere Point Corporation kept a book of records of the proprietors’ and another of the directors’ meetings, and all records in them which refer to the Canal Bridge or Prison Point Dam, and which were given in by the clerk of that corporation upon a specific call made by the defendant, were considered part of the case ; the admission of which, however, as being illegal evidence, was objected to by the plaintiffs.
    The cross bridge was finished in July 1816, but no road was laid out from the northerly end into Charlestown until the autumn of 1817, since which time the passage over this bridge and the part of the Canal Bridge between it and Lechmere Point has been left free ; and no toll was demanded for passing on this route until July 1820, when the Proprietors of the Canal Bridge removed their toll-houses from the ends ol their bridge, and placed them on each side of the opening where the cross bridge joins the Canal Bridge. Since July 1820, toll has been demanded of all persons who came on the Canal Bridge, as well those who were going from Charlestown to Lechmere Point, or the reverse, as those going from Charlestown to Boston, or the reverse.
    The defendant went from Charlestown to Lechmere Point, passing by the westerly toll-house on the Canal Bridge.
    The plaintiffs also proved, that the flats adjoining the up«nd at Lechmere Point extended several hundred feet beyond the line of junction of the two bridges ; and that ever since the second year after the Canal Bridge was built, there nos been a gate at the easterly end of it, where the easterly toll-house used to stand, which is shut whenever the corporation please.
    The plaintiffs objected to the introduction of any evidence except what their own particular records afforded. They contended that they were not bound by any act of another corporation ; that every corporation must stand on its own charter; that they have a right to demand toll of every person who goes on their bridge or past their toll-house ; and that the defendant was therefore liable to pay the toll demanded.
    The defendant contended, 1. That there was not, by any of the acts above referred to, any authority to take toll of persons passing from Charlestown to Lechmere Point by the way of the cross bridge and Canal Bridge, and therefore it could not be legally exacted : 2. That by the conduct and transactions of the three corporations they had become amalgamated, so that the doings of any one bound each of the others, and the Proprietors of the Canal Bridge must be considered as having built the cross bridge, and as subject to the same terms as the Prison Point Dam Corporation would have been, if it had been built by them : 3. That the Proprietors of the Canal Bridge, m suffering the other bridge to be united with theirs, waived any right of taking toll from any one who should pass their westerly toll-house from that avenue : 4. That the proceedings of the Proprietors of the Canal Bridge in relation to the other bridge, and particularly their declining to demand toll for four years after the junction of the two bridges, should be construed to be a relinquishment to the public of any claim tt, toll of persons passing between Charlestown and Lechmere Point : and 5. That by their charter the Proprietors of the Canal Bridge had authority to take toll only of persons passing from Boston to Lechmere Point, and not of those passing from Charlestown to Lechmere Point.
    Some other facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court. A verdict was taken, by consent, for the plaintiffs, which was to be set aside and a general verdict entered for the defendant, if the Court should be of opinion that the plaintiffs had no right of action for toll for passing between Charlestown and Lechmere Point.
    The cause was argued at March term 1822, by Hubbard and Peabody, for the defendant, and Prescott and Otis, for the plaintiffs.
    The defendant's counsel cited The case of Sutton's Hospi tal, 10 Co. 31, to the point of the three corporations becoming one ; Woodyer v. Hadden, 5 Taunt. 137, Rugby Charity v. Merryweather, 11 East, 375, note, to the point of dedi cation ; and Garland v. Salem Bank, 9 Mass. Rep. 410, Rex v. Chipping-Norton, 5 East, 239, to show that corporations may act otherwise than by vote or deed.
    For the plaintiffs it was argued, in regard to their right to demand toll by their charter, that it was an integral right, indivisible, not apportionable. The People v. Denslow, 1 Caines’s Rep. 177; Stuart v. Rich, ibid. 182; Major v. Oxenham, 5 Taunt. 340. The charter says, “ The rates of toll on said bridge shall be the same as are now demandable by law for passing over Charles River Bridge ” ; which shall be “ written over me doors of such toll-houses as may be. erected on said bridge.” This bridge is private property, in which the public have a qualified right, upon performing a condition precedent, viz. paying toll. The charter does not fix the places for the toll-houses, nor limit the number of them ; and it can make no difference in what direction persons travel before or after they come on the bridge.
    The original right of the plaintiffs has not been in any man ner modified, nor surrendered. They gave permission for one end of the Prison Point Dam to be built adjoining the bridge, jar the purpose of increasing the amount of their tolls, which they had a right to do. It was not their business to inquire whether the Prison Point Dam Corporation conformed to its charter or not. The corporations were different in all respects. But it is said, that the permission to pass free of toll for four years is a grant of the western end of the bridge. This was a benefit for which no one paid the plaintiffs any equivalent, and the resumption of their right to toll was not an injury to the public. If a bank should discount at five per cent, for a number of years, it might resume its right of discounting at six per cent. The right which the defendant sets up is a perpetual grant of part of the tolls ; but such a grant must be in writing. A paroi lease of tolls is void ; they are within the statute of frauds ; they are a tenement; they partake of the realty, and an assize will lie for them. Rex v. Chipping-Norton, 5 East, 239; Vin. Abr. Corporation, K 30; Knapp v. Williams, 4 Ves. jr. 430, note; Co. Lit. 6 a, 19 b, 20 a; St. 1783, c. 37, § 2. Neither can the acts of the plaintiffs be construed to be a license to pass always ; for a license, also, which concerns the realty, must be by deed. Cook v. Stearns, 11 Mass. Rep. 533, where is cited Vin. Abr. License, E, G; Hoskins v. Robins, 2 Saund. 328.
    The corporations, it is said, have amalgamated themselves, so that the acts of one are the acts of all; and this is inferred from entries relating to the other corporations being made in the plaintiffs’ records, and from the stock in all the corporations being owned in equal proportions by the same persons. Those entries are mere surplusage. The corporations never meant to amalgamate themselves ; else why keep so many different books ? They knew they could not do it ; as appears from their choosing their officers at distinct ballotings. If they had voted expressly that the three corporations should constitute but one, it would have been of no effect. Otherwise, the Proprietors of the Canal Bridge might become a perpetual corporation, since no limit is fixed for the duration of the Prison Point Dam Corporation ; and a new corporation might be made with different powers from either of those created by the government. But one corporation cannot create another. A corporation must be created by statute, or perhaps undei ths great seal of the Commonwealth. Bac Abr. Corporation, L Rex v. Ginever, 6 D. & E. 735; Child v. Hudson’s Bay Company, 2 P. Wms. 209; Com. Dig. Franchise, F 5. The fact of one or many members of one corporation owning shares in other corporations, in any given proportions, cannot create any relation between the corporations, other than then respective charters create. The records of any other corporation ought not to have been admiteti in evidence to affect the rights of the plaintiffs.
    There is no well defined rule in England, as to what shall amount to a dedication of a highway. A dedication to the public cannot be presumed from leaving a way open no more than four years. Rex v. Hudson, 2 Str. 909; Lade v. Shepherd, ibid. 1004; Rex v. Lloyd, 1 Campb. 260, and notes ; Rugby Charity v. Merryweather, 11 East, 275, note ; Woodyer v. Hadden, 5 Taunt. 125. All the cases of dedication have been where private individuals have thrown open their private closes ; here, there was always a highway, on condition, however, of paying toil. But all the cases admit, that any thing which shows an intention in the party to preserve his right will prevent a dedication ; and here this is shown by the taking toll constantly at one toll-house, and at both on commencement days, and by maintaining a gate. The obligation on the corporation to keep this part of the bridge in repair proves that the free use of it does not belong to the public.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered at November term 1822, by

Parker C. J.

The plaintiffs having shown an act of the legislature incorporating them with authority to build a bridge over Charles River from Boston to Cambridge, and to take toll from all persons who shall pass over the same, would be entitled to recover in the present action, unless, by some act binding on the corporation, they have disabled themselves from exacting it. We think it immaterial whether the defendant passed over the whole, or only a part of the bridge, for the corporation, not being restricted as to the location of their toll-houses, may lawfully demand toll of any one who may pass either of them notwithstanding the passenger may not have entered the bridge at one end and passed off at the other; so that it a person were to go from the ice, or a boat, to the middle of the bridge, and then pass to Cambridge or Boston, there is nothing in the act which will exempt such person from the toll. But it is undoubtedly competent to the proprietors to commute the t j11 for a certain sum by the year or the quarter. This is done by most of such corporations : and they have the same authority to give a free passage, where they shall deem it for their interest; at least the corporation cannot claim against a vote granting such free passage, and if their authority is questioned, it must be by those members of the corporation who do not assent to the act, and are injured by it.

It is true, that the acts, doings and declarations of individual members of the corporation, unsanctioned by the body, are not binding upon it; but it is equally true, that inferences may be drawn from corporate acts, tending to prove a contract or promise, as well as in the case of an individual; and that a vote is not always necessary to establish such contract or promise. This has been settled m several cases in this country and in England.

The defence, therefore, set up in this case, which is, substantially, that the plaintiffs have parted with their right to exact toll from persons who shall pass from Charlestown to Cambridge by the way of the bridge leading from Prison Point in Charlestown, is valid in law, if maintained in point of fact; and we consider it as referred to the Court to decide, whether the evidence used in the case is legally sufficient to warrant a verdict against them on that fact. Some difficulty has arisen in considering this point, from the intricate and complex manner in which the business of three several corporations, which are connected in this inquiry, has been transacted. There seems to have been a combination of interests, whicl. made it difficult for them to maintain a distinct'character ; so that sometimes they met and voted conjointly, and at others seem to have holden separate meetings and kept separate records. We find the proprietors of the bridge, upon some occasions, passing votes respecting the land, and the proprietors of Lechmere Point doing the same thing in relation to the bridge ; and it appears that the whole interest of the Prison Point Dam Corporation was purchased, or otherwise assumed, by the proprietors of Lechmere Point. This confusion resulted from the circumstance, that the same individuals were members of all the corporations, and that their corporate interest, which was at first distinct, had become identified by the equalization of shares in the several companies, and the obligation imposed by the votes of each that they should always be kept or transferred together.

There are no doubt technical difficulties in considering these several companies as copartners, or as having blended their powers and interests together, so that whatever should have been done by one, should be binding upon the others ; and yet, as they are all composed of the same individuals, using several corporate powers for the same end and purpose, with nothing but the form of a record to distinguish them, equity would seem to require that they should not have the power of severing to the prejudice of any persons with whom either might contract. But as the Court is bound, in a suit at common law, to observe the rules of that law, we have, in the discussion of the case, considered the three corporations as distinct legal persons, and endeavoured to ascertain the rights of the parties in this view only ; without reference to the singular combination, which has without doubt occasioned some difficulty to those who unfortunately adopted this mode of carrying "nto effect their intentions.

The statement of the defendant is, that by virtue of the several acts of incorporation referred to in the case, and the corporate acts and proceedings of the several companies constituted by them, that part of the Canal Bridge, which leads from the place of the junction of the cross bridge, has virtually become a part of the dam which was authorized by the act incorporating the Prison Point Dam Corporation ; and that, as by virtue of that act no toll was authorized for the passing of the dam, the proprietors of the bridge have voluntarily, and for a sufficient consideration, abandoned the right to take toll from those who should come by that route over their bridge. There being no legal impediment to the proprietors of the bridge making such a bargain, it is rather a question of fact, whether it has been made ; and the only view in which we can entertain this question is, whether the evidence in the case is legally sufficient to maintain the defendant’s position.

The act incorporating the Prison Point Dam Corporation was passed in 1806, before either of the other corporations was created ; but we have no evidence that the act was put in operation, to any purpose, until after the existence of the other corporations. Under this act, the corporation was authorized to build a dam from Prison Point, in Charlestown, to Lech-mere Point, in Cambridge. It would seem, by the provisions in the act, that the principal object was the erection of mills ; but the dam was also intended to be used as a road, since it was required, that there should be a railing and lights, and the width was to be such as could only be necessary for a road. No toll whatever was established for passing this road, the legislature probably considering that the great water privilege given, and the probable profits of the works upon the dam, would be a sufficient compensation for the expense of making and maintaining a passage over the surface.

In 1808, Andrew Craigie and others were incorporated as the Proprietors of the Canal Bridge, to be extended from Boston to the same Lechmere Point. And, in 1810, the proprietors of land on Lechmere Point were also incorporated, with the right to hold their land in shares, and transfer the same as personal property.

This latter corporation, or its members, became the owners of all the shares in the Prison Point Dam Corporation ; and, in 1815 and 1816, erected a bridge from Prison Point to the Canal Bridge, at the distance of 780 feet from the upland of Lechmere Point. This must be considered as done by the corporation, because they appointed committees to locate the bridge, and declared that they had assumed all the shares, and the presumption is, nothing being shown to thé contrary, that the expense was paid from the corporate funds.

It is proper here to inquire, whether this bridge was built by virtue or under color of the act establishing the Prison Point Dam Corporation, or avowedly without any authority, by persons professing to act as trespassers or violators of the public right of passage over navigable waters. And we cannot do the injustice to the corporation, or the respectable individuals' composing it, to hesitate a moment in believing that they intended, as they professed, to act under authority of the legislature. Their acts and declarations show it. They purchased up the right under the act of incorporation, and all their proceedings of record have reference to the authority thereby given ; and they made provision in their stipulation with the Proprietors of the Canal Bridge, to turn a part of that bridge into a dam upon some future opportunity. It is true, that they have not built a close dam, and that the purposes for which the authority was given appear not to be executed ; but we apprehend they will not say, they never intended to make a dam, and if they should, we apprehend the law will not allow them to hold that language. • It ought to be supposed, that what they have done is with a view to a future full compliance with the terms of the charter under which they acted, and that they relied upon the indulgence of the government for a temporary suspension of the public projects which they have begun. Either this is their intention, or they must be supposed to have occupied a public privilege and converted it to their private purposes, without any authority or pretence of right whatever. Assuming it, then, as a point established, that the proprietors of Lechmere Point erected the cross bridge under and by virtue of the legislative act, it is clear, that they have no authority to establish a toll; and they have not pretended to demand one ; which is another reason for believing, that what they did was under color of the act.

But they had no right to join their bridge or dam to the Canal Bridge, without the consent of the proprietors of that bridge ; and if they had done so, without doubt all who should pass on to the bridge and cross it for the purpose of going to Cambridge would be liable to toll; and even with this con-, Bent, unless the proprietors of the bridge had made some contract winch would legally deprive them of this right.

Have, then, the proprietors of the bridge done any act, which can legally operate to deprive them of the right to exact toll of the passengers from Charlestown to Cambridge or Cambridge to Charlestown ?

In August 1814, the proprietors of Lechmere Point voted, that, having assumed all the shares in the Prison Point Dam Corporation, and being at the whole expense of building and keeping in repair said dam, agreeably to the act of incorporation, the free use of said dam be granted to the Proprietors of Canal Bridge, for passing and repassing to and from Charles-town ; provided, that the said Proprietors of Canal Bridge give to the proprietors of Lechmere Point and Prison Point Dam the use of that part of Canal Bridge extending from the dam to Lechmere Point, and keep the same always in repair, and provided, also, that permission be given to the Lechmere Point and Prison Point Dam proprietors to cause that part of the bridge to be so filled up as to make it a solid dam, whenever they shall think it expedient.

Here was a direct and plain proposition, and if it had been met by as plain an acceptance by vote recorded, no one would imagine that any question could arise as to the effect. One corporation, having a lawful right to build a dam, proposes to another to make part of their bridge into a dam, and that par ty accepts it. Surely, if they act as separate and independent bodies, they are both bound by the contract, and a legal remedy would be found for the violation of it. The consequence would be, that to all intents and purposes the part of the bridge so occupied would become a part of the dam ; and if any citizen would have a right to pass over the dam, he would have the same right to pass over the bridge thus appropriated.

The question, then, is narrowed to this, — Have the Proprietors of the Canal Bridge assented to this proposition and acted under it ? We find no vote to this effect, but we do find, that the cross bridge was suffered to unite with theirs pursuant to the proposition, and that for four years, all were suffered to pass without toll who came from Charlestown to Cambridge, or vice versa. Now, corporations can be bound by implicaron, -as well as individuals, as has been before stated, and no acts could be stronger to show an assent to a proposition, an agreement or bargain, than those which have been mentioned.

We account for there being no express vote, only from the mixed interests of these corporations, and their being composed of the same individuals. We find the proprietors of the bridge appropriating 10,000 dollars to the erection of houses on the Point, and the proprietors of the Point exempting from toll persons passing over their bridge. They are one and the same in interest, and, although we were not permitted to consider them so in point of form, the evidence result ing from the acts of each cannot but have an influence on any question relating to their transactions. The proprietors of the bridge have sold a part of their bridge to the proprietors of Lechmere Point, to be used as a dam, and the proprietors of the dam, or of the Point, have sold to the proprietors of the bridge the use of the dam. Acting under statutes of the government, they must be bound by them ; their rights must be ascertained by their charter ; and considering the charter to the Prison Point Dam Corporation as granting no right to toll, and that the westerly end of the Canal Bridge is virtually a part of the dam, we think it clear that those who pass from Cambridge to Charlestown, or Charlestown to Cambridge, by way of the cross bridge or dam, are legally subject to no toll.

Verdict set aside and-a general verdict entered for the defendant. 
      
      
        Episcopal Charitable Soc. v. Episcopal Church in Dedham, post, 372; Smith v. Propr’s of F. C. M. H. in Lowell, 8 Pick. 178; New Eng. M. Ins. Co. v. De Wolf, 8 Pick. 56; Mott v. Hicks, 1 Cowen, 532; Danforth v. Schoharie Turnp. Co. 12 Johns. R. 227; Dunn v. St. Andrew's Church, 14 Johns. R. 118; Chestnut Hill Turnp. Co. v. Rutter, 4 Serg. & R. 16; Bank of Northern Liberties v Cresson, 12 Serg. & R. 312; Bank of U. States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheaton, 64; Eastman v. Coos Bank, 1 N. Hamp. R. 26; Baptist Church v. Mulford, 3 Hal sted, 182; Union Bank of Maryland v. Ridgely, 1 Har. & Gill, 426; Angell & Ames on Corp. 128, note (1). See White v. Westport Cotton M. Co., ante, 215; Frankfort Bank v. Anderson, 3 Marshall, 1.
     