
    John White, and Others v. Adele Poussin.
    A voluntary conveyance will not be protected by the statute of limitations' against creditors of the donor, if the fact, that such conveyance had been made, was unknown to the creditors until within the statutory period before the bill was filed to set it aside, and the donor remained all the time, ostensibly, in possession.
    Although a bill praying relief against fraud must, in order to avoid the effect of the statute of limitations, allege that the fraud was not discovered until within the statutory period before suit .brought, yet it will be sufficient if the allegation is substantially, although not clearly, or formally made; and even if it is not made at all, yet, if it appear at the hearing, that the discovery was not made until within the statutory period, it seems that leave will be given to amend for the purpose of making it.
    Heard by Harper, Chancellor, at Charleston, May, 1830.
    This was a bill by the assignees of Thomas W. Price, an insolvent debtor, to set aside three bills of sale, executed by him in the years 1812, 1816, and 1820, by which he had conveyed several slaves to the defendant. The bill charged that the bills of sale were, in fact, without consideration, and fraudulent as to creditors ; and prayed that the slaves might be delivered up to be sold for the benefit of the creditors. The defendant' pleaded the statute of limitations: and under this plea evidence was adduced to shew, that she had held adverse possession of the slaves for more than four years; that the tax returns had been made in her name; and that she had also brought an action for one, and sold others of them, in her own name ; that she was a single woman, and lived in her own house; and that Price cohabited with her.
    It was insisted at the hearing, that this was, at the utmost, a case of constructive fraud merely, which was no bar to the operation of the statute; and that if it were, the statute would run from the discovery of the fraud: but, that to avoid the effect of the statute, the complainants should have alleged, that the fraud had not been discovered until within four years before the filing of the bill; and this had not been done.
    Harper, Ch. This is a very clear case. Independently of the evidence furnished by the bills of sale, that the slaves were origi. nally the property of Price, the proof is, that they remained in his possession until his death in 1827. These bills of sale were relied on for the purpose of shewing, that although Price had an apparent possession, it was exercised in defendant’s right, enured to her benefit; in short, that the possession was exclusively hers. Whether the statute of limitations could have matured her title against him, it is unnecessary to consider. She had a good title against him independently of the statute. But the complainants are not volunteers, standing, to all intents, in the place of Price. They stand in the- situation of creditors; and one of them is a creditor to a very large amount, and may impeach what Price himself could not. It is apparent that the deeds were fraudulent. They are so charged to have been ; and as the plea does not deny, it must be taken to admit the charge. Then the rule is notorious, that time will not run to protect a fraud, until the fraud has been discovered. nnd “
    It is true, that the party seeking relief, in such a case, must allege, that the fraud was discovered within the statutory period before the filing of the bill. The allegation is not strictly susceptible of proof; but it is material, to put the defendant upon the proof of discovery. I think that the allegation, though not clearly, or formally, is yet substantially made by the present bill. The allegation is, that the complainants, under a decree of the Court of Appeals, made in 1828, directing the slaves belonging to the estate of Price to be delivered -up for sale, were proceeding to seize the slaves in question as part of that estate, when the defendant produced her bills of sale for them. They do not say, directly, that they had no knowledge of these conveyances before; but I think they do so impliedly: and this was enough to put the defendant upon proof •of their knowledge.
    But if the allegation were not made, yet as I am satisfied, that the fact was so, and the justice of the case requires it, I should give leave to amend in order to make it. The allegation is sup. ported by the circumstances, that the conveyances were never recorded, and that Price remained ostensibly in possession until his death. There is no way in which the discovery could probably have been made. Indeed, I believe that the charge, that the deed was kept secret, must be taken as admitted to be true. On the part of the defendant, no proof is produced of any previous knowledge of the fact by complainants. If it were established, that the defendant exercised acts of ownership by selling one or two of the slaves, there was but the merest chance, that complainants should be informed of that. So of the returning the slaves to the tax collector in the name of the defendant after 1824. I must take it that the fraud was discovered in 1828; and since that there has not been time enough for the statute to run.
    It is therefore ordered and decreed, that the plea be overruled.
    Legare, Attorney General, for the motion.
   On appeal,

Johnson, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We concur in the decree of the Chancellor for the reasons on which it is founded, and the appeal is therefore dismissed.

O’Neall, J., and Harper J., concurred.

Decree affirmed.  