
    Felix Arturo Loayza WONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 14-10856
    Non-Argument Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    March 27, 2015.
    David Alexander Villarreal, Lipcon Mar-gulies Alsina & Winkleman, PA, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Felix Arturo Loayza Wong, pro se.
    David J. Horr, Stephanie H. Wylie, Brian T. Scarry, Horr Novak & Skipp, PA, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Felix Wong appeals an order that compelled him to arbitrate his employment dispute with Carnival Corporation. We affirm.

Wong argues that the arbitration clause in his contracts of employment is void as against public policy, but his argument is foreclosed by our precedent in Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.2011). Wong argues that the application of Panamian law, as required by his arbitration agreement, would bar his claims for negligence under the Jones Act and for maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness under the general maritime law. But in Lindo we held that a seaman’s argument that a choice-of-law clause would foreclose all meaningful relief under the laws of the United States was not a viable defense to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement. Id. at 1283-85.

Wong argues that Lindo is no longer good law for two reasons, but his arguments fail. First, Wong argues that American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 186 L.Ed.2d 417 (2013), recognizes that federal courts can invalidate an arbitration agreement as against public policy if it prevents the effective vindication of a federal statutory right, but the Supreme Court held no such thing. The Supreme Court instead stated that we must “rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms,” 133 S.Ct. at 2309. Italian Colors in no way abrogates our precedent in Lindo that a seaman cannot raise a defense of public policy at the “arbitration-enforcement stage.” Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1282. Second, Wong argues that we are bound by the contrary rule applied in Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir.2009), but we explained in Lindo that Thomas is inconsistent with an earlier precedent, Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005). Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1277-78. We are bound by Bautista and Lindo.

We AFFIRM the order that compelled Wong to arbitrate his employment dispute with Carnival.  