
    Tayloe v. Adams.
    June, 1821.
    Sale of Land — Mortgage for Purchase Money— Waiver of General Lien. — A mortgage of land by a vendee, to secure tlie payment of the purchase money due by his vendor to the prior vendor, by agreement between all the parties, is a waiver of the general lien, which but for such mortgage, the intermediate vendor would have ou the land, to seenre to him the payment of the purchase money.
    A bill was brought in equity by Adams, against Peter and Carter Beverley, to compel a specific performance of an agreement entered into with Peter Beverley; or to subject the Cloverdale furnace and some adjoining lands to sale, for the purpose of raising the purchase money agreed to be paid by Beverley' to Adams.
    It appeared, that Peter Beverley had not executed the bonds which he had covenanted to execute jointly with Carter Beverley, and that a considerable portion of the purchase money was due for the Cloverdale furnace. And the Chancellor decreed a sale of as much of the land, &c., as should be necessary to raise the money due.
    In this state of the case, Taylor filed a petition, praying an injunction to arrest the execution of the decree. He stated, that the furnace, &c. was originally sold to "Adams by Breckenridge ; and that Breckenridge took a mortgage on the land, &c. which was not recorded. That Adams afterwards with the knowledge and consent of Breckenridge, sold the land thus purchased of Breckenridge, and another small tract not mortgaged to Breckenridge to Peter Beverley. The conveyance to Beverley was immediately from Breckenridge, who then took a mortgage from Beverley to secure the payment of the purchase money, which he had not received of Adams. Peter Beverley then, with the knowledge and consent of Breckenridge, sold the land, &c., to his brother Carter Beverley; and with the consent and privity of Breckenridge whose money' was yet unpaid, the land was now mortgaged to him by Carter Beverley, to secure the original purchase money and interest. Tayloe bought of Carter Beverley with the knowledge and consent of Breckenridge, and had paid to Breckenridge the whole amount due him for the purchase. Carter Beverley it was alleged was insolvent, so that Tayloe had no effectual recourse against him; and that Adams’ lien was lost by his transactions with Beverley and Breckenridge. The Chancellor granted the petition.
    Adams on the contrary insisted in his answer, that Tayloe was a purchaser pen-dente lite, and that the original decree bound him.
    At a subsequent term the petitioner Tay-loe was permitted to come in as a defendant, and to answer the original bill. Depositions were taken; among others that of Breckenridge, which was excepted to for his incompetence, on the ground of interest. This objection was overruled; and the Chancellor considering Tayloe as a purchase pen-dente lite, and so bound by the former decree ; and that he must be taken to have had notice, because his agent in making the purchase, Breckenridge, had actual notice of the debt due to Adams by Beverley, and that it was for the purchase of the land, &c. in dispute; that against Peter Beverley, Adams had a lien *on the land, which followed it when it came to Tayloe.’s hands; dissolved the injunction, dismissed the petition, and Tayloe appealed.
    
      
      Sale of Land — Mortgage for Purchase Money— Waiver of General Lien — When a vendor takes a mortgage for the purchase money, his implied equitable lien Cor the purchase money Is superseded. Buchanan v. Clark, 10 G ratt. 170, citing the principal case, and Little v. Brown, 2 Leigh 353.
    
   ROANT3, Judge.

The court is of opinion that as it is alleged by the appellant, is not denied by the appellee, and is moreover proved by the testimony, that a mortgage was given by Peter Beverley to Breckenridge a creditor of the appellees, for a part of the debt due by the said Beverley to the appellee; that mortgage amounted to a waiver ot the general lien existing upon the land under the sale of the same by the appellee to the said Beverley, on the authority of Bond v. Kent and other cases on the same subject. The decree therefore is reversed for want of equity; except so far, as it prays for personal relief against Peter and Carter Beverley. _  