
    McCOY v. PEARCE.
    (S. C., Thomp. Cas., 145-148.)
    Knoxville,
    September Term, 1858.
    1. PURCHASER’S TITLE AT SHERIEE’S SALE ASSIGNED.
    The purchaser of land at an execution sale, without the sheriff’s deed, acquires an equitable title which he may assign before redemption, and his assignee takes the same title with which he was invested. [See notes 1 and 8 under sec. 4785 and note 38 under sec. 3812 of the Code. On the sheriff’s deed generally, see notes 1-18 under said sec. 4785.]
    Cited: 11 Hum., 122.
    
      
      2. SAME. To daughter of debtor; advancement.
    The purchaser’s assignment of his such title, before redemption, to the daug-hter of the judgment debtor, with his assent and direction, upon her paying the purchaser the amount of his bid, invests her with his title. Where the judgment debor fails to redeem, and the value of the land is ten times the amount of the bid paid, the difference might be considered as an advancement by the judgment debtor to his daughter. This would preclude him and his other heirs from setting- up any interest in the land, though she has only an eauitable title. [See note 12 under sec. 4178 of the Code. On the general subject of advancements, see Code, secs. 4174-4178, and notes.]
    Cited: 1 Yer., 97; 10 Hum., 9.
    3. SAME. Same. Title not affected by declarations of father and husband.
    .The title being once in the assignee, no acts or declarations of her husband or of her father against her interest could affect it. A contract between her husband and father that the former should go on the land, build and live there, and support the latter, made between them alone, and not traced to her, cannot affect her title thus acquired.
    Cited: 1 Yer., 97; 10 Hum., 9.
    4. ESTOPPEL. By sworn statements as witness or in answer.
    Where a party swears, either in an answer to a bill or as a witness, that he has no interest in land', he is thereby es-topped to set up title to the property. [See Allen v. West-brook, 16 Lea, 255, 256, and cases cited.]
    Cited: 5 Sneed, 39.
   Weight, J.,

delivered tbe opinion of the court:

We think the chancellor’s decree is correct. By the sale of this land under execution, George Click, the purchaser, became invested with the equitable title, subject to John Muncher’s right of redemption for two years. This title, he, on the 9th of October, 1846, three days prior to the expiration of the time of redemption, with the assent and direction of John Muncher, assigned and relinquished to Polly Ann Pearce, wife of Thos. W. Pearce, and daughter of said Muncher. The said Polly Ann borrowed the money and paid Click his bid, and her husband refunded the same, and there is no evidence that John Muncher ever refunded or paid Thos. W. Pearce the sum so advanced; but he permitted the time to redeem to expire and made no effort, so far as we can see, to redeem the estate of his daughter. And we are satisfied when he caused ber to be invested with it, it was not meant or expected th?t he should do so; but that, on the contrary, he intended it as an advancement to her. The sum paid Click was about $30, and the land was worth about $300, and he intended that she should become the owner of the tract, and that the sheriff should make her a deed, he yielding his right to redeem. Such, we think, was the original purpose of Muncher in this arrangement. If so, he could have no relief against her. Even if he had paid the money to redeem from Click (as he did not), and taken the assignment in his daughter’s name, it would, prima facie, have been an advancement to her, and unless the presumption were overturned by proof, his claim would be repelled. 1 Yer., 97; 10 Hum., 9. And we think so far from being shaken, the presumption is fortified and sustained in the testimony. The title being once in Polly Ann Pearce, no acts or declarations of her husband, or of Muncher, could affect it, or be evidence against her. 1 Yer., 97; 10 Hum., 9. Muncher often declared the land belonged to Polly Ann, and the weight of the proof is that way. There is no evidence that she redeemed for him, and the presumption and proof are that she did not. The most that can be said is that Thos. W. Pearce was to. go on the land, build and live there^ and support Muncher; but this, if meant to be a contract, was entirely between Thos. W. and Muncher, and is not traced to Polly Ann.

The statute of frauds is not in the way of Polly Ann here, the assignment from Click being in writing and sufficient. 2 Hum., 335. If she did not redeem for Muncher, but took the title as an advancement, his right was gone; certainly after the right to redeem had expired. It may be that she had only an equitable title for want of the sheriff’s deed (11 Hum., 122), and that the decree against the sheriff and Click (Muncher not being a party), also failed to invest her with the legal title; but still Muncher and his heirs, having no real interest, can have no equity against her. -

There is another view of the' case which is decisive. In a suit between Pearce and one Loney for this land, Muncher, when offered as a witness for Pearce, being objected to because of his alleged interest, swore he had no interest in the land, and that it belonged to his daughter, Polly Ann. We have repeatedly held that a party who thus swears — either in an answer, or as a witness — is estopped to set up title to the property. 5 Sneed, 39.

Decree affirmed.  