
    Barry v. Second Ave. R. Co.
    (New York Common Pleas—General Term,
    December, 1892.)
    Plaintiff a child four years old was knocked down by defendant’s street car and his foot crushed so that amputation became necessary. In an action to recover for the injury, a physician called by plaintiff, testified that he advised amputation at once but the parents objected. Held, that on cross-examination it was proper to ask him to give the reasons of his advice, as the evidence, if not tending to establish a defense, was relevant on the question of damages.
    A master mechanic who never drove a car is not comptent to testify as to the distance within which a car might be stopped; and an exception to the exclusion of such evidence is not well taken.
    Evidence that the horses were “ old timers,” that is, aged and infirm, was proper in rebuttal of plaintiff’s evidence that they had been driven far and furiously.
    Appeal from judgment on a verdict, and from order denying motion for a new trial.
    Action for injury to plaintiff, by collision with a car, while he was crossing the defendant’s railway track in the street.
    Cantor, Linson & Van Shaick, for plaintiff (appellant).
    
      Payson Merrill, for defendant (respondent).
   Pryor, J.

We do not see how, consistently with familiar rules, we can revise this judgment.

The issues were submitted to the jury on conflicting evidence, and upon a charge with which the plaintiff’s counsel avowed his perfect satisfaction.”

Nor, is there any such preponderance of proof in favor of the plaintiff as would authorize us to set aside the verdict as against the weight of evidence. It may be that in view of the apparent" discrepancy between the testimony of plaintiff’s chief witness on this and on a former trial, the jury declined to credit his story; but, the truthworthiness of his evidence presented a question peculiarly for solution by them, and we are incompetent- to interfere with their decision.

Appellant impeaches the judgment for error in the rulings upon evidence; but, despite the forcible argument of his counsel, we are constrained to the conclusion that none of his exceptions is tenable.

The testimony of Dr. Fivey to which exception is taken, if not tending to establish a defense, was certainly relevant to the question of damages. The witness answered, by doing this operation the child could have stood as I stand now, perfectly erect, and could have worn a false foot with perfect safety and repose.” It appears the parents objected to the amputation; and the plaintiff being non sui juris, their objection was his objection. The defendant was not chargeable with an aggravation of the jury by his act. Then, too, the witness had testified in chief for the plaintiff that he suggested amputation, and it was clearly proper, on cross-examination, to allow him to be asked the reasons of his advice.

The exception to the exclusion of the evidence as to the distance within which a car might be stopped, is not well taken; because, it is not apparent that a master mechanic who never drove a car,” is an expert in the matter as to which the witness was interrogated; and because, it seems from the evidence of both parties that when the driver saw the boy he was too near to prevent the collision with him.

The exposition of the meaning of the word old timers,” i. <?., that the horses were aged and infirm, was proper in rebuttal of the plaintiff’s evidence that they had been driven so far and so furiously.

We observe no error in the record; and we cannot say that injustice is done by the verdict.

Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.

Daly, Ch. J., and Bischoff, J., concur.  