
    Christian WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CORPORATE EXPRESS DELIVERY SYSTEMS; Todd Bixby, Vice President of Operations, Corporate Express Delivery Systems; Jim Hoyle, Manager of Operations, Corporate Express Delivery Systems; Russell Hester, Director of North Carolina Operations, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 00-1492.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted Sept. 26, 2000.
    Decided Feb. 6, 2001.
    
      Christian Williams, pro se. Kimberly Quade Cacheris, McGuire Woods, L.L.P., Charlotte, NC, for appellees.
    Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Christian Williams appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his employer in his civil action filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West Supp. 2000), in which he claimed race discrimination relative to his employment with Corporate Express Delivery Systems (“Corporate Express”). Our review of the record and the district court’s opinion discloses that this appeal is without merit and we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Williams moved, and Corporate Express cross-moved, for summary judgment in this case. After thoroughly reviewing Williams’ claims and the materials submitted by the parties, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Corporate Express. While it appears that Williams was not provided with notice pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir.1975), we find, on this record, that such omission was harmless error. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 61; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). As the district court concluded, Williams failed to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination because, inter alia, he admitted that the hiring practices of Appellees were not discriminatory (and that he was not wrongfully discharged), and failed to establish any nexus between his race and the discriminatory practices in which he alleged Appellees engaged.

Williams also failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation, his sole remaining claim, because he did not show any causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Tinsley v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 442-43 (4th Cir.1998) (applying McDonnell Douglas scheme to retaliation claims). Williams asserts that Corporate Express retaliated against him for filing the instant lawsuit. However, the evidence reveals that Appellees terminated Williams ten days prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court’s finding of nondiscrimination was clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).

We therefore affirm substantially on the reasoning of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.  