
    Ernesto AMAYA-MEJIA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-71133.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Sept. 24, 2013.
    
    Filed Sept. 30, 2013.
    Ernesto Amaya-Mejia, Marysville, CA, pro se.
    OIL, Jessica Segall, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    
      Before: RAWLINSON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Ernesto Amaya-Mejia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1036-37 (9th Cir.2013); Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 942 n. 1 (9th Cir.2007). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir.2006), and we deny the petition for review.

Amaya-Mejia does not contend he suffered past persecution. He contends he fears harm from gangs and inadequate medical care in El Salvador. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Amaya-Mejia failed to establish a clear probability of future persecution on account of a protected ground. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (the REAL ID Act “requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”). Accordingly, his withholding of removal claim fails.

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Amaya-Mejia’s CAT claim because he failed to show that it is more likely than not that the Salvadoran government would consent or acquiesce to his torture by gangs or by intentionally depriving him of medical care. See Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 988-89 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that to constitute torture, the act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     