
    The State v. Spencer Fields.
    The act of 1748, limiting the time for commencing prosecutions in respect of penalties fines, and forfeitures, imposed by statute, tosix months after the offence committed, is no bar to an indictment, for forgery, under the act of 1801. The act of 1748 relates only to pecuniary penalties, imposed by statute, and does not apply either to the common law punishment of an. offence, for which farther penalties are provided by statute, or to any corporal punishment imposed by a statute.
    Statutes on the same subject are to be taken together, and construed in puri materia, even though there be no reference by the latter statute to the former, vide State ». Baldwin, aide, p. 541.
    The title of a statute may be resorted to in aid of the construction, vide State' v. Stephenson, ante, p. 334.
    Before Mr. Justice Evans, at Darlington, Fall Term, 1831.
    This was an indictment, under the act of 1801, 2 Faust, 379,. for uttering and publishing, as true, a false, forged, and counterfeit note of the Bank of Cape Fear, of the State of North-Carolina, knowing it to be false, forged, and counterfeit. The defendant pleaded, that he was not guilty of the offence charged at any time within six months before the commencement of the prosecution. To this plea a demurrer was filed on the part of the State, and the defendant joined in demurrer.
    The presiding Judge delivered judgment as follows :
    By the 11th section of the act of 1712, P. L. 103, it is provided, that “ as to all penalties and forfeitures mentioned in any statute or act now in force in this province, wherein a particular time is not mentioned in the said statutes or acts, for the suing for the said fines and forfeitures by civil process, by action of debt, plaint, or information, the same shall be prosecuted within six months after the cause of action or suit given, and not after.”' The act of 1748, P. L. 217, provides, “ That in all and every case where any penalty, fine, or forfeiture whatever hath been,- or shall hereafter be, inflicted or imposed, by any act or acts of the general assembly of this Province, already passed, or hereafter to be passed, and the time of prosecuting the offender or. offenders against such acts, not thereby provided, no information, action, suit, or prosecution, shall be had, issued, brought, or commenced against the offender or offenders against any such act or acts, for or in respect of any such penalty, fine, or forfeiture, unless the same be done within six months after the time •of passing this act, if the offence hath already been committed; and within the same space of time after the offence committed, 1 for the future : And all and every offender and offenders against any such act or acts, shall not from thenceforth be subject or liable to any penalty, fine, or forfeiture which may thereby be inflicted or imposed, any law, usage, or custom to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding.”
    ■ By the act of 1801, the offence with which the defendant is •charged is declared a felony ; and the act provides, lhat the •offender “ shall suffer death as a felon, without benefit of clergy.” 2 Faust, 381. The question,made by the demurrer m this case, is, therefore, whether “to suffer death as a felon, without benefit of clergy,” is a penalty, or forfeiture, within the meaning of the acts of 1712, and 1748.
    Without entering into a philological inquiry, as to the precise technical meaning of the words in question, it would seem to me to be sufficient, to refer to the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Bay, in the case of The State v. Taylor, 2 M’C. 488, in which the whole of the Constitutional Court concurred. He observes in reference to the act of 1712, that it “ has no relation to the commencement of prosecutions for felonies, or other high crimes, or misdemeanors; but relates entirely to penalties which may be recovered by civil actions or qui tarn suits.” And of the act of 1748, he says, “It is clear, that the title of this act and the enacting clause exactly correspond with each other, in the end and object of the act, for recovery of fines and forfeitures, and has not the most distant allusion to the foul crime of murder, or other felony whatever, .but relates only to pecuniary matters.” The case of The State v. Youngblood, 2 M’C. 241, is not at variance with this conclusion. That was a case of hog-stealing, the punishment of which is a pecuniary fine; and it is only in the event of the offender’s inability to pay the fine that corporal punishment is to be inflicted. P. L. 486.
    Independently of this view, it seems to me, that the negative of the proposition, presented by the demurrer, must be sustained, on the ground, that no case is within the provisions of the acts of 1712, and 1748, unless the statute, which provides the penalty, fine, or forfeiture, also creates the offence, for the commjssiou of which the penalty, fine, or forfeiture is imposed. The act of 1748 speaks of the “offender or offenders against any such act or acts referring to the acts which impose penalties, fines,or forfeitures,without fixing any time, within which prosecutions or suits shall be commenced. If, then, the aet of 1801, under which the defendant is indicted, did not create the offence, I am of opinion, that the act of 1748 does not apply. I am also of the opinion, that the act of 1801 did not create the offence. I am aware, that it was once doubted, whether the forgery of any private instrument, except a will or a deed, was an offence at common law : but this notion is controverted by Hawkins, 1 Hawk. P. C. Ch. 70, sec. 11; and I presume the question has been regarded as settled in England since the decision of Ward’s case. Ld. Raym. 1461. In this State the case of The State v. Foster, 3 M’C. 442, is equally conclusive.
    On the whole I am of opinion, that the plea is untenable, and •that the demurrer must be sustained.
    The defendant appealed, and now moved to reverse the decision of his Honor, as contrary to law.
    Blanding, for the motion.
    Mayrant, Solicitor, contra.
    
   Harper, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

■ It is argued, that the word “ penalty,” as used in the act of 1748, is an unambiguous one, and includes every punishment, even that of death, as well as pecuniary forfeiture. But in the act of 1712, it is plain, that the word was used only in the latter sense. And it is a rule, that in construing statutes on the same subject, they shall be taken together, and construed in pari materia; even though there be no express reference by the latter statute to the former. The Legislature in the former act, explains, clearly, that by the word “penalty,” is meant only pecuniary fine, or forfeiture; and in legislating on the same subject, we may conclude that the word was used in the same sense. It is asked, for what purpose then, is the act of 1748, made retrospective, since the bar of the aet of 1712 applied to all acts imposing penalties, which were of force at the time of its passage t It may be a sufficient answer to say, that the act of 1712, applies only to the recovery of fines and penalties, 5‘by civil process, by action of debt, plaint, or information” The act of 1748 extends the bar to prosecutions, or indictments, which were not included in the former act. Besides, there may have been statutes, imposing pecuniary penalties, passed in the interval between the act of 1712 and that of 1748, for which it was necessary to provide.

I do not know how it can be said that the word “ penalty” relates unequivocally to every punishment, when it is plain, that the Legislature, in one statute, at least, has used the word to signify no more than fine. In the largest sense, the word may certainly be said to extend to every punishment. But I think there is a more restricted and popular sense, in which it is taken to signify pecuniary forfeiture, as distinguished from punishment. There are civil penalties, as of a bond, which are only pecuniary forfeitures. It strikes me that when the words “ penalty of death,” are used, they are understood in a somewhat figurative sense, to signify the forfeiture of life. It is less usual to say the penalty of imprisonment,or the penalty of whipping. Inclining to the construction I have given, I think it is confirmed by the title of the act of 1748, which is to limit a time for the recovery of fines and forfeitures.

We concur with the presiding Judge, that the bar of tlie statute applies only to the fine, and not to the offence itself, or to any corporal punishment inflicted by a statute.

Motion refused.  