
    EL SIROCCO MOTOR INN, INC., and Boston Insurance Company, Petitioners, v. Joanne B. PREKOP and the Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.
    No. 36139.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    Jan. 24, 1968.
    Rehearing Denied March 21, 1968.
    Jones, Adams, Paine & Foster and Paul C. Wolfe, West Palm Beach, for petitioners.
    Urchisin & Sylvester, Deerfield Beach, Patrick H. Mears, Tallahassee, and J. Franklin Garner, Lakeland, for respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the Order of the Full Commission reversing the Order of the deputy.

The deputy dismissed the claim on the ground that claimant’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. The Commission, one member dissenting, reversed and remanded, holding the claim compensable.

Petitioner contends the Full Commission has substituted its findings for those of the deputy and that the Order of the deputy is supported by competent and substantial evidence. We agree. There is no evidence to support the Commission’s finding that claimant was required to park in the vacant lot across the street from her employer’s place of business. The dissenting Commissioner correctly stated:

“The evidence is clear and uncontra-dicted that the vacant lot was not the premises of the employer. The mere fact that the employee had no other place to park her car and that she was told she could use the vacant lot across the street from the hotel for parking space, was purely for her benefit. There is nothing in the workmen’s compensation law which contemplates that an employer must provide parking facilities, however crowded the area may be where his activities are conducted. Even if the employee had to walk several blocks or miles from the nearest parking area, the workmen’s compensation law does not contemplate placing a burden on the employer to assume liability for his employees who are injured going to and from work and the nearest parking area.”

The case is clearly within the “going and coming” rule.

In view of the foregoing the Order of the Full Commission is quashed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the Order of the deputy.

CALDWELL, C. J., and THOMAS, DREW and THORNAL, JJ., concur.

ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.

WHITE, Circuit Judge (Retired), dissents and concurs with ERVIN, J.

ERVIN, Justice

(dissenting):

I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority that the instant situation falls clearly within the “going and coming” rule.

The record reveals that the Respondent, an employee of the Petitioner motel, suffered a broken arm as a result of a fall caused when she slipped and fell in a vacant lot across the street from her employer’s (Petitioner) premises. As stated in the order of the full Commission, “the testimony of all witnesses reflects that the vacant lot was grassy, slippery when wet, and pitted with holes.” Petitioner’s employees had been instructed by the manager not to park on the motel premises inasmuch as the space was needed for customer parking, and the vacant lot across from the motel was pointed out as the place employees, including Respondent, should use for their parking. Further, this vacant lot was the only place available within a reasonable distance from the motel for the employees to park their cars. In view of the particular facts and circumstances involved in the instant situation, I agree with the opinion of the full Commission wherein it said that

“ * * * under such circumstances, it is immaterial whether the employer owned the vacant lot, leased it, or just plain used it for his convenience * * * The fact is that the employer did use it as an employee’s parking area, had done so for the past several years, and directed his employees to park their cars there. It therefore seems evident to us, under the circumstances herein related, that the vacant lot can be considered in all respects as a parking lot for the use and benefit of the employees of the employer, and as such, could be considered a part of the employer’s premises for the purposes of claimant’s coverage under the workmen’s compensation law.”

Therefore, I would hold that the Deputy’s order finding Respondent not to have been injured in the course of her employment is not supported by the necessary degree of competent substantial evidence in accord with logic and reason.

I would, accordingly, affirm the order of the full Commission whereby it reversed the order of the Deputy and remanded the cause for entry of a new order awarding Respondent payment of compensation commensurate with her disability as prescribed by the workmen’s compensation law.

WHITE, Circuit Judge (Retired), concurs. 
      
      . General Development Corp. v. Kelley, 159 So.2d 471 (Fla.1964); Bowen v. Keen, 154 Fla. 161, 17 So.2d 706 (1944). Seabreeze Industries v. Phily, 118 So.2d 54 (Fla.App.1960).
     