
    UNITED GAS AND ELECTRIC ENGINEERING CORPORATION v. THE UNITED STATES 
    
    [No. B-173.
    Decided January 21, 1924]
    
      On the Proofs
    
    
      Contract; implied agreement; Dent Act. — Plaintiff entered into a contract with a power company to perform certain services for it, and said power company thereafter contracted with a corporation to furnish electric power for a plant which the latter corporation was building for the United States. The Army officer in charge of the construction work told a representative of the plaintiff that it would receive compensation for its work on the power plant, but in so doing such officer was not acting under the authority of the Secretary of War or of tire President. Held, That the promise of the officer can not he construed to mean that he was entering into such an agreement as is contemplated by the Dent Act, 40 Stat. 1272.
    
      Ihe Reporter’s statement of the case:
    
      Mr. Raymond M. Hudson for the plaintiff.
    
      Mr. Edmond 0. Fletcher, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Robert H. Lovett, for the defendant. Mr. John E. Hoover was on the brief.
    
      The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
    I. The United Gas and Electric Engineering Corporation is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York and has its principal office in the city of New York.
    II. On April 24, 1918, the Everly M. Davis Chemical Corporation entered into a contract in writing with the United States whereby the said corporation agreed to furnish to the United States 42,000,000 pounds of picric acid at Picron, Ark., for the sum of $168,000. Maj. E. W. Moore was an officer of the United States Army and was supervising construction quartermaster on this project. It was necessary that electric power be obtained for the plant at Picron. Little Rock, Ark., was the nearest point where power could be obtained, and the Little Rock Railway & Electric Co. owned and operated the power plant at Little Rock.
    III. In July, 1918, the said Everly M. Davis Chemical Corporation and the Little Rock Railway & Electric Co. had a contract under which the latter company furnished electric power to the plant at Picron, Ark., and at the time the picric acid plant was in contemplation the plaintiff had an existing contract with the Little Rock Railwray & Electric Co. which' provided for the furnishing of engineering work by the plaintiff to the Little Rock Railw-ay & Electric Co., which work therein provided for was not discontinued until the latter part of 1919.
    IY. When the plant at Picron was in contemplation, and after the contract for its construction had been entered into, Major Moore went to New7 York to consult with the plaintiff corporation, then under contract with the Little Rock Rail■way & Electric Co. As a result of this conference, James W. Thomas, an employee of the plaintiff, went to Little Rock, Ark., where the plaintiff maintained an organization, and entered into a conference with Major Moore, the Little Rock Railway & Electric Co., and the Everly M. Davis Chemical Corporation. The result of this conference was an agreement by ’which all payments for work done on the project were to be made by the Everly M. Davis Chemical Corporation; and this included the work to be done by the Little Nock Railway & Electric Co. on its power plant; and this claim is for work done on said plant; for traveling expenses for the plaintiff’s' employees while at work on said plant ($7,276.35), for overhead expenses ($1,819.09), and for profits ($7,000), amounting to the sum of $16,095.35.
    V. While at Little Eock James W. Thomas had one or two conversations with Major Moore in which the compensation to be paid plaintiff was casually discussed. It does not appear that Major Moore made any promise as to this compensation, nor that he was authorized by the Secretary of War to enter into any contract with the plaintiff or its representative. Major Moore stated to Mr. Thomas that “ he was too busy to go into details, but that he believed what was just and reasonable would be paid.” The plaintiff presented its bill to the Little Eock Eailway & Electric Co.; that company handed it over to the Everly M. Davis Chemical Corporation. Both of these companies refused to pay it, and the Everly M. Davis Chemical Corporation advised the plaintiff to proceed against the United States, whereupon the plaintiff filed its claim with the claims board in St. Louis. Afterwards the claim was presented to the Board of Contract Adjustment in the War Department, which board dismissed the claim, and the plaintiff appealed to the Secretary of War, who affirmed the decision of the board.
    
      
       Appealed.
    
   MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT

The plaintiff in this case had an agreement with the Little Eock Eailway & Electric Co. to perform certain services for it; and while that contract was in existence the power company entered into a contract with the Everly M. Davis Chemical Corporation to supply electric power to a picric acid plant which the latter corporation was building for the United States Government. The work done by the plaintiff was done for the Little Eock Eailway & Electric Co.; that company was to be paid for its work by the Everly M. Davis Corporation. The fact that Major Moore, an officer of the United States, who was supervising the construction of the picric acid plant for the Government, told a representative of the plaintiff that it would receive compensation for its work on the power plant can not be held to imply an agreement between the plaintiff and the United States that the United States would pay the plaintiff for the work done, especially when it appears that the plaintiff had an agreement with the power company to do the work.

The Dent Act, under which the plaintiff claims, authorizes the award of compensation for expenditures when they were made by the plaintiff upon the faith of an “ agreement, express or implied,” entered into by it with an officer or agent acting under the authority of the Secretary of War or of the President, and such agreement was not executed in the manner provided by law. In this case the officer, Major Moore, was not acting under the authority of the Secretary of War or of the President. In fact, he did nothing which could by any possibility be construed as entering into an agreement of any sort. He positively denies that he did enter into any agreement with the plaintiff. The language attributed to the officer, and set out in the findings, can not be construed to mean that he was entering into such an agreement as is contemplated in the Dent Act. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 592, 597; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 385.

The petition is dismissed.  