
    ROLAND M. FILHIOL, ADMINISTRATOR, v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 17196.
    Decided January 31, 1893.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    In 1788 tlie governor of Louisiana mates a grant to Don Juan Filhiol, commandant of the post of Ouachita, of a tract of land which included the Hot Springs of Arkansas. In 1869 his heirs cause a hill to he introduced into Congress to confer jurisdiction on this court, and to refer to it their claim under the grant. In 1870 Congress pass the Sot Springs Act, referring all claims to this court. The heirs of Filhiol do not app'ear; others do, and the title is adjudged to he in the United States. The Government leases lands in the reservation and receives rents. In 1883 the grant, which has heen for many years lost, is found; and the claimant now brings suit to recover the rents collected hy the defendants.
    I. The purpose of the Hot Springs Act, 1870 (16 Stat. L., p. 149), was to settle all rights, perfect or imperfect, legal or equitable, to the tract; and the limitation prescribed that “all claims to any part of said reservation upon which suits shall not he brought” * * * “ shall he forever barred,” applies to a complete title under a Spanish grant as well as to claims under United States statutes.
    II. Congress can not affect the title to and ownership of property so as to divest its rightful possessor, but can confer jurisdiction which will enable a court to determine conflicting titles.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of tbe case:
    Tbe following are tbe facts of tbis case as found by tbe court, and the Exhibit H referred to in its opinion:
    I. Don Juan Filbiol was commandant of tbe post of Oua-chita, Louisiana, under tbe Spanish Crown, between 1783 and 1790. Don Estevan Miro was governor-general of the province of Louisiana, under the Spanish Crown, between 1780 and 1794.
    II. December 12,1787, Don Juan Filhiol, Spanish commandant of the post of Ouachita, memorialized the governor of the province for a grant of land, whereon the governor ordered a survey to be made, and on February 22, 1788, the following instrument was executed and delivered to said Don Juan Filhiol, to wit:
    “From the Land Archives.
    “The governor and intendent of the provinces of Louisiana and Florida west, and inspector of troops, etc.
    “Considering the anterior surveys made by the surveyor of this province, Don Carlos Trudeau, concerning the possession given to Don Julian Filhiol, commandant of this post of Oua-chita, of a tract of land of 1 square league, situated in the district of Arcansas on the north side of river Ouachita, at about 2 leagues and a half distance from said river Ouachita, and understanding that this land is to be measured so as to include the site or lecality known by the name of Hot Waters, as is besides expressed by the figurative plan and certificate of said surveyor Trudeau above named, and recognizing this mode of measurement, we approve those surveys, using the faculty which the King has vested in us, and assign in his royal name unto the said Julian Filhiol the said league of land in order that he may dispose of the same and of the usufruct thereof as his own.
    “We give these presents under our own hand, sealed with the seal of our arms and attested by the undersigned secretary of his majesty in this government and intendence.
    “ In New Orleans, on the 22d of February, 1788.
    “Estevan Mibo.
    “ By mandate of his excellency.
    “Andees Lopez Akmesto.
    “ Registered.”
    TTT- On December 6,1788, under the order of the intendent of the province of Louisiana and West Florida, the surveyor of the province executed to said Filhiol the certificate described as Exhibit D annexed to and made part of said petition as follows:
    “Don Carlos Trudeau, land and particular surveyor of the Province of Louisiana, in consequence of a memorial signed on the 12th of December, of the year 1787, by Don Juan Filhiol, commandant of the post of Ouachita, and by order of His Excellency Don Estevau. Miro, brigadier of tbe B. Ex. Gob., Intendeut of tbe Province of Louisiana, West Florida, etc., dated tbe 22d of February, 1788, directing me to give possession to tbe aforesaid commandant of a tract of land of 1 league square, situated in tbe district of Arkansas, to include that spot known by tbe name of tbe Warm Waters, and in conformity with tbe aforesaid order, I certify having measured in favor of tbe aforesaid commandant, Don Juan Filbiol, tbe league of land indicated in tbe memorial situated on the north side of Ouachita Eiver in tbe district of Arkansas, at. about 2 leagues and a half distance from said river, to be verified by tbe figurative plan which accompanies, in conformity with * * * of the 6th of tbe present month of December and of tbe current year 1788.
    “Carlos Trudeau.”
    IV. On November 25,1803, said Don Juan Filbiol executed tbe instrument in writing described as Exhibit F, annexed to and forming part of claimant’s petition, and on tbe 17th of July, 1806, Narcisso Bourgeat executed and delivered to said decedent the instrument in writing described and annexed to said petition as Exhibit H.
    V. In White’s New Becomp. Civil Laws of Spain and France (1S39, Vol. 2, p. 236) appears tbe following:
    “Article VII of the General Regulations and Instructions oe Morales for Conceding Lands. (July 17, 1779.)
    “To avoid for the future tbe litigations and confusions of which we have examples every day, we have also adjudged it very requisite that the notaries of this city and tbe commandants of posts shall not take any acknowldgment of conveyance of land obtained by concession unless tbe seller (grantor) presents and delivers to tbe buyer tbe title which be has obtained, and in addition being careful to insert in tbe deed tbe metes and bounds and other descriptions which result from tbe title, and tbe proces-verbal of tbe survey which ought to accompany it.”
    VI. Grammont Filbiol, son of said decedent and others of bis descendants, from time to time employed agents to prosecute tbe claim for tbe Hot Springs. The heirs of said decedent, some time prior to 1841, placed tbe papers in tbe bands of Bezin P. Bowie for said purpose. After tbe death of Bezin P. Bowie, in 1841, tbe heirs of Don Juan Filbiol applied to Bowie’s widow for tbe papers of said Filbiol in relation to tbe Hot Springs, and tbe daughter of said Bowie made an unsuccessful search for them, but afterwards found them, as hereinafter shown.
    Till. In 1869-70 the heirs of said Filhiol caused to be introduced into the House of Bepresentatives a bill to eonfer jurisdiction on the Court of Claims, and refer to it their claim under this grant to one square league, which embraces the Hot Springs, pari passu, with the reference of the persons who had located thereon in derogation of the act of Congress.
    IX. An act of Congress reserving four sections, embracing the Hot Springs, from entry and location ivas enacted in 1832 (4 Stat., 505). The lands of this section were surveyed by the United States in 1833.
    X. Subsequently at and prior thereto these springs were in possession of sundry persons, who claimed them under the laws of the United States, to wit, under a New Madrid location and under a preemption claim, and it was not until these claims were adjudicated in the suits brought under the act of 1870 that the United States went into actual possession.
    XI. In the year 1805 the government explorers, Lewis and Clark, who had visited Hot Springs in 1804, reported to the President and the President forwarded same to Congress, wherein it is stated that “ it is understood that the Hot Springs are included within a grant of some hundred acres granted by the late commandant of the Washita to some of his friends,” but it is not believed that a regular patent was ever issued for the place, and it can not be asserted that residence with improvement here form a plea to claim the land upon.
    XII. The originals of the exhibits attached to and made part of the petition were by one of the heirs of decedent placed in the hands of Bezin P. Bowie about the year 1840, who then resided in the State of Louisiana, and who was engaged in the business of prosecuting land claims. Said Bowie died in the year 1841, leaving his papers at his house in the possession of his family j search was instituted after his death, but the said papers could not be found until the year 1883, when they were discovered by a daughter of said Bowie and delivered to the parties ininterest in the Filhiol claim. Their attorneys nowpro-dnce them on the trial of this case.
    XIII. The said decedent died in the year 1821, and up to the time of his death he resided in the Territory of Louisiana. It does not appear that he or his heirs or assigns were ever in actual possession of the land in controversy.
    
      James Ball, who was the agent of the heirs of said decedent, in the year 1828 brought; a suit in his own name in the superior court of Arkansas against the United States under the act of 1824, alleging a grant to said decedent from the King of Spain. Under the order of the court said suit was dismissed, the said Ball haying failed to comply with a rule of the court requiring said plaintiff to file said alleged grant. The claimant and heirs of said decedent did not commence any proceedings under the act of 1870 (16 Stat. L., 14) or the act of 1877 (19 Stat. L., 377). The said claimant was appointed administrator of the succession of said decedent on the 12th day of August, 1891.
    XIV. A tract of land of one square could be located so as to include the Springs at said place which are known as “Hot Waters” or “Hot Springs.” The defendants took possession of the land in controversy, claiming the right of ownership, and have continuously held it, claiming it as the property of the Government. It was not taken possession of as private property for the public good, but under a claim of title and right in the United States.
    XY. The net amount realized by the defendants as rent for the six fiscal years next preceding the commencement of this suit and expiring on June 30, 1891, was $17,807.53, the said defendants having taken possession of said land before the commencement of said six years.
    The retrocession marked Ex. H, annexed to and made part of the petition, is as follows:
    “Exhibit H.
    “I, the undersigned, Narcisso Bourgeat, do by these presents retrocede to John Filhiol a tract of land 3 leagues front and 1 in depth, situated on Bayou Darquelon, also a tract 1 league square, situated at the mouth of the Hot Springs Creek where it flows into the Ouachita, being the same property which he sold to me by act passed before Yincent Fernandez Texeieo, then commandant of Ouachita post, resell to him for the same sum for which he sold to me, and which sum he has repaid me, and for which I hereby give receipt and transfer to him the said property. In testimony of which I have signed this deed, at Pointe Coupee, this 17th July, 1806.
    “Naecisso Bourgeat.
    “ I certify that the present retrocession has been passed in my presence on the day and year above written.
    “J. Poydeas,
    “ Judge of the Court of the Parish of Pte. Coupee?
    
    
      
      Mr. William J7. liarle, for tbe petitioners,
    submitted tbe following points :
    Tbe valid Spanish grant, being wbat is designated in tbe statutes and decisions as a “perfect grant,” and tbe juridical possession thereunder, both established by tbe evidence, constitute a valid legal title in tbe heirs and personal representatives of Don Juan Filbiol. It segregated a league square, with tbe hot springs as its center, from tbe public domain of Spain, which did not pass to France under tbe treaty of San Ildefonso, and consequently did not belong to France to cede to tbe United States in 1803.
    1. Such a title is paramount to any right of property in tbe United States.
    
      (a) This has been repeatedly held by tbe Supreme Court of tbe United States. {Beard V. Federy, 3 Wall., 478,491; Rorns-by v. United States, 10 Wall., 224.)
    
      (b) It is so by tbe rules of international law. (Strother v. Lúeas, 12 Pet., 436; Beard v. Federy, supra; Rornsby v. United States, supra.)
    
    (e) It is expressly protected by tbe treaty with France. (Delassus v. United States, 9 Pet., 117.)
    
      (d) Congress, representing tbe political power of tbe United States and specifically charged with tbe obligation of carrying out treaties, has expressly recognized tbe fact that tbe title under a perfect Spanish grant is paramount to tbe title of tbe United States. (Tide act of March 2,1805, 2 Stat., 324; act of February 28,1806, id., 352.)
    Tbe act of April 21,1806 (2 Stat., 301), is purely supplemental to that of March 2,1805, and so is that of March 3, 1807. (Id., 440.)
    In tbe acts of 1824 (4 Stat., 52), and 1844 (5 Id., 676), providing for a commission to examine French and Spanish grants in Louisiana, it is provided that tbe claimants of “ inchoate grants” shall and those of “perfect grants” may present them.
    This distinction and this construction of tbe acts have been adopted by tbe Supreme Court. {Fremont v. United States, 17 id., 542; United States v. Iteynes, 9 How., 127; United States v. Boselius, 15 id., 36.)
    (e) Congress recognized tbe same distinction and tbe same fact in tbe act organizing tbe Court of Private Land Claims (March 3,1891).
    
      (/) Tbe Department of tbe Interior recognized tbis distinction between “inchoate”and “complete” grants. ("Vide letter of instructions under act of March 2,1805, from tbe Secretary to J. W. Gurley, register of tbe land office for tbe eastern district of Orleans.)
    
      (g) Tbe Supreme Court has frequently decided that tbe execution'of a grant by an officer of tbe Spanish or Mexican government is prima facie evidence of bis authority to make it, and that tbe burden of proof is upon him who disputes it.
    “ He who would controvert a grant executed by lawful authority with all tbe solemnities required by law takes upon himself tbe burden of showing that tbe officer transcended tbe powers' conferred upon him or that tbe transaction is tainted with fraud.” (United States v. Clarice, 8 Pet., 452; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet., 727; JDelassus v. United States, 9 Pet., 134; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet., 438; United States v. Peralta, 19 How., 347; Fremont v. United States, supra; United States v. Reading, 18 How., 4.)
    Tbis, too, was tbe Spanish law. (1 White, 367.)
    2. No adverse title could be acquired under tbe laws of tbe United States. (United States v. Wiggins, 14 Pet., 334; Stod-dard v. Chambers, 2 How., 318; Bissell v. Penrose, 8 id., 317; White v. Walls, 5 Martin (La.), 652; Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall., 160; MeGuirev. Tyler, 8 id., 652; Best v. Pope, 18 id., 112; Morton v. Nebraska, 21 id., 660.)
    3. A grant is conclusive evidence of legal title. (Green v. Liter, 8 Or., 230; Bagnell v. Brodericlc, 13 Pet., 436; Brush v. Ware, 15 id., 93.)
    4. Tbe statute of limitations is inapplicable. (Hosmer v. Wallace 97 U. S. R., 575; Henshaw v. Bissell, 18 Wall., 264; Astiazaran v. Santa Rita Land & Mining Co., U. S. R., MS., present term.)
    
      (a) Tbe right of tbe antecedent squatters was determined, and they were ousted under tbe act of 1870. Any claims of individuals since are not involved in tbis suit.
    
      (b) Time will not aid tbe actual occupation by tbe United States for governmental purposes. (Meigs v. McClung, 9 Or., 16; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498; Lee v. United States, 106 U. S. R., 196.)
    
      (c) Tbe United States can acquire title by three modes only, viz, by conquest, by purchase, and by condemnation for public use under tbe right of eminent domain. It can not acquire title by prescription. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
    5. Jurisdiction of this court.
    
      0 This is a suit for rent of property of which the United States has taken possession without tort and under the belief that it has title thereto. On this fact an implied contract to pay the rent arises. The jurisdiction conferred by the act of 1863 of all claims arising' upon “contracts, express or implied” is an investment of this court with all jurisdiction ex contractu as distinguished from jurisdiction ex delicto. (Langford’s Case, 101 U. S. B., 341.)
    But jurisdiction of this case is clearly given by the first line of tlie first paragraph of the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 505), viz, “Shall have jurisdiction to determine: First. All claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States.”
    When the United States takes possession of the property of a citizen, other than by tort or by condemnation under the right of eminent domain, it must be presumed to take the use merely, and is liable for “just compensation ” for the use.
    Jfr. John G. Ohaney (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Cotton) for the defendants.
    The peace of society demands a refusal of antiquated claims, where gross laches prevail or where there has been long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights. (McGuiddy V. Ware, 20 Wall’., 14; Wagner v. Baird, 7 How., 234; United States v. Moore, 12 How., 209; Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall., 87; Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U. S. B., 201; Brown v. Buena Vista Compcmy, 95 U. S. B., 157.)
    Courts will not entertain stale claims. (Grosby v. Beale (Hume v. Beale), 17 Wall., 336; Russell v. Transylvania University, 1 Wheat., 432.) Lapse of time, even less than a statute of limitations, is presumptive bar. (96 U. S. E., 611.)
    Where the agent of the original proprietor resided in the neighborhood and had knowledge of the existence of a ferry, by public statute, for thirty-eight years, it is too late for the original proprietor to interfere with the ferry privilege under claim of a prior right. (Bowman v. Walvten, 1 How., 189.) Long acquiescence and laches can be excused only by showing some actual bindrauce or impediment caused by tbe fraud or concealment of tbe opposite party. (Wagner v. Baird and Badger v. Badger, supra.)
    Tbe statutes of limitations are hereby especially invoked. There is no place where they can be of more righteous use* Tbe statute runs against a title as well as a 4‘suit.”
    Where adverse possession has continued for twenty years or more, it constitutes a complete bar in equity wherever an ejectment would be barred if the plaintiff possessed a legal title. (Mmendorfv. Taylor, 10 Wheat., 152; Hunt v. WicMiffe, 2 Pet., 201; Peyton v. 8tith, 5 Pet., 485; Harpending v. Dutch, Church, 16 Pet., 455; Bowman v. Wathen, 1 How., 189; Moore v. Greene, 19 How., 69; Goddenv. Kimmell 99 U. S. B., 201; Ware v. Galveston Go., Ill U. S. B., 170; Banlc of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet., 32; Lewis v. Marshall, 5 Pet., 470.)
    A statute of limitations is the law of a forum and operates upon all who submit themselves to its jurisdiction. (MeCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet., 219-,McMmoylev. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How., 407; Walsh v. Mayer, 111 U. S. B., 31.)
    Statutes of limitations are statutes of “repose.” (Leffmgwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599.)
    They are entitled to the same respect as ■ other statutes. (Clementson v. Williams, 8 Cranch, 72; United States v. Wilder, 13 Wall., 254.)
    The acts of .limitation of the States form a rule of decision for the courts of the United States. Boss v. Duval, 13 Pet., 45 ; Banlc of Alabama v. Dalton, 9 How., 522; Bacon, v. Howard, 20 How., 22; Amy v. Dubuqtie, 98 U. S. B., 470.)
    The claimant, however, does not regard the statute of limitation with any concern. He ignores all our laws save those that give him a right to sue for use and occupation. He sues for rents and profits for the last six years, and is within the limitations of the statute. It is true that unless he possesses title the rents are not due him. He therefore files a deed from the Spanish Government, executed while that power owned Louisiana and had jurisdiction over that domain. His position is, in short, that he can support his action by a grant dated 1788, which was never delivered nor accepted, possession of the premises under the grant never taken, adverse interests asserted with the knowledge of the ancestor and his posterity for a full century, legal notice of the existence of such grant never given the United. States, although the Government notoriously claimed the premises embraced within the grant, under the treaty of purchase (1803), and the United States can not urge laches, limitations, or objections, because his grant is from a power which gives the grant a rank above and beyond our Constitution and laws.
    He has brought a suit for rents an d profits. This presupposes that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the claimant and the defendant. Such relation, however, never did exist and does not now. Unless this relationship does exist he can not maintain his action.
    The possession of the United States has always been as the rightful possessor under the treaty of France of 1803. Its possession has been and is now actual, and under a different and adverse title to that of the claimant. Its possession is at least under a colorable right. (Wrightv.Mattison,18How.,50.)
    
    An action for use and occupation will not lie where possession is under a different or adverse title. (Lloyd v. Sough, 1 How., 153.
   Weldon, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In the petition it is averred that the decedent departed this life in the year 1821; that on the 12th day of August, 1891, the claimant was appointed administrator de bonis non of the estate of said decedent; that he was born in France in the year 1740; that he left France in 1763; and reached New Orleans in the year 1779; that he joined the volunteers when the Spaniards took possession of Florida and Pensacola, and in the year 1783 was appointed by the King of Spain commandant of the army and militia assigned to duty at the post of Ouachita, La., under the orders of Don Estovan Miro, governor general of the province of Louisiana; that for his service general grants of land.were made to him by said Miro; that among other grants is one dated February 22,1788, of the description, metes and bounds as follows:

“A tract of land of one square league situated in the district of Arcansas on the north side of the river Oacheta, at about two leagues and a half distant from the said river Oacheta, and understanding that this land is to be measured so as to include the site or locality known by the name of Hot Waters, as is besides expressed by the figurative plan and certificate of the said surveyor Trudeau above-named, and, recognizing this mode of measurement, we approve these surveys.”

It is alleged that- said grant was made after a preliminary survey, and a certificate of possession was issued by tlie surveyor of tlie Province of Louisiana; tliat said decedent leased tlie “Hot Waters,” as tbey were afterward called, to Stephen P. Wilson in the 'year 1819; that the papers were misplaced and liave only been recovered within the last few years; that the said decedent sold and conveyed said land to one Narcisso Bourgeat, and the deed was recorded in 1833; that said Bour-geat retroceded said land to'said decedent, and said deed of retrocession was filed for record at Point Coupee on July 17, 1866. The petition then alleges the legal effect of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, concluded in the year 1800 between Spain and France and the treaty of Paris of April 30, 1803, between France and the United States; that in the year 1832, Congress passed an act (4 Stat. L. 506) reserving four sections of land embracing the Hot Springs; that the act of June 11,1870 (16 Stat. L.,. 149), and the judgment of the Court of Claims did not affect the title and rights of claimant, because said act did not attempt to give said court jurisdiction of the rights of petitioner ; that the defendants are in possession of a considerable portion ofthe property of petitioner, to wit, what is now known as “Hot Springs reservation,” embracing thereon the hospital of the “Army and Navy Hospital'”; that to that possession claimant does not object; that the defendants have leased the use of the waters to sundry persons contrary to the rights of the petitioner; that for the amount realized by defendants as rent for said waters petitioner brings suit; and that for sis years past the Government has realized the sum of $36,726.60 as rents, and for that amount claimant prays judgment.

The findings of fact may be briefly stated as follows:

The decedent Don Juan Filhiol departed this life in 1821; claimant was appointed administrator as alleged in said petition; said decedent was a native of France, and came to New Orleans in 1779, joined the volunteers when Spain took possession of Florida and Pensacola, in 1783 was appointed by the King of Spain commandant of the army and militia assigned to duty at the Post of Ouachita under the orders of Don Esto-van Miro, governor-general of the Province of Lousiana; that he received from said Miro the grant or instrument in writing described as Exhibit B to said petition, which purports to be a grant of the land in controversy; that the land and particular surveyor of the Province of Louisiana gave to said decedent the certificate or instrument described in Exhibit D to said petition (which is claimed by petitioner as having the effect of putting said decedent in the actual possession of the land in suit); that in the year 1802 the said decedent sold to his son-in-law and in 1806 received from him a deed of retrocession as shown in Exhibit H of the petition. Aside from the legal effect of what might be presumed from the certificate of the surveyor, it does not appear that the said decedent of any of his heirs, tenants or assigns ever had actual possession of the land described in the grant from Miro to the said decedent.

The said decedent claimed said land, and after his death his heirs continued to claim title to it, until the bringing of this suit by claimant. In the year 1828 an agent of the heirs commenced suit in the Superior Court of the Territory of Arkansas in his own name. It does not appear that he had any title to the land, or any connection with the interest of the heirs, except that of agent. The suit was instituted under the act of 1824, and was dismissed by the court because of the failure of the plaintiff to file the grant under which he claimed. Between said time and 1841 the heirs, for the purpose of prosecuting their rights, placed the papers in relation to their claim in the hands of Itezin P. Bowie, who was a land agent, and who died in the year 1841. Shortly after his death search was made for the papers belonging to the heirs of said Filhiol, but they could not be found. About the year 1883 another search was instituted, which resulted in finding, among the effects of said Bowie, the papers' -upon which this suit is brought, and which appear at length in the pleadings and findings. In the year 1869-’70 the heirs of decedent caused to be introduced into the House of'Representatives a bill to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to determine their right to the land in dispute; the bill failed to become a law. The parties in interest failed to assert any right under the provisions of the act of 1870 (16 Stat. L., 14) or the act of 1877, (19 Stat. L., 277) and were not parties to the judicial proceedings under said statutes.

The claimant is the duly appointed administrator of the estate of Don Juan Filhiol by the District Court of the parish of Ouachita.

At the threshold of our inquiry we are confronted by three defenses affecting the jurisdiction of the court: First, the act of 1870 (16 Stat. L., 14), entitled “An act in relation to the Hot Spring’s reservation in Arkansas. ” The first section of said act is as' follows:

“ That any person claiming title, either legal or equitable, to the whole or any part of the four sections of land constituting what is known as the Hot Springs reservation in Hot Springs County, in the State of Arkansas, may institute against the United States in the Court of Claims, and prosecute to final decision, any suit that may be necessary to settle the same: Provided, That no such suits shall be brought at any time after the expiration of ninety days from the passage of this act, and all claims to any part of said reservation upon which suit shall not be brought under the provisions of this act within that time shall be forever barred ”.

Second. The findings show, that the defendants took possession of the land in controversy claiming the right of ownership, and have continuously held it, claiming it as the property of the Government, and that, therefore, if the United States had no title to, or right justifying possession, it was a wrong upon the part of the defendants; and any proceeding founded upon that taking, or incident to it, is an action sounding in tort, within the meaning of the act entitled “An act to provide for the bringing of suits against the Government of the United States.” (1 Sup. to R. S., 2d ed. p. 559; 24 Stat. L., p. 505.)

Third. As the alleged right to the rent did not accrue during the lifetime of said decedent, no power inheres to his administrator to maintain a suit for rent; but if any such right exists, it is in the heirs of said decedent and not in his administrator.

These defenses go to the right of the claimant to maintain this action, because of the want of jurisdiction in the court as to the subject-matter, and the disability of the claimant as administrator. If any of these defenses is well taken, it is decisive of the rights of claimant and the petition must be dismissed.

The act of 1870 was passed for the ■ purpose of settling the rights of the Government in and to the reservation of Hot Springs, and to accomplish the purpose of a complete settle-meat tbe act provided that every person claiming title, either legal or equitable, should within a certain time institute proceedings for the purpose of settling and adjusting by judicial determination such claim. The words “legal or equitable” are of the broadest import in the law, and it is impossible to conceive of an interest having the semblance of a claim which is not embraced and comprehended in the words “legal or equitable.” The court had complete power to adjudicate and determine a claim, whether it was founded upon a legal estate in the lands, such as a court of law could recognize, or upon an equitable estate, such as would require the more subtle and effective powers of a court of chancery. If a title is not perfect, absolute, and unconditional, having incident to it all the requirements of a legal estate, it must necessarily fall within the broad signification of the term equitable estate; but if it is perfect, absolute, and unconditional, embracing a complete estate, then it is a legal title.

The statute provides that the suits should have the form of a bill in equity, thereby clothing the Court of Claims with all the powers incident to a court exercising as a joint proceeding all the powers and duties of a court of law and a court of chancery. The act in question did not lessen or increase the estate of parties claiming title either legal or equitable in the land in controversy. Such was not the purpose and intended effect of the law. The object was to create and establish a jurisdiction within which the claimants could institute proceedings against the sovereign, and, by virtue of that proceeding, settle for all time conflicting claims of all parties. Under the provisions of said statute five cases were commenced against the United States by parties claiming a title and interest in and to said reservation, which were decided adversely to the claimants, and which judgments were affirmed by the Supreme Court. (Hale et al. v. U. S., 10 C. Cls. R., 289; 92 U. S. R., 698.)

At the time of the passage of this act, to wit, on June' 11, 1870, Congress was not in ignorance of the claim of the Filhiol heirs, as the findings show, that prior to the passage of the act, there had been introduced into the House of Bepresenta-tives a bill to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Claims, to settle and determine the rights of claimant to one square league of land, in connection with persons who had located on said lands in derogation of the act of Congress. In reference to the condition of tbe reservation as to conflicting claims and torts, we quote what the Supreme Court say in the opinion affirming the judgment of this court.

“The title to a well-known watering place in the State of Arkansas, called the Hot .Springs, now located in Hot Springs County, has been contested by a number of claimants for nearly half a century. * * *
“ In order to settle, if possible, the controversies which existed, and which seemed interminable, none of the parties having any regular Government title, and it being doubtful whether any of them were entitled thereto, Congress, on the 31st day of May, 1870, passed the following act:” (U. S. E., 698.)

It is most ably argued, both in oral statement and by printed briefs, that the title of Filhiol being, as it is claimed, a perfect grant from the Spanish Government was not intended to be embraced in the judicial in’oceeding authorized and contemplated by the act of 1870. It is true, as a constitutional and legal proposition, that Congress can not affect the title and ownership of property, so as to divest its rightful possessor, except in pursuance of the power of eminent domain; but it is perfectly competent on the part of Congress to prescribe and determine jurisdiction in courts, especially where the Government stands in the attitude or relation of a suitor. The citizen must in cases where the Government is defendant accept the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States with all the limitations prescribed by the laws conferring or amending jurisdiction.

It is true, as a matter of fact, that all the claims filed in the Court of Claims under the act of 1870 were claims founded upon imperfect titles, the claimants having, as was alleged, an equitable interest in the land, capable of maintaining their right to have decreed and adjudicated a perfect grant; but that fact does not necessarily give construction to-the statute to the extent of denying the jurisdiction of the court, to consider and determine the validity of claims founded upon a perfect title or legal estate. Without the statute of 1870, there was no jurisdiction in the Court of Claims to entertain a suit for any claim to the Hot Springs reservation; and to hold that the jurisdiction provided for, and contemplated by the provisions of the act, was to be confined exclusively to the consideration of imperfect or equitable claims would be to bold that tbe greater and more consummate tbe right, tbe less tbe protection and remedy afforded by tbe statute. Tbe Court of Claims in tbe very able and exhaustive opinion of Judge Nott said:

“ In 1870 the Hot Springs of Arkansas bad been tbe subject of legal contention for thirty years, and every conceivable method which professional ingenuity could devise bad been resorted to to obtain, directly or indirectly, the adjudication of a court upon the rights of the parties. No one bad received a patent or pretended to have acquired tbe legal title, but each bad again and again insisted that be was tbe equitable owner of tbe property. At tbe same time tbe interposition of Congress bad been invoked for a confirmation of one or tbe other of tbe titles. With such precedent facts existing, Congress passed tbe £Act in relation to the Hot Springs reservation in Arkansas,’ June 11, 1870 (16 Stat. L. 149). It provides that ‘any person claiming title, either legal or equitable,’ may institute in this court ‘ any suit that may be necessary to settle the same;’ that such suits ‘ shall be conducted and determined according to tbe rules and principles of equity practice and jurisprudence in tbe other courts of tbe United States;’ that this court shall be ‘ invested with tbe jurisdiction and powers exercised by courts of equity so far as may be necessary to give full relief;’ that ‘separate suits asserting conflicting-rights’ ‘shall be consolidated and tried together,’tbe court being directed to ‘ determine tbe question of title’ and to grant ‘ all proper relief as between tbe respective claimants, as well as between each of them and tbe United States;’ and if tbe final decision be in favor of tbe defendants, tbe court ‘shall order such lands into tbe possession of a receiver;’ and, if its decision be in favor of a claimant, it shall ‘ proceed by proper process to put such successful claimant in possession,’ and that upon tbe filing of its decree with the Secretary of tbe Interior, be shall cause a patent to be issued to tbe party in whose favor such decree shall be rendered.” (10 C. Cls. B., 363, 364.)

Tbe statute of 1870 does not affect tbe estate of parties, neither increasing nor diminishing their extent, and tbe limitation of ninety days does not involve a forfeiture of title; but simply operates as a limitation upon tbe jurisdiction of tbe Court of Claims; a matter always within tbe power of Congress and subject to its discretion.

Tbe law intended to settle controversies as to tbe title to tbe “Hot Springs reservation” and for that purpose provided a limitation of ninety days, within which suit should be brought in tbe following words:

“Provided, That no suit shall be brought at any time after the expiration of ninety days from the passage of this act, and all claims to any part of said reservation upon which suits shall not be brought under the provisions of this act within that time shall be forever barred.”

The statute having provided that as a subject-matter the court had jurisdiction of either legal or equitable titles, if the claimant’s decedent had as insisted a perfect and complete grant in fee simple, his claim founded on such title comes within the letter of the law, and the bar of ninety days applies with the same force to it as it did to the incomplete or equitable titles litigated under said act. It is true, neither this court nor the Supreme Court mention or discuss the question of legal title in their opinions, as such titles were not in fact in that proceeding; but the clause of the statute embracing legal' titles remains intact. The bar, operating as it did on legal titles still remains in force, and no statute of our jurisdiction has removed that bar.

The act of March, 1887, entitled "An act to provide for bringing suits against the Government of the United States” was not intended to reopen for litigation cases which were expressly barred by former statutes. It may have the effect to extend the jurisdiction of this court in other directions,- but it cannot be held as repealing by implication statutes providing a bar, which by the policy of the law was to continue through all time. Eegarding the act of 1870 as sufficiently broad to include the claim of the plaintiff, we hold that the present proceeding is barred under the last clause of the first section. It is not necessary to notice the other defenses urged upon the part of the defendants. The motion to reform findings is allowed; but as the changes do not affect in the opinion of the court the judgment heretofore entered, it is unchanged.  