
    John M‘Dowall against John Beckly.
    Parol evidence teTto wltSt alter the terms °rfe'‘m™lte“ a‘
    This was an action of assumpsit, brought to re-to ver the sum of 635 dollars 75 cents, which the , • % defendant had collected, as attorney for the plaintiff Defendant acknowledged the receipt of the money; but contended that he was entitled, by contract, to retain one half of it for his fees in the case in which the money had been collected, and other cases in which he had been employed ; and that he had paid over the other half to Benjamin Saxon, Esq. pursuant to directions from the¿plaintiff; to prove that fact, Mr. Saxon himself was called. After being released by the defendant, he deposed in substance, that the plaintiff applied to him to defend an action of slander, brought against him in Greenville. That he demanded an hundred dollars as a fee: plaintiff refused to give it; but said, he would do better for him than to give him one hundred dollars. He stated, that he had commenced an action against Daniel M-Kie, in which he ought to recover a considerable sum of money, 'f hat Mr. Beckly was his attorney, and was to have one half of what should be recovered, for his trouble in attending to that and some other cases. He showed him a statement between M'-Kie and himself, in which it appeared, that the least sum which he could recover was 177 dollars 24 cents; and that he was, in fact, entitled to recover a considerable sum beyond that; and agreed to give him as a fee one half of what he should recover, whatever it might be. They at length •concluded a bargain, that Mr. Saxon should accept the one half of what should be recovered of MiKicy provided it did not fall short of fifty dollars ; if it did, M'Doioall was to make it up to that amount. That the sum of 635 dollars 75 cents, had been recovered; one half of which he had received. Mr. Saxon produced a written contract, under the hand of M-Dowall, in the words following:
    “ I agree to give B. H. Saxon one half of the within, amounting to the sum of 88 dollars 71 cents, if recovered of Daniel M‘Kie; if not, then I promise to pay him 50 dollars, as a fee for defending me in an action of slander, commenced by John H. Harrison, in Greenville District.
    (Signed) JOHN M‘DOWALL.”
    This was written on the back of the above-mentioned statement of accounts between him and M^f&e.
    
    The cause was tried at Abbeville, Spring Term, 1816, before Mr. Justice CqIcocJc, when the J ury found a verdict for the defendant.
    A motion was now made for a new trial, on the ground, that parol evidence ought not to have been permitted to contradict the written agreement between the plaintiff and Mr. Saxon.
    
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Nott.

The rule of law is, that “ parol evidence cannot be admitted to contradict, add to, or vary the terms of a will, deed, or other written instrument.” (Phillips on Evidence, 423.) And Lord Coke observes, “ it would be inconvenient that matters in writing, made by advice and on consideration, and which finally import the certain truth, and the agreement of the parties, should be controlled by an averment of parties, to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory; and it would be dangerous to purchasers, and all others in such cases, if such nude averments against matter in writing, should be admitted.” The case under consideration comes directly within the rule. Here is a clear, explicit, and unequivocal written agreement to pay certain sums of money depending on-contingencies, which are also expressly stipulated. The verbal evidence went to prove a different contract. In the language of Lord Ellenborough, I might say, “ If the parol evidence were admissible in this case, in what instance might not a party by parol testimony, superadd any term to a written agreement, which would be setting aside all written contracts, and making them of no effect ?” It is not only a sound and salutary rule of law, but it is equally a rule of common sense, that written contracts should not be controlled by oral testimony. The various conceptions of different minds on the same subject, the " 7 liability of all persons to forgetfulness, the influence passion, prejudice, and interest, renders contracts, at all times, uncertain. But litera scripta manet. It cannot change with times, or circumstances; and when a contract is reduced to writing, the law presumes that the writing contains the whole agreement. The testimony of the witness, in this case, ought not to have been admitted, and, therefore, a new trial must be granted. I would observe, further, that my brethren all concur in opinion with me, that this was an unreasonable demand ; and taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, it is a contract of such a nature as is not to be highly favoured by the Court. However, as it is to go back for another trial, I will leave the merits of the case for further investigation.

Cheves, Johnson, and Gantt,, J. concurred.

Colcock, J. dissented.

Grimké, J. was absent.  