
    [741 NYS2d 384]
    Knute Numme, Appellant, v Saundra Lemon, Respondent.
    Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department,
    February 28, 2002
    
      APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
    
      Ewin M. Blant, Port Chester, for appellant. Westchester/ Putnam Legal Services, White Plains (Barbara Finkelstein, Judith B. Studebaker and Rhona Bork of counsel), for respondent.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

Order unanimously affirmed without costs.

This holdover proceeding involves a section 8 lease agreement entered into by the parties in December 1994. Landlord contends that he terminated the section 8 lease in 1998 by refusing to sign a renewal lease, tenant then became a month-to-month tenant, and he served her with a 30-day notice to vacate in April 2000.

When the parties first entered into the lease in 1994, section 8 tenants had a statutory entitlement to continued occupancy absent good cause for eviction (see, 42 USC § 1437f [d] [1] [B] [as amended by Pub L 97-35, § 326 (e) (1981), 95 US Stat 357]; Mitchell v United States Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 569 F Supp 701; see, Swann v Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F2d 1342). In 1996, the automatic renewal provision was changed so that, pursuant to 42 USC § 1437f (d) (1) (B) (ii) (as amended by Pub L 104-134, § 101 [e] [1996], 110 US Stat 1321, and Pub L 105-276, § 549 [a] [2] [A] [1998], 112 US Stat 2461), “during the term of the lease, the owner shall not terminate the tenancy except * * * for other good cause” (emphasis added). This change became permanent in 1998. However, there is no indication that it was intended to be applied retroactively to existing section 8 leases containing automatic renewal provisions.

Since the lease term automatically renewed, it did not convert into a month-to-month tenancy upon landlord’s refusal to sign a renewal lease. The only way landlord could have terminated the lease was for good cause shown pursuant to paragraph H of the lease addendum, which he failed to do. Moreover, since a section 8 tenancy can only be terminated upon specified grounds, landlord was required to plead the basis for his termination of the section 8 tenancy (see, Sanchez v Vierra, NYLJ, Nov. 12, 1997, at 29, col 4 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). In this case, neither the petition nor the 30-day notice states the basis for landlord’s termination of the section 8 tenancy. Accordingly, the petition was properly dismissed.

Floyd, P.J., Doyle and Colabella, JJ., concur.  