
    Gregory GARMONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEVADA SUPREME COURT; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 17-15715
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 18, 2017 
    
    Filed February 23, 2018
    
      Gregory Garmong, Pro Se
    Brandon R. Price, Attorney, AGNV— Office of the Nevada Attorney General (Reno), Reno, NY, for Defendants-Appel-lees
    Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. 
        See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Garmong's request for oral argument, set forth in the reply brief, is denied.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Gregory Garmong appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising from state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Garmong’s action as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Garmong’s action is a “de facto appeal” of prior state court judgments, and raises claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with those judgments. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claim that was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feld-man doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because alleged legal injuries arose from the “state court’s purportedly erroneous judgment” and the relief sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     