
    William Shaw against Executors of Samuel Kelly.
    oc^óucfoffi? c¡Ík°fnobcause setting aside “nvardára8nt
    This was a rule to show cause why the judgment in the above case should not be set aside for irregularity. The plaintiff had sued out a scire facias to revive a judgment previously obtained. The cause was referred to arbitrators, who gave an award for the defendant, with costs, without a notice to the plaintiff, to attend before the Clerk at the taxing of costs. On this ground it was contended, the rule should be made absolute for setting aside the judgment. Execution had issued; and a tract of land belonging to the plaintiff against whom judgment had been entered up as aforesaid, had been sold. The presiding Judge discharged the rule without hearing the merits of the case, because of the length of time which had elapsed between the rendition of the judgment, and the application for this rule. It has not been made to appear to this Court what length of time had elapsed between the entering up of judgment and the application for this rule.
    The case was brought before Mr. Justice Bay, at Newberry, in March Term, 1816. This is a motion to reverse the decision of the District Court, and to make the rule absolute.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Cheves.

There is no doubt that there is a period at which the Court will quiet judgments, and the °f those claiming under them. But no time has hitherto been fixed; and the present case, from the uncertainty when the judgment was entered up, does not present a case in which it is fit to determine this point. The only question then before the Court is, whether the entering up of judgment, without giving notice to the opposite party to attend at the taxing of costs, is of itself cause for setting aside the judgment? and the Court are unanimously of opinion it is not. If it were, nine-tenths, and probably more, of the judgments in the state, might be set aside.. If it were otherwise doubtful, which the Court does not mean to say, the uniform practice, on such a point, ought to establish the law of the case. This motion must, therefore, be refused..

Grimké, Colcock, JVott, and Johnson, J. concurred.  