
    The Lessee of Andrew Le Grange v. Isabella Ward et al.
    The probate of a will, taken witbin tbe county, at another place than the county seat, by the associate judge, is competent evidence to establish the will.
    The solemn adjudications of courts having jurisdiction over the subject mat. ter, are not void, but valid until reversed.
    This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Ashtabula county, to reverse a judgment in ejectment, at the August term, 1841.
    On the trial, a bill of exceptions was taken to the opinion of the court, from which it appears the cause was submitted to the court for trial, without the intervention of a jury, and that *the plaintiff, having proved that Benjamin Morse died lawfully seized of the premises; that the lessor of the plaintiff was one of his heirs, and entitled to one-fifth of tbe land of which he died seized, rested his case.
    The defendants then offered evidence of the will of Benjamin Morse, under which the defendants claimed title, and the probate thereof. The caption of the record of probate reads as follows: “ Special Court, Harpersfield, Tuesday, March 25,1813. Estate of Benjamin Morse, Esq., deceased. At a special court of common pleas-for the county of Ashtabula, held at the house of Marian Morse, widow of the late Benj. Morse, Esq., deceased, and at the particular request of James Harper, James A. Harper, and the said Marian Morse, widow, as aforesaid, the widow being an executrix of the last will and testament of the said Benjamin, and unable to attend at the seat of justice in said county, the request was made and granted by thecourt. Present: the Honorable Aaron Wheeler, Solomon Griswold, and Ebénezer Hewins, Esqs., associate judges.”'
    The evidence was objected to, but admitted by the court, and exception taken.
    The only special error assigned is, the permitting said paper writing, purporting to be a record of certain proceedings had in the court of common pleas, to go in evidence; Harpersfield not being the seat of justice of Ashtabula county, at the time the associate judges convened there and received the will to probate.
    
      Giddings & Chaeeee, for plaintiff:
    The jurisdiction of all probate and testamentary matters is vested in the court of common pleas. Constitution of Ohio, sec. 5, art. 3.
    If the associate judges had the power to change the place of holding the court of common pleas, they would have equal power to change the time.
    *The law then authorizing a special session of the court of common pleas, for probate matters, was the same as the law now in force.
    The law could give to the judges no power to take the probate of will, etc., except as a court of common pleas. It is therefore believed when the judges met at Harpersfield, they were no court of common pleas, and, of course, their acts were void.
    Wade & Rannet, for defendants:
    If the court should have been held at the county seat by law, still having jurisdiction over the subject matter, their proceedings can not be impeached collaterally; for, however irregular, the solemn judgment of a competent and authorized tribunal can not be treated as a nullity; and it can only be reinvestigated by writ of error or certiorari. Wier v. Zane, 3 Ohio, 306; Goodrich v. Jenkins, Wright, 349; 6 Ohio, 43; Buel v. Cross, 4 Ohio, 327; Lessee of Parker v. Miller, 9 Ohio, 108; Lessee of Mitchell v. Eyster, 7 Ohio, 257.
    The law in force at that time did not provide any place in the county where the courts should be held for any purpose. 2 Chase’s L. 797.
    The law under which this court was held, is found in section 5 of the supplementary act for proving wills, etc., passed February 8, 1812. 2 Chase’s L. 770. It authorizes any three of the judges * to convene,” for the purpose of granting letters of administration, etc., without any directions or limitations as to place. Now, they had jurisdiction throughout the county, and might, of course, convene at any place within their jurisdiction. If they went beyond its bounds, their acts would be coram nonjudice; but, while acting within it, they are not only valid, but perfectly regular. And this was the construction put on the law by the courts themselves at that time; for numerous instances of the kind occurred in this and the neighboring counties. Such a construction as is contended * for by the plaintiff in error would invalidate a great number of titles.
   Wood, J.

The seat of justice, as fixed by law, for Ashtabula county, when probate of the will was taken, was at Jefferson ; and the question raised by the plaintiff in error is, whether the court of common pleas, or the associate judges thereof, had power to take the probate of a will at any other place than the county seat. It is contended, by the plaintiff in error, they had not; and, therefore, their proceedings in this case are void. If so, it follows that the court erred in admitting the probate in evidence, and the judgment must be reversed. Let us inquire, then, what the law was at the date of this probate.

The act of February 8, 1812 (2 Chase’s L. 770), provides as follows : “ That it shall, at all times hereafter, be lawful for the judges of the court of common pleas, or any three of them, when required, to convene for the purpose of granting letters of administration, taking probate of wills, or for transacting any other necessary business relative to the settlement of estates of deceased persons.” This act was in force in 1813, when this probate was had, and it will be observed that it is silent as to the place where the court or associate judges shall assemble for the transaction of probate or testamentary business ; and, if there was any positive statute, then or now, requiring the court of common pleas to convene at the county seat, I have not been able to find it; it has been overlooked after diligent inquiry.

The county seat may have been a convenient place ; but whether the only place where the court could legally have held its sessions, under all possible exigencies, is, at most, doubtful. The associate judges are limited in their jurisdiction only by the county lines, and while they keep within them, there can be no substantial objection to their taking probate of a will at any place, and it is a part of the history of that section of the country that there are several others like the case at bar.

But suppose we are wrong in this, and that the judges were required by law to do all official business at the county seat, *it by no means follows that the acts of the court, or of the associate judges, are void.

If a court have jurisdiction over the subject matter, its solemn, acts and adjudications, although erroneous, are not void. They are valid until reversed. Weir v. Zanc, 3 Ohio, 306. And even the proceedings of mere judges de facto have repeatedly been sustained both in England and the United States. We are of the opinion, there was nothing erroneous in receiving the record of the probate court in evidence, and that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ashtabula county ought to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  