
    James H. Gibbs v. W. R. Ross, Adm’r, &c.
    Sale or Eeal Estate. Rent. When it passes by the sale. The sale of land passes the right to the rents that subsequently become due as incident to the reversion, but not the rents then in arrear. Kent is not due, where the contract for renting is by the year, until the end of the year, and the rent is not in arrear until due. Eent, therefore, not due at the time of the sale, passes with the reversion, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary, in the contract.
    ERQM WEAKLEY.
    Yerdict and judgment for the plaintiff, at the October Term, 1858. Fitzgerald, J., presiding. The defendant appealed.
    ROGERS and Somers, for the plaintiff in error.
    The charge of the Court is manifestly erroneous in more than one particular. It is nearly all wrong.
    An estate for years is a contract for the possession of land for some determinate period, and the lessee is tenant for years, although the lease he for less than a year. 2 Bh, C., 99.
    A reversion is an estate left in the grantor, after a particular estate, either for life or years, is granted by him. 2 Bl. 0., 175; 4 Kent C., 353.
    Then Gibbs was tenant for years of the land, and the intestate, Parnetta Thompson and her brothers and sisters, were reversioners.
    
      Rent is one of the incidents to a reversion, and passes bj a general grant of the same to the grantee. It may be reserved by special words. 2 Bl. C., 176, margin; 4 Kent 0., 356. Rent not due is an" incorporeal hereditament, and goes to the heir of the landlord in case of his death. 3 K. C, 464; 1 Hilliard’s’ Abridgement, 155.
    But in this ease the rent must necessarily have passed to Gibbs when he purchased the land and became the owner of the reversion, from the way in which it was to be paid. Gibbs was tenant for years, and was to pay the rent in improvements upon the place rented, and before the expiration of the time within which he was allowed to make the improvements, he buys the reversion, and gets an absolute conveyance. Of course his particular estate was t merged when he became owner of the reversion. And it was surely a matter of no interest to the intestate, Parnetta Thompson and her brothers and sisters, whether Gibbs improved the place after they had sold it to him. They had not the right to complain if he did not' improve it; and it was no concern of- theirs if he did.
    This case is nothing more nor less than a suit against Gibbs for an alleged failure to improve his own property. His purchase of the reversion could not have the effect to abrogate the contract for the rent of the place, so far as to change the terms relative to the way m which Gibbs had the -right to pay the rent. He was not thereby deprived of his right to pay the rent in improvements, if bound to pay at all. And the proof is clear that he did make improvements worth as much or more than the rent of the place within the time for which, according to the plaintiff’s proof, he had rented it. This was a perfect compliance with the contract of rent, which the plaintiff below insists' was made.
    Cardwell and Roulston, for the defendant in error.
   CarutiieRS, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Parnotta Thompson, the intestate of Ross, rented a tract of land to Gibbs,' in March, 1855, for that and the year 1856. The rent of the first year was to be paid in improvements, as the weight of the evidence shows. Before the expiration of that year, Viz: in October or November, 1855, Gibbs became owner 'of the land by purchase from said Parnetta Thompson and her sisters by deed. There was no reservation of rent or any other stipulation in relation to it, but the sale was general, without reference in any way to the pending contract of renting. Some improvements were made by-Gibbs, but mostly after the date of his purchase.

This suit is instituted upon this state of facts to recover the’ rent of 1855. The charge to the jury was—

“That the rent in the- case did not'pass as an incident to the reversion when defendant purchased the land; that if the purchase had been -made soon after, or in a few days - after the contract for renting, then the rent would have passed as an incident; but in this case the rent was nearly due when the purchase was made, and therefore did not pass.”

We apprehend his Honor misconstrued the law in the distinction taken by him as to the importance given to the time of the year at which the reversion was purchased from the lessor. Kent says a sale “ passes the right to the rents that subsequently become due as incident to the reversion, but not the rents then in arrear.” 4 Kent, 354. Rent is that which is to be paid for the use of the land, whether in money, labor, or other thing agreed upon. (It is not due until the year is out, where the renting is by the year. The rent is not in arrear ” until after it is due. If not, it passes with the sale of the reversion without regard to the time of the year it was made, unless there had been some stipulation to the contrary.

We think the finding was contrary to the law as charged on another question. The Court charged that if the contract was that the rent of 1855 was to be paid in improvements, there could be no recovery in this action. That is so clearly established that it may be said there is no proof to the contrary, and the verdict should have been for the defendant on that ground. The supposed promises of the defendant to pay something, after the year had passed, were not such as to bind him, if any were made. What was said on that subject was in view of a compromise, and if not, was void for want of consideration. The recovery was small — only $19— but the law should be correctly administered without regard to amounts.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial granted.  