
    THOMAS CROFT vs. BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY.
    At Law.
    No. 10789.
    I. Where a through-line for transportation of passengers and freight is established by the owners of different railroads, the first carrier who receives fare for the whole route, and gives a through-check for baggage, becomes liable for any loss or injury, not only on its own line, but on any other road in the connecting line throughout the entire distance.
    II. Where three companies constitute a through-line, and the fare received for through-tickets is accounted for by the first company to the other companies, according to a tariff established by each company for itself, and there is no division of profits or losses, such an arrangement is not a partnership involving joint liability.
    III. No other company can be sued for a loss unless such occurred on its own line.
    STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
    This is an action for damages against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company as a common carrier of goods for hire. The facts appearing from the bill of exceptions are? that the plaintiff purchased an emigrant through-ticket from New York to the city of Washington, and received through-checks for her baggage; that she procured all her baggage upon reaching Washington, with the exception of the piece represented by a check introduced in evidence, and which has never been delivered to her.
    The three roads which constitute the throngk-line, are the Camden and Amboy, the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Companies, and the fare received for through-tickets is accounted for by the first company to the other companies according to their established rates, but there is no division of losses.
    The defendant owns and operates the railroad extending from Baltimore to the city of Washington, and by the arrangement between said companies the emigrant-baggage is transferred by the Philadelphia and Wilmington to the Baltimore and Ohio Company at their station in the city of Baltimore, and there receipted for by defendant’s agent; that defendant had no baggage-agent at New York; and that in point of fact the baggage in question was not received or receipted for by defendant’s agent in the month of April, 1870, in the city of Baltimore, or elsewhere. Whereupon the defendant’s counsel prayed the court, if the jury believed that there was such an arrangement as has been stated between the three companies, then the plaintiff was not entitled to recover without showing the receipt of the missing baggage by the agent of the defendant, which the court refused; and this constitutes the. first exception, and is the only one necessary to mention in this statement.
    W. A. Cook and D. E. Cahill for plaintiff.
    
      Walter S. Cox and James A. Buchanan, for defendant, assigned the following reasons for reversing the judgment:
    1st. Because the court below erred in overruling the first prayer of the defendant in the court below, as said prayer was, and is, a correct statement of the law applicable to the state of facts proved on the trial of the case at bar in the court below, and, therefore, it should have been granted. In support of this proposition the counsel for the appellant cité and rely upon the following authorities:
    2 Redfield on Railways, 106, sec. 102, and cases cited in notes. McCann vs. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 20 Maryland Reports, 202, 208, 209, and 211. Nutting vs. Connecticut River Railway Company, 1 Gray’s Report, 502. Parsons’s Mercantile Law, 216, 217, note 2. Pierce on American Railroad Law, 143. Elmore vs. Naugatuck Railroad Co., 23 Connecticut, 457. Ellsworth vs. Tait, 26 Alabama Reports, 733. New York and New Haven Railroad Company vs. Hood, 22 Connecticut Reports, 1. Straiton vs. New York and New Haven Railroad Company, 2d E. D. Smith’s (New York Court of Common Pleas) Reports, 184, pp. 187, 188. Briggs vs. Vanderbilt, 19 Barbour, 222. 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, page 205, sections 210, 213. Sanderson vs. Lamber
      
      ton, 6 Birney’s (Pa.) Reports, 129. 2 Redfield’s Railroad Law, 227 and 229.
    And it appears from a.recent case that the receiving carrier is bound to ship the goods through to their destination, and is liable for any loss which occurs on any part of the connecting line. Nashua Lock Company vs. Worcester and Nashua Railway Company, 48 New Hampshire Reports, 339; and reported also in 2 Redfield’s American Railway Cases, 290. This case was decided in 1871; and it was further held in this case that the receipt of the goods, and the delivery thereof by the last carrier, and the payment of the charges of its predecessors, do not render it liable for damages which occurred, before the goods came on its line. (See same case, at page 305 of 2 Redfield's Railway Cases.)
   Mr. Justice Mac Arthur

delivered the opinion of the court:

Upon the facts stated it is quite clear that the defendant has been guilty of no negligence. The first carrier took the fare for the entire route, and gave a through check for the plaintiffs trunk, and that company is undoubtedly liable for its transportation through to Washington. It is now very well settled that, where a continuous line for transportation of passengers and freight is established by the owners of different railroads, the first carrier who receives fare for the whole route, and gives a through check for baggage, becomes liable for any loss or injury, not only on its own line, but on any other road in the connecting line throughout the whole distance. Central Railroad vs. Copeland, 24 Ill., 332; Lock Company vs. Nashua Railroad, 48 N. H., 330; S. C., 2 Redf Railway Cases, 290; Redf. Railway, 109, where the authorities on this point are reviewed.

The contract of the first company is to transport the pas. senger and his baggage to their destination without injury and without delay, and this rule meets public convenience by giving a certain remedy for any loss happening on any portion of the through line.

An arrangement between the companies, such as is disclosed by the testimony, may resemble, but it certainly does not constitute, a partnership. Bach company in the connection receives its portion of the fare, according to a tariff established and regulated by its own will, and with regard to which the other companies are not consulted. They divide neither profits nor losses, but each receives its own fare through the agency of the first company. It would seem unreasonable to hold them responsible upon a principle of joint liability for any loss not occurring on their own road, except the company with which the contract was made. The trunk said to be lost in this case never came into the possession of the defendant’s agents to be transported, and was in fact lost on another portion of the line. The instruction, therefore, asked by defendant’s counsel was improperly refused. The judgment must be set aside, and a new trial ordered.  