
    Barney vs. Patterson’s Lessee.
    , Appeal from Baltimore county court. Ejectment, for a lot -of ground in the city of Baltimore. PJéa, non cul.
    
    1. At the trial the plaintiff, (now appellee,) having deduced a title to the lot in dispute down to Jiqidla Brown, gave in evidence, that Brown, being- largely indebted to tlie United States, had removed from this state, (where lie had before resided,) sometime in the year 1802, .and had for several years last past resided in some part of Europe,, and that the United States caused and procured process of attachment to be laid upon said lot, a? the right and property of said Brown, and certain proceedings and judgment thereon to be had in the circuit court of the United States for the Maryland District, and also a fieri facias to be issued from said court on that judgment, and levied \:pcm said lot. A record of this attachment, proceedings, judgment and fieri facias, the plaintiff offered in evidence. By the record it appeared, that an action on the case was brought in the circuit court of the U. 3. for the fourth circuit in and for the District of Maryland, by the United Si-ates against Brown, on tho £lih of September 1816, and the writ of capias ad respondendum, which then issued returnable on the rth of November then next, was returned ñon est‘, that an atlas writ of capias ad respondendum was issued on the 17th of March 1817, returnable on the lot of May following. On that day the last mentioned writ was also returned non est, and a declaration in the usual form was then filed on a bill of exchange, dated at Baltimore oil the £2d of December 1801, drawn by Brown on Messrs. Fan Staphorst & Cd. at Amsterdam, for 60,000 guilders, Holland currency, payable 60 days after sight to the order of James Clarke. The bill was endorsed by Clarke, payable to Brown and Ilaekemaa, or order, and by them endorsed to B. 0,.vine's, or order, who endorsed it to T„ Tucker, treasurer of the United States, and agent of tho U. 8. and to and for the use of the O. 8. The bill not being accepted was, on tbe 16th of March 1802, protested for nonacccptance and not being paid, on the U)th of May 1802, was protested for nonpayment. The United States filed in court the bill of exchange, and protest thereof for nauacceptance; and on the prayer for a writ of attachment against the lands, &c. of Brown, according to the act of assembly of this state, &c. to attach for them to the value of their damages and costsj and it appearing to-the court, that the United Slates had complied with the law as alleged, and having made proof to the court of their damages to the amount of 858,291 71, a writ of attachment was awarded against the lauds, &c. of Brown, in the usual manner.. (2 Harr. Eni. 78.) On the 2d of April 1810, a writ of attachment against the lands, &c. of Brown, was issued in ihe usual form of an attachment on judgment after two non esis, wdíh aclause of scire facias, &c. (d, Harr. Ent. 612,) returnable on the 1st day of May ensuing. On that day the marshal of tho district ¡nade this return of the attachment, viz, 4‘4th April 1818, attached and appraised as per schedule.” The schedule stated that the lands and tenements of Brown had been seized and taken by the marshal by virtue of tho writ of attachment, and being an-praised by four appraisers, &c. were as follows, viz. “A lot. on SSarleet Street in tbe city of Baltimore, fronting on said street about 66 feet; and about 166 feet deep to Cow-pen Alley, having á three story brick house, and a two story frame store thereon, vizi 66 feet front, estimated at 8300 per foot, 819,800.” Then follow other lots and improvements, with their value. This appraisement was signed and sealed by the appraisers. Brown, although solemnly called, did not appear, and on the prayer of the United Stales the lot and promises above described were condemned to satisfy the United States the damages and costs aforeóaid, security being given in the usual manner. {Harr. Enf. 03.) Upon this judgment of condemnation a writ of fieri facias issued on thé, 19th of May 1818, directed to, and, commanding the marshal oí thé district, that of the lands and tenements above described and condemned, he should cause ip be ¡nade and levied the damages and costs aforesaid, to render to the United Státes, &c. on the Tth of November then next. At tbe return day the marshal made this return of the writ of fieri faciass “I hereby certify to ihe Circuit Court within mentioned, that by virtue of the within writ to me directed, I have caused to be made* of the lands and tenemerits of the within named Aguila Brown, the sum of gl6,104 84, currerit money, which I have here ready to render to tlie within named United Slates, in part of the- damages, costs arid charges, iri the said within writ specified. So ansivers,” &c. The plaintiff further gave iri evidence; that Paul Bentalou, esquire, the marshal of said District of Maryland, to whom said writ of fieri fdcias was directed, after having levied the same upon the sail! premises, gave this notice by advertisement of the sale of said premises: li Marshal’s sale. By virtue and in pursuance of a writ of fieri facias, from tbe Circuit'Court of the United States for the fourth circuit, in the District of Maryland, to me directed, will be sold at public auction, for cash, on tbe premises, at four o’clock in the afternoons on Monday tbe 8th June next, the following. Valuable property, situated on the,north, side of Baltimore St. between Howard and Eutaio Streets, and running Lack to Cowpen Alley, to wit. 1 st. The lot with tbe three story dwelling, and all the improvements thereon, formerly occupied by tbe late Judge Nicholson, and now by Mr. John Barney, fronting Baltimore Street about S3 feet, and running back about 166 to Cowpen Alley. 2d. The adjoining lot, with a frame warehouse thereon, formerly occupied by Messrs. Hollingsworth and. Sullivan, and now by Mr. Abraham Buckwalter, as á flour store, having, as the foregoing, S3 feet front on Baltimore-Street, and running back about 166 feet to Cowpen Alley', which said lots and tenements have been levied upon, and are to be sold towards satisfying a claim of the United States, in virtue of judgments of the aforesaid court against Aguila Brown, late of Baltimore, merchant. On the full payment of the purchase money, deeds conveying all the right acquired by-the United States to the aforesaid property, will be executed by Paul Bentalou, Marshal,
    
      The __ petition, commission, and other proceedings before commissioners of bankruptcy, and their judgment thereon, are not evidence for the purpose of showing that a person had become and hail been declared a bankrupt tinder the provisions of the act of congress
    ' The Circuit Court of the United' States has jurisdiction and authority to award an attachment, nndet the act of 1715, ch 40, on the return of fw;o non c§ts to writs of captas ad respondendum, sued out m the name of the'United States* against* Jhe goods aiul chattels, lands and tenement^, of a defendant, whethtr he' be in fact a resilient' of the state or not,. " ,,
    An attachment will lie against the property of foreigners, whether they have been residents within the state or not. (and note.)
    
    As proof of the cause of action to warrant the issuing an attachment in the name of the United^ States, a bill oí* exchange, drawn by the defendant, and payable to 3 C. and by him endorsed to T T, the treasurer of the*#" S, as their agtnt, and to and for their use, and duly protested for nonaechpuince* and for nonpayment, was with pvotesl for uonaceept» nee filed in court, and it being stated that the U S had complied with the jaw, and had made proof of their damages, &c —Held to be. sufficient ‘ *
    , An attachment under the act of 1715, ch. 40, may he awarded agamst the lands and tenements, aa well as the good-i, &.c. of the defendant ’
    Under the construction given to the statute of 5 Geo. IX, ch. 7, lands became liable to be taken and sold by fieri facias* in the’same numner as goods and chattels, and iue subject to attachment
    An attachment ounht regn'any to issue as'of the term at which it was awarded; and it is the duty cf the sheriff to servo the scire facifis in tlu* attachment mi the perrons who are lound in posstssimV of the property attached, and to certify such set vice: or if the property is unoccupied, to make a eov«' responding return * , '
    Although the intervening of a term before the issuing of an attachment which is awarded, and the negligence of the tnaishal in not serving the scire facias in the attachment, &c and making bis rex turn m conformity i hereof, are irrogiilari ties in the pioceedincs of the circuit court offered in evidence, yi t the judgment of condemnation is not therefore void, that court being k court of record of eom« petent jurisdiction, ftom whose decisions'an appeal or writ of error lies to the supreme court '
    It is not like the case ol special and extraordinary powers given by statute to a-court which has no jurisdiction independent of such statute ''
    ' The proceeding by a yachmuit is oivv piocess to compel the appearance of a defendant whose pci'~ .von'cannot be reached by the process of the court; ami is not a procetding iii derogation of the prin»' eiples% of the common law, but rather in mitigation of the severity of the '¿onunon Jaw in favour of defbudnuttf '* • * "
    Foreign judgments are not conducive, but are always examinable, where the parties claiming the benefit of tin m apply to the'-coin t' of tliis country to enforce them. But such judgment» when coming ingideniaiiy in question, has e the same Jorce and effect as domestic judgments *
    ‘ A judgment of life eiruiií court of the US, if treated as the judgment ot a foreign tribunal of competent jurisdiction, stands' upon the same looting, vlun often d in evidence, as a domestic jlnigroent, and is not liable to Be iinpoucM for any irregularity, though such irregularity would be u's’yftjcient' ground for reversal in an appellate court *' ' '
    , A judgment of the circuit' court of the U S is not to be treated as a foreign judgment Tile doctrine that judgments' and decrees are only evidence in suiri between parties and privies, ds not applicable where such'judgments-are imvoduced, not as binding per se, but only as documents connected with the chain of a plaintiff’s title in ejectment ....
    / Where there ii a subsisting judgment by a com t of competent jurisdiction, a fieri facia* thereon [ clothes the sheriff‘with amhouty to sell,.and if the judgment be aftenvatds reversed, the title of the ' purchaser'will not thereby be defeated ‘ * 5' ••
    If the return to a fieri facías úwa riot set oqt the name of the purchaser, and there is no description given of tbe property sold, ii.might perhaps be set aside*on motion^ But it is not the return of the sheriff that gives title to the purchaser, but the previous kítlé* *
    its a sheriff’s sale of land is within the statute af ft auds, sum** memorandum in writing is necessary* It f> therefore right and proper, that theie should be a special return of the,fieri facias, particularly ■ •describing the premises, and setting out the name of the purchaser; either of which, though not operate iaig’tb pass the title, would be safe and competent evidence of tlie sale *' ‘‘ *• •’ •
    
      District of Maryland.”
    The marshal exposed said premises to public sale on the '8th day of June, in the year 1818, and at said sale, William Patterson, the lessor of the plaintiff, was the purchaser and highest bidder, by bidding the sum of §16,104 84, and the marshal, upon receiving said purchase money, on the 29th of June 1818, duly made and delivered to Patterson a deed for the lot and premises as the same are described in the declaration of ejectment in this cause. This deed, after reciting the judgment for attachment, the writ of attachment, return thereof, judgment of condemnation, and the fieri facias thereon issued in the manner as herein before stated, proceeded as follows: “And whereas the said writ came to the hands of the said marshal, who in pursuance thereof, after giving due notice of the time and place, of sale, did set up and expose to sale, at public auction, on the premises, ail that part of the lot, piece or parcel of ground, taken on the writ of attachment aforesaid, which is contained within the metes and bounds, courses and distances following; that is to say, beginning,” &c. describing the lot as tbe same is described in the declaration in this cause. At which said sale, that is to say, on the 8th of June 1818 aforesaid, the above named William Patterson became the highest bidder for, and purchaser of the part of a lot of ground above particularly described, with the appurtenances, at and for the price or sum of §9,900. In consideration of which said sum of money the marshal conveyed the premises to said Patterson; which said deed was duly acknowledged and recorded. The plaintiff further gave in evidence, that Brown was a merchant engaged in commerce in the city of Baltimore; and, for the purposé 0f showing that he had become, and had been declared a bankrupt, Under . and by virtue of the provisions of the statute of the United Slates in such case made and provided; the plaintiff produced, and offered to read in evidence, the petition; commission, qualification, depositions,- and other proceedings before the commissioners' of bankruptcy, duly appointed and qualified, and their judgment thereon, which are set forth; and also a deed from the commissioners aforesaid to George Grundy arid 'Joseph Thornburgh, who had been duly appointed assignees of the creditors of said. Brown; which deed is also set out; ’and also gave in evidence a deed from said Grundy and Thornhivrgh, to the lessor of the plaintiff, dated the 27th of January 18Í9, reciting that they had, at public salé,- af-x ter due riéticé', &c. sold the lot arid premises herein before described; to William Patterson, for the sum of $50,' it " being the same lot and premises conveyed by Bentalbu, to Patterson. But the defendant objected to tlie admissibility of said petition, commission; qualification, depositions ? and other proceedings last meiitioiied; for the purpose last aforesaid; but the court, [ Ward, At J.j overruled- the ob'jection, and permitted said evidence to be read to'the jury, for' the purpose for which it was offered.1 The defendant excepted. ,
    
      Ú. The. defendant then prayed the opinion of the court*, and their direction to the jury, that upon the matters so as aforesaid given in evidence by the plaintiff, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover; which direction the court refusectto give. The defendant excepted; arid the verdict ant! judgment being against him,- heappealed to this, court.
    The cause vtas argu’ed before Buch’anan, Civ J- Earle, Martin, and Stephen, J.
    
      Wirt, (Attorney General of' U. S. and Harper', for thé Appellants,
    stated, that the appellee claimed title to the property for which the ejectment was brought, 1st. Under A deed from Grundy and Thornburgh, assignees of Brown, a bankrupt; and 2d. Under .a deed from Paul Bentalou, marshal of the' U. é. in and for the District of Maryland.- They contended, 1. That the deed from the assignees was not evidence of title without-proving the act of bankruptcy committed, and that the record of the proceedmgs before the commissioners, being the only evidence offered for that purpose, was inadmissible.
    2. That the deed from the marshal passed no title to the lessor of the plaintiff — 1st. Because the circuit court of the U. S. for the fourth circuit in and for the district of Maryland, had no rightful jurisdiction of-the cause in which the judgment was given and the fieri facias issued, by virtue whereof the marshal sold the property, 2d. Because the proceedings in said cause, the record of, which was given in evidence by the plaintiff below, were irregular, erroneous and defective, and therefore wholly void. On the first point they referred to a decision of this court in Wood vs. Grundy 'S? Thornburgh’s Lessee, at December term 1810, as conclusive that there must be proof of bankruptcy, independent of the proceedings of the commissioners. On the second point they contended, 1. That the record of the circuit court was not evidence, as neither of the parties in this case wsre parties in that proceedings and that, the general rule was, that a judgment was not conclusive except between parties and privies, that it might be evidence, but that it was not conclusive evidence. They referred to Barr vs. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 220. Morgan’s Lessee, vs. Davis, 2 Harr. & M‘Hen. 9 Runn. Eject. 110. Gilb. Evid. 9. 2 Esp. Dig. 12. Pullen vs. Birbeck, 1 Ld. Raym. 718. 2 Salk. 563, S. C. That here was a judgment of condemnation on an attachment, which was entitled to less respect than other judgments. That it was not prima facie evidence of a debt, "and whenever it came before the court, eiiher incidentally or otherwise, might be examined into. They referred to Buchanan vs. Rucker, 9 East, 192. Buttrick vs. Allen, 8 Mass. Rep. 273. Pawling vs. Wilson & Smith, 13 Johns. Rep. 192. Phelps vs. Holker, 1 Dall. Rep. 261. Kilburn vs. Woodworth, 5 Johns. Rep. 37. Robinson vs. Ward’s Ex’rs, 8 Johns. Rep. 86. Fenton vs. Garrick, Ibid 197. Bissell vs. Briggs, 9 Mass. Rep, 464. Borden vs. Fitch, 15 Johns. Rep. 141, 1 Phill. Evid. 254, (note.) That the proceeding under attachment was borrowed from the custom of -London, and, being in derogation of the common law, was to be strictly pursued. They referred to 1 Com. Dig. tit. Attachment, (I.) 604. Davidson’s Lessee vs. Beatty, 3 Harr. 4 Mullen, 534. West vs. Hughes, 1 LLarr. 4" Johns. 6. Shivers vs. Wilson¡, B Lian. 4 Johns. 130. That the proceeding under the tachment, being given by the act of 1715, ch. 40, is confín», ed by the 2d section of that act to inhabitants or residents in the state; and the 3d section applies to a different class of persons, absent out of the province, where a short note, &e. was to be left. That this proceeding was under the second section of the act, and did not take in the case of Brown, who was not an inhabitant or resident of the state when the writ of capias ad respondendum issued against him, at the suit of the United States, out of the circuit court of the U. Si that court seeking to carry into effect that act, and which court, they contended, had no jurisdiction thereof, being limited by the subject and character of the parties. That the party plaintiff" should he one who 'might be a defendant, and here the United States were plaintiffs, and were not liable tó be sued, so that the attachment law could not apply to the United States. To show that the circuit court had a limited jurisdiction, they referred to Turner vs. The Bank of North America, 4 Dall. Rep. 8. By the judiciary act 1789, ch. 20, s. 11, the circuit court had no jurisdiction ip civil cases, unless the defendant was a resident of the' district in which the court was held. Where the circuit* court'act upon the at- , tachment law, it must appear* that the party is absent out of the U. S. or that court has no jurisdiction. Hollingsworth vs. Adams, 2 Dall. Rep. 396. ' If the circuit 'court had no right to act upon' the attachment law, no title accrued under the judgment of- condemnation. ' In Shivers vs. Wilson, the character of the' plaintiff was looked at; so, here the character of the defendant must be looked at, to see if he comes within the description of, persons pointed but in the second section of the act of 1715,’' He was neither an inhabitant, nor an'absentee who was to return; iand if he ivas liable to béprocéeded against, he came within the third section of tliat act. 2. There wás, no proof of fhe cause of actkmby the plaintiffs; neither the hand-writing of the drawer i nor of any of .the endorsors of the bill of exchange, was proved.' There was nó evidence that the bill had bééti presented 'for payment, and none that the debt was due. ! The bill was endorsed in blank, and, no suit could be .'maintained, thereon by ‘the United States. They referred tó Ringgold vs. Tyson, in this court, at December term 1810, and’’ Hudson vs. Goodwin, 5 Harr. & Johns. 115, In the proceedings there is an -emission of an entire term between the judgment for attachment, and the issuing the writ. 3. There was no return made by the marshal to the clause of scire facias included in the writ of attachment. Nor, was it stated whether the property attached was in the possession of a garnishee, or any other person. Nor was any garnishee summoned. 4. There was no copy of a declaration or short note left, as required by the act. 5. The act confines the attachment to goods, chattels and, credits, and cannot be extended by construction to lands and tenements" under the statute "of 5 George M; and if Hot, then lands and tenements were riot liable to be attached. 6. The return to the fieri facias is defective. The marshal returned that be made of the lands and. tenements of Brown, &c. not showing that they were the lands and tenements mentioned in the fieri facias. ' Nor is it stated that they were sold to the lessor of. the plaintiff, which must appear by the return, and cannot be supplied by the marshal’s deed, which gives no title without the aid of a, proper return to the fieri facias„
    
      Taney znü.Magrudtr, for the Appellee,
    stated, that the-record of the circuit court had been treated by the counsel for the appellant as if it was under the review of. this court on an appeal. When the act of 1715, ch. 40, passed, goods, chattels and credits only, were to be affected under it; but under the statute,of 5 Geo. II, lands and tenements were liable to debts, by construction put upon that statute by our courts; and the same principle which led. to that construction, led to its introduction into the attachment law; and since then it has been the uniform settled practice to attach and condemn lands and tenements. In Davidson’s Lessee vs. Beatty, 3 Harr. & M‘Hen. 600, 608, 612, 616, it was admitted by the counsel who argued the case, and by the court, that lands and tenements were liable to be attached and condemned. They contended, 1. That if the judgment,of the circuit court was res enter alios acta, and was not evidence, there was no mode by which a party, deriving title under such a judgment and fieri facias, could establish it. But that the judgment might be offered in evidence, they referred to Barr vs. Gratz’s heirs, 4 Wheat. Rep. 213. Boring’s Lessee vs. Lemmon, 5 Harr. & Johns. 223, A court of compeiei\t jurisdiction, acting in the course of the. common law, can? not have its acts impeached in a court of general jurisdiction, where the question comes before that court collaterally, and not by appeal. If the judgment was only prima facie, it would be sufficient for all the purposes of the appellee; but it is ’final and conclusive. They cited The Marshalsea’s Case, 10 Coke, 76. Tarleton vs. Tarleton, 4 Maule & Selw. 21. Where the suites on the judgment, the consideration may be gone into, but whpre the judgment comes in collaterally,, if is’ final and conclusive. No person can impeach a judgment but a party to it, which lie can do by'way of appeal» A stranger has no right to call on the court to exainineinto the irregularities of other. <^ourts. Kempe’s Lessee vs. Kennedy, et al. 5 Cranch, 173. Pratt, et al. vs. Law & Campbell, 9 Cranch, 478, 496, Serg. Law Att. 114, 116, 117, 121, 123. v The records and proceedings in this case are offered in evidence as links in ifie chain of title, and are produced for the purpose of showing-how the title passed’to the lessor of the plaintiff, in the same manner as the deeds, under which the' title was transmitted to Broten, wereyiroduced and offered in evidence, Barr vs. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 215, 220. Goodtitle vs. Alker, 1 Burr. 136. 1 Phill. Evid. 254, ch. 3, s. 3.
    2. The subject of the jurisdiction of the circuit court is settled in Kempe’s Lessee vs. Kennedy, et al. 5 Cranch, 185; and Turner vs. The Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8.
    3. Under the attachment act- óf -1715, the attachment is a mere,process to compel the appearance of the defendant, arid’belongs to the common .law, and is.in aid of, and not i'n deroga!ion of the common law jurisdiction; if borrowed from the custom of London, that custom was borrowed-from the common law, and moulded» so as to conform to-the wants at the, pity. They referred to Coombes vs. Clements, in this court, at June term 1819. 3 Blk. Com. 272, to 282. 1 Tidd's. Pr. 105, 108, 135 to 137, 1 Saund. 67, (note.) The circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction, and being so, the.'attachment was a process which the court had a right to usé; and having used it, whether right or wrong, it is not for this court to investigate the-subject; that is a question only for the supreme court, on an appeal. If this court liad a right to examine into the correctness of the judgment, and their decision was opposed to that of the supreme court, there would be two laws Cn i'liis same subject incompatible with each other. By the judiciary act, ITS9, ch. 20, s. 14, the court may issue all process which may be necessary; and by the 34th section, the laws of the respective states are to be the rules of decision for the government of the United States. Robinson vs. Campbell, 3 Wheaton, 212. Under the act of 1715, t'po’i two non ests, the plaintiff may proceed against all description of persons, and it was so decided by the general court in Willis vs. Pearce, Garn. of Garrigues, 
      
       If the act admired óf a different constriction, how can the fact be come at that Brown was not a resident of the otate? The record does not show that he was not a resident. The writ and declaration states him to be “late of the Maryland district, merchant,” winch means, that lie LI ?,n the district-according to our practice against all residents of the state. There is nothing in the act which sanctions the principle, that a party who touid not be »■ defendant did mi come withití the provisions of the act. The proof of the canse of action need not be set out in. the proceedings; ¿11 that was necessary was, that the court should be satisfied that the money was due, and to satisfy llunnselves of that, they could resort to viva voce proof. The record slates that the U. 3. made proof of their de - s«c,isd. This was sufficient, and such are the forms in 2 Harr. Ent. 78, 79, under the act of 1715. There is nothing in the Objection, that there Is no ret urn made of the 
      8‘iire facids included i'n thfe attacliment. The practice is to lay the attachment on the property, although no person is in possession; but where any person is in possession, then to take notice of the scire facias. Campbell vs. Morris, 3 Harr. & M‘Hen. 535. Davidson’s Lessee vs. Beatty, Ibid 594. It was not necessary that the attachment should have issued, returnable to the terni succeeding, the judgment; there is nothing iri the act which required it. ' The blank endorsement bn a bill of exchange, by the decision of this court, must be filled up before verdict. Hero there was no verdict. It is an objection to form, and has no foundation in reason; The English decisions are opposed to that of this court. Where the judgment is by confession, or by default, no advantage can be taken of such an objection, were it a valid one. The endorsement need not be filled up unless where non assumpsit is pleaded, and the plaintiff is put to the proof of his cause of action. The practice of the courts of this state, under the attachment law, so long and uniformly acted under, is evidence of the law. They referred to M‘Keen vs. Delancy, 5 Cranch, 22, as a case in which proof of the practice was required, and that being obtained, it was considered the law. All the objections, previous to the judgment, are unfounded; and whether the judgment ia correct or not, or whether the writ of fieri facias was regularly issued, cannot now be inquired into. The case stated admits the sale of the property by the marshal, and the purchase by the lessor of the plaintiff. And the law is, that the sheriff need not return the execution; and this court has said, in Boreing’s Lessee vs. Lemmon, 5 Harr. & Johns, 225, that the legal estate, in the land sold under a fieri facias, is transferred, by the sale of the sheriff, to the vendee, by operation of law; and that a deed from the sheriff' is unnecessary to vest the legal estate. If a. deed was not necessary, a return by the marshal was unnecessary, as it need not be made. This is the law of England. 2 Bac. Ab. tit. Execution, 710, 740. The deed, without any thing else, is evidence of title, there must be some writing on the subject. 7 Bac. Ab. Appendix, tit. Evidence, 458. Jeanes vs. Wilkins, 1 Ves. 195. 2 Tidd’s Pr. 918, 928. Palmer’s case, 4 Coke, 74. Palmer vs. Humphrey, Cro. Eliz. 584. Taylor vs. Cole, 3 T. R. 295, 297. If the return is the only evidence of title, then the deed was unnecessary, and a nullity; and if the return is defective, the deed cannot aid it. There is no authority on which to ground the principle, that the return is necessary, and that the return alone vests the title to the property sold. The act of 1813, ch. 102, s. 3, 4, shows that a deed from the sheriff is to be giveil. It is a legislative exposition of the law on that subject. If the deed does not convey the title what operation has it? Is it of no value unless it cooperates with the return? The doctrine in New-York is, that the sale by the sheriff is to be established by legal proof, and that it may be proved as other facts are to be proved. They referred to Jackson vs. Bartlett, 8 Johns. Rep. 361. Jackson vs. Bush, 10 Johns. Rep. 223. Jackson vs. Rosevelt, 13 Johns. Rep. 97. Jackson vs. Dickenson, 15 Johns. Rep. 309. Jackson vs. Sternbergh, 1 Johns. Ca. 153. It is not the sheriff’s sale nor his deed which vests the title in the purchaser, but the law. The return of the sheriff may be evidence, but the sale and payment of the purchase money may be proved in any other way. Courts have protected the title of purchasers of property at sheriff’s sales, notwithstanding the fieri facias be erroneous, or the judgment on which it issued reversed. Jeanes vs. Wilkins, 1 Ves. 195. 2 Bac. Ab. tit. Execution, 740. Drurie’s Case, 8 Coke, 143. The omission of the sheriff to make a proper return ought not to prejudice the purchaser.
    
      Harper, in reply,
    stated, that the grfeat question was, bow far the proceedings in the circuit court were to be examined by this court. He contended that the judgment was to be considered as a judgment of a foreign court. It was a special proceeding, under a special authority, which was to be strictly pursued, and differed from ordinary proceedings in other cases in the ordinary course of the court’s jurisdiction. By the law of England a judgment of a foreign court of admiralty having jurisdiction, is conclusive, because all the world have notice. But if the sentence professes to be made on particular grounds which, are set forth, but which appear not to warrant the condemnation, the sentence will not be conclusive as to such facts. The sentence of a domestic court is conclusive within its sphere. But the judgments of foreign courts, acting out of their jurisdiction, are not conclusive, but examinable^ So of á domestic court acting beyond its jurisdiction. A court exercising general jurisdiction may be vested with special powers irt particular cases; and they must be exercised within the sphere Ot these special powers. To seo that they havé been so exercised, may be examined into. It has been urged; that the proceeding under the attachment law of 1715, was according to the course of the (common law; using process to compel appearance. When the defendant is in court, the proceedings are according to the course of the common law; but when the attachment is resorted to; the coursé of the common law is abandoned.33y the coursé of the commoti law a jiiry may pass on the (claim, tíere it is not permitted, but a judgment is ren-i, dered without the intervention of a jury; This proceeding is to affect the property of the defendant — a proceeding in rent. The common law course is ¿gainst the person,'and hot the property, until the defendant has had an opportunity to defend himself. This is an essential departure from the common law. The writ of attachment is not an exécútioh, and it was so decided in Davidson's Lessee vs. Beatty, 3 Harr. & M‘Hen. 534, and Owings vs. Norwood's Lessee, 2 Harr. & Johns. 96. It is in the. hátüré of mesne process; and a judgment of condemnation, is not a common law judgment. It is a new and irregular proceeding; unknown to the common law; and grows out oif some authority given by the statute, coiitrary to the common law| and being so given, the coilrt must conform Strictly to the stóute; If thé sentence of a court of admiralty, v hicli ife supposed to act according to the law of nations, may be impeached, there can be no reason Why a domestic judgment should not. Suppose a man was tried and convicted in Baltimore, where the offence was hot Committed within the jurisdiction of the court, would not sucha judgment be examinable? if So, there is ntf distinction in prindiple between that case and the one before the court; There is no reason why a person, n'ot a party to the proceedings, should not take advantage' of thé errors .thérein. The defendant here is in possession, and it may be that he is so for a valuable consideration, and has a good title. But the-proceeding in this case was under a special authority, to which the general law does not apply. In Shivers vs. Wilson, this court treated the proceeding as a nullity; and, in Kempe's Lessee vs. Kennedy, 5 Cranch, 
      173, the supreme court held, that where a court of general jurisdiction acted within the sphere of its authority, its proceedings were not examinable yvhen coming before them collaterally. But that where the jurisdiction was limited, it must be shown, upon the, record itself, that the court acted within the sphere of its authority. So also in 2 Esp. Dig. 12. Pullen vs. Birbeck, 1 Ld. Raym. 718; and 2 Salk. 563, S. C. Where a special authority is delegated, and the acts under it are not legally and specially in pursuance of it, they are void; and- where acts are void, all persons may take advantage of them. Morgan's Lessee vs. Davis, 2 Harr. & M‘Hen. 9. The. proceedings here are examinable in the same manner as. a.foreign judgment is. The state courts were foreign courts, before the adoption of the constitution of the U. S. By the constitution some change, was effected, so as to point out the manner ia which the judgments, &c. of one state, should be evidence in another state. But the courts remain foreign, to each other as they were before. A judgment in a court of the U. S. must be proved in the state courts in the same manner as foreign judgments are proved, and they are to he received and treated as such, and, are only prima fade evidence. Mills vs. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 483. Hampton vs. M‘Connell, 3 Wheaton, 234. Here the judgment, and proceedings under it, are offered in evidence as an essential link in a chain of title, and it is examinable in the same, manner that a conveyance would be, to see that it is correct in all its parts. There is no distinction, between the judgment coming before the court, collaterally and directly^ Here it is brought in to give effect to the plaintiff’s title,, so that it comes directly before the court. There is no reason why.-tjiq court should ba precluded from looking into the judgment more in. the one case than in the other. The questions decided in Kempe’s Lessee vs. Kennedy, 5 Cranch, 185, & Pratt vs. Law & Campbell, 9 Cranch, 495, are not similar te the one before this court. In Barr vs. Gratz, 4 Wheaton, 220, the court did not say that the, judgment was not examinable. Because it was prima fade evidence it does not follow that, it was conclusive evitalice. This case shows, that where the judgment Í8 brought in collaterally, as a muniment of title, it is prima fade evidence. In Tarleton vs. Tarleton, 4 Maule & Selw. 21, there was no objection to the jurisdiction of the court in Granada, which did what it had a right to do; and the court of K. B. was called upon to enlarge the sum awarded, which could not be done unless on appeal'. In Keilburn vs. Woodworth, 5 Johns. Rep. 39, 41, a judgment in Massachusetts was offered in evidence in New-York; and although it was a good judgment in Massachusetts, yet the court in New-York refused to receive it os prima facie evidence. This authority -is in favour of the appellant. This judgment is examinable on the ground of its being a foreign judgment, andits also being under a special authority in derogation oí the common law. In the return to the fieri facias there is no designation or description of the property sold. The deed states, that the land was sold to the lessor of the plaintiff, and this is the only proof of the sale. There cannot be two modes of proof to supply defects in the return to a fieri facias. The return is the only, legal evidence of the sale; and it is the only evidence of title under the sale. There is no principle of law which says, that a title to land can be made out by parol evidence., This was attempted in Maydwell vs. Carroll, in this court, at December, term 1813. Parol evidence cannot supply the defect'of a written title. The return of a sheriff is made under oath, but his. deed is not, and cannot be entitled to the same weight as/his return. In Boreing’s Lessee vs. Lemmon, the sheriff’s return, was special, that he had sold the lands to the. defendant. The court did not in that case say that the deed was evidence of title. The doctrine that a fieri facias, under which lands are. seized and. sold, need not be returned, is not applicable, to our system of laws. It may do in, England, where personal, property only can be seized, and which passes, by delivery. It is not so here where a fee simple is. sold, and where all titles, to land are matters of record. ,
    
      
       The case here referred to of Willis vs Pearce, Garnishee of Garrigues, n the general court at. April term 1769, was on an appeal from Kent county court. It was an attachment on judgment under the act of 1715, ch* 40, where two nun ests had been •returned on writs of capias cd respondendum. It was alleged, «and , iso slated in the record, that the party, against whose effects the attachment issued, had never been a resident of this state* The1 county court quashed the attachment upon this ground, and the plaintiff appealed to the general court. The cause was argued by Jjp.thrhury for the appellant, and by T Wright for the appellee» Martin, (Attorney General,) though not concerned as counsel, -expressed his opinion — that he himself, when he first came into the practice, shortly after the revolution, had put the same construction on the act of assembly ofl7!5 which had been given by tthfi county court; hut, upon inquiry, he had found that the prac* tice had been so long and uniformly to the contrary, under the act of 1715, that he thought it was not now io be shaken.
      Harrison, Ch. J. Toe judgment of the court below must be severed. It has always been the practice, that attachments under the act of 1715 would lie against the effects of foreigners, notwithstanding they had never been residents. 1 remember a case many years ago, of an attachment against the effects of a resident in Virginia, and the practice has been uniformly s'o.
      JUDGMENT RS.VBaSBJ>#
      , An uffnchmeftt iVayhstie ag’aimi the _ property of forei-'-nei s under the act. of 1715, ch. 40, whether they are or ham ever been residents of this state or not»
    
   Buchanan, Cb, J.

delivered- the opinion of the courts This is an appeal from the judgment of Baltimore county-court, in an action of ejectment, brought by William Patterson's lessee, the appellee, against John Barney, the appellant.

The appellee, claims title under a sale made to the lessor of the plaintiff by Paul. Bentalou, marshal of the United States, in virtue of a writ of fieri facias, sued out of the circuit court of the United States, for the District of Maryland, upon a judgment of a condemnation by that court, of the premises in .question, on proceedings in attachment, in a suit instituted by the Untied Slates against JSquila Brown, to whom the premises so condemned and sold belonged. All discussion of the first bill of exceptions was waived by the counsel on both sides; but the question involved, having been heretofore differently decided in this court, we do not concur in opinion with the court below on that exception.

The question raised on the second bill of exceptions taken at the trial is, whether the lessor of the plaintiff acquired the legal title under and in virtue of that judgment and sales’ On the part of the appellant it has been strongly urged, that he did not; first, on the ground that the proceedings under the attachment were coram non judice, and wholly null and void; and second, that the judgment of the circuit court is a foreign judgment, and not Conclusive, but examinable.'

Ey the eleventh section of the act of congress of 1789, eh. 20, it is provided, “that the circuit court of the United States shall have original cognizance," concurrent with the courts of the several stales, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law, or in, equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought, and. a citizen of another state.” And by the thirty-fourth section of the same law it is enacted, “that the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States, shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at. common law in the courts of the United Slates, in cases where they apply.”

The amount for which the suit was brought by the UniU ed States against Brown, far exceeded five hundred dollars, the circuit court therefore had full, complete and unlimited jurisdiction of the subject matter in dispute, under the eleventh section; and the laws of this state, applicable to the subject, being by the thirty-fourth section made rules of decision for the circuit court, that tribunal was clothed with all the power and authority to award aa attachment possessed by the courts of this state, under the, act of 1715, 'ch. 40. The second section of this act, upon which the proceedings ip attachment in the circu.it court Were foundp^ js in these words: “from henceforth no attachment shall issue out of any court of this province, before a writ or summons be first made opt, upon which writ, if the party defendant; be an inhabitant, or resident within this province, and thp sheriff shall return a non est inventus, one other writ op summons shall thereupon, in like manner aforesaid, issue forth against the sgid defendant; and if the sheriff shall, upon the second writ or summons, return a non est inventus likewise,'an attachment shall and . may, in manner and font) hereafter set down, be awarded.”. The third section authorises, an attachment, “such proof-being made by the plaintiff of his action as the court shall; thin.k fit,” to be awarded against the “goods, chattels and, credits,” of the defendant, with a. clause commanding the sheriff, at the time of executing the attachment, to make known to the person or persons in whose hands or possession the goods, &c. attached are, to.appear before the court, cpn the return of the attachment, to show cause, why. such goods, &c. should not .be condemned, &c. and directs, that, if on the return day neither the defendant nor the garnishee ' shall appeal; to show cause to the contrary, the goods, &c„ shall be condemned,, and execution thereof awarded as in otlier judgments, the plaintiff giving security for the. usé of the defendant, (which was done by the United States,) to make restitution of the goods, &c. so condemned, or the value thereof, if. the defendant shall at any time within a year and a day, in person, or by attorney, appear to the original action, and prove payment of the debt or demand, or otherwjse in court discount or bar the-plaintiff of the same, or any part thereof.” In support of the first position it has been contended, that in the case of a foreigner no attachment cap. be awarded on the.return of-non est inventus upon a second capias,, but that, it. will, only lie where the defendant is an inhabitant or resident of' the state; which, to give jurisdiction to the court, must' appear upon the face of the proceedings in the cause; and that the proof in the record shows that BrQwn was not an. inhabitant of this state at the time of suing out the writ of attachment, -but was residing in Europe. To which it. may be answered, that the proof of Brown’s residence ill ¡Europe was taken at the trial of this cause in the court below, and not in the suit in which the attachment was awarded by the circuit court, with which it has no connexion. But that in both the writs of capias ad respondendum, the declaration, and thé.writ of attachment, he is styled Jlquila Brown, late of the Maryland District. The bill of exchange, on which the suit was founded, is dated at Baltimore, and the declaration charges that Brouni was i-esiding in the Maryland District, and there carrying on the business of a merchant, at the time the bill was made. So that whatever may have been the fact in-relation tó his residence, it does, technically at least, appear upon the face of the proceedings that he was a resident of the state, and there is nothing in the case from which the contrary appears, or can be inferred; and if his being a resident tvas necessary to the jurisdiction of the court, is not the style and character given him in the proceedings prima fade sufficient confer aiid sustain that jurisdiction? And what is there in the act of assembly requiring of a plaintiff to make proof of the residence of the defendant by affidavit, or otherwise, or to do any thing more than wad done in the Case of tile United States against Brown to give jurisdiction to the court? No mode of proof is pointed out, nor any description of proof expressly required; all that is said is, that no attachment shall issue, where the defendant is a resident of the state, before a second non 'est inventus has been returned.

But is it true that an attachment can only be awarded under the second section against the goods, &e. of a resident defendant? The act is indeed silent as to foreigners eo nomine, but is it not prohibitory only as respects residents? The language used is, not that no attachment shall issue unless the party defendant be a resident of the state, or if he be a foreigner or nonresident, but the words are, “that from henceforth no attachment shall issue out of any court of this province before a writ or summons be first made out, upon which writ, if the party defendant be an inhabitant or resident within this province,” &c. Then provision is made for the return of a first and a second non est inventus, before an attachment shall be awarded. But it is not provided that an attachment shall not be awarded if he be not an inhabitant or resident; and in the absence of any such provision, the construction found to have been given to that section of the act by the .different coiifts of the state is; that oii the return of two non ests, an attachment will lié against the property of the defendant, whether he he in fact a resident or not, and the practice has been so long settled as to command respect whatever would be the construction; if it was now vexata quesiio. it is. also objected, 2d, that there was not sufficient proof made of the cause of action to warrant the issuing of an attachment. 3d; That the attachment awarded is against the lands, tenements, goods, chattels and credits, of Brown, whereas the act of assembly only authorises an attachment ’against the goods, chattels and credits. 4th. That a term was suffered to intervene between the time of issuing the attachment, and the term at which it was awarded. And 5th. That it doés not appear that there was any service by the marshal of the scire facias contained in the writ of attachment, no notice being taken of any such service in hist return of the attachment. The second and third objections have nothing in them; with respect to the former, the act of assembly prescribes no particular proof, but leaves ifc entirely in the breast of the court.

The bill of exchange on which the suit was brought, was exhibited to the court, and appears in the proceedings, and in the judgment for the writ of attachment it is recited, that the United States made proof to the court of their damages to the sum of g58,201 71; and with regard to the latter, it is sufficient to say, that lands were not liable to execution for debt at the time of the passage of the act, and not being’in terms embraced by it, were not subject to. attachment. But under the construction given to the sta-, tute 5 Geo. II, ch. 7, lands became liable to be taken and .sold by fieri facias in the same manner as goods and chattels, and have ever since been uniformly held to be subject to. attachment by all the tribunals of the state.

The attachment in question, therefore, was properly awarded under the circumstances of the case, jurisdiction being given to the court on the face of the proceedings. If it were otherwise, property acquired in this state by foreigners residing without the United States, would be completely protected against their creditors, there being no other mode of reaching it, and when they are placed in no worse situation than citizens, and their property is subject-pd only to the same process, it is no cause of complaint that they are styled and treated as citizens in the foiras of ’proceedings.

As to the fourth and fifth objections, the attachment Should regularly have been issued as of the tdrm at which it was awarded, and it was the duty of the marshal to have served the scire facias in the attachment on the person or persons who were found in possession of the property attached, and to have certified such service, or if th¿ property was unoccupied, to have made a corresponding return. Rut though the intervening of a term before the issuing of the attachment, and the negligence of the marshal, were irregularities in the proceedings, the judgment of condemnation is not therefore void, (whatever disposition might be made of it by an appellate court,) the circuit court being a court of record of competent jurisdiction, from whose decisions an appeal or writ of error lies to the supreme court of the United States, and is not an inferior court according to the technical sense of the term as used in England. It is not like the case of special and extraordinary powers given by statute to a court in relation to a subject matter of which such court has no jurisdiction independent of the statute, but derives its authority to act upon facts arising in pais entirely from the statute giving the power, and prescribing the mode of proceedings The act upon which the .proceedings of the cirpuit court were founded, professes to give no new jurisdiction, blit only to regulate and limit the powers of courts already possessed of full and complete jurisdiction of the whole subject matter. The preamble is in these words: “Whereas it is highly expedient to settle the manner of proceedings on attachments, and limiting the extent of them, and to provide what shall be levied on such attachments aud executions. ” It belongs to the sovereign authority of a state to prescribe’ the manner of proceeding in its courts of justice, and to make such provisions for the recovery .of debts as the legislature may deem most expedient. The- proceeding by attachment under that law is only process to compel the appearance of a defendant to a suit before brought and depending in a court of competent jurisdiction, whose person cannot be reached by the process of the court, of which it comes in aid, and without which the plaintiff would be without remedy| and it is not a proceeding in derogation of the principles of the common law, but rather in mitigation of the severity of the common law in favour of defendant??' By the common law, where a defendant was summoned; and would not appear, his goods were liable to be proceeded against by attachment and distress infinite, and the goods seized were forfeited to the king; and where the defendant was abroad or kept out of the way so that he could not be arrested, the plaintiff might proceed against him to outlawry, which was also attended with a forfeiture to the king of all his goods and chattels; The proceeding to outlawry, or by distringas, was to compel the appearance of the defendant; and so with the attachment here, it is only a proceeding against the defendant’s goods, to compel his appearance, with this difference in favour of the defendant, that a year and a day is given him to come in and appear to the original action, and if he can defeat it, to have a return of his property without any forfeiture to tire state. And it would seem, from the language of the preamble; that the act was passed with a view to a mitigation; bf the rigour of the common law; and an outlawry, though illegal because the party was beyond sea, cannot be set aside by a third person in a collateral action, but is voidable alone by the party himself, and that only sub modo by his appearing and putting in bail. 6 Com. Dig. (C 2,) 488. Simonds vs. Parmiter, 1 Wm. Blk. Rep. 20. And in the case of The Marshalsea, Coke, 77, it is laid down, “that if the court of common pleas hold plea in debt, trespass, &c. without an original, it is not void, for they are judges of those pleas, and it cannot be said that the proceeding is coram non judice,” and surely in such case the irregularity is as great as any appearing in the proceeding before the circuit court. And in the same hook, 76, it is said, “That if the court of common pleas, in a plea of debt, awards a capias against a Duke, Earl, &c. which by law doth not li.e against them, and that appears in the writ itself; and if the sheriff arrests them by force of the capias, although the writ be against law, notwithstanding, inasmuch as "the court has jurisdiction of the cause,- the sheriff is excused;’"5 which could not be if the proceeding was void.

With regard to the second point raised, “that the judgment of the circuit court is a foreign judgment and not conclusive but examinable,” the long and well established' rule in England is, that foreign judgments are not conclusive, but are always 'examinable, where the' parties «¿¡aiming the- benefit of them apply to the courts of that country to enforce, them; as, if an action of ccbt or assumpsit be brought apon such a judgment, it is onjy prima facie evidence of the debt, and may be impeacheid, by the other party; but that the judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction, when coming incidentally in question, have the same force and effect with domes,tic judgments. .That principle was recognized and adopted; in Pennsylvania in Repelje vs. Emery, 2 Dall. 231, and in the supreme court of the United States, in Croudson & others, vs. Leonard, 4 Cranch, 434; and the. same principle applying with equal force in this state, the, same rule will be adopted here. Treating then the judgment of the circuit court as the judgment of a foreign tribunal-of;compefent jurisdiction, it stands upon the same footing, that a domestic judgment offered at the trial for the same purpose would have done, and was not liable to be impeached in the Baltimore county court for any mere irregularity, though such irregularity should be a sufficient ground for reversal in an appellate court, unless the Baltimore county court could have erected itself into a court of errors to, revise and correct the proceedings of the circuit court, nor can it be here. But under the peculiar structure of our political system,, it should not he treated as a foreign judgment. The constitution and laws of the United States are the supreme law of this state; the laws of this state furnish rules of decision for the circuit court, and causes commenced in the state courts may be removed for trial in-, to the circuit court. The citizens of; the state are return j ed and serve as jurors in that court, and-axe amenable to its process; and their properly, real- and- personal, is.liable to seizure and sale by the marshal of the district, under executions issued upon the judgments of-that court, with other attributes of a domestic court, belonging, to that tribunal, which place it on a ground very different from, that-of a foreign court.

This judgment is also objected to on the ground-, that it is res inter alios aeta, the appellant not being a party to the proceedings. But ffie doctrine that judgments and decrees are only evidence in suits between parties and privies, though generally true, is not applicable to this case;, th e judgment of the circuit court being introduced, not as binding per qe, upon the rights of the appellant, but only as a document connected with the chain of the appellee's title, and is no more obnoxious to objection, than a deed from Brown, or any other title papers, equally res inter, alios acta, would bp,' Without showing that judgment, under the authority of which the sale by the marshal was. made to the lessor of the plaintiff, the validity of that sale, would not be established'; and tQ.reject it, would-be in effect to decide that a title derived under a sale by a marshal or sheriff is of no validity in a suit by or against a. stranger, and to render the law in relation to sales of land, by fieri facias, worse than a mockery.

It has further been contended- in argument, that the lessor of the plaintiff acquired no title by his purchase from, the niarsljal, on the ground — 1st. That a fieri facias issued upon an. erroneous judgment confers no authority upon the officer to. sell; and 2d. That the marshal’s return on, the fieri facias is imperfect and void. The answer to the first oethese positions, is, that if it sho.uld be admitted that there are irregularities in. the proceedings under the attachment, which would on appeal to the proper tribunal be sufficient cause for a reversal of the judgment, yet that judgment is not only not void, but has not been reversed, and is still in full force, and cannot h” impeached by a stranger, in another court, in this collateral way. If it was not merely voidable, but absolutely void ab initio, a different question would be presented; But being a subsisting judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, and not a mere nullity, the fieri facias clothed the marshal with authority to sell, and if tlje judgment had afterwards been in fact reversed, the title of the purchaser would not thereby have been defeated. The law will not permit even the party himself, who has suffered his land to be sold uncier an erroneous judgment, to disturb the tifie of a bona fide purchaser, by afterwards procuring the judgment to be reversed! If it was otherwise, there would be no security to purchasers, and writs of execution would be of little effect, as few Would incur the risk attending such purchases. "

The objection to the return of the fieri facias^ stands on Jio better ground. It is true that the return does not set out the name of the purchaser, and fhat no description is given of the property sold, for which reason it might perhaps have been set aside on motion. But it is not the return of the officer that gives title to ^ purchaser, but the 'previous sale; which was decided by this court in the case of Boreing’s Lessee vs. Lemmon, 5 Harr. & Johns. 223. And it would be of dangerous consequence to boya fide purchasers, if after having paid their money for property sold under competent and legal authority, they should be at the mercy of officers who might malee imperfect returns of executions, or if they pleased snake no returns at all. But a sheriff’s sale of land being within the statute oí frauds, some memorandum in writing is necessary toba made. It is therefore always right and proper, for the security and protection of purchasers, that in addition to a deed for the laud sold, there should be a special return of the execution, particularly describing the premises, and setting «at the name of the purchaser, either of which, though riot operating to, pass the title, would be safe and «competent evidence of the sale.

fndhis case the sale by the marshal, was of ihe specific property condemned according to the act of assembly, for which he passed his deed to the lessor of the plaintiff, containing a sufficient description of the premises sold.

3 VD GHENT ArEIIUIF».  