
    Asa Dinkins & H. Macon vs. Wm. Vaughan & John McLauchlin.
    The act of 1809, which refers the “ sum actually due,” on any liquidated demand to be assessed by the clerk, does not include cases wherein the judgments were final, and required no verdicts even before the act; as for instance, debt on bond or judgment.
    Sumter. Motion to set aside judgment and execution.
    m X HIS was a case of debt, on a judgment which was referred to the clerk at the extra court in May, 1819, who assessed the damages on the 24¡th May, 1819, at $78 39, and stated the debt at $878 17.
    
    Judgment was signed on 21st June, 1820, and execution issued.
    The motion In the circuit court was to set aside the judgment and execution, because the judgment was not entered until more than a year and day had elapsed since the assessment; which motion was overruled. From this decision the defendant appealed, and renewed the motion Id set aside the judgment and execution, because the iudg-rnent was not entered up, until a year and day after the assessment.
    And because this was not a case which ought to have been referred to the clerk.
    
      De Saussure, for the motion.
    Miller, control.
   Mr. Justice Richardson

delivered the opinion of the court.

The act of 1809, which refers the “ sum actually due,” on any liquidated demand to be assessed by the clerk, could not have intended to include such cases wherein the judgments were final, and required no verdicts even before the act. ' As for instance, debt on bond or judgment. In such cases, the remedy was perfect before the act, and required no alteration.

It is to be observed too, that although judgments usually bear interest, yet I am not prepared to say, that circumstances .may not attend a judgment, which would authorize a jury to assess no interest; and assuredly the clerk can assess no interest in any case in which interest does not follow as a matter of course; his office being in this respect merely ministerial, i. e. to compute the amount actually due, and not to exercise any discretionary power.

The motion is therefore granted.

Justices Colcock and Mott, concurred.  