
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brian FLEWELL, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-50113.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted April 12, 2012.
    Filed April 19, 2012.
    Curtis Arthur Kin, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Joshua Robbins, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Ashfaq Gani Chowdhury, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    
      Before: SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable John R. Tunheim, U.S. District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Appellant Brian Flewell (Flewell) challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress his confession and evidence of child pornography found on his computer. Flewell maintains that his confession and consent to search his computer were involuntary because Flewell was not advised of his Miranda rights prior to an in-home interrogation.

The district court properly denied Flewell’s motion to suppress. The interrogation was non-custodial, as “a reasonable person in [Flewell’s] position would [not] have felt deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way ...” United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir.2008); see also United States v. Bassignani, 575 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir.2009), as amended (“An officer’s obligation to give a suspect Miranda warnings before interrogation extends only to those instances where the individual is in custody.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The officers’ deceptive tactics did not render Flewell’s confession involuntary. See United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (“Trickery, deceit, even impersonation do not render a confession inadmissible, certainly in noncustodial situations and usually in custodial ones as well ... ”) (citation omitted).

Flewell voluntarily consented to the search of his computer. The officers never compelled Flewell to consent and Flewell signed a consent form informing him of his right to refuse consent. See United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1119-20 (9th Cir.2010); see also United States v. Childs, 944 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir.1991) (“The consent form clearly states that a person may refuse to sign it. Knowledge of the right to refuse consent is highly relevant in determining whether a consent is valid.”) (citation omitted).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
     