
    Mirella JAKAJ, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-2425-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 12, 2012.
    
      Mary Elizabeth Delli-Pizzi, Babylon Village, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Michael P. Lindemann, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation; Lyle D. Jentzer, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Mirella Jakaj, a native and citizen of Albania, seeks review of a June 15, 2010, order of the BIA affirming the July 31, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Gabriel C. Videla denying her motion to reopen. In re Mirella Jakaj, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 15, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 31, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam).

Because Jakaj’s motion to reopen was untimely, she was required to establish changed country conditions to except it from the time limit or that the time limit should be equitably tolled because she received ineffective assistance of counsel. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2006). The agency found that she established neither, and accordingly denied her motion as untimely.

Jakaj argues that the agency abused its discretion in failing to consider her evidence about conditions in Albania and concluding that she did not establish changed country conditions. This argument is unavailing because the record does not compel the conclusion that the agency did not consider Jakaj’s evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 (2d Cir.2006) (providing that this Court will “presume that [the agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). Indeed, the agency explicitly discussed the key parts of Ja-kaj’s evidence of changed country conditions: her evidence about general conditions in Albania and her claim that her uncle was murdered. While the agency did not explicitly address Jakaj’s evidence that in 1993 masked men looking for her confronted her family in Albania or that in 2008 a family member was attacked by masked men, that evidence did not show a material change in country conditions, as the 1993 incident occurred before Jakaj’s initial removal hearing and Jakaj did not present evidence establishing the identity or motives of the 2008 attackers, or why that incident established a change. See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (explaining that in evaluating whether an applicant has established changed country conditions, the agency “compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”).

Having considered her evidence, the agency did not abuse its discretion in finding that Jakaj did not establish changed country conditions. When Jakaj first applied for asylum in 1997 she asserted that the Socialist Party killed and threatened its opponents. As the agency reasonably concluded, any evidence that the Socialist Party continued to perpetrate political violence did not show a change in country conditions, but at most that conditions had not changed despite the 2005 election following which the Socialist Party lost power. As the agency concluded, the murder of Jakaj’s uncle in 2004, though regrettable, established only the continued persecution of her family (while the Socialist Party was in power), not a change in conditions in Albania.

Jakaj also argues that the agency erred in failing to reopen her proceedings based on her allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, because Ja-kaj’s motion to reopen was filed nearly ten years after her initial removal order, she was required to show that she “ ‘exercised due diligence in pursuing the case’ ” in order to toll the time limits on motions to reopen. See Cekic, 435 F.3d at 170 (quoting Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir.2000)). The agency did not abuse its discretion in finding that she did not meet this burden because Jakaj submitted no evidence that she pursued her case in any way between 1998 and 2008. Id.

Finally, Jakaj was not deprived of due process because she had an opportunity to present her evidence to the IJ and BIA in her motion to reopen and the agency did not err in denying that motion as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C); Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that due process requires that an applicant receive “a full and fair opportunity to present her claims”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  