
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marcus DEAN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 17-30126
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 18, 2017 
    
    Filed December 21, 2017
    Paulette Lynn Stewart, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USHE — Office of the US Attorney, Helena, MT, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, Ryan George Weldon, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USGF — Office of the U.S. Attorney, Great Falls, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Michael Donahoe, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FDMT-Federal Defenders of Montana (Helena), Helena, MT, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Marcus Dean appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 11-month sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Dean argues that the district court-erred by failing to consider the exception to imprisonment listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and, in turn, by not sentencing Dean to drug treatment instead of imprisonment, as requested. We review for plain error, see United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2012), and conclude that there is none. Even if Dean is correct that the district court could have ordered substance abuse treatment in lieu of imprisonment, the record reflects that it would not have done so. See United States v. Dallman, 533 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2008) (to show plain error, defendant must show “a reasonable probability that he would have received a different sentence” absent the error). Contrary to Dean’s contention, the record shows that the court considered his request for substance abuse treatment, as well as his alternative request for a 5-month sentence, and concluded that an 11-month sentence was warranted. The court’s reasons for imposing the high-end sentence are apparent from the record. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Moreover, in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Dean’s history on supervision, the sentence is substantively reasonable. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 993.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     