
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT,
    COLUMBIA,
    NOV. 1805.
    State v. Stroud.
    If the owner of a slave permit the slave to traffic with any one, yet if the slave has not a ticket, or permit, in writing, from the owner, or some other person having the cave or management of such slave, the person who shall traffic or deal with such slave, will be liable to the penalty imposed by the act of 1706: and it will make no difference if the owner, or overseer of the slave, should send the slave to the person who shall deal with Mm, in order to entice him to violate the act of assembly ; and should secret himself so as to he present, within the view and hearing of the parties, who shall so trade or traffic, when the trade is accomplished — provided the person so dealing with a slave, should be' ignorant of the presence of the owner, or overseer, and of the permission given to the slave to trade.
    Indictment for trafficking with a negro slave, tried before Wilds, J., in Abbeville district. It appeared in evidence, that the over? seer of the negro, with whom the defendant traded, had secretly permitted the negro to carry corn to the defendant, to deal with him, in order to .ascertain whether the defendant would trade with the negro for it, when it did not appear to him, the defendant, that the negro had any permission so to do. It was proved that the defendant did receive from the negro ,a basket full of corn, for which he promised payment; the overseer being present, but unseen by the defendant.
    Wilds, J., charged the jury to acquit the defendant, because, although in a moral point of view, the defendant was as guilty of the offence charged against him, as if the com had been received by him contrary to the knowledge and will of the owner, or of the person having the care or management of the slave, yet, in a legal view, he could not be found guilty, since the trafficking with the negvo was not contrary to the permission, and without the knowledge of, the owner or manager of the negro ; and because it appeared to be rather a dealing with the overseer than with the slave. See A. A. 1796,-which forbids every person, directly, or indirectly, to deal, trade, or traffic, with any slave, not having a ticket, or permit, under the hand of his master, or such person as may have the care or management of such slave.
    The .jury found contrary to the judge’s charge. The motion in fn (his court was for a new trial; and was argued by Bowie,for. the motion. Coloocx, solicitor, opposed it.
   Grimke, Waties, Trezevant, and Bay, Justices,

were of °?111*011 that the conviction was good, and within the intent of the act. Brevard, J., hesitated at first, but afterwards concurred.

Present, Grimke, Waties, Bay, Trezevant, Brevard, and Wilds, Justices.

Note. See the Case of The King v. Egginton and others, 2 Bos. and Pul. 508. Indictment for burglary, tine concerned in the burglary, informed the owner of the house of the attempt to be made, who consented to his assisting. It was objected that it is of the essence ofthe crime, that it should be committed against the will of the owner. Brac. lib. 3, tr. 2, c. 32. I Leach, 232. That the informer was a principal, being present, aiding and consenting. The opinion of the judges was never publicly known; but the objection seems to have been overruled, as appeared from the prisoners receiving a pardon, on condition 0$ transportation beyond seas.  