
    (35 South. 509.)
    No. 14,702.
    STATE ex rel. YOUNG v. SANDERS, Sheriff.
    (June 8, 1903.)
    APPEAL—PARTY IN INTEREST—RIGHT TO COSTS—JURISDICTION.
    1. A sheriff, ex officio tax collector, having refused to receive payment of a poll tax and deliver the poll-tax receipt to a person delegated by a taxpayer to make the payment and to receive the receipt, was mled by the latter to show canse why he should not accept the payment and deliver the receipt to the agent. The district court made the rule absolute, and issued a peremptory mandamus. The tax collector appealed. Held, that he had no legal, appealable interest in the premises.
    2. A litigant’s interest in the mere incidental matter of costs of a suit does not entitle him to appeal to the Supreme Court, where he has no appellate interest in the subject-matter of the suit itself.
    3. The rule that the right of one of the parties to a suit to an appeal to a particular court carries with it the right of the opposing party to a like appeal is not universally true. One person may have a vital interest in enforcing a special right which another may willfully, and with no reason whatever, force him to litigate.
    On Rehearing.
    4. The sole issue in this case being whether the relator has the right to pay a poll tax of $1 through a representative, or whether he is required to conform to a rule, established by the respondent tax collector, that the poll tax must be paid by the debtor in person, or forwarded by him through the mail, and there being neither allegation nor proof in the record as to the value of the right claimed by either litigant, this court is without jurisdiction of the appeal.
    Blanchard, X, dissenting.
    (Syllabus by the Court.)
    Appeal from Twenty-Third Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary; Albert Campbell Allen, Judge.
    Application by the state, on the relation of William J. Young, for a rule to show cause why mandamus should not issue to John B. Sanders, sheriff. Writ granted, and defendant appeals.
    Appeal dismissed.
    W. K. Wilson, J. B. Roberts, and Poster, Milling, Godchaux & Sanders, for appellant. D. Caffery & Son, W. Richards Gates, Henry Mayer, and Percy Saint, for appellee.
   Statement of the Case.

NICHOLLS, C. J.

On the 24th of November, 1902, relator wrote a letter to the defendant, the sheriff and ex officio tax collect- or of the parish of St. Mary, to the following-effect:

“Enclosed please find one dollar the amount of my poll tax for the year 1902. You will please deliver my receipt to the bearer and oblige yours truly. W. J. Young.”

This letter, with $1 bill, inclosed in an envelope addressed to the sheriff and tax collector, vyas handed by relator to P. C. Marsh, with instructions to deliver the same, and obtain in return the writer’s tax receipt for 1902.

The deputy tax collector of St. Mary, under instructions from the tax collector, refused to receive payment of the poll tax from. Marsh and deliver the tax receipt to him, declaring relator would have to apply in person or through the mail. Relator then filed a petition in the district court, to which he annexed, as part thereof, the letter and the dollar note referred to, and, .under appropriateaverments, prayed that a rule issue to the sheriff and tax collector to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue, and be-made peremptory, requiring him to accept the dollar tendered him, as stated, in payment of his poll tax for 1902, and to issue therefor to his duly authorized agent a proper receipt, and that upon trial the rule be made absolute, and the mandamus peremptory. The defendant, after filing some exceptions, pleaded a general denial.

He then averred: That, owing to the constitutional provisions regulating suffrages in the state of Louisiana, it was necessary that any person desiring to vote should produce the poll-tax receipts for two years preceding-that in which he offered to vote. That, on account of this constitutional provision, tax receipts had become very valuable, and those-persons who were entitled to them under the law had become very careful in obtaining and preserving them. That, under the law, it was his duty to issue tax-poll receipts, and, knowing the value of the same, and the-scrupulous care taken by all persons to get and keep them, and in order to prevent the poll-tax receipt of one person from falling into the hands of a person other than the owner, and in order to prevent ward politicians from gathering up the poll-tax receipts, and thus influencing the votes of their owners at elections, he had made it a rule of his office that any one desiring a poll-tax receipt must either apply in person or make application by letter through the mail for the same. That relator was perfectly able to comply with the rules established in the office. That-he was neither sick, lame, nor blind, and, had he been either of these, he was still left open the right to obtain the receipt by simply addressing a letter to the sheriff and inclosing the dollar note. That the rule announced was just and equitable, and its working was not a denial of justice to any one, but that every citizen in St. Mary entitled to a poll-tax receipt could obtain the same without having recourse to a mandamus. '

That while it was his duty to deliver poll-tax receipts to all persons entitled to the same when he was paid for them, the manner of complying with this duty was one strictly within his discretion, and he could not be forced by mandamus or otherwise to alter the rule established in the office to suit the whim of every person who might differ with him as to how he should conduct the affairs of the office. That there was no legal obligation on him to deliver the poll-tax receipts of any person to any one other than the person entitled to receive the same. That while there was no ministerial duty on his part to deliver receipts on orders, or even send them through the mail, yet, in order to facilitate persons in securing them, and deeming it safe so to do, he had mailed said tax receipts.

That he had never at any time refused to deliver to relator the poll-tax receipts to which he was entitled, and he stood ready at all times' to deliver the same whenever he should comply with all the rules established in the sheriff’s office, and that he then formally offered to deliver to relator his receipts, which he attached to his answer, upon payment of $1. He prayed that the writ be discharged, and relator’s mandamus dismissed.

The district court rendered judgment in fa-L vor of the relator against defendant, making the rule applied for absolute, at respondent’s costs, and decreeing that the writ of mandamus be made peremptory.

Defendant appealed.

Opinion.

The first question which presents itself for our consideration is the appealable interest of the sheriff and appellant in this matter.

Assuming that the tax collector had the discretion to have acted originally as he did, he certainly has no interest to appeal from a judgment in a particular case or action, rendered at the instance of the party himself entitled to have the payment made, which ordered him to receive the payment and deliver the receipt to a designated agent. The relator in the present case is the party himself who was entitled, admittedly and beyond dispute, to have the payment made, and payment to him, or to the party to whom he delegated the duty of making the payment and receiving- the tax receipt, would leave the tax collector without any legal duty or any legal responsibility in the premises, and without pretext or shadow of right to proceed further in the matter. We fail to see any appeal-able interest which the respondent sheriff and tax collector has in taking this appeal.

Assuming that relator would have had the right to an appeal to the Supreme Court, had he been cast in the action, it by no means necessarily follows that respondent should-have an equal right. The rule that the right of one of the parties to a litigation to an appeal to a particular court carries with it similar right of appeal to the opposing party is not universally true. One person may have a vital interest in the enforcement of a special right, which another, willfully, maliciously, and with no reason whatever, may force him to litigate. This matter is discussed in Bargebur v. Creditors, 2 Mart. (N. S.) 524, 525.

The tax collector having no legal interest to bring the main action to this court by appeal, his interest in the incidental matter of costs does not authorize him to do .so, particularly as the costs are insignificant in amount. See State v. Judge, 4 Rob. 87, 88; Succession of Dougart, 42 La. Ann. 516, 7 South. 794.

Appellant having no appealable interest, we have no power to revise the judgment on his behalf. The appeal must be, and it is hereby, dismissed; costs of appeal to be borne by the appellant.

See dissenting opinion of BLANOTIARD, J., 35 South. 510.

On Rehearing.

(Dec. 14, 1903.)

MONROE, J.

It is said that, inasmuch as relator’s right to vote in 1903 and 1904 depends upon the payment of his poll tax for 1902 within the year, that right is at issue in this case; that it is worth more than $2,000; and hence that, as to the relator, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal; and from this it is argued that such jurisdiction necessarily attaches with respect to the appeal taken by the respondent.

It is indisputable, however, that the relator could have secured the coveted franchise by the payment, either in person or through the mail, of the sum of $1; and it is equally beyond dispute that the defendant, in the event of his complying with the relator’s utmost demands, would sustain no pecuniary loss, and would suffer no other invasion of his right, if right there be, than would be involved in his receiving the dollar from the relator’s agent, rather than from the relator personally or through the mail. The real and only issue in the case, therefore, is whether the relator has the right to pay his poll tax through a representative, or whether it is necessary for him to conform to a rule established by respondent that the poll tax must be paid by the debtor either in person or through the mail. Conceding, arguendo, that the relator had the right to pay through a representative, and that the defendant unlawfully denied him that right, he could still have secured the right to vote by paying in person or through the mail, so that, as to him, the value in dispute is the value of the right to pay in one way rather than another. Upon the other hand, conceding that the respondent had the right to require that the payment should be made by the relator in person or through the mail, the value' in dispute, as to the respondent, is measured by the value of the right to enforce the rule established by him. But there is not a syllable in the record to show that the value of the right thus asserted by either party exceeds $2,000, so that, the Constitution offering no other basis therefor, if this court assumes jurisdiction of the appeal, it must do so upon the violent presumption that it is worth more than $2,000 to the relator to pay his poll tax in one way, and more than $2,000 to the defendant to compel him to pay it in another way; either way, so far as we can see, being equally within the power of the relator, and equally convenient to the respondent.

Article 85 of the present Constitution contains an enumeration of the cases in which this court is authorized to exercise appellate jurisdiction, beginning with “all eases where the matter in dispute, or the fund to be distributed, whatever may be the amount therein claimed, shall exceed two thousand dollars, exclusive of interest”; and no such case as that here presented is included in the enumeration. Evidently, however, it was thought that cases would be likely to arise in which it might become necessary, in the interest of justice, to invoke the authority of this court in some other way than by appeal. Article 101 therefore provides a method of reviewing cases otherwise cognizable in last resort in the Courts of Appeal; and, in order to provide for still other possible cases, which might be within neither the appellate jurisdiction conferred by article 85, nor the jurisdiction conferred by article 101, article 94 provides that “the Supreme Court shall have control and general supervision of all inferior courts,” which jurisdiction, it had been repeatedly held, may be exercised in all cases “where serious injury may accrue to the parties to whom no other remedies are afforded.” State ex rel. Gaslight Co. v. Judge, 37 La. Ann. 286; State ex rel. Murray v. Judge, 36 La. Ann. 580; State ex rel. Hirsch v. Judge, 39 La. Ann. 97, 1 South. 281; State ex rel. Le Blanc & Richard v. Justice of the Peace, 41 La. Ann. 908, 6 South. 807; State ex rel. Sorrel v. Judge, 106 La. 425, 31 South. 57.

Our conclusion, then, upon 'a re-examination of this case, is that this court had no jurisdiction of the appeal. It is, therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment heretofore rendered be now reinstated, and made the final judgment of the court.  