
    Phælon against M'Bride.
    a negro boy out as an ap-Uaii'-drcsser,"1 blo'for1 rent níasteíy ^to yhom he is bound.
    REPLEVIN. A negro boy was bound as an apprentice to McBride, to learn the trade of a hair-dresser. He was seized, under a warrant of distress, for rent, and re-plevied. The distress for rent was avowed ; and the single P°int wasi whether a negro apprentice, bound out to learn a trade, was liable to be distrained for rent due by the master ’ to whom he was bound.
    Smith, for the avowant,
    contended, that on the general principles of law, all goods and chattels found on the premises, were liable for rent in arrear. That negroes are considered by the laws and customs of the country, as goods and chattels ; and the boy in question, being found on the premises, he was liable to the distress.
    Pinckney, for plaintiff
    in replevin, insisted, that the negro in question was not liable to distress for rent. That ne-groes of third persons ought to be exempt from distress. That in this case, they might be considered as goods in the way of trade ; and even in England, goods in the way of trade are not liable to distress. That hair-dressers could not carry on their trade without boys or apprentices ; and who would bind out their negro boys if they were liable to-be seized for rent ? No one. The doctrine of distress was a hard one, taken from old feudal principles, not applicable to the circumstances of this country. All the modem cases had liberalized the doctrine of distress exceedingly. He quoted the case of Himely v. Wyatt Richardson, (in this court,) v,diere goods sent to vendue were held not liable for rent.
   Court

unanimously of opinion, that. the negro boy was not liable to be distrained; upon the principle that goods in the way of trade are exempted; and also, because indentures of apprenticeship are not, even in England, liable to distress. The case of Himely v. Wyatt, &c. was adjudged upon wise and legal principles, and is much in point* In the opinion of the court, it would be hard and unreasonable, under those circumstances, to make the property of a third person liable for the default of a tenant; and that wherever there was a case so much against natural justice, the court would uniformly lean in favour of the just and reasonable side.

Verdict for plaintiff in replevin.  