
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
    APRIL, 1809.
    Ford, Administrator cum testamento annexo v. Travis.
    If an administrator sue in his own right, although he sue as administrator, as for a conversion after his intestate’s death, he shall pay costs of nonsuit.
    Appeals to the Court of Appeals, by way of motion, must depend on the question, or point, submitted to the District Court; and no new ground can be taken. Therefore, if the District Court should decide properly, on an improper state of the question presented for its decision, this court will not reverse that decision, upon a correct view of the question presented to it.
    A nonsuit had been obtained in this case. Execntion had issued against the plaintiff for costs. On motion to set aside the execution and judgment, as irregular in regard to the costs, before Smith, J., in Edgefield District, it was so determined. Motion in this court to reverse the decision. In the argument of the motion in the District Court, it was not shewn when the cause of action accrued ; or whether the plaintiff sued in right of the testator, or for a conversion after his death.
    Smith, J., reported that the distinction, taken in the argument on the motion in this court, was not taken in the District Court; but for the defendant, it was insisted on, as a general position, that the plaintiff, as administrator, was liable to pay costs ; upon which, relying on the decision in the case of Murel’s Executor v. Howard, 1 vol. 884, he granted the motion.
    In support of the motion in this court, Goodwin, for the defendant, contended that the plaintiff was liable for the costs, as he sued for a conversion, after the testator’s death; and that he acted wil-fully wrong in bringing the action. He cited Tidd’s Prac. 891. 2 Sellon 457. 8 Burr. 1451, 1684. 1 L’d Raym. 436. 5 D. and E. 234. 2 East. 7 D. and E. 358. 4 Burr.
    Farrow, contra,
    cited 2 Bos. and P. 253. 2 Str. 3 Bac. Abr.
   Smith, J.,

said that, in the District Court, the counsel for the defendant had relied on the argument, that the court could not, on motion, set aside the judgment and execution, and that the argument, now used, had not been advanced there.

The court overruled the motion, on the ground that the District Court had decided correctly on the points made in that court; but recognized the doctrine contended for by Goodwin. But in this case the facts did not appear to the District Court.  