
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Vincent Cataldo, Appellant.
    Argued April 30, 1976;
    decided June 2, 1976
    
      
      Lynn Fahey and William E. Hellerstein for appellant.
    The court erred in summarily rejecting appellant’s request to withdraw his plea, which presented a substantial claim that it was taken in violation of due process in that he reasonably misunderstood the sentence promise which the court made to him. (Marvel v United States, 380 US 262; Kercheval v United States, 274 US 220; People v Campana, 33 NY2d 538; People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338; People v Serrano, 15 NY2d 304; Mosher v LaVallee, 491 F2d 1346; United States ex rel. Leeson v Damon, 496 F2d 718; People v McClain, 32 NY2d 697; People v Selikoff, 35 NY2d 227; People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926.)
    
      Eugene Gold, District Attorney (Suzan Picariello and Laurie Stein Hershey of counsel), for respondent.
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. (United States ex rel. Curtis v Zelker, 466 F2d 1092; United States ex rel. LaFay v Fritz, 455 F2d 297, 407 US 923; United States ex rel. Scott v Mancusi, 429 F2d 104, 402 US 909; People v George, 47 AD2d 662; People v Weyant, 43 AD2d 700; People v Melendez, 47 AD2d 662; Mosher v LaVallee, 491 F2d 1346; United States ex rel. Leeson v Damon, 496 F2d 718; People v Vaughan, 35 NY2d 926.)
   Memorandum. The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

The record in this case clearly indicates that the court, in accepting defendant’s plea of guilty to a reduced charge, made the following promises as to sentence: (1) that if the Probation Department so recommended, the court would sentence defendant to the Narcotic Addiction Control Commission for a period of five years; (2) that if the Probation Department recommended a prison sentence, the court would sentence defendant to a term of imprisonment with a maximum term not to exceed five years; and (3) that if after reading the probation report it could not in good conscience keep the above promises, the court would permit defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty. The probation report revealed numerous prior convictions, sufficient to cause the Probation Department to recommend an indeterminate term of imprisonment with a maximum of five years. The court sentenced defendant in accordance with this recommendation. In so doing, it complied with the agreement the court made at the time it accepted defendant’s plea of guilty. The court thereafter denied defendant’s motion to withdraw this plea of guilty as well as defendant’s subsequent motion in the nature of coram nobis to vacate the judgment.

Where a sentencing court keeps the promises it made at the time it accepted a plea of guilty, a defendant should not be permitted to withdraw his plea on the sole ground that he misinterpreted the agreement. Compliance with a plea bargain is to be tested against an objective reading of the bargain, and not against a defendant’s subjective interpretation thereof. A contrary holding would permit any defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty solely because he was disappointed with the sentence received, even though the court has kept its word in that respect.

Since the plea bargain here is susceptible to but one interpretation, we conclude that the court properly refused to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.

Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke concur.

Order affirmed in a memorandum.  