
    NEW YORK SUPERIOR COURT.
    Adam Pilger agt. Louis Gou.
    Where the plaintiff’s attorney gets the consent of the defendant to discontinue the action, without the knowledge of the defendant’s attorney, but enters no order, nor gives any notice of discontinuance, the plaintiff must pay all subsequent costs made by the defendant’s attorney in noticing the cause, taking default, &c.
    
      New York Special Term, February, 1861.
    This action was brought to recover the sum of $1,000 for an alleged slander. The plaintiff in his complaint charges the defendant with having, on the 12th July, 1859, uttered in the presence and hearing of a great number of persons, “that plaintiff poisoned his wife; he administered to her poison, or some drug, for the purpose of having her conducted to a lunatic asylum;” “ that he has bribed some physicians, and paid them ten dollars, to assist him to accomplish his design,” meaning thereby that plaintiff had bribed a physician to give a certificate of the insanity of his said wife, so that she should be conveyed to a lunatic asylum; and further, that he, plaintiff, has so done to enable said plaintiff to cohabit and live with another female. The defendant, by his answer, specifically denied all the allegations of the complaint. On the 11th instant, the cause being reached, the plaintiff not appearing, the defendant moved the court to dismiss the action with costs, which motion was thereupon granted. The plaintiff’s attorney, upon his own affidavit, now moves to discontinue this action, and produces a consent purporting to be signed by the defendant and plaintiff’s attorney on the 24th March, 1860. The motion was opposed by
    A. H. Reavey, defendant’s counsel.
    
    Ranken & Reavey, defendant’s attorneys.
    
   Robertson, Justice.

The plaintiff’s attorney seems to have obtained the defendant’s consent to discontinue without the knowledge of the attorney, and allowed the latter to go on noticing the cause and taking the default of the plaintiff without applying to the court to enter an order of discontinuance. Although the default is excused, the attorney is entitled to the costs he has been put to, by'the plaintiff’s neglect. The default may, therefore, be opened, and an order for discontinuance entered, upon the plaintiff’s paying the cost of the term, being ten dollars, with any disbursements by the defendant’s attorneys, and the costs of opposing the motion, fixed at ten dollars. ’  