
    
      Ex parte Wood and others.
    To entitle a judgment creditor to redeem lands from a purchaser at a sheriff’s sale, the judgment in virtue of which the right of redeeming is claimed must be ■against the defendant in the writ under which the sale took place, and must also be a lien on the lands sold.
    Judgments having been obtained against R. which were a lien on his land, he conveyed to P.; after which executions were issued, and the lands sold by thef sheriff to W. P. then conveyed to S., against whom and R. a' judgment was obtained by M. within fifteen months from the sheriff’s sale, and M. claimed the right to redeem on paying the amount of W.’s bid, together, with interest. Held, however, that he was not entitled to redeem.
    Redemption of lands. Previous to the 26th of September, 1840, three judgments were obtained in this court in favor of Wood and others, plaintiffs, against Ramsdell, defendant, which judgments were docketed and became liens on the defendant’s land in Genesee county. On the day above mentioned, Rams-dell conveyed the said land to Pringle & Moore, and, on the 9th of January thereafter, it was sold by the sheriff under executions issued upon the said judgments, to the plaintiffs therein. On the first of April following, Pringle & Moore sold a part of the land to Rose; and, on the 6th of January, 1842, Mallory obtained a judgment against Rose and Ramsdell before a justice of the peace, and procured the same to be docketed on the next day after its rendition. By virtue of this judgment, Mallory claimed to redeem the land from the sale under the execution, and, on the 9th of April, 1842, paid to the sheriff the amount for which it had been sold, with interest. The sheriff thereupon executed a deed to Mallory, as a redeeming creditor, and refused, after the expiration of fifteen months from the day of sale, to execute a deed to the plaintiffs in the execution. This motion was therefore made in their behalf for a mandamus to compel the sheriff to execute and deliver such deed.
    
      Dibble <§r Martindale, for the relators.
    The judgment under which a creditor may redeem must possess two qualities, viz. 1. It should be a lien on the land; and 2. It should be against the execution debtor. (2 R. S. 371, § 51.) Mallory’s judgment had neither of these requisites. Ramsdell was a defendant in it, but it was not a lien on the land as against him, for he had conveyed to Pringle and Wood before the judgment was obtained. And although as against Rose the judgment was a lien on that part of the land which had been previously conveyed to him, yet he was not the individual against whom the execution issued under which the sale took place. Mallory was not, therefore, in a position which would enable him to redeem as a creditor of either Ramsdell or Rose,
    
      B. Pringle,' contra.
   By the Courts

Nelson, Ch. J.

I am of opinion the counsel for the relators are right in their exposition of the statute, and the motion must therefore be granted.

Ordered accordingly.  