
    * The Inhabitants of Hallowell versus The Inhabitants of Harwich.
    Expenses incurred in the support of a pauper, more than two years before action brought, cannot be recovered, although the same plaintiffs have, in a former action, recovered from the same defendants expenses incurred for the support of the same pauper; nor without a new notice.
    This was an action of assumpsit for further expenses incurred in the relief and support of Ephraim Burgess, the pauper mentioned *" in the preceding case ; and was commenced on the 30th of August, 1815. The plaintiffs demand the amount of the expenses which arose between the 14th of November, 1810, (the time to which they recovered in the former suit,) and the 22d of November, 1814.
    It was admitted that the said Burgess, from the time that he first became chargeable as a pauper in Hallowell, was at all times supported as such by said Hallowell, to the said last-mentioned day.
    If the Court should be of opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for the whole time stated in the declaration, it was agreed that judgment should be rendered in their favor for 350 dollars; if the Court should be of opinion that they were entitled to recover for two years only next before the commencement of the action, judgment should be entered for 150 dollars; and if the Court should be of opinion that they were not entitled to recover any sum in this action upon the foregoing statement, they were to have a trial by jury, which was to be final for them.
    
      Bond, for the plaintiffs.
    This being the second action between these parties for the support of the same pauper, and judgment having been recovered in the former suit by the plaintiffs, no notice need be proved to support the present action. The notice required by the statute relates exclusively to the first suit, and one notice only is contemplated by the law, where the pauper continues to be chargeable. This may be inferred *from the cases of Leicester vs. Rehoboth, 
       and Sydney vs Augusta, 
       the want of notice not being the ground of objection in either of the cases. Judgment in the first suit gives effective operation to the notice, and determines the question of settlement. A second notice can afford no further information; and even if seasonably answered, will not open for dispute the question of settlement. After judgment, it is the duty of the town chargeable to make provision for the pauper.
    The limitation of two years applies to the first suit only. This, as an action of assumpsit, comes within the provision of the general statute limiting personal actions; and the plaintiffs have therefore a right to recover for the expenses incurred within six years prior to the date of their writ. A different construction of the statute would encourage and require a frequency of suits not consistent with sound policy or the true interest of the parties.
    But if the parties have no right to recover for all the expenses incurred within six years before the commencement of their action, it seems clear, upon any reasonable interpretation of the statute, that they may have judgment for the amount of their expenditures within two years.
    
      
      Williams, for the defendants.
    The only effect of the former judgment is to conclude the defendants on the question of the settlement of the pauper. Notice is as necessary to be alleged and proved in a second suit as in tine first. The statute furnishes no ground for the distinction set up by the plaintiffs. 
    
    If, however, the Court should hold a second notice unnecessary, the limitation of two years must certainly apply to the action.
    
      
       4 Mass. Rep. 180.
    
    
      
       12 Mass. Rep. 316.
    
    
      
       6 Mass. Rep. 501, Dalton vs. Hinsdale. — 5 Mass. Rep. 325, Bath vs. Freeport, - 3 Mass. Rep. 436, Salem vs. Andover. —12 Mass. Rep. 334, Mitchell vs. Cornville — Ibid. 452, Needham vs. Newton.
      
    
   Parker, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by this case is twofold : 1. Whether the action can be maintained for the whole sum demanded, which is claimed as a reimbursement of expenses incurred from November 14, 1810, to November 22, 1814, notwithstanding the proviso in the ninth section *of the statute, which must be construed to be a limitation of the action to the term of two years after the cause of action accrued.

It is insisted by the plaintiffs that this limitation is not applicable to a case like the present, where there had been a previous action, upon which judgment was recovered by the plaintiffs, and where the expenses sued for accrued during the pendency of the former suit.

But we are not able to make such an exception to the express provision of the legislature; nor are there any equitable reasons inducing us to wish that we had such power. The defendant town, in such suits, knows nothing necessarily, but that they are called upon to reimburse the plaintiffs for expenses, which had accrued up to the time of the commencement of the suit which is brought against them. Whether the person who has caused the expense continues to be a charge upon the town, which has sued them or not, they may be ignorant. The distress which called for the relief may have been temporary, and may have ceased; or the person may have left the town where he fell into distress, and have gone to some other place. There is no continuance of the liability, therefore, in consequence of the existence of the suit; but every subsequent right of action must stand independent of that which has preceded, and must be subject to the same restrictions in the statute.

All the expenses, therefore, which are sued for in this action, and which accrued more than two years before the commencement of the suit, are barred by the proviso of the statute, which, it has been determined, will be taken notice of by the Court, without its being pleaded by the defendant; because, by the statute, the plaintiffs’ right of action is conditional, viz., that it be brought within two years after the accruing of the expense.

2. Another question is, whether the residue of the sum can be recovered, no notice having been given to the overseers of Harwich before the suit brought. * And we are clear that it cannot; the notice in the former suit, or the pro ceedings in that suit, having no relation to this, except to conclude the defendants upon the question of settlement. For the reasons before stated, applicable to the other question, the notice should be renewed upon every new cause of action. The purpose and object of the notice is to give the town called upon the election of taking the pauper home, and supporting him within their own town. Now, the proceedings in the former suit cannot inform them that the person is still a pauper; or that he has not acquired a settlement in some other town, which may be done in several of the ways provided in the statute, in less time than elapsed between the commencement of this and the former suit. The notice to the overseers of the town sued is a sine qua non of the action.

The plaintiffs, then, cannot have judgment on the facts before us; but as it has been suggested that it may be in their power, on another trial, to prove the requisite notice to the defendants, a new trial is to be had for that purpose, according to the agreement of the parties, 
      
      
         [Belfast vs. Leominster, 1 Pick. 123.—Ed.]
     