
    Julio Enrique CHOY-ALVAREZ and Isabel Matilda Sebastian-Fuentes, Petitioners, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 15-71176
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted December 5, 2017 San Francisco, California
    Filed December 15, 2017
    Francisco J. Barba, Esquire, Senior Attorney, Law Offices of Francisco J. Barba, San Jose, CA, Charles E. Nichol, Attorney, Law Offices of Charles E. Nichol, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioners
    Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Paul F. Stone, Esquire, Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent
    Before: GRABER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, Chief District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chief United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Julio Enrique Choy-Alvarez and Isabel Matilda Sebastian-Fuentes, husband and ■wife, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of their appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We deny the petition for review.

1. We lack jurisdiction to “review [the] determination of the Attorney General” that Choy-Alvarez is barred from asylum because he “has engaged in a terrorist activity.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(v) & (D), 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), 1227(a)(4)(B). However, we retain jurisdiction over legal questions relating to the scope and meaning of the terrorism bar, withholding of removal, and relief under CAT. See Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2009).

To the extent we have jurisdiction, the evidence does not compel us to conclude that the BIA- erred in determining that Choy-Alvarez was ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal, because he had engaged in terrorist activity. See Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that we must uphold' the agency’s determination unless “the evidence not only supports, but compels the conclusion that the asylum decision was incorrect” (internal quotation marks omitted)). First, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s adverse credibility finding with regard to Choy-Alvarez’s knowledge and relationship with the Shining Path terrorist organization. Choy-Alva-rez presented inconsistent testimony, for which the BIA found he was unable to provide a reasonable explanation. Second, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Choy-Alvarez failed to meet his burden of proof of establishing eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. Because Choy-Alvarez’s relationship and activities with the Shining Path indicated that the terrorist bar may apply, he had “the burden of proving by a preponderance of .the evidence that such grounds do not apply.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). Choy-Alvarez was unable to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not provide material support to the Shining Path.

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Sebastian-Fuentes failed to establish eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under CAT; thus, we are not compelled to conclude otherwise. See Lolong, 484 F.3d at 1178. The BIA determined that there was no evidence of an objective basis for Sebastian-Fuentes’s stated fear of future persecution if she returns to Peru. See id. Although Sebastian-Fuentes’s credible testimony about the four incidents in Peru satisfies the subjective component to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, her fears are not objectively reasonable; Sebastian-Fuentes failed to .present objective evidence to suggest an individualized risk of future persecution existed. See id. Thus, Sebastian-Fuentes failed to demonstrate that she was eligible for asylum. Accordingly, Sebastian-Fuentes is unable to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal, see Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 2004), and she has not shown that she is more likely than not to be tortured, see Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2007).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     
      
      . Choy-Alvarez failed to present any specific argument in his opening brief that the BIA's conclusions denying CAT relief were legally or factually erroneous. Thus, he waived this issue. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996).
     
      
      . The IJ found that Sebastian-Fuentes failed to establish past persecution, Sebastian .does not challenge this finding. Thus, it is waived. See Martinez-Serrano, 94 F.3d at 1259-60.
     