
    
      Ann Hellman vs. Thomas McWhennie.
    
    Warrants of attorney to prosecute or defend actions, are not in general use in this State ; and the court will not, it seems, upon mere motion, without cause shewn, require one to he produced.
    By consent of plaintiff’s and defendant’s attorneys, the examination of a witness for the plaintiff had been taken in writing, “ to be read if the defendant did not object to it.” On the trial, the defendant’s attorney, without the knowledge of his client, objected to its being read. Held, that though the client might dissent, yet the attorney could not, and the examination was read.
    
      Before Gantt, J. at Charleston, Spring Term, 1831.
    This was an action of trespass for beating a slave. Several points were made in the course of the trial, only two of which it is necessary to state. The plaintiff’s attorney was called on to shew his warrant of attorney. No cause was shewn, and his Honor thought it unnecessary, and overruled a motion made for that purpose. The examination of James Ludlow, a witness for the plaintiff, had been taken in writing, with the reservation, “ that it was to be read if the defendant did not object to it.” The defendant’s counsel, without the knowledge of his client, for he had not communicated with him on the subject, ob- ■ jected to its being read, and his Honor overruled the objection. The plaintiff had a verdict, and the defendant appealed, and moved for a new trial, on the grounds that his Honor erred in refusing to require the plaintiff’s attorney to produce his warrant, and in permitting the examination of Ludlow to be read.
   Curia, per

Johnson, J.

Warrants of attorney have never, within my experience, been in use in our courts. The general integrity of the gentlemen of the profession, furnishes a security against their taking upon themselves to defend or prosecute a cause without the authority of the party ; and when we add to this, the difficulty of concealing such a practice, and their accountability in the event of detection, I cannot well perceive why they were ever thought necessary, otherwise than as protection to the counsel himself. The objection to the admissibility of the written examination of the witness, Ludlow, arises out of an agreement between the counsel, that it should be read in evidence, with a reservation on the part of the defendant’s counsel, that it should not be read if his client should object to it. It is not questioned that the counsel were competent to make this agreement, and that their clients were bound by it; and I think it is equally clear, that the reservation is not inconsistent with it. The counsel might not think proper to conclude the rights of his client without his assent, and that was the object of the reservation or proviso in this agreement ; and unquestionably, the defendant himself might have dissented. But the dissent here was by the counsel himself, and, as he candidly admits, without the knowledge of his client, for he had not communicated with him on the subject. This was not the case provided for in the agreement. The attorney was bound, although the client might have dissented. The evidence was, therefore, properly admitted.

Motion dismissed.

O’Neall, J. concurred.  