
    Sergio RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Brenda M. CASH, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 12-55515.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted May 9, 2013.
    
    Filed May 29, 2013.
    Patrick Morgan Ford, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    William M. Wood, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    
      Before: PREGERSON and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and DANIEL, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Wiley Y. Daniel, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Sergio Rodriguez appeals the district court’s order dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.

Rodriguez contends that the state court unreasonably applied Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), by failing to find error when the prosecutor made impermissible comments about Rodriguez’s failure to testify at trial. “While a direct comment about the defendant’s failure to testify always violates Griffin, a prosecutor’s indirect comment violates Griffin only ‘if it is manifestly intended to call attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, or is of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure to testify.’ ” Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 912 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir.1987)).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) standard, the state court’s conclusion that no error occurred was neither an unreasonable application of Griffin nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Although Rodriguez contends the prosecutor made an indirect reference to his failure to testify, when viewed in context, the prosecutor was referring to defense counsel’s failure to rebut certain questions raised about the evidence. A comment on the failure of defense counsel to counter or explain the testimony presented or the evidence introduced is not a Griffin violation, where, as here, it is “not in any manner directed at the [defendant’s] failure to take the stand.” United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 461 (9th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1498-99 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Mende, 43 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir.1995).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     