
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnnie E. MOSLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 12-1106.
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    
      Submitted May 2, 2012.
    
    Decided May 2, 2012.
    Christopher C. Heery, Angela Scott, Office of the United States Attorney, Fair-view Heights, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Johnnie E. Mosley, Tucson, AZ, pro se.
    Before KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge and DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge.
    
      
       After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
    
   ORDER

Johnnie Mosley appeals from the denial of his motion for a reduced sentence based on a retroactive amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Because the amendment does not apply to Mosley, we affirm the judgment.

Mosley pleaded guilty in 2006 to being a felon in possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession of crack cocaine with intent to deliver, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was sentenced as a career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, to 262 months’ imprisonment. The Sentencing Commission later retroactively amended U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 to lower the base offense levels for certain crack offenses, see U.S.S.G. app. C at 253 (2011) (Amend. 713), and Mosley moved under § 3582(c)(2) to reduce his sentence. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Mosley’s status as a career offender made him ineligible for a sentence reduction.

On appeal Mosley argues broadly that the Sentencing Commission should have extended the reach of its amendment to include those sentenced under the career-offender guideline. He also argues that the district court should have considered his post-sentencing rehabilitation before denying his motion. But whatever the merits of Mosley’s arguments as a policy matter, the district court lacked authority to reduce his sentence because it had sentenced him based on his status as a career offender and not § 2D1.1. See United States v. Guyton, 636 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir.2011); United States v. Jackson, 573 F.3d 398, 399-400 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Forman, 553 F.3d 585, 589-90 (7th Cir.2009).

AFFIRMED.  