
    Linda E. EWING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Randy MEGRDLE, Detective Employee Number 135509 an Officer of Lancaster Sheriff's Dept; C. Husbands, Sergeant Employee Number 135509 an Officer of Lancaster Sheriff's Dept, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-56061
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 14, 2017 
    
    Filed February 23, 2017
    Linda E. Ewing, Pro Se
    Jonathan McCaverty, Stephen Takaaki Niwa, Los Angeles County Counsel, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees
    Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Linda E. Ewing appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Ewing’s Fourth Amendment judicial deception claim because Ewing failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Megrdle procured the search warrant by making misrepresentations or omissions intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth. See Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements of a Fourth Amendment claim on the basis of judicial deception).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ewing’s motion for leave to amend because granting leave to amend would be prejudicial to defendants and cause undue delay. See Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1990) (setting forth standard of review and relevant factors; noting that prejudice is the most important factor). We reject as without merit Ewing’s contention that the district court improperly considered the motion seeking leave to amend after grant-mg defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ewing’s motion for reconsideration because Ewing did not present any newly discovered evidence. See Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1987) (setting forth standard of review and noting that evidence is not newly discovered if it could have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence); see also C.D. Cal. R. 7-18.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim[.]”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
      
         This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     