
    GWATHMEY SIEGEL KAUFMAN & ASSOCIATES ARCHITECTS, LLC, fka Gwathmey Siegel & Associates Architects, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mitchell RALES, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-2802-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 1, 2013.
    
      Albert W. McKee, Gogick, Byrne & O’Neill LLP, New York, NY. (Kevin J. O’Neill; on the brief; James F. Lee Jr., Lee & McShane, PC, Washington, DC, on the brief), for Appellant.
    Robert E. Zimet, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, New York, N.Y. (Alexander N. Lamme, Watt Tieder Hoffar Fitzgerald, LLP, on the brief), for Appel-lee.
    Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges, CATHY SEIBEL, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Cathy Seibel, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Gwathmey Siegel Kaufman & Associates Architects, LLC appeals from the June 20, 2012 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Scheindlin, J.) granting Michael Rales’ motion to dismiss the action and denying its motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

On appeal, Gwathmey argues that the language contained in Paragraph 7.2 of the agreement between the parties (the “Agreement”) providing that “[i]n no event shall the demand for arbitration be made after the date when institution of legal or equitable proceedings based on such claim, dispute or other matter in question would be barred by the applicable statutes of limitations” establishes that arbitrability is to be determined by the courts. At a minimum, Gwathmey argues, the language creates an ambiguity as to who decides arbitrability.

The Agreement is not ambiguous, and by incorporating the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) rules the parties agreed to have the arbitrators decide arbi-trability. “[WJhen, as here, parties explicitly incorporate rules that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate such issues to an arbitrator.” Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution, Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir.2005). The AAA rules state that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.” The district court correctly determined that the “in no event” language does not abrogate the decision to allow the arbitrator to determine arbitrability. The “in no event” language is simply a term of the arbitration agreement that establishes an outer limit for the “reasonable time” to which the previous sentence refers. Gwathmey’s arguments simply do not hold up against the weight of our Court’s precedent.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. Each side to bear its own costs.  