
    (67 Misc. Rep. 240.)
    HOWE v. STEWART.
    (City Court of New Toril, Special Term.
    April, 1910.)
    Witnesses (§ 198)—Competency—Attorney and Client— Confidential Relations.
    An attorney, who has represented a judgment debtor for 10 years, and m such manner has acquired information as to the latter’s estate, should not be compelled, on supplementary proceedings against his client, to testify whether he has managed any of his real estate, or whether he has any of his property.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 747, 748, 753; Dec. Dig. § 198.*]
    Action by Prank M. Howe against William W. Stewart. On motion to punish for contempt.
    Denied.
    Por opinion reversing this, see 123 N. Y. Supp. 971.
    See, also, 123 N. Y. Supp. 1121.
    Walter P. Prank, for plaintiff.
    A. Edward Woodruff, for defendant.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
    
   GREEN, J.

This is a motion to punish for. contempt the attorney for a judgment debtor, who, being examined under a third party order, declined respectfully to answer questions in relation to his client’s property upon the ground of professional privilege, basing his refusal under the inhibition of section 835 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

There are a number of technical objections interposed to the order in relation to the failure of personal service of the order after a stay had been procured and another day fixed, and also in regard to the failure of payment of witness fees, and upon which I will not pass, basing my decision upon the broad one of professional privilege. The witness, in answer to the questions of counsel for the judgment debtor, stated that-he had known the judgment debtor for 40 years, that he had been his attorney for upward of 10 years, and that whatever he knew about his affairs he acquired as his attorney. He was asked if he managed any real estate for him, and also if he had any property of the judgment debtor, and these questions he declined to answer upon the ground hereinbefore stated. I am of the opinion that the attorney was justified in declining to answer these questions, upon the authority of Eastman v. Kelly, 49 Hun, 607, 1 N. Y„ Supp. 866, and, were he to do so, would bring down upon himself the same condemnation as was suffered by the attorney in the case cited. See, also, the illuminating article on “Privileged Communications to Attorneys,” in Bench and Bar, April, 1910.

The motion to punish for contempt is denied, without costs.

Motion denied, without costs.  