
    Catherine Watson versus The Inhabitants of Cambridge.
    Wn sre an inhabitant of a town incurs an expense for the relief of a pauper, for which the town is liable after notice and request to the overseers of such town, such notice and request need not be in writing.
    An action against the town, for the reimbursement of such expense, is not limited to two years after the notice.
    Where a bond had been given by one individual to another, for the support of a poor person, and the indemnity of the obligee, who was chargeable for such support, the town of the pauper’s lawful settlement was not thereby discharged from the obligation to support and maintain such pauper.
    Assumpsit for the support of one Venus Whittemore, ninety-eight weeks, at one dollar fifty cents per week.
    At the trial, which was had upon the general issue, at the sittings here, after the last October term, before Putnam, J., the plaintiff proved that the said Venus was ninety years old, and that she was formerly the slave of Samuel * Whittemore, deceased, who was an inhabitant of Cambridge; that her settlement was in Cambridge, and that she liad been supported by the plaintiff.
    The plaintiff also proved, by two of the overseers of the town of Cambridge, that she had applied to them to take care of and support the said Venus, about two years and a half before this action was commenced ; and that they refused to do so, after conferring upon the matter at their board.
    
      The defendants contended that a written notice ought to have been given by the plaintiff to the inhabitants, and that paroi testimony of such notice should not have been admitted.
    The defendants proved that the administrator of the said Whittemore, in the year 1793, disposed of the said Venus at auction, to William Watson, of Cambridge, now deceased ; who gave to the said administrator a bond, in the penal sum of £200, conditioned to provide for the support and maintenance of the said Venus, in raiment and diet, and both.in sickness and health, in a comfortable manner, and at her death, to cause her to be decently buried, free of expense to the heirs of the said Whittemore; and to save them harmless from all costs, charges, and expenses, to arise on account thereof. They also proved that the said Venus was present at the said auction, and refused to go into the family of one of the bidders ; that, in consequence of said refusal, the auction was suspended for some time; that said Watson, after the auction, said he had undertaken to support said Venus during her life ; and that he did support her during his life. And the defendants contended that this evidence was sufficient to prove that the said Watson had undertaken to support the said Venus; that she had a right to recover the money, necessary for that purpose, of the administrator of the estate of said Watson; and so, that the said Venus was not a pauper.
    The plaintiff objected to the admission of the testimony produced by the defendants. And the judge instructed the *jury, that the paroi evidence, given as aforesaid, was admissible ; and that the evidence adduced by the defendants was not admissible to prove that the said Venus had any estate ; and that they were to consider her as a pauper, and to inquire as to the amount which the plaintiff ought to recover.
    The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff, for 147 dollars. But if, in the opinion of the whole Court, the direction of the judge was wrong, the verdict was to be set aside, and the plaintiff to become nonsuit. Otherwise, judgment was to be rendered on the verdict.
    
      Hoar, for the defendants.
    The notice to the overseers was deficient, in that it was not in writing; and having been given more than two years before the commencement of the suit, is not sufficient in law to support the action.
    But the point in the case, principally relied upon by the defendants, is the rejection of Watson’s bond, offered in evidence. It was suitable and proper evidence to prove that Venus was not a pauper whom the town was bound to support or relieve. It was proof of a promise by Watson to her to provide every thing necessary to her support and comfort during her life ; and it is submitted that she might maintain an action upon such promise, in the same manner as the assignee of a bond can. In the case of Marchington vs. Vernon & Al., 
       it was ruled by Buller, J., that, “ if one person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third, that third person may maintain an action upon it.” In the present case, there was also other evidence of this undertaking on the part of Watson to support this woman. This promise was property, and being precisely com petent to her support, she was at no time a pauper. If the plain tiff recovers in this action, the defendants will, undoubtedly, have their remedy over against the representatives of Watson ; and thus an unnecessary and inconvenient circuity of action is produced.
    
      Fay for the plaintiff.
    
      
       1 B. & P. 101, note (c). — See also Cowp. 443, Martyn vs Hind. 1 Vent. 318, 332, Dutton vs. Poole.
      
    
   * Parker, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff’s action is founded upon the thirteenth section of the statute of 1793, c. 59, providing for the relief and support of the poor, &c., which enacts, among other things, that every town and district shall be holden to pay any expense which shall be necessarily incurred for the relief of any pauper, by any inhabitant not liable by law for his or her support, after notice and request made to the overseers of the said town or district, and until provision shall be made by them.”

The report finds that notice was given verbally to two of the overseers of Cambridge, by the plaintiff, more than two years before the commencement of the suit, that the negro woman had her lawful settlement in Cambridge, and that she had been supported by the plaintiff, according to her allegations in the declaration.

But it is objected that the notice to the overseers was not in writing. The statute does not require the notice to be in writing ; nor is there the same reason for it that exists when one town calls upon another for the reimbursement of expenses for the support of a pauper. For, in this latter case, the pauper may be supported at a distance from the town which is called upon ; and it is reasonable that they have formal and specific notice of the demand, with such information respecting the pauper as may enable them to ascertain whether they are liable or not.

In a case like the one before us, the pauper is supposed to be within the town against which the demand is made; for none but an inhabitant of the town can maintain the action, The overseers may, therefore, upon general notice, satisfy themselves upon the points important for them to know, without any formal written communication.

Nor is it any objection to the action that more than two years elapsed, after the notice was given, before the action was brought; for there is no special limitation of this action, as there is of an action brought by one town against another, under the ninth section of the act.

*The point most insisted on is that, as a bond was given by William Watson, to Samuel Whittemore, in the year 1793, to secure the maintenance of this negro woman, and indemnify the obligee and his heirs from any expense on that account, »he is not a pauper within the meaning of the statute, and so the town is not liable for her support.

If the bond had been made directly to the woman, she might nevertheless be a pauper; for the mere possession of a right to sue might not prevent her from falling into distress, or deprive her of the public charity provided by the laws. In this bond, however, she had no legal interest, nor could she maintain any action upon it; so that it is difficult to perceive how she can be less entitled to a support on account of its existence.

The cases cited, by the counsel for the defendants, to prove that the negro woman might have resorted to the bond, do not establish the point. They are merely cases of promises to one, to do some act for the benefit of another ; in which cases it has been held, that the promise is made substantially to him who is to receive the benefit, and that he may maintain the action, There is no instance of any one, not a party to a bond, or claiming a lawful title under it, maintaining an action upon it.

If the estate of Watson is legally liable to support the pauper, in virtue of the bond, no reason has been shown why the plaintiff, who does not represent the estate, should be deprived of the indemnity provided by law for those who afford relief to paupers, when the overseers of the town shall refuse to bestow it.

Perhaps the town may be entitled to relief from the estate of Watson, if that is liable on the bond. But of this we give no opinion.

Judgment on the verdict 
      
      
         Mitchell vs. Comville, 12 Mass. Rep 333. 1**4
     
      
      
        а) Felton vs. Dickinson, 10 Mass. Rep. 287. — Lent vs. Padelford, Ibid. 230.
     
      
      
        Windham vs. Portland, 4 Mass Rep 384.
     