
    William H. PAIGE, Appellant, v. FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, Appellee.
    No. AO-351.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 17, 1983.
    Rehearing Denied July 29, 1983.
    
      Thomas B. Woodward, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Enoch J. Whitney, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Florida Parole and Probation Com’n, Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

By order dated May 3, 1983, we temporarily relinquished jurisdiction to the Florida Parole and Probation Commission for the purpose of the Commission’s conducting another review in order to explain its reasons for denial of appellant’s parole and to report its findings and actions pursuant to such review to this court. On remand, the Commission reestablished appellant’s presumptive parole release date (PPRD) to be May 11,1982, and vacated its revised PPRD of May 13,1989. In doing so, the Commission, however, pursuant to the provisions of section 947.18, Florida Statutes, declined to set an effective parole release date for appellant due to his extensive prior criminal record. Nevertheless, as we stated in Jackson v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 424 So.2d 930, 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the limited discretion remaining with the Commission under the provisions of section 947.18 must be considered in pari mate-ria with other provisions of the Objective Parole Guidelines Act of 1978, permitting the Commission to change a PPRD only upon a showing of new information, institutional conduct or extraordinary circumstances. The Commission in the instant case, as in Jackson v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 429 So.2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), has done no more on remand than it did previously, by relying on the same information it had before it when it first established appellant’s PPRD as of May 11, 1982, and when it later revised the date as of May 13, 1989.

Accordingly, the special commission action taken on May 18, 1983, reestablishing appellant’s presumptive parole release date as of May 11, 1982, is affirmed. That portion of the order declining to set an effective parole release date is vacated and this cause is remanded to the Commission for the purpose of establishing appellant’s effective parole release date, subject to the standard provisions of parole in such cases.

ERVIN and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.

NIMMONS, J., dissents.

NIMMONS, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Section 947.18, Florida Statutes (1981), gives the Florida Parole and Probation Commission ultimate discretion in determining whether to parole an inmate. Before directing release thereunder, that section provides that the Commission must find that there is reasonable probability that the inmate “will live and conduct himself as a respectable and law-abiding person and that his release will be compatible with his own welfare and the welfare of society.” This inmate’s substantial criminal history of felony offenses, along with his previous violations of the conditions of his prior mandatory conditional release (MCR), as explicated by the Commission on remand, are such that I am unable to conclude that the Commission abused its discretion in concluding that the inmate does not qualify for release under the above-referred Section 947.18 criteria. See Gobie v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 416 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The fact that this inmate’s criminal history and prior violations of MCR were considered in establishing his presumptive parole release date (PPRD) should not preclude the Commission from according heavy weight to such factors in exercising its discretionary authority under Section 947.18 in determining whether the inmate should be released on parole. I, therefore, dissent from the majority’s opinion requiring the Commission to set an effective parole release date for Paige.  