
    Jesus Mendoza BENITEZ; Gloria Mendoza-Palma, Petitioners, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 05-74526.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 16, 2007 .
    Filed April 24, 2007.
    Susan E. Hill, Esq., Hill & Piibe, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioners.
    CAC—District Counsel, Esq., Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Patricia A. Smith, Esq., DOJ-—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    
      Before: O’SCANNLAIN, GRABER, and BEA Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jesus Mendoza Benitez and Gloria Mendoza-Palma seek review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying their application for cancellation of removal. To the extent we have jurisdiction, it is conferred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings. See Sanchez-Cruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

The petitioners’ contention that the hardship standard set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D) is unconstitutionally vague does not state a colorable due process claim. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.2005) (“traditional abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due process violations do not constitute colorable constitutional claims that would invoke our jurisdiction.”).

Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the agency’s interpretation of the hardship standard falls within the broad range authorized by the statute. See Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir.2003).

We do not consider the petitioners’ contentions regarding moral character, because their failure to establish hardship is dispositive.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     