
    [No. 4667.]
    WM. H. PATTERSON v. THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ.
    Pbemminaey Injunction.—The granting or continuing of a preliminary injunction is often a matter of discretion, and the appellate court will not reverse or modify the action of the District Court in that respect, except when there is a manifest mistake, or an abuse of discretion.
    Appeal from the District Court, Twentieth Judicial District, County of Santa Cruz.
    The plaintiff was an owner of real estate, and a taxpayer in the county of Santa Cruz, and, as such, on behalf of himself and others who owned real estate and taxable property in the county, filed a bill in equity to enjoin the supervisors of said county from issuing to the Santa Cruz Railroad Company bonds of the county to the amount of two hundred and forty thousand dollars, under an act approved April 4, 1870, entitled “An Act to empower the Board of Supervisors of the several counties of the State to aid in the construction of a railroad in the respective counties.” The act permitted bonds to the extent of five per cent, of the assessed value of the property of a county to be issued by the supervisors after the question had been submitted to the electors and they had voted in favor of the proposition. The complaint alleged that the board had, in 1871, submitted to the electors the proposition of issuing county bonds to the amount of $100,000 to the Santa Cruz and Watsonville Bailroad Company, and that there had been a majority in its favor; and that before the bonds were issued, and in 1872, the proposition for $240,000 to the Santa Cruz Company was also submitted and received a majority of votes. Various reasons were assigned to show why the board had no power to make the second submission, or to issue the bonds on the second vote. An answer was filed. The plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction on the pleadings and on affidavits. The defendant appealed from the order granting the preliminary injunction.
    
      H. H. Haight and C. B. Younger, for the Appellant.
    
      Wm. Irvine, for the Respondent.
   By the Court:

The granting or continuing of a preliminary injunction is often a matter of discretion, and this Court ought not to reverse the action of the District Court in that regard, except when there is manifest mistake or an abuse of discretion. (Godey v. Godey, 39 Cal. 157.)

In view of the gravity of the questions involved in this case, and the circumstance that the dissolution of the restraining order might possibly produce great evil, while its continuance can produce no serious injury, we are unwilling to say that there was an abuse of discretion or a manifest mistake in making the order appealed from.

It accords with the theory of our system, that the Supreme Court shall have the benefit of the judgment of the District Court at the final hearing below, and, except in a clear case, we ought not to anticipate the final judgment of the District Court by our action on appeal from the order granting the preliminary injunction.

Our present judgment is not intended to be any intimation of what the judgment of the District Court should be at the final hearing.

Order affirmed.  