
    Aisha ELSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alan VENGERSKY, City of New York, Defendants-Appellees.
    16-1378-cv
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    September 1, 2017
    Appearing for Appellant: Aisha Elston, pro se, Bronx, N.Y.
    Appearing for Appellee: Jeremy W. Shweder, Assistant Corporation Counsel (Deborah A. Brenner, Assistant Corporation Counsel, on the brief), for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, N.Y.
    Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges. PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge.
    
      
      . The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption as above.
    
    
      
      . Judge Paul A. Engelmayer, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Aisha Elston appeals from the March 29, 2016 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Amon, /.), dismissing her complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Elston sued the City of New York and former deputy commissioner of the New York City Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Alan Vengersky, asserting that she had been fired from her position as a DOC correctional officer, in violation of her right to due process and her contract with the DOC. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Garcia v. Hartford Police, Dep't 706 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013). Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. Although Elston was a tenured employee, who had a protected interest in her continued employment, she knowingly and voluntarily waived her tenure rights by signing her limited probation agreement with the DOC. See DeMichele v. Greenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 167 F.3d 784, 789 (2d Cir. 1999); Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Roberts, 61 N,Y.2d 244, 249-50, 473 N.Y.S.2d 370, 461 N.E.2d 856 (1984). Thus, she was not entitled to pre-deprivation hearing and could only challenge her termination though an Article 78 proceeding. See Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1292-93 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) (determining that an Article 78 proceeding “constitutes a wholly adequate post-deprivation hearing for due process purposes,” even when the challenged conduct was not random and unauthorized).

We have considered the remainder of Elston’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. Each side to bear its own costs.  