
    STEAM BOAT MARY BLANE vs. FRANCIS BEEHLER.
    J. Where a person furnisbqs.a boat with articles, under q special-contract, and. delivers them on different days, the lien attaches upon the delivery of the first articles.
    2. In computing the time within, which suit against a boat or stores should be commenced, the.day on which the delivery was completed should be excluded,,
    APPEAL FROM ST. LOUIS COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
    Rannells for appellant.
    The time given by statute is for six months and no more. It begins to run from the moment qf time when the goods.are delivered. 9 Mo. 654, Darby vs. St: Bt. Inda.
    In this case, as to the goods delivered on the 14th Dec. 1847, the statute began to run on that day, and the time expired prior to the day the suit was brought.. No agreement of the parties for credit can extend the time, nor can any arrangement between them as to the manner and times when the goods are to be furnished, change the time of the commencement of the lien, nor prolong its duration. It is fixed by law. Same case, and Rev. Code of ’45—title Boats and Vessels.
    The contract (so called) is not entirely in the sense the appellee’s counsel contends, nor can such a contract be made. Otherwise by an agreement to furnish ail the goods a boat may want during a season or a year, a lien may be continued for a year and six months.
    As to the goods furnished on the 22d Dec., 1S47, the lien had expired before suit brought; the day on which the goods are furnished should be included in tti.e computation of the time that the lien continues. The hen commences with and from the very moment of the delivery of the goods ; it exists continuously from that moment; suit may be brought upon it that very day. The law knows no division of a day.
    When a per cent, interest is to commence from the date, the day of the date is included in the computation of time. 4 Wash C. C. Rep. 240; 15 Sergt. & Raw. 136.
    When the computation is, to- be made from, am act done, the day on which it is performed is included: because the act is the terminus a quo the computation is to be made. 4 Wash. C. C. R. 240; Brown Pa. R. 18,9th C. 119; 3rd T. R. 623; Doug. 446; 1 Ld. Ray, 280; 3 East. 152; Rix vs. Adderly, Doug. 464; 3d N. H. Rep. 94; 4th lb. 270; 9th lb. 307.
    In construing the statute of limitations the day on which the cause of action accrues is inqluded. 15 Mass. Rep. 193; 3 G. & John. 395; Indell. Dig. N. C. R. 2, 649.
    When the term month, is used in a statute, it means a lunar month or 28 days, unless otherwise expressed. 4 Wendell, 512; 15 John. 120; L. vs. Cooler, 6 T. R. 226; John. 1, 100.
    Crockett & Briggs for appellee.
    l,st. The contract was an entirety, and embraced all the articles in the plaintiff’s line of business, which would b^,needed to fit out the boat, consequently under the contract he could not have sued for the price of the articles furnished on the I4th Dec., until he had completed the contract by furnishing all that she wanted, which was not done until the 22d. In other words, the delivery was not complete, nor the contract fulfilled by the plaintiff until the 22d, and until then he had no cause of action. The contract was,an entire thing, and if the delivery had run through a dozen days, some articles being delivered each day, the plaintiff-could not have split up his cause of action and maintained a separate suit for each separate delivery, but must wait until all are delivered before he could sue for any.
    
      2d. That the delivery being complete on the 22(1 Dec., 1847, and the suit commenced on the 23d June, 1848. The plaintiffs demand is not barred by the statute of limitations. The rule' is, that in contemplation of Jaw a day is an indivisible point of time, and there can be no distinction, in computing time, between the act done and the day on which it is done. Wiggin vs. Peters, 1 Metcalf Rep. 127-9; Ewing vs. Bailey, 4 Scam. R. 420; Bigelow vs. Wilson, 1 Pick. R. 485, and numerous authorities collated; 3 U. S. Digest, page 518—title, “Time;” Littleton vs. Christy's adm’r. 81 Mo. R.
    A limitation to commence “from and the passage of an, act ” in computing the time, the day of the passage of the act is to be excluded. King vs. Moore, Jefferson R. 9.
    An execution dated 3d June and returnable in three months, may be served on 3d September, Chase vs. Gilman, 3 Shipley, 64.
    When time is to be computed irom any act done, the day on which the act is.done is to be excluded; for a day is to.be regarded an indivisible point of time. Eairbank vs. Wood, 17 Wend. 329; 1 Metcalf, 127, 129; Sanders vs. Norton, 4 Monroe, 464; Gore vs. Hodges, 7 Monroe, 520
    In the computation of. time from an act done, the day on which the act is done will be excluded, whenever such exclusion will save a forfeiture or prevent an estoppel. Windsor vs. China, 4 Greenleaf, 298.
    3. The statute provides that the action shall be commenced within six months after the-cause of such action shall have accrued. In the case of Darby, adm’r. vs. St. Bt. Inda, 9 Mo. R. 653, it is held that the liabilities under this clause, “are such as would accrue and upon which an action could be brought within six months after the materials were furnisbed or the labor done.” Tbp six months, therefore, begin to run from the time the act is done, to wit: the materials furnished or the labor done. The authorities above quoted conclusively establish the rule to.be, that in such cases the day on which the act is donéis to be excluded in the computation, and especially if it be necessary to prevent an estoppel or save a forfeiture. We maintain, therefore, that the judgment of the court below was right.
   Judge Birch

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action commenced in the St. Louis court of common pleas," under the statute concerning boats and vessels, to recover the value of certain articles of upholstery furnished to the steamer. It was. admitted on the trial that the articles charged in plaintiff’s bill of particulars (filed with his complaint) were furnished and delivered by him for the use of' the boat, at the dates respectively stated in the bill, to-wit: a part on the 14th and the remainder on the 22d of December, 1847. That the prices charged were reasonable,, and that the articles were furnished at the request of the captain and o'wners. It was further proven, that when the contract was made, it was to the effect that the plaintiff should furnish all such articles of upholstery as might be needed for the boat, to be paid for on her return from New Orleans, and that the last articles ordered were furnished on the eve of the boat’s departure for that port. The suit was commenced on the 22d day of June, 1848, and the court below having given judgment for the whole amount, of the plaintiff’s bill, the cause is here by appeal.

Upon the point first raised, both reason and authority sufficiently concur in fixing the point of time at which the lien should be held to attach. Unless commencing coincident with the delivery of the first stores, cases might occur in which the fraudulent removal or incumbrance of the boat, during the subsequent portion even of a day, would defeat the object of the statute, and we can perceive no injustice in so construing it as to guard against such contingencies. Whilst, therefore, for the reasons intimated, a lien, in cases like the present, should be held (at least contingently) to incept or attach, at the time when the first goods are delivered on board the vessel, the rule adopted by this court in the case of Stine vs. Austin, 9 Mo. 558, which was a suit under the mechanics lien law, is deemed not only applicable to the account, but most reasonable in reference to the limitation of the action.

Being governed, then, by the least item in the account, and that item having been furnished on the 22d day of December, the remaining question is, whether a suit instituted on the 22d day of June following was within the statutory limitation of six months ? This, of course, depends upon the settlement of the question, whether in the compulation of this period the day of delivery should he included or excluded. And upon this point the authorities are somewhat contradictory. We incline to the opinion, however, that they preponderate, as they should, in favor of excluding the first day, or rather as regarding it as an “indivisible period of time,” covered by the delivery of the goods, when thereby a right can be asserted or a forfeiture prevented. In analogy to these decisions, therefore, the judgment of the court of common pleas is affirmed.  