
    XUE YING LIN, aka Wing Mui Tseung, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    15-1838
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    October 3, 2016
    
      FOR PETITIONER: Thomas V. Mas-succi, New York, N.Y.
    FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director; Russell J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, PETER W. HALL, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Xue Ying Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 14, 2015, decision of the BIA, affirming a September 27, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Lin’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Xue Ying Lin, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 14, 2015), aff'g No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 27, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). Lin’s sole challenge on appeal is to the agency’s determination that she failed to show a well-founded fear of persecution based on her prospective practice of Christianity in China.

“An asylum applicant can show a well-founded fear of future persecution in two ways: (1) by demonstrating that he or she ‘would be singled out individually for persecution’ if returned, or (2) by proving the existence of a ‘pattern or practice in [the] ... country of nationality ... of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant’ and establishing his or her ‘own inclusion in, and identification with, such group.’ ” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)).

I. Pattern or Practice

The agency reasonably concluded that Lin failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly-situated individuals. To establish a pattern or practice of persecution against a particular group, an applicant must demonstrate that the harm to that group is “systemic or pervasive.” In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A. 2005); see Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency correctly concluded that Lin did not establish “systemic or pervasive” persecution of house-church Christians like herself because the country conditions evidence showed that small house churches, such as the one Lin testified she would attend, “do not generally encounter problems.” See Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming agency’s finding of no pattern or practice of persecution of Catholics in Indonesia where evidence showed that religious violence was not nationwide and that Catholics are generally free to practice their faith). That finding is supported by the country conditions evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (observing that the weight accorded to an applicant’s evidence “lies largely within the discretion of the IJ”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The State Department’s 2012 International Religious Freedom Report (“IRF Report”), for example, states that family and friends have the right to meet at home for worship, including prayer and Bible study, without registering with the government.

II. Individualized Risk of Persecution

The agency also did not err in finding that Lin failed to show a reasonable possibility that she would be singled out individually for persecution. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (observing that, absent “solid support in the record,” a fear of persecution is “speculative at best”). While the IRF Report and the State Department’s 2012 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in China note detentions of a house-church pastors and harassment of large house-church congregations, the agency reasonably found that this evidence did not support a well-founded fear of persecution for Lin because she was not a religious leader and would be attending a small underground church.

Lin argues that the agency ignored the most significant reason she fears persecution in China: her history of run-ins with Chinese authorities from her past pro-democracy activities. She contends that this personal history takes her outside the rubric of a typical house-church Christian, but that is beside the point. Lin did not claim that she would engage in pro-democracy activities in China and she did not argue that she had a well-founded fear of persecution based on her past pro-democracy activities before the BIA. Further, Lin testified that she had never been arrested or even detained by authorities. Even if Lin’s prior run-ins result in her prospective underground church attendance being discovered, as set forth above, the agency reasonably concluded that the country conditions evidence did not show a reasonable risk of persecution for engaging in that religious activity.

Accordingly, the agency did not err in finding that Lin had failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, and as a result failed to meet her burden for asylum and withholding of removal. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that an alien who fails to establish her entitlement to asylum “necessarily fails to establish h[er] entitlement to withholding of removal” because withholding of removal entails a higher burden of proof).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  