
    HOADLEY v. GAFILL OIL CO.
    1. Judgment — Binding Until Set Aside — Collateral Attack.
    A judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter is binding until set aside in a direct proceeding brought for that purpose, and is not subject to collateral attach.
    1Judgments, 34 C. J. § 815.
    
      2. Same — Res Adjudicata — Infants — Compromise and Settlement.
    Where a guardian for an infant was appointed by the probate court and a settlement of the infant’s claim for personal injuries was effected, and judgment by consent was entered and paid by defendant, an action by the infant, by next friend, for the same injury, could not be maintained; the former judgment being res adjudicata of the questions involved.
    3. Same — Satisfaction—Joint Tort-Feasors.
    As a plaintiff can have but one satisfaction for a joint wrong, if he recovers a judgment against one of the tortfeasors and obtains satisfaction, this operates as a discharge of the others.
    4. Courts — Action Not Transferrable to Equity Side of Court Where Doctrine of Res Adjudicata Applicable.
    An action at law which could not be maintained because a former judgment is res a'djudicata of the questions involved, may not be transferred to the equity side of the court under the provisions of 3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 12351; said statute not being applicable under the circumstances.
    2Judgments, 34 C. J. § 1408; 3Id., 34 C. J. § 1404; 4Courts, 15 C. J. § 606; Trial, 38 Cyc. p. 1291.
    Error to Cass; Warner (Glenn E.), J.
    Submitted October 5, 1927.
    (Docket No. 30.)
    Decided December 1, 1927.
    Case by Helen Hoadley, an infant, by her next friend, against the Gafill Oil Company and another for personal injuries. From an order granting a motion to dismiss, plaintiff brings error.
    Affirmed.
    
      Walter C. Jones, for appellant.
    
      Clarence M. Lyle and Shively, Gilmer & Arnold, for appellees.
   McDonald, J.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries received from fire alleged,to have been caused by an explosion of kerosene sold by the defendants. Helen Hoadley is an infant. She was injured on July 8,1924. On March 80, 1925, she settled her claim for damages with the Gafill Oil Company for $1,000. In the settlement agreement, which was reduced to writing, she was represented by her father, Harrison Hoadley, and her brother, Glenn Hoadley. It was agreed that she should apply to the probate court for the appointment of a guardian, who, when appointed, should cause a suit to be begun in the circuit court against the defendant and that the defendant would consent to the entry of a judgment against it for $1,000, and would pay the same. The father, Harrison Hoadley, was appointed guardian of the plaintiff and duly qualified. The settlement agreement was fully carried out; suit was begun; judgment for $1,000 was obtained and was paid and discharged by the defendant. On March 26, 1927, the present suit was begun involving a claim for damages for the same injury as that for which judgment had been entered in the former suit. No motion was made to set aside the former judgment and no reference was made to it in this declaration. It came into the case with defendants’ plea in which the facts were alleged and the claim made that the former judgment was res adjudicada of the matters averred in the plaintiff’s declaration. On this ground the defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit judge granted the motion and entered an'order of dismissal. The plaintiff has brought error.

It is the contention of counsel for the plaintiff that the former judgment is not binding on her because it was entered by the court without an Investigation of the facts and without any knowledge as to whether the settlement on which it was based was fair and just. In support of this contention, he cites Dudex v. Sterling Brick Co., 237 Mich. 470; Palazzolo v. Judge of Superior Court, 234 Mich. 547; and Metzner v. Newman, 224 Mich. 324 (33 A. L. R. 98). These cases might be applicable if this proceeding were a motion to set aside the judgment. The trouble with counsel’s argument is that it is all directed to a collateral attack on the former judgment. That judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter. It is binding until set aside, and it can only be set aside in a direct proceeding brought for that purpose. The circuit judge correctly held that the judgment rendered in the former case was a bar to the plaintiff’s recovery in this suit.

It is also argued by the plaintiff that, as the defendant Sigmond Patz was not a party to the former suit, he is not released by the judgment rendered in that case.

The plaintiff is here suing for the same wrong and on the same facts as were involved in her previous suit in which she obtained judgment which has been satisfied by payment. Her theory in this suit is that the defendants were joint wrong-doers.

“As a plaintiff can have but one satisfaction for a joint wrong, if he recovers a judgment against one of the tort-feasors and obtains satisfaction, this operates as a discharge of the others.” 34 C. J. p. 982, § 1404.

Counsel concludes his argument with the request that if the judgment be reversed this court direct that the case be transferred to the chancery side of the court under the provision of section 12351, 3 Comp. Laws 1915. That statute has no application to the situation presented by this record.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs to the defendants.

Sharpe, C. J., and Bird, Flannigan, Fellows, Wiest, and Clark, JJ., concurred.

The late Justice Snow took no part in this decision.  