
    THE STATE v. NICHOLAS L. WILLIAMS.
    The act of Congress of 1825, c. 275, see. 35, exempting postmasters from serving on juries, is constitutional; and those officers cannot he compelled to serve as jurors on the original panel in the slate courts. Though it seams, that they would not bo so exempted when called as tales-jurors.
    An appeal lies from a judgment of the Superior Court, ordering a postmaster to he lined for not serving as a juror.
    The defendant was summoned as a juror on the original panel to the last Term of the Superior Court of law! for Surry County; when he appeared in open court before Ws Honor Judge Martin, alleged that he was a postmaster
    
      under the authority of the United States, and claimed an exemption from serving on the jury under an act of Congress. His Honor deemed the cause shown insufficient, and upon the defendant’s refusing to serve, ordered him to be fined twenty dollars; and he thereupon prayed and obtained an appeal to the Supreme Court.
    
      Pearson for the defendant.
    The Attorney General for the State
    — objected, that the judgment below was for a fine for contempt, and could not be appealed from.
   Gaston, Judge.

— Upon this appeal the only question presented is, whether a postmaster is exempt from serving as a juror on the original panel. The act of Congress, 1825, eh. 275, sec. 35, declares this exemption in explicit terms. If the postmaster has it not, it must be because this provision of the act is not warranted by the constitution of the United States, and is therefore null. The attorney general has declined to take that ground here, and we must therefore consider it as virtually abandoned. We think that it has been properly abandoned. Under the authority “to establish post offices,” Congress can rightfully require of the postmasters to devote their time and attention to the execution of their appropriate duties, and by such an exemption to secure them against compulsory interruptions in the performance of these duties. Were the exemption given as a personal privilege, it would present a different inquiry. But we do not so regard it. Respect for the constituted authorities of the general government, and a due sense of the necessity of harmony between the institutions of the United States, and the municipal regulations of the individual states, forbid such an interpretation, except it were unavoidable.

It may not be improper to remark, that our decision does not apply to the case of a postmaster who shall be called on as a bystander to make up a jury. Should he have official engagements demanding his attention, upon making this known to the court, it ought, and would, no doubt, excuse him. But the fact of his being a bystander furnishes a presumption that the duties of his office leave him then at leisure to perform those which, in common with other freeholders, he owes to the state — to aid her in the administration of justice.

The attorney general has objected that the judgment below was conclusive, and that no appeal lies therefrom. This objection is not tenable. The judgment below was on a matter of right, and not of discretion, and the party aggrieved thereby can, under the broad terms of the acts defining the jurisdiction of this court, insist on the legality of that judgment being examined into here. An appeal in a case of precisely this character was entertained without objection in The State v. Hogg, 2 Murph. Rep. 319; S. C. N. C. Term Rep. 254.

It is the opinion of this court that the judgment below is erroneous, and that a certificate to this effect be sent to the court below.

Per Curiam. Judgment reversed.  