
    Daniel vs. Capers, Sheriff.
    An attachment for contempt in not paying over money on an execution or for not collecting it, is in effect a civil proceeding, by which courts compel their officers to indemnify suitors for losses sustained by neglect of duty.
    If the party elects to proceed by attachment and receives the principal of the debt he cannot afterwards bring an action against the sheriff'for damages for the detention.
    As a condition to his discharge from an attachment the court may add that the sheriff should pay interest on the money during the period of the detention. But not having done so the plaintiff cannot bring suit to recover interest by way of damages.
    This was an action against the defendant, who was sheriff, for neglecting to collect the money due on an execution for the plaintiff lodged in his office. The execution had been renewed twice, and while the third renewal was in the hands of the sheriff, he had been ruled and finally an attachment issued against him. He was arrested and he paid off the principal sum due on the execution, and was discharged. The execution had been two years in his hands and this suit was brought to recover damages for the detention or neglect in not paying over the money during that time. The jury found damages for the whole time that the execution remained in the hands of the sheriff.
    
      Miller, for the sheriff,
    moved for a new trial on the ground that the judge who tried the cause had erroneously charged the jury that they should find damages lor the whole t¿n3- as the plaintiff had twice renewed the execution. The plaintiff had also elected his remedy. He had proceeded against the sheriff by attachment for this same matter and had received the principal and had consented to the discharge. He could not now proceed in this action for the same cause. 1 Hen. Bl. 233. 2 Bay 193. Heppell vs. King, 7 T. R. 366.
    
      Hart, contra.
   Cuma, per

Johnson, J.

The proceeding by attachment against an officer of the court for a neglect of duty is a substitute for amercement, in which the offender was punished by a fine to the king and in which the remedy of the party injured was on petition to the king to be indemnified out of the fine imposed; and the inconvenience of this mode of proceeding was the reason why the attachment, in which the court have the power to compel him to do justice to the injured party, has been substituted in its place. The King vs. the Sheriff of Middlesex, 1 H. Black. 543. And the court will in its discretion compel a sheriff to pay the whole amount of the plaintiffs loss and all costs that have accrued. Ibid.

It appears then that an attachment as for a contempt is in effect a civil proceeding of a.summary nature, by which courts of justice compel their officers to indemnify individual suitors for losses sustained by neglect of duty. To this remedy the present plaintiff has had recourse, and the question now is whether he can have a further satisfaction? I think not. It is a fundamental principle that a party is not entitled to more than one satisfaction for the same injury.

However often the mode of recovery may be varied, in the proceeding had the court might as before shown have compelled the defendant to do ample justice to the plaintiff and the presumption is that it did, and in its discretion might have superadded, as a condition to the discharge of the attachment, interest o>. the amount due him; or if the plaintiff had thought prop! have proceeded by action at law he might have recoITi’ddit. But having elected to proceed by attachment his wrongs are repaired and he can have no further remedy.

Colcock, J.

I concur, except that I think a judge could not give interest on a rule.

New trial granted.  