
    Jeremiah Woodford v. The State of Ohio.
    Where the clerk of the court has placed on the margin opposite the several counts the numbers one, two, and so on, and, by mistake or otherwise, has commenced the numbering on the second count, and the same error has been continued through the whole of the counts, and the jury have returned a *verdict of guilty on the seventh and eighth counts as marked, it is error for the court to sentence the defendant on the seventh and eighth counts of the indictment, being the sixth and seventh counts as marked.
    "Where the court has passed separate sentences on the defendant on two counts of an indictment, on one of which counts he has been found guilty, and on the other of which he has been acquitted, and have made the sentence on which he was convicted to commence at the expiration of his term on the-count on which he was not convicted, the whole judgment must be revei’sed.
    Where an offense forms but one transaction, and the indictment containing several counts on which the jury have returned a verdict of guilty, it is error in the court to sentence on each count separately.
    Error to the court of common pleas of Harrison county.
    The plaintiff in error was indicted at the October term, 1852, for stabbing Thomas Carothers. The indictment contained ten counts, the first, under the seventeenth section of the crimes act, for assault with intent to murder; the second, sixth, seventh, eighth,, and ninth counts were under the twenty-fourth section of the act, varying the intent with which, and the part of the body on which the stab was inflicted; the third, fourth, and fifth counts were under the twenty-third section, varying the intent with which the cutting is alleged to have been done; and the tenth count was for-assault and battery.
    The counts in the indictment had numbers marked in the margin, from one to nine in sequence; but the first count was omitted in the numbering, and the second marked number one.
    The plaintiff in error was tried at the same term, and the following verdict rendered : “ The jury find the defendant guilty in manner and form as he stands charged in the seventh and eighth counts, as marked in the indictment, and not guilty on the other counts of the indictment.”
    The court, after overruling motions for new trial and in arrest-of judgment, sentenced the plaintiff in error to be “ imprisoned in s the penitentiary and kept at hard labor for the term of one year, upon the seventh count of the indictment; and, after the termination of the said one year, that he be imprisoned in the penitentiary and kept at hard labor for the ^further period of one year, upon the eighth count of said indictment.”
    Bills of exceptions were taken on the trial to the admission and rejection of testimony, to the charge to the jury, and the overruling of the motions for new trial and in arrest, and various errors are assigned upon the record. But two need be referred to.
    1. That the court erred in pronouncing two judgments for the same act; and
    2. That the court erred in sentencing the plaintiff in error upon the seventh count of the indictment, upon which the verdict was,, not guilty.
    Bingham,, for plaintiff in error.
    Pugh, attorney general, for the state.
   Caldwell, J.

This cause comes into this court on a writ of error to the common pleas of Harrison county. The plaintiff in error was indicted for an assault,and stabbing, alleged to have been committed on Thomas Carothei’S; he was found guilty, and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary. Numerous errors have been assigned on the record ; we have not thought it necessary to consider but one. The indictment contained ten counts, some charging an assault with intent to murder, others charging stabbing with intent to kill, wound, etc.

The clerk, previous to the trial, had placed on the margin of the indictment, opposite each count, the numbers one, two, and so on, to nine, commencing with the second count in the indictment. In In this way the second count was numbered one, and the tenth count numbered nine ; this made the eighth and ninth counts in the indictment the seventh and eighth, as numbered in the margin. The jury returned a verdict as follows: “That the defendant is guilty in manner and form as he stands charged in the seventh and eighth counts, as marked in the indictment, and not guilty on the other counts.”

The court sentenced the defendant to imprisonment in the penitentiary on the seventh count of the indictment, for one *year, and one year on the eighth count of the indictment; the latter ■term of one year, to which the defendant was sentenced on tha * ^eighth count, to commence at the expiration of the term of one year, to which the defendant was sentenced on the seventh count.

Now, there is nothing technical or formal in the finding or ver-dict of a jury. The charges are set forth in technical form in the pleadings. In a ease like this, where the jury find the defendant guilty of some of the charges, and not guilty of others, it is only necessary that they should point out with certainty upon what charges they find guilty, and of what they acquit; if they do this, it matters not what terms of indication' they may use. It was perfectly clear, both from the record itself and from the affidavits of the jurors, that the jury found the defendant guilty on the ¡seventh and eighth counts as numbered on the indictment, which were the eighth and ninth counts of the indictment; and these were the only counts on which the defendant could be sentenced; he was acquitted on all the other counts. The court sentenced the •defendant on the seventh and eighth counts of the indictment; on the former of which he had been acquitted by the verdict of the jury.- This is clearly erroneous. The judgment on the eighth •count of the indictment, which was the seventh count as marked, was supported by the verdict; but the term of one year’s impris-onment to which the defendant was sentenced on that count was made to commence at the expiration of the term of one year to which the defendant was sentenced on the former seventh count. "The judgment is, therefore, not severable, and will have to be reversed in whole, and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.  