
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT,
    COLUMBIA,
    MAY, 1803.
    Gruber v. Boyles.
    Where a conveyance is imppached for fraud as to'creditors, the declara^' tions of the parties t.o it, made at. tne time of its execution, are not admissible in evidence, to shew that it was not. made with a' fraudulent intent.
    The party cross-examining a witness has a right to stop him, if his answer to the question put tends to matters, which the party, who called the witness, is not intitled t.o introduce m evidence; nor can the latter insist, on hearing the answer out/
    Although a voluntary conveyance may bé val'd, yet where there are’ other circumstances of a fraudulent, intention, the deed’s being voluntary and gratuitous, and the donor’s being m debt., are evidence, along with the otlier circumstances, of an intent to defraud creditors : and a deed of conveyance, made with a' design to- defraud* ohe creditor,- iff void as to every other creditor/
    Motion for a ntiw trial, on behalf of the defendants. The a<V lion was trover, and was tried before Bay, J. in C< lleton district. The plaintiff sued as trustee ol one M. ii., a feme covert. The negro, the object of the suit, was taken under an execution, and sold by the sheriff as the property of the husband of M. H., and came, after several transfers, fairly into the possession of the deiendant. It appeared that the negro liad belot ged to the husband of M. H., bur was conveyed by bun to her use by a tru.-t deed. This deed was contested on the ground of fraud, as voluntary, and made to defeat creditors. It was proved, that at the time I be deed was made, the husband was considerably indebted to sundry persons and that several of his negroes were under mortgage. At the trial, one O’Driscol, who drew the deed of trust, was permitted to give in evidence, declarations made to him by the husband of M. H., and by herself, ut the time, indicative of an hornet intention, for the purpose of shewing that the deed was bona jide, and not fraudulent. This evidence was objected to then ; and now, on the argument of the motion, furnishi d the chief ground for a new trial.
    In support of the motion, was cited, 1 Esp. Dig. 148, 1 Fonbl. Eq.-888,870, Cowp. 438. The deed was made with a view to defeat one creditor, and any other creditor may take advantage thereof. And although it was conceded in this case, that the deed could not be pre». sumed to have been made to defeat that creditor, under whose execution the negro was sold; inasmuch as it appeared that he was secured. by a mortgage of negroes, which negroes, however, were afterwards kept out of the way by the in mgagnr ; yet as there was proof to shew, that u might have bee;, made to prejudice other creditors, and particularly mi: other creditor, that proof ought not to have been allowed to he rebutted by any declarations of the parties to the supposed fraud, to evidence a lair intention, and bolster up their .povinous deed, Li this case, all l: e principal badg 'S of a frauda, lent conveyance, to the prejudice of credit >rs, were to be found. Twyne’w case, 8 Rep. 81. Slat 18 Ehz. c. 5 P. L. 67.
    
      £1 Contra. It was contended, that the evids ce to the point objected to, had been drawn from the witness on his cross examination by the defendant; the witness having been produced by the plaintiff,to prove die deed only,, and having been examined by the defendant, as to toe m rives of the parties in making the deed. That the .question, which brought out this evidence, was asked by the defendant’s counsel; and after they found what the answer would tend to, they stopped the witness upon the point of answering, whether the intentions of the party were mala, or bona fide : and that the plaintiff’s counsel merely insisted on hearing the answer out, and that the witness could not be stopped on the point when answering, hut that he ought to answer as far as he knew, quo animo, the p-uty had applied to have the deed drawn. That deens oi this kind are not. i -herently and intrinsically vicious, bui depend on the occasions which give birth to them, .and the motives which indue.! their execution ; all of which must be collected from extrinsic circumstances. The deed in this case was founded on a good consideration ; on a moral duty, not on morral turpitude. Fonbl. 260 The circumstance of its being voluntary, does not affect its validity, where the consideration is meritorious. And although it was prov; n, that the debt which it was Supposed was the inducement to a fraud iu this case, was contracted m such a manner, as to induce a belief that the debtor was grossly imposed on, yet tins is but slight evidence that he contrived this fraud to defeat that debt, it was also conten 'ed, that the creditor under whose execution the negro was sold, had slept upon his rights, having sufferm the negro to pass through so many hands, before he was taken in execution , a -d that he mig-it tie considered as one standing by, an;.' acqu.osc;,,o- in these transfers.
    in reply was cited Bu!! P 257, Esp. Dig. 204. 6 T. R. 680, 4 T. R. 678. Eiur. ,596. i Adt. 18. No declarations of wife are evidence ¡or the husband.
   The court

(Johnson, Trezevakt, and Bkbvakd, Justices, i« the absence of Grimke, J. and Watie*, J.j /

Curves & Drayton, for the motion. Primóle & Duncan* pontra.

granted a new ° trial, on the ground, that the evidence of O’Driscol, as to the declarations of the parties at the time of the making of the voluntary deed of settlement in question, and of the wife of the sajc| jyj j.| ^ relative to the motives and intentions of the maker of the deed, was improperly admitted in evidence. Such evidence was not warranted by the rules and principles of law, as applicable to the case ; and it is impossible to tell what influence that evidence might have had, in producing the verdict. The question of fraud, or no fraud, might have been determined by it. It does not appear, that this evidence was brought forth by the examination of the defendant’s counsel, as alleged. It appears, that they objected to the evidence before it came out: but the court admitted it. The declarations of a parly should not be allowed in evidence, to explain his intentions in favor of himself, in questions of this nature. Voluntary conveyances may be valid ; but where there are other circumstances of a fraudulent intention, the deed’s being voluntary and gratuitous, and the donor’s being in debt, are evidence, along with the other circumstances, of an intent to defraud creditors : and a deed of conveyance, made with a design to defraud one creditor, is void as to every other creditor.

Bay, contra,

was of opinion, that the verdict was according to the obvious justice of the case, and therefore ought to stand. That the creditor, at whose suit the negroes were sold, liad a mortgage of two other negroes, which was ample security for his debt, which he might obtain satisfaction for, without resorting to the negroes in question. It was true, that he acknowledged, that the negroes mortgaged had been removed out of the State by the instigation, as was supposed, of the mortgagor ; but still they might be come at, and besides, the debtor was not insolvent, but had other property. That the evidence to prove the deed fraudulent was slight and insufficient: and that although the negroes i n question had been sold fairly at sheriff’s sale, and had since passed through the hands of sundry persons ; yet these vendees were not ignorant of the deed of conveyance, and bought with their eyes open.

New trial awarded.  