
    RICHARD S. CURLE & ARCHIBALD GODDIN vs. THE ST. LOUIS PERPETUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
    Where a debtor verbally accepts a written order from his creditor, in favor of a third person, he becomes liable to the latter, for the amount of the acceptance.
    APPEAL FROM ST. LOUIS COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
    STATEMENT OP THE CASE.
    The St. Louis perpetual insurance company obtained a judgment against Benjamin Ames, in the St. Louis courtof common pleas. On this judgment an alias execution was issued, and Curie and Goddin summoned as garnishees,
    
      TJio usual interrogatories were filed at the return term, and atthe same term Curie and Goddin filed their answer, in which they say, that they were indebted to John O’Fallon in the sum of three hundred and seventy-five dollars, due lor rent. That said O’Fallon gave Benjamin Ames an order on them for the sum duo ; that Ames presented the order, which they verbally agreed to pay; that after they were summoned as garnishees in this case, the order was returned to O’Fallon, and that he the said O’Fallon then called on the respóndanla, and required payment of them, and they then paid to said John Q’Fallon the said sum of three hundred and twenty-five dollars due for rent as aforesaid ; and that no other accounts existed between them and said Ames at the time they were summoned, §-e.; and they submit these facts for the court to pass upon, and decide as to their liability.
    Upon the coming in of this answer the plaintiff moved for judgment against the defendants upon the facts stated in the answer, which motion was entertained by the court, and judgment awarded.
    The appellants (here) then moved for a new trial, which was refused, to which refusal exceptions were taken and the caso brought hero by appeal-
    McPhers-on for appellants.
    It is contended for the appellants, that the-court below erred in giving judgment against them upon the facts stated in the answer. The answer does not admit any indebtedness to. Ames.
    Ames could not have sued in his own name upon the verbal promise to pay. Nor was such promise binding on. the appellants, as the order-amounts to a bill of exchange, and if so, the acceptance must be in writing. Rev. stat. 172.
    The plaintiffs below were bound to show the indebtedness of the -appellants to-Ames atthe time they were summoned as garnishees, and It must- be such an indebtedness as would.entitle Ames to maintain his action against them.
    Again, the order may have shown, if produced, that Ames was only the agent of O’Fallon, to collect the rent due.
    And it is contended that this court have established the doctrine that the plaintiff must clearly show the indebtedness of the garnishees at the time they were summoned, which was not done in this ease. Scott and Rule vs. Hill and McGunnegle Mo. Rep. 88.
    ©amble &. Bates.
    1st- On the general principle of the action of assumpsit Ctirle and Goddin were liable. Their in'debtedness to O’Fallon, and his order to pay Ames, constituted a good and valuable consideration to support their promise. Weston vs. Barker 12 John R. 276; 2 Farfield 385.
    2d. The order of O’Fallon, as stated in the-ansvver, was a simple command or request, and not a bill of exchange, and hence there was no-need of a written acceptance.
    3d. The answer admits that the garnishees recognised the order, and promised to pay its contents ■to Ames—which, whether written or verbal, is an acceptance by tho general law,- (Chit, on bills 174 #c. 8th Am. Ed.) and we must take the admission most strongly against him who makes it.
    4th. The statement in this answer, that after the service of attachment, the-order to pay was returned to O’Fallon, and the money paid to him, is of no force in favor-of the garnishees ; and is objectlonablo in several particulars.
    1st. It is impertinent to the matter in hand, and not responsive to the interrogatories.
    2d. The garnishees are fixed by the service of process; and no after, act of theirs, can vary their liability.
    3d. The money may have been paid to O’Fal-lon with a guaranty, or it may have been done by collusion with Ames, and for the purpose of hindering his creditors.
   Judge Birch

delivered the opinion of the court.

The St. Louis perpetual insurance company, having an execution against Ames, garnisheed the plaintiffs in error—defendants below. In answer to the usual interrogatories, the defendants admitted, that having been indebted to O’Fallon in the sum of three hundred and seventyffive dollars, for rent, and Ames having presented an order upon them for that sum, they verbally agreed to pay it to him.

Matters stood thus until they were garnisheed, after which the order was returned to O’Fallon, upon whose requisition, and to whom, they paid the money.

If this had been u a bill of exchange ” instead of an order,” whilst a written acceptance would have been necessary (under our statute) to have charged the defendants below with the liabilities which pertain to “ acceptors, ” we apprehend it would have been unnecessary in an equitable proceeding like the present. Be this as it may, a verbal acceptance of such “ an order, ” or even a verbal agreement admitted all round, whereby one man assumes to pay to a third person the debt which he owes to another, is not deemed to be within the statute of frauds, and is no less binding and conclusive upon the parties than if the whole had been in writing.

Not doubting, therefore, that the. defendants were legally indebted to Ames at the time they were garnisheed, the judgment of the court of common pleas, which rightfully found them liable to the authorised proceedings of his creditors, is affirmed, with costs.  