
    Milinah CHIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 10-44-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 18, 2012.
    Milinah Chin, pro se.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Anthony W. Norwood, Senior Litigation Counsel; Surell Brady, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent-Appellee.
   Petitioner-appellant Milinah Chin, a native and citizen of Indonesia, seeks review of a December 17, 2009, order of the BIA affirming the February 11, 2008, decision of an Immigration Judge (“U”) denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Milinah Chin, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Dec. 17, 2009), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 11, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA’s decision. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Jian Hui Shoo v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157-58 (2d Cir.2008); Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110-11 (2d Cir.2008).

Chin’s argument that she established past persecution on account of her ethnicity or religion is unavailing. The agency reasonably found that Chin’s testimony that she was once threatened with rape during a riot was insufficient to constitute past persecution because it was a fleeting threat, which was not carried out, and Chin was not physically injured as a result. See, e.g., Gui Ci Pan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 408, 412 (2d Cir.2006) (providing that unfulfilled threats do not constitute persecution). It also reasonably found that Chin’s testimony that native Indonesians frequently groped her described harassment, not persecution, and that Chin had failed to link this harassment to her ethnicity or religion. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that a showing of past persecution requires that the harm suffered rise above “mere harassment”); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (to warrant relief, persecution must be “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”).

Chin’s argument that she demonstrated a pattern or practice of persecution against ethnic Chinese and Christians in Indonesia is equally unavailing. Although Chin’s testimony comports with the background evidence showing some violence against, and harassment of, ethnic Chinese and Christians, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the country-conditions evidence showed only sporadic and localized violence, and thus did not establish a pattern or practice of persecution across Indonesia. See Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir.2009) (affirming IJ’s conclusion “that religious violence in Indonesia “was occurring on a very localized basis and was not countrywide’ ” and rejecting claim that there is a pattern or practice of persecution of Chinese Christians in Indonesia after taking judicial notice of the fact that Indonesia contains “approximately 6,000 inhabited islands” and that Muslims were not predominant across the country). Though Chin argues that there is widespread discrimination against Christians and ethnic Chinese, the record does not compel the conclusion that this discrimination is so severe or pervasive that it gives rise to a well-founded fear of persecution should Chin return to Indonesia.

Accordingly, because Chin did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, the agency did not err in denying her claim for asylum. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004). Because Chin’s claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief were based on the same factual predicate as her claim for asylum, the BIA did not err in denying those forms of relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 155-56 (2d Cir.2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  