
    Michael J. O’REILLY and John T. O’Reilly, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CONNECTICUT LIGHT & POWER COMPANY, Diane H. Brown, Mary Goffin, and Northeast Utilities, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 09-1927-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 17, 2010.
    Michael J. O’Reilly and John T. O’Reilly, pro se, Guilford, CT, for Appellants.
    Howard K. Levine, Carmody & Torrance LLP, New Haven, CT (Duncan R. MacKay and Alicia B. Davenport, Northeast Utilities Service Company, Legal Department, Berlin, CT, on the brief), for Appellees.
    Present: ROBERT D. SACK, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges, RICHARD K. EATON, Judge 
    
    
      
       The Honorable Richard K. Eaton, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs-appellants Michael O’Reilly and John O’Reilly, both pro se, commenced this action pursuant to, inter alia, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; and Connecticut law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and it denied plaintiffs’ subsequent motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs appeal both decisions. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment. Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 183 (2d Cir.2006). Having conducted a thorough and independent review of the parties’ submissions and the appellate record, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. First, Michael O’Reilly failed to adduce sufficient evidence that defendants discriminated against him “ ‘by reason of ” his disability. Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132). Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate as to his claim under Title II of the ADA. Second, with respect to Michael O’Reilly’s FHA claim, we agree with the district court that a rational trier of fact could not conclude from this record that defendants violated the statute in the manner that plaintiff alleges. Third, the district court properly dismissed both plaintiffs’ FDCPA claims because no defendant in this action is a “debt collector” under the statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Finally, because each of plaintiffs’ federal claims was properly dismissed, the district court acted within its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. WWBITV, Inc. v. Vill. of Rouses Point, 589 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir.2009). Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Following the district court’s entry of summary judgment, plaintiffs’ filed a timely motion for reconsideration. The district court denied this motion, and we review that conclusion for abuse of discretion. United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 158, 175 (2d Cir.2009). However, for substantially similar reasons to those stated by the district court in its April 2, 2009 order, that motion was properly denied as well.

We have considered each of plaintiffs’ arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. 
      
      . We have jurisdiction to review both the district court’s February 2, 2009 order and its April 2, 2009 denial of plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. See “R” Best Produce, Inc. v. DiSapio, 540 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir.2008). However, plaintiffs have not challenged the district court’s April 22, 2008 dismissal of John O'Reilly's claims under the ADA and FHA, and both plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692?.
     