
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Orlando MADERO, a.k.a. Juan Perez, a.k.a. Rogelio Jose Diaz, a.k.a. Javier Victor Santos, a.k.a. Jose Rolando Reyes, a.k.a. Rene Rolando Maldonado, a.k.a. Angel H. Torres, a.k.a. Javier Jose Santos, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-3293-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 5, 2012.
    Daniel M. Perez, Esq., Newton, NJ, for Appellant.
    Harris Fischman (Brent S. Wible, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, ROBERT D. SACK, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Orlando Madero, who was convicted in 2007 of bank fraud, and whose supervised release in that case was revoked based on his 2009 commission of bank fraud, appeals the sentence imposed on revocation — 27 months’ imprisonment followed by a two-year term of supervised release — as substantively unreasonable. In the absence of procedural error, we will identify a sentence as substantively unreasonable only in “exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of permissible” sentences. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is not such a case.

Record evidence amply supports the district court’s determination that a significant prison sentence beyond the 12-to-18-month range recommended in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 (policy statement) was warranted in Madero’s case. Madero’s extensive criminal history included three federal convictions for fraud crimes, two of which he committed while serving terms of supervised release, as well as a separate violation of supervised release based on his failure to pay restitution and to report to the Probation Department. This emphatically demonstrated Madero’s inability to conform his conduct to law and his total disregard for the district court’s supervision, circumstances that establish the substantive reasonableness of a 27-month prison term for his latest criminal violation of supervision. Nor do we identify any abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to accord significant mitigating weight to Madero’s health problems, claimed acceptance of responsibility, or professed intent to lead a law-abiding life. The district court, which had the advantage of dealing directly with Madero over the years, see United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir.2008) (recognizing that district courts “gain insights not conveyed by the record” through direct interaction with defendants (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)), concluded that there was “little reason for [it] to trust what” Madero had said in his sentencing statement, Revocation Hr’g Tr. at 20:25-21:1. That credibility assessment was only reinforced by the fact that Made-ro had jumped bail after the Probation Department initiated the instant revocation proceedings, and had eluded capture for nearly a year after the district court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. On this record, we identify no abuse of discretion in how the district court weighed the relevant factors in revoking Madero’s supervised release and sentencing him to a 27-month term of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 191 (holding that weight determinations are generally left to district court). We reject the substantive reasonableness challenge as meritless.

We have considered Madero’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that they are also without merit. Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.  