
    Robert H. Shannon, Resp’t, v. John H. Pickell et al., Impl’d, App’lts.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,
    
    
      Filed December 30, 1889.)
    
    Will—Construction—The word “ children ” does not include grandchildren.
    The will of a testator, after devising a» life estate to his wife, directed that after the deaths of his wife and mother the remainder, if any, should be divided among the children of his sister and the children of his brother according to the designation of his wife. The wife having died without executing the power, Held, that the word “ children ” in the will did not include a grandchild of said sister whose mother had died in the lifetime of the testator, and that she was not entitled to share in the property.
    Appeal from an interlocutory judgment entered upon the report of a referee, in an action for the partition of lands, by which., it was determined that the plaintiff, together with all the other respondents were tenants in common of the premises, deriving their title under the last will and testament of William H. Pickell, who died, as it is claimed by the plaintiff, and a part of the defendants, the owner in fee simple, which was denied by the appellants, who claim title thereto as the heirs-at-law of John Pickell, ■who was a brother of the said testator. At the time of his death, William H. Piclcell was in possession of the premises claiming title thereto. By his last will and testament made on the 4th day of August, 1859, he devised to his wife, Haney Gr. Pickell, a life estate in the premises, and directed that his mother should have support and maintenance during her life-time, and directing that his executors carry out that provision of his will.
    The sixth and last clause of the will is as follows:
    “ I further order and direct that after the decease of my mother and sister Shannon, and my wife, Haney G. Pickell, the remainder of my estate, should there be any, shall be divided among the children of my sister Shannon and the children of my brother, John Pickell, according to the discretion and judgment of my wife, Haney Gr. Pickell, as she shall direct.”
    The said Haney Gr. Pickell and two other persons were appointed executors, all of whom were dead at the time of the commencement of this action. In her life-time, and in September, 1863, the said Haney Gr. Pickell, by an instrument in writing and under seal, which recited that the same was made in pursuance of a power given to her by the will of William Gr. Pickell, to dispose of said lands according to her discretion, conveyed the premises to John Pickell, the father of the appellants. The mother of the testator and his sister Shannon also died before the commencement of this action, the said Haney G". never having, in any form or manner whatever, executed, or attempted to execute, the power vested in her by the will. All the parties to the suit Avere either the children of Mrs. Shannon or of John Pickell, except the defendant, Sarah J. Mead, "who was a granddaughter of Mrs. Shannon, and her mother died in the life-time of the testator and before the making of the will. By the decree each party to the action, including Sarah J. Mead, were allotted the undivided one-fourteenth part of the premises. The complaint alleged that Sarah J. Mead was entitled to the undivided one-fourteenth part of the premises, and she appeared and admitted that her share or interest in the premises was correctly set forth in the complaint and submitted her rights to the protection of the court.
    The appellants, in their answer, deny that she had any rights therein.
    
      John A. Vanderlip, for app’lts; E. F. Bullard, for resp’ts; A. J. Abbott, for Brown et al.
    
   Barker, P. J.

On the former appeal in this action it was held that the controversies between the parties to this action, as to their rights and interests in the premises, could be litigated and determined and a decree for partition entered under the provision of § 1543 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See 2 H. 'Y. State Bep., 160. It was also determined that the conveyance of the premises by the trustee of the power of Haney G-. Pickell to John Pickell was unauthorized and invalid, and that the power remained unexecuted at the time of her death, and vested in this court to be executed under its directions, as provided by the provisions of the Bevised Statutes. 2 B. S., 734, §§ 99, 100, On the last trial, as well as the first, the question was litigated whether the title to the lands was vested in the testator or his brother, John Pickell, the father of the appellants.

We think the fair preponderance of - the evidence is in support of the conclusion of the referee that William H. Picked, the testator, was the owner of the fee,, and that all the equities which John PL Picked had at one time in the premises had been extinguished.

We are also of the opinion that none of the exceptions to the reception or rejection of evidence were wed taken. This brings us to the consideration of the only other question that merits attention, which is, whether the defendant, Sarah J. Mead, is designated in the will as one of the persons whom the donee of the power might designate to take the whole or any part of the remainder after the termination of the life estate of Haney Gr. Picked, the widow of the testator, as provided in the sixth clause, of the will ? This question was not presented for consideration on the former appeal, nor does it appear by the records now before us that the attention of the learned referee was directed to the point, but the exceptions are broad enough to raise the question, and it has been discussed in the written argument presented by the learned counsel for the appellants. The trustee of the power having died leaving the power unexecuted, the statute provides that its execution shall be decreed by a court of equity for the benefit equally of all persons designated as objects of the trust. R. S. part 2, chap. 1, title 2, §§ 99, 100. Mrs. Mead is a grandchild of Mrs. Shannon and her mother, - Mrs. Searls, died in the lifetime of the testator and before he made his will. If .Mrs. Mead is included in the word children, as the same is used in the sixth clause of the will, to designate the class of persons to whom the trustee might convey the premises after the termination of the life estate, then the decree declaring that she is interested in the premises equally with the other parties to the record is correct, otherwise she has no estate therein. The word children in common parlance does not include grandchildren, or any other persons than the immediate descendants in the first degree of the person named as the ancestor. But it may include other persons where it appears that there were no persons in existence who would answer to the description of children in the primary sense of the word at the time of making the will; or where there could not be any such at the time or in the event contemplated by the testator; or where the testator has clearly shown, by the use of other words, that he used the word children as synonomous with descendants or issue, to designate or include legitimate offspring, grandchildren or stepchildren. Mowatt v. Carow, 7 Paige, 328; Palmer v. Horn, 84 N. Y., 516 ; Magaw v. Field, 48 id., 668.

In the case last cited, the testator devised to the children of one Magaw, then deceased, a certain parcel of land, to have and hold the same to their said children, their heirs and assigns, forever. At the time of the execution of the will there were seven children of the said Magaw living. All had died but two before the testator’s death. The two living claimed the whole estate, and it was held that the devise was to a class, and only the surviving children took under it. Sherman v. Sherman, 3 Barb., 385; Cromer v. Pinckney, 3 Barb. Ch., 466; Tier v. Pennell, 1 Edw. Ch., 354.

All the cases hold that the word children, in its primary and ordinary sense, means the immediate, legitimate descendants of the persons named; and where there is nothing to show that the testator intended to use it in a different sense, it will not be held to include grandchildren. There is nothing in the context of the will which suggests the thought that the testator had in mind his granddaughter, Sarah J. Mead, whose mother was dead when he executed the will The remainder of the estate in the premises was given in terms to the children of his brother and sister as a class, and they are entitled to the same in equal proportions, excluding all other persons.

The case of Prowitt v. Rodman, 37 N. Y., 42, contains an elaborate discussion as to who are, and who are not, included in the word children when used in an instrument disposing of property, and is not at all in conflict with the rule which we have quoted from other decisions, and fully recognizes the same.

So much of the judgment as declares that Sarah J. Mead is the owner of the undivided one-fourteenth part of the premises is reversed, and as to her the complaint is dismissed, without costs, as against her, and the judgment so modified that it will adjudge that the other parties to the suit are each entitled to the undivided one-thirteenth part of the premises, without costs of this appeal to either party.

Dwight and Macomber, JJ., concur.  