
    The Phœnix Insurance Company v. The Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad Company.
    Where a policy of insurance against fire had in it a condition, that, “ if the assured shall have, or shall hereafter make, any other insurance on the property hereby insured, or any part thereof, without the consent of the company written hereon, . . . then, and in every such case, this policy shall be void.” Held :
    
    1. That subsequent insurance in this case of the same property against fire in other insurance companies, covering other property of the insured as well, is, within the meaning of the contract, other insurance.
    2. Such other insurance, made without the consent of the company, the consent of which is required by the contract, renders the policy issued by such company void.
    
      Error, reserved from the' District Court of Lucas county.
    The petition avers:
    That the plaintiff is a corporation duly incorporated and organized under and by virtue of the laws of the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois. That the defendant is a corporation duly incorporated and organized for the purpose of carrying on the business of insurance under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Connecticut; that on the 1st day of February, a. d. 1866, said defendant, at Toledo, in the county of Lucas, State of Ohio, in consideration of the sum of two hundred and seventy-five dollars to it in hand paid by the plaintiff’, made its policy in writing, and delivered the same to the plaintiff.
    A copy of said policy is set out in the petition, but only so much as appears in any way necessary to an understanding of the case is here inserted, to wit:
    
      “ Dy this policy of insurance the Phcenix Insurance Company, in consideration of two hundred and seventy-five dollars to them in hand paid by the assured hereinafter named, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do insure the Michigan Southern and Northern Indiana Railroad Company against loss or damage by fire to the amount of ten thousand dollars, for the period of one year, on their steam elevator or grain warehouse and the machinery therein, known as the M. S. and N. I. Railroad Elevator No. £A’ (building; plank, with metal roof, slated sides and ends), situated on the grounds of the company, on the middle ground of the Maumee river, at Toledo, Ohio— $10,000 — for one year @2f cents — $275.....If the assured shall have, or shall hereafter make, any other insurance on the property hereby insured, or any part thereof, without the consent of the company written hereon, . . . . then and in every such case this policy shall be void.
    
      “ In case of any other insurance upon the property hereby insured, whether prior or subsequent to the date of .this policy, the assured shall be entitled to recover of this company no greater proportion of the loss sustained than the sum hereby insured bears to the whole amount insured thereon, whether such other insurance be by specific or'by general or floating policies. Reinsurance for any other insurance company, to be on the basis of joint liability with said company, and in the event of loss this company to pay its proportion of said loss sustained by said company under their policy.” ....
    The petition then avers that the said policy was renewed in February, 1867, for one year; and “ that on the 21st day of December, A. d. 1867, said property insured by said policy, and the renewal thereof, was totally destroyed by fire, which did not happen by means of or during an invasion, insurrection, riot, civil commotion or military or usurped power, nor in consequence of any neglect or deviation from the laws or regulations of the police, or by lightning. That the plaintiff duly performed all the conditions of said policy on its part to be performed, and on the 20th day of January, A. D. 1868, and more than sixty days before the commencement of this action, gave the defendant due notice and proof of the fire and loss aforesaid, and duly demanded the payment of the sum of ten thousand dollars, but no part thereof has been paid, and the defendant is now justly indebted to the plaintiff1 therefor in the sum of ten thousand dollars, with interest from the 20th day of March, A. D. 1868, for which amount the plaintiff asks j udgment against the defendant.”
    The defendant, for answer, after denying the allegations of the petition as to the corporate character of the plaintiff; the loss by fire; the character of the fire, and the performance by the plaintiff of the conditions of the policy, says that“itis provided by, and is one of the conditions of the policy of insurance described in said petition, that if the assured named therein should have, or should thereafter make, any other insurance on the property thereby insured, or any part thereof, without the consent of the company written thereon, that then such policy should be void; that said condition was agreed to by the said plaintiff at the time said contract of insurance was entered into, and was and is so important and necessary a part thereof that the said contract of insurance would not have been made without it, by the defendant; that after said contract was made, to wit, on the 27th day of June, 1867, the plaintiff caused the property described in the aforesaid policy of insurance to be insured in the Magnolia, Buckeye State, American, Firemen’s, and Enterprise Insurance Companies, all of the city of Cincinnati, and State of Ohio, for the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, and on the 27th day of July, 1867, the plaintiff caused the same property to be insured in tkeUnion, Central, Boatmen’s, Lafayette, and Ohio Yalley Insurance Companies, all of the city of Cincinnati, and State of Ohio, for the additional sum of twenty-five thousand dollars. That by the aforesaid insurances so made by the plaintiff the sum of fifty thousand dollars additional to the policy described in the petition was insured upon the same property ; that no consent of the defendant was given to the said insurances made on the 27th day of June, in the Magnolia, Buckeye State, American, Firemen’s, and Enterprise Insurance Companies, all of the city of Cincinnati, and State of Ohio, and no consent was given to said insurance made on the 27th day of July, in the Union, Central, Boatmen’s, Lafayette, and Ohio Yalley Insurance Companies, all of the City of Cincinnati, and State of Ohio; that no such consent in either case was written on the policy described in the petition, and no waiver of said condition was ever made in any form whatever ; that by reason of the promises hereinbefore stated and of the other insurances of the property described in the policy of insurance made by defendant to plaintiff, the said policy of insurance became thereby void and of no effect, and defendant is not liable to the plaintiff by reason of anything therein contained in any sum whatever.
    The plaintiff, in its amended reply to the answer of the defendant, says: “ That the alleged insurance in said Union, Central, Boatmen’s, Lafayette, and Ohio Yalley Insurance Companies was for the sum of five thousand dollars in each of said companies, ‘ on any property belonging to the plaintiff, and on any property for which it might be' liable, except as common carriers or warehousemen, of whatsoever it might consist or wheresoever it might be situated, provided it was on premises owned or occupied by the plaintiff, or situated upon the line of its railroad or on any branch road operated by said plaintiff’ at the time of making said policy.’ That at the time of making said several policies, the plaintiff was the owner of a railroad extending from Toledo, in the State of Ohio, to Elkhart, in the State of Indiana, and from Chicago, in the State of Illinois, through Elkhart, in the State of Indiana aforesaid, to Monroe, in the State of Michigan, and also from a point near Adrian, in the State of Michigan aforesaid, to Jackson, in the same State of Michigan ; and that it operated the Erie & Kalamazoo Railroad, from Toledo aforesaid to Adrian aforesaid, and the Detroit, Monroe & Toledo Railroad, from Toledo aforesaid to Detroit, in said State of Michigan; That the railroads so owned and operated by said plaintiff exceeded five hundred miles in length, and that the property of the plaintiff situated on the line of said railroads, and that for which it was liable except as common carrier or warehouseman, exclusive of that included in the policy of said defendant, and which was covered by the policies of said other companies, exceeded in value the sum of three millions of dollars, at the time said several policies were issued, and thereafter until the loss in the petition alleged; That the alleged insurance in said Magnolia, Buckeye State, American, Fireman’s, and Enterprise Insurance Companies, was for the sum of five thousand dollars in each of said companies ; ‘ on any property belonging to the plaintiff, and on any property for which it might be liable except as common carriers or warehousemen, it mattered not of what it might consist or where it might be, provided it was upon premises then owned or occupied by the plaintiff' and situated on the line of its railroad at Toledo aforesaid.’ That at the time of the making of said policies, and from thence up to the time of the happening of the loss in the petition set forth, the plaintiff was the owner of property situated upon the line of its railroad in Toledo, exclusive of the property covered by the policy of said defendant, but covered by the policies of said last named companies of the value of two hundred thousand dollars and upward. That as the premium for the assurance by the companies hereinbefore first named, there was paid by the pláintiff to each of said companies the sum of seven hundred and fifty dollars, and for that by the companies last named, there was paid by said plaintiff to each the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars. That as the plaintiff avers and is advised, the property covered by the policy of the defendant, in tlie petition set forth, is not in fact covered by those of the several companies in the answer of the defendant set forth; but if it be true that said property insured by the defendant is also included in the policies of said other companies, then the plaintiff avers and so states the fact to be, that the property insured by said other companies, other than that insured by the defendant, was entirely separate and distinct from that insured by the defendant, and so situate as to constitute risks entirely separate and distinct from that taken by the defendant.”
    There was an agreed statement of facts, which is as follows :
    
      “First. That the plaintiff is a corporation in manner and form as stated in the petition.
    
      “Second. That on the 21st day of December, a. d.'1867, the ’property insured by the policy of insurance in the petition set forth, was totally destroyed by fire, which did not happen by means of or during an invasion, insurrection, riot, civil commotion, or military or usurped power, nor in consequence of any neglect or deviation from the laws or regulations of the police, or by lightning.
    “ Thirct. That the value of the property covered by the policy of insurance at the time of the destruction thereof by fire as aforesaid, was sixty thousand dollars.
    
      “Fourth. That the several policies of insurance in the Union, Central, Boatmen’s, Lafayette, and Ohio Yalley Insurance Companies, in the answer of the defendant referred to, were each for the sum of five thousand dollars ‘ on any property belonging to the plain,tiff, and on any property for which it might be liable, except as common carriers or ware-housemen, of whatsoever it might consist or wheresoever it might be situated, provided it was on premises owned or occupied by the plaintiff, or situated upon the line of its railroad, or on any branch road operated by the plaintiff at the time of making said policies — liberty for other insurance whether contemporaneous or future.’
    
      “Fifth. That the several policies in said Magnolia, Buckeye State, American, Firemen’s, and Enterprise Insurance Companies, were each for the sum of five thousand dollars ‘on any property belonging to the plaintiff, and on any property for which it might be liable except as common carriers or warehousemen, it mattered not of what it might consist or where it might be, provided it was upon premises then owned or occupied by the plaintiff', and situated on the line of its railroad at Toledo — liberty for other insurance, whether contemporaneous or future.’
    
      “Sixth. That at the time of making said several policies, the plaintiff was the owner of a railroad, extending from Toledo, in the State of Ohio, to Elkhart, in the State of Indiana; and from Chicago, in the State of Illinois, through Elkhart aforesaid, to Monroe, in the State of Michigan. Also from a point near Adrian, in the State of Michigan, to Jackson, in the same state; and that it operated the Erie & Kalamazoo Railroad from Toledo aforesaid to Adrian, and the Detroit, Monroe & Toledo Railroad from Toledo to Detroit in the State of Michigan. The entire line of railroad owned and operated by the plaintiff at the time of issuing said several policies, exceeded in length five hundred miles.’
    
      “Seventh. That at the time of the making said several policies by the defendant and the companies in the answer of the defendant set forth, and thereafter up to the time of said fire, the plaintiff' was the owner of personal property on the line of its said railroads, for which it was not liable as common carriers or warehousemen, of the value of two million of dollars and upwards, and of buildings and other fixed property on the line of its several railroads, other than that covered by the policy of said defendant of the value of one million of dollars.
    “Eighth. That at the same time, and from thence up to the time of said fire, the plaintiff Was the owner of personal property at Toledo, on the line of the railroad, and for which it was not liable as common carriers or warehouse-men, of the value of one hundred thousand dollars, and of buildings and fixed property at the same place, other than that covered by the policy of the defendant, of the value of one hundred thousand dollars and more.
    
      “Ninth. That the premium paid by said plaintiff:' for the assurance, by the said companies hereinbefore first named, was the sum of seven hundred and fifty dollars on each of said policies, and that paid to the last named companies the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars on each of said policies ; the insurance by said policies being for the tei’m of one year from the date thereof.
    “ Tenth. That the steam elevator or grain warehouse, with the machinery therein, was on the line of the plaintiff’s road, but was separate from other property of the plaintiff' covered by the policies in the other companies, and so situated as to constitute a separate risk.
    “ The defendant’s policy was confined to the said grain warehouse, while said other policies covered such property of the plaintiff as is hereinbefore described in paragraphs 4 and 5.
    
      “Eleventh. That after the fire and destruction of said elevator, the plaintiff made proof of the loss thereof to all the companies hereinbefore named, and claimed payment from them under the several policies aforesaid. That the plaintiff" also, in making proof of the loss to the defendant, stated said several policies issued by the other companies aforesaid, and claimed that said companies were insurers of the said property as well as the defendant. The proof furnished the defendant was the same as that furnished the other companies. The Enterprise and American Companies paid the amount of their respective policies without objection; all the other companies objected to the payment; and finally a compromise was effected, each of the companies paying three thousand dollars in full of all demands under their respective policies.
    “ Twelfth. That neither said Phoenix Insurance Company nor its agents had any notice of said other insurance, or gave any consent thereto in writing or otherwise.”
    In the court below, the action was submitted on the pleadings and agreed statement of facts. The trial resulted in a judgment in favor of plaintiff below. Defendant asked for a new trial, which was denied him. Exception was taken to the ruling and judgment of the court, and a bill of exceptions,^embodying all the exceptions, pleadings, and agreed statement of facts, was taken in due form and made of record. The action was taken to the District Court of Lucas county, on error, and by that court reserved to this.
    
      Lincoln, Smith & Stephens, for plaintiff in error :
    I, The question presented is — Was the insurance taken and existing at the time of the loss, in any of the companies named in the answer, “ other insurance,” under the condition set up in the answer ?
    These policies were very peculiar. They are called in insurance language, “ floating policies,” for the reason that they cover many distinct and separate risks, at great distances apart, which are subject to various and different perils, and are hazardous to the underwriter, and a large premium is paid. P. & Ill. R. R. Co. v. Yorkins Ins. Co., 10 Ill. 75; N. Br. & M. Ins. Co. v. Moffat, 20 Wis. 114; Liscom v. Bos. M. Ins. Co., 9 Met. 211; 5 Md. 169.
    II. There are certain well known definitions in insurance laws:
    
      First. “ Double insurance ” is insurance in favor of the same party, upon the same title and property, and for the same risks. Roots v. Cin. Ins. Co., 1 Dis. 141; Godin v. London As. Co., 1 Burr. 489; Col. Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 11 Johns. 238; The How. Ins. Co. v. Scribner, 5 Hill, 301; Lucas v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 6 Cow. 637; Stacey v. Franklin Ins. Co., 2 W. & S. 542; Haley v. Dov. M. Ins. Co., 1 Allen, 538; Sloat v. Royal Ins. Co., 49 Pa. St. 18; 1 Arnould on Ins. 317.
    One of the peculiarities of this insurance is that all these insurances are regarded as one insurance, and the several underwriters as sureties for each other. Lucas v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 6 Cow. 637, 638; How. Ins. Co. v. Scribner, 5 Hill, 301, 302; Stacey v. Franklin Ins. Co., 2 W. & S. 542; Sloat v. Royal Ins. Co., 49 Pa. St.18.
    Where there is no provision to the contrary, the assured may sue one or more of the companies, and collect his whole loss from one or more of them, leaving such underwriter or underwriters to seek his or their remedies against the other insurers. Newby v. Reid, 1 Wm. Bl. 416.
    “ The different underwriters were, in effect, insurers of each other.” Stacey v. Franklin Ins. Co., 2 W. & S. 543; see also Cronne v. Ky. & L. Ins. Co., 15 B. Mon. 436.
    It was to meet this state of the law that underwriters adopted the condition requiring—
    1. That they should only be liable for such proportion of the loss as the amount insured by them bore to the whole amount insured. How. Ins. Co. v. Scribner, 5 Hill, 301; Lucas v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 6 Cow. 638; Stacey v. Franklin Ins. Co., 2 W. & S. 542.
    2. And notice of such insurance, that they might know the extent of their liability. Conway Tool Co. v. H. R. Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 150.
    3. And, in some cases, the indorsement of the insurance upon the policy or written consent to such insurance, in order that there might be written evidence of such notice. Conway Tool Co. v. H. R. Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 150.
    
      Second. “ Over insurance ” is when the property is insured for more than it is worth. I Arnould on Ins. 318.
    
      Third. “ Other insurance ” is any insurance covering the property, though it may cover other property also.
    III. The insurances pleaded were “ other insurances,” within the terms of the policy sued upon. Fellows et al. v. Madison Ins. Co., 1 Dis. 222; Same v. Same, 2 Dis. 138; Harris v. Ohio Ins. Co., Wright, 545; Same v. Same, 5 Ohio, 468; Washington Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 17 Ohio St. 437, 438; Bal. F. Ins. Co. v. Loony, 20 Md. 39; P.F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Anahow, 45 Ill. 88, 90; Walton v. L. N. M. & F. Ins. Co., 2 Rob. (La.), 564, 565; Holbrook v. Am. Ins. Co., 1 Curtis, 193; R. M. C. Man. Co. v. Mu. F. Ins. Co., 11 Up. Can. Q. B. 516; Mussey v. The At. Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 79, 82, 83; Columbus Ins. Co. v. Walsh, 18 Mo. 233; Blake v. Ex. M. Ins. Co., 12 Gray, 272, 273; Angelrodt v. Del. M. Ins. Co., 31 Mo. 597, 598; McMahon v. Pots. U. F. Ins. Co., 2 Foster, 17, 18; Liscom v. Bos. M. Ins. Co., 9 Met. 211; Haley v. Dov. M. Ins. Co., 1 Allen, 540; 49 Pa. St. 18; Bigler v. N. Y. Central Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 404; Conway Tool Co. v. H. R. Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 150.
    These authorities meet this very point, and decide the very question involved in this case.
    The .point is that, because these policies cover a large amount of other property besides the elevator, largely greater in amount than the sum insured, and the policy sued upon covers only the elevator, that, thereforej these insurances are not, in the language of insurance law, “ other insurance,” under the condition in question.
    
      R. & E. T. Waite, for defendants in error :
    The real question is whether the insurance effected through the several policies set forth in tbe answer of the defendant below was such other insurance on the property covered by the’ policy of the Phoenix Insurance Company as to render that polioy void, because no consent of said company was given for such insurance, as required by the provision in its policy.
    What was meant by the parties to this contract of insurance, by the expression “ any other insurance ? ” We claim that this “ other'insurance” is what is known in the books and decisions as double insurance. Clark v. New England Ins. Co., 6 Cush. 342; Rising Sun Ins. Co. v. 
      Slaughter, 20 Ind. 520; 23 Pick. 418; 2 McMullen, 220; 38 Conn. 181; 28 Mich. 173: May on Insurance, secs. 364, 365 (p. 437, ed. 1873); Godin v. London Ins. Co., 1 Bur. 489; Harris v. Ohio Ins. Co., 5 Ohio, 466; Phillip on Ins., sec. 359; Root v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 1 Dis. 138; French v. Chenango Ins. Co., 7 Hill, 122; Associated Firemen’s Ins. Co. v. Assum, 5 Md. 165; Loehner v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Mo. 247.
    We claim that this “ other” or double insurance which, under this stipulation, is to avoid a previous or subsequent policy, because of the want of consent to such other insurance thereon written, must be an insurance of the same interest in the same property, and not only as to the insured, but as to the insurers, against the same risk. In other words, that the risk assumed by the one company must not only be of the same character, but to the same extent as that of the other company. Howard Ins. Co. v. Scribner, 5 Hill. 298; Baltimore Fire Ins. Co. v. Loney, 20 Md. 20; Sloot v. Royal Ins. Co., 49 Penn. 14; Donaldson v. Manchester Ins. Co., 14 Cas. C. Ses. 601; Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 11 Johns. 233; Harris v. Ohio Ins. Co., 5 Ohio, 466; Lucas v. Jefferson Ins Co., 6 Cush. 635; Millandon v. Western M. & F. Ins. Co., 9 Louis, 27.
   Ashburn, J.

A number of alleged errors are assigned in this court against the judgment. In our view of the case a consideration of one of them disposes of the case. It is assigned for error “ that the court rendered judgment in this case for the plaintiff, when by the laws of the land judgment ought to have been rendered in favor of the defendant.” •

The case is here on error to have it determined whether the judgment rendered in the court below is in accordance with the facts and law of the case.

The first question is one of fact raised by the reply. Plaintiff avers in the reply that, “as it is advised, the property covered by the policy of the defendant in the petition set- forth is not covered in fact by those of the several companies in the answer of the defendant set forth.”

It is agreed that the property described in the policy of defendant was situated on the line of plaintiff’s road; that the policies issued June 27, 1867, are “ on any property belonging to plaintiff, . . . situated on the line of its railroad, etc.;” that the policies issued July 27, 1867, are “ on any property belonging to the plaintiff", . . . provided it was upon premises then owned or occupied by plaintiff", and situated on the line of its railroad at Toledo; that after the fire and destruction of said elevator, the plaintiff" made proof of the loss thereof to all the companies hereinbefore named, and claimed payment from them under the several policies aforesaid. That the plaintiff also, in making proof of the loss to the defendant, stated said several policies issued by the other companies aforesaid, and claimed that said companies were insurers of the said property as well as the defendant. The proof furnished the defendant was the same as that furnished the other companies.”

From this proof we are satisfied that all the policies covered the “ steam elevator or grain warehouse, and the machinery therein.”

“ The steam elevator or grain warehouse, and the machinery therein,” were of the estimated value of sixty thousand dollars. It wTas insured in the Phoenix Insurance Company for ten thousand dollars; in the Union, Central, Boatmenls, Lafayette, and Ohio Yalley, along with other property, for five thousand dollars in each; in the Magnolia, Buckeye State, American, Fireman’s, and Enterprise, along with other property, for five thousand dollars in each — in all sixty thousand dollars. A risk never contemplated by the defendant without giving its consent. The very thing the Phoenix Insurance Company intended to guard against has happened, unless the condition in defendant’s policy is effective to prevent. It is unusual for insurers to insure property at its full value, and they sel•dom assent that property upon which they have a risk may be insured in other companies to its full value. “ They assure the risk of only a certain part, not usually, if ever, •exceeding two-thirds or three-fourths of the value.” 9 Met. 211.

As a part of its contract, and in this case the essential part of the contract, the policy issued to the plaintiff, on which this action is founded, contained the following condition :

“ If the assured shall have, or shall hereafter make, any •other insurance on the property hereby insured, or any part thereof, without the consent of the company written hereon; . . . then and in every such case this policy shall be void.”

Subsequent to the issuing of the policy by the defendant (the Phoenix Insurance Company) the ten policies named in the answer were taken upon the same property, and also •embracing a large amount of other property. Was the insurance effected through the ten several other policies set out in the answer, other insurance, so as to render the policy •of the Pbcenix void, because no consent was given by it for such subsequent insurance?

We think it was and had that effect.

Counsel for plaintiff below urge, that the other insurance ■sought to be guarded against in the policy is what is defined to be double insurance. The decisions as to what constitutes double insurance are not uniform in expression •or exact in description; and no comprehensive definition of what strictly constitutes double insurance has been found. It would seem to be a case of insurance where, but for some restrictive contribution clause in the policy, the insured can recover from several insurances a double satisfaction for the same loss.

As we understand this contract and the law governing it, the question of double insurance is of no great significance. We think it was not intended to be and is not so limited,but was intended and so understood by the parties to prohibit any and all insurance, on the pain of forfeiture, unless the consent of the Phoenix Insurance Company was obtained. Manifestly the purpose of this condition in the policy was to prevent over-insurance of any name — to prevent such increase of the risk on the property as would ■occasion temptation to fraudulent acts. It was no doubt intended, as one effect of the condition, to excite the insured to diligence in the preservation of the property, as a salutary check upon over-insurance of any name — a restriction founded in that wisdom which comes from experience.

Keeping .within the principles of public policy, a person ■or corporation may insure the same property against the same risk in several offices, to any amount, consent being given and duly noted on the policy to be affected thereby. Parties to the policies may name their own conditions, and such conditions must have effect whenever a case for which they provide may arise.

The provision in this policy in regard to contribution in ease of loss, tends strongly to show that the other insurance intended to be guarded ■ against was not double insurance alone, nor indeed to be limited specially to any other general or special fire insurance. In giving construction to a contract all its parts may be considered.

The second clause in the policy casts some, light upon this ■question. It is provided : “ In case of any other insurance upon the property hereby insured, whether prior or subsequent to the date of this policy, the assured shall be .entitled, . . . whether such other insurance be by specific or by general or floating policies.” There is no intention here manifested to limit the insurance and provide alone against, double insurance. On the contrary, this clause indicates quite clearly that the other insurance guarded against might be either specific, general, or floating. The ten policies set forth in the answer come fully within the meaning of floating policies, they being such as cover many and separate risks, at greater or less distances apart, and subject to many perils from fire, in this case, covering the steam elevator, locomotives, and ears, at widely different points, along five hundred miles of road, station houses, etc.

The general doctrine, that a previous or subsequent insurance on the same property without notice, under a policy requiring notice of such insurance upon pain of forfeiture, discharges the insurer from any obligations under such circumstances, is well settled and universally recognized. May on Insurance, 437, 438.

Numerous adjudicated cases clearly show that the facts-of the case under consideration bring it within the general rule of other insurance, which, made without consent, as in this case, renders the policy void. Jefferson Kimble v. Howard Fire Ins. Co., 8 Gray, 33; Bigler et al. v. New York Central Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 402; Conway Toll Co. v. Hudson River Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 144; The Ramsey Woolen Cloth Man. Co. v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of the District of Johnstown, 11 Up. Can. Q. B. 516.

That the insurance made by the ten companies named in the answer upon the steam elevator or grain warehouse, and the machinery therein, was other insurance, and such as the restrictive clause of the Phcenix policy intended to guard against, is clear. As no consent was given by the-defendant authorizing such insurance, the policy upon, which this action is founded is void.

Judgment of the court of common pleas reversed. Having all the facts of the case before us, this court will render the judgment that should have been «rendered in the court below.

Petition dismissed.  