
    Helburn Leather Company, Appellee, v. Benjamin Stone and Jacob W. Stone, copartners, trading as Stone Brothers, Appellants.
    Gen. No. 22,839.
    (Not to be reported in full.)
    Abstract of the Decision.
    1. Sams, § 129
      
      —what constitutes symbolical delivery of goods to consignees. Delivery of goods f. o. b. a certain city, held to mean that the goods should arrive in such city, and when they did so arrive in the usual and customary course of transit the possession of the common carrier at such city was a symbolical delivery to the consignees who had ordered the goods and effective to vest the title of the goods in them.
    2. Carriers, § 79*—who may maintain action for wrongful or negligent, delivery where goods are deliverable f. o. b. cars at destina^ 
      
      lion. Where goods are delivered to a common carrier for shipment to a purchaser f. o. b. cars at the purchaser’s city and are at such city delivered by the carrier to another, any right of action for wrongful or negligent delivery lies only in favor of the purchaser against the carrier.
    
      Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Hugh J. Keabns, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1916.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed April 16, 1917.
    Statement of the Case.
    Action by the Helbnrn Leather Company, a corporation, plaintiff, against Benjamin Stone and Jacob W. Stone, copartners, trading as Stone Brothers, defendants, to recover the agreed price of three bundles of leather bought of plaintiff. From a judgment for plaintiff for $195.89, defendants appeal.
    Max M. Grossman, for appellants; H. J. Rosenberg, of counsel.
    A. M. Schwarz, J. A. Joseph and M. E. Burr, for appellee.
    
      
      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic snd section number.
    
   Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.

3. Trial, § 295*—when request that proposition of law be passed upon is too late. A request that propositions of law presented to a trial judge after entry of judgment be passed upon nune pro tunc as of the date of the judgment is properly refused as being too late.  