
    Moctar Baidy SENGOTT, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-5184-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 19, 2010.
    Law Offices of Malick A. Diop, Bronx, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Emily Anne Radford, Assistant Director, Nehal H. Kamani, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Moctar Baidy Sengott, an alleged native and citizen of Mauritania, seeks review of the November 17, 2009, decision of the BIA affirming the January 14, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“U”) William P. Van Wyke pretermitting his application for asylum, and denying his applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Moctar Baidy Sengott, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Nov. 17, 2009), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 14, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). We review only the agency’s denial of Sengott’s applications for withholding of removal and CAT relief because he waives any challenge to the agency’s pretermission of his asylum application as untimely. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005).

With respect to Sengott’s application for withholding of removal, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. While Sengott claims that the agency improperly relied on minor inconsistencies, the agency reasonably found that Sengott’s contradictory testimony and failure, though given multiple opportunities, to establish his location during the six years after he and his family purportedly were forcibly deported from Mauritania constituted substantial discrepancies going to the heart of Sengott’s claim. See Secaidar-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir.2003). Moreover, the agency did not err in concluding that these discrepancies in conjunction with other inconsistencies such as those related to whether Sen-gott’s brother’s arm was broken, whether soldiers accused Sengott of not being Mauritanian, and whether his family was beaten and whipped by a rival ethnic group, cumulatively supported an adverse credibility determination. See Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir.2006) (emphasizing that “even where an IJ relies on discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the claim, ... the cumulative effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential by the fact-finder”).

Accordingly, because the agency’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, it did not err in denying Sengott’s application for withholding of removal. See id. at 402-03. Further, the agency did not err in finding that Sengott failed to credibly establish his eligibility for protection under the CAT because that claim was based on the same factual predicate as his claim for withholding of removal. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005).

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to consider Sengott’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it was not presented to the BIA, and we dismiss the petition for review to that extent. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 84(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  