
    Charles Baker versus Israel Loveti.
    Where one of full age and an infant had jointly assaulted and beaten another infant, and the infant only was sued for the trespass, who pleaded an accord and satisfaction between the plaintiff and the other trespasser of full age, it was held, that the plaintiff was not bound by such adjustment
    This was an action of trespass for an assault and battery committed on the plaintiff (who, being an infant, sues by his next friend) by the defendant, also an infant, who defends by his guardian appointed by the Court. It appears from the record that the original writ was purchased as well against James Dennis as the defendant ; but Dennis, not being served with process, was, at the plaintiff’s motion, with leave of the Court, struck out of the writ.
    The defendant pleads in bar, that the trespass charged was committed jointly by him and Dennis, and that pending the suit there had been an accord and satisfaction betw'een the plaintiff and Dennis, the latter having paid the former fifty dollars in full satisfaction.
    The plaintiff, protesting that he did not accept the said sum of fifty dollars in satisfaction of the trespass, replies that, at the time of the supposed satisfaction, he was an infant, of eighteen years of age, and no more.
    To this replication the defendant demurs generally, and the plaintiff joins in demurrer.
    * Dane, in support of the demurrer. It is a general- [*79] principle, that if an agreement be for the benefit of an infant at the time, it shall bind him.  It is averred here that the fifty dollars was a full and ample satisfaction, which the plaintiff has not denied, though he insists upon further damages. If fraud or imposition had been practised, it should have been shown by the plaintiff, and the accord would have been avoided. The writ was sued by the plaintiff’s next friend, and it is to be presumed that he was consenting to the settlement, which in such case would certainly bind; and by our law an infant above fourteen years of age may choose his own guardian. The privilege of an infant should never be made the engine of fraud, which will be the case, if, after having received a fair satisfaction for a personal wrong, he can still compel a second satisfaction for the same injury. A minor may sue, arrest, and imprison, one who has done him a personal injury ; and it seems to be an absurdity, that, with this power, he should not have authority to receive the compensation which he demands for the injury, and to discharge the wrong-doer.
    
      Prescott for the plaintiff.
    The rule that all contracts made by an infant, except for necessaries, are voidable, is general. If he submit a demand to arbitrators, he is not bound by the award : 
      a fortiori, he shall not be bound by an adjustment made by himself, without the protection of indifferent and judicious arbitrators.
    Where an infant plaintiff had licensed the defendant to cut off a parcel of hair, in consideration of a sum previously paid, the contract was held absolutely void, and the plaintiff recovered judgment, notwithstanding the license. 
    
    In the writ against Dennis and Lovett, the damages demanded were a hundred dollars; and it is a strong presumption that the fifty dollars paid by Dennis were intended only as satisfaction for that part of the trespass committed by him. This is also [ * 80 ] a sufficient answer to the observation * cited for the defendant from Justice Duller, that an agreement for the benefit of an infant shall bind him.
    
      
       2 D. & E. 161, Drury vs Drury; cited by Buller, J., in the case of Maddon vs White
      
    
    
      
      
        Fitz. Abr. Arbitrament, 3, 4.
    
    
      
       3 Keb. 366,
    
   Parsons, C. J.

Where one trespass has been committed by several persons jointly, the party injured may sue any, or all the trespassers ; but he can recover but one satisfaction for the same injury. As it is confessed by the pleadings in this case, that the trespass was committed jointly by Dennis and the defendant, and that Dennis has made full satisfaction, the plea in bar is sufficient, unless the plaintiff can by law avoid the accord made between him and Dennis.

This right in the plaintiff is insisted on by his counsel, on the general principle, that an infant may avoid all contracts made by him, with the exception of contracts for necessaries.

infants are supposed to be destitute of sufficient understanding to contract. The law, therefore, protects their weakness and imbecility, so far as to allow them to avoid all their contracts by which they may be injured. But in favor of infants, they are bound by all reasonable contracts for their maintenance and education, and also by all acts which they are obliged by law to do. Upon this principle, they may avoid the sale of their chattels or lands, or any contract or agreement to surrender or release their rights, for which they are entitled to an equivalent; because it is a presumption of law, that infants have not sufficient discretion to put a just value on their property or rights.

But an injury done to an infant, by assaulting and beating him, vests in him a right of action, to recover adequate damages. He is not, however, supposed to have capacity to ascertain the damages, and, therefore, if he release them, he may avoid the release. On the same ground, if he submit his rights to arbitration, he will not be bound by the award, from a presumed incompetency to choose suitable arbitrators. For the same reason, if he attempt himself to ascertain the damages, he cannot be obliged by *this act, although he may have received the damages [ * 81 ] he claims. They may be extremely inadequate to the injury, and the law will protect him as well against himself as against others.

Where the infant is quite a child, this humane provision of the law is evidently reasonable; but the law has drawn no line between an infant of six years old, and one of twenty years old; for all infants are entitled to equal protection.

The law, however, will not admit these principles to be made an engine of fraud and injustice; and in the case at bar, if the jury on the trial are convinced that the satisfaction received from Dennis was a compensation for the injury, they will assess for the plaintiff but nominal damages. But if the compensation should be found inadequate, the jury will give such further sum, as, with the money received from Dennis, will amount to a reasonable satisfaction. The law very properly will not trust an infant to fix a value on his own rights. But this power is devolved on a jury, who will do justice to all parties.

The replication is adjudged good; and let a jury inquire of the damages.  