
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Benigno Class, Appellant.
    Argued April 30, 1986;
    decided May 29, 1986
    
      POINTS OF COUNSEL
    
      Mark C. Cogan and Philip L. Weinstein for appellant.
    Officer McNamee violated appellant’s right, under New York law, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when, upon stopping appellant’s car for a traffic infraction and lacking any reason to believe that the car was stolen, he opened the door, entered the vehicle, reached inside and moved papers on the dashboard, in a search for the vehicle identification number (VIN). (People v Marsh, 20 NY2d 98; People v Adams, 32 NY2d 451; People v Erwin, 42 NY2d 1064; Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648; South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364; People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398; People v Perel, 34 NY2d 462; People v Weintraub, 35 NY2d 351; United States v Robinson, 414 US 218; People v Troiano, 35 NY2d 476.)
    
      Mario Merola, District Attorney (Roger L. Stavis and Steven R. Kartagener of counsel), for respondent.
    The actions of a police officer who had lawfully stopped appellant’s vehicle for two observed traffic violations and routinely attempted to inspect its VIN plate, ordinarily viewable from outside the vehicle but obscured by some papers on the dashboard, by opening the door and moving the papers aside, were reasonable and, thus, the loaded weapon which was then discovered in plain view was properly seized under the New York Constitution. (Oregon v Haas, 420 US 714; People v Gokey, 60 NY2d 309; People v Adams, 53 NY2d 241; People v Elwell, 50 NY2d 231; Cooper v Morin, 49 NY2d 69, cert denied sub nom. Lombard v Cooper, 446 US 984; People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154; Sharrock v Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 NY2d 152; People v Isaacson, 44 NY2d 511; SHAD Alliance v Smith Haven Mall, 66 NY2d 496; People v Gonzalez, 62 NY2d 386.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

In our earlier opinion in this case, we held that the police "officer’s nonconsensual entry into [defendant’s] automobile to determine the vehicle identification number violates the Federal and State Constitutions where it is based solely on a stop for a traffic infraction (US Const, 4th Amdt; NY Const, art I, § 12)” (63 NY2d 491, 493). The Supreme Court reversed on the Federal Constitution, holding that "the police officer’s action does not violate the Fourth Amendment” (475 US —, —, 106 S Ct 960, 963), and the case is now before us again.

In support of its own jurisdiction to hear the case, the Supreme Court stated that our decision did not rest on "an independent and adequate state ground” because it lacked the requisite "plain statement” (475 US, at p —, 106 S Ct, at p 964; see, Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1041-1042). At this juncture, in our consideration of the case under State law, we cannot disregard the fact that we held that article I, § 12 of our State Constitution was violated by the search. Although on remand we have in the past, as a matter of State law, followed Supreme Court decisions in several cases (see, e.g., People v Quarles, 63 NY2d 923, on remand from New York v Quarles, 467 US 649; People v Ferber, 57 NY2d 256, on remand from New York v Ferber, 458 US 747; cf. People v Belton, 55 NY2d 49, on remand from New York v Belton, 453 US 454), in none of those cases had we initially and expressly relied on the State Constitution (see, People v Quarles, 58 NY2d 664; People v Ferber, 52 NY2d 674; People v Belton, 50 NY2d 447).

Where, as here, we have already held that the State Constitution has been violated, we should not reach a different result following reversal on Federal constitutional grounds unless respondent demonstrates that there are extraordinary or compelling circumstances. That showing has not been made.

Accordingly, upon reargument, on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, the motion to suppress granted, the conviction vacated and the indictment dismissed.

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Meyer, Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone and Hancock, Jr., concur in Per Curiam opinion.

Upon reargument, on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, order reversed, etc.  