
    Gary M. COHEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 08-2400-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 7, 2010.
    
      Gary M. Cohen, pro se, Miami Beach, FL, for Appellant.
    Terrence O. Reed, FedEx Corporate Services, Inc., Memphis, TN, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: ROGER J. MINER, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Gary M. Cohen (“Cohen”) brought this action alleging various employment discrimination claims against his former employer, defendant-appellee Federal Express Corporation (“defendant”). The District Court granted summary judgment to defendant with respect to each of Cohen’s claims. Cohen then brought this appeal. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of this action, and the issues raised on appeal.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “[Cjonclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. State of N.Y., 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2002).

Here, having undertaken the required de novo review, we conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment to defendant, as Cohen provided no evidence — beyond his own conclusory allegations — that would support a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Nor did Cohen submit sufficient evidence showing a violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.

We have considered all of plaintiffs arguments on appeal and have determined that they are meritless.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the March 31, 2008 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.  