
    M’Niel and Turner v. Baird.
    Decided, March 11th, 1819.
    1. Case Approved. — The point in Snelson & Co. y. Franklin (ante), again determined.
    2. Negotiable Paper — Bona Fide Assignee — Efíect oí Equities on. — The right of a bona fide assignee, for valuable consideration of a note negotiable at the Bank of Virginia, to recover against the maker and indorsers of such note, is not to be affected by any equity, of which he had no notice when he received it.
    3. Same — injunction against Payee and Assignee-Decree. — ff the maker of a note negotiable at the Bank of Virginia, file a Bill of Injunction against the payee and his assignee, on the ground of an equity affecting the payee only, the Court of Chancery, having before it all the parties concerned, ought not to discharge the maker altogether, nor to turn over the assignee to a suit at law against the payee, but should decree against the latter, in the first instance, that he pay the amount of the note to the assignee, and the costs at law; and liberty should be reserved to the assignee to applj' to the Court to dissolve the Injunction as to the maker for so much of the said debt as he may not be able to recover from the payee; in which case a decree ought also to be rendered in favour of the maker against the said payee, for so much thereof as he may be compelled to pay as aforesaid. And the decree should farther direct that the action at law in favour of the assignee against the paynee, if any be pending, be perpetually in-joined, except as to the costs.
    4. Same — Same—Same—Costs,—In such case the payee should pay to both the other parties, their costs in Chancery, and in the Court of Appeals, upon an appeal taken by himself and the assignee; in the decision of which, both the other parties substantially prevail.
    5. Chancery Practice — Decree between Codefendants. —A Court of Equity may decree in favour of one defendant against another: in a case where the same decree operates in favour of one Complainant, by subjecting, in the first instance, that defendant who ought ultimately to pay the debt.
    Upon a Bill filed by Herbert Baird against Hector M’Niel, stating similar grounds of equity to those on which Franklin relied in his Bill against Snelson & Co., (see ante.) Chancellor Taylor granted an injunction to restrain and injoin the defendant, his agents, &c., from paying, endorsing away, or in any manner enforcing the collection of, three notes negotiable at the Bank of Virginia, executed by the plaintiff to the defendant, amounting in the whole to eleven hundred dollars, and payable as described in the order.
    It appearing from the answer of M’Niel, that the notes had been assigned by him for value received before the Bill was filed; Samuel Turner the assignee was made “also a defendant, by an amended Bill; and another Injunction was awarded, to restrain and injoin him, his agents, &c., from proceeding to enforce, by suit or otherwise, the payment of those notes.
    Turner by his answer said, that he received the notes in question, for a valuable consideration, long before the Court had awarded an Injunction to prohibit their collection, and without knowing that there was any equity against them; and ‘‘is advised that there can be no set-off or equity against a note negotiable at the Banks of Virginia.”
    The equity in the Bill, against the defendant M’Niel only, was fully supported by testimony.
    The Chancellor made the Injunctions perpetual; reserving, however, to the defendant Turner the liberty or proceeding at law, for the recovery of the amount of the notes, against the other defendant; and decreed farther that the defendant M’Niel pay to the plaintiff his costs.
    From this decree, both the defendants appealed.
    May for the appellants.
    Eeigh for the appellee.
    
      
      NegotiaMe Paper — Bona Fide Purchaser. — See monographic note on "Bills, Notes and Checks” appended to Archer v. Ward, 9 Gratt. 622. The principal case is cited on the subject in Hogshead v. Baylor. 16 Gratt. 105.
    
    
      
      Chancery Practice — Decree between Codefendants. —In Whitlock v. Gordon, 1 Va. Dec. 251, Wingfield, P., who delivered the opinion of the court, said: “In relation to decrees between codefendants, I understand the rule in Virginia tobe the same as that laid down by Lords Eldon and Redesdale in the House of Lords in the case of Chanity v. Lord Dunsany, 2 Sch. and Lef. 689, that ‘whenever a case is made out between the defendants by evidence arising from the pleadings and proofs between the plaintiff and defendants a court of equity is enti- • tied to make a decree between the defendants, and is bound to do so.’ M’Niel v. Baird, 6 Munf. 316; Allen v. Morgan, 8 Gratt. 60; Morris v. Terrell, 2 Rand. 6; Mundy v. Vawter, 3 Gratt. 518; Templeman v. Fauntleroy, 3 Rand. 434. There have been various cases decided in our court of appeals rej ect-ing decrees between codefeudants (and the case of Blair v. Thompson, etc., 11 Gratt. 441, cited by the counsel of the appellants, is one of them), because the matter did not arise from the proceedings and proofs between the plaintiffs and defendants. But none of them, I think, impugn the rule as above laid down that whenever a case does arise between the defendants upon such proceedings and proofs it is the right and duty of the court to decree between them, and make an end of the controversy, and save the necessity of other suits and further delay and expenses.” On the same subject the principal case is cited in Thorntons v. Fitzhugh, 4 Leigh 220; Blair v. Thompson, 11 Gratt. 450, 451. See generally, monographic note on "Decrees” appended to Evans v. Spurgin, 11 Gratt. 615.
    
   The following was this Court’s opinion, delivered by

JUDGE ROANE.

The Court is of opinion that, as between the appellant M’Niel and the appellee, the latter is entitled to recover back the amount of the notes in controversy; on the principle, and for the reasons, on which relief was given by this Court in the case of Snelson v. Franklin. As between the ap-pellee and the appellant Turner, however, the former as well as the said M’Niel is responsible for the payment of the said notes to the said Turner; they having passed into his hands, and being placed on the footing of foreign bills of Exchange by our statutes made in relation thereto: and, both these parties, so liable to the demand of Turner, being before the Court, the Court is of opinion, that a decree ought to have been rendered in his favour, subjecting the appellant M’Niel, in the first instance, to the payment of the said notes; he being the principal debtor. The decree before us is therefore erroneous, so far as it discharges the appellee *by perpetuating the injunction as to him: it is also erroneous in turning over the appellant Turner to a suit at law against M’Niel, instead of decreeing against him' in the first instance. The opinion of the Court therefore is, that a decree ought to be rendered in favour of Turner against the appellant M’Niel, for the amount of the said notes, with interest and the costs at law ; and that liberty be reserved to the said Turner to apply to the Court of Chancery to dissolve the injunction, as to the appellee, for so much of the said debt as he may not be able to recover from M’Niel; in which case, a Decree ought also to be rendered in favour of the appellee, agair^t the appellant M’Niel, for so much thereof as he may be compelled to pay as aforesaid: and that the action or actions at law, now pending' against the appellant M’Niel, in favour of the other appellant, if any such there be, be perpetually injoined, except as to the costs thereof.

In thus decreeing in favour of one defendant against the other, we not only decree substantially in his favour, by subjecting in the first instance to his claim another defendant, and giving him an immediate decree against him, but we also decree in favour of the plaintiff, by interposing, between him and Turner, that defendant who ought ultimately to paj' the debt.

The decree is to be therefore reversed, and the cause remanded, to be finally proceeded in pursuant to the principles of this Decree; and, both the other parties having substantially prevailed against the appellant M’Niel, he is to pay the costs, as well in this Court, as in the Court of Chancery.  