
    Kerriann Gooden, Appellant, v Wendesa A. Joseph et al., Respondents.
    [27 NYS3d 393]
   In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lane, J.), dated February 2, 2015, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of the plaintiffs spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff submitted competent medical evidence which raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to the lumbar region of her spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]).

The defendants’ remaining contention is without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Hall, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.  