
    *Samuel Carey’s Administrator v. The Administrator of Clark Robinson.
    "Where non-residents are within the saving clause of the act of limitations of ■ 1810, the statute does not begin to run until their death, and after their death, their heirs may commence suit within the period limited.
    Hazlet and others v. Critohfield and others, 7 Ohio, 153, pt. 2, affirmed,
    lessee of Whitney v. Webb and Westenhaven, 10 Ohio, 513, explained and' qualified.
    This is an action of debt from Geauga county.
    There are three counts in the declaration. The first is upon a judgment; the second is upon a sealed note, executed by ihe defendant to Samuel Carey, on September 19, 1817, for the sum of $630, with interest, to be paid in four payments, as follows: $166 on May 1, 1818; $100 on May 1, 1819.; $89 on May 1, 1820; $275 on May 1, 1821. The third count is for goods sold, etc.
    To the second count the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations, that the cause of action did not accrue within fifteen, years.. The plaintiff replied that at the time the cause of action accrued, Samuel Carey was residing in the State of New York;. that the defendant there made and executed the sealed bill; that the said Samuel Carey, from said September" 19,1817, continued to ■ reside beyond sea to the time of his death, on January 1, 1834, and was never within the State of Ohio; and that this suit was commenced within fifteen years from and after the death of the said Samuel. To this replication the defendant demurs.
    Suit was commenced on April 15, 1838, since which time Clark Robinson, the original defendant, died, and his administrator has-been made defendant.
    
      Perkins and Osborn, for defendant, in support of the demurrer:
    The replication does not aver any disability in the plaintiff, but only in his intestate. *The demurrant claims the law to be that the saving in the statute only operates in favor of the person entitled to it at the time the action accrued. The plaintiff insists he has fifteen years after the death of that person.
    This question has already l’eceived two solemn, well-considered decisions in this court, both of which are.in favor of the demur-rant; and we are accustomed to consider that reported decisions •settle a question so that we may repose on an established principle as a rule of civil conduct. The cases to which wo refer are Whitney et al. v. Webb et al., 10 Ohio, 513, and Ridley et al. v. Hettman et al., 10 Ohio, 524.
    The disability which entitles a party to the saving of the statute must exist when the right of action accrues, and successive dis.abilities do not save. Demarest v. Wyncoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 3; Griswold v. Butler, 3 Conn. 227. In this case the father was a lunatic, and died, leaving minor children who claimed the saving. 1 Swift’s Dig. 164; 5 Cruise, 221. Now if the doctrine contended for by the plaintiff prevails, either these authorities and a host of like ones must be disregarded, or else the court must establish an arbitrary rule entirely outside of the statute. For if, at the death • of the person to whom the action accrues, there still remains a right in his heir or administrator; then if the heir or administrator is under disability, he will have fifteen years after his disability shall be removed, and so on, ad infinitum, unless the statute somewhere fixes a limitation. Our statute provides no saving in favor of the heir or administrator, but only in favor of the person to whom the action accrued.
    The act of 1810, 1 Chase, 655, governs this case, and provides “that all actions of covenant or debt, founded upon any specialty under hand and seal, shall be sued or brought within fifteen years next after the cause of such actions or suits.” The time of “ the cause of such action” is no doubt the time when the defendant was first liable to action. Kerns v. Schoonmaker, 4 Ohio, 331.
    As more than fifteen years had elapsed no person bad, at the time of the institution of this suit, any right to sue unless *by virtue of some saving clause in the statute. This brings us to in■quire what is the saving applicable to this caso? And it here follows : “Provided, that if any person or persons, who are or shall be entitled to have, sue, or bring any suits, action or actions, as aforesaid, shall be beyond sea at the time when any suits, action or actions, may or shall have accrued, then every such person or persons shall have a right to have, sue, or bring any action or actions aforesaid, within the time hereby before limited in this act, after such disability shall have been removed.” As before: “ The time when any suits may have accrued ” must have relation to the time when defendant became liable to action. The saving, then, is in favor of the person to whom action first accrued, and provides that every such person, i. <?., the same person may bring action after “such” disability; that is, the same disability shall be removed. There is no saving in favor of any person except the very individual who is under disability at the time the defendant became liable to action.
    The plaintiff, we judge by the framing of his replication, has drawn it from English precedents, based on the English statutes. In the saving clause of the English statute, and also of the New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut statutes, there is a provision for action by heir, etc., a certain number of years after the death of the person to whom the action accrued. In our statute there is no such saving. Our statute is substantially copied from the English act, and this clause being left out furnishes additional argument against the replication. The difference between ours and the English law having been overlooked by the plaintiff, he has replied that the action was brought within fifteen years after the death of the person to whom the action accrued, and at the same time shows that more than fifteen years has elapsed since the action accrued.
    Our law, very well in its saving, omits the provision in favor of the heir, etc., after the death of the ancestor, because, unlike the English statute, in its body the words “descended or fallen ” are omitted, and the operation of the law is to bar all ^persons after fifteen years from the time the action accrued. 10 Ohio, 520, 521.- The omission of the words “or death” in our law, which is also to be found in the English, makes the statute still more restrictive. Ib. 522. And the pei’son to whom the action accrued being dead, and fifteen years having expired, the plaintiff is barred.
    
      P. Hitchcock, for plaintiff, contra:
    It will be seen, from the statement, that the cause of action accrued in May, 1821, or rather, that the last installment on the sealed bill fell due at that time. And at the time of the execution of said bill, at the time the several payments fell due, and from the first period up to the time of his death, in 1834, the obligee was beyond sea, and at no time, within that period, within the State of Ohio. He died in 1834, and the suit was commenced four years thereafter. '
    The question raised for the consideration of the court is, whether this action is barred by the statute of limitations of January 25, 1810, the act in force at the time this cause of action accrued. By that act it is provided, among other things, “that all actions of covenant or debt, founded upon a specialty, under hand and seal, shall be sued or brought within fifteen years after the cause of such actions or suits.” This action was not brought within fifteen years from the time the cause of action accrued. But the statute contains the following proviso: “That if any person or persons who are, or shall be, entitled to have, sue, or bring any suit, action, or actions, as aforesaid, shall be within the age of twenty-one years, insane, feme covert, imprisoned, or beyond sea, at the time any suit, action, or actions may or shall have accrued, then every such person or persons shall have a right to have, sue, or bring any action or actions aforesaid, within the time hereby before limited in this act, after such disability shall have been removed.” Chase’s Stat. 655. This proviso is substantially the same as that in the limitation act of 1804, which by this was repealed with a saving clause. We supposo the *right of action in the case before the court is saved by this proviso, and that this action is well brought, having been commenced within fifteen years after the disability of the intestate, which existed at tho-time the cause of action accrued was removed. As to the terms' “beyond sea,” as used in this statute, the court have always held it to bo equivalent to out of the state.
    We suppose there would never have been a question raised as to the right of the plaintiff to recover under the pleadings in this ease, but for the decision of this court as reported in 10 Ohio, 513, of the ease of Whitney v. Webb and Westenhaven. It is supposed, and unquestionably it is true, that, by that decision, a new principle was introduced as to the construction of our statutes of limitation. Before that decision, the uniform course of decision had been the same in this state as it'still is in Kentucky. Cumulative or successive disabilities were allowed, as corning within tho proviso of tho statuto. Thus, for instance, if a right of action accrued to a feme sole, and she died, leaving an infant heir or heirs, the statuto was held not to commence running until tho heir arrived at full ago. Or, if a right of action accrued to a person who was a non-resident, or beyond sea, and he should die, leaving heirs who were also non-residents, tho statute would not commence running until ho or they, who had the right of action, cama within tho state. Disability was added to disability, until tho right vested in some person who was not within tho saving clause of tho statute. And I never hoard tho propriety of this course of decision questioned, until tho case of Whitney v. Webb and Westenhaven was presented for consideration. I think that two members of the court, at least, will bear mo witness, that this statement is correct. Such, as before remarked, I understand still to bo the law in Kentucky; but in this I may be mistaken.
    In this state tho principle has ever been held, that when the statute commences to run, it continues, although there should subsequently be a disability in one in whom the right of action might bo vested. As, for instance, a right of action accrues *to a feme sole, and she becomes covert; as tho statuto commonccd running while she was sole, i.t continues to run, although by her subsequent intermarriage, she is disabled to sue. In this respect our decisions have been different from those of Kentucky. In the case of Macbir v. May, 4 Bibb, 44, it was holden that, “if the statute begins to run against the ancestor, but, by his death, the land descends to his heirs, who are infants, the statute does not run on, but the infants shall have tho time allowed by tho statuto, after arriving at full age.” This is a doctrine which has never been adopted in this state.
    When the case of Whitney v. Webb and Westenhavon was presented to the court, tho propriety of the former course of decision was questioned, and eventually a new rule was adopted. Tho action was ejectment, and the case was this: The defendants were in possession under a deed from Farmer, who derived title under Ephraim Cutler, and had been in possession from«-1805. Tho plaintiff derived title from Manasseh Cutler, who, on July 2,1792, conveyed the land in controversy to Elisha Whitney; who devised the lands in fee to Eunice Whitney, and died on February 22, 1807. Eunice Whitney died, intestate, on April 28,1819, leaving the lessors of the plaintiffs her heirs at law. Their title upon the face of it was the better legal title. The suit was commenced on November 4, 1839. Neither Elisha Whitney, Eunice Whitney, nor the lessors of the plaintiff, were ever within the State of Ohio.
    It will be seen, from this statement, that the right of action accrued to Elisha Whitney in his lifetime, for the defendants were in possession as early as 1805, and he did not die until 1807. From the time of his death to tho commencement of this suit was thirty-nine years; and from the time of the death of Eunice Whitney, who next succeeded him, to the commencement of the suit was more than twenty years. The act of limitation by which tho case was governed was the act of 1804, which-required actions of -ejectment to be commenced within twenty years.
    *The defense relied upon was tho statute, and it was insisted that tho disability attached to the person to whom the right of action first accrued, and that disability could not be added to disability, otherwise it might so happen that the statute of limitations would run forever; that there would never be a bar. Hence it was further insisted that when Elisha Whitney, to whom the right of action first accrued, died, the disability was removed, and that tho action not having been brought within twenty years from that time was barred. After much consideration and examination the court came to that conclusion and decided, that “the disability of '*beyond sea” in the act of limitations is removed by death, and the heir, -whether himself under disability or not, is barred of his ejectment unless he sue within twenty years after the death of his .ancestor.”
    This was decided by the court, and it was all that was decided. And in making this decision, I thought at the time and still think, we wore verging more nearly to legislation than a court ought generally to do. But it seemed to be necessary, and I think it was right.
    It will be seen by examination that the English statute is materially different from ours. By the English statute it is provided, “ that if any person or persons shall be entitled to such writ or writs, or shall have such right or title of entry, and shall bo, at the time the said right or title first descended, or accrued, under or within tho age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned or beyond seas, that then such person or persons, and his and their heir and heirs, shall, or may, notwithstanding the said twenty years be expired, bring his action or make his entry as he might have done before this act, so that such person and persons, or his or their heir or heirs, shall, within ten days next after his and their full age, discoverture, coming of sound mind, enlargement out of prison, or coming into this realm, or death, take benefit of and sue for the same, and at no time after said ten years.”
    The statute of fines contains a similar exception in favor of persons under disabilities, allowing such persons five years to *enter after the removal of their disabilities. 1 Law Lib. 11, n. 2.
    It will be seen that by the express provisions of this statute the disability attaches expressly to the individual to whom the right “first” descended or accrued, and that by the English statute “death” of the party removes the disability. Neither of these words are contained in oür statute, but we were compelled, in effect, to interpolate them to conform our decisions to the English.
    But there is still another difference in the statute. The English statute gives ten years after disability removed within which to commence the action; our statute gives the same length of time after disability removed as must run where there is no disability, in order to bar the-action. Notwithstanding this difference, however, the court did decide as before stated, and such is the marginal note ot the case.
    But it is said that the decision of the court, as expressed by the learned judge who gave that decision, goes farther than this, and sustains the doctrine that if the number of years necessary to constitute a bar has run before the disability is removed, the action is barred upon the removal of the disability, especially if the disability is removed by death. It can not be so if the disability is removed in any other way than by death, because the statute expressly provides that time shall be given after the removal of the disability equal to the time that must have run had there been no disability. And it seems to me preposterous to say that if a man lives and comes into the state, he shall have twenty or twenty-one years to prosecute an ejectment, but if he dies without coming into the state, his heirs are thereby barred from having the action. ,In such case it is the death of the ancestor which operates as a barj not the statute of limitations.' Such was not the intention of the court, nor could it have been the intention of the judge.
    We are willing and free to admit that the opinion is not as clear and lucid as tho opinions of that learned judge usually were, and ho does seem to carry tho idea that where the disability is removed by death, the case shall be considered as if *no disability had existed, and the reason assigned is that the disability is a personal privilege.
    As before remarked, the court decided no such thing, as is well known to two of the present members; and if this case is to bo considered at law, that law was not settled by the four members of the court, but by one of its members. And what would be the consequence of accepting this opinion of the justice as law? Take a simple case: A right of action accrues to a feme covert — it may be an action of ejectment; she lives after the right of action accrued twenty-one years, and died still being covert. At her doath the heirs can have no action; it is barred. By what law? Not by tho statute of limitations, for by its express provision that does not commence running until she becomes discovert. If barred at all, it is barred by death.
    Take another case: A cause or right of action accrues to an insane man. He remains insane fifteen or twenty years, as tho case may be, and dies. By his death tho right of action is taken away; his heirs lose the inheritance. Had he recovered his health and lived he-would have had twenty years within which to receive the inheritance and transmit it to his heirs; but as ha died before his disability was removed it is gone, and neither his heirs nor personal representative can enforce his rights. And all this because the word heirs is not contained in the statute; at any rate this is the most plausible reason assigned. I repeat, this court never did recognize a principle as being law that would be. fraught with such consequences, and I trust never will.
    And now I beg leave to call the attention of the court to tho authorities which ai’e cited to sustain this opinion. The first case cited is the case of Stowel v. Zouch, Plow. 458. That case decides this: “Disseizee levies a fine with proclamation; disseizee dies after throe years, and within fivo years bis heir, being within age, who, after the five years expired, comes of full ago, and within a year after his full age enters, and adjudged that his entry was not lawful; for here the five years given by tho statuto, 4 Hon. 7 (the statute of fines), first attached *in his ancestor; and in such case, being once commenced, there shall not bo any intermission or interruptions of them, but the heir, though within age, must claim within those five years, or he shall be barred, and he shall not have other five years after his full age.”
    Now this case, although a very long one, settles no other point than this: that when the statute of limitation begins to run there shall be no intermission, but it shall continue to run, a principle which has always been recognized as law in this state.
    In the case of Doe v. Jepson, 6 East, 80, which is next quoted, the marginal note is this: “Where the ancestor dies seized, leaving a son and daughter, infants, and on the death of the ancestor a stranger enters, and the son soon after went to sea and was supposed to have died abroad within ago, held that the daughter was not entitled to twenty years to make her entry after the death of her brother, but only to ten years, more than twenty years having •elapsed in the whole since the death of her brother.”
    The case settles the principle that disabilities are not cumulative, and can not be added one to another, precisely the principle which this court intended to adopt and settle, and did, in fact, settle in the case of Whitney v. Webb and Westenhaven. But the English statute, as we have soon, attached to the person to whom the right first accrued, and by the same act the statute continued to run but two years alter the disability removed, provided ten years had transpired after the right accrued, and before the disability was removed. Our statute, or rather the statute of 1810, gives twenty-one years after the disability is removed. But this case does not in the least conduce to establish the principle that, if the twenty years has run before the disability is removed, the law operates upon the removal of the disability.
    The ease in 4 Mass. 182, only settles the question that whero two disabilities center in the same person, the one which existed at the time the right accrued is the one which is protected; as, for instance, a right of action accrues to a female ^infant, and she marries; her rights as a feme covert are not protected by the statute. The statute commences running as soon as she arrives of ago. In this respect the law is different in Massachusetts from what it is in England, for in England the disability would continue qu account of the coverture.
    
      The case in 2 Conn. 27, in principle, is like the last quoted. The court decide that the saving of the statute of limitation, regarding the right of entry into lands, applies only to such disability as existed at the time the right of entry accrued, and not to any supervenient disability. The case was one where the right accrued to a female infant and she marriod during her infancy. In that case the court say, “It has been long recognized as a principle, in this state, that a statuto of limitations never begins to run during the existence of a disability; though, when it begins to run, it will not be interrupted by an intervening disability.” And so I say it has always been held in this state, until the doctrine was broached in the opinion which I am examining, that, if tho party laboring under the disability died during that disability, tho statute commenced running from the time tho right of action accrued. It did not run during the life, but at death it run both ways, both prospectively and retrospectively.
    But the case principally relied upon by the judge, as sustaining his opinion, is the case of Demarest v. Wyncoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129. All that is decided in this case is, that the disability which entitled the party to the benefit of the proviso of the statute of limitation must exist when tho causo of action first accrued, and that successive or cumulative disabilities are not within the policy or sound construction of the statute.
    It will be soon that tho cases cited do sustain the decision of the court, as given in the note of the case; but they do not sustain the judge in his opinion, and I hope and trust that this court will now settle tho question whether tho law is as laid down in the note, or as intimated in the opinion ; for this has been a matter of controversy with tho profession ever since the report was published. *Tbo question is important, and, if time would permit, I would be glad to go more fully into it. Although important, it seems to mo to be perfectly plain.
    As beforo remarked, in the decision of the case of Whitney v. Westenhaven, the court well knew that a new principle was introduced as to tho construction of the statute of limitations of the state; and it was done for the purpose of conforming our decisions to those of England, and some of the other states, and for the purpose of putting an end, at some period, to the limits of the statute.
    In England it was held, that the disability attached to tho person to whom the right of action “first” accrued, and that the statute begins to run, from the time such disability is removed; and it is so decided, because such is the express provision of the statute. An examination of the English cases fully shows this, and the court will see it to be so from the treatise on limitations, contained in the Law Library, vol. 1. This court held the same principle in the before-cited case, although, by our statute, there is no provision that the disability shall attach to the person to whom the right of action “ first” accrued.
    The English courts hold, that the disability is removed by the “ death” of the person who is laboring under the disability, and it so holds, because such is the express provision of their statute. This court adopted the same principle, although our statute contains no such provision.
    The English courts hold, and in this most of the courts in tho United States concur with them, that from the time the disability is removed, the statute begins to run. This court holds the same, and so decided in the aforesaid case; and further decided, that when the statute begins to run, it shall not be interrupted.
    Now I do not complain of the decision of the court. It is justified, however, from necessity, rather than from the reading of the statute. But the opinion of the judge, as commonly understood, goes beyond what has ever been decided in England or America. It holds, that when the disability is removed, *the statute runs, not from the time of such removal, but from the time tho cause of action accrued. It is the same as if no disability had ever existed. The statute, as to such cases, is repealed, and the reason assigned for it is, that the word heirs is not used in tho statute; and therefore, it is said, that nothing is saved to the heirs.
    This not only breaks down all former constructions of this particular statute, but it upturns another general principle of law, that a man dying in whom is vested a right of action, that right descends upon his heir if a real action, and is cast upon his personal representative if' a personal action, unless the action is for a tort.
    By our statute, all causes of action survive, except those named in section 78 of the practice act, and these are actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, assault or assault and battery, action Oon the case for a nuisance, or against justice of tho peace for misconduct in office. That I am correct, the court will see by looking at the same section 78, and tho sections following. Swan’s Stat. 666-670. By this statute tho right of survivorship extends much further than at common law, or by any of the English statutes. But by this decision the principle is overthrown, at least in a large class of cases. The principle of the common law, the principle of tho statute, is general. It extends to all eases. But this opinion, if it does not destroy entirely, limits by not extending it to those cases where, but for tho disability of tho ancestor, the caso would have been barred by the statute of limitations.
    If this opinion is adopted as law, tho court, in order to bo consistent, must go further and say, that whoro the action is actually commenced by tho ancestor, who had boon laboring under a disability, and tho ancestor dies during the pendency of the suit, tho action shall abate, provided the time limited by the statute has passed away, although, during the whole of that time, tnc ancestor was laboring under disability. I say tho court must so hold, Cor it would be an extraordinary position to assume that a cause of action which does not survive, *shall survive if the suit was commenced by tho ancestor. Neither tho heir, nor the personal representative, can come in to prosecute or defend a suit already depending, unless that heir or personal representative could originally have commenced or defended tho suit.
    By tho decision o( tho court in tho before-named case, tho law of Ohio is made to conform to the laws of other states and of England. By the decision of the judge, taking that as law, the law of Ohio is different from that ol all the oilier slates and of England. I have said that no court in England or America have made any such decision. In this I ain mistaken, for the circuit court for tho district of Ohio, did so decide after this case was reported, not because the judge supposed that this was a correct interpretation of the statute, but because ho supposed such had been tho construction put upon it by tho state court, at least such was his statement after he had made the decision.
    It must bo borno in mind that this construction is not to apply to actions of ejectment alone, but to all- other actions to which a bar is created by the statute of limitations, and the simple question is, can that statute bar a claim before it begins to run? After it begins to run, can it bar a claim until it has run the length of lime prescribed by the statute itsell? Turn it in whatever way you may, this is the whole of the question.
    
      In the ease of Ridley et al. v. Hettman et al., 10 Ohio, 524. the same judge who gave the opinion of the court in the case of Whitney states corrcctlj’ what was actually decided in that case. Ho says, “ The principle there decided was, that successive or cumulative disabilities in different persons aro not within the true intent and meaning of the proviso in the statute of limitations; that whore the person to whom the right has aecured is beyond tho state, the statute does not commence against him until ho comes within the slate, but that if he dies abroad, tho heirs can not unite their disabilly tu his, so as to bring them within the protection of the law.” Such was tho decision. The statute did not oommonco running until tho disability removed from tho ancestor, and that disability being ^removed by tho death of tho ancestor, it did then commence to run, and although at the death of tho ancestor, the heirs, being under age, were disabled, this disability could not for their protection bo added to that of the ancestor, but as the statutes commenced to run at his death, it must continue to run, notwithstanding the disability of tho heirs. Tho court were iar from deciding that the statute commenced to run from tho tirno tho right of action accrued.
    But without taking up any more of the time of tho court, I will, for a few moments, call its attention to the caso now under consideration.
    On September 19, 1817, Clark Robinson, in tho State of New York, executed his sealed note to Samuel Carey, now deceased, lor the paymont-of $630, in installments, the last of which fell due on May 1, 1821.
    Samuel Carey was never within the State of Ohio, but died in the State of Now York, on January 1, 1834.
    This suit was commenced by the personal representatives of Samuel Carey, on April 6, 1838.
    Now the question is, whether it is barred by the statute of limitations. It is admitted that if Samuel Carey was now living, it would not ho barred. He would have legal right to prosecute the claim to effect. Is it barred when the same claim is prosecuted-by Ins personal representative? That is the simple question for the court to settle.
   Lane, C. J.

The declaration contains several counts in debt. The plea is the statute of limitation of fifteen years.

The plaintiff implies, that when the cause of action accrued, Samuel Carey resided in the State of New York; that he died in 1834, never having been in this state; that this suit is brought within fifteen years from his death. The defendant demurs.

The last installment of the instrument on which the action was brought, fell due in 1821, so that the statute of limitations at that time in force was the act of 1810. 1 Chase’s Stat. 655; 7 Ohio, 123, pt. 2.

*Tho question, therefore, is, whether the saving in the Btatutb of limitations of 1810, of a right of action to a non-resident of this state, is terminated by his death, or whether it survives to his heirs for the period originally limited.

The case of Whitney’s Lessee v. Webb and Westenhaven, 10 Ohio, 513, seems fatal to this right in the heirs. That case arose under tho act of 1804 (1 Chase’s Stat. 393), tho terms of which are similar to the act of 1810. The right of action was saved until the death of the ancestor, in April, 1819, and the suit was brought in November, 1839. The time limited is twenty years. The question, then, presented by that record, was not whether the heir of a nonresident could bring his action at any time within twenty years after tho death of the person in whose iavor the right accrued, for that time had elapsed before suit, but it was whether the protection of the heir could be coupled with the protection of the ancestor’s right of action ; so that the statute did not begin to run until tho pei’son having the right to prosecute should arrive within this state. It was neither more nor less than the old question of supervenient disabilities, and was discussed and decided on no other principles.

But the judge who reported that case extends his reasoning beyond this, and regards the right of action absolutely lost by the death of tho ancestor, occurring after the period limited lor tho statute to tako effect. With entire respect for oar late associate, we feel constrained to examine the soundness of his opinion in a case which depends upon the precise point.

The object of statutes of limitation is to provide a time within which suits may be brought. One of tho first principles is, that whero the statute begins to run, it continues to run without interruption irom any subsequent disability, unless produced by tho act of the defendant.

The proviso in section 2 confers privileges upon “ minors, insane, femes covert, imprisoned, and beyond seas.” As to them, tho statute does not begin to operate until the cause for protection ceases; and it authorizes bringing the suit at anytime afterward, within the time originally before limited. *The causes which prevent the running of the statute are called in it “ disability; ” and when they cease to exist, as by the majority of a minor, or the diseoverture of a feme, then the statute does its perfect work, by requiring the action to be prosecuted by him who holds the right, within the “times limited.” Tho rights of non-residents are created and controlled by the same word, in the same sentence, and must receive the same construction. They suspend the operation of the statute in favor of him who holds the right of action when it ac crues; but when such person ceases to hold it, the effect of tho proviso ceases, the statute begins to run, and the suit must be com • menced within the time it prescribes.

This construction of the statute gives effect to all its words, and conflicts with no previous decisions, and seems conformable to its general objects. It does not permit one “ disability” to be connected with another, of either the same or a different kind, but it secures the right of pursuing a cause of action after the first privilege has expired, or the first disability has been exhausted.

Demurrer overruled.  