
    Clyde J. NORWOOD, Jnr., Appellant, v. Geralyn RUHLE, Director of Administration, LBDC, Rosemarie Perez Jaquith, Administrative Counsel, LBDC, New York State Legislative Bill Drafting Commission, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 12-4428-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 21, 2013.
    Vincent U. Uba, Albany, NY, for Appellant.
    Jonathan D. Hitsous, Assistant Solicitor General, (Barbara D, Underwood, Solicitor General, Andrea Oser, Deputy Solicitor General on the brief), for Eric T. Schneid-erman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, NY, for Appellees.
    Present: JON 0. NEWMAN, PETER W. HALL and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Clyde J. Norwood appeals from a memorandum opinion and order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees the New York Legislative Bill Drafting Commission (“LBDC” or “Commission”), Geralyn Ruhle, and Rosemarie Perez Jaquith. Although Norwood does not challenge the district court’s decision with respect to the LBDC, he appeals its decision to dismiss his injunctive relief and individual liability claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Ruhle and Jaquith. Additionally, Norwood contends that the district court erred in failing to address his presumption of innocence claim and in dismissing his race discrimination claim. Finally, Nor-wood challenges the district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir.2005). We will uphold a grant of summary judgment “if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom it is entered, demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the judgment is warranted as a matter of law.” Global Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 562 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir.2009).

Substantially for the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion, we agree that Norwood failed to show that Defendants Ruhle and Jaquith were personally involved in what he asserts was a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Norwood contends that there is an issue of fact about whether Defendant Ruhle made the initial decision to place Norwood on administrative leave. Assuming arguendo that a jury could find that she had the authority to, and did, make that decision, Norwood’s claim still fails, because it did not violate due process to place Norwood on administrative leave during the pendency of his criminal trial. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 934, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997) (holding that placing even a tenured employee — which Norwood was not — on leave without pay pending resolution of serious criminal charges does not violate due process). The record does establish, moreover, that only the LBDC Commissioners had the authority to extend Norwood’s leave and terminate his employment; thus, neither Ruhle nor Jaquith can be held liable for these decisions. Ruhle merely conveyed the Commissioners’ decisions to Norwood, and Jaquith provided legal counsel to the LBDC. Likewise, there is no evidence in the record that either Ruhle or Jaquith had the authority to reinstate Norwood’s employment, and thus the district court correctly dismissed the injunctive relief claims under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) as to them.

Although Norwood challenges the district court’s failure specifically to address his presumption of innocence claim, in determining that Norwood could not assert claims against either Ruhle or Jaquith, the district court implicitly held that his presumption of innocence claim must also fail. Additionally, the presumption of innocence applies only to criminal trials; the Constitution does not require that such a presumption be applied by public employers. See Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir.2006). As such, Norwood’s presumption of innocence claim is not cognizable in an employment action under § 1983, and the district court correctly dismissed it.

Finally, we agree with the district court that Norwood’s complaint did not allege a race discrimination claim and that any such claim asserted at the summary judgment stage is untimely and must be dismissed. In light of its dismissal of all of Norwood’s federal law claims, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Domnister v. Exclusive Ambulette, Inc., 607 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir.2010).

We have considered Norwood’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  