
    Hawes Manufacturing Co’s. Appeal.
    Under the tax Act of April 15, 1834, the real estate of a private manuf acturing corporation, consisting of a lot of land, with the buildings and machinery necessary for manufacturing purposes, all of which is included in the capital stock of the corporation, is liable to a county, poor, school and borough tax, notwithstanding the Act of June 30,1885, in ji 20, abolished the taxes laid upon manufacturing corporations, by and under the revenue laws of the commonwealth, and further abolished the laws under which such taxes are laid and collected, so far as they apply to manufacturing corporations.
    
      It seems, that the revenue laws of the commonwealth referred to in 20 of the Act of 1885, are those which provide revenue for the commonwealth, as distinguished from those which provide revenue for county, borough, school and township purposes, and that said section does not offend against article IX, $$ 1 and 2, of the constitution, providing for uniformity of taxation and restricting the passage of laws furnishing exemption from taxation to the cases therein •enumerated.
    
      It seems, also, that the title to said JLct, being “A further supplement to an Act entitled ‘An Act to provide revenue by taxation,’ approved June 7,1879,” is not contrary to article in, $ 3, of the constitution, prohibiting the passage of laws containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title, said Act, in addition to the above exempting clause, imposing and regulating taxation in certain cases.
    
      It seems, also, that 20 of the above Act, is not local legislation, either •direct or indirect, under clauses 23 and 27, of article in, \ 7, of the constitution.
    March 21, 1889.
    Appeal, No. 364, Jan. T. 1889, from C. P. Bradford Co., to review a judgment for plaintiffs on a case stated in the nature of a bill and answer in equity, between the Commonwealth, to the use of Bradford Co., Bradford Co. Poor District, Towanda Borough School District and Towanda Borough, as plaintiffs, and the James H. Hawes Manufacturing Co., as defendant, at Feb. T. 1889, No. 136. McCollum and Mitchell, JJ., absent.
    The case stated was as follows:
    “And now, to wit: Dec. 14, 1888, it is hereby agreed, by and between the parties to the above suit, that the following case be stated for the opinion of the court in the nature of a special verdict, with the same force and effect as if a bill and answer had been filed in an equity proceeding.
    “ 1st. G-eorge W. Blackman, the duly elected assessor and the two assistant assessors of the borough of Towanda, assessed and returned, Dee. 31, 1887, the above-named defendant as follows : ‘ Toy Factory, unfinished, and 1'ot, valuation $8.000.00 ’ which said property is owned by said defendant.
    “2d. Notice was given to said defendant of the time and place an appeal would be held, and an application was duly made by said defendant to the board of commissioners of Bradford county to strike off said assessment, which said application was heard by said board of commissioners, April 18, 1888, and refused.
    “ 3d. There was levied by the proper authorities for the year 1888, a county tax of three mills ; a poor tax of one and one-half mills; a school tax of five and one-half mills, and a borough tax of six mills.
    “ 4th. Duplicates were duly issued for the collection of said taxes and placed in the hands of A. Wickham, the collector of taxes of the said borough of Towanda.
    “ 5th. The amounts levied against the said defendant are as follows:
    County Tax, ....... $24.00
    Poor <£....... 12.00
    School “ ....... 44.00
    Borough “....... 48.00
    To which is added a penalty of 5 per cent, . 6.40
    Total,.......$134.40
    which amount the said collector of taxes threatens to collect from said defendant.
    “ 6th. Under the Act of April 29, 1874, and its supplements, the said defendant was, April 18, 1887, incorporated as a manufacturing company, with the right and authority, under said laws, to manufacture wooden ware, toys and other novelties made of wood, iron or steel or other materials and parts thereof, with a capital of $50,000.00, divided into live hundred shares of the par value of $100.00.
    “ 7th. The lot of land of said defendant, assessed and returned as aforesaid, has erected thereon certain buildings, with machinery and improvements, etc., therein, all of which is used solely for, and is necessary and indispensable for, manufacturing purposes, for which said defendant was incorporated, and all of which is wholly included in the capital stock of said defendant company.
    “ If the court be of the opinion that, under the foregoing facts, the said taxes were legally assessed and that the defendant is liable to pay the same, then judgment to be entei'ed for the plaintiff for the use of the parties named, for the sum of $134.40; but, if not, then judgment to be entered for the defendant; the costs to follow the judgment, and either party reserving the right to sue out a writ of error, or appeal therein.”
    The following opinion of the court was delivered by Sittser, P. J"., of the 44th judicial district, specially presiding:
    “ The defendant’s claim of immunity is founded on the 20th section of the Act of June 30, 1885, P. L. 199, which provides ‘that the taxes laid upon manufacturing corporations, by and under the revenue laws of the commonwealth, be and the same are hereby abolished as to such corporations, and the laws, under which such taxes are laid and collected, be and the same are hereby repealed, so far, and so far only, as they apply to and affect manufacturing corporations.’
    “ This Act is entitled, ‘A further supplement to an Act to provide revenue by taxation.’ This title, we think, fairly embraces the subject matter of the 20th section. In an Act ‘ to provide revenue by taxation,’ new subjects of taxation may be enumerated, the taxes may lie increased or diminished or entirely abolished upon property already subject to taxation.
    “ ‘ The revenue laws of the commonwealth,’ referred to in this section, are those which provide revenue for the commonwealth, as distingrushed from those which provide revenue for county, borough, school and township purposes. This, we think, is the plain meaning of the Act, and it does not, therefore, offend against the 2d section of article ix of the constitution by attempting to exempt the property of these corporations from all taxation.
    “By the Act of April 15, 1834, Purd. 1583, ‘manufactories of all descriptions’ are subject to taxation as real estate. This act has never been repealed, and it justifies the taxes complained of by the defendant.
    “We direct judgment to be entered for the plaintiff for $134.40.”
    
      The assignments of error specified the action of the court, 1, in directing judgment to be entered for the plaintiff; and, 2, in not directing judgment to be entered for the defendant.
    
      R. A. Mercur, with him John W. Mix and Henry Strecter, for appellant.
    The Act of June 7, 1879, imposed a tax on the dividends and stock of manufacturing companies. By the Act of April 15,1834, P. L. 509, § 4, “real estate, viz.: all houses, lands . . . mills and manufactories of all descriptions,” were directed to be assessed for county taxes. By the Act of April 3, 1851, P. L. 320, § 2, boroughs have the power to “levy and collect annually for borough purposes any tax not exceeding one-half cent on the dollar on . . . all property . . . made taxable . . . for county rates and levies.” By the Act of May 8, 1854, P. L. 623, § 29, all subjects or things made taxable for state and county purposes are taxable for school purposes. And by the Act June 4, 1879, P. L. 78, § 14, poor taxes ai’e directed to “ be levied . . . and shall be collected in the same manner as the county taxes.”
    The Act of 1885 cannot be construed to abolish and repeal only the revenue laws which levy and collect a state tax, because the language used therein is too broad and comprehensive. It could not refer to the Act of June 7, 1879, alone, as the plural number is used.
    If it had been intended to exempt manufacturing companies from taxation for state purposes only, the same, or similar phraseology would have been used as was used in the Act of May 22,1883, P. L. 38, exempting building associations from taxation for state purposes.
    The intention of the legislature in repealing the taxes cannot be misunderstood, in view of the well known fact that so many manufacturing corporations of this state were seeking locations elsewhere, on account of the local authorities claiming the right to tax their necessary and indispensable works and improvements as real estate, and the shares of capital stock in the hands of the individual owners, in addition to the taxes for state purposes on the capital stock when the plant had been obtained by the issue of the capital stock paid for by the money of the stockholders, which is in fact the identical ■capital stock represented by the stock certificates.
    Based upon the assumption that they are now wholly exempt from taxation, a bill is at present pending in the legislature, which, if it becomes a law, will impose taxes upon them.
    The Act of 1885 was construed and pronounced constitutional '■by the supreme court in Fox’s Ap., 112 Pa. 337; Van Nort’s Ap., 121 Pa. 118; Sanderson’s Ap., 17 W. N. C. 456; Loughlin’s Ap., 19 W. N. C. 517; MacKellar, Smiths & Jordan Co. v. Com., 10 Cent. R. 45; and cases on the State Tax on Corporate Loans, Com. v. Del. Division Canal Co., 23 W. N. C. 216.
    In Fox’s Ap., supra, § 20 of the Act was sharply criticized by Mr. Justice Paxson, while in MacKellar v. Com., supra, the section was expressly upheld.
    The Act and § 20 thereof has been construed and declared constitutional in the lower courts by Judge McPherson in Com. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 2 Pa. C. C. R. 62; Com. v. Quaker City Dye Works Co., 5 Pa. C. C. R. 94; Com. v. Mahoning Rolling Mill Co., 5 Pa. C. C. R. 95.
    While it is admitted the cases cited do not decide the question raised here, the section being constitutional, and the repealing clause embracing all prior laws which are “ inconsistent ” with or “ substantially re-enacted” by the Act, as was held in Loughlin’s Appeal, supra, is decisive of the position and claim of the appellant here.
    Previous to the Act of 1885, all shares of stock in corporate ■companies were subject to taxation for all state and county purposes whatsoever, by § 32 of the Act of April 29, 1844, P. L. 497; and, in Whitesell v. Northampton Co., 49 Pa. 526, it was held the shares are taxable to the owners personally; but § 1 of the Act of 1885, repeals § 32 of the Act of 1844, and jxrovides that mortgages and moneyed capital shall be taxed for state purposes at the rate of three mills on the dollar of the value thereof, annually; “Provided, that the same shall, after the passage of this Act, be exempt from Ml taxation except for state purposes.”
    
      J. McPherson, with him E. J. Angle, J. N. Califf, J. H. & J. W. Coddrng, for appellees.-
    The lands of corporations for mere private purposes are taxable -just as the lands of individuals, unless •expressly exempted by Act of the legislature authorized by the constitution. Carbon Iron Co. v. Carbon Co., 39 Pa. 251; Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co. v. Luzerne Co., 42 Pa. 424; Northampton Co. v. Glendon Iron Co., C. P., 1 Lehigh Valley L. R. 81.
    Section 20 of the Act of 1885 is not germane to the title, under article in, § 3, of the constitution. The title must embrace the subject of the Act, and also express it so clearly as to give notice of the legislative purpose concerning it. Dorsey’s Ap., 72 Pa. 195; Union Passenger Railway Co.’s Ap., 81* Pa. 91; Beckert v. City of Allegheny, 85 Pa. 196; Road in Borough of Phoenixville, 109 Pa. 44; Rogers v. Manufacturers’ Imp. Co., 109 Pa. 109; Ruth’s Ap., 10 W. N. C. 500; Hatfield v. Com., 120 Pa. 395.
    If a title to exempt from taxation does not authorize legislation imposing taxation, as was decided in Sewickley Borough v. Sholes, 118 Pa. 165, the converse must be true.
    Section 20 of the Act of June 30, 1885, is in conflict with article ix, §§ 1 and 2, of the constitution. The legislature cannot exempt the real estate of some manufacturing corporations from taxation and leave that of others subject thereto. It can only exempt from taxation such property as the constitution authorizes it to exempt. Pox’s Ap., 112 Pa. 355.
    Section 20 of the Act of 1885 is also an offender against clauses 23 and 27 of § 7 of article iii of the constitution; forbidding the passage of local legislation.
    In the cases cited by appellant, the constitutionality of section 20 is not referred to; except in Pox’s Appeal, where the decision of this point is expressly reserved.
    Courts treat an Act as constitutional until its constitutionality is called in question. County of Erie v. Comrs. of Erie, 113 Pa. 368; Sewickley Borough v. Sholes, 118 Pa. 168.
    But, treating § 20 of the Act of June 30, 1885, as constitutional, what is the scope of it ? Legislation in this state for many years past has been in the line of a settled policy to provide revenue for state purposes by taxation in various forms upon corporations. The various • Acts passed in pursuance of this policy were revised, amended and consolidated by the Act of May 1, 1868, P. L. 108. This, in turn, was supplied by the Act of June 7 1879, P. L. 112, entitled, “An Act to provide revenue by taxation.” This Act is purely a .state revenue Act. A supplement to it was passed June 10, 1881, P. L. 99. The Act of 1885 was a further supplement. The 2d proviso to § 20 of this supplement is as follows : Provided, This Act shall go into effect immediately, reserving and excepting unto the commonwealth the right to collect any taxes accrued under the laws repealed by this Act.
    The 2d proviso of the section clearly shows that the “ taxes abolished” are such as accrue to the commonwealth; and, 2d, that the “ laws repealed ” are the laws under which taxes accrue to the commonwealth.
    The taxes claimed in this case are not “taxes laid upon” a manufacturing corporation, as such, but they are taxes assessed upon real estate, as such, in the manner and for the purposes authorized by law. See Sanderson v. Comrs., 1 Pa. C. C. R. 342.
    
      March 25, 1889.
   Per Curiam,

We affirm this decree upon the opinion of the learned judge of the court below.

Decree affirmed and the appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellants.

Note. — In Lackawanna Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Scranton, 94 Pa. 221, the Act of March 31,1870, which provides, in § 4, that, in case any bank or savings institution shall elect to collect and pay annually a tax of one per centum upon the par value of all the shares of said bank or savings institution, the said shares, capital and profits shall be exempt from all other taxation under the laws of this commonwealth, was held not to be a law exempting property from taxation within article ix, | 2, of the constitution.

This case also holds, in a per curiam opinion, that “ the banking house was a part of the capital of the institution represented by its shares of stock, and a tax upon the par value of the shares wms a tax upon it,” and the bank building was held not liable to taxation for county purposes. This case, decided in 1880, seems necessarily to overrule Farmers’ and Drovers’ Nat. Bank v. Greene Co., 1 Ches. Co. 129, decided in 1874. In the latter case, the building was purchased with the profits or earnings of the bank, but this does not seem to be a distinguishing feature. It is said, in the overruled case, per curiam: “The meaning of the word ‘ shares, capital and profits ’ is made plain by the general course of the state legislature as to taxes upon the shares, capital stock and dividends of corporations. The word capital does not, in the sense of its use in the Act of March 31,1870, refer to real estate ás a portion of the capital of the bank.”

In the case of N. Y. & Erie R. R. v. Sabin, 26 Pa. 242, the railroad was a foreign corporation authorized to extend their road into Pennsylvaniia and, by the Act of March 26,1846, P. L. 179, additional privileges were conferred upon them, in consideration of which they were required to pay into the state treasury the sum of $10,000 annually and it was provided “ that the stock of said company to an amount equal to the cost of the construction of that part of their road situate in Pennsylvania shall be subject to taxation by this commonwealth in the same manner at the same rate as other similar property is or may be subject.” “ It was held that it was the intention of the legislature, as manifest in these provisions, that whatever property of this corporation was included in the cost of construction and thus formed part of its capital stock should be subject to no other taxes than those specified in the Act.” Per Sharswood, J., in East Penna. B. B. Co.’s Case, 1 Walker, 428.

In the East Pa. R. R. Co.’s Case, 1 Walker, 428, it was held that the office buildings, in the city of Beading, situated on a lot two and a half squares from the terminus of the railroad and which was purchased by the company, were taxable as real estate. So also were the following buildings erected upon a tract of 20 acres adjoining the main tract and acquired by right of eminent domain and charged in cost of construction: the machine shops in which the locomotive engines of the road are repaired, the blacksmith shop in ■which the smithwork of the road is done, the carpenter shop in which the passenger and freight cars used on the road are built and repaired, and the paint shop in which new and repaired cars used on the road are painted, “ as they are not necessary parts of the railroad, but merely useful in order to enable them to conduct their operations more profitably and conveniently than if these matters were attended to by persons not in their regular employment.” Per Sharswood, J., 1868. But the oil and waste house where oil and waste are stored, round house, turn tables, coal docks in which coal for locomotives is stored, water station and cattle yard, situated on this tract of 20 acres were held exempt.

In Northumberland Co. v. Phila. & Erie R. R., 8 Cent. R. 531, 20 W. N. C. 381, a repair shop for repairing the freight cars and engines, used upon its road, an oil house and paint shop, an engine aud boiler house, a sujiply room for frogs, switches and other materials used upon its road, a master mechanic’s office, and car inspector’s office, situated on a lot of some 44 acres of land adjacent to the line of the railroad, were held to be exempt from taxation as real estate. In this case, however, the case stated agreed that these buildings were indispensably necessary to the operation of the railroad, which may distinguish it from the East Pa. R. R. Co.’s Case.

On the subject of duplicate taxation, Judge Cooley, in his work on Taxation, after reviewing the cases where the legislature has undoubted power to impose double taxation, says, on page 225: “ There is a sense, however, in which duplicate taxation may be understood — and which we think is the proper sense — which would render it wholly inadmissible under any constitution requiring equality and uniformity in taxation. By duplicate taxation in this sense is understood the requirement that one person or any one subject of taxation shall directly contribute twice to the same burden, while other subjects of taxation belonging to the same class are required to contribute but once. We do not see, for instance, how a tax on a merchant’s stock distinctively by value could be supported, when, by the same authority and for the same purpose, the same stock was taxed by value as a part of his whole property. This is a very different thing from one tax upon property and another upon the business, though the latter may indirectly reach the property : here is no circumlocution, no question of ultimate effects; but a tax levied twice on the same subject, only under different names. The same may be said of a tax on the property of a corporation and also on the capital which is invested in the property; if the latter is taxed as property, this also is duplicate taxation, and as much unequal as would be the taxation of a farmer’s stock by value when on the same basis it is taxed as a part of his general property. When, for instance, the money paid in as capital of a manufacturing corporation has been invested in buildings and machinery, these are what then represent the capital, and to tax the capital as valuable property distinct from that which then represents it would be to tax a mere shadow; it would be to make the shadow stand for the substance in order that it might be taxed, when the substance itself is taxed directly under its own proper designation. We do not speak here of a taxation of the property and also of the franchise, those being two things, as will be seen further on.”

In the case reported above, the tax as imposed upon the capital stock is for state purposes, while that imposed upon the real estate is for local purposes. These facts seem to take the case out of the rule stated by Judge Cooley above.  