
    Jason Thompson vs. Green Hill.
    Questions of boundary aro exclusively within the jurisdiction of a court of law, with a few exceptions; and in order to entitle a party to the aid of a court of equity, he must bring himself within the exceptions.
    When a court of law and a court of equity have concurrent jürisdiction of tho matter in dispute, the court which takes jurisdiction settles the matter conclusively.
    After a trial at law, a court of chancery has no jurisdiction to grant relief, or disturb the verdict and judgment.
    The State of North Carolina granted to complainant 640 acres of land, by grant dated sometime in 1789. The said state also granted to Green Hill 640 acres, by grant bearing date sometime in 1786. By running the courses and distances called for in Hill’s grant, it interfered with complainant’s, about thirty acres, which complainant was in possession of. Green Hill, in his life time, commenced an action of ejectment against complainant, and recovered a verdict and judgment. This bill was filed to perpetually enjoin him from taking out execution upon said judgment, alleging that the true boundary of Hill’s grant was an ash in a lane, that it had been fixed there by agreement, that both parties had cleared up to the lane, and that complainant had been in possession of the land a number of years; that if this be the true boundary, the land recovered at law will be in complainant’s grant. The bill was filed to enjoin Hill from proceeding at law, to quiet the possession, and to establish the conditional line.
    The answer denies the agreement, states the ash was agreed upon conditionally, that Thompson violated the condition, and subsequently refused to abide by it, and relies upon the verdict and judgment obtained at law. Testimony was taken upon both sides, which it is unnecessary to notice, as the opinion of the court is founded upon facts admitted in the pleadings. The bill was dismissed by the chancellor.
    
      Gibbs, for complainant.
    1. The conditional line and the agreement in relation to it are proved, and the defendant is concluded from insisting on his boundary at any other point. Jackson vs. Hade, 4 John. Rep. 202. Ridley vs. Rains, decided in this court.
    2. This court will entertain jurisdiction upon the subject of boundary, where the boundaries are confused, or where defendant, by his own act, makes the interposition of a court of equity necessary to establish an agreed line. 1 Eden. Rep. 335. 9 Yesey, 345. Miller vs. Wormington, 1 Jacob and Walker, 464. Spear vs. Crawter, 2 Merivale, 410.
    3. A court of equity has original jurisdiction to remove the cloud hanging over complainant’s estate. Haw vs. Harwood, 14 Yesey, 28. Lile vs. Lile, II Yes. 535. 17 Yesey, 111.
    4. If a party wishes to object against the jurisdiction OI equity, because the matter is cognizable at law, he must object in his answer or by demurrer. The objection comes too late at the hearing: 4 John. Ch. Rep. 287. 2 John. Ch. Rep. 369. 10 John. Rep. 595.
    
      Lacy and G. S. Yerger, for defendants.
    First. The bill has one of two objects; either to establish the original boundary of Hill’s Grant, the evidence of which is the supposed agreement stated in the bill; or it seeks to divest all the land in Green Hill’s grant south of the line, contended for by Thompson, by virtue of the parol agreement.
    On the first point. It is purely a legal question.— Ejectment is the proper remedy; and it is the province of a jury to settle which was the original line or boundary. Smith vs. M’lver, 9 Wh. Rep. 532.
    A parol agreement, as to disputed boundary, need not be in writing, where it does not seek to change the original known and defined boundary, but merely to ascertain where the original boundary was run. In such case, it is an ascertainment of the true boundary.— Houston vs. Davidson’s heirs, 1 Yer. Report. In such case a court of equity has no jurisdiction.
    2. If the bill seeks a specific execution of the agreement establishing the line claimed by Thompson, and a divestment of Hill’s title to the land between that and the true boundary, then it should be in writing. 15 Mass. 153. Proffit vs. Williams, 1 Yer. Rep.
    3. There is no consideration proved; and the agreement, if any is proved, is different from that stated in the bill; the consideration there stated is disproved, and no consideration, or a different one, proved.
    Again: If any agreement is proved, it is conditional, and it ought to have been so charged in the bill. 2 Ball and Beaty, 363. 2 Sch. and Lefroy, 1. 5 Yesey, 452. 2 Yesey, 299.
    The conditional agreement is proved to have been violated by Thompson; he refused to abide by it, and . . , , J . ./ ,' „ . , ., claimed beyond it, and effectually waived it.
    ( 4, ¶⅛ divest title, the proof must be clear and decisive, or the parties will be left to their remedies at law. 2 Vernon, 622. 2 Whn. 336, 341. The case must be clear of all doubt. Hood vs. Tinly, 2 Ball and Beatty, 16, and 62.
   Catron, Ch. J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This cause presents a naked question of boundary, which, if not exclusively a legal question, has but few exceptions; no exception giving a court of equity jurisdiction, is found in the case presented by the bill.

Had a court of equity concurrent jurisdiction with a court of law, (as has been agued,) yet there having been a full and fair trial at law, a court of chancery has no jurisdiction to disturb the judgment. This rule is laid down in the cause of Smith and M’Iver, (9 Wh. Rep. 532,) and has been repeatedly recognized by this court, particularly in the case of Blount vs. Garin, at Knoxville.

Decree affirmed.  