
    The State against John Johnson, a Justice of the Peace for Charleston District.
    
      Charleston District,
    
    1802.
    A magistrate is not liable to be punished upon an indictment^ un« less he acts corruptly or oppressively in iiis office. He may commit for con-tempts or abuse offered to his face, while in the execution of his office-
    UPON an indictment for oppression in office, hy committing one Rachel Hart to prison.
    Upon this indictment, the defendant Mr. Johnson had been convicted. This was a motion íor a new trial, on the ground that the conviction was not warranted in law.
    This case was tried before Geimke, Justice, and the facts were briefly stated by him to be the following, to wit: That on the day stated in the indictment, the prosecutrix, who having a previous dispute with the magistrate, for committing her negro to gaol, went to his house, while he was in the execution of his office as a magistrate, and before sundry persons, insulted him to his face, as also the constable who had taken the negro to gaol. That he had desired her to go about her business, or be quiet, but she refused to do either, saying she had come to laugh at him ; he threatened to commit her, but she defied his authority ; upon which he sent her to prison, for her contemptuous be-haviour; .and for this commitment, she commenced this prosecution. On the trial before the jury, the judge told them, that the magistrate should have fined her in the first instance, under the act of assembly, (Public Lotus, p. 129.) instead of sending her to prison, which he thought was premature on the part of the magistrate. The jury therefore brought in their verdict against him.
    The counsel in support of this motion, argued, that this was an act of self-defence ; and without the exertion of such an authority, the magistrate could neither defend himself against insult and abuse, nor execute the laws of his country committed to his care. That when the prosecutrix came to his house, he was in the actual exercise of his judicial functions ; and she told him she had come to laugh at, or insult himand when he threatened to commit her, she defied his authority ; he then sent her to prison ; and he would have been unworthy of the office he bore if he had not done so. They then laid it down as law, that a justice of the peace, in all cases of contemptuous behaviour, has his choice of two remedies ; either to proceed by indictment, or to make himself a judge in his own case, and commit for a contempt. 1 Strange, 420. Salk. 698. 3 Mod. 139. That a magistrate sitting in judgment on matters within his authority, constituted a court of inferior jurisdiction ; and it was incident to all courts to commit for contempts. They further contended, that it was a well known rule of law, that unless a magistrate acts with a corrupt intention, he is not punishable by indictment. And so far does the law go on this head, that if a justice of the peace acts illegally, yet if he acts from good motives, and mistakes the law, the court will not grant an information against him. 1 Durnford East, 653.
    But in the present instance, they denied that Mr. Justice Johnson had acted illegally; on the contrary, they insisted he had acted agreeably to the rules of law, and in support of decorum and good order, and had only used the peaceable weapons the law had put into the hands of every magistrate in the country in their own defence, and unless they were used by them whenever insult or abuse was offered to them, the magistracy and the majesty of the laws would be prostrated at the feet of turbulence and rude impertinence.
    Against the motion, it was urged, that the liberty of a citizen had been infringed by this high-handed act of injustice. That the prosecutrix had been oppressed by this magistrate, under colour of his office. That the offence which she was supposed to have committed, was at most only a misdemeanor, which was in its nature bailable, and that the defendant ought to have demanded bail of her for her good behaviour, or have fined her in the first instance, and not have hurried her off to the common gaol of the district. That a jury of the country had duly considered all the circumstances of this case, and convicted the defendant, and their verdict ought to be supported.
    See ante.
    
    
      
       In England, the mode of proceeding against justices of the peace for ynal-practices is by information, which in this country is taken away by our constitution- See Mitchell’s case, Bay’s Reports, vol. 1. p. 267. Riley’s edit
    
   The Judges,

after duly considering this case, were clearly of opinion, that the magistrate had not exceeded his authority, or acted in any degree oppressively on the present occasion. If it had been an accidental thing, or if the words had been spoken in the sudden heat of passion, the justice in pity to her weakness might have overlooked it, or at most have fined her for her improper behaviour. But this appears to have been a deliberate act on her part; she went on purpose to insult him, and that, too, at a time when he was acting in his judicial capacity as a justice of the peace, before a number of citizens then on public business with him ; he had therefore no other mode sufficiently speedy and effectual to check her insolence, but by commitment ; as in all probability, she would have laughed to scorn and contempt at his fine, or demand of good beha-viour ; for she herself said, she went to laugh at him, and defied his power of commitment. The authority given by the act of assembly to fine for contempts, does not take away the common law remedy of commitment, for this is a power incident to every court of judicature, from the highest' to the lowest, and without it good behaviour and order could not be preserved. A justice of the peace sitting in his judicial capacity, forms a court for the determination of all matters within his jurisdiction, and he is clothed by law with sufficient powers to defend his authority, if he chooses to exercise them, and he may make himself a judge in his own cause, and commit for contempts offered to his face, as is laid down in 1 Strange, 420. Salk. 698. and as was determined in the case of Lining v. Bentham, in this court, after solemn argument.

That it is the duty of this court, to support the magistrates of the country in the due execution of their duty, and unless they act corruptly or oppressively, it never will pu~ nish them in a criminal way when they mean well, even if they should mistake the law upon small or immaterial. points. In the present case, however, there does not appear to have been any mistake. The magistrate acted legally and properly in his own defence, and in support of his judicial authority.

Gaillard and MlCredie for the motion, Ward and Chevesf against it.

Let the verdict be set aside, and a new trial granted.

Present, Grimke, Waties, Bay, Johnson, Trezevanx and Brevard.  