
    Nicholas Beaugenon, Appellant, v. François Turcotte and François X. Valois, Appellees.
    APPEAL PROM ST. CLAIR.
    A party who asks equity must do equity: and where a party signed a note for specie, supposing it to be for state paper, though no fraud was practised, and a judgment was entered against him for the specie value of so much state paper as the note called for, chancery will not relieve against such judgment as it is equitable.
    If a defendant neglects to avail himself of a legal defense, a court of equity will not relieve him.
   Opinion of the Court by

Justice Lockwood.

This is an appeal from the equity side of the circuit court of St. Clair county. The bill filed in this cause alleges that the appellant when he executed the note, was deceived as to the kind of money in which it was payable, and was also deceived as to the language in which it was written. When the appellant executed the note, neither Turcotte or his agent was present, and there is no ground to charge either of them with any knowledge that any fraud or misrepresentation had been used in obtaining appellant’s signature to the note. The court below, however, acting under the impression that the appellant supposed that in executing the note he had made himself liable only to pay its amount in state paper, have reduced the judgment to the value of state paper at the time it became due. This is all that justice requires, for the appellant was willing, and agreed, according to his own showing, to become the security of Valois for the amount of the note in state paper. It perhaps might well be doubted, whether the testimony was altogether sufficient to establish the fact that any imposition was practised in obtaining the appellant’s signature to the note. But the court do not intend to disturb the decree of the court below, as we are satisfied that the appellant has received all the relief that he is entitled to, upon the most favorable view of the case. It is a well settled principle in equity, that a party who seeks relief in a court of chancery, must first do equity. In this case, neither Turcotte or his agent practised any fraud or deception. Turcotte was delayed in collecting his debt against Valois, in consequence of the appellant’s signature being by him affixed to the note, and the bill acknowledges his willingness and agreement to execute the note, supposing it to be payable in state paper. It is then no more than' equitable, that he should pay the value of state paper when the note became due. The imposition supposed to have been practised, hi representing the note to have been written in English, could produce no injury; the real imposition, if any, consisted in representing the note to be payable in paper instead of specie, for which relief has been granted. Strong doubts are entertained by the court whether the appellant was entitled to any relief. The object in a court of law in serving the process on the party, and filing a declaration ten days before court, is to apprize the defendant of the precise nature of the appellant’s demand against him, and if the defendant neglects to avail himself of the means thus furnished him, of ascertaining the cause of bringing the suit, courts of equity will seldom interfere to protect parties from the effects of such negligence, when the defense is a legal one. The authorities to this point are numerous. 1 Bibb., 173. 2 Bibb., 192.

Blackwell, for appellant.

Starr, for appellee.

Chancellor Kent, in delivering his opinion in the case of Duncan v. Lyer, 3 Johns. Ch. Rep. 356, says : “ It is a settled principle, that a party will not be aided after a trial at law, unless he can impeach the justice of the verdict or report by facts, or on grounds of which he could not have availed himself, or was prevented from doing it by fraud or accident, or the act of the opposite party, unmixed with negligence or fault on his part.” As Turcotte has not appealed, and as the court are satisfied, although the testimony is loose, that justice has been done, they will not disturb the decree, as pronounced in the court below. The decree must be affirmed with costs. ,

) Decree affirmed. 
      
      
         Where a party, in an action at law, had notice of a defense in time to avail himself of it, but neglected to do so, he will not be allowed to litigate the matter in chancery, but is forever concluded by the judgment. 1 Johns. Cas., 436.
      There may be cases in which relief ought to be extended to a person who might have defended, but has omitted to defend himself at law; but such cases do not frequently occur. 7 Cranch., 332. Mar. Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Hoopor.
      
      See Hubbard v. Hobson, and the cases there referred to.
     
      
       See note to Moore et al. v. Bagley et al., ante, p. 94.
     