
    John F. Baxter, Respondent, v. Charles E. McDonnell, Appellant.
    
      Powers of ecclesiastical courts — no jw’isdiction over purely civil rights—one cause of action can he assisted, hy another only when it refers to it.
    
    Where a right of property is dependent upon a question of church doctrine, discipline or government, the civil courts of the State of New York will treat the determination of such question, made by the highest tribunal within the church organization having jurisdiction to determine such questions, as controlling, but beyond that there can be no recognition of the. jurisdiction or judicial power of any ecclesiastical court.
    The Metropolitan Court of the Archdiocese of New York, a tribunal organized within and for the ecclesiastical government of the Holy Roman Catholic church, can have no jurisdiction of purely civil rights, whether the same relate to persons or to property, nor can jurisdiction as to such rights be conferred upon that court by the consent of parties.
    The decision of that court upon the claims of a priest of the Holy Roman Catholic church against his bishop for a balance of his salary as pastor, and as to the validity of a general release signed by the priest, is not a bar to a subsequent action brought by the priest against the bishop in the civil courts of the State of New York to recover such balance.
    Where no reference is made in a second cause of action to any allegations contained in a prior cause of action, nothing contained in the prior cause of action can be made available to support the second cause of action.
    Appeal by the defendant, Charles E. McDonnell, from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of-the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 2étli day of December, 1896, upon the decision -of the court, rendered after a trial at the Kings Special Term, sustaining the plaintiff’s demurrer to the third separate and affirmative defense set, up in the defendant’s answer. . ■ .
    The'action was brought to recover an alleged balance due to the plaintiff as his salary for his services as priest of the Roman -Catholic church. He alleges that he, as such, was assigned,, in September, 1885, by the Right Reverend John Loughlin, the -bishop of the diocese of Brooklyn, as pastor to the parish of Babylon in the county of Suffolk: , He seeks to recover the alleged balance of his salary from that time until in October, 1892, and from December, 1892,- when he was assigned to the duty of chaplain of St. Mary’s Hospital in Brooklyn. He also alleges that the execution' by him of" a general release to the defendant who is. the- successor of the ' Reverend' John Loughlin; was .obtained -from him by fraud and duress.
    The defendant by his answer put in issue, some, matters set forth in the complaint. And for a third, separate and affirmative defense alleged: ' . •
    “ That in an action in the Metropolitan Court of the Archdiocese of . Hew York, in which.the plaintiff- herein was plaintiff and this , defendant was defendant, and in which .all the matters, of complaint alleged by the plaintiff in the complaint herein, were alleged and set forth by said plaintiff in his action in .said Metropolitan Court and in'Which all the issues that'are herein, joined were- therein tried, a judgment wras duly rendered on -or about the 25th day of August, 1895, whereby it was adjudged- that.:
    “I. The decision of the court on the first complaint is that the resignation of the. Rev. John F. Baxter, plaintiff, was valid. ■
    
      “ II. The decision of the court in the matter of , the release and settlement is that the- release signed by the plaintiff relinquishing all claims' for the sum of fifteen hundred-, dollars ($1,500) paid, to him Hovember 30th, 1892, is binding on. both' parties to this suit, and must stand as valid.
    “ III. The court refuses to grant- plaintiff’s demand for a pastor’s salary for the time' lie has served at St. Mary’s Hospital.
    
      “ That the-said Metropolitan Court of the Archdiocese of 'Hew York is a court duly organized by the IIoly-Romaii Catholic Church, and at the time said action was therein brought and tried, and said judgment was rendered, had,, jurisdiction of the parties to said action and of the subject-matter of said action, and that at the times said action was commenced, and continuously thereafter until the present, said plaintiff was, has been, and now' is, a member of the Holy Roman Catholic Church, and subject to the rules, laws and discipline of said church, and subject to the jurisdiction and adjudication of said Metropolitan Court.”
    The plaintiff interposed a demurrer to this affirmative matter so alleged, on the ground that it failed to state facts. sufficient to constitute a defense.
    
      Henry G. M. Ingraham, for the appellant.
    
      L. J. Morrison, for the respondent.
   Bradley, J.:

The Metropolitan Court of the archdiocese of New York, mentioned in the defendant’s answer, it may be assumed was a tribunal duly organized within and for the ecclesiastical government of the Roman Catholic church. As such the court was vested with judicial functions to determine questions of faith, discipline, rules and custom pertaining to church government. And w;hen the right of property is dependent upon the question of doctrine, discipline or church government, the civil court, where the question may arise, will treat the determination made upon such question by the highest tribunal within the church organization as controlling in that respect. (Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679; Connitt v. R. P. D. C. of N. Prospect, 54 N. Y. 551.) Beyond that there can be no recognition in this State of the jurisdiction and judicial power of any .ecclesiastical court. The questions of civil rights of persons relating to themselves personally or to property, whatever may be their relation to church organizations and pertaining thereto, are the subjects of adjudication in the civil tribunals exclusively. (Miller v. Gable, 2 Den. 492.) The civil courts do not interfere with ecclesiastical matters in which temporal-rights are not involved.

When the plaintiff assumed the relation of pastor of- the parish ■to which he was assigned, he, in that relation, was subject to the rules, discipline and canons of the church and the judicatories within its organization. (Rector of St. James Church v. Huntington, 82 Hun, 125; Connitt Case, 54 N. Y. 551; Walker v. Wainright, 16 Barb. 486; Union Church v. Sanders, 1 Houst. 100 ; 63 Am. Dec. 187; Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509; 11 Am. Rep. 95.) The plaintiff, by his complaint, goes beyond this and alleges facts which, on their face, show that a legal liability arose against the defendant as the successor of the Right Reverend John Loughlin, deceased, as bishop of the' diocese of Brooklyn, to the plaintiff for the alleged balance of his salary as pastor of the parish of Babylon for the period extending from September 10, 1885, to October 12, 1892. And the question for consideration is whether the remedy sought by this action survives or is barred by the alleged adjudication in the Metropolitan Court of the archdiocese of New York wherein the plaintiff and defendant were parties, and in which was included the subject-matter of this action. For the purposes of the question here, the facts alleged relating to that court, its jurisdiction and the subject-matter of the controversy there, are necessarily taken as true, so far as they are capable of being so, by force of the demurrer, which proceeds upon the assumption and admission that, they are so far true. It is, therefore, urged by the learned counsel for the defendant that the plaintiff has by his demurrer admitted that such Metropolitan Court had jurisdiction of the. parties and of the subject-matter of the action, and that the plaintiff, being a member. of the Holy Roman Catholic church and subject to the. rules, laws and discipline of the church, was subject to the jurisdiction and adjudication of that court. He evidently was, so far as related to the matter of discipline and ecclesiastical rules, laws and customs of the church government. But notwithstanding the allegations of the alleged defense to the effect that the Metropolitan Court -was duly organized and had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter, judicial notice will be taken of the -fact that it was not a court created or organized pursuant to any law of the State of New York, and was one which could not, by virtue of any law, he created within the State. (Const. art. 6, § 18; People ex rel. Townsend v. Porter, 90 N. Y. 68.) No facts are alleged showing that the court had juris"diction of'the parties'and the-subjeebmatter. (Gilbert v. York, 111 N. Y. 548.) And it appearing that the alleged tribunal in its nature is ecclesiastical only,.it cannot be assumed that it, as such, had jurisdiction to determine the civil rights of the parties, but judicial notice must be taken to the contrary. Nor could jurisdiction of the subject-matter be conferred upon that tribunal as a court by consent of the parties. (Coffin v. Tracy, 3 Caines, 129; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9; Harriott v. N. J. R. R. & Trans. Co., 2 Hilt. 262.) The allegéd adjudication by it as a court must, therefore, be deemed to have been non coram judice and void so far as relates to the plaintiff’s alleged cause of action in the present case. The defendant’s counsel contends that, if the allegations of the answer to which the demurrer was interposed failed to constitute a defense to the first cause of action, they did constitute a defense to the second cause of action alleged in the complaint. If the allegations of the latter constitute a- cause of action in this court, the alleged defense in question would,not be any bar to a recovery for the reason before given; and if they do not constitute a cause of action, that alleged defense can have no' necessary application to them. . It is not seen that the allegations. of what is designated as the second cause of action, aided by the preliminary statement in the.complaint,‘do, without reference to matters alleged in the first one, constitute a cause of action. And as no reference is made in it to any allegations of the first alleged cause of action, nothing contained in the latter can be made available in support of the second cause of action alleged in the complaint. (Victory Webb, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Beecher, 55 How. Pr. 193 ; Reiners v. Brandhorst, 59 id. 91; Simmons v. Fairchild, 42 Barb. 404; Woodbury v. Deloss, 65 id. 501.) The second count fails to allege any agreement, or facts constituting one, to pay the plaintiff the Sum claimed for the period there mentioned. Exclusive of the preliminary allegations in the complaint applicable to both counts, the plaintiff alleges that, inasmuch as he was a pastor, he should have been paid $1,000 per year for the period during which he acted as chaplain of St. Mary’s Hospital, to which duty he was assigned; and as the amount received by him during that time was $300 per year, he seeks to recover the difference. As the alleged defense was pleaded as a bar to any recovery by the plaintiff, the question of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the second cause of action for its support requires no further.consideration.'"

The adjudication of the Metropolitan Court is not pleaded as an arbitration and award, nor are the facts essential to such a defense alleged in the answer. The contention of the counsel in that respect .is, therefore, not supported.'

The judgment should he affirmed.

All concurred.

- Interlocutory judgment affirmed, with costs, with leave to the defendant, within twenty days, to amend the third defense, on payment of costs of demurrer and of this appeal.  