
    Nancy FADDIS-DECERBO, Victoria Lowe, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ASTOR SERVICES FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, Mary Sontheimer, in Her Individual & Corporate Capacities as Assistant Executive Director, PHD, Konstantinos (GUS) Tsoubris, in His Individual & Corporate Capacities as Associate Executive Director for Hudson Valley Community Based Mental Health & Prevention Programs, Kim Stella, in Her Individual & Corporate Capacities as Program Director of Astor’s Bridges To Health Program, Cyndi Palma, in Her Individual & Corporate Capacities as Former Program Director for Astor’s Bridges To Health Program and Present Director of Astor’s Community Based Behavioral Health Services, Early Childhood Programs, Melinda Weisberg, in Her Individual & Corporate Capacities as Assistant Executive Director, Public Policy & Organizational Development, John Does 1 Through 5, in their Individual and Corporate Capacities, Defendants-Appellees.
    
    Nos. 11-3072-cv, 11-4624-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 16, 2012.
    James P. Drohan, Thomas, Drohan, Waxman, Petigrow & Mayle, LLP, Hopewell Junction, NY, for Appellants.
    Jimmy M. Santos, Law Offices of Jimmy M. Santos, PLLC, Cornwall, NY, for Ap-pellees.
    
      PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR. and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges and JOHN GLEESON, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as shown above.
    
    
      
       The Honorable John Gleeson of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs-appellants Nancy Faddis-DeCerbo and Victoria Lowe appeal from orders of the district court in their separate actions, granting summary judgment for defendants-appellees and denying Faddis-De-Cerbo’s and Lowe’s cross-motions for summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

“We review de novo a district court’s ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, in each case construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). ‘We will affirm the grant of summary judgment only if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the mov-ant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Ramos v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc., 687 F.3d 554, 558 (2d Cir.2012), quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record, we find no error in the district court rulings.

“Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are therefore required to demonstrate that defendants acted under color of state law when they engaged in the challenged conduct. See Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 206-07 (2d Cir.2012). “In analyzing whether a private entity acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983, we begin ‘by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains,’ rather than the general characteristics of the entity.” Id. at 207, quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999).

We need not decide whether defendant-appellee Astor Services for Children & Families (“Astor”), a private not-for-profit organization, engages in state action when it provides mental health, welfare, and development services to children in its community. Plaintiffs-appellants have failed to put forth any evidence that Astor acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when it decided to fire them. That Astor is subject to state regulation, performs some of the same services as the government, and receives public funding does not render it a state actor when it makes employment decisions. See Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir.1996) (“The fact that a municipality is responsible for providing medical attention to persons held in its custody may make an independent contractor rendering such services a state actor within the meaning of § 1983 with respect to the services so provided, but that fact does not make the contractor a state actor with respect to its employment decisions.” (citations omitted)). “Here the decisions to discharge the [plaintiffs] were not compelled or even influenced by any state regulation,” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982), and the state was not in any sense “a joint participant in the challenged activity,” Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). Accordingly, Astor’s decision to terminate plaintiffs-appellants is not “fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982).

Because the decisions to terminate Fad-dis-DeCerbo and Lowe did not constitute state action for purposes of § 1983, their First Amendment retaliation claims fail as a matter of law. We therefore need not consider plaintiffs-appellants’ remaining arguments. For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district court are AFFIRMED.  