
    MARY LUDINGTON, Admx. &c., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. ABRAHAM B. MILLER, et el., Defendants and Respondents.
    Before Monell, Oh. J., and Curtis, J.
    
      Decided January 4, 1875.
    RECEIPT IN FULL.—COMPROMISE.—MISTAKE AS TO THE LAW, &c.
    A party who has been prejudiced by a mistake as to the law, and who seeks relief from the consequences, should evince a disposition, by his acts or offers, to restore his opponent to his original position existing at" the time the alleged mistake occurred.
    A party should not seek to hold all the advantages gained by the mistake, and thus seek’to profit by his own oversight.
    In the case of a compromise between parties, and the payment of the moneys provided for therein, and a receipt in full given, that compromise, settlement, and payment can not be reopened, in consequence of a party being ignorant at the time of a statutory provision, or having overlooked some feature of the law, or the proofs, and because he believes afterwards that if he had not so overlooked the law or proofs he might have obtained better terms.
    In the case at bar, it was held that there was such a compromise and settlement between the parties that the receipt in full constituted a complete accord and satisfaction, and so far in the nature of a written contract that its terms can not be varied by parol proof.
    In cases where interest is allowed, not as a part of the contract, but as an incident and in lieu of damages, or as compensatory for some loss, by reason of a breach or default, after the payment of the principal of the debt, and its receipt in full, no action lies to recover the interest, it being extinguished with the debt (S. Central R. R. Go. d. Town of Moravia, 61 Bwrb, 189).
    Appeal from an order.
    
      The action was brought under the act of March 16, 1870, to recover damages resulting from the death of the husband of the administratrix. At an assessment of damages at the trial term, December 18, 1873, a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for three thousand dollars. Pending some subsequent proceedings, a settlement was made by the payment to the plaintiffs on January 5, "1874, of two thousand dollars, and on January 15, 1874, of one thousand eight hundred and thirty-four dollars and thirty-six cents, and a receipt was given the defendants “in full of damages and ■costs” in the action. In May following, the plaintiff’s counsel learned of the provision in the act of March 16, 1870, “that the amount of damages recovered in any such action shall draw interest from the time of the ■death of such deceased person, which interest shall be added to the verdict, and inserted in the entry of judgment in such action.” The defendant’s counsel was not aware of this provision of the statute when the settlement was made. The plaintiffs thereupon applied at the special term, for leave to enter up judgment for four ■thousand two hundred and ninety-nine dollars and thirteen cents, and to issue execution for four hundred and sixty-four dollars and seventy-five cents, the latter being the alleged,interest on the verdict. This motion was denied at the special term, and the plaintiffs appeal to the general term.
    
      George W. Lord, for appellants.
    
      A. H. Dana, for respondents.
   By the Court.—Curtis, J.

There are difficulties ■in the way óf granting the relief sought in this application. It ought not to be granted under any circumstances, unless the defendants were restored to the position in the case that they occupied at the time of the settlement and closing- up of the controversy, which appears, on the whole, not" to have been an unwise or unfair disposition of the litigation at the stage when it was terminated, by the act of the parties through their respective counsel. To restore the defendants to their position, the money paid to the plaintiffs should be returned to them, and they should be restored to all their rights at the time of the settlement in respect to appeals, and to proceedings for a new trial now lapsed. There is nothing disclosed in the papers, that indicates, either willingness or ability on the part of the plaintiffs to place tile defendants in their original position. If the plaintiffs have been prejudiced by a mistake as to the law, it properly devolves on them, when asking to be relieved from the consequences, to evince a disposition to restore their "opponents to their original position, and least of all, to seek to profit by their own oversight.

Heither would it be just to reopen a controversy, because the counsel for one of the parties thinks that if he had previously known about a provision of the-statute that he has since discovered, that he would have claimed more in the statement of his demand than he did at the time he was paid, and believes that in the-contingencies of a further prosecution of the litigation, he might have recovered it. It would be a dangerous precedent to reopen a compromise, in consequence of a party thinking that if he had not overlooked some feature of the law, or the proofs, he might have obtained better terms. The payments to the plaintiffs were made under circumstances that may be regarded as such a compromise, that the receipt in full constituted a complete accord and satisfaction, and so far in the nature of a contract, as not to be varied by parol evidence (Coon v. Knap, 8 N. Y. R. 402).

A question also arises whether the payment of the verdict, the principal, did not extinguish the interest. Where interest is made payable by the terms of the contract, its collection maybe enforced, although the principal-of the debt has been paid (Fake v. Eddy, 15 Wen. 76). But in that class of cases where interest is allowed, not as a part of the contract, but as an incident and in lien of damages, or as compensatory for some loss, by reason of a breach or default, it has been often held that after the payment of the principal of the debt, and its receipt in full, no action lies to recover interest, it being extinguished with the debt (S. Central R. R. Co. v. Town of Moravia, 61 Barb. 189). In the present case, the verdict is the principal of the debt, which the statute directs shall draw interest from the time of the-death of such deceased person, and be inserted in the-, entry of judgment. The statute declares a rule of damages by which the amount of a verdict may be increased,, by adding interest in the nature of a compensatory incident. There is no element of a contract in reference to this interest, and nothing that would seem to change « the rule, that when the principal, the verdict, is extinguished, the interest and all right or claim to it, is. extinguished.

There seems to be no good reason to disturb the-determination of this question made by the judge at. the special term, and the order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs to the defendants, to be paid out of the assets in the hands of the plaintiff, as administratrix.

Monell, Ch. J.

Fully concurring in the foregoing-opinion, I desire to state an additional reason for affirming the order.

The damages were assessed, and judgment entered in December, 1873, and paid January 6, 1874. This motion was not noticed until more than four months thereafter. However absolute the right to interest may be under the statute, it is a right which may be lost by laches, and the delay here amounted to laches. The judge below may very probably have considered this, and put his decision, in part at least, upon that ground.

Besides, I think, the damages were very liberal, and all the jury intended the plaintiff should have. Had they known that the court could add interest to the damages found by them, they might have given a less sum than they did.  