
    White v. Flynn and Another.
    Tax Title—Effect of Deed.—It seems not competent for the legislature to make a deed of land sold for taxes conclusive evidence' of the facts therein recited. 1 <J. & H. 108-109.
    Same.—The recitals in a deed of land sold for taxes must he within the scope of the power of the officers hy whom they- are made.
    • Same.—The recital that certain facts appear from the records of the audit- or’s office is not equivalent to the recital that they exist.
    APPEAL from tbe Bartholomew Common Pleas.
    
      
      Francis T. Hord, for appellant.
    
      Stansifer $ Herod, for appellee.
    Counsel for appellant argued: That each and every step from the appointment of the assessor to the sale is an independent act, and should he averred; and cited Blackwell on Tax Titles, 584-596, and 178-183; 2 Blackf. 421; 6 Blackf. 36; 8 Blackf. 335; 4 Blackf. 258; Id. 70; Id. 294; 5 Blackf. 40; Id. 98; 11 Ind. 3; 4 Ind. 132; 1 Ind. 542; 2 Ind. 649; 17 Ind. 309; Id. 214.
    It- -is not competent for the legislature to say what shall he conclusive evidence of a fact, and cited Wantlan v. While, 19 Ind. 471; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 101-107.
   Per Curiam.

In this snit, the defendant sought to hold lands by virtue of a tax title. He relied on his tax deed. The court seems to have held it conclusive evidence of title under the recitation in the deed thus: “ And it appearing from the records of said county auditor’s office that the aforesaid lands were legally liable for taxation, and had been duly assessed and properly charged on the duplicate,” etc. See 1 G-. & H. 108, 109.

The statute enacts that the deed shall be conclusive evidence of the facts recited, etc. Now, we do not suppose the legislature could make such an enactment. See Wantlan v. White, 19 Ind. 470. But, supposing they could, the recitation quoted is only of the fact that it appears on the records of the auditor’s office that certain things had been done, etc., all which might be true, and yet not be true, that those things had, in fact, been done. Nor would it be within the scope of the powers of those officers to recite that such things, in fact, had been done. The recitals in deed must be within the scope of the powers of the officers making them. The plaintiff replied that there was personal property on the lands that was not called for, etc., to pay the taxes, etc.

The court held this could not affect the validity of the title. The rulings of the court below were wrong. See Gavin v. Shuman et al., at this term, and 1 Selden (N. Y.) R. 366; also, 14 Ind. 465.

The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded.  