
    Felita SAMPLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank O’HARA; Tina Bell; First Transit, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-16231.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 29, 2012.
    
    Filed Aug. 6, 2012.
    Felita Sample, San Francisco, CA, pro se.
    Matthew S. Conant, Karen E. Giquinto, Lombardi, Loper & Conant, LLP, Oakland, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: HUG, FARRIS, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Felita Sample appeals the district court judgment dismissing her pro se action against First Transit, Inc. (“First Transit”) and two of its employees (collectively “Defendants”). Sample’s complaint alleges that Defendants violated federal law by failing to reserve seating for disabled passengers on a school bus it operates and by discriminating against Sample. The district court dismissed Sample’s action with prejudice for failure to state a claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Sample argues on appeal that Judge Susan Illston was required to recuse herself from Sample’s case. Sample claims that Judge Illston had rendered an adverse decision against her in a previous case and that Judge Illston is currently involved in a “disability proceeding for judicial misconduct.” Sample also argues that the district court should not have granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss before Defendants filed an answer to her complaint.

Judge Illston was not required to recuse herself from hearing Sample’s case. Sample has not presented evidence of any past case in which Judge Illston ruled against her, and in any event “ [unfavorable rulings alone are legally insufficient to require recusal.” Matter of Beverly Hills Bancorp, 752 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir.1984). Nor has Sample substantiated her allegation that Judge Illston is involved in a proceeding for disability or judicial misconduct. In the absence of any such evidence, it is impossible to determine whether there is in fact any such proceeding or whether it could have affected Judge Ill-ston’s impartiality. We therefore reject Sample’s argument that Judge Illston acted improperly in declining sua sponte to recuse herself from the case.

We also reject Sample’s argument that Judge Illston erred in ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss before Defendants filed an answer to Sample’s complaint. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 prescribes a time period within which a defendant must file an answer to a complaint, the filing of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b) tolls the answering deadline until the district court rules on the motion. See, e.g., 5B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1346 (3d ed.) § 1346: Service of Responsive Pleadings — Time for Serving and Filing.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     