
    The President and Trustees of the Town of Jacksonville, Appellants v. Murray McConnel, Appellee.
    AGREED CASE FROM MORGAN.
    A corporation, being a mere creature of the law, can. only exercise such powers as are conferred upon it by the act creating it. »
    A power to assess and collect a tax upon all personal estate, includes the power to tax money loaned.
    Under our constitution the legislature has not the power to exempt one species of personal property from taxation, while it collects a tax from another within the same jurisdiction.
    
      The agreed case, filed herein, is substantially as follows:
    An act the better to provide for the incorporation of the town of Jacksonville, passed by the legislature of said State, provides as follows: ‘ ‘ The board of trustees shall have power and authority to assess and collect taxes uniform, in respect to persons and property for corporate purposes, upon all the real and personal estate within said town, not exceeding one-half per cent, per annum upon the assessed value thereof, as ascertained and returned by the assessor of the corporation, and may enforce the payment of the same in any manner to be prescribed by ordinances not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and of this State, and such ordinances may provide for the advertisement, sale, and conveyance of any such real estate for taxes unpaid thereon to said corporation, and the time and mode in which the same mOT^ergdeemed from such sale in the manner prescribed of this State.” On the 9th of March, 1849, lpfi¡^f)pellants pls|ed an ordinance relative to the revenues of tBfe corno^ioru^iieh was duly published; which provides as foll(MaA^U^ordaine'|, by the President and Trustees of the TowrKof Jacjmimmtt^-ym all property, real and personal, within sanl wtoqrorcffcion wbjÉh. may be subject to taxation for state and oounT^S8Miaaa¿g**ffiv the laws of this State, shall be liable to taxation for the use of the corporation, and the lien of the corporation for such taxes shall attach from and after the date when the assessment list is received by the collector.” The appellee was an inhabitant of said corporation in 1849. For that year there was assessed against him amongst other taxes, a tax of 40 cents to the one hundred dollars, on four thousand dollars money loaned, or at interest, amounting to sixteen dollars.
    To restrain the collection of this tax the appellee filed his bill, and obtained a writ of injunction from Woodson, Judge. The appellants filed an answer, admitting the foregoing state of facts. The parties in the Circuit Court submitted to Woodson, Judge, the question, “whether the corporate powers of said town extend to the right to levy on the inhabitants of said town a tax for money loaned by them, in or out of said town.” The Court decided that, “the ordinance under which the assessment was made was not in accordance with authority granted by the charter, so far as it attempts to assess a tax on money loaned, and is to that extent void;” and perpetuated the injunction. From this decision the plaintiffs in error appealed and bring the case to this Court; and assign for error, that the Court below erred in deciding the aforesaid ordinance void, and that appellants had not a right to collect a tax on money loaned.
    P. A. Smith for Appellants.
    Mubbay McConwel for himself.
   Trumbull, J.

The right of the town of Jacksonville to levy and collect a tax upon money loaned by the inhabitants of said town, is the only question involved in this case.

That a corporation, which is a mere creature of the law, can only exercise such powers as are conferred upon it by the act of incorporation, is a well settled doctrine.

Let us then inquire what powers have been granted the town of Jacksonville, upon the subject of taxation.

The 9 th section of an act, the better to provide - for the incorporation of the town of Jacksonville, approved February 10,1849, declares, that “the Board of Trustees shall have power and authority to assess and collect taxes uniform in respect to persons and property, for corporate purposes, upon all the real and personal estate within said town.”

Here the power to assess and collect taxes is expressly given, but it is insisted that the power to assess and collect a tax upon all personal estoedoes not include the power to tax money loaned; in other words, that-money loaned is not personal estate. We cannot assent to this proposition. The term all.personal estate, in its ordinary sense, is understood to include loaned money, as well as every other species of personal property.

This view of the case is strengthened by the fact, that the general revenue law in force at the time the act in question was passed, expressly declares that"the term “personal property ”—a term of similar import to that of “ personal estate ”—shall be construed to include “all .moneys on hand and moneys'loaned whether within or without the State.”

When the legislature passed the act authorizing the Board of Trustees of the town of Jacksonville to assess and collect a tax, upon all the personal estate within said town, it is but reasonable to suppose that the term personal estate ” was understood to have the same meaning as had previously been given to a similar term, used in the general law, upon the subject of taxation.

There is another reason why the term personal estate,” should be construed to include money loaned, and every other species of personal property.

The constitution of the state expressly declares, that the mode of levying a tax shall be by valuation, “so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property.” Under this provision the legislature would have no power to exempt from taxation one species of personal property, while it collected a tax from another, within the same jurisdiction, and it is never to be presumed that the legislature intended to pass a law which should be contrary to the Constitution, either in its letter or spirit.

To restrict the term “personal estate” within narrower limits than would embrace every species of personal property, would, to say the least, render the validity of the law doubtful, if it did not make it wholly void, as being repugnant to the constitution.

We cannot doubt that the Board of Trustees of the town of Jacksonville had authority, under their act of incorporation, to assess and collect a tax upon money in hand, or money loaned in or out of said town, by the inhabitants thereof.

The decree of the Circuit Court, enjoining the collection of the tax in question, is therefore reversed, and the bill dismissed.

Judgment reversed.  