
    M.W., father of K.W., K.W., and K.W., children, Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES.
    No. 93-2852.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    March 6, 1995.
    
      Janis Burke of Day, Meade and Burke, P.A., Fort Walton Beach, for appellant Mark Watford.
    Steven J. Gilpatrick, Asst. Dist. Legal Counsel, Fort Walton Beach, for appellee Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
    Melanie Seymour, Fort Walton Beach, for appellee Kay Watford.
   ALLEN, Judge.

The appellant challenges an order of the trial court adjudicating his children dependent pursuant to Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, due to physical abuse by the appellant. We reject the appellant’s assertion that there was an insufficient evidentiary basis for the order, but we nevertheless reverse the order because the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony at the adjudicatory hearing.

Despite numerous hearsay objections by the appellant, the trial court permitted six separate witnesses to testify as to out-of-court statements by the appellant’s children regarding acts of abuse by the appellant. Although this testimony might otherwise have been admissible under the hearsay exception set out in section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes, the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact on the record indicating the basis for determining this testimony admissible, as required by section 90.803(23)(c). Accordingly, this testimony was not properly admitted. See Hopkins v. State, 632 So.2d 1372 (Fla.1994).

Having carefully reviewed the entire record in this case, we are unable to conclude that the improper admission of the hearsay testimony was merely harmless error. We therefore reverse the order of adjudication and remand for further proceedings.

BENTON, J., concurs.

BOOTH, J., dissents with written opinion.

BOOTH, Judge,

dissenting.

I doubt the applicability of Hopkins v. State, 632 So.2d 1372 (Fla.1994), to these proceedings. Hopkins, a criminal case, allows a general objection raising Sixth Amendment “confrontation rights” to preserve for review specific procedural objections to the victim’s statements and testimony. The basic rule requiring specific objection remains unaffected by Hopkins and should control in civil cases and certainly in dependency proceedings wherein the court has wide discretion in the acceptance of evidence bearing on the welfare of the children involved. Technical rules of evidence which prevent the court from considering critical evidence are not favored, see, e.g., In the Interest of S.C. v. State, 471 So.2d 1326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); In re J.A.R., 419 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); T.A.F. v. Duval Coun ty, 273 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), and should be expressly raised by objection. The objections made in this case were neither of the general kind allowed in Hopkins nor were they specific objections alerting the trial court to the error now raised. I would hold the error was not preserved.

Assuming Hopkins applies in dependency proceedings and that appellant’s objections were sufficient, failure to make “findings” under section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes, was harmless, nonetheless. State v. Diguilio 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). The substance of the hearsay testimony at issue was testified to by all three children at the dependency hearing. As such, the hearsay testimony is merely cumulative or repetitive. Flanagan v. State, 586 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). This court has previously held that an error in admitting hearsay testimony is harmless when substantially the same evidence is presented through other witnesses. See Salter v. State, 500 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Flanagan, supra. I would affirm.  