
    THRIFT BUILDING CO v. THE UNITED STATES
    [No. E-123.
    Decided April 2, 1928]
    
      On the Proofs'
    
    
      Eminent domain; just compensation; refusal to accept 15% of award; interest. — Where the statute provides' that one whose lands have been taken by the Government may accept a certain percentage of the amount determined by the President to be just compensation, and sue for such add tional amount as will make up just compensation, and such person refuses to accept any of the amount so determined, he is not entitled, in a judg- „ ment for. just compensation, to interest on the percentage which he could have accepted.
    
      The Reporter’s statement of the case:
    
      Millam, c& Smith for the plaintiff.-
    
      Mr. W. F. Norris, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Herman J. Galloway,, for the defendant.
    The court made special findings of fact, as follows:
    I. The plaintiff is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of South Dakota and does business in the city of Washington, District of Columbia.
    II. On or before the 24th day of September, 1918, the plaintiff was the sole owner of a certain piece of real estate situate in the District of Columbia, known and described as original lot 2, in square 1098, on Massachusetts Avenue Southeast, with a frontage of 96 feet and 3 inches, and contains 13,530.2 square feet of ground, subject to a deed of trust dated July 20, 1899, and recorded among the land records of the District of Columbia on July 21, 1899, in liber 2420, folio 143, to secure Thomas W. Smith the sum of $1,800. Thomas W. Smith is dead, and the Washington Loan and Trust Company, a corporation doing business in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, is the trustee by virtue of his last will and testament, duly probated in the Supreme Court of the said District of Columbia. The Washington Loan and Trust Company is the holder and owner of the debt secured, which has been reduced to the sum of $1,400 principal by reason of payments thereon, and consents to the filing of this suit in the name of the plaintiff, and for the purpose of this suit waives its interest, it and the plaintiff having agreed upon a method of adjustment of the proceeds of judgment, as appears by its consent recorded at the end of the petition, which is made a part of this finding by reference.
    III. On June 18, 1918, the President of the United States issued an Executive order as follows:
    “ By virtue of the authority vested in me by the first section of the act of Congress entitled An act authorizing the President to coordinate or consolidate executive bureaus, agencies, and offices, and for other purposes in the interest of economy and the more efficient concentration of the Government,’ approved May 20, 1918, and by the other acts of Congress hereinafter mentioned, I hereby direct that the Secertary of Labor shall have and exercise all power and authority vested in me by the act of Congress entitled An act to authorize the President to provide housing for war needs,’ approved May 16, 1918, and by the act of Congress entitled An act making appropriations to supply additional urgent deficiencies in appropriations for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eighteen, on account of war expenses and for other purposes,’ approved June 4, 1918, in so far as the same relates to ‘housing for war needs.’ ”
    IV. On September 25, 1918, pursuant to the authorization contained in the act of Congress approved May 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 551, and said Executive order of June 18, 1918, the United States requisitioned the land owned by the plaintiff effective as of noon on said day, and the Secretary of Labor appointed James J. Owens requisition officer and authorized him to take possession of said land on behalf of the United States, and in pursuance of said statute and said Executive order the land was duly requisitioned by the United States as of the 25th day of, September, 1918.
    V. The President of the United States, acting through the Secretary of Labor, on March 1, 1919, determined the just compensation for such real estate to be $1,218.00, which amount was unsatisfactory to the owner and was declined, and no compensation has been received by the plaintiff for the said real estate. The value of the said real estate when requisitioned was $1,691.27.
    The court decided that plaintiff was entitled to recover.
   MEMORANDUM!

BY THE COURT

Just compensation in the amount of $1,691.27 has been awarded plaintiff for the land taken under the act of May 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 551, and the Executive order of June 18, 1918. On March 1,1919, the President of the United States, acting through the Secretary of Labor, determined that the fair and reasonable market value of the land taken was $1,218, which amount plaintiff declined to accept. Under the provisions of the statute cited plaintiff could have accepted 75 per centum of the amount offered, approximately $900.00, with the right to sue the United States, under said act, for the recovery of such additional sum as added to such 75 per centum might be found to be just compensation for the land taken. This the plaintiff failed to do. This court is without authority to allow .interest on 75 per centum of the award from the date of the award, March 1, 1919, to the date of judgment. In Luckenbach, Steamship Company v. United States, 272 U. S. 533, 542, it is said:

“ We think such postponement as has occurred in the actual payment of the compensation is attributable entirely to claimant, and therefore that an allowance of interest to the time of payment is not ,in this case made essential * *

Interest has been allowed on the amount determined as just compensation, $1,691.27, from the date of taking, September 25,1918, to March 1,1919 (date of award), and thereafter on $777.77 to the date of judgment, the latter amount representing the difference between the just compensation, $1,691.27, and 75 per centum of the original offer, $913.50, on which, as already stated, interest is not allowable.

Judgment will accordingly be awarded in the sum of $2,159.25, together with interest on $777.77 from date of judgment until paid. It is so ordered.  