
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. David De Maio, Appellant.
    (Argued May 26, 1926;
    decided July 9, 1926.)
    
      Crimes —• murder in first degree — trial — evidence —• erroneous charge and erroneous' interference of court with examination by counsel disregarded in view of convincing evidence of guilt.
    
    A trial judge may properly interrupt at times to clear up obscure points, but subject to the applicable rules of evidence counsel ordinarily ought to have a fair opportunity to examine in his own way the client or witness whom he has placed upon the stand. It is the province of cross-examination to correct any omissions of which counsel may be guilty in bringing out the facts or to test the accuracy of the witness. Possible errors will be disregarded, however, where the evidence of defendant’s guilt is so convincing that it is certain that the result of the trial was not changed by them.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court rendered November 27, 1925, at a Trial Term for the county of Westchester upon a verdict convicting the defendant of the crime of murder in the first degree.
    
      Theodore H. Lord and William L. Moran for appellant.
    
      Arthur Rowland, District Attorney, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The trial justice committed error in part of his charge relating to corroborative evidence. Claim- has also been made that by constant interruptions he unduly interfered with the direct examination by defendant’s counsel of his client. The trial judge may properly interrupt at times to clear up obscure points but subject to the applicable rules of evidence counsel ordinarily ought to have a fair opportunity to examine in his own way the client or witness whom he has placed upon the stand. It is the province of cross-examination to correct any omissions of which counsel may be guilty in bringing out the facts or to test the accuracy of the witness. If the case were at all close these contentions would require careful consideration. The evidence of defendant’s guilt, however, is so convincing that we fed certain that the result of the trial was not changed by them and, therefore, we disregard them.

The judgment of conviction should, therefore, be affirmed.

His cock, Ch. J., Cardozo, Pound, McLaughlin, Crane and Andrews, JJ., concur; Lehman, J., absent.

Judgment affirmed.  