
    Sharon A. MERRELL, Appellant, v. David E. MERRELL, Appellee.
    No. 92-3174.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Oct. 20, 1993.
    James R. Rich of Law Office of James R. Rich, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    
      Peggy Rowe-Linn of Peggy Rowe-Linn, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   BIRKEN, ARTHUR M., Associate Judge.

This court considered an appeal from appellant wife alleging a number of issues, only two of which this court will specifically address.

This court is of the opinion that the permanent alimony award of $300 per month was insufficient under the facts of this case. There was a nineteen-year marriage and one minor child. According to the current terms of the final judgment, the appellee has $1,840 per month available after alimony and support payments and the appellant has $1,777 per month available which includes support and income from the rental unit attached to the marital home. Yet, in one year the appellee’s support obligations will cease and the marital home will be sold reducing the appellant’s monthly income to $775 and increasing the appellee’s income to $2,367, resulting in an acute disparity between their incomes. This situation requires an upward adjustment in the permanent alimony award. Nonetheless, the court is cognizant that ap-pellee works seventy-two hours per week. The appellee should not be compelled to continue his current work schedule; instead, his second job should weigh in the appellee’s favor in the determining a more equitable alimony award.

Additionally, child support obligations should continue for the minor child through her completion of high school. All other matters raised are deemed without merit.

The order of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part consistent with this opinion. The trial court is directed to conduct such further hearings as may be necessary in order to reassess and enter an appropriate order for permanent alimony, and to modify its judgment relative to the termination date of child support obligations.

ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with opinion.

GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.

ANSTEAD, Judge,

concurring specially.

I agree with Judge Birken that the circumstances of this case, especially the gross disparity in income after a long term marriage, require reversal. I write separately only to comment on one possible solution.

First, the gross disparity in income that I noted is reflected in the fact that the husband was earning close to $50,000 annually at the time of dissolution, and had been doing so for sometime. Most of this income was from his job as a fireman; the balance was from a construction business with his brother. The wife had never worked full-time during the marriage and never earned more than $5,000 in a single year. She did have 2 1½ years of college, a real estate agent’s license, and a part-time business called “Kid-sercise”. The husband was also ordered to pay child support. However, that obligation will end shortly when the remaining minor child of the parties turns 18 and graduates from high school.

The husband attempts to support the trial court’s decision, which he concedes is “low,” by characterizing the wife as “lazy” and capable of earning much more than the husband. To the husband, the solution is simple: simply project the wife’s part-time earnings to what they would have been if she had worked full-time. The problem is that there was no evidence presented below that this work was available to the wife on a full-time basis.

The wife did, however, present substantial evidence that she could complete her college education over the next two years and thereafter substantially support herself as a teacher. Based on this, I believe one of the realistic alternatives open to the court on remand is to direct the payment of rehabilitative alimony for the next two or three years as a supplement to the permanent alimony award. In the long run this will benefit the husband by keeping the alimony “low,” and benefit the wife by making her self-supporting.

GLICKSTEIN, Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree that the trial court should have insured the payment of child support through the minor child’s last year in high school, albeit her eighteenth birthday takes place during the year.

As for the majority’s decision upon the issue of alimony, the trial court dealt with the facts as it saw them in September, 1992. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980), meant what it said; therefore, I would not reverse on that issue.  