
    Arthur J. FREER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, United States Social Security Administration, Defendants-Appellees.
    17-1204
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    January 31, 2018.
    For Plaintiff-Appellant: Arthur J. Freer, pro se, Narrowsburg, NY.
    For Defendants-Appellees: Amanda F. Parsels, Assistant United States Attorney (Benjamin H. Torrance, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Joon H. Kim, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.
    
      Present: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges, EDWARD KORMAN, District Judge.
    
      
       Judge Edward Korman, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Arthur Freer, proceeding pro se, seeks review of a final determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. He appeals from the magistrate judge’s grant of judgment on the pleadings to the Commissioner. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review dc novo a judgment on the pleadings. Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010). When the judgment upholds a benefits determination by the Commissioner, we assess “whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Id. (quoting Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002)). “The substantial evidence standard means that once an [administrative law judge (“ALJ”)] finds facts, we can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Upon such review, we find that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, and that the determination that Freer was not disabled was supported by substantial evidence. As part of the test set out in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920, the ALJ found that Freer:

1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since becoming disabled;
2) was not mentally deficient but did suffer from physical impairments, some severe (such as degenerative changes of the right shoulder and spine and osteoarthritis of the knee), others not (including carpal tunnel syndrome);
3) did not have any impairments equivalent in severity to those listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix i;
4) could perform sedentary work but not his past, more physical work; and
5) could work as an information clerk or a call-in operator, both unskilled jobs for which the national economy has a reasonably strong demand.

Freer argues on appeal that the pain from his injuries and the side effects from his medication preclude him from performing even sedentary work. But the ALJ considered both issues, finding that Freer’s objective medical records and relatively active life suggested that Freer’s allegations about his subjective pain and side effects were overstated. Freer has not provided us any reason to believe that a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise. Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the same reasons as the magistrate judge stated in her March 31, 2017 order.

We have considered all of Freer’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment. 
      
      . Freer also says that he will need more surgeries in the future, but such potential future impairments have no bearing on whether the ALJ erred in finding that he was not disabled from 2009 through 2013. See Polynice v. Colvin, 576 Fed.Appx. 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2014) ("The finding that [a plaintiff] was disabled more than two and a half years after the ALJ’s unfavorable decision says little about 'whether plaptiff was disabled’ during the time period relevant here, ‘and any inference that can be drawn is too weak to displace the substantial evidence supporting the AU's determination.’ ” (quoting Baladi v. Barnhart, 33 Fed.Appx. 562, 563-64 (2d Cir. 2002)).
     