
    BOLT v. NELSON.
    Interest — Judgment-Statutes.
    Where case was remanded to trial court with direction to enter judgment in certain amount, court was in error in adding interest for period prior to assessment of damages in Supreme Court, although interest from said date might properly have been included (2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 9238).
    Appeal from Muskegon; Vanderwerp (John), J.
    Submitted April 18, 1933.
    (Docket No. 67, Calendar No. 37,139.)
    Decided May 16, 1933.
    In action of assumpsit by Louis J. Bolt and another, doing business as L. J. Bolt & Son, against Hjalmar C. Nelson, judgment was ordered by this court for a certain amount. On remand to circuit, interest for alleged excessive amount was included in entry of judgment. Defendant appeals.
    Be-versed and remanded for entry of judgment for proper amount.
    
      Cross, Foote & Sessions and Francis G. Barlow, for plaintiffs.
    
      Alexis J. Rogoski, for defendant.
   Clark, J.

On its former appearance here (257 Mich. 610) this cause was remanded with direction to enter judgment in a certain amount. The order of this court made April 4, 1932, is:

“That the judgment of said circuit court for the county of Muskegon be and the same is hereby reversed and vacated, and that the defendant do recover of the plaintiffs, his costs, to be taxed, and have execution therefor, and that the cause be remanded to the court below with directions to enter a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the sum of $9,260.49.” •

The judgment entered September 20, 1932, in the circuit court is for the sum of $10,017.36, the trial court having added interest from April 30, 1931, on the amount of judgment as determined in this court. Defendant has appealed.

Damages were assessed by this court on April 4, 1932. In entering judgment pursuant to the direction, this being an action in contract, interest from the date of our assessment of damages to date of entry of judgment might properly have been included. 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 9238. But to attempt to increase our assessment of damages by adding interest for a period prior to such assessment is an attempt by the trial court to amend our order, which may not be done.

Reversed, with costs to appellant, and remanded for judgment not inconsistent herewith.

McDonald, C. J., and Potter, Sharpe, North, Fead, Wiest, and Butzel, JJ., concurred.  