
    Giménez v. Díaz Et Al.
    Appeal from the District Court of Ban Juan.
    No. 15.
    Decided November 18, 1903.
    Appeals —Amount Involved in Litigation — Ad appeal to tbe Supreme Court is not admissible when, tbe value oí tbe property in litigation does not exceed four hundred dollars.
    STATEMENT OP THE CASE.
    This is a case of intervention of ownership from the District Court of San Juan, prosecuted in the former Court of First Instance of Caguas, by Juan Giménez Ramos, a .a resident of Caguas, on behalf of his wife Juana López Flores, and of his infant children, had by his former marriage with Gertrudis López Flores, as plaintiff, against Damián Díaz and José López Flores, as defendants, which ■case is pending before us on appeal in cassation for error of law, taken by counsel for Damián Díaz, who has been represented before this Supreme Court by Manuel F. Rossy, Esq., the plaintiff José López Flores being represented by Rafael López Landrón. and José López Flores having been declared in default, by reason of his failure to appear.
    In a complaint in intervention of ownership filed in the former Court of First Instance, of Caguas, by Juan Giménez Ramos, on behalf of his wife and minor children, against Damián Díaz and José López Flores, involving certain lands the value whereof does not exceed four hundred dollars, said court rendered judgment on May 18, 1899, .sustaining said complaint in intervention, ordering that the attachment of the property involved in the suit be dissolved, and reserving to Damián Díaz his right to prosecute the same in the proper manner, without special imposition of costs.
    The record in the case having been forwarded to the District Court of San Juan, pursuant to the new organization of the courts, as provided by General Order No. 118, series of 1899, counsel for Damián Díaz petitioned said court to hear the appeal taken by him from aforesaid judgment, and in case it should consider that such appeal did not lie, then to allow the appeal in cassation for error of law, which be took from the said decision. By an order dated November 27, 1899, the court dismissed the appeal and allowed the appeal in cassation for error of law, and directed that the original record be sent Up to this Supreme Court, after duly citing and summoning the parties.
    Counsel for Damián Díaz, filed a motion requesting that aforesaid- order of November 27, be amended so that the appeal taken might be heard en ambos efectos, (that is to say, with the effect both of staying the proceedings in the trial court and transferring the case to .the higher court on appeal), inasmuch as the appeal in cassation did not lie. On July 30, 1900, the court ordered that a copy of said motion be delivered to the adverse party, and said remedy having been opposed by the latter, by an order of September 1, 1900, it revoked the order of July 30, aforesaid, so. far as the motion for an amendment had thereby been notified to Juan Giménez Ramos, and restored the record to the stage it had reached when the parties were summoned to appear before the Supreme Court; for the District Court having no jurisdiction in the matter, it could make no decision on the aforesaid motion for an amendment.
    From this order of September 1, 1900, Damián Díaz likewise moved for an amendment annulling the order allowing the appeal in cassation referred to in the order of November 27, 1899, and that in lieu thereof that the appeal taken be heard; and further moved that in case the court should hold that from aforesaid order there could be no appeal other than an appeal in cassation, he would forthwith enter such appeal for error of law, requesting that it be allowed. The Court by an order made on February 3 of last year, dismissed the principal motion and in regard to the additional prayer thereto, the same was ordered to be attached to the record where in due time it would be given effect.
    
      The record having heen forwarded to this Supreme Court, the same was ordered to be returned to the'District Court of San Juan with the direction that it either allow or deny the appeal in cassation taken from the order of September 1, 1900, whereupon said court, by an order dated March 5 last, denied the appeal in cassation, leaving the party at liberty to resort to the remedy of complaint in the proper manner.
    The record having been again forwarded to this Supreme Court, after duly summoning the parties to appear before the same, the proceedings were made to conform to the provisions of the act of the Legislative Assembly approved March 12, 1903, changing this Supreme Court from a court of cassation to a court of appeals. The hearing of said appeal was had on the 10th instant, Manuel F. Lossy and Rafael López Landrón being present and making such arguments as they deemed proper in support of the respective claims of their clients.
    
      Mr. Manuel F. Rossy, for appellant.
    
      Mr. López Lanclrón, for respondent.
   Mb. Justice MacLeaby,

after making the above statements of facts, delivered the opinion of the court as follows:

The only appeal submitted for the decision of this Supreme Courtis the appeal in cassation from the judgment rendered in the present suit, and allowed by the District Court of San Juan; for the other appeal, likewise in cassation, from the order of .September 1, 1900, was denied by the District Court of San Juan on March 5 last, and from said denial the remedy of complaint has not been resorted to.

Although the appeal in cassation allowed from the judgment entered, should be considered as an .appeal pursuant to the act of the Legislative Assembly approved March 12, 1903, changing this Supreme Court from a court of cassation to a court of appeals such remedy, even as an appeal, will not lie according to law, for pursuant to Rule 78 of General Order No. 118, series of 1899, not repealed by aforesaid Act, inasmuch as the value of the property in litigation does not exceed four hundred dollars, as admitted by the party appellant, we adjudge that we should declare and do declare that the appeal in cassation, now appeal, taken by Damián Díaz from the judgment rendered in the suit, cannot be decided, and impose costs upon appellant. This decision is ordered to be communicated and the record returned to the District Court of San Juan, that due effect' may be given thereto.

Chief Justice Quiñones and Justices Hernández and Sulz-bacher, concurred.

Mr. Justice Figueras did not sit at the hearing of this case.  