
    Emmanuel ANDERSON, aka George Orhin Kwasi Ansah, aka George Ansah, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-4516.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 29, 2012.
    Thomas M. Griffin, Philadelphia, PA, for Petitioner.
    Stuart M. Delery, Attorney General; Senior Litigation Acting Assistant Nancy E. Friedman, Counsel; Christina Bechak Parascandola, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, JON O. NEWMAN and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Emmanuel Anderson, a native and citizen of Ghana, seeks review of a September 26, 2011, order of the BIA, affirming the October 15, 2010, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Sandy K. Horn, which denied his motion to reopen. In re Emmanuel Anderson, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Sept. 26, 2011), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 15, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

When, as here, an alien files a motion that seeks both rescission of an in absen-tia exclusion order as well as reopening of proceedings based on new evidence, we treat the motion as comprising distinct motions to rescind and to reopen. Alrefae v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir.2006); see also Maghradze v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 150, 152 n. 1 (2d Cir.2006). We review the denial of a motion to rescind an in absen-tia exclusion order under the same abuse of discretion standard applicable to motions to reopen. See Alrefae, 471 F.3d at 357; see also Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam).

A. Motion to Rescind

Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions are both reviewed, “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A motion to reopen exclusion hearings on the basis that the Immigration Judge improperly entered an order of exclusion in ab-sentia must be supported by evidence that the alien had reasonable cause for his failure to appear.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(B); see also Matter of Haim, 19 I. & N. Dec. 641, 642 (BIA 1988). Failure to receive notice is “reasonable cause.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A) (permitting rescission of an in absentia deportation order at any time if the alien did not receive notice of his hearing).

Anderson argues that he was not given notice of the October 1995 exclusion hearing. As the agency observed, however, the record evidence reflected that an immigration officer personally served Anderson with a Form 1-122, Notice to Applicant for Admission Detained/Deferred for Hearing Before Immigration Judge (“Notice to Applicant”), which ordered Anderson to appear before an IJ at a specified date, time, and location. Anderson neither disputes the accuracy of the information contained in the Notice to Applicant, nor presents any compelling evidence undermining the validity of service. See Kulhawik v. Holder, 571 F.3d 296, 298 (2d Cir.2009) (per curiam) (recognizing that personal service of a Notice of Hearing provided proper notification of a hearing). Accordingly, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson’s motion to rescind the in absentia exclusion order for failure to establish a reasonable cause for his failure to appear. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(B); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A); Matter of Haim, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 642.

B. Motion to Reopen

The agency similarly did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson’s request to adjust to permanent resident status. An approved immigrant visa petition does not constitute grounds for reopening the ease. See Matter of Castro-Padron, 21 I. & N. Dec. 379 (BIA 1996). In exclusion proceedings, the IJ and the BIA “generally lack jurisdiction to entertain an application for adjustment of status,” except in limited circumstances that are inapplicable here. See id. Because it is undisputed that Anderson was in exclusion proceedings, the agency lacked jurisdiction over Anderson’s adjustment of status application. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.2(a)(1) and 1245.2(a)(1); Matter of Castro-Padron, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 379-80.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  