
    Raszell REEDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael HOGAN, OMH Commissioner, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-4818-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 25, 2013.
    Raszell Reeder, Malone, NY, pro se.
    Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Denise A. Hartman and Martin A. Hotvet, Assistant Solicitors General of Counsel, Albany, NY, for Defendants-Ap-pellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges, JESSE M. FURMAN, District Judge.
    
    
      
      . The Honorable Jesse M. Furman, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Raszell Reeder, proceeding pro se, appeals from the October 13, 2011 judgment of the District Court dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b) for abuse of discretion in light of the record as a whole. See Spencer v. Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir.1998). In reviewing a Rule 41(b) dismissal, we consider five factors, including whether:

(1) the plaintiffs failure to prosecute caused a delay of significant duration;
(2) plaintiff was given notice that further delay would result in dismissal; (3) defendant was likely to be prejudiced by further delay; (4) the need to alleviate court calendar congestion was carefully balanced against plaintiffs right to an opportunity for a day in court; and (5) the trial court adequately assessed the efficacy of lesser sanctions.

Lewis v. Rawson, 564 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting United States ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir.2004)). In examining these factors, no single one generally is disposi-tive. See Drake, 375 F.3d at 254.

After independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Reeder’s complaint for failure to prosecute, substantially for the reasons stated in the well-reasoned decision of the District Court as well as the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. Indeed, the District Court properly found that Reeder submitted no evidence and made only bare assertions to support his contention that he had timely mailed his second amended complaint to the District Court.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Reeder’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court. 
      
      . Reeder does not contend, nor can his appellate brief be liberally construed to suggest, that the District Court erred in dismissing either his initial complaint or his amended complaint. As such, any argument regarding those decisions is abandoned. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995) (holding, in the context of a pro se appeal, that issues not raised in an appellate brief are abandoned).
     