
    David Wayne WILSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DIRECTOR OF ADULT INSTITUTIONS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 09-15953.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 14, 2010.
    
    Filed Dec. 22, 2010.
    David Wayne Wilson, San Diego, CA, pro se.
    
      Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner David Wayne Wilson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing without prejudice his constitutional and statutory claims stemming from his inability to watch educational programming on television while housed in administrative segregation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss Wilson’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir.2003), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s Eighth Amendment claim because the lack of educational television programs, standing alone, does not amount to deliberate indifference. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254 (9th Cir.1982) (“Idleness and the lack of programs are not Eighth Amendment violations.”), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).

The district court also properly dismissed Wilson’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). Wilson failed to allege that he was denied access to educational programming because of a disability or that he was unable to access the programming because of the disparate impact of a facially neutral policy. See Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir.2010) (ADA claim failed because pretrial detainee was not excluded from outdoor recreation because of disability); O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.2007) (plaintiff must allege that he was denied access to programming solely because of a disability to state an RA claim).

Wilson’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

We deny Wilson’s motion under Fed. RApp. P. 15 as moot.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     