
    MEI ZHEN CHEN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-5495-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 20, 2010.
    Sheema Chaudhry, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Thomas B. Fatouros, Senior Litigation Counsel; Jeffrey R. Meyer, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Mei Zhen Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the October 29, 2008, order of the BIA, which denied her motion to reopen. In re Mei Zhen Chen, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Oct. 29, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the 'BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely because she filed it over five years after the BIA issued its final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

To the extent Chen argues that the Chinese government’s awareness of her violation of the family planning policy, her practice of Christianity and baptism in the United States, and her anti-government sentiments constitute changed country conditions, that argument lacks merit. The BIA reasonably viewed the motion as based on a change in personal circumstances, which is not an exception to the applicable time limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006); see also Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that a contrary rule would give aliens ordered removed an incentive “to disregard [those] orders and remain in the United States long enough to change their personal circumstances (e.g., by having children or practicing a persecuted religion) and initiate new proceedings via a new asylum application.”).

Moreover, contrary to Chen’s argument, a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to conclude that the BIA failed to consider her evidence. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336-37 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006). Nor did the BIA err in declining to give weight to that evidence, including a purported village committee notice. See Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 342. The BIA’s finding in this respect was particularly appropriate given its prior adverse credibility determination. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir.2007).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in these petitions is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  