
    Bank of Alabama vs. Berry.
    Plaintiff made affidavit that the defendant -was justly indebted to him and that the defendant was according “to the best of his knowledge and belief removing privately out of the countyHeld, that this affidavit was a good affidavit under the 19th section of the act of 1794, ch. 1, and authorised the issuance of an attachment against the effects of defendant.
    On the 13th day of October, 1841, in the county of Franklin, W. C. Roberts, agent of the branch of the bank of the State of Alabama, at Decatur, appeared before James Robinson, a justice of the peace of said county, and filed an affidavit as the agent of the said bank, for the purpose of getting an attachment against the effects of one John Berry. This affidavit stated that “John Berry is justly indebted to the branch of the bank of the State of Alabama, atDecatur, after giving him lili just credits, the sum of sixteen hundred dollars by note, bearing date, &c., and that said John Berry is removing privately out of the county to the best of my knowledge and belief.”
    Robinson issued the attachment upon this affidavit, returnable to the circuit court held at Winchester on the 3d Monday in November, 1841. It was levied on the waggon, stock, household furniture, &c., of the defendant, and returned according to law. At the return, term the defendant moved the court to quash the attachment, which motion prevailed, and the court ordered the attachment to be quashed. From this judgmeñt the plaintiff appealed in error. •
    
      J. Campbell, for the bank.
    
      Taul, for the defendant.
   Reese, J.

delivered the opinion the court.

This case was commenced by attachment in the county of Franklin. The agent of the plaintiff in the affidavit filed, havingstated the indebtedness of the defendant, adds, “that the said John Berry is removing out of this said county ‘privately’ to the best of my knowledge and belief.’ ” The question is whether this affidavit is sufficient? The 19th section of the act of 1794, ch. 1, provides, that upon complaint being made, &c., that “any person hath removed, or is removing himself out of the county, ‘privately,’ or so absconds or conceals himself, that the ordinary process of law cannot be served on such debtor,” &c., the attachment may be granted.

The statement in the case before us is, that the debtor was removing himself out of the county “privately,” and the defendant insists that this is not sufficient,but that the words “ordinary process of law cannot be served,” should have been added. In grammatical construction it is obvious that the word “privately” qualifies the phrases “hath removed” and “is removing,” and that the subsequent words “ordinary process of law cannot be served,” relate to and explain the meaning of the words “abscond” and “conceal.” In its sense and legal construction, the first clause provides for a case of private change of domicil, past, or in the act of taking place, and the second clause fora case where, there being no change of domicil, the debtor yet' “absconds” and “conceals” himself in a manner (o prevent the serving of ordinary legal process. The defendant in the case before us has cited and relied on the case of Dunn vs. Myers, 3 Yerg. 414, and the plaintiffhas cited and relied on the case of Conrad vs. McGee, 9 Yerg. 428. But an attentive consideration of the two cases will make it manifest, we think, that they are in harmony with each other. The first case, indeed, contains the following sentence: “Having ‘removed’ or being about to remove, are connected together in the first sentence of the 19th section, so as to mean, that the manner in which the one may have taken, or the other is about to take place, are the same, that is ‘privately,’ so that the ordinary process of law cannot be served.” That the juxtaposition of these phrases is intended to intimate that they are of equivalent meaning, and not that they must both be set forth, is shown in the paragraph which immediately follows in the opinion of the court. Besides, the case of Dunn vs. Myers, did not turn, as did that of Conrad vs. McGee, upon the form of the attachment oath. We are of opinion, therefore, that the court below erred in quashing the attachment upon the ground stated.  