
    Lawson, adm’r of Trotter, use &c. vs. Crutchfield.
    L. as administrator of T. sued C. before a justice of the peace on a bond made by C, to T., and obtained judgment. C. appealed to the circuit court, an’d when the cause' came on for trial, moved tho court to dismiss it upon the ground that the affidavit made by L. before the probate court, on applying for letters upon the estate of T.f showed that T. left no estate to administer, and that, therefore, the letters granted'to L. were void and of no effect in law: the court sustained the motion, dismissed the suit, and awarded a supersedeas to the judgment of the justice — Held that inasmuch as by the constitution and laws of the State, the probate court has exclusive juris, diction of the granting of letters of administration, there was no1 precedent by which its acts could be reviewed and annulled in such a summary mode, and that the circuit court erred in dismissing the case for the reasons disclosed by the motion,
    
      Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Pulaski County.
    
    James Lawson, as administrator of Ben. Trotter, brought suit against Peter T. Crutchfield for the use of Taylor, before a justice of the peace of Pulaski county, upon a bond for cost executed to Trotter in his life-time by Crutchfield. The justice rendered judg* ment in favor of Lawson, and Crutchfield appealed to the circuit court.
    
      The cause came up for hearing at the April term, 1845, before the Hon. J. J. Clendeivin, one of the circuit judges.
    Crutchfield moved the court to dismiss the case: ■“ on the ground that the affidavit made by the said Lawson, on which letters of administration were granted to him, shows that the said Trotter left no estate whatever to administer, by reason, whereof, the said letters of administration granted to said Lawson, are void and of no effect in law.” In support of the motion, he exhibited to the court an authenticated copy, from the records of the Circuit court of Pulaski county, of the affidavit made by Lawson on applying for letters of administration upon the estate of Trotter, which is, in substance, as follows:
    “ Pulaski Peobate Couiit, in vacation, 9th March 1844.
    James Lawson, Jr., here applying for letters of administration on the estate of Benj. Trotter, deceased, being first duly sworn, deposeth and sayeth, that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the said Trotter departed this life about the year 1832 or 1S33, and that the value of his estate is nothing, and not more than about that sum, that the heirs of the deceased are unknown, and that he died without a will: that affiant will make a perfect inventory of, and faithfully administer all and singular the goods and chattels, rights and credits of the said Trotter, and pay his debts as far as the assets which may come to his hands will extend, and the law direct; and that he will account for and pay over according to law, all assets which'shall come to his hands or possession.
    JAS. LAWSON JK.
    Sworn to and subscribed, this 9th March, 1844.
    H. HARALSON, Clerk. By- J. THOMPSON, D. 0.”
    Lawson’s counsel resisted the motion, and presented for the inspection of the court an authenticated copy of letters of administration granted to him, by the probate court of Pulaski county, upon the estate of Trotter, bearing date 16th March, 1844, and contended that the court could not look behind the letters to enquire into the .sufficiency of the affidavit. The court sustained the motion to dismiss, and-a warded a supersedeas to the judgment of the justice. The plaintiff excepted, took a bill of exceptions, setting out the facts, and brought error.
    Cummins & Blackburn, for Plaintiff
    Hempstead & Johnson, contra.
   Oldham, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

By the constitution and laws of this state, the power to grant letters testamentary and of administration is vested exclusively in the probate court, or the clerk in vacation subject to the approval of the court. There is certainly no precedent by which the acts of a1 court of exclusive jurisdiction can be reviewed and annulled in the summary mode adopted in this case. If the facts'- contained in the motion and upon-1 which the circuit court dismissed the case, are available for any purpose (upon which point we express no opinion) it is in bar of the action. They are in denial of the plaintiff’s right to sue, because he has no interest in the subject of controversy. The judgment of the circuit court in dismissing, the suit for the reason disclosed by the motion, is erroneous and must be reversed.  