
    Dobson against Pearce.
    A court of equity has power to grant relief against a judgment procured by fraud.
    Under the Code of Procedure, a defendant in an action upon a judgment may allege and prove as a defence that it was obtained by fraud,
    A duly authenticated copy of a judgment record of a court of a sister state, in a suit where it had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, is conclusive evidence in a suit in the courts of this state between the parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, on all questions litigated and decided in the foreign court.
    
      Accordingly, where the plaintiff in a judgment recovered in this state brought an action upon it in the superior court of Connecticut, and thereupon the defendant in the judgment filed a bill against the plaintiff on the equity side of the same court, alleging that the judgment was procured by fraud and praying relief; and the plaintiff in the judgment appeared in and litigated the equity suit, and the court adjudged that the allegations of fraud in obtaining the judgment were true, and enjoined the plaintiff from prosecuting the action upon it; Held, in a suit in the court of this state by the assignee of the plaintiff on the judgment, that a duly authenticated copy of the record of the proceedings and judgment in the Connecticut court was conclusive evidence that the judgment was obtained by fraud.
    The action was commenced in the New-York superior court, on the 26th of September, 1850. The complaint was upon a judgment for $612.93, recovered in that court m April, 1846, in favor of one Olney against Pearce, the defendant in this suit, alleging an assignment thereof from Olney to Dobson, the plaintiff, just previous to the commencement of the action.
    The defendant by his answer alleged that the judgment was entered in a suit commenced against him, in favor of Olney, by the service of a capias upon him in February, 1846, when he was casually in New-York, he then and ever after being a resident of Connecticut; that Olney had no just or legal demand against him, when the capias was served, and that he was induced by fraudulent representations and assurances of Olney, made to him after the capias was served, and upon which he relied,' to the effect that no further proceedings would be taken in the suit, not to appear therein; and that afterwards Olney fraudulently and without the knowledge of the defendant procured the judgment mentioned in the complaint to be entered in the suit upon a false and unfounded claim, and known so to be by Olney at the time; that in 1848 Olney commenced an action of debt on the judgment, against tlie defendant, in the superior court of the State of Connecticut. Thereupon the defendant commenced a suit in chancery against Olney, before the same court in Connecticut, alleging that the judgment was procured to be entered by fraud on the part of Olney, and praying the court to perpetually enjoin him from further prosecuting it. Olney appeared in and defended the chancery suit by attorney; and on the 10th of September, 1850, a decree was made therein, declaring the judgment fraudulent and perpetually enjoining Olney from further prosecuting the action upon it; that in submission to this decree the action upon the judgment in the superior court of Connecticut was discontinued ; and that the pretended assignment to the plaintiff was made after the decree and with full knowledge of it and of the fraud in procuring the judgment. The plaintiff replied, denying the allegations in the answer.
    This suit was tried first in 1851, when a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff; this was set aside and a new trial ordered. (See 1 Duer, 142.) On a second trial, in 1853, the court directed the complaint to be dismissed; this was set aside and a third trial ordered. The third trial was had before Justice Duer and a jury, in 1853. On this trial the plaintiff proved the judgment described in the complaint, and the assignment thereof by Olney to the plaintiff, on the 11th of September, 1850, and rested.
    The defendant offered in evidence a duly authenticated copy of the record of the proceedings in the suit in chancery in the superior court of Connecticut, mentioned in the answer. The counsel for the plaintiff objected to it as evidence; the objection was overruled and the same received and read in evidence, and plaintiff’s counsel excepted. From this record it appeared that Pearce commenced a suit in chancery against Olney in the superior court of Connecticut, in 1849, and in the bill or petition for relief he stated the éntry of the judgment against him in the superior court of New-York, and alleged that there was no just or legal demand against him in the suit in which it was entered, that he was prevented from appearing in that suit by the fraudulent representations and assurances of Olney, detailing them, and that the judgment was procured to be entered by fraud on the part of Olney; that Olney had commenced an action of debt against him on the judgment in the superior court of Connecticut, which was pending; and prayed relief. Olney appeared in and defended the chancery suit, by George Perkins, Esq., an attorney. It was referred to a committee to hear evidence and report'the facts. At the March term of the court, in 1850, the cause was heard on the report of the committee and objections made thereto by the counsel of Olney, and thereupon the court at that term found, from the facts stated in the report of the committee, that the material allegations in the bill were true; and afterwards, at a term of the court held on the second Tuesday of September, 1850, a decree was made by which the material facts stated in the bill were declared to be true, and Olney was enjoined from prosecuting his action of debt upon the judgment under a penalty of one thousand dollars, and adjudged to pay the costs of the chancery suit.
    The counsel for the defendant read in evidence a duly authenticated copy of the record of the proceedings in the action of debt on the judgment rendered in the New-York superior court, commenced by Olney in the superior court of Connecticut. To the admission of this record in evidence the counsel for the plaintiff duly objected; the objection was overruled and he excepted. By this record it appeared that the action was commenced in November, 1848, and prosecuted by George Perkins, Esq., as attorney for Olney; that Pearce appeared therein, and that on the 8th of April, 1850, the suit was discontinued with the leave of the court. The counsel for the defendant further proved that the judgment mentioned in the records of the proceedings in the suit at law, and the chancery suit prosecuted, in the superior court of Connecticut, was the same judgment mentioned in the complaint herein; and that the suit at law was discontinued after the committee appointed in the chancery suit had reported the facts to the court and notice thereof had been served on the attorney of Olney. It was further proved that the assignment of the judgment to the plaintiff was after the final decree in the chancery suit had been made, and after notice of it to Olney and the plaintiff. The justice before whom the'cause was tried instructed the jury that the record of the proceedings, finding and decree of the superior court of Connecticut in the chancery suit, was conclusive evidence against the plaintiff to sustain the allegations in the defendant’s answer, if the jury found that Olney appeared in that suit by an attorney who was authorized by him to do so ; that if the jury did not so find, then this record did not affect the plaintiff. The counsel for the plaintiff excepted to such instructions. The jury rendered a. verdict in favor of the defendant. The judgment rendered on this verdict was affirmed at a general term of the superior court. The plaintiff appealed to this court.
    
      E. Terry, for the appellant.
    The justice improperly admitted in evidence the record of the proceedings in the petition in equity or chancery in Connecticut: 1. The decree in Connecticut, offered and admitted in'evidence', was, by its terms, only intended to operate upon a suit then pending in the State of Connecticut. 2. The decree was not intended to operate upon any .other suit then pending, or upon any suit to be thereafter commenced in any other state of the Union, or even in Connecticut. 3. It would be incompetent for the court of equity of another state to enjoin against the enforcement in this state of a judgment regularly rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction of this state, on the verdict of a jury, where the defendant was personally served with process. (Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481; Greenl. Ev., § 549.) 4. It does not appear by the record introduced from Connecticut whether the finding of the facts by the special committee was upon competent evidence. It may be that it was upon no other evidence than the testimony of the defendant himself, and in fact such was the case. (Bill of Rights, Cons. N. Y., 1846, art. 1, sec. 2; 1 Gil. Ev., p. 32; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 548, 551.) 5. The decree in Connecticut has no force, per sc, except to restrain the prosecution of the action of debt in the perpetual injunction specified. (See Donelly v. Corbett, Ct. of Appeals, Dec. 30, 1852.) 6. There was no decision in Connecticut upon the merits of'the judgment rendered in this state, and there could be none. The decision in Connecticut was only in a special proceeding for special relief. 7. A party who is sued upon a judgment cannot set up as a defence that it was fraudulently obtained. He must bring a distinct original suit as plaintiff to get rid of and set aside the judgment. As long as it stands as a judgment, no averment in pais can be received of its invalidity. (McRae v. Mattoon, 13 Pick., 53.) 8. The court in Connecticut should not, under the constitution of the United States, have inquired into the question whether the judgment rendered in this tate was fraudulent. By the common law the judgment recoid was prima facie evidence. By the constitution it was conclusive. (Cons. U. S., art. 4, § 1; Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481; McRae v. Mattoon, 13 Pick. R., 53; 3 Cow. & Hill’s Notes, 898, et seq.; Homer v. Fish, 1 Pick., 435; 3 Doug. R., 313; Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns. R., 157; Aldrick v. Kinney, 4 Conn. R., 380; Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. R., 500; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. R., 462; Jacobs v. Hull, 12 Mass. R., 25; Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 J. R., 41; Robinson v. Ward, 8 J. R., 86; Davison v. Hyde, 6 Conn. R., 508; Moren v. Killibrew, 2 Yerg. R., 376; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Metcalf R., 333; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. R., 239; Read v. Pratt, 2 Hill R., 64; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. R., 158; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. R., 447.) 9, The decree of the Connecticut court of equity could not have any effect beyond giving the special relief sought; because if it should have, that court would be chargeable with violating the intimate international comity which exists between the independent states of the Union, in allowing the validity of a judgment in New-York to be questioned. The object of that decree was to allow a stay of proceedings and to give the defendant time to move in the court in New-York to set aside the judgment, or to be relieved against it if he should show sufficient grounds. (See Ch. Walworth, 2d Point, Beckwell v. Field, 8 Paige, 440; Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige, 404; Burgess v. Smith, 2 Barb. Ch. R., 280.)
    
      Asa Child, for the respondent.
    ' I. Since the enactment of the Code., the defendant in an action on a judgment may have affirmative relief against it on facts, which formerly would authorize relief on a bill in equity. (Code, §§ 69, 150, 152.)
    II. Judgments may always be impeached, and shown to be void upon two fundamental principles in the administration of justice; one, that no man can be condemned before he has had an opportunity to be heard in his defence; the other, that fraud vitiates every species and form of obligation. (Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 Comst., 514; Opinion of Bronson, Ch. J., 518; do. Mullett, J., p. 625; Shumway v. Stillman, 4 Cow., 292; same case, 6 Wend., 447; Andrews v. Montgomery, 19 John., 162; Harrod v. Baretto, 1 Hall, 155; Borden v. Fitch, 15 John., 145; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend., 148; Story Con. of Laws, p. 508, § 609; Beckwell v. Field, 8 Paige, 440.)
    III. The judgments of a court in this state, and those of the court of any other state, as to the right of a party to impeach them and the power of the court to grant relief, rest upon the same ground, so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned. (Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat., 234.)
    
      IV. The numerous class of cases where, to an action on the judgment of a court of another state, a plea of facts, not only aliunde the record, but in contradiction of the record, has been admitted, all recognize and rest' upon the principle in the answer in the case at bar. (Shurbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend., 148; Holbrook v. Murray, 5 Wend., 161; Harrod v. Baretto, 2 Hall, 302; Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn., 500; Ewer v. Coffin, 1 Cush., 23; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Metc., 333; Wilson v. The Bank, &c., 6 Leigh, 570; Steele v. Smith, 7 Watts & Serg., 447; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn., 380; Harmon v. Taylor, 20 Vermont, 65.)
    V. The authority exercised by the courts of this state to relieve, on motion, against iniquitous judgments, upon the allegation of facts not only beyond the record but in contradiction to it, recognizes the principle of the impeachability of such judgments. The principle which will allow a defendant on motion to impeach a judgment upon affidavit, most certainly will allow him to impeach it by action, and if sued on it to answer it. (Meechum v. Dudley, 6 Wend., 514; Campbell v. Bristol, 19 Wend., 101; Dederick v. Richley, 19 Wend., 108; Floyd v. Jayne, 6 John. Ch., 479.)
    . VI. The rule as to the impeachability of a judgment of another state, within the limits named, is not only upon principle applicable to judgments of this state, but is fully recognized by our courts. (Bruen v. Bokee, 4 Denio, 56, Carman v. Townsend, 6 Cow., 595; same case, 6 Wend., 206; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 Comst., 514.)
    VII. A court of equity has always, in the exercise of its admitted jurisdiction, had power to grant relief against judgments obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. The facts set up in defence of this action would have given a court of chancery here jurisdiction to relieve against this judgment. (McDonald v. Neilson, 2 Cow., 139, 193; Reigal v. Wood et al., 1 John. Ch., 402; Dilly v. Hechrott, 8 Gill. & John., 170; Carrington v. Hollibaird, 17 Conn., 530, Duncan v. Lyon, 3 John Ch., 352; Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch., 333; Hawley v. Mancius, 7 John., 174, 182; Shottenkirk v. Wheeler, 3 John. Ch., 275; Foster v. Wood, 6 John. Ch., 87; Lee v. Baird, 4 Henning & Mumford, 452; Winthrop v. Lane, 3 Dessaseux, 310.)
    VIII. The record of the judgment of the superior court of Connecticut being duly authenticated, was properly admitted in evidence to prove the allegations in the answer; and, -as it showed the matter in controversy to have been there tried and decided, was conclusive upon the parties: 1. That court had jurisdiction, being a court of chancery, of the subject matter and of the parties, by Olney going into that state and suing on this judgment, and, when sued in chancery for relief against it, by his employing counsel, appearing and defending in the suit. (Mayhew v. Fletcher, 6 Wheat., 129; Reid v. Pratt and Taylor, 2 Hill, 64; Wheeler v. Raymond, 4 Cow., 311.) 2. The matter involved in this action was in that suit tried and determined, and is res adyudicata. (Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat., 109; Denison v. Hyde, 6 Conn., 508; Betts v. Starr, 5 Conn., 550; Coit v. Tracy, 8 Conn., 208; Simson v. Hart, 1 John. Ch., 91; Burt v. Sternburg, 4 Cow., 559; Gardner v. Bugbee, 3 Cow., 120; Young v. Rummell, 2 Hill, 478; Bouchaud v. Dias, 3 Denio, 238; Doty v. Brown, 4 Comst., 71; Bangs v. Strong, 4 Comst., 315; Beebe v. Ellicott, 4 Barb. S. C., 457; Kingsland v. Spalding, 3 Barb. Ch., 343; Coit v. Zeigler, 16 Sergt. & Rawle, 283.)
   W. F. Allen, J.

A judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be impeached collaterally for error or irregularity, but is conclusive until set aside or reversed by the same court or some other court having appellate jurisdiction. (Smith v. Lewis, 3 J. R., 157; Homer v. Field, 1 Pick., 435.) The jurisdiction of the court in which a judgment has been recovered is, however, always open to inquiry; and if it has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not acquired jurisdiction of the parties by the due service of process or by a voluntary appearance, the proceedings are coram nom judice and the judgment void. The want of jurisdiction has always been held to be a valid defence to an action upon the judgment, and a good answer to it when set up for any purpose.

So, fraud and imposition invalidate a judgment as they do all acts; and it is not without semblance of authority that it has been suggested that at law the fraud, may be alleged, whenever the party seeks to avail himself of the results of his own fraudulent conduct by setting up the judgment, the fruits of his fraud. (See per Thompson, C. J., in Borden v. Fitch, 15 J. R., 121, and cases cited.) But whether this be so or not, it is unquestionable that a court of chancery has power to grant relief against judgments when obtained by fraud. Any fact which clearly proves it -to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could not avail himself at law, but was prevented by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or .his agents, will justify an interference by a court of equity. (Reigal v. Wood, 1 J. C. R., 402; McDonald v. Neilson, 2 Cow. Rep., 139; Duncan v. Lyon, 3 J. C. R., 351; Marine Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Hodgson, 6 Cranch, 206; Shottenkirk v. Wheeler, 3 J. C. R., 275.)

Under our present judiciary system, the functions of the courts of common law and of chancery are united in the' same court, and the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, are abolished, and the defendant may set forth by answer as many defences as he may have, whether they be such as have been heretofore denominated legal or equitable, or both. (Code, §§ 69, 150.) The Code also authorizes affirmative relief to be given to a defendant in an action by the judgment. (§ 274.) The intent of the legislature is very clear, that all controversies respecting the subject matter of the litigation should be determined in one action, and the provisions are adapted to give effect to that intent. Whether, therefore, fraud or imposition in the recovery of a judgment could heretofore have been alleged against it collaterally at law or not, it may now be set up as an equitable defence to defeat a recovery upon it. Under the head of equitable defences are included all matters which would before have authorized ait application to the court of chancery for relief against a legal liability, but which, at law, could not have been pleaded in bar. The facts alleged by way of defence in this action would have been good cause for relief against the judgment in a court of chancery, and under our present system are, therefore, proper matters of defence; and there was no necessity or propriety for a resort to a separate action to vacate the judgment. In Connecticut, although law and equity are administered by the same judges, still the distinction between these systems is preserved, and justice is administered under the head of common law and chancery jurisdiction by distinct and appropriate forms of procedure; .and hence, as it was at least doubtful whether at law the fraud alleged would bar a recovery upon the judgment, a resort to the chancery powers of the court of that state was proper if not necessary.

The right of the plaintiff in the judgment was a personal right and followed his person; and, aside from the fact that he had resorted to the courts of Connecticut to enforce his claim under the judgment, the courts of that state, having obtained jurisdiction of his person by the due service of process within the state, had full power to pronounce upon the rights of the parties in respect to the judgment and to decree concerning it. It necessarily follows that the decree of the superior court of Connecticut, sitting as a court of chancery, directly upon the question of fraud, is conclusive upon the parties to that litigation and all persons claiming under them with notice of the adjudication. The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction .upon a point litigated between the parties, is conclusive in all subsequent controversies where the same point comes again in question between the same parties. (White v. Coatsworth, 2 Seld., 137; Embury v. Conner, 3 Comst., 522.) In the State of Connecticut, it is quite clear the question of fraud would not be an open question between the parties, but would be considered entirely settled by the decree of the court of that state; and as full faith and credit are to be given by each state to the judicial proceedings of every other state, that is, the same credit, validity and effect as they would have in the state in which they were had, the parties are concluded in the courts of this state by the judgment of the court in Connecticut directly upon the question in issue. (Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat., 234.) The decree of the court of chancery of the State of Connecticut as an operative decree, so far as it enjoined and restrained the parties, had and has no extra-territorial efficacy, as an injunction does not affect the courts of this state ; but the judgment of the court upon the matters litigated is conclusive upon the parties everywhere and in every forum where the same matters are drawn in question. It is not the particular relief which was granted which affects the parties litigating in the courts of this state; but it is the adjudication and determination of the facts bv that court, the final decision that the judgment was procured bv fraud, which is operative here and necessarily prevents the plaintiff from asserting any claim under_it, The court acquired jurisdiction of the parties by the commencement of the action, and the service of process upon the defendant therein, and his appearance by an authorized attorney; and the withdrawal of the action of debt upon the judgment did not deprive it of jurisdiction thus acquired.

The judgment of the superior court must be affirmed, with costs.

Johnson, J.

The questions in this cause arise upon two , exceptions taken at the trial. The first was taken to the decision admitting in evidence the record of a decree m equity, made by the superior court of judicature of the State of Connecticut, between the defendant in this suit and one Olney, the immediate assignor to the plaintiff of the judgment now sued upon. The second was to the instruction of the court to the jury, that the record of the proceedings, finding and decree aforesaid, given in evidence by the defendant to support the allegations in his answer, was, for the purposes of this suit, conclusive evidence upon the plaintiff, if the jury found that Olney appeared in that cause by his authorized attorney.

The plaintiff is in the same position which Olney would have occupied had he been plaintiff; he is the immediate assignee of Olney, against whom, before the assignment, the decree was pronounced; and if it be material, he had actual notice of the decree when the assignment was made to him. "Giving to the plaintiff’s objection to the admission of the record the broadest effect, the first question is whether the defence set up by the answer was available. That defence is, in substance, that the judgment sued upon was fraudulently entered up after assurances on behalf of the plaintiff in that suit to the defendant, that no further proceedings should be taken in it without notice to him, whereby he was induced not to take steps to interpose a defence, which in point of fact he could successfully have maintained.

Relief against such a judgment, upon these facts, would have been within the power of a court of equity in this state, upon a bill filed for that purpose. (2 Story’s Eq. Jur., §§ 887, 896; Huggins v. King, 3 Barb., 616.) The Code, § 69, having abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions as theretofore existing, an equitable defence to a civil action is now as available as a legal defence. The question now is, ought the plaintiff to recover; and anything which shows that he ought not is available to the defendant, whether it was formerly of equitable or legal cognizance.

The next question is whether the record of the decree of the superior court of Connecticut was competent evidence upon that issue. Olney actually appeared by his attorney in that suit and was heard upon its merits. He was, therefore, before that court, and it had jurisdiction of his person if it had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit. The object of the suit was to restrain Olney from prosecuting a suit at law in the same court upon the judgment in suit here, and the grounds on which that relief was sought were the same which are set up as a defence here. The jurisdiction to restrain suits at law being one of the firmly established parts of the authority of courts of equity, and the plaintiff, in the suit which was enjoined, having undertaken to prosecute that suit in a court of law of the State of Connecticut, the only conceivable grounds for denying the equitable jurisdiction which was exercised in the case are, either that no court of equity anywhere had power to restrain a suit upon a judgment at law upon such grounds, or that a court of equity in one state has no jurisdiction to restrain such a suit upon a judgment of a court of law of another state. ¡ The first of these grounds has been already .considered and found unsound. The other rests either upon some ground of comity between states, or upon the force of the constitution and laws of the United States. The objection, so far as it is founded upon an assumed violation of the comity which exists between the several states of the United States, does not reach to the jurisdiction of the court. The rules of comity may be a restraint upon a court in the exercise ‘of an authority which it actually possesses, but it is self-imposed. (Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet., 519.) The courts of each state must judge for themselves exclusively how far they will be restrained, and in what cases they will exercise their power, except where the constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance of it prescribe a rule. Where that is the case, the question ceases to be one of comity and becomes one of right.

The question then remains to be considered upon the constitution and laws of the United States, and here the decisions permit of no doubt. Full faith and credit are given to the judgments of a state court, when in the courts of another state it receives the same faith and credit to which it was entitled in the state where it was pronounced. (Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat., 234.)

We have then a decree of the superior court of Connecticut in a cause where they had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, and it is duly authenticated and relevant to the issue on trial. Its admissibility in evidence follows of course.

By the record of that decree it appears that the very matters in issue here wqre litigated there, and were decided adversely to Olney, whom the plaintiff represents. The determination is necessarily conclusive upon him as to all the material facts there litigated and determined.

The judgment should be affirmed with costs.

Judgment accordingly.  