
    Kim J. STEVENSON TOTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-793-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 8, 2016.
    
      Kim J. Stevenson Tota, pro se, Staten Island, NY, for Appellant.
    Candace Scott Appleton, Varuni Nelson, and Arthur Swerdloff,' Assistant United States Attorneys, for Robert L. Capers, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: REENARAGGI, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges, J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge.
    
    
      
      
         The Honorable J. Paul Oetken, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Kim J. Stevenson Tota (“Stevenson Tota”), proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s affirmance of the Commissioner of Social Security’s 2009 denial of her application for disability benefits. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

In considering whether the Commissioner was entitled to judgment on the pleadings, we review the administrative record de novo, mindful that our function is not to determine whether plaintiff is disabled but, rather, to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision and if the correct legal standards were applied. See Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir.2012). We have recognized “substantial evidence to be more than a mere scintilla,” and defined it as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).

Upon this review, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s September 4, 2009 finding that Stevenson Tota is ineligible for disability benefits for the period between November 1, 2001, and December 31, 2007. We also conclude that the administrative law judge correctly applied the relevant legal standards in reaching that decision. Thus, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated in the district court’s thorough and well reasoned opinion. See Mem. & Order, Stevenson-Tota v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-cv-3463 (DLI), 2015 WL 998101 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2015), EOF No. 26.

We have considered all of Stevenson Tota’s arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.  