
    Michael WINSTON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
    No. 11-232C
    United States Court of Federal Claims.
    (Filed: May 13, 2011)
   ORDER

ERIC G. BRUGGINK, Judge

Mr. Winston, appearing pro se, filed a complaint in which he alleges that he was battered by local and Pennsylvania state police on separata occasions, beaten by three private individuals on another occasion, and then falsely imprisoned on a later date. It is unclear whether these alleged events are connected. The complaint also states that plaintiff has been petitioning a variety of state, local, and federal officials for aid in obtaining relief from “MENTAL AND PHYSICAL TORTURE" including a seven year conspiracy that appears to have its genesis in a proceeding before a social security administrative law judge. Mr. Winston’s address is that of a state penitentiary in Pennsylvania. He asks that “all cases that have been filed by him. [plaintiff] be REFILED and a HONEST FEDERAL JUDGE be ordered to reside over all and this be done with no further delay.” Compl. 2. He also asks for his release from incarceration and protection by the federal government. Lastly he makes reference to prior refusals by “the state,” presumable Pennsylvania, to appoint him counsel in a criminal case.

Although we are mindful of plaintiffs pro se status, and pro se litigants are afforded latitude, that cannot excuse jurisdictional failings. See Kelley v. U.S. Sec’y of Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“a court may not similarly take a liberal view of that jurisdictional requirement and set a different rule for pro se litigants only”). If the court lacks jurisdiction, it must dismiss the complaint. See Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). We can and must raise the issue on our own whenever jurisdiction appears lacking. See, e.g., Arctic Corner, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

It is plain that plaintiff has failed to allege any set of facts that give rise to a claim over which we have jurisdiction. The Tucker Act, this court’s primary jurisdictional grant, gives this court power to hear monetary claims against the government, not sounding in tort, based on money-mandating provisions of law or regulation or based upon a contractual right. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006); See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 215-18, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983). This court has no power to review plaintiffs criminal proceedings nor order his release from incarceration. Nor does this court have jurisdiction over plaintiffs allegations of battery and conspiracy; tort claims are specifically excluded by the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (granting jurisdiction over cases “not sounding in tort”).

We do have jurisdiction, in limited circumstances, over claims for unjust imprisonment brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1495. Plaintiffs claims do not fit under the purview of section 1495, however, because his conviction has not been reversed or otherwise set aside. 28 U.S.C. § 2513 requires that any person suing under section 1495 must “allege and prove” that his conviction was “reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty ... or on new trial or rehearing he was found not guilty.” 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2006). Plaintiff has not alleged the necessary elements for a claim under section 1495 nor could he since his complaint evinces that he is still incarcerated.

We lack jurisdiction over all of the allegations in the complaint. Accordingly, the clerk of court is directed to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and enter judgment accordingly. No costs. 
      
      . The complaint is mostly devoid of specific allegations of events and is instead replete with characterizations, e.g. ‘'Torture” or ""abuse,” of events.
     
      
      . It appears from the context of this paragraph that plaintiff is not complaining of not having been appointed counsel in his initial criminal proceedings but has been denied such for later habeas corpus petitions,
     