
    Julius A. Smith’s Adm’r v. Louisville Benevolent & Relief Association.
    Administrator, Maintenance of Action — Decedent’s Association Membership.
    Where a decedent died prior to any distribution of the proceeds of an association of which he was a member, and before the members were empowered by law, in, the event of a dissolution, to retain the property among themselves, the administrator cannot maintain an action against the living members for contribution.
    Decedent’s Association Membership.
    Where, under the rules of an association of which decedent was a member it was provided that at the death of a member his wife or mother would be entitled to certain named benefits, it is held where the wife died prior to her husband, but decedent’s stepmother survived him that such stepmother is not entitled to such benefits.
    APPEAL PROM LOUISVILLE CHANCERY COURT.
    October 15, 1874.
   Opinion by

Judge Pryor :

The administrator of Julius A. Smith can maintain no action against the appellee or its members for contribution, for the reason that his intestate died long before there ivas any distribution of the proceeds of the association (if any has been made), and before the members of the association were empowered by legislative enactment, in the event of a dissolution, to retain the property among themselves.

At Smith’s death, by the terms of the charter, as a consideration for what he had paid, and by reason of his membership, his relations, such as are designated by the charter, become entitled to certain benefits. The widow is to have twenty dollars per month, and if no widow or child, his mother is entitled to the same benefits. In the present case, Smith died without leaving a wife or children, but leaving surviving him a stepmother, who, in conjunction with his administrator, is prosecuting this action. There was no legal or natural obligation on the part of Smith to support and maintain his stepmother, and the relation between them was not such as would entitle her to the beneficent provision of the act in question. One may stand in loco parentis to another, and as such become responsible for the maintenance and education of the child for the reason that the latter is held out to the world as one of the family. So the intestate might have been made liable for the support and maintenance of a stranger when based upon a sufficient consideration. The mlere moral obligation, if any, to maintain in either case would not authorize a recovery against the intestate, and it was never contemplated that the clause of the charter in question entitled those occupying the relation of stepmother to its beneficial provisions. There was neither a natural nor legal obligation on the part of Smith to maintain the appellant (his stepmother); and as he having died without leaving any such kindred as those mentioned in the charter and who were alone entitled to the benefits, the money paid by him into the association passes to the surviving members. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

Armstrong & Flemming, for appellant.

Russell & Helm, for appellee.  