
    Adamson v. Melson.
    A case was tried in December, 1892, during the September adjourned term of the superior court, and at that term an order was passed reciting that a motion for a new trial had been filed, and allowing movant “until the third Saturday in January, 1893, and until such time as may be then designated by the court, in which to perfect his motion and prepare a copy of the written and brief of the oral testimony in said case.”, On the day last named, the hearing of the motion was, by a consent order, continued until the fourth day of February. The hearing was then, by another consent order, -again continued until the March term, 1893, of the court. Neither of these consent orders designated expressly any time within which the brief of evidence might be filed or approved, or made any reference whatever to this subject. At the March term there was a motion to dismiss the motion for a new trial, and an order was then passed continuing the hearing of the motion for a new trial until the September term of the court, with leave to respondent to renew his motion to dismiss. This order also extended the movant’s time for having the brief of evidence approved and filed, until the September term. It does not appear that this was consented to by the respondent in the motion, but it was not excepted to by him. At the September term the hearing of the motion was again continued until the 16th of October, in vacation, “the movant to be in no way prejudiced by the delay.” On that day it was again continued, “ with all rights reserved to both sides,” until November 11th, when the motion to dismiss the motion for a new trial was overruled, and a new trial was granted. The motion to dismiss recites that a brief of evidence was filed in the clerk’s office August 29th, 1893, but it does not appear that the same was ever approved before November 11th, the time when the motion was heard and disposed of.
    Under the facts recited, the two continuances by consent carried the whole matter into open court at Marsh term; the order granted at that term did the same with reference to the September term, and the orders granted at the latter term and subsequently thereto are susceptible of a construction which would- carry the whole matter down to November 11th, the time when the motion was actually heard and decided in vacation. The presiding judge having by his action adopted this construction, it was no abuse of discretion for him to approve the brief of-evidence at that time, no actual injustice as to the merits of the litigation, so far as appears, having resulted from his so doing; and it was not error to refuse to dismiss the motion for a new trial.
    August 31, 1894.
    Motion for a new trial. Before Judge Richard H. Clark. Clayton superior court. September term, 1898.
    G. D. Stewart and Watterson & Kimsey, for plaintiff in error. John L. Doyal, contra.
    
   Judgment affirmed.  