
    Dickerson vs. Wheeler.
    Partners. — The power which one partner has to bind his co-partner ceas<es on the dissolution of the firm.
    After the dissolution of the firm one partner cannot, without the assent of his co-partner, endorse a note payable to the firm so as to pass the legal title in the note to the assignee.
    On the 26th day of January, 1839, James W. Wheeler, as assignee, instituted an action of debt in the circuit court of Giles county, against Aehilles A. Dickerson, John H. Walker' and Carter White, upon a bill single of the following tenor:
    
      “$196 93: On or before the 25th day of December next I promise to pay Walker and White, or order, one hundred and ninety-six dollars and ninety-three cents, for value received of them. Witness my hand and seal.
    “October- 28th, 1837. A. A. Dickerson, [Seal.] ”
    The declaration was in the usual form, and set forth that “the said Walker and White, to whom said sum of money in the said writing obligatory specified was thereby made payable, afterwards, to wit, on the 18th day of April, 1838, in the county aforesaid, sold the said note to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration, and then and there assigned the same, by the name of Walker and White, to the said plaintiff, for value received, waiving the necessity of demand and notice, and then and there delivered said note so assigned to the plaintiff,” which said assignment was exhibited to the court.
    The defendant Dickerson pleaded, “1. No assignment from Walker and White to the plaintiff, in manner and form as alleged in the declaration; and, 2. Payment;* and the said Walker and White pleaded “payment;” and issue was taken on "these pleas.
    At the June term, 1839, the cause came on for trial, when :a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff for the debt and damages against the defendants. A new trial was moved for, the verdict set aside as to defendant Dickerson, and overruled as to the others. At the October term, 1839, the cause came on again for trial, when a verdict was again rendered in favor of the plaintiff for his debt and damages. A motion was made for a new trial, which was overruled, and judgment rendered on the verdict. The defendant.then filed his bill of exceptions, which is in the following words:
    “In this cause the plaintiff, after reading the pleadings, •read to the jury the note, as above set forth, and offered to read to the jury the assignments thereupon, which was objected to by the defendant; whereupon the plaintiff proved that said endorsement had been made by one of the firm of Walker and White, to wit, by Carter White, and the same_ was then read to the jury. The defendant then proved that the firm of Walker and White was dissolved in 1836, before the endorsements on said note were made; and the question was, whether one partner, after the dissolution of the partnership, could, without the assent of his co-partner, assign a note by endorsement, payable to the firm before the dissolution, and thereby pass the legal title in the note so as to authorize the assignee to sue in his own name. Whereupon, the court charged the jury that, if in the due course of trade, and without fraud, one party assigned a note or bill single after the dissolution of the partnership, the endorsee would get a good title, and well might sue; and that if in this cause the jury was satisfied that the note was so assigned to the plaintiff by one of the partners after the dissolution, the plaintiff might well maintain his action, and in the absence pf any thing else to bar his right, he would be entitled to recover. The jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant moved for a new trial, which the court refused to grant; which opinion of the court the defendant excepts, and prays that this, his bill of exceptions,- may be signed, sealed and made a part of the record, which is done.
    Edmund Dillahunty, [Seal.]”
    From the judgment of the court an appeal in error was taken.
    
      Wright, for plaintiff.
    The only question in this case is, whether one partner, after the dissolution of the partnership, can endorse a note, payable to the firm, without the consent of the other partner, so as to convey the legal title, and enable the assignee to maintain a suit in his own name. I contend that he cannot for any purpose whatever, and that the circuit judge erred when he chai'ged the jury that a partner had such power. Chitty on Bills, 8th Am. ed. from 8th Lon. ed. 65-6: Thomason vs. Frere, 10 East, 418: Chitty on Bills, same ed. 60: Kilgour vs. Fynlison, 1 Hen. Bla. 155: Abel vs. Sutton, 3 Esp. Rep. 10S: Watson, 209: Henderson, etal. vs. Wild, 2Camp. 561: Wrightson, etal. vs. Pulían, etal. 1 Stark. 375: 2 Chitty’s Rep. 121: Dolman vs. Orchard, 2 Carr and P. 101. In New York, Sanford vs. Nickles and Forman, 4 John. Rep. 224-6: Whitaker vs. Brown, 10 Wend. Rep. 175. In Massachusetts, Whitman vs. Leonard, 3 Pick. Rep. 177. In South Carolina, 2 Des. Rep. 40: 1 M’Cord’s Rep. 18, 389. In Louisiana, Offat vs. Breedlove, 4 Miller’s La. Rep. 31. See also Bell vs. Morrison, el al. 1 Pet. Rep. 370. The judgment should he reversed.
    
      Combs, for the defendant,
    left no brief of his position and Authorities of which the reporter could avail himself.
   Gkeen, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action of debt upon a note executed by Dickerson to Walker and White, and after the dissolution of the firm of Walker and White, it was assigned to the plain tiff by Carter White, one of the late firm of Carter and White. The defendant pleaded no assignment; and the question was, whether one partner, after the dissolution of the partnership could, without the assent oi the other partner, endorse a note, payable to the firm before the dissolution, so as to pass the legal title in the note to the assignee. The circuit court decided that the assignment was good to vest the legal title in the plaintiff, so that he might maintain this action in his own name. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, to reverse which, this writ of error is prosecuted. We think there is error in the judgment in this cause. The power (Which one partner has to bind his co-partner, ceases on the dissolution of the firm; otherwise his co-partners might still charge him by negotiating bills given during the partnership or notes executed to the firm. We concur with the supreme court of New York, in the case of Sanford vs. Nickles and Forman, 4 John. Rep. 224, where it says, “it is impossible to separate the right to endorse a bill by one passing the title from the legal responsibility on all those having an interest in it.” Let the judgment be reversed.  