
    Harris v. The State.
    
      Indictment for pocket-picking — Verdict of guilty sufficient, though value of property not found.
    
    A verdict rendered upon the trial of a valid indictment for pocket-picking, which finds the defendant guilty o£ pocket-picking in manner and form as charged in the indictment, is sufficient to sustain judgment and sentence, although such verdict does not find and return the value of the property. taken.
    (Decided November 16, 1897.)
    Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin county.
    The plaintiff in error, Joseph B. Harris, was tried on an indictment based upon sectioa 6818, Revised Statutes, which in one count charged the crime of robbery, and in a second count charged the crime of pocket-picking, averring the property to be of the value of three dollars. The verdict found the prisoner not guilty under the first count, but “guilty of pocket-picking in manner and form as charged in the second count,” but failed to find and return the value of the property taken. When asked why judgment should not be pronounced,-the prisoner interposed a motion in arrest, on the ground that the verdict is insufficient in law because it does not find the accused guilty of any crime, and will not sustain any sentence. This motion was overruled and sentence pronounced, which is the ground of error complained of.
    
      E. IF. Courtright, for plaintiff in error, argued that the verdict does not comply with section 7315, Revised Statutes, and is, therefore, fatally defective and will not sustain any sentence because pocket-picking is an offense against property, and the section referred to, provides that “when an indictment charges an offense against property by iarceny * * * the jury on conviction shall ascertain and declare in the verdict, the value of the property stolen, ” and in support, cited sections 6818 and 7315, Revised Statutes; People v. Nelson, 56 Cal., 77; State v. Sigermon, 19 Pac. Rep., 370; Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 5 S. W., 365; Same v. Prewitt, 82 Ky., 240; Armstrong v. The State, 21 Ohio St., 357; and Powell v. The State (Georgia), 13 S. E., 829.
    
      Joseph H. Dyer, prosecuting attorney for the state, argued that the value of the property taken in the crime of pocket-picking is but one of the ingredients of the crime, and that, unless definitely required by statute, it is not ever necessary that the verdict, in order to be valid, shall find all the ingredients of the crime; and farther, that within the meaning of our statute, pocket-picking is an offense against the person and not one against property, and hence section 7315 does not apply, citing State v. Howerdon, 58 Mo., 581; State v. Brown, 113 N. C., 645; State v. Perley, 86 Me., 427; Ellers v. The State, 25 Ohio St., 388; Wilson’s Crim. Code, 35; McClain on Crim. Law., part 5, chap. 22; 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 430; 1 Wharton’s Crim. Law, 857; 2 Archibald’s C. P. & P., 1287; Bishop’s Stat. Crimes, see. 427. and 73 N. C., 83.
   By the Court.

The question is: Is it necessary, in the trial of an indictment for pocket-picking, that the jury, upon conviction, ascertain and declare in the verdict, the value of the property taken ?

We answer the question in the negative. The crime involves stealing, but it is not primarily an offense against property, but an offense against the person, and is so classified in our statutes. The punishment is not made to depend upon the amount taken, but is confinement in the penitentiary from one to five years, irrespective of the amount. The section providing for the offense is found in chapter 3, of title 1, of the penal subdivision of the statutes. This chapter is entitled “Crimes against the Person,” and includes murder, rape, robbery, and the like, while larceny is provided for in chapter 4, under the sub-title of “Offenses against Property,” which embraces, also, arson, burglary, horse-stealing, and the like. These titles are part of the statutes, and are to be considered in arriving at the intent of the legislature. Had that body intended to require a finding by the jury as to the value of the property taken by a pick-pocket, it would not have limited that requirement, as is done in section 7315, Revised Statutes, to offenses “against property by.larceny, ” but would, in apt language, have embraced also offenses against the person where larceny is involved.

Judgment affirmed.  