
    Douglas WOO, an individual; Arthur Moore, an individual; Benson Lin, an individual; Juan Salcedo, an individual; John Araki, an individual, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Ohio corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 14-56992
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted November 10, 2016 Pasadena, California
    Filed April 28, 2017
    Carol S. Zaist, Esquire, Carol S. Zaist, Esquire, Newport Beach, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants
    Douglas J. Collodel, Esquire, Sedgwick LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Valerie Rojas, Attorney, Cozen O’Connor, Los Angeles, CA, Defendant-Appellee
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and MARQUEZ, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Rosemary Marquez, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs-Appellants Douglas Woo, Arthur Moore, Benson Lin, Juan Salcedo, and John Araki (“Insureds”) sought declaratory relief and alleged breaches of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after Defendant-Ap-pellee Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Insurance Company”) declined to defend against and provide coverage for a lawsuit brought against Insureds. The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the Insurance Company, and denied summary judgment in favor of Insureds. Insureds now appeal.

We review de novo. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Moran v. Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1998). “We determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Oswalt v. Resolute Indus., Inc., 642 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The district court correctly granted the Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment and denied Insureds’ motion for summary judgment. At least two clauses included in the parties’ insurance contract namely the exclusions for prior knowledge and prior litigation expressly preclude coverage for the entirety of the Tatung lawsuit. The prior knowledge exclusion precludes coverage for the Tatung suit because an insured, albeit not necessarily the Insureds here seeking coverage, knew of the facts and circumstances from which the Tatung suit derived. Similarly, the pri- or litigation exclusion precludes coverage for the Tatung suit because the suit arose out of a demand letter issued before April 2010. Because these exclusions render coverage impossible for any of the claims raised in the Tatung lawsuit, Insurer has no duty to defend Insureds therein. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 6 Cal.4th 287, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157-59 (1993).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     