
    THE LETTER CARRIER CASES. AARON S. POST v. THE UNITED STATES. CHARLES C. SLADE v. THE SAME. RUE H. SHOLES v. THE SAME. WILLIAM W. WISCOMB v. THE SAME. SAMUEL R. SKIDMORE v. THE SAME. CHARLES E. HAYWARD v. THE SAME. WALTER WISCOMB v. THE SAME. JOSEPH L. WEILER v. THE SAME. BRIGHAM L. MORSE v. THE SAME. FRANK GATES v. THE SAME.
    [Nos. 16974, 17039.
    Decided March 7, 1892.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    Letter-carriers receive annual salaries and are entitled T>y statute to leave of absence without loss of pay. The Post-Office Regulations provide that “Awing the intervals between their trips they may be employed in the post-office in such manner as the postmaster may direct, but not as clerics;” and the Revised Statutes (§ 1764), that “no allowance or compensation shall be made for any extra service whatever.” Such being the law, Congress enact “ that hereafter eight hours shall constitute a day’s worlc for letter-carriers,” and that if a carrier “is employed a greater number of hours per day tha/n eight, he shall be paid extra for the same im, proportion to the salary now fixed by law.” In New York the carriers are employed in their proper work more than eight hours on week days but less on Sundays, the average per month not exceeding eight per day. In Sait Lake City they are employed five on their routes and seven in the post-office.
    I.The regulation (§ 647) which provides that carriers may be employed in the intervals between their trips “in such manner as the postmaster may direct, but not as clerics,” leaves the office work which they may do wholly undefined.
    II.Where a postmaster having nine carriers and only three clerks, whose united force was barely able to carry on the business of the office, interpreted the regulation to mean that carriers might be employed in the distribution of mail matter within the office, the court, in the silence of the Post-Office Department, will not hold that his interpretation was wrong.
    III.A11 work relating to mail matter which carriers distribute and collect must be regarded as carrier service within the intent of the Eight-hour law 24thMay, 1888 (25 Stat. L., p. 157).
    
      IV.The eight-hour law was not intended as a door of evasion whereby a postmaster can bring into his office additional clerks for additional pay; hut where the necessities of an office require the services of the carriers after their own work is done, they will he entitled to additional compensation for all in excess of-eight hours, notwithstanding the provision of the Revised Statutes (§ 1761) that no compensation “shall he made for any extra service whatever.”
    
    V.Where a statute restricts the service of an employd receiving an annual salary to eight hours per day, and provides that if he he employed a greater number of hours “ he shall he paid extra for the same in proportion to the salary now fixed by law,” the computation of extra time will follow the general usage of the Treasury, and he reckoned by taking a day as the three hundred and sixty-fifth part of a year.
    VI.A statute which provides that increased pay shall be in proportion to increased work can not be construed as intended to change the long established usage of the Treasury in the computation of salaries, nor as intended to prescribe one rate for regular work and another for extra.
    VII.Under the eight-hour law a carrier is entitled to eight hours’ pay whether eight hours work be given him or not. For any excess of work on any day he is entitled to extra pay. The Department can not give him a deficit of work one day and an excess another, and make a monthly average of the number of hours employed.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case.
    The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
    I. The claimants were letter-carriers at the post-office at Salt Lake City, in the Territory of Utah, between May 24,1888, and December 31,1889, their respective terms of service, classes, and salaries being as hereinbelow set forth, viz:
    
      
    
    
      II. During tiieir aforesaid terms of service said claimants were actually employed in the performance of their duties more than eight hours a day, the excess oyer such eight hours being-shown in the following finding :
    III. The manner, time, and nature of their employment was generally as follows:
    They were required to report for duty at the post-office at 7 a. m.
    From 7 to 7:30 they were employed within the post-office in the distribution of mail matter; that is to say, in taking- letters and papers from newly arrived pouches, assorting them, and placing them in the boxes for box and general delivery.
    From 7:30 to 8 they were severally engaged in arranging their own mail matter for carrier delivery by streets and numbers, and where the residence of a person was not expressed in the direction of a letter and was not known or remembered, in looking it up in the directory.
    From 8 to 11 they were occupied on their routes in delivering and collecting mail matter.
    From 11 to 11:30 they were engaged within the post-office building in making returns of persons not found and other things connected with their route delivery.
    From 11:30 to 1 they were employed within the post-office in the general distribution of mail matter.
    From 1 to 2 they were absent and off duty.
    From 2 to 3:30 they were again employed on the post-office work of distributing general mail matter,
    From 3:30 to 4 they were severally engaged in arranging their own mail matter for delivery.
    From 4 to 6 they were again occupied on their routes in delivering and collecting mail matter and in making their returns.
    From 6 to 7 they were again absent and off duty.
    From 7 to 8 they were again employed on the post-office work of distributing general mail matter.
    The above statement represents an ordinary or average day’s employment. The time of going ont and the time of being- out on the routes in fact varied with the size of the mail, as did the time of their being relieved from duty at night. But their reporting for duty at 7 in the morning, at 2 in the afternoon, and at 7 in the evening was constant. The above statement does not apply to Sundays. On Sundays tbe carriers made no deliveries. They were employed, however, in tbe office, but tbe time of employment did not exceed eight hours. During the time covered by this claim there were nine carriers and three clerks employed in said post-office.
    IT. The carriers, by one of their number, remonstrated against the performance of work not connected with their duties as carriers. The postmaster, however, held that “under the regulations the postmaster could use them in that service.” He therefore required them to perform it.
    V. During the time embraced within the present claims the following regulations of the Post-Office Department were in force, all under the general title, “Free-delivery service” (Postal Laws and Regulations, 1887, pp. 259, 261, 266, 268, 269):
    “ Sec. 628. Postmasters to supervise carrier service. — Postmasters will supervise their carrier service, and are specially enjoined—
    “ 1. To see that superintendents, carriers, and clerks connected with this service are fully informed as to their responsibilities and duties. * * *
    “3. To frequently visit the stations, and see that the regulations are there observed and proper order and discipline maintained.
    “ 4. To issue all necessary orders and instructions necessary to carry out the regulations and promote the efficiency of the service.
    “5. To reprimand the carriers for irregularities or report them for removal to the Superintendent of Free Delivery, as the nature of the offense may require. (See sec. 642.)
    “ Sec. 642. Reprimand suspension and removal. — The due performance of their duty by carriers, and the observance of law, regulations, and orders prescribed for their conduct will be enforced by reprimand for slight offenses; by suspension, with loss of pay, for more serious ones, not, however, to exceed thirty days; and by suspension and recommendations for removal for grave offenses, or persistent disregard of the rules herein prescribed or of the orders of the postmaster not inconsistent herewith. In all other cases of recommendation for removal carriers should not be suspended, but postmasters should await the action of the Department.”
    All the following are under the sub-title, “ General Duties of carriers: ”
    Sec. 647. Duties generally. — Carriers shall be employed in the delivery and collection of mail matter, and during the intervals between their trips may be employed in the post-office in such maimer as the postmaster may direct, but not as clerks.
    “ The delivery and collection by them must be frequently tested at irregular intervals, to determine their efficiency.
    
      u Seo. 648. Delivery of matter. — The mails must be assorted and the carriers started on their first daily tnp as early as practicable. They must proceed to their routes with expedition and by the most direct way. A schedule of the order of delivery of each route should be made in a legible hand bynames of streets and numbers of houses, and the mail delivered according to such schedule. Mail matter directed to box numbers must be delivered through the boxes. Mail matter addressed to street and number must be delivered by carriers, unless otherwise directed. Mail matter addressed neither to a box-holder nor to a street and number must be delivered by carrier if its address is known or can be ascertained from the city directory; otherwise, at the general delivery.
    
      “ Sec. 649. Oare in delivery of mail. — Carriers will exercise great care in the delivery of mail to the persons for whom it is intended, or to some one known to them to be authorized to receive it. They will, in case of doubt, make respectful inquiry with the view to ascertain the owner. Failing in this, they will return the mail to the office, to be disposed of as the postmaster may direct.
    
      u Sec. 651. Directory to be used to ascertain addresses. — Where a directory is published, it must be used when necessary to ascertain the address of persons to whom letters are directed, and it should also be used in the case of transient newspapers and other matter of the third and fourth classes, where the error in or omission of street address is evidently the result of ignorance or inadvertence; but when circulars, printed postal cards, or other matter, except letters, shall arrive at any post-office m large quantities, apparently all sent by the same person or firm, and from which the street addresses have been purposely omitted, the directory need not be used to supply such omission, and all of such circulars, etc., which can not readily be delivered through boxes or by carriers shall be sent to the general delivery to await call.”
    YI. In the case of Aaron S. Post, the claimant, between the 24th day of May, 1888, and the 31st day of December, 1889, was employed by order of the postmaster in excess of eight hours a day, as follows:
    Before 7 a. m., the regular hour when the carriers reported for duty, he arrived at the office and opened the eastern mail, which came at about 5 in the morning, in order to prepare the same for the southern mail. This was done so that it would not have to lie over twenty-four hours. The time thus employed was two hundred and forty-six and one-half hours.
    During intervals between 7 a. in., when carriers reported for duty, and 6 p. m., when their wort as carriers ended, he was employed in the office in opening the mail, stamping it, and distributing the same as hereinbefore stated in excess of eight hours, nine hundred and eighty-six hours.
    After his last trip and his returns as carrier were made — i. e., after 7 p. m. — he was employed on the post-office work of distributing general mail matter in the office four hundred and ninety-three hours.
    Til. In the case of Frank Gates the court found:
    The claimant was, during the months of May, June, and July, 1888, a letter-carrier of the first class, salary $1,000 a year, in the city of New York, in the State of New York.
    From May 24, 1888, to July 31,- 1888, he was actually and necessarily employed in the performance of his duties more than eight hours a day, the excess over such eight hours being as follows:
    Hrs. Min.
    May, 1888. 16 53
    June, 1888. 78 58
    July, 1888. 69 18
    Total. 165 9
    He has received no extra pay for the excess.
    For the said period of time claimant performed only fifteen hours of service on the ten Sundays, and four hours and thirty minutes on Decoration Day, and the same time on the Fourth of July.
    
      Mr. G. A. King and Mr. W. B. King for the claimants.
    
      Mr. Henry M. Foote (with whom was Jir. Assistant Attorney-General Ootton) for the defendants:
    The act under consideration was not in tended, to limit the hours of service to be performed in a day before the annual compensation should be earned. Up to the limit of eight hours of service all carriers stand precisely upon the same footing or equality; their salary is earned howsoever their time may be employed, and it is of little concern to them that any labor is performed in a day if there exists a readiness to perform it and none is required.
    
      But the legislation wliiob we are considering in so far as the same changes the manner of compensation, also has relatiou to the character of the service required to be performed in establishing the basis of the claim and the extra service necessary-in order that a right to extra compensation shall be maintained. In considering the purpose of the act, it is apparent that what was intended was the relief of a class of letter-carriers who were required to perform more than eight hours a day to earn their salary.- It must have been considered that the character of the service was such as to entitle them to more favorable consideration than any other class of salaried officials, for we are unable to find any other class of persons in Government service who are paid annual salaries that are affected by this kind of legislation.
    The generosity of Congress was no doubt aroused by the plea in behalf of these persons that, notwithstanding the unfavorable conditions of weather and the necessary exposure to all manner and forms of contagion and diseases, the letter-carrier must necessarily perform his daily routine of service although more than eight hours were required in its performance. It is thought that some such considerations as these must have influenced Con gross to enact this extraordinary legislation, oth er-wise there could have been no justification for a discrimination against any other class of persons whose duties required a service of more than eight hours a day.
    The act is confined strictly to letter-carriers, and must therefore be construed strictly with reference to the kind of service covered by its provisions. It must be construed to read therefore as follows:
    
      u That if any letter-carrier is employed more than eight hours a day in the performance of letter-carrier service, he shall be paid extra for such service in proportion to his annual salary.”
    This construction necessarily precludes the idea of any other kind of service, and confines the inquiry to the one subject of what constitutes letter-carrier service. Beginning with section 647 of the Postal Laws and Begulations for 1887, the duties of a letter-carrier are defined. That section provides as follows:
    “Carriers shall be employed in the delivery and collection of mail matter, and during the intervals between their trips .may be employed in the post-office in such manner as the postmaster may direct, but not as clerks.”
    
      Following tliis section are others, defining specifically the duties enjoined upon them in such, delivery and collection, as also certain things which they are forbidden to do while performing this service.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

These cases affect the compensation of probably all the letter-cariers in the United States. The statute under which they arise is singularly brief and clear, and expresses in unmistakable terms the legislative intent. But the services of letter-carriers are so peculiar and ill-defined, that the application of the law to the facts is no easy task. The statute is in these words:

“ That hereafter eight hours shall constitute a day’s work for letter-carriers in cities or postal districts connected therewith, for which they shall receive the same pay as is now paid for a day’s work of a greater number of hours. If any letter-carrier is employed a greater number of hours iter day than eight, he shall be paid extra for the same in proportion to the salary now fixed by law.” (Act 24th May, 1888, 25 Stat. L., p. 157.)

So far as compensation is involved, there are four classes of carriers, receiving annual salaries of $1,000, $850, $800, $000. Act 31 Jcmuary, 1887 (24 Stat. L., p. 355). So far as services are involved, there are apparently two classes: one like the carriers in New York, and probably in all the great cities, who are occupied incessantly from morning to night without an intermission for rest or food; and one like the carriers in Salt Lake City, who have a morning and afternoon collection and delivery, which per se requires less than eight hours of service.

On the part of the claimants it is maintained (1) that all of the work which letter-carriers perform by order of their postmasters is service contemplated by the statute, (2) that in estimating the extra service an extra hour is not to be reckoned as the eighth part of a day, but that the court and the accounting officers must take into consideration the fact that under another statute they are entitled to fifteen days’ leave of absence without loss of pay (Act 27th June, 1884, 23 Stat. L., p. 60), and under the Postal Laws and Regulations to .six holidays during the year (Regulations 1887, sec. 483), and that at common law they are not required to render service on Sunday, and by tbe Regulations, section 481, only for a brief period, leaving two hundred and ninety-two days in tbe year which should be taken as the divisor of their annual salary, instead of three hundred and sixty-five.

On the part of the defendants it is maintained that the only service which is to be reckoned in estimating the eight-hour day is carrier service proper; that the Regulations, section 047, provide that—

“ Carriers shall be employed in the delivery and collection of mail matter, and during the intervals between their trips may be employed in the post-office in such manner as the postmaster may direct, but not as clerks.”

And that the Revised Statutes, section 1764, provide that—

“No allowance or compensation shall be made to any officer or clerk by reason of the discharge of duties which belong to any other officer or clerk in the same or any other Department; and no allowance or compensation shall be made for any extra services whatever which any officer or clerk may be required to perform unless expressly authorized by law (§ 1704).

Hence it is argued that the statutes and regulations are to be construed together, and that the additional pay which the eight-hour act grants is to be restricted to cases where the carrier performed service authorized by law; that is to say, the service of a carrier and not of a clerk.

The Salt Lake City cases, it is believed, embrace, with a single exception, all the questions presented by the New York cases and many more besides. We will therefore deal with the facts which they bring before the court.

In the Salt Lake City post-office the force employed consisted of three clerks and nine carriers. It appears from the testimony of the postmaster himself that the three clerks were insufficient to perform the work of the office; and it appears from the evidence that the work of the carriers in delivering and collecting letters outside of the post-office building did not occupy them more than five hours a day; A third kind of work appears in the case, which has been one of the debatable grounds of the argument, viz, the work which carriers perform within the post-office building upon the mail matter which they are to deliver. Before they go out on their rounds each takes a package of unassorted letters — i. e., no further assorted than to segregate from the mass those which belong to each carrier’s route — and arranges them in the order of street and number. This is called routing ” the letters. Where the street and number are not given in the'direction on the letter, this service also involves looking up the residence in the directory or in noting it from memory. After the carrier returns from his round he also has work to do in connection with his carrier service, such as returning letters where the party to whom they were addressed could not be found.

In the Salt Lake office the carriers, by order of the postmaster, rendered the following service during each working day:

At 7 a. m. the carriers reported for duty. For half an hour they were employed inside the post-office proper in distributing the mail, by placing it in the general-delivery boxes. For half an hour they were occupied in “routing” their own letters ; that is, in arranging them for ready distribution on their rounds. At 8 a. m. they went out on their first delivery, returning at various times, according to the quantity of mail matter to be delivered, but generally within three hours. From the time of their return until 1 p. m. they were engaged within the post-office in the distribution of the mail. From 1 to 2 they were allowed an hour for dinner. At 2 all were required to report for duty. For an hour they were again engaged in the distribution of the mail and in “routing” their own letters. At 3 they went out on their second delivery, returning ordinarily about 5 o’clock. From 5, with an interval of an hour for supper, they were again employed in the work of distributing the mail until, ordinarily, 8 o’clock or later.

Such was the ordinary day of a letter-carrier in this office. It may be analyzed by saying that he was absent from home thirteen hours; that he was allowed two hours for his meals; that he was occupied outside of the building in the work of delivering and collecting letters five hours; that he was occupied in preparing his mail matter for the route and in making reports and returns in regard to it two hours; and that he was employed in the work of distributing letters within the building for general delivery four hours. It is also to be observed that for at least an hour this work was not performed “ during the intervals between his trips” (in the words of the regulation above quoted), but was performed after his last service as a letter-carrier had ended.

Tbe work wbicb letter-carriers may do during tbe intervals between tlieir trips and tbe work wbicb they may not do as clerks is wholly undefined. No regulation, order, or instruction of tbe Post-Office Department can be found wbicb would inform postmasters or enlighten tbe court as to what these services are. Tbe term clerical service strictly, means a service that involves writing. It may be that tbe regulation was intended to prohibit tbe carriers from writing reports, making up accounts, registering letters, selling stamps, issuing money orders, and that tbe manual labor of assorting a handful of letters and throwing them into tbe appropriate boxes was not intended to be forbidden. It may be that tbe regulation was in tbe nature of a police precaution against post office robberies, by keeping tbe responsibility in tbe fewest possible bands. It may be that it was intended to keep each expense of tbe post-office within its proper appropriation. But certainly tbe regulation contemplated tbe employment of carriers on other work than collecting and delivering letters, and authorized postmasters so to employ them “during tbe intervals between their trips,” and compelled carriers to render such service.

Here, then, was a post-office with three clerks and nine carriers, tbe united force of wbicb was barely able to carry on its business. Under tbe stress of circumstances tbe postmaster interpreted tbe regulation to mean that be might exact from tbe carriers additional work in tbe distribution of mail matter within tbe office, and tbe court is not prepared to say that bis interpretation was wholly and clearly wrong.

Coming now to tbe kind of work done by tbe carriers, tbe court is unqualifiedly of tbe opinion that whatever work they may be required to do, relating to tbe mail matter wbicb they distribute and collect, must be regarded as carrier service in construing and applying tbe eight-hour law. A carrier may receive tbe letters of bis own route and simply arrange them in tbe order of tbe streets and numbers; or all tbe carriers may receive all tbe letters wbicb go out by tbe carrier system, and be obliged to divide tbe mass according to tbe routes; or they may have banded to them tbe newly arrived mail pouches and be obliged to divide tbe matter wbicb is to go out from tbe matter wbicb is to remain within tbe post-office; that is, tbe carriers’ letters from tbe box and general-delivery letters. We do not say that this last arrangement is wise or judicious; but simply that if carriers are thus employed by the postmaster under whom they serve it will be, in the present state of the law and regulations, carrier service.

As to the distribution of mail matter for boxes and general delivery by carriers during the intervals between their trips, the court can not say, in the silence of the Postmaster-General, whether it was or was not the clerical service prohibited by the regulation, and in this uncertainty must adopt the construction which was apparently known to the Department,, and which for the purposes of this case must be regarded as. the construction of the Department itself.

As to the last kind of service, that which was not rendered during intervals but after the carrier’s day was over, the case is not so clear. The regulation did not by any construction authorize the postmaster to exact this, and it involved the Government under the eight-hour law in an additional liability, and was in its practical effect employing one man to do another man’s work, contrary to the intent of the Revised Statutes, if section 1764 is applicable to these cases. We agree with the counsel for the defendants that the eight-hour law was not intended as a door of evasion whereby a postmaster could bring into his office additional clerks to do work for additional pay; but the question is doubtful, the necessities of the situation were great, the good faith of the postmaster is undisputed, and the equities of the case are so strongly in favor of the carriers, that we deem it only just to resolve doubts in favor of the claimants, who have no right of appeal, leaving it to the Supreme Court to correct the error, if error it be.

We now come to the manner in which this additional time must be reckoned in dollars and cents. As has before been said, the claimants insist that the year should be divided by two hundred and ninety-two days instead of three hundred and sixty five, and the value of a day of eight hours proportionately increased. From this day of augmented value it is maintained the value of the additional hours must be derived.

The principle of excluding apparent time, which the counsel for the claimants applies to days, the counsel for the defendants, though by a different process of reasoning, applies to hours. He maintains that the additional hours intended by the statute are additional to the carrier’s actual hours of service as carrier; that it is not the time during which the carrier is nominally on duty wbiob is to be reckoned, nor the time when the employment proper or improper is within the post-office building, but the time when the carrier is actually engaged in delivering and collecting letters. If the services are more than eight such hours, he is entitled to ask additional pay; otherwise, not. Or, as was said on the argument, “The door of the post-office defines the service; service without is carrier service, service within is clerical survice.'” It is apparent that the principle will cut both ways. Applied to days, it will augment the value of the additional service; but as very few carriers are actually on their feet eight hours a day running about the streets, it will cut down the hours until there is no additional time left to be paid for.

The statute which attaches an annual salary to the service does not fix the amount as compensation for three hundred and fifty-nine days — i. <?., for a year less six holidays; nor as compensation for three hundred and fifty days — that is, for a year less fifteen leave-of-absence days; nor as compensation for three hundred and forty-four days — i. e., a year less the holidays and leaves of absence; nor for two hundred and ninety-two days — i. e., for a year without holidays, leave-of-absence days, or Sundays. The salary is for a year, and when it was enacted covered all service which the carrier might render or be required to render within a year.

If the suit were brought to recover an unpaid balance of salary, we are inclined to think that no question which has been raised by one side or the other would have appeared. If a claimant had held office one day and the suit was to recover one day’s pay, we believe that the damages demanded would have been for one-three hundred and sixty-fifths of the annual salary. Conversely, if the suit had been brought to recover one year’s pay, less one absent day, we doubt whether it would have entered into any mind to deduct more than one-three hundred and sixty-fifths for that day. It can not be supposed that a claimant would have said, “In crediting the Government with the value of this one day’s deduction I should credit more than one-three hundred and sixty-fifths of my year’s pay. I should take into consideration Sundays, holidays, leave-of-absence days, and credit the Government with more — with one-two hundred and ninety-seconds of my annual salary.” Neither can we believe that the counsel for the Government would have asked such a computation. Time out of mind men have been employed by the year, and certainly we can-recall no case for work and service where a court has introduced such refinements into the measure of damages.

The Treasury computation of the pay of all officers and em-ployéson annual salaries is made substantially on the ordinary basis. The year is divided into four calendar quarters, which are almost exactly equal, the first and second on a leap year containing ninety-one days each, the third and fourth ninety-two. In reckoning a day’s pay the fourth part of the annual salary is divided by the number of days in that quarter. In ascertaining this, the Treasury disregards Sundays and holidays. If a man holds an office or employment two days in a year, he is credited for two days, though one of them may be a Sunday and the other a holiday.

A statute of this nature must be interpreted in conformity with the system upon which it is ingrafted. This judgment to be declared here by the court is not an isolated judgment which, when satisfied, will pass out of existence and leave no disturbing element behind it. On the contrary, it will furnish a rule of decision for the Department. Hundreds of carriers will be paid on it for years past and continue to be paid for years to come. Assuredly the judiciary must not give an interpretation to the act which will bring trouble and confusion into the Executive Departments unless its language imperatively requires it.

There is nothing in this statute indicative of the principle by which the value of the extra time shall be computed, and whatever the principle maybe, it is manifest that regular time and extra time should be estimated by one and the same rule. If the judiciary prescribes one principle and the accounting officers proceed on another, it is evident that two rates of pay will be given to the different hours of the same day. For eight hours of a day the computation will be on the basis of three hundred and sixty-five days in the year; for the additional hours on the basis of two hundred and ninety-two; and thus trouble and confusion will be brought into the account. A monthly pay roll may show that on the first day a carrier was on duty eight hours; on the second, nine hours; on the third, ten hours; on the fourth, eight hours, etc. The numbers áre added, the total is multiplied by the value, of the hours at the prescribed annual salary, ascertained from tbe formulas of tbe Department. But if tbe accounting officers have to ex-mine every carrier’s time for every day in tbe month and segregate hours which belong to a year of two hundred and ninety-two days from hours which belong to a year of three hundred and sixty-five days, the statute will have brought a confusing element into the work of accounting which never could have been anticipated by the lawmaking power.

There is one consideration which seems conclusive of the question. This statute was not intended to change the usage of the Treasury nor to disturb the existing rate of pay, and avowedly does nothing more than provide that the increased pay shall be in proportion to the increased work. That is to say, it does not change the rate of compensation, nor does it provide that a carrier shall be paid for regular work at the rate of $1,000 a year and for extra work at the rate of $1,250. On the contrary, both regular work and additional work are to be paid for at the same rate, however they may be computed. Now, if the construction contended for be given to this statute, the result will be that if a carrier is absent without leave two hours on Monday he will be charged for the two hours of absence on a basis of three hundred and sixty-five days in a year, while if he works ten hours on Tuesday he will be credited with two hours excess of time on the basis of there being two hundred and ninety-two days in the year. Nothing can be more preposterous than to construe a statute which expressly proportions increased pay to increased work so that a deduction shall be debited at one rate and an addition be credited at another. Certainly if the principle advanced for crediting letter-carriers for extra time is right, the principle on which the Treasury has debited officers and employés this hundred years and more for absence is wrong.

The counsel for the defendants has suggested that while the delivery of mail matter is a service which requires the greatest possible promptitude, this eight-hour law may operate as a bounty on tardiness and unnecessary delay, and therefore should not receive an interpretation conducive to that evil effect. And the Post-Office Department has also said in its circulars of instruction that “more than a million dollars annually” is expended in this free-delivery service, and that in consequence of the eight hour law “one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two additional carriers were appointed during tbe fiscal year of 1888 to enable postmasters to bring tbe hours of service witbin tbe limits of that law. ” It is undoubtedly true that tbe system of an eigbt-bour service involves great expense and is subject or may be subject to abuses. Put these are evils to be corrected by statutes and regulations; they can not be prevented by a strained construction of tbe law. Tbe intent of tbe legislative authority as declared by tbe law itself must have full effect given to it by tlie judiciary.

In tbe New York cases a single question arises which was not presented by tbe others. On week days tlie carriers were employed more than eight-hours, but on Sundays less, and tbe deficit of tbe latter nearly equals tbe excess of tbe former. Tbe Post-Office Department, by its circular February 19,1891, has directed postmasters “To determine tbe time a letter-carrier may have been required to work during any month in excess of eight hours per day, as follows:

“Ascertain tbe aggregate hours worked during the month. Multiply tbe number of days worked durin g tbe month by eight, and subtract the product thus obtained from tbe aggregate number of hours worked, and tbe remainder will be the extra time for which tbe carrier is entitled to pay at tbe following rates:
“The time necessarily consumed in tbe performance of tbe service between “Beport for duty” and “End of duty” is tbe “actual time” to be allowed, and the interim between deliveries is tbe carrier’s own time, and can not in any case be charged against tbe United States.”

Tbe carriers’ eigbt-bour law declares “ that hereafter eight hours shall constitute a day’s work,” but it allows compensation to continue in tbe form of an annual salary, and requires no deduction to be made if tbe duties of tbe day do not extend through tbe prescribed time. It also declares that “if any letter-carrier is employed a greater number of hours per day than eight be shall be paid extra for tbe same.” To sustain tbe interpretation given to tbe act by tbe Department, it will be necessary to read in it by construction tbe words “ on an average” — i. e., if any letter-carrier is employed on an average a greater number of hours per day than eight, he shall be paid extra for the same. This the court is not at liberty to do. The carrier is entitled to eight hours’ work, and to his pay if work is not furnished to him. For any excess on any day he is entitled to extra pay. The only set-off that can be maintained is when he is absent from duty without leave. The Department is at liberty to keep a carrier employed eight hours every day, but not to give him a deficit of work one day and an excess another.

In the case of Action S. Post the judgment of the court is that the claimant recover of the defendants the sum of $502.12.

In the case of Franlc Gates the judgment is that the claimant recover the sum of $56.48.

In the remaining cases submitted judgment will be suspended until the further order of the court.  