
    PEOPLE v LEE
    1. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Waiver of Rights — Right to Speedy Public Trial — Court Rules.
    The right to a speedy public trial is not one of the rights which a court must advise a criminal defendant that he is waiving by his plea of guilty (GCR 1963, 785.7).
    2. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Waiver of Rights — Court Rules.
    A court should determine when accepting a plea of guilty that the defendant understands that he is waiving the following rights: the right to a jury trial or trial by the court, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to confront and question witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, the right to remain silent or to testify at his trial as he may choose, and that at a trial no inferences adverse to him may be properly drawn if defendant chooses not to testify (GCR 1963, 785.7[1] [d]).
    References for Points in Headnotes
    fl] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 253.
    [2] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 495.
    Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Dalton A. Roberson, J.
    Submitted February 4, 1976, at Detroit.
    (Docket No. 25043.)
    Decided March 9, 1976.
    Roscoe Lee, Jr., was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of assault with intent to rob while armed. Defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cabalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney Research, Training and Appeals, and 
      Arthur N. Bishop, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
    
      John D. Reseigh, for defendant.
    Before: Bashara, P. J., and N. J. Kaufman and D. F. Walsh, JJ.
   Per Curiam.

Defendant appeals a plea-based conviction for assault with intent to rob while being armed, MCLA 750.89; MSA 28.284. The plea was accepted by the Detroit Recorder’s Court which subsequently sentenced defendant to a term of from 7 to 15 years in prison.

Defendant’s sole assertion of error on appeal is that the plea taking procedure was reversibly erroneous because the court did not inform defendant of his right to a speedy, public trial. We disagree. We do not wish to get involved in an argument involving the importance of the right to a speedy trial in relation to other constitutional rights. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has carefully established such a hierarchy, first in People v Rufus Williams, 386 Mich 277; 192 NW2d 466 (1971), and then in the promulgation of GCR 1963, 785.7(l)(d). That rule explicitly specified those rights which the court must tell the defendant he is waiving by pleading guilty. The right to a speedy, public trial is not among them.

Affirmed.  