
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
    NOV., 1812.
    The Cambridge Association v. Julius Nichols.
    If the real demand of the plaintiff be under- 201., but other counts are’ added deceitfully to swell the costs, the plaintiff shall have no more than summary process costs. So, if the demand be reduced, by payments made before the action brought, to less than 201. But if the plaintiff do bona fide claim a sum beyond 201., though he recover less than 201., he shall have full costs.
    The motion in this case was submitted without argument; It is to reverse the decision of the Court of Common Pie as for Abbe-ville District, on a question of costs. The action was assumpsit; and the plaintiff, by several counts in the declaration, stated several distinct causes of action, one of which was a promise to pay fifty-five dollars, and was the only count supported by evidence.' It was insisted for the defendant, that as the verdict was on the only count supported by evidence, and as the cause of action stated in that court was. within the summary jurisdiction of the court, the form of the remedy was mistaken, or ihat the plaintiff had wilfully pursued an improper remedy in order to accumulate costs. On this ground the motion was made in the District Couit, to order the taxation of summary process costs only ; which motion was overruled.
   BREvaed, J.

From the report of the judge who presided in the District Court, it has appeared that the plaintiff’s claim amounted to five hundred dollars, and that their claiming on the other counts, which were not supported by evidence, did not appear to be deceitful, or merely pretended, in order to accumulate costs. If this had been the case, or if the real demand of the plaintiffs had been reduced within the summary jurisdiction of the court, by payments made before suit brought, which in justice he was .bound to admit, and which the defendant could not object to his allowing, on the ground that the payment was made on some other account, I should be of opinion that the decision was incorrect, and that summary process costs only, ought to have been charged. But as the case stands, my opinion is, that the decision of the District Court was right, and ' that the motion should be discharged.

Colcock, Bay, Grimke, and Nott, Js., concurred.  