
    FU LI, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-2032.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: March 19, 2009.
    Decided: April 10, 2009.
    
      Norman Kwai Wing Wong, New York, New York, for Petitioner. Michael F. Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, William C. Peachey, Assistant Director, Rebecca Hoffberg, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
   Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Fu Li, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.

The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2006). It defines a refugee as a person unwilling or unable to return to his native country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). “Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one of the enumerated grounds----” Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2008), and can establish refugee status based on past persecution in his native country on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2008). Without regard to past persecution, an alien can establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected ground. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.2004). Credibility findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony on credibility grounds must offer “specific, cogent reason[s]” for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir.1989). “Examples of specific and cogent reasons include inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony .... ” Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Where, as here, the applicant filed his application for asylum after May 11, 2005, certain provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005 regarding credibility determinations are applicable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii) (2006). Specifically, “a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii).

This court accords broad, though not unlimited, deference to credibility findings supported by substantial evidence. Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir.2004). A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). Administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). This court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence ... presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n. 14 (4th Cir.2002).

We find substantial evidence supports the Board’s and the immigration judge’s finding that Li was not credible with respect to his membership in Falun Gong. Thus, he failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution based on a protected ground. We further find substantial evidence supports the finding that Li did not show it is more likely than not he will be tortured when he returns to China as a result of having left the country illegally.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED.  