
    BOSS'S CASE.
    (10 Court of Claims R., 424; 92 U. S. R., 281.)
    George W. Ross, appellee, v. The United States, appellants.
    
      On the defendants’ Appeal.
    
    
      The court below finds as facts the circumstances attending the capture of the claimant's cotton, viz: At Borne, 6a., it toas carried, on Government wagons to a warehouse adjoining a railroad operated bg the military authorities ; all the cotton in this warehouse was shipped on that road; cotton from the place of capture arrived in Kingston and was forwarded to Chattanooga ; the quartermaster at Chattanooga received cotton from the quartermaster at Kingston; this was traced to a Treasury agent at Nashville, and the proceeds thereof are now in the Treasury. No title has been asserted against the fund by third persons. The court below decided that a capture being shown, and an unclaimed fund arising from cotton captured in that vicinity being in the Treasury, entitled the claimant to the benefit of the legal presumption established by the Supreme Court in Crussell’s Case. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.
    
    I. It is incumbent upon a claimant, under the Abandoned or captured property Act, to establish by proof that the proceeds of his property were paid into the Treasury. But the evidence need not be direct. (And see Sundry cotton cases, post.)
    II. When certain facts in the nature of circumstantial evidence have been found by special verdict, it cannot be inferred, 11 as matter of law,” that certain other facts existed: ea> gr., when the circumstances attending the capture and transportation of certain property are set forth in the findings, but the court below has not found “ as a fact” that the property came to the hands of the Treasury agent, nor that it was sold, nor that the proceeds of “ that property” were paid into the Treasury, these facts cannot be deduced as a presumption of law from the circumstances stated.
    III. A presumption of law cannot be founded on a presumption of fact to be made by the jury. There must be an open visible connection between the fact proved and the legal deduction to be drawn from it. Presumptions cannot rest on presumptions.
    IY. The presumption that public officers do their duty cannot be used as a substitute for proof of an independent and material fact. If the party’s right to recover depends upon his establishing the fact that the proceeds of his property reached the Treasury, it will not do to trace his property into the hands of an officer whose duty it was to transmit the proceeds, and then trust to the presumption that the duty -was performed.
    Y. The decision of the Supreme Court iu Grussell’s Case (7 C. Gis. K., p. 876) examined and explained, and the doctrine of the burden of proof being on the Government to rebut certain presumptions in captured property oases apparently overruled.
    
    
      
      The Reporters’ statement of the case :
    The following are the findings of fact and conclusions of lav returned by the court below:
    I. In May, 1864, the claimant resided at Athens, Tenn., where he continued to reside till October of that year, when he enlisted' in the Army of the United States, and continued in its service until the end of the rebellion. At the same time, in May, 1864, he owned 31 bales of cotton, which were then in a warehouse in Eome, G-a.
    II. On the 18th of May, 1864, Eome was captured by the United States forces, and continued to be held by them till November of the same year. Shortly after the capture of the town the cotton was removed on Government wagons to a warehouse immediately adjoining and upon the . railroad leading to Kingston and Chattanooga. Subsequently all of the cotton in this last-mentioned warehouse was shipped on the railroad to Kingston. The railroad was in the possession of the military authorities. The time of the shipment from Eome is not shown 5 but it is shown and found by the court that cotton arrived in Kingston from Eome and was forwarded to Chattanooga at some time prior to the 19th August, 1864, and that on the 19th of August, 1864, the quartermaster at Chattanooga received from the quartermaster at Kingston 42 bales of cotton, which were shipped by him to the quartermaster at Nashville on the 21st August, and that on the 24th August 42 bales were received by the quartermaster at Nashville as coming from Kingston; and that these 42 bales were turned over to the Treasury agent and sold, the proceeds thereof being in the Treasury, and amounting to $20,806.09, and that no title has been asserted against these 42 bales by third parties.
    And upon the foregoing findings of fact the Court of Claims decides the following as conclusions of law:
    The capture of the claimant’s cotton by the Army of theUnited States, and its shipment by them upon a railway in possession of the military authorities, followed by the receipt of cotton by the quartermaster at Nashville, coming by that railway from the place of capture, and its transfer to the agents of the Treasury, and the existence of an unclaimed fund in the Treasury arising therefrom, raises a presumption that the cotton taken from the claimant was a part of that transmitted and sold, and the burden of proof to defeat such presumption is upon the defendants.
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Smith for the appellants:
    If the claimant’s cotton has been taken and converted by the United States, his only remedy or relief is that afforded by the Captured and abandoned property Act. (Eaycraft v. United States, 10 C. Cls., R., 114 ; Kidd’s Case, 8 C. Cls., R., 264.) The case, therefore, turns upon the true construction of this statute. The jurisdictional clause of the third section is this : “Any person claiming to have been the owner of any such abandoned or captured property may, at any time within two years after the suppression of the rebellion, prefer his claim to the proceeds thereof, in the Court of Claims ,• and on proof to the satisfaction of said court of his ownership of said property, of his right to the proceeds thereof, and that he has never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion, to receive the residue of such proceeds, after the deduction of any purchase-money which may have been paid, together with the expenses of transportation and sale of said property, and other lawful expenses attending the disposition thereof.” The last sentence of the preceding section (§ 2) required that “ all sales of such property shall be at auction to the highest bidder, and the proceeds thereof shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States.” Similar provision for the payment of the proceeds into the Treasury is found in the third section of the Act July 2,1864, (13 Stats., 376.) The last section (§ 11, p. 378) authorizes “ the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, to make such rules and regulations as are necessary to secure the proper and economical execution of the provisions of this act, and shall defray all the expenses of such execution from the proceeds of fees imposed by said rules and regulations, of sales of captured and abandoned property, and of sales hereinbefore authorized.”
    Up to this time claimants have been held entitled to recover only such net proceeds of their cotton as are traced, directly or inferentially, into the Treasury of the United States. Such has uniformly been the effect heretofore given to these statutes by the Court of Claims, whose decisions upon this point we will examine, because it is the only tribunal having original jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and its course, guided by the supervisory power of this court, must very seriously affect the Treasury of the United States, from which the adoption as legal presumptions of the inferences in this case must draw very large sums. Among the earliest of these cotton cases brought before the court was that of Gaither v. United States, (3 C. Cls., 193,) where the claimant was held entitled only to the proceeds actually in the Treasury, though these were greatly reduced by the fraud of the Treasury agents. See also Byrne'1 s Case, (id., 195,) where the proceeds only, irrespective of value, were allowed. In Geilf ass’s Case, (5 C. Cls., 699,) they reiterate that “ the claimant is entitled to judgment only for the net proceeds of the sale of his property paid into the Treasury.” Therefore, no award was made the claimant for that part of his captured cotton which was lost in transitu by a common carrier (the Illinois Central Railroad Company) in a loyal State, nor for that detained by the forwarding-house of Able & Co. (Terry’s Case, 8 0. Cls., 277.) Upon page 288 of this volume is reported Spencer’s Case, now before this court upon appeal, where the Court of Claims again.declare that the claimant cannot recover unless the proceeds of his cotton actually reach the Treasury, without regard to the question whether or not the failure to deposit them there was wrongful upon the part of the Treasury agent by whom the cotton was sold. Conformably to this, they ruled in Bynum’s Case (id., 440) that where illegal expenses were allowed against the cotton, whereby the proceeds actually coming into the Treasury were correspondingly diminished, the owner is without redress against the Government. (Same in Bent’s Case, id., 474.) In Gone’s Case (id., 330) they state the law, as held by them, sustained (as they understand) by the approval of this court, thus: “We are of the opinion that the existence of the money in the Treasury, actually or constructively, is a jurisdictional fact forming the very basis of the suit, and that it cannot be left to inference or presumption. In cases where the property has been traced to a responsible officer of the Government, whose duty would have been to transmit it, and a fund has been shown to be in the Treasury which may have been derived, in whole or in part, from the capture, there the Supreme Court has held that a legal presumption does arise which connects two established facts, viz, the fact of capture and the fact of a fund derived from captures. (Orussell’s Case, 
      7 0. Cls., 276, and 14 Wall,, 1.) And this court had previously held the same, (Alee Henry's Case, 6 C. 01s., 389.) Beyond this we do not feel warranted in carrying the rule of legal presumption/’ (Cones v. United States, 8 0. 01s., 330.)
    What is meant by “ constructively ” in the Treasury is explained in the earlier part of the opinion by saying, “ Where a fund has been held tobe constructively paid into the Treasury, it has appeared that it was lawfully expended in the service of the Governmentciting Hudnal’s Case, ( 3 0.. 01s., 291.)
    It is upon this ground, that the money must reach the Treasury, that the Court of Claims have adopted the course of calling the proceeds of captures made at a particular time and place a “ fund,” and dividing it among those proved to have had cotton taken at that time and place. (Mott’s Case, 3 0. 01s., 363 ; Hayes’s Case, 4 id., 489; Geilfuss’s Case, 5 id., 607; Lynch’s Case, 6 id., 246; Le Bebians’s Case, id., 377; Minor’s Case, id,, 393; Martin’s Case, 7 id., 450 ; Price’s Case, id., 567; Carroll’s Case, id., 589; Sheppard’s Case, 8 id., 456; Boyd’s Case, 9 id., 420.) Sundry Cotton Cases, 10 id., 502, and that of George W. Eoss, the present claimant, id., 424, in which a pro-rata dividend of a certain alleged fund in the Treasury is awarded him, because the Court of Claims “ think these facts [those set out in their finding, supra] entitle the claimant to the benefit of the legal presumption established by the Supreme Court in Crus-sell’s Case.” We believe a wide difference can be shown between the case at bar and that of Crussell. Crussell’s cotton was proved to be in the hands of the quartermaster at Atlanta, who had charge of captured property there; that he shipped large quantities of captured cotton to Nashville, whence it was all forwarded to Cincinnati, sold there, and the proceeds paid into the Treasury. A witness, one Drake, testified that he was present at the sale, in Cincinnati, of what purported to be captured cotton, and identified by its mark the cotton of Orusselb The same witness also testified that cotton bearing the name of Silvey was sold at the same time and place; but this court were equally divided upon the question of Silvey’s right to recover, his cotton not having been distinctly shown as coming into the custody of an officer specially charged with the care of captured property, though it did appear that Silvey reported his cotton to the quartermaster, (Captain Hade,) upon whom that duty devolved, was furnished with a pass to go and put it into shipping order, and that it was removed by men claiming to act undr Hade’s direction.
    Mr. Ross makes out no such case. Shortly after May 18, 1864, when Rome, Ga., was captured by our forces, his cotton was removed, upon Government wagons, from the building ■where he had stored it to a warehouse near the railroad leading to Chattanooga via Kingston, that road being then under military control. It is evident from the findings that this warehouse contained other cotton. At some time (nobody knows or states when) its contents were all shipped to Kingston. The court finds that, at some equally indefinite time, (except that it was before August 19,1864,) “cotton” of unknown quantity, bales, marks, or ownership “ arrived at Kingston from Rome, and was forwarded to Chattanooga $ ” whether it ever reached that destination or not does not appear. To say that it did is the merest conjecture. “On the 19th of August, 1864, the quartermaster at Chattanoooga received from the quartermaster at Kingston 42 bales of cotton,” which bales were shipped to the quartermaster at Nashville August 21, 1864, who received that quantity as coming from Kingston August 24,1864, and they were turned over to the Treasury agent and sold, and the proceeds paid into the Treasury, where they remain unclaimed, unless they are claimed by this petition.
    There is absolutely nothing but conjecture to establish any connection between Ross’s 31 bales and the 42 bales shipped from Kingston in August, 1864; and a grossly improbable conjecture at that. How was Kingston situated 1 It lies a dozen miles east of Rome, and the branch road from Rome strikes the Great Western and Atlantic Railway at Kingston; so that the cotton coming over this little branch of a dozen miles or so was but a drop in the bucket to that which came over the trunk-line extending via Atlanta to the sea-coast at Savannah and Charleston in one direction, and to Mobile and New Orleans in the other, with ramifications throughout the cotton States. Thus, Kingston was in the heart of the cotton country. That 31 bales were shipped from Rome some time between May and the middle of August, 1864, and 42 bales were received at Chattanooga from Kingston later in the latter month, would not •seem to be sufficiently-related facts to charge the United States with actually having the proceeds of these 31 bales in its Treasury. To do this, the capture of the cotton and the transportation and sale of cotton ought, at least, to occur in a sequence that renders a connection between them more than possible, or simply probable, even ; or else it ought to be distinctly traced, at least, until it reaches some official distinctly charged with such a disposition of it; but in the hasty summary which precedes the court’s “conclusion of law” these important elements of time and space are entirely disregarded.
    The case does not show that the cotton in the warehouse of the railroad was shipped before November, 1864, when the place was evacuated; only that some cotton went from Borne prior to August 19, 1864. The finding is merely that “subsequently” to the taking of the town the warehouse cotton was sent to Kingston.
    This indefinite word “subsequently” was used advisedly. These findings were carefully drawn, and left it thus vague, as to the time of its being shipped, because the evidence on this point was even more uncertain.
    In Silvers Case, by a bare majority, the Court of Claims held that, if the cotton was traced to the control of a quartermaster “ charged ivith the care of captured and abandoned property,,” the legal presumption was that it was turned over to the Treasury agents, and that its proceeds reached the Treasury. (4 C. Cls., 490.) Chief-Justice Casey and Judge Nott thought it must be traced, at least, into the hands of the Treasury agents, if not to the Treasury, by direct proof. Upon this issue the Supreme Court was equally divided. As before remarked, the testimony was very strong to show that Silvey’s cotton was in fact sold at Cincinnati by a Treasury agent.
    In Alce Henrfs Case (0. Cls., 391) a quartermaster was found in charge of the cotton, with express instructions to forward it to Chattanooga; and it was deemed probable that cotton from unknown sources was that so forwarded j but, in both of those cases, there was no question as to the possession of the claimant’s cotton by an officer whose special duty it was to forward it. In CrusselVs Case (4 C. Cls., 533) the cotton was traced to Captain Hade, engaged in this service. Yet these and other cases heretofore cited show the gradual enlargement of the doctrine that substitutes an inferential conclusion for positive proof that the net proceeds of the claimed cotton were in the Treasury. This is the first case in which it has been decided that transportation of cotton at indefinite times, in unknown, quantities, under charge of no authorized officer, upon a wagon or railroad controlled by the military, would give a valid claim for the proceeds of a specific number of bales of cotton at a. fixed price, as being part of that “ unknown quantity.” This legal conclusion is an inference, not from known facts, but from the unknown and hypothetical.
    As another illustration of how these inferential presumptions grow in the mind which conceives them, let us look at the-“conclusions of law,” as stated by the Court of Claims, drawn from their “findings of fact.”
    They find, as fact, that after Borne was captured, Boss’s cotton was hauled in G-overnment wagons to a warehouse; that,, some unknown time after, all the cotton in the warehouse in which it was at one time stored went to Kingston over a railroad controlled by the military, but for what uses does not appear. Thence it is inferred, as a matter of law, that the capture and shipment was by that aggregation of muskets, &c., known as “ the Army of the United States.” The power to-draw inferences grows by exercise. Next, it is stated as law that this shipment to Kingston was “followed by the receipt of (some) cotton by the quartermaster at Nashville,” omitting entirely the fact found that there was an interval of three months between the capture of Boss’s thirty-one bales at Borne, and the receipt of somebody’s foi;ty-two bales coming from Kingston to Nashville. Crescit eundo. The next “conclusion of law” is-still more remote from the facts. The facts found were that Boss’s cotton was captured at Borne; that the cotton received, at Nashville came from Kingston ; the cotton (whosever it was)' shipped from Borne via Kingston being traced no farther north, at any rate, than Chattanooga, (really not beyond Kingston,) and that received at Nashville no farther back than Kingston; but from these it is stated, “as conclusion of law,” that the' cotton received at Nashville came “by that railway from the place of capture,” was then turned over to the Treasury, and became the origin “of an unclaimed fund in the Treasury arising therefrom.”
    This comparison of fact and fancy shows that the last “ conclusion of law ” — i. e., that the cotton transmitted and sold was-presumably that of the claimant, and the burden of disproving this assumption was upon the Government — was drawn rather-from the preceding “ conclusions of law” than from the facts..
    
      Presumptions of law are divided by Greenleaf into two classes, conclusive and disputable. We hardly think it will be claimed that those said to arise in this case b'elong to the first class. As to the latter class, see 1 Greenl. on Ev.', § 33.
    A presumption is the deduction of the fact decisive of the cause, as a conclusion from the facts proved. The jury may find either way upon presumptions of fact; but a legal presumption is the conclusion which the law peremptorily requires to be drawn whenever those facts appear which it declares the basis of that inference. To determine contrary to such a presumption is, of course, error of law. Matthews says: “ Presumptions of law are suppositions or opinions previously formed on questions of frequent occurrence — being found from experience to be generally accordant with truth — and remain of force till repelled by contrary evidence. Presumptions of fact are conclusions drawn from particular circumstances.” (Matthews’s Pres. Ev., 1.)
    The subject to which attention is now called is that this supposed legal presumption is not imagined to arise except in the instance of property coming into the possession of a Government officer, upon whom rests the duty of its transmission, i. e., a Treasury agent or a quartermaster “charged with the care,” &c., of captured property. As to military officers and to privates, the act under which the present action arises devolves upon them only the duty of turning over the property when called upon for it, and not of forwarding it, which would frequently be incompatible with more serious and urgent obligations. (12 Stat. L., 821, § 6.)
    This inference of an official duty imposed by law, and of its performance, is the sole support of the plaintiff’s claim; it can only stand by an application to the evidence of the maxim 11 omnia preesumuntur rite esse acta ; ” and if this application be not legally justifiable upon the state of facts disclosed, the case fails altogether. (Best on Evidence, 468, § 353.) This maxim has generally been used to indicate that where the principal act is established, its incidents will be presumed; that whatever is shown to have been done will be conceived' to have been rightly done, as to its preliminaries, &c.
    Here, for instance, the essential jurisdictional fact is the existence in the Treasury of a fund derived from the capture made when the plaintiff’s cotton was taken. If that be proved, it will be assumed that it was fairly sold, that only just deductions were made, and that the balance is the correct “net proceeds” to be paid to the proper party. Such presumptions are made in favor of the officer, either where he is a party, or, as between third persons, where his action is incidentally brought before the court; not as against him, to charge him in a suit defended by him with a liability which the plaintiff ought to prove affirmatively. Here, again, the distinction above indicated should be borne in mind. Ordinarily, the reception of the plaintiffs property by the defendant, coupled with a refusal to return it on demand, casts upon the latter the burden of accounting for his possession of and dealings with it. Here the mere fact of a possession of the cotton or of its conversion throws no burden upon the Government, but only proof of a fund in the Treasury arising from its sale. The claimant must show, not merely that the United States is somebody’s trustee, but that it is trustee of a fund of which he is the cestui que trust —not merely the seizor of cotton he formerly owned.
    This maxim, “ omnia prwsumuntur rite esse acta” cannot arise as to unknown persons. Its application is to a deputy sheriff, a recording-officer, a man known by name or station, who is charged with a duty. It cannot apply to that general body designated in this record as “the Army of the United States.” No duty rested on that organization, as such, to forward captured cotton; nor on its soldiers, whether privates or officers, by reason of their enrollment and muster into service.
    The books of the Treasury are as available to the claimants as to the Government. It is only when this information is refused that the presumption of there being a fund in the Treasury arises, even if it could arise from such refusal, which this court has held not to be the case, (Hanson v. Eustace, 2 How., 653,) though it was ruled otherwise in England. (Attorney-General v. Windsor, 24 Beav., 679.)
    An omission to produce these records, (had there been such omission, which the facts stated as to the forty-two bales show was not the case,) which are equally accessible to both parties, raises no adverse presumption. (Scovill v. Baldwm, 27 Conn., 316.)
    The best evidence is at the command of the claimant. He has either neglected to procure and produce it, or else it was found not to sustain his claim of a fund in the Treasury to which he is entitled. In either case his proof fails. (Brunswick v. McKean, 4 Maine, 510.)
    
      Mr. George Taylor, for the appellee,
    relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Crussell’s case.
    
      
      If the Supreme Court had not decided another case (Raymond’s, post) at the same term, and indeed on the same day, it might be inferred that the intention in this case was to overturn what has been the settled doctrine of the Court of Claims in “ cotton cases ” ever since the decision of the Supreme Court in Cnmell’s Case. But when the findings of these two cases (this and .Raymond’s) are compared, it will be seen that they differ chiefly in form, both resting on inference; this one leaving the inference in the shape of a presumption of law, the other placing it in the guise of a conclusion of fact. Stripped of form and phraseology, the realf acts appear to be in the one case that the ■cotton lost its identity and then went forward by rail toward Nashville, the great cotton depot of that military region; in the other, that it likewise lost its identity and then went forward by transports toward Yicksburgh, the great cotton depot of that military region. Iu neither case was there a partióle of evidence directly tracing either the cotton of the claimant, or the mass in which it was merged. The chief substantial difference between the two cases seems to be that in Raymond’s the Vicksburgh mass of cotton was undisposed of, and all of -the parties seeking relief out of it were before the court; while in this case the Nashville mass had been analyzed and segregated into the “funds in Price’s Case,” and this claimant stood alone in seeking relief out of an unclaimed fund.
      As to the difference of form iu the two findings, it is unquestionably a substantial difference. In this case the findings state the circumstances, and then leave the inference to the operation of the law, i. e., to a supposed legal presumption under a misunderstanding of Crussell’s Case. In Raymond’s Case the findings likewise state the circumstances, pointing out the paucity of evidence, but they then find these facts as foots: (1) That from the nature of the case, and the circumstances attending the capture, the claimant could not specifically trace his cotton; (2) that the cotton amid the circumstances of its seizure and removal would naturally have gone into the mass at Vicks-burgh; and (3) “though without there being direct proof of the ultimate fact,’’ that the claimant’s cotton constituted a part of that received by the Treasury agent at Yicksburgh, and contributed to the fund before the court. It is also significant that these conclusions of fact in Raymond’s Case were found under a specific order of the Supreme Court, the court apparently intending to throw the responsibility on the court below, sitting as a jury, of drawing a conclusion from the circumstantial facts whether or not the cotton reached the Treasury; and with that purpose remanding the case for these additional findings.
      The general legal conclusion to be drawn from both cases seems to be this: on the circumstantial evidence (or facts) of either case no presumption of law would arise; but from the .'same circumstantial facts a jury might draw a conclusion favorable to the plaintiff, and it would not be set aside for the insufficiency of the evidence.
    
   Mr. Justice Strong-

delivered the opinion of the court:

It is incumbent upon a claimant under the Captured or abandoned property Act to establish by sufficient proof that the property captured or abandoned came into the hands of a Treasury agent, that it was sold, that the proceeds of the sale were paid into the Treasury of the United States, and that he was the owner of the property and entitled to the proceeds thereof. All this is essential to show that the United States is a trustee for him, holding his money. That there is in the Treasury a fund arisen out of the sales of property captured or abandoned, a fund held in trust for somebody, and that the claimant’s property after capture or abandonment came into the hands of a quartermaster of the Army, or a Treasury agent, is not sufficient. There must be evidence connecting the receipt of it by the Treasury agent with the payment of the proceeds of sale of that identical property into the Treasury. We do not say that the evidence must be direct. It must, however, be such as the law recognizes to be a legitimate medium of proof. And the burden of proof rests upon the claimant who asserts the connection.

In the present case the Court of Claims has not found as a fact that the claimant’s cotton came into the hands of a Treasury agent, that it was sold, and that the proceeds of that cotton were paid into the Treasury. No connection between the cotton captured and the fund now held by the United States has been established. Certain facts have been found, and from them it was inferred as matter of law that other facts existed, and upon the facts thus inferred the court gave judgment.

We think that in this there was error. The claimant owned in May, 1864, thirty-one bales of cotton, then in a warehouse in Rome, Ga. On the 18th of that month Rome was captured by the United States forces, and shortly afterward the cotton was removed on Government wagons to a warehouse adjoining the railroad leading from Rome to Kingston, and connecting there with a road leading thence to Chattanooga. Whether it was the only cotton in that warehouse is not found, but it is inferrible, from the other facts found, that it was not. Subsequently (but how long afterward does not appear) all of the cotton in that warehouse was shipped on the railroad to Kingston, the road being then in the possession of the military authorities. It is next shown that cotton (some cotton) arrived in Kingston from Rome before August 19, 1864, and was forwarded to Chattanooga ; that on the 19th of August forty-two bales were received at Chattanooga from the quartermaster at Kingston ; that thence they were shipped to Nashville, where they were received as coming from Kiugston, turned over to the Treasury agent, and sold. The proceeds of sale were paid into the Treasury, and no'title to these forty-two bales has been asserted by third persons.

Such were the facts found, and from them the court deduced, not as a conclusion of fact, but as a presumption of law, that the thirty-one bales removed on Government wagons to the warehouse immediately adjoining the railroad at Rome, shortly after May 18, 1864, were a part of the forty-two bales received at Nashville on the 24th of August, four months afterward, and there turned over to the Treasury agent. It is obvious that this presumption could have been made only by piling inference upon inference and presumption upon presumption. Because the thirty-one bales of the claimant were taken to the warehouse alongside of the railroad at Rome, in May, 1864, and the cotton in that warehouse afterward, at some unknown time, (whether before or after August 19 does not appear,) was shipped on the road to Kingston, it is inferred that the claimant’s cotton was part of the shipment. Because somebody’s cotton (how much or how little is not shown) arrived at Kingston from Rome at some time not known, and was forwarded to Chattanooga before the 19th of August, 1864, it is inferred that the claimant’s thirty-one bales, presumed to have reached Chattanooga, thus arrived and were forwarded, and because forty-two bales were received at Chattanooga on that day from the quartermaster at Kingston, it is inferred that the claimant’s bales were among them. These seem to us to be nothing more than conjectures. They are not legitimate inferences even to establish a fact. Much less are they presumptions of law. They are inferences from inferences, presumptions resting on the basis of another presumption. Such a mode of arriving at a conclusion of fact is generally, if not universally, inadmissible. No inference of fact or of law is reliable drawn from premises which are uncertain. Whenever circumstantial evidence is relied upon to prove a fact the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. Starkie ou Evidence, p. 80, lays down the rule thus: “In the first place, as the very foundation of indirect evidence is the establishment of one or more facts from which the inference is sought to be made, the law requires that the latter should be established by direct evidence sa if they were the very facts in issue.” It is upon this principle that courts are daily called upon to exclude evidence as too remote for the consideration of the jury. The law requires an open, visible connection between the principal and evidentiary facts and the deductions from them, and does not permit a decision to be made on remote inferences. (Best on Evidence, 95.) A presumption which the jury is to make is not a circumstance in proof, and it is not, therefore, a legitimate foundation for a presumption. There is no open and visible connection between the fact out ot' which the first presumption arises and the fact sought to be established by the dependent presumption. (Douglass v. Mitchell, 35 Penn. State, 440.)

The Court of Claims thought the facts found by them entitled the claimant to the legal presumption said by this court to exist in Crussell's Case, (14 Wall., 1,) and, therefore, determined, as a conclusion of law, that the cotton taken from the claimant was a part of that transmitted to Nashville, and turned over to the Treasury agent and sold. We think Orussell’s Oase does not justify such a presumption. Because property was captured by a military officer and sent forward by him, and because there is an unclaimed fund in the Treasury derived from sales of property of the same kind as that captured, because “ omnia preeswnuntur rite esse acta,” and officers are presumed to have done their duty, it is not the law that a court can conclude the property was delivered by the military officer to a Treasury agent, that it was sold by him, and that the proceeds were covered into the Treasury. The presumption that public officers have done their duty, like the presumption of innocence, is undoubtedly a legal presumption, but it does not supply proof of a substantive fact. Best, in his Treat-tise on Evidence, section 300, says: “ The true principle intended to be asserted by the rule seems to be that there is a general disposition in courts of justice to uphold judicial and other acts rather than to render them inoperative, and with this view, where there is general evidence of facts having been legally and regularly done, to dispense with proof of circumstances, strictly speaking, essential to the validity of those acts, and by which they were probably accompanied, in most instances, although in others the assumption may rest on grounds of public policy.” Nowhere is the presumption held to be a substitute for proof of an independent and material fact. The language of the opinion in Crussell's Case would, perhaps, mislead were it not read in connection with the finding of facts. The question was whether seventy-three bales of cotton of the plaintiff’s had been forwarded, with a much larger amount, to the officer in charge of military transportation at Nashville, and by him turned over to the Treasury agent. There was no direct proof that the plaintiff’s cotton wasincluded in the shipment; but there was proof that the Treasury agent forwarded the cotton received by him to the supervising agent at Cincinnati, where a sale was soon after made, and some of the bales sold were marked with the plaintiff’s mark. The question, therefore, whether the military officer who shipped the large quantity had shipped with it the cotton of the plaintiff, was not left to depend upon the presumption that he had done his duty. There was distinct and independent proof of it in the fact that some of the plaintiff’s cotton had reached Cincinnati, and had been sold there. The presumption was only confirmatory of what had been proved by evidence, and in confirmation of that proof it might be invoked. This is all that can fairly be deduced from the opinion of the court as delivered by the Chief-Justice.

No more need be said of the present case. It is not found as a fact that the identical cotton captured from the plaintiff ever came into the hands of a Treasury agent, or that it was sold, and that the proceeds were paid into the Treasury. And the presumption of law adopted by the court, that the cotton was a part of that transmitted and sold, was unwarranted.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.  