
    Joseph Blake v. William Heyward, James Bolan, and Abraham Huguenin.
    Under the act of 1824, which provides, “ that the second section of the-act of 1712,^limiting the time for the prosecuting of a right, or title, to lands, to jive years, be altered, so as to extend the time for the prosecution of such right, or title, to ten years,” a party residing beyond seas is intitled to ten years for the prosecution of his right, or title, to lands, although by the second section of the act of 1712, he is limited to seven years, vide acts of 1824, p. 24, P. L. 101.
    Although, if the Legislature will plainly enact that which is hard, and unreasonable, the Courts are bound to give it effect; yet, if the terms of an act are not unequivocal, the Courts are not bound by their most obvious literal import, but should give such a construction to them, as ■tfill suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, contemplated by the framers.
    A purchaser pendente lite, for valuable consideration, without fraud, and without actual notice, will be protected in his possession, against the lien of a mortgage, by the statute of limitations.
    A decree in equity, for the payment of money, constitutes a lien on land", similar to that of a judgment at law, so as to bind it in the hands of a purchaser, whose title has not been matured by the statute of limitations,-
    The lien of a decree is not defeated by the plea of purchase for valuable consideration, without notice. This defence is a protection in equity only, and can never prevail against a legal title, to which there is no obstacle to a recovery at law.
    Although, in general, equity will not relieve against a purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice ; yet where, upon a bill to revive a decree, the purchaser was directed to be made a party, as a favor to him, and to enable him to protect himself against the decree, if it appear, that the ■ lien of the decree might have been enforced against him, without the aid of the Court, a decree will be made against him upon the ground of the lien.
    At Coosawhatchie, January, 1830.
    Harper, Ch. This was a suplemental, or amended bill,and was-filed on the 7th April, 1828. The original bill was filed on the 8th September, 1823, against Richard B. Screven, Benjamin S. Screven,- and Thomas E. Screven, executors, and devisees of John Screven, deceased, to revive a decree, obtained in 1806, for payment of a debt, secured by a mortgage, and for the sale of certain mortgaged premises, called Jasper’s Barony, part of the estate of the said John Screven, deceased, and by him devised to the defendant, Thomas E. Screven. A decree to revive was made in 1827, from which decree there was an appeal; and on the hearing in the Court of Appeals, it being suggested, that certain persons were in possession of some parts of the land, claiming the same by an adverse title, it was ordered, that the complainants should have leave to amend their bill, and make such persons parties. The present bill -■ was filed in pursuance of that order.
    The answer of the defendant, William Heyward, states, that in 1802, his mother purchased' four hundred acres of the land from Richard B. Screven, one of the executors of John Screven ; that from his mother, it came, by conveyance, to him ; and that there has been quiet possession from the date of the purchase. He further states, that on the 23d June, 1819, Richard B. Screven conveyed to him two acres of the land ; and that on the 5th June, 1821, Thomas E. Screven conveyed to him eight hundred and seventy-seven acres, and on the 8th March, 1824, seven hundred and thirty-eight acres more. The purchase money of the last tract was $2,214, of which he secured, and,.in fact, paid, $1,200 ; but then receiving notice of the present suit, gave a conditional bond for the balance.
    The defendant, James Bolán, states in his answer, that he purchased one thousand and fourteen acres of land of Thomas E. Screven, and took ac onveyance on the 18th October, 1819.; and that he has held adverse possession ever since. Abraham Huguenin, another of the defendants, states, that he is in possession of two hundred and thirty-four acres, part of the barony, which was purchased by one Fitts, of Thomas' E. Screven, on the 7th February, 1820, and by the defendant from Fitts, on the 10th May, 1822 ; and that he received a title directly from’ Thomas E. Screven, no conveyance having been executed to Fitts. This defendant is also in possession of another tract of land, of two hundred and ninety-five acres, .also part of Jasper’s Barony, which he purchased of Benjamin H. Buckner, who received a conveyance on the 11th , January, 1819.
    All the defendants state a full consideration paid, and deny notice of the complainant’s incumbrance at the time of their respective purchases. They rely' on their being bona fide purchasers, without notice, for valuable consideration; and also on the statute of limitations.
    So far as regards the statute of limitations, the several tracts of land following, to wit: the two acres purchased by the defendant, William Heyward, on the 23rd June, 1819, and the tract of eight hundred and seventy-seven acres, purchased on the 5th June, 1821; that of one thousand and fourteen acres, purchased by the defend. ant, Bolán, on the 18th October, 1819 ; that of two hundred and thirty-four acres, purchased by Fitts, on the 7th February, 1820, and conveyed to the defendant, Huguenin, on the 10th May, 1822; and the tract purchased by Buckner, on the 11th January, 1819, and conveyed by him to the defendant, Huguenin ; stand on the same footing.
    P. L. 101.
    Acts of 1824, p. 24.
    ■ I suppose adverse possession to have been taken of these several tracts from the date of the respective purchases. The complainants from the earliest of the purchases, resided beyond seas. By the act of 1712, seveh years were required to bar actions for land, of persons beyond seas ; and, by analogy, the claim to right, or interest, in lands. In all these cases, less than seven years had elapsed, at the time of the passing of the act of 1824, extending the limitation of actions, for the recovery of land, to ten years, and, therefore, no title was then matured; and less than ten years, although more than seven, had elapsed before the filing of the present bill, on the 7th April, 1828. It was contended, however, that the act of 1712, was not altered by the act of 1824, so far as relates to persons beyond seas, but that the limitation of seven years still applies to them.
    This raises a question of construction, which, I confess, embarrassed me considerably. The second section of the act of 1712, provides, that if persons to whom titles to land, shall descend, or come, “ do not prosecute the same, within five years after such right or title accrued, that then he, or they, and all claiming under him, or them, shall be forever barred from recovering the same; excepting any person, or persons beyond the seas, or out of the limits of this province, femes covert, or imprisoned, who shall be allowed the space of seven years, to prosecute their right, or title, or claim to any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, in this province, after such right and title accrued to them, or any of them, and at no time after the said seven years.” P. L. 101. The Act of 1824, enacts, “ that the second section of the act of 1712, limiting the time for the prosecuting of a right, or title to lands, to five years, be altered, so as to extend the time for the prosecution of such right, or title, to ten years.” Acts of 1824, p. 24. The argument is, that only the limitation of five years, applicable to persons within the State, is altered by the act of 1824 ; and that with respect to persons beyond seas, it is, as it was before. Such is said to be the plain letter of the act.
    Now, in my private judgment, I am perfectly satisfied, that the Legislature never intended to put persons beyond seas, femes co
      
      vert, and persons imprisoned, in a worse situation than persons who are in the country, or under no disability. I believe so, because it would be hard, and unreasonable, that persons should be required to prosecute their rights within a shorter time, who have less opportunity of doing so, or even of knowing that they are invaded. But yet it is true, that if the Legislature will plainly enact, that which is hard, and unreasonable, the Courts are bound to give it effect. If the words are unambiguous, there is no room for construction. If, for instance, the word “ ten” had been used, as suggested in argument, instead of “ five,” in the act of 1712, there could be no room for doubt as to the meaning ; but without resor. ting to the doctrine of Blackstone, 1 Com. 91, that although the ■words of a statute are plain, yet “ when some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happens to be unreasonable, then the judges are in decency to conclude, that this consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and, therefore, they are at liberty to expound the statute by equity, and, only quoad hoc, disregard it”— a doctrine which has been questioned, although precisely applicable to the present case — I think it cannot be said, that the words of the act of 1824, are unequivocal. The words “ limiting the time for the prosecution of a right, or title to lands, to five years,” are only descriptive of the section referred to, and they describe it loosely. If these words had been omitted ; if the enactment had been, “ that the second section of the act of 1712, for the limitation of actions, be altered, so as to extend the time for the prosecuting a right, or title to lands, to ten yearsthis would have been plain, and would have no doubt included persons beyond seas. The enactment is not that so much, &c., &e>, shall be altered. It speaks of “ the second section of the act of 1712, limiting, &e.,” as if the exclusive purpose of that section had been to limit actions to five years; and such is the impression, which any person, unacquainted with the act of 1712, would receive from reading that of 1824. Now that was the general purpose of the section ; and persons beyond seas, femes covert, &c., would have been barred by the general limitation of five years, but for the subsequent qualification, in the same section ; and the act of 1824, alters the general provisions of the section, without adopting any qualification. It is as if the Legislature, pursuing the terms of an old statute, had enacted, for the amendment of the law, “ that if, in future, any person shall fail to prosecute his action for land, within ten years, he shall be forever barred.” This would have applied to all persons, whether beyond seas, or not.
    
      ^ we ta^e Lord Coke’s rule for the construction of statutes, to consider the old law, the mischief, and the remedy, and “ to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy,” (3 Rep. 7,) it will lead us to the same conclusion. The mischief intended to be remedied was, that titles to land were acquired, by possession, in too short a time; and there was no grievance, that femes covert, and persons beyond seas, were unduly protected. The purpose of the act of 1824, unlike that of 1?12, was not to quiet litigation, but rather the contrary ; that parties should not lose their property, without having a reasonable time to vindicate their claims to it: and we advance the remedy of the statute, when we apply it to all, who were affected by the grievance. An objection was made, that there was another qualification in the second section of the act of 1712, giving infants time to prosecute after they came of age; and it is asked, whether they are restricted to ten years, although the time may expire before they come of age, as would seem to follow, if the limitation of ten years is applicable to all persons. That part of the act of 1712, had already been superseded by the act of 1788, P. L. 455, to which that of 1824 has no reference ; and it would be useless to inquire what would be the effect of the last act, if that of 1788 had not been passed. The Legislature may have been governed in the mode of enactment by the existence of that act. i think that the titles to the several tracts of land mentioned are not matured by the statute.
    These defendants also plead that they are bona fide purchasers, for valuable consideration, without notice. The lien on. Jasper’s Barony, in nature of a mortgage, was constituted by a decree of the Court in 1802. This decree was upon a bill for specific performance of an agreement for the purchase of Jasper’s Barony, by John- Screven ;. and the decree was, that the purchaser should pay the purchase money, and the land be mortgaged for the payment. The money not having been paid, but in part, a final decree for the sale of the mortgaged premises, was made in 1806 ; and the bill to revive the decree of 1806, was filed on the 8th September, 1823: so that there was no lis pendens to affect the defendants with notice, at the time of the' several purchases last mentioned. It was contended, however, that the decree of 1806 bound the land; and that the defendants cannot avail themselves of the plea of purchase, for valuable consideration, without notice. If by this it be meant that a decree of this Court constitutes a lien on land, like a judgment at law, so as to bind it in the hands of a purchaser, I know of no authority for such a doctrine. A decree of this Court nnr! ^ Searle v. Lane, 2 Vern. ranks with a judgment at law, in a course of administration must be paid according to priority of time. 89. Morrice v. Bank of England, Ca. Temp. Talb. 218. But this, in general, relates only to personal estate ; and there is no lien on land. Bligh v. Earl of Darnley, 2 P. Wms. 621.
    I suppose the argument to be, that a decree of the Court is, of itself, notice to a purchaser. In the case of Price v. White, decided by the Court of Appeals, at Charleston, in 1828, it was determined, that a decree of this Court is not notice. See also, Sugdenon Vendors, 538. A judgment at law is not notice : nor will the Court interfere against a bona fide purchaser of property, if he has obtained any advantage, by which he can, at law, protect himself against the judgment; such as the assignment of an outstanding term. 2 Cruise’s Digest, 254. Indeed, the rule of equity is general, that a bona fide purchaser, without notice, who has paid his money, has such equity, that the Court will not in any case .interfere against him, if he can defend himself at law. In Jerrard v. Saunders, 2 Ves. Jun. 457, Walwyn v. Lee, 9 Ves. 24, it is said, that if a bona fide .purchaser, without notice, has obtained the legal estate, he can never be affected in equity. In this case, the defendants have obtained the legal estate ; and if it was necessary for the complainant to bring the present bill, to obtain the benefit of the decree of 1806, he cannot have the aid of the Court against the defendants, standing in the situation of bona fide purchasers, for valuable consideration, without notice.
    It was also argued, that the defendants could not make a good legal title to the land, without finding the incumbrance : according, I suppose, to the rule laid down, 2 Fonbl. 303, book 3, ch. 3, sec. 1, note (6.) “ that where a purchaser cannot make out a title, but by a deed, which leads him to another fact, he shall be presumed to have notice of such fact.” Without entering into any consideration of the meaning and effect of the rule, it is sufficient to say, that it does not appear in this case, how the title could be made out, or what deed in the chain of title could lead to a knowledge of this incumbrance. As the defendants deny notice, the complainant was bound to prove it. As the land was decreed to be mortgaged, I suppose that a conveyance was executed to John Screven, in his life time, so as to vest the title in him; although this is not stated, or shewn. If there was such a conveyance, however, it does not follow, nor is it probable, that it would have afforded the notice. It *s state(^ al)d admitted, that the land was devised to defendant’s vendor, Thomas E. Screven, by the will of his father, John Screven. That will is not in evidence, but the mere devise of the land, cou^ 11 ot give notice of the incumbrance. If by making out the title, 'it be meant, that defendants could not have searched the public offices for incumbrances, and among them that of the register in equity, without finding the decree, which affected the land ; that raises the question, which has already been considered, and determined, to wit, whether the decree of the Court is of itself notice; or whether the party shall be presumed to have searched the office, and obtained notice. I think the plea of purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice, must be sustained.
    The purchase of seven hundred and thirty-eight acres made by the defendant, Heyward, on the 8th March, 1824, was made pendente lite, so that he cannot, as to that purchase, avail himself of the plea of purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice; nor has time enough elapsed, to give him a title by the statute of limitations.
    We are next to consider the case, with regard to the four hundred acres of land, stated, by Mr. Heyward, to have been purchased by his mother, in 1802. This purchase was also made pendente lite ; but I am inclined to think, that the constructive notice implied from Us pendens, has nothing to do with the statute of limitations. The statute will not run in favor of a purchaser from a mortgagee, or trustee, with notice, because, in general, such purchase is a fraud. That is, it will not run until the fraud is discovered. But to make out a case of fraud, it would seem, that there must be actual notice. All the cases on the subject are, that the Us pendens is such notice, as will disable a purchaser from pleading that he is a Iona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice. The reason of the rule is, that otherwise, it would be in the power of a defendant to defeat the plaintiff, if he could find an innocent purchaser; or, by shifting the property from hand to hand, create the necessity of making new parties, and render the suit interminable. All this has nothing to do with the statute of limitations. Actual notice, with respect to this land, was attempted to be inferred, from what is stated by Mr. Heyward, in his answer ; that about 1807, or 1808, he saw an advertisement, for the sale of the land, by Mr. Parker, as agent of the complainant; that he called on Mr. Parker, and requested him to investigate the circumstances of his mother’s purchase, and discontinue the advertisement, if the title was good ; and that he again saw Mr. Parker, who told him, that the advertisement was improper, and withdrew it. This r • m seems to me the reverse of proving notice. The conduct of Mr. Parker was calculated to satisfy him, that the title was good ; and even if Mr. Heyward had notice previously, it may be doubted, whether the complainant could assert his claim, after this conduct of his agent. Besides, if this were notice, it was long after the purchase was made1; and even then, probably, time enough elapsed for the statute to run out: and moreover, if Mr. Heyward had purchased fraudulently, with notice, this communication to complainant’s agent, was a discovery of the fraud. He was then aware, that Mr. Heyward claimed by an adverse title, and from that time, the statute began to run. I think, there can be no doubt of Mr. Heyward’s title to the tract of four hundred acres.
    It is therefore ordered, and decreed, that the bill be dismissed as to all of the defendants, except so far as it seeks to make liable to complainant’s demand, the seven hundred and thirty-eight acres of land, purchased by the'defendant, William Heyward, of Thomas E. Screven, on the 8th March, 1824. And it is ordered, that the said land be sold, in pursuance of the original decree in this case, for the satisfaction of complainant’s demand.
    The complainant appealed from this decree; and now moved that it might be reversed, except as to so much of it, as made one of the tracts of land, purchased by the defendant, Heyward, liable to the complainant’s demands.
    Frost, for the motion.
    The question upon the construction of the act of 1824, as to the time within which the complainant is barred by the statute of limitations, may be safely left where the Chancellor has placed it. His argument is conclusive in itself, and it would be as difficult to add to its force, as to overthrow it.
    On principle and authority, the decree of 1806 must be regarded as a lien on the lands. Woddrop v. Price, 3 Desaus. 203.' Decrees are not liens in England, because there is no process by which the defendant’s property can be sold, or be otherwise made directly liable, in satisfaction. Even a sequestration acts but indirectly on the estate, being, in fact, a process for contempt. 2 Mad. Ch. 205. In this State, the real, as well as the personal estate, is made liable to, and may be sold in satisfaction of, a decree in equity, by writ of execution, in nature of a fi. fa., under the act of 1785, P. L. 361, and see st. 5 Geo. 2, c. 7, s. 4, P. L. 250 ; and hence the rule of the English Chancery does not apply to decrees iu equity here. Wherever the law renders land directly liable to the satisfaction of adjudicated claims, the adjudication constitutes a ^en on ^ie 'an<^ 5 anc^ that for the obvious reason, that otherwise the law would be evaded and defeated. This is a principle of the common law, and is illustrated by the history of every lien by judgment, or debt of record. .Take, for instance, statutes merchant, and statutes staple, which are liens on land, simply because the land is made liable for the satisfaction of the debt. Before the st. 2 Westm. 2, 13 Edw. 1, c. 18, a judgment at law was not a lien on land; but after that statute, it was held to be so, because, under the statute, the defendant’s land might be extended by writ of elegit, and the execution would be defeated, if the judgment were not a lien. 1 Statutes at Large, 93,101. 2 lust, 394, 395. Plowd. 72. 3 Rep. 14. Gilbert on Executions, 32, 37, 42, 55. And see st. 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 15, P. L. 83.
    The plea of purchase for valuable consideration, without notice, cannot avail against a legal lien ; and even if the decree were not a lien, this defence cannot protect the defendants in this case, for they have not intitled themselves to the benefit of the rule of this high equity. A plea of purchase for valuable consideration, without notice, will not avail, unless it be alleged, and proved, that the vendor was seized, or pretended to be seized, in fee, and was in possession ; that the purchase money was actually paid, and not merely secured to be paid, and notice before payment, or execution of the deeds, is sufficient notice; and lastly, the plea must aver a conveyance, and not a mere agreement to convey. Not one of these defendants have come up to these requisitions, and therefore they are not protected by this defence. Moreover, a purchaser will be presumed to have notice of every deed, and of every fact, which must come to his knowledge in investigating his title ; and, indeed, whatever is sufficient to put the party upon inquiry, is notice. The Chancellor is mistaken, in presuming that a conveyance was made to John Screven, in his life time. No conveyance was made to him, or to his heirs, devisees, or executors; and their only title is the decree of 1802, which, while it vested the land in them, uno Jlalu declared it mortgaged for the debt. In support of these views, the following authorities were cited. Sugden on Vendors, 554, 556, 530. Mitf. PI. 215. Cooper’s Eq. PI. 281, 282, 285. 2 Mad. Ch. 322, 323. Head v. Egerton, 3 P. Wms. 281. Story v. Lord Windsor, 2 Atk. 630. Attorney General v. Backhouse, 17 Ves. 290. Walwyn v. Lee, 9 Ves. 32. Daniels v. Davison, 16 Ves. 252. Harta. Middlehurst, 3 Atk. 377. Brandlyn v. Ord, 1 Atk. 571. 2 Cruise’s Dig. 254. -2 Fonbl. 303, book 3, ch. 3, sec. 1, note (&.) Moore v. Bennett, 2 Ch. Ca. 246. Murray a. Ballou, 1 Johns. C. R. 575. Drapers’ Company v. Yardley, 2 Vern. 662. Smith v. Low, 1 Atk. 490. Biscoe v. Earl of Ban-bury, 1 Ch. Ca. 291. Coppin u. Fernyhough, 2 Bro. C. C. 291. and Taylor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves. Jun. 437.
    R. B. Smith, contra.
    
    As to these defendants, this is an original bill, and before it was filed, the complainant was'barred by the act of 1712 ; and that act is not altered, as to persons beyond seas, by the act of 1824. The act of 1824 is, in terms, confined to such as, by the act of 1712, were barred in jive years, by the act of 1712, and the complainant was not barred until the lapse of seven years : and if we go beyond the terms of the act, and speculate upon the intention of the framers, there is no more ground for allowing the complainant ten years, than there is for giving him twelve, because the act of 1712 allows persons beyond seas, two years more than residents of the State ; or for extending his time to fourteen years, because the act of 1824 doubles the time allowed to persons here by the act of 1712. In this uncertainty, the only safe rule is, to adhere to the plain import of the terms of the act; which may, perhaps, be founded on very sound principles of policy.
    On the question of lien, and the notice of the decree, the case of Price v. White, referred to by the Chancellor, is conclusive. Nor is there any thing in any of the authorities cited, which can deprive •the defendants of the benefit of their plea, that they are purchasers for valuable consideration, without notice. The Screvens were in the quiet possession of the land from the time of the purchase, and the defendants neither knew of any incumbrance, nor was there any on record, where they were bound to look for it. Sugden on Ven. dors, 130, 131. Powell on Mortgages, 670, 672. Frost v. Beck-man, 1 Johns. C. R. 288. And see Jackson v. Henry, 10 Johns. 185 ; Mertins v. Joliffe, Ambler, 313 ; and Earl of Portsmouth v. Lord Effingham, 1 Ves. Sen. 435.
    Mazyck, in reply,
    cited, and commented on Sugden on Vendors, 338, 398, 554. Montagu on Lien, 86. Mackreth v. Symmons, 15 Ves. 330. 2 Mad. Ch. 128. Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. C. R. 267. Martin v. Kerridge, 3 P. Wms. 240. Bligh v. Earl of Darnley, 2 P. Wms. 621. Newland’s Ch. Pr. 113.
    
      
      
         Vide post, for a report of this case.
    
   O’NeaMi, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. •

This Court concurs in opinion with the Chancellor, in his construction of the act of 1824.

.On the question, whether a decree of the Court of Equity constitutes a lien on land, similar to that of a judgment at law, so as to bind it in the hands of a purchaser, we have, unanimously, come to a different conclusion from that maintained by the decree.

At common law, a judgment did not bind the land of the defendant’ f°r reason, that the execution went against his goods alone, and his land was not liable, by any process,- to be taken in satisfaction ; but after the st. Westm. 2nd. 13 Edw. 1, cap. 18, which subjected a moiety of the defendant’s land to an extent, by writ of elegit, it was held, that the judgment bound from its recovery. Gilbert on Executions, 37. 2 Inst. 394, 395. This lien was by the statute of frauds and perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, sec. 15, P. L. 83, restricted, in its commencement, to the day on which the judgment was signed. It would hence seem to follow, from the effect produced by subjecting land to execution, for the payment of debts, that although, by the common law, the recovery of a judgment created no lien on the goods of the defendant, yet that it did create a lien on land, so soon as by statute it was made liable to be taken in execution to satisfy the judgment.

In the English Court of Chancery, a decree is regarded as acting against the defendant, personally. The non-performance of it is a contempt, to punish which, and to compel the performance of the decree, the only processes resorted to are, the writs of attachment, and sequestration. The first operates directly upon the person of the defendant, the latter, upon his estate. The writ of sequestration is only issued on the special order of the Chancellor, and for a contempt clearly made out. The effect of it is, to sequester the rents and profits of the defendant’s estate, until he performs the act required, and thus discharges the contempt. That there was no process, issuable, as of common right, whereby the estate of the defendant was rendered liable' to the satisfaction of a decree in chancery, was, manifestly, the only reason why such a decree, has been held, in England, to create no lien on the defendant’s estate; for in the case of Morrice v. The Bank of England, Ca. Temp. Talb. 217, it is, in all other respects, held to be equal to a judgment at law.

In this State, there has been a most material change of the En. glish law, both as to the enforcement of judgments at law, and of decrees in equity by execution. Before the st. 5 Geo. 2, c. 7, land in this State was not liable to be sold under execution ; but by that statute, it is declared to be liable to the like remedies, proceedings, and process, in any Court of law, or equity, to which personal estate is-liable. P. L. 250. Under this statute, land became liable to levy and sale under a fieri facias ; and if the Court of Equity bad then possessed the power of issuing executions against the goods of defendants, little doubt could have been entertained, that. decrees would have bound land. That power, however, did not belong to the Court, until it was conferred by the act of 1785 ; by which, it is provided, that, “ whereas, the mode of enforcing decrees in the Court of Chancery, is tedious, and often defective : be it therefore enacted, that in all cases where payment of money is decreed by the said Court, it shall be lawful for the party, to whom such payment is to be made, to sue forth, at his option, either the usual process for compelling performance óf the said decree, or a writ in nature of fieri facias, to make the estate, both real and personal, of the party, by whom, such money is to be paid, liable in satisfaction thereof, in the same manner as it is on such a writ from the Court of Common Pleas; and that the sheriff of the district, in which the estate levied upon lies, shall have the same power and authority to sell and convey the same, as he hath on a fieri facias from the Couijt of Common Pleas.” P. L. 361. The consequence, as we have already seen, of subjecting by statute, the defendant’s real estate, to the payment of a judgment, by means of an execution, is, at common law, to create a lien from the recovery of the judgment, and by the statute of frauds and perjuries, from the day on which the judgment is signed. The grant, therefore, of the common law process of fieri facias, to enforce a decree in equity, against both the real and personal estate of the party, gave to such decree, as a necessary incident, the lien of a judgment at law.

But even under the words of the act, without resorting to a common law inference to aid us, we should be compelled to come to the same conclusion. The act authorizes the party, to whom money is decreed to be paid, to sue out a writ in the nature of a fieri facias, to make the estate, both real and personal, of the party, by whom money is decreed to be paid, liable to the satisfaction of the decree; and how can it be made liable,- but by giving to the decree the same lien as a judgment at law ? If it had not this lien, the party could easily defeat the satisfaction of the decree, by a sale of his land so soon as it was pronounced, and before, under the rules of the Court of Equity, execution could be issued. Other creditors, too, by judgments at law intervening between the decree and execution, might sweep off the means of satisfaction. To make the party’s estate liable to satisfy the decree, it must have the same lien as a judgment at law, and the act certainly intended to give it that effect.

The decree, to Have this lien, must, however, bé a decree for the payment of money ; for that is the only case in which, by the act, the party can resort to a fieri facias. If the decree is for the per-f°rmance of a specific act, then to compel performance, an attachment, of sequestration, must be resorted to. It could have no lien, therefore, for it only looks to, and requires the party to perform the specific act. But there may be such a thing as a specific, as well as a general lien, under a decree. When the decree sets apart a particular piece-of property, for the payment of a sum of monéy, it would create a specific lien, and if not aided by the general lien, it would stand pretty much on the footing of a mortgage; and would, in general, be subjected to most of the rules relating to liens created by the act of the parties : but where the decree also ad. judges the money to be paid out of the whole of the party’s estate, then it creates a general lien, which follows all his property, as well that which is subjected to the specific lien, as the rest; and the party, to whom the money is ordered to be paid, may resort to his fieri facias, and compel satisfaction, by a sale of the estate. But the case of a specific lien, wherever the decree ascertains, and directs a sum of money to be paid, is aided by; or is, perhaps, merged in, the general lien which the law gives to it as a decree for the payment of money.

The decree in the case before us, establishes a sum of money to be due by the defendants in the original bill, and not only subjects the land in dispute to the payment of it, but also directs that the balance, if any, after the sale of the land, shall be paid out of the estate of their testator. It is, therefore, a decree for the payment of money, and has a lien, from the time it was pronounced, on all his real estate. The casé of Woddrop b. Price, 3 Desaus. 203, is an authority sanctioning the conclusion, that decrees for the payment of money bind land, in the same manner as judgments át law. Other decisions of the former Court of Appeals in Equity, it is believed, followed up, and maintained the same conclusión ; but for the want of repórts of the cases decided in that Court, fbr many years, we have been unable to refer to the cases themselves.

The decree having a legal lien on the whole of the testator’s real estate, it is unnecessary to consider the questions made on the defence set up, of purchase for valuable consideration, without notice. The purchasers took subject to a legal lien, and are liable to be divested by a sale under the decree. The complainant has a legal title to enforce his decree; and the defendants have but an equity to oppose to it, and must of course fail. The plea of pur. chase, for a valuable consideration, without notice, can never prevail against a legal title, to which there is no obstacle to a recovery at law. It is only a protection against an equity. It was not necessary for the complainant to have made these defendants parties. He might have enforced his decree without noticing them; and if he had, of his own mere motion, made them parties, I will not say, that the Court would have thought itself authorized to decree against them. But as a favor to the defendants, and to enable them to protect themselves if they could, he was directed to amend his bill, and make them parties. This has accordingly been done, and the defendants have been heard in defence of their title; and failing to protect themselves under the statute of limitations, it follows, from our view of the lien of the decree, that the land in dispute must be adjudged to be liable to the satisfaction of it.

It is, therefore, ordered, and decreed, that so much of the Chancellor’s decree as dismisses the amended, or supplemental bill, be reversed : and, that the tract of land containing one thousand and fourteen acres, purchased by the defendant, Bolán, on the 8th October, 1819 ; the tract of land, containing two hundred and thirty-four acres, purchased by Fitts, on the 7th February, 1820 ; the tract containing two hundred and ninety-five acres, purchased by the defendant, Huguenin, from Buckner, who purchased on the 11th January, 1819; the tract of two acres, purchased by the defendant, Heyward, on the 23d June, 1819; the tract containing eight hundred and seventy-seven acres, purchased by him on the 5th June, 1821; and the tract containing seven hundred and thirty-eight acres, purchased by him on the 8th March, 1824; be sold in pursuance of the original decree, in this case, for satisfaction of the complainant’s demands,

Johnson, J., and Harper, J., concurred.

Decree modified.  