
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kamalu GONZALES, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 14-10076.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 13, 2015.
    
    Filed March 17, 2015.
    Kimberly M. Frayn, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Michael Anthony Humphreys, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Kathryn C. Newman, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Las Vegas, NV, William Ramsey Reed, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Elizabeth Olson White, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Reno, NV, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Alina Maria Shell, Amy Cleary, Federal Public Defender’s Office Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellant.
    
      Before: McKEOWN, MURGUIA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The. panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Kamalu Gonzales appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to two counts of mail fraud, six counts of wire fraud, and two counts of money laundering. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We affirm.

The district court did not err — and certainly did not clearly err, see United States v. Aragbaye, 234 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir.2000), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. McEnry, 659 F.3d 893, 899 n. 8 (9th Cir.2011)—in imposing a two-level enhancement on the basis that Gonzales’s offense involved sophisticated means. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2Bl.l(b)(10)(C) (2013). “Conduct need not involve highly complex schemes or exhibit exceptional brilliance to justify a sophisticated means enhancement.” United States v. Jennings, 711 F.3d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir.2013). The district court’s finding that Gonzales used shell corporations was sufficient to support imposition of the enhancement. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 9(B) (2013). Additionally, in general, Gonzales’s conduct was comparable to conduct that we have held sufficient to support imposition of the enhancement. See United States v. Horob, 735 F.3d 866, 872 (9th Cir.2013) (per curiam).

Likewise, 'the district court did not err in imposing a two-level enhancement on the basis that Gonzales abused a position of trust in a manner that significantly facilitated his offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.3 (2013). As a loan officer, Gonzales enjoyed the kind of professional discretion-marked by, inter alia, “special knowledge [or] expertise”— that defines a position of trust. See United States v. Laurienti, 731 F.3d 967, 973-74 (9th Cir.2013). Having correctly concluded that Gonzales’s position as a loan officer was a position of trust, the district court did not clearly err in finding that abuse of this position significantly facilitated Gonzales’s offense.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     