
    The State ex rel. Campbell v. The Board of Police Commissioners of St. Louis, Appellants.
    
    
      1. Power of Police Commissioners. The power of the polioe commissioners to appoint a chief of police “for such time as the board may determine,” does not include the power to discharge and appoint a chief of police at their pleasure.
    2. --. An appointment of a chief of police without specifying the duration of the term is not void, and the commissioners cannot remove such an appointee at their pleasure.
    8. -. A chief of poliee cannot be removed by the commissioners before the expiration of his term of office, except for specified causes.
    4. Chief of Police : term or office. The statutory limitation of the term of office of a chief of police is four years where the term of his tenure is nob otherwise fixed by the order of his appointment.
    5. -: presumptions : certiorari. In proceedings by certiorari? it wiil not be presumed from a record which shows merely the removal of an officer that such removal was for cause shown.
    6. Practice. In such a proceeding such a record will be quashed. 
    
    
      Appeal from St. Louis Qourt of Appeals.
    
    
      Affirmed.
    
      Leoeretb Bell and C. II. Krum for appellants.
    
      O. id Joy and J. G. Chandler for respondent.
    
      
       These syllabi are taken from 14 Mo. App. 397.
    
   Henry, C. J.

We are satisfied with the conclusion reached by the court of appeals, viz., that the board could not remove Campbell, the chief of police, except for cause. The statute requires the board, when it appoints a chief, to fix the term for which he shall hold the office, and provides that he can only be removed for cause; and the board cannot evade the latter provision, either by neglecting or purposely omitting, to determine the period for which he shall hold the office. To concede to the board such authority would enable them to designate a term of office not warranted by the law, by appointing a chief to hold during their pleasure, and thus thwart the clearly expressed intent of the general assembly, that the chief should not be capriciously removed. It would sanction the acquisition by the board of authority, by their own disregard of the express injunction of the law, to remove the chief for political, or other reasons, in no way touching his capacity, or integrity.

The reasoning of the court of appeals (14 Mo. App. 2.97) on the question, I think unanswerable, and its conclusions are fully supported by the authorities cited in its opinion. The judgment is affirmed.

All concur.  