
    GARRETT et al. vs. LYNCH, Adm'r.
    [appeal ekom oedeb dissolving injunction.]
    1. Bill in chdheery; when without equity. — Where the allegations of a bill, filed to enjoin a judgment at law, show that there was á well ascertained and sufficient remedy at law, it is without equity, uüless it also shows that the defense at law was unlmowfi to complainant at the time of the rendition of the judgment; and if tho bill fails to show this; an injunction staying the collection of the judgment will be dissolved, on motion, in vacation, made under provisions of section 3438 of Eevised Code.
    S. Injunction; when will he dissolved. — An injüáction will be dissolved upon the denials of one of the defendants, upon wkom the gravamen rests, where there are several, and all have answered, if the denials' are full and complete.
    Appeal from Chancery Court of Limestone.
    Heard before Hon. Wm. Séinneíí.
    This was a bill in equity, filed by the appellants against the appellees, praying for injühction to restrain the collection of a judgment at law against them, founded on a promissory note given by them for lands sold by appellee, Lynch, as administrator of Thomas Lynch, deceased. The bill alleges, among other things, that the sale of lands was void; that the administrator sold them without having obtained the proper orders and authority for such purpose from the probate court; that the note given for the purchase was without consideration ; that there was no petition filed in the probate court alleging the grounds necessary to give the probate court jurisdiction to order a sale; that parties interested were not notified ; that there were minors, who were heirs-at-law of said estate, who had not been brought before the court, and who were not represented by guardian ad litem; that the sale of the land has never been confirmed ; that the sale of the land, thus made by the administrator, was not only void, but was a fraud upon the purchaser, &e.” The administrator and heirs-at-law of Thomas Lynch, deceased, are made parties defendant to the bill. Upon bond being given, an injunction was issued, as prayed for.
    The defendants all answered the bill, denying all of its material allegations, so far as known to them. The defendant, Darius Lynch, from personal knowledge, flatly and fully contradicted, and denied the allegations of the bill, upon which its equity rested, and the defendants demurred to the bill for want of equity.
    Afterwards, upon the coming in of the answers, on motion, before the chancellor in vacation, the injunction was dissolved. The dissolution of the injunction is the only error assigned which need be noticed.
    J. N. Malone, and Walker & Jones, for appellants.
    Houston & Pryor, contra.
    
   PETERS, J.

The complainant in a bill in chancery is not only a pleader, but also a witness. He is entitled not only to make a clear and orderly statement of the facts on which his suit is founded, but so far as this statement is not denied or contradicted by the answer of the adverse party, it is to be taken as proved or admitted. — Gresham’s Eq. Ev. pp. 8, 9; Rev. Oode, §§ 3327, 3390, 3391. But that eminent good faith, which is a prevailing principle in courts of equity, requires that the statement thus permitted should be fairly made, without attempt at suppression or evasion. When this is not done, it leaves room for very great uncertainty in the mind of the court, when seeking to ascertain the true import of the allegations made in the bill. Here the statement of facts in the bill upon which its equity is based, is seemingly that the order of the probate court for the sale of the lands of Thomas Lynch, deceased, was so irregular as to be void, for want of conformity to the statute. — See Satcher v. Satcher’s Adm’r, 41 Ala. 26. But there is no allegation that this irregularity was unknown to the complainants at the date of the judgment, which is sought to be enjoined, or at the time of the sale. If the note on which the judgment was founded was without consideration, void or fraudulent, as is stated in the seventeenth and eighteenth paragraphs of the bill, this was a sufficient and well ascertained defense at law. — 1 Parson’s on Cont. 853, et seq.; 2 ib. 879. It was, therefore, necessary to allege in the bill, that some competent reason intervened to prevent the interposition of such defense, upon the trial at law, This additional allegation was required to sustain the equity of the bill. If there was a valid defense at law, then there should have been an excuse shown for failing to plead it. This is not done. The bill, then, is without equity in this particular —McCollum v. Prewett, 37 Ala. 573; Weaver v. The State, 39 Ala. 535; French v. Garner, 7 Porter, 549. This deficiency in the bill was sufficient to justify the dissolution of the injunction. — Cave v. Webb, 22 Ala. 583.

But, eveji if this were otherwise, the facts upon which the equity of this case is presumed to rest are fully and directly met and denied in the answer of Lynch, the administrator. This would authorize the injunction to be dissolved. — Hilliard on Inj. p. 99, § 53; Saunders v. Cavett et al., 38 Ala. 51; Hogan v. Branch Bank, (at Decatur,) 10 Ala. 485; Dunlap v. Clements et al., 7 Ala. 539.

Then, without going further into the merits of the case, we feel constrained to approve the action of the learned chancellor, in the court below, in dissolving the injunction. His decree is therefore affirmed, with costs of the appeal in this court and the court below,  