
    Jose Armando MONROY-PERDOMO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-70435.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 11, 2013.
    
    Filed Feb. 14, 2013.
    Frank P. Sprouls, Esquire, Law Office of Ricci and Sprouls, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.
    Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, OIL, Aaron R. Petty DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jose Armando Monroy-Perdomo, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo constitutional challenges to removal orders, Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 586 F.3d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.2008), and review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to remand, Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir.2005). We deny the petition for review.

Even assuming that the allegedly unlawful search of Monroy-Perdomo’s residence and his subsequent arrest was an egregious violation of his constitutional rights, the agency did not err in concluding that there was substantial independent evidence in the record to establish that he was nonetheless subject to removal as charged. See Hoonsilapa v. INS, 575 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir.1978), modified by 586 F.2d 755 (9th Cir.1978) (“[T]he mere fact that a Fourth Amendment illegality directs attention to a particular suspect does not require exclusion of evidence subsequently unearthed from independent sources”)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Monroy-Perdomo’s motion to remand to apply for voluntary departure, where he had the opportunity to apply for voluntary departure before the IJ and he did not claim that ineffective assistance of counsel prevented him from applying. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931, 934 (9th Cir.1986)(“petitioners are generally bound by the conduct of their attorneys, including admissions made by them, absent egregious circumstances.”)

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     