
    COURT OF APPEALS,
    JUNE TERM, 1805.
    Scrivener’s Adm’r. vs. Scrivener's Ex’rs.
    on a bill filed Jn the court of ■'ban-eery by the administrator of an. intestate, claiming (after a number of years had elapsed,) in the intestate’s own right, and in right of a deceased brother, distributive shares of the per*- nal estates of his father and brother, and a distributive «hare of his mother’s personal estate, against the executors ofano-thet brother, who w >s the adminie tyatov of lite mother, 'who -was admimstvatvix of the father. In the answer of the defendants they relied on the act or limitation!. Decreed to the complainant a proportion of the personal estate®' of the intestate’s mother, not included in the inventory returned hy her administrator; also for the’ hire of certain slaves the property of the intestate and of his deceased brother—and after allowing certain deductions to he. mude in favour of the defendants out of the personal estate of the complainant’s intestate, the residue decreed to be paid to the complainant, with interest from the time of fiUng the bill.
    General exceptions to the auditor’s report ought not to be made, Every exception ought to point out a particular error
    The court of chancery neither decides on titles to property, nor determines important litigated ipoiats of law.
    Appeal from a decree of the court of chancery dismissing the appellant’s bill of complaint. The bill, filed on the 28th of March 1799, charges that Mary JJerivener, mother of William Scrivener, the complainant's intestate, obtained letters of administration on the estate of John Scrivener, the father of the said William, and paid the said William sundry specific articles of stock, &e. and two negro women, to wit, Grace and Hagar, which Magar afterwards had issue a daughter called Meriah, both now alive. That the said William was entitled to a distributive part of the Del.sonaj estate of bis deceased brother, Richard, I Scrivener, and that in satisfaction of said distributor^ portion, some stock, and a negro man called Tim, was delivered to him. That the said Mary Scrivener, in her life-time, after the delivery of negro Grace to the said William, sold the said negro woman Grace, and received the purchase money, and has never accounted for the same to the said William. That the said Mary died intestate in the year 1772, and that Francis Scrivener, brother of the said William, administered on her estate, and afterwards paid two negroes to the said William in part of his share ■of his mother’s personal estate, but kept and detained the rest of the personal estate to which the said William was by law entitled. That the said William is lately dead, leaving several poor relations, to whom their legal proportion of his estate is an object of consequence; that he was for thirty years last past in a slate of such imbecility of mind as to be utterly inca» pableof doingor transacting any business, or of making any contract or disposition of property. That Francis Scrivener is lately dead, having made his will and thereby appointed the defendants his executors, who have proved the will, and obtained letters testamentary. That the said Francis took into his possession the whole negroes and personal property of the said William some time in 1772, and has used, worked, and enjoyed the same to his own exclusive use and benefit, until his death, and by the defendants since that period to the present time; and neither the said Francis in his life-time, nor the defendants since his death, have accounted for or paid over to the said William or (he said complainant, any thing or satisfaction therefor. That the said Francis, taking advantage of his brother’s weakness and imbecility of mind, kept him in an out-house, clothed, fed, and worked him as a negro, and with his negroes, and received from his labour, through a period of many years, great pecuniary benefit and emolument, far exceeding the value of his food and clothes. That the said Francis, to cover his improper and fraudulent conduct, drew up a will, in which he devised to himself all the estate of the. said William, and then caused the said William to sign the same, thereby intending to secure to himself his estate and exemption from any account as to its value — But that the said William, at the time of signing the said instrument or will, was, by reason of mental weakness and imbecility, foolish, childish, and incapable of making or understanding one. That the said instrument, purporting to be the will of the said 'William, on the decease of the said Francis, came to the hands of the defendants, who with great honesty and fairness, knowing the circumstances of their personal knowledge, and calling on the witness, who refused to prove it, permitted letters of administration in the usual form of intestacy to be granted to the complainant. That he the complainant lias called on the defendants, the executors of the said 'Francis, to account with him for the use, profits and enjoyment, of the said William’s estate, whilst in possession of their testator, and whilst in their possession since his deatii, and to pay the same over, which reasonable request the defendants have refused to comply with. Prayer for an account, &c.
    The answers of the defendants admit the said Mary obtained letters of administration on the estate of her deceased husband John, and that the said Wil-t liam was entitled to a distributive share, which the said Mary did actually pay to the said William on the 14th June 1763, as by his receipt produced in full for his share of his father’s estate. They have heard that the said William obtained a negro man named, Tim, as his proportion of his brother Richard’s estate, but that the said negro has been dead 20 or 30 years past. They do not know or admit that he ever was in the possession of the said Francis. They do not know that negro Grace was, after she was given to the said William, sold by the said Mary, or that she received the money arising from the sale; but they admit, that on the death of the said Mary the said William was entitled to a proportion of her estate. That the said Mary has been dead upwards of 18 or 20 years past, and that on her death the said Francis obtained letters of administration on her estate, avid did, as the defendants believe, pay and satisfy the said William for his proportion of the said estate, as will appear by a receipt given by him on the 1st of January 1775, to the said Francis the administrator. They admit that the said negro James, (mentioned in the last receipt,) and llagar, lived with and worked for the said Francis until his death, which happened in 1797; and they admit the said William also lived with and was supported by the said Francis until his death, which happened in 1795 or thereabouts* That since the death of the said William and Francis, the said negro Sugar has been permitted to go at largo by the complainant. That the said two negroes arc about 60 years of age, and of course rather an expense than profit. That they were not included by the defendants in the inventory returned by them of the estate of the said Francis, nor do lliey claim them as such. They admit that the said William was a man of weak mind, and incapable of managing for himself, and that he lived with and was under the care of his brother Francis; but they deny that the said Francis made a profit by his labour, or treated him ás a negro, or worked him as such; but that he lived with the said Francis as one of the family, and amused himself in any mode he thought proper; that in the latter part of his life, and at his request, the said Francis had a house furnished for him that he might live by himself, and that a negro boy, belonging to the said Francis, was constantly employed to wait on him, and that he eat in the family ofthc said Francis. That the labour of the slaves of the said William was not equal to the expense, of maintaining him. They admit that, the said negro llagar had a daughter named Meriah, and that she is now about 30 years of age. That the said William, at the time when he was capable of managing for himself, exchanged the said Meriah, when she was young, with the said Francist 
      for ahorse, and the said Francis, afterwards, (25 years ago,) held and claimed her. That Meriah has, on the distribution of the said Francis’s estate, been given to Folly his daughter. They do not know that the said William was ever entitled to negro Sail, as stated in the bill, or that she ever belonged to the said Richard Scrivener. That she was always held as the property ■of the said Francis. From the length of time in which the different events stated in the answer took place, the defendants pray the aid of the act of limitations, and plead the same in bar to the complainant’s bill, and of the relief prayed, &c.
    The parties agreed that the auditor should state an, account between them, and return the same to the court of chancery, there to be liable and subject to every exception, which could be made against a decree to account, by either party, within SO days after the return. The auditor accordingly stated sundry accounts, and made report thereon to the court of chancery — and the complainant’s counsel excepted to the auditor’s report and accounts, “because the accounts No. 4, &c. against the weight of evidence, state balances in favour of the defendants, when according to the evidence the balances ought to be in favour of the complainant.” And the defendants’counsel also excepted to the said report and accounts, «‘because the accounts No. 4, &c, against the weight of evidence, state a balance due to the complainant, when the balance, according to the evidence, should be in favour of the defendants.” There had been much evidence taken under a commission, and also by the auditor. The case was argued before the chancellor on the exceptions of each party to the aui ditor’s report.
    HaNsoN, Chancellor, (2,1st of March 1803.) Th,e. auditor had stated an acco.unc without any order of the chancellor, but merely o.n the agreement of the parties, reserving the equity, &c. And the exceptions, are only general, viz. that the auditor has stated against the evidence^ such exceptions, the chancellor. conceives, ought never to be. filed; every exception, in his opinion, ought to point out a particular error or errors, and general exceptions only transfer in effect the examination of the papers from the. auditor to the .chancellor. He has however examined the papers.
    He wishes it impressed on the minds of the gentlemen of the bar, that this court neither decides on titles to property, nor determines important litigated points of law.
    The complainant grounds his application chiefly on the point, that certain property of Mary Scrivener was not returned in the inventory by John Scrivener9 and it seems that John Scrivener claimed it as his own property. Is the chancellor now on depositions to ascertain in which of them was the right of property? A great number of years have elapsed since the death of the said Mary, and no proper legal steps seems to have been taken on account of the supposed omission in the inventory. In short, thechanceilor will not undertake to decide with respect to the right of the said pioperty.
    As to the exceptions, the chancellor can only say, it appears to him that none of the auditor’s statements is right, except merely his calculations, which are seldom (if ever) wrong. The chancellor would state the account himself, if it were not, that on examination of the great mass of strange evidence he is far from being satisfied that the complainant as administrator of William Scrivener is entitled to claim any thing on an account to be stated fairly between John and William Scrivener, for clothing and maintenance, on one side., and for labour, the use of property, &c. on the other side.
    From the. manner in which the cause was argued, the chancellor considered, that he was hearing it finally; and he sees no reason for postponing a final decision. Decreed — that the bill of the complainant be dismissed; and that the defendants be hence dismissed, but without costs. There is no necessity for deciding with respect to limitation or the lapse of time.
    
      From which decree the complainant appealed to this court.
    
      Key and Shaaff, for the Appellant.
    Martin, (Attorney-Genera!,) Biukney and Johnson, for the Appellees.
   The Court of Appeals,

[Rumsey,

Ch. J. Jones and Dennis, J.J

at this term, (June 1805.) reversed the decree of the court of chancery — And Decreed, that the appellant shall be allowed against the appellees for one fourth of the personal property of Mary Scrivener not included iti the inventory returned by her administrator Francis Scrivener, the said one fourth part amounting, as stated by the auditor in his report made to the court of chancery, to the sum S6Z 15s ,0d cut rent money; that the appellant shall also he allowed ten years hire of the following negroes, from the 4th of April 1772, to the 4th of April 1782, and at the following prices, to wit: Tim at £ 15 per annum; Jem at £15 per annum; and Hagar at 7l 10s 0d per annum; and also the following sums annually for the following negroes, from the said 4th of April 1772, to the 1st of January 1797, to wit: for Jem £15, and Hagar 71 10s Od, arid tiie sum of 5110s Od per annum for the negro Meriah, from the 1st January 1790 to the 1st January 1797, That the appellees be allowed against the appellant the sum of £15 per annum, from the 4th of April 1772 to the 1st January 1797, for the board and maintenance of William Scrivener, deceased; and the appellees shall also be allowed one third part of the balance due the appellant, after deducting as aforesaid for the board and maintenance of the said W. Scrivener; the said one third part being the proportion due the appellees as their share of the personal estate of the said W. Scrivener — and the balance remaining due to the appellant after the aforesaid deductions for the appellees shall, under the particular circumstances of this case, only bear interest from the 28th of March 1799;, the time of filing the bill — And that the appellees shall pay the said appellant the said balance, with the interest aforesaid, together with one third part of the appellant’s costs of suit, both in the court of chancery and this court, And that the chancellor pass such order and decree in the premises as shall be proper and sufficient to carry into effect the judgment and decree of this court therein.  