
    Joseph T. Buckingham versus Bradish Billings.
    Of the tools of a debtor, necessary for his trade or occupation, exempted from attachment and execution by the statute of, 1805, c. 100.
    'Trespass for taking and carrying away one printing-press, of the value of $75 ; 560 pounds of long primer types, of the value of $ 366 ; 530 pounds of brevier types, of the value of $ 397 ; and 34 wooden cases, of the value of $ 34 ; and converting the same to the defendant’s use.
    The defendant, besides the general issue which was joined, pleaded a special justification in bar, that, as a deputy sheriff of this county, by virtue of a writ of attachment sued, out of the Court of Common Pleas for this county, and directed to the sheriff or his deputy, commanding them to * attach the said Buckingham’s goods to the value of $ 4000, he attached and took the said chattels, and afterwards duly returned the said writ, &c.
    
      The plaintiff replied, that the said chattels are tools necessary to him for the carrying on and doing the business of his trade, art, and occupation, as a book-printer ; and that, by the law of the Commonwealth, entitled “ An Act to exempt certain goods and chattels of debtors from attachment and execution,”  they are and were altogether exempt from attachment on mesne process and execution
    The defendant, in his rejoinder, traversed, that the said chattels were the tools of the defendant necessary to his trade or occupation, &c., on which an issue to the country was joined.
    The jury found a special verdict, namely, that the plaintiff is and was, at the time of the trespass complained of, a printer, within the town of Boston, carrying on business extensively in printing books of various descriptions ; that the articles mentioned in the declaration were taken by the defendant out of the possession of the plaintiff; that they were his property, and were implements and machines, namely, types, printing-press, and cases, commonly used in the exercise of that art; that the defendant, as is set forth in his plea at bar, and in the capacity he has therein set forth, took the articles by virtue of the precept which he has described in his plea, and duly returned the said precept ; that, to carry on the business of the plaintiff, in the extensive manner he was accustomed to exercise it in, and to be ready for all employments in the line of book-printing which might offer, the articles taken were necessary ; but that many common school-books, works particularly the copyright of which is commonly secured, newspapers, and many other works, might be executed with the implements and materials which were not taken, but suffered to remain with the plaintiff, and which were of the value of $ 1600 ; and that the want of the articles taken would render it more difficult for the * plaintiff to procure employment in his trade and occupation in the town of Boston, where there is a competition ■ among printers. If, upon the whole matter above found, the taking of the articles described in the declaration was unlawful, the jury find the defendant guilty, and assess damages for the plaintiff in the sum of $ 705-50. Otherwise they find the defendant not guilty.
    
      Parker, for the plaintiff,
    contended, that it was sufficiently found by the verdict, that the articles in question were the necessary tools of the plaintiff in the exercise of his trade as a book-printer. Distresses at common law cannot be made of the books of a scholar, or utensils of trade, or things used in trade ; and the reason given for the exemption of these and other articles is, that it is for the public good that trade be encouraged. Nor is the exemption limited 1•» tools used by the hand; for anvils in a smith’s shop, millstones, and looms are privileged. 
    
    The statute, under which the defendant justifies, has no limitation as to the value of the tools exempted ; and, being intended for the upholding of trade and industry, as well as for the relief of insolvent debtors, it should receive a liberal construction. The law encourages apprenticeships to manual occupations as a public benefit. To employ them is part of the master’s business and duty ; and for this purpose a greater quantity of implements and materials is necessary.
    Shaw, for the defendant.
    The statute, being in derogation of the common right of attaching for security, should be construed strictly.  The policy of our law is, to extend the remedy for creditors as against the property of the debtors, and to restrain it as against their persons.
    The defendant was obliged to act at his peril, respecting the provisions of this statute.  The law will not, then, make him a wrongdoer by construction.
    The general object of the statute was to exempt articles of small value, and of frequent and daily use, under the name of tools necessary to a debtor’s trade. Tool is * defined by Johnson, “ any instrument of manual occupation ” ; and the authorities he cites go fully to support this restricted interpretation ; in which he is also confirmed by the larger dictionaries of arts and sciences.
    But, allowing the articles in question to have been tools, they were not necessary to his trade or occupation. To be necessary, they must be indispensable. But this is plainly contradicted by the verdict.
    As to the law of distresses, it is inapplicable. For the articles exempted under that law are still liable to be seized on fieri facias, and the object of our attachment on mesne process is only to secure the chattels to satisfy the execution. 
    
    
      
      
        Stat. 1805, c. 100.
    
    
      
      
        Com. Dig Tit. Distress, C.
      
    
    
      
       6 Bac. Abr. Tit. Stat. 1. 6.
    
    
      
       3 Mass. Rep. 198.
    
    
      
       1 Burr. 587.-3 Salk. 136 - Wittes, 512
    
   Parker, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. The replication in this case avers, that the articles taken were tools of trade, necessary for the occupation of the plaintiff. The rejoinder denies that fact. And the special verdict finds that the articles were a printing-press, types, and certain other implements of a printing-office ; that other articles of the like nature, and of the value of more than $ 1600, were left unattached ; and that the articles taken weie necessary to enable the plaintiff to prosecute his business in the extensive manner he had been accustomed to carry it on ; but that he might, with the implements that were left, carry on the business of a printer to a considerable extent. Whether the articles taken were necessary tools or not, within the meaning of the statute, the jury have referred to the opinion of the Court.

By the first section of the statute upon which the question has arisen, it is provided, that, among other things therein specified, the tools of any debtor, necessary for his trade or occupation, shall be exempted from attachment and execution. This statute, as it is in derogation of the common rights of creditors to secure their debts out of the property of their debtors, ought to have a strict construction ; according to the true intent and meaning of the legislature, if that can be ascertained.

* It is not to be supposed, that it was designed to comprehend within the term tools (which are properly small "articles used by the hand) complicated machinery or expensive utensils, which may, of themselves, be of great value. There are many machines now used in manufactures, which may as well be denominated tools as the apparatus of a printing-office ; and yet it cannot be supposed it was intended to exempt them from attachment, and thus to enable a debtor to hold a great capital which cannot be reached by his creditors. And, indeed, when the household furniture to be exempt is limited by the statute to the value of $ 50, and the tools of trade are exempted without any limitation, we are necessarily led to the conclusion, that the term tools was used in the statute to designate those implements which are commonly used by the hand of one man, in some manual labor necessary for his subsistence.

It has been shown, from the best lexicographers, that, by the word tool is to be understood some simple instrument used by the hand ; and even if we should not confine the term to so strict a sense, yet we are not at liberty to suppose that the legislature departed so entirely from the appropriate meaning as to extend it to complicated and expensive machinery, which requires many hands to set it in motion. In the broad sense contended for by the plaintiff, all the utensils of a distillery; the looms, spindles, &c., of a cotton or woollen manufactory; the forges and other instruments of a manufactory of iron, would be free from attachment; although it is well known that these articles may cost thousands of dollars. Such a construction cannot be adopted, without a violation of the common principles of our laws for the security of debts.

But, allowing the furniture of a printing-office to be the tools of trade of a printer ; still the verdict in this case does not find them to be necessary. This term excludes from the exemption every thing without which the debtor can work at his trade. It is not intended that he shall bo * protected in carrying on an extensive trade, with a large capital in tools ; while his creditor may be suffering for the money that is justly due to him. It appears in the case before us, by the verdict, that a printing apparatus, in all respects complete and of great value, has been left with the plaintiff; by the use of which he might carry on many branches of his trade. This is surely enough to show that those taken were not necessary.

It has been suggested, that the remedy still exists against the per son of the debtor. But by our laws, as at present existing, the imprisonment of a debtor is merely nominal. He may sleep in his own bed, eat at his own table, and carry on business at his usual place, notwithstanding he is legally in jail. If, to these privileges, be added the right of securing a fortune under the name of tools of trade, the situation of the debtor will often be preferable to that of the creditor. And he may even free himself from this figurative imprisonment, by swearing that he has no estate, except what is exempted from attachment. In every view of the subject, we are satisfied that the articles taken by tbe defendant were not tools of trade, within the true meaning of the statute. Judgment must, therefore, be rendered upon this verdict for the defendant.

[Howard vs. Williams, 2 Pick. 80; Danforth vs. Woodward, 10 Pick. 423. — Ed.]  