
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Alfred SANTOS, Defendant—Appellant.
    No. 04-4533.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: Dec. 15, 2004.
    Decided: Jan. 6, 2005.
    Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Walter B. Dalton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt, Research and Writing Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant.
    Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Michael J. Elston, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Damon A. King, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
    Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM:

Alfred Santos pled guilty to aggravated sexual abuse of a child, but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress his statements to an officer of the United States Army Criminal Investigation Division. Santos was sentenced to ninety-eight months imprisonment. He appeals the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Santos alleges that his statement should have been suppressed because it was not voluntary and was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Specifically, he contends that he did not understand English well enough to understand the Miranda warnings, that he was intimidated by a gun in the interrogator’s office, that he confessed in exchange for a promise of leniency, and that he was under duress during the interrogation due to pain and pain medication. We review the district court’s factual findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir.1992). When a suppression motion has been denied, this court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.1998). Reviewing the evidence as required, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding Santos’ statement was voluntary, and thus the motion to suppress was properly denied.

Because Santos’ claims fail on appeal, we affirm his conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED  