
    Artemas Thompson versus Henry Marsh and Another.
    An action lies for a deputy sheriff who has attached chattels on mesne process against another deputy of the same sheriff, who takes such chattéls from the possession of the bailee of the first deputy, upon another writ against the same party.
    
      This was an action of trover for a horse. The plaintiff, being a deputy sheriff of this county, had attached and taken the horse on mesne process in August, 1815, as the property of one Taggart. The defendant Marsh, being also a deputy sheriff for this county, took the same horse in execution, as the property of the said Taggart, in March, 1816, from the bailee or servant of the plaintiff. The other defendant was interested in the said execution, although not nominally a party to it; and he went with Marsh and showed him the said horse, as the property of the said execution debtor, and directed him to take it as such.
    These facts being in evidence at the trial of the cause before Jackson, J., at the last April term in this county, the defendants’ counsel objected that this action would not lie under such circumstances, for one deputy sheriff against another. The judge, intending to reserve that question for the consideration of the whole Court, permitted the trial to proceed; and the plaintiff obtained a verdict.
    If the Court should be of opinion that this action was * maintainable under these circumstances, the verdiet was to stand ; otherwise the verdict was to be set aside, and the plaintiff to become nonsuit.
    
      Hubbard, for the défendants,
    urged the objection taken at the trial, and he cited, in support of it, the cases of Draper vs. Arnold, 12 Mass. Rep. 449. — Watson & Al. vs. Todd & Al. 5 Mass. Rep. 271. —Perley vs. Foster, 9 Mass. Rep. 112. — Barkly & Al. vs. Kempstow, Cro. Eliz. 123.—Martyn vs. Podger & Al. 5 Burr. 2631.— Warren vs. Leland, 9 Mass. Rep 265. — Lundden vs. Leavitt, Ibid. 104.— Cameron vs. Reynolds, Cowp. 403.— Ackworth vs. Kempe, Doug. 40. — Woodgate vs. Knatchbull, 2 D. & E. 156.—Bac. Abr., Sheriff, H.
    
      Gold, for the plaintiff,
    cited the cases of Blake vs. Shaw, 7 Mass. Rep. 506. — Pierce vs. Jackson, 6 Mass. Rep. 242. — Grinnel vs. Phillips,. 1 Mass. Rep. 537. — Weld vs. Bartlet, 10 Mass. Rep. 470. — Parker vs. Kett, 1 Salk. 95.
   Per Curiam.

The objection taken in this case proceeds upon the ground that all the deputies of the sheriff are but one officer, being all servants of the same master. This arises from a dictum of the late Chief Justice Parsons, in the case of Watson if Al. vs. Todd if Al. The position is true in a limited sense ; so that one deputy cannot interfere with another, and take property already in the hands of that other; but this very principle gives a right of action where there is such an interference. Otherwise there would be great confusion and continual contention between deputies. Where property is attached by a deputy sheriff, and in his actual or constructive possession, he has the legal custody of the whole, and subsequent attachments can be made only by him. A second deputy, who comes to attach, finding the goods already in legal custody, is bound in duty to deliver his precept to the one who has the goods, and require him to attach. If he do not, he is guilty of a breach of duty, for which he will be responsible.

Judgment on the verdict.  