
    Fales versus Dearborn.
    IThe Si. 1820, c. 65, establishing the law of the road, applies to the streets in Boston, and other populous places.
    A person driving a vehicle across the street must see that he does not interfere with others in the proper exercise of their right of passing.
    This was an action of trespass, originally brought before a justice of the peace, to recover a compensation for an injury to the plaintiff’s hackney-coach, occasioned by the defendant in negligently driving against it with his chaise. Plea, the general issue,
    By St. 1820, e. 65, it is enacted, that in all cases of persons meeting each other on any bridge, turnpike, or other road, travelling with carriages, &e., the persons so meeting shall seasonably drive their carriages, &c., to the right of the centre of the travelled part of such bridge, turnpike, or other road, so as to enable each other’s carriages, &e., to pass each other without interference or interruption ¡ and that every person offending &c., shall pay a fine for each offence or neglect, and shall, moreover, be held answerable to any party injured, for all damages sustained in consequence of such offence or neglect.
    At the trial in the Court of Common Pleas, it was testified, that the plaintiff’s servant was driving the coach in Boston, up Hanover Street, (which opens, at nearly right angles, into Court Street, where it terminates,) towards Court Street, keep- ' ing on the right side of Hanover Street; that the horses had not proceeded so far into Court Street, as that the driver could turn the corner to the right, which he intended to do, when the chaise, coming from the right ran against the pole of the coach ; that the chaise came through Court Street and was crossing the street to go to Concert Hall, at the other corner of Hanover and Court Streets.
    
      Ward, chief justice of the Court of Common Pleas,
    instructed the jury, that the statute was applicable to all highways, as well in Boston as elsewhere ; that the right side of the street was the peculiar right of the traveller, and although he might use the middle, or the left side, when he did not interfere with the rights of other persons, yet if he departed from the right side and interfered with other persons, and damage was done to them, he was responsible for the consequences ; that if the jury found that the chaise of the defendant was on the left side of the street which he was coming down, the defendant was answerable for any injury which they might find the plaintiff had sustained.
    ■ The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant filed his exceptions to these instructions.
    S. L. Knapp, for the defendant,
    contended that the statute was not meant to apply to a crowded city like Boston, where some of the streets and lanes are so narrow that two carriages cannot pass by each other. In the present case the parties did not meet, but crossed each other. Even if the statute does apply to Boston, the defendant certainly had a right to cross the street, in order to go to any particular house. The injury to the plaintiff was occasioned by a mere accident, for which no one is to be blamed.
    
      M. Moore, for the plaintiff.
   The Court observed, that the defendant, before he attempted io cross to Concert Hall, ought to have seen that he could do it without interfering with persons who were in the proper exercise of their right of passing through the street, and that they saw no reason to find fault with the direction of the judge of the Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed 
      
       See Mayhem v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 423; Aston, v. Heaven, 2 Esp. 533; Wordsworth v. Willan, 5 Esp. 273. [ Wade v. Carr, 2 Dowl. & R. 255; Story on Bailments, 376 - 378; Earing v. Lansingh, 7 Wendell, 185; Clark v. Commonwealth, 4 Pick. 125.]
     