
    Charles Bridge versus Abraham Lincoln and Others.
    One who had bond Jide received, on the morning of the first Monday in April, two hundred dollars in advance of his yearly salary, was holden to possess the pecuniary qualification required by the constitution to entitle a citizen to.vote in the election of governor, &c.
    This action was in case against the defendants, the selectmen of the town of Worcester in the year 1814, for refusing to place the name of the plaintiff upon the list of voters for that year, qualified to vote in the choice of governor, lieutenant-governor, counsellors, and senators; and for refusing to receive his vote, when duly tendered at the meeting, for the choice aforesaid.
    The declaration contained several counts, the third of which was as follows, viz.: “ Also for that at Worcester aforesaid, on the 7th day of March last, the inhabitants of the said town of Worcester, who were qualified according to law to vote in the choice of town officers, were then and there duly convened in town meeting, it being the annual meeting of said inhabitants for the choice of town officers, and the said defendants were then and there legally chosen by said inhabitants to the office of selectmen of said town for the year then next ensuing, and did then and there severally accept said office, and were afterwards, on the * same day, duly sworn, &c.; — all which by the records of said town appears. And the said defendants there afterwards, on the first Monday of April current, it being the 4th day, and the day appointed by the constitution of the commonwealth for the choice of a governor, &c., having previously called a meeting of said inhabitants according to law, to be holden on said day for the purpose aforesaid, the said defendants did convene at said Worcester, pursuant to the statute in such case made and provided, for the purpose of receiving evidence of the legal qualifications of such persons, belonging to said town, to vote at the meeting aforesaid, as had not previously been entered on the list of voters in said town, and for the purpose of correcting said list before the opening of said meeting, so as that the same list might contain the names of all the qualified voters belonging to said town. And the plaintiff, being then more than twenty-one years of age, and being then and ever since a citizen of said commonwealth, and an inhabitant of said town of Worcester, and having an estate within said commonwealth of the value of sixty pounds, and being in all respects qualified according to law to vote in the choice of governor, &c., and not being borne upon said list, did then and there, while the defendants, in their said capacity of selectmen of said town, were convened as aforesaid for the purposes aforesaid, present himself before them, and request them, in their capacity aforesaid, to put his name on said list, that he might be entitled to vote at said meeting in the choice of the aforesaid officers and magistrates of the said commonwealth, and did then and there exhibit to said selectmen good and sufficient legal evidence of his qualifications to vote in the choice of governor, &c., for the purpose of satisfying them of his being qualified as aforesaid. And the said defendants, there afterwards, on the same 4th day of April current, did preside as selectmen of said town of Worcester, at the said last-mentioned meeting, which had been duly called by them as aforesaid for the purpose of electing a governor, (fee., and did then and there, in said capacity * of selectmen, call upon all persons belonging to said town, qualified according to law to vote at said meeting, to bring forward and to deliver to them, as selectmen of said town, their votes for a governor, (fee. And the plaintiff, being qualified to vote as aforesaid, did then and there, in open town meeting, and before the close of the poll by the defendants, offer to them his vote for a governor, &c., and requested them, the said selectmen, to receive and count the same. Yet the said defendants, well knowing the plaintiff to be qualified as aforesaid, and that his name ought to be borne on said list, and that his vote ought to be received and counted by them in their said capacity, did, at the said meeting held by them for the purpose of receiving evidence as aforesaid, and of correcting said list, neglect and refuse to put the name of the plaintiff upon said list, and also at the said meeting of the said inhabitants, held on the said 4th day of April current, at all times before the close of the poll as aforesaid, and during the continuance of said meeting last mentioned, did refuse to receive and count the vote of the plaintiff offered as aforesaid;— by reason of all which the plaintiff wholly lost his privilege of voting at said meeting in the choice of governor, (fee., as aforesaid. To the damage,” <fec.
    At the trial, which was had on the general issue of not guilty, before Jackson, J., at the last April term in this county, the plaintiff proved all the facts alleged in the said third count, and that he was duly qualified as a voter in all respects, excepting only in the following particular, which was reserved for the consideration of the whole Court: —
    Above five or six weeks before the first Monday of April, 1814, the day fixed by the constitution for the said election, the plaintiff, having then lately arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and having quitted the store in which he had been educated as a merchant, proposed to a certain cotton manufacturing company to take charge of their store in Worcester for one year, for the salary of five hundred dollars a year. He then * stated that he should wish to have about one half of the said salary paid in advance, to enable him to pay his board and expenses, and for other purposes. The said company soon after acceded to his proposition, and he accordingly took charge of their said store in .the latter part of March. The company was not incorporated ; .but this agreement was made in their behalf by two or three of the members, who owned one half of the joint stock, and who were chiefly relied on by the other members for managing the concerns of the company.
    The agent and members of the company being in some of the neighboring towns, and not residing in Worcester, the plaintiff did not receive any part of the said advance when he entered the store; but on the morning of the said first Monday of April, one of the largest proprietors in the said company, and who had the principal charge in managing their affairs, happened to be in Worces ter; and at the request of the plaintiff paid him two hundred dollars, for which the plaintiff gave his receipt as on account and in advance of his said yearly salary.
    The original contract for said salary, and for receiving a part of it in advance, was not made with any reference to the said election, nor for the purpose of qualifying the plaintiff as a voter therein ; but when the plaintiff happened to meet the said proprietor on the morning above mentioned, he requested to be paid at that time, in order that he might produce the two hundred dollars to the said selectmen, as conclusive evidence of his qualification as to property.
    The question at the trial was, whether the money, thus received by the plaintiff, was estate in his possession, to the value of sixty pounds, within the true intent of the constitution, prescribing this qualification for such voters.
    If the Court should be of opinion that it was so, the verdict, which was returned for the plaintiff, was to stand ; otherwise it was to be set aside, and a general verdict entered for the defendants.
    
      Bigelow and Lincoln, for the defendants.
    The pecuniary qualification of voters for governor, &c., as fixed * by the constitution, is the “ having a freehold estate within the .commonwealth, of the annual income of three pounds, or any estate of the value of sixty pounds,” equal, in the present currency, to two hundred dollars. The question in this ease arises on the latter provision ; and the defendants say that, upon the facts disclosed, the plaintiff had not the qualification required. Johnson’s definition of estate, applicable to the present inquiry, is “ fortune, possession ; generally meant of possessions in land or realities.” The plaintiff, in fact, had no more estate or fortune, from being possessed of the money, which his employers had furnished him in advance, and for which he had given them an accountable receipt. He was, from the moment he received it, accountable to those who had advanced it to him, and for the whole amount, either in his labor or in money.
    The contemplation of the framers of our constitution, in requiring this pecuniary qualification, small as it is, was that thereby the voter should feel some degree of independence and self-government. Yet in the very act of possessing himself of this money, the plaintiff became less independent than before. He was, from that time, morally as well as legally, the hired servant of the company, accountable to them for his time and his conduct.
    If this was a sufficient pecuniary qualification for the plaintiff, so it would also have been for a person to whom he should have lent it, on a promise to repay it; and this process might have been continued indefinitely, and one sum of two hundred dollars have qualified any number of electors. For a promise to pay money is as truly an estate in the promisee as the money itself. If the plaintiff had seen fit to advance to his landlord a moiety of this money, and taken his accountable receipt for the sum advanced, it would have served his landlord as a qualification pro tanto, without diminishing that of the plaintiff.
    
      Burnside, for the plaintiff.
    Estate means property in general ; every thing which can be valued in money, * which the possessor can lawfully transfer, which can be taken in execution, or for which the possessor is liable to be assessed, notwithstanding any liabilities he may be under by reason of his possessing it. The plaintiff had two hundred dollars in possession, which he had obtained fairly, and which he had a right to retain against all the world. He did not give an accountable receipt for the money. Had he failed to perform the services, as he had undertaken, the company could not have demanded the money to be repaid, on the ground of the consideration having failed; but they must have brought their action for his failure of performing his contract, and in such action they would have recovered more or less than the sum advanced, as they should be able to prove their damages.  But until he had violated his engagement, no action lay against him; and the selectmen had no right to presume that he would so violate it.
    Perhaps it cannot be denied that the plaintiff, by lending this money to another, on the day he received it, might have qualified another as a voter; but the supposition of a case so extreme, and which can hardly be conceived to take place without fraud, can never be supposed proper to influence a judicial decision.
    The action stood continued for advisement, and at the following April term in this county, the opinion of the Court was delivered by
    
      
      
        2 Burr. 1011, Dutch vs. Warren.
    
   Parker, C. J.

We cannot doubt that the two hundred dollars, possessed by the plaintiff on the morning of the day of election, was his property, so as to be an estate to the value of sixty pounds, within the meaning of the constitution.

He received this money as his own property ; pursuant to a contract before made, and then in performance by him, without any reference to his qualification as an elector. He had the absolute dominion over it, to pay his debts, to purchase property with it, or to give it away if he had seen fit. Had he died on the day of the election, his administrator would have rightfully challenged the property; and the persons who * advanced it could have supported no claim to it. By the word estate, as used in the constitution, it is obvious that every species of property, capable of valuation in money, was intended to be embraced. The elector is to have an annual income from real estate of three pounds, or any estate which is any property of the value of sixty pounds.

It is objected that he had given his accountable receipt for this money. But be was obliged to account for it no otherwise than by performing his contract. No action would lie upon this receipt; and it could only be shown in evidence to prove his contract, and to ascertain the damages attending a non-performance of it on his part.

It has been urged that the possessor of such a receipt might as well exhibit it as evidence of his qualification to vote, as the holder of the money. But it is not so. The receipt, in the hands of the person to whom it was given, is only evidence of a debt paid in advance, and not of any estate or property in the holder.

We do not mean to intimate that a transaction of this nature, resorted to for the purpose of giving the pecuniary qualification to an elector, could be successful. Such a subterfuge would be fraudulent and unavailing. The case reported excludes all suspicion of fraud, and leaves the single question, whether money thus obtained belongs to, and is the estate of, the holder; and we think it must be a harsh and severe construction of the constitution which could give room to doubt.

As to the question, whether the constitution intended that the estate, which is established as the qualification, should be over and above all debts due from the elector, we cannot imagine that so strict a scrutiny into every voter’s affairs, as such a construction would require, was intended. If it were so, the selectmen, who are to decide promptly, and from the pressure of affairs are often held to decide instantaneously, would be obliged to spend hours, and perhaps days, in investigating the affairs of their fellow-citizens Besides which, this would necessarily produce such an exposure of every * man’s circumstances, as would be injurious and vexatious. It cannot be supposed that this sort of inquisition was intended to be established by the constitution; but that the true intent and meaning of the constitution is, that every man, who is in possession of the requisite estate, claiming it as his own, and having the lawful right to dispose of it, shall be entitled to the franchise.

Judgment according to the verdict.  