
    Wright v. Dawney.
    Saturday, November 26, 1808.
    Superior Courts of Chancery — Appeals from Interlocutory Decrees — Term of Court. — The power of the Superior Courts of Chancery to grant appeals from interlocutory decrees, in certain cases, is not limited to the terms at which such decrees were rendered; but may be exercised at any subsequent term.
    In this case the Chancellor for the Richmond District, at a subsequent term, after the vacation in which he refused an appeal from his interlocutory decree between the same parties,  granted an appeal under the act of Assembly, 
    
    Williams moved to dismiss this appeal as improvidently granted, saying the Chancellor had no right to allow it after the term at which the decree was entered.
    
      
      See monographic note on “Appeal and Error” appended to Hill v. Salem, etc., Turnpike Co., 1 Rob. 263.
    
    
      
       2 Hen. & Munf. p. 12.
    
    
      
       Rev. Code, 1 vol. c. 223, s. 1, p. 375.
    
   JUDGE TUCKER

said that, as to final decrees, the power of the Court ceased at the end of the term; but over interlocutory decrees it always continues; for the Chancellor may, at any subsequent term, set such decrees aside, and therefore may grant appeals from them.

JUDGE ROANE

observed the great inconvenience which would result from the construction of the law contended for by the counsel of the appellee. This court having decided that appeals from interlocutory decrees cannot be granted by the Chancellor in vacation, it might happen that the party aggrieved by a decree would be deprived of his appeal altogether, if it could not be allowed him at a subsequent term, since he might be absent when the decree was ^rendered, and know nothing of it until after the term. Such a construction should prevail as advances the object the Legislature had in view, which was the convenience of the people: and, moreover, no words exist in the act restiicting the power of the Chancellor to the term when the interlocutory decree was entered.

JUDGE FLEMING

was of the same opinion; and the motion was unanimously overruled.  