
    
      A. O. Norris, bearer, v. George Graves.
    
    A plaintiff sued by the name of A. O. Norris. The defendant pleaded in abatement that this was not his true Christian name, which was Andrew O. The plaintiff replied he was known by one name as well as the other. It was ruled, J st. that A. 0. is no name at all; 2nd. that the plaintiff must know and state his true name, and therefore his replication could not cure the defect; 3d. that such a replication is good only when the plaintiff mistakes the defendant’s name. Exceptions were recognized, 1st. if the note had been payable to A. O. the plaintiff, then this might have precluded the defendant’s plea; or, 2d. if the note had been signed A. O. then as a defendant he might have been so sued.
    
      Before Wardlaw, J. at Abbeville, March, 1849.
    
      Sum. pro. on note,
    payable to J. S. Seigle or bearer.
    There was filed for the defendant in propria persona, a plea in abatement — -a misnomer of the plaintiff’s name, in that he was called throughout the process, A. O. Norris, whilst his true Christian name was Andrew O.
    The plaintiff’s attorney, ore tenus, replied, that the plaintiff was known as well by one name as by the other. Three gentlemen of the bar testified that the plaintiff is Commissioner in Equity and Magistrate, who does much business, and is well known ; that he always signs his name A. O. Norris; that out of his own family he is generally called A. O., and by that name spoken of by many persons who seem to know no other Christian name for him; although all of these gentlemen knew that the A. stood for Andrew, the true name, and one of them knew that the O. stood for Orlando.
    Further, the sheriff testified that the defendant came with the copy process into his office, wishing to pay the case: his attorney happened to be there, looked at the paper and said “1 can quash it for you defendant replied “ but it is a just debt, and I wish to pay itthe attorney answered “ X can get you rid of the costs.”
    It appeared further, by admissions of the bar, that the plaintiff' ’s attorney had received the principal and interest, and that the contest was only about the costs — in which it was agreed that the plaintiff should receive no prejudice having received his whole debt.
    The circuit Judge said, I looked with no favor upon the plea, and would have overruled a plea setting forth a like misnomer of the defendant, if there had been like proof. But ancient law did not permit the contraction of names, or the expression of a Christian name, any more than of a sur-name, by an initial letter; and the relaxation of strictness which modern usage has introduced, did not seem to me to justify a plaintiff in misstating his own name throughout a legal proceeding.
    I was assured that the true name here was Andrew, and was known to be something else besides A. O., even by those of the persons who called it A. O., that did not know what it was.
    I sustained the plea, and ordered the process to be quashed; glad that the costs would be small, at which a rule'might be asserted that would serve to check the increasing laxity which prevails in the mode of writing names.
    Plaintiff appealed, on the ground that his Honor erred in sustaining the plea of misnomer, in the case made.
    
      F. M. Norris, for the motion.
    -— contra.
   Curia, per O’Neall, J.

The circumstances attending the defence entities it to no favor. If it were practicable to sustain the plaintiff’s case, the whole Court would gladly have concurred in such a result.

But the law is too well settled to permit the Court to exercise any discretion. The Stat. 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, § 11 and 12, has very much modified the English law, (and it is worthy of the attention of our Legislature to consider whether it would not be wise to adopt its provisions;) still, notwithstanding it, it was held, that the acceptor of a bill of exchange, sued by the name of John M. Knott, might demur, for that the declaration did not set out his Christian name, nor assign any reason under the Stat. for not doing so.

That case carries the doctrine farther than we should do here.

But still there is no doubt of the general rule, that the Christian and surnames of the parties must be given truly. It may be, and I think it is true, that a middle name represented by an initial letter will'be sufficient; "indeed there is some room to say, that its omission might not be a misnomer or variance, though I think the weight of authority is that it (the initial letter) should at least be stated. In general, where all the names of a party are known, it is best to give them all, — for then the case becomes exceptione major, and that should always be apleador’s study to attain.

The plaintiff’s Christian name is Andrew Orlando; the initials A. O. are no name at all. To reply that the plaintiff is known by them, as well as his real name, is no answer for him. For he is legally presumed to know at least his own name, and hence he must state it. A defendant sued by a name, and pleading in abatement, that it is not his true name, may very well be answered in the plaintiff’s replication, that he is known by the name sued, as well as the other. For in such a case, the plaintiff is not presumed to know which is the real name.

If the note here had been drawn payable to A. O. Norris, then it is possible the case might have been sustained on the ground that the defendant by his own writing had admitted the name to be in letters; or if the case had been against one who had so signed a contract, in such a case his signature would conclude him from denying the name.

The cases of Martin & Cornwall v. Kelly, and Chappell & Cureton v. Proctor, cited by the plaintiff’s attorney, would be authority for such positions. Still it is advisable, in both these cases'supposed, to set out truly and fully the true name, by saying, where plaintiff, that the note was made and delivered to Andrew Orlando Norris, by the name of A. O. Norris, and where defendant, that Andrew Orlando Norris, by the name of A. 0. Norris, made his certain note in writing, &c.

The motion to reverse the decision below is dismissed.

The whole Court concurred.

Motion refused.  