
    Joseph DRAPALA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. A.C. MOORE, Defendant, Appellee.
    No. 16-1284
    United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
    September 19, 2016
    Christopher J. Trombetta and Law Office of Christopher J. Trombetta, Mansfield, MA, on brief for appellant.
    Christine P. O’Hearn, Brown & Connery, LLP, Westmont, NJ, Elizabeth A. Houlding, and Peabody & Arnold LLP, Boston, MA, on brief for appellee.
    Before Howard, Chief Judge, Torruella and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
   Per curiam.

Joseph Drapala appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for his former employer, A.C. Moore, on Drapa-la’s claim that his termination from his management-level position at age sixty-six constituted age discrimination in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4.

The district court correctly applied the familiar burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Examining the record in the light most favorable to Drapala, the court found that, despite establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, Drapala could not point to any competent evidence nor indicate any disputed fact capable of showing that A.C. Moore’s non-discriminatory explanation for his firing — that he had repeatedly failed to meet the company’s performance standards — was pretextual. Accordingly, the court concluded that A.C. Moore was entitled to summary judgment.

Upon a de novo review, we arrive at the same conclusion for the same reasons and thus we summarily affirm. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c). In doing so, we specifically note that the district court properly refused to consider affidavits from individuals whom Drapala did not identify during discovery.

So ordered. 
      
      . This claim is all that remains of Drapala’s three-count complaint. Drapala voluntarily dismissed his parallel federal claim of age discrimination/ under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2), and he declined to oppose A.C. Moore’s summary judgment motion as to his state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
     