
    Sabir Abdul-Haqq YASIR, Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, et al., Appellee.
    No. 5D02-2344.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 31, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 30, 2003.
    
      Sabir Abdul-Haqq Yasir, Polk City, pro se.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General Tallahassee and Joseph H. Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
   PALMER, J.

Sabir Abdul-Haqq Yasir appeals the trial court’s order denying his request to reopen a lawsuit for the purpose of obtaining a refund of copy fees. Concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reopen Yasir’s previously concluded lawsuit, we affirm.

In 1998, Sabir Abdul-Haqq Yasir filed a lawsuit in the circuit court against Harry Singletary, as head of the Florida Department of Corrections. Pursuant to section 57.085(7), Florida Statutes (1997), Yasir was required to provide the court with copies of his previous civil actions. Yasir paid $7.50 to obtain copies of those documents and then he attached them to his pleading. Yasir’s claims were adjudicated on their merits and the action was closed.

Subsequent thereto, in Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So.2d 521 (Fla.2001), the Florida Supreme Court struck down the copy requirement of section 57.085(7) as being unconstitutional, concluding that it denied certain prisoners access to the courts. The court further ruled that all inmates whose cases had been dismissed for failure to comply with the copy requirement would have two years from the date of the decision within which to file motions seeking reinstatement of their claims.

Thereafter, Yasir filed a motion to “reopen” his lawsuit against Singletary for the sole purpose of obtaining a refund of the $7.50 in copying costs he incurred. His request was denied and this appeal ensued.

The trial court would only have jurisdiction to reopen the case if, as Yasir contends, Mitchell v. Moore gave him such a right. It did not. The Mitchell case specifically applied only to those “inmates whose cases were dismissed for failure to comply with the copy requirement to file a motion seeking reinstatement.” Id. at 531. Yasir does not fall within that definition. In fact, he provided the necessary copies and made payment therefor. Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that Ya-sir was not entitled to reopen his case.

AFFIRMED.

PLEUS, J., concurs and concurs specially.

SHARP, W., J., dissents, with opinion.

PLEUS, J., concurs and concurs specially.

De minimis non curat lex.

SHARP, W., J.,

dissenting.

I disagree the trial court lacked jurisdiction to “reopen” Yasir’s lawsuit to consider refunding the fees he spent to comply with the unconstitutional copy requirements of section 57.085(7). Yasir is unskilled in the law and so not unreasonably moved for a refund of fees in the case in which he incurred those fees. Had Yasir instead filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination he is entitled to the refund, the courts would have to address the issue on its merits.

Admittedly Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So.2d 521 (Fla.2001) did not address the issue of entitlement to refunds for indigent prisoners who had paid for copies and accordingly had not been barred from bringing a lawsuit. But it seems logical that if the copy requirement is found unconstitutional, an indigent prisoner would be entitled to a refund of the cost of complying with that requirement. See, e.g., Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1158, 115 S.Ct. 2608, 132 L.Ed.2d 853 (1995) ($295.00 impact fee on cars purchased or titled in other states that were then registered in Florida was unconstitutional; full refund to all who had paid this illegal tax was the only clear and certain remedy); Moultrie v. Florida Department of Corrections, 496 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (inmate had standing to challenge prison rule which provided authority for assessing damages against him for destruction of state property; if inmate prevails on his rule challenge he may be entitled to a refund or restoration of funds to his inmate account).

It is tempting to dismiss Yasir’s claim on jurisdictional grounds or to consider the sum involved de minimis. See Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir.1971). However, to an inmate with only $100.00 or less in his or her inmate account, $7.50 may not be de minimis.

The situation in which Yasir finds himself, of having been forced to pay an unconstitutional fee in order to be granted access to the courts, is one which others may also find themselves and may be a recurring problem the courts should resolve. Martinez v. Singletary, 691 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); C.M.T. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 550 So.2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). I would reverse and remand for Yasir to obtain a refund of those fees. 
      
      . Section 57.085(7) of the Florida Statutes (1997) provides:
      57.085 Waiver of Prepayment of court costs and fees for indigent prisoners.—
      
        
      
      (7) A prisoner who has twice in the preceding 3 years been adjudicated indigent under this section, certified indigent under s. 57.081, or authorized to proceed as an indigent under 28 U.S.C. s.1915 by a federal court may not be adjudicated indigent to pursue a new suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal without first ob-taming leave of court. In a request for leave of court, the prisoner must provide a complete listing of each suit,- action, claim, proceeding or appeal brought by the prisoner or intervened in by the prisoner in any court or other adjudicatory forum in the proceeding 5 years. The prisoner must attach to a request for leave of court a copy of each complaint, petition, or other document purporting to commence a lawsuit and a record of disposition of the proceeding.
      (Emphasis added).
     
      
      . De minimis non curat lex" — the law does not concern itself with trifles.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed.1999).
     