
    EDMONDSON v. STATE.
    (No. 11410.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    May 2, 1928.
    1. Criminal law <&wkey;1106(3) — Delay in filing transcript in felony case because of district clerk’s illegal demand for fee is not ground for dismissing appeal (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, arts. 843, 845).
    It being, under Code Cr. Proc. 1925, arts. 843, 845, the duty of the clerk to prepare the transcript and forward it to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the fact that it was not seasonably filed is not ground for dismissal of the appeal, unless the delay was due to negligence of defendant or his attorney, and so not where the delay was due to demand of the district clerk for fee for making out the transcript, which in view of the case being a felony case could not be legally demanded or received by him.
    2. Criminal law <®=s4I9, 420(10) — Statement of member of defendant’s family made in his absence relative to shooting of deceased held hearsay. -
    Statement of member of defendant’s family relative to the shooting at a time when it was contended that it could not have been generally known, being made in defendant’s absence, was hearsay, and inadmissible against defendant to show guilty knowledge.
    3. Homicide &wkey;»l 66 (3) — Deceased’s opposition to road, not shown known by defendant, held inadmissible to show motive.
    Pact of opposition by deceased to a road may not be shown to establish motive for killing on defendant’s part, deceased’s opposition not being shown to have been known to defendant.
    4. Criminal’ law &wkey;>l 169(1) — Meagerness of necessary corroborative evidence accentuates error in admission of evidence to show guilty knowledge and motive.
    Where necessary corroboration of accomplice is at most meagerly sufficient, erroneous admission of evidence to show guilty knowledge and motive cannot be held harmless, though it might be otherwise were evidence of guilt overwhelming.
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from District Court, San Saba County; J. H. McLean, Judge.
    Will Edmondson was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    See, also, 106 Tex. Cr. R. 321, 292 S. W. 231; 107 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 294 S. W. 587.
    J. P. Taulbee, of Georgetown, and J. H. Baker, of San Saba, for appellant.
    G. A. Walters, of Mexia, and A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   MARTIN, J.

Attorneys for the state have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal based upon two grounds:

(1) Because the transcript in this case was not filed within 90 days after the adjournment of the court at which conviction was had. .i

(2) Because the transcript was forwarded by the attorney of appellant and not by the district clerk. ^

Under the terms of articles 843 and 845, C. C. P., it is made the duty of the clerk to prepare and forward the transcript to this court.- It was said in Young v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 594, 218 S. W. 505:

“The accused is not responsible for the record in criminal cases. The clerk is required to make out and forward the transcript to the clerk of this’court.”

It is not a valid ground for the dismissal of an appeal because the transcript was filed after 90 days from the adjournment of the court, unless the failure to file same was due to the negligence of the defendant or his attorney or to some act of one or both of them. Gould v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 250, 153 S. W. 326; Lord v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 109, 164 S. W. 1021. It affirmatively appears in the motion that the failure to file the transcript in time was due to the demand of the district clerk for his fees for making out the transcript. Such a fee could not be demanded or legally received by the clerk in a felony case.

The state’s motion is not supported by any affidavit while the answer of appellant is so supported. There is no affirmative showing that the record was transmitted by the attorney for appellant to this court.

While the transcript appears to have been filed about five months after the date of the adjournment of court, it satisfactorily appears that it was the illegal demand of the clerk that caused such delay rather than the negligence of counsel for defendant. Under these circumstances the motion will be denied and the appeal considered on its merits.

A former appeal of this case will be found reported in 106 Tex. Cr. R. at page 321, 292 S. W. 231. The facts are not substantially different on this appeal and will be found-sufficiently reported on the former appeal.

It was the theory of the state that the shooting of deceased, Efed Bolinger, was not known until the morning of November 10 at about 8 o’clock a. m. The testimony of Mrs. Sarah Puston, mother of the accomplice, Fred Fusion, was introduced by the state, who testified over proper objection that the first time she heard of the shooting of deceased was from appellant’s oldest girl, who told her about it at about 8 o’clock tlie morning of November 10. The state’s theory seemed to be that appellant, having done the shooting, would have knowledge of it prior to the public, and therefore what his family had to say about it at a time of day when it could not have been generally known would be admissible against him as a circumstance to show guilty knowledge. This statement was made in appellant’s absence by a third party and was clearly hearsay.

The state attempted to show as a motive for the killing that there was some feeling between appellant and deceased over the opening of a public road. As tending to establish this, the state over objection proved by the county clerk of San Saba county that Fred Bolinger opposed this road. It was nowhere shown in the record that appellant knew of Bolinger’s opposition. It has been frequently held that “proof of facts not directly or circumstantially shown to be known to defendant at the time of the homicide is not admissible against him to show motive on his part.” Phillips v. State, 22 Tex. App. 139, 2 S. W. 601; Branch’s P. C. p. 1081, where a number of authorities are collated.

The error in both of the above matters is accentuated by the extreme meagerness of the evidence corroborative of the accomplice, Fred Fusion. Its sufficiency is a matter of grave doubt, and this incompetent evidence may have and doubtless did injuriously affect appellant.

There was ample evidence to raise the issue that no offense had in fact ever been committed and that deceased in fact committed suicide. This is made plain by the facts recited in the opinion on the former appeal.

With overwhelming proof of guilt, we might hesitate to reverse upon errors of no more importance than those above recited, but in view of the fact that the. corroborative evidence is meagerly sufficient, if at all, we cannot say that the admission of the above evidence was harmless.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER OURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court. 
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