
    VALTON v. NATIONAL LOAN FUND LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY.
    March, 1864.
    [Reversing 17 Abb. Pr. 268.]
    The pecuniary circumstances of a person on whose life insurance is applied for, are facts material to the estimation of the risk; and in an action on the policy, the effect produced on the mind of the medical examiner by a representation that the applicant is a moneyed man, is a proper subject of inquiry
    
    Gerhart Valton brought this action in the supreme court to recover on a policy 'of insurance on the life of one Conrad Schumacher. On the trial, the medical examiner of the defendants testified that when Schumacher applied for insurance on his life, it was represented that he was the moneyed man of a mercantile firm in which he was partner. Defendants’ counsel then asked, 1. “If it had not been for the representation that Schumacher was the moneyed man of the concern, would you, from your knowledge and observation of Schumacher, have recommended the acceptance of the proposal ?” 2. “ Did the representation in question produce any, and if any, what effect, on your mind?” 3. “.Did the said representation have any influence, and if any, what, upon your subsequent action in making your certificate and report ?”
    
      The questions were excluded, as being immaterial, and defendants’ excepted and appealed.
    
      Tht&upxme court at general term, sustained the decision in the court below, and the defendants appealed to this court.
    
    
      Lyman Tremain, and Henry Nicoll, for defendants, appellants.
    
      C. B. Cochrane and John K. Porter, for plaintiff, respondent.
    
      
      Compare Higbie v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 53 N. Y. 603.
    
    
      
      For a full statement of the facts in the case and the testimony, see 17 Abb. Pr. 268. For previous decisions in the case, see 20 N. Y. 32; reversing22 Barb. 9.
    
   By the Court. Coctet.

Mullin, J.

The object of a physical examination of a person proposing to insure his life in an insurance company by a competent physician, is to ascertain whether he is laboring under, or is subject to, any diseases or defect which may have a tendency to shorten life. The inquiry involves an examination not only into the present state of the various organs and functions of the body, but into the tendency of those organs and functions to take on diseases, as affected by habits of mind as well as of body, temperament, tendency to disease from hereditary causes, and the occupation and condition in life of the subject. Of two persons of the same age and present bodily health, the one may present a risk entirely safe and proper to be taken—the other unsafe and improper to be taken. It is impossible to affix limits to the subjects, into which it is not only proper but necessary for an examining surgeon to inquire, in order to arrive at a conclusion upon which he can safely advise the acceptance or rejection of a risk.

Whether I am right or wrong in these views, I entertain no doubt that in many cases a knowledge of the pecuniary circumstances of a person desiring to be insured is material to the risk, as affecting, in some degree, the life; and they are a legitimate subject of inquiry for the examining physician or surgeon.

This inquiry may not be material in every case, but the surgeon alone can tell whether it was or was not so in a given case. It is, therefore, competent to ask him whether he made the inquiry, and what response was given, and how far he deemed such answer material in deciding to advise the taking of the risk.

In such cases the very point of inquiry is whether the pecuniary circumstances were deemed by him material, and whether he would have advised the acceptance of the risk if it had not appeared that the person desiring to be insured was a man of means. This is the only inquiry by which the real importance of the inquiry and answers can be ascertained.

For these reasons I think the learned justice who tried this cause erred in rejecting the question put to Dr. Staats, as to the effect upon his mind and action in respect to said application ; and the judgment, should, for this reason be reversed, and a new trial ordered, costs to abide the event.

All the other judges concurred, except Weight, J., who did not vote.

Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered, costs to abide event.  