
    L.J. Minor Corporation, Appellant, v. Breitenbach, Cleveland Tax Administrator, Appellee.
    [Cite as L.J. Minor Corp. v. Breitenbach (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 168.]
    
      (No. 95-1774
    Submitted October 8, 1996
    Decided December 18, 1996.)
    
      
      Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue and Roger F. Day, for appellant.
    
      Sharon Sobol Jordan, Cleveland Law Director, and Debra D. Rosman, Assistant Law Director, for appellee.
    
      Paul A. ■ Grau, Brecksville Director of Law, and Ross S. Cirincione, urging reversal for amicus curiae, city of Brecksville.
    
      Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Raymond D. Anderson, Eric A. Pierce and Kevin M. Czerwonka, urging reversal for amici curiae, Borden, Inc. and The Limited, Inc.
   Cook, J.

The issue before this court is whether Minor was required to pay municipal income taxes to the city of Cleveland on sales resulting from purchase orders received in Cleveland from customers located outside Cleveland when the products that filled those orders were shipped to the customers from inventory stored in Brecksville.

The portion of a company’s net profits subject to a particular municipal corporation’s income tax is calculated by utilizing an apportionment formula that compares the company’s property, payroll, and sales within the boundaries of that municipal corporation to the company’s total property, payroll, and sales. R.C. 718.02(A). The resulting ratio is then applied to the taxpayer’s total net profits to calculate that portion subject to the municipal corporation’s tax.

The “sales” portion of the apportionment formula is defined as “[g]ross receipts of the business or profession from sales made and services performed during the taxable period in such municipal corporation to gross receipts of the business or profession during the same period from sales and services, wherever made or performed.” R.C. 718.02(A)(3). R.C. 718.02(B) defines “sales made in a municipal corporation” as:

“(1) All sales of tangible personal property which is delivered within such municipal corporation regardless of where title passes if shipped or delivered from a stock of goods within such municipal corporation;

“(2) All sales of tangible personal property which is delivered within such municipal corporation regardless of where title passes even though transported from a point outside such municipal corporation if the taxpayer is regularly engaged through its own employees in the solicitation or promotion of sales within such municipal corporation and the sales result from such solicitation or promotion;

“(3) All sales of tangible personal property which is shipped from a place within such municipal corporation to purchasers outside such municipal corporation regardless of where title passes if the taxpayer is not, through its own employees, regularly engaged in the solicitation or promotion of sales at the place where delivery is made.”

The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Minor’s refund request on the basis that “[t]he emphasis in this legislation is plainly upon the sales aspect of the activity, not upon the physical act of loading the goods upon a truck or train whose final destination is the customer.” A plain reading of R.C. 718.02(B) establishes, however, that the place of shipment and the place of delivery determine the municipal corporation to which a sale is attributable for taxing purposes. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the only situation in which products shipped from Minor’s Brecksville warehouse may be attributable to Cleveland is where the products are shipped to customers located in Cleveland. R.C. 718.02(B)(2) and (3).

The sales at issue here involve only products shipped from Brecksville to customers located outside Cleveland. Under R.C. 718.02(B)(3), such sales are deemed to have been made in Brecksville. Because R.C. 718.02(B)(3) plainly and unambiguously states that sales of products shipped from within a municipal corporation to purchasers outside that municipal corporation are deemed to have occurred at the place of shipment so long as the taxpayer is not, through its own employees, regularly engaged in the solicitation or promotion of sales at the place where delivery is made, taxing authorities and the courts may not interpret R.C. 718.02(B)(3) as embodying a contrary legislative intent. “An unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.” Storer Communications, Inc. v. Limbach (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 193, 194, 525 N.E.2d 466, 467; Sears v. Weimer (1944), 143 Ohio St. 312, 28 O.O. 270, 55 N.E.2d 413, paragraph five of the syllabus.

The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the Cleveland Tax Administrator is hereby ordered to refund to Minor that portion of net-profit taxes paid by Minor to Cleveland for tax years 1984 through 1988 as the result of sales of products shipped from Brecksville to customers located outside the city of Cleveland.

Judgment reversed.

Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer and Stratton, JJ., concur.  