
    Margaret Taylor, Plaintiff, v. William H. Wallace, Defendant.
    (Supreme Court, Kings Trial Term,
    May, 1900.)
    Slander — Pleading — Words not necessarily imputing unchastity.
    A complaint in slander alleging that the defendant said of the plaintiff, a woman, that she had “ coaxed his bartender to stay with her all night ” is not, without an allegation showing that the meaning was to attribute unchastity to the plaintiff, sufficient, as the words in. question do not necessarily impute unchastity.
    Motion for a new trial-. Action for slander, the alleged words being as follows: “ ‘ Who is that woman that was here with your wife? ’ Mr. Worth made answer, ‘ She keeps a little boarding house-down in South Brooklyn.’ Defendant replied, ‘ I think she keeps something else besides a boarding house. She (meaning plaintiff)came down here and coaxed my bartender to stay with her all night.’ ” Mo meaning of the words was alleged in the complaint» The complaint was dismissed for not stating a cause of action.
    George J. O’Keefe for plaintiff.
    Michael Burst for defendant.
   Gaynob, J.:

It was claimed at the trial that the words imputeuncliastity to the plaintiff. They do not necessarily do so. A woman may ask a man to stay at her house over night for more reasons than one. It is a familiar rule of pleading in actions for damages for libel or slander that where the words are not necessarily slanderous, i. e. are capable of a meaning not slanderous, the slanderous meaning which is claimed must be alleged in the complaint in order to state a cause of action. Otherwise the defendant is not put on his defense as to such meaning, and enabled to plead facts in justification or mitigation. It is not for him to attribute a slanderous meaning to his words in order to plead thereto (Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517; Smid v. Bernard, 31 Misc. Rep. 35).

Motion for a new trial denied.  