
    *Pepper v. Barnett.
    June Term, 1872,
    Wytheville.
    Absent, Staples, J.
    
    Comparison of Hands—Competency of Witness.—M, a witness called to prove the signature of B. a parly to an instrument, said that he was not familiar with the handwriting of B, never having seen her write but once, and then only to make her signature; that he would not be able, from his knowledge of her handwriting, to distinguish it from that of others; but that he was of opinion, from having compared the present signature with the one he had seen her make, it was her handwriting. M was a competent witness, and the evidence was admissible.
    This was an action of ejectment in the Circuit court of Montgomery county, brought in August 1856, by John Pepper against George W. Barnett. On the trial of the cause, after the plaintiff had introduced his evidence, the defendant offered in evidence an agreement in writing, purporting to be between Ann R. Barnett, executrix of C. B. Barnett, deceased, and George W. Barnett; and to prove the signature of the paper by Ann R. Barnett, introduced a witness, Montague, who said, “that he was not familiar with the handwriting of the said Ann R. Barnett, never having seen her write but once, and then only to make her signature; that he would not be able, from his knowledge of her handwriting, to distinguish it from that of others; but that he was of opinion, from having compared the present signature with the one he had seen her make, it was in her handwriting. ” ' To the introduction of the evidence the plaintiff objected; but the court overruled the objection, and admitted the evidence; and the plaintiff excepted.
    *The jury found a verdict for the defendant, and the court entered a judgment accordingly. And thereupon the plaintiff obtained a supersedeas to the District court of Appeals, where the judgment was affirmed; and he then applied to this court for a supersedeas; which was allowed.
    Crockett' and Blair, for the appellant.
    J. W. Johnston and Wade, for the appellee.
    
      
      He had been counsel in the cause.
    
    
      
      Comparison of Hands — Competency of Witness.— The court in Flowers v. Fletcher, 40 W. Va. 103, 20 S. E. Rep, 871. citing the principal case and others said: “The law is that a witness who has any personal knowledge of a signature in controversy, however slight, has the right to give his opinion, and the weight of that opinion is a question for the jury, and not for the court. A witness who has seen a person write but once, and then only his abbreviated signature, may testify regarding the same; or if he has seen a signature admitted by the owner to be genuine.”
      The court then continues by saying, “But he must have some knowledge, and the mere fact that he has received letters purporting to be from the person whose signature is in controversy is not sufficient, unless there has been some admission or acquiescence equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the supposed writer, other than the letters themselves, that said letters are genuine and in the handwriting of the person from whom they purport to come.”
      See also, Hanriot v. Sherwood, 82 Va. 14, 17, where the principal case is cited upon the said proposition.
    
   CHRISTIAN, J.

This case presents a single question, and one easy of solution upon well settled principles, established by repeated decisions of this court, as well as by all the best writers on the law of evidence.

When it is laid down as a rule that comparison of handwriting is not admissible, it must be remembered that “by comparison is now meant the juxta positione of two writings, in order by such comparison to ascertain whether both were written by the same person. 2 Starkie’sEv. 654, and cases there cited. But where the witness has seen the party write, and is able to swear to his belief, that the writing in question is the hand of that person, such evidence is clearly admissible as legal proof of handwriting, and is considered as distinct from evidence by comparison. Greenl. on Ev. §§ 576-577; Redford’s adm’r v. Peggy, 6 Rand. 316. In the case before us, the witness, Montague (who was called to prove the signature of Mrs. Barnett to the title bond sought to be given in evidence), stated that “he had never seen her write but once, and then only to make her signature; that he would not be able from his knowledge of her handwriting to distinguish it from that of others; but that he was of opinion from having compared the present signature with the one he had seen her make, and from other circumstances not disclosed by the witness, he was of opinion it was in her handwriting.” The question is, was this evidence admissible? However *little or however much credit may be given to it, is not the question. It may be entitled to very little weight; but the weight of the evidence is one thing, its competency is another. The point upon which courts have differed in opinion is upon the source from which the knowledge of the handwriting is derived, rather than as to the degree or extent of it. All the authorities agree that a witness is competent to testify to the genuineness of a controverted signature if he has the proper knowledge of the party’s handwriting. The difficulty has been in determining what is proper knowledge, and how it has been acquired. One mode of acquiring this knowledge, and certainly one of the best, is having seen the party write. Whether he has seen him write once or many times, goes rather to the degree and extent of his knowledge than the source from which it is derived, and does not affect the question of his competency, but only the weight to be given to his evidence, which is a question for the jury.

It has been well settled in numerous cases, and is laid down as settled law in all the standard works upon evidence, that a witness who has seen the party, whose signature is controverted, write but once, and that only his signature, is competent to testify, although he may have to compare the signature which' he knows to be genuine with the one in controversy, in order to refresh and strengthen his recollection.

The case (cited by the counsel for the appellee) Burr v. Harper, 3 Eng. C. L. R. 168, is one exactly in point, and is strikingly like the one under consideration. In that case the witness, whose competency was questioned, stated, when called to prove the signature of Harper, that he once saw him sign his name to a paper, which he then had in his possession; that the fact made so slight an impression upon his' mind that, judging from that single occurrence, he was not able to say whether the handwriting to the agreement was the defendant’s or *not; that he would not venture, upon the mere inspection of the paper, to form a belief on the subject; but that, by comparing the signature of the agreement, to which he was required to speak, with that which was subscribed to the paper then in his possession, he was able to swear that he believed it to be the defendant’s writing. It was held in that case, and its authority has never been questioned, that the witness was competent to prove the handwriting. The court in that case says: “The mere fact of having seen a man once write his name may. have made a very faint impression upon the witness’ mind; but some impression, however slight in degree, it will make, and surely as the standard exists, and the witness possesses the genuine paper, he may recur to it to revive his memory upon the subject. Here a basis is laid in the fact of his having seen the defendant sign his name once. But his memory is defective. He then recurs to a paper which he knows, to be an authentic writing. He uses it to retouch and strengthen his recollection, and not merely for the purpose of comparison. The evidence, therefore, is admissible.”

In a case recently decided by the Supreme court of the United States,Mr. Justice Davis, speaking for the whole court, says: ‘ ‘It has been settled everywhere that if the witness has seen the party (whose signature is controverted) write his name but once, he is competent to testify.” Rogers v. Ritter, 12 Wall. U. S. R. 322.

I am of opinion that there is no error in the judgment of the Circuit court, and that the same ought to be affirmed.

The other judges concurred in the opinion of Christian, J.

Judgment affirmed.  