
    STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Todd RILEY, Appellee.
    No. 92-2789.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Oct. 1, 1993.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellant.
    James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Susan A. Fagan, Asst. Public Defender, Day-tona Beach, for appellee.
   COBB, Judge.

The state appeals an order of suppression based upon the trial court’s finding that the defendant was improperly stopped for failure to use a turn signal. The trial court found that no other vehicle was affected by the turn, therefore no offense occurred based upon the provisions of section 316.155, Florida Statutes (1991), which provides:

(1) No person may turn a vehicle from a direct course upon a highway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety, and then only after giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided, in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.
(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left must be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning, except that such a signal by hand or arm need not be given continuously by a bicyclist if the hand is needed in the control or operation of the bicycle.

The state, relying on State v. Kamins, 615 So.2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), argues that the “specific” language of subsection (2) above prevails over the “general” language of subsection (1), thereby negating the reference to the effect of a turn on any other vehicle.

We agree with the trial court and disagree with Kamins. Subsections (1) and (2) of section 316.155, Florida Statutes, should be read in pari materia. Subsection (2) is not in conflict with subsection (1), but merely defines the distance prior to an intended turn that a signal is required — in the event one is required at all by the effect of that turn on another vehicle.

Accordingly, we affirm, and cite conflict with State v. Kamins, 615 So.2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).

AFFIRMED.

HARRIS, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur and concur specially with opinions.

HARRIS, Chief Judge,

concurring and concurring specially:

I agree with the logic of Judge Cobb’s analysis. He has, I think, properly interpreted the statute as written. But, as so interpreted, the statute, as an effective traffic regulation, becomes illusory. The question before the traffic judge is no longer whether the signal was given but rather whether the requirement for a signal is applicable.

What does “may be affected by the movement” mean? If any vehicle is in or near the intersection (even behind the subject vehicle) is the law applicable? How close to the intersection must other traffic be in order to make the statute applicable?

One must stop at a stop sign even if no other vehicle is in sight; twenty-five miles an hour through a residential section is the speed limit even if everyone else is asleep. It is only the applicability of the turn signal requirement that is subject to debate depending upon the location of other traffic. Kamins is- better policy. But policy is the function of the legislature. It should reexamine this issue.

DAUKSCH, Judge,

concurring specially.

I concur with the opinion of Judge Cobb; I write only to say that the trial judge would be eminently correct in suppressing the evidence based upon the illegal pretextual stop and could easily disbelieve the drug enforcement policemen who urge that they were merely trying to keep the highways safe from persons who don’t signal a right turn after they have stopped for a stop sign. 
      
      . It also appears to be more consistent with the legislative history of the 1983 amendment to section 316.155:
      The bill amends § 316.155 to prohibit turning a vehicle or moving right or left upon a roadway unless it is safe to do so and proper turn signals are given. (Emphasis added.)
      Ch. 83-68, S.B. 274, Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement (1983).
     