
    DIAN EN JIANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-2154.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 24, 2014.
    Theodore N. Cox, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Blair T. O’Connor, Assistant Director; Holly M. Smith, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, ROBERT D. SACK and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Dian En Jiang, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of the May 17, 2018, order of the BIA denying his motion to reconsider the BIA’s February 15, 2013, denial of reopening. In re Dian En Jiang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 17, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

As Jiang petitions for review of only the BIA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, having voluntarily dismissed his petition for review of the underlying denial of reopening, we are precluded from considering the merits of the underlying motion to reopen. Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). We have reviewed the denial of Jiang’s motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam).

A motion to reconsider must “specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.2001). Here, Jiang merely reiterated his previously rejected arguments, rather than specify errors in the prior decision. The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration. See Jin Ming Liu, 439 F.3d at 111.

Even if he had articulated some new argument, the BIA properly found no error in its prior denial of sua sponte reopening. Jiang argued that new law invalidated the frivolousness finding, which was preventing him from adjusting status through his U.S.-citizen wife. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (precluding any immigration benefits if application deemed frivolous). A fundamental change in law that renders the movant newly eligible for relief merits exercise of the BIA’s authority to reopen sua sponte. In re G-D- 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132,1135 (BIA 1999). We retain jurisdiction to determine whether the BIA has misperceived a movant’s eligibility for relief in denying sua sponte reopening, and by extension whether a motion for reconsideration identified such a misperception. See Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469-71 (2d Cir.2009). Accordingly, we may address whether the decisions Jiang cites, In re Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 151 (BIA 2007), and In re B-Y-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 236 (BIA 2010), established a fundamental change. We conclude, as the BIA did, that the decisions established only an incremental, not a fundamental, change in the law governing frivolousness findings because they set forth new procedural guidelines, but did not alter the applicable regulations. See In re Y-L- 24 I. & N. Dec. at 158-61; In re B-Y-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 240. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration of its prior denial of reopening.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), ánd Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  