
    AIRGAS SPECIALTY GASES INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shivesh KUMAR, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-667-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 13, 2012.
    
      Lori B. Alexander, Jason R. Stanevich, Littler Mendelson, P.C., New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Shivesh Kumar, Cheshire, CT, pro se, Defendant-Appellant.
    PRESENT: B.D. PARKER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges, and SIDNEY H. STEIN, District Judge.
    
      
       Judge Sidney H. Stein, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Shivesh Kumar, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting the motion of Appellee Airgas Specialty Gases Inc. (“Airgas”) to enforce a settlement agreement that the parties entered into in May 2010. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

As an initial matter, although the district court did not enter a separate judgment in this case after issuing its order granting Airgas’s motion, this Court nonetheless has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the order clearly indicated the district court’s intent that the order be the final decision in this case. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mollis, 435 U.S. 381, 387-88, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978).

In reviewing a district court’s decision whether to enforce a settlement agreement, we review its findings of fact with respect to the agreement for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432 F.3d 437, 443 (2d Cir.2005).

Under Connecticut law, a contract is unambiguous where “its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise intent.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If a contract does not define a given term, the court should “look to the plain meaning of the language to ascertain whether there is ambiguity” and may refer to “widespread custom or usage” to define the term. Lee v. BSB Greenwich Mortg. Ltd. P’ship, 267 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir.2001)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Kumar argues on appeal that the district court erred in finding that Airgas had satisfied its obligation under the settlement agreement to change Kumar’s record in its Human Resource Management System (“HRMS”) to “reflect a voluntary quit as opposed to an involuntary termination” because the screen shot of Kumar’s record provided by Airgas indicates that the reason for Kumar’s termination was “Resignation-Other Position.” Kumar contends that “Resignation-Other Position” does not mean the same thing as “voluntary quit.” According to Kumar, the notation “Resignation-Other Position” falsely indicates that he took another position in the same company (Airgas).

Kumar’s argument is without merit. A “voluntary” act is one that is “performed, made, or given of one’s free will,” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary Unabridged 2564 (3d ed.1961), and to “quit” means “to give up employment,” id. at 1867. Thus, a voluntary quit means to “give up employment” “of one’s free will.” “Resignation” is defined as “[t]he act ... of surrendering or relinquishing an office,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1336 (8th ed.2004), and “quit” is a synonym of the verb “resign,” see Roget’s Int’l Thesaurus at entry 448.02 (6th ed.2001).

Kumar has provided no support for his contention that “Resignation-Other Position” suggests a transfer within the same company, and in any event, interpreting the phrase in that manner is not inconsistent with a finding that he left his original position voluntarily. See Omega Eng’g, 432 F.3d at 446. Thus, the district court correctly held that Airgas had satisfied its obligation to modify Kumar’s HRMS record to “reflect a voluntary quit” by changing the reason for Kumar’s termination to “Resignation-Other Position.”

Kumar also argues that the district court erred in finding that Airgas had provided Kumar with “proper documentation” of its modification of Kumar’s HRMS record because the screen shot provided by Airgas was allegedly “truncated,” as evidenced by the location of the “scroll thumb” on the scroll bar in the screen shot.- However, as Kumar has conceded, the settlement agreement merely requires Airgas to provide Kumar with “documentation” of the change, and does not mandate that the documentation be in a specific form. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that Airgas’s screen shot satisfied the terms of the settlement agreement. See Lee, 267 F.3d at 178.

We have considered all of Kumar’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.  