
    No. 856
    BARBER v. STATE
    Ohio Appeals, 4th Dist., Hocking Co.
    Decided Oct. 15, 1927.
    First Publication of this Opinion.
    Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
    118. AUTOMOBILES — 747a. Manslaughter —“Without due regard for the safety and rights of pedestrains and drivers and occupants of all other vehicles, and so as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person while in the lawful use of the roads or highways,” as used in 12603-1 GC., includes passenger, in automobile unlawfully operated.
    Error to Common Pleas.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Eugene Wright, Logan, for Barber.
    Phil A. Henderson, Logan, for State.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS.
    Jethro Barber was indicted and convicted of the charge of manslaughter*. The state claims that the accused killed Alexander Snedden, who was, at the time, riding with the accused in the former’s automobile; as a proximate result of the accused violating three laws of this state. One, the law against operating an automobile while in a state of intoxication; another, the statute against operating a motor vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonble and proper, having regard for the width, traffic, use and the general and usual rules of such road or highway, and particularly that the accused was, at the time, operating his automobile in the closely built up portion of the municipality; third, that the accused was violating Section 12603-1 GC., which denounces the operation of an automobile on the public roads “without due regard for the safety and rights of pedestrains and drivers and occupants of all other vehicles, and so as to endanger the life, limb or property of any person while in the lawful use of the roads or highways.”
   OPINION OF COURT

The following is taken, verbatim, from the opinion.

MAUCK, J.

One of the assignments of error relates to the application and interpretation of the language just quoted. It is contended that Sned-den was neither a pedestrain nor driver or occupant of another vehicle and that he was not a person then in the lawful use of the roads or highways, and consequently that there was no violation on the part of the accused if the latter so operated his automobile as to endanger the life of Sncdden. We can not give to this section the restricted interpietation contended for. Snedden was in the lawful use of the highway. He was travelling in the machine of the accused and with the consent of the accused and there is as much reason for the law to protect his life and limb as to protect those of any other person using the highways. This view is sustained by all the authorities cited by the plaintiff in error. We find no error in the record.

(Middleton, J., concurs. Sayre, PJ., not sitting.)  