
    Rocky-Lee: HUTSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of COLORADO; John Hickenlooper, Governor; Cynthia H. Coffman, Colorado State Attorney General; Wayne W. Williams, Colorado Secretary of State; Colorado Department of Motor Vehicles, all of the officers and assistants; American Bar Association, all licensed bar attorneys and assistants; Colorado Bar Association, all licensed bar attorneys and assistants; Mesa County Court, all of the judges and their assistants; Mesa County District Attorney's Office, all of the officers and assistants; Mesa County; Matt Lewis, Mesa County Sheriff; Mesa County Jail, all deputies in the Sheriffs Department; City of Grand Junction; Grand Junction Police Department, The Chief of Police and everyone under him down to the meter maid; Eagle County; James Van Beek, Eagle County Sheriff; Eagle County Jail, all deputies in the Sheriff's Department; City of Eagle; Eagle County District Attorney's Office, all of the officers and assistants; Eagle County Courts, all of the judges and their assistants; City of Golden; Jefferson County; Jeff Shrader, Jefferson County Sheriff; Jefferson County Jail, all deputies in the Sheriff's Department; Pueblo County; Kirk M. Taylor, Pueblo County Sheriff; Pueblo County Jail, all deputies in the Sheriff's Department; Pueblo County Court, all of the judges and their assistants; City of Pueblo; Pueblo County District Attorney's Office, all of the officers and assistants, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-1062.
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    April 28, 2016.
    Rocky Lee: Hutson, Clifton, CO, pro se.
    Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER AND JUDGMENT

CARLOS F. LUCERO, Circuit Judge.

Rocky-Lee: Hutson [sic], pro se, appeals the dismissal of his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

Hutson alleges that various state and federal officials, as well as the American and Colorado Bar Associations, conspired to deprive him of his federal rights. The district court concluded his complaint was insufficient under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. It also noted that most of the defendants were immune from suit or were not acting under color of law. The district court granted Hutson leave to file an amended complaint, but because he did not cure the aforementioned defects, the court dismissed his claims. Hutson timely appealed.

We review a Rule 8(a) dismissal for abuse of discretion. United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir.2010). Construing his pro se filings liberally, Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), we agree with the district court that Hutson has not complied with Rule 8. A complaint “must explain what each defendant did to him or her; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed him or her; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir.2007). Hutson raises numerous claims for relief, but does not explain what actions particular defendants took or how their actions violated his rights. Similarly, on appeal Hutson does not address Rule 8 in a meaningful manner, but instead advances vague assertions that he has been harassed by a special agent (who was not named as a defendant), that an unnamed attorney offered to settle this case for $25,000,000, and that various entities are improperly acting under “corporate law.”

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Because Hutson has not made a “reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal,” Watkins v. Leyba, 543 F.3d 624, 627 (10th Cir.2008), we DENY his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. All other pending motions are DENIED. 
      
       After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
     