
    Rufus L. Todd, Ex’r, App’lt, v. The Union Dime Savings Institution, Resp’t.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
    
    
      Filed April 17, 1891.)
    
    Vendor and purchaser—Title.
    In an action to recover back moneys paid on a contract for the sale of real estate on the ground of defect of title it appeared that the original record of a deed in the chain of title showed a dash after the grantor’s name instead of a seal, but it was again recorded when it was represented as being sealed. Held, that the title was such as a purchaser would be required to take, and that a judgment in favor of defendant was proper.
    (Following Todd v. Union Dime Savings Institution, 118 Ñ. Y., 337; 28 N. Y. State Rep., 697.)
    Appeal from judgment in favor of defendant, entered after trial at special term.
    Action to recover moneys paid on account of an executory contract for the purchase of real estate, on the ground of a defect of title.
    The defect alleged was that a deed of the premises in question from one Catharine Ferris to Griffith Bowe was not sealed at the time of delivery. Said deed was first recorded in 1871, and such record showed no sign of a seal after the grantor’s name, but only a dash. Afterwards, on defendant’s making a loan on the property, this defect in the record was discovered, when the deed was procured, upon which was a seal, and it was again recorded in proper form. The deed itself recited that it was sealed, and the court of appeals has decided that the first record furnished no affirmative evidence that the deed was not sealed when delivered. 118 R Y, 337; 28 R Y. State Bep., 697.
    
      William A. Boyd, for app’lt; William H. Arnoux, for resp’t.
   Van Brunt, P. J.

Although I am of the same opinion which I expressed upoh the first trial of this case, and that the title in question is not such an one as a purchaser should be required to take, but as the court of appeals was of a different opinion, there remains nothing for the judge below to do but decide as he did, and we must affirm the judgment. The facts are substantially the same as on the previous trial, and the alleged errors in admitting evidence, even if they existed, could not affect the result Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Daniels and Lawrence, JJ., concur.

MEMORANDA

Memorandum of cases in which no opinions were written.  