
    Sarah Frazier v. Charles Drayton.
    Tlie boots of tbe owner of a ferry are admissible to prove an account for fer-riage. 
    
    Where several witnesses swore that tbe rates of ferriage had been “ fixed up in a conspicuous pilace,” agreeably to the Act of 1798, at the plaintiff’s ferry, at different times, though they could not remember as to one particular portion of time, it is sufficient evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff, in an action brought by him to recover ferriage.
    This was an action to recover a sum of money due for ferriage, from the year 1802, to 1812, tried at Charleston, May Term, 1819.
    To support the claim, the plaintiff’s books were introduced, and were admitted to go to the jury as evidence. They were proved in the usual manner by those who had made the entries; and as to one who was dead, his hand-*4721 was proven. It was ^proved, that the rates of ferriage had been at different times set up, though there was a portion of the time when the witnesses could not swear that they recollected to have seen them up.
    A verdict was found for the plaintiff under the direction of the Court; and a motion is now made for a new trial, cm the following grounds :
    1. Because the books were not evidence under the act of 1721, to go to the jury as evidence of the plaintiff’s claim. .
    2. Because his honor erred in directing the jury in finding a verdict generally against defendant, for the whole of the plaintiff’s demand.
    
      
      *(a) Samuel Richabds v. Robeet Howard. [*474
      Chakleston, January Term, 1821.
      
        A printer's boohs are only evidence to prove the authority for advertising, but the file of newspapers must be produced to show the performance of the printing alleged to have been done.
      
      This was an action brought by the plaintiff, as survivor of Freneau, against the defendant, to recover the amount of a printer’s bill.
      The cause was tried in the Circuit Court of Charleston, May Term, 1819, and the presiding .Judge permitted the original book of accounts, kept by the plaintiff, to he given in evidence, to prove not only the authority to advertise, but the actual performance of the work.
      The defendant contended, that the book of accounts was not the best evidence that the nature of the case would admit of, hut that the orders for advertising, and the file of papers, ought to be produced, to show the authority to advertise and the performance of the work alleged to have been done.
      A verdict was given for plaintiff; and a motion for a new trial was submitted on the following grounds :
      1. That the book of accounts ought not to have been received as sufficient evidence of the authority of the defendant to advertise. And,
      2. That if they were sufficient to prove the authority to advertise, they were not sufficient to prove the performance of the work done, but that the file of papers ought to have been produced.
      The opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice Huger.
      The general rule of law prevents a party furnishing such entries in his favors even in the ease of a regular tradesman’s books. Pitman v. Maddox, 2 Salkeld, 690, and Bull N. P. 278. Our Courts, however, have permitted several exceptions to this rule ; and it appears now to be fully established that not only tradesmen’s books, but mechanics’ and printers’ books, when regularly and properly kept, are to be received in evidence. In the case of Thomas v. Administrator of Best, I Nott & McCord, 186, this doctrine is reviewed and reluctantly acquiesced in. As I do not feel myself at liberty to question the authority of this ease, I must decide, that, on the first ground, the motion for a new trial must fail. But as the Court, in the ease of Thomas and the Administrator of Best, did not decide to what extent a printer’s hooks were evidence, I feel myself at liberty to limit its operation within the narrowest compass. I am of opinion, therefore, that such books are only evidence to prove the authority for advertising, and that in this case the file of papers ought to have been produced, to show the performance of the printing alleged to have been done.
      A new trial must, therefore, be granted.,
      Nott and JoHsrsoir, JJ., concurred.
      Colcock and Richardsok, JJ., dissented.
      1 N. McC. 187, 438, and cases cited.
    
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Colcock, J.

It was contended on the part of the defendant, that the books of a ferryman ought not to be introduced, because they were not enumerated in the Act of 1721, and had never before been admitted as evidence in any case. I was of opinion the question did not depend on the Act; for that is not of force, and has not regulated the decisions on the subject. The Act recognizes the law or custom of giving in evidence the books of merchants, mechanics and handicraftsmen ; and declared that they shall not be evidence beyond one year; and the decisions in our Courts have extended the principle to the books of physicians, and made them all evidence beyond the year. Now I am unable to see any reason why a ferryman’s books, if regularly kept, should not be admitted in evidence as well as a physician’s. Both charge for services performed, though of a different character. There is less room for imposition in the charges of a ferryman than in those of a physician. One can better remember how often he crosses a ferry, than how often a physician has visited his house, or distinguish between the visits of the friend and physician. And, again, the charges of the ferryman are fixed by law, those of the physician are not so limited.

*4781 *When we advert to the reason on which merchant’s books were admitted as evidence, that the goods are delivered without witnesses and by agents, I think it applies with peculiar force to a ferry owner, and with more than peculiar force to the case before us ; for generally they employ agents, and, in this case, the owner being a lady, was obliged to employ one.

A majority of my brethren are of opinion that the books were properly admitted.

The Act of 1799 declares, "that every person or persons, their heirs and assigns, in whom public ferries, toll bridges, or causeways, have been- or shall be vested by law, shall keep fixed up, in some conspicuous place, the several rates, as are, or shall be established by law; and if any person or persons, their heirs or assigns, in whom public ferries, toll bridges, or causeways, have been, or shall hereafter be vested, shall neglect or refuse to keep fixed up, their several rates, as established by law, such keeper or keepers of a public ferry’ toll bridge, or causeway, shall forfeit all such toll as they would have been entitled to receive.” The object of this is manifestly to prevent imposition, and give the traveller an opportunity of guarding against it. In this case, the defendant lived very near this ferry, and that circumstance, together with his passing so long and frequently without paying his ferriage, well warrant the presumption, that he was perfectly acquainted with the rates of ferriage, and had entered into a contract to pass on credit. As to him, therefore, the protection of the law was unnecessary. But it was distinctly submitted to the jury to decide the question of fact as to the rates having been posted up, for at least the greater part of the time ; and it is the unanimous opinion of the Court, that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict on this ground.

The motion is, therefore, rejected.

Bay, Gantt and Johnson, JJ., concurred. 
      
       P. L. 117; 7 Stat. 168, § 10; Ante, 803; 1 Bay, 41.
     
      
       9 Stat. 396, g 16.
     