
    Mayes and others against Jacoby.
    If an appeal ofarbitrators*1 Be entered aftertwentvdavs from the time awardSthee irregularity b^the acijuh-3 eseencr and pellre; and a years in movthe -ppeaf1 ■will amount of su7h'air objection.
    In Error.
    A RULE having been granted by the Court of Common ^eas °f Washington county, on the plaintiff below, the defendant in error, to shew cause why the appeal entered by _ * i j him in this case, from an award of arbitrators, should not be sct as^ei u appeared, on shewing cause, that on the 10th of March, 1819, the case was referred to arbitrators under the Act of the 20th of March, 1810, who on the 9th of July following, filed an award in favour of the defendants. On the 30th of July, the plaintiff appealed from the award, paid the costs, made the requisite affidavit, and gave security. A dec^arati°n was afterwards filed by the plaintiff, to which the defendant pleaded'; issue was joined, and a rule for trial en~ tered. Various rules were afterwards entered for taking depositions, under which much evidence was taken by both parties. The cause was continued on the list until the holding of a special Court of Common Pleas, on the 30th of July, 1822, when a jury having been called, , and being about to be sworn for the trial of the cause, the defendants moved to quash the appeal, because it had not been made within twenty days from the time of the award.
    The Court below being of opinion, upon argument, that the irregularity in entering the appeal, had been waived by the acquiescence and acts of the defendants, discharged the rule ; and in this opinion it was now alleged there was error. . '
    
      M'-Gijfin and Kennedy, for the plaintiffs in error.
    
      M1-Kenan, Campbell, and Ross, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Gibson ]. —

The appeal was entered on the twenty-first day excluding that on which the award was filed, and, therefore, out of time ; but it is also clear, that the delay of more than two years before the motion to quash, was a waiver of all objections that might originally have been made, on the ground of defects arising out of the mere omission of circumstances : such, for instance, as a defective acknowledgment of the recognisance of bail. But it is argued, that the judgment on the award having become absolute on the expiration of the twenty days, no right of appeal existed when the appeal was taken ; and consequently, that as in Morrison v. Weaver, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 190, no acquiescence by the appellee could give jurisdiction to the Common Pleas. But there is this plain difference between that case and the present. In Morrison v. Weaver, the Court had not a general jurisdiction of the subject matter, an appeal in any shape not having been originally given : here, there was a general jurisdiction, which would enable the Court.to entertain an appeal., All that was decided in Morrison v. Weaver was, that the acquiescence of the appellee did not amount to an agreement to consider the cause as an amicable action originating in the Common Pleas, and falling within the original jurisdiction of that Court, when it was evident the parties had not considered it so themselves ; and as to appellate jurisdiction, there was none. Here, however, the Common Pleas had appellate jurisdiction; and the expiration of the time for taking an appeal, furnished an objection which the appellee might waive. I can see no difference between an appeal taken out of season, and an appeal taken without having paid costs, made the requisite affidavit, or given the proper security; and any or all of these may be waived: yet they are conditions precedent, and an appeal without them, is as much a nullity, as if it'were entered after the expiration of the twenty days. In either case, the judgment would be declared absolute, if an objection were made in time.; but any one may dispense with provisions that were intended to operate in his own favour. It is ,clear, then, that the appellee was too late with his motion, and the judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  