
    BYRD v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Dec. 17, 1913.)
    1. Criminal Law (§ 198) — Former Jeopardy —Separate Offenses — Periods Covered.
    Under Pen. Code 1911, § 756¡ providing that any person practicing medicine m violation of law shall be punished, and that each day of such violation shall constitute a separate offense, a conviction of unlawfully practicing medicine in March" is no bar to a prosecution for practicing medicine upon another person in May.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 385; Dec. Dig. § 198.*]
    2. Jury (§ 101) — Impaneling.
    Where accused had at the same term been convicted of a similar offense, there is no error where there were only 12 jurors on the regular panel, 6 of whom tried accused in the first case, and the court excused them and. retained only 1 juror who had heard the evidence in the first prosecution, upon his statement that he had no opinion as to the guilt or innocence of accused in the second.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 458, 459; Dec. Dig. § 101.]
    Appeal from Delta County Court; J. N. Viles, Judge.
    B. F. Byrd was convicted of unlawfully practicing medicine without registering his certificate, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Sturgeon & Beauchamp, of Paris, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other eases see same topic and section NUMBER in Deo. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   PRENDERGAST, P. J.

This is a companion case to that of the same appellant from the same county (this day decided) 162 S. W. 360. The indictments in the two cases are identical, except as to the time and the person he is alleged to have practiced upon. In this case he has only three grounds in his motion to quash the indictment; those are his first, second, and third in the other case. What we said in that case disposes of his motion in this.

The statute (article 756, P. C.) makes each day a separate offense. In this case the indictment alleges he practiced, etc., on Ida Oauley on or about Mm1 10, 191S. In the other case it alleges he practiced, etc., on Lem Freeman on or about March 1, 191S. Neither is a bar to the other, and the conviction in the other does not put him in jeopardy in this — they are not the same offenses, but entirely separate and distinct offenses.

Appellant made a motion to continue, to the effect that there were only 12 jurors on tile regular panel, 6 of whom tried him in the other case, and the others were present and heard that tried, and were disqualified to try this. The court qualified his bill to the overruling of said motion by stating he excused the 6 who tried his other case, and all the others, except 1, testified they were not present when the other case was tried, and heard none of the evidence, and knew nothing about either case. The one testified he heard the evidence of the other trial, but had no opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant in this. Neither the bill nor record otherwise shows whether this, or any of said 6 jurors, served on this trial. The bill shows no error whatever. The evidence is clearly sufficient to sustain the conviction.

The judgment is affirmed.  