
    Den on demise of Lindsey and wife v. John Burfoot.
    
      } From Camden.
    Testator devised his lands “to be divided between his daughters, Amey and Jaca ; and if either of them died before they came of age or married, the share of the one so dying to vest in and belong to the other.” Jaca married and died before she came of age, in 1792. She had a brother, who died in her life-time, leaving children, who were her heirs at law under the act of 1784, c. 22, s. 3. The lands . devised to Jaca, vested absolutely in her upon her marriage, and upon her death descendpd to her heirs at law.
    The Court will not construe the word or copulatively, so as to render the happening of both events, viz : Jaca’s marriage and her death • ynder age, to be necessary to the absolute vesting of the estate in her, unless it be to carry into effect the intent of the testator ; and where no intent appears rendering such a construction necessary, the word or shall be construed disjunctively.
    The question in this case arose upon the will of Robert Burfoot, who being’ seised of the lands mentioned in the declaration, devised them with certain personal estates “to be divided between his daughters, Amey and Jaca }, and if either of them died before thetj became of age or married, the share of the one so dying’ should vest in and belong to the other.” Jaca married and died before she came of age, in 1792. She had one brother, who died in her life-time, leaving children, and these children were her heirs at law under the act of 1784, c. 22, s. 3. Her sister Amey married Lindsey, the lessor of the Plaintiff. And the question was, Whether Amey was entitled to the lands under the limitations of the will? Or whether they descended to the heirs at law of Jaca, under whom the Defendant claimed ?
   By the Coprt.

It is contended for the lessors of the Plaintiff, that both events, to-wit, the marriage of Jaca and her death under age, must happen, before the lands vested absolutely in her and defeated the limitation to Amey; and that the word or ought to be construed copulatively as and. If it were necessary to resort to this construction to carry into effect the general intent of the testator, the Court would do it: but there is no good reason in this case for giving to the word or any other than its ordinary meaning; there is nothing from which the Court can infer, that the testator did not intend that the estate should vest absolutely in Jaca, upon the happening of either event; and one of them having happened, we are of opinion, the lands vested absolutely in her, and descended to her heir's at law. — Judgment for the Defendant.  