
    Alley and others v. Denson, Chief Justice.
    The second section of the act of tho Oth of May, 1838, providing for the removal of county seats of justice, (Hurt. Dig., art. 338,) malees tho chief justico of tho county the judge or what shall bo a sufficient number of petitioners to authorize the ordering of an election; it does not require that a majority or any specified number ol persons shall sign the petitiou.
    In order to remove a county scat from a place which is not within five miles from the center of the county to a place within five miles from the center, a majority of all the votes cast only is required; not a majority of all the votes which, by possibility, might have been cast if all the qualified electors hud voted.
    There is no contract within the purview of the Constitution, either with the purchasers ot property or the donors of property, upon condition of tho establishment of a county seat at a particular place, that the county scat shall not bo removed from such place, nor has any one a vested right in tho continuance of a county scat at a particular place; therefore county seats maybe removed either by special act of tho Legislature or under tho general law of 1838, without compensation. (jN'oIq 31.)
    Appeal from Cass. This case originated in a controversy in respect to the county seat of Cass countj'-. It appeared l>y the record that on the 21st day of August, 1831. tho chief justice, of the county, proceeding under flic provisions of the act of the. 9lh of Slay, 1S38, (Hart. Dig., arts. 337, 338,) ordered an election for the removal of the seat of justice from Jefferson, where it had been established at a greater distance than live miles from the center of the county, to Linden, within live miles of the center. An election was hold, pursuant to tho order, on the I3th day of September, 1831, at which Jefferson received one hundred and fifty-six votes and Linden two hundred and fifty-six. Linden was declared duly elected and proceedings taken with a view to remove the public offices to that place.
    The appellants filed their petitions on the 12th day of October, 1831, praying an injunction to prevent the removal. As the grounds of their interposition they alleged that, in consideration of tho location of the seat of justice at Jefferson, they had purchased property there, &c., and that the faiili of the county is pledged to them that the seat of justice shall remain there, &c.; that the election hold was without tho authority of law, and that Linden was not duly elected, for that the petition on which the election was ordered by the chief justice was not signed by a majority of the qualified voters of the county; that there were more than six hundred qualified electors in the county, anil lliat Linden, having received but 200 voles at the election held on the 13th of Hepfomber. had not received a majority of (lie votes of tlie qualilied voters; wherefore, they alleged that the election was illegal and void.
    On tliis petition'an injunction was awarded.' Afterwards, oil the 13th of Marcln 1832, (lie plaintiffs filed an amended petition, setting forth tho facts connected with the location of the seat, of justice at Jefferson, under Ihe provisions of an act “to establish the county of Cass,’’ approved April 25th, 18-IG, alleging that the. commissioners appointed by the. act, acting on behalf of the county, received propositions from the plain tills to convoy-to them lands for the erection of public buildings in consideration lliat Jefferson should lie elected the seat of justice; that Jefferson was so elected, and that the plaintiffs thereupon conveyed the lands; that (he principal consideration and inducement to the contraer, on the part of the plaintiffs was tlie-enhancement of the value of their other lands and property adjacent, to the seat of justice, &c., &e. The petition further alleged that since the tiling- of the original petition an act liad been passed by the Legislature of Ihe Slate, entitled “An act (o locate the, scat of just ice of Cass county,” approved January 15Ui, 1852. by which Linden was declared to he Ihe seat of justice of the comity, and it was made tho duly of the county officers to remove their offices to (hat place, and that no provision was therein made to compensate the. plaintiffs for the. injury done them. They averred that the act was in violation of the obligation of their contract wil.li the county; that it was in derogation of their rights, and unconstitutional and void.
    On motion of the defendant at the hearing, the court dissolved the injunction ami dismissed the petition, and the plaintiff's appealed.
    
      0. Lewis and W. P. Hill, for appellants.
    I. The county seat cannot he removed without Alley’s consent. (Dartmouth College, 4 U. S. Cond. It., 52(1; Fletcher v. Peck, 2 Id., 308.)
    II. If the Legislature have constitutional right to remove the county seat without Alley’s consent, it cannot be removed until Alley’s land is recon veycil to him and damages paid to him for the lots sold to innocent bona fide purchasers ; and until the reconveyance is made and the damages paid, defendants ought to be enjoined. On this point see Livingstone v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. It., 507. On the question of injunction read Yates’ opinion from, page 502; Thompson’s opinion, from pago 509; Kent’s opinion, from page 5S9; 2d Story’s Eq. Jur., 3d. ed., p. 241, note 1; Osburn v. U. S. Bank, 5 U. S. Cond. It., 741.
    This last case, as well as the ease in 9th Johns. It., shows that notwithstanding the party applying for the injunction has a legal remedy, equity will enjoin ; and the latter case shows that if the original injunction was properly dissolved and original petition properly dismissed, the injunction prayed for in the amended and supplemental petition ought to be granted. (See Story Eq. Jur.. secs. 801, 802, 872, 927, 953, and cases referred to.)
    That Alley is entitled to compensation before removal of the county seat, see 3 Howard Miss. II., 240.
    
      J. O. Everett, for appellee.
    I. That (he election complained of was legal. See Hartley’s Digest, articles 337 and 338. which were then and are still in force.
    But it is said that 250 votes is not a majority of all the votes in the county at that time. We answer, the only way to ascertain the number of votes in a county on any given day is through the ballot box, bjr the number polled and returned to the said chief justice as required by law.
    That the statute of 1838 is still in force, see decision of this court made at Austin, in the. case, of Brown v. Fowler. This fact being established, it follows as a matter of course that there was no error in sustaining the demurrer and motion to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the bill.
    II. Eacli county is a public corporation, created for public political purposes, and the whole interest in them belongs to the public, and is therefore instituted for purposes connected with the administration of the Government and may be, controlled by the Legislature, and is not a contract within the purview of the Constitution of the United States. (2 Kent’s Com., 275; 3 Story’s Com., 200.) The right lo control, or locate, or relocate the seat of justice in a county belongs to the Legislature; it is a power incident to sovereignty and secured by the Constitution ; and if the county seat, be removed, whose loss is it? Is the public bound to repair losses and afford indemnity to individual interests which may be affected by such removal? (See 4th Black. R., 208, Armstrong et al. v. The Commissioners of Durben County.)
   WHEELER, J.

In the case of Fowler v. Brown (5 Texas R., 407) it was decided that the act of the 9th of May, 1S3S, “providing for the removal of county seats of justice” is in force. The election of the 13th of September therefore, was not without the. authority of law.

The 2d section of the act (Hart. Dig., art. 838) makes the chief justice oi tlie county the judge of what, shall be a sufficient number of petitioners to authorize (he ordering of an election. It does not require that a majority or anv specified number of persons shall sign the petition.

The act (sec. 1, Hart. Dig., art 337) provides that “a majority of all the votes shall be sufficient” for the removal of a seat of justice from a place not within five miles of the center of the county to a place “ within the limits of live miles from tlie center.”

Note 01. — Bass v. Fontleroy, 11T., 098; Walker v. Tarrant County, 20 T., 16.

By a “majority of the votes” must have been intended a majority of all the votes cast at any election held for that purpose, and not, as seems to have been supposed by the petitioners, a majority of all tlie votes which by possibility might have been east if all the qualified electors of the county had voted.

It is conceded that Linden received a majority of all the votes cast at tlie election held on the 18th of September. It therefore ivas duly elected. By virtue of the election Linden became and was at the date of the passage of tlie act of the Legislature of the 15th of January, 1852, the legally-constituted seat of justice of the count}', and the act was merely declaratory and confirmatory in its character.

Biit independently of the election, ive entertain no doubt of the constitutional authority of the Legislature to remove the seat of justice of the county. Counties are public corporations. They are created for political purposes, and are subject to the control of the, legislative power of the State. (2 Kent’s Com., 275.) "• A public corporation instituted for purposes connected with the administration of the Government may be controlled by the Legislature, because such a corporation is not a contract within the purview of the Constitution.” (Id., 805.)

The quest ions presented in the present case were considered by the Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of Armstrong v. Commissioners, a parallel case to the present. (4 Blackf. R., 208.) By a statute of 1827, commissioners were appointed to relocate the seat of justice for Dearborn county, and were authorized to receive donations, &e. The statute provided that as soon as the public buildings were completed at the designated place that place should forever thereafter be the permanent seat of justice of the county. Tlie commissioners fixed tlie seat of justice at Lawrenceburgh, receiving from certain persons as a donation an obligation conditioned for building a court house there. Tlie court house was built by the donors, conformably to their contract. By a statute of 1S35 commissioners wore again appointed to relocate the seat of justice of the county, but tlie statute made no provision, in case of removal, for the repayment to the donors of the money they had expended in building the court house. The seat of justice was removed to Wilmington. Upon these facts the court held that the statute of 1835, under the authority of which the seat of justice ivas removed to Wilmington, was not unconstitutional, and that the removal could not be resisted by the persons who built the court house, although no compensation was provided or made them for the building of the court house and the injury sustained by them.

We deem it unnecessary to enter upon a particular examination of the several grounds relied on in support of the appellants’ case. The authorities cited by them are not, it is conceived, applicable to a ease like the present. We think it free from doubt that Linden is legally the scat of justice of the county, both by virtue of the election of the 13th of September, 1851, and the act of the Legislature of the 15th of January, 1852; and we are of opinion therefore that the judgment be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  