
    Chapman vs. Kincaid.
    Trespass for pulling down a house. A threat that if plaintiff’s daughter did not yield to defendant’s unchaste solicitations, he would pull down the house in which her mother resided, is competent evidence, first, to establish the identity of the person pulling down the house; and secondly, to show the malicious feelings which dictated the violence. A threat to hi 11 the daughter if she did not yield, is also evidence to prove malice against those inhabiting the house.
    This is an action of trespass, which was instituted in the circuit court of Marshall county, by Nancy Kincaid against Robert Chapman. It was tried on the plea of not guilty by a jury, under the direction of judge Dillahunty, at the December term, 1846. It appeared in evidence, that Kincaid, the husband of plaintiff, resided in the county of Bedford; that Chapman went to Bedford county, and proposed to Kincaid to rent him a place near the residence of defendant, in the county of Marshall; that Kincaid acceded to his terms and took possession of the place; that in about a month after his removal he died, leaving his wife Nancy and his two daughters in possession of the place; that shortly after the death of Kin-caid, Chapman made various attempts on the chastity of one of the daughters of plaintiff, and having been repulsed, that he threatened that if she did not yield to his solicitations he would kill her, and to the other, if her sister did not “accommodate” him he would throw down the house in which they then lived.. Some short time after this, four or five men appeared in the night and pulled down the house, and injured and destroyed much of the furniture in the house. The plaintiff and her daughters left the premises, and having been refused admittance into a neighboring house' remained in the woods from Thursday till Sunday, in bad weather in March: and this action was brought for damages.
    The material facts stated above, were proven by the two daughters. They stated also that the house was pulled down by Chapman and others under his control; and . they also proved the propositions for sexual intercourse, and to this evidence a general objection was interposed, which was overruled by the presiding judge. The jury rendered a verdict for $500, and judgment was rendered thereupon.
    From this judgment the defendant appealed.
    
      Wisner, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Venable and Baxter, for the defendant in error.
   Turley, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

The first error assigned in this case is, that illegal evidence was heard by the court below, though objected to by the defendant. There were two daughters of the plaintiff examined as witnesses; one of them proved, that the defendant had proposed sexual intercourse with her sister, and upon being repulsed, said he would pull down the house if he were not gratified; the other, that he said, on another occasion, he would kill her. The defendant made a general objection to the reception of evidence of conversations between himself and the witnesses about sexual intercourse, which objection was overruled by the court, and we think correctly.

The daughters resided with their mother, in the house which was pulled down-by the defendant and others; and for doing which this suit is commenced. A portion of the testimony was clearly legal, viz, that of the threat to pull down the house, as evidence of a preconceived design and malicious intent, and ought not to have been rejected. The court was not asked to discriminate, but to reject without discrimination, which was properly refused. But we also think, that the testimony-proving a threat to kill, if not accommodated, is also legal proof in the case, and for the same purpose, to wit, to prove an evil design and wicked intent against those inhabiting the house. And though the suit is brought in the name of the mother, as the head of the household, yet the wicked intent, and malicious feelings of the defendant towards the daughter, is evidence to establish the' identity of the defendant as the person who committed the trespass; and, also, to aggravate the damages.

The second objection is, that the damages are excessive.

We do not think so; if they had been three times as much, they would not have been excessive, under the circumstances of the case.

Let the judgment be affirmed.  