
    Sarah Schmeig, Plaintiff, v. Christian Kochersberger et al., Defendants.
    (Supreme Court, Queens Special Term,
    December, 1896.)
    Will — Construction of — Life estate.
    By the terms of a will the entire estate was devised and bequeathed to the widow, who was appointed executrix, with authority to sell any or all of the real estate, if she saw fit, and use the interest derived from the proceeds for her support. By subsequent clauses the will gave to testator’s adopted daughter, after the death of the widow, all of said estate for her own use and benefit forever, and directed that if such adopted daughter should die in testator’s lifetime, the executrix must sell the real estate, if not already sold under the former authority, and invest the proceeds for the children of said daughter. Held, that the widow took only a life estate and as to the remainder she was made a trustee for said daughter.and her children.
    Action to set aside a conveyance of real estate, made by the widow of Michael Beminger, his adopted daughter mentioned in his wil] being the plaintiff. The defendants contended that the will gave to the widow an absolute power of alienation for her own benefit, and thus devised to her an absolute fee, and that therefore the plaintiff has and had no interest upon which to maintain the action. The other facts appear in the opinion.
    Henry A. Montford, for plaintiff.
    William Rasquin, Jr., for defendants.
   Gaynor, J.

By the second ” clause of the, will the testator devised and bequeathed all of his real and personal estate to his wife, in so many words, but .coupled therewith that she might sell any or all of the real estate, if she saw fit, and use the interest. derived from the proceeds for her support. This, in itself, indicates, an intention to devise to her a life estate only. The next .two. clauses make this intention plain. The “ Third ” clause is that the testator gives and devises unto his adopted daughter, after the death of his said wife, “ all my real and personal estate as aforesaid (if said real estate has not been sold as hereinbefore provided) for her' own ■ use, benefit and behoof forever.” The phrase in brackets means that if the real estate has been sold, the. proceeds are embraced in the' bequest to the' daughter. The “ Fourth ” clause provides that if the said adopted daughter should die in the lifetime of the testator, the executrix must sell the said real estate, if it has not already been sold as permitted by the Second ” clause, and invest and keep the proceeds for the children of the said daughter. By the “ Fourth ” and last, clause the wife is appointed executrix.

This is the substance of the will. Though the actual language and arrangement are crude and inartificial,' the meaning is plain, and therefore artificial rules of construction may not be resorted to; for they may be,applied tó a will only when the meaning is doubtful, and in order to spell out a meaning. Matter of James, 146 N. Y. 78. The contention that the plaintiff had and has no interest in the reál estate, but that the widow took m fee, is not good.

The widow was given only a life estate by the will, and in respect of the remainder she was, as has been seen, made the trustee of the adopted daughter and her children. The conveyance of the real-estate by her to her two. brothers, defendants herein, was without adequate consideration, and- was made and accepted with the fraudulent intention of defeating the rights of the said daughter (the plaintiff. herein) under- the will, and depriving her of the said property.

As has been seen, the only power of sale specifically coupled with the office of executrix by the will. was in .the event of the said daughter dying during the. testator’s lifetime. Though that event did not occur, the conveyance by the widow is in terms under the power of sale to the executrix. The point has not been raised that the conveyance therefore conveys nothing, and thus not being a cloud upon the title, that this action cannot be maintained, and I therefore do not pass upon it. ' I notice it only because cases upon appeal are not unfrequently determined upon questions not even mooted upon the trial, and often not thought of, or, if thought of, carefully avoided by counsel for present purposes, though they may seem to be covered- by general exceptions shown by the appeal record. This will continue to be the case, apparently, until. 0U1* practice shall require that the questions of law to be reserved for review upon appeal shall be stated by counsel at the close of the trial, and noted, as is done in some jurisdictions.

Judgment for plaintiff.  