
    SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 34205.
    Decided May 16, 1921.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      Coast Guard; land grant deductions. — The Coast Guard, after the passage of the act of January 28, 1915, 38 Stat., 801, became part of the military organization of the United States within the meaning of the land-grant acts allowing deductions for the transportation of “ troops of the United States.”
    
      The Reporter’s statement of the case:
    
      Mr. Charles H. Bates for the plaintiff. Mr. William R. Harr was on the briefs.
    
      Mr. Horace S. Whitman, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frank Davis, jr., for the defendant.
    The following are the material allegations of plaintiff’s petition:
    That plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Kentucky, and was, and now is engaged as a common carrier by railroad in the transportation of passengers and freight between the points referred to herein, either directly over its own lines or in conjunction with connecting carriers.
    
      That under Acts of Congress granting lands in aid of railroads and regulating the expenditures of appropriations by the United States for Army transportation over such land-aided roads, said land-grant railroads were required to transport troops of the United States at certain less rates than those charged private parties for similar transportation, but in none of said acts were said land-grant railroads required, nor have they ever agreed, to transport as “ troops of the United States,” at such less rates, the certain persons hereinafter referred to.
    Some years ago, and prior to the time's when the services hereinafter mentioned were performed, the railroad companies of the United States generally, including plaintiff, severally agreed with the Quartermaster General of the Army (subject to certain exceptions not necessary here to state) to accept, for the transportation of troops of the United States the lowest net fare, and lowest net excess-baggage rate, lawfully available as derived through deductions on account of land-grant distance via a usually traveled route for military traffic from a lawful fare filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission as applying from point of origin to destination at time of movement. These agreements, commonly known as “ Land-Grant Equalization Agreements,” were in force at the times of the transactions hereinafter referred to.
    Between January, 1915, and April 6, 1917, both inclusive, plantiff, upon transportation requests issued by the War Department, transported certain persons belonging to the U. S. Coast Guard, whose status in such organization is more particularly set forth in the statement marked “ Exhibit A.”
    That at the times of the transportation referred to herein the United States was at peace and the Coast Guard was charged only with the performance of civil duties and was operating under the Treasury Department.
    In making payment for transportation services over land-grant railroads, the accounting officers of the United States, against the protest and objection of plaintiff, refused to pay plaintiff therefor at the lawfully published tariff fares without land-grant deductions in manner chargeable for such services when rendered the general public, and paid plantiff lor said transportation only at the fares authorized for the transportation of “ troops of the United States ” over land-grant railroads.
    That the difference between the amount so paid plaintiff for such transportation at land-grant fares, as for the transportation of “ troops of the United States,” and the amount which plaintiff was entitled to. receive therefor at published tariff fares without land-grant deductions, was $868.30, for which plaintiff prays judgment.
    The court filed the following
   ORDER.

It is ordered by the court that the petition herein should be, and the same is hereby, dismissed. See memorandum.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

The question involved in this case is whether the Coast Guard at the time that the service herein sued for was rendered by the plaintiff, which is a land-grant railroad, was a part of the military organization of the United States in the sense that when the members of it traveled on official business the Government was entitled to a deduction allowed under the land-grant acts for the transportation of “ troops of the United States.” The act of January 28, 1915, 38 Stat., 801, provides:'

That there shall be established * * * the Coast Guard, which shall constitute a part of the military forces of the United States.”

This question was decided by this court in the case of Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. United States, 55 C. Cls., 45. In that case the court quoted with approval from the case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 52 C. Cls., 226; 249 U. S. 354 (affirmed), the following language:

“ We think that the general rule applicable to all of these cases is that, in order to come within the provisions of the land-grant act, the persons transported should be a part of the military organization of the United States, and may in certain cases include the Naval Establishment, which, however, is not decided.”

In the case of Louisville da Nashville Railroad Co. v. United States, supra, the court said:

“ It goes without, saying that the Navy and Marine Corps are parts of the military organization of the country. The Coast Guard is made ‘ a part of the military' forces of the United States ’ by the act of January 28, 1915, 38 Stat., 800. The transportation of the Coast Guard here involved was subsequent to that act.”

The transportation involved in this case was also subsequent to the passage of the above act.

The petition should be dismissed and it is so ordered.  