
    The Woodbridge Company, Appellant, v. The Charles E. Hires Company, Respondent.
    
      Lease — eonstmictionof the words “at and from, "when referring to a notice of tcrmination of a lease.
    
    Where a lease contains a clause stating that the lessee may cancel the lease “ without damages, at and from the first day of September, 1895, by giving thirty days’ written notice” to the lessor, the words “at and from” simply fix a point of time at which and from which the lease' may- be terminated by a "written notice of thirty days; and where this notice is given on August 31, 1895, and the premises are not surrendered until October 1, 1895, the condition of the lease under which the tenant was entitled to surrender the premises and terminate his liability for rent has not been complied with. •
    O’Brien, J., dissented.
    Appeal by the plaintiff, The Woodbridge Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Hew York on the 5th day of March, 1897/upon the dismissal of its complaint by direction of the court after a trial, at the Hew York Special Term..
    
      
      Edward W. Sheldon, for the appellant.
    
      John A. Garver, for the respondent.
   Patterson, J.:

• The determination of the question arising upon this appeal depends upon the proper construction to be given to that clause in the lease which provides as follows-: It is further understood and agreed that the party of the second part (the lessee) has the privilege of canceling this lease, without damages, at aiid from the first day of September, 1895, by giving thirty days’ written notice to the party of the first part.” The meaning of this clause seems to be entirely clear and unmistakable. All the terms and conditions upon which the property was rented by the plaintiff’s assignor to the defendant are contained in the lease, and construction can be given to every clause of that instrument without resort being had to extraneous evidence. The words at and from ” simply fix a point of time at which and from which the lease may be terminated, and it may be thus terminated, upon the lessee giving thirty days’ written notice to. the lessor. The evidence is distinct that the premises were not surrendered until October. 1, 1895; the notice was not given until August 21, 1895, and, therefore, the condition of the lease upon which the defendant was entitled to surrender the premises and cease to be liable for the rent was not complied with.

The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.

Van Brunt, P. J., Williams and Ingraham, JJ., concurred.

O’Brien, J. (dissenting) :

I concur with Mr. Justice Patterson in the view that the words at and from ” fix a point of time; but I think the conclusion is wrong, that it fixes a point of time from which the lease may be terminated. The• question presented -is: Was the point of time thus fixed one at and from which the privilege was to continue, or was it the date upon which, if thirty days’ prior notice were given, the lease might be canceled ? I think it was just what the language says : that September first was fixed as the time at and from which the privilege of canceling this lease ” was to run. If the parties had intended that the first of September was the only time at which the lease could be canceled, it would have been most natural for them to say that, in that event,, thirty days’ written notice must be given prior to that date. We find no such language in the clause in question. I, therefore, agree with tlie view taken by the learned trial judge who, in construing this clause, said it was, “ the privilege" of canceling ” that was fixed as of and from September first

Whether this construction, or the one given by Mr. Justice Patterson, is correct, it is quite evident that the meaning of the clause is not “ entirely clear and unmistakable.” If not, then, under the authorities and as held- by the trial judge, resort may be had to parol evidence; and, in the light of such evidence, what the parties intended by the language used becomes “ entirely clear and unmistakable.” For it appears, that, in the negotiations which terminated in the lease, the plaintiff had offered to rent the property for a year at $100 a month, but that if the defendant wanted it for less than a year, the rent would be $125 a month.' By the evidence of a number of witnesses, it was conclusively established that the defendant paid $125.a month, instead of $100, for the privilege of canceling the lease; that it was the intention of the parties that the clause' should confer upon the defendant the right to cancel the lease on the first of September, or at any time thereafter, upon giving thirty days’ written notice ; and that such notice was given, and the premises were vacated accordingly.

As I think,.therefore, that the judgment should be affirmed, I dissent.

Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellant to abide event.  