
    John B. Root versus Malcolm Henry.
    Of the causes proper to arrest judgment, and for a new trial. [Where the declaration contained an allegation that a note of hand was payable to, and endorsed by G. & R. to G., and by him to the plaintiff, the want of an allegation that G. & R. were copartners at the time, was held not to be a good ground for arresting judgment; and the declaration was held sufficient, without any allegation of the Christian names of G. & R., or any other averment respecting the endorsement. — Ed.]
    The plaintiff declares on a promissory note made by the defendant, dated August 14th, 1802, payable to Messieurs Graves Sp Root or order for 75 dollars 50 cents on demand with interest, and endorsed by them to Perez Graves or order, and by him to the plaintiff.
    The defendant pleaded non assumpsit, and non assumpsit infra sex annos, on both which pleas issues were joined, and a verdict found for the plaintiff, that the defendant promised within six years.
    
      Gold, for the defendant,
    then moved in arrest of judgment, assigning the following causes : —
    “ 1. That the declaration does not set out any copartnership of Graves & Root on the 14th of August, 1802 ; and, in fact, none then existed. '
    [ * 505 ] * “ 2. That the said note is pretended to be assigned by the present plaintiff’s endorsing thereon the names ‘ Graves & Root,’ which in that form could not have the effect to assign the said note.
    “ 3. That no legal assignment of the said note could be made, but either by the payees’ endorsing thereon their own proper names, under their own hands, or by the said Root’s endorsing the same for himself and Graves, having special power so to do, conformable to legal usage in such cases.
    
      “ 4. That in the declaration it is alleged that the promise in said note was made to ‘ Graves & Root,’ without inserting any proper names, or description of the persons or firm, to whom the said promise is alleged to be made.
    “ 5. That the plaintiff has not in said declaration set out or alleged any assignment by any description of persons or firm having a right to do it.
    “ Wherefore the said Malcolm prays that the judgment may be arrested, or that the said matters may be reserved for the consideration of the Court, as is by the law provided in such case.”
   Parsons, C J.

An allegation of the existence of a copartnership between Graves & Root is unnecessary; and the promise to Graves & Root is sufficient, if there were no copartnership.

Williams for the plaintiff

The second objection is not on the record ; and it is also contradicted by the jury, who have found that Messrs. Graves & Root en dorsed the note; and after verdict we shall presume the endorsement to be in legal form, and regularly made.

The declaration alleges an endorsement by Messrs. Graves fy Root, the promisees, which the jury have found to be true ; the third objection cannot, therefore, prevail.

The fourth objection is, that the declaration does not allege the proper names, or give any description of the promisees, calling them only Messrs. Graves & Root. — We must presume that the declaration pursued the description in the * note ; which [ * 506 ] is sufficient, as the promisees are not parties to the writ. Had they been parties, additions would have been necessary.

The fifth objection is not founded in fact; for the endorsements are made, first by the promisees, and secondly by their endorsee, all who had a legal right to assign the note. — Upon the whole, there seems no color, on which the judgment can legally be arrested.

The defendant’s counsel prays that judgment may be arrested, or that the matters may be reserved for the consideration of the Court as is by law provided.

Cases may be reserved for the consideration of the Court, either by the agreement of the parties on a case stated, or on the judge’s report, or on exceptions filed and allowed agreeably to the statute of 1804, c. 105, § 5, neither of which methods is adopted here ; and although some of the objections would imply that the jury had erred in their conclusions of fact from the evidence, yet we can consider the application only as a motion in arrest of judgment. This motion one judge is competent to hear and decide, as the objection is on the record, and the party, if aggrieved, may be relieved on error.

The motion must be overruled, and judgment be entered on the verdict, with additional damages from the finding of the verdict to the rendition of the judgment.  