
    Ex parte DOUGLAS.
    (No. 11796.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 11, 1928.
    1. Infants <§=>16 — Judgment committing girl to State Training School, not providing duration of term.of commitment, held! nullity (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, arts. 1089, 1090; Rev. St. 1925, art. 2338).
    Judgment committing girl to State Training School as delinquent child, but failing to state duration of term of commitment, held, nullity, since under specific terms of Code Cr. Proc. 1925, arts. 1089, 1090, and Rev. St. 1925, art. 2338, judgment should have stated duration of term of commitment, and in no event could girl be committed to such institution for any time after she reached age of 21 years.
    2. Infants <§=>16 — Information in prosecution to commit girl as dielinquent, charging that she loitered on public streets and refused to obey parents, held not proper basis of prosecution (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 1083).
    Where information upon which girl was committed to State Training School as delinquent child charged that she unlawfully loitered on public streets and refused to obey her parents, held that such information was not proper basis of prosecution; no such act being mentioned in Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 1083, defining delinquent child.
    3. Infants <§=>16 — Court may not commit child as delinquent for offense not defined by law and act which did not constitute her delinquent child under statute. (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 1083).
    Court may not assume jurisdiction and commit child as delinquent for offense not defined by law and act which did not constitute her delinquent child as defined by Code Cr. Proc. 1&25, art. 10S3.
    4. Infants <3=>I6 — Before child may be committed as delinquent, terms of law must be strictly followed (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 1083).
    Before child may be deprived of parenthood and committed as delinquent child, as defined by Code Or. Proc. 1925, art. 1083, terms of law must be strictly followed.
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County; C. A. Pippen. Judge.
    Jessie Douglas was committed as a delinquent child. Erom a judgment remanding her to custody, she appeals.
    Reversed, and relator ordered discharged.
    Taylor & Irwin and J. S. Parker, all ofl Dallas, for appellant.
    A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   MARTIN, J.

Prom a judgment remanding relator to the custody of Mrs. Agnes Stephens, superintendent of the State Training School for Girls at Gainesville, relator appeals to this court.

It is alleged that both the judgment upon which relator was committed and the information upon which she was prosecuted are void. The judgment shown in the record reads in part as follows:

“It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that said Jessie Douglas, said defendant herein be and he is declared a delinquent child and that he be committed to the State Juvenile Training School for an indeterminate term of-years from date of commitment and subject to orders of court until committed.”

The trial was before the court without a jury. The length of time of relator’s commitment is nowhere stated in said judgment. The quoted portion of the judgment contains all there is in the record with reference to the duration of her sentence or the time and terms of same. In Ex parte Brooks, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 252, 211 S. W. 592, it was said:

“Such judgment should state the length of time which is the maximum commitment in such case, same in no event to be more than five years, and likewise in no event to extend beyond the time said juvenile reaches the age of twenty-one.”

A somewhat similar judgment was declared void in the case of Ex parte Roach, 87 Tex. Cr. R. 370, 221 S. W. 975. Under the specific terms of articles 1089 and 1090, C. O. P., and article 2338, R. C. S. (1925), the judgment should have stated the duration of the term of commitment and in no event could relator be committed to such institution for any time after she reached the age of 21 years. Undér the plain terms of the statute and the two decisions above quoted, the judgment in the instant case was a nullity.

The information filed charged in part that relator was a delinquent child, in this, that she did “then and there, unlawfully loiter on the public streets and refuse to obey her parents.” This is the only act charged against her. No such act is mentioned in article 1083, C. C. P., defining a delinquent child, and such an information could not be made the basis of a prosecution. Ex parte Roach, 87 Tex. Cr. R. 370, 221 S. W. 975.

The court could not assume jurisdiction and enter a judgment of conviction against relator for an pífense not defined by law and for an act which under the statute did not constitute her a delinquent child. Before a child can be deprived of parenthood and' become a ward of the state, a situation lamentable in any case, the terms of the law must be strictly followed.

Because both the judgment of conviction and the information upon which the prosecution was based are a nullity, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the relator is ordered discharged.

PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court. 
      <§=For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in ail Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     