
    Dean Ervin PHILLIPS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Beth Renee RIETEMA; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No.. 16-36074
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted October 23, 2017 
    
    Filed November 9, 2017
    Dean Ervin Phillips, Pro Se
    Kate Forrest, Counsel, The Law Office of Kate M. Forrest, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Defendants-Appellees Beth Renee Rietema, Kate Forrest, Daniel John Riete-ma, Frederick Doyce Rietema
    Jane Futterman, Thurston County Prosecuting Attorney, Olympia, WA, for Defendants-Appellees Thurston County, WA, Luke Hansen, Jennifer L. Lord, J. Dixon,Jonathon Lack, Christopher Wickham, Indu Thomas, Christine Schaller
    John E. Justice, Esquire, Attorney, Law, Lyman, Daniel, Kamerrer & Bogda-novich P.S., Olympia, WA, for Defendants-Appellees City of Tumwater, WA, City of Lacey, WA, JV Lyman, Christopher J. Coker, Boling, Elliot, Yancey, Mason, Lis-ka, Quites, Kenderesi, J. Knight
    Anthony Stephen Broadman, Esquire, Attorney, Ryan David Dreveskracht, Attorney, Galanda Broadman, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee Nisqually Jail
    Kimberly S. Reid, Olympia, WA, for Defendant-Appellee Kimberly S. Reid
    Bat-Sheva Stein, Pro Se
    Kenneth D. Cohen, Pro Se
    ■ Suzanne LiaBraaten, AGWA—Office of the Washington Attorney General (Olympia), Olympia, WA, for Defendant-Appellee Schmidt
    Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Dean Ervin Phillips appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment and dismissal orders his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Phillips’s claims stemming from his prior state civil actions as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because these claims constitute a “de facto appeal” of prior state court judgments, or are “inextricably intertwined” with those judgments. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1155-56 (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars de facto appeals of a state court decision); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding plaintiffs claim for conspiracy was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to determine the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void").

Dismissal of Phillips’s claims stemming from prior state criminal actions was proper because these claims are Heck-barred, as success on these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and Phillips has failed to allege that his conviction has been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).

To the extent that Phillips’s conspiracy claim is not barred by Rooker-Feldman or Heck, dismissal of Phillips’s conspiracy claim was proper because Phillips failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible civil conspiracy claim. See Woodrum v. Woodward County, Okla., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989) (§ 1983 conspiracy requires more than conclusory allegations).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Phillips’s “urgent motion for summary disposition” (Docket Entry No. 35) is denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     