
    John H. Helmich vs. Adam Johnson.
    
      July, 1841.
    The writ of certiorari is a common law writ; and the District Courts of this Territory possess a common law jurisdiction, and a supervisory control over all the inferior jurisdictions within the Territory.
    In the absence of any statute giving such authority, the District Courts, upon proper application, can direct writs of certiorari to be awarded to bring before such courts, causes pending before Justices of the Peace.
    A Justice of the Peace has no authority to set aside the verdict of a Jury. Those parts of the statute of January 21,1889, sections 2 and 3, article 9, which refer to applications to set aside judgments, apply merely to judgments by default, and not to judgments rendered Upon the verdict of a jury.
    This was a trial of the right of property under theStat. Jan. 21,1839, before Wm. Griffy, Justice of the Peace, in which Hclmich was claimant against Johnson. The jury in the Justice’s court found for the plaintiff', the Justice granted a new trial, and the case was brought up to the District Court by certiorari. In the District Court the cause was dismissed without a hearing, and was from that court removed to the Supreme Court by writ of error.
    The assignment of error contained two causes of error, to wit:
    1. The cause was legally and properly removed to the District Court from said magistrate by the writ of certiorari; and the said court having jurisdiction of the subject matter of said suit, should have sustained the said cause, and have corrected the erroneous proceedings of the said Justice, and have rendered such judgment as pertained to the equity and right of the matter, or have given effect to the judgment below.
    2. Because said Justice had granted a new trial contrary to the statute, and refused to issue execution on the original judgment, the District Court should not have dismissed the certiorari, but by its judgment have done what the Justice ought to .have done.
    Learned for plaintiff — Rorer and Grimes for defendant.
    For the plaintiff it was contended that a Justice of the Peace has no authority to grant a new trial in cases where a verdict of a jury has been rendered before him, but only in cases of nonsuit or default. And the Justices’ Act, sec. 2, was relied on by the plaintiff. He. contended that the writ of certiorari was properly sued out. That it was the proper remedy in all cases where the writ of error does not lie. Petersd. Cert 214, 213. The statute of Iowa was not enacted until subsequent to the issuing of the writ, and the common law on the subject must be in forcé. The District Court should have corrected the proceeding or have affirmed the judgment below. 1 Toml. L. Die. Cert.; 2 Bac. Jib. Cert.
    
    Grimes and Rorer for defendant.
    It must-be taken to be the intention of the statute to allow the Justice to grant a new trial in any case. We don’t deny that the District Court has authority to issue certiorari; but this was not a case for certiorari. We deny, however, the power of the court to render such judgment as should have been rendered below, in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect. There is no such power in the Court of King’s Bench, at common law, except in a particular class of cases, of which the case now under consideration is not one. The supervisory tribunal can only affirm the proceedings if found to be regular, and quash them if found to be irregular. Bac. Ah. tit. Cert, letter H; Com’ih vs. Ellis, 11 Mass. Rep. 465.
    The party aggrieved by the judgment of the Justice could not appeal to the District Court until he had applied to the Justice to set -aside the verdict of the jury and grant a new trial. See Iowa Laws, p.- 304, sec. 2 and 3. These statutory provisions clearly give the Justice power to grant a new trial, and without s-uch power the 2d sec. above referred to would be nugatory so far as to any proceedings after setting aside the verdict as therein contemplated.
    Learned in reply. It is the duty of the court so to construe the different provisions of a statute as that all may stand, if they can do so.
    The eourt erred in dismissing the case, but should have examined the proceedings. We should have our judgment perfected, so that we. should have had the lrenefit of the judgment below.
   BY THE COURT.

We think that the writ of certiorari is a common law writ, and that the District Courts of this territory possess a common law jurisdiction and a supervisory control over all the inferior jurisdictions within the Territory; that, in the absence of any statute giving such authority, the District Courts, upon proper applications,, can direct writs of certiorari to be awarded, to bring before such courts causes pending before J ustices of the Peace; and that the District Court erred in dismissing the writ, and not examining the record of the magistrate’s proceedings.

It is not absolutely necessary that the Supreme Court should examine the record of the magistrate’s proceedings, and give an opinion upon any of the matters set forth in the petition as errors of the magistrate, or say what judgment the District Court should give — whether it should proceed to render such judgment as the magistrate should have rendered, or only affirm the proceedings if found to be regular, and quash them if found to be irregular. It will be the province of the District Court to determine these matters. There are, however, in the case, two points, the immediate decision of which would, it is alleged, settle two important questions of practice. The questions are,

First — Whether, under the statute, a Justice of the Peace has a right to set aside a verdict of a jury and grant a new trial?
Secondly — Whether, previously to taking an appeal from the judgment of Justices, it is necessary that there should be, in all cases, an application to set the judgment aside and a refusal to grant the application?

The statute allowing appeals is not very plain, and the doubts, if any exist, have .arisen from a want of care in wording the statute. We are of the opinion that a Justice of the Peace has no authority to set aside the verdict of a jury, and that those parts of sections 2 and 3, article 9, of the act prescribing the duties, powrers, and regulating the proceedings of Justices of the Peace, approved January 21, 1839, which refer to applications to set aside judgments, apply merely to judgments by default, and not to judgments rendered upon the verdict of a jury. If the statute should be construed as authorizing magistrates to award new trials after the finding of a jury, it would lead to endless confusion and litigation : for, if a- magistrate can, under this statute, allow one new trial, he can allow an infinite number, and by so doing might deprive the party desiring to appeal for years from that privilege. The third section explains the second. It expressly authorizes an appeal, upon condition that the party aggrieved shall, within a limited time, enter into recognizance, &c. This section does not require an application to be made to set the judgment aside, except in cases where it has been rendered by default.

The judgment of the District Court, in dismissing the writ of certiorari, is reversed, and this cause is remanded to that court for trial, that such proceedings may be had as justice may require.  