
    Efren VALENCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEAZEVEDO, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 14-17168.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 13, 2016.
    
    Filed April 20, 2016.
    Efren Valencia, Soledad, CA, pro se.
    Kathleen Boergers, AGCA-Office of the Attorney General, Oakland, CA, Cassandra Jean Shryock, Esquire, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Los An-geles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    
      Before: FARRIS, TALLMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Efren Valencia, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations in connection with his conditions of confinement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir.2015). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Valencia’s claims regarding his living conditions because Valencia failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted his administrative remedies, or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (requiring proper exhaustion, which means “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)” (emphasis, citation, and quotation marks omitted)); Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822-24, 826-27 (9th Cir.2010) (describing limited circumstances under which administrative remedies might be effectively unavailable or otherwise excused).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting summary judgment without allowing Valencia to conduct discovery because Valencia failed to show what material facts would have been discovered that would have precluded summary judgment. See Klingele v. Eikenber-ry, 849 F.2d 409, 412-13 (9th Cir.1988) (setting forth standard of review and recognizing that “[t]he burden is on the nonmoving party ... to show what material facts would be discovered that would preclude summary judgment”).

Valencia’s motion for appointment of counsel, filed on April 20, 2015, is denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     