
    Daniel J. WIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard A. DOLLINGER, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 14-3003-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 9, 2015.
    
      Daniel J. Wik, pro se, Rochester, New York, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Frank Brady, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Nancy A. Spiegel, Senior Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, New York.
    PRESENT: PETER W. HALL, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Daniel J. Wik, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his complaint and its order denying reconsideration. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id.

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Wik’s complaint because it failed to state a claim for relief. Wik’s claim for damages against Justice Dollinger in his official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir.2009). Justice Dollinger is immune from a personal suit for money damages because when he allegedly rescinded the writ of habeas corpus granted to Wik, he was acting within his judicial capacity. See Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209-10 (2d Cir.2009) (recognizing that “even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity”).

With regard to Wik’s claims for equitable relief, he lacks standing to pursue such relief, as he has not shown any likelihood that Justice Dollinger will harm him again in a similar fashion. See Marcavage v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir.2012). Finally, Wik has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s order regarding attorney’s fees by failing to raise it in his brief. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir.1995).

We have considered all of Wik’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment and order of the district court.  