
    Stebbins Walbridge vs. Hiland Hall.
    Bennington.
    February, 1830.
    The judgements of a superior eourt are never considered void, and, until set aside, they are to be considered as regular judgements for every purpose : and it belong» exclusively to such court to exnmine'into and decide upon the regularity of its ovni proceedings. But
    When courts of a special and limited jurisdiction exceed their powers, their whole proceedings are coram non judice, and all concerned in such void proceedings are trespassers. ,
    The act of 1824, altering the jurisdiction of the county and Supreme Courts, provides that certain cases be removed from the Supreme Court to the county court, and that u all suits in chancery, all writs of error, and suits and appeals, where matters of nlau> are to be litigated, which shall be pending in, or returnable to, the Supreme “ Court,” shallbe retained and tried by said Court. It was held that an action pending before the Supreme Court at the time the act went into operation, on a case stated and agreed to by the parties,was not transferredby the act from the jurisdiction of said Court
    The facts in a case having been ascertained by the verdict of a jury, or by the agree* ment of the parties, it is a question of law what judgement shall be rendered thereon.
    Action of assault and battery and false imprisonment, wherein the plaintifl declared that the defendant, without any reasonable or probable cause, had made an assault on the plaintiff, and committed him to the common jail in Bennington, and there imprisoned him for the space of ten months and fifteen days.
    The defendant pleaded, 1st. the general issue ; 2d. accord and satisfaction; and 3d. That at the term of the Supreme Court holden at Manchester in the county of Bennington, in February, 1827, he the defendant recovered a judgemerit against said Wal-brfdge, in an action of trover, for #5143,90 damages, and for 
      $176,80 costs of suit 3 that execution was issued thereon, signed by the clerk of said court,on which said Walbridge was, v-ithin the life of it, duly committed to jail, and that said execution was after-wards, and within sixty days from its date, returned to the office of the clerk of said court from whence it issued 5 and that Wal-bridge was by Virtue Of'sard execution, and for the cause therein specified, kept and detained in prison for the space of time mentioned in the declaration3 and that this was the same trespass and imprisonment complained of by him.
    The plaintiffin his replication traversed the plea of accord and satisfaction, and pleaded mil tiel record to the third plea.
    The decision of the cause depended wholly on the validity of the judgement mentioned in the third plea. The action in which that judgement was rendered was entered in the county court, June term, 1822, and a judgement was rendered at the samé term for the defendant on the general issue. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme court, and the appeal was entered there at the February term, 1823 3 at which term a judgement was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant had leave to review the cause. At the next term, February, 1824, the parties agreed on a stated case, containing certain depositions which were to be considered a part ofit. While the action was thus pending in the Supreme Court on this stated case, the legislature passed an act reorganizing the county and Supreme Courts, altering their jurisdiction, and directing that certain matters and causes pending in either court should be removed to, and tried by, the county court as established by said act, and “ That all suits in chancery, all writs of “ error, and suits and appeals, where matters of laiv are to be “ litigated, which shall be pending in, or returnable to, the SuM preme Court in any county when this act shall come in forcé, a shall be heard and determined, and the parties thereto shall “ appearand have day in court and attend to the same,at the next “ term of said Supreme Court, to be holden in such county, ac- “ cording to the provisions of this act.” The cause was retained by the Supreme Court, and was tried at February term, 1827, on the case stated'and agreed to, as before mentioned ; both parties submitting to its jurisdiction of the cause without objection.
    The defendant, at the trial in the county court, in support of the issue on his part, offered in evidence the record of the said judgement ; which the plaintiff objected to on the ground that, by the act aforesaid, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction of the cause. But the objection was overruled, and the record admitted, the court being of opinion that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction, and that said judgement and proceedings thereon were a bar to a recovery in the suit. The case was reserved for the consideration of this Court.
    
      Argument for the plaintiff. — It is contended that the record of the judgement set forth in the plea in bar was inadmissable on the ground that, from the record it appears the Supreme Court had not jurisdiction of the case, but that, under the statute of 1824, it was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the county court. From the record offered it appears that cuase was pending in the Supreme Court in the year 1824, under the plea of not guilty, closed to the court; and no question can be made but that the case should have passed to the county court under the 9th section of the act, unless the case agreed upon by the parties will enable the Supreme Court to retain jurisdiction of the same.
    The 11th section of the act is the only one upon which it can be contended that the Supreme Court could retain the case within their jurisdiction. This section provides, “ that all suits in chancery, writs of error, and suits and appeals, where matters in law are to be litigated,” shall be retained by the Supreme Court. The two first cases, to wit, “ suits in chancery and writs of error,” do not pass to the county court by the 9th section. The whole case then depends upon the construction to be given to the words “ suits and appeals, where matters in law are to be litigated.” The rational construction of this statute is, that when all the facts are judicially found, and have become a part of the record, it is a case of law, and could be retained by the Supreme Court. That the facts in this case were not judicially found, and were not a part of the record, is apparent from the fact, that a writ of error could not be sustained on such a case.' — 9 Mass. Rep. 329 ; — ■ 11 Mass. Rep. 394.
    The only method of making a case of law within the meaning of the act was — 1. by a bill of exceptions ; 2. by the jury signing a verdict subject to the opinion of the court as to the law upon the facts agreed ; 3. by a special verdict. It cannot be pretended that this case can fall within the two first, for in those cases the issue was found between the parties, and the court sits to revise the proceedings, and see whether the verdict was correctly rendered : but in this case the issue was not found, but open as if pending before a jury. Neither can it fall within the third casa ; for in cases of special verdicts the facts are judicially found, and are obligatory upon the parties. But in this case, the facts agreed to were not obligatory, and had the case gone for trial to the county court, or any subsequent term of the Supreme Court, the parties could have objected to the conclusiveness of the facts agreed to, and required the issue to be proved by competent and legal testimony. — 2 JY. H. Rep. 181.
    It will not be pretended, but that, at the time the statute came into operation the case belonged exclusively to the county court. The case was then in the county court by operation of the statute without any act to be done by the court; for their order and duty were purely ministerial. The fact that the issue of not guilty was joined by the pleadings, and no verdict or judgement had been rendered upon the issue, is, it is believed, conclusive upon the question; for under that issue, before the facts were agreed to, the parties could require the introduction of the best evidence the nature of the case demands : and this agreement of facts amounts to no more nor less than the introduction of secondary evidence to maintain the issue.
    Again, as a conclusive answer on this point of the case, it appears that the facts in the case were not all agreed to by the parties, and, for this purpose, the depositions of different individuals were filed containing much conflicting testimony upon material facts in the case.
    If it be true that under the statute of 1824, the Supreme Court had not jurisdiction of the case, but the same was within the jurisdiction of the county court, it is contended, that this action is sustainable upon the most plain and settled rules of the common law, that where the court, under whose judgement the party justifies, has not jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, or, having jurisdiction over the subject matter, their proceedings are such as render them coram non judice, the same is void, and the party acting under them is a trespasser. — 8 Term Rep. 425, Brown vs. Compton; — 10 Coke, 76 (a) 6; — 2 Blac. Rep. 845,Parsons vs. Lloyd;-1 Chitty’s PleadA68;-2 Sel. JV.P.546.
    
      Argument for the defendant. — Defendant justifies under an execution issued upon a judgement of the Supreme Court, February term, 1827. It appears by the record that the case was agreed to by the parties, and tried by the court by consent. It is objected by the (now) plaintiff that the case embraced questions of fact 5 that the court at the timejof rendering the judgement was not authorized to try matters of fact, that, therefore, the proceedings of trie court were coram non judice, and the party executing the judgement a trespasser. The defendant contends—
    
      I. That the ease was properly tried by the Supreme Court; 1. At the time of making the case (February, 1824) the court was spe-authorized by statute (page 113)totry all questions of fact, the Parties so agreeing. 2. This authority is not expressly taken away by any subsequent statute. 3. The casé made by the parties,- though in form a case of fact, was substantially a question of law; and it is believed that by the immemorial practice of this court, such cases have been substituted for, and treated in the nature of, special verdicts — triable as matters of law.
    II. But conceding that the case was improperly tried by the court — that the court even exceeded their authority ; the proceeding is not therefore absolutely void ; but is merely erroneous.— For the judgement of a Superior Court is never void, but is only voidable by plea or error. — 7. Bac. Ah. 67 ; — 1. Chitty’s FI. 183; — Prigg vs. Adams, 2 Salic. 674; — Kempe vs. Kennedy, 5 Crunch, 185. For this doctrine it isa good reason that there is no superior tribunal before which the proceedings can be reviewed. If trespass be brought, the plaintiff must either call upon an inferior court to pronounce the proceedings of its superior void, or upon the superior to review its own proceedings on a collateral suit. Either course involves an absurdity, If a superior court exceed its authority, the remedy must be for the party on application to the court to set aside the proceedings ; or against the court — by impeachment.
    This is not a case of irregularity in which the party can be distinguished from the court or its officers ; but if there be any fault,it is the fault of the court as well as the party,and all are liable in trespass, or none. Cleaveland vs. Hopkins, 2. Aikens, 399. But the judges of a superior court can never'be made liable for any thing done by them in a judicial capacity.-Hammond vs. Howell, 2 Modern, 218; — Miller vs. Seeve, 2 Bl. Rep. 1141 ;— Yates vs. Lansing, 5 Johns. Rep. 290 — 1, 293-4 — 1. Swift’s Dig. 496.
    But if the proceeding were deemed an irregularity of the party without the fault of the court, still the judgement would be a protection to the party until set aside. — Ham. JY. P. 54,55 ;— 1. Strange, 509.-Reynolds vs. Houglass, 3. Caines’, 270 ; — Allen vs. Huntington, 2 Aikens, 251. — And the reason is that a superior court must judge of the regularity of its own proceedings, and,in setting them aside, can impose equitable terms on the party injured ; as tha t he shall not bring trespass, &c.
    III. But if the judgement, be treated as one of an inferior court, still it is a justification to the party. The subject matter of the action was trover, which action the court had authority to try; and the defect at most was an improper course of proceeding, an ir- ? egular mode of ascertaining ihemeriis of the action, and,therefore, the proceeding was merely erroneous. Ham. JY. P. 50; — Mar-shalsea Case, 10 Rep. 76 — M. 301; — Yates vs. Lansing, 5 John. 289, 290. — The appearance and consent of Walbridge to the trial, if it would not give jurisdiction to the court, must be deemed an estopping him from maintaining trespass.-Ham. JY. P. 50. n. w.— Cowp. — 20.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Williams, J.

In this case JWr. Hall, the defendant, who is sued by the plaintiff for an assault and battery and false imprisonment, justifies under an execution issued on a judgement of this Court at their February term, 1827. The plaintiff contends that the judgement and execution will not protect the defendant, inasmuch as the Court had no jurisdiction of the case. The judgement has not been vacated nor set aside; but it is contended that by the statute passed in 1824, the jurisdiction of the action, in which the judgement was rendered,was taken from the Supreme Court, and transferred to the county court. This leads to the inquiry whether the jurisdiction of this Court can be inquired into, and their judgements declared void,in the way now attempted,as well as the inquiry whether the jurisdiction was thus transferred. If the proceedings of this courtin rendering the judgement and awarding the execution, under which the defendant justifies, are void, then neither the Court nor the parties are protected by them ; but are tresspassers, and liable, as such, to the party injured. And if we render judgement for the plaintiff we must subscribe to this position, however unpalatable it may be. We believe, however, that the judgement of the highest tribunal of law and equity in this state cannot be impeached in this way. The judgements of a superior court are never considered void, (7 Bacon, 67,) and the judges of a superior court are never liable personally for acts done in a judicial capacity. This subject was fully considered in the case of Yates vs. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, and 9 Johns. 394; and the able opinion of chief justice Kent on that point was not shaken by the arguments brought against it, but was sustained by a majority of the judges of the Supreme Court, and the court of errors of the state of JYew- York. If it was not so, this absurdity would result, under our judicial system, that the iuferior courts would be called on to review and set aside, or disregard,the judge-ments of the Supreme Court; and the proceedings of the inferior courts would pass to the same court for revision, and be liable to be vacated or reversed. In this case we are called upon to disregard a judgement once rendered before us, and say that it shall not protect the party acting in obedience to its precepts. When courts of a special or limited jurisdiction exceed their powers,their whole proceedings are coram, nonjudice, and all concerned in such void proceedings are trespassers. But this principle never has been, and cannot be, extended to superior tribunals, and especially to those which have the ultimate jurisdiction in all cases arising in the other courts. If the judgement here complained of was either erroneous or irregular, the court, on a proper application, would set it aside: but, until set aside, it is to be considered as a regular judgement for every purpose : and it belongs exclusively to this Court to examine into and decide upon the regularity of its own proceedings. The act of 1824 was subject to judicial construction .as well as any other act of the legislature. Of the causes or actions then pending before this Court, it was for them to determine what part, according to the statute, were tobe retained in this court, and what part should be removed to the county court. And the party who acts in obedience to their determination is not to be made responsible for the correctness of it, nor is the correctness of it to be a subject of inquiry before any other tribunal. There can be no doubt but that the judgement was a complete justification to the defendant, and a full answer to this suit.

We are also fully satisfied that the action on which the judgement was rendered, was properly retained, and heard and determined, in this court. The cause came by appeal into this court before the passing of the act of 1824, at a time when trials of issues of fact, as well as of law, were had in the Supreme Court. One trial was had before the court, and a review entered. The facts were then agreed on,a case was made,and the cause was submitted to the court for their consideration. The facts having been ascertained, whether by verdict of a jury, or by agreement of parties, it became a question of law what judgement should be rendered thereon. The hearing was upon a case stated, as upon a special verdict: no testimony was to be weighed, and no facts were in dispute; no other inferences were to be drawn from the facts agreed on,except inferences of law. By the 11 th section of the statute, before referred to, it is provided, “ that all writs of error, suits and appeals, where matters in Zaw are to be litigated which shall be pending in or returnable to the Supreme court in any county when the act comes in force, shall be heard and determined, &c., at the next term of the Supreme court.” This case being then properly depending before this Court when the act came in force,the facts having been ascertained,and a case made and agreed on, it was rightly considered, and treated both by the parties and Court, as a suit where “ matters in law” alone were to be litigated, the jurisdiction of which exclusively belonged to the Supreme Court. It was so considered by the Court, as appears frottf the report of the case in 2 Aikens’, 215. It was argued at the term of the court in 1826, continued for advisement, and judgement rendered at the next term, and the objection now raised was not made or suggested either by the court or counsel.

Squire & Isham, for plaintiff.

Hall, Bennet & Aiken, for defendant.

In the brief presented to the Court by the plaintiffs counsel, a reference is made to two cases decided in Massachusetts. In the case of Wellington vs. Stratton, 11 Mass. 394, whieh was an appeal from the judgement of the court of common pleas, rendered upon a case stated by the parties for the opinion of the court, Judge Jackson,who gave the opinion of the court, says, that it has been decided that a writ of error does not lie upon a judgement rendered on a case stated by the parties for the opinion of the court, and says, that the principle established is, that when the parties have agreed that a certain judgement shall be rendered for either of them, according to the opinion of the judges, upon a case stated, the court of errors cannot rescind that agreement and enter a different judgement. If this reasoning is sound and is applied to ihe-present case, it would prevent the parties from questioning the judgement rendered by this Court in the case referred to. The cause was regularly before the Court — the parties agreed upon a case,and that judgement should be rendered thereon according to the opinion of the Court; and if it could not be reversed by a superior tribunal, if any such was known to our law, it certainly could not be questioned in another suit between the parties.

The judgement of the county court is affirmed.  