
    JOSEPH C. FINNELL v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [Not reported in C. Cls. R.;
    185 U. S. R., 236.]
    
      On the defendants Appeal.
    
    The following are the facts of the case as found by the court below:
    I. The claimant, Joseph C. Finnell, was clerk of the district and circuit courts of the United States for the district of Kentucky from July 1, 1894, to June 30, 1898, duly qualified and acting.
    II. During said period he entered orders, decrees, and other proceedings of the court on one hundred and ninety-nine days, extending through said time. None of the judges of said courts were personally present at the time of the entry of such orders, decrees, and proceedings, but said orders, decrees, and proceedings were transmitted to the claimant by mail by the different judges composing the courts of said district. Said orders, decrees, and proceedings were indorsed: “Enter this order” (signed by the judge); or, “Enter this” (signed by the judge); or, “Enter” (signed by the judge). For the purpose of entering said orders, decrees, and other proceedings the claimant made the following entries on the journal for opening and adjourning court on the dates for which attendance is claimed: “Court met. Present, Hon. John W. Barr, sitting as circuit judge”, (or Judge Taft, or Judge Lur-ton, or whoever may have been the judge sending the order. Then follows the entry of the order or other proceedings of the court for that day), and, “It is now ordered that the court stand adjourned until-.” The date to which adjournment was had was left blank, and when another such order, decree, or other proceeding was received to be entered said blank was filled by entering therein the date on which the same was received, and another entry, similar to the above, opening and adjourning the court to a blank date was made. The record containing the entries of the opening and adjourning of court, the certified presence of the judge, and the orders, decrees, and other proceedings of the court was afterwards signed by the judge sending such orders, decrees, and other proceedings to be entered as the record of the court for the days on which the same were respectively entered. The Exhibits. A, B, and C, attached to and made a part of these findings, are illustrative copies of the record of the court upon such days. The nature and character of business transacted on the days on which court was opened and adjourned; as aforesaid, is best shown by the following statement of the subject-matter of said orders, decrees, and other proceedings entered as aforesaid on the days actually claimed for:
    
      Entry of order granting additional time to plead, four days; entry of order directing drawing of jury by jury commissioners, eighteen days; entry of order granting restraining order, five days; entering orders disposing of sundry demurrers and motions, twenty-one days; entry of orders granting rule, ten days; entry of orders granting application for writ of certiorari, four days; entry of orders granting petition for witnesses on behalf of the defendant at the cost of the United States, seven days; entry of orders approving report of receivers, authorizing compromise by receiver, instructions issued to receiver, and various other orders pertaining to the appointment and conduct of receivers, thirty-three days; entry of orders and decrees finally disposing of cases, seventeen days; sundry entries of orders granting writs of possession, approving bond of clerk of court, granting leave to withdraw exhibits, granting leave to file intervening petition, ordering sale of property, confirming sale of property, determining the priorities of liens, continuing cases, and granting appeals, eighty days.
    III. Claimant made his account for said services as attendance on court when the same was opened and adjourned by order of the judge and while the-same was actually in session and business actually transacted, which was verified and presented to the United States court for approval in the presence of the district attorney, and orders approving the same as being just and according to law were entered of record. Said accounts were then presented to the accounting officers of the Treasury Department for payment, and payment of fees as per diems in Finding IV was refused.
    IY. Item 1. Per diems for attendance on court on the days on which said orders, decrees, and other proceedings were entered, one hundred and ninety-nine days, at $5 per day, §995.
    Y. Charges for similar services have been made by the claimant in every account rendered since 1882, and were always allowed and paid by the accounting officers of the Treasury up to June 30, 1893.
    Upon these facts the court, without rendering any opinion, found as a conclusion of law that the claimant was entitled to recover the sum of $995.
    The decision of the court below is affirmed.
    The Supreme Court held: ‘ ‘ The district and circuit courts of the United States are always open for the transaction of some business which may be transacted under the orders of the judge in his absence, and on such transaction rest the plaintiff’s claims in this case, which the court sustain as business which could be transacted by the clerk in the absence of the judge, following the departmental construction of the statutes.
    Of course if that construction were obviously or clearly wrong it would be the duty of the court to so adjudge; but if there simply be doubt as to the soundness of that construction, the action of the Government in conformity with it for many years should not be overruled except for cogent reasons.”
   Mr. Justice Ilarlan

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court April 21, 1902.

Mr. Justice Brown delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Beckham concurred.'  