
    Luciano URIARTE, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-70586
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted August 11, 2017  Pasadena, California
    Filed August 21, 2017
    Jose Osorio, Jr., Esquire, Attorney, Glendale, CA, for Petitioner
    OIL, Brendan Paul Hogan, Esquire, Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the. Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
    Before: FARRIS, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      
         The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Luciano Uriarte, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) for, inter aha, making a material misrepresentation, and denying his application for a discretionary waiver of deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). We deny the petition in part and dismiss in part.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) provided clear and convincing evidence Ur-iarte was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A). See Nakamoto v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2004). Uriarte misrepresented material facts by repeatedly failing to disclose his 1989 marriage in Mexico, including on his 1997 California marriage certificate, his immigrant visa petition, his sworn statement to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, and his application for adjustment of status.

2. We review de novo Uriarte’s claim that the IJ violated his due process rights by failing to act as a neutral arbiter. See Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). Uriarte’s claim is without merit. Contrary to Uriarte’s contention, the IJ did not insist that DHS file marriage fraud charges against him and said nothing to indicate she had prejudged the case. Likewise, Uriarte’s due process rights were not violated by the IJ’s decision to move forward with a hearing on the merits of his waiver application under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), rather than simply granting relief when DHS initially indicated its non-opposition. Cf. Tadevosyan v. Holder, 743 F.3d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 2014) (agency may not deny relief based solely on DHS’s opposition). The record demonstrates Ur-iarte received a full and fair hearing of his claims and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his behalf. See Lianhua Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Cir. 2014).

3. Absent a colorable constitutional or legal claim, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary denial of Ur-iarte’s application for waiver of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), (a)(2)(D); Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2009). Uriarte’s constitutional claims are not colorable, therefore we dismiss that portion of his petition seeking review of the agency’s discretionary determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H).

PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     