
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Thomas Jefferson KENT, also known as Sealed Defendant 1, also known as Daryl Walker, Sanford Gottesman, also known as Sealed Defendant 2, Defendants-Appellants, Brad Robinson, also known as Sealed Defendant 3, Beno Matthews, also known as Sealed Defendant 4, Defendants.
    Nos. 14-2082-cr (L), 14-2874-cr (CON).
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 16, 2016.
    
      Paul M. Monteleoni and Karl Metzner, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for the United States of America, for Appellee,
    Yuanehung Lee, Federal Defenders of New York, New York, NY, for Thomas Jefferson Kent and Lawrence H. Schoen-bach, Law Offices of Lawrence H. Schoen-bach, PLLC, New York, NY, for Sanford Gottesman, for Defendants-Appellants.
    Present: PETER W. HALL and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges, ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Alvin K. Hellerstein, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation,
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Sanford Gottes-man and Thomas Jefferson Kent were participants in a years-long scheme by which small businesses were tricked into paying fees to secure capital loans that did not exist. Gottesman appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, for wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 2, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. We describe the underlying facts of this criminal case in detail in a published opinion filed today regarding Kent’s claim on appeal. We address Gottesman’s case here and assume familiarity with the issues on appeal.

Gottesman’s arguments — that it was improper to give the jury a conscious avoidance instruction and that the content of the conscious avoidance instruction was erroneous — lack merit. Charging the jury on conscious avoidance was not error because Gottesman put “the element of knowledge .... in dispute” and the jury was presented with sufficient evidence that “would permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact.” United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 542 (2d Cir.1995)). There was ample evidence that Gottesman either knew he was a participant in a criminal enterprise or consciously avoided obtaining such knowledge — such as Gottesman’s admission that he told lies to victims about his own role with Wilshire Financial. Reviewing the jury charge, we are also satisfied that it comports with the law of this Circuit which, contrary to Gottesman’s argument on appeal, was not changed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 131 S.Ct. 2060, 179 L.Ed.2d 1167 (2011). See United States v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir.2013) (“The Court [in Global-Tech] did not alter or clarify the [conscious avoidance] doctrine.... Global-Tech simply describes existing case law. In so holding, we follow other decisions in this Circuit since Global-Tech that have applied the traditional conscious avoidance doctrine.”).

Gottesman’s challenge based on the district court’s initial decision to exclude redacted portions of an e-mail he believes to be exculpatory also provides no basis to vacate his conviction. Any error in the district court’s temporary exclusion of the redacted part of the email was harmless. See United States v. Abreu, 342 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir.2003) (“[W]e will not order a new trial because of an erroneous eviden-tiary'ruling if we conclude that the error was harmless.”). Because the initially excluded part of the e-mail (1) was eventually provided to the jury, (2) was duplicative of Gottesman’s testimony at trial, and (3) at most established that Gottesman was unaware of the existence of one particular victim of the scheme rather than his lack of knowledge of the scheme as a whole, we are convinced that its initial exclusion had no “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 62 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 577 (2d Cir.1987)).

We have carefully considered all of Gottesman’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the district court is AFFIRMED with regard to Gottesman’s conviction.  