
    YUN CHEN, aka Yong Chen, aka Ja-Lim Sung, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-4560 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 19, 2013.
    Scott E. Bratton, Cleveland, OH, for Petitioner.
    Paul F. Stone, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation; Edward Duffy, Senior Litigation Counsel, for Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge and ROBERT A. KATZMANN and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Yun Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 17, 2011, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Yun Chen, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Oct. 17, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of Chen’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). When, as here, the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating the motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

Although Chen’s motion was indisputably untimely and number-barred because it was filed more than eight years after the agency’s final order of exclusion and it was his third motion to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), there is no time or numerical limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Here, the BIA did not err in finding that Chen failed to establish such circumstances based on his newly commenced practice of Christianity in the United States. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (explaining that a change in “personal circumstances in the United States ” did not constitute a change in country conditions (emphasis in original)). Moreover, the BIA did not err in finding that Chen failed to establish a material change in conditions in China. It was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that the 2009 and 2010 reports submitted by Chen merely reflected a continuation of, and not a change in, China’s longstanding oppression of unsanctioned religious groups. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  