
    Simon S. LEVI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA; et al., Defendants, and Ronald M. George, Administrative Law Judge, Chief Justice; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 08-15242.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted May 25, 2010.
    
    Filed Aug. 5, 2010.
    Simon Levi, Pleasant Hill, CA, pro se.
    Danielle Adoración Lee, Esquire, Assistant General Counsel, The State Bar of California Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA Michael John Von Loewenfeldt, Esquire, Kerr & Wagstaffe, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.
    Paul T. Hammerness, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: CANBY, THOMAS and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   ORDER

Simon Levi’s motion to “correct error found in memorandum issued by this Court on June 21, 2010” is granted, and we strike references in the memorandum disposition to the State Bar of California as an appellee.

We instruct the Clerk to withdraw the memorandum disposition filed on June 21, 2010, and to file the revised memorandum disposition submitted for filing with this order.

No further filings will be accepted in this closed case.

MEMORANDUM

Simon Levi appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action against the Justices of the California Supreme Court as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.2003), and we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

The district court properly concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the action because it is a forbidden de facto appeal of the California Supreme Court’s decision denying Levi’s application for admission to the bar, and the remaining claims are inextricably intertwined with the forbidden appeal. See id. at 1158; Craig v. State Bar of Cal., 141 F.3d 1353, 1354 (9th Cir.1998) (explaining that “[u]n-der California law, only the state supreme court ... has the authority to grant or deny admission to the bar[,]” and holding that “[b]ecause [plaintiff sought] review of the California Supreme Court’s decision to deny his individual application, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction” pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

We do not consider issues raised in the opening brief for which Levi developed no argument. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir.1992) (issues raised in pro se litigant’s brief but not supported by argument are deemed waived).

Dismissals under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Kougasian v. TMSL, 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.2004), and thus, should be dismissed without prejudice, Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir.1999) (order). Accordingly, we vacate in part the judgment, and remand for the limited purpose of dismissing the action without prejudice.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; REMANDED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     