
    LOUISE J. ALLEMAN ET AL v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [Congressional,
    11403.
    Decided January 6, 1908.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    The United States marshal in New Orleans conveys confiscated real property, formerly belonging to John Slidell, to one Brugere. The marshal’s conveyance recites on its face that the property is conveyed to the purchaser “ by virtue of the laws in such case made and provided, and under the authority of the acts of Congress of ,6th August, 1861, the 17th July, 1862, and the 8d March, 1868, in relation to confiscation * * * to have and to hold * * * forever.” Brugere occupies it for some time, but on the death of Slidell is ousted by his heirs. Brugere’s heirs now seek to obtain from Congress a return of the purchase money. The Senate refers the claim to the court under the Tucker Act.
    I.The purchaser of property sold under execution assumes the risk of title. There is no warranty.
    II.In proceedings under the Confiscation Act 11th July, 1862 (12 Stat. L., 5S9), only the life estate of the person for whose offense the land has been seized can be sold. A conveyance by the marshal to the purchaser “to have and to hold forever ” conveys nothing more than the life estate. The purchaser is chargeable with knowledge of the law that only a limited title can be sold.
    III. A government is not liable for the mistakes of its agents, but can not in equity and good conscience retain money acquired through the mistake of an agent.
    IV. The court in its report to Congress in Congressional cases will discriminate between claims legal or equitable and applications for grants, gifts or bounties unsupported by equities. The responsibility of the court ends in such cases with reporting the facts to Congress.
    V.Reports to Congress in Congressional cases create no vested right, though favorable to a claim. Where a claim is neither legal nor equitable the amount, if anything is to be paid, rests with Congress alone by way of gift or gratuity.
    
      The Reporters* statement of tbe case:
    This is a claim for the return of the purchase money alleged to have been paid to the United States Government by Joseph Brugere, deceased, for a parcel of land situated in the city of New Orleans, La., at public auction, pursuant to a venditioni exponas issued out of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana directing the sale of certain property of John Slidell.
    On April 26, 1904, by resolution of the United States Senate, the following bill was referred to this court under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1887:
    “A BILL For the relief of the estate of Joseph Brugere, deceased.
    “Ne it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated, to the estate of Joseph Brugere, deceased, late of Orleans Parish, Louisiana, the sum of five thousand and fifty dollars, the same being the purchase money received by the United States Government of Joseph Brugere, deceased, for a parcel of land situated in the city of New Orleans, Louisiana, and condemned as the property of John Slidell, but which was_ found not to be the property of the United States in fee simple and of which the purchaser was evicted after the death of said Slidell.”
    The claimants appeared in this court and filed their petition, in which they make the following allegations:
    That the petitioner, Mrs. Louise J. Alleman, is a citizen of the United States, residing in the parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana; that petitioner, Mrs. Augustine B>. Bibes, is a citizen of the United States, residing in the county of Robertson, State of Texas; that petitioners are the daughters and only heirs and representatives of Joseph Brugere, deceased, late a resident of said parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
    That on June 14, 1865, said Joseph Brugere did purchase at United States marshal’s sale, in the city of New Orleans, State of Louisiana, a certain tract or parcel of land, described as a certain lot on the northeast part of Custom-House street, between Charles and Levee streets, measuring 29 feet 1 inch and upward front on Custom-House street, by 100 feet deep, bounded on one side by the property of one Wolf and on the other side by the property of one Rouzan, situated in said city of New Orleans; that said sale was the result of a suit brought by the United States Government for the purpose of declaring a forfeiture of the estate of John Slidell, said sale having been made after a decree of forfeiture by the United States district court of the eastern district of the State of Louisiana; that previous to said sale said United States marshal had advertised the sale in newspapers, stating that said land, with other tracts, was to be sold; that at the time of said sale by said United States marshal to said Joseph Brugere a deed was made and executed by said marshal to said Joseph Brugere, purporting to convey a fee simple title to said land to said Brugere; that the consideration actually paid by said Brugere to the United States Government, through said marshal, for said land so purchased by him was the sum of $5,050; that thereafter said John Slidell died and suit was brought by the heirs of said Slidell against said Brugere to recover possession of said land, which suit was finally decided in favor of the heirs of said Slidell upon the ground that the decree of forfeiture of the lands of said Slidell could be operative only during the lifetime of said Slidell, and that the estate so purchased by said Brugere at said marshal’s sale was not a fee simple estate, but was an estate for the life of said Slidell; that as the result of said last-mentioned suit, so brought by the heirs of said Slidell against said Brugere, said Brugere was ousted from possession of said land, to his great loss and damage, he having expended a large sum of money in improving said land after his purchase thereof, all of which expense was lost to said Brugere, as well as the original purchase money so paid by him to the United States Government.
    That in view of the above-stated facts petitioners now make claim against the United States for return of said original purchase money, amounting to $5,050, by reason of failure of the United States Government to vest in said Brugere a title in fee simple, which title is pretended and purported to convey in consideration of said sum of money.
    The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
    I. The petitioners, Louise J. Alleman and Augustine B. Bibes, are the heirs of Joseph Brugere, deceased, who was a French citizen and resided in New Orleans, La.
    II. In 1865, as the result of a decree against John Slidell, a venditioni exponas was issued out of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, directing the sale at public auction of certain real estate levied upon as the property of the said Slidell. After due notice, sale was made on June 14,1865, of various parcels of land and among them a certain lot described as “A lot of ground on the northeast part of Custom-House street, between Charles and Levee streets, measuring 29 feet 1 inch and upwards front on Custom-House by 100 feet deep, bounded on one side by the property of J. 11. Wolf and on the other side by that of Wm. Bouzan.” Joseph Brugere became the purchaser of said lot at said marshal’s sale at and for the sum of $5,050, and went into possession. When Joseph Brugere went into possession of the property he did so under a conveyance from the marshal which recited on its face that the property was conveyed by him, the marshal, “ by virtue of the laws in such case made and provided, and under the authority of the acts of Congress of 6th August, 1861, the 17th July, 1862, and the 3d March, 1863 in relation to confiscation * * * to have and to hold * * * forever.” These acts of Congress only operated upon the life estate of John Slidell. There is no evidence that the marshal made any oral representations pertaining to the title. The act of Congress relating to confiscation, of July 17,1862, is set forth (12 Stat. L., page 589 and page 627); and on the latter page appears the following language: “ Nor shall any punishment or proceedings under said act be so construed as to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life.”
    The act of August 6th, 1861, relating to confiscation (12 Stats., 319) authorizes the confiscation and condemnation of property knowingly used or employed by persons aiding insurrection or resistance to the laws.
    Proceedings condemning the property were had under the act of July 17, 1862.
    III. Some years after entering into possession of the premises, suit was brought against said Brugere by the heirs of John Slidell, deceased, alleging said Slidell’s death, and praying that they be put in possession1 of the premises, and for an accounting for rents. This suit was defended by Joseph Brugere, who alleged that he had acquired the fee simple title to the land and improvements fully described and set forth in the decree under which the sale of the property was had, and further alleging that condemnation of the property was taken by default, and that he had acquired the title to the property as described in the libel of information against the same, together with all the improvements thereon situate, and that by virtue of the statutes and laws of the United States in such case made and provided, and by force and effect of the sentence of condemnation of the land and improvements thereon, the heirs of John Slidell were bound and concluded and that by force of the statutes and laws of the United States, full, complete, and absolute title to the land by virtue of the decree taken on the libel of information became vested in the United States. Decree, however, was entered May 13, 1872, by a district court for the parish of Orleans in the State of Louisiana, in favor of plaintiffs, for the possession of said land and the improvements thereon, and for an accounting of rents of the same from July 30, 1871, which was the date of the death of John Slidell. This decree was affirmed January 20, 1873, by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and on January 19,1874, by the Supreme Court of the United States. As the result, Joseph Brugere was ousted and compelled to pay the rental of said premises from July 30,1871, at $1,800 per annum. His occupancy, however, was free of rents or charge of any kind from the date of his purchase to July 30, 1871 — a period of something over six years.
    IV. The evidence does not establish to the satisfaction of the court the value of the life estate, nor the value of the fee in the property so sold to Joseph Brugere.
    V. The evidence does not establish that the United States received any excess at the sale over and above the value of the estate which the marshal sold under the decree of the court in the confiscation proceedings.
    
      Mr. Charles F. Consaul for the claimant. Moyers c& Con-saul were on the brief.
    
      Mr. George M. Anderson (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Van Orsdel) for the defendants.
   Howry, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The findings are not to be taken or construed as the judgment of the court that this demand is a claim, legal or equitable, against the United States.

The case is not proven. The findings do not show the value of the property nor does it appear that the amount paid at the marshal’s sale exceeded the reasonable value of the life estate of the defendant in execution. On the contrary, it would seem that the purchaser received a fair equivalent in the use or occupancy of the property.

But whether Brugere as a purchaser profited by the transaction or lost money the law applicable to all the facts ought not to be ignored in determining the equities of the case. Though this is such a case that Brugere as a foreigner should be given the same consideration as the citizen — no more and no less — there are some general rules of law too well established to be overlooked.

When an individual purchases property at an execution sale the purchaser voluntarily assumes the risk of acquiring a good title. Bids are usually graduated as to amount upon knowledge of value as well as information of the validity of the proceedings and of the title to be conveyed and such bids are raised or diminished in proportion to doubts respecting the vital matter of title to be acquired. The principle of caveat emptor necessarily comes into consideration because there is no warranty of title, and under these circumstances the law treats sales of this character when the money is paid by the purchaser and the conveyance delivered to him as closed.

Again, Governments are not liable for the mistakes of their agents and officers. There are instances, however, where Governments should not profit by their mistakes. They should not in equity and good conscience retain money not legally and rightfully coming into the Treasury.

The United States sold Slidell’s life estate under the act of Congress of July 17, 1862. Only the life estate of the person for whose offense the land had been seized and sold was subject to condemnation and sale. Nothing more was within the jurisdiction or judicial power of the court rendering the decree than to sell John Slidell’s life estate (Forrest v. Bigelow, 9 Wall., 341; Day v. Micou, 18 Wall., 156). There could have been no other decision, because the joint resolution explanatory of the act of Congress, commonly called the confiscation act,” approved July 17, 1862 (12 Stat. L., 589), was passed the same day, and it expressly provided that no punishment or proceedings under the act should be “ so construed as to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life.” Brugere must have known this, and that ought to end this case, as the conveyance to Brugere put him upon notice of the limited title to be sold. Whether he actually knew it is not material. It was his business to know it.

Congressional cases, of which this is one, are peculiar to the jurisdiction of this court alone and have their origin in those acts (22 Stat. L., 485; 24 Stat. L., 505; Rev. Stat., 195) which authorize either house or a committee of either house, of Congress to refer certain bills for a judicial investigation upon which findings are to be made and reported to the body transmitting the resolution. They are a separate class of cases designed to supply information so full and exact as to leave to the legislative body nothing to do but determine the justice of the complaint (usually transmitted in papers accompanying the bills) as a legal or equitable demand against the United States; or, as one resting upon no law but depending upon moral considerations of such character as may or may not fairly appeal to the bounty of the Government. The endeavor of the court is to frame the findings with accuracy such as to enable Congress to discriminate between a meritorious claim and an application for a gift as a mere matter of favor. In the class of actual “ claims ” so reported with an amount stated, it will generally be found that our findings rest upon an actual benefit either received by the Government or a liability assumed by the United States and where no equity exists there is generally something to show a want of merit.

It goes without saying that applications for “ grants, gifts or bounties ” unsupported by equities appearing in the findings and which do not according to the judgment of disinterested men obviously appeal to the conscience upon principles of right and justice, ought to be denied, nor can it be assumed that those charged with the duty of making appropriations will give any more consideration to claims not measuring up to the standards indicated than the court. But whatever of consequence may attach to applications the responsibility of the court ends with the fair and impartial statement of all the material facts arising out of the evidence in any cause within the jurisdiction of the court to report.

The necessity for care in discriminating between “ claims ” and applications for donations from the Public Treasury is apparent, inasmuch as the Congress never have the benefit of counsel when the cases leave this court to oppose an appropriation, while claimants are generally represented by attorneys when the matter reported comes to be considered for payment from the Public Treasury. While mere reports in favor of a claim create no vested right and are unlike those results which flow from actions founded on the Constitution or laws of Congress under the general jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, and cases arising under special jurisdictional acts where opinions are generally required and judgments are very generally entered subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, there is yet considerable responsibility as well as labor in making up the findings notwithstanding their advisory character. The duty of sometimes showing the relations of the facts found to the law and adverting to the law applicable to the facts is strictly in line with the objects of the original organic law creating the court half a century ago, and in accord with the practice for many years whenever a special case seems to require an opinion.

The claim not being legal or equitable against the United States the amount, if anything is to be paid, rests with Congress alone by way of gift or gratuity.

The findings and this report will be transmitted to the Senate of the United States.  