
    Javier GARCIA-CAMACHO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-3537-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 28, 2011.
    
      Randy Olen, Providence, RI, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; William C. Peachey, Assistant Director; Geoffrey Forney, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, PETER W. HALL, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Javier Garcia-Camacho, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a July 19, 2010, order of the BIA affirming the April 16, 2009, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Michael W. Straus pretermit-ting his application for asylum and denying his applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Javier Garcia-Camacho, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 19, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. Hartford, CT April 16, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

With respect to Garcia-Camacho’s claim for withholding of removal, the BIA did not err in finding that he failed to demonstrate his membership in a legally cognizable social group, which Garcia-Camacho defined as “persons who have long residence in the United States and who[ ] are returning to Mexico.” Before the IJ, Garcia-Camacho testified that he feared kidnaping and extortion at the hands of criminal gangs who would target him and his family because they would be perceived as having money. However, we have held that perceived wealth is insufficient to establish membership in a particular social group. See Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir.2007) (“[w]hen the harm visited upon members of a group is attributable to the incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering those people a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning of the INA”). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected a petition for review raising a virtually identical argument. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that “[pjetitioners’ proposed social group, ‘returning Mexicans from the United States,’ ” was “too broad to qualify as a cognizable social group” because “[individuals falling within the parameters of this sweeping demographic division naturally manifest a plethora of different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

Garcia-Camacho argues that the BIA improperly defined his alleged social group, which he now claims is comprised of “Mexican citizens who are returning to Mexico, after a long period of residence in the United States, who have immediate family members remaining in the United States.” However, as noted above, Garcia-Camacho did not include “immediate family members remaining in the United States” in the social group that he offered before the IJ and the BIA, and he therefore has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies to the extent he proposes a new social group for the first time here. See Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir.2004).

The BIA also did not err in denying Garcia-Camacho’s application for CAT relief. Garcia-Camaeho argues that the BIA erred in finding that the Mexican government would not acquiesce in any attempted torture, asserting that “the documentary evidence in the record establishes that corruption is so entrenched in official police and government offices that persecutors are often themselves government officials.” However, the record evidence also indicates that the Mexican government has taken affirmative steps to root out corruption and to prevent torture. Thus, the BIA reasonably determined that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the Mexican government would acquiesce in or remain willfully blind to any torture attempts perpetrated by criminal gangs. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 171 (2d Cir.2008) (“We do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the agency.”); Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir.2004). Garcia-Camaeho also failed to demonstrate that someone in his “particular alleged circumstances” would be singled out for torture. See Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 143-44 (2d Cir.2003).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 
      
      . Garcia-Camacho did not challenge the IJ’s pretermission of his asylum application as untimely before the BIA, nor does he do so in his brief to this Court.
     