
    Kevin Deon BRAZIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey A. BEARD; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 17-15898
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted November 15, 2017 
    
    Filed November 22, 2017
    Kevin Deon Brazier, Pro Se
    Diana N. Chinn, Litigation Counsel, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, Suzanne Antley, Deputy Attorney General, Michelle Des Jardins, Attorney, AGCA — Office of the Attorney General (San Diego) San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Jeffrey A. Beard, Kathleen Dickinson, K. Holland, S. Reed, J. Gutierrez, R. B. Hughes,. J. Branch, S. Schlanger, A. Landou
    Diana N. Chinn, Litigation Counsel, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee A. Landon
    Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Kevin Deon Brazier appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from defendants’ failure to grant him a kosher diet. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Brazier failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted administrative remedies, or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See Ross v. Blake, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858-60, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (describing limited circumstances under which administrative remedies are deemed unavailable); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies ...' means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically'and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     