
    STATE v. WILLIAM DeBERRY.
    (Filed 3 January, 1945.)
    1. Courts § 9—
    The purchase of lands by the United States, within the limits of a State, does not of itself oust the jurisdiction of the State over the lands so purchased; but where the purchase is with the full consent of the Legislature of the State, the jurisdiction of the United States then becomes exclusive.
    2. Same—
    The consent of the Legislature of a State to the acquisition of lands within its borders by the United States, having once been given, may not thereafter be revoked or withdrawn, unless Federal jurisdiction had not been accepted.
    3. Same—
    The Legislature of the State may qualify its consent to the acquisition of lands within its borders by the United States so as to retain some jurisdiction or partial jurisdiction over such lands.
    4. Same—
    Jurisdiction of the United States is exclusive over property in this State, acquired in 1899 by virtue of Art. I, sec. 8, clause 17 of the Federal Constitution and with the State’s legislative consent as expressed in ch. 136, Public Laws 1887, and such exclusive jurisdiction is not affected by the restrictive provisions of G-. S., 104-1 and 104-7 subsequently enacted, which are prospective only.
    Appeal by defendant from Clement, J., at July Criminal Term, 1944, of FORSYTH.
    Criminal prosecution tried upon'warrant charging the defendant with assault and battery on “one Louise Johnson, a woman, he being a man over eighteen years of age,” in violation of G. S., 14-33 (C. S., 4215).
    The original trial was in the municipal court of the city of "Winston-Salem and resulted in a conviction. From a judgment of thirty days on the roads, the defendant appealed to the Superior Court of Forsyth County, where the case was tried de novo.
    
    In the Superior Court the defendant "entered a plea in abatement, for that the scene of the alleged assault was on property over which the United States Government has exclusive jurisdiction, to wit, the Federal courtroom in the Post Office Building in the city of Winston-Salem. It was admitted for the purposes of the plea that the Federal Government acquired the property in question on 28 July, 1899; acquisition confirmed in 1900. Motion to abate denied; exception.
    The evidence for the State tends to show that on 20 June, 1944, a "panel hearing of the National War Labor Board, involving labor relations at tbe R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, was being beld in tbe Federal courtroom at Winston-Salem, N. C. During tbe noon recess, tbe prosecuting witness, whose affidavit bad been used in tbe bearing, was talking with two fellow employees, when, according to ber testimony, tbe defendant came up and slapped ber or struck ber from behind and grabbed ber skirt and pulled it. He was gritting bis teeth and seemed very angry.
    This evidence is corroborated by tbe two fellow employees.
    Tbe defendant denied that be made any assault on tbe prosecuting witness or that bis attitude was in any way threatening. His testimony is corroborated by a number of witnesses.
    Several exceptions were taken to tbe admission of evidence and to questions likely to incite race feeling or tension.
    Exception was also to tbe denial of tbe motion to nonsuit.
    Tbe jury returned a verdict of guilty, and from judgment of 60 days on tbe roads, tbe defendant appeals, assigning errors.
    
      Attorney-General McMullan and Assistant Attorneys-General Rhodes and Moody for the State.
    
    
      I. Duke Avnet, W. H. Boyer, Fred S. Hutchins, and H. Bryce Parker for defendant.
    
   Stacy, C. J.

Tbe case turns on tbe question of jurisdiction.

It is admitted that tbe alleged assault took place “in tbe Federal Courtroom, which is located in tbe Post Office Building in tbe city of Winston-Salem,” and that “said property was acquired by tbe Federal Government in 1899 and confirmed by Judge Boyd in 1900.”

It is further conceded that this property was “purchased by tbe consent of tbe legislature of tbe State,” as expressed in cb. 136, Public Laws 1887, and that its acquisition by tbe United States was under and by virtue of Art. I, sec. 8, clause 17, of tbe Federal Constitution.

This clause 17 provides that Congress shall have power “to exercise exclusive legislation . . . over all places purchased by tbe consent of tbe legislature of tbe State in which tbe same shall be, for tbe erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings.” In Battle v. United States, 209 H. S., 36, 52 L. Ed., 670, it was said that “post offices are among tbe ‘other needful buildings.’ ” So, also, are court buildings and customhouses. Sharon v. Hill, 24 Fed., 726. Indeed, “other needful buildings” would seem to embrace whatever structures are necessary in tbe performance of tbe particular functions of tbe Federal Government for which tbe property was acquired. James v. Dravo Contracting Go., 302 H. S., 142, 82 L. Ed., 155.

It is established by the pertinent statutes and decisions on the subject that—

1. The purchase of lands by the United States, within the limits of a State, does not of itself oust the jurisdiction of the State over the lands so purchased; but where the purchase is with the full consent of the legislature of the State, the jurisdiction of the United States then becomes exclusive. Ft. Leavenworth R. Go. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525, 29 L. Ed., 264; Supply Trading Go. v. Goolc, 281 U. S., 647, 74 L. Ed., 1091; Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S., 19, 83 L. Ed., 455.

2. The consent of the legislature of a State to the acquisition of lands within its borders by the United States, having once been given, may not thereafter be revoked or withdrawn, unless Federal jurisdiction has not been accepted. United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S., 138, 74 L. Ed., 761; Adams v. United States, 319 U. S., 312, 87 L. Ed., 1421.

3. The legislature of the State may qualify its consent to the acquisition of lands within its borders by the United States so as to retain some jurisdiction or partial jurisdiction over such lands. Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U. S., 186, 82 L. Ed., 187; James v. Bravo Contracting Co., supra.

4. The most usual qualification to be found in the consent statutes is that of the reservation of authority to execute any civil or criminal process in and on the lands acquired by the United States. See Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, supra.

5. In many of the States concurrent jurisdiction is also retained for the enforcement or administration of the criminal laws of the State. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Co., 204 U. S., 518, 82 L. Ed., 1502.

The Legislature of North Carolina, in 1887, gave its unqualified consent to the acquisition of lands within the State by the United States for the purpose of erecting thereon any post office, courthouse, etc., and this statute was in force at the time of the purchase of the post office site in 'Winston-Salem in 1899.

Section 5426 of the Eevisal of 1905 undertakes to qualify the State’s consent to the acquisition of Federal lands, and reserves to the State concurrent jurisdiction with the United States over such lands for the service of process issued by the courts of the State, and “the State of North Carolina also retains authority to punish all violations of its criminal laws committed on any such tract of land.” Now Gr. S., 104-1. Two years later, however, in 1907, another statute was enacted which ceded “exclusive jurisdiction in and over any land so acquired by the United States . . . for all purposes, except the service upon such sites of all civil and criminal process of the courts of this State.” Ch. 25, Public Laws 1907. Now G. S., 104-7.

Neither the cited section of the Revisal of 1905 nor the cited statute of 1907 makes any reference to lands theretofore acquired by the United States for the purposes named; and according to the general rule of construction, in the absence of such reference, the statute is to be regarded as prospective only. Ashley v. Brown, 198 N. C., 369, 151 S. E., 725; S. v. Pridgen, 151 N. 0., 651, 65 S. E., 617. Hence, the applicable law would be that which was in force at the time of the acquisition of the property in 1899. At that time the Legislature had given its unqualified consent to the acquisition of lands within the State by the United States for the purpose of erecting thereon any post office, courthouse, etc., and the Federal jurisdiction therefore became exclusive. United States v. Unzeuta, supra.

The same conclusion would apparently follow, even if the subsequent legislation be given a retroactive effect, since the law as found in the Revisal of 1905 seems to be in conflict with the later statute enacted in 1907.

This may lead to an undesirable result. Nevertheless, we can only declare the law as we find it.

The motion to abate is well founded.

Reversed.  