
    
      Adam Pressly vs. James Hunter.
    
    Generally, when an instrument is proved, so as to be read in evidence, every thing contained in it is regarded as also proved; but this does not conclude the party against whom it is offered. He may show, that either through mistake or design, it bears a wrong date.
    
      Before O’Neall, J., at Union, Fall Term, 1842.
    This was an action of assumpsit for overseer’s wages. The plaintiff proved that he lived with defendant in 1839, as his overseer, and that he was to have $200 certain, and more, if his crop exceeded 40 loads of corn and 40 bags of cotton. He made a good crop, but how much did not appear.
    Tne defendant relied upon a discount. He gave in evidence, and proved, seven small notes of the plaintiff, making an aggregate beyond $200. Two of these notes were payable to himself; the others were payable to Liverett & Glenn, Caldwell & Kenner, and Clarke & Moorman. They were endorsed or assigned, and the endorsements or assignments were proved, and bore date before the commencement of the plaintiff’s suit.
    The plaintiff struggled to show that the defendant bought these notes after the plaintiff’s suit was commenced. The .writ was issued 26th of February, 1840.
    It appeared that in March, 1840, Hunter, the defendant, was at Maybinton, where Caldwell & Kinner, and Clarke & Moorman, carried on business, hunting up notes on the plaintiff.
    The plaintiff insisted he was entitled to interest on his demand from January, 1840; or to have the interest on the defendant’s notes stopped at January, 1840, and have the balance then struck. Neither position was, in the opinion of the presiding Judge, sustainable. The jury were instructed to inquire when the defendant procured the notes on the plaintiff from Liverett & Glenn, Caldwell & Kenner, and Clarke & Moorman, and to exclude from the defendant’s discount such as they might believe to have been obtained since suit was brought. They were told to compute the interest on the notes to the trial, and allow the plaintiff no interest. The jury allowed the defendant’s whole discount, and found on it the excess over the plaintiff’s demand, in the defendant’s favor.
    The plaintiff appealed, in this case, on the grounds following :
    1st. Because there was no sufficient legal evidence that the defendant was the holder of the notes offered as a discount at the commencement of the suit.
    2d. Because it was clearly proved that the note of $40 28, which defendant got of H. Moorman, was obtained by him after suit was brought. ■
    3d. Because the court should have charged the jury that they had the legal right to compute the interest up to the commencement of the suit, and settle the accounts of the parties. The court said this was right, but he feared he had not the power to make such an order, or charge so to the jury.
    A. W. Thompson, for the motion. Herndon, contra.
   Curia, per

O’Neall, J.

The first ground of the defendant’s motion makes the question, whether the proof of an endorsement or assignment, in the ordinary way, by proof of the endorser or assignor’s handwriting, is also proof of the date which it bears 7 Generally, when an instrument is proved so as to be read, every thing contained in it is regarded as also proved. When a deed is proved, its consideration and date are also regarded as proved, in contemplation of law. So, in less solemn instruments, where title passes by writing without seal, as in cases of endorsements or assignments, when the instrument is proved its date is also proved. This is, however, not conclusive. For it may be shown, by the party against whom it is offered, that, either by mistake or design, it bears a wrong date. The plaintiff was allowed the full benefit of this, both in proof and before the jury, and having failed, he has no ground to ask for a new trial in this respect. The other two grounds have been so often ruled as the Judge below ruled them, that it is unnecessary to make any comment upon them. The motion is dismissed.

Richardson, Evans, Earle, and Butler, JJ., concurred.

Wardlaw, J., dubitante.  