
    STATE v. JIM (J. W.) MORRISON and JESSE ROBINSON.
    (Filed 27 February, 1935.)
    1. Receiving Stolen Goods A b—
    Felonious intent in receiving stolen goods with knowledge at the time that they had been stolen is necessary to a conviction under O. S., 4250, and a charge which fails to submit the' question of such intent to the jury entitles defendant to a new trial.
    2. Receiving Stolen Goods B d—
    In a prosecution under O. S., 4250, it is not required that- the jury should determine the value of the goods in its verdict.
    Appeal by defendant from Sink, J., at July Term, 1934, of Meck-leNbueg.
    Criminal prosecution, tried upon indictment charging the defendants Jim Morrison and Jesse Robinson (1) with the larceny of 65 chickens and 5 turkeys, of the value of $25, the property of Caldwell Bradford, and (2) with feloniously receiving said chickens and turkeys, etc., knowing them to have been feloniously stolen or taken in violation of C. S., 4250.
    The State’s evidence tends to show that by arrangement with Jesse Robinson, Dewey Allison and Alf Sloan, on the night of 9 November, 1933, raided the poultry yard of Caldwell Bradford, stole four sacks of chickens and five turkeys, carried them to Highway No. 74 and there delivered them to Jim Morrison and Jesse Robinson, a white man and colored man, who were waiting with a Chevrolet truck. There were no lights on the truck. Allison and Sloan were to get 30 cents each for the chickens and 50 cents for the turkeys. Jesse Robinson promised to pay for them the next day, but he never did.
    In the course of the trial Jesse Robinson fled the- jurisdiction, and a mistrial was ordered as to him. The case proceeded against Jim Morrison.
    Verdict: Guilty.
    Judgment: Imprisonment in the State’s prison at hard labor for not less than 3% years nor more than 7 years.
    Defendant appeals, assigning errors.
    
      Attorney-General Seawell and Assistant Attorney-General Bruton for the State.
    
    
      Armfield, Sherrin & Barnhardt for defendant.
    
   Stacy, O. J.

The following excerpt taken from the charge forms the basis of one of the defendant’s exceptive assignments of error:

“Tbe court tells you that, receiving stolen goods, knowing them to bave been stolen, means exactly wbat tbe language implies; taking into one’s possession tbe goods, wares, and chattels of another, knowing at tbe time of such taking that tbe goods were stolen, or under such circumstances as would put a reasonably prudent man on notice that such goods are stolen.”

It will be observed tbe indictment charges tbe defendant with “feloni-ously” receiving stolen goods, knowing them to bave been feloniously stolen or taken, and be has been “punished as one convicted of larceny.” C. S., 4250. Thus, it would seem, under tbe indictment as drawn, tbe intent with which tbe defendant received tbe stolen goods, knowing at tbe time that they bad been feloniously stolen or taken, was inadequately submitted to tbe jury. S. v. Caveness, 78 N. C., 484; S. v. Rushing, 69 N. C., 29; S. v. Dail, 191 N. C., 231, 131 S. E., 573; S. v. Bethel, 97 N. C., 459, 1 S. E., 551; S. v. Eunice, 194 N. C., 409, 139 S. E., 774.

Personal-profit motive is not essential. It was said in 8. v. Bushing, supra, that intent to aid tbe thief, with tbe other elements present, would render tbe receiver guilty. But, of course, one who receives stolen goods for a lawful purpose, i.e., an officer making arrest, incurs no criminal responsibility by taking such goods into bis possession. Tbe law does not condemn where tbe heart is free from guilt.

Tbe indictment is under C. S., 4250, and not under C. S., 4251. It is provided in tbe latter statute that if tbe value of tbe stolen property be in doubt, “tbe jury shall, in tbe verdict, fix tbe value of tbe property stolen.” S. v. Spain, 201 N. C., 571, 160 S. E., 825.

For tbe error as indicated, tbe defendant is entitled to a new trial, and it is so ordered.

New trial.  