
    Richard W. Chandler, Plaintiff in Error, v. John H. Gay, Defendant in Error.
    ERROR TO ST. CLAIR.
    The circuit court can not arrest or interfere with the proceedings on an award where the submission has been by bond or rule of court, except for the causes expressly stated in the statute, to wit: that the award was obtained by “fraud, corruption, or undue means.”
    It is error for the circuit court to enter up a judgment on an award. The proper course is, under the statute of 1819, for a rule of court to be entered up on filing the submission and award, requiring the parties to abide by the award. A disobedience to this rule would be a contempt. (See act of 1827, Rev. Laws, p. 64.)
   Opinion of the Court by

Justice Smith.

This was a proceeding under a statute of this state, authorizing and regulating arbitrations, approved 25th February, 1819. The plaintiff in error applied, in the court below, by his counsel, to set aside the award made in this case, on the ground of uncertainty, want of mutuality, as not embracing the matter submitted, and as not final. ■

He gave the defendant here, notice in the court below, of his intention to make such application. It appears that the circuit court entertained this motion, though after hearing it overruled the same, and directed the bond and award to be. filed; confirmed the award, and made it a judgment of the court, and that Gay should recover the sum of thirty-eight dollars and seventy-five cents.

The statute under which these proceedings were, as it is contended, correctly taken, provides “ that the submission of the parties may be made a rule of court, and after making an award, a true copy thereof shall be delivered to each of the parties, and if either of the parties refuse or neglect to obey the award or umpirage, the other party may return the same with the submission or arbitration bond, and the same award or umpirage so returned shall be entered on record and filed by the clerk, and a rule of court thereupon made, and after such rule is made, the party disobeying the same shall be liable to be punished for a contempt of court on motion, and that process shall issue accordingly, which process shall not be stayed or impeded by order of any court of law or equity, until the parties shall in all things obey the award or umpirage, or unless it shall be made to appear on oath, that the umpire or arbitrators misbehaved, and that such award or umpirage was obtained by fraud, corruption or other undue means: provided, that before such rule shall be granted, the party moving therefor shall produce to the court satisfactory evidence of the due execution of the arbitration or submission bond, and that the party refusing or neglecting to obey the award or umpirage, hath been furnished with a true copy thereof.”

It is alleged for cause of error, that the court below erred in not setting aside the award for the reasons set forth in the notice of the plaintiff of his motion, and in rendering judgment for the defendant in error on the award, before deciding on the said motion of the plaintiff in error.

The force of the reasoning of the counsel, is not perceived, as to the error of the court below, in deciding on the application to file the arbitration bond—and award, before pronouncing an opinion on the motion of the counsel in the court below to set aside the award; nor can it be perceived why the judgment can be erroneous, if warranted by the statute, because of the order of precedence given to it over a motion clearly cor am non judice. It is very apparent that the application by notice and motion, before the filing of the submission or arbitration bond and award, was wholly irregular, there being no record or evidence in the court below of any proceedings upon which to base such notice and motion.

The statute in question has very clearly provided the mode and order of proceeding, and had the present plaintiff desired to have resisted the filing of the bond and award, he could have done so at the time of the application to file it, and have shown to the circuit court the causes on which he predicated such resistance.

If the reasons assigned came within the causes of objection recited in the statute, it would have been the duty of the court to have suspended the entry of the rule on the submission and award, and if satisfied by evidence, that the award had been produced by fraud, corruption or other undue means, to have arrested the proceedings or quashed the award.

The language used in the act forbids the idea that the circuit court could arrest the proceedings, or interfere therewith, except for the causes expressly therein stated, and the same prohibitions extend equally to this court unless for manifest error appearing in the record.

Thus far then, it is not perceived but what the proceedings on the part of the defendant in error were correct, but it is an important inquiry in this case to ascertain the nature and extent of the order taken and entered upon filing the 'submission or arbitration bond and award.

The circuit court, it appears, confirmed the award, declared it to be a judgment, overruled the motion to set aside the award, and adjudged that Gay should recover against Chandler thirty-eight dollars and seventy-five cents, as awarded.

Is this entry of the judgment in conformity with the provisions of the statute ? If not, was the court authorized to enter such judgment ? Will it be contended that the judgment is the one contemplated by the statute ? The statute, it will be seen, directs a rule of the cpurj; to be entered on filing the submission and award, leaving it uncertain, it is true, as to the precise form of that rule, or its extent.

For in the sentence immediately following, it declares that the party disobeying such rule, after it is made, shall be liable to be punished for a contempt. The only rational construction then, of the terms of the statute, must be, that the rule to have been made, should have been one directing a compliance with the award, leaving the party to his remedy in case of refusal, by attachment for contempt.

The court are therefore of opinion that the decision of the court below confirming the award be affirmed, and that so much thereof as declares it to be a judgment of the court directing the recovery of the sum of thirty-eight dollars and seventy-five cents, being erroneous and not warranted by the statute, be reversed. The cause is remanded to the circuit court with leave to the defendant in error to perfect his proceedings agreeable to the provisions of the statute, and that each party pay one-half of the costs of the proceedings in this court, , 
      
      
         Duncan v. Fletcher, post. Cromwell v. March.
      
     
      
       By the statute now in force in this state it is enacted (after providing the manner in which arbitrations may be entered into,) that the parties “may in such submission, agree that a judgment of any court of record competent to have jurisdiction of the subject matter, to be named in such instrument, shall be rendered upon the award made pursuant to such submission.” Purple’s statutes, p. 88, Sec. 1. Scates’ Comp., p. 209.
      By virtue of this statute if the submission and award are in pursuance of it, and the submission so provides, a judgment may be entered on the award. Low v. Nolte, 15 Ill., 368; Thorpe v. Starr, 17 Ill., 199.
      A judgment on an award can only be entered by a justice of the peace when it is on a suit pending before him, and is by the parties referred to arbitrators. Weinz v. Dopler, 17 Ill., 111; Shirk v. Trainer, 20 Ill., 301.
      A parol submission and award are binding in aU cases except where a writing is required to pass the title to the thing in controversy. Smith v. Douglass, 16 Ill., 34.
      If there is neither fraud or misconduct on the part of the arbitrators, the award is final. Merritt v. Merritt, 11 Ill., 565; Root v. Renwick, 15 Ill., 461; Ross v. Watt, 16 Ill., 99.
      Unless the submission requires it, it is not necessary that an award should be published, or that notice of it should be given to the parties. Nor need it be in writing. Denman v. Bayless, 22 Ill., 300.
      An award must be so certain that it can be easily comprehended, and be carried into execution without the aid of extraneous circumstances. Howard v. Babcock, 21 Ill., 259.
      A court of equity may rectify a mistake of arbitrators, in omitting the name of the person from an award to whom certain land was to be conveyed, if the proof is clear and explicit as to what was intended by the arbitrators. Williams v. Warren, 21 Ill., 541.
     