
    No. 703
    MANCUSO v. CLEVELAND RY. CO. et
    No. 19916.
    Supreme Court
    On motion to certify.
    Dock. June 23, 1926;
    4 Abs. 404.
    966. PROXIMATE CAUSE — Where the conductor on a car belonging to a street railway company fails, upon coming to a railroad crossing, to leave the car and see that the tracks are clear and the gates belonging to the railroad company are not lowered upon the approach of a train; and the narrow escape of the car from a collision with the train causes a panic in the street-car which results in the injury of one of the passengers, may such negligence of either the street-car company or the railroad company be said to be the proximate cause of the injury?
   . Josephine Mancuso brought this action originally in the Cuyahoga Common Pleas against the Cleveland Railway Company and the New York, Chicago, & St. Louis Railroad Company for damages arising from personal injuries while a passenger on a street car belonging to the defendant company.

It appears that the conductor of the street car did not leave the car to see if the tracks of the railroad company were clear and that upon an approach of the train belonging to the Railroad Co. the gates were not lowered; and that the train very narrowly escaped colliding with the street car while crowing the tracks of the Railroad Company. The passengers on the street car concerning the possibility of an accident precipitated a panic and thereby trampled and injured Mancuso.

Attorneys — Nicola \ & Horn for Mancuso; Tolies, Hogsett, Ginn & Morley, & Squires, Sanders & Dempsey, for Railway Co. et; all of Cleveland.

The judgment of the Common Pleas in favor of companies upon a motion for a .directed verdict was rendered upon the theory that any negligence of either company was not the proximate cause of the inj'^fy. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Mancuso in the Supreme Court contends:

1. That the question of whether or not the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury was for the jury to determine.

2. That the negligence of the companies was the proximate cause of the injury.

3. That the doctrine of the famous ancient Squib case applies.  