
    Grazier’s Estate.
    Argued October 6, 1930.
    Before Moschzisker, C. J., Frazer, Walling, Simpson, Kephart, Sadler and Schaffer, JJ.
    
      Ray Patton Smith, with him Wm. H. Burd, for appellants.
    
      November 24, 1930:
    
      James A. Graham, of Graham, Yost & Meyers, for appellee.
   Per Curiam,

A petition was filed by a majority of tbe beneficiaries, asking the court below to end a trust; the prayer was refused and petitioners have appealed.

John A. Grazier, by his last will, provided, inter alia: “All stocks, bonds or certificates for shares in limited partnerships which I may possess at the time of my decease, I give......to my son Harvey F. Grazier as trustee, he to hold the same in trust for the persons and for the time and purposes as follows”: (1) To pay the income derived from the trust fund to the widow of the decedent “during the term of her natural life.” (2) After the death of the life tenant, to continue the trust for a further term of ten years, paying the income to the three children of decedent, Harvey, John and Ethel, “their heirs or assigns, share and share alike,” and at the end of that time to divide the principal equally among these children, “their heirs and assigns”; with a provision that, should the three children, “after the death” of the widow, “unanimously decide” to end the trust, they might do so within the ten-year period. He also gave to his wife a life interest, free of trusts, in all of his property, not otherwise disposed of, with remainder to his children, also free of trust.

The widow and all three children survived the testator, but Harvey S. Grazier, son of testator, who was named as the trustee, subsequently died, leaving to survive him a widow and three children, one of whom is a minor. The Johnstown Trust Company took Harvey S. Grazier’s place as trustee and also became guardian of his minor child. The company, both as trustee and as guardian, filed an answer in which it objected to the termination of the trust.

The court below, in refusing appellant’s petition, states: “There is no doubt in [our] mind......that when......John A. Grazier created this trust......his object was to take care of his widow so that she would not come to want during her life......; it is......evident that [this] was......satisfactory to [her], for she did not elect to take against his will; and even though she now [may desire] to end the trust created in her interest, we do not believe that the court should be a party to thwarting the intentions of the testator...... Furthermore, we do not see how this trust can be terminated without the consent of the guardian of the minor who is interested, and both the guardian and the trustee......object to the termination of the trust on the ground that it would not be for the best interest of the minor and the [widow of the original testator]...... There has not been submitted to this court persuasive ......evidence that it would be to the best interests of the minor and the cestui que trust to have the trust terminated.”

After reading the entire record and considering the able arguments of counsel, we are not convinced of error in the decree under attack or that the court below erred in refusing a rehearing to appellants. In reaching this determination, we have not overlooked the fact that, in an earlier proceeding, the present appellee, the Johns-town Trust Co.., asked leave to execute, with the present appellants, a certain agreement relating to the trust property here involved, and at that time averred its belief that a prime purpose of the trust was to provide for the control of the companies and limited partnerships whose stocks, bonds and shares, prior to their conversion into other securities, had composed the corpus of the trust fund; nor, on the other hand, have we overlooked the fact that the agreement in question, signed by appellants, not only provided for the continuation of the trust during the life of the widow of the original decedent, but also particularly recited that it was entered into “in accordance with the known wishes and intention of the testator” that said trust should continue during the life of Ms widow. No doubt one of tbe intentions of tbe testator was to place tbe control of bis companies in tbe bands of tbe trustee named by bim, but, as found by tbe court below, tbe will itself shows that testator intended tbe trust to last at least during tbe life of bis widow, for tbe purpose of securing to ber tbe income from tbe fund thus set aside. We agree with tbe orphans’ court that, under tbe circumstances disclosed by this record, tbe conversion of tbe securities left by testator, and tbe reinvestment of tbe fund in other securities, presents no sufficient reason for ending the trust at this time. In conclusion, we may say, the fact averred by appellants that tbe widow has sold her interest, provided tbe trust should be judicially declared terminated, for a sum sufficient to purchase an annunity equal to ber present income from tbe trust estate, does not, in law or otherwise, so alter tbe situation as to warrant tbe reversal of tbe decree entered by the court below.

Tbe decree is affirmed at cost of appellants.  