
    Mark GRIFFIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 1D13-1640.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    June 21, 2016.
    Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and David Henson, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brittany Ann Rhodaback, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   ON REMAND FROM THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

PER CURIAM.

We previously affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences for using a computer online service to solicit a person he believed to be a minor in violation of section 847.0135(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and traveling to meet a person he believed to be a minor in violation of section 847.0135(4)(a). Griffis v. State, 133 So.3d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). Thereaftér, the Florida Supreme Court quashed our decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of State v. Shelley, 176 So.3d 914 (Fla.2015), which held that double jeopardy principles prohibit separate convictions for solicitation under section 847.0135(3)(b) and traveling to meet a minor after solicitation under section 847.0135(4)(b) if the charges aré based on the same conduct.

After the remand, we ordered the state to show cause why Appellant’s conviction and sentence for the lesser ■ included offense should not be vacated based on Shelley. The State filed a response stating that it “does not oppose this Court vacating Appellant’s conviction and sentence for unlawful use of a computer service to solicit a minor.” Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to vacate Appellant’s conviction and sentence for the lesser included offense of using a computer online service to solicit a minor. In all other respects, we affirm for the reasons stated in our original opinion.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED with instructions.

LEWIS, WETHERELL, and ROWE, JJ., concur.  