
    Reuben James THOMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eric FANNING, Secretary of the Army, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 14-17160
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 14, 2016 
    
    Filed December 22, 2016
    Reuben James Thompson, Pro Se
    
      Peter Michael Lantka, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Laurence G. Tinsley, Jr., Esquire, Senior General Counsel, USPX— Office of the US Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee
    Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Eric Fanning is substituted for his predecessor, John M. McHugh, as Secretary of the Army under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Reuben James Thompson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his employment action alleging constitutional claims and discrimination in violation of Title VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Arrington v. Wong, 287 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)); Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006) (summary judgment). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Thompson’s constitutional claims because Title VII “provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.” See Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Thompson’s Title VII race discrimination claim because Thompson failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and, even assuming that Thompson had established a prima facie case, Thompson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual. See Moran, 447 F.3d at 753-58 (affirming summary judgment on Title VII claim because plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case and, alternatively, failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to pretext).

The district court did hot abuse its discretion by denying Thompson’s motion for reconsideration because Thompson failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief from judgment under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We reject as unsupported by the record Thompson’s contention that the district court improperly held private meetings with defendant.

We treat Thompson’s request that case law be established, set forth in his reply brief, as a request for publication of the memorandum disposition, and deny his request.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as proyid-ed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     