
    Congregation Kollel Horabonim, Inc., Respondent, v Clara M. Williams, as the Assessor of the Town of Ramapo, Appellant.
    Argued September 13, 1979;
    decided October 18, 1979
    
      POINTS OF COUNSEL
    
      Arnold Becker, Kenneth H. Resnik and Thomas W. Faist for appellant.
    I. A parsonage is simply the officiating clergyman’s residence related to the congregation’s place of worship. II. Historically the majority rule was to afford no exemption from real property taxes to a parsonage; if the parsonage exemption (Real Property Tax Law, § 462) was meant to be a per se, self-executing statute, it would have logically been included in the "used exclusively for religious purposes” exemption statute (Real Property Tax Law, § 421, subd 1, par [a]). III. Sister State Constitutions and statutes are of varied construction and import and cases reaching different conclusions are not necessarily conflicting. IV. Construction of the parsonage exemption in section 462 of the Real Property Tax Law is not so clearly worded as to be self-executing: the words "In addition to” are not surplusage yet are prone to various interpretations. (Direen Operating Corp. v State Tax Comm., 46 AD2d 191.) V. Legislative intent underlying exemption from real property taxation is that the exemption statute be strictly construed against petitioner seeking exemption that petitioner carries the burden of proof, and .that any ambiguities or uncertainties are resolved in favor of the taxing authority. (People ex rel. Mizpah Lodge, No. 518 of I. O. O. F. v Burke, 228 NY 245; Matter of Great Neck Section, Nat. Council of Jewish Women v Board of Assessors, County of Nassau, 21 Misc 2d 142; Matter of Kennedy, 240 App Div 20, 264 NY 691; Crusade for Christ v Town of New Lebanon, 50 Misc 2d 774, 36 AD2d 247, 31 NY2d 765; People ex rel. Young Men's Assn. for Mut. Improvement in City of Albany v Sayles, 32 App Div 197, 157 NY 677; Matter of Schwartzman [Miller], 262 App Div 635, 288 NY 568; Pinelawn Cemetery v Cesare, 90 Misc 2d 736; People ex rel. Unity Cong. Soc. of City of N. Y. v Mills, 189 Misc 774; People ex rel. Andrews v Cameron, 140 App Div 76, 200 NY 585; Matter of Community-General Hosp. of Greater Syracuse v Town of Onondaga, 80 Misc 2d 96.) VI. A parsonage is not real property "used exclusively for religious purposes” and thus derives no constitutional protection. (Matter of Association of Bar of City of N. Y. v Lewisohn, 34 NY2d 143; People ex rel. Society of Free Church of St. Mary the Virgin v Feitner, 168 NY 494; Matter of Mandelcorn v Bruckman, 266 App Div 908, 292 NY 543; Interstate Lien Corp. v St. Paul's African M. E. Zion Church of Buffalo, 275 App Div 993.) VII. The parsonage tax exemption (Real Property Tax Law, § 462), is not so precise as to obviate its interpretation and consequently its construction provided room for abuse. (Matter of Las Aguas, 21 Misc 2d 937; Matter of Religious Soc. of Families v Assessor of Town of Carroll, 73 Misc 2d 923; Matter of Basilio Scientiñc Spiritist Cult Assn., 9 Misc 2d 389; Kupperman v Congregation Nusach Sfard of The Bronx, 39 Misc 2d 107; Walker Mem. Baptist Church v Saunders, 285 NY 462; Fiske v Beatty, 206 App Div 349, 238 NY 598; Westminster Presbyt. Church of West Twenty-Third St. v Trustees of Presbytery of N. Y., 211 NY 312; Ravenal v Ravenal, 72 Misc 2d 100.)
    
      Mark Landesman for respondent.
    I. It is difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to grant tax exemptions to only those parsonages owned by religious entities which also own the parcel at which they conduct their religious services and worship but deny such exemption to religious entities which lease their houses of worship. (Syracuse Center of Jehovah's Witnesses v City of Syracuse, 163 Misc 535; Direen Operating Corp. v State Tax Comm., 46 AD2d 191; Kinkele v Wilson, 151 NY 269; Matter of Mulligan, 4 Misc 361; City of New York v Carolla, 48 Misc 2d 140; Abood v Hospital Ambulance Serv., 
      30 NY2d 295; People ex rel. Society of Free Church of St. Mary the Virgin v Feitner, 168 NY 494; Walz v Tax Comm., 397 US 664.) II. Serious constitutional questions would arise if parsonage exemption would be granted to only some religious groups but denied to others merely because of rental rather than ownership of other real property at which they conduct their services. (Le Drugstore Etats Unis v New York State Bd. of Pharmacy, 33 NY2d 298; People v Ryan, 274 NY 149; Matter of New York Post Corp. v Leibowitz, 2 NY2d 677; Matter of Capone v Weaver, 6 NY2d 307; Matter of Martinez v Ficano, 28 AD2d 215; Jaffe Plumbing & Heating Co. v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 51 Misc 2d 1083, 29 AD2d 1052; Gross v West New Brighton Bank, 181 Misc 1, 267 App Div 870; Matter of Merchants Refrig. Co. v Taylor, 275 NY 113; Matter of City of New York, 190 NY 350.)
    
      Robert L. Beebe and Stephen J. Harrison for State Board of Equalization and Assessment, amicus curiae.
    
    I. The exemption accorded parsonages by section 462 of the Real Property Tax Law is connected to and contingent upon the eligibility of the owning religious corporation to receive an exemption pursuant to section 420 of such law. (People ex rel. Hutchinson v Collison, 22 Abb NC 52.) II. Section 462 represented an expansion of an exemption, but that expansion was subject to definite limitation. (People ex rel. Mizpah Lodge, No. 518 of I. O. O. F. v Burke, 228 NY 245; Matter of City of Lackawanna v State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment of State of N. Y., 16 NY2d 222; Association of Bar of City of N. Y. v Lewisohn, 34 NY2d 143; Matter of State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment v Kerwick, 92 Misc 2d 547.) III. The concerns of the court below are met by existing law.
    
      Dennis Rapps and Aaron C. Kinderlehrer for National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, amicus curiae.
    
    I. The purpose of property tax exemption is to spare religious corporations. (Walz v Tax Comm., 397 US 664.) II. The term "In addition” is synonymous with "also” or "besides” rather than contingent upon extrinsic characteristics. (Matter of Daggett, 2 Connoly 230; Matter of Mulligan, 4 Misc 361; City of New York v Carolla, 48 Misc 2d 140.) III. A statutory classification must be reasonable and bear a relationship to the object of the statute. IV. Respondent conducts a research center of Talmudic law and codes and grants fellowships to full-time scholars who devote their activities to resolving intricate questions of religious law and practice.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Fuchsberg, J.

The sole issue in the case is whether section 462 of the Real Property Tax Law is to be construed as exempting the residence of a bona fide clergyman from local property taxes when the religious organization that he leads does not own real property used exclusively for religious purposes.

The statute reads as follows: "In addition to the exemption provided in section four hundred twenty of this chapter [since renumbered as section 421, subd 1, par (a)], property owned by a religious corporation while actually used by the officiating clergymen thereof for residential purposes shall be exempt from taxation”. Section 421 (subd 1, par [a]) exempts real property owned and used exclusively for religious purposes by an organization which itself is engaged exclusively in religious activities.

It is unquestioned that the petitioning congregation is a religious corporation entirely devoted to such purposes. It conducts daily religious services and sponsors advanced studies in Talmudic law. Since its establishment in 1973, it always has carried on its spiritual and educational activities in leased or borrowed buildings at various sites within the Town of Ramapo. The only property to which it holds title is a single-family house used as a residence for the congregation’s rabbi and his household. His quarters are also used as his rabbinical office and study.

Appellant tax assessor ruled that the rabbi’s residence was not exempt from real property taxes. The congregation thereupon commenced this proceeding to review that determination, only to have Special Term dismiss it on the ground that the prefatory "In addition to” language in the statute indicates that the entitlement to an exemption for an officiating clergyman’s residence embraced by section 462 is conditioned upon the religious organization having also qualified for an exemption by reason of ownership of property covered by section 421 (subd 1, par [a]). On review, however, a closely divided Appellate Division panel reversed, the majority holding that the congregation was entitled to the benefit of section 462 notwithstanding the fact that its synagogue is not housed in a building owned by the corporation. For the reasons that follow, we now uphold its determination.

The history of section 462 of the Real Property Tax Law lights the way for our analysis. Though that section itself is of comparatively recent vintage, the practice of exempting church property from taxation dates to at least early biblical days (e.g., Genesis 47:26; Ezra 7:24), after which it blossomed into a tradition almost universally followed throughout western civilization. When, not unexpectedly, it was transplanted to this continent, its strength was such that it continued to be followed with full force even after the adoption of the American Constitution’s provisions for separation of church from State. Indeed, without gainsaying that the exemption, given by the State as a matter of grace rather than right, rests somewhat uneasily between the opposing poles of the "nonestablishment” and "free exercise” clauses of the First Amendment (compare Walz v Tax Comm., 397 US 664, 668-672, with id., at pp 700-716 [Douglas, J., dissenting]; see, also, Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 14-9, p 846), every jurisdiction in the United States today allows it as to real property. (See, generally, Pfeifer, Church, State & Freedom, pp 183-185.)

Most States exempt clergymen’s residences as well. In New York, this phase extends back to 1892, when chapter 565 of the Laws of that year was enacted. Its grant of an exemption was for a "dwelling-house owned by any religious corporation and the lands upon which the same stands, while and during only the time actually used by the officiating clergyman of such religious corporation”. Significantly, the "In addition to” phrase which introduces the present form of the statute was completely absent. Rather, the "dwelling-house” exemption was self-standing and unqualified.

Furthermore, the words "In addition to”, on which respondent places such heavy emphasis and on which we therefore focus with some particularity, in fact did not make an appearance until four years later when New York’s tax statutes were codified, and then only, after reiterating the language of the uncodified statute, in a concluding sentence that read, "Such exemption shall be in addition to that provided by [the predecessor of today’s § 421, subd 1, par (a)].” That sentence could not have been intended to serve other than a purely conjunctive purpose since the 1896 report of the Commissioners on Statutory Revision makes clear that no substantive change in the law was intended by the codifiers (Report of the Commissioners, at p 19; see, also, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Statutes, Book 1, § 422). Thus, this is not a case where there is no apparent guide to the subjective intention of the legislators (cf. Messina v Lufthansa German Airlines, 47 NY2d 111, 115).

True, when the residence statute was later amended, first to increase a prior $2,000 exemption limit to $3,000 (L 1944, ch 529) and then to extend it to the entire value of the clergyman’s residence (L 1959, ch 733), while the sentence as such was deleted, the words "In addition to” were transposed to the beginning of the statute. But, the mere contraction or carrying forward of vestigial language which, when long ago adopted, was not central to the statutory purpose is too common an occurrence in legislative drafting for us, without more, to attach special meaning to that fact, and most certainly not when it would undercut so established a practice as the one the statutory scheme had theretofore carried out here.

Moreover, by no means do the statutory annals recited above suggest any legislative purpose to distinguish between a clergyman’s residence owned by a religious institution which leases its house of worship and one owned by a group with sufficient resources to purchase its sanctuary outright. To say the least, given prevailing community values and the proverbial financial straits in which many a religious organization characteristically finds itself (see, generally, Whitman & Trimble, Churches and Church Membership in the United States [1956]), the creation of such a difference in treatment could hardly have taken place without legislative turmoil, of which not the slightest hint can here be found. In sum, the disputed phrase appears to have been included for no other purpose than to call attention to the parallel provisions in the two statutes; nothing in the wording, read with the meaning ordinarily assigned such terms, suggests any dependence of one statute on the other.

Finally, the assessor’s contention that section 462 contemplates a "parsonage exemption” and therefore must be construed in accordance with the historical definition of "parsonage” or "manse”, while perhaps interesting, is hardly convincing. In support of this point, a definition of "parsonage” as lands appurtenant to an estate on which a church stands is urged upon us. But the authority cited for this proposition (Black’s Law Dictionary [4th ed], pp 819 [defining "glebe”], 1116, 1273-1274) fails to assert that this connection was a necessary element of a parsonage. In any event, and most pointedly, the statute does not provide the opportunity for such semantic niceties since it refers not to a "parsonage”, but, plainly and simply, to "property * * * used by * * * officiating clergymen * * * for residential purposes”.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler and Meyer concur with Judge Fuchsberg; Judge Jasen dissents and votes to reverse in the following memorandum: I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division and reinstate the judgment at Special Term, sustaining the appellant’s determination denying tax exemption, as a parsonage, to respondent’s residential property, for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Joseph F. Hawkins at the Appellate Division.

Order affirmed, with costs. 
      
       Studies of church finances indicate that most carry forward little or no surplus from one fiscal period to the next, that even today the weekly donations of church members is their largest source of funds, and that endowments play a comparatively small role in church finances (Johnson, Picard & Quinn, Churches and Church Membership in the United States [1971]).
     