
    Evansville, Paducah & Tennessee River Packet Co. v. Slater.
    
      Action against Common Carrier for loss of Goods.
    
    1. Bill of exceptions; presumption when all the, evidence not set out.— When the bill of exceptions does not purport to set out all the evidence, this court will, on appeal, presume that there was other evidence in the case sufficient to support the judgment oí the trial court.
    
      Appeal from the District Court of Colbert.
    Tried before the Hon. W. P. Chitwood.
    This was an action brought by the appellee, Mary W. Slater, against the appellant corporation to recover the value of goods, which had been deposited in a warehouse at Sheffield, Alabama, for shipment on the defendant’s line of boats.
    The Evansville, Paducah & Tennessee River Packet Co. is, and has been for a number of years, a common carrier by water, operating a line of steamboats in the Ohio and Tennessee rivers, between Evansville, Indiana, and Florence, Alabama. Sheffield, Alabama, being situated opposite Florence, on the Tennessee river, is practically one of the terminal points of the aforesaid carrier.
    R. D. Morrow was superintendent of the packet company from 1886 to 1889, and during this time appointed H. H. Brumbach as collecting agent or landing-keeper for the packet company at Sheffield, Ala., which position he held at the time of the trial. Brumbach’s authority, as agent of the packet company, was limited to receiving freight from the boat, collecting the boat’s charges on same, and soliciting patronage. During the continuance of the aforesaid agency, Brumbach was operating a dray-age or transfer business in and about Sheffield, doing a commission business in salt and hay, and engaged in forwarding and shipping goods. In this business he made use of a warehouse situated on the bank of the river below the regular landing. This warehouse was in no wise connected with the business of the packet company, nor did the packet company have any interest in, or control over it, but the same was used by Brumbach for his individual purposes and business.
    Under the foregoing facts, the appellee, on or about . February 29, 1892, had her household goods hauled by Brumbach and deposited in said warehouse at Sheffield, Ala., for the purpose of having them transported by the packet companjr to Evansville, Indiana. On the morning'of March 1, 1892, the said warehouse and contents, including the household goods of appellee, were destroyed by fire, the origin of which was unknown. Appellee seeks to hold the packet company liable for the value of her goods under its common carrier liability. The case was tried without a jury, and the court rendered judgment in favor of appellee. The opinion renders it unnecessary to make a more detailed statement of the facts of this case and of the rulings of the trial court.
    Wilhoyte & Harris, for appellant.
    J. B. Moore and Roultiac & Nathan, contra.
    
   HARALSON, J.

We have carefully examined the evidence in this cause, as we find it set out in the bill of exceptions in the transcript. Without more, it is not sufficient to support the judgment of the court below. Unless Brumbach was an agent of the defendant at Sheffield, authorized to make a contract of affreightment for defendant with the plaintiff, to transport her goods to Evansville, and, having such authority, made such a contract, and the goods were accordingly delivered to the defendant for carriage, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The evidence, as we find it in the transcript, falls far short of establishing such an agency, sucha contract and such a delivery. So far as appears, Brumbach was not an agent for any such purpose, he made no contract of any kind to bind the defendant, and the goods were never delivered to him as agent for defendant.

But, be this as it may, the bill of exceptions does not contain a statement that the evidence therein set out was the evidence on which the trial was had, or was all the evidence introduced on the trial, and we are committed, by the uniform rulings of this court, to presume in such case that there was other evidence in the cause sufficient to support the judgment of the court below, and the cause must be affirmed. — Hood v. Pioneer M. & M. Co., 95 Ala. 461, 11 So. Rep. 10; Hunt v. Johnson, 96 Ala. 130, 11 So. Rep. 387; 3 Brick. Dig., 406, §43 ; Ib. 81, §47.

Affirmed,  