
    Zakir AHMED, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    Nos. 10-2940-ag (L), 10-4914-ag (Con).
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 23, 2011.
    
      Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, New York, N.Y., for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Jennifer L. Lightbody, Senior Litigation Counsel; Kiley L. Kane, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, ROBERT. A. KATZMANN, and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Zakir Ahmed, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks review of a June 22, 2010 decision of the BIA affirming the May 15, 2009 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Steven R. Abrams, which denied Ahmed’s application for cancellation of removal. In re Zakir Ahmed, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 22, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 15, 2009). Ahmed also seeks review of a November 15, 2010 decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen and reconsider. In re Zakir Ahmed, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Nov. 15, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case. Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

I. Cancellation of Removal

In order for an alien who is not a lawful permanent resident to demonstrate eligibility for cancellation of removal, he must demonstrate, inter alia, that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D). Although we generally do not have jurisdiction to review the agency’s “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” finding, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); see also Bar co-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 38-39 (2d Cir.2008), we retain jurisdiction to review questions of law, including a claim that a hardship finding rests on fact-finding that “is flawed by an error of law.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 322-23 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When “some facts important to the subtle determination of ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ have been totally overlooked ... an error of law has occurred.” Mendez, 566 F.3d at 323.

Ahmed argues that the agency erred as a matter of law by overlooking evidence he submitted, and by not considering certain factors relevant to the hardship determination. Specifically, Ahmed contends that the agency overlooked evidence regarding his finances and country conditions in Bangladesh. Because Ahmed’s children would return to Bangladesh -with Ahmed, conditions in Bangladesh are relevant to the hardship determination. See Matter of Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468 (BIA 2002). Moreover, Ahmed’s assets and finances are relevant because that information helps to illustrate how difficult a transition to life in Bangladesh might be for the family. See Matter of Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 324 (BIA 2002).

Having reviewed the BIA decision, however, we conclude that the agency did not overlook or ignore this evidence. The BIA noted that Ahmed had asserted on appeal that the IJ’s decision was flawed “because he failed to consider the potential difficulty the children will have with regard to their education and/or simply adjusting to life in another country in assessing the hardship in this case.” See In re Zakir Ahmed, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ], at *2 (B.I.A. June 22, 2010). The BIA stated that it was “unpersuaded” by this argument, because “[t]he types of ‘hardships’ to which [Ahmed referred] generally do not constitute the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship required under the statute.” Id. Because the BIA specifically stated that it was unpersuaded by Ahmed’s argument regarding his children’s adjustment to life in Bangladesh, we presume it considered all the evidence regarding that issue. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (“[W]e presume that [the agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.”). Ahmed has not raised any other claim of legal error with respect to the denial of cancellation.

II. Motion to Reopen

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ahmed’s motion to reopen and reconsider. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” and Ahmed did not establish that the psychological report he submitted was unavailable at the time of his proceedings before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). Furthermore, the psychological report provided only that Ahmed’s children are “mildly clinically depressed and anxious” about Ahmed’s removal, an analysis which is unlikely to affect the agency’s determination regarding whether they would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if their father were removed. See Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 470 (“[T]he exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard for cancellation of removal applicants constitutes a high threshold that is in keeping with Congress’ intent to substantially narrow the class of aliens who would qualify for relief.”); Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 472-73 (BIA 1992) (the BIA will grant a motion to reopen only when it is satisfied that “if proceedings before the IJ were reopened, with all the attendant delays, the new evidence offered would likely change the result in the case”). Moreover, to the extent that Ahmed’s motion requested reconsideration, he did not argue any errors of law or fact which would warrant reconsideration. See 8 C.F.R. § 1008.2(b)(1); Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir.2006) (“[T]he BIA does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to reconsider where the motion merely repeats arguments that the BIA has previously rejected.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motions for stays of removal in these petitions are DENIED as moot.  