
    KISOR AND OTHERS v. STANCIFER AND OTHERS.
    Interrogatories in chancery — demurrer to idle — unskilful bill — court will suggest amendments.
    The interrogatories annexed to a bill in chancery, must be in accordance with the allegations of the bill; all beyond such are idle.
    If the bill is answered, a demurrer will not lie to the interrogatories annexed.
    Where the interrogatories are unwarranted, the defendant should answer to the pertinent ones, and omit to answer the others; the complainant can except to the answer, which will present the question of their pertinence to the decision of the court; if found proper, a further answer will be ordered.
    Interrogatories are not usual in our practice, and are in general unnecessary, except in cases of fraud.
    Where there is an unskilful bill and answer, leaving it doubtful if the proper relief can be decreed, the court will suggest an amendment to both parties, without costs.
    No man can be called in question under our constitution for his religious belief; but if it be necessary to inquire into the tenets of a body of worshippers to settle a controversy between them about property, that is constitutional.
    Chancery. Demurrer to the interrogatories annexed to the bill. The case appears in the opinion of the Court.
    
      Cole and Crane, for demurrants,
    contended that the bill did not lay a predicate for the interrogatories. It should state facts, and adapt the interrogatories to them. But the bill seeks of the defendants that they set forth their religious tenets and belief, when, by the laws of Ohio, no man can be called to account for his religious belief.
    
      T. Corwin, contra,
    contended that the bill laid the foundation for the interrogatories, and it was competent to interrogate as to the main facts in controversy, and the incidents. He cited 5 O. JR. 286; 4 O. JR. 513; Dole. JR,T.
   Wright, J.

A demurrer admits the- matter well set forth to' be true, and claims that it is legally insufficient to found upon it the relief prayed for, or to compel an answer. The bill, in’ its stating and charging part, should make a case on which the court can grant relief. In order to secure a full answer in the first instance, and avoid delay, it is sometimes the practice (though unnecessary) to reassert the matter in specific interrogatories, and pray an answer to each. This is seldom done in our practice, except in cases of fraud, or where a discovery is sought. In all cases, the interrogatories must be confined to the case disclosed in the bill, though they may descend to particulars, and embrace incidents inconvenient to be set forth in the bill.

The bill before us is inartificially drawn, and if demurred to, might not be held sufficient. But the defendants have answered the bill, and demurred to the interrogatories. This is not regular. If the answer is not full, the complainant should except, and on the hearing of the exceptions, the question will arise whether the defendant is bound to answer, or whether the questions are pertinent to the case. The point cannot be resolved by demurrer.

The bill, though unskilful, asserts, that a Baptist association or church, was established in Dayton, some years since, which was independent of all others, which bought a lot and built a house of worship, and took a conveyance to their trustees and their successors. That for spiritual comfort, this church occasionally associated with others in a yearly meeting of messengers, and did associate with the Miami Association. That in 1824, the defendants and associates separated from the association with their pastor, and rejected their plain simple doctrine and practice; have written a reproachful letter to the association, and kept out of the meeting house ministers kindly inyited to give consolation in their distracted state, and attempted to disown certain members. It prays a discovery of the doctrines of their belief, the difference between them and those disowned, and that the lot may be restored to the complainants.

Although the general proposition of the defendants’ counsel, that no man shall be called in question for his religious belief, is true, yet that is supposed not to interpose any barrier in the way of this Court, when called to settle the right of property dependent upon belief, to prevent inquiry to the extent necessary to ascertain who is entitled. To that extent, the inquiry is incident to the controversy, and we doubt not is within our power. No one shall be called in question, or held responsible to punishment or criminal prosecution for his religious belief, for it is his constitutional right to worship God according to his conscience, and no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience. The question before us is not one of conscience, but one of property, and is not embraced in the constitutional inhibition.

The demurrer is not well taken; but the bill is so loose, that we cannot well see, how relief can be afforded, if its allegations are provep. Both parties appear before us in fault, and we suggest that the demurrer be withdrawn by agreement, and that the complainants have leave to amend their bill, and the defendants their answer, without costs; which was done accordingly.  