
    McCollom, Appellant, vs. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company, Respondent. Same, Respondent, vs. Vollmar & Below Company, imp., Appellant.
    
      January 30
    
    February 18, 1913.
    
    
      Sales: Delivery f. o. b.: When title passes: Parties: Interpleader: Affirmative relief on cross-complaint.
    
    1. Lumber to be manufactured at a certain mill was sold at specified prices “f. o. b. cars the mill,” and certain advances were made by the vendee. Inspection was “to be made at time of loading and same to be final.” While a car was being loaded under inspection for the vendee, the vendor stopped all further loading and the vendee’s inspector thereupon billed the ear, then containing 9,000 feet, for shipment to the vendee. Afterwards the vendor unloaded the car, and later reloaded it with the same lumber and 1,000 feet additional and billed it for shipment to himself at another place. The railway company delivered the car to the vendee. Held, that under the contract of sale the title to the 9,000 feet of lumber passed to the ven-dee as soon as it was loaded, and the subsequent unloading and reloading thereof did not impair such title; also that the loading of the additional 1,000 feet into the car operated to pass title thereto to the vendee.
    
      2, The vendor brought an action against the railway company for damages for nondelivery of said lumber to him. The vendee • was interpleaded as a defendant and filed a cross-complaint to recover from the plaintiff the difference between the value of the lumber received and the advances made on the contract. It appeared that plaintiff had disposed of the remaining lumber and thus disabled himself to comply with the contract. Held, that the affirmative relief asked in the cross-complaint might properly be granted against the plaintiff under secs. 2610, 2656a, Stats.
    Appeals from a judgment of tbe circuit court for Wash-bum county: FiiaNK A. Ross, Circuit Judge.
    
      Affirmed on plamtiff’s appeal; reversed on the cross-appeal.
    
    By an agreement dated March I, 1910, one George Hewitt sold to Vollmar & Below Go. all of certain varieties of “lumber to be manufactured by [him] during the season of 1910 at R.oesler’s mill near Ladysmith, Wis.,” at specified prices for the various varieties. The agreement further provides:
    “All of said lumber to be manufactured into standard sizes in a careful workmanlike manner and in 'accordance with specifications furnished by the party of the second part. Inspection to be made at time of loading and same to be final. The party of the second part [George Hewitt] agrees to have all lumber covered by this contract shipped out by Dec. 31st, 1910, or 'agree to pay for same on estimate.”
    A payment of $1,200 was to be made upon the signing and delivery of the contract, $1,600 on April 10, 1910, and $1,600 on May 10, 1910. The vendor was to give his notes for these sums, and these notes were “to be returned upon the shipment of lumber having reached an equal amount in dollars and cents.” By an agreement dated April 1, 1910, Hewitt assigned to the plaintiff this contract and a contract for the sawing and piling of lumber, and the plaintiff assumed Hewitt’s liabilities under these contracts and the liability of Hewitt on a claim of the Arpin Lumber Go. for trespass. Prior to any delivery of lumber under the contract the plaintiff and tbe Vollmar & Below Go. bad some negotiations seeking to modify tbe Hewitt agreement.
    Early in June, 1910, after four cars bad been loaded with lumber at Bass Lake, where tbe mill was situated, and while tbe fifth car was being loaded under tbe inspection of Voll-mar & Below Go., the plaintiff stopped tbe loading of tbe fifth car, being car No. 107680, because tbe Vollmar & Below Go. refused to make further advances. Tbe railway company bad no agent at Bass Lake, and upon plaintiff’s refusal to further load lumber tbe inspector for Vollmar & Below Go., as usual, made out a shipping bill for car No. 107680 to Vollmar & Below Go. at Kolz, Illinois, and mailed it to tbe railway agent at Ladysmith. Tbe inspector then left Bass Lake. This shipping bill reached tbe agent at Ladysmith June 27, 1910. After tbe departure of tbe inspector tbe plaintiff unloaded tbe lumber from car No. 107680, and thereafter reloaded this lumber into tbe same car with 1,000* additional feet of lumber. He then made out a shipping bill for tbe car, consigning it to himself at Minneapolis, Minnesota. He delivered tbe shipping bill to tbe conductor of a way freight and tbe car was taken to Ladysmith. Neither tbe railway company nor tbe Vollmar & Below Go. knew what tbe plaintiff bad done in tbe matter of unloading and reloading tbe car. Npon learning at Ladysmith of tbe double billing, tbe railway, upon inquiry of tbe Vollmar & Below Go. as to tbe true destination of tbe ear, were directed to ship it to Kolz, Illinois. Tbe car was accordingly delivered by tbe railway company to Vollmar & Below Go. at Kolz, Illinois, tbe plaintiff not having been informed of what was done.
    Tbe plaintiff brought action against tbe railway company for damages for tbe nondelivery of tbe car of lumber to him. In tbe circuit court for Washburn county, upon an appeal from tbe judgment of tbe municipal court in plaintiff’s favor, tbe railway company asked that tbe Vollmar & Below Go. be made a defendant in tbe action. Tbe Vollmar & Below Go. answered alleging tbat tbe lumber in car No. 107680 belonged bo it, and filed a cross-complaint by wbicb it seeks to recover tbe difference between tbe value of tbe lumber received by it from tbe plaintiff, amounting to $775.26, and tbe sum of $1,200 paid by it to Hewitt on tbe contract at tbe time tbe contract was made.
    Tbe court found tbat tbe facts set out in tbe cross-complaint of tbe Vollmar & Below Go. were not properly plead-able as a cross-complaint and tbat tbe plaintiff bad not waived •objection thereto, tbat tbe carload of lumber in controversy belonged to tbe Vollmar & Below Go., and tbat tbe defendants were entitled to a nonsuit. Judgment was entered against tbe plaintiff for costs in favor of tbe- railway company and for costs in favor of tbe" Vollmar & Below Co. Tbe Voll-mar & Below Go. appeals from tbat part of the judgment which dismisses its cross-complaint, and tbe plaintiff appeals from so much of tbe judgment as is in favor of tbe defendants.
    For tbe plaintiff tbe cause was submitted on tbe brief of James Bobbins.
    
    For tbe defendant railway company there was a brief by Clarence G. Goe and Arthur JE. Coe; for tbe defendant Voll-mar & Below Company there was a brief by Goggins & Bra-aeau; and tbe cause was orally argued by Theo. Brazeau.
    
   SiebeoKER, J.

The issue between tbe plaintiff and tbe railway company raises tbe question of title to and ownership of tbe carload of lumber which tbe plaintiff consigned to himself at Minneapolis, Minnesota, after 9,000 feet thereof bad been loaded into tbe car under tbe inspection of tbe Voll-mar & Below Go., pursuant to their contract for tbe purchase of tbe lumber to be manufactured at Roesler’s mill during tbe season of 1910. It is undisputed tbat this car was being loaded for tbe Vollmar & Below Co. when tbe plaintiff intercepted all further loading, that the company’s representative billed the car, thus loaded, for shipment to the company at Kolz, Illinois, and that he did nothing to surrender any of the company’s rights to the lumber. It is evident from the terms of the contract of purchase that the Vollmar & Below Go. acquired title upon compliance with the provision of the contract of purchase, that it was to be furnished “f. o. b. cars the mill.” These terms import delivery free on board of cars and fix the time when title fully passed to the Vollmar & Below Co. Vogt v. Schienebeck, 122 Wis. 491, 100 N. W. 820. Under the circumstances shown by the evidence, title to the 9,000 feet of lumber, contained in the car when the company’s representative billed it, was in the Vollmar & Below Co., and plaintiff’s subsequent unloading and reloading thereof in no way impaired its ownership. The loading of an additional one thousand feet of lumber into the car, under the circumstances, operated to pass title thereto to the Vollmar & Below Go., as part of the lumber they had purchased. The plaintiff had no authority to direct shipment thereof to himself. The railway company properly transported it as directed by the Vollmar & Below Co. and hence is not liable to the plaintiff for its value.

The Vollmar & Below Go., upon motion of the railway company, was made a party defendant, to enable the court to determine the rights of all the parties interested in the subject of the action, namely, the lumber’ in controversy. These rights arose from the contract between the plaintiff and the Vollmar & Below Go. for the purchase and sale of lumber. Under the facts and circumstances of the transaction, the interests of all the parties, the right to have the Vollmar & Below Co. interpleaded as a defendant, and the granting of relief upon its cross-complaint, as against the plaintiff, are governed by the provisions of secs. 2610 and 2656a, Stats. As declared in Hemenway v. Beecher, 139 Wis. 399, 121 N. W. 150, these statutes “are very broad in their terms and were intended to give courts plenary powers not only to call in new parties, but to mould tbe pleadings and dispose of all branches of a controversy in one action after having obtained jurisdiction of the necessary parties.” The objects of the statutes are to gather up all the issues germane to the main controversy that may arise between the parties plaintiff and defendant or between the defendants, and finally to determine the same, to avoid circuity and multiplicity of actions. Warren Webster & Co. v. Beaumont H. Co. 151 Wis. 1, 138 N. W. 102, and cases there cited.

The count found that the Vollmar & Below Go. had advanced $1,200 on the purchase price of the lumber purchased from the plaintiff, that it received from the plaintiff lumber of the value of $775.26 to apply thereon, leaving a balance of such advancement of $424.74 due the Vollmar & Below Go. It also appears that the plaintiff had disposed of all the remaining lumber and thus disabled himself to comply with the contract of sale to the Vollmar & Below Go. It is therefore obvious that the Vollmar & Below Go., on account of this breach of the agreement, had a demand against the plaintiff for this balance. The issue thus presented by the pleadings, clearly involved the right to the lumber embraced in the contract, and affected the transaction and property which was the subject matter of the action, and was therefore, upon defendant’s cross-complaint, a proper subject for determination. It therefore was error for the court to deny the Vollmar & Below Go. affirmative relief against the plaintiff upon its cross-complaint. The plaintiff showed no cause of action under his alleged breach of contract by the defendant. The Vollmar & Below Go. is entitled to judgment against the plaintiff for the sum of $424.74, with interest from the time plaintiff refused compliance with the contract of sale, and f or its costs.

By the Court. — That part of the judgment dismissirig plaintiff’s complaint and awarding defendants costs against tbe plaintiff is affirmed; and that part of tbe judgment dismissing tbef cross-complaint of tbe Vollmar & Below Co. is reversed, with directions tbat tbe circuit court award judgment to tbe Vollmar & Below Qo., as indicated in tbe opinion, upon its cross-complaint and tbe facts found.  