
    Exparte, William Vance.
    f i) every eme of appeal ^by act 1815,) where the decision is against the appellant, 7 per cent, interest is allowed on the amount recovered, from the day of the verdict to the time ■when the appeal is dismissed. And when in trover, the jury found an alternative verdict for §3,000 , or a return of the property converted, which property, after the dismissal of an appeal by the defendant, roas returned to the plaintiff, the Court IMd this case no exception to the general rule, and allowed interest on the §3,000 from the day of the verdict, until the appeal was dismissed.
    September 6, 1821.
    1PlflS was a motion to quash or suspend an execution issued at the instance of Joseph Ratcliff vs. William, Vance, on a recovery had in an action of trover, wherein the verdict was given in the alternative, viz,: to pay three thousand dollars, or to deliver up certain negroes, the subject of the action. From that verdict there was an appeal to the constitutional court on a motion for a new trial; and'ia the conclusion of the opinion delivered by Judge Cheve~ therein, it is stated that “ the ground of the motion for a new trial, is without even the semblance of plausibility.” He concludes that the appeal was in the full sense of the word frivolous. On the decision thus had in the court ol appeals, the negroes were delivered up by Vance the defendant, to the plaintiff, who accepted them; but execution was taken cmt for tbe interest accruing an the ¡83,000, from the time of the recovery had, to tbe dismissal of the appeal; and it was urged on the motion now made, to quash or suspend that execution, that the verdict was not such as would by the law of the state, convey interest.
    On the argument of the case at Chambers, and from the authority of the case -of Norris and others vs. Berkley, (2 Const. Rep, 228,) Judge Gantt, before whom the motion was made, was inclined to think that the view taken by the defendants counsel was a correct one ; but on a more minute examination of tire case of Beckly, and the purport of the act of Assembly of 1815, for the prevention of frivolous appeals, he was inclined' to take a different view of what he then deemed the law of the case. “ He said the act of 1815, in every case ofappeal where the decision was against the appellant, allowed interest on the amount recovered, at the rate of 7 per cent, from the day the verdict was given, to the time when the appeal should he dismissed. Then the amount recovered in this case was % 3,000. On the dismissal of the appeal, the plaintiff accepted the ne-groes as an equivolent to that amount. Now whether the payment of the amount recovered, was in money or any thing else, was immaterial. , The interest for the delay in, paying it follows'from the terms of the act, like the shadow the substance. It cannot with reason be supposed that the negroes were more valuable when delivered, than when the recovery was had, unless like wine they are bettered by age ; consequently their acceptance cannot be urged as a reason why the plaintiff should not avail himself of the indemnification expressly given by the act of 1816^ for the delay in coming at his right occasioned by the act of the defendant, and as Judge Cheves in writing the opinion, declared without a shadow of pretence for so doing. The right to 7 per cent..is secured to the plaintiff by the act of 1815, as before stated, and the law must have its effect.
    “ The motion to quash ox suspend the execution issued ■in this case must therefore fail.”
    
      From this decision made at Chambers,- an appeal was-claimed to this court:
    1st. Because the plaintiffhaving taken such a verdict, he is bound by it.
    2nd. Because having accepted the negroes, it was a discharge of the verdict by the very terms of it.
    3rd. Because the law giving interest in cases of appeal, relates only to contracts.
    
    — --— for the motion. (
    •-— contra.
   Mr. Justice Gantt

delivered the opinion of the court.

The court have duly considered those several grounds, -and which were equally insisted on before the Judge at Chambers. They cannot avail the appellant. The: motion is therefore dismissed, and the opinion at Chambers sustained, for the reasons therein given.

Justices Noit, Johnson and Huger, concurred.  