
    FULLER v. STATE.
    (No. 11093.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Nov. 2, 1927.
    Rehearing Granted Jan. 25,1928.
    1. Criminal law <&wkey;I038(l) — Appellate court cannot consider complaints'of. court’s charge, raised for first time in motion for new trial.
    Court of Criminal Appeals cannot consider complaints of charge of court, raised for first time in motion for new trial.
    2. Criminal law <&wkey;d064(2) —Appellate court cannot consider complaints directed at form of indictment, called to trial court’s attention for first time in effort to secure new trial.
    Court of Criminal Appeals cannot consider complaints directed at form of indictment, when for first time called to attention of trial court in connection with effort to secure new trial.
    3. Criminal law * ¡&wkey;l037(l) — Appellate! court cannot consider complaints of state’s attorney’s argument, presented for first time in motion for new trial.
    Court of Criminal Appeals cannot consider complaints regarding argument of state’s attorney, presented for first time in motion for new trial.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    4. Criminal law <&wkey;304(6)~Court of Criminal Appeals has no judicial knowledge of county or precinct in which Cross Plains is located.
    Court of Criminal Appeals has no judicial knowledge of county or precinct in which Cross Plains is located.
    5. Criminal law <&wkey;304(6) — Indictment for brib-> ery, alleging complaint pending in justice court in precinct in Callahan county, held not sustained’ by proof of complaint pending at Cross Plains.
    Where indictment charging assistant county attorney with accepting bribe, under agreement not to prosecute one charged with felony, alleged that “there was then and there . a legal complaint pending in justice court, precinct No. 6. of Callahan county, Texas, charging” D. with offense of grade of felony, and the only testimony on subject was that there was complaint filed against D. in justice court at “Cross Plains, Texas,” without evidence showing county or precinct in which Cross Plains was situated, state failed to prove fact essential to conviction, and judgment of conviction must be reversed.
    Appeal from District Court, Callahan County; M. S. Long, Judge.
    B. 0. Fuller was convicted of bribery, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    J. A. Mooney, of Woodville, 'for appellant.
    A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   LATTIMORE, J,

Conviction for bribery; punishment, two years in -the penitentiary. Appellant was assistant county attorney of Callahan county. He brought about the ar rest of one Dilliard in the justice court upon complaints charging him with the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor. Thereafter, according to the testimony of Dilliard and his wife, appellant came to Dilliard’s home at a late hour in the night and offered to have the case against him dismissed and finally settled upon the payment of $100, winch amount he later reduced to $50. Dilliard agreed to pay $50. He and his wife testified that they later got the $50, which Dilliard took to Baird and delivered to appellant. There was no further prosecution of Dilliard.

Appellant defended upon the proposition that, after having brought about the arrest of Dilliard, he- concluded that he would let him plead guilty to vagrancy in settlement of the felony charge, and that he made the trip to Dilliard’s house, and told him that, if he would pay him $50 he would enter pleas of guilty in vagrancy charges and allow the liquor selling charge to be thus settled. He admitted that he never made any vagrancy charges against Dilliard. He admitted the reception of the money from Dilliard.

There were no exceptions to the charge of the court. While there appear in this record what are called bills of exception, four in number, same appear to be complaints based entirely on errors complained of in the motion for new trial. We cannot consider complaints of the charge of the court raised for the first time in the motion for new trial, nor those directed at the form of the indictment, when for the first time called to the attention of the trial court in connection with an effort to secure a new trial, nor to complaints of the argument of the state’s attorney when presented for the first time in the motion for new trial. These are the matters embraced in the so-called bills of exception.

We think the testimony of the witness Dil-liard fully corroborated both by that of his wife and others, also of appellant himself, who took the witness stand and admitted substantially all of the facts testified to by Dil-liard.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

MORROW, P. J.

In the indictment it is charged that—

“ ⅜ * * There was then and there a legal complaint pending in justice court, precinct No. 6, Callahan county, Texas, charging Bud Dilliard with an' offense of the grade of felony.”

It is further charged, in substance, that Dil-liard gave the appellant $50, in consideration of which he promised to bring about the dismissal of the cases pending against Dilliard and secure his release from his appearance bond.

The court instructed the jury in accord with the indictment; namely, that, if they believed that there was pending in the justice court, precinct No. 0, Callahan county, a complaint charging Bud Dilliard with an offense of the grade of felony, and that Dil-liard was under bond for the appearance before the district court of Callahan county to await the action of the grand jury, etc. In our examination of the record, we have failed to discover any proof that there was filed in the justice court, precinct No. 6, of Callahan county, the complaint charged in the indictment. The only testimony on the subject is that there was a complaint filed against Dil-liard in the justice court at “Cross Plains, Texas.” Touching the county or precinct in which Cross Plains is situated, the record is silent. There is no testimony, and this court has no judicial knowledge of the county or precinct in. which Cross Plains is located. The state having failed to prove the fact essential to the conviction,- the judgment must be reversed. Cases in point are Lerma v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. R. 109, 194 S. W. 167; Fields v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 24 S. W. 407; Latham v. State, 19 Tex. App. 305; Vivian v. State, 16 Tex. App. 262; Cain v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 25 S. W. 1119.

For the reason stated, the motion for rehearing is granted, the affirmance is set aside, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded. 
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