
    Benjamin J. Barrier v. William Young.
    [50 South. 559.]
    Descent and Distribution. Dower. Conveyance of widow. Life estate only passed 6y.
    
    Where tie owner of land died leaving a widow and three children and the land, under the statutes of descent then (1879) in force, descended to the children, subject to the dower of the widow, a deed by her conveyed her life estate only, although it purported to convey a greater estate, and on her death the survivor of the children, having inherited from the deceased ones, was entitled to a confirmation of his title.
    From the chancery, court of Neshoba county.
    BEon. James F McOool, Chancellor.
    Barrier, appellant, was complainant in the court below; Young, appellee, was defendant there. From a final decree in defendant’s favor tbe complainant appealed to the supreme court.
    The father of the appellant died intestate in 1879, leaving a wife (who afterwards married one Nay) and three children, the appellant and two brothers, both of whom died in infancy, without issue, leaving appellant as their sole heir.- At the time of the death of the elder Barrier, appellant’s father, he was the owner of the land in controversy, which descended to his children, subject to the dower interest of his wife, who took a life estate only. The appellee claims title under a deed executed by the widow of decedent, the dowress, who was Mrs. Bay at the time she executed the deed.
    After the death of the dowress, appellant instituted this suit ■ to cancel the claims of appellee, who held under the deed executed by his father’s widow, the dowress, as a cloud', upon his title, inherited from his father and his two brothers.
    
      J. 0. Ward, for appellant.
    B. J. Barrier, Sr., appellant’s father, was the common source of title. Briggs v. Harvey, 68 Miss. 60; Hill v. Nash, 73 Miss. 849; Jordan v. Bobbitt, 91 Miss. 74.
    The complainant has the better title from the common source. The dowress could not convey any thing more than her life estate. The statute of limitations affords appellee no defense, and this for two reasons, first, this suit was begun less than ten years before he would have been barred if the statute began running and, second, the appellee never held the lands adversely to him, nor did any other person so hold them.
    
      Byrd, Wilson & Richardson and W. M. Lewis, for appellee.
    Appellant’s mother executed to Gustavus Young, the ancestor of defendant, a warranty deed, thereby obligating her estate to make good the warranty, and it appears from the testamentary devise made to Kelley for appellant that all of the estate of Mrs. Nay was given to her son, tbe appellant; that be received tbe same on arriving at majority. Having received ber property, charged with a liability to appellee on tbe warranty, be is estop-ped from asserting any claim or bringing any suit to recover tbe land in question, without first offering to reimburse appel-lee, because ber property that be obtained and squandered was liable. Tbe only authority necessary on this proposition is tbe maxim of equity, grown hoary with age, that “be who seeks equity must do equity.” Tor this reason alone tbe decree should be affirmed.
    Argued orally by J. G. Ward, for appellant, and by Adam Byrd, for appellee1.
   Mayes, J.,

delivered tbe opinion of tbe court.

Tbe facts of this case show, beyond question, that tbe property involved belonged to B. J. Barrier, Sr., father of complainant, at tbe date of tbe father’s death, to wit, in tbe year 1879. When B. J. Barrier, Sr., died, as be left no will, tbe only interest which bis wife inherited was a dower interest; tbe law relative to dower then being in full force. When Albert Kelly Barrier and John Miller Barrier died,' they both being under age and without issue, all their interest in this property was vested by law. in tbe complainant. When complainant’s mother, then Mrs. Hay, made tbe conveyance complained of in this case, she only conveyed a life interest, and, she being now dead, all this property must belong to tbe complainant as tbe sole heir, unless be is barred from setting up bis claim by tbe statute of limitations, and tbe proof utterly fails to establish any such bar. Tbe case of Harvey w. Briggs, 68 Miss. 60, 8 South. 274, 10 L. R. A. 62, is decisive of this case.

Tbe chancellor having decreed tbe property to belong to ap-pellee, and dismissed complainant’s bill, tbe cause is reversed and remanded.  