
    Reverend Franklin C. REAVES; Fannie Melette; Michael Small; Lamar Melette; Betty R. Davis; Lewan Melette; Patricia Bennett; McRoy Barr; Willie Johnson; Jerry Mason, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs—Appellants, and David Fraizer; Joseph Bennett; Bobby G. Snowen; Franklin M. Snowen; Kenakenoa N. Godboat; McArther Brunson; Zuynetra Brunson; Marshall Rainey; Patricia Brunson, Plaintiffs, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEMOCRATIC PARTY; South Carolina Election Commission; Dillon County Election Commission; Marlboro County Election Commission; Marion County Election Commission; State of South Carolina; Florence County Election Commission, Defendants—Appellees.
    No. 05-2388.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: June 23, 2006.
    Decided: July 21, 2006.
    Reverend Franklin C. Reaves, Fannie Melette, Michael Small, Lamar Melette, Betty R. Davis, Lewan Melette, Patricia Bennett, McRoy Barr, Willie Johnson, Jerry Mason, Appellants Pro Se. William Norman Nettles, Sanders & Nettles, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina; Henry Dargan McMaster, Attorney General, John William McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina; Thomas Parkin C. Hunter, Office of the Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina; Lucas C. Padgett, Jr., McNair Law Firm, PA, Charleston, South Carolina; Clyde Havird Jones, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina; Elizabeth Ramage McMahon, Office of the Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina; Charlie James Blake, Jr., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellees.
    Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM:

Appellants seek to appeal the standing order referring pretrial matters in pro se cases to a magistrate judge for report and recommendation. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order appellants seek to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Nor has the district court entered a final order in this case. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED.  