
    OCTOBER TERM, 1782.
    Sim and Lee’s Lessee against Francis Dealdns.
    EJECTMENT for two tracts of Land, called Salsbury, and Austin’s Delight, both lying in Washington county.
    It appears from the bill of exceptions, that the plaintiff, at the trial of the cause, produced to the Court, and offered to read in evidence to the Jury, a deed of bargain and sale, dated the 23d of September, 1778, setting forth to be “ between Jeremiah Warder, of the city of Philadelphia, merchant, of the one part, and Joseph Sim and Thomas Sim Lee, of Prince George’s county, and state of Maryland,” for the two tracts of land in question. To which deed was the following acknowledgment, viz.
    “ Maryland,. Cecil county, to wit: Be it remembered, that on the 24th day of September, 1778, Jeremiah Warder appeared before us the subscribers, two of the Justices of Cecil County Court, and acknowledged the.. ■within instrument of writing to be his act and deed, and the lands and premises therein mentioned, to be the right and estate of the within named Joseph Sim and Thomas Sim Lee, their heirs,” &c.
    To which was annexed a certificate of the clerk of Cecil County Court, that the subscribers to the acknowledgment were Justices of Cecil county.
    And it was proved, that the grantor, Jeremiah Warder, at the time of executing the deed and making the acknowledgment endorsed on it, was a subject and inhabitant, and resident, of the state of Pennsylvania; and it was also proved, that the said Jeremiah Warder, at the time of the executing and acknowledging of the deed, was personally present in Cecil county; and that he acknowledged the same in Cecil county, before two magistrates of the said county, and that the lands mentioned in the deed, lie in Washington county. The defendant’s •counsel objected to the reading of the said deed in evidence to the Jury.
    
      Hall, Stone, Jenings and Cook, for the plaintiff.
    Chase, for the defendant.
    The defendant’s counsel founded his objection to the deed, on the act of assembly of November, 1766, c. 14»
    The second section enacts, “ That after the ffet day of May next, no estate of inheritance or freehold, or any declaration or limitation of use, or any estate for above seven years, shall pass or take effect, except the deed or conveyance by which the same shall be intended to pass or take effect, shall be acknowledged in the Provincial Court, or before one of the Justices thereof in the County Court, or before two Justices of the same county where the lands, tenements or hereditaments, conveyed by such deed or conveyance, do lie, and be also enrolled in the records of the. same county, or the Provincial Court, as the case may be, within six months after the da’te of such deed or conveyance,” &c.
    . The 3d section provides, “ That when the person or persons making any deed or conveyance, &c. shall live* remote from'the Provincial Court, or out of the. county where the lands, &c. lie, it shall and may be lawful for such person or persons to acknowledge the same in, the County Court of the said county, or before two Justices of the said county wherein he, she or they shall, reside ; and a certificate of such acknowledgment under the hand of the county clerk, and under the seal of the: said county,” &c.
    The 4th section. “ If any person conveying, limit-, ing or declaring as aforesaid, shall not be a resident of this province at the time of the execution of such deed or conveyance, so as the same cannot be acknowledged as is before directed, or enrolled within the time for that purpose herein before limited, then, and in every such case, the deed or conveyance shall be acknowledged by letter of attorney, well and sufficiently proved, either in the Provincial Court, or County Court, where the land, &c. doth lie, or before one Justice of the Provincial, or two Justices of the County Court, as aforesaid, and be enrolled as aforesaid, within six moths from the time of such acknowledgment,” &c.
    He observed, that the Justices before whom the acknowledgment was made, were duly commissioned and sworn; that under this act of assembly, the general rule was, that all deeds passing lands must be acknowledged in the General Court, or before some Judge of the General . Court, or in the County Court, or before two. Justices of the county where the land lies. That then a proviso is introduced for grantors who live remote from the General Court, or out of the county where the land lies. They may acknowledge a deed in the County Court, or befar,e tw.o Justices of the county where théy reside. That if the grantor is a non-resident of the state, he must acknowledge the deed by letter of attorney proved in the General Court, or in the County Court where the land lies, or before some Judge of the General Court, or two Justices of the County Court, as aforesaid, that is, where the land lies. That deeds of residents were to be recorded within six months from the date of the deed; those of non-residents, within six months from the acknowledgment by letter of attorney. And contended, that the expression reside, used in this act, meant where a person had his continual, ordinary, or usual habitation. That the grantor in the deed in question, could not be considered as a resident of the county where the acknowledgment was made, hut was nothing more than a traveller on his passage or way from or to his usual place of residence. That he should have acknowledged the deed by a power of attorney, or in person, in the county where the land lies, or before a Judge of the General Court.
    Fenings, for the plaintiff.
    Two objections have been raised to the deed: 1. That the grantor was a resident, of Philadelphia, and therefore should have acknowledged the deed by a power of attorney ; 2. Admitting he might have acknowledged it in person, yet it should have been in the county where the land lies, or before a General Court magistrate.
    The clause in the act of assembly respecting non-residents, is a permission, and not an exclusive prohibition. The legislature conceived, that to oblige all persons to make an acknowledgment in the county, or before a provincial magistrate, or in the state, might be productive of inconvenience, on account of the situation of particular persons, and therefore gave them a liberty, under the circumstances in the act, to pursue a different method.
    
      To avoid the inconvenience, and sometimes the iln» practicability, that persons who lived out of the province m*gbt be under in coming to it, the act of assembly gave a bberty of acknowledging by letter of attorney. But this indulgence could never be meant to preclude the grantor’s waiving the liberty given him, and coming to do.it himself. Quisquís potest renunciare jure pro se introducto. Gilb. Law of Evid. 43.
    In cases of acknowledgment by attorney, the deed may be enrolled within six months/rsm the acknowledgment, but in other cases the enrolment is to be within six .months from the date. This shows the legislature had only in view to give an indulgence to non-residents, and ■not to lay them under restrictions. That it was to give them a more easy way of acknowledging conveyances, than by coming into the province, and not to preclude them from coming there to make such acknowledgment.
    Again, it is a general position, that a person wh'O may give another a power to act in pais for him, may do the act in person. Every derivative power must spring from an original right to confer it, and if a person has no right to do the act, he cannot appoint another to do it, for this would be doing by circuity what the law would not allow to be done directly. But the re.verse of this position is law. Thus on a feoffment, livery of seisin may be made by attorney ; so it may be in person. This is a ceremony to denote a transfer by some act of notoriety. The acknowledgment is substituted for that purpose, and should be construed on similar principles. Suppose a person who had an estate here, should have resided in England, and have come over here to sell it, would it not be absurd to say he could . not transfer it himself, though here, but he must go back and send a letter of attorney over to acknowledge it. It would be the same case, .if he lived in any of the states different from the one in which the land lay.
    
      The fourth section of the act says, if a person is not a resident at the time of making the deed, “ so as the same cannot be acknozvledged and recorded ■within time, then it shall be done by letter of attorney.” If the party, while here, had made a letter of attorney to acknowledge, it would then have been objected to, because the party himself being here, he could have acknowledged it. The power, therefore, of doing it in person seems plain.
    The second objection gives up the position on which the first objection is founded; that is, that the deed must be acknowledged by attorney. It is also an admission, that what the party might do by attorney, he may do himself j and that this is the true construction of the law.
    If, then, the party is here, he must be considered as a resident of the state, but he must be considered as a resident in the county where he is, not where he is not j that is, if he is at a distance from the county where the land lies, he may execute it before magistrates of the county he stays in, or before a General Court magistrate.
    What reason can be assigned, why a man who comes from Pennsylvania to Cecil county, and has land in St, Mary's, should go there to execute the deed; for if a knowledge of. the person is to have any weight, he would be better known nearest home. If he is here, and not in the county where the land lies, the act does not say he shall go there.
    The acknowledgment is intended to prevent imposition. It is admitted, that if he had not come here, it; might have been acknowledged by a letter of attorney helor a General Court magistrate. Now the acknowledgment by letter of attorney is one step further removed ;s to the evidence of his making such acknowledgment, dmm the doing of it in person ; consequently, his acknowledging it before a magistrate of the county into which he Comes, is better evidence of the fact, than an affidavit of the execution of a power. The magistrate’s certificate is conclusive, but what he certifies of his own knowledge is better evidence than what he certifies on the testimony of another. If the law even prescribes a particular mode for doing a thing, it never excludes stronger testimony. 1 Stra. 546.
    No doubt many deeds of this nature have been made by persons coming over from Virginia, Pennsylvania, &c. and a question has never before been started on the subject. If the county records were searched, many deeds under the same circumstance, to make a tenant to the prwcipe for suffering recoveries, might be found.
    It is said, that if the person lives in the county where the land lies, he cannot make the acknowledgment in a different county. But if this objection holds, it must be because the law says, if a person resides out of the county in which the land lies, he may make the acknowledgment in the county where he resides, and that it therefore follows, if he resides in the county where the land lies, he must do it there. Suppose, then, the grantor had been in the county where the land lies, he might have- made the acknowledgment there. Why ? Because he resided there. But what would in this case make him a resident for this purpose ? Because he was there; •ex consequenti in whatever county he is, in the state, he is a resident there.
    It is admitted, that a person residing in the state, out of the county where the land lies, may acknowledge it before two magistrates of the county where he lives. Now ás to the acknowledgment: The grantor in the deed in question, was a resident of Cecil county at the time of the making of the acknowledgment.
    The term residence, in the abstract, does not convey any determinate idea of a particular length of time; for if the question is asked, how long a man must live in a place to make himself a resident, it would be difficult to answer it. Therefore it is, that when a statute qualifies a man by residence, or disqualifies him from doing a particular thing, it always fixes the time. So by our constitution, a man must reside five years in the state to be eligible as a governor. One year, as an assemblyman. So under the old government, he must have resided three years within the state, .to have been capable of holding an office.
    The word residence is equivocal, and may mean either a general or a temporary residence, according to the subject matter •, as allegiance may be general and local. So that if the nature of the subject is such as must require a general or constant residence, as for the purpose of holding an office, it must be expounded to be such a residence. So on the contrary, if a law was made to prohibit persons residing in the state, from going abroad after eight o’clock at night, as was the case in the time of William the Conqueror, or for prohibiting persons residing in the state from travelling on a Sunday, the subject being transient, it would be applicable to a temporary residence.
    Suppose a law was made, imposing a fine on any person who should maim another residing in the state, would not such a law extend to every person who should be maimed within the state, and would not a person be considered a resident quoad hoc. Suppose again, an act was passed inflicting punishment for a particular offence, such as sowing sedition, speaking contemptuously of the government, &c. on any person residing in the state, would it be any plea for the person to say that he had committed the transgression here, yet he was not a resident, and therefore not punishable ? If, then, the law will consider a person as a resident to punish a transitory act, why not consider him as such, for the purpose of drawing a convenience from such transitory act ?
    This- distinction between a general and temporary residence, may be further illustrated. Suppose a law was made, imposing a fine on clergymen who did not reside here-whole months in the year on their benefices. Suppose one to be absent five months in the year, would he be admitted to say that he resided on his benefice during this time, because it was his home, and his family continued there ? Admitting this would prove a general re-> sidence, yet he would certainly be punishable for his temporary residence elsewhere.
    
    If-a tempox-ary residence is.not sufficient to entibie a party to execute a conveyance, could any officer in the army,. whose general residence is there, convey his property here by letter of attorney, as this power extends only to non-residents. But he would certainly be considered as having, quoad hoc, a texxixporary residence there, and a temporary noxx-residence here, so as to enable him to-do a transitory act.
    Could a person who was hei-e, execute a power of attorney to acknowledge a deed, because his' general residence was in a neighbouring state ?. Being here, he must execute it in person, otherwise he would be so circumstanced as not to be able himself to make any conveyance at all..
    If, in this case,' he would be obliged to execute it in person, as being in the state, he must be considered as a resident as to this purpose; and if a resident, he must be a resident where he is, and not where he is not.
    No inconvenience can result from this construction. By the other construction, many conveyances, in all probability, and titles derived under them, will be destroyed. Deeds must haye a liberal construction. 2 Wils. 78. 220. 2 Burr. 712, 713, 714. As to the equity of statutes, see 1 Stra. 664. Carth. 221.
    
      Cooke, for the plaintiff. Beneficial laws ought to be construed so as to advance the remedy. 3 Co. 7. b. 60. Carth. 121. Hob. 346. Bl. Comm. 87.
    
    By the act of assembly, section 3. a person residing in a remote county may acknowledge a deed before two justices of the county where he resides.
    
    By section 4. if not a resident at the time of the execution of such deed, so as the same cannot be acknowledged as before directed., then to be acknowledged by letter of attorney, either in the Provincial Court or county where the land lies.
    By the act of If 15, c. 47. s. 8. persons living remote must acknowledge in the Court, and if out of the province, so that it cannot be acknowledged as aforesaid, then to be done by power of attorney.
    If a thing contained in a subsequent státute be within the reason of a former statute, it shall be taken to be within the meaning of that statute. Ld. Raym. 1028.
    And if divers statutes relate to the same thing, they ought all to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them.
    The act of assembly in question was made for the security of the estates of purchasers. The party here might have executed a deed with a power of attorney to acknowledge it. In that case, there would be little security against fraud. The deed might be forged. But: by coming into the state, a further security is given., The party executes the deed before witnesses known in the state, of established characters, and he subjects him self to a personal examination.
    The object of the act of assembly is for the better security to the purchaser. In the case of a deed executed out of the state, and acknowledged by power of attorney, the fact of the execution of it might be controverted. But in the latter case it could not; for the party making the deed would be bound by the acknotv. ledgmenta
    
      What reason can be assigned why a resident should acknowledge, and a person coming into the state for that purpose should not ? A man living in Cecil county may be as great a stranger in Washing-ton, where the land lies, as if he lived in the state of Delaware. And there-can be no reason why, by living ten steps over the line, one should not convey in the same manner as if he lived in Cecil.
    
    In the construction of statutes, all cases which are within the reason, are within the words of the law- 2 Show. 16. For instance, the stat. 16 & 17 Car. II. for making writs of error a supersedeas, says, the party shall enter into bond with security. If he gives the security without executing the bond himself, it is sufficient. Carth. 121.
    Coming into the state gained a residence pro hac vice, within the intent and meaning of the law.
   (Harrison, Ch. J. and Hanson, J.)

The Court were of opinion, that the deed and acknowledgment thereon should be read in evidence to the Jury, and declared that it was sufficient in law to convey the lands therein mentioned.

The defendant excepted to this opinion, and appealed to the Court of Appeals. '

The Court of Appeals, at October term, lf-87, affirmed the judgment of the General Court,  