
    SIERRA’S CASE. Joaquina Sierra, administratrix, v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      A collector of customs in Florida joins in the rebellion. At the breaking out of the rebel lion there is a balance due him, though at what date adjusted by the Treasury Department does not appear. In May, 1867, he dies, and his widow becomes administratrix. She brings her action for the balance due him on the 16th May, 1872. The defendants plead the statute of limitations.
    
    I. During tlie rebellion the statute of limitations clid not run against a creditor of the Government residing within the insurrectionary district, and this period of suspension continued as to a person residing in Florida until tho Proclamation 2d April, 1836, when the rebellion, so far as the State of Florida was concerned, was declared to he at an end.
    II. The disability of a party to bring suit against the Government because of his own disloyalty does not suspend the running of the statute of limitations.
    III. The disability of an administrator to bring suit against tho Government because of his own disloyalty does not suspend the running of the statute of limitations'against tho claim of the intestate.
    
      Vie Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The court found the following facts:
    At the breaking out of the war of the rebellion Joseph Sierra was collector of customs for the district of Florida, at the port of Pensacola, and also superintendent of lights, and agent of the marine hospital, at the same place.
    During the period of that war he resided in Floiida, giving aid and comfort to the rebellion, and continued to reside there till the 14th of May, 1807, when he died, and the claimant became his administratrix.
    At the breaking out of the rebellion there was a balance due him from the defendants, on account of the offices held by him as aforesaid, of $3,704.08; but at what date that balance was adjusted and stated by the officers of the Treasury Department, upon the books thereof, does not appear.
    
      
      Mr. Joseph Gasey for the claimant:
    The claimant’s intestate was collector of customs at the port of Pensacola, Florida, from. April 21, 1853, until April 9,1861. He at the same time acted as agent of the marine hospital at the same place, and as superintendent of lights for that district. When the rebellion broke out in 1861, he ceased to act tor and on behalf of the United States, and continued voluntarily to reside where the rebel forces held sway during the time they so held Pensacola. After the breaking out of the rebellion the United States were indebted to tli.e claimant’s intestate for an unstated and unsettled balance of, $3,704.68. After the war, his accounts were settled and the balance struck, but payment of the same was refused because the Joint Resolution of Congress March 2, 1867, prohibited the payment to any person of the balance due them, where such person was implicated in the rebellion. This suit is brought upon the ground that the Proclamation of pardon and amnesty of the President of December 25,1868, restored not only, the right to the debt, but the right to sue for it in this court.
    There can certainly be no doubt that the private property of individuals on land or debts due to them are not only not forfeited by a state of war, but are not subject to capture and confiscation by the rules and laws of war, as held and practiced in modern times among civilized nations.
    Following this well-established doctrine of international law, our Supreme Court has decided that there can be no forfeiture or confiscation of private property on land, of non-combatant enemies, without the direct authority of an act of Congress.
    
      (Brown v. United States, 8 Oraneh, p. 129; Mrs. Alexander’s Cotton, 2 Wall., p. 404; Prise Case, 2 Black, p. 687; Halleck’s International Laws of War, p. 456 ; 1 Kent’s Com., pp. 92, 93; Aet of Congress July 13, 1861, 12 Stat. L., p.257 ; Aet of August 6,1861, 12 Stat. L., p. 319; Aet of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. L., p. 589.)
    The question now arises, how is the claim affected by subsequent events and legislation. The only subsequent legislation that bears directly upon the question is that of the Joint Resolution of Congress March 2, 1867, (14 Stat. L., p. 571.) That resolution prohibits the payment “ of any account, claim, or demand against said Government, which accrued or existed prior to the 13th day of April, 1861, in favor of any person who promoted, encouraged, or in any manner sustained the late rebellion, or in favor of any person who during said rebellion was not known to be opposed thereto, and distinctly in favor of its suppression.’7 The prohibition of this resolution is, that it“ shall be unlawful for any officer of the United States Govern-' ment to pay” any such account, &c. The immediate question with which we are confronted is whether this act prohibits the claimant in this case from maintaining her action for the recovery of the amount due her intestate. I hold that it does not; because it is a fair, honest debt, due from the United .States to the claimant, as is.shown by their own books and records. And Congress has neither the right nor the power to repudiate the just debt due by the United States. On the contrary, they are directed expressly by the Constitution to provide for their payment. The debt or claim is the property of the-claimant, which neither Congress nor any other Department of the Government can take without “ due process of law,” or without making just compensation therefor.
    The resolution is unconstitutional, so far as it attempts to inflict ex-post facto punishment.
    In the cases of JEx-parte Garland, (4 Wall., p. 333,) and Gum-ings v. Missouri, (id., p. 277,) the Supreme Court of the United States expressly rules that “ deprivation or suspension of any civil rights for past conduct is punishment for such conduct.” “The prohibition in the Constitution was intended to secure the rights of the citizen against deprivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under any form, however disguised.” And “although the prohibition of the Constitution to pass an ex-post facto law is aimed at criminal cases, it cannot be evaded by giving a civil form to that which is in substance criminal.” The same cases referred to are explicit in declaring tbat-legislation similar to that now under consideration was unconstitutional, because it was in the nature of a bill of pains and penalties; for, says the court, “ a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.is a bill of attainder. If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the Constitution,-bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties.” These provisions of the Constitution guard the property of the citizen with the same care, and throw around it the same safeguards as are provided for bis life and bis liberty. This provision is but an enlargement or extension of tlie doctrine of Magna Gharta, which says, “ Wee super eum ibimus, nee super eum mittimus nisi per legale judicium pariicm suorum, vel per legem terree.” (2 Story on the Constitution, 1, p. 789; 2 Kent’s Com., secs.. 12 13.) Among the matters embraced ■ in due process of law are the recognized and established rules of evidence, as they prevail in judicial tribunals, and which are clearly violated by the legislation we are now considering. (Galder v. Bull, 3 Dali., p. 390.) Whatever effect may be given to the legislation heretofore cited, we contend that all the disabilities imposed, or attempted to be imposed, and all the forfeiture denounced by that legislation, have been remitted and restored by the subsequent pardon and amnesty of the President of the United States.
    The same effect is attributed to a pardon by Chief Justice Marshallin United States v. Wilson, (7 Peters, p. 150;) by Mr. Justice Wayne, in Bx-parte Wells, (18 How., p. 315;) 2 Sharsw. Black Com., p. 402; Plowd, 401;) Bish. Or. L., sec. 713; Perlcins v. Stevens, (24 Pick., p. 280;) Gope v. Gommonivealth, (4 Casey, p. 297.)
    A disability to sue, in consequence of a crime committed, is punishment for that crime. In England an outlaw was punished by taking away from him the right to sue in the courts. A pardon, by obliterating the offense and remitting the punishment, restored the right, and placed him in all his legal relations precisely as if he had never transgressed; and he was entitled to a restoration of all his property, seized into the king’s hands, by writ of amoveas mantes.
    
    The only remaining question to be considered is whether this claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The tenth section of the Act March 3, 1863, provides, “That every claim against the United States, cognizable by the Court of Claims, shall be forever barred, unless the petition setting forth a statement of the claim be filed in the court or transmitted to it under the provisions of this act within six years after the claim first accrues.” The claim in this case accrued in 1861, but was not subject to this provision, as no such limitation existed at that time. But for the existence of the war of the rebellion at the time of the passage of this law it would have been included within the first proviso to the section quoted. The attention of the court is especially directed to tire peculiar phraseology in which this limitation is expressed. It is only such cases as are cognizable by the Court of Claims that are within its scope and terms. Hence the limitation does notrunagaiust any case until this case is cognizable by this court. The proviso to the twelfth section of the same act prohibited this court from rendering a judgment in favor of any claimant who had “in anyway voluntarily aided, abetted or given encouragement to rebellion against,” the United States. This prohib lion, of course, operated to take away the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in favor of persons situated as were the claimant’s intestate. And so long as this prohibition continued the limitation did not commence to run. The idea and purpose of statutes of limitation are to bar «stale claims, which parties might have prosecuted, but failed and neglected to do, within the time prescribed by law; and they are consequently founded upon the presumption of satisfaction and payment of the claim after the designated time, where the party has had full opportunity to prosecute the debt or claim and has failed to do so. Where no right of action has existed, there can be no operation of a statute of limitation, because the very elements upon which such limitation is founded are wanting in such cases. Hence it will be perceived that so long as the prohibition contained in the Act March 3, 1863, and that of March 2, 1867, continued in force and operation, the limitation in the tenth section of the Act March d, 1863, could have no effect to bar this claim. And these prohibitions continued until the ñnal and unconditional Proclamation of amnesty by the President on the 25th December, 1868. The cases already cited on the subject, of pardon and amnesty, are full and clear on the point, that the general pardon and amnesty contained in the final Proclamation December 25, 1868, not only purged the party of the guilt of rebellion, and nob only relieved him of the punishment pronounced against it by law, but also restored to him any rights lost, forfeited, or suspended by his crimes, and likewise restored to him the right to sue in courts of the United States. Thus it will be seen that, so far as this claimant and her intestate are concerned, this claim against the United States, now sued for, was never cognizable by the Court of Claims until after the 25th of December, 1868, and therefore the limitation commences to run from that time, and this suit, being brought within six years from that date, is not barred by any limitation. We might possibly rest this case safely upon the general doctrine that the running of the statute was suspended during the rebellion, and that it did not commence running again until the final suppression of the rebellion on the 20th of August, I860, the date of the President’s proclamation, and this suit, having been brought within six years from that date, would be in time. The doctrine upon this point is most ably and lucidly discussed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Clifford in Ranger v. Abbott, (6 Wall., p. 532.)
    In that case the whole doctrine of statutes of limitations, as affected by a state of war, was discussed with great ability, and all the authorities reviewed. The conclusion is reached that statutes of limitation, during the continuance of the war of the rebellion, were suspended, and that irrespective of the provision of any statute, by the operation of the general laws of war. The same doctrine ivas re-affirmed in The Protector, (9 Wall., p. 6S7;) Levy v. Steioart, (11 Wall., p. 244;) Ludlow v. Ramsey, (11 Wall., p. 581:) The Protector, (12 Wall., p. 700.)
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Goforth for the defendants .
    If one having a claim against the United States, but under disability to sue, had it in his power to remove his disability by simply taking and keeping iuviolate an oath to be faithful t) the Constitution and laws of the United States, the statute of limitatiou will commence to run against his right to sue here from the time when he first had an opportunity to take such oath and return to his allegiance. It appears by the record that Joaquin Sierra, the husband of the claimant in this suit, survived the war, living until May 14, 1807. On the 29th of May, 1865, the President of the United States issued his proclamation granting amnesty and pardon to all persons who had, directly or indirectly, participated in the rebellion, (with exception of certain classes of persons,) with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves, and except in cases where legal proceedings for the confiscation of property of persons engaged in rebellion had been instituted, upon the single condition of taking and keeping inviolate an oath to faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States and the union of the States thereunder; also, to abide by and faithfully support all laws and proclamations made during tbe rebellion with reference to the emancipation of slaves; in other words, to cease to be a rebel against the United States. It is not shown by the record that Joaquin Sierra was barred of his pardon by any of the fourteen exceptions of classes of persons stated in this proclamation, and, if he did not come within any of those exceptions, he had within a few days of two years from the date of the same wherein he might have placed himself in a position to sue in this court by the commendable and easy act of taking the oath recited in the proclamation, and keex>ing the same inviolate. Joaquin Sierra having died without pardon, and before the General amnesty proclamation December 25, 1868, and his offense not being obliterated by that proclamation, his administratrix cannot maintain this action for what is alleged to have been due him from the Treasury. The right of action lost by the default aud neglect of the intestate cannot be revived in his personal representative. (7 O. Gis. B., p. 595.)
    
   Drake, Ch. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The cases in which it has been held that the period of the rebellion is to be excluded from the computation of the time fixed by statutes of limitation for the bringing of suits, though arising between individuals, and principally under State laws, were settled upon grounds which seem to apply equally to the case of a claim against the United States in favor of an inhabitant of an insurrectionary State during that period, whether he was in act and fact a rebel, or was loyal to the Government, but constrained by circumstances to abide in the territory occupied by the rebel authorities and people. Regarded either way, he was excluded from suing in this court during that period. The following language of the Supreme Court in the leading case of Hanger v. Abbott (6 Wall., p. 532) would seem to leave no room for further question on this .point:

“Total inability on the part of an enemy creditor to sustain any contract in the tribunals of the other belligerent exists during war, but the restoration of j>eace removes the disability, and opens the doors of the courts. Absolute suspension of the right, and prohibition to exercise it, exists during war by the law of nations, and, if so, then it is clear that peace cannot bring with it the remedy if the war is of much duration, unless it also be held that the operation of the statute of limitation is also suspended during the period the creditor is prohibited, by the existence of the war and the law of nations, from enforcing ' his claim. Neither laches nor fraud can be imputed in such a case, and none of the reasons on which the statute is founded can possibly apply, as the disability to sue becomes absolute by the declaration of war, and is a conclusion of law. Ability to sue was the status of the creditor when the contract was made, but the effect of war is to suspend the right, not only without any fault on his part, but under circumstances which made it his duty to abstain from any such attempt.”

We give the claimant’s intestate the full benefit of this exposition of the law, though in her petition she avers that he aided, encouraged, and abetted the rebellion.

If, then, the limitation prescribed by the Act March 3,1803, was suspended during the period of the rebellion, the next point to be determined is the date at which it became operative as against this claim. This was settled by the Supreme Court in the case of The Protector, (12 Wall., p. 700,) where it was held that the date of the Proclamation April 2, 1866, was the close of the war in the States therein mentioned, of which Florida was one. Hence we assign to that date the beginning of the operation of the statute.

It is, however, contended by the claimant’s counsel that this limitation is not operative, because of the peculiar language of the statute, which is in these words : “ That every claim against the United States, cognizable by the Court of Claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement of the claim be filed in the court, or transmitted to it, under the provisions of this act, within six years after the claim first accrues.”

It is urged that Sierra’s claim was not cognizable by this court while his status was that of an unpardoned rebel, because he could not, in a petition, make the averment of loyalty required by the statute. His immunity from the operation of the limitation is therefore based upon his own voluntary disqualification of himself to make that averment; which disqualification continued, it is said, until the general amnesty of December 15,1868, cleansed him from guilt and relieved him from the consequences of his treason.

This does not seem to be the true construction of the provision. The statute does not act upon the right of a party to sue here, but upon the claim, declaring it forever barred, unless the petition thereon be filed or transmitted within the time limited. Hence, in referring to claims cognizable by this court, the intention, as we consider, was to apply the provision to claims of the descriptions which were by law subjected to the jurisdiction of the court, as distinguished from claims not so subjected. In other words, it is as if the clause read, “That every claim against the United States, of which the Court of Claims is authorized to take jurisdiction, shall be forever barred,” &c.

This view draws a clear line of distinction between the subject-matter of a claim and the personal right to prosecute the claim here. In subject-matter a claim may be within the jurisdiction of the court, while the claimant is disabled to prosecute it. It is with reference to the subject-matter and ndt to the personal right of the party to sue that the words “ cognizable by the Court of Claims” are used in this statute.

But were it otherwise, we hold again, as we did in Haycraft's Case, (8 C. Cls. R.,) that a rebel cannot avoid the effect of the limitation by setting up his own voluntary self-disqualification, through his acts of rebellion, to sue in this court. We cannot admit the soundness of a doctrine which would suspend the operation of the limitation in favor of a rebel during the period of the rebellion, and during the same period enforce it, as might well happen, against a Union soldier, who was too busy fighting for his Government to allow of his seeking recourse against it here. Especially should such a doctrine not be declared, when, immediately after the surrender of the rebel armies, amnesty was freely offered by the Proclamation May 29, 1865, to the great mass of the people of the rebel States, upon the single condition of their taking and keeping inviolate a prescribed oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Union of the States thereunder. From the date of that proclamation to the day of his death, nearly two years afterward, the door of amnesty stood wide open to Joseph Sierra, and he would not avail himself of the opportunity to remove the only barrier to his recourse here. Had he sought the benefit of that proffered amnesty, he might at any. time thereafter have filed his petition here, without averring his adhesion to the United States during the war of the rebellion; for the Supreme Court, reversing tbe judgment of this court, held, in a case where that averment was not made in the petition, that amnesty relieved claimants from the necessity of proving the fact, (Pargoud v. United States, 13 Wall., p. 156,) and, of course, such averment needed not to be made. Whether, therefore, Sierra willfully refused or merely neglected to avail himself of the amnesty tendered, or of a special pardon, the continuance of his disqualification to sue here was the result of his own omission, and that disqualification did not prevent the operation of the limitation.

The views we have expressed dispose of the remaining position of the claimant’s counsel, that not until the Proclamation December 25, 1868, was the way cleared for a suit here on this claim. We answer that by holding, as we did in Meldrim & Doyle's Case, (7 C. Cls. R., p. 595,) that that proclamation was inoperative as to one who had died before its issue.

But it is insisted that the claimant, as his administratrix, had six years from the time she became the subject of that amnesty within which to bring a suit upon this claim, and having brought it within that time, the claim isnot barred. To this the answeris, that the statute of limitation having begun to run in the lifetime of her intestate, its operation was not arrested by his death. Whether he lived or died, the suit should have been brought on or before the 2d day of April, 1872, and not having been brought till after that date, the claim is forever barred.

The claimant’s petition must be dismissed.

Nott, J., did not sit in this case, and took no part in the decision.  