
    The State vs. Thornton Holman.
    Under tlje net of 1822, rendering it indictable for " knowingly and wilfully packing or putting info any bags, bale or bales of cotton, any stone, , jvood, trash-cotton, cotton seed, or any matter or thing whatsoever SfC.” a person may be convicted for fraudulently packing, putting and pouring a large and undue quantity of water, into bales of cotton with intent to cheat and defraud &c. ■ -
    The expression uany matter or thing,” is not restricted to the things, “stone, wood, fee.” specified in the preceding part of the clause.
    The rule, that general terms in a criminal statute aré restricted to the particular offences enumerated, does not apply, except in those cases where there is some repugnance or incompatibility between the specific and ge- - neral expressions.
    As under the act against trading with a slave, the selling goods to a slave for cash, was held indictable under the general words of the act “ or shall otherwise deal, trade or traffic.’'
    
    Tried before Judge Gaillard, Laurens, Spring Tertri, 1825..
    This was an indictment, under the act of December 1822, against fraudulently packing Cotton. The indictment charged that the defendant “ on &c. with force and arms, at &c. knowingly, wilfully and unlawfully did pack, put and pour, and cause to be packed, put and poured into two bales of cotton, a large and undue quantity of water to the. purpose and intent to cheat and defraud one Alanson Rice, in the sale thereof, contrary to the form of the act.” There was a second count for exhibiting and offering for sale the said two bales of cotton, knowing the same to be frau«' dulently packed.
    . The defendant’s counsel made a motion to quash the indictment by way of demurrer thereto, on the ground that the facts charged were not embraced in the act of the legislature on that subject, and did not constitute the . offence intended to. be punished by that act, therefore the indictment did not lie.
    His Honor overruled the motion and. decided that the offence, charged in the indictment did come within the act, and therefore the indictment did well lie,
    
      The defendant not being ready for trial on the merit?;, the case was postponed.
    The defendant’s counsel now moved to reverse the decision of the presiding Judge on the same ground taken on the circuit.
   Johnson, J.

The clause of the act of 1822, on which this prosecution is founded, is in the following words (viz :) “ Be it enacted &c. that from and immediately after the first day of March next, if any person or persons whomsoever shall be convicted in any court of sessions of this State of knowingly and wilfully packing or putting into any. bag, bale or bales of cotton, any stone, wood, trash-cotton, cotton seed, or any matter or thing whatsoever, or causing the same to be done, to the purpose or intent of cheating or defrauding any person or persons whomsoever &;c. he shall for the first offence be sentenced to pay afine &c.”

The arguments urged in support of the present motion are deduced from the rule, that general terms in a statute, are not permitted to control particular provisions; and it is contended that the terms “ any matter or thing whatsoever,” must be construed in reference to the preceding specifications, and hence it is concluded, water not being included in those specifications, the defendant had not offended against the act. But it will be seen that this rule does not apply except in those cases where there is some repugnance or incompatibility between the specific and general expressions.

Without entering fully into the various and salutary rules which have been adopted in the construction of statutes it will suffice in the present case to refer to that laid down in the caseofthe U. States v.s Fisher, 2 Cranch 335-390, as superced-ing all others. It is,.thatwhere á law is plain and unambiguous, whetherit be expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction. Let it then be asked what did .the legislature mean by the use of those terms, and what do they plainly express ? The act itself gives the answer. If any one shall with an intention to'commit a fraud, pack or put in “ any bag, bale or bales of cotton, any stone, wood, trash-cotton, cotton-seed or other matter or thing whatsoever,” he shall incur the penalty, fac, Here there is no incongruity between the specifications and the general expression, and it cannot be doubted that it was the intention of the legislature to punish frauds in packing cotton without regard to the character of the material used.

O’JYeal & James, for the motion.,

Earle, Sol. contra.

The case of the State vs. Mugy proceeded on this principle. In that case the court held that selling goods to a slave for cash, was a violation of the act against trading with slaves, under the general expression shall otherwise deal, trade or traffic;” notwithstanding that mode of traffic is no* enumerated in the many specifications contained in it.

Motion refused.  