
    James R. McDugle v. John D. Filmer.
    1. Jurisdiction. Circuit Court. Foreign judgment. Costs. Amount.
    
    If the amount of the judgment of a justice of the.peace in another state and the costs of suit therein paid by the plainiff added exceed two hundred dollars the circuit court has jurisdiction of a suit for the aggregate amount brought in this state.
    2. Judgment. Tennessee justice of the peace. ' Collateral attack. Defa/ult. How of trial.
    
    The judgment of a Tennessee justice of the peace is not void (Shannon’s Tennessee Code, § 5988)j. because tried on the return day of the summons and the record thereof does not show that the trial was after the hour named in the writ for defendant’s appearance.
    3. Same. Writ of enquiry. Unliquidated, damages.
    
    A judgment of a Tennessee justice of the peace cannot be assailed where sued upon in this state because it was rendered by default upon an unliquidated demand and the record does not show the award of a writ of inquiry to fix damages as required by the statutes of Tennessee (Shannon’s Code, § 4679), since by the same statutes (§ 5988) it is provided that every intendment is in favor of the validity of proceedings before justices of the peace.
    From tbe circuit court of DeSoto county.
    JIon. Perrin H. Lowrey, Judge.
    Filmer, appellee, was plaintiff in tbe court below; Mc-Dugle, appellant, was defendant there. Tbe suit was an action begun in tbe circuit court upon a judgment of a justice of tbe peace of Sbelby county, Tenn. A demurrer to tbe declaration was overruled, tbe defendant declined to plead further and judgment was entered for tbe plaintiff, from which tbe defendant appealed to tbe supreme court. Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion of tbe court.
    
      [For a previous suit between tbe parties, see McDugle v. Filmer79 Miss., 53.]
    
      B. L. Dabney, for appellant.
    Tbe first ground of demurrer is, that tbe suit in Tennessee being for unliquidated damages, tbe judgment by default was interlocutory only; that tbe justice could bave beard proof and given judgment for sucb sum as tbe proof showed tbe plaintiff entitled to. And, second, that under tbe laws of tbe state of Tennessee, tbe summons in a justice court has no return day written in it, but it is tbe duty of tbe constable to summon tbe defendant to appear on a day, and at an hour, to be set out in tbe return. Tbe certified copy shows tbe defendant was summoned for a day, and for 2 o’clock on that day, while tbe record fails to show that tbe hour named bad arrived when judgment by default was rendered.
    Tbe third ground of demurrer is, that tbe Tennessee judgment being for $200 only, tbe circuit court bad not original jurisdiction of tbe subject-matter, tbe costs in Tennessee being no part of a plaintiff’s recovery. That is, their courts bold that where a defendant pays a successful plaintiff tbe amount of bis judgment and tbe costs, that tbe officers of tbe court can bave an execution issued against tbe defendant if tbe plaintiff fail to pay tbe costs be has collected over to them, and this was once tbe view of tbe appellee; for McDugle v. Filmer, 79 Miss., 53, is-this same case begun in a justice court in Mississippi on this same judgment.
    
      S. John Waddell, for appellee.
    As to tbe second ground of tbe demurrer, that tbe suit in tbe court below was only for $200, it is only necessary to call tbe attention of this court to tbe declaration in tbe case where it is explicitly stated that appellee sued and demanded judgment for tbe $200, for which he bad received judgment in Tennessee and tbe $2.15 costs paid by him in obtaining that judgment, making a total of $202.15, and that this amount was in excess of the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, in this state and therefore the suit was properly brought in the lower court. As to the third ground of demurrer, an examination of the transcript of the record from the court of the justice of the peace shows that the summons upon which the judgment was rendered was returnable at 2 o’clock p. m., January 9, 1900, and the judgment was regularly rendered by said justice of the peace and dated and signed on that day, and counsel for appellant can cite no authority to this court showing that the justice of the peace in Tennessee was required to note the particular hour on which judgments are rendered by him. This question, like the one raised upon the first ground of demurrer, is a question of procedure by the justice of the peace in arriving at the judgment rendered by him, and is one, which, under both the statute law of the state of Tennessee and by the authorities generally, every intendment and presumption is in favor of the regularity and validity of such judgments, and they cannot be attacked in a collatteral procedure for mere errors of this kind.
    By appellants’ first ground of demurrer, that the judgment sued on was an interlocutory and not a final judgment, he is relying upon sec. 5968 of Shannon’s Code of Tennessee, which provides that “If the defendant does not appear at a trial before a justice of the peace, the justice of the peace shall proceed to hear the allegations and proof of the plaintiff and render judgment thereon for the amount to which he shows himself entitled under the warrant.” (See sec. 5968, Shannon’s Code of Tennessee), and the argument is made to this court that because the judgment sued on recites simply the fact that it is a judgment by default in favor of plaintiff for $200 and costs, that it is void because it does not further show that the justice of the peace heard evidence on the claim sued on and rendered said judgment according to that evidence.
    The answer to this proposition is that the judgment sued on is not an interlocutory judgment, but a final judgment, and one upon which, execution could have been issued immediately after it was rendered. There was nothing further to do in the State of Tennessee, so far as this judgment was concerned, except to issue execution thereon and collect the same if it could be done. This demonstrates it to be a final and not an interlocutory judgment. 2 Enc. of PI. & Pr., 53; lb. 1104 and note 3.
   Oarhoow, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Fihner recovered a judgment before a justice of the peace in Tennessee against MeDugle by default, on proper service of summons, for $200 and costs, and he paid the costs, $2.15, and then sued MeDugle in Mississippi, in a circuit court, for the $202.15. The circuit court had jurisdiction. The costs, added to $200 recovered, constituted a debt over the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace in Mississippi, and the procedure to recover this debt had to be in a circuit court.

It is urged that, because the Tennessee process to MeDugle cited him to appear at 2 o’eock p. m., the judgment there should show that the trial was on or after that hour. It is also insisted that, the Tennesee suit being for “damages for failure to comply with lease contract,” it was for unliquidated damages, and that therefore the judgment, reciting that it was “for plaintiff, by default, for $200,” will not sustain the present action, because the statute of that state (Shannon’s Code, .§ 4679) provides -for assessment of damages when the amount of the claim cannot be readily ascertained by calculation. These contentions are unsound. It will be assumed that the justice tried the case at the proper time, and properly ascertained the damages. There was no appeal, and this is a collateral attack upon a judgment which, even if voidable, is certainly not void. Section 5988, Shannon’s Tennessee Code, reads as follows: “Every intendment is in favor of the sufficiency and validity of proceedings before justices of the peace, when brought in question* either directly, or collaterally, in any of the courts of the state, where it appears on the face of the proceedings that the justice had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties.” In the case before us the justice had jurisdiction of both. The universal rule is that, when such jurisdiction appears, the intendments and presumptions apply in favor of courts of limited as fully as to those of general jurisdiction.

Affirmed.  