
    The Insurance Company of Pennsylvania against Passmore and another.
    
      Thursday, December 17.
    RANDALL, for the defendants,
    obtained a rule to shew cause why the judgment entered in this case, should not be opened, and the execution set aside. It appeared, that shortly after March Term, 1818, a summons issued against the fendants, returnable on the last Monday in July, which was returned, “ served,” arid on the 4th August following, the plaintiffs’ attorney signed a judgment for want of an appearance,
    The last ¡^merely of writs, “uies and*1 6 it is nota Term, at which a judgj-an^nt 0V an appearanoe"
    
      Rarvle, for the plaintiffs,
    shewed cause. He reviewed the several acts of assembly by which the original jurisdictiori of this Court has, from time to time, been regulated, particularly that of the 10th April, 1807, the 8th section of which declares, that the last Monday of July, shall be a common day of return for the Supreme Court of the Eastern District, at which time all writs and process may be returnable in the same manner as at the regular terms of the sai d Court, and may also bear teste on the same day. It had been the practice, he contended, to consider July as a regular Term of the Court, for many important purposes. Sheriffs’ deeds were then acknowledged ; in case of appearance, a rule to plead might be taken ; and for default of appearance on a capias, returnable to July, the bail-bond might be put in'suit. To establish the practice of taking judgments for want of an appearance, he referred to the records of ten cases in which it had been done, and insisted, that it lay on the opposite party to shew cases of judgments taken at December Term, for defaults in July. A practice ot five or six years under an act of parliament, where it is general, and the consequences of altering it would be important, fixes the construction. Regina v. Ballivos, &c. de Bewdly.
    
    For the defendants it was answered, that the practice had not been to consider July as a Term; that it was not so counted in foreign attachments ; that the general impression of the bar was, that judgments by default could not be entered at July; that the cases cited by Mr. Rarwle, were all scire faciases, and in several of them, the proceeding was amicable, and the judgment by consent; and that if they had been cases of summonses, they were not sufficiently numerous to establish a practice. That the words of the act, merely made the last Monday in July, a day of return and teste of writs, ' and not a Term; that one Judge only sat, for the purpose of making rules and orders preparatory to trials, without the power of giving judgments; and that when verdicts were taken between March find July, judgment was never entered until December Term. The Chief Justice, in July last, refused, on motion, to enter a judgment in a foreign attachment. He cited Shaw v. Pearce,
      
       and Kearney v. MiCullough.
      
    
    
      
       1 P- Wm. 212.
      
    
    
      
      
         4 Minn. 485.
    
    
      
       5 Binti. 389.
    
   By The Court.

We do not think, that the practice has been by any means so general, as to induce the Court, from an apprehension of shaking property, to depart from the obvious meaning of the law. The last Monday in ■ July, is a Court held by one Judge, for special purposes, to receive the return of writs, and to make rules and orders preparatory to trials. But there is no power to give judgments. No instance hafe been shewn, of a Judge ever giving judgment on that day, but several have been cited, where it has been refused. The cases of judgments cited, are all the acts of attornies, sub silentio■, and there are but few of them. It is, therefore, our opinion, that the rule in this case should be made absolute.

Rule absolute.  