
    Crowell Adams vs. Bowdevine Decker.
    CERTIORARI.
    It is not error, for the sheriff in an action of unlawful detainer, to return a panel of twenty-four jurors, if twelve only are sworn on the jury.
    "What is a sufficient state of demand or complaint in the action of unlaw ful detainer — see the complaint in this case.
    What is a sufficient notice in this action — see the notice in the argument of the plaintiff’s counsel. ' . •
    
      This was a certiorari brought by Crowell Adams to reverse •a judgment rendered against him in an action for [*85 an unlawful detainer, upon a complaint exhibited against him by Bowdevine Decker, in the words following, viz: '‘ For that whereas, by a certain written lease between the said Bowdevine Decker and Crowell Adams, bearing date the first day of April, A. D. 1825, the said Bowdevine did demise and lease unto the said Crowell Adams, the messuage, farm and tract of land on which the said Crowell resided, ■containing about one hundred and forty-six acres, situate on the Pepocoting, near the Pepocoting bridge, in the said township of Wantage, in the said county, whereof the said Bowdevine Decker then was, and now is seized of an estate ■of inheritance in feo simple, to have and to hold the said farm, messuage and tract of land, unto the said Crowell Adams, for the term of one year from the date of the said loase ; and the said Crowell Adams hath wilfully and without force, held over and unlawfully detained the possession of the said premises, from the expiration of the said term to the day of exhibiting this complaint, and still doth wilfully and without force, hold over and unlawfully detain the same from the said B. Decker, although demand of the possession of the said premises and notice in writing for the delivery thereof, to the said B. Decker, was made and given by the said B. Decker, to the said 0. Adams, to wit, on the 29th day of January, 1828, and so the said Crowell Adams is guilty of unlawful detainer of the said promises.”
    
      Vroom,
    
    for the plaintiff in certiorari, relied upon the following reasons for the reversal of the judgment: — 1st. Because the sheriff returned twenty-four men by virtue of -.the writ of venire facias directed to him in this cause, which •was unlawful and improper. In proof of the fact alleged in inis reason, the counsel referred to the panel of the jury returned with the venire, which contained the names of iwonty-four persons, and also to the copy of the record of the return of the sheriff, which shewed the same. And in support of the legal position, he relied upon the section of’ the act concerning forcible entries and detainers, Rev. Laws-349, which directs the justice “to issue a precept directed to the sheriff of the county, commanding him to cause to-come before the said justice twelve good and lawful men.”
    2d. Because the jury was unlawfully summoned and the-, case was not tried by a lawful jury.
    *86] *In support of this reason, he referred to the panel of the jury as returned by the sheriff annexed to the venire; by which it appeared, that the twelfth man returned and named on the panel was John B. Hall, and by reference to-the copy of the record of the justice, it appeared that the twelfth man sworn was Ezekiel Dennis, who was the fourteenth man named upon the sheriff’s panel. The record of the justice in regard to the swearing of the jury was as follows: — “And the jurors summoned to enquire and try the-said complaint being called, also appeared, viz., Bobert H. McCarter, &c.,” (stating the names of the first eleven jurors-named on the sheriff’s panel) and then stating the name of. Ezekiel Dennis as the twelfth man.
    It was contended by the counsel of the plaintiff in certiorari, that if all the twenty-four jurors appeared (and it was to be presumed they did until the contrary was shewn) that the justice had no right to swear the fourteenth man returned in the panel, and exclude the twelfth and thirteenth.
    3. Because the state of demand or complaint was informal and insufficient, inasmuch as it did not state the time when the injury was done.
    4. Because 'the notice given in evidence was not sufficient to found an action of unlawful detainer/ The notice was in-the words following, viz., “ Crowell Adams, please to take-notice that I do hereby require and demand of you to quit- and deliver up to me the possession of the messuage, farm, and tract of land, now in your possession, and wherein and whereon you live, which you have held under me, and your term wherein has expired, or you will be proceeded against-as a person guilty of unlawful detainer. Dated January the 28th, 1828, Bow. Decker.
    
      Ryerson, for the defendant in certiorari.
    As to the first reason relied upon by the plaintiffs counsel, said, it was customary for the sheriff to summon twenty-four jurors; that justice Pennington, in his treatise, recommended the summoning of that number : And as the statute authorized no tales, unless the sheriff summoned twenty-four men, it would be impossible in most cases to get a jury.
    As to the 2d and 3d reasons relied upon by the plaintiffs counsel, the court told Mr. Ryorson he need not speak.
    As to the 4th reason, he contended that the notice was sufficient.
   *By the Court.

The first objection relied upon [*87 by the plaintiff’s counsel is, that the sheriff returned a panel of twenty-four jurors. This objection is not a valid one; it is usual for the sheriff to return twenty-four although he is directed to return twelve. The counsel for the plaintiff sought to support this objection, by referring to the act, -which says that the oath shall be administered to each juror returned (Rev. Laws, 351, sec. 11;) but this is not a fair construction of the act, for if it is, then if the' sheriff returns a brother of the party as juror, he must necessarily be sworn.

As to the second objection, viz. that the twelfth and thirteenth jurors appeared but were not sworn. The fact, as we read the transcript of the justice, does not bear out the objection.

As to the third objection that the complaint does not sufficiently set forth the time. It is true that the defendant could not be gulty of an unlawful detainer until notice for' delivery given, and a demand of the premises made, but we-think all this is sufficiently expressed in the complaint.-

It is said also, that Decker was holding the premises as a -tenant; that ñe rented them for one year; and that he remained afterwards, and is to be presumed, as holding -under the .original agreement. But there must be some act ■on the part'of the landlord to recognize him as a tenant.

As to the fourth objection, it is said that the notice is .insufficient, because it contains an admission that Decker is .a tenant for the year; but no such admission can be fairly inferred from the language of the notice. The language is which you have held,” and not which you now hold.

Let the judgment be affirmed.  