
    James Agnew vs. The President and Selectmen of Natchez.
    The constitution of the state of Mississippi and the laws passed under it, secure the right of appeal from the decisions of justices of the peace to circuit courts; where, therefore, a judgment is rendered before a city magistrate for the violation of a city ordinance, and the magistrate certifies to the judgment as city magistrate and justice of the peace, it will be error for the circuit court to dismiss an appeal from such judgment for want of jurisdiction.
    If a special and exclusive jurisdiction be claimed for the president and selectmen of the city of Natchez, to render judgment for violation of the city ordinances, without the right of appeal therefrom to the circuit court, such special and exclusive jurisdiction must be shown to exist, or it will be error in the circuit court to dismiss such an appeal.
    The constitution, adopted in 1832, declared, that justices of the peace shall be elected by districts for two years; and that right of appeal from their decisions shall be secured by law; and in accordance therewith, a law was passed securing the right of appeal to the circuit courts ; in 1825, by the charter of the city of Natchez, it was provided that the president of the selectmen, who is to be elected, should be commissioned, every year by the governor as a justice of the peace, from whose decision in any matter or cause, arising under the ordinances or by-laws of the city, any one aggrieved might appeal to the board of selectmen, who should give judgment as they thought right: Held, that the charter of 1825 seemed to be in conflict with the constitution.
    In error from the circuit court of Adams county; Hon. C. C. Gage, judge.
    On the 2d day of March, 1844, a summons was issued from the office “ of John R. Stockman, city magistrate and justice of the peace for the city of Natchez,” (as he is styled in the summons,) commanding the constable to summon James Agnew to appear before him at his office, to show cause, if any he could, why he should not be fined, not exceeding fifty dollars, for violating the first section of “ an ordinance of said city, supplementary to an ordinance concerning the appropriate duties of city constable, passed on the 10th day of August, 1837, and for other purposes,” for opposing the harbor master in the performance of his duty. The warrant was signed “ J. R. Stockman, city magistrate and justice of the peace.
    On the return day of the summons, the magistrate rendered a judgment by default, for forty dollars damages and four dollars costs, and Agnew appealed to the circuit court of Adams county; and the magistrate accordingly certified the judgment and proceedings to that court.
    At the June term, 1844, of which, the president and selectmen of Natchez filed their declaration against Agnew in assumpsit, to recover the amount of the fine so rendered.
    At the same term of the circuit court, on motion of the president and selectmen, the appeal was dismissed, and Agnew prosecutes this writ of error.
    
      Hewett, Sanders and Price, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Reed, for defendants in error.
   Mr. Chief Justice Sharkey

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error was prosecuted before a justice of the peace for a violation of a city ordinance, and a judgment for forty dollars was rendered against him. He appealed to the circuit court, when a motion was made to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that an appeal does not lie from the judgment of a city magistrate for fines and forfeitures, which motion was sustained, and the appeal dismissed, and thereupon this writ of error was sued out.

The judgment of the justice was not for a fine, but a civil action founded on the ordinance, and when the case was taken to the circuit court, a declaration was filed by the president and selectmen, for a breach of the ordinance.

The judgment of the circuit court is attempted to be sustained on the provisions of the city charter, which seems to have undergone sundry amendments. The clause to which we are referred as sustaining the judgment, is found in the Revised Code, 626, and is said to have been passed in 1825. It provides, that when any person shall feel aggrieved by the judgment of the president of the board of selectmen, when acting in the capacity of city magistrate, in any matter or cause arising under the ordinances or by-laws of the city, he may appeal to the board of selectmen, who are required to give such judgment as they may think right. This seems to be the last act, and must be regarded as regulating the matter of appeal in questions arising under city ordinances, if it be now in force. The charter provides for the election of a president of the selectmen, and directs that he shall be commissioned by the governor as justice of the peace every year, and shall continue in office until the first Monday in January thereafter. The constitution provides that justices of the peace shall be elected by districts, and shall hold their offices for the term of two years. It also provides, that in all cases tried by a justice, the right of appeal shall be secured by law. The law, in pursuance of this article in the constitution, has fully provided for appeals from justices of the peace. H. & H. Dig. 436, § 47 -49. In this respect the charter and constitution do not seem to harmonize. But if it be admitted that that provision of the charter is still in force, another difficulty arises. It does not appear that this judgment was rendered by the president of the selectmen, acting as city magistrate. The justice certifies to the judgment as city magistrate and justice of the peace, but this does not authorize us to consider him as anything more than an ordinary justice of the peace, from whose judgment an appeal is to be taken as in ordinary cases. The act of 1842 expressly authorizes appeals to be taken directly from the judgment of a justice to the circuit court, and this case must be regarded as coming within that provision. As a special and exclusive jurisdiction is claimed in this instance, it ought to have been shown to exist. The appeal was, therefore, improperly dismissed, and the judgment must be reversed and cause remanded.  