
    Peter A. MUNTJAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald WALTEMEYER; David Cheuvront, II; Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City; City of Baltimore; State of Maryland, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 01-2378.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted April 30, 2002.
    Decided June 7, 2002.
    Peter A. Muntjan, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Ray Huskey, Law Department of Baltimore City, Baltimore, Maryland; Maureen Mullen Dove, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Shane Whipkey, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland; William Rowe Phelan, Jr., Office of the City Solicitor, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
    Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
    Vacated and dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Peter A. Muntjan appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp.2001) complaint. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Muntjan’s notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded thirty days after entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, see Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960)).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on October 9, 2001. Muntjan’s notice of appeal was filed on November 13, 2001, more than thirty days after entry of the order. Although Muntjan’s notice of appeal did not request an extension of the appeal period, the district court liberally construed the motion to include such a request and granted relief based on Muntjan’s pro se status and his misunderstanding of the rules that explain how to calculate the time for noting an appeal. Although we certainly understand the district court’s decision to liberally construe Muntjan’s filing given the long tradition of so construing pro se documents, the rule in this circuit is that courts may not grant an extension of the period in which to note an appeal in the absence of a motion explicitly requesting that the court do so. See Shah v. Hutto, 722 F.2d 1167, 1168-69 (4th Cir.1983) (holding that in the absence of a motion for extension of time, the district court cannot extend the appeal period in a civil action). Furthermore, the reasons given by Muntjan to justify his late filing, i.e. his pro se status and misunderstanding of the applicable rules, would not warrant relief in any event. Id. (“The fact that plaintiffs are incarcerated and are proceeding pro se” does not warrant relief from the time limits imposed by Rule 4(a)).

Moreover, because Muntjan never requested an extension of the appeal period, his notice of appeal was untimely. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order granting an extension of time to file an appeal and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND DISMISSED.  