
    LEWIS v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 11, 1914.)
    1. LARCENY (§ 60) — SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE — Reasonable Dotjbt.
    In a prosecuton for theft of property, possession of which was alleged to be in one W., but shown to be in his renter, while the evidence of such possession in the renter did not amount to demonstration, it was clear to the exclusion of reasonable doubt so as to require reversal.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Larceny, Cent. Dig. §§ 156-158; Dec. Dig. § 60.]
    2. LaRceny (§ 32) — Indictment—Possession of Property.
    An indictment for the theft of property in possession of a renter should allege general possession in the owner’s agent and special ownership in the renter, or ownership in the agent, or in the renter.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Larceny, Cent. Dig. §§ 81-92, 99; Dec. Dig. § 32.]
    Appeal from Mitchell County Court; A. J. Coe, Judge.
    Mary Lewis was convicted of theft of property under the value of $50, and she appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Shepherd & Sandusky, of Colorado, Tex., for appellant C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic and section NTJMBER-in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   DAVIDSON, J.

Appellant was convicted of theft of property under the value of $50.

The property in fact belonged to a man named Whiteraft. The evidence shows the stolen property was some widows and a door. One of the witnesses turned state’s evidence and testified against the defendant. He was an accomplice, and therefore it was .necessary to corroborate him. The testimony is weak on corroboration, even if it be sufficient. Womack testified he was the agent of Whiteraft and rented the property to Riley for' the year 1913, and this contract carried possession in Riley of the property from the 1st of January, 1913, to the 1st of January, 1914. The property, if taken by appellant, was taken on the night of January 3, 1913-. Riley being the -renter was legally, or supposed to be legally, in control of the property. The indictment alleged possession in Womack. The evidence, as we understand it, shows it to be in Riley. While this is not sufficiently clear to amount to a demonstration, yet it occurs to us it is so to the exclusion of the reasonable doubt, and as this record is presented to us we are unwilling to affirm the judgment in this condition. However we would suggest upon another trial the different counts be drawn so as to meet any contingency. Womack was not in actual control, but only in such control as the agency gave him; the property being ten or twelve miles distant in the country. The indictment should contain a count alleging the general possession in him and special ownership in Riley. Another count might be added charging ownership in Womack, and the third charging it in Riley. This would meet any’phase of it if the state sees proper to prosecute the case further.

As the matter is presented, the judgment is reversed, and cause remanded.  