
    Guoku HU, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-70902.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 3, 2016.
    
    Filed Feb. 8, 2016.
    Thomas Ogden, Counsel, Law Offices of Thomas Ogden, Alhambra, CA, for Petitioner.
    O.I.L., Ann M. Welhaf, Imran Raza Zai-di, Trial, D.O.J.-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: CALLAHAN and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges and RAKOFF, Senior District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Guoku Hu petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the fine imposed on Hu did not amount to economic deprivation rising to the level of past persecution. “[Substantial economic deprivation that constitutes a threat to life or freedom can constitute persecution.” Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir.2006). However, “mere economic disadvantage alone, does not rise to the level of persecution.” Id. (quoting Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.2004)). Although this fine was significant in comparison to Hu’s stated income, Hu did not testify that he could not earn a living or suffered more than mere economic disadvantage. Thus, a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to find that Hu demonstrated past persecution.

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Hu failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Hu argues that he is subject to future persecution because of his anti-corruption activities. A finding of a “well-founded fear of persecution” requires both a showing of “subjectively genuine” and “objectively reasonable” fear. Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.2000), overruled on other grounds by Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (per curiam). Even if Hu subjee-tively fears that he will be persecuted if he returns to China, Hu has failed to present specific, objective evidence to support his fear of future persecution.

3.Because Hu failed to prove that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in China, he also failed to prove by a “clear probability” that he will suffer persecution if he returns, which is required for withholding of removal. See Martinez-Sanchez v. INS, 794 F.2d 1396, 1397 (9th Cir.1986),

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . Hu did not request protection under the Convention Against Torture. Nonetheless, the IJ and BIA considered his eligibility and denied relief. Hu did not challenge this issue in his opening brief. Therefore, it is waived. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir.1996).
     
      
      . Hu argues that the IJ and the BIA did not credit Hu’s testimony as credible. However, Hu fails to point to any material testimony that the BIA and IJ discredited.
     