
    Arthur GASPARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. S. HATTON; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-17661.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Nov. 18, 2014.
    
    Filed Dec. 4, 2014.
    Arthur Gaspard, Lancaster, CA, pro se.
    Trace Maiorino, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Arthur Gas-pard appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from an inmate assault. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Gaspard failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Gaspard when they determined that he was eligible for a cellmate. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (holding that “a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate ... safety”); see also. Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir.2002) (while prison officials’ decisions to double-cell the inmates “turned out [to] be quite unfortunate judgments,” it could not be said that a reasonable officer would have clearly understood the “risk of serious harm was so high” that the inmates should not have been double-celled).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gaspard’s discovery motions because Gaspard failed to show how the requested discovery was relevant to defeat summary judgment or that the denial caused substantial prejudice. See Preminger v. Peake, 552 F.3d 757, 768, n. 10 (9th Cir.2008) (setting forth standard of review).

We reject Gaspard’s requests to void the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), enter summary judgment in his favor, and grant him the relief he sought in his lodged Second Amended Complaint.

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     