
    Newman Haynes et al. v. W. Jones at al.
    
    1. Statute oe Limitations. What will arrest it. Descent cast. If a parent placo a son in possession of land under a verbal gift and the possession is hold by the son adversely to the father and all other persons, the death of the father will not arrest the running of the statute. By the descent cast the heirs are placed exactly in the shoes of their ancestor. And the statute having attached and commenced running against him in his lifetime, it continues to run without intermission against his heirs. Its operation can, in such case, be arrested, only, by a suit at law, or in equity, effectually prosecuted.
    2. Same. Same. Same, Saving of the statute. The ancestor being free from disability when the adverse possession is taken and the running of the statute commenced, there is no saving or exception in the statute in favor of his heirs; and they, though infants or femes covert, are bound to sue just as much as their ancestor would have been had he lived, before the expiration of seven years from the adverse possession.
    3. Same. Possessory right. Act of 1819. Advancement. If a child is placed in the possession of land, by the parent, under a parol gift as an advancement, and such child holds said land adversely to the parent and the other heirs for a period of seven years, he will be protected under tho second section of the act of 1819, to the’ extent of his enclosure, for which he must account at the estimated value put upon the land at the time of the advancement.
    
    EROM GIBSON.
    At the June Term, 1858, Chancellor Williams pronounced a decree, from which the defendants appealed.
    Hill, for the complainants.
    
      T. J. & J. T. OaRTHEl, for the defendants,
    argued—
    The course of decision, both in England and in this country, has established the rule, beyond doubt, that when the statute of limitation has commenced running, it runs over all subsequent disabilities and intermediate acts and events, 2 Greenl. Ev., § 439; Angel on Lim., ch. 36, and page 520.
    The question of joint tenancy has nothing to do with the case, because the parties had no joint interest at the time the adverse possession of J. W. Jones commenced. That possession having commenced in the lifetime of the father, his death did not arrest the operation of the statute, although some of the heirs upon whom the estate was cast may have been infants, or femes covert.
    
    J. W. Jones having acquired a title to the land by operation of the statute of limitations, we insist that it relates back to, and he is only chargeable with the value of the land at the time he was placed in possession.
    
      
       The parol gift of the land, as an advancement, is void. The possesso-ry right to the' land is perfeetted, only, by operation of the statute of limitations. Now, is the land to be valued at the time the possession is given, or at the time the title is perfected by the running of the statute ? The former seems to be the ruling of the Court. Yet, such has not been the universally received opinion of the Bar, nor the uniform course of decision in the inferior Courts. The rule is different in Kentucky. There every advancement is to be charged at its value at the time when the gift becomes complete and irrevocable, in law or equity. And where a father advances a child by a verbal gift of land, which cannot be enforced and may be revoked, but is afterwards confirmed by a conveyance, the value of the land at the date of the conveyance is the value at which it is to be brought into hotchpotch. Barber v. Taylor’s heirs, 9 Dana., 84; Hook v. Hook, 13 B. Monroe, 528. See, also, Stallings v. Stallings, 1 Dev., ch, 298; Robinson v. Robinson, 4 Hum., 392: Cawthon v. Coppedge, 1 Swan. 487.
    
   McKinney, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The complainants are a portion of the heirs at law and distributees of the estate of John Jones, who died intestate in Gribson county, in 1853, and the defendants are the administrator and remaining distributees and heirs.

In addition to an account of the administration, the complainants seek distribution and partition of the slaves and real estate.

The case is brought here upon a single question, in relation to part of the real property. Some time previous to the year 1846, the intestate made a parol gift to the1 defendant, Joshua, his son, of two hundred acres of land, part of the tract on which the intestate resided. The only written evidence of the gift is a memorandum made in a book kept by the intestate, showing the advancements made to his several children, which is as follows: “ Grave to my son, Joshua, 200 acres of land, to be taken off of the west side and north end of the tract I now live on, at $450.00.” The land was not run off or set apart by metes -and bounds, to the donee; but about the first of the year 1847, and nearly seven years before the death of his father, he entered into possession of a tenament on the land intended for him, and has resided thereon ever since, and has made valuable improvements on the same. Before the filing of this bill, he had been in possession for more than seven years, claiming it as his own, with the knowledge and approbation of his father during his life; and since the death of his father, he has, in like manner, claimed it against the other heirs, to which no objection has been made, except by the complainants — his brothers-in-law. The proof shows that some thirty acres or more were enclosed and adversely held by the defendant, Joshua, for a period of more than seven years before this suit. The Chancellor was of opinion that the defendant would only he protected in the possession, under the second section of the act of 1819, of so much of said land, if any, as he had in actual possession, by enclosure, for the full space of seven years, prior to the death of the intestate ; and that on the • death of intestate, and consequent descent of the title to his heirs at law* the operation of the statute Avas arrested.

In this view, his Honor erred. By the descent cast, the heirs Avere placed exactly in the shoes of their ancestor. And the statute having attached and commenced running against him in his lifetime, it continued to run, without intermission, against his heirs. Its operation could only have been arrested by a suit at law, or in equity, effectually prosecuted. The ancestor being free from disability when the adverse possession was taken, and running of the statute commenced, there is no saving or exception in the statute in favor of his heirs; and they, though infants or femes covert, were bound to sue just as much as their ancestor would have been had he lived, before the expiration of seven years from the commencement of the adverse possession.

The idea that the title descended to all the heirs jointly, and, therefore, the possession of the defendant, Joshua, was the possession of all, and, consequently, the statute ceased to operate from the descent of the title to the heirs, is altogether fallacious. The exclusive and adverse character of the defendant’s possession, upon which the operation of the statute depended, was, in no respect, changed or affected by the descent of the title to the heirs.

The result is, that the defendant, Joshua, has acquired a possessory right, to so much of said tract of land as may have been held and occupied, by actual enclosures, for the period of seven years' before the commencement of this suit; for which he must account at the estimated value put upon the land at the time of the advancement.

The decree will he modified accordingly.  