
    Amin B. BOOKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. MALY, Deputy Superintendent of Security, Shawangunk Correctional Facility, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-1257-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 14, 2015.
    Amin B. Booker, pro se, Stormville, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Owen Demuth, Assistant Solicitor General, for Barbara D. Underwood, New York State Solicitor General, and Eric T. Scheiderman, New York State Attorney General, Albany, NY, for Defendants-Ap-pellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CHESTER J. STRAUB, and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Amin Booker (“Booker”) — incarcerated and proceeding pro se — appeals the District Court’s March 31, 2014 summary judgment in favor of defendants, as well as the District Court’s orders denying Booker’s motions for Rule 11 sanctions against defendants and for appointed counsel. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

As a threshold matter, we must first decide which of Booker’s claims remain on appeal. In his notice, Booker stated that he was appealing “from a Decision and Order denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denying plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel, [and] denying plaintiffs motion for sanctions” entered on March 31, 2014. Booker’s notice of appeal did not mention the previous denials by the District Court of his motions to amend the complaint or for discovery. Because Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 is jurisdictional, we are “limited by the wording of the notice [of appeal].” New Phone Co. v. City of New York, 498 F.3d 127, 130-31 (2d Cir.2007). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of Booker’s motions to amend and for discovery. This appeal therefore challenges only the District Court’s grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, as well as its orders denying Booker’s motions for Rule 11 sanctions and for appointed counsel.

First, we review • the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing] ■ all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir.2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, upon our de novo review, we conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants for substantially the- reasons stated in Magistrate Judge Andrew T. Baxter’s thorough Report and Recommendation, which the District Court adopted over Booker’s timely objection. See Booker v. Maly, No. 12 Civ. 246(ATB)(NAM), 2014 WL 1289579 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014).

Second, we review the District Court’s denial of Booker’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion. See Storey v. Cello Holdings, 347 F.3d 370, 387 (2d Cir.2003) (“[T]he district court is familiar with the issues and litigants and is thus better situated than the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts and apply a fact-dependent legal standard.”) (internal quotations marks and brackets omitted); see generally In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (explaining the term of art “abuse of discretion”). Given that Booker’s motion was based on the mistaken assertion that defendants’ 7.1 statement was “evasive” and “incomplete,” the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for sanctions.

Third, we also review the District Court’s denial of Booker’s motion for appointed counsel for “abuse of discretion.” See Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, 610 F.3d 776, 780 (2d Cir.2010). In considering a motion to appoint counsel, a district court “should first determine whether the indigent’s position [is] likely to be of substance.” Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1986)). Here, because Booker had little chance of success on the merits, the District Court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying his motion for appointed counsel.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Booker on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the March 31, 2014 judgment of the District Court.  