
    Commissioners of Roads vs. Robert R. Durant.
    
      Road Laws — Manning, streets of- — Jursidietion.
    Tlie Act of 1855, to establish the judicial district of Clarendon, appoints Commissioners, who, “ at the expense of the district,” are to purchase a tract of land, “ upon which they shall lay out a village,” to be called Manning: — Held, that it is the duty of the Commissioners thus appointed to lay out and open the streets, and that, until opened and dedicated as highways, the Commissioners of Roads have no jurisdiction over them.
    BEFORE GLOVER, J., AT CLARENDON, SPRING TERM, 1858.
    Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows:
    “ Tbe action was in tbe Summary Process jurisdiction to recover twenty-five dollars, a fine imposed by tbe Board of •Commissioners of Eoads for neglect of the defendant to send bis slaves to open tbe streets in Manning. Tbe names of tbe Commissioners are not used as plaintiffs in tbe action, wbicb is brought by them as Commissioners of the Eoads.
    
      “ By a resolution of tbe Board, Commissioner Lesesne was directed to order out tbe bands liable to work, to open tbe streets within tbe village of Manning. In March, 1857, tbe work was done, and tbe streets laid out and opened sixty and seventy feet wide, and tbe defendant failing to send bis bands, was summoned as a defaulter to May, when tbe consideration of tbe default was postponed. August 10, 1857, be was fined twenty-five dollars and tbis suit was commenced on tbe day of February, to recover tbe fine.
    “ One witness stated that tbe distance from defendants to Manning, by Brewington is twenty miles; but Dr. Ingram said that be is certain it is not ten miles in a direct line.
    
      “ A motion for a nonsuit was made on tbe following grounds:
    “ 1. Because tbe Commissioners did not sue in tbeir individual names.
    “ 2. Because tbe recovery was barred by tbe statute.
    “ On both grounds tbe motion was refused and a decree was given for twenty-five dollars.”
    Tbe defendant appealed and now moved tbis Court to reverse tbe decree, or for a new trial, on tbe grounds:
    1. That tbe Commissioners should bave sued in tbeir individual names as plaintiffs styling themselves Commissioners.
    2. That tbe person who ordered out tbe defendant’s bands was not a Commisssioner.
    8. That tbe road or street *on which tbe defendant was summoned *to work bis bands was wider than tbe law permits.
    4. That tbe proof was insufficient that tbe defendant resided within ten miles of tbe place where be was summoned to send bis bands.
    5. That tbe fine or penalty was barred by tbe statute of limitations.
    6. That defendant bad no notice of tbe meeting of tbe Board at which be was fined.
    7. That defendant is not estopped by any action taken by the'Board.
    
      
      Spain, Richardson, for appellant,
    cited on first ground Commissionerss vs. Querard, 1 Sp. 216; Commissioners vs. McPherson, 1 Sp. 218; 2 Brev. 295; Evans’ Road L. 32, note 1; 11 Stat. 160; and under tbe third and seventh grounds they contended that the streets of Manning were not under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of Roads. They are subject to a special jurisdiction created by the Act of 1855, sec. 2, 12 Stat. 417.
    
      J. R, Saynsworth, contra.
    The Board is a. corporation for certain purposes, and, as such, may sue as a corporation would sue. In Miller vs. Ford, (4 Rich. 376,) it is declared that they are sub modo a corporation; that they “ have a corporate organization, having perpetuity and succession of members, and by law are constituted a Board,” &c., and “ to the extent of their duties and the liabilities which may be incurred in the performance of them, they have a corporate capacity.” The duty is imposed upon them to sue in certain cases; in so far they are a corporation. “ The Boards of Commissioners are quasi corporations and may sue without setting "but their individual names.” (Commissioners vs. Murray, 1 Rich. 341.)
    
      Quasi corporation — what is it ? Not properly, at any time, a single officer, as the governor or the clerk. The “ term is applied to such bodies or municipal societies, which, though not vested with the general power of corporations, are yet recognized by statute or immemorial usage as persons or aggregate corporations with precise duties which may be enforced, which may be maintained by suits at law.” They are only “restrained from a general use of the authority which belongs to these metaphysical persons by common law.” (Bouvier’s Dio. 400.)
    
      Quasi corporation is a 1/most a corporation; the description marking a resemblance and supposing a little difference. In this case the difference is small. Points of resemblance, (from text books.) 1. Corporation is an aggregate assemblage of many persons joined in one fellowship. 2. Acting under a common name. 3. Created to support' the common charge; to sue and be sued. 4. Deriving their existence from lawful authority. 5. Has power to raise money (by Act of 1825, the Commissioners of Eoads have power to raise money.) 6. Has the inherent power of assembling at pleasure (Act of 1825). 7. A majority binding the minority thus acting as one man, (this is the very essence and nature of a corporation.) 8. Prescribed quorum for transacting business. 9. Perpetuity and succession of members. 10. Power to fill vacancies; and actions do not abate by death or removal.
    2. Unnecessary to set out individual names.
    
    If the Court declares that it is necessary that the parties to a writ should be as certainly designated as is conveniently practicable, it will not insist upon technical particularity, when it is inconvenient or impracticable. It would be inconvenient to set out the names, because they are a “ numerous assemblage of individuals joined in one fellowship.” Impracticable, because frequent changes are occurring, so that at the end of a suit the parties may be entirely different. Inconvenient to encumber the records with suggestions of such changes. Unnecessary because*they act “ under a common name,” “ have legal existence,” &e.
    Why must the parties to a writ be known ? It is only necessary (as declared in 1 Spear, 216 or 220,) in order that the Court may know that it is brought by proper authority-, and that there is a party responsible for costs. Unnecessary in this case, because the board from the nature of the case, from circumstance of appointment by the Legislature, are composed of the best citizens. Their appointment is - almost a pa-rt of the law. Their meetings are public, freely advertised, and held at regular and stated intervals. Their aets are public property, their individuality and personality for all proper purposes are patent or accessible to all. They are known to the public, and in law, as a body; and are always entitled as of tbeir associate capacity. So that there can be no question, that, when the Board of Commissioners of Roads for Clarendon, a body recognized by law, bring suit as of their title, it is brought by proper authority.
    
    As to their responsibility for costs.
    
    
      Individually they are not liable for costs, (4 Rich. 382,) so that there is no use for their individuality to appear. As a Board they are liable, and as a Board “ they have power to assess their respective districts and parishes for all necessary expenditures.” And when they sue as á Board, whether their individual names appear or not, they are responsible for costs. They have a fund.
    
    3. The plea is bad, because (1 Spear 217) “the office controls the interest, and not the interest the office^' and it is in the office, and not the individual filling it, that the legal interest and cause of action vests.”
    
      2d ground. (11 Stat. 269.) Provision is made for filling vacancy by the Board in case of death, removal or refusing to serve. (9 Stat. 604.) Provision -is made for appointment of overseer in case of absence. The legislature makes it the duty of the Commissioners to clear the streets. They appoint a warner, an agent, or a special Commissioner to execute it in place of Commissioner of Lesesne, whom, for some reason ■(good to them) they have excused. Are they so utterly powerless as that the work must languish, rather than hands .should be called out by any other agency than his ?
    
      3d ground. (Evans’ Digest, 25.) Public roads shall be at ■least twenty or thirty feet wide. Does not say they shall never be wider, as discretion may dictate: (Ev. Dig. 47.) The streets of unincorporated villages are clearly under the ¡jurisdiction of Commissioners of Roads. Must they work ■them only the width of thirty feet, whatever that width may be? A committee appointed by the legislature to locate the village. They mark the streets a reasonable width. The 'Commissioners had to open them as marked out. The Committee was appointed to lay off or locate a village. Having done so according to proper butts and boundaries, tbeir authority ceased, and the Commissioners must work the streets.
    
      4th ground of appeal. The Commissioners cannot be expected to measure distance for every individual. They take reasonable means to find out. Let the party aggrieved measure the distance.
    - 5th ground. Default, March 23, 1857. Board met and took up the case second Monday in May. Continued it over to second Monday in August. Process lodged February 5, 1858. ..
    It is the intent of the law that the action of the Board should take case out of statute. They are required to meet only twice a year. (Ev. Dig. 11.) And “before action brought the amount of the fine must be fixed and ascertained.” When the cage is once before them they have clearly the power duly to deliberate upon it, and the law will not insist upon a hurried decision if six months shall have almost expired.
    
      7th ground. “Where the subject matter and the person are within the jurisdiction of the Commissioners their decision is final and conclusive, unless they have exceeded their jurisdiction, admitted illegal evidence, or in some way violated the law.” . (Price vs. Commissioners, Ev. Dig. 25.)
    Three months notice not necessary. Three months notice only required when they open road of their own authority, or where there is opposition and they petition the legislature. In this case the Commissioners of Location were required to advertise sale of lots three months; this having been complied with, the Commissioners of Boads need not advertise other three months.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

O’Neall, J.

There is too much diversity of opinion on some of the grounds of appeal to justify tbe Court in pronouncing an opinion upon tbem. Tbe ground taken in tbe argument on tbe third and seventh grounds together, “ that tbe streets of Manning were under a special jurisdiction,” and therefore that tbe Commissioners bad no right to call out tbe inhabitants of tbe District to work upon tbem, is that which has obtained an unanimous concurrence.

Tbe second section of tbe Act of 1855, entitled An Act to establish Clarendon County as a separate judicial District,” (12 Stat. 417,) appointed thirteen gentlemen Commissioners, who, at tbe expense of tbe District, were to “ select and purchase and contract for a tract of land of not less than six acres nor more than sixty acres; upon which they shall lay out a village to be called the Tillage of Manning.” The power to lay out a village, is the power to lay off the lots and open the streets. For it can only become a village by having places of habitation, and the means of ingress and egress. The Commissioners of Eoads had nothing to do with the matter, until the streets were thus opened and dedicated as highways. Then, if they thought proper, they might accept them as such, and call out the hands to work on them. This, however, was subsequent to the laying them out, which was done at the expense of the District by the gentlemen mentioned in the Act of 1855.

The motion to reverse the decree is granted.

Wardlaw, WhitNer, Glover and Müítro, JJ., concurred.

Motion granted. 
      
      
        State vs. Carver, 5 Strob. 217.
     