
    Richard Hutcheson vs. James M. Minis.
    M. purchased at marshal’s sale two negroes, and sold them to H., who gave his notes for the purchase-money; M., when the notes became due, suedH. on the notes and recovered judgment, and H. moved for a new trial: it was proved that H. wanted to purchase the negroes for his daughter, hut was unwilling to do so unless the title of M. was good; that M. refused to give any more than a bare quitclaim to the negroes; that M. purchased them under an execution against A. W. H., against whom there was also another judgment which was known to both M. and íL, and its lien canvassed at the time.H. was contracting with M. for the negroes; that they both then believed that M.’s title to the negroes, acquired by his purchase at the marshal’s sale, was paramount to the lien of the other judgment, and under that impression II. purchased the negroes, and gave his notes, and received from M. his quitclaim; and that the negroes were subsequently seized and sold under an execution which issued on the other judgment. The court overruled the motion for a new trial: Held, that both parties were equally cognizant of the facts relative to the title of M. to the negroes ; that M. was guilty of no fraud, and the motion was properly overruled.
    ERROR from the circuit court of Monroe county; Hon. Stephen Adams, judge.
    This was an action of assumpsit, brought by James M. Minis against Richard Hutcheson, in the circuit court of the county of Monroe, to the April term, 1843, founded upon fourteen promissory notes given by the defendant to the plaintiff on the 4th day of November, 1841, due and payable on or before the 1st day of March, 1842; twelve of which were for the sum of fifty dollars each, and two for forty dollars each, amounting in all to the sum of six hundred and eighty dollars. The defendant pleaded the general issue.
    On the 30th day of April, 1845, the cause was tried, and a verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $852 26.
    On the 8th day of May, 1845, and during the same term of the court, the defendant, by his counsel, moved the court for a new trial, upon the ground “ that the finding of - the jury was contrary to law and evidence.
    This motion was overruled by the court, and the defendant filed a bill of exceptions, setting out all the evidence.
    The bill of exceptions shows, that the plaintiff introduced upon the trial and read to the jury the fourteen promissory notes sued on, and rested his case.
    The defendant then proved that said notes were given to secure the purchase money of two negroes, Violet and Henry; which had once been the property of one Andrew W. Hardy, and had been sold by the marshal of the northern district of Mississippi, as his property, to satisfy an execution in favor of Led-yard, Hatter & Co. against him, which was issued on a judgment obtained at the June term, 1839, of the district court of the United States, at Pontotoc. That the plaintiff became the purchaser of said negroes, at the marshal’s sale, for the sum of six hundred and fifty dollars; that soon after, he purchased, he proposed, through his agent and brother-in-law, Parker Alexander, to sell them to the defendant, Hutcheson. The defendant stated that he desired to purchase them for his daughter, the wife of Andrew W. Hardy, but he would not do so unless the plaintiff’s title was good; that he was old and did not wish to buy a lawsuit ; that the sale from the plaintiff to the defendant was effected by Parker Alexander, at which the plaintiff, defendant, Parker Alexander, and Andrew W. Hardy were all present, at the house of Hardy, where the negroes were; that at the time of the sale they all conversed freely about an older judgment outstanding and unsatisfied against said Hardy; that all knew PJardy was insolvent, and the only doubt relative to the title was, whether the older, unsatisfied judgment, in the circuit court of Monroe, did not bind the property; that the knowledge of that judgment induced the defendant to refuse to purchase said ne-groes at first, and state that he was old and would not buy a law-suit; that Andrew W. Hardy, who was the son-in-law of the defendant, was desirous that the defendant should purchase the negroes, in order that his wife might have the use of them; that the plaintiff, Hardy, and Alexander, all expressed the opinion that the title of the plaintiff, under the marshal’s sale was good. The defendant finally agreed to purchase the negroes, and executed the notes sued on, and took a quitclaim title from the plaintiff, that being the only kind of title the plaintiff was willing to give, and left the negroes in the possession of Hardy, his son-in-law; that Hardy agreed with his father-in-law, if he would purchase the negroes, he, Hardy, would repay the money for them, when able to do so, and should he fail, the defendant could give him that much less at his death.
    The defendant, also, proved the existence of an older judgment, in the circuit court of the county of Monroe; that an execution founded upon this older judgment, was levied upon said negroes, Violet and Henry; that the defendant interposed his claim against said execution, tried the right of property, which resulted against him, and the negroes were again sold as the property of said Hardy to satisfy said older judgment.
    The plaintiff then proved, that at the time of the sale of the negroes to the defendant, they were worth a thousand dollars; that they were then in the possession of A. W. Hardy, by the permission of the plaintiff, under a promise from him, made at the time he purchased them at the marshal’s sale, that Hardy might redeem them, if he could do so.
    This was all the testimony in the cause.
    The defendant brought the case to this court by writ of error.
    
      R. Davis, for plaintiff in error.
    The grounds relied on to reverse the judgment in this case are, first, that the contract for the sale and purchase of the ne-groes, Violet and Henry, was made in mutual error, under circumstances material to the trade, which render it void.
    No question in the science of jurisprudence is better established than that total ignorance of the title, founded in a mistake of a plain and settled principle of law, misrepresentation, imposition, undue influence, misplaced confidence, and surprise, will abrogate and annul a sale for the purchase of property to which the title is defective. See 16 Ves. 72; 1 Veas. & Beam. 524; 1 Story on Eq. Juris. 132-138, 149, 152; Madd. Oh. Pr. 60; Mitford’s Eq. PI. 129; Newland on Contracts in Equity, 432. These authorities too fully sustain the proposition assumed to admit of cavil.
    It is manifest the plaintiff in error purchased ignorant of his rights, and was induced to do so by misrepresentation, imposition, undue influence, and misplaced confidence. He had not proposed the purchase ; it was the suggestion of the defendant in error, who procured his brother-in-law to hunt out this old man, ready to lie down in the grave, as the victim of his purposes, expecting, I apprehend, to exert an undue influence on his actions by softening his sympathies, by pointing him to the distressed condition of his daughter, and induce him to purchase property to which the title was defective. By these means of art and stratagem the misplaced confidence of the old man was betrayed into the purchase of the negroes, to whom he acquired no title, and which has become to him an entire loss, after much expense in defending the same, and much more harassment of feelings in his old age, when he required repose.
    Now if the defendant in error intended no imposition, why did he induce his brother-in-law to see the plaintiff in error, in relation to the purchase of the negroes 1 and why did he have him decoyed to the house of Hardy, and then when the conversation Avas had in regard to the title, remain profoundly silent? More than this, why did he sell the negroes for a price so much less than their value, and give a bill of sale Avith a warranty of title? Can the court believe that if the confidence of the plaintiff in error had not been misplaced, he ever Avould have purchased the negroes ? Had he not been ignorant of the title he Avas getting Avould he have purchased? Were not gross misrepresentations made in regard to the effects of the lien in favor of the older judgment? And more undue influences exerted upon him doubtless there were. The rule here advanced has been fully recognized in the courts of this country. See 1 Story’s Eq. Juris. 153; 1 Johns. Ch. R. 512; 2 Ibid. 51; 6 Johns. R. 169; 8 Wheaton, 211; 1 Peters’s S. C. R. 1; 12 Ibid. 32.
    
      The next and remaining ground to which I shall direct the attention of the court, is, that fraud marks this whole transaction, which is so manifest from the views above presented, that I will not trouble the court with an argument upon this point.
    
      John Goodtuin, for defendant in error.
    The counsel for the plaintiff in error, insists,
    1. That the sale of the negroes, Yiolét and Henry, was made in mutual error, under circumstances material to the contract, which render it void.
    2. That the sale was procured by fraud, and therefore void.
    These positions are evidently contradictory; the first cannot be maintained upon principle, nor the second by the facts. It is contended, in this case, that the negroes were purchased by the plaintiff in error, under a mistake of a well-settled principle of law, but not under a mistake of fact. The question is presented, how far, and under what circumstances, does the law relieve a man against mistakes 1 Mistakes are ordinarily divided into two sorts; mistakes in matter of law, and mistakes in matter of fact. In regard to mistakes of matter of law, it is a well known maxim, that ignorance of the law will not furnish an excuse for any person, either for a breach or an omission of duty; ignorantia legis neminem ex cus at; and this maxim is equally as much respected in equity as in law. Story’s Eq. Jurisp. 121. The ground assumed cannot be sustained.in a court of law; and no case can be found where the naked principle, that relief may be granted on account of ignorance of the law, is asserted in the books. This is the doctrine held in the case of Huniv. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174. The legal signification of the term, mistake in law, is, where the party had full knowledge of the facts upon which he acted, but misunderstood, or misapplied, the law arising upon such a state of facts. Jeremy’s Eq. Jurisp. 358. Courts of equity, which alone can take jurisdiction of, and correct mistakes, either in law or fact, hold, that ignorance of the law shall not affect agreements, nor excuse from the legal consequences of particular acts. Fonbl. Eq. b. I. ch. 2, sec. 7; 1 Madd. Ch. Pr. 60; 3 P. Will. 127;
    
      
      Shotwell v. Murray, 1 Johns. Oh. R. 512; 4 Mass. R. 342. The presumption is,' that every one is acquainted with his own rights, provided he had a reasonable opportunity to know them. And nothing can be more liable to abuse, than to permit a person to reclaim his property upon the mere pretence, that at the time of parting with it he was ignorant of the law acting upon his title. SiotTs v. Baker, 6 Johns. Oh. R. 169.
    The proof does not show any misrepresentation, imposition, undue influence, mental imbecility, undue confidence, or surprise. But upon the contrary, the proof shows conclusively that the parties dealt with each other at arms-length, the plaintiff in error confiding in his own opinion, and relying upon his own judgment.
    The plaintiff in error undertook to decide for himself the legal effect of /the elder judgment, which was in existence against Hardy, and under which the negroes were afterwards sold; and if this opinion afterwards turned out to be erroneous, he must abide tile consequences. The case of Shotwell v. Murray, 1 Johns.,,£!h. R. 512, is decisive of this case. In that case the c/stirt decide, that a sale under a second or junior judgment, is not of itself a waiver of the plaintiff’s rights under a first or elder judgment. Every person is bound to know the law; and where there is no mistake as to the fact, but as to the legal consequence, and that on a collateral point, there can be no ground of relief, either by vacating the sale, or by a perpetual injunction against the exercise of the defendant’s rights. The court further say, “ that it is a decisive fact, in this case, that when the plaintiff made the purchase he knew that such a prior judgment existed, and it was his business to make further inquiry upon the subject of that judgment, if such inquiry should become material. It was not incumbent on the defendant to tell the plaintiff that the former judgment would bind the land, notwithstanding the purchase, for that was a legal consequence, with which the defendant must be presumed to have been acquainted.” In this case, Hutcheson knew of the existence of the elder judgment against Hardy, and whether that judgment bound the negroes he was about to purchase, was a legal consequence, which he was bound to know. Minis concealed no fact of which Hutcheson was ignorant; and a person cannot be permitted to disavow or avoid the operation of an agreement entered into with a full knowledge of the facts, on the ground of ignorance of the legal consequences which flow from those facts. This is a settled principle of law and sound policy.
    The circumstance of the plaintiff in error taking a bill of sale, without warranty, implies a knowledge of doubtful title. The doctrine of caveat emptor is a fixed maxim, applicable alike to the transfer of lands and chattels. Smith & Montgomery v. Winston & Laioson, Executors of Kyle, 2 How. 601.
    On the trial below, the plaintiff objected to no testimony that was offered, and the defendant was suffered to prove .any and everything he could, whether legal or illegal. No instructions were asked by the counsel on either side, and after a fufl investigation, the jury found, a verdict for the plaintiff, whilch they were warranted in doing. \
    Motions for new trials are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court, and should not be granted unless the 'apt., plication discloses sufficient ground to render it probable that justice has not been done. 1 Peters’s R. 183; 1 How. R. 19. The general rule is, that a verdict will not be disturbed, but when it is manifest that the verdict is without evidence to support it. 2 Hill’s R. 524; 3 Dev. R. 34; Ibid. 112; 4 Ibid. 232. It is insisted, therefore, that the verdict of the jury is sustained by the law and testimony; and that the circuit court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial.
    
      R. Davis, in reply.
    It is admitted that ignorance of the law is no excuse, as a general rule, subject, however, to the exception contained in this class of cases, as shown by the authorities referred to.
    The doctrine of caveat emptor cannot apply in this case, because the vendor of property can never protect himself by that doctrine. Third persons, whose rights have been affected by the sale, can only avail themselves of that doctrine.
   Mr. Justice Thacher

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case comes up upon a motion for a new trial overruled. The facts of the case were, that the defendant in error instituted his action in the circuit court of Monroe county, against the plaintiff in error, upon his fourteen promissory notes, the aggregate amount of which was six hundred and eighty dollars. The defendant below showed upon the trial that the notes were given to secure the purchase-money of two slaves, Violet and Henry; that the plaintiff below purchased the slaves at a marshal’s sale, under an execution against one Andrew W. Hardy; that the defendant below was desirous to purchase the slaves for his daughter, who was the wife of said Hardy, but was unwilling to purchase them unless the title of the plaintiff below to the slaves was good; that finally the purchase was made by the defendant below, at the house of said Hardy, at which time the priority of lien of another judgment against Hardy was talked about and canvassed, upon which subject the plaintiff below, as well as others, expressed the opinion that the title under the marshal’s sale was paramount to the lien under consideration ; that Hardy urged the purchase by his father-in-law, promising to repay him the amount of the purchase-money, or to submit to a correspondent deduction in the distribution of his father-in-law’s property by will; that the plaintiff below gave and was willing to give to the defendant only a quitclaim title to the slaves; and that the slaves were subsequently seized and sold under the judgment which had been the subject of conversation above mentioned.

The evidence exhibits that both parties were equally cognizant of the facts relative to the title of the plaintiff below to the slaves. It is clear that the defendant below knew of the existence of another judgment against his son-in-law, and he could have made inquiry respecting the effect it might have upon the slaves. The mistake was in the legal effect of that judgment. That mistake was not occasioned by the fraud, or even instrumentality of the plaintiff below, for, on the contrary, he held out a warning to his purchaser, by declining to make other than a bare quitclaim to the slaves. The circumstances, therefore, do not present anything that can fairly affect the validity of the sale, or require the court below to grant the motion for a new trial. 1 Johns. Ch. R. 512.

Judgment affirmed.  