
    Stephen O. Knowlton v. The Erie Railway Company.
    The defendant is a common carrier of passengers, incorporated by the laws of New York, and was sued as. such common carrier on account of injuries received by the plaintiff whilst being carried as a passenger from one point to another on defendant’s road, and wholly within said State. The injury was charged to have been occasioned by defendant’s negligence. The pleadings show that the plaintiff was being carried gratuitously at the time of the accident, under a contract by which the plaintiff assumed all risks of accident and injury arising from negligence, eto.,, and that such pontract is, valid hy the laws, of New York. Held— That the validity of the stipulation exempting the defendant from liability for negligence must be determined by the laws of New York, within whose jurisdiction the contract was.made and to be executed; and as the plaintiff, under his contract, could have no right of action in the courts of New York, so his action cannot be maintained in this State..
    Error to- the court of common pleas of Trumbull county. Reserved in the district court.
    The plaintiff sued in the court below to recover damages for personal injury occasioned by tb.e bursting of a defective boiler, attached to one of defendant’s trains of cars, upon which the plaintiff was, at the time of the accident, being carried as a passenger, under a contract for carriage from Dunkirk, in the State of New York, to New York city, in the same State.
    The defendant, by answer, avers that the plaintiff was, at the time of the alleged injury, riding on defendant’s cars as a passenger, under a contract made in the State of New York, and valid by the laws thereof, by the terms of which the plaintiff was to be carried gratuitously, and assumed and took upon himself all risk of accident, and agreed that the defendant should not be liable, under any circumstances of negligence of their agents for any injury to his person, or any loss or injury to his property.
    To this answer the plaintiff demurred, and his demurrer having been overruled, judgment was entered for the defendant.
    To reverse this judgment, for supposed error in overruling his demurrer, the plaintiff filed his petition in error in the district court, where the case was reserved for the decision of this court.
    
      H. H. Moses for plaintiff in error:
    I. That a contract with a railroad company, exempting it from liability for damages caused by the negligence and carelessness of its employes, is, in the State of Ohio, abso¡lutely void, when such contract is made in this State, seems to be fully settled. Jones v. Voorhes, 10 Ohio, 145; Welsh v. Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 65.
    2. That the general rule is, that the validity of a contract is to be decided by the law of the place where it is made, is not doubted. But it is equally clear that to this general rule there are exceptions, founded upon the absolute right of each State to judge for itself how far they ought to go in enforcing contracts made in other States, and carrying them into effect according to the laws of such States. Story on Confl. Laws, secs.' Y, 18 to 24, 244. They have often been applied not only between a State and a foreign country, but also between a State and a sister State of the American Union.
    (1.) The first class of excepted contracts comprehends, anj contract which is injurious to its own interests or the interests of its own subjects. Story on Confl. Laws, sec. 244. (2.) Any contract against good morals or religion or public right. (3.) Any contract which is opposed to national policy and institutions and the interests of the people. Story on Confl. Laws, secs. 244-258-260; Tappan v. Poor et al., 15 Mass. 399; Ingraham v. Geyer, 13 Mass. 146; Martin v. Hill, 12 Barb. 633; Inhabitants of West Chester v. Inhabitants of Lexington, 1 Pick. 503; 1 Western Law Journal, 264; 20 Ohio, 301; Lawrence's Wheaton on International Law, 179.
    The contract in question comes within the exceptions, and our courts are not bound to enforce it, and, being opposed to our laws, will not enforce it, although made in New York and valid by the laws of that State.
    Our courts have declared that a contract exempting a public carrier from liability to respond for damages caused by negligence, is against the interests of our citizens, and opposed to our State policy and institutions, and to good morals and, public rights. Graham & Co. v. Davis & Co., 4 Ohio St. 377; Welsh v. Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 75; Jones v. Voorhes, 10 Ohio, 148.
    Such seems to be the law in England and in nearly all the States of the Union. Pierce on Railroad Law, 422; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Henderson, 51 Penn. St. 315; Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468; Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 469.
    And even in the State of New York a contrary doctrine seems to rest on a bare majority of the court. Wells v. New York Central Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 181, 190; Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill, 623.
    If it be said that, inasmuch as the contract is good where made, the courts here have nothing to do but to enforce it— that they have no power to loot into the morality or public policy of such a contract, I refer to the rule given us by the courts of the State of New York. 4 Cowen, 512.
    The doctrine herein urged has lately been affirmed in Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657.
    
      John M. Stull for defendant in error:
    The question is, How can this State affix a liability to acts done in the State of New York which the law of the State of Now York does not affix to them, and which, if it arise at all, must arise in opposition to the contract, and in opposition to the law of the place where the contract is made and where the act is done.
    The authorities are full and explicit: 2 Redf. on Railways (3d ed.), 235; Story on Confl. Laws, secs. 250, 307; Chapman v. Robertson, 6 Paige Ch. 627; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Peters, 65; Pomeroy v. Ainsworth, 22 Barb. 118, 120; Balme v. Wombough, 38 Barb. 352; 32 Barb. 522; 33 N. Y. 615; Shenill v. Hopkins, 1 Cowen, 103.
   Scott, J.

It has been repeatedly held by this court, that a common carrier cannot, in this State, even by express contract, relieve himself from liability for injuries caused by his own negligence, or that of his. servants, in the discharge of the duties incident to his employment. But, in this case, the plaintiff by his demurrer admits, that the contract for his carriage was made in New York, and was wholly to be performed in that _State; that it expressly stipulated for defendant’s exemption from all liability for such negligence as that which constitutes his cause of action, and that such contract exempting the carrier from liability is valid in that State. As the contract was made within the jurisdiction of New York, and contemplated no action outside of that jurisdiction, it is clear that the question of its validity must be determined solely by the laws of New York. The rights and obligations of the parties to such a contract, and in respect to the manner of its execution, cannot be affected by the laws or policy of other States. If no cause of action arose to the plaintiff under his contract, when the accident occurred, the transaction cannot be converted into a cause of action by the fact that the parties have subsequently come within the jurisdiction of Ohio. Story’s OonfL. of Laws, § 242; 2 Redf. on Railways, sec. 15.

The judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

Brinkerhoee, C.-L, and Welch, White, and Day, JJ., concurred.  