
    Frank B. Spear v. William H. Rood, garnishee of John E. Ward.
    
      Q-a/i'nishment — Transfer to official bail — Wrcmd.
    Garnishment process will not reach property transferred absolutely and in good faith by a public officer to a surety on his official bond to enable the latter to secure bis own and bis principal’s liability.
    The sufficiency of the consideration for a conveyance may bear on the honesty of the grantor’s intent; but excess in value over the amount of consideration is not conclusive evidence of fraud.
    Fraud in making a conveyance must be found as a fact before the con- . veyance can be avoided as fraudulent.
    Error to Marquette. (Grant, J.)
    June 13.
    June 22.
    Garnishment. Plaintiff brings error.
    Affirmed.
    
      Ball & Hanscom for appellant.
    
      E. E. Osborn for appellee.
    A debtor has the right to prefer one or more of his creditors, and pay them in full to the exclusion of all others: Olorice v. White 2 Pet. 178; Blalcey's Appeal 7 Penn. St. 449; TJIiler v. Maulfair 23 id. 481; Hop-Jems v. Beebe 26 id. 85 ; Hostrcmd v. Atwood 19 Pick. 281; Walceman v. Grover 4 Paige 23; Hollister v. Loud 2 Midi. 309; transfers of some specific article, or one or more descriptions of property directly to some favored creditor and for his exclusive benefit, are valid even where preferences are forbidden : Seymour v. Wilson 19 N. Y. 417; Hessing v. Me Gloslcey 37 Ill. 341; Archer v. O'Brien 7 Hun 146; York Oount/y Bk. v. Carter 38 Penn. St. 446; an assignment directly to a particular creditor for tbe payment or ■security of his debts is not “ an assignment for the benefit of ■creditors: ” U. S. v. McLellan 3 Sumn. 345; Leitch v. Hollister 4N.Y. 211; where preferences in assignments are prohibited, the prohibition is confined to cases of general assignments where the preferences are given by the assignment itself and not extended to specific transfers of property in payment or security of some particular debt: Meredith Mfg. Go. v. Smith 8 N. H. 347; Henshaw v. Sumner 23 Pick. 446; it is bad faith that makes a conveyance void as to creditors: Ilolbird v. Anderson 5 Term 235; Wood v. Dixie 7 Q. B. 892; Hall v. Arnold 15 Barb. 599 ; sureties and endorsers can be-preferred as well as actual present creditors: Burrill Assignments, §§ 113-175; Gunnvngham v. Freeborn 11' Wend. 240; Siemens v. Dell 6 Mass. 339; Halsey v. Whitney 4 Mason 206; Jewett v. Warren 12 Mass. 300; Dice v. Southgate 16 Gray 14-2; Barney v. Grover 28 Yt. 391; Krcvmer v. Danh 15 Ohio 253 ; JJhler v. Semple 20 N. J. Eq. 288; Perlcms v. Mayfield 5 Port. 182; HawTdns v. Mazy 12 Ala. 673; Lane v. Sleeper 18 N. H. 209; Me Whor-ter v. Wrighl 5 Ga. 555;. Bellune v. Wallace 2 Pich. (Law) 80.
   CaMPbbll, J.

Pood was garnished as holding property belonging to Ward, under the provisions of the garnishee act, which allow persons holding property by assignment in fraud of creditors to be treated as garnishees.

Ward, who was county treasurer of Marquette county, discovering a deficiency in his accounts to the amount of about $18,000, for which he was personally liable, turned over considerable property to Pood, who was a surety on his official bond. The transfers were absolute in form, and no written declaration of trust or defeasance was made, but it was understood to be a transfer to secure Ward’s liability, and to enable Pood to provide for his own liability as Ward’s surety.

The court below found there was no fraud in fact, and that the consideration was sufficient to uphold the conveyance. In this we can see no legal error. Ward was equitably bound to provide for this deficit, and to do so in such a way as to enable his sureties to be saved from difficulty. They were absolutely bound to the county, and it was right that property should be placed in their hands which they could convert and use to pay the debt. Where there is any considera■tion. of a valuable nature for a conveyance, its sufficiency in point of fact may be evidence on tbe question of honest intent, but an excess of value over the amount of consideration cannot be conclusive evidence of fraud, which must be found as a fact before the conveyance can be invalidated. There was, in our opinion, abundant evidence of good faith .in this transaction, and the finding was warranted by the testimony.

Under the statute of frauds no trust whatever was made to result in this case, and the questions applicable to trusts .are foreign to the issue, which was one of fraud or good faith.

Ve think there is no reason for disturbing the judgment, which must be affirmed with costs.

The other Justices concurred.  