
    Bonner and Wife vs. Bonner.
    A Court of Chancery will provent tlie removal of property beyond the limits of tho State, and the jurisdiction of the courts, where it is necessary to protect the remainder interest; or where the remainder is lost to the remainderman by sale or removal? it will order the owner of the life estate, ora stranger, to restore the value of the remainder. Tho court will not, however, exact security for the forthcoming of slaves which have been received in exchange for those in which complainants have the remainder.
    Thomas E. Bonner and wife, Minerva, filed this bill in the Chancery Court at Lebanon, against John S. Bonner and William Baird.
    The bill alledges, that Isham Smith made his will, in which he gave a life estate in a slave, Isabel, to his daughter Rebecca, with remainder to her children; that John Bonner married Rebecca, and Thomas E. Bonner, ihe son of John Bonner, married Minerva, the only child of Rebecca; that Isabel had children Randal, who was sold with absolute title to Baird, and Tom, who was exchanged for Caroline; that Caroline had issue, to wit, Ann, and that Ann was sold to John S. Bonner; that Baird and John S, Bonner do not recognize complainants as having any title in remainder to said slaves Ann and Randal, but claim them absolutely.
    The complainants state, that Rebecca is old and infirm, and that they will be entitled to all of said slaves or the proceeds and their increase at her death. The bill expresses the apprehension of complainants, that said slaves will be removed beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of the State, and so will be lost to complainents.
    The complainants pray, that their title in remainder be declared and protected; and to that end, that said Bonner and Baird be required to give bond and security that said slaves shall not be removed beyond the limits of the State, and shall be delivered over to them at the death of said Rebecca.
    The bill states the facts, and at the hearing the following decree was entered in the Chancery Court:—
    “This cause came on this day, July 20, 1846, to be heard on the pleadings and proof, before Chancellor Ridley, and the court being satisfied by the will of Isham Smith made in the State of Virginia, and there proved and recorded in the year 1795, that Rebecca Smith, who afterwards married J. Bonner, became entitled to a life estate in a slave named Isabel, and her increase, subject to the contingency of her marrying a second time, in which event, or upon her death, the complainant, Minerva, being her only child, would be entitled to the remainder. And it further appeared to the court, that the negro boy Randal, sold by John Bonner to the defendant Wm. Baird, was a son of said Isabel. And it further appeared to the court, that another son of Isabel, named Tom, was exchanged by the, said John or Rebecca for a woman named Caroline, and that the girl Ann, now in the possession of the defendant John S., is a daughter of said Caroline, and that she now has two or more children, and that the said John S. Bonner bought the said girl Ann from his father, the said John Bonner, with full notice of the state of the title. The court do, therefore, order, adjudge and decree, that the complainant, Minerva, is entitled by law to the remainder in the said slaves Randal and Ann and her children; and that the said Wm. Baird and Samuel Hancock deliver over the said slave Randal, and the said John S. Bonner the slaves Ann and her children, to the Master, who is hereby appointed a receiver, to take care of and hire out the said slaves from year to year until the death or marriage of the said Rebecca; paying over, however, the proceeds to the owners oí the life estate, to wit, the said Baird and John S. Bonner. But the tenants for the life, or said Rebecca, may be allowed to keep the possession of the said slaves by, giving bond and good security, renewable at each January term of this court: conditioned, that the said slaves, left in their respective possessions, shall be forthcoming and delivered over to the Master for the complainant at the marriage or death of the said Rebecca. The costs to be paid by the said William Baird and John S. Bonner equally, and that execution issue. And the said John S. Bonner being dissatisfied with the decree, prays an appeal to the Supreme Court, on his branch of the case, which is granted to him, on his giving bond and security for costs and for the forthcoming of said slave Ann and her children to abide by the order of said court.”
    
      From this decree the defendants appealed.
    
      Caruthers, StoJces and Brien, for the complainants.
    By a clause in the will of Isham Smith an estate for life was vested in Rebecca, his daughter (who afterwards married John Bonner, father of defendant) in a negro woman named Isabel, and remainder to her children. That this is the legal effect of the clause in said will, see Hunter vs. Loving 8 Yerg. Polk vs. Farris 10 Yer. But upon this point there can be no serious controversy.
    Tom, one of the children of Isabel was exchanged by John Bonner for a woman named Caroline, and one of her children named Ann was sold by the said John to defendant, John S. and she has now two children. These are the negroes in controversy. It is in proof that defendant had read the will of Isham Smith, and knew its provisions, and that the negro Tom was the son of Isabel and had been exchanged for Caroline and that Ann was a daughter of Caroline before he purchased her from his father.
    We assume the position in the first place that the tenant for life, John Bonner, was a trustee for the benefit of the remain-derman. King and others vs. Sharp, 6 Hump, 57, 2 McCall, 1 Hill S. C. Rep. 74, 374.
    
      2. This being true, it will follow, that the remainderman or cestui que trust, has the right, in case the thing held in trust is commuted or exchanged for any other property to pursue and take the original property or the proceeds of it. He may elect which he will have. 1 Story Eq. sec. 34, 322, 2 Story Eq. sec-1259, 1260, 1261, 1262, and cases there cited. This is a principle of universal application in courts of Eq. Ib 1258.
    The'same principle applies to all cases of a fiduciary character. Ib. 1 Story Eq. sec. 314 to 328 and cases there cited.
    
      Guild, for defendant Bonner.
   Reese, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

By a clause in the will of Isham Smith, he devised to his daughter Rebecca a negro woman, slave, named Isabel for the life of the said Rebecca, with remainder to her children. The devisee Rebecca intermarried with John Bonner, the Father of defendant. The slave Isabel had children, one of whom, a boy, named Tom, was long since exchanged by the said John Bonner for a negro girl slave, named Caroline. One of the children of Caroline, named Ann, was sold by the said John Bonner to John S. Bonner, the defendant. Rebecca Bonner, formerly Rebecca Smith, is still living. She is the owner of the life estate in the woman Isabel and her increase of which Tom was one. Tom is still living, and has always remained, and been kept in the neighborhood of Bonner. This bill filed by the complainants, entitled in remainder, to be secured and indemnified, as to the forthcoming at the death of Rebecca Bonner formerly Rebecca Smith, not of the slaves Isabel and her increase, limited to them in remainder, but for the forthcoming at that time of Ann and her children, the descendants of Caroline for whom Tom was exchanged. This court has manifested in the case of Logan Henderson vs. Vaulx and wife that a Court of Chancery will protect the interest of a remainderman in slaves, so far as to prevent the life estate owner from taking them beyond the limits of the State, and the jurisdiction of our courts—and this, upon the principle, that the life estate owner, although entitled to the beneficial use of the property as owner, must yet so use it, as not to destroy, or unnecessarily impair the value of the remainder. And in other cases, we have held the life estate owner, or even a stranger to be liable for the value of the property in remainder, if it has been lost to the remainderman, by sale and removal beyond the limits of the State.

Upon the principle of these cases, we should have felt no difficulty in decreeing a security and indemnity for the forthcoming of Tom, at the determination of the life estate, if the bill had been filed for that purpose against John Bonner and the present owner of Tom: for to Tom, at the determination of the life estate, or to his value, the remaindermen are unquestionably entitled.

We are aware of no principle, or precedent, however, which will sanction or authorise the relief prayed for in the bill as to Ann and her children.

Let the decree of the Chancellor be reversed, and the bill be dismissed.  