
    Alice Davol versus Humphrey Howland.
    A wife, divorced for the adultery of her husband, is entitled to dower in all the lands of which he has been seised at any time during the coverture.
    In this action, the said Alice, styling herself late the wife of Pardon Davol, demands her dower in a certain parcel of land; and alleges that the said Pardon, formerly her husband, was seised in his demesne as of fee of the premises during the coverture of the said Pardon with the demandant; that she has been divorced from the bonds of matrimony, for the cause of adultery committed by him: and that, since the said divorce was had, and a month before the purchase of her writ in this case, viz., on, &c., at, &c., she demanded of the said Humphrey, tenant in possession, and having the next immediate estate of freehold in the premises, to assign and set out to her her reasonable dower in the premises; which the said Humphrey hath refused to do, but hath deforced, and still deforceth, her thereof.
    The tenant pleads in bar, that, at the time when the *said Alice was divorced from the bonds of matrimony as aforesaid, the said described premises were not the land of the said former husband of her, the said Alice.
    
    To this plea in bar the defendant demurs generally, and the tenant joins in demurrer.
    
      
      Bassett, for the demandant.
    By Stat. 1785, c. 69, § 5, it is enacted that, “ When the divorce shall be for the cause of adultery committed by the husband, the wife shall have her dower assigned her in the lands of the husband, in the same manner as if such husband was naturally dead.” But a seisin at any time during the coverture gives the wife a right to dower after the death of her husband, whatever alienations may have been made of the land.
    
      Tillinghast and J. M. Williams, for the tenant,
    argued that the statute referred to lands of which the husband was seised at the time of the divorce; what is added has respect only to the remedy, which is to be the same as if the husband was dead. The expression in the old statute, of which the one now in force is a revision, is, “ All such lands, &c., as her husband was seised of, &c., at any time during the marriage.” 
       Nor was this change of phraseology adopted without reason. Purchasers of real property, in which the widow of the grantor maybe entitled to dower, in case she survives her husband, may estimate by mathematical rules the value of such a possible encumbrance, and he may make his contract at a price resulting from such calculation. But how are the chances of a divorce of this kind to be calculated ? Besides, divorces may be, and it is believed sometimes are, obtained by collusion. It is, then, against a wise policy to extend the provision of the statute in this case by construction.
    The declaration in this case is greatly defective. The allegation of the divorce is too general. The divorce is a matter of record, and the record should have been referred to, with a prout patet, &c. As it is here stated, it cannot be known in what county or at what time it was decreed.
    
      Holmes, for the demandant, in reply.
    The declaration * was copied from a precedent of the late Chief Justice Parsons, when at the bar.  The divorce is sufficiently alleged, to have been traversed, which would have brought up the record. As to the construction of the statute, the intention of the legislature clearly appears, that a woman divorced from her husband for cause of adultery in him, shall have a right of dower in the same degree as if her husband were naturally dead.
    
      
      
        Mass. Laws, vol. ii. Appendix, 961.
    
    
      
      
        Precedents of Declarations, 313.
    
   Parker, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. The point presented by the pleadings is, that the husband of the demandant, although seised of the land in which dower is claimed during the coverture, had alienated it before the decree of divorce took place; and the legal inference attempted to be drawn is, that the wife is not dowable, but of lands of which the husband continues seised until the dissolution of the- marriage.

The counsel for the tenant have argued that the legislature intended, by the language of the provision in question, to limit the right of the wife to the lands which remained the husband’s at the time of the divorce.

But this is too narrow a construction; for the whole sentence manifestly shows an intention to place the divorced wife upon the same footing with the widow, in respect to dower. The construction contended for would operate severely upon an unfortunate woman who feels obliged to seek a separation from an unworthy husband, and might prevent her from asking for the relief which the law designs for her. For if she remains with her husband, after he has forfeited all claim to her respect and confidence, until his death, she will have dower in any lands he may have alienated during the coverture. But if she withdraws from the connection, she may be cut off from all dower; for it would be in the power of the husband, after committing the crime which is a legal cause of divorce, to transfer all his real estate, and thus deprive his injured wife of the means of living. Such a construction of * the statute would be unnatural and injurious. Nor is it to be supposed that the legislature intended to place in the hands of a criminal husband a power to coerce a continued cohabitation, by exposing the wife to want, if she should avail her self of the liberty afforded her by the law.

Plea in lar adjudged lad  