
    DOSSETT v. STATE.
    (No. 6504.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Nov. 29, 1922.)
    Criminal law <&wkey;>4l9,420( 11) — Disorderly house <@=>l 6 — Sheriff’s conversation with inmate of disorderly house after arrest held inadmissible hearsay, hut evidence as to arrest of girls admissible.
    In a prosecution for keeping a disorderly house, testimony by the sheriff that he arrested two girls outside the house while attempting to escape, and that thereafter they returned to the house for their effects and left town, held admissible, but the testimony as to a conversation had, not in defendant’s presence, with one of the girls while she was confined in jail, held inadmissible hearsay.
    <@s»For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
    Appeal from Milam County Court; W. G. Gillis, Judge.
    Lena Wells Dossett was convicted of keeping a disorderly house, and she appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    R. Lyles, of Cameron, for appellant.
    A. J. Lewis, Co. Atty., of Cameron, and R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   HAWKINS, J.

Appellant was convicted of keeping a disorderly house, punishment being assessed at a fine of $200 and 20 days’ imprisonment in the county jail.

Only one point will be considered. On the night that appellant was arrested, the officers made two visits to the house in question. On the first visit they found no women at the house with the exception of appellant, who told them there were no other girls there. About an hour and a half later the officers again visited the house, at which time they discovered two girls who were apparently undertaking to get away, being on the outside of the house at the time. These girls were arrested and placed in jaiL

Upon the trial, over objection, the sheriff was permitted to testify that after they were placed in jail he had a. conversation with one of them who told him they came front Navasota and had lived in a bawdy house there; thqt she had been living in appellant’s house since the morning of the day before and had plied her vocation in appellant’s house on two occasions only; that she had been deceived about the condition of things at Cameron; that she had been told there was no trouble there, and if he would let them, go they would leave town and never come back; that he took them out of jail and. down to appellant’s house, where they got their clothes, and from there they were taken to the train; that they left town; that he had never seen them since, did not know who they were nor where they were. Appellant was not present at the time this conversation occurred.

Objection was made to the recital of the statement on the ground that it was hearsay testimony, not in the presence of appellant, and in no way binding upon her. As supporting the contention that the testimony was admissible, the state has cited, among other cases, Robbins v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 523; Finn v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 521, 132 S. W 805; Novy v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 492, 138 S. W. 139; Hickman v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 88, 126 S. W. 1149; Davidson v. State, 76 Tex. Cr. R. 196, 173 S. W. 1037; Key v. State, 71 Tex. Cr. R. 485, 160 S. W. 354; Dimitri v. State, 70 Tex. Cr. R. 17, 155 S. W 535. We have examined all of these cases carefully and have reached the conclusion that they do not support the state’s contention. It will be found from an inspection of the cases in every instance the evidence objected to related to matters which occurred in or about the house which was under investigation. There is no question but that in this state the conduct and conversation of the inmates of a house claimed to be disorderly may be shown, because in a sense it may be said that the conduct and conversation of the inmates is the res gestte of the business there being conducted, and reflects the character of the house. It has been held many times that it may also be shown that inmates of the house have entered pleas of guilty to charges against them for being prostitutes. This is admitted for the purpose of establishing their character. Many of the cases, notably Key v. State (supra), show that the defendant signed the bonds of the women and interested himself in the charges against them. The general rule is stated in Corpus Juris, vol. 18, p. 1259, as follows:

“It is competent to show the conduct and conversation of the inmates and frequenters while in and about the bouse, and in some cases their conduct and conversation when away from the house may be shown, as bearing upon their character. But this rule does not let in hearsay, and evidence of conduct not in the vicinity of the house has been held prejudicial error.”

Courts have been very liberal not only in this state but in other jurisdictions in admitting evidence upon charges incident to the keeping of disorderly houses, but we know of no authority that has extended the liberality to the extent of admitting evidence similar to .that complained of in the instant case. It was competent to show that the two women in question were seeking to escape from the vicinity of the house and also that they returned to the house and secured their clothing; but when the officer was erroneously permitted to detail the conversation had with one of the women, which to our minds was the most damaging evidence introduced in the trial of the case, and which appears to fall clearly under the hearsay rule, it becomes our duty to reverse. If the evidence complained of in this case was admissible, then it would be permissible for a witness to state that six months before the arrest at some place other than the house in question a woman had told him that she was a prostitute and had plied her vocation in the house. It would follow that such statements made at any time within the statute of limitations could be admitted. We do not believe such an extension to be within the sound rule • of evidence recognized by all the authorities, even touching the investigation of disorderly houses.

For the error committed, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.  