
    Cary PICKETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEVADA BOARD OF PAROLE COMMISSIONERS; Nevada Department of Public Safety Division of Parole and Probation, Defendants-Appellees.
    Nos. 13-17625, 14-15291
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 14, 2016 
    
    FILED June 22, 2016
    Cary Pickett, Indian Springs, NV, Pro Se.
    Adam Derrick Honey, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, AGNV-Office Of The Nevada Attorney General (Las Vegas), Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

In these consolidated appeals, Nevada state prisoner Cary Pickett appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising out of parole violation hearings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pickett’s Rule 60(b) motion because Pickett did not demonstrate any grounds warranting such relief. See id. at 1100-04 (discussing grounds for relief under Rule 60(b), and explaining that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is granted “only where extraordinary circumstances” are present (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Contrary to Pickett’s contentions, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Pickett failed to demonstrate that his counsel’s actions amounted to virtual abandonment entitling him to relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See id. at 1104 (finding plaintiff not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) even though “decision may have been driven by inept or erroneous advice or conduct of her counsel”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pickett’s motion to file an amended complaint after the deadline set forth in the pretrial scheduling order because Pickett failed to demonstrate good cause. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-10 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth standard of review and “good cause” requirement to modify a scheduling order).

We reject, as meritless Pickett’s contentions that the magistrate judge acted improperly.

All pending requests are denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     