
    Maria JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The SCOTTS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 09-0950-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 16, 2009.
    
      Sandra D. Frelix, New York, NY, for Appellant.
    Craig S. Friedman, (Matthew W. Lampe, on the brief), Jones Day, New York, NY, for Appellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges and P. KEVIN CASTEL, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable P. Kevin Castel, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Maria Jackson (“plaintiff’ or “Jackson”) appeals from the February 11, 2009 judgment of the District Court dismissing Jackson’s claims of discrimination, defamation, failure to make reasonable accommodations, and breach of the implied duty of good faith against defendant The Scotts Company (“defendant” or “Scotts”) under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), the Equal Protection Clause of the New York State Constitution, and New York common law in this diversity action. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the District Court erred in (1) dismissing plaintiff’s claims under the NYCHRL after concluding that the discriminatory acts did not occur in New York City; (2) dismissing in part plaintiff’s claims under the NYSHRL as untimely; (3)dismissing plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages after concluding that punitive damages are unavailable under the NYSHRL; (4) not giving effect to a stipulation between the parties to extend plaintiffs time to respond to defendant’s motion to dismiss; (5) denying plaintiffs request to extend discovery; and (6) the district judge’s failure to disqualify himself. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the procedural history of this case.

Plaintiff argues that, for various reasons, the District Court’s March 27, 2008 WL 1700224, and April 30, 2008 orders granting defendant’s partial motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. § 12(b)(6) were in error. Because Jackson did not oppose this motion to dismiss before the District Court, she failed to raise the arguments she now makes on appeal before the District Court. We will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Diaz v. Paterson, 547 F.3d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir.2008). Accordingly, we decline to consider plaintiffs arguments that the District Court erred in dismissing her first through third claims to relief, to the extent that they are time barred, and her fourth through eleventh claims for relief, in their entirety.

The District Court dismissed plaintiff’s remaining claims—namely, claims under the NYSHRL arising out of acts occurring after December 21, 2004—in a memorandum opinion of February 10, 2009, 2009 WL 321010, for non-compliance with a discovery order pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 37. On appeal, plaintiff fails to contest the basis on which the District Court dismissed these claims—namely, for failure to comply with discovery orders. Jackson’s brief states only that “Plaintiff responded to the Defendant’s discovery requests.” PI. Br. 7. “[A] single conclusory sentence” is insufficient to raise an issue on appeal, Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005), and an argument not raised in an appellate brief is deemed abandoned and lost. United States v. Joyner, 313 F.3d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we conclude that Jackson has abandoned any argument to challenge the District Court’s dismissal of her claims under the NYSHRL for acts occurring after December 21, 2004.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the district judge erred in denying Jackson’s motions to disqualify him. Before the District Court, plaintiff argued that Judge Kaplan should be disqualified because the law firm at which he formerly was a partner purportedly represented defendant in an unrelated matter. On appeal, however, Jackson argues that Judge Kaplan should be disqualified because of a “pattern of unequal treatment of the parties’ legal arguments and filings.” PI. Br. 12, 21. Because plaintiff did not raise this argument before the District Court, we decline to consider this argument. See Diaz, 547 F.3d at 94-95. On appeal, plaintiff does not argue that recusal is warranted because of a purported connection between Judge Kaplan’s former law firm and defendant, and thus plaintiff has abandoned this argument. Joyner, 313 F.3d at 44. In any event, to do so would be futile as the firm has confirmed on the record that it has never represented defendant.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed plaintiffs arguments on appeal and find each of them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.  