
    COURT OF APPEALS.
    Patrick McKenna agt. Helen M. Edmundstone, impleaded, &c.
    Mechanics’ lien lew of 1875, applicable to New York city, not repealed by chapter 486 of Laws of 1880—Jurisdiction of court to make order canceling lien on giving bond.
    
    The mechanics’ lien law of 1875, applicable to the city and county of Hew York, was not repealed by chapter 486 of the Laws of 1880, which by its terms provided for the acquiring and enforcement of mechanics’ liens in the cities of this state.
    Under the law regulating mechanics’ liens, now in force in the city of Hew York, the court has jurisdiction to make an order canceling the lien on the giving of a bond.
    
      January, 1883.
    
      M. J. Farley, for appellant.
    
      A. C. Thomas, for respondent.
   Andrews, J.

This action was brought to foreclose a mechanics’ lien filed by the plaintiff on July 30, 1881, against the premises owned by the defendant Edmundstone, situate in the city of Hew York, for work done after May 1, 1881.

The order from which the appeal is taken was made under the mechanics’ lien law of 1875, applicable to the city and county of Hew York, which directed the lien to be discharged upon the giving by the defendant of a bond with sureties for the payment of any judgment which might be recovered in the action pursuant to subdivision 4, section 15 of that act.

It is claimed by the appellant that the act of 1875 was repealed by chapter 486, Laws of 1880, entitled “An act to secure the payment of mechanics, laborers and workmen who perform work; also persons furnishing materials toward the erection, altering or repairing buildings, wharves, vaults or any other structure in the cities of the state of Hew York;” and the determination of this appeal depends upon the correctness of this contention.

It is well settled that a special and local statute providing for a particular case or class of cases is not repealed by a subsequent statute general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general act, but for the special law, include the cases provided by the latter (Matter of the Commissioners of Central Park, 58 N. Y., 493). This is but the application of the larger rule that a statute is not to be deemed repealed by implication by a subsequent act upon the same subject, unless the two are manifestly inconsistent with and repugnant to each other, or unless the clear intention is disclosed on the face of the latter statute to repeal the former one (Bowen agt. Lease, 5 Hill, 225).

There was no express repeal of the statute of 1875 in the statute of 1880, and if the former statute was repealed by the later one, it must be upon the ground that the two cannot consistently stand together, in' which case a repeal by implication is necessarily effected. The statute of 1875 related exclusively to the city and county of Hew York; the statute of 1880 relates to the cities of the state, and while the city of Hew York, in the absence of any other statute upon the subject of mechanics’ lien, would be deemed included within its purview, that alone is not' sufficient to indicate an intention on the part of the legislature to repeal the act of 1875.

It was held by this court, in Van Denburgh agt. The Village of Greenbush (66 N. Y., 1), that chapter 558, Laws of 1869, which amended the lien law of 1854, applicable to certain counties in the state, by extending its provisions to all counties except Erie, Kings, Queens, Hew York and Onondaga, did not operate as a repeal of chapter 778, Laws of 1865, •which enacted a special lien law applicable to the county of Rensselaer. And in Whipple agt. Christian (80 N. Y., 523) it was held that the lien law of 1844 (chap. 305), applicable to all the cities in the state, except Hew York and certain specified villages, including Canandaigua, was not repealed as to that village by chapter 204, Laws of 1858, which extended the hen law of 1854 to all the counties of the state except Hew York and Erie.

The rule that the later statute does not repeal a former one relating to the same subject, but limited in its application to a particular locality, is applicable, although the more general statute does not embrace the whole territory of the state. A - statute affecting all males or all females or all infants would plainly be a general one, and on the same principle an act. applicable to all cities is general in contradistinction to a statute applicable to one city only (See In re. The Evergreens, 47 N. Y., 216). It is claimed that the intent of the legislature in passing'the act of 1880 to repeal the act of 1875 is shown by the fact that the city of Buffalo is excluded from its provisions. This, it is claimed, affords an inference of an intention to include all the cities of the state except the one specially excepted, on the construction that the exclusion of one city is the inclusion of the others. But we think this does not afford that clear evidence of intention, which justifies us in holding that the former statute was repealed by implication.

The legislature, at the same session in which the act of 1880 was passed, also enacted a special lien law for the city of Buffalo (Laws of 1880, chap. 143), and the legislature, for greater caution, may have excepted the city of Buffalo from the general law to prevent any doubt that the special act was not superseded. But we think it would be extending the inference beyond its legitimate limits to infer from such exception an intention to repeal the act of 1875.

The Hew York city consolidation act of 1882 (chap. 410, sec. 1807, et seq.) incorporates provisions found in both the act of 1875 and that of 1880, but we do not perceive that it affords any light upon the point here considered.

We are of opinion, therefore, that the act of 1875 was not repealed by the act of 1880, and that the court had jurisdiction to make the order in question.

All concur, except Rapallo and Miller, JJ., absent.  