
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jorge PEREZ-DIAZ, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-50229
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 11, 2017 
    
    Filed April 24, 2017
    Jennifer L, Gmitro, Esquire, Attorney, Ajay Krishnamurthy, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, US Department of Justice, Southern District of California, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Bridget Lynn Kennedy, Esquire, Trial Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jorge Perez-Diaz appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 18-month custodial sentence and ten-month term of supervised release imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Perez-Diaz contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to consider his mitigating argument that his underlying deportation order may have been erroneous. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court properly considered Perez-Diaz’s arguments and explained sufficiently its determination that an above-Guidelines sentence was warranted in light of his significant criminal and immigration history. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357-58, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007).

Perez-Diaz next contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the mitigating factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Perez-Diaz’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the need for deterrence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; United States v. Gutierrez-Sanchez, 587 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The weight to be given the various factors in a particular case is for the discretion of the district court.”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     