
    Sherman BAHR, d/b/a Video One Repair, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CANON U.S.A., INC., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 14-56292
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted July 6, 2016 Pasadena, California
    July 26, 2016
    Steven Nathan Berk, Berk Law PLLC, Washington, DC, Thomas D. Mauriello, Mauriello Law Firm, APC, San Clemente, CA, James C. Shah, Shepherd Finkelman Miller & Shah, LLC, Media, PA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Katherine J. Santón, Santón General Counsel, Costa Mesa, CA, Kent J. Schmidt, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Irvine, CA, Richard H. Silberberg, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: VANASKIE, MURGUIA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges
    
      
      The Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Sherman Bahr, the owner of Video One Repair, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims under the Song-Beverly Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1790 et seq., the Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720 et seq, and the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of these claims.

1. Bahr argues that Section 1798.03 of the Song-Beverly Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.03, requires manufacturers of certain electronics to supply all “service and repair facilities” with repair parts and service manuals for at least seven years after the date of manufacture. The Act’s text, however, suggests that this section was not meant to apply to all repair facilities. Although the phrase “service and repair facilities” is not defined in the Act, other sections of the Act clearly indicate that this phrase refers to the manufacturer’s facilities or to authorized-independent facilities, but not to unauthorized facilities like Bahr’s. Indeed, several provisions of the Act address “service and repair facilities” that are operated or authorized by the manufacturer, but address unauthorized “independent repair or service facilities” separately. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(a); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.3. Considering the legislation as a whole, Boise Cascade Corp. v. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991), it is evident that the “service and repair facilities” referred to in Section 1793.03 are those maintained or authorized by the manufacturer. Because Bahr’s shop is unauthorized, Section 1793.03 does not require Canon to supply Bahr’s repair shop with repair parts or service manuals. As such, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Bahr’s Song-Beverly claim.

2. Bahr also argues that he properly pled a “tying” claim under the Cartwright Act. We disagree. The district court identified defects with Bahr’s tying claim and gave him an opportunity to amend his complaint, but Bahr did not do so. Because Bahr did not properly allege that replacement parts and services are two distinct products, see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992), we agree with the district court that Bahr failed to properly plead a tying claim.’ Thus, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Bahr’s Cartwright Act claim.

3. Lastly, Bahr argues that his Song-Beverly and Cartwright claims support a derivative claim under the UCL. Because we find that the district court properly dismissed these claims, however, Bahr’s claim under the UCL necessarily fails. Thus, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Bahr’s UCL claim.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     