
    Filemon ARELLANO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ben CURRY, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 08-56173.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Oct. 13, 2011.
    
    Filed Oct. 24, 2011.
    
      Ramiah Shanti Brien, R. Shanti Brien, Attorney-at-Law, Oakland, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Filemon Arellano, Soledad, CA, pro se.
    Sarah J. Farhat, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: FERNANDEZ and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and ERICKSON, District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, Chief United States District Judge for the District of North Dakota, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Filemon Arellano appeals the district court’s denial of his April 2007 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.

The district court determined that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Arellano asserts that the statute did not begin to run when the state criminal judgment became final, but rather at a later date when he discovered the factual predicate “through the exercise of due diligence.” He also asserts that he was entitled to equitable tolling. See Holland v. Florida, — U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010). We disagree. Our review of the record makes it apparent that, as the district court decided, by the year 2000 at the latest, Arellano should have discovered his claim that, although directed to do so, prior counsel had not filed his notice of appeal. Indeed, Arellano might well have been expected to discover that claim at an earlier date, but using the year 2000 does give him the benefit of the doubt. We are unable to hold that Arellano’s delay between then and April of 2007 can be excused on the basis that he was sufficiently diligent for either delayed statute of limitation commencement or equitable tolling purposes.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
     
      
      . 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).
     
      
      . See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D); Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n. 3 (9th Cir.2001).
     
      
      . See Holland, - U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 2562; Bryant v. Ariz. Att'y Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir.2007). Put otherwise, the extraordinary circumstance of his attorney’s bad acts (which should have been known by 2000) does not sufficiently explain his delay in filing. See United States v. Buckles, 647 F.3d 883, 889-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 436, 181 L.Ed.2d 283 (2011); Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047, 1057-58 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 474, 178 L.Ed.2d 301 (2010).
     
      
      . We note that the state courts denied relief on the basis of his untimeliness and lack of diligence in filing papers with them. See Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir.2005). They declared he had procedurally defaulted.
     
      
      . We decline to consider the uncertified issue that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing; we see no basis to hold that the district court erred. See Doe v. Woodford, 508 F.3d 563, 567 (9th Cir.2007); Brown v. Ornoski, 503 F.3d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir.2007).
     