
    ZHU JIAO JIANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-4769-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 3, 2012.
    Gary J. Yerman, Yerman & Associates, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Mark C. Walters, Senior Litigation Counsel; Glen T. Jaeger, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Zhu Jiao Jiang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 27, 2010, decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Zhu Jiao Jiang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Oct. 27, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of Jiang’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). When, as here, the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Jiang’s motion was indisputably untimely and number-barred because it was filed almost seven years after the agency’s final order of deportation and it was her second motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(A), (C)(i), there are no time limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Jiang’s newly commenced practice of Christianity constituted a change in her personal circumstances, rather than a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the untimely filing of her motion to reopen. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005). Moreover, the BIA reasonably concluded that the evidence that Jiang submitted in support of her motion did not demonstrate a material change in conditions excusing the untimely and number-barred filing of her motion because the evidence showed only that, since Jiang’s 2002 removal proceedings, the Chinese government had continually repressed the practice of Christianity in certain areas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Furthermore, although the Chinese government may have intensified its repression of unregistered religious groups in certain regions leading up to the 2008 Olympics, that intensification was not material to Jiang, as she was from a province not mentioned with respect to the intensification, and she filed her motion more than one year after the Olympics had concluded. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jiang’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  