
    Frangky PEKOENEGORO, Maria Sintya Dewi, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-3693-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 5, 2011.
    
      Linda Kenepaske, New York, NY, for Petitioners.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Anthony W. Norwood, Senior Litigation Counsel; Micheline Hershey, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, GUIDO CALABRESI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Frangky Pekoenegoro and Maria Sintya Dewi, natives and citizens of Indonesia, seek review of an August 17, 2010, order of the BIA affirming the December 15, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Patricia A. Rohan, which denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Frangky Pekoenegoro and Maria Sintya Dewi, Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/071 (B.I.A. Aug. 17, 2010), aff'g Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/071 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 15, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA’s decision. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

The only issues before us are Petitioners’ eligibility for withholding of removal and CAT relief. The agency reasonably determined that Pekoenegoro and Dewi failed to demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. As the agency found, the harm Pekoenegoro and Dewi described — including taunts and other verbal abuse, isolated physical harm, including Pekoenegoro’s 1999 assault, two instances of sexual harassment of Dewi, and Dewi’s detention by government officers when she tried to obtain a passport — was insufficient, considered either individually or in the aggregate, to constitute persecution, as neither Pekoenegoro nor Dewi was subjected to serious physical or mental harm. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341-42 (2d Cir.2006) (in order for harm to constitute persecution, it must be sufficiently severe, rising above “mere harassment”); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985), overruled, in part, on other grounds, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). Moreover, with the exception of Dewi’s brief detention, Petitioners were consistently harmed by other Indonesians, and not by, or with the consent of, the Indonesian government. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222.

Because Pekoenegoro and Dewi did not establish past persecution, they are not entitled to a presumption of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1). Although Petitioners argue, independent from their claim of past persecution, a pattern or practice of persecution of ethnic Chinese Christians, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2) (providing that an applicant for asylum shall not be required to show that he will be singled out individually for persecution if he establishes that there is a pattern or practice of persecution of a group of similarly situated persons); Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir.2007), substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Pekoenegoro and Dewi did not establish a pattern or practice in Indonesia, see Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110 (2d Cir.2009).

Because Pekoenegoro and Dewi did not establish past persecution, a likelihood of future persecution, or a pattern or practice of persecution, the agency did not err in denying them application for withholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1), (2). Moreover, because Petitioners’ CAT claim was based on the same factual predicate, they similarly failed to meet their burden for that form of relief. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522-23 (2d Cir.2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  