
    No. 1229.
    A. J. Fry v. Dudley & Nelson.
    Where words in a written, instrument may convey two different meanings, the one in harmony with, and the other antagonistic to, the law, that construction should always be given to them which will harmonize with the law.
    The words “in currency ” in a bill of exchange means legal currency.
    Where a party received for collection drafts on a bank m New Orleans, payable in currency, he cannot receive payment in any other than legal currency. His receiving payment in Confederate treasury notes,current at the time, will not release him from liability, because they were not legal currency.
    APPEAL from the Fifth District Court of New Orleans, Leaumont, J.
    
      John McKee, for plaintiff and appellee.
    
      Bradford, Lea <& Finney, for defendants and appellants.
    
      Brief for plaintiff and appellee.
    
    * * * The only question presented for the consideration of the Court in this case is: Is the defence set up, that Confederate currency was the consideration given for the obligation sued on sufficient?
    The defence is not sufficient, and cannot be maintained.
    The letter of plaintiff, addressed to the defendants, dated 19th January, 1862, in which the two drafts or checks for $1,000 and $500 were inclosed, contain no instructions, and is silent as to the kind of money in which the drafts were to he paid; and although offered in evidence by the defendants, it contains nothing which can, by any possibility, exonerate them from liability to pay the plaintiff in current funds of the United States. The obligation remains unpaid, except to the extent of $130 70, for which credit is given; and the sum of $1,362 10 is still due, and must be paid in current funds.
    The defendants allege that the sum of $130 70 was paid in Confederate currency, and was accepted by the plaintiff. There is no proof of that fact in the record, and rests solely on their allegation in the answer. If such were the fact the Court would not grant us any relief, nor do we seek relief from any part of the contract which has been executed, even if that part had been liquidated by a payment in Confederate currency, which is not shown to have been the case.
    The attempt made on the part of the defendants to show by the testimony of Mr. Ereret, that the two drafts in question were paid in Confederate currency, is not admissible on the question involved in the obligation sued on. The plaintiff has nothing to do with the kind of currency in which the bank paid the defendants.
    If the defendants took Confederate currency, they done so at their own risk and on their own responsibility, and their act cannot bind the plaintiff Besides their letter to the plaintiff, which is the obligation sued oh, acknowledging the receipt of the two drafts, and apprising him that the sum of $1,500 was placed to his credit, is silent as to the kind of icurrency in which the drafts were paid.
    It is a pure, simple and unconditional obligation, that they held the sum of $1,500 of plaintiff’s money, and subject to his draft. And when called on for the amount of their indebtedness they refused payment, eicept in the currency of the so-called Confederate States of America, issued by a government not known to the law, but formed in direct violation of law, which has never been recognized as a legal currency, and is worthless paper.
    The letter of the defendants, written to the plaintiff, was their voluntary act, and contains neither condition nor any restrictive stipulation, as to the kind of currency which they had received for the drafts and which they would hold subject to his order, and they cannot now be permitted to allege and prove anything which would tend to modify their written obligation. It is on its face unconditional, and they are bound. Therefore, the bill of exception taken to the admissibility of Mr. Ereret’s testimony was well taken. Even if admissible, it has no bearing on the question involved in this suit; and relates to matters which took place between the witness and the defendants; and the plaintiff, not having been a party to that transaction, and never, in the most distant manner, having ratified the act of the defendants, he is not bound. Williams’, administrator v. Boozeman, et al., 18 A. 532.
    The fact sought to be established by the testimony of Mr. Ereret is, that as the defendants received Confederate currency for the two drafts, that is a sufficient reason why the defendants should not pay their obligation in current funds. The law says, that “parol evidence is inadmissible to prove a modification of a written agreement, or to establish a subsequent parol agreement inconsistent with the written one.” Barthel v. Estibene, 5 A. 315.
    In the case of Garthmaiie, Wheeler <& Go. v. Wentz, et als. This was a suit brought to annul and set aside satisfaction of judgment, and the reinscription of a mortgage, on the ground that the attorney had no authority to receive payment in satisfaction of judgment in Confederate currency. The Court held, that “the mode of payment in treasury notes of the Confederate States of America was clearly proven, and the attorney had no right to receive such.papers in payment of his clients’ judgment without their consent.” 19 A. 196.
    In the case just referred to the payment was declared a nullity, and the judicial mortgage ordered to be reinscribed, as the attorney was without the special authorization of his clients to receive Confederate currency in satisfaction of the judgment.
    In this case, if the defendants took Confederate currency, without special instruction from the plaintiff as to the kind of currency in which the drafts were to be paid, which on their face did not specify that they were to be paid in Confederate currency, they assumed the responsibility in taking such, and are bound to the plaintiff for current funds of the United States.
    ; This Court has often held that it will not lend its aid to settle disputes relating to contracts reprobated by law. It will notice their illegality ex officio, and allow it without any plea at any stage of the pleadings. Parties cannot be heard who ask relief from a violation of law. The law leaves them where their conduct has placed them.” Schmidt v. Barker, 17 A. 261.
    The defendants, in their defence, seek to relieve themselves from liability on their obligation by showing that, because they received Confederate currency for the drafts, the plaintiff necessarily was a party, thereby confessing their receipt of and circulation of this currency.
    They cannot be heard in such a demand, and relieved from their illegal act, and the odium and loss imposed on the plaintiff, who is an utter stranger to any complicity in the receipt of Confederate funds.
    The obligation sued is on its face unconditional, and does not show that it had Confederate currency as a basis. McG-uigin v. Oehiglevich, 18 A. 96.
    In the case of Emerson v. Lee, 18 A. 135, a case in which the plaintiff tvas compelled by imprisonment to receive Confederate notes in payment jf a mortgage, and this action was brought to recover the amount of the nortgage. The Court held, “that in order to recover, it was essential ’or him not only to allege and prove that he retained and tendered the dentical notes received by him, but he has failed to make the necessary >roof, which it appears he might have done, as the payment was made o or in presence of his broker.”
    “ What a party receives and uses as money, whatever kind of paper it is, must be paid iu currency. Confederate notes are not monies, withii the meaning of the law.”
    “By receiving and using the amount of the drafts, they became th< debtors to plaintiff; they must pay in currency, unless they show, whicl they have not done, that plaintiff ratified their act.” Strauss v. Bloon & Co., 18 A. 48.
    In the case of Thomas v. Thompson & Barnes, decided on the 18tl November, 1867, and not yet published, it was held that the defendants having admitted the receipt of Confederate notes for the goods sold they are bound to pay the claim of plaintiff in legal tender notes.
    In the case at bar, the defendants admitted the receipt of Confederate notes for the two drafts, and they are bound to pay in United State, currency.
    Wherefore, we pray that the judgment of the lower court be affirmed
    
      Brief for defendants and appellants.
    
    On the 2S)tb of January, 1862, tin plaintiff, by letter, transmitted to the defendants two drafts, one fo $1,000 and the other for $500, drawn on the 14th of the same month b the Branch of the Planters’ Bank of Tennessee, at Clarksville, on th Union Bank of New Orleans, with instructions to place the same to hi credit. See letter, p. 15.
    The drafts on their face are payable in currency, (pp. 14, 15.) The; were actually paid in Confederate money, which, at that time, was th only currency paid by the banks in New Orleans. The Planters’ Bank by which the drafts were drawn, and the Union Bank, upon which the; were drawn, were at that time dealing in Confederate money, and tlies drafts represented that kind of currency.
    The defendants collected these drafts in the only currency-in whic they were collectable, and in which, according to their terms, they wer payable. For it is proved, and there is no contradictory evidence, tin the dealings in exchange between the bank by which the drafts wei drawn, and the bank upon which they were drawn, represented onl Confederate money; that “ currency ” meant Confederate money, an was so understood by the drawer and drawee; and that gold and silve and bank-notes did not, at that time, circulate as currency, but were sol at a premium. See testimony of Freret, p. 11; Froh. pp. 13, 14.
    ■ On the 12th of February, 1862, fourteen days after the drafts ha been mailed at Seguin, Texas, the defendants advised the plaintiff ths they had collected the amount of the drafts and placed it to his credit ¡ he had instructed. This is what the plaintiff sues upon as a note < receipt. See letter, p. 3.
    It does not appear that any demand was made by the plaintiff upo the defendants for the amount thus collected for over three years.
    Nor does it appear that the defendants were aware of the plaintiff intention to entrust them with this collection, or that they agreed undertake it prior to the reception of the letter enclosing the drafts; < that they charged or received, or were ever tendered the slightest cor pensation for their agency in this business. It seems, however, th they did gratuitously, from motives of kindness, or some other motiv perform the mandate imposed on them by the plaintiff, and collected f his account a certain amount of currency, then known to be precarioi and now to be illegal. It seems the plaintiff’s game was to induce tl defendants to collect this precarious currency for his account, and th leave them to keep it at their risk during all the chances of the war, aj when it has proved worthless, to demand the same amount in the b( currency afloat. We submit that this demand is as destitute of equi as unfounded in law.
    In their answer, the defendants denied generally the allegations of t petition, but admitted that they received certain drafts for collecti (the drafts B and O at p. 14) which upon their face were payable in ci rency; that by the term “ currency ” was meant “ Confederate monej that according to the tenor, they did collect the amount of said drafts lonfederate money, placed it to the credit of the plaintiff, and promptly dvised him thereof; that they had paid him $137 92 on account in Confedrate money, leaving in tli.eir hands a balance of $1,362 10, always in the urrency aforesaid, which they have always been, and are still ready to ay, and which they tendered and deposited to the credit of the plaintiff, iee answer, p. 5.
    The amount in Confederate money is admitted to have been on hand, n deposit in the cash-box of the clerk. See Rec., p. 13.
    We submit that the evidence sustains the allegations of the answer, nd that even if the plaintiff had an equitable claim, which we deny, he annot recover; because his demand is for an amount of Confederate íoney collected for his- account, in- pursuance of his mandate. It was a randate to collect Confederate money, and no other kind of money ould have been collected.
    We do not deem'it necessary to cite authorities to show that such q, ause of action cannot be .maintain ed. ’’
    Nor can it avail the plaintiff to pretend that he was ignorant that the arm “ currency ” -in the drafts meant Confederate money. He was ound to understand the import of the terms and the usages in vogue in is own business; .and even if he was ignorant, the tenor of the drafts emained the same, and'could only be collected in Confederate money, nd no action can be maintained for such a cause.
    We pray that the judgment be reversed, and for judgment in favor of efendants.
   Idsi/ey, J.

On the 29th January, 1862, the plaintiff, by letter, translitted to the defendants twq drafts; one for one thousand dollars and íe other for five hundred dollars, both drawn on the 14th of the same tonth by the Branch of the Planters’ Bank of Tennessee, at Clarkesville, n the Union Bank of New Orleans, with instructions to place them to is credit. Those drafts, upon their face, are payable “in currency."

On the 12th February, 1862, the defendants addressed and forwarded > the plaintiff the following letter:

“A. J. Fbv, Esq., Seguin Texas.

Bear Sh — Your favor of the 29th ult. is received, enclosing two checks lanters’ Bank of Tennessee, on Union Bank of Louisiana; one for one loúsand dollars and one for five hundred dollars, making fifteen hundred filars, which we have placed to your credit, etc. ”

It is to recover the amount of these drafts, standing with the defentnts to the credit of the plaintiff, that the present suit is brought. It is proved that the collection of these bills was made by the defends in the treasury notes of the then so-called Confederate States; Ld these identical notes they have always retained, and they tender them the plaintiff as the proceeds of the bills.

The plaintiff demands legal currency.

The result of the present controversy depends upon the construction be placed on the words “in currency ” used in the bills, for if the fendants’ are correct in their interpretation of the words, the plaintiff mid have no standing in court.

When words in instruments may convey two different meanings, the e in harmony with, and the other antagonistic to the law, the former raid always, upon principle, be adopted; because, in that sense legal ect can be given to the instrument, whilst the other would render it gatofy. ' O. C. 1946,

The words in currency in the bills which the defendants undertook to collect for the plaintiff, means current money, in the legal sense. If the parties intended to attach a different meaning to them, the instruments themselves should show it, which they do not.

It was so ruled, and correctly, in Dugan v. Campbell, 1 Hammond, Ohio Rep., p. 115. The defendants were not authorized to receive in payment of the drafts anything but legal currency.

They accepted the mandate, and although it was gratuitous they are nevertheless responsible, under the facts of this case, for their fault or neglect. C. C. 2971, 2972, § 2. 4 La. 28. 11 La. 81. Imboden v. Richardson, 15 A. 534.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed, with costs.,  