
    *The Brunswick and Albany Railroad Company, plaintiff in error, vs. The State of Georgia, defendant in error. Lyon, McLendon & Company, plaintiffs in error, vs. Henry Clews & Company, defendants in error.
    (Atlanta,
    January Term, 1873.)
    1. State — Parties—Creditors’ Bill — Receiver.—When the Governor of this State, with other creditors of the Brunswick and Albany Railroad Company filed a creditor’s bill against the company, alleging that the company was insolvent, and praying the appointment of a receiver, the bill charging that the State of Georgia was interested in the assets, in so far that it was stated that certain bonds of the company were in circulation, purporting to have upon them the State’s indorsement, and praying on the part of the State, that the receiver might be appointed and the property preserved until the liability of the State should be ascertained:
    Held, That the Legislature having, by law, declared that the indorsement of the bonds was illegal and void, it was not error in the Chancellor, on motion of the Governor, to dismiss the State, as a party plaintiff to the bill, even if the receiver had been appointed and had possession of the effects of the company under the order of the Court.
    2. Same — Account — Master’s Report — Interlocutory Order.— Where, during the progress of a cause in equity, there was a reference of accounts to a master, who reported, and his report was excepted to, on matters of fact and of law, and before any final action on the exceptions, the Judge permitted one of the parties to withdraw his account and substitute another:
    Held, That this was a mere interlocutory order, and not such a judgment as can be brought to this Court before a final judgment in the cause.
    State. Party. Receiver.. Practice in the Supreme Court. .Practice in the Superior Court. Bill of exceptions. Before Judge Sessions. Glynn Superior Court. May Adjourned Term, 1872.
    Rufus B. Bullock, as Governor of the State of Georgia, for said State, Lyon, McLendon & Company, and others, creditors of, and the city of Brunswick and others, stockholders in the Brunswick and Albany Railroad Company, suing in behalf of themselves and others standing in similar respective relations to the defendant, filed their bill against the Brunswick and Albany Railroad Company, prayiiig an injunction and the appointment of a receiver.
    *The case made by the bill, so far as it .concerns the State of Georgia, was as follows:
    The said State, in order to secure the construction of the road by the defendant, by its constitutional authorities, passed two Acts, by the first of which, under certain conditions, it obligated itself to indorse the bonds of said company for the sum of $15,000 00 per mile, and by the second of which said indorsement was extended to an additional $8,000 00 per mile. The road has been completed a distance of one hundred and seventy miles, and the bonds of said defendant have been indorsed by the State to the amount of $4,910,000 00. These bonds have been negotiated or hypothecated to various persons, some of whom are unknown to complainants, and whilst they do not admit the legality of their issue or negotiation, yet they are informed and believe that the present holders thereof will seek to render the State responsible on said indorsement. For the security of the State from liability, the defendant executed a deed of trust, conveying all its property, real and personal, to said State, and the Governor has seized said property in order to compel the defendant to pay its indebtedness, and has appointed John Screven receiver. But the counsel of numerous creditors of said road, holding executions against it, have advised their clients that such seizure is invalid, and will not be regarded when the day of sale, under such executions, arrives.
    The hill was sanctioned, and John Screven was appointed receiver by the Chancellor, and took possession of all of the property of said defendant. Pending the litigation, an Act of the General Assembly was passed declaring that the aforesaid indorsement was not binding upon the State.
    At the May term, 1872, of Glynn Superior Court, the counsel for the State moved to strike the Governor’s name from said bill, thus withdrawing the State'from the litigation. This motion was resisted by the defendant upon the following grounds, to-wit:
    1st. Because the Governor forcibly seized the Brunswick *and Albany Railroad with its equipments, and placed them in the hands of a receiver.
    
      2d. Because at the instance of the Governor this bill was filed, and upon the issues therein contained the defendant has joined in the pleadings, appeared before the master in chancery, and the appointment of a receiver by this Court was predicated upon the seizure and appointment by the Governor.
    3d. Because the action of the Legislature of 1872 does not change, in law, the status of the case made, for their act was an exercise of the judicial power, and the question was before a Court, to the jurisdiction of which it had been voluntarily submitted.
    4th. Because the only right the Governor could exercise would be to dismiss the bill and restore the property forcibly and illegally taken from the defendant back to those who are its owners and custodians, and who have done no act to forfeit their right to it without a judicial hearing.
    The objections were overruled and the motion sustained. Whereupon, the defendant excepted.
    In the further progress of the case, Henry Clews & Company, a creditor of the defendant, who had been made a party complainant, moved to withdraw a claim of $2,844,000 00, which had been before the auditor appointed by the Chancellor, and to substitute therefor a claim for $562,000. 00, and to go before the auditor with proof of the same. This motion was resisted by Lyon, McLendon & Company, upon the ground that it was contrary to the law and the practice of the Court to allow a claim to be withdrawn after it had been passed upon by the auditor.
    The objections were overruled and the motion allowed. Whereupon, Lyon, McLendon & Company excepted.
    Error was assigned by the Brunswick & Albany Railroad Company upon the first exception, and by Lyon, McLendon & Company, upon the second.
    O. A. Lochrane, for the Brunswick & Albany Railroad Company, and for Henry Clews & Company.
    *Lanier & Anderson ; Hines & Hobbs, for the State, and for Lyon, McLendon & Company.
   McCay, Judge.

We do not care to discuss the question so elaborately argued by the plaintiff in error as to the liability of the State on the indorsement of the bonds, nor as to the duty of the Treasurer or Governor to permit the bondholders to use the name of one or the other of these officers to enforce the trusts in the mortgage or trust deed. The Governor only appears in this bill for a special purpose. He asks the interposition of the Court to preserve the property until it can be ascertained whether the State is liable on the indorsement. For this reason, he joins with the other plaintiffs in the prayer of the bill. There was no answer, no cross-bill, no plea. There has occurred nothing, as appears by the pleadings, to show any right to a decree against the State, or any claim of such a decree. Can it be contended that any other of these plaintiffs would not, in the present state of this cause, have the right to dismiss himself from .this bill? The statute, in terms, declares that any complainant,. either in term time or vacation, may dismiss his bill, so that he does not thereby prejudice any right of the defendant. What right of the defendant is prejudiced? ITe sets up no right, not having pleaded or filed any answer. The fact that a receiver has been appointed and the property taken out of defendant’s hands may be a wrong, but any right of defendant arising from that wrong is not in the least affected by permitting the State to go out of the litigation. The interest of the State in the bill is gone, since the Legislature has declared the State is not interested. The Governor is only the agent of the State, and if the State has no interest, it is not only his right, but his duty, to withdraw. The State cannot, against the' will of the Legislature, be compelled to submit its liabilities to its own Courts. We do not express any opinion on any of the rights of any of these parties. We simply say. that, as the litigation stood at the time of this order, it was not error to grant it.

'Judgment affirmed.

On the other branch of this bill of exceptions, whilst we do not affirm the judgment, nor the contrary, we think it a mere interlocutory order, and we will not entertain a writ of error founded on it. Whilst the cause is still pending, clearly the judgment is not a final one, nor would it have been final if the permission granted had been denied. The exceptions to the report were undisposed of, and the whole matter is still pending in the Court below. The master’s report, as it stood, even if unexcepted to, was not final, since it is, of itself, very uncertain and indefinite. It would be an endless task if this Court were to hear bills of exceptions in cases like this. In a cause like the present, there- might be fifty of them before the final hearing.  