
    (Common Law.)
    Murray’s Lessee v. Baker et al.
    
    Tha terms “ beyond seas,” in the proviso or saving clause of a statute of limitations, are equivalent to without the limits of the State where the statute is enacted ; and the party who is without those limits is entitled to the benefit oi the exception.
    This was an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff in error in the circuit court for the district of Georgia*, to recover the possession of certain lands ly- ■ ing in that state. At the tripl, a special verdict was found, as follows:
    
      “ We find that the lessors of the plaintiff have not been . in the state of Georgia since the defendants, or their ancestors, came, into possession of the premises sued for. We further find, that the ancestor of the defendants possessed the land from about the year 1791 •until his death, which happened about'February last, and that the defendant, his children, and legal repreV sentatives, have been in possession thereof from that time. If the court are of opinion that the case of the plaintiffs is excepted from the operation of the act of limitations of this state, passed the 21st day of March, 1767, then we find for the plaintiffs, with ten cents damages; but if the court are of a contrary opinion, then we find for the defendants.”
    The judges of the court below divided on a motion • that judgment should .be entered up for the plaintiffs On this verdict, and the question was thereupon certified to this court.
    The statute of limitations .in question is as follows:
    Be it enacted, &c. that all writs' of formedon in descender, remainder, and reverter oi any lands, &c. or. any other writ, suit, or action, whatsoever, heréafter to be sued Or brought, by. Occasion or means of any title heretofore, accrued, happened, or fallen, or which may hereafter descend, happen, or fall, shall he sued , or taken within seven- years next after the I * passing of this act, or after the title and cause of action shall or may descend or accrue to the same,, and at no time after the said seven years. Ahd that no person or persons that now hath, or have, any right or title, of entry into any lands, &c. shall at any time hereafter majce any entry but within seven years next after the passing of this act, or after his or their right or title shall or may descend or accrue to the same; and io default thereof, such person so not entering^ and his heirs, shall be utterly exeludid and disabled from such entry after to be made. Provided, never, theless, that if any person or persons,. that is or shall be entitled to such writ or writs, or that hath, or shall have such right or title Of ehtry, be, or shall be, at ■ the time of such right or title first descended, accrued, come, or fallen, within, the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos, mentis, imprisoned,. or beyond seas, that then such person or persons, and - his and their heir, and heirs1, shall or may, notwithstanding the said seven years are expired, bring his, betyor. their action, or make his, her, or their entry. as be, she or they might have done before this act; so Us such person, or persons, or his, her, or their heir and heirs, shall, within three years next after his, her, or'fjheir full-age, dis'coverture,' coming of sound mind, enlargement out of prison, or returning fioni beyond seas, take benefit of, and sue for the same, and- at no time after the -said three years.”
    March 1st.
    Mr. Berrien, for the plaintiff,
    argued that the term “beyond seas,” in the statute of limitations,-was not to b'e construed literally, according to its geographical import, but liberally, and with reference to the protection which this clause of the statute was intended to afford. “Beyond seas, and out of the state, ^.re analogous' expressions, and must have the same construction.” the expression beyond seas has been borrowed from a-corresponding statute in Great- Britain, where it has a local or geographical aptitude,- which it does not possess here. The phraseology of the English' statutes has b?en modified to adapt it to the verying circumstances of that nation. Anterior to the acoession of.the .first dames, 'the northern part of the island was held by Scotland in distinct sovereignty^1 and in this state of things-, the expression “beyond seas” would have been únápt. A resident of Scotland, though that country, was then foreign to England, would not have been within the proviso of the statute. Accordingly,.we find, that the corresponding expression- in the statutéspassed anterior to this- period, is-“out of the realm.” And Mr. .Justice Wilmot, in pronouncing, his opinion in,the- case of the King v. Walker, observes, that “the legislature by. altering the phraseology of the'statute from ‘out of the realm1 to.‘beyond seas’at this precise period, seems to have pointed to the case of a dwelling in Scotland.” During the war of our revolution, the British army was in possession of pait of the state of New-York. It has ■ been held there, that-the maker of á promissory note, who was within the British lines during such occupancy, and departed with the-British army at the close, of the war, was out of the state during that time, and, therefore, not entitled to plead the statute in bar;, and that the cause of action accrued only upon bis coming into the state after the peace. “The party was out of the jurisdiction of the state. He was quasi .out of the realm. He .was where the anthority which was exercised, was derived, not from the state, .but from the. king of Great Britain by right , of conquest. in this case, the plaintiffs were never within the jurisdiction of the state: and if in the language of the chief justice first cited, beyond seas and out of the state are analogous expressions, they are entitled > to bring their action,, at any time within three years after coming into- the state. The opposite construction would involve the absurdity of refusing the protection of.the- statute to a person living in Chili, because access can. be had to that remote country by land; whilst it is extended to a person residing in the neighbouring West-India island, because the seas must be passed in order to reach the latter.
    -No. counsel appeared'to argue the cause on the other side.
    
      March 9th.
    
    
      
      
         Per Chief Justice Marshall. Faw v. Roberdeau’s ex’rs. 3 Cranch, 174. 177.
    
    
      
      
         1 W. Bl. 286.
    
    
      
      
         Sleight v. Kane, 1 Johns. Cas. 76, 81.
    
   Mr. Justice Johnson

delivered the opinion, of the court. This is an action of.ejectment-.. The defence set up is the act of limitations of the state of Georgia. The only question which the. case presents is, whether the plaintiff, who resided in Virginia, comes within the exception in the act in favour of persons “beyond seas.”

Qn this question, the court aTe-unanimously of opinion, that to give a sensible construction to that act,, the words, “beyond, seas” must be held to- he equivalent to “without the limits of the state,” and order this opinion to be- certified to the circuit court of the district of ■ Georgia.

Certificate for the plaintiff..  