
    Ariel BAREL, personal representative of Joseph Piovo; Donna Kara, personal representative of Joseph Piovo, Appellants, v. Robert STONE; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-15650
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 11, 2017 
    
    Filed April 24, 2017
    Ariel Barel, Pro Se
    Donna Kara, Pro Se
    Robert Stone, Pro Se
    Shauna S. Brennan, Attorney, Brennan Legal Counsel Group, PLLC, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellee Antonieta To-var-Guzman, Shauna S. Brennan
    Robert DeLong, Esquire, Attorney, Parsons Behle & Latimer, Reno, NV, for Defendant-Appellee Merscorp, Inc., Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., Merscorp Holdings, Inc.
    Robert DeLong, Esquire, Attorney, Parsons Behle & Latimer, Reno, NV, David Ray Hall, Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant-Appellee U.S. Bank N.A., National Association
    Ronald A. Colquitt, Pro Se
    Christina Wang, Attorney, Fidelity National Law Group, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellee Chicago Title
    Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Joseph Eugene Piovo, through personal representatives Ariel Barel and Donna Kara, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing Piovo’s action alleging a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Piovo’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Piovo did not present a federal question on the face of his amended complaint. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475, 118 S.Ct. 921, 139 L.Ed.2d 912 (1998) (plaintiff must present a federal question on the face of a properly pleaded complaint); see also Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1980) (setting forth elements of a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1982).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Piovo’s action without granting further leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and factors for a district court to consider in determining whether to grant leave to amend).

We reject as unsupported by the record Piovo’s contentions that the district court was biased, faded to comply with court rules, erred in staying discovery, held Pio-vo’s pleadings to an improper standard, or otherwise erred in its analysis of Piovo’s pleadings.

Piovo’s request for judicial notice, set forth in his reply brief, is denied.

Piovo’s motion to strike (Docket' Entry No. 59) is denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     