
    Gift vs. Hall and Simpson.
    An action of debt will lie upon a bill siiigle payable in Tennessee money, Alabama money, Brandon money, & c¡
    Where the words “Brandon rriilnfey” were written on the face of a bi 11 Slfagle payable in dollars, blit below thfe seal, and it did not appear that the words “Brandon money” were placed on the same at thé time of the execution of the instrument, it will not be regarded by the court as a part of the contract.
    The defendant should have craved oyer of the instrument and of the words written upon it fand then pleaded that they were a part of the contract; the question of fact could then have been submitted properly to the determination of a jury.
    Richard Hall and JohnT. Simpson, partners, instituted an action of debt in the circuit court of Shelby county, for the use of William B. Greenlow, on the 3d day of January, 1839) ágairtst Robert Gift. At the February term succeeding they filed their declaration in thfe form usual upon bills sihgle; in which they set forth that Robert Gift made his writing obligatory to the plaintiffs, binding himself to pay them the Sum of seven hundred dollars.
    The defendant craved oyer of the writing obligatory de-blared upon and set forth in the following words, to wit;
    “$700. On or before the 1st day of November we or hither of us promise to pay Hall and Simpson seven hundred dollars, value received. Witness our hands Snd seals, August 22d, 1838. Hinson Gift, [l. s.]
    (Brandon money.) Robert Gift, [e. s.]”
    The defendant then filed a demurrer, which Y. D. Barry, judge, overruled, ánd gave judgment for the balance of debt three hundred and fifty dollars, fourteen dollars damages, and costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed in error.
    
      
      T. J. Turley, for the plaintiff in error.
    1. Are the words “Brandon money’* á part of the bill single declared upon? That they are is expressly decided in the case of Jones vs. Fales, 4 Mass. R. 245-, 253: also in the case of Williams vsi Handly, 3 Bibb’s Rep. 10, and in the case of Hughes vs. Saunders' Exr. 3 Bibb’s Rep. 360. In the case of Blair vs-Billingsly, Peck’s Reports, it is evident the endorsement was made on the covenant long after it was executed; and the endorsement was not under seal, and of course formed no part of the covenant according to all the cases, even that of Williams vs. Handly above referred. The covenant was á bond to convey land when the money was paid; the endorsement was á receipt for the money, &c. In the case of Saunders and Ogden vs. Bacon, from 8 John. Reports, the only point decided was that it was a good promissory note, and that'the endorsement was to show the consideration and to give notice. The cases on the subject of notes payable at a particular place are upon commercial law, and are decided with a view to the convenience and advancement of trade and commerces but they are very unsatisfactory and conflicting, and therefore cannot be safely relied upon in giving a construction to this contract. See authorities reviewed in 3 Kent’s Com. 98-9: Chitty on Bills, 160: 2Camp.205 : 4M. and S. 25. In our State as well as other States of the Union the courts seem to make little of no difference whether the place of payment is embodied in the note or contained in a memorandum at the bottom, for when it is embodied in the note they do not require that a presentment there should be averred or proved. 1 Yer. 502: 2 John. 81. Another reason for holding a memorandum no part of the note might-be, that the holder may put it there for his own convenience and advantage; but here such could not be the case, for it is to his disadvantage; and the covenant being all the time in the payee’s possession, it is impossible that the words “Brandon money” Could have been put there at any. other time than when the contract was made.
    2. What is meant by the -ftords “Brandon money?” Shall we consider them as mere idle words without meaning, or as explanatory of the contract? They cannot be treated as idle or unmeaning words. Jones vs. Wales, 4 Mass. R. 253. We must give effect to every part and parcel of a contract and construe it in such a way, if it can be done, as that no part of the contract be lost, nam verba debent intelligi cum effectu, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Ghitty Con. 20: 1 P. Williams, 457: 2 Blac. Com. 379: 2 M. and S. 369. The construction must be upon the entire instrument. Chitty Con. 20: 4 M. and S. 426: -11 East, 643. Another rule of construction is, that contracts must be interpreted according to the true intent and meaning of the parties; and that intentions and meaning are to be ascertained by construing the words in their plain ordinary and popular sense as they are used and understood in common parlance, (Chitty Con. 20: Co. Lit. 42: 2 Blac. Com. 487,) unless they have acquired in law a legal and technical meaning; in which case they are supposed to be used in that technical sense, unless there is something on the face of the instrument showing that they are used in a different sense. There is no rule whatever so strictly technical but that it may be varied and wholly altered by the parties for contrac-tus legem vincit; as, for instance, the rule in Shelly’s case, which is as technical and as closely adhered to as any other known to the law. Now, the word “money” has a technical and legal meaning, so have the words “Tennessee money,” and parol proof could not be heard to vary that meaning. But the agreement might contain words that would of necessity vary it, as Tennessee money issued by and payable at the Bank of Tennessee. The words “Brandon money” have no legal or technical meaning whatever, and must therefore be understood as used in their popular sense, otherwise their meaning cannot be ascertained at all. The word “money” may have its technical meaning and acquire a meaning ■entirely different, and would, by the aid of explanatory words, be clearly understood in its acquired and not its technical sense by the courts, as if we say “river money,” “paper money,” “Memphis bank money,” “Planters” or “Union bank money,” or even “Memphis money” without the word bank. So we contend the words “Brandon money” are as well understood in the community as “paper money” or “Memphis bank money,” and means the notes of the Brandon bank. But can the courts judicially know what is the popular sense of these words? To me it seems they can and must. In Hicklin vs. Tucker the court took notice that Tennessee currency had acquired a popular meaning, different from its legal or constitutional one, and construe it in that popular sense. 2 Yer. 448. Courts must take notice of all public laws; as, for instance, that there is a public institution of their State called the Union Bank of Tennessee and the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Memphis. 4 Mass. 252. So they take notice of the laws of a sister State, as their registrative laws, interest laws,&c. and so must take notice that there is a Brandon Bank of Mississippi.
    3. Is demurrer the proper way to bring the question before the court? It is: First, for the variance. 4 Mass. R. 255. Secondly, because it is not payable in gold or silver. The case of Hicklin vs. Tucker, above referred to, was decided on demurrer. 2 Yer. 44S. So was the case of Williams vs. Handly, 3 Bibb, 10. See Jones vs. Fales, 4 Mass. R. 252-3» upon this point of judicial notice, and 5 Cowan’s Rep. 186. Courts take notice that “New York State bills,” and bank notes cun-ent in the city of New York, in conformity with general usage and understanding, are cash. 9 John. R. 120: 19 John, 144. ■
    
      J. C. Humphreys, for the defendant in error,
    insisted: 1. The words “Brandon money” are no part of the bill single. Saunders vs. Bacon, S John. Rep. 485: Blair vs. BillingslyK Peck’s Rep. 85: Chitty on Bills, 8 Amer. 8 Lon. ed. 164: Williams vs. Waring, 21 Eng. Com. L. Rep. 1: and 12 Pickering’s Rep. 399. Again: the case is presented upon demurrer, and does not and cannot show in whose hand-writing are the words “Brandon money,” or when they were written, whether at the time or after the bill single was made.
    2. “Brandon money” is lawful money of the United States. Searcy vs. Vance, Mar. and Yer. 225: Hicklin vs. Tucker, 2 Yer. 448: M’Chord vs. Ford, 3 Monroe, 166. The “money” has a known legal signification, therefore eviddfid^'' would not be admissable to show the parties used the words in a different sense according to the custom of the country. 3 Stark. Ev. 1038. Money is the medium of exchange established by law. Co. Lit. 207; Jac. L. Diet. 303. In the United States it is gold and silver. If it were true that Brandon is in the United States, the plaintiff in error having demurred, has failed to make the issue.
   Turley, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiffs in error executed their note to Hall and Simpson in the words and figures following:

“$7Q0. On pr before the first of November we or either of us promise to pay Hall and Simpson seven hundred dollars, value received. Witness our hands and seals, August 20, 1838. Hinson Gift, [l. s.]
(Brandon money.) Robert Gift, [l. s.]”

Upon this note an action of debt was brought. To the declaration there is a demurrer, which was overruled by the court below and judgment given for the debt due, to reverse which this writ of error is prosecuted; and it is now contended that this is a note payable in Brandon money, which means a currency different from gold or silver, and therefore the action to be brought on it sounds in damages and debt will not lie.

It is to be observed that there is no case which goes the length of saying that debt will not lie upon instruments for so many dollars to be paid in money, let it be called by what name it may, as Tennessee money, Alabama money, &c. they being confined entirely to those payable in bank notes, cash notes and currency. The last of which we think doubtful. The only possible reason upon which the decision requiring covenant to be brought on bills single, payable in cash notes or bank notes, can be sustained is, that the.pxr press number of dollars called for can be handed over in cash notes or bank notes; and therefore it may fairly be inferred that it was the intention of the parties to pay the par-, ticular number of dollars of the kind called for, without regard to their actual value. This 3'eason cannot apply to any case where the debt is not to be discharged in a substitute call - ing for dollars, as in the case where it is to be paid in hoi'i ses, cotton or -any other kind of property, where it has al- - ways been held that the payee, if he got the property, is entitled to an amount equal to his demand in dollars. So it would seem to be when the demand is for so many dollars to be paid in the currency or money of a place.

But, furthermore, the words “Brandon money” are not embraced in the body of the contract, but are appended to it. Now, whether they form a part of the contract depends upon the fact as to whether they were introduced at the time of making it or subsequently; if subsequently, the contract is not varied by them, and debt will lie. Now to settle this upon a demurrer precludes an investigation of the fact, for by it the plaintiff is placed in the following dilemma: If he does not declare upon his contract as one payable in Brandon money his declaration is demurred to for a variance; if he does declare upon it as such, it is demurred to for the form of action. So which ever way he turns he is met with Brandon money, although in point of fact he may never have contracted for it. It is impossible for the court to judge upon inspection whether these words are a part of the contract; we have before us nothing but a copy, and even if we had the original we dp not perceive how Qur opportunity of judging upon it would be bettered.^.

We think the correct mode of pleading would have been to set forth the words “Brandon money” upon oyer, and have pleaded that they were a part of the contract, which could then have been denied by the plaintiff in a replication and the question submitted to the determination of a jury. We therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court.  