
    Senior v. Ratterman.
    
      Constitutional law — Act of May 14, 1886 — JDow law — Application to wholesale liquor dealers.
    
    1. Section 18 of the schedule to the constitution, which provides that “ no license to traffic in intoxicating liquors shall hereafter be granted in this state; but the general assembly may, by law, provide against evils resulting therefrom,” applies as well to the wholesale as to the retail traffic in intoxicating liquors.
    2. "Wholesale dealers in intoxicating liquors, who are not manufacturers, are within the terms of the act of the general assembly passed May 14, 1886, entitled “An act to provide against the evils resulting from the traffic in intoxicating liquors,” and are liable to the tax therein imposed.
    3. Said act, as applied to wholesale dealers in such liquors, is not in conflict with section 2, of article 12, of the constitution, which provides that “ laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all moneys,” etc., nor with section 26, of article 2, of the constitution, which provides that “ all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state.”
    
      Motion for leave to file petition in error to the Superior Court of Cincinnati.
    
      Follett, Hyman § Kelly, for the motion.
    I. Wholesale dealers are not included in the provisions of the Dow law.
    By the application of any fair rules of construction the term “ traffic in intoxicating liquors/’ as used in section 18 of the schedule to the constitution, does not embrace wholesale dealers in intoxicating liquors. Regulation of the traffic can, in no proper sense, be held to apply to sales in large quantities.
    The evils contemplated, arid against which the legislature may by law provide, are the evils consequent upon the retail trade, the sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, and to be drank on the premises where sold. Judge McUvaine, in announcing the opinion of a majority of the court in The State v. Frame, 39 Ohio St. 399, 410, used the following language: “ Undoubtedly the evils contemplated by the constitution, as resulting from the traffic in intoxicating liquors, are those which result from the sale and use of such liquor as a beverage.”
    The sale and use as a beverage, it must be admitted, is selling at retail, by the drink, and to be drank where sold.
    “ The object of construction, as applied to a written constitution, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it.” Cooley Const. Lim. 68.
    The history of the legislation of this state, both before and since the adoption of the present constitution, prior to the year 1882, shows conclusively that the iutont of the people in adopting section 18 of the schedule was to apply its operations to the retail trade. No attempt prior to that time had ever been made to license, restrict, restraiu, control, or in any way regulate the wholesale trade. Upon this proposition the reasoning of Judge Okey, in his dissenting opinion in State v. Frame, supra, 421, is unanswerable: “ The evil supposed to exist, and against which the constitutional provision was directed, was the sale; by any person, of spirituous liquors by the drink, for that was the license, and all there was of it — that was the privilege, and the only privilege with respect to liquors, secured by such license. And this being true, it is too clear for argument that if it was sought by such constitutional provision to cut off such privilege to the few, much more was it intended to absolutely deny it to the many.” And again, on page 422, in considering “the condition of the statutes in relation to the traffic in liquors, in force in 1883,” he said: “ The leading and far most important statutory inhibition then in force was the provision which was directed against the sale of spirituous liquors by the drink. By force of that provision, which had retained substantially the same form during our entire existence as a state, and a portion of our existence as a territory — a period, indeed, of more than ninety years —it was a crime, and punishable as such, for any one not licensed to sell spirituous liquors by the drink.”
    “ In construing a statute, aid may be derived from attention to the state of things as it appeared to the legislature when the statute was enacted.” Platt v. Union Pacific R. Co., 99 U. S. 48.
    “ That construction of a statute should be adopted which, without doing violence to the fair meaning of the words used, brings it into harmony with the constitution.” Grenada County Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261; Bloodgood v. M. & H. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9; Bailey v. Railroad Co., 4 Harrington, 389.
    Adopting familiar and well established rules for the construction of statutes, and for the purpose of bringing this statute into harmony with the constitution, it is necessary to read the last part of section 8, as follows: “ But such phrase does not include the manufacturing of intoxicating liquors from the raw material, or the sale thereof in quantities of one gallon or more at any one time.”
    So read and construed, the statute accomplishes the purposes designated by its title, to wit, “to provide against the evils resulting from the traffic in intoxicating liquors,” as such evils were defined by this court-, as known and understood by the legislature at the time it was passed ; relieves it of its unjust and unconstitutional discrimination and want of Uniformity ; does no violence to the language used; effectuates the intention of the legislature as gathered from the act, and brings it into harmony with the constitution. Thus read the legislature is relieved of the absurd position that there is no evil in manufacturing intoxicating liquors from the raw material, and none in the sale of the same by the manufacturer in quantities of one gallon or more at any one time, but that a sale in like quantity by any one other than the manufacturer is an evil.
    The meaning of the legislature may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, from the reason or motive upon which the legislature proceeded, from the end in view, or the purpose which was designed. A statute is to be interpreted, not only by its exact words, but' also by its apparent general purpose. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556; United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482; United States v. Saunders, 22 Wall. 492; Preston v. Drew, 33 Me. 558; Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. 259; Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 479; Corwin v. Benham, 2 Ohio St. 36; Stetson v. City Bank, 2 Ohio St. 167; Rezner v. Hatch, 2 Handy, 42; Medical College v. Zeigler, 17 Ohio St. 52; 48 Am. Dec. 573.
    The evils against which the general assembly intended to provide was the sale of intoxicating liquors in quantities of less than one gallon, as is clearly shown by the act itself, and especially by section 11.
    II. The act is unconstitutional so far as the same relates to wholesale liquor dealers.
    1. Section 18 of the schedule to the constitution contains the only grant of power in the constitution to legislate upon the subject of the liquor traffic, since the grant of specific power in that section is exclusive. The evils contemplated by that section are such as result from tbe sale and use of such liquors as a beverage, and at retail.
    2. It is in violation of section 2, article 12, of the constitution. It is apparent from the act that the only object that can be attained by imposing burdens on wholesale dealers is revenue, inasmuch as the exemption in favor of manufacturers who sell in quantities of one gallon or more at any one time is evidence conclusive of the fact that such sales were not regarded by the legislature as an evil.
    No distinction can be made among those who sell in the same way and in the same quantities. The taxation must be uniform and levied by a uniform rule.
    “A statute would not be constitutional which should select particular individuals from a class or locality, and subject them to peculiar rules, or impose upon them special obligations or burdens from which others in the same locality or class are exempt.” Cooley Const. Lim. 489-490.
    If real or personal property is to be taxed it must be by a uniform rulo ; if a license fee or a burden be imposed upon business which is in its nature injurious to the public welfare, the same uniformity must apply. Equality of burden 'is the principle of the constitution. Persons in the same class and property of the same kind must be subjected to the same burden. Fields v. Commissioners, 36 Ohio St. 481; Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 43; City of Lexington v. McQuillan, 6 Dana, 513; St. Louis v. Spiegel, 75 Mo. 145; Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153; Knowlton v. Supervisors, 9 Wis. 410.
    3. The law is one of a general nature and, as to wholesale dealers, is not of uniform operation throughout the state, and is therefore repugnant to section 26, article 2, of the constitution.
    The uniformity of operation required applies as well to individuals and occupations as to geographical limits. The principle of selection is just as reprehensible in the one case as in the other and just as violative of this provision. Kelley v. State, 6 Ohio St. 269; State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54; Falk, Exp., 42 Ohio St. 638.
    
      4. If wholesale dealers are .held to be embraced within the provisions of the How law and subject to the burden imposed by it, the dealers in this state who may sell their goods by sample or otherwise, and if they have no place of business in the state, are not taxed. The dealer residing here, and having his place of business here, pays taxes as other merchants do, and then must pay this tax in addition, while the dealer residing outside pays nothing. The-effect must necessarily be to drive dealers across the border where trade can be as advantageously prosecuted and no burdens imposed.
    
      Rufus B. Smith and Wm. H. Taft, county solicitors, and Edward, Barton, contra.
    1. If the claim made by counsel for plaintiff in error, to the effect that the phrase “traffic in intoxicating liquors,” as used in section 18 of the schedule to the constitution, applies only to the retail traffic, be sound, then, by parity of reasoning, the general assembly is only prohibited from licensing the retail traffic and might enact a license law, provided it was confined to the wholesale trade. Such a conclusion is unsound, in law; but as it logically results from the proposition claimed that the evils against which the general assembly may provide are those which result from the retail trade only, it is clear that the proposition is itself unsound upon which the conclusion is based.
    The word “traffic” is used in its ordinary sense, and means “ to pass goods and commodities from one person to another, for an equivalent in goods or money.” Webster. The word certainly applies to every form of buying and selling intoxicants.
    The mistake of plaintiffs is in assuming that liquor can not be sold and used as a beverage unless it is drank where sold, as in the case of a single drink. But if liquor is sold at wholesale, and is not to be used for “ mechanical, pharmaceutical, or sacramental purposes,” to what use is it to be put except that of a beverage?
    2. The claim that the act is unconstitutional because of the exemption from assessments in favor of manufacturers from the raw material, who sell in quantities of one gallon or more at any one time, and therefore an unjust discrimination, is unsound. The contention of plaintiffs is that “equality of burden is the'principle of the constitution” in the levying of taxes, and that the Dow law violates this rule of uniformity in taxing wholesale dealers and exempting manufacturers; and hence in conflict with section 2, article 12, of the constitution. This section furnishes the governing principle for all laws levying taxes upon property for general revenue. But this being a tax upon business, and levied for the purpose of' “ providing against the evils resulting from the traffic in intoxicating liquors,” and not for revenue, the section is not applicable to it. The uniformity there enjoined does not apply to taxes upou licenses, occupations, or business. West. Union Tel. Co. v. Mayer, 28 Ohio St. 536; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 534; State v. Frame, 39 Ohio St. 399.
    3. The tax is not void for want of uniformity, because its burdeu rests uniformly upon all the classes upon which it is imposed, and thus answers the .only requirement of uniformity that the law demands from a tax upon business or even upon property, when levied for police purposes.
    The legislature has the right to tax at will different occupations and kinds of business, and different classes of occupations, and the tax can not be regarded as unjust because discriminations appear to be made in favor of or against particular trades or business, provided the tax reaches all in the particular occupations or business, or in the particular class of the occupations or business which have been selected. Cooley Taxation, 125,129.
    The right to. tax different trades, occupations, and kinds of business necessarily involves the right to so tax without reference to the discriminations which necessarily appear to be made against other trades, occupations, and business. Such discriminations are from the very nature of such a tax inevitable. For it always happens that the business taxed has characteristics in common with some other business exempted. But this does not make the classification unjust or the tax illegal. Eor there may have been reasons satisfactory to the legislature for taxing the former and exempting the latter, and the investiture of them with such a discretion has always been regarded as wise. This running into and overlapping of different classes is readily seen.
    Class is defined by Webster to be “ a group of individuals ranked together as possessing common characteristics.” Things and men may be differently classified according to the characteristic chosen as the type. The elementary text-books used in schools enumerate among other general divisions or classes of occupation, agriculture, mining, fishing, manufacturing, and commerce. Political economy divides men into buyers and sellers, producers and consumers. But the farmer who sells a bushel of wheat is, while in the act of selling, engaged in commerce, and the same is true of the fisherman selling his fish, the miner selling his ores, and the manufacturer selling his wares. The buyer is at times a seller, the producer a consumer. The farmer is still a farmer and not a trader, even though he sells his wheat; and the manufacturer does not cease to be a manufacturer, because he takes on at times some of the characteristics of a trader.
    Thus we see the fallacy of the plaintiff’s claim that wholesale dealers who do not sell less than one gallon or more at any one time, and manufacturers from the raw material who do not sell in quantities less than one gallon or more at any one time, belong to the same class. The latter makes the liquor while the former does not; an important difference, and one that fixes them as members of a different class.
    The following citations of authorities strongly sustain the general assembly in its right to classify and tax as may to it seem best. Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N. C. 119; State v. Chadbourn, 80 N. C. 479; New Orleans v. Kaufman, 29 La. Ann. 283; State v. Lathrop, 10 La. Ann. 398; Kenny v. Har
      
      well, 42 Ga. 416; Davis v. Macon, 64 Ga. 128, 132; 1 Desty Tax. 309, 311; Cooly Tax. 179, n. 6; State v. West, 34 Mo. 424; State v. Whittaker, 33 Mo. 457; Barton v. Morris, 10 Phila. 360; Norris v. Commonwealth, 27 Pa. St. 494; Commonwealth v. Campbell, 33 Pa. St. 380.
    Our own statutes have for years afforded us an illustration of taxation of this kind in which the general assembly has in its discretion selected certain kinds of business for taxation, discriminating against them, as plaintiffs would say, in favor of other business.
    The statutes referred to are sections 2669, 2670, 2672, 4222, 4226, 4388, 4397 to 4402, of the Revised Statutes.
    These statutes provide for the imposition of license fees upon various trades and occupations, such as exhibitors of shows, peddlers, auctioneers, venders of gunpowder, hucksters in the public streets, and pawnbrokers.
    These taxes have been sustained by our courts on the ground that they were laid by the general assembly in the exercise of the police power for the purpose of regulating trade. Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 534.
    And yet there is greater discrimination made here than that which is said to exist in the Dow law.
    Classification analogous to this has been made in Texas, in the liquor law of that state, and the propriety of it was not questioned in the supreme court of the United States. Tiernen v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123; and in State v. Brewster, 39 Ohio St. 653, 658, this court say, in speaking of the classification of cities: “It is no sufficient objection to this classification that it is illusory.”
    But granting, for the sake of argument, that plaintiffs are right in the position they take, that there is a discrimination against wholesale dealers, which is unjust and illegal, nevertheless it is not possible to so change the act by construction that it will exempt wholesale dealers together with manufacturers. The provision is that all the traffickers shall be taxed'except certain manufacturers. If the exception is void because it does not include other classes of dealers, it is void and falls ; the act stands without it; and all traffickers, except those selling for medicinal, mechanical, or pharmaceutical purposes will be taxed. Cooley Const. Lim. *178; City of St. Louis v. St. Louis Railway Co., 14 Mo. App. 221; Tillman v. Cocke, 9 Bax. 429. In this last case an exception to a law was embodied in a separate section. Part of the exception was void. It was contended that the exception must stand or fall as a whole. It was held that the exception might stand in part and fall in part. See also Tierner v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123; State v. Amery, 12 R. I. 64. These two cases are liquor cases, and the first is' a high authority, and directly ip point. See also Little Miami R. Co. v. Commissioners, 31 Ohio St. 338, 344; Gilpin v. Williams, 25 Ohio St. 283; Gibbons v. Catholic Institute, 34 Ohio St. 289; Bowles v. State, 37 Ohio St. 36, 44.
   Spear, J.

The question involved in the case is whether wholesale dealers in intoxicating liquors are subject to the tax imposed “ upon the business of trafficking in spirituous, vinous, malt, or any intoxicating liquors,” by the act of the general assembly passed May 14, 1886, entitled “An act providing against the evils resulting from the traffic in intoxicating liquors ” ? Section 8 of the act, the section more particulaidy involved in this inquiry, reads as follows : “ The phrase ‘ trafficking in intoxicating liquors/ as used in this act, means the buying or procuring and selling of intoxicating liquors otherwise than upon prescriptions issued in good faith by reputable physicians in active practice, or for exclusively known mechanical, pharmaceutical, or sacramental purposes, but such phrase does not include the manufacturing of intoxicating liquor from the raw material, and the sale thereof by the manufacturer of the same in quantities of one gallon or more at any one time.”

Counsel for plaintiffs insist that this question must be answered in the negative, and urge in support of this claim:

1. That wholesale dealers can not be included, because the phrase, “traffic in intoxicating liquors,” as used in section 18 of the schedule to the constitution, does not embrace such dealers, but applies only to the retail traffic; and if 'the terms of the law compel a construction including wholesale dealers, then, as to them, it is unconstitutional, being repugnant to the section of the schedule referred to, which reads as follows: “ No license to traffic in intoxicating liquors shall hereafter be granted in this state; but the general assembly may, by law, provide against evils resulting therefrom.”

2. The provisions of the law, so far as they may be held to apply to wholesale dealers, are in violation of section 2 of article 12 of the constitution, because the object of the act in imposing burdens upon them is revenue only, and the burdens are not uniformly imposed in that there is an unjust discrimination against the wholesale dealer and in favor of the holder of other classes of property and against the former, and in favor of the manufacturer.

8. The law is of a general nature, and, as to wholesale dealers, is not of uniform operation throughout the state, and is, therefore, repugnant to section 26 of article 2 of the constitution.

4. If wholesale dealers are held to be within the provisions of the law, the dealers of this state will be put to great disadvantage in competition with dealers from without who sell by sample, and the effect must necessarily be to drive home dealers beyond the limits of the state.

The legal propositions are all disputed by counsel for defendant, who contend that the act applies to wholesale dealers, and is a constitutional and valid law. These contrary views are enforced and illustrated by very able and ingenious arguments on the part of the respective counsel, which will be found epitomized in the pi-eceding pages, and need not be repeated.

We do not feel called'upon to enter at large into a discussion of the law. Save as to a feature not involved in the controversy here, it is the same in its provisions as the act of April 17, 1888, popularly known as the Scott law. That enactment was subjected to a critical examination by this court in the case of The State v. Frame, 39 Ohio St. 199. The present law was very fully examined in the cases of Adler v. Whitbeck and of Anderson v. Brewster, disposed of and reported at the last term, ante, pp. 539, 576. The conclusions reached by'the court in those cases, so far as they affect questions involved here, are satisfactory, and, where applicable to this case, control it. We have no disposition to unnecessarily swell the already plethoric volume of literature upon the general subject embraced in the diseussions'in the various cases arising under the liquor taxing laws, and will endeavor to dispose of the case at bar as briefly as may be.

It is contended that section 8 of the statute should be construed to read as follows: “But such phrase does not include the manufacturing of intoxicating liquors from the raw material, or the sale thereof in quantities of one gallon or more at any one time.” The language of the section appears to be plain, and to admit of but one meaning. It seems to explain and construe itself, and, when this is the case, the task of the interpreter can hardly be said to arise; nor, as we think, does anything in the context have the effect to render its meaning questionable. To adopt the foregoing would be to strike out and insert, a process common in legislative bodies, but unusual in courts of justice. It is our duty to give effect to what the law-makers have put in the law, and to all of it, not to repeal and substitute. In terms the section says that selling at wholesale by the manufacturer is not the form of traffic included in the law, and specifies no other form of wholesaling as not included. It follows, therefore, necessarily, as we think, that selling at wholesale by others than the manufacturers is included within the terms of the law.

The proposition that the phrase “traffic in intoxicating liquors,” used in section 18 of the-schedule, applies only to the retail traffic, we are of opinion is not sound. The language of the section is clear and unambiguous, nor is there any other clause or section of the constitution which serves in the least to throw doubt upon the meaning of the words used. Words so employed maybe taken in their plain, ordinary sen.se, unless a different meaning is required in order to give effect to some other portion of the instrument, or unless they are varied by the language of some other portion, or the consequences following such construction would be plainly contrary to the legislative intent. No different construction is required in order to adapt the language used to the particular subject-matter, for there can be no question but that the mischiefs sought to be remedied were those arising from the improper use of intoxicating liquors, and the means intended to be legalized were legislative enactments providing against the sale or furnishing of liquor in any form that would be productive of evil. The word “traffic” has always had a well understood meaning in the popular sense. It is the passing ‘of goods or commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or money; and a trafficker is one who traffics — a trader, a merchant. No limit as to amount is fixed in the section, and it is plainly as much traffic to deal in a given commodity by the wholesale as at retail. The two forms of traffic were in existence at the time of the framing and adoption of the constitution as they now are, and it would be strange indeed if the very intelligent body of gentlemen who drafted that instrument used language naturally including both forms if it was meant to include only one. The phrase referred to had not obtained a technical meaning; hence, it is proper to attach the popular meaning, especially as neither the context nor a consideration of the consequences which would result from a literal interpretation, furnish any ground for departure from such construction. The business of the interpreter is not to improve the language in question;.it is to expound it. The question for him is not so much what the law-makers meant, but what their language means. And yet, if wo were at liberty to regard the history and external circumstances which led to the adoption of the section in question, and by putting ourselves in the position of those whose words we are. to interpret, seek in that way to ascertain what those words relate to, the same result would follow, for the general scope of the subject is clearly indicated by the petitions presented and the comments of the members thereon.

Those petitions varied in form. Some prayed the adoption of a clause preventing the legislature “ from passing any act authorizing the retail of intoxicating liquors; ” others, a clause forbidding the legislature passing any law “whereby the sale of spirituous liquors may be granted to any one, or the traffic therein in any manner legalized ; ” others, a provision “prohibiting the sale of ardent spirits ; ” others, a clause “ prohibiting traffid in intoxicating liquors; ” and others that “ an excise be laid on every gallon of liquor manufactured sufficient to prevent the distillation.” These several phases of the question were matters of discussion, and there was no manifest haste or want of consideration in the formulating of the language of this section. On the contrary, the debates of the convention show that the section was the subject of much criticism; and while it is true that the evils which its advocates urged as most demanding correction were those of the retail traffic (the only form theretofore .sought to be regulated by license),-and while it is possible that some may not have realized the fullest effect of the language employed, yet the debates show beyond question that the meaning and possible effects of the proposed section were discussed, not only as affecting the retail trade, but the manufacture and all commercial dealings in liquors.

The adoption of the section was urged by some members with the avowed purpose of enabling the general assembly to provide against evils arising from any and all forms of the traffic. One member, responding to another who had advocated the adoption of the section, used this language : “ The gentleman supposes that if we insert this provision into the constitution, taking away from the general assembly the power of authorizing by license the traffic in spirituous liquors, that such a provision, together with the existing laws upon the subject, would have the effect to prevent the manufacture of and all commercial dealings in those articles. I understand that to be the substance of the gentleman’s legal opinion.” To this the other assented. Another member used language of this import: “I am opposed to the traffic in ardent spirits. I desire to cut it up by the roots, and drive it out,of the state.” Another, commenting upon the diverse views of those who. had spoken upon.the subject, and the possibility of the language used not conveying to the people and' the general assembly the meaning intended by the framers, expressed himself in this way : “ But the gentlemen should remember that our individual designs and intentions can not affect the proper and legitimate meaning of the words which we employ in this article.”

The addition of a single word would have confined the effect of the section to the retail traffic. The convention chose not to insert such word, but submitted the section as we have it, and as it was adopted by the people. They used general language, and whatever naturally falls within its ordinary meaning must, in view not only of the obvious import of the words used, but of the circumstances which led to its adoption, be held to have been intended.

To the point that the language itself is controlling, may be cited the following from the opinion of Gholson, J., in Goshorn v. Purcell, 11 Ohio St. 649: “Particular cases or instances lead to the adoption of general rules or principles-Many- of the general rules of law are thus deduced from the decision of particular cases. . . . But when particular instances lead to the adoption of a general rule, in the shape of a legislative or constitutional provision, the authority for the rule has no such limit. The rule is to be interpreted by the language employed in its enunciation, and that language, when clear and comprehensive, is not to be limited in view of the particular instances which may be supposed to have led to the adoption of the rule.”

There is, too, much significance in the point made by defendant’s counsel in their brief that the mode of submission throws light upon the understanding of the people as well as of the convention as to the meaning of the section. In voting, those who favored it voted a ballot having on it: “ License to sell intoxicating liquors, no;” while those who were opposed voted a ticket having on it: “ License to sell intoxicating liquors, yes.” The people who voted the former ticket cau not have supposed that when they voted “ no-” on the proposition to license the sale of intoxicating liquors, they were voting “ yes ” as to the wholesale trade, or leaving the question of license or no license as to that form of traffic an open one for legislative discretion. Yet this result would follow if the construction claimed by plaintiffs is the true one. It is clear that the word “ therefrom ” in the second clause refers to the phrase traffic in intoxicating liquors” in the first clause, and if the word “ therefrom” is confined to the retail traffic then it follows that the same construction must be given its equivalent in the first clause.

But even if it should be admitted that the evils contemplated by section eighteen are those of the retail traffic alone, still it would not follow that the act, in the particular complained of, is unconstitutional, for power to legislate generally upon the subject is conferred by section one of article 2 of the constitution. That section provides that “ the legislative power of this state shall be vested in a general assembly.” This essential power may be exercised upon all subjects to which it is applicable to such extent as the government may see fit to carry it, and unless restrained by other sections it is clearly within legislative competency to select this object of 'taxation, and place upon it such burdens as in the discretion of the law-making power may be wise and expedient. It does not now admit of controversy in Ohio that the power to levy taxes is a part of this legislative authority, and that, except so far as restrained by other provisions, the power is unlimited, and may be exercised for the accomplishment of lawful objects in regard to any property or business within the state.

The second proposition of plaintiff’s counsel implies that section 2 of article 12 of the ^constitution affords a limitation upon that power, and that the provisions of the law in question, as to wholesale dealers, are in violation of that section, because, while the section requires that laws shall be passed taxing property by a uniform rule, this law, so far as wholesale dealers are concerned,-is for revenue only, and unjustly discriminates between the wholesale dealer and the manufacturer, and betweeu the wholesale dealer as to his property and the holder of other kinds of property, inasmuch as the former is required to pay a tax under this law and general taxes under the general tax law in addition. To this it may be answered that the law does not purport to be for revenue, but to provide against evils, and, to construe it as a revenue law it must be shown that there are no evils incident to the wholesale traffic, and, in contemplation of law, that none can arise, a proposition which, we think, can not be maintained.

The first liquor law enacted under the present constitution made it an offense to sell intoxicating liquor to a person intoxicated, to one in the habit of becoming intoxicated, or to a minor, and these provisions have been in force ever since. True, the evils here sought to be guarded against sprang chiefly from sales in small quantities. But will any one say that evils are likely to arise from the sale to such a person of a drink of liquor, and none likely to follow the sale to the same person of a gallon ? "We assume not. And of all evils, and how they may be provided against, the general assembly is, by the constitution, made the judge. The whole field of choice is left to that body, and so long as it keeps within constitutional limits, no supervising power exists in the courts to say that the choice has not been wisely made. This law, as to its taxing features, operates upon a business and not upon property within the meaning of the section referred to, and hence is not required to be uniform in its application to all forms of the traffic or to all classes. We need not enlarge upon this. The opinions and holdings of this court in Adler v. Whitbeck, supra, and Anderson v. Brewster, supra, treat at length of the question and dispose of the proposition.

Nor is the proposition tenable that the law being of a general nature is not of uniform operation throughout the state, and for that reason repugnant to section 26 of article 2 of the constitution. True, the law is of a general nature and does discriminate between the general dealer and the manufacturer. It requires one to pay, and the other, where the sales are of one gallon and over, is exempted. This implies a division of the two into separate classes, but does not show that because of that fact the law is not of uniform operation. The principle of uniform operation requires simply that the law shall bear equally in its burdens Upon persons standing in the same category. A law is uniform in its operation where every person who is brought within the relation and circumstances provided for is alike affected by the law. It must have a uniform operation upon all those included within the class upon which it purports to operate. It is not claimed that the law does not purport to operate equally upon all wholesalers who are not manufacturers. As between the wholesale dealer and the manufacturer there is manifestly a real, taugible difference, though they have characteristics in common. The general assembly has chosen to classify and to discriminate accordingly. If the classification is proper the discrimination can not be objected to. Ve are not prepared to say that the classification is not warranted. The question in its general aspects is fully discussed and disposed of satisfactorily in the opinion in Adler v. Whitbeck, supra, and, we think, the argument of defendant’s counsel in this case will be found to amply meet the special phase of the question presented by the record.

Respecting the claim that if the law is held to apply to wholesale dealers they will be put to great disadvantage and driven from the state, it is enough to say that the consideration relates to the wisdom of the law, and not, in any sense, to its validity, and is addressed wholly to the general assembly. The court has no concern with it.

Motion overruled.

Owen, O. J., dissents.  