
    Lawrence vs. Jenkins.
    The Hen of the landlord upon the crop raised by his tenant, for the payment of the rent due to him, by virtue of the act of 1825, eh, 21, takes effect only on an execution for the rent, and extends to the date of the forfeiture of the contract. ' •
    A landlord cannot maintain a suit against a purchaser of the crop raised by his tenant, until he has first obtained a judgment against the tenant for the amount of rent due to him.
    This was an action of assumpsit brought by the defendant in error, Jenkins, against the plaintiff in error, Lawrence, to recover the value or proceeds of some cotton, sold by Washington Crouch to the plaintiff in error, Lawrence. The facts were these: Crouch rented from Jenkins, the defendant in error, thirty-five acres of land for the year 1831, and was to pay three dollars per acre. Upon this land he raised some corn, oats, and cotton. After he had gathered his cotton, he sold it in the seed to the plaintiff in error, Lawrence, for one dollar and fifty cents per hundred. There was about eight thousand pounds sold to Lawrence that had been raised in 1831 on the rented premises. The plaintiff below, Jenkins, did not introduce any proof before the jury on the trial, to show that an action had been brought by him against the tenant, by which the amount of rent still due had been ascertained.’ The court charged the jury, “that an action of assumpsit would lie against an individual who had purchased the produce of rented land front the tenant, in favor of the landlord, if the suit was brought ivitbin three months from the time the rent fell due. That it was not necessary for the landlord to show, that the debt created’for the rent was still due from the tenant, by producing a judgment against him; evidence of the existence of the debt, if the same be otherwise shown to be owing, is enough. That whenever he made that proof, the onus was thrown on the defendant to prove that the debt for the rent had been paid, was released, or that an accord and satisfaction for it had taken place, or that the debt never existed, or that the cotton sold was not raised on the rented land, and if the defendant failed to show any of these things, the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict against him for the amount for which the land was rented, provided the cotton purchased by him from the tenant was equal in value to the rent.” To the above opinion of the court, the defendant, by his counsel, excepted. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and motion having been made by the defendant for a new trial, and the same being overruled by the court, he prosecuted an appeal in the nature of a writ of error to this court.
    
      C. Ready, for plaintiff in error.
    
      James Campbell, for defendant in error.
   Catron, Ch. J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case presents the same point adjudged in Davis vs. Parks, and Ballentine vs. Greer, (6 Yerg. 253, 267). and it is insisted that the court was mistaken when it supposed the lien contemplated by the act of 1825, would only be asserted by an execution on part of the landlord against the tenant. The legal title to the crop, it is presumed. is in the landlord, and that the tenant holds possession for him the same as the barkeeper at an inn does for the proprietor, the horse of the guest; and that the same lien exists for the rent in favor of the landlord, that pertains to the innkeeper for the tavern bill. That if the f , . , , , 1 ... . - , barkeeper fraudulently parts with the possession of the horse, even to the guest himself, and the bill is not paid, trover will lie.

It is true, that where possession is lawfully delivered to an innkeeper, taylor, dyer, miller, or carrier, for hire, the property may be retained until the sum due the tradesman, &c. for the labor and expense bestowed on it is paid; but he retains his lawful possession, whereas the landlord never has had possession of the crop grown on the premises, and proceeds upon his naked right. 2 Kent’s Com. 496, well explains the description of lien referred to by the counsel for the defendant. Were the premises true,' the conclusion would follow: if the right of property is in the landlord, he may recover in trover for its conversion. What description of lien the legislature referred to, in the act of 1825, must be inferred. The court have heretofore thought the lien of the landlord’s judgment and execution, took date from the day the rent fell due, and not the date of the judgment, and test of the first execution. That the legislature meant this, is yet believed to be apparent from the act, the reasons fo’r which, are given in the cases cited from 6 Yerg.; and that it must be so from the strict construction given to statutes conferring a priority of satisfaction in cases of the government, (1 Kent Com. 24,) and in all other cases where the rules of the common law have been altered in favor of a particular class of creditors.

If it be true, that the landlord has title, he may sue every person who has received by purchase any part of the product of the rented premises; twenty may be recovered against, and each to the amount of the rent; and who of the defendants is to make satisfastion, no one can tell; and if double satisfaction were likely to be obtained, it cannot be seen how it could be prevented. Again: the purchasers from the tenant are sued, recovered against, and pay; then they separately sue the tenant for a defect of title in the property sold them; he relies in defence on payment of the rent to the landlord, or a setoff, and for the first time between the tenant' and third persons, it is legally ascertained whether there is rent due. In the cases before the court, the landlord has no judgments against the tenant; they are precisely like Ballentine vs. Greer. The costs of these double sets of suits would far exceed the rent in most instances.

Placing the construction of the statute on the ground that the lien takes effect only on an execution for the rent, and extends to the date of the forfeiture of the contract, and we have legal and settled rules governing the priorities of contending creditors of the tenant, and purchasers from him, and we avoid many and great inconveniences.

Judgment reversed.  