
    Daniel Stone and Others, Petitioners, &c., versus Jonathan Davis and Others.
    No review lies upon a report of referees, appointed pursuant to Slat. 1786, c. 21, where the party found indebted has paid the sum awarded, and the report, with the acknowledgment of satisfaction, had been returned and recorded, accord ing to the statute.
    This was a petition for a review of a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Common Pleas for this county.
    The petition stated that the said' Davis &f Al. having a demand against the said Stone fy AL, the parties had, by an agreement entered into before a justice of the peace, pursuant to the statute of 1786, c. 21, submitted the same to the decision of certain referees, who had made a report, in favor of the respondents, to that court. The petitioners having paid the sum awarded against them, the respondents had acknowledged the payment thereof, by their receipt on the back of the report, which had been returned and recorded according to the statute. The petition states certain facts, which had come to their knowledge since the acceptance of the report, which, in equity and good conscience, would entitle them to a rehearing of the matter submitted to the referees.
    
      Bigelow, for the petitioners.
    By the statute of 1791, c. 17, <§> 2, the justices of this Court “are vested with *a discretionary power to grant reviews in civil actions, whenever they shall judge it to be reasonable.” It will not be denied that this was a civil action. Nor is it an objection to this application, that the decision complained of was made by judges of the parties’ own selection. This Court has often granted reviews of actions, which had been submitted to the award of referees by a rule entered into in the Court of Common Pleas ; and in such cases have ordered new pleadings. In this case, it is true, there is no declaration in form; but a declaration is but a part of the pleadings; and the Court may as well order the respondents to file a declaration upon their original demand, as to direct new pleas to a declaration already formed. If it be objected that, in this case, the parties found by the referees to be in debt have paid the amount found due before the report was returned to the Court, and so no formal judgment was rendered, it is answered, that, by the statute of 1788, c. 11, § 2, this Court is authorized to grant reviews in cases, where no judgment has been rendered.
   Per Curiam.

The petitioners exhibit a strong claim in justice tc a rehearing of their cause. But, they seem to be without legal remedy. Were we to grant them a review, we are not able to » conceive by what course of proceedings we could set aside the award of the referees. The proceedings are entirely regular in point of form. Were they brought before us by an order on this petition, they would not show any common law action. There would be no declaration, no plea, nor issue, nor judgment. We could not compel the respondents to file a declaration, upon which the petitioners could plead to issue. In truth, the parties, from the beginning, selected another forum ; they submitted the question between them to judges of their own choosing; they never intend ed to have the question decided at law. To entertain the cause here, would be utterly changing the whole ground upon which the parties have voluntarily placed themselves. Upon the facts disclosed, and which hitherto we have taken as not denied, the petitioners have a very hard case, and * are suffer-mg great injustice. But it is the effect of their own conduct, in putting their cause out of the course of the common law. Cases of equal hardship frequently occur, from causes not dissimilar to that in the present case. They are, however, out of our power to remedy. Had fraud been shown in any stage of the proceedings, the petitioners might have obtained relief; but here was nothing more than mistake.

The petitioners can take nothing by their petition.

Lincoln for the respondents.  