
    SCOGGINS v. STATE.
    (No. 8400.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Nov. 19, 1924.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 1924.)
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    Highways <§=>186 — Failure to define “intoxicated” in prosecution for driving automobile while intoxicated held not reversible error; “drunk.”
    Court’s failure to define “intoxicated,” in prosecution for driving automobile while intoxicated, held not reversible error, under Vernon’s Ann. Code Or. Proc. 1916, art. 743, in view of undisputed evidence that defendant was “drunk,” which, as commonly understood,' means result of excessive drinking, a state of intoxication depriving one of normal control of bodily and mental faculties.
    [Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Drunk.]
    Appeal irom Criminal District Court, Dallas County; C. A. Pippen, Judge.
    V. P. Scoggins was convicted of driving an automobile while intoxicated, and appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Hughes & Monroe, of Dallas, for appellant.
    Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

The offense is driving an automobile while intoxicated; punishment fixed at a fine of $1 and confinement in the county jail for a period of 90 days.

The attack upon the indictment and the statute upon which the prosecution is founded is not unlike that passed on by this court in Nelson v. State, 261 S. W. 1046, in which both the law and the indictment were held valid.

The evidence was all one way to the effect that the appellant was drunk and was staggering. Under these circumstances the omission of the definition of the term “intoxicated” is not deemed error requiring a reversal.

Finding no error, the judgment is .affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

It is urged that we were in error in holding that there was no reversible error revealed by the failure of the trial court to define the term “intoxicated.”

There was no evidence for the appellant. One of the state’s witnesses testified that while the appellant was driving his car and officers were trying to stop him, he came very near running over them. They finally stopped and ' arrested him. The witness said:

“The defendant was drunk. I smelled intoxicating liquor on his breath. , When he got out of the car, we had to hold Mm up so he could walk.”

Two other witnesses testified-that the appellant was drunk. One of them said:

“At that time I would say he was drunk; he didn’t walk very well, and he had no control of his eyes. It didn’t seem like he could tell which he was walking hardly. * * * I smelled intoxicating liquor on his breath; it smelled like corn whisky to me.” ’

It may be conceded that “intoxication” may be of varying degrees. Under our statute (article 743, Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916), an omission in the charge of the court which is not calculated to injure the right of the accused does not warrant a reversal. Taking into account the undisputed evidence that the appellant was “drunk,” this court would not be warranted in reversing the judgment because of its failure to define the term “intoxicated.” “Drunk,” as commonly understood, means the result of excessive drinking; a stage of intoxication depriving one of tlie normal control of one’s bodily and mental faculties. See Hugbes v. State ex rel. Sutton, 50 Ind. App. 617, 98 N. E. 839; Paris v. Robinson, 104 Tex. 482, 140 S. W. 434; also Id. (Tex. Civ. App.) 127 S. W. 294 ; 2 Words & Phrases, Second Series156.

In the light of the record, we are constrained to overrule the motion for rehearing. It is so ordered. 
      <§=>Eor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     