
    
      Penn Central Transportation Co. v. Armco Steel Corp.
    [Cite as Penn Central Transportation Co. v. Armco Steel Corp. (1971), 27 Ohio Misc. 76.]
    (No. 134710
    Decided April 8, 1971.)
    Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County.
    
      Messrs. Bieser, Greer & Landis, for plaintiff.
    
      Mr. F. Thomas Green, for defendant.
   McBride, J.

Once upon a time, not many months ago, lawyers and judges played the game of semantics with pleadings and motions. This court does not propose to transfer such abandoned games to interrogatories. These games are contrary to the Civil Rules, particularly 1 (B); they appropriate judicial time, badly required in the cause of justice.

Reviewing the interrogatories in this case the court is impressed by the basic problem of what is an interrogatory. So many do not ask a question but demand a narrative dissertation on a broad subject, impossible to incorporate in one statement. For example, we find such directions as: “describe in detail,” “state in detail,” and “describe the particulars,” repeatedly used. In each instance, the direction is an open end invitation without limit on its comprehensive nature with no guide for the court to determine if the voluminous response is what the party sought in the first place.

The dictionaries suggest that interrogatories in the legal sense are questions and answers, such as are customary at trial, which seek to elicit facts and which can be answered in a categorical fashion, fair to the party or witness and suitable for the jury. In this context, many of the separate interrogatories submitted under Rule 33 in this case violate every rule of evidential simplicity and reasonable intelligence. If objections are sustained at trial to double questions and narrative dissertations of great length and with many subdivisions, it is appropriate that this rule be applicable to interrogatories under Rule 33 unless the Rule itself requires another definition.

As a member of the Civil Rules Committee the writer confesses that it never occurred to him that it was necessary to define the word interrogatory; however, from experience of less than a year it is apparent that if this form of discovery is to serve the purpose intended by the rules, a definition must be adopted.

The word interrogatory has no fixed or invariable meaning in the common law, the statutes or the rules. Technically it implies a question in writing. When used in rules in connection with other forms of discovery, such as' depositions or demands for exhibits or admissions, the word takes on a more precise meaning and purpose. An interrogatory seeks an admission or it seeks information of major significance in the trial or in the preparation for trial. It does not contemplate an array of details or outlines of evidences, a function reserved by rules for deposition. It does not include exhibits, contracts or the like which may be otherwise obtained or agreed upon. The interrogatory should be a narrow question that is capable of being answered by a categorical statement without a lengthy explanation such as can be explored on deposition. 22 Words and Phrases 385. From this definition it is apparent that Rule 33 on interrogatories, limited as it is to the parties, is a preliminary step in discovery and is not a substitute for the comprehensive form of questioning provided by deposition. This is the major difference between the two forms of discovery.

With this in mind we turn to the instant case.

On January 13, 1971, a motion to compel answers to 101 interrogatories each with many parts was sustained without hearing or consideration of individual questions or of the number involved.

Answers and objections were filed on January 19, 1971 on each of the 101 questions. (16 pages) Plaintiff responded again with a motion to compel discovery and in opposition to defendant’s objections to individual questions. (9 pages) To this the defendant on April 5, 1971 asked for protective orders, answered plaintiff’s memorandum and requested an oral hearing on the motion for protective orders. (8 pages) The confusion is compounded by a failure to follow Rule 33 (D).

A cursory review of the “Interrogatories” reveals innumerable directions (as distinguished from questions) commencing with the words, “describe,” “state,” “outline” all the details or particulars of one situation and operation after another. While such words may be used to require a short, categorical response, it is obvious in this case that what the plaintiff seeks is a detaile4 an4 comprehensive statement, amounting to a lenthy “white paper,” containing all the evidence on each situation. This brings out the second difference between an interrogatory and a deposition. An interrogatory is a question, not a command.

A direction or command to another party to set forth a picture or history with particulars or a narrative of events by words or drawings is not an interrogatory. Such a command requires no categorical response, leaves everything to the discretion of the party so directed, bears no relationship to the simple question and answer at trials as contemplated by the Rules and is improper. This type of discovery requires a deposition and even then may at times be as objectionable as it is at trial.

This conclusion is supported not only by the definition of the word but also by the fact that the court cannot pass upon the sufficiency of the answers to unreasonable commands. If an interrogatory commands the other party to spew out all the intricate details of a complicated situation, the limit of acceptable use of this form of discovery has been violated.

As indicated earlier it is not the form but the substance of the command that is improper. “List the names and addresses of witnesses to an accident” is in the form of a command, but is essentially an interrogatory that can be categorically answered. It is, therefore, entirely proper.

With these guidelines counsel may resolve their problems on a good portion of the 101 questions and their subdivisions.

What, then, is to be done with the balance? If the court must determine all of the differences and arguments on this effort of counsel at the interrogatory level and before deposition, the trial of this case will inevitably be delayed and judicial time unnecessarily appropriated contrary to the purpose of the Civil Rules which are designed to confine discovery and exchange of information to counsel within their professional responsibilities to the general public.

To avoid such misfortune to the public and to expedite this case the court invokes and adopts Rule 17 of the Federal Court for the Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio. In addition to the report required in such Rule 17 (d), the court requires a statement of the hours counsel consulted together on the problems that have been raised.

The court has the same if not greater right and duty to regulate discovery as it does to control the trial and to impose reasonable limits and conditions, consistent with the rules, to expedite the administration of justice.

As to any matters not disposed of by consultation, the court orders that such matters be subsequently reported and separately stated under Rule 33 (D) so that they may be considered and resolved by the court independent of present filings which fail to reveal the required cooperative effort by counsel.

Every effort should be made by counsel to eliminate demands that are not interrogatory in nature and substance as outlined by the court, to reduce the unreasonable volume of interrogatories, to explain to each other what is desired and what will satisfy reasonable requests, to otherwise reduce differences in their professional demands upon each other and to decide what depositions will be taken.

Counsel will advise the court upon compliance with the foregoing order. Arrangements will be made to determine upon memorandum the disputes remaining as well as whether a hearing is required.

This decision and order was served upon all of counsel, by ordinary mail on April 8, 1971.  