
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. HO DUC NGUYEN, aka Ah Wah, William Nagatsuka, aka Japanese William, Sui Min Ma, aka Frank Ma, aka Ma Gor, Paul Cai, Bing Yi Chen, aka Ah Ngai, Defendants, and Luyen Dao Nguyen, aka Ah Wing, aka Ah Wren, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-5282-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 25, 2013.
    
      Stephen Marzen (Jason M. Swergold and Sue Kim, on the brief), Shearman & Sterling LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Paul M. Monteleoni (Brent S. Wible, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, for Appellee.
    Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges, JED S. RAKOFF, District Judge.
    
      
      
         The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, of die United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant Luyen Dao Nguyen appeals from a December 14, 2011, judgment of conviction entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Batts, J.), following his plea of guilty to one count of participation in a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and one count of murder while engaged in a narcotics offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). The district court principally sentenced him to 400 months of imprisonment, a sentence within the federal Sentencing Guidelines range. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Nguyen challenges both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We review sentences for “unreasonableness,” which “amounts to review for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 187 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc).

Nguyen contends that his sentence is proeedurally unreasonable because the district court did not consider the mitigation evidence relating to his troubled childhood and his rehabilitation prior to his arrest. However, “we entertain a strong presumption that the sentencing judge has considered all arguments properly presented to her, unless the record clearly suggests otherwise.” United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 29 (2d Cir.2006). Here, the record contains no such clear suggestion.

Nguyen’s reliance on United States v. Woltmann, 610 F.3d 37 (2d Cir.2010), is misplaced. There, the district court explicitly refused to consider material that was relevant to the sentencing. Id. at 38. Here, the district court listened to oral argument with respect to the mitigation evidence and stated that it had received the written materials submitted by the defendant. Indeed, the district court indicated that it had considered the mitigation evidence offered by the defense, acknowledging that “the defendant indeed had a harrowing life experience and deprivation as a child” and that “the defendant has made efforts at living a life without crime for several years before his arrest on these charges in 2003.” App’x 173-74. At no point did the district court suggest that it would not or did not consider the mitigation evidence. Nguyen fails to overcome the strong presumption that the district court considered the argument that he presented with respect to mitigation.

Nguyen contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court placed undue weight on the sentence of Nguyen’s co-defendant, Paul Cai. Nguyen principally argues that his sentence should have been similar to Cai’s and that the district court should not have sentenced Nguyen to a longer period of imprisonment based on his more extensive criminal history. “We do not, as a general matter, object to district courts’ consideration of similarities and differences among co-defendants when imposing a sentence.” United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229, 236 n. 8 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Wills, 476 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir.2007), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Cavera, 550 F.3d 180). Indeed, “it is appropriate for a district court, relying on its unique knowledge of the totality of the circumstances of a crime and its participants, to impose a sentence that would better reflect the extent to which the participants in a crime are similarly (or dis-similarly) situated and tailor the sentences accordingly.” Wills, 476 F.3d at 110 (emphases omitted). The district court did so here, and neither its consideration of Cai’s sentence nor the final sentence that it imposed is substantively unreasonable.

We decline to reach Nguyen’s argument, made for the first time in his reply brief, that the sentence is proeedurally unreasonable because it rests on clearly erroneous findings of fact. See McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir.2009) (“[W]e ordinarily will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).

We have considered defendant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED. 
      
      . Nguyen also challenges the sentencing appeal waiver in the plea agreement that he executed, arguing that the waiver is unenforceable. The government does not seek to enforce the appeal waiver. Accordingly, we reach the merits of Nguyen's arguments here.
     