
    In the Matter of the Applications of Philip J. Sheridan and Others, Appellants, v. Theodore B. Willis, as Commissioner of the Department of City Works of the City of Brooklyn, Respondent.
    
      Brooklyn—removal of clerks by heads of departments—no reason .required for removals made within thirty days after appointment of the head of the department^-when the thirty days begin to run.
    
    Upon the hearing of a motion for a writ of peremptory mandamus, directing Theodore B. Willis, the commissioner of city works, the respondent, to restore the petitioners to their positions in the department of city works in the city of Brooklyn, it appeared that Theodore B. Willis, the respondent, was appointed • by the mayor-commissioner of the department of city works in the city of Brooklyn on January 21, 1896, for a term of two years from February 1,1896, and on the same day the certificate of appointment and the respondent’s oath of office were filed, and that on January twenty-ninth his official bond was approved and filed. The charter of the city of Brooklyn provides in substance that the head of a department may appoint.and remove his clerks and subordinates, provided, •' however, that on. and after the expiration of thirty days from the time when a new head of department shall have been appointed, he may remove such clerks and subordinates only upon filing in writing with the city clerk his. reasons for the removal. The petitioners in this proceeding, former employees of the department, were discharged by the respondent on February 29, 1896, and no reasons were assigned.
    
      Meld, that a mandamus was properly refused;
    That the respondent’s term of office did not begin until February 1, 1896; that it was the intention of the Legislature to give to the newly-appointed heads' of the departments thirty days within which they might make removals without assigning any reasons for so doing."
    Appeal by the relators, Philip J. Sheridan and others, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Kings County Special Terra and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 11th day of May, 1896, denying their motion for a writ of peremptory 'mandamus, directing the respondent to restore them to their respective positions in the department of city works of the city of Brooklyn.
    
      
      Edward M. Grout, for the appellants.
    
      Alfred E. Mudge, for the respondent.
   Brown, P. J.:

The petitioners in this proceeding were, prior to February 29, 1896, employees in the department of city works in the city of Brooklyn. On that day the respondent discharged them from their positions, and the sole question presented on this appeal is whether such discharge was lawful. The respondent was appointed commissioner of the city works by the mayor on January 21,1896, for the term of two years from the following first day of February, and the certificate of appointment and the commissioner’s oath of office were on that day filed, as required by law, and on January twenty-ninth the commissioner’s official bond was approved by the common council and filed with the city clerk. The provision of the charter of the city of Brooklyn applicable to the. facts here present is as follows:

The officer or officers at the head of any department may appoint and remove his or their clerks and assistants and other subordinates and fix their salaries, provided, however, that on and after the expiration of thirty days from the time that a new officer or officers shall have been appointed as such head of department, he or they may remove clerks or assistants only upon filing in writing the reasons for any removal with the city clerk, which reasons shall not be questioned in any other place, except that foremen, inspectors and laborers temporarily employed under the department of city works may be removed at any time at the pleasure of the head of such department.” (Laws of 1888, chap. 583, tit. 3, § 2.)

It is clear that the intent of the Legislature was to give to newly-appointed heads of departments thirty days within which to make removals without assigning reasons therefor.

This power evidently could not be exercised until the head of the department entered upon the discharge of his duties. The thirty days, therefore, began to run at the commencement of the appointee’s term of office. The respondent was appointed on January twenty-first, but his term of office did not begin until February first, and he did not enter upon the discharge of his duties until the latter date. Beginning with that date, for a period of thirty days he was empowered to make, removals of- employees in -his" department without assigning any reason for his action. As the petitioners were removed from their positions on February twenty-ninth, their discharge, therefore, was lawful.

. The order must be affirmed, with ten dollars costs and 'disbursements.

All concurred.

Order affirmed, with ten ¿dollars costs and disbursements.  