
    MARY A. STRAIT v. NEWTON A. STRAIT.
    Equity. —
    No. 5147.
    I. A decree of divorce obtaine.d in the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania, by one who floes not reside there, is void for want of jurisdiction, and will be so declared here.
    II. Fraud may also be set up against, a judgment of divorce obtained in another State.
    STATEMENT 0E THE CASE.
    This is the case of a petition, by the wife, for a divorce; and for cause of divorce she charges the defendant with cruelty of treatment towards her, endangering her life and health, and with desertion for the period required by our statute.
    'Defendant’s answer sets up a decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming county, Pennsylvania, obtained January 28, 1876, by defendant, divorcing him from the bond of marriage with the complainant, upon his application, alleging desertion upon her part since June, 1873.
    By her amended bill complainant charges fraud in the procurement of said decree, and want of jurisdiction in the court rendering the same.
    The testimony shows that the defendant, then a child thirteen years of age, removed, with his parents, in 1861, from Lycoming county, Pennsylvania, to the city of Washington, where he has ever since remained, employed first in the ambulance corps, then in the service of an express company, and for the residue of the time in the United States Pension Office. The parties were married here, where both have continuously resided ever since. The alleged desertion of defendant by complainant is laid here. Defendant’s Pennsylvania application for divorce was verified in the office of the clerk of this court, and the whole of the testimony offered in support of it was taken in this city, within three or four squares of complainant’s residence, but without notice to her¡
    Complainant has never resided in Pennsylvania, and her first knowledge of the proceedings had there was derived from the copy of the decree filed with the defendant’s answer to her bill. The jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania court is attempted to be supported on the ground that defendant has been in the habit of making an annual visit, of about one month’s duration, to his parents, in Lycoming county, to which place they returned about one year after the removal to Washington ; of claiming a residence there, and, since a year or two subsequent to his marriage, of voting there at elections.
    A copy of the Pennsylvania decree is attached to the plea, and a copy of the statute of that State concerning divorce is among the proofs ;■ from whieh it appears that the petition may be filed in the Court of Common Pleas of the proper county where the injured party resides. The act of 1858 extended the jurisdiction, with a proviso “ that the applicant shall be a citizen of the commonwealth, or shall have resided therein for the term of one year, as provided by the existing laws of this commonwealth.”
    The plea was set down for hearing upon the proofs, and certified to be heard at the general term in the first instance.
    
      
      R. T. Morsell, for complainant.
    
      L. G. Sine and S. T. Thomas, for defendant.
   Cartter, Ch. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court, substantially as follows: .

The bill in this case is for a divorce on the ground of. desertion. Defendant’s answer sets up a decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming county, Pennsylvania, obtained by the husband January, 1876, divorcing him from the bond of matrimony with the complainant, upon his application, alleging desertion, on her part, since June, 1878.

The complainant charges that the said decree was procured by fraud, and that the court rendering the same had rió jurisdiction in the case, and wé think she is correct in both propositions. Under the laws of Pennsylvania, the party exhibiting a petition for divorce must reside in the county where he brings his or her suit. Now, the defendant came, with his parents, when a child, to live in Washington. His parents returned to Pennsylvania, but he remained here in the employment of the government. Here he reached his majority, being engaged in various ways, both military and civil. He was married here, and resided with the father of his wife. He separated from her in Washington. Under these circumstances we do not think he resided in Pennsylvania. Now, whether the decree is void because ■ it was without notice to the complainant, and because she never resided in that State, it is not necessary to determine; for, independently of that; consideration, it is clear that the husband had no such residence in Pennsylvania as to give jurisdiction to the courts of' that State in an action of divorce.

The circumstances relied on to establish fraud lead to the same conclusion. Although he went to Pennsylvania to ' obtain his divorce, his petition in that case was prepared in this city, and was sworn to before the clerk of this court; and he took all his proofs in Washington, within two squares of where his wife resided, without any notice and without any service. There is no concealing the fact that he designed to obtain a divorce without her knowing it. Where fraud is so apparent, we think it may? be set up against the divorce, although the judgment was obtained in another State. The circumstance that he was permitted to vote in Pennsylvania is not one to which we attach much importance on a question relating to the domestic relations.

The plea is overruled, and the case remanded to be proceeded in accordingly.  