
    ISAAC N. BRYSON vs. ROSANNA CAMPBELL.
    Marriage is a civil contract, and cannot be dissolved by the Stale Legislature.; '
    APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT.
    Glover. & Campbell, and Porter for appellant,
    The act of the legislature divorcing Bryson and wife was constitutional, and dissolved the? mutual relations between them. The counsel for the appellant never having seen propriety of the decision in the case of State*vs. Fry. But being well satisfied of the legislative power to grant divorces; and believing that the doctrine laid down in that case is not satisfactory to the bar generally, respectfully solicit a review of the grounds on which it was decided. They will not attempt to add any thing to the able argument already before the court.
    A. H. Buckner for appellee.
    In the case of Bingham vs. Miller, 17 Ohio Reports, p. 445, the court say emphatically that “the constitution confers no such power;” yet strange to say they declare this Void and unconstitutional act valid, because forsooth, the legislature have assumed this power for more than forty years. In the Kentucky case, Gaines vs. Gaines, reported in the May No., 1849. Western Law Journal, page 363, will be found a very profound argument on this question, and the court take a distinction, as to the effect of a legislative divorce, which, if it had occurred to the Ohio court, would have produced a different opinion from that tribunal.
   Judge Bircii

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a suit to recover the sum of $217 50 for boarding the wife of Bryson after he had obtained an act of legislative divorce; and the only question presented by the record concerns the constitutional competency of the general assembly to pass such laws. The authority to do so was disaffirmed by a former bench of this court, in a case (Gentry’s case, 4 Mo. Rep. 120) originating before the legislative enactment of 18:35, which has remained in force ever since, and which declares in concurrence with the judicial opinion alluded to, that marriage is “a civil contract.” The marriage in question having taken place subsequent to the act aforesaid, and under what we consider its express guaranties, to sanction the legislative competency to interfere with such a “contract,” would be scarcely less objectionable upon the score of public justice, than it has heretofore been deemed tobe incompatible with public policy and the constitutional distinction of the powers of government.

The judgment of the circuit court is therefore affirmed.

Napton, J.,. gave no. opinion.  