
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT,
    CHARLESTON,
    MAY, 1805.
    Bevin v. Linguard and others.
    In trespass for assault and battery against several defendants, who pleaded jointly not guilty, a verdict wat, found for several damages: It was adjudged that the jury may, in such case, sever the damages and apportion them.
    A joint plea may be considered as several, as well as joint, in order to the attainment of justice.
    Motion for a new trial. This was an action for assaulting and beating the plaintiff, in his dwelling house, and tearing down part of his house, throwing about his goods; &c. The defendants pleaded jointly the general issue. At the trial before Brevard, J, in Charleston, the plaintiff recovered a verdict for five hundred dollars, to be paid, so much by one defendant, so much by another. The motion for a new trial was argued upon two grounds: 1st. That the damages were excessive. But it appeared from the re^ port of the judge who presided at the trial, that the trespass was exceedingly outrageous, and the damages were not thought immoderate. 2d. That the jury could not award several damages,- a& the defence was joint,
    
      Desaussuiie, and Chevf.s, for the defendants,
    cited 5 Bur. 2790. 2 Buc. Abr. Tit. Damages. Bay’s Report of the case of White v. M’Xeily and others, does not contradict the doctrine of the En. glish books on this point, for that Report does not state that the defendants pleaded j uíitiy; and, it ought to be presumed, they pleaded several pleas, i Esp. Dig. 420.
    Pringle, contra.
    
    The case ol White v. M’Xeily is conclusive. The defendants in that case pleaded jointly; and jet it was adjudged the jury might apportion the damages. The plea of all the defendants should be taken as a joint and several plea. Trespasses are joint and several. There can be no greater impropriety in apportioning the damages in a verdict against all upon a joint plea finding all the defendants guilty, than in acquitting one of several joint trespasses upon.a joint plea, and finding a verdict against the others. The object is to do justice, by apportioning the damages according to the different degrees of guilt. It is always done in criminal cases; and there is no principle of law which requires that it should not be done in civil cases, merely because the defendants join in pleading the same plea, which may be considered as their several as well as joint plea. In the eye of the law, they are all regarded as equally guilty; but they are not, therefore, to be re» garded as guilty in the same degree. The cases cited from the English books are of authority in England, only because the practice there had been long so settled, and it was not found convenient to alter it; but with us, the practice has always been otherwise; and this practice has been found by experience to answer the eiids of justice. Besides, the first part of the verdict is sufficient as against all, and the rest may be rejected.
   Tiie court,

(Waties, Bat, Brevard, and Wilds, Justices,)

were of opinion that the verdict ought not to be set aside : 1st, Because, if the objection to its being a finding of several damages, against defendants jointly charged, and found jointly guilty, could be supported, yet the apportionment of the damages might be rejected as surplusage, and the finding of a gross sum by the verdict, which is afterwards apportioned, might be considered as joint damages. 2d, Because the jury, upon such joint charge, may find the defendants jointly guilty, and yet apportion the damages according to their different degrees of guilt. This appears to have been the practice in this country for a long time past; and it has not been found, upon experience, productive of any mischief or inconven, ience; nor is it contrary to any principle of law. The case of Hill and another v. Goodchild, in 5 Bur. 2790, was decided upon full ¡argument and consideration, but yet no principle of law is stated as the ground of the decision, nor any strong reason for it, except that it was warranted by former determinations. The court seemed to think, that because the trespass was joint, the damages mus! of necessity be joint also ; admitting, that if the defendants had been charged jointly and severally, they might have been found severally guilty, and the damages apportioned ; and also admitting, that there was a great confusion in the cases upon the subject. The practice and rule of law in England upon this point, does not seem so well adapted to answer the real justice of such cases wherein the point occurs, as the practice of our couris, which has established a different rule of law, by which the jury are authorized to assess damages according to the different degrees of guilt ;• although the trespass should appear to be joint, where the dele-idants are jointly charged, yet they may plead severally; for no man can be compelled 10 combine his defence with others: and if th. y [dead Severally, the jury may, according to the English authorities, .-ever the damages. 2 Str. 1140. But a joint plea may be considered as several, as well as joint, in order to the attainment of justice.

Motion refused.

Note. Co. Litt. 232. A. When divers do a trespass, the same is joint,- or several, at the will of him to whom the wrong is done See the 5th Ref. in Sir John Hey don’s case. 11 Co. 5. See 5 Johns. 278. Jackson v. Haines. Ejectment against five defendants, who pleaded jointly. The verdict found each defendant severally guilty as to the pait of the premises in Ins separate possession, and not guilty as to the rest, adjudged plaintiff was ¡«titled to judgment against . J1 the defendants severally, according to tlie verdict. See Cro. C. 54, 50, 11 C. 5. 2 Str. 1149. 2 Johns. 438. See Cro. Jac. 118, Crane and Hill v. Humberston. Trespass. Defendants severed in pleading. The jury found several verdicts. 1 he court was of opinion there ought to he hit one judgment. (In Error.) See 1 Hen. and Munf 488. Ammonet v. Harris and Turpin Joint action of assault against several defendants. Two of them appeared, and pleaded not guilty. Verdict guilty, and joint damages assessed.' Released. And afterwards, judgment against the other defendants was not permitted. It is said judgment must be against one pro metioribus dumnis, or against all jointly. But it is left doubtful if the jury had apportioned »n several pleas.  