
    Paul HUPP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey Howard FREEDMAN, individually and in his official capacity as “Pro Tem Administrative Law Judge”, individually, jointly, and severally, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-55175.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 7, 2014.
    
    Filed April 14, 2014.
    Paul Hupp, Beaumont, CA, pro se.
    Elizabeth Vann, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Paul Hupp appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations and state law claims in connection with the denial of his application for a temporary teaching permit. We review de novo. Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1077 n. 1 (9th Cir.2006). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Hupp’s action because Freedman is entitled to judicial immunity. See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir.2004) (explaining that judges functioning in their judicial capacities are generally entitled to judicial immunity and setting fourth factors for determining whether an official’s functions are quasi-judicial in nature); Hirsch v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (concluding that administrative law judges are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); O’Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 368-70 (9th Cir.1981) (extending judicial immunity to a pro tem judge and discussing the distinction between acts taken “in clear absence of all jurisdiction” and those taken merely “in excess of jurisdiction”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     