
    *Richard Douglas v. Cadwallader Wallace, Aaron Johnston, and Joseph Bloomer.
    Where, on a ea. sa., the defendant turns out real estate to release his body, the lien of the judgment on other lands is not thereby discharged.
    Equity has no jurisdiction to compel a sheriff to pay over moneys collected on execution.
    This is a bill in chancery, from the county of Fayette.
    
      The facts of the case, as they appear in the bill, answer, exhibits, and testimony, are as follows :
    At the September term of the court of common pleas of Fayette county, 1818, the defendant, Wallace, recovered a judgment, by confession, against Absalom and Adam Funk, for a debt of $140 and costs. At the time of the rendition of this judgment, Absalom Funk held, by deed, from Adam Funk, the following lands, lying in Fayette county, to wit: Survey No. 7251, of 150 acres; No. 3708, of 400 acres; and No. 3789, of 176 acres. Wallace levied his execution upon the tract of 150 acres, and purchased it in on May 14, 1825, at $150, which, deducted from the amount of his judgment, cost, and interest, left a balance of $76.60 due.
    On December 8,1818, Dingle, Hansberger, and Yan Matre, obtained judgment, against Absalom Funk, for $506.62, and costs of suit. On April 21, 1819, a ca. sa. was issued on this judgment, and the defendant, Funk, arrested. To obtain his release, he turned out to the sheriff, survey No. 3708, of 400 acres, which was accepted by the sheriff, and appraised at three dollars per acre.
    On July 17, 1823, Absalom Funk conveyed the above survey, No. 3789, of 176 acres, to Adam Funk, and, on the 23d of October, of the succeeding year, Adam Funk conveyed the same to the complainant.
    At the March term of the court, 1825, on motion of Dingle, Hansberger, and Yan Matre, the appraisement of the 400 acres was set aside, and another appraisement ordered. Upon this *reappraisement, the land was valued at $1.37J per acre, and thereupon Hansberger, one of the plaintiffs, purchased the 400 acre survey, at the price of about $367, leaving a large balance due on the judgment.
    To collect the balance of his judgment, Wallace took out an execution, and had the same levied on 123f acres, part of the survey of 176 acres, and, at the same time, an execution was issued in favor of Dingle, Hansberger, and Yan Matre, and levied on the same land.
    At the sheriff’s sale, under these executions, Wallace became the purchaser, on September 30, 1825, for the sum of $577.50. This amount was sufficient to satisfy the judgment in favor of Wallace, and leave a surplus of $478.88. It was sufficient to satisfy both judgments, and leave a surplus of about sixty dollars. Wallace, at the time of the sale, had become interested in the judgment, in favor of Linglo, Hansbcrger, and Yan Matre. The money arising from the sale was appropriated to the satisfaction of both judgments, and the surplus of sixty dollars was paid over to the defendant, Johnson, who was sheriff of tho county at the time of sale, and, by him, was paid over to tho defendant, Bloomer, who was his successor in office. After Douglas, in 1823, purchased the survey of 176 acres, ho took possession of the same, and sold it to one Green. In 1836, in pursuance of an arrangement made with Douglas, Green effected a settlement with Wallace and received a conveyance from him.
    Tho bill was filed in 1830, and tho object and prayer is to compel either of the defendants, who may have the surplus money in hand, to pay it over to the complainant.
    Douglas, for the complainant,
    insisted that he was entitled to the surplus money in this case, the land, from tho sale of which the money was made, having been conveyed to him for a full consideration, prior to the sale. He insisted that this surplus amounted to $478.88; that the sheriff had no right to appropriate any part of this money to the satisfaction of the judgment in favor of Lingle, Hansbergor, and Van Matre, that ^judgment having been satisfied by the arrest of Funk, the judgment debtor, in ca sa. Ambl. 39; 13 Ves. 193; Wright, 344, 447.
    Thurman and Stanbery, for the defendant,
    insisted, that the arrest of the body of a defendant, on a ca. sa., where that arrest was discharged by the surrender of property, real or personal, could not operate as a discharge of tho judgment.
   Hitchcock, J.

Two questions seem' to be presented to the' court, for consideration, in this case:

1. As to the effect of an arrest on ca. sa., where the arrest is discharged by the surrender of property; and,
2. Whether, in a ease like the present, a court of chancery can furnish relief.

As to tho first question. We are aware that, by the principles of the common law, if a judgment debtor is arrested on a ca sa., such arrest will be considered equivalent to, a satisfaction of a judgment. In fact, it is said to be tho highest satisfaction known to the law. But there are, and must necessarily be, exceptions to this rule. If the creditor is not permitted to retain his debtor in custody, it would hardly do to say, that, by the arrestvhis debt was discharged. As if, for instance, a judgment debtor, arrested) is discharged under the insolvent laws, there can be no pretense that the judgment is satisfied. If, at any subsequent period, the debtor shall accumulate property, the judgment can be enforced against that property, although it can not be enforced by a second arrest of the body.

By the law in force at the time these proceedings were had, the lands and tenements of the judgment debtor were bound for the satisfaction of the judgment, from the first day of the term of its rendition. The judgment creditor had his election to sue out either a writ of ft. fa. or ca. sa. If the writ sued out was a ft. fa., it was levied upon the personal or real property of the defendants. If a ca. sa., the body of the defendant must be taken. But it was provided, “ That any person taken by a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum shall be discharged, by ^delivering, or setting off, to the officer serving the same, real or personal property sufficient to satisfy the judgment and cost3 for which said writ issued.” And the same act provided that, if a defendant should die in execution, the creditor might afterward sue out execution against his goods or lands. 2 Chase’s L. 1303. The property delivered or set off by a debtor, to procure his discharge from arrest must be sold in the same manner as if the same had been levied oh bj^ a ft. fa. Under these circumstances, we can not suppose that the lien of the judgment was discharged, because the form of the writ was that of a ca. sa., unless it would have been discharged by the levy of a fi. fa. upon the same property. The effect of the levy, in either case, would be the same; and why should not the consequences be the same? In the opinion of the court, the judgment of Dingle, Hansberger, and Yan Matre continued to be a lien upon the land of Funk, the judgment debtor, and the avails of the sale of that land were well appropriated to •satisfy that judgment.

But there is still a balance of about sixty dollars remaining, and the complainant insists that-he is entitled to a decree for this amount; and this claim raises the question whether a court of equity can, with propriety, give relief in a case like the present. Courts of chancery have jurisdiction in those cases in which plain, adequate, and complete remedy can not be had at law. If, in a caso like the present, a court of law could not relieve, a court of chancery may. By the law regulating judgments and executions, it is made the duty of the sheriff, or other officer making sale of land, or other property, on execution, if there be a surplus of money after satisfying the execution, to pay the same over to the judgment debtor, or his legal representative, on demand. If payment is refused, an action of law will lie against the officer, at the suit of the judgment debtor, to receive this surplus, or the statute confers upon him the same right to move the court to amerce the officer, as is conferred upon the judgment creditor. The remedy at law is plain, complete, adequate.

*In the present case, however, Funk was the judgment debtor, and, by the letter of the law, would be entitled to the surplus. The complainant claims, however, that, having purchased the land of Funk previous to the sheriff’s sale, he is justly entitled to this surplus. There is, certainly, an appearance of equity in this claim; but the question as to whether the complainant or Funk has a right to this surplus is one with which these defendants, have nothing to. do — a question in which they have no interest. Wallace, as he was bound to do, h&a paid it over to sheriff Johnson, and Johnson has paid it over to his successor. It belongs either to Funk or Douglas. But Funk, who has the only interest opposed to Douglas, is not a party to this suit. But even if Funk were a party, we apprehend it could make no difference. The court to whom the execution was returned might, with propriety, on motion, determine this question of right.

The bill must be dismissed, with costs.

Bill dismissed.  