
    (85 Tex. Cr. R. 179)
    RUSSELL v. STATE.
    (No. 5291.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 16, 1919.)
    1. Criminal Law <§=>371(1), 673(5) — Slander ox Female — Other Offenses — Evidence.
    In a prosecution for slander of a female, it is proper to admit testimony as to statements by accused at different times from that alleged, as tending to show that statement for which he is prosecuted was wantonly and maliciously made; but the court must instruct that jury cannot consider such evidence for any other purpose, and that it should not be considered at all unless it has been shown to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that such statements were in fact made.
    2. Libel and Slander <§=3152 (5) — Slander oe Female — Innuendoes—Proof.
    In a prosecution for slander, defendant having said that a third person had “knocked up” the female in question, where it was necessary to allege the meaning of such words it was necessary for the state to prove meaning and what the witness who heard the statement understood by the same.
    3. Criminal Law <§=>673(2) — Libel and Slander <§=>155 — Slander of Female — Evidence.
    In prosecution for slander of a female, evidence to effect that accused told a witness that female in question had slighted him is admissible as showing motive or malice of accused in making statement for which prosecuted, but should be restricted by court to that purpose.
    4. Criminal Law <§=>673(3) — Witnesses <§=> 370(2) — Impeachment—Unitriendly Relations. '
    In a prosecution for slander of a female, evidence as to the act of a witness, a brother of accused, in arming himself and going to where the father of proseeutvix lived, and as to what took place there, is admissible to show bias, interest, and motive of such witness; but, where such matter occurred out of the presence of accused, the effect of such testimony should he restricted by the court to the question of bias, interest, and motive of the witness.
    Appeal from Collingsworth County Court; C. C. Small, Judge.
    Sam Russell was convicted of slander, and appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    R. H. Templeton, of Wellington, and Chas. L. Black, of Austin, for appellant.
    E. A. Berry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   LATTIMORE, J.

In this case appellant was convicted in the county court of Col-lingsworth county of slander, and his punishment fixed at a fine of $500 and six months in jail.

It was alleged in the indictment, in substance, that on or about April 15, 1917, the appellant did wantonly and maliciously impute a want of chastity to Alta Grigsby, in that in the presence of W. C. Benton, and divers other persons, he stated that one Flagal Stewart had “knocked up” said Alta Grigsby, then and there meaning by the term “knocked up” that said Alta Grigsby was pregnant by the said Elagal Stewart, etc.

On the trial of the case, the state was permitted to introduce several witnesses who testified to different statements made by the appellant at other and different times from that alleged in the indictment. It is strenuously urged that this was error. We are inclined to think in a case of slander, where one of the material issues is whether a particular statement charged in the indictment was wantonly and maliciously made, that testimony of other similar statements at times other than that charged in the indictment is admissible; but in such case it is- the plain duty of the trial court to instruct the jury that they cannot consider such evidence of extraneous offenses for any other purpose than as affecting the question as to whether the particular statement charged was wantonly and maliciously made, and the court should go further and instruct them that they cannot consider such extraneous statements for any purpose whatever, unless it has been shown to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that such statements were in fact made. We do not think the charge of the court properly restricted the purpose of this evidence on this trial.

The case would be reversed for the failure of the state to prove the meaning of the language used as set out in ■ the innuendo clause of the indictment. It is the law of this state that where it becomes necessary to explain the language used, by an innuendo pleading, it is also necessary to prove that the language' so used has the meaning attached to the same by the innuendo. This was not done in the instant case, as no proof was made as to what the language imputed to the appellant meant, or what the witness Benton understood by the same. Riddle v. State, 30 Tex. App. 425, 17 S. W. 1073; Frisby v. State, 26 Tex. App. 180, 9 S. W. 463.

The evidence to the effect that appellant told a witness that Alta Grigsby had slighted him is also admissible as showing the motive or malice of the accused in making the statement, if he did make the same, but should be restricted by the court to that purpose. McDonald v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 125, 164 S. W. 831.

We cannot say that the evidence as to the act of the witness J. W. Russell in arming himself and going to where the father of the prosecutrix lived, and as to what took place there, is inadmissible as the same may serve the purpose of showing bias, interest, and motive of said witness J. W. Russell; but, inasmuch as this occurred out of the presence of the appellant, the effect of such testimony should be restricted by the court to the purpose for which it is admissible, and the jury should be told that they could not consider the same' as being otherwise against the appellant.

For the errors indicated, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. 
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