
    Keith Hugh JENSEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Robert J. HERNANDEZ, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 12-16681.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted May 13, 2014.
    Filed May 15, 2014.
    Karyn H. Bucur, Esquire, Karyn H. Bu-cur Attorney at Law, Laguna Hills, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Carlos Antonio Martinez, AGCA — Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: RIPPLE, SILVERMAN, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Keith Hugh Jensen appeals from the district court’s order conditionally granting his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on his claims of constitutional error under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Jensen argues that the remedy ordered by the district court is insufficient to redress his constitutional injury and that the appropriate remedy is vacatur of his conviction unless the state initiates proceedings to retry him within 90 days. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

“A district court’s determination of the appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation on a habeas petition is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Johnson v. Uribe, 700 F.3d 413, 424 (9th Cir.2012), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 617, 187 L.Ed.2d 409 (2013). “[A] district court abuses its discretion “when it makes an error of law, when it rests its decision on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir.2012) (en banc)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a remedy permitting the state to dismiss the sentence-enhancing prior prison-term allegations and re-sentence Jensen accordingly. This remedy puts Jensen in the position he would have been had the constitutional violation never occurred, see Chioino v. Kernan, 581 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir.2009), while recognizing the “considerable resources the State properly invested in the criminal prosecution,” Lafler v. Cooper, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388-89, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). A new trial on the substantive counts is unnecessary to “neutralize the taint” of the violation because Jensen was not prejudiced by the introduction of evidence concerning his prior prison terms. See id. at 1388. Similar evidence would have been introduced regardless of the enhancement allegations, becausé his criminal history was used for impeachment purposes. The court admonished the jury not to consider Jensen’s prior prison terms in determining his guilt on the substantive counts, and strong evidence supported the convictions. Moreover, the failure to bifurcate the proceedings was not a constitutional violation in and of itself. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 568, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967).

AFFIRMED 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     