
    Pamela D. EVANS, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AFFILIATED COMPUTER SERVICES INC, a Delaware corporation, authorized to do business in the state of California; Xerox Corporation, a New York corporation, authorized to do business in the state of California, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-55453
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 8, 2017 
    
    Filed March 16, 2017
    
      Pamela D. Evans, Pro Se
    Karen J. Pazzani, Esquire, Attorney, Young, Zinn & Bate LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Samuel Zurik, III, Rachel E. Linzy, Attorney, The Kullman Firm, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellee Affiliated Computer Services Inc
    Holly Ruth Lake, Esquire, Miller Law Group, Los Angeles, CA, Karen J. Pazzani, Esquire, Attorney, Young, Zinn & Bate LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Samuel Zurik, III, Rachel E. Linzy, Attorney, The Kullman Firm, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellee Xerox Corporation
    Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument.
      
        
        See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Pamela D. Evans appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment holding Evans in contempt and dismissing her action for failure to comply with court-ordered arbitration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Ferdik v, Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (failure to comply with court orders); General Signal Corp. v. Donallco, Inc., 787 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1986) (determination of contempt). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants’ motion for contempt where, on more than one occasion, Evans violated the district court’s order to arbitrate her employment-based claims. See General Signal Corp., 787 F.2d at 1379 (“Civil contempt occurs when a party fails to comply with a court order.” (citation omitted)).

Contrary to Evans’ contentions, the district court properly determined her claims should proceed to arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth de novo standard of review and explaining that the Federal Arbitration Act “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Evans’ action on the basis of her “multiple bad faith violations” of the district court’s order compelling arbitration. See Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth the factors to consider before dismissing for failure to comply with a court order).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Evans’ motion for reconsideration where Evans failed to set forth any basis for relief. See Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (motions for reconsideration “should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law” (citation omitted)).

We reject as unsupported by the record Evans’ contentions that the district court violated her right to due process.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     