
    Kenda DIALLO, aka Kenda Djallo, aka Bha Fria, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-4068 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 16, 2013.
    Theodore Vialet, New York, N.Y., for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; David V. Bernal, Assistant Director; Anthony C. Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, DENNY CHIN, and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Kenda Diallo, a native and citizen of Guinea, seeks review of a September 24, 2012, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Kenda Diallo, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Sept. 24, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Diallo’s motion to reopen, filed in 2012, was untimely, because the BIA issued a final order of removal in Diallo’s case in 2008.

Diallo contends, however, that he has established materially changed country conditions excusing his untimely motion to reopen, namely, that the government of Guinea is aware of his political activities in the United States, and will persecute him on the basis of those activities and his ethnicity if he is removed to Guinea. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Diallo did not warrant reopening on this basis. It gave “reasoned consideration” to Diallo’s country conditions evidence, including U.S. Department of State reports, and it reasonably found that although the reports indicated violence against opposition party members actively engaged in protests against the government, Diallo did not establish that the government had persecuted individuals based on their political activities outside the country. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

Although Diallo argues that the evidence supports drawing inferences in his favor, we review only whether a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to make contrary findings in this case, and conclude that the BIA’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir.2010).

Diallo also argues that if removed to Guinea, he would continue to participate in activities with an opposition political party and be persecuted on the basis of his future activities. This argument was not exhausted before the agency, and we decline to consider it. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir.2007).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2) and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  