
    
      Executors of Cromwell vs. the Charleston Insurance and Trust Company.
    
    An incorporated insurance company, having its office and doing business in the City of Charleston, is subject to the jurisdiction of the City Court, and may he sued therein.
    A corporation has its place of legal residence wherever its corporate business is done.
    
      Tried in the City Court of Charleston, November Term, 1845.
    The report of the Recorder is as follows.
    “ This was an action on a policy of insurance of a certain house in the City of Charleston, from fire, entered into by the Charleston Insurance and Trust Company with the plaintiffs. There was proof of loss by fire, and that the Charleston Insurance and Trust Company, (a corporation under an Act of the. Legislature of this State,) had an office and did business in the city of Charleston. There was no proof as to who were the members of the corporation, nor that they all' resided in the city of Charleston.
    “ After the plaintiffs had closed their testimony, the defendants moved for a non-suit, on several grounds ; among others, on the want of proof of the jurisdiction of the City Court in this case.
    
      “ Without expressing any opinion on the other grounds taken, I granted the motion for non-suit, on the ground that the City Court had no ju risdiction. The grounds of my judgment were briefly these : All the Acts giving jurisdiction to the óity Court of Charleston, from the Act of 1801 down to this time, in defining the parties who shall be liable to be sued in that court, seem to contemplate natural persons only, for they all speak of defendants as residents of the city of Charleston. The Act of 1801, 7 Stat. 301, provides “ that no suit or action shall be brought or maintained in the said court, unless the contract or cause of action hath been made or arose within the limits of the said city of Charleston ; and that between persons resident in the said city or between persons resident and foreigners, or between foreigners at the time of said contract or cause of action, or citizens of the United States. But nothing herein contained shall be construed to bar any person from suing any person resident in the said city, in the said court, for any sum not exceeding $101),” &c. Sec. V. provides “that no citizen of this State, not having resided •within the limits of the city for three months immediately preceding the commencement of the suit, &c., or who shall not have been in the habit of residing there during four months in the year, preceding the commencement of the suit, shall be liable to be sued in the said court.” So the Act of 1818, 7 Stat 319, extending the jurisdiction of the City Court, provides that “nothing contained in this Act shall be so construed as to extend to any inhabitant of this State, who may not be a resident within the City of Charleston ; and no person shall be construed to be a resident of the said city, unless he shall have resided in the said city three months prior to the commencement of the suit, (fee. or shall have resided within the city four months during the year immediately preceding the commencement of said suit,” (fee. By the Act of 1824, 7 Sfat. 325. the amount merely of the jurisdiction is increased from $500 to 1000. The Act ot 182.5, 7 Stat. 329, extends the jurisdiction of the Court to certain classes of contracts, (indefinitely as to the amount,) and, among others, to all suits arising upon policies of insurance, “ to the same extent, to all intents and purposes, as the Court of Common Pleas, where the contract or cause of action arises within the limits of the corporation, and where the defendant is a resident within the limits of the said corporation, or is not a resident of this State.” From all these Acts, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the residence of the parties to be sued, within the limits of the city, and that neither the language nor apparent meaning of the terms used, can be considered as applying to a corporation sued as such. Even if they could be so construed as to include a corporation, sued as such, in that case, as in any and all others, the actual residence of the natural persons constituting the corporation, within the city, for’ three months, or four, as the case might be, would have to be proved, to give the court jurisdiction. Whatever view may be taken of the intention of the Act of 1825, in regard to the extention of the jurisdiction of the Court to cases of insurance, and the other classes of contracts mentioned in the Act, it is clear, by the latter part of the Act, that the indispensable requisite of residence is still preserved,, in order to confer jurisdiction upon the Court in any particular case arising under it.
    “It has been stated that many cases against corporations, ■ and one, if not more, against this very corporation, have been brought and tried in the City Court. This is very likely to be so, and the court would willingly hear and try such cases, where the convenience of the parties might induce them, by consent, to submit them to the decision of this Court; hut it furnishes no authority for the jurisdiction of the court, where that jurisdiction is questioned, and the court is called upon to decide, as a legal question, whether it can entertain in inviium, any authority over parties not resident, and therefore not subject to the authority or power of the City Court of Charleston. It is clear, in an action against several joint contractors, where one or more had resided in the city for the requisite period to make them liable to be sued in the City Court, if the action were against themselves alone, that, if the other parties necessary to be made defendants resided in the State'of South Carolina and out of the city of Charleston, this court would have no- jurisdiction. An action against a corporation, if sustainable at all, could stand in no other or better position, and the application of this principle would, in almost every case, against a corporation, (it is apparent,) exclude the jurisdiction of the Court. If it is desirable that jurisdiction should be conferred upon this court, in cases like the one before us, it remains only for the Legislature to say so, clearly and definitely, and there will be no hesitation on the part of the court in contributing, as far as in its power, to what may be thought a more convenient or prompt administration of the justice of the State.”
    The plaintiffs appealed, and now moved that the non-suit be set aside, on the ground that, under the Act of 1825, the court had jurisdiction.
    
      Seym,our, for the motion,
    cited The Rail Road Com~ pany vs. Letson, 2 Howard U. S. R. 497.
    
      A. G. Magrath, contra,
    cited 8 Stat. 430; Bank vs. McKenzie, 2 Brock. 399.
   Curia, per BütleR, J.

From my construction of the Act of the Legislature, passed in 1825, the language of which is recited in the report of the Recorder, I have come to the conclusion that it was the design of the Legislature to give jurisdiction to the city court, not only of contracts of insurance, but over the legal parties making such contracts, within the limits of the corporation. At that time, such contracts were made usually by corporate bodies. Indeed, my inquiries have satisfied me that chartered companies were alone in the habit oí becoming underwriters on such policies as that before the court, at the time the Act was passed. If there were any such entered into by persons individually, they were rare exceptions, and could not have been within the contemplation of the Legislature. It is certain that the Act would now be wholly inoperative, if its provisions were to be confined to personal, in contra-distinction to corporate, inhabitants or residents. I readily admit that a corporation cannot be regarded, in any case, as a resident citizen. It has been decided in the United States’ courts that a corporation, as an ens rationis, does not come within the provision of the Constitution respecting “ controversies between citizens of different States.” In some of the earlier decisions, (Strawbridge vs. Curtiss, 3 Cranch, 267; The Bank vs. Deveaux, 5 Cranch, 61,) the courts went very far in holding that a corporation could not be a party, only so far as it was the means of bringing before the court the actual stock-holders; and that their personal residence would control the jurisdiction of the court. These decisions have been very much modified by the case of the Rail Road Company vs. Letson, 2 Howard’s U. S. R. 497. As the representative- of others, a corporation should be always be regarded as the true legal party. Although not a citizen, it may be the representative of citizens. In the case now under consideration, the question is whether a corporation, as a legal party defendant, can have a local residence, or can be a resident, not citizen, within the meaning of the Acts of the Legislature creating and enlarging the jurisdiction of the city court. The language of the Act of 1825 is, where the defendant is a resident within the limits of the said corporation.” I take it, that residence is a place of legal abode, in its legislative meaning. A corporation must have some abiding place, of local definiteness. Is there anything out of the way in saying where a bank resides ? We all understand the import of the words, “ where is a bank, or other corporation, situated ?” It is situated where it is in the habit of doing its business. It has been often decided in the English courts, that a corporation may be a local inhabitant. The residence of a corporation must be ascertained, not by the habitation of the stock-holders in interest, but by the official exhibition of legal and local existence. We are not without precedent on this subject. In the Bank vs. McKenzie, 2 Brock. R. 393, a corporation is held to reside where its principal office is. In the' case that I am now considering, the defendant is a party doing business as a corporation, in the city of Charleston. If the individual stock-holders were asked the question, they would at once recognize the distinction between their residences as individuals, and the residence of their corporation. Without hesitation they would answer, that their company resided where it was notoriously doing its corporate business. I can see nothing unreasonable in the court’s conforming to the common, and I may say the received, understanding on the subject. Nor can I see any reason for courts fettering themselves by arbitrary rules of construction, when the meaning of an Act may be reached by carrying out the obvious intention of its authors. Where the intention of an Act is indicated by the state of things existing at the time it was passed, equivocal language should receive such a construction as would subserve the design of the legislature. This company sought employment in the city of Charleston, and it-has all the advantages and protection of city residence; and it is nothing but right that it should be amenable to, or subject, to some extent, to the judicial forum of the city.

This being my judgment, I am in favor of reversing the judgment below.

Richardson, O’Neall, Evans, Wardlaw and Frost, JJ. concurred.  