
    Godfrey v. Cruise.
    A replication, which states the title of the cause, before what court pending, and the time, and then contains the following allegations, to wit: “Now comes the plaintiff, A. B., and denies owing the defendant, C. D., [here state the amount claimed by the other party,] or any other sum, as alleged by the defendant,” and which is signed by the plaintiff or his attorneys, is a sufficient denial of a set-off filed by the defendant.
    ■ Appeal from the Boone District Court.
    
    Godfrey sued Cruise before a justice of tbe peace, on an account, claiming some seventy-two dollars. Cruise appeared to tbe action,- and denied owing tbe amount claimed by plaintiff, or any part thereof, and also plead a set-off, composed of several items, amounting to some eighty dollars. To this set-off tbe plaintiff replied, which replication, after stating tbe title of tbe cause, tbe time, and before what court pending, alleges: “ Now comes tbe plaintiff, Suvigney Godfrey, and denies owing tbe defendant, James Cruise, eighty dollars and thirty-five cents, or any other sum, as alleged by tbe defendant,” and which was signed by tbe proper attorney of tbe plaintiff. Tbe cause was appealed to tbe District Court, and on tbe trial there, after tbe plaintiff bad introduced evidence to prove bis account, and rested bis case, tbe defendant moved that bis set-off should be taken as true, because tbe same bad not been replied to bj tbe plaintiff. Tbe replication above recited was on tbe files of tbe court. Tbe court sustained tbe motion, and ordered tbe set-off to be taken as true, and thereupon, tbe jury im-panneled -in tbe cause rendered a verdict in favor of defendant for some $56.00, on which there was judgment. Tbe plaintiff appeals, and assigns for error, tbe sustaining of the motion taking tbe set-off as true.
    
      J. F. Jewett, for appellant.
    
      Bates & Finch, for appellee.
   Weight, O. J.

Tbe Code provides that each pleading shall, in relation to every affirmative allegation to wbicb it should respond, contain a specific admission or denial, or state sufficient reason for not doing so ; and that allegations not thus responded to, will be taken as true. Section 1742. This section, it is true, is found in tbe chapter regulating-pleading and practice in tbe District Court: but, by section 2284, tbe pleadings are to be substantially tbe same in proceedings before a justice of tbe peace. Tbe court, in sustaining this motion, must have assumed that tbe replication did not contain a denial of tbe defendant’s set-off, for it would scarcely be claimed, that it admitted it. In this, we think, tbe court erred. Tbe plaintiff says, that be does not owe defendant tbe amount by him claimed, or any other sum. There is not, perhaps, in tbe language used, that technical precision or critical nicety, found in some of our courts, but in the language of tbe Code, these words do convey to tbe “ common understanding a reasonable certainty of meaning.” More than this is not required in tbe District Court, and we certainly will not make tbe rule more strict in proceedings before inferior tribunals. There was no. reasonable room for doubt, as to what was denied by this replication, and an issue was very distinctly made thereby. And especially so, from the fact, that no objection appears to have been taken to this pleading before the justice. But the plaintiff having denied the defendant’s set-off, in the same language substantially, in which his account had been denied by defendant, the first intimation he has that he has not sufficiently denied it, is after he has closed his evidence in the District Court. We think both denials ‘were sufficiently specific, and defendant should have been put upon proof of his set-off.

Judgment reversed.  