
    Kara A. TZANETIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WEINSTEIN & RILEY, P.S., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 11-3169-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 18, 2012.
    Joanne S. Faulkner, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Kenneth S. Jannette, Weinstein & Riley, P.S., New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.
    PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, JOSÉ A. CABRANES and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Kara Tzanetis appeals a final judgment of November 1, 2010 entering summary judgment against her on her claim for relief under The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692-1692p, and a ruling of July 26, 2011 denying her motion for reconsideration.

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the factual history and proceedings below. Briefly, Tzanetis argues that the following language contained in a demand letter from defendant-appellee Weinstein & Riley, P.C., a law firm, violated the FDCPA: “The amount due on the day you pay may be greater because of additional interest, late fees, attorney fees and costs, and other charges that may vary from day to day.” The language was modeled after a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut designating permissible language for such letters. See Dragon v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 483 F.Supp.2d 198, 202 (D.Conn.2007).

DISCUSSION

We review de novo an order of a district court granting or denying summary judgment. See, e.g., Durakovic v. Bldg. Serv., 32 BJ Pension Fund, 609 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir.2010). Summary judgment is warranted only upon a showing “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, “we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2002). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. The factual evidence before the District Court consisted of two demand letters. Tzanetis declined to submit additional evidence. The letters contained passages that merely indicated the possibility that other lawful charges might accrue at a later date, and do not establish a violation of the FDCPA.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Tzanetis’s arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.  