
    John G. Needham, Appellant, versus Timothy Ide.
    When a will is offered for probate, the subscribing witnesses may give their opinions in regard to the sanity of the testator ; the mere opinions of other witnesses are not competent evidence, nor entitled to any weight, except so far as they are supported by the facts and circumstances proved.
    This was an appeal from a decree of the judge of probate approving the will of Samuel Needham. The principal question submitted to the jury was, whether the testator was of sane mind at the execution of the will. The three subscribing witnesses testified, among other things, that in their opinion he was of sane mind. Some of the witnesses called by the appellant, without being asked their opinions, in the course of their testimony stated their opinions of the insanity of the testator.
    The counsel for the appellant, in arguing to the jury, contended that in cases of conflicting evidence, the testimony oi
    
      tne subscribing witnesses, with like means of forming opinions, was not entitled to so much weight as that of the other witnesses, because the former, having made up an opinion at the execution of the will, were influenced by the pride of opinion and a desire to support an instrument which they have sanctioned by their attestation ; while the latter were free from the influence of any previous bias ; and that these remarks were particularly applicable to professional witnesses, (one of the subscribing witnesses being of this description.)
    
      Morton J., in summing up, stated to the jury, that the subscribing witnesses, being with the testator when he signed the will and required to notice the state of his mind, might lawfully give their opinions of his sanity, but that the mere opinions of other witnesses were not competent evidence, and were not entitled to any weight, further than they were supported by the facts and circumstances proved on the trial.
    The appellant excepted to this instruction.
    
      Rand,
    
    in support of the exceptions, contended that on a
    question of this sort, where the testimony relates to a fact to be inferred from many little circumstances and from which the witness can draw the inference better than the jury, the opinion' of the witness should be received, for it is the best evidence which the nature of the case admits. In general, where a witness testifies as to distances, time, the identity of a person, the genuineness of writing, &c., he merely states his opinion. A witness may on sufficient grounds believe a man to be insane, and yet be able to mention hardly a single circumstance which led him to that conclusion. No good reason can be given for the distinction in favor of the subscribing witnesses. They have not a better opportunity of judging than other witnesses, nor will they probably be so free from bias. M'Kee v. Nelson, 4 Cowen, 355 ; Glassford on Ev. 268 ; 1 Stark. Ev. 519, note ; Goodtitle v. Braham, 4 T. R. 498.
    
      Metcalf, contra,
    
    cited Heyward v. Hazard, 1 Bay, 335 : Rambler v. Tryon, 7 Serg. & Rawle, 92 ; Irish v. Smith, 8 Serg. & Rawle, 371 ; Lessee of Hoge v. Fisher, 1 Peters’s C. C. R. 164 ; Chase v. Lincoln, 3 Mass. R. 237 ; Poole v. Rich
      
      ardson, ibid. 330 ; Buckminster v. Perry, 4 Mass. R. 593; Hathorn v. King, 8 Mass. R. 371.
    
    
      
       See 2 Stark. Ev. (5th Am ed.) 932, n. 1; Ware v. Ware, 8 Greenl. 42.
    
   The Court afterwards overruled the exceptions.  