
    Jim MERAM and Maysoon MERAM, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE and Does, 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-55202.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Feb. 8, 2016.
    Filed Feb. 26, 2016.
    Charles S. Limandri, Esquire, Teresa L. Mendoza, Esquire, Law Offices of Charles S. Limandri, Rancho Santa FE, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Brett Norris, Assistant U.S., Katherine L. Parker, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: FARRIS, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Jim Meram and Maysoon Meram appeal the district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss, which held that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the discretionary function exception. We affirm.

The Mérams contend that the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (“Forest Service”) violated its mandatory duty to locate a sign "in advance of the junction such that trail junctions are evident,” and that Joseph Meram would not have taken the unmarked, user-made trail if there had been a sign in advance of the junction of the trails. However, the mandatory duty imposed on the Forest Service by its Sign and Poster Guidelines is disjunctive — “[sjigns shall be located either at the junction or in advance of the junction such that trail junctions are evident.” EM 7100-15, § 5.3 (emphasis added). The Forest Service fulfilled its mandatory duty by placing a sign at the junction.

In omitting to mark or decommission the user-created path on which Meram turned, the Forest Service exercised a discretionary function within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Merams’ claims.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     