
    McLaughlin v. Armfield.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.
    
    December 10,1890.)
    1. Negligence—Failure to Furnish Fire-Escapes—Liability op Landlord.
    Plaintiff, employed in a building used as a factory, but not provided with fire-escapes, as required by statute, was compelled to jump from a window to escape from a fire, and was injured. In an action by her therefor against the owner of the building, it appeared Jiat he had owned it and collected rent from it for five years. Held, that he could not avoid responsibility by alleging that he had no personal knowledge that fire-escapes were not erected; and that, under Laws N. Y. 1888, c. 583, tit. 14, § 16, providing that such buildings “shall be provided with such fire-escapes and doors as shall be directed and approved by the commissioner, ” the initial duty rested on the owner.
    2. Same—Contributory Negligence.
    The question whether plaintiff, but for giving way to fright, might have found safe egress by another window, is for the jury, and their finding, sustained by the testimony, will not be reviewed on appeal.
    Appeal from circuit court, Kings county.
    Action by Catherine McLaughlin against William W. Armfield. Plaintiff and others were employed in a factory occupying the upper stories of a building owned by defendant, situated in the city of Brooklyn, and which was not provided with fire-escapes. A fire having broken out on a lower floor, plaintiff and many others were compelled to leap from the windows of the third story in order to escape. Plaintiff fell to the roof of an adjoining building, and was severely injured. Most of the others on the same floor escaped through another window in the same room to a roof higher than that on which plaintiff fell, and were not seriously injured. The building had been constructed by a lessee of defendant under a lease providing for the erection thereof, and for payment of the cost by defendant; and plaintiff’s employer hired the upper floors from such lessee. From a judgment for plaintiff entered on the verdict of a jury, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. The charter of the city of Brooklyn, (Laws N. Y. 1888, c. 583,) tit. 14, § 16, provides: “Any building already erected, or that may hereafter be erected, more than two stories in height, occupied as, or built to be occupied as, a * * * factory, * * * in which operatives are employed in any of the stories above the first story, shall be provided with such fire-escapes and doors as shall be directed and approved by the commissioner. * * * Any person, after being notified by said commissioner, who shall neglect to place upon any such building the fire-escape herein provided for, shall forfeit the sum of five hundred dollars, and shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. ” ‘
    
      Argued before Barnard, P. J., and Dykman and Pratt, JJ.
    
      John H. V. Arnold, for appellant. Andrew L. Gardiner and Frederic A. Ward, for respondent.
   Pratt, J.

The appellant, for five years before the accident, had owned and -collected rent from the defective building. If, under those circumstances, he can avoid responsibility by alleging he had no personal knowledge that the fire-escapes were not erected, as required by law, the statute would be a snare, .and not a safeguard. The appellant argues that as the statute does not, in •express terms, declare that fire-escapes shall be erected by the owner, the duty cannot be placed upon him by a judicial construction of the law. The law enacts that any building occupied, or built to be occupied, as a manufactory ■shall be provided with such fire-escapes as shall be directed by the commissioner. We think the initial duty rests upon the owner that he should bring the subject before the commissioner and seek his direction. The statute is intended to protect human life. Its intentions are easily discovered, and no reason is perceived why the court should strain after so strict a construction of its language as to deprive it of all useful operation.

The appellant argues that had plaintiff not given way to fright, and exer-cised a sound discretion as to the method of escape adopted, she might have found a safe egress by another window. All those considerations were prop=erly submitted to the jury. Their finding was adverse to defendant, and was ^sustained by the testimony. It follows that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.  