
    The Inhabitants of Rutland versus The Inhabitants of Mendon.
    A pauper having resided in a town three years successively, a part only of which was after the passing of St. 1793, c. 84, did not gain a settlement according to the fourth mode in that statute.3
    «See St. 1821,c.94
    Assumpsit for expenses incurred in the support of Harriet Robinson, a pauper. It was agreed that her settlement was In Mendon, unless her father, Samuel Robinson, had gained a settlement in Rutland. He had removed from Mendon to Rutland or the 16th of July, 1792, and had continued to live there more than three years from that time, but not three years after the passing of St. 1793, c. 34. The question was, whether he had lived in Rutland long enough to gain a settlement according to the following clause of that statute : — “Any person, &c., having an estate of inheritance or freehold in the town or district where he dwells and has his home, of the clear yearly income of three pounds, and taking the rents and profits thereof three years successively, whether he lives thereupon or not, shall thereby gain a settlement therein.”
    
      Hastings, for the defendants.
    By St. 1789, c. 14, a resi dence for two years only was required. The statute of 1793 extended this term to three years. Although the last status repeals the first, yet, being in pari materia, they are both to be taken into consideration in giving a construction to the last. Bac. Abr. tit. Statute, I, 3. The legislature intended, that the time already elapsed in beginning to acquire a settlement under the statute of 1789 should be counted as a part of the three years required by the statute of 1793, otherwise persons would be deprived of vested rights ; for paupers have an interest in gaining a settlement in the town where they have been accustomed to reside. The town of Mendon, also, is interested in having the settlement completed. It cannot be presumed that the legislature intended, and it is doubtful whether they had the power, to interfere with these vested interests. [ Wilde J. Suppose there had been no statute of 1789, would the statute of 1793 have a retrospective effect, so that the previous residence of Robinson could be counted as a part of the three years ?] No, it would not, but here was a statute under which the parties had begun to acquire rights.
    
      J. Davis, for the plaintiffs.
    The statute of 1793 repeals all previous laws on this subject, without the reservation of any rights, except where settlements had c been already .actually gained. It was not the intention of the legislature, that a settlement begun under the previous laws should be perfected under the last statute. The former laws were struck out of existence, and were as if they had never been passed. Commonwealth v. Duane, 1 Binn. 601; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dallas, 378; United States v. Passmore, 4 Dallas, 372; Miller's case, 1 Wm. Bl. 451. The two statutes cannot be taken together, because their provisions are not substantially aline. The statute of 1789 provides that “ every person oeing a citizen of this Commonwealth, who shall be seised of an es-tote of freehold, &c., and shall reside thereon or within the same town or district, occupying and improving the same in person, for the space of two whole years,” &c. The provision in the statute of 1793 is, that any person of twenty-one years of age, being a citizen of this or any of the United States, having an estate of inheritance or freehold, &c., and taking the rents and profits thereof three years successively, whether he lives thereon or not," &c. The reasoning of the Court in the case of Salem v. Andover, 3 Mass. Rep. 436, is conclusive against joining the two statutes together. The competency of the legislature to pass such a law as that of 1793 is manifest from the case of Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass. Rep. 443.
   Per Curiam.

We are clear, that Samuel Robinson did not gain a settlement in Rutland. If he did gain one, it must be under one of the two statutes. He did not acquire it under the statute of 1789, and this is not contended; but it is said that the two statutes are to be taken together ; that the residence under the statute of 1789 is a part of the residence un» der the statute of 1793. This position cannot be maintained. It is true that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together: as, if a provision in one statute receives a judicial construction, and it is inserted in another, the same construction would be given to it; but where the clause varies, it shows a different intention in the legislature. The legislature did not mean, that a residence of a year and five months, under the statute of 1789, should make a part of the three years required by the statute of 1793.

The statute of 1793 does not interfere with vested rights. If Samuel Robinson had acquired a settlement under the statute of 1789, there would have been ground for the objection. There can be no question of the power of the legislature to pass the statute of 1793. As to the construction of it, the defendants say, that it is not in the future tense. But we must give it this construction, otherwise it would confer an immediate settlement on a person who had lived in any town three years next preceding the passing of the statute. But it is admitted by the counsel that if there had been no act previous to the statute of 1793, this statute would not confer a settlement in the present case. The only ground assumed was, that it should be referred to the statute of 1789. Had the legislature chosen to say so, they might; but they have made no saving, except where a settlement had been actually gained.

Judgment must therefore be entered for the plaintiffs. 
      
       See Boston v. Wells, 14 Mass. R. 384; Charlestown v. Boston, 13 Mass R. 469; Groton v. Boxborough, 6 Mass. R. 54; Mansfield v. Pembroke, 5 Pick. 449.
     