
    Jeffrey RODMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STRYKER SALES CORPORATION, Stryker Corporation, Howmedica Osteonics Corp., DBA Stryker Orthopaedics, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-4271-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 21, 2015.
    Patrick W. Brophy, McMahon, Martine & Gallagher, LLP, Brooklyn, N.Y., for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Kim M. Catullo, Gibbons P.C., New York, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, REENA RAGGI, and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Jeffrey Rodman appeals from the District Court’s October 7, 2014 judgment dismissing his amended complaint, which raised various state law claims under diversity jurisdiction for injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of a hip replacement surgery. We assume the. parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Carpenters Pension Trust Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays PLC, 750 F.3d 227, 232 (2d Cir.2014). “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

Upon de novo review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed the amended complaint, substantially for the reasons stated in its well-reasoned October 7, 2014 opinion. Specifically, Rodman failed adequately to allege how his hip replacement was defective and how any defect caused his injuries. Instead, Rodman alleged con-clusorily that his implant was manufactured “in an improper workmanship-like manner, including but riot limited to the application of the Hydroxyapatite (HA) coating.” Am. Compl. ¶ 42. At best, Rod-man alleged that the coating “did not meet certain specifications ... for tensile bond strength and crystallinity,” id. ¶ 100, but he never identified how this problem rendered the product defective, whether it affected his individual hip replacement, or how it caused his alleged injuries. Accordingly, Rodman failed to state a claim to relief for each of his causes of action.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Rodman on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s October 7, 2014 judgment. 
      
      . As a clerical matter, Rodman's CM/ECF filing for his notice of appeal in the District Court failed to select the order from which he was appealing. Although Rodman cured this technical defect only after the time to file a notice of appeal had expired, his actual notice of appeal, which was otherwise timely, specifically referenced the District Court’s October 7, 2014 order. See Contino v. United States, 535 F.3d 124, 126-27 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that Clerk of Court cannot refuse to accept notice of appeal erroneously filed electronically in violation of local rules); see also Fed. R.Civ.P. 5(d)(4) ("The clerk must not refuse to file a paper solely because it is not in the form prescribed by these rules or by a local rule or practice.”). Accordingly, it "can be inferred from the notice of appeal” that Rodman intended to appeal the District Court’s October 7, 2014 final judgment. Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 548 F.3d 59, 66 (2d Cir.2008); see Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir.1995) (”[W]e construe notices of appeal liberally, taking the parties’ intentions into account.”).
     