
    Echo W. DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Captain LABORIEL, Shield # 754, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-3074-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 29, 2011.
    Echo W. Dixon, Attica, NY, pro se.
    Deborah A. Brenner (on the brief) and Kristin M. Helmers, of Counsel, for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Appellees.
    
      PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, PETER W. HALL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Echo W. Dixon, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and ask whether the district' court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2002).

Having conducted a de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the court in its thorough and well-reasoned decision. The majority of the arguments in Dixon’s brief are raised for the first time on appeal, and, moreover, could have been raised in Dixon’s first appeal in this case, but were not. This includes Dixon’s constitutional challenge to the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and his argument that his failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies should be excused because he was denied access to the courts. As a result, we decline to consider those arguments, which in any event have been waived. See In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (“It is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1229 (2d Cir. 2002) (an issue that was ripe for review at the time of an initial appeal, but was forgone, is considered waived in a subsequent appeal); see also Nokia Corp. v. Uzan, 425 F.3d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir.2005) (applying the rule articulated in Quintieri to a civil case).

Dixon also argues that Defendant Laboriel was not entitled to qualified immunity. The district court concluded that Dixon’s description of the alleged assault was contradicted by a video of the incident made by a prison security camera, which showed a sequence of events that entitled Laboriel to qualified immunity. Dixon has not challenged the accuracy of this video. Under the circumstances depicted, we agree with the district court that Laboriel was entitled to qualified immunity. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379-80, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (holding that summary judgment may not be defeated by allegations that are “blatantly contradicted” by video footage).

We have considered Dixon’s other arguments on appeal and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  