
    MIAO ZHOU, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-1669-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 3, 2010.
    Fuhao Yang, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Michael F. Hertz, Assistant Attorney General; Blair T. O’Connor, Assistant Director; Samia Naseem, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, REENA RAGGI, and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Miao Zhou, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 23, 2009 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen as untimely filed. In re Miao Zhou, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 23, 2009). We review the denial of a motion to reopen immigration proceedings for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). In doing so here, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

A motion to reopen must generally be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Zhou does not contest that he filed his petition after the 90-day deadline had passed. Rather, he argues that the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen was “contrary to law” because, as an “arriving alien,” he should have been allowed to apply for adjustment of status on account of his marriage to a U.S. citizen. Pet’r’s Br. at 10. The argument is without merit. As the government correctly contends, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, not the BIA, has jurisdiction to adjudicate the adjustment-of-status application of an “arriving alien.” See Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 107 (B.I.A. 2009); see also Sheng Gao Ni v. BIA, 520 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2008).

Zhou’s reliance on the “changed circumstances” exception set forth at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) is also unavailing, as that provision has no bearing on motions to reopen. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 151-52 (2d Cir.2008). The BIA correctly concluded that Zhou did not meet an exception to the filing deadline applicable to his motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Thus, it did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhou’s motion to reopen as untimely.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).  