
    
      A. Wallace, administrator of Patrick, v. John J. Craps.
    
    The object of recording is to give notice; therefore where the creditor had notice of a deed, that shall stand in the place of recording.
    The notice which will stand in the place of recording must be, not necessarily a knowledge of the entire contents of the deed, but an explicit notice of its existence, such as the creditor would have had if the deed had been recorded — notice that a deed conveying the property has been executed, and that the title has passed out of the grantor.
    
      Before the Commissioners of Special Bail, Lexington District, June, 1848.
    On appeal from the verdict of a jury, on a former trial of this case, the Appeal Court, at May term, 1848, ordered a new trial without prejudice. About the 12th of June, 1848, A. H. Porcher, attorney for plaintiff, gave notice to the Commissioners of Special Bail to order a new trial, and at the same time furnished other specifications as amendatory to the original suggestions. These it will be unnecessary to notice in full, as the following only raised the question decided by the Appeal Court, viz :
    
      Because the said schedule is false and fraudulent, inasmuch as it does not contain certain negroes belonging to John J. Craps, to wit: nine negroes.
    These negroes rvere supposed, by the defendant, to be covered by a deed of trust from John J. Craps to John Craps.— The following copy of which was offered in evidence:
    
      The State of South Carolina :
    
    Know all men by these presents, that I, John J. Craps, of Lexington District, for and in consideration of the sum of five hundred dollars, to me in hand paid by John Craps, of the district aforesaid, have bargained, sold, and delivered, and by these presents do bargain, sell, and deliver unto the said John Craps, five negro slaves, namely: Scipio, Lucy, Affy, Ben, and Dice ; also, one handsome clock, and side-board, and all my household and kitchen furniture, and plantation tools of every description. To have and to hold the said five slaves, with their future increase, and all the other goods and chattels above described, unto the said John Craps, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assignees, forever. In trust nevertheless, for the following uses and purposes, that is to say, for the sole use and benefit and behoof of my wife, Elizabeth Craps, for and during the term of her natural life, and after her death, to and for the use, benefit and behoof of my child, Washington McLane Craps, and such other child or children which I may hereafter have; hereby authorizing my said trustee, John Craps, to barter, sell, or exchange the whole, or any part of said property, should it hereafter be deemed proper, provided the proceeds or property purchased or exchanged, shall be held by him as trustee as aforesaid, for the uses and purposes herein before limited and appointed ; and I do hereby bind myself, my heirs, executors', and administrators, to warrant, and forever defend, all and singular the said property, unto the said John Craps, as trustee as aforesaid, and to his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns as trustee as aforesaid, against myself and my heirs and all other persons claiming the same. Witness my hand and seal, this nineteenth day of January, A. D. 1830.
    John J. Chaps, [l. s.J
    Signed, sealed, and executed ) in the presence of >
    James S. Goignahd. )
    Of the negroes named in the deed, some had died, but others had been born, increasing the number to nine.
    It was admitted that the deed had not been recorded in Lexington, where the defendant lived ; and there was abundant evidence that Patrick had no notice of its existence, certainly not before his debt was due.
    There was no objection to the evidence on either side, and after argument of counsel, the case was submitted to the jury. They returned a verdict of not guilty, on all the grounds made.
    The plaintiff appealed: 1. Because the defendant failed to shew that C. C. Patrick had notice of the said deed, or any other of a similar character.
    2d. Because the verdict was, in other respects, contrary to law and evidence.
    
      Porcher, for the motion.
    Boozer, contra.
   Evans, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

I think it was abundantly proved that the defendant's schedule was false, in not including the negroes mentioned in the deed from the defendant to John Craps, in trust for his wife, Elizabeth Craps, and her children. The deed is a species of marriage settlement, which, according to the Act of 1824, should have been recorded, both in the Secretary of State's office, and in the Clerk’s office of Lexington district. It was not recorded in the latter office ; was therefore void unless Patrick, the creditor, had notice. Since the case of Tart v. Crawford, it has been uniformly decided that where the creditor had notice of the deed, that shall stand in the place of recording. But the notice which will suffice, must be an explicit notice of the existence of the deed, such as he would have had if the deed had^ been recorded. The object of recording is to give notice, and the knowledge which is to supercede the recording, must be of the deed, the recording of which has been neglected. I do not mean to say that the creditor or purchaser must have knowledge of the entire contents of the deed, but to charge him with the required notice he must know that a deed settling the property has been executed, and that the title has passed out of the grantor. It is very manifest Patrick had no notice of the deed, nor does it seem that any of the witnesses had. Apman says Patrick told him he understood Mrs. Craps was a free dealer, but he did not regard that; Craps could not make his wife a free dealer ; he would get his money notwithstanding. It is clear from this, his debt was due; after that, it would seem from the evidence of this witness, he asked Mrs. Craps about the right to the property, and she said it was made over to her, but there was no explanation as to the manner, for he says on his cross examination that he never heard of the deed.— He told Patrick of this conversation, but this was no notice to him of the existence of the deed in controversy, and even if it was, Patrick’s debt was then due.

I am of opinion there was no such sufficient notice of the existence of the deed as will dispense with the recording; and as a consequence, that the verdict of the jury was wrong, and a new trial is ordered.

Rxchae-dson, J. — O’Neall, J. — Frost, J. — and Withers, J. — concurred.

Motion granted.  