
    William Heath versus Lewis Nutter & al.
    
    The authority in a power of attorney “ to grant any and all discharges by deed or otherwise, both personal or real,” as fully as the principal might do, cannot be fairly construed as enabling the agent to convey by deed of warranty the real estate of his principal.
    And where the agent has assumed so to convey, the principal cannot after-wards*ratify it by parol, or by a writing not under seal.
    If a person, with a full knowledge of the equitable title of such a grantee, obtains a quitclaim from the principal, which is effectual at common law to vest the title in him, a court of equity can alone afford protection to the former grantee.
    Reported from ITisi Prius, Appleton; J., presiding.
    Writ oe entry. Plea, general issiie.
    Both parties claim under Charles D. Robbinsthe demandant under his deed dated Eeb. 17th, 1858, duly acknowledged and recorded; the tenants under ’ the deed of ■said Robbins, by. Samuel G. Rich, his attorney, to the inhabitants of the town of Tremont, dated May 3d, 1854, who, on 21st of Dec., 1856, conveyed to said Lewis Nutter. The other defendant holds under. Nutter.
    The power of attorney from Eobbins to Eich was duly recorded and is as follows : —
    "Know all men by these presents, that I, Charles D. Eobbins of Tremont, in the county of Hancock, and State of Maine, mariner, do appoint Samuel G. Eich of said Tremont, for me and in my name and to my use, to demand, recover and receive of the overseers of the poor of the town of Tremont, or any other person or persons authorized by said town of Tremont to settle the same, all such sums of money as are due me from the town aforesaid, or any other persons for the support and maintenance of Benjamin Eobbins and wife, of said Tremont, and all debts due me from said Benjamin, and to settle and compromise all matters in dispute in said premises, and for me and in my name to grant any and all discharges by deed or otherwise, both personal and real, as he, my said attorney, shall deem proper, and to do all other things concerning the premises as fully as I myself could do if I were personally present, hereby ratifying and confirming all the lawful acts of him, the said attorney, or of his substitute, by virtue of these presents. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set Ay hand and seal, this tenth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four. Signed, sealed,” &c.
    The tenant offered to prove by said Eich, that the power of attorney was given to him by Eobbins for the purpose of conveying the real estate to the town of Tremont, and receiving such sum as they would pay in addition to their taking care of his father and mother: that, after the bargain with the town, he informed Eobbins what the town had agreed to pay and to do, and Eobbins wrote him back agreeing to it; that when Eobbins returned he received §50 as part of the consideration of the deed, the balance of the consideration of the deed being the agreement to support his father and mother. The tenant further offered to prove by said Robbins, that, before he gave the quitclaim to plaintiff, before referred to, he informed plaintiff he did not consider that he had any interest in the premises; that he had given a power of attorney to Samuel Gr. Rich for the purpose of conveying the same premises to the inhabitants of Tremont, and that said conveyance had been made by virtue of said power of attorney; that, after said conveyance bf said Rich, he ratified the doings of his attorney Rich, by letter and verbally, and received fifty dollars as part of the consideration from the town; that said Heath induced him to believe there would be no impropriety in giving him (the plaintiff) said quitclaim deed; that lie did not consider he had any right or interest in the premises, having deeded the same and removed from the premises some four or five years previously, and that said premises since then have been occupied by Nutter, the grantee of the town. The presiding Judge ruled that the power of attorney to Rich did not authorize him to convey the premises in question; and excluded the evidence offered. If either of these rulings are erroneous the cause is to stand for trial, otherwise a default is to be entered.
    The case was argued by
    
      Hathaway & JDrin7cwater, for the demandant, and by
    
      Wiswell, for the defendants.
   The opinion of the Court was drawn up by

Appleton, C. J.

The power of attorney to Rich did not empower him to convey the demanded premises to the inhabitants of Tremont. The authority "to grant any and all discharges by deed or otherwise, both personal and real,” as fully as the principal might do, cannot be fairly construed as enabling the agent to convey by bill of sale, or by deed of warranty, all the personal and real estate of his principal. Nor can the authority to convey by deed be found elsewhere.

Whenever any act of agency is required to be done in the name of the principal under seal, the authority to do the act must be conferred by an instrument under seal. A power to convey lands must possess the same requisites, and observe the same solemnities as are necessary in a deed directly conveying the land. Gage v. Gage, 10 N. H., 424; Story on Agency, §§ 49, 50; Montgomery v. Dorion, 6 N. H., 250. So the ratification of an unauthorized conveyance by deed must be by an instrument under seal. Story on Agency, § 252. A parol ratification is not sufficient. Stetson v. Patten, 2 Greenl., 359 ; Paine v. Tucker, 21 Maine, 138; Hanford v. McNair, 9 Wend., 54; Despatch Line Co. v. Bellamy Man. Co., 12 N. H., 205.

The plaintiff received his conveyance. with a full knowledge of the equitable rights of the tenants. The remedial processes of a court of equity may perhaps afford protection to the defendants. At common law their defence fails.

Defendants defaulted.

Rice, Cutting, Davis and Walton, JJ., concurred.  