
    DeWITT v. GERARD.
    1. Appeal and Error — Directed Verdict — Evidence.
    In reviewing directed verdict for defendant in action for personal injuries against municipal street railway department, evidence is considered in light most favorable to plaintiff.
    2. Automobiles — Street Railways — Evidence — Negligence — Question por Jury.
    In action for personal injuries sustained by pedestrian crossing city street who was first knocked unconscious by an automobile and then struck by a city streetcar, evidence held, to present question for jury as to negligence of each defendant.
    
      8. Damages — Street Railways- — Inferences—Question for Jury.
    In personal injury action against motorist whose car knocked plaintiff pedestrian unconscious and city whose streetcar moved plaintiff a few feet, rolled him under but did not run over him, under evidence from which it may fairly bo inferred some injuries were inflicted by latter defendant, question of their extent held, for jury.
    4. Same — Burden of Proof — Preponderance of Evidence.
    In action by pedestrian who was first knocked unconscious by automobile and then rolled over but not run over by city streetcar, plaintiff lias burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence, and could recover from city for, injuries negligently inflicted by its streetcar.
    Appeal from Wayne; Webster (Clyde I.), J.
    Submitted October 11, 1935.
    (Docket No. 72, Calendar No. 38,535.)
    Decided January 6, 1936.
    Case by James DeWitt against Peter Gerard and City of Detroit, a municipal corporation, for personal injuries received when struck by an automobile and streetcar. Nonsuit as to defendant Gerard. Plaintiff appeals from directed verdict and judgment for defendant city.
    Reversed and new trial granted.
    
      Riseman & Lemke, for plaintiff.
    
      James S. Shields (Rodney Baxter, of counsel), for defendant City of Detroit.
   Fead, J.

.Plaintiff reviews "directed verdict and judgment for defendant city.

Taking tbe testimony most favorable to plaintiff, it appears that as he was about to cross Woodward avenue in Detroit, going east, he looked to the north and saw no cars approaching within dangerous distance; he crossed to'the center of the avenue and reached a point between the two lines of streetcar tracks; he stopped and retreated a step or two.because of traffic coming from the south; he was struck by an automobile coming from the north driven by defendant Gerard, thrown over the fender of the car and rendered unconscious; he lay close to or partly upon the streetcar track, on his left side; a Detroit city streetcar coming from' the north struck him, moved him a few feet and, when it stopped, his head and part of his body were under the center of the car, tightly wedged in.

The testimony presented a jury question as to the liability of Gerard but the court directed a verdict in favor of defendant city upon the authority of Frye v. City of Detroit, 256 Mich. 466, on the ground that plaintiff had failed to show injuries attributable to the streetcar. Thereupon plaintiff entered a nonsuit as to defendant Gérard. Unless the Frye Case prevents, the testimony made a case for the jury against the city.

The automobile struck plaintiff at his left hip. His physical injuries were a cut on the left side of the forehead, a cut on the right ear, bruises all over the body and skin abrasions on his face and hands. And, in addition, his right thumb Avas broken in two places, his left shoulder pained him and his head ached.

A witness who saw plaintiff as he lay on the pavement on his left side after he was struck by the automobile testified that he saw no blood but that as he lay under the streetcar his face was a “mass of blood.”

In the Frye Case the cause of action was for a specific injury — death. Recovery was denied because the testimony did not show circumstances from which could be drawn a reasonable inference that the streetcar had caused or contributed to the death.

Here, there is a fair inference that the streetcar caused some of plaintiff’s injuries, at least some of those resulting in blood on the face and hands. Fair argument may be made as to cause of some of the other injuries. It is not necessary that plaintiff shall account exactly and specifically for all of his hurts but he is entitled to compensation for those shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have been caused by the negligence of defendant city.

Reversed, with new trial and costs.

North, C. J., and Butzer, Bushnerr, Edward M. Sharpe, and Potter, JJ., concurred with Fead, J.

Wiest, J.

(concurring). If the operator of the streetcar was guilty of negligence, causing injury to plaintiff, then defendant city is liable to respond in damages for the injuries inflicted by the streetcar.

The burden is on plaintiff to show the specific injuries occasioned by the streetcar, for defendant city is not liable for any injuries occasioned by the automobile of defendant Gerard. This may be difficult, but is an issue of fact for the jury.

Plaintiff was not run over by the streetcar, but rolled under the side thereof until wedged beneath the step of the side door entrance.

Butzer, Bushnerr, Edward M. Sharpe, and Potter, JJ., concurred with Wiest, J.

The late Justice Nerson Sharpe took no part in this decision.  