
    Joel David JOSEPH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-56141.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 10, 2014.
    
    Filed March 18, 2014.
    Joel David Joseph, Beverly Hills, CA, pro se.
    
      Starr Babcock, Esquire, Rachel Simone Grunberg, Esquire, Senior, Danielle Ado-ración Lee, Esquire, Assistant General Counsel, Lawrence C. Yee, The State Bar of California Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appel-lee.
    Before: PREGERSON, LEAYY, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Joel David Joseph, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his action arising from his failure to pass the California Bar Exam. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Joseph’s action because the State Bar of California is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (the State Bar of California is an arm of the state and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Joseph’s Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion because Joseph failed to establish grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for reconsideration).

Joseph’s contention that the district court deprived Joseph of due process by allegedly failing to serve him electronically with its dismissal order and not entering a separate judgment is unpersuasive. See Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food and Drug Ctrs., Inc., 476 F.3d 701, 703 (9th Cir.2007) (“[E]ven if the district court does not set forth the judgment on a separate document, an appealable final order is considered entered when 150 days have run from the time the final order is docketed.”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     