
    NOURSE’S CASE. Joseph E. Nourse et al., Executors, v. The United States.
    
      On Demurrer.
    
    
      A judgment is rendered by the Court of Claims before its reorganization under the act 3d March, 1863, in favor of a claimant, and a bill is reported to Congress for Ms' relief\ directing the payment to him o/$2,827 32. The House of Representatives receives the bill and refers it to various committees, but it is not acted upon further. The claimants now bring their action upon the former finding of the court, and pray judgment for the amount thereof with intei'cst.
    
    The judgments of the Court of Claims as it existed under the act 24th February, 1855, (10 Stat., I/., p. 612,) and prior to its reorganization under the act 3d March, 1863, (12 Stat. L., p. 765,) have not the final and conclusive character of judicial decrees, and this court cannot give effect to the decree in a case reported to Congress and still pending there.
    The Assistant Solicitor for the defendants:
    The only questions presented by the demurrer which has been filed in this case are as follows :
    1st. Were the decisions or judgments of the Court of Claims rendered, prior to the passage of the act of March 3, 1863, amendatory of the act for the establishment of the Court of Claims, final and conclusive 1
    
    2d. Does the presentation of a certified transcript of the finding or judgment of the Court of Claims, rendered prior to the 3d day of March, 1863, furnish conclusive evidence of the indebtedness of the United States in favor of the person in whose behalf such finding or decision was made?
    The judgments of this court were to become final only by receiving the approval of the legislative branch of the government. The powers and duties of the court were in a certain sense judicial; that is, they were to hear and determine. And so are the powers and duties of masters or auditors in chancery, arbitrators, and the accounting officers of the treasury. The committees raised by Congress, especially such as have power to send for persons and papers, take testimony, and report their decisions — even grand juries and coroner’s juries exercise judicial authority.
    But none of these are final. Some are auxiliary to further judicial, others to legislative, action; and others still are made final under certain conditions. (See U. S. v. Ferriera, 13 How., 40.)
    In no case was the judgment of this court, as then organized, final, or conclusive of any right in controversy. The law makes an adverse decision conclusive when it shall have been confirmed by Congress. It was the confirmation by Congress, not the decision itself which made the decision conclusive.
    Mr. J. 0. Norton for claimants:
    In order to decide this question in the affirmative four things must concur :
    I. There must be a court.
    II. It must have power to hear causes.
    III. It must have power to decide causes.
    
      IV. It must have jurisdiction of tbe particular case.
    I. Is the Court of Claims a court ?
    The first section of the act of Congress organizing this tribunal provides, “ that a court shall be established, to be called a Court of Claims.”
    The act further provides for the appointment of three judges, to hold their office during good behavior, for a clerk, solicitor, commissioners, and all other officers necessary to constitute a court.
    It provides also that the court shall keep a record.
    All subsequent acts speak of it not as a commission, or a committee, but as a court.
    II and III. Had the court power to hear and decide causes ? The first section of the same act declares, “ that the said court shall hear and determine all claims, &c.”
    “ Hear and determine.” What is the meaning of these words ? Their meaning is well settled. They are the exact words uniformly used to confer judicial power upon courts of justice — civil tribunals— to try causes and pass judgment upon the rights of parties. They confer perfect, complete, and indisputable power to pass judgment upon the matters in hearing.
    IV. Had the court jurisdiction of the case?
    This is admitted by the demurrer.
   Casey, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimants’ testator, in his lifetime, on the 16th day of June, 1855, filed his petition in the Court of Claims to recover certain compensation, as Acting Register of the Treasury, to which he alleged he was entitled. His case was heard, and on the 19th April, 1856, found in his favor and a bill reported to Congress for the sum of two thousand eight hundred and, twenty-seven dollars and thirty-two cents, (§2,827 32,) which was on the 16th of May, 1856, referred to the Committee of Claims, and on January 5, 1858, was again referred to the Committee of Claims. On the 14th of May, 1858, that committee reported back the bill with a substitute, which, was referred to the Committee of the Whole House; but no final action was taken thereon by Congress, or by either house of Congress. This action is based upon the finding in that case, and no other claim is set forth in the petition.

The solicitors for the United States demur generally, and allege that the matters averred are not sufficient in law to maintain the action.

Prior to the act of 3d March, 1863, reorganizing this court, its decisions had not the force of judicial decrees or judgments. Under the act of 24th February, 1855, it had power “ to hear and determine.” But the judicial and conclusive character of its findings were destroyed by the provisions, subjecting them to the affirmance or disapproval of Congress. The case of Ferriera v. The United States, 13 How., 40, is identical in principle, and rules this case.

By the express provisions of the act of 24th February, 1855, cases like this reported to Congress are continued from session to session, and from Congress to Congress, until they shall have been finally acted upon. Being there under this law, and for the purpose declared there, we can have no right or authority to take any cognizance of or jurisdiction over it, so long as it is pending there. There is nothing in the subsequent enactments which changes the status of those cases. It has been a mooted question whether we could take cognizance of such a case, retransmitted to us by resolution of only one of the houses of Congress.

If the former finding has the force and effect ascribed to it by the claimants and their counsel, this action is unnecessary and superfluous. Being already a judgment of the court, it could he nothing more nor higher after we had again passed upon it, and they would be equally entitled to have it paid in the mode prescribed by the acts of Congress, as well before as after a second decision.

In our opinion the difficulties in the way of the claimants’ recovery-here, and in this manner, are insuperable, and we therefore dismiss the petition.  