
    Chasity SNYDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carolyn COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
    15-3502
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 30, 2016
    For Appellant; Mark Schneider, Platts-burgh, New York.
    For Appellees: Fergus Kaiser, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney (with Stephen P. Conte, Regional Chief Counsel—Region II Office of the General Counsel Social Security Administration, on the brief), for Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York.
    PRESENT; DENNIS JACOBS, REENA RAGGI, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Chasity Snyder appeals from the district court’s affirmance of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Social Security disability benefits. We review the administrative record de novo, and will uphold the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and the correct legal standards were applied. See Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Substantial'evidence .... means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

1. The plaintiff argues that the district court applied an incorrect standard of review, but does not support the argument with record evidence or citation to any portion of the district court ruling. The standard of review is “very deferential.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012). “Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.” City of Syracuse v. Onondaga Cty., 464 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. The ALJ acknowledged that the plaintiffs cervical condition, obesity, and depression were impairments, but found that they did not rise to the level of a disability. The plaintiff argues that she was disabled by the “combination” of her spinal disorders, mental impairments, obesity, and other “exertional and non-exertional limitations.” However, the ALJ considered her impairments in combination, as well as separately. See Rivers v. Astrue, 280 Fed.Appx. 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order) (rejecting allegations that the ALJ failed to consider impairments in combination where record showed that each ailment and its cumulative effects was considered).

3. Snyder argues that the ALJ gave too much weight to the medical opinion of the consulting psychologist. The opinion of a treating physician is not binding if it is contradicted by substantial evidence, and a consulting physician report may constitute such evidence. See Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1983). Here, the consulting psychologist opinion was consistent with other medical evidence and was supported by substantial evidence; the ALJ therefore did not err in affording his opinion great weight.

4. Snyder argues that the ALJ erred by not crediting her testimony. The Commissioner is not obligated to credit a claimant’s testimony about her limitations and symptoms, but has discretion to evaluate the claimant’s credibility in light of the evidence in the record. See Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2010). The ALJ determined that, while Snyder’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, Snyder’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely credible. The ALJ specifically analyzed Snyder’s claims of neck pain, arm numbness, obesity, and depression; as to each condition, the ALJ cited specific medical evidence in the record and concluded that the alleged limitations were without support. Accordingly, the ALJ sufficiently explained the credibility determination and committed no error.

5.Snyder argues that the ALJ erroneously relied upon the lack of “formal mental health treatment” to deny her appeal. The ALJ considered and discussed Snyder’s “history of treatment for depression,” which included prescription antidepressants from her primary care physician. The ALJ’s credibility assessment observed that the plaintiff never sought “formal menta} health treatment” (such as counseling or' psychiatric care). Although an ALJ may find a plaintiff less credible if she failed to seek medical treatment, an ALJ is obligated to consider any explanation- a plaintiff may have for such failure, see SSR 16-3p, 81 Fed. Reg. 14,166, 14,170-71 (Mar. 16, 2016), and here the ALJ did not consider any reasons why the plaintiff did not seek “formal mental health treatment.”

Despite this error, the credibility determination was supported by other substantial record evidence as discussed above. Furthermore, the lack of formal mental health treatment was just one of multiple factors considered in assessing the plaintiffs credibility, including that Snyder’s allegations were unsupported by objective medical evidence, and so any error was harmless.

6. Snyder argues that the Commissioner did not satisfy her burden to show at Step 5 that she could not perform work in the national economy. When the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert is based on a residual functional capacity finding that is supported by substantial evidence, the hypothetical is proper and the ALJ is entitled to rely on the vocational expert’s testimony. See Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1554 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Salmini v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 371 Fed.Appx. 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order). Here, the ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert closely paralleled the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding, which was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the plaintiffs challenge fails.

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in the plaintiffs other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  