
    No. 295.
    The State of Louisiana vs. Will Harris.
    Ownership o£ a particular person is not an essential ingredient oí the crime oí larceny, which is simply the felonious tailing and carrying away of the personal goods or property of another.
    
    APPEAL from the Second District Court, Parish of Webster. Ellis, J.
    
    
      J. Henry Shepherd, for the State, Appellee:
    1. An application for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence must not only show duo diligence to obtain the testimony after its discovery, but. must also contain a showing of diligence to discover the existence of the testimony. State vs Woodworth, 28 An. 89; State vs. Crowley, 33 An. 782; State vs. Young, 34 An. 346; State ys: Decker, 35 An. 46; State vs. Sweeney, 37 An. 1.
    2. A new trial will not be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, when such evidence isnot likely on another trial to produce a different result on the merits. If such is the opinion of the trial judge, the Supreme Court will reverse a judgment denying a new trial. Wharton’s Or. PI. and Pr., Sec. 854;32 An. 1227; State vs. Crowley, 33 An. 44; 33 An. 898; State vs. Young, 34 An. 346; State vs. Lamothe, 37 An. 43.
    .3. In an indictment for larceny it is sufficient to allege ownership of proport stolen in the ostensible or apparent owner. State vs. Everage, 33 An. 120; State vs. Kane, 33 An. 1269.
    
      Watkins & Watkins for Defendant and Appellant.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Watkins, J.

The accused was charged in the indictment with stealing a horse, the property of Alonzo Early. On the trial he was convicted, and his counsel made a motion for a new trial, principally on the ground that the horse was not the property of Alonzo Early, but was the property of James Crichton. This motion was denied by the judge, who assigned as his reason therefor that “ the only evidence adduced on this point was that of Alonzo Early, who swore on the trial that the horse was his;” and that while it was “sufficiently shown that * * * the legal ownership may be in Crichton, (yet) the possession and equitable ownership may be in Early,” which, in his opinion, was sufficient basis for the conviction.

The ruling of the judge was correct. The ownership in a particular person of the property stolen is not of the essence of the crime of larceny, though it is of its essence that it should be alleged and proven to have been the property of another than the accused.

In Hanks’ case, 89 An. 284, we decided that the ownership of a particular person is not an essential ingredient of the crime of larceny, which is simply the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods of another; and even if the owner be unknown, the offence may be properly charged and sustained.

“The essentialÍacts constituting the crime of larceny of a particular specified horse are not in any manner affected by the question whether the horse was the property of Sevrigne Duhon or Cecile .Duhon. It is sufficient if the horse was the property of another. The identity of the horse charged to have been stolen is the important thing in determining whether the offence proved is the offence charged.”

Whether the horse in question was the property of Alonzo Early or of James Crichton, it can make no difference to the accused. It was confessedly the property of another than himself.

Judgment affirmed.  