
    Kanwal Daler SINGH, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 07-70064.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Nov. 4, 2010.
    Filed Dec. 7, 2010.
    
      Robert B. Jobe, Esq., Law Offices of Robert B. Jobe, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.
    Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Eric W. Marsteller, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, RYMER, Circuit Judge, and KENNELLY, District Judge
    
    
      
       The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

The government failed to provide Singh the originals of the allegedly fraudulent English letter from Dr. Bedi and the letter in Punjabi Dr. Bedi gave to DHS investigators even though it knew Singh wanted to use the letters in his defense against the government’s allegations. See Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 374 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that failure to provide documents in government’s possession denied alien “an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his removal”). At Singh’s final hearing, the IJ stated that it would be “probative” of Singh’s truthfulness if he could prove by forensic analysis of the originals that Dr. Bedi signed letters in both English and Punjabi, yet refused to grant a continuance for that purpose. This denied Singh a “reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against [him].” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B); see Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir.2009) (noting that denial of continuance shouldn’t exclude evidence “of vital importance” to the alien’s case). This was an abuse of discretion. Cruz Rendon v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1104, 1110-11 (9th Cir.2010).

The adverse credibility determination and frivolous application finding are vacated. The BIA’s denial of all relief to Singh resulted from these findings and is likewise vacated. Because Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc), changed the law on firm resettlement findings, we leave that issue for the BIA to address in the first instance. See INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002).

GRANTED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     