
    WILCOX’S CASE. Edward W. Wilcox, for the First National Bank of Parkersburg, West Virginia, v. The United States, and six other cases.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      On the 7th July, 1864, Major General Hunter, commanding a military departmentr issues an order during a military exigency directing his quartermaster to purchase 1,000 cavalry horses within seven days, to he inspected hy a designated hoard of officers, the price being limited to $165. The quartermaster procures Che horses, they are delivered within the time specified, inspected hy the officers detailed, accepted hy them on behalf of the government, and vouchers issued to the contractor for payment. A receipt signed hy him is attached to the account and transmitted to the Quartermaster General’s Office for payment. The claim is there disputed, on various grounds. The Quartermaster General finally orders that it he settled at $150 per headi 'The officer charged uith the settlement malees the deduction on the face of the account, and, with no intent to do wrong, changes the amount slated in the body of the claimant’s receipt, so that it, as a voucher, may not exceed the amount of his disbursement. The claimant’s agent is informed of the Quartermaster General’s order for settlement, hut the claimant himself is ignorant. Ho release is given for the balance.
    
    I. Whore a commanding general in a military exigency orders a purchase of a limited number of horses within a brief, prescribed time, at an unusually high price, to be inspected by a board of officers, and the contractor complies with all the conditions, the sale is valid under the Act ilh July, 1864, (13 Stat. L., p. 394, § 4,) and the Quartermaster General has no power to reduce the price.
    X. Where an account for cavalry horses, purchased under the orders of a commanding general during a military exigency, and valid under the Act 4th July, (13 Stat. L., p. 394, § 4,) is disputed by the Quartermaster General, and a settlement is directed to be made with the contractor at a reduced price, it must bo made in a manner binding between individuals. Notifying the contractor’s agent of the Quartermaster General’s order, and altering a receipt, previously given, though with the assent of the claimant’s agent, will not work a valid release.
    
      Mr. Thomas Wilson for tlie claimant:
    In July 1864 Major General David Hunter, commanding tbe military department of West Virginia, issued two special orders, dated respectively tbe 7tb and 13tb of tbat month; tbe first directing tbe chief quartermaster of tbe department to purchase all tbe horses be could, not to exceed 1,000 horses, within tbe next seven days; tbe second directing him to purchase a second thousand horses, provided it could be done immediately, the' horses to be subject to thorough military inspection, and the price not to exceed $165 per head.
    The horses were purchased in accordance with these orders. They were purchased in open market, of whomsoever presented such as would pass inspection.
    The quartermaster’s department having no funds at the tipie, vouchers Avere issued, daily, by Captain Phelps, the post quartermaster at Parkersburg, to the various owners, for such horses as passed inspection.
    Of these vouchers a certain number were sold by plaintiffs to the Northwestern Bank of Virginia, at Parkersburg.
    Subsequently the bank transmitted these Arouchers to Washington, and presented them for payment, but payment ivas refused by order of the Quartermaster General, on the alleged ground of the irregularity of the purchase, and the excess of price over the price paid for horses by the OaAmlry Bureau at the time these horses AA’ere purchased.
    In February 1865, upon the recommendation of Colonel Ekin, chief of the Cavalry Bureau, the Quartermaster General ordered the vouchers paid, at the rate of- $150 per horse, and in May 1865 Colonel Ekin paid to the bank $131,850, being at the rate of $150 per horse, leaidug unpaid and due upon the vouchers $13,185.
    Plaintiffs maintain—
    I.That General Hunter’s orders Nos. 122 and 125 were lawful, Avithin the scope of liis authority, and the defendants are bound by the purchases made under them.
    1. Under the 4th section of the Act of July 4,1864, reorganizing the Quartermaster’s Department. (13th Stat. L., p. 396.)
    2. General Hunter had a right to decide that an “ emergency ” existed. (Beeside’s Case, O. Ols. B., 27; Stevens’ Case, ib., 101; Floyd and Speed Case, ib., 439; Crowell’s Case, ib., 501; Baker’s, Case, 3 ib., 343; Caleb’s Case, ib., 351.)
    3. An “ emergency” such as contemplated in the fourth section of the Act of July 4,1864, actually did exist at the time these orders were issued. The public history of the times shows it.
    4. General Hunter required 2,000 horses in addition to those on hand for immediate service. The “ established depots” of the department could not furnish them “within the required time.”
    The testimony shows that at the time there were on hand for issue at the various depots of the department, (which extended from Frederick, Maryland, to Parkersburg, West Yirginia, and from Wheeling to Charlestown, West Yirginia,) 200 horses.
    The report of the Quartermaster General for the year ending June 30,1865, p. 49, shows the number on hand July 1,1864, in the entire department to have been 367.
    II. Under these orders plaintiffs furnished the horses, payment for which is now claimed.
    III. That the horses thus furnished passed the inspection prescribed in the orders were received and accepted by the United States, and could not have been bought at the time, and under the circumstances, to be paid for in quartermaster’s vouchers, for less than the price authorized to be paid by the orders.
    1. The certificates of the inspecting officers are attached to each voucher.
    The Cavalry Bureau at the time most of these horsey were purchased was paying $155 per head.
    Undoubtedly, a limited number could have been, and was purchased at that price, but the evidence shows that within the required time two thousand could not have been.
    General Hunter had a right to fix such a price as would accomplish the purpose for which his orders were issued, and upon his best judgment he fixed the price at $165.
    As to right of commanding officer, under certain circumstances, to fix a price greater than, that ordinarily paid, see Bakers Case, 3 C. Cls. II., p. 350.
    IY. The act of the Quartermaster General in refusing to pay the full amount of the vouchers was without authority of law. (See Baker’s Oase, 3 C. Cls. B., 343; Caleb’s Case, ib., 351; Livingston and Bell Case, ib., 131; Brady’s Case, ib., 203.)
    
      The Assistant Attorney General tor the defendants:
    The United States maintain—
    First. That these purchases or contracts to purchase were not authorized by law, because—
    I. Not General 'Hunter, but the Quartermaster General, was authorized to order the purchase of horses for the use of the Army.
    II. Tbe purchases were not made in the manner, required by law.
    
      III. There was no overwhelming necessity such as would justify a military officer in violating the injunctions of law.
    Under pressing necessity impressment might have been resorted to.
    IV. The purchases were not made in accordance with General Hunter’s orders. These orders required strict military inspection, which would have excluded mares, while half the number bought were mares. No authority to Lieutenant Alexander is shown. Four-year-old horses were also taken, contrary to the existing regulations.
    Second. The price was excessive to the full sum now claimed as unpaid by the government.
    The price paid by the Cavalry Bureau in that department was July 7,1861, $145, and July 16, $155. August 29, mares were offered at $145 in certificates.
    The rule of law asserted in brief for the claimants, namely, that a payment of a smaller sum than the whole debt, though received in full, cannot be held to discharge the whole debt, has no application to these cases. For, from the operation of that rule are excepted disputed, claims.
    
    This is a disputed claim. The proper officers of the government disputed the authority of General Hunter to order these purchases, the fairness of the price claimed, the promise of the United States to pay, and the validity of the contract; and, accordingly, refused to pay the sums certified in the vouchers. (Theodore Adams v. United, States, 7 Wallace, 479, 480.)
    That even the rule of law cited for claimants is deemed technical, and to be restricted on slight grounds, see Broolcs v. White, (2 Metcalf, 284,) and Kellogg v. Richards, (14 Wendall, 116.)
    That it was never applied to disputed claims, see Stipp v. Cole, (1 Smith, (Indiana,) 75;) Qallcins v. The State, (13 Wisconsin, 394.)
    That the receiving of payment under circumstances like the present is to be deemed a receiving in full, see Me Glynn v. Billings, (16 Vermont, 236,) and Gole v. Champlain Transportation Company, (26 Vermont, 92.)
    That, after such receiving, the action cannot be maintained, even for the balance, until the money paid has been returned, see Bishce v.JIarn, (47 Maine, 546.)
    
      For the government a receipt in full does not seem necessary. It is sufficient that it pays in full, and that the money tendered is received. (Galkins v. The State, 13 Wisconsin, 389; Massing v. The State, 14 Wisconsin, 503 and. 504. See also 2 C. Cls. B.., 179; Johnson, Administrator, v. The United States; Opinions of Attorneys General, vol. 5, pp. 125 and 178.)
   Casey, Oh. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In July 1864 Major General David Hunter, of the United States Army, was in command of the military department of which West Virginia was a part. To meet a pressing exigency he issued orders to his chief quartermaster, on the 7th July, 1864, to procure 1,000 horses within seven days. A board of officers was designated as inspectors of these horses. The orders limited the price to $165 per head. A similar order for an additional 1,000 horses was issued by General Hunter on the 13th of the same month, at the same price stated before. The quartermaster procured the claimant and others to deliver the horses. They were delivered within the time specified, or very shortly thereafter. The horses delivered were all inspected by the officers detailed for that purpose, and accepted by them on behalf of the United States. Vouchers were then made out, specifying that the claimant had delivered so many horses at $165 per head, and carrying out in figures the aggregate, the certificate of the board of inspectors, and the approval of the quartermaster added to the same. To the whole was added a receipt, (with blanks left for date, and the name of the paying-officers,) stating the amount in words of the aggregate of' the voucher at $165 per head for the horses. These receipts were signed by the claimant and others who delivered horses under these orders, and for each delivery separately. The vouchers, certificates of inspection, approval of the quartermaster, and receipts were all the same, varying only in amounts according to the number of horses delivered'.

Neither General Hunter nor- his quartermaster had been furnished with money to pay for these horses. The parties to whom these vouchers had been given procured the money on them from the banks at Parkersburg, West Virginia, and various individuals, to pay for the horses to the farmers from whom they were bought. The vouchers, with the receipts in full appended, sigued by the claimant and the other contractors, were handed over to the banks and the individuals from whom the money had been procured, to enable them to draw it from the treasury. Some of the vouchers were forwarded to Biggs' & Co. and Jay Cooke & Co.,, and others sent direct to the Quartermaster General’s office for payment. Those sent to Biggs & Co. and Jay Cooke & Co. were also deposited in the same place for settlement and payment. They were referred to the cavalry division of that Bureau, which reported that the price paid for the horses was too high, and stated that the market price of horses at that time was from $145 per head to $155. The Quartermaster General thereupon referred the matter back to the cavalry 'division, directing that the claims should, if practicable, be settled with the holders of these vouchers, at $150 per head for the horses. The head of that •division thereupon caused a deduction of $15 per head to be made. The vouchers being in his possession, the deduction was stated in red ink upon their faces, and a new balance struck. He also caused the sums written in the receipts, at the bottom of the vouchers, to be erased, and interlined instead the reduced balance, after deducting $15 per head for the horses specified in the particular voucher. He then made •out checks or drafts on the treasury for these reduced sums, ■and sent or handed them to the holders of the vouchers or their agents. The payments were made at various times between the 23d of May, 1865, and August 12,. 1865.

During the time that the question.'of the allowance of the vouchers was before the War Department, several officers of the banks owning part of these vouchers, as well as agents of the individual holders, demanded the payment and allowance of the vouchers, and protested against any reduction beings made upon the same to the Quartermaster General and Secretary of War. They gave notice to those officers that any payments of less than the face of the original vouchers would only be received in part payment, and that they would look to •Congress or the Court of Claims for the balance. Those officers •concurred that they would not be barred of any just demand they had to claim the balance by the adjustment ordered in the Quartermaster General’s office.

The horses were purchased under a lawful order of an authorized officer of the United States, during a pressing military exigency. The price paid was a fair and reasonable one, under the circumstances, and we find no fraud in the transaction, either on the part of the officers or claimants.

We also find that the alterations in and deductions from the vouchers, and the erasures and interlineations in the receipts, ivere made after they were signed, without the consent or acquiescence of the holders. There is no proof in the record that the owners or holders of these vouchers either expressly or impliedly agreed to receive the reduced sums paid in full of their claims, but have always insisted upon payment of the entire sums.

These facts require but little elaboration. They make the questions of law but few, and tliose very plain. The act of July 4, 1864, “to provide for the better organization of the-Quartermaster’s Department,” makes the general commanding an army or detachment the sole judge of where an emergency exists; and his order during the continuance of the emergency authorizes the quartermaster to procure supplies in the most expeditious methods, and without advertisement. And it shall be the duty of such quartermaster to obey such order,” says the-law. In Baker v. The United States, (3 C. Cls. R., 351,) we held that the commanding general was the sole judge of when the-emergency exists; and that no other officer could interfere with-his orders in the premises. This construction is recognized and approved in Emery v. United States, (4 C. Cls. R., 404-5.) We-have seen no reason to change our A-iews upon this subject but we think every reason of public policy, convenience, and safety requires that the power of the responsible officer in such circumstances shall be upheld and maintained. When public peril impends, the officer charged Avith the duty of averting it possesses powers equal to his responsibilities; and the safety of the State is not to be weighed in the same balances with the price of supplies. The supplies are indispensable — cost what they may. Every precaution against unnecessary exorbitancy in price should be taken consistent with the utmost certainty and expedition in .obtaining them. There is no evidence in this record that this was not done. In the absence of such proof, we are to presume that these officers performed their duty legally and faithfully. If they did, then they had taken care that the price paid for these animals, considering time and place and circumstance, should be fair and reasonable; and such is our opinion from the evidence in the case. Neither the Quartermaster-General nor any of his officers had any right to interfere with their contracts, without the consent of the other parties. This, consent has not been shown by any competent proof in the case.

The Attorney General has pressed with great earnestness, upon us that the receipts in full appended to the vouchers are-evidence of the payment; that there was a dispute, and that the reduced sum was paid and receipts given in full satisfaction of the claim; but the fact does not bear out or sustain the-argument. The reduction was arbitrarily made without the-consent of the claimants. The vouchers given them were-changed and scaled down against their remonstrance. The receipts which they had signed for the full amount of their claims were erased and interlined without their knowledge, authority, or assent. It is true, a receipt is prima facie evidence of the payment of the sum stated in it, and a receipt in full of a designated account is evidence of the full and final adjustment of the matter to which it relates. 'But it is only prima facie and liable to be overthrown by any evidence which shows, that it is not in fact what it purports to be. So here this receipt in full is prima facie of the payment of these accounts. But when it is shown that the receipt was changed and altered in a material respect after it was signed, and made entirely different from what it was before, its value as evidence is destroyed. It then lies upon the party setting up that receipt to show that the alteration was made with the knowledge, consent, or acquiescence of the party who is to be affected by it. If he fail in this, it goes for naught. That is exactly the position of things here. There is not in these records any evidence that these claimants in anyway assented to or authorized the alterations in these vouchers and receipts. On the contrary, throughout the whole negotiations they have insisted on their right to the face of these vouchers. There is not a spark of evidence of the compromise of the matter, as a doubtful or disputed claim. The reduction was the mere ex parte, unauthorized act of the United States officers, the other party neither giving previous consent nor subsequent acquiescence and ratification. The receipt of the amount paid was received expressly as part payment and with full notice that the balance would be claimed from Congress or the courts. We have no doubt that the officers who made these reductions acted from proper motives and considerations of public policy, but we have as little doubt that they were mistaken in the extent of their own authority and power, as well as in their views of the policy of the Government. Due economy in the administration of public affairs is •a virtue as commendable as it is rare, especially in times of war and public commotion. But that is mistaken and wasteful economy which would save a few dollars at the expense of violating the plighted faith of the nation, or by doing wrong and injury to its citizens. We think this was a fair and honest contract for these horses. The officer who made it had full authority to do so. Nor under all the circumstances can we say that the price was exorbitant and unconscionable. The Quartermaster General had no right to scale it dcnvn without the consent of the claimants; that consent was not given. The full amount due under the contract was not paid, and no sufficient reason has been given why it should be withheld. We therefore find in favor of the claimants.

Nott, J.,

concurring:

I exonerate the Quartermaster (3-eneral from all blame in this matter. When it had been much misrepresented and muddled, he made the following order:

“ QUARTERMASTER GENERAL’S OeEICE,

u November 18,1864.

General Thomas, please examine this case; it grows more complicated and difficult. It seems to me that it is desirable to arrive at the true value of the horses delivered, and to take some means to jiay the true owners or jiersons who actually delivered the horses. The commanding general ordered purchases, believing they were necessary to enable him to move into the enemy’s country, under orders from his superior. If he made a mistake, if unscrupulous persons imposed upon his •office, still there were horses delivered and used, and a fair price should be paid to the proper .creditor. The questions are the price and the persons to be paid.

“M. C. M.”

The case was further examined, and, upon the final report recommending tlie payment of $150 a horse, tlie Quartermaster General endorsed tbis order:

“Let tbe accounts be settLed upon tbe terms recommended.

“ M. C. MEIGS,

Quartermaster General, Brevet Major General.

“February 20, 1865.”

Instead of obeying tbis order, by proffering a settlement to tbe claimants and procuring proper releases from tbem, a subordinate of tbe Quartermaster General coolly scratched out tbe amounts written in tbe cl aimant’s receipts, then in bis possession, wrote in their stead the reduced amounts, and, with no attempt whatever to protect tbe rights of tbe government, sent drafts for payment to tbe respective parties. His unauthorized alteration of tbe written instrument, over tbe signature of another, was n ot forgery, for there was no criminal intent; but tbe altered receipt was precisely as worthless as though be bad written and signed tbe contractor’s name to it himself. It is tbe defendants’ misfortune that the Quartermaster General’s order was not executed, and one of many instances where the government must suffer through tbe negligence of its officers.  