
    ZHEN KAI WANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-2043-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 28, 2012.
    
      Eric Y. Zheng, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Blair T. O’Connor, Assistant Director; Juria L. Jones, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, ROBERT D. SACK, REENA RAGGI, and Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Zhen Kai Wang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 12, 2011, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Zhen Kai Wang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 12, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008). An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Wang’s motion was indisputably untimely and number-barred because it was filed more than ten years after the agency’s final order of removal and because it was his third motion to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(A), (C)(i), there are no time or numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Wang’s conversion to Christianity constituted a change in his personal circumstances, rather than a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the untimely and number-barred filing of his motion to reopen. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005). Moreover, the BIA did not err in finding that Wang failed to demonstrate a change in country-conditions since the time of his previous proceedings because he failed to provide baseline evidence concerning conditions in China at the time of his 1998 hearing or address the fact that the 1998 U.S. Department of State report, “China: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions,” which was submitted at the time of his hearing, indicated that the Chinese government repressed, harassed, and persecuted unauthorized and unregistered religious groups at that time. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Matter of S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (“com-par[ing] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wang’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(A), (C); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

We further find no error in the BIA’s denial of Wang’s motion on the grounds that he had not submitted an asylum application as required by regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  