
    DE BO TIAN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-1208-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 2, 2009.
    
      Gary J: Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General; Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director; Julie S. Pfluger, Trial Attorney; Joseph F. Grossman, Law Clerk, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: Hon. DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, Hon. JON O. NEWMAN and Hon. PIERRE N. LEVAL, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner De Bo Tian, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February 21, 2008 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re De Bo Tian, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Feb. 21, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). Where the agency considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008). We find that the BIA did not err in denying Tian’s untimely motion to reopen or in finding him ineligible to file a successive asylum application.

Tian argues that the BIA failed to adequately consider his evidence and that he demonstrated changed country conditions excusing the untimeliness of his motion to reopen. However, these arguments fail where we have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no error in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish material changed country conditions or an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. See id. at 169-72 (noting that “[w]e do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the agency”); see also Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as “the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”). Additionally, the BIA reasonably declined to credit Tian’s particularized evidence given the agency’s underlying adverse credibility determination. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-47 (2d Cir.2007); see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir.2007).

Similarly, the BIA’s determination that Tian was ineligible to file a successive asylum application was not in error. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 156, 158-59 (2d Cir.2008).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).  