
    DENNICK v. CENTRAL R. R. CO. OF NEW JERSEY.
    
      (Supreme Court of United States,
    
    
      March, 1881
    
    
      Error to the U. S. Circuit Court for the Northern District of New York.)
    
    1. Jurisdiction. Whenever, by either the common law or the statute law of a State, a right of action has become fixed and a legal liability incurred, that liability may be enforced and the right of action pursued in any Court which has jurisdiction of such matters, and can obtain jurisdiction of the parties.
    2. Same. A statute of New Jersey gives a right of action for death by negligence, to “be brought by and in the name of the personal representatives of such deceased personHeld, that an administrator of one, whose death was caused by negligence in New Jersey, appointed in New York, can maintain an action in the Courts of the latter State to enforce the liability imposed by the statute of the former.
   Miller, J.

The plaintiff in error brought her suit in a State Court of New York to recover damage for the death of her husband by an accident on the defendant’s railroad.

The railroad company entered an appearance and removed the case into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York, on the ground that the plaintiff was a citizen of New York, and the defendant, a corporation of the State of New Jersey. The complaint filed in the Circuit Court alleges that plaintiff was a widow, and her children were next of kin to the decedent, and that she was administratrix of his estate, appointed by the proper Court in New York. Other allegations showed the death of the husband by negligence of the defendant, and claimed $ 15,000 damages.

The answer of defendant denied the negligence, but admitted the death by the train running off the track in New Jersey, and that there were a widow and next of kin, and that plaintiff had been appointed administratrix by the Surrogate of Albany county, New York.

The parties waived a jury, and plaintiff introduced evidence tending to prove the negligence charged, and rested.

Whereupon the Court ruled that for the loss of her husband accruing in the State of New Jersey, under the special statute of that State on that subject, plaintiff could not recover in that action, and gave judgment for the defendant, to which this writ of error is prosecuted.

It is understood that this decision rested solely upon the proposition that the liability for the death of a party by a civil action for damages, under the statute of New Jersey, can be enforced by no one but an administrator, or other personal representative of the deceased, appointed by the authority of that State, and the soundness or unsoundness of this proposition is what we are called upon to decide. The statute of New Jersey, under which the action was brought, is as follows:

“Sec. i. That whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who, or the corporation which would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.
“Sec. 2. That every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal representatives of such deceased person, and the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin of such deceased person, and shall be distributed to such widow and next of kin, in the proportions provided by law in relation to the distribution of personal property left by persons dying intestate; and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem fair and just, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death to the wife and next of kin of such deceased person.”

It must be taken as established by the record, that the accident, by which plaintiff’s husband came to his death, occurred in New Jersey, under circumstances which brought the defendant within the provisions of the first section of the act making the company liable for damages, notwithstanding the death.

It is scarcely contended that the act belongs to the class of criminal laws which can only be enforced by the Courts of the State where the offense was committed, for it is, through a statutory remedy, a civil action to recover damages for a civil injury-

It is indeed a right dependent solely on the statute of the State; but when the act is done for which the law says the person shall be liable, and the action by which the remedy is to be enforced is a personal, and not a real action, and is of that character which the law recognizes as transitory, and not local, we cannot see why the defendant may not be held liable in any Court to whose jurisdiction he can be subjected by personal process or by voluntary appearance, as was the case here.

It is difficult to understand how the nature of the remedy, or the jurisdiction of the Courts to enforce it, is in any manner dependent on the question whether it is a statutory right or a common-law right

Wherever, by either the common law or the statute law of a State, a right of action has become fixed and a legal liability incurred, that liability may be enforced and the right of action pursued in any Court which has jurisdiction of such matters and can obtain jurisdiction of the parties.

The action in the present case is in the nature of trespass to the person, always held to be transitory, and the venue immaterial, and the local Court in New York, and the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District, were competent to try' such a case when the parties were properly before it. (See Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp., 161; Rafael v. Verelst, 2 W. Blacks., 1055; McKenna v. Fisk, 1 How., 241.) We do not see how the fact that it was a statutory right can vary the principle. If the defendant was legally liable in New Jersey, he could not escape that liability by going to New York. If the liability to pay money was fixed by the law of the State where the transaction occurred, is it to be said it can be enforced nowhere else, because it depended upon statute law, and not upon common law? It would be a very dangerous doctrine to establish, that in all cases where the several States have substituted the statute for the common law, the liability can be enforced in no other State but that where the statute was enacted and the transaction occurred. The common law never prevailed in Louisiana, and the rights and remedies of her citizens depend upon her Civil Code. Can these rights be enforced or the wrongs of her citizens be redressed in .no other State of the Union? The contrary has been held in many cases. See ex parte Van Riper, 20 Wend., 614; Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y., 119; Pickering v. Fisk, 5 Vt., 102; Railroad v. Sprayberry, 8 Bax., (Tenn.), 341; Great Western R. Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich., 305.

But it is said that conceding that the statute of the State of New Jersey established the liability of the defendant and gave a remedy, the right of action is limited to a personal representative appointed in that State and amenable to its jurisdiction.

The statute does not say this in terms. “ Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representatives of such deceased person.” It may be admitted that for the purpose of this case the words “personal representatives” mean the administrator.

The plaintiff is, then, the only personal representative of the deceased in existence, and the construction thus given the statute is, that such suit shall not be brought by her. This is in direct contradiction of the words of the statute. The advocates of the view interpolate into the statute what is not there, by holding that the personal representative must be one residing in the State, or appointed by its authority. The statute says the amount recovered shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin. Why not add here also, by construction, “if they reside in the State of New Jersey?”

It is obvious that nothing in the language of the statute requires such a construction. Indeed, by inference it is opposed to

it. The first section makes the liability of the corporation or person absolute where the death arises from their negligence. Who shall say it depends on the appointment of an administrator within the State?

The second section relates to the remedy, and declares who shall receive the damages when recovered. These are the widow and next of kin. Thus far the statute declares under what circumstances a defendant shall be liable for damages, and to whom they shall be paid. In this there is no ambiguity. But fearing there might be a question as to the proper person to sue, the act removes any doubt by designating the personal representative. The plaintiff here is that representative. Why can she not sustain the action ? Let it be remembered that this is not a case of an administrator, appointed in one State, suing in that character in the Courts of another State, without any authority from the latter. It is the general rule that this cannot be done.

The suit here was brought by the administratrix in a Court of the State which had appointed her, and, of course, no such objection could be made.

If, then, the defendant was liable to be sued in the Courts of the State of New York on this cause of action, and the suit could only be brought by the personal representative of the deceased, and if the plaintiff is the personal representative of the deceased, whom the Courts of that State are bound to recognize, on what principle can her right to maintain the action be denied?

So far as any reason has been given for such a proposition, it seems to be this: that the foreign administrator is not responsible to the Courts of New Jersey, and cannot be compelled to distribute the amount received in accordance with the New Jersey statute.

But the Courts of New York are as capable of enforcing the rights of the widow and next of kin as the Courts of New Jersey. And as the Court which renders the judgment for damages in favor of the administratrix can only do so by virtue of the New Jersey statute, so any Court having control of the administratrix can compel distribution of the amount received in the manner prescribed by that statute.

Again, it is said that by virtue of her appointment in New York, the administratrix can only act upon or administer that which was of the estate of the deceased in his lifetime. There can be no doubt that much that comes to the hands of administrators or executors, must go directly to heirs or devisees, and is not subject to sale or distribution in any other mode; as the amount set apart in most of the States to the family devises of specific property to individuals, all of which can be enforced in the courts; and no reason is perceived why the specific direction of the law on this subject may not invest the administrator with the right to receive or recover by suit, and the duty of distributing under that law. There can be no doubt that an administrator, invested with the apparent right to receive or recover by suit property or money, may be compelled to deliver or pay over to some one who establishes a better right, or that what was so recovered was held in trust for some one not claiming under the will or under the administrator. And so here. The statute of New Jersey says the personal representative shall recover, and the recovery shall be for the benefit of the widow and next of kin. It would be a reproach to the laws of New York to say that when the money recovered in such an action as this came to the hands of the administratrix, her Courts could not compel distribution as the law directs.

It is to be said, however, that a statute of New York, just like the New Jersey law, provides for bringing the action by the personal representative, and for distribution to the same parties, and an administrator appointed under the law of that State would be held to have recovered to the same uses, and subj’ect to the remedies in her fiduciary character which both statutes require,.

We are aware that in the case of Woodward v. Michigan Southern R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 120, asserts a different doctrine, and has been followed by the cases of Richardson v. New York Cent. R. Co., 88 Mass. 85, and McCarthy v. Chicago, R. I. and P. R. Co., 18 Kans., 46; S. C., 26 Am. Rep., 742. The reasons which support that view we have endeavored to show are not sound. These cases are opposed by the latest decision on the subject in the Court of Appeals of New York, in the case of Leonard v. Columbia Steam Navigation Co., not yet reported, but of which we have been furnished with a certified copy.

The right to recover for an injury to the person, resulting in death, is of very recent origin, and depends wholly upon statutes of the different States. The questions growing out of the statutes are new, and many of them unsettled. Each State Court will construe its own statute on the subject, and differences are to be expected. In the absence of any controlling authority or general concurrence of decision, this Court must decide for itself the question, now for the first time presented to it; and, with every respect for the Courts which have held otherwise, we think that sound principle clearly authorizes the administrator in cases like this to maintain the action.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore reversed, with directions to award a new trial.  