
    City of Kankakee v. Christina Whitehouse.
    1. Instructions—Error Without Injury Not Ground for Reversal.— Although the instructions may not have been free from error, if it appears that under the evidence the jury could not have been misled, the error furnishes no ground upon which to reverse the judgment.
    2. Cities and Villages—A City Held Liable for an Injury Caused by a Defective Walk.—The court thinks that the evidence in this case warranted the jury in finding that the walk upon which appellee was hurt was in bad condition at the time of the accident upon which this suit is based; that the board that caused the injury to appellee had been broken from its fastenings and had thereby become dangerous to pedestrians; and that this condition had existed for such a length of time that the municipal authorities should have known of it and repaired the walk.
    Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County; the Hon. Charles R. Starr, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the May term, 1897.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed September 20, 1897.
    Paddock & Cooper and T. P. Donovan, attorneys for appellant.
    H. Loring, attorney for appellee.
   Mr. Justice Wright

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellee brought suit against the appellant, alleging that on the 15th day of June, 1896, the defendant negligently suffered a board sidewalk in said city to be in an unsafe condition; that one of the boards was loose, on which appellee tripped, fell and dislocated her hand and wrist. The jury found in favor of the appellee, and assessed her damages at $250; and the court having overruled the appellant’s motion for a new trial, rendered judgment on the verdict against the appellant, from which it appeals to this court, assigning for error improper evidence was admitted by the court, improper instructions to the jury, and that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

We find no reversible error in the rulings of the court, nor in the instructions to the jury. Some of the instructions are not free from criticism, but we think, under the evidence, the jury could not have been misled by them. We think the evidence warranted the jury in finding that the walk in question was in bad condition; that some of the boards, especially the one that caused the injury to appellee, had become broken from their fastenings, and thereby dangerous to pedestrians; and that this condition had existed for such a length of time that the municipal authorities, in the 'exercise of reasonable care, should have known of such condition, and repaired the walk.

We find no error sufficient to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court, and it will therefore be affirmed.  