
    (110 Tex. 190)
    KIRKSEY v. SOUTHERN TRACTION CO.
    (No. 2906.)
    (Supreme Court of Texas.
    Dec. 17, 1919.)
    1. Appeal and error <&wkey;>930(l) — Appellate COURT WILL CONSIDER EVIDENCE IN LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PARTY OBTAINING VERDICT.
    The appellate court should consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party obtaining the verdict.
    2. Trial &wkey;139(l) — Evidence on which REASONABLE MINDS MIGHT DIFFER FOR JURY.
    Where the evidence is such that reasonable minds may differ, the question is for the jury.
    3. Railroads <&wkey;350(22) — Contributory negligence QUESTION FOR JURY.
    Evidence, showing that decedent, while driving an automobile along' a much-traveled highway, was struck by a ear, which was behind schedule and approaching without warning, and that the view at the crossing was obstructed, held to requite the submission of the issue of contributory negligence to the jury.
    4. Appeal and error <&wkey;1082(2) — Supreme Court on writ of error to Court of Civil Appeals will not consider matters NOT DETERMINED BY IT.
    AVhere the Court of Civil Appeals reversed á judgment for plaintiff on the ground that the evidence showed plaintiff’s decedent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and did not dispose of questions of adjective law relating to the admission of evidence, held that, under Laws 1913, c. 55 (Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 1521, 1522, 1526, 1543, 1544), the Supreme Court, which reversed a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals on writ of error, will not determine the questions undecided, and will remand the case to the Court of Civil Appeals for that purpose.
    Error to Court of Civil Appeals for Third Supreme Judicial District.
    Action by Pearl Kirksey against the Southern Traction Company. A judgment for plaintiff was reversed and rendered by the Court of Civil Appeals (181 S. W. 545), and plaintiff brings error.
    Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and cause remanded, with directions.
    Collins & Cummings, of Hillsboro, and Scott & Ross, of Waco, for plaintiff in error.
    Templeton, Beall & Williams, of Dallas, and Wear & Frazier, of Hillsboro,, for defendant in error.
   HAWKINS, J.

In the district court, upon a jury’s verdict, Mrs. Pearl Kirksey obtained a judgment against the Southern Traction Company for $5,000, as damages for causing the death of her husband, James Kirksey, by negligently operating an express and baggage trolley car across a public road at Home-wood, a station in Ellis county, on the line of the traction company’s interurban electric railway.

In the Court of Civil Appeals for the Third Supreme Judicial District that judgment was reversed, and judgment was rendered in favor of the traction company, upon the holding by that court that, under all the evidence, the decedent was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 181 S. W. 545. '

In this court, upon the tentative view that said holding and said judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals were erroneous, the writ of error was granted.

Upon repeated and very careful consideration of this case we are of the opinion that the evidence bearing upon the presented issue of contributory negligence on the part of said decedent clearly was such as to require submission of that issue to the jury. The jury had a right to consider the evidence most favorably for the plaintiff, from the position of the decedent just before and at the moment of the coll’ision, rejecting all evidence favorable to the traction company; and this court must so consider the evidence. Railway v. Ball, 96 Tex. 622, 75 S. W. 4; Wininger v. Railway, 105 Tex. 56, 143 S. W. 1150; Irving v. Freeman, 106 Tex. 38, 155 S. W. 931; Cartwright v. Canode, 106 Tex. 502, 171 S. W. 696; Mitchum v. Railway, 107 Tex. 34, 173 S. W. 878; Manning v. Railway, 107 Tex. 546, 181 S. W. 687. In the light of all the evidence, so considered, we think that, justly and properly, it cannot be held, as a matter of law, that a reasonably prudent person in James Kirksey’s situation would have seen the approaching trolley car, and would have stopped his automobile, or sufficiently diverted its course, in time to avert the fatal collision. As to the effect of the evidence bearing upon that point reasonable minds may differ; hence the question properly is one for the jury. Cartwright v. Canode, supra.

. The evidence supporting our conclusion need not be set out here in full. Much of'it is reflected by the cited opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, to which we refer with the following explanatory statements:

Plaintiff alleged negligence in the operation of the trolley car, in maintaining excessive and dangerous speed, and in failing to give proper signals. The ' verdict of the jury against the traction company necessarily involved a finding that it was guilty of negligence as alleged; but upon that issue the Court of Civil Appeals expressed no opinion whatever. Its disposition of the appeal was controlled entirely by its holding on the issue of contributory negligence upon the part of the decedent, raised by the defensive plea of the traction company.

• The evidence bearing upon the issue of contributory negligence, although in certain respects conflicting, was such as to authorize the jury to. believe and find that as said trolley car approached said public crossing the customary whistle was not sounded, although required by law; that the trolley car approached and passed said crossing at a speed of 60 miles an hour; that decedent was a hotel man, and familiar with the schedules of the traction company’s cars, and that this trolley car was proceeding behind its regular time, late in the evening; that from said crossing northwardly the track of the interurban railway runs downgrade about half a mile, the, effect being to obscure, more or less, the south-bound trolley car from the view of a person in an automobile approaching from the east of said crossing on the public highway, or pilie, which was on practically the same grade as was said crossing; that at a comparatively short distance east of said crossing, and north of but near said pike, are a residence, barn, and other outhouses, and, further north, another building, the effect being to obscure, more or less, such south-bound trolley car from the view of any west-bound automobile passenger along said pike, in approaching said crossing; that a very high wind from the south was blowing; that just prior to said collision Kirksey, in his automobile, on said pike, approached said crossing from the east, passing east and south of said houses at a speed of -30 miles an hour; that as he passed to the south of said houses the witness Deloach, standing near them and on the north side of the pike, signaled him, repeatedly, to stop, Deloach’s purpose being to obtain a ride to town with Kirksey; that thereupon Kirksey, whose line of vision, after he had passed south of said houses, constantly had been directed westwardly, toward said crossing, turned his gaze toward Deloach, and immediately afterward “shut off” the ,engine of his automobile, and slowed down to a speed of 10 miles per hour as he neared said crossing, again looking toward it, but endeavoring to stop to pick up Deloach, who thereupon started toward the automobile; that just before the collision occurred, and just after the air brakes of the speeding trolley car were applied, Kirksey then first became aware of its approach, and endeavored, too late, to avoid it, turning his automobile southwardly, almost parallel with the course of the trolley car, resulting in the collision, the right side of the automobile being seriously damaged, and Kirksey being thrown south-wardly through the interurban railway cattle guard in such manner as to break his neck.

Conceding that the physical conditions were such that as Kirksey approached said crossing he might have discovered the approaching trolley car in time to have avoided the collision had his thought and attention not been distracted by Deloach’s signals to stop and his movement toward the automobile as it slowed its speed, there remained for the jury the question whether under all' the facts and circumstances, including said distractions, a reasonably prudent person, in Kirksey’s situation, would or would not have done substantially as he did.

Obviously the material facts are essentially different in legal effect, from those involved in McDonald v. Railway, 86 Tex. 1, 22 S. W. 939, 40 Am. St. Rep. 803, and Railway v. Edwards, 100 Tex. 22, 93 S. W. 106, upon which the Court of Civil Appeals relies. The facts of the present case are more analogous, in an important respect, to those in Mitchum v. Railway, 107 Tex. 34, 173 S. W. 878. There the attention of the injured man was diverted from the approaching train which hurt him. Here, as in that case, that common element may have entered, materially, into the deliberations and verdict of the jury.

Numerous assignments of error presented by the Traction Company to the Court of Civil Appeals were not considered there. Several of them relate to admissibility of certain evidence presenting questions of adjective law over which this- court has not jurisdiction, under Acts 1913, p. 107 (Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 1521, 1522, 1526, 1543, 1544), under which the application for the writ of error was filed. They, and others, should be considered by that court. Accordingly the judgment of thu Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for consideration by it of all duly presented unconsidered assignments of error, and for orders not inconsistent with this opinion. 
      ©=For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     