
    The Prince Mfg. Co., Resp’t, v. Prince’s Metallic Paint Co., App’lt.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
    
    
      Filed January 28, 1889.)
    
    •Injunction—Construction.
    Where an injunction order restrained the defendant from inserting in the newspapers advertisements denying the right of the plaintiff to use a ce’ tain trade-mark, and they published an advertisement containing the following: “Wei desire to state that the recent decision of Judge Lawrence, in a suit brought against us by our competitors in trade, is not a final disposition of the case,” and then, in reference to a recent decision in the Philadelphia courts, “In these cases our right to use our corporate name and trade-mark were fully sustained, and we are confident that upon the final hearing of the case upon its merits our rights in the city of New York will also be sustained in the New York court,” Held, that this was a substantial denial of the right to use the designation.
    Appeal from order adjudging the defendant and Edward Barclay, guilty of contempt in violating a preliminary injunction.
    
      John FranJsenheimer, for app’lt; J, Davenport, for resp’t.
   Brady, J.

The injunction, among other inhibitions, restrained the defendant and others from- inserting in the newspapers advertisements denying the right of the plaintiff to use the designation “Prince’s Metallic Paint.”

The allegation of the plaintiff was that this part of the injunction order had been violated by an advertisement in the papers in which the plaintiff’s right to the trade-mark was denied. The learned justice, on considering the evidence, determined that the violation complained of was complete. And so it appears upon an examination of the advertisement in question. It was so' apparent, indeed so flagrant, that it is hardly worth serious consideration. The defendant said, “We desire to state that the recent decision by Judge Lawrence in a suit brought against us by our competitors in trade is not a final disposition of the case.” And- then, in reference to a recent decision in the Philadelphia courts, it is said, “In these cases our right to use our corporate name and trade-mark was fully sustained, and we are confident that upon the final hearing of the case upon its merits our rights in the city of Hew York will also be sustained by the Hew York court.”

This was a substantial denial of the right of the plaintiff to use the designation, and the decision of the court below was not only proper, but imperatively demanded by the evidence.

For these reasons the order should be affirmed, with ten-dollars costs and disbursements.

Macomber, J., concurs.  