
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kendrick Byron Lamar DANIELS, a/k/a T, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-4224.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: Aug. 7, 2013.
    Decided: Aug. 13, 2013.
    Ann Briks Walsh, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before KING, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
   PER CURIAM:

Kendrick Byron Lamar Daniels appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to twelve months in prison followed by twelve months of supervised release. Daniels’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to An-ders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), raising the issue of whether his sentence is substantively unreasonable but concluding that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Daniels was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. We affirm.

We review a district court’s judgment revoking supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse of discretion. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir.1992). We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir.2006). We first consider whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438. In this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for Guidelines sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir.2007). Only if we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.

While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven policy statements and the statutory factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006), the court need not roboti-cally tick through every subsection, and ultimately, the court has broad discretion to revoke the previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum. Id. at 656-57. Moreover, while a district court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence, the court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as when imposing a post-conviction sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir.2010).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that Daniels’s sentence is reasonable, and the district court did not abuse its discretion. The sentence is within the prescribed statutory range and the policy statement range, and the district court reasonably determined that a sentence at the high end of the policy statement range was appropriate in this case. Moreover, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform his or her client, in writing, of his or her right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.  