
    Salomons v. León.
    Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.
    No. 62.
    Decided April 6, 1904.
    Obligations — Contracts—Construction.—Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations, and the same are not open to construction when their meaning is clear and specific, it not being permissible to distort the meaning of the clauses therein contained by violent interpretations.
    Id. — Fulfillment—Indemnity.-—In cases in which a party fails to comply with the stipulations contained in a contract, it is proper to compel him to the performance of the same and to make the appropriate indemnity for damages and losses sustained by reason of their nonfulfillment.
    
      Id. — The nonfulfillment by a party of the clauses inserted in a contract for his own benefit and utility cannot injure anyone except said party, and, therefore, it is not proper to compel him to the fulfillment of said clauses.
    Costs — Absence op Obstinacy. — No open and manifest obstinacy being shown by the litigant parties, and the claims of both sides not having been totally rejected, the judgment should be rendered without any special imposition of costs.
    STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
    TMs is an action instituted in the District Court of Ponce, by Ana Salomons y Lind, as plaintiff, against Esteban de León y Martinez, as defendant, to enforce the performance of a contract; which case is now pending before ns on appeal in cassation, now ordinary appeal, prosecuted by León y Martinez from the judgment rendered by said court, the appellant having been represented in this court by Attorney Antonio Alvarez Nava, and the respondent by Attorney José de Guzmán Benitez.
    The said judgment, which was rendered on July 22, 1902, is as follows:
    “Judgment. — In tbe city of Ponce, July 22, 1902. This declaratory action, which was brought to compel the performance of various clauses of a contract, was heard in an oral and public trial, Ana Salomons Lind, who is above the age of majority, a widow, and a resident of this city, having appeared therein as plaintiff, represented by Attorney Mant^el León Parra, and Esteban de León y Martinez, who is above the age of majority, a resident of this city, and a landowner, having appeared as defendant, and being represented by Attorney Luciano Ortiz Antón.
    “The opinion of the court was prepared by Presiding Judge Isidoro Soto Nusa, as follows: \
    “On the 17th of April of this year Ana Salomons y Lind, through her attorney, León Parra, instituted the present declaratory action against Esteban de León y Martinez, praying that the latter be adjudged, within the period to be fixed by the court, to raise upon certain leased lands malojillo pasturage absolutely free from noxious plants which might tend to injure said pasturage, and also to repair the irrigation canals in order that a water-right concession made in favor of jthe estate might be utilized, tbe defendant to be admonished that in case of his failure to do so the work would be done at his expense; and also praying that he be adjudged to the payment of the losses and damages sustained or which may be sustained from the 15th of February of the current year, and to the payment of costs, her complaint being based upon the following facts: That on December 4, 1893, the plaintiff, before Joaquin Mayoral, a notary of this city, entered into a contract of lease with the defendant for an undivided one-half of her property in the estate described as the former sugar-cane plantation known as ‘Santa Cruz,’ situated in barrio ‘Bueaná,’ of this municipal district, which has.an area of 250 cuerdas of land, being equivalent to 98 hectares, 25 ares and 98 cen-tares, of which 180 cuerdas are suitable for sugar-cane and 70 cuerdas for pasturage, brambles and saltpetre beds. Said land is bounded on the north by the ‘Isabel’ estate, pertaining to the estate of Oppenheimer, and by a neighborhood road; on the east by the said ‘Isabel’ estate; on the south by the ocean; and on the west by the Bueaná river; and the part or parcel of the estate leased to León is that previously held under lease by Victor Quinones. That among the conditions stipulated in said contract appears one to the effect that the lessee Esteban de León was obliged to raise malojillo pasturage upon the leased lands, which pasturage, upon the termination of the contract, would inure to the benefit of the lessor, to whom it was to be delivered absolutely free from plants which might be injurious to the same; that as the leased estate had a water-right concession which could not then be utilized for the reason that all the ditches were closed up, the lessee León covenanted to at once open them at his exclusive expense, for the purpose of utilizing said waters, with the understanding that if, after the ditches had been put in repair, the lessor could make use of the waters if she so desired, but without in .any way impairing the acquired rights of the lessee; that the contract was made for the period of six years, and could be extended for another year at the option of León, said period to be computed from September 11, 1903; that the possession of the estate was not restored, however, until February 15, 1892; for upon the expiration of the contract, -when the son of the lessor went to assume charge of the estate, he discovered that León had .not performed any of the conditions of- the public contract made, as the leased lands were completely overrun with brambles, no grass or m,alojillo having been planted thereon; and as regards the irrigation canals, not only Rad the repairs agreed to not been made, but Raving failed to exercise tRe most indispensable care in their preservation, those which Rad been delivered to León at the time of entering into the contract of lease Rad greatly deteriorated; and notwithstanding the private offers made by León to comply with the contract he has failed to do so.
    “The complaint is accompanied by a certified copy of the instrument embodying the lease in question, and by a certificate to the effect that conciliatory proceedings had been attempted.
    “The complaint having been admitted, the same was referred to the defendant Esteban de León y Martinez for the period of twenty days, during which he appeared to the record and answered the complaint, admitting the first land second allegations of fact therein contained, and averring that after the contract had gone into force, not only for his own benefit but also to attempt compliance with a manifestly impossible clause, inasmuch as there were no means of planting an undivided one-half of the estate, he planted the whole thereof to malojillo grass, and in order to likewise comply for his own benefit as lessee with the sixth clause, which had been inserted in his sole favor, he proceeded to clean the ditches in order to utilize the waters appurtenant to the estate; that in consequence of the cyclone which devasted this Island in 1899, the leased estate suffered, like all other estates, the effects of the inundation, the ditches opened by him having been closed up, and the pasturage which had been planted thereon having been destroyed and covered with filth; that upon the expiration of the term of the lease he and the plaintiff entered into a new contract, which did not contain the clause relative to the planting of grass or any of the other clauses sought to be enforced. He accordingly requested that the demand be rejected and that the costs be imposed upon the plaintiff.
    “The case being ready for the presentation of evidence the same was submitted by both parties, and the 10th of the present month having been fixed for the holding of the oral trial and the taking of evidence, the same was proceeded with, and thereupon counsel for both sides presented such arguments as they deemed pertinent to their respective rights.
    “From the documentary evidence attached to the record it appears that the lease contract wás made in the form and under the conditions specified by the plaintiff. An ocular inspection made of the leased lands on the 1st of the present month shows that they are covered with different kinds of grasses, and among them bitter grama, crowfoot grama and aromatic plants, a few stalks of malojillo being disclosed in places, as well as a few indications of this latter grass in other places; that at one end of the estate, near the river, the remnants of a canal were found at the entrance of the waters, in which a strip of said canal was found at the place where the meter was located, the meter and dam being no longer in existence, the waters being unable to enter, and said canal being found partly destroyed and partly intact. It also appears that Oscar Oppenheimer gave two receipts to Esteban de León, one for twenty-five pesos, having no date, as the balance of the rent for the month of August, and the other dated August 5, 1901, for the sum of seventy-five pesos, for account of rental on the ‘Santa Cruz’ farm.
    “It appears from the proof of confession of the defendant, Esteban de León, that he claims that Oscar Oppenheimer, the son of the plaintiff, pointed out to him the land constituting one-half of the leasehold estate; that the declarant repaired the canal, cleaned it, and constructed a dam which was not included in the contract, and which , dam does not now exist for the reason that the material thereof was stolen; that he caused said lands to be plowed and sown to malojillo and constructed a meter which was carried away within a few days after the canal was closed up by the river; that in the first year of the lease he paid thirty dollars monthly as the consideration thereof, and in the succeeding seven years he paid at the rate of sixty dollars per month; and thereafter entered into a new lease with Oscar Oppenheimer, the son of Mrs. Salomons, without agreeing upon any other conditions than that of paying one hundred dollars per month, which sum he had been paying for the period of a year and a half, namely, up to the 16th of February of the present year, when he abandoned the lease, and thereupon cattle belonging to Messrs. Sauri y Subirá were taken upon the premises; that sometimes he had left the one hundred dollars per month with Julio Verne, and at other times with the brother-in-law of Oscar, to be delivered to the latter; and that during the continuance of the lease he has obtained only two receipts, one from Oscar and the other from his sister.
    “Upon taking the testimony of witnesses, Oscar Oppenheimer testified that de León paid only sixty dollars, provincial money, on the lease, and that subsequent to the exchange of currency he paid the equivalent thereof, or thirty-six dollars; that he did not make any contract with León; and that the latter never paid twenty-five dollars per week, or one hundred dollars per month. The witness identified the receipts fonnd in the record, and stated that they were for deferred monthly payments; that he always issued receipts for the sums paid him by León, delivering them through the same person sent by the latter with the money; that he is unable to affirm whether the receipt for twenty-five dollars is prior to the one for seventy-five dollars, and that he does not remember the date on which he authorized the former receipt. Vicente Valdivieso y Torruella testified that he heard Oscar Oppenheimer and Esteban de León discussing the lease of the ‘Santa Cruz’ estate, and that León agreed to put the same in order under the same conditions. The witness did not give further details. Emilio Feri, the overseer of the plantation ‘ Estrella, ’ stated that this plantation had a lease upon the lands of the ‘Santa Cruz’ estate, which lands are sown to hicole grass which is torn up by the declarant for the reason that cattle do not eat it and it does not permit malojillo to grow; that he did not see León sow malojillo upon said lands, nor does he know whether he repaired the canal; that when he took charge as overseer of said plantation, he discovered that a part of the land was sown to malo-jillo. Ulises Clavel testified that for sis or eight years he has frequently passed along the road of the ‘Santa Cruz’ estate, from which forty or fifty cuerdas of said lands can be distinguished; that he never observed that León had sown malojillo thereon, neither did he ever observe water flowing through the canal, and that he does not know the reason therefor. Carlos Torres testified that the plantation ' Restaurada’ has been utilizing the waters of the river which were previously utilized by the ‘Santa Cruz’ estate, which, for a long time past, does not utilize them for lack of canals, those which it had having been destroyed; that he did not see León repairing the •same, and that if he had repaired them the witness would have seen it, although at the time León held said lands the witness did not see the canals. Alejo Marco testified that neither for a year before the cyclone nor thereafter had he seen any malojillo grass planted on the lands of the ‘Santa Cruz’ estate, nor had he seen the canals repaired. Julio Verne testified that the statement as to the delivery of money made to him by León was true, and that he turned it over to Oscar Oppenheimer without taking any receipts; that he knew that said money proceeded from the lease of the ‘Santa Cruz’ estate; that León always told him for which week the payment was made, the money for which the witness always sent to Oppenheimer; and that such payments occurred in tiie years 1900 and 1901,. Juan Angel Rivera testified that León built fences, cleaned the place up and planted grass on the leased premises; that he had made a dam and installed a meter on the river and that he caused the canals to be repaired. Juan Jome and Juan Centeno testified to the same effect’, as the previous witness.
    “This day having been set for the voting upon the present judgment, the same was unanimously approved.
    ‘ ‘ The provisions of law have been observed in the conduct of this-, appeal.
    “Pursuant to article 1091 of the Civil Code, obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties, and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations; it is not permitted to distort the terms of the obligation or of the contractual clauses by farfetched or violent interpretations when the sense thereof is clear and specific.
    “Among the clauses contained in the contract of lease entered into between the litigant parties, as appears from the instrument produced, is one to the effect that the lessee, Esteban de León, was obligated to raise malojillo pasturage on the leased premises, which pasturage, upon the termination of the contract, would inure to the benefit of the lessor, to whom the same was to be delivered completely free from any plant calculated to injure it; and another clause to the effect that as a water-right concession existed in favor of the leased estate which could not then be utilized for the reason that the ditches were closed up, the said lessee agreed to at once open them up at his exclusive expense in order that said waters might be utilized, the lessor being permitted to make use thereof, but without impairing the acquired rights of the lessee.
    “With reference to the first clause set forth in the foregoing conclusion of law, the literal sense thereof being clear and explicit, it cannot be argued as against said clause that it is one impossible of execution, upon the flimsy pretext that the leased premises are pro indiviso, inasmuch as this point owas thoroughly controverted during the probatory period according to the confession of the said defendant lessee, made before the court under the sanctity of an oath when he affirmed that Oscar Oppenheimer, the son of plaintiff, had pointed out to him the land constituting one-half of the leased estate; and it is therefore evident that it was upon this surveyed portion, and not upon any other, that the lessee was to raise the malojillo pasturage referred to in said clause.
    
      ‘1 Neither is the continuance of the effects of said clause disproved, for the allegation made by the party defendant does not appear to have been established by any of the means of evidence recognized by law, to the effect that upon the expiration of the term of the lease he gmd the plaintiff had entered into a new contract which did not contain either this clause or the other clauses referred to in the complaint. All the legal effects of said first clause should therefore be held to be final, subsistent and enforceable.
    “All this being shown by the evidence of the ocular inspection, confession, documentary evidence and that of witnesses offered and taken at the instance of the party plaintiff on the oral trial, the fact has been established under the view taken by the trial court according to the sovereign dictates of its conscience, that the lessee, Esteban de León, neither during the term of the contract nor at the expiration thereof, nor upon any other occasion while in possession of the leased premises, has raised or planted malojillo pasturage upon the portion of the land pointed out to him, according to agreement; but far from that, upon the expiration of the contract in question, the estate was found to be overrun with different kinds of grasses, such as bitter grama, crowfoot grama, and aromatic plants, only a few stalks of malojillo being disclosed here and there upon the ground, and a few indications of said grass being found on other parts of the same. All of this fully convinces us that the lessee failed to comply with the clause stipulated, the fulfillment of which is demanded in this action.
    “One of the specific principles of the substantive law is that the proof of obligations devolves upon the party who demands their fulfillment, and the extinction thereof upon the party who opposes them, and it is therefore conclusive that the party plaintiff having established his right in this regard, and the adverse party having failed to answer the allegations made, it is of course proper to sustain that portion of the demand which relates to enforcing compliance with the first clause under analysis, with the remaining subsidiary pronouncements concerning compensation for losses and damages sustained by reason of the nonfulfillment of said clause.
    “If everything considered with respect to the nonfulfillment of the said first clause and to the obligation of the lessee to fully comply with the same is clear and evident, the same does not occur with respect to the second clause set forth, and which constitutes another of the terms or conditions of tbe contract made, wben the legal ground is taken into consideration that said clause or condition was inserted in favor of the lessee, and for his benefit and utility as such lessee, he being the only person who, after all, was concerned as a mere holder and usufructuary of the leased premises with the utilization of said waters and the placing of the ditches or canals in good condition to facilitate the flow of the same, by which improvement he would obtain the greatest return possible from the land. It is perfectly evident that the nonfulfillment of said clause could not have injured anyone except the lessee himself, for whose benefit the same had been established.
    “In this respect the portion of the complaint which refers to the enforcement of the said second clause is devoid of any legal foundation, and the claim made on this point is therefore untenable.
    “As no open and manifest obstinacy has been shown by the parties in litigation, and the claims of the same have not been totally rejected, the decision should therefore be pronounced and the legal declaration made without any special imposition of costs.
    “Having examined articles 1091, 1098, 1100, 1101, 1107, 1118, 1203, 1214, 1218, 1231, 1235, 1241, 1244, 1248, 1281 and 1555 of the former Civil Code, in connection with the articles applicable of the Law of Civil Procedure, General Order 118, and the decisions of the Supreme Court applicable to the case, we adjudge that that portion of the complaint presented on behalf of Ana Salomons y Lind which relates to the first ground of the same should be sustained, and that we ought to adjudge and do adjudge that the defendant, Esteban de León y Martinez, in his legal capacity as lessee, within the period of five natural months from the date on which this judgment becomes final, raise upon the leased premises the malojillo pasturage completely free from noxious plants, under the admonition that if he fails to do the work it will be done at his expense, and to the payment of the indemnity for losses and damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the nonfulfillment of the first obligation agreed upon, payment for said damages to be enforced in the manner and form prescribed by the Law of Civil Procedure. In like manner we dismiss said complaint as to the other ground of plaintiff’s claim or demand, absolving the defendant Esteban de León therefrom, without special imposition of costs in either of the two pronouncements. Thus do we pronounce, order and sign. Isidoro Soto Nussa, R. Sán-chez Montalvo, Libertad Torres Gran.”
    From this judgment counsel for Esteban de León y Martinez took an appeal in cassation, which was allowed, and the record haying been sent np to this conrt, after citation of parties, the case was conducted as one on appeal. A day was set for the hearing, which took place with the presence of the attorney for the appellant.
    
      Mr. Alvarez Nava, for appellant.
    ■' Mr. Guzmán Benitez (José), for respondent.
   Me. Justice Hernández,

after stating the foregoing facts, delivered the opinion of the conrt.

The findings of fact and conclusions of daw contained in the judgment appealed from are accepted.

Having examined the legal provisions therein cited, we adjudge that we ought to affirm and do. affirm the judgment of July 22, 1902, rendered by the District Court of Ponce, in all of its parts, the costs of the appeal to be paid by the appellant. The record is ordered to he returned to said court accompanied by the proper certificate.

Chief Justice Quiñones and Justices Figueras, Sulzbacher and MacLeary concurred.  