
    White vs. Vann.
    Common carriers who advance to forwarding agents existing charges on goods for freight, storage, &c., are entitled to be reimbursed by the consignee and owner of the goods the amount so advanced, and this by the usage of trade.
    Assumpsit in the circuit court of Knox county, by Vann against White for money paid, laid out, and expended. Plea, non assumpsit.
    It appeared on trial before Judge Cannon and a jury, that White sold a steamboat to Reese, Ferrie and Banks, and agreed to take a part of the consideration in freight. Reese, Ferrie and Banks were the lessees of the Tuscumbia and Decatur railroad, and a large quantity of the goods of White en route for Knoxville from New Orleans by the way of the Tennessee river, and the railroad aforesaid, come to the hands of Reese, Ferrie and Banks, as carriers, and were by them transported over the road; and Vann being desirous of transporting them from the termination of the road to Knoxville, advanced to Reese, Ferrie and Banks the amount of charges on the goods for freight, storage, áse. There was no proof that Vann at the time he made the advances on behalf of White was cognizant of the contract between White and Reese, Ferrie and Banks in regard to the transportation of the goods and the deduction of the charges therefor from the sum due to White by them.
    The plaintiff introduced divers witnesses who testified that it was the invariable usage of common carriers on the waters of all the navigable streams in the United States, and on railroads, to advance for the benefit of the .owners of goods in a course of transportation all existing, charges for freight, storage, áre. where the goods were regarded as worth so much, and that such usage was mutually beneficial to merchants and carriers, and without it the safe and speedy transportation of goods from oné point to another could hardly be effected; that it had been invariably adhered to and had not been objected to. The presiding judge charged the jury that Vann was entitled to be reimbursed for advances made by him for White’s benefit in the discharge of lawful charges on his goods, and that the special contract with Reese, Ferrie and Banks would not vary his liability to Vann unless Vann was informed or had reasonable ground to believe that the special contract alluded, to in the proof existed.
    The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed,
    
      Crozier and Swan, for plaintiff in error.
    In this case a request must be alleged and proved, 8 T. R. 610.
    
      A mere voluntary courtesy in advancing money for another without a request will not create an assumpsit. L. Lib. vol. 43, p. 125.' Vann could not make White his debtor without his consent. These general principles cannot be controverted.
    An usage to control a general principle of law should be uniform and general. The usage of trade should be so well settled that those engaged in trade must be considered as acting in reference to it. 1 Peters C. C. Rep. 225; 1 Galli-son R. 443.
    White made a contract with Reese, Ferrie and Banks which utterly excludes the idea of acting on the usage of trade.
    
      Lyon, for defendant in error.
   Reese J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error, a wholesale and commission Grocer in the town of Knoxville, purposing to purchase and have forwarded to that place from New Orleans and from the eastern cities, by the way of New Orleans and up the Tennessee river, a considerable amount of merchandise in his line, sold to Reese, Ferrie and Banks, who were the lessees of the Tuscumbia and Decatur railroad, and forwarding agents for all persons engaged in trade above, the steamer Guide, of which he had been former owner, and stipulated with, and directed Reese, Ferrie and Banks that the price of said steamer should be paid by their advancing on behalf of said White the charges upon his merchandise for freights, storage, &c. below and above Decatur. He also informed Hugh L. McClung, one of the owners of the steamer Hark-Away, of this arrangement with Reese, Ferrie and Banks; and he made an agreement with said M’Clung to freight his goods' upon the Hark-Away. The defendant in error, Joseph Vann, was the owner of the steamer Holston, a boat which had been employed in transporting goods and passengers between Decatur and Knoxville, and intermediate points; but it was the intention of the owner, upon the first considerable rise in the Tennessee river, adequate to that purpose, to transfer it below the Muscle Shoals and employ it in business there.— The master of this boat, Chapman, ignorant of the state of accounts, or of any special agreement between White and Reese, Ferrie and Banks, and ignorant also, of any special contract between White and the owners of the Hark-Away, to transport his goods, applied to Reese, Ferrie and Banks for goods to ship to Knoxville, and among other goods for those of White. The clerk of Reese, Ferrie and Banks refused to deliver to him the goods, unless he would pay the charges which there existed against him for freight, storage, &c.— This he paid to Reese, Ferrie and Banks, received the goods and a bill of lading thereof in which such charges and payments were stated, and delivered the goods safely to the clerk of White in Knoxville. White paid to Vann the freight from Decatur to Knoxville but refused to pay advances made by Vann for pre-existing charges. To recover these, this action is brought. It was proved in the case by several enlightened merchants and well informed owners of steamboats that it is the long and well established custom and usage of trade, not only on the Tennessee river, but throughout the United States, for freighters of goods to advance to the forwarding agents the existing charges upon them, which the consignees and owners are liable to refund; that this usage is indispensable to the successful prosecution of commercial operations and' of great and mutual advantage to all parties. The position of Reese, Ferrie and Banks as lessees of the Tuscumbia and Decatur railroad, made them necessarily and exclusively the general agents of all the owners of merchandise shipped from that point to any point above; and 'moreover, it is in proof that they were the special agents of White to ship his goods. When, therefore, they shipped White’s goods upon the terms proved, those terms bound White. The private arrangements between White and his agents and the private instructions given to them, cannot on well settled principles affect the rights of Vann. See Skipwith vs. Walker, Meigs 502. If indeed Vann or his agents had known, or had good reason to believe the fact that White had previously paid these charges, then, indeed, Vann ought not to recover; and this the circuit court charged the jury. The verdict which was rendered is sustained by the evidence in the record, and there is no error in the opinion or action of the court.

The judgment, therefore, must be affirmed.  