
    JOHN J. WEED AND WILLIAM PENN CLARKE vs. LEANDER M. BLACK.
    At Law. —
    No. 10888.
    I. All contracts for services generally, in procuring legislation, are void from public policy, and it is the duty of courts so to declare.
    II. But contracts which provide for compensation in consideration of particular service to be rendered, such as the collection of evidence, the preparation of papers, or the delivery of arguments in support of a claim, are legitimate everywhere.
    III. A contract whereby the parties agree to pay any claim of a Delegate in Congress for service rendered by him in securing the payment of the claim (where legislation is required for the payment of the claim) is void, as against public policy.
    STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
    The plaintiffs are attorneys at law, and bring this action to recover the amount of a contingent fee for prosecuting a claim against the Government in pursuance of an agreement with defendants to pay them twenty-five per cent, of the sum which they might collect. The contract is in writing, and is set forth in the opinion of the court. On the trial of the cause before the chief-justice, several exceptions were taken by the defendants, which were'not considered, as the case was decided upon the simple ground that the contract was illegal, as being against public policy. The exception on that point is based upon that part of the charge of the court below to the jury which is in the following language:
    “Again, it is urged by the defendant, as I understand the character of their case, that the contract was vicious in its inception and void in the law; that it incorporated into it, as an inseparable part of it, a provision for the corruption of a member of.Congress, and that this virus poisoned the whole contract under the law, and that it is invalid; and that the plaintiffs may not predicate a right to receive upon it, or a right to recover a reasonable compensation for services rendered under it. This peculiarity of that contract makes the question one for discrimination. The member of Congress alluded to here is not a party to this controversy unless he is a party to this contract. He is referred to in it, and his compensation for something is provided for by it. But the contract subsists between other parties, as remarked to the counsel when this feature of the case was presented. The court reiterate now to you, if you find that these parties •designedly entered into a contract with each other, involving the undertaking on the part of the plaintiffs in the ■case to enter upon a process of corruption, or to pay the rewards of corruption on the part of a legislator in connection with the subject of this labor, then it would vitiate the entire contract, and could not be enforced. And it is the opinion of the court that the vice would be carried over and fastened upon the services rendered under the contract, so that even for labor ■ performed, within the limitations of the contract and under its rule and obligation, could not be recovered outside of the suit upon the contract.
    “ Butbeforeyou come to a conclusion, gentlemen of thejury, that this contract is corrupt under the law, you will come to that conclusion upon proof. You will borrow no such conclusion from the atmosphere. It don’t enter into the economy of the law to judge men’s rights under the law by presumption that they violated the law. It is reversing the whole -economy of jurisprudence in this regard to enter upon an investigation with the presumption that the party sat down corruptly to the violation of the law, or that a public servant becomes particejps criminis in that corruption. It is by proof, and not by presumption, that the law arrives at that result; so in this particular you will examine the testimony and inquire of it whether the testimony conspires in its prevailing proof to the conclusion that these parties did concertedly sit down and make this contract, and that this member of Congress was a beneficiary in it for corrupt purposes. If the testimony is doubtful and contradictory, it is your duty to reject it; if it is consistent and uncontradictory, and is persuasive in its effects upon your minds and consciences that such was the contract and such the purpose of the parties to it, you must give effect to it.
    
      “ It is insisted upon by the plaintiffs that no such agreement was entered into with reference to the corrupt services of any member of Congress, especially the Delegate denominated in the contract. It is not pretended that one member of this firm had any knowledge of any such purpose or of any such contract. You have heard the testimony of the other member of the firm; you have the testimony of Black in reference to it; and these two witnesses constitute, I believe, the only living witnesses to that issue. Eeconcile their statements, if you can, when they are contradictory; if you cannot, reject both, without you are persuaded under the circumstances that one witness is entitled to higher credit than the other, or without corroboration give to the testimony of one of the witnesses greater strength than the other; and if you find in the testimony enough evidence to counteract the presumption of the law in every period of the contract, and the period of the conduct of legislative life, on this question you will render a verdict for the defendant. On the contrary, if you do not find the testimony in the case to counteract the presumption, you will, upon this issue, find a verdict for the plaintiff.”
    The plaintiffs recovered a judgment for $11,321.62, but, the defendants having moved for a new trial, the plaintiffs consented to enter a remittitur for the sum of $ 1,075.69, and thereupon the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for $7,215.69; from which judgment the defendant prosecutes this appeal.
    The other facts necessary to a correct understanding of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.
    
      J. D. McPherson and L. G. Hine, for plaintiffs, argued:
    There is no error in the statement of the law as presented to the jury by the above-quoted portion of the charge of the court below. There was nothing in the contract itself which would show that it was made for a corrupt purpose, or that corruption of a member of Congress was contemplated by it or an incident of it, or that the plaintiffs were to have any intercourse with Cavanaugh upon the subject of these claims. It, therefore, becomes a question of fact, to be determined by evidence outside of the contract, as to whether the contract had any such purpose, or whether any such act was an incident of it. These questions of fact the court very properly left to the determination of the jury. That part of the contract upon which this defense is based is in the following language:
    “And the said Weed & Clarke hereby agree to pay and discharge any claim or charge which may be made by Hon. J. M. Cavanaugh against said L. M. Black for services rendered by him in securing the payment of said claims.”
    This agreement is an undertaking to pay and discharge any claim or charge which Cavanaugh may make against the defendant for services “ rendered” by him to the defendant previous to the making of said contract. The language of the contract is “/or services rendered,” not for services to be rendered as a member of Congress. It is in the past tense, and comtemplated, if it contemplated anything, a settlement between the defendant and Cavanaugh for services previously rendered at the defendant’s request. These claims had been pending since the spring of 1867, and the act of Congress providing for their adjustment was not passed for more than three years afterward, and not until the 15th day of July, 1870. It was clearly shown at the trial that Cavanaugh was not informed of the making of said contract, and that he had never made any claim under it either from the plaintiff or the defendant. The questions of fact presented by this part of the defense to the plaintiff’s action were, therefore, very properly left by the court to the determination of the j ary.
    
      Wm. F. Mattingly and A. G. Riddle, for the defendant, argued in regard to the point decided in the case:
    The suit for the Montana war-claims being upon the common count, and there being no evidence that the defendant had collected a dollar, or of the value of the plaintiff’s services for what they had done, were they entitled to recover f We submit that they were not. The contract is one to procure legislation for a contingent fee, and, in addition to that, the contract providing on its face for the payment of the Delegate in Congress from Montana Territory for services rendered by him in securing payment of the claims. The evidence shows that the whole effort of the plaintiffs was to secure legislation on the part of Congress, and that the act of July 15, 1870, was drawn by one of the plaintiffs. This in connection with the provision in the contract for paying a Delegatein Congress, ought to be conclusive of the invalidity of the contract, as against public policy.
    The Supreme Court of the United States has declared as follows: “Agreements for compensation to procure legislation have been uniformly declared invalid, and the decisions have not turned upon the question whether improper influences were contemplated or used, but upon the corrupting tendency of the agreements. Agreements for compensation contingent upon success suggest the use of sinister and corrupt means for the accomplishment of the end desired. The law meets the suggestion of evil, and strikes down the contract from its inception.” 2 Wall., 52, Tool Company vs. Norris; 10 Barb., 488, Harris vs. Roof; 18 Pick., 472, Fuller vs. Dame ; 21 Wall., 441, Trist vs. Childs; 12 Am. Rep., 503, Jones vs. Blacklidge. This case not only decides that a contract of this kind for a contingent tee is void, as against public policy, but that it is void under the act of February 26, 1853. 21 Ind., 479, Coquillard vs. Beares. This case decides the naked question that a contract to procure legislation for a contingent fee is void, although no improper influences were used. 5 Watts & Serg., 315; Clippinger vs. Hapbaugh is to the same effect.
    The Supreme Court of the United States, in 16 How., 325, Marshall vs. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, in referring to the cases bearing upon this question, says :
    “ The sum of these cases is, that all contracts for a contingent compensation for obtaining legislation, or, to use personal or any secret or sinister influence on legislation, is void by the policy of the law.”
    The necessary consequences of such contracts, as depicted by the courts in this ease, may be deemed prophetic.
   Mr. Justice Wylie

delivered the opinion of the court:

Previously to the 21st of July, 1870, the defendant held certain claims against the government of the United States, generally known as Montana war-claims, in regard to which, the plaintiffs had rendered him certain services. But the claims had not been paid or allowed by the Government, and it became necessary to procure the passage of an act of •Congress for that object. On the 15th July, 1870, Congress passed an act authorizing the Secretary of War to ascertain the expense incurred by the authorities of Montana Territory in suppressing Indian hostilities, and the names of persons entitled to relief. The plaintiffs in this action had rendered active services in procuring the passage of that law, and evidence was given to approve that the act itself was drawn up by Mr. Weed, one of the plaintiffs.

The act having passed on the 15th of July, 1870, the following contract was entered into between the parties on the 21st of the same month :

“Whereas I have a claim against the United States for horses, equipments, and supplies furnished by me to the territorial authorities of Montana Territory, and used in suppressing Indian hostilities in said Territory in the year 1867; and whereas Weed & Clarke have been engaged in making efforts to secure the payment of said claim, and propose to •continue such efforts until said claims are settled and paid: Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises, and of the services heretofore rendered and hereafter to be rendered by said Weed & Clarke in the prosecution of said claim, I do hereby agree to pay to them, the said Weed & Clarke, twenty per cent, of the amount collected by them on said claim, and I hereby agree that the amount herein specified to be paid to them shall be paid out of the moneys allowed and paid to me on said claim at the time I may receive the same.
“And the said Weed & Clarke hereby agree to pay and discharge any claim or charge which may be made by Hon. J. M. Cavanaugh against said L. M. Black for services rendered by him in securing the payment of said claims. Dated Washington, D. 0., July 21, 1870.
“L.- M. BLACK.
“WEED & CLARKE.”

At the date of this contract the Hon. J. M. Cavanaugh was a Delegate from Montana in the Congress of the United States.

In pursuance of the act of Congress above referred to, General Hardie was appointed by the Secretary of War to investigate these claims, and Weed appeared before him in December, 1870, as agent of the defendant. Part of the claims were allowed and others suspended by General Hardie.

On the 30th of May, 1872, Black, the defendant, gave written notice to Weed & Clarke that he had revoked their authority, for the reason that they had been negligent of their duties-in the business, and.that he had employed other agents in their place.

On the 3d March, 1873, an act of Congress was passed directing payment of such of the claims as had been allowed by General Hardie, which amounted to $55,613.25.

The verdict was for $11,322.65, at the rate of twenty per cent, on this sum; but the plaintiffs having entered a remittitur for $4,075,69, a judgment was entered up iñ their favor for the balance, $7,245.69.

The main question in the case was as to the validity of the-contract; and the decision of that question was left by the court to the jury, as one of actual fraud, to be determined “ upon proof.”

On its face, the contract was for a contingent fee, which was to be divided between the plaintiffs and the Delegate named for services to be rendered, or for services which had already been rendered, by all three in procuring the allowance and payment of the claims under authority of acts of Congress. One of these acts had already been passed, and one other at least had yet to be passed before the claims-could be paid.

This question has been so often decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, that we must regard it as conclusively settled. All contracts for services, generally, in procuring legislation, are void from public policy, and it is the duty of the courts so to declare. Agreements for compensation contingent upon success suggest the use of sinister and corrupt means for the accomplishment of the end desired. The law meets the suggestion of evil and strikes down the contract from its inception.” See Marshall vs. Baltimore Ohio Railroad Company, 16 How., 325; Tool Company vs. Norris, 2 Wall., 52; Trist vs. Childs, 21 Wall., 441.

Honest contracts, however, whose character appears upon their face, are unaffected by the rule. If the terms of the contract be broad enough to cover services of any kind, whether secret or open, honest or dishonest, the law pronounces a ban upon the paper itself. Nor will honest services substantially performed sanctify an uni awful contract. But contracts which provide for compensation in consideration of particular services to be rendered, such as the collection of evidence, the preparation of papers, or the delivery of arguments in support of claims, are legitimate everywhere. Even these, however, would not be sustained if employed as covers for actual fraud, against the policy of the law.

These considerations are deemed sufficient to dispose of the present case finally. The other points are of minor consequence, and need not be considered.

The judgment should be set aside and a judgment entered in favor of the defendant non obstante veredicto.  