
    Isaac STENGEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bradford BLACK, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 08-2721-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 2, 2010.
    
      (Alex Colgan — argued by); Isaac Stengel, New York, NY, pro se.
    Ambrose Richardson, Solomon Blum Heymann & Stich LLP, New York, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Circuit Judges, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, District Judge.
    
      
       Richard J. Sullivan, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Isaac Stengel, pro se, appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.), dismissing his complaint alleging replevin and due process claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002), and Rule 12(b)(2), see DiStefano v. Carozzi North America, Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir.2001). Similarly, in reviewing a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, accepting all material facts alleged in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2008).

Here, our independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that Appellant’s complaint was properly dismissed. First, with respect to Appellant’s due process claim, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) (explaining the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). Appellant’s complaint satisfies all of the criteria for application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, in that: (1) he lost in an Ohio state court action; (2) he complains that he was injured by the Ohio state court judgment; (3) he has invited review and rejection of that judgment, arguing in his complaint that it was erroneous, and on appeal explicitly calling for it to be vacated; and (4) the Ohio judgment was entered before the commencement of the instant proceedings. Accordingly, Appellant’s due process claim was properly dismissed. See ACEquip Ltd. v. Am. Eng’g Corp., 315 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir.2003) (“Our court may ... affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground appealing in the record, even if the ground is different from the one relied on by the district court.”). Furthermore, as the due process claim was the only alleged basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, it was proper for the district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellant’s replevin claim arising under state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  