
    VENNUM, Respondent, v. MERTENS, Appellant.
    St. Louis Court of Appeals,
    May 8, 1906.
    1. CONFLICT OF LAWS: Place where Contract is to be Executed. A-note, made payable in the State of Illinois and showing on its face that it was to be controlled by laws of that State, is governed by the laws of Illinois no matter where it was in reality signed.
    2. -: Judgment: Warrant of Attorney, A judgment by a confession of an attorney on a note which contained a warrant of attorney authorizing such action, if valid in the State where rendered,' is treated as valid in this State.
    Appeal from Jefferson Oircnit Court. — Hon. Joseph J. Williams, Judge.
    Affirmed.
    
      H. B. Irwin for appellant.
    (1) The testimony shows conclusively that the note on which judgment Avas rendered in the State of Illinois was a Missouri contract, and that the power of attorney authorizing any attorney of record to appear in court and confess judgment without process, in favor of the holder, rendered said note non-negotiable in the State of Missouri where the same was negotiated, and hence the Illinois court rendering the judgment on which this suit is brought, acted without jurisdiction. National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 49 Law Ed. U. S. 184, 195 U. S. 257. (2) The law where the contract was made governs. 9 Cyc. 666; Kerwin & Co. v. Doran, 29 Mo. App. 897; Hartmann v. Railroad, 39 Mo. App. 88. (3) The power of the attorney is not negotiable, and when the legal title to the note is transferred the power of attorney is invalid and no power can be exercised under it for the benefit of the endorsee. Ausbern v. Hawley, 19 Ohio 130. (4) Crim v. Crim, 162 Mo. 545, 63 S. W. 489, is the leading case in this State, Judges Vabliant and Robinson dissenting. This case differs from the one at bar in this: the note sued on in Crim v. Crim was made in the State in which the con fession of judgment was had; whereas in the case at bar the note was not only made in Missouri but also transferred in Missouri to the third party. The reasoning of the learned judge who wrote the dissenting opinion in Crim v. Crim appears to be more in harmony with the later decisions. Penoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 729, 734; Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 670; Solon v. Wiley, 195 U. S. 257.
    
      James F. Green and E. A. Green for respondent.
    (1) Judgments by confession, on warrant of attorney, as this, if valid in the State where taken, are recognized by the courts of this State as valid. Crim v. Crim, 162 Mo. 545, 63 S. W. 489; Randolph v. Keiler, 21 Mo. 557; Harness v. Administrator, 19 Mo. 323; Barney v. White, 46 Mo. 139; Tootle v. Buckingham, 190 Mo. 183, 88 S. W. 619; Davis v. Cohn, 96 Mo. App. 587, 70 S. W. 727. (2) Contracts to be performed in a foreign State are to be construed according to the laws of that State; under this view it makes no difference whether the note was signed in Missouri or Illinois. It was to be performed in Illinois, as witnessed by the note itself. The law of the place of performance governs in such a case as this. Stix v. Mathews, 63 Mo. 371; Roach v. Type Foundry, 21 Mo. App. 118; Lambs v. Rhodes, 54 Mo. App. 133; Ins. Co. v. Simon, 52 Mo. App. 357; Smoot v. Judd, 161 Mo. 673, 61 S. W. 854; Clark v. Porter, 90 Mo. App. 143; Trower Bros. Co. v. Hamilton, 179 Mo. 205, 77 S. W. 1081; Davis v. Tandy, 107 Mo. App. 437, 81 S. W. 457; Thompson v. Traders’ Ins. Co., 169 Mo. 12, 68 S. W. 889.
   BLAND, P. J.

The suit is on a judgment rendered by the circuit court of Ford county, in the State of Illinois, at the April term, 1905, of said court. The suit on which the judgment was rendered was to recover the sum due on the following promissory note, which was duly indorsed by the payee and delivered to plaintiff on the day of its date, to-wit:

“1750.00. Bloomington, 111., March 27, 1904.
“Sixty days after date, for value received, I promise to pay to the order of The William R. White Company, seven hundred fifty dollars, at the McLean County Bank Bloomington, 111., with interest at seven per cent per annum after date, until paid.
“And to secure the payment of said amount, I hereby authorize, irrevocably, any attorney of any court of record to appear for me in such court, in term time or vacation, at any time hereafter and confess a judgment, without process, in favor.of the holder of this note, for such amount as may appear to be unpaid thereon, together with costs and ten per cent of the principal amount as attorney’s fees, and to waive and release all errors which may intervene in any such proceedings, and consent to immediate execution upon such judgment.
“P. O. DeSoto, M'o. Henry A. Mertens.”

The defendant was not served with process and did not appear in person to the suit. But the record of the proceedings show that E. M. Rhodes, an attorney at law, appeared for defendant and filed an answer, waiving the issuance of. process, confessing the execution of the note and the amount due thereon, and confessing that judgment might be rendered therefor.

Plaintiff offered in evidence the judgment roll, the entry of the judgment on the records of the Illinois Circuit Court, dffly authenticated, and section 66, Revised Statutes 1899, of Illinois, which provides: “Any person, for any debt bona fide dne, may confess judgment by himself or attorney, duly authorized, either in term time or vacation, without process;” and offered in evidence the case of Roach v. Belden, 119 Ill. 320, which holds that under the statute, supra, an attorney, by virtue of a warrant of attorney like that appended to the note, supra, produced and filed in open court by his cognovit, could waive issue of process and confess judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant, over the objection of the plaintiff, was permitted to testify that the note and power of attorney were not executed at Blooming-ton, in the State of Illinois, but were executed and delivered in the city of St. Louis, Missouri.

The issues were tried to the court, sitting as a jury, who rendered judgment for plaintiff.

The note was made payable in the State of Illinois, and the instrument shows on its face that the parties had the laws of that State in mind when they produced the writing and signed it, so that it is immaterial at what particular locality it was signed. The laws of the State where the note was made payable, and by which the parties intended its validity and enforcibility should govern, is controlling in this proceeding. [Trower Bros. Co. v. Hamilton, 179 Mo. 205, 77 S. W. 1081; Thompson v. Traders’ Ins. Co., 169 Mo. 12, 68 S. W. 889; Smoot v. Judd, 161 Mo. 673, 61 S. W. 854; Davis, McDonald & Davis v. Tandy, 107 Mo. App. 437, 81 S. W. 457; Clark v. Porter, 90 Mo. App. 143.] Judgments on confession on wax-rant of attorney, if valid in the State where taken, are recognized and treated as valid in this State, under that clause of the Federal Constitution, which requires the courts of each State to give “full faith and credit” to the judgments of sister States. [Crim v. Crim, 162 Mo. 545, 63 S. W. 489; Randolph v. Keiler, 21 Mo. 557; Harness v. Green’s Admr., 19 Mo. 323; Barney v. White, 46 Mo. 139; Tootle v. Buckingham, 190 Mo. 183, 88 S. W. 619.]

The appeal is without merit, and the judgment is affirmed.

All concur.  