
    Remine v. Vance.
    •ChancebY Pbactice. Equities met and denied. No case for account. It is error to order an account, where the case is heard not by consent but upon bill and answer under the rule, the answer in response to the bill meeting and denying all the equities. There is nothing to take an account of.
    FROM GREENE.
    Appeal from Chancery Court, November Term, 1870. H. C. Smith, Ch.
    Pettibone & Robinson, for complainant:
    1st. This decree is interlocutory. It neither declares the rights of the parties, nor does it even pretend to settle the facts upon which such rights depend, nor does it dispose of the costs; and it expressly reserves all questions of law and fact until the final hearing on bill, answer’, decree pro confesso, report of master, and proof to be taken, etc. Overton v. Bigelow,. 10 Yer., 48; Allen v. Barksdale, 1 Head, 238; Delass v. Hunter, 1 Sneed, 104; Gill v. Creed, 3 Col., 297;. Meek v. Mathis, 1 Heis., 536; Abbott v. Fagg, 1 Heis,, 742.
    2d. And the decree not coming within the reservation of section 3157 of the Code, nor final, the appeal must be dismissed. Meadows v. State, 7 Col., 416; Harrison v. Farnesworth, 1 Heis., 751.
    McKee, for defendant:
    The decree in this ease from which the appeal was taken, referring the cause to the master, does not appear to have been by agreement, but upon hearing; and therefore, although by the terms of the decree, all questions are reserved until the coming in of the master’s report, yet the effect of the decree is to settle the principle involved mainly, viz: that respondent is indebted to complainant by account, as claimed in the bill, when such indebtedness is expressly denied in the answer, which is called for on oath, and the cause was heard without proof. It is therefore insisted that the decree ordering the account, is one “determining the principles involved,” in the language of the section of the Code 3157, inasmuch as the decree of reference was pronounced by the court, and not one by agreement for the purpose of expediting the progress of the cause.
    
      The answer meets and denies every material allegation of the bill, including that as to the suretyship of the note to .Hardin. True, the answer says it was executed by the parties for a debt of. respondent to Hardin; but then follows the statements that respondent sold to complainant mules. Respondent owed Hardin, and desired to pay the Hardin debt with the proceeds, and complainant assumed to pay it, but Hardin would not take complainant’s note for the debt, .unless respondent would sign it also, which was accordingly done, and the debt transferred from respondent to complainant as debtor, and complainant became the principal, and respondent the surety thereon.
    There was no proof to justify the taking of an account, and the decree ordering it was properly appealed from. See West v. Weaver, 3 Heis., 589.
   Nicholson, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause was heard on bill and answer — not by consent of parties, but under the rule that all causes stand for hearing after answer. The allegations of the bill are fully and completely met and denied in the answer. Yet the Chancellor held that it was a proper case for an account, and so ordered. This was error. As the answer was responsive to the bill, and met and denied all the equities set up, there was nothing to be referred for account. The decree is reversed, and the bill dismissed with costs.  