
    SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert HOFMANN, Secretary, Vermont Agency of Human Services, Susan Besio, Director, Office of Vermont Health Access, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-3574-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 28, 2012.
    Michael A. Duddy, Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman, Portland, Me, for Appellant.
    David R. Cassetty, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Vermont (William H. Sorrell, Attorney General; Jana M. Brown, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief), for Appellee.
    Present: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Springfield Hospital (the “Hospital”) appeals from the April 9, 2010 decision and order of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Reiss, J.) granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss; and the August 4, 2011 opinion and order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

The Hospital challenges the district court’s finding that it lacked a private cause of action under the relevant Medicaid statutes sufficient to state a claim pursuant to Section 1983. The Hospital’s Section 1983 claim rests on alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4, and related federal regulations. As the district court properly found, the Hospital’s claims are foreclosed by our decision in New York Ass’n of Homes and Servs. for the Aging, Inc. v. DeBuono, 444 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.2006) (“DeBuono”). As established by DeBuono, “health care providers have no enforceable federal rights under §§ 1396a(a)(13)(A) and 1396a(a)(30)(A).” Id. Moreover, section 1396r-4, which was not at issue in DeBuono, lacks the rights-creating language that would imply a private cause of action. See Children’s Seashore House v. Waldman, 197 F.3d 654, 659-60 (3d Cir.1999).

The Hospital also contends that the district court erred in dismissing its claims brought pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. Count V of its complaint alleges that the Defendants’ new DSH payment methodology, “is preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause.” The Hospital argues that the state’s actions taken to implement the new payment methodology fail to comply with the procedural or substantive requirements of the Medicaid Act, conflict with federal law, and are therefore preempted. However, as the district court properly found, the Hospital failed to plead that a Vermont law conflicts with a federal law, but instead pleads that the DSH rate calculation, made by a division of Vermont’s executive branch, fails to comply with federal law. The Supremacy Clause claim was properly dismissed. Moreover, the Hospital cannot maintain an action for a declaratory judgment without an underlying federal cause of action. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 731 (2d Cir.1993) (no independent cause of action grounded in the Declaratory Judgment Act). A prayer for relief, standing alone, simply does not satisfy the requirement that a case or controversy exist. Id. at 731; see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Karp, 108 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir.1997).

We have examined the remainder of the hospital’s arguments and find them to be without merit. While we are not unsympathetic to the Hospital’s lack of a remedy, we are bound by the law Congress creates, as well as our own precedent.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.  