
    Kincannon vs. Carroll, Gov. &c.
    The condition of a bond was,“that the sheriff and collector should well and faithfully pay the taxes, &c. on or before the 1st of January, 1833.” By law, the condition ought to have been to pay the taxes on or before the 1st of the preceding December: Held, that the condition of the bond was valid, and authorized a judgment .on motion ¿against the-sheriff and his sureties.
    Although the condition of ahondmay not "be so extensive as the act of assembly authorizes, it is nevertheless good as far as an obligation is created, and to that extent •a. judgment may be rendered. -
    ‘Where a*“word’Ms omitted in the condition of a bond,'without which, the condition ‘is insensible, if it appear from other parts of the bond, what the meaning of the .parties was, the court will supply or add the word to the condition.
    The law required the condition of a shenfTs bond for the payment of the taxes, to he made payable to the treasurer of the district wherein the sheriff resided. The bond ‘in this case, recited that A, the party bound was elected sheriff and collector of Lincoln county; the condition of the bond was, “that the taxes should be paid to the treasurer iofthe district of Tennessee.” Lincoln county is in the district of West Tennessee: Held, that the court could supply the word “West,” so as to malte the condition read payable to the treasurer of the district of West Tennessee, .
    This writ of error is prosecuted from a judgment rendered on motion, in Davidson circuit court, agáinst A. A. Kincan-non, as sheriff and collector for Lincoln' county, and the -other plaintiffs m error, as his securities. The bond recited, that Kincannon was elected sheriff -and collector of Lincoln -county. The condition of the hond, ,as recited in the judgment is, that “the above hound A. A. Kincannon shall well and truly and faithfully pay to the treasurer of the district of Tennessee, all taxes by him collected, or which ought to be collected on .or before the 1st of January, 1833, and the 1st of January, 1834, then the obligation to be void, else to remain in full force and effect.”
    
      T- Washington, for plaintiff in error,
    1st. The bond given in this case was not such as is directed by statute. The act of 1801, c. 12, § 1, requires, that the bond to be given shall be “conditioned for the payment of all public and county taxes that may become due during the time such person shall be appointed.” The condition of the bond in this case is, “that he shall well, and truly and faithfully pay over to the treasurer, for the district of Tennessee, an taxes by him collected, or which ought to be collected, ° ' or before the 1st of January, 1833, and on the 1st of ^ January, 1834.”
    The condition of this bond, and that required by statute, is wholly different; and not being taken conformably to the statute, no motion will be upon it, as has often been determined by this court. Vide 4 Yerger’s Rep., Sumner vs. Henry, 163.
    2nd. The condition of the bond is, that payment of the taxes collected shall be made to the “treasurer of the district of Tennessee.” There is no such officer known to the law, nor any such person in rerum natura; the bond is therefore wholly void. Vide acts of 1796, c. 6, § 1; 1813, c. 26, § 1; 1827, c. 12, § 1 and 2.
    3rd. It does not appear that the county court of Lincoln ever directed in what penalty the said bond should be executed, (See act of 1801, c. 12, § 1.) It does not appear that said bond was ever acknowledged before, or accepted by. the court, and for aught that appeal’s to the contrary, • it may have been executed in a penalty, less than the court would have been satisfied with, and may have gotten into the files very, irregularly, in order to prevent the court from passing forinally upon it.
    4th. It does not appear that A. A. Kincannon had ever been, commissioned by the governor. See Constitution of Tennessee, art. .6, § 1: act of 1779, c. 5, § 1.
    
      George S'. Yerger, (Atto. Gen.) for defendant in error.
    The condition of this bond requires the sheriff to pay the taxes to the “treasurer of the district of Tennessee,” and it is urged, that as there is no such officer known to the law, the bond, being a statutable bond, is void, and no recovery can be had on it by motion or otherwise.
    The act of 1803 repeals the act of 1801, and required the bond to be made payable to the treasurer of the district in which the sheriff resides. The intention of the parties was to make it payable to the treasurer of the district of West Tennessee, that being the district in which the plaintiff in error resided, and this intention is manifest from the bond itself. It recites that he was elected sheriff of Lincoln county, and the court . . , T • 1 . J ’ . is bound to notice, that Lincoln county is in the district J ‘ . . ' . West Tennessee. It is evident, therefore, that in drawing the condition, the word “West” was omitted by mistake; add this word and the condition is sensible — it will then make the taxes payable to the “treasurer of the district of West Tennessee,”
    In construing the condition of a bond,- if a word is left out, without which the condition would be insensible or repugnant, the court may supply the word, if the recitals, or .any other part of the instrument shows what the parties intended. 4 Hay. Rep. 258-9: 15 En. Com. Law Rep. 300. In the latter case, the word “pounds” was omitted, but the court supplied it, in order to give the instrument a sensible meaning, such being the meaning of the parties, as evidenced by other parts of the instrument.
    Again,- if the bond were merely conditioned, “that he should pay the taxes,” it would be good, because the law points out the person to whom they are to be paid, therefore, the words, “to the treasurer of the district of Tennessee” may be stricken out, or rejected, as surplusage, and still the bond be good. 7 Bingh. Rep. 423.
    ■ It is objected, that this judgment does not recite or show that Kincannoü was sheriff, or that the bond was acknowledged or recorded, and that the court had no proof of its execution, or that he was commissioned as sheriff.
    The judgment must only state such facts as show the court has jurisdiction.- JiPCarrol vs. Weeks, 2 Tenn. Rep. 215: Hamilton-vs. Burem, -3 Yerg, Rep. 355.
    The law does not require that the facts or evidence, upon which the court acted, should be recited in the judgment. Hamilton vs. Burem, 3 Yerg. Rep. 355: Finch vs. Ferrell, 8 Yerg. Rep. 432.
   ■Green, 3.

delivered the opinion of the court.

Two questions are raised upon this condition. 1. It is insisted that as -the act 1803, c. 3, § 14, prescribes, that the bond shall be conditioned to pay the taxes to -the treasurer, on or before the first day in December in each year, and as the bond in this case is conditioned to pay on or before the 1st day of January, it is not a statutory bond, and no judgment by motion can be rendered. The difference between the bond which was executed, and that directed by the act of assembly to be taken, is in favor of the obligors, as it gives the sheriff one month longer, within which to pay the taxes. The court has constantly held, in relation to appeal and certiorari bonds, that although the condition might not be so extensive, as the act of assembly authorized, it was nevertheless good, as far as an obligation was created, and that to that extent a judgment might be rendered. The principle of these cases applies here. Although the collector is not required to pay the taxes so early by a month as the law authorizes, yet as the delay was beneficial to him, the bond was good to compel him to pay, at the time specified in it. In addition to this it may be remarked, that as by the fifteenth section of the same act, the collector is required to pay the taxes to the treasurer, by the last day of December; no proceeding can be had against him for non-payment. The bond, though in form as directed in the preceding section, is made payable the first day of December, yet it is not, in fact, payable till the last day of that month, so that the condition of the bond, in this case, corresponds with the obligation created by law

2nd. It is insisted, that as the law requires the bond to be conditioned for the payment of the taxes to the treasurer of the district, where the said sheriff resides, and in this bond he undertakes to pay to the treasurer of the district of Tennessee, and as there is no such officer, there is no obligation created to pay one, and therefore no recovery can be had.

This sheriff resided in Lincoln county, within the district of the treasurer of West Tennessee, and the taxes should have been made payable to the treasurer of the district of West Tennessee. To have specified the place where payable, with critical accuracy, would only have required the insertion of the word “West,” before the word Tennessee. This was manifestly intended by the parties. They live in West Tennessee. The law requires this sheriff to pay tq the treasurer of West Tennessee, and except the amission of" the word “West,” they use all the words necessary to show a strict compliance With the law. The words used are insensible, if we are not permitted to supply the word “West;” but supplying that word, they are sensible, and are the precise words the law required should be used. This being the case, may not the word be supplied? We think it may. In the case of Coles vs. Hulme, 15 Com. Law Rep. 295, a suit was brought upon a penal bond, the pen-altybeing described as “seven thousand seven hundred,” without any species of money being mentioned. It however appeared from the recitals in the condition, that various sums expressed in pounds, were agreed to be paid, and hence it was apparent, that the parties intended to express the penalty also in' pounds, and therefore, the court said, that in furtherance of the intention of the parties the word “pounds” might be supplied. This case is full to the point, and so reasonable in itself, that we fully concur in its principle. But if.the words, “district of Tennessee” were rejected, so that it would read, “pay to the treasurer,” without specifying to which treasurer, the law would have directed the sheriff, and would have made it obligatory on him to pay to the treasurer of West Tennessee.

Judgment affirmed.  