
    Ana URSU, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-1239.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: Aug. 24, 2012.
    Decided: Aug. 29, 2012.
    Michael Alexei, Law Office of Michael Alexei, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Holly M. Smith, Senior Litigation Counsel, Joseph D. Hardy, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
   Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ana Ursu, a native and citizen of Moldova, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing her appeal from the immigration judge’s order denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal and withholding under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2006). The INA defines a refugee as a person unwilling or unable to return to her native country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). “Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one of the enumerated grounds.... ” Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In order to qualify for relief, an applicant must show that her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was, or will be, at least one central reason for the persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(i) (2006); Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir.2009). Specifically, an alien must show that a protected ground is a central reason for the feared persecution and not an “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate” reason. Id. at 164.

An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2012), and can establish refugee status based on past persecution in her native country on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2012). “An applicant who demonstrates that [s]he was the subject of past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.2004).

Without regard to past persecution, an alien can establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected ground. Id. at 187. The well-founded fear standard contains both a subjective and an objective component. The objective element requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution. Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir.2006). “The subjective component can be met through the presentation of candid, credible, and sincere testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution.... [It] must have some basis in the reality of the circumstances and be validated with specific, concrete facts ... and it cannot be mere irrational apprehension.” Qiao Hua Li, 405 F.3d at 176 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). Administrative findings of fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA and any attendant regulations.” Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir.2008). This court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence, presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n. 14 (4th Cir.2002).

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that Ursu did not establish that she was targeted on account of á protected ground. The record falls short of compelling this court to find that Ursu qualifies for asylum or withholding of removal. We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that Ursu failed to show that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured if returned to Moldova in order to qualify for CAT protection. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2012).

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED.  