
    Gad Humphry, Plaintiff in Error, versus Thomas B. Strong.
    A demand annexed to a rule of reference under the statute of 1786, c. 21, is sufficiently made, if in the hand-writing of the party making it, as, “ A B demands,” &c., without being subscribed by him. And it is competent for the Court of Common Pleas to receive evidence that it is in the hand-writing of the party.
    This writ of error was brought to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Common Pleas for this county, rendered upon the report of referees appointed under the statute of 1786, c. 21.
    The referees made their report to the Common 'Pleas, June term, 1817, awarding tw7enty-five dollars to the said Strong. The said 
      Humphry objected to the acceptance of the report, because the demand annexed to the rule was not signed by Strong.' The demand annexed to the rule was thus:—“ Thomas B. Strong claims damages of Major Gad Humphry, two hundred dollars, for trespass committed by his dog in killing his sheep,” &c.
    The record of the Common Pleas states that,after hearing tire parties, it appearing to the court here that the demand annexed is in the hand-writing of the said Thomas B. Strong, it is ordered that the said report be accepted, and judgment entered accordingly. It is therefore considered,” &c.
    * The errors assigned, besides the general error, are, — 1. That the demand annexed to the rule of reference was not signed by the said Strong; and, 2. That the Court of Common Pleas undertook to try and determine this matter of fact, viz., that the demand annexed was in the hand-writing of the said Strong. '
    
    
      Jarvis, for the plaintiff,
    observed that the provisions of the statute, on which the original proceedings in this case were founded, were in derogation of the common law, and should not be extended beyond the natural and common force and understanding of the expressions made use of by the legislature.
    The statute requires that the person making the demand shall make out a particular statement thereof under his hand. Now, the common acceptation of this expression is a subscription of the person’s name written by himself. This, too, is the construction which this Court have put upon the words, as used in this statute, in the case of Mansfield in Error vs. Doughty. 
      
    
    The Court of Common Pleas had no authority to adjudicate on the matter of fact, whether the demand was in the hand-writing of the party making it. The referees could not amend the submission, and give themselves jurisdiction, before making their report; nor could the court alter the report after it was made. They could only see that the demand was not properly subscribed, and they were then bound to reject the report, as made without authority, and of course giving them no jurisdiction in the case.
    
      Hubbard, for the defendant in error.
    
      
       3 Mass. Rep. 398.
    
   Per Curiam.

The demand annexed was m the hand-writing of the party claiming it, and the name was written by himself, although not subscribed to the demand. We think this a sufficient compliance with the statute, which does not require subscribing; and if it did, it would be too close a construction, to reject this demand, actually made out by the party himself, in his own hand-writing

The case of Mansfield vs. Doughty is not like this; for in that case it does not appear that * the party’s name was used at all, or that the demand was in his handwriting. For aught that appears, it might, have been a mere copy of an account.

We think, also, that .the Court of Common Pleas did right in receiving evidence that the demand annexed to the rule was in the hand-writing of the party making it. Had it been subscribed, it might have been necessary to prove the hand-writing; and if it womd nave been proper in that case, it was equally proper in this.

Judgment affirmed.  