
    
      John W. Motte vs. David Aiken.
    
    1. Defendant, at Sheriff’s sale, purchased a horse, as the property of plaintiff’s father, the horse being claimed by the plaintiff under a parol gift from the father about seven years before the trial. Plaintiff and his father lived together, the latter having as much the possession of the horse after as before the gift. Held, on a suit for the value of the horse, that since the Act of 1832, (6 Stat. 483) plaintiff could not recover on such a case against a purchaser under an execution, for a debt contracted since the gift, as was the case.
    
      Before O’Neall, J. at Fairfield, Fall Term, 1843.
    This was a summary process to recover the value of a horse, purchased by the defendant at Sheriff’s sale, as the property of the plaintiff’s father.
    
      The plaintiff relied upon a parol gift of the horse by his father to him, about seven years before the trial.
    The proof was, that the plaintiff and his father lived together, and that his father, after the gift, had as much possession of the horse, as he had before.
    The presiding Judge said to the plaintiff’s counsel, that since the Act of 1832, he could not recover on such a case, against a purchaser under an execution, for a debt contracted since the gift, as was the case here.
    For that Act declares that, “ no parol gift of any chattel shall be valid against subsequent creditors or purchaser, or mortgagees, except when the donee shall be separate and apart from the donor, and actual possession shall, at the time of the gift, be delivered to, and remain and continue in, the donee, his or her executors, administrators or assigns.” (6 Stat. 482.)
    The plaintiff submitted to a non-suit, and now moves to set it aside on the following grounds.
    1. Because, it having been proven that the plaintiff had seven year’s possession of the chattel sued for, he was entitled to recover.
    2. Because seven years possession of the chattel of itself, gave a perfect title to the plaintiff.
    3. The only object of the Act of 1832, was to give notice, that the possession in this case having been public and notorious for so many years, dispensed with the necessity of the gift being originally in writing and recorded.
    4. That the only object of the Act of 1832, was to give notice to subsequent purchasers or creditors, that in this case, the defendant, having express notice at the time he purchased, that he purchased the property of the plaintiff, he cannot desire any protection from the Act of 1832.
    Boyce, for the motion.
    McDowell, contra.
   Ouria, per

Q’Neall, J.

This case was a summary process to recover the value of a horse, purchased by the defendant at Sheriff’s sale, as the property of the plaintiff’s father.

The plaintiff relied upon a parol gift of the horse by his father to him about seven years before the trial. The proof was, that the plaintiff and his father lived together, and that his father, after the gift, had as much possession of the horse as he had before.

I said to the plaintiff's counsel, that since the Act of 1832, he could not recover on such a case against a purchaser, under an execution for a debt contracted since the gift, as was the case here.

For that Act declares that, “no parol gift of any chattel shall be valid against subsequent creditors or purchasers or mortgagees, except when the donee shall be separate and apart from the donor, and actual possession shall, at the time of the gift, be delivered to and remain and continue in the donee, his or her executors, administrators or assigns.” (6 Stat. 482.)

The plaintiff submitted to a non-suit, and now moves to set it aside, on the grounds stated within.

This court concurs in the view of this case taken by the Judge below. The motion is dismissed.

Richardson, Evans, Butlr and Wardlaw, JJ. concurred.  