
    W. and D. H. Daviess et al., Plaintiffs in error, v. John H. Fairbairn et al., Heirs of Mary E. Fairbairn, deceased, Defendants in error.
    In affirmative statutes, ?uch parts of the prior as may he incorporated into the subsequent statute, as consistent with'-it.musi be Considered in force. '
    If a subsequent statute be not repugnant fn all its provisions to a-prior one, yet if the later statute, clearly intended to prescribe the ohly 'rules which should . govern, it repeals the pripr one., .
    Under the 'application of these rules, the law of Virginia, passed in. 1776, ■ authorizing the mayor of a city to take the acknowledgment of a feme covert 'to a deed, is'not repealed by the act of 1785, or that of 179t>.
    This .case was brought up by writ of error from.the Circuit Court of the United States for.the district of Kentucky.
    It'was-an ejectment brought, by the. heirs-of Mary E. Fairbairn, to recover a 'hajf-acre lot in the city of Louisville, designated on the old plan as number 22, and on the néw plan as number 31.
    There were many questions in the case,- but as the opinion of the court turned upon a single - point, it is not necessary to state any except that one.
    On the 12th of Marc i, 1811, Mary E. Fairbairn,' being the wife of Thomas H. Fairbairn, and .the owner of the lot in controversy* subject to the dower interest of her mother,. united withher husband and mother in executing a deed for. the premises. She then resided in the city of Baltimore. It was alleged by her children and heirs that this deed was incompetent to pass her interest, being improperly executed,.
    They therefore brought an ejectment to recover it.
    The deed was as follows;
    “This indenture, made this 12th .day of March, intheyearof our Lord' 1811, between" 'Elizabeth Henry, Thomas H. Fairb'airn and Maria his wife, (daughter and heiress of Daniel Henry, deceased,) of' the city of Baltimore, in the state of-Maryland, of the one part; and Dr. Richard Ferguson, of the town of Louisville, in the county of Jefferson and state of Kentucky, of the other part, witnesseth: that the said'Elizabeth Henry, and Thomas H. Fairbairn and Mania fiis wife, for and in consideration of the sum of eight hundred- dollars, .current money of the United- States of America, to the said Thomas H. Fairbairn'.in hand paid, at and before the execution of these -presents, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the said Elizabeth Henry, as tenant in dower, hath aliened, released* and cbiJirmed, and by these presents dpth alien,-release, and confirm-; and the said ThomasH. Fairbairn-as ténant by the curtesy, and the said Maria'his wife, as tenant in fee-simple, have granted, bargained, sold, conveyed, released, and confirmed, and by these presents doth grant, bargain, sell, release, convey, and confirm, unto the said Richard Ferguson, his heirs and assigns, for ever, a certain lot of land, with all tfie appurtenances, situate, lying., and being, in the town of Louisville aforesaid, and known on the plan or map thereof by.the number ninety-one^ (93,).containing half an acre, be the same more or less, on Main street, adjoining the north-wardly side of -.the half-acre lot whereon the said Ferguson now lives, and between the same and Main street: to have and to hold the said half-acre lot number ninéty-one, with all the appurtenances, unto the said'Richard Ferguson, his heirs and assigns, to his' and their only proper.use and behoof for ever. And the said Thomas. H. Fairbairn and Maria his wife do covenant and agree, to and with the said Richard Ferguson, and his heirs and assigns, that they, the said Thomas arid Maria, will, and their heirs, executors, and administrators, shall, warrant and for ever defend the said lot of land num-. bered nirfety-one, with al the appurténances, unto the said Richard Ferguson,-, his heirs. and. assigns, against all and every person or persons whatsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same.
    “ In witness whereof, the said Elizabeth Henry, Thomas H. Fair-bairn, and Maria his wife, have hereto set their hands', and seals, on the day and yfear first written.
    Elizabeth Henry, [l. s.'
    Thomas H. Fairbairn, [l. s.
    Maria Eliza Fairbairn. "l. s.
    
    
      u ¡Signed, sealed, and delivéred, in presence of—
    Edw’d Johnston,
    Jno.' Hargrove,
    Henry Payson,
    Cuth. Bullitt,
    Thomas Lester.”
    “Baltim .e county, state of Maryland, set.:
    “ Be it known and remembered, that on this 12th day of March, 1811, Elizabeth Henry, and Thomas H. Fairbairn and Maria his wife, parties to the within and foregoing deed óf conveyance to Dr. Richard Ferguson, come in their proper person before me, Edward Johnston, mayor of the city of Baltimore, in the state aforesaid, and signed, sealed and delivered said deed of conveyance; as and for their voluntary act and deed; and the said Maria,.being privately examined by me out of the presence and-hearing of her said husband; did, of-her own free will arid consent j again consent to and acknowledge the said deed of conveyance as and for her, act and deed, the same being shown and explained to her; and also relinquished and released all her right, title, .interest, and estate, and fee. of, in, and to the lot of land.number 91, with ajl.the appurtenances by the sáid deéd conveyed, or intended to'he conveyed, j- , “ In testimony whdfeof, I have hereto set my hand, and L1, caused the corporate seal of the city of Baltimore to be hereunto affixed, the; dáy and year above written.
    “ Edw’d Johnston; mayor of the city of Baltimore.”' -
    
      Upon the trial in the court below, the following instructions were given with reference to this deed.
    “ And in substitution of a number of instructions moved by the plaintiff, the court gave tb the jury these instructions.
    
      “ Instead of the plaintiff’s;instruction No. 1, the court instructed the jury, that the deed of conveyance by'Thomas H. Fairbaim, &c., of 12th March, 1811, to tire defendant Dr. Richard Ferguson, whereof, a copy was read in evidence by the plaintiff, was' not in law the deed of the feme covert Maria E. Fairbairn, is not her deed of conveyance' for any purpose whatever, and passed from her to Dr.. Ferguson no estate whatever in the lot of land in controversy.”
    The bill of exceptions brought up this instruction, amongst others.
    The question was, whether ■ the mayor of the city of Baltimore had a right to take' the' acknowledgment.
    The act of Virginia, passed in 1776, which had been adopted by Kentucky, (4 Littell’s Laws of Kentucky, 432,) allowed the mayor of a city to take an acknowledgment, where the grantor-resided out of Virginia.
    Two acts were afterwards passed by Virginia, one in 1785 and the other in 1796, prescribing other modes of taking acknowledgments in such cases, and the question- was, whether 'these acts repealed that of 1776. The provisions of these acts are quoted in the opinion of the court, and need not be repeated.
    Crittenden, for the plaintiffs in error.
    Loughborough, for the defendants in error.
    • Crittenden, for the plaintiffs in error, referred first to the act of Virginia passed in 1748, (4 Littell, 423; 1 Statute Laws of Kentucky, 42.9,) and then to the súccéeding acts.' The act df 1785 was thought to repeal that of 1776, but there was no repealing clause in it, and the courts of Kentucky construe them'to be in pari materia» The laws of Virginia successively enlarged the means of conveyance. The title of the act of T796 was “ to enable,” &c. The rule is, that repugnancy, in statutes -must be clear and undeniable, .before courts will assume it to éxist. Dwarris on Staff 638, .699, 717,718, 726,734. ' . •
    And again, where a statute is remedial and enlarging,, it will not be held to control the operation of a previous one. The general character of these statutes is enabling. The act of. 1776 allows femes covert to go before a mayor; that of' 1785 to appear in court and acknowledge a deed. ■ Where is the inconsistency hetween the. two? If the latter is a repeal of the former, we "have never found it out in. Kentucky; There are more conveyances of land there than in any other state, and much land is owned by non-residents. Up to 1827, the doctrine now contended for was never heard of. The first time that the question was raised was in the case of Hynes and Campbell, 6 Monroe, 286, much relied on by the other side. But there was no question in that -case about a feme covert. A deed was set aside because justices, did not certify that it was subscribed before them. The court say that the act of 1785 repeals that, of 1776 as to justices. But then the. provisions of the two laws are inconsistent with each other in this respect. In Miller v. Hehshaw, 4 Dana; 327, the point is not décided. There are some loose-dicta, but although- the decisions of state courts upon state laws are binding upon ibis court, dicta of judges are Hot. In Taylor-®. Shields, 5 Littell, 295, the'court held that a subsequent statute -requiring deeds to be recorded in eight months, did not repeal a prior one allowing eighteen months.' 6 Monroe, 186, refers to the preceding case. ■ The act of 1796 contains a general repealing clause, (1 Littell, 508, 509,) repealing all that is inconsistent with the acts therein recited and' continued. But affirmative subsequent statutes are not held to.be inconsistent with prior ones. 6 Co. Rep..part 11, p. 54.
    The Digest sanctioned by the judges of the court , of appeals contains this act of 1776.
    Loughborough, for defendants-in error.
    The first opinion of the court pronounced on -the trial was, that the .deed-of March 12, 1811, was-ineffectual as to the wife of T. H. Fairbairn, and that her title to the lot did not pass thereby.
    The act of Virginia of 1748 respecting conveyances provided for cases of conveyances by^persons residing in the state. It will be found in 4 Littell, 423, (l'Statute Law's of Kentucky, 429.)
    . By the act'of 1785, (1 .-Statute Laws,-432,) husband and wife residing in another state were enabled to'convey, the dower or inheritance. of the wife within the commonwealth by the acknowledgment of the deed, and. the privy examination of the wife before two justices of peace of the, county of the-wife’s residence,-to be empowered by a 'commission for that púrpose from the' court in which the deed should be recorded.
    By an a t of 1792, (1 Littell, .152,1 Statute Laws, 434,) the acknowledgment and subscriptidh of the deed before.two justices of-the peace, though not empowered by commission, and their certificate of the privy examination of the wife, upon being recorded in diie time, shall be effectual to pass the wife’s right of dower. '
    - ^ In T795, shortly after Kentucky .became á state, its legislature considering the .complexity and uncertainty of the- statute laws in force, provided .by.act of December 17, (1 Littell, 293,) for a revision thereof,, fcr a .selection of such as ought to be ..continued in force, - and for a reduction of all of those relating to the same subject into one act.
    Revisors were accordingly, appointed, and discharged their duty. ■ The results of their labours may be seen in various important acts passed in 1796, in ihe first volume of Littell’s Laws. • Having enacted them, the legislature, by an act of the' 19th December, 1796, provided that they should take éffect on the 1st day of January, 1797, and that so much of any act or .acts as came within the purview of the said acts should be repealed from and after that day. 1 Littell’s Laws, 508, 509.
    One of these revised ¡statutes was the act to reduce into one the several acts for regulating conveyances, 1 Littell', 567, (1 Statute ■ Law, 437.) It provides specially (section 4) fon the conveyance by husband and wife, living in another state-, of the wife’s land in Kentucky. The .mode prescribed is the acknowledgment of the deed, and the privy examination .of th.e wife before two justices .of the peace of the county of her residence, to ,be commissioned for that purpose. This act also embraces the provisions of the act of 1792, respecting the transfer of the wife’s dower, in its 6th, 7th, and 8th sections.
    It was the law in force at the date of the deed to Ferguson.
    In Elliott- v. Piersoll, 1 Petérs, 338, this court held that in Kentucky the capacity of a feme covert to convey her land, is the creature of the statute law, and that to make her deed effectual, the forms and solemnities provided by that law must be observed. This is the received doctrine, in the courts of Kentucky. It is_ held, there, that the deed of a. feme co.vert to convey her inheritance, or even her dower, must not only be executed in the mode, and with the solemnities required by th.e statute laws, Phillips et ux. 'v. Green, 3 Marshall, 12; Steele v. Lewisj 1 Monroe, 49; Roberts’ heirs v. Elliott’s heirs, 3 Monroe, 397; Smith v. White, 1 B. Monroe,. 19: but it miist be actually recorded, together with the certificate of her privy examination, not merely lodged in the proper office for record, Whitaker v. Blair, 3 J. J. Marshall, 241; Tomlin v. McChord’s Reps., 5 J. J. Marshall, 336; and that, too, within the time fixed by the statute, .otherwise it is vo“id. Prewitt v. Graves, 5 J. J. Marshall, 124; Applegate i). Gr’acey, 9 Dana, -215. And to authorize, its recordation it must be authenticated in the mode proscribed, and by the officer^ appointed, for that purpose. Hunt v. O'wings, &c., 4 Monroe, 21 -; McConnell v. Brown, Litt. Sel. Cases, 464; Wo-mack v. Hughes, Ibid: 292. And if, in fact, placed on the record without being so authenticated, it is still regarded as an unrecorded instrument — cases last cited.
    ’ These cases show the strictness with which the statutes of Kentucky, authorizing married women to part with their titles, have been construed by its courts; and the care they have exhibited in the protection, of the rights of such persons and their heirs.
    In this case, though the deed to Ferguson was in fact recorded, it was not upon, its authentication, as regarded the feme covert, properly admitted upon the records. As to her it is an unrecorded deed.
    The Mayor of Baltimore -was not' authorized to take her acknowledgment, and to make and certify á privy examination.
    . it was contended, in the Circuit Court that he derived authority to perform these acts from a statute of Virginia of 1776, (4 Littell, 432.)
    
    The' answer to this is, 1st. That this act was impliedly repealed by the act of 1785. .
    This act of 1785 occupied the same ground, and so far as' regards conveyances of real estate, contemplates and provides for the same case. It was decided by the Court'of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Hynes v. Campbell, 6 Monroe, .289, that this act virtually, yet effectually, repealed that of 1776.
    ■ 2d. When the legislature passed the act of 1796, it was obvious- . ly intended that all the provisions of existing statutes on the subject of conveyances should be thereby superseded. Its history and title make this manifest. It was a codification of all the laws which it was. intended should remain in force. Its first sections are the same as those of the act of-1785. Those succeeding, are the provisions of . the act of 1792. The old act of 1776 was wholly dropped. Other modes than those of that act being adopted for the conveyance of land by non-residents.
    Without a clause of repeal, it would seem that after the act of 1796, that of 1776 was not in force. To hold otherwise would imply the folly on the part of the legislature in the effort to. render simple and condense into one law all acts on the subject, to have retained two acts on the same subject by which the same tiling could be done in different modes — or would be to deny 16 the legislature the .power to simplify and reduce into one the laws of conveyances, since there can be no' doubt that was its intention. -
    But having adopted the codes, so to call them, of the revisors, the legislature, by a separate act, passed .on thé saíne d&y, (1 Littell, 508,) as if to leave no doubt upon this subject, expressly repealed all former acts coming within the purview of these statutes.
    Can it be said that the act of 1776, so far as it regarded conveyances of real, estates, by non-resident husbands and wives, is not within the nurview of the act of 1796 ?
    As to what subsequent statutes annul prior- ones, see 1 Pickering, 45; 12 Mass. Rep. 563; 5 Pickering, 169. The case of Taylor «, Shields ought to have no weight upon this point. There must have been an error in copying the word “ eight” instead of “ eighteen.”. The last' syllable must have béen left out by 'mistake, for rio good reason can be given" for allowing the people of the state eighteen months to record their deeds, and restricting non-residents to eight.
    It is admitted by the other side that the act of 1796 -repeals the prior statute' as to" justices of the peace, because it makes provision for them; but it is argued that the authority of a mayor was permit-ted to remain, because no n ice is taken of him in the -.ict. But both laws'are equally .applicable to justices. What good reason, then, can- be given for the distinction ?
    This case does not rest on an implied repeal only; we say that 'there was an express repeal. The revisors were .to collect what was proper to be 'retained, and omit What ought to be left out. ' The title of the act of. 1796 was “ to reduce into one,” &c. One branch of the laws reported on by the revisors related to county courts, and upon this subject they made an entirely new code. We say that the same purpose was intended with regard .to the deeds of femes covert. Additional guards were thrown around them for protection. They were required to go into a court, or beforé ¡commissioners. If the legislature had repealed the whole act of 1776, by name, they would have gone further than they wished, because they intended all such parts of it as related to personal property to -remain in force. We must find out the intention of the legislature by looking at the evils which existed before the passage of the law, tiie circumstances of the case, &c. 6 Dane’s Abr. 595; 9 Peters, 317’; 3 Wheaton, 610.
    It is said, in 6 Dáñe, 595, that where the legislature intends a revision, it amounts to a repeal of prior laws.
    In 1he act of 1796, clerks are directed to record papers “ acknow- ■ ledged as before prescribed,” which shows that the legislature intended to make a new rule.
    
      Crittenden, in reply and conclusion.
    The deed is admitted1 by the other side to be good, if the statute of 1776 is. not repealed. The burden of proof is on him, therefore, to show that it has been, so; and it has been attempted to be shown,
    1. From its being inconsistent with the act of 1785.
    2. From its inconsistency with 1796
    3. From an express repeal by 1796.
    The fact that the act of 1796 is the-work of revisors, cannot affect the construction of iti • There is no rule like this laid down by the elementary writers. It is only, after all, a revised statute. Every act of a legislature implies á revision of all former laws; and is the construction of it to be varied, because A. B. prepared it? A part of the duty of revisors is to say: what statutes shall be repealed. If they thought that the act of 1776 ought to have been repealed, why did they not say so? ‘ A revised act is-cumulative, 11 Leigh, first’ case in the volume; What part of the act of 17.85 repeals that of 17.76? By-174 8 deeds must be acknowledged before the General Court, or a,County Court, in Virginia. ■ By,1776 a feme co.vert may. go before a mayor, and by. 1785 she may go before any court of record, or two justice's appointed by a commission. But these might all be put into one statute, and not be inconsistent with each ■ other. How can the circumstance’that-they are in different statutes vary the result? Statutes in pari materia must be construed together. _
    _ In 5 Pickering, a higher penalty was imposed than had’ been imposed by a preceding law. Here there was a direct conflict. But in the case in'Foster, where <£20^ per month, and 12d. per Sunday, were inflicted for not going to chQrch, both penalties could be levied. The multiplication of the means of acknowledging deeds was 'only a facility afforded to women.
    If the act of 1785 did not repeat that of 1776, the act.of 1796 did not, because it is almost an exact transcript of former laws. The designation of one person to do any given thing, does not exclude the right of another to do the same thing. It is said that the legislature intended to protect women, but Mrs. Fairbairn never denied or questioned the validity of her deed, as long as shé lived,
   Mr. Justice McLEAN

delivered the opinion ot the court.

This case is brought here by a writ of error to the Circuit Court for the district of Kentucky.

The lessors of the plaintiff brought an action of .ejectment, to recover a half-acre lot in the city of Louisville, numbered on the new plan of the city ninety-one. Richard Ferguson, Daviess, and others, were made defendants. The jury found the defendants guilty, and a judgment was entered against them. - On the trial, exceptions were taken to various rulings of the court, only one of which it is material to consider.

The court instructed the jury, “ that the deed of. conveyance, by Thomas H. Fairbairn and wife, of the 12th of March, 1811, to the-defendant, Dr. Richard Fergusbn, whereof a copy was read in evidence by the plaintiffs, was not, in law, the deed.of the feme covert-, Maria E; Fairbairn; is not her deed of conveyance for any purpose whatever; and passed from her to Dr. Ferguson no estate whatever in the lot of land in controversy.”

The plaintiffs below claimed as heirs at law of Maria E. Fairbairn: The fairness of the purchase of the lot by Ferguson was not controverted, nor that he paid for it an adequate consideration. The lot having descended to Maria E. Fairbairn, and' her husband being dead, her heirs claim the property, on the ground that the acknowledgment of the deed by their mother, she being a feme covert, was defective. -And so the court ruled in the above instruction.

The deed was acknowledged on the 12th of March, 1811; the day it bears date, by Elizabeth Henry, who signed it, and who had a dower interest in the lot, and.by Fairbairn and wife; the latter being examined separate and apart from her husband, in due form, before ■the mayor of Baltimore, who. affixed his certificate and the seal of the corporation to the acknowledgment. ■

On the 20th of May, 1811, Warden Pope, .clerk of the County Court of Je'fferson, in which Louisville is situated, certified that the '.deed_was received in his office; and it being duly certified and authenticated;' he recorded the same.

By the Virginia act of 1776, adopted by Kentucky, 4 Litt. Laws of Kentucky, 432, entitled “ An act to enable persons living in other countries to dispose of foeirestates in this commonwealth, with more ease and convenience,” it was provided “ that a person residing in any other county, for passing any lands and tenements in this commonwealth, by deed, shall acknowledge or prove the same before” the mayor or: other chief magistrate of the city, town, or corporation, wherein or near to which he resides. But where there was' no mayor or other chief magistrate within the county, then a certificate, under the hands and seals of two justices or magistrates of the county, that such-proof or acknowledgment.has been made before them,is sufficient. ''Without an acknowledgment, the fee did not pas§ under this statute. And “where any person making such conveyance shall be a feme covert, her interest in any lands or tenements shall not pass thereby, unless she shall personally acknowledge the same before such mayor or other chief magistrate, or before two justices or magistrates, as aforesaid.” A privy examination is required, and the same being certified, the deed may be recorded in the county where the land lies. And such deed shall be effectual to pass all the interest of the feme covert.

The acknowledgment of the deed under consideration, in all re— 'spects, conforms to the requirements of the above act; and the important question is, whether, at the time of the acknowledgment, the act was in force ? If the act had not been repealed, the deed is unquestionably valid.

The plaintiffs in error contend that the above statute was repealed by the act of 1785, and also of 1796. The act of 1785 is entitled “An act for regulating conveyances,” in the 1st section of which it is provided, “that no estate of inheritance, or freehold, or for a term of more than five years, in lands or tenements, shall be conveyed from one-bo another, unless, the conveyance be declared by writing, sealed and delivered; nor shall such conveyance be good against a purchaser for valuable consideration, not having-notice thereof, unless acknowledged or proved before the General -Court, or before the court of the- county, city, or corporation, in which foe land is conveyed, or in the manner hereinafter directed,” &c.

“When husband and wife-shall have sealed and delivered a waiting, purporting to be a conveyance of any estate or interest, if she appear in court, and being .examined privily and apart' from her . husband, by one of foe judges thereof, &e.; or. if beforé two justices of foe peace, of that county in which she dwells, who may be em-. powered by commission, to be issued by the ‘ clerk of the court. wherein the writing ought to be recorded,” &c., shall be sufficient to convey her éstate.

In this act there is no express repeal of the-act of 1776, consequently that act can only be-repealed in so far as it may be repugnant to the subsequent act. They are both affirmative statutes, and such parts of the prior statute.'as may be. incorporated into foe subsequent one, as consistent with it, must be considered in force. This is a settled rule of construction, and applies, with peculiar force,.to these statutes. Their object was to prescribe certain modes by which real property within the commonwealth should be conveyed, by residents' and non-residents, and also by femes covert, and it must be admitted,' that no other modes of conveyance than those which are so-prescribed will be valid.. • These forms have been adopted for' the security of real property, and the convenience of individuals; hence we find in the statute books of all the states, numerous acts regulating.the signing, acknowledging, and recording of deeds.

If the act of 1785 be not repugnant in all its provisions to the act of 1776, yet if the former clearly intended to prescribe the only modes .by which real estate should be conveyed, it repeals the prior act. And this intention, it is said, is found in the act of 1785. To some extent, this may be correct. In, the first section of that act, it ■is provided, that “ no estate of inheritance in lands or tenements shall be conveyed from One to another, unless the conveyance be declared by writing,'sealed and delivered.” Now a deed, to be valid as a conveyance, under'this statute, must be in writing, sealed and delivered. This is the common law definition of a deed. But there are other requisites to make this conveyance valid against a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice. The deed must be. acknowledged as the statute requires, and lodged with the clerk for record. The conveyance as between the parties would be valid, under this statute, without acknowledgment, but unless acknowledged and recorded, or lodged for record, would not be notice to subsequent and innocent purchasers.

The acts under consideration provide specially the mode by which the estate of a feme covert shall be conveyed. In the act of 1785, her privy examination may be made in court, or by one of the judges thereof, or she may be examined by two justices of the peace, of the' county where she' resides, “who maybe empowered to do so- by commission,” &e.

By the act of 1776, the acknowledgment and priv.y examination of a feme covert, were-required to be made before the mayor or other chief magistrate, or before two justices gr magistrates of the town or place wherein she shall reside. The acknowledgment before'two justices is retained in the act of 1785, with this additional requisite, that the justices shall be commissioned, as provided, to perform this duly. This necessarily repeals that part of the prior - act" which authorized the acknowledgment to be taken before two justices, without being commissioned. The latter act is, in' this regard, repugnant to the former. The provisions cannot'stand together, as the latter .act superadds an essential qualification of the justices not required by the former. But the important question is, whether, as the act of 1785 made no provision authorizing a mayor of a city to take the acknowledgment of a feme covert, that provision in the act of 1776 is repealed by it. In this respect it is clear there is no repugnancy between the two acts... The- two provisions may, well stand together, the latter as cumulative to the former.

Does a fair interpretation of the act of 1785 authorize the inference, that the legislature intended no conveyance by a feme-.covert should be valid, unless acknowledged in the form prescribed by that' act? We think no such inference can be’drawn. In-the first section of that act, in reference to ordinary acknowledgments of conveyances, in order,- when recorded, that they might operate as notice to - subsequent purchasers, it is required that -the acknowledgment should be made as provided, “or in the manner hereinafter directed.” The words here cited can have no bearing oh the ' execution of a conveyance by a feme covert. In a subsequent part of the -same section, provision is made for the execution-of-such-an instrument, which is complete, without reference to any other part of the statute. The above words, therefore, could only refer to the conveyances spoken of in the first part of the section, and in- order that they might operate, when,recorded, as notice.

■Upon a careful comparison of these statutes, as regards the point in controversy, we think there is no repeal of the act of-1776, by the-act of 1785. There is no express repeal; no repugnancy, as •regards the power of-the mayor of a city'to'take the acknowledgment of a feme covert; nor- on this point are there any words of-the - latter act which show an intention to make its provisions exclusive. We- are therefore brought to the. conclusion, looking only at these statutes, that the latter -act, in this regard, may be considered as cumulative.

As having a strong and decided bearing on this view, we refer to Wood v. The United States, 16 Peters, 362. In that case, the court say, “ the question then arises whether the:66th section of the- act of 1799, chap. 128, has been repealed,-or whethe'r it remains in full force. . That it has not been expressly, or by direct terms, repealed, is admittedand the question resolves itsehf into the more narrow, inquiry, whether it has been repealed by necessary implication. We -ay by necessary implication, for-it is not sufficient to establish that subsequent laws cover some or even all the cases'provided for by it; for they may be merely affirmative, or-cumulative, or auxiliary. But there must be a positive repugnancy between the .provisions of the new laws and those of the old; and even then the old law is repéaled ' by implication only pro tanto, to the extent of the repugnancy/’

We come now-to consider the act of 1796. The act of the 20th of December, 1792, concerning, the relinquishment of .dower, in the- 2d section, provides that dower may be relinquished before two justices of the peace, where the parties- reside out of the commonwealth, and the clerk of the county is required, to'certify that the persons taking the acknowledgment were justices, &c. This .provision is repugnant to that of the act of 1785, which requires a commission to be issued to such justices.-

By the act of the 17th .of December, 1795, two persons were authorized to be appointed by joint ballot of the legislature, to revise the laws in force, &c. These persons, having been so appointed, reported the act of 1796, which is entitled “An act to reduce into one the several acts, or parts of acts, for regulating conveyances.” In this act are included' parts of the act of 1776, and nearly the whole of the. act of 1785. It was passed the 19th of December, 1796, and, with all other acts reported at the same time, was- adopted .by a general act, referring to the various acts, and providing that “ so much of every act or acts before recited, as comes within the purview of this act, shall be and the same is hereby repealed from and after the 1st day of January, 1797,” on which, day the above act took effect.

That part of the act of 1776, authorizing the mayor of a city to take the acknowledgment of a feme covert, is not included in the act of 1796; nor were certain-provisions of the act of 1748, “for settling the titles and bounds of lands,” &c., included, some parts of which have since been recognised by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, as in force. —

Great reliance is placed by the counsel for the defendants in error, in the case of Hynes’s Representatives v. Campbell, 6 Monr. 286. In that case, the complainants prayed a rescisión of the contract for the conveyance .of a certáin tract of land, on the ground of a defect of title-; and the court held, that they were not bound to accept the deed for the land, tendered by the defendant, as some of the conveyances under which he claimed were not acknowledged and recorded, as the law required. The deeds thus objected to “ wére acknowledged before two justices of the peace of Dunwiddie county; Virginia, who certified simply that the grantor acknowledged the-same before them, as the law required,” without adding that the grantor “ also subscribed the same in their presence.” This proceeding was under the act of 1792, which had been construed to require a certificate of the justices that the deed had been subscribed in their presence, in regard to deeds executed within the state. And the court say, they turned their, attention to the act of 1776, “ and they find that it regulates only conveyances made out of the state, and that it provides for acknowledgment alone, before two justices of the peace, and says not a word about subscribing, and if that act is in force in this respect, it will exactly embrace the case in question.” And they held that the above act was virtually repealed by the act of 1785, which requires that the two justices taking the acknowledgment should be commissioned to do so. This view of the court, as regards the acknowledgments of the deeds then before them, was undoubtedly correct. It is the construction which we have before ■ given to this part of the act of 1785. The attention of the court was not drawn to any other point than the one before them. They did not say that that part of the act of 1776 which regulates the aclmowledgment by a feme covert, which is wholly different from the above, ■ was' repealed.- lit is"ixue .their language is general, but their meaning must be limited to the point under consideration. . This decision, therefore, cannot be considered as having a bearing on the- point now before us. ■

In the case of Prewet v. Graves et al., 5 J. J. Marshall, 120, the court say, that the 5th section of Hie act of 1748 had been repealed by subsequent and repugnant enactments. In Miller et al. v. Hen-shaw & Co., 4 Dana, 323, they say, in reference to the act of 1776, and to the decision of Hynes’s Representatives v. Campbéll, above cited, that the act ofT776 “is nowhere repealed by express words, but only by construction, in consequence of the inconsistency of its provisions with those of subsequent statutes; and as none of the subsequent statutes relate to the authentication of deeds of personalty, out of the state, except those which reduce the number of witnesses from three to two, there can be no inconsistency, and therefore no constructive repeal of so much of this statute as related to deeds of personalty, except as to the number of witnesses.”

' In McGowen v. Hay, 5 Litt. 244, the court held the act of 1748 was in force in Kentucky, in regard to the acknowledgment and recording of mortgages and deeds of trust. By the act of 1796, a deed, executed out of the commonwealth for lands-within it, was required to be recorded in eight months.' ’T.he act oí 1785, which preceded it, required such deed to be recorded in eighteen months; and in Taylor v. Shields, 5 Litt. 297, the question was, whether the latter of these acts, in this respect, had repealed the former; and the court say, “we should hesitate much to give such effect to the latter statute,” “Virtual repeals are not favoured by courts. A body of acts ought to be held as one act, so far as they do not conflict with each other. Here the same restriction to the ‘ manner prescribed by law,’ existed before the passage of oür act, as well as afterwards; and if, in transcribing the Virginia Code into ours, any part shall be adjudged to be repealed, barely by putting in the date of transcribing as the date of the law, and because the provision, so transcribed, shall apparently coriflict with any former part not so transcribed, it maybe of serious-consequence to the community.” “We incline,” the court say, to the opinion; “ that the clause in our statute, (of 1796,) 4 in the manner prescribed bylaw,’ meant to retain, and was intended to retain, former provisions, with regard to deeds entire;” and they held, that the recording of the deed within eighteen months, under the act of 1785, was sufficient.

That part of the act of 1785,-which regulated the time of recording deeds, executed without the commonwealth, was not copied into the act of 1796, -and yet the court held that the latter act, in this respect, did not repeal the former;

In Elliott et al. v. Piersoll et al., 1 Peters, 339, .this court say, the Virginia statute of 1748 “was adopted in Kentucky, at her separation from Virginia, and is understood never to have been repealed'.”

It does not appear that the question, as to the validity of the acknowledgment of a deed before, the mayor of a city, by a: feme covert, under the act of 1776, since that of 1785 has been enacted, has ever been decided. Some general expressions, as above stated, have-been used by the Court pf Appeals, in regard to the repeal of the former act by the latter, but those expressions - did not relate to the above question. And it may be again observed, that those remarks by the. Court of Appeals can only be held to apply to the • matter then before them; and that a more extended application of 'them would be inconsistent with the views-taken by the same court,in the other cases cited. If the provision in the act of 1785, requiring a deed -executed' out of the state to be recorded in eighteen months, is not repealed by the act of 1796, requiring such deed to be recorded in eight months, is the act of 1776, authorizing the acknowledgment of a deed before a mayor, by a feme cdvert, repealed by subsequent acts ? • None of «those acts repeal, in terms, the above provision in the act of.1776, and they contain no repugnant provision. Consequently, the first act stands unrepealed. The different-acts on the same subject, in the language of the Court of Appeals, must be “considered as one act.” In this view, the provision in question stands consistently with all the subsequent statutes; and on this ground we feel authorized to say, that the acknowledgment of the deed before us is valid, under the act of 1776, and that it conveyed to Ferguson, the grantee, a good title in fee-simple. . The clause of the act of 1796, “repealing so much of the acts referred to as come within the purview of that act,” extends no further than the repug-nancy of the act of 1796 to the provisions of the acts named. .

Upon the whole, the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, at the costs of the defendants, and the cause be remanded, &c.  