
    Joseph LADEAIROUS, aka Joseph Michael Ladeairous, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the State of NEW YORK et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-2720-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 18, 2015.
    
      Joseph Ladeairous, pro se, Craigsville, VA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    No Appearance for Defendants-Appel-lees.
    Present: PETER W. HALL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges, JEFFREY ALKER MEYER, District Judge.
    
      
       Judge Jeffrey Alker Meyer, of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Joseph Ladeairous, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing sua sponte his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

On appeal, Ladeairous argues that he could have stated a plausible right-to-petition claim. He is incorrect. The defendants’ failure to respond to his New York Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”) request did not violate his First Amendment right to petition because “[njothing in the First Amendment ... suggests that the rights to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or respond to individuals’ communications.” Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285, 104 S.Ct. 1058, 79 L.Ed.2d 299 (1984); see also Trentadue v. Integrity Comm., 501 F.3d 1215, 1236-37 (10th Cir.2007) (ruling that government’s failure to respond to document requests did not deprive litigant of his right to petition). To the extent that Ladeairous argues that the right to petition or the First Amendment generally encompasses the right to access government information, “[njeither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information within the government’s control.” Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 57 L.Ed.2d 553 (1978). Thus, the district court properly dismissed this claim without leave to replead.

The district court also properly dismissed Ladeairous’s court access and equal protection claims. In dismissing his court access claim, the district court properly considered court documents, which demonstrated that the complaint’s allegation of actual injury was false because Ladeairous’s other litigation was dismissed for failure to submit an informa pauperis application or pay the filing fee, see Ladeairous v. Holder, 574 Fed.Appx. 3 (D.C.Cir.2014). See Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir.1991) (observing that “courts routinely take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts”). Because the dismissal of that action was unrelated to the defendants’ actions, Ladeairous did not plausibly allege actual injury, as is required to state a court access claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-52, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (requiring “actual injury”). The district court also properly dismissed Ladeairous’s equal protection claim because the amended complaint alleged only that he was treated differently “because of’ his political beliefs. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-63, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (observing that “a wholly conclusory statement of claim” warrants dismissal).

We have considered Ladeairous s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  