
    PECOS & N. T. RY. CO. et al. v. COX.
    (Supreme Court of Texas.
    Feb. 14, 1912.)
    1. Motions (§ 51*) — Appeal and Eebob (§ 907*) —Presumptions.
    The consent required by Acts 31st Leg. (1st Ex. Sess.) c. 32, authorizing the judges of the district court in vacation by consent of the parties to make orders as fully as in term time, need not be in writing, and, where a judge has made an order that he may make, only by consent, an appellate court must presume that consent was given.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Motions, Cent. Dig. § 63; Dec. Dig. § 51;* Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §■§ 2911-2915; Dec. Dig. §1 907.*] 1
    2. Exceptions, Bill op (§ 40*) — Time to File — Extensions—Powee op Judge in Vacation.
    Under Acts 31st Leg. (1st Ex. Sess.) c. 32, authorizing the judges of the district court in vacation by consent of the parties to make orders as in term time, a judge of the district court may by consent of the parties make an order in vacation extending the time within which to file a statement of facts and bill of exceptions.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Exceptions, Bill of, Cent. Dig. §§ 57-64; Dec. Dig. § 40.*]
    Error from Court of Civil Appeals of Fourth Supreme Judicial District.
    
      Action by C. B. Cox against the Pecos & Northern Texas Railway Company and others. There was a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirming a judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.
    Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and cause remanded, with instructions.
    See, also, 140 S. W. 1078; 141 S. W. 327.
    Terry, Cavin & Mills and Madden, Trulove & Kimbrough, for plaintiffs in error. . R. R. Hazlewood, Sam R. Merrill, and A. A. Bumpkin, for defendant in error.
   BROWN, C. J.

Suit was instituted in the district court of Hale county against the Pecos & Northern Texas Railway Company and others and judgment rendered for Cox, from which an appeal was taken to the Court of Civil Appeals of the Second District and transferred to the Court of Civil Appeals of the Fourth District in the apportionment of dockets.

Before adjournment of the district court of Hale county, the judge allowed 30 days after adjournment within which to file, a statement of facts and bills of exceptions, and it is claimed that counsel for both parties then agreed orally that the district judge might in vacation grant further extension if necessary. After adjournment Hon. L. S. Kinder, before whom the case was tried, made this order: “That as the official stenographer who took down the testimony in this, upon the trial of this cause, has a number of orders for transcript filed prior to the order overruling the motions of the defendants for a new trial in this cause, and that he is overcrowded with work, and. will not be able to furnish the transcript or the testimony to the defendants in time for them to prepare their statements of facts and bills of exception within the 30 days heretofore allowed, ordered that an additional 60 days be allowed the petitioners, making in all 90 days after adjournment of the term at which*the case was tried in which to file their statement of facts and bills of exception in this cause, and allowing the respondent the same period of time in which to file any statement of facts and bills of exception he might desire to file.” It was further ordered “that the clerk enter this order upon the minutes of the district court of Hale county, Texas, and that the same become a part of the records in this cause.”

The above order was made in pursuance of Act Leg. First Called Ses-s. 1909, p. 352, as follows: “Art. 1107a. The judges of the district court may, in vacation, by consent of the parties, exercise all powers, make all orders, and perform all acts, as fully as in term time, except to enter final judgment in any suit; provided, that the judge may, by consent of the parties, try any case without a jurj' and enter final judgment, except in divorce cases. All such proceedings shall be conducted under the same rules as if done in term time, and the right of appeal and writ of error shall apply as if the acts had been done in term time.” The order was entered on the minutes, and the statement of facts was filed within the time prescribed. Upon motion of the defendant in error the Court of Civil Appeals of the Fourth District struck out the statement of facts. Counsel for defendant in error said he had no recollection of the agreement.

We are of opinion that the statute copied above did not require the consent of the parties to be in writing, and, the judge having made an order that he could make only by consent of the counsel or parties, the court should presume that the consent was given.

The act of the Thirty-First Legislature, as copied above, is in plain terms and conferred authority upon the judge of the district court to make in vacation the order that was entered in this ease. The policy of the law was to facilitate and expedite the trial and final disposition of cases. It should be construed so as to secure that end. The Court of Civil Appeals did not submit this issue in the questions certified. Lest there be any misapprehension of the scope of this opinion, we think it proper to say that we have no doubt of the correctness of the answers given to the questions certified (140 S. W. 1078).

It is ordered that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals be reversed, and that this cause be remanded to the honorable Court of Civil Appeals of the Fourth Supreme Judicial District, with instructions to restore the statement of facts, and to proceed with the cause upon the full record.  