
    Stanimir Georgiev PAVLOV, a/k/a Atanas Velichkov Yordanvo, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Warden SMELZER, [sic]; John W. Suthers, Attorney General of the State of Colorado, Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 11-1040.
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    March 31, 2011.
    Stanimir Georgiev Pavlov, Olney Springs, CO, pro se.
    
      John Jacob Fuerst, III, Attorney General for the State of Colorado, Denver, CO, for Respondents-Appellees.
    Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED ON APPEAL INFORMA PAUPERIS, DENYING REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DISMISSING APPEAL

TERRENCE L. O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.

Stanimir Pavlov filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. The District Court dismissed it as “barred by the one year limitation period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d),” explaining why. It also prospectively decided that no Certificate of Appealability (COA) would issue because Pavlov “has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right:” (R. Doc. 23 at 8.); See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Pavlov then filed a Notice of Appeal with the district court.

Later, in this Court, he filed several documents: a “Statement” on February 28, 2011, which we construed as a motion for issuance a COA; on March 9, 2011, a two-page “Combined Opening Brief and Application for Certificate of Appealability,” which we construed as a supplement to his “Statement,” and on March 10, 2011, a Brief and Application for COA.

The parties are familiar with the facts so they will not be repeated here. We have reviewed Pavlov’s proposed opening brief and application for a COA in light of the district court’s decision. A COA may be issued only upon “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). We are confident jurists of reason would not find the district court’s analysis debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595,146 L.Ed.2d 542, (2000).

The district court also denied Pavlov’s request to appeal in forma pauperis {ifp), concluding it was “not taken in good faith.” (R. Doc. 30.); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). He renews his ifp request here. To proceed ifp on appeal, he “must show a financial inability to pay the required filing fees and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” DeBarde-leben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir.1991) (emphasis added). We have solicitously reviewed his filings. He has utterly failed to pass the threshold. An appeal on a matter of law is frivolous where “[none] of the legal points [are] arguable on their merits.” Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Pavlov’s arguments are either irrelevant or contrary to settled law; and he makes no reasoned argument for modification of that law.

Pavlov’s application for a COA and his motion to proceed ifp on appeal are DENIED. He must pay the filing and docket fees in full to the clerk of the district court. See Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir.2001). 
      
      . We liberally construe his pro se filings. See Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir.2003).
     