
    Wheeler v. Pope.
    whether interest can be allowed on a note payable at a place beyond the jurisdiction of this State, in the absence of ail allegation and proof of the rate of interest at the place of payment,^ not an open question. It is settled that no interest can be allowed. (Note47.)
    Judgments of mldicit are entitled to a more liberal construction than judgments by default. Indeed, it is questionable whether a more stringent rule than is applicable to judgments by confession can with propriety bo applied to such judgments. (Note 48.)
    Where the defendant withdraws his answer and says nothing against the plaintiff’s suit, if the plaintiff’s claim be liquidated, the amount of the judgment may be ascertained by the court without a jury, as in case of judgment by default.
    Suit was brought upon a note payable in another State, and the judgment was by nil ditit, including “interest at the usual ratethere was no allegation in the petition of the rate of interest where the note was payable; the judgment was entered without the interven* tion of ajury; the plaintiff assented to stay of execution for six months: Reid, That the defendant was presumed to have assented to the judgment as it was entered;
    Error from .San Augustine. In this case suit was brought by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error on a.note payable at the house of a commercial firm in the city of New Orleans, in the State of Louisiana. The defendant, after an answer of general denial of indebtedness and payment, subsequently, by his attorney, withdrew his defense, “ and says nothing in bar or preclusion of the plaintiff’s action.” Judgment was rendered in the following terms: “ It is therefore considered and ordered by the court that the plaintiff, Daniel N. Pope, do have and recover of Otis M. Wheeler, the defendant, the sum of three hundred and thirty-five dollars and fifty-five cents debt, as principal, and sixty-nine dollars and seventy-five cents interest, at the legal rate, as damages; making in all the sum of four hundred and five dollars and thirty cents, together with all the costs in this behalf to be taxed. And it is further ordered that execution issue. And comes the plaintiff, by attorney, and agrees to stay execution six months for the principal and interest.”
    Note 47. — Bailey v. Heald, 17 T., 102.
    Note 48. — Where the defendant withdraws his answer, and judgment nihil dicit is rendered against him, such judgment must conform to the legal effect of the facts and admissions stated in the plaintiff’s petition; and if it exceed that .amount it is such an error as may be reviewed on appeal. (Storey v. Nichols, 22 T., 87.) A confession of judgment operates as a release of all errors. (Garner v. Burleson, 2G T., 348; Goss -y. Pilgrim, 28 T., 263.)
    Ardrey, for plaintiff in error,
    argued that it was error to enter up final judgment without a jliry to ascertain'the amount. It is only upon judgments made final by default that the judge or clerk can assess the damages. The statute is an innovation upon the common law, and should be construed strictly.
    II. Admitting that the judge or clerk had all the capacity of a jury, it was error to render'judgment for interest, the note being payable in another State, and the rate of interest of that State being neither alleged nor (we may presume) proved.
    Sublett, for defendant in error,
    cited Cartwright v. Rolf, 1 Tex. R., 78, and Burton v. Varuell, Id., 035, and suggested delay.
   Lipscomb, J.

The judgment of the court below is sought to be reversed on the ground that as the note sued on was payable in the city of Hew Orleans, in the State of Louisiana, and as there was no evidence in the court below to prove the rate of interest at the place of payment, it was error to allow any interest at all. Whether interest can be allowed on a note payable at a place beyond the jurisdiction of this State, in the. absence of an allegation and proof of the rate of interest at the place of payment, is not an open question in this court. It is settled that no interest can be allowed.

But it is the established doctrine of this court that a judgment like the one now under revision is entitled to a more liberal construction than if it had been rendered in the absence of the defendant. Indeed, it is questionable whether a more stringent rule can with propriety be applied to such judgments than would be proper to judgments by confession. The record shows that the defendant was present; that lie withdrew his defense; and it does not appear that lie objected to the judgment as entered up against him. It is then nothing more than a fair inference that he assented to it, and to this assent we will hold him.

Judgment affirmed.  