
    Joseph CARLINO, Jr.; Joseph Carlino, Sr.; Elizabeth Carlino; Kyle Rossell; Cheryl Rossell; Elwood Wrigley; Joanne Wrigley; Steven Burkhardt; Kathleen Brandt; Todd Evans; Robert Evans; Mildred Evans, v. GLOUCESTER CITY HIGH SCHOOL; Ronald Pritchett, Dr.; James Hetherington; Gloucester Cty Bd Ed; Shirley Cleary; Susan Allgeier; Leroy Kramer; Barbara Stout; Fort Magruder Inn and Conference Center; Interstate Hotels; John Travato; Stanley Booth; Chris Connelly; Edward C. Hubbs, Board President; Louisa W. Llewellyn, Board Vice-President; Robert Bennett; Sandra L. Cowgill; William F. Fisher, III; Patrick J. Hagan; Edward L. Hutchinson; Danny O’Brien, Jr.; Joseph Schili; Margery Wade Samuel A. Malat, Appellant.
    
      No. 00-5262.
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Submitted July 11, 2002.
    Decided Aug. 14, 2002.
    Before SCIRICA and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges, and FULLAM, District Judge.
    
    
      
       (Pursuant to Rule 12(a) F.R.A.P.).
    
    
      
      . The Honorable John P. Fullam, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    
   OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.

The issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion by imposing Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 sanctions upon attorney Samuel Malat. We will affirm.

I.

This case involves a group of high school seniors who admittedly purchased and consumed alcohol and became intoxicated while on their senior class trip. Before the trip, each student had to sign and obtain a parent’s signature on an authorization form that stated, inter alia, that any student who possessed, distributed, purchased or consumed alcoholic beverages while on the trip would “lose their privileges to participate in Commencement Exercises” and possibly “forfeit all rights as members of their class.” The student plaintiffs here were allowed to graduate but as punishment for their alcohol consumption, were excluded from graduation exercises.

Plaintiffs, through their attorney, Samuel Malat, filed a complaint on June 15, 1998, and an amended complaint on November 23, 1998, alleging the school board and various school officials violated their constitutional rights by denying their participation in the graduation ceremony. Parent plaintiffs alleged they suffered emotional distress as a result of their inability to attend their children’s high school graduation. Plaintiffs essentially alleged six causes of action: (1) an equal protection claim on behalf of the student plaintiffs; (2) a religious freedom claim on behalf of the student plaintiffs; (3) a due process claim on behalf of the student plaintiffs; (4) an emotional distress claim on behalf of student Todd Evans; (5) an emotional distress claim on behalf of parent plaintiffs; and (6) a retaliation claim on behalf of Elizabeth Carlino. Carlino v. Gloucester City High Sch., 57 F.Supp.2d 1, 16 (D.N.J.1999).

On February 2, 1999, the District Court issued an Order to Show Cause requiring plaintiffs’ counsel “to show cause why ... sanctions should not be imposed against [him] pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the Court’s inherent powers” for filing frivolous claims. The District Court waited six months, until August 2, 1999, before imposing sanctions upon Malat. The District Court found the amended complaint, signed by Malat, contained three “patently frivolous” claims that were statutorily barred. The court concluded that

Mr. Malat has conducted absolutely no legal research whatsoever regarding these claims at any time before or during the pendency of this litigation. “Even a casual investigation, let alone the reasonable inquiry required by Rule 11, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b), would have revealed” that the New Jersey Statutes Annotated prohibit both emotional distress claims and the CEPA [Conscientious Employee Protection Act] claim. Such a flagrant failure to conduct any legal research violates Mr. Malat’s obligations under Rule 11(b).

Id. at 38.

The District Court stated “the combination of a monetary and a nonmonetary sanction would best deter future similar conduct” and ordered Malat to attend two continuing legal education courses within eighteen months, and pay a $500 fine. Id. at 39. Malat’s only argument on appeal is that the District Court violated Fed. R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(A) by not providing a “safe harbor” letter. But the sanctions were imposed under Rule 11(c)(1)(B), which has no safe harbor provision. Rule 11(c)(1)(B) clearly provides that “[o]n its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.” Malat erroneously relies on an inapposite provision, Rule 11(c)(1)(A) (upon motion by other party), instead of Rule 11(c)(1)(b), when the court files an order to show cause “on its own initiative.”

Additionally, the District Court’s February 2, 1999 Order to Show Cause and the six months the court waited before imposing sanctions provided Malat with “notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c). The District Court did not abuse its discretion.

II.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s imposition of sanctions. 
      
      . We review for abuse of discretion. Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir.2000).
     
      
      . Counts seven through ten were dismissed for failure to state a claim, “because these claims [did] not even satisfy the minimal pleading requirement set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Carli-no, 57 F.Supp.2d at 11.
     
      
      . On the same day, August 2, 1999, the District Court filed an opinion addressing the claims. The court held that counts four, five and part of six were statutorily barred. The court disposed of counts one, three, and part of two on summary judgment. The remaining claims have since been resolved.
     
      
      . For a discussion of the 21-day “safe harbor” provision contained in Rule 11, see Zuk v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute, 103 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 1996).
     
      
      . Rule 11(b) provides:
      (b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of a person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,—
      
        (1) it is not presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
      (2) the claims, defenses, or other legal contentions therein are warranted by law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
      (3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
      (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonable based on a lack of information or belief.
     