
    HARRIS v. BURRIS.
    (S. C., Thomp. Cas., 137-139.)
    Knoxville,
    September Term, 1858.
    1. PRACTICE. Judicial notice of, in supreme court.
    The supreme court cannot judicially know the rules of practice established by the circuit courts, and will not notice them unless they are proved on the trial below and incorporated into the bill of exceptions; or unless put in the record or bill of exceptions by the judge as a rule of his court. The supreme court will know only the rules of practice established by la.w. [Rules of practice in circuit courts. Code, secs. 6075-6087, 4534-4538, 4595, and notes.]
    2. DEPOSITIONS. Presumption in favor of notice, or waiver, when.
    Where a deposition is excepted to for want of notice and agreement to take it, and the circuit judge overrules the exceptions and permits it to be read, the supreme court will in support of the circuit judge presume that notice was regularly given on- waived, unless it appears from the record, or by proof incorporated into the bill of exceptions, that there was no notice, or waiver thereof. [The supreme court will presume in favor of the regularities of the proceedings of the circuit courts. Conner v. State, 4 Yer., 137, 141; Perdue v. State, 2 Hum., 495; Betts v. Demumbrune, Cooke, 39, 48; McGavock v. Ward, Cooke, 403, 405; Kelton v. Bevins, Cooke, 90, 102; Gregory v. Allen, M. & Y., 74; Cassel v. Pranklin, 2 Tenn. (2 Ov.), 201; White v. Hembree, 1 Tenn. (1 Ov.), 529; Nolen v. Wilson, 5 Sneed, 333, 340. So-, of the county court. Matthews v. Weeden, 4 Yer., 166, 167; Wilcox v. Cannon, 1 Cold., 370; Cate v. Little, ante, p. 39; Gass v. Hawkins, post, p. —; note 5 under sec. 6050 of Code.]
   Wright, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The only question that need be noticed here, is whether the court erred in permitting the deposition of James Watson to be read. And we think it did not. This court cannot notice the rules of practice established by the circuit courts "in the trial of causes, unless they are proved on the trial below, and incorporated into' the bill of exceptions, as any other fact; or unless the judge himself, in showing the grounds of his decision upon the rule, shall insert the same in the record or bill of exceptions, as a rule of his court. We can judicially know only the rules of practice established by law. But aside from this, we think there is nothing in this record to put the circuit judge in error in regard to said deposition.

On the 4th day of the May term, 1858, an order of court was made,-by consent, that the deposition of this witness should be taken on that day, at the courthouse, without further notice. But, from some cause not very apparent, it was not taken on that day, but was taken on the 4th of June afterwards, at a commissioner’s office in itogersville. In the exception to the deposition, it is alleged to have been taken without notice, and after an agreement that it should not be taken at the time it was taken, in consequence of which defendant was absent, and failed to cross-examine. But we cannot take the allegations of an exception, or of the parties as true, unless they áre proved, or 'the facts they suggest exist in the record; they stand as exceptions only. The only fact proved is, that the depositions were taken after the defendant left town; but this does not negative notice, and for anything in the record, he may have had notice, or there may have been an agreement; and this we are bound to presume, in support of the action of the circuit judge; and besides, the defendant’s counsel was present when the caption of the deposition was being written. No order or commission under our present practice was required. Affirm the judgment.

Judgment affirmed.  