
    Nathan Hooker, Sen. vs. Nathan Hooker, Jr. et ux.
    The probate court had no jurisdiction, prior to the act of 1846, (Acts 1846, p. 144,) to set aside a settlement made by a guardian or an executor, at a term subsequent to that at which the decree was made; the act of 1846, providing a remedy in the probate court for that end is prospective entirely in its operation, and does not apply to any settlement made prior to its passage.
    The operation of a law must always be prospective, unless the contrary intention is manifest, even where the legislature had power to give it a retrospective effect.
    It seems, that to give the law of 1846, referred to, a retrospective effect, and permit judgments and decrees final and conclusive, according to the then existing law, to be opened and inquired into under that law, would be in violation of the constitution.
    On appeal from the probate court of Carroll county; Hon. James S. Johnston, judge.
    Nathan Hooker, jr., and his wife, filed their petition in the probate court, against Nathan Hooker, sen., on the seventh day of September, 1846, to impeach and set aside for fraud, the final settlement of the latter as guardian of the wife of Nathan Hooker, jr., made at the February term, 1842.
    The defendant demurred to the petition, for the want of jurisdiction in the court; the demurrer being overruled, he appealed.
    
      Sheppard, for appellant.
    1. If the decree sought to be set aside was erroneous, the party aggrieved must resort to an appeal or writ of error. Smith v. Denson, 2 S. & M. 339.
    2. The probate court has no power to set aside a final settlement for fraud. Turnbull v. Endicott, 3 S. & M. 304; Hendricks v. Huddleston, 5 lb. 427.
    3. Under the act of 1846, the petition makes out no case for a bill of review. Story Eq. Plead. 446, § 426; lb. 431.
    
      Brooke, for appellee.
    1. This petition was filed under the law of 1846, p. 144. Under that law the court had jurisdiction; though the decree was prior to its passage, yet the law was purely remedial; the remedy existed before, in equity; the legislature have only given a similar remedy to another tribunal. Calder and wife v. Bull and wife, 3 Dallas, 386; 1 How. U. S. R. 316; 7 Johns. R. 488.
    2. The chancery court had jurisdiction to set the decree aside for fraud. 2 Sto. Eq. 313; 13 Yes. 136; 2 lb. 548, 549; 18 lb. 126; 9 lb. 297; 2 Leigh, 11. This jurisdiction is transferred to the probate court by the act of 1846.
    
      Sheppard, in reply,
    insisted, that the law of 1846 could not retroact; the decree was final, and could not be re-opened. Davis v. Minor, 1 How. (Mi.) R. 189.
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a petition, filed in the probate court of Carroll county, to set aside a final settlement made by the appellant, as guardian of the female petitioner, on the ground of fraud. The final account of the guardian was received and allowed by the court, in February, 1842. There is a demurrer to the relief prayed for.

It has been repeatedly decided, that the probate court had no jurisdiction to set aside a settlement made by a guardian or an executor, at a term subsequent to that at which the decree is made. 5 S. & M. 130, 422, 751. If the decree were obtained by fraud, the remedy was in chancery. Turnbull v. Endicott, 3 S. & M. 304. This was the settled doctrine of this court prior to the statute of 1846, in regard to the powers of the probate court. Pam. Acts, 144.

It is insisted that this cause is embraced by the act of 1846, notwithstanding the settlement in question was made several years before its pagsage. It is true, the law provides a new remedy, but there is nothing to show that the legislature intended to give it a retrospective eifect. The operation of a law must always be prospective, unless the contrary intention is manifest, even in cases in which it would be admissible to the law-making power, to give it a retrospective eifect.

By the law in force at the time this settlement was made, it was final and conclusive, so far as the action of the probate court was concerned. It might operate harshly and unjustly on the appellant to take away the conclusive character which then attached to it. Indeed, the power of the legislature to open a judgment, and unsettle rights previously ascertained and declared by a competent tribunal, would hardly be asserted. But we can see no evidence of any such intention in this instance.

The order of the court, overruling the demurrer, is reversed, and the bill dismissed for want of jurisdiction.  