
    Randle vs. Harris and Murray.
    When the sheriff levied an execution upon the property of the defendant in the possession of a third person, and such third person agreed verbally if the sheriff would release the property he would pay the execution: Held, that this agreement was binding in law, and not within the statute of frauds.
    In promises, the extent of the benefit is not to be considered in settling the question, whether binding or not.
    A promise is binding when a benefit results to both, or is a benefit to him who makes it, or works an injury by non-compliance to him to whom it is made.
    Randle and Tyrrell were the joint owners of -a horse; an execution in favor of the plaintiffs below came into the hands of the sheriff against the goods and chattels of Tyrrell. The horse was in the possession of Randle. The sheriff made a levy upon him as the property of Tyr-rell, but did not take the horse in possession, Randle refusing to give him up, or to give a bond for his delivery on the day of sale. After the levy, Randle verbally agreed, that if the sheriff would release the property he would pay the plaintiffs in the exebution fifty dollars in cash notes, in January following. This was agreed to, and the property released. The circuit court charged the jury that this promise and undertaking was not within the provisions of the statute of frauds and perjuries, but being founded on a good consideration was binding. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. The defendant moved for a new trial, which was refused by the court, from which decision of the court the defendant prosecuted his writ of error to this court.
    
      H. A. Garrett, for plaintiff in error.
    The promise in this case was made by Randle for the benefit of a third person, was not in writing, and made by a person who was in no wise interested, or benefited by the promise, and no injury resulted to the plaintiffs, by the non-compliance of Randle. It was no satisfaction of the execution; that remained in full force and virtue. It is therefore void under the statute of 1801, ch, 25.
    
      B. Gillespie, for defendant in error,
    contended that the judgment of the circuit court was right; that this was a good consideration from plaintiff to defendants, not an engagement or undertaking for another. The defendants releasing their levy on Tyrrell’s property, relinquished their debt on him, and this promise is an original undertaking of Randle.
   Peck, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

The question raised upon the charge of the court is, whether this undertaking on the part of Randle was binding in law. This was clearly a binding promise, founded on a valid consideration. In promises the extent of benefit is not to be considered in settling the question, whether binding or not. Here the promise was for the benefit of both. It induced the discharge of the property unincumbered by the levy, left it in the hands of the promisor, and was therefore a benefit to him; not to enforce the promise would be an injury to the plaintiffs. A promise is binding when a benefit results to both, or is a benefit to him who makes it, or works an injury to him to whom it is made.

Judgment affirmed.  