
    *Henry Parker v. Lewis Holmes & John Spann.
    When actual fraud in a judgment or conveyance is clearly proved, it is wholly void and will'not be permitted to stand as a security for what is actually due; but when Equity infers fraud from the circumstances and relation and character of th^ parties, it is at the discretion of the Court, to allow the security to stand good for what is really due. [*95]
    Edgefield. — Before Chancellor De Saussure, June, 1833.
    The plaintiff, as a judgment creditor of John Spann, filed this bill to set. aside a judgment the defendant Holmes had against Spann, charging the same to be fraudulent, and praying that certain moneys, which Holmes had received on it of sales by the sheriff, may be decreed to him. Spann has left the State. The answer of Holmes denies fraud in the judgment, and affirms that the consideration was for services rendered by him in attending on behalf of Spann to an important suit in Equity, and for moneys advanced to him.
    Evidence was given on both sides, for and against the fairness of the transaction, which need not be detailed. The Chancellor’s decree declares that the transaction between Holmes and Spann was contrived and intended as a cover of Spann’s property against his creditors, which is fraudulent; or that it was an imposition by Holmes on the weakness and credulity of Spann, an habitual drunkard and exposed to the acts and extortions of designing men, and cannot at any rate be allowed to affect creditors : That Holmes is entitled to credit fdr the actual advances of money by him, and the true value of the services rendered ; and to ascertain these a reference was ordered.
    Both parties appealed ; but as the defendant’s grounds depend wholly on the facts, they need not be stated.
    
      Griffin, for the plaintiff,
    now moved the Court to reverse so much of the decree as allows the defendant for advances made, or services rendered, on the ground — that the transaction being fraudulent, he should derive no benefit from it; and cited Miller v. Tolleson, Harp. Eq. Rep. 145 ; 1 Jac. & Walk. 119.
    
      Wardlaw, contra,
    cited 2 Seh. & Lef. 501; 1 John. Ch. Rep. 418; 8 Yes. 282.
   Harper, J.

[After noticing the facts and concurring with the Chancellor in his conclusions thereon.] Nor can we, in relation to the plaintiff’s ground of appeal, say that the Chancellor has erred *in decreeing the judgment to stand as a security for what shall be found L actually due to Holmes. When actual fraud (dolus malus) is clearly proved, the judgment or conveyance is wholly void, and will not be permitted to stand as a security for what is actually due. Miller v. Tolleson, State Rep. Eq. 145. But where equity infers fraud from the circumstances and relation and character of the parties, it is at the discretion of the Court to allow the security to stand good for what is actually due. 1 John. Ch. Rep. 4Í8.

Decree affirmed,

Johnson and O’Neall, Js., concurred. 
      
      
         Sea Smith v. Loader, Prec. in Ch. 80; Abingdon v. Butler, 1 Ves. jr. 206 Townsend v. Lowfield, 1 Ves. sen, 35; Herne v. Meeres, 1 Vern. 465.
     