
    Romana VAN HOUTVEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul ADAMS, Detective, Defendant-Appellee. Judith Holler, SPA et al., Defendants.
    No. 14-1657-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 22, 2015.
    Romana Van Houtven, pro se, New York, N.Y., for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Pamela Seider Dolgow, Kathy Chang Park, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, N.Y., for Defendant-Appellee.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, REENA RAGGI and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Romana Van Houtven, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s April 3, 2014 order denying her motion for leave to amend, her complaint and dismissing her action with prejudice. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review the denial of motion to amend on the basis of futility de novo Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir.2014). Leave to amend may be denied when the proposed amendments would be futile. Tocker v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 470 F.3d 481, 491 (2d Cir.2006). Amendment is futile if it fails “to cure prior deficiencies or to state a claim.” Panther Partners, Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir.2012). Courts consider the proposed amendments “along with the remainder of the complaint.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Upon de novo review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the District Court properly denied Van Houtven’s motion for leave to amend, substantially for the reasons stated in its April 3, 2014 order. The record reveals that Detective Adams had probable cause to arrest Van Houtven for stalking based upon a Domestic Incident Report signed by Van Hout-ven’s ex-boyfriend that provided sufficient information to justify her arrest. See Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.1995) (“An arresting officer advised of a crime by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint [to that effect], has probable cause to effect an arrest absent circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim’s veracity.”). Such probable cause is “a complete defense” to Van Houtven’s claim of false arrest. Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 536 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Van Houtven’s abuse of process claim also fails because she failed adequately to allege that Detective Adams had “a collateral purpose beyond or in addition to [Van Houtven’s] criminal prosecution.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 77 (2d Cir.2003). Van Houtven alleged conclusor-ily that Detective Adams acted “for the ulterior purpose of causing [her] ... to be unlawfully deprived of her liberty and civil rights, to suffer inconvenience, humiliation, shame, embarrassment, damage to her reputation and good name, and to incur legal expenses.” Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 24. These alleged consequences, however, were incident to prosecution and not “beyond or in addition to ... criminal prosecution.” Savino, 331 F.3d at 77. We decline to consider Van Houtven’s newly alleged collateral objective — that Detective Adams was “trying to get retribution,” Appellant’s Br. 8 — because it was not raised below. See Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir.1994) (“[I]t is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.”).

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Van Houtven on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s April 3, 2014 order. 
      
      . As a clerical matter, the District Court appears to have overlooked entering final judgment in the case. We nevertheless have jurisdiction because the April 3, 2014 order effectively terminated the litigation. See Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 55 n. 1 (2d Cir.2000) ("Although judgement never entered, we nevertheless have jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the order of dismissal effectively terminated the litigation."). Moreover, if a required separate judgment is not entered, it is deemed to have been entered 150 days after entry of the dispositive order. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 58(c)(2)(B); Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii).
     
      
      . The District Court relied on both the Do- ' mestic Incident Report and a Misdemeanor Complaint sworn out by Van Houtven’s ex-boyfriend. The Misdemeanor Complaint, however, was not sworn to until after Van Houtven’s arrest and, therefore, cannot establish probable cause for the arrest to the extent it references any facts not known by the officer at the time of arrest. See Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir.2006). We need not pursue this point, however, because the Domestic Incident Report itself was sufficient to establish probable cause.
     