
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Daniel FIERRO, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 07-50900
    Summary Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    April 18, 2008.
    Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Daniel Fierro, Sierra Blanca, TX, pro se.
    Before KING, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Daniel Fierro entered a guilty plea to one count of receiving a firearm while under indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(n), 924(a)(1)(D), and was sentenced to 40 months of imprisonment. He appeals his conviction on the grounds that the factual basis presented at rearraignment was insufficient to support his guilty plea. He contends that, at rearraignment, he denied receiving firearms and accepted the guilty plea due to judicial coercion.

Fierro did not object to the sufficiency of the factual basis in the district court, and thus this court reviews for plain error. See United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 315 (5th Cir.2001). At rearraignment, Fi-erro admitted that he possessed two of the weapons charged in the indictment, and admitted to meeting his Mend, Beto, at his grandparents’ house for the specific purpose of retrieving two weapons, which constitutes “receipt” under the statute. See United States v. Clark, 741 F.2d 699, 703 (5th Cir.1984) (explaining that, in an analogous offense, “receipt” is knowingly taking possession). Further, this “court may consult the whole record when considering the effect on substantial rights.” United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002). The record indicates that, in the presentence interview, Fierro admitted committing the charged offense. He has therefore failed to show reversible plain error with respect to the sufficiency of the factual basis. Finally, there is no evidence of judicial coercion in the record.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     