
    LOGAN v. STATE.
    (No. 10675.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 20, 1927.
    Rehearing Denied June 22, 1927.
    1. Jury <&wkey;66(2) — Permittingi trial by jury summoned by sheriff held not error where indictment was returned and ease set after expiration of term for which juries were drawn (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 640).'
    Where indictment was returned and case set for trial after expiration of weeks of term for which juries had been drawn by regular jury commission, proceeding to trial by jury summoned by sheriff held not error under Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 640.
    2. Jury <§=67(3) — Fact that sheriff was witness did not alone show jury summoned by him was unfair (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. •640).
    In prosecution for possessing intoxicating liquor for sale, fact that sheriff was witness was not alone sufficient to require reversal on ground that jury summoned by him under Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. -640, was unfair, in absence of facts showing justice was not done.
    3. Intoxicating liquors <§=>249 — Officer was not required to have search warrant in following defendant to barn on another’s land and observing defendant as he carried jar of whisky.
    Acts of sheriff, observing defendant in car with another party, in following defendant to barn on another’s land and watching him while he produced and transported jar of whisky, which he attempted to destroy,' held not such as to require authority of search warrant.
    4. Arrest <&wkey;7l— One violating law in officer’s presence may be arrested and searched without warrant.
    Any. person who violates criminal statute in presence of officer is subject to arrest without warrant, and may be lawfully searched.
    5. Searches and seizures &wkey;»3(4) — -Affidavitfor search warrant sworn to by two credible parties setting out facts showing probable cause is sufficient.
    Affidavit for search warrant is sufficient when signed and sworn to by two parties deemed credible by magistrate, where affidavit sets out facts deemed by magistrate to amount to probable cause.
    6. Criminal law &wkey;369(6) — Testimony as to liquor found in defendant’s house in prosecution- for possession for purposes of sale held not to involve separate offense, where liquor previously found was only few hundred yards distant.
    In prosecution for possessing liquor for purposes of sale, testimony as to liquor found in defendant’s house under search warrant, based on observation of defendant transporting liquor to another in field within few hundred yards from defendant’s house, held not objectionable as constituting proof of separate and disconnected offense; it being unnecessary to limit purpose for which testimony was admitted.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    7. Intoxicating liquors <3=248 — Affidavit stating affiants believed defendant was unlawfully selling liquor at his residence, based on observation of attempted delivery thereof, held to authorize warrant; “probable cause” (Pen. Code 1925, art. 691).
    Affidavit for search warrant stating affiants believed defendant was engaged in unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor at his residence, based on sheriff’s observation of defendant attempting to deliver at his residence liquor, deemed intoxicating, to another, where properly sworn to, held sufficient under Pen. Code 1925, art. 691, as furnishing “probable cause” for magistrate’s issuance of warrant, which is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in belief that accused is guilty of offense with which charged.”
    [Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Probable Cause.]
    8. Intoxicating liquors <&wkey;>236(7) — Evidence held to sustain conviction for possessing intoxicating liquor for purposes of sale.
    In prosecution for possessing intoxicating liquor for purposes of sale, evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction.
    Appeal from District Court, Franklin County; R. T. Wilkinson, Judge.
    Mat Logan was convicted of possessing intoxicating liquor for purposes of sale, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    R. T. Wilkinson, Jr., of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., and Robt. M. Lyles, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.
   LATTIMOR®, J.

Conviction for possessing intoxicating liquor for purposes of sale; punishment, one year in the penitentiary.

It has been a pleasure to examine the well-written brief of appellant, and we only regret that we cannot agree with the conclusions reached therein. The bill of exceptions taken to the refusal to postpone or continue this case, in order that appellant might be tried before a jury drawn by a jury commission, makes no sufficient showing of injury to call for review at our hands. The facts stated in the qualification to said bill are not controverted, viz. that the indictment herein was returned, and the case set down for trial after the expiration of the weeks of - the term for which juries had been drawn by the regular jury commission. In such case article 640, 1925 C. C. P., provides that the court shall order the sheriff to summon a jury to try the case. This is what was done in the instant case. Green v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 490, 110 S. W. 920, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 706; Taylor v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. R. 330, 221 S. W. 611.

The fact that the sheriff is a witness in any case standing for trial will not alone furnish sufficient reasons for concluding that a jury summoned by him is therefore unfair, and that its inembers cannot fairly try a case in which the sheriff is a witness. He who asserts injustice in any particular matter must go beyond mere assertion. He must present some supporting facts. None here appear.

The testimony shows that the sheriff observed appellant leave Mt. Vernon in a car with another party; that he followed them in his ear; that he found their car in front of a barn located some 300 yards from appellant’s house, the barn being on the land of a Mr. Kennedy. Weatherford, the party with appellant, was coming to the car from said barn. The officer drove around to where he could see behind said barn, and saw appellant approaching same from the direction of what the officer called “a little patch”; appellant having in his hands a half gallon jar full of whisky. When appellant saw the officer he started to run and disappeared. The officer jumped out of his car and ran around behind the barn, and saw appellant running down a cotton row. He pursued. Appellant threw the half gallon jar of whisky down, but it failed to break. The officer gained on him. Appellant picked up the jar, and threw it at a tree, and again it was not broken, and the officer captured it. Appellant took to his heels. This all occurred a little before sundown.

The officer went back to town, and had a couple of people make affidavit before a magistrate, upon which a search warrant was issued, armed with which the sheriff went back to appellant’s house and watched it all during the night. About daylight he went into the house and found three bottles of whisky and five bottles of home brew.

Appellant defended upon the theory that he went out to the barn with Weatherford for the purpose of trading some live stock, and that, as he was walking up behind the barn, he observed the half gallon jar of whisky in the grass. He said he picked it up, intending to hide it and drink it himself, but, observing the officer he tried to break it, fearing that it would be evidence against him. Interrogated as to the whisky found in the house, he said that some three weeks before that some parties came by and got a meal at his house and gave him some whis-ky in fruit jars. In one place he said his wife emptied it into the bottles in which it was found, and in another place he stated he emptied it into the bottles. He said they had it for medicinal purposes, but did not testify to its use for such purpose. He said he knew nothing about the home brew, and that some one must have left it at his house without his knowledge.

Under these facts, the acts of the officer relative to his finding appellant in possession of a fruit jar containing a half gallon of whisky, when he saw him behind the barn not far from his home, and that the latter fled, were not such as to have required the authority of a search warrant. Any person who violates a criminal statute in the presence of an officer is subject to arrest without warrant, and may be lawfully searched; but what was seen and testified to by the officer near the barn in the instant case was not seen as a result of any arrest or search. The officer was simply in the road, and then in the field, and saw appellant having in his possession, and trying to destroy, a half gallon fruit jar of whisky. Objection was made to the testimony of the officer as to what was found at appellant’s private residence; the ground of the objection being that the affidavit for the search warrant to search said private residence was not in conformity with the requirements of the law. The members of this court are not in accord with each other as to what such requirements are, but are not in disagreement when the affidavit is signed and sworn to by two parties deemed credible by the magistrate, and when such affidavit sets out facts which are deemed by the magistrate to amount to probable cause. The affidavit in this case was made by two affiants, and sets out the facts upon which they based their belief. It is stated that the ground for their belief is that at a prior time, while Sheriff Campbell was watching appellant’s said residence, the latter was seen attempting to deliver what Mr. Campbell took to be whisky to another party. We think the attack on the affidavit not sound.

We do not think the testimony of what was found at appellant’s residence by the search open to the objection that it was proof of a separate and disconnected offense. The finding in appellant’s possession of the half gallon of whisky was at a place a few hundred yards from the appellant’s house, at which latter place the officer found by search within twelve hours afterward a quantity of other intoxicating liquor. The larger the quantity of liquor found in 'possession of 'one accused of so possessing it for the purpose of sale, the stronger the inference that he had it for the unlawful purpose of sale. The latter being one of the issues in this case, we do not think it was necessary to limit the purpose for which this testimony was admitted; it being directly pertinent to one of the issues, the establishment of which rested upon the state.

We are unable to agree that the exceptions to the charge of the court are meritorious. The numerous citation of authorities in the able brief of appellant can all be distinguished from the propositions in support of which same are cited.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

Appellant files an able motion for rehearing, setting forth his belief that we erred in our affirmance, for the reason that the facts stated in the affidavit for search warrant were not sufficient to justify the issuance of such warrant, and further that said affidavit failed to show the private residence of appellant to be a place where intoxicating liquor was made or sold in violation of law, and hence the warrant issued contrary to the provisions of article 691, P. O. Other objections were made, but are not argued.

The affidavit for search warrant in this ease states that the affiants have good reason to believe,' and do believe, that Mat Logan is engaged in the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor in his residence, situated, etc.; that the basis for their affidavit and belief is that he was seen by the sheriff, while previously watching said residence, attempting to deliver to another party what was supposed to be intoxicating liquor. The jurat to this affidavit was in the usual form:

“Sworn to and subscribed before me this the 11th day of September, 1926. O. S. Yates, J. P. Precinct No. 1, Franklin county,, Tex.”

Examination of the affidavit shows that it contains the statement that appellant is engaged in the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors in his residence. This we think sufficient. Said affidavit also states that it is sought upon the fact that the sheriff had previously seen appellant attempting to deliver at his residence liquor deemed intoxicating. ' We are not prepared to say that this recitation of facts is not sufficient to justify the magistrate, or that same did not amount to the probable cause required by our Constitution, and which is defined in Landa v. Obert, 45 Tex. 539, as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of tile offense with which he is charged.

We are not inclined to agree with appellant’s proposition that the facts in this case do not sufficiently support the verdict.

Appellant was .unquestionably in possession of a quantity of liquor. He was seen with it in his possession, and tried to make his escape with same, as set forth in our original opinion. The only question seemingly in any doubt, under the testimony, would be whether he possessed it for the purpose of sale. This fact the jury has resolved against him.

The motion for rehearing will be overruled. 
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