
    Lofton Ryan BURRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-55517
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 13, 2018 
    
    Filed February 22, 2018
    
      Lofton Ryan Burris, Pro Se
    Bernard Kornberg, Attorney, Jan T. Chilton, Attorney, Jon D. Ives, Esquire, Attorney, Severson & Werson APC, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
    Mark D. Estle, Esquire, Senior Counsel, The Estle Law Firm, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee NBS Default Services, LLC
    Kevin Broersma, Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Ticor Title Company of California
    Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Burris's request for oral argument, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.
    
   MEMORANDUM

This matter has been stayed since February 23, 2017 pending resolution of Ho v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., No. 10-56884, or further order of the court. Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company and Wells Fargo Bank, NA’s motion to lift the stay (Docket Entry No. 30) is granted. We hereby lift the stay.

Lofton Ryan Burris appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Burris’s action because Burris failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See id. at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by accepting defendants’ motion to dismiss over Burris’s objection that defendants had not complied with Central District of California Local Rule 7-3. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (standard of review); Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The district court has considerable latitude in managing the parties’ motion practice and enforcing local rules that place parameters on briefing.”).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     