
    City of Kenton et al. v. State ex rel.
    
      Redistricting certain cities — Unconstitutionality of act óf April 27,1898. (90 Ohio Local Laws, 278.)
    
    Tlie act passed by the general assembly, April 27,1893, entitled, “An act to re-district certain cities of the fourth grade of the second class,” is in conflict with the first branch of section 26, article II of the constitution of Ohio, which requires that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state.
    (Decided October 16, 1894.)
    Quo Warranto.
    Error to the Circuit Court of Hardin county.
    On April 27, 1893, the general assembly passed an act entitled, “An act to re-district certain cities of the fourth grade of the second class.” Sections 1 and 2 of the act read as follows:
    “Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, That in every city of the fourth grade of the second class which had at the last federal census a population not less than 5550 and not greater than 5560, or which at any subsequent federal census may have a population of not less than '5550 and not g-reater than 5560, it shall be the duty of the mayor of such city, within five days from the passage of this act, upon petition of not less than twenty electors of such city, to appoint four electors and actual residents of said city, not more than two of whom shall belong to the same political party, who shall constitute a redistricting board for such city.
    “Sec. 2. The members of said board shall be sworn by the probate judge faithfully and impartially to discharge the duties conferred upon them by this act, and shall immediately proceed to redistrict such city into wards, which shall be bounded by center lines of streets, alleys, public grounds, corporation lines, water courses and railroads. ' Said wards shall be composed as nearly as possible of adjacent and compact territory; they shall contain, as nearly as practicable, an equal number of inhabitants, and shall be consecutively numbered. ”
    The state of Ohio, on the relation of O. D. Kelly, as prosecuting attorney of Hardin county, Ohio, the defendant in error, filed its petition in quo wa/rranto, in the circuit court of Hardin county, against the city of Kenton, Ohio, A. W. Munson, John H. Smick, Henry Price and John U. Born, the plaintiffs in error. It was claimed in the petition that the above entitled act is in violation of the constitution of the state of Ohio; and the relator prayed that the said defendants, and each and all of them, may be severally and collectively ousted from exercising’, doing or performing any of the corporate acts, franchise's or privileges sought to be conferred by the act of the general assembly aforesaid;
    There was a demurrer to the petition; the demurrer was overruled, and the defendants excepted to the ruling of the court.
    This proceeding in error is instituted to reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
    
      John H. Smick and George K. Hash, for plaintiffs in error.
    
      John H. Doyle and Phil M. Groto, for defendant in error.
   By the Court.

It is ordained by section 6, article XIII, of the constitution of Ohio, that “the general assembly shall provide for the organization of cities, and incorporated villages by general laws. ’ ’ The act passed by the general assembly, April 27, 1893, entitled, “An act to re-district certain cities of the fourth grade of the second class, ” is a law of a general nature, within the meaning of the first branch of section 26, article II of the constitution. Costello v. Wyoming, 49 Ohio St., 202.

At the time of its passage, the act could have no application to any city in Ohio of the fourth grade of the second class, except the city of Kenton. No other city in the state could come under the provisions of the act, through the aid of existing statutes, without additional legislation. State ex rel. v. City of Toledo, 48 Ohio St., 112. We discover no reason why cities of the fourth grade of the second class, because at the last federal census they had a population not less than five thousand five hundred and fifty, and not greater than five thousand five hundred and sixty, should require exclusive legislation; and a classification of such cities by themselves, upon such a basis, is, in our judgment, too restrictive, uncertain and illusory, to relieve the act from the constitutional infirmity of not being uniform in its operation throughout the state, but local and special in its character.

Judgment affirmed.  