
    William Walker and Alexander Walker against Joseph Willard Gibbs and William Gibbs, garnishees of Joseph Waldo.
    S. C. 2 Dall. 211.
    Under the act of 4 Ann. c. 28, debts are attachable by foreign attachment; but the garnishee is not compellable to pay the money before it is due.
    A judgment in foreign attachment cannot be removed by certiorari. Aliter of the scire facias issued on it.
    The word “exclusive” in the verdict of a jury, construed “over and above ” to effectuate their plain intention.
    This action came before the court on a case stated. It comprehended the whole of the record, and was in substance as follows:
    A foreign attachment was instituted by the plaintiffs against Joseph Waldo in the Common Pleas of Philadelphia county, and his property attached in the hands of the defendants, together with a considerable debt due by them to him. Judgment was obtained the third court; on which, after the execution of a writ of inquiry, a scire facias issued in the Common Pleas against the defendants as garnishees, returnable to March term 1789, which was removed by certiorari into the court to July term 1789.
    The defendants pleaded to the scire fapias thus removed, that they had no goods or effects in their hands at the time of the attachment, or any time after; on which issue was joined. Previous to the trial, the defendants were examined on interrogatories pursuant to the act of assembly passed 28th September 1789, (Loose Acts, pa. .154,) and admitted that they were justly indebted to Waldo by bond dated 17th November 1786, for 10.000I. payable on the 17th November 1790, with interest, but denied owing him any other sums. The cause came to trial on the 24th September 1790. when the jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs tor 1204I. 12s. 4J¿d, exclusive of certain outstanding debts as per list thereof filed, and of a bond from the defendants to the said Joseph Waldo for io,oool. dated 17th November 1786, and due on the 17th November 1790, in the hands of the defendants. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and afterwards when the io,oool. bond became due, the plaintiffs issued a second scire facias *2561 *n court against the garnishee, to shew * cause -* why satisfaction should not be had of the residue of their debt out of this bond. To this second scire facias the defendants appeared and imparled specially; and it was submitted to the court on all the proceedings, whether the plaintiffs were entitled, by law, to recover the remainder of their demand, out of this bond for io,oool.
    Three exceptions were taken by the defendant’s counsel.
    1. It was contended, that a bond, before it became due, was not subject to a foreign attachment.
    It was said that debts were not attachable by the laws of this state; much less bonds before they became due. The act of 4 Ann. c. 28; § 1, pa. 44, declares that attachments shall be served upon the “goods and chattels” of the persons against whom the same shall be awarded; and, in § 2, the words “goods, money, or effects,” are mentioned. But choses in action are comprehended under neither of these expressions: and the late act of 28th September 1789, has no retrospective words. In 3 Eeou. 236, there is a dictum, that bonds before they come due, may be attached by the custom of Eondon. But this is denied to be law in 1 Rol. Ab. 553, pi. 2. Cro. El. 184, 713. 7 Vin. Ab. 229, pi. 2, 3. (Vide 1 Com. Dig. 424, where it is said by Ch. Lord Baron Comyns that the cases in Cro. El. 184, 713, are misreported.)
    B.ut admitting that a bond, before it is due, may be attached by the custom of London, it does not follow that such a bond is attachable here. The state of Pennsylvania is governed by her own laws, not by the customs of London. There can be no general convenience, or propriety, in extending the usages of London, which are confined to the bounds of that city, over the whole of this government. If such customs had been found convenient for England at large, they would have, ere now, been declared to be the law of that kingdom, by statute.
    It is- evident that our practice in foreign attachments, differs greatly from the customs of London. There, a debt assigned cannot be attached. Priv. Londini, 277. There, the plaintiff must swear to his debt in person, and not by attorney, or a stranger. 7 Vin Ab. 230, pi. r. 231, pi. 4.
    And we have learned from respectable authority, that by the custom there, a summons must issue to the original debtor, and a nihil be returned; there -must be four repeated defaults on summons before attachment can issue; that it lies only in cases of debt; and that judgment, in attachment, may be given there at any time.
    
      In every of these particulars, our laws and practice differ. A custom will be void for uncertainty. 7 Vin. Ab. 164. A pre*scription must be founded on reason. Ib. 165, pi. rt.057 8. A custom which may be general, and extend to all L the subjects of England, and is not warranted by, but contrary to the common law, is void. Ib. 179, pi. 4. — 189, pi. 30. Gilb. 51.
    It was also insisted on, that if a bond, due by the garnishee to the original debtor, may be attached, his situation would be extremely unsafe, inasmuch as the obligee may assign it over before the payment thereof to the plaintiff in the attachment, and the obligor be obliged to pay it over again to the assignee.
    To this it was answered by the plaintiff’s counsel, and so ruled by the court, that the generally received opinion, under the act of 4 Ann. c. 28, had been, that debts were attachable by foreign attachment, under the' words ‘1 goods, money or ‘ ‘ effects, ’ ’ and the practice had been uniformly so, since the passing of the act. The law of 28th September 1789, though . it has no retrospection, is a declaratory act; and the legislature, in the preamble thereof, evidently suppose, that the ‘ ‘ credits ’ ’ of the defendant may be attached under the general words of the first law.
    A bond, before the day of payment, is debitum in prcesenti, though solvendum in futtiro, and there is no reason why such a debt may not be attached, as well as any other chose in action. But the garnishee is not compellable to pay the money until the obligation becomes due. A debt may be attached before it becomes due, though it may not be levied till after the day of payment. W. Jon. 406. 1 Sid. 327. 1 Rol. Ab. 553, pi. 5. 2 Danv. 3x6, pi. 2. Bac. 692.
    As to the objection of bonds being assignable by our law, it can have little weight, since mere choses in action are assignable in equity, or ships at sea: and the objection would reach all personal property whatever, which is assignable. The court will not presume there has been an assignment of the bond, unless it be shewn: and, if the fact was so, the party might give it in evidence under the plea of nulla bona. Moreover, the obligor is perfectly secure in paying the bond to the plaintiff in the attachment, unless he should receive notice and due proof of the assignment. And it has been adjudged, that when, after a bankruptcy in England, and before payment to the assignees, money owing to the bankrupt out of England is attached bona fide by regular process, according to the lex loci., the assignees of the bankrupt in such case cannot recover the debt. Doug. 162.
    2. It was contended, that the second scire fiadas was brought on the wrong judgment, and that it should have issued out of the Common Pleas,
    
      *268] * On this head, it was doubted, whether the first scire facias could be removed without a removal of the judgment on which it was founded. The second scire facias, grounded on the attachment in the Common Pleas, and the judgment here on the first scire facias was said to be a perfect novelty. A scire facias cannot issue on a judgment in another court. A scire facias to revive a judgment ought not to be granted, if the record be not in the court where the scire facias was moved for. Trim 24 Car. B. R. Eor the record is the warrant for the scire facias; and, if there be no such judgment, there is no ground to move for it. Style’s Pract. Reg. 495, (3d ed.) 4 Bac. Ab. 409.
    When it appears on the face of a writ that it is bad, the court are bound to quash it at any time. Hob. 280, 281. The plaintiffs must give bail under 4 Ann. c. 28, in the Common Pleas, where the attachment originated, that if the defendant should disprove or avoid the debt within a year and day, he would restore the money recovered; and, therefore, the scire facias could only issue in that court.
    To this it was answered, and so resolved, that there was no ground whatever for the doubt expressed. The judgment in the original action could not be removed by certiorari. The law imposed no restriction on removals of scire facias's founded on judgments, and this court had always exercised the power. Such suits might be removed equally as actions of debt, brought on the judgments of other courts. But, if the law was otherwise, the exception should have been taken on the removal of the first scire facias. The defendants were examined on interrogatories in this court; the trial on the first scire facias was had here, and a judgment had thereon, and the second scire facias was duly issued. This case re- . sembles greatly that of Dorchester v. Webb, (Cro. Car. 373,) where it is resolved, that if an- executor pleads plene admin-istravit, and it is found by the jury, that the defendant hath some assets, although of little value, so as he hath not fully administered, the plaintiff shall have judgment for the entire debt, but he shall not have execution but of as much as is found, and shall not be barred for the residue; and, if more assets come afterwards, he may have a scire facias to have execution thereof. Where the plaintiffs in the attachment give security respecting the disproving, or avoiding the debt within a year and. day, it must necessarily be in the original action, which, as between those parties, was only in the Common Pleas. But it does not follow, that the second scire facias, grounded on the proceedings removed hither, and the judgment thereon, must issue out of that court.
    *2591 *3- Easily, it was insisted, that the verdict was sub- -* stantially defective, and could not now be amended. It was argued, that the verdict was insensible, and conveyed no precise clear idea. To make it suit the plaintiffs case, the word “exclusive” must be construed to be “ inclusive,” which is a greater power than it was presumed the court would assume. A verdict which finds the matter in issue only by argument and inference, is void. 5 Com. Dig. 165. And, however liberal the courts, of late years have been, as to making amendments, their powers will not be exercised in the present instance, where the plaintiffs have issued their scire facias, affirming the verdict as it stands.
    On the part of the plaintiffs were cited the following cases: Hob. 54, 2 Burr. 699, 3 Term Rep. 349, 749, that it needs only to be understood what the intention of the jury was, agreeably to which the verdict may be afterwards moulded into form. Dali. 462.
    Messrs. Ingersoll, Lewis andj. B. M’Kean, pro quer.
    
    Messrs. Rawle, Coxe and Dallas, pro def.
    
   By the court.

We see no reason why an amendment is necessary on the whole of the proceedings. The bond of. io,oool. was admitted by the defendants to be due from them to Waldo, by their answers to the interrogatories, which form a part of the record. The bond was not put in issue to be tried by the jury. We are to judge from the whole of the record. The verdict of the jury is plain and obvious: they find a debt to be due at the time of the trial, from the garnishees to Waldo, of 1204I. 12s. 4j4d., “over and above” the bond which was not denied, and was not then payable, which evidently in this case was the true meaning of the jury, when they made use of the term “exclusive.” Therefore the plaintiffs in our opinion, are entitled by law to- recover the balance pf their demand out of the bond for io,oool.

Judgment incle.  