
    The State v. James Fife.
    The indictment charged a trading with one negro. The evidence was, that defendant traded at the same time, with two negroes belonging to the same owner. Held, to be no variance; and that the evidence supported the indictment.
    The defendant traded at the same time with two negroes, belonging to the same owner; neither of them had a written permit from their master, but each had been furnished by him with a piece of bacon, with instruc-to sell it to defendant, who purchased both pieces. Held, that he was guilty of two distinct offences, and was indictable and punishable for each.
    Tried before Mr. Justice Gantt, Fairfield, Spring Term, 1828.
    The defendant was charged upon two separate indictments, with distinct acts of illicit trading with a slave. The indictment in each case, alleged a trading with “ a certain negro slave.” The evidence was, that Mr. Johnston, the owner of two slaves, Smart and Nat, sent them in the night time to the house of the defendant, each furnished with a piece of bacon, and with instructions to sell it to the defendant; that they went there together, and that defendant purchased from them both pieces of bacon. The counsel for defendant contended, that the offence proved, was a joint trading- with two slaves, and did not support the allegations of either indictment. That this variance was fatal, inasmuch as the act proved, amounted to only one offence, and the admission of such evidence to support either of the indictments, would enable the prosecutor to split it into several offences. His Honour, the presiding- Judge, charged otherwise, and the jury rendered a verdict of guilty in each case.
    
      Columbia,
    May, 1828.
    
      The defendant now moved to set aside the verdicts, and for a new trial upon the ground urged at the trial below.
    Clarke, for the motion.
    Cited Crepps v. Durden. 2 Cowp. 640.
    Peareson, Solicitor, contra.
    
    Cited State v. Sonnerkalb. 2 N. & McC. 280.
    ^ Acte of
   Colcock, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The argument of the defendant amounts to this ; that the owner of the slaves Sustained but one injury, and, therefore, that the defendant is guilty of only one offence. The fallacy of this reasoning is exposed by shewing, that the injury to the owner docs not at all enter into the offence, and therefore, the circumstances which may characterize the injury, determine nothing as to the point in controversy. The Act declares it unlawful to trade with a slave without a permit; and the offenee consists in trading without such permit. It is of no consequence to whom the slave belongs, what the article he sells, how he came by it, or whose property it is. If it is purchased from him without the written permission of his master, the offence is complete. But suppose the injury to the master to be an ingredient of the offence, yet if it be an injury to him to buy from one of his slaves, it is certainly a repetition of it to buy from another. It is conceived that there is no room for doubt, when we look into the act which declares every trading with every slave unlawful.

The case cited from Cowper, is not analogous. There the offence consisted in the time when the act was done. A penalty was imposed for selling bread on Sunday. The offence was not in selling- bread, but selling it on Sunday; and, therefore, repeated acts of selling on the same Sunday, was not a repetition of the offence. The time was the essence of the offence, and only one penalty could be imposed for any number of acts at that time.

Whether we look to the injury, the acts done, or the law, it is clear that, in this case, the defendant has committed distinct of-fences, and is liable to two prosecutions.

Motion refused»  