
    N. J. SPILMAN v. JOHN THOMASSON’S LESSEE.
    (S. C., Thomp. Cas., 71-72.)
    Knoxville,
    September Term, 1850.
    LEVY ON ENTBY. Grant oonclnsive of what.
    Where judgments were recovered before a justice of the peace against a person holding land by a certificate of entry,, upon which land executions from said judgments were levied after the said judgment debtor had assigned the said certificate of entry to his daughter, and after a condemnation and sale, and the purchaser had been in possession more than one year, the daughter assigned said eertificate to another, who procured a grant from the State, the title to the land was thereby vested in him, and he was permitted to recover- the land from said purchaser at the execution sale. These facts existing- anterior to the grant, cannot be looked into for the purpose of invalidating- the grant. [While the court does not state any further reason for its decision than the last sentence, still it seems that the true ground for the decision is that the judgments rendered by the justice were not liens on the judgment debtor’s land, and before any lien was fastened upon it by levy, etc., he had assigned the certificate of entry. The statute expressly authorizes a levy upon lands held by entry or location. (See Code, sec. 4761, and note 23 under see. 4765); but before the levy was made the certificate of entry had been assigned. The other point insisted on for the execution purchaser that the assignment of the certificate of entry by said-debtor’s daughter to the said grantee was void for champerty, was not well taken, because in ejectment suits between adverse claimants of land, evidence is not admissible to show that the grant upon which the interest of one of the parties depends was obtained by fraud, nor to show irregularities and imperfections in the mode of obtaining the g-rant. (Smith v. Winton, 1 Ov., 230; Dodson v. Cocke, 1 Ov., 314; Overton v. Campbell, 5 Hay., 3 63; State v. Nashville University, 4 Hum., 157; Curie v. Banel, 2 Sneed, 63; Parker v. Claiborne, 2 Swan, 565; Ferguson v. Coleman, 5 I-Ieis., 381 (citing, cases); Fowler v. Nixon, 7 Heis., 725; Berry v. Wagner, 13 Lea, 595.) The champerty in the assignment of the certificate of entry could not be considered, and only the grant could be looked to on the point of champerty, upon the above authorities, and as the State cannot be guilty of a champertous act, the g-rant was not vitiated or invalidated by said alleged champerty.]
   John Thomasson, the defendant in error, who was the plaintiff below, claimed title to' the land' in dispute under a grant. It’ appeared that William H. Cook entered the land, April 7, 1827. He assigned his certificate of entry to James Barnett, November 14, 1834. Barnett assigned it to Isaac Cook, July 9, 1839. Cook assigned it to Eliza Cook, his daughter, December 7, 1840; but not before Spilman, plaintiff in error and defendant in the court below, had recovered against him several judgments before a justice of the peace, in October, 1840, upon which levies were made in April, 1841. The papers having been returned to the circuit court, judgment of condemnation was entered and a sale ordered; which sale took place on the 3rd of July, 1841.

Spilman became the purchaser at this sale and entered into possession. In the meantime, Eliza H. Cook, who held the certificate of entry, married to one Ashley; and on the 30th of December, 1844, after Spilman, the purchaser at the execution sale, had been in possession more than a year, she and her husband assigned their certificate of entry to John Thomasson, lessor of the defendant in error, who by virtue of the same obtained a grant issued and dated December 31, 1844.

. It further appeared that at the time of the levy, the officer saw the certificate of entry, and there were but two assignments upon it.

Ejectment by Thomasson’s lessee, setting up title under the grant. Judgment in the circuit court for the plaintiff, the defendant Spilman appealing in error to this com’t.

Heiskell for Spilman insisted that the sale of the entry by the sheriff vested a right in Spilman upon which he might recover against Cook or his assigns, and that, a fortiori he could defend in this action, citing Bumpass v. Gregory, 8 Yer., 46; Heffly v. Hall, 5 Hum., 581; Hall v. Heffly, 6 Hum., 444; and Lee v. Crossna, 6 Hum., 281.

He further’ insisted that the assignment from Ashley and wife to the plaintiff’s lessor was void for champerty, Spilman having previous to that time obtained possession, and having been in possession more than one year.

But the court (McKinney, J., dissenting) held that these facts anterior to the grant, could not be looked into at all for the purpose of invalidating the grant, and affirmed the judgment below.

Judgment affirmed.  