
    
      James S. Guignard vs. Lovick Parr.
    
    Suit commenced, 22d Sept’r., 1849, on an instrument as follows, to wit: “ 28th July, 1845. 1 acknowledge to owe A. B. or order, forty-five dollars for three years rent of the fields and houses I l-eside in, on Congaree creek; commencing 1st. January, 1843, and ending 1st. January, 1846. I have given him an order on J. S., for fifteen dollars, which, when paid, is to, be credited on this. C. D.” Plea the statute of limitations. Held, that the right of action accrued on the day of the date of the instrument.
    The following indorsement on the instrument, to wit: “ Credit fifteen dollars by J. S. 1847, April 10, A. B,” lield, not to take the case out of the statute: .
    
      Before Wardlaw; J. at Lexington, Spring Term, 1850.
    This was a sum. pro., lodged on the 22d September, 1849, upon the following cause of action:
    “ Columbia, 28th July, .1845. I acknowledge, to owe James S. Guignard or order, forty-five dollars for three years rent of the fields and houses I reside in, on Congaree creek,commencing 1st January, 1843, and ending 1st January, 1846. 1 have given him an order on J. H. Wise, for fifteen dollars, which, when paid, is to be credited on this. '
    
      
    
    “ Credit fifteen dollars by Wise, 1847, April 10. J. S. G.”
    The plea was the statute of limitations.
    
      His Honor held that the statute barred the demand. That the debt was due at the date of the note, 28th July, 1845, and not at the expiration of the lease, as contended by plaintiff; and that the credit endorsed by the plaintiff did not take the case out of the operation of the statute.
    The plaintiff appealed and now moved this Court for a new trial, on the following grounds :
    1. That the debt was not payable at the date of the note, but only at the termination of the lease, and that the statute therefore did not bar.
    2. That the credit endorsed upon the note prevented the bar of the statute.
    
      W F. DeiSaussure, for the motion.
    
      Boozer, contra.
   Curia, per

Frost, J.

One may stipulate for the payment of rent in advance, and give a note or due bill for the amount. That is the consideration expressed in the defendant’s due bill. The acknowledgment is of a debt, presently due ; and the statute of limitations must be computed from the date of the due bill, when a right of action accrued to the plaintiff.

Gibson vs. Peebles (2 McC. 418) is direct authority for the admission in evidence of a credit, endorsed on a note for a payment by the debtor, and dated within four years after the note is payable, without any other evidence of the time when the credit was endorsed, except that supplied by the date itself.

But the credit relied on in this case, to take the case out of the statute, was given for a payment made by Wise. Payment is an acknowledgment of a debt. If the security is left in the possession of the creditor, that is evidence that the debt is not paid in full. These inferences can only arise when the payment is made by the debtor himself; not when it is made by another, without notice to the debtor. Wise had no authority to demand the defendant’s due bill. It is not shewn that he knew of it. Guignard’s possession of the due bill, after Wise’s payment, cannot warrant any presumption against Parr, that the due bill was not paid in full. Parr may have paid all that was due, except the amount of Wise’s order. This order was given when Parr made the due hill. The order did not prevent the plaintiff from suing the due hill; and cannot suspend the statute in an action for its recovery. The giving of the order might serve as evidence for the defendant, of payment, pro tanto, of the due bill. The payment of the order cannot be evidence, for the plaintiff, of non-payment of the due bill.

The motion is dismissed.

O’Neall, Evans, WaRdlaw and WitheRS, J. J. concurred.

Motion dismissed.  