
    Fernando M. MALDONADO, Plaintiff-Appellant, LOCAL 803 I.B. OF T. HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND, affiliate with International Brotherhood of Teamsters AFL-CIO, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 11-5361-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 16, 2013.
    Fernando M. Maldonado, pro se, El-mont, NY, for Appellant.
    Stephen H. Kahn, Kahn Opton LLP, New York, NY, for Appellee.
    Present: RALPH K. WINTER, ROSEMARY S. POOLER and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Fernando Maldonado, proceeding pro se, appeals from a November 30, 2011 order denying his Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for relief from the July 2010 judgment dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. See Johnson ex rel. United States v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 642 F.Bd 121, 125 (2d Cir.2011). “A court abuses its discretion when (1) its decision rests on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding; or (2) cannot be found within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. A Rule 60(b) motion is properly denied where it seeks only to relitigate issues already decided. See Zerman v. Jacobs, 751 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir.1984) (dismissing as frivolous an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion, where the appellant “continue[d] to reliti-gate the same issue that the district court [previously] decided”). Moreover, we require “the party seeking to avail itself of [Rule 60(b)(6) ] to demonstrate that ‘extraordinary circumstances’ warrant relief.” Stevens v. Miller, 676 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir.2012); Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir.2004) (“[A] proper case for Rule 60(b)(6) relief is only one of extraordinary circumstances, or extreme hardship.” (quotation marks omitted)). Additionally, a Rule 60(b) motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3) must be made within one year of the entry of the court order, and a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) must be made within a “reasonable time.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c).

Upon a review of the record and case law, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Maldonado’s Rule 60(b) motion. Regardless of whether his motion sought relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3), Maldonado’s motion was time-barred, as it was filed more than 16 months after the district court’s July 2010 judgment dismissing his complaint. The one-year bar under Rule 60(c)(1) is “absolute.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir.2000).

Moreover, to the extent the motion could be construed as seeking relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), Maldonado has not provided any valid reason for the extensive delay. See PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 897 (2d Cir.1983) (in order to determine whether a Rule 60(b) motion was filed within a reasonable time, the court should “scrutinize the particular circumstances of the case, and balance the interest in finality with the reasons for delay”). Furthermore, Maldonado has not established any “exceptional circumstances” or “extreme hardships” that would warrant granting a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Harris, 367 F.3d at 81.

Finally, the Appellee asks this Court to warn Maldonado to cease his “vexatious, duplicative motions and appeals.” Although “courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system” if “a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits,” Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), such measures are unwarranted here.

We have considered all of Maldonado’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  