
    *Daniel D. Free ads. The State.
    To discredit a witness, it is incompetent to offer testimony to prove that the witness has Been guilty of stealing.
    Where incompetent testimony has been received, and no objection is made at the time of its reception, counsel have the right to comment upon it before the jury.
    Before Gantt, J., at -, Fall Term, 1836.
    The defendant was convicted on a charge of trading with a slave. The trading consisted in having sold to a slave three yards of cotton shirting, at twenty cents per yard, Matthew Petigru was introduced as a witness to prove the trading. To show that Petigru was not entitled to credit, testimony was offered, proving that he had been guilty of taking two great coats in Columbia. In the cross examination of Petigru by defendant’s counsel, he was asked questions respecting the cloaks, for the purpose of discrediting his testimony. The evidence was conclusive that Petigru did take the cloaks. The first ground taken for a new trial is correctly stated. I did restrain the counsel within the specified limits, and I refused to permit them to draw conclusions from the evidence of Petigru’s guilt. 1 may have narrowed down the rule to the injury of the defendant. The extent to which counsel may go, appears to be clearly settled.
    If the jury should be permitted to draw conclusions for themselves after a full development of the real character of the witness, whose testimony is impeached, then the counsel were restricted within limits too confined.
    
      See Supra, 458. An.
    
    GROUNDS OF APPEAL.
    1. Because his Honor, the presiding Judge, erred in refusing to allow the defendant’s counsel in argument to impeach the credit of the witness Petigru, by adverting to and relying upon the testimony brought out under the decision of his Honor, that the witness Petigru had stolen two cloaks and a jug.
    2. Because his Honor erred in charging the jury that the testimony, that the witness Petigru had stolen two cloaks and a jug, would not impeach his credit, and that they were bound to regard him free from the guilt of larceny.
    3. Because without the testimony of Petigru, there was not sufficient credible testimony to warrant the jury in finding the defendant guilty.
    
      Gregg, for the motion. Player, Solicitor, contra.
   Curia, per

Butler, J.

The testimony introduced to show that Peti-gru had been guilty of having taken two coats, with a view to discredit him, was clearly incompetent; and there is little doubt that the presiding *Judge would have rejected it, if an objection had been made to its competency. I assume, as it is inferable from the facts reported — that no ojection was made to the introduction of the testimony. The question is, how was it to be regarded after it was permitted to go to the jury. Incompetent te%timony is frequently received by consent; indeed parties are, sometimes, sworn themselves in their own case. When such testimony is so received, it is usually regarded as competent testimony is — to be believed or not believed, as the jury may think proper.

The effect and influence of testimony must depend upon the minds of those who are to be governed bv it. What weight will be given to testimony is a question for the jury, and not for the Judge Iso one mind can prescribe limits to the belief of another, nor say what influence evidence is to have in producing belief. The Judge who tried this case says, “I did restrain counsel within the specified limits, (I suppose the limits specified in the grounds of appeal,) and I refused to permit them to draw conclusions from the evidence of Petigru’s guilt.” This, the Court is of opinion, the Judge could not do. After the evidence was fairly before the jury, counsel had a right to comment on it, as on any other evidence.

The motion for a new trial is granted.

The whole Court concurred.  