
    Roland Brunssen, Appellant, v. Lloyd Parker, Appellee.
    No. 45072.
    April 2, 1940.
    Tobin, Tobin & Tobin and Putnam, Putnam, Fillmore & Putnam, for appellant.
    Harold C. Kruse and Nichols, Nichols & Milroy, for ap-pellee.
   Oliver, J.

Appellant was injured' in a héad-on collision between an automobile in which he was riding and a car driven by appellee. The accident occurred at night, near the crest of a hill, on a narrow paved country highway. The car in which appellant was riding was then attempting to pass another car, traveling in the same direction, and was on the left-hand side of the highway. Alleging the collision was due to the negligence of appellee, appellant instituted this action at law. Tbe case was tried to a jury, appellee then not being represented by tbe counsel wbo now appear for bim. Tbe jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant. Tbe trial court set aside tbe verdict and granted a new trial. Tliis appeal is taken from said order.

Appellee’s motion for new trial contained several grounds, one of wbicb was tbat tbe verdict was contrary to tbe evidence. In addition to sustaining tbe motion generally tbe court’s order contained tbe following:

“In granting tbe new trial aforesaid tbe court does not limit itself to tbe matters set forth in tbe motion for new trial filed by tbe defendant herein but tbe court feels and is persuaded tbat it cannot give its approval to. tbe verdict returned by tbe jury herein in view of tbe entire record in tbe cause and believes that. in furtherance of justice tbe cause should be retried. ” .

One of tbe grounds of tbe motion for new trial was tbat tbe verdict was contrary to tbe evidence. Tbe motion was sustained generally. Tbe evidence was in serious conflict. These elements bring this case squarely within tbe rule* established by a-long'line of decisions tbat where tbe evidence is conflicting tbe order of a trial court granting a new trial upon tbe ground tbat tbe verdict is contrary to -the evidence will not be reversed unless'it clearly appears there has been an abuse of tbe discretion lodged in tbe trial court. Mitchell v. Heaton., 227 Iowa 1071, 290 N. W. 39; In re Estate of Younggren, 225 Iowa 348, 280 N. W. 556; Hawkins v. Burton, 225 Iowa 1138, 281 N. W. 790; Rupp v. Kohn, 210 Iowa 969, 232 N. W. 174; Woodbury Company v. Dougherty & Bryant, 161 Iowa 571, 143 N. W. 416; Porter v. Madrid State Bank, 155 Iowa 617, 136 N. W. 666; Thomas v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 169 Iowa 337, 151 N. W. 387.

Tbe order also stated tbat under tbe entire record the court could not give its approval to tbe verdict and believed that in furtherance of justice tbe cause should be retried. If a party has not received a fair and impartial trial, tbe trial court has inherent power to set aside tbe verdict. Morton v. Equitable Life Insurance Co., 218 Iowa 846, 254 N. W. 325; Thomas v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., supra; In re Estate of Younggren, supra.

The remaining question is whether or.not the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the verdict and- granting a new trial A careful examination of the record persuades us that there was no abuse of discretion in' the ruling.

In view of this conclusion other grounds of the motion and ruling need not be considered.

The order of the trial court is affirmed. — Affirmed.

Chief Justice and all Justices concur.  