
    Horace Curtis v. The State of Ohio.
    A person who makes it a business to keep a house of entertainment for travelers, is a tavern-keeper, within the statute, though he keeps no liquor in, his house, for any purpose.
    This was a writ of error brought to reverse a judgment rendered against the plaintiff in error, by the court of common pleas of "Washington county, and was adjourned here for decision by the Supreme Court.
    The case was this: Curtis was indicted for that “on the first day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-one, and from that day to the present term of this court, with force and arms, at Belpre township, in said county of Wash■ington, the said Curtis did keep a tavern, without being duly licensed as a tavern keeper, contrary to the statute, etc.
    The indictment was found at May term, 1832, and was predicated upon the following provision of the statute : “ If any person shall keep a tavern, or shall retail spirituous liquors, or shall vend or sell any spi2’ituous liquors of any kind, to be drank at the place where sold, or shall vend or sell such spirituous liquors by less quantity than one quart, without being duly licensed as a keeper of such tavern, each and every person so offending, shall ^forfeit and pay for each offense any sum not exceeding one hundred dollars, nor less than five dollars,” etc.
    The evidence given on the trial is set forth in the subjoined bill of exceptions : “ The defendant, at the time alleged in the indictment, and thence hitherto, had received and entertained travelers and their horses, for compensation, at his house, situate upon hi» farm in Belpre township. That defendant’s house was and is situate near the junction of several leading and public roads, Upon which there was much traveling, and that it was usual and customary for travelers to make the defendant’s house a stopping place either for breakfast, dinner, horse-feed or lodging; that such were in the habit of stopping there without invitation, and with no more ceremony than is usually practiced ata tavern. That the defendant was never known to turn any such persons away, but, on the contrary, furnished food and lodging, stabling and horse-feed, as desired, receiving therefor reasonable compensation.” It was further proved that the defendant did not, during such time, sell, vend, or retail any vinous or spirituous liquors to any person ; that he did not give or furnish any such liquors to his guest» or any other person, and that he did not keep any in his said house. Upon the foregoing facts, the court of common pleas charged the jury that if they should find the facts as stated in the bill of exceptions to be true, such facts constituted a tavern-keeper within the statute, and an offense under the statute. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was adjudged to pay a fine of ten dollars and costs. To reverse this judgment the present writ of error was brought.
    Goddard and Converse for the plaintiff in error,
    contended that the term tavern, as used in the statute, embraced onty those who kept public houses for supplying guests with liquors, as well as food and lodgings. They cited Johnson’s Dictionary, Shakespeare, and Swift, and, as being in principle analogous, Parkhurst v. Foster, 1 Salk. 387.
    Nye, for the state,
    argued, that persons who made it a business regularly, and whenever called upon, to supply travelers and their horses with entertainment, for compensation, *and who was' notoriously known as furnishing such supplies, were tavern-keepers, within the statute, and subject to its penalties. On the construction of the statutes, he cited 6 Bac. Ab. 380; 2 Cranch, 386. The case cited from Salkeld was considered as bearing no analogy to this.
   The court were divided in opinion : Judges Hitchcock and Uollet, for reversing the judgment; Judges Lane and Wright, for affirming it. So, according to the rule of the court, the judgment was affirmed, no opinion being given.  