
    William Clap versus Shubael Bell.
    The sheriff cannot retain goods attached by him on mesne process after judgment is rendered for the defendant, although the plaintiff reviews the account
    This was a writ of replevin brought to replevy certain chattels which the defendant, who is a deputy sheriff of this county, had attached as the property of the present plaintiff.
    By a statement of facts, upon which the opinion of the Court was given, it appeared that Brazier and Davis, in February, 1803, commenced a suit against Clap, on which the defendant, Bell, attached the goods in question. On the 8th day of January, 1806, a verdict was given for Clap in that suit, and judgment rendered thereon for costs against the then plaintiffs. On the 13th of February following, * Brazier and Davis sued a writ [ * 100 ] of review of that judgment, which Was duly served on Clap on the 21st of the same February, and was still pending. On the 15th of October, 1806, Clap sued this writ of replevin, having previously demanded the goods of Bell, who refused to deliver them, by the direction of Brazier and Davis, they claiming a right to hold them under the attachment, until the determination of the said review.
    
      Blake, of counsel for the defendant,
    was called on by the Court; and he contended that under the existing statutes a review must be considered as a continuation of the original suit, being confined to the same pleadings, &c. The provision in this respect was very different from the old statutes on the subject, under which a review is considered as an original suit. By the statute of 1784, c. 28, <§>11, “All goods and estate attached upon mesne process for the security of the debt or damages sued for, shall be held for the space of thirty days after final judgment, to be taken in execution.'” Now, it seems to be absurd to call that a final judgment, which the party against whom it is rendered may cause to be reviewed, and of which he may suspend the execution. It resembles more the judgment of an inferior court, from which there lies an appeal, in which case goods attached are still held to respond the judgment of the court having the appellate jurisdiction.
    
      
      C. Paine, on the other side,
    was stopped by the Court, whose opinion was the next day delivered by
   Parsons, C. J.

Bell, the deputy sheriff, contends that, on the facts in this case, the attachment continued in force, and that it was his duty to retain the goods notwithstanding Clap’s demand. But we are all of opinion that, when goods or estate are attached by virtue of an original writ to secure the judgment, which the plaintiff may recover, if on the appeal judgment be rendered for the defendant, the attachment is ipso facto dissolved ; and the sheriff can no longer retain the property attached against the demand of the defendant. If the plaintiff should recover judgment, and should delay delivering his execution to the sheriff for thirty days, then the attachment is also dissolved. According to the agreement of the parties in this case, the defendant must be called.  