
    MOORE’S CASE.
    (8 Court of Claims R., 560; 91 U. S. R., 270.)
    Joseph Moore, appellant, v. The United States, appellees.
    
      On the claimant’s Appeal.
    
    
      On the trial the defendants produce a hill of sale of the cotton in dispute, pwportvng to he from the claimant to the Confederate government, and ash the court to malee comparison of handwriting with the signature to a power of attorney on file authorizing prosecution of this suit. The claimant’s counsel admits that the power was filed by or on hehalf of the claimant, and that by authority thereof the attorney of record appeared. The poiver bears what appears to he an original signature of the claimant. The court malees suck comparison and finds the signature to the hill of sale to he the handwriting of the claimant. Without other evidence the court finds the title to the cotton to have passed to the Confederate States. Judgment for defendants. The claimant appeals.
    
    I. The law of evidence by which the Court of Claims must he governed is that of the common law.
    II. The general rule of the common law disallows a comparison of handwriting as proof, hut there are exceptions as well settled as the rule itself. One is that if a paper admitted to he in the handwriting of the party or to have been subscribed by him is in evidence for some other purpose in the cause, the signature or paper in question may be Compared with it by the jury. (Affirming the decision of the Court of Claims in Medway’s Case, (6 C. Cls., p. 421,) where this point was first determined.)
    
      III. Comparison of handwriting may be instituted with the signature to a power of attorney on file in the court, by authority of which the attorney of record has prosecuted the suit, although the signature to the power has not been proved nor in terms admitted to be the signature of the party.
    
      The Reporters' statement of the case:
    The decision in the court below went entirely upon the authority of the former decision in Medway's Oase. There being no other point in the case it Was not reported, and is merely noted among the judgments of the term in 8 O. Cls. B.., p. 560. The following are the findings of fact on which the appeal was argued.
    The petitioner claims the net proceeds of 26§ bales of upland cotton, and the court finds the facts to be:
    Thatthe petitioner, a British subject, owned and was possessed of said 26§ bales, stored in a warehouse in Saint Joseph’s, in the State of Louisiana.
    That on that day it was seized by the United States, by the boats of their marine brigade under the command of Colonel Ellet, and taken from the possession of the petitioner and sold by the United States, and the net proceeds thereof, amounting to the sum of $5,780, paid into the Treasury.
    That after said seizure, and while the said cotton was in a boat of the marine brigade, the said petitioner sold the said cotton, as appears by the certificate or paper-writing, and a copy of which is hereto annexed and marked “A.”
    Thatthe original of said paper-writing marked “A” was proved in court by a comparison, made by the judges of the court, of the handwriting and signature of said-paper-writing with the handwriting and signature of the petitioner in another paper-writing in evidence, for other purposes in this cause.
    At the hearing the petitioner offered his own deposition, taken in May, 1872, to prove that he was induced to make the sale of his cotton above stated to Cummings, a sutler on board the boat on which the cotton after its seizure was loaded, by the duress of his cotton and the connivance of the officer who seized it with Cummings. And the deposition was not admitted as evidence, but rejected.
    On the facts stated it was ordered that the petition in this case be dismissed.
    
      
      Messrs. Bartley & Casey for the appellant:
    The court below erred in admitting proof of execution of the papers in question by comparison of handwriting. If comparison be admissible to prove the execution, it could only be by experts, and it is not shown that the judges of the Court of Claims, or any of them, are such experts. The mode of proof adopted deprived the claimant of the right of cross-examination, or of testing the knowledge and accuracy of the witnesses by whom the facts were to be established. The very point is ruled by this court, that proof of execution by comparison is inadmissible where the witness has had no prior knowledge of the handwriting. (Strother v. Lúeas, 6 Peters, 763 ; Rogers v. Ritter, 12 Wall., 321; Martin v. Taylor, 1 W. C. 0., 363.) In Pennsylvania comparison is only admitted in corroboration of other testimony. (MeCorkle v. Binns, 3 Binn., 349; Bank v. WMtehill, 10 S. & B., 110;) Bank v. Raldeman, 1 Pa. Bep., 161; Baker v. Raines, 6 Wharton, 266; Depue v. Flaee, 7 Barr, 428.) Same rule in New York. (People v. Spooner, 1 Denio, 343; TitfordY. Knott, 2 John., 211; Jackson v. Phillips, 9 Cow., 94; Wilson v. Kirtland, 5 Hill, 182.) In Maryland that it is not competent to prove by comparison is too firmly established to be disturbed. (Smith v. Walton, 8 Gill, 77;) same in Kentucky, (7B. Mon., 269 ;) same in Alabama, (2 Ala., 703;) same in Bhode Island, (2 B. I., 319; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 576, et seq.)
    
    If the evidence of comparison be admissible at all, it must be by experts. And it does not appear in any way that these judges, or any of them, are such experts.
    The party against whom such evidence is admitted is precluded from contesting or gainsaying in any way the accuracy or extent of the knowledge by which the instrument is decided to be that of the party.
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Smith for the United States:
    Comparison of hands has always been considered a legitimate mode of determining as to the authenticity of a signature.
    In the opinion, Judge Loring speaks of it as the method sanctioned in Medway’s Case (6 C. Cls. B., 421) and “ the law of the court;” it would be more accurate to say that it was adopted because found on examination to be the law of the land. (See the cases cited in 6 C. Cls. Ii., 429, 432; also Henderson v. Hackney, 16 G-a., 521; Me Gor cicle v. Binns, 5 Binn., 340; Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn., 55; Adams v. Meld, 21 Vt., 256; Homer v. Wallis, 11 Mass., 309 ; Moody v. Howell, 17 Pick., 490; Richardson v. Newconib, 21 Pick., 315.)
    And in Chandler v. Le Barron, (45 Me., 534,) the plaintiff was allowed to put in a signature that he had required his opponent’s witness to write in the presence of the jury, in order that a comparison of it with the signature in controversy might be instituted by the jury without the intervention of experts. In very many cases, (e. g., Hides v. Person, 19 Ohio, 426) — perhaps in nearly all where the point has been made — experts have been allowed to compare signatures and give their opinion thereon to the jury. The papers upon which these opinions were formed then go to the jury, and from them they determine whether the expert came to a correct or to an erroneous conclusion. Is it not absurd to say that the jury cannot examine the papers as independent testimony, yet can decide, upon an inspection of them, that testimony which has been given for their guide in this matter was unreliable and the witness mistaken ?
    Every day capital causes are determined by comparisons; and where, as in many States, views are ordered, comparisons are made by the jury. They see that the shoe ffts an impression, or are told that it did; that a hat fits a certain head; that a child in features and appearance resembles or does not resemble the putative father; {Finnegan v.'Dugan, 14 Allen, 197;) though testimony to such likeness (Hddy v. Gray, 4 Allen, 435) or unlikeness (Young v. Makepeace, 103 Mass., 50) is not admitted. All this is simply recognizing’the existence of a natural law of similitude in the matters inquired of, and allowing the jury to determine whether or not such similarity is found in the cause upon trial.
    The paper being properly received, and the court finding its statement of a sale to be true, the claimant was not entitled to prosecute the petition, because of his failure to prove “ to the satisfaction of said court his ownership of the property and his right to the proceeds;” (12 Stat. L., 820, § 3 ; Hashell v. Hilton, 30 Me., 419.)
   Mr. Justice Bradley

delivered the opinion of the court:

According to the facts found in this case we think no error was committed by the court below. It appeared from a docu-meut purporting to be signed by the claimant that he had sold the cotton in question ou the 12th of December, 1863, and therefore that he was not entitled to claim the proceeds thereof from the United States. The only question of importance is, whether the signature to this document was properly proved. The court compared it with his signature to another paper in evidence for other purposes in the cause, respecting which there seems to have been no question, and from that comparison adjudged and found that the signature was his. Had the court a right to do this ¶ The Court of Claims, like a court of equity or admiralty, or an ecclesiastical court, determines the facts as well as the law. And the question is, whether they may determine the genuineness of a signature by comparing it with other handwriting of the party. By the general rule of the common law this cannot be done, either by the court or a jury. And that is the general rule of this country, although the courts of a few States have allowed it, and the legislatures of others as well as of England have authorized it. In the ecclesiastical courts, which derived their forms of proceeding from the civil law, a different rule prevails. The questionis, by whatlawis the Court of Claims to be governed in this respect ? - May it adopt its own rules of evidence, or is it to be governed by some system of law ? In our opinion it must be governed by law; aiid we know of no system of law by which it should be governed other than the common law. That is the system from which our j udicial ideas and legal definitions are derived. The language of the Consti-tutiou and of many acts of Congress could not be understood without reference to the common law. The great majority of contracts and transactions which come before the Court of Claims for adjudication are permeated and are to be adjudged by the principles of the common law. Cases involving the principles of the civil law are the exceptions. We think that where Congress has not provided, and no special reason demands, a different rule, the rules of evidence as found in the common law ought to govern the action of the Court of Claims. If a more liberal rule is desirable, it is for Congress to declare it by a proper enactment.

But the general rule of the common law disallowing a comparison of handwriting as proof of signature has exceptions equally as well settled as the rule itself. One of these exceptions is that if a paper admitted to be in the handwriting of the party, or to have been subscribed by him, is in evidence for some other purpose in the cause, the signature or paper in question may be compared with it by the jury. It is not distinctly stated in this case that the handwriting used as a basis of comparison was admitted to be in the claimant’s hand, but it was conceded by counsel that it was in fact the power of attorney given by him to his attorney ill fact, by virtue of which he appeared and presented the claim to the court. This certainly amounted to a declaration on his part that it was in his hand, and to pretend the contrary would operate as a fraud on the court. We think it brings the case within the rule, and that the Court of Claims had the right to make the comparison it did.

The decree is affirmed.  