
    Daniel Swett vs. Francis Dodge, et al.
    A contract must be governed by the law of the place where it is to be performed.
    The courts of law in this state cannot judicially know the rate of interest of a foreign state ; that being regulated by the law of such state, must be proven, as a fact, to the court.
    A note payable in the district of Columbia, on the Maryland side thereof, will bear the rate of interest of the law regulating that portion of the district, which rate, not being judicially known to the court, must be proved.
    In error, from the W arren circuit court.
    Francis Dodge and Alexander Dodge sued Daniel Swett, to the April term, 1842, of the Warren circuit court, upon a note, of which the following is a copy, viz.:
    
      “ §229. Georgetown, August 23, 1836.
    Five years after date, I promise to pay Davidson & Dodge, or order, two hundred and ninety-nine dollars, for value received, with interest from date. Daniel Swett.”
    Indorsed, “ Davidson & Dodge.”
    On the trial, the counsel for the plaintiffs admitted that the note sued on was executed in Georgetown, in the district of Columbia, on the Maryland side of the district, and that all the parties resided there at the date of the note. The note sued on was all the evidence before the jury.
    The plaintiffs then claimed six per cent, interest, as the rate authorized by the law of the district of Columbia, applicable to the contract, to which the defendant’s counsel objected, and insisted that the plaintiff’s counsel should prove what the law of the district of Columbia was, on the subject of interest, before any interest could be allowed. The circuit court, however, decided that it was bound to know the law of the district of Columbia, regulating interest, and instructed the jury that the interest there was at the rate of six per cent, per annum ; to which decision and instruction the defendant below excepted.
    
      The jury assessed the damages of the plaintiff at four hundred and eighteen dollars, and the defendant below prosecuted this writ of error.
    
      John M. Chilton, for plaintiff in error.
    The court erred in deciding that it could judicially take cognizance of a statute of Maryland, or Virginia, regulating interest. The act of congress, creating the district of Columbia, does not reenact the statutes of Virginia, or Maryland, and thereby make them a part of itself; they are not, therefore, a part of that act. It merely declares, that “ the operation of the laws of the states within said district, shall not be affected'1'1 by the change or division of territory ; thus leaving those laws precisely as if no allusion had been made to them. This is not an “adoption,” but a refusal to change, alter, or “affect” laws already existing, independently of the act of congress referred to. Therefore,
    The distinction taken between these laws and the laws of any other state, is fanciful and unsubstantial. Though courts are bound to know judicially all the acts of congress, yet as the existing laws of Maryland and Virginia do not derive their obligation from the act creating the district, but from acts of the legislatures of those several states, long prior to this act of congress, they form no essential part of this act, and are not, therefore, judicially cognizable by our courts, but must be proved, as laws of other states.
    In regard to the cases cited, to show that the court will not reverse the judgment in this case, because the interest adjudged is less than Mississippi interest, to which the plaintiff contends he would, in the absence of proof, be entitled, we think that this position is rather petitio principii, as well as an assumption of fact. In this case the plaintiffs relied on the statute of Maryland, and claimed the interest of that state. The onus of proof, therefore, rested on them, and not on the defendants. Had the plaintiff claimed Mississippi interest, so as to throw the onus of proof on the defendant, and the defendant had failed to prove the rate of interest in Maryland, and that the contract was made there, then the court might, as decided in the cases referred to, have presumed that the law of Mississippi was the law of the contract. But this was not the fact, nor the issue in this case. The only issue was, the competency of the proof offered by the plaintiffs; or, in other words-, the power of the judge judicially to take cognizance of the law of Maryland. And if the judgment of the court below should be reversed, the plaintiffs cannot abandon this issue, but will be compelled to produce an exemplified copy of the law of Maryland ; or it may turn out that there is less or no interest allowed by that state, in which event judgment would be for less, or none.
    
      W. A. Lake, for defendant in error.
   Per Curiam.

The judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. See Martin, Aikin, et al. v. Martin, Pleasants, Co., 1 S. & M. 176.  