
    HONG DUAN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-1919-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 11, 2010.
    David J. Rodkin, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General; Carl H. McIntyre, Assistant Director; Justin R. Markel, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JON 0. NEWMAN, ROSEMARY S. POOLER and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.
    
    
      
      . The Honorable Sonia Sotomayor, originally a member of this panel, was elevated to the Supreme Court on August 8, 2009. The Clerk has designated, by random selection, the Honorable Jon O. Newman to replace her. See Local Rule 0.14(2).
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Hong Duan, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 28, 2008 order of the BIA, affirming the May 15, 2006 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Sandy K. Horn, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Hong Duan, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 28, 2008), ajfg No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (Im-mig. Ct. N.Y. City May 15, 2006). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

As an initial matter, we note that the government correctly argues that Duan waives any challenge to the agency’s denial of his application for relief insofar as it was based on his family planning claim. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005). Likewise, Duan waives any challenge to the agency’s denial of his application for CAT relief. Id. We do not agree, however, -with the government’s contention that Duan waives any challenge to the IJ’s burden of proof finding. Indeed, as the BIA indicated, the IJ’s burden of proof finding was inextricably linked to his adverse credibility determination, which Duan challenges before this Court. Additionally, the government incorrectly argues that Duan failed to exhaust before the BIA his argument that the IJ erred in concluding that his whistle blowing activities did not constitute a protected ground under the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-20 (2d Cir.2007). We need not consider this argument, however, where the IJ alternatively considered his whistle blowing activities as an exercise of his political opinion and, as discussed below, reasonably found him not credible. See Jin Hui Gao v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 963, 964 (2d Cir.2005).

When, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s conclusion that a petitioner is not credible and, without rejecting any of the IJ’s grounds for decision, emphasizes particular aspects of that decision, we review both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions — or more precisely, we review the IJ’s decision including the portions not explicitly discussed by the BIA. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.2005). We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility findings, under the substantial evidence standard. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 2007).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See Jin Hui Gao, 400 F.3d at 964. Indeed, the IJ reasonably found implausible Duan’s purported ability to obtain an exit permit and depart China using his own passport, particularly where he claimed that the Public Security Bureau (“PSB”) sought to arrest him and where there was evidence in the record that the PSB is the office that issues exit permits and provides fugitive lists to Chinese airports. See Ying Li v. BCIS, 529 F.3d 79, 82-83 (2d Cir.2008). Moreover, Duan waives any specific challenges to the IJ’s findings that: (1) it was implausible that Chinese government officials would have selected him to be a member of a corruption task force; and (2) that he failed to submit sufficient corroborating evidence. See Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7.

Ultimately, because a reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled to conclude to the contrary, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. See Shu Wen Sun, 510 F.3d at 379. Thus, the agency’s denial of Duan’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal based on his political opinion was proper. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (recognizing that withholding of removal necessarily fails if the applicant is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Having completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 
      
      . Duan incorrectly argues that in finding him not credible both the IJ and BIA ignored our order on remand by failing to apply the principles addressed in Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297 (2d Cir.2003). To the contrary, both the IJ and the BIA applied the principles discussed in that case.
     