
    Jo Ann AVERY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of James Avery, Deceased, and for the use and benefit of Cynthia Ann Avery and Charles Mark Avery, minors, surviving children of James Avery, Deceased, and Jo Ann Avery, individually, Appellants, v. Donald OWEN and City of Sweetwater, Appellees.
    No. 80-2318.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Aug. 11, 1981.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 21, 1981.
    
      Daniels & Hicks and Sam Daniels, Head-ley & Headley, Miami, for appellants.
    Kimbrell, Hamann, Jennings, Womack, Carlson & Kniskern and R. Owen Ricker, Jr. and Susan J. Cole, Miami, for appellees.
    Robert A. Ginsburg, County Atty. and Ralph C. Rocheteau, Asst. County Atty., for Metropolitan Dade County as amicus curiae.
    Before BARKDULL and FERGUSON, JJ., and MELVIN, WOODROW M. (Ret.), Associate Judge.
   FERGUSON, Judge.

Though we agree that defendants-appellees acted as special agents of Metropolitan Dade County in this case, we find that an ambiguity exists as to whether the parties to the release intended the word “agents” to include appellees. The City of Sweetwater is a political subdivision distinct from Metropolitan Dade County. Ap-pellees became temporarily vested as officers of Dade County when they responded to an emergency call for help from the County. Florida law does not hold that discharge is allowed only to those defendants specifically named, but it does require a clear manifestation of intent to discharge. Hurt v. Leatherby Insurance Co., 380 So.2d 432 (Fla.1980). Appellant released “Metropolitan Dade County, its officers, agents, and employees” and defendant “Edward Hafner”, who as a Metropolitan Dade County Officer is without question an agent of the County. The specific inclusion of agent Hafner and the failure to name Owen and the City of Sweetwater who may be considered “agents” in this case only because they responded to an emergency situation, creates a question of intent precluding entry of summary judgment. Hurt, supra.

Reversed.  