
    Robert B. Daniel v. Duncan Ray, et. al.
    
    
      Tried before Mr. Justice Earle, at Chesterfield — Fall Term, 1882.
    This was an action on a note given for the purchase in part, of a negro which the defendant Ray had bought from the plaintiff.
    „ when the dc-■torney'had ”ord!a°e“ Ixeiul tion of the note not, afterwaids, quire0tlproof ‘of
    ^ainsttliemaker f?™ note, which hi'evSelfli-’ aw by of count,a paroi the™egro^^id fendant, ‘'‘when due, theptai„aff *oúw^take 'ipCtheñote.slTC
    _&t gome time previous to the attorney had agreed to dispense with the prooí oí the and signed a written admission of its due exe-cut ion, on the record. On the trial this was produced the plaintiff, and he offered no other evidence on P0^- The defendant’s counsel objeeted, that he had withdrawn this admission, and moved the Court leave to do so, on the ground that before the last Term he had given the plaintiff notice that he would reqUire strict proof of the note. His Honor held as the agent of his clients, the counsel had the right to make the admission, that it was virtually an acknowledgment by the defendants themselves, not confined to any particular Court, nor to any special and refused the motion. A notice of discount was filed, in which the defendant claimed damages for the breach of a parol agreement, he produ-eed and proved the bill of sale of even date with the note in the usual terms; and then offered the following parol testimony “that when the defendant bought the negro, the contract was, that the plaintiff. should come after the money when the note fell due, that if the negro did not suit the defendant, the plaintiff was then to take him back, and give up the note; or that he was to furnish another negro that would suit the defendant; that the plaintiff did not come after the money, that the negro did not suit the defendant, and that the plaintiff did notlurnish the defendant with another.”
    His Honor held, that as the contract, aa^appearaul^ from the bill of sale and note, was absolute and unconditional, the testimony offered, would have the effect of making the bill of sale conditional, and went to shew that instead of buying the negro, the defendant merely took him on trial; that it would also make the note conditional and establish a parol defeazance in contradiction to the absolute written undertaking to pay; when the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the document itself is the only evidence in regard to it which the law should recognize so long as it exists, and oral declarations of the parties at the time of execution, should not be admitted to alter or contradict it; that the parol agreement was either prior to the bill of sale and note which constitutes the written evidence of the contract, or cotemporaneous with them; if the former, it was superseded by them; if the latter, it is contradictory to them, andón either ground inadmissible. The evidence was therefore rejected.
    A verdict was found for the plaintiff, and the defendants now move for anew trial on the grounds,
    1. That his Honor refused to allow the defendant’s counsel to withdraw his admission of the note-.
    
      2. BecausehisHonorrejected the evidence which was offered to shew aparol contract,for the breach, of which the defendant claimed damages byway of discount.
    Graham, for the motion.
    On the 1st ground contended that the Circuit Court had mistaken the agency of the Attorney. Oil the 2nd ground he cited and relied on, 2 Bailey, 305. 1 Marsh. 582. 4 Hen. & Munf. 101. 1 Wash. 14. Norris’ Peake, 178. 1 Yates Rep. 132. 2 Dallas, 171. Long, on Sales, 264. 2 Johns. cases, 253.
   MARTIN J.

(sitting for Q’Neall, J.) delivered the opinion of the Court. — I concur fully with the presiding judge, who refused to allow the defendant’s counsel to withdraw the admissions made on the record of the hand-writing. The reasons assigned in the report are entirely satisfactory. But it may be added that the circumstances are strikingly analagous to'the case of the defendant’s having, by pleading, admitted the cause of action, and at the trial, asked leave to withdraw the plea. It then would become, as it was in this case (putting it in the strongest light for the defendant,) an application to the discretion of the Court. And if it be considered as addressed to the Court’s discretion, but few will question its having been properly exercised in this case.

It cannot be denied that some of the cases relied on by defendants in support of the second ground for a new trial, go very far to support it. But they do not go the whole length contended for; and if they did, it would become a question whether the long established and settled opinions and practice of our Courts, were again to be set afloat. I could not consent that they should be, unless very fully satisfied that they were founded in error, and were instrumental in producing injustice. Without going, into an argument to shew that none of these evils exist, but on the contrary, that these opinions and this practice, are in conformity with rules of evidence fully recognized and acquiesced in by the most learned jurists, it is sufficient to say, that the last case on this question (Caston v. Perry, 2 Bailey, 342, ) must be considered as furnishing the law on this point raised by this ground.

The motion is refused.  