
    GENERAL COURT (E. S.)
    APRIL TERM, 1800.
    Garrett vs. Hughlett, Exr. de son tort of Dixon.
    Scire eacias upon a judgment obtained in this court, on a verdict in an action of trespass for mesne profits, brought by the present plaintiff against Dixon in his lifetime. On the day before the judgment, Dixon had conveyed all his real estate by deed to the present defendant; and after the judgment, upon the payment of certain sums of money by the defendant for him, he (Dixon) made a bill of sale of his negroes also to the present defendant. The defendant after-wards distrained upon Dixon for rent accruing for the use of the premises, so as aforesaid conveyed by the deed before mentioned, and of which Dixon had continued in possession, and some personal property of Dixon was sold under the distress, the proceeds of which came to the hands of the defendant after Dixon’s death.
    A bill of sale of personal property-may be deemed fra u do lent fron} other circumstan-ceh than that of the vendor’s continuing’ in possession; and the acknowledgment &L recording of th* bill of sale, where the vendor re* mams in possession, is not conclusive to show the absence offrauri.
    A distress for rent in arrear, to be legal, must bo agreeably to the statute, 2 W. & M. sess. 1, ch. 5.
    
    
      Hammond for the plaintiff contended,
    that the defendant had made himself executor de son tort of Dixon, upon two grounds.
    First. That the bill of sale being fraudulent, (Dixon continuing in the possession of the negroes,) the receipt of the negroes, after the death of Dixon, was such an unlawful intermeddling with his goods, as made the defendant an executor de son tort.
    
    Secondly. That the distress being irregular and illegal, tue sale of Dixon’s goods, and the receipt of the proceeds thereof by the defendant, made him an ■executor de son tort in like manner.
    The illegality of the distress was in not complying with the requisites of the statute of 2 W, & M. sess, 1, oh. .5.
    
      Bullitt, for the defendant,
    in reply to the first ground, contended, that inasmuch as the hill of sale was duly acknowledged and recorded, according to the requisites of the act of assembly, it could not he deemed fraudulent.
   The Court were of opinion, that such a bill of salo might be deemed fraudulent from other circumstances than the continuance of possession. The act of assembly, by requiring the bill of sale to be acknowledged and recorded within a limited time, intended by those circumstances of notoriety to take off the presumption of fraud arising from the vendor’s continuing in possession. But if there were other circumstances attending the transaction, which tended to shew it fraudulent, those circumstances might be given in evidence.

The court were also of opinion that the distress was illegal. . Yerdict for the defendant.

N. B. This seems to be a judicial decision, that the abovementioned statute of 2 W. & M. sess. 1, ch. 5, is in force in this state.  