
    Mohammad Monir HASSAN, Naziat Hassan, Nasrin Hassan, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-4267-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 27, 2012.
    
      Lawrence Spivak, Jackson Heights, NY, for Petitioners.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Anthony P. Nieastro, Senior Litigation Counsel; Andrew N. O’Malley, Trial Attorney, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, REENA RAGGI and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioners, Mohammad Monir Hassan (“Hassan”), his wife Naziat Hassan, and his daughter Nasrin Hassan, natives and citizens of Bangladesh, seek review of a September 14, 2009, decision of the BIA affirming the December 4, 2007, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Philip L. Mo-race denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mohammad Monir Hassan, Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ], [ AXXX XXX XXX ] / 797 (B.I.A. Sept. 14, 2009), aff’g Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ], [ AXXX XXX XXX ] / 797 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 4, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Under the circumstances of this ease, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). Because the Hassans do not meaningfully challenge the agency’s denial of CAT relief, we address only the agency’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1 (2d Cir.2005).

With respect to the Hassans’ claim of past persecution, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. The agency reasonably relied on several inconsistencies in the record that went to the heart of the Hassans’ claims, see Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir.2003), to support that determination, see Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir.2006). Hassan provided testimony that was internally inconsistent, inconsistent with his written applications, and inconsistent with his wife’s testimony regarding when he was arrested and detained by government authorities, when he was attacked and stabbed, the chronology of when he was attacked and when his cousin was killed, the reasons why his cousin was killed, and whether and for how long he obtained medical treatment following the alleged arrests and attacks. Given that Hassan was not able to provide explanations for these numerous inconsistencies, a reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled to conclude that Hassan’s testimony was credible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”); Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d at 402 (emphasizing that “even where an IJ relies on discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken separately, concern matters ‘collateral or ancillary to the claim,’ ... the cumulative effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential by the fact-finder” (quoting Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d at 308).

In addition, the agency did not err in determining that the Hassans failed to establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal based on a threat of future harm. Neither the letter from Hassan’s brother nor the background materials identified any harm that Hassan would face upon return to Bangladesh or indicated more generally that former supporters of the Jatiyo Party, or individuals who sought asylum in the United States, faced any harm by the government or others in Bangladesh. Indeed, as the IJ correctly recognized, the evidence regarding Has-san’s brother shows at most that he was detained for two days and mistreated for reasons inapplicable to Hassan, namely, the brother’s support for a different opposition party and his suspected smuggling of money from Russia into Bangladesh. Thus, the agency did not err in determining that Hassan’s fear of future harm was not objectively reasonable. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that a fear is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the record and is merely “speculative at best”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  