
    Spier v. Corll et al.
    1. The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal entering a judgment in any particular case may always be inquired into, when such judgment is made the foundation of a'n action, either in a court of the state in which it was rendered, or of any other state.
    2. A personal judgment, rendered against one over whom the court has no jurisdiction, is wholly invalid.
    3. Where, in a promissory note, payable at a future day, a warrant of attorney is incorporated, authorizing any attorney to appear for the maker in any court, and confess a judgment for the sum named in the note, etc., such warrant of attorney does not authorize the entry of an appearance, etc., before the maturity of the note; and an appearance prematurely entered by virtue of such warrant, confers on the court in which it is entered no jurisdiction of the person of the maker.
    Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Trumbull county. Reserved in the district court of said county.
    The action in the court below was brought by plaintiff in error, against defendants in error, upon three alleged judgments of the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer county, Pennsylvania, rendered at its May term, 1872, in favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendants. The defendant, Corll, answered, denying the existence and validity of the judgments sued upon, and setting up other grounds of defense. Upon the trial of the case by a jury, a bill of exceptions was taken by plaintiff, from which it appears that the plaintiff, to maintain the issues on his part, introduced as a witness George W. Carskadden, who testified that he was a resident of Greenville, Pennsylvania, was a lawyer by profession, and had practiced law in the State of Pennsylvania for thirty years last past, and that section 32 of the chapter on “ Judgments,” shown the witness, in a book called “ The Session Laws of Pennsylvania,” was a statute of said state, unrepealed and in full force in said state, and the law thereof; and, further to sustain the issues, the plaintiff introduced said section 32 of said statutes, which is in the words following, to wit: “ It shall be the duty of the prothonotary of any court of record within this commonwealth, on the application of any person being the original holder (or assignee of such holder) of a note, bond, or other instrument of writing, in which judgment is confessed, or containing a warrant for an attorney at law, or other person, to confess judgment, to enter judgment against the person or persons who executed the same, for the amount which, from the face of. the instrument, may appear to be due, without the agency of an attorney, or declaration filed with such stay of execution, as may be therein mentioned, for the fee of one dollar, to be paid by the defendant; particularly entering on his docket the date and tenor of the instrument of writing on which the judgment may be founded, which shall have the same force and effect as if a declaration had been filed, and judgment confessed by an attorney, or judgment obtained in open court, and in term time; and the defendant shall not be compelled to pay any costs or fee to the plaintiff’s attorney, when judgment is entered on any instrument of writing aforesaid.”
    And, to further maintain the issues on his part, offered three several exemplifications of record, to the admission of each of which the defendants objected, and the court-sustained said objection, and excluded each of said records, to which the plaintiff excepted. And there being no other evidence offered by either party, the cause was submitted to the jury, who found a verdict for the defendant. And, thereupon, the plaintiff" filed his motion for a new trial, which, being heard by the court, was overruled, and judgment rendered by the court against plaintiff on said ver•dict, to all of which action and ruling of the court plaintiff excepted.
    One of the exemplifications of record is as follows:
    “ Copy of Appearance JSntry, May Term, 1872.
    “ Seth Spier 401.] v. M. R. Kerney, Hugh Montgomery, and William Corll.
    “Judgment confessed by G. W. Carskadden, Esq., in :a warrant of attorney, dated the 19th day of August, a. d. 1872, against the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff, :for the sum of $280 (which includes $13.33J, attorney’s •commission), with costs of suit, release, and waiving exemption, etc. The note indorsed and guaranteed by L. H. .Mizner, on back of same.
    “ Filed and entered August 23, 1872.
    “ W. M. Slater, Prothonotary.”
    
      Copy of Note.
    
    •“ 266.66. Mercer, August 19,1872.
    “.Nine months after date, we, or either of us, promise to pay to Seth Spier, or order, $266.66, value received, being part payment of horses, buggies, and harness; and we jointly .and severally hereby authorize any attorney, or the prothonotary of Mercer county, or any other county in this state -or elsewhere, to enter and confess judgment against us, for the above sum, with costs of suit and attorney’s commis.sion of five per cent, for collection, release of errors, and without stay of execution; and we do waive the right and benefit of any law of this or any other state, exempting property, real or personal, from sale; and if levy is made on land, we do also waive the right of inquisition and consent to the condemnation thereof, with full liberty to sell the same on fi. fa., with release of errors therein.
    “ With interest from date. M. R. Kerney,
    “Attest: S. R. Mason. Hugh Montgomery,
    William Corll.”
    
      Then follows a declaration, signed by G. W.-Carskadden, as attorney for the plaintiff, and an appearance and confession of judgment, signed by the same Carskadden, as attorney for defendants, by virtue of the foregoing warrant ■of attorney. The other two exemplifications show similar entries of judgment, at the same date, and for similar amounts, the only difference being that, while the notes in all the cases bear the same date, and are for similar amounts, the note, in one of the cases, is payable in three months, and, in the other, in six months after date. Each of the exemplifications of the records appear to be formally authenticated.
    The plaintiff, by petition in error in the district court, sought to reverse this judgment, on the ground of error in excluding the several exemplifications of record offered in evidence by him on the trial. And the three judges of the -district court, being equally divided in opinion, as it is certified, on the question of error or no error in said judgments, ordered the cause to be reserved for decision by the -Supreme Court.
    
      Taylor $ Jones, for plaintiff in error :
    That a judgment properly obtained in a sister state can become the foundation of an action in the courts of this «tate, there can be little or no doubt (Constitution II. S., art. 4, § 10): “Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings ■of every other state, and cougress may, by general laws, pi’escribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.” By act •of congress, it is provided that the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state or territory shall be proven or admitted in any other court in the United States by the attestation of the clerk and the seal of the court :annexed, if there be a seal, together with the certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, that- the .«aid attestation is in due form, and the said records and judicial proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such laith and-credit given to them in every other court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence they are taken (Revised Statutes U. S., § 905, ch. 17, title 13), and when the record of such judgment or legal proceeding shows a service, notice, or appearance, although not amounting to personal appearance, the jurisdiction of the court rendering such judgment will be presumed, and the judgment treated, not altogether as a foreign judgment, or merely prima facie evidence of debt, but is conclusive upon the merits, and retrial upon the same can not be had. Warren v. McCarthy, 25 Ill. 95 ; Buffum v. Simpson, 5 Allen (Mass.), 591; William M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Peters (U. S.), 312-325; Spencer v. Brockway, 1 Ohio, 257; Goodrich v. Jenkins, & Ohio, 43; Starbuck et al. v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148 ; Milne v. Van Buskirk, 9 Iowa (1 With.), 558; Lazin v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. (12 Smith), 146.
    But, in a suit upou a judgment rendered in a court of competent jurisdiction of another state, the defendant will not be permitted to attack its foundation by showing that the original cause of action was not such an one as would constitute a good cause of action in the state, when suit is brought upon such judgment. The effect of such judgment is to be determined by the laws of the state where such judgment was obtained; this alone is necessary to b¿ inquired of, and if such judgment is in accordance with the laws, practice, and usage of that state, and constitutes a valid judgment there, although it may not be a valid judgment under the laws and practice of other states, but may even appear harsh and erroneous, still, until reversed in the state where rendered, it is entitled to full faith and credit and to have the effect of a valid judgment, provided it has been properly authenticated. Phillips v. Godfrey, 7 Bos. (N. Y.), 150; Bramagim v. Chem, 4 Green (N. J.), 130; Clemmer v. Cooper, 24 Iowa, 185 ; Rankin v. Barnes, 5 Bush (Uy.), 20; Green v. Van Buskirk, 38 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 52; Weyman v. Zane, 3 Ohio, 305 ; Arndt v. Arndt, 15 Ohio, 33; Stockwell v. Coleman, 10 Ohio St. 33.
    
      In the case at bar, the only remaining question is, whether under the laws and practice in the State of Pennsylvania, the judgment, which is the foundation of this action, and which was obtained in that state, would have the effect of a valid judgment, and be enforced as such in the courts of Pennsylvania ?
    It is claimed, on the part of the defendant, that a judgment entered by warrant of attorney, during vacation, is not a valid judgment, and entitled to that effect in the courts of Pennsylvania. Evidence, however, has been introduced by the plaintiff to prove that section 80 of the chapter on “ Judgments,” contained in a book called “ The Session Laws of Pennsylvania,” was a statute of said state, unrepealed and in full force in said state; and it is therein expressly provided that judgments may he entered in this way by warrant of attorney, and a judgment so recovered is to have the same force and effect as a judgment on verdict,until reversed or set aside, and such has been the holding of the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania. 1 Trowbuts & Haly’s Pr. 844; 4 Watts, 476; and in Supreme Court of Ohio, in case of Sipes v. Whitney et al., 30 Ohio St. 69.
    
      II. H. Moses, for defendant in error:
    Assuming that the section of the Pennsylvania session laws, referred to in the bill of exceptions, fully authorizes the prothonotary “to enter judgment” in the cases, we insist that in fact there was nothing in the transcripts, offered! as evidence, showing that he had, in fact, ever entered, judgments in them.
    The plaintiff’s causes of action were founded upon judgments obtained in his favor against the defendants, by the consideration of the Court of Common. Pleas of Mercer county, Pennsylvania. The rendition of these judgments by said coui't, is distinctly denied by the answer.
    A judgment is defined as being “ the- decision or sentence of the law, pronounced by a court, or other competent tribunal, upon the matter contained in the record.” 3 Blackstone’s Com. 395; Ætna Ins. Co. v. Swift, 12 Minn. 437.
    If, therefore, the records of which transcripts were offered as evidence, were judgments, they were such because they indicated and showed the sentence of the law, as pronounced by a court, or other competent tribunal. This they do not even profess to do. Neither of them, in form or substance, appear to have been intended as the entry of a judgment, nor do they indicate, in any maimer whatever, that any adjudication took place. The docket entries seem to be nothing more than mere memoranda by the prothonotary, that Gr. W.Carskadden had appeared, and in the name, and for the defendants, confessed judgment.
    Such memoranda are certainly not judgments; they are not the adjudications of any court, or any other competent tribunal. Taylor v. Bunyan, 3 Clarke, 474; Wheeler v. Scott, 3 Wis. 362 ; Martin v. Barnhardt, 39 Ill. 9; Hinson v. Wall, 20 Ala. 298; Faulks v. Killums, 54 Ill. 189 ; Wright v. Fletcher, 12 Vt. 431.
    Again, it is evident, from an examination of the record, in connection with the statute copied into the bill of exceptions, that the prothonotary did not understand that the entry made was an entry of an absolute judgment, for the reason that the statute did not authorize him to enter up any judgment at that time. The statute authorized him to enter judgment against the person or persons who executed the same, for the amount which, from the face of the instrument, may appear to be due. . The entry which was made by him seems to have been made on the 23d day of August, 1872, several months before any of the notes were due. Due, is defined to be “ what ought to be paid; what may be demanded.” (1 Bouvier’s Law Hie.) “ It differs from owing in this, that sometimes what is owing is not due; a note payable thirty days after date, is owing immediately after it is delivered to the payee, but it is not due until the thirty days have elapsed.” At the time the prothonotary entered upon the docket the fact that Carskadden had appeared and confessed judgment, nothing could rightfully be demanded upon the notes ; they were not due, and consequently no judgment could rightfully be entered up at that time, by the prothonotary. "With the confession entered upon the record, when, by the terms of the notes, they were due, he could enter judgment, but not before. He is not to be presumed to have done what it is evident he had no authority to do. He is rather to be presumed to have done that which he alone had authority to do. He had authority to enter upon the record the fact that a certain person had appeared, and confessed judgment, upon a certain claim ; and when, from the face of the notes, the money had become due, and was not paid, he might enter judgment.
    It seems to be insisted, by counsel for the plaintiff, that although these records do not show judgments, as understood and recognized by our law and practice, yet if good and valid as judgments in Pennsylvania, full faith and credit must be given to them here. But this can not help the plaintiff out of this difficulty, for the reason that it will be observed that there was no evidence that such an entry is a judgment, or has the effect of a judgment, by the laws and.practice of that state. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the court will presume that the law (except, perhaps, the statute laws), is the same in a sister state as in our own. In this case, therefore, the court must be governed by the laws of this state in determining whether the records offered showed that judgment had been rendered by the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer county.
   Scott, J.

The only question necessary to be considered in this case, is: Did the court of common pleas err in excluding from the consideration of the jury, the authentiticated transcripts, purporting to evidence the confessions of judgments by the defendants, in favor of the plaintiff, before the prothonotary of Mercer county, Pennsylvania ?

Assuming that the evidence offered and received fully showed a general authority conferred on the prothonotary, by the laws of that state, to enter judgment, as by confession, on cognovits, or upon warrants of attorney duly executed by a defendant, and purporting to authorize such confession of judgment, yet the jurisdiction of the tribunal entering a judgment in any particular case, may always be inquired into, when such judgment is sought to be made the foundation of an action, either in a court of the state in which it was rendered, or of any other state As was said in Pennywit v. Foote, 27 Ohio St. 615, “ every judgment depends, for its force and validity, on the competency and authority of the tribunal which pronounces it, and may be assailed by showing a want or failure of jurisdiction over the subject-matter or the person, even though absolutely conclusive in other particulars.” And, in that case, it was held, that “ neither the constitutional provision that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state, nor the act of congress, passed in pursuance thereof, prevents an inquiry into the jurisdiction of a court by which a judgment offered in evidence was rendered.” The numerous authorities cited in that case fully support this doctriue, and render a farther reference to them unnecessary.

Let us then inquire whether the tribunal entering orrendei’ing the judgments offered in evidence, had, at the time of its action in the premises, jurisdiction of the pei’sons of the defendants. It is conceded that no process was issued for their appearance in either of the cases, they, had no notice of the proceedings, actual or constructive; and made no appearance therein, other than an appeax’ance entex’ed for them by-an attorney, who claimed to have authority to appear for them, and confess judgments against them. The record exhibits the sole authority, in virtue of which he assumed to represent and bind them, by a confession of judgment. The debts xipon which judgments were confessed, were evidenced by thx*ee promissory xxotes, of which the first was payable in three months, the second in six months, and the third in nine months after date. Warrants of attorney were incorporated into each of these notes authorizing any attorney, etc., to enter and confess judgment against the makers for the amount of the note, with costs of suit and attorney’s commission of five per cent, for collection, release of errors, and without stay of execution, etc.

Four days after the date of these notes, an attorney appeared before the prothonotary of Mercer county, and, by virtue of these warrants of attorney,'confessed the judgments in question. Did these warrants of attorney confer such authority? We think not. The notes were each given on time. Each note with its warrant of attorney constitutes a single instrument of writing, which should be so construed as to make its parts consistent with each other. When a note is made payable, three, six, or nine months after date, it is clear that the maker does not intend that its payment may be enforced by judgment and execution immediately upon its delivery. These warrants of attorney, construed in connection with their context, can only be understood as authorizing the entry of an appearance, confession of judgment, etc., after the maturity of the respective notes. A different construction would be a fraud upon the makers. And if this be so, the entry of an appearance for these defendants, and the confession of judgments against them, by Mr. Carskadden, four days after the date of the notes, was wholly unauthorized, and the judgments sought to be given in evidence were utterly void for want of jurisdiction of the persons named as defendants therein. It follows that the court of common pleas did not err in excluding the exemplifications of the records offered in evidence, and its judgment is therefore affirmed.  