
    DROVERS LIVE STOCK COMMISSION COMPANY v. ST. PAUL UNION STOCKYARDS COMPANY.
    
    December 12, 1924.
    No. 24,074.
    Complaint states cause of action, for breach of contract.
    The complaint considered and held to state a cause of action against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff.
    Action in the district court for Dakota county to recover $35,000. From an order, Converse, J., sustaining defendant’s demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appealed.
    Reversed.
    
      Patríele J. Ryan, for appellant.
    
      Mitchell, Doherty, Rumble, Bunn & Butler, as amici curiae, filed a brief.
    
      D. L. Grannis, for respondent.
    
      
       Reported in 201 N. W. 314.
    
   Quinn, J.

This is an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint upon the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

It is alleged in the pleading that plaintiff and defendant are corporations, transacting business in this state;- that the defendant owns and operates the stockyards at South St. Paul in connection with which it maintains facilities for receiving, unloading, handling, buying, selling and shipping live stock of all kinds; that said stock yards are adjacent to several large packing plants, engaged in buying largely of tke stock arriving at tkat point; tkat, because of tke location of such yards and packing plants of suck purchasers, nearly all of tke live stock produced in tke northwest reaches said stock yards on its way to market; that tke defendant derives its income directly from tke producers and skippers of suck stock; tkat plaintiff is a commission agent, handling live stock upon a commission basis; tkat tke defendant holds itself out to, and does pretend to, provide space in its yards, witkout discrimination, to suck commissionmen to extent tkat tke business developed by any suck stock dealer would warrant; tkat, so long as suck commission men would continue suck commission business, it would continue to maintain and secure to suck parties suitable space in its yards for suck business witkout charge to them.

' It is furtker alleged tkat, relying upon suck representations, plaintiff, in July, 1918, engaged in tke stock business on a commission basis at suck stockyards and was duly allotted space therein by tke defendant, and was permitted and induced to invest large sums of money in tke establishment and building up of a commission business, relying upon tke statements and representations of the defendant; tkat at about tkat time tke defendant entered into a contract in writing with tke plaintiff, allotting to it sufficient space in said stockyards for its said commission business; tkat thereafter plaintiff continued to carry on suck business in said yards and entered into similar contracts with tke defendant from year to year until January, 1923, when tke defendant, pursuant to its established practice and in fulfilment of its representations and assurances, tendered to tke plaintiff a form of contract for tke year beginning January 1, 1923, which plaintiff signed and entered into with tke defendant, all in accordance with suck custom and practice whereby tke plaintiff was allotted space in suck stockyards for tke year ending December 31, 1923.

It is furtker alleged tkat, notwithstanding tke making of said contract and tke reliance of plaintiff upon tke representations of tke defendant, defendant, in July, 1923, wrongfully and witkout cause or justification excluded plaintiff from said yards and tke space so allotted to it, and refused to permit it longer to do business therein, to its damages, etc. It is clear that the complaint states a cause of action for breach of contract. In justice to the trial court it may be noted that a letter from counsel to him, when the case was submitted, may have induced the understanding that the question of breach of contract was not in issue. We must decide the appeal upon the complaint as written. We have not reached any conclusion as to whether, aside from the alleged breach of contract, the complaint states a cause of action, either at common law or under the “Packers & Stock Yards Act 1921,” 42 St. 159, c. 64, Fed. Ann. St. 1921 Supp. 287. No rule or administrative order of the secretary of agriculture is involved.

Reversed.  