
    Armando Antonio MARROQUIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MacDONALD, Warden, Defendant, and Jack R. Hudson; Jennifer Ward, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-17524.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 19, 2011.
    
    Filed Jan. 12, 2012.
    Armando Antonio Marroquin, Eloy, AZ, pro se.
    Daniel Patrick Struck, Esquire, Managing Senior Counsel, Nicholas D. Acedo, Esquire, Struck, Wieneke & Love, PLC, Chandler, AZ, Jamie Dennise Williams, Jones Skelton & Hochuli, PLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee.
    
      Before GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Armando Antonio Marroquin, a California state prisoner housed in Arizona, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust, and for clear error its factual determinations. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the action without prejudice because Marroquin failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Marroquin’s post-judgment motion because Marroquin failed to show any grounds justifying reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and elements for reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying as premature Marroquin’s motion to compel. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir.2002) (setting forth standard of review and describing trial court’s broad discretion to deny discovery).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

Marroquin’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     