
    Strickland against Strickland and others.
    
      Monday, July 3.
    compensation '5of lands within tlieSevenshi¡ís?the cerüficate of the commissioners is condnpairtycanno! ordertoraisea ttatf&ecomwere imposed Síecé^eat? ought to have cohim. Between Connecticut «claimants, under the act for granting
    In Error.
    WRIT of error to the Common Pleas of Bradford county.
    The land which was the subject of controversy in the present ejectment, was situate in Claverack, one of the 1 J 7 “ Seventeen i ownships’ , and was claimed by the defendants ’n error, the plaintiffs below, by virtue of a certificate, issued on the 21st January, 1807, by the commissioners appointed , , ^ . under the act of the 4th April, 1799, for offering compensaPennsylvania claimants of lands, within the Seventeen Townships, &c., and its supplements of the 15th March, 1800, 8th April, 1802, who certified, that Nancy Strickland, an£j her children, by Stephen Strickland, all of whom were named in the certificate, were the owners, as Connecticut claimants, of 265 acres and 64 perches of land, in the townshjp of Claverack, as tenants in common; one-third part thereof to the said Nancy, and two-third parts thereof to the children; being parts of lots No. 22, 23, 24, which lots were severally acquired by Connecticut claimants, actual settlers there, before the decree of Trenton, and were particularly assigned to such actual settlers, prior to the said decree, agreeably to the regulations then in force among such settlers. In pursuance of this certificate, a patent was granted to the plaintiffs, on the 21st March, 1807, which completed the title on which they rested their case.
    To counteract this title, and establish his own right of possession, the defendant offered evidence to prove, that Stephen Strickland, his father, was legally married in the year, 1782, in the State of Connecticut, to Lydia Tillotson, by whom he had issue, two sons; Jacob, the present defendant, and Peters that in the summer of 1785, he went into the State of Pennsylvania, for the purpose of purchasing land, with a view to the removal of his family, and in the year 1796, bought the land in dispute, of one Franklin, for 250 pounds, who was seised of it, by a title derived under the State of Connecticut, from the Susquehanna (Company: that he entered upon the land, and continued to reside upon it, until the month oí May, 1799, when he died intestate ; that Mathias Hollenbach, and Nancy Wilcox, alias Strickland, one of the plaintiffs, a woman with whom he cohabited after his removal to Pennsylvania, took out letters of administration on his estate, and after having destroyed the deed to Stephen Strickland, prevailed on Franklin, to execute another, dated the 6th October, 1802, conveying one-third of the premises to Nancy Strickland, in fee, and the remaining two-thirds to the other plaintiffs, her reputed children by Stephen Strickland; that the last mentioned deed was without consideration, and that all the reputed children of Stephen Strickland, who were grantees in the deed, were minors at the time of its execution; that Hollenbach and Nancy Strickland, were warned, that the destruction of the deed to Stephen Strickland, would be fraudulent on the defendant, and his brother Peter, the only heirs, and legal representatives of the said Stephen; that the lawful .wife of the said Stephen, was living at the time of the trial, and that Nancy Strickland., when she began to cohabit with the said Stephen, knew he had a wife in full life, by whom he had two children; that at the time of the destruction of the first, and of the execution of the second deed, and also at the time of issuing the commissioner’s certificate, the defendant, and his brother, were minors, and resident out of the State of Pennsylvania, and that the plaintiffs, by virtue of the deed of the 6th October, 1802, alone, obtained the commissioners’ certificate, upon which they received patent.
    An objection being made by the counsel for the plaintiffs, to the admission of the proposed evidence, the Court refused to receive it, and sealed a bill of exceptions.
    
      Hall, for the plaintiff in error.
    The case of Enslin v. Bowman,
      
       has decided, that the certificate of the commissioners, appointed under the compensating act of the 4th April, 1.799, and its supplements, is not conclusive upon a Pennsylvania claimant; the question now is, whether, between Connecticut claimants, it is so absolutely conclusive, that it cannot be enquired into, unde? any circumstances; for if there be a case, in which it is proper to examine the grounds upon which the commissioners proceeded, it is the present case. Stephen Strickland, died seised of an equitable interest in the land in question, for which he had paid a full and valuable consideration. Whatever his interest was, it descended to his two legitimate children, who were his only heirs, and who alone were entitled to the benefits intended to be secured to Connecticut claimants, under our acts of assembly. The defendants in error, derive their title through a palpable fraud; the embezzlement and destruction of the original deed, from Franklin to Strickland, which, by the act of 1700, is denounced as a crime, and subjected to infamous punishment; and by another deed, fraudulently and wickedly obtained from the grantor. Imposed upon by the fraud of the plaintiffs below, and deceived by the false lights which were presented to them, the commissioners, on an ex parte hearing, pronounced a decision, by which it is attempted, not only to divest the rights of minors, but of minors resident in another State. The whole proceeding is tainted with the blackest fraud, and in such a case, it never could have been intended to shut out investigation. Where a title has been derived through fraud, even the decree of a court of justice, may be examined; and more respect cannot be asked for the judgment of the commissioners, than is due to the decision of a Court. Wherever fraud or imposition shew themselves, chancery will lend its aid to counteract their effects. It will order a void deed, to be delivered up. 1 Madd. Ch. 183. It will vacate a conveyance, obtained by imposition. Id. 211. It will set aside a fine for fraud. Baler v. Pritchard.
      
       It will relieve against a fraudulent conveyance, barring contingent remainders. Engle field v. Englejield.
      Cartwright v. Pidtney.
      
       It will make void a king’s patent, obtained by fraud. Attorney General v. Vernon, 
      
       Fraud so completely contaminates, and corrupts every proceeding with which it mingles, as to destroy its efficacy, and prevent its operation. The conclusion, therefore, is, that if the defendants in error, hold the legal title for the lands in controversy, in consequence of the certificate of the commissioners, they' can derive no benefit from what has been drawn from so impure a source, but that they hold it as trustees for the plaintiff in error, in whom the right is justly vested.
    Baldwin, for the defendants in error.
    
      Stephen Strickland, derived no title whatever from the Susquehanna Company, recognised by the laws oí Pennsylvania, and consequently, possessed no interest, either legal or equitable, which he was capable of transmitting to his heirs. He could not have been compelled to pay the purchase money; he could not have put his deed upon record ; in fact, it was utterly void. Whatever was given to the Connecticut claimants by Pennsylvania, was a mere gratuity. She was therefore authorised to annex what conditions she pleased to the gift, and to establish what rules she deemed proper, for the decision of controversies between them. With respect to Pennsylvania claimants, the certificate of the commissioners does not conclude their rights, because, the commissioners have no right to decide Upon their claims. Disputes among themselves, are referred, in the first instance, to the Board of Property, the unsuccessful party, having the privilege of bringing an ejectment, in order to have a re-hearing in a Court of law. But with respect to Connecticut claimants, the Legislature have erected the commissioners into a tribunal for the determination of disputes between such of them, as think proper to submit to their decision, and if they do not avail themselves of the option given by the 11th section of the act of 1799, to have their respective claims decided by the Court of Common Pleas of the proper county, the certificate of the commissioners is, alone ; a sufficient foundation for a patent. In Enslin v. Bowman,
      
       it was intimated by the Court, that although the commissioners’ certificate would not affect the rights of a Pennsylvania claimant, yet it would be conclusive, where the dispute was between claimants under Connecticut. It was so declared, in Perkins v. Gay,
      
       decided at Sunbury, in June, 1817, and the point was expressly decided in Dailey v. Avery, in the same district, in June, 1818. These decisions .are in perfect accordance with a great number of others, on analogous questions, which are too numerous to be now referred to. It has been very usual to appoint commissioners for the settlement of disputed boundaries between States; and the invariable practice has been, to make their decree conclusive, between parties claiming under the same State. Nor has the plaintiff in error, a right to complain. Every question of fraud, was open before the commissioners, and an opportunity was given to all interested, to be heard. It appears, that Nancy Strickland was warned against the destruction of the deed ; this warning must have been given by the guardians of the defendant and his brother, whose duty it was to appear before the commissioners and protect the interest of their wards. At all events, the act of 1799, was notice, by which they were bound. In Nace v. Bollenback,
      
       the judgment of a Court of law, was not permitted to be enquired into, on an allegation of fraud, because, the party alleging the fraud, had had an opportunity of being heard ; and the judgment of the commissioners stands precisely on the same footing. If- the question of fraud, were open to examination, in this case, it would be in every other, and the whole country, to give repose to which, it has cost so much time, labour, and money, would be thrown into confusion.
    Hall, in reply, observed, that there was no dispute between Connecticut claimants before the commissioners, when they made their decree in this case, because the defendant was in Connecticut-at the time, and had no-knowledge of their proceedings. His object, however, was not to impeach the certificate ; he claimed under it, and acknowledged the validity of the patent, but insisted, that the patentees, held in trust for him.
    
      
       6 Binn. 462.
    
    
      
      
        а) 1 Sm. L. 4.
      
    
    
      
       2 Atk. 390.
    
    
      
       1 Vern. 443.
      
    
    
      
      
         2 Atk. 381.
    
    
      
       1 Vern. 277.
      
    
    
      
      
        а) 6 Binn. 462.
    
    
      
       Since reported in 3 Serg. Rawle, 330.
      
    
    
      
       Since reported in 4 Serg. & Rawle, 281.
    
    
      
      
         1 Serg. & Rawle, 450.
    
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Gibson J.

The only question is, whether a certificate of the commissioners, under the act for granting compensation to the Pennsylvania claimants, for lands within the Seventeen Townships, is conclusive between Connecticut claimants; or whether, to raise a trust, it is open to a party to shew, that the commissioners were imposed on, and that the certificate ought to have been issued to him. In Perkins v. Gay, 3 Serg. & Rawle, 327, this question was decided, on great consideration, by two Judges of this Court; and, unless that decision is plainly wrong, we ought not to depart from it.. What were the powers of the commissioners ? The board was constituted a tribunal, to decide on, and .quiet, all questions of original right between Connecticut claimants, before Pennsylvania should proceed to invest them with title. By the fifth section of the principal act, the commissioners were to ascertain all the rights or lots, within the townships named, which were occupied or acquired by Connecticut claimants, before the decree of Trenton; “and make out certificates therefor, with a draft of the survey thereto annexed.” In the execution of this power, it was impossible, but that disputes, which it would be absolutely necessary to have decided by some tribunal, should arise. It is true, the Susquehanna Company, in apportioning its lands among settlers, pursued a wise course, by having, before any part was granted, the whole country on the branches of the Susquehanna, north of the forty first degree, surveyed and laid off in lots; and hence, as there were, in no instance, separate grants of the same lot, (except perhaps, where the right was forfeited for a violation of the rules of the company,) • there could be no dispute on the subject of original title. A copy of this survey, together with an ample collection of scarce documents, made by Judge Cooper, when one of the commissioners, I lately deposited with the secretary of the historical branch of the American Philosophical Society. But though there were few, if any conflicting grants, the transmission of the rights of the original half share- holders,- by deed, or otherwise, would necessarily give rise to.many controversies. Many questions of boundary, also, would have to be decided. It was accordingly provided, by the eleventh section of this act, 1‘ that in case of disputes between the Connecticut claimants, they may elect to have the same decided by the said commissioners, or appeal, before such decision, to the Court of Common Pleas of the proper county; and a certificate of the clerk of such commissioners, or from the prothonotary of such Court of Common Pleas, before which tribunal such decision , may be had, certifying in whose favour the same is adjudged, shall be good evidence to obtain a patent from the proper office aforesaidAnd by the fourth and fifth sections of the supplementary act of the 6th April, 1802, Connecticut claimants, who should be infants, or residents out of the State, or prevented by sickness or other infirmity’, from attending personally before the commissioners, were to exhibit their title by attorney : the commissioners were authorised to summon witnesses, and administer oaths; false swearing in any matter within the scope of their powers, being punishable as perjury. Thus the board was clothed with extensive judicial powers: and why ? Undoubtedly, that there might be a final and conclusive settlement of all disputes, before the patents should be issued. A civil war had raged between the claimants under Connecticut, and those under Pennsylvania ; and to give peace to this quarter of the State, on terms that would insure its continuance, was the motive which induced the extraordinary interference of the legislature, whose acts on the subject, are to be considered as statutes of repose. The object was not to be attained, without exertion and perseverance; nor, in many instances, without hardship, or even injustice, to individuals. The latter was anticipated'; but to obviate it altogether, was, in comparison with the pacification of the country, a minor object: sacrifices, 6n all sides, were inevitable; and the Legislature made suCh provisión on the subject, as circumstances permitted. The business languished in the hands of several sets of commissioners, and fears were entertained, that the project, fróm its'magnitude, and the difficulties with which it was surrounded, would entirely fail. In truth, it'was to the extraordinary energy'and abilities of' Judge Cooper,' (a gentleman of' the last commission, which at length cut its wáy through' all impediments,) that its eventual accomplishment is due. Much of the difficulty arose from deficiency of means in tracing the titles from the original holders. ' The Connecticut claimants had disavowed the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania altogether; and consequently, before the year 1774, when they were incorporated by Connecticut,- as a town, which was at first annexed to the county of Litchfield, but afterwards, in 1776, erected into a separate county, by the name of Westmoreland, there was no office among them for registering deeds or wills, nor any means of recording the descent of land, in' cases of intestacy; and when, after the jurisdiction of Connecticut had been extinguished by the Decree of Trenton, the present county of Luzerne was erected, Connecticut titles were not recognised by our laws, and their registry was strictly forbidden. The evidences of transfer, therefore, necessarily depended on documents in the custody of individuals; on the minutes of the Susquehanna Company ; on the Westmoreland records, which embrace a period of only eight years, (from 1774 to 1782,) and on the recollection of witnesses. The Wyoming massacre, which depopulated the country in 1778, materially lessened these sources of information. Many of the inhabitants who fled to Connecticut, on that event, were deterred from returning, at the peace, by the Decree of Trenton, and the rigorous measures which Pennsylvania thought proper to adopt; and seem for some time to have abandoned their claims, and the country, together. This state of things, necessarily rendered the establishing of a complete chain of title, in many instances, impossible. But every thing was done by the board, that could lead to the discovery of truth. Ample time and opportunity were allowed to claimants to establish their titles; and the instances in which disputes were actually litigated, in which witnesses were examined, and counsel heard, are neither few nor rare. Every one had a fair opportunity to establish his claim, and if he failed, it was either because the claim in reality hád not merits, or he was prevented' by misfortune, or want of preparation, from disclosing them. Where the parties actually appeared, there can be ho colour of reason, why the loser should not be concludedfor the commissioners, where the matter was submitted to their judgment, had the same power to máke a final decree, that the Common Pleas had, where the matter Was submitted to that Court in the first instance. This seems to'be' conceded in Enslin v. Bowman, 6 Binn. 462 ; and in truth, it is strictly conformable to every principle, not only of law, but of- justice, that the judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction, directly on the point, should be conclusive on the same matter again coming incidentally into question. 'It would be monstrous in principle, as well as disastrous in its consequences to this part of the State, if, after having submitted to an examination by the commissioners, in which every thing was heard and weighed ; if after a patent was actually issued; and after all light on the subject was extinguished by a lapse of sixteen years, a Connecticut claimant should be permitted to try his fortune in Court, when, if he did not mean to abide by the judgment of the commissioners, he should have carried his cause to Court, in the first instance. The Legislature never intended to allow him a double chance1 of success. The only thing that can afford a plausible ground of distinction in this particular case, is, that when the certificate was granted, the defendant below was an infant, residing out of the State, and without notice of the proceedings. But in none of the acts on the subject, is there any saving or provision for the usual cases of disability, nor could there be: the objects to be attained, were of a nature too urgent to await the removal of disabilities of any kind; and the want of actual notice is immaterial. Before a controversy had actually arisen, who was to give it? And while an adverse claim remained dormant, perhaps its existence unsuspected, who was to receive it ? The commissioners were to “ ascertain all the rights or lots which had been occupied or acquired by Connecticut claimants, and make out certificates therefor.” Hence, their proceedings being not in personam, but. in rem, every person interested, was bound to take notice at his peril: they had nothing to do with litigant parties, till litigant parties appeared. From the mass of business cast on them, it is not to be supposed, that the commissioners should in no instance, have fallen into error, or have been imposed on; but where individual wrongs have been suffered, they are to be considered as necessary sacrifices, by distributive justice, to the accomplishment of a great state object. It is a sound principle of law, that where a party has had an opportunity of being heard, he shall be considered as having been actually heard; into a departure from which we ought not to be decoyed, by even a strong case of apparent fraud, the correction of which, in particular instances^ would be greatly overbalanced in point of advantage, by the flood of uncertainty and litigation that would be let in. The certificate, therefore, unless where there has been an arrangement between the parties, to have the patent taken out in a particular way, or some agreement to raise a trust, cannot be impugned; but the decision of che commissioners, in an adversary proceeding, is to be taken as conclusive.

Judgment affirmed.  