
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael MILAY, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 17-10128
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted September 26, 2017 
    
    FILED OCTOBER 2, 2017
    
      Shelley D. Weger, Assistant U.S., Office of the US Attorney, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Mia Crager, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDCA — Federal Public Defender’s Office, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is „ suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Michael Milay appeals the 12-month- and-one-day sentence, and a condition of supervised release, imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

For the first time on appeal, Mi-lay contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to consider his non-frivolous sentencing arguments, and adequately explain the sentence. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the court considered and responded to Milay’s arguments, and sufficiently explained the below-Guidelines sentence. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Moreover, notwithstanding the court’s misstatement regarding the length of the aggregate term, the record is clear that the court intended to impose a sentence of twelve months and one day for the instant offense and run it consecutively to the seven-month sentence for Milay’s violation of supervised release.

Milay also challenges a condition of his supervised release that prohibits him from communicating or interacting with known convicted felons, absent permission from his probation officer. He contends that the condition is not reasonably related to his rehabilitation because some of his family members are felons and it is beneficial to him to have relationships with those family members. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this standard condition. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(e)(8) (2016); United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2008). The court exempted Milay’s father, the only family member Milay identified as affected by the condition, and the condition is reasonably related to the relevant sentencing factors, and involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purposes of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); Daniels, 541 F.3d at 924. Contrary to Milay’s argument, the court was not required to explain further its reasons for imposing the condition. See Daniels, 541 F.3d at 924.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     