
    WILLIAM F. HOLTZMAN vs. EDWARD B. ROBINSON ET AL.
    At Law. — No.—.
    I. The condition in an official bond of a justice of the peace, that he shall well and faithfully perform the duties of said office, means, so far'as the same affects the sureties on said bond, that he will discharge the duties of a justice of the peace to the best of his ability.
    II. In an action against the sureties on the official bond of a justice of the peace, which action is on the alleged ground that the justice issued- a writ without authority of law, by virtue of which writ certain gooils were seized and taken away by the constable executing the same, it is necessary to aver in the declaration that -the justice knowingly, willfully, or wrongfully omitted to do what ought to have been done, or that, in doing what he did by way of issuing process, he knowingly, willfully, or corruptly instituted the proceedings to the injury of the plaintiff.
    STATEMENT OP THE CASE.
    This suit was brought against the defendant Robinson to recover damages against him and his sureties for a violation of the conditions of his official bond as a justice of the peace.
    The declaration sets forth that the defendant Robinson, being appointed justice of the peace, gave, jointly with the defendants Kirk and Cochran, his bond to the District of Columbia, in the sum of $5,000, conditioned as follows, viz:
    “ If the said E. B. Robinson do and shall well and faithfully perform the duties of said office, and faithfully pay over all moneys which may come into his hands by virtue of said* office, then this obligation is to be void.” ' For a breach of this bond it is alleged that the said E. B. Robinson did not well and faithfully perform the duties of his said office of justice of the peace, in this, that, after the making of said written obligation, to wit, on the 6th day of May, 1876, the said Robinson, acting in his capacity of justice of the peace, by his certain writ or warrant given under his seal as such justice, and issued by the said Robinson at the suit and instance of John F. Hechtman, commanded one W. W. Kirby, constable, from the said William F. Holtzman and one Thomas J. Bicksler, who was in said writ named as a defendant jointly with said Holtzman, to take the following-described goods and chattels, to wit, one walnut chamber-set, consisting of one bedstead, -one bureau, and one washstand. And plaintiff says that the said W. W. Kirby, acting by virtue of the said writ, did seize and take from the said Bicksler the said goods and chattels,, the same being lawfully in the possession of the said Bicksler, who, being a duly-appointed constable, had seized and levied upon the said goods by virtue of a writ of ■execution issued by Samuel C. Mills, justice, &e., upon a certain judgment theretofore had before him in favor of William F. Holtzman against one Olive M. Hechtman, for the sum of $80.50, debt and costs; that said goods were more than sufficient in value to have satisfied said judgment, to wit, of the value of $125.
    . That Kirby, after taking the goods, delivered them to said ■John F. Hechtman at the command of said Bobinson, and said Hechtman made away with said goods, whereby said judgment was wholly lost.
    That the defendant Bobinson had no' authority in law to issue said writ.
    To this declaration the defendants filed a demurrer and assigned as cause therefor—
    1st. That a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia is not liable to an action for damages by the defendant in a replevin suit for issuing the writ prior to the 14th day of J une, A. D. 1875, and subsequent to the 16th day of August, 1871, when the goods replevied do not exceed $100 in value.
    2d. The sureties on the official bond of a justice of the •peace are not liable for the acts of said justice in a case where he has no jurisdiction.
    Upon the hearing, the demurrer was sustained, and the suit was dismissed, and upon the judgment entered dismissing the suit an appeal was taken to this court.
   Mr. Justice Olin

delivered the opinion of the court:

The act requiring justices of the peace to give a bond with sureties was passed by the late legislative assembly for this District. The conditions of the bond are set out in the complaint. The conditions are these: First, that said Robinson shall well and faithfully perform the duties of the office of a justice of the peace5 and, second, that the said justice shall pay over all moneys which shall come to his hands by virtue of said office.

It is the first condition of the bond upon which the plaintiff relies to maintain this action, and the case presents .the question as to the meaning of the first condition of the bond as affecting Robinson’s sureties. If that condition means anything, I think it means this and this only, that Robinson should discharge the duties of the office of justice of. the peace to the best of his ability.

In the assignment of the breach of this bond, it is not averred that the justice knowingly, willfully, or wrongfully omitted to do what ought to have been done, or that in doing what he did by way of issuing process, he knowingly, will, fully, or corruptly instituted the proceedings to the injury of the complainant. Any other construction of the condition of this bond than we have before indicated as its true meaning would require us to hold that, if a justice of the peace gave an erroneous judgment upon the facts proven before him to the damage of some suitor, the latter, instead of applying to the proper tribunal to correct the error, may bring an action against the justice and his sureties to recover damages to the extent he can prove himself to be injured. This, to say the least of it, would be a very extraordinary way of reviewing the errors of inferior tribunals. The law has provided various and multiplied remedies for correcting any or all errors which may be committed by magistrates of limited or inferior jurisdiction.

We are well aware that a rule of law, as well settled as a rule of law can be by judicial decisions, is that a justice of the peace who issues process without having jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, or without having jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the controversy, may be sued in trespass, if such process was an injury to persons or property. In a leading case upon this .subject, reported in 19 Johns., 39, Bigelow vs. Stearns, the law laid down by Chief-Justice Spencer is correct. In- that case it was held that, “if a court of limited jurisdiction issues, process which is illegal, or if a court, whether its jurisdiction be limited or not, holds cognizance of; a cause without having gained jurisdiction of the person of the defendant by having him before the court in the manner required by law, the proceedings are void.”

And, in the case of a limited and special jurisdiction, the magistrate attempting to enforce a proceeding founded on any judgment, sentence, or conviction in such case is a trespasser.

The rule as to the liability of inferior magistrates is well stated by Chief Justice Savage in the case of Atkins vs. Brewer, wherein he says, in a case where a justice of the peace has no jurisdiction whatever and undertakes to act, his acts, are eoram non judice and void equally as if he were not a justice. If he has jurisdiction, but errs in exercising it, then his acts are not void, but voidable only: in the former case he is personally liable, in the latter he is not.  