
    George Webb, Com’r, etc., v. W. B. Miller, et als.
    
    The act of 1872, c. 3, for the sale of lands bid in by the State for taxes, is a valid act, and proceedings may be maintained to sell the lands for taxes.
    PROM HAWKINS.
    Appeal from the decree of the Chancery Court at Rogersville, disallowing a demurrer to the bill. November Term, 1873. H. C. Smith, Ch.
    
      
      W. P. Gillenwateks for defendants, said:
    It appears from the face of the bill, that after these taxes became due, the tax collector proceeded under the Code to bring the land to sale, and that on the 3d of July, 1871, the land was bid in by the collector for the use of the State, bidding on said land the amount in full due the State, including cost and charges, which it is averred, the State has paid in full. This has the effect of a judgment against the defendants, and the purchase of the lands by the State operates as a satisfaction of this judgment, and the question presented by the demurrer, is: Can the State have another decree against the same parties for the- same taxes without setting aside the satisfaction in the Circuit Court of Hawkins county.
    Code, 2990, following the act of 1848, provides the manner in which the plaintiff may have the satisfaction set aside, and a judgment or decree revived by scire facias.
    
    Before this act, the Chancery Courts had assumed jurisdiction to set aside judgments, and as intimated by the court in the case of Henry v. Keys, 5 Sneed, 488, the court may yet have original jurisdiction, and relief has been granted in one unreported case since, though it is not known whether this was the only ground on which the jurisdiction vested. The question is therefore an open one — at least, not so well settled as to be passed over by this court without examination. And the question is here presented, but not pressed, as it is immaterial to defendants in this case, which way it is determined, the question of juristion not depending on it.
    Satisfaction must be set aside before another execution can issue, or before another court can, for the same thing, pronounce another judgment.
    If it be admitted that the Chancery Court in this case has jurisdiction to set aside the judgment, then the act to be performed by the court, is an adjudication of a fact, to-wit: The fact of the failure of the title, acquired by the plaintiff to the property purchased in satisfaction of the judgment; for if the purchaser’s title is good, his. judgment is satisfied, and whether it is good or not is matter of proof. This is well settled by the decision of this Court in the case of Swaggerty v. Smith, 1 Heis., 403.
    It follows, that this question must be presented in the pleading with the proper averments, so that the issue can be made, proof taken, and the adjudication of the court invoked. The whole case turns on the adjudication of this question, and the court must settle this first. ' If the satisfaction is not set aside, the case ends there; if it is set aside, decree may be for the amount of the judgment and satisfaction enforced.
    But before this Court can adjudicate a question, it must be presented, as before stated in the pleading. The bill in this case states the assessment of the taxes, the proceeding in the Chancery Court, the sale and the purchase by the complainant, but does not even aver that the sale and purchase was void, and states no facts to predicate such an averment on, and does not ask to have the satisfaction in the Circuit Court proceedings set aside. By demurrer is the proper mode for defendants to present this question: Code, 4314; Heis. Dig., p. 536, sec. 554; Eaton v. Breathitt, 8 Hum., 536; Lee v. Cone, 4 Col., 392; Story’s Eq. PL, § 42, p. 46; Daniel’s Ch. Pl. & Pr., p. 355.
    It was insisted in the court below, that the act of March' 29th, 1872, set the whole proceedings in the Circuit Court aside, and that therefore, it was not a question for adjudication of the court, as to matter of the satisfaction of the judgment, etc.
    To this it is replied (if the Attorney-General should .insist on it,) that the setting aside the satisfaction of the judgment is a judicial act, and exclusively within the province of the courts, under Sec. 1 of Art. VI, of the Constitution, and that this act, so far as it undertakes to interfere with the adjudication of the courts to annul their judgments and proceedings therein, is unconstitutional: State Const. Art: VI, § 1; Fisher v. Dabbs, 6 Yer., 554; State v. Fleming, -7. Hum., 152; Jones v. Perry, 10 Yer., 59; Sedg. on St. & Const. Law, 166, 167, 168, 169, and 676, 677, and notes, and notes to p. 647; citing Biglow v. Pritohard, 21 Pick., 174; also 253, 254.
    Attorney-General Heiskell ■ for • the State, said:
    The State has the right to prescribe a mode in which her interest in the lands bought in for taxes may be disposed of, or in the event her title is not perfect, the money actually due may be collected. The position that such a law is not constitutional is not worthy of serious consideration. It is general; applies to all such titles throughout the State, and there is-no ground on which it could be attacked.'
    The State either owns the ■ land and has the right to sell it, or she has got no title, and has the right to the taxes. If she got the title, she will sell that,, and has a perfect right to do so. If she did not, the-tax is not paid, and she proceeds to set the sale aside and collect the tax. This is what any creditor may do on precisely similar grounds. Remedies in favor of the State have to be in some measure different from those by individuals. The State can act only through agents, and she must specify these agents. She has given her own cases precedence in her own courts. She has instituted summary proceedings to collect taxes, and against officers, and to sell railroads. All of these are of the same character as the present law, and are sustained by numerous authorities.
    This act was before the court at Jackson, in Cason v. Newsom, Freeman, J., delivering the opinion reversed the decision on a demurrer, allowed below, because the act was supposed to be repealed, and disallowed the demurrer. The question was not made there of unconstitutionality, but it was involved of course, and if it was tenable was fatal to the whole case, and it was a great oversight to have maintained a proceeding on a void act, as is now insisted this is.
   Nicholson, C. J.

delivered the opinion. of the Court.

This bill was filed by complainant, in pursuance of the act of March 27th, 1872, ch. . 3, against the several defendants, to subject the small tracts of land •specified, to sale, to satisfy the lien of the State for amounts of taxes assessed thereon, and for which said lands were sold in July, 1871, and bought in by the •collector of revenue, in pursuance of law.

The bill was demurred to by defendants, and the demurrer overruled. The defendants have appealed.

The ground of demurrer relied on here is, that the bill shows that the' complainant has no claim against the defendants, on account of any taxes, because it is shown in the bill, that by a judgment of the Circuit Court, the complainant recovered of • defendants the amount of those identical taxes and costs, and that the lands were sold and bid in by the collector for the full amount of the taxes and costs— whereby the judgments were fully satisfied, and that the bill does not show that this satisfaction has been set aside.

The bill was filed to enforce the lien of the State for unpaid taxes, by a sale of the land on which the taxes remain unpaid. These same lands were before offered for sale to satisfy the taxes, but no purchaser being found, the same were bid in by the collector for the benefit of the State. It is assumed in the demurrer, that the taxes were satisfied by thus bidding in the lands. If this were so, then the lands became the property of the State, and the legal effect of the present proceeding is, that the State proposes to sell the lands, for the purpose of collecting the amounts of the taxes so bid upon them, giving the owners of the land the privilege of paying up the accrued taxes, with six per cent, interest, and retaining the lands. In this view, the State clearly has a right to sell her own lands in this way. But we think it obvious, that the State did not bid in the lands as purchaser, and in satisfaction of the taxes due; but this mode was adopted for enforcing . the collection of the revenue, and of preserving the the lien of the State for the taxes. There is no allegation in the bill from which it can be inferred, that the judgments for taxes was satisfied by the bidding in of the lands. On the contrary, the bill is expressly filed for the enforcement of the lien on the lands, which is alleged to exist.

We are therefore of opinion that the demurrer was properly overruled, and the decree overruling it is affirmed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. 
      Tbe same question arose in the case of E. O. Sugg, Fax Commissioner, v. Sorrell, et als., and tlie following opinion was delivered by Sneed, J., at Jackson, May 2, 1874.
      The bill is filed under the act of 1872, ch. 3, by the Commissioner of taxes of the County of Dyer, to sell divers tracts of land in said county for taxes. The land liad been heretofore sold for unpaid taxes. The land being yet unredeemed, and the taxes yet unpaid, the Commissioner for the State has filed this bill, making the original owners of the land defendants. The bill was dismissed by the Chancellor on the motion of defendants. The decree is erroneous. The case is governed by the principles of the case of Webb v. Miller, recently decided at Knoxville, and Cason v. Newsom, recently decided here, in which the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court in similar cases was sustained. Beverse the decree and remand the case.
     