
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Randy HIGHTOWER, Appellant.
    No. 09-1675-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 2, 2010.
    
      Randy Hightower, Allenwood, PA, pro se.
    Robert J. Boyle, standby counsel, New York, NY, for Appellant.
    Edward Y. Kim and Virginia Chavez Romano, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges, RICHARD W. GOLDBERG, Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant, Randy Hightower, appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on April 15, 2009, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, following a three-day bench trial. Appellant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, High-tower argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence seized from him on the night of his arrest, namely the gun that forms the basis for his conviction, and an incriminating statement he made to the responding officers. Appellant further contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

In evaluating the district court’s ruling on the suppression motion, we review factual findings for clear error. United States v. Rodriguez, 356 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir.2004). We review the district court’s determination as to when the appellant was seized de novo, as this is a question of law. United States v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir.2007). We conclude that this Court’s decision in United States v. Baldwin governs this case.

“[T]o comply with an order to stop — and thus to become seized — a suspect must do more than halt temporarily; he must submit to police authority, for there is no seizure without actual submission.” Id. at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although appellant did momentarily stop when approached by the responding officers, “[a] reasonable person standing in [Hightower’s] place would have felt bound to stop, and having stopped and stayed, would be able to argue suppression on the ground of a baseless seizure.” Id. at 219. However, Hightower fled and is, therefore, not entitled to have the evidence at issue suppressed. See United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 359 (3d Cir.2000).

Appellant’s sufficiency challenge is without merit. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that it was clearly sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction. See United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 459-60 (2d Cir.2004).

We have considered all of appellant’s arguments on appeal, and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. 
      
      . Standby counsel’s motion for leave to file a supplemental reply brief is granted.
     
      
      . We have also considered the arguments of standby counsel.
     