
    Jin LIN, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    15-400
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    August 10, 2016
    FOR PETITIONER: Theodore N. Cox, New York, NY.
    FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director; Manuel A. Palau, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., BARRINGTON D. PARKER, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Jin Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a January 22, 2015, decision of the BIA, affirming a December 14, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Lin’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jin Lin, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 22, 2015), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec, 14, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir, 2008).

For asylum applications, like Lin’s, governed by the REAL ID Act, the agency may, “[cjonsidering the totality of the circumstances,” base an adverse credibility determination on an asylum applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” and on inconsistencies within the applicant’s statements, “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. “We defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination, which was based on inconsistent and unclear testimony calling into question whether Lin understood the basis of his asylum claim, and by extension, calling the credibility of the claim into question. Lin alleged that he has been, and would be, persecuted for attending an underground church. However, when questioned initially, he said he would attend a government-sponsored church. Then when questioned by his own counsel, he said he was unwilling to go to a government church. But when questioned by the IJ, he said he did not know the difference between the two churches, stated he would maybe go to both, and finally stated that he would not attend at all if he returned to China. Lin did not provide compelling explanations for these inconsistencies because his responses that he did not know the difference, would attend both, or would not attend at all, introduced more confusion. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005).

The adverse credibility determination is further supported by the IJ’s demeanor finding, to which we defer. Id. at 81 n.1; Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We can be still more confident in our review of observations about an applicant’s demeanor where, as here, they are supported by specific examples of inconsistent testimony.”).

Moreover, Lin’s failure to corroborate his testimony with evidence further undermined his credibility. Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The IJ did not abuse her discretion in declining to give weight to his letters. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the weight given corroborating evidence lies largely with discretion of agency); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013).

In light of the inconsistent and confusing testimony regarding the basis for Lin’s fear of persecution, the totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Because asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief all relied on the same factual predicate, the adverse credibility determination is dispositive. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  