
    * Simon Coburn and Others, Plaintiffs in Error, versus John C. Richardson.
    Lands belonging to non-residents are within the purview of the statute of 1811, c. 6, § 2.
    
    The plaintiffs in error, as assessors of the first parish in Dracut, having assessed the lands of Richardson, an inhabitant of Methuen, which lay within the limits of the said parish, and having caused the tax so assessed to be levied by warrant of distress, Richardson brought his action of trespass against them. They justified as assessors, and Richardson replied that he was a member of a regular Baptist society in Methuen, which was a sect or denomination different from that of the said parish, and showed that he had duly filed the certificate prescribed in the statute of 1811, c. 6. Upon demurrer to the replication, the plaintiff had judgment in the Common Pleas; and the plaintiffs in error brought this writ to reverse the said judgment.
    The only question made to the Court was, whether a citizen, circumstanced as Richardson was, could claim an exemption from parochial taxes, for lands lying in another town than that of his residence. -This question arose on the facts in the preceding case; but Mie point was not made.
    
      Stearns, for the plaintiffs in error,
    argued that it could never have been the intention of the legislature, by the statute of 1811, to make assessors liable as trespassers, if they should, from mere want of information, tax the land of a non-resident, who may belong to a not her sect than the parish. The statute provides for no notice, but in the town where the party has his residence. The assessors then must be at the expense and trouble of sending to the place of residence of every non-resident owner of land in the parish, to ascertain to what religious sect he has attached himself: and this they must do every year, if they would avoid all risk of being trespassers in performing their duty. Such a construction would operate * oppressively upon the regular parishes, and this [ * 214] merely for the sake of favoring sectarians. Such a construction is not necessary ; for the words of the statute exempt only the person from taxation, without mentioning his property.
    It is laid down by Lord Colee, “ that acts of parliament are to be so construed, as no man that is innocent, or free from injury or wrong, be by a literal construction punished or endamaged” . And Blaclestone says, “ If there arise out of them collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly contrary to common reason, they are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void ”. Thus this Court has in effect excluded negotiable securities, actually negotiated, from the operation of the statute against usury. So it is expressly enacted by the statute of 1783, c. 24, that any child, not having a legacy given him or her in the will of their father or mother, shall have a proportion of the estate, as if the parent had died intestate. But in construing this statute, it has been held that if a child is named in the will, though no legacy be given him, he shall not have advantage of this provision. Thus also by the statute of 1786, c. 21, any persons having a dispute of what nature soever, may have the same determined by referees, in the manner therein prescribed. Yet this Court has decided that, if the dispute concern the title to real estate, it may not be so determined. It is believed that a con struction of the statute in question, favorable to the plaintiffs in error, may be as well supported upon principle, as either of those referred to.
    
      Hoar, for the defendant in error.
    
      
      
        Co. Lit. 360, a.
      
    
    
      
       1 Black. Comm. 91.
    
   Parker, C. J.

The only question in this case is, whether the land of Richardson, the defendant in error, lying in another town than that in which he dwells, is exempted from taxation by force of the statute. We suggested our opinion upon this question, in the last action of Turner vs. The Parish of Burlington. Nor do we see occasion to alter the opinion then thrown out. We cannot limit the exemption to a tax on the person. Indeed, * the [ * 215 ] tax upon the land in another town is as much a tax upon the person, as a tax upon the land in the town in which the owner dwells.

Numerous are the inconveniences, and great is the injustice which may flow from this statute; But it is for the legislature alone to determine whether these are or are not counterbalanced by any great public good, which may be expected to be produced by it.

Judgment affirmed  