
    Celestine WENEGIEME, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-214-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 16, 2016.
    Celestine Wenegieme, pro se, Bronx, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Jason M. Myers, Wilson, Elser, Mos-kowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, New York, NY, for defendants-appellees Alba Law Group, Thomas P. Dore, and Mark Devan.
    Christian Fletcher (Lisa J. Fried, Michael T. Snyder on the brief), Hogan Lo-vells U.S. LLP, New York, NY, for defendant-appellee Wells Fargo Home Mortgage.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S- POOLER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges and JANET C. HALL, Chief Judge.
    
      
       Judge Janet C. Hall, of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Celestine Wenegieme, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Wenegieme sued Wells Fargo Home Mortgage and attorneys involved in the foreclosure sale of property that he and his sister owned in Maryland. He alleged that the sale was unlawful because his sister had filed for bankruptcy and the sale violated the automatic stay. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a dismissal pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.2005). Under this doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over claims that effectively challenge state court judgments. See D.C.Ct.App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). The doctrine applies when: (1) the federal court plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites the federal court to review and reject that judgment; and (4) the state court judgment was rendered prior to the commencement of proceedings in the district court. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85.

The district court held that all four requirements were met, and therefore that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Wenegieme’s claim. In his brief on appeal, Wenegieme does not contest any of these elements, and he has therefore waived any challenge to the district court’s ruling on this issue. See, e.g., Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 728 F.3d 139, 142 n. 4 (2d Cir.2013) (holding that, where a pro se appellant “[did] not mention the substance” of the district court’s ruling with respect to one defendant, he “waived any challenge to this aspect of the [district [cjourt’s judgment” “notwithstanding the latitude we traditionally afford pro se litigants”); LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that although “appellate courts generally do not hold pro se litigants rigidly to the formal briefing standards set forth in Fed. R.App. P. 28 ... we need not manufacture claims of error for an appellant proceeding pro se”). Wenegieme argues only that the district court had jurisdiction because the complaint involved a bankruptcy matter. However, Wenegieme did not file a bankruptcy petition; his complaint invoked the court’s diversity jurisdiction and challenged the state foreclosure action. He contends that the foreclosure sale violated the automatic stay, but this does not present a basis for federal court jurisdiction under these circumstances.

We have considered all of Wenegieme’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  