
    Dennis C. KELLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HANDY & HARMAN, WHX Corporation, Handy & Harman Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan, Handy & Harman Executive Post-Retirement Life Insurance Program, Handy & Harman Pension Plan/WHX Pension Plan, Handy & Harman Management Incentive Plan, Handy & Harman Long-Term Incentive Plan, Incentive and Non-Qualified Stock Option Plan, The Handy & Harman Post-Retirement Medical Plan, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-0718-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 19, 2011.
    Leslie D. Corwin (Timothy E. Di Domenico, on the brief), Greenberg Traurig, LLP, New York, NY, for Appellant.
    Thomas J. Fleming, Olshan Grundman Frome Rosenzweig & Wolosky LLP, New York, NY, for Appellees.
    Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Dennis C. Kelly appeals the district court’s February 16, 2010 judgment granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denying Kelly’s motion for partial summary judgment, and dismissing Kelly’s complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues presented on appeal.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2003). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In an ERISA action where, as here, “written plan documents confer upon a plan administrator the discretionary authority to determine eligibility, we will not disturb the administrator’s ultimate conclusion unless it is ‘arbitrary and capricious.’” Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

“[A] plan under which an administrator both evaluates and pays benefits claims creates the kind of conflict of interest that courts must take into account and weigh as a factor in determining whether there was an abuse of discretion, but does not make de novo review appropriate.” Id. at 82-83 (quoting McCauley v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 551 F.3d 126, 133 (2d Cir.2008)). A plaintiffs showing that the administrator’s conflict of interest affected the choice of a reasonable interpretation is one of “several different considerations” that judges must take into account when “reviewing] the lawfulness of benefit denials.” McCauley, 551 F.3d at 133 (citation omitted). “No weight is given to a conflict in the absence of any evidence that the conflict actually affected the administrator’s decision.” Durakovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 BJ Pension Fund, 609 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir.2010) (citing Hobson, 574 F.3d at 83).

In light of these principles, and after an exhaustive review of the record, we conclude that the district court properly granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion because the plan administrator did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying Kelly’s request for benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants and denial of partial summary judgment for Kelly, for substantially the same reasons articulated by the district court.

In addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Kelly’s remaining state-law claim after it dismissed all of Kelly’s federal claims before trial. Indeed, “if a plaintiffs federal claims are dismissed before trial, ‘the state claims should be dismissed as well.’ ” Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 250 (2d Cir.2008)).

Lastly, Kelly requests attorneys’ fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Kelly’s request is denied because he has not shown “some degree of success on the merits” and therefore is not eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees under Section 1132. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2158, 176 L.Ed.2d 998 (2010).

We have considered all of Kelly’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  