
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Johnny COLESON, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 10-0496-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 17, 2011.
    
      Lawrence Gerzog, New York, N.Y., for Appellant.
    Amanda Kramer, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York (Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Katherine Polk Failla, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, on the brief), New York, N.Y., for Appellee.
    Present: JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN, ROSEMARY S. POOLER and REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Johnny Coleson appeals from the judgment of conviction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Holwell, J.) entered December 18, 2009, sentencing him principally to 83 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release. The issue raised by this appeal is whether the sentence was procedurally reasonable. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

The government contends that the terms of Coleson’s plea agreement bar him from challenging his sentence on appeal. On March 9, 2011, the government moved to dismiss Coleson’s appeal on the ground that his plea agreement contained a valid appeal waiver, or, in the alternative, for summary affirmance. We denied the motion and refused to enforce the appeal waiver. This is the law of the case. “As a general matter, this Court will adhere to its own decision at an earlier stage of the litigation.” United States v. Plugh, 648 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation omitted). We will not revisit the issue.

However, we also find no merit to Cole-son’s argument that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately set forth the basis for its sentence. Specifically, Cole-son argues the district court failed to take into account cooperation he provided to the government. His argument is belied by the record. At sentencing, the district court stated:

Given the defendant’s long criminal history, I would have selected the top of the range as recommended by the probation officer. However, I’ve selected the bottom of the range to reflect defendant’s good-faith efforts to cooperate with the government.

This statement fulfills the district court’s duty to provide a “brief statement of the reasons” for the sentence imposed. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 192 (2d Cir.2008).

We have examined the remainder of Coleson’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.  