
    Darcy Joan Chamberlin GRIM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ellen L. BAKER, John Burke Chamberlin, William J. Chamberlin, John Scott Chamberlin, Estate of Paul Edmund Chamberlin, Jane Doe, John Doe, Corporation X, Corporation Y, Ralf Rastu, Sarah Gleacher, Kenneth Ryan, Village of Sagaponack, New York, County of Ulster, New York, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-1189-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 3, 2014.
    Darcy Joan Chamberlin Grim, pro se, West Park, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Scott Kossove and Diane Peixoto Whitfield, L’Abbate, Balkan, Colavita & Conti-ni, L.L.P., Garden City, NY, for Appellee Ellen L. Baker.
    Brian S. Sokoloff and Mark Anthony Radi, Sokoloff Stern LLP, Carle Place, NY, for Appellees John Burke Chamber-lin, William J. Chamberlin, and John Scott Chamberlin.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Darcy Joan Chamberlin Grim, proceeding pro se, appeals the judgment of the District Court, dismissing her complaint against her father and brothers (the “Chamberlins”) and her deceased mother’s estate lawyer, Ellen Baker. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

As a preliminary matter, Appellant challenges only the district court’s holding that her claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; she does not challenge the district court’s alternative grounds for dismissing her complaint, including that they are precluded by collateral estoppel and time-barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, any such arguments are deemed abandoned. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995). These bases, independent of the District Court’s Rooker-Feldman holding, are sufficient to affirm the District Court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s complaint. See Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e are free to affirm a decision on any grounds supported in the record.”). In any event, Appellant’s challenge to the District Court’s Rooker-Feldman analysis is meritless.

“Because Rooker-Feldman goes to subject-matter jurisdiction, we review de novo the district court’s application of the doctrine.” Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, in most circumstances, the lower federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to review final judgments of state courts. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-83, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). The Supreme Court has clarified that the doctrine is “confined” to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); see also Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85. On de novo review, we conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the exercise of federal subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.

CONCLUSION

We therefore affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court on the record following oral argument on the Ap-pellees’ motions to dismiss. We have considered all of Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the March 13, 2013, judgment of the District Court.  