
    Quinn WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles L. RYAN; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-15960.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted May 13, 2015.
    
    Filed May 29, 2015.
    Quinn Wilson, Tucson, AZ, pro se.
    Claudia Acosta Collings, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Arizona Attorney General, Tucson, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: LEAVY, CALLAHAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Quinn Wilson, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violation of his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs under the First Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s summary judgment and finding of qualified immunity, Tarabochia v. Adkins, 766 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir.2014), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity because defendants’ conduct did not violate clearly established law. See Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir.2002) (a prison official may be entitled to qualified immunity where he has a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the law requires in a given situation). Contrary to Wilson’s contentions, the law was not sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand he was required to provide a predawn meal, rather than a pre-sunrise meal, during Ramadan. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right”).

Wilson’s requests for counsel, set forth in his briefs, are denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     