
    Paul SALUJA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOCAL 1199 UNITED HEALTHCARE WORKERS EAST, SEIU, North Shore Long Island Jewish Health System, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 08-3542-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 29, 2010.
    
      Paul Saluja, pro se, New Hyde Park, NY, for Appellant.
    Richard Dorn, Levy Ratner, P.C., New York, NY, for Appellee Local 1199.
    Michael Joseph Volpe and Shaffin Abdul Datoo, Venable LLP, New York, NY, for Appellee North Shore Long Island Jewish Health System.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, WALKER and ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Paul Saluja, pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Local 1199 United Healthcare Workers East, SEIU (“the Union”) and North Shore Long Island Jewish Health System (“the Hospital”), dismissing Saluja’s complaint. Saluja alleges that after he was terminated from his position as a medical technologist with the Hospital, the Union breached its duty of fair representation to him and the Hospital breached its collective bargaining agreement with the Union. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo and ask whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “con-clusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. State of New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2002).

The district court correctly identified Saluja’s claim as a “hybrid Section 301/fair representation claim,” referencing Section 301(a) of the Labor Relations Management Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), which governs Sa-luja’s claim that the Hospital breached the collective bargaining agreement; the Union’s duty of fair representation is implied under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. See Carrion v. Enterprise Ass’n, Metal Trades Branch Local Union 638, 227 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir.2000). An employee may sue either his employer or the Union, or both, in a hybrid Section 301/fair representation claim, but to prevail, the employee “ ‘must not only show that [his] discharge was contrary to the contract, but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union.’ ” Id. (quoting DelCostello v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983)). The “indispensable predicate for such an action is ... a demonstration that the Union breached its duty of fair representation.” United Parcel Service. Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 62, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), overruled on other grounds by DelCostello, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476. A union breaches its duty of fair representation only if it acts in a manner that is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); see also White v. White Rose Food, a Div. of DiGiorgio Corp., 237 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 2001). If an employee establishes that the union acted in such a manner, he must then prove a causal connection between the union’s conduct and his injuries. See White, 237 F.3d at 179.

Here, Saluja failed to establish that the Union breached its duty of fair representation, as he provided only conelusory allegations that the Union did not adequately investigate his grievances or acted arbitrarily in choosing not to pursue arbitration when his grievances were denied. Such conelusory allegations are insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Davis, 316 F.3d at 100. Because Saluja failed to establish that the Union’s conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, the district court appropriately did not consider whether the Union’s conduct caused his injuries, or whether the Hospital breached the collective bargaining agreement. See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 62, 101 S.Ct. 1559.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  