
    R. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. H. ACKERMAN, Respondent.
    Paeol Lease eor Moke than One Yeak.—Whei’e A. leases of W. a store under a verbal lease for three years, and enters into possession and pays rent, such tenancy becomes a tenancy from year to year, and can only be determined by notice from one party to the other.
    Appeal from Multnomah County.
    The respondent (Ackerman) occupied the north half of lot number two in block number one, Portland, under a parol lease from appellant Williams, for the term of three years. The original lease was made December 1,1876, with the firm of Ackerman & Co. Respondent was the successor of the said firm, occupying the premises under the same lease from January 1, 1877. A written lease had been prepared and presented to and retained by the lessees, but never executed, though they took possession by virtue thereof. Respondent so occupied said premises until February 6,1878, with the consent of appellant, and paid appellant the rent up to that time. On that day respondent abandoned the premises and sent the key to appellant, who refused to receive it, and it remained in possession of respondent until the twenty-second day of March, 1878, when appellant proposed to receive the premises from that day, and the respondent,, without remark, delivered the key to appellant. The monthly rental was one hundred dollars. No notice, either verbal or written, had been given by either party to the other. The action was commenced by appellant in the county court for the rent accruing from February 6 to March 22, in which court the appellant recovered judgment for the sum of one hundred and fifty-eight dollars and thirty-three cents.
    The respondent appealed from this judgment to the circuit court. The latter court, the judge having heard the case upon a written stipulation and without the intervention of a jury, found for respondent. From that decision this appeal is taken.
    
      
      Claude Thayer, for appellant.
    
      Whalley & Fechheimer, FL. Ach, and James Gleason, for respondent.
   By tbe Court,

Boise, J.:

From this statement of facts it appears that Ackerman & Co. entered the premises in question under a parol agreement to lease the same for three years, and being so in possession delivered the possession to the defendant, who became their successor under the same right. We think that under the authority of Garret v. Clark, this became a tenancy from year to year, and could only be determined by notice by one party to the other. The rule is fully stated in that case, and we feel constrained to adhere to it as settling an important principle concerning such tenures, and we are not at liberty to change this rule at this time, unless we should find very cogent reasons for so doing, and we think no such reasons exist. We therefore refer to the opinion of Judge Shattuek, in that case, for a full statement of the reasons on which the rule was established. (5 Or. 64.)

The judgment of the circuit court will be reversed and judgment given for the plaintiff on this agreed statement of facts.  