
    Inland Mfg. Div., General Motors Corp., Appellant, v. Lawson, Admr., et al., Appellees.
    (No. 125614
    Decided May 31, 1967.)
    
      Messrs. Smith & Schnaclce, for appellant.
    
      Messrs. Gallon é Miller, for Lawson, appellees.
    
      Mr. William B. Saoobe, attorney general, and Mr. Egle-ton F. Dunn, for administrator.
   Bkenton, J.

This cause comes on for hearing upon the motion for new trial and final judgment by the plaintiff-appellant, Inland Manufacturing Division, General Motors Corporation, together with an exhaustive and per-, suasive memorandum.

Inland predicates its several contentions for a new trial upon subdivision (F) of Section 2321.17, Revised Code, to wit: For the reason that the final order and judgment heretofore entered herein is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law; and if so then, Inland moves for final judgment in its favor.

The first complaint made by Inland as to the court’s decision has to do with the court’s statement that Lawson was returning to her work area on paid time. According to the evidence before this court, the contract of employment did not specify the exact minutes during the thirty-five-minute period for lunch that Lawson was to employ in washing up and going from and returning to her work area. There is no evidence that she was required by her contract of employment to clock out and clock in during her lunch period. At this point the court feels compelled to refer to the zone of employment. This phrase, according to Inland’s briefs heretofore filed, represents a distasteful and touchy subject matter. As recently as March 29, 1967, the Supreme Court of Ohio approved the description of the “zone of employment” as pronounced in Merz v. Industrial Commission, 134 Ohio St. 36, as “the place of employment and the areas thereabouts, including the means of ingress thereto and egress therefrom, under control of the employer.” (Emphasis supplied.) Marlow v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 10 Ohio St. 2d 18.

It is therefore the opinion of the court that it does not make any difference whether Lawson was injured under the same circumstances in going from her work into the cafeteria for lunch or whether it occurred under the same circumstances as she was leaving the cafeteria to return to her work.

Inland admits that it maintained the cafeteria for the convenience of its employees. This significant statement is found in the third complete paragraph on page three of Inland’s motion for new trial and final judgment. This cafeteria, then, comes within the confines of the statement “and areas thereabout.” In fact, the cafeteria in question was located within the confines of the building where Lawson performed her work.

The court is also of the opinion that the fact that Inland leased the operation of the cafeteria to an independent contractor does not distinguish this case from what is meant by the phrase “under control of the employer” as used in Merz v. Industrial Commission, supra, and Marlow v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra. “Under control of the employer” under the compensation act simply means as respect the areas thereabout the place of employment, the employer has the right to control and manage such areas as it sees fit.

When Lawson was injured she was in that zone and her injury was proximately caused by a natural hazard of the zone. It was not self-inflicted or a result of an act of nature or of an occurrence inconsistent with her employment, its activities, conditions or environments.

This court has studied and reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeals of Montgomery County, Ohio, in case No. 3013, Spivy v. Keller, and rejects it along with Eagle and Coston as cited by Inland as authority to overturn its prior decision herein. Suffice it to say that a thorough and researching inquiry into the entire decision and holding in Marlow v. Goodyear, supra, convinces this court that Inland’s motion for new trial is not well taken.

Wherefore plaintiff-appellant’s motion for new trial and final judgment is hereby overruled..

Exceptions to the adverse rulings herein are hereby noted.

Motion overruled.  