
    John Eberhart and wife vs. Robert Gilchrist and others.
    The court will not interfere, on account of mere inadequacy of price, with a sale under a decree, unless the price is so grossly inadequate that, from such inadequacy, the court can infer fraud» But where, in addition to the inadequacy of price, there has been some mistake or accident which has caused the property to be sacrificed, then the court will sometimes interfere.
    But the same grounds upon which the court may properly interfere with its own process, will frequently not justify its interference with the process of other courts.
    Inadequacy of price, coupled with the considerations that the judgment being in attachment against a nonresident debtor, who was not aware of the judgment against him until the sale had actually taken place, and that he lias a good defence against the judgment, are not enough to justify the interference of a court of equity»
    Where a complainant claims the benefit of a statute, his bill must contain all the averments necessary to bring his case within its beneficial provisions.
    The hill alleges that, on the first day of September, 1853, a verdict was rendered in the Supreme Court of New York, at the suit of Susan Mary Jay cocks, against Susan Eberhart, then a feme sole by the name of Susan Ayres, and that on the 7th day of November, 1853, and before judgment was entered on the verdict, the said Susan became the wife of John Eberhart, and that after-wards, on the 13th of August, 1854, judgment was entered on the verdict for $650 damages and $264 costs. The bill then charges that John Eberhart was joined in the said judgment only for the sake of form. The bill further shows that, on the 9th of October, 1854, another judgment was obtained in the Supreme Court of the state of New York against John Eberhart and wife, at the suit of the same Susan Mary Jaycocks, for $400 damages, and; $69.84 costs, for liabilities of the said Susan Ayres, incurred before her intermarriage with John Eberhart; that on the 18th of July, 1853, before said intermarriage, and before obtaining either of said judgments passed a law, as follows: Passed July 18th, 1853.
    “ The people of the state of New York, represented in the senate and assembly, do enact as follows:
    § 1. An action may be maintained against the husband and wife, jointly, for any debt of the wife contracted before marriage, but the execution on any judgment in such action shall issue against, and such judgment shall bind the separate estate and property of the wife only, and not that of the husband.
    § 2. Any husband who may hereafter acquire the separate proj)erty of his wife, or any portion thereof, by any ante nuptial contract or otherwise, shall be liable for the debts of his wife contracted before marriage to the extent only of the property so acquired, as if this act had not been passed.”
    The bill then alleges that, on the 23d September, 1854, the said John Eberhart and wife, then residing in New York, the said Susan Jaycocks caused an attachment to be issued out of the Circuit Court of the county of Hudson, in the state of New Jersey, against the rights, &c., of the said John Eberhart and wife, and thereby attached certain lands in Jersey City; that the property so attached was the property of John Eberhart, and was his property before his marriage with his present wife, and that, by the laws of the state of New York, where the. parties in said suits resided, the property of the said John Eberhart was exempt from the payment of the said judgments.
    The bill states that judgment was entered upon the said attachment, on the 15th of October, 1855, for §1476.23; J. E. is not much acquainted with the English language; that during the issuing and conducting the said attachment, he and his wife lived in the city of New York, that the plaintiff in the suit knew this; that notice of the attachment was published in a newspaper published in Jersey City only, and that the said J. E. never had any notice of the said attachment; that at the time of issuing said attachment, J. E. had a large amount of property in the city of New York, more than sufficient to satisfy said judgment obtained in Now York, and that the plaintiff knew the fact; that he, on the 14th February, 1856, sold the said lauds in Jersey City to one It. G-., for a price much less than the value thereof, to wit, about the sum of §1500, which is a grossly inadequate price, when in fact said property was worth §5000.
    The bill prays for injunction to restrain the delivery of a deed to the purchaser, and from the sale of other property under the attachment.
    The injunction was applied for upon notice to the defendants, and on the hearing the bill was before the Chancellor, and also one affidavit on part of defendants, which was read without objection.
    
      A. O. Zabriskie and Mr. Shay (of New York), for the injunction.
    
      It. Gilehrist, jun., contra.
   The Chancellor.

Admitting that the complainant is entitled to the benefit of the statute of the state of New York, and that, by virtue of that statute, his lands, which have been sold under the judgment in attachment, are entitled to an exemption from liability to pay it, still I do not see upon what principle this court can interpose and stay the process of execution to carry that judgment into effect. The judgment has been obtained in due course of law, and execution has been issued upon it, and the property duly sold.

On the ground of mere inadequacy of price, this court has repeatedly held that it will not interfere with a sale under its own decree, unless, indeed, the price is so grossly inadequate that from such inadequacy the coui’t may infer fraud. But where, in addition to the inadequacy of price, there has been some mistake or accident beyond the control of the party injured, which has caused the property to be sacrificed, there the court will, in some cases, interfere. The same grounds upon which the court may properly interfere with its own process will not justify its interference with the process of other courts. This court is asked to interfere with this sale, on the ground of inadequacy of price, coupled with the considerations, that the judgment, being in attáchment against a nonresident debtor, he had no personal notice, and was not aware of any proceedings against him until the sale by the sheriff had actually taken place, and that he has a good defence against the judgment upon which the execution issued. If these grounds are sufficient, then in all sales upon judgments in attachment this court must interfere, if the debtor had not actual notice of the proceedceedings in attachment which subjected his land to execution and sale, and if he has a good defence against the judgment. There must be something more to justify the interposition of this court.

But there are other difficulties. The complainants do not show that they have a case entitling them to relief, if it were within the power of the court, and the court had jurisdiction of it, to adjudicate upon it. The complainant, John Eberhart, does not show that the lands in question are within the beneficial provisions of the statute of New York. This he was bound to do. He has no case for relief, unless lie brings himself within the beneficial provisions of the statute.

The complainant, Eberhart, should show by his bill— first, that the judgments in New York were for debts of his wife, contracted before marriage. The bill does not show whether the judgments were for debts or for torts. On the argument, the defendants read an affidavit showing that the judgments were recovered in suits for slander. No objection was made, by the opposite party, to reading the affidavit, though it was not competent under the rule, which allows of no affidavits except such as are annexed to an answer, unless taken under a special order of the court.

The complainants insisted that the statute embraces torts, as well as debts. But no reasoning can show that the legislature meant any such thing, unless some judicial or legislative authority of that state can be produced to establish that there is no distinction between a tort and debt in their judicial proceedings. But the complainants further insisted that, as to one of the judgments, the marriage having taken place after verdict, and before judgment, the verdict liquidated the damages, and that from the date of the verdict the amount ascertained by that verdict became a debt, and consequently, when the marriage took place, that verdict was a debt due from the wife. Eor some purposes that may be true, but not for the purpose of entitling the husband to the benefit of this statute. Such a construction is not within the letter or spirit of the statute.

But, secondly, the bill must show that the husband did not acquire the separate property of his wife, or any portion thereof, by any ante nuptial contract, or if he did, then it must show the value of such property; for, by the statute, the estate of the husband is liable for the debts of the wife contracted before marriage to the extent of the property so acquired. There is no allegation, in the bill, to bring the husband within this provision of the statute. By the rough draft of the complainants’ bill, which is inadvertently (I suppose) before me for the purposes of this argument, it appears that the property which is claimed as exempt from execution for the wife’s debts was, on the 11th of September, 1858, which was ten days after the verdict and less than ten days before her marriage, conveyed by the wife to her present husband. The affidavit, before referred to, also shows this fact, and there is no denial of it before the court'.

I do not think the complainant makes out a case by his bill to entitle him to relief, and the motion for an injunction must therefore be denied with costs. I have noticed only the points taken by counsel in argument.  