
    ADRIAANS v. DILL.
    -Attorney and Client; Contracts; Infants; Laches; Notice; Equity.
    .1. A contract for a contingent fee of one fifth of an estate and a deed of trust on the estate, securing the performance of the contract, procured by attorneys from, a widow, a woman seventy-eight years of age, the life tenant under a will, and her grandchildren, the remaindermen, for services to be performed in defending a caveat to the will, held, at the suit of the remaindermen, who were illiterate, after the death of the widow, to have been fraudulently procured by the attorneys, where it appeared, inter alia, that the defendants obtained the signatures of the complainants, most of whom were minors, and who lived in another city, without reading or explaining the papers to them, and on the representation that the object was to obtain money for their grandmother; that when the instruments were procured, the executors of the will, who were lawyers, had taken all necessary steps, without the aid of the defendants, to defend the will; and that the caveat was abandoned without the defendants having rendered any substantial service in the matter.
    •2. The object of the general rule deferring the act of avoidance by an infant of a contract made by him, until his coming of age, is his protection ; and when it is apparent to the court that delay will work injury to the infant, the power of repudiation may be exercised by the court immediately.
    3. Where illiterate parties living in another city, on learning of the true meaning of a contract and a deed of trust securing it, on their interest in an estate in this District, executed by them about nine years before as the result of fraudulent representations made to them, immediately took steps towards bringing suit to set aside the instruments as fraudulent, and commenced the suit within a year of their discovery of the fraud, it was held that they were not guilty of laches. (Following George v. Ford, 36 App. D. C. 315.)
    
      4. One who practises had faith will not be permitted to invoke the doctrine of constructive notice in aid of his wrongdoing, unless negligence on the part of the injured party has supervened.
    5. In a suit in equity against an attorney, to vacate a fee contract fraudulently obtained by him, and in which the fraud alleged is established, he will not be allowed remuneration for the services he actually performed, especially where, in his answer, he relies upon the contract,' and does not offer to accept the reasonable value of his services.
    No. 2253.
    Submitted March 6, 1911.
    Decided April 3, 1911.
    Hearing on an appeal by one of two defendants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a court of equity, vacating a contract and a deed of trust securing it, as having been fraudulently procured.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    the Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:
    Tbis is an appeal from a decree of the supreme court of the district, declaring null and void a deed of trust and the contract thereby secured, the purpose of said deed and contract being to insure the payment of a contingent fee to appellant, John H. Adriaans, and Samuel H. Lewis, for professional services in defeating the caveat to the will of Peter Dill, deceased, of the District of Columbia.
    the material averments of the bill are these: Peter Dill died on the 18th day of December, 1897, in tbis District. At that time be owned certain land situated in Charles county, Maryland, and considerable real estate in the District of Columbia. the deceased left a will, dated February 13th, 1896. Under tbis will all bis real estate was left to bis wife, Ann Dill, for life with remainder over in fee to the grandchildren of bis wife, they being the children of the wife’s son, who was the testator’s stepson.
    Joseph J. Waters and Oliver P. Johnson, members of the Bar of the District of Columbia, and residents of the District, were named as executors of the will, and both qualified as such. Thereafter a caveat was filed, and said executors, as in duty bound, undertook to secure the probate of the will. Thereupon, the defendant Adriaans and said Lewis (who was named as codefendant in the bill, but who died October 20, 1909, prior to the entering of the decree below, and whose representatives abandoned the case), both being members of the Bar, appeared in said probate proceeding, claiming to represent Mrs. Dill, the widow, and the remaindermen, who are the complainants herein. The bill expresses ignorance as to whether the widow ever employed the defendants to represent her, and avers, upon information and belief, that said defendants “deceived and defrauded the said Ann Dill, widow, as to her rights and duties in regard to the probate of the will of said Peter Dill, deceased, and deceived and defrauded the said Ann Dill into executing a contract in reference to compensating said John H. Adriaans and Samuel H. Lewis for alleged professional services rendered, and deceived and defrauded said Ann Dill, widow, into executing a deed of trust hereinafter referred to, to secure the payment of the fees of said John H. Adriaans and Samuel H. Lewis for said alleged professional services.”
    The bill then avers that the complainants were all made parties to said contract and deed of trust to secure the payment of fees under said contract. The ages of the complainants, six in number, at the time of the execution of said contract and deed of trust, are then given, and they range from twenty-one year to seven. It is then averred that the complainants did not read the contents of said contract, did not have the same read, nor the contents thereof made known to them, and have no further knowledge or information in reference to said contract, except the recitals of said deed of trust, referring to said contract; that complainants knew nothing of said deed of trust at the time of the execution thereof, nor were the contents nor the effect thereof known to complainants until during the year preceding the filing of the bill, when “they immediately employed counsel to take the proper steps to protect and restore to them their rights in the premises.” Said deed of trust was recorded in this District on the 28th of September, 1900, and a copy thereof is annexed to the bill.
    
      It is then stated that the complainants “never employed,, either directly or indirectly, said John H. Adriaans and said. Samuel H. Lewis, or either of them, to represent them, or any of them, in said proceedings. That the said John H. Adriaans and said Samuel H. Lewis, with intention to deceive and defraud your complainants, knowingly and wilfully induced your complainants, and each of them, to sign said contract and said, deed of trust by representing to your complainants, and each, of them, that the said papers being signed, to wit, the contract, and deed of trust, were for the purpose of obtaining an allowance for their grandmother, Ann Dill, the widow of said Peter Dill, deceased. That your complainants and each of them, as. far as they were able to comprehend what they were doing, owing to the tender years of several of your complainants, signed said contract and deed of trust under the misrepresentation, aforesaid; to wit, that the object of the same was to obtain am allowance for the grandmother of complainants, Ann Dill, the-widow of Peter Dill, deceased. That your complainants, and each of them, learned for the first time of the misrepresentation and fraud that had been practised upon them by the said John H. Adriaans and Samuel H. Lewis, during the past, year, and employed counsel as aforesaid.” The bill then avers that' the defendants “never rendered any legal services that were-necessary to protect the interest of complainants, or that were' beneficial to, or aided the interest or rights of, complainants; that, on the contrary, the said John H. Adriaans and Samuel H. Lewis instigated and continued much needless litigation in. reference to the probate of the will of said Peter Dill, deceased, and in the settlement of his estate, thereby incurring great expense to said estate;” that the trustees named in said deed of' trust, to wit, Charles C. Cole and Clarence F. Norment, did. not qualify as said trustees, but renounced said trust.
    The bill further avers that the widow, Ann Dill, died om May 3d, 1906, being at the time about eighty-six years of age; that said deed of trust and contract, while in fact null and void, nevertheless constitute a cloud upon the title of the real estate devised to complainants, which cloud, complainants aver,. they are entitled to have removed by the cancelation of said instruments; that complainants have not, since becoming of age, sanctioned and consented to said contract and deed of trust, but, on the contrary, have repudiated them. The bill ends with appropriate prayers.
    The defendants filed separate answers, Mr. Adriaans stating-“that he was employed by complainants and said Ann Dill to-defend said will against said caveat, in co-operation with the-executors named therein; and that, as security for the services thus contemplated, a lien was given upon the subject-matter-of the will, that a contemporaneous contract of compensation would be carried.out by complainants and said Ann Dill.” He-then denies that any misrepresentations were employed or fraudpractised in procuring the execution of said instruments, “and says that the statements in said paragraph (of the bill) that said papers were not read to or by complainants are absolutely-false. This defendant distinctly denies that it was represented-to complainants that the object of said papers was to secure an allowance for Ann Dill;” that he rendered valuable services to-complainants; “that complainant William P. Dill was of full age, and intelligently signed said trust in 1898;” that complainants Marian A., John H., and J. Edward Dill “have waited beyond the statutory period, after arriving at age, to-repudiate their action;” that complainants Leo A. J. and Maurice E., not being of age, can neither affirm nor deny said contract, nor can this be done for them by a guardian and next friend.”
    The defendant Lewis, in his answer, states “that he was retained by one Ann Dill, together with the complainants herein, to defend the will of Peter Dill, in connection with the-executors therein named,” and that said contract and lien were executed to secure his fees; “that he entered the said employment at the special instance and request of the said Ann Dill.”' Misrepresentation and fraud are denied, and it is averred that said instruments were read by the complainants “and were apparently thoroughly understood by them, as well as by the said Ann Dill.” Mr. Lewis in his answer “says that he is willing; to accept a reasonable compensation for the services rendered in connection with the contents of the will and the administration of the said estate.”
    The testimony in behalf of the complainants is substantially .as follows: Mrs. Annie L. Dill, mother of complainants, testified that the family were living in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1898, where they had since resided; that her husband was the adopted .son of the testator, Peter Dill, and that her husband’s mother was Ann Dill, wife of said Peter Dill. The witness further testified that the first knowledge of or dealings with Mr. Adriaans and Mr. Lewis, or either of them, was in August, 1898, when one of them—she was not sure which—(it was in fact Mr. Adriaans) called at her home in Baltimore, and “said hie wanted them (her children) to sign a paper for Mrs. Ann Dill, to get her some money, to Mr. Waters,—to get her some money;” that she remembered her husband saying that he did not wish to have anything to do with the matter, “and this gentleman was representing that the object was to get his mother (her husband’s mother) some money.” The witness was asked if she knew what the papers, which either Mr. Lewis or Mr. Adriaans wanted her to sign, were about, and replied “I paid no attention as to that, we thought it was to get some money •for the children’s grandmother, Mrs. Ann Dill, but I don’t know what it was about, they just signed them, and I don’t know whether they were read over or not; they may have been, but I ■don’t remember whether they were;” that either Mr. Lewis or Mr. Adriaans called again in 1889, when the witness told him ■she did not wish to see him or have anything more to do with him, as she “had no interest and did not care to see him;” that the first information she had about the contract and deed of trust was obtained from Mr. Dumler, a Baltimore attorney representing her children, about a year and a half before she testified.
    Marian A. Dill was about twenty-nine when she testified, and hence about nineteen at the time of the execution of the papers here involved. She testified that her father died in 1898; that not long before her father’s death she saw either Mr. Adriaans or Mr. Lewis in Baltimore. Asked what then occurred, she replied: “Well, I signed a paper, I remember I signed a paper, but I don’t know what it was, I don’t know what the paper was, I don’t know what it was except it was to get my grandmother some money, something like that it was;” that she was working at the time, and had only a half hour at noon for lunch; that it took her at least ten minutes to make the trip to or from her home, and that she remembers signing the paper at the office of a notary on Lexington street, in Baltimore, and returning to work within the half hour allotted to her; that she therefore was in the notary’s office but a few minutes. She was again asked the occasion of signing the paper, and replied: “All that I remember is that it was to get some money for my grandmother. That was all that was explained to me, and that is all I Jcnow about it. I remember going to the office on Lexington street to sign for the money, so that my grandmother could get the money;” and that from the representations which were' made at the time she .thought that Mr. Adriaans and Mr. Lewis were acting for her grandmother, and not for complainants.
    The next witness for complainants was John H. Dill, then twenty-eight years of age, or fifteen at the time the papers were executed. He testified that one of the defendants, in the fall before the death of witness’s father, called at the family home. Asked to tell what took place, witness stated:
    Well, as far as I remember it was supper time, and we were just finished our supper; in fact we were sitting in the kitchen, in the dining room, and my mother and my father were in the parlor, talking to a gentleman, and I don’t know whether it was Mr. Adriaans or Mr. Lewis, and we were sitting there, and a time elapsed, and then we were asked to go in, and—
    Q. In where ?
    A. To the parlor, where my mother and father and this gentleman were, and we were to go in one by one; and I went in, and I was asked to sign my name, and I signed my name and I left.
    
      Q. What was the purpose of signing your name to that paper ?
    A. Well at that time—I do not really remember what was the reason. I know they were trying to get some money for my grandmother.
    The witness further stated that the papers which he signed were not read or explained to him. In cross-examination this witness was asked who told him that the object of the 'papers was to get money for his grandmother, and replied: “It was not ■told to me, it was only a surmise I had from, overhearing the conversation about signing the papers."
    The testimony of J. Edward Dill, who was thirteen years old when he signed the contract and deed of trust, and that of Leo A. J. and Maurice E. Dill, who were still younger, throws no further light upon the case.
    William P. Dill, the eldest of the children, remembered that on a Sunday in the spring of 1898, he met Mr. Adriaans at his grandmother’s home in the District of Columbia; that a conversation ensued between Mrs. Dill and Mr. Adriaans; that his grandmother said that the estate was all tied up, and that Mr. Adriaans was going to get her some money. The next time witness saw Mr. Adriaans was at the place of employment of the witness in Baltimore, where Mr. Adriaans called in the late summer of 1898. Witness testified that it was about 8 o’clock in the evening at the time, but he was still working; that there was a rule forbidding anyone to see employees during working hours, and that Mr. Adriaans experienced considerable difficulty in getting witness down to the office. Witness said: “After a while the boss let me down in the office, and the boss was standing outside the door, and I could see him anxious for me to get back to my work, and so Mr. Adrians showed me the papers, and he had been to my home, and I usually get home about 6 o’clock or a little after, and so I suppose they sent him down there to see me, to my place of employment, and after Mr. Adriaans showed me the papers, I saw my brothers’ and sisters’ names on there, and of course I had no time to read it, to read anything, but I just saw my brothers’ and sisters’ names on this paper that Mr. Adriaans had with him;” that Mr. Adriaans told witness that it was the request of witness’s father that he sign the papers, and that the object or reason for signing the papers, to quote from the testimony of the witness, was “to relieve my grandmother, to try to get her some money, and I didn’t know how he was going to go about it, or anything else, but my grandmother told me about that, that she was going to get some money to relieve her.”
    All the foregoing witnesses testified that they had no knowledge of said deed of trust and contract until late in 19 07 or the early part of 1908; and that such knowledge was obtained through counsel, who was sent to Washington to see about the settlement of the estate of their grandfather. Mr. Dumler, the attorney, gave testimony tending to corroborate these statements.
    Mr. Joseph J. Waters, surviving executor under the will of Peter Dill, testified that he had been a member of the Bar for thirty years or more; that he had been engaged in active practice and was familiar with the probate practice in this District; that he had knowledge of what Mr. Adriaans and Mr. Lewis had done in connection with the probate of the will of Peter Dill; that he didn’t “think they performed any services of value to the estate or to the complainant; rather, their services were a detriment;” that their services were not necessary for the protection of the interests of the beneficiaries under the will.
    Mr. Strokmeyer, the notary before whom the deed of trust was executed by the complainant, had no recollection whatever concerning the matter, and did not even remember going to the factory to take William P. Dill’s acknowledgment. He testified that if the signature and seal on the papers were before him, he could state whether the parties appeared before him. The production of the original deed of trust was thereupon requested, but it transpired that it had been misplaced by the defendant Adriaans, and therefore could not be produced.
    Mr. Adriaans, testifying in his own behalf, stated that the first knowledge he had of the case was obtained through Mr. Lewis, who, according to Mr. Adriaans, was more of a departmental lawyer than a general practitioner; that he learned through Mr. Lewis that the will of Peter Dill had been filed, and also a caveat thereto; that Mrs. Dill, the widow, was dissatisfied with Mr. Waters, and wished to retain somebody to defend the will; that he went to Mrs. Dill’s house on the 30th of August, 1898, and was introduced to her by Lewis; that Mrs. Dill then made known her desire to employ counsel “for the purpose of defeating the caveat and to procure the probate of the will;” that he thereupon drew up the papers forming the basis of this suit; that a notary was procured before whom Mrs. Dill executed the papers upon the same occasion; that she gave witness a list of persons who would testify as to the soundness of mind of her husband; that at the same interview witness learned that a suit had been filed by the caveators in the circuit court of Prince George county, Maryland, against the executors “and other persons claiming under said will,” the object of the suit being the appointment of receivers pending the determination of the will contest; that he prepared an answer for Mrs. Dill to sign, and filed it.
    The witness further testified, that the day after the papers were signed by Mrs. Dill, he went to Baltimore to obtain the signatures of the complainants; that Mr. Lewis did not accompany him; that he had a letter from the widow Dill introducing Mm and "requesting that they also sign the same par persj” that he had a talk with the father and mother in the parlor, the children—except William P. Dill—being present, explaining to them the situation; that “their interest in the estate depended upon procuring the probate of the will.” In his cross-examination, however, he was asked the condition of the father’s health, and replied: “Well, he wasn’t very robust, or very strong, but he was down stairs in the dining room and sat at the table. He read these papers over and he called the children in. I think the children were in the front room, and he called them and told them it was proper for them to sign the papers.”
    Later the witness stated that he explained, on this occasion, “that an attack on that will had been made by the next of kin in the shape of a caveat, and it was necessary that there should be a defense made to that caveat, and that probate of the will obtained if possible;” that he “stated that Mrs. Ann Dill was in a distressed condition financially, and that she had told me that she needed money, and that she would be able to get money if the probate of the will could be procured; and it was for this purpose that we were to make the defense of the will, to enable her to raise money to live upon.”
    
    The witness did not testify that he read the papers to William P. Dill, nor did he contradict said Dill as to the circumstances surrounding the signing of the papers by him. The witness did say that Mr. Dill, having the papers in his hands, “saw the signatures of his brothers and sisters and his father and mother, and he signed them;” that witness thought Mr. Dill “had the papers something like twenty minutes in deciding.”
    It further appeared from the testimony of Mr. Adriaans that, prior to the time when the issues in the will case were submitted to a jury through the efforts of the executors, the caveators not appearing, complainants had signed a paper “in which paper, drawn up by Mr. Waters, and signed by them,, they said they didn’t want to have the jury trial interfered with. * * * At first they were dissatisfied with Mr. Waters and came after us, Mr. Lewis and myself, and then it seems they returned to their first love, and repudiated Mr. Lewis and myself.”
    The witness testified that besides filing an answer in the-Maryland proceeding, he interviewed various people whose-names Mrs. Dill had given him, with the object of using them as witnesses when the trial was had upon the caveat. There was no corroboration, however, of the latter testimony. He= further testified that “Mr. Waters seemed to be very resentful that we should come into the case, and our efforts finally resulted in hostilities, and he filed charges against us, and I filed counter charges;” that the will was filed on the 24th of February, 1898, the caveat on the 24th of March, 1898, the petition for the probate of the will on the 2d of May of the same-year, and the caveators filed their answer on the same day. To this answer a replication was filed by the executors on the 19th of May, 1898. Such was the condition of the will case when Adriaans and Lewis appeared therein. Adriaans further testified that he and Lewis, without contest, secured the prohate of the will in 1900; that the executors, two years later, obtained a vacation of the prior decree on the ground that the issues had not been submitted to a jury, and the issues were thereupon, through the efforts of the executors, formally submitted to a jury and the will duly probated. It further appeared from the testimony of this defendant that on June 1st, 1900, the defendants obtained a power of attorney from Mrs. Annie L. Dill as guardian ad litem, of her minor children. In reference to this power of attorney Mrs. Dill wrote:
    “Mr. Lewis,
    Dear Sir:—
    I send you this paper i hope it will be the last one, for i am tired, of running to the attorney. Mr. Waters is offended at me for sending you the papers, he send me the same papers as you did, and as he was so long answering my letter to him, i thought i would have yours filled out and he doesn’t like it. Mrs. Dill employed you and of course it don’t see what i have to do with employing other Lawyers, Mr. Waters will suit himself without my consent i wont interfere let them all do as they please I told Mr. Waters to fight Mrs. Ann Dill and not me she employed you and send Mr. Adriaans to uS, and that was all i ever know of the case and i don’t care to be worried to death nothing is more worring than trying to please everybody, i said at first i would not have anything to—with it and now i am all mixed up in it. i dont think there would be mush use in me appealing to more Lawyers, as he dosent seem to think mush of me i wont sent you his cards as i refuse to send him yours excuse this writing as i have my children all sick.
    Tours respectfully,
    Mrs. Anne L. Dill.
    
      
      Mr. Edward L. Qies and Mr. Tracy L. Jeffords for the appellant.
    
      Mr. Daniel W. O’Don-oghue for the appellees.
   Mr. Justice Bobb

delivered the opinion of the Court:

1. The fundamental question which we are called upon to ■consider is whether good faith was practised in procuring the signatures of complainants to the challenged fee agreement and ■deed of trust, or whether those signatures were obtained as the result of misrepresentations amounting to fraud. This question necessarily must be determined upon the evidence before us, which we will now briefly review.

Peter Dill died December 18th, 1897. The executors of his will were two lawyers, and, according to the will, friends of the testator. The value of the estate, consisting of realty, is conceded to have been about $10,000. Testator’s wife was made tenant for life, with remainder over to complainants in fee. The will was seasonably filed by the executors, and steps were also taken by them to procure the probate thereof. On the 4th of March, 1898, a caveat was filed by nonresident collateral heirs. This caveat, as we have seen, was subsequently Abandoned, leaving no contest whatever against the probate of the will.

It is apparent that the utmost good faith was not practised in procuring the signature of the widow Dill to these papers. She was almost seventy-eight years old when Mr. Lewis and Mr. Adriaans, on August 30th, 1898, appeared at her home. At that time the executors had done all that in reason they should have done towards the probate of the will. Mr. Adriaans and Mr. Lewis knew that the estate could not be settled within •one year from the death of the testator. They knew, or should have known, that the executors had qualified as such and were not remiss in their duty; and yet we find these two lawyers representing to this old lady that their services were necessary because of the nonaction of the executors, and we find them obtaining her signature to a contract calling for one fifth of the estate in the event they succeeded in overcoming the opposition to the probate of the will. At this time they either knew, or easily might have ascertained, the character of that opposition. That they misled Mrs. Dill as to the situation is apparent. What followed ? Her son, the father of complainants, with his family, resided in Baltimore. He was then stricken with a fatal disease, from which he died in the November following. His wife, as appears from her testimony and from other evidence before us, was a woman little versed in the affairs of life. The children were all minors save one. Neither of the parents nor the minor children had ever seen, or, so far as this record discloses, heard, of these attorneys. Mr. Adriaans, armed with a letter from the widow Dill, appeared upon the scene. He, of course, realized that his contract and deed of trust were valueless without the signatures of the remaindermen. It was therefore greatly to his interest to obtain them. He was fully advised as to the conditions surrounding the probate of the will;. they knew little or nothing about it. Mrs. Dill’s letter requested the signing of the papers which he had with him. Supplementing that request he admits that he told this stricken son and his wife that their mother “was in a distressed condition financially, and that she had told him (Adriaans) that she needed money, and that she would be able to get money if the probate of the will could be procured, and it was for this purpose that we were to make the defense of the will, to enable her to raise money to live upon.” He did not tell them the value of the estate; that the executors were lawyers; that these executors were then proceeding with reasonable despatch towards the probate of the will; that the signing of the papers meant so much additional and probably needless'expense. On the contrary, he played upon their sympathies and suppressed the facts which he should have disclosed. We shall not dwell upon the testimony of the mother of complainants and that of her children other than William P., who was of age when he signed these papers. We are fully convinced, from that testimony and the testimony of Mr. Adriaans, that the signatures of tibe minor children were procured as the result of misrepresentations; that the children did not know, and Mr. Adriaansdid not intend they should know, the real character and purport of the papers they were signing. The letter of June 1st, 1900,. from the mother of complainants, contradicts rather than supports the defendant, for it is apparent that it was the then understanding of Mrs. Dill that Mr. Lewis and Mr. Adriaans were representing Mrs. Ann Dill, and not her or her children.

Having obtained the signatures of William P. Dill’s father, mother, brothers, and sisters, Mr. Adriaans repaired to the place of employment of this complainant. Mr. Adriaans does not contend that he read the papers to William, nor does he-contend that he made him acquainted with the contents thereof, owing to the presence of third parties. Mr. Adriaans’s testimony contains the significant statement that when William “saw the signatures of his brothers and sisters and his father and mother,” he signed the papers. William testified, it will be remembered, that Mr. Adriaans told him that the object of the papers was the relief of his grandmother; that Mr. Adriaans further told him that it was the request of his father-that he sign, and that thereupon, without reading the papers, he signed them. It is apparent that this complainant was deceived into signing the papers and that the deception practised, considering the circumstances and relative positions of the parties, amounted to fraud. While Mr. Adriaans testifies that William read, or might have read, the papers, he does not deny that it was with considerable difficulty that he even obtained William’s presence in the office. Nor does he deny that the immediate superior of Mr. Dill was standing near and apparently waiting for him. The situation, therefore, was such that any representations made by Mr. Adriaans were very likely,, as he well knew, to be accepted and acted upon. Can there be any doubt that had Mr. Adriaans acquainted this complainant with the true situation, instead of making the representations which he did make, complainant would have declined to sign the papers? This is the test, and there can be but one-answer to the question.

2. Two of the complainants, at the time of the filing of the bill, were under age. The defendant contends that they could .not disaffirm the contract and deed securing it during infancy, .and that therefore there has been a misjoinder of parties.

We have found this contract and deed to be the fruit of bad faith, and hence void. This finding brings the case within the ruling in Fridge v. State, 3 Gill & J. 103, 20 Am. Dec. 463; Ridgeley v. Crandall, 4 Md. 442; Monumental Bldg. Asso. No. 2 v. Herman, 33 Md. 134, to the effect that a contract that a -court can see and pronounce to be to the prejudice of the infant is void. There can be no doubt that had the defendant in 1900, at which time he claims to have performed his part of the • contract, attempted to enforce that contract to the prejudice of these infants, equity would have had jurisdiction to stay his .hands. The object of the general rule deferring the act of avoidance until the coming of age of the infant is his protection. When, therefore, it is apparent to the court that delay will work injury to the infant, the power of repudiation may be •exercised immediately. Tyler, Infancy, sec. 29. In Andrews v. Hall, 15 Ala. 85, it was held that the guardian ad litem of .-an infant might, with the concurrence of the orphans’ court, 'bring into the estate of an intestate advancements to the infant, and claim for the infant his or her share of the estate. "The court said: “It was the duty of the guardian ad litem in this case, to present to the court the right of his ward to contribution, and the circumstances and conditions connected with it, so that the court could protect him by making the election which was essential to his interest.” Why, then, may not a court of equity, in a ease like the present, avoid a multiplicity • of suits, and protect the interests of infant parties to a contract •by permitting their guardian or next friend to represent them ? We know of no reason. Surely a court of equity has the power, when it is apparent that infants are the victims of deceit, to award them the same relief that it is ready to award adults.

3. Complainants are not guilty of laches. While the deed •■of trust was recorded two years after its execution, complainants, living in Maryland, and having no actual knowledge that they had signed such an instrument, could not be charged with laches until something occurred which should have led them to make inquiry; in other words, until they had some reason to suspect the injury done them. George v. Ford (present term) 36 App. D. C. 315. Inasmuch as complainants did not discover the wrong that had been done them until late in 1907 •or early in 1908, and almost immediately took steps looking to the bringing of the bill herein, which was filed within a year, it is apparent that they cannot be charged with unreasonable delay. Halstead v. Grinnan, 152 U. S. 412, 38 L. ed. 495, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 641. They had no representative here, and there is no testimony that anything occurred between the time when they signed the papers and the time when Mr. Dumler was sent over here to see about the settlement of their grandfather’s estate to lead them to suspect the real nature of those papers. Mr. Adriaans recorded his deed and quietly awaited developments. He said nothing and did nothing likely to put complainants upon inquiry, and, so far as the record discloses, neither did Mr. Lewis. Notice ought never to be imputed to the victim of a deception unless his failure to obtain actual notice was the result of his own negligence; in other words, he who practises bad faith ought not to be permitted to invoke the doctrine of constructive notice in aid of his wrongdoing, unless, as above suggested, negligence on the part of the injured party has supervened.

One point remains. It was suggested in argument that the •defendant is at least entitled to remuneration for the services actually performed by him to the benefit of the complainants, and that the court should have referred the case to the auditor for the ascertainment of the value of those services. The defendant in his answer, however, did not offer to accept compensation for services actually performed, as did his codefendant Lewis, but insisted on the letter of his contract. That contract being tainted with bad faith, we do not feel justified, upon the meager evidence before us, in prolonging this contest. We are not convinced that any necessary and valuable services 'were rendered complainants by the defendant.

The decree is affirmed, with costs. Affirmed.  