
    Jocelyn GREEN v. UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS, Louisiana State University Board Of Supervisors.
    No. 98-CA-1809.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    June 2, 1999.
    Rehearing Denied Sept. 15, 1999.
    
      Joel P. Loefelholz, New Orleans, Louisiana, Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant Jocelyn Green.
    M. Nan Alessandra, David M. Korn, Joanne Rinardo, Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., New Orleans, Louisiana, Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees, University of New Orleans, LSU Board of Supervisors.
    Court composed of Chief Judge ROBERT J. KLEES, Judge MOON LANDRIEU and Judge PATRICIA RIVET MURRAY.
   _jjKLEES, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Jocelyn Green appeals a judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, the Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors (“the Board”). We affirm.

Jocelyn Green began working for UNO in 1993 as the Associate Director of the Office of Student Financial Aid. In 1994, after the director resigned, she was appointed Acting Director of the office. She maintained this position for more than one year, when, after an advertised search for a new director, she was offered the position. On January 17, 1996, Ms. Green received a letter authored by David Shroyer, Assistant Vice Chancellor for Enrollment Management. The letter read in its entirety:

| January 17,1996

Mrs. Jocelyn W. Green

University of New Orleans

Office of Student Financial Aid

New Orleans, LA 70148

Re: Letter of Offer

Dear Mrs. Green:

I am pleased to offer you the position of Director of Student Financial Aid for the period beginning January 16, 1996, subject to the final approval of the LSU Board of Supervisors. This position is a full-time fiscal year position and the fiscal year salary is $48,000.00.

This appointment is subject to the final approval of the LSU Board of Supervisors. Assuming funds are available, and assuming that you receive satisfactory or better performance appraisals, the appointment may be continued on a year to year basis. We hope and trust that, on the bases indicated, we can offer such a continued appointment, and that you will accept further appointment. You are already familiar with the Louisiana State Employee Retirement System, and are already enrolled in it. You are also aware of and participate in the various university-sponsored insurance and health coverages which best meet your needs. You are, however, encouraged to speak with persons in the Office of Human Resources should you wish to change or revise these. You also have a copy of the UNO Faculty Handbook which covers university policies affecting faculty and staff.

I look forward to continuing our close and productive professional relationship as you continue to serve and grow as a member of our Enrollment Management family, but now in the more critical and sensitive administrative role of Director of Student Financial Aid.

I need not remind you of how important the efficient operation of the Student Financial Aid Office is to the University and our students, nor how very important it is that we continue to develop our staff team through ongoing training and close supervision. We must become ever more conscious of improving our customer service, audit-readiness, and technological proficiency. Highest priorities for the coming period must be:

1. Customer Service
2. Acquiring new financial aid software.
3. Implementing a Voice Response Inquiry system for the office.
4-. Implementing a Electronic Funds Transfer capability.
5. Training and cross-training of professional staff.
6. Securing state-of-the-art PC’s for staff.
|s7- Sprucing up the Financial Aid Office suite to be brighter and more welcoming both for our hardworking staff but particularly for our students.

Together, we have made immense progress in the nearly two years since you began as Acting Director. Now we must keep these priorities before us, pressing them forward every single day. If we do this, we’ll have the best office and the best staff in the state.

If you accept this offer, as indicated by the terms of this letter, please indicate your acceptance by signing in the space provided. Please return one signed copy to me.

Sincerely,

David Shroyer

Assistant Vice Chancellor for

Enrollment Management

AGREED AND ACCEPTED:

Jocelyn Green Date

cc: Dr. Louis V. Paradise, Provost

On October 31, 1996, Ms. Green received a memorandum from Louis V. Paradise, provost of the university, terminating her employment as of November 30, 1996.

Ms. Green filed suit against the University and the Board alleging that the letter she received from David Shroyer was a written offer of employment for a definite term, UNO’s fiscal year, which was accepted by her. The contract renewed by its own terms on July 1, 1996, because, by statute, the UNO fiscal year runs from July 1 until June 30. She alleged that the employment contract was breached when she was fired before the end of the term, and claimed that she was entitled to her salary for the remainder of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1996. Ms. Green also claimed that she lost the opportunity to renew the contract because of UNO’s breach, and that she suffered a loss of standing in the community, mental anguish and distress.

|4The Board maintained that the letter sent to Ms. Green was merely an offer of employment confirming the salary to be paid. The letter did not set forth a specific term for employment, but rather signified that Ms. Green would be paid on a twelve-month basis. The Board moved for summary judgment contending that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the existence of an employment contract. The Board offered the affidavits of David Shroyer, who authored the January 17, 1996 letter and Henry Dillon, Director of Human Resources Management at UNO in support of the motion. The trial court granted summary judgment on April 24, 1998. On April 28, 1998, in response to Ms. Green’s motion for written reasons, the trial court stated its finding that the letter dated January 17, 1996 “merely confirmed the offer of employment to Ms. Green and was not an employment contract.” Ms. Green appeals this final judgment.

On appeal, Ms. Green contends that the trial court erred in finding that the January 17, 1996, letter she received from David Shroyer was not an employment contract. Ms. Green argues that the statement, “[t]his position is a full-time fiscal year position” contained in the letter from Mr. Shroyer connotes a definite term. Ms. Green’s argument is without merit.

Courts of appeal review summary judgments de novo. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730. The summary judgment article provides that the burden of proof remains with the mover. However, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial, he only need demonstrate the absence of factual support for one or more of the elements essential to the adverse party’s claim. If this is accomplished, the burden shifts to the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If he fails to do so, the mover is entitled to summary judgment. La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 966 C(2).

l,Jn support of the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Shroyer attested that on January 17, 1996, he sent a letter of offer to Ms. Green, that this letter was an offer to establish Ms. Green’s salary, and that the letter was a “job offer” for an indefinite time period. He also attested that the letter was not an employment contract for a definite term. Mr. Dillon attested that, based on his knowledge, UNO used the term “fiscal” to refer to an employee’s pay type and the frequency of paychecks received. Thus, according to Mr. Dillon, a “fiscal employee” is one who is paid on a twelve-month basis, as opposed to those employees paid on a nine-month basis, or bi-weekly! He further attested that unclassified/non-classified employees hold their positions at the pleasure of the Louisiana State Board of Supervisors and such employees may be terminated upon thirty days written notice.

In opposition to the summary judgment motion, Ms. Green argues that “both the contract and our State statutes are clear and unambiguous in the provision of its term. The contract clearly states that it is for a fiscal-year and appellees who drafted it must be bound.” Ms. Green offered her affidavit to the effect that she understood the letter to be an offer for a contract of employment for a full fiscal year, July 1 through June 30.

However, the letter sent to Ms. Green offering her a position was dated January 17, 1996 which is the middle of the fiscal year. There is no evidence that the offer was renewed in June for the following fiscal year. Further, in light of Mr. Shroyer and Mr. Dillon’s testimony, we find that Ms. Green failed to produce sufficient factual support to satisfy her eviden-tiary burden of proof at trial that “a full-time fiscal year position” is a definite term of twelve months beginning on January 16, 1996.

| ¡^Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision granting the LSU Board of Supervisors’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

AFFIRMED.

LANDRIEU, J„ CONCURS, with reasons.

MURRAY, J., DISSENTS, WITH REASONS.

LLANDRIEU, J„

CONCURRING.

Mrs. Green’s contentions are that she was offered and accepted a contract of employment from January 17, 1996, through June 30, 1996, and that, because she was not terminated on June 30th, the contract was renewed for another fiscal year. She does not contend she was given a one-year contract beginning January 17, 1996, and ending January 16,1997.

There are no material facts in dispute. Mrs. Green worked at UNO as Associate Director of the Office of Student Financial Aid without the protection of a contract. From 1994 until January of 1996, she served as Director, again without the benefit of a contract. She has offered no proof that she demanded or requested a contract for a fixed term; instead, she relies on the January 17 th letter as the sole proof of such a contract and on the fact that because she was not terminated, the contract was automatically renewed for another fiscal year.

The letter on which Mrs. Green relies is not a contract of employment for a fixed term; rather, it is an appointment letter informing her that she was appointed Director instead of Acting Director, the position in which she had been serving. Her acceptance of the promotion and salary did not constitute a six-month contract.

Even if the letter could be read to constitute a contract for a fixed term, there is not the slightest evidence of a renewal.

^MURRAY, J„

DISSENTING.

Because I find that the letter sent to Ms. Green was an offer of employment for a definite term, I respectfully dissent.

Louisiana Civil Code art. 1906 defines a contract as “an agreement by two or more parties whereby obligations are created, modified, or extinguished.” Art. 1927 of the Civil Code, entitled “Consent,” provides:

A contract is formed by the consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance.
Unless the law prescribes a certain formality for the intended contract, offer and acceptance may be made orally, in writing, or by action or inaction that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of consent.
Unless otherwise specified in the offer, there need not be conformity between the manner in which the offer is made and the manner in which the acceptance is made.

The Board does not deny that Mr. Shroyer’s letter to Ms. Green contained an offer of employment. Nor does it deny that Ms. Green accepted the offer, and returned the executed agreement. Therefore, I believe the trial court erred when it found that the letter “merely confirmed the offer of employment to Ms. Green and was not an employment contract.”

The letter offered and Ms. Green accepted the position of Director of Student Financial Aid for the period beginning January 16, 1996. The letter [¡¡specified that this position is “a full-time fiscal year position and the fiscal year salary is $48,-000.00.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines fiscal year as “an accounting period of twelve months.” Thus, by definition, the letter offered Ms. Green a full-time position for twelve months, at a salary of $48,000 to be paid over a twelvemonth period.

In addition, the second paragraph of the January 17 letter advised Ms. Green that, assuming certain conditions are satisfied, the appointment may be “continued on a year to year basis.” This language is consistent with an offer of employment for a specific term of a year.

When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent. La. Civ. Code art. 2046. This rule of interpretation applies to contracts of employment. Barbe v. A.A. Harmon & Co., 94-2423, 94-2424, p. 13 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/7/98), 705 So.2d 1210, 1219, twits denied, 98-0526, 98-0529 (La.5/15/98), 719 So.2d 462.

It is clear from the wording of the agreement at issue that Ms. Green was offered and accepted a position for a twelve-month period that began on January 16, 1996, which would be renewed on a year to year basis, assuming certain conditions were met. Enforcing this agreement as written will not lead to an absurd result. Consequently, there is no need to examine extrinsic evidence, such as the affidavits offered by the parties.

For this reason, I would reverse the summary judgment in favor of UNO. 
      
      . Although the motion for summary judgment was brought on behalf of the University of New Orleans and the LSU Board of Supervisors, the record reveals that the University of New Orleans was dismissed from the suit by judgment dated April 7, 1997, pursuant to exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action.
     