
    NEWTON LUMBER CO., INC. v. Lennord C. OWENS.
    2940648.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Oct. 20, 1995.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 1995.
    E. Clark Summerford of Zeanah, Hust, Summerford, Davis & Jones, Tuscaloosa, for Appellant.
    No brief filed by Appellee.
   ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge.

This is a workmen’s compensation ease.

On May 13, 1994, Lennord C. Owens filed a complaint in the Tuscaloosa County Circuit Court, seeking workmen’s compensation benefits. Owens alleged that in February or March 1993 he suffered an injury and that such injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with Newton Lumber Company, Inc. Newton answered, denying that Owens suffered an injury and that such injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.

An ore tenus proceeding was held on March 21, 1995. The only testimony presented to the trial court was by Owens; Mr. William Roy Simmons, Owens’s supervisor; and Ms. Linda McDowell, Secretary-Treasurer of Newton. All of the testimony revealed that the accident had occurred on June 10, 1992, and Owens admitted that he was confused about the dates of his injury. Following the completion of the testimony and the submission of the medical records, Owens moved to amend his complaint to conform to the evidence that the accidence occurred on June 10, 1992; the trial court allowed that amendment. On March 22, 1995, the trial court entered a judgment, finding that Owens suffered a hernia resulting from an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment; the trial court awarded benefits accordingly.

Newton appeals, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in finding that Owens suffered a hernia arising out of and in the course of his employment with Newton; and (2) that the trial court erred in awarding Owens workmen’s compensation benefits and medical expenses.

In Ex parte Eastwood Foods, Inc., 575 So.2d 91 (Ala.1991), our supreme court set out the standard for appellate review of factual determinations in a workmen’s compensation case:

“Initially, the reviewing court will look to see if there is any legal evidence to support the trial court’s findings. If such evidence is found, then the reviewing court determines whether any reasonable view of that evidence supports the trial court’s judgment.”

575 So.2d at 93. The second prong of this standard was further explained in Ex parte Veazey, 687 So.2d 1348 (Ala.1993):

“Where one reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court’s judgment, the judgment must be upheld, even if another, perhaps better reasoned, view of the evidence might have dictated a different outcome.”

637 So.2d at 1349.

We first address whether the trial court erred in finding that Owens suffered a hernia arising out of and in the course of his employment with Newton. In order for Owens to receive compensation benefits for his alleged hernia, he must prove all of the following:

“1. That there was an injury resulting in hernia.
2. That the hernia appeared suddenly.
3. That it was accompanied by pain.
4. That the hernia immediately followed an accident.
5. That the hernia did not exist prior to the accident for which compensation is claimed.”

Section 25-5-57(a)(6)a., Ala.Code 1975. The trial court’s judgment stated, in pertinent part:

“[Owens] was injured in an accident, on the job, arising out of and in the course of his employment with the defendant on June 10, 1992. At that time, [Owens] was lifting a heavy piece of lumber and sustained a strain to his left groin area. [Owens] felt immediate pain, and notified his employer.
“Under the facts of this case, there is no doubt that [Owens] sustained an injury to his left abdominal area on June 10, 1992. [Owens] continued to have pain and soreness from the date of injury till the hernia was detected over one year later. [Owens] testified that he had no problems with his left abdominal area prior to the June 10, 1992, injury. The unclear issues are whether this injury resulted in á hernia and if it appeared suddenly. On a close examination of the medical records submitted, Dr. Kumar, who noted the hernia in July of 1993, noted that the hernia was noticeable only on straining and eoughing. The other doctors records were silent as to whether or not they had the plaintiff strain or cough. Some records stated only that no masses were palpable, perhaps meaning that they only felt the area. Giving all favorable presumptions to [Owens] as the law requires, this court finds that the hernia occurred on June 10, 1992, and appeared suddenly.”

After carefully reviewing the record, we find that the evidence is accurately reflected in the trial court’s judgment. There was legal evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Owens suffered a hernia as a result of the accident on June 10, 1992, and that the hernia appeared suddenly. Even though another reasonable view of the evidence might suggest a different outcome, one reasonable view of that evidence supports the trial court’s judgment; therefore, we must affirm. Ex parte Veazey, supra.

The affirmance of the first issue mandates an affirmance of the trial court’s award of workmen’s compensation benefits and medical expenses to Owens. §§ 25-5-51 and 25-5-77, Ala.Code 1975.

AFFIRMED.

THIGPEN, YATES, and MONROE, JJ., concur.

CRAWLEY, J., dissents.

CRAWLEY, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. No reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court’s judgment that Owens met his burden of proof under Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-57(a)(6)a. That statute requires:

“For hernia resulting from injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employee’s employment, it must be definitely proven to the satisfaction of the court all of the following:
“1. That there was injury resulting in hernia.
“2. That the hernia appeared suddenly.
“3. That it was accompanied by pain.
“4. That the hernia immediately followed an accident.
“5. That the hernia did not exist prior to the accident for which compensation is claimed.”

The purpose of a special hernia statute such as § 25-5-57(a)(6)a. is to “ensur[e] causal connection between the employment and the hernia.” A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 39.72 at 7-449, -50 (1991).

“The ultimate objective of the statute, which is to distinguish nonindustrial congenital hernias from those definitely produced by trauma or effort at work, is used by the courts to provide guidance in determining how short a time ‘immediate’ must be in the circumstances.”

Id.

Owens presented no evidence that the hernia appeared “suddenly” or that it “immediately followed an accident.” The undisputed evidence established that Owens received an injury on June 10, 1992, but that he was not diagnosed as having a hernia until July 28, 1993, over thirteen months later. A thirteen-month interval between injury and diagnosis means that the hernia was neither “sudden” nor “immediate.” See Metropolitan Dade County, Board of County Comm’rs v. Wyche, 383 So.2d 315 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (hernia did not appear “suddenly” when discovered one year after accident); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Quibedeaux, 403 S.W.2d 826 (Tex.Civ.App.1966) (hernia was not “sudden” or “immediate” when symptoms appeared two or three months after accident); Frohman Gear Co. v. Fellows, 149 So.2d 557 (Fla.1963) (hernia not diagnosed until twelve months after injury did not appear “suddenly”).

Owens had five examinations by four different doctors, all of whom were specifically looking for, but did not find, a hernia. The notes from those five examinations reflect the following:

1. “Mike McIntyre, M.D. 6/11/92:
“HISTORY: This is a 40 year old gentleman that works at a lumber company. He states that he was picking up a very large piece of lumber yesterday and pulled something in the left groin area. He states that he went home last night and he felt better. This morning he was still a little bit tender but as he started to lift again he had severe pain in the left groin area.
“PHYSICAL EXAM: He is very tender in the left groin. I feel no herniation at this point, but he is quite tender in that area....
“DIAGNOSIS: Groin strain. I am concerned about the possibility of a developing hernia in that area.”
2. “Steve Lovelady, M.D. 6/15/92:
“HISTORY: This is a 40 year old for reeheck of groin strain. The patient states he is some better but he still has a little soreness there.
“EXAM: There is no hernia. He is still a little tender in his left testicle, but there is no bulging or herniation noted.”
3. “Steve Lovelady, M.D. 6/17/92:
“HISTORY: This is a 40 year old from Moundville who works for Newton Lumber Company. He has a groin strain and he states that it is not getting any better.
“PHYSICAL EXAM: I have again reexamined him today and there is no evidence of herniation although he is very tender up in the left inguinal ring.
“PLAN: I am going to go ahead and add some antibiotics today to be sure that he is not getting an early epididymitis that may be causing some of this; but I still think it is purely a strain.
4. “Robert E. May, M.D. 10/02/92:
“HISTORY: This is a 41 year old workmen’s comp for Newton Lumber who comes in for recheck of groin strain. He was hurt initially on 6/11 and we saw him then. He states it is still sore, especially when he is bearing down and when he is lifting. He says that when he does a lot of lifting, he has some left testicular pain.
“EXAM: He is tender to the left abdominal wall over the left adnexa, but no masses or hernias are felt. However, because of his persistent symptoms, I am going to go ahead and get him to see a surgeon for evaluation.
“DIAGNOSIS: Abdominal wall strain; rule out hernia.
5. “Joseph C. Wallace, M.D.:
“I saw Mr. Owens in the office on October 5, 1992, referred to rule out a left inguinal hernia. By documentation, he had picked up a heavy 3 x 6 at work and hurt his left groin three to four months prior. This had improved with symptomatic treatment with NSAIA’s. I found no evidence of left inguinal hernia or right inguinal hernia, and advised him to continue medical treatment for left groin strain as above.”

The medical notes show that Owens suffered an injury at work and that the injury caused pain. They also show that Owens eventually developed a hernia. They do not show, however, that the hernia was either “sudden” or “immediate.” While I am not insensitive to the worker’s pain, our legislature has determined that pain is not sufficient to authorize relief under § 25-5-57(a)(6)a. A worker seeking compensation for a hernia “has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury and his employment.” Egbert v. Book Press, 144 Vt. 367, 369, 477 A.2d 968, 969 (1984). In order to sustain his burden of proof, he must do more than show a mere “possibility of causation.” Id.

The trial court’s finding that “‘perhaps” the first four doctors did not locate the hernia because they did not have Owens strain or cough during their examinations constitutes pure speculation. Although the trial court stated that it was “giving all favorable presumptions to [Owens] as the law requires,” I believe that, instead, the trial court excused Owens from his burden of proof.

I would reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. 
      
      . This case is under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as it read before the 1992 amendments to the Act, because the injury occurred on June 10, 1992.
     
      
      . Also evidenced by Dr. McIntyre’s notes of Owens's examination on June 11, 1992, as quoted in the dissent.
     