
    BLACK and WOTRING vs. SEBASTIAN AMAN.
    1. A clearly substantial compliance with the statutes providing for the acknowledgment of deeds is sufficient; a literal compliance is not required.
    2. But there is not such a substantial compliance when it is seriously doubtful whether it can be correctly inferred from the acknowledgment that the grantors in the deed were known personally or by proof to the officer taking the acknowledgment; or that the deed was fully explained to the wife Upon her separate examination; or that she there “declared that she had willingly signed, sealed and delivered the same, and that she wished not to retract it,” when the statute (R. S I). 0., sees. 442-451) requires these facts to appear from the acknowledgment.
    3. When a vendor seeks specific performance of a contract for the ' sale of realty, equity will not compel an unwilling vendee to take a doubtful title.
    In Equity.
    No. 10,002.
    Decided October 17, 1887.
    The Chief Justice and Justices Hagner, James and Merrick sitting.
    Appeal by complainants from a decree of Special Term, dismissing a bill in equity by vendors seeking specific performance of a contract for the purchase of real estate.
    Messrs. Edwards & Barnard, for complainant:
    A literal compliance with the prescribed form of acknowledgment is not required by the provisions of the statute, nor by the construction given to similar laws by judicial decisions.
    Sections 442 and 451, R. S. D. 0., provide that the forms prescribed shall be “ to the following effect,” then follow the forms.
    Literal conformity with the statute is not, as a general rule, required. A substantial compliance is all that is necessary. When the end is answered the mere mode is not usually of -the substance of the act. Ingoldsby vs. Juan, 12 Cal., 577. See also Fipps vs. McGehee, 5 Port. (Ala.), 434 (413); Carpenter vs. Dexter, 75 U. S.; 8 Wall., 526; Kelly vs. Calhoun, 95 U. S., 713; Roe vs. Trammarr, Willes, 682; Johnson vs. Walton, 1 Sneed (Tenn.), 258; Fall vs. Roper, 3 Head (Tenn.), 485; Farquarson vs. McDonald, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.), 404; Canandaigua Academy vs. McKechnie, 19 Hun. (N. Y.), 68; Van Ness vs. Bank of U. S., 38 U. S.; 13 Pet., 22; Deery vs. Cray, 72 U. S.; 5 Wall., 795; Dundas vs. Hitchcock, 53 U. S.; 12 How., 269; Martindale, Conveyancing, sec. 260.
    The acknowledgment of a feme covert, as shown by the magistrate’s certificate, agreeing in substance, although not in words, with that prescribed in the statute, hold sufficient. Owen vs. Norris, 5 Blackf., 479 ; Stevens vs. Doe, 6 Blackf., 475; Watson vs. Clendenin, 6 Blackf., 477; Hughes vs. Lane, 11 Ill., 123; Tubbs vs. Gatewood, 26 Ark., 128.
    In construing certificates of acknowledgment resort may be had to the deed or instrument to which they are appended. Carpenter vs. Dexter, supra, citing: Brooks vs. Chaplin, 3 Vt., 281; Luff borough vs. Parker, 12 Serg. & R., 48; Wells vs. Atkinson, 24 Minn., 161.
    Governed by the rules above laid down we contend that the deed in question is properly executed, and that the certificate of acknowledgment and authentication attached thereto is a substantial compliance with the law regulating the same.
    A comparison with the forms of an attestation clause to the deed, and of the certificate of acknowledgment attached thereto in' the case of Carpenter vs. Dexter, supra, as to the place where acknowledged and the identity of the grantors, with the deed now under consideration, shows that they are substantially the same.
    In Dundas vs. Hitchcock, supra, it was objected that the acknowledgment was not in the very words of the statute. In place of the words, “as her voluntary act and deed, freely,” it substitues the words, “freely and of her own accord.” The Court held that the words of the acknowledgment had the same meaning, and were in substance the same with those used in the statute.
    Again: in Deery vs. Cray, 72 U. S.; 5 Wall., 795, objection was made to the deed of a married woman that the certificate of acknowledgment did not show that she had been examined “out of the presence and hearing of her husband,” as required by the Act of Assembly of Maryland, wherein the property conveyed by the deed was located. The certificate in that case stated that the wives were “ privately examined apart from and out of the hearing of each of their husbands.” The Supreme Court held that the certificate was sufficient and a substantial compliance of the law.
    That the wife acts freely, understandingly and without compulsion of her husband is the gist of the law. A fair analysis of the certificate in question shows that it contains the material and substantial requirements of the statutes governing the same.
    Messes. Hagner & Maddox, for the defendant:
    The statute requires that the parties should be personally well known to the officer, or proven by the oaths of credible persons, to be the parties to the deed; and the fact should appear in the certificate. Here we have simply a certificate that two persons (not designated as parties to the annexed deed) appeared and acknowledged that they had signed and sealed the foregoing deed. It is claimed that, inasmuch as the deed was signed in the presence of the acknowledging officer, this is equivalent to his certifying that the parties were the grantors in the deed, and were personally well known to him.
    This contention is based mainly upon the authority of Carpenter vs. Dexter, 75 U. S.; 8 Wall., 526. That case came up from Illinois, where such an acknowledgment, by some accident, had been held good in 1840. See Ayers vs. McConnel, 2 Scam. (Ill.), 307.
    
      It had, therefore, become a rule of property; and as such the Supreme Court refused to disturb it.
    Besides, the certificate and other proofs m that case were very different from the certificate now under consideration. There the certificate showed that the “above named” grantor appeared. We have nothing like it here. Again, stress is laid in the Court’s opinion upon the oath of an attesting witness as to the identity of the grantor. Here wre have nothing similar.
    In other States the identity of parties must be in terms certified to by the acknowledging officer, or the conveyance will not be upheld. See Bryan vs. Ramirez, 8 Cal., 466; Wolf vs. Fogarty, 6 Cal., 225; Kelsey vs. Dunlop, 7 Cal., 161.
    The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in passing upon a District of Columbia deed, held that failure of the officer taking acknowledgment to state identity of grantors is not a substantial compliance. Smith vs. Garden, 28 Wis., 688.
    The statute, section 450, makes it imperative that the officer shall explain to the wife the nature of the conveyance, and set out that fact in the certificate. This requirement has been altogether omitted; nor have we any words of similar import.
    “A deed executed and acknowledged by a wife, with her husband, is not good if it does not appear in the certificate of acknowledgment that the contents of the deed were made known to the wife, or that she did, in fact, know them.” Watson vs. Bailey, 1 Binney, 477; Evans vs. Commonwealth, 4 Serg. & R., 271.
    But according to the statute a wife must do more than merely acknowledge a deed; she must also make certain declarations. Here the certificate stops short with the most decrepit of acknowledgments, and entirely omits to state that the wife declared that she had voluntarily signed, sealed and delivered the deed and wished not to retract it.
    Can it be said, then, that a title which depends for its validity upon so defective an acknowledgment is free from doubt and is unquestionable? The uniform rule is “That specific performance of a contract of sale, at the instance of the vendor, will not be decreed, unless his ability to make a good title is unquestionable.” Owings vs. Baldwin, 8 Gill, 337; Garnett vs. Macon, 6 Call (Va.), 308; Christian vs. Cabell, 22 Gratt., 82; Craig vs. Shatto, 9 Watts & S., 83; Mullings vs. Trinder, L. R, 10 Eq., 455; Jeffries vs. Jeffries, 117 Mass., 184; Powell vs. Conant, 33 Mich., 396; Vreeland vs. Blauvelt, 23 N. J. Eq., 483.
   Mr. Justice Bingham

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This is a bill to enforce the specific performance of a contract for the purchase of certain real estate in the District of Columbia, exhibited by the complainants, who were the vendors.

On or about February 22, 1865, Israel Dille and his wife, Sophronia, acquired the property as joint tenants in fee simple, by conveyance of that elate, and by their deed of June 13, 1867, conveyed the same to E. R Tuller and his heirs, in trust:

1. For the use, benefit and behoof of the grantors, the said Israel and Sophronia, during their joint lives; 2, on the death of either of said grantors, for the use and benefit of the survivor as a life estate; and 3, upon the decease of both, for the complainants, Mrs. Black and Mrs. Wotring (both nee Dille), their heirs and assigns.

Sophronia survived her husband, and both were dead at the time of the sale by the complainants to the defendant, Aman.

At the date of the deed to Tuller, and of the execution thereof, and at the time of her death, Sophronia had no children or descendants.

The complainants, Mrs. Black and Mrs. Wotring, are the only children of Israel Dille, by a former marriage, and they are the same persons mentioned in the deed of conveyance from their father and his wife, Sophronia, to Tuller, and through that conveyance they claim, title.

The said Israel Dille left no other children surviving him, and he had no other children or descendants at the date of the deed to Tuller.

The property was sold to the defendant on the assurance and condition that the complainants had a good title.

The defense is, that the complainants had not, at the time of sale, and have not now, a good title to said lot, because of the defective acknowledgment of the deed from Mr. and Mrs. Dille to Tuller, trustee, and which is the only objection made by the defendant to complainants’ title to the property.

The deed of Dille and wife to Tuller is signed and sealed by the grantors in the presence of Seth Hillman and N. Callan.

The certificate of acknowledgment and authentication attached to this deed is as follows:

“District or Columbia, \
Washington City. j s'

Before me, a notary public, in and for said District, personally appeared Israel Dille, and Sophronia, his wife, and acknowledged that they severally signed and sealed the foregoing deed for the uses and purposes therein specified, she, the. said Sophronia, being by me examined separate and apart from her husband, acknowledged that she signed and sealed the same for the uses and purposes aforesaid and doth now acknowledge the same. Witness, etc.

“13th day of June, 1867. N. Callan,
“[notarial seal] Notary Public.”

Sections 442, 450 and 451, R. S. D. C., providing for the acknowledgment of a deed including one of this character are as follows:

“Sec. 442. The officer taking an acknowledgment shall annex to the deed a certificate, under his hand and seal, to the following effect:

“ County (or city, etc.), to wit:

“I, A. B., a justice of the peace (or other prescribed officer, giving his title), in and for the county (or city, or parish, or district) aforesaid, in the State (or Territory, or District, of-), do hereby certify that C. D., a party (or C. D. and E. F., etc., parties) to a certain deed, bearing date on the - day of -, and hereto annexed, personally appeared before me in the county (or city, etc.), aforesaid, the said C. D. (or C. D. and E. F., etc.), being personally well known to me as (or proved by the oaths of creditable witnesses before me to be) the person (or persons) who executed the said deed, and acknowledged the same to be his (her or their) act and deed. ■ Given under my hand and seal this-day of-.
“A. B. [seal]”
“Sec. 450. When any married woman shall be a party executing a deed for the conveyance of real estate or interest therein, and shall only be relinguishing her right of dower, or when she shall be a party with ■ her husband to any deed, it shall be the duty of the officer authorized to take acknowledgments, before whom she may appear, to examine her privily and apart from her husband, and to explain to her the deed fully.
“Sec. 451. If, upon such privy examination and explanation, she shall acknowledge the deed to be her act and deed, and shall declare that she had willingly signed, sealed and delivered the same, and that she wished not to retract it, the officer shall certify such examination, acknowledgment and declaration by a certificate annexed to the deed, and under his hand and seal, to the following effect:

“County (or city, etc.), to wit:

“I, A. B., a justice of the peace (or other.prescribed officer, giving title), in the county (or city, et¿.), aforesaid, in the State (or Territory, etc.), of-, do hereby certify that C. D., the wife of E..F., party to a certain deed, bearing date on the-day of-, and hereunto annexed, personally appeared before me in the county (or city, etc.), aforesaid, the said C. D., being well known to me as (or proved by the oaths of credible witnesses before me to be) the person who executed the said deed, and being by me examined privily and apart from her husband, and having the deed aforesaid fully explained to hes, she, the said E. F., acknowledged the same to be her act and deed, and declared that she had willingly signed, sealed and delivered the same, and that she wished not to retract it. Given under my hand and seal the-day of-.
“A. B. [seal]”

Complainants claim that the certificate to the deed in 'question is substantially the same as the form prescribed by Congress. If it be clearly so, there can be no doubt of its sufficiency. A substantial, not a literal, compliance is required. Carpenter vs. Dexter, 75 U. S.; 8 Wall., 526; Kelly vs. Calhoun, 95 U. S., 713; Deery vs. Cray, 72 U. S.; 5 Wall., 795; Dundas vs. Hitchcock, 53 U. S.; 12 How., 269.

But the defendant claims that the acknowledgment in controversy is defective, in that it does not state: 1, where Israel and Sophronia appeared; 2, that they were parties grantor in the deed; 3, that they were personally known to bo such; 4, that the wife was examined privily; 5, that the deed was explained to the wife; 6, that the wife declared that she had willingly signed, sealed and delivered the deed, and that she wished not to retract it.

After a careful comparison of the certificate to the Tuller deed, with the form prescribed by statute, we are inclined seriously to doubt whether it can be correctly inferred, from any language used in the former, that Israel and Sophronia Dille were known personally or by proof to be the grantors in the deed; that the deed was fully explained to Sophronia upon her separate examination, or, that she then “ declared that she had willingly signed, sealed and delivered the same, and that she wished not to retract it.”

The cases cited by complainants' counsel were generally in ejectment where the parties in interest were before the Court, and when the adjudication would set at rest all questions as to the title. In such a case the Court may safely resolve the doubt in favor of the validity of the title, if, in its judgment, it should be so decided. But the rule is different when a vendor seeks specific performance of a contract for the sale of realty. Courts of equity will not compel an unwilling vendee to take a doubtful title. In this case the heirs of Sophronia Dille W'ho would be entitled to this property (if the deed to Tuller should be adjudged insufficient) are not parties and would not be affected by our decree.

We think it may fairly be said that the title of the defendant, were we to enter a decree for specific performance, would, under the circumstances, be doubtful; and we are, therefore, constrained to dismiss the bill, imth costs.  