
    Laura Longhua PIAO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel RUSSBACH, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-2153-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 8, 2013.
    John R. Williams, The Law Office of John R. Williams, New Haven, CT, for Appellant.
    Bruce Matzkin, Esq., Branford, CT, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Susan L. Carney, originally a member of the panel, recused herself shortly after oral argument. The two remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement, have determined the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b). Cf. United States v. Desimone, 140 F.3d 457 (2d Cir.1998).
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Laura Longhua Piao appeals from the dismissal of her amended complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal, Piao argues that the complaint sufficiently alleged the elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim under Connecticut law. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of the prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

Our review of a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is de novo. Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 185 (2d Cir.2012). “In reviewing the complaint, we give no effect to assertions of law or to legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, but we accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint, and construe all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (alteration, citation, and quotation marks omitted).

The elements of an IIED claim under Connecticut law are: “(1) that the [defendant] intended to inflict emotional distress, or knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of [his] conduct, (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiffs distress, and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.” Dusé v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 252 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir.2001) (quotation marks omitted); accord Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 442-43, 815 A.2d 119 (2003).

After reviewing Piao’s amended complaint, we conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing it. Although the amended complaint includes some factual allegations about the allegedly extreme and outrageous conduct — briefly, that the defendant, a local justice of the peace, filed an affidavit falsely and intentionally stating that he had served certain papers on Piao in a separate legal action — there are no factual allegations that support the amended complaint’s conclusory assertions with respect to the defendant’s intent to cause emotional distress, the severity of Piao’s distress (if any), or the causal relationship between the alleged conduct and the asserted distress. Even if Piao’s allegations sufficiently established conduct that was “extreme and outrageous” — a question we need not resolve — the amended complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

We have considered all of Piao’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.  