
    *Edward C. Rice and Narcissa Rice v. Robert Lumley.
    1. When a man leaves his home or usual place of residence, and goes to parts unknown, and is not heard of or known to be living for the period of seven years, the legal presumption arises that he is dead.
    
    2. Dower is provided for by statute in Ohio, and is only allowed to the widow who was the wife of the person dying, at the time of his,'death.
    3. A woman, who has obtained a divorce a vinculo matrimonii for the'fault of her husband, under the statute of 1824, and afterward married another man, is not, after the death of the person who was her first husband, entitled to dower in his real estate.
    4. In such case, the dow.er is not lost by way of forfeiture; but a woman divorced a vinculo matrimonii from her first husband, and by subsequent marriage the wife of another man, at the time of the death of the person who had been her first husband, is not the widow of the latter within the terms of the statute relating to dower.
    This is a petition for. dower, reserved in the district court of Hamilton county for decision here.
    The petition was filed in the commercial court of Cincinnati in April, 1851, wherein it was alleged that the petitioner, Narcissa, was married to one Leonard Dixon about the year 1826; and that during the coverture said Dixon was lawfully seized of the premises in the petition described, consisting of certain real estate in the ■city of Cincinnati, as an estate of inheritance; and further, that said Nixon is dead, and said Narcissa entitled to dower in said premises; and that said Robert Lumley, the defendant, claims to be the owner thereof.
    The defendant answered, admitting his claim of ownership of the premises by a regular chain of title from one Leonard Dixon, but denying any knowledge that the same Dixon was ever lawfully married to said Narcissa, or that he was dead. And the defendant by his answer states that said Narcissa obtained a divorce, without alimony, from one Leonard Dixon, in the Supreme Court of Hamilton ^county, in the year 1830; and denies that the potitionor, Narcissa, is entitled to any right of dower in the" premises.
    Testimony was taken on both sides, a decree for dower rendered in the commercial court, and the cause appealed to the district court.
    It appears that Dixon left Cincinnati some time about the year 1830, and went to parts unknown, and has never been heard from since by his relatives and acquaintances, either in Cincinnati or in "Virginia, where ho originally resided.
    It appears further, that Narcissa and Dixon separated a few years after their marriage; and that Narcissa filed her j>etition for Aivorce and alimony in the Supreme Court of Hamilton county, and in June, 1830, obtained a decree for divorce against Dixon, on the ground of cruel treatment; but as to the allowance of alimony, the petition was continued until April, 1832, when it was dismissed, and no alimony allowed.
    It also" appears that the petitioners, Edward C. Rice and Nar■cissa, wore living together as man and wife, in the city of Cincinnati, in January, 1832 ;. and had been so living, and were reputed .as man and wife, from as early as some time in the year 1830.
    
      Upon this state of facts the case was reserved in the. district court for decision in this court.
    
      James <& Jackson, for petitioners.
    
      Corwin & Says,.for defendant.
    
      
       Knight v. Nepean, 27 E. O. L. 42; Loringu. Steinman, 1 Mete. 204, Iunia ■v. Campbell, 1 Rawle, 373.
    
   Bartlev, C. J.

When a man leaves his home or usual place of residence, and goes to parts unknown, and is not heard of or known to be living for the period of seven years, the legal presumption arises that he is dead.

Bower is provided for by statute in Ohio, and is *only allowed to the widow who was the wife of the person dying, at. the-time of his. death.

A woman who has obtained a divorce a vinculo matrimonii for the fault of her husband, under the statute of 1824, and afterward married another man, is not, after the death of the person who was her first husband, entitled to dower in his real estate.

In such case the dower is not lost by way of forfeiture; but a woman divorced a vinculo matrimonii from her first husband, and by subsequent marriage the wife of another man, at the time of the-death of the person who had been her first husband, is not the widow of the latter within the terms of the statute relating to dower..

Petition dismissed.

5. cott and Sutliee, JJ., concurred.

S,wan and Brinkerhoee, JJ.,

dissented, holding that when the-divorce is granted to the wife, on account of the aggression of the husband, she is entitled to dower, and her subsequent marriage has-no more effect on her right than the marriage of a widow  