
    United States National Bank, Respondent, vs. The Poor Handmaids of Jesus Christ, Appellant.
    
      February 20
    
    March 12, 1912.
    
    
      Taxation: Exemption: Special assessments: Property of “religious corporations:” Municipal corporations: Superior city charter.
    
    
      ■ 1. A corporation organized under ch. 86, Stats., for benevolent and educational purposes, even though organized hy a religious order of the same name as the corporation and incidentally conducting religious services in a hospital maintained hy it, is not a “religious corporation” within the meaning of the Superior city charter (sec. 244, ch. 124, Laws of 1891), exempting “parsonages or property owned hy some religious society, association or corporation” from payment of assessments for sewers, street improvements, etc.
    
      2. It see ms tliat tlie term “religious corporation,” as used in such-charter, means a corporation organized in connection with a church under ch. 91, Stats.
    3. Sec. 1038, Stats., exempting property therein described “from taxation,” has no reference to taxes on account of special benefits or under police regulations.
    4. Statutes on the subject of taxation are to be construed, where construction is permissible, strictly against exemption.
    Appeal from a judgment of the superior court of Douglas county: Chaeles Smith, Judge.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    Action to foreclose tax-sale certificates representing special assessments under the charter of the city of Superior for the construction of a sewer.
    Defendant contends that the property was exempt from such assessments under the following provision:
    “No lot or parcel of land benefited in said city shall he exempt from the payment of its portion of any tax or assessment for sewers, the improvement of streets or the building or repairing of sidewalks, excepting only property belonging to the United States or the state of Wisconsin, and parsonages or property owned by some religious society, association or corporation and not used for pecuniary profit, and this shall be exempt.” Laws of 1891, ch. 124, sec. 244.
    Defendant owned the realty. It was organized under ch. 86 of the Statutes. Its objects were to maintain and teach parochial schools, maintain and support hospitals for the treatment of the sick, infirm and aged persons, and help the poor and distressed. It was not organized for profit, but was for the benevolent and educational purposes mentioned. It was authorized to acquire, own, and deal with all property, and do all business appropriate to the purpose of its organization, and'to receive gifts to that end. The principal place of business was its hospital maintained in Superior, Wisconsin. The body was organized by a religious order of the same name as the corporation, and it was provided that the hospital property, which included the particular realty, should be in charge of sucb order. Some religious services by an accredited priest of tbe Catbolic cburcb were commonly conducted in tbe hospital for tbe benefit of tbe inmates. That was incidental to tbe corporate business. Tbe hospital was not a cburcb or used as a cburcb. It was used for tbe benevolent and educational purposes indicated in tbe corporate articles. Tbe religious services were conducted as part of tbe administrative work of tbe institution.
    Tbe court decided that defendant was not a religious corporation within tbe meaning of. tbe charter provision.
    Judgment was entered accordingly.
    Eor tbe appellant the cause was submitted on tbe brief of W. P. Orawford.
    
    He cited St. J oseph’s H. Asso. v. Ashland Co. 96 Wis. 636, 72 N. W. 43; sec. 1787, Stats. (1898) ; St. John’s M. Academy v. Edwards, 143 Wis. 551, 128 N. W. 113.
    For tbe respondent tbe cause was submitted on tbe brief of 3. V. Card.
    
    He cited, among other cases, 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) 327; Weld v. May, 63 Mass. 181; In re Fay’s Estate, 37 Mise. 532, 76 N.'Y. Supp. 62; Ohurch of St. Monica v. Mayor, 119 N. Y. 91, 23" N. E. 294; State ex rel. Morris v. Board of Trustees, 175 Mo. 52, 74 S. W. 990; De Wolf v. Lawson, 61 Wis. 469, 21N. W. 615.
   Marshall, J.

Is appellant “a religious . . . corporation” within tbe meaning of sec. 244, cb. 124, Laws of 1891 (tbe city charter of Superior) ? That is tbe vital question.

Tbe statutes furnish opportunity for incorporating religious bodies. Cb. 91. Appellant does not refer to that for existence. They also provide for forming corporations in general. Cb. 86. Appellant was organized under tbe latter. That is significant.

It seems tbe term “religious . . . corporation” in tbe Superior charter means tbe same as tbe similar term in cb. 91 of tbe Statutes. It is further considered that tbe declared purposes of appellant’s organization fall well within one or more of the purposes for which corporations may he organized tinder ch. 86. That provides for corporations for “benevolent, charitable or medical institutions . . . schools, . . . hospitals, asylums or other like institutions.”

The organizers of appellant, evidently, were not competent to incorporate as a religious corporation because it was essential to have a membership maintaining regular public worship as a church society, and the organization to be in connection with a church. Sec. 1990, Stats. (1898). There seems to have been a considerate puUnited States National Bank v. Poor Handmaids of Jesus Christrpose not to organize a religious corporation as the term is used in such section (sec. 1990), because otherwise it was not necessary to resort to ch. 86 on account of the educational and benevolent purposes mentioned in its articles. The section provides that the organization “in connection with a church” may be “for religious, charitable or educational purposes.” The dominant idea in the statute is that a church with a place of regular public worship is an essential to organization of a religious corporation. It' is the membership of the church, as such, that are empowered to organize, — for the purposes, primarily, of the church in the propagation of religious principles, the worshipful exercises in connection therewith, and the meetings, associations, and business incident thereto. That, ordinarily, in the main, includes a residence for the religious teacher, a church building, and the ground and other property in use and for use in carrying out the object of the organization to teach and otherwise promote religion along the lines of some particular belief.

The term “religious society,” in the general sense, has often been construed by courts. It is a body of persons organized for the purpose of maintaining religious worship only. Silsby v. Barlow, 16 Gray (82 Mass.) 329, 330. It is a body of persons who usually meet in some stated place for worship of God and religious instruction. Robertson v. Bul lions, 9 Barb. 64, 67. A society maintained for tbe support of public worship. Riffe v. Proctor, 99 Mo. App. 601, 74 S. W. 409. Thus tbe meaning of tbe term “religious corporation” suggests, at once, tbe limit of tbe term “property of a religious corporation” in case of there not being other words expanding by inference tbe ordinary meaning. There were such in Hebrew F. S. Asso. v. Mayor, etc. 4 Hun, 446. But we have tbe opposite here. Tbe words “parsonage or property owned,” etc., suggest as to tbe latter such as is for use in connection with tbe purpose for which the parsonage is owned, that is for religious purposes.

Eor tbe considerations mentioned, it is considered that, a corporation organized under cb. 86 of tbe Statutes for benevolent purposes, is not a religious corporation under tbe Superior charter; that tbe term “religious corporation” there is to be regarded as having reference to religious purposes, and tbe term “parsonage and other property” regarded as meaning parsonage and other property in use and for use for religious purposes as distinguished from mere benevolent or educational purposes, in tbe ordinary sense.

Tbe suggestion of exemption from taxation under sec. 1038 of tbe Statutes hardly merits notice, since that has no reference to taxes on account of special benefits or under police regulations. Yates v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 352, 66 N. W. 248; 1 Cooley, Taxation (3d ed.) 362. Tbe distinction has been made on tbe familiar principle that statutes on tbe subject of taxation are to be construed, where construction is permissible,' strictly against exemption. ,

By the Gourt. — Judgment affirmed.  