
    [Lancaster,
    May 29, 1827.]
    
    
      The FARMERS’ BANK of Reading against BOYER and others.
    IN ERROR.
    The omission of the words, “ and generally to abide all orders of the said court,” prescribed as part of the condition of the bond, to be given by a petitioner for the benefit of the insolvent laws, by the first section of the supplemental act of the 28th of March, 1820, does not vitiate the bond, as respects either the principal or sureties; and it is immaterial that the parties recite, in the introduction to the condition, that the bond was given to comply with the requisitions of an act of assembly which has been repealed.
    This cause was tried at a Circuit Court held in Berks county in May last, before His Honour Judge Duncan. The jury returned a verdict in favour of the plaintiff for five hundred and three dollars and thirty-four cents, a motion was made by the defendants for a new trial, which being overruled, they entered an appeal*
    The action was brought by the Farmers’ Bank of Reading against John K. Boyer, Henry Bowman, Joseph Siting, and John Adams, on a bond dated the 3d of December, 1823, of which the following was the condition:
    “Whereas the above hounden John If. Boyer, hath been arrested and is now in custody, at the suit of the said Farmers’ BanJe, for the sum of three hundred and twenty dollars and sixty-five cents, besides costs, and the said John K. Boyer having made application to William Witman, jr., one of the judges of the Court of Common Pleas, to be released from such confinement on his entering into bond with sufficient security to comply with the provisions of the act of the general assembly of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, passed the 29th of January, A. D. 1820, entitled a supplement to the act entitled, ‘ an act for the relief of insolvent debtors,’ and the said William Witman having approved of the above named Henry Bowman, and Joseph Siting, and John Adams, esq., as a security for the said John K.. Boyer.
    
    “Now the condition of the obligation is such, that if the said John If. Boyer shall appear before the Honourable the judges of the Court of Common Pleas for the county of Berks at the next term of the said court, to be holden on the first Monday of January A. D. 1824, and then and there remain and abide the final order of the said court to be made during the said term, and then and there surrender himself to prison, in case on his appearance before the said court he shall not comply with all things required by law to procure his discharge from confinement, then the above obligation to be void, otherwise to be and remain in full force and virtue.”
    The defendants pleaded conditions performed, hut it was agreed that if the Supreme Court should be of opinion that upon any plea which the defendants could legally enter, they could avail themselves of the fact that the act of the 29th of January, 1820, had been repealed when the bond was executed, then the judgment to be reversed and a new trial had upon new pleading.
    
      Baird, for the plaintiffs.
    The bond on which this suit is brought, is declared to have been taken under the act of the 29th of January, 1820, and the condition is in exact conformity to the provisions of that act. But the act had been repealed before the execution of the bond, which was therefore void. The only act in force at the time was that of the 28th March, 1820, which required a very different condition in the bond, from those required by the act which had been repealed. Part of the required condition, was, that the petitioner-should “generally abide all the orders of the court;’* a condition wholly omitted in the bond in question. A statutory bond is void, if it do not follow the statute. 1 Plowd. 62. 19 Johns. 233. 13 Serg. & Rawle, 190.
    
      Smith, contra,
    
    answered, that the terms of the bond complied substantially with the act of the 28th of March, 1820, which was sufficient.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Gibson, C. J.

It is admitted that a bond whose terms are not in acordance with the provisions of a statute by which it is required, is void, but this is to be restrained to cases where the condition is to do something which the statute does not require, or where it contains a provision which the statute does not authorize. This bond was avowedly framed to meet the exigencies of the second section in the supplement of the 29th of January, 1820, which had been repealed and supplied by the further supplement of the 28th of March in the same year. The condition is, that Boyer should appear before the judges of the Common Pleas, “and then and there remain and abide the final order of the said court, to be made during the said term, and 'then and there surrender himself to prison, in case on his appearance before the said court, he should fail to comply with all things required by law to procure his discharge from confinement.” By the first section of the further supplement, which happened to be the only act on the subject in force when the bond was executed, the condition prescribed is that the debtor appear at the next court, “ then and there to take the benefit of the insolvent laws, and to surrender himself to the jail of the county if he fail to comply with all things required by law to entitle him to be discharged, and generally to abide all orders of the said court.” From this it is perceived tbat the condition of the bond given by the defendants is not as large as the terms of the act, inasmuch as it does not contain a stipulation, that the debtor shall generally abide all orders of the court. I hold it to be immaterial that the parties recite, in the introduction to the condition, that the instrument is intended to produce a compliance with the provisions of the act of the 29th of January: it is sufficient, if it be a substantial compliance with the act of the 28th of March. In what does it differ from the bond prescribed in the latter? In nothing but the requisition to abide all orders of the court. But that, had it been inserted, would have increased the responsibility of the obligors; and what right have they to complain of its having been omitted? The legislature directed it to be inserted, not for the benefit of the obligors, but of the creditors; and any one can dispense with a provision introduced for his own benefit. The creditors, who alone had a right to complain, are content; and it would be carrying the doctrine of conformity to legislative provisions to a most unreasonable extent, were we to permit the party who has benefited by the variance, to set it up as a bar to liability. Could the variance have been urged as an objection to the debtor’s discharge, it would have been fatal to the action here; but it was held in Lincoln v. Williams, (12 Serg. & Rawle, 105,) that the bond being designed to secure the debtor’s attendance at court, cannot enter into his title to be discharged. Nor does the surety stand on more advantageous ground than the principal. A variance of this sort, where it is available at all, may be pleaded at law, and it therefore affords no room for the extraordinary interference of a chancellor. But it was held in Wolverton v. The Commonwealth, (7 Serg. & Rawle, 278,) that a surety can avail himself of no defence at law, which would not equally avail the principal; and, in Simms and Wise v. Slacum, (3 Cranch, 299,) the case was ruled without reference to any supposed distinction between the defendants in the court below. We therefore fully concur with the direction given by the judge who tried the cause, that the omission of the particular clause in the condition was not sufficient to avoid the bond.

Judgment of the Circuit Court -affirmed.  