
    Richard B. Harrison v. William Hollis, Sen.
    Where a purchaser at sheriff’s sale does not record his title, it will not affect the title of a subsequent purchaser at sheriff’s sale, without notice of the first purchaser’s title, 
    
    
      A Court of Law cannot notice a resulting trust, it belongs exclusively to the Court of Equity. 
    
    This was an action of trespass to try title to land, tried at Fairfield, Fall Term, 1820, before Mr. Justice Non.
    It will be unnecessary to go into a detail of all the circumstances which came out on the trial. It will be sufficient to state, that some time anterior to the year 1799, William Hollis, sen., the defendant, purchased the land in question, of Jesse Havis, and took his bond to make him titles, when the purchase money should be paid. In the year 1799, the money was paid, and Havis, by the directions of the defendant, made titles to W. Hollis, jr., son of the defendant. Defendant gave as a reason for having the title made to his son, that he was indebted to M’Orea and Oantey, and if the titles were made to him, the land would *be taken from him for the payment of that debt. W. Hollis, jr., r*gijg being a minor, continued to live on the land with his father ; some time <■ after this, General Oantey obtained a judgment against W. Hollis, sen., and in 1804, had this land sold as his property, and purchased it in himself, and took the sheriff’s title for the same. He then permitted W. Hollis, sen., to live on the land as his tenant, and he and his son-continued to live there together, until the year 1816, when W. Hollis, jr., died. But previous to his death, in the year 1815, a judgment was recovered against him, for one hundred dollars. In the year 1817, or T8, the land was sold as the property of W. Hollis, jr., to satisfy that judgment, and purchased by the plaintiff. Upon this statement of facts, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff; and a motion was now made for a new trial, on two grounds :
    1. Because the titles were made to W. Hollis, jr., for the purpose of defrauding M’Ora and Oantey out of the debt due to them by W. Hollis, sen., and were therefore void.
    2. Because Wm. Hollis, sen., having lived on the land more than five years, as the tenant of General Oantey, acquired a title by possession for him.
    
      
       Ante, 107, and notes, 110.
    
    
      
       8 Rich. 358, 394; 7 Rich. 373 ; 2 Rich. 624; 1 McM. 351.
    
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Clarke and Gregg, for the motion. Peareson, contra.

Hott, J.

In considering the several questions which arise out of this case, we must regard General Cantey, as he actually is, the real defendant ; and as connected with that view of the case, it is necessary to notice an important fact which is not stated in the brief, to wit, that the sheriff’s deed to him has never been recorded. That fact gives a complexion to the case which supersedes the necessity of considering the first ground made for a new trial; for admitting the fraud to exist, there is no proof that the plaintiff was a party’or had any knowledge of it; and being a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice of Genera Cantey’s title, was entitled to recover. *But what is the -I nature of the fraud complained of? W. Hollis, sen., never had a right to the land, and he could not be compelled by this Court to take a title to himself to enable him to pay his debt; directing the titles to be made to his son, was not therefore such a fraud upon M’Cra and Cantey as this Court can notice, because the land was never tangible by them. Setting aside this deed could not vest the land in old Hollis, and of course Cantey can have no right. And it is only with reference to creditors, that it can be considered fraudulent, for it is certainly good as between the parties.

It has, however, been contended that young Hollis ought to be considered as a trustee for his father, and that the sale by the sheriff was therefore good. But the doctrine of implied or resulting trusts belongs exclusively to the Courts of Equity, and cannot be reached by this Court. This Court cannot travel out of the deed itself, for its construction. We can receive evidence aliunde to show that a deed is fraudulent and void, but not to give it a different operation than what it expresses upon its face.

2. With regard to the second ground, the possession of the son was coextensive with that of the father, and in such case, the possession would enure to the benefit of him who had the right. In any view of the case, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to retain his verdict; and this motion must be refused.

Colcock, Richardson, Gantt, and Huger, JJ., concurred. 
      
       1 Mill. C. R. 131.
     