
    Thomas Fisher against John Hyde.
    One arrested after being discharged under an insolvent act of New. York, whose courts do not respect discharges under the Pennsylvania bankrupt or insolvent act, shall not be discharged on common bail.
    The defendant was arrested on a cdpias out of this court, and in September term last, Mr. T. Ross obtained a rule to shew cause why he should not be discharged on common bail. H e then produced the discharge of the defendant, on the 7th April 1797, by Morgan Lewis, esq. one of the judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature of the state of New York, (under an act of $ 1 *assembly of that state, passed 21st March 1788, giving -*'■J relief in cases of insolvency,) from all debts due at the time of his assignment, or contracted for before that time, though payable afterwards. The defendant relied on the case of Hilyárd and Pippet v. Greenleaf, in this court, March term 1800, wherein the then defendant was discharged on common bail, in consequence of his being discharged under an act of insolvency, passed in Maryland. The court there considered themselves bound by the decision of Miller v. Hall, (1 Dali. 229,) and governed themselves accordingly. That and the principal case are precisely similar.
    Mr. Rawle for the plaintiff shewed cause. This is an action of trover for certain bonds delivered to the defendant, and the evidence of conversion is subsequent to his discharge under the New York law. Besides the courts of New York do not regard discharges either under our bankrupt or insolvent laws. This appeared in the case of Thomas Nixon v. Charles Young, tried in this court in December term 1796. There the defendant, after judgment recovered against him in the Mayor’s Court of New York, obtained a certificate of conformity under a commission of bankrupt issued against him in Pennsylvania. Pie was afterwards taken in execution on the judgment, and applied to eminent counsel to obtain enlargement under his certificate, but was assured, that the Mayor’s Court would pay no regal'd to his certificate. Besides this, the Supreme Court of the United States, in two late instances, Emory v. Greenough, and Green-leaf v. Banks, have shewn a strong inclination to disregard certificates *of conformity to the bankrupt laws, or discharges under the insolvent acts of one state, when pleaded in bar of debts in another state.
    
      
      The reporter has been favoured by Mr. E. Tilghman, with the following statements of these cases:
      Samuel Emory, a citizen of Massachusetts Bay, entered into a contract with Greenough, of the same state. Emory removed to Pennsylvania, became a bankrupt, and obtained a certificate. Emory being found in Massachusetts, was arrested by Greenough, on the contract in Massachusetts. Emory pleaded the certificate in bar, and judgment was rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States for Greenough. Emory brought a writ of error, and the same was argued in the Supreme Court of the United States, by Lewis, Ingersoll and Dallas, for the plaintiff in error, and by E. Tilghman, for the defendant in error. The court inclined strongly in favour of the defendant in error. Mr. Ingersoll was to argue the case further, but the judgment was reversed, the Supreme Court of the United States being of opinion, that there did not appear a jurisdiction of the cause in the Circuit Court, the plaintiff there not being stated to be a citizen of Massachusetts Bay.
      Greenleaf v. Banks. In Supreme Court of the United States, February term 1800. Error to the Circuit Court of Virginia. Greenleaf had been discharged under a special insolvent law of Maryland, and pleaded that discharge in bar. But judgment was given for Banks in the Circuit Court of Virginia. On error brought, the cause was to have been argued by Ingersoll and W. Tilghman, for the plaintiff in error, and by E. Tilghman, for the defendant in error: but there being only four judges on the bench, and two of them declaring that they had given judgments similar to that in question, the cause was continued. In August term 1800, Greenleaf having learned, that the opinions of a majority of the judges had been given against him, discontinued the cause.
      It was supposed to have been an amicable matter between Greenleaf and Banks, in order to settle the question.
      Mr. E. Tilghman intended to have made a particular objection to the law of Maryland, that the same ought not to be respected by a sister state, if the argument had been proceeded in.
    
   The court said, they well recollected the circumstances disclosed in Nixon v. Young; and unless it clearly appeared, that the courts of New York paid regard to discharges under our bankrupt and insolvent laws, they declared that on principles of reciprocity, they could not respect discharges under their laws. At the instance of the defendant’s counsel, they gave further time to make inquiries as to this point.

The argument being resumed this term, and it being admitted, that by the practice of the courts in New York, no regard was paid to certificates of bankruptcy under the laws of Pennsylvania, the court discharged the rule, and directed that the defendant should give bail.  