
    LIBERTY CHAIR COMPANY v. W. S. CRAWFORD et al.
    (Filed 13 April, 1927.)
    Evidence — Letters—Carbon Copies.
    Unsigned carbon copies of letters are incompetent evidence of their contents without identification as to the person against whose interest on the trial they are sought to be introduced. The general requirements as to the competency of letters as evidence, when mailed, the identification of the writer, their mailing and receipt, notice to produce, etc., stated by Brogden, J.
    Civil action, tried before Daniels, J., at November Term, 1926, of Alamance.
    The plaintiff instituted an action against the defendants to recover the sum of $1,003 upon an open account and upon notes executed by the defendants to the plaintiff. The defendants admitted the execution of the notes, but set up a counterclaim for damages for breach of contract. The case was tried in the county court of Alamance, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff.
    
      The defendants assigned certain errors, growing out of the trial in the county court, and these assignments of error were heard by Daniels, J., at the November Term of the Superior Court. Judge Daniels sustained exceptions one, five, and six filed by the defendants, and awarded a new trial, remanding the case to the county court for such purpose.
    From the order of the Superior Court, the plaintiff appealed.
    
      Carroll & Carroll for plaintiff.
    
    
      No counsel for defendants.
    
   Brogden, J.

Are unsigned carbon copies of letters admissible in evidence ?

The record discloses that in the trial court nine unsigned carbon copies of letters were introduced in evidence, purporting to be written by the plaintiff to the defendants. The trial court, over the objection of the defendants, admitted the letters in evidence, and upon hearing said objection before Judge Daniels, he sustained defendants’ objection and awarded a new trial upon the ground that said evidence was incompetent.

The courts have established certain fundamental principles regulating the introduction of letters, and copies thereof. Some of the controlling principles declared by this Court are:

(1) When a letter is properly addressed, with the required postage thereon, and properly placed in the mail, it is presumed that it was received by the person to whom it was addressed. Beard v. R. R., 143 N. C., 137; Mahoney v. Osborne, 189 N. C., 445.

(2) When the writing is in the possession of the adverse party, who' refuses to produce it, secondary evidence of its contents may be given, even when the contents are directly in issue. S. v. Wilkerson, 98 N. C., 696; Pollock v. Wilcox, 68 N. C., 47; Mahoney v. Osborne, 189 N. C., 445.

(3) If the writing is in the possession of the adverse party, notice to produce it must be given to authorize the introduction of secondary evidence thereof. Nicholson v. Hilliard, 6 N. C., 270; Overman v. Clemmons, 19 N. C., 185; Robards v. McLean, 30 N. C., 522; Ivey v. Cotton Mills, 143 N. C., 189.

(4) If a letter has been received and lost, parol evidence of its contents is admissible, provided the party offering the contents can show affirmatively to the satisfaction of the court the loss thereof, proper and sufficient search therefor, and the existence of all such facts as are necessary to make secondary evidence competent. Gillis v. R. R., 108 N. C., 444; Avery v. Stewart, 134 N. C., 287; Mitchell v. Garrett, 140 N. C., 397; Greene v. Grocery Co., 159 N. C., 121; Bank v. Brickhouse, ante, 231.

(5) Reasonable and timely notice to produce letters must be given tbe adverse party. Sermons v. Allen, 184 N. C., 127; Mahoney v. Osborne, 189 N. C., 445.

(6) A letter received in due course of mail, purporting to be written by a person in answer to a letter proved to have been sent bim, is prima facie genuine, and is admissible in evidence without proof of the band-writing, or further proof of its authenticity. Echerd v. Viele, 164 N. C., 122.

(7) While tbe presumption is that an addressee receives a letter that is properly addressed, stamped and mailed, yet tbe receipt of a letter purporting to be signed by a person is no evidence that it was written by such person. Beard v. R. R., 143 N. C., 136; Arndt v. Ins. Co., 176 N. C., 652.

(8) A letter is not admissible in evidence until satisfactory proof has first been made of its authenticity. Arndt v. Ins. Co., 176 N. C., 652; Bank v. Brickhouse, ante, 231.

(9) If a person admits that a copy shown bim is a correct transcript of tbe original, then, as against bim, it should be admissible in evidence. Beard v. R. R., 143 N. C., 136.

(10) Carbon copies of letters made at tbe same time and by tbe same mechanical operation as tbe original are considered as duplicate originals, and are therefore admissible in evidence without notice to produce the original. Gravel Co. v. Casualty Co., 191 N. C., 313; McLendon v. Ebbs, 173 N. C., 603; Beard v. R. R., 143 N. C., 136. It has also been held that a letter-press copy is a duplicate original.

Tbe carbon copies of tbe letters offered in evidence by tbe plaintiff were unsigned, and there was no evidence that they were made at tbe same time or by tbe same mechanical operation as tbe originals, or that tbe originals bad been properly mailed, stamped and addressed to tbe defendants, or that they bad received them, and there was no notice to tbe defendants to produce tbe originals. Tbe only evidence of identification was tbe following statement of a witness for tbe plaintiff: “This correspondence is letters from me and from Crawford and Straugbn in regard to this matter.”

We are of tbe opinion, and so bold, that tbe evidence of identification of tbe carbon copies was not sufficient, and that Judge Daniels was correct in sustaining tbe objection of defendants to their introduction in evidence.

Affirmed.  