
    EMILY WIGHTMAN, ADMINISTRATRIX, v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 15264.
    Decided February 13, 1888.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    A mail service is reduced by order of the Postmaster-General. Citizens along the route request that it be restored. The Postmaster-General orders that if the contractor will trust to the justice of Congress to pay for the restored service the mails may be carried by him. On the faith of this the contractor does so. Finally, Congress pass an act referring the claim to this court and directing tho manner in which the damages shall be computed. The claimant seeks to recover interest.
    
      I. Where a service, additional to that required by an express contract, is accepted by an Executive Department with the understanding that compensation must be dependent upon the future action of Congress, and Congress pass an act referring the claim and directing the manner in which damages, if any, shall be computed, the effect of the statute is to validate the service.
    II. Where ihe additional service of a mail contractor is voluntary, no liability is imposed on the Government.
    III.From a legal obligation created solely by statute no obligation to pay interest will arise.
    IY. A remedy given by statute to a Government contractor authorizing him to bring an action is in contemplation of law immediate.
    V.By the ordinary law of debtor and creditor interest is incident to the debt, and the obligation to pay it, if not expressed, is implied, and the rate fixed by law. But the law which regulates public obligations' assumes that the Government is always ready to pay its lawful debts when properly presented, and is not liable for the laches of its agents if they erroneously neglect or refuse to pay.
    VI.There is no law fixing a general rate of interest for all classes of the public debt.
    VII.A long-established public policy has been to pay interest only where it is a subject of express agreement or of positive enactment.
    
      The Reporter's statement of the case:
    The following is the private act upon which the case rested:
    “ Be it enacted, etc., That the claim of the legal representatives of John Wightman, deceased, for and on account of the mail service rendered, by said John Wightman, deceased, in carrying the United States mails on route No. 3413, from Pittsburgh to Erie, Pennsylvania, a distance of one hundred and thirty-three miles, three times a week each way, from August 1, 1859, to and including June 30, 1860, at the rate of nine thousand dollars per annum for six times a week each way on said route, be and the same is hereby referred to the Court of Claims, and the said court is authorized and required to take jurisdiction of the same; and if, upon the evidence in tho case, it shall appear to the satisfaction of the said court that the said service was performed by the said John Wightman upon the said route six times a week, as contemplated by the contract for said service as originally made July first, eighteen hundred and fifty-six, between the Post-llffiee Department and the Erie and Meadville Express and Transportation Company, aud which contract was subsequently transferred to said John Wightman, and the same, or any part thereof, has not been paid for, then and in thatcase the said court shall render a judgment in favor of claimants for the said service so rendered and not paid for, at the rate of compensation provided for- in said contract, any statutes of limitations, receipt, or acquittance to the contrary notwithstanding, deducting therefrom the sum of three hundred and seventy-five dollars, one month’s extra pay received by the claimant.”
    And the following are the facts as found by the court:
    On the 1st day of July, 1856, a contract was made between the United States and the Erie and Meadville Express and Transportation Company for carrying the mail six times per week over route 3413, from Pittsburgh to Erie, in the State of Pennsylvania, for a period of four years from July 1, 1856, at a compensation of $9,000 per annum. The contract was assigned to John Wightman and Sidney Colt, to take effect October 1,1857. On April 28, 1859, Colt assigned his interest to Wightman.
    On the 28th of June, 1S59, the Postmaster-General, by reason of failure by Congress to make necessary appropriations,' reduced the service to three times per week, and correspondingly reduced the compensation to $4,500 per annum.
    Shortly after the order of curtailment to three times a week, owing to appeals made to the Postmaster-General by citizens along the route interested in the mails for revocation of the order of reduction, the Postmaster-General indicated to the agents sent by these citizens to the Postmaster-General that if the contractor, John Wightman, would carry'the mails six times per week, and trust to the justice of Congress for future appropriations to pay for the restored service, he would cause the postmasters along the route to deliver the mails to him six times a week.
    On the faith of such assurances from the Postmaster-General, Wightman did carry the mails six times a -week each way from on or about the 1st day of July, 1859, to and including the 30th day of June, 1860, the mails during that time having, under orders from the Post-Office Department, been delivered to him six times a week each way.
    The said contractor was paid for carrying the mails three times a week each way, and wms also paid $375, one month’s extra pay, and no more. "
    
      Mr. Samuel Shellabaracr for the claimant.
    Does not the case made by the evidence here bear a strong resemblance' lo McKee, reported in 1 Otto, 442. The judgment of this court, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, was by accruing interest swelled to five times the original claim made. The counsel for the claimant in that case cited some fifty cases in support of the claim made for interest, although Congress had not expressly authorized the allowance of interest. He also referred to the case of the widow and children of E. T. Warren, and a number of other acts of Congress, under which the payment of accruing interest had been made when money had been advanced for theUnited States. Many of such statutes show that Congress authorized the payment of interest from the date of the rendition of the services, or furnishing supplies. (McGonnel v. Thomas, (3 Ill. (Scam.), 313; Ayres v. Metcalf, 39 Ill., 307; Glioctaw Case, 21 C. Cls. R., 59.)
    After inducing the service for which compensation is claimed here, before such service was half rendered the representative of the Government, the Postmaster-General, conscious of duty as well as assurances to contractors who were rendering service without any express promise to pay when rendered (confessing the inability of the Government to pay), called the attention of the President to the matter in the following language: '
    “ As the faith of the Government has been broken, not only should the principal of these debts be promptly paid, but interest on them should also be allowed.'1'’ Adding, “from the “ gravest considerations of public justice and policy, and can “ not, in my judgment, be withheld without national dishonor.”
    
      Mr. F. P. Dewees (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Hotoard) for the defendants.
    Without express or implied authority from Congress, this court has no power to enter a judgment in this case embracing interest.
    Section 1091, Revised Statutes, is as follows :
    “No interest shall be allowed on any claim up to the time of rendition of j udgment thereon by the Court of Claims, unless upon a contract expressly stipulated for the payment of interest.”
    It is not contended, nor is it a fact, that the original contract in this case expressly stipulated for the payment of interest. Tillson v. The United States (10 C. Cls. R., 43).
    
      Where an act of Congress authorizes the payment of money out of the Treasury to a citizen interest can not be allowed thereon unless it is authorized by the act in express terms. (9 Op. Atty. Geni., 49.) Acts of Congress authorizing the settlement of claims according to “equity” or “equity and justice” do not give interest (7 Op. Atty. Geni., 523.)
    Interest is uot a legal incident on a debt due from the United States where it is merely shown that a debt is due. (White v. The United States, Dev., O. Gis. R., 93; Todd v. The United States, lid., 75.)
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The court is of the opinion that this case in every essential element is precisely like that of Marshall O. Roberts et al. (92 U. S. R., 41). The service was rendered to the Post-Office Department; it. was additional to that required by an express contract existing between the parties ; it was accepted by the Postmaster-General with an agreement or understanding that compensation therefor must be subjectto and dependent upon the future action of Congress; the services rendered under the express contract were duly paid for; and, finally, Congress has passed a special act referring the claim to this court, and directing the manner in which the damages, if any, shall be computed. (Act ith August, 1886, 24 Stat. L., 875.)

Concerning the former case the Supreme Court held that the effect of the private act was to validate a claim where no legal obligation existed, and to prescribe and limit the liability which it created.

It is manifest that where there was no legal obligation to pay the principal, there could have been no implied obligation to pay interest.

The services of the claimant being voluntary, no liability therefor arose until the private act came and assumed one,, which it both restricted and defined. From the legal obligation thus created no obligation to pay interest arose, for the Government was then ready and willingin contemplation of law to meet that obligation; and the remedy which the statute gave was, so far as the Government was concerned, immediate.

By the ordinary law of debtor and creditor, interest is incident to the debt, and the obligation to pay it, if n >t expressed and tlie rate fixed by agreement, is implied, and the rate fixed by law. But the law which regulates the obligations of a government assumes that it is always ready to pay its lawful debts when properly presented, and that it is not liable for the laches or mistakes of its agents if they negligently or erroneously refuse to pay. Hence there is no law fixing a rate of interest for all clases of the public debt, and a long-established public policy has been to pay interest only where it is a subject of express agreement or of positive enactment.

In the numerous cases which have been brought against the Government in this court during a period of nearly twenty-five years, interest has been recovered in only one, McKee's Case (10 O. Gis. B., 231), and that one was affirmed by a divided court (91 U. S. B., 442). The recovery rested upon the fact that the debt belonged to a class on which the Ordincmee 7 th May, 1787 (1 Laws U. S., p. 062), and likewise the subsequent policy of Congress had expressly allowed interest; and that the private act referring the claim to this court directed that its adjustment should be governed by “rules and regulations heretofore adopted by the United States in the settlement of like cases.” In the subsequent case of Tillson (100 U. S. B., 42), the Supreme Court held that a private act, referring to this court a claim founded upon a contract with the United States, did not authorize a recovery of interest unless it expressly said so. The present case comes under the decision in Tillson and not under the decision in McKee, and interest can not be recovered. As to the principal there is no controversy.

The judgment of the court is that the claimant recover of the defendants the sum of $4,125.'  