
    *Massie v. Greenhow’s Adm’r et als. Fitzpatrick v. Greenhow’s Adm’r et als.
    January Term, 1856,
    Richmond.
    Absent, Git/mjbb, J„ and Thompson, J. — (Thompson, J., decided the cause in the court below.)
    1. Foreign Decrees — Conveyance of Land — Enforcement against Purchaser without Notice. — A decree of a court of another State, for the conveyance of land in Virginia, will not he enforced in equity against bona fide purchasers without notice, or even against the heirs of a party against whom the decree was rendered, after the lapse of thirty years from the date of the decree before the institution of the snit.
    2. Purchaser — Outstanding Equity — Notice of. — To affect a purchaser with actual notice of an outstanding equity his information must be sufficiently definite to enable him to ascertain whether it be authentic.
    3. Same —Same — Insufficient Notice of. — It is not sufficient notice of an equity to bind a purchaser, that he is informed that the party entitled to the equity has some claim, if upon enquiry of the party entitled and diligent search of the proper records, he is unable to ascertain what is the nature of the claim, or upon what it is founded.
    4. Same — Prior Unrecorded Deed — Effect. — A prior unrecorded deed from his vendor does not affect the rights of a purchaser, without notice, where his vendor appears, by the records of the county where the land lies, to he the legal owner thereof.
    
      Four thousand acres of land in that portion of Amherst county out of which the county of Nelson was afterwards formed, were surveyed and taken up for Thomas Doswell and John-Drummond. In the year 1768, partition of this tract was made, and two thousand acres thereof were allotted to John and Henly Drummond, the heirs of their deceased father, John Drummond. In 1794, they sold and conveyed this tract to John Tyler. On the 16th June, 1796, Tyler conveyed the same to John Foster. On the 12th of January, 1799, Foster conveyed to Robert Young, but *this deed was not recorded. On the same day, Young conveyed to Bertrand Ewell by deed, which recited the chain of title above given, and which was duly recorded in the county of Amherst.
    In the month of May in the year 1813, Samuel Greenhow filed his bill, in the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia for the county of Alexandria, against John Foster’s executor, Robert Young, Bertrand Ewell, and Henry Eee: setting forth that he had purchased the tract of land above mentioned in Amherst county, containing two thousand acres, and, before a conveyance to him by Tyler, had sold it to Foster, and had directed Tyler to convey the land to Foster; that Foster had since died, leaving a will, by •which he devised all his real estate to his executor, with authority to sell it for the payment of debts and legacies; that Foster in his lifetime failed to pay the purchase-money for the land; and that when the complainant instituted suit against him for the same, a compromise was effected, by which Foster had agreed to pav the complainant two hundred dollars and re-convey the. land to him; that Foster had sold the land to Robert Young, Robert Young had sold it to Bertrand Ewell, and Ewell to Henry Eee; that afterwards Foster had re-purchased the land and procured a re-conveyance thereof to himself, but had never conveyed it to the complainant. The bill' prayed that the defendants should be decreed to convey the larid to the complainant. With this bill were exhibited Foster’s will; an agreement under seal, dated 11th January, 1798, between John Foster and Robert'Young for the sale of the said tract of land to Young; a deed from John Foster to Robert Young, dated 12th January, 1799, conveying the land in controversy, acknowledged before the County Court of Fairfax; a deed from Robert Young to Bertrand Ewell, dated 12th January, 1799, conveying the same, acknowledged before the County Court of Fairfax, and recorded in Amherst county; an unrecorded deed from Bertrand Ewell to *Robert Young, dated 22d January, 1800, re-conveying the same property, purporting to have been acknowledged before three witnesses, and again acknowledged before three other witnesses on the 19th May, 1803; an unrecorded deed from Robert Young to John Foster, -dated 28th January, 1800, conveying the same property, certified to have been acknowledged before the Mayor of Alexandria, in June, 1804; an obligation under seal, signed by Bertrand Ewell, and attested by a witness, dated 22d January, 1800, binding him to procure his wife’s relinquishment of dower in the said land to Robert Young; a similar obligation of the same date of Bertrand Ewell, to deliver to Robert Young two certificates for the said tract of land; and a letter from Greenhow to Foster was filed in the suit, in which Greenhow requests Foster to send him his deed for the Amherst land, and all the title papers connected therewith.
    The defendants appeared . by counsel. Young answered the bill, admitting his purchase of the tract, his sale to Ewell, his re-purchase from Ewell, and re-conveyance to Foster. Eee answered, that he knew nothing of the matter. The bill was taken for confessed as to Ewell. The cause was heard on the 15th May, 1817, upon the bill, answers and exhibits; and the court decreed, that Henry Thompson, executor of John Foster, Bertrand Ewell, Robert Young and Henry Lee should execute deeds conveying to Samuel Greenhow all their respective rights, title and interest in law or equity in and to the tract of land in the bill mentioned. No conveyances were executed in accordance with the requisitions of this decree. Samuel Greenhow died in the year 1815, before the decree was rendered, leaving a will, by which he bequeathed his whole estate, real and personal, to his wife, Frances Brown Greenhow. Mrs. Greenhow died in the year 1839, leaving a will, which disposed of a very small property, making no mention of the lands in Nelson county, but constituting *her sisters, Hannah Ball Hedgman and Jean Wood Lewis, her residuary legatees.
    The lands in Nelson county remained unoccupied until about the year 1834, when William O. Slade, who had married one of the heirs of Bertrand Ewell, employed Alexander Fitzpatrick as his agent to take possession, drive off intruders, and rent out the land. On the 23d Nov. 1836, the other heirs of Bertrand Ewell, by their deed of that date, in consideration of the sum of twelve hundred dollars,' conveyed their interest in the land to Wm. O. Slade. Wm. O. Slade and wife, by their deed, dated October 27th, 1837, in consideration of the sum of $752 50, conveyed five hundred and one and a-half acres of the tract to William Massie; and by their deed of the 12th October, 1839, in consideration of the sum of sixteen hundred dollars, conveyed the balance of the tract to Alexander Fitzpatrick.
    In January, 1848, Walker P. Conway, the administrator with the will annexed of Frances B. Greenhow, died; Hannah Ball Hedgman and John Wood Lewis and Jean Wood Lewis, his wife, filed their bill in the Circuit Superior Court for the county of Nelson, to which they made Alexander Fitzpatrick, Henry Thompson, the administrator of John Foster, William O. Slade, and his five infant children, and the heirs of Bertrand Ewell, parties defendant.
    
      The complainants set forth in their bill the foregoing- facts, and claimed, that Hannah Ball Hedgman and Jean Wood Bewis, as the residuary devisees of Frances Brown Greenhow, who was the sole devisee of Samuel Greenhow, were equitably entitled to the land in the possession of Alexander Fitzpatrick, purchased by him of William O. Slade. That the heirs of Bertrand Swell were bound by the unrecorded deed of their ancestor to Robert Young, dated 12th January, 1800; and that Fitzpatrick was a purchaser, with notice of Mrs. Frances B. Greenhow’s equity. The bill prayed, that the legal title to the lands held by Fitzpatrick should be decreed to the complainants, H. B. Hedgman and J. W. Bewis; *that an account should be ordered of the rents and profits of the lands while in the possession of Fitzpatrick, and that such as accrued in the lifetime of Frances B. Greenhow should be decreed to her administrator, and that the balance should be decreed to her residuary devisees; and that if the title of Fitzpatrick to the land should be confirmed, that the complainants might have a decree against William O. Slade and the other defendants, who might be bound therefor, for the true value of the land and back rents, with interest until paid, or for the price at which it was sold, or fairly worth at the time of sale, with interest until paid. There was also a prayer for general relief. With this bill were exhibited--the will of Samuel Greenhow; the will of Frances B. Greenhow ; the will of John Foster; a letter from John Foster to Samuel Greenhow, dated Alexandria, 24th October, 1804, which contained the following paragraph: i:I have at length got the deeds from Bertrand Ewell and Robert Young for the tract of land in Amherst county. These, with my unrecorded deed for it to you, I will forward to you by some early and safe hand. The right of dower from Mrs. Ewell is not obtained, for the want of the necessary paper for so doing. If you could send it to me, I could have that effected without loss of time. It will be the only ■one wanting;” a transcript of the record of the suit in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia for the county of Alexandria, in which Samuel Greenhow was plaintiff, and the executor of John Foster, Robert Young, Bertrand Ewell and Henry Bee were defendants, together with the deeds and other papers exhibited in that suit; a deed from the heirs of Bertrand Ewell, other than the wife of Slade to William O. Slade, of the 23d November, 1836, conveying their interest in the two thousand acres of land in Nelson county ; a deed from W. O. Slade and wife to William Massie, of the 27th October, 1837, conveying five hundred and one and a-half acres of the said land; and a deed from Slade and wife to Alexander Fitzpatrick, dated 12th October, 1839, ^conveying the balance of the two thousand acres of land.
    Fitzpatrick demurred to the bill, and also answered. In his answer, he averred that he had no knowledge or notice of the unrecorded deeds from Ewell to Young, and from Young to Foster, of the decree of the United States Circuit Court for the county of Alexandria, and insisted that he was a fair purchaser for full value, without notice of Mrs. Greenhow’s equity. The answer admitted that he had heard that Mrs. Greenhow had some claim to some land in Amherst, but upon inquiry he had been unable to ascertain what that claim was. Upon this point, the answer was in these words:
    “This respondent denies that he ever did have any notice that Mrs. Greenhow claimed said land, or knew of it in any other way than he will proceed to state. This respondent, some time from the year 1819 to 1825, heard from a certain Thomas Goodwin, who is now dead, that one Mrs. Green-how claimed some land in Nelson county, on the Blue Ridge, adjoining a tract said Goodwin owned; that he was desirous to buy it; that he had been to see Mrs. Green-how to buy it, if she had any title to it; that he had made diligent inquiry of Mrs. Greenhow or her agent (perhaps both); that they could not tell him of any title she had, nor put him on any trail by which he could find that she had any title; that all she could tell about it was that her husband, -who had died several years before that time, said he owned some land in Nelson or Amherst, and consequently the said Goodwin, being satisfied that Mrs. Greenhow had no title, he declined buying. After Goodwin satisfied himself that Mrs. Greenhow had no claim, and so expressed himself, the persons to whom I have alluded took possession of said land, and surveyed it, as this respondent has shown, in 1834, as well as this respondent recollects. When Slade employed him, he informed Slade that it had been supposed that the land was Mrs. Greenhow’s, but this respondent had understood that she could not show any title to it; to which *Slade replied that Mrs. Greenhow had no claim whatever, and the only pretence, she could make to it was that, in the lifetime of her husband, he contracted to buy said land, but died without paying one cent for it. In 1836, to the best of this respondent’s recollection, before the sale by Bertrand Ewell’s heirs to William O. Slade of the said land, this respondent wrote to a gentleman in Richmond, requesting him to ascertain what Mrs. Greenhow would take for her land in Nelson; this respondent thinks his inquiry was what Mrs. Greenhow would take, but he knows the object was to ascertain whether or not she had any title; in answer to his letter, this respondent’s friend in Richmond informed him that Mrs. Greenhow knew nothing of the title, she only had heard her husband say he owned some land in Amherst or Nelson; if any person would give her a small amount, she would sell all the claim she had to any land in Nelson, but she would not warrant any title, except she would convey such title only as she had, not knowing what that was. Some time after that, as well as this respondent recollects, this respondent and a certain William Massie, who owned a tract of land near said land, got in conversation about said Mrs. Greenhow’s pretended claim, when Massie informed this respondent that, many years before that time, himself and one William B. Jacobs, who was then dead, had agreed to buy said land from Mrs. Greenhow, and that he, having some other business in Richmond, hunted up Mrs. Greenhow or her agent, and contracted for said land, but, after the contract was made, he found they could tell him nothing about the title, more than they supposed it was in Amherst clerk’s office, where the said Massie said he examined on his return home, but found no title; said Massie'informed this respondent that afterwards said Jacobs went to Richmond, and he and Mrs. Greenhow, or her agent, examined the office of the General Court to see if Mrs. Greenhow had any trace of a title there, but that nothing could be found, whereupon the contract was abandoned, and Mrs. *Greenhow or her agent said they did not know what title she had. Thus this respondent showeth, that instead of having notice from Mrs. Greenhow, that he had the most conclusive assurance that Mrs. Greenhow had no claim whatever to said land, and that assurance coming from herself or agent three times to different persons proposing to purchase of her if she would shew them that she had title, and after all the above efforts to trace the title to the true owner, and with evidence of Slade’s legal title in this respondent’s possession, could he for a moment doubt but Slade’s title (especially after all that he had heard from Goodwin and Massie, and after Massie had purchased five hundred and one and a-half acres of said land) to said land was good, and that Mrs. Greenhow had no claim whatever.”
    The infant defendants answered by their guardian ad litem, and the bill was regularly taken for confessed and set for hearing as to the other defendants.
    The execution of the unrecorded deeds, and the genuineness of the other papers exhibited, were proved. It also appeared, that up to the year 1839, the land in controversy had been listed on the books of the commissioner of the revenue in the name of John Tyler, and that the taxes had been regularly paid by him during his life, and after his death by his heirs.
    The cause was heard in October, 1849, when the court over-ruled the demurrer, and being of opinion that the equitable rights of Samuel Greenhow, under whom the complainants claimed, were established beyond doubt, cavil, or controversy, and without deeming it necessary to decide whether the legal title was in Foster’s representative by virtue of the unrecorded conveyances of Swell to Young, and from Young to Roster, or whether Fitzpatrick acquired the legal title of that part of the subject held by him by virtue of the conveyance from the heirs of Ewell to Slade, and from Slade and wife to him, the court being satisfied that the defendants must be regarded as purchasers with notice, and that therefore their legal title (if they *had it) thus acquired could present no bar to the plaintiff’s relief, and that a fortiori their claim under Ewell’s heirs should be postponed to the plaintiff’s equity, if the legal title was in Foster’s representative, appointed a commissioner to convey the two thousand acres of land to Hannah Ball Hedgman and Jean Wood Bewis, to be held by them as tenants in common ; and the court ordered and decreed that Alexander Fitzpatrick deliver up possession of so much of the said land as came to his possession by virtue of the deed from William O. Slade and wife, dated 12th October, 1839. The court further ordered an account of the rents and profits of the land in the possession of Fitzpatrick, which accrued within five years before the date of the subpoena in the cause, distinguishing in the report such as accrued in the lifetime of Mrs. Greenhow, and that which accrued after her death, in order to a just apportionment between her personal representative and her devisees.
    There was another suit in the same court, by the same complainants, to recover the land which had been conveyed by Slade and wife to William Massie, involving the same facts, which was heard at the same time, and in which there was a similar decree.
    Fitzpatrick and Massie severally appealed to this court.
    J. Garland, for Massie:
    The appellants have an unbroken chain of title from 1768 to 1847, and have actual possession of the property. It is true, the deed from John Foster to Robert Young, of the 12th January, 1799, was not recorded in Amherst. It was, however, acknowledged before the County Court of Fairfax, and is admitted by the appellees. The deed from Young to Bertrand Ewell, of the 12th Jan-ua.ry, 1799, was duly recorded, and there is no record in Amherst or Nelson of any subsequent conveyance of the property until the conveyance from Ewell’s heirs to Slade, and from Slade to the appellants. *The appellants had no notice of the subsequent deeds between Ewell, Young and Foster, or of the decree in Alexandria. The fact that those deeds were filed in the suit in Alexandria, did not amount to notice of them. The doctrine of lis pendens has no application here. That is a rule of policy, and seems to operate where the suit is ended by a decree. Adams’ Equity, 324, 325, note; Story’s Equity, § 405; Newman v. Chapman, 2 Rand. 102; Trimble v. Boothby, 14 Ohio R. 109, 323.
    The appellees charge that the appellants were purchasers with notice of their prior equity. This notice must have been actual or constructive. There is no evidence of actual notice, other than what is contained in the answers of the appellants. They there aver, that they had heard that Mrs. Greenhow had some title to some land in Amherst. She could not inform them upon what her title was founded, nor where the lands were, nor give them any clue by which they could ascertain her title; that they had searched the records of Amherst county and of the General Court, and could find no trace of any title in her. Was this sufficient notice to bind them? What is actual notice? It must be certain and definite. The evidence of the prior title must be so clear that the party acquiring the legal title and having it recorded, is affected with mala fides, and acts fraudulently. 1 Story’s Equity, 429; Adams’ Bq. 320; American Beading Cases in Equity, pp. 99-111, and 116-124; Mundy v. Vawter, 3 Grat. 545.
    Nor does the decree in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, for Alexandria, affect the appellants with constructive notice. Worsley v. Earl of Scarborough, 3 Atk. 392; Beneuve v. Beneuve, 2 American Beading Cases in Equity, 144; Adams’ Equity, 325; 2 Sugden on Vendors, 431. Greenhow’s equity was not proved, and the decree in the suit in Alexandria was erroneous. That court had no jurisdiction of the case; it was not properly matured; Young and Bee were improper parties: Young having parted with his '^interest, and Bee never having had any; the heirs and devisees of John Eoster should have been made parties defendant ; the material allegations ot the bill were not proved; Greenhow had been dead two years when the decree was rendered, and the suit had never been revived by his representatives. Even now, the equity of Greenhow is not sufficiently proved. It is so shadowy and indefinite that a bill for specific performance could not be maintained, even against the heirs of Ewell, if they were in possession. In any view, the appellees were bound by their laches and the lapse of time from 1804 until 1847.
    Patton, for Fitzpatrick:
    These bills were filed to set up a latent equity, by parties confessedly having no legal title, but a mere equity. If it be an equity growing out of the alleged contract of sale from Greenhow to Eoster, made in 1798, it amounts to nothing more than a vendor’s lien.
    Another equity is set up, growing out of the decree in Alexandria, made under a foreign jurisdiction, having no force pro-prio vigore. It was rendered in 1817, twenty-three years before the death of Mrs. Greenhow, who was the devisee of this equity, and who never took any steps to enforce it, and ten years more elapsed after her death before any action was taken to enforce it. The parties entitled to this equity slept upon it for more than thirty years after the date of the decree. Mrs. Greenhow in her lifetime acknowledged that she knew nothing of it, and the purchasers of the property could learn nothing of it from those entitled. There was, then, gross laches in setting up this decree. Smith v. Clay, in note to Deloraine v. Browne, in 3 Brown Ch. E. 639.
    If application had been made, in 1847, to the court which rendered the decree, to enforce it, it would have been refused because of the laches. This objection would be fatal, if the parties in possession were privies of Bertrand Ewell; but the appellants are not privies, *and are not bound by that decree. The Court of Appeals have constantly reprobated laches. West v. Thornton, 7 Grat. 177.
    It was Mrs. Greenhow’s misfortune that she knew nothing of this equity. She did not intend to devise it by her will, but it passed by force of the technical words of the devise. Can these purchasers be charged with notice, from Mrs. Greenhow, of that of which she herself knew nothing?
    Conway Eobinson, for the appellees:
    Tyler conveyed the land in controversy to Foster, by the direction of Greenhow. This deed was probably never recorded. It appears by the recitals in the agreement between Foster and Young, dated January 11th, 1798, that Foster had purchased the land of Greenhow. Foster made a deed for the land to Young the 12th January, 1799. Young conveyed the land to Ewell by deed of the same date. 'Ewell, by his agreement binding himself to Young to procure his wife’s relinquishment of her dower in the land to Young, dated 22d January, 1800, admits that he had made a deed for the land, which he had acknowledged in court. A deed from Ewell to Young, dated February 22d, 1800, conveying the land with general warranty, is exhibited, which was twice acknowledged before three witnesses. On the 28th January 1800, Young re-conveyed to Foster. The land had thus returned to Foster, who had purchased of Greenhow, but had never paid the purchase money. Greenhow sued him for the purchase money, and the suit was compromised. Greenhow in his bill states the terms of the compromise. Foster was to re-convey the land to him. On the 27th November, 1801, Greenhow wrote to Foster to send him his deed for the land, with Ewell’s and all the other title papers. On the 24th October, 1804, Foster wrote to Greenhow that he had Ewell’s and Young’s deed for the land in Amherst, and would forward them with his own deed for the land by an early and safe hand. *This letter was proved to be in the handwriting of Foster. Foster died without ever sending the deed to Greenhow, or at least it never reached him. Hence the suit in Alexandria by Greenhow to enforce the contract for a re-conveyance, against his executor, and to procure the legal title. Massie’s counsel here has examined the decree in that suit as if it were here upon appeal. If that decree be erroneous, it cannot be corrected here. The court had jurisdiction, and its decree is binding upon all parties and privies.
    But there were no irregularities in the proceedings in that suit. Foster’s executor was a proper party, because the will empowered him . to sell the real estate. He never did sell or attempt to sell, but permitted the suit to proceed. Foster’s heirs and devisees were aliens, and could only take by a sale and a conversion of the real estate into personal. Ewell’s heirs were made parties out of abundant caution, although he had parted with his entire interest in the subject.
    There is no doubt that a court of equity had jurisdiction wherever it could lay hold of Foster’s executor. He appeared and defended the suit by counsel. It is therefore not necessary to show that process was served on the parties. 1 Rob. Prac. (2d ed.) 220, and authorities there collected.
    A foreign judgment is conclusive of the facts upon which it is founded. 1 Rob. Prac. (2d ed.) 205. The court in Alexandria necessarily' passed upon the conveyances of Ewell to Young and from Young to Foster, and decided that neither Ewell, Young nor Foster had any title at that date, but that Greenhow was entitled to the subject.
    Who are the claimants in this suit? They are persons claiming under Ewell, who had conveyed his interest by contract in writing, and by deed in pursuance thereof, and against whom was the decree in Alexandria, by which he and his heirs were unquestionably bound.
    The Alexandria decree was made in 1817. No appeal *was taken from it. It is true that no conveyance was made in pursuance of it, because Greenhow was dead at the time; but no effort was made to reverse it on that ground. The time for reversing it has passed, and it must have full force and effect ‘ in all collateral proceedings.
    The record of that suit was not objected to in the court below, and the objection cannot now be made here. At the date of that decree Greenhow was entitled to the land. At his death it passed under his will to his wife, Mrs. Frances Greenhow. At her death it passed, under the words “all my little property,” to her (residuary dev-isees, H. B. Hedgman and J. W. Lewis. Wall v. Langlands, 14 East. 370; Jackson v. Housel, 17 Johns. 281; Jarman on Wills, 670; Miars et ais. v. Bedgood, 9 Leigh, 361.
    What has been done to impair the rights of these parties since 1817? The lapse of time has confirmed, rather than impaired, their rights. It is in favor of the parties insisting that the state of things, which has existed, shall not be disturbed. Evans v. Spurgin, 11 Grat. 615.
    It was said, that this decree has been dormant since 1817. How dormant? It is like other decrees, establishing 1he best titles in the State. There has been merely neglect to take a conveyance under the decree, all parties acquiescing in it. It is like the case of a division of land under a decree by commissioners, and a report returned, but no decree of confirmation entered. All parties acquiesce in the division I and act on it. Time operates to confirm, not to destroy, such a division.
    In this case, the decree was incapable of satisfaction, except by a conveyance. The case of Smith v. Clay, 3 Brown Ch. R. 639, n., merely establishes, that a court of chancery will not entertain a bill of review after the lapse of forty years. There was no abandonment by Mrs. Green-how, but a continual claim, for she treated with the appellants for the sale of her interest. *It is true, she was not accurately informed of the nature of the claim, but was as well informed as ladies usually are about such matters. There was no adverse claim until 1836, when Ewell’s heirs conveyed to Slade.
    What was the state of the title in 1836? If the case had been in court at that date, and the question between Mrs. Greenhow and Ewell’s heirs, would not a conveyance have been decreed to Mrs. Greenhow? Can there be a doubt that Bertrand Ewell had conveyed away his interest in the property? His deed was filed in the Alexandria suit. If the record is evidence, the exhibits are evidence. Smith v. Chapman, 10 Grat. 453.
    The appellants claim under Ewell. Are they in a better position than their vendors? They were purchasers with actual notice of Mrs. Greenhow’s claim to the particular subject. As to constructive notice, the authority of the case of Munday v. Va'wter, 3 Grat. 545, was invoked in Heth v. R. F. & P. Railroad Co. without effect, in which there was no imputation of mala fides. In this case, the appellants had actual notice. Argenbright v. Campbell et ux., 3 H. & M. 144: Pendleton v. Fay, 2 Paige Ch. R. 202; 2 Lomax Dig. 369. But the appellants cannot make the defence that they are purchasers without notice, for they have not denied notice in their answers. 2 Rob. Prac. 307; Balcomb et ux. v. N. Y. Ins. Co., 11 Paige, 456; Galatin v. Erwine and Cunningham v. Erwin, 1 Hopkins’ Ch. R. 55, and 8 Coweh, 373. And if they rely upon Slade’s want of notice, they should have alleged it.
    There is an unrecorded link in the appellants’ title, to wit: the deed from Foster to Young.
    As to the decree between the co-defendants, that could be rendered after the coming in of the report.
    Slade’s heirs are liable in either contingency: in one event, to the appellees for the purchase money received by him, and in the other, to the appellant upon his general warranty of title.
    *Patton, in reply:
    As to the formal pleading of want, of notice, Fitzpatrick says in his answer, that he was informed, after enquiry, that Mrs. Greenhow had no claim or title, and this is a sufficient denial of notice for himself and Slade. Whatever may be the rule in reference to bills which say nothing of notice, here the bill, by alleging notice, distinctly puts the fact in issue. It is too late to take this objection, if good, in the Court of Appeals.
    Mrs. Greenhow never had any lien upon this land against any body. If she ever had, the laches of her husband himself, and her devisees, bar her and them in a court of equity, thirty years after her rights accrued, and forty years after the rights of her husband accrued. There was a contract for re-conveyance to Greenhow in 1804. No suit was instituted until 1807, and no decree entered until 1817, when there was no party in existence to whom the conveyance could be made, and no one to make it.
    If any claim ever existed, it cannot be set up against these innocent parties, who had no notice of this stale claim, and who had made actual enquiry in the proper quarters, and could find no outstanding title. What was this Greenhow right? The decree in Alexandria was a decree in personam, and not in rem. It was the decree of a foreign court, and could create no equity or lien upon property in Virginia. Suppose it did create an equitable lien and gave a right to call for the legal title. After having been suffered to sleep from 1817 to 1847, it could not be enforced against purchasers from those -who appeared on the registers of the country to have the legal estate. The interposition of a court of equity is refused, after a great lapse of time, upon grounds of public policy. In the case of Smith v. Clay, 3 Brown Ch. R., there was manifest and admitted error, and 3et the court would not review. The same reasoning applies to an application to enforce a decree.
    This doctrine is not confined to *cases where there is an adversary possession, but even to cases where, in the nature of things, there could be no adversary possession. Smith v. Thompson, 7 Grat. 112; West’s adm’r v. Thornton et als., 7 Grat. 177. In Evans et ux. v. Spurgin, 6 Grat. 107, the party whose right was confirmed by lapse of time had been in possession. In cases of partition, where no order of confirmation has been entered, the title is perfected by the parties remaining in possession under the division. In this case, neither Mrs. Greenhow nor her representatives ever had possession, or the right of possession, at any time. She never knew what her claim was, nor upon what.
    Want of more precise information by Mrs. Greenhow of her title does not excuse her. She knew in the lifetime of her husband, in 1815, that there was some claim; yet from that time until her death in 1840, though frequently applied to, she never took the trouble to ascertain what it was, but merely referred the parties to the records of the General Court, and of the county of Amherst, where there was no trace of any title in her.
    The latent equity of Mrs. Greenhow must be held to have been abandoned thirty years before the institution of the suit. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 168, and cases cited.
    It is admitted, by the counsel for the ap-pellees, that these purchasers had no constructive notice of this outstanding equity. Constructive notice binds parties, where there is no fraud or mala fides. The case of Heth v. R. E. & P. Railroad Co., 4 Grat. 482, was a case of constructive notice. The decision there, too, was doubtless influenced by the relations of the parties, a widow and orphans against a wealthy corporation.
    Actual notice is insisted upon in this case. Actual notice is such as will affect the party purchasing with fraud or mala fides. Newman v. Chapman, 2 Rand. 93; Munday v. Vawter et als., 3 Grat. 518.
    It is not every piece of information given to a party ^purchasing which will affect him with notice. It must be given at the time of the purchase, by some one having an interest in the subject. And not merely that there is a claim, but facts by which it may be ascertained if the claim is well founded. In the case at bar, the parties might properly have disregarded the notice they had, but thej’ did not, and examined the records of the State to ascertain the title. Adams’ Equity, 324; H. & W.’s edition Smith’s Beading Cases in Equity, vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 97, 101.
    In this transaction, there was no speculation upon the obscurity of the title, but the parties purchased and paid full value for the land for their own use and occupation, in the ordinary course of business.
    As to the unrecorded link in their title. An unrecorded deed passes title. The purpose of the record is merely to affect subsequent purchasers. The effect of not recording is to let in a subsequent purchaser who does record his deed.
   TYBER, J.

These causes have been argued at much length, and many questions discussed -which it is deemed unnecessary to decide, because we think, according to the plainest and best established principles of a court of chancery, admitting the equity of the appellees to have been ascertained by a decree of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, in 1817, that they have lost all right to enforce it against the appellants : Eirst, by laches and lapse of time, and, secondly, because the appellants are purchasers for valuable consideration, without notice.

It appears from the records in these cases, that sometime prior to 1819, Massie, one of the appellants, hearing that the land in controversy belonged to Mrs. Greenhow, agreed with a certain William B. Jacobs to purchase the same; and accordingly, in the fall of 1819, they visited the city of Richmond, had an interview with Mrs. Green-how and her agent, and proposed to purchase the land; that Mrs. Greenhow seemed to *know little about the land, except that she claimed a tract of mountain land somewhere, and that she was willing to sell the same; that in the spring or summer of 1820, the said Massie again visited the city of Richmond, had an interview with the agent of Mrs. Greenhow, and found her willing to sell, and the terms of sale were agreed on. But on investigation Mrs. Greenhow could not, or did not produce any title whatever to the land; nor could she or her agent inform Massie where to look for a title, except in the clerk’s office of Amherst county. Massie then returned home and, being anxious to buy the land, diligently examined the office of Amherst county, and could find no title that Mrs. Greenhow had to the land in controversy, or any. other land. Soon thereafter Jacobs, who had agreed to unite in the purchase of the land with Massie, went to the city of Richmond and informed Mrs. Greenhow that no title to said land could be found, and that they could not pay for the land until the title was produced. It was then agreed to search the records of the General Court office, and on finding no title there the purchase was abandoned. This is the statement detailed in Massie’s answer.

Fitzpatrick, the other appellant, in his answer states, that about 1836, and' before the sale by Ewell’s heirs to Slade, he wrote to some one in Richmond to enquire as to Mrs. Greenhow’s title to the land, and what she would take for the same, and was informed in reply, that Mrs. Greenhow knew nothing of the title to the land, except that she had heal'd her husband say that he owned some land in Amherst or Nelson.

It further appears, that in 1813 there was a decree rendered in the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, in which Samuel Greenhow was plaintiff, and Bertrand Ewell et ais. were defendants, decreeing a conveyance of said land to be made to Samuel Greenhow. The said Samuel Greenhow died in 1815, leaving his wife his sole dev-isee. She died in 1840. And that Bertrand Ewell stood on the records of Amherst *county, where the land was situated, as the holder of the legal title, by deed dated in 1799, and duly recorded; that the appellant Massie derived his title to said land in 1837, and the appellant Fitzpatrick derived his title in 1839, from Slade and wife, who owned one-sixth of the land, she being the daughter of Bertrand Ewell, the other five-sixths of the land having been purchased by Slade from the other heirs of B. Ewell; that they completed their purchases, took possession and held it undisturbed until January, 1848, when this suit was instituted.

Thus it appears that Mrs. Greenhow, as far back as 1815, supposed her husband had a claim to some land in the counties of Amherst or Nelson. She was-his sole dev-isee ; had been applied to to sell the land, and was willing and anxious to sell it in 1819 and 1820, and the only obstacle to the sale was, that she could produce no muniment of title; and under these circumstances she remained in a state of supineness and indifference as to her rights, up to the time of her death in 1840, a period of twenty years; and no s'uit is instituted to assert her right, or the rights of those claiming under her, for a period of upwards of thirty-four years from the time her equity was ascertained by the decree of 1817. If, then, it be true, as was said by Lord Camden in Smith v. Clay, 3 Brown Ch. R. 639, “that a court of equity has always refused its aid to stale demands where the party has slept on his rights and acquiesced for a length of time,’’ and that “nothing can call a court of equity into activity but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence,” what standing have these appellees in this court? The general rule in equity is, “that every right of action in equity that accrues to a party must be acted on at the utmost within twenty years,” and there is nothing in the pleadings or proofs in these causes to exempt the appellees from the operation of this rule.

The claimant of this equity labored under no disability. There was no mala fides on the part of the purchasers. Mrs. Greenhow was sui juris from 1815 *to 1840, the time of her death, about a quarter of a century, and no effort was made during this period to ascertain her rights or to enforce them. The purchasers were diligent in their efforts to ascertain the real owner of the land. They had heard from rumor, which they were not bound to notice, that Mrs. Greenhow had some claim to this land. But they did not notice it, and applied to her for information, and on her naked assertion of title they searched the records of Amherst county and the General Court office, and did all in their power to ascertain whether she had in fact any title to this land or not.

In the meantime, warrants are laid on this land as waste and unappropriated, and Slade, the holder of the legal title, claiming under Bertrand Ewell, interferes and' arrests these proceedings, asserts title to the property, takes possession of it, and makes sale of it to the appellants; and some eight or ten years after this undisturbed possession and purchase, and upwards of thirty-four years after the decree of 1817, this suit is instituted.

We think no precedent can be found that would justify a court of equity in opening its door .to a claimant of an equity against a purchaser of the legal title, after such a lapse of time, and under circumstances .indicating the grossest negligence. It is said, however, that these purchasers had actual notice of this equity, and this notice was given by Mrs. Greenhow. In notes to American Leading Cases in Equity, vol. 2, part 6, p. 111-12, the author says: “Actual notice is where the purchaser either knows of the existence of an adverse claim or title, or is conscious of having the means of knowledge, and does not use them, whether his knowledge is the result of a direct communication or is gathered from facts and circumstances;” and further on, speaking of communications by parties interested and strangers, he adds, “But from whatever quarter such communication comes, it must be sufficiently definite to enable the purchaser to ascertain whether it is authentic. ” ^“Notice,” he continues, “must therefore be certain in the sense of the legal rule, which regards that as certain which may be reduced to certainty; and the question whether a statement made at the time of the purchase is to be considered as notice, seems to depend on, whether it is sufficiently clear and authentic to put the purchaser on en-quiry, and to enable him to conduct that enquiry to a successful termination. ’ ’ Now, what was Mrs. Greenhow’s statement? Nothing definite, nothing calculated to put the purchaser on enquiry, or to conduct him to successful termination, or to ascertain whether her statement was authentic or not. True, they searched the records of Amherst county and the office of the general Court, and finding no evidence of title there, the purchase was abandoned, because, as one of the respondents says, neither Mrs. Greenhow nor her agent “could put him on any trail by which he could find that she had any title.” It is impossible, then, that Mrs. Greenhow could have given such actual notice as the law requires. Hers was emphatically a latent equity, buried among the records of a foreign jurisdiction, and raked up after her death, and thirty years after it was ascertained by parties more vigilant and active than she was. She did not know where it was hid, and therefore could not inform others.

The court is therefore of opinion, that the decrees pronounced in these causes are erroneous, and that the same be reversed and annulled, and that the appellants recover against the appellees their costs expended in prosecuting their appeals here. And this court, proceeding to render such decrees as the court below ought to have rendered, it is ordered and decreed, that the bills of the complainants be dismissed as to the appellants, the defendants in the court below, with costs.

CLOPTON, J., and FIELD, P., concurred.  