
    HARRIS v. BARBER.
    ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE TIIE DISTRICT OF COLIÍMBIA.
    No. 1443.
    Submitted January 7, 1889.
    Decided January 28, 1889.
    A judgment of tlio Supreme Court of the.District of Columbia, quashing a -. writ of certiorari, after a justice of the peace, in obedience to the writ, has 'returned.the record of his proceedings and judgment in alandlord and tenant process, is reviewable by this court on writ of error,_if the right to. the possession of the premises is worth more than $5000. "
    A judgment of a justice of the peace, which is subject to appeal, cannot be quashed by writ of certiorari, except for want of jurisdiction, appearing on the face of his record. • >
    
    Under the Landlord and Tenant Act of the District of Columbia, requiring a “ written complaint on oath of the person entitled to the possession of the premises to a justice of the peace,” the oath may be taken before a notary public outside of the District.
    Under the Landlord and Tenant Act of the District of Columbia, a complaint which alleges that the complainant is. entitled to the possession of the premises, and that they are detained-from him and held without right by the defendant, his' tenant at sufferance, and whose tenancy and estate therein have been determined by a thirty days’ notice in writing to quit, is sufficient to support the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace.
    
      This was a writ of error to reverse a judgment quashing a writ of certiorari to a justice of the peace.
    On December ¿L7, 1881, John H. Harris filed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia a petition, verified by his ■ oath, and alleging “ that he is in possession of the house, and premises known as the Harris House, Nos. 1327-1329 E street northwest, in the city of "Washington, in the District of Columbia, under a lease to him from Mary A. Matteson, dated May 3,1883, and modified April 20,1885, for a term ending October 1, 1889, at a rent of $3000 per annum, with the privilege of extension for a further term of four years' at a rent of $4000 per annum; that under the terms of said lease he expended about $15,000 in permanent improvements and betterments to said building, put it in teiiantable condition, and paid the taxes, assessed thereon until the sale hereinafter mentioned, besides • expending upwards of $20,000 in furniture and appliances for its use as a hotel; that he did this upon the faith and expectation of enjoying his full term as tenant of said premises; that on May 4, 1886, the said land and premises were sold under a deed of trust prior in date to the lease of your petitioner, and of which your petitioner was in actual ignorance at the time of said lease, and were purchased by one Amaziah D. Barber, who, a few days, after said sale, notified'your petitioner to quit said premises, and on July 31,1886, instituted aproceeding under the act of Congress regulating proeeedings-ih cases between landlord and tenant in the District of Columbia, before William Helmick, justice of the peace'for said District of Columbia, and on August 14, 1886, said justice of 'the peace rendered’ judgment against your petitioner for the possession of said premises.”
    The petition asserted that the proceedings before the justice were void for want of jurisdiction; beqause the oath to the’ complaint was not taken before the justice; but before a notary public in the county of-Oneida and State of New York, and because “the- relation of landlord and tenant did not exist-• between said Barber and your petitioner by convention, .and said Barber relying upon the absence of such .relation for his right to possession, his only remedy was by art action ó’f ejectment:-”
    
      .The petition prayed for a writ of certiorari, commanding the justice to certify and send up the record of his proceedings. A writ of certiorari was issued accordingly, and in obedience to it the justice returned his record, by which it appeared that the complaint to him was subscribed and sworn to by the cpmplainant before a notary public in the county of Oneida and State of New York, and that the whole complaint, except the address and the prayer for process, was as follows :
    “ Your complainant, Amaziah D. Barber, respectfully represents that he is entitled to Jhe^possession. of the tenement and premises known as . the Harris House, situate on lot five in square Nb. 254 in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, and that the same is detained from him and held without right by John H. Harris, tenant, thereof by sufferance of this complainant, and whose tenancy and estate therein has been determined by the service of. a due notice to quit, of thirty days, in writing.”
    The Supreme Court-of"the District of-Columbia in special term, upon the motion of Barber, rendered judgment quashing the writ of certiorari / and that judgment was affirmed in general term. 6 Mackey, 586. Harris sued out this writ of error.
    Barber now filed' a motion to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction, as well as a motion to affirm the judgment.
    
      Mr. James S. Bd'wards and Mr. Job Barnard for the motions.
    
      Mr. A. O. Bradley opposing..
   Me. Justioe Geat,

after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

The grounds relied on in support of the motion to disiqiss this writ of error .ai’e, in substance, that the granting or refusing of a writ of certiorari "is a matter of discretion, and not the subject of review; that there is no sufficient pecuniary value in dispute to support the jurisdiction of this court; and that tbe proceedings of a justice of the peace under tbe landlord and tenant act of tbe District of Columbia cannot be' reviewed, except by appeal.

Tbe writ of error before us is not upon tbe judgment of the justice in the landlord and tenant process, but upon tbe judg-. ment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia quashing the writ of' certiorari to the justice. Tbe last ground assigned for the motion to dismiss is untenable, because it affects tbe correctness of the. judgment quashing the writ of certiorari, afid not tbe jurisdiction of this court to review that. judgment. •

The other grounds for the motion to dismiss, though more plausible, appear, upon examination, to be also insufficient.

A writ of certiorari, when its object is not to remove a case before trial, or to supply defects in a record, but to bring up after judgment the proceedings of an inferior court or tribunal whose procedure is not according to the course pf the common law, is in the nature of a writ of error. Although the granting of the writ of certiorari rests in the discretion of the court, yet, after the writ has been granted, and the record certified in obedience to it, the questions arising upon that record must be determined according to fixed rules of law, and their determination -is re viewable on error. People v. Brooklyn Assessors, 39 N. Y. 81; People v. Brooklyn Commissioners, 103 N. Y. 370; Farmington Co. v. County Commissioners, 112 Mass. 206, 212.

It is argued that the-justice of the peace had no juTisdiction to try the title to land ; Rev; Stat. D. C. §§. 687, 997; that'the only matter in dispute before him was the right of possession ; and that the rental value of the property in question cannot be considered as in dispute, because, whatever the judgment might be in the action for "possession, the defendant would have to pay that value, either as rent under the lease if the judgment should be in his favor, or for use and occupation if the judgment should be against him.

The case differs from any of the precedénts cited at the bar, and is not frée from difficulty. But the petition for the writ of certiorari alleges, upon the oath of the petitioner, £hat he, is, in the possession of the' premises under a lease haying nearly a ’ year to run, with a privilege of extension for four years more; and that he has expended $15,000 in permanent improvements upon the leased property, of .which he will be deprived, if the judgment of the justice of the peace, which he alleges to be void for want of jurisdiction, is not set aside .by writ of certio-rari. The reasonable inference from this is, that the possession of the premises, with the right to use these improvements, throughout the- lease and the extension thereof, would be worth ■more than $5000, showing that the matter in dispute is of sufficient pecuniary value to support the jurisdiction of this court, '.under the'act of March 3, 1885, c. 355. 23 Stat. 413.

But upon the merits of the case, the judgment below is so clearly right that the motion to affirm must be granted.

The landlord and tenant act, embodied in the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia, provides not only that every occupation, possession or holding of real estate without express contract or lease, or by a contract or lease the terms of which have expired, shall be deemed a tenancy at sufferance, but also that “ all estates at sufferance may be determined by a notice ■in writing to quit of thirty days,” and that “ when forcible entry is made, or when a peaceable entry is made and the possession unlawfully held by force, or when possession is held without right after' the estate is determined by the terms of ■the lease by its own limitation, or by notice to quit, or otherwise,” then, “ on written complaint on oath of the person entitled to the premises', to a justice of the peace, charging such forcible entry or detainer of real estate” — that is to say, charging either a “ forcible entry,” or any “ detainer,” whether forcible after- a peaceable entry, or without right after the estate is determined — a summons may be issued to the person complained of; and if it appears that the complainant is entitled to the possession of the premises, he shall have judgment for the possession and costs, but if the complainant fails to prove his fight to possession, the defendant shall have judgment for costs; and that eithef party may appeal from the judgment of the justice.of the peace to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Rev. Stat. D. C. §§ 680, 681, 684, 686, 688.

As an appeal lies from the judgment, of the justice of the peace, his proceedings cannot be quashed by writ of ceHiorari, unless' for want of jurisdiction, appearing on the'face of his record. People v. Betts, 55 N. Y. 600; Gaither v. Watkins, 86 Maryland, 576.

It' is suggested that the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction, because the oath to the complaint was not taken before, him, but before a notary public in the State of New York. JBut the statute only requires a “ written complaint on oath of the ■ person entitled to the premises.” ' Rev. Stat. D. C. § 8.84, As it requires the oath to be made by the complainant in .person, and does not in terms require it to be administered by the justice or within the District, it is a more reasonable construction to -permit the oath to be taken anywhere before a proper officer, than to require the personal attendance of the complainant at the filing of the complaint.

Tt is further suggested that the complaint does not allege, that, the complainant is “ entitled to the premises,” but only that he is “entitled to-the possession” of the premises. But as the. whole scope and ..aim of the complaint are to recover the possession, the difference is immaterial.

The remaining suggestion is that the complaint doés not show the defendant to have been such a tenant as is contemplated by the landlord and tenant-act of the District of Columbia. But that act, as we have seen, provides that all tenancies at sufferance may be determined by thirty, days’ written notice to quit, and does not require the facts constituid ing the relation of landlord and tenant to be set forth in the complaint. Its requirements are satisfied, at least so far as to support the jurisdiction of the justice, by the distinct allegations in the complaint before us, that the complainant is entitled to the possession of the premises, that they are detained from |iim and held without right by the-.defendant, that the defendant is his tenant at sufferance, and' that the defendant’s tenancy, and estate in the.premises have been determined, by such a notice to quit.

-As was well said, by Mr. Justice Merrick in delivering, the opinion of the court below, “These averments constitute;fully •a statement of the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties. Now whether the proof came up-to these aver-ments or not cannot be inquired into upon a writ of certiora/ri. Certiorari goes only to the jurisdiction. It does not go to any errors of judgment that may have been committed by the justice in the progress of the exercise of that jurisdiction.”

• The decisions cited at the bar, made under statutes requiring the .proceedings to be commenced by affidavit of the facts requisite to bring the case within the statutes, and giving no appeal from the decision of .the justice of the peace, have no application to this case.

Judgment affirmed. 
      
       N. Y. Rev. Stat. pt. 3, c. 8, tit. 10; Hill v. Stocking, 6 Hill, 314; Sims v. Humphrey, 4 Demo, 185; People v. Matthews, 38 N. Y. 45; N. J. Stat. March 4, 1847, Nixon’s Digest (2d ed.) 422; Fowler v. Roe, 1 Dutcher, (25 N. J. Daw,) 549; Shepherd v. Sliker, 2 Vroom, (31 N. J. Law,) 432.
     