
    Vincent U. SOLOMON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BARAJAS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-17041, No. 14-17188
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted November 15, 2017 
    
    Filed November 22, 2017
    
      Vincent U. Solomon, Pro Se
    Diana Esquivel, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Barajas, Campbell, Franco, J. Lundy, Medrano, Norgaard, K. Prior, Hazelton, Vasquez, Wright
    Susan Eileen Coleman, Esquire, Senior Litigation Attorney, Kristina Doan Gruen-berg, Esquire, Attorney, Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee H. Tate
    Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision without oral argument, See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Vincent U. Solomon appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Solomon’s deliberate indifference claim against defendant Dr. Tate because Solomon failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Dr. Tate was deliberately indifferent in treating Solomon’s pain. See id. at 1058-60 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A defendant must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need in order for deliberate indifference to be established.”), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Solomon’s motion to appoint counsel because Solomon did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement for appointment of counsel).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

We do not consider documents not presented to the district court because they are not part of the record on appeal. United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     