
    Jairo Ernesto Diaz SORTO, AKA Eairo Diaz, AKA Ernesto Diaz, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 15-73229
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted October 23, 2017 
    
    Filed December 5, 2017
    Jairo Ernesto Diaz Sorto, Pro Se
    Andrea Gevas, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
    Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jairo Ernesto Diaz Sorto, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution and thus is not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see Martinez v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 655, 658-59 (9th Cir. 2017). We review for substantial evidence the IJ’s factual findings. Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016). We deny the petition for review.

We do not consider the facts Diaz Sorto references in his opening brief or the materials. attached to it that are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Diaz Sorto failed to establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution, where the evidence demonstrates his feared harm from gang violence lacks a nexus to an enumerated ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An [applicant’s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”).

We reject Diaz Sorto’s contention that he is eligible for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(g)(2)(i).

Finally, Diaz Sorto does not make any specific arguments regarding CAT relief. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised in a brief that are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     