
    (4 Court of Claims R., p. 176; 12 Wallace R., p. 232.)
    Alonzo Child et al., Appellees, v. The United States, Appellants.
    
      On ths defendants' Appeal.
    
    
      The Court of Claims finds on the trial the following facts : I. The chief quartermaster of a military department purchased of the claimants army stores “at prices amounting to $478,119.62,.upon which tliere remains unpaid a balance of $163,111.” II. The goods were received l>y the proper officers of the Government and used in its service and were worth the price charged. III. Payment was ivithheld by the Government, and the Davls-Holt-Campbell commission appointed. A provost-guard forcibly seined the claimants’ vouehez-s and carried them before the commission. The commission examined the same and ordered deductions to be made from each voucher, and also deductions to be made “ as reclamations for other claims ” held by other parties as assignees of the claimants. The commission withheld all of the vouchers until the claimants signed an agreement that the reduced amounts, when paid, should1 ein full of all demands. Theclaimants “ never submitted their vouchers to the arbitration or decision of the commission, and did not sign the said receipt voluntarily, but under protest and to obtain possession of their vouchers withheld until they should do so.” IV. The Quartermaster-General having possession of the vouchers, referred them to a quartermaster for payment. The quartermaster paid the claimants' the amount allozoed by the commission. The claimants then made no formal objection, but were required to sign a receipt upon each voucher which acknowledges having received the reduced amount “ in full of the above account.” The receipts were not under seal and expressed no new consideration. Upon these facts the Court of Claims decides: 1. That neither Congress nor the claimants having submitted the controversy to the arbitrament of the commission, it.was without jurisdiction, and the receipts exacted by the commission were exacted by duress of the claimants’ goods, and without consideration and void. 2. That the receipts required by the quartermaster at the time of payment expressed up)on their face that a less sum was received than was due, and being zvithout consideration did not operate as a release, and were void. But the Supreme Court on the Government’s application (see motion, page 157, ante) orders a further finding of facts, and the Court of Claims in response to the interrogatories sent dozen finds as follows : I. “ The claims of the claimants were never submitted to the said commission,” but before the seizure of their vouchers by the provost-guard they, in pursuance of a published notice, had presented or given notice to the commission of their claims, but “ had not presented their original vouchers nor any proofs.” II. The claims were never presented to the commission by the claimants after the seizure of their vouchers. III. The claimants did appear before the commission ivith witnesses after their vouchers had been seized and while they were forcibly withheld, but whether or not the zoitnesses were produced .to support the claims did not appear on the Mai of the case before the Cowl of Claims. Judgment for the claimants. The defendants appeal.
    
    I. This case comes within the decision of the Supreme Court in Adams’ Case, (ante, page 58,) notwithstanding that in that case there was a “ voluntary szibmission” of the claims to the Davis-Kolt-Campbell Commission, and in this, the' claimants did not submit their claims to the commission as arbitrators nor with the intent that its decision should be conclusive; though they presented them to the commission and appeared to support them with witnesses, after their original vouchers had been seized by a provost-guard acting under the commission’s orders and while the vouchers were forcibly withheld from them by the commission. Chase, Ch. J., and Cliotoed, J., dissentizig.
    
    II. Where the Government, through one of its quartermasters, buys goods at an agreed price, (whichis their reasonable value,) but refuses, without fault on the part of tile contractor, to pay the official vouchers of the quartermaster properly issued therefor, nevertheless it will be conclusive against the contractor if he accept payment in part and g'ive a receipt in fall, even though it appear on the face of the receipt that the part is roceived for the whole without a new consideration being expressed or shown for the release. Chase, Ch. J., and Clifford, J., dissenting.
    
    
      Findings of fact in the Gotirt of Claims :
    
    1. During the months of August and September, and before the 14th October, 1861, the city of Saint Louis, being the military center and headquarters of a large military department known as the Department of the West, Major McKinstry, the chief quartermaster of the department, and his assistant quartermasters, under the express orders and with the approval of Major-General Frémont, commanding the department, purchased of the claimants, then doing business in Saint Louis under the firm name of Child, Pratt & Fox, goods and merchandise, consisting of army clothing, cooking utensils, and other quartermaster stores, at prices amounting to $478,119.62, upon which there remains unpaid a balance of $163,111.
    2. And the Court of Claims further finds as matter of fact:
    
    The goods and quartermaster stores mentioned and described in the petition in this case were sold and delivered to the defendants and were received by the proper officers of the defendants charged with the care and custody of such goods, and were by them distributed and used in the service of the defendants, who received the benefit thereof. The fair and reasonable value of the same, under the conditions and circumstances of their purchase, was the sum of $478,119.62, and there remains due and unpaid to the claimants the balance of $163,111.
    3. And the Court of Claims further finds as matter of fact:
    
    The paymentof the quartermaster-vouchers held by the claimants, set forth in the petition in this case, and described in the first finding of fact, were suspended by the Secretary of War in common with all others issued before the 14th of - October, 1861, by reason of suspected frauds, extravagance, and irregularities in the Department of the West. On the 25th of October, 1861, a military commission was appointed by the Secretary >of War, whose powers and duties were thus defined:
    “War DEPARTMENT, October 25, 1861.
    ■“By direction of the President a commission has been appointed, consisting of Hon. David Davis, of Illinois, Hon. Joseph Holt, of Kentucky, and Hugh Campbell, esq., of Saint Louis, Missouri, to examine and report upon all unsettled’ claims against the military department of the West that may have originated prior to the 14th of the present month.”
    After the commission had entered upon its investigations, the provost guard of Saint Louis forcibly entered the office of the claimants, and, against their consent, seized and carried before the commission the aforesaid vouchers of the claimants, with their private books of account and business papers. The commission examined the same, and at the conclusion of its investigation indorsed upon each of the said vouchers the amounts allowed respectively by it. And the commission also ordered that there be further deducted from four of these vouchers, u as-reclamations for other claims of said Child, Pratt & Fox, held by their assignee and allowed in full ” by the commission, the sum of $46,159.77, making in all the sum of $163,111, to be deducted from the claimants’ vouchers. The commission also withheld all of the said vouchers until the claimants signed a receipt or agreement, not under seal and without consideration, which provided that when the reduced amounts allowed by the commissioners should be paid, the payment should be in full of all the claimants’ demands against the United States. The claimants on their part never submitted their vouchers to the arbitration or decision of the commission and did not sign the said receipt voluntarily, but under protest and to obtain possession of their vouchers withheld until they should do so.
    4. And the Court of Claims further finds as a matter of fact :
    
    The claimants, after receiving back from the commission aforesaid their said vouchers as described in the preceding finding of fact, presented them for payment to the Quartermaster-General, but the disbursing officers of the defendants-refused to pay the same or any part thereof on the ground that they had no legal authority so to do; and they continued to refuse payment until the enactment by Congress of the Joint Resolution approved 11th March, 1863, (12 Stat. L., p. 615;) and thereupon, on the 19th March, 1863, the Quartermaster-General, by an order indorsed on each voucher respectively, u referred” the said vouchers “ to Major M. S. Miller, quartermaster, for payment under the joint resolution of Congress-approved March 11, 1863.” And Major Miller, in pursuance of this order, paid to the claimants upon their vouchers the amount allowed by the commission. The claimants, at the time •of receiving payment, made no formal objection or protest, but were required to and did sign upon each voucher a receipt not under seal, and without consideration, whereby they acknowledged having received such reduced amount “ in full of the above account.”
    
      Supplemental findings ordered by the Supreme Court:
    
    
      Mrst. And in response to the first instruction of the Supreme Court, viz, to find :
    “ Whether or not before the seizure of the books and papers of the claimants as found by the said court, the. claims of the claimants had been submitted or presented by them to the commission consisting of the Honorable David Davis, Joseph Holt, and Hugh Campbell referred to in the record.”
    
      The Court of Claims finds, upon the proofs and evidence given on the trial of this ease, That the claims of the claimants were never submitted to the said commission; but that before the said seizure, the claimants, in pursuance of the published notice of the said commission, (requiring all claims which had accrued before the 14th October, 1861, to be presented to the said commission,) had in some manner, not shown to the court, presented •or given notice of their claims against the defendants to the said commission. But the claimants had not presented their •original vouchers, nor any proofs to the said commission.
    
      Second. And in response to the second instruction of the •Supreme Court, viz, to find:
    “ Whether or not the said claims were so submitted or presented after such seizure.”
    
      The Court of Claims finds, upon the proofs and evidence given on the trial of this case, That they were not.
    
      Third. And in response to the third instruction of the Supreme Court, viz, to find:
    “ Whether or not the said claimants appeared before the said commission with witnesses to support their said claims; and, if they did so appear, whether or not it was before or after the seizure of their books and papers by the provost-guard of Saint Louis.” ,
    
      
      The Court of Claims finds, upon the proofs and evidence given on the trial of this case, That the claimants did appear before the said commission with witnesses; but what the said witnesses testified, or whether or not they were produced before the commission to support said claims, did not appear at the trial; that such appearance was after the seizure of the claimant’s books and papers by the provost-guard of Saint Louis, and while tli.o same were withheld from the claimants by the commission.
    Settled and allowed.
    
      Mr. Solicitor-General Bristoic and Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Hill for the appellants.
    
      Mr. H. H. Davies and Messrs. Bartley and Casey for the appellees.
   Mr. Justice Miller

delivered the opinion of the court:

This case, which is brought here by appeal from the Court of Claims, belongs'to a class of demands against the Government originating at Saint Louis in the early days of the late civil war, which, by order of the President, were investigated at that time by a special commission appointed for the purpose. The claim of appellees for the sum of $478,119.02 was examined by that commission. It allowed the sum of $315,008.15 on the demand, and rejected the remainder of $163,111.47.

They accepted the sum so allowed by the commission, gave receipts in full of the accounts included in the demand, and have brought this suit to recover the amount rejected by the commission.

These facts are undisputed, and are part of findings of the Court of Claims in the case. If they stood alone they would bring it within the principles laid down by this court in the case of The United States v. Adams. That case was twice argued before us and affirmed by a full bench, and as we are satisfied with the principles on which it was decided they must govern us in passing on subsequent cases, so far as they fall within its rulings. — (7 Wallace, 463; 9 Wallace, 554.)

But claimants contend that other facts found by the Court of Claims take this case out of the propositions laid down for the government of that case, and entitle them to an affirmance of' the judgment rendered in their favor by the Court of Claims.

An important difference between the two is said to exist in the fact that Adams voluntarily submitted-his claim, to the commission we have mentioned, and the claimants in this case did not. And it is insisted that this submission constituted an important, if not a controlling element in the decision of the Adams ease.

The court in discussing the question of the conclusiveness of a receipt which Adams had given in order to obtain possession of his vouchers, and which he asserted to have been obtained by duress, says: “ In the view we have taken of the case, the giving of the receipt is of no legal importance. The bar to any further legal demand against Government does not rest upon this acquittance, but upon the voluntary submission of the claims to the board 5 the hearing and final decision thereon; the receipt of the vouchers containing the sum or account found due to the claimant, and the acceptance of the payment of that amount under the act of Congress providing therefor.’’

Counsel for claimants, construing the phrase “voluntary submission,” here used, to mean such a submission as would constitute the commission a board of arbitrators, or, at all events, such a submission as would render their decision legally conclusive, deny that the parties in the present case ever made such a submission. As much importance seems to have been given to this question by both parties, an order was obtained from this court on motion of the appellant directing the Court of Claims to make a more specific finding of facts on that subject. Such a supplementary finding is in the present record, and that court says, among other things, that the claimants never were submitted to said commission. But they further say in this supplementary finding that claimants have, in some manner not shown to the court, presented or given notice of their claim against the defendants (The United States) to the said commission, but claimants had not presented their original vouchers, or any proofs, to said commission. They also find that claimants appeared before said commission with witnesses, but what they testified to is not shown. Taking these findings together, it seems to us that the Court of Claims meant to say that claimants did not submit their claims to the commission as arbitrators, or with intent that their decision should be conclusive, but that they did present their claims and did appear to support them with witnesses. This view of their meaning is confirmed by reference to their original finding, in which it is said that “ claimants on their part never submitted their vouchers to the arbitration or decision of the commission.” No doubt these were the facts of the case; and as to this part of it they come fairly within the decision of the court in Adams's Case.

In the opinion of the court then delivered, it is held that this board had no authority to compel parties to submit their claims to it, and that its decisions were not conclusive when they did submit them. The court, referring to the various ways open to claimants to obtaiu satisfaction of their demands, and after speaking of an application to Congress, a suit in the Court of Claims, and a submission to this special commission, adds : “ This tribunal afforded an additional advantage over others, namely, that if, after the hearing and adjustment of the claims, the claimants were not satisfied, they were free to dissent and look for redress to the only legal tribunals provided in such cases.” And to the application of Adams to remand the case to the court below, founded on the allegation that the Court of Claims had made a mistake in finding that he had submitted his claim to the board, tLii court responds: “ Though it is true that the appellee did not present his claim to the board, as stated in the finding in the record on appeal, it cannot, in view of the original record of the evidence before the Court of Claims, be denied that he made himself a party to the proceedings and took the benefit of the adjustment of his accounts by them, which brings the case within the principle decided in 7th Wallace.” — (See 9 Wallace, 554.)

But though the claimants might have refused to abide by the decision of the board and sought relief from the Court of Claims or from Congress, they did not do so.

We lay out of view in this case, as in the Adams Case, the receipts which they gave, under protest, in order to regain possession of their vouchers. But we cannot disregard the finding of the Court of Claims that, after Congress had appropriated money to pay the sums found due by the commissioners, claimants received the amount so allowed, and signed upon each voucher a receipt whereby they acknowledged having received said reduced amount “in full of the above account.” And at the time of receiving this payment they made no formal objection or protest, but were required to aud did sign the receipt above described.

Although it is found by the court that these receipts were not under seal and were without consideration, the latter statement must have some meaning not apparent to us, in view of the other fact found also, that over $315,000 was paid to the claimants on those accounts at the time they gave the receipts.

To avoid the legal effect of these facts it is argued that not only in giving the receipts above mentioned, but also in accepting the money for which they were given, the complainants acted under duress.

We can hardly conceive of a definition of duress that would bring this case within its terms. Authorities are cited to show that where, under peculiar circumstances, property is withheld from the owner and he is forced to pay some unjust demand to obtain possession of it, he can afterward maintain a suit for the money so paid. But no case can be found, we apprehend, where a party who, without force or intimidation and with a full knowledge of all the facts of the case, accepts on account of an unliquidated and controverted demand a sum less than what he claims and believes to be due him, and agrees to accept that sum in full satisfaction, has been permitted to avoid his act on the ground that this is duress. If the principle contended for here be sound, no party can safely pay by way of compromise any sum less than what is claimed of him, for the ■compromise will be void as obtained by duress. The common and generally praiseworthy procedure by which business men every day sacrifice part of claims which they believe to be just to secure payment of the remainder would always be duress, and the compromise void.

But it is argued that the Government should be held to a different rule than that which applies to private parties. It is said that the amount in dispute here was so large that the ■claimants were compelled to accept what was offered to avoid bankruptcy.

No fact found by the Court of Claims, or otherwise presented by the record, justifies us in supposing that claimants were threatened with insolvency, and the circumstance that the claim which was the subject of the compromise was a very large one can hardly be accepted in a court of law or equity as a reason for setting it aside. If indeed there was any such pressing motive in tbe minds of tbe clamants arising out of tbe condition of their private affairs as influenced them strongly to accept tbe offer of tbe Government, it cannot, in tbe absence of fraud or constraint on its part, invalidate tbe settlement.

It seems to us that this case, under tbe ordinary principles of law applicable to its class, is free from embarrassment.

If there bad been no reference to, and no finding by, tbe commission, it would still remain true, that here was a claim, tbe justice of which bad been denied and tbe amount that was due on it bad been in dispute for nearly two years. Tbe Government finally says to tbe claimants : We will pay you a certain sum on this disputed claim provided you will taire it in full satisfaction of tbe whole; when without intimidation, without fraud or concealment on tbe part of tbe Government; without protest or .objection on their part, claimants accept tbe money offered and sign a receipt acknowledging it to be in full of the-whole'claim.

Is not this a legal and binding compromise of tbe disputed demand1? Is it not a voluntary adjustment of tbe matter in dispute between tbe parties ?

And we think that it is a strong additional argument in favor of tbe validity of this settlement, when it is called in question in court, that tbe sum so agreed upon was found to be a balance justly due on tbe claim by a commission of three capable and honest men, appointed by tbe Government to ascertain what was due, and that before this commission tbe other party presented bis claim and produced bis witnesses, and was allowed a full and fair bearing to any extent that be desired.

In this view of tbe case it is of no avail to urge that tbe Court of Claims has found that tbe whole claim was just and ought to be paid. After tbe compromise that question was no longer open to inquiry. It is of tbe very essence of such adjustments of disputed rights that tbe contest shall be closed; and whatever consideration might be given tbe finding of tbe Court-of Claims on that subject in another department of tbe Government, this department, which sits to administer th'e law, must be governed by its recognized principles. _

Tbe judgment of tbe Court of Claims is reversed, and the-case will be remanded to that court with directions to render-judgment in favor of tbe United States.

Mr. Justice Clifford

dissenting:

The Court of Claims having found that the claim in this case was never submitted to the commission appointed by the direction of the President to examine such claims, I am unable’ to concur in the conclusion of the court that the case is controlled by the decision of the court in the case of The United States v. Adams, (7 Wall., 481,) and for the reason that the claim was never so presented.

' I dissent from the decision of the court, and I am requested to say that the Chief Justice also dissents for the same reason.  