
    Broadfoot v. Dyer.
    Thursday, Dec. 3d, 1812.
    Agreement under Seal — Voluntary Consideration— Effect as to Creditors — Case at Bar. — An agreement, under seal, by which A. (being much involved in debt) binds certain slaves to B.. until they attain the age of twenty one years, upon a condition, merely, “that B. shall treat them in a lawful and humane manner, and if he shall die, or remore from the country, they shall be treated equally well, or It shall be optional with A. whether they shall remain any longer in the said service,” is not on valuable consideration, but voluntary only, and void against creditors.
    On the trial of an issue, on the plea of non detinet, in an action brought by William Dyer against Charles Broadfoot, for several slaves, the plaintiff gave in evidence, on his part, an agreement under seal, dated the 2d of June, 1797, between himself and one John Finney, setting forth that the said John Finney did bind the following negroes to the said William Dyer, to wit, Ned, aged eight jrears, Rebecca, aged five years, and Pleasant, aged three years; until they should each, and severally, arrive to the age of twenty-one years; upon condition, that the said William Dyer should treat them in a lawful and humane manner; and if the said William Dyer should die, or remove from the county, the aforesaid negroes should be treated equally well, or it should remain optional with the said Finney, whether the aforesaid negroes should continue any longer in the said service.” The plaintiff also proved, that possession of the negroes in the said agreement mentioned, accompanied, on his part, the execution thereof? and that while they remained in his possession, which they did from the date of the said deed, until June, 1801, he treated them in a lawful and humane manner.
    *The defendant thereupon proved, on his part, by William Mann, administrator of the said John Finney, thal:, in the year 1797, when the said deed bears date, the said John Finney was very much involved in debt; that he died in the following year; and that he, the said Mann, has not, and never has had, in his hands, assets sufficient to pay all the said John Finney’s creditors; and that the defendant was one of his creditors who levied his execution on the said negroes.
    Whereupon the plaintiff, by his counsel, moved the Court to instruct the jury, that, if they should be of opinion, from the said deed, that the raising of the slaves, in the said agreement mentioned, by the plaintiff, until they should arrive, respectively, to the age of twenty-one years, was the real bona fide consideration which induced the said John Finney to convey, to the said plaintiff, the services of the said negroes until they should so attain to the age of twenty-one years, respectively, such a consideration is, in law, to be deemed a valuable consideration. And the Court did so instruct the jury; to which opinion of the Court the defendant excepted.
    The jury found a general verdict for the plaintiff; whereupon, the defendant moved the Court for a new . trial, on the ground, that the agreement between the plaintiff and John E'inney was insufficient, in law, to protect the slaves therein mentioned against the claims of the said Finney’s creditors, of whom the defendant was one; which motion the Court overruled; “the question, as to the adequacy of the consideration, having been inquired of by the jury:” and the defendant again excepted.
    Judgment being entered for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed to this Court.
   Tuesday, January 12th, 1813,

JUDGE ROANE

pronounced the opinion of the Court, that the deed in the bill of exceptions contained, having been made by a *person indebted at the time, being grounded on no valuable consideration, moving to the grantor for, and on account of, the slaves thereby transferred, and having imposed no conditions even in favour of the slaves themselves, other than such as are imposed by the principles of law and humanity, upon every just and humane master, and a right having been moreover reserved to the grantor, under circumstances, to resume the possession of the said slaves, prior to the expiration of the term for which they are conveyed, in and by the terms of the deed aforesaid, ought to be considered, in relation to the appellant, one of the creditors of the grantor, as a voluntary deed; that, therefore, the instruction given by the district ■Court in the first bill of exceptions contained, was improper, and that the said judgment is erroneous.

Judgment reversed; verdict set aside; and cause remanded for a new trial, on which no such instruction is to be given.  