
    John C. Hill vs. A. M. Smith, Ex’or.
    
      Contract — Statute of Frauds — Consideration.
    A’s wife was the daughter of B, and A being about to remove to the West, B, who was much opposed to the removal, promised A, that if he would purchase a certain plantation in his neighborhood, then offered for sale, he would aid him in the purchase'by paying one thousand dollars. A purchased the plantation, and immediately occupied it: Held, that the promise was valid; that it was not within the Statute of Frauds, and that it was upon sufficient consideration.
    
    BEFOBE WHITNEB, J„ AT LATJBENS, SEEING TEEM, 1860.
    The report of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows :
    “ This action was brought to recover a sum of money on an alleged undertaking of defendant’s testator, Wm. E. Smith. Plaintiff married the daughter of testator, and shortly after was about to remove to the West. To this removal the testator was greatly opposed, who urged the purchase of a tract of land in the immediate neighborhood, and promised to aid the plaintiff by paying the sum of one thousand dollars.
    
      “ The plaintiff thereupon attended the sale, and purchased the land at a high price (eight thousand one hundred dollars) on a credit of one, two and three years. The purchase was made in September, 1856, and the place was at once occupied by plaintiff. Testator being greatly gratified with the arrangement, declared that, instead of giving him the one thousand dollars, as he had promised, he would gladly have paid two thousand dollars rather than his daughter should have been taken off. During the subsequent spring, testator went to market with cotton for the purpose of raising the thousand dollars, but on his way back was taken sick, reached his home with difficulty, and very soon after died. The executor declined to pay the money to plaintiff, and he was under the necessity of selling the plantation, I think at a loss. The case was submitted without argument on the question presented in the first ground of appeal. There was no dispute about the fact shown by the repeated admissions of testator, and these conversations I have not thought necessary to report minutely. It was manifest that plaintiff had been induced to change his purpose, and make the purchase and location, in consequence of the overture of the father-in-law. Notwithstanding my own impressions.as to the legal difficulty suggested, I thought it better to instruct the jury as indicated in the -ground of appeal, that the case might be ended in any event if a review should be asked for. The verdict was for plaintiff”
    The defendant appealed on the grounds:
    1. Because his Honor erred in instructing the jury that the promise relied upon in this case was sufficient in law to sustain the action, whereas, it is respectfully submitted, that he should have charged that said promise, not being in writing, and not being required to be performed in one year, was within the Statute of Frauds, and therefore void.
    2. Because there was no sufficient consideration to support said promise, and it is respectfully submitted that his Honor should have so charged the jury.
    3. Because there was no evidence that the plaintiff was influenced by said promise to buy the B-land.
    
      4. Because the verdict of the jury is contrary to the law and the evidence.
    
      Bobo, for appellant. .
    
      Sullivan, contra.
    
      
      
         Gee vs. Hicks, Ricb. Eq. Ca. 5.
    
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Wardlaw, J.

This action was brought to recover one thousand dollars, with interest, on the promise of defendant’s testator to pay this sum to the plaintiff, testator’s son-in-law, if he would purchase as a home a particular plantation in the neighborhood, offered for sale at auction, in abandonment of plaintiff’s purpose to remove with his family from the vicinage of the testator. The plaintiff did purchase the land at a high price; and testator, towards fulfilment of his promise, soon afterwards took his crop to market in order to raise, by sale, money to pay the one thousand dollars, but died in the course of his return from market. The jury found for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

By the first ground of appeal, defendant insists that the promise, not being in writing, and not required to be performed within a year, is void by the Statute of Frauds. By the fourth section of that statute, 2 Stat. 526, it is provided, among other things, that a party shall not be charged by action, upon any verbal agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof. But in this case the promise was to pay without limitation of time, and -in reference to a contract of purchase expected to be made, and in fact made, within a year; ■ and as the payment was to be made in aid of the purchase, the money was promised and due at the date of the purchase. ■ The statute does not require that the agreement shall be executed absolutely within a year, and it is not inhibited by the statute that the execution of the agreement shall depend on a contingency which may or may not happen within a year. Gadsden vs. Lauce, McMul. Eq. 87. It is argued, that as in fact the plaintiff purchased, the land on a credit of one, two and three years, the promise to pay one thousand dollars must be interpreted, in reference to the terms of purchase made, as a pro^. mise to pay one thousand dollars in instalments of one, two and three years. But this is a forced construction. The natural interpretation, aided by the relation of the parties, the motive of advancement, and all the circumstances, is, that the testator intended to advance the sum mentioned to his son-in-law, in furtherance of the purchase, whenever the purchase should be made.

In the second ground of appeal, it is affirmed that there was no sufficient consideration for the promise. A consideration may consist as well of benefit to the promisor as of injury to the promisee. Now, here the obstruction of plaintiff’s purpose of removal, and the retention by defendant of the society of his daughter and her family, constitute a good consideration.

Most of the cases cited by the counsel of appellant are more applicable to the provision in the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, requiring a promise to answer for the debt of another to be in writing. It is enough to say, that the question thus suggested is not covered by the appeal. It could not well arise except in a contest between the vendor ' and the representative of the promisor.

Apart from all this, the litigated promise is an original and not a collateral promise, and is founded on sufficient consideration.

Ordered, that the appeal be dismissed.

O’Neall, O. J., and Johnstone, J., concurred.

Motion dismissed.  