
    J. W. STOTT v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY.
    (Filed 13 December, 1933.)
    1. Evidence D f — Tetters written by plaintiff held competent in corroboration of plaintiff’s testimony on controverted fact.
    Where plaintiff’s testimony as to the amount he was to receive under a contract of employment is directly challenged by testimony of defendant’s general manager, letters written by plaintiff to officers of defendant company relative to the compensation agreed upon are competent in corroboration of plaintiff’s testimony, and objections to their admissions on the ground that they contained self-serving declarations will not be sustained, the letters being admitted solely for the purpose of corroborating plaintiff’s testimony and not as an admission by defendant of the matters therein contained.
    2. Corporations G c—
    The act of a general manager of a corporation for a large territory in transferring a store manager from one of defendant’s stores to another of its stores within the territory and in fixing such store manager’s compensation at the new post is binding on the corporation.
    Appeal by defendant from Qowper, Special Judge, at June Special Term, 1933, of MecKleNbttbg.
    Civil action to recover damages for breach of contract of employment.
    The defendant operates a number of mercantile establishments throughout the country, and is engaged in a large retail business. One of its stores is located at Charlotte, N. C., which store, prior to 1931, had not proved very satisfactory from the standpoint of profits. New management was desired.
    The plaintiff had successfully managed two stores for the defendant, one at Youngstown, Ohio, and the other at Scranton, Pa. His drawing-account, or guaranteed salary, as manager of the Scranton store for the year 1931, was $4,200, in addition to which, it was estimated he would receive approximately $4,000 as a bonus, depending upon the net earnings of the company for the preceding year, according to defendant’s plan of sharing with managers of its different stores.
    On 27 July, 1931, plaintiff was transferred to Charlotte as manager of defendant’s store at a guaranteed minimum salary for the year 1932 “of as much as he was making at Scranton,” so he alleges and the jury accordingly finds. This was denied by the defendant. On 26 March, 1932, plaintiff was released from the Charlotte store, with assurance that he would hear from F. M. Judson, the former district manager in the north, relative to assignment to another store. Not hearing from Mr. Judson, plaintiff wrote him in regard to another assignment, first on 7 April, 1932, which was followed by correspondence consisting of an exchange of several letters. To the introduction of these letters the defendant objected and excepted.
    Plaintiff then exchanged a number of letters with other officers of the defendant company relative to employment at some other point, but which resulted in no further employment. In apt time, the defendant objected to the introduction of this correspondence as containing self-serving declarations, tending to show plaintiff’s version of the terms of the contract of employment. Overruled; exception. The court stated to the jury that it was admitted in corroboration of plaintiff’s testimony. Some of the letters were written before and some after plaintiff’s definite discharge in June, 1932.
    
      Tbe remaining assignments of error relate to prayers for instructions refused, and instructions given.
    Tbe jury returned tbe following verdict:
    “I. Did tbe plaintiff and tbe defendant enter into a contract by tbe terms of wbicb tbe defendant agreed to employ tbe plaintiff for tbe year 1932, at a minimum salary of eigbty-two hundred dollars ($8,200) ? Answer: ‘Yes.’
    “II. If so, did tbe defendant wrongfully breach said contract? Answer : ‘Yes.’
    “III. What amount, if any, is tbe plaintiff entitled to recover of tbe defendant? Answer: ‘$5,648.20.’”
    Judgment on tbe verdict, from wbicb tbe defendant appeals.
    
      Uhlman 8. Alexander and John M. Robinson for plaintiff.
    
    
      Gansler & Gansler for defendant.
    
   Stact, C. J.

Tbe testimony of tbe plaintiff and that of C. A. Woods, defendant’s southern territorial officer, is in direct conflict as to what plaintiff’s salary was to be for tbe year 1932. They both agree that it was to equal bis Scranton compensation for tbe balance of 1931. Therefore, plaintiff’s testimony with respect to bis compensation for tbe year 1932, was directly challenged by defendant’s witness, C. A. Woods. In this state of tbe record, it was permissible for plaintiff to offer in evidence tbe correspondence bad between himself and officers of tbe defendant company, with respect to tbe terms of tbe contract of employment, as corroborative of bis own testimony. Allred v. Kirkman, 160 N. C., 392, 76 S. E., 244; Burnett v. R. R., 120 N. C., 517, 26 S. E., 819.

Tbe case is not like Leach and co. v. Peirson, 275 U. S., 120, 72 L. Ed., 194, and others of similar import, cited and relied upon by defendant, where tbe plaintiff sought to offer in evidence, as proof of tbe facts set forth therein, an unanswered letter, written by himself to defendant and containing self-serving declarations, tbe Court saying in tbe cited case that tbe failure to answer such a letter was not tantamount to an admission on tbe part of tbe defendant of tbe truth of tbe matters and things therein asserted. See Annotation, 8 A. L. K., 1163.

Likewise, tbe cases of S. v. Melvin, 194 N. C., 394, 139 S. E., 762, S. v. Exum, 138 N. C., 599, 50 S. E., 283, and S. v. Parish, 79 N. C., 610, strongly relied upon by defendant, are not against, but, for tbe purpose offered, are in support of tbe admissibility of tbe evidence now in question.

While not offered for tbe purpose, it is suggested by plaintiff that this evidence was also competent to show diligence on bis part to secure other employment in diminution of loss. Distributing Corp. v. Seawell, ante, 359; Mills v. McRae, 187 N. C., 707, 122 S. E., 762; Monger v. Lutterloh, 195 N. C., 274, 142 S. E., 12.

It is observed that the defendant was allowed to strengthen C. A. Woods’ testimony by offering in evidence exchange of letters had between himself and other officers of the defendant company relative to plaintiff’s status. The competency of this evidence, as corroborative of defendant’s witness, is not questioned, though it may have been res inter alios acta. Stanley v. Lbr. Co., 184 N. C., 302, 114 S. E., 385; Bryant v. Bryant, 178 N. C., 77, 100 S. E., 178. The only purpose in mentioning this circumstance is to point out that both sides resorted to and were granted the privilege of offering corroborative evidence. The principle stated in Shelton v. R. R., 193 N. C., 670, 139 S. E., 232, is not involved.

The authority of C. A. Woods to act for the defendant in transferring plaintiff to the Charlotte store, and in agreeing upon his compensation, while challenged on the record, was properly ruled in favor of such authority. Lumber Co. v. Elias, 199 N. C., 103, 154 S. E., 54; Strickland v. Kress, 183 N. C., 534, 112 S. E., 30.

The remaining exceptions are not of sufficient merit to warrant a new trial, or to call for elaboration. The verdict and judgment will be upheld.

No error.  