
    Brown & Overstreet vs. Elias Wallen, Indorser.
    The defendant took the benefit of the Insolvent Debtors Law of of Georgia, and among his credii ors, residing in that Slate, and for rvhose benefit the assessment was made, ivas a met r cantile house to which the plaintifis were members. The note sued on was for a debt due before the assignment. Upon suit being brought against the defendant in South Carolina on the note, held that as both plaintiffs and defendant wore citizens of Georgia, the discharge in Georgia was conclusive against the plaintiffs in this State.
    The defendant, formerly a merchant residing in Georgia in January, 1820, havingfaiied in business, applied for and obtained the benefit of the Insolvent Debtors Act of that State. But having lately occasion to come to Charleston, had been ¿nested and obliged to give special bail in an action founded on an indorsement on a negotiable note given to Brown, Green & Co. merchants- in that State, dated 21st April, 1820, due nine months after date; and from the proceedings in the case before the Court, where the discharge was given, it appeared that Brown, Green & Co. were creditors to the amount of $1000, or $¡1200, and that the note in question had been transferred to them in part payment of this debt, and that their names were mentioned in the assignment as creditors for a dividend of the defendants estate.
    Frost, moved for an exon ere tur to be entered .on the bail piece, and that defendant be discharged from his arrest upon entering common appearance to the action; and he produced a certificate from the Clerk of the Court of Chatham county, in Georgia, under the certificate of one of the Georgia Judges, of the proceedings in that Court, by which it appeared that he was, on 10th July, 1820, duly discharged from his creditors. Ho read the 2nd clause of the Insolvent Debtors Act, ol 1801, of the State of Georgia, which declares that any debtor duly discharged under that act, shall not be again arrested, or im-pleaded, or held to bail on mesue process for any debt or contract made or entered into prior to such discharge; and further, that any perr.cn bringing such suit knowing the discharge under the act, shall forfeit and pay the sum of $500. He contended that the defendant was entitled to his discharge under the act of the State of Georgia; that this act was part of the lex loci of that State, and ought to be respected here.
    
      Fife, against the motion, urged that as the defendant was duly arrested for a debt due on an indorsed note of hand, and held to bail upon an affidavit of the debt in due form, he was not entitled to his discharge in South Carolina, although the note was made and indorsed in Georgia before his insolvency in Georgia. That although the taking the benefit of the Insolvent Act might operate as a discharge in Georgia, it had no effect in South Carolina. That though the lex loci, or the law of Georgia might operate there, it did not bar the remedy here, and the lex fori was unimpoached in Carolina, and the proceedings thus far were agreeably to the laws of South Carolina for the recovery of debts; and he relied on 7 th Johnson, 117, where it was laid down that a discharge under the Insolvent Act of Connecticut, was no bar to an action in the State of New York — 2 John. Rep. 198; 11 Do. 194; 15 Johnson, 467.
    Frost, in reply.
    There was a species of legal warfare between New York and Connecticut, and a great want of curtesy in not giving due respect to the laws and the legal proceedings of each other’s Courts of Justice. This curtesy subsisted in all the other States, and due regard was paid to the laws and proceedings of the Courts of Justice in all the States to the laws and proceedings of the others. In 5th Binney, 332, it is laid down that as the laws of Maryland give effect to a discharge of an insolvent Debtor under the laws of Pennsylvania,- so, on the other hand, tho Courts of Justice in Pennsylvania ought to pay due regard to the laws and proceedings in the Courts of Justice in Maryland, and to allow of a similar discharge. The same doctrine was laid down in Dallas 229, 294; 2d Dallas, 100. In like manner a similar curtesy had prevailed between this State and Georgia. The Courts of each have respected, reciprocally, the laws and proceedings of the other, and as the law of Georgia in question has declared that a debtor discharged under the Insolvent Act shall not be again arrested for the same debt under a penalty of $500, he hoped the defendant in this case would be discharged from his present arrest.
    Bay, J. (who heard the motion.) Had no hesitation in granting the motion in favour of defendant, for a variety of reasons.
    1st. Because a refusal to respect the acts and proceedings of a sister State would have a tendency to destroy the harmony which so happily subsisted between the great majority of the States in the Union,andwould put an end to the faith and credit which, for the good of the whole, was due, and owing to every State in the Union from every other sister State in the confederacy.
    2dly. That, even by the law of Nations not confederated together, as we are, the lex loci were acknowledged and supported by the curtesy and common consent of Nations ; consequently where a citizen of one State is acquitted of an offence, or discharged from an obligation by the laws of one country, he can never be called again to answer, or his release again questioned, by another.
    3diy. That, by tb , insolvent Debtors Act of Georgia, the debtor is, upon .¡is voluntarily giving up his effects, entitled to his dig barge from imprisonment and release from his debts, and any man suing him again is liable to the penalty of $500.
    
      dthly. That, tbe Courts of Justice in Georgia have always, as far as be understood, respected tbe Insolvent Laws of South Carolina¿and have never called their validity in question.
    5thly. .That he was of opinion that the eases quoted from Johnson’s Reports were at war with the Curtesy of the other States of the Union, and the principles of most of the Insolvent Laws; while, on the other - hand, it appeared to him that the cases quoted on behalf of the defendant, were in unison with the principles of the law of Nations and the. true policy of the different States.
    Gthly. That, when a creditor voluntarily comes into a Court of Justice seeking redress against his debtor, he consents to be bound by the conditions which are imposed by^ an Insolvent Law of the State where the debtor takes the benefit of such law, in cases where the debtor is unable to pay the debt — 1st. Nott & M’Cord ¿ 494.
    7.th!y. and lastly. Because this had been the uniform construction, given to the Insolvent Law of South Carolina since the time our Insolvent Law had been in force to the present day. And,- he, therefore, .ordered that the defendant be discharged from his present arrest upon li.is entering common appearance to the suit, and that an exonerefur be entered on the bail bond.
    The point was now arguéd again in this Court,
   Curia per

Nott J.

It appears that this claim arose on the indorsement of the defendant to a mercantile house of the plaintiffs in Savannah; so that the plaintiffs and defendant were all citizens of the same State in which the latter took the benefit'of, the act. On that ground, we concur with tbe Judge below, arid.are of opinion that the motion ought to be refused.

Exonerelvr entered.  