
    Suman PANTHI, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    16-1098
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    October 3, 2017
    FOR PETITIONER: Stuart Altman, New York, NY.
    FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Greg D. Mack, Senior Litigation Counsel, Christina P. Greer, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, PIERRE N. LEVAL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Suman Panthi, a native and citizen of Nepal, seeks review of a March 14, 2016, decision of the BIA affirming a January 6, 2015, decision of an Immigration Judge (“U”) denying Panthi’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Suman Panthi, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 14, 2016), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 6, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions. See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2008).

The agency may, “[considering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on the plausibility of an applicant’s account or inconsistencies in her statements and other record evidence with or “without regard to whether” those inconsistencies go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § U58(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Panthi was not credible.

1. The agency reasonably determined that Panthi undermined her credibility when she could not identify other members of the Nepali Congress Party (“NCP”) who had been attacked in the same incident. When asked specifically about a fellow NCP member who, according to Panthi’s written statement, was killed that night, she explained that she thought the original question referred only to senior NCP members. But the original question contained no reference to rank or seniority, and the agency was not required to credit her explanation. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005). Even after the question was clarified, Pan-thi could not name the other NCP members who were harmed, including the one who submitted a letter in support of Pan-:thi’s asylum application. The agency reasonably found that this contradiction and lack of familiarity with her own evidence impaired her credibility. See Zhou Yun Zhang v. U.S. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2004) overruled on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007).

2. The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Panthi’s written statement and testimony, on one hand, and letters from fellow NCP members, on the other. Panthi testified that she was attacked while she was alone, having separated from other NCP members; a letter from fellow NCP member indicates that they were attacked as a group. The agency’s inference is tied to the language of the letters and we cannot make an inference to the contrary. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2007) (affording deference to the agency’s inference so long as it is “tethered to the evidentiary record” and explaining that “record support for a contrary inference—even one more plausible or more natural—does not suggest error”).

Finally, Panthi challenges the agency’s treatment of her corroborating evidence. Letters from fellow NCP members that were inconsistent with her version of events did not rehabilitate her testimony. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”). Moreover, the agency did not err in giving diminished weight to the letters from Pan-thi’s father and fellow NCP members. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to diminished weight given to evidence “submitted by an interested witness”); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the weight afforded to evidence in immigration proceedings “lies largely within the discretion of the IJ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Given the inconsistencies relating to one of the main allegations of past harm, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-66; Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006). That determination is dispositive of Panthi’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  