
    GRANDIN’S CASE.
    (8 Court of Claims R., 566;
    — Wallace R., —.)
    Hannah C. Grandin, administratrix of Piatt, appellant, v. The United States, appellees.
    
      On the claimant's Appeal.
    
    
      A commissary resigns with an unsettled account, and becomes an army contractor. In 1814 he agrees in writing with the Secretary of War to furnish rations to the Northwestern Army for one year, at 20 cents per ration, and the Government agrees to accept his drafts on delivery of the rations. Me furnishes rations accordingly to the amount of $269,051.28, but the Government allows his drafts to the amount of $210,000 io go to protest. Consequently he notifies the Secretary of War, at a personal interview, that he will furnish no more rations under the contract. The Secretary admits the inability of the Government to comply with the contract, and it is then agreed by parol that the contractor shall receive for rations thereafter furnishedwhatever they may be worth at the time of delivery, and that the Government may defer payment, instead of paying immediately, as originally provided. The contractor then furnishes rations worth 45 cents at the time and place of delivery, but the officers of the.Treasury refuse atthe end of the war to allow more than the original contract price, 20 cents. Subsequently the Government brings its action against him on his account as commissary, and arrests him on a capias for an alleged balance of $48,230.77. While under arrest, Congress pass a private act for his relief, directing the offi-
      
      eers of the Treasury to settle his accounts as contractor, " giving all due weight and consideration” “to the assurances and decisions of the War Department,” with a proviso that the sum allowed shall not exceed the arnotmt claimed by the Government. The accounting officers settle the accounts by alloiving 45 cents a ration, which gives a balance in his favor of $179,739.67. From this they deduct sufficient to reduce it to the amount of $48,230.77, claimed by the Government, and he is released from ax-rest. Sis admin-istratrix brings suit for the balance withheld. ■ The court below, being equally divided, renders judgment pro forma for the defendants. Claimant appeals.
    
    I. Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract; but after a contract is reduced to writing, the parties, at any time before the breach of it, by a new contract, not in writing, may vary the terms of the instrument; and the new contract may be proved partly by the written agreement and partly by the subsequent verbal terms engrafted upon it. Hence, where a written agreement with the Government provided that the contractor should furnish rations at 20 cents, payable on delivery, and the Secretary of War subsequently agreed by parol that he should receive what they might he worth at the time and place of delivery, payable at the convenience of the Government, the parol agreement is valid, and the contractor is not confined to the original contract-price..
    II. Where a contractor owes the Government a balance upon a former account, for money received as commissary, and the Government owes him a larger balance upon an account for supplies furnished as contractor, and he-has been arrested and held to bail on a capias, and Congress interposes and directs a settlement of his accounts by the officers of the Treasury, with a proviso that the'amount allowed “shall not exceed the amount now claimed by the United States," and this is done and he is released from arrest, the settlement is not a bar to the residue of his claim. Such a proposition would he utterly destitute of merit, and repugnant to the plainest dictates both of law and justice.
    III. What the Supreme Court decided iu Mason’s Case (8 C. Cls. R., 125 ; 17 Wall., 70) was that, where a contractor voluntarily accepted a modification of the contract, and executed a new contract in the place of the one superseded, he must have understood that the new contract was intended to define the obligations of all concerned.
    IV. Where a party voluntarily accepts the amount awarded him by a commission possessed of no judicial power, it is just to conclude that he acquiesces in the decision of the special tribunal which rejects a part of his claim as well as in the finding in his favor.. But where the accounting officers of the Treasury are forbidden by law to alio w a contractor anything beyond the amount of a cross-claim of the Government against him, manifestly he has no option. Debiting him that amount on his claim and releasing him from arrest in a suit brought by the Government will not bar his action for the balance of his account; nor will his case come within the decisions in Child, Pratt & Fox, and Justice’s Cases, (7 G. Cls. R., 209; 8 id., 37.)
    
      
      The 'Reporters' statement of the case:
    The court below, being equally divided upon the law of the case, found the following facts for the purposes of an appeal:
    “I. John H. Piatt, the claimant’s intestate, on the 14th of January, 1814, entered into the written contract for furnishing rations to the Northwestern Army from the 1st day of June, 1814, to the 31st day of May, 1815, set forth and described in the petition.
    “II. On the 1st of January, 1815, Piatt had furnished and delivered rations, according to the terms’of his contract, to the amount of $269,051.28, but the defendants had not complied with the terms of the contract, and had neglected and failed to pay for such rations according to the terms thereof, and were then in default to the amount of $210,000, and were, in fact, unable to comply with its terms.
    “III. On or about the 1st day of January, 1815, at a personal interview in the city of Washington, Piatt notified Mr. Monroe, the Secretary of War, that he would furnish no more rations under the contract, and the Secretary admitted to Piatt the inability of the defendants to comply with the terms of the contract on their part, both as to money already due and as to money which might become due for future supplies. But a military exigency then rendered it necessary that a large quantity of rations should be furnished immediately for the Northwestern Army, and it was thereupon agreed by parol, between Piatt and the Secretary of War, that, in consideration of Piatt’s furnishing the rations which might be required, he should receive for them whatever price they should be reasonably worth at the time and place of delivery, and that the defendants, instead of paying as required by the terms of the original contract, should defer payment until such time or times as they should have the. requisite funds.
    “IV. Under the parol agreement, in the third finding as set forth, Piatt furnished and delivered to the defendants 730,070.10 rations, the fair and reasonable value of which, at the times and places at which they were furnished, was 45 cents per ration, amounting in the aggregate to $328,531.54. But on the settlement of Piatt’s account at the close of the war, the officers of the Treasury, having ■ no knowledge or evidence of the parol agreement under which the rations were furnished, allowed and paid to Piatt only the price designated in the original written contract, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $148,791.87, and leaving due a balance of $179,739.67. But there was subsequently allowed to Piatt, as a payment under the private act 8th May, 1820, (6 Stat. L., 245,) in the manner set forth in the next finding, the further sum of $48,230.77, leaving a balance of $131,508.90, which still remains due and unpaid.
    . “V. In September, 1819, an action was brought by the United States against Piatt, and he was arrested on a capias ad respondendum, for an alleged balance of $48,230.77, due from him as commissary of subsistence; and while the suit was still pending, and he on bail, Congress passed for his relief the private act of 8th May, 1820, (6 Stat. L., 245,) in the words following :
    “ ‘ AN ACT for the relief of John H. Piatt.
    
      illJBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the proper accounting officers of the Treasury Department be, and they are hereby, authorized and required to settle the accounts of John H. Piatt, including his account for transportation, on just and equitable principles, giving all due weight and consideration to the settlements and allowances already made and to the assurances and decisions of the War Department: Provided, That the sum allowed under the said assurances shall not exceed the amount now claimed by the United States, and for which suits have been commenced against the said John H. Piatt.’
    “Under and in pursuance of this act the accounting officers of the Treasury settled the accounts of Piatt, as follows:
    “First. The accounting officers allowed him a credit of $74,475.85 for transportation and rations furnished by him for the use of citizens and Indians, not embraced or included in either of the contracts or agreements before described, from which credit certain deductions were made, leaving a balance of $63,620.48.
    “ Second. They allowed him a credit upon a certain specified portion of the rations delivered upon the parol agreement before mentioned, equal to the amount claimed by the United States in the suit against him, to wit, the sum of $48,230.77 ; and such credit was ascertained in the following manner: They first ascertained the fair and reasonable value of the specific portion of the rations thus referred to; they then deducted therefrom the price per ration already paid to him; and from the balance thus ■ ascertained they made a further deduction sufficient to reduce the amount of the credit to the said sum of $48,230.77, as required by the proviso .to the private act.
    “ YI. After the death of Piatt, Congress passed the private act 24th May, 1824, (6 Stat. L., 314,) and there was paid thereunder, to the assignees and administrators of John H. Piatt, the sum of $63,620.48, the same being for transportation and rations furnished to citizens and Indians described in the fifth finding, and not for the army supplies previously described.
    
      “ The plaintiif is the duly appointed administratrix of the estate of the said John H. Piatt, deceased.'
    “ The plaintiff, the said John H. Piatt, in his life-time, and his heirs also, are and were citizens of the United States, have at all times borne true allegiance to its Government, and have never, at any time, afforded aid or comfort or given encouragement to rebellion against the Government of the United States.
    “And the Court of Claims, being equally divided upon the right of the claimant to recover, does, for the purposes of an, appeal to the Supreme Court, decide as conclusions of law—
    “I. The parol agreement entered into by John H. Piatt and the Secretary of War after the forfeiture and1 abandonment of the original written contract, being a new contract upon a new consideration, was valid, and, under such agreement, the defendants became indebted to Piatt for the fair and reasonable value of the rations furnished under it and for the balance of $131,508.90.
    “ II. But this action is barred by the allowance made by the accounting officers of the Treasury under the private act May 8, 1820, -which must be construed to have been intended by Congress as a settlement of all claims against the defendants.”
    
      Mr. William Johnston and Mr. Thomas Wilson for the claimant, appellant:
    The Court of Claims have found by unanimous decision that there is a balance of $ 131,508.90 in plaintiff’s favor, which still remains due and unpaid. If the action to recover this sum is barred by compromise, this defense ought to have been pleaded. (Kenyon v. Sutherland, 3 Gilman, 99; Sinard v. Patterson, 3 Blackf., 354; Hall v. Flockton, 4 Eng. Law & Eq., 185; State Bank v. Littlejohn, 1 Dev. & Batt., 505; Stark’s Administrator v. Thompson’s Executor, 3 Mon., 302; Peace v. Stennet, 4 J. J. Marsh, 450.) A compromise in which a less sum is accepted instead of what is actually due is a contract, and, as in other contracts, there must be a good consideration, and the minds of the parties must meet. (Wiley v. Warden, 1 Williams, Yt., 655; Claris v. Hinsmore, 5 N. H., 136, and cases there cited; Frentress v. Maride, 2 Greene, Iowa, 553, and cases there cited; 5 East, 230; 16 Johns., 86; Hardman v. Bellhouse, 9 M. & W., 600.)
    To make a compromise binding, the party conceding away part of his rights must act freely, and duress will vitiate the contract; much more so when the conceding party is unlawfully imprisoned at the suit of the other party and purchases his freedom by the compromise. (2 Bac. Abr., 402, title Duress; Phelps v. Zurschlag, 34 Texas, 371; Bane v. Detrick, 52 III., 129; Bowker v. Lowell, 49 Maine, 429; Hacked v. King, 6 Allen, Mass., 58; Strong v. Qranniss, 26 Barb., N. Y., 122; Tilly v. Damon, 11 Gush., Mass., 247; Brown v.' Peck, 2 Wis., 261; Breéis v. Blanchard, 2 Foster, N. H., 303; Foshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill, N. Y., 154; 2 Vern., 497.) Where a party by compromise agrees to accept a less sum than what is actually due, the sum agreed on must be paid or the compromise is void. (Blackburn v. Ormsby, 41 Penn. St., 97; Hear.ne v. Kiehe, 38 Penn. St., 147; State Bank v. Littlejohn, 1 Dev. & Batt., 565, and cases there cited; Higgins v. Halligan, 46 Ill., 173, 176,177.) If a doubt should exist as to the meaning of the Act May 8, 1820, it should be liberally construed in favor of the object of relief, and decided according to that construction which is most consonant to equity. (8 Wheeler’s Am. Com. Law, 142; United States v. Goose, 8 O. Gis. R., 1; Kerlin v. Bull, 1 Dal., Penn., 178; United States v. Bright et at, Whart. Dig., 708; Bank of Am. v. Fitzsimmons, 3 Binn., 356.)
    This act was an act for relief, and is entitled to a liberal construction in favor of the object of relief. It afforded no present relief except the enlargement of the man. That it contemplated further relief when the accounts should be settled and the balance ascertained cannot well be questioned, and this purpose of further relief was carried out by an act of appropriation in 1824, to the full extent to which the accounts had been settled. Piatt’s troubles about his accounts grew out of circumstances beyond human control. No man in his circumstances could have produced such vouchers as the rules of the Department seemed to require. So long as he worked under the old contract no vouchers were required. The quantity of rations and the places of delivery were proved by the certificates of the receiving officers, and the price per ration was fixed by the written contract.
    The-balance of the commissariat fund during the war had been treated both by Piatt and the War Department as an advance on his contract, and belonged to his account as a contractor, and was properly payable out of what might be due him on his account as contractor, and so it was ordered to be allowed out of that account. If Congress had intended t]iis allowance to be a final discharge of all claims against the United States, doubtless they would have said so. There is nothing cheaper than words. It would have required but five more to have said u This allowance shall be final.”
    To settle means to adjust an account and strike the balance. But it may mean both to adjust and pay the account. You order your clerk to settle my account when you- are flush; I naturally expect payment. But if you order my account to be settled when you have not a dime in your pocket nor a dollar in bank, it is clear you only meant to' have the account adjusted preliminary to payment in future 5 and now if there is a lingering doubt as to whether the act of 1820 and the settlement thereunder was final or preliminary, I invoke the testimony of the voucher for $63,620.48, which, like the unclean spirit mentioned in the Gospels, walked about in dry places, seeking rest and finding none for four long years, and returned to Congress at last for an appropriation to pay it off.
    We seek to unsettle nothing that ever was settled. The alleged balance of $48,230.77, whether bogus or genuine, is settled, and so let it rest. The account for transportation is settled, and, whether fairly or unfairly, so let it rest. His own final account is settled, and so let it rest forever. But when we find hidden away in the archives of the nation a just and-meritorious account for 520,000 rations never settled and never paid, justice to the memory of a departed patriot, justice to his surviving heirs — more than all, justice to the United States of .America, demand that better late than never this debt should be canceled.
    But we must not allow the hardship of the case to lead us away from the logic of the argument. Piatt owed the United States nothing. They owed him for money laid out and expended, after deducting the sum for which he was arrested, $195,129.38, and, in justice and equity for five years’ use of his money, $58,541.81 more. . He was in no sense a debtor to the United States, and yet the United States arrested and imprisoned him for debt; and with a capias ad respondendum on his back and a capias ad satisfaciendum staring him in the face, he stood like a sheep dumb before his shearers on the 8th day of May, 1820, when the compromise is supposed to have been made. I trust I need not produce an authority in this court to show that when a party is' unlawfully arrested and held to bail, and purchases his enlargement by a ruinous compromise, such compromise is of no legal obligation whatever.
    But there was nothing in Piatt’s case looking or even squinting toward a compromise. There was no “amicable agreement between parties in controversy to settle their differences by mutual concessions.” There was no submission and award. There was no accord and satisfaction, or anything of kin to a compromise.
    Mr. Attorney-General thinks the claim of Piatt is barred by submission, because it was held that the claim of Adams was barred by submission. I should agree with him if there was an important analogy between the cases.
    To what extremes of folly the wholesome rulings of this court are perverted by mixing discordant facts and calling things by new names! The defenses in the case at bar come down to this. I owe a banker $100 for a suit of clothes purchased of him when he was only a tailor. To help him when he was poor, I deposited $100,000 in his bank, and he has used it for five years without interest. My tailor’s bill is getting old and ought to be settled, and so he sues me, and by capias ad respon-dendum puts his old friend in jail. But this is not duress. I give special bail, go to the bank, and demand my money. This is a submission. The paying-teller refuses to give me my money. This is an award. The banker orders his clerk, for sbame, to give me a credit sufficient to cancel the tailor’s bill, and let me have my liberty. This is a compromise. Besides the tailor’s bill, the cashier allows me a small part of what is due, and gives me a check on a bank where there are no deposits to meet it, not likely to be made good for four years to come. This is an accord and satisfaction.
    
      Mr. Attorney- General Williams and Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Goforth for the United States, appellees: 1
    An allowance by the legislature in full, when accepted by claimant, is an estoppel of further claim. (Sholes v. The State, 2 Chand., 182; Galkins v. The State, 13 Wis., 389.) It is clear, from the wording of the act and from the circumstances which called for its passage, that this sum was inteuded by Congress as full payment of the claim under the assurances.
    “The word settle has an established legal meaning, and implies the mutual adjustment of accounts between different parties and an agreement upon the balanee. When, therefore, it is averred that the committee settled with the plaintiff, we think that sufficiently avers his consent, because without his consent, express or implied, there could be no settlement.” (Baxter v. Wisconsin, 9 Wis., 44; see also 11 Ala., 419.)
    This was offer of settlement by Congress to Piatt of a disputed claim. He could accept its offer or not, as he chose. That he had no other remedy at the time does Dot affect the question. (Mason v. United States, 17 Wall., 67.)
    He presented his proofs, made his claims, and accepted the allowances without protest. He is barred by the submission of his claims. (Adams’ Case, 7 0. Gis. R., 58; United States v. Child etal., 7 C. Cls. R., 209; United'States v. Justice, 8 O. Gis. R., 37; Mason v. United States, 8 O. Gis. R., 125.) There was no duress. Piatt could have demanded that any part of the claim, upon which Congress placed no limit as to proof and no restriction as to amount, and not connected with the assurances in any way, should have been applied to his indebtedness; in fact, a part of it was so applied by the accounting officers to that portion of his indebtedness which had not been included in the pending suits. No compulsion was exercised over him at-any stage of the proceedings..
   Bir. Justice Clifford

delivered the opinion of the court :

Parol evidence of what passed between the parties, either before their contract was reduced to writing or during- the time it was in a state of preparation, is not admissible to add to, subtract from, or in any manner to vary or qualify the terms of the executed instrument; but it is competent for the parties, after the agreement is reduced to writing, at any time before a breach of it, by a new contract not in writing, unless the agreement is one required by law to be authenticated by writing, either to waive the same altogether, or dissolve or annul it, or in any manner to add to, subtract from, or vary or qualify the terms of the instrument, and thus to make a new contract, which, in a proper case, may be proved partly by the written agreement and partly by the subsequent verbal terms'engrafted upon it by the new stipulations. (Emerson v. Slater, 22 How., 41; Ad. Con., 6th ed., 934.)

Services of an important character were rendered by the deceased claimant, during the war of 1812, as commissary of subsistence, and it appears that when he ceased to act in that capacity there remained in his hands $46,112.56 unexpended of the public moneys appropriated for that purpose. On the 26th of January, 1814, the deceased, then in full life, contracted in writing with the Secretary of War to furnish rations to the Northwestern Army for the period of one year, upon the terms and conditions fully set forth in the petition.

Pursuant to that contract, he delivered the rations required to the amount in value of $269,051.28, as appears by the finding of the court below. All of the rations included in that aggregate of value were furnished according to the terms of the written contract, but the United States failed to make the stipulated payments, and made default to the amount of $210,000, and were in fact, as the court below find, unable to fulfill the terms of their contract.

Payments being refused, and the Secretary of War admitting that the United States were unable to fulfill the contract both as to what was due and as to what might become due for future supplies, the contractor notified the Secretary of War that he should furnish no more rations under that contract.

Both parties appear to have acquiesced in that view of the case; but tbe public exigency rendered it imperatively necessary that a large quantity of rations should 'be immediately furnished for the Northwestern Army, and the court below finds that, in order to meet the exigency of the public service, it was agreed by parol between the deceased claimant and the Secretary of War that'the former should furnish the required rations, and that he should receive for the same whatever price they should be reasonably worth at the time and place of delivery, and that the United States, instead of paying as stipulated by the terms of the original contract, might defer payment until such time or times as’they should have the requisite funds.

Eations were furnished by the contractor under the new agreement, exceeding in number 700,000, and the court below finds that the fair and reasonable value of each ration was 45 cents at the times and places at which they were furnished, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $328,531.54, as appears by the fourth finding of the court below. By the same finding it also appears that the accounting officers of the Treasury settled the accounts of the contractor at the close of the war without any knowledge of the parol agreement, and consequently that they allowed him only the price designated in the original written contract, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $148,791.87, leaving due to him a balance of $ 179,739.67.

- Unadjusted accounts were also held by the deceased claimant against the United States for transportation services and expenses, and for supplies in the form of rations furnished for the use of indigent citizens and Indians, not embraced nor included within either of the described contracts or agreements, for which he claimed large credits. Instead of adjusting those accounts, the United States instituted a suit against the claimant to recover the balance due from him as commissary of subsistence; and the fifth finding of the court below shows that he was arrested and held to bail in that suit, and that Congress, during the pendency of the same, passed an act for his relief. By that act the proper accounting officers were directed to settle his accounts on just and equitable principles, giving all due weight to the settlements and allowances already made, and to the assurances and decisions of the War Department, provided the sum allowed under such assurances shall not exceed the amount claimed by the United States, for which suit has been commenced against the claimant. (6 Stat. L,, 245.)'

Under and in pursuance of that act the accounting officers of the Treasury settled his accounts as follows:

1.. They allowed him for his transportation claim, and for the rations furnished to citizens and Indians $63,620.48, which is a matter entirely separate and distinct from the rations furnished under the parol agreement.

2. They also adjusted his accounts for the rations delivered to the army under the parol agreement in the following manner : Before making any deductions they estimated the fair and reasonable value of the rations furnished under that agreement, and then deducted the price of rations already paid to the claimant, and “ from the balance thus ascertained they made a further deduction sufficient to reduce the amount of the credit to the” sum due from the claimant as commissary of subsistence, in obedience to the proviso contained in the private act passed for his relief.

Enough appears by the foregoing statement to show that the last deduction amounted to the sum of $131,508.90, which still remains due and unpaid, as appears by the fourth finding of ' the court below.

Subsequently Congress passed another private act, under which the assignees and administrators of the deceased claimant were paid the amount allowed for the transportation claim and for the rations furnished to indigent citizens and Indians, and the present suit was brought to recover the balance for the rations furnished to the army under the parol agreement. (6 id., 314.)

Foiir only of the judges of the Court of Claims were present at the hearing of the case. They were unanimous in all of the findings of fact and in respect to the conclusions of law that the parol agreement was valid, and as to the amount of the balance due to the deceased claimant; but being equally divided upon the right of the claimant to recover, they entered judgment in favor of the defendants for the purpose o'f an appeal to the Supreme Court. Appeal was taken from that judgment by the present claimant, and the assignment of errors is that the second conclusion of law, that the cause of action is barred by the allowance reported by the accounting officers of the Treasury, is erroneous.

Attempt is made to vindicate that conclusion chiefly upon two grounds: (1) That the auditor passed to the credit of the deceased claimant the amount claimed by the United States as due from him as commissary of subsistence, and that he, the claimant, accepted the settlement without protest. (2) That Congress intended by the act directing the adjustment of his accounts that the settlement should be final and conclusive; that the act was in the nature of an offer for a disputed claim ; and that the acceptance of the adjustment is a bar to the claim.

Yerbal agreements between the parties to a written contract made before or at the time of the execution of the contract are, in general, inadmissible to vary its terms or to affect its construction, as all such agreements are considered as merged in the written contract. Both parties admit that proposition; no'r is it denied by the defendants that oral agreements subsequently made, on a new and valuable consideration, before the breach of the contract, may have the effect to enlarge the time of performance of the contract, if it is not one within the statute of frauds* or that such an oral agreement may have the effect to vary any of the terms of the written contract or to waive or ‘discharge it altogether.

Exceptions, it is everywhere admitted, exist to the rule that parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary the terms of a written instrument. Most of such exceptions are enumerated by Mr. Greenleaf, and in the course of that enumeration he says: aNeither is the rule infringed by the admission of oral evidence to prove a new and, distinct agreement upon a new consideration, whether it be as a substitute for the old or in addition to and beyond it; and if subsequent and involving the same subject-matter, it is immaterial whether the new agreement be entirely oral or whether it refers to and partially or totally adopts the provisions of the written contract, provided the old agreement be rescinded and abandoned.” (1 Greenl. Ev., 12th ed., § 303; 2 Taylor’s Ev., 6th ed., § 1044; Goss v. Nugent, 5 B. & Ad., 65; Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Met., 400; Leonard v. Vredenburg, 8 Johns., 39; Marshall v. Lynn, 6 M. & W., 109; Stead v. Dawber, 10 Ad. & E., 57; Harvey v. Grabham, 6 Ad. & E., 65; Stowell v. Robinson, 3 Bing., N. C., 927.)

Sufficient appears in the very nature of the arrangement to show that the promise of the United States was made upon a good and valid consideration, as nothing is better settled than the rule that if there is a benefit to the defendant and a loss to the plaintiff, consequent upon and directly resulting from the defendant’s promise in behalf of the plaintiff, there is a sufficient consideration, moving from the plaintiff to enable the latter to maintain an action upon the promise to recover compensation. (1 Pars, on Con., Oth ed., 431.)

Other authorities state the rule much stronger, authorizing the conclusion that benefit to the party by whom the promise is made, or to a third person at his instance, or damage sustained at the instance of the party promising by the party in whose' favor the promise is made, is sufficient to constitute a good and valuable consideration for the support of an action of assumpsit. (Violet v. Patton, 5 Cranch, 150; Chit, on Con., 28; Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet., 182.)

Modern authorities supporting the proposition that parol evidence is admissible to prove such a new agreement, under the circumstances disclosed in this case, are very numerous, and are quite sufficient to show that the proposition may be regarded as an established rule of decision. (Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Met., 489; Bank v. Woodward, 5 N. H., 99; Barley v. Johnson, 9 Cow., 99; Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend., 75; Lindley v. Lacey, 17, C. B., N. S., 584.)

Apply that rule to the case, and it is quite clear that the whole amount claimed by the plaintiff was due to the deceased claimant at the time his accounts were adjusted by the accounting officers of the Treasury, in addition to the amount claimed by the United States in set-off for balance due from him as commissary of subsistence. Well-founded doubt upon that subject cannot be entertained, as it satisfactorily appears that in order to reduce his claim to an amount not exceeding the claim of the United States, those officers found it necessary to deduct from the aggregate estimate of the value of the rations furnished under the parol agreement, an amount exactly equal to the balance found due to the claimant by the subordinate court from whose judgment the appeal is prosecuted in this case.

Nothing was paid to the claimant under that private act except what was allowed to the claimant for services and expenses in furnishing transportation and rations for the use of Indians and indigent citizens. He was discharged from arrest, and the balance due from him to the United States for the moneys in his hands as commissary of subsistence was also discharged, but nothing was paid to him for the large balance now found to be due by the court below. Argument to show that such a settlement is not a bar to the residue of the claim is unnecessary, as the proposition is utterly destitute of merit and repugnant to the plainest dictates both of law and justice.

Opposed to that is the suggestion, in behalf of the United States, that the act of Congress was in the nature of an offer of compromise, and that the acceptance of the adjustment is a bar to the claim.

Support to that proposition is attempted to be drawn from the decision of this court in the case of Mason v. United States (8 C. Cls. R., 125 ; 17 Wall. R., 70;) but the court here is very clearly of the opinion that the case cited affords no countenance whatever to any such conclusion. Muskets were wanted by the United States in that case, and it appears that the plaintiff in that controversy contracted to manufacture and deliver at a specified time large quantities of such arms at the price specified in the contract. Arms of the kind were delivered and paid for, and the plaintiff was notified, by order of the Secretary of War, that a larger quantity would be received. Preparations were accordingly made by the plaintiff to fill the second order, but the Secretary of War subsequently appointed a special commission to audit and adjust all such orders and claims. They reported that the contract should be confirmed to a certain extent upon the condition that the contractor should, within fifteen days after notice of their decision, execute a bond, with good and sufficient sureties, for the performance of the modified contract; and the case shows that he executed the modified contract and gave the required bond. By that contract he engaged to manufacture thirty thousand muskets, and the finding of the subordinate court showed that the contract was fulfilled by both parties.

What the court decided in that case was that the claimant voluntarily accepted the modification of the contract as suggested by the commissioners, and that he executed the new contract in the place of the one superseded, which new contract he must have understood was intended to define the obligations of all concerned. Beyond all doubt the new contract in that case was substituted for the old one, and the court held that no party, after accepting such a compromise and executing such a discharge, could be justified in claiming damages for a breach of the prior contract which had been voluntarily modified and surrendered.

Other cases to the same effect have been decided by this court. (The United States v. Child, 12 Wall., 222; 7 C. Cls. R., 209; The United States v. Justice, 14 id., 535 ; 8 C. Cls. R., 73.) Rone of those cases, however, proceed upon the ground that sucha commission possesses any judicial power to bind the parties by their decision or to give the decision any conclusive effect. Claimants in such cases may appear before the commission or not, as they choose, but the decision is, if they do' appear and accept the terms awarded as a final settlement of the controversy, without protest, they must be understood as having precluded themselves from further claim and litigation.

Where a party accepts the amount awarded in such a case, it is just to conclude that he acquiesces in the decision of the tribunal by which a part of the claim is rejected as well as in the finding in his favor. But the accounting officers in this case were forbidden by law to allow the claimant anything beyond the amount in his hands as commissary of subsistence, and they’ obeyed the directions given in the act of Congress. Manifestly the claimant had no option upon the subject, and in the opinion of the court it would be an unreasonable construction of the act of Congress to suppose that its framers intended that the claimant should relihquish the large balance found to be due him in consideration of his discharge from arrest, and the discontinuance of the suit against him for the recovery of the amount due from him to the United States.

Certain cases from the State reports are referred to, which it is supposed assert a different rule, but the court here is of a different opinion. (Sholes v. State, 2 Chand., 182; Baxter v. State, 9 Wis., 44; Calkins v. State, 13 Wis., 389.)

Suffice it to say that in the case before the court no appropriation whatever was made in favor of the claimant. Where the claim is disputed and an appropriation is made in favor of the claimant for an amount less than the amount claimed, and the appropriation purports to be in full payment of the demand, the rule may be different, but it is sufficient to say in response to those authorities that nothing was appropriated in this case, and the accounting officers of the Treasury were forbidden to allow anything beyond what was involved in the pending suit against the claimant.

Judgment reversed and tbe cause remanded, with instructions to render judgment in favor of tbe petitioner for tbe amount found to be due him in tbe fourth finding exhibited in tbe transcript.

Mr. Justice Bradley

dissenting :

I dissent from tbe judgment of the court in this case. In my view tbe case was decided and settled more than fifty years ago. The claim cannot be established without opening that settlement and declaring that a valid contract was made which had been decided not to be a valid contract, but only a mere claim for some equitable allowance which was in fact made and accepted at that time.

Piatt, the original claimant, was an army contractor in the Northwest during the war of 18 L2. Becoming embarrassed by not receiving funds from the Government, and from the great rise in the prices 'of provisions, he threatened to throw up his contract; but the allegation is that at the request of Mr. Monroe, then acting Secretary of War, and upon his assurances that he should not be the loser, he went on, and furnished supplies to a large amount. ' For these supplies he claimed a large allowance beyond the amount stipulated in his contract. The petition then states as follows :

u But your petitioners state that the officers of the Treasury, feeling themselves bound only by what appeared of record in the Department, allowed the said Piatt, in the settlement of his account for rations furnished after the first day of January, 1815, no more than the original contract price per ration. Under these circumstances he brought his claim before the Secretary of War, Mr. Crawford, who would have settled it on the principles for which the said Piatt then contended, and which your petitioners now claim to be legal and just, but that, by reason of what he considered countervailing evidence, he had doubts whether such assurances had ever been given.”

Thus it is seen that there were two sides to the question at that early day, when all the events were fresh, and when Mr. Monroe was living at tbe seat of government, and accessible at any moment.

In 1820 Piatt was arrested for 8-18,230.77, the balance found due to the Government in his accounts, as ascertained by the settlement at the Department. He then brought his*, claim before Congress, and ■ the Judiciary Committee of the Senate reported adverse!y thereto. But on the 8th of May the folio wing act was passed for his relief, to wit:

“AN ACT for the relief of John H. Piatt.

uBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, That the' proper accounting officers of the Treasury Department be, and they are hereby, authorized and required to settle the accounts of John H. Piatt, including his accounts for transportation, on just and equitable principles, giving all due weight and consideration to the settlements and allowances already made, and to the assurances and decisions of the War Department: Provided, That the sum allowed under the said assurances shall not exceed the amount now claimed by the United States, and for which suits have been commenced against the said John H. Piatt.”

Thereupon his accounts were restated under the provisions of the actj and the officers of the Department, after Allowing him the sum of 163,620.48 for provisions furnished to friendly Indians and to distressed settlers of Michigan, (which was entirely outside of his contract, and was afterward paid in full,) allowed liim a credit on the footing of the assurances of Mr. Monroe for $48,230.77, the full amount of the claim for which he had been arrested. He was thereupon discharged from custody on the 25th of J uly, 1820, and died in February, 1822. The present, claim is prosecuted by his representatives.

Upon these facts it seems difficult to resist the conviction that, in the contemplation of both parties, (Piatt and the Government,) this case was then and there forever ended and determined. Between individuals it must necessarily have been so. Had such a disputed and doubtful claim been held by one man against another, and left to arbitration, subject to the condition that no sum should be awarded beyond a certain amount, and had that amouut been awarded and accepted, can there be a- doubt that the award would have been binding and conclusive 1 I think not.

The present case is stronger. Congress proposed to allow Piatt a settlement of his claim by the Treasury Department, in which due weight and consideration should be given to the assurances in question, provided that the sum allowed under them should not exceed the amount claimed by the United States against him, and for which suit had been commenced. He accepted the law, had the benefit of the settlement, and was allowed under the assurances the amount named, which justly canceled the debt for which he was sued and arrested by the Government. Thereupon he was discharged. .The declaration of Congress, thus made binding by the acts of the party, that nothing should be allowed against the Government on that claim beyond a certain amount named, was equivalent to a solemn adjudication. It amounted to a declaration of the Government that it would not suffer itself to be pursued or molested for a greater sum. .Can it now be contended that the act of 1855, constituting the Court of Claims and allowing suits to be brought against the Government on contracts made with it, has opened this adjudication, this settlement and determination of the case? In my judgment, certainly not. The act constituting the Court of Claims was not intended to disturb past adjudications and settlements, and to open afresh claims that had been disposed of. The Court of Claims had no right to go behind the final settlement and attempt to establish the original facts of the case. Its findings of fact, in this respect, were illegal and void. The Government has never consented to be sued on this claim or any claims similarly situated.

The conclusion of law to which the court came, I think, was correct, and the decree should be affirmed.

Swatne, Davis, and Hunt, JJ., concurred in this opinion.  