
    (85 Tex. Cr. R. 434)
    BONNEAU v. STATE.
    (No. 5420.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    June 11, 1919.)
    1. Criminal Law @=>371(1) — Seriously Threatening Another — Evidence of Other Offense — Intent.
    Where prosecuting witness in an altercation slapped defendant, and defendant said he had told witness that if any one placed his hand upon him in anger he would kill him, and that witness should get his gun and be ready, as defendant was going to get his and kill witness, evidence of prosecuting witness and another that defendant had told them that years before he had told a certain man that if he whipped defendant he would kill him, and that such man did whip defendant, and that he afterwards killed him, was admissible on question whether threat was seriously made.
    2. Criminal Law @=673(5) — Charge—Limiting Effect of Evidence.
    It is only when proof of the collateral offense is such as that the jury might use it improperly to convict, or .that it might reasonably result in harm to appellant, that it is necessary to limit the effect for which such evidence was introduced.
    3. Criminal Law @=673(5) — Charge—Limiting Effect of Evidence.
    In trial for seriously threatening prosecuting witness after an altercation in which witness had slapped defendant, the evidence of prosecuting witness and another that defendant had told them that years before he had told a man that if he whipped defendant he would kill him, and that such man did whip defendant, and that he killed him, could not have been considered by jury, except to show that threat involved was seriously made, so that it was not necessary to limit purpose for which it was admitted.
    . Appeal from Jasper County Court; C. C. Brown, Judge.
    C. Bonneau was convicted of seriously threatening another, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    C. B. Neel, of Jasper, for appellant.
    E. A. Berry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   LATTIMOiRE, J.

The appellant was convicted in the county court of Jasper county of the offense of seriously threatening another, and his punishment fixed at a fine of $100, from which he appeals.

The evidence was conflicting, but the jury seemed to have believed that of the state’s witnesses, and we cannot say that the verdict is without support.

The state was allowed to prove by the prosecuting witness and his father, over objection, that appellant had stated to them substantially that long .years before he had told a certain man that if he whipped him he would kill him; that the man did whip him ; and that he killed said man.

The testimony of the state in the instant case showed that an altercation preceded the threat charged therein, in which altercation the prosecuting witness slapped appellant with his open hand; that after such altercation ended, and appellant had gotten into his buggy, he turned and said:

“I have told you if any man place his hand upon me in anger I would kill him: -Now get your gun and be ready, for I am going to get mine and kill you.”

We think the evidence of the statement that appellant had carried out a former threat was admissible, even though tending to show a separate offense, as bearing upon the question as to whether the threat in the instant case was seriously made.

No charge was asked limiting the effect of such evidence, and no exception taken to the charge by the trial court. Buckley v. State, 70 Tex. Cr. R. 550, 157 S. W. 765; Elliott v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 127 S. W. 547; Webb v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 207, 140 S. W. 95.

It is only when proof of the collateral offense is such as that the jury might use it improperly to convict, or that it might reasonably result in harm to appellant, that it is necessary to limit the purpose for which such evidence was introduced. Carroll v. State, 58 S. W. 340; Purcelly v. State, 29 Tex. App. 1, 13 S. W. 993; Bailey v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 474, 155 S. W. 536; Leeper v. State, 29 Tex. App. 63, 14 S. W. 398; Gilbert v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 85, 121 S. W. 1126.

We do not see how the jury could have considered the evidence as to the former threat testified to by the prosecuting witness and his father for any other purpose than to show that the threat in the instant case was seriously made.

There being no other errors seriously complained of, and none apparent in the record, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 
      <g=Por other eases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER In all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     