
    M’Gowan vs. Wade.
    The county court have the power with the consent of the administrator, or upon good and sufficient cause shown, to cause the administrator to surrender up his administration, and appoint another
    This bill was filed by the complainant, as administrator of Seth Wade, deceased, to recover the slaves mentioned in it, alleging that they were the property of Henry Wade,in his lifetime; that complainant’s intestate was one of the distributees of said Henry Wade, deceased, and that he purchased for a valuable consideration, from the other distributees, their respective shares; all of which facts are proved by the evidence in the cause.
    The defendant insists, that the complainant has no title; that he is not the administrator of Seth Wade, deceased, and consequently not entitled to receive the slaves.
    From the records of the county court of Henry, where said Seth died, produced in evidence, it appears that at the March term 1825, of said county court, James Wade and Robert Wade were appointed administrators of the estate of the said Seth Wade, deceased, and gave the necessary security. At the December term 1825, of said court, the complainant was appointed administrator of said Wade’s estate; the records of that term show the following entry: “This day came Robert Wade and James Wade, and with the assent of the court surrender the administration,” &c. and the court thereupon appointed the complainant administrator, &c.
    The slaves in controversy, if recovered, will be assets in the hands of complainant, and the suit is brought for the benefit of Seth Wade’s estate.
    It is seen from the evidence, that nine months elapsed from the time when Robert and James Wade administered, to the time when with the assent of the county court, they surrendered the administration; and yet during that time, no attempt was made by them as admin-trators, to recover this claim.
    
      G. S. Yerger and II W. Dunlap, for complainants.
   Peck, J.

The single question presented is, whether the county court of Henry county could, under the circumstances of this case, permit the said administrators to surrender up the administration and appoint another.

It is clear that the county court would not have the power of doing so arbitrarily, and without the consent of the administrator, or without a good and sufficient cause. It is not perceived by the court, why the county court should not have this power when the administrator'abuses his trust, or where he assents to it, and when it may be evidently for the benefit of the estate that the administration should be given up.

The authorities cited only show, that the court having once granted administration, has not the power to revoke it at pleasure; but where a case is presented, in which the court believe it to be advantageous to the estate to change the administrator, who is willing and consents to it, there is no rule or principle of law to prevent it. Such a change of the administration will not discharge or release the former administrator, or his securities, from any liabilities incurred before he surrendered the administration. The court believe that the county court of Henry had the power, and that it was properly exercised in this case; the more especially as the complainant must be considered as holding in a character which he cannot dispute.

The decree of the Chancellor must be reversed, and the defendants decreed to deliver up the negroes mentioned in the pleadings.

Whyte, J. and Green, J. concurred.

Catron, Ch. J.

(dissentiente.) I view this cause set-tied by the decision of Marshall as administrator of John Childress against Perry Cohea, decided by this court at Columbia, in 1823. Samuel B. Marshall and Elizabeth Childress, in 1819, were appointed administrator and ad-ministratrix of the goods, &c. of J. Childress, deceased. Suit in their names was brought in the Maury county court, in their representative character, against Perry Cohea, on a contract for the sale of lands made between John Childress and Cohea. In 1822, pending the suit, Elizabeth Childress died, and the suit stood in the name of Samuel B. Marshall. In the fall of 1822, said Marshall resigned his administration to the Davidson county court, where granted, and John Catron was appointed in his stead., This was by consent. It was then moved, on the new letters granted to Catron, to prosecute the suit against Cohea in his (Catron’s) name, and a cross motion was made to abate it. The county court abated the suit, and entered judgment that the defendant go hence. An appeal was prosecuted to the circuit court, where the judgment was affirmed; and an appeal in error was prosecuted to the supreme court, which decided that the administration granted to Catron was merely void, because Marshall had no power to resign-at his own election, and, consequently, the county court had no jurisdiction to appoint a second administrator, there being one vested with the trust and title to the property. Brown, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

Decree reversed.  