
    Hendrick v. The State.
    The principal office of the “arraignment” is to fix the personal identity of the accused. Where the defendant is arraigned and pleads “ not guilty,” there is no necessity of other proof of his identity.
    Appeal from Houston. The appellant was put upon his trial on an indictment for keeping and exhibiting a faro hank for gaming. He was arraigned and pleaded “not guilty.” The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and assessed his line at ten dollars. The defendant moved the court for a new trial upon six several grounds: the 1st, 3d, 5th, and 6th of which were as follows: “1st. The verdict was contrary to the evidence.” “3d. There was no proof before the jury that the defendant was the identical person against whom the charge was made and to whom the proof applied.” “ 5th. The State introduced proof of an offense for which this defendant had been before indicted, and to which this defendant had pleaded guilty and suffered (he penalty of the law.” “ 6th. That tlie defendant had instructed his eouusel to plead said former conviction on tlie trial of this case in bar of the indictment herein; but in the hurry and confusion of the proceedings lie failed to do so, which operated a surprise and injustice upon the defendant unless a new trial is granted him.” The 2d and 4th grounds were the same in substance as the 1st and 5th. Tlie Cth was supported by (he affidavit of the defendant. There was in the record a statement of facts as follows : “James English, tlie only witness sworn, stated that lie had seen the defendant Hendrick keeping and exhibiting a faro bank in the county of Houston, within twelve months next before tlie date of the filing of the bill of indictment, that is, he stated, between the 30f!i of April, 1848, and tlie 30th of April, 1840. On cross-examination by defendant’s attorney, witness stated that he could not he specific as to time, but believed that tlie exhibiting of said bank was on the first or tlie second week of the District Court for said county at the April Term, 1849.”
    Tlie court overruled the motion for a new trial, and gave judgment upon the verdict, and tlie defendant appealed.
    
      Attorney General, for appellee.
   4Vheei.ee, J.

The evidence appears clearly to have established the defendant’s guilt. As to his identity, that was established by the arraignment. The principal office of tiie arraignment is to fix tlie personal identity of the accused. Having been arraigned and pleaded to the indictment there was no necessity of other proof of iiis identity.

The fifth ground embraced in the motion for a new trial appears to have been an assumption of fact unsupported by anything contained ill tlie record. It cannot he pretended that the mere suggestion of a fact in the motion was to be received as evidence of the fact in the court below, or that it is to be so received in this court. Neither is the mere affidavit of the defendant, to tlie effect that his attorney omitted to make his defense in consequence of “tlie hurry and confusion of the proceedings,” to be received as proof of the fact. This ground for a new trial is not deemed of a character to require serious consideration.

4Ve sec no reason to apprehend that the defendant was deprived of any legal right on the trial, or that his defense was not urged by ills counsel, in every 'aspect of which it was susceptible, with an earnestness and zeal quite adequate to tlie occasion.

The conviction appears to have been legal and correct, and we are of opinion that tne judgment be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  