
    STANDARD-VACUUM OIL COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES
    [No. 50336.
    Decided July 12, 1957]
    
    
      Mr. George 8. OoTlins for the plaintiff. Mr. Warraoh ’Wallace and Mr. Leonard F. Hoefler, Jr. were on the briefs.
    
      Mr. David D. Hochstein, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Perry W. Morton, for the defendant.
    
      
      Plaintiff’s petition for writ of certiorari denied by tbe Supreme Court December 9, 1957.
    
   Laramore, Judge,

delivered the following opinion:

This is an action in which plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the alleged use of certain properties by the United States which are owned by plaintiff and located in Japan.

The paramount question to be answered here is whether the properties in question were taken by the United States for which plaintiff can be compensated under the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

The facts clearly show that the property in question was taken from plaintiff by the Imperial Government of Japan after the outbreak of hostilities, under the provisions of the Japanese Enemy Property Custody Law (No. 99 of December 22, 1941) and Japanese Imperial Ordinance Relative to the Enforcement of Enemy Property Custody Law (Imperial Ordinance No. 1179 of December 1941).

Title to and custody of the properties were registered and recorded in the name of the Enemy Property Custodian appointed by the Japanese Ministry of Finance.

At the time of seizure, Japan was a sovereign independent nation having power and jurisdiction over all property within its territory, and its actions with respect to plaintiff’s properties were legally valid and divested the plaintiff of any interest in them. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304, 310; Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U. S. 468, 471.

On August 14, 1945 (U. S. time) the Japanese Government accepted the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, defining the terms for Japanese surrender, and offering to surrender unconditionally to the Allied Powers. This offer was accepted on the same day and the Japanese Government was ordered to cease hostilities and formally surrender to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at a time and place to be designated by him. After the instrument of surrender was signed, the authority of the Japanese Government to rule the state was made subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The instrument of surrender was accepted by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics, and in the interests of the other United Nations at war with Japan, and was also signed by representatives of nine powers at war with Japan. Immediately thereafter General Douglas MacArthur was named Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and commenced the military occupation and control of Japan.

On September 3, 1945, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a directive to the Japanese Government requiring it to place at the disposal of the occupation forces of the Allied Powers all local resources required for their use. Procurement regulations were established for the acquisition of facilities and the properties in question were subjected to demand from the Japanese Government.

Under the Far Eastern Commission’s policy decision and directive of March 6,1947, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was authorized to restore to the allied owner property which had been seized by the Japanese Government. Pursuant to such authorization, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued instructions to the Japanese Government concerning the procedure to be followed in effecting restoration of the property to the allied owner.

The plaintiff filed demands for the return of each of the properties in question with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and supplemented them with final requests for restoration in accordance with procedures established by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. In each of its final requests the plaintiff stated:

We understand that General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, and the Japanese Government will be relieved of all preservation, maintenance and custodial responsibilities with respect to said property after the date set for restoration, consistent with the procedure for physical repossession of property under Procurement Demand.

Pursuant to such demands for the return of property and final requests for restoration, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers directed the Japanese Government to return the properties to the plaintiff. In those instances where the property was being used by the Occupation Forces, the plaintiff was informed that physical possession could not be effected until such time as the property was no longer required by the Occupation Forces.

The military control and occupation of Japan under the sole executive authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers began on September 2, 1945, and from its inception the occupation of Japan was an allied undertaking and responsibility. The use of the properties in question was determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be necessary to the occupation of Japan.

Thus the property was, because of the allied victory, legally taken by the Allied Powers from Japan and title restored under a directive of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

It is to be noted at this point that all action taken was by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, not by the United States. As was said in Anglo Chinese Shipping Company, Ltd. v. United States, 130 C. Cls. 361, 362:

* * * The occupation of Japan was a joint venture, participated in by the United States of America, the United Kingdom, China, and Russia; * * *.

This leaves no doubt but that occupation of plaintiff’s properties was not an act by the United States but by the Allied Powers. There was no taking by the United States and thus the Government is not liable under the fifth amendment. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U. S. 197; Flick v. Johnson, 174 F. 2d 983.

To hold otherwise would be to open the door to claims of not only citizens but noncitizens alike for all occupancy by the Allied Powers, thus causing the United States to bear almost the entire financial burden, not only of the war but also of the peace. This we are not prepared to do.

The unfortunate circumstances of war very often lead not only to human misery but to financial loss as well. It is unfortunate that plaintiff has received no compensation for the occupancy of the properties in question, but on the other hand perhaps it is fortunate that plaintiff’s property was preserved and protected by the Allied Powers’ occupancy.

There being no fifth amendment taking by the United States, plaintiff’s petition is dismissed.

It is so ordered.

LittletoN, Judge, concurs.

MaddeN, Judge,

delivered the following opinion:

When a defeated country is occupied, the victor has the right to impose upon the government of the defeated country the burden of housing the occupying troops. This would be true whether the occupation was that of a joint force, or by the forces of a single victorious nation. In the instant case the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers exercised this' right by issuing his directive to the Japanese Government. It then became the duty of the Japanese Government to make available to the occupying forces such housing as they selected and needed.

The Japanese Government had the duty to exercise its sovereign power to obtain the housing to comply with the directive of the Supreme Commander. It was not acting as an agent of the Supreme Commander, authorized and directed by him to secure housing for his troops at his nation’s expense. It was fulfilling its own obligation as a defeated and occupied sovereign. How it obtained the housing needed to fulfill that obligation was its own problem, governed by its own law. If its law was like our law, including our Fifth Amendment, it would have to pay for what' it took for this public purpose, i. e. for fulfilling its obligation as an occupied nation.

Japanese sovereignty, including its power to requisition property for a public purpose, extended, of course, to all the property within its territory, whether the private ownership of that property was in Japanese, British, Dutch, American, or any other citizens. In the instant case, the property selected by the occupying forces and requisitioned by the Japanese Government happened to belong to an American citizen. That fact would seem to be completely immaterial. The important thing was that the property was taken by the Japanese Government for the purposes of that government. There was, then, no taking by the United States. There was use by United States forces, or allied forces, of housing furnished to them by Japan.

It seems that the Japanese Government, under its laws, which laws may have been dictated by the Supreme Commander, or may have been the existing laws of Japan, did pay rent for housing which it took from private persons in order to furnish it to the occupying forces. It tendered such rent to the plaintiff, at the rate which was legal under the laws of Japan. That is all that a Japanese or a Britisher or a Dutchman would have been entitled to and that is all that the plaintiff, an American, was entitled to, for its property in Japan and subject to Japanese laws. The plaintiff refused the tender. It made a mistake in doing so. Whether, under Japanese laws, the money is still available to it we do not know. That is a problem for it and the Japanese Government. Plaintiff’s petition must be dismissed.

Jones, Chief Judge, joins in the foregoing opinion.

Whitaker, Judge,

dissenting:

I cannot agree with the opinions of the majority. In the first place, I do not agree with the reason assigned by Judges Laramore and Littleton for the nonliability of the United States to pay just compensation for the occupation of plaintiff’s property, to wit, that it was an occupation not by the United .States, but by the Allied Powers.

The occupation of Japan was a joint enterprise of the United States, Great Britain, Bussia and other Powers, but each Power was liable for the expense of the maintenance of its own forces. Food and clothing were purchased by the United States for its troops, by Great Britain for its troops, etc. Liability for these purchases was on the Government making them, and on it alone. The cost of quartering its troops was also the responsibility of the several Governments. That each of them was engaged in a joint venture with the others affords no escape from liability. See Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, 130 C. Cls. 361.

However, there is in my mind a serious question of the liability of the United States on another ground. After the outbreak of war with Japan, plaintiff’s property, located in Japan, was, under international law, enemy property, and during hostilities, at least, was liable to utilization, or even to destruction, by our forces with impunity; the owner had no redress against the United States therefor. Juragua Iron Co., Ltd. v. United States, 42 C. Cls. 99; affirmed 212 U. S. 297; Herrera v. United States, 222 U. S. 558; Oppenheim, International Law (6th Ed.) Vol. II, section 140; Wheaton, International Law (7th Ed) p. 248; Hyde, International Law (2d Rev. Ed.) Vol. III, pp. 1726-1731.

Does this rule apply to the property of a citizen of the United States, or a corporation of the United States, after the formal surrender of the enemy ?

Technically, of course, the war is not over until the treaty of peace is signed, and occupation forces are a necessary aftermath of the surrender. Also, it will not be disputed that during the period of occupation our Government could require the use of the property of a Japanese national, and that national would have no recourse against it. But does this same rule apply to the property of an American citizen or an American corporation after the enemy has surrendered ? After the surrender, is the property of an American citizen still enemy property ?

The war was fought for the protection of American lives and property, for the protection of this property as well as other property of our citizens; it was fought to secure restoration of American property that had been seized by the enemy. This purpose was partly accomplished by the order of the Supreme Commander requiring the restoration of the property seized by the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government restored title to it, and would have restored possession except for its occupancy by the American Army. From that time on, Japanese sovereignty over this property was ended; its dominion and control over it was surrendered and the title of its former owner was recognized.

Thereafter, this property could not in reason be classified as enemy property. It was the property of an American corporation, which had been liberated from the hands of the Japanese.

Now, the right of the American Army of Occupation to use it in furtherance of the purposes of the occupation is not open to question; but when so used, it was used, not as enemy property, but as the property of an American corporation. Its owner was entitled to the same recompense as the owner of other property taken by the Government for public purposes, to wit, the payment of just compensation.

The United States had the right, as the victor, to require the conquered enemy to pay the cost of occupation, including the rental value of plaintiff’s property; but this does not mean that the United States can shift to Japan’s shoulders the responsibility the United States is under to one of its own citizens for the taking of its property. It must compensate the citizen itself, and then look to Japan for restitution. Seery v. United States, 130 C. Cls. 481.

I think the plaintiff is entitled to recover the fair rental value of the property from the time title to it was restored to plaintiff by the Japanese Government, and until possession of it was restored to plaintiff by the United States Government.

I would remand the case to a commissioner to determine this amount.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Commissioner George H. Foster, and the briefs and argument of counsel, makes findings of facts as follows:

1. Plaintiff, Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, is, and at all times hereinafter mentioned was, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware.

2. Prior to December 7,1941, plaintiff was the owner and entitled to the possession and control of the following properties in J apan:

Type of Property Location
Land and Residence_No. 1. Negishi, Yokohama
Land and Residence_No. 2. Negishi, Yokohama
Land and Office Building_No. 8. The Bund, Yokohama
Land and Double Residence_No. 76-B. The Bluff, Yokohama
Land and Residence_No. 219-B. The Bluff, Yokohama
Land and Residence_No. 48-C. The Bluff, Yokohama
Land_Kanagawa, Yokohama
Railway Service Station_Yokohama
Land and Oil Installation_Fukagawa, Tokyo
Land and Oil Installation_Hatta, Nagoya

3. Because of unprovoked acts of war committed by the Imperial Government of Japan on December 7,1941, against the Government and people of the United States, the Congress, by a Joint Resolution approved December 8, 1941, (55 Stat. 795) (December 9 Japan time) formally declared war on Japan.

Pursuant to and under the provisions of Japanese Enemy Property Custody Law (No. 99 of Dec. 22, 1941) and Japanese Imperial Ordinance relative to the enforcement of that law (Imperial Ordinance No. 1179 of December 1941), the properties described in paragraph 2 were designated as enemy properties and seized by the J apanese Government in 1942 and 1943, and the title to and custody of said properties, including the right of sale and disposal, were registered and recorded in the name of the Enemy Property Custodian appointed by the Japanese Ministry of Finance.

4. On August 14,1945, (U. S. time) the Japanese Government accepted the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, defining the terms for Japanese surrender, and offered to surrender unconditionally to the Allied Powers. This offer was accepted on the same day and the Japanese Government was ordered and directed to cease hostilities and formally surrender to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at a time and place to be designated by him.

On September 2, 1945, an instrument of surrender was signed by representatives of the Japanese Emperor and Government whereby, among other things, the unconditional surrender of Japan to the Allied Powers was proclaimed and the authority of the Emperor and J apanese Government to rule the state was made subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The instrument of surrender was accepted by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics, and in the interests of the other United Nations at war with Japan, and was also signed by representatives of nine powers at war with Japan, including the defendant. Immediately thereafter, forces of the Allied Powers, including the defendant, commenced the military occupation and control of Japan under General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

5. On September 3,1945, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a directive to the Japanese Government requiring it to place at the disposal of the Occupation Forces of the Allied Powers all local resources required for their use in accomplishing the terms of surrender and to establish a central agency to receive requisitions for areas and facilities required by the Occupation Forces. In furtherance of this directive the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers established procurement regulations and procedures for the acquisition of facilities in Japan for the use of the Occupation Forces and representatives or missions of Allied Governments in Japan. The properties described in paragraph 2 of the petition (finding 2) were required for the use of military units of the defendant, as part of the Occupation Forces of the Allied Powers, pursuant to the procurement procedures and regulations established by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, by procurement demands placed with the Japanese Government by General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or a duly authorized representative designated by him, for the purpose of obtaining facilities for the Occupation Forces.

The dates when procurement demands for the properties described in paragraph 2 of the petition (finding 2) were placed with the Japanese Government and the dates when the properties were released to the Japanese Government are as follows:

Property Date of Procurement Demand on Japanese Date Released to Government Japanese Government
No. 1. Negishi, Yokohama_ Sept. 23,1945 Jan. 13, 1951.
No. 2. Negishi, Yokohama_ July 1,1946 Oct. 26, 1949.
No. 8. The Bund, Yokohama_ Sept. 22,1945 Various dates to Jan. 23, 1951. (Date of total release).
No. 76-B. The Bluff, Yokohama. Oct. 1, 1945 July 14, 1949 (One-half).
June 5, 1950 (Remainder) .
No. 219-B. The Bluff, Yokohama. Apr. 1,1947 Mar. 31, 1953.
No. 48-C. The Bluff, Yokohama. Oct. 1,1946 Aug. 27, 1949.
Kanagawa, Yokohama_ Oct. 25,1946 Aug. 4, 1952.
Railway Service Station, Yokohama. June 14,1946 June 21, 1948.
Fukagawa, Tokyo_ Jan. 15,1947 July 27, 1952.
Hatta, Nagoya_ Oct. 4,1946 Apr. 20, 1953.

The dates of release are subject to correction at time of further proceedings for the determination of the amount of recovery, if necessary.

6. As part of the costs of occupation of Japan by the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government agreed to pay and was obligated and required to pay rental to the plaintiff for the use of the properties which were under procurement demand and were used and occupied by military units of the defendant as one of the Allied Occupying Powers. The Japanese Government on numerous occasions attempted to negotiate leases with the plaintiff for the use of its properties and tendered to the plaintiff the amount of rental due under Japanese law in accordance with the Imperial Japanese Eent Control Ordinance (Imperial Ordinance No. 678 of September 19, 1940, as amended) but the plaintiff refused to execute any lease or to accept the rental offered and tendered by the Japanese Government.

The plaintiff does not agree that it is bound by the Japanese Eent Control Ordinance as applicable to the situation here involved.

7. Plaintiff conducted negotiations and correspondence and had numerous conf erences and conversations with representatives of the Japanese Government during the period when the properties were under procurement demand regarding the terms of the proposed leases and the amount of rental to be paid by the Japanese Government, but refused to execute leases or accept any rental upon the ground that the rental offered by the Japanese Government was too low.

During the same period, plaintiff conducted negotiations and correspondence and had numerous conferences and conversations with officers of the Eighth Army, to obtain repossession of the properties in question. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers had designated the Eighth Army of defendant as part of the Occupation Forces of the Allied Powers as the sole procuring agency for Japanese supplies, real estate, construction, and services for all the occupation forces in Japan. Procurement was effected by means of a procurement demand, served by the Eighth Army on the Imperial Japanese Government through Japanese Liaison officers or local Japanese governments.

8. Under the Far Eastern Commission’s Policy Decision and Directive of March 6,1947, entitled “Interim Principles for Restitution of Identifiable Property Confiscated in Japan from Allied Nationals,” the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was authorized to restore to the allied owner property which had been seized, confiscated or sequestered by the Japanese Government, provided that the restoration of such property should be made without expense to the owners and without prejudicing the claim of the original owners against the Japanese Government for damages to property, rent, depreciation, and other losses.

Pursuant to such authorization, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued instructions to the Japanese Government concerning the procedure to be followed in effecting restoration of such property to the allied owner. In those cases where the property was under procurement demand by the Occupation Forces the Japanese Government was directed to restore title to the allied owner immediately upon issuance by General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, of a directive ordering restoration of the property, and to restore possession to the allied owner after release from procurement demand.

The plaintiff, through duly authorized representatives acting in its behalf, filed demands for the return of each of the properties described in paragraph. 2 of the petition (and paragraph 2 of this memorandum) with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and supplemented them with final requests for restoration in accordance with precedures established by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. In each of its final requests for restoration the plaintiff stated:

We understand that General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, and the Japanese Government will be relieved of all preservation, maintenance and custodial responsibilities with respect to said property after the date set for restoration, consistent with the procedure for physical repossession of property under Procurement Demand.

Pursuant to such demands for the return of property and final requests for restoration, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers directed the Japanese Government to return the properties to the plaintiff and set a definite time and place for the signing of receipts for restoration by representatives of the plaintiff and the Japanese Government. In those instances where the property was being used by the Occupation Forces the plaintiff was informed that physical possession could not be effected until such time as the property was no longer required by the Occupation Forces.

The defendant further alleges that a duly authorized representative of the plaintiff and the Japanese Government executed a “Receipt for Restoration to United Nations National of Property in Japan” for each of the properties described in paragraph 2 of the petition (finding 2) and that the receipt in each instance provided in part as follows:

RECEIPT EOR RESTORATION TO UNITED NATIONS NATIONAL OE PROPERTY IN JAPAN
The signatures of the Restoree and the authorized representative of the Japanese Government, respectively, which are hereto subscribed attest to the fact that the Japanese Government has delivered and transferred and thereby restored possession and custody of thei property listed * * * , together with the title indicated, to the Restores * * *, and that the Restores has accepted such delivery, transfer, restoration, possession and title of the listed property from the Japanese Gov-eminent. It is hereby acknowledged and agreed that the following conditions shall apply:
1. The return of the listed property to the Eestoree is made at no expense to the Eestoree and does not prejudice the claim of the Eestoree against the Japanese Government or other enemy governments and/or their nationals for damages to property, rent, depreciation and other losses.
2. Property is restored free of all legal encumbrances to which it may have become subject subsequent to wrongful transfer or seizure.
*****
5. Anyone injured by the restoration of the property to Eestoree shall look to the Japanese Government for relief.

The dates when the properties described in paragraph 2 of the petition (finding 2) were seized by the Japanese Government and registered in the name of the Enemy Property Custodian, the dates when demand for return of the property was made by the plaintiff, the dates when title to the properties was registered in the name of the plaintiff, and the dates when receipts for restoration of the properties were executed by representatives of the plaintiff and the Japanese Government are as follows :

Registered in Name of Enemy Property Property Custodian Title Registered in Name of Demand for Standard Return of Vacuum Oil Receipt for Restoration Property Company of Property
No. 1 Negishi, Yoko- Ian. 16,1942 hama. Aug. 17,1948 Jan. 18,1949 Jan. 21,1949.
No. 2. Negishi, Yoko- Jan. 16,1942 hama. Aug. 17,1948 Jan. 18,1949 Jan. 21, 1949.
No. 8. The Bund, Nov. 23,1943 Yokohama. Nov. 10,1948 Feb. 18,1949 Feb. 10,1949. July 29, 1949 (Supplemental).
Nov. 14, 1949 (Supplemental).
No. 76-B. The Blufl, Yokohama. Mar. 19,1942 Aug. 12,1948 Jan. 19,1949 June 5,1950.
No. 219-B. The Blufl, Yokohama. Feb. 25,1943 June 17,1948 Dec. 20,1948 Dee. 23,1948.
No. 48-0. The Blufl, Yokohama. Deo. 24,1942 May 6,1948 Deo. 20,1948 Dec. 23, 1948.
Kanagawa, Yokohama. Sept. 16,1942 June 14,1948 May 23,1949 May 31,1948.
Bailway Service Station, Yokohama. Jan. 16,1942 May 10,1948 June 19,1948 June 21, 1948.
Fukagawa, Tokyo — .. Sept. 12,1942 Mar. 3,1949 May 27,1949 May 31,1949.
Hatta, Nagoya_ Sept. 3,1942 Nov. 1,1948 Feb. 12,1949 Feb. 25, 1949.

9. A state of war existed between the Imperial Japanese Government and the United States and other Allied Powers from December 8,1941, until April 28,1952, when the Treaty of Peace with Japan became effective. The military control and occupation of Japan under the sole executive authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers began on September 2,1945, and from its inception the occupation of Japan was an allied undertaking and responsibility. The use of the properties here involved was determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be necessary to the occupation of J apan in furtherance of the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, and the terms of surrender which were accepted by the Japanese Government.

10. The defendant has refused to pay plaintiff any compensation for having occupied and used the properties here involved, or for deprivation of use thereof by plaintiff, and no action has been taken by Congress or by any department of the United States Government to award the plaintiff compensation therefor except as may be shown above.

11. The following documents were offered and received in evidence:

Laws and Ordinances Pertaining to Foreign Property, March 31, 1950, pages 107 and 109 particularly.
Photostats of certain Imperial J apanese Ordinances and other documents on file in the Office of The Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army.
List of contents of Defendant’s Exhibit No. 2.
Copy of “Interim Principles for Restitution of Identifiable Property Confiscated in Japan from Allied Nationals” adopted by the Far Eastern Commission, March 6,1947.
Report of the Secretary General, of the Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, Feb. 26, 1947 to July 10, 1947. (Pages 21 and 22 thereof.)
Copy of Directive No. 2 of Sept. 3,1945, to the Japanese Imperial Government.
Copy of Cabinet Order No. 6 included in official Gazette of the J apanese Imperial Government.
Circular No. 15, General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Nov. 6, 1951.
Copy of “Japanese Peace Treaty” printed in Senate Document of 82d Congress, 2d Session.
Copy of Administrative Agreement between the United States and Japan, 1952.
Memorandum regarding claims of American Nationals under Provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Japan.
A photograph of each of the properties described in paragraph 2 of the petition and use of which properties were put under Procurement Demand.
Letter of October 11, 1949 from Eighth Army to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

CONCLU8ION OF I/AW

Upon the foregoing findings of fact, which are made a part of the judgment herein, the court concludes as a matter of law that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and its petition is therefore dismissed. 
      
       Plaintiff was, however, tendered the rent at the Japanese legal rate by Japan but refused to accept claiming It was not bound by the Japanese Rent Control Ordinance. Apparently Japan is willing to pay this amount today.
     
      
       Custodian removed.
     