
    CHORPENNING’S CASE.
    (11 Court of Claims R., p. 625;
    94 U. S. R., p. — .)
    George Chorpenning, appellant, v. The United States, appellees.
    
      On the claimant’s Appeal.
    
    
      The Joint resolution 15th July, 1870, authorizes “ the Postmaster-General to investigate and adjust the claims of George Ohorpenning.” One claim is' the subject-matter of a formes' suit decided adversely to him, (3 O. Cls. JR., 140,) another is new matter. The resolution also provides that “ the right of appeal from the findings of the Postmaster-General to the Court of Claims is reserved and allowed to said claimant.” Under it the JPost-master-General awards to the claimant $443,010.60. JBefore this is paid Congress repeals the resolution. The claimant, brings his action on the award. The defendants plead the repealing act in bar. The claimant demurs. The court below decides that the direction to the Postmaster-General “to investigate and adjust ” was not a submission to his arbitrament, and that no action can be maintained on such an award where Congress repealed the referring act, though after the award toas made. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.
    
    I. Where a private act directs the head of a Department to “ investigate and adjust” the claims of a party, it thereby creates no obligation on the part of the defendants to pay the amount found to be due. Congress may repeal the private act at any time before payment; anil no action can be maintained on the award.
    II. Where a private act authorizes the head of an Executive Department to “ investigate and adjust ” a claim, he acts in a ministerial and not in a judicial character. The investigation is not an arbitrament, nor is he an arbitrator; and his adjustment is in no sense a binding award, nor of a higher character than the ordinary adjustments made by accounting-officers of the Treasury.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case :
    This cáse was heard in the court below upon the defendants’ demurrer to the claimant’s petition, and the petition was dismissed.
    
      
      Mr. Joseph Casey for the appellant:
    I argue that these claims were referred to the Postmaster-G-eneral to be finally and conclusively adjusted and settled.
    This conclusion is drawn from the express words of the act of 1857, and the resolution of 1870. A portion of the claim, under the act of 1857, was for unliquidated damages, and its settlement and adjustment necessarily involved the exercise of judgment and discretion. The whole of the additional claim, referred by the resolution of 1870, was of the same character, and involved the same judgment and discretion. The act and. resolution necessarily made the action of the Postmaster-General conclusive by not providing for any appeal, or report to, or revision by, any other body or tribunal on part of the United States. They made the finding final by providing that the amount allowed by the Postmaster-General should be paid out of the Treasury, without further revision, or even special appropriation by Congress. It is a conclusive award, because the resolution of 1870 gives the direct right to appeal to the claim-' ant from the findings of the 'Postmaster-General to a judicial tribunal. It is a conclusive award, because it was adjudged judicially to be so by a competent court iu a suit between the same parties, for the same subject-matter, under one of the same enactments. That a decision having been rendered by that court in favor of the United States, upon the plea and at the instance of the Attorney-General, of a conclusive award under the act of 1857, they are estopped in this case to deny that it conferred the power to make such an award. It is a conclusive award, because when Congress passed the joint resolution of 1870 they knew that the former proceedings under the act of 1857 had been so held by that court, and there is in the latter enactment nothing which rejects or repudiates the construction given, but a clear adoption and approval of it by implication. Because, from all these considerations, it appears the intention and purpose of Congress in referring the matter to the Postmaster-General was to furnish an arbiter or tribunal, invested with all the faculties and powers necessary to a full investigation and final determination of the controversy. The former case, appealed from the Court of Claims, was pending on appeal iu this court when the resolution of 1870 was passed. That appeal was then withdrawn or discontinued. It was, therefore-, in effect the reference and submission of a pending suit.
    
      “ Submission is the technical designation of that contract by which parties agree to refer matters which are in dispute, difference, or doubt between them to be finally decided by the award of judges named by the parties, and called arbitrators.” (Morse on Arb. and Aw., 36.)
    An act of Congress is necessary to submit the rights of the United States to arbitration. (The United States v. Ames, Wood and Min., 89, 90; The United States v. Nicholl, 1 Paine’s C. C. R., 649.)
    The Postmaster-General, under the acts of 1857 and 1870, was a judge or arbitrator invested with quasi-judicial power. {The United States v. Kendall, 12 Pet., 611; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 ibid., 511; Kendall v. Stolces, 3 How., 87; I)e Groot Case, 9 Op. Att. Gen., 481; Washington Aqueduct, 9 ibid., 494, 495; JDe Groot v. The United States, 1 C. Oís. R., 97; Same v. Same, 5 Wall., 428; Carmielc & Ramsey v. United States, 2 O. Gis. R., 126; TheUnited States v. Adams, 7 Wall., 463 ; Samer. Child & Co., 12 id., 232; Comegys r. Vasse, 1 Pet., 212; Meade -v. The United States, 2 O. Cls. R., 277; Same v. Same, 9 Wall., 691.)
    The law implies an agreement to abide the result from the mere fact of submission. (Smith r. Morse, 9 Wall., 76.)
    “ Courts will always seek to uphold a submission, in spite of a defect in formality, according to the obvious intent of the parties.” (McAdams's Kxrs. v. Stilwell, 13 Pa. St., 90; Large v. Passmore, 5 S. & R., 51; Karris v. Kayes, 6 Binn., 422; and see Morse on Arb., 47.)
    The tendency of courts to construe with great liberality statutes permitting submissions. (Morse, 57.)
    “ Courts will always seek to put as liberal, large, and comprehensive a construction upon the submission as the apparent intent of the parties to it will admit.” • (Morse, 59, and cases cited in notes.)
    Submission of “a claim ”, involves both the “legality” and “ amount” of the claim. Coleord v. Fletcher, 50 Me., 398; Morse, 60.)
    Even if the submission be indefinite, the court will seek to uphold it. (Morse, 61, and cases cited.) The award is mutual, certain, and final, and according to the submission. The statutes here constitute the submission or reference. The presumption of law is always in favor of validity. (Myers v. R. R., 2 Curtis C. C., 28; Lamphire v. Cowan, 39 Vt., 420; Kayes v. Forslcoll, 31 Me., 112; and see Morse, 179.)
    
      In the United States the doctrine is established that arbitrators are not bound by the strict principles of the law, but may decide according to their general views of what is right, just, and conscientious in the case. (See Morse, 216 and 217, 218, 219, and 220, and cases cited. See also Chorpenning v. The United States, 3 C. Cls. It., 140.)
    So if there be no re-enactment of the act of 1857, yet it is in pari materia with the resolution of 1870, and therefore as one statute. (Patterson v. Winn, 11 Wheat., 385, 386; Dubois v. McLean, 4 McL., 489.)
    What is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as what is expressed. (The United States v. Babitt, 1 Bl., 61; GelpeeJce v. Dubuque, 1 Wall.,. 120; The United States v. Saunders, 22 Wall., 492.)
    A statute is to be interpreted not only by its exact words, but also by its apparent general purpose.
    The Act June 8,1872, referred to the Court of Claims the claim of the heirs of Col. Francis Yigo, “ with full jurisdiction to adjust and settle the same.” Was this a mere ministerial power % (See case in Supreme Court, 1 Otto, 540.)
    I present, lastly, what appears to me absolutely conclusive on this subject of interpretation and construction. It is the list of congressional enactments contained in the appendix to this brief. They commence with the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, and have been continued to the present day. They refer disputed and unliquidated private claims to various persons and officers of the Government, to be“ audited,” “ adjusted,” “liquidated,” “ settled,” “ allowed,” and paid. And in these multiplied instances, running through a century of unbroken usage, there are, so far as diligent research disclosed to me, but three or four instances where Congress has, subsequent to the settlement, interposed to prevent payment. These instances were peculiar, and will be adverted to in a subsequent part of this brief. So that this court in the Kendall ‘Cases, in 12 Peters and 3 Howard, were but affirming and recognizing the usage of the Government up to.that time. And since then, in the light of that decision, and in full recognition of its justice and propriety for forty years more, Congress has, in numerious and repeated instances, passed similar laws, has expressed no dissent, manifested no other intent but; year after year Congress has continued to pass these, laws. They bave referred many hundred claims and accounts, involving many millions, to these designated officers. And they have adjusted, decided, and paid them, without one word of dissent from Congress. This, un,til the organization of the Court of Claims, was the usual if not universal method of determining claims upon the United States involving disputed facts, as controverted questions of law. We must, therefore, conclude that Congress expected and intended our acts, being similar, be construed in the same way.
    
      Mr. Solicitor-General Phillips for the United States, appellees:
    Taking the Resolution July, 1870, as responsive to the petition of the claimant, a view presented in his petition, it seems that the Postmaster-General acted entirely as an accounting-officer of the United States. The claimant asked for a reference to the Postmaster-General or other accounting-officer, and thereupon accordingly reference was made to the Postmaster-General. The claimant asked also that such reference authorize the officer to adjust and settle all matters in disfrute, but the reference thereupon ordered authorized the Postmaster-General only to investigate and adjust his claims; i. e., presumably, while the claimant desired that the referee might consider and settle the grounds upon which the United States objected to the payment of his claim, as well as the amount of the claim itself, Congress limited his authority to the former point alone, reserving, it may be, to itself the determination of the weight due to the latter.
    It is not to be presumed that Congress intended to give to the claimant more than he had asked. Upon the above facts, taken from the petition of the claimant, it is therefore to be understood that the Postmaster-General acted in the premises merely as an accounting-officer of the Government.
    The circumstance that he acted under special legislation gives to the results at which he arrived no greater force than belongs to the ordinary daily investigations and adjustments of claims against the Government occurring in one or other of the Executive Departments under general provisions of law. If these latter be awards, or stated accounts, then so also is the former ; but if they be not such, then neither is the former.
    Section 2 of the Act March 3, 1817, (3 Stat. L., 366,) provides that all claims and demands whatever by the United States or against them, and all accounts whatever in which the United States are concerned, either as debtors or creditors, shall be settled and adjusted in the Treasury Department. The sections following specify the accounts which shall be examined by the several Auditors, and provide that the balances certified by them, and the account, voucher, and certificate, shall be transmitted to one or.other of the Comptrollers, who, after examination, shall certify the balance to the Register of the Treasury or to the Secretary of the Department in which the expense has been incurred. But it has never been pretended that a balance found by these officers, whether for or against the United States, had the force of a judgment, award, or account stated.
    The need for special legislation in order that an accounting-officer should act in this case was owing to dertain previous obstructions in point of administration mentioned in the petition. The effect of such special legislation was no more than to remove these obstructions, and thereby to place the claim upon a level with claims in what may be termed a normal condition.
    An adjustment made by an accounting-officer of the United States is no valid basis for an action in the Court of Claims. It it not either a contract or a regulation of an Executive Department, or a law of Congress, within the terms of the act (Rev. Stat., § 1059) which defines the jurisdiction of that court. In a suit brought upon the original contract that had been before the accounting-officer such adjustment might have been of some wéight as evidence, but this action is not brought upon the original contract. It rests entirely upon the adjustment, which it characterizes as an award, or, at all events, stated account.
    It is submitted, in general, that Congress should be left at full liberty to refer to the accounting-officers of the United States, for investigation and adjustment by them, any claim prosecuted before it; that it will be presumed that such reference is for the purpose of future more intelligent action by that body itself; and that in the absence of such action it would be bad policy for the judiciary to treat any question provisionally adjusted upon such reference as being adjusted for all purposes. It seems that such a principle will result in greatly hampering future action by Congress intended to secure information for itself, information to be passed upon, accepted, or rejected by itself alone. While this is so in general, the Eesolution July 1870, has a special feature enforcing the suggestion in the present case. Congress provides by the last clause for an “appeal” by the claimant from the findings of the Postmaster-General to the Court of Claims, in case such findings should be unacceptable to him. That is, as I submit, Congress, understanding that the findings by the Postmaster-General would be merely a basis for its own future action, provided that as it was not bound, so also even the claimant should not be bound by them, but at his instance the Court of Claims might re-investigate and re-adjust the matters referred. ,
    In either case Congress contemplated that the adjustment by the Postmaster-General would not be final. It is difficult to suppose that it intended to be final for the United States and not final for the claimant. Congress did not mean to say to the claimant, " You may have your wish, and if not satisfied therewith, then another chance; meanwhile the United States will abide whatever happens.” Its reason for not providing expressly that the action of the accounting-officer should not be binding on the United States (as it had done in favor of the claimant) was no doubt the presumption that such action would certainly be returned to Congress for a final determination. Both parties must be bound, or neither; if the claimant were not bound by the adjustment, (prqprio vigore, that is, and not because of his own subsequent acquiescence therein,) so also were not the United States.
    If the United States were not bound by it, it could of course constitute no cause of action against them.
    Upon the whole, the decision in Gordon’s Case (7 Wall., 188) covers this, as it is evident, from the principle there declared as to the nature of adjustment of claims by executive officers under references by Congress, that the foundation of the present action is not an award, that being the only head of jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of Claims to which the subject of contention upon which the present action is founded, bears any resemblance. I refer also to the opinion in this ease of the learned court below.
   Mr. Justice Swayne

delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellant rests his claim upon the Act March 3,1857, (11 Stat. L., 521,) and the Resolution July 15,1870, (16 id., 673.)

Under the act of 1857, Postmaster-General Brown, on the 25th of May and the 30th of June, 1857, awarded to the claimant three several sums of $30,000, $49,842, and $29,590.95, which were paid to him. He received them under protest.

Thereafter he filed his petition in the Court of Claims, averring that he was entitled to further compensation and damages under the act.

The Court of Claims held that the action of the Postmaster-General, and the payment and receipt of the sums awarded, were final and conclusive between the parties, (Chorpenning v. The United States, 3 C. Cls. R., 140,) and the petition was dismissed. The claimant appealed to this court. While the appeal was pending, Congress passed the resolution of July 15, 1870. Under that resolution Postmaster-General Oreswell found there was due to the claimant the further sum of $443,010.70. Before anything further was done, Congress, by the Resolution 9th February, 1871, (16 Stat. L., 702,) repealed the resolution of the 15th of July, 1870, under which the last adjustment was made, and by the Act March 3,1871, (16 id., 519,) directed that no part of the money thereby appropriated for the use of the Post-Office Department should “ be applied to the payment of what is known as the Chorpenning claim.”

Upon analyzing the resolution of 1870, it is found to contain the following provisions: (1) The Postmaster-General was authorized to “investigate and adjust” anew the claims of George Chorpenning under the first section of the act of 1857, “ on the basis of compensation allowed by said act for regular mail service ; ” (2) “ arid the claim growing out of the curtailment and annulment of his contract on route No. 12,801, on the basis of his agreement with the Postmaster-General for the service, to be settled as provided for the services named in said act.” (3) “And the right of appeal from the proceedings of the Postmaster-General to the Court of Claims” was “reserved and allowed to the said claimant.”

The act of 1857 became defunct by what occurred under it in that year. It was in no wise revived by the resolution of 1870. It was only referred to by that resolution for the rules and basis upon which the new adjustment authorized was to proceed.

The question before us is as to the effect of the repealing resolution of 1871. In considering that subject the act of 1857 may be laid out of view, and will not be further adverted to.

The resolution relied upon by the appellant was wholly unilateral. It contained no stipulation of payment, express or implied. Congress, for its own reasons, simply directed an examination and adjustment. It gave no promise, and came under no obligation to the other party, and asked and received none from him. The Government and the claimant stood, and continued to stand, wholly independent of each other. The Government could at any time before payment recall what it had done, and the claimant was at liberty up to the same period to refuse concurrence, and assert aliunde his legal rights, if any he had. Prior to that time there could be no vested right and no commitment of either party not subject to the exercise thereafter of such discretion, affirmative or negative, as might be deemed proper. The case presents the same legal aspect as if it were between individuals. If a merchant should direct his clerk or other agent to “investigate and adjust the claim” of a third party upon a prescribed basis, and the adjustment was made accordingly, can it be doubted that the merchant might, thereafter, because he had come to the conclusion that the claim was tainted with fraud or had been already fully paid, or for any other reason, or as a matter of choice, without assigning any reason, decline to recognize what had been done as of any validity, and withdraw the authority under which the proceeding had been taken ?

The reason of the right would be that there was no binding mutuality of assent, no consideration, and hence no legal obligation resting upon either party. The duty devolved upon the Postmaster-General was wholly ministerial, and in no sense judicial, or that of an arbitrator. The record discloses no element of an arbitrament. The adjustment having been made under a special law renders it in no wise different as regards the point we are considering from those made daily by the accounting-officers of the Government, under the general law conferring their powers and prescribing their duties. The idea that the Government is finally concluded by the results at which they may arrive would be regarded as a novelty within and without the several Departments.

The implication from the repeal of the resolution of 1870, and the prohibition in the act of 1871, is clear that Congress did not intend that anything more should be paid to the claimant without further authority from that body. (The United States v. Babbitt, 1 Black, 53.) This case is not distinguishable in principle from Gordon v. The United States, (7 Wall. R., 188.) Aside from the views we have expressed, that adjudication is conclusive as authority against the appellant.

Our attention has been called by the counsel on both sides to the clause of the resolution giving the claimant the right of appeal from the findings of the Postmaster-General to the Court of Claims. The view which we take of the case renders it unnecessary to consider that point, and we express no opinion upon the subject.

The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed.  