
    Lorraine Althea WELLS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANKLIN APARTMENTS, TENANTS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 08-57031.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 16, 2010.
    
    Filed March 9, 2010.
    Lorraine Althea Wells, Beverly Hills, CA, pro se.
    Jeanette Rosa Schachtner, Deputy City, Office of the City Attorney, Harold Eugene Griffin, Santa Monica, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, and therefore denies Wells's request for oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Lorraine Althea Wells appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in her action alleging various claims against the Franklin Apartments and/or tenants, the City of Santa Monica, and Westside Regional Center. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo both the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, Peralta v. Hispanic Bus., Inc., 419 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir.2005), and a grant of summary judgment, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Wells’s claims against the City of Santa Monica for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because her complaint does not allege facts to support federal question or diversity jurisdiction against the City. See Peralta, 419 F.3d at 1068 (“In civil cases, subject matter jurisdiction is generally conferred upon federal district courts either through diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”); see also Vaden v. Discover Bank, — U.S.—, 129 S.Ct. 1262, 1272, 173 L.Ed.2d 206 (2009) (explaining that section 1331 confers jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under” federal law and that an action “arises under” federal law only where the plaintiffs statement of the claim shows that the claim is based on federal law).

To the extent that Wells has alleged any causes of action against Franklin Apartments, the district court properly determined that they were foreclosed by Wells’s prior settlement agreement with the owners. See Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 449-50 (9th Cir.2006) (discussing release of claims under California law). To the extent that Wells has alleged any causes of action against the tenants of Franklin Apartments, she failed to name those individuals and to serve them with the summons and complaint, so they were never properly made parties to the action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4.

Wells’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     