
    WILLIAM P. RAVENEL ET AL. v. THE UNITED STATES. SUSAN H. PERRONEAU ET AL. v. THE SAME.
    [Nos. 15490, 15489.
    Decided March 26, 1888.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    Three tracts of land are sold for direct taxes. The defendants concede that the surplus, whatever it may he, belongs to the owners. The amount only is in dispute. The commissioners by whom the lands were sold deducted $2 for every $100 of valuation; the claimants deduct only $1.17^%.
    I. Having the whole amount of the direct tax apportioned to a State, and the valuation of a tract, the amount chargeable to it can be ascertained by following the rule of assessment prescribed by the Direct Tax Act June 7, 1862 (12 Stat. L., p. 422, § 1.)
    II. The correct amount of surplus being ascertained under the Direct Tax 'Acts, the court has jurisdiction to render judgment therefor, notwithstanding that the accounting officers state a less amount as the surplus in the Treasury.
    III.Jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the recovery of “ the surplus of the proceeds of the sale ” necessarily carries with it authority to ascertain what that surplus is.
    
      The Reporters’’ statement of the case:
    The following are. the facts, as found by the court:
    I. Coffin Point plantation, on St. Helena’s Island, Beaufort County, S. 0., was sold under the direct-tax act, on the 10th of March, 1863, to E. S. Philbrick. At the time of the sale Mary C. De Saussure, Susan H. Peronneau, William H. Peronneau, and Ann B. Du Bose were owners, as tenants in common, in fee-simple in remainder of one undivided fifth of the said plantation. Ann B. Du Bose died in 1873, and William H. Peron-neau died in 1874, and the claimant, Henry W. De Saussure, jr., has been appointed administrator.©! their respective estates. At the time of the said sale Elizabeth Coffin Eavenel was owner in fee-simple, as tenant in common, of another undivided one-fifth of the said plantation. She died in 1870, and the claimant, William Parker Eavenel, is administrator of her estate.
    
      II. Cherry Hill plantation, on St. Helena’s Island aforesaid, was sold on the 10th March, 1863, under the direct-tax act, to B. S. Philbrick. At thé time of the said last-mentioned salé Elizabeth Coffin Bavenel, William Parker Bavenel, Daniel Bavenel, Elias P. Bavenel, and Mary-Goffin Bavenel were owners in fee-simple of an undivided one-fifth part of Cherry Hill plantation. Mrs. Bavenel, who was tenant iii dower, died in 18(0. - Elias P. Bavenel died in the latter part of 1886, and the claimant, William Parker Bavenel, hás been appointed administrator of Iris estate. At the time of -the sale of Cherry Hill, Mary S. Peronneau, as tenant in dower, and her children, Mary O. De Saussure,- Susan H. Peronneau, William H. Peronneau, and Ann B. Du Bose, were owners of an undivided one-fifth part thereof in fee simple. Mary'S. Peronneau has died. Henry W. De Saussure, jr., administrator, is entitled to the shares of William H. Peronneau and Ann B. Du Bose.
    III. On the 10th March,. 1863, MeTureous tract, a plantation ■-on St. Helena’s Island aforesaid, was sold under the direct-tax act, and bid in by the United States. At -the time of the last-mentioned sale Mary S. Peronneau was owner of an undivided one-fifth of the equitable fee- simple in th e said plantation. The claimant, William E. Breese, has been duly appointed administrator of her estate. At the time of the sale of MeTureous tract, Elizabeth C. Bavenel was owner of an undivided one-fifth in the equitable fee-simple thereof. The claimant, William Parker Bavenel, has been appointed administrator of her estate. - . .
    IY. Under the Act of August 5, 1861 (12 Stat., 292), apportioning- to the State of South Carolina $363,570.66 of the direct tax therein provided for, diréct-tax commissioners were appointed, who agreed upon the following resolutions as the basis nf their action:
    . Beaufort, Nov. 3,1862.
    
      “ Resolved, That inasmuch as the records of the last assessment and valuation of the lands and lots of ground made under the authority of the State , of South Carolina, previous to the first day of January, A. D. 1861, are so concealed as not to come within the possession of -the commissioners, therefore, upon the evidence taken and which has come before us, the said commissioners, the said assessment and valuation of the whole real estate in said State we- find to be, and do fix and -establish the same at, the sum of thirty millions eight hundred- and tliirty-three thousand three hundred and twenty-two dollars ten cents and four mills ($30,833,322. lO^-).
    
      u Resolved further, That there be assessed upon the lands of thé said State the sum of two dollars ad valorem for each one hundred dollars’ valuation, and that there be assessed upon the cit'y, town, village, and borough lots the sum of eighty cents ad valorem on each one hundred dollars of valuation.”
    # * * * # * #
    The aggregate valuation placed by the commissioners upon the said three tracts of land was $9,076.
    V. The aggregate surplus of the proceeds of sale of the three tracts, after deducting taxes, interest, penalties, costs, and commissions, amounts, according to the computation made by the commissioners, to $1,302.27; computed by the rule prescribed in the statute, as construed in the opinion of the court, to $1,429.
    VI. The surplus proceeds of the sales of the three tracts of land now held by the Treasury in trust for the respective claimants in these two cases are stated and apportioned in the following tables. The left-hand column of figures represents the amount as computed by the commissioners, and the right-hand column the amount as computed by the court, iu the manner explained in the opinion:
    
      Case No. 15490.
    W. P. Ravenel, in Ms own right . *W\ P. Ravenel, administrator C. E. Ravenel.. W. P. Ravenel, administrator E P. Ravenel. Daniel Ravenel.*. M. C. Ravenel. Total. By tbe commissioners. $17.02 195.50 17.04 17.02 17.02 263.60 By the $17.83 214.48 27.84 17.83 17.82 285.80
    
      Case No. 15489.
    Mary O. De Sanssure. Susan H. Peronneau. Henry W. DeSaussure, jr., administrator of William H. Peronneau.. Henry W. De Saussure, administrator A. B. Du Bose. William E. Breese, administrator M. S. Peronneau. By the commissioners. $65.58 65.57 65.58 65.58 1.29 263.60 By the court. $69.77 69.77 69. 77 69.77 6.72 285.80 Total.
    
      
      Mr. William JE. JEarle and Mr. James Lowndes for the claimants
    contended that no jurisdiction conferred by any act of Congress upon any executive officer can affect the jurisdiction existing by law in this court, and cited Seahroolc v. The United States (21 C. Cls. R., 39) and Simons v. The United States (19 U. S. R., 691).
    
      Mr. Heher J. May (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Howard) for the defendants.
    1. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to determine judicially, upon satisfactory evidence which is required to be furnished to ,him, whether money has been illegally collected. If he finds that it has, he is authorized to order it refunded. If he finds it has not, he is authorized to order a rejection of the claim. He is an officer clothed by the law with exclusive jurisdiction and power to judicially determine, upon satisfactory' evidence, the claim in controversy. After he has determined-a claim upon satisfactory evidence, under the joint resolution, and exercised his judgment and discretion, as in the case at bar, can his action be controlled by this or any other court ? Under such circumstances, could a judgment of this or any other court be enforced against the Secretary, and could he be compelled by mandate or otherwise to pay the same ? Clearly not. Of what value, then, would such a judgment be?
    Although the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction, for which the defendants contend, has been frequently passed upon by the courts, yet it has not been anywhere so strongly emphasized as in the case of Johnson v. Towsley (13 Wall., 83).
    In Marshall’s Case (21 C. 01s. R., 308), the court held that a special act of Congress conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the Secretary of War. The language of that act (14 Stat. L., 417) is not nearly as expressive of such exclusive jurisdiction in that officer as the language of section 4 of the joint resolution aforesaid is of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury in this case. The case at bar and Marshall’s Case are almost exactly alike. In each case money claimed to have been illegally collected is to be refunded by the respective Secretaries, upon certain satisfactory evidence being adduced, as provided by the law conferring jurisdiction upon them to act in tbe allowance or rejection of the claims, in accordance with their judgment and discretion.
    In Ramsay’s Gase (14 C. Ols. R., 371), the court, in an opinion delivered by Chief-Justice Richardson, held that the claim of an informer was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the Act of July 13,1866 (14 Stat. L., 145). The above doctrine is adhered to in the case of Ramsay, widow (21 O. Oís. R., 448), although a judgment was rendered in favor of the claimant upon the ground that the Secretary had decided the material facts in the case, which gave the court jurisdiction.
    One of the strongest reasons that can be assigned for the interpretation that the act confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Secretary of the Treasury is found in the act itself. As an officer he is required to determine the illegal collection of the money upon satisfactory evidence as a matter precedent to the order directing it to be refunded. He is therefore authorized and required to determine the question of fact upon such evidence as may satisfy his own mind. (Woolnerh Gase, 13 O. Ols. R., 366.)
    The Portland Company’s Gase (5 O. Ols. R., 445) was decided upon doctrine in WicholVs Gase (7 Wall., 122) as coming within the administration of the internal-revenue laws. The petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and Judge Nott, in a ■concurring opinion, placed the case upon another ground than the one contained in the opinion of the court, namely:
    “ It is the case of a party seeking affirmative relief, given, not by the general principles of law, but by an express statutory provision, which at the same time prescribes a special mode of obtaining redress, and designates a particular tribunal as having what the courts have again and again held to be exclusive jurisdiction.”
    This exactly states the case at bar. The claimants failed to come into this court within the time limited by statute and seek relief under the general law upon an implied contract, but now attempt to recover back money under an express statutory provision, which prescribes a specific mode of obtaining redress, and designates a particular officer,-and confers exclusive jurisdiction upon him to hear and determine the case upon satisfactory evidence. The duties of the Secretary are not ministerial, as they were in the case of Gampbell (12 C. Ols. R., 475 ; 107 U. S. R., 412), where the action was to recover a drawback. In the case at .bar the Secretary exercises a judicial function.
    In Davidson’s Case (21C. Cls. R., 298), the court held that section 4756, Revised Statutes, conferred upon the Secretary of the Favy exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts and decide the law. How will the claimants be benefited in this case by obtaining a judgment against the defendants which can not, under the law, be enforced against the Secretary 1 Has this court jurisdiction to say the Secretary shall do a thing which in his judgment and discretion, and upon satisfactory evidence, he has already refused, and is authorized by law to continue to refuse to do ?
    That the heads of the Executive Departments can not be controlled by the courts in the discharge of their official duties, in which they may exercise their judgment and discretion, is well settled. {Board, etc., v. McGomb, 92 U. S. R., 531; Marquez v. FrisMe, 101 U. S. R., 473;- Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U. S. R., 654; Keyser’s Gase, 4 Lawrence, 261.)
    2. If the claim in this case comes within the administration of the revenue laws, and we think it does, then this court is, in the absence of an award in favor of the claimants, without jurisdiction. It comes within the rule laid down in Kaufman’s Case (11 C. Cls. R., 659). The following decisions are to the same effect, viz: Bybrandt’s Gase (19 C. Cls. R., 461), Bank of Greencastle (15 O. Cls. R., 225), Kaufman’s Gase (96 U. S. R.r 568), Mehol’s Gase (7 Wall., 122).
   Scofield, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In 1863, three tracts of land, known respectively as Cherry Hill, Coffin Point, and McTtireous tract, in Beaufort County, S. C., were sold by the United States for direct taxes. The lands were bid off at the aggregate sum of $1,605. After deducting from the proceeds of sale the taxes, costs, and charges, a small surplus remains in the Treasury. The defendants concede that this surplus, whatever it may be, belongs to the owners of the land. The amount only is in dispute.

The commissioners, by whom the lands were sold, computed the surplus at $1,302.27, while the claimants make it $1,429. The difference arises from the amount of taxes that should properly be deducted from the proceeds of sale. . The commissioners deducted $2 for every $100 of valuation, and theclaim-ants deduct only $1.17^ for the same valuation.

To determine which is right, we must examine the law under which the sales took place.

The Act August 5, 1861 (12 Stat. L., 295), fixes South Carolina’s proportion of the direct taxes at $363,570.67.

Under the Act June 7, 1862 (12 Stat. L., 422), commissioners were appointed to levy and collect these taxes from the “lands and lots of ground ” in that State. They were authorized to take the valuation of the lands made by the State next prior to January 1, 1861, if the same could be found: if not found, to make a valuation “in their judgment upon such evidence as may appear before them.”

Failing to secure the State valuation, they made one of their own, whereby “they fixed and established” the valuation of all the real estate in the State at $30,833,322.10^.-

They also fixed the valuation of these three tracts at $9,076.

Having thus the whole amount of taxes apportioned to the State, the valuation of all the lands of the State, and the valuation of these three tracts, the amount of taxes chargeable to these three tracts can be- accurately ascertained by following the rule of assessment prescribed in section 1 of the act of June 7, 1862, which is as follows:

“ Each and every parcel of the said lands, according to said valuation,is hereby declared tobe, by virtue of this act, charged with the payment of so much of the whole tax laid and apportioned by said act upon the State or Territory wherein the same is respectively situate, as shall bear the same direct proportion to the whole amount of the direct tax apportioned to said State or Territory as the value of said parcels of land shall respectively bear to the whole valuation of the real estate in said State or Territory according to the said assessment and valuation made under the authority of the same.” ,

Deducting from the proceeds of sale the taxes, interest, and all charges computed, according to this rule, leaves, as the defendants concede, a surplus of $1,429. The commissioners, by allowing $2 of tax for each $100 of valuation, instead of $1.17 as required by this rule, made a surplus of only $1,302.27. In this they made a mistake. The correct amount is $1,429.

The claimants, in each case, are entitled to the one-fifth part ■of that sum.

Thé correct amount of surplus being thus ascertained, has the court jurisdiction to render judgment therefor, notwithstanding more than six years have elapsed since the money was deposited in the Treasury 1

Upon that subject we refer to section 36 of the act of August 5,1861, which is as follows:

“ In all cases where the property liable to a direct tax under this act may not be divisible, so-as to enable the collector by a sale of part thereof to raise the whole amount of the tax, with all costs, charges, and commissions, the whole of such property shall be sold, and the surplus of the proceeds of the sale, after satisfying the tax, costs, charges, and commissions, shall be paid to the owner of the property, or to his legal representatives, or if he or they can not be found, or refuse to receive the same, then such surplus shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States, to be there held for the use of the owner or his legal representatives until he or they shall make application therefor to the Secretary of the Treasury, who upon such application shall, by warrants on the Treasury, cause the same to be ¡paid to the applicant.”

This section, in controlling the jurisdiction of this court, was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of The United States v. Taylor (104 U. S. R., 216), and therein the court said :

“The second question raised by the appeal is whether the Court of Claims had jurisdiction of a suit for such proceeds, when the application to the Secretary of the Treasury and the bringing of the suit therefor were both more than six years after the sale.
“ Section 1069 of the Bevised Statutes provides that every claim against the United States cognizable by the Court of Claims shall be fot ever barred, unless the petition setting forth a statement thereof is filed in the court within six years after the claim first accrues.
“The thirty-sixth section of the act of 1861 required, as we have seen, the surplus proceeds of the sale of land for taxes to be deposited in the Treasury, to be there held for the use of the owner or his legal representatives until he or they should make application therefor to the Secretary of the Treasury, who, upon such application, should, by warrant on the Treasury, cause the same to be paid to the applicant.
“ This section limits no time within which application must be made for the proceeds of the sale. The Secretary of the Treasury was not authorized to fix such a limit. It was his duty, whenever the owner of the land or his legal representatives should apply for the money, to draw a warrant therefor, without regard t.o the period which had elapsed since the sale. The fact that six or any other number of years had passed did not authorize him to refuse payment. The person entitled to .the money could allow it to remain in the Treasury for an indefinite period without losing his right to demand and receive-it. 1 It follows that if he was not required to demand it within six years, he was not required to sue for it within that time.
“ A construction consistent with good faith on the part of the United States should be given to these statutes. It would certainly not be fair dealing for the Government to say to the owner that the surplus proceeds should be held in the Treasury for an indefinite period for his use or that of his legal representatives, and then, upon suit brought to recover them, to plead in bar that the demand therefor had not been made within six years.
“The general rule is that when a trustee unequivocally repudiates the trust, and claims to hold the estate as his own,, and such repudiation and claim- are brought to the knowledger of the cestui que trust in such manner that he is called upon to assert his rights, the statute of .limitations will begin to run against him from the time such knowledge is brought home to him, and not before.”

The suit in Simons’s Case (19 C. Cls. R., 601) was brought to recover money which had been erroneously exacted by the direct-tax commissioners as interest on taxes. That case and the one at bar involve the same principle, but the court held that they had jurisdiction of it, and rendered judgment for the claimant. *

In Harrison’s Case (20 O. Cls. R., 175), the same question was-involved, and it was decided the same way.

Seabrooh’s Case (21 C. Cls. R., 37), which involved not only the same principles of law but exactly similar facts, was decided in favor of the claimant.

From these decisions the defendants did not appeal.

A new objection is now, for the first time, presented. Ik might have been raised with equal propriety in all the cases above cited. Either it was not considered of much importance, or was overlooked both by counsel and the court. It is based upon section 4 of the Act February 25, 1867 (14 Stat. R., 568),, which is as follows:

“ That the Secretary of the Treasury shall be authorized to-refund to persons from whom money has-been received without warrant of law, asín payment of dues under the direct-tax laws, the sums so illegally collected; such refunding to be ordered on the presentation, in each case, of satisfactory evidence of the illegal collection.”

The defendants contend, that the authority herein given does not extend to the Court of Claims. It is not necessary to controvert that position in order to maintain jurisdiction of this case.

The jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon that act. The Supreme Court, it will be observed, bases our jurisdiction in such cases upon section 1059 of the Revised Statutes, and section 36 of the act of August 5, 1861, above quoted, exempt, from the limitation of section 1069.

Jurisdiction under these acts and the decision of the Supreme Court, to entertain a suit for the recovery of “ the surplus of the proceeds of the sale” necessarily carries with it authority to ascertain what that surplus amounts to. That involves investigation and consideration of all the facts and data by which it is to be determined. Results arrived at by ministerial officers do not conclude the court.

If the'act of 1867 does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the court, it certainly does not diminish it. It simply authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to refund, upon satisfactory evidence, certain taxes illegally collected. Whether an adverse decision by the Secretary upon such a claim would constitute a bar to its reconsideration in this court it is not necessary to decide. The facts in the case involve no such question.

The ownership of the claimants in case No. 15490 to one-fifth of the land sold, and of the claimant in case No. 15489 to another one-fifth, and also the several amounts due each are shown in the findings of facts and conclusion of law.

Judgment in each case will, be entered in accordance therewith.  