
    John Steven HALLMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Matthew CATE, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-17098.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Sept. 10, 2012.
    
    Decided Oct. 4, 2012.
    John Steven Hallman, Crescent City, CA, pro se.
    Thomas S. Patterson, Esquire, Supervisory California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Hallman’s request for oral argument is denied.
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner John Steven Hallman appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process and First Amendment violations in connection with his 2008 re-validation as an associate of the Mexican Mafia prison gang. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 2001) (failure to state a claim); Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (issue preclusion). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.2008), and we affirm.

Dismissal was proper because the state court’s denial of Hallman’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his retention in the Security Housing Unit precluded Hallman from relitigating the same issues in a § 1983 action. See Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir.1981) (“[B]ecause of the nature of a state habeas proceeding, a decision actually rendered should preclude an identical issue from being relitigated in a subsequent § 1983 action if the state habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to be heard and determined under federal standards.”). Hallman’s contention that he was not provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues in the prior proceeding is unpersuasive. See Clark v. Yosemite Cmty. Coll. Dist., 785 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir.1986) (“[A]n opportunity to reach the merits is sufficient to invoke a preclusive effect.”).

Absent an underlying constitutional violation, Hallman’s supervisory liability claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989) (stating standard).

To the extent that Hallman alleges that his continued retention in the Security Housing Unit following his 2008 re-validation is an “atypical and significant hardship” in violation of his federal due process rights, this claim is not viable because, even if there was a protected liberty interest at stake, the documents submitted in support of his complaint show that he received all of the process that was due. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 229, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005).

Hallman’s motion for appointment of counsel, filed on August 10, 2012, is denied as moot.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     