
    Mohammed Tajul ISLAM, aka Tajul Islam, aka Mohammed Tazul Islam, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-1006-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 27, 2012.
    
      Usman B. Ahmad, Long Island City, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Douglas E. Ginsburg, Assistant Director; Paul Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., REENA RAGGI and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Mohammed Tajul Islam, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks review of the February 15, 2011, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Mohammed Tajul Islam, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Feb. 15, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as it was untimely and number-barred and because Islam neither established changed conditions related to a protected ground nor established his prima facie eligibility for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). There is no dispute that Islam’s third motion to reopen, filed in June 2010, was numerically barred and untimely, because an Immigration Judge issued a final order of removal in June 2005. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Accordingly, Islam was required to show changed circumstances arising in Bangladesh, and that the evidence of the changed circumstances was “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii).

As an initial matter, Islam’s argument that he is a member of a social group consisting of persons who have “offended or shamed a police officer and therefore [are] vulnerable to violent attack that will go unpunished by the government” is unexhausted and not subject to review, because he never presented that argument to the BIA. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-22 (2d Cir.2007).

Even if Islam had raised the social group argument before the BIA, the BIA’s finding that Islam alleged mere “criminal matters” that do not satisfy any established ground for asylum or withholding of removal is supported by substantial evidence, as Islam alleged that he was being targeted by his father-in-law because he left his wife in Bangladesh. Because the alleged change in conditions did not relate to a protected ground, Islam failed to demonstrate a change in conditions material to asylum or withholding of removal. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (Under the substantial evidence standard, the BIA’s factual findings are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”).

Moreover, the BIA reasonably determined that Islam did not present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169. To establish eligibility for CAT relief, an alien must show that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the authorities. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17. Here, the BIA reasonably found that the evidence that Islam provided did not sufficiently establish that he would be unable to obtain the protection of Bangladeshi authorities against any threat posed by his father-in-law, as the only evidence to support his claim that his father-in-law would be allowed to act with impunity was his own speculation. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005). Since Islam failed to establish changed country conditions relevant to a protected ground or a prima facie case for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the CAT, the BIA properly denied his motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (a movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought is a proper ground for the denial of a motion to reopen).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 84(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  