
    Inderjeet Singh BRAR, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-73500.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Oct. 23, 2015.
    
    Filed Oct. 27, 2015.
    Robert Bradford Jobe, Esquire, Law Offices of Robert B. Jobe, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.
    Matthew Albert Connelly, Trial, Oil, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: HAWKINS, SILVERMAN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Inderjeet Singh Brar, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir.2010). We review de novo claims of due process violations. Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir.2010). We deny the petition for review.

Among other things, the IJ found Brar not credible based on inconsistencies between his statements to the asylum officer and his testimony to the IJ as to whether Sikhs were taken to his police station and mistreated there, and whether Brar personally transported Sikhs to the station.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination based on the inconsistencies between his statements to the asylum officer and his testimony to the immigration judge. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048 (adverse credibility finding reasonable under totality of the circumstances). We reject Brar’s contention that the agency erred by relying on the asylum officer’s notes because, as the IJ found: they were taken during Brar’s interviews in a question and answer format, they were taken through an interpreter who was overseen for the second interview by a monitor, both Brar and his interpreter were under oath, Brar’s counsel was present during both interviews, the notes were read back to Brar through his interpreter, Brar signed at the end indicating the notes were an accurate reflection of his statements, and the asylum officer testified before the IJ. See Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2005) (identifying indicia of reliability for an asylum officer’s notes); see also Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 962-63 (9th Cir.2004) (concluding that an airport interview statement was a .reliable impeachment source where certain indicia of reliability were met), superceded by statute on other grounds, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

Brar’s explanations for his inconsistent responses do not compel a contrary result. See Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973-74 (9th Cir.2011) (agency not required to accept explanations for inconsistencies). Last, we reject Brar’s contentions that the IJ erred in her weighing of evidence, denied Brar an opportunity to present evidence in support of his claim, or failed to consider Brar’s credibility under the totality of circumstances. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due process violation). Thus, in the absence of credible testimony, Brar’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003).

Finally, Brar’s CAT claim fails because jt is based on the same testimony the agency found not credible, and Brar does not point to any other evidence in the record that compels the conclusion that it is more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to India. See id. at 1156-57.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     