
    Sharon MABRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-2663-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 6, 2012.
    
      Sharon Mabry, pro se, Bedford Hills, NY, for Appellant.
    Andrew S. Wellin, Assistant Corporation Counsel, New York, NY; Marion R. Buch-binder, Assistant Solicitor General, New York, NY, for Appellees.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, GUIDO CALABRESI, and ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Sharon Mabry appeals from the district court’s judgment granting the defendants’ summary judgment motions and dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging deliberate indifference to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and focuses on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). The Court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmovant; the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts revealed in materials such as affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm. The magistrate judge correctly concluded that a reasonable jury could not find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mabry actually contracted hepatitis C by any of the means she had alleged. While Mabry challenged the defendants’ interpretation of her medical records, the magistrate judge correctly concluded that Mabry’s interpretation of her records was unwarranted, and that the unrebutted medical evidence indicated that an individual may not show symptoms of a hepatitis C infection for twenty years or more after infection. Mabry’s allegations that the defendants used unsterilized equipment would, if proven, suffice to make out a prima facie showing of causation. But in the instant case, any such showing was negated by unrebutted evidence of other sources of hepatitis C linked to Mabry’s lifestyle. We conclude, therefore, that a reasonable jury could not find that the defendants’ alleged misbehavior caused Mabry’s hepatitis C.

With respect to Mabry’s hepatitis A and B infections, the magistrate judge properly concluded that Mabry could not establish actual or imminent harm, because her testimony and the medical evidence established that the presence of hepatitis A and B antibodies in her system was not harmful in an any way.

We have considered all of Mabry’s arguments, including her arguments that the magistrate judge improperly denied her motions for the appointment of an expert witness and to add several defendants to her Second Amended Complaint, and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.  