
    Knight vs. The State.
    If an affidavit fora continuance be not full, satisfactory and direct as to material allegations necessary for a continuance, exhibiting palpable error in a refusal of the Judge to continue the case, the court will not reverse for such refusal.
    Knight was indicted on the 29th of October, 1844, in the Circuit Court at Memphis, for grand larceny. The case was called for trial on the 1st day of November, wrhen the defendant moved the court for a continuance, upon an affidavit, which averred that-Yale and-Yale were material witnesses for him in the trial of his case — that he could not go safely to trial without the benefit of their testimony — that he would have had them subpoenaed to attend at this term of the court, but that he has been in confinement in jail e.ver since his arrest, and has in this manner been deprived of the power of preparing his defence — that he expects to prove by said witnesses, that he was not about the place where the property set forth in the bill of indictment was said to have been stolen, until some hours after the same was taken from the possession of the owner of said property — that said witnesses are absent without his advice or procurement — that he knows of no • other person by whom he can prove the same facts — that he expects to obtain the benefit of their testimony at the next term of the court, and that the continuance was asked for justice and not merely delay.
    The presiding Judge, King, refused the continuance, and thereupon the case was submitted to a jury, and the defendant found guilty, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for five years. From this judgment he appealed, on the ground of error in the Judge, in not granting him a continuance.
    
      Henry Barry, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Attorney General, for the State.
   Tubley, J.

delivered the opinion of the court. .

This is an application on the part of the prisoner, by an appeal in the nature of a writ of error, to reverse a judgment rendered against him in the Criminal Court at Memphis, for the offence of grand larceny, upon the ground, that the Judge refused him a continuance at the time he .was put upon his trial.

What has been said at the present term, in the case of Bellew vs. The State, relative to the course,of action pursued by this court, in cases of this land, is equally applicable to the present case.

The affidavit upon which prisoner moved for a continuance, states, that one James S. Youngis a material witness for him— that he expects to prove by him that he was not about the place where the property was said to have been stolen, and for which he was indicted.

This affidavit, if possible, is of a more doubtful character than that in the case of Bellew. “Was not about the place;” what does he mean by that? That he was not at the place ? If so why not say so? Does he mean that he was at another place, and, therefore, expected to prove an alibis If so why not so state it?

The affidavit is evasive, and insinuates without charging the existence of a fact, which, if true, would constitute a good de-fence. The Criminal Judge committed no indiscretion in refusing a continuance.

Let the judgment be affirmed.  