
    The State v. Jones.
    Corn and cotton the produce of the preceding year were not liable, under the act of 1846, to taxation in the hands of the planter, although that act taxed “ all property, both real and personal,” and contained no exemption as to the species of property in question.
    Appeal from Matagorda. This suit was brought by the State to recover a penalty of five hundred dollars from the defendant for his refusal to return for assessment and taxation corn and cotton owned by him on the 1st ■day of January, 1848. The defense set up by the defendant was that the corn ■and cotton were the produce of his plantation for the year preceding. The court sustained the defense, and the State appealed.
    Hamilton, for appellant.
    The. error assigned raises the question as to what is and what is not property within the meaning and intention of the first section of the act of 1S4G “to raise a revenue by direct taxation.” (Acts of 1S4G, p. 14G.) The language of the section is comprehensive, and is believed to include every.species of property not exempt by law from taxation. It is as follows: “There shall be assessed and'collected of all persons within the limits of this State, for the use of the State, a direct ad valorem tax at the rate of twenty cents upon each •one hundred dollars’ value of all property, real and personal, (excepting such property as may be hereafter excepted by law from taxation,) owned or held by any sucli person or persons,” &c.
    It is needless to argue that cotton, corn, &c., are “ property ” in the strictest legal sense as well as in the most common acceptation of the terms. (Toml. Law Die., vol. 3, p. 249.) And the only exception from this .tax being such articles as are exempt by law from taxation, and there being no law exempting the commodities in question, they are as much the subjects of taxation as ■any other species of property.
    The question would be different if a growing or ungathered crop were sought ■to be subjected to the operates of the law. In such case it might with propri-ety be urged that no “property” has been realized or can be considered as in possession until the chances of the seasons and the casualties incident to the products of the soil have been passed. In the present case the property in the preceding crop has been realized and reduced into actual possession,* and to • all intents and purposes constituted a portion of the estate of the party, upon all of which the law intended an ad valoremtasi to be levied, (except such articles as were or might be by law specifically exempted.)
   Lipscomb, J.

The word “property” used in the statute imposing taxes is certainty comprehensive enough to embrace corn and cotton; and were the question to be decided on the import of that term in the abstract, it would be destructive of the defense set up. But such construction of the term “property,” when taken in connection with the Constitution and law imposing taxes for the purpose of raising a revenue, would be so unequal, unjust, anil oppressive to the planting interest of the State that it cannot be supposed that such was the meaning of the law. A single view of the subject will fully show that it was not. The planter’s slave is assessed at his full value as a slave for life. How, it would be difficult to conceive of any intrinsic value in the slave. He is only valuable as possessing a capacity for usefulness. He is capable of producing corn and cotton when employed'by the planter. How, if the slave has been taxed in proportion to his value, and the corn and cotton produced by him again taxed, it is, in effect, levying another tax on the slave. Under the tax law the slave ¡¿assessed annually at his full valuation, what it is supposed he would sell for. And so are the mules or teams. If the products are to be taxed, it surely could not be required that the slaves and teams should be assessed at a higher valuation than for one year’s use. A tax is imposed on money at interest, and yet the interest so accruing is not taxed until it is let out to interest. IE the corn and cotton should be exchanged for other property, that property would be subject to taxation. So the interest accruing on money loaned; if that interest is invested in a loan, it becomes subject to taxation. It would seem that the law did not intend to embrace such property, because it had already been taxed. If it had been sold before the 1st da.y of January following the year it was made, the corn and cotton would not have been subject to taxation, nor the proceeds, if in money, and not at interest. To tax it, then, would look very much like imposing a penalty for not getting it to market before the 1st day of January. I am satisfied that it was not intended to tax such products, and that the law, when taken altogether, does not include them as taxable.

This being a question of revenue, the proper source was applied to to ascertain what had been the general construction given to the law as to such property, and it seems that no special instruction's have been given to the assessors and collectors in relation to it; that on two occasions the comptroller had been asked for information by assessors and collectors whether such property should be taxed, and that he answered in the affirmative under the advice of counsel; that it has not been general to include it as taxable property; that it has only been done in a few counties; that the last revenue law expressly excepts it from taxation. I believe there is no error in the judgment of the court beiow, .and that it ought to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  