
    Christi NINGSIH, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the UNITED STATES, Respondent.
    No. 07-1249.
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 24, 2008.
    Filed: May 8, 2008.
    H. Raymond Fasano, Madeo & Fasano, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Richard M. Evans, Nancy E. Friedman, Christina B. Parascandola, United States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Before: McKEE and RENDELL, Circuit Judges, and TASHIMA, Senior Circuit Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    
   OPINION

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Christi Ningsih petitions for review of the final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals denying hex-motion to reopen an earlier decision in which the BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s denial of her application for asylum and withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and relief under Article III of the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review.

I.

Inasmuch as we write primarily for the parties who ai-e familiar with this case, we need not set forth the factual or procedural history except insofar as it may be helpful to our brief discussion. We review the BIA’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard, and must uphold the decision unless it is ax-bitrary, capricious, or contrax-y to law. Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 173 (3d Cir.2002). The BIA’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence. Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 283 (3d Cir.2002).

Ningsih’s motion to reopen is based upon changed country conditions. Ningsih argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying her motion to reopen because it failed properly to analyze the evidence of changed country conditions she submitted which post-dated her original removal hearing.

A motion to reopen will be denied if the BIA determines (1) that the movant has failed to establish a prima facie ease fox-relief sought, (2) that the movant has failed to ixxtroduce previously unavailable material evidence that justified reopening, or (3) that, in the case of discretionax-y relief, that movant would not have been entitled to the discretionary x-elief evexx if the motion were granted. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992). Here, the BIA denied Ning-sih’s application because she failed to establish a prima facie ease for x*elief. The IJ had held that the new evidence did not establish a pattex-n or practice of persecution of Chinese or Christians in Indonesia or show that Ningsih would be individually singled out for persecution. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir.2005) (explaining requirements under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A) for prima facie case for asylum).

Although the BIA cited our decision in Lie, which relied on an older couixtx-y report, the record establishes that the BIA conducted an indepeixdent analysis of the newly submitted material and appropriately concluded that it did not satisfy Ning-sih’s entitlement to relief. We have reviewed the record aixd agree that the “changed circumstances” were not such as to support his claim. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying relief.

II.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we will deny the petition for review.  