
    Ahmed ZUBAIR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ENTECH ENGINEERING, P.C., Soudabey Bayat, Defendants-Appellants.
    No. 13-727-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 16, 2014.
    John LoPresti, Jr., Staten Island, NY, for Appellants.
    Larry Cary, Joshua S.C. Parkhurst, Melissa S. Chan, Cary Kane LLP, New York, NY, for Appellee.
    Present: RALPH K. WINTER, CHESTER J. STRAUB and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Ahmed Zubair (“Zubair”) brought suit against his former employer Entech Engineering, P.C. (“Entech”) and Soudabey Bayat (“Bayat”) (collectively “Appellants”) for unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York State Labor Law (“NYSLL”). After a bench trial the district court entered judgment against Appellants and awarded Zubair unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. Appellants moved for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. The district court denied the motion. Appellants appeal from that denial. This Court reviews a district court’s ruling on a motion to extend time to file a notice of appeal for abuse of discretion. Goode v. Winkler, 252 F.3d 242, 245 (2d Cir.2001) (per curiam). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

For the first time on appeal Appellants argue that they were misled by their previous attorney, Jeffrey Meyer, Esq., who assured them that he would timely file a notice of appeal and, if he were unable to file timely, he would obtain an extension of time from the district court. “[I]t is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.” Bogle-Assegai v. Conn., 470 F.3d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). Because this “rule is prudential, not jurisdictional, we have discretion to consider waived arguments.” Sniado v. Bank Austria AG, 378 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir.2004) (per curiam). “We have exercised this discretion where necessary to avoid a manifest injustice or where the argument presents a question of law and there is no need for additional fact-finding.” Id. (citing Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 420 (2d Cir.2000)).

The circumstances here militate against an exercise of our discretion to address the new arguments on appeal. First, although this argument was available to Appellants below they failed to present it to the district court. See Id. (“Equitable factors do not weigh heavily in favor of discretionary review of a belated argument which was theoretically available” below.). Second, Appellants’ argument is not a pure question of law, and resolving it would require additional fact-finding. Specifically, the district court would have to make findings of fact as to Attorney Meyer’s assurances. In these circumstances, therefore, we decline the invitation to address Defendants-Appellants’ arguments. See Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Entertaining issues raised for the first time on appeal is discretionary with the panel hearing the appeal.”).

Even if this Court were to consider Appellants arguments, we have previously held that district courts exceed their discretion in granting a motion for extension of time for excusable neglect or good cause when attorney errors are the cause of the untimely filing. See e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 476 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir.2007) (“[EJxperienced counsel’s misapplication of clear and unambiguous procedural rules cannot excuse his failure to file a timely notice of appeal.”).

Finally, Appellees ask this Court to remand this case to the district court for an award of attorney’s fees and costs associated with this appeal. The FLSA provides that a court “shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Appellees are entitled to fees and costs associated with this appeal. See Young v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 586 F.3d 201, 208 (2d Cir.2009) (concluding that under the FLSA plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated with the appeal and remanding to the district court for a determination).

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court and REMAND this matter for a proper determination of appellate fees and costs.  