
    Daniel SAMSON, a/k/a Paul Aarons, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 91-2108.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    July 15, 1992.
    Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Joseph R. Chloupek, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Daniel Samson, also known as Paul Aar-ons, appeals his judgment and sentence. We affirm the trial court in all respects, except for its entry of enhanced and mandatory minimum sentences on Counts I, IV, VI, and VII.

As the State concedes, the trial court entered incorrect sentences on Counts I, IV, VI, and VII. The trial court enhanced Aarons’s second degree murder conviction (Count I) from a first degree felony punishable by life to a life felony. The trial court also imposed three-year mandatory minimum sentences for Aarons’s convictions of second degree murder (Count I), attempted robbery (Count IV), and aggravated assault (Counts VI & VII). In order for the trial court to have properly enhanced the second degree murder conviction and imposed the mandatory minimum sentences, the jury first needed to find that Aarons had used a firearm to commit the offenses. Because the jury did not make such a finding, the trial court erred in entering the sentences and is, therefore, reversed. Sears v. State, 539 So.2d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Holt v. State, 512 So.2d 268, 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (per curiam).

On remand, the trial court is instructed to change Aarons’s second degree murder conviction (Count I) to a first degree felony punishable by life and to strike Aarons’s three-year mandatory minimum sentences on his second degree murder conviction (Count I), his attempted robbery conviction (Count IV), and his two aggravated assault convictions (Counts VI-VII).

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

GUNTHER, J., and ALDERMAN, JAMES E., Senior Justice, concur.

WARNER, J., concurs specially with opinion.

WARNER, Judge,

concurring specially.

I concur in the majority and only wish to address one issue respecting the trial. Appellant rightly asserts that the trial court erred in giving the flight instruction. Fenelon v. State, 594 So.2d 292 (Fla.1992). However, I conclude that it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). The real issue in this case was whether or not appellant was the trigger man in a robbery/murder. While there was inconsistency in the testimony as to who actually did the shooting, there was no contradiction that appellant was at least a participant in the robbery and fled the scene with his accomplices. Thus, the flight instruction would have had no impact on the uncontra-dicted testimony regarding the robbery, and I cannot conceive of how the instruction impacts on the issue of identification of the trigger man when all three robbery participants fled the scene.  