
    Hagar v. The State.
    An indictment charging that the prisoner broke into a store-room, is insufficient, under a statute (74 Ohio L. 248, g 5) making it an offense to break into a “ store-house; " and the defect is available to him, although the objection was not made until the verdict had been rendered.
    Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Summit county.
    John Hager was convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary, at the September term, 1879, of the Court of Common Pleas of Summit county, on an indictment, in which it is charged, that on August 5, 1879, in that county, in the night season, be maliciously and forcibly broke and. entered the store-room of John E. Roth, with intent to steal bis personal' goods, etc. No objection was made to the indictment, except by motion in arrest of judgment.
    The statute provides as follows : “ Whoever, in the night season, maliciously and forcibly breaks and enters any dwelling-house, kitchen, smoke-house, shop, office, storehouse, ware-house, malt-house, still-house, mill, pottery, factory, water-craft, school-house, church or meeting-house, bam or stable, or railroad car, car factory, or station-house, with intent to commit a felony, or with intent to steal property of any value, shall be imprisoned in the i penitentiary not more than ten nor less than one year.” 74 Ohio L. 248, § 5; Rev. Stats. § 6835.
    
      G. K. Pardee, for plaintiff in error:
    The indictment is insufficient. Thalls v. The State, 21 Ohio St. 233; Wine v. The State, 25 Ohio St. 69.
    
      Isaiah Pillars, attorney-general:
    The objection, if any, to the indictment, was only available to the defendant on motion before verdict. Bartlett v. The State, 28 Ohio St. 669.
    
      E. W. Stuart, prosecuting attorney, also for the state:
    Store-room and store-house are synonymous. Webster’s Die. Hence the indictment is sufficient. 2 Wharton’s Or. L., § 1576; Commonwealth v. Pennock, 3 S. & R. 199; Bauer v. The State, 25 Ohio St. 70.
   Okey, J.

In charging an offense in an indictment, it is not good practice to omit the words of the statute which define the crime. The safer course is to employ them; and, while this is not always indispensable to the validity of the indictment, it is clear that if they are omitted the defect will be fatal, unless the words used are the precise equivalent of the words of the act, or, at least, plainly and necessarily include them. Spencer v. The State, 13 Ohio 401; Poage v. The State, 3 Ohio St. 229; Kennedy v. The State, 34 Ohio St. 310. Erom this it is not to be inferred that an indictment which simply pursues the language of the statute is sufficient, for in many cases something more is required. Lamberton v. The State, 11 Ohio, 282; Dillingham v. The State, 5 Ohio St. 280.

Here the prisoner was charged with breaking into a store-room, while the only structures of that general character specified in the statute are “ store-house ” and “ warehouse.” But a store-room is not necessarily either a storehouse or ware-house.

The indictment is insufficient, and the defect is not cue of form but of substance; hence, the objection is fatal, though not made until the verdict had been rendered.

Judgment reversed.  