
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT,
    COLUMBIA,
    APRIL, 1802,
    Hicks' Executors v. Pouncey.
    Where the statute of limitation* has been suspended, the time, which elapsed prior to the suspension, may be added to that, which has elapsed since the suspension ceased, in order to complete the period requisite to the bar of the statute.
    The act of 1788, suspending the operation of the statute of limitations, as to actions of debt, covenant, assumpsit, trover, and detinue, and the act of 1791, extending the operation of the act of 1788, to a further period, differ from the ordinance of 1784, fixing a period, from which the statute, which had previously been suspended, should begin to run, in this, that they merely suspended the operation of the statute, as to the actions specified, and did not extinguish it, as to the time which had elapsed prior to the suspension: and they differ from the acts of 1789, 1790, and 1791, extending the time at which the statute should bar the recovery of lands, in this, that they effected an absolute suspension of the statute, and net a mere extension of the time, [rids Sims v. Ram dal, ante, 85.]
    This was an action of assumpsit, brought in the district court of Marlborough ; to which the defendant pleaded non assumpsit- infra, qualuor annos. The plaintiff, in his replication, stated, that by an ordinance of the general assembly, passed the 26th day of March, 1784, it appears, that the operation of the act of limitations had been, from time to time, suspended by several acts of the legisla» ture, from the first of January, 1775, to that time; and that; ordinance declares, “ that from and after the passing thereof, in all suits, actions, process, or proceedings, either in law or equity, no time that had already passed, should be eounted, or looked upon,' as part of the time limited by the act of limitations, but thát the different periods mentioned in the said act, (A. A. 1712, P. L. 101,)-in all cases whatsoever antecedent thereto, should begin and be counted as and from the time of the passing of the said ordinance, and not sooner,P. L. 856 : whereby the time which had run against the cause of action in this case, prior to the passing of the said ordinance, according to the limitation act of 1712, was thereby extinguished, and cannot be counted as having attached, and run against the same right of action. That on the 29th day of February, 1788, an act of assembly passed, which enacts, that the limitation act t>£ 1712, shall be. suspended, so far as. the same shall extend te actions of debt, covenant, assumpsit, trover, and detinue, until the 28th day .of March, .1791. P. L. 455. That by another act, passed in February, 1791, the said act of limitations was further suspended, until the 25th day of March, 1793 ; (1 Faust, 55 ;) and that since the last period, limited by the act of 1791, suspending the operation of the act of limitations, four years had not elapsed before suing out the leading process in the present case.
    The defendant rejoined, and shewed, that by counting the time .passed before and after the suspending acts, the plaintiffs would .be barred. The plaintiffs demurred, and Waties, J., who presided, gave judgment for the defendant, on the demurrer. The plaintiffs now mo.ved to reverse the judgment.
    For .the plaintiffs it was said, that the cause of action existed prior to 1784, and the question was, whether the act of limitations, according to the true meaning of the several suspending acts, should begin to run from the last period limited by ' the acts suspending its operation ; or whether the time which .it had run, between the time when the ordinance of 1784 passed, and the time when the last act of suspension passed, in February, 1791, should be taken into the computation. The plaintiffs’ counsel contended, that the legislature, by using the word “ suspend,” clearly intended not-merely to stay the future operation of the limitation act, but to annihilate the time past; and as in the case of actions concerning real' estates, to fix the period from whence the act should begin, de novo, its operation: and they cited the case of Sims v. Randal, ante, 85.
    On the other side it was contended, that this being a demand which existed antecedent to 1784, the limitation act attached upon j,t immediately after the passing the ordinance of 1784, and run from thence, without interruption, untjl February, 1788, when the act, which then passed, obstructed its ..course, .and prevented its running, to work any effect, until February, 1791, when another act passed further to postpone its operation, until the 25th of March, 1793, when its operation revived, and continued until tho 11th day oí September, 1797, when a writ was sued out, &c. That the acts suspending .the operation of the limitation act, did not extinguish the time past, so as to prevent the same from being reckoned in the calculation of time which had run in bar of this suit; but only operated to prevent the time mentioned, during which the act was suspended, from being taken into the calculation, and fixed no new period from whence the act was to commence its operation^ $$ is done by the ordinance of 1784. Nor do they fix any certain ■..period at which time, and not sooner, the act of limitations shall .complete its object, and work a.bar, as is done by several acts in ¿relation to lands. Sims -.v. Randal, supra.
    
   The judges delivered their opinions seriatim :

Brevarp, J.

I am of opinion that judgment should be for the defendants. The 26th of March, 1784, was fixed by act of assem. bly for the commencement of.the operation of the act of limitations. This act began to run against <the plaintiffs’ right of action from that day until the 29th of February, 1788, when its operation was suspended, until the 28th of March, 1791, by an act of February, 1788 ; and in February, 1791, an act passed, which further suspended its operation until the 25th day of March, 1793 ; then its operation .revived, and it ran on to complete the time necessary to bar the plaintiff’s right of action, before the writ was sued out. I conceive that the true sense and sound construction of the acts pf assembly, .relative .to this subject, require that the time which passed prior to the first, and subsequent to the last, act, suspending the operation of the limitation act, must fee reckoned in computing the time, the limitation act has run against the plaintiffs’ right of action,' before he commenced his suit; and that the suspending acts .operated only to interrupt and stay the course of the act of limitations for the times respectively mentioned by them, and did not establish any other period than was before, established for the com. .menceraent of its operation. And, therefore, I am of opinion the defendant’s rejoinder and plea are good, and the demurrer, naught.

Trezevanít, J.

I concur in the opinion just delivered. The ■time which ran from the 26th March, 1784, to the 29th February, .1788, viz., three years, eleven months, and three days, must be added to the time which again began to run from the 25th of March, 1793: and agreeably to this opinion, the executors of Loocock v. Nathaniel Russell, was decided by me, in Charleston, last May.

Bax, J., concurred;

Waties, J.,

presided in the district court, and decided the question in favor of the defendant, on the same ground as above stated, He gave no opinion now.

Johnson, J.

In this case I am of opinion, that the time which .elapsed between 1784 and 1788, is to be added to the time subsequent to the act of 1791, so as to make up the necessary time for supporting the plea of limitation. It is only necessary to recur to the literal signification of the words of the two acts of 1784, and 1788, on this subject. The act of 1784 declares, that the limitatioii shall commence from that time ; but alter running nearly four years, the act of 1788, to use the words of it, suspends its fur. ther operation. The hand óf the clock was arrested at the eleventh, but not put back to the first, hour.

Griiukb, J.

On examination of the limitation acts, relative to personal actions, I think the word “ suspend,” does • not destroy such time as began to run, and which continued to run, between any of the said acts. The act of 1784 declares that no time past shall be Counted; but the remaining acts only declare the time which has begun to run, to be suspended. Between the. acts of 1784, and 1788, there intervened a space of three years, eleven months, and three days, so that' only twenty.seven days were wanting, after the expiration of the 25th March, 1793, when all these suspensions of the limitation of personal actions expired. More than these deficient days expired before the commencement of the action ; and, therefore, the two periods of time, taken together,: making more than four years, the party is barred.

Judgment affirmed.  