
    *Ex Parte Barker.
    June, 1830.
    lirant of Administration — Want of Jurisdiction — Effect.  — Letters of administration granted by a court having no jurisdiction to grant them, are merely void; and the conrt having competent jurisdiction to grant the administration, may proceed to grant it, though the letters of administration before improperly granted, have not been revolted.
    Barker, a citizen of Kentucky, applied for letters of administration of the estate of James Markham deceased. The county court of Henrico had heretofore granted administration of the decedent’s estate to William Duval, taking jurisdiction to do so, upon the ground, that the decedent died out of the state of Virginia, and had estate in Henrico, namely, the claim on the treas-ttry, which was the subject of the case of The Commonwealth v. Markham’s adm’r, 1 Eeigh, 516. But Barker now exhibited proof, that he was a grandson of Markham, and that he lived and died in the county of Cabell in Virginia, and Duval, being present in court, admitted notice of this application of Barker for the administration.
    The case was argued by John Scott in support of Barker’s application, and by the attorney general,
    who opposed the grant of administration to him.
    
      
      Grant of Administration — Wrong Exercise of Jurisdiction--Effect. — The doctrine of the principal case —that a grant of administration by the court of a county or corporation not authorized by the facts of the case to make such grant (as where the decedent had neither a residence nor any estate, real or personal, in the county or corporation in which the administration was granted) is the act of a court without jurisdiction and is void — has been entirely repudiated by subsequent decisions in Virginia (see Schultz v. Schultz, 10 Gratt. 378; Hutcheson v. Priddy, 12 Gratt. 90); and it seems well settled that where a court has general jurisdiction to grant letters of administration, an order granting administration, in a case in which the state of facts is not such as to give the court jurisdiction in that particular case, is not a void, but only a voidable, act. See discussion of this subject in foot-note to Andrews v. Avory, 14 Gratt. 229; foot-note to Fisher v. Bassett, 9 Leigh 119; foot-note to Burnley v. Duke, 2 Rob. 102; monograpbic note on “Executors and Administrators” appended to Rosser v. Depriest, 5 Gratt. 6.
    
   BROCKENBROUGH, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court. The court has reviewed its decision upon the same point, at November term 1828, in the case of the administration of Robert Robinson’s estate. In that case, the hustings court of Richmond had granted administration to Scott, of the estate of Robinson, who lived and died in Canada: it was proved, that a debtor of Robinson lived in Middlesex, but that there was no estate in the city of Richmond, nor any debt due him there; and this court decided, that the grant of administration by the hustings court of Richmond was void, and proceeded to commit administration to the sheriff of Middlesex. In the case now before us, it was contended, 1. that the non-residence of Barker, the applicant, was an ^objection to the grant of administration to him; and 2. that the grant to Duval was not void, but voidable only, and that till it was revoked, administration could not be granted to another. As to the first, the court is of opinion, that the applicant being a citizen and resident of another state, furnishes no legal objection. It is a matter of sound discretion. If there were creditors of the deceased in this state, and if the distributees lived in this state, it might be indiscreet and improper to give administration to a non-resident; but where the tacts are otherwise, as in this case, the objection does not lie. As to the second point, the jurisdiction to grant administrations, is conferred by the statute, 1 Rev. Code, ch. 104, 12, 32, p. 377, 382. The circuit and county courts have jurisdiction to grant administrations within certain limits. If they transcend those limits, they have no jurisdiction. The place of residence of the intestate, gives jurisdiction to the local courts: if he had no known place of residence, then the place of his death gives jurisdiction, or the place where his estate lies. In this case, the intestate resided in Cabell county, and died there: the circuit or county court of Cabell had jurisdiction, but not the courts of Henrico, although he had estate there. It would have been different if the intestate had resided and died out of the state. The court of Henrico not having jurisdiction, the grant was a mere nullity. Toller’s law of ex’ors, B. 2, ch. 3, § 8, p. 120; Blackborough v. Davis, 1 Salk. 38, 1 P. Wms. 44, S. C. Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cranch, 1. See also Piggot’s case, 5 Co. 29, b. The statute gives this court jurisdiction to grant administration in any case. Administration of the decedent’s estate is granted to Barker.

SEMPLE and MAY, J., dissented.  