
    Deanna L. KELLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 14-16020
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted May 9, 2016 San Francisco, California
    FILED May 24, 2016
    
      Before: FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Deanna Kelley appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that Kelley was not disabled because she had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work and was capable of performing past relevant work as a grocery store cashier. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The ALJ identified “specific, clear and convincing reasons” to justify her decision to grant little probative weight to Kelley’s testimony. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ALJ reasonably concluded that the record was not consistent with Kelley’s descriptions of her daily activities. Kelley testified that she needed to He down all day and that her children would handle all household responsibilities. Yet the ALJ identified portions of the record that showed KeHey was able to perform at least Hght household chores, such as doing laundry and preparing meals, and that she was able to drive, shop, and speak with others on the phone.

2. The ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. Casey’s opinions regarding Kelley’s limitations because they were based on Kelley’s subjective self-reports. In Hght of Kelley’s adverse credibility determination, this is a “specific .and legitimate” reason supported by substantial evidence in the record. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998).

3. The ALJ’s RFC determination did not turn on treatment notes that predate the onset date of Kelley’s alleged disability. Thus, even if the ALJ erred by citing the evidence, that error was harmless. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are harmless.”).

4. The ALJ did not express Kelley’s RFC on a function-by-funetion basis, but the ALJ is not required to do so where she relies on medical opinions that define the relevant functional limitations. Cf. Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 838, 843 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001) (warning against the “practice of determining a claimant’s ability to perform past work on the sole basis of a categorical RFC assessment” (emphasis added)); see also Lind v. Astrue, 370 Fed.Appx. 814, 817 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The ALJ is not required to repeat the function-by-function analysis [provided in the record].”). Here, the ALJ adopted medical opinions that offered function-by-function analyses. Those analyses are substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s RFC finding.

5. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Kelley had past relevant work as a grocery store cashier. KeHey worked as a construction store cashier for 13 years, which the vocational expert testified would allow her to learn the job of grocery store cashier in the month she worked. Moreover, Kelley’s earnings records show she earned enough in the month she worked as a grocery store cashier for the position to qualify as substantial gainful activity.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     