
    Alexandra T. Bacon, an Infant by Her Mother Janice T. Bacon, et al., Appellants, v Varick Bacon, Respondent.
    Argued January 11, 1979;
    decided February 15,1979
    
      POINTS OF COUNSEL
    
      Steven L. Siskind for appellants.
    Subdivision c of section 516 of the Family Court Act is unconstitutional and violates the rights of illegitimate children to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and section 11 of article I of the Constitution of the State of New York. (Keve v Steinberg, 64 Misc 2d 141; Matter of Ferrer v Ferrer, 58 AD2d 529; Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762; Levy v Louisiana, 391 US 68; Weber v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 US 164; Labine v Vincent, 401 US 532; Gomez v Perez, 409 US 535; Matter of Lalli, 38 NY2d 77; Matter of Storm v None, 57 Misc 2d 342.)
    
      Christopher S. Rooney, Lawrence P. McGauley and Albert G. Lingelbach for respondent.
    Section 516 of the Family Court Act bears a reasonable relationship to a proper State objective and is constitutional. (Mathews v Lucas, 427 US 495; Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762; Matter of Lalli, 43 NY2d 65; Matter of Mores v Feel, 73 Misc 2d 942; Matter of Piccola v Hibbard, 51 AD2d 674, 40 NY2d 1035; Matter of Maureen K. v Kinglsey 
      
      P., 51 AD2d 744; Matter of Suzanne "J. ” v Russell "K. ”, 46 AD2d 935; Matter of Van Order v Hawley, 34 AD2d 591.)
    
      Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Samuel A. Hirshowitz and Robert J. Schack of counsel), amicus curiae.
    
    I. Section 516 of the Family Court Act shows a strong and rational relationship to the substantial, legitimate governmental interests it is intended to serve. (Moncrief v Ely, 19 Wend 405; Todd v Weber, 95 NY 181; Bunn v Winthrop, 1 Johns Ch 329; Matter of Shan F. v Francis F., 88 Misc 2d 165, revd sub nom. Matter of Ferrer v Ferrer, 58 AD2d 529; Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762; Fiallo v Bell, 430 US 787; Yarborough v Yarborough, 290 US 202; Rhyne v Katleman, 206 Misc 202, 285 App Div 1140; Matter of Bancroft v Court of Gen. Sessions of City of N. Y., 278 App Div 141, 303 NY 728.) II. Subdivision c of section 516 of the Family Court Act satisfies the equal protection standards established by this court and the United States Supreme Court. (Matter of Lalli, 43 NY2d 65; Alevy v Downstate Med. Center of State of N. Y., 39 NY2d 326; Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41; Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762; Mathews v Lucas, 427 US 495; Fiallo v Bell, 430 US 787.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Section 516 of the Family Court Act permits a mother and putative father, upon fulfillment of certain requirements, to enter into a binding agreement for the support of their out-of-wedlock child. Complete performance of such an agreement "bars other remedies of the mother or child for the support and education of the child” (Family Ct Act, § 516, subd c). Because this rule differs from the principles governing support of legitimate children, plaintiffs mother and child claim the statute is constitutionally infirm on equal protection grounds.

Not every legislatively created classification runs afoul of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws (see, e.g., Montgomery v Daniels, 38 NY2d 41, 63). Statutory classifications premised upon illegitimacy will withstand judicial scrutiny so long as they are "substantially related to permissible state interests” (Lalli v Lalli, 439 US 259, affg 43 NY2d 65; see Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762). Measured against this standard, section 516 is unquestionably valid.

At least two important and legitimate ends are fostered by the challenged legislation. Initially, the statute encourages putative fathers to settle paternity claims, thereby reducing the necessity for legal proceedings. Certainty as to the father’s future obligation is achieved by affording the settlement agreement binding effect. Yet, the interests of the child and mother are protected by the requirement that the agreement be judicially reviewed and approved. Moreover, since the statute does not mandate or prohibit the inclusion of any particular term in the contract, the parties are free to make the agreement modifiable and thus provide for unforeseen contingencies.

More important, the challenged statute helps to ensure that the child will not be without support from his father. Paternity proceedings have traditionally involved complex and difficult problems of proof, and uncertainty as to the outcome is ever present (see, e.g., Trimble v Gordon, supra, at p 771; Gomez v Perez, 409 US 535, 538). By furnishing an incentive to settle, the statute serves to prevent the illegitimate child’s support from becoming lost in the intricacies of the adjudicatory process. The statute is thus related, in a substantial respect, to permissible and salutary governmental interests and represents a balanced approach to the sensitive problem it addresses.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler and Fuchsberg concur in Per Curiam opinion.

Order affirmed.  