
    The State of Ohio v. George K. Pardee.
    The receiving of stolen goods of the value of $35, knowing them to be such, with intent, by concealing the same, to induce the owner to pay to the receiver money for the return of the goods to him, is a crime within the meaning of section 26 of the crimes act of March 7, 1835.
    Exceptions by the prosecuting attorney to the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County.
    George K. Pardee was jointly indicted in the court of common pleas of Summit county, with one David Croy, under section 26 of the crimes act of 1835 (S. & C. 112), which provides: “ That if any person shall receive or buy any goods or chattels of the value of thirty-five dollars or upwards, that shall have been stolen or taken by robbers, knowing the same to have been stolen or taken by robbers, with intent to defraud tbe owner,” &c. The defendants were charged in the indictment with having received on May 30, 1877, at the said county, certain goods and chattels of the value of $540.59, the property of one John Ileib, which had been recently stolen, knowing the same to have been stolen, with intent to defraud the owner. At the October term, 1877, of said court, Pardee being tried separately, the state offered testimony tending to prove the larceny of the goods, as alleged in the indictment, and that Pardee was acting as attorney for the thief after his arrest for said larceny, and that Ileib, the owner of the goods, had offered, by publication, a reward of $50 for the return of said goods. Evidence was also offered by the state, “tending to prove that said George IL Pardee and David Croy, having knowledge that said goods had been stolen as aforesaid, acquired information, from said thief, where said goods were secreted ” (in the city of Akron, in said county), “ and with the consent and direction of said thief, they, the said Pardee and Croy, jointly received and removed said goods to another place of concealment in said city of Akron, on 31st day of May, 1877, where they remained until the 9th day óf June, 1877, when they were discovered on search by an officer acting under and by virtue of a search warrant.” Evidence was also produced by the state tending to prove “that before said defendants received said stolen goods, and during the time they were keeping them concealed as aforesaid, they were endeavoring to persuade and induce the owner of said property to deposit sixty dollars with some third party to be paid over to defendants upon the’delivery of said goods to said owner—defendants saying to said owner that it would cost about the sum of sixty dollars to send a man out of the state to find the goods and bring them back.” Also, “ that a portion of said sixty dollars was to have been used in paying certain expenses to be incurred in feigning to send an officer out of the state after said goods; and that a portion of said sixty dollars was to have been paid by. said defendant Pardee to the thief, from whom they, Pardee and Croy, learned where the goods were first hid.”
    
      The court, among other things, charged the jury: “ In thus fixing the penalty in accordance with the value of the property in the case of receiving stolen goods, we think it was the plain intention of the legislature that the fraud intended towards the owner of the goods is to deprive him of the goods he is charged with receiving.” Also, “If the defendant received the property under the circumstances and in the manner above indicated, and at the time he so received the property honestly intended to return all the property to the owner at some future time, but he did at same time intend to induce the owner to pay to him a reward for such return, such transaction would not constitute the intent to defraud the owner within the meaning of the statute under which this indictment was found.” Again, “An intent to defraud the owner of the property into paying a reward for a return to him of the property, if at the same time he honestly and in good faith intended to return the same to such owner, would not fall within the purview of our statute.” To those instructions the prosecuting attorney excepted, and the verdict having been for defendant, he now asks the opinion of this court upon such exceptions.
    
      John J. Hall and E. W. Stuart, for plaintiff in error
   McIlvaine, J.

The statute makes it an offense to receive stolen goods, of the value of $35, knowing them to have been stolen, with intent to defraud the owner. According to the view of the v.ourt below, the only fraud intended against the owner, within the meaning of the statute, is one which de prives him of the property so received in whole or in part. In our opinion, this construction of the statute is too narrow. The terms of the statute include every form of fraud upon the owner, of which the receiving may constitute an element. Ilence, the receipt of stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, with intent to use the possession thus acquired as a means to induce the owner to pay the receiver money for their return to him, is a fraud within the meaning of the statute. And when such intent exists in the mind of the re ceiver, it. excludes the existence of an honest intention to return the goods to the owner. The right to the possession of stole], goods is in the owner. The immediate and unconditional possession is his right. It is the duty of every one receiving them, knowing them to have been stolen, to return them to the owner, or, at least, to hold them for his use. Hence, it is a fraud against the owner for any one so receiving them to conceal them and withhold the possession from him for the purpose of inducing him, in ignorance of the facts, to pay or agree to pay for their return.

Whether a person receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, may rightfully demand a reward, which may have been voluntarily offered for the return of the goods by the owner, is a question not involved in the exceptions before .us. The fraud in this case consisted in receiving the goods, having knowledge of the owner and that the same were stolen, with intent, by concealing the fact of possession in the receiver, to induce the owner to part with other property as a compensation to the receiver for the return of the goods. This was a fraud within the meaning as well as within the words of the statute. See People v. Wiley, 3 Hill, 194, and Berry v. State, 31 Ohio St. 219.

Exceptions sustained.  