
    STEPHEN G. BURBRIDGE VS. JANE C. FACKLER.
    At Law. —
    No. 12705
    A contract for a contingent fee for tlie collection of a claim against the United States, which is otherwise fair upon its face, is not in violation of public policy.
    STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
    The action is brought by the plaintiff, who is an attorney at law, to recover the amount of a contingent fee upon the following agreements.
    “ This agreement, made between Mrs. Jane C. Faekler, of Danville, Boyle County, State of Kentucky, of the first part, and S. G. Burbridge, of Covington, Ky., of the second part, witnesseth: That the party of the first part employs the party of the second part as her attorney to collect a claim against the United States for Q. M. stores, as per claim} amount $7,527.00, and in consideration of the services of the party of the second part, the party of the first part hereby agrees to pay the party of the second part an amount equal to one-half of whatever sum of money may be collected from the United States on said claim.
    
      “ Dated this 10th day of October, 1871.
    
      “ JANE C. FACKLER. [l. s.]
    . “ W. A. Harness.”
    “ This agreement, made between Mrs. Jane C. Faekler, of Danville, State of Kentucky, of the first part, and S. G. Bur-bridge, of Covington, Ky., of the second part, witnesseth: That the party of the first part employs the party of the second part as her attorney to collect a claim against the United States for quartermaster’s stores, as per claim, amount $1,150.00, and in consideration of the services of the party of the second part, the party of the first part hereby agrees to pay the party of the second part an amount equal to one-half of whatever sum of money may be collected from the United States on said claim.
    “ Dated this-day of-, 187 — .
    “ JANE C.- FACKLER. [l. s.]
    “ W. A. Harness.”
    
      Upon the trial of the cause the agreements were admitted by counsel for defense to have been executed and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff, and they were read as evidence to the jury, but subsequently the justice ordered the agreements to be withdrawn as evidence, and instructed the jury to find for the 'defendant, on the ground that it is against public policy to enforce such agreements; whereupon the counsel for the plaintiff made his exception.
    This ruling of the justice who tried the cause is the only point to be determined by this court.
    
      John N. Oliver and F. P. Cuppy for plaintiff.
    
      Enoch Totten for defendant.
   By the Court:

We are of opinion that the court erred in withdrawing the agreements from the consideration of the jury. We do-not understand that a contract for a contingent fee, which is otherwise fair upon its face, is in violation of public policy. In Weed & Clark vs. Black, we decided, at the last term, (ante, 268,) that a contract to pay a Delegate in Congress for services rendered by him in securing the payment of a claim where legislation is required for that purpose is absolutely void, but in the same decision we also laid down the doctrine, that contracts for particular service, such as the'collection-of evidence, the preparation of papers, or the delivery of arguments in -support of a claim were legitimate, and could be enforced. Child vs. Trist, 21 Wall., 441. In the present case, the agreements simply provide a contingent compensation for collecting a claim against the United-States. There is nothing apparent in the reading of the agreements affecting their validity as being to procure legislation on the part of Congress in any improper form, or indeed in any form whatever. They were erroneously excluded,, and the judgment must, therefore, be reversed.

Humphreys, J., dissenting.  