
    ABELA v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
    Docket No. 124375.
    Decided April 7, 2004.
    On application by the plaintiff for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave, affirmed the result in the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
    John and Barbara Abela brought an action in the Oakland Circuit Court against General Motors Corporation (gm) involving an automobile warranty. Gm moved for summary disposition, arguing that the action was barred by an agreement calling for binding arbitration of warranty disputes involving vehicles purchased under gm’s employee purchase plan. The court, David P. Breck, J., denied the motion and granted summary disposition for the plaintiffs on the basis that the defendant had failed to state a valid defense, MCR 2.116(C)(7). The Court of Appeals, Griffin, P.J., and Jansen, J. (Murphy, J., concurring), reversed because the Court concluded it was bound by the decisions of two federal courts of appeals. 257 Mich App 513 (2003). The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal, claiming that gm’s program for binding arbitration was contrary to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (mmwa), 15 USC 2301 et seq.
    
    In a memorandum opinion, signed by Chief Justice Corrigan, and Justices Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman, the Supreme Court held-.
    
    State courts are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing federal law. Lower federal court decisions are not binding on Michigan courts. Although the federal circuit court decisions on which the Court of Appeals relied in this case are not binding, they are persuasive in that they correctly concluded that the text, the legislative history, and the purpose of the mmwa fail to evidence a congressional intent under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC 1 et seq., to bar agreements for the binding arbitration of claims covered by the mmwa. The plaintiffs’ agreement with the defendant to address the warranty claim through the defendant’s dispute resolution process, including mandatory arbitration, is enforceable.
    Affirmed; case remanded to the circuit court for entry of an order for binding arbitration.
    
      Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justice Kelly, would not dispose of this matter by memorandum opinion, but would grant leave to consider further briefing and argument.
    1. Arbitration — Warranties.
    The Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act does not bar agreements for binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act of warranty claims covered by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (9 USC 1 et seq., 15 USC 2301 et seq.)
    
    2. Statutes — Federal — Interpretation.
    State courts are bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing federal law, but state courts are under no similar obligation with respect to the decisions of the lower federal courts.
    
      Miller Shea, P.L.L.C. (by E. Powell Miller and Marc L. Newman), Consumer Legal Services, P.C. (by Christopher M. Lovasz and Mark Romano), and Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P.C. (by F. Paul Bland, Jr. and Michael J. Quirk), for the plaintiffs.
    
      Wienner & Gould, P.C. (by S. Thomas Wienner and Seth D. Gould), and Kirkland & Ellis LLP (by Richard C. Godfrey, P.C.) (Carol H. Lesnek-Cooper, of counsel) for the defendant.
   Memorandum Opinion. This case poses the question whether the federal consumer product warranty act prohibits enforcement of a binding arbitration agreement entered into by a person who purchases a vehicle under a motor vehicle manufacturer’s employee purchase plan. The trial court ruled that such a binding arbitration agreement is prohibited by the federal act. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, relying on the supposedly binding authority of the decisions of two federal circuit courts of appeals. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, but do so because we are persuaded by the reasoning employed in the federal decisions and not because we are bound by them.

Plaintiff John Abela purchased a 1999 Chevrolet truck from a General Motors dealership under defendant’s employee purchase plan, which offered him a discount because of his wife’s employment with General Motors. As part of the purchase contract, plaintiff was required to sign an agreement requiring any warranty dispute to be settled by binding arbitration. The truck subsequently developed a number of problems, necessitating costly repairs. Plaintiff and his wife brought suit under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty— Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (mmwa), 15 USC 2301 et seq., as well as two Michigan statutes. Defendant responded with a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), claiming that plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate any claims they had against defendant.

The trial court denied defendant’s motion and granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9), for failing to state a valid defense. The trial court based its ruling on the determination that defendant’s program for binding arbitration was contrary to the mmwa and, therefore, unenforceable.

The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court. 257 Mich App 513; 669 NW2d 271 (2003). It noted that two federal circuit courts of appeals had addressed the question whether the mmwa bars compulsory arbitration of written warranty claims, and that both had determined that the MMWA does not preclude such arbitration, otherwise enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (faa), 9 USC 1 et seq. Citing Schueler v Weintrob, 360 Mich 621; 105 NW2d 42 (1960), and Woodman v Miesel Sysco Food Co, 254 Mich App 159; 657 NW2d 122 (2002), the Court of Appeals held that it is bound by the authoritative holdings of the federal courts of appeals on a federal question where there is no conflict among those federal courts on that question. Because the only two federal circuit courts of appeals that had ruled on the issue concluded that binding arbitration agreements are not prohibited by the mmwa, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition and in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals basis for reversing the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals concluded that it was bound by the decisions of the federal circuit courts of appeals on questions of federal law. 257 Mich App 523. Although state courts are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing federal law, Chesapeake & O R Co v Martin, 283 US 209, 220-221; 51 S Ct 453; 75 L Ed 983 (1931), there is no similar obligation with respect to decisions of the lower federal courts. Winget v Grand Trunk W R Co, 210 Mich 100, 117; 177 NW2d 273 (1920). See generally 21 CJS, Courts, § 159, pp 195-197; 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts, § 171, pp 454-455. The Court of Appeals reliance on Schueler v Weintrob, 360 Mich 621; 105 NW2d 42 (1960), is misplaced. In that case, we were faced with conflicting decisions of lower federal courts and, of course, were “free to choose the view which seems most appropriate to us.” 360 Mich 634. However, that statement does not establish the converse—that where there is no such conflict, we are bound to follow the decisions of even a single lower federal court. Although lower federal court decisions may be persuasive, they are not binding on state courts.

Although the federal courts of appeals decisions are not binding, we nevertheless affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. We have examined the decisions in Walton v Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F3d 470 (CA 5, 2002), and Davis v Southern Energy Homes, Inc, 305 F3d 1268 (CA 11, 2002), and find their analyses and conclusions persuasive. Both decisions carefully examined the mmwa and the faa, and both concluded that the text, the legislative history, and the purpose of the mmwa did not evidence a congressional intent under the faa to bar agreements for binding arbitration of claims covered by the mmwa. Persuaded by these analyses of the federal courts of appeals, we conclude that plaintiffs’ agreement with defendant to address the warranty claim through defendant’s dispute resolution process, including mandatory arbitration, is enforceable.

The Court of Appeals result is affirmed on the basis of the above analysis, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of an order for binding arbitration pursuant to the agreement.

Corrigan, C.J., and Weaver, Taylor, Young, and Markman, JJ., concurred.

Cavanagh, J., would not dispose of this matter by memorandum opinion, but would grant leave to consider farther briefing and argument.

Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J. 
      
       The two statutes are not relevant to this discussion. As the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in this case, the Michigan warranties on new motor vehicles act, the “lemon law,” MCL 257.1401 et seq., and the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, MCL 445.901 et seq., are surmounted by the federal arbitration act.
     