
    John W. Hadfield, plaintiff, vs. The Mayor &c. of the City of New York, defendants.
    ■ 1. A statute, the intention and design of which, manifestly, is to deprive the plaintiff, in a judgment recovered upon contract, which is in existence and in full focre when such statute is passed, of his remedy upon such judgment and his rights thereunder, forever, unless the legislature shall in its discretion, at some future time, by a new law, provide for its payment, is unconstitutional.
    2. So held in respect to the act of the legislature, of May 1, 1865, (laws of 1865, eh. 646, § 5,) authorizing the board of supervisors of the county of New York to raise money by tax, &c.
    (Before Barbour, J., at Special Term,
    October, 1866.)
    This was. a motion on the part of the defendants for an order vacating and setting aside an execution issued upon the judgment in this action, based upon a provision of the statutes of the state, passed in 1865, (Y. Y. Sess. Laws, 1865, oh. 646, § 5,) relating to taxes and expenditures for the city of Hew York, whereby the amount of all final judgments recovered against the city, after the confirmation (by the supervisors) of the tax levy for the year 1865, shall be included by the comptroller in his next annual report or budget, and shall be included in the tax levy for the current year, and until the moneys to pay such judgments shall have been so raised, the issuing of any execution against the defendants is prohibited, unless the amount of such judgment should not be included in the succeeding tax levy passed by the legislature. The judgment in question was recovered subsequent to the passage of that act; but the contract upon which it was founded was entered into before the act was passed.
    
      R. H. Huntley, for the plaintiff.
    
      D. J. Dean, for the defendants.
   Barbour, J.

It is not necessary to consider the question whether the restriction in regard to executions and judgments, referred to in the statute in question, is expressed in the title of the act, or whether such act embraces more than one subject, within the meaning of the 16th section of the third article of the constitution. It is sufficient to say in this case that the intention and design of the provision of the act in question is, manifestly, to deprive the plaintiff, in a judgment recovered upon a contract, which was in existence and in full force when such act was passed, of his remedy upon such judgment, and his rights thereunder, forever, unless the legislature shall, in its discretion, at some future time, by a new law, provide for its payment. The question as to the unconstitutionality of statutes of this character is now so well settled, by numerous decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States and elsewhere, that nothing is necessary here beyond a mere statement of the case and a reference to the authorities. (Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. U. S. Rep. 315. McCracken v. Hayward, 2 id. 608. Curran v. State of Arkansas, 15 id. 304. Baumgardner v. Peigart, 4 Missouri R. 50. Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. R. 429. See also Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. Law, 647 et seq., and 4 Kent’s Com. 434.)

The motion must be denied, with $10 costs.  