
    N. Underwood vs. William Jacobs.
    Where a purchaser, under sheriff sale, refuses to comply with his bid and the sheriff goes out of office, his successor cannot bring an action for a breach of the contract.
    No privity exists between a sheriff and his successor, but what is created by statute; and it has never yet been extended to actions accruing to the predecessor, by contract, tort, or any othereause.
    
      Quere? Whether a purchaser at sheriff sale, who does not comply with his "contract, should be sued by the sheriff, or by the person whose property is sold?
    Tried before judge Richardson, at Greenville, fall term, 1825.
    The defendant had bid off a tract of land sold by A. Crowder, the former sheriff of Greenville district, and refused to comply with the terms of sale. The land was resold by Crowder, at the risk of the defendant, and purchased by another person for a less sum than he had bid at the first sale. This action was brought by the plaintiff as successor in office of Crowder, to recover the difference between the first and 'second sale.
    The defendant demurred to the declaration, on the ground that if any action had accrued to Crowder, it had not passed to his successor in office.
    The presiding judge sustained the demurrer. And this %Vas a motion to reverse that decision, on the ground, that the land was sold by Crowder in the character of sheriff, and therefore the right to consummate the sale and all other incidents of the sale passed to his successor.
    
      Waddy Thompson, for the motion.
    The vendue law applies to sheriff sales. 1 M,Cord 197. 1 Equity Reports 142. 2 Bay 169. Suppose the laud had been resold by the plaintiff, who must have brought this action?
    
      Earle, contra.
    Is this a contract? If so, the contract was with the predecessor. A sheriff could not even execute titles for his predecessor, until he was authorized by act of assembly. A sheriff at common law might perfect a sale at common law when he had made a levy. The defendant whose property is sold never will sue, because he will always col--lude with the bidder.
   Kott, J.

Whether Crowder himself could have maintained this action is a question which it is not now necessary to decide. But it would seem to me that if a cause of action accrued to any body, it must have been to the party whose land has been sold as he is the only person injured However on that question, I shall express no opinion. If Crowder had any cause of action it must have been on the ground of contract. The promise was made to him and could not by operation of law pass to his successor, there being no promise either express or implied to him. At common law whatevei’ official act the sheriff had begun, he was required to go ow and perfect. Ifhe had made a levy it was his duty to sell, make titles, &c. The right of his successor to consummate what he had begun, is derived from a special act of the legislature for that purpose. But it does not extend to actions ao eruiug to him by contract, tort, or any other cause. There is no privity between the plaintiff and defendant, nor any consideration on which an action could accrue to him. The court therefore concur in opinion with the presiding judge.

Waddy Thompson, for the motion.

. Earle, contra.  