
    Linda Annette KPAKA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, Borough of Manhattan Community College, Howard Meltzer, Thaddeous Radell, Simon Carr, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-3527
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    September 5, 2017
    
      FOR APPELLANT: Linda Annette Kpaka, pro se, Staten Island, NY.
    FOR APPELLEE: Jane L, Gordon, Qian Julie Wang, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY.
    PRESENT: Barrington D. Parker, Susan L. Carney, Circuit Judges, Timothy C, Stanceu, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Int’l Trade.
    
    
      
       Chief Judge Timothy C. Stanceu, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Linda Annette Kpaka, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment in favor of her former employer, Borough of Manhattan Community College, 'a college within the City University of New York system, and several of its employees in her suit pursuing claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1; and alleging breach of her employment contract. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 2015). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim' to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, that requirement is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

To survive a motion to dismiss an employment discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege “facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87 (2d Cir. 2015). An inference of discrimination arises from “circumstances including, but not limited to, the employer’s criticism of the plaintiffs performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.” Littlejohn v. City of N.Y., 795 F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, with one exception, Kpaka’s discrimination claims all fail for the same reason: her complaint was devoid of any factual allegations giving rise to an inference of discrimination, much less sufficient allegations to “nudge[ ] [her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” See Vega, 801 F.3d at 87 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The one exception is the allegation that Kpaka, who is black, was passed ovter for a committee position in favor of a white employee. The district court concluded, however, that because the allegedly unlawful action occurred more than 300 days before Kpaka filed her complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, any claim based on it was time barred. See id. at 79. Kpaka does not meaningfully challenge this ruling on appeal. See, e.g., Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.”). Even if we were to consider it, however, it would fail because Kpaka made no factual allegations demonstrating that she was similarly situated to the employee in question. See, e.g., Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that plaintiff attempting to “show[] that the employer treated [her] less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside [her] protected group ... must show she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed all of Kpaka’s Title VII discrimination claims.

Kpaka’s remaining claims are also insufficiently pleaded. She failed to allege that she was paid less than similarly situated male employees, as required to sustain her equal pay claim. See Lavin-McEleney v. Marist College, 239 F.3d 476, 480 (2d Cir. 2001). Although she alleged that she was fired in violation of her employment contract, she failed to allege that the conditions set forth in the employment offer — “sufficiency of enrollment, financial availability and curriculum need,” Appel-lees’ App. 162 — were met, as necessary to support this claim. See Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd., 304 F.3d 200, 215 (2d Cir. 2002) (no performance due under contract if condition precedent is not met). Finally, Kpaka failed to allege any facts demonstrating an unreasonable restraint on trade, as required to pursue her antitrust claim. See, e.g., Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 182 (2d Cir. 2012).

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We have considered Kpaka’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the' district court.  