
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shaun LERTSWAN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 14-10156.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 10, 2015.
    
    Filed March 18, 2015.
    Megan Anne Schultz Richards, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Fresno, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Lisa M. Sciandra, Lisa M. Sciandra, Attorney at Law, San Leandro, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: FARRIS, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Shaun Lertswan appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the two-year sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Lertswan contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors, instead basing the sentence exclusively on a promise made to him by the court at an earlier sentencing hearing. He also argues.that the district court erred by failing to explain the extent of its upward variance from the Guidelines range except by reference to that promise. Because Defendant did not raise these objections before the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir.2010). Contrary to Lertswan’s argument, the record reflects that the district court considered the parties’ arguments and the statutory sentencing factors before imposing sentence. The court imposed sentence on the basis of Lertswan’s breach of the court’s trust, a permissible sentencing factor, and its explanation of the sentence was legally sufficient. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc) (“The district court need not tick off each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them.”); United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir.2007) (at a revocation sentencing, the court may sanction the violator for his breach of trust).

Lertswan next contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Lertswan’s sentence. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 993. The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the section 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of circumstances, including Lertswan’s violation history. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 993; Simtob, 485 F.3d at 1062-63.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     