
    Monique GARCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NYC ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES, The City of New York, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 07-4742-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 25, 2009.
    Monique Garcia, St. Albans, NY, pro se, Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Dona B. Morris, Assistant Corporation Counsel (Michael A. Carclozo, Corporation Counsel, on the brief), The City of New York Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CHESTER J. STRAUB and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Monique Garcia (“plaintiff’), proceeding pro se, appeals from a Memorandum Opinion and Order of the District Court entered September 27, 2007 granting summary judgment to defendants, the New York City Administration for Children’s Services and the City of New York (jointly, “defendants”). Plaintiff asserted claims for: (1) discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq(2) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) violations of New York state law; and (4) violations of the New York City Human Rights Law. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining factual and procedural history of this case.

We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of plaintiffs discrimination, retaliation, § 1981, and state law claims substantially for the reasons stated in its thorough and careful Memorandum Opinion and Order entered September 27, 2007. See Garcia v. N.Y. City Admin. of Children’s Servs., No. 03 Civ. 05271, 2007 WL 2822153 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007).

With respect to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim, we note that since the District Court’s decision, our Circuit has further refined the requirements of proving such a claim. See Aulicino v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 82-85 (2d Cir.2009). In Aulicino, we vacated a grant of summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim upon concluding that “the court should have discounted from its analysis, if not altogether disregarded, the intervening [two-year] period between comments by one supervisor and comments by another” because “a ‘realistic’ picture of the hostile workplace alleged by [plaintiff] is not obtained by focusing on a two-year stretch of time in which he fails to allege acts of hostility.” Id. at 84. Unlike Aulicino, the District Court here did not improperly use any break in incidents of discrimination to “dilute the strength” of more intense periods of harassment that might otherwise be considered pervasive. See id. Moreover, the severity of the harassment alleged by plaintiff is distinguishable from Aulicino, where the plaintiff faced threats of physical violence. See id. at 84-85.

Accordingly, we find no error in the District Court’s conclusion that the incidents alleged by plaintiff were not “ ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment’ ” and, therefore, do not support a claim for hostile work environment. See Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)).

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of plaintiffs arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.  