
    Ordinary v. Davis Williams and H. Parkman. Same v. Adm’r and Adm’x John Gibson.
    Neither principal nor sureties in a bond to the Ordinary for the faithful administration of intestate’s effects, can be sued on their bond, until they have been cited before the Ordinary to account for the “actings and doings” of the administrator, and a decree has been made by him.
    An executor or administrator cannot be compelled to account in this Court.
    Debt on administration bond, tried before Ms Honor Judge Golcook.
    George Farrar died on the -- day of-, 18 — , leaving his widow and one child, Uaddaway Farrar. On the fifth day of July, 1802, she administered, and Davis Williams, H. Parkman, and John Gibson, were her sureties. She was likely to waste the estate, and her sureties applied to the Ordinary to be exonerated, and her administration was revoked, and granted to Joseph Collier, on the 11th March, 1803.
    John Talbird, at the Court of Equity for Edgefield district, in 1816, was appointed guardian of Haddaway Farrar, who is still a minor, and commenced the present actions against her sureties. Peggy Farrar died shortly after the revocation of the letters of administration. She left no will, and no one administered. No citation to account before the Ordinary was proved, and a motion was made by defendant’s counsel for a nonsuit for want of it, and also on the ground ":íthat Joseph Collier ought to have cited her, in her lifetime, to account before the Ordinary.
    The presiding judge refused the nonsuit on the firáí ground, but granted it ■ on the second.
    The plaintiff moved the Constitutional CouiB-to reverse the decision of the presiding judge, and to reinstate the case ojaf'the docket, on the ground that the direction was contrary to law, inasmugnas the neglect of Joseph Collier to cite her, would forever preclude all possibility of suing on the bond, and render the bond nugatory and void.
    
      Ellison, for the motion. Charles Goodwin, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Richardson, J.

Both these cases present the single question, whether the principal and sureties, or either, in a bond to the Ordinary, for the faithful administration of intestate’s effects, must, of necessity, be cited before the Ordinary to account, in the language of the bond, for “the actings and doings” of the administrator, before they, or either, can be liable to be sued upon their bond ? In the laws of contract, this rule is plain, that no one can be bound but by the plain expression of his undertaking, unless varied by some established rule of interpretation. Here the expression is, “do make a just and true account of,” &c., “when required by the said Court,” (the Court of Ordinary.) Words cannot be more explicit. It is asked, whom can you now cite, the administratrix being dead ? The answer is easy and satisfactory, let those who are interested act as they must, before claiming account in a Court of Equity, where a principal party is dead, i. e., make a representative, or possibly it might suffice to cite the securities before the Ordinary ; but I cannot, for myself, recommend the latter course.

It cannot be lost sight of, too, that bringing administrators to account in this Court, is taking them from the proper jurisdiction, the Court of Equity or Ordinary. Executors, standing in precisely the same situation, cannot be compelled to account in this Court, *and it would be most inconvenient to bring them here without the peculiar powers of the Court of Equity, The same objections arise against bringing administrators to account here. Over and above, then, the letter of the bond, which is deemed conclusive, the arguments ab inconvenienti are cogent, and the motion to set aside the nonsuit is unanimously refused.

Nott, Johnson and Gantt, JJ., concurred.

See 6 Riot. 355 ; 4 Riot. 271; 4 MoC. 113; 1 MoC. 380 ; 7 Riot. 179.  