
    SETH DRIGGS vs. JOSEPH DANIELS.
    In Equity. —
    No. 2669.
    I. No appeal will lie from an order denying a motion not involving the merits of the action.
    II. Where a motion is made for the delivery of certificates to the plaintiffs solicitor, which were deposited with the clerk of the court by an agreement of the parties, and the motion is denied, no appeal will lie from such refusal.
    STATEMENT OR THE CASE.
    Motion to dismiss appeal.
    The suit was brought to recover among other things, certain certificates of award made by the late Venezuelan commission, amounting at par to $25,000. In the course of the proceedings $20,000 of these certificates were deposited with the clerk of the court, and it was also stipulated by the counsel on both sides that the defendant should deposit the remaining $5,000 of certificates and pay $1,000 in money to the plaintiff or his solicitors within fifteen days thereafter. The stipulation concluded in the following words :
    “And the plaintiff agrees that, upon this being done, the case shall be entered ‘ settled by agreement between the parties,’ and, further, that the $25,000 of Venezuelan certificates shall be held by the court subject to any claim to be made upon them by the administrator de bonis non of John Clark’s estate, or the assignee or creditors of that estate, or Mrs. Miller; such claims to be presented within thirty days after such payment.”
    After the certificates had been fully deposited, and more than thirty days having transpired, and no claims having been presented by the administrator or creditors of the Clark estate, or by Mrs. Miller, the plaintiff’s counsel moved the court for an order directing the delivery of such certificates to his solicitor of record. The motion was overruled, from which this appeal was taken by the defendant.
    
      
      B. F. Butler, of Massachusetts, and R. D. Mussey, for plaintiff:
    The plaintiff contends that the only fair construction of the above stipulation is that the claims to be made against the certificates were to be filed in this case, were to be directed specifically to the certificates referred and deposited, and that in default of the presentation of such claims, the court should have ordered the delivery of the certificates to the plaintiff.
    
      James G. Payne for defendant.
   By the Court :

The order appealed from determines no question involving ' the merits of the action. The refusal to deliver the certificates is an intermediate proceeding, and its regularity can only come before us for review on an appeal from the final l'udgment or decree.

The appeal must therefore be dismissed.  