
    PEOPLE, ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION, v. PARIS GRAVEL COMPANY.
    1. Mines and Minerals — States—Deeds—Reservation op Mineral Rights.
    Deed from State reserving mineral rights held, to include sand and gravel, where statute classified sand and gravel as nonmetallie minerals (CL 1948, § 322.212).
    2. Same — States—Tax Deeds — Reservation op Mineral Rights— Recording — Subsequent Purchasers.
    Reservation of mineral rights in deed from State of land obtained for nonpayment of taxes held, binding upon subsequent purchasers of the land, by operation of law, where deed was duly recorded.
    3. Same — States—Tax Deed — Reservation of Mineral Right— Subsequent Purchasers — Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict.
    Judgment notwithstanding verdict, following jury verdict for State in its action to recover value of sand and gravel extracted by subsequent purchasers of land obtained by State for nonpayment of taxes and conveyed by State under recorded deed reserving mineral rights held, error, where statute applicable to transfer of such land by State specifically defined sand and gravel as “nonmetallie minerals,” subsequent purchasers being bound by the reservation by operation of law (CL 1948, ' § 322.212).
    References for Points in Headnotes
    [1] 36 Am Jur, Mines and Minerals §§ 5, 35.
    Clay, sand, or gravel as “minerals” within deed, lease, or license. 95 ALR2d 843.
    [2, 3] 36 Am Jur, Mines and Minerals §§ 24, 28.
    [4] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 1009.
    
      4. Costs — Appeal and Error — Public Question — States—Sand—. Gravel.
    No costs are allowed on appeal in State’s action to obtain value of sand and gravel extracted by subsequent purchasers of land obtained by State for nonpayment of taxes and conveyed by State under deed reserving mineral rights, a public question being involved.
    Appeal from Mecosta; Van Domelen (Harold), J.
    Submitted Division 3 March. 7, 1967, at' Grand Rapids.
    (Docket No. 1,606.)
    Decided November 8, 1967.
    Complaint by the People of the State of Michigan, on relation of the Director of the Department of Conservation, against Paris Gravel Company, William R. Davison and Janet E. Davison, his wife, to recover the value of sand and gravel extracted from land purchased by defendants. Verdict for plaintiff. Judgment notwithstanding verdict for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.
    Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment on verdict.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Nicholas V. Olds and Warren R. Snyder, Assistants Attorney General, for the people.
   Burns, J.

On November 29, 1940, the auditor general of the State of Michigan conveyed a parcel of property situated in Mecosta county to the State of Michigan for nonpayment of taxes. The Michigan department of conservation which had jurisdiction over this land offered it for sale. The advertisement for sale informed prospective purchasers that “Pursuant to statute all deeds conveying such property will reserve the following to the State of Michigan: All rights to minerals, coal, oil, gas, sand, gravel, marl, etc.” The statutory reference was CL 1929, § 5848 (Stat Ann 1958 Rev § 13.441).

The former owner, Dan Worth, was notified of his right to retain the land by matching the successful high bid within 30 days after the sale. The high bid was $250, and the State land' purchase certificate reserved the mineral rights including sand and gravel. Worth filed an application to retain said property, and this application acknowledged the reservation of sand and gravel by the State. However, the deed from the State of Michigan to Worth, although reserving mineral rights, did not specifically mention sánd and gravel.® Thereafter, Worth conveyed the property to one Clifford E. James, who, in turn, conveyed the property to defendants William R. and Janet E. Davison. Both conveyances contained the language “subject to the exceptions and reservations con-' tained in the deed from the department of' conservation for the State of Michigan to Dan Worth,” which deed was recorded in liber 180 of deeds, page 346, Mecosta county register of deeds office.'

Shortly after the Davisons acquired the property, they removed sand and gravel from the subject, property. Plaintiff brought suit to recover the value of the sand and gravel removed hy the defendants, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $5,500. The trial judge thereafter granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendants.

The reservation of “mineral rights” in a deed wherein the State is the grantor, has already been interpreted by our Supreme Court in Matthews v. Department of Conservation (1959), 355 Mich 589. There Justice Talbot Smith traced the history of such a clause and on page 595 stated:

“The scope of the mineral reservation is expressly made dependent upon a particular statute, which, as we have seen, classifies sand and gravel as nonmetallic minerals. The legislature made specific that which in general speech is obscure. When construed in light of the statute [which was the same as CL 1929, § 5848], the deed necessarily reserves sand and gravel to the State.”

The interpretation is plain and direct. The State reserved mineral rights, including the ponmetallic minerals, sand and gravel. Such reservation by operation of law is binding upon subsequent purchasers.

Cause is reversed and remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment on the jury verdict.

No costs, a public question being involved.

Fitzgerald, P. J., and Holbrook, J.,.concurred. 
      
       See, however, CL 1948, § 322.212, amended by PA 1964, No 125 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 13.441) which now speeifieally provides that “Por the purpose of this section, 'mineral rights’ shall not include 'sand, gravel, clay or other nonmetallic minerals’.”
     
      
       Inasmuch as Worth failed to make his application for redemption within 90 days from the time title to sueh property vested in the State of Michigan by virtue of the tax sale, he did not qualify as one entitled to redeem the property and receive a quitclaim deed, conveying fee title without exceptions or reservations as provided by PA 1937, No 155, § 6, as amended (CL 1948, § 211.356 [Stat Ann 1960 Éev § 7.956]). Under these circumstances the conservation department had power under PA 1909, No 280, § 8, as amended (CL 1948, § 322.212 [Stat Ann 1958 Eev §13.441]) to reserve in the deed in the instant case all mineral, coal,, oil and gas rights.
     