
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Abdel Hameed SHEHADEH, aka Abu Baheera, aka Abul-Qasim Ibn Abu Muhammad, aka Abul-Qasim, aka Sunnah101, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-4561-CR.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 8, 2014.
    James P. Loonam (David C. James, Alexander A. Solomon, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
    Frederick H. Cohn, The Law Office of Frederick H. Cohn, Jersey City, NJ, for Defendant-Appellant.
    PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, DENNY CHIN and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-appellant Abdel Hameed Shehadeh appeals from a judgment entered November 25, 2013 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Vitaliano, J.) convicting him, following a jury trial, of three counts of making materially false statements to federal agents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). On appeal, Shehadeh challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements. He also argues that his conviction on Count One should be vacated because the district court erred in instructing the jury that the government did not need to prove that he knew he was lying to an F.B.I. agent. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision.

1. Post-Arrest Statements

Custodial statements are admissible at trial only if the government establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights against self-incrimination. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); United States v. Jaswal, 47 F.3d 539, 542 (2d Cir.1995). “Whether a confession is a product of coercion may only be determined after a careful evaluation of the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, including the accused’s characteristics, the conditions of interrogation, and the conduct of law enforcement officials.” United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1991). Here, in a 16-page opinion filed August 31, 2012, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Shehadeh’s motion to suppress statements he made in custody after twice being read his Miranda rights.

We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Rodriguez, 356 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir.2004). Additionally, “[cjredibility determinations are the province of the trial judge, and should not be overruled on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 435 (2d Cir.2001).

On October 22, 2010, Shehadeh was arrested in Honolulu, Hawaii for making materially false statements to federal agents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). He was interviewed for four hours, during the course of which he made a number of incriminating statements.

The district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, and its conclusion that Shehadeh’s waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights was “uncoerced, knowing and voluntary” was well supported by the record. G.App. at 174. Shehadeh was a 21-year-old man of “at least average intellectual ability,” who was comfortable in his interactions with the agents and prosecutors. G.App. at 168. He was not handcuffed during the interrogation, and the atmosphere in the room was “relaxed,” “cordial,” and “professional.” G.App. at 169. Although the district court observed that some of the conduct of the agents and prosecutor was perhaps ill-advised, it nonetheless held that Shehadeh was not misled or coerced. To the contrary, he understood that he had the right to remain silent and the right to a lawyer.

Shehadeh argues specifically that Agent Tinning deceived him into thinking that if he invoked his right to counsel, he would lose any opportunity to later cooperate with the government. The district court rejected this argument, as a factual matter, and found that Agent Tinning’s suggestions were truthful and not misleading. The district court found that Tinning’s statement “that the current, casual nature of Shehadeh’s interactions with law enforcement would change in tenor” once lawyers were involved “was actually truthful and was not misleading.” G.App. at 172. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Shehadeh’s motion to suppress.

2. Count One

Shehadeh also argues that his conviction on Count One should be vacated because, under the court’s charge to the jury, the government was not required to prove that he knew or should have known that his lies were addressed to an F.B.I. agent. In accordance with our ruling in United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1990), that, with respect to proof of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, “no mental state is required with respect to federal involvement,” id. at 1060, the district court’s instructions to the jury did not require a finding that the defendant knew he was lying to an F.B.I. agent.

Shehadeh acknowledges that this panel is bound by the holding of Bakhtiari. He explains that he included this argument in his briefing to solely preserve it as the basis of a petition for en banc review by the full court, or review by the Supreme Court. The argument he seeks to preserve is that, under the Bakhtiari rule and the district court’s instructions to the jury, he could have been inappropriately convicted for lying in circumstances that gave him no reason to believe that his lies were addressed to a federal agent or that they constituted a violation of law.

As the defendant properly anticipates, we must adhere to our Circuit’s prior holding in Bakhtiari, and on that basis we reject the defendant’s contention that his conviction on Count One should be vacated. We note, however, that the record in this case does not support the defendant’s argument that he could have been convicted without knowing that his lies were addressed to a federal agent and without reason to believe that lying in these circumstances might be illegal. While it is true that Shehadeh would not have known that Special Agent Panetta, who questioned him together with Officer Patrick Gormley of United States Customs and Border Protection, was an agent of the F.B.I., Panetta was presented to the defendant as a Customs official. There was no doubt the defendant understood him to be a federal official. For the purposes of liability under § 1001, it makes no difference whether Panetta was an official of the F.B.I. or of Customs. Further, the court instructed the jury that, in order to convict Shehadeh, it needed to find that he acted “willfully.” The court defined the term “willfully” as acting “with the bad purpose to disobey the law.” G.App. at 80-81. Accordingly, under the court’s instructions, the jury could not find the defendant guilty unless it found that the defendant understood his lies to be forbidden by law.

We have considered Shehadeh’s remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  