
    Jovan FLUDD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Brian FISCHER, Commissioner, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-3181-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 28, 2012.
    
      Jovan Fludd, Alden, NY, pro se.
    Victor G. Paladino, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, and Nancy A. Spiegel, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, of counsel), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York State Office of the Attorney General, Albany, NY, for Defendants-Ap-pellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, PETER W. HALL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Jovan Fludd (“Fludd”), an inmate at New York State’s Wende Correctional Facility (“Wende”) proceeding pro se, appeals the July 7, 2011 order of the District Court denying his motion for a preliminary injunction directing the defendants to transfer him to another correctional facility. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we have jurisdiction over appeals from “[i]n-terlocutory orders of the district courts ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” “To qualify as an ‘injunction’ under § 1292(a)(1), a district court order must grant at least part of the ultimate, coercive relief sought by the moving party.” Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 246 F.3d 176, 182 (2d Cir.2001). In other words, § 1292(a)(1) imparts appealability only to those injunctive orders that affect the substance of the plaintiffs underlying claim. See id.

Fludd alleges in his complaint, in relevant part, that his administrative segregation in Wende’s Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) violates his constitutional rights. Although it is clear that Fludd does not want to remain in the SHU, the only relevant coercive relief he seeks in his complaint is release into the general population at Wende — not transfer to a different correctional facility. Since the District Court’s order does not involve the grant of part or all of the substantive relief Fludd seeks in his complaint, § 1292(a)(1) does not provide us with a basis to exercise jurisdiction over the instant appeal.

The only other potential basis for appellate jurisdiction in this case is the collateral order doctrine. For an interlocutory order to fall within the collateral order doctrine, the order must: “(1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Murphy v. Reid,, 332 F.3d 82, 83 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, although the District Court’s order conclusively determined an issue that is separate from the merits of the action, ie., whether Fludd was entitled to a prison transfer, the issue is not one that would effectively be unre-viewable on appeal from a final judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.  