
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ONE 2004 LAND ROVER RANGE ROVER, Defendant, Sanfer Sports Cars, Inc., Claimant-Appellant.
    No. 09-2102-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 10, 2010.
    
      Richard J. Diaz, Coral Gables, FL, for Appellant.
    Monica J. Richards, Assistant United States Attorney, of counsel, for Kathleen M. Mehltretter, United States Attorney, Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, GUIDO CALABRESI, Senior Circuit Judge, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, District Judge.
    
      
       Christopher F. Droney, Judge of the United Stales District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Sanfer Sports Cars, Inc. (“Sanfer”) appeals from a March 31, 2009 order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Skretny, /.), striking its civil-forfeiture claim for lack of standing pursuant to Rule G(8)(e)(i)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions (“Supplemental Rules”). We assume familiarity with the underlying facts, the case’s procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Sanfer argues that it had standing as actual owner of the defendant vehicle. However, under Florida law, which governs, Sanfer’s ownership ceased at the moment Sanfer delivered the defendant vehicle. See Fla. Stat. § 672.401(2); Palm Beach Auto Brokers, Inc. v. DeCarlo, 620 So.2d 250, 252 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993). Sanfer’s failure to register the title transfer did not prevent the title’s passage. In re Mullennix, No. 05-BK-28199-JKO, 2006 WL 1548643, at *4 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. Apr.27, 2006) (applying Florida law); Motor Credit Corp. v. Woolverton, 99 So.2d 286, 290 (Fla.1957). Nor is Ragg v. Hurd, 60 So.2d 673 (Fla.1952) (cited by Sanfer) to the contrary; here, the parties to the sale did not condition the passing of title on the payment of the balance of the purchase price. Cf. id. at 674 (holding that, where “the entire course of conduct of the appellants discloses an intention not to part with the title to the car until the cash payment had actually been received by them,” (emphasis added) that intention is enforceable).

Sanfer argued in the district court that its interest as lienholder was sufficient to confer standing. Sanfer, however, has not presented that argument on appeal. It is therefore forfeited. See, e.g., Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 75 (2d Cir.2001) (“It is a settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.”).

Finding no merit in Sanfer’s remaining arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the order of the district court. 
      
      . The result is the same whether the issue is characterized as one of constitutional (i.e., Article III) standing or one of "statutory standing" (i.e., according to the parties, San-fer’s status as owner for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)). We express no opinion on the nature of the "standing” inquiry that should be undertaken when considering a motion to strike under Supplemental Rule G, let alone whether either of the aforementioned "standing” inquiries (constitutional or “statutory") is the appropriate one.
     
      
      . Both parties assume that any property interest Sanfer had was divested at the moment of seizure by operation of 21 U.S.C. § 881(h), and that any act thereafter was ineffective. Neither party having disputed this assumption, we do not examine its validity. But cf. United States v. Parcel of Land, Bldgs., Appurtenances & Improvements, Known as 92 Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, N.J., 507 U.S. 111, 128—29, 113 S.Ct. 1126, 122 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (plurality opinion) (holding that relation-back provision of § 881(h) does not operate until entry of a forfeiture judgment; therefore, "[bjecause the success of [forfeiture defenses] will necessarily determine whether § 881(h) applies, [the innocent owner defense] must allow an assertion of the defense before § 881(h) applies”); Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir.1994) ("It is manifest that [§ 881(h)] cannot serve to transfer ownership of the property until there is a final judgment of forfeiture.”).
     