
    
      Lucy Perry and Peter Perry, adm’rs., vs. David Aiken.
    
    The plaintiffs issued their writ returnable to Spring Term, 1845, and at fall .term of the same year, obtained an order for further time to declare. At Spring Term, 1846, no declaration having been filed within the period limited by the previous order, the plaintiffs applied for, and obtained, an order far yet further time to declare. Held, on appeal, that the court had power to grant the last order.
    Every order entered in a cause is such a continuance of it, that the party cannot be held to have let fall his action, until a year and a day has expired from the entry of the order.
    
      Before Frost, J. at Lancaster, Bpring Term, 1846.
    The report of his Honor, the presiding judge, is as follows :
    “ The plaintiffs issued their writ in this case, returnable to Spring Term, 1845. At Fall Term, 1845, an order was made extending the time for the plaintiffs to file their declaration ; and the time had expired before the sitting of the court. On motion, further time was granted to the plaintiffs to declare. This seemed to be warranted, because, though a year and a day had expired since the suing out of the writ, yet a discontinuance was avoided by the order made in the case at Fall Term, 1845; and until the case was discontinued by neglect to take any step for the period of a year and a day, the plaintiff had not so let fall his action, as to preclude any further order or proceeding.”
    The defendant appealed, and now moved the court to reverse the order, on the ground :
    Because the writ having been issued more than a year and a day, and no declaration filed, the case is out of court.
    
      Boyce and Johnson, for the motion. -, contra.
   Curia,-per

Frost, J.

A cause is not necessarily out of court, because the plaintiff has not declared within a year and a day from the return of the writ; because, if unprepared, he may obtain rules for further time to declare, indefinitely. These rules do, generally, extend the time for declaring' beyond a year and a day from the return. The necessity of declaring within a prescribed time, affects only the party, and does not abridge the authority of the court to control and direct its proceedings as may be most conducive to justice. Every order entered in a cause, is such a continuance of it, that the party cannot be held to have let fall his action, until a year and a day has expired from the date of the entry, Within this period, it is in the discretion of the judge to grant further time to declare. The point was ruled in So. W. Rail Road Bank vs. Dupont, decided on appeal from Charleston, Spring Term, 1843. The motion is refused.

Richardson, O’Neall, Evans, Butler and Ward-law, JJ. concurred.  