
    WILLIAM E. FISHER, By His Next Friend, W. C. WAKEFIELD, v. E. L. DEATON and MRS. HATTIE DEATON.
    (Filed 2 January, 1929.)
    Highways — Regulation and Use for Travel — Law of the Road — Negligence —Automobiles—Instructions.
    Where the plaintiff was not walking along the highway but ran out from behind another automobile near an intersection and was struck and injured by the defendant’s car for which injury he seeks to recover damages in his action: Held, it is not reversible error for the trial judge to fail to charge the jury specifically upon the various particulars as to the speed, etc., required of the driver of an automobile upon the highway at a cross-road, if he charges correctly upon the general law arising from the evidence. C. S., '564. Bowen v. Sohni'b'ben, 184 N. C., 248, cited and distinguished.
    Civil action, before Cranmer, J., at April Term, 1928, of "Waice.
    Tbe plaintiff, a minor about four years of age, instituted tbis action against tbe defendant for personal injury resulting from being struck by defendant’s automobile at or near tbe intersection of St. Mary’s Street and tbe Calvin Eoad in the city of Ealeigb.
    Tbe cause was submitted to a jury, and tbe .issue of negligence was answered against tbe plaintiff and in favor of tbe defendant.
    From judgment upon tbe verdict plaintiff appealed.
    
      Gatling, Morris & Parker for plaintiff.
    
    
      Charles U. Harris for defendant.
    
   Pee Cueiam.

Calvin Eoad intersects St. Mary’s Street from tbe west and terminates at tbe intersection. Defendant’s car was being driven' northwardly by bis wife. Tbe plaintiff, according to tbe evidence, was on tbe east side of St. Mary’s Street opposite tbe intersection of Calvin Eoad and was running across tbe street toward tbe intersection. Had plaintiff been using tbe intersection of Calvin Eoad at tbe time of tbe injury, tbe failure of tbe car to slow down to 15 miles an hour might have been found to have been tbe proximate cause of tbe injury. However, as tbe plaintiff was not walking along tbe highway, but ran out from behind a car toward tbe intersection of Calvin Eoad, a different situation was presented, and for tbis reason tbe principle announced in Bowen v. Schnibben, 184 N. C., 248, 114 S. E., 170, does not apply.

Tbe trial judge charged: “Tbe driving of any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard of tbe rights of others, or without due caution and circumspection, and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property, is ‘reckless driving.’ ”

Tbe judge further charged: “It is the duty of the driver of any vehicle to drive it at a careful and prudent rate of speed, not greater than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the surface and width of the highway, the traffic and other existing conditions; and so as not to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person.”

While the judge did not specifically call the attention of the jury to the provision of the statute requiring a motorist to reduce the speed to 15 miles an hour when approaching an intersection, there was no specific request for such instruction, and in our opinion the charge upon the question of negligence and the statutes applicable, constituted a substantial compliance with C. S., 564, in view of the facts disclosed in the present record.

Upon the face of the record we find no error of law warranting a new trial.

No error.  