
    Hallam v. Jones.
    December, 1820.
    Attachments — Statute—Application.—Tile 12th section. ch. 123. 1 Rev. Code, allowing- any person to interplead in attachments, without hail, applies, only to attachments lor debts, and not for rent.
    Edward Hallam procured a warrant of attachment, against certain goods of John M’Pherson, for rent. The defendant not appearing to replevy the goods, Hallam moved the Hustings court of Richmond (to which the warrant was returnable) for judgment. The court gave judgment, and gave a day to Jones and Winston (with whom the officer stored the goods, and who claimed title to them) to interplead. M’Pherson at another day, moved the court, to set aside the judgment; which motion was overruled and the cause continued, on the motion of Jones and Winston ; who at the next term filed a special plea, which was afterwards withdrawn : the defendant allowed to plead any matter he legally might; and the cause continued. At the next term, Jones and Winston moved for leave to interplead, which was refused; the plaintiff had judgment, and the effects attached were ordered to be sold. Jones and Winston excepted to the opinion of the Hustings court, refusing permission to plead that the property was theirs: and appealed to the Superior court of law for Henrico county. That court reversed the judgment of the court of Hustings, on the exception; and Hallam appealed.
    
      
       Attachments — Statute—Application.—Tt lias been decided in Hallam, v. Jones, (Him. 142, that the general lavs relating to attachments against absconding debtors, do not extend to attachments for rent, notwithstanding the generality of the words “all attachments.'’ Bedford v. Winston, 3 Band. 156.
      See generally, on the subject oi attachments, monographic note, on “Attachments'’ appended to Lancaster v. wilson, 27 Gratt. 624.
    
   x"ROANE), Judge.

The court is of opinion, that notwithstanding the generality of the expression “all attachments, ” () these terms do not extend to attachments for rent, like the one before us. This is evident not only from a recurrence to the several acts from which that act is complied, and which make that construction inadmissible, but also from the 13th section immediately following. In that section,the phrase is limited by the expression “such attachment,” therein used, to attachments for debt onlj; as is evident from the general provisions to the section aforesaid; which provisions apply, only to attachments of the latter character.

On these grounds, the court reverses the ■judgment of the Superior court with costs; and affirms that of the court of Hustings. 
      
      Cabemi absent.
     
      
      (a) Chap. 123, § 12,1 Bey. Code.
     