
    Von Helmold, Appellant, v. Von Helmold.
    
      Husband and wife — Desertion—Nonsupport—Acts of February 22, 1718, and Hay 4, 1855, P. L. 430.
    The Act of May 4,1855, P. L. 430, which provides that “ whenever any husband from drunkenness, profligacy or other cause shall neglect or refuse to provide for his wife, or shall desert her, she shall have all the rights and privileges secured to a feme sole trader under the Act of February 22, 1718, 1 Sm. L. 99,” does not confer upon deserted wives all the privileges set forth in the act of 1718, but only those which inhere in women as feme sole traders, namely, those affecting their rights in their own estate and earnings, and their right to trade. The act does not sustain an application for an attachment against the real estate of an absent husband by a deserted wife.
    Argued Dec. 9, 1901.
    Appeal, No. 105, Oct. T., 1901, by plaintiff, from order of C. P. No. 3, Pbila. Co., March T., 1901, No. 166, making absolute rule to quash attachment in case of Emma Elizabeth Von Helmold v. George H. Von Helmold, sometimes called George H. Helmold.
    Before Rice, P. J., Beaver, Oready, W. W. Porter and W. D. Porter, JJ.
    Affirmed.
    Rule to quash attachment.
    The petition for the attachment averred that the petitioner and George H. Von Helmold were married in 1894, and lived together until December 3, 1898, when Von Helmold deserted her. The petition averred :
    That the said George H. Von Helmold, sometimes called George H. Helmold, for two years last past, being possessed of his health and liberty, has neglected and refused to provide for his wife, and has deserted and absented himself from the said deponent, his lawful wife, without making any provision whatever for her maintenance during his absence, rendering her liable to become chargeable to the city of Philadelphia for her support.
    The petition prayed for an attachment against the husband’s real estate, and the attachment was accordingly issued.
    The court quashed the attachment.
    
      Error assigned was the order of the court.
    
      
      J. H. Shoemaker, with him Edward Wiener, for appellant.—
    By the act of 1855, any married woman, whose husband has failed to support her, is entitled to all the rights conferred upon certain married women by virtue of the act of 1718: Reilly v. Reilly, 4 Brewster, 169; Miller v. Miller, 4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 309; Longbotbam v. Longbotham, 18 Pa. C. C. Rep. 460 ; Gilpin v. Gilpin, 19 Phila. 294.
    
      Alex. Simpson, Jr., with him Martin II. Stutzbach, for appellee. —
    Section 4 of the Act of February 22, 1718, 1 Sm. L. 99, and section 2 of the Act of May 4,1855, P. L. 430, do not cover a case like the present: Duquesne Savings Bank’s App., 96 Pa. 298.
    January 21, 1902:
   Opinion by

William W. Porter, J.,

This was an application for an attachment against the real estate of an absent husband by a deserted wife, based upon the provisions of the acts of February 22, 1718 and May 4, 1855. The facts set forth in the petition do not bring the petitioner within the provisions of the act of 1718, standing alone. But it is said that the case comes within the act of 1855, which provides that, “ whenever any husband from drunkenness, profligacy or other cause, shall neglect or refuse to provide for his wife, or shall desert her, she shall have all the rights and privileges secured to a feme sole trader under the act of 22d February, 1718, entitled ‘an act concerning feme sole traders,’ and be subject as therein provided, and her property real and personal, howsoever acquired, shall be subject to her free and absolute disposal during life ánd by her will without liability to be interfered with or obtained by such husband, and in case of her intestacy shall go to her next of kin as if he were previously dead.”

We are of opinion that this act does not confer upon deserted wives (as described in its provisions) all the privileges set forth in the act of 1718, but only those which inhere in women as feme sole traders, namely, those affecting their rights in their own estate and earnings and their right to trade. The expressions used in the act, both in the portion quoted as elsewhere, leave no room to doubt the soundness of this construction which follows the decision of the Supreme Court in Duquesne Savings Bank’s Appeal, 96 Pa. 298.

The order is affirmed.  