
    Harmon et al. vs. Garland.
    At Law.
    No. 20,318.
    Decided June 14, 1880.
    Justices Wylie, Mac Arthur and Hackee sitting
    1. Under tlie Married Woman’s Act of 1869, It. S. D. C., a married woman owning a separate estate may contract to repair her house, or to have anything done to it that will put it into a condition to make it rentable.
    2. Defendant, a married woman, owned a house as her separate estate. Plaintiffs sold and delivered furniture to her upon her promise to pay for same out of said estate. The defendant bought and used the furniture for the purpose of furnishing the house.
    
      Held, That this was a contract having relation to her separate estate.
    Motion in General Term for judgment on a special verdict-
    The plaintiffs, furniture dealers, sued the defendant, a taarried woman, to recover the price of furniture used in furnishing a house forming part of her separate estate. At the trial, the jury rendered the following special verdict: -
    “ We, the jury, find that the furniture,-the price of which is sued for in this action, was sold and delivered by the plaintiffs to the defendant, upon her representation that she was the owner of property in her own right, and that she would pay for said furniture out of her said separate estate. We further find that said furniture was bought and used by the defendant for furnishing a house forming a part of her separate estate, which house so furnished, said defendant thereafter rented. Ve further find that said defendant, at the time of making said contract, was a married woman ; and being ignorant in point of law what our verdict should be upon the above facts, we find for the plaintiffs for the amount claimed, $1,834.33, with interest from the first day of March, 1878, if the court shall be .of opinion that upon said facts the plaintiffs are entitled to recover in point of law ; and if the court shall be of opinion that the plaintiffs ai’e not entitled to recover upon said facts in. point of law, then we find for the defendant.”
    J. J. Darlington for plaintiff:
    The “Married Woman’s Acts” have been liberally construed in a majority of the States. This court having, however, in Rich vs. Iiyatt, Wash. Law Rep., Yol. 7, No. 13, indicated its disposition to adhere to the “ strict construction ” school, the authorities cited will be confined to the decisions of the courts of those States, in which these statutes haye been most strictly construed, viz.: New Hamp-. shire: Bailey vs. Pearson, 29 N. II., 77 ; Ames vs. Foster, 42 N. H., 381; Muzzey vs. Reardon, 57 N. H., 378; Illinois: Carpenter vs. Mitchell, 50 Ill., 470 ; Williams vs. Hugunin, 69 Ill., 214 ; New - York: Yale vs. Dederer, 18 N. Y., 265 ; Si C. 22 N. Y., 450.
    The language of the New Hampshire act is as follows : “ Married women, in the cases aforesaid, shall * * * be liable to be sued at law and in equity upon any contract by them made, or any wrong by them done, in respect to such property * * * in the same manner and with the same effect as if they were unmarried.”
    . In the case of Batchelder vs. Sargent, 47 N. H., a case strikingly analogous to the present, the court said; “ The power to hold property to the wife’s sole and separate use,, necessarily implies a power to hold whatever .is essential to make that use beneficial; such as farming tools, stock, and the like ; and as incident to holding such tools and stock, must be the right to purchase them, and pledge her credit' for the price. * * * The wife has used her credit, to stock her farm, and she enjoys the benefit of it; and a decision which would discharge her from the obligation to pay for it, would not only be painfully unjust and productive of much mischief in that direction, but would, we are persuaded, be inconsistent with the policy of our legislation, which is to place the wife in respect to such property upon the footing of a feme sole.”
    
    This case is cited, first, because it is the decision of a court than which none has been a more strict constructionist qf the class of legislation in question; secondly, because it is the decision of a court whose views in Ames vs. Foster were adopted and apparently most relied upon by this court in Each vs. Hyatt; and, thirdly, because the case itself cannot be distinguished in principle, in a single particular, from the case at bar.
    From the authorities of the States above mentioned, the following may be stated as contracts “in relation to the separate estates of married women” in the sense of the Married Woman’s Acts, and which when made are binding upon them, viz.:
    1. Contracts connected with and growing out of her property, or necessary to its use and enjoyment; as cattle to stock or labor to cultivate her farm. Bailey vs. Pearson, 29 N. Ii., 77; Batchelder vs. Sargent, 46 N. H., 262 ; See Conway vs. Smith, 13 Wis., 147 ; Ames vs. Foster, 3 Allen, 545 ; Muzzey vs. Beardon, 57 N. H., 378 ; Carpenter vs. Mitchell, 50 Ill., 470; Coobson vs. Toole, 59 Ill., 515; Owen vs. Cawley, 36 N. Y., 600.
    2. Contracts for the benefit of the separate estate, or for the wife’s benefit upon its credit; as for money to pay interest upon an encumbrance, or board for wife and her husband upon her promise to pay out of her separate estate. Yale vs. Dederer, 18 N. Y., 266 ; Owen vs. Cawley, 36 hi. Y., 600 ; Maxon vs. Scott, 55 N. Y., 247 ; Hammond vs. Corbett, 5 N. II., 311; Williams vs. Ilugunnin, 69 Ill., 214 ; Manhattan B. & M. Co. vs. Thompson, 58 N. Y., 80; White vs. McNett, 33 N. Y., 376.
    3. Contracts made with intention to bind the separate estate, or by both parties, upon its credit. White vs. McNett, 33 N. Y., 376 ; Hammond vs. Corbett, 51 N. H., 311; Com. Ex. Ins. Co. vs. Babcock, 48 N. Y., 613 ; Carpenter vs. O’Dougherty, 50 N. Y., 660; Manhattan B. & M. Co. vs. Thompson, 58 N. Y., 80 ; McVey vs. Cantrell, 70 N. Y., 295.
    
    Rich vs. Hyatt decides nothing either for or against the plaintiffs in this action ; its reasoning is conclusive in their favor. The doctrine of courts of. equity upon this subject will be found in Willard vs. Eastham, 15 Gray, 328.
    Hagner & Maddox argued the case for the defendant, but filed no brief.
   Mr. Justice Wylie

delivered the opinion of the court.

Our married woman’s act of 1869 declares that a married woman may contract as a feme sole in regard to any matter relating to her separate estate, and the question in this case is whether the purchase by a married woman of furniture for a house forming her separate estate is such a contract as relates to that estate. We think that it is. A woman who owns a farm, if she lives on it herself, may stock it. If she finds that she can rent it to better advantage by stocking it than by renting it without the stock, we think it is such an incident to the farm as would enable her to buy stock for that purpose. Under a similar statute in New Hampshire, just such a case has been cited by the plaintiff".

The house in question was in this city and was the property of the defendant, a married woman. It was of no use to the owner unless occupied or rented. Now a married woman may contract to repair her house or to do anything that will put it in a condition to make it rentable. We think it is a fair inference from the verdict in this case that the defendant, in order to rent the house to advantage, had to furnish it. Now to allow a woman owning property of this description to go to a furniture establishment or to a merchant and represent that she is the owner of a house and wants to furnish it so that she may rent it, and then permit her to come into court and say that she had no power to make such a purchase, would be allowing her to commit a fraud upon the parties who trusted her, and would be a construction oí the law that we ought not to give to it.- Although the purchase of furniture may not strictly be said to be a contract relating to her separate estate, it would be a very narrow construction to allow the woman to defraud her creditors by keeping the furniture ; for to turn the creditors over to the husband, who would probably set up the defense that he was not bound, would be to deprive them of a remedy anywhere.

We, therefore, direct that a judgment for the amount found to be due the plaintiff on the special verdict be entered.  