
    ELIZA B. MOORE v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY.
    (Filed February 17, 1909.)
    Insurance — Indemnity—Receipt—Future Indemnity.
    When insured, in a policy securing a fixed amount of indemnity on account of sickness, files proof of claim, as provided by the terms of the policy, to a fixed date and executes a receipt for such amount, the language will be restricted to the amount due, and not extended to cover a claim for indemnity for future sickness. The Court concurs with the construction put upon the receipt by the trial judge.
    ActioN beard before Guión, J., at December Term, 1908, of BEAUFORT.
    On 12 Time, 1907, defendant issued to plaintiff its policy, insuring bis life in tbe sum of $5,000'“and for a weekly indemnity of $25 for tbe term of twelve months from 12 June, 1907.” For a total disability tbe defendant agreed to pay tbe said sum, and for a partial disability one-balf thereof. Tbe policy provided that if tbe disability continued less than thirteen weeks tbe amount should be payable at tbe termination of tbe disability; and if for longer’duration, at tbe end of thirteen weeks from tbe date of tbe accident or illness. Tbe plaintiff, on 23 October, 1907, filed with tbe company a claim for indemnity for total disability of eight weeks and for partial disability of seven weeks, amounting to $275. Tbe claim was not controverted, and on 31 October, 1907, defendant sent to plaintiff its draft for tbe full amount. Attached to tbe draft was a paper containing tbe following language:
    
      “To Maryland Casualty Company, Baltimore, Md.
    
    “Claim No. 619 J. D. is Policy No. DX 44178.
    “Tbe above draft must be endorsed on back, and tbe attached voucher signed and sealed by the payee.
    
      “Voucher No. A10059. — In consideration óf tbe payment of tbe above draft for $275, I hereby discharge and release tbe Maryland Casualty Company from all claim for indemnity under Policy No. DX 44178 on account of illness beginning on 6 July, 1907.
    
      • “It is understood that this payment shall not be construed as an admission of any liability on the part of the company for the said accident or illness or results therefrom.
    “Dated at Washington, N. C. Witness my hand and seal, this 5 November, 1907.
    “E. B. Moore. [Seal.]
    “Elias B. Moore..
    “Witness: L. A. Squires,
    S. 0. Pegram.
    “Endorsement: Elias B. Moore.”
    The draft was paid upon presentation. Thereafter jfiaintiff filed a claim for indemnity for partial disability for eleven weeks, amounting to $137.50. The partial disability was caused by a continuation of the sickness beginning 6 July. Defendant refused to pay the claim, and plaintiff prosecutes this action to recover the amount demanded. Defendant relies upon the voucher of 31 October, 1907, as a release and discharge of all further claim on account of said sickness beginning 6 July, 1907. The partial disability of plaintiff is not controverted. Upon appeal from the justice’s court, the cause was heard in the Superior Court, when his Honor instructed the jury that plaintiff was entitled to recover. Defendant duly excepted. Judgment and appeal by defendant.
    
      Ward & Grimes for plaintiff.
    
      Small, MacLean & McMullan for defendant.
   Connor, J.,

after stating the case: The sole question presented by defendant’s exception is whether the voucher executed by plaintiff at the time he received the draft for $275 bars his recovery of the amount sued for in this action. The amount received by him was all that was due at that time, under the terms of the policy. The proof of claim makes no reference to any claim for future indemnity. It is, of course, conceded that, pursuant to our statute (Revisal, sec. 859), the acceptance of “a less amount than that demanded or claimed to be due in satisfaction thereof” is a valid discharge of the whole amount, if so agreed upon and accepted. But there was no other amount tban tbe $275 paid, “claimed or demanded,” nor was any reference made to any claim or demand for future indemnity for disability thereafter sustained. Tbe plaintiff bad paid defendant in full at tbe date of tbe policy for its contract of indemnity, extending over tbe full period of twelve months, but four of which bad expired. Neither party, so far as appears, desired to put an end to tbe contract or surrender any benefits accruing thereunder. It would be a strange result if; in accepting and acknowledging tbe receipt of tbe exact amount due him at tbe time, tbe plaintiff’s receipt should be construed to be a surrender of all further claim under bis contract with defendant for which be bad paid a full consideration, it will be noted that tbe paper is a printed form used by tbe defendant, attached to tbe draft, tbe signature of which was°required before payment. It is hardly probable that either party understood that it applied to or'covered any other tban tbe claim then made and due. It may be that tbe language of tbe voucher, without reference to tbe proof of claim and other papers attached, would be sufficiently broad to include all claims accruing by reason of tbe sickness of 6 July, 1907, but, when read in connection therewith, we think it manifestly referred to tbe claim then due and for which tbe draft was drawn. Defendant relies upon tbe decision of this Court in Wright v. Railroad,, 125 N. C., 1. In that case tbe damage for which tbe plaintiff sued bad been sustained prior to tbe date of tbe release and was expressly referred to and included therein. Tbe distinction is obvious. It is true that tbe sickness of 6 July, 1907, was sickness from which tbe claim for weekly indemnity arose, but tbe plaintiff’s right to demand indemnity was not for being sick, but for disability caused by sickness, measured by tbe week. For such disability as bad not accrued plaintiff neither bad nor claimed to have any demand. If it be suggested that tbe language used was an agreement to release such claim as might accrue in tbe future, the objection to its validity is found in tbe fact that it is without consideration. He received no more tban be was entitled to, and defendant paid no more tban it was under legal liability to pay. “It is a general principle that tbe release shall be construed from tbe standpoint which tbe parties occupied at tbe time of its execution, and confined to the intention of the parties at the time of such execution. * * * The words employed in a release should not be extended beyond the consideration; otherwise, the courts make a release for the parties which they never intended or contemplated.” 24 Am. and Eng. Enc., 290. The’ case, stated in the simplest form, comes to this: On 31 October, 1907, defendant owed plaintiff $275, and plaintiff held its contract to pay a fixed indemnity for any disability thereafter accruing. Defendant paid the amount which it owed by draft, attaching the voucher. Plaintiff received the draft and signed the voucher.' To extend its language, by construction, to indemnity for disability thereafter accruing would, we think, do violence to the intention of the parties — certainly of the plaintiff, who, if so construed, surrendered a claim for indemnity, for which he had paid in full for no consideration. As a release is a new contract, it must be so construed as to effectuate the intention of both parties. Considered from any point of view, we concur with his Honor’s ruling. The judgment must be Affirmed.  