
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Omar RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-3798.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 28, 2015.
    
      Peter J. Tomao, Garden City, NY, for Appellant.
    Eugenia A.P. Cowles for Eric S. Miller,United States Attorney for the District of Vermont, Burlington, VT, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, RICHARD C. WESLEY and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Omar Rodriguez appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Murtha, J.), sentencing him after a guilty plea to 262 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

On the original appeal of the sentence, we remanded pursuant to United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir.1994), for the district court to make findings as to whether Rodriguez had the intent necessary to commit the offense of attempted murder, thereby supporting the applicable sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Rodriguez, 595 Fed.Appx. 83, 84 (2d Cir.2015). The district court found that Rodriguez possessed the requisite intent by a preponderance of the evidence, restoring our jurisdiction over Rodriguez’s appeal.

1. Rodriguez argues that his 262-month sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court, in finding that Rodriguez possessed a specific intent to kill, relied in part on the testimony of Rodriguez’s friend, William Dillon. “Reasonableness review is akin to that for abuse of discretion.... ” United States v. Tapia-Vitinio, 463 Fed.Appx. 11, 12 (2d Cir.2011). Rodriguez had ample opportunity to challenge Dillon’s statement in the course of sentencing, which was in any event just one of four specific findings adduced to support the attempted murder sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:12-cr-73-1-jgm, 2015 WL 3454725, at *1-2 (D.Vt. May 29, 2015).

2. Rodriguez contends that the district court applied an incorrect standard in finding that he had a specific intent to kill. The district court cited the correct standard — namely that by a preponderance of the evidence, Rodriguez “actually attempted or intended to kill his victim” — and then applied this standard in making its findings. United States v. Stroman, 420 Fed. Appx. 100, 105 (2d Cir.2011).

3. Rodriguez argues that, by virtue of Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2163, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), the district court was precluded from considering any facts not admitted during the plea hearing. Rodriguez misreads Alleyne, which does not apply to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 528 (2d Cir.2005) (“[W]hen a judge sentences a defendant within the statutory range authorized by the jury verdict and uses advisory Guidelines to calculate that sentence, there is no Sixth Amendment violation.”).

4. Rodriguez contends that his case should be remanded to a different judge for resentencing. Because there is no ground for disturbing the district court’s judgment, further remand is unnecessary. In any event, Rodriguez has not shown this to be the rare case “in which the judge’s fairness or the appearance of the judge’s fairness is seriously in doubt.” United States v. Bradley, 812 F.2d 774, 782 n. 9 (2d Cir.1987).

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Rodriguez’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  