
    Rebecca HOUPT, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICTORIA FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, an Ohio corporation; Nationwide Mutual Life Insurance Company, an Ohio corporation; Titan Auto Insurance of New Mexico, Inc., a New Mexico corporation, Defendants-Appellants.
    No. 11-55869.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted July 14, 2011.
    Filed July 18, 2011.
    Joseph Antonelli, Esquire, Janelle C. Carney, Esquire, Law Office of Joseph Antonelli, West Covina, CA, Kevin Barnes, Gregg Lander, Esquire, Law Offices of Kevin T. Barnes, Los Angeles, CA, Ross E. Shanberg, Shane C. Stafford, Esquire, Shanberg Stafford LLP, Irvine, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    James J. Oh, Esquire, Littler Mendel-son, P.C., Chicago, IL, Denise M. Visconti, Littler Mendelson, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellants.
    Before: RYMER, TALLMAN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Because Houpt’s parenthetical request for relief above CAFA’s $5 million jurisdictional limit rendered her complaint ambiguous as to the total recovery sought, the district court erred in concluding that the defendant insurers needed to prove the amount in controversy to a legal certainty rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. See Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir.2007). Here the insurers have satisfied CAFA’s jurisdictional requirements: because Houpt alleged that the insurers improperly reduced the plaintiffs’ sales commissions, the full amount of those commissions, $12,375,968, rather than the sum of all “improper” deductions, is properly included in the amount in controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2); Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 397-98 (9th Cir.2010).

Finally, by alleging only that the plaintiffs are “California-based” sales agents, rather than California citizens, Houpt failed to plead or prove a necessary element of both the discretionary abstention and local controversy exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3), (4)(A)(i)(I); Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 824 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam). We therefore decline to affirm the decision of the district court on these alternative grounds.

The district court’s order remanding this action to the state court is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.

REVERSED and REMANDED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     