
    *Baldwin v. Darst.
    July Term, 1846,
    Lewisburg.
    (Absent Baldwin, J.)
    Equity Jurisdiction — Injunction—Joint Devisees. — A Court ot Equity has no Jurisdiction to restrain one joint devisee of land from entering thereon, at the suit of a tenant claiming under the other dev-isees.
    Hugh Paxton, late of the county of Rock-bridge, by his will directed his estate to be equally divided among his six children ; of whom Margaret, the wife of Cornelius C. Baldwin, was one. The real estate consisted of two tracts, one containing about three hundred acres of land well improved, and upon which there was a valuable tavern house, the other tract contained about 80 acres of wood land of little value.
    Paxton in his lifetime, had leased the farm and tavern to Samuel Darst, for a term of five years ending on the first of March 1841: and before that time he died. In November 1840, C. C. Baldwin and Margaret his wife filed their bill in the Superior Court of Rockbridge, against the other children and devisees of Hugh Paxton, for a partition of the land. This was resisted by the other cotenants, on the ground that the tract of land was not susceptible of division without greatly impairing the value of the respective interests therein.
    At the termination of the lease to Darst, Baldwin wished to take possession of a portion of the joint estate, and to cultivate it himself; but the other cotenants rented the whole of the farm, for another term of a year, to Darst, who took the lease with a full knowledge that Baldwin refused to join in it; and of his intention to cultivate a part of the farm himself.
    On the 2d of March 1841, Darst’s new term commenced; and on the same day, Baldwin entered upon *and took possession of about thirty acres of the land ; declaring his intention to cultivate it.
    In April, Darst obtained from the Judge of the Circuit Superior Court of Rockbridge, an injunction to restrain Baldwin from disturbing him in the possession of the land; and at the next term of the Court Baldwin having answered moved for a dissolution of the injunction, but the motion was overruled. At the September term of the Court, the cause was finally heard, when the Court premising that the purpose of the injunction would cease to exist after the expiration of the plaintiff’s lease on the 1st of the next March, and as its dissolution after that time, would be necessarj to give full and complete effect to the decree for partition entered during the then present term, in a suit for the purpose, between the defendant and his codevisees, made a decree, that the injunction be dissolved from and after the first day of the next March ; that the plaintiff’s bill be dismissed, and that the defendant pay him his costs. From this decree Baldwin applied to this Court for an appeal, which was allowed.
    J. B. Baldwin, for the appellant.
    The injunction was improvidently awarded in this case, and should have been dissolved with costs. 1. One joint tenant has no right to the exclusive possession of the joint estate against his cotenant; and therefore, cannot confer any such right upon another by lease or otherwise. Tuttle v. Eskridge, 2 Munf. 330; Allen v. Gibson, 4 Rand. 477; 13 Yiner’s Abr. 381, pi. 14. The lease to Darst was therefore void as to Baldwin ; and he might enter upon the joint property, and take its profits. 2. But if the appellant had no right to enter upon the land a Court of Equity had no jurisdiction to grant the tenant relief. There was a plain and adequate remedy at law. Allen v. Gibson, 4 Rand. 477.
    No counsel for the appellee.
    
      
      He had been counsel in the cause.
    
    
      
      See monographic note on "Injunctions” appended to Claytor v. Anthony, 15 Gratt. 518, and mono-graphic note on “Jurisdiction” appended to Phippen v. Durham, 8 Gratt. 457.
    
   *CABELL, P.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Court is of opinion that the Court below erred in not dissolving the injunction, at the first hearing of the motion made for that purpose, and also in continuing the injunction till the termination of the lease, and then dissolving it at the costs of the appellant; this Court being clearly of opinion that the injunction ought never to have been granted. The decree is therefore reversed with costs; and this Court proceeding to pronounce such a decree as the Court below ought to have pronounced, it is adjudged, ordered and decreed, that the injunction be dissolved, and the bill dismissed with costs.  