
    RANKIN against WOODWORTH.
    Idle statute of limitation begins to run, so as to to an action on a Contract to &dta* píete a certain work, from the time when the work Was to have been completed,* and not from the time when the plaintiff' had received actual damage from the imperfebt execution of the work.
    A' contract to complete work li¡ a certain time, means that it shall he doiie before! that time.
    Error tb Veriangó bounty.
    This suit, in which Jared Woodiborih was plaintiff, and David Rankin Was defendant, originated on the 29 th November, 1821. It was brought Upon a contrast dated the 9th of February, 1S15> by which Rdnkin and Cochran agreed to build a saw mill for* the plaintiff, and <£to have it Completed by November next.” The defendant plead non assumpsit infra sex anrios. The plaintiff requested the court to charge the jufy* “that the statute of limita* tion did not begin to run till Woodworth sustained damage; and that he can recover at any time within six years after the defect iri the work was discovered. The court instructed the jtiry that the Statute of limitation Was not a bar in this case. This opinion Was the dnly error assigned.
    
      Galbreath for plaintiff in error. Stopped by the court.
    Pearson contra., Cited Salomon v. Salomon, 2 Bin. 436.
   Per Curiam.

Viewing this case in the' aspect most favorable to the plaintiff below, by taking the date of the precipe to be satisfactory evidence of the commencement of the action, and it certainly is not Conclusive', — the ¡joint is still against him. By the Contract, the work was to be finished by the ensuing month of November, which, in the popular acceptation of the wordj excludes the month. When a thing is ordered by a particular day, it is with a view of hayihg the use of it On the day. Thus, a coat is ordered by Sunday, with a view of wearing it to church. And the popular 'agrees with the philological import of the word which is explained by our great lexicographer, by the words, “near, beside, passing, in presence;” all of which denote exclusion. The action was; therefore, not brought within six years from the period limited for the execution of the Work. As to the point made, that the statute did not begirt to run before the plaintiff had received actual damage from the imperfect execution of the contract, it is sufficient to say, it ran from the instant when first he had a right of action, which, from the form of the suit here, was the period limited for the completion of the work. If, as is alleged, the defect was in the manner of the performance, the plaintiff was bound to judge of that before he took the work off their hands; and if there were a fraudulent concealment of its quality, a special action on the case, perhaps, would be the remedy for that; but it is not a matter to suspend the operation of the statute, in this action.

Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novó awarded.  