
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Trevor D. JAMES, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-4641.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: Jan. 23, 2014.
    Decided: Jan. 27, 2014.
    
      David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. William Jacob Watkins, Jr., Office of the United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
   Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Trevor James pled guilty to making a false statement to a federal agent and was sentenced in 2009 to five years of probation. In August 2018, the district court revoked James’ probation and sentenced him to fourteen months of imprisonment after James admitted to violating a condition of his probation. On appeal, James’ attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), questioning whether the revocation sentence is reasonable. James was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. Finding no error, we affirm.

Upon finding a probation violation, the district court may revoke probation and resentence the defendant to any sentence within the statutory maximum for the original offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2012); United States v. Schaefer, 120 F.3d 505, 507 (4th Cir.1997). “[W]e review probation revocation sentences, like supervised release revocation sentences, to determine if they are plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir.2007). We first assess the sentence for unreasonableness, “following] generally the procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our review of original sentences.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir.2006). Only if we determine that a sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we “decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439.

Although a district court must consider the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines along with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), “ ‘the court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.’ ” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir.2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656-57. In addition, “[t]he court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed, as with the typical sentencing procedure, but this statement ‘need not be as specific as has been required’ ” for original sentences. Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657 (quoting Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the sentence imposed is both procedurally and substantively reasonable; it follows, therefore, that the sentence is not plainly unreasonable.

We have examined the entire record in accordance with the requirements of An-ders and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. This court requires that counsel inform James, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If James requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on James. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.  