
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff — Appellee, v. Lawrence S. SPIVEY, Defendant— Appellant.
    No. 05-7074.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 15, 2005.
    Decided Dec. 21, 2005.
    
      Lawrence Spivey, Appellant Pro Se. Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM:

Lawrence S. Spivey seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion and denying reconsideration. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960)).

The district court’s order denying relief on Spivey’s § 2255 motion was entered on the docket on March 30, 2005, and the order denying Spivey’s motion for reconsideration was entered on the docket on April 26, 2005. The notice of appeal was filed on June 28, 2005. Because Spivey failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we deny Spivey’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED 
      
       For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R.App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988).
     