
    Lissette GAUD, Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY.
    No. 02-3753.
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) March 7, 2003.
    Decided March 26, 2003.
    Before ROTH, BARRY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Lissette Gaud (“Gaud”) appeals a final order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirming the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) to deny her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Gaud claims that the District Court erred in concluding that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) findings were supported by substantial evidence.

The District Court exercised jurisdiction over Gaud’s request for review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Because the District Court’s Order was a final judgment that disposed of all of the Parties’ claims, we exercise jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo the issue of whether the Commissioner’s denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence. See Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir.1999) (stating that “[t]he role of this Court is identical to that of the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision.”) Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or significant amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.1999) (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988)). “We will not set aside the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 360 (citations omitted).

After a careful review of the record and the Parties’ arguments, we find no basis for disturbing the District Court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion. The District Court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the evidence considered by the ALJ, including a summary of medical reports from ten sources dealing with Gaud’s diagnoses and treatment. The District Court then evaluated each of the alleged errors set forth by Gaud in challenging the ALJ’s decision and concluded that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Gaud raises essentially the same issues before this Court as she did before the District Court. Because we agree that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, we will affirm the judgment for substantially the same reasons set forth in the record.  