
    Patterson et al., Executors v. Pyle.
    Where a judgment was entered in an amicable action in ejectment ■under a warrant to confess judgment contained in a lease, and it appeared that the lessor in the lease was an agent of the owners of the property, while the judgment was entered in the names of the owners as plaintiffs, the court below properly struck off the judgment.
    Where judgment is entered in an amicable action of ejectment on a lease, if there is nothing on the record to show that the defendant had broJeen the covenants in the lease, the law will not presume that he has done so, and the judgment will be stricken off.
    Feb. 11, 1889.
    Error, No. 82, July T. 1887, toO. P. Delaware ■Co., to review an order making absolute a rule to strike off a judgment in an amicable action in ejectment, entered on a warrant contained in a lease, by Eobert E. Patterson, William Hayward Dray-ton, and Heñry P. Smith, Executors of Eobert E. Patterson, deceased, trading as E. Patterson & Co., against L. H. Pyle, at .June T. 1887, No. 60. McCollum and Mitchell, JJ., absent.
    The lease, more particularly described in the affidavit of ■defendant below, named the lessor as “James G. Davis, for Patter,son Mills, of the city of Chester,” and contained an agreement for entering, in any competent court, an amicable action and judgment in ejectment, etc. The lease was signed by Davis, individually, without naming his agency, and was sealed. It also released all errors and defects in entering the judgment or any proceedings thereon and agreed that no writ of error or exception should be taken thereto.
    An amicable action in ejectment, between the parties named .above, was entered April 19, 1887, in the following manner, signed and witnessed by attorneys:
    “ It is hereby agreed that an amicable action in ejectment be •entered in the said court between the above parties to recover possession by the plaintiffs from the defendant of the premises, No. 214 Market Street, in the city of Chester, designated in the annexed lease, and that judgment be confessed in the said action in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant for the said premises.”
    The defendant filed the following affidavit:
    “ Lewis H. Pyle, the defendant in the said writ, being duly .affirmed, says that about Oct. 15, 1884, his wife called upon James G. Davis in quest of a house. The said Davis agreed to rent No. 214 Market street, city of Chester, at the rental of $1.16 per week, .and at his request your deponent called at the counting room, on Oct. 15, 1884, and signed a paper, or a written and printed agreement, which he supposes to have been the same as the one filed as the foundation of this writ. The said paper was not read to him, nor did he read it himself; having confidence in Mr. Davis, he did not anticipate deception.
    “ From the said 15th day of October till within a few days, the ¡.said Davis has, from week to week, been receiving the said rent, . and no complaint has been made that there was any rent in arrear nor has this deponent had any notice to quit the premises till about .the commencement of these proceedings.
    
      “ Upon the 16th of April, instant, your deponent called upon, the said Davis and offered to pay him all rent in arrear, if any-remained due, which he declined to receive, or give him a receipt in full; that on the 18th day of April, instant, this deponent strove-to obtain a copy of the paper or agreement which he had signed,, but was persistently denied an audience with the said Davis and less, than forty-eight hours thereafter the action was entered in the said, court, and judgment taken without a statement or affidavit of claim, and a writ of habere facias possessionem was issued to eject him and his family from the possession of premises which he verily believes himself entitled to retain till the 15th day of October, 1887.
    “And this deponent further says that there is no condition in the lease; but at most a mere covenant, and that the proceedings, are irregular in other respects.”
    On April 25, 1887, a rule was granted to show cause why the-judgment should not be stricken off, and on, May 2,1887, the court,, without filing an opinion, made the rule absolute.
    
      The assignment of error specified the action of the court in making absolute the rule granted to the defendant, and striking off' the judgment.
    
      W. Ward, for plaintiffs in error.
    The proper practice in testing the validity of a judgment is by a collateral issue. Gallup v. Reynolds, 8 Watts, 424.
    The remedy of the defendant seeking relief from an alleged, invalid or erroneous judgment is by motion to open it and to be let into a defense upon the merits. Clark v. Douglass, 62 Pa. 408. In Kocher v. Rice, 2 Luz. L. R. 24, it wras held that, as a general rule, a judgment will not be opened on the defendant’s unsupported affidavit, contradicted by plaintiff under oath.
    The waiver of errors prevents the defendant from taking-advantage of technical objections.
    
      P. B. Carter and V. G. Robinson, for defendant in error.
    The lease showed a power to confess judgment to James G. Davis, for Patterson Mills but not to R. Patterson & Co. When the record shows upon its face an irregular judgment, it is the duty of' the court to strike it off. Knox v. Flack, 22 Pa. 337; Hutchinson v. Ledlie, 36 Pa. 112; Gordon v. Bartley, 4 W. N. C. 37; Earley’s. Appeal, 90 Pa. 321.
    The amicable action should contain a suggestion of a default..
    Feb. 25, 1889.
   Per Curiam,

The court below committed no-error in striking off this judgment. There was no authority in the lease to confess a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Had the.confession of judgment followed the lease there would have been no room for objection upon this ground. The judgment was-properly stricken off, however, for the further reason that there was - nothing upon the record to show that the defendant had broken any of the covenants in the lease, and the law will not presume that he * has done so.

Judgment affirmed. T. E. P.  