
    Bernard Nichols, Respondent, v Thiruvinayagan Thurairajasingam, Defendant and Grant Mazzon, Jr., Appellant.
    [936 NYS2d 901]
   The appellant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that as a result of the subject accident, the lumbar region of his spine sustained certain injuries. The appellant submitted evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the region did not constitute a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Rodriguez v Huerfano, 46 AD3d 794, 795 [2007]).

However, in opposition, the plaintiff submitted competent medical evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged injuries to the lumbar region of his spine constituted a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 219 [2011]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. Rivera, J.E, Eng, Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.  