
    Lockridge v. Carlisle.
    June, 1830.
    Deeds — Acknowledgment in Another State — Who May Take. — The provision of the statute of conveyances of 1792, Rev. Code of 1794, ch. 90, § 5, was repealed by the 5th and 7th sections of the revised statute of 1819, 1 Rev. Code. ch. 99, so that, now, a deed of lands in Virginia made by a party residing in another state of the union, cannot be recorded here, upon acknowledgment thereof by the party before a court of such state where he resides, but only on such acknowledgment before two justices of the peace of such state.
    This was a bill exhibited by Lockbridge against Carlisle, in the superiour court of chancery of Greenbrier, the principal object of which was to injoin and suspend the proceedings of Carlisle, on a judgment he had recovered at law against Lockridge, for the purchase money of land in the county of Bath, sold by Carlisle to Lockridge, until the vendor should get in and convey to the vendee, a good and perfect title to-the land. At the time of the sale, the legal title of the land was in Carlisle and his brothers and sisters, as devisees and tenants in common claiming under their father’s will. These co-devisees of Carlisle resided in the state of Kentucky: they all, by several deeds, in due form, executed in 1824 and 1826, conveyed their rights and interests in the land, to Carlisle the vendor; but most of these deeds were acknowledged by the grantors before the *county courts of Campbell, Fayette &c. in Kentucky, and by those courts certified to the clerk of the county court of Bath in Virginia, where the land lay, to be there recorded. And one question that arose in the cause was, Whether these deeds were duljT registered or not?
    The statute of conveyances of 1792 (Rev. Code of 1794, ch. 90, 5, Pleasants’ edi. p. 157,) provided, that if the party executing a deed should not reside in Virginia, the acknowledgment by the party of the sealing and delivery thereof, before any court of law, or mayor, or other chief magistrate of any city, town or corporation of the country wherein the party should dwell, certified by such court &c. in the manner such acts are usually authenticated by them, and offered to the proper court in Virginia to be recorded, should be as effectual as if it had been in this last mentioned court. And the deeds in question were duly acknowledged and certified to be recorded, according to the provisions of that statute. But the revised statute of conveyances of 1819 (1 Rev. Code, ch. 99, 2 S, 7, pp. 362, 3,) provides, that in case the party executing the deed, reside not in the U. States or any territory thereof, then the deed may be acknowledged and certified for registry, in the manner prescribed by the statute of 1792; and that deeds may be admitted to record, upon the certificate of the acknowledgment thereof, under the seals of any two justices of the peace for any county or corporation within the D. States, or any territory thereof, or the district of Columbia. So that the real question was, whether the latter statute superseded and repealed the former, in respect of the mode of acknowledging and certifying deeds of lands in Virginia, made by a party in another state of the union, for registry here?
    The chancellor held, that the two statutes might well stand together, and that the provision of the statute of 1792 was not repealed by that of the revised statute of 1819; that, therefore, the deeds in this case were duly registered. And he made an interlocutory decree founded on that principle: from which Lockridge appealed to this court.
    *Johnson for the appellant; Leigh for the appellee.
    
      
      The principal case. was cited in approval in Hassler v. King, 9 Gratt. 120, 122; Grove v. Zumbro, 14 Gratt. 511.
      For further information, see monographic note on “Acknowledgments” appended to Taliaferro v. Pryor, 12 Gratt. 277.
    
   BROOKS, P.

It is very probable, that the legislature, by the provisions of the statute made in 1819, on this subject, intended only to facilitate the acknowledgment of foreign deeds, by extending the authority to take acknowledgments of such deeds, to two justices of the peace, where the party executing the same resided in any of the U. States, or the territories thereof, and not to repeal the Sth section of the statute of 1792, which gave the authority to any court of law, mayor or chief magistrate &c. in every case in which the party executing such deeds did not reside in Virginia. But, as the authority, in such case, was by the statute of 1819 restricted to the case, in which the party executing the deed resided without the O'. States, and the territories thereof; and as also all laws of a general nature, not published in the new code, were repealed by the 9th section of the statute providing for the re-publication of the laws (1 Rev. Code, ch. 1, p. 16,) the Sth section of the statute of 1792, and all the subsequent statutes on the subject, must be considered as repealed by the statute of 1819. The objection to the authentication and registry of the deeds in question, cannot be got over. So much of the decree, therefore, as declares them duly registered, and dissolves the injunction, is erroneous, and must be reversed.  