
    LIZZIE A. NIXON, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JOAST NIXON, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
    Argued June 26, 1913
    Decided June 26, 1913.
    On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which the following per curiam was- filed:
    The plaintiff sued the defendant in the Supreme Court upon a contract. The declaration contained the common counts and the defendant filed a plea of the general issue. At the close of the case, after both sides had rested, the judge of the Circuit Court, to whom the cause had been referred for trial, directed a verdict for the defendant upon the ground, as he observed, that the plaintiff’s testimony was of such a loose character touching the alleged contract that the denial of the defendant and the testimony of a number of witnesses supporting him, made it seem to the court that if ever there was a ease which ought to be taken from the jury, it was the one on trial. We dissent from that view. There was testimony in the case tending to show the making of the contract sued on and the defendant’s liability thereunder. The question of contract: or no contract, and of the extent of the defendant’s liability, if lie be liable, are jury questions; therefore, the cause should have been submitted to the jury. There must be a reversal and a venire de novo.
    
    For the appellant, Edward C. Waddington.
    
    For the respondent, John Boycl Avis and Isaac O. Aclon.
    
   Per Curiam.

After a careful examination and consideration of all of the evidence submitted to the jury in this ease, we feel satisfied that its verdict is not supported by a preponderance of that evidence, but on the contrary is opposed to it. For this reason the rule to show cause must be made absolute.

For affirm,anee — None.

For reversal — The Chancellor, Chiee Justice, Garrison, Swayze, Trenckard, Parker, K&lisoit, Bogert, Vredenburgh, Congdon, White, Terhune, Heeeen-HEISTER, JJ. 13.  