
    The Inhabitants of Westminster versus The Inhabitants of Bernardston.
    A notice to a town to be charged with the support of a pauper, signed by one overseer, by order of the whole, is sufficient within the statute of 1793, c. 59, § 12.
    Such notice, not duly objected to, is a bar to a defendant town, as to the question of the pauper’s settlement, although it appears that such pauper had no legal settlement in any town within the commonwealth.
    This action was assumpsit for expenses incurred in the support of Hugh Casey, a pauper; and it was tried upon the general issue before Sewall, J., at the sittings after September term, 1809, in this county.
    Upon the trial, the plaintiffs showed in evidence, that the pauper was in their town, sick and in need of relief, and that they had supplied him as alleged in their declaration; that on the 11th July, 1806, the following letter was delivered to the overseers of the poor of the town of Bernardston, to whom it was addressed, viz. “ This is to inform, you that there is a person now residing in Westminster, in the county of Worcester, by the name o/Hugh Casey, who by misfortune broke the bone of his thigh, and is now under the hand of the surgeon, at the expense of this town. We are informed that he has resided some years in Bernardston, and we suppose he has a residence there. This is therefore to notify and request you to take such measures for his support or removal, as you in your wisdom may * think best. Westminster, July 3, 1806. By order of the selectmen and overseers of the poor. Abel Wood.” — And that said Abel Wood was at that time one of the overseers of the poor of said Westminster.
    
    The defendants did not show that any answer had been returned to the said letter; but offered to prove that the said pauper had no legal settlement within the commonwealth, by his own deposition, which stated that he had been supported by the commonwealth, both before said accident, and since his removal to Bernardston; and by the written acknowledgment of the overseers of the poor of Westminster, referring to facts which had come to their knowledge since the present controversy.
    The judge rejected the evidence so offered by the defendants, on the ground that it was not competent to them to contest, in this action, the question of the settlement of the said pauper.
    The defendants excepted to this decision of the judge, and, after a verdict for the plaintiffs, the action stood over upon their motion for a new trial.
    This motion was argued at the last September term in this county, by Upham and S. Strong for the plaintiffs, and Bigelow and Blake for the defendants.
    
      For the defendants
    
    it was urged, that the notification from. the plaintiffs was not conformed to the requisitions of the statute, and so ought not to operate as an estoppel to the defendants. It was subscribed by one of the overseers only, whereas the statute requires it to be signed by the overseers generally, so that at least a majority of them is necessary. In the case of Quincy vs. Braintree, 
       this objection was taken to the notice, and no decision was had on it, as the point went off on the admission of the defendants, in the agreed case, that the notice was given “ by the overseers of Quincy.” There is no affirmation in the notification that the pauper had his settlement in Bernardston. It is merely alleged that he had resided there some years, and that the overseers of Westminster supposed he had a residence there.
    * But the point most relied on by the defendants was, that all the provisions of the statute  upon this subject contemplate only the case where the pauper has a legal settlement in some town within the commonwealth. From the ninth to the twelfth section, inclusively, the duties and rights of towns, in which paupers may be legally settled, are regulated. The thirteenth section alone makes provision for the support of paupers having no settlement within the commonwealth. If the defendants had been ' permitted to prove the facts respecting the pauper in this case, the estoppel furnished by the statute, and relied on by the plaintiffs, would have been shown not to arise.
    
      For the plaintiffs
    
    it was said that the provision in the twelfth section was absolute and unlimited; that if the notice is not objected to within two months, the town, to whom the notice is given, shall be barred from contesting the question of settlement with the town giving the notice. The construction contended for by the defendants would defeat the salutary intentions of the statute. Towns would never know what course to take when they received no answer to the notice given.
    As to the form of the notice, it was within the spirit and intent of the act. It was signed by order of the whole board of selectmen and overseers, and was abundantly sufficient to put the defendants upon their guard, and to lead them to examine the question of their liability, or, at least, by objecting to the removal of the pauper within two months, to prevent themselves from being estopped on the question of settlement. By residence in the notice must be understood settlement, or the notice is perfectly nugatory.
    
      
       5 Mass. Rep. 86.
    
    
      
       1793, c. 59.
    
   The action stood over to this term for advisement; and, now,

The Court

were of opinion that the signature of one of the over seers, purporting to be by order of the whole, was a sufficient com pliance with the statute.—As to the use of the word residence where settlement was evidently meant, it might have been

deserving of some attention, had it not *been explained by the after request that measures might be taken by the overseers of Bernardston for the support or removal of the pauper. Thus explained, the notice was sufficient for the purposes intended by the statute. — And this notice, not objected to, is by the statute a bar to the question of settlement, although the pauper may in fact have no legal settlement within the commonwealth. The object of the law was to prevent needless suits. The town, who gives the notice and requests the removal of the pauper, has ground to presume, from the silence of the other party, that they acquiesce in the charge.

Judgment on the verdict.  