
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Victor L. LARSEN, Jr., Jonathan Davidson, Angel Cordero, Jimmy Albright, aka Shawn Albright, aka Markey Tone, Theo Stratus, aka Theologos Stratas, Defendants, John Markou, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-94.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 8, 2012.
    Devin McLaughlin, Langroek Sperry & Wool, LLP, Middlebury, VT, for Appellant.
    Winston M. Paes, Susan Corkery (on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, N.Y., for Appellees.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, DENNY CHIN, and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

John Markou appeals from a judgment of conviction of one count of Hobbs Act robbery, see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and one count of use of a firearm in furtherance of that robbery, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii). In his plea agreement, Markou waived the right to appeal his conviction or sentence unless the sentence exceeded 365 months. The court sentenced him to 204 months’ imprisonment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

During the plea colloquy, the court incorrectly recited that Markou waived his right to appeal in the event that it imposed a term of 365 months or more. However, “invalidation of a waiver of appeal [is not required] in every case where the sentencing court’s explanation of the waiver is not completely correct.” United States v. Chen, 127 F.3d 286, 289 (2d Cir.1997). Invalidation is unnecessary when “ ‘the record clearly demonstrates that the waiver was both knowing (in the sense that the defendant fully understood the potential consequences of his waiver) and voluntary.’” Id. at 289-90 (quoting United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Arevalo, 628 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir.2010) (“[W]e find waivers unenforceable only in very limited situations, such as when the waiver was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and competently....”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We infer that Markou understood the appeals waiver provision based on his statement that he had attended some college; his statements that he read the plea agreement carefully, understood it, and discussed it with counsel; and the fact that the court advised him of his right to appeal a sentence above 365 months, which Markou said he understood. Cf. Chen, 127 F.3d at 290 (“In the absence of some affirmative evidence from which appellant’s knowledge and understanding of the waiver provision could reasonably be inferred ... the magistrate judge’s error rendered the waiver ineffective.”).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the appeal waiver is valid. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED.  