
    CHARLES E. HOVEY AND WILLIAM P. DOLE v. AUGUSTINE R. McDONALD AND WILLIAM WHITE.
    Eqrtity. —
    No. 3937.
    I. A sum of money liad been paid out o£ a fund in the hands of the receiver under tire order of the special term, which .order was after-wards set aside and vacated at tire general term, and (lie defendants ordered to pay back the said sum of money lo the custody of the clerk of the court; and having failed to comply with that order, they were declared to be in contempt.
    II. As a general rule, where it is sought to bring a party in contempt for disobedience to an order of the court, personal service of the motion should be made upon the party instead of the solicitor or counsel; but if the party flees the jurisdiction, he will not be permitted to prosecute or defend his suit until lie purges himself of his contempt.
    STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
    An order was made at the special term, sitting in equity, on the 28th of June, 1875, directing the receiver, George W. Riggs, to pay to the defendants the sum of $47,297.56 in gold out of the fund belonging to the suit in his hands, which payment was accordingly made. On the 5th of May, 1876, a motion was made by complainants for a rule upon the defendants requiring them to deposit in the custody of the court the said sum of money which had been so paid to them by the receiver, and that application was transferred by order of the special term to be heard at the general term in the first-instance; and on the 19th day of June, 1877, the court in general term passed an order vacating that of June 28,1875, and directing the defendants to pay back into the registry (or clerk) of the court the sum which they had received from the receiver. A copy of this order was served upon the defendant William White personally, on June 28,1877, at his place of business in the city of Cincinnati and State of Ohio, and a like copy was served upon McDonald, the other defendant, by leaving the same in the city of Washingtou at his last place of abode, he having left the city. The defendants having failed to comply with the order, an application is now presented that each of them show cause why they should not be punished for disobedience, in failing to pay the said money into the registry of the court, as for a contempt.
    
      Durant $ Sornor, for complainants.
    No appearance for defendants.
   Mr. Justice Olin

delivered the opinion of the court:

At the last term of this court a motion was made by the plaiutiffs against the defendants, that the latter be ordered to pay back to the clerk of this court the sum of forty-seven thousand dollars, or thereabouts, which it was alleged had been illegally ordered to be paid over by the clerk to the defendant McDonald. That motion was fully argued by counsel for the respective parties, and upon full consideration of the case, an order was made to return that amount of money to the custody of the clerk of this court.

It is wholly unnecessary to inquire whether the order for the return of the money was rightfully or wrongfully made; it is sufficient to say that said order must be obeyed, unless .reversed or set aside by proceedings instituted for that purpose.

The defendants having failed to comply with that order, this motion is instituted for the purpose of proceeding against them for contempt.

An attempt was made to serve the same on McDonald, who, upon diligent inquiry, could not be found. Inquiry was made upon his solicitor and counsel, who seemed to be wholly unable to give any information upon the subject.

An attempt was then made to serve a copy of the moving papers upon the solicitor and counsel of the defendants, but they declined to receive or admit service.

As a general rule, where it is sought to bring a party in contempt for disobedience to an order of the court, personal service of such motion should be made upon the party, instead of the solicitor or counsel; but if the party flees the jurisdiction of the court after he has contemned and disobeyed its orders, he cannot be permitted further to prosecute or defend his suit until he purges himself of his contempt. To hold otherwise would render the court more in contempt than he who contemns its authority.

Where the court cannot obtain by its process control of the person of the litigant, we know of no other way to secure obedience to its authority than by the manner of conducting the proceeding before the court; and in this light the order proposed seems eminently proper, and justified by numerous authorities not necessary here to be cited.  