
    STE. MAKIE’S CASE.
    (9 Court of Claims R., 415; 92 U. S. R., 73.)
    William Shuey, administrator of Ste. Marie, appellant, v. The United States, appellees.
    
      On the claimant’s Appeal.
    
    
      The Secretary of War offers a reward of $25,000 for the “apprehension” of Sur-ratt, and “liberal rewards” for any information that shall conduce to the arrest. The President, after some months, revokes the offers'. Subsequently the claimant, a zouave in the Papal service, recognizes Surratt and informs the American minister, ivho applies for his extradition. The Papal government arrests him, but he escapes and makes his way to JSgypt. Re is traced there by the American minister, and re-arrested. Congress awards the claimant $10,000 for his information and assistance. Re brings suit in the court below for the balance of the reward of $25,000, on the ground that the arrest by the Papal government, at the instance of the United States, on his information, entitled him to the whole of the reward. The court below decides that where a proclamation makes two offers, one for the apprehension of a criminal, the other for information conducing to his arrest, the former offer contemplates actual captare and delivery to the Government, and that giving information which directly leads to am, arrest by a foreign government, which is followed by the criminal’s escape before delivery to the American Government, is not his “ apprehension,” within the meaning of the proclamation. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.
    
    I. Giving information which conduces to the arrest of a criminal is a distinct thing from his “ apprehension ” by a party seeking a reward for the latter, though the one may have been the consequence of the other.
    II. Where a proclamation offers a reward of $25,000 for the “ apprehension” of a criminal, and a “ liberal reward” for information which may conduce to his arrest, a person who did not, by himself or his agents, make the arrest cannot claim the former reward, though the discovery and arrest were due entirely to disclosures made by him.
    III. A proclamation offering a reward for the apprehension of a criminal is revocable at any time before it is accepted. There is no contract until its terms are complied with. Like any other contract, it may be withdrawn before anything has been done in reliance upon it, and before rights have accrued under it.
    IY. A proclamation by the Secretary of War offering a reward for the apprehension of a criminal may be withdrawn by a proclamation revoking it; and a party seeking to arrest the criminal is chargeable with notice of the revocation, though actually ignorant of it.
    
      
      The ’Reporters' statement of the case:
    The court below found the following facts:
    I. On the 20th April, 1865, the Secretary of War issued, and caused to be published in the public newspapers and otherwise, a proclamation whereby he announced that there would be paid by the War Department, “ for the apprehension of John H. Surratt, one of Booth’s accomplices,” $25,000 reward; and also that “ liberal rewards will be paid for any information that shall conduce to the arrest of either of the above-named criminals or their accomplices,” and such proclamation was not limited in terms to any specific period, and it was signed Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. On the 24th November, 1865, the President caused to be published his order revoking the reward offered for the arrest of John H. Surratt. (13 Si at. L., p. 778.)
    II. In April, 1866, John H. Surratt was a zouave in the military service of the Papal government, and the claimant was also a zouave in the same service. During that month he communicated to Mr. King, the American minister at Eome, the fact that he had discovered and identified Surratt, who had confessed to him his participation in the plot against the life of President Lincoln. The claimant also subsequently communicated further information to the same effect, and kept watch, at the request of the American minister, over Surratt. Thereupon certain diplomatic correspondence passed between the Government of the United States and the Papal government relative to the arrest and extradition of Surratt, and on the 6th November, 1866, the Papal government, at the request of the United States, ordered the arrest of Surratt, and that he be brought to Eome, he then being at Yeroli. Under this order of the Papal government Surratt was arrested, but at the moment of leaving prison at Yeroli he escaped from the guard having him in custody, and, crossing the frontier of the Papal territory, embarked at Naples and escaped to Alexandria, in Egypt. Immediately after his escape, and both before and after his embarkation at Naples, the American minister at Eome, being informed of the escape by the Papal government, took measures to trace and re-arrest him, which was done in Alexandria. From that place he was subsequently conveyed by the American Government to the United States, but the American minister, having previously procured the discharge of the claimant from the Papal military service, sent him forward to Alexandria to identify Surratt. At the time of the first interview between the claimant and the American minister, and at all subsequent times until the final capture of Surratt, they were ignorant of the fact that the reward ottered by the Secretary of War for his arrest had been revoked by the President. The discovery and arrest of Surratt was due entirely to the disclosures made by the claimant to the American minister at Rome,, but the arrest was not made by the claimant either at Veroli or subsequently at Alexandria.
    III. There has been paid to the claimant by the defendants, under the Act 27th July, 1868, (15 Stat. L., p. 234, § 3,) the sum of $10,000. Such payment was made by a draft on the Treasury payable to the order of the claimant, which draft was by him duly indorsed.
    And the Court of Claims, upon the foregoing facts, decided, as conclusion of law :
    The claimant’s service, as set forth in the foregoing findings, did not constitute an arrest of Surratt within the meaning of the proclamation, but was merely the giving of information which conduced to the arrest. For such information the remuneration allowed to him under the act of Congress was a full satisfaction, and discharges the defendants from all liability.
    
      Mr. F. G.,Brewster, with whom was Mr. D. B. Meany, for the appellants :
    The appellant established his claim : 1st. By the diplomatic correspondence on the subject of said Surratt’s apprehension, carried on between the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, and Mr. Rufus King, United States minister at Rome, at the time of the discovery and apprehension of said Surratt, in the kingdom of Italy. 2d. By the testimony of Hon. Rufus King, United States minister at Rome. 3d. By no denial by the appellees of any of the facts contained in the petition and testimony of appellant, (not ruled out as irrelevant by the Court of Claims.) 4th. By a full acknowledgment of the facts contained in the petition and testimony of the appellant in the Court of Claims, as per the finding of facts in said court, which says: “ The discovery and arrest of Surratt was due entirely to the disclosures-made by the claimant to the American minister at Rome.”
    
      The appellant here contends that the honorable court below erred, upon tbe facts stated, in deciding that claimant gave.only-such information as entitled him to a liberal reward under the said proclamation; that under the proclamation it was the duty of the claimant to manually take Surratt to entitle claimant to said reward; that claimant did not apprehend Surratt within the meaning of the proclamation; that the payment of $10,000 to claimant was a full satisfaction, and discharged the defendant from all liability.
    The proclamation issued by the Secretary of War was properly issued; he was acting for the President, the President for the Government. Governments must act through their officers. (Story on Agency, 6th ed., chap. XI, sec. 302 ; Kent, Oomm., Lect. 41, p. 633, 4th ed.) Even if improperly issued, the principal was bound by it; for though published and made known to the people, the principal did not contradict or deny the right of the officer to make such proclamation, therefore the principal was bound by it. The proclamation was a special contract, made upon the credit and responsibility of the Government, offering the fixed sum of $25,000 for the apprehension of John H. Surratt. “ Government, far beyond that of any private man, is ready to fulfill ” all just contracts not only with good faith, but with punctilious promptitude, and in a spirit of liberal courtesy. (Story on Agency, chap. XI, sec. 302, 6th ed.) TJnder the contract, the claimant apprehended Surratt and caused Surratt to be taken into custody by the United States Government. At the time of the publication of the said proclamation there was but one ingredient of the contract missing, to wit, the assent of the claimant; but by the rule of law, that we judge of the motive by the act, so do we by the same rule arrive at the assent of a party to a contract by his acts in connection therewith. (Benjamin on Sales; Chitty on Con.; Smith on Oon.) Applying this rule to unravel the unusual conditions of the contract in this case, where does it lead to? That the claimant did assent from the beginning, for he apprehended Surratt. The claimant, if he did assent, had a vested interest in the contract which could not be divested by any subsequent act of the appellees such as the revocation of the reward, or any legislation on the subject such as part payment. Besides this, it was the duty of the appellees to inform the appellant, at the time of his discovery of Surratt in Italy, that the reward was revoked.
    The Court of Claims, in its conclusions of law and in its opinion, very properly. ignores the revocation, and says that “the proclamation made two offers, the one looking to the arrest of Surratt and his actual capture and delivery to the ■Government; the other looking to valuable information which would lead to his arrest. The claimant’s service came within the second offer. This service was valuable, and for it he has been compensated by Congress.” According to the foregoing, the claimant took under the proclamation offering the reward, and was not affected by the revocation of the same. The next question, then, would naturally be, are there two offers in the proclamation % and, if so, under which of the two offers did the appellant deserve to be rewarded for his services, to wit, his discovery and apprehension of said Surratt in the manner established even by the finding of the Court of Claims ? The words of the proclamation are as follows, viz: “ $25,000 reward will be paid for the apprehension of John H. Surratt, one of Booth’s accomplices; liberal rewards will be paid for any information that shall conduce to the arrest of either of the above-named criminals or their accomplices.” Can it be said or maintained that the servies and acts of the appellant came under the very vague and general term u any information,” mentioned in said proclamation, when the Court of Claims in its finding of facts says that “ the discovery and arrest of Surratt was due entirely to the disclosures made by the claimant to the American minister at Borne ?”
    Did not the appellant apprehend Surratt in the very letter and spirit of the proclamation ? What more could the appellant have done, had he discovered Surratt in the United States, than to go to some public officer and say to him, “ I have found Surratt; I will take you where he is, and you can take him into custody for the Government ?” That is exactly what the appellant did in Italy. He found Surratt after a long search. Then the appellant went immediately to a public officer (Mr. King) and told him of the discovery and the place where Surratt could be taken. Surratt was at the place mentioned. If the American minister had not the political power to then arrest Surratt, surely it was not the fault of the appellant, but rather the fault of the appellees for not having an extradition treaty with Italy for such purposes. Surely the proclamation did not mean that it was necessary the appellant should take Sur-ratt with his (the appellant’s) own hands, to entitle him to the fnll reward.
    It is contended, however, that inasmuch as the claimant did not himself manually take Surratt into custody, nor cause the papal government to arrest him directly, but that it was at the request of the American Government, and not at the claimant’s request, that the papal government arrested Surratt, the claimant is, therefore, barred from claiming the whole of the reward. But the arrest was regarded as a compliment by the papal government toward the United States, (there then being no extradition treaty between said governments.) How, then, could it be expected that the claimant could get the papal government to arrest Surratt for him ? Might it not with more propriety be contended by the claimant that, having discovered and pointed out Surratt to the defendant, the defendant took Surratt into custody by its agents, (the papal government,) and that after Surratt was in custody of defendant be (Surratt) escaped, and that even had Surratt never again been recaptured the claimant was entitled to the reward ? For the claimant is not responsible for the carelessness of the defendant’s agent in allowing Surratt to escape. If Surratt had been discovered by claimant in the city of Washington, and the claimant caused Surratt to be taken into custody by the constituted authorities there, and Surratt effected his escape from such authorities at Washington, would it be said in such case that the claimant was to lose the reward because of the carelessness of tbe authorities at Washington in allowing Surratt to escape? It is a parallel case, now, whether Surratt escapes from the authorities in Washington or in Italy. If he was recaptured (especially if his recapture or second arrest, whether made in Egypt or elsewhere, was owing to his first discovery by the claimant, which it is admitted was the case,) for “ the discovery and arrest of Surratt was due entirely to the disclosures made by the claimant,” &e.; but more especially if such re-capture or re-arrest of Surratt was made by a public officer (as was the case) whose duty it was to take Surratt as an escaped criminal, and who as such public officer had no right to expect the reward for doing his duty, then the claimant was and is entitled to the whole of said reward, and any payment of the claimant less than the whole sum named in the contract was not and is not a discharge or satisfaction of said contract, but was and is only-part payment on account of said contract, unless such part payment was specially agreed to by the claimant and defendant.
    Authorities cited: 163 Andr., 1778; 14 Pet., 448; 15 Pet., 337; 18 How., 92; 2 Curtis, 617; 1 How., 290; 7 Wall., 666, (1868;) 1 Nott. & H., 292; 4 Serg. & B., 241; 14 Serg. & B., 267; 4 Watts, 317; 7 Casey, 263; 4 Barr, 353; 3 P. F. Smith, 207; 15 P. F. Smith, 269; 2 P. F. Smith, 484.
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Smith for the appellees :
    The original offer was unauthorized. It does not even purport to have been made by the President, or his authority; only that “ the War Department will pay.” To cause the arrest of supposed criminals and bring them before the judicial tribunals for trial is not the special province of that Department. The United States were never legally bound by that offer, because it was not within the scope of Mr. Stanton’s official authority to make it, and they are held only to the extent they have actually given power to him who professes to be acting as their agent. (Lee v. Munroe, 7 Cranch, 366; Hunter v. United States, 5 Pet., 188; Johnson v. United States, 5 Mason, 425; United States v. City Bank, 6 McLean, 130; 9 Atty. Gen. Op., 18.)
    Although the President might, perhaps, offer such reward, yet the War Department could only make a contract in writing, “signed by the contracting parties.” (Aet June 2, 1862, c. 93, 12 Stat. L., 411.)
    If authorized, the offer of a reward, general or special, is a promise conditional upon the rendition of the proposed service before the offer is revoked. Such an offer is revocable at any time before performance; and it is only by performance that it becomes a binding contract. (Freeman v. Boston, 5 Mete., 57 ; Boring v. Boston, 7 Mete., 409; Oummings v. Gann, 52 Penn. St., 590; Byer v. Stoekwell, 14 Cal., 137; Gilmore v. Lewis, 12 Ohio, 285; Orocker v. N. L. B. B. Co., 24 Conn., 261; Janorinv. Exeter, 48 N. H., 83; Jones v. Phenix Bank, 4 Seld., 228; Fiteh v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y., 248.)
    This offer was revoked November 24, 1865. Ste. Marie had rendered no service to the United States; he, at least, had performed no condition of that promise before that date. The revocation was as public, and certainly as authentic, as the original promulgation of the proclamation. Suppose he had incurred expense in traveling to seek information, he had obtained none, and could communicate nothing to the purpose till the spring of 1866. If his bare efforts, availing nothing or successful, as the event might prove, gave him any claim, then all others who traveled anywhere, made any exertion, or incurred any expense to track Surratt, Thompson, Tucker, or Saunders prior to November 24, 1865, have an equal right; if success is essential to the validity of the claim, (as it doubtless is,) exitus probat rei, that was not attained till after the revocation.
    According to the terms of the original offer, Mr. Ste. Marie never did that which would have entitled him to $25,000, of anything more than a “liberal reward,” had there been no revocation. The terms of such an offer are rightly prescribed by the person offering it, and must be strictly complied with by him who claims the reward. (Jones v. Plienix Bank, 4 Seld., 228; Pitch v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y., 248; Clinton v. Young, 11 Rich., So. Car., 546.)
    The proclamation of Secretary Stanton contained two propo-, sitions, to wit: (1) that “$25,000 will be paid for the apprehension of John H. Surratt;” and (2) that “liberal reward will be paid for information that shall conduce to the arrest.” That he found Surratt in a country and situation which precluded the possibility of his arrest by the claimant is not sufficient to entitle him to the full reward offered for making the arrest.
    His counsel ask, “What more could the appellant have done had he discovered Surratt within the United States,” than to give information of the fact to some public officer and conduct him to the place where the culprit could be found ? The answer is that it would have been his legal right to have forcibly taken Surratt and carried him to the officer and committed him into custody. “Any private individual may arrest a felon.” (2 Bouv. Inst., 498, § 2221; 1 Bouv. L. D., 122; Wharton’s Law Lex., 85; Termes de le Ley, 52; 1 Bishop on Criminal Procedure, §§ 625-626.) He not only may do it, but it is his duty to do it. To stimulate activity in the discharge of that duty rewards are offered. The authorities are also unanimous that, if the felony has certainly been committed, a private person may arrest one whom he has reasonable eause'to suspect of its commission. (1 Bish. on Or. Proc., § 625; 2 Bouv. Inst., § 2220.)
    Though Ste. Marie, according to strict law, was entitled to nothing, Congress wished to deal equitably with him. He made his appeal to that body, not claiming $25,000, nor that he made the arrest, but only for furnishing the information which led to it. He received $10,250, his discharge from the papal service, and a free passage home. He has had his “liberal reward.”
    His receipt of the $10,000 was in full of all equitable claim; legally he had none. (Marvin v. Treat, 37 Conn., 96; Sholes v. State, 2 Chand., Wis., 182; Oallcins v. State, 13 Wis., 389.)
   Mr. Justice Strong-

delivered the opinion of the court:

We agree with the Court of Claims that the service rendered by the plaintiff’s testator was not the apprehension of John H. Surratt, for which the War Department had offered a reward of $25,000, but giving information that conduced to the arrest. These are quite distinct things, though one may have been a, consequence of the other. The proclamation of the Secretary of War treated them as different, and while a reward of $25,000' was offered for the apprehension, the offer for information was only a “ liberal reward.” The findings of the Court of Claims also exhibit a clear distinction between making the arrest and giving the information that led to it. It is found as a fact that the arrest was not made by the claimant, though the discovery and arrest was due entirely to the diclosures made by him. The plain meaning of this is that Surratt’s apprehension was a consequence of the disclosures made. But the consequence of a man’s act are not his acts. Between the consequence and the disclosure that leads to it there may be, and in this case there were, intermediate agencies. Other’persons than the claimant made the arrest, persons who were not his agents, and who themselves were entitled to the proffered reward for his arrest, if any persons were. We think, therefore, that at most the claimant was entitled to the liberal reward” promised for information conducing to the arrest, and that reward he has received.

But if this were not so, the judgment given by the Court of." Claims is correct.

The offer of a reward for the apprehension of Siirratt was revoked on the 24th day of November, 1865, and notice of revocation was published. It is not to be doubted that the offer was revocable at any time before it was accepted, and before anything had been done in reliance upon it. There was no contract until its terms were complied with. Like any other offer of a contract, it might, therefore, be withdrawn before rights had accrued under it, and it was withdrawn through the same channel in which it was made. The same notoriety was given to the revocation that was given to the offer. And the findings of fact do not show that any information was given by the claimant, or that he did anything to entitle him to the'reward offered, until five months after the offer had been withdrawn. True, it is found that then, and at all times until the arrest was actually made, he was ignorant of the withdrawal, but that is an immaterial fact. The offer of the reward not having been made to him directly, but by means of a published proclamation, he should have known that it could be revoked in the manner in which it was made.

The judgment is affirmed.  