
    MARTIN against Rex.
    Friday, December 22.
    . After a judgment ‘been entered by virtucfof a warrant of judgment ensamf bond,6 under the same warrant, in another county, is irregular. Such judgment, however, is not void, for if a sale has been made under it, the purchaser from the sherifFhas a good title. The attorney who entered such judgment, or the obligee, if it was entered by him, is answerable for the consequences.
    
      ATHERTON, for the defendant,
    and Bradford on be-J r . - .. . naif or a judgment creditor, obtained a rule to shew cause wliy the judgment entered, by virtue of a warrant of attorney, on the 3d January, 1820, on a bond for 800 dollars, should not be vacated.. It appeared, that on the 4th May, 1818> a judgment was entered in Montgomery county ori the same bond,
    
      It was insisted in support of the motion, that the warrant of attorney being merely for the confession of a judgment, it was fully executed on the performance of that act, and that the bond itself was merged in a security of a higher nature, namely, the judgment; consequently a .second judgment could not be regular. So the law was distinctly laid down in Livezley v. Pennock, 2 Browne's Rep. 321.
    
      Tilgkman, for the plaintiff,
    said, that this was an application to the equitable discretion of the Court, and he should shew a strong equity in favour of the plaintiff. He then stated that the money lent was the property of orphans, and was invested by the- defendant in land in Philadelphia county. The defendant had sold this land on the 1st April, 1820, to Christian Naglee, for 2573 dollars, with express notice from the plaintiff of the judgment in Philadelphia county, and the plaintiff promised to wait some time for the money, .provided the interest were paid punctually. On the 15th June, 1820, the defendant conveyed away his personal property.
    
      Christian Naglee,
    
    who was sworn, stated that he had purchased land near the Rising Sun on the Germantown road, for the sum above mentioned, and paid 1000 dollars on the 1st April last, when he received a deed ; that he had been informed of this judgment by the plaintiff, who promised to -, let 800 dollars stand, provided he paid the interest; that he heard the defendant acknowledge, that with the money borrowed of the plaintiff, he had paid off a mortgage on the property ; and that he was still indebted to thedefendant i.575 dollars, for which he had his bond and mortgage on the land.
    Upon these facts it was contended, that the Court, in order to do equity, would exercise the right it certainly possessed, of relaxing the strict rule of law, in favour of the plaintiff, and Gilman v. Hill, Cowp. 141. and Denton v. Noyes, 6 Johns. 296. were relied on.
   . Per Curiam

We do not consider this as a void judgi ment. On the contrary, if a sale had been made under it, the purchaser from the sheriff would have had a good title ; many titles in Pennsylvania depend on this principle. But this judgment was clearly entered irregularly—the warrant, was to confess a judgment, which was done in Montgomery county, after which the warrant had no force. There was real estate of the defendant in Montgomery county, and the object of the plaintiff was to bind it, so that he has no right to. complain of hardship in not being permitted to bind the real estate of the defendant in another county. This judgment was entered by the plaintiff himself, in pursuance of our act of assembly. I believe it has. been not unusual for attorneys to enter judgment in different counties, under a warrant on the same bond. But in such cases, having acted without authority, they are answerable for the consequences; and where the obligee causes judgment to be entered on the same bond, in different counties, without the intervention of an attorney, he also is answerable for the consequences. We are of opinion that the rule should be made absolute.  