
    Logan vs. The State.
    To make dying declarations competent evidence, the declarant must not only be in articulo mortis but must be conscious that he is so.
    Robert Logan was indicted in the Commercial and Criminal Court of Memphis for the murder of John Curry. Upon the examination of the case before Judge King and a jury of Shelby county, at the July term, 1847, it appeared that Logan was a watchman in the town of Memphis; that Curry had determined to leave Memphis at five o’clock in the morning, was drunk, and roaming about the streets of Memphis without any apparent purpose, and that being arrested by Logan he attempted to make his escape, and whilst running Logan shot him with a pistol in the back. Curry' fell, and asked, what did that man shoot me for? One of the witnesses stated that Curry told him that he must die; that he was murdered without a cause, but that he forgave the murderer; that the watchman was taking him off to the calaboose, and that he was afraid that he would loose his trip on the beat which left at five o’clock in the morning, and that he had therefore run; and that whilst running he was shot by the watchman; and that he had not raised his hand against the watchman. He said he was shot through the heart. He was shot with ten balls, about midnight. He died the next day, after having requested the services of a priest.
    The jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter, and fixed his term of imprisonment in the penitentiary at ten years. The motion of defendant for a new trial was refused, and judgment was entered against him on the record.
    He appealed.
    
      E. M. Yerger, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Attorney General, for the State.
   Tukley, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

In this case, the cause assigned for a reversal, is, also, that dying declarations were received illegally against the prisoner.

Having entered so fully into the doctrine upon this subject, in the case of Smith vs. The State, we have deemed it unnecessary ágain to do it here. In that case we held, that the declarations received were not dying declarations, and ought not, therefore, to have been received. In the present case we have arrived at a different conclusion, for reasons which we will assign.

The wounds, of which the deceased died, are proven by the attending physician to have been mortal, and of a very painful character: he died within forty-eight hours after their reception. It appears that he was a Catholic, and that a priest had been with him before he made the declarations complained of, no doubt for the purpose of administering extreme unction: it cannot be supposed that the deceased was not informed and fully aware of the nature of his wounds, and of the opinion of the doctor that they were mortal;-he told the witness that he must die and that he forgave his murderer. We are well satisfied, not only that the deceased was in articulo mortis, but that he was fully conscious that be was so, and tbat he had no hopes of life, but was certain of his almost immediate death. We therefore think, that the judge of the criminal court committed no error in receiving the declarations of the deceased.

Some other points have been mooted, but not seriously-pressed in the case: we think there is nothing in them and .that they need no discussion by the court.

Let the judgment be affirmed.  