
    Clyde James RAINEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Mike KNOWLES, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 08-17222.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted June 15, 2010.
    Filed July 6, 2010.
    Richard Braucher, Esquire, First District Appellate Project, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Allen R. Crown, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of The California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: RYMER and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and PALLMEYER, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Clyde James Rainey appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.

I

The California Court of Appeal’s determination that the trial court was not required sua sponte to hold a competency hearing is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. The standard applied by the court of appeal comports with federal law. See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 383-85, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). No controlling federal law indicates that a mental deficiency, alone, suffices, nor did Rainey’s behavior raise a bona fide doubt such that the trial court was obliged to conduct a hearing on its own initiative. Expert testimony showed that Rainey could think, get through life, and live and work on his own. And Rai-ney’s discussion with his mother not only reveals consciousness of guilty, but confirms Rainey’s understanding of the nature of the proceedings he faced and his ability to help in his defense. Finally, defense counsel expressed no concern about Rai-ney’s competence. This is not a controlling factor as a matter of federal law (as it is under California state law), but it bolsters the conclusion that the trial judge was not required to conduct a competency hearing.

II

The state trial judge’s finding on habeas review that Phillip Kendrick’s statement was not material, and thus that failure to disclose it did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Kendrick testified at an evidentiary hearing, gave several different versions of the incident, and admitted he was not telling the truth. Nor was the court’s determination an unreasonable application of Brady. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681-82, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). The absence of testimony as unreliable and untrustworthy as Kendrick’s does not undermine confidence in the outcome.

The trial court’s conclusion that any attempt to prove Rainey’s confession was false would be unavailing likewise is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. Rainey’s statements to his mother were clear, spontaneous, and unqualified. His statement to the police also implicated a gang member, which would undermine a theory that he was afraid of gang retaliation.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9fh Cir. R. 36-3.
     