
    Richard Farrow vs. James Martin.
    
      Defendant hy a ivritten agreement, engaged ‘‘to meet” plaintiff, and make him title to a tract of land; a time and place of meeting were appointed, and defendant attended accordingly; held. that plaintiff, having failed to attend at the time and place, and not having demanded title at any other time, could not sustain the action for breach of the contract.
    
    The plaintiff declared in assumpsit, on the following ■written contract: “August 31st, 1820.” “I James Martin do promise to meet said R. Farrow and give ij] (to him rights for one hundred and sixty acres of land in the Missouri Territory, for which I have received a note of him, for one hundred and twenty dollars” (signed) “James Martin.” The breach assigned was that the defendant had not made the title according to this agreement.
    A witness called by die plaintiff, stated that at the time this contract was entered into, the parties agreed to meet a few days after either at the “Cross-Keys,” or “Cross-Anchor” for the purpose of carrying it into effect: these places were in the same neighbourhood, and the witness could not recollect, and would not undertake. to say which was the place, agreed on; but was inclined to think the latter.
    The witnesses called by defendant proved that on the day appointed the defendant went .to. the Cross-Keys for the avowed purpose of meeting the plaintiff, to. carry the contract into effect: That titles were prepared and readj to be- executed, but the plaintiff did not attend.
    There was no proof that the plaintiff attended at either place; nor was there any that he ever -appointed any other place of meeting, or that he had even requested defendant to make the titles before the commencement of the action.
    The presiding judge, being of opinion that if the case went to the jury, the verdict must be for the defendant, by which the plaintiff would have been for ever concluded, directed anon-suit; and this was a motion to set it aside on the ground, that the contract imposed a legal liability on the defendant, and that tí was incumbent pn him to have made or tendered titles tó the plaintiff, without any iequest from him.
   The opinion of the Court ivas delivered by

Mr. Justice Johnson.

In the interpretation of contracts, that which is derived from the plain and obvious intention of the parties, to be collected from the whole instrument, must in general prevail; and if this rule is applied to this agreement, I think it will clearly follow that it imposed on the plaintiff an obligation to meet the defendant, and accept the titles. It does impose on the defendant, in explicit terms, the obligation to meet plaintiff and to make - titles, and by a necessary implication, the plaintiff was bound to t-ut it in his power to do so. Now if plaintiff would not meet, or would not accept titles, it was impossible, and that without any fault of defendant, that he could keep his contract.

A practical interpretation of the contract is I think found in the conduct of these parties; they acted upon it immediately; a time and place were appointed, and' if the evidence proves any ■thing, it shows that defendant kept his agreement and was ready to do what was required of him, and did do all that was ip his power.

It is a settled principle, that to enable a party to recover for the breach of a contract, it is incumbent on him to show that he has dpne eyery thing which was required of him, to enable the defendant to perform his part; and it is shown that there was an obligation on the plaintiff to meet the defendant at tlie time and place ap: ointed, to carry the agreement fully |nto effect. He failed to do so; nor did he give the defendant, any otlier opportunity to do what was required of him, before. he brought his action. I think therefore that the nonsuit wa,s properly ordered. Motion refused.

Farrow, for motion,

Herndon, contra.

Colcock, JYoit and Gantt, Justices, concurred.  