
    Brown, by guardian, ad litem, Respondent, vs. Eastern Wisconsin Railway & Light Company, Appellant.
    
      March 23
    
    April 13, 1915.
    
    
      negligence: Injury to child: Brolcen live wire: Improper installation: Special verdict: Proximate cause: Adequacy of finding: Excessive damages."
    
    1. In an action for injuries to a boy caused by coming in contact with a broken live wire, one end of which lay flat on the ground after a storm, the evidence is held to sustain findings by the jury that the wire was so installed that it came in contact with a limb of a tree, that such installation was negligent and caused the breaking of the wire, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.
    2. Where, in answer to separate questions in a special verdict, the jury found two negligent acts or omissions of the defendant, both of which were actionable, a further finding that the negligence “thus found” was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury was a sufficient finding of proximate cause. Peek v. Bara-boo, 141 Wis. 48, and Kruck v. Wilbur L. Go. 148 Wis. 76, distinguished.
    3. Where, through defendant’s negligence, the right hand of a boy eight years old was so severely burned that he lost a part of it and the rest was disfigured and its use impaired, an award of $2,250 was not excessive.
    Appeal from a judgment of tbe circuit court for Eond du Lac county: Ohesteb A. Fowleb, Circuit Judge.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    Action to recover damages for a personal injury sustained 'by plaintiff coming in contact witb a broken live wire belonging to tbe defendant. During tbe nigbt of July 13 and 14, 1912, there was quite a heavy storm accompanied by lightning in tbe city of Fond du Lae, and in tbe morning of July 14th a wire belonging to tbe defendant was broken on Hickory street in such a manner that one end lay flat on tbe ground. Plaintiff, a boy eight years old, while going to a neighbor’s bouse to play between 8 and 9 in tbe morning of July 14th, saw tbe wire lying on tbe ground, did not notice -that it was attached to anything, picked it up, and was severely burned so thjit it became necessary to amputate tbe little finger and tbe one next to it of his rig’ht band. It is claimed by plaintiff that defendant was negligent in permitting tbe wire to come in contact with the limbs of a tree whereby it was broken and in failing to seasonably inspect its line tbe next morning. Tbe defendant claims tbe wire did not touch tbe limbs of a tree, but on tbe contrary was broken by a bolt of lightning and that it did not fail in its duty of inspection.
    The jury found (1) that tbe wire on which tbe plaintiff was injured became broken by a limb of a tree coming in contact therewith during the storm that occurred tbe night previous to tbe injury; (2) that defendant did not use ordinary care in leaving the wire so that it came in contact with a limb; (3) that tbe defendant did not use ordinary care in inspecting its line after tbe storm; (4) that the want of ordinary care found in questions 2 and 3 was tbe proximate cause of tbe injury; (5) that there was no contributory negligence by plaintiff; (6) that tbe parents of plaintiff were not negligent; and (7) damages in tbe sum of $2,250: Judgment upon tbe verdict was entered in favor of plaintiff, and tbe defendant appealed.
    
      T. L. Doyle, attorney, and J. C. Hardgrove, of counsel, for tbe appellant.
    For tbe respondent there was a brief by Clichsman, Gold & Corrigan and Henry Mahoney, and oral argument by W. D. Corrigan.
    
   ViNjb, J.

Tbe jury found that tbe wire was so installed as to pass among and touch tbe branches of a tree; that such installation was negligent, and that it caused its breaking. They further found that tbe defendant was negligent in failing seasonably to inspect its line tbe next morning. On behalf of tbe defendant it is claimed that tbe evidence does not sustain a finding that tbe wire ran through or touched the branches of a tree; that lightning caused it to break; and that tbe defendant seasonably, inspected its line tbe nest morning after tbe storm.

,We bave carefully examined all tbe evidence in tbe case and from sucb examination conclude tbat not only does it sustain a finding tbat tbe wire touched tbe branches of a tree, but also preponderates in favor of sucb finding. Tbe claim tbat lightning caused tbe break in tbe wire rests upon vague and unsatisfactory evidence, and is considerably rebutted by tbe fact tbat several lightning arresters nearest tbe break were apparently unaffected. Tbe fact tbat if a wet wire charged with a heavy current comes in contact with a wet tree it is likely to burn off tbe insulation and cause tbe wire to fuse and break is now almost a matter of nonexpert knowledge. Upon tbe evidence which supported sucb conclusion tbe jury could well find tbat tbe contact between tbe wire and tbe limb of a tree was tbe proximate cause of tbe injury.

Tbe finding of negligent installation being sustained it becomes unnecessary to consider whether tbe finding of negligence as to inspection is justified by tbe evidence.

Question 2 read: “Did tbe 'defendant use ordinary, care in leaving said wire so tbat it came in contact with a limb ?” Question 3 read: “Did tbe defendant use ordinary care in respect to inspecting its lines during and after tbe storm tbat occurred during tbe night preceding tbe injury?” and question 4 read: “If to tbe second and third questions, or either of them, you answer ‘No,’ then answer this question: . . . ‘Was tbe want of ordinary care thus found tbe proximate cause of tbe injury V

It is claimed by defendant tbat tbe affirmative answer to this question returned by tbe jury does not adequately find proximate cause because some of tbe jury may bave thought tbe want of ordinary care found in tbe second question was tbe proximate cause, and tbe others tbat tbe want of ordinary care found in tbe third question was tbe proximate cause, and so' all answered it “Yes,’,’ though their minds did not meet as to either cause. We think tbe question can bear no sucb construction and was not so understood by tbe jury. Wben tbeyi were asked if tbe want of ordinary care thus found was tbe proximate cause, referring to two specific questions, tbe jury must have understood that they could not answer tbe question in tbe affirmative unless they were satisfied that tbe want of ordinary care found in eacb question was tbe proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. The cases of Peck v. Bamboo, 141 Wis. 48, 122 N. W. 140, and Kruck v. Wilbur L. Co. 148 Wis. 16, 133 N. W. 1117, are relied upon. In both of those cases tbe jury found actionable negligence and nonac-tionable negligence to be tbe proximate cause of tbe injury, and it was beld the verdict would not support a judgment for plaintiff. We have no sucb case here. In this case both acts of negligence found are actionable,

It is claimed tbe damages -are! excessive. Plaintiff lost tbe little finger of bis right band at tbe knuckle joint and tbe finger next close to tbe knuckle. A portion of tbe palm back of tbe little finger was removed; tbe middle finger was so severely burned as to leave heavy scar tissue, making it impossible for him to fully extend it, and through tbe palm there is a burned ridge covered with scar tissue. Tbe ruling and reasons given therefor in Willette v. Rhinelander P. Co. 145 Wis. 537, 130 N. W. 853, negative tbe justness of sucb claim.

By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.  