
    Washington v. The State.
    
      'In ■ ictnient for Arson.
    
    1. What building ix within curtilage of dwelling-house.--A barn, one end of which opens in lb the yard surrounding the dwelling-house, forming a part, of the fence which separates the yard from another inclosure, is “ within the curtilage of the dwelling-house,” as Ihe words are used in the statute (Code, § 4347) defining arson in the second degree.
    From the City Court of Montgomery.
    Tried before the Hon. Thos. M. Arrington.
    Gordon Macdonald, for the appellant.
    Thos. N McClellan, Attorney-General, for the State,
    cited Ivef v. State, 61 Ala. 58 ; Fisher v. State, 43 Ala. 17; State v. Whit, 4 Jones, N. C. Law, 349.
   CLOPTON, J.

— The bill of exceptions does not purport

to set out the entire evidence, and all reasonable presumptions will be indulged to sustain tlie rulings of the court. The defendants were indicted, under section 4347 of the Code, for having willfully set fire to or burned a barn, the property of L. L. Hill, being within the curtilage of his dwelling-house. The. barn was situated with the front end in the rear yard of the dwelling, constituting a part of the inclosure of the yard, the rear part extending into another inclosure. Curtilage, as used in the statute, certainly includes the yard or space of ground near to the dwelling-house, contained in the same inclosure, and used in connection witli it by the household. On tlie evidence in this

case, the barn, opening into the yard immediately surrounding the dwelling, and forming a part of the inelosure, must be regarded, in legal contemplation, as one of the cluster of buildings appurtenant to, and used for domestic purposes in connection with the dwelling, and as within tlie curtilage. Fisher v. State, 43 Ala. 17; Pritcher v. People, 16 Mich. 142; State v. Whit, 4 Jones’ L. (N. C.), 349; 1 Whar. Cr. Law, S 783.

Affirmed.  