
    Jose David VALDEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ken CLARK, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 10-55737.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 8, 2014
    
    Filed Dec. 10, 2014.
    Charles Roger Khoury, Jr., Esquire, Del Mar, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Kevin Vienna, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General (San Diego), San Diego, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: SILVERMAN and BEA, Circuit Judges, and BELL, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jose Valdez appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging his California convictions for witness intimidation, brandishing a firearm, and street terrorism. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The state court reasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), when it denied the claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a juror bias claim on direct appeal. Because there was no specific evidence that any juror was actually biased, the state court reasonably held that Valdez failed to prove both prongs of the Strickland test.

The state court reasonably applied Jackson v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), to hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for dissuading a witness with a threat of force in violation of California Penal Code § 136.1(a)(1) and brandishing a firearm in violation of California Penal Code § 417(a)(2). Evidence at trial established that two individuals, Moreno and Gonzalez, had been stabbed and beaten by members of Valdez’s criminal street gang, and the victims were scheduled to testify in juvenile court against members of Valdez’s gang. On May 16, 2004, the day before the victims were scheduled to testify, Valdez repeatedly advised the victims’ friend, Galvan, to tell Moreno and Gonzalez, in effect, to get their stories straight and keep their mouths shut to avoid trouble with Valdez’s rival street gang. While issuing this warning to Gal-van, Valdez sat in the front passenger seat of a car, leaned back, and ominously allowed Galvan to observe the assault weapon he was holding on his lap. Valdez admitted that he was a member of the Laurel Hood Thugs criminal street gang, he had the conversation with Galvan, and he carried his assault weapon during the conversation with Galvan. The state court reasonably held that a rational juror could have found that Valdez brandished a firearm and intentionally used threats to dissuade Moreno and Gonzalez from testifying against Valdez’s fellow gang members in the juvenile court prosecution. Cal.Penal Code §§ 136.1(c)(1) & 417(a)(2); People v. Mendoza, 59 Cal.App.4th 1338, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 728, 733-34 (1997). In addition, a rational juror could have found that Valdez dissuaded the witnesses with the specific intent to benefit or promote the criminal activity of his gang. Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1); People v. Jasso, 211 Cal.App.4th 1354, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 483 (2012).

Valdez argues that there is insufficient evidence to support two convictions for violating California Penal Code § 186.22(a), street terrorism or active participation in a criminal street gang. After the district court denied federal habeas relief in this case, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Rodriguez, 55 Cal.4th 1125, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 533, 290 P.3d 1143 (2012). Rodriguez held that the prosecution must prove that a defendant’s underlying felonious criminal conduct in a § 186.22(a) case was committed by at least two gang members. Id. at 1134, 150 Cal. Rptr.3d 533, 290 P.3d 1143. The warden now concedes that, in light of Rodriguez, there is insufficient evidence to support the street terrorism conviction alleged to have been committed on May 20, 2004 because Valdez was by himself — not with others — on that occasion. As for the May 16, 2004 incident, the district court has not yet had an opportunity to assess whether that conviction passes muster under Rodriguez. We reverse the district court’s denial of the sufficiency of the evidence challenges to the two street terrorism convictions and remand for the district court to reconsider the claims in light of Rodriguez. We do not reverse the May 20, 2004 conviction at this time because of issues of exhaustion and procedural default that remain for the district court to determine in the first instance.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     