
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William R. DIXON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 01-4131.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted Aug. 28, 2001.
    Decided Oct. 15, 2001.
    
      Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, NC, for appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, NC, for appellee.
    Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

William R. Dixon, Jr., appeals the district court’s order revoking his term of supervised release and imposing a new period of imprisonment. Dixon was serving a five year term of supervised release subsequent to completing a twenty-seven month sentence for bank fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1) (1994). After Dixon admitted four violations of the conditions of his supervised release, the district court sentenced Dixon to twenty-four months in prison. In this appeal, Dixon contends that the district court acted unreasonably in revoking his supervised release and imposing the twenty-four month sentence. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court, we affirm.

This court reviews the district court’s order imposing a term of imprisonment for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir.1995). An abuse of the district court’s discretion occurs when the court fails or refuses to exercise its discretion or when the court’s exercise of discretion is flawed by an erroneous legal or factual premise. See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir.1993). Dixon has identified no such flaw in the district court’s judgment. Neither do we find that the twenty-four month sentence was plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Sweeney, 90 F.3d 55, 57 (2d Cir.1996); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) (1994). The term of imprisonment was well within the sentence authorized by the statute governing revocation of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (1994). Consequently, there was no reversible error in the district court’s judgment.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.  