
    [No. A140040.
    First Dist., Div. Five.
    Jan. 11, 2016.]
    THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH VERDUCCI, Defendant and Appellant.
    [CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION]
    
      Counsel
    Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan and Catherine A. Rivlin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    
      
      Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part II.B.
    
   Opinion

BRUINIERS, J.

— On the evening of January 14, 2007, Jose Corona was shot to death during an attempt to kill a cast-out gang member. After three mistrials in which juries deadlocked, appellant Joseph Verducci was convicted of the first degree murder of Corona (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). Verducci was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 50 years to life. On appeal, Verducci contends the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him of due process by denying his motions to dismiss and admitting hearsay evidence. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 2008, Verducci was charged by information with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and criminal street gang and firearm enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1); former § 12022.53). The first jury trial began in November 2009, and the following December the court declared a mistrial when the jury deadlocked eight to four in favor of a guilty verdict. A second trial in March 2011 ended after that jury reported it was hung 11 to one in favor of a guilty verdict. Both sides made additional arguments to the jury. After deliberating further, the jury repeated it could not reach a verdict and the court declared a mistrial.

A third trial began in April 2012,.and the jury reported on May 1 that it was hung, “nine not guilty and three guilty.” The court asked the jury to continue deliberating. On May 3, the jury again stated it could not reach a unanimous verdict. The court once again declared a mistrial. A fourth trial began in April 2013.

The Prosecution’s Evidence at the Fourth Trial

Thomas Covey’s Testimony

Thomas Covey testified that he and Coby Phillips were among the cofounders and leaders of a white supremacist gang, the Family Affiliated Irish Mafia (FAIM). Verducci joined FAIM in 2001 or 2002. FAIM’s primary purpose was to make money from selling drugs, primarily methamphetamine, in the area between the counties of Alameda and Napa. As time went on, FAIM began moving larger amounts of methamphetamine. At its peak, FAIM dealt 10 to 15 pounds per week. The source for FAIM’s methamphetamine was two Mexican nationals with connections to the Mexican Sinaloa cartel— Jose Vega-Robles (known as Carlos) and Sergio Vega-Robles. In order to collect money owed from drug sales, FAIM members routinely inflicted violence, including beatings, stabbings, shootings, and murder.

In 2006 and early 2007, most of the FAIM leadership responsibilities fell to Thomas because Coby was in federal custody. In 2006, Coby and Thomas suffered a falling out. While Coby was in prison, his wife, Stacey Phillips, began an affair with Thomas’s brother, Tim Covey. Soon thereafter, Coby learned of the affair and ordered Thomas to kill Tim. Thomas promised to shoot Tim, but ultimately took no action. Further tension was created by Thomas’s physically abusive relationship with Stacey’s sister, Tina Cates.

Toward the latter part of 2006, Coby and Thomas began threatening to kill one another and their respective families. On at least one occasion, Thomas pulled a gun on Coby. In November 2006, Thomas took a stolen .45-caliber handgun and drove to Coby’s house, intending to kill him. On the way, he led police on a high-speed chase and was arrested. Thomas remained in custody until he posted bail in January 2007.

On January 14, 2007, Thomas and fellow FAIM member Kyle Galal spent the day watching football and drinking heavily. That evening they went to the My Office bar, which was around the corner from Coby and Stacey’s house in Vallejo. Thomas stepped outside to smoke a cigarette and saw Stacey’s black Impala pull into the bar’s parking lot and then speed off. He could not see who was in the car because the windows were tinted and rolled up. Thomas called Stacey on his cell phone, asked who was in her car, and apologized for the conflict between him and Coby. He was emotional, but Stacey did not accept his apologies. Instead, she asked if Thomas wanted her to send Verducci to the bar. She said Verducci was high on drugs and acting “crazy.” Thomas assumed Stacey had learned where he was from the people in the Impala or had been in the Impala herself. Not overly concerned, Thomas went back into the bar. Not long thereafter, Thomas and Galal again left the bar and walked around the comer of the building to urinate. Thomas noticed a maroon Ford Taurus, which he recognized as belonging to Carlos, pulling into the parking lot. Thomas was immediately concerned and began moving towards the bar’s front door, as Carlos was a good friend of Coby’s.

Thomas saw Verducci and Carlos get out of the car. Thomas initially focused on Carlos, who Thomas knew to be a very violent person. Thomas saw that Carlos had a knife, but never saw Carlos with a gun. Thomas then glanced in Verducci’s direction and saw Verducci point a gun at him and begin firing. Thomas ran towards the bar’s front door and then inside, ducking and weaving as he ran. Jose Corona, who had been sitting on a bar stool near the front window of the bar, was shot in the head. The bullet entered Corona’s left temple and brain, killing him.

When police arrived, Thomas was arrested on an outstanding warrant. After his arrest, Thomas refused to speak to police. He posted bail and remained out of custody until May 2007. When Thomas returned to custody in May 2007, several other FAIM members were incarcerated in the same unit. Thomas tried to regain his good standing in FAIM. Thomas was subpoenaed to testify át Verducci’s preliminary hearing in July 2008, but he refused because he was “still living by the code that we don’t tell on each other.” Thomas was subpoenaed a second time to testify at Verducci’s first trial. He again refused. Thomas decided to cooperate in 2009 after FAIM members tried to kill him in prison. In exchange for a favorable plea deal in another case, Thomas agreed to testify against Verducci. Thomas, his wife, and his son were placed in a witness protection program.

Even before reaching the favorable plea agreement, however, Thomas had implicated Verducci in the shooting. In March 2007, Thomas’s father called Thomas and accused Thomas of a second burglary at his home. Thomas was unaware the police were recording the call. Thomas denied involvement in the burglary. However, when the conversation turned to the My Office bar shooting, Thomas said, “They tried to take my fuckin head dad. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Joe Verducci, that’s the one who did it. Punk ass Joe did it for Coby.”

Steve Buchanan’s Testimony

Steve Buchanan joined FAIM in 2000, after meeting Thomas in state prison. Buchanan thought FAIM gang members were “[his] caliber of people” because the gang had a violent reputation that matched his own. In 2005 or 2006, Buchanan met Coby and Verducci, who was called “Joe Rue.” Buchanan thought Verducci and Coby were related, as Verducci called Coby “cousin.” Verducci frequently stayed at Coby’s house, sleeping on a blanket and pillow on the floor next to Coby’s bed. Buchanan had seen Verducci with a nine-millimeter automatic handgun.

Buchanan became aware of a conflict between Coby and Thomas when, on one occasion in late 2006, Coby called Thomas and put him on speakerphone. Buchanan heard Coby tell Thomas to get his FAIM tattoos removed. Coby also threatened to kill Thomas. Buchanan explained that telling a gang member to remove his gang tattoos is a “green light,” which meant there would be no repercussions from the gang if that person was injured. Buchanan himself was “green lighted” by FAIM in 2008, after he agreed to testify against FAIM members in another murder case. He received a $1,000 stipend every month thereafter.

Clayton Cates’s Testimony

Between 2004 and 2008, Stacey’s brother, Clayton Cates, lived with Stacey and Coby. Clayton helped FAIM traffic drugs by transporting methamphetamine between Los Angeles and the Bay Area. Clayton knew Verducci as Coby’s close associate.

On the evening of January 14, 2007, Clayton was at Joanna Núñez’s house with Carlos, Verducci, and Melesa Wright. Verducci told Clayton that Stacey had just called him and said Thomas was threatening her family. Verducci asked Clayton to give him a ride to “the bar.” Thereafter, Clayton drove Verducci, Wright, and Carlos to the My Office bar in Carlos’s Ford Taurus. Verducci was seated in the front passenger seat with his backpack. Clayton did not see a gun, but he knew Verducci always carried a gun in this backpack. Clayton knew of a plan to shoot Thomas, but said he “didn’t think [Verducci] would do it.” Clayton recalled Verducci using his cell phone while in the car. Clayton said Verducci’s cell phone number at the time was (707) 712-1152.

After arriving at the My Office bar, Clayton saw Verducci touch his backpack and then exit the car, followed by Carlos. Clayton and Wright stayed behind in the car. Next, Clayton heard six or seven gunshots. When the shots ended, Verducci and Carlos ran back to the car and got in. Verducci said, “[I] got him.” Clayton drove away and learned later that night Thomas had not been killed.

At the time, Clayton did not report the events to police. In November 2008, Clayton was arrested on drug charges and questioned about the shooting. Initially, Clayton did not tell the truth, but he eventually admitted being in a car when someone got out and shot at Thomas. Clayton pled no contest to manslaughter and agreed to testify in exchange for probation with an 11-year suspended sentence. Clayton was also placed in a witness protection program and thereafter received $1,200 each month for rent. Clayton understood the checks would stop coming and he would go to jail if he refused to testify.

Police Investigation

Police arrived at the bar around 8:00 p.m. Bullet strike marks were located on a front window, on the exterior wall near the door, and on the wooden doorframe. The glass in the front window was shattered. Officers found Corona lying face up on the ground, close to that window, with a gunshot wound to his head. A bullet was recovered from Corona’s body. Another bullet fragment was recovered from a pool table. Police also found five bullet casings in the parking lot outside the bar.

Firearms Evidence

Five days before the My Office bar shooting, on January 9, 2007, Verducci had used a gun to shoot Casey Holmes in the leg. A firearms expert examined the bullet casings collected from the parking lot outside the My Office bar and compared them to the bullet casing recovered on January 9, 2007. The expert determined all the casings were of the same caliber and fired from the same gun.

Michael Whisenhunt’s Testimony

Although he claimed not to recall the call itself, Michael Whisenhunt testified that two male voices on a January 13, 2007 recorded jail phone call were his and Coby’s. In the recording, which was played for the jury over Verducci’s hearsay objection, Coby calls Whisenhunt’s landline from jail. Coby reports to Whisenhunt that “Bubba” is out of jail and conveys that they are not on good terms. Coby then asks Whisenhunt, “Can you call (Joanna) on your cell phone and see if she has a number for [‘Joe Rue’]?” While still on the phone with Coby, Whisenhunt makes a call to “Joanna” and then indicates he is dialing 712-1152 on his cell phone. Whisenhunt says, “(Tina)’s on the phone” and that “she’s with (Joe).” Coby says, and Whisenhunt repeats, “[P]ut [Joe Rue] on the phone.” Whisenhunt then acts as go-between in a conversation between Coby and “Joe Rue.” During that conversation, Coby expresses, and Whisenhunt conveys to “Joe Rue,” Coby’s desire that “Joe” stay at Coby’s house to protect his children now that Thomas is “out.” However, Whisenhunt testified that he had never met Verducci and could not identify his voice.

Phone Records

Phone records from Metro PCS showed calls from Thomas’s phone at 7:22, 7:31, 7:40, and 7:58 p.m. on January 14, 2007. Metro PCS records also show the phone number (707) 712-1152 received a call at 7:55 p.m. When it received that phone call, the (707) 712-1152 cell phone used the same cell tower Thomas’s phone had used between 7:22 and 7:58 p.m.

Gang Expert Testimony

The prosecution’s gang expert believed Verducci was a member of FAIM. The expert opined the attempt to kill Thomas benefited the gang because it was an attempt to get rid of a gang member who posed a threat to the gang’s leader.

Defense Evidence

Stacey’s Prior Testimony

At the fourth trial, Stacey was called by Verducci but refused to testify after her immunity agreement was withdrawn by the People. She was found unavailable to testify, and portions of her testimony at prior trials were read into the record. In January 2007, Stacey’s marriage to Coby was strained' because they were both having affairs — Coby with Joanna Núñez and Stacey with Tim. In the early morning hours of January 1, 2007, Coby and Stacey had an argument. Coby threw Stacey to the ground in their master bathroom and began punching her in the face. He bloodied her face and blackened her eyes. Stacey’s brother, Michael, had been spending the holidays with Stacey and Coby. Michael tried to leave with Stacey, but Coby rammed Michael’s car with Stacey’s car. Police arrived and arrested Coby.

At the 2012 trial, Stacey testified that after his arrest, Coby left a cell phone with the number (707) 712-1152 at the house for Verducci. However, when she testified in 2009, Stacey had denied giving Verducci that phone. Stacey’s testimony at prior trials also conflicted as to whether she called Verducci on the night of January 14, 2007. In 2009, she denied calling Verducci. However, Stacey acknowledged that, after making a deal with prosecutors, she testified in 2011 to having in fact talked to Verducci that night. Stacey also admitted lying throughout her testimony at Coby’s trial for domestic violence, wherein he was acquitted. She also admitted lying in her past testimony in this case. Stacey recalled a debt owed to Carlos. According to Stacey, Coby owed a large sum because Thomas and his brother Tim had not paid their share for drugs they had obtained.

Jamie Beckwith’s Testimony

Jamie Beckwith, who was Carlos’s former girlfriend, testified Carlos sold large quantities of drugs for a living and usually carried a firearm. In the latter part of 2006, Beckwith and Carlos were living with Núñez in Vallejo. Coby and Stacey also lived in Vallejo. Beckwith and Carlos were frequent visitors in their home.

Beckwith remembered Coby’s arrest at the end of 2006. After his arrest, Beckwith recalled an evening in January 2007 when she and Carlos went to Stacey’s home for dinner. They drove over in Carlos’s maroon Ford Taurus. Stacey, Tina, Clayton, and Timothy were also at Stacey’s house. At one point, the women were in the kitchen and the men were in the living room. Beckwith overheard one of the men say “Tommy [was] snitching” and “a rat.” All the men then left. She also heard the phrase “at the bar.” Beckwith did not know where they went, but she saw a news bulletin about a shooting that same night. The bulletin included footage of the My Office bar. Beckwith was concerned that Carlos might have been involved in the shooting.

Beckwith testified she had met Verducci once. At the third trial, she testified she did not know Verducci at all. Beckwith claimed she had not recognized him until after she got on the witness stand and simply failed to correct her mistaken assertion. Verducci was not present at Stacey’s home when the men discussed Tommy being a snitch.

Closing Argument

The shooter’s identity was the focus of closing arguments. The prosecutor argued that Clayton’s and Thomas’s testimony identifying Verducci as the shooter was corroborated by the firearms evidence, phone records, and motive evidence. Verducci’s trial counsel, on the other hand, argued that the prosecution’s witnesses should not be believed, given their criminal pasts and incentives to testify against Verducci. The defense also relied on Beckwith’s testimony, as well as the debt evidence, to suggest Carlos was the shooter.

Verdict and Sentence

The jury found Verducci guilty of first degree murder and found the enhancement allegations true. The trial court denied Verducci’s motion to dismiss and sentenced Verducci to a term of 25 years to life on the murder count, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement — for a total of 50 years to life. The court ordered the sentence to be served concurrently with a term Verducci was already serving for a separate 2007 conviction. Verducci filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Verducci contends the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him of due process by denying his motions to dismiss and admitting hearsay evidence contained in the January 13, 2007 phone call. Neither argument has merit.

A. Denial of the Motions to Dismiss

First, Verducci maintains that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant his motions to dismiss after his three previous trials ended in hung juries. Verducci contends that his due process rights were violated by the fundamental unfairness of a fourth trial relying on virtually the same evidence. According to Verducci, “[t]he sequence of trials shows that [his] conviction was the outcome of a process of attrition whereby the prosecution learned the defense strategy and fine-tuned its case until it finally obtained a conviction.”

Verducci concedes that double jeopardy principles do not mandate a dismissal and bar of retrial when juries deadlock. “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause bars reprosecution following a defendant’s acquittal.” (People v. Batts (2003) 30 Cal.4th 660, 679 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67, 68 P.3d 357], italics added.) And some prosecutorial misconduct resulting in mistrial “not only constitutes a due process violation but also a double jeopardy violation, and hence warrants not only reversal but dismissal and a bar to reprosecution.” (Id. at p. 692.) However, double jeopardy principles do not bar retrial when a mistrial is justified by “ ‘manifest necessity’ ” — for example, when jurors are unable to agree on a verdict. (Id. at p. 679.) Verducci instead relies on section 1385, subdivision (a), which provides in relevant part: “The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.”

“ ‘Dismissals under section 1385 may be proper before, during and after trial.’ [Citation.] Because the poncept of ‘furtherance of justice’ (§ 1385) is amorphous, we have enunciated some general principles to guide trial courts when deciding whether to dismiss under section 1385. Courts must consider ‘the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society represented by the People,’ and ‘[a]t the very least, the reason for dismissal must be “that which would motivate a reasonable judge.” ’ ” (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 268 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165].)

“A determination whether to dismiss in the interests of justice after a verdict involves a balancing of many factors, including the weighing of the evidence indicative of guilt or innocence, the nature of the crime involved, the fact that the defendant has or has not been incarcerated in prison awaiting trial and the length of such incarceration, the possible harassment and burdens imposed upon the defendant by a retrial, and the likelihood, if any, that additional evidence will be presented upon a retrial. When the balance falls clearly in favor of the defendant, a trial court not only may but should exercise the powers granted to him by the Legislature and grant a dismissal in the interests of justice.” (People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1968) 69 Cal.2d 491, 505 [72 Cal.Rptr. 330, 446 P.2d 138]; accord, People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 92 P.3d 369].) We review a trial court’s refusal to dismiss for abuse of discretion. (Carmony, at p. 374.)

1. Background

Verducci invited the trial court to dismiss the case on two relevant occasions — in advance of the fourth trial and after the jury’s verdict. In both instances, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the case in the interests of justice. Verducci cited the three prior hung juries and argued a fourth trial would be vindictive and violate due process.

In denying Verducci’s pretrial invitation to dismiss, the court explained: “It is pretty unusual ... to have a fourth trial after three hung juries. And there was quite a wide swing in the votes, if you will. . . . [¶] The first trial was 8 to 4 for guilt. The second trial was 11 to 1 for guilt. The third trial was 9 to 3 for acquittal. . . . [¶] And the difference between the first trial and the second trial was [Thomas] testified in the second trial, not the first. . . . [¶] The holdout juror in the second trial, as I recall, had some issues. I think at one point I had to inquire of all the jurors as to whether or not that juror was deliberating. And it was a discretionary call on my part to find that he was and not remove him. [¶] And then the difference between the second trial and the third trial was, in terms of evidence . . . was Jamie Beckwith. [¶] . . . [¶] What I do know is that. . . apparently Ms. Beckwith has . . . made statements now that . . . contradict portions of her trial testimony. [¶] Apparently, [Wright], who has not yet testified in any of these trials and is purported to be . . . the right front passenger in the car that allegedly brought Mr. Verducci and Mr. Robles to the bar. She is now in custody, apparently. I signed a removal order to bring her to trial. . . . Whether she’ll actually testify or not, I don’t know.

“And Mr. Verducci has been in custody this entire time. But, as I understand it, he’s serving a sentence. Even if this case were dismissed, he’d still be in custody. . . . [¶] These are serious charges. The evidentiary landscape has changed. There is some likelihood of additional evidence being offered. There really is no dispute that the gun used . . . was the same gun that Mr. Verducci had in his possession to commit the [Casey Holmes] offense some days before. It wasn’t a matter of months or years. They were closely connected in time. [¶] I just think considering all the evidence, society’s interest, I don’t view this as harassment or vindictiveness on the part of the People. It’s just a difficult case.”

The trial court also denied Verducci’s postverdict motion to dismiss. It acknowledged an absence of binding authority to support Verducci’s argument, but explained: “There are a couple of cases from other states . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I thought, for the sake of clarity of this record, that the factors that those states’ Courts set out to govern the Court’s discretion might be [instructive] here. [¶] One of the factors is the severity of the offense charged. Well, this is quite a severe charge. First degree murder, the discharge of a firearm, and a gang enhancement. [¶] A number of prior mistrials and the circumstances of the jury deliberations in those trials, ... the first jury . . . was hung 8 to 4 for guilt. The second, 11 to 1 for guilt. . . . [¶] And then kind of in the turnaround, the third trial ended with a hung jury that was reported to me ... to be 9 to 3 for acquittal. [¶] In that third trial, [Beckwith] had been called ... by the defense .... [¶] ... [¶] And then [Buchanan] ... did not testify in that trial. [¶] . . . [¶] So there was kind of a different flavor or mix of witnesses the last trial round. [¶] [Stacey], the People basically withdrew their offer of immunity, under which she had testified previously. . . . [¶] [T]he primary reason I allowed a fourth trial in the first place was because . . . there was this different information regarding [Beckwith]; [Wright] had been located and was expected to testify; and ... I thought that was the right decision, and still do think that. [¶] ... I think this is a relatively strong case, particularly given the fact that the firearm used to commit this crime is the same firearm [Verducci] used just a few days earlier in Pinole to commit a crime that he stands convicted of and for which he’s still serving a sentence. [¶] . . . I have no reason ... to question [the prosecutor’s] professional competence or how she acted in the trial.”

The court continued: “[Verducci] has been incarcerated for a long time, but all of that time ... he’s been serving a sentence out of Contra Costa County, that’s eleven plus years in length. [¶] . . . He would have been in custody regardless of whether this case went to trial once, twice, three times, or four. [¶] And in terms of harassment, given the severity of the charges, the difficult circumstances under which the People found themselves with witnesses refusing to testify, this just doesn’t strike me as a case where the Court should grant a motion to dismiss because the defendant feels like he’s been harassed. [¶] . . . And basically, the evidence was strong enough I think it warranted a fourth trial. [¶] And I just have in mind the type of case this was, the circumstances under which it was committed. And I think in terms of the protection to society in case the defendant should actually be guilty ... I just think all of that weighs against granting the motion to dismiss.”

2. Analysis

Our Courts of Appeal have not addressed whether successive trials after jury deadlock that do not violate double jeopardy principles may still violate a defendant’s due process rights. For this reason, Verducci relies on authority from other jurisdictions concluding that “precepts of fundamental fairness, together with the judiciary’s need to create appropriate and just remedies, and its general responsibility to assure the overall efficient administration of the criminal justice system, confirm an inherent power in a trial court to dismiss an indictment with prejudice following general mistrials attributable to repeated jury deadlocks.” (State v. Abbati (1985) 99 N.J. 418 [493 A.2d 513, 517] (Abbati); accord, State v. Sauve (1995) 164 Vt. 134 [666 A.2d 1164, 1168]; State v. Moriwake (1982) 65 Haw. 47 [647 P.2d 705, 712]; State v. Witt (Tenn. 1978) 572 S.W.2d 913, 917.)

The Abbati court held that “a trial court may dismiss an indictment with prejudice after successive juries have failed to agree on a verdict when it determines that the chance of the State’s obtaining a conviction upon further retrial is highly unlikely.” (Abbati, supra, 493 A.2d at p. 521, italics added.) It also announced a set of factors to govern a trial court’s decision whether to dismiss the indictment: “(1) the number of prior mistrials and the outcome of the juries’ deliberations, so far as is known; (2) the character of prior trials in terms of length, complexity, and similarity of evidence presented; (3) the likelihood of any substantial difference in a subsequent trial, if allowed; (4) the trial court’s own evaluation of the relative strength of each party’s case; and (5) the professional conduct and diligence of respective counsel, particularly of the prosecuting attorney. The court must also give due weight to the prosecutor’s decision to reprosecute, assessing the reasons for that decision, such as the gravity of the criminal charges and the public’s concern in the effective and definitive conclusion of criminal prosecutions. Conversely, the court should accord careful consideration to the status of the individual defendant and the impact of a retrial upon the defendant in terms of untoward hardship and unfairness.” (Abbati, at pp. 521-522.)

The People urge us not to follow Verducci’s nonbinding authority, asserting a double jeopardy violation provides the sole basis for the remedy Verducci seeks. We agree with the People that a dismissal “in furtherance of justice” would not necessarily afford Verducci a bar to further prosecution. (See § 1387, subd. (a) [except in circumstances not relevant here, “[a]n order terminating an action pursuant to this chapter ... is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense if it is a felony . . . and the action has been previously terminated pursuant to this chapter’’’ (italics added)]; People v. Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 270 [§ 1387 “establishes that two dismissals pursuant to section 1385 . . .bar retrial on felony charges except in limited circumstances” (italics added)].) And our Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]he remedy mandated by the double jeopardy clause — an order barring retrial and leading to the dismissal of the criminal charges against the defendant without trial- — is an unusual and extraordinary measure that properly should be invoked only with great caution.” (People v. Batts, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 666.)

Yet unlike the People, we do not read Richardson v. United States (1984) 468 U.S. 317 [82 L.Ed.2d 242, 104 S.Ct. 3081] as necessarily foreclosing that remedy. (Id. at pp. 322-323.) The Richardson defendant was charged with two counts of distributing a controlled substance and one count of conspiring to distribute a controlled substance. The jury acquitted him of one count but was unable to reach a verdict on the other two. A mistrial was declared as to those counts, and they were set for retrial. (Id. at pp. 318-319.) The defendant unsuccessfully moved for a judgment of acquittal based, in relevant part, on the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. (Richardson, at p. 319.)

The United States Supreme Court rejected the argument. It explained: “It has been established for 160 years . . . that a failure of the jury to agree on a verdict was an instance of ‘manifest necessity’ which permitted a trial judge to terminate the first trial and retry the defendant, because ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’ [Citation.] Since that time ... we have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.” (Richardson v. United States, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 323-324.) “[A] trial court’s declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy to which petitioner was subjected. The Government, like the defendant, is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict from the jury, and jeopardy does not terminate when the jury is discharged because it is unable to agree. Regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence at petitioner’s first trial, he has no valid double jeopardy claim to prevent his retrial.” (Id. at p. 326.)

Verducci’s circumstances are distinguishable from those presented in Richardson v. United States, supra, 468 U.S. 317. Unlike the Richardson defendant, Verducci relies on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, under which “criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness.” (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 485 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 104 S.Ct. 2528].) Furthermore, Verducci had been tried not once before, but on three prior occasions.

We will assume without deciding that the trial court had discretion to dismiss the action against Verducci. Nonetheless, the authority Verducci cites is distinguishable because those reviewing courts did not reverse a trial court’s order declining to dismiss. (People v. Steinbrook, supra, 85 Cal.App.3d at p. Supp. 9; Abbati, supra, 493 A.2d at p. 516; State v. Moriwake, supra, 647 P.2d at p. 708; State v. Witt, supra, 572 S.W.2d at pp. 914, 917.) Under Abbati, “[a]n appellate court reviewing the decision of a trial court to dismiss an indictment' with prejudice must ensure that the correct standard was employed by the trial court. [Citation.] Presupposing that that threshold is met, the trial court’s decision is entitled to deference for the obvious reasons that the trial court saw the witnesses and heard the testimony. The decision should be reversed on appeal only when it clearly appears that the exercise of discretion was mistaken.” (Abbatti, at p. 522.)

Here, the trial court implicitly recognized that, because Verducci’s prior trials had ended in repeated jury deadlock, another trial on the same charges would not violate the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. It also proceeded on the apparent assumption that it had the authority and discretion to dismiss if a fourth trial was not “in furtherance of justice,” considering the relevant factors in balancing a defendant’s rights with the interests of society as a whole, but declined to dismiss. The trial court provided a well-reasoned explanation for its decision. It specifically examined the nature of the charges, discussed the strength of the evidence, considered the burdens imposed on Verducci by retrial, and the likelihood that additional evidence would be presented at a fourth trial.

Verducci does not contend that any of the factors considered by the court were not relevant to the exercise of its discretion. He merely contends that the trial court should have given more weight to his interests. We will not second-guess the trial court’s ruling, which found particularly relevant the strength of the People’s evidence, the seriousness of the charges, and the limited prejudice to Verducci of a fourth trial. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling.

B. Admission of the January 13, 2007 Phone Call

III. Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

Simons, Acting P. J., and Needham, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied January 29, 2016, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 30, 2016, S232458.

Kruger, J., did not participate therein. 
      
       Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
     
      
       Given the numerous family relationships and mutual surnames involved, we hereafter refer to certain persons by first name.
     
      
       For example, Thomas testified on cross-examination that he and Coby were involved in a drive-by shooting in 1999 or 2000. Thomas was in the car when Coby shot at two men with whom they had “issues.”
     
      
       Around this same time, a large debt was owed to the Sinaloa cartel for drugs. According to Thomas, only Coby owed the debt and no one looked to Thomas to pay it. However, Thomas also admitted committing a string of crimes during the latter part of 2006 to raise money to purchase “more drugs.” Among other things, he stole a car and broke into his father’s home to steal guns. Thomas kept a .45-caliber revolver from his father’s collection and sold the rest of the stolen guns.
     
      
       When confronted by his father regarding possession of the stolen gun, Thomas denied any responsibility for the burglary.
     
      
       After pleading “the Fifth” at the preliminary hearing, Thomas was placed in the holding cell area. Verducci, who was also in a holding cell, yelled, “No names, no papers. And you’d better keep your fucking mouth shut.”
     
      
       None of the audio recordings are part of the record on appeal, as Verducci did not designate the exhibits. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.224.) However, Verducci did augment the record to include the transcripts of these exhibits. Because the audio recording contents apparently are not in dispute, we rely on the transcripts instead of the audio recordings actually admitted at trial.
     
      
       It was not unusual for FAIM members to carry guns.
     
      
       On cross-examination, Clayton testified that he knew the drugs were sourced from the Sinaloa cartel in Mexico. He was aware that, at some point, FAIM owed a debt to the cartel.
     
      
       “Bubba” was a nickname used by Thomas.
     
      
       A police officer — who was present at the scene between 8:00 p.m. and 12:30 a.m. the next morning — testified that he did not observe any news cameras.
     
      
      
         One published opinion of a superior court appellate division holds California trial courts have discretion to dismiss, under section 1385, when a prior trial has resulted in a hung jury. (People v. Steinbrook (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8, 9 [149 Cal.Rptr. 479].) However, the opinion is exceedingly spare in its analysis. (Ibid.)
      
     
      
       We observe that these factors are not substantively different from the balancing section 1385 requires. (Compare Abbati, supra, 493 A.2d at pp. 521-522 with People v. Superior Court (Howard), supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 505.)
     
      
       Retrial after a hung jury — or even several hung juries — “does not necessarily inconvenience defendants . . . ; they do not face emotional trauma caused by multiple, lengthy trials. A continuation of the same proceeding after mistrial simply does not present the same degree of stigmatization and humiliation; indeed, such a retrial should be expected, as compared to the unknowing defendant who can only guess at what lies ahead when the state fails to join charges into one proceeding. [¶] ... In such cases the state’s interest in enforcing its laws and ensuring public order outweighs the burden borne by the defendant who must once again face the prosecutorial machinery of the state.” (People v. Williams (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 398, 407-408 [240 Cal.Rptr. 717], fn. omitted.)
     
      
      See footnote, ante, page 952.
     