
    CHENG JIN YU, aka Chengjin Yu, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 07-4668-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 24, 2008.
    Lee Ratner, Of-Counsel, Law Offices of Michael Brown, New York, New York, for Petitioner.
    Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Senior Litigation Counsel; Aimee J. Frederick-son, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: Hon. ROGER J. MINER, Hon. JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Hon. REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey is automatically substituted for former Acting Attorney General Peter D. Keisler as the respondent in this case.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Cheng Jin Yu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the September 27, 2007 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Cheng Jin Yu, No. [ AXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Sept. 27, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). “An abuse of discretion may be found ... where the [BIA’s] decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements; that is to say, where the Board has acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted). The movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought is a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Yu’s motion to reopen where it reasonably found that he failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. In Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir.2007), we held that the definition of “refugee,” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), did not extend automatically to partners (legally related or otherwise) of individuals who have been forcibly sterilized or forced to have an abortion. Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 309-10. Accordingly, in order for the spouse of an individual who was forcibly aborted or sterilized to be eligible for asylum, the spouse must independently “prove past persecution or a fear of future persecution for ‘resistance’ that is directly related to his or her own opposition to a coercive family planning policy.” Id. at 313.

Here, Yu argues the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen for failure to demonstrate pñma facie eligibility for relief was an abuse of discretion where he was not provided an opportunity to establish his own resistance to the family planning policy. However, despite ample opportunity at his hearing before the IJ, Yu has never alleged personal acts of resistance to the family planning policy, and he does not do so now. Thus, the factual record in this case was “adequately developed” with respect to the issue of other resistance. See Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d 377, 381 n. 5 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Gui Yin Liu v. INS, 508 F.3d 716, 723 (2d Cir.2007)). Accordingly, we cannot find that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen where he failed to establish pri-ma facie eligibility for asylum. See Abu-du, 485 U.S. at 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904.

As the BIA properly found that Yu failed to establish pñma facie eligibility for relief, we need not reach Yu’s argument that the BIA abused its discretion by finding that the evidence he submitted in support of his motion to reopen was neither new nor previously unavailable.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b). 
      
      . We note that Yu waives any challenge to the BIA's finding that his motion to reopen was number-barred; however, because the BIA may have erred in making such finding, we deny the instant petition for review based on the BIA’s alternative prima facie finding.
     