
    Ibrahima DIA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-145-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 21, 2012.
    H. Raymond Fasano, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation; Robert Michael Stalzer, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Ibrahima Dia, a native and citizen of Mauritania, seeks review of a December 17, 2010, order of the BIA affirming the January 29, 2007, decision of Immigration Judge (“13”) Joanna Miller Bukszpan, which pretermitted his application for asylum and denied withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ibrahima Dia, No. A096 264 BU (B.I.A. Dec. 17, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. New York, January 29, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008).

Dia argues that ineffective assistance of counsel led to the inconsistencies in his application that form the basis of the agency’s adverse credibility determination. Dia fails to challenge the agency’s preter-mission of his asylum claim for failure to demonstrate that he applied for asylum within one year of his entry into the United States, the agency’s adverse credibility finding, the agency’s finding that he failed to demonstrate a nexus to a protected ground, or its finding that he could internally relocate. The agency’s dispositive findings stand as valid bases for denying his claims.

Dia argues for the first time before this Court that he was denied due process as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Dia failed to exhaust this argument before the BIA either on appeal or through a motion to reopen with the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). In addition to the statutory requirement that petitioners exhaust the categories of relief they seek, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), petitioners must also raise to the BIA the specific issues they later raise before this Court. See Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir.2004). While not jurisdictional, we treat exhaustion as mandatory. Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-20 (2d Cir.2007). Accordingly, because Dia failed to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal to the BIA, which failure the government raised in its brief, we decline to consider the issue in the first instance.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, we VACATE this Court’s March 30, 2011 temporary stay of removal and dismiss petitioner’s referred motion for a stay of removal.  