
    MORGAN’S APPEAL.
    Where a receiver of a corporation settles a claim subject to the approval of the Court, the settlement is not binding unless it is approved.
    Where upon a rule to mark a judgment satisfied the Court declines to make such order upon the merits of the case, such action is a bar to a subsequent proceeding in equity, even though. rhe allegation upons rule was that a compromise had been made and the amount agreed upon paid, and the case was consequently not within the provisions of.' the Act.
    Appeal from Common Pleas of Leckawanna County. Im Equity. No. 98, January Term, 1883.
    John T. Morgan borrowed money of the National Building-Association, giving security. Afterwards there was a dispute as to the amount due, and Morgan took a rule to open the-judgment. Pending this rule, Morgan paid the Receiver of the: association $356.38 and took the following receipt:
    In Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, No. 573, April T., 1881.
    Now, 14th January, 1882, received from John T. Morgan: three hundred and fifty-six dollars and thirty-eight cents in full satisfaction of the above entitled judgment debt, interests and costs as per terms to be submitted to said Court, the money to.be returned if the said terms are not approved.
    Jas. H. Torrey, Receiver.
    An application to the Court was made at Scranton on Janu~ ary 16, 1882, to approve of the settlement, but owing, to some-informality, was returned to the receiver. On the same, day, January 16, 1862, the Court at Wilkesbarre, discharged the rule to open the judgment and fixed the amount due at $670.40.. Morgan subsequently obtained a rule to satisfy the judgment in Lackawanna County. The Court discharged the rule on. May 4th, 1882, in the following opinion, per
    Hand, J.
    Under the receipt given in this case, and the decisions under the head of Accord and Satisfaction, Brightly’s Digest, 588-9, among others: Keen vs. Vaughn, 48 Pa., 479; we cannot make this rule absolute. The rule is discharged.
    Morgan then filed his Bill in Equity, setting forth these facts and prayed for an injunction to restrain the collection of the judgment, and that it be marked satisfied. The defendant entered a plea in bar, and the Court gave judgment for defendant in the following opinion, per
    Hand, J.
    We are of the opinion that the merits of this case were passed upon in the former proceeding pleaded now in bar. It is true that the technical form of the rule was a writ to satisfy, and that this can be made absolute only in the specific case mentioned in the Act of Assembly. But admitting for the sake of the argument that a payment was not alleged and would not be found within the meaning of the Act of Assembly still under our practice we would have amended the form of the rule to meet the merits of the case. We really passed upon the merits. We therefore sustain this plea. Judgment is entered In favor of the defendant upon the plea in bar with costs.
    Morgan then appealed.
    
      L. Ammerman, Esq., for appellant,
    cited: Gifford’s Appeal, 9 W. N. C., 246; and argued that the merits of the case -could not be adjudicated upon the rule to satisfy.
    
      H. A. Knapp, Esq., contra.
    
   The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Common Pleas on March 5th, 1883, in the following opinion:

Per Curiam.

In the alleged settlement the appellee acted in a fiduciary ■character. The receipt which he gave was not to be a satisfaction of the judgment, unless the terms of settlement were approved by the Court. They were not so approved. In addition to this, the Court had actually passed upon the merits of this case in a former application. Granting that it was in an irregular proceeding, yet if all the equities were there submitted by the parties, and considered and decided by the Court, without .any objection to the form of application, the decree therein made, may well be held sufficient to defeat this bill in equity.

Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant.  