
    Brian CLAROS-BEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. J. T. SHARTLE, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 16-16872
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted July 11, 2017 
    
    Filed July 17, 2017
    Brian Claros-Bey, Pro Se
    Dennis C. Bastron, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Office of Attorney General, Tucson, AZ, for Respondent-Appellee
    Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2),
    
   MEMORANDUM

Brian Claros-Bey appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition. We review the denial of a section 2241 petition de novo, see United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

Claros-Bey was convicted in the Superi- or Court of the District of Columbia. He was assessed $500 pursuant to the Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Act of 1996 (“WCCA”) and designated to serve his custodial sentence with United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Claros-Bey contends that the BOP lacks authority to collect, through its Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”), the $500 WCCA assessment. This claim is belied by the language of the applicable statutes and regulations. Regardless of how the WCA assessment is categorized under 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a), the BOP is authorized to collect Claros-Bey’s WCCA assessment from wages earned during his period of incarceration. See D.C. Code § 24401(a) (any person incarcerated pursuant to the District of Columbia Official Code is in BOP custody and subject to BOP regulations); id. at § 4-516(a) (assessments made pursuant to the WCCA shall be paid from wages subsequently earned, including “in a facility of the Department of Corrections or elsewhere”). Moreover, contrary to Cla-ros-Bey’s contention, his participation in the IFRP is voluntary and “does not implicate [his] constitutional rights.” See Lem-oine, 546 F.3d at 1049.-

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     