
    E. WALLACE v. ROBERT BARLOW.
    (Filed 20 May, 1914.)
    1. State’s Lands — Entry—Vague Description — Trusts and Trustees.
    In order to declare that a second enterer upon State’s lands, and who takes a grant to the lands covered by the first entry, holds the lands in trust of the latter’ upon completing his entry, it is necessary that the prior entry sufficiently describe the land to give notice of its location and extent; and in this action the description filed with first entry is held to be too vague and indefinite, towit: E. W. enters 100 acres of land in said county, in B. Township, on the waters of White Creek,- adjoining the lands of A. and others, beginning on a stake on A.’s line on Berry Mountain, and running various courses for complements.
    2. Appeal and Error — Objections and Exceptions — Unanswered Questions.
    Exceptions to unanswered questions, without indication of their relevancy or materiality, will not be considered on appeal.
    Appeal by plaintiff from Cline, J., at October Term, 1913, of Wilkes.
    Tbis is an action to remove a cloud from title and to declare a trust in certain land.
    Tbe plaintiff claims title from tbe State under Grant No. 16401, for 50 acres. Grant issued on 14 January, 1905, based upon an entry filed in tbe office of tbe entry-taker of Wilkes County, on 1 January, 1902, by plaintiff; survey made thereunder on 12 December, 1904, and application for grant filed in tbe office of tbe Secretary of State, and jiurchase money therefor, paid on 31 December, 1904; warrant of survey issued 18 April, 1903. Tbe entry of tbe plaintiff is as follows:
    “E. Wallace enters 100 acres of land in said county, in Boomer Township, on tbe waters of White’s Greek, adjoining tbe lands of Robert Barlow and others, beginning on a stake in Robert Barlow’s line on Berry’s Mountain, and running various courses for complements. ‘E. Wallace.’ ”
    The defendant claims title from tbe State under Grant No. 15814, issued on 28 March, 1903, based upon an entry filed in tbe office of tbe entry-taker for Wilkes County on 26 March, 1902, and warrant issued 7 April, 1902.
    
      It was admitted at the trial of the cause that the land in controversy was covered by both grants.
    Plaintiff relies upon “priority of entry, and notice, both actual and constructive,” to defendant of plaintiff’s prior entry.
    The defendant contends that the entry of the plaintiff is too vague and indefinite to affect him with notice.
    His Honor held that the entry of the plaintiff was not sufficient to give notice, and the plaintiff excepted.
    There was a verdict and judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.
    
      Hugh A. Cranor and Frank D. Hachett for plaintiff.
    
    
      W. W. Barber for defendant.
    
   AlleN, J.

It is not necessary to decide whether any evidence of notice, outside of a survey, is admissible to aid a vague and indefinite entry, as his Honor heard the evidence tending to prove notice, and the jury has found under proper instructions there was no notice.

The entry of the plaintiff is in all material respects like the one considered in Call v. Robinett, 147 N. C., 616, which was held too vague to affect a senior grantee with, notice, and that case is decisive of this.

In the present case the entry is “E. Wallace enters 100 acres of land in said county in Boomer Township, on the waters of White’s Creek, adjoining the lands of Robert Barlow and others, beginning on a stake in Robert Barlow’s line on Berry’s Mountain and running various courses for complements,” and in the Call-Robinett case, “640 acres of land in said county, lying on the waters of Stony Fork, in Elk Township, adjoining the lands of S. G. Anderson and others, beginning on a stake in S. G. Anderson’s line and running various courses for complements”; and of the latter entry the Court said:

“The defendant says, conceding that the legal title passed to plaintiff by entry, survey, and grant, he is entitled -to have him declared a trustee for his benefit. It is well settled that when an entry is made, and subsequent thereto another person lays an entry and takes a grant, he acquires the title, and the grantee will be declared a- trustee for tbe first enterer; tlie reason of tbis being that tbe first entry entitled tbe enterer to a prior right or equity to call for legal title upon complying witb tbe statute, and tbe second enterer took, subject to tbis claim or equity, tbe entry being notice thereof. Tbe defendant is confronted witb two difficulties in tbis aspect of tbe case: First, bis entry is subsequent to that under which plaintiff claims. * Second, bis entry is too vague and indefinite to give any notice. It is always held that to entitle tbe first to have tbe grantee declared a trustee, bis entry must be sufficiently definite to put tbe second enterer upon notice. In Johnson v. Shelton, 39 N. C., 85, Ruffin, 0. J., says that if the,-first entry is too vague to put tbe second enterer upon notice, equity will not aid him. Tbis is a different question from that which we first discussed. There tbe survey makes tbe vague entry certain, and tbe State accepts it and issues tbe grant. Here tbe question of notice of tbe first entry controls tbe rights of tbe parties. If tbe first enterer makes bis entry certain by survey before tbe second entry, it is sufficient. So, in Munroe v. McCormick, 41 N. C., 85, Pearson, J., says: ‘When one makes an entry so vague as not to identify tbe land, such entry does not amount to notice and does not give any priority’of right as against another individual who makes an entry, has it surveyed, and takes out a grant.’ Tested by tbe decided cases cited in Grayson v. English and Fisher v. Owens, swpra, we think defendant’s entry too vague to afford notice. It is a 'floating entry,’ without any definite beginning. ‘A stake in S. G-. Anderson’s line’ is about as vague as it is possible to make it. It calls for no single point from which a survey could be made, and gives no other indicia for that purpose.”

Tbe exception to tbe exclusion of tbe two questions asked tbe witness Ferguson are without merit. There is nothing in tbe record to indicate what answers would have been made by tbe witness, and tbe questions relate to an entry not involved in tbis controversy, and which, as tbe witness says, tbe plaintiff “let run out.”

Tbe other exceptions are untenable in view of our holding as to tbe sufficiency of tbe plaintiff’s entry.

No error.  