
    COMPERE v. STATE.
    (No. 10676.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    March 16, 1927.
    Rehearing Denied June 8, 1927t
    1. Statutes &wkey;225 — Penal Code, repealing former laws, held not to prohibit consideration of civil statutes in construing article requiring registration of lawful authority to procure medical license (Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proe. 1925, p. 396, § 3; Pen. Code 1925, art. 739).
    Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proe. 1925, p. 396, § 3, repealing all prior criminal statutes, and providing that articles in Revised Statutes shall not be construed as continuations of former laws, held not intended to prohibit Court of Criminal Appeals from taking into consideration civil statutes relating to procedure of medical board in granting certificates for practice of medicine, in construing Pen. Code 1925, art. 739, requiring applicant for medical license to register with district clerk lawful authority to practice medicine.
    2. Criminal law <&wkey;l3 — Penal Code requiring ' registration of lawful authority for medical license, held not uncertain for failing to define “lawful authority” (Pen. Code 1925, art. 739).
    Pen. Code 1925, art. 739, requiring applicant for medical license to register with district clerk of county “lawful authority to so practice medicine” is not ambiguous, vague, or uncertain because failing to define “lawful authority,” when construed in light of civil statutes pertaining to Medical Practice Act.
    3. Indictment and information 162 — Amendment of jurat to complaint before trial, by adding name of officer before whom it was made, held not error.
    In prosecution for violating Pen. Code 1925, art. 739, prohibiting' practice of medicine without registering license, action of court in permitting county attorney to amend jurat to complaint before trial by adding thereto name "of officer before whom it was made held not error.
    4. Criminal law &wkey;>l 166</2(5) —Refusal to quash jury panel because jury commissioners and jury were not selected from different parts of county, held not error, in absence of showing of injury.
    Refusal of court to sustain motion to quash jury panel, in prosecution for practicing medicine without registering license, because jury commissioners selected at large were not from different parts of county, and because jurors selected were taken largely from three towns .and not uniformly selected from over county at large, held not error, in absence of showing of injury to defendant.
    5. Criminal law <&wkey;>l 1661/2(5) — Case will not be reversed for failure to follow statutes relating to selection of jury without showing injury; statutes being directory only.
    Civil statutes relative to selecting jury commissioners and'jury are directory and not mandatory, and appellant must show some injury ' resulting to him before court will reverse case for failure to strictly follow civil statutes.
    6. Criminal law <&wkey;l 1661/2(8) — Bill complaining of refusal to sustain challenge for cause to juror showed no error, where juror did not sit in cause.
    Bill of exceptions complaining of refusal to sustain challenge for cause to juror, showing that defendant peremptorily challenged juror, who did not sit in case, and that defendant did not exhaust peremptories, showed no error.
    7. Criminal law <&wkey;814(8, 9) — Under evidence showing defendant, prosecuted for practicing medicine without registering license, acted as chiropractor, refusal to direct acquittal if defendant acted as masseur, was not error (Pen. Code 1925, art. 739).
    In prosecution for violating Pen. Code 1925, art. 739, requiring license to practice medicine to be registered, refusal to charge that masseurs are no amenable to Medical Practice Act, and to acquit if defendant was a masseur held not error under uneontradicted testimony that defendant acted as a chiropractor.
    8. Criminal law <&wkey;>829(3) — Requested charge held properly refused, where covered by general charge.
    Refusal to charge that defendant could not be convicted of practicing medicine without registering license, unless jury believed defendant treated another for disease at time alleged in information, held not error, where covered by court’s general charge.
    9. Criminal law &wkey;>800(2) — Refusal to charge that words “physicians and surgeons” and “to treat disease” are to be taken as ordinarily used held not error (Pen. Code 1925, art. 739).
    In prosecution for violating Pen. Code 1925, art. 739, refusal of charge that words “physicians and surgeons” and “treat or offer to treat disease and disorders” are to be taken in sense in which they are ordinarily used held not error.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    10. Criminal law &wkey;>l 165(1) — Error not harming defendant is not ground for reversal.
    Court of Criminal Appeals will not reversé case because of error which could not and did not harm defendant.
    11. Statutes <&wkey;-l47 — Revision held not to repeal statutes, providing for medical board, carried forward in revision (Rev. St. 1925, art. 4495, and final title, § 2).
    Rev. St. 1911, art. 5735, providing for establishment and appointment of board of medical examiners by Governor within 90 days after inauguration, carried forward in Revision of 1925 as article 4495, held not repealed by Rev. St. 1925, final title, § 2, repealing all statutes not expressly continued in force, and hence did not cause medical board to become.defunct.
    12. Indictment and information <&wkey;I40(2) — Motion to quash information is pleading requiring proof to give effect to averments on appeal.
    Motion to quash information charging defendant with violating Pen. Code, art. 739, prohibiting practice of medicine without registering license, is a mere pleading, requiring proof to give effect to its averments on appeal.
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from Hidalgo County Court; Oliver C. Aldrich, Special Judge.
    W. Gano Compere was convicted of violating the Medical Practice Act, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    J. Q. Henry, of Mission, and Neal A. Brown, of Edinburg, for appellant.
    Chas. L. Black, Robert M. Turpin, Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., and Robt. M. Lyles, Asst. State’s Atty., all of Austin, for the State.
   BAKER, J.

The appellant was convicted of violating the Medical Practice Act (Pen. Code 1925, art. 739 et seq.), and his punishment assessed at a fine of $150 and one day in the county jail.

The record discloses that the appellant was a chiropractor, and that he treated or “adjusted” Mrs. George Rouse, for which he accepted pay, without first having obtained a license from the state board of medical examiners, or without having a diploma from some reputable medical college, with the verification license from said medical board, and having same properly registered with the district clerk of said county, as required by law.

The appellant strenuously insists that article 739, P. C., under which this conviction was had, is unconstitutional and in conflict with article 6. P. C., in that it is vague, indefinite, and uncertain in requiring an applicant for medical license to register with the district clerk of the county in which he resides “lawful authority to so practice medicine as herein prescribed,” etc., without properly defining what is meant by “lawful authority,” and that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to quash the information and complaint by reason thereof. In other words, it is the appellant’s contention that the Legislature, in adopting the 1925 Penal Code and by use of the words set out in section 3 to the effect that:

“All penal laws and all laws relating to criminal procedure in this state, that are not embraced in this act and that have not been enacted during the present session of the Legislature, be and the same are hereby repealed. All laws and parts of laws relating to crime omitted from this act have been intentionally omitted. * * * And the articles contained in this act as revised, rewritten, changed, combined and codified shall not be construed as a continuation of former laws, except as otherwise herein provided,” (Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1925, p. 396)

—intended to prohibit this court from taking into consideration, in construing article 739, supra, the civil statutes relative to the procedure of the medical board in granting permits and certificates to applicants who desire to practice medicine.

Looking at article 739 alone, without the aid of said civil statutes, it is true that it would be impossible to determine just what is meant by “lawful authority.” However, we are not in accord with the contention of appellant’s counsel that the Legislature, in adopting this Code, intended, under section 3, to prohibit this court from referring to and taking into consideration the civil statutes pertaining to the Medical Practice Act, as herein urged. We are of the opinion that the Legislature only intended, in enacting section 3, to meet the former decisions of this court, in construing former codifications of the penal laws, which held that the codifiers having failed to bring forward in said Codes certain penal statutes, same were not invalidated or repealed by reason thereof. In keeping with this view, we are of the opinion that the trial judge was not in error in refusing to sustain the appellant’s motion to quash the information and complaint, and that article 739, when considered in the light of the civil statutes, is not ambiguous, vague, or uncertain by reason of failing to define the term “lawful authority.”

The appellant also complains of the action of the court in permitting the county attorney to amend the jurat to the complaint by adding thereto the name of the officer before whom it was made. The' amendment was made before the trial began. There was no error in the court’s action in this respect. Flournoy v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 29,100 S. W. 151; Cubine v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. R. 99, 151 S. W. 301; Adams v. State, 80 Tex. Cr. R. 632, 192 S. W. 1067; Nichols v. State, 84 Tex. Cr. R. 522, 208 S. W. 931.

In bill of exception No. 1, the appellant complains of the refusal of the court to-sustain his motion to quash the jury panel because the jury commissioners who selected the jury were not from different parts of the county, but were all from the city of Edinburg in said county, and because the jurors selected by the jury commission were taken largely from the towns of Edinburg, McAllen, and Pharr, and were not uniformly selected from over the county at large. This court has held that the civil statutes relative to selecting jury commissioners, and relative to other matters complained of by appellant herein, are directory and not mandatory, and that the appellant must show some injury resulting to him before this court will reverse a case because of a failure to follow strictly the civil statutes in question pertaining to such matters. This the appellant has not done. Whittle v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 468, 66 S. W. 771; Williams v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 218, 75 S. W. 859; Walker v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 663, 267 S. W. 988.

In bill No. 2, complaint is made to the action of the court in refusing to sustain the appellant’s challenge for cause to the juror McKenzie. This bill of exception shows that the appellant peremptorily challenged the juror in question and struck his name from the list, and that he did not sit in the case. The bill, as presented, shows no error.

Bill No. 5 complains of the refusal of the court to give in charge to the jury appellant’s special charge No. 2, to the effect that masseurs are not amenable to the Medical Practice Act, and that, if the jury believed from the evidence that the appellant was acting at the time in the capacity of a masseur, to acquit him. We are of the opinion that there was no error in the refusal of this charge, as the uncontradicted testimony shows that the witness Rouse called the appellant to treat his wife as a chiropractor; that the said Rouse knew the methods of treatment used by chiropractors; that Rouse’s wife had been under the treatment of chiropractors for several years prior to this instance; and that the appellant “adjusted” her spine as a chiropractor.

Bill of exception No. 6 complains of the refusal of the court to give in charge to the jury appellant’s special charge No. 3, to the effect that, although the jury should not believe that the appellant had lawful authority to practice medicine in this state, still they could not convict him unless they further believed beyond a reasonable doubt that he treated or offered to treat a disease or disorder of Mrs. George Rouse’s in said county about the time alleged in the information. We think there was no error in refusing to give this charge, as the court’s general charge sufficiently covered this phase of the case.

Bill No. 7 complains of the refusal of the court to give in charge to the jury appellant’s special charge No. 4, to the effect that “physicians and surgeons” and the words “treat or offer to treat disease and disorders” are to be taken in the sense in which they are ordinarily used. We are unable to see any error in the refusal to give this charge, and are of the opinion that the facts in this case did not call for such a charge.

Finding no reversible error in the record, after a careful examination thereof, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is accordingly so ordered.

PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.

On Motion for Rehearing.

MORROW, P. J.

The trial court overrated the appellant’s challenge for cause of a member of the jury panel. He was excused upon the peremptory challenge of the appellant. We are not prepared to agree with the appellant’s contention that the juror was properly subject to challenge for cause. If it be assumed, however, that, the trial court erred in refusing to sustain the challenge for cause, this court is not authorized to and would not reverse the case for the error unless it inured to the injury of the appellant. The law allowed him three peremptory challenges. He used one of them in disposing of the juror mentioned. He had two peremptory challenges remaining, which he was privileged to use upon any person objectionable to him offered as a juror. The record fails to show that he used either of them, and also fails to show that any juror objectionable to him sat in the case. In a recent case it was said:

“The established rule appears to be that to secure a reversal by reason of an erroneous failure of the trial judge to sustain the challenge of venirement for cause the bill of exceptions must show injury, and where the bill fails to show that the error resulted in forcing upon the jury, against appellant’s will, an objectionable juror, it is insufficient to comply with the rule.” Sanchez v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 522, 236 S. W. 736, and authorities there cited.

The rule stated is well established and is deemed sound. It is in accord with • the uniform practice of this court of refusing to reverse the case because of an error which could not and did not harm the accused.

Article 5733 of the Civil Statutes, adopted in 1907, provides for the establishment and appointment of a board of medical examiners, stating:

“Said board shall be appointed by the Govern- or of this state within ninety days after his inauguration, and the term of office of its members shall be two years or until their successors shall be appointed and qualified.”

This provision of the statute, with a slight change of verbiage and no difference in meaning, was carried forward in the revision of 1925 in article 4495. In the final title of R. S. 1925, p. 2419, § 2, the following language is used:

“Repealing Clause.—That all civil statutes of a general nature, in force when the Revised Statutes take effect, and which are not included herein, or which are not hereby expressly continued in force, are hereby repealed.”

If the position taken by the appellant’s counsel is comprehended, it is that at 12 o’clock, meridian, September 1, 1925, article 5733 became extinct and was superseded by article 4495, supra, in which the appointment of a medical board was directed, and the Governor allowed 90 days after his inauguration within which to make the appointment, and that, article 5733 having become defunct, the medical board appointed under that statute became likewise defunct, and, until the appointment of .a new board, as provided by article 4495, there was no provision by which the appellant could undergo a medical examination; that therefore the penal statute (article 739, P. G. 1925) under which he was convicted required of him the impossible and was void. In the assumption that article 5733 was repealed, and that the medical board appointed thereunder became defunct, we think the appellant is mistaken. The proper construction of the repealing clause is deemed that which would give effect to article 4495, as a continuation of article 5733, and that the two years’ tenure of the board of medical examiners, appointed by. virtue of that statute (article 5733) would not be interrupted. We will say, moreover, that the offense in the present case seems to have been committed on January 3, 1926, more than 90 days after September 1, 1925. The appellant does not aver in his motion that, at the time the act upon which the prosecution is founded was done, a new board of medical examiners had not been appointed, but, even if the motion' contained such an averment, no proof of it is discerned. The motion being a mere pleading, to give effect to its averment, upon appeal, proof of it would be essential.

Touching the other matters of which complaint is made in the motion, reference is made to the original opinion.

The motion for rehearing is overruled. 
      @^>For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     