
    Philip R. BELPASSO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Appellee, City of New York, New York, Defendant.
    
    Nos. 09-4582-cv (L), 09-4773-cv (Con).
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 17, 2010.
    
      Philip R. Belpasso, pro se, Fair Lawn, NJ, for Appellant.
    Megan Lee, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New York, NY, for Ap-pellee.
    PRESENT: ROGER J. MINER, CHESTER J. STRAUB, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform with the caption above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

In this consolidated appeal, plaintiff-appellant Philip R. Belpasso (“Belpasso”), pro se, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Stein, J.) 1) adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and granting defendant-appellee Port Authority of New York and New Jersey’s (“Port Authority”) motion for summary judgment; and 2) denying Belpasso’s motion for a “contempt hearing” and request for sanctions against the Port Authority. Belpasso also appeals from an order dismissing, on the grounds set forth in the report and recommendation, a separate action raising identical legal claims and involving the same parties. He further moves to compel defendant City of New York, New York (“City”) to file a response brief in this appeal. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and must determine whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003); Republic Nat’l Bank v. Delta Air Lines, 263 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir.2001). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “‘required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.’ ” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of N.Y., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir.1997)). However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis added); see also Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir.2005). When the moving party has carried its burden, its opponent “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and cannot “rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation,” Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428 (2d Cir.2001).

Where the party opposing summary judgment is proceeding pro se, we must read that party’s pleadings “liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). A pro se plaintiff, however, cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by simply relying on the allegations of his complaint; he must present admissible evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in his favor. See Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 485 (2d Cir.1996). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Having reviewed the record in light of these principles, we affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same reasons presented in the thorough and well-reasoned report and recommendation by the magistrate judge. We have considered all of Belpasso’s contentions on appeal and find them to be without merit.

The judgment and order of the district court are therefore AFFIRMED. It is further ORDERED that Belpasso’s motion to compel the City to file a brief in this action is DENIED. 
      
      . The district court dismissed Belpasso’s claims against the City in a Memorandum and Order issued July 2, 2008. Belpasso's motion for reconsideration was denied on October 20, 2008. The City is not a party to this appeal.
     