
    GUILLEN v. STATE.
    (No. 10204.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    June 2, 1926.)
    I.Criminal law &wkey;>9l3(l), 918(6) — Verdict on plea of guilty will not be set aside on insufficiency of testimony or lack of attorney to represent accused, unless accused was prevented from making defense without his fault, or suffered tangible injury.
    Verdict on plea of guilty will not be set aside on insufficiency of testimony or lack of an attorney to . represent accused, unless it. be shown that through no fáult of accused he was prevented from making some defense, or otherwise suffered some tangible injury.
    2. Criminal law <&wkey;^>913(1) —'That attorney was employed to bring suit for divorce for accused from former wife held insufficient showing to set aside verdict of bigamy on plea of guilty.
    . That an attorney was employed to bring suit for divorce for accused from former wife without showing that such divorce was granted or reasonable ground for believing that it was granted held insufficient showing of defense to set aside verdict of bigamy on plea of guilty.
    3. Criminal law <&wkey;9l8(6) — That attorney employed by accused’s father two days before trial was absent held insufficient showing to set aside bigamy conviction, where accused pleaded guilty after warning and stated he wanted no attorney.
    That attorney, employed by accused’s father to represent accused, was not at trial through misunderstanding, held insufficient ground to set aside bigamy conviction, where accused pleaded guilty after being warned of consequences, and after stating he did not want an attorney, and no attempt, was made to employ attorney until two days before trial.
    @^>For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
    Appeal from District Court, De Witt County; John M. Green, Judge.
    Juan Guillen, alias Jesus Guillen, was convicted of bigamy, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    I. D. Fowler, of Victoria, for 'appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., of Austin, and Robt. M. Lyles, Asst. State’s Atty., of Groesbeck, for the State.
   LATTIMORE, J.

Conviction in district court of De Witt county of bigamy; punishment, three years in the penitentiary. Appellant pleaded guilty after being fully warned as to the consequences, and after the learned trial judge, upon investigation, became satisfied no undue influence was operating upon appellant to cause him to enter such plea. A motion for new trial is in the record, supported by the affidavit of a reputable attorney, from which it is made to appear that, on Saturday night before this case was called for trial on Monday, said attorney, who lives in an adjacent county, was employed by the father of appellant to represent him on this trial. We further learn that a call was put in over long distance by said attorney on Monday morning in an effort to have the case postponed. The conversation seems to have been had at the other end of the line with a deputy sheriff. That some confusion resulted is apparent, though Said officer denied having made any statements calculated to mislead said attorney. The officer testified that he told the attorney after a conference with the district attorney that the case would be called for trial at once. ■ As part of the hearing on the motion for new trial the district judge, before whom the case was tried, certifies that he fully interrogated the appellant as to whether he had an attorney or wanted one, to both receiving negative answers, and as to his reasons for entering a plea of guilty.

A verdict upon a plea of guilty in any event would not be set aside upon the insufficiency of the testimony, or the lack of an attorney to represent the accused, unless it be shown that through no fault on the part of the accused he was prevented from making some defense, or otherwise suffered some tangible injury. The only showing as to any defense which might'be interposed for appellant is that an attorney had been employed to bring a suit for the divorce for appellant from his former wife. The record is wholly devoid of any showing that such divorce had been granted, or of any reasonable ground on the part of appellant for believing that it had been granted. "

The indictment herein was returned on the 7th of January 1926, and the ease was tried on the 18th of said month. No effort to employ an attorney between the return of the indictment and the Saturday night before the trial is shown in the,record. We have carefully reviewed the showing made on behalf of appellant, taking into consideration all the facts before us, and are unable to satisfy ourselves that there was any error in the refusal of the motion for new trial. ' So believing, the judgment of conviction will be affirmed.  