
    KINCAID v. STATE.
    (No. 9842.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 17, 1926.
    Rehearing Denied March 24, 1926.)
    I. Criminal law <&wkey;l 166>/2(6) —Where accused ¡¡leaded guilty and applied for suspended sentence, refusal to allow him to ask veniremen if In deserving cases they would grant suspended sentence was not reversible error, where practically same question was asked and answered.
    Where accused pleaded guilty and applied for suspended sentence, refusal to allow accused to ask veniremen on their voir dire if in deserving cases they would. be willing to grant suspended sentence yas not reversible error, the question calling for a conclusion of the tales-man, where practically the same question was asked and answered, and the record does not show accused was prevented from asking other questions concerning jurors’ attitude towards the suspended sentence law.
    •2. Criminal law <&wkey;-l 152(2) — Jury <&wkey;>I3l (3)— Accused may elicit facts which will enable him to intelligently exercise his right of challenge, within reasonable limits, in discretion of judge, abuse of which will be corrected on appeal (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 614 [Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 690]).
    As* predicate for challenge for cause, accused may elicit facts enabling him to intelligently exercise his right of challenge, within reasonable limits, in the discretion of the judge, abuse of which will be corrected on appeal, and great latitude should be allowed accused that he may determine desirability of exercising a peremptory challenge under Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 614 (Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 690).
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from District Court, Jones County ; Bruce W. Bryant, Judge.
    J. A. Kincaid was convicted of the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, .and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    C. P. Chastain, of Hamlin, for appellant.
    Sam' D. Stinson, State’s ,Atty., Of Austin, and Nat Gentry, Jr., Asst. State’s Atty., of Tyler, for the State.
   BERRY, J.

The offense is unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, and the punishment is one year in;the penitentiary.

The record discloses that the appellant entered his plea of guilty to the offense charged and filed an application for a suspended sentence. The only question requiring serious consideration is his complaint at the court’s action in refusing to permit him to ask the veniremen on their voir dire” the following questions:

“In deserving cases where the defendant in the case comes within the purview of the suspended sentence law and shows himself deserving, would you.be willing in such cases to grant a suspended sentence? ”

This • question was asked each of the jurors, and the state’s objection to the same was sustained. In qualifying the bill of exceptions, however, the trip! court states that the defendant was permitted to ask each juror on his voir dire as to his prejudice, if any, to the suspended sentence law, or its application, and- each juror was permitted to answer the same. No juror sat in the case who did not say that in some cases he would give a suspended sentence. .

Our statute defines a peremptory 'challenge as one made to a juror without-assigning any reason therefor. Article 614,1925, C. C. P., O. O. art. 690. As a predicate for a challenge for cause the' accused may by proper interrogation, elicit facts which will enable him to intelligently exercise his right of challenge. Belcher v. State, 258 S. W. 815, 96 Tex. Cr. R. 562. “This must, qf course, within reasonable limits, be determined under the facts of the particular case by the trial judge. His discretion in the matter, however, has limitations, and when abused, will be corrected upon appeal.” Reich v. State, 251 S. W. 1073, 94 Tex. Cr. R. 449. As a general rule great latitude should be allowed a party interrogating a venire in order to enable his counsel-to determine the desirability of exercising on the members thereof his right of peremptory challenge, and this court does not look with favor on any unreasonable limitation of this right. In the instant case, however, we think that the question asked was of doubtful propriety, in that it clearly called for a conclusion of tlfe talesman, and, in any event, it seems that practically the same question was asked and answered by each of the jurors in the case, and the record also fails to show that the appellant was in any wise prevented from asking any other question concerning the attitude of the jurors toward the suspended sentence law. Under this condition of the record, -we hold that the court did not abuse- his discretion in refusing to permit the question above stated to be asked.

We have carefully considered the other complaints urged by appellant at the action of the court, but, ,in view of the fact that a plea of guilty was entered and the lowest penalty was assessed under facts amply supporting the verdict, we think no reversible error is shown.

The judgment of the trial court is there•fore in all things affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.

On Motion for Rehearing.

MORROW, P. J.

Appellant presents the same question which was considered by the court on the original hearing, contending that in restricting his examination of the veniremen as shown in the original opinion the court committed error.

Our. re-examination of the matter leaves us of the opinion that the proper conclusion was reached on the original hearing.

The motion is overruled. 
      <®=»IPor other oases see same topic and KBY-NXJMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     