
    Rachel BENSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ENERGY SOLUTIONS, INC.; Law Office of James R. Vaughn, P.C.; TRS Financial Corporation; Victor and Jane Doe Gilgan; Robert Conti and Nikal Conti, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-16909
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted October 17, 2016  San Francisco, California
    Filed October 25, 2016
    Mark William Straface, Attorney, Mark Straface Attorney at Law, Beverly Hills, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    James R. Vaughan, Esquire, Law Office of James R. Vaughan, Scottsdale, AZ, To-mio Buck Narita, Attorney, SIMMONDS & NARITA, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    
      Before: GRABER and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT, Senior District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument.See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

The district court dismissed plaintiff Rachel Benson’s suit on the ground that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Benson from proceeding and affirm that part of the district court’s judgment, but remand for the limited purpose of dismissing Benson’s case without prejudice.

In 2001, defendant Energy Solutions, Inc., filed the debt collection action against Benson that is the genesis of the present dispute, in an Arizona state court. The complaint alleged that Benson had failed to pay a debt on a. contract she had with an assignor for Energy Solutions. Although Benson was personally served with the summons and complaint, she did not respond. Energy Solutions obtained a default judgment. Five years later, Energy Solutions sought, and was subsequently granted, a renewal of its judgment against Benson. Energy Solutions obtained a second renewal of its judgment against Benson in 2011. By this time, the amount owed stood at $4,729,15. In 2012, Energy Solutions sought a writ of garnishment for Benson’s Bank of America account, which the state court granted.

Nearly a year later, and almost twelve years after default judgment was entered against her, Benson filed her.original complaint in this case against Energy Solutions and the' Law Office of James R. Vaughan, P.C. She sought, inter alia, to vacate the Arizona state court’s default judgment against her. Benson amended her complaint to add defendants. In her amended complaint, Benson, again sought, inter alia, to have the Arizona state court default judgment against her vacated. Defendants sought dismissal of the amended complaint on several grounds, including that Benson’s action was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district court agreed and dismissed Benson’s case.

1. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by “state-court losers” challenging “state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the plaintiffs claim because alleged legal injuries arose from the “state court’s purportedly erroneous judgment” and the relief hé sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void.”); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc. 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If a plaintiff brings a de facto appeal from a state court judgment, Rooker-Feldman requires that the district court dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”). Here, Benson seeks to vacate the Arizona state court’s default judgment against her. Thus, the district court properly concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Benson’s action because it is a forbidden de facto appeal of the Arizona state court’s grant of default judgment against her. Indeed, that is the relief she expressly seeks in her federal action. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517. Benson’s remaining claims are inextricably intertwined with the forbidden appeal. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.16, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).

2. The district court did not err in failing sua sponte to grant Benson leave to amend her complaint for a second time. Where all of her claims were inextricably intertwined -with the Arizona court’s default judgment, they could not be replead-ed to avoid the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

3. Dismissals under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1139. Consequently, they should be without prejudice, Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999) (order). Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate in part the judgment, and remand for the limited purpose of dismissing Benson’s case without prejudice.

AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; REMANDED, Costs on appeal awarded to Defendants. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     