
    McMANIGLE VS. CROUSE.
    An innkeeper has not a lien upon a man’s horse for the board of the driver.
    An innkeeper has not a lien upon A.’s horse for the keeping of other horses, which were hired and used in A.’s business.
    Error to Common Pleas of Juniata County. The facts of the-case appear in the charge to the jury by
    Junkin, P. J.
    B. E. Crouse, the plaintiff, brings this action of replevin against John McManigle, to recover a horse, which had been detained by the defendant, upon the ground that Crouse, the owner of the horse, owed him a bill for lodging, boarding, feed, &c., he, the defendant, being an innkeeper in Perrysville, Juniata County. The horse was in the stable of the defendant on the 7th January, 1873, and was on that day locked up and since held by McManigle, as he alleges, by virtue of his lien as innkeeper and liveryman.
    “The common law gave á landlord or innkeeper a lien on the goods of his guest for his board and lodging ; but this right was regarded as confined to particular objects, as for illustration, the person of the guest who eats could be detained, or the horse which eats, till payment; but the horse could not be detained for the meat of the guest, nor the guest for the meat oí the horse, because the chattels are only in the custody of the law for the debt which arises from the thing itself, and not from any other debt due from the same party, for the law is open for all -such debts, and doth not admit private persons to take reprisals.” Bacon’s Abr., Yol. 5, p. 236 and 237.
    By an act of Assembly, passed 7th April, 1807, Sec. 1, “Livery stable keepers, and innkeepers shall have a lien upon any and every horse delivered to them to be kept in their stables for the expense of the keeping,” and provides a mode of sale. Then the act of the 7th May, 1855, declares that “all proprietors of hotels, inns and boarding houses shall have a lien upon the goods and baggage belonging to any sojourner, boarder or boarders, for any amount, of indebtedness contracted for boarding and lodging for any period of time not exceeding two weeks, and shall have the right to detain said goods and baggage, until the amount of said indebtedness is paid,” and then provides a mode of sale, &c. It , is probable that the class of persons provided against in this last act were not subject to the rules of the common law as to lien, Ac., in favor of an innkeeper. A sojourner is one who dwells for a time, as a temporary resident,” according to Webster — so that boarders and sojourners were placed upon the same footing as travelers; and the right to detain their goods and baggage is limited to two weeks’ board. But horses are neither baggage nor goods ; the latter word, says Bouvier, (L. D.) is a “term not so wide as chattels, for it applies to inanimate objects, and does not include animals,” so that this horse could not have been detained under the act of 1855, for the boarding of Liggett or Miller, and thus Liggett’s bill for boarding due to McManigle, is put out of the controversy, even if Crouse, the plaintiff, was in any way liable for its payment, to the defendant. So, too, and for the same reason, the defendant could not detain the horse for the boarding of the railroad hands (Beale and others) even if it was true that Crouse had ordered McManigle to keep them until he came for them. Crouse may be liable in assumpsit to McManigle for all these bills, but for these his' remedy was not by locking up the horse, but by action, having for these no lien on the horse.
    Now, this brings us to the true issue, and the questions of law and fact involved; and we will recapitulate the main features briefly, so as to enable you to discern the pivots on which the case turns. It is a fact that Crouse had the contract from the United States to carry the mail from Perrysville, where McManigle kept his hotel, to Waterford, some 24 miles west of the former place; that previously to 3d July, 1872, Seiber had the contract; that Crouse was unprepared to assume the duty on the 3d July, and that he empowered Liggett to see Seiber, and get him to carry until Crouse was prepared: that Liggett, instead of doing this, organized a team (horse and buggy) and carried the mail himself, and for four nightsstopped with McManigle, keeping his horse there; that the horses employed by Liggett were hired horses from liveries, and that this horse fare for four nights is still unpaid to McManigle. Then, about 10th July, 1872, Crouse sent on his teams and drivers, to supersede Liggett, and they, men and horses, were for some time kept at Shield’s Hotel, and after that were kept by McManigle, one David Miller driving for Crouse. Then Crouse sold out to this driver, David Miller, about the 12th December, 1872, who continued to drive on the route much as before, with the same horses and buggies, and although the horse in dispute was not sold by Crouse to Miller, still he was loaned to Miller to help him along; then the epizooty broke out, and this disputed horse became affected, and Crouse came to take him to his own home, at Selinsgrove, and the horse was brought down from the west end of the route to McManigle’s, and in bad condition. The same night that the horse was brought to McManigle’s he and Crouse attempted a settlement of their accounts — and just here you will gike your attention, as the case may hinge on what was done and said that evening, but failed. Now, just at that point, what lien had McManigle on this horse? "Well, he could hold him for his feed of the evening and morning; he could keep him for the feed of the same horse remaining unpaid, for any time covering the period that Crouse and his drivers had used him in carrying the mail on that route : Young vs. Kimball, 11 Harris 193. He could keep him for any horse feed, unpaid, which had been furnished, to this, and to any other horse used by Crouse and his drivers, to carry that mail on that route. 11 Harris 193. That is, if this horse 'and his associates-in carrying the mail, were kept by McManigle, he could hold one for all, as he did ; because, in the language of the Supreme Court in Young vs. Kimball, supra, “the right of lien for the keeping of several horses of the same person at the same time, is a charge, not against the horses, and therefore several and divided, but against the owner, secured by a lien upon all the horses, and therefore joint and several, and one horse may be detained for the keeping of all ;” and the same case further decides, that the-daily removal and return of these horses used in the mail service, was not an abandonment of the lien, under the act of 1807, the arrangement being totally different 'from that which takes place in the entertainment of strangers and travelers. But could he .detain for the four night’s feed of the horses used by Liggett from 3d to 10th July, 1872, while he was running the route, and which horses were hired by him (Liggett) from Pettit and Todd,livery men, and before the horse in dispute had been put with his associates, on the route, by Crouse. We are of the opinion that inasmuch as the law abhors secret liens and reprisals, the right to detain the property of another until a debt is satisfied, must be well defined, ascertained and recognized when its origin is found, or claimed, at common law; and where it is claimed as springing from positive legislation, it should be fairly and certainly covered by the statutory enactment; and as the common law limited the lien to the horse for his feed, and to the owner and his goods for his lodging, and whilst the right to detain one of a number of horses, for the feed of all, was found in the act of 1807, there is nothing in this statute that would justify the detention of one horse for the feed of another, with which he had never been associated - in the business carried on, and which in fact belonged to different owners, hired, too, in this ease by another for temporary use, not exceeding ten days; so that when McManigle permitted the hired livery horses used by Liggett, to leave at the end of ten days, he waived his lien for their keeping, and* cannot now, nor could he then, 7th January, 1873,assert the old lien against a new set of horses, afterwards brought there by Crouse, owned by him, and used from 10th July to 7th January, a period of six months after the others had left, and this one detained.
    Now then, the issue narrows down to this, namely, on the 7th January, 1873, when this horse was detained by defendant, was there due to him money, for keeping stage horses, owned and used by Crou3e and his employees, in operating this mail route ? And, if there was any sum, however small, he could detain this horre for all, unless Crouse offered to pay him, or tendered him payment, which was refused by defendant.
    There was some attempt at an adjustment of the defendant’s ■claim, at the time the horse was detained, and it is for you to say what that was. Is it true that Crouse offered to pay both his own and Miller’s bills, amounting, as then claimed by McManigle, to $6 and $13, or thereabouts, and that he offered to pay it, and prpduced money, and McManigle said that he would receive none, unless he got Liggett’s bill, and I have told you that he could not detain the horse for Liggett’e bill at all. Now, if you find that Crouse did make this offer to pay, and it was refused by defendant, that offer necessarily covered the whole of the amount due for horse feeding, because it also covered the bills for the keeping and lodging of Miller and Crouse, then you should value this horse at what he was fairly worth on the 7th January, 1873, and find that for the plaintiff.
    If you find, however, that no effort to pay was made by Crouse as he alleges, then there was a lien for keeping which justifies the detention, and the plaintiff cannot recover, and you should find for defendant.
    December 7, 1875, verdict for Crouse for $87. McManigle then took this writ of error.
    
      E. D. Parker and Alfred J. Patterson, Esqs., for plaintiff
    in error argued that an innkeeper has a lien on each and every horse belonging to his guest, for all his charges. Young vs. Kimball, 11 Harris, 193. Story on Bailments, Sect. 476, 478, 481. Kent’s Commentaries, Sec. 593 and 594, Vol. 2. Notes B. and C.
    An innkeeper has a lien on all the property of guest, for his own entertainment and for the entertainment of the guest’s servants and horses. Parsons on Contracts, Vol. 2, 4th Ed. Sec. 745, and note.
    And even upon property which does not belong to the guest, but is only in his possession. Ibid.
    
    The Act of April 7, 1807, P. Dig. 890 Pl. 16, 4 Smith, Laws 403 does not apply to this case; as that act contemplates a horse being left with an innkeeper by a person who is not a guest. It is the relation of landlord and guest which gives the lien. Grinnel vs. Cook 3 Hill 489. The authority relied on by the judge in Bac. Abr. is said not to be the law. Story on Bailments, Sect. 476.
    
      Wm. A. Sponsler and L. E. Atkinson, Esqs., contra.
    
   The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court below on June 18, 1887 in the following opinion,

Per Curiam.

We do not discover that the Court below committed any error in this ease. Under the Act of April 7, 1807, the lien given to livery-stable keepers and innkeepers within this Commonwealth, upon horses, is for the expense of their keeping. In Young vs. Kimball 11 Harris 193, it was held in a case of contract for carrying the mail, when the horses were used daily, and sometimes interchanged, that one pair of horses were liable under the act for the keeping of ail used in the same business by the same person. In the Court below the judge held that they were liable tor the board of the driver, but in this Court it was said that the error assigned to the board of the driver, was immaterial, because the lien upon the horses for their keeping, and that of the other horses employed in the same business, was sufficient to support the action of replevin by the landlord. It has not been decided so far as we know,- that a lien exists also for the board of the drivers in such a case. Certainly the language of the act does not extend to anything beyond the keeping of the horses employed in the business of the owner. Indeed, the opinion in Young vs. Kimball puts the case upon the rights of a livery-stable keeper,the nature of whose business admits of the coming and going of horses without a loss of lien. The reason, tot>, is strong, for carrying the mail, and the case before us is so, demands the constant use of the horses, where the return may not be for several days at a time. But this is not the nature of an innkeeper’s business, which is the entertainment of travellers and mere sojourners. Now the Act of May 7, 1855, P. Laws 480, P. Dig. 890 Pl. 17, which confers a lien on the proprietors of hotels, and inns and boarding houses, extends only to the “goods and baggage” belonging to any sojourner, boarder, or boarders. But a case like this, where a contract is made by the mail contractor, and where the landlord may make his own terms, certainly is nut one to require us to extend the rights of a livery-stable keeper, or of an innkeeper, who stands in that relation, to the horses used for carrying the mail, beyond the terms of the Act of 1807.

Judgment affirmed  