
    LIANG WEI SHAO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-3512-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 31, 2010.
    Galab B. Dhungana, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Anthony C. Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation; Lance L. Jolley, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, JON O. NEWMAN and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner, Liang Wei Shao, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 20, 2009, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Liang Wei Shao, No. [ A XXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 20, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). When the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is indisputable that Shao’s motion to reopen was untimely. However, the time limitation does not apply if the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

In denying Shao’s motion to reopen, the BIA found that he failed to demonstrate a change in China’s enforcement of the family planning policy. Shao does not address this finding, and even concedes that the evidence he submitted demonstrated only an ongoing policy of persecution. Because Shao failed to explain how his evidence demonstrated a change in circumstances arising in China, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Shao’s untimely motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). For these same reasons, Shao’s due process claim is entirely without merit. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that due process “requires that an applicant receive a full and fair hearing which provides a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.  