
    HUI JIN LIN, also known as Hurjin Lin, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-1480-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 19, 2011.
    Thomas V. Massucci, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Leslie McKay, Assistant Director; Margot L. Carter, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Present: RALPH K. WINTER, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Hui Jin Lin, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a March 22, 2010, order of the BIA denying her motion to reconsider. In re Hui Jin Lin, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. March 22, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Our review is limited to the BIA’s March 2010 denial of reconsideration, as Lin’s petition for review is timely filed only as to that order. See, e.g., Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (holding that the Courts of Appeals must treat each petition for review as challenging only the BIA decision from which it was timely filed).

Although we generally lack jurisdiction to review a decision of the BIA not to reopen or reconsider proceedings sua sponte, as such a decision is “entirely discretionary,” see Azmond Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006), because Lin’s motion for reconsideration was timely filed from the denial of reopening, it is a statutory motion to reconsider, the denial of which we generally review for abuse of discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(6)(A)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2); Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 96 (2d Cir.2011); Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). As discussed below, however, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying reconsideration.

Lin argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying reconsideration because the IJ’s frivolous finding was erroneous and because the BIA did not meaningfully address the problematic aspects of that finding. These arguments are unavailing. On reconsideration, the BIA was not required to revisit the frivolous finding, because it had previously considered and rejected the same arguments in reviewing Lin’s previous motion. See Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the BIA does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to reconsider where the motion merely repeats arguments that the BIA has previously rejected). In any case, the BIA did not abuse its discretion, because the record contained multiple warnings to Lin regarding the permanent bar to relief that would result from a frivolous application, Lin had repeated opportunities to correct inaccuracies and explain inconsistencies, and the IJ listed multiple material inconsistencies and instances of implausibility in Lin’s testimony. Accordingly, the IJ complied with the law regarding frivolous findings that was in effect at the time of his decision, 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 (2000), and the BIA properly affirmed his decision. The regulatory requirements for a frivolous finding were therefore met, and Lin should not be permitted to seek application of a new guideline that did not take effect until several years after she was ordered removed. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006); see also Alvarenga-Villalobos v. Ashcroft, 271 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (9th Cir.2001).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  