
    Ansel Phelps et al. versus William Townsend.
    The defendant gives the plaintiffs a written contract, by which, after reciting that ie places his son with the plaintiffs to learn the art of printing,(C to stay till he is twenty-one years of age,” the defendant agrees “ in consideration of the son’s being so old ” (lie was then eighteen), to pay the plaintiffs a stipulated amount if the son does not continue in the plaintiffs’ employment six months after he is twenty-one. The son enters into the plaintiffs’ employment in pursuance of the agreement, and is instructed by the plaintiffs in the art of printing, for some months, uhen he leaves the plaintiffs without cause. Held, that there was a sufficient consideration for the defendant’s contract and that he was liable on it to the plaintiffs.
    The want of a counterpart to such a contract does not render it invalid.
    Assumpsit upon the following contract.
    “I the subscriber place my son David Townsend with Phelps & Clark to learn the art of printing, on these conditions ;— 1st. The said David is to stay three weeks on trial; then, if both parties are suited, he is to stay till he is twenty-one years of age. In consideration of his being so old, I agree further, that I will pay said Phelps & Clark the amount of six months’ work at 4 dollars per week, unless said David continues in their employ six months after he is twenty-one years of age. Greenfield, August 31, 1827. William Townsend. (Said David was eighteen'years of age the 18th day of June, 1827.)”
    The declaration averred that the plaintiffs received David as an apprentice on trial for three weeks, and afterwards, both parties being suited, they employed and instructed him as an apprentice, treating him like other apprentices, from August 31st, 1827 to February 8th, 1828, on which day he left their service without any cause ; and that he refuses to stay in theii service till he is twenty-one.
    At the trial, before Parker C. J., the evidence proved the allegations in the first count; and it was admitted that the contract was in the handwriting of one of the plaintiffs, and that the defendant had no counterpart. But the judge was of opinion, that the written contract was not binding on the de- ' fendant, on the ground that there being no provision in t for the benefit of the plaintiff and his son, it was without consid«ration. A nonsuit was ordered, subject to the opinion of the whole Court. _
    &pt. 2~2d.
    
      Wells and Grennell, for the plaintiffs.
    _ The paper was in the handwriting of one of the plaintiffs, and their names were in it, which amounts to a signature by them ; and they, having accepted the contract, were bound by it. 1 Pow. on Contr. 243 ; Bret v. Cumberland, Cro. Jac. 399, 522 ; Eure v. Strickland, ibid. 240 ; 2 Stark. Ev. 606 ; Goodwin v. 9 Mass. R. 510 ; Fletcher v. M'Farlane, 12 Mass. R. 43. The plaintiffs were bound to instruct the son in the art of printing, and this obligation is a sufficient consideration for the defendant’s contract. The consideration need not be in the contract. The statute respecting apprentices, cannot prevent the defendant from entering into a contract in regard to his son. Matter of M'Dowles, 8 Johns. R. 253 ; Mead v. Billings, 10 Johns. R. 99 ; Day v. Everett, 7 Mass. R. 145.
    
      R. E. Newcomb and H. G. Newcomb, contra.
    
    The con tract is void for want of mutuality. There was no considera tian for the defendant’s promise, for the plaintiffs were not bound to do any thing for the defendant or his son. The de fendant could not sue the plaintiffs on this contract, supposing there was a neglect on their part to instruct the son as an The act of the father, at common law, could not bind the son without the son’s consent. 2 Kent’s Com. 212 ; The King v. Cromford, 8 East, 25 ; The King v. Arnesby, 3 Barn. & Aid. 584. This paper, therefore, did not bind the son to serve or the father to pay. In consequence of the statute regarding apprentices, this contract is void. Reeve’s Dom. Rel. 341. Even if papers had been signed and on both sides, the contract would be void. Butler v. Hubbard, 5 Pick. 250.
   Per Curiam.

A nonsuit was ordered at the trial, the judge

being then of opinion, that the written memorandum signed by the defendant was not sufficient to sustain the action, there being no obligation on the other party to do any thing which might form a consideration for the promise by the defendant; but we are all of opinion, that the acceptance of the contract by the plaintiffs and the execution of it in part by receiving the apprentice, created an obligation on their part to maintain aQd instruct the defendant’s son. The want of a counterpart is not a valid objection. It might put the defendant to a disadvantage in regard to proof; but it does not affect the consideration. It is clear, that where one makes a grant to anoth cr, which is accepted, and by the instrument something is to be done by the grantee, the grantor may compel performance.

This is not a contract under the statute respecting apprentices, but a contract by a father for the services of his minor son, which he has a right to dispose of.

New trial granted.  