
    Ahmad Kheir ABULFEILAT, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-70969.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted May 3, 2016.
    Filed May 17, 2016.
    Louis A. Gordon, Esquire, Law Offices of Louis A. Gordon, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.
    OIL, Tim Ramnitz, Trial, Laura Halli-day Hickein, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: FISHER, M. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Ahmad Kheir Abulfeilat, a native and citizen of Jordan, appeals from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings on the basis of changed circumstances in Jordan. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). Reviewing the BIA’s determination for abuse of discretion, we deny the petition. Valeriano v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 669, 672 (9th Cir.2007).

Abulfeilat claims that- he is entitled to protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) because, if returned to Jordan, it is more likely than not that he would be tortured on account of his apostate status. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Previously in Abulfeilat v. Holder, 472 Fed.Appx. 674, 675 (9th Cir.2012), we found that Abulfeilat had failed to establish a CAT claim with the evidence introduced at his 2002. hearing. In connection with the present motion to reopen, Abulfei-lat has not presented new and material evidence of changed circumstances in Jordan. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). Abulfei-lat did submit new expert affidavits, news articles, and reports concerning the treatment of apostates by members of civil society in Jordan since 2002. Yet, this evidence does not establish a prima facie case that he would more likely than not be tortured “with the consent or acquiescence, through awareness or willful blindness, of the Jordanian government.” See Abulfeilat, 472 Fed.Appx. at 675 (citing Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir.2003)). We therefore deny Abulfeilat’s petition.

We also deny Abulfeilat’s pending motion to seal this disposition. Two of our decisions on Abulfeilat’s case are already publicly available and Abulfeilat did not move to seal those proceedings.

PETITION DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     
      
      . We do not find Abulfeilat’s remaining arguments persuasive. Abulfeilat points to no authority for sealing the BIA’s proceedings. Further, the BIA’s “ 'general statement that [it] considered all the evidence before [it]’ ” is sufficient because "nothing in the record or the BIA’s decision indicates a failure to consider all the evidence." Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771 (9th Cir.2011) (second alteration in original) (quoting Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir.2006)). We cannot review the BIA’s refusal to reopen removal proceedings on a sua sponte basis. See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir.2011). Finally, Abulfeilat did not provide sufficient justification for revisiting our determination that he had been convicted of a "particularly serious” crime. See Ingle v. Circuit City, 408 F.3d 592, 594 (9th Cir.2005).
     