
    546 A.2d 472
    Michael Edward LASTER v. STATE of Maryland.
    No. 72,
    Sept. Term, 1987.
    Court of Appeals of Maryland.
    Sept. 9, 1988.
    
      Arthur A. DeLano, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
    Ann E. Singleton, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
    Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS and BLACKWELL, JJ.
   BLACKWELL, Judge.

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”) provides two different time periods within which the receiving state must bring the prisoner to trial. If a prisoner initiates the proceedings under Article III, then the trial must commence within 180 days after the “prosecuting officer” and the “appropriate court” receive the prisoner’s request. If a member state initiates the proceedings under Article IV, then the trial must commence within 120 days of the prisoner’s arrival in the receiving state. The sanction for failure to comply with the prescribed time periods is a dismissal of the charge or charges with prejudice. This case concerns the application of these time periods when there are multiple jurisdictions in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner as well as the application of these time periods when both the prisoner and the member state initiate proceedings under the IAD.

I

We begin with a brief history of the case. Since July of 1985, Petitioner Michael Edward Laster (“Laster”) has been serving a term of life imprisonment for first degree rape in North Carolina. In November of 1985, Laster was transported to Maryland pursuant to the IAD and subsequently prosecuted in Anne Arundel County and in Howard County. In March of 1986, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (Thieme, J.), Laster was tried and convicted in two sexual offense cases. On April 30,1986, Laster appeared in the Circuit Court for Howard County (Nissel, J.), and subsequently was convicted of first degree sexual offense, third degree sexual offense, armed robbery, wearing and carrying a handgun, and three counts of use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.

Laster appealed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Howard County to the Court of Special Appeals and, among other allegations of error, claimed that Howard County had failed to comply with the 120 day time period prescribed in Article IV of the IAD. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that there was “no provision within Article IV making the 120-day period applicable to all prosecuting authorities within a single state” and, finding no other error, affirmed the convictions. We granted certiorari at 310 Md. 144, 527 A.2d 331 (1987).

II

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, to which Maryland became a signatory in 1965, consists of nine articles and a number of supplemental provisions. Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, §§ 616A-616R. In addition, there are eight optional implemental forms, set forth in full in an appendix to this opinion, which apparently have been adopted for use in this state by the Office of the Attorney General and which were used in this case. The purpose of the IAD is found in Article I:

“The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.”

The central provisions of the IAD are Articles III and IV. Article III permits a prisoner incarcerated in a member state to demand disposition of any “untried indictment, information or complaint [pending in another member state] on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner.” Article 111(a) provides, in part:

“Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint: provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction over the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”

The prisoner’s demand:

“operate[s] as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed.
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If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.”

Article 111(d).

Article IV permits the “appropriate officer” of a member state, who has previously filed a detainer against the prisoner, to obtain temporary custody of a prisoner incarcerated in another member state against whom any “untried indictment, information or complaint is pending.” Article IV(a) provides:

“The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available [for temporary custody] upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated: provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted the request: and provided further that there shall be a period of thirty days ... within which the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody____”

Article IV(e) continues:

“In respect of any proceeding made possible by this Article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner and his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction over the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”

And Article IV(e) provides:

“If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of imprisonment ... such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.”

Finally, with respect to both a prisoner demand for disposition under Article III and a member state request for temporary custody under Article IV, Article V(c) provides:

“If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.”

A.

Article III, read in conjunction with the forms, works as follows. When a detainer is lodged by a member state against a prisoner incarcerated in another member state, the warden of the prison, using Form 1 (“Notice of Untried Indictment, Information or Complaint and of Right to Request Disposition”), informs the prisoner of the detainer and the prisoner’s right to request disposition of the charge or charges upon which the detainer is based. If the prisoner wants to request disposition, he or she signs Forms 1 and 2 and returns them to the warden. Upon receipt of Forms 1 and 2, the warden sends Forms 2 (“Inmate’s Notice of Place of Confinement and Request for Disposition of Indictments, Informations or Complaints”), 3 (“Certificate of Inmate Status”) and 4 (“Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody”) by registered or certified mail to the “appropriate prosecuting official and court.” Upon receipt of Forms 2, 3 and 4, the prosecutor completes Form 7 (“Prosecutor’s Acceptance of Temporary Custody Offered in Connection with a Prisoner’s Request for Disposition of A Detainer”), in which the prosecutor certifies that the prisoner will be brought to trial within the time specified in Article III, and sends it to the warden. The prosecutor also completes Form 6 (“Evidence of Agent’s Authority to Act for Receiving State”), which indicates both the date the prisoner will be transported from the sending state and the date of the prisoner’s trial,* *** and sends it to the receiving state’s Agreement Administrator. The Agreement Administrator signs-off on Form 6 and sends it to the warden.

If there are other detainers lodged against the prisoner from the receiving state, those detainers are included on the prisoner’s request for disposition (Form 2) and the warden’s offer to deliver temporary custody extends to those jurisdictions (Form 4). The warden sends copies of Forms 2, 3 and 4 to the prosecuting officers and appropriate courts in these jurisdictions and the prosecutors who want to bring the prisoner to trial complete Form 8 (“Prosecutor’s Acceptance of Temporary Custody Offered in Connection with a Prisoner’s Request for Disposition of a Detainer”), in which the prosecutor certifies that the prisoner will be brought to trial within the time specified in Article III. The prosecutor sends copies of Form 8 to the warden, the Agreement Administrator in the receiving state, and the other prosecutors listed in the offer for temporary custody.

B.

Article IV, read in conjunction with the forms, works as follows. If a prosecutor in a member state wants temporary custody of a prisoner incarcerated in another member state, the prosecutor completes Form 5 (“Request for Temporary Custody”), in which the prosecutor certifies that he will bring the prisoner to trial within the time specified in Article IV, and sends copies of Form 5 to the prisoner and the warden having custody of the prisoner. Following a 30 day period in which the governor of the sending state may deny the request, the warden then forwards Forms 3 (“Certificate of Inmate Status”) and 4 (“Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody”) to the requesting prosecutor. Upon receipt of Forms 3 and 4, the prosecutor completes Form 6 (“Evidence of the Agent’s Authority to Act for the Receiving State”), which indicates the date that the prisoner will be transported from the sending state and the date of the prisoner’s trial, and sends it to the Agreement Administrator in the receiving state. The Agreement Administrator signs-off and sends it to the warden.

If there are other jurisdictions in the receiving state who have lodged detainers, those jurisdictions are included in the offer to deliver temporary custody and the warden sends copies of Forms 3 and 4 to the prosecuting officers and appropriate courts in those jurisdictions. If the prosecutors in those jurisdictions want to bring the prisoner to trial, those prosecutors complete Form 8 (“Prosecutor’s Acceptance of Temporary Custody Offered in Connection with Another Prosecutor’s Request for Disposition of A Detain-er”), in which the prosecutor certifies that the prisoner will be brought to trial within the time specified in Article IV.

III

We start with the facts relating to the Anne Arundel County detainer. On October 8, 1985, Anne Arundel County lodged a detainer against Laster in Central Prison, North Carolina. On October 22, the warden, using Form 1, notified Laster of the detainer and his right to request final disposition. On the same day, Anne Arundel County, using Form 5, requested temporary custody of Laster. On October 28, Laster received his copy of Form 5. In response, Laster, using Form 2, made a written demand for disposition. On the following day, the warden forwarded Forms 2, 3 and 4, and, in a cover letter which accompanied the forms, directed the prosecutor to complete Form 6 and Form 7 (“Prosecutor’s Acceptance of Temporary Custody Offered in Connection with a Prisoner’s Request for Disposition of a Detainer”). On November 4, Anne Arundel County, referring to the warden’s cover letter, sent Form 7, certifying that Laster would be brought to trial within the 180 day time period set forth in Article III. Finally, on November 13, the Agreement Administrator for Maryland sent Form 6 to the warden.

Howard County lodged its detainer against Laster in November of 1984 while he was a pretrial detainee in North Carolina. The record indicates that the Howard County detainer followed Laster to Central Prison and that the warden mistakenly believed that the Howard County and Anne Arundel County detainers, which contained almost identical charges, were based on the same indictment. Consequently, none of the multiple jurisdiction procedures were followed by the warden or the Howard County prosecutors. Howard County eventually got custody of Laster from Anne Arundel County by use of an intrastate detainer.

IV

The threshold issue in this case is whether all 'jurisdictions in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner must bring the prisoner to trial within the time periods prescribed in Articles III and IV.

While the IAD is silent on this issue, the forms, written by the drafters of the IAD, plainly indicate that each jurisdiction in the receiving state which has lodged a detain-er is bound to bring the prisoner to trial within the specified time periods. In Form 7, which is intended for use by all prosecutors in the receiving state who accept temporary custody in connection with a prisoner request for disposition, the prosecutor certifies that the prisoner will be brought to trial within the time set forth in Article III. Similarly, in Form 8, which is intended for use by all prosecutors who accept temporary custody in connection with another prosecutor’s request for temporary custody, the prosecutor certifies that the prisoner will be brought to trial within the time specified in Article IV. Reading Forms 7 and 8, we are convinced that the drafters intended that each jurisdiction in the receiving state which has lodged a detainer must bring the prisoner to trial within the prescribed time periods. Accord The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control, supra note 2, at 111-12, under “Suggested Instructions for Prosecutors” (With respect to a member state initiated request, “[t]he agreement requires that trial be commenced within 120 days from the time the prisoner arrives within your state. If other jurisdictions in your state also have detainers pending against the inmate, trials on their indictments, informations or complaints must also be begun within this same 120-day period.”) (With respect to a prisoner initiated request, “[provisions of the agreement regarding disposition of indictments, informations or complaints pending in other jurisdictions in your state apply in the same manner as they do in actions initiated by a prosecutor.”)

The Court of Special Appeals reached a contrary conclusion stating, among other things, that “such an interpretation ... would unduly burden the prosecuting authorities in the receiving state.” We disagree for two reasons. First, both time periods may be extended for “good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present.” Clearly, the prospect of multiple trials in the receiving state would establish good cause for a continuance. Second, under Article VII, each member state is required to designate an Agreement Administrator. The Agreement Administrator:

“shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this agreement, [and] shall provide, within and without the state, information necessary to the effective operation of [the IAD].”

Given that each member state has an Agreement Administrator who functions, at least in part, to assist prosecutors in coordinating trials and given that prosecutors may seek continuances where there are multiple trials in the receiving state, we are unpersuaded that our reading of the IAD places an undue burden on the receiving state.

The second issue is whether the 180 day rule, the 120 day rule, or both, apply when the prisoner and the member state initiate proceedings under the IAD.

While there is one author who suggests, without citation of authority, that the prisoner may be entitled to the benefit of both time periods when both the prisoner and the member state initiate proceedings under the IAD, see Abramson, Criminal Detainers, p. 109 (1979), we think that this result was not intended by the drafters of the IAD and decline to follow it. The effect of two clocks running agaipst the State is to place an outside limit of 180 days on the time within which the receiving state must transport the prisoner into the receiving state or dismiss the indictment. While the IAD no doubt contemplates the timely transportation of the prisoner into the receiving state pursuant to a prosecutor initiated request, a member state’s statutory obligation is to bring the prisoner to trial within 120 days of the prisoner’s arrival in the state. If the result were otherwise, every member state request for temporary custody would be followed by a prisoner request for final disposition. It is our view that the IAD contemplates two separate mechanisms for proceeding under the Agreement, one for prisoners and one for member states, and that any-given proceeding under the IAD is governed either by the provisions relating to a prisoner demand for disposition or the provisions relating to a member state request for temporary custody. The question thus becomes whether the IAD proceeding in the case at bar was pursuant to a prisoner demand for disposition or a member state request for temporary custody.

On October 28, with knowledge of Anne Arundel County’s request for temporary custody, Laster demanded disposition under Article III. On November 4, Anne Arundel County, without objection to Laster’s demand for disposition, accepted the warden’s offer of temporary custody in connection with a prisoner request for disposition. Under these circumstances, Laster gained the right to be tried within the 180 day period prescribed in Article III. We conclude that he is so bound.

Laster’s trial in Howard County commenced within the 180 day period set forth in Article III and we accordingly affirm.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS.

MURPHY, C.J., and RODOWSKY and McAULIFFE, JJ., concur.

McAULIFFE, Judge,

concurring.

Laster’s contention is that Howard County was required to begin his trial within 120 days of his arrival in this State. He is wrong because he requested trial in Howard County and thus triggered the 180-day limitation of Article III. He was tried within 180 days of delivery of his demand to a prosecutor in this State, and his conviction is properly affirmed.

I write separately to explain my concern with the majority’s dictum regarding the effect of an Article IV request by a prosecutor. The majority states that when a prosecutor files a request for temporary custody, each jurisdiction in the receiving state that has lodged a detainer is bound to bring the prisoner to trial within the time specified by Article IV. 313 Md. at 559, 546 A.2d at 478. I have serious doubts about the accuracy of that dictum, and I believe it to be in direct conflict with our opinion in Boyd v. State, 294 Md. 103, 447 A.2d 871 (1982), adopting the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, Boyd v. State, 51 Md.App. 197, 441 A.2d 1133 (1982). In Boyd, detainers were filed by two Maryland counties with the custodial authority in Washington, D.C. The prosecutor in one of the counties filed an Article IV request for custody of the prisoner, tried him, and returned him to the District of Columbia. The second Maryland county then initiated an Article IV request and, over the objection of the prisoner that the “one-trip” requirement of Article IV (Art. 27, § 616E(e)) prevented his second transfer and trial, transported, tried, and convicted him. We held that subsection (e) did not apply because neither the prisoner nor the prosecutor in the second county had requested transfer to that county during the first transfer or trial. 51 Md.App. at 206, 441 A.2d 1133.

The majority opines that because the custodian of the prisoner is required to give notice of an Article IV request to all other prosecutors in the receiving state who have detainers pending, this operates as a request for final disposition and triggers the 120-day time limit for all such jurisdictions. This concept of automatic notice most assuredly operates in Article III proceedings, but it does so because of the express language of subsection (d) (Art. 27, § 616D(d)):

Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to subsection (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed.

No similar language is found in Article IV.

In an appropriate case, where the issue is properly before us and has been fully briefed and argued, we should determine the effect of an Article IV request on other jurisdictions in the receiving state. I believe a strong argument may be made that the “one-trip” requirement of Article IV is entirely consistent with the notice requirement of that article, and where notice is properly given, the several jurisdictions within the receiving state may be required to complete all trials before returning the prisoner. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the 120-day time limit should apply to every jurisdiction in such cases, and that question should await its proper resolution on another day.

MURPHY, C.J., and RODOWSKY, J., join in this concurring opinion. 
      
      . For a history of the IAD see United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 349-52, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1842, 56 L.Ed.2d 329, 340-41 (1978). The 50 signatories are listed at 18 U.S.C.App. (1985, 1988 Cum.Supp.).
     
      
      . The forms are published in Council of State Governments, The Handbook on Interstate Crime Control, Chapter IV, p. 100 (rev.ed.1966) ("Handbook”). The Handbook is “a reference book in the field of interstate crime control which ... contain[s] copies of the uniform laws drafted and recommended by the [Council of State Governments], the regulations called for thereunder, [and] the legal forms for their proper enforcement.” Id. at Foreward. Chapter IV of the Handbook, which covers the IAD, contains the implemental forms and instructions for their use. With respect to the adoption by the forms by the Office of the Attorney General, see Rogers, Maryland Extradition Manual, p. 43-72 (rev.ed.1985).
     
      
      . Article III(c) provides:
      "The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on which the detainer is based.”
     
      
      . Article 111(a) provides in part:
      “The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.”
      Article V(a) provides, in part:
      "In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement.”
      Article 111(b) provides:
      "The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in subsection (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.”
     
      
      . Article V(b) provides:
      "The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
      (1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
      (2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.”
     
      
      . Under Article VII of the IAD, each member state is required to designate an Agreement Administrator. In Maryland, the Attorney General is the Agreement Administrator. Maryland Code, (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 616-0.
     
      
      . Article 111(d) provides, in part:
      "The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner’s request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this subsection shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate.”
     
      
      . Article IV(b) provides, in part:
      "Upon receipt of the officer’s written request as provided in subsection (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.” Article V(a) provides, in part:
      "In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had."
     
      
      . Article V(b) provides:
      "The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
      (1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
      (2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.”
     
      
      . Article IV(b) provides:
      "[The] authorities [having the prisoner in custody] simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.”
     
      
      . The majority opinion suggests that Laster’s demand for disposition was made to Anne Arundel County in response to that County’s request for temporary custody. In fact, Laster’s request for disposition (Form 2) was specifically addressed to the State’s Attorney for Howard County (although it described the Circuit Court for Howard County as being in Annapolis, Md.) and was received by that State’s Attorney on November 6, 1985. A legal assistant in the office decided that Laster’s demand was intended for Anne Arundel County, and forwarded it. Whether we treat this as a direct demand to Howard County, or as a demand to Anne Arundel County that constituted a demand to Howard County by operation of law, the result is the same.
     
      
      . Article 27, § 616Q, added by Maryland at the time of its adoption of the IAD, provides that certain notices are not effective until actually received.
     