
    Huffman v. The State.
    
      Indictment for Larceny.
    
    1. Confessions; -when voluntary ancl admissible. — On a trial under an indictment for tlie larceny of cotton, where an officer who arrested the defendant testified that he had made no threats or promises to induce the defendant to confess, hut that after he arrested him, he had two several conversations with the defendant in each of which he asked him about the cotton alleged to have been stolen, and the defendant denied having stolen it, and that he then stated to the defendant: “If yon have stolen the cotton, it will be better for yon to tell the truth about it,” such statement on the part of the witness does not render involuntary and inadmissible a confession thereupon made by the defendant in which he admitted that he had stolen the cotton.
    2. Same; same. — The statement by a person who is not an officer or in authority to a defendant charged with the larceny of cotton, that it would be better for the defendant to tell the truth about it, and if he had stolen he cotton to say so, but if he had not stolen-it, .not to say that-he had, does nou render involuntary and inadmissible the confession then .made by the defendant to such person.
    3. Same; charge io the jury. — Whether or not confessions by a defendant are voluntary and admissible in evidence, is a question for the court to determine, and after such confessions are admitted in 'evidence, it is the province of the Jury to pass upon the truth or falsity of such confessions; and, therefore, charges which instruct the jury that if they believe the confessions admitted in evidence by the court were made in consequence of statements made by the witness testifying to them, then the jury must exclude from their consideration the evidence of such confessions, is erroneous . and properly refused.
    Appeal from the City Court of Montgomery.
    Tried before tlie Hon. William H. Thomas.
    The appellant in this case was indicted, tried and convicted for the larceny of two bales of cotton, and sentenced to hard labor for the county, for two years. The facts of the case relating to the rulings of the court reviewed on the present appeal, are sufficiently shown in the opinion.
    Upon the introduction of all the evidence, the defendant requested the court to give to the jury the following written charges, and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each-of them as asked:- (1.) “If the jury believe from the evidence that the confession as testified to -by the -witness 'Isadore Ruffin, that ocurred on Tuesday-morning, was made by the defendant in consequence of the statement made by the'said Ruffin to the effect that if the defendant had stolen the property, it ivould be better for bim to tell the truth about it, then the jury must exclude from their consideration such alleged confession”. (2.) “If.the jury believe from the evidence that the confession testified to by the witness Amo® ■ Jones was made in consequence of the statement made by the said Jones to the defendant, that it would be better-for him (defendant)' to tell the truth about it,’ then the jury’must-exclude from their consideration the evidence of such confession.”
    
      O. P. McIntyre, .for appellant,
    cited .Ridci v. .'State, 69 Ala. 255; Young v. State, 68 Ala. 569; Gregg v. State, 106 Ala. 44.
    Cuas. G. Brown, Attorney-General, • for tlie- State,
    cited Steele v-. State, 83 Ala. 84; Dodson v. State, 86 Ala. 60; Dotson v. State, 88 Ala. 208; Kelly v. State, 72 Ala. 244; Beckham v. State, 100 Ala. 15; Long v. State, 86 Ala. 37; McGuff v. State, 88 Ala. 147.
   HABALSON, J.

Tlie witness, Buffin, for tbe State, testified that he was the officer who arrested the defendant; that he questioned him about the cotton alleged to have been stolen, and he denied having tafeen it; that the following morning, witness called at the jail and had another conversation with defendant, in which he charged him with the larceny of the cotton, and he-again denied it; that -witness urged defendant to tell all he knew about the cotton, and finally said to him: “If you have stolen the cotton, it will be better for yon to tell the truth about it,” and, thereupon, the defendant admitted he had stolen it. This evidence was brought out by the State, after the witness had testified that he had made no threats or promises to induce the defendant to confess. The defendant, afterwards, moved to exclude the evidence of confession, on the ground that it was obtained by'holding out inducements to confess, by threats and promises, and that it was not voluntary, which motion the court overruled.

The witness, Jones, testified substantially, that he ■saw and conversed with defendant, and told him to tell him, the witness, the truth about the ‘matter; that it would be better for him to tell the truth about it, and if he stole the cotton to say so, but that, if he had not stolen it, not to say that he had. This evidence was admitted against the objection and .exception of defendant.

There was no error in the admission of -the testimony of these witnesses. It does not render a confession inadmissible, to charge a defendant with crime before he confesses it, ‘ nor to tell him it will be better for him to tell the truth, if he is guilty.—Aaron v. State, 37 Ala. 106; King v. State, 40 Ala. 314; Kelly v. State, 72 Ala. 244; Dodson v. State, 86 Ala. 63; McAlpine v. Stale, 117 Ala. 93.

The two charges requested by the defendant were properly refused. Whether or not the 'confessions referred to were made in consequence of the statements made to him by the witnesses referred to, is not the test of their admissibility. The question always is, in the admission of such evidence, was the confession made voluntarily, without the appliances of hope or fear, without extraneous inducement or pressure in either of these directions from other persons. These confessions seem to have been thus made. Having been properly admitted, the truth or falsity of the confessions was a question for the jury.—McAlpine v. State, supra; Jackson v. State, 83 Ala. 76, 79.

Affirmed.  