
    Baxter v. Ray et al.
    Execution: notice of claim by third party: indemnifying bond. Where an officer held several executions in favor of several plaintiffs, but against the same defendant, which he levied upon certain property as the property of such defendant, but the plaintiff herein claimed to be the owner of the property, and gave to the officer the notice prescribed by section 3055 of the Code, but gave only one notice, which was, however, made applicable to all the executions; and the execution creditors thereupon joined in one indemnifying bond; (Code, § 3056;) held that the one notice and the one indemnifying bond were a sufficient compliance with the statute, and that a separate notice and bond for each execution was not necessary. 1.
    2. -: ACTION ON INDEMNIFYING BOND: ESTOPPEL: JOINDER OF parties and oauses. In such case, the execution plaintiffs who executed the indemnifying bond, and who, upon the security thus given, procured the property of the claimant to be sold, were estopped from insisting that the notice and bond were not a compliance with the statute; and, being all bound together, they could not claim that they were improperly joined as defendants in an action brought upon the bond by the claimant of the property, nor that there was a misjoinder of causes.
    3. Practice: absence of judge during argument to jury. A judge may properly be absent, when the business of the court requires it, while counsel are addressing the jury; and, unless prejudice is shown, a cause will not be reversed on account of such absence.
    
      Appeal from Union Circuit Court.
    
    Monday, December 10.
    AotioN upon an indemnifying bond executed by the defendants, pursuant to the provisions of Code, § 3056. There was a j'udgment upon a verdict for plaintiff. Defendants appeal.
    
      
      S. 8. Denning and D. W. Higbee, for appellants.
    
      McDill <& Sullwan, for appellee.
   Beck, J.

I. A constable lield five executions, issued upon as many judgments, against J. A. Baxter. Two of tbe judgments- were in favor of one of tbe defendants, two in favor of another, and one in favor of tbe third.' , . The writs were levied upon certain promissory r r j notes as tbe property of the defendants in execution. Thereupon plaintiff caused a notice to be served upon tbe constable, as prescribed in Code, § 3055, claiming tbe property in tbe notes, and demanding possession thereof. There was but one notice, and it referred to and was made applicable to all tbe executions by its express terms. Thereupon tbe plaintiffs in execution, tbe defendants in this case, united in an indemnifying bond required by Code, § 3056. This bond recites tbe five judgments, naming tbe plaintiffs in each, tbe levy of tbe executions, the notice to tbe .constable served by plaintiff, and other particulars. It is conditioned, as the statute requires, to pay to any claimant of tbe property tbe damages be may sustain in consequence of the seizure and sale of tbe property. Tbe action is brought upon this bond.

II. Tbe defendants in-tbe court below, by objection to tbe introduction of tbe notice and bond in evidence, and by instructions to tbe jury asked by them, insisted that . „ , a separate cause ot action arose upon each execution, and that there should have been a separate bond and notice applicable to each, instead of one applicable to all, and that there is a misjoinder of defendants and of causes of action. These objections are renewed in this court.

Tbe purpose of the provision of tbe Code above cited requiring, upon notice in writing given by the claimant of property levied upon by execution, an idemnifying bond to be executed and returned with the execution, is tbe protection of tbe officer and tbe claimant of tbe property. Tbe latter, in case be establishes ownership of tbe property in himself, may recover tbe damages be lias sustained by tbe seizure and sale of tbe property, which would ordinarily be tbe value of tbe property. When, as in this case, several executions at the same time are levied upon the property, which is sold upon tbe writs, there is not and cannot be successive and separate seizures and sales upon tbe separate executions, but the property is seized and sold upon all the executions as one act. This is true, though tbe officer may make separate returns to each writ. While tbe writs are in bis bands, be acts upon all together, and not upon each separately. No possible benefit to any party could be attained by requiring separate notices and separate bonds for each execution. And no possible prejudice could have resulted to defendants by there being but one notice and one bond.

Tbe defendants, responding to tbe requirments of tbe law, upon the notice to tbe constable executed tbe bond, which was regarded by tbe constable and plaintiff as sufficient to authorize tbe officer to sell tbe property; for they so treated them, and defendants obtained all tbe benefits and advantages they could derive from lawful papers of -the kind. Tbe notice and bond were by tbe defendants regarded as sufficient, and, by means of these instruments, they caused plaintiff’s property to be sold upon tbe executions; they are estopped now to insist that tbe instruments are insufficient.

We are of the opinion that defendants are in no different or worse position than they would have been in bad there been a notice and bond for each execution, tbe bonds in that case being executed by all of tbe defendants. In an action on one of them, tbe plaintiff could have recovered the value of tbe property against all of tbe defendants, and, having so recovered, be could not recover upon the other bonds.

It cannot be said that there is a misjoinder of causes of action or of defendants. The defendants are bound by tbe bond; upon it plaintiff lias one canse of action against tbe defendants jointly.

Tbe rulings of tbe court below upon tbe admission of testimony and upon tbe instructions are in barmony with tbe views we liave expressed.

III. After tbe evidence was submitted, tbe court, against defendants’ objection, directed and required tbe argument of counsel to be made to the jury when tbe judge was not present, but was conducting other business of the court m a separate room. The circumstances creating occasion for this course are not shown by the record. "While, doubtless, tbe judge should have been present, unless bis absence was required by sufficient cause, we would not disturb tbe judgment, unless prejudice resulting from Ms absence is shown or could be inferred. But there is no claim of or attempt to show prejudice, and no ground to infer that any resulted from bis action to defendants.

We have held that a judge may properly be absent during the progress of a trial. Hall v. Wolff et al., 61 Iowa, 559.

Tbe foregoing discussion disposes of all questions presented in argument by defendants’ counsel. In our opinion tbe judgment of tbe circuit court ought to be

Affirmed.  