
    ELIZABETH PITTS v. BURWELL PACE.
    Where the Words charged, in a declaration, as slanderous, have a fixed and unambiguous meaning, it is not competent for a witness to say ho understood the speaker to mean differently from the common import of such words.
    This was an action of slanber, tried before Heath, J., at the last Spring Term of Henderson Superior Court.
    The plaintiff, a female, declared against the defendant at ‘common law, and under the statute, for speaking of her, the following words, “ she keeps a disorderly house,” (innuendo, that she kept a house of prostitution, and was herself incontinent.) “This,” (meaning the plaintiff’s,) “ is a disorderly house,” (meaning it was a house of prostitution, kept by her, and she was a prostitute and incontinent) “If I said she kept a disorderly house, I don’t know it, but if I did, it is true( meaning her house was a house of prostitution, and she was a prostitute and incontinent.) There was no averment of special damages.
    The plaintiff proved that the defendant came to her house ■one night when considerable company (males and females) w,as there; that two of defendant’s daughters were there; that some of the company were standing on the floor; some sitting on chairs, and one gentleman and one or more ladies were sitting on a -bed in the same room-; that the defendant said “she keeps a disorderly house. I have seen enough to satisfy me; it is a disgrace to my children I 'came here for a fuss, and I intend to have it-; this is not the first time you have allowed them to pile up on your bed, and not ordered them up ; this is a'disorderly house;” that, some days thereafter, speaking of the plaintiff, he said, “ if I said she kept a disorderly house, I fion’t know it; but if I did, it is true; for it is not the first time by several, she has allowed persons to pile up on her bed, and did not object, nor order them up.”
    These words were all spoken within six months prior to the institution of the suit.
    The plaintiff then tendered a witness to prove that he was present when all these words were spoken, and he understood the defendant to mean “to charge the plaintiff with keeping a house of prostitution — with being a prostitute, and being incontinent.
    This testimony was objected to by defendant’s counsel, and ruled out; for which, plaintiff excepted, and, submitting to a nonsuit, appealed to this Court.
    
      Ect/ney, for the plaintiff.
    
      Dickson, for the defendant.
   Pearson, C. J.

The words uttered by the defendant charge the plaintiff with keeping a house for prostitutes, in other words, it is a charge of keeping “a bawdy-house,” which is an indictable offense. But every charge of an indictable offense is not actionable per se, without proof of special damage, and the case states there was no such proof. Whether to charge a woman with keeping a bawcly-hoiose, is actionable per se, either at common law, or under the statute on the ground that “ the greater includes the less,” and a woman who would keep a house for prostitutes must, necessarily be a prostitute herself, is a question not presented by the case as made up by his Honor, and in regard to which, we are not now at liberty to express an opinion; for the exception of the plaintiff is put on the ground that she offered'to> prove that the witness understood the charge of keeping a ba.wdy-house, which the defendant made against her, as being in fact a charge that she- was herself an unchaste woman, which: is-clearly untenable.

Suppose a witness says- he heard one say that A kept a, grog shop, can the witness be- allowed to- go on and say that by these words he understood that A was charged- with- being himself a drunkard ?

The question is too plain for discussion, and the-learning on. the subject is fully set out in Sasser v. Jioiise, 13 Ired. Rep. 14where it is said, “ without the restrictions above pointed out, any man would be liable to-be sued for slander, wh.o has the misfortune to speak in the presence of an ign.onm.% or of a prejudiced, or of a corrupt witness; for the misapprehension of the witness, whether real- or pretended, would thereby be substituted in the place of the inference which it is-the duty of the Court to make as to the meaning of the words.”’

There is no error..

Per CueiaM,

judgment affirmed!  