
    Ham v. Kunzi.
    
      Right of action — By married women — Determined by statute i% force when right accrued — Section 4968.
    
    A right of action accrued to H., a married woman, before section 4968, Revised Statutes, was amended March 26th, 1883, so as to remove her disabilities as to actions concerning her separate property: Held — that her rights must be determined by the statute of limitations in force at the time her right of action accrued, and the 'removal of her disabilities by said amendment clid not have the effect to cause the statute of limitations to begin to run against her.
    (Decided June 8, 1897.)
    Error to the Circuit Court of Franklin county.
    On the 3d day of March, 1892, Mrs. Ham, plain tiff below, commenced an action against Mr. Kunzi, defendant below, for the recovery of five hundred and thirty dollars ($530), and interest. The body of her petition is as follows:
    “Plaintiff says that some time in the month of February, A. D., .1878, the exact day she cannot now state, she loaned to the defendant the sum of five hundred and thirty dollars (530) dollars, out of her separate property, under and by virtue of a parol agreement between plaintiff and defendant then entered into, whereby the defendant promised and agreed to borrow from plaintiff said sum of money, for a short time, to be used by him in his business and then promised to pay the same back to plaintiff within a short time from that date, with interest thereon for the use thereof. Pursuant to said agreement and promise, plaintiff on the date aforesaid, paid to the defendant the sum of money aforesaid, without taking his promissory note for the re-payment thereof, but relying- wholly upon defendant’s promise to repay the same as aforesaid.
    “Plaintiff was at the time of making said contract with the defendant and paying the 'said money to him, a married woman, the wife of one Frederick Ham, and remained a married woman, the wife of said Ham, from that date until the 26th day of January, 1889, when she was divorced from her husband, by a decree of the court' of common pleas of Delaware county, Ohio.
    “Notwithstanding the premises, the defendant has always, since a short time after receiving said sum of money as aforesaid, refused to pay the same back to the plaintiff, although she has frequently requested him so to do, and he now refuses to pay the same or any part thereof back to the plaintiff. 1
    “Wherefore, plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant for said sum of five hundred and thirty ($530) dollars, with interest thereon from the first day of March, A. D., 1878, and for any other or further relief in the premises, to which she either in law or equity, may be entitled.”
    To this petition the defendant demurred on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of said plaintiff and against said defendant.
    The demurrer was overruled by the court of common pleas, and proper exceptions taken. An issue was made up, a jury waived, and the cause was tried to the court, and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Mrs. Ham, for the full amount claimed in her petition. A motion for a new trial was made and overruled, and proper exceptions taken.
    
      Upon petition in error, the circuit court reversed the judgment, upon the sole ground that the court of common pleas erred in overruling the demurrer to the petition. Thereupon, Mrs. Ham filed her petition in this court, seeking to reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and for an affirmance of the -'udgment of the court of common pleas.
    
      G. J. Marriott and F. M. Marriott, for plaintiff in error.
    The simple fact that plaintiff in error might have brought her suit under section 28, of the old Code, earlier than she did, could not have the effect of repealing by implication the saving clause of the statute extended to married women. Hurlbut v. Wade, 40 Ohio St., 603; Ashley v. Rockwell, 43 Ohio St., 386.
    The amendment of section 4986, by the act of April 14, 1886, repealing the saving clause, to married women, of the former section, cannot be considered as affecting the question involved, as six years had not elapsed from the date of this amendment, before the bringing of the suit, so that there is but the one amendment of the statute left, to be considered as affecting the question involved, and that of March 26, 1883, Ohio Laws, vol. 80, p. 77.
    We think it is quite clear that this amendment did not affect, nor^was it intended to affect the right of plaintiff in error to sue upon her claim against defendant in error, at any time within six years after the removal of her disability of coverture, and her rights continued unaffected after the amendment of 1883, just as they existed before.
    
      The subsequent amendments of the different sections of the statute of limitations do not affect this general provision found in section 4974, and were not so intended. Webster et al. v. Bible Society, 50 Ohio St., 17.
    Under our claim that the statute above referred to, in S. & S., page 1, prevents the amendment of section 4986 of March 26, 1883, from affecting the cause of action of plaintiff in error, we cite, without comment thereon : Bode Adm. v. Welch, 29 Ohio St., 19 ; Railroad Co. v. Belt, 35 Ohio St., 479 ; Rafferty v. Shinn, 38 Ohio St., 46.
    
      S. A. Webb and Harry E. Stafford, for defendant in error.
    Plaintiff alleged in her petition that it was her own separate property on which she was seeking to recover, and under .this statute as amended there can be no question but that this action was barred when commenced, March 3, 1892.
    But an attempt is made to support the position of plaintiff in error by claiming that two other sections are of “controlling importance.” One, on page 1 of Swan & Sayler’s Statutes, and which was carried forward into the Revised Statutes of 1880, section 79. Sec. 4974 is the other section cited to sustain her position.
    The amendment of March 26, 1883, to section 4986 (O. L., vol. 80, p. 77), shows beyond doubt that it was the intention of the legislature to remove the disability of married women so far as rights of action growing out of her separate property were concerned.
    A statute must be construed with reference to the subject matter of it, and its real object and true intent. Doyle v. Doyle, 50 Ohio St., 330. Courts must consider the policy of Statutes. 
      B. &B.v. Trustees, 19 Ohio St., 97; Wilber v. Paine, 1 Ohio St., 251; B. B. Co. v. Belt, 35 Ohio St., 481.
    Plaintiff in error relies on the general statutes to support her position, but when the general provisions of the statutes are varied by special provision of the same or another statute relating to the subject, the special section will govern. State ex rel. v. Mg Gregor, 44 Ohio St., 628; Brower v. Hunt, 18 Ohio St., 311.
    We contend that the act of March 26, 1883, if given effect as the legislature intended, bars the action brought by plaintiff. Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St., 573; Commissioners of Knox Co. v. Mc-Cornb, 19 Ohio St., 320; Ex parte Van Hagan, 25 OhioSt., 425; Trust'Co. v. Beiter (Neb.)66N. W., 658; State v. Moore (Neb.) 67 N. W., 876 ; Anderson v. City of Camden (N. J. Sup.), 33 A., 846; Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, vol. 23, p. 485 (Note 4).
   Burket, C. J.

The circuit court was of the opinion that the action was barred by the six years statute of limitations, and that for that reason the demurrer to the petition should have been sustained.

T]ie money was loaned in the month of February, 1878, to be paid back in a short time, which would mean a reasonable time, not beyond one year.

The statute of limitations then in force was found in chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the limitation for the recovery of money loaned, not evidenced by written instrument, was six years. Section 19 of the Code was then a part of said chapter 3, and reads as follows:

“Section 19. If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this chapter, except for a penalty, or forfeiture, is, at the time the cause of action accrued, within the age of twenty-one years, a married woman, insane, or imprisoned, every such person shall be entitled to bring such action within the respective times limited by this chapter, after such disability shall be removed.” S. & C., 949. '

This section was carried into the Revised Statutes without change, and became section 4986, found in title 1, division 2, chap. 2, sub-division 3.

Said sub-division 3 of chapter 2 is devoted to the statute of limitations, and it is therein provided in section 4981, that actions upon contracts not in writing, can be brought only in six years after the cause of action accrues. This limitation subject to the saving clause in said section 4986, applies to the cause of action of the plaintiff. The question is, when was the disability of being a married woman in her case removed?

This section 4986 remained in the same form,- and with the same saving clause in favor of married women until March 26th, 1883, 80 O. L., 77, when it was amended so as to read as follows:

“Section 4986. If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this sub-division, except for a penalty or forfeiture is, at the time the cau§e of action accrues, within the age of twenty-one years, a married woman, insane, or imprisoned, such person may bring such action within the respective times limited by this chapter, after such disability is removed; provided, however, that the disability of being a married woman shall not extend to rights of action of a married woman, concerning her separate property, or growing out of or concerning business transacted in her own name.”

The section as so amended became part of said chapter 2, sub-division 3, and is to be read and construed as if introduced into the place of the repealed section in said chapter and sub-division. McKibben v. Lester, 9 Ohio St., 627.

By this amendment of March 26, 1883, of said section 4986, the disability of being a married woman was removed as to rights of action concerning the separate property, and as the petition in this case shows that the money sought to be re. covered is the separate property of the plaintiff, it is urged, and the circuit court held, that the statute of limitations began to run upon the removal of her disability on March 26th, 1883. and that the cause of action became barred in six years from that date.

This might be so were it not for the provisions of section 4974, Revised Statutes, passed in 1880, and also found in said chapter 2. Said section reads'as follows:

“Section 4974. This chapter shall not apply to actions already commenced, nor to eases wherein the right of action has already accrued; but the statutes in force when the action accrued shall be applicable to such cases, according to the subject of the action and without regard to the form; nor shall this chapter apply in the case of a continuing and subsisting trust, nor to an action by a vendee of real property, in possession thereof, to obtain a conveyance of it.”

As section 4986 as amended March 26th, 1883, is to be regarded and construed as though intro, duced into the place of the repealed section, it forms a part of said chapter 2, and by the express provisions of said section 4974, said chapter 2 does not apply to eases wherein the right of action had already accrued. And as the right of action of the plaintiff had accrued before said amendment of said section 4986, removing her disabilities, it follows that said removal did not apply to her case, and that her rights remained the same as if there had been no such removal.

It was provided in the statute of limitations passed in 1831, that it should not apply to actions already commenced, nor to causes of action already accrued, and that the statute of limitations in force at the time of the accruing of any right of action should be applicable to such action. That provision has been retained in our statute of limitations ever since, and is now found in said section 4974, re-enacted in the year 1880.

The amendment of section 4986, March 26th, 1883, by removing the disability of a married woman as to rights of action concerning her separate property, changed the statute of limitations in that regard, and shortened the time within which a married woman could commence an action concerning her separate property.

That change of the statute of limitations could not apply to causes of action already accrued, without violating the statutory provision in force ever since 1831, to the effect that the statute of limitations in force at the time the right of action accrues, shall govern the case. This rule was recognized in Webster v. Bible Society, 50 Ohio St., 1, 17.

Again, it is provided in section 79 Revised Statutes, that a repeal or amendment of a statute shall not affect causes of action existing at the time of such amendment or repeal, unless otherwise expressly provided in the amending or repealing act.

It is not expressly provided in the amendment of said section 4986, March 26, 1883, that it shall apply to, or affect causes of action then existing; neither is there an implication to that effect.

It therefore follows by force of both said sections, 4974 and 79, that said amendment of March 26th, 1883, does not apply to or affect her accrued right of action; and therefore her disability as a married woman continued until she was divorced, January 26th, 1889. As she commenced her action in less than six years after her divorce, it is clear that her action was not barred by the statute of limitations.

The court of common pleas was right in overruling the demurrer to the petition, and the circuit court erred in reversing the judgment. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and that of the common pleas affirmed.

Judgment reversed.  