
    THOMPSON v. STATE.
    (No. 7585.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 4, 1923.
    Rehearings Denied May 16 and June 13, 1923.)
    1. Criminal law 1159(3) — Finding of jury on issue of fact not disturbed.
    On appeal from a conviction, where testimony raised an issue of fact, the jury’s finding thereon in favor of the state cannot be disturbed.
    2. Criminal law <©=>! 122(1) — Requested charge not shown to have been submitted in a timely manner not considered on appeal..
    On appeal from a conviction for the unlawful possession of liquor for sale, a special charge requested by the accused, but not shown to have been submitted to the trial court in a timely manner, cannot be considered.
    3. Criminal law <®=5Q7(1)— Purchaser of intoxicating liquor not an accomplice of seller.
    The purchaser of intoxicating liquor is not an accomplice of the seller.
    4. Criminal law @=U184 — Judgment reformed on appeal so as to apply to proper count in the indictment.
    Where an indictment charged in one count unlawful transportation of liquor, and in another count unlawful possession of liquor for sale, and only the second count was submitted to the jury, a judgment condemning the accused to be guilty of unlawful transportation will be reformed so as to apply only to the count for unlawful' possession, and the conviction applied only to the count charging unlawful possession.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    5. Intoxicating liquors <©=3236(7) — Evidence held sufficient to support conviction for unlawful possession.
    In a prosecution for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor for sale, evidence held sufficient to support a conviction.
    
      Appeal from District Court, Knox County; J. H. Milam, Judge.
    John Thompson was convicted of the unlawful possession of liquor for the purpose of sale, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Jas. A. Stephens, of Benjamin, and J. S. Kendall, of Munday, for appellant.
    R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   HAWKINS, J.

The indictment charged appellant in the first count with unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor, and in the second with unlawfully having the same in his possession for the purpose of sale. The second count only was submitted to the jury. Appellant was convicted and his punishment assessed at two years in the penitentiary.

R. W. Land testified that he met appellant in Knox City and had a conversation with him relative to buying some whisky; that they then got in a car, went out about half, a mile north of town, and he there purchased from appellant a half gallon of white corn whisky. Appellant denied the transaction. The state proved by one Shaver that a few days before the trial appellant inquired of him if he had seen the witness Land, and upon being" answered in the negative said ‘to witness “he would give a hundred dollars for Land to leave,” but in the same conversation denied having sold him any whisky. Appellant does not deny this conversation, but says he does not remember it, but that, if it occurred, he was only speaking in a jocular manner. The issue of fact raised by this testimony the jury settled in favor of the state, and we would not be authorized to disturb their finding. We find no objection to the court’s charge, and the indictment is in proper form. One special charge was re: quested by appellant, but, failing to show whether it was submitted to the trial court in a timely manner (Nichols v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 277, 238 S. W. 232, and Barrios v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 548, 204 S. W. 326), the same cannot be considered. We observe, however, in this connection that the charge is based upon the theory that the state’s witness Land was an accomplice.' The purchaser of intoxicating liquor is no longer an accomplice.

The only count in the indictment submitted for the jury’s consideration was that charging appellant with unlawfully having in his possession for the purpose of sale intoxicating.liquor. The verdict should have been applied to the only count submitted. We note, however, that the judgment condemns appellant to be guilty of the offense of unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor when the count so charging was not submitted at all. The sentence correctly applied the verdict to the second count. Only one count having been submitted to the jury, and the evidence sustaining that count, it is our duty to reform the judgment and apply the conviction to the count in the indictment charging the possession for the purpose of sale, and the same is accordingly ordered.

Finding no error in the record which cannot be corrected by the reformation ordered, the judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

LATTIMORE, J.

In an earnest motion for rehearing and oral argument appellant insists that the testimony does not support a judgment of guilty of possessing intoxicating liquor for purposes of sale. We have reviewed again carefully the short testimony in the record. Witness Land swore positively that in December, 1921, he approached appellant and wanted from him some whisky. Appellant told him that he thought he knew where he could get some for him. They got in appellant’s car and drove out in the edge of town, and appellant got a half gallon of whisky, for which witness paid him $10. There is nothing in the testimony of appellant while on the witness stand which suggests his agency for Land or for any other person, for that matter. He denied in terms any connection with the transaction testified to by Land. After indictment and before trial appellant told the remaining witness, but three having testified, that he would give $100 for Land to leave. The two simple issues appear: First, did appellant possess liquor? Second, did he possess it for purposes of sale? Land swore that appellant sold him the half gallon of whisky. It would be difficult for a man to sell and deliver that which he did not have in possession. We have been unable to bring ourselves to believe this evidence insufficient to justify the jury’s conclusion. The connection of no other person with the transaction is testified'to or suggested.

Being unable to agree with appellant’s contention, his motion for rehearing will be overruled.

On Appellant’s Request to File Second Motion for Rehearing.

HAWKINS, J.

Appellant presents a request that he be permitted to file a second application for rehearing. We have examined same, and it presents no matters not already considered by this court, and the request is therefore denied.  