
    Cousins vs. Allen.
    Tax Deed. What it must recite as to assignment of tax certificate. — Presumption from such recital.
    
    Tax Sale — Bedemptioh. When heirs camiot redeem.
    
    1. Where a tax deed recites that the grantee was assignee of the tax certificate, it must he assumed that the assignment was properly made, until the contrary is shown ; especially where the statute makes the deed either conclusive or prima facie evidence of the regularity of all the proceedings up to its execution.
    2. The successive assignments of the certificate intermediate between the purchaser at the tax sale and the final assignee who procures the deed, need not be recited therein.
    3. After lands of an estate have been duly sold by the administrator, the heirs cannot redeem from a prior tax sale.
    
      APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for Winnebago County.
    Ejectment. Tbe court found, inter alia, that tbe county, assigned to one Bierly, “ by an endorsement by tbe county treasurer in blank, January 8, 1868, two tax certificates, one of tbe sale of 1858, and one of tbe sale of 1865, and tax deeds were issued on both November 20, 1868, to tbe plaintiff. Tbe sale was made and tbe certificates issued to the treasurer of Winnebago county.” There was no further finding as to plaintiff’s.ownersbip of tbe certificate. As a conclusion of law tbe court held, that “ tbe tax deeds might lawfully issue to tbe bolder of a tax certificate endorsed in blank only, even though it appeared that tbe certificate was originally assigned to another person.”
    Tbe other facts will sufficiently appear from tbe opinion.
    Judgment for plaintiff; and defendant appealed.
    
      Moses Hooper, for appellant,
    contended that, to entitle plaintiff to a tax deed, be should show an endorsement in blank or otherwise by Bierly. Laws of 1859, cb. 22, sec. 14; Richmond v. The State, 19 Wis., 807. A tax certificate, being a creation of tbe statute, can be assigned only as provided by tbe statute. It carries with it an interest in land, and cannot be passed from band to band like a bank bill. Smith v. Ciarle, 7 Wis., 551 Whitney v. The State Bank, id., 620; Mowry v. Wood, 12 id., 418. Such a state of tbe law would be productive of much evil. Parties would frequently bold tax certificates on their own .land, endorsed in blank, and when it might be for their interest, would, by delivery, pass over tbe certificate to other persons. Tbe certificate would not show through whose bands it bad passed. 2. Counsel contended that tbe minor heirs bad a right to redeem, which passed to their privies in estate; and that tbe land here bad been properly redeemed by tbe defendant. E. S., cb. 18, sec. 130 ; Dubois v. Hepburn, 10 Peters, 22.
    
      Gray & Burnell, for respondent,
    contended that tbe finding that tax deeds were issued to-plaintiff, was sufficient to sustain tbe judgment; but that even if it were assumed that there was no endorsement from Brierly to Cousins, this was not necessary; tbat possession, of tbe certificate is prima facie prbof. of ownership, and so tbe statute regards it. Laws of 1859, cb. 22, secs. 25, 50. Sec. 54 provides for an assignment by tbe purchaser in blank. And see 19 "Wis., 304.
   Cole, J.

It appears from tbe finding of tbe court, tbat tbe plaintiff claimed title through two tax deeds, one based upon tbe sale of 1848, and tbe other on tbe sale of 1865. These tax deeds are not set out in tbe record, nor are tbe tax certificates on which tbe deeds were issued. It is objected by tbe counsel for defendant, tbat tbe tax certificates were not properly endorsed or assigned to tbe plaintiff so as to entitle him to tax deeds upon them. To this tbe counsel on tbe other side gives tbe obvious and most satisfactory answer, tbat in tbe absence of all proof showing tbat tbe certificates were not properly assigned, we must assume tbat they were, and tbat tbe officer issued tbe tax deeds to tbe person who was entitled to them. See Nelson v. Rountree, 23 Wis., 367; and Huey v. Van Wie, id., 613. Where tbe tax deed issues to an assignee of the certificate, we do not suppose tbe law requires tbat tbe deed should show upon its face all tbe various assignments of tbe certificate. Tbe tax certificate may have been assigned a dozen times, and we can conceive no good reason why these should all be set out in tbe deed, nor do we think tbe statute requires they should be. In respect to tbe deed on tbe sale of 1858, tbe law in force when tbe sale was made (§ 1, chap. 66, Laws of 1854), makes tbe deed conclusive evidence of the regularity of all tbe proceedings previous to tbe execution and delivery of tbe deed. In tbe face of such a statute it is clear we cannot assume tbat tbe tax certificate was not properly assigned to tbe plaintiff. And in respect to tbe other deed, issued on tbe sale of 1865, tbe statute of 1859 (chap. 22, § 25), makes tbat deed “prima facie evidence of tbe regularity of all tbe proceedings from tbe valuation of tbe land by tbe assessor, inclusive, up to tbe execution of tbe deed.” So it is apparent we must assume on this record tbat tbe certificates were properly assigned to the plaintiff. Woodman v. Clapp, 21 Wis., 350; Knox v. Huidekoper, id., 528.

It was further insisted that the facts found by the court show that the land had been redeemed from the tax sales. It appears that the land in question was patented to Augustin Grignon, who died in 1860, leaving Margaret Childs, Alexander Grignon and Charles A. Grignon his only heirs at law. Charles A. Grignon died in 1863, leaving Margaret aged 19, May 17, Eme-line 13, Ora 11, and Charles 4 years. Louis B. Porter was administrator of Augustin Grignon, and as such conveyed the land in question, February 25th, 1868, to J. H. Whitney, who conveyed it to the defendant November 16, 1868. April 30th, 1869, Moses Hooper, attorney of defendant, attempted to redeem the premises in the name of the infant heirs of Charles A. Grignon.

Upon these facts it is very plain there was no effectual redemption of the lands. For, on the death of Augustin Grignon, the lands descended to his heirs subject to his debts. The administrator of his estate sold the lands, doubtless for the purpose of paying the debts of the deceased. This sale vested in the purchaser the title and interest of the heirs of Augustin Grignon. So that when the attempt was made to redeem the lands in the name of the infant heirs of Charles, such heirs had ceased to have any estate or interest in the property. The statute provides that “ the lands of minors, or any interest they may have in lands sold for taxes” may be redeemed, etc. Section 130, chap. 18, R. S. But these heirs, at the time of the attempted redemption, had no interest whatever in the property, and of course no right to redeem under this provision of the statute.

The judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed

By the Court. — Judgment affirmed  