
    PEOPLE v WINDSOR
    Docket No. 168410.
    Submitted September 19, 1994, at Detroit.
    Decided October 4, 1994, at 9:10 a.m.
    Ruth Windsor was bound over to the Recorder’s Court of the City of Detroit on a charge of embezzlement of more than $100, a charge that arose out of her alleged theft of money from her employer. The defendant was discharged from her employment because of the alleged theft and thereafter filed a claim for uneniployment compensation. The employer asserted that the defendant was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation because her discharge had been for good cause. A claims examiner for the Michigan Employment Security Commission found that the defendant was not disqualified because the employer had not produced adequate facts to support the claim of embezzlement. The defendant moved for dismissal of the criminal charge on the ground of collateral estoppel. The court, Dalton A. Roberson, J., granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The prosecution appealed.
    The Court of Appeals held:
    
    Determinations of the Michigan Employment Security Commission of factual issues regarding eligibility for unemployment compensation may not be used to estop collaterally the litigation of the same issues in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Accordingly, the prosecutor was not estopped from bringing the criminal prosecution for embezzlement, and it was error to dismiss the criminal charge on the basis of collateral estoppel.
    Reversed.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O’Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Olga Agnello, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
    
      Steven R. Sonenberg, for the defendant.
    
      Before: Doctoroff, C.J., and White and D. B. Leiber, JJ.
    
      
       Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
    
   Per Curiam.

The prosecutor appeals as of right the dismissal of an embezzlement charge against defendant on the ground of collateral estoppel. We reverse.

In December 1992, defendant was discharged from her employment after allegedly stealing money from her employer’s cash register. In February 1993, defendant filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits. A criminal complaint was filed in March 1993, and defendant was subsequently charged with embezzlement over $100, MCL 750.174; MSA 28.371. On April 5, 1993, a claims examiner for the Michigan Employment Security Commission ruled that defendant was not disqualified from receiving benefits because the employer had not provided adequate facts to support its charge of embezzlement and there were insufficient grounds for a finding of misconduct. After defendant’s employer sought a redetermination, the examiner’s ruling was upheld on May 17, 1993. On July 8, 1993, defendant moved to dismiss the criminal charge on the ground that the prosecutor was collaterally estopped by the mesc determination from proceeding with the prosecution of the criminal charge. After a hearing on August 13, 1993, the trial court granted defendant’s motion.

On appeal, the prosecutor relies on Storey v Meijer, Inc, 431 Mich 368; 429 NW2d 169 (1988), and People v Johnson, 191 Mich App 222; 477 NW2d 426 (1991), and defendant relies on People v Watt, 115 Mich App 172; 320 NW2d 333 (1982), and People v Grainger, 117 Mich App 740; 324 NW2d 762 (1982). We find that Watt and Grainger are distinguishable and that Storey is dispositive.

Unlike Watt and Grainger, the parties to this proceeding are not the same as, or the substantive equivalent of, those in the administrative proceeding: here, the people of the State of Michigan is not the same entity as defendant’s former employer. Nor did Watt or Grainger involve the Employment Security Act.

Section 11(b)(1) of that act, MCL 421.11(b)(1); MSA 17.511(b)(1), expressly provides:

. . . [A]ny information in the commission’s possession that may affect a claim for benefits or a charge to an employer’s rating account shall be available to interested parties. Except as provided in this act, such information and determinations shall not be used in any action or proceeding before any court or administrative tribunal unless the commission is a party to or a complainant in the action or proceeding.... [Emphasis added.]

In Storey, the Supreme Court considered both this express language and the public policy behind the act and concluded:

[M]esc determinations are not to be used to collaterally estop the litigation of issues in a subsequent civil suit. Determinations made by the mesc are limited to the purpose of determining a claimant’s eligibility for benefits. [431 Mich 379.]

While this conclusion addressed civil suits rather than criminal prosecutions, we find that Storey’s reasoning is equally applicable to criminal proceedings. The statute does not limit its application to civil suits, but, rather, refers to "any action or proceeding before any court. . . .”

Accordingly, we reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the complaint. 
      
       The ruling was again upheld on August 20, 1993, after review by an mesc referee.
     