
    CASE 15 — PETITION EQUITY
    JUNE 16.
    Raymond, &c., vs. Smith, &c.
    APPEAL FROM HARRISON CIRCUIT COURT.
    1. A writing was found among the papers of a suit, in the hand-writing of plaintiff’s attorney in the case, purporting to be a decree of court for the sale of land sought to be subjected in the suit, and appointing a commissioner to make the sale upon certain terms, and directing him to report his proceedings. The paper was not entered of record, nor was it noticed or referred to as a decree or order of court in the minute book kept by the clerk, nor did the paper itself contain any indorsement indicating that it was ever filed as a part of the record. Held — That the paper must be regarded as wholly ineffectual for any purpose, and that a sale made under it by the commissioner invests the purchaser with no title.
    2. Decrees, judgments, and orders of court, are required to be drawn up and recorded by the clerk on the evening of each day, and signed by the presiding judge or justice of such court. (1 Statute Law, 329.)
    3. Although records may be amended in certain cases, there must be something by which to amend. A writing found among the papers of a suit, purporting to be a decree of court, which W'as not noticed on the record, and having no indorsement upon it indicating that it had ever been filed as part of the record, cannot be, after the lapse of fifteen years, established as a decree of court by parol proof.
    The facts appear in the opinion of the court.
    G. & R. T. Davis for appellants—
    If the order allowing the decree under which Raymond purchased the land to be entered nunc pro tunc was properly made, the prayer of the bill of review should have been granted by the court below; and we insist that the order was properly made. (Tidd’s Practice, p. 661; McKey vs. Moore, 4 Bibb, 321; Bramlett’s heirs vs. Pickett’s heirs, 2 Mar., 10; Bank of Ky. vs. Lacey, &c., 1 Mon., 7; Varnon vs. Moore, 1 Mon., 213; Norton vs. Saunders, 7 J. J. Mar., 12; Roman vs. Caldwell’s heirs, 2 Dana, 20; Jeffreys’ heirs vs. Callis, 4 Dana, 468.)
    R. H. FoRRestbr ore same side—
    The final decree rendered after the sale, directing Ross to convey the land to the purchaser in pursuance of the commissioner’s sale was not void, and if erroneous, was not appealed from; it therefore cannot be modified for any errors in the record.
    The record furnishes enough on its face to enable the court to amend it by inserting the omitted decree nunc pro tunc.
    
    It is the policy of the law to sustain judicial sales, and not to disturb them for errors in the record, and this decretal sale should not be set aside for a mere clerical misprision.
    Curry on same side—
    The record was amendable, and the order entering the decree nunc pro tunc proper. (8 Gill & Johnson, 359 ; 4 Iredell, 81; 5 lb., 12; 8 lb., 70; 4 Eng. Ark. Rep., 185; 9 Geo., 185; 9 Gushing, 282; 8 Lb., 315; 2 Wallace, jr., 569; 15 Eng. Law and Equity, 571.)
    W. W. Thimble for appellees—
    A decree not entered upon the records of the court is void. (Commonwealth vs. Chambers, 1 J. J. Mar., 143 ; Buchner vs. Conley, 1 Mon., 3.) The order entering the decree nunc pro tunc was erroneous; there was nothing in the record to amend by.„ It could not be established as a decree of the court, by parol proof, especially after the great lapse of time.
   JUDGE DUVALL

delivered the opinion of the court:

Raymond claims to have purchased the land in contest under an alleged decree of the Harrison circuit court, which, he contends, was rendered at the September term, 1840, in a suit in chancery, brought by Barker and others against Ross and others.

The evidence relied upon as establishing the fact that such decree, in the suit mentioned, was rendered, consists of a writing which was found among the papers of that suit, proved to have been in the hand-writing of the attorney, and purporting to be a decree of the court directing a sale of the land which the complainants were seeking to subject, appointing a commissioner to make the sale upon the terms prescribed, and requiring him to report his proceedings. It appears, however, that this paper was not entered of record as part of the proceedings in the case, nor was it even noticed or referred to as a decree or order of court in the minute book kept by the clerk; nor does the paper contain any memorandum or indorsement indicating that it had ever been filed as a part of the record.

The question to be decided upon these facts is, whether there was a valid decree directing a sale of the land, and whether the sale made by the commissioner, and the subsequent proceedings, were such as to invest the purchaser with title.

That the paper relied upon as a decree must be regarded as wholly ineffectual for any purpose, is, in our judgment, perfectly clear.

The decrees, judgments, and orders of our courts are required to be drawn up and recorded by the clerk, on the evening of each day, and if found correct, they are to be signed by the presiding judge or justice of such court. (Statute Law, 329.) When so drawn up, recorded, and signed, they constitute a part of the records of the court, permanent and conclusive, for the preservation and perpetuation of which the most scrupulous care and vigilance is demanded of the officer having them in charge. In this abiding form, and with the various safeguards which the law has wisely thrown around them, the records of the courts are made the sure tests of the truth of what they contain, and which cannot be denied or contradicted; and upon the integrity with which they are made and preserved, depend, in a great measure, the most valuable rights of every citizen.

It certainly would be unnecessary for us to enlarge upon the consequences which would inevitably result, if a mere fragment of a writing, found among the papers of a cause, after the lapse of fifteen years, should be allowed, by parol proof, to be established as a final judgment or decree of court, and to acquire, by such means, the effect and verity of a judicial record. Such a rule would strike at the very foundations upon which rest the security of property and the repose of society. It cannot be tolerated.

It is true, as argued by the appellants, that the record may be amended, in certain cases; but there must invariably be something to amend by. The effort in this case is not, however, to amend the record, but actually to establish a record which has no existence by proof of extraneous facts. None of the numerous authorities referred to have any application to the real question which this record presents.

Without noticing the various other points made in the argument, we feel satisfied, after a careful consideration of the record, that Raymond’s purchase invested him with no title, and that no error has been committed to the prejudice of the appellants.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.  