
    LAVELLE vs. SCRANTON.
    Where an Act of Assembly allows compensation to Councilmen for attending meetings, they are not entitled to pay ror attending committee meetings.
    Error to Common Pleas of Lackawanna County. No. 232, January Term, 1880.
    The facts of the case are set forth in the opinion of the Court below, which was as follows:
    Per Curiam.
    This is a case stated, and raises the question whether members of the Select and Common Council of the City of Scranton, are entitled to daily pay for services in attendance on committee meetings. The plaintiff was a Councilman of the city from April 1st, 1877, to April 1st, 1879, and during that time has served on various Council committees to the total amount of thirty-six (36) days, bei-g for thirty-six committee meetings. If the Court be of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to pay for services on committee, then judgment to-be entered for plaintiff for thirty-six dollars, otherwise judgment be entered for defendant. The case stated cites the 9th section of the Act of Assembly of March 30, 1867, (P. L. 633), a supplement to the City Charter; also Ordinance No. 25, approved March 16, 1868; section 20, clause 17, of the Act of Assembly of 23d May, 1874, classifying cities (P. L. p. 240), and manuscript ordinance of April 18th, 1879. By the original charter of the City of Scranton (P. L. 1867, p. 633, Sec. 9), it is enacted that the Select and Common Councils may, by ordinance duly passed, fix the salaries of any of the officers of said city not otherwise fixed by law, at such rate as they may deem proper; provided, that two thirds of the members of each Council concur therein; and provided, that the pay of each of. the members of the select and Common Council shall not exceed one dollar for each meeting at which they shall be present. By Act of May 23d, 1874, classifying pities, adopted by the City of Scranton, among the powers of Council enumerated is the following: “To regulate and prescribe the powers, and duties, and compensation of all the officers of the cityff The Act of 23d May, 1874, Sec. 57 (P. L. 269), prov.des that, no acceptance of this act by a city of the third class shall be cons rued to be a repeal or surrender of any rights, powers,-: privileges and franchises heretofore by law conferred on said city not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
    We do not consider section 9, Act of 1867, above referred torn the original charter, inconsist mt with the provisions in section 20, clause 17, of the Act of 23d May, 1874, but the two may wholly stand in harmony with each other. The power,, therefore, given to the City of Scranton, to fix the compensation of Councilman is contained in the Act of March 30, 1867,. section 9, above cited. Poes that Act give powers to pass an ordinance to pay Councilmen for attendance on committee meetings? A municipal corporation derives its powers wholly from the sovereign power granting its charter. It can exercise only such powers as are given in express words or necessarily, or fairly implied in, or incidental to the powers expressly granted, or essential, not simply convenient, but indispensable-to the objects of the corporation. If a power is in doubt, it is not in existence. These principles, Dillon in his work of' Municipal Corporations, says are of transcendant importance, and lie at the foundation of municipal corporations. The Act-of 1867, giving power to fix the compensation of Councilmen, conta nga limitation or exception, that it shall not exceed one dollar for each meeting at which they shall be present. What meeting is intended? Why, of course, the meeting of the-Council. No other meeting is contemplated. If it were, it is. reasonable to suppose it would be mentioned. A limitation in Act of Assembly is to be strictly construed. There is no. certainty- that committee meetings were intended, and if not, then there is doubt, and that the law resolves against the corporation. A committee meeting is not a meeting of Council. It is to prepare for, or facilitate the work of, the Council when it does meet. The books are full of cases recognizing tho principal of strict construction of charters of corporations in. nearly every State in the Union. It is not necessary to cite-them; they are grouped in Dillon on Corporations, vol 1, page 173.
    We, therefore, conclude that the ordinance of 18th April, 1879, was ultra vires, so far as it provides for the payment for attendance upon committees. There is also another objection to the ordinance of 1879. The ordinance of 1868 had already provided for the payment of Councilmen at one dollar for each and every meeting of such Council, at which such member was present. The constitution of the State prohibits (Art. 3, Sec. 11), and the Act of 23 May, 1874, Sec. 5, (with a doubtful legal qualification) prohibits giving any extra compensation to any public officer * * * after services-shall have been rendered or contract made. * * * Now the ordinance of 1879, by its own provisions, purposes to-antedate itself two years or more, and take effect in 1877. This we consider is giving extra pay after the services were-rendered. The service was rendered by virtue of being a. Councilman. His pay as such was already fixed, and it was, the duty of the plaintiff to serve, and 'he did serve voluntarily on committees. Now the ordinance proposes to increase his pay after services rendered. Such an ordinance is also against the policy of the law, It is not show n to us that any contract or inducement was held out prior to 1877, for the rendering of these services; that the charter prescribed payment therefor; that the people elected their Councilmen expecting to pay them for such services, and that this ordinance was passed to fulfill a moral or legal obligation incurred by the city, or to correct a mistake inadvertently made. The people are justly jealous of attempts to vote away their money, and increase their taxation by a mere spontaneous dip into the public treasury. The time was when the sovereign power of the Legislature could possibly authorize this, but since the Constitution of 1874, even this power is now taken away. The number of Councilmen in the City of Scranton is 76, and taking this present instance as the average attendance upon committee, the total amount would be $2,736, simply for services as comteemen, besides the regular pay as Councilmen. We are asked to give by implication, inference or construction, this effect to the charter of the city and the ordinance of 1879. Under the law as we find it, we cannot so extend the defined powers of this municipal corporation. It would practically nullify the Act of 1867, for even the Councils do not control the number" of meetings each committee might hold and attend. Such an intent by the Legislature should be clealy indicated in the organic law of the city, before the Court can resolve the doubt in such a direction. We, therefore, enter judgment in favor of the defendant.
    Lavelle then took a writ of error, complaining of the entry of judgment in favor of defendant.
    
      H. M. Hannah, Esq., for plaintiff in error.
    
      I. H. Burns, Esq., contra.
    
   The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Common Pleas on May 3rd, 1880, in the following opinion.

Per Curiam.

This judgment is affirmed upon the opinion of the learned •Court below.

Judgment affirmed.  