
    
      James R. Pringle and Julius St. Julien Pringle, executors of Elizabeth M. Pringle, vs. William Ravenel and wife et al.
    
    By marriage settlement the survivor had power, by will, to fix the proportion each child should take of the settled estate: the wife survived, andón bill for settlement of the husband’s estate, by a consent decree, the trustee under the settlement became the purchaser, to and for the uses of the settlement, of the husband’s separate estate, and entered into bonds to pay, as trustee, to each child, a certain sum, the value of its share of the husband’s estate: the wife died leaving a will, by which she devised and bequeathed the trust and other property to the children, and directed that her several devises and bequests should be taken by her devisees and legatees in full satisfaction of any demand on herself, or her estate, or the estate of her deceased husband: the bond of the trustee to E. R. one of the children, was unpaid at the death of the wife: Held, that the acceptance of E. R. of the devises and bequests to her operated as a satisfaction of the bond.
    
      Before DtjnkiN, Ch. at Charleston, June, 1850.
    The bill stated that, by marriage settlement, made between plaintiffs’s father, James Reid Pringle and Elizabeth Mary Pringle, by her then name of Elizabeth Mary McPherson, and Susanna McPherson, James E. McPherson, and John Julius Pringle, trustees, bearing date the 18th day of March, 1807, certain real and personal estate; and also certain reversionary interests to which the said Elizabeth Mary was entitled under the will of her father, General John McPherson, were, by her, with the consent of the said James Reid Pringle, conveyed to the said trustees, among other uses, after the marriage then expected, and shortly after solemized between the said James Reid Pringle and Elizabeth Mary McPherson, to the use of husband and wife during life, and the survivor for life, and after the decease of the survivor, “to the use of all and singular, or such one or more of the children of them the said Elizabeth Mary McPherson and James Reid Pringle, and for such estate and estates in such parts and proportions, manner and form, with or without power of revocation as the said Elizabeth Mary McPherson and James Reid Pringle shall, at any time or times during their joint lives, by any deed or deeds, writing or writings, under both their hands and seals, attested by two or more credible witnesses, direct, limit and appoint; and in default of such direction, limitation and appointment, and in case any such shall be when and as soon as the estates and interests thereby limited shall respectively end and determine, and as to such part or parts of the premises where no such direction, limitation or appointment shall be made, then, as the survivor of them, the said Elizabeth Mary McPherson and James Reid Pringle, shall, at any time or times, during his or her life, by any deed or deeds, writing or writings, under his or her hand and seal, attested by three or more witnesses, or by his or her last will and testament, in writing, to be by him or her, signed, sealed and published, in the presence of the like number of witnesses, direct, give, limit and appoint, the same as aforesaid; and, in default of such direction, limitation, gift and appointment, or in case any such shall be, when and so soon as the estates and interests thereby limited shall respectively end and determine, and as to such part or parts of the premises whereof no direction, gift, limitation or appointment as aforesaid, shall be made, to the use of all and every, the child or children of the said Elizabeth Mary McPherson and James Reid Pringle,” &c.
    That Susannah McPherson, by her last will and testament, bearing date the 20th day of August, 1834, gave and bequeathed to the said James Reid Pringle, one-third part of the residue of her estate, in trust, for the sole and separate use of her daughter, the said Elizabeth Mary Pringle, during her life, and after her death, to her children then living : and appointed the said James Reid Pringle one of her executors.
    That on the 11th day of July, 1840, the said James Reid Pringle died intestate, leaving the said Elizabeth Mary Pringle surviving him, and leaving issue, the plaintiffs, and Eliza Butler, wife of William Ravenel, and Rosamond Miles, Pringle, and having had issue of the said marriage, one son and three daughters,. who had died before him; that administration of his estates and effects was committed to the plaintiff, James Reid Pringle, and for the settlement of his estate, a bill was filed, wherein Elizabeth Mary Pringle, William Ravenel, Eliza Butler Ravenel, Julius St. Julien Pringle, and Rosamond Miles Pringle, were complainants, and the plaintiff, James R. Pringle, defendant ; and an account was taken between the said James Reid Pringle, and the trust estate under the marriage settlement, and also an account of the funds which came into the hands of the said James Reid Pringle as trustee of his wife, under the will of Mrs. McPherson, and the said Elizabeth Mary Pringle, bepame the purchaser of his estate, and undertook to pay to his children the sum of seventeen thousand seven hundred and one dollars, sixty-four cents, as the amount of two-thirds of his estate after the payment of debts, which arrangement, on the 29th day of May, 1841, was carried into effect by a decree of this Court, 
    
    That soon after the settlement of the said estate, the said Elizabeth Mary Pringle entered into a bond to William Ravenel conditioned for the payment of f4,4-25 41, being the portion of the said Eliza B. Ravenel in her father’s said estate, and the said William Ravenel soon afterwards assigned the said bond, and all the interest and estate of the said Eliza B. Ravenel, under the marriage settlement, and the will of Mrs. McPherson, to the plaintiff, James Reid Pringle, in trust for husband and wife for life, and to the survivor for life, and to the issue of the marriage, as the survivor may appoint, and in default of issue to the survivor in fee. 
    
    That plaintiifs’s mother, the said Elizabeth Mary Pringle, by her last will and testament in writing, bearing date the 14th day of April, 1843, in execution of her power of appointment, and in exercise of her rights of property, undertook to dispose of all the trust estate under the marriage settlement, as well as her mother’s will, and gaVe her son-in-law, William Ravenel, one thousand dollars, and legacies to her grandchildren, Catha-rine Prioleau Ravenel, James Pringle Ravenel, and Elizabeth McPherson Ravenel, (the legacy to Catharine Prioleau. Ravenel being a slave belonging to the trust estate,) and to plaintiffs, an undivided fourth part of the plantation and negroes, and other real and personal property in' trust, for the sole and separate use of her daughter, Eliza Butler Ravenel, during the joint lives of herself and husband, and in case she should die in his lifetime, to the use of her issue then living; the issue of a deceased child to take the parent’s share and no more, and in default of issue, as she may appoint; and in case she should survive her husband, to her absolute use and behoof forever freed and discharged. from all other and further trusts. And declared the same trusts of the estate given to her daughter Rosamond Miles Pringle, and directed that her several legatees should receive their legacies as a satisfaction of all demands, on her or her estate, or that of her late husband.
    That the testatrix afterwards, on the 14th day of August, 1843, departed this life,' leaving the said will in full force; and plaintiffs, as executors therein named, proved the same, and have undertaken the execution thereof; but are unable to proceed without the aid of this Court.
    That it is denied that the said power of appointment to which the said Elizabeth Mary Pringle was entitled, authorized her to limit estates to her grandchildren ; and it is also denied that the legatees are bound to elect between provisions made by the settlement and the will of Mrs. McPherson, and" that made by the testatrix; and the said William Ravenel . insists that the share to which the said Eliza Butler Ravenel is entitled, under the marriage settlement of her parents, and the will of her grandmother, should be held by the plaintiff, James Reid Pringle, subject to the uses which have been declared thereof by the assignment of the same in trust, as before mentioned. And that the bond of the testatrix for Mrs. Ravenel’s part of her father’s estate should be satisfied; whereas, the plaintiffs insist that the testatrix had the power to ap« point, and that the said power is well executed by her will, and that the parties interested must all elect whether to take under or against the will of the testatrix. And the bill prayed that the trusts of the said will may be declared and executed under the sanction of this Court, &c.
    Dunkin, Ch. The first inquiry is, whether the will of Mrs. Pringle is a due execution of the power of appointment, vested in her by the settlement of 1807. It is very clear, that such was the purpose of the testatrix. In the recital, it is declared, that the will is made “ as a disposition .of all the estate which I may dispose of, either in my own right, or by virtue of any power.” If she has failed, it is from a misapprehension of the extent of her authority.
    On the part of the defendants, William Ravenel and wife, it is insisted that, under the marriage settlement, Mrs. Pringle had no authority to limit any part of the property to her grandchildren, and that such limitation is void. The settlement declares that, upon the decease of the survivor of them, “ the property shall be held to the use and behoof of all and singular, or such one or more of the children of them, the said Elizabeth Mary McPherson and James Reid Pringle, and for such estate and estates, in such parts and proportions, manner and form, with or without power of revocation, as they, the said Elizabeth Mary McPherson and James Reid Pringle, may direct, limit and appoint, and, in default of such direction, limitation and appointment,” &c., “ then, as the survivor of them, the said Elizabeth M. McPherson and James R. Pringle,” shall, at any time, by deed or will, “direct, give, limit and appoint the same, as aforesaid.”
    The important clause of Mrs. Pringle’s will is as follows :—
    “Item. To the use of my daughter Eliza, (Mrs. Ravenel,) subject to the trusts hereinafter mentioned, and to my sons, Jas. Reid and Julius St. Julien, and my daughter Rosamond Miles Pringle, I give my plantation, and all my lands on Santee River, in the parishes of Prince George, Winyah, and St. James’, San-tee, and all the negro slaves employed on the said plantation,” &c. “ And, to provide against the casualties of commerce, from which the most prudent are not secure, I do hereby declare the following trusts of the property bequeathed to the use of my daughter, Eliza Butler Ravenel, that is to say : — the estate, so bequeathed to my said daughter, shall not be vested in her, but in my sons, James Reid Pringle and Julius St. Julien Pringle, as her trustees, to have and to hold the same to the said trustees and their heirs, upon the following trusts, that is to say, upon trust, for the sole and-separate use of my daughter, Eliza Butler Ravenel, during the lives of her and her said husband, and, if she should die in the lifetime of her said husband, then to the use of her issue then living, the issue of a deceased child to take the parent’s share and no more ; but, if she should die in the lifetime of her said husband, without leaving issue, then to such uses as she, by her last will and testament, may limit and appoint; and, in case she should survive her said husband, then to her absolute use and behoof forever, freed and discharged from all other and further trusts.”
    The argument seems to be, that the limitation to tlie children of Mrs. Ravenel, on her death, in the lifetime of her husband, is an excessive execution of the power, and nidi and void. Robinson vs. Hardcastle, (2 Bro. C. 0. 22,) bears a striking analogy to this case. The power was there created by a marriage settlement, and was executed by the will of the husband. Lord Thurlow, before whom the cause was heard, said, that except the case of Cavendish vs. Cavendish, he knew of no case where it had been decided that an appointment to grandchildren is a good execution of a power to divide among children. If that case be so decided, he believed it was the first case to that purpose. “ What is a perpetuity,” continues he, afterwards, “ but the extending the estate beyond a life in being, and twenty-one years after. That would have been the effect of this, if done by devise ; the question, therefore, is, whether, by the intervention of a power, a grantor may extend the estate beyond the rules of law, to what the law terms a perpetuity ?” A case was directed for the opinion of the Court of King’s Bench ; and Bul-ler, J., in delivering the judgment, of rather the reasons, of the Court, says : “ I take it to be a clear rule of law, on the execution of a power, that the execution must have a reference to the power itself; and that a person, claiming under the execution, takes under the deed by which the power is created ; and, therefore, that the uses, limited by the power, must be such as would have been good if limited by the original deed. If that rule be law, it puts an end to the case.” (2 T. R. 252.) So if the uses, limited by the will of Mrs. Pringle to the children of Mrs. Ra-venel, had been so limited in the original settlement, (Mrs. Ra-venel not being then in existence,) it seems quite clear that they would have been too remote and void. But, as was said by Lord Northington, in Marlborough vs. Godolphin, (1 Eden, 404,) if the grantor could not lock up his property in this manner himself, neither can he deliver up the keys to another, and empower him to do it. The will of Mrs. Pringle, being no more than an execution of the power, this limitation to- the children is consequently inoperative and void. The result, or effect, is not equally clear.
    In reference to the valuable estates, included in the clause already cited, the scheme or purpose of the testatrix is not easily to be misapprehended. She designed to execute her power of appointment, then to make an equal division of the property among her four children, as between themselves ; and, lastly, to place her daughters on precisely the same footing, in regard to the restrictions and limitations of the estates designed for them respectively. These, in the opinion of the Court, were the leading objects of the testatrix, to which every provision of the clause was intended to be subordinate. If any of these provisions prove inoperative, as violating the rules of law, or transcending the authority of the testatrix, this should not be permitted to defeat the general design, if it may be carrried into effect without reference to those inoperative designs. The estates on Santee, with the negroes, &c., upon them, are appointed to her four children. To three out of four, the terms of the appointment, in the first part of the clause, are in the most absolute and unqualified language, and “ I request,” she adds, “ that the said plantation and negroes be not divided, as long as the parties can agree in the management of the property, believing that, as a joint estate, it will conduce most to their advantage.”
    The testatrix then proceeds, “ and to provide against the casualties of commerce, from which the most prudent are not secure, I do hereby declare the following trusts of the property bequeathed to the use of my daughter, Eliza Butler Ravenel.” It is then declared, that the property shall be held by the trustees ;t for the sole and separate use of Mrs. Ravenel, during the joint lives oí her husband and herself, and if she should die, in the lifetime of her husband, then to the use of her issue then living,” &c. The testatrix had an undoubted right to restrict the estate of her daughter to her sole and separate use, and the only part of the declaration which exceeds the power, is the limitation to the issue of the marriage on the contingency contemplated. A similar condition is annexed to the gift of the lands and negroes given to her daughter, Rosamond Miles Pringle. And it will be more simple, first to consider her interests in connection with the authorities to be cited. The first part of the clause gives in as absolute terms to Rosamond as to James Reid and Julius St. Julien. Afterwards the condition, (as it is called,) is annexed to this “ gift of land and negroes,” to wit, that, on her marriage, a settlement should be made, declaring the property subject to the same uses as those declared “ of the testatrix’s daughter, Eliza.” In Arnold vs. Congreve, (1 Rus. & Mylne, 209,) Sir Thomas Plumer, after holding that a limitation to children of grandchildren was, in the particular case, void for remoteness, uses this language : “ The testatrix, having by her will, given her grandchildren absolute interests, has made a codicil, expressing her desire that they should take only life estates, in order that their children might take in succession after their deaths; that her sole object in making the codicil was to let in those children of grandchildren; that that purpose necessarily failed, and that, as the great-grandchildren could not take, the intention of the testatrix would be best effectuated by holding, that the absolute interests given to the grandchildren by the will, were not destroyed by the codicil.” So here, the gift to Rosamond is absolute. The subsequent attempt to limit the succession, being ineffectual for the purpose intended, should not be permitted to cut down the absolute estate, previously well given. And this rejection of qualifying clauses, ineffectually attempted to be en-grafted on a previous absolute gift, equally obtains where the whole is contained in the same testamentary paper; it being considered that the testator intends the prior absolute gift to prevail, except so far only as it is effectually superseded by the subsequent qualified one. (1 Jarm. 257.) Carver vs. Bowles is cited as authority. In that case, a testatrix, having, under 'a marriage settlement, a power of selection in favor of her children, appointed the settled fund absolutely, in equal shares, to her five children, two sons and three daughters, and then declared that the shares of each of her daughters should be held to her sole and separate use, for life, and after her decease, for her children, &c. It was held, that the words of the appointment were sufficient to vest the shares absolutely in the daughters ; that the attempt to restrict their interests by limitations to their issue, being inoperative, did not cut down the absolute appointment ; but that it was competent to the donee of the power, to limit the interests which she appointed to her daughters, to their separate use, &c. This authority was followed by Lord Lang-dale, in Kempf. vs. Jones, (2 Keene, 756.) “ The testatrix,” says he, “ has made limitations, which, to a certain extent, were quite within her power, but she has attempted to make others which were beyond the limits of her power; and I think that the absolute gift ought to have effect, subject to the limitations which were within the power, and free from the others.” It seems very difficult to distinguish the appointment in favor of Rosa-mond Miles Pringle, from the cases thus adjudicated.
    The gift to Mrs. Ravenel, in the first part of the clause, is not in the same unqualified terms, but the difference is rather verbal than substantial. As has been stated, the evident purpose of the testatrix, in this clause, was to exercise her power of appointment, by making an equal division of that estate amon g her children, and by placing the fortunes given to her daughters, (in the language of the will,) under the same restrictions and limitations. The gift to Rosamond was absolute, and no condition was annexed, but in the event of her marriage. Mrs. Ra-venel was already married. Giving to her daughter Eliza one-fourth of the estate, she was solicitous “ to provide against the casualties of commerce,” and, in that view, declared that the estate should be held to her sole and separate use, during the coverture, and, in the event of her decease in the lifetime of her husband, leaving issue, to the use of the issue then living. If she survived her husband, whether with or without issue, then to her daughter, discharged of all further trusts. So far as the purpose of the testatrix is to be accomplished, by securing the fortune of her daughter to her sole and separate use, this object is fully attained. The deed of 1807 authorized her to prescribe “the manner and form” in which the estates given to her children should be enjoyed. But she had no power, under that instrument, to limit the succession, either for the purpose declared by the will, or for any other purpose. She was vested with unlimited authority to apportion the estate, as she might think proper, among the children ; to give all to one absolutely, and leave all the others unprovided for, or to give such estate or estates to each, as to her might seem expedient. She might make a partial appointment, or might omit entirely to exercise the power of appointment. The only limit to her discretion was the circle of objects within which it was to be exercised. She could not look beyond her own children. So the settlement declared, and beyond this, the law would not have permitted the parties to the settlement to have provided, had they been so disposed. Mrs. Pringle’s power of appointment did not extend to grandchildren, and her purpose, in making this limitation, is necessarily frustrated. But, as the estate given to her daughter, was thus restricted or qualified, only for this purpose, and this has failed, the general intention of the testatrix will be best effectuated by holding, as in Arnold vs. Congreve, that the estate of the daughter is not impaired by this inoperative limitation. Whittell vs. Dudin, (2 Jac. & Walk. 279,) was not decided on the principle of the cases already cited, hut is illustrative of what remains. to be said. In that case, the testator directed the residue of his property to be equally divided between his wife, and sons and daughters, subject, as to the shares of the daughters, to certain trusts, for the benefit of themselves and their children. The Master of the Rolls held, that a daughter, dying without a child, was entitled absolutely under the original bequest, from which it was to be collected that the testator’s design was to make an equal division among his children, which would be frustrated, if the shares of the daughters were to go to the testator’s next of kin, as undisposed of property, on their dying without children. So in Holme vs. Holme, (9 Sim. 644,) ■ the testator directed the trustees, on the death of his wife, “ to divide and assign the trust moneys ” into as many shares as there were children of that wife ; the shares of the sons to be paid to them when the youngest child attained twenty-one years of age, and the shares of the daughters, who should be alive at that time, he directed should remain in the hands of the trustees, upon trust to pay the interests to the daughters, during their natural lives, for their sole and separate use, and, upon the death of a daughter, leaving issue, to such issue, &c., &c. The vice-Chancellor declined to hear Mr. Knight Bruce, and declared the gift to the daughter to be absolute, notwithstanding the super-added directions to settle the shares of the daughters; and that a daughter, who died without leaving children, took an absolute estate. In a note to that case, Mayer vs. Townsend, (3 Bea. 443,) is referred to. Testator had directed trustees to raise £5000 for his daughter Elizabeth ; and when raised, to invest the same, and pay the dividends to his daughter, for her separate use, during life, and, after the decease of his daughter, there was a limitation to her children. Lord Langdale held, that the limitation not having taken effect, in consequence of the death of the daughter without children, the absolute interest remained in the daughter. When Mrs. Pringle uses the expressions “ to the use of my daughter Eliza, subject to the trusts hereinafter •mentioned,” and then, “ the estate, so bequeathed to my said daughter, shall not vest in her, hut in my sons, as her trustees,” no more is implied, than by the language used in Holme vs. Holme, and in Mayer vs. Townsend. The gift is to her daughter. The provision is for her. More than once it is referred to as “her daughter Eliza’s estate,” “her daughter Eliza’s fortune.” The absolute character of the gift to her was only to be qualified for the purposes and with the limitations mentioned. Part of these attach effectually to the gift. The other is inoperative. From whatever cause is immaterial. “ The general rule,” says Vice-Chancellor Wigram, “ is, that an absolute interest is not to be taken away by a gift over, unless that gift over may itself take effect.” Green vs. Harvey, (1 Hare, 428.)
    Then, what is the result ? The Court has assumed, as clearly deducible from the language of the clause, that the design of Mrs. Pringle was to make an equal division among her children, of the estates therein described. It seems, too, scarcely open for question upon principle or authority, that the limitation to the children of Mrs. Ravenel, was an excessive ap]3ointment, and is, consequently, void. Then, upon any other construction than that adopted by the Court, the fortune of Mrs. Ravenel, on the contingency contemplated, would pass, not to her own children, but by the express terms of the marriage settlement, to the children of Mr. and Mrs. Pringle, to be equally divided between them, if the provision be regarded as a limited or defective appointment. But, whether the estate vested in the several children, as they came in esse, or in those who survived the parents, or in the heirs at law of the grantors, as in a case not contemplated, or provided for in the settlement, is unimportant for the purposes of this inquiry. The result would be the same. The design of the testatrix to establish equality among her children would be entirely broken up and defeated ; and an ineffectual attempt, to secure the fortune of the daughter “ from the casualties of commerce,” would become the means of disinheriting her offspring. On the other hand, the leading purposes of the testatrix will be accomplished by establishing the gift in the daughter, as in Kempf vs. Jones, subject to the limitations 'which were within the power, and free from the others.
    Then does this present a case of election ? The text writers all agree that, in regard to the doctrine of election, it is immaterial whether the testator, in disposing of that which was not his own, was aware of the want of title, or proceeded upon the erroneous supposition that he was exercising a power of disposition which belonged to him; in either case, whoever claims in opposition to the will must relinquish what the will gives him. (1 Jarman, 387.) The whole language and spirit of Mrs. Prin-gle’s will prove that she, herself, entertained no misgivings as to her absolute right of disposition, and that she intended to exercise it. In this respect the case differs from Church vs. Kemble, (5 Sim. 525.) There the testatrix was authorized, by the father’s will, to appoint to such children, grandchildren, or more remote issue, as were born before the appointment. By her will she bequeathed her own estate, and that which she had the power to dispose of under her father’s will, to be equally divided among her four children, the shares of her three daughters to their sole and separate use; a codicil, premising in case she had the power so to do, under the will of her late father, or otherwise, directed the interest, under her will, of her daughter, Mrs. Church, to be vested in trustees, for her sole use, during life, and, after her death, to divide the principal among her children. It was conceded that the appointment, including all the children of Mrs. Church that might be thereafter bom, exceeded the power, and was consequently void. On the question of election, Sir Edward Sugden, for Mrs. Church, insisted that the codicil applied only to the property which was the subject of the power ; and the testatrix says she did not mean to make the gift, unless she had the power to make it under her father’s will, or otherwise. She had no such power. A case of election never arises, unless a party does an act which he believes he has power to do. The Yice Chancellor said, “ the question is whether the testatrix meant the disposition to take effect in all events, or only in the event of her having the power to make it. If the testatrix had an absolute, unconditional intention to give -what she could not, then a case of election would arise.” Holding that the disposition was conditional, that she only intended to give, provided she had the power under her father’s will, the Yice Chancellor decided that it was not a case of election. Mrs. Pringle expresses no such doubt, implies no such condition, but, believing that she had the power, manifests an absolute, -unequivocal intention to give the property in the manner indicated. As was said by Sir Pepper Arden, in Whistler vs. Webster, (2 Yes. jr. 370,) it is not permitted to the Court to speculate as to what she would have done if she had known one thing or another. “ No man,” says he, “ shall claim any benefit under a will, without conforming, as far as he is able, and giving effect to every thing contained in it, whereby any disposition is made, shewing an intention that such a thing shall take place, without reference to the circumstance whether the testator had any knowledge of the extent of his power or not.” Again, “ Whether the testator thought he had the right, or, knowing the extent of his authority, intended, by an arbitrary exertion of power, to exceed it, no person, taking under the will, shall disappoint it.”
    The Court is of opinion that Mrs. Ravenel is bound to elect; but she cannot be required to make her election, “ until all the circumstances are known, and the state and condition and value of the funds are clearly ascertained.” (2 Story Eq. §1098.)
    The remaining question, on which the complainants ask the decision of the Court, relates to the bond of the testatrix for four thousand four hundred and twenty-five dollars and forty-one cents. The bill alleges that this bond was executed to William Ravenel, and by him afterwards assigned to the trustees of his marriage settlement. The last disposing clause of Mrs. Pringle’s will declares as follows : “ And it is farther my will that the several gifts and devises herein contained, shall be taken, deemed and accepted by my several devisees and legatees, as full satisfaction of and for any claim or demand, whatsoever, which such legatees or devisees may have on me or my estate, or the estate of my deceased husband.” This is the law of the case, and is binding equally upon femes coverts and infants, as upon all other persons claiming under the mil: “ The doctrine of election extends to all interests, whether they are immediate or remote, vested or contingent, of value or of no value.” (2 Story Eq. §1096.) The legatees, of Mrs. Pringle, insisting on their rights under the will, can take them only upon the terms prescribed, namely, in full satisfaction of their respective interests, whatever they may be, in the bond executed by testatrix. It is ordered and decreed, that it be referred to one of the Masters of this Court, to take an account of the estate of Mrs. Pringle, and of the debts due and owing by her and by the late James R. Pringle, and out of what fund the same ought to be paid, with leave to state any special matter, and with leave to either party, upon the coming in of the Master’s report, to apply for further directions.
    W. Eavenel and wife appealed, on the following grounds r
    1. That his Honor, it is respectfully submitted, has erred in supposing that the bond mentioned in the decree, was the bond of the testatrix, when, in fact, it was the bond of James R. Prin-gle, substituted trustee of the marriage settlement of the late James R. Pringle, deceased, and family.
    2. That his Honor, it is respectfully submitted, has erred in decreeing that Mrs. Pringle’s will presents any case of election, so far as Mrs. Ravenel is concerned.
    That the decree is, in these and other respects, contrary to equity.
    ~Yeadon, for defendants.
    
      Petigru, contra.
    
      
       So much of the consent decree, of 29th May, 1841, as is necessary to a proper understanding of this case is as follows.
      “On hearing the Master’s report in this case, and on motion of Mr. DeSaussure, complainant’s solicitor, ordered that the same be confirmed. And it is further ordered and decreed that James W. Gray, Master in Equity, do convey to James R. Prin-gle, the trustee substituted in lieu of John Julius Pringle, at the present term, as trustee, under the marriage settlement of Mrs. Elizabeth M. Pringle, upon the trusts, and subject to the conditions and limitations expressed therein, the plantation on Santee river, called the Marsh, containing two hundred and forty acres — also, the plantation adjoining the above, on Santee river, containing two hundred and six acres of swamp land; also, the small lot and house on South Island; also, the lot of land, with the dwelling house thereon, in Cannonsborough, on Charleston Neck, all which premises are fully described in the pleadings.” “ And that the said James R. Pringle hold, to the uses of the marriage settlement, the remaining sixteen negroes, mentioned in Schedule No. 5, as standing in the name of his testator, nine of whom are taken to supply the place of nine, which were sold by the late James R. Pringle, belonging to the trust estate, and seven, to make up the seven due by the Schedule No. 3. And it is further ordered and decreed, that the said trustee do pay, with the funds of the trust estate, the sum of sixteen thousand and sixty-eight dollars, and forty-one cents, with the accruing interest thereon, being the amount of the debts the said James R. Pringle, deceased, reported by the Master. And it is further ordered and decreed, that the said trustee do pay, from the funds of the trust estate, to the four children of James R. Pringle, deceased, seventeen thousand, seven hundred and one dollars and sixty-six cents, with interest from the date of this decree, in equal shaves, to wit, — to Mrs. Eliza B. Ravenel, and William Ravenel, her husband, the sum of four thousand, four hundred and twenty-five dollars and forty-one cents; to himself, the said James R. Pringle, the sum of four thousand five hundred and twenty-five dollars and forty-one cents; and, to the duly appointed guardian of Rosamond M. Pringle, the sum of four thousand, five hundred and twenty-five dollars and.forty-one cents; and to the duly appointed guardian of Julius St. Julien Prin-gle, the sum of four thousand five hundred and twenty-five dollars and forty-one cts.”
    
    
      
       The bond here referred to was, in fact, the bond of James R. Pringle,, trustee, ana is as follows.
      THE STATE OP SOUTH CAROLINA.
      Know all men by these presents, That I, James R. Pringle, substituted trustee, under the marriage settlement of Mrs. Elizabeth M. Pringle, in conformity and obedience to a decree of the Court of Equity, made on 29th May, 1841, at Charleston, in a certain cause, wherein the said Elizabeth M. Pringle and lier children are complainants, and James R. Pringle, executor of James R. Pringle, deceased, is defendant, acknowledge myself, as trustee under the said marriage settlement, to be held and firmly bound unto James R. Pringle, trustee under the marriage settlement of William Ravenel and Eliza B. his wife, in die full-and just sum>of eight-thousand eight hundred and fifty dollars, eighty-two cents, to be paid to the said James R. Pringle, trustee of William Ravenel, and Eliza B. his wife, his-certain attorney, executors and administrators, or assigns; to which payment, well and truly to be made and done, X bind wyself, and each and every one of my heirs, executors and administrators, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents.
      Sealed with my seal, and dated at Charleston, the twenty-ninth day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and' forty-one, and in the sixty-fifth year of the Sovereignty and Independence of the United States of America.
      
        The condition of the above obligation is such, That if the above bound James R. ’Pringle, trustee of Elizabeth M. Pringle, his heirs, executors, and administrators,. shall and do well and truly pay, or cause to be paid, unto the above named James R. Pringle, trustee of William Ravenel and Eliza B. his wife, [their] certain attorney, executors, administrators or assigns, the full and just sum of four thousand four hundred and twenty-five dollars and forty-one cents, with legal interest from the date, payable annually, in two equal successive instalments, the first instalment whereof is to be paid on or before the twenty-ninth day of May, which will be in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and forty-two, without fraud, or further delay, then the above obligation to be void, and of none effect, or else to remain in full force and virtue.
      (Signed)
      Jambs R. Peinóle.
      Sealed and delivered in the presence of
      (Signed ) H. A. DeSaussum.
    
   Dunkin, Ch.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is true that the bond adduced, is not the bond of Mrs. Prin-gle, but of the trustee. Yet the bill sets forth expressly, that by what is called the consent decree of May 1841, Mrs. Pringle became the purchaser of her husband’s estate, and undertook, among other things, to pay his four children $17,701 64, as the amount of their shares, and that she executed a bond to William Ravenel for his wife’s share, ($4,425 41,) which was afterwards assigned by him to J. R. Pringle, as trustee of his marriage settlement. The answer made no issue on this allegation. On reference to the Master’s report, which constituted the basis of the decree of May, 1841, in schedule No. 3, Mrs. Pringle is made the purchaser of certain property, and charged with the pajunent of $17,701 66, as the balance due to the children. Among the property, of which Mrs. Pringle is thus set down as the purchaser, is the Cannonsborough House, valued at $24,000, and the plantations on Santee, valued at $42,000. In her will, Mrs. Pringle devises the first, as “ my house in Cannonsborough, where I reside,” and the second she devises to her four children, as “ my plantation and all my lands on Santee River, in the parishes of Prince George, Winyaw, and St. James, Santee and she afterwards provides, that these, and the other beneficial interests under her will, shall be taken, by her several devisees, in full satisfaction of any demand on herself, or her estate, or the estafe of her deceased httsband.

It is nevertheless true, that, although the Master recommended the adjustment set forth in schedule No. 3, and this recommendation was approved and confirmed by the Court, in the decree of May, 1841, yet the same decree recommends, that the Master convey this same property to James R. Pringle, who had been substituted for the original trustee to the marriage settlement of 1807, and it further directs, that the trustee shall pay out of the trust estate the $17,701 66, due to the children of James R. Pringle, deceased. Accordingly, instead of a bond from Mrs. Pringle, to William Ravenel, as set forth in the bill, a bond was executed by James R. Pringle, trustee under the marriage settlement of Mrs. Pringle, to himself as trustee to the marriage settlement of William Ravenel and wife, for $4,425 41, in obedience (as is recited) to the decree of May, 1841. It need hardly be said, that this decree, as well as every thing done under it, is the act of the parties themselves. But it is evident, that the property purchased by Mrs. Pringle, and for which this sum of $17,701 66, was in part the consideration, became, by the declaration of the decree, part of the trust estate under the marriage settlement, and her trustee was directed to pay the amount out of the trust estate, and so it is admitted, or rather stated, in the defendant’s answer. In her will, Mrs. Pringle seems not to have distinguished very precisely between her own estate, and the estate held under the marriage settlement. But, by the terms of the settlement, she was authorised to dispose of the estate among her children in such proportions as she thought fit. Each of the four children had a claim of four thousand four hundred dollars on the estate which she had purchased. The trust estate was augmented by the transfer of this property, and the trustee charged with the paymént of that debt. Mrs. Prin-gle’s will, substantially, declares that the share devised to each shall be received discharged of the incumbrances held by them mutually. This is no more than a legitimate exercise of the discretion vested in her under the power of appointment.

The only question presented by the grounds of appeal, or argued by the counsel, was in relation to the bond of 29 May, 1841. This bond is the creature of the decree of the same date. Mrs. Pringle may well have regarded this as a claim on her estate ” as she so treats the property from which this bond was to be paid. But the intention cannot be mistaken. Regarding the bond, however, as that of the trustee, and the property devised as part of the trust estate, a case of satisfaction, and not of election, is presented. In devising the property, which by the decree was made part of the trust estate, the testatrix declares that it shall be taken by the several devisees, discharged of the respective liens created by that decree. This operates a satisfaction of the bond. It is an appointment to each of so much of the estate less the incumbrance. Such is the manifest object of the testatrix, and so much she was fully competent to do under the settlement of 1807.

The decree of the circuit Court is affirmed.

Dakgan and Wardlaw, CC., concurred.

Decree affirmed. 
      
       Schedule No. 3, accompanying the Master’s report, is as follows:
      
        Schedule No. 3.
      ADJUSTMENT WITH MRS. PRINGLE.
      Dr.
      To Santee Plantation, - - $42,000 00
      “ Cannonsboro’ House - - 24,000 00
      “ 42 Negroes, $400, - - 17,200 00
      Or.
      By property due her, as by Schedule No. X, - - - $36,000 11
      By one third of Mr. Prin-gle’s estate, by Schedule
      No. 2,. 13,429 82
      By debts of estate, assumed
      by Mrs. P., - - - - 16,968 41
      $65,498 34
      Balance, 17,701 66
      $83,200 00 $83,200 00
      To balance due by Mrs. Pringle to estate of Mr, P, ----- - $17,701 66"
     