
    Samuel M. Allen et al. v. Mary Barksdale et al.
    
    1. Chancery Practice. Bill of review. Power of Court over its decrees. A decree winch is a final adjudication upon the rights of the parties, passes beyond the control of the Court after the term at which it was pronounced, and cannot bo changed or altered, except upon a bill of review filed- within proper time.
    2. Same. Same. Same. Case in judgment. A final decree was made in 1852, settling the rights of the parties to certain slaves. After the lapse of more than three years, this bill was filed, alleging that said suit was prosecuted upon a champertous agreement, but the complainants were ignorant of it until a short time before filing of the bill. Held ; the Court had no power to alter or change the original decree passed in 1852; that this is not a bill of review, and if it was, it is not filed within proper time.
    PROM DAVIDSON.
    The bill was dismissed upon demurrer by Frierson, Chancellor, at the November Term, 1858. The complainants appealed.
    J. S. Brien, for the complainants,
    said:
    On the fact of champerty appearing in either of the modes pointed out in the law, the suit must be dismissed. Weedon v. Wallace, Meigs R., 286- to 296'; Vincent v. Ashley, 5 Hum., 593; Webb v. Armstrong, 5 Hum., 379.
    Are these suits still pending? If so, then there is no further questions which need be noticed.
    But suppose them to have been finally determined. Yet we insist that the act of the parties was an open violation of tbe law of the land; was a fraud upon the rights of the complainants; and as these facts were unknown to complainants, being in the* breast of defendants alone, until a short time before the filing of this bill. They have now the right to be heard in this complaint. Belches v. Belcher, 10 Yer., 121 to 182; Story’s Equity, 187; Floyd v. Groodtoin, 8 Yer., 484.
    This case put in issue the title of property acquired by a champetous agreement. The Judge charged the jury on this point, and the Supreme Court say it is correct. See the principles of this case, and the authorities cited.
    The doctrine is well understood, that a contract procured in violation of a public law, is void at the instance of the party injured. Brien v. Williamson, 6 Howard, Miss.. R.
    YeNABLE and Thimble, for the defendants.
   Whisht, J.,

delivered the opinion of the- Court.

This bill cannot be sustained, and the Chancellor acted very properly in dismissing it upon demurrer.

It appears that Wm. Scruggs and Mary Barksdale, in the year 1852, by various decrees- in the Chancery Court at Nashville, in several different- suits against the complainants, succeeded in establishing their title to a large number of slaves.

These decrees were appealed from and affirmed in the Supreme Court of the State, and the causes remanded, to the end, the decrees might be executed.

The slaves were claimed under the will of James Scruggs, who had bequeathed them to Finch Scruggs for life, with remainder to Wm. Scruggs and Mary Barksdale; and the effect of the decrees was to establish their title to the slaves; and that complainants, who were defendants in these suits, should give bond and security to have them forthcoming for delivery, to said Wm. Scruggs and Mary Barksdale at the death of Finch Scruggs, the tenant for life.

The defendants in said suits unite as complainants in this bill, and file it more than five years after the rendition of said decrees, for the purpose of impeaching and setting the same aside.

The ground upon which this is asked to be done is, that the said Wm. Scruggs and Mary Barksdale, prior to the institution of the suits by which they obtained said decrees, had entered into a champertous agreement with Phineas T. Scruggs, to divide the slaves with him when recovered; and that under this agreement the said decrees were had in the names of said Wm. Scruggs and Mary Barksdale. The complainants allege they would have made the defence of champerty to said suits, but were ignorant of it until within a short time of filing this bill.

In other words, the ground assumed is, that they had a defence to the suits of Wm. Scruggs and Mary Barksdale, but did not know it, and now ask that these ■decrees be set aside to enable them to make it. This cannot be permitted.

These decrees were final adjudications upon the rights of tbe parties, and after the adjournment of the Terms at which they were pronounced, passed beyond the control of the Chancery Court, and cannot be altered or changed. Overton v. Bigelow, 10 Yer., 48-52-53; 1 Johns. Ch. R., 543.

It is not pretended that this is a bill of review. And if it was, it is out of place and comes too late.

Decree affirmed.  