
    
      Richard Young et al. vs. Larkin Dinkins et al.
    
    The testator bequeathed slaves to his wife for life, and at her death directed them to fye set free : the Act of 1820 prevented this from being done: .the slaves at the death of the tenant for life reverted to the testator’s estate, and for the want of a residuary clause, under which they could pass, were held to be distributable under'the Act of 1791.
    
      Before Johnston, Ch. at Sumter, February, 1831.
    Johnston, Ch. The only question submitted in this case arises on the following facts.- Wm. Wright, on the 5th of January, 1808, made his will and died the same year. By that will he lent ■ his wife his whole estate during her natural life, and attempted an emancipation of certain slaves in the following wdrds: after the death of my wife (-Martha) “I give Leah, Esther and Letty their freedom.” ■ Martha Wright, about th,eyear 1813, under the advice,of counsel, seized all the slaves and their issue under the Act of 1800, with, the view of vesting. ,the property in herself, which seizure the Court of Appeals has declared vested no property in her. There is no residuary clause in the will. Martha Wright, the widow, died the' -8th Octqber, 1829, having conveyed all her interest- in the said, slaves to the complainants. The distributees of Wm. Wright’ under - the Act of 1791, would be Martha Wright, his widow, and fohr nephews and one niece, whose 'representatives are defendants in this case, and -Mrs. Low, another niece, who is also a defendant. The executor of William -Wright never emancipated said slaves, and since the Act of 1820 they cannot b,e J legally emancipated. If Mrs. Martha Wright was ■entitled to a distributive share of these slaves, then they must be divided, and one-half be assigned to complainants and the other half to the defendants; but if she could not take as dis-tributee, then' the, whole of the slaves should be divided among the defendants according to their several interests.
    The case. is submitted, without argument, and I am of opinion that, the complainants are entitled. It is, therefore, ordered and decreed, that the slaves be divided, equally between the complainants and' defendants,. the complainants taking one-half and the defendants the other half; but it appearing frond the statement of the parties, all of whom -are adults, that there will be great difficulty in making -d division, by the consent 'of .the said parties', it is ordered, that the said slaves be sold by the Commissioner of this Court on a credit of one year and the proceeds be divided among the. parties according to their respective rights. - ■ .
    
      The defendants appealed on the ground that complainants were not entitled to a part of the estate.
    
      Preston, for appellants.
    Blanding, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

O’Neall, J.

In this case we concur in the decision of the Chancellor.

In the Cases of Young and Lenoir vs. Sylvester (1 Bail. 632), it’ was decided that the executory devise of freedom to, the slaves now in dispute after the death of Mrs. Wright'was void, and that they reverted to the estate of the testator at her death. This interest in the testator, or rather in his executors, or administrators, might have passed under the residuary clause of his will, if there had been any, sufficiently comprehensive to pass it. In the absence of any such clause,, he must be regarded as having died intestate as to it, and it is distributable under the Act of distributions. It is perfectly immaterial in. this point of view, whether at the death of the testator, the devise of freedom might have been executed, and subsequently became unlawful, and -therefore, impossible to be executed. It was contingent, and might or might not take effect, and until the actual emancipation took place, the right of property remained in the legal representatives of the testator. The remainder or reversion after the death of his wife, was part of his estate, and upon the executory devise over becoming impossible, that remainder or reversion was undisposed of by his will, and was distributable among his-distributees entitled to distribution at his death.

It is, therefore, ordered and decreed, that the decree of Chancellor Johnston be affirmed.

Johnson and Harper,-JJ. concurred.

Decree affirmed■  