
    Alice Graves, Resp’t, v. Archibald W. Gilchrist, App’lt.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department,
    
    
      Filed February 24, 1890.)
    
    Sn andeb—Evidence .
    In an action for slander, where the answer puts in issue the good character of plain'iff, a witness for plaintiff may testify that in her individual opinion the plaintiff’s character is good ; that the witness knows nothing to the contrary. When the plaintiff’s general character is involved in the issue its nature may be shown and proof of it is not confined to reputation only.
    Appeal from judgment for $800 in favor of plaintiff.
    Action for slander. The words laid in the complaint are as follows: “ Alice Graves has kept a whore house in Rutland during the past winter.”
    The answer is first: A general denial; second, in mitigation that he only repeated what he had heard others say, and third, that at and prior to the time of the alleged slander, the plaintiff was a bad woman, a woman of bad repute among her neighbors.'
    
      L. Fraser, for app’lt; J. M Whitman, for resp’t
   Learned, P. J.

This is an action for slander in which the' plaintiff recovered and the defendant appeals.

The defendant claims that the damages were excessive. A motion for a new trial on that ground was made at the close of the trial. There is no order denying it; and even the case does not show that it was denied. Even if we could review that matter we should not say that the damages were so great as to justify us in setting aside the verdict.

"The defendant does not deny that he spoke the slanderous words. He only says he does not recollect whether he did or not.

Evidence was given on both sides as to the character of the plaintiff, and it was conflicting. The balance was not so strong against her character that we can say that the jury were biasecl improperly in their verdict.

.The defendant objected that one witness called by him to show" plaintiffs bad character was allowed, on cross-examination, to say ■that, personally, he knew nothing against her character. This was not improper.

Another witness called by plaintiff to show her good character testified, on cross-examination, that the favorable opinion which' ■she had given in her direct examination was her individual opinion, and not what people said of plaintiff. The court refused to exclude this; but afterwards struck it out as far as she had given her own opinion.

We think that evidence was admissible. This is not the case of a witness whose testimony is impeached by other testimony as to his bad reputation for truth. The plaintiff’s good character was put in issue by defendant’s answer setting up that she was living separate from her husband and was of a bad repute. Thus the question what her character actually was became directly material on the question of damages. After the defendant had given evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was in fact a woman of bad character, we see no reason why those who know her may not state that they know her character to be good or know nothing to the contrary.

“If his (the plaintiff’s) character be generally bad, independent of the slander of which he complains, the jury may consider it.” Wolcott v. Hall, 6 Mass., 518. “ The plaintiff’s general character is involved in the issue.” 2 Greenl. Evid., 275. And we suppose that evidence of a man’s general character in such cases is not confined to reputation.

We see no error in the case.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Lajstdoit and Mayham, JJ., concur.  