
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Fitzgerald LIGHTNER, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 12-7920.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: May 30, 2013.
    Decided: June 4, 2013.
    David Fitzgerald Lightner, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
   Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

David Fitzgerald Lightner seeks to appeal the district court’s text order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2012) motion. The order is not ap-pealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Lightner has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED. 
      
       Although the district court assumed, without deciding, that it had jurisdiction to entertain Lightner’s motion, the motion was in fact an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion for which Lightner failed to obtain authorization from this court to file.
     