
    Robert GRUNDSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Linda EIDE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-2122.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 18, 2015.
    Robert Grundstein, Morrisville, VT, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Matthew S. Borick, Esq., Downs, Raeh-lin Martin PLLC, Burlington, VT, for Defendants-Appellees.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges, GARY L. SHARPE, District Judge.
    
      
       Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe, of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Robert Grundstein, pro se, appeals from the judgment dismissing his complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants, all of them residents of Washington State. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(2). Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir.1996). In ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), a district court “must determine whether there is jurisdiction over the defendant under the relevant forum state’s laws.” Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir.1999). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction exists. Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir.1994). However, in reviewing a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, we construe all pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiffs favor, DiStefano v. Carozzi N. Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir.2001) (per curiam), though we need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate minimum contacts with Vermont sufficient to support personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Plaintiff contended that personal jurisdiction was proper under the “effects test” applied by the Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones. We agree with the district court’s distinction of that authority: Grundstein failed to show that the defendants’ conduct in this case was “calculated to cause injury” to him in Vermont. See 465 U.S. 783, 791, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984).

Unlike certain cases on which Grund-stein relies, the defendants in this case have not voluntarily subjected themselves to personal jurisdiction by filing an action to enforce a foreign judgment. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated in the district court’s thorough opinion and order.

We have considered all of Grundstein’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  