
    Zanas KHAN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-3224-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 15, 2012.
    
      Zanas Khan, pro se, Buffalo, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Douglas E. Ginsburg, Assistant Director; Paul Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
    
    
      
      . The Honorable Roger J. Miner, originally a member of the panel, died on February 18, 2012. The two remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement, have determined the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b); United States v. Desimone, 140 F.3d 457 (2d Cir.1998).
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Zanas Khan, a native and citizen of Pakistan, seeks review of a final order of removal, In re Zanas Khan, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 12, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. The only issue for review is whether the agency erred in denying Khan’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture based on an adverse credibility determination.

Where the BIA issues its own decision and does not adopt the IJ decision, we review only the BIA decision. See Huang v. Holder, 591 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir.2010). We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence standard, treating them as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir.2008). Because Khan filed his application for relief after May 11, 2005, we apply the credibility standard imposed by the REAL ID Act of 2005 (“REAL ID Act”), Pub.L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 302 (2005). Under that standard, considering the totality of the circumstances, an IJ may base an adverse credibility determination on any inconsistencies or inaccuracies in an asylum applicant’s statements without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii).

Substantial evidence supported the agency’s adverse credibility determination. The Board identified three inconsistencies or omissions in Khan’s statements and determined that the IJ had not erred in relying on them. Our review of the record confirms that the Board accurately described the discrepancies, and that the discrepancies reasonably cast doubt on Khan’s veracity. In particular, Khan’s attachment to his asylum application described an attack against Khan’s brother that was precipitated by Khan’s expected attendance at his cousin’s wedding, but Khan failed to mention that attack at his 2006 hearing, even after the IJ prompted him to provide any additional reasons he feared return to Pakistan.

While Khan plausibly suggested that translation difficulties contributed to the IJ’s adverse determination, the BIA was not compelled to credit that explanation because Khan had requested the Urdu interpreter and had not expressed an inability to understand her until after the IJ had denied relief. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, Khan failed to identify any specific inaccuracies in the IJ’s determination attributable to translation error.

Finally, the Board did not err in basing its affirmance in part on Khan’s failure to provide corroborating evidence. Once the IJ concluded that Khan was incredible, the IJ could require Khan to present reasonably available corroborating evidence to support his application. See Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir.2011).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED and the pending motion for a stay of removal is DISMISSED as moot.  