
    William Whitesides vs. H. S. A. Poole.
    Where creditors of a son-in-laW seek to subject to their demands a negro which the father-in-law had permitted to go into the son-in-law's possession, it need not appear that the possession of the son-in-law was adverse.
    In a suit in this State the law of North Carolina must be proved before a question can be made under it.
    BEFOEE WAKDLAW, AT SPABTANBUBG-, EXTEA TEEM, SEPTEMBER 1855.
    The report of his.Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows:
    “ Trover for a slave Prudence.
    “ The plaintiff lives in Rutherford County, North Carolina, ten miles or more beyond the Court House; is old, and has, for twenty years, been so crippled with rheumatism that he cannot walk without help ; has twelve children, who have all left him, and has about twelve negroes. To some of his children he has given a negro a piece, to others not. Fifteen or twenty years ago, Charles Dunkin, who is a carpenter, made a runaway match with Sarah, a daughter of plaintiff. After the marriage, Dunkin lived three or four years at Mon-ford’s Cove, in Rutherford county, and subsequently he was for a year or so at Rutherford Court House, and for five, six or more years in Marion, in McDowell county, North Carolina. In the meantime he lived a year or so at the plaintiff’s, before he went to Marion. In 1850 or early in 1851, he came to work at Spartanburg Court House, leaving his family in Marion. In July or August, 1851, he took his family to the plaintiff’s, and there they remained until September, 1851, when he with them removed to Spartanburg, where they all yet remain.
    “ Prudence, a black girl, now twenty or more years old, was born the plaiptiff’s. To Monford’s Cove, Mrs. Dunkin took with her Lucy, a girl born the plaintiff’s. Lucy ran away and returned to the plaintiff’s. Prudence, then a small girl, went to Monford’s Cove in Lucy’s place, and ever afterwards, until she was seized by the Sheriff, was in the possession of Dunkin, wherever his family was.
    “ In July, 1854, the defendant levied on Prudence as Dun-kin’s property, under many writs of fieri facias against Dunkin, and a mortgage by Dunkin to F. Cantrell; and in August, 1854, sold her to Cantrell for four hundred and thirty-five dollars, which was applied to the mortgage. Prudence was then worth from seven to eight hundred dollars, and was demanded from the Sheriff by plaintiff’s agent whilst she was in jail, before she was sold.
    “ Richard Whitesides, a son of plaintiff’s, who lives near to his father, in his testimony stated much of what precedes, and further, as follows:
    “ At a camp-meeting in Rutherford county, in August, 1851, I came in during a conversation between father and Dunkin. Father said that he would not let Dunkin have Prudence, but if he had a chance he would buy a girl and make her over to Dunkin’s wife and children ; that he was afraid Dunkin was so involved that he could not hold property. Dunkin said that he had no objection, he did not want the right in himself.
    “ A few days afterwards, just before sister Sarah came to Spartanburg, in a conversation between her and father, father said that he did not intend to let her take Prudence, or any of his family negroes, but if he had an opportunity he would- buy a girl and Settle on her and her children. Sarah said she could not do without Prudence. Father then said, she might take her for a while, and he would buy one for her and her children. Under this arrangement Prudence was taken when Dunkin was not present.
    “From the beginning father was not willing to make a right to Dunkin. Dunkin gave father several notes, three or four, before he came to Spartanburg. I saw one he gave whilst he was at Marion. I think it said, “for the hire of a negro girl,” and was for twenty or twenty-five dollars. Whilst Dunkin was at Marion, Ann, the mother of Prudence went and stayed with sister several months, in case of sickness, until father sent for her; but Prudence was the only girl in Dunkin’s possession when he gave the notes; she had not been long, not over two or three years in Dunkin’s possession, when I saw the first note.
    “ In Defence —The defendant showed twenty-nine writs of fieri facias; some against Charles Dunkin, and some against Jarrott & Dunkin, partners, of whom Charles Dunkin was one : entered in October, 1853, March, 1854, and June, 1854 — also, the mortgage to E. Cantrell, dated December .30,1852, including Prudence and another girl, about 23 years old, called Charlotte.
    “ Jefferson Choice, Esq. — Lived very near Dunkin in Spartan-burg village. Dunkin had bargained with Cantrell for a hotel and lot, and I was called on to draw the papers. Dunkin offered to give for securing the purchase money, a mortgage of the house and lot, and also of his negroes. He proposed to sell the negroes; Mrs. Dunkin said, they had better keep the negroes that year. I asked about title; Dunkin said there was nothing against them, all was right; I might search the records. I drew title deeds, a bond and mortgages. Dunkin went into possession of the house.
    
      íl Creorge A. Setzler. — In July, 1854, I had business i'n Rutherford, and went as a witness with Cantrell to the plaintiff’s house. Cantrell asked plaintiff if he had heard that the Sheriff had levied on Prudence. The plaintiff answered, “ No. I sent the girl with Dunkin and his family, and intended her for them, but never became satisfied to make a right to them.” Cantrell asked plaintiff if he had ever had any writing about the girl. Plaintiff answered “No.” Cantrell, “Is there any entailment?” Plaintiff, “No.” Plaintiff said Dunkin had had possession of her seven or eight years; that the girl was his (the plaintiff’s) because he had never given any bill of sale — that he had sent her to wait on his family. He said nothing about the laws of North Carolina, nor about hiring her to Dunkin, nor about any other negro.
    “ In reply. — The plaintiff called Joseph Elford whose house Dunkin had built, W. Petty, a constable, and Jamess Lee, who all testified that from workmen who came with Dunkin to Spartanburg, they had understood that Dunkin was much indebted in North Carolina, and that the negroes in his possession were not his own.
    “ No evidence was adduced concerning the law of North Carolina, nor was any North Carolina statute cited, but a general statement in argument was made, that by the laws of North Carolina, the title of a slave cannot be transferred without writings.
    “ It appeared to me that the plaintiff, by permitting his slave to come into this State, had subjected her to the laws of this State.
    “ I instructed the jury to inquire concerning the facts, and amongst other questions, submitted these : Did the plaintiff, if owner of the slave, enable his son-in-law to hold himself out as the owner in such manner as might have deceived creditors ? and did Oantrall and others extend credit to him upon the faith of the deceitful appearances held out ?
    “ The jury found for the defendant.”
    The plaintiff appealed, and now moved this Court for a new trial on the grounds:
    ' 1. Because the possession of the girl, sued for, by Dunkin, was not adverse to the right of the plaintiff, and being only for a temporary purpose, could not confer any right on the creditors of Dunkin.
    2. By the laws of North Carolina, where the plaintiff resides, to confer title to negroes, requires a conveyance in writing.
    3. Because Dunkin was known where he lived, not to be the owner of the girl.
    4. Because the verdict was against law and evidence.
    
      Bolo, 'for appellant.
    
      Thomson, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Whitner, J.

In delivering the judgment of the Court, I do not propose to discuss the general doctrines applicable to this class of cases.

No question thereupon is involved that has not often been the subject of inquiry and adjudication.

The plaintiff, the former owner of the slave in question, placed her in the possession of his son-in-law, where she remained for a series of years, first in North Carolina, and subsequently in this State. In South Carolina the son-in-law, whilst in possession of the slave, contracted debts and also executed a mortgage of her. The defendant, as sheriff by virtue of certain writs of fieri faeias, and the mortgage, levied on and sold the slave as the property of the son-in-law, and this action is brought to recover her value.

The presiding Judge directed the jury to inquire, and by their verdict they affirm, that the plaintiff enabled the son-in-law to hold himself out as the owner, in such manner as might have deceived creditors, and that Cantrell (the mortgagee) and others extended credit to him upon the faith of the deceitful appearances held out.

In the first ground of appeal it is suggested that the possession of the son-in-law was not adverse, and only for a temporary purpose, and therefore, the rights of creditors could not attach.

The first branch of this proposition is too strongly met by the authorities which lay down the principles on which such a case must rest, and the second branch, by the facts — whether the possession was adverse or not, might be very material in a contest between parent and child, and yet as between the parent and subsequent creditors, amount to nothing at all.

Archer vs. McFall, Rice, 73; Ford vs. Aiken, 1 Strob. 93; and Burgess vs. Chandler, 4 Rich. 170, whatever may be the shades of distinction at which they respectively arrive, will be found to vindicate fully the course pursued by the Judge on circuit. The question submitted to the jury embraced the precise points of the case, and, though I do not propose to review the testimony, I may add that, on the case made, we are of opinion the verdict was well authorized.

On the second ground in reference to the laws of North Carolina, it may be requisite to add a few words. The mode of authenticating a statute of another State, is prescribed by Act of Congress, and the usual proof therefore when relied on is by an exemplification certified by the proper officer. In this State, we have gone a step further. In a case heard many years since, a well known Digest of the Laws of Georgia was regarded competent: Allen vs. Watson, 2 Hill, 319. In a case, 1 Dallas, 458, it was held that a pamphlet purporting to be printed by the Printers for the Commonwealth of Virginia, should be received rima facie. I do not see any well founded objection to the admission of a book bearing the impress of publication by the proper authorities of the State, and it is not improbable that from the comity that prevails by the interchange of the statutes amongst the States, and the frequent occasion for reference in our administration of justice, such a rule may prevail. Though on this point really no duty has been devolved upon me. Whether a statute of the import suggested would under the circumstances of this case have varied the result, or whether as was said by the presiding judge in his report, that the plaintiff by permitting the slave to come into the State, had subjected her to the laws of this State, are not questions now. No evidence was adduced on this subject, • and some such was indispensable before the question could be raised.

The motion for new trial is dismissed.

O’Neall, Ward law, Withers and Munro, JJ., concurred.

Appeal dismissed.  