
    The Executors of George Leiby v. Jacob Wolf et al.
    The registry of a deed; the grantor and grantee in which are both out of the chain of title as recorded, is no notice to a subsequent purchaser.
    This is a bill in chancery from the county of Hamilton.
    Jacob Wolf held a lease, from the commissioners of Hamilton county, duly executed, but never recorded. While in possession under the lease, he made a mortgage to George Leiby, which the plaintiffs, his executors, now seek to enforce. The mortgage was duly recorded.
    Wolf, while in possession, sold his estate in the land to Marcus Smith, who had actual notice of the mortgage.
    Marcus Smith procured a new lease from the commissioners, which was duly recorded. .
    
      Marcus Smith afterward sold the lease to Samuel S. Smith, who denies, by his answer, any notice of the mortgage.
    Samuel S. Smith afterward sold to David Boring, who also purchased without actual notice of the mortgage.
    Upon this state of facts, the question is raised, whether Boring holds the land free from the mortgage or not.
    W. R. Morris, for the plaintiff:
    The registry of the mortgage is conclusive notice against all subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers. 1 Story’s Eq. 390 ; 8 Amer Com. Law, 303. The record estops the defendants from saying that they are innocent purchasers, without notice, nor can the plaintiffs be called upon to prove notice at all. 1 Story’s Eq. 392. Under the registry act of Ohio, a deed or *other instrument [84 duly recorded, is notice to all the world. Nor can the effect of such notice be evaded by any subsequent management between the original vendor and any other purchaser.
    But the case shows that the defendant had actual notice. Where a subsequent purchaser, by the use of reasonable diligence, can acquire the knowledge of a fact, the law presumes him to know it. Cunningham v. Buckingham, 1 Ohio, 264; Ohio Cond. 127 ; Reader v. Barr, 4 Ohio, 446 ; Sug. Tend. 484, 498; 8 Amer. Com. Baw, 305 ; 1 Story’s Eq. 384.
    A more possessory interest in land may be mortgaged; also, a mere equitable right. Powell on Mortg. 23; Parkert v. Alexander, 1 Johns. Ch. 394.
    Wolf, while in possession, with at least an equitable title, for a valuable consideration, gave the plaintiff this mortgage, which is duly executed and duly recorded. How, then, is the title of a subsequent purchaser to be preferred to that of the plaintiff?
    Storer and Fox, for the defendants.
   Lane, C. J.

Whenever the state of the title on record would lead a searcher of incumbrances, who was using common prudence and care in investigating the title, to a knowledge of the fact, the law assumes that he acquired the knowledge of it. A purchaser’, therefore, from Wolf, ought to learn all conveyances, from Wolf, existing on record at the time- of his purchase.

But where the series of deeds runs on a line entirely different, and there is nothing to connect the name or the interests of a third person with any part of it, it would be unreasonable to impule to the searcher a knowledge of the acts of such third person. Here Wolf was not in the connection of title at all; Loring, searching for incumbrances, would, be led, first, to Samuel S. Smith ; next, to Marcus Smith, and third, to the commissioners, 85] without any indication of Wolf’s interests,- or *the notice of any fact showing his relation to the estate. It seems that such a purchaser should be protected from claims which no ordinary prudence could detect.

■Bill dismissed.  