
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Barry BUKER, Louis Stephenson, Defendants, Donald Lauber, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 09-1499-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 11, 2009.
    
      Jarrod W. Smith, Syracuse, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Gwendolyn Carroll (Ransom P. Reynolds, of counsel), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Andrew T. Baxter, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY, for Appellee.
    Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges, LOUIS L. STANTON, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Louis L. Stanton of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Donald Lauber appeals from a judgment imposed April 13, 2009 (Suddaby, J.), sentencing him principally to 16 months’ imprisonment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and specification of issues on appeal.

We review a district court’s sentence for “ ‘reasonableness.’ ” United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 65 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)). Our review proceeds in two steps. First, we determine whether the district court has complied with the procedural requirements of the Sentencing Reform Act. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc). “A district court commits procedural error where it ... treats the Guidelines as mandatory ... does not consider the § 3553(a) factors, ... [or] fails adequately to explain its chosen sentence.” Id. at 190 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As to substantive reasonableness, we will “set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. at 189 (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted).

Lauber argues that the district court erred in failing to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although we have “refrained from imposing any rigorous requirement of specific articulation [on] the sentencing judge,” United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir.2005), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Lake, 419 F.3d 111, 113 n. 2 (2d Cir.2005), in this case, the district court explicitly stated that it had reviewed and considered the factors outlined in § 3553(a). Therefore, this argument is without merit. The same is true for Lau-ber’s argument that the district court treated the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, in violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). There is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court did not understand that the Guidelines are advisory.

As to Lauber’s argument that the district court improperly relied on Lauber’s Canadian convictions, the Canadian convictions were actually not used in calculating Lauber’s criminal history category and the district court did not upwardly depart under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.3. The district court was permitted to consider the “history and characteristics of the defendant” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and we find no error in its treatment of Lauber’s Canadian convictions. Finally, we disagree with Lauber that his sentence is unreasonable given the less severe sentences imposed on his co-defendants. As the district court observed, whereas each of Lauber’s co-defendants had one minor past offense, Lauber had a long criminal history beginning in 1991. The district court also indicated that Lauber’s role in the offense was greater than his co-defendants’.

We have considered all of Lauber’s other arguments and find them without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  