
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Leonard WOLF, also known as Sealed Defendant 1, Defendant-Appellant.
    16-2631-cr (L)
    16-3576-cr (CON)
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    October 27, 2017
    Appearing for Appellant: Matthew B. Larsen, Federal Defenders of New York, Appeals Bureau, New York, N.Y.
    Appearing for Appellees: Jonathan Cohen, Assistant United States Attorney (Niketh Velamoor, Michael Ferrara, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), for Joon H. Kim, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, N.Y.
    Present: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-Appellant Leonard Wolf, also known as Sealed Defendant 1, appeals the judgment of conviction entered against him on July 28, 2016 by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Wood, J.), following a guilty plea by Wolf to the charges of: (1) conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, and (2) wire fraud. Wolf challenges the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing following his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We assume the' parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 permits a defendant to withdraw his accepted plea anytime before sentence is imposed if the defendant “can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). While “this standard implies that motions to withdraw prior to sentence should be liberally granted, a defendant who seeks to withdraw his plea bears the burden of satisfying the trial judge that there are valid grounds for withdrawal.” United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “To determine whether the defendant has proffered a fair and just reason to justify withdrawal, a district court should consider, inter alia: (1) the amount of time that has elapsed between the plea and the motion; (2) whether the defendant has asserted a claim of legal innocence; and (3) whether the government would be prejudiced by a withdrawal of the plea.” United States v. Doe, 537 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where a motion to withdraw a plea is premised on involuntariness, the “defendant must raise a significant question about the voluntariness of the original plea.” United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir. 1997).

“A defendant is not entitled to an evi-dentiary hearing as a matter of right whenever he seeks to withdraw his guilty plea.” Gonzalez, 970 F.2d at 1100. “Although the standard to be applied in granting a hearing is less rigorous than the standard for granting the motion to withdraw the plea, the defendant must present some significant questions concerning the voluntariness or general validity of the plea to justify an evidentiary hearing.” Id. (citation omitted). “No hearing need be granted when the allegations on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing merely contradict the record, are inherently incredible, or are simply conclusory.” Id.

We “review a district court’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 2006). The same standard of review applies to a district court’s decision not to hold an evi-dentiary hearing before denying a motion. See Doe, 537 F.3d at 212.

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to hold an evidentia-ry hearing. The district court here solicited affidavits from Wolfs two trial attorneys in order to rule on Wolfs motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although Wolfs affidavit provided specific allegations, none were particularly credible given Wolfs pri- or behavior, his statements at his plea allocution, and the trial evidence available to the district court. Trial counsel’s affidavits, in contrast, provided detailed descriptions of the events, which account for Wolfs decision to plead guilty after days of what the district court described as “devestating” trial testimony, as well as the half-year delay. between his plea and his motion to withdraw. It was thus within the district court’s discretion to determine that there was no need to provide Wolf with an opportunity to cross-examine his trial counsel where Wolf had failed to credibly suggest a valid ground for the withdrawal of his guilty plea.

We have considered the remainder of Wolfs arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.  