
    Philip M. Manning, Appellant, v. The Standard Theater Company, Respondent.
    St. Louis Court of Appeals
    November 12, 1895.
    Jurisdiction, Appellate: appeal prom taxation op costs. An order taxing the costs of a suit is merely an incident of that suit; and ■ a separate appeal to this court from an order denying a motion for the recaE of an execution for costs is not warranted, where an ■appeal from a judgment on the merits of the cause is pending in the • supreme court.
    
      Appeal from the St. Louis City Circuit Court. — Hon. Daniel Dillon, Judge.
    Transferred to supreme court.
    
      M. and James B. Kinealy for appellant.
    
      T. J. Bowe for respondent.
   Rombauer, P. J.

The plaintiff took an appeal from an order of the court, refusing to recall an execution which has been issued against him for the amount of thefees of a special commissioner and a stenographer appointed to take the testimony of a witness. We are requested to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order is one from which no appeal lies.

The case, in' which the costs were taxed, is an action of ejectment. It appears from the transcript of the record before us that the plaintiff in the action was compelled to take a nonsuit, but it does not appear what became subsequently of the main case. On our suggestion the parties have filed a stipulation, by which it appears that the main case was appealed to the supreme court and is now pending there on appeal.

The order taxing these costs is a mere incident to the main suit. The fact, that-the plaintiff has saved his exceptions to the order by separate bill, does not warrant a separate appeal to a court other than the one in which the appeal in the main case is pending. Hence, we must order the transfer-of this case to the supreme court, which has exclusive jurisdiction of the appeal in that case.

All the judges concurring,

it is ordered that this case be transferred to the supreme court.  