
    E. Jennings v. John Springs.
    It is within the discretion of the Court, to,permit a hill to be amended, hv substituting the name of a new, for the original complainant, even after answer filed; but it must he upon payment of all the costs, up to the time of the amendment, as well as of the amendment itself.
    This was a motion to rescind an order made by De Saits sure, Chancellor, at York, July, 1830, permitting the complainant to amend his bill, upon payment of the costs of such amendment, by substituting the names of the executors of William Pressley, for his own ; the bill having been filed by him, as their agent, and his own name erroneously inserted, as complainant. The order was objected to, as the defendant had answered, but the objection was overruled.
    Hn.ii, for the motion,
    cited Butterworth v. Bailey, 15 Ves. 363, Godwins. Godwin, 3 Atk. 370, and Dennison v. Little, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 11, in note; and contended, that the order was unprecedented and irregular, and introduces a new practice, in the highest degree inequitable and pernicious. It is substantially, a permission to the complainant, to dismiss his bill without costs, and to make the defendant a party to a new suit, without process. A new answer must be put in by the defendant, and no provision is made for the costs of that already filed ; nor can they be taxed in the new suit, if the new bill is dismissed. It is obvious, that if such an order as this can be made, a defendant may be harrassed, ad infinitum,, with sujt aqei. su¡t) ¡n tjje names 0f successive parties, until he is ruined by costs and expenses.
    Pressley, contra.
    
    The order was clearly within the discretion t|le (Chancellor, and was neither irregular, nor unprecedented. In the case of Godwin v. Godwin, which has been cited, it was conceded, that a bill may be amended, by making new parties, even after the cause has been set down for hearing ; and it is every day’s practice, to strike out the names of-parties, having no interest, and who have been improperly joined. Admitting that the order is substantially the dismissal of the bill, and the substitution of a new suit $ yet, it is difficult to conceive, what injury this can occasion to the defendant. It is said, that the costs of his answer ought to be paid ; but there is no reason why they should, unless a new answer is necessary : and a new answer is not made necessary by the amendment, and scarcely any verbal amendment. If further amendments are deemed advisable, it is not because the amendment of the bill requires it; and if a new answer is filed, there can be no reason for it, but such as would render the defendant justly liable for the costs. The costs are always subject to the discretion of the Chancellor; and that discretion has been wisely exercised in this case.
   Johnson, J.

We are of opinion, that the order made in the Circuit Court was within the discretion of the Chancellor; but we think the complainant should be required to pay all the costs, up to the time of the amendment, as well as of the amendment itself: and it is so ordered. This seems,, indeed, to be the necessary effect of the order of the Circuit Court, and this order was thought necessary, only, to remove any doubt on the subject.-

O’Neall, J., and Harper, J., concurred.

Order modified.  