
    In the matter of Deming, alias Daniels, and his children.
    NEWYORK,
    May, 1813.
    
      it seems, that a pvrson sentenced to the /or&;/lq’ar!(i pardoned, is restored to duties as a/>acomésntttied to the custody of his infant children, who had been placed under the care of a guardian, appointed during his civil death. The effect of the pardon is to acquit the offender of the penalties annexed to the conviction, and to give him a new credit and capacity ; but it does not affect or annul the second marriage of his wife, nor the sale of his property by persons appointed to administer on his estate, nor devest his heirs of the •interest acquired in his estate in consequence of his civil death.
    ^ MOTION was made in behalf of Deming for the allowance . 4 ® of a writ of habeas corpus to bring up his mfant children, in the custody of their mother and one J. 8.
    
    ^ appeared that Deming, in June, 1810, was convicted of passing counterfeit money, and sentenced to the state prison for life, having, at the time, a wife and two children, and some property. By the statute, (sess. 24. c. 58. s. 10.) persons adjudged to imprisonment for life, in the state prison, are declared to be , civilly dead to all intents and purposes in law.” In January, 1811, his wife married a second husband; and in July, 1811, she and J. 8. were appointed guardians of the children, who were put under the care of their mother and her second husband. On the 19th of May, 1812, Denting obtained a pardon from the go» vernor, by which he was “pardoned, remised, and released from the offence, and from all sentences, judgments and executions thereonand he now claimed the possession and custody of his children. The question raised for the consideration of the court was, whether Denting, by the pardon, was restored to his parental l ights, and entitled to the custody of his children ?
   Per Curiam.

The court do not mean to preclude a further and more full consideration of the question on the return of the habeas corpus, if the parties should not, in the mean time, accommodate and preclude its return; but,the present impression of the court is in favour of the applicant’s right, and the following reasons have occurred: No conviction under our law works corruption of blood, or forfeiture of property, except in cases of treason. The effect of the pardon was to acquit the offender of all the penalties annexed to the conviction, and to give him a new credit and capacity. The limitation to the operation of a pardon on his antecedent rights is, that it cannot devest any person of any right, or interest, which the law had permitted to be acquired and vested, in consequence of the judgment. (Hawk. tit. Pardon, c. 37. s. 34. 54.) It, consequently, cannot annul or affect the validity of the second marriage of the wife, nor the sale of any of the property of the convict by the persons who had, in the mean time, been appointed to administer upon his estate, nor "his heirs of the vested interest acquired in his estate, in consequence of his civil death. But the pardon restores Mm to the relation of father, and there cannot have occurred any intervening right to defeat it. With the rights it would seem as if he must be restored to the duties of a parent, and be bound to maintain and protect his infant children; and, consequently, entitled to the custody of them. The guardian appointed during his civil death, was. but a trustee 'without any vested interest, and he cannot be affected in interest hy a cessation of that trust. Policy and humanity require that we should give to the convict so pardoned as complete a restoration of his private rights as may be consistent with the interv~ fling rghts and interests of others.

The writ of habeas corpus ought to be allowed.

Motion granted.  