
    LI GHUANG YOU, aka Li Guang You, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-3293.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 31, 2016.
    Fuhao Yang, Law Offices of Fuhao Yang, PLLC, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Leslie McKay, Assistant Director, Kristofer R. McDonald, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Li Ghuang You, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a July 26, 2012, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Li Ghuang You, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. July 26, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that You’s motion to reopen, filed in 2011, was untimely because the BIA issued a final order of removal in 2002.

You contends, however, that his recent membership in the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) constitutes materially changed conditions excusing his untimely motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). As the BIA properly determined, You’s political activities constituted changed personal circumstances, which are insufficient to excuse the un-’ timely filing of his motion to reopen. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir.2006) (making clear that the limitations on motions to reopen may not be suspended because of a “self-induced change in personal circumstances” that is “entirely of [the applicant’s] own making after being ordered to leave the United States”); see also Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.2008) (concluding that the system does not permit aliens who have been ordered removed “to disregard [those] orders and remain in the United States long enough to change their personal circumstances (e.g., by having children or practicing a persecuted religion) and initiate new proceedings via a new asylum application”).

Moreover, You’s evidence does not compel the conclusion that the treatment of political dissidents in China has worsened since 2000. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (the BIA’s factual findings are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (reviewing BIA’s factual findings regarding changed country conditions under substantial evidence standard). Notably, none of You’s evidence related to individuals, like himself, who joined the CDP in the United States, or showed that conditions for political dissidents in China had changed since his merits hearing. See In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007) (“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compares the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  