
    Charles BRAXTON, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Case No. 2D15-3473
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Opinion filed March 10, 2017
    Charles Braxton, pro se.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Cerese Crawford Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Charles Braxton, Jr., appeals the order summarily denying his motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(2), which provides an exception to the two-year time limit for newly established constitutional rights that have been held to apply retroactively. We reverse.

In 1987, a jury found Mr. Braxton guilty as charged of second-degree murder and of armed robbery. The trial court departed from the sentencing guidelines and imposed concurrent sentences of life imprisonment. In his postconviction motion, Mr. Braxton argued that because he was a juvenile at the time of the offenses, his life sentences are unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2475, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (holding that a mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment categorically forbids a mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole for a juvenile who commits a nonhomicide offense). Both of these cases apply retroactively. See Falcon v. State, 162 So.3d 954, 956 (Fla. 2015) (applying Miller); Kleppinger v. State, 81 So.3d 547, 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (applying Graham).

Relying on Starks v. State, 128 So.3d 91, 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), quashed, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S372, 372 (August 22, 2016), the postconviction court denied relief. But while this appeal ivas pending, the supreme court disapproved Starks. See Landrum v. State, 192 So.3d 459, 470 (Fla. 2016) (holding that a discretionary life sentence imposed on a juvenile without consideration of how children are different is unconstitutional under Miller); see also Lawton v. State, 181 So.3d 452, 453 (Fla. 2015) (holding that Graham does not allow for an exception to the categorical rule against sentencing juvenile offenders to life imprisonment without parole for non-homicide offenses).

Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction court’s order denying Mr. Braxton’s rule 3.850 motion and remand for resen-tencing pursuant to chapter 14-220 as codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes (2014). See Henry v. State, 175 So.3d 675, 680 (Fla. 2015) (holding that resentencing pursuant to chapter 14-220 is the proper remedy for a sentence that violates Graham); Horsley v. State, 160 So.3d 393, 406 (Fla. 2015) (holding that resentencing pursuant to chapter 14-220 is the proper remedy for a sentence that violates Miller).

Reversed and remanded.

LaROSE, CRENSHAW, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.  