
    Joseph Ingersoll versus John Jackson.
    A vessel’s being liable to condemnation for a breach of the embargo laws of the United ¿states, at the time of executing a bill of sale of her, was holden to be within the usual covenants of warranty in a bill of sale.
    
      Covenant broken, on a bill of sale of a sloop and appurtenances, with the usual covenants of warranty. The breach was alleged as follows, viz.: “ Now, the plaintiff in fact avers that the said Jackson was not then the lawful owner of said sloop and appurtenances, and that he had no right and authority to sell the same to the plaintiff or his assigns; but the said sloop, with her appurtenances, at the time of making and executing said deed, had violated the embargo laws of the United. States, so called, and on her return to a port of the United. States, to wit, the port of Boston, in the district of Massachusetts, the said sloop was seized by the custom-house officers of the United States, libelled and condemned in the District Court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, sold by order of said court, and the net proceeds of said sale paid into the treasury of the United States.”
    
    Several issues to the country were joined, on all which a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, excepting that it was found that the plaintiff knew' that the said sloop had violated the embargo laws of the United States at the time of making and executing the bill of sale.
    
      Bigelow,
    
    for the defendant, moved the Court that judgment be arrested, and he assigned as causes, —
    1. That there was no allegation that the offence against the embargo laws was committed before making the bill ot sale; *nor that the seizure and condemnation were on account of an offence committed before that time.
    2. If it were so alleged, and so appeared, yet this was not wdthin the covenants against encumbrances. This was no debt or charge of bottomry for debt, or repairs, or wages of seamen, which must have been the only meaning of the parties to the deed. Since the fact of the breach of the embargo laws was known to the parties, it is absurd to suppose the covenants extended to that liability.
    3. It is not alleged that the plaintiff made any defence against the condemnation. As he was an innocent purchaser, he might have prevented it.
    4. The condemnation might have been for a fact committed before the defendant owned the vessel, and he might have been wholly ignorant of it.
    5. The plaintiff knew the fact, and by purchasing the vessel, he wras aiding to defraud the United. States of the forfeiture which had been incurred. He was then particeps criminis; and the contract being founded in fraud, the Court will not interfere as between the parties to it.
    
      Welsh for the plaintiff.
   By the Court.

The declaration in this case is certainly very imperfect. The breach of the covenants is much too loosely alleged. No reference is made to any statute of the United States, the provisions of which had been violated by the vessel to which the covenants relate Had the objections been taken on demurrer, we must have ruled the declaration bad. But as the breach is substantially alleged, and the jury have found a verdict for the plaintiff upon it, we do not think the exceptions sufficient to warrant an arrest of the judgment.

The fact found,-that the plaintiff was himself knowing to the offence which had been committed by the vessel, cannot operate to protect the vendor from the consequences of his own voluntary contract,

Judgment on the verdict. 
      
      
         [Vide Spring vs. Tongue, ante, p. 29, and note. — Ed.]
     