
    Johnson v. Happell.
    'Where the matter in controversy is valued at or amounts to 5100, exclusive of interest and costs, and no more, the District and Justices’ Courts have concurrent jurisdiction.
    The jurisdiction, conferred on the District Courts by the tenth section, of the fourth article of the Constitution is not exclusive. Inferior courts may be invested with jurisdiction concurrent with the District Courts over the subjects mentioned in that section.
    The conferring upon an inferior court jurisdiction of a case of which a superior court has jurisdiction renders their jurisdiction concurrent, but nob inconsistent.
    Error from Guadalupe. The plaintiff in error brought suit against the defendant in error, in March,-1848, in a Justice’s Court, on a promissory note ¡for the payment of $100. The justice gave judgment-for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed to the District Court. The defendant there moved to -dismiss, upon the ground tliat the justice had no jurisdiction of the case, the amount being within, the jurisdiction of the District Court. The court sus■tained the motion and dismissed the case, and the plaintiff obtained a writ of error to this court.
    Neill, for plaintiff in error.
    This case was dismissed from the District Court because the justice had no jurisdiction.. The suit is brought on a note for $100 'before a justice of the peace who entertained jurisdiction. We conceive there ■is no conflict between the 10th section of tire Constitution, article 4, and the law regulating proceedings before justices. Tito Constitution is only directory, and does not give exclusive jurisdiction to District Courts for that sum, and the 17th section, same article, clearly sets that matter at rest. (Acts of 1848, p. 109, sec. 35.) The question has also been fully settled by this court at last ¡term in case of Love and Chappell v. McIntyre. (Aulanier v. The Governor, 1 Tex. R., 653.)
    
      Gordon, for defendant in error.
    The court having, at its last term, in the case of Love and Chappell v. McIntyre, decided tlie most material point involved in this case, it is with great deference to the court that the defendant in error a- k-s leave to again bring- the point before them, to-ask that it be again com!' red.
    T • fst •••('; ¡’.'-i of article IV of the Cons ' Ton yi- "des that the judicial pov. - ...hall b - --ested in one Supreme Co: - , in DT t Courts, and in such inf ,: ranfla the Legislature may iron: .‘me. toll * ordain and establish. Sec V.i 10 drllues the original jurisdiction 1 the IT 'it Courts, and grants them a general •nperintendcnce and contr 1 over inf; , ..n- courts. Section 17 provides that ju tices of the peace shall have -noli civil and criminal jurisdiction as shall be provided for by law. Section 1 ! provides "or trial by jury, in all causes arising out of contracts, before inferior tribunals, where the amount in controversy shall exceed 010. Every part of the article must be taken into view, and that construction must he, adopted which will consist with its words and promote its general intention, (ñ IT. Í3. Cond. It., 111.) The court may imply a negative from affirmative words, whore the implication promotes the intention. "(Id.) It is therefore submitted that tlie Legislature cannot create any judicial tribunal which is not inferior and subordinate to the Supremo and District Courts. It is also out of the power of the Legislature to deprive tho District Courts of any of their consritutional jurisdiction, either directly or indirectly. IE any portion of tho original jurisdiction of the District Courts can he conferred cm Justices’ Courts, it can-all he so conferred. To have original jurisdiction is to have power Lo try a cause upon its merits. But the Constitution guarantees to every citizen that his rights shall be tried according to tlie due course of the law of the land. A trial according to the course of tho law of tlie land in any particular of jurisdiction embraced in the 10th section of the 4th article is a trial upon tho merits in tlie District Court. It is no answer to say that an appeal to tlie District Court and a trial de novo are allowed. Tlie appeal is given by the Legislature, and may be taken away. If the appeal should he taken away, and the plaintiff should elect to bring his suit for 0100 before a justice, the defendant could not obtain a trial of his cause upon its merits according to the duo course of tho law of tlie land; that is, in the District Court. As it. is, the appeal (that is, tlie trial according to the due course, of the law of tho land) is allowed upon onerous terms only, upon tiie condition of giving bond and under Ihe penalty of incurring ten per cent, damages. The jurisdiction of the eaino obtained in this way by the District Court is not conferred by the Constitution, but by tlie ordinary law.
    It is further respectfully submit led that tho District Courts cannot have original and appellate jurisdiction in the Mime, cases. (Cohns v. Virginia, 5 II. S. Cond. II., Ill); Murbnry r. Madison, 1 Id., 28:2; 2 IlillE., 139.)
   IViiEEi.r.R. J.

The only quest ion presented for oiu- consideration is upon, the ruling of the court in dismissing tho case for tlie supposed want of juris-clioTon in the justice.

In support of llio judgment it. is insisted that as the subject-matter of tho suit is within tlie original jurisdiction of the District Court, as given by.lie Constituí ion, it was iiot competent for the Legislature to confer jurisdiction of the same subject-matter upon the, Justices' Courts, and that the act assuming to do so is unconstitutional and void.

Tlie jurisdiction of tlie District Court is conferred by Ihe 10th section of the 4th article of the Constitution, which,-among other subjects of jurisdiction, declares that the District Court shall have original jurisdiction of all suits where “ tlie matter in controversy shall be valued at or amount to one hundred dol- “ iars. exclusive of interest.”

The 17th section of tlie samo article of the Constitution declares that “jus- “ líeos of the peace shall have such civil and criminal jurisdiction as shall he “ provided for by law.” And tlie 25lh section of the “ act to organize Justices’ Courts,”’ provides that “they shall have jurisdiction in all suits “and actions for the recovery of money, on any account, bond, bill, note, or “ other instrument of writing; of all suits and actions for the recovery of spe- “ cifio articles or the value thereof; of-all suits and actions for torts, trespasses, “and other injuries to person or property', where the amount claimed or the “value of the articles or the damages sought to bo recovered shall not exceed “ one hundred dollars, exclusive, of interest and cost.”

By these provisions the District and Justices’ Courts are given a concurrent jurisdiction, where the amount in controversy is 8100. And it is not perceived that there is any repug-nancy or conflict between them. Had the jurisdiction conferred upon (he District Court boon an exclusive original jurisdiction of the subject-mailer of this suit, it would not have been competent for the legislature to confer jurisdiction of the same subject-matter upon any other tribunal. And the argument against the constitutionality of the act conferring this jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace must proceed upon the supposition that that conferred upon the District Courts by the Constitution is exclusive ; for unless it be so in effect it cannot operate au inhibition upon the Legislature, to confer the same jurisdiction concurrently upon another court. This proposition seems too evident to require illustration or to admit, of controversy. The proposition, then, upon which the whole argument for the appellee rests is that the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution upon the District Court is in effect an exclusive original jurisdiction. And this proposition is not, it is conceived, correct. To adopt it would be in effect to interpolate in the provision in question the word “exclusive,” and, instead of “shall have exclusive original jurisdiction,” to make the provision read, “shall have exclusive jurisdiction.” Had tills been intended by the framers of the Constitution, they would doubtless have employed language appropriate to convoy their meaning.

Had the jurisdiction conferred upon each court, been by legislative enactments in the same language employed, it would not, it is presumed, be questioned that it woukThave been concurrent in each court, and of course exclusive in neither. And it is not perceived that it affects the question that the jurisdiction is conferred upon one court by the Constitution, and upon the other by the statute, since the former is not excluí ive, and there is no inconsistency or conflict between the provisions. The conferring upon an inferior court jurisdiction of a case of which a superior court has jurisdiction renders their jurisdiction concurrent, but not inconsistent. It does not deprive the superior court of its jurisdiction. (4 Ala. R., 272.), And this is in accordance with the opinion of this court in the case of Love & Chappell v. McIntyre, decided at the last term; from which we see no reason to depart.

We are of opinion, therefore, that it was competent for the Legislature to give to the Justice’s Court jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this suit: that there is no conflict between the Constitution and the statute in tiiis respect; 'that the justice, therefore, had jurisdiction, and that the court erred in dismissing the case. Tile judgment must therefore he reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Judgment reversed.  