
    Skipwith v. Clinch.
    [April Term, 1800.]
    Lease — Rents — Scale of Depreciation. — A takes a lease of B in May ’77 for 21 years. In August 1778 a similar lease of the same estate is executed. The rents are to he settled by the scale of May 1777.
    Interest — Rents.—Interest upon the rents refused.
    This was an appeal from a decree of the High Court of Chancery. Where Clinch as executor of Holt together with the children of Holt brought a bill against Skipwith stating, that on the 23d of May 1777 Skip-with leased of Holt an estate for twenty years at ;£160. per annum, with a proviso for payment of the further sum of £50. per annum provided there should be peace between G. Britain and America, the said ;£50. to commence with the peace. That another lease was afterwards executed between the said parties, in every respect like the former, except that the latter is dated on the 31st of August 1778 instead of the 23d of May 1777. That the only reason for executing the second lease was, that the first had not been recorded. That the plaintiffs can prove that specie and not paper money was contemplated in the said lease. The bill states the plaintiffs rights to the rents under the lease; the deed for which it states to have been lost. And prays that the defendant may be compelled to pay the rents and perform the other covenants in the lease, and for general relief.
    The answer admits the two leases; but states that the second was a new contract, as there had *been a misunderstanding between the parties relative to the first. Denies that it was a specie contract: and says it would not have been worth above a fourth or third of the nominal rent, had it been payable in specie. States that the taxes, owing to the unjust valuation of the land by the commissioners, are excessively high, with other circumstances and difficulties, which have attended the contraen.
    The deposition of a witness states, that Skipwith informed him there was a lease of a date prior to that of August 1778, but that the last had been executed at the particular request of Holt; although there was very little variance between them.
    Another witness says, he understood from all he could learn from either party, that the rent was to be paid in specie, or (what he understood" by that expression) good money.
    Another witness says he witnessed the original lease, which he has lately seen ; and at the bottom was a note in' the hand writing of Holt as the deponent was informed, in these words, “This lease renewed the 31st of August 1778,” but that the deponent, knows nothing of the last mentioned lease.
    Another witness says the plaintiff Clinch told him that the defendant had paid Holt the first years rent in paper money, as appeared by Holt’s books; and that he believed the reason why he did not annually pay it, to have been because Holt would not receive it.
    Another witness says he lived with the defendant in 1778 and wrote the last lease, which he attested as a witness.
    The two deeds appear to be the same, except as to their dates.
    The Court of Chancery was of opinion, that the rents were payable according to the value of ‘money at the date of the first lease, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to the same benefits under the last lease as if it had been executed on the date of the first. That court therefore decreed, the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs, ^"300. of the present current money of Virginia, for the arrearages of the rents on the 1st of January 1784, (taken for the date of the peace) ; and £1044. of like money for the arrearages to the 1st of January 1797, with liberty to sue writs of scire facias from time to time to recover future arrears, and that upon all trials at law the defendant should admit the deed of the 31st of August 1778 to be of like force, as if executed in May 1777. From which decree Skipwith appealed to this court. And the plaintiff likewise petitioned for an appeal, because the court had scaled the rents instead of decreeing them in specie; and because interest was not allowed upon the rents.
    Randolph for the appellant.
    There is no pretext for considering this as a specie contract; as there is in fact nothing to shew that it was meditated by the parties, and the answer denies that it was a specie contract. The true way is tp consider it as a contract of the date of the last deed, and subject to the scale of that period. That is the only legal notion, and the circumstances lead to a belief that the parties intended it as a new substantive contract of that date. Consequently the depreciation is to be settled by the scale at that time; and none of the cases in this court are against us. Pleas-ants v. Bibb, 1 Wash. 8, is rather in our favor; because the principle which it establishes is, that you cannot antedate the period of depreciation, unless there is something upon the face of the instrument to authorize it; but here there is nothing. The same doctrine was held by the court in stronger and more explicit language in Bogle Somer-ville & co. v. Vowles; and there, evidence of the date of the original contract was actually ^refused. Which was an express determination in the very point contended for by us; because there is nothing particular in our case to take it out of the common rule. Finally the principles laid down by the Court in Watson v. Alexander, instead of militating against the position we contend for, will on due examination, be found to be consistent svith it. Interest was properly disallowed by the Court of Chancery under all the circumstances of the case; for the full value of the rent was agreed to be given, had there been no change in the property; and in event it has proved a very hard bargain.
    Wickham contra.
    The stile of the last deed evidently shews that the drawer had the first before him ; and that the latter was intended merely as a renewal of the first, the time for recording of which had expired. Consequently Pleasants v. Bibb, 1 Wash. 8, cited by the appellants counsel operates against him, and in every point applies in our favor. For the last deed is for payment of rent from a day anterior to the date. The case of Bogle Somerville & co. v. Vowles is very different from this, and cannot affect it; because there was nothing, in that case, to form a ground of enquiry into the date: for it was a naked case, unattended with circumstances. As to Watson v. Alexander, the spirit of that determination is clearly in our favor. Besides all those were cases at common law where more strictness obtains; but this is a case originating in the Court of Chancery, and therefore to be governed by the principles of Equity. At the least we are entitled to the value of the money at the date of the first deed. But there is strong ground to infer that specie was intended by the parties; for the lease was a long one, and probably to last beyond the period of the war: and at the close of that the rent was to be increased. All which circumstances lead to a belief that specie was the object of the parties. ^Interest ought to be allowed upon the rents; because they were liquidated and certain ; in which case, and especially where there have been long delays, interest has been given. 1 Wms. 542; 2 Vez. 170; 3 Aik. 579; 2 Wms. 163.
    Randolph in reply.
    _ Pleasants v. Bibb was fully considered in Bogle Somerville and company v. Vowles; which makes the authority of the latter more conclusive. That those were cases at common law does not alter the rule; because the act makes no difference between a Court of Raw and a Court of Equity in this respect. On the contrary it gives equal power to both Courts to decide according to Equity. The circumstances of this case are particularly hard; and therefore interest ought not to be allowed.
    Cur. adv. vult.
    
      
      Paper Money — Scale of Depreciation —The principal case is cited in Meredith v. Salmon, 21 Gratt. 774.
    
    
      
      nterest — Upon Rent Arrear, — The principal case is cited with approval in Newton v. Wilson, 3 H. & M. 491, 499 ; Mickie v. Wood, 5 Rand. 573 ; Deans v. Scriba, 2 Call 419. See Cooke v. Wise, 3 H. & M. 483 ; Dow v. Adam, 5 Munf. 21.
      Same — Discretion of Court. — The principal case is cited approvingly in Newton v. Wilson, 3 H. & M. 406, for the proposition that a court of chancery, in its discretion, and under circumstances, may give or refuse interest on rents. See Graham v. Woodson, 2 Call 253.
      Same — Claim Doubtful. — The principal case is cited in Stearns v. Mason, 24 Gratt. 404, for the proposition that the court ought not to allow interest when the claim, though just, is doubtful, or where the amount is unliquidated and uncertain. See Kerr v. Love, 1 Wash. 172; McConnico v. Curzen, 2 Call 358; Rootes v. Stone, 2 Leigh 650; Auditor v. Dugger, 3 Leigh 241, and monographic note on “Interest" appointed to Fred v. Dixon, 27 Gratt. 541.
      Principal Case. — In Skipwith v. Clinch, 2 Call 253, interest on the rents was denied, although the rent had been 20 years due ; because there was on the leased estate, abundant property of the tenant, whereof distress might have been made.
    
    
      
      1 Gall’s Rep. p. 244.
    
    
      
       Washington’s Rep. 340.
    
   BYONS, Judge,

Delivered the resolution of the Court, that there was no error in the decree in establishing the date of the contract ; and as to the interest that the plaintiffs were not entitled to it. Because if it was certain they might have distrained, and therefore should not have lain by and suffered the interest to accumulate; and if it was uncertain (as they themselves plainly shewed it was, by contending, at one time, that it was specie, and at another, that .the lease was to be considered as of a different date from that admitted by the defendant, and therefore they did not venture to dis-train) then, according to the very cases relied on by the plaintiff’s counsel, interest was not demandable. Nor ought the plaintiffs to have interest from the -time of the decree; because they had themselves appealed as well as Skipwith, and therefore contributed to rendering the amount uncertain and undetermined still.

Decree affirmed.  