
    Richmond.
    Peatross v. M’Laughlin.
    1849. April Term.
    
    ^ -(jp0n a m0ti0a to dissolve an injunction before answer of the defendant, all the allegations of the-bill must be taken as true.
    2. A judgment debtor having obtained his discharge as a bankrupt subsequent to the judgment, may enjoin the suing out or levy of any execution upon said judgment.
    
      William L. Peatross in March 1847, applied to the Judge of the Circuit court of Pittsylvania for an injunction to restrain proceedings upon a judgment which had been recovered against him in that Court in 1838 by Daniel M’Laughlin. The bill stated that Peatross had been taken on a capias ad satisfaciendum which issued on the judgment, and that he had in March 1838, been discharged from custody upon taking the oath of an insolvent debtor. That previous to that time, he had made a general deed of trust for the benefit of his creditors; that the trustees had proceeded to sell the property, and that a negro man named Harrison had been sold by them and bought by James M. Williams for Pealross, and placed in his possession. That in the year 1842, Pealross had, upon his application, been regularly decreed to be a bankrupt, and had obtained his discharge. That in 1847, M’Laughlin had sued out an execution of fieri facias on the judgment of 1838, and caused it to be levied on the negro boy Harrison ; and that the sheriff had the said negro in possession, and had advertised him for sale.
    The injunction was awarded; and at the May term of the Court, M’Laughlin appeared, and without filing an answer, moved the Court to dissolve the injunction ; which motion the Court sustained, and dissolved the injunction, whereupon Pealross applied to this Court for an appeal, which was allowed.
    Grattan, for the appellant.
    Patton, for the appellee.
   Baldwin, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Court is of opinion, that the Circuit court erred in dissolving the injunction in the proceedings mentioned, inasmuch as the appellee by declining to answer the appellant’s bill, must be regarded, on the motion to dissolve, as admitting the same to be true ; and it appearing from the statements in the bill, that the judgment enjoined had been discharged by the proceedings in bankruptcy therein alleged, it was competent for a Court of equity to relieve the appellant against the suing out or levy of any process of execution upon said judgment.

Decree reversed with costs, injunction reinstated, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.  