
    Suckling, Appellant, v. Most Excellent Assembly of the Artisans’ Order of Mutual Protection.
    
      Beneficial associations — Death benefits — Compliance with constitution and by-laws — Amendment of constitution and by-laws.
    
    A certificate of a beneficial association provided for the payment of $2,000 to the legal heirs of a member, named, “provided always nevertheless, that before his death he shall have fully complied with the charter, constitution, rules, by-laws and regulations of the order.” The original constitution provided for a payment of a death benefit of $2,000. Shortly after the date of the certificate, the constitution was so changed that thereafter the death benefits paid were only $1,000 to the heirs of a member. The member did not surrender his certificate, but continued to pay the same charges as theretofore, which were the same as were being paid by the other members, who were, under that amendment, entitled to only $1,000 death benefits. He never after the amendment paid the premiums which were required to place him in the rank of members who were entitled to receive $2,000 benefits. Held, that as the member’s certificate, which evidenced his contract, had incorporated in it “ the constitution, rules, by-laws and regulations of the order,” a lawful change in the constitution or by-laws worked a corresponding change in the contract binding on the member: Hale v. Equitable Aid Union, 168 Pa. 377; Hayes v. German Beneficial Union, ante, p. 142, distinguished; Chambers v. Knights of Maccabees, 200 Pa. 244, followed.
    Argued Dec. 13, 1906.
    Appeal, No. 222, Oct. T., 1906, by plaintiffs, from judgment of 0. P. No. 2, Phila. Co., March T., 1904, No. 2,093, for plaintiff on case stated in suit of John T. Suckling et al. v. The Most Excellent Assembly Artisans’ Order of Mutual Protection.
    Before Rice, P. J., Porter, Henderson, Morrison, Orlady, Head and Beaver, JJ.
    Affirmed.
    Case stated to determine liability for death benefits.
    From the case stated it appeared that on January 17, 1876, the defendant, a beneficial association, issued to John Suckling a beneficiary certificate which contained the following clauses:
    “Therefore this corporation doth hereby grant unto him this beneficiary certificate, pledging to pay to the legal heirs or other legal representatives of the said John Suckling, the sum of Two thousand Dollars, lawful money of the United States of America, to be paid within sixty days after due proof of his death.
    “Provided always nevertheless, that before his death he shall have fully complied with the Charter, Constitution, Rules, By-Laws and Regulations of the Order whether of the Most Excellent Assembly, The Excellent Assembly of his State, if such there be, or of the Subordinate Assembly of which he was a member and entitled to death benefits at the time of his death.”
    The original constitution provided that the death benefits should be $2,000 payable to the heirs or legal representatives of a deceased member. On February 10, 1876, the constitution was amended as to death benefits as follows:
    Sec. 3. “Upon the death of a member of the Order in good standing in his Subordinate Assembly his heirs or legal representatives shall be entitled to receive from the death benefit fund .of the Most Excellent Assembly, within sixty days from the date-that the Most Excellent Recorder shall receive due proof of his death, such amount as the Most Excellent Assembly shall determine from year to year, not less than $500.00, nor more than $2,000.00.”
    In accordance with the amendment resolutions were passed each year until 1890, fixing the amount at $1,000. In 1890 the constitution was further amended by classifying members, and members paying such premiums as entitled them to a death benefit of $1,000, were placed in the first class, and those paying premiums as would entitle them to death benefits of $2,000, in the second class.
    The case stated incorporated further facts, as follows:
    9. The said John Suckling knew of the various changes in the constitution above set forth, but never assented thereto, unless that fact be implied from the payments as herein set forth, and never surrendered his certificate upon which this suit is brought. In his subordinate assembly after 1890 he frequently protested against the changes thus made and against the said resolutions passed by the Most Excellent Assembly which also were known to him, and he never stated to which class after 1890 he wished to belong. From the time of the amendment of 1876 to that of 1890 he paid the same charges as theretofore, which were the same as were being paid by the other members who were, under that amendment and the resolution passed in pursuance thereof as above set forth, entitled only to $1,000 death benefits; and from and after 1890, he continued to pay the same dues as theretofore and was regarded as a -member of the first class. He also knew that he was carried on the books as a member of the first class, and charges paid by the subordinate assembly to which he belonged on that basis only, which was different from that paid for members of the second class.
    The court entered judgment for plaintiff on the case stated in the sum of $1,145. Plaintiff appealed.
    
      Error assigned was in entering judgment for the plaintiff for $1,145 on the case stated.
    
      Horace L. Henderson, with him Thomas J. Baldrige, for appellants.
    — The amendment of the laws, if applied against Suckling, were in derogation of the terms of his certificate, and the defendant could not, without Suckling’s consent, thus alter or modify his certificate: Hale v. Equitable Aid Union, 168 Pa. 377'; St. Patrick’s Male Beneficial Society v. McVey, 92 Pa. 510; Chambers v. Knights of Maccabees, 200 Pa. 244.
    February 28, 1908:
    The Hale case has since been cited or followed in numerous cases in which the power of amendment, though expressly reserved, has been held not to extend to the alterations of a contract contained in a certificate: Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 104 Fed. Repr. 638; Supreme Council of American Legion of Honor v. Getz, 112 Fed. Repr. 119; Supreme Council of American Legion of Honor v. Jordan, 117 Ga. 808 (45 S. E. Repr. 33); Legion of Honor v. Black, 123 Fed. Repr. 650; Life Association v. Tuttle, 87 111. App. 309; Lanagan v. Legion of Honor, 174 N. Y. 266 (66 N. E. Repr. 932); Morton v. Supreme Council, 100 Mo. App. 76; Gaut v. Legion of Honor, 107 Tenn. 603 (64 S. W. Repr. 1070); Wuerfler v. Order of Druids, 116 Wis. 19 (92 N. W. Repr. 433); Newhall v. Legion of Honor, 181 Mass. Ill (63 N. E. Repr. 1).
    
      Francis Skunk Brown, with him Joseph T. Taylor and Alex. Simpson, Jr., for appellees.
    — Under the charter of incorporation the judgment below is clearly right: St. Patrick’s Male Beneficial Society v. McVey, 92 Pa. 510; Com. v. Equitable Ben. Assn., 137 Pa. 412; Masonic Aid Assn. v. Jones, 154 Pa. 99; Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489 (20 N. E. Repr. 479).
    Plaintiffs’ ancestor was estopped, and they claiming only through him are also estopped from claiming more than f1,000. Moreover, the judgment below is right even if the certificate alone is to govern: Supreme Lodge v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489 (20 N. E. Repr. 479); Poultney v. Bachman, 31 Hun (N. Y.), 49; May v. N. Y. Safety Reserve Fund Society, 14 Daly (N. Y.), 389; Reynolds v. Order of Heptasophs, 10 Pa. Dist. Rep. 528; Chambers v. Knights of Maccabees, 200 Pa. 244.
   Opinion by

Head,J.,

In Hayes v. Beneficial Union, ante, p. 142, we considered at length some of the legal principles proper to be applied in the construction of beneficial certificates issued by societies like the appellee. What was there said we need not here repeat. Were the present case, in its facts, like that one, nought would remain but to enter the judgment contended for by the appellants in accordance with the doctrine there enunciated. But a careful study of both cases, in the light of the authorities, leads to the conclusion they are to be broadly distinguished. The distinction between them is essentially the same that led the Supreme Court to different conclusions in the cases of Hale v. Equitable Aid Union, 168 Pa. 377, and Chambers v. Knights of Maccabees, 200 Pa. 244.

It is to be remembered, in all such cases, that the member who purchases such certificate, thereafter occupies a dual relation towards his society. He ceases not to be a member, and in this relation he is bound, like every other member, by the obligation to obey the laws that may be, from time to time, duly ordained for the government of the society and its members. His refusal to do so may be punished in such reasonable and appropriate manner as the laws themselves may prescribe. But he also maintains a contractual relation, and his contractual rights, when once fixed and established, cannot afterwards be impaired or destroyed by any act merely of the other party, he not assenting. In other words the law will not presume that such contracting party, merely by the expression of his willingness to obey the by-laws of his society, has assented to the proposition that the penalty for a subsequent neglect or refusal to obey such laws, shall be the loss of his rights, under a contract which, in its terms, does not incorporate as a part of it or need in explanation or construction of it, such by-laws.

But the member who elects to become beneficial has, like every other person sui juris, an unlimited capacity to contract so long as the paramount law or established policy of the state be not contravened. If he choose to write in and as a part of his contract, that the benefits therein specified shall become due and payable only on condition that he shall have, down to the date of his death, “fully complied with the charter, constitution, rules, by-laws,” etc., there is no reason why he should not be bound thereby. The law will not aid him in enforcing his right and at the same time permit him to evade or refuse to perform the condition on which the right rests. This is precisely, as we view it, the situation of the present plaintiffs. The existence, in the body of the certificate, of the proviso from which we have just quoted, is the impassible barrier that separates the plaintiffs from the recovery they seek. This it is that distinguishes the present case from Hale v. Equitable Aid Union and Hayes v. German Beneficial Union, ante, p. 142, and classes it with Chambers v. Knights of Maccabees. Under the authority of the latter we must hold that the plaintiffs can recover only such sum as, after compliance with the Constitution and by-laws by their decedent, they would have the right 'to claim. Under the facts agreed upon in the case stated it clearly appears that such compliance on his part would have left him a member of what is called the first class of beneficiaries whose claims cannot exceed $1,000. The judgment entered by the learned court below is exactly responsive to the doctrine here indicated and the assignment of error must therefore be dismissed:

Judgment affirmed.  