
    No. XXII.
    Rebecca Cummings, Administratrix, v. Oliver Jones.
    (See .)
    
      Appeal from Austin County.
    
    
      
      .—Cummings v. Jones, p. 530.
      In order to maintain motion against executor or administrator, claim must be duly authenticated, presented and rejected. Darly v. Chevalier, Dal., 555; Graham v. Vining, 1 T., 639; Tompkins v. Bennett, 3 T., 36, 49; Harrison v. Knight, 7 T., 47; Hall v. McCormick, 7 T., 269; Millican v. Millican, 13 T., 460; Thompson v. Branch, 35 T., 21; Bank v. Higgins, 72 T., 66; Jenkins v. Cain, 72 T., 88; Kiolbassa v. Raley, 1 T. C. A., 165; Perkins v. Traynham, 3 App. C., sec. 78; Ballard v. Murphy, 4 App. C., sec. 171; Rainer v. Taylor (T. C. A.), U. R. C., 1897. Presentation and rejection alter suit is filed is not sufficient. Thompson v. Branch, 35 T., 21. And authentication, presentation, rejection an<p date of same should be specifically alleged and proved. Darly v. Chevalier, Dal., 555; Graham v. Vining, 1 T., 639; Graham v. Vining, 1 T., 669; Hall v. McCormick, 7 T., 269, 278; Deen v. Duffield, 8 T., 235; Fulton v. Black, 21 T., 424; Wiley v. Pinson, 23 T., 486; Walters v. Prestidge, 30 T., 65; Swift v. Trotti, 52 T., 498; Tolbert v. McBride, 75 T., 95; Rogers v. Harrison, 1 App. C., sec. 495. Indorsement on claim rejecting it, is prinja facie proof of rejection, in absence of plea of non est factum. Tolbert v. McBride, 75 T., 95. These rules are as applicable to claims secured by liens as to unsecured claims. Graham v. Vining, 1 T., 699; Graham v. Vining, 2 T., 433; Danzey v. Swinney, 7 T., 617; Conkrite v. Hart, 10 T., 140, 141; Crossby v. McWillis, 11 T., 94; Duty v. Graham, 12 T., 427, 437; Robert - son v. Paul, 16 T., 472, 475; Cunningham v. Taylor, 20 T., 126; Converse v. Sorley, 39 T., 515; Buchanan v. Wagnon, 62 T., 375; Wilson v. Harris, 91 T., 427. It is not necessary to verify and present claim to independent executor before bringing suit. Pleasants v. Davidson, 34 T., 459; Black v. Rockmore, 50 T., 88, 99; Smyth v. Caswell, 65 T., 379; Ellis v. Mabry, 25 T. C. A.. 164. If executor allows claim and rejects lien, suit can not be maintained to foreclose lien. Mortgage Co. v. Jackman, 77 T., 622; George v. Ryon, 94 T., 317; Moore v. Glass, 6 T. C. A., 368. In such cases the lien must be enforced through probate court and not by an independent action in another court, except where claimant has some legal or equitable right connected with claim, which can not be adjudicated in probate court. Cunningham v. Taylor, 20 T., 126; Cannon v. McDaniel, 46 T., 303; George v. Ryon, 94 T., 317; Moore v. Glass, 6 T. C. A., 368; Perkins v. Traynham, 3 App. C., sec. 78. When both claim and lien on land are rejected, only remedy is in district court. Leslie v. Elliott, 26 T. C. A., 578. Presentation to and rejection by one of several executors is sufficient to authorize suit. Deen v. Duffield, 8 T., 235. Failure to present claim within one year from appointment of administrator does not defeat action to foreclose lien. Phillips v. Mortgage Co., 90 T., 195. When a lien claim is rejected, claimant may have judgment in district court for establishment of lien as well as debt. Cunningham v. Taylor, 20 T., 126; Perkins v. Sterns, 25 T., 561; George v. Ryon, 94 T., 317 (reversing George v. Ryon (T. C. A.), U. R. C., 1900); Jenkins v. Cain (T. Sup.), U. R. C., 1889. Presenting claim without presenting lien is sufficient presentation, though the better practice is to present both. Danzey v. Swinney, 7 T., 617; Cundiff v. Simpson, 32 T., 144; Cannon v. McDaniel, 46 T., 303; Mortgage Co. v. Jackman, 77 T., 622. Presenting claim alone is not waiver of lien. Ball v. Hill, 48 T., 634; Kempner v. Comer, 73 T., 196; Sutherland v. Elmendorf, 24 T. C. A., 137. In a contest between lien creditors, appellant can not on appeal object for first time that appellee’s claim was not duly authenticated and presented, where administrator is not party to appeal. Watt v. White, 46 T., 338. Holder of vendor’s lien note is not required to present claim to administrator of deceased indorser before bringing’ suit against maker to foreclose lien. Watt v. White, 46 T., 330.
    
   JACK, Justice.

This cause is brought by appeal from the District Court of Austin County. It was an action brought in that court by Oliver Jones against Rebecca Cummings, administratrix of John Cummings, to recover damages on a breach of covenant by the intestate in his lifetime. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, a new trial was asked for and refused by the court, and the defendant appealed. The record contains a statement of facts, certified by the judge below, containing many material facts as to the contract and breach thereof on the part of the intestate, and damages sustained by the plaintiff. But it does not show that the plaintiff proved a demand of the administra-trix and her refusal to allow the claim as a debt against the estate. The counsel for the appellee insist that this court ought to presume that a demand was proven, inasmuch as the defendant’s counsel below raised no objections to the want of such evidence, nor asked any charge of the judge in relation to it. This position would, we think, be correct, if the record itself did not contain a certificate of the judge that the statement of facts sent up contains all the evidence introduced on the trial below. We are bound to take the record as true. The question then presented to us is: did the plaintiff make out his case in the district court? The statute (volume 4, page 116) directs, that no bearer of a claim against a succession shall commence an action against such succession before presenting such claim to the administrator, etc., for allowance. That if the claim be not allowed by the administrator, the owner thereof, for the purpose of establishing the same, may bring his action, etc.

The petition must contain an allegation of such demand and refusal, and it is equally necessary to prove it. This proof in the case before us was not made in the trial below.

The verdict of the jury was Dot sustained by the evidence and a new trial ought to have been granted.

Let the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.  