
    GEORGE M. DAVIS, DOING BUSINESS AS THE CONSOLIDATED SUPPLY COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES
    [No. B-88.
    Decided January 28, 1924]
    
      On the Proofs
    
    
      Public printing; authority of executive officers. — All executive officers of the. Government are required by the acts of January 12, 1895, 28 Stat. 622, ancl June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 697, 762, to have all Government printing done at the Government Printing-Office, except in cases otherwise provided by law, ancl such officers can not obligate the United States by acting contrary to the provisions of said acts..
    
      The Reporter's statement of the case:
    
      Mr. Richard S. Harvey for the plaintiff.
    
      Mr. J. Robert Anderson, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Robert H. Lovett, for the defendant.
    The following- are the facts of the case as found by the court:
    I. Plaintiff, George M. Davis, is a resident of the District of Columbia, and during the year 1918 conducted a business under the name and style of the Consolidated Supply Company.
    II. On July 17, 1918, the plaintiff was given an order by the purchasing officer of the United States Fuel Administration, Washington, D. C., to print for the said Fuel Administration a quantity of letterheads containing the words “United States Fuel Administration, Washington, D. C. In your reply refer to,” to be delivered in Washington, D. C., at the price stated in the order, $750.00. The printing so required was executed by the plaintiff and 500,000 printed impressions containing the aforementioned heading were thereafter delivered to the Fuel Administration in Washington, D. C.
    III. On June 20,1919, the plaintiff received a communication from the Auditor for the State ancl Other Departments stating that claim for compensation stated in the purchase order hereinbefore mentioned had been rejected because of the provisions of section 87 of the act .of January 12, 1895, 28 Stat. 622.
    On November 21, 1919, the plaintiff appealed from said • decision of the auditor to the Comptroller of the Treasury, who, on or about December 11, 1919, affirmed the action of the auditor in disallowing said claim.
    On March 13, 1922, the plaintiff applied to the Comptroller General for a reconsideration of the decision of the Comptroller of the Treasury in affirming the action of the auditor. On April 1, 1922, the Comptroller General reaffirmed the previous decisions denying payment of this claim.
   MEMORANDUM BY THE COTJRT

This case was before the Auditor for the State and Other Departments and afterwards before the comptroller, on appeal. The claim was disallowed in both instances. While the claim is beyond doubt an equitable one, we find no legal way for the rendition of judgment. Section 87 of the act of January 12, 1895, 28 Stat. 622, provides: “All printing, binding, and blank books * * * for the executive and judicial departments shall be done at the Government Printing Office, except in cases otherwise provided by law.” This statute, taken in connection with section 2 of the act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 697, 762, clearly imports a positive inhibition against an executive officer going outside the Government Printing Office for supplies such as are here involved. The comptroller has for a long time and without exception disallowed claims of a similar nature, and Ave are unable to discover in the record any fact or circumstance which makes of' this case an exception. Where a statute in express language circumscribes the authority and power of an officer of the Government and expressly directs the manner of secui'ing supplies of the character here furnished, we are not, in the absence of borne precedent to that effect, authorized in holding the United States liable for a contract made in direct opposition to existing law.

The cases cited in the very able brief of plaintiff’s counsel do not meet the issue. If an officer of the Government is positively forbidden to enter into a contract, and in addition to this is mandatorily directed to act in a certain way under prescribed conditions, he may not disregard the mandate of the law and obligate the United States in so doing. His authority to act is derived from the statute.

The petition is dismissed.  