
    LEWIS WHITFIELD vs. THOMAS LONGEST & AL.
    The ordinance of the corporation of a town, which is authorized to abate nuisances within the town, and which declares that hogs running at large are nuisances, operates as well upon non-residents, who suffer their hogs to run within the limits of the town, as upon those who are actnal residents. The case of Hellen v. Noe, 3 Ired. 495, cited and approved.
    Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Carteret County, at the Spring Term,. 1846, his Honor Judge Manly presiding.
    This was an action of trespass, to recover damages for taking a parcel of hogs. On the trial below, the following case agreed was submitted to the Court:
    The defendant, Longest, was the Constable of the town of Beaufort, in the County of Carteret, and the other defendants Commissioners. The latter made and published an ordinance, whereby the running at large of hogs in the streets was declared a nuisance, and forbidden ; and it was ordained “ that each and every hog, found at large in the town, will be taken up and put in pound, and advertised to be sold on the third day, unless the owner thereof shall pay the charges for taking up such hog or hogs. And if sold, the money arising therefrom, after paying the charges, shall be paid over to the owner.” The Constable is authorized to charge thirty cents for the taking up, and ten cents a day,'for keeping each hog. The plaintiff does not reside within, but adjacent to, the town, and his hogs being found at large in the streets, were, by the defendant Longest, by virtue of the ordinance, taken up. Notice was duly given to the plaintiff, and he was informed, that if he would'pay the charges, as established by the ordinance, the hogs would be restored to him. This he declined, and after due advertisement, they were on the third day sold; and this action brought. The presiding Judge gave judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed.
    
      Iredell, for the plaintiff.
    
      
      J. W. Bryan, for the defendant, submitted the following argument:
    The Commissioners of Beaufort had the power, under the act of the Legislature, to pass the bye-law, and it was for them to determine whether it was expedient and necessary, and for the Court solely to decide upon its reasonableness. Hellen v. Noe, 3 Ired. R. 493. It would therefore be a complete justification to the defendants, if it operated upon the property of the plaintiff, who was a stranger, and did not live within the limits of the corporation of Beaufort. In Cuddock v. Eastwick, 1 Salk. 192, it is laid down that a corporation is properly an investing of the people of the place with the local government thereof, and therefore their law shall bind strangers. In Pierce v. Bartruni, Cowp. 269, a bye-law of the corporation of Exeter to prohibit butchers and other persons from slaughtering any beast within the walls of the city, was holden to bind the defendant, though not a member of the corporation, upon the principle that whoever comes to reside in any place, for however short a duration of time, is an inhabitant pro hac vice, and consequently is bound by the same regulations as the other members of the corporation are; and, being so subject to the byelaws, is chargeable with notice of the same. Village of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wendell’s Rep. 100. And though in Franklin v. Green, 1 Bulstr. 11, a bye-law of the corporation of butchers, merely respecting the manner of preparing a particular sort of meat, was holden not to bind strangers, yet it is there said that the law “ would have been good to bind strangers, if made to suppress fraud, or any other general inconvenience.” There cannot be a greater general inconvenience and nuisance to 'a town, than that of permitting hogs to run at large in the same, rooting up the streets, &c.; and if. this were not obviously so, it is sufficient for the defence, that the Commissioners deemed it a nuisance, and to remedy the same, passed the ordinance in question, which it is admitted they had a right to do, under the laws and Constitution of the State, llellen v. Noe, nt supra. That ordinance is intended to abate the alleged nuisance by taking up, penning, advertising .and selling the hogs as therein prescribed, and operates upon the thing then within the town, and is expressly extended to all hogs there being, no matter to whom, or where belonging. A stranger is bound to keep his hogs out of the town, and the town authorities, even in self-defence, would have the power to abate such a nuisanee even at common law, by penning or impounding them, without subjecting themselves to an an action of, trespass. Cro. Gar. 184. The ■ordinance does not subject the owner to a penalty ; but if the law be settled as it is contended, that if a stranger •should come into a town and violate a bye-law, he would be liable to its penalty, and thus it operates in personam, ■the reason of .the rule does not cease, but applies with equal force, that if the property >of a stranger comes into •a town and there becomes a nuisance in violation of its ibye-laws, the bye-laws so violated operate in rem. And it would be an anomaly, indeed, in the law, that the hogs of a stranger should be regarded as being less a nuisance and not liable under the bye-law, whilst those of a cor-porator were subjected to all its pains and penalties. The absurdity of such a proposition is apparent from its bare statement. The plaintiff had express notice of the impounding of his hogs and the consequent violation of this ordinance, and refused to pay the charge of keeping them, before a sale was made. He therefore has no right to complain. It would seem that all these' principles have been affirmed in the case of the Commissioners of Plymouth v. Peltijohn, 4 Dev. R. 591. In that case, the defendant, not being a corporator, was warranted for a penalty for suffering his cow to lie in the streets of the town after night, and not penning her before dark. And it is there declared, “ that there seems as little reason to 
      question, tliat one not a corporator, but who comes within the limits of a town, and there violates a police regulation sanctioned by a penalty, becomes liable to pay it, as if he were a member. For a local jurisdiction is vested in the corporate authorities, which, embraces all persons and things within its loeal boundsand he who-comes within the limits is no longer a stranger, but for the time being is subject to the jurisdiction as-an inhabitant. So too it may be yielded of things, as well as persons. . The cattle of a stranger straying into the town and there becoming nuisances, or found damage-feasant,, may be removed, by way of abating the -nuisance ; and probably may be restrained and impounded until the owner shall pay the expenses and such pecuniary mulct as may have been before imposed.”
   Nash, J.

We perceive no error in the opinion of the presiding Judge. The common law gives to every corporation power to make bye-laws for the general benefit of the-corporators, and the Legislature, by the private act incorporating the town of Beaufort,, passed in the year 1825, authorized the Commissioners to make ordinances, for the removal of public nuisances. The ordinances so made must be reasonable and for the general benefit. The Commissioners, then, are clothed with power to make laws to abate-nuisances, within the corporation. They have declared, that the running, at large of hogs in the streets of the-town is a nuisance, and by their ordinance pointed out the mode by which it was tobe abated. Their authority to pass the ordinance, so far as the inhabitants of the town are concerned, has not been directly denied;. nor indeed is it an open question. The very point, upon this, same ordinance, was before this Court in the case of Hallen v. Noe, 3 Ired. 495, and then received a judicial exposition. The only question now submitted to us is, does-this ordinance bind the plaintiff who is not an inhabitant of Beaufort, or his property. It is very certain that the legislative acts of the commissioners of a town, are, and must be limited to, and can have no effect beyond, the limits of the corporation ; but the proposition is not true, that none are bound by them, but those who, in common parlance, are inhabitants of the town. All who bring themselves within the limits of the corporation are, while there, citizens, so as to be governed by its laws. If this were not so, those town laws or police regulations, so absolutely necessary and useful, would be entirely nugatory. No matter how important and necessary, whether to the health or peace of the town, or to the supply of its inhabitants with their daily provisions, they might be set at defiance, so far as the police of the town was concerned, by any individual, who was not a corporator. A citizen may not be at liberty to fire a loaded gun within the limits of the town, but a man whose yard adjoins those limits may do the same act pin him it is not punishable by the law of the corporation, because he is not a citizen. The law is not so. It is the act, which the commissioners have a right to punish, no matter by whom done. But the principle does not rest alone on reason for its justification; it is sustained by legal authority. In the case of Pierce v. Bartram, Cowp. 260, it is expressly recognized. The defendant was sued to recover a penalty inflicted by the ordinance of the city of Exeter upon any one butchering cattle therein. The defendant had so done, and rested his defence upon the fact that he was not a citizen of Exeter, and that the ordinance could apply to none but such. Lord Mansfield declared that the plaintiff having come within the city, was, pro hac vice, an inhabitant, and bound by the same regulations as the other members of the corporation. So also the case of Village of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wendell 99, recognizes and enforces'the same doctrine. The case of the Commissioner's of the town of Plymouth v. Pettijohn, 4 Dev. 591, fully recognizes the principle of the cases from Cowper and Wendell, and establishes it as the law of this State. The action was brought to recover from the defendant, who was not an inhabitant of the town of Plymouth, a penalty, incurred, as it was alleged, by the violation of a bye-law of a town, which required owners of cattle to pen them every night, and some of those belonging to the defendant being found at night in the town unpenned, - the penalty was considered as incurred by him'. The Court say, “ when an offence is made to consist of the omission to do an act in the town, he only is within the purview of the law, upon whom, by that or some other law, the act is imposed as a duty to be performed within the town.” They therefore held that the penalty did not attach to the defendant, not simply because he was not a corporator, but because of that fact and the additional one that it was for the omission of an act to be done within the town. The Court say that “ there can be no doubt that one, not a corporator, but who comes within the limits of a town, and there violates a police regulation, sanctioned by a penalty, becomes as liable to pay it, as if he were a member.” But in this case, the plaintiff has done no act within the corporation, to bring him within the character of a corporator ; that is true, nor is any penalty, as such, or any forfeiture sought to be enforced against him by the corporation of Beaufort. If, however, he has not, in his own person, violated the ordinance of the town, his property has, and through his means. He has, as every other farmer does, turned out his stock to range upon the unenclosed land around him. His hogs were permitted to stray into the town of Beaufort, in violation of the ordinance. Had the defendants a right to take them up and sell them .as done in this case ? Pettijohn’s case puts things within a local jurisdiction, upon the same footing as persons. “ The cattle of a stranger (say the Court,) straying into a town and there becoming nuisances, or found damage feasant, may be removed by way of abating the nuisance, and may be distrained and impounded, until the owner shall pay the expenses, and such pecuniary mulct as may have before been imposed.” As to the objection, that there is no judicial decision condemning the property to be sold, we think it insufficient, since the owner may, if he chooses, have a full investigation of the case by bringing an action of replevin, as in any other case of distress.

Per Curiam-. Judgment affirmed,  