
    Fawzy Boshra Hakeem MEKHEEL, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-3351-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 20, 2010.
    
      Robert M. Birach, Detroit, MI, for Petitioner.
    Michael F. Hertz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Senior Litigation Counsel; Kristin K. Edison, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JON 0. NEWMAN, ROBERT D. SACK, and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Fawzy Boshra Hakeem Mek-heel, a native and citizen of Egypt, seeks review of a June 9, 2008 order of the BIA denying his application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Fawzy Boshra Hakeem Mekheel, No. [ A XX XXX XXX ] (BIA June 9, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

When the BIA issues an independent decision on remand from this Court, the Court reviews the BIA’s decision alone. See Belortaja v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 619, 622-23 (2d Cir.2007). The applicable standards of review are well established. Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008); Gao v. BIA, 482 F.3d 122, 126-27 (2d Cir.2007). Here, we find that the BIA’s denial of Mekheel’s application for withholding of removal and CAT relief is supported by substantial evidence. The BIA reasonably determined that Mekheel failed to show that he was persecuted as a Coptic Christian by groups the Egyptian government was either unable or unwilling to control. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir.2006).

Mekheel argues that our holding in Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 79-80 (2d Cir.2005), precluded the BIA from giving adverse weight to the fact that Mek-heel never reported any of the alleged incidents of persecution to the Egyptian authorities. However, the BIA reasonably noted that country reports contained in the record stated that “Egyptian authorities respond to reports of violence against Christians, which is not inconsistent with the opinion of the respondent’s expert,” and Mekheel points to no evidence overlooked by the BIA showing why it was unreasonable to require him to seek redress from the Egyptian government.

The BIA also did not err in relying on the 2002 Religious Freedom Report and the 2003 Country Report in its decision. While we have warned the immigration courts against placing excessive reliance on State Department Reports, we have held that the courts “may consider that evidence,” but are “obligated to consider also any contrary or countervailing evidence with which [they are] presented, as well as the particular circumstances of the applicant’s case demonstrated by testimony and other evidence.” Tian-Yong Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir.2004). Here, the BIA considered contrary and countervailing evidence in the record; thus, it did not place excessive reliance on the State Department Reports. See id. Furthermore, while we have also warned against reliance on “outdated versions of State Department Reports,” Mekheel never sought to submit new background country materials.

Mekheel also contends that the BIA’s use of the phrase “purported expert witness affidavit” indicates that the BIA displayed “obvious” prejudice against his expert, Dr. Marshall. Petitioner’s Brief at 21, 23. We will remand based on agency prejudice when the conduct “results in the appearance of bias or hostility such that [the Court] cannot conduct a meaningful review of the decision below.” See Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 490 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir.2006)). Aside from the BIA’s use of the word “purported,” its decision gives no indication that it was in any way biased or hostile toward Dr. Marshall.

Finally, Mekheel argues that the BIA erred by reviewing the IJ’s factual findings de novo, rather than under the required “clearly erroneous” standard. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(3)®, (ii). However, the BIA properly noted that it reviews questions of law de novo. Accordingly, it was entitled to review de novo the question of whether Mekheel established that his fear was on account of groups that the Egyptian government was unable or unwilling to control, finding that it was not.

Because the BIA did not err in determining that Mekheel failed to establish his eligibility for withholding of removal, it did not err in denying his claim for CAT relief based on the same factual predicate. See Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir.2004).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).  