
    
      G. D. Beckham and wife vs. James F. Secrest.
    
    Voluntary deed held void as against the claims of creditors.
    Where a party made a voluntary deed of gift of a slave, reserving to herself a life estate, and the sheriff, under a Ji. fa. obtained after the gift, levied on the slave, and advertised and sold it “as the property of” the donor — Held that the purchaser, who had notice of the deed, took, not merely the life estate, but the whole estate in the slave, the deed being declared fraudulent and void as to creditors.
    
      Before Dunkin, Ch. at Lancaster,
    June, 1845.
    
      The Chancellor. The complainants claim a negro girl Clarissa, under a deed of gift from Dicy Caston, dated 3d Feb. 1834. By the terms of the deed a life estate is reserved to the donor.
    In Sept. 1843, Clarissa was sold by the sheriff under an execution against Dicy Caston, and purchased by the defendant for three hundred and ten dollars. Clarissa was advertised “as the property of Dicy Caston” and ivas sold as her property, but at the sale the complainant gave notice of the deed, and the defendant purchased with this notice. On the part of the defendant it is insisted that the deed of 1834, being voluntary, is void as against creditors and purchasers. The execution, under which Clarissa was sold, issued from the court of chancery to enforce a decree in a cause in which the defendant and his wife were complainants, and Dicy Caston was defendant. The object of that proceeding was to obtain an account from the defendant as administratrix of William Caston deceased, the father of Secrest’s wife, and as her guardian. A decree was entered at July term, 1843, for $4567. The account commenced in 1827, and at the date of the deed in 1834 it appears by the accounts that she was indebted between six and seven hundred dollars.
    It was replied, that this decree was obtained by collusion ; and there are many circumstances which indicate that the suit was not hostile. But this evidence rather goes to shew that the defendant, Dicy Caston, was indifferent as to the amount of the decree — that, if she had been so disposed, she could have charged the defendant, (Secrest’s wife,) with board <£@. But there can be no doubt that she held the negroes of her ward during a long minority, and was fairly accountable for a considerable sum. But, however suspicious some of the circumstances may be, they are, at most, equivocal, and furnish ground for conjecture, but not for impeaching the judgment of the court.
    Then, as to existing creditors, the deed of 1834 cannot be sustained. The donor was indebted at the date of the deed, the debt is yet unpaid, and the donor is yet insolvent. According to the decision of Izard vs. Izard, Bail. Eq. 228, the deed is void.
    It is ordered and decreed that the bill be dismissed, but without costs.
    The complainants appealed, on the following grounds.
    1. Because was expressly proved that, at the sale of the negro Clarissa, by the sheriff, when purchased by defendant, nothing was oflered or sold but the life-estate of Dicy Caston, and complainants were therefore entitled to the relief prayed for.
    2. Because it is submitted, that by the terms of the deed from Dicy Caston to complainant, an absolute estate in the negro Clarissa vested in them at the time of its execution — the reservation in favor of Dicy being void in law, and there was no indebtedness by Dicy at the time, to avoid the deed.
    Wright, for the appellants.
    Clinton, contra.
   Curia, per DunkiN, Ch.

In relation to the first ground of appeal, it is only necessary to repeat what is said in the decree. The slave Clarissa was levied on by the sheriff under an execution against Dicy Caston. She was advertised by the sheriff “as the property of Dicy Caston,” and was sold as her property. It is true that the complainant was present at the sale and gave notice of the deed, declaring that Mrs. Caston had only a life estate. John Adams, the deputy sheriff, thence infered that this was all that was offered to be sold on that occasion. Notwithstanding this, she was sold at sheriff’s sales in September, 1843, for three hundred and ten dollars.

It was quite clear to the chancellor, who heard the case, that all the right, title and interest of Dicy Caston, whatever it might be, was offered for sale and was sold.

The court is satisfied that the voluntary deed of February, 1834, .cannot stand against the claims of creditors, and that the bill of the complainauts was therefore properly dismissed.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.

Johnson and Johnston, CC. concurred.

Harper, Ch. absent.  