
    The Mayor, &c. of Baltimore, vs. Moore & Johnson.
    Appeal from Baltimore county court. Assumpsit for money due for paving taxes, imposed upon the property of the defendants, (the appellees.) They pleaded non as-sumPs^‘ .At the trial the plaintiffs, (now appellants,) save in evidence an act of assembly of this state, passed at November session 1796, du 68', entitled, “An act to erect Baltimore-i'own, iii Baltimore county, info a city¿ and to incorporate tile inhabitants thereof,” and also another act of the general assembly aforesaid, passed at November session 1797, ch. 54, entitled* “A supplement to the act, entitled, An act to Ci-ect Baltimore-town, in Baltimore county; into a city, and to incorporate the inhabitants thereof.” And also, the following ordinances of the mayor and city council of Baltimore, to wit; “An orclifiance, entitled, An ordinance fó appoint city Commissioners, and prescribing their duties; an ordinance, entitled, An ordinance directing the paying of a part of Dulanystreet; iii the City of Baltimore; and. an ordinance, entitled, An ordinance fdr paving Wilkes*-Street; Washington street, Castle,-n\\ej, and County-street, within certáin distances, and For other purposes; so as more effectually tte preservé tlie navigation.” And the plaintiffs further gave in evidence; Certain paving tax warrants; signed -Henry Síóuffér; James Martin, ánd Nathaniel Hynson; the city commissioners for the year 1817, and approved by George Stiles, Esq. the mayor of the city of Baltimore for the year last aforesaid. And also gave in evidence* that the said paper writings are thfe warrants issued by the city commissioners, under the ordinances herein Before mentíoned. And further gave in evidence* that át the time of the passing the said owlinaiices, the said Philip Moore, one of the defendants, was, arid ever since hath been seized in fee of one undivided moiety of certain lots of ground in the said warrants mentioned,- which moiety had belonged to his deceased wife, as one of the heirs of William Fell, who was former owriér; and died seized in fee of the whole of said lots; and that the said Thomas Johnson, the other defendant, at the time of tlie passing the ordinance aforesaid, did hold, and ever since háth held, as tenant by the courtesy, the other undivided moiety of the said lots, in right of his deceased wife, who wás tlie other heir at law of said Fell; and that the amount of the said paving taxes, so charged Upon the said lots of ground, so held by the said defendants, are as follow, to wit: On Dutany-street $3500 28, oil Wilkes'1-street from Market-street to Wash ■_ 
      tíígfor.-síreeí', ¿939 50, on Washington-street ¿116 S3, and ou Wilkes'-street from W&skington-sivcet to County-street, S415 80. And the plaiuthYs further gave m evtdance, that the city commissioners, on the 26th day of June 1817, contracted for the paving Zbi/awy-street between Bomlstreet and (/’«¿¿/«-alley, and for placing kirb stones and flag or stepping stones thereon; and that on the i 4 th day of April 1817, they contracted for the paving of /rtfos’-street between Market-street and PFashington-stmct, and placing kirb stones thereon; and also, that on the 21st day of July 181?','they contracted for the paving of Ifashington-stveet between /'feci-street and the north side of Wilkes’-street, and placing kirb and flag stones thereon;- and also, that on the 26th Ociober 1817, they contracted for the paving of Wilkes''-street frbm Washington to County-street, and placing kirb and flag stones thereon; all which contracts were made in the name and on behalf of the mayor and city council of Baltimore,. And further gave in evidence, that Du!any-street front Bond-siraeA, eastward to Market-street, was paved in the fall of the year 1817, for the paving of which part there is no charge or ciaba'against the defendants, they having no property or lots on said part; that the paving of the residue of said street under said contract, was commenced in April 1810, and finished in the fall of that year; that the paving of Wilkes'-street between Market and Woshington-sireela, was begun and finished in the summer and fail of 1817; and that the paving of the oilier parts of the streets in said contracts mentioned, were began in- April or May 1818, é/id finished in that year; bat that the sanie had been, in the year 1817, dug down and filled up in different parís, as the unevenness of the ground rendered necessary, preparatory to being pasa! under the said contracts. And (he plaintiffs further gave in evidence, that the city coinmis¡doners caused that part of Cfosíie-alley, mentioned in the ordinance last yeciled, to be paved according to said ordinance; and that the part oí' County-streef, mentioned in the said ordinance was, at the. time of the making the same, a small distance, not exceeding a hundred yards, out of the then lisaiis of the city of Baltimore; and that before the passing of the ordinance aforesaid for paving Bulany-e,treef, that part of said street, from Castly-aliuy eastward to 1he old city line, had been gravelled and put in good order by and at the expense of the Baltimore and Ilavre-de-Grace turnpike road éompany. The defendants gave iii evidence act of fsembly of 1791, ch. 59; the act of 1816, ¿in-218; and oF i'817, ck. 148. And also gave evidence, that the mayor and city council of Baltimore have not By themselves, the city commissioners,- or other agents, contracted! for the paying oF any other street, part of street dr place directed by the said ordinances, other than those mentioned in the aforesaid contracts, and that the matters and work directed to be done by the said o’rdinaricés have not been otherwise or further executed than as set forth in said contracts, arid herein before stated. And also gave evidence; that the ancient eastern boundary line of the city of Baltimore, called in the aforesaid ordinance the Old City Line, crosses Bnlany-street about 2U0 feet eastward of Castle• alley; that said street has not been paved from said alley eastward to the said old city line. And also gave evidénce, that the description or designation of persons in the said several warrants, as “Fell’s heirs” or “Fell’s li’rs. ” is meant and intended to designate arid describe the heirs of the said William frell, deceased, who was the owner, and died seized of the several lots of ground so designated in the said warrants; and that the said deceased wife of the said Johnson, mentioned in the plaintiffs’ evidence, died intestate, leaving a soil William Fell Johnson, and a daughter, Ann Johnson, her heirs at law, to whom her moiety iii fee of said lots descended, and who are seized of the same in representation of their mother, as heirs of the said William Fell, and that they reside in Baltimore county. And they further offered evidence, that the several alterations? from the original manuscript of the said warrants, in the ñames ór description of persons therein charged with the paving taxéá aforesaid, by inserting in a different handwriting from the said originals, the names or words UP. Moore for Fell’s heirs,” “Moore and Johnson for Fell’s heirs,” whether connectedly or separately used and applied, were so written, altered and made, by the authority of the city commissioners at the time being, and done after the institution of this suit at the term previotls to the trial thereof. And they further offered evidence, that the said city commissioners never did make return, under’their hands and seals, or otherwise, to the register of the city, a certificate or other writing, of the pitching, levelling, or grading of the said streets, or any of them, or cause the same to be done, and that the said several warrants were issued, and the paving aforesaid* done, without the consent of the proprietors of a majority of the ground fronting on* the said streets, or either of them, or the consent of the majority of the proprietors of ground fronting thereon, or on either of them;, and that the said charge for paving said streets is made at the rate of nine cents for every square foot of pavement in said streets, in front of the lots or ground of individuals thereon, except the parts allotted for footways, which are paved at the expense of the owners of the lota fronting thereon, at what the work and materials may cost. The defendants then prayed the direction o.f the court to the jury, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover; which direction the court ¡jHanson and Ward, A. J.] gave. The plaintiffs excepted, and the. verdict and judgment being against them, they appealed to, this court.
    
      Under the 2nr3 s-cct oí the act oí’ 1797, ch 54, tlitj corporation of the city of Baltimore have no power to tax any particular part of the city, for p iyinsf the Streets, lanes and alleys, in such part, unless such pavm.'j is for the benefit of such p irt especially.
    If the corporation, in the preamble to an ordinance t.>provide for the pavement ofstreets, states the object to be one of general benefit to tin* city, they cannot in the same ordinance tax'exclusively the particular part of the city in winch the streets are located.
    If such an ordinance is parsed without its statin”- what the object of ih<* pavement is, the Ie^nl pre* „ sumption is', that it i» (he especial benefit of the ¡wt of the city wnese the streets are situated,
    
      The cause was argued at the last June term, before Buchanan, Ch. J. Eaiile, and Martin, J.
    
      Taney and Scott, for ihe Appellants,
    contended — If That the plaintiffs had the right to impose the taxes stated, in the declaration and bill of exceptions.
    2. That that right liad been properly exercised;
    3. That the. action w.as properly brought, and that the plaintiffs were entitled-to recover,
    On the first and second points, they referred to the acts ef assembly of 1796, ch. 68, and 1797, ch. 54, s. 2, and the several ordinances passed by the city council of Baltimore on the subject of paving streets, &c. Mayor of London vs. Sory, Carthew, 92. 6 Bac. Ab. tit. Statute, 381, 382, 384. Fisher vs. Blight, 2 Cranch, 386, 399. Rex vs. Loxdale, 1 Burr. 447. Church vs. Croeker, 3 Mass. Rep. 21. 1 Bac. Ab. tit. By Laws, 544. Rex vs. Spencer, 3 Burr. 1837. Martin vs. Mansfield, 3 Mass. Rep. 419. M‘Culloh vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316.
    On the third point, they referred to 1 Esp. Dig. 6, 7. 5 Mass. Rep. 325. Tilden vs. Metcalf, 2 Day’s Rep. 259. Beatty vs. Marine Insurance Company, 2 Johns. Rep. 109.
    
      Harper, R. Johnson, and Hotvard,
    
    contended, L The ,action had not been rightfully conceived,.
    3, The right to lay the tax was a special authority, and the corporation had no power.to delegate the authority to the city commissioners.
    8. The paving warrants being altered after the institution of this action, was iatal to the plaintiffs.
    4. The warrant is made the contract.
    5. The plaintiffs had no right to recover because the work had not been done. .
    On the first point they, referred to the act of 1796, ch. 68, s. 10. 1 Chitty’s Plead. 339.
    On the second, to Rex vs. Spencer, 3 Burr. 1837. Rex vs. Cutbush, 4 Burr. 2204. The King vs. Ginever, 6 T. R. 732. Rex vs. Croke, 1 Cowp. 26.
    
    
      Curia adv. vulL
    
   Buchanan, Ch. J.

at this term, delivered the judgment, of the court. The decision of this case involves the construction of the second section of the act of 1797, ch. 54, a supplement to the act incorporating the .city of Baltimore. That'section of the act, after conferring upon the. corporation full power and' authority to enact and pass all ordinances ' necessary for paving arid keeping in repair the' streets, lanes and alleys, in the city of Baltimore, gives the further power “to tax any particular part or district of the city, for paving the streets, lanes or alleys therein, or for sinking wells, or erecting pumps, which may appear' for the benefit of. such particular part or district.” The question arises upon this latter clause, which is, whether authority is given to the corporation to'tax any particular part or district of the city for paving the streets, lanes or alleys therein,' unless such paving shall appear to be for the benefit of that particular papt or' district! or whether the word “which*.’, relates to wells or pumps only? And we think it extends as well tó the paving the streets, lanes and alleys, as to the sinking of wells and erecting pumps. A general and unlimited paving power is before given to.' the corporation, and it is difficult to suppose that the legis-’ lature meant to authorise the imposition of a special tax, on any particular part of the city, for any paving» which' should not be, or appear'to be, for the benefit of siich part/. Sucli a power might‘be attended with evil consequences,' and, in many cases, work very great injustice. "Where a street is d 'Cted to be paved for the benefit of a particular p $rt or district of the city, it is' perhaps proper that piinb part or district should be taxed for the purpose; but where the bavins is for the general benefit, and not of the •inmiediate district m which the street lies, it ought to be |>aid for out of the general fund ; and there would be much injustice in imposing a special tax on the particular district for that object, which couid not have been the intention of the legislature. And where a law is of doubtful construction, that interpretation should be given if, so far as it can be done, width is pregnant with the least mischief. This view of the second sed ion of the supplement to the charter of the city of Baltimore, brings us to an examination of the two ordinances of the 10th of April 18Í/, on which this suir is founded. Each of these, ordinances has a preamble setting out, the purpose for which it was passed. The first, that for paving apart of Dulany-street, after reciting in the preamble that it is a public highway leading into the city, which ought to bo kept in the roost perfect state of repair, and good condition, but has become in many places dangerous to travellers passing in carriages afier dark, and that there is an imperious necessity for' having it javed, proceeds to direct the city commissioners to pave it, in order 10 remove those inconveniencies to travellers, and imposes a tax on that particular district of the city for teat purpose. The title of the'other is, “An ordinance for paving Wilkes*-street, N-asliington-sireet, Casfle-a\ley and Cozmty-street, within certain distances, and for other purposes, so as more effectually to preserve the navigation.” The preamble slat es the object to be the protection of the navigation from injury by the wash coming down the mils, and also to remove the injury 'and in» convenience experienced by many individuals from the same cause, and-that no alternative presents itself, but the paving the dreels mentioned, for which purpose a tax is imposed on the particular districts in which they lie.

If these ordinances were without preambles, though the paving directed to be done is ho where said to be for the benefit Of the particular parts or districts in which the streets lie, yet such an exercise of the special taxing power, in the absence of any thing to' the contrary, would be taken to have been in pursuance of the authority conferred by the charter. The city council would be presumed not to have exceeded their powers, but to have imposed the. tax, for that pirróse only for which the charter authorises it to be imposed; and with no other guide the mind would come to the conclusion, that it did appear to them to b.e ^01’ ^le benefit of those particular districts, and it is. not necessary that it should be expressly so stated.

But it is a settled principle, that in the exposition of statutes, every part should be taken into consideration, in order to arrive at the intention of the legislature, which, when it plainly appears, ought to prevail.' It is also a general rule, that the preamble of sl statute is a key to its-construction, and should be resorted to, to unlock the mind of the makers, but not to restrain the general words of an enacting clause, which, understood according to their'genuine and natural import, clearly and plainly express the meaning of the legislature. And the same general rules, of construction are equally applicable to the ordinances of a corporation.

In the enacting clauses alone, of th,e ordinances under consideration, not a word is to be found expressive of the opinion of the makers, that the paving directed would be, or appeared to them to be, for the benefit o.f the particular districts, they only direct the streets to be paved, and impose the tax for that purpose. And looking to these clauses alone, the mind is left to labour to discover why these particular districts are so taxed, and to conjecture that the paving appeared to the corporation to be for their benefit; but if we apply the preamble as a key, the mind of the makers is at once opened, and the intention clearly disclosed, by which it plainly appears,, that the paving was meant in one case for the benefit of travellers, and the improvement of a public highway leading into the city, and in the other, to preserve the navigation;.both of which objects were matters of general concern, and it was not considered to be for the benefit of either particular district, or intended for that purpose, and nothing is left to construction. The keeping in repair a public highway leading to the city, which is declared by the preamble to be the object of one of the ordinances in question, and the preservation of the navigation, the declared object of the other, are clearly matters of public and general concern* and in the latter case of peculiar benefit to the parts or districts of the city coiztiguous to the harbour; and there would be mucb haz'dship in taxing any particular part or district of the city for doing what is for the benefit oí Another part, or for the benefit of the whole, the burden of which should be borne by the whole. The taxing the particular districts, therefore, in this case, not for their benefit, but for the benefit and convenience of the whole city, was unauthorised, and the ordinances so far nugatory and Void.

■JUDGMENT AFFIRMED,.  