
    BAO YIN HUANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 08-3524-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 6, 2009.
    Tina Yu Howe, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Michael F. Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Russell J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel; John D. Williams, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, JON O. NEWMAN and PIERRE N. LEVAL, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey as respondent in this case.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Bao Yin Huang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 30, 2008 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Bao Yin Huang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jun. 30, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying-facts and procedural history in this case.

When the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ and supplements the IJ’s decision, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). When the agency considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

We find that the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Huang’s untimely and number-barred motion to reopen because we have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no error in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish either materially changed country conditions or an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. See id. at 169-72 (noting that “[w]e do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the agency”); see also Wei Guang Wang v. B.I.A., 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as “the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”).

Because the failure to establish changed country conditions provides a valid basis for denying a motion to reopen, we cannot find that the BIA abused its discretion in denying Huang’s motion to reopen. See Wei Guang Wang, 437 F.3d at 273; Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169.

Huang’s argument that he is entitled to file a successive asylum application based on the birth of his children in the United States fails under Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143 (2d Cir.2008).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).  