
    BUCKLIN, Appellant, v. LAWLOR, Respondent.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Term.
    December, 1901.)
    Action by Charles A. Bucklin against Charlotte B. Lawlor.
    William C. Relyea (George H. Fletcher, of counsel), for appellant.
    Eugene K. Saclcett (Lemuel Skid-more, of counsel), for respondent.
   MacLEAN, J.

The refusal by the learned justice at special term and the affirmance of his order by the general term were within the discretionary control by the city court of its own calendar in the due administration of justice, which well might be furthered by having all the facts in issue between the same parties in the cause in the supreme court determined before restoring the cause for trial. Moreover, the determination appealed from was according to the liberal interpretation of the stipulation under which the cause was marked “Reserved generally.” Order appealed from affirmed, with costs.

McADAM, P. J., concurs.

SCOTT, J.

(concurring). In my opinion the interlocutory judgment in the supreme court was not the judgment intended by the stipulation, which provided that the present action should not be brought to trial until the supreme court action shalf have been settled or have been brought to trial and proceeded to judgment upon complaint and answer. To construe the stipulation in the manner contended for by the plaintiff would be to undo all that was sought to be effected by the negotiations which led to the making of the stipulation. Order affirmed, with costs.  