
    GRAYCE OIL CO. v. VARNER.
    (No. 2302.)
    (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Amarillo.
    April 2, 1924.)
    1. Process &wkey;sl49 — Burden upon party impeaching . officer’s return to do so by clear and convincing evidence.
    The burden is upon Mm who seeks to impeach an officer’s return upon process to do so by dear and satisfactory evidence.
    2. Process -<@=>149 — Degree of proof necessary to impeach officer’s return upon process stated.
    The verity of an officer’s return upon process is condusive to such an extent that the testimony of two witnesses, or of one strongly corroborated by other evidence, is ordinarily necessary to impeach the return.
    3. Judgment &wkey;>l7(IO) — Testimony held to sustain sheriff’s return that citation was served1 on agent of dlefendant corporation.
    On hearing of motion to set aside default judgment, entered against defendant corporation, testimony of two witnesses held sufiitient to sustain fact, as disclosed by sheriff’s return, that service of citation was made on C., and that he was an agent and a stockholder of defendant corporation.
    &wkey;>For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER, in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
    Error from District Court, Wichita County ; P. A. Martin, iudge.
    Action by S. R. Varner against toe Grayce Oil Company. A default judgment was entered against defendant, which trial court refused to set aside on motion, and defendant brings error.
    Affirmed.
    Weeks, Morrow & Francis, of Wichita Falls, for plaintiff in error.
    W. L. Scott, of Wichita Falls, and W. T. Carlton, of Harlingen, for defendant in error.
   HALL, C. J.

Defendant in error, Varner, recovered a judgment by default against plaintiff in error, Grayce Oil Company, January 15, 1923, in tbe sum of $500. At tbe same term of tbe court tbe company filed its motion to set aside tbe judgment and for a new trial upon tbe ground that tbe citation had not been served upon any one upon whom tbe law authorized such service to be made, that tbe petition did not give tbe name of any local agent or other representative or any officer of tbe company upon whom process should be served. Tbe sheriff’s return is as follows:

“Came to band this 19th day of September, 1922, at 10 o’clock a. m. and executed the 22d day of September, 1922, by delivering to Grayce Oil Company," by delivering(to Mr. Campbell, its agent, tbe within named defendant, in person a true copy of this writ.”

The motion to set aside the judgment was beard by the court and overruled on March tbe 31st, during the same term of'the court. W. R. Hill, cashier of tbe bank at Burk-burnett, where the Grayce Oil Company kept its account, testified that S. J. Campbell signed checks on the. company’s account, opened by him, that the account was originally carried in the name of Stanley J. Campbell and afterwards transferred to the Grayce Oil Company. Varner testified that the company had oil leases at Burkburnett, and that S. J. Campbell was superintendent of its business there, and employed him to drill for the company on said leases, and had paid him $1,500 at one time and $1,200 when the well was completed, and that Mr. Campbell accepted the well. The witness testified that he was employed by S. J. Campbell and paid by him for work in drilling another well for said company, that he drilled twotwells for the Grayce Oil Company, and that S. J. Campbell gave him a check for his money each time. Harry Weeks, one of the company’s attorneys, testified that in September, 1922, S. J. Campbell left a citation in the case at his office, and that it was his intention to file an answer in the case, that Campbell discussed the facts with him at that time. He further testified that he wrote the charter under which the Grayce Oil Company was organized, that S. J. Campbell, Walter K.. Campbell, and Carl Purcell were the in-corporators. It was shown that S. J. Campbell owned $5,000 of the capital stock of the company, and that the citation had been served upon S. J. Campbell. In E. P. & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Kelly (Tex. Civ. App.) 83 S. W. 855, Neill, Justice, said:

“It is not essential, though perhaps tbe better practice in suits against corporations, for the petition and citation to state tbe local agent or general manager of tbe defendant upon whom service is to be made, but an omission to- do so invalidates neither tbe petition nor citation. * * * While it is a general rule that tbe return on a citation, made by an officer competent to serve tbe writ, of the fact and mode of service, if in due form, is ordinarily conclusive upon the parties to tbe record, yet it seems that in this state, in a suit against a corporation, when its local agent or other officer upon whom service may be bad is not named in tbe citation, tbe sheriff’s return showing service upon such agent or officer is not conclusive of the fact that he was such agent or officer, but such fact may be put in issue (G., H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Gage, 63 Tex. 568); and that, if judgment by default has been taken against a corporation, it can, either by motion or original suit, have tbe judgment set aside by proving that tbe person cited was not its agent or officer authorized by law upon whom service can be bad. Houston & T. C. Ry. v. Burke, 55 Tex. 323, 40 Am. Rep. 808.”

The burden is upon him who seeks to impeach an officer’s return upon process to do so by clear and satisfactory evidence. The verity of the return is conclusive to such an extent that the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness strongly corroborated by other evidence, is ordinarily necessary. Harrison v. Sharpe (Tex. Civ. App.) 210 S. W. 731; McBride v. Kaulbach (Tex. Civ. App.) 207 S. W. 576; Gatlin v. Dibrell, 74 Tex. 36, 11 S. W. 908. The testimony is unquestionably sufficient to sustain the fact that service of the citation in this case- was made upon S. J. Campbell, and that he was an agent and a stockholder of the company.

The judgment is affirmed.  