
    Phillip Jerome GARDNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sergeant MCARDLE, Detective Kristoffsen, Detective Jimenez, Police Officer Zorovic, Police Officer Costales, all of the 77th Precinct in Kings County, Defendants-Appellees.
    
    No. 10-1977-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 16, 2012.
    James W.B. Benkard, Andrew Ditch-field, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, New York, N.Y., for Appellant.
    PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges, LEE H. ROSENTHAL, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is respectfully instructed to amend the caption as set forth above.
    
    
      
       Corporation Counsel of New York has chosen not to appear as counsel for Defendants-Ap-pellees in this appeal because the district court dismissed the case before any defendant was ever served.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Phillip Gardner appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Preska, C.J.), dismissing his pro se, in forma pauperis complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed Gardner’s complaint sua sponte on the basis that the complaint failed to plead proper venue and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) de novo. Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir.2001). We agree with the district court that Gardner’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim if it is construed to assert a failure to provide Miranda warnings and false arrest. Accordingly, dismissal of the case would noi'mally be proper. However, “[a] pro se complaint is to be read liberally. Certainly the court should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir.1991) (citation omitted).

Having conducted an independent review of the record, we conclude that the district court should have afforded Gardner an opportunity to amend his complaint to replead a due process claim stemming from a Miranda violation. “A Miranda violation that amounts to actual coercion based on outrageous government misconduct is a deprivation of a constitutional right that can be the basis for a § 1983 suit even when a confession is not used against the declai'ant in any fashion.” Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 348 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted).

In our view, a liberal reading of the complaint does give an indication that Gardner might state a valid claim that his due process rights were violated on the basis that police coercion led to inculpatory statements. Indeed, Gardner’s complaint alleges that while he was in custody for approximately fourteen hours, he was (1) placed in a line-up; (2) forced to make written and videotaped statements; and (3) told that he could not place a phone call until he made a written statement — all without receiving Miranda warnings. Moreover, the mention of Gardner’s use of mental health medication alludes to the possibility that he suffered from mental health issues. Finally, the affidavit attached to Gardner’s complaint specifically contends that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was infringed and discusses that Gardner was suffering from mental health problems at the time of the incident. Thus, Gardner’s complaint, construed liberally, alleges more than a simple Miranda violation and suggests that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim. See Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir.1999).

We recognize that an amended complaint brought by Gardner faces several difficulties, to say the least. Among others, the circumstances of Gardner’s interrogation may have not been “so coercive as to amount to a constitutional violation.” Deshawn E., 156 F.3d at 348. In addition, the doctrine of collateral estoppel may bar relitigation of Gardner’s claim as it appears that the claim may have been previously adjudicated in state court. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Despite these challenges to Gardner’s Section 1983 action, we cannot “rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim.” Gomez, 171 F.3d at 796. Accordingly, Gardner should be permitted to amend his complaint.

Finally, the district court erred in dismissing Gardner’s complaint sua sponte for improper venue because there were no extraordinary circumstances to justify such a dismissal. See Concession Consultants, Inc. v. Mirisch, 355 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir.1966); see also Stich v. Rehnquist, 982 F.2d 88, 88-89 (2d Cir.1992). Neither the complaint’s insufficient venue allegations nor failure to state a cognizable claim constitute the type of extraordinary circumstances that warrant a sua sponte dismissal. See Gomez, 171 F.3d at 795-96.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED with instructions to permit Gardner to amend his complaint. 
      
      . The affidavit was previously submitted in New York state court in support of Gardner’s motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure § 440.10.
     