
    Pepper and others vs. O’Dowd.
    Statute op Limitations: Adverse Possession. Limits of constructive adverse possession defined.
    
    1. Secs. 6 and 7, oh. 138, R. S., relating to adverse possession under paper-title, must be considered together as one entire provision; the former giving the general rule, and the latter defining certain particular conditions of such adverse possession.
    2. Under these sections, actual adverse possession of part of a singlé lot or of a known farm does not operate as constructive adverse possession beyond the limits of such lot or farm, even where it is part of a more extensive tract included in the instrument or judgment under which the occupant entered.
    3. Subds. 3 and 4 of sec. 7 are independent of each other, and under the former, actual possession of part of an unindosed lot by its use for fuel or fencing for the ordinary use of the occupant, will probably, under proper circumstances, operate as constructive adverse possession of the whole lot; hut, under the limitation of sec. 6, it can in no case so operate beyond the limits of the same lot.
    4. Being independent, both subdivisions cannot support the same possession of the same premises; and an ambiguous possession claimed in part under each, and not supported by either alone, is not within the statute.
    5. In subd. 4, the word “ included.” must be construed in the sense of “inclosed.”
    [6. As applied to a single lot, subd. 4 may operate to limit the'effect of subds. 1 and 2, by requiring the improvement or inclosure to be “ according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining countiy; ” subd. 4 making actual possession by improvement or inclosure of a part, constructive possession of the whole, only where the unimproved or uninclosed part is left so according to such course and custom.]
    7. The “ single lot ” of the statute is the smallest legal subdivision of land; and its extent is certain of itself, without recourse to any course or custom.
    8. The “farm” of the statute island held for cultivation and cultivated in whole or in part, of whatever size, shape or boundaries, and whether comprising several lots or parts of lots, or less than one lot.
    9. It being the purpose of the section to confine constructive adverse possession to such visible and notorious possession as may fairly imply notice and acquiescence, the extent of the “ farm ” of subd. 4 must be “ "known ” in the sense of being notorious.
    
    
      JO. To constitute adverse possession, enfty must he made with defined claim of title and of possession; and after entry, such claim cannot he enlarged, except hy acts equivalent to a new entry and new claim of adverse possession.
    11. Entry upon part of a lot under claim of title to the whole, while the other part is held adversely, cannot found adverse possession of the whole lot,' though afterward the adverse possession of the other part he abandoned.
    12. To establish adverse possession of a known farm, outside of the actual possession taken, the known extent of the farm at the time of entry must he established, and adverse possession founded on such entry is limited to that extent.
    13. Constructive adverse possession of uninclosed land under subd. 4 can he established only hy actual proof of a course or custom in the adjoining country, sanctioning the manner of occupation.
    14. To make the actual adverse possession of part of a tract of farming land once possessed and used as several farms, by several owners, constructive adverse possession of the whole tract as one farm, it must he shown, not merely that the whole tract is included in some of the claimant’s title papers, hut that the several farms had been joined together in one known farm before the entry under which'he claims, and constituted one known farm at the time of such entry.
    15. The actual use of one lot for fuel or fencing under subd. 3, sec. 7, cannot carry with it constructive use of the same piece of timber on another lot. To come within that subdivision, it seems that the land must he held in good faith for the supply of fuel or fencing for the purposes there named, as its sole or principal object; the extent of the land so used must bear a reasonable proportion to the use; and such use must he distinct, visible, continued and notorious, under claim of title, and not mere casual trespass or occasional use; and what is a reasonable quantity in each case is a question for'the j^^r;|, under proper limitation and instruction.
    APPEAL from the Circuit Court for ’Iowa County.
    Ejectment, commenced in 1872, for one hundred and sixty acres of land in Iowa county. The answer alleged adverse possession under color of title for more than ten years, hy defendant and those under whom he claimed, and pleaded the statute of limitations.  On the trial,' defendant introduced a number of deeds through, which he traced his claim of title; but none of these appeared to connect him with the original government title shown by plaintiffs to have passed by patent to their ancestor, Harvey Pepper; and no acts of possession of the premises were shown except those of defendant himself and his immediate grantor.
    The deed to defendant’s grantor, made in 1846, purported to convey 680 acres, including the land here in dispute, with neighboring lands. The tract comprised what had been previously known as two separate farms, viz: the Pepper farm, here in dispute, and the Miller farm.
    Defendant’s grantor moved his family into a house upon the Miller place, cultivated part of it, and paid taxes upon the whole tract; but none of the Pepper farm was inclosed by him or cultivated. The only use apparently made of this part of the 680 acres, was for cutting timber, which he did indiscriminately upon all parts of the premises in dispute, as well as upon other woodland owned by him (of which he had a large quantity), as he needed timber for fuel or fencing and also for purposes of sale.
    
      Defendant, after Ms purchase in 1861, continued to haul wood to market from said land, paid the taxes, and occasionally cut hay thereon, hut did not actually inclose or improve any part of it until within about five years previous to the commencement of the action. The plaintiffs asked the court to give the following among other instructions: 1. That “the use by the defendant or his grantor of the land in question, or a part of it, in common with several other tracts lying in several different sections, comprising in all eight hundred acres of timbered land in a body, for the supply of fuel or fencing timber, would not be within the intendment of the statute of limitations in relation to adverse possession of land by its use for the supply of fuel or fencing timber, unless the jury shall find from the evidence that the quantity claimed was reasonably necessary to supply his actual farm with fuel and fencing timber.” 2. That possession of one lot or congressional subdivision of land would not be possession of any other, unless the jury should find that the defendant had established by clear and positive proof that the whole tract claimed by his grantor constituted, according to the custom of the country, a known farm or single lot. 3. That “ under the pleadings and proofs, subd. 4 of sec. 7 of the statute of limitations does not apply to this case; ” because “this large tract of forest cannot be considered a known farm or single lot.” 4. That “this land being divided into forty-acre lots, the facts establishing continued adverse possession must be proved as to each lot.” The court refused to give the three instructions first recited, and gave the fourth, modified by adding the following: “ This is correct when the unoccupied lot does not constitute part of a known farm.”
    The court then instructed the jury, in effect, that if the tracts cultivated, together with the lands in question, with or without the other lands mentioned in the deed to defendant’s grantor, constituted what might be called a known or recognized farm, then the adverse possession was sufficient, even if tbe defendant or bis grantor bad never taken timber from tbe Pepper land, so called, for tbe purpose of fencing or fuel; that a tract of new land covered with forests, if intended to be cultivated by one man as owner, is called a farm; that land, tbougb not a part of a known farm, and not inclosed, may be beld adversely so as to set tbe statute of limitations running, wliere it is used for tbe supply of fuel or fencing timber, for tbe purpose of husbandry or tbe ordinary use of tbe occupant; and that tbe quantity of timber which a farmer ought to be allowed for tbe present and prospective use and improvement of bis farm, could not at present be established by any settled custom; but when there was no fraud, or insincerity or palpable absurdity in tbe claim, every farmer should be allowed to judge for himself bow much of bis land he would devote to timber, and bow much to tbe plow.
    Yerdict and judgment for tbe defendant; and tbe plaintiffs appealed.
    
      A. JR. BuslmeTl, for appellants,
    as to tbe construction to be given tbe statute of limitations, and tbe sufficiency of tbe acts shown to constitute an adverse possession, cited Sydnor v. Palmer, 29 Wis., 251; Wilson v. JETenry, 35 id., 245; State v. Supervisors of Sheboygan Oo., 29 id., 79; Smith’s L. C., 637; Tyler on Eject., 900; Simpson v. Downing, 23 Wend., 320; Mwiro v. Merchant, 28 N. Y., 44; Dupont v. Davis, 35 Wis., 643; Bouvier’s Law Die., “Farm;” 2 Binn., 238; 18 Pick., 553; 6 Met., 529; 2 Hilliard on E. P., 338 et seq.
    
      J. M. Smith, for respondent,
    to tbe point that defendant’s entry and tbe extent of bis claim and possession must be referred to bis deed and measured by it, cited Stevens v. Brooks, 24 Wis., 326; Sydnor v. Palmer, 29 id., 226; Tyler on Eject., 495-6, 897, 904; 10 Pet., 412; 1 Chip., 92; 8 Crancb, 229; 4 Mason, 330; Paine’s C. C., 457; 3 Wash. C. C., 475; 3 Ired., 578; 2 Tay., 131; 1 Strob., 143; 1 Scam., 181, 186; 23 Cab, 431; 37 Miss., 155; 33 Barb., 386; and be argued that where a “ known farm ” is partly uninclosed, tbe only safe rule for determining tbe extent of tbe occupant’s adverse possession is, to be governed by tbe boundaries in bis deed.
    
      
      Secs. 6 and 7, ch. 138, R. S., are as follows: “ Sec. 6. Wheneverit shall appear that the. occupant, or those under whom he claims, entered into the possession of any premises under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, founding such claim upon some written instrument, as being a conveyance of the premises in question, or upon the judgment of some competent court, and that there has been a continual occupation and. possession of the premises included in such instrument or judgment, or of some part of such premises, under such claim for ten years, the premises so included shall be deemed to have been held adversely; except that when the premises so included consist of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot shall not be deemed the possession of any other lot of the same tract.
      “ Sec. 7. For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claiming a title-founded upon some written instrument or some judgment, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following-cases: 1. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 2. Where it has been protected by a substantial indosure. S. Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry or the ordinary use of the occupant. 4. Where a known farm or a single lot has been partly improved, the portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not included according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining country, shall be deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part improved or cultivated."
    
   ByaN, C. J.

This case involves tbe construction of secs. 6 and 7, cb. 138, E. S., and especially subdivisions 3 and 4 of sec. 7.

These sections were copied from'tbe New York revision of 1829, part 3, cb. 4, secs. 9 and 10, witb some verbal differences of no significance bere, except tbe substitution of ten years in sec. 6- for twenty in tbe New York statute. Here, as well as in New York, these sections clearly limit and define tbe entire rule of constructive adverse possession. All constructive adverse possession under tbe statute must come within some of tbe conditions which tbe statute gives. And, in giving construction to these, any nice consideration of tbe rules of decision outside of tbe statute would, we think, be quite unavailing. The questions before us are new here, and seem to have been tbe subject of but little authoritative discussion in New York. Simpson v. Downing, 23 Wend., 316; People v. Livingston, 8 Barb., 263; Munro v. Merchant, 26 id., 383; 28 N. Y., 9; Dominy v. Miller, 33 Barb., 386.

Tbe two sections must be considered together as one entire provision; for they are not only in pari materia, but are clearly dependent on each other. Sec. 6 gives tbe general rule ef adverse possession under paper title; and sec. 7 defines certain particular conditions of such adverse possession. Sydnor v. Palmer, 29 Wis., 253. We cannot regard sec. 6 and subds. 1, 2 and 3 of sec. 7, as giving different rules, as tbe New York court of appeals seems to have thought. Munro v. Merchant, supra.

Sec. 8 limits adverse possession, under claim other than upon paper title, to actual possession only. Sec. 6 enacts what was generally recognized as tbe law before tbe statute, that when one enters into and bolds continual possession, under a paper title, of part of tbe premises included in it, be shall be deemed, to bold adversely all tbe premises included in it; that is, when one enters under color of title, be is presumed to enter claiming according to tbe extent of bis title (Sydnor v. Palmer, 29 Wis., 226), and where there is no adverse possession, tbe law will construe bis entry to be coextensive with bis title (Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet., 412); “ except that when tbe premises so included consist of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot shall not be deemed tbe possession of any other lot of tbe same tract.” This exception materially restricts tbe rule of constructive adverse possession, as held before tbe statute; and unquestionably enters into every condition of adverse possession under these sections, save only in the instance of a known farm, substituted by subd. 4 of sec. 7 for a simgle lot. And so, under these sections, actual adverse possession of part of a single lot or a known farm shall not operate as constructive adverse possession be■yond the limits of such lot or farm.

The object of tbe exception is sufficiently intelligible.' Before tbe statute, adverse possession, to bar tbe true title, should be visible and notorious. Hare and Wallace’s notes, 2 Smith’s Lead. Cas., 561; Hawk v. Senseman, 6 S. & R., 21. Being visible and notorious, the true owner was presumed to have notice of it and to acquiesce in it. But although the actual possession of some of the premises claimed might be so visible and notorious as fairly to imply notice and acquiescence, there was danger in extending such possession by construction to all of the premises claimed; for this could not always be visible and notorious, so as to raise a fair presumption of notice and acquiescence. The paper title might be relatively extensive, and the actual possession relatively limited. And it might'often be unsafe to hold actual adverse possession of one or some of several parcels, under one title, as constructive adverse possession of all the parcels; so as to bar the right of the true owner, however insignificant the actual possession might comparatively be. The difficulty lay in connecting the actual possession with, tbe extent of tbe paper title. And tbe presumption tbat actual possession of some of tbe premises ■claimed under one title, should operate as visible and notorious adverse possession of tbe whole, really implied another presumption, perhaps seldom true- in fact, tbat tbe extent of tbe paper title was as visible .and notorious as tbe actual possession. Where tbe paper title covered several distinct lots, possession of one lot under it could not always be, perhaps seldom was, fair notice of possession claimed in tbe others. But as possession of part of a single lot may well imply a visible and notorious claim of title and possession to tbe whole of it, tbe danger of injustice from tbe doctrine of constructive adverse possession is greatly lessened, if not wholly removed, by confining it to tbe single lot within which tbe actual possession is taken and maintained. This is our understanding of tbe intent of tbe sections under consideration. See revisers’ notes, 5 Edmunds’ Stats., 430; Simpson v. Downing; Munro v. Merchant.

Sec. 6 having determined tbe general rule, tbat actual possession of one lot shall not be deemed constructive possession of any other lot, sec. 7 proceeds to define some conditions of adverse possession under see. 6. And these are distributed into four instances:

1. Cultivation or improvement.

2. Protection by a substantial inclosure. Whether and in what circumstances, under these two subdivisions, cultivation or improvement in tbe one case, or inclosure in tbe other, of part of a single lot could be held constructive adverse possession of tbe whole lot, except under tbe conditions of subd. 4, are questions not before us in this case.

3. Use of. uninclosed land for fuel or fencing, for tbe ordin-. ary use of tbe occupant. Du Pont v. Davis, 35 Wis., 631. This subdivision, as reported by tbe New York revisers, was limited by tbe words, “ for tbe purposes bf a farm of which it forms a part.” Tbe legislature there rejected those words, and substituted tbe limitation found in tbe section as adopted by tbe legislature bere, “ for tbe purpose of husbandry or the-ordinary use of tbe occupant.” Tbe language adopted and tbe language rejected alike indicate tbat tbis subdivision is-independent of subd. 4. 26 Barb., 383.

These three instances are obviously held by tbe statute as-equivalent to actual possession, independent of any other possession. If such actual possession be of less than a whole lot,, it may, in proper circumstances, probably under subd. 3 and possibly under subds. 1 and 2, operate as constructive adverse possession, of tbe whole lot. But such actual possession certainly can, under tbe limitation of sec. 6, be carried, in no-case, as constructive adverse possession, beyond tbe limits of' tbe same lot.

These three subdivisions have defined actual adverse possession, leaving constructive possession arising from it to the-general rule of sec. 6. But tbe fourth subdivision appears to-give a rule of actual and constructive adverse possession for itself.

4. “ Where a known farm or a single lot has been partly improved, tbe portion of such farm or lot tbat may have been left not cleared or not included according to tbe usual course- and custom of tbe adjoining country, shall be deemed to have-been occupied for tbe same length of time as tbe part improved or cultivated.”

Tbe word included is found in tbis subdivision, apparently by inadvertence, instead of tbe word inclosed in tbe New Tork statute; and must be construed in tbe same sense, as it-cannot well bear any other bere, and will bear tbat.

As applied to a single lot, tbis subdivision may operate to limit the effect of subds. 1 and 2, by making them' dependent-on tbe usual course and custom of tbe adjoining country. For subds. 1 and 2, of themselves, limited only by tbe general rule of sec. 6, would make cultivation or improvement in the-one case, inclosure in tbe other case, of part of a lot, actual possession of such part and constructive possession of tbe whole, independent of any course or custom; while subd. 4 gives that effect to such actual possession only when the unimproved or uninclosed part is left so according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining country.

There is no difficulty in determining what a single lot of the statute is. It is the smallest legal subdivision of land. Munro v. Merchant, supra. Its extent is certain of itself without recourse to any course or custom. And in regard to it, the provisions of sec. 6 and subds. 1 and 2 of sec. 7 seem to have been complete without subd. 4. The latter subdivision, so far as it relates to a single lot, appears only to confuse the statute, otherwise precise and certain. It is apparent that the principal object in framing that subdivision was a hnown farm; and it is to be regretted that the subdivision was not confined exclusively to it. _

The farm of the statute is not land intended to be cultivated, but a body of land held for cultivation and cultivated in whole or in part. Burrill’s Diet. A farm' may be of any sizé, of any shape, of any boundaries; may include less than one lot, or comprise several lots or parts of lots. And in taking a farm out of the general exception in § 6, and in applying to it in some degree the same rule as to a single lot, the statute substitutes Imown limits according to the course and custom of the country, for the defined limits of a single lot.

As already seen, the purpose of the section is to confine constructive adverse possession to such visible and notorious possession as may fairly imply notice and acquiescence; in other words, to render the extent of constructive adverse possession as certain as its nature will permit. Hence the limitation to the defined boundaries of a single lot. Hence, also, the condition of a farm substituted for a single lot, that it shall be hnown. As the possession is limited to one lot, so it is to one farm, with hnown boundaries to compensate the. defined boundaries of a lot. And as it is the object of the statute to render adverse possession notorious, so tbe extent of a farm substituted for a single lot, must be known, in tbe sense of being notorious.

Being so known, when part of it is left uncleared or unin-closed, according to tbe usual course and custom of tbe adjoining country, adverse possession of tbe part actually occupied may extend, by construction, to tbe part left uncleared or uninclosed according to sucb course and custom. Tbe course or custom intended is presumed to make tbe uncleared or uninclosed land a known part of tbe farm; and the course or custom wbicb operates to extend a notorious adverse possession, must itself be notorious. And thus tbe limited rule of constructive adverse possession wbicb tbe statute continues, can never carry it beyond the defined limits of tbe whole lot or tbe known limits of tbe whole farm, of wbicb part is held in actual possession; making constructive possession, as far as may be, as visible, notorious and distinct as tbe actual possession on wbicb it rests.

All adverse possession must be distinct and continued; notoriously and visibly so. Hare & Wallace, ubi supra. And it canbot be enlarged, either as to title or extent, after entry. To constitute adverse possession, entry must be made with defined claim of title and of possession, continued while tbe statute runs; and, after entry, sucb claim cannot be enlarged, unless indeed by acts equivalent to a new entry and new claim of adverse possession. Angelí’s Lim., sec. 384. Entry upon part of a lot, under claim of title to tbe whole, while other part is held adversely, cannot found adverse possession of tbe whole lot, though afterwards the adverse possession of tbe other part be abandoned. And so possession of a known farm cannot be enlarged after entry, to constitute adverse possession founded on sucb entry by enlarging tbe boundaries of tbe farm. Within tbe statute, tbe known extent of tbe farm at tbe time of entry limits adverse possession under tbe entry, as surely as tbe defined extent of a single lot. And, in order' to establish adverse possession of a known farm, outside of the actual possession taken, the known extent of the farm at the time of entry must be established. "When established, adverse possession founded on the entry can, under no claim or pretense, be suffered to travel beyond that extent. It is the intent of the statute to make the hounds of a known farm as certain, as far as may be, as the hounds of a single lot; and so to make adverse possession of the one as distinct, visible and notorious, as far as possible, as adverse possession of the other.

“ The usual course and custom of the adjoining country ” is obviously a local custom. If there were, in fact, such a custom applicable to this case, it might and should have been proved by parol. 2 Greenl. Ev., § 250. No proof was given on the subject; but it was, perhaps, hardly competent for the court below to assume that there was no settled custom on the subject. If the assumption were correct, it seems that subd. 4 of sec. 7 should have been excluded from the consideration of the jury, because that subdivision is dependent on such a custom. And it was certainly error to instruct the jury that, in the absence of any settled custom, every farmer should be allowed to judge for himself; that is to say, every farmer shoiild be a custom unto himself.

It appeared in evidence that what are called the Pepper farm and the Miller farm had been, not remotely, possessed and used in severalty, as several farms, by several owners. Both are embraced in some of the respondent’s title papers. But that goes no more to make them one farm than to make them one lot. To reduce the two into one known farm, within suhd. 4, so as to make the actual adverse possession of the respondent or his grantor of part, constructive adverse possession of the whole, it should have been proved that the two had been joined together in one known farm before the entry on which the respondent claimed, and constituted one known farm at the time of such entry. We-understand the charge of the court below, and we think the jury must have understood it, to bold that if tlie Pepper and Miller farms, after entry, with or without intervening land held by the respondent’s grantor under a different title, constituted one known farm, then constructive adverse possession of tbe whole followed the entry of the respondent’s grantor. We need not repeat the reasons why we consider this to be fatal error. And we may be permitted to remark that there is, throughout the charge, an obvious conflict between the certain rule of adverse possession which the statute sanctions, and the loose and indefinite application of the rule sanctioned by the court below; and much that looks very like a reversal of the rule that, under the statute, every presumption is in favor of the true owner. Wilson v. Henry, 35 Wis., 241.

How much uninclosed land may be so used for fuel or fencing or both, under subd. 3, as to constitute an actual adverse possession of it, may be a question of some difficulty. Certainly such actual use on one lot cannot carry with it constructive use on another lot, of the same piece of timber. The use is put by the statute as actual possession, subject to the general exception of sec. 6. Land, to come within the subdivision, must be used for the supply of fuel or fencing according to the subdivision, and we are inclined to think, must be held for that use as its sole or principal object, in good faith. The extent of land so used must bear a reasonable proportion to the use; must not be positively greater than is reasonably sufficient for fuel and fencing, in the circumstances of each case. And the use must be distinct, visible, continued and notorious, under claim of title; distinguishable from casual trespass or occasional use. Austin v. Holt, 32 Wis., 478. It must be such as to constitute the person using the land for fuel or fencing, the occupant of it, in the words of the subdivision. This question also seems to have been referred, by the court below, very much to the judgment of the occupant, in the absence of fraud or insincerity. We cannot but say that the quantity, several hundred acres, appearing to be «¿aimed bere for tbis use, looks to us unreasonably out of proportion to tbe supply of fuel and fencing, in tbe circumstances proved. So large a tract of forest would not be witbin tbe intendment of tbis provision.” Munro v. Merchant. Wbat is a reasonable quantity, in eaeb case, is not altogether for tbe party as matter of choice, nor altogether for tbe court as matter of law; but is a question for tbe jury, under proper limitation and instruction.

• Ve ought not to close tbis discussion without tbe remark, that subds. 3 and 4 of sec. 7 are quite independent of each ■other; and that both cannot support tbe same possession of tbe same premises. We do not say that one may not, under any circumstances, bold possession of a farm under subd. 4, •and of a separate lot for fuel and fencing under subd. 3. On that point we intimate no opinion. But as there is no confusion in tbe statute between tbe two forms of possession, so there can be no confusion of possession in fact under them. And where possession is claimed as of a farm, tbe claim can receive no aid from subd. 3; where it is claimed as used for the supply of fuel or fencing, tbe claim can receive no aid from subd. 4. An ambiguous possession, claimed in part under each subdivision and not supported by either alone, is not witbin tbe statute, and will go for nothing.

Other matters were discussed at tbe bar, which we do not deem it necessary to consider. It is apparent from all that has been said, that tbe judgment of tbe court below must be reversed, and tbe cause remanded for a new trial.

By the Gowrt. — So ordered.  