
    Ronald Allen REYNOLDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEWIS COUNTY, WASHINGTON; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-35347
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted September 1, 2017  Seattle, Washington
    Filed November 3, 2017
    
      Rick Cordes, Cordes Brandt PLLC, Olympia, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant
    John E. Justice, Esquire, Attorney, Law, Lyman, Daniel, Kamerrer & Bogda-novich P.S., Olympia, WA, for Defendants-Appellees
    Before: HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and FOOTE, District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
      The Honorable Elizabeth E. Foote, United States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Ronald Reynolds appeals from a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellees, Lewis County and Lewis County Coroner, Warren McLeod. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1997)). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Reynolds filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for claims arising out of an inquest conducted by the Coroner into the death of Reynolds’s wife. An inquest jury determined that the cause of death was homicide and that Reynolds was one of the persons responsible. The Coroner issued an arrest warrant for Reynolds, though the County Prosecutor declined to bring charges. Reynolds contends that both the County and the Coroner violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during this process.

The Coroner is entitled to qualified immunity as Reynolds has not shown a violation of his constitutional rights. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The Coroner had jurisdiction and authority to conduct the inquest, and he did not abuse his discretion in doing so. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.24.020 (2011). Therefore, the arrest that followed, which was mandated by statute, was supported by probable cause and did not violate Reynolds’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Wash. Rev. Code § 36.24.100 (2011). Similarly, Reynolds has not shown a violation of his. Fourteenth Amendment rights. Reynolds claims that he was deprived of his property interest in his continued employment with the school district, but has offered no evidence that his employment was the sort of public employment in which he had a constitutionally protected property interest, and no evidence that he did not resign voluntarily. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). As to any substantive due process claim, Reynolds’s assertion that his arrest was unlawful is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, and, for the reasons announced above, the claim is without merit. See Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2001). Additionally, no conduct of the Coroner meets the high standard of a substantive due process violation. See Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-49, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)) (noting that a substantive due process violation involves action that shocks the conscience).

Reynolds also appeals the district court’s dismissal of his three state law claims against the Coroner for abuse of process, unlawful arrest, and libel. All of Reynolds’s state law claims stem from the Coroner’s inquest proceeding, which is a mechanism for determining the cause and manner of death. Therefore, pursuant to Washington state law, the Coroner is immune from liability for Reynolds’s ■ state law claims. Wash. Rev. Code § 68.50.015 (2011).

Finally, summary judgment was proper as to Reynolds’s claims against the County under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), because a municipality cannot be held liable when there is no underlying constitutional violation. Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     