
    Kramer v. Board of Police of New York.
    
      (New York Superior Court,
    
    
      General Term,
    
    
      Filed June 1, 1886.)
    
    
      1. Injunction—Not a proper remedy in criminal oases—Board op police—When injunction should not issue to restrain arrest.
    By chapter 410 of the Laws of 1882, known as the consolidation act, the selling or furnishing of any liquors in the auditorium or lobby of a place of exhibition or performance, is made a misdemeanor, and by the same act it "is made the duty of any member of the police to arrest any person found so selling qr furnishing: Held, that an injunction should not be granted, at the suit of a person engaged in such business, to prevent a threatened arrest by the police.
    8. Same—Court op equity no jurisdiction—Jury.
    Whether a person accused of a crime be guilty or innocent should be determined in a common law court by a jury. A court of equity has no jurisdiction to try the question as to the guilt or innocence of a person accused of a crime on affidavits.
    Appeal from order granting injunction.
    
      D. J. Dean, for appellants.
    
      Howe & Hummel, for respondent
   Ingraham, J.

The defendants in this action are sued as “a body, duly created by law, specially charged with enforcing the laws of this state and preserving the peace of the city,” and the complainant alleges that the defendants, by its servants and policemen, have threatened to arrest the plaintiff and all his employees, and to interfere with plaintiff’s business, and prevent him from carrying on the same at. his place of business in the city of New York, Claiming that the plaintiff violates the law, and further alleging “that plaintiff violates no law whatever, and unless the defendants are enjoined from interfering with plaintiff’s business, and making the threatened arrest, the injury plaintiff will sustain will be irreparable, which cannot be estimated or ascertained in an action at law,” and the complaint demands judgment “that the defendants, its superintendent, inspectors, captains, sergeants, roundsmen, patrolmen, etc., be enjoined and restrained from arresting or taking into custody any person engaged upon the premises of the plaintiff in the transaction of the business of the plaintiff, and from interfering with or hindering any such persons in the transaction of said business, and from in any manner proceeding against such persons by arrest, or otherwise in the conduct of said business on plaintiff’s premises, and from in any manner interfering with or hindering plaintiff or such person or persons authorized in carrying on the business as aforesaid.”

On this complaint and the affidavit of the plaintiff, which, it is claimed, tended to show that the business carried on at the premises described in the complaint was not in violation of law, and that he and his servants were not guilty of the crime charged, an order was entered which provided “that the said defendants, and all persons acting under defendant’s authority, or by its directions, desist and refrain, until the final determination of this action, from arresting or taking into custody any persons engaged upon the premises of the plaintiff in the transaction of any business with the plaintiff, and from interfering with or plundering any such person in the transaction of said business, and from in any manner proceeding against any such person by arrest or otherwise in the conduct of said business upon the plaintiff’s premises, and from in any other way interfering with or hindering plaintiff or such person or persons as may be authorized by him in carrying on his business as aforesaid.”

By section 250 of chapter 410 of the Laws of 1882, known as the consolidation act, it is provided that the government and discipline of the police department of the city of New York shall be such as the board of police may from time to time by rules and regulations prescribe, and by section 277 of the said act, “The several members of the police force shall have power and authority to immediately arrest without warrant, and to take into custody, any persons who shall commit, or threaten to, or attempt to commit, in the presence of such member, or within his view, any breach of the peace or offense directly prohibited by the legislature or by any ordinance of the said city, and the members of the police force shall possess, in the city of New York, and in every part of this state, all the common law and statutory powers of the constables.”

By section 2010 of the said act it is provided, “It shall not be lawful to sell or furnish any wine, beer, or strong or spirituous liquors, to any person in the auditorium or lobbies of any place of exhibition or performance mentioned in section 1998, or in apartments connected, therewith by any door, window or aperture,” and by section 2012 it is provided, “That any person violating any of the provisions of section 2010 shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.”

The selling or furnishing of any wine, beer or liquor in the auditorium or lobby of a place of exhibition or performance having been made a misdemeanor, it became the duty of the members of the police force to arrest the plaintiff if he sold or furnished wine or liquor in the place prohibited by the statute, and the ground upon which the plaintiff requested the court below to grant the injunction was that the act of the plaintiff and his servants were not in violation of the section referred to, or in other words, that they were not guilty of the misdemeanor for which the police threatened arrest. This was the only question discussed in the opinion below and in the briefs submitted by counsel for respondent on this appeal.

The court below held that the plaintiff was not guilty of the crime, thus trying in a court of equity the guilt or innocence of a person accused of a crime on affidavit. There was no charge in the complaint that the police had threatened to make the arrest without a warrant or the authority required by law. The allegation is that plaintiff was accused of a crime; that the police threatened to arrest him for committing such crime; that he was innocent of the crime charged and did not want to be arrested, because it would injure his business, and whether or not a court of equity has jurisdiction to determine such a question in this action, is presented.

It is clear—that the assumption of such jurisdiction by a court of equity would entirely subvert the method provided by law for the trial of criminal cases. If such jurisdiction should be upheld, every person accused of crime would have the right to apply to the court for an injunction restraining his arrest and the court would be bound to entertain the application and to try the question of his guilt or innocence upon affidavits. Upon no principle could the jurisdiction be restrained to a particular class of crimes and a person charged with the crime of murder would be as much entitled to the remedy as a person charged with a violation of the section of the statute referred to.

The tendency has been to greatly extend the remedy by injunction in civil cases, but certainly such remedy should be limited to civil cases and criminal cases left to be disposed of in the criminal courts.

The question was presented to the court of appeals in the case of Davis v. The American Society, etc. (15 N. Y. 368), where as in this case the plaintiff claimed that his acts were not in violation of the statute under which the officers ■of the defendant claimed the right to arrest, and it was there held that the action was absolutely without sanction in ■precedent or principles of equity. The court say “the only ■question for contestation was whether as matter of fact they were guilty or innocent of such violation and the determination of that question could not by such an action ■as this be drawn to a court of equity. Whether a person accused of a crime be guilty or innocent is to be determined in a common law court by a jury and the people as well as the accused have the right to have it thus determined.”

But the order granted in this case went further than to restrain the arrest of the plaintiff and his employees. The defendants are “enjoined from arresting or taking into custody any person engaged upon the premises of the plaintiff in the transaction of any business with the plaintiff, and from in any manner proceeding against any such person by arrest or otherwise in the conduct of said business upon plaintiff’s premises.”

Such an injunction would give any person engaged upon the premises of the plaintiff in the transaction of any business, immunity from arrest for any crime and practically nulify the statute which gives to the members of the police force power and authority to arrest and take into custody any person who shall commit, or threaten, or attempt to commit in the presence of such officer any offense prohibited by law.

We do not decide whether or not the acts of the plaintiff were in violation of section 2010 of the consolidation act, but we are of the opinion that such questions cannot be ■determined by this court in this action.

The order appealed from should, therefore, be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements; and motion for injunction denied, with ten dollars costs.  