
    In the Matter of Damon A. Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York et al., Respondents. Marcia R. Lowry, Guardian ad Litem, Appellant.
    Argued November 23, 1983;
    decided December 20, 1983
    
      POINTS OF COUNSEL
    
      Michael Starr and Rochelle Feder Hansen for appellant.
    I. The sweeping limitation imposed by the court below on Family Court authority in section 358-a proceedings is wholly unsupportable. (Matter of Edward M., 76 Misc 2d 781, affd sub nom. Matter of Murcray, 45 AD2d 906; Matter of Samantha S., 80 Misc 2d 217; People v Lovell, 21 Misc 570; Matter of Kurtis v Ballou, 33 AD2d 1034; Matter of Sanjivini K., 40 NY2d 1025; Matter of Barbara P., 71 Misc 2d 965; Matter of Lydia H., 77 Misc 2d 807; Matter of Gravina, 89 AD2d 534; Matter of John M., 71 AD2d 144, 51 NY2d 999.) II. The Family Court’s informational and custodial orders were within its power and must be upheld. (Matter of John M., 71 AD2d 144.) III. The Family Court’s order appointing a guardian ad litem was within its power and must be upheld. (Matter of Lascaris v Carioti, 105 Misc 2d 728; Matter of Hirsch v Hirsch, 53 Misc 2d 938; Barry E. v Ingraham, 43 NY2d 87; Matter of Marilyn H., 100 Misc 2d 402; Matter of P v Department of Health, 200 Misc 1090; Matter of Melis v Department of Health, 260 App Div 772; Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565; Matter of Winship, 397 US 358; Tinker v Des Moines School Dist., 393 US 503; Matter of Gault, 387 US 1.)
    
      Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Corporation Counsel {June A. Witterschein and Leonard Koerner of counsel), for Commissioner of Social Services, respondent.
    I. This court has held that the jurisdiction of the Family Court in a section 358-a proceeding is limited to approving or disapproving the voluntary placement instrument and to determining whether the instrument was signed knowingly and voluntarily and whether it serves the best interests of the child to be removed from the home. The Legislature did not give the Family Court the power in section 358-a to direct the course of foster care for a child who has been voluntarily and temporarily placed with the Commissioner of Social Services or to direct the commissioner not to return a child to the placing party for the purpose of determining whether the child should be placed for adoption. (Matter of John M., 71 AD2d 144, 51 NY2d 999; Matter of Leon RR, 48 NY2d 117; Matter of James B., 96 AD2d 730; People ex rel. Ninesling v Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs., 46 NY2d 382; Matter of Lorie C., 49 NY2d 161; Matter of Ruth J, 55 AD2d 52; Matter of Emily R., 112 Misc 2d 71; Matter of Trida Lashawnda M., 113 Misc 2d 287.) II. As a matter of law, it was improper for the Family Court to appoint a stranger as a guardian ad litem for Damon A. solely for the purpose of the appeal. (Matter of Anonymous [Betty Lynn] v Anonymous [Michael], 70 Misc 2d 584; Matter of Orlando F., 40 NY2d 103; Matter of Holland, 75 AD2d 1005; Matter of Carmen G. F., 63 AD2d 651; Matter of Tracy B., 80 AD2d 792; Matter of Donna H., 70 AD2d 521; Kossar v State of New York, 13 Misc 2d 941; Matter of Ford, 79 AD2d 403; Matter of Mark V., 80 Misc 2d 986; Matter of Apel, 96 Misc 2d 839.)
    
      Daniel L. Greenberg, Norman Siegel and Louise Gruner Gans for Adéle C., respondent.
    I. The jurisdiction of the Family Court in a section 358-a proceeding is limitéd to approval or disapproval of the voluntary placement instrument. Neither section 358-a of the Social Services Law nor section 255 of the Family Court Act nor any general powers of the Family Court authorize the Family Court order in this case. (Matter of John M., 71 AD2d 144, 51 NY2d 999; Matter of Kurds v Ballou, 33 AD2d 1034; Matter of Mehl, 114 Misc 2d 55; Matter of Ruth J, 55 AD2d 52; Matter of Ulster County Dept. of Social Servs. v Irva XX, 57 AD2d 1009; Schampier v Office of Gen. Servs., 73 AD2d 1011, 52 NY2d 746; Matter of Ella B., 30 NY2d 352; Matter of Roland F. v Brezenoff, 108 Misc 2d 133; Matter of Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v Polk, 29 NY2d 196; Matter of 
      
      George O., 115 Misc 2d 782.) II. The Family Court’s orders and proceedings violated Ms. C.’s right to due process of law. (Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645; Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745; Smith v Organization of Foster Families, 431 US 816; Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390; Matter of Leon RR, 48 NY2d 117; Matter of Sanjivini K., 47 NY2d 374; People ex rel. Ninesling v Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs., 46 NY2d 382; Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543; Matter of Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v Polk, 29 NY2d 196; People ex rel. Scarpetta v Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 NY2d 185.) III. The appointment of the guardian ad item was improper. The Family Court Act mandates the appointment of a Law Guardian. (Matter of Anonymous [Betty Lynn] v Anonymous [Michael], 70 Misc 2d 584.) IV. Appellant’s interpretation of section 358-a is contrary to current State legislative policy. Appellant’s proposals for statutory change should be addressed to the Legislature.
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

This appeal arises out of a petition for approval of a voluntary transfer of custody of Damon A. from his maternal grandmother to petitioner Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York. The proceeding was instituted in Family Court pursuant to section 358-a of the Social Services Law. The petition was approved. In doing so, however, Family Court included in the order a directive that the Department of Social Services submit a written report so that the court could evaluate Damon’s adjustment to foster care and whether he should be placed for adoption.. In addition, the agency was prohibited from releasing Damon from its custody before the reports were made. The agency was to submit its report within two months of the order approving the transfer of custody.

It was error for Family Court to order the agency to return to the court with a progress report. The purpose of a section 358-a proceeding is to approve or disapprove a petition to transfer custody. Once the petition is granted or denied, the court’s jurisdiction over the matter generally ends (Matter of D. Children, 60 NY2d 838, affg on opn below 90 AD2d 348). When the transfer is approved, responsibility for caring for the child’s best interests vests in the agency (Matter of D. Children, 90 AD2d, at p 351, supra). This obligation is to be discharged without interference by the court unless 18 months have elapsed and the child is still in foster care (see Social Services Law, § 392). Only when a new proceeding is initiated, may Family Court intrude earlier than is authorized by section 392. In the present case, the Family Court’s order was unjustified. Once the petition was approved, the proceeding terminated and Family Court was without power to oversee the agency’s efforts (see id.; Matter of John M., 51 NY2d 999, revg on dissenting opn of Herlihy, J., 71 AD2d 144,148). By the same token, there was no authority to appoint a guardian ad litem after the proceeding ended, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances (see Matter of D. Children, supra).

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, Meyer, Simons and Kaye concur in Per Curiam opinion.

Order affirmed, without costs.  