
    Thomas Taylor, Appellant, v. The Union Traction Company.
    
      Bicycle law—Buie of the road—Negligence—Contributory negligence— Street railways—Act of April 23, 1889—City ordinance.
    
    Notwithstanding the Act of April 23,1889, P. L. 44, which gives to riders of bicycles the same rights as persons using carriages drawn by horses, and a city ordinance which gives vehicles on passenger railways going in the direction that the cars travel, the right to the track when they meet vehicles going in the opposite direction, if a bicycler, while riding between the tracks of a street railway in the direction that the cars run, meet a wagon approaching him on the tracks from the opposite direction, it is his duty to leave the tracks, and if he fails to do so, and is run down by the wagon, he is guilty of contributory negligence, and cannot recover damages for his injuries from the owner of the wagon.
    Argued Jan. 26, 1898.
    Appeal No. 334, Jan. Term, 1897, by plaintiff, from judgment of C. P. No. 4, Phila. Co., March Term, 1890, No. 444, on verdict for defendant.
    Before Sterrett, C. J., Williams, McCollum, Mitchell and Fell, JJ.
    Affirmed.
    Trespass for personal injuries. Before Willson, J.
    At the trial it appeared that on the evening of March 19, 1896, plaintiff was injured by one of defendant’s wagons while he was riding a bicycle.
    Under the instructions of the court, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.
    The facts appear by the opinion of the court below, Will-son, J., discharging a rule for a new trial as follows:
    This case arose in the following manner: The plaintiff was riding his bicycle on his way home from his work. He rode down Broad street and turned eastward into Dauphin street. While he was on his course rain fell, making the streets wet, and requiring, as the plaintiff said, some care on his part in order to avoid the slipping of his vehicle. He rode down Dauphin street slowly; before he reached Thirteenth street he saw a cart drawn by a single horse on its way up Dauphin street. The plaintiff testified that he saw the driver of the cart coming; that he was not going to make any turn, and that the man was driving very fast. According to the plaintiff’s testimony, he first saw the cart when it was thirty or forty feet distant. The cart was occupying the tracks of the passenger railway company; the plaintiff kept on his course and so did the driver, each evidently claiming or acting upon the theory that he had the right of way. When it was too late for the plaintiff to' do it safely he turned off; the plaintiff on his bicycle was struck by either the cart or the horse, and he was thrown and injured. The cart belonged to the defendant company and the driver was in their employ. The plaintiff now seeks to recover damages for his injuries. In the statement of the facts of the case it is also to be added, that the street cars which run upon the tracks on Dauphin street run eastwardly, that is, in the same direction as the plaintiff was riding his bicycle. There may be said to be two grounds upon which the plaintiff bases his cause of action. The first of these is that the defendant’s driver was driving at a high rate of speed. I do not think there is anything in the evidence which would justify an inference that the plaintiff’s injuries were owing to any negligence of the driver upon that course. The other ground is that the plaintiff had the right of way. To sustain this point, reliance is had upon the statute which gives to a bicycle the character of a vehicle, and also to an ordinance of the city which, in .ordinary cases, gives to vehicles the right of way upon the tracks of the passenger railway companies in the direction in which the cars ordinarily run. The obvious reason of this ordinance, however, is that it was intended to give to the vehicles making use of the rails of the tracks a convenient and settled right of direction and occupancy upon those rails. I do not think it has any bearing whatever upon the rights of riders of bicycles. Nobody, I presume, would dispute the proposition that in the ordinary occupancy of streets, and under ordinary circumstances, the drivers of vehicles drawn by horses and the riders of bicycles must regard the ordinary rules of the road for each other’s convenience and safety. I do not, however, think that such a rule would require that in an open unobstructed highway, a vehicle, like a cart, for instance, should be driven to one side in order that the rider of a bicycle might be relieved of the necessity of deviating from a straight line. Good sense and a reasonable regard for the peculiarites of such cases ought to be required, both of the drivers of vehicles and of the riders of bicycles. This is hardly necessary to say. The experience of almost everyone, in his own family, if not from his own personal use of the bicycle, emphasizes the importance of proper and reasonable regulations for the protection of the many thousands of people who use the modern vehicle known as the bicycle. At the same time, it is also to be borne in mind that that vehicle is much lighter and more under the control of its rider than vehicles of the other sort, which are drawn by horses.
    In many cases, therefore, it is the duty of the rider of the bicycle to regulate Ills course and to make concessions, which possibly the driver of a vehicle of burden ordinarily would not be obliged to do. In this particular case it is quite evident that the plaintiff, under the notion that he had a right to compel the driver of the cart to leave the track in order to give him a free and unobstructed passage, remained in his onward course so long that the collision which occurred was unavoidable. In this he was at fault; he brought the consequences upon himself by his own lolly. In our judgment, there was nothing in the circumstances of the case or in his duty which required the driver of the cart to leave the track to make room for the plaintiff. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the plaintiff made out no case, and that the instruction of the trial judge to the jury to render a verdict in favor of the defendant was proper and should be sustained. The rule is therefore discharged.
    Judgment was entered upon the verdict.
    
      Error assigned was in giving binding instructions, for defendant.
    
      Thomas Earle White, for appellant.
    A bicycle is a vehicle, and as such, has the rights of a vehicle: Act of April 23,1889; Geiger v. Turnpike Co., 167 Pa. 582; Com. v. Forrest, 170 Pa. 40.
    
      Thomas Learning, for appellee, was not heard, but argued in his printed brief:
    A lighter vehicle or boat must give way for the heavier and more unwieldy one: Beach v. Parmeter, 23 Pa. 196; Grier v. Sampson, 27 Pa. 183; P. & R. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 89 Pa. 31.
    January 26, 1898.
   Pee Cubiam,

Judgment affirmed at bar.  