
    Mohamed Jean Aboulaye KABA, aka Charlie, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-1100.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 16, 2015.
    
      Mohamed Jean Aboulaye Kaba, New York, NY, pro se.
    Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Julie M. Iversen, Senior Litigation Counsel; Robert Michael Stal-zer, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: WALKER, JR., GUIDO CALABRESI, and REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

' Mohamed Jean Aboulaye Kaba, a native and citizen of the Ivory Coast, seeks review of a March 13, 2014 decision of the BIA, affirming a September 27, 2012 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Helen Sichel, which denied Kaba’s applications adjustment of status and voluntary departure. See In re Mohamed Jean Aboulaye Kaba, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 13, 2014), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig.Ct.N.Y.C. Sept. 27, 2012). Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s opinion as modified by the BIA, see Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005), applying well established standards of review, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir.2008). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

For applications like Kaba’s, governed by the REAL ID Act, the agency may, “[cjonsidering the totality of the circumstances ... base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account,” and inconsistencies in an applicant’s statements, and other record evidence “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 163-64. We “defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 167.

The IJ reasonably relied on implausible aspects of Kaba’s testimony in finding him not credible. In making a finding that an applicant’s claim is inherently implausible, an IJ is not required to “explain in precise detail what made each identified act implausible.” See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir.2007). Rather, if “the reasons for [the IJ’s] incredulity are evident,” the implausibility finding is supported by substantial evidence. Id. We have recognized that the point at which an implausibility finding “ceases to be sustainable as reasonable and, instead, is justifiably labeled ‘speculation,’ in the absence of an IJ’s adequate explanation, cannot be located with precision.” Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.2006). Nevertheless, while “bald” speculation is an impermissible basis for an adverse credibility finding, “[t]he speculation that inheres in inference is not ‘bald’ if the inference is made available to the factfin-der by record facts, or even a single fact, viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary experience.” Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168-69 (2d Cir.2007). Accordingly, so long as an IJ’s finding is “tethered to record evidence, and there is nothing else in the record from which a firm conviction of error could properly be derived,” we will not disturb the inherent implausibility finding. Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d at 67; see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d at 169. In reviewing an adverse credibility determination based on an applicant’s implausible testimony, “we review the entire record, not whether each unusual or implausible feature of the account can be explained or rationalized.” Ying Li v. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 529 F.3d 79, 80 (2d Cir.2008).

Here, Kaba testified that he lived with his girlfriend for two years and had two children with her, but did not know her immigration status at any time. He also testified that he had impersonated her to find employment four separate times prior to his employment at the bakery. The IJ reasonably relied on this testimony to find it implausible that Kaba would not know (1) his girlfriend’s immigration status or (2) that the forms he submitted to the bakery falsely indicated that his girlfriend was a U.S. citizen. .This reasoning was not unduly speculative, and it is supported by testimony in the record. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d at 168-169 (holding that speculation is not “bald” if based on facts in record viewed in light of common sense).

The IJ also reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Kaba’s testimony and the testimony of the bakery’s owner. Kaba testified that he went to the bakery to speak to a manager, and that the manager completed his employment application for him. The owner, however, testified that the store had no manager, that he interviewed Kaba, and that no employee ever filled out paperwork for job applicants. Kaba provided no explanation for these discrepancies at his hearing. Accordingly, we identify no basis to disturb the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

This adverse finding disposes of Kaba’s argument that he is eligible for adjustment of status. Even if we could reach his argument that the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) requires that a false claim to citizenship be willful, Kaba’s willfulness is supported by the IJ’s finding that Kaba was not credible in denying knowledge of the false claim. See Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir.2006) (recognizing that false denial of knowledge can support willfulness).

Kaba also argues that the IJ denied him due process. Kaba, however, failed to raise this issue before the BIA. See Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that petitioner must “raise issues to the BIA in order to preserve them for judicial review” (emphasis omitted)). Accordingly, we decline to consider this argument.

Finally, Kaba argues that the agency’s denial of voluntary departure was arbitrary. We lack jurisdiction, however, to review Kaba’s challenge to the IJ’s discretionary balancing of the equities. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229c(f), 1252(a)(2)(D).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  