
    Robert Bell vs. Mathew Hutchinson.
    I'lie court may, before going into trial, grant leave to the defendant to withdraw a plea of justification, when it can do no injury to the plain, tiff.
    A judge may, at his discretion, request a jury to reconsider their verdict.
    Tried before Mr. Justice Richardson, Fairfield, Spring Term, 1S23.
    THIS was an action of Slander, for charging the plaintiff with stealing a pen knife and handkerchief.
    The defendant pleaded not guilty to the first charge, and justified as to the second.
    Before the commencement of the trial, the defendant’s council moved the court to withdraw the justification, and the court granted the motion, although opposed on the part of the plaintiff.
    The jury found for the plaintiff one dollar damages,-but informed the court at the time of delivering in their verdict, they intended the defendant to pay the costs of the suit, as they had understood one cent would carry costs.
    Upon this statement of the jury, the counsel for the plaintiff moved the court, that the jury might be permitted to reconsider the verdict; but the motion was refused, and the verdict recorded, as delivered in.
    The plaintiff moved the Constitutional Court for a new trial, on the following grounds :
    1st. Because the court ought not to have permitted the defendant to withdraw his justification without leave of the plaintiff.
    2nd. Because the court ought to have permitted the jury to correct their verdict, in as much as the same was founded in a misapprehension.
   Mr. Justice Richardson

delivered the opinion'of the court:

That the court may permit a defendant to withdraw his plea before going into a trial, when such withdrawal doer no injury to the plaintiff, is clear, and that the court may permit or direct the jury to reconsider their verdict, has been too often done to be less evident. But that the court is bound to do so, at the request of the counsel of a party who may disliite the verdict rendered, would be strange indeed. The suggestion was to the discretion of the court; and as the jury had separ ted by consent of parties, after making up their verdict the night before, and as they could not give costs but by increasing the verdict, which had been actually published, more than twelve fold, i. e. to J20 currency, the precedent might have been of evil tendency.

Clarke, for the motion.

Feare&on, contra.

The motion :s therefore dismissed.

Justices iXotl, Gantt, Cohock, Huger and Johnson concurred.  