
    Gary JOHNSON, Petitioner — Appellant v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent — Appellee.
    No. 07-70043.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Sept. 9, 2008.
    
      Roy E. Greenwood, Jr., David A. Schul-man, Austin, TX, for Petitioner-Appellant,
    Katherine D. Hayes, Office of the Attorney General, Postconviction Litigation Div., Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee,
    Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

_ _ , Gary Johnson was convicted or capital , , , , . murder and sentenced to death for the . „ T tt , t, 1986 murders of James Hazelton and Pe- , 0 , . ,, • • 1 ter Sparagana during the same cnmmal transaction He rennests a certificate of UJL dIlod.vl/iOIl* 1 lc 1 v\|Ucouo d Lei biilLduc Oi appealability (“COA”) authorizing him to appeal the district court’s denial of federal habeas relief. Johnson asserts that he is entitled to a COA for three claims:

, 4 . „ (1) The State s suppression of evidence ,, \,, , that two of the State s witnesses at trial , , , , ,. , . , , , T 1 ! had been hypnotized violated Johnson s . . , . . T, , ., due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963);

(2) The district court erred by refusing to consider the affidavits of attorneys on the issue of whether Johnson’s trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance; and

(3) Johnson’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by calling Johnson’s brother, Terry, as a witness at the guilt phase of trial.

To obtain a COA, Johnson must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, he must demonstrate that “jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of ^is constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 327, 123 S.Ct 1029; 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). “[A] claim can be debatable even though every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been and ^ ^ hag m consideration, that petitioner will not prevail.” Id. at 338, 123 S.Ct. 1029. The Supreme Court has instructed us that, in . . , . . . making our decision whether to gi'ant a 4 COA, we must limit our examination to a „ , , ,, . . „ , . , threshold inquiry, which consists of an ^ OTerview of the claims ln the babeas Petl" tion and a general assessment of then-merits” 1(1 at 327> 336’ 123 S'Ct 1029' We cannot deny a C0A because we believe the petitioner ultimately will not prevail on the merits of his claims. Id. at 337, 123 ~ ,, ,, , , , S.Ct. 1029. On the other hand, however, , issuance of a COA must not be pro forma „ ., „„„ ,, or a matter of course. Id. While the nature of a caPital case is not of itself sufficient to warrant the issuance of a COA, in a death penalty case any doubts ag to a C0A should issue must be in the petitioner’s favor.” Ra- ^ u 39g FM m (5th Cil.2005) (interna] quotation marks and d. , ... tations omitted).

Based on our limited, threshold inquiry and general assessment of the merits 0f Johnson’s claims, we conclude that his Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel claims present issues that are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. We therefore GRANT a COA authorizing Johnson to appeal the district court’s denial of habeas relief for these two claims.

A COA is not required for Johnson’s claim that the district court erred by refusing to consider the attorney affidavits he submitted to the district court in support of his ineffective assistance claim. This claim by Johnson involves an evidentiary ruling of the district court and not a claim of the denial of a constitutional right. See Lewis v. Quarterman, 272 Fed.Appx 347, 351 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished). Accordingly, the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider the attorney affidavits will be addressed in connection with the ineffective assistance claim for which we have granted a COA. See id.

We think that these issues have been well briefed. If, however, Johnson wishes to file a supplemental brief with respect to the merits of the claims, he may do so within thirty days of the date of this order. The supplemental brief should address only matters, if any, that have not already been covered in the brief in support of the COA application. If Johnson files a supplemental brief, the State may file a response fifteen days thereafter, to be similarly limited to matters that have not already been covered in its brief in opposition to Johnson’s COA application.

For the foregoing reasons, Johnson’s request for a COA is GRANTED in part and DENIED, as unnecessary, in part. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir R. 47.5.4.
     