
    Tamara HARUTYUNYAN and Lilit Yengoyan, AKA Lilit Avakyants, Petitioners, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
    Nos. 12-72200, 12-73076
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted May 24, 2017 
    
    Filed May 30, 2017
    Stuart Irwin Folinsky, Attorney, Law Office of Stuart I. Folinsky, Los Angeles, CA, Lea Greenberger, Attorney, Attorney at Law, Encino, CA, for Petitioners
    Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Suzanne N. Nar-done, Esquire, OIL, Joanna L. Watson, Trial Attorney, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent
    Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Tamara Harutyunyan, a native of Azerbaijan and a citizen of Armenia, and Lilit Yengoyan, a native and citizen of Armenia, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) June 18, 2012, and September 14, 2012, orders denying their motion to reopen removal proceedings. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petitions for review.

As to petitioners’ arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen where petitioners failed to comply with the requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and any ineffective assistance was not plain on the face of the record. See Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000) (Lozada compliance is not dispositive where ineffective assistance is plain on the face of the record). We lack jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ contentions that Yengoyan was improperly sequestered because they failed to raise this to the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (petitioner must exhaust issues or claim m administrative proceedings below).

As to petitioners’ arguments regarding changed country conditions, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as time and number-barred, where it was filed more than seven years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R, § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish materially changed country conditions in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003,2(c)(3)(ii), Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening). We reject petitioners’ contention that the BIA discredited evidence.

PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     