
    ATOCHA a. GARCIA.
    
      New York Superior Court; Special Term,
    
    
      July, 1862.
    Reference, when ordered.—Complaint.—Statement of Ground for Arrest.
    In an action in which the trial of an issue of fact will require the examination of a long account, a compulsory order of reference is proper, notwithstanding the complaint may contain allegations of fraud, such as constitute a ground of arrest, and the defendant has been arrested thereon.
    
    
      Especially is this so where the case is such that the allegations of fraud are immaterial, and unnecessary in the complaint.
    Section 288 of the Code of Procedure, as amended in 1862,—which provides that no execution shall issue against the person of a judgment-debtor, unless an 'order of arrest has been served, as in this act provided, or unless the complaint contains a statement of facts showing one or more of the causes of arrest required by § 179,—in its 'true construction, requires that in all those actions, where the nature of the cause of action is such that the defendant may be arrested, the ground of arrest must be stated in the complaint; otherwise an execution cannot go against the person, unless aa order of arrest has been served. But when the action is one in which the defendant cannot be arrested without some intrinsic fact, forming no part of the cause, of action, but merely incidental to it, the fact must he stated in an affidavit, and an order of arrest must be obtained and served, and the averment of such fact in the complaint will not alone authorize an execution against the person.
    In the latter class of cases, allegations of the facts constituting the ground of arrest are not proper in the pleading.
    Motion for a reference of the action.
    This action was brought by Alexander Atocha against dementi P. Garcia, to recover the value of board and lodging. The complaint contained allegations of fraud in the contracting of the debt in question, intended to show a ground for arresting the defendant, as a provisional remedy. The plaintiff caused the defendant to be so arrested, and now, the cause being at issue, moved for a reference, on the ground that it would require the examination of a long account.
    
      
       Lewis a. The Ibvinq Fibe Insdbance Cosípany. In two actions, brought by George and Everett Lewis against the Irving and the Fulton Fire Insurance Companies respectively, it was Held (Supreme Court, Second District, Special Term and Circuit, October, 1862), that the issue of damages in insurance causes was referable where it required the examination of a long account.
      Motion for reference on the part of defendants.
      These actions were brought to recover under policies of insurance for loss by fire of a stock of goods, consisting of stoves and tin-ware, embracing many items.
      The answers of the defendants denied that the plaintiffs lost by the fire the goods claimed to have been lost, and charged fraud upon the plaintiffs in making claim for more goods than they lost, whereby, by a condition of the policies, they are precluded from any recovery whatever.
      The causes were noticed for trial, and placed on the calendar for the Circuit of October, 1862.
      The defendants gave notice of motions for the first day of circuit that the causes be referred, on the ground that the trial would require the examination of a long account.
      
        Aft-er argument by Edward Fitch and John Owen for the motion, and by E, J. Beach, opposed—
      The court (Sobugham, J.) granted the motion to refer the issue of damages, on defendants paying costs of the term.
      The plaintiffs appealed to the general term, but the appeal was dismissed, on the ground, that by accepting the costs plaintiffs had waived their right to appeal
    
   Monell, J.

I cannot entertain a doubt that the trial of this action will require the examination of a long account, on the part of the plaintiff. The issues require the plaintiff to prove each item. The defendant, by his answer, puts him to this proof, and the action will fail, as to any part not sufficiently established by evidence. The case is brought, therefore, directly within section 271 of the Code. But it is objected by the defendant, that he has a right to a trial by jury of the allegation of fraud contained in the complaint, and upon which an order of arrest has been issued, and executed by the arrest of the defendant; and that, therefore, the case is no longer referable.

I think, however, the defendant is mistaken in supposing such an issue can be tried at all. The action is to recover the value of board and lodging, &c., furnished the defendant, and for no other purpose. The allegations of fraud in the complaint are not only unnecessary, in order to procure the provisional remedy of arrest, but I think them to be improper, and should be stricken out as irrelevant: Doubtless, the plaintiff’s attor-

ney, in reading the amendment to section 288 of the Code,— which provides that no execution shall issue against the person, unless an order of arrest has been served, or “ unless the complaint contains a statement of facts showing one or more of the causes of arrest required by section 179,”—has supposed it necessary to allege the fraud, to secure the right to issue an execution against the person, if the plaintiff should not or could not procure an order of arrest. This, however, is not the correct construction of the amendment.

Subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 179, authorize an arrest when the action is for the recoveries therein enumerated. In such actions, the grounds of arrest must necessarily appear. They are a part, if not all, of the cause of action. Whereas, in subdivision 3, the grounds of arrest must as necessarily appear after the action is commenced. Subdivision 4,—which authorizes an arrest where the debt has been fraudulently contracted, —gives the provisional remedy in an action to recover the debt; and subdivision 5, when the defendant has removed, &c., his property, with intent to defraud his creditors.

It is clear, that in all that class of cases where the substantive cause of action is such that the defendant may be arrested, it must be stated in the complaint, as in actions for injuries to the person or character, or for wrongfully taking, detaining, or converting property, and the like. In these, the complaint, in alleging the cause of action, necessarily alleges the grounds which authorize an arrest; but where the substantive cause of action does not, of itself, warrant an arrest, and the arrest is an incident merely, growing out of other facts, arising at the time or subsequently, they become no part of the cause of action, and are unnecessary in the complaint. The true construction, therefore, of the amendment of the Code referred to, is, that in all those actions, where the nature of the cause of action is such that the defendant may be arrested, it must be stated in the complaint, otherwise an execution cannot go against the person, unless an order of arrest has been served. But when the action is one in which the defendant cannot be arrested, without some extrinsic fact, forming no part of the cause of action, but merely incidental to it, the fact must be stated in an affidavit, and an order of arrest must be obtained and served, and the averment of such fact in the complaint will not alone authorize an execution against the person. Hence the averment in the complaint is immaterial. The grounds óf arrest, in such cases, must appear by affidavit, and can only be met by affidavit. The issue to be tried in the action is the debt, not the fraudulent contraction of it. The judgment recovered is for the debt, not for the fraud. If the defendant fails to get the order of arrest vacated, he is liable to an execution against his person; and if no order has been obtained and served, he cannot be arrested, although the complaint alleges the fraud. In this view, if it be correct, no question of fraud can be tried in this action, and the only judgment the plaintiff can obtain is for the demand stated in his complaint.

But even if this view were incorrect, the case would still be referable. The necessary examination of a long account would make it so; that is, the substantive cause óf action. The fraud is incidental, and only important to the plaintiff, as furnishing the ground for obtaining the provisional remedy provided by law in such cases. That remedy has already been obtained, and the grounds for it cannot enter into the trial of the action.

The action must therefore be referred to a referee, to hear and determine.  