
    Stafford against Green.
    
      f action of slander3 on a motion of armenM^was held, tIlat if one count in the declaration be bad, and the other comits good, and a general verdict, and the judge before whom the cause was tried, certifies tnat the evidence did not particularly apply to the bad count, but went to the other counts, the plaintiff jjiay ejateg up his judgment on the good counts, on payment of costs.
    
      Foot moved in arrest of judgment in this cause, which was an action of slander. There were several counts in the declaration, in one of which, the words charged were, “ He swore false before Squire Andrews, and I can prove itP There was no colloquium stated, but a mere innuendo, 1 
      that it was in- a certain cause depending before a justice, &c. There was a general verdict for the plaintiff", and it was objected, that the above words did not amount to á charge of perjury, which consisted in swearing falsely in a matter material to an issue, of point in question before some court. A person might swear falsely, yet not be guilty of the crime of perjury. It was contended, that the count was bad, and not helped by the innuendo, nor could the verdict be amended.
    
    
      Van Vechten and Shepherd, contra,
    contended, that the old and strict rule of construction had been done away that words are to be taken in their natural sense, and as they would be understood by the hearers. Though the meaning of the words, in themselves, be' uncertain, yet, if from the circumstances and manner in which they were spoken, it is obvious they were uttered maliciously, and tfith a view to disparage another, the jury and the court-may make the inference, as,to their meaning, here put in the innuendo. They cited various casts in which the words ivere equally uncertain, yet held sufficient. Yet if this count'were bad, still the verdict might be amended by the notes of the judge, so as to apply it to the good counts.
    
    
      
       1 Caines, 348. Hopkins v. Beadle.
      
    
    
      
      
         4 Bac. Ab. 504. (Old ed.) 3 Levinz. 69. 2 Ld. Raym. 559. 8 Mod. 57. Cro. Eliz. 135, 297, 348, 492. 3 Caines, 74. Pelton v. Ward.
      
    
    
      
      
         7 Term, 56. 3 Term, 659. Douglass, 376. 1 Bos. & Pul. 389. 1 Caines, 392-4, 583.
    
   Per Curiam.

The count in question is certainly bad ; but as it appears from the judge’s certificate that the evidence did not particularly apply to that count, we are of •opinion, that the judgment ought not to be arrested, but that the plaintiff have leave to enter up his judgment on the good counts-, on payment of costs.

Motion denied» 
      
      
        Douglas, 377. Eddoes v. Hopkins.
      
     