
    Ricketts, Appellant, v. Capwell.
    
      Equity — Specific performance — Findings of fact.
    
    Where on a bill in equity to enforce specific performance of an alleged parol agreement in relation to land, the answer denies all of the material allegations of the bill, and the court finds that the plaintiff's proof is far from being clear and convincing, and such finding appears to be fully warranted by the evidence, the Supreme Court will not reverse a decree dismissing the bill.
    Argued April 11, 1910.
    Appeal, No. 242, Jan. T., 1909, by plaintiff, from decree of C. P. Luzerne Co., Oct. T., 1905, No. 12, dismissing bill in equity in case of Agib Ricketts v. R. U. Capwell and Benton Coleman, Executors of Isaac B. Felts, deceased.
    Before Fell, C. J., Brown, Mestrezat, Potter and Elkin, JJ.
    Affirmed.
    Bill in equity for specific performance. Before Evans, P. J., specially presiding.
    The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.
    
      Error assigned was decree dismissing the bill.
    
      May 16, 1910:
    
      Wm. S. McLean, with him Alexander Ricketts, for appellant.
    
      J. M. Walker, for appellees.
   Per Curiam,

The object of the bill in this case was to enforce by a decree for specific performance, an alleged parol agreement in relation to land. The answer contained a distinct denial of all of the material allegations of the bill and the court found that the testimony produced by the plaintiff upon the controlling question of fact in the case was far from being clear and convincing. This finding appears to have been fully warranted by the evidence and it will not be disturbed.

The decree dismissing the bill is affirmed at the cost of the appellant.  