
    Barnaby versus Barnaby.
    An awaid on a submission by guardian, that the ward, and infant heir, shall pay an annuity to the widow in lieu of dower, is voidable but not void.
    A letter from such heir, after coming of age, inclosing money, and saying—“You will find inclosed the sum of — in part towards your right of dower. The remainder I shall forward you in a few days. It was entirely unexpected to me tlv.t it was not paid before, as I had lodged property in A.'s hands to meet an annual payment/7— is a ratification.
    Accepting the estate free of dower, and entering into and enjoying it for several years after coming of age, according to the contract made by the guardian, is a ratification.
    This was an action of assumpsit. The declaration contained four counts;—1. On an account annexed. 2. On a promise to pay the plaintiff an annuity of 31 dollars, in consideration of her having released her right of dower in the real estate of her late husband, the father of the defendant. 3. On a like promise, in consideration of her permitting the defendant to enjoy his share of the real estate, being one sixth part, without claiming her dower therein. 4. For use and occupation of the same sixth part.
    At the trial, before Wilde J., the plaintiff offered in evidence the award of arbitrators between herself and the heirs of her late husband, upon a submission by mutual bonds of the parties, in which it was awarded, that the heirs should pay her an annuity of 186 dollars, each heir according to his proportion of the estate, and that she should release her right of dower. The defendant, at the time of the submission and award, was an infant, but his guardian in his behalf became a party to the submission, and the whole annuity was paid from year to year until the autumn of 1818. In July 1820, the defendant, being then of full age, inclosed 10 dollars, in part payment of the annual sum which was due, according to the award, in November 1819, in a letter addressed to the plaintiff, which was as follows : “You will find inclosed in this letter the sum of 10 dollars, in part towards your right of dower in my father’s estate. The remainder I shall forward you in a few days. It was entirely unexpected to me that it was not paid before, as I had lodged property in my brother’s hands to meet an annual payment.” There was no evidence that the plaintiff had ever released her right of dower, or that she was ever requested so to do; The heirs have continued to occupy the estate, and it has been divided among them, one sixth part having been assigned to the defendant.
    A verdict was taken for the plaintiff, upon this evidence, • subject to the opinion of the Court, whether it was sufficient to prove a ratification of the award and a promise by the defendant to pay his proportion of the annuity. If the Court should be of opinion that it was sufficient, judgment was to be entered according to the verdict; or if they should be of opinion, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover only a balance of the annual sum which became due in the autumn of 1819, the verdict was to be altered conformably:
    . W. Bay lies and H- Cushman contended,
    that the letter did not refer to the award, and that at most it was a promise to pay only the remainder of the annuity due in 1819. But if the letter was a recognition of the award, then the plaintiff should have averred and proved, that she had released or was ready to release her right to dower, that being the condition on which the annuity was to be paid.
    Morton, for the plaintiff,
    to show that if a promise was proved, the award was a sufficient consideration, cited Com. Contr. 25, 163; Edmond's case, 3 Leon. 164. Although there was no release, the defendant has had the enjoyment of the property.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered at April term 1823, at Taunton, by

Parker C. J.

The question is, whether an express promise by the defendant to perform the award of the arbitrators is proved. After the defendant came of age, he in- • closed 10 dollars in a letter to his mother, in part of the annual payment which had become due according to the award. The words of the letter are, “You will find,” &c. [ut ante]. There can be no doubt, that this amounts to a complete recog nition of the award, and a ratification of it. The doubt has been, whether it amounts to an express promise to pay any thing beyond the instalment due at the time of writing the letter.

It is agreed to be law, that the promise of an infant canna be enforced against him upon a mere acknowledgment after he comes of age, as in the case of the statute of limitations, and that part payment after coming of age of a contract made during infancy is not a sufficient ratification of the promise. But we think this case stands upon different grounds, and that it is like those cases in which contracts are made by or with infants, which are voidable, but which may be affirmed or ratified after they come of age. Here the subject matter of the contract is a release of an incumbrance of dower upon the infant’s estate, with an equivalent to be paid by him in money by way of annuity. As this bargain was made by the guardian, the infant on coming of age has a right to avoid it; but so far from doing this, he has accepted the estate free of dower as assigned to him by the probate court, and has entered into the possession of the estate, and enjoyed it for several years, according to the contract made by his guardian. This alone would be a sufficient ratification of the contract; but, in addition to this, he pays the plaintiff part of the money due, promises to pay the residue of that instalment, admits that it is on account of the dower, and says he had lodged money in his brother’s hands to meet an annual payment.

Whether he meant that he had lodged funds to meet every annual payment is not certain, though probable; but be this as it may, there is a sufficient ratification of the contract. If an infant make a lease for years, and at full age say, God give you joy of it, this is a good affirmation of the lease. 4 Leon. 4. If an infant take a lease for years of land, rendering rent, which is in arrear for several years, then the infant comes of age, and still continues the occupation of the land, this makes the lease good and unavoidable, and charges him with all the arrears incurred during his minority. Kurton v. Eliot, 2 Buls 69; S. C. Cro. Jac. 320; S. C. Godb. 120; S. C. 1. Rol. Abr. 831, l. 45. Here affirmation is only implied, so that there seems to be a difference between contracts simply for the payment of money, or the performance of any personal duty, and those which are connected with land, or grow out of an interest therein. Had the mother executed a release, pursuant to the award, and the infant entered into the estate, after he came of age, and denied her dower, she could have no remedy except upon the award. And there is no difference arising from her not having executed the release ; she cannot claim dower but at the peril of her bond, so that the defendant is perfectly secure of the consideration for which he was to pay the money.

Judgment according to the verdict. 
      
       See Weed v. Ellis, 3 Caines’s R. 253; Bean v. Farnum, 6 Pick. 272. A guardian of infant heirs is authorized to assign dower. Jones v. Brewer, post, 317. But he cannot avoid a beneficial contract of his ward made without ilia consent, though it is voidable by the infant himself. Oliver v. Houdlet, 13 Mass. Rep. 240. See Irvine v. Crockett, 4 Bibb, 437.
     
      
       See Van Dorens v. Everett, 2 Southard, 460; Belton v. Briggs, 4 Desauss. 465; Hubbard v. Cummings, 1 Greenl. 11; Dana v. Coombs, 6 Greenl. 89. If an infant conveys land, a mere admission of that fact by him, after he is of full age, is not an affirmance of his act. Jackson v. Burchin, 14 Johns. R. 124
     
      
       See Ford v. Phillips, ante, 202, Boston Bank v. Chamberlain, 15 Mass R 220
     