
    Scott v. Alexander & Peterfield Trent.
    
    Partnership — Individual Debt — Right to Set Off against Social Demands.- — A debt due from an individual partner cannot be set off against a partnership demand. But a payment to one partner is a payment to all unless, perhaps, where it is forbidden by the company.
    The appellees brought an action on the case, against the appellant in the District Court of Charlottesville; the declaration contains three counts; the first and second upon an indebitatus assumpsit & quantum valebant for goods sold and delivered, and the third for money lent. Plea non asump-sit.
    At the trial, the defendant offered in evidence four receipts, signed by Peterfield Trent, as offsetts against the plaintiffs demand. One of the receipts is in the following words, to wit: ‘Received of John Scott, per the hands of James Scott, £43: 14: which I shall return, when demanded- — (Signed) Peterfield Trent”— The others are general and not differing essentially from the following viz: “Received of John Scott, thirty-five bushels of wheat — (Signed) Peterfield Trent.” He also offered in evidence a receipt, signed by John Osborn, collector for Peterfield Trent, in the following words, to wit: “Received of John Scott, thirty-five bushels of wheat, on account of Peterfield Trent, (John Osborn).” He also produced testimony, to prove, that before the commencement of this action, he paid to said P. Trent, ■twenty barrels of corn — and further offered to prove, that he presented to Peterfield Trent, the following account, to wit: “List of money &c, paid to P. Trent for payments of my debts, which you promised to pay, and the balance to my account that may arise with you, and your brother’s stores.” After which follows a number of items of payments &c.
    The court refusing to admit the above receipts and list, as evidence of offsetts against the demand of the plaintiffs, the defendant filed a bill of exceptions, stating the above facts; and further, that it was proved, that when the said list of money &c. paid to P. Trent, was presented to him, he admitted all the items in it to be just, except one; and also that the said Trent had said, that the items, except the one objected to, had been taken from an recount formerly rendered to the said Scott by him, but the defendant did not prove what the balance was after the payment of the said defendants debts, and it was admitted by the defendant, that the 35 bushels of wheat mentioned in one of the receipts was the same as charged in the list, and that the flour mentioned in another of the receipts, was only stored by the said P. Trent, for the defendant, and to be sent to Baker and Blowe for his use. The bill further states, that the defendant did not prove any otherwise, than as above mentioned, that the said payments were made to P. Trent, on account of the demand for which the present action was brought, and that it appeared, that a considerable private account subsisted between the said P. Trent, and the defendant; on which account the said P. Trent acknowledged himself to be the debtor of the defendant.
    The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed.
    
      
      For monographic note on Partnership, see end of case.
    
    
      
      Partnership — Individual Debts — Right to Set Off against Social Demands. — For the proposition that, a debt due from an individual partner caunot be set off against a partnership demand, the principal case is cited in Porter v. Nekervis, 1 Rand. 363 ; Gilliat v. Lynch, 2 Leigh 505 ; Rose v. Murchie, 2 Call ill, and foot-note; Choen v. Guthrie, 15 W. Va. 102.
    
   The PRESIDENT

delivered the opinion of the court.

*It is undoubtedly true, that a debt due from an individual partner cannot be set off against a partnership demand. A payment indeed, to one partner, will be a payment to the company, and his receipt (unless perhaps, where such payment is forbidden by the company) will bind the whole. But in this case, the receipts do not specify, that the payments were made for the use of the company. The list does; but in that, the balance is not stated, and therefore being entirely’ unsettled, the court did right, in refusing to let it go in evidence to the jury.

If indeed, P. Trent has received the balance, and should be unable to pay it, Scott may obtain relief against the company by getting an injunction for so such.

Judgment affirmed.  