
    Anonymous.
    
    Tho court will not, upon an allegation, that an attorney lias been guilty of larceny, make a rule upon such attorney to shew cause why his name should not be struck off the roll, before lie has been indicted and convicted for such offence.
    This was an application to the court by J. W. Scott, Esq., (in behalf of the members of the bar) for a rule upon ono of tho attorneys of this court, to shew cause why his name should not be struck from the roll.
    *En this caso, Mr. Scott observed, ho bad ho personal knowledge of the circumstances, ho acted only upon the public rumors aud reports relative to the conduct of this young man. It was a matter of public notoriety that he had been guilty of larceny, had purloined books to a considerable amount from persons who were at this moment in court, and ready at any time, when called upon, to substantiate the charge, and fix the crime upon him. It these facts were true, it was due to the members of this bar that they should be relieved from tho reproach of having such a personas this attached to their profession; and if they were false, it was duo to the person implicated that he should have an opportunity to wipe away from his character the foul stigma which now rested upon it. In making this motion (he observed) he had no more interest than any other gentleman of tho bar present; but he felt, in common with them, the necessity of preserving its purity inviolate. If the members of this bar should tamely submit to have their names associated with those of thieves and felons, without any remonstrance or effort to relieve themselves from such a reproach, they must soon lose that high character for honor and integrity which hitherto they always had, and he hoped they always would maintain. The only method to preserve the honor and integrity of the bar unimpaired, was, by removing from it all such persons who, by then-conduct, evinced themselves unworthy of being ranked among its members., In behalf, therefore, of the members of the bar, he called upon the court to relieve them from the reproach of having this man attached to their profession, and from the disgrace of being compelled, in their professional duties, to have intercourse with a man with whom they should be ashamed to associate in private life. That this court had the power to grant the rule he applied for, there could be no doubt: for as it was essential to the admission of an attorney that he should be a person of good moral character, it must be equally essential to his continuance as an attorney. He cited 6 Mod. 16, 187; 1 Wils. Rep. 22; 2 Ibid. 382; Cro. Car. 52, 74; and Bigelow’s case in the Mayor’s court of Philadelphia, June session 1820.
    
      
      The Reporter, out of regard to the feelings of the family of the person implicated, (who are highly respectable) has thought proper to omit his name.
    
   Kirkpatrick, C. J.

The offence of which it is alleged this man has been guilty, is neither a contempt of court, nor does it fall within the denomination of malpractice. It would appear to *me, therefore, that he must be first convicted of the crime by a jury of his country before we can proceed against him for such an offence; for suppose he should be brought to the bar, and should say he was not guilty, we could not try the fact.

Scott said, that an antecedent conviction was by no means essential to enable the court to proceed in a case of this kind. The general rule was, that if the attorney denies the charges made against him, they will dismiss the complaint; —but in some cases they will disbar him, though he deny the fact. 1 Tidd’s Prac. 59, let. H. Cowp. 829; 1 Jac. Law Dist. title Attorney 170-3; 1 Bac. Abr. 192, title Attorney. To shew that courts would interfere and' disbar attorneys for dishonest conduct, in cases not falling under the head of contempt or malpractice, and that, too, before there had been, a conviction, he cited the case of Levi S. Burr, decided in the Circuit Court of the United States, District of Columbia, and reported 1 Crim. Bee. 503; also Stryker’s ease, ibid. 330.

Curia advisare vult.

At a subsequent day in the term,

Kirkpatrick, C. Ji

said — We have reflected upon this case, and do not see how we can do any thing in it, because the court seems to be confined to cases of malpractice, or to crimes which are of the nature of the crimen falsi, and for which there has been a conviction.

Ford, J.

An attorney may be struck off the roll — I. For a breach of the rules of the court. 2. For breach of any of his official duties. 3. For all such crimes and misdemeanors as affect his moral character. But in this third class of cases, we cannot proceed in the ordinary way; there ought always to be a previous conviction before this court can interfere. All the cases cited sanction this distinction, except the case from the District of Columbia, which is anomalous.

Rossell, J. concurred.

Rule refused.  