
    David MORALES-ACOSTA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-70509.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 9, 2016.
    
    Filed Feb. 11, 2016.
    Zulu Ali, Zulu Abdullah Ali, Riverside, CA, for Petitioner.
    Julie M. Iversen, Trial, Oil, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: McKEOWN and IKUTA, Circuit Judges and PRATT, Senior District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, 'Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Morales-Acosta appeals a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to deny Morales-Acosta relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He also appeals the BIA’s decision that he was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

The BIA’s decision that Morales-Acosta was ineligible for relief under CAT was supported by substantial evidence. The record did not establish that it was more likely than not that Morales-Acosta would be tortured in Mexico “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); see Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1066 (9th Cir.2013).

The BIA did not err in holding that Morales-Acosta was convicted of a “particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) and was therefore ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The agency applied the correct legal standard in determining that Morales-Acosta’s conviction did not qualify as an exception to the presumption that drug trafficking felonies are particularly serious crimes under the factors set forth in Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002). If the agency- has considered the appropriate factors, “we cannot reweigh evidence” as to whether the conviction meets the “particularly serious crime” standard. Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir.2014) (quoting Blandi- no-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir.2013)).

PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     