
    James Bennett against Nathaniel Howard, jun.
    WRIT of error.
    This was an action on the case. The plaintiff alleged in Ms declaration, that on the 15th of February, 1802, he . sailed from) New-London, as a seaman on board the snip Dispatch, of which the defendant was master, on a sealing voyage to the Pacific Ocean, under an agreement to receive, as wages, a certain share of the profits of the voyage : and that during the voyage, the ship put into the harbour of IVcst Point, one of the Falkland Islands, barren, uninhabited, and in an intemperate cii- . , ⅛ , , . . , , , , . . mate. While the ship lay at this island, the plaintiti was ordered to go on shore by the defendant; who after wards refused to receive him again on board the , . , . , , ,. , ' . . , _ , . snip; but, without the iault ol the plaintiff, left him, contrary to his will, with nine other seamen, on the island, destitute of provision, and without the necessary . . means ol procuring subsistence : by which his health was impaired, and his time wasted. Which doings of the defendant were averred to he fraudulent and malicious ; and with a design to deprive the plaintiff of his share of the profits of the voyage.
    
      It is a sufficient ground of arrest of ¿''fYe of the jurors conversed about the cause, persons not of
    ^'Vdefendant, being roaster of the ship on board ofwhieh tin- plaintiff £'rtti,efptah£ tiff, contrary to his will, on a desolate *U&a The defeod-ant proved, that he com-pontiff to** leave the
    island, and come on board the ship; which the plaintiff refused to do. The plaintiff, to show that he had fears of ill usage, then offered to prove particular instances of abuse of the crew, by the inferior officers of the ship. Held, that such evidence was not admissible.
    
      The cause was first tried, on the general issue, at Hartford, November term, 1806. A verdict was found for the plaintiff. The defendant moved in arrest of judgment;
    1. For the insufficiency of the declaration.
    2. For that one of the jurors, empannelled in the cause, and who joined in the verdict, freely conversed about the case, while it was on trial, with other persons, not of the jury, publicly declaring that the defendant’s conduct could not be justified; and gave his opinion in favour of the plaintiff, before the testimony had been received, and the cause argued.
    3. For that one or more of the jurors, being opposed to the verdict, as first returned, and finally accepted, at last agreed to join in the verdict, after the jury had been returned to a second and third consideration, upon a mistaken apprehension, that after having once come in with a verdict, he could not deny his assent to it again, and on that ground, only, he assented to the verdict.
    To the first reason, the plaintiff replied; that his declaration was sufficient.
    To the second reason, that the matters contained therein were untrue, and insufficient.
    And to the third reason he demurred.
    The court adjudged the declaration sufficient. As to th« second reason, the court found, timt me of the jurort, 
      emftannrllrd and sworn in the cause, and who joined in the verdict, freely conversed about the case, while it was on trial, with other persons, not of the jury; but that the other facts alleged in the second reason were not true. The third reason was adjudged sufficient.
    The verdict was set aside, and the cause, ordered for a further hearing. It was again tried, on the general issue, February term, 1807.
    The defendant, to rebut the charge that he would not suffer the plaintiff to come again on board the ship, but left the plaintiff on the island of West Point, against his will, now produced sundry witnesses, who testified, that the defendant commanded the plaintiff, and the other persons who were on the island, to come on board the ship, which the plaintiff and the other persons refused to do. It was proved, that when the order to come on board was given the plaintiff and his companions on the island, they replied that they were willing to do their duty, on board the ship, if the defendant would oblige himself to them that they should have their lays (shares of the profits) at the end of the voyage, and that they should receive good usage on board. And to show that the plaintiff and his companions had apprehensions of ill usage, the plaintiff offered evidence to prove, that during the voyage, and before the ship arrived at the island of West Point, the crew had suffered extreme ill usage from the officers; particularly, that John Howard, the second mate, had, without provocation, beaten two of the seamen with such severity as occasioned their deaths; and that he nad seriously wounded three others, without being punished, or reprimanded for it, by the defendant; although the facts were within the defendant’s knowledge; which the plaintiff also offered to prove. And that those were the reasons why the plaintiff, and the other seamen who were left, ought to have security for future good usage. this evidence the defc’dai.t objected ; and tilt- court ruled, that it was inadmissible. A verdict was found for the defendant, and the plaintiff filed his bill of excep-lions.
    The errors assigned were, first, That the allegations in the second reason contained in the defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment, which the court found to be true, ought to? have been adjudged insufficient. Secondly, That the allegations in the third reason contained in the plaintiff’s motion in arrest, were also insufficient. Thirdly, That the evidence offered by the plaintiff at the second trial of the cause, and rejected by the court, ought to have been admitted.
    
      Ingersoll and Bradley, for plaintiff in error.
    The allegation in the motion in arrest, that “one of the jurors conversed freely about the case, while it was cm trial,” is too general. A juror may lawfully speak about the cause, if what he says does not relate to its merits. Thus, he has a right to relate who the parties are; to say that the jury have agreed on a verdict; or any thing else, which does not, in the language of the juror’s oath, concern “ the business and matter they have in hand.” The allegation found, by the court, to be true is, indeed, not traversable. The only material allegation is negatived by the finding of the court.
    The last exception is, merely, that the juror concurred in the verdict, in consequence of his ignorance of the law. But this averment cannot be made ; for the defendant is estopped by the record, which is as conclusive of his voluntary concurrence in the verdict, as it is of the judges’concurring in the judgment.
    The evidence offered by the plaintiff, as stated in the bill of exceptions, is not to prove the averments in the declaration; to explain the fact proved by the defendant, that the plaintiff refused to comply with his order to come on board the ship ; and therefore remained voluntarily on the island: It is to show, that to stay on shore was resorted to as an expedient less dangerous than to return to the ship; which the plaintiff offered to show he could not do, without hazard of his life. For this purpose the evidence was admissible.
    1. Because the cruelties exercised upon the crew by the inferior officers of the ship, were chargeable upon the plaintiff; since, when they came to his knowledge, he refused to restrain them.
    2. Because circumstances might exist of such a nature as would justify the plaintiff' in refusing to return on board, without being assured of proper treatment. What these circumstances were, he had a right to show.
    
      Daggett and Terry, for the defendant in error.
   By the Court.

The oath of jurors obliges them to ;i speak nothing to any one concerning the matters they have in hand, but among themselves, nor suffer any to speak to them about the same but in court, until the verdict is delivered up in court.”

In this case, the court below found, that one of the jurors conversed freely with persons not of the jury, about the case, while it was on trial. This was directly contrary to his oath. To suffer such practice to obtain, would be of very dangerous tendency, by opening the way to corrupt the streams of justice; and would destroy all confidence in the trial by jury.

The testimony offered, and rejected by the court, was wholly inadmissible. The gist of the action, as laid in the declaration, is the leaving the plaintiff, contrary to . . his will, upon a desolate island, in the South Sea, by the defendant; which the defendant attempted to show was not true, by proving that he invited, and even commanded, the plaintiff to come on board, and proceed on the voyage.

The plaintiff, by the testimony offered, and rejected, attempted to show another cause of action, viz. that he was unwilling to return on board the ship, and proceed on the voyage, through fear of abuse and ill usage. It could have no tendency to show or establish the facts alleged in the declaration, or put in issue; and would have led to an inquiry into facts out of the case, which might have had a very improper influence on the minds of the jury.

Judgment affirmed. 
      
      
        Stat. Cmn. tit. S23. o. 1. si !»
     