
    KAHANEK v. STATE.
    (No. 4850.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 13, 1918.
    Rehearing Denied March 27, 1918.)
    1. Receiving Stolen Goods <&wkey;7(3) — Indictment — Naming Parties from Whom Received.
    In indictments charging the reception of stolen property, it is necessary to name the parties from whom the stolen property was received by defendant, if the names are known, and, if not, the grand jury is justified in alleging that the names of the parties are unknown to it.
    2. Receiving Stolen Goods <&wkey;7(6) — Indictment — Issues and Pbooe — Parties erom Whom Received.
    Where an indictment for receiving stolen goods alleged that defendant received the property from two named persons to convict it was necessary' for the state to meet the allegations with appropriate evidence.
    3. Indictment and Information &wkey;>171 — Allegations — Support by Proof.
    Wherever descriptive averments are made in an indictment, whether necessary or not, the proof must meet them, and all necessary allegations must be met by corresponding evidence.
    4. Receiving Stolen Goods 3 — Reception in Good Faith — Subsequent Concealment.
    If defendant did not know, when he received a buggy from those who had stolen it, that it was dishonestly acquired, he was not guilty of fraudulently receiving the property; but if subsequently he ascertained that the property was stolen, and later concealed it with a fraudulent design, he might have been guilty of fraudulently concealing it.
    
      Appeal from District Court, Lavaca County; M. Kennon, Judge.
    Joe Kahanek was convicted of receiving stolen property, and he appeals.
    Reversed, and cause remanded.
    Schwartz & Bagby, of Hallettsville, for appellant. E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   DAVIDSON, P. J.

Appellant was charged with receiving stolen property from George Clark and Joe Haffernik, which property was alleged to belong to J. A. Nachlinger.

The theory of the prosecution, as evidenced by the allegation in the indictment, was that Nachlinger owned a buggy, and Clark and Haffernick stole it and sold it to appellant, and that the evidence would justify the jury in finding that appellant at the time he bought it or received it knew it was stolen property.

The court charged the jury, over appellant’s exception duly reserved, that if defendant fraudulently received from George Clark and Joe Haffernik, or from George Clark alone, the buggy mentioned in the indictment, and same had been theretofore acquired from J. A. Nachlinger by the said George Clark and Joe Haffernik, or by George Clark alone, in such manner as to constitute theft thereof, etc., they would find him guilty of receiving stolen property. We are of opinion that appellant’s exception to this phase of the charge is well taken. It is necessary in indictments charging this offense to name the parties from whom the stolen property was' received by the accused if the names are known, and, if not, the grand jury would be justified in alleging that the names of the parties from whom the property was received were unknown to that body. The authorities seem to be practically unanimous on both propositions. Since the rendition of State v. Perkins, 45 Tex. 10, the jurisprudence has been harmonious to the effect that the names of the parties from whom the accused received the stolen property must be stated. There are quite a number of these cases, which will be found collated in Mr. Branch’s Ann. P. C. pp. 1366, 1367. Specifically, we might mention Brothers v. State, 22 Tex. App. 447, 3 S. W. 737; McKay v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 118, 90 S. W. 653; Franklin v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 547, 110 S. W. 909. In the instant case the grand jury alleged directly and affirmatively that appellant received- the property from the two named parties. In order then to convict, it was necessary for the state to meet these allegations with appropriate evidence; otherwise the state’s case would fail. In this respect it is somewhat analogous in alleging ownership in a theft case. Wherever descriptive aver-ments are made, whether necessary or not, the proof must meet these averments. But it is the law as announced by the decisions that the allegation of the names of the parties from whom the property is received is necessary. It is an element of description that cannot be set aside, and it is the universal rule that all necessary allegations must be met by corresponding evidence. Appellant’s exception, therefore, to that portion of the charge where it authorized a conviction if the jury should find appellant received the property alone from Clark, is well taken. It was necessary on this phase of the case for the evidence to show that he received it from both- parties. The law holds such allegations are necessary and not to be dispens-* ed with; therefore the evidence must corie-spond to meet such allegation. Tucker v. State, 23 Tex. App. 512, 5 S. W. 180; Williams v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 163, 153 S. W: 1136; Meek v. State, 71 Tex. Cr. R. 433, 160 S. W. 698.

There is another question in the case which will hardly occur upon another trial. The court submitted alone the question of receiving stolen property, the indictment containing averments he received and. concealed the property. The court submitted alone the reception of the property and not the concealing. While the verdict is general, yet it seems , this could apply as well to that count not submitted to the jury as to the other. The evidence is not as clear and forceful as it might be upon that phase of the indictment. It is true he bought the buggy from the named parties and paid them for it, and there are subsequent facts indicating, if he did not know then, he learned afterward that the buggy was not honestly acquired. If he did not know at the time he received it that it was dishonestly acquired, he would not he guilty of fraudulently receiving the property; but if subsequently he ascertained that the property was stolen, and after so finding concealed it with a fraudulent design, he might be guilty under that phase of the indictment. We mention this so that upon another trial, if the matter becomes an issue in the ease, the verdict will be made to correspond with the facts of the case submitted by the court. We are not here passing, or undertaking to pass, on any probable complications that might arise by virtue of any question of jeopardy.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded. 
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