
    Welles et ux. v. Olcott.
    Aotxof of disseisin. On special pleadings tbe case was — Tbat John Knowles, by bis last will, dated tbe 30tb day of November, 1753, among other things, devised tbe lands in question to bis “ daughter Mary Knowles, and tbe heirs of her body forever.” Mary Knowles was married in June, 1762, to Alexander Chalker, and bad issue a daughter, Bridget (wife of tbe plaintiff) born September, 1764. Tbe said Mary having heirs born of her body, did aben tbe lands on tbe 6th day of June, 1765, by a deed of bargain and sale, executed by herself and husband; and by several mesne conveyances it came regularly to tbe defendant.
    On demurrer,— It was contended tbat this was a hmited estate, and no more tlian a life estate in Mary Knowles; therefore she could not aben tbe fee, but tbat it descended' to Bridget Chalker, tbe plaintiff’s wife.
    On tbe other side it was urged, tbat this devise created a conditional fee, and tbat tbe condition was performed when Mary bad married and bad heirs of her body; and tbat tbe estate then vested in her, as a fee simple: .That tbe English statute of Westminster, 2d, 13th Edward I, entitled tbe Statute de donis OonditionaWbus, did never extend- to this country, and bath never been adopted here; therefore, such tenures ought not to be construed to be estates tail in this state.
   By the Court.

Uniformity of decision is to be preserved. Tbe point in this case bath been twice recently adjudged, in tbe cases of Allen v. Bunce, and Devey v. Foot; and on tlie following principles: Tbat the intent of the testator was to be pursued, where it did not interfere with the policy of law: That the intent in the present case obviously was to create an estate tail, and not a conditional fee. A limitation in tail, so far as related to the first donee in tail, might be for very good reasons; and it does not interfere with the policy of law, like perpetuities, or more than any life estate: And that the late statute, admitting limitations in tail, as relative to the first donee, might well be considered as in affirmance of the common law. Judgment was therefore for the plaintiffs. ,

N. B.— Judge Pitkin excused himself from judging in this case, being related to one of the parties.  