
    Sampson vs. Lessee of University of Nashville.
    Limitation of actions. Lands reserved for the use of schools. Colleges. Act of 1819, oil. 28. The proviso to § 3, act of 1819, oh. 28, declaring “that this act shall have no bearing on the lands reserved for the use of schools,” does not prevent the bar of the statute as to lands held by colleges, which were not reserved for their benefit, under the act of Congress, of 1806, ceding lands to the State of Tennessee, for the use of colleges, academies and schools.
    This was an action of ejectment in the circuit court of Dyer county, brought by the lessee of the University of Nashville, formerly Cumberland College. At the October Term, 1852, Read, Judge, presiding, there was judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed in error.
    E. G-. Sampsou, for plaintiff in error,
    argued, that the land sued for in this action, was not embraced within the saving of the proviso to section 3 of the act of 1819, ch. ■ 28, for these reasons:
    1.These lands are spoken of by the term, “the lands ; ” clearly intending to embrace that pa/rticular class of lands in the Hiwassee district, which were, previous to 1819, reserved by the State, and known as school lands.
    2. They are described as lands “reserved,” and certainly not intended to include those lands granted by the State. In the one case, the title is reserved in the State; in the other, it is granted out from the State, to individuals.
    3. They are described as lands “reserved for the use of schools,” while in our acts of assembly, and constitution, as well as in common English, we never use the simple word, schools, to include colleges and universities. They are different and distinct institutions, and hence, were not intended to be included in tbe term, schools.
    4. This saving was made with a view to a particular description of lands, then in being, and certainly could not be intended, by a “prospective sweep,” to include lands of a description, at that time unknown to the law.
    5. The reason of this proviso, was in the maxiin, “ nullum temjpus ocourit regi,” that the statute should not run against the State. But when lands have been granted away to individuals, it is their duty to guard and protect them. They cease then, to be the objects of the State’s protection; and if the grantees sleep upon their rights, until other persons, (believing they had abandoned them,) are induced to buy and improve the -lands, they come with a bad grace to claim the State’s protection. See 3 Yerger, 405-1; Meigs’ Rep., 224; 8 Humph., 406; acts of 1819, N. & C., p. 442-4; 11 Humph., 317; 1 Swan, 321 and 382.
    S. Williams, for defendant in error.
   Cakuthees, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court. ,

This is an action of ejectment for six hundred and forty acres of land in Dyer county. The plaintiff below read and relied upon a grant by the State of Tennessee, dated 2d July, 1824, to the trustees of Cumberland College, assignees of the University of North Carolina, and proved the defendants in possession.

The defendant relied upon the deeds of the sheriff of Dyer county, on tax sales, and more than seven years possession under them by himself or tenants. The court .charged that the deeds were void, and that the statute of limitation did not run against the plaintiffs below.

The only question it is necessary for us to decide, arises upon the construction of the act of limitations of 1819. If that applies, it would not be material whether the tax sales and deeds were void or not; because, if the deeds “purported to convey an estate in fee simple,” seven years’ possession under them would cure them of all unsoundness, and make them perfect and paramount to all other titles, not within some of the savings of the statute.

■ But it is insisted here, that Cumberland College is saved from the operation of the statute. The words at the close of the third section Car. & Nich., 444, which are-relied upon, are these: “ And provided also, that this act shall have no bearing on the lands reserved for the use of schools.”

Now, if by any fair construction, this saving can be extended to all lands held by universities, colleges, academies and common schools, we think public policy would require it to be done. As the promotion of learning in our country is of the highest importance to its prosperity and happiness, the protection of lands and other means set apart for that purpose, might, perhaps, very properly, deserve more consideration than the policy upon which statutes of limitation are founded. By these laws the better title is made to yield to the inferior; because, as a general question of interest to the whole, it is thought best to offer up, as a sacrifice to the general good, to the peace and quiet of society, the individual rights of the citizen, or at least to withhold from him the aid of the courts, in asserting his rights after a fixed period. This, then, being a mere question of public policy, and against private right, it might seem that the higher policy of sustaining schools ought to prevail. This, however, is not for us, but the legislature to determine.

But the question before us is one of construction of legislative intention. Was it the intention of the legislature of 1819, to exempt from the general operation of the act, cases of this description; or can their language, by any fair construction, be extended so far? If so, we would certainly be inclined to adopt it.

It is, however, well settled by a long series of decisions in this State, that the savings of the statute cannot be increased or enlarged by the courts. New exceptions must be made by the legislature, as that body may deem it wise and proper.

The titles of corporations, whether they are created for schools or other purposes, are certainly subject to the general bar of the statute. There is no saving for them. The saving is only in the case of lands “ reserved for the use of schools.” Can it be supposed that it was in the mind of the legislature, in 1819, to embrace in that saving, lands that might be after that time sold, or donated by individuals or other corporations, to institutions of learning? The word reserved, must have some meaning. The legislative history of the country, up to that time, clearly fixes the signification of the phrase.

By the Cession Act of congress of 1806, 2 Hay. & Cobb, 14, as a condition of the cession, to the State of Tennessee, of all the vacant land north and east of a line therein designated, afterwards called the “congressional reservation line,” required the State to appropriate one hundred thousand acres in one tract to colleges, the same quantity for the use of academies, one in each county, and moreover six hundred and forty acres in every sis miles square, where existing claims will allow it, “which shall be appropriated for the use of schools for the instruction of children forever.” Tire college and academy lands, the legislature was empowered to sell for not less than two dollars per acre, and vest the proceeds, for the purposes intended. No such power was expressly given over the “school lands.” Now, these lands in the various counties where they were located, were always known by the name of school lands, or lands reserved for the use of schools. They were much neglected by the public authorities and subject to be wasted and occupied by intruders. There was then a definite idea in the phrase “reserved for the use of schools.” But to give it the largest signification of which it is capable, it could only be extended to the college and academy, as well as school lands, reserved in this act of cession, or set apart and “reserved” from sale or appropriation for other purposes, by the legislature acting under, and in pursuance of the act of congress.

The warrant upon which the grant in this case is based, was transferred, with many others, to the trustees of Cumberland College, by the University of North Carolina, in 1822. To extend the saving in the statute to these lands, would leave no land belonging to a literary institution, whether obtained by will, deed or otherwise, subject to the bar. This construction would not only give the word “schools” a much larger signification than that which it has in common parlance, or most probably had in the minds of the members of the legislature of 1819, but would strike out the word “reserved,” or entirely change its meaning.

We feel constrained, tben, in giving a fair construction to the language of the act, and sustaining the policy on which it is founded, to decide that the plaintiff below is not embraced in the saving of the statute, and is therefore subject to the bar of seven years.

His honor, the circuit judge, having charged the law differently, the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial awarded.

TotteN, J., dissented.  