
    Khalid KHAN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-3947.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 9, 2012.
    Michael J. Campise, Ferro & Cuccia, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Russell Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel; Nancy K. Canter, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JOSEPH M. McLaughlin, debra ann LIVINGSTON and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Khalid Khan, a native and citizen of Pakistan, seeks review of an August 31, 2011 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Khalid Khan, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Aug. 31, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Khan’s motion to reopen as untimely because he filed it more than five years after his final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).

Although the time limits on motions to reopen may be excused when the movant demonstrates changed country conditions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), the BIA reasonably concluded that Khan did not demonstrate changed conditions in Pakistan. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (providing that we review the the agency’s factual findings regarding country conditions under the substantial evidence standard).

In support of reopening, Khan submitted letters from his family in Pakistan asserting that his parents’ house had been destroyed by the Taliban and that Khan was on the Taliban’s list of people it was targeting, as well as his own affidavit reiterating those assertions and photographs purportedly showing the destruction of his parents’ home. Contrary to Khan’s contention, the BIA did not ignore this evidence; rather, it explicitly referred to the evidence he presented, but gave it little weight. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (“[W]e presume that [the agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by not crediting Khan’s evidence, as he previously admitted that he filed a false application for relief and gave false testimony. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to credit unauthenticated documents submitted with a motion to reopen where the alien had been found not credible in the underlying proceedings); Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir.2007) (“[A] single false document or a single instance of false testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”).

Because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Khan’s motion as untimely, we do not address Khan’s argument that he established his prima facie eligibility for asylum.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  