
    Davis, Auditor, v. The Cincinnati Camp Meeting Association.
    
      Association organized for public charity — As camp meeting tmder control of some church — Property not subject to taxation, when.
    
    Where an association, organized and conducted for the purpose of a purely public charity, as a camp meeting, under the supervision and control of some church, owns real estate devoted exclusively to the same use; and thereon provides privileges for the comfort and convenience of those who may attend the meeting, the fact that it makes charges for the use of these privileges, does not subject its property, nor the piúvileges so provided, to taxation under the laws of this state.
    (Decided December 14, 1897.)
    Error to the Circuit Court of Clermont county.
    The suit below was commenced in the common pleas of the county, by the Cincinnati Camp Meeting Association of the Methodist Episcopal Church, incorporated under the laws of this state, against the auditor of the county to enjoin him from assessing the lands of the plaintiff for taxation and causing the taxes to be collected by placing them on the duplicate, on the ground that it is organized and holds all its property, for purposes of purely public charity, and that the same is not leased, or otherwise used with a view to profit. The answer of the defendant simply controverts this claim. The case having been heard and disposed of in the common pleas, against the plaintiff, was appealed by it to the circuit court, where judgment was rendered in its favor, restraining the defendant as prayed for in the petition. On the trial, the court, as requested, made a finding of the facts and its conclusions of law thereon which are as follows:
    “The plaintiff, The Cincinnati Camp Meeting Association of the Methodist Episcopal Church, is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Ohio.
    “And the defendant, John W. Davis, is the duly-elected, qualified and acting auditor of Clermont county, Ohio.
    “That plaintiff is an institution of purely public charity, and is organized not for profit, but for the purpose of holding in trust for the use and benefit of the Methodist Episcopal Church, such real and personal property as may be necessary and convenient for the holding, conducting, managing and carrying on religious camp meetings, in strict accordance with the policy, established usage and discipline of the said Methodist Episcopal Church, and for the purpose of supporting and maintaining and managing, perpetually, public religious camp meetings, and such other public meetings for religious, educational and other public charitable purposes, as may be approved by the board of trustees of said association, all of said camp meetings and other meetings to be conducted and managed in strict accordance with the policy, established usage and discipline of said Methodist Episcopal Church, and all of said meetings to be conducted on the Camp Grounds of said Association, hereinafter described, situate near Loveland, * in Clermont county, Ohio.
    “That plaintiff is the owner in fee simple, in trust, for the uses and purposes of carrying on and conducting religious camp meetings and other public meetings, for religious, educational and other public charitable purposes to be conducted in strict accordance with the policy, established usage and discipline of said Methodist Episcopal Church of the following described real estate, the real estate described in the amended petition herein, and all situate in Miami township, Clermont county, Ohio.
    “That all of said real estate, and the buildings and improvements thereon, have been owned in fee simple by plaintiff herein, for more than six years last past, and all of the said building’s and real estate, are, and for said six years, have been actually occupied and used by plaintiff herein, for public, religious, educational, and other public charitable purposes, and for no other purpose.
    “That none of said real estate is leased by plaintiff, nor is any of said real estate, in any manner used, with a view to profit, nor has any of said real estate, been either leased or used, with a view to profit, during any part of the six years last past.
    “That all the money, credits and property of plaintiff, are, and always have been, appropriated solely to sustaining said association and carrying out the purposes for which said plaintiff was organized.
    “That said two tracts of real estate, herein-before described, by metes and bounds, after deducting therefrom, all the lots designated, and numbered on said recorded plat of said The Epworth Heighth Camp Grounds, are listed upon said tax duplicate for taxation as one tract of real estate, and are listed as containing together, twenty-five acres of land. But said real estate so described by metes and bounds, as aforesaid, is in fact composed of twelve different and distinct tracts of real estate, and of about six acres of drives and highways, and that a portion of said land is situate in survey No. 1767, and the balance in surveys Nos. 1545 and 2195, of the Virginia Military District; that one tract of said land, composed of about one acre of land, has situate thereon, a stable and a small frame building, which is used as a grocery in which are kept for sale, during the meetings herein described, such groceries and provisions as are pecessary for the sustenance of the persons attending said meetings; that said lots numbers 232 and 233, have situate thereon a small frame cottag'e occupied by the sexton of said camp grounds, as a dwelling-house; that said lot number 254, has situate thereon, a frame ice-house, in which ice is packed and furnished to persons attending said meeting, at cost, and sometimes at less than cost; that another tract of said land included in the real estate, situate in said survey No. 1767, and hereinbefore described by metes and bounds, contains about three acres of land, and has situate thereon, a large frame building, which is used during said meetings for sleeping apartments, and as a boarding house by persons attending said meetings and for which sleeping accommodations and boarding, a small charge is made, which, in the aggregate, has never been sufficient to maintain said building in repair, pay the insurance thereon, and the running expenses thereof; that one tract of said real estate so described by metes and bounds, as aforesaid, containing about three acres of land, lies between the Little Miami Railroad and the Little Miami river, and is vacant ground, except that it has situate thereon, a pumping’-house and pumping machinery, which is connected with water tank by underground water pipes, and is used to pump water into said tanks1 for the use of persons attending said meetings; that said water tanks are situate on lots num-' bers 247 and 248, hereinbefore mentioned, and are connected with underground distributing pipes, through which water is distributed throughout the said camp grounds, for the use of persons attending said meetings; - that persons using said water for use in their cottages are required to pay for the same, but that said charges for said water amount in the aggregate, to no more than is necessary to keep said water-works in repair and operate the same; that the balance of said real estate, hereinbefore described by metes and bounds, and listed upon said tax duplicates as land, has no buildings of any kind thereon, and is entirely unimproved, and a large portion thereof is covered by forest trees, and is used as camping grounds and for hitching horses and as places of rest and recreation by persons attending said meetings, and that the whole of said lands and lots so numbered and designated on said plat, together with the building thereon, and together with the building designated on said plat as the auditorium, and the building designated on said plat as the German auditorium, and all other buildings and lots on said camp grounds owned by the plaintiff herein, are owned and occupied and used by the plaintiff herein, exclusively for the carrying on of said meetings herein described, and for carrying out the purposes for which the said plaintiff was organized, and that the same are necessary for the proper carrying out of said purposes and said meetings; that the public at large, are admitted to all said meetings upon equal terms, without distinction or discrimination; that sometimes an admission fee is charged by plaintiff for persons attending said meetings, but that said charges are always made for all persons attending said meetings without distinction or discrimination, and for the purpose only of helping to pay the expenses of conducting said meetings, and never with a view to profit; and that no profit has ever accrued therefrom to plaintiff; that charges are also made by the plaintiff for the privileges of keeping public stables on said grounds for the accommodation of persons attending said meetings; for the privilege of keeping boarding and rooming houses on said grounds, and for the privilege of keeping a grocery on said grounds, and for other privileges on said grounds during said meetings, all for the accommodation only of such persons as may attend said meetings, but that none of said charges are made with a view to profit, but only to assist in paying the expenses of said meetings, and that all the charges made by plaintiff in connection with managing and maintaining its said grounds and conducting said meetings, are, and always have been, insufficient to pay the expenses necessarily incurred in conducting said meetings, and that the expenses of said meetings are, and have long been, largely supported by donations from charitable persons, and that plaintiff is now in debt nearly $7,000.00; and that all of the buildings, property and lands so owned and occupied by plaintiff, as aforesaid, are proper and necessary for properly conducting and managing its said meetings. That in addition to the lots and lands hereinbefore designated and described, there are two hundred and forty-five (245) lots situate upon said camp ground, as the same are known and designated upon said recorded plat, in which plaintiff has granted and conveyed to various persons the right to use such lots for the camp meeting association purposes, the same to be used by said persons only in accordance with the constitution, by-laws-and rules and regulations of the said plaintiff, and the discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church, as the same now exists, or may hereafter be lawfully made, and the said lots to be used by said persons respectively in no other way, and for no other purpose; all of which lots in which plaintiff has granted and conveyed privileges as aforesaid, are respectively listed for taxation in the names of the respective persons to whom plaintiff has granted the aforesaid privileges; and upon which such persons pay the taxes, and the taxes upon which are not involved in this case, and upon many of said lots in which said privileges have been granted as aforesaid, the persons owning said privileges, have erected wooden cottages for their convenience in attending said meetings, but many of said last mentioned lots are still vacant and used only for camping purposes; and persons owning such interests in such lots, pay the same admission fees and other charges that other persons do who attend said meetings . on said grounds.
    “That all of the lots included in the plat of said camp grounds and designated by numbers thereon, were subdivided by plaintiff, for the purpose of assigning to per sous attending said meetings, definite portions of the camp grounds for tenting and camping' purposes during said meetings, and not for purposes of sale, nor with a view to profit, and most of the said lots are entirely unfit for building purposes, and none of said lots are held by the plaintiff with a view to profit, but only for the purpose of conducting its said meetings.
    “That all of its said real estate and the buildings and improvements thereon, except those lots in which privileges have been granted, as aforesaid are, and for more than six years last past, have been owned in fee simple, by plaintiff herein, and all of said buildings and real estate are, and for more than six years last past, have been actually occupied and used by plaintiff herein, for purely public, charitable purposes, in conducting public, religious, educational meetings and schools, and for no other purpose.
    “That none of said real estate nor any of the buildings thereon, is leased by plaintiff, nor is any of said real estate in any manner used, with a view to profit, nor has any of said real estate been either leased or used with a view to profit during any part of the six years last past.
    “That all the money, credits and property of plaintiff, are, and always have been, appropriated soleiy to sustaining said association and carrying out the purposes for which said plaintiff was organized, and that no person connected therewith, has ever derived any financial profit therefrom.
    “That prior to filing the petition herein, plaintiff made due application to defendant in writing, to have said defendant refrain from assessing the said taxes, and to have said defendant correct said tax lists and duplicates. And that the defendant is about to levy taxes against the real estate hereinbefore described, and threatens to enforce the collection of the same by process of Law, and that said defendant refuses to correct said tax lists and duplicates by striking therefrom said alleged taxes.
    “And the court further finds that all said real estate and' property, hereinbefore described, including the 245 lots, the right to use which for camp meeting purposes, plaintiff has conveyed to various persons, as aforesaid, are enclosed by a fence- and kept under the absolute control and management of plaintiff herein, for the use and purpose of accomplishing the ends for which the plaintiff was organized as aforesaid, and that all of said real estate and property is situate more than two miles from any hotel, grocery or boarding house, at which accommodations and supplies might be secured by persons attending the said meetings held on said grounds.
    “And the court further finds, that the matters stated in allegations of facts contained in the amended petition herein,1 are true.
    “And as its conclusions of law, upon the above facts, the court finds that said plaintiff is entitled to hold its said real estate and property, exempt from taxation under the laws of the state of Ohio, and that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for in the said amended petition, and that it is the duty of said defendant, John W. Davis, auditor, as aforesaid, to refrain from assessing any taxes against said property. And further, that it is said defendant’s duty to proceed forthwith and correct the tax lists and tax duplicates of said county, by striking therefrom, all sums and amounts now standing charged thereon 'as taxes against said real estate or any part thereof.”
    
      Nichols & Nichols and Parrott & Parrott, for plaintiff in error.
    In the presentation of our views, to the court -in this case, we expect to rely almost entirely on the decisions of the Supreme Court of Ohio as rendered in the case of Cincinnati College v. State, 19 Ohio, 110, and that of Library Association v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St., 253.
    
      The case at bar involves the construction of the 6th paragraph of section 2732 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio.
    In the case at bar, as in case of Library Association v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St., we have to deal with an institution of purely public charity.
    Can it be logically maintained that an ice-house, a grocery store, a water-works establishment, a public livery stable, a hotel and boarding-house, which are leased, and whose privileges are sold to highest bidders are conducted and can be legally determined as institutions of purely public charity?
    We repeat that it is immaterial whether the money paid for the privileges of running and operating a hotel, boarding-houses, livery stable and grocery store, is used for charitable or other purposes ; the fact remains that they are leased for profit.
    The selling of privileges with use of buildings therefor, which the sale of privileges naturally implies, clearly constitutes a lease in law, as the party purchasing said privileges has all the rights and equities of a lessee. The camp meeting association unquestionably derives a profit,, whether large or small.
    There is a wide difference between a “view to profit” and an “actual or realized profit.” The circuit court, in the fact of the contrary fact found by them, say, virtually, that because actual profit was not realized, actual profit was not intended.
    We presume it is unnecessary to call the attention of the court that it has been the invariable rule and policy of the courts of this state to strictly construe the provisions of the statutes with regard to the exemption of property from taxation. Lee, 
      Treasurer, v. B. S. Sturges; Insurance Company v. Ratterman, Treasurer, 46 Ohio St., 153.
    Under the circumstances, we ask that lot No. 254, upon which is situated a frame ice-house, and that lots Nos. 247, 248, upon which the water tanks are situated; that the three-acre tract of land upon which the hotel is situated, and that the one-acre tract of land upon which is situated the grocery store and livery stable, be ordered by this court restored to the tax duplicate of Clermont county, Ohio.
    
      Wm. W. Prather, for defendant in error.
    Counsel for plaintiff in error misquote the statute, and maintain that in paragraph 6 of section 2732, of the Statutes, as amended May 9, 1894, in 91 Ohio Laws, 392, the exemption is limited to buildings and that it does not extend to the grounds attached thereto. But paragraph 6 exempts from taxation “all buildings belonging to institutions of purely public charity * * * together with the land actually occupied by such institutions * * * not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit.” This is perfectly apparent, not only from the wording of the statute as it now stands, but also from the wording of the Statutes of 1890, before the amendment and from the Supreme Court Reports in The Library Association v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St., 253, and Humphries v. The Little Sisters of the Poor, 29 Ohio St., 201, in which last case the court expressly says that paragraph 6 of section 2732 extends to lands as well as buildings.
    The provisions of section 2732, Revised Statutes are constitutional. Section 1 of article 12 of Constitution of 1851; Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St., 229.
    Defendant in error is an “institution of purely public charity.” Myers v. Aikens, 8 O. C. C., 228; Sowers v. Cyrenius, 39 Ohio St., 29; Miller y. Teachout, 24 Ohio St., 525; McIntyre Poor School Case, 9 Ohio, 287; Mannix v. Purcell, 46 Ohio St., 102; 2 Perry on Trusts, 687 to 701; Academy v. Philadelphia, 150 Pa. St., 565; Donohough’s Appeal, 86 Pa. St., 306; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 556; 29 Ohio St., 201; 65 Maine, 92; 36 Ohio St., 253; 50 Md., 421.
    The property in question -and the buildings thereon belong to defendant in error. And defendant in error actually occupies said buildings and land, using the same for the purpose of carrying on the charitable work for which the institution was organized, and for that purpose alone, i. e. for public, religious, educational and other public charitable purposes, and for no other purpose. Donohough’s Appeal, 86 Pa. St., 206; Northampton Co. v. LaFayette College, 128 Pa. St., 137; Ramsey Co. v. College, 51 Minn., 437; State v. Powers, 10 Mo., Appeal Cases, 263, affirmed in 74 Mo., 476; People v. Academy, 6 Hun., 109, affirmed in 64 N. Y. Rep., 656; State v. Ross, 24 N. J. L., 498; 10 Hun., 246.
    The camp meeting association is in its nature analogous to a college; and the work carried on by defendant in error is educational as well as religious. It is not a church but a religious school, where charitable men spend their money and time for the benefit of the public, society, and the state, in teaching the truths of morality, and religion to all the people, and where they pursue the course of teaching, reading and study marked oat for the Chautauqua assemblies all over the country, and other educational work.
    The sleeping apartments and boarding-houses are nothing but dormitories. The water-works are in lieu of wells and cisterns. Electric lights simply take the place of lamps and oil. These things are strictly confined in their use to persons attending the institution, and the charges made in connection therewith are insufficient to keep them in repair and pay the expenses of maintaining them, and the charges are never made with a view to profit, and they never produce a profit, but are a continual expense, which must be supported by the association in order to carry on its work.
    Moreover these questions are all conclusively settled by the finding of facts of the circuit court, for that court found that none of said real estate was leased or otherwise used with a view to profit.
    Now these are the ultimate facts found by the circuit court and upon these their decree is based in accordance with the rule laid down in Albright v. Hawk, 52 Ohio St., 362; and Leach v. Church, 10 Ohio St., 149.
    The finding of facts should be construed so as to support the judgment, if possible; Jack et al. v. Hudnall, 25 Ohio St., 255.
   By the Court.

We see no error in the judgment of the circuit court. By the sixth clause of section.2732, Revised Statutes, “All buildings belonging to institutions of purely public charity, together with the lands actually occupied by such institutions, not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit, ” are exempt from taxation. This exemption is authorized by the constitution of the state. The court found that the camp meeting association is such an institution, and holds all its lands and property purely for the same purpose. And “that none of said real estate is leased by plaintiff, nor is any of said real estate in any manner used with a view of profit, nor has any of said real estate been either leased or used for profit.” And though charges .are made for the use of certain privileges, these are not inconsistent with the finding, that none of its property is leased or used with a view to profit. None of its lands, as shown by the finding, are used for any other purpose than to provide for the convenience and comfort of those who may attend the meeting; and these are not sufficient to meet the expenses of the association, and have to be met in part by donations from those interested in the maintenance of the meeting. So that the charges are not then made with a view to profit.

The auditor relies principally, on two cases heretofore decided by this court. In the case of Cincinnati College v. The State, 19 Ohio, 110, after a fire, the buildings of the college were restored, and were constructed with special reference to a renting of a part of them for secular purposes, such as stores for the carrying on of ordinary business, and. were so rented for profit only, not to uses that would be ancillary to the necessary uses and purposes of the college, such as dormitories and the like. Such parts of the buildings so constructed and rented, were held subject to taxation; and the same distinction exists in the case of Library Association v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St., 253.

Judgment affirmed.  