
    * John Tilley versus Josiah Farrow.
    A registered vessel bound coastwise from the port of Boston to another port in tno United States, and from such other port to a foreign country, is a coaster within the exception in the Slat. 1796, c. 85, § 2, for regulating pilotage, and so is not obliged to take a branch pilot on board.
    This was an action of debt, to recover the penalty of fifty dollars given by the statute of 1796, c. 85, entitled “ An Act in addition to an Act entitled an Act for regulating pilotage in the several ports in this commonwealth, and for otherwise regulating the pilot-age of the port of Boston.”
    
    The action was submitted to the determination of the Court upon the following facts agreed by the parties:—
    The defendant, on the 28th of July, 1815, was master of the brig (Economy, of Boston, then lying in the harbor of Boston, ready for sea, and drawing more than ten feet of water, and not being a fishing vessel. The plaintiff was on that day, and long before, a branch pilot, duly appointed and qualified; and on that day went on board said brig, and informed the said Farrow, that he was such branch pilot, and was ready to carry the said brig to sea; and produced his branch, and the law imposing a penalty on any person who should conduct a vessel to sea without a pilot. The said Farrow refused to take the plaintiff, or any other person, as pilot, saying he knew the law, and intended to be his own pilot; and he did, on the same day, pilot the said brig to sea from the port of Boston, having no pilot on board, nor having himself a branch, or acting under one. The said brig was registered at the port of Boston and Charlestown, cleared at the custom-house of that port for the port of Alexandria in Virginia, and sailed to that port, it being her first voyage. From Alexandria she proceeded to a port in Europe.
    
    If, on these facts, the Court should be of opinion that the said brig was not a coasting vessel, within the meaning of the act declared on, the defendant was to be'defaulted, and judgment to be rendered for the plaintiff for the penalty. If the opinion of the Court should be, that she was a coasting vessel, and not bound to take a * pilot, the plaintiff was to become nonsuit, and the defendant to recover his costs.
    
      Welsh, for the plaintiff,
    relied on the statute above mentioned, by the second section of which it is enacted, “that no person shal, undertake to pilot any vessel drawing nine feet of water, or more, (coasters and fishing vessels excepted,) into or out of the harbor of Boston, without having obtained a commission or branch, as is here inufter provided, under the penalty of fifty dollars for each offence; and he contended that by coasters, in the exception, were intended vessels enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade only, and not registered vessels, as the (Economy was, even when bound coastwise.
    
      Savage for the defendant.
   Parker, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. The question submitted to us by the statement of facts agreed by the parties in this case is, whether the vessel mentioned therein, at the time when the penalty is supposed to have been incurred, should be considered a coasting vessel, within the meaning of the terms used in the exception in the section of the statute giving the penalty. All vessels drawing nine feet of water, or more, are within the express provisions of the statute, except coasters and fishing vessels. The vessel in this case was registered, but was bound from the port of Boston to Alexandria, from whence she was destined to, and actually went upon, a foreign voyage.

By the laws of the United States, a vessel enrolled and licensed is considered as a coaster, and under that character may sail from any port or district within the United States, to any other port or district within the same; and although registered, so that she may proceed from the United States to a foreign port or place, yet she has the privileges of á coasting vessel, while engaged in trade from district to district, as is provided by the law of the United States, passed February 18, 1793, subject only to a tonnage duty. A registered vessel may, therefore, be a coasting vessel, * and as such is fairly within the exception in the statute of the commonwealth, upon which this action is founded.

The broader ground, taken by the counsel for the defendant, that under the last-mentioned statute, every master of a vessel may pilot his own vessel, and that the object of the statute is only to regulate the pilotage of such vessels as may choose to take a pilot, we cannot accede to. The legislature did not mean to give an option to masters of vessels, to take a pilot or not, as they might see fit, except in the case provided for in the eighth section of the statute, in which the right is given to the master of a vessel coming from a foreign port, upon the terms therein expressed.

The second section of the act provides that no person shall undertake to pilot any vessel, coasting and fishing vessels excepted, into or out of the harbor of Boston, &c., and by the fourth section the branch pilot is authorized and directed to take possession of any vessel, &c., and pilot her; first showing the master his branch, &c. The privilege given to the master of a vessel coming from a foreign port to refuse the pilot, upon paying half the fees, if boarded without the lighthouse, and to pilot his vessel in himself without paying any fees, if he shall have passed the lighthouse, cannot be construed to give any vessel bound out, excepting coasting and fishing vessels, the privilege of sailing without a pilot. At least, this seems to us at present to be the true construction of the act. But as it is not necessary to decide this point, in order to settle the action before us, we withhold a definitive opinion upon it.

Plaintiff nonsuit  