
    ROBERTSON v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Oct. 11, 1911.)
    1. BREACH OF THE PEACE (§ 8) — SUFFICIENCY of Evidence.
    Evidence in a prosecution for a breach of the peace held sufficient to sustain a conviction.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Breach of the Peace, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. § 8.]
    2. Criminad Law (§ 1091) — Bill of Exceptions — Setting Forth Errors in Admission of Evidence.
    A bill of exceptions on appeal from a conviction for a breach of the peace, which shows the admission of evidence to a certain effect and then sets out a statement from the witness’ testimony, is insufficient, in that it does not inform the court as to what the other testimony was, so as to show whether or not the statement was admissible, and presents nothing for review.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. § 1091.]
    3. Criminal Law (§ 507) — Evidence—Testimony of Accomplices.
    Under Pen. Code 1895, art. 91, which provides that “persons charged as principals or accomplices, whether in the same indictment or by different indictments, cannot be introduced as witnesses for one another,” a witness offered by defendant, who was charged by information with having committed the same offense at the same time and place, is incompetent to testify in behalf of the defendant.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. § 507.]
    Appeal from Rains County Court; O. H. Rodes, Judge.
    T. F. Robertson was convicted of disturbing the peace, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    W. W. Berzett, for appellant. C. E. Dane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State
    
      
      For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indoxes
    
   PRENDERGAST, J.

By proper complaint and information the appellant was charged in the county court with disturbing the peace. The evidence introduced was sufficient to establish, and the jury by its verdict evidently so found, that the appellant, at night, on the public streets in the town of Emory, Rains county, in company with another, sang vulgar songs, and talked loud, and holloed. The talking and singing was loud and vociferous, and all done in such a manner as to disturb the peace. In view of the verdict of the jury and the action of the lower court, the evidence was amply sufficient to sustain the verdict. So that appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient is not well taken.

By appellant’s bill of exception it is shown that the state offered in evidence the testimony of W. L. Green to the effect that he was in his home asleep and some one holloing woke him up; that he did not know who it was holloing, or what time of night it was when he heard the holloing; it was some time between the hours of 9 and 12 o’clock on the night of the 13th of March, 1910; “I didn’t know that the defendant was in town on that night” — to which testimony the appellant then and there" objected, which said objection was overruled by the court, and said testimony was admitted, to which appellant excepted. It will be seen that this bill is clearly insufficient, in that it does not inform the court of what the other testimony was, so as to show whether or not this was admissible, nor is any objection stated in the bill. As the matter is presented to us, there was no error in the action of the court.

By another bill the appellant complains as follows: “The defendant offered Grover Stuart as a witness for the defendant; that he would have testified that he was with the defendant on the night of the 13th of March, 1910, and that he knows he did not commit the act alleged against him in the information in this cause; that he did not curse or swear, or use loud and vociferous language, or yell or shriek; that the state objected to the testimony of Grover Stuart, for the reason that the state claimed that this witness was a principal in the commission of the offense alleged in the information against the defendant; that he was charged with disturbing the peace at the same time and place, and the court sustained said objection and excluded said testimony, to which appellant excepted.” The court, in approving this bill, qualified it by stating “The witness Grover Stuart was, at the time he was offered as a witness, charged by information then filed in this court with having committed the same offense as the defendant at the same time and place, and the proof showed that they were singing and holloing together.”

Article 91 of the Penal Code provides: “Persons charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, whether in the same indictment or by different indictments, cannot be introduced as witnesses for one another, but they may claim a severance; and if any one or more be acquitted they may testify in b.e-half of the others.” This bills shows that this witness was incompetent to testify as proposed by this bill, and the court did not err in excluding the testimony. Article 91, Penal Code; Rutter v. State, 4 Tex. App. 57.

There being no reversible error pointed out, the judgment is affirmed.

DAVIDSON, P. J., absent.  