
    Oliver H. P. Green vs. William Brookins.
    G Induced B to subscribo for shares in a patent right, and to give his note for $500, under tb promise that G wonld find a man to take the shares and pay the amount of the note therefor. G failed to find a party to take the shares. B paid the notes, with the knowledge of G, and brought suty against G. G contended that the promise was void, under the statute that declares that every special promise to answar for the debt, default, &c., of another shall be void unless in writing; and sécond that it was void undor the provisions of the statute respecting the sale of goods for the price of $50 or more. ¿ZéfcZ, That the promise was not within either of these statutes. Held also, That though the payment of the note was voluntary, G’s approval of such payment, was an admission that there was no defense to the note.
    
      X general objection to the charge of the Court doesnot come within the rule requiring assignments ef orror tobe special.
    Error to Oakland Circuit.
   Opinion by

Graves, J.

Brookins sued Green to recover damaages for breach of a verbal contract. The entire evidence was given under the two special 'counts The first stated that Green claimed r,o have an interest in a hay fork patent, and was about to organize it company for the purpose of dealing in the fork and in rights under the patent, and promised Brookins that in consideration that he would become a member of the company, and take two shares at $250 each, and iu payment therefor give his promissory note, such shares should not cost him anything, and that he, (Green,) as soon as the company should be organized would find a man who would ¡biiy the shares and take them off Brookins’ hands and pay him the amount of the note, and that Brookins should not be put to any ■cost or expense on account of the shares -or the note. It is then averred that Brookins, confiding in Green’s promise, did subscribe for shares, gave his note for $500, etc., and that Green refused to find a man to take the shares and pay the amount of the note, and that Brookins had been required to pay it, and had so done, etc.— The second special count was substantially like the first, except that the agreement on the part of Green was laid as a promise to Brook-ins to indemnify and save him harmless from all damages on account of the note, if he should give it.

The requests of plaintiff raise two questions under the statute of frauds. Plaintiff insists, first, that the contract- between the parties being wholly verbal, was void under that provision that declares every special promise to answer for the debt, default, or misdoing of another person, shall be void unless in writing; and second, that it was also void under the provision respecting the sale of “ goods, wares and merchandise for the price of $50 or more.” The promise iu this case, by Green, as alleged in the declaration, was not collateral, not an undertaking in relation to the doing or misdoing of any third person. It was a promise by Green to Brookins to find some one to take his place as member of the company, and to save Brookins from expense and damage in consequence of becoming shareholder, giving his note, etc.

Held, That a promise of that description is not within the statute

Held also, That the agreement by which Green was to find a man to take stock to be thereafter credited, in a company to be thereafter organized, was not an agreement on the part of Green to buy goods, wares or merchandise, within the meaning of the statute.

The sixth error raises the objection that this payment of the note, or part thereof by Brookins'was voluntary, and, therefore, not evidence of. damage under the agreement of Green to indemnify him.

Held, That this position is rendered "lintenable by the circumstance that the note was taken up by Brookins with the knowledge and approbation of Green. When Green approved of the payment ■ he virtually admitted to Brookins that there was no ground for refusing, and if there was none, he had no defense on the ground of payment without coercion.

There was a general objection to the charge of the Court to the jury, but without, specifying in, what particulars it was objectionable.

Held, That this assignment does not corns within the pule which requires every assignment of érror to be .Special j furthermore, that the advice to the jury was qhite as favorable to the plaintiff as the law of the case would justify, and as there are no errors in the same, the judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed with costs.  