
    Carnagy and Wife v. Woodcock and Mackey, Executors of Martin.
    Friday, April 26th, 1811.
    1. Will  — Devise of Realty with Crops Thereon — What Passes. — By a devise of a tract of land in fee simple, together with all the crops thereon, whether gathered or growing at the time of the testator’s death, not only the crops made the year the testator died, hut those of the preceding year remaining on the land, and those brought thither, from other plantations, to be stored, will pass.
    2. Same — Bequest of “All Household Goods” — What Passes. — By a bequest of “all my household goods and furniture, except my plate and watch,” every thing, about the houses, that had been usually held and enioyed therewith, and that would tend to the comfort and accommodation of the householder, will pass.
    3. Same —Construction — Explanation of Terms by Testator. — When, in the context of a will, the testator has explained his own meaning in the use of certain words, the court should take that as their guide, without resorting to lexicographers to determine what those words ought to signify in the abstract, or to adjudicated cases to discover what they have been decided to mean under different circumstances.
    The contest in this case arose on the following clause in the will of Thomas Bryan Martin : “I devise and bequeath to my present housekeeper, Betsey Powers, and her heirs, if she be alive at the time of my death, one thousand acres of land, as described by a survey made by George Bell, dated the-day of July, in the year 1794, where I now live, together with all houses thereon, and all the appurtenances and crops thereon, whether gathered or growing at the time of my death, and all the implements of husbandry used, or intended to be used, upon the said land, and one half my stock of horses, cattle, sheep and hogs, and all my household goods and furniture, (except my plate and watch,) and, moreover, the choice of ten slaves to be made by herself.” *The suit was brought in the county court of Prederick, by William Car-nagy, and Betsey his wife, (late Betsey Powers,) claiming all the crops; not only those that were growing on the 1,000 acres the year in which the testator died, but also those that were severed at the time of his death, whether made in that year, or the preceding year; whether made on that particular tract, or on the adjoining plantations, and brought thither to be stored.
    The plaintiffs also claimed the liquors, books, and various other articles mentioned in a schedule annexed to the bill, viz. “A spyglass, 7 empty double barrels, 11 do. single, a pair of large brass scales, 4 hogsheads, a copper tea urn, a large mahogany chest, 2 large brass sifters, 6 hearth stones, 2 crow-bars and 2 sledge hammers, a garden pitcher, 2 grindstones, all the narrow axes, 1 steel apple mill, 1 do. corn mill, 2 large jack screws, 1 brass bushel, 77 barrels of ñour, do. do. in the mill, 1 marble mortar, 1 marque, 3 backgammon tables, 1 speaking trumpet, 1 large office press, 1 corn mill iron, 4 plough plates, 2 pair large money scales, and one iron chest.”
    The county court rendered a decree pursuant to the construction put on the will by the plaintiffs; but, upon an appeal, the chancellor of the district court of Staunton excluded all crops except those on the 1,000 acres the year of the testator’s death ; being of opinion that the words, “Whether gathered or growing,” were used “to prevent such as should be severed before the 31st day of December from being assets in the hands of the executors.”
    
    He also excluded the liquors, books, and all other articles that did not come strictly within the idea of household furniture and implements of husbandry. On this branch of the controversy, his opinion was in the following words: ‘ ‘The next difficulty arises on the devise of the household goods and furniture; for, I presume, none *can arise about the implements of husbandry : whatever is necessary or useful in carrying on the business of the farm are embraced by these words. Household goods, and household furniture must receive the same interpretation; for they are the same. In Kelly v. Powlett, Amb. 60S, household furniture is said to comprise every thing useful or convenient to the householder, or ornamental to the house; and that circumstances are to be considered in determining what will pass by it. But this definition or description of household furniture must be taken in a limited sense; for, in the same case, it is held that books will not pass by it; though there was some evidence of the testator’s intention to pass them. In Bridgeman v. Dove, 3 Atk. 176, it is laid down that a library will not pass by a devise of furniture, and it is there said to have been so determined. In Porter v. Tournay, 3 Vesey, jun. 311, it is said to have been determined that the word furniture does not include books or wine. 
    
    “The marque cannot pass under any construction of the will; nor the backgammon tables ; for I cannot consider them more useful or ornamental than a library, and, more especially, as the devisee is a female, whom I will not presume either very skilful in the game, or inclinable to practise it. With respect to the spyglass, and speaking trumpet, I cannot bring them within any idea which I have of household furniture. It is true, that they may be useful and convenient to the proprietor: but not more so than a surveyor’s compass, or a set of blacksmith’s tools. The hearth stones, if intended for any of the houses upon the 1,000 acres, ought to pass: the intent of the testator must have been such. The corn mill iron (perhaps an iron corn mill is meant, as there is before men-
    tion made of a steel corn mill) if so, it passes; *or, if it is the iron of a mill devised to the appellee Elizabeth, it must also pass. The liquors, as before said, do not pass : nor can I consider the empty barrels, &c. within the devise; they are not household furniture, nor implements of husbandry, though they might be useful in securing some of the products of the farm. The other articles in the schedule (except the flour, the right to which will depend on circumstances, one important one will be the crop out of which it was made) will, I think, pass by the devise.
    “It has been contended that the exception of the testator’s plate and watch affords evidence that every thing else was intended to pass by the devise ; and that, though the plate would pass, yet the watch would not; and therefore the exception would have been idle and useless iri any other view. But it must be observed that the plate and watch were intended as specific legacies to near relations, and reserved for that special purpose. The exception of the watch might be therefore connected with the plate, out of abundant caution.”
    The chancellor, therefore, reversed the decree of the county court, and directed an account to be taken of the several articles to which the appellees, Carnagy and Wife, were entitled, according to the principles, and subject to the restrictions, he had mentioned. From this decree, by special leave of the court, an appeal was taken.
    Wickham, for the appellants.
    Williams, for the appellees.
    Wednesday, May 1st. The president informed the the counsel that the record was defective ; a copy of the will not being inserted.
    * Judge Roane observed there was no clause in the bill, or answer, praying the will to be taken as part thereof.
    Wickham. By consent of parties, a copy of the will may now be received as part of the record. There is in the bill a reference to the will, and that is sufficient.
    Williams. In the case of Bristow v. The Commonwealth, (MS.) a whole record was admitted, by consent of parties, to be added to the transcript before the court.
    On examining the order made in that case, the court was satisfied, and a copy of- the will was received by consent.
    Judge Cabell observed another defect. A statement of an account of sales is referred to, but does not appear. ,,
    Wickham. The failure to file that exhibit was a fault of the defendants; of which they have no right to complain.
    
      
       Wills. — See monographic note on “Wills” appended to Hughes v. Hughes, 2 Munf. 209.
    
    
      
      Rev. Code, vol. 1, p. 166, s. 46, 47.
    
    
      
       See Rev. Code, vol. 1, c. 223, s. 1.
    
    
      
       Order Book, May 12,1806.
    
   Monday, June 24th. The judges pronounced their opinions.

JUDGE CABEEE

(after stating the case) proceeded as follows : This is not one of those cases in which we are obliged to bend the testator’s intention to some stubborn rule of law. On the contrary, it is admitted, on all hands, that that intention (whatever it may be) must here prevail. And it appears to me that all the difficulties made in this case have arisen from attending to the common and natural acceptation of certain terms, rather than to the sense in which they are used by the testator ; from considering those terms in the abstract, rather than as explained by other parts of the will, and the circumstances *of this particular case. I can perceive nothing in the will calculated to restrict the devise of the crops as the chancellor has done. The expressions are broad and general, extending to all crops “gathered or growing,” and correspond with the liberal provision intended by the testator. The construction of the chancellor would render almost nugatory that part of the will which gives the crops “gathered for, suppose the testator had died on the 1st of April; to what could the term “gathered” have applied, but to the crops of the preceding year?

With respect to the books, liquors, &c. it is important to be observed that this was a devise in fee; that the devisee took the lands, with all the houses, all their appurtenances, all the implements of husbandry, half the stocks of every kind, and all the household goods and furniture ; and, even if the testator had left us to collect his intention from these circumstances only, I think the inference would have been extremely strong that, although, “household goods,” and “household furniture,” have in some cases been decided, and may in general be considered, synonymous, yet, in this case, the testator intended, by “household goods,” something more than mere “furniture;” that he intended every thing about the houselthat had been usually held and enjoyed therewith, and that would tend to the comfort and accommodation of the householder. But this inference is rendered- irresistible when " we consider the exception of the “watch,” which the testator thought it necessary to make from this devise. There is not one article, in the whole list objected to by the executors, which would not fall under the idea of “household goods,” with as much, if not more, propriety, than the watch ; and yet the testator shows that these terms, as understood and used by himself, would have comprehended the watch, had it not been specially excepted. Of course, the articles not excepted must pass. The testator having explained his *own meaning in the use of these terms, I shall take that as my guide, without resorting to lexicographers to determine what the same terms ought to mean in the abstract, or to adjudicated cases to discover what they have been decided to mean under different circumstances. Without inquiring, therefore, what would, in general, not pass by the terms “household goods and furniture,” but believing, from the particular circumstances of this case, that it was the intention of the testator to bequeath the articles objected to, I am of opinion that the decree of the chancellor be reversed, and that of the county court be affirmed.

JUDGES BROOKE and DEEMING

said that their sentiments were expressed in the opinion just pronounced.

Decree of the chancellor unanimously reversed, and that of the county court affirmed.  