
    The State, vs. Joseph Durant.
    
      The act of the Legislature of 1822, requiring the Governor, whenever a vacancy shall happen in the office of Sheriff, to issue his writ to the managers of elections for the district, requiring them to hold an election to fill the vacancy, does not repeal that part of the act 0/T8O8 which directs elections for Sheriffs to be held by the managers, in all districts in which vacancies exist, f>n the second Monday in January andt he day following in everij-year; nor is the writ of the Governor necessary to the validity of these elections.
    
    This was an information in the nature of a Quo Warranto, calling upon the defendant to show by what authority he exef> . ctsed the office of sheriff of said district.
    
      The defendant answered, and set forth an election held by the managers of elections for Sumter district, on the second Monday in January, 1824, and the day following, at which he was lawfully elected into said office.
    To that plea, it was replied, that the said pretended election was held without the writ of election of the Governor, issued to said managers, in that behalf, as is required by the act of the General Assembly of 1822.
    To which the defendant demurred.
    . The act is in these words, “ whenever any vacancy shall Occur in the office of sheriff in any of the circuit court districts in this state, by death, resignation-, removal from the state, or removal from or expiration of office of any sheriff, or where any election shall be declared void by the managers, or where any two or more persons shall have an equal number of votes, it shall be the duty of the governor forthwith to issue writs of ■election.”. - •
    
      For the motion, it was argued that although the words of the act of 1822 seem very explicit, yet by comparing it with the act of 1808 on the same subject, it will be seen that the writ of the governor was not necessary to the validity of this election. That act provides that elections shall be held “ on the second Monday and the day following, in January next,’* and on the same days in every year thereafter, to fill vacancies in the office of sheriff. Another clause of the same act gives the governor power to appoint sheriffs, in cases of vacancies occasioned by “ death, resignation, removal out of the state, removal from, or expiration of office,” to hold their appointments until the next election. The operation of the act would have been to render' the times of the elections of sheriffs and the expiration of their offices uniform throughout the state. But with respect to sheriffs already in office, their appointments having been made at various times, and the tenure of their offices being for four years, it was apparent that their offices would expire at various periods of the year. 1 o fill the vacancies occasioned by these irregular expirations of office, the governor was authorized to make appointments.
    
      When it was decided by this- court that a sheriff, oncé lawfully appointed, must by the constitution hold his office for four years, the Legislature, for the pui'pose of securing the elections to the people, passed the act of 1822. By taking both acts together, it will be apparent that the legislature, by the latter act, only intended to require the governor to issue his writ of election in cases in which, under the former, he had the pow-. er of appointment — that is to say, in cases of the irregular expiration of office( before referred to, and not where there was a' regular expiration succeeding a regular election,-as in the present instance.
    
      Against the motion.
    
    When the words of a statute are-clear, there is no room for construction. None can be more explicit than those of this act “in every, case of vacancy arising from” various enumerated causes and from “expiration-of off fice.” It does not appear that the requisition of writs of election, in cases of expiration of office, can' be restricted to the irregular expirations contended for. The Governor’s power of appointment was not so restricted by the act of 1808. If the managers failed to hold an election, he might appoint — if from any cause he found the office vacant, he might fill it. It is true the occasion would seldom arise for him to exercise the-power. The sheriffs elected on the second Monday in January, and the day following, were, by the act of 1808, to enter-on the duties of their office on the second'Monday in February following; so that at the succeeding election a successor would be provided, ready to. fill the vacancy the-instant it occurred. ,
    The provision of the act of 1808, for holding elections to fill vacancies about to occur, is inconsistent with the letter of the act of 1822, which provides that when the vacancy has happened, the clerk of the court shall give notice to the governor,, who shall thereupon issue his writ of election; and is,, we contend, therefore repealed.
    But if this is thought to be an adhering too closely to the letter, let us regard the spirit and purposes of the act. The-act intended to provide that the sheriff’s offices should expire--fegularly at a fixed period of the year,, and that election^ should be held regularly, to supply the vacancies. The two' objects seem to be connected and mutually dependant. When the court decided that sheriffs once in office must continue for four years, and when the act of 1822 was passed, many sher-* iffs were in office by the governor’s appointment, made at various times of the year. The commission of these must continue to expire irregularly. It can scarcely happen in any district for many years, that some accidental vacancy will not occur, from death, resignation or other cause. Whenever one of these shall occur, at a different period from that contemplated by tho act of 1808, it is plain that the office must continue to expire, and the new appointments to be made irregularly. Thus m the course of a few years all the sheriff’s offices in the state must expire irregularly. It can hardly be thought the intention of tire legislature to preserve the regular election, when the object for which it was instituted is entirely defeated.
    The presiding judge overruled the demurrer, and held that writs of election from the Governor, were necessary to the validity of the election.
    This was a motion to reverse that decision.
   The opinion of the c'ourt ivas delivered by

Mr. Justice Mott.

Previous to the adoption of our present constitution, sheriffs were elected by the legislature. The constitution re-quires that they shall be elected as they hitherto have been, Until otherwise directed bylaw,” but that they shall hold their ■ofScesfórfouryears. In the year 1808, the legislature transferred the election to the people. The act declares “ that an election shall be held on the second Monday and the day following, in January next, and on the second Monday and the day following In January,-in every year thereafter, in such of. the circuit dis-, tricts as there may then be vacancies, to be conducted in the same manner, by the same managers, and to be holden at the same places as now are or hereafter shall be appointed by law, for the conducting, managing and holding elections for members of the legislature, to elect sheriffs for the several circuit const districts within this state, wherein any vacancy shall or may hereafter happen in the office of sheriff; .occasioned either by death, removal out of the state, resignation from, or expiration of office or otherwise of any person possessing the same.”

A subsequent section of the same act provides “ that the governor shall have power, and he is hereby required to fill up all vacancies in the office of sheriff, that shall take place by the death, resignation, removal out of the state, removal from or expiration of office, of any person- possessing the same, or by any election of sheriff being,declared void by the managers, ¡or when any two or more candidates shall have an equal number of votes, to hold under such appointment, until such time as an election shall take place, according to the provisions o£ this act.”

Here are two seeming contradictory clauses in the same act — . ■one giving the people the. right of election in all cases, when a vacancy shall happen, and the other giving to the governor the power of appointment, in terms equally extensive. But they are easily reconciled, when we look to the policy of the law,. The'object was to give to the people the power of electing all. tbe sheriffs throughout the state — and the second Monday of January and the day following in each, and every year, are der dared the days of election for that purpose. No writ of election is required; but the managers, ex-officio, are to proceed to to an election on those days, in all the districts where a vacancy shall then exist, from whatever cause that vacancy may have been occasioned. But they are not authorised to elect at any other time. And to prevent the inconvenience which might result from occasional vacancies in the course of the year, the governor is authorised to make temporary appointments until the day of general election shall come round.

But in the case of the State against M‘Clintock, it was held that the legislature could not authorise such temporary appointments to be made. And that whenever a sheriff is appointed, (no matter by what authority) he is in, under the constitution, for four years. The effect of that decision would have been to defeat the object, of the law entirely, and to transfer the appoints rnent of the sheriffs in all cases from the people to the governor;. The act of 1822, is intended to counteract that decision, and to preserve to the people the privilege allowed them by the act of 1808. It commences with taking from the governor the power of appointment, and in its stead, authorises him to issue writs of election to the managers, appointing a time when they shall hold the election. The clause of the act of 1808, authorising the-governor to appoint, is transferred to the act of 1822, limiting the power of appointment to that of issuing writs of election. The wards of' the two clauses are as nearly the same as it waif possible to make them, except as. to the power to be exercised by the governor. It is true, the terms of the clause in the act of 1822 giving to the governors the power to issue writs of election, are very general and may he construed to embrace every Oase of vacancy; and in all probability, if there had been no ether act on the subject, would have received that construction. But they admit of a different view, when we read the two acts together, which must be done in order to give effect to either. There are no words of repeal in the latter act, neither is any stieh inference to be drawn from any of its provisions. If the act had simply taken from the governor the power of appointment, the- people, by occasional vacancies, would have been loft a great portion of the time without a sheriff — Because the managers can only hold elections by law, on the second Monday in January and the day following. To remedy that evil, the governor is authorised to issue writs of election, authoris-. ing them to hold elections at other times, whenever occasion shall require. But the remedy need not be applied, where the evil does not exist. There appears to have been an impression, that the managers could elect on the 2d Monday in January and the day following, according to the general provisions of the act, in those cases only, where the vacancy happened by the expiration of office. But|that is a mistaken view of the subject. They are authorised to ¡elect at that time in all cases, where a vacancy may then exist, at whatever time it may have occurred, or by whatever causo it may have been occasioned».-

Miller, Desaussitre, and M‘ Cord, for motion--

-Harper .and Mayrant, coptra?

The two acts then maybe constructed harmoniously together, and the two clauses rendered auxiliary to each other; •If the governor shall omit or neglect to issue writs of election whenever a vacancy shall happen, the managers may open a poll on the day required by law, and proceed to an election •without writs — if they should fail to do so, on that day the governor may issue his own writs, directing the election to be '.held on any other day. And when we see that the clauses of the act of 1822, authorizing the governor to issue writs of election, is couched precisely in the same words as the clause in the act of 1808, giving the power of appointment, except so far as was necessary to accommodate the phraseology to the new power conferred on him, it is reasonable to conclude that it was the intention of the legislature to require him to issue writs of election, in those cases only where he had before the power to appoint. That construction seems best to comport with the letter and spirit of both acts — it gives an uniform operation to both, and is the best calculated to insure an election •with the least possible delay and inconvenience.

I think, therefore, that the decision ought to be reversed • on that ground.

JVott, Gantt, Richardson, and Johnson, Justices, concur-' red.  