
    The State, ex rel. Fox, v. Yeatman et al., Board of Deputy State Supervisors and Inspectors of Elections of Hamilton County. The State, ex rel. Thompson, v. Bundenthal et al., Board of Deputy State Supervisors and Inspectors of Elections of Montgomery County.
    
      Municipal courts — Acts (103 O. L., 279 and 3&5) extending jurisdiction of police courts in Cincinnati and Dayton — Valid as to election of judges.
    
    The act “providing for enlarging and extending the jurisdiction of the police court in the city of Cincinnati, and changing the name of such court to the municipal court of Cincinnati” (103 O. L., 279), and the act “providing for enlarging and extending the jurisdiction of the police court of the city of Dayton and changing the name of such court to the municipal court of Dayton” (103 O. L., 385), are valid enactments to the extent of providing for the elections of the judges of such courts,
    (Nos. 14409 and 14417 —
    Decided October 22, 1913.)
    In Mandamus.
    In the case firstly entitled the relator alleges that at a primary election held in the city of Cincinnati on September 2, 1913, he was duly nominated by the Democratic party for the office of judge of the. municipal court of Cincinnati. He further alleges all the facts necessary to entitle him to have his name printed upon the official ballot for the municipal election to be held in said city on November 4, 1913, ás si candidate for said office if the act of April 17, 1913' (103 Ó. L., 279), entitled “An act. providing for enlarging and extending the jurisdiction of the police court in the city of Cincinnati, and changing the name of such court to .the municipal court of Cincinnati,” is a valid enactment.
    By the averments of the petition in the case lastly entitled, the relator shows that he is entitled to have his name printed as a candidate for the same office upon the ballot to be voted at the municipal election to be held in the city of Dayton November
    4, 1913, if the act of April 8, 1913 (103 O. L., 385), entitled “An act providing for enlarging and extending the jurisdiction of the police court of the city of Dayton and changing the name of such court to the municipal court of Dayton,” is a valid enactment.
    In each petition it is alleged that the defendants refused to cause the tickets to be so printed, and in each there is a prayer for a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the defendants to cause the relator’s name to be so printed upon said ballot, and in each case the defendants demur to the petition.
    
      Mr. Alfred Bettman, for Bernard C. Fox. •
    
      Messrs. Gordon, Morrill & Ginter; Mr. Timothy 5. Hogan, attorney general, and Messrs. Burch, Peters & Connolly, for Warner M. Yeatman et al.
    
      Messrs. McMahon & McMahon; Mr. Frank S. Breene, city solicitor, and Mr. Albert J. Dwyer, assistant city solicitor, for Chilton D. Thompson.
    
      Messrs. McConnaughey & Shea, for Edward W. Bundenthal et al.
   Shauck, J.

A more extended statement of the allegations of the petitions is not necessary since in each case the only question to be considered is the constitutional validity of the statutes to create the municipal courts of Cincinnati and Dayton. Though differing in some of their detailed provisions, in the respects as to which their constitutional validity is challenged, the acts are identical. They provide for the merging of the courts of justice of the peace and police courts in both of the cities named, for the election of judges thereto, and changing the name to the municipal court of the city, conferring upon it not only the jurisdiction of the courts that are merged, but further jurisdiction taken from, the court of common pleas of the county. They provide for the election and qualification of judges, the organization of the court and the fixing of salaries; providing in each case that the present judge of the police court shall be the presiding judge of the municipal court during his term of office. Naturally those who deny the validity of this legislation recur to the requirements of the constitution with respect to uniformity of legislation upon subjects of a general nature. As naturally those who maintain the validity of the legislation recur to The State, ex rel. Attorney General, v. Bloch, 65 Ohio St., 370. While the doctrine of that case has not met with universal approval, it is now to be taken as authority for all that it decides. That case and contemporaneous and subsequent legislation creating a court of insolvency in Hamilton county, municipal courts in other cities, and conferring jurisdiction in divorce and in the partition of lands upon probate courts in several named counties of the state, have recognized in the legislature as large a power under the constitutional authority to create other courts inferior to the supreme court as has been exercised in the present cases. In all of those cases the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas in the several counties was invaded as it is by the terms of the statutes now under consideration'.

A further objection is that by the terms of these statutes a new office is created, that is, the office of presiding judge of the municipal courts in the cities named, and that the legislature by designating the present judge of the police court to be the presiding judge has practically exercised the power of appointment. But upon considerations which we do not think it necessary to review here, in State, ex rel., v. Hunt, 84 Ohio St., 143, it is decided that the supervising judge does not by virtue of that distinction hold an office additional to the office of judge of the court of common pleas, and by parity of reasoning the same conclusion must be reached in these cases.

The validity of the acts is further challenged upon the ground that they are in contravention of the provisions of Article XVIII of the Constitution as amended in September, 1912. In support of that conclusion it is urged upon our attention that all laws affecting cities must now be general laws, else they are subject to the home-rule provisions of the article referred to. But the force of this objection disappears when it is remembered that at the time of the decision of State, ex rel., v. Bloch, and the passage of the other statutes referred to, laws of uniform operation throughout the state were required upon all subjects of a general nature and that the provisions of Article XVIII as amended have no relation to the judicial organization of the state, but only to the government of municipal corporations. It seems quite clear that special acts of the character of these may stand against a provision as to general laws for the government of corporations quite as firmly as against the constitutional provisions formerly in force.

In the light of the cases cited we see no valid objection to those provisions of~ these acts which relate to the organization and jurisdiction of the municipal courts in the cities named. If there are invalid provisions with respect to salaries, they do not require consideration here.

Peremptory writs allowed.

Nichols, C. J., Johnson, Donahue, Wanamaker and Wilkin, JJ., concur.  