
    HUGH MAGUIRE ET AL. v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [Departmental,
    88.
    Decided May 4, 1908.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    Congress provide salaries for letter carriers, in cities which contain a population of 75,000 of from $600 to $1,000; and for carriers, in cities of less than 75,000 of from $600 to $850. The claimants are carriers in Long Island City, N. Y., which, by State authority, is annexed to and made a part of the city of New York. The question presented to the court by the Postmaster-General is whether the claimants became, by virtue of the merger of Long Island City into the city of New York, entitled to the higher grade of salaries.
    I.The laws of Congress are affected by State statutes, not by disputing their authority, but by sometimes changing their application.
    II.The postal system is organized for the benefit of the whole public; and when it enters a State it takes cities, counties, villages, railroads, and creatures of the State as it finds them, and coordinates them to its use.
    III. Congress have classified letter carriers with reference to the population of municipal subdivisions and without reference to the receipts of post-offices; and the classification of a letter carrier depends upon the population of the place where he serves.
    IV. Long Island City, on the 1st January, 1898, by virtue of the act of the legislature of New York, became a part of the city of New York; and thereafter the letter carriers serving therein became letter carriers in the city of New York and entitled to be paid as such.
    
      
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
    I. The claim or matter in this case was transmitted to the court by virtue of a reference by the Postmaster-General under the provisions of section 2 of the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat. L., 485), known as the Bowman Act, in a communication dated June 5, 1907, as follows:
    “ Oeeice oe the PostmasteR-General,
    “Washington, D. (7., June 5,1907.
    
    
      “The Ghief Justice and Judges of the Court of Claims.
    
    “ Sirs : The claim or matter set forth in the accompanying petition of letter carriers at Long Island City, New York, applying for reclassification as letter carriers of the first class, is transmitted to the Court of Claims under authority of section 2 of the act of March 3, 1882, 22 Statutes at Large, page 485, for findings and opinion to be reported to this department as provided by that statute.
    “ A statement showing the name, the date of entry into the service as a regular carrier, and the date of promotion and increase of salary of each carrier whose name is signed to the application is transmitted herewith, as is also an argument presented to this department with the application, containing an extract from the statute of the State of New York bearing on the case.
    “ The facts pertinent to the issue involved in the case are as follows:
    “Prior to January 1, 1898, Long Island City, New York, was a separate municipality created by and existing under the laws of the State of New York. A post-office had been established at Long Island City having free delivery with approximately the same boundaries as the city. On May 4, 1897, an act of the legislature of the State of New York (Laws of New York, 1897, volume 3, section 1, page 1; section 1611, page 556) was passed and went into effect on January 1, 1898, whereby various separate municipalities, including the city of Long Island City, were annexed to the city of New York and out of the combination was created a single united municipality called ‘ the city of New York.’ The city of New York, as thus constituted, had a population far in excess of 75,000, and has so since continued. The post-office known as Long Island City was continued as a separate post-office by the Post-Office Department. The population within the territory served by that post-office was less than 75,000, and has so continued up to the present time.
    “ The classification and promotion of the letter carriers have been since January 1, 1898, regulated by the following statutes:
    “Act of January 3, 1887 (24 Statutes at Large, page 855).
    “ ‘AN ACT To extend the free-delivery system of the Post-Office Department, and for other purposes.
    “ iBe it macted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That letter carriers shall be employed for the free delivery of mail matter, as frequently as the public business may require, at every incorporated city, village, or borough containing a population of fifty thousand within its corporate limits, and may be so employed at every place containing a population of not less than ten thousand, within its corporate limits, according to the last general census, taken by authority of State or United States law, or at any post-office which produced a gross revenue, for the preceding fiscal year, of not less than ten thousand dollars: Provided, This act shall not affect the existence of the free delivery in places where it is now established: And provided further, That in offices where the free delivery shall be established under the provisions of this act, such free delivery shall not be abolished by reason of decrease below ten thousand in population or ten thousand dollars in gross postal revenue, except in the discretion of the Postmaster-General.
    “c Section 2. That there may be in all cities which contain a population of seventy-five thousand or more three classes of letter carriers, as follows: Carriers of the first class, whose salaries shall be one thousand dollars per annum; of the second class, whose salaries shall be eight hundred dollars per annum; and of the third class, whose salaries shall be six hundred dollars per annum.
    “‘ Section 3. That in places containing a population of less than seventy-five thousand-there may be two classes of letter carriers, as follows: Carriers of the second class, whose salaries shall be eight hundred and fifty dollars per annum, and of the third class, whose salaries shall be six hundred dollars per annum.
    “ ‘ Section 4. That all laws inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.’
    “Act of August 2, 1882, section 2 (22 Statutes at Large, page 185), enacting a substitute for the act of February 21, 1819, section 4 (20 Statutes at Large, page 317):
    “ ‘AN ACT To amend sections three and four of the act of February twenty-first, eighteen hundred and seventy-nine, to fix the pay of letter carriers, and for other purposes.
    $ ‡ ‡ ‡
    “‘Section 2. That section four of the act aforesaid be, and the same is hereby, amended so that it will read as follows:
    “ ‘ Section 4. Appointments of letter carriers in cities having two or more classes shall be made to the class having the minimum rate of pay, and promotions from the lower grades in said cities shall be made to the next higher grade at the expiration of one year’s service, on certificate of the postmaster to the efficiency and faithfulness of the candidate during the preceding year.’
    “ In the administration of these statutes it has been held by the Post-Office Department that carriers attached to the post-office at Long Island City are not entitled to the benefit of section 2 of the act of January 3, 1887, but that their rate of compensation is governed by the provisions of section 3 of the same act; so that the carriers of that post-office have not been promoted to the first class defined by section 2. The carriers in their petition transmitted herewith claim, for reasons stated in the accompanying argument, that they are entitled to be included within the provisions of section 2 and to be promoted, in compliance with the act of August 2, 1882, to carriers of tbe first class, with, salaries of one thousand dollars per annum.
    “ In making promotions from the lower grades to the higher grades of letter carriers it has been the uniform practice of the department to promote all the carriers in service at the expiration of one year’s service to the next higher grade on receipt of certificates of efficiency and faithfulness from their postmasters; and if postmasters failed to submit certificates their attention has been called to the provisions of the statute. Upon receiving such certificate, the carriers have been promoted, effective from the expiration of one year from their appointment as regular carriers or from their last promotion. No new commissions or letters of appointment are issued to carriers on such promotion and no new bonds are required of them.
    “ The carriers at Long Island City, whose application is now transmitted to the Court of Claims, have, so far as the department is aware, served efficiently and faithfully and would have been entitled to promotion under the uniform custom and practice of the department and would have been promoted had the department held that Long Island City was entitled to the benefit of section 2 of the act of January 3, 1887.
    “ The question upon which a decision of the Court of Claims is now asked is whether upon the facts hereinbefore recited the carriers of the post-office known as Long Island City were, after January 1, 1898, entitled to the benefits of the provisions of section 2 of the act of January 3, 1887, or were confined to the provisions of section 3 of the same act.
    “ Eespectfully, yours,
    “ G. v. L. Meyer,
    “ Postmaster-General.”
    II. On January 1, 1898, by virtue of an act of the legislature of the State of New York, dated May 4, 1897, Long Island City, N. Y., was annexed to, and became a part of, the city of New York.
    III. Since the enactment of the foregoing statute annexing Long Island City to the city of New York the Postmaster-General has continued the service of carriers from the Long Island City post-office the same as prior thereto, independent of the New York City post-office, and they have been paid as class two and three at the rate of $850 and $600 per annum, respectively, as authorized by section 3 of the act of January ”3, 1887 (24 Stat. L., 335).
    
      Mr. George A. King for the claimants. Messrs. George A. <& William B. King were on the brief.
    
      Mr. S. 8. Ashbaugh (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General John Q. Thompson) for the defendants.
   Barney, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This case comes to this court under a reference from the Postmaster-General under section 2 of the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat. L., 485), known as the Bowman Act. Prior to January 1, 1898, Long Island City, N. Y., was a separate municipality, organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York. A post-office had been established there having free delivery, and has ever since been conducted as a separate post-office. By an act of the legislature of the State of New York, Long Island City was annexed to and became a part of the city of New York on and after January 1,1898. In his letter of 'reference the Postmaster-General recites the facts above stated and asks the conclusion of the court, with an opinion, whether upon the facts so recited hereinbefore found by the court “ the carriers of the post-office known as Long Island City were, after January 1, 1898, entitled to the benefits of the provisions of section 2 of the act of January 3, 1887 (24 Stat. L., 355), or were confined to the provisions of section 3 of the same act.”

The two sections named are as follows:

“ SectioN 2. That there may be in all cities which contain a population of seventy-five thousand or more three classes of letter carriers, as follows: Carriers of the first class, whose salaries shall be one thousand dollars per annum; of the second class, whose salaries shall be eight hundred dollars per annum; and of the third class, whose salaries shall be six hundred dollars per annum.
SectioN 3. That in places containing a population of less than seventy-five thousand there may be two classes of letter carriers, as follows: Carriers of the second class, whose salaries shall be eight hundred and fifty dollars per annum, and of the third class, whose salaries shall be six hundred dollars per annum.”

The Congress has seen fit to classify mail carriers according to the population of the cities in which they are serving, and to provide for a different rate of compensation for such classes. Where the law is plain, it is unnecessary to look to the reason for its enactment, but if it wfere necessary so to do in this case it would not be difficult. When the difference in the cost of living is taken into account, a salary of $1,500 per annum in a large city is hardly equivalent to one-half that sum in the ordinary city of 10,000 inhabitants.

It is contended by the defendants that “ the laws of Congress can not be affected by the statutes of a Stateand in the brief of the defendants we are treated to a learned discussion of the important question of the relative powers of the federal and state governments as applicable to this case. As we view the question at issue, the relative rights of the States and the General Government are not in the least involved.

The laws of Congress are affected by the statutes of the different States, not by disputing their authority but by affecting and sometimes changing their application. The post-office service ramifies throughout the length and breadth of the land without reference to State lines, yet municipal bodies, which are only creatures of the States, are everywhere recognized, (1) free postage is granted within the county of publication to newspapers; (2) county rural free-delivery systems are organized; (3) mail must be delivered to every court-house; and other instances might be mentioned. If a State should see fit to enlarge the boundaries of a county in the first-cited case, would that be a startling or dangerous conflict of federal and state authority? Or if a court-house should be removed to a greater distance from the post-office, would that involve the same great question? The postal system is organized for the benefit of the whole public, and when it enters a State it takes the cities, counties, villages, railroads and other means of transportation (all creatures of the State) as it finds them, and coordinates them to its use.

Section 2 of the act of January 3, 1887, provides: “That there may be in all cities which contain a population of seventy-five thousand or more * * * ” certain classes of mail carriers with different salaries named.

Section 3 of the same act provides for different classes and salaries of the same officers in places containing a population of less than 75,000, the word “ places,” instead of “ cities,” being used in the latter section for the reason, doubtless, that there are towns of less than 75,000 inhabitants which are not cities, but which are receiving free delivery.

It is thus seen that Congress has classified letter carriers with reference to the population of municipal subdivisions, and without reference to the receipts of post-offices. The question as to the classification of a letter carrier depends, then, not upon the receipts of the post-offices from which he serves, but upon the population of the city or place where he serves.

Prior to January 1, 1898, Long Island City was a separate and distinct municipal corporation or “ place,” and letter carriers from its post-office were classified and paid accordingly. On that date, by virtue of an act of the legislature of the State of New York, it became a part of the city of New York, and thereafter letter carriers serving therein were as much letter carriers serving within the city of New York as though they carried mail on Broadway or Fifth avenue. It appears to us out of place in the discussion of this case to speak of the change of a federal statute by the act of the legislature of a State. Of course, municipal corporations in every State are the creatures of legislation, Long Island City no more so than any other city, and when Congress saw fit to recognize them in the regulation of its postal affairs, it did so with the knowledge that the same power which created them could diminish or enlarge their boundaries. Congress has seen fit to say that letter carriers within a city containing a population of more than 75,000 shall be classified and jjaid according to a certain rule. The legislature of the State of New York has enlarged the boundaries of the city of New York so as to include Long Island City, and there is no longer any Long Island City as a municipal organization within, the meaning of the law under consideration, and within the meaning of that law its letter carriers are New York letter carriers and not Long Island City letter carriers.

It is urged that the claimant is still a letter carrier from the Long Island City post-office and not from the New York City post-office, and that for that reason he must be classified according to the population of what was once Long Island City. We have already said that Congress has seen fit to classify and pay letter carriers according to the population of the cities where they serve without any reference to the character of the post-office where they receive their mail. Doubtless the Postmaster-General can establish as many post-offices within the city of New York or any other city as he may see fit, and cut it up into as many different post-office districts as he may see fit, and provide for the delivery of mail by mail carriers within these districts, so limited that no one of them would have a populaton of more than 75,000. If he should do this, would it be contended that such mail carriers should be classified under section 3 instead of section 2 ? If not, why can he classify under section 3 mail carriers within that part of the city of New York where he has seen fit to maintain a post-office called Long Island City? This court has nothing whatever to do with the equities in this case; it is simply a question of the construction of the statute and nothing more. But if we were to take into consideration the equities due these carriers, it is a fair presumption that when Long Island City was made by law a part of the city of New York it was so in fact, sufficiently to make the services of letter carriers there as valuable as in any other part of the city.

It is the opinion of the court that since January 1,1898, the carriers attached to the post-office at Long Island City were entitled to the benefits of section 2 of the act of January 3, 1887.

This opinion, together with the foregoing findings, will be certified to the Postmaster-General for his guidance and action.  