
    CRAFT’S CASE.
    Heber Craft v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      The claimant residing in ¡Mississippi, within the Confederate lines, bays cotton there, the consideration being a sight draft on one residing in Memphis, within the United States lines. Subsequently the cotton is captured. The claimant brings suit for the proceeds.
    
    I. Where the purpose of a contract daring the rebellion was to place at the disposal of one resident in hostile territory funds within the United States fixed lines of military-occupation, no effect can be given to the contract in courts of the United States ; and a title to personal property thus acquired cannot be upheld in a suit for the proceeds under the Abandoned or captured property. Act. (12 Stat. L., 820 )
    II. It was unlawful for two persons resideut in the insurrectionary districts during the rebellion to trade across the United States military lines, and what they could not do directly they could not do by any number of intermediate links; ex. gr. by the one without the lines giving to a third person a sight draft for the purchase of cotton on the other within the lines. No title to property thus acquired can be enforced in courts of the United States.
    III. Where the purpose of the vendor, resident during the rebellion in the insurrectionary districts, was to obtain funds within the United States lines to the end'that he might acquire supplies there and carry them back to his own hostile territory j and the vendee gave in exchange for the property a sight draft on one within the United States lines, he was chargeable with knowledge of the illegal consequences that might flow from the transaction.
    
      
      The Reporters’ statement of the case
    The following facts found by the court fully set forth the transactions out of which the claimant acquired title to the property in suit:
    1. On the 24th of March, 1864, the claimant bought of E. P. Daves 150 bales of cotton. The transaction took place at Holly Springs, in the State of Mississippi; but the cotton at the time was at Daves’s plantation, in Noxubee County, in that State. Both of the contracting parties were then residents of Mississippi, and neither of them was within the United States lines of military occupation. The consideration for the sale was a draft or bill of exchange, in the following terms:
    “$1,000.] . Holt.t Springs, March 24, 1864..
    “Pay to the order of Pugh Daves, esq., one thousand dollars and charge same to account. .
    “ HEBER GRAFT.
    “To Henby Craft, Esq., Memphis, Term.
    
    (Indorsed:) “Pay to the order of Miss E. R. Otey.
    “E. P. DAVES.
    “ E. R. Otey. ”
    This draft was indorsed by Daves payable to the order of Miss E. R. Otey, who acted as his agent in the- matter; and she, by his direction, about the same time, passed within the United States military lines, and collected the amount of the draft from the drawee in Memphis, and then purchased in Memphis supplies for Daves with the money thus received by her, which supplies so acquired were sent to and received by Daves.
    2. In November, 1865, an agent of the Treasury seized, on thó ground that it belonged to the Confederate States, a large quantity of cotton on the plantation of Daves, consisting of 300 bales. Of this quantity, 150 bales was the alleged property of the claimant, being the cotton described in the first finding; 101 bales the property of the Confederate States, being cotton sold to them by Daves, but remaining in his possession ; and 49 bales the property of Daves, having been grown by him upon his plantation. Of the 300 bales so seized, the claimant has shown' that 71 bales were sold, and that the proceeds thereof are in the Treasury, and amount to $5,409 49. What became of the remainder of the 300 bales has not been shown by either party.
    
      Mr. John A. Wills for the claimant.
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Simons for the defendants.
   Bott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The purpose of the contract on which the claimant’s title rests was to place at the disposal of an enemy of the United States, resident in hostile territory, funds which were within the United States fixed lines of military occupation. We are of the opinion that a title thus acquired was acquired against the public policy of the United States, and that within their courts public policy forbids that it should be upheld.

It was lawful for the claimant to trade with Daves so long as their transactions were without an unlawful purpose; for both were residents within the insurrectionary district, and their transactions were carried on within the enemy’s lines; but it was not lawful for Daves to trade across the United States lines with Henry Graft, at Memphis, (as was held by the Supreme Court in Ensley’s Case, 9 C. Cls. R., 11,) and what be could not do directly he could not do by any number of intermediate links.

If the consideration of the sale had been cash the sale would have been valid. If the consideration had been a draft on some one within the United States lines, in terms payable only after hostilities had ceased, a different question would be before the court. But the draft which formed the actual consideration imported that the drawee had funds subject to the order of the drawer, and such was the fact; and it in effect was payable whenever presented, and such was the intent; and its real purpose, like the practical effect, was to place at the disposal of an enemy funds which he could use within our own territory. Manifestly the courts of the United States cannot carry out such a purpose, nor aid in giving effect- to such a transaction.

Moreover, it is shown to have been the purpose of the vendor to obtain these lunds within the United States lines, to the end that he might acquire supplies there and carry them back to his own hostile, territory. Whether the vendee was or was not informed of this purpose we deem immaterial, for he was chargeable with knowledge of the illegal consequences that might flow from his own illegal transaction.

The judgment of the court is that'the petition be dismissed.

Peck, J., was absent when the case was heard, and took no part in the decision.  