
    Michael MAROM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD, Kate Murray, Supervisor, Jon Lipinsky, Code Enforcement Officer, Martin Smith, Code Enforcement Officer, Defendants-Appellees.
      
    
    17-1024-cv
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    January 30, 2018
    FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Michael Marom, pro se, Baldwin, NY.
    FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Donna A. Napolitano and Daniel J. Evers, Berkman, Henoch, Peterson, Peddy & Fenchel, P.C., Garden City, NY.
    PRESENT: Guido Calabresi, José A. Cabranes, Raymond J. Lohier, Jr. Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as shown above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Michael Marom, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s March 22, 2017 grant of summary judgment to defendants-appellees Town of Hempstead, Town Supervisor. Kate Murray, and Code Enforcement Officers Jon Lipinsky and Martin Smith (jointly, “Defendants”). On appeal, Marom argues that the District Court erred in finding that Defendants did not violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when Officer Smith entered Marom’s house during a realtor-hosted open house, conducted a building inspection, and issued an “appearance ticket” for possession of a sauna without a plumbing permit. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “resolv[ing] all ambiguities and drawing] all inferences against the moving party.” Garcia v. Hartford Police Dept, 706 F.3d 120, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Pro se submissions are reviewed with “special solicitude,” and “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

Officer Smith conducted the inspection during an open house to which Marom “invitfed] the public at large to visit the premise.” Appellant Br. at 16. While Ma-rom suggests that visitors were not granted unlimited access to the house, id. at 20, Marom does not argue that visitors were prohibited from viewing the sauna. Nor were we able to identify any such limitation in the record.

“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); see also United States v. Titemore, 437 F.3d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes' to the plain view of outsiders are not protected because no intention to keep thém to himself has been exhibited.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because Marom exposed his house and sauna to the public when he held the open house, the Defendants did not violate Marom’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an inspection and viewing the sauna-during the event. We therefore affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court in its March 22, 2017 Opinion and Order.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Marom on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the March 22, 2017 judgment of the District Court.  