
    Ronnie COVINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-5116-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 27, 2012.
    
      Ronnie Covington, pro se, Romulus, N.Y.
    Scott Shorr, Senior Counsel, Appeals Division (Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, and Francis F. Caputo, on the brief), for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Ronnie Covington (“Covington”), proceeding pro se, appeals from a November 16, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Gleeson, J.), on remand from this court, dismissing his false arrest claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, proceedings below, and specification of issues on appeal.

Upon de novo review, see Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir.2004), we find that the district court correctly concluded, under Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388-89, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007), that the statute of limitations for Covington’s false arrest claim accrued on February 19, 1990, the date he was arrested and formally charged. Covington’s claim, which is deemed filed on June 2, 1994, is therefore time-barred, unless equitable tolling applies.

Contrary to Covington’s argument, this case does not present rare and exceptional circumstances that would warrant equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for his false arrest claim. See Walker v. Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir.2005) (explaining that we have applied equitable tolling only in “rare and exceptional circumstances, where we found that extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from timely performing a required act, and that the party acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he sought to toll”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The record here reveals no extraordinary circumstances that prevented the timely filing of Covington’s false arrest claim. Covington could have filed a complaint asserting the false arrest claim after his 1990 arrest, or even after the 1991 dismissal of the case, which would have been within the limitations period established by then-controlling case law. See Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir.1980) (concluding that the date plaintiff was arrested was the date on which his claim for false arrest accrued, as that was “the time at which plaintiff knew of [the] injury” serving as the basis for his claim). Further, Covington did not act with reasonable diligence in pursuit of his claim, but instead commenced his action nearly three years after his criminal case was dismissed.

Because Covington cannot demonstrate that equitable tolling is justified in this case, his false arrest claim is time-barred and the district court properly dismissed it. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

To the extent that Covington moves to petition for panel rehearing of this court’s 1998 order denying reinstatement of all of Covington’s claims other than his claim for false arrest, that motion is hereby DENIED. A petition for panel rehearing must be filed within 14 days after entry of the challenged order. See Fed. R.App. P. 40(a)(1). Covington did not file the present motion until August 2011, which is well past the permissible time to do so, and he offers no explanation that would excuse that delinquency.  