
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT,
    COLUMBIA,
    NOV. 1804.
    Hane & Berk v. Goodwyn.
    The statute of limitations is an “ issuable” plea, within the rule of court; and may be pleaded, together with m-n assumpsit, on setting aside an Order for judgment. Vide 2 Bay, 521, á. C.
    Stark moved before Bay, J. in Richland district court, to have $n order for judgment set aside in this case, and for leave to plead pon assumpsit, and the s’alute of limitations, which was refused, on the ground, that the defendants were not imitled to the benefit of •Jspth these pleas, and especially the last, on a motion oi this sort.
    
      The motion in this court, was to obtain a reversal of the decision in the district court.
    It was coatended by Stark,
    in support of the motion, that the defendants were intitled to the benefit of any plea which was issuable, and which was calculated to promote any substantial defence, he might have. Cited 2 Bur. 961. Barnes, 889. The statute of limitations was held to bean issuable plea within the rule of court, in the case of Woodward v. Andrews, in this court, (ante, p. 310.) The statute of Ann, see P. L. 94, is a remedial law, and ought to be beneficially expounded.
    Hooker, contra.
    
    The statute of limitations is a plea not to be favored. Upon an order for judgment being set aside on motion, the court will impose terms on the defendant, and not allow him to plead any thing, which does not affect the real merits of the case, 1 Bl. Rep. 376. Stadholme v. Hodgson, 2 T. R. 390. 2 Com. Rep. 560. Barnes, 253. Prac. Reg. 235.
   The court

(all ihe judges present)

considered the plea as issu. able within the rule of court, and not necessarily unconscientious : and therefore, they thought it ought to have been allowed ; and granted the motion. See 1 Bos & Pul 228. Rucker, and another, v. Harnay, 3 T. R. 124. 1 Sellon’s Practice, 346.

<2fuere. Whether the defendant is intitled to the same privilege and indulgence, where he moves to set aside an interlocutory order for judgment, and for leave to pleau, as where he has obtained a judge’s older for time to plead, ori terms. See 1 Sellon, 346.  