
    Frank D. MAKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of NEW YORK, State of New York Department of Health Office of Professional Medical Conduct, Justice Jonathan Lippman, Justice Karen K. Peters, Justice Edward O. Spain, Justice Elizabeth A. Garry, John C. Egan, Jr., Justice William E. McCarthy, Eugene Peckham, Deborah Goodrich, Shawn Nash, Bassett Healthcare, Dr. Shannon Conrad, Dr. James Leonardo, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-897.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 12, 2015.
    Frank D. Maki, pro se, Walton, N.Y., for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Kate H. Nepveu, Assistant Solicitor General, for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, N.Y.; Shawn F. Brousseau, Napi-erski, VanDenburgh, Napierski & O’Con-nor LLP, Albany, N.Y., for Bassett Healthcare, Shannon Conrad, and James Leonardo; Thomas J. O’Connor, Napier-ski, VanDenburgh, Napierski & O’Connor LLP, Albany, N.Y. and Shawn T. Nash, pro se, Albany, N.Y., for Shawn Nash, for Defendants-Appellees.
    PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Frank D. Maki, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint on the recommendation of the assigned magistrate judge. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir.2013). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Pro se complaints are to “be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

Maki correctly observes that before the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss his complaint, he' was entitled to de novo review of those portions of the magistrate judge’s report to which he objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 686(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Although the phrasing of the district court’s order suggests that it may have reviewed the report and recommendation only for clear error, even assuming the court applied the incorrect standard of review, that error was harmless because our independent and de novo review of the entire record reveals that the magistrate judge’s recommendations were correct and Maki’s objections were without merit. See Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 n. 7 (2d Cir.2009). We therefore affirm for substantially the. same reasons stated by the magistrate judge in his thorough December 5, 2013 report and recommendation.

We have considered all of Maki’s re-, maining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.  