
    Frank DeLUCA, Appellant, v. I. M. MATHEWS et al., Appellees.
    No. 75-2140.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Feb. 25, 1977.
    On Rehearing May 13, 1977.
    Arthur J. Morburger of Weinstein & Bavly, P. A., Miami, for appellant.
    Janis M. Halker of Gurney, Gurney & Handley, P. A., Orlando, for appellees, I. M. Mathews and Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co.
    Bruce S. Bullock and Robert M. Sharp of Bullock, Sharp & Childs, P. A., Jacksonville, for appellees Boudet and Employers’ Fire Ins. Co.
    Edna L. Caruso of Howell, Kirby, Montgomery, D’Aiuto & Dean, West Palm Beach, for appellees Kennedy and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon review of the briefs and oral argument and after due consideration of the record on appeal we are of the opinion that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the applicability of the statute of limitations, particularly, when notice was acquired so as to commence the running of the limitation period. Schetter v. Jordan, 294 So.2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1976); Salvaggio v. Austin, 336 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Accordingly, the summary judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

MAGER, C. J., ALDERMAN, J., and STETTIN, HERBERT, Associate Judge, concur.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

On petition for rehearing, we conclude, in reference to Appellees-I. M. Mathews and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the applicability of the statute of limitation and that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in their favor. Therefore, our prior opinion is modified and we affirm the summary judgment in favor of Mathews and Hartford. As to all other parties the summary judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

MAGER, C. J., ALDERMAN, J., and STETTIN, HERBERT, Associate Judge, concur.  