
    H. Renee BAKER, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND, Defendant—Appellee, and Bruce M. Smoller, Material Witness, Defendant.
    No. 05-1883.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 13, 2006.
    Decided March 6, 2006.
    
      Curtis C. Osborne, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. David S. Whit-acre, County Attorney, Rajeshanand Kumar, Associate County Attorney, Tonia Y. Belton-Gofreed, Associate County Attorney, Office of Law for Prince George’s County, Maryland, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM:

H. Renee Baker, formerly employed as a police officer by Prince George’s County, Maryland (“the County”), appeals a district court order granting summary judgment to the County on her claims for gender discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge, all pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), 2000e-3(a) (West 2003). The district court held that Baker’s gender discrimination claim failed because she had not shown that the nondiscriminatory reasons given by the County for not promoting her were pretextual. Regarding Baker’s retaliation claim, the district court determined that Baker had not established a causal connection between her filing of discrimination complaints and any adverse employment action. As to Baker’s constructive discharge claim, the district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that the County had deliberately subjected Baker to intolerable working conditions.

After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, we conclude that the district court correctly decided the issues before it. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Baker v. Prince George’s County, No. RWT-02-3085, Hr’g Tr. (D.Md. Sept. 27, 2004). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED  