
    CHANDLER v. STATE.
    (No. 9393.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 3, 1926.
    Rehearing Denied March 24, 1926.)
    (.Criminal law <&wkey; 1169(5) — Admission in evidence of indictment against accused for felony held not reversible error, where court sustained objection and instructed jury to-disregard.
    Reception of testimony of accused on cross-examination, as to indictment against him for felony, held not reversible error, where objection was not made until after answer given,, and court thereafter sustained objection on finding that indictment was returned 14 years previous and instructed jury to disregard such testimony.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    2. Criminal law <&wkey;394 — Statute forbidding use-of evidence illegally obtained held not to apply to offense committed and case tried before statute became operative (Acts 39th Leg. [1925] o.49).
    Acts 39th Leg. (1925) c. 49, which forbids-the use of evidence which has been illegally obtained, held not to apply to an offense committed and to a case tried before such statute became operative.
    3. Criminal law &wkey;>l 144(12).
    Reviewing court must, assume that trial court was correct in admitting evidence, unless contrary is made manifest by party complaining.
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from District Court, Polk County;. J. L. Manry, Judge.
    Ed Chandler was convicted of unlawfuljy transporting intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Hill & Bethea, of Livingston, and John M. Mathis, Sr., and Heidingsfelder, Kahn Branch, all of Houston, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., of Austin, and Nat Gentry, Jr., Asst. State’s Atty., of' Tyler, for the State.
   BERRY, J.

The offense is unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor, and the punishment ia two years in the penitentiary. The evidence is entirely sufficient to support the verdict, and there are no complaints in the record at the charge of the court. The charge as given by the learned trial judge was peculiarly applicable to the facts of this case, and is a model of brevity and clearness.

The only question necessary to consider is appellant’s complaint with reference to proof by him while on cross-examination that he had heretofore been indicted for a felony. The bill of exceptions shows that this question was asked and answered by the appellant before any objection was made. After it was asked and answered in the affirmative, appellant objected to the question and answer on the ground that it was too remote, and the court overruled the objection at the time, but subsequently, when it was developed that the indictment referred to by the question was about 14 years ago, and counsel renewed his objection, same was sustained by the court, iand the jury was instructed by the court not to consider the same. Appellant' cites many authorities which hold that it is error to permit the state to impeach the defendant by proof of a remote charge or conviction for crime. Among those cited are Bowers v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 71 S. W. 284; Brown v. State, 120 S. W. 444, 56 Tex. Cr. R. 889; Vick v. State, 159 S. W. 50, 71 Tex. Cr. R. 50.

Appellant also correctly contends that it has often been held by this court that errors in admitting proof of other offenses committed by defendant are not cured by withdrawing the illegal testimony from the jury. Welhousen v. State, 18 S. W. 300, 30 Tex. App. 626; Dimry v. State, 53 S. W. 853, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 273; Collins v. State, 171 S. W. 730, 75 Tex. Cr. R. 534. It occurs to us, however, that the questions decided in the cases above cited are not applicable to this case. In each of the cases last cited the record discloses that the testimony was objected to and appellant forced to answer the question over his objection. In this case the testimony was not objepted to until the answer was made, and the record affirmatively discloses that, when appellant moved to strike out the testimony and it was brought to the attention of the court that the prior indictment was remote, the court then sustained appellant’s objection and instructed the jury not to consider it. Under these facts, no reversible error appears.

Finding no reversible error in the record, it is our opinion that the judgment should be in all things affirmed. ■

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.

On Motion for Rehearing.

HAWKINS, J.

For the first time in his motion appellant seeks to invoke the law passed by the Thirty-Ninth Legislature, c. 49, forbidding the use of evidence which has been illegally obtained. The offense was committed and the case tried long before such law became operative; hence it has no application. '

We would call attention to the fact that this question was in no manner raised on the trial. The record is silent as to whether the officers did or did not have a warrant. Under these circumstances we could make no application of the law how sought to be invoked even if it applied. As a reviewing court we must assume that the trial court was correct in admitting evidence, unless the contrary is made manifest by the party complaining.

The motion for rehearing is overruled. 
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