
    Kerilei R. OLDOERP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO & COMPANY LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-16369.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Nov. 7, 2012.
    Filed Nov. 21, 2012.
    
      Russell George Petti, Law Offices of Russell G. Petti, La Canada, CA, John C. Breslo, Esquire, The Breslo Law Firm, Scottdale, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Erin Ann Cornell, Rebecca Ann Hull, Sedgwick LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: FERNANDEZ and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable William E. Smith, United States District Judge for the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Kerilei Oldoerp, who was covered by the Wells Fargo & Company Long Term Disability Plan (“Plan”), a Plan insured and administered by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”), brought this action when she was denied long term disability benefits. She appeals the district court’s determination that the benefits were properly denied. We reverse and remand.

The district court decided this matter by applying an abuse of discretion standard to MetLife’s decision. However, unless the Plan conferred discretion upon MetLife, review should have been de novo. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 956-57, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 2348, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008). On the record before us, the Plan, by its terms, was made up of the group policy, the Certificate of Insurance, and amendments or endorsements to the group policy. There is no indication that any one of those documents confers discretion upon MetLife. The Summary Plan Description (“SPD”) and a document referred to as additional information did indicate that MetLife has discretionary authority. However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that extraneous documents, like SPDs, “[are] not [themselves] part of the plan.” Amara, — U.S. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 1877. As the Court pointed out, summary documents make statements “about the plan, but ... their statements do not themselves constitute the terms of the plan.” Id. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 1878; see also Skinner v. Northrop Grumman Ret. Plan B, 678 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir.2012) (recognizing that “SPD language [is not] an enforceable part of the retirement plan”). Thus, we reject MetLife’s argument that because of the SPD and the ERISA Information document, the Plan confers discretion upon it. The district court erred, and must now review Met-Life’s “denial of benefits de novo.” Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc).

REVERSED and REMANDED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      .The district court ruled before the Supreme Court’s decision in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011).
     
      
      . The Certificate declares that those documents constitute the entire contract.
     
      
      . The SPD declares that it is meant to be informative, but cannot "change any provisions of the actual plan documents.”
     
      
      . The additional information in question is set forth under the heading "ERISA Information,” which, itself, is in the form of a general information and summary document.
     