
    Johanna Rau Longhi, Appellee, v. Emilio Longhi, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 21,735.
    (Not to he reported in full.)
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. David F. Hatchett, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1915.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed November 14, 1916.
    Statement of the Case.
    Bill for separate maintenance by Johanna Ban Longhi, complainant, against Emilio Longhi, defendant, in the Circuit Court of Cook county. To reverse an order adjudging defendant in contempt for failing to pay temporary alimony as ordered, defendant appeals.
    It appeared that on appeal by defendant from a final decree granting the relief prayed, the Appellate Court affirmed the decree, but granted a stay of the order ,of affirmance during such time as a petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the Appellate Court might be pending in the Supreme Court. The default in question was after the affirmance by the Appellate Court.
    Jambs B. Ward, for appellant.
    John C. Mechem, for appellee; Mechem, Bangs & Harper, of counsel.
    
      
      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
    
   Mr. Presiding Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.

Abstract of the Decision.

1. Divobce, § 84 *—what is purpose of statute authorising temporary alimony. The manifest purpose of the Divorce Act, sec. 15 (J. & A. U 4230), relating to temporary alimony, and providing, inter alia, that such alimony may be granted and enforced during the pendency of an appeal or writ of error, is to enable a dependent wife to have support until she may have the benefit of a final decree in her favor, if granted.

2. Appeal and ebbob, § 710*—what is effect on alimony of stay pending certiorari to Appellate Court. Where on appeal from a final decree for separate maintenance and alimony the Appellate Court affirms the decree but stays the mandate during such time as a petition for certiorari to review such affirmance shall be pending in the Supreme Court, the appeal is, until the mandate of the Appellate Court issues, still pending, within the meaning of the Divorce Act, sec. 15 (J. & A. 1 4230), relating to temporary alimony, ajad providing, inter alia, that such alimony may be granted and enforced during the pendency of an appeal or writ of error by the husband.

3. Divobce, § 121*—when refusal to pay alimony wilful. A refusal to pay alimony is none the less wilful because defendant questions the legal effect of the order for its payment.  