
    Jonathan Moses versus Jonathan C. Stevens.
    Where an infant made a special agreement to labor for a certain time for certain wages, and before the time expired left the service of his employer voluntarily and without any fault on the part of his employer, it was held that he might nevertheless recover on a quantum memit for the services performed. But it seems, that if tha employer is injured by the sudden termination of the contract without notice, a deduction should be made on that account.
    The plaintiff declared, 1st, in indebitatus assumpsit; 2dly, upon a quantum meruit for work and service performed. Plea, the general issue.
    On the trial of the case in the Court of Common Pleas, Before Howe J., the following facts appeared in evidence.
    The plaintiff was about eighteen years of age when he began to labor for the defendant, and he had no parents living-, and no guardian in this commonwealth. He produced evidence to prove a service of three months and six days from February to May 1820, and witnesses were examined on both sides as to the value of his service.
    The defendant then produced evidence, that the plaintiff had agreed to work for him for the period of three years, or until the plaintiff should come of age ; and that the defendant was to furnish the plaintiff with spending money, clothes and other necessaries, during that time, and at the end of it was to pay him 100 or 120 dollars. The plaintiff left the defendant’s service in May, without any cause of complaint against the defendant. In the following winter the plaintiff called on the defendant for satisfaction for his services. The defendant denied his liability to pay any thing, claiming to have suffered damages by the plaintiff’s breach of his contract and leaving the defendant’s service at the time when he did, equivalent to the benefit received from the work ; but he said he would give the plaintiff two dollars. The plaintiff received that sum, and at the time, and afterwards, while an infant, acknowledged it to be perfectly satisfactory, and said he had settled the claim sued for in this case. The plaintiff had labored in the neighbourhood of the defendant before and after the period of service before mentioned, and had received his wages himseh from his employers.
    The judge instructed the jury to consider what the services of the plaintiff were worth to the defendant, and that if the defendant was injured by the sudden determination of the services without notice, they might make a deduction on that account; but that as the plaintiff was an infant at the time when the special contract was made, that contract could not be set up as a bar to a recovery in this action, and as the contract was voidable by the infant and no damages could be recovered from him for not fulfilling it, the jury ought not to make any deduction from the sum which the plaintiff would otherwise be entitled to, on account of his breach of this contract, in leaving the defendant before he was of age.
    The jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant filed his exceptions to the direction of the judge.
    Arguments in writing were handed to the Court, at this term, by Whiting and Barnard in support of the exceptions, and by Filley and Twining for the plaintiff.
    In support of the exceptions it was contended, that the fact of the plaintiff’s being an infant did not make this case differ in principle from that of Stark v. Parker, ante, p. 267, in which it was held that a person of full age, under similar circumstances with the plaintiff, was not entitled to recover any thing of his employer. A contract with an infant, which is made with fairness, and which is obviously for his personal benefit, ought to, and in law does, bind the infant. Maddon v. White, 2 T. R. 159 ; Hands v. Slaney, 8 T. R. 578. The contract here was of this character, as well in a pecuniary point of view, as in regard to the habits of industry and virtue which would probably be acquired from a faithful performance of it. If this action is sustained, it will have a pernicious effect in inducing other persons situated like the plaintiff to avoid beneficial engagements, in violation of the plainest principles of moral honesty.
    Supposing however that the contract was voidable, yet if the infant avoids it without any fault on the side of the other party, he shall not derive any advantage from it. The privilege of an infant is intended to guard him from imposition, and not to enable hin to defeat an equitable and beneficial contract; and he is not entitled to any benefit from such a contract, when by his own wrongful act he causes a failure of the consideration on which the promise of the other party was founded. The judge who tried the cause admits that some deduction from the value of the services would be reasonable, provided the sudden termination of them had occasioned an injury ; which implies that the defendant had an equitable claim upon the service of the plaintiff, and that a wrong was done by the plaintiff in not performing the contract. The infancy of the plaintiff does not take this case out of the general rule, that if one party rescinds a contract while it remains executory, the other party ceases to be bound. Reeve’s Dom. Rel. 244 ; Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. R. 359 ; Vasse v. Smith, 6 Cranch, 226.
    The declaration is insufficient to support this action. As the contract was, at most, voidable only, and not void, and as it was not executed by the plaintiff, he ought to have set it forth specially and alleged that he had exercised his privilege by putting an end to it before he brought the action. 1 Chit. Pl. 339 ; Hulle v. Heightman, 2 East, 145 ; Mussen v. Price, 4 East, 147 ; Brooke v. White, 1 New Rep. 330 ; Clark v. Smith, 14 Johns. R. 326 ; Warwick v. Bruce, 2 Maule & Selw. 205 ; Maddon v. White, 2 T. R. 159.
    For the plaintiff, were cited Powell on Contr. 36, 38 , Bac. Abr. Infancy &c., I, 3 ; 1 Roll. Abr. 729, Enfants ; Bowyer v. Blorksidge, 3 Lev. 17 ; Reeve’s Dom. Rel. 227 ; Baker v. Lovett, 6 Mass. R. 78.
    The opinion of the Court was read at May term 1825, as drawn up by
   Parker C. J.

It having been decided in the case of Stark v. Parker, that an action cannot be maintained on a quantum meruit for labor and services, by one who had made a special agreement as to time and wages, and had broken his contract by leaving the service before the time expired, voluntarily and without any fault on the part of the defendant, the only question requiring our attention in this case is, whether the minority of the plaintiff when he nade the spe contract constitutes a difference.

If it were true, as alleged in the argument, that this con tract for- work and labor is binding on an infant because it is for his benefit, then it ought to follow that a violation of it should deprive him of the right to obtain compensation for a partial performance. But we apprehend that this contract is voidable by the infant, it not coming within the exception to the general rule of law, that all contracts by infants may be avoided by them either before or after they arrive at full age. This is an elementary principle and authorities need not be cited to support it. Contracts made for maintenance and education according to the degree of the infant, if he have no parent or guardian, are to be enforced from regard to the infant himself; for if he may avoid such contracts none will trust him, and he may be left to present want and with out the means of providing a future living.

But a contract for his services only, although he is to receive wages, ought not to be binding, because he is not presumed to be capable of judging of the value of his services, nor of the kind of labor most suitable for him. Even a con tract of apprenticeship, by means of which he is to acquire a knowledge of some mechanical or other business, is not by the principles of the common law obligatory; certainly a contract by which he disposes of his personal labor without any stipulation for instruction, is less deserving of legal protection.

The cases cited to prove that this was a binding contract upon the plaintiff, because it was for his interest, only show that it was not absolutely void, but only voidable. He has avoided it by leaving the service before the time expired, and by bringing his action upon a quantum meruit, instead of an action upen the contract. There are some cases from which it has been inferred in argument, that certain acts done by an infant are not only not void, but cannot even be avoided by him; but that doctrine has been only applied to cases of land, which it is said are necessarily required by law to be binding, otherwise the land would lie unoccupied There is no case in which it is holden that an executor) contract by an infant, except for necessaries, is binding. II the ground taken by the defendant could be maintained, that this contract could not be avoided, because it is for the benefit of the infant, then every loan of money of which he might make a profitable use, and every sale of goods upon which he might get an advanced price, would form a consideration for a promise which he could never avoid; and in order to determine his right of rescinding, it would be necessary to look into the consequences of his contracts. But the law has established the general rule from a regard to the general effect of allowing minors to make valid contracts, not with a view to the particular benefit or mischief which might result from them.

The contract then being lawfully avoided, the question remains, whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover a reasonable compensation for his services, as though no such contract had been made. An infant is by law entitled to recover wages for his personal services ; he may sue for them by prochein ami while under age, or by himself when he. comes of age. An infant may also make a special contract for his services, which shall be binding on the party with whom he contracts, if the infant do not choose to avoid it. Such contract is valid until it is avoided.

Is there any implied promise to pay m a manner different from the provisions of such contract ? We think the special contract being avoided, an indebitatus assumpsit upon a quantum meruit lies, as it would if no contract had been made ; and no injustice will be done, because the jury will give no more than under all circumstances the services were worth, making any allowance for any disappointment amounting to an injury which the defendant in such case would sustain by the avoiding of the contract. This is the ground taken by the Court of Common Pleas -at the trial. We think it both reasonable and lawful ; so that the judgment ought to be affirmed. 
      
       S. P. Corpe v. Overton, 10 Bingh. 252, (25 Serg. & Lowb. 121); S. C. 3 Moore & Scott, 738. But see Weeks v. Leighton, 5 N. Hamp. R. 343, and M'Coy v. Huffman, 8 Cowen, 84, contrà. These cases depend much on 
        Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508, as an authority for holding a different doctrine from that maintained in Moses v. Stevens, supra. But the case Holmes v. Blogg, has been so limited and explained in the late case Corpe v. Overton, that it is evident it would no longer be regarded in the court where it was decided, as an authority for the position taken in Weeks v. Leighton, and M'Coy v. Huffman, ubi supra. See also Abell v. Warner, 4 Vermont R. 149
     