
    Hicks against Brown.
    a., residing at Wew a bi’ir’of voura^c!“an Tmn¿se?¡' on iyhania >fS was protested for non-acceptencer due no-lice of. which was given to 1Sis,\vh™ aftainedda <fchS^dobts tile insolvent state, in anytian brought in tills cqui-t -by it awas"SLi(ii charge3 was'a míe1 discharge or a insolvent^ 'Kfto'Sw lex loci, on the eoutract where it was made, or is to be ex-ecutcd. ,
    THIS, was" an action of/fs-sumpsíí against the drawer of a bill of exchánge. The'biíí was drawn at New-Orleans, on the 23d , July, 180?, for 1,365 doííarsl payable to the plaintiff or order, sixty days after sight, .on James Br.own Sr Co. of .Philadelphia. ®i®plaintiff.- wás"an inhabitánt' of the state pi Tennetssepi The bill was protested fo'r non-accéptaiicej'and:diie notice-there-F • * , - ‘ - r '' - , * , of given tó the-defendant, who resided-at New-Orleans, .where _ ... * " _ v - ’ . ' . •. 4 _ he had. lived for several years before, arid continued to reside, until he obtained his discharge as an insolvent debtor, under -the Iaw,s.ofthat place.,. The discharge1 waá after, the defendant received notice of the dishonour of the bill, and. by the ]aWg Qf pférv-Orléans, such discharge exoneMes the debtor from all debts previously contracted ; .and in ail the: courts there, ■ r * . \ 1 - • . . such certificate of discharge would, completely exonerate'the defendant from any suit or responsibility on account of the'said bill, or.any. previous, debt or-demand. .'.'The defendaht.pleaded. non-assumpsit, and his discharge under the insolvent.-act otÑépOrleans. To the second plea, there was a general demurrer and. jotoder.,. # '
    . . , , S. Jones, jun. in.support of the demurrer. •/; . '. 1 ■'
    
      J. D. Fay, contra.
    He, cited Robinson v. Bland, (1 Bl. Rep. 25.) Smith v. Smith, (2 Johns. Rep. 242.) Emery v. Greenough, (3 Dallas, 369.).
   Per Curiam.

The questioni is, ..whether1 the defendant cari "avail-himself of his discharge here. - It seems to-be well'settled, both in our own and m the English courts, that the discharge is to operate according to the lex loci, upon the contract where it was made or to be executed..The c'ontract, in this case, originated in New-Orleansand had it not,beep forthe circunistance of the bill’s being drawn upon a pérspn.in another state, there could be no doiibt but thatfhe,discharge would reach this con-trad:; and this circumstance can make no'difference, as the démand is against the defendant, as drawer of the bill, in consé" guence of the non-acceptance. The whole contract or response Bility of the drawer .was entered into and incurred in New-Orleans. By the act of drawing the bill he became, conditionally, liable for the payment, and this condition -was receiving due notice of the dishonour of the bill, and this notice was given to him in Nerv-Orleans, where the bill was drawn, and where the defendant lived. The liability of the defendant was not complete upon the bare non-acceptance. It was consummated by the notice; so that the essential transactions lipón which the defendant became bound to pay the .bill, took place in NemOrleans ; and as it respects him, the contract was wholly made there, which brings it .within the principle of the case of Smith v. Smith, (2 Johns. Rep. 242.) The defendant is, accordingly, entitled to judgment.

Judgment for the defendant.  