
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Chancey Terrel FULLER, aka Chance, aka Fat Boy, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 09-50635.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Feb. 8, 2012.
    Filed Feb. 24, 2012.
    Aaron Michael May, Christopher Khoo Pelham, Michael J. Raphael, Esquire, Assistant U.S., AUSA-Office of U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee.
    Wayne Richard Young, Law Office of Wayne R. Young, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Chancey Terrel Fuller, Santa Monica, CA, pro se.
    Before: D.W. NELSON, O’SCANNLAIN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Chancey Terrel Fuller appeals his jury conviction for conspiracy to traffic marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The district court did not err in denying Fuller’s motions to suppress the wiretap evidence. The government’s reliance on an invalid delegation order in its wiretap applications was a minor insufficiency that did not subvert the congressional purpose of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See United States v. Callum, 410 F.3d 571, 576 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Swann, 526 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.1975) (per curiam). In addition, the government’s failure to comply with the prescribed minimization requirements does not warrant suppression because the government still “adopt[ed] reasonable measures to reduce to a practical minimum the interception of conversations unrelated to the criminal activity under investigation.” United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1199 (9th Cir.2002).

The district court also did not clearly err by finding that Fuller’s text messages were obtained from an independent source. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988).

In addition, Fuller failed to make a substantial preliminary showing to warrant a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). See United States v. Whitworth, 856 F.2d 1268, 1280-82 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Stanert, 762, F.2d 775, 782 (9th Cir.), amended by, 769 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1985).

Further, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Fuller’s waiver of counsel was unequivocal. See United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir.2009). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting advisory counsel to withdraw and then declining to reappoint advisory counsel. Cf. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1269 (9th Cir.1998); United States v. Salemo, 81 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir.1996). Moreover, the withdrawal of advisory counsel was not a substantial enough change in circumstances to require a second hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). See United States v. Hantzis, 625 F.3d 575, 580-81 (9th Cir.2010). The district court also did not clearly err in concluding that Fuller requested counsel at sentencing in bad faith. Cf. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1060 (9th Cir.2004).

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fuller’s motion to continue. United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 1138-39 (9th Cir.2005).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     