
    Thomas Green vs. Eliza Smith.
    A citizen and resident of Rhode-Tsland may sue a citizen of Soath-Caro - lina, resident of Charleston, in.the city court of Charleston.
    Indeed it seems that any person competent to sue, may institute an action in the city court against any inhabitant who 1 resides within the city, to the extent of (Jg 500) the jurisdiction conferred.
    It seems also that where the defendant resided in Charleston, and ordered goods to be sent to her, that the contract will be considered a? arising in Charleston. ■ ■" .
    Jn the City Court of Charleston, July Term, 1820. As-sumpsit for goods sold and delivered.
    THE report of the Recorder is as follows : “ That the plaintiff was a citizen of, and 'a resident in the state of Rhode-Island; the defendant, a citizen of South-Carolina, and a resident of the city of Charleston. The defendant ordered certain goods to be shipped to her in Charlee-ton. They were accordingly shipped to her, and arrived safe; but in consequence of a man of the name of Uniackc obtaining fraudulent possession of one of the bills of lading the goods were taken out of the vessel by him, and the defendant never got them. The defendant upon the back of one of the bills of lading acknowledged the receipt of the goods and their freight, though she never received them.
    “ After this testimony had been offered, the defendant’s counsel moved for a non-suit, upon the ground that the case jvas not within the jurisdiction of the court, as the plaintiff was not a resident of the city, and the contract did not arise within its limits. The non-suit was refused. Under the general words of the acts of the legislature of 1801 and 1818, the plaintiff, wherever he resided, might bring a suit in this court, and there existed no exception which ;,vould exclude him from that right. (See the 2d clause of the act of 1801, and the 4th clause of the act of 1818.)— The words made use of in the act of 1818, are, that this court shall have jurisdiction in all cases of trover, &c. &c. “ arising within the said city.” The -words of the act of 1801, in its fourth clause are, “ that no suit or action shall be brought in the said court, unless tlx; contract or cause of action hath been made, or arose within the limits of the said city of Charleston.” This clause in the act of 1801p not being repealed by the act of 1818, and being in pari :materia, illustrates the meaning of the legislature, and shews it to have been, that a suit may be commenced in this court when a Contract originates here, or where a par-7 ty who’is suable, is resident here, And the latter part of the clause last referred to, necessarily implies, if it does pot express, that if an action can be sustained against an individual resident ,in the city, that it may be sustained against him, although the contract might have been completed in another place. Immediately after requiring that the contract or cause of action must arise or be made in the city, the act says, u but nothing herein contained shall be construed to bar any person from suing any person resident in the said city, in the said court, for' any sum not exceeding'S 100,” (by act of 1818, extended to $500,) “ exclusive of costs.”
    “ It appeared to me, in this case, that the contract ought to be regarded as substantially arising in the city. The order was to be executed by sending goods to Charleston to a person resident in Charleston. “ A contract made in a foreign cófmtry, but to be performed here, and invalid in the place of the contract, by reason of some formal defect, is not for that cause, to be deemed invalid here.” (Lud-low vs. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Rep. 94.) “ A contract made in a foreign country, but to be executed here, is to be governed by the laws of this state, so that the defendant may avail himself of a defence permitted by our law, but which he would not be allowed to use in the place where the “agreement was entered into.” (Thompson vs. Kctcham, 4 Johns. Rep.'283. J As the goods were to be delivered here, and as they were delivered here, upon their delivery, it necessarily resulted that payment for them might be instantly demanded, unless some other special agreement had been shewn; and upon failure to pay, i» cause of action immediately arose. For these reasons, the motion for a non-suit was overruled. The case then went to the jury, who found a verdict for the plaintiff.”
   Mr. Justice Gantt

delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant has appealed in this case, on the ground that a non-suit ought to have been granted for defect of jurisdiction in the city court. But the reasoning of the Recorder, in relation to the acts of assembly of 1801 and 1818, giving jurisdiction to the city court, is conclusive to shew that there was no usurpation of jurisdiction. These acts are to be construed in pari materia. The act of 1818, extended the jurisdiction to cases not before cognizable in the city court, but was not designed to impair, in any manner, the extent of jurisdiction given by the act of 1801. — > Any person may institute an action against any inhabitant who resides within the city to the extent of the jurisdiction conferred; the right of the Recorder to sustain jurisdiction of this case, follows of course. For myself, I perfectly coincide too in the opinion expressed by the Recorder, that the cause of action in the case appealed from, did substantially, and I will add actually, arise within the limits of the city of Charleston. The order for the goods was drawn in Charleston; it is this order which creates the responsibility, and gives the right of action against the defendant. The delivery of the articles under the order to the agent of the defendant is, in law, the delivery of the articles under the order to the defendant himself. A bare delivery, without an authority to deliver, would create'nú cause of action. Had a bond been executed by the defendant, after receiving the goods in Charleston, and forwarded to the plaintiff, the bond would have become the cause of action, and having been executed in Charleston, would have been made there pursuant to the words of the act of 1801; and for such cause of action, could there be a doubt but that the plaintiff might have instituted an action in the city court ? In either case the delivery of the goods completes the contract, and the place from whence the overture is made, may be regarded as the place of contract; for all which is subsequently done by virtue thereof, rest upon, it as a foundation. The overture here was made in Charleston, acquiesced in by the plaintiff, and the goods delivered to the person making- it in Charleston. The 'cause of action of course arose in that place, and not elsewhere ; but whether I am correct herein or not, the act of 1801 confers upon the plaintiff the right of suing the defendant in the city court. The very able opinion of the Recorder, detailed in his report, would have saved me the necessity of doing more than declaring, as I how do, my concurrence in the opinion which he has expressed'.

The motion for anon-suit is refused.

Justices JVott, Johnson and Colcock, concurred.

■ Mr. Justice Richardson, dissented.  