
    Mary M. Ridgway v. Ann M. Masting.
    A release of dower by a married woman, who joins her husband for that-purpose in a deed to defraud purchasers, is binding only as against the releasee and his privies; and where such fraudulent conveyance is set aside at the suit of the party injured, and a transfer of the premises, as against her husband, is decreed to the plaintiff, the wife, in the event of her surviving the husband, is entitled to dower as against such owner.
    Motion for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the-judgment of the District Court of Brown county.
    The original action, which was a proceeding for dower,, prosecuted by defendant in error against plaintiff in error, was brought by appeal into the District Court, and upon hearing therein, dower was decreed as demanded by the petitioner.
    The testimony was placed upon record by bill of exceptions, from which the following state of facts appears:
    1. Alonzo Masting, late husband of defendant in error, and under whom she claims, was, during the coverture, seized in fee simple of the lands in controversy.
    2. During such coverture the husband contracted with, plaintiff in error to sell and convey to her said lands; and, in pursuance of the contract, possession was delivered to-her.
    3. Afterward, said Masting and the defendant in error, his wife, executed and delivered to one W. W. Carpenter a, mortgage upon the premises, and subsequently a deed, to Delia Carpenter, wife of said W. ~W., purporting to convey to her the same premises absolutely.
    4. Afterward, the plaintiff in error brought an action-in the Common Pleas of Brown county, against said Alonzo Masting, W. W. Carpenter, and Delia Carpenter, for the purpose of setting aside the mortgage toW. W. Carpenter and deed to Delia Carpenter, upon the ground that they were made in fraud of her rights under said .contract of purchase, and to compel said Masting to convey said premises to her according to the terms of said, sale; and such proceedings were had therein, that said mortgage and deed were, by the decree of said court, declared fraudulent and void, and the same were set aside- and hold for naught as against the plaintiff'in error; and it was further decreed therein that said Masting should, within ten days, convey said'premises to the plaintiff in error; and in default thereof, that the decree should operate as such conveyance.
    5. Said Masting afterward died, leaving the defendant in error his widow.
    
      White & Waters, for the motion:
    The conveyance by Masting and wife to Delia Carpenter bars Ann M. Masting of her dower. As Ann was not a party to the proceedings to set aside said deed, as to her it remains a valid subsisting conveyance, or release of her dower estate.
    
      Baird & Young, contra:
    The deed to Delia Carpenter was, on the petition of the plaintiff in error, decreed to be void and of no effect; and having obtained that decree, and received the benefits thereof, she is estopped from claiming through or under said deed.
    She can not claim them void as to Masting’s title, and for the purpose of obtaining his title, and valid to convey the dower of defendant in error. The effect of the decree was one of two things, and only two, to wit: 1. That the said deed and mortgage being fraudulent and void, the 'title of Masting never passed to the grantee or mortgagee; or, 2. That the title, by the decree setting aside the mortgage and deed, re-invested in Masting. In either event, whether the seizin continued, in Masting or re-invested in him, the dower of defendant in error attached.
    We deem it necessary only to refer the court to S. & C. 516, sec. 1; Sears et al. v. Hanks et al., 14 Ohio St. 298.
   By the Court.

Upon this state of facts we think the District Court did. not err in decreeing dower to the defendant in error.

That the husband of the petitioner was seized of a dowable estate in the premises during the coverture is not denied; and the only point made in the case is, as to the effect of Mrs. Masting’s release to the Carpenters.

It is well settled that a release of dower by a married woman is binding only as against the releasee and his privies. 5 Ohio St. 72; 14 Ib. 450; Ib. 298; 18 Ohio, 567; 8 Met. 40. The petitioner was not a party to the action, wherein the plaintiff in error was decreed the prem ises in controversy, nor does that decree purport to affect her rights in any way. The title of the plaintiff’ in error is not derived through the fraudulent vendees. Those fraudulent deeds were declared void, and the plaintiff took title from the husband of the petitioner, leaving her rights in the property to remain in the exact state they would have occupied had the fraudulent conveyances never been made.

Motion overruled.  