
    FINLEY v. STATE.
    (No. 8056.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 20, 1924.)
    1. Criminal law <®=8I4( 17)— Facts held not to call for charge on circumstantial evidence.
    Where one prosecuted for transporting intoxicating liquors, and who had been arrested while carrying a suit case containing liquor from a depot to a train, denied any knowledge that the suit case contained liquor and explained his having the suit case, on the ground that he was merely aiding one arrested with him, held, that the facts did not demand a charge on circumstantial evidence.
    2. Intoxicating liquors <©=>131, 239(4) — In-struotibn as ,to purpose of transportation held properly denied.
    Denial of an instruction, in a prosecution for transporting liquor, that defendant must have been transporting it for sale, barter, or exchange, or for some purpose other than his personal use, before a conviction was warranted, held properly denied as not being the law and unauthorized by the evidence.
    3. Crfmina'l law <©=>829'( I) — Denial of special charges covered by others given, not error.
    Denial of special requested charges covered by the general charge given held not error.
    4. Intoxicating liquors <©=>138 — Unnecessary to olfensei of transportation that intended destination shal! have been reached.
    Eor one to be guilty of transporting intoxicating liquor in violation of statute, it is not necessary that transportation from the beginning point to the place of its intended destination shall be completed.
    Appeal from District Court, Morris County; R. T. Wilkinson, Judge.
    Columbus Finley was convicted of transporting intoxicating liquors, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.
   HAWKINS,’ J.

Conviction is for transporting intoxicating liquor; punishment, one year in the penitentiary.

Appellant, in company with. Jesse Lee, arrived. at the depot in Daingerfield about 1 o’clock at night. They had two suit cases, one containing 2 gallons of whisky, the other 2½ gallons. Lee had 2 full quart bottles of whisky on his person, also a pint bottle with some whisky in it. The smell of whisky on their breath attracted the attention of the man on duty at the ticket office. Lee asked for a ticket to Greenville, but was informed that no tickets were sold at night. Both parties remained at the depot until the train going towards Greenville arrived about 3 o’clock. They started towards the train, each having one of the‘suit cages, and were arrested by the sheriff. Appellant explained his presence by testifying that he had brought Lee at the latter’s requesfi to the depot from some miles in the country; that he had no connection with the whisky, and no knowledge that the suit cases contained liquor. He disclaimed any intention of going to Greenville, and accounted for remaining at the depot for two hours in the middle of the night with the statement that he thought he would just stay and help Lee on the train.

There is no merit in the contention that the facts demanded a charge on circumstantial evidence.

Appellant requested the court to charge that before a conviction could be had he must have been transporting liquor for sale, barter, or exchange, or for some purpose other than his own personal use. This special charge was properly refused. In the first place, it is not the law (McNeil v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. R. 259, 247 S. W. 536, and cases therein cited); and, second, no evidence raised the issue that appellant was transporting it for his personal use.

The court was not required to give the special charges refusal of which is complained of in bills Nos. 3 and 6. The defensive issues therein presented were covered in the general charge.

Bill No. 4 is an exception to the court’s charge for failure to define what is meant by “transportation.” The charge may have been amended to meet this objection. It’contains an instruction upon the subject which is applicable to the case.

The criticism of the charge appearing in bill No. 5 is without merit.

The charge requested as shown by bill No. 7 was properly refused. In substance, it was that before 'one could offend against the law forbidding “transportation” of liquor the carrying or transportation must be completed from the beginning point to the place of its intended destination. This is not the law. See Lamb v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 255 S. W. 424; Lee v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 255 S. W. 425; Coburn v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 255 S. W. 613; Black v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 255 S. W. 731.

The judgment is affirmed. 
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