
    FOCKE v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 21, 1912.)
    X Ckiminal Law (§§ 1092,1095) — Statements of Facts and Bills of Exceptions — Time fob Filing — Extension—Judicial Power.
    In trial for a misdemeanor, the county ■court cannot grant more than 20 days after the adjournment of the term in which to file a statement of facts and bills of exceptions, and statements and bills filed after that time will be stricken on motion.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal La"’. Gent.Dig. §§ 2834-2861; Dee.Dig. §§ 1092,1095.]
    2. Criminal Law (§ 1144) — Review—Presumptions.
    In the absence of a statement of facts and bills of exceptions, a charge submitting the offense stated in the information will be presumed on appeal to have charged the law applicable to the evidence.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3032; Dec. Dig. § 1144.]
    3. Statutes (§ 110%) — Title—Sufficiency.
    The pure food law (Acts 31st Leg. c. 94), being entitled an act to amend Acts 30th Leg. c. 39,_ “An act to prohibit and prevent the adulteration, fraud and deception in the manufacture and sale of articles of food and drugs; prescribing penalties for the violation of this act,” etc., is not unconstitutional as to one charged with violating the act because the title ■does not specifically refer to and describe the offense, which is done in the body of the act.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, •Cent. Dig. § 139; Dec. Dig. § 110%.]
    Appeal from Dallas County Court, at Law; W. M. Holland, Judge.
    E. W. Focke was convicted of violating the pure food law, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    R. M. Clark, Co. Atty., Currie McCutcheon, Asst. Co. Atty., and C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
       For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r indexes
    
   HARPER, J.

This case was tried in the county court at law in Dallas county on complaint and information charging appellant with violation of the provisions of the pure food law, in that he was engaged in business as a butcher and left his meats exposed. When tried, the jury found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at a fine of $50, from which judgment he prosecutes this appeal.

Appellant was tried on the 9th day of September, 1910, the term of court adjourning on the 31st day of October, the day on which his motion for new trial was overruled. The court granted 20 days after term time in which to prepare and file statement of facts and bills of exceptions. On November 24th the court made an order extending the time 30 days longer. This latter order was without warrant of law, and is void. The statement of facts and bills of exceptions were not filed until December 22, 1910, 52 days after the adjournment of court. The Assistant Attorney General moves to strike out the statement of facts and bills of exceptions. In misdemeanor cases tried in the county court, the court has no authority to grant more than 20 days after day of adjournment in which to file statement of facts and bills of exceptions, and the motion is sustained. Mueller v. State, 135 S. W. 571; Misso v. State, 135 S. W. 1173; Hooper v. State, 138 S. W. 396; McGowan v. State, 138 S. W. 402.

There being no statement of facts or bills of exceptions in the record we can consider, if the charge of the court submits the offense charged in the information, this court presumes that the trial court charged the law and all the law applicable to the facts in evidence. Wright v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 146, 38 S. W. 1004; Bell v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 163, 25 S. W. 769; Hall v. State, 33 Tex. Cr R. 537, 28 S. W. 200; Yawn v State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 205, 38 S. W. 785, 39 S. W. 105.

There is a motion to quash the information, alleging that the pure food act of the Thirty-First Legislature (Session Acts, p. 166), is unconstitutional; First, “because the, caption of the pure food act does not specifically refer to and describe the offense with which this defendant is charged, and the said caption does not carry, with it or provide for a penalty for violation of the act.” The title has in it the clause “prescribing penalties for the violation of this act,” and it is not necessary for the title of the act to specifically refer to and describe the offense; this is done in the body of the act. The object and purpose of the constitutional requirement as to the title is that legislators and others interested may receive direct notice of the subject of the act so that they may be put upon inquiry as to its provisions and effect; it is not necessary to go into details in tlie title. The object and purpose of the statute is to secure to the people good and wholesome food, and this is sufficiently stated in the title. Brown v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 270, 122 S. W. 565; Johnson v. Martin, 75 Tex. 33, 12 S. W. 321; Newnom v. Williamson, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 615, 103 S. W. 656. We have considered the various grounds in the motion, and none of them point out any provision which would render the act unconstitutional, and the information charges an offense under the law.

Affirmed.

PRENDERGAST, J.,' absent  