
    Ephraim B. Creasser v. William R. Young.
    1. In setting forth a “ ground ” of attachment, in an affidavit made for the same, it is not indispensable that the words of the statute be followed, provided the affidavit contains language fully equivalent, or clearly “showing” the ground specified or intended.
    ■2. An affidavit for attachment, setting forth that the action was brought to recover damages for the defendant’s unlawfully assaulting, beating, bruising, and shooting the plaintiff, sufficiently shows that the defendant “criminally . . . incurred the obligation” on which the suit was brought, within the meaning of section 191 of the civil code, as amended February 16, 1865 (S. & S. 550). Sturdevant v. Tuttle, 22 Ohio St. Ill, and Kirk v. Whitaker, lb. 115, approved.
    Motion for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the District Court of Geauga county.
    This was an action by the plaintiff in error against the •defendant in error, to recover damages for an assault and battery. The plaintiff caused an order of attachment to issue in the case, and the same was levied upon the defendant’s property. The affidavit on which the attachment issued was in all things in conformity to the statute, unless it was defective in not sufficiently alleging that the defendant “ criminally incurred the obligation ” on which the suit had been brought. The affidavit did not contain these-statutory words, but instead thereof, alleged that the action was brought for “ damages sustained by the plaintiff from the unlawful assault with force and arms upon the plaintiff by the defendant, and for the beating and bruising and shooting of the plaintiff by the defendant.”
    The defendant made a motion to dissolve the attachment on the ground of its alleged insufficiency in this respect,, and also on the ground that the statement in the affidavit,, that the defendant had left the county of Geauga, the-county of his'residence, to avoid the service of a summons,, was untrue.
    On the hearing of the motion, -numerous affidavits and counter affidavits were read by the parties, touching the question whether the allegation that the defendant had left the county to avoid the service of a summons was true or false, but as they are not material to an understanding of the court’s decision, they need not be further noticed.
    The motion to dismiss the attachment was overruled,, and the defendant prosecuted a petition in error in the district court, where the order overruling the motion was reversed, and it is now claimed that the judgment of reversal was erroneous.
    
      JDurfee Stephenson, for the motion.
    
      Burrows Bosworth, contra.
   Welch, C. J.

We think this affidavit was sufficient,, and that the district court erred in holding otherwise. By section 191 of the civil code, as amended February 16,1865-(S. & S. 550), one of the “grounds” on which an attachment is allowed to issue is, that the defendant criminally . . . incurred the . . . obligation for which the suit is . . . brought.” Section 192 (S. &• 0. 1003) requires an affidavit “ showing,” among other things, one- or more oí these several “ grounds ” of attachment. That this language, “ criminally incurred the obligation,” is equivalent to “ criminally incurred the liability,” and that an attachment may, therefore, be allowed in cases like the present, we have already held in Sturdevant v. Tuttle, 22 Ohio St. 111, and and in Kirk v. Whitaker, 22 Id. 115. If this be the true construction of the statute—and we still think it is—the simple question in the case is, whether this affidavit shews that the defendant criminally incurred the liability for which the suit was brought. The statute prescribes no form, or words, in which the “ shewing” is to be made, but merely prescribes the fact which is to be shewn. It is not indispensable that the words of the statute should be used, provided the affidavit contains language fully equivalent, or clearly “ shewing” the fact. And surely here are wrords sufficient for that purpose. If a person who “ unlawfully, and with force and arms . . . assaults, beats, bruises, and shoots” another criminally incurs a liability ¿ and if an action by the injured party to recover damages for the injury is an action brought for that liability, then this affidavit is clearly sufficient. It sets out specifically, and in detail, what the statute permits to be set out in general terms.

This view of the case renders it unnecessary to consider the other ground on which a dissolution of the attachment was asked, namely, that the statement therein, that the defendant had left the county of his residence to avoid the service of a summons, is false. One good ground for the attachment is sufficient. If it is well and truly stated in the affidavit, that the defendant criminally incurred tide obligation on which the action was brought, it is immaterial whether the defendant had left the county or not, or with what intention he left it, if at all.

Judgment reversed.  