
    Thomas Ross v. John Gilmore.
    Question of fact upon rml tiel record.
    
    This was a writ of sci.fa. to revive a judgment rendered in the Supreme Court of Fayette county, in favor of the plaintiff, against the defendant. The defendant pleaded in bar, that after the rendition of the judgment, he prosecuted a suit in chancery, in the common pleas of Fayette county, and obtained a final decree, enjoining all further proceedings upon the judgment, concluding with a profert of the record. The plaintiff replied that there was no such record, and upon this issue the cause was submitted, and adjourned here for decision.
    
      The transcript of the record, produced in support of the plea, set out a bill in chancery, prosecuted by John Gilmore against Thomas Ross, R. Curtain, and A. Dillon. It charged, that in August, 1799, the complainant executed to Dillon three notes for money, payable, one August 6, 1800; one August 6, 1801;. one August 6, 1802; that after these bonds became due, the defendant Curtain, and the defendant *Ross, had them in possession, and that suits were commenced upon them, and judgments recovered in Ross county, Ohio; that one of the notes had been paid, before the judgments were had, but that complainant could not prove the payment; that the complainant paid off said judgments, but that afterward, October 12, 1810, the defendant, Ross, took advantage of Complainant’s indigence, and induced him to give a due bill for seventy-one dollars and twenty cents, with his son as security, for an alleged balance due on the judgments in Ross county; that suit was brought upon this due bill, and judgment recovered in .Fayette county. The bill then alleged, that the judgment was obtained upon the due bill, because complainant could not prove that it was given for a balance due on -the judgments in Ross county ; made the usual suggestions, that relief could only be had in equity, prayed that each of the defendants might answer specially, to certain matters propounded, embracing the various allegations of the bill, as they related to each defendant. Relief was then prayed, in these terms :
    “Your orator prays your honors enjoin said proceedings at law, until your orator can be heard on the equity side of this court, and on a final hearing, to enjoin said proceedings perpetually, freo your orator irom the judgment now in favor of said Ross, grant to your orator the writs of subpena and injunction, for the purpose of obtaining the relief herein prayed for, and such further and complete relief, in the premises, as will meet your orator’s case, and the money paid said Ross, unless he show a right to it, order to be paid back to your orator, with,” etc.
    There was no appearance ever entered, or pleadings or answer put in. The decree was pro confesso, and in these words :
    “It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court, that the plaintiff’s said bill be taken as confessed, and the prayer thereof decreed accordingly, and that said defendants be perpetually enjoined from further proceeding against said judgment at law.”
    
      Douglas, for plaintiff.
    Bond, for defendant.
   *By the Court :

We are of opinion that the plea is not supported by the transcript of the proceedings adduced to sustain it. The bill is very in artificially drawn. It sets out several judgments obtained in different counties and in behalf of different parties. It prays that “proceedings ” may be enjoined without confining the prayer to any of these proceedings specially, or to any of the parties.- The decree is that “ said defendants be perpetually enjoined from further proceedings on said judgment.” We can not say what defendant, or what judgment is referred to; consequently we can not say that the judgment, upon which the sci. fa. in this case is founded, is the one. It might, with equal propriety, upon the terms of the decree, be referred to any one of them. The judgment upon this plea must, therefore, be given for the plaintiff  