
    Edgar Emilio ANGARITA-SOLORZANO, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-71391.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted April 5, 2016.
    Filed April 25, 2016.
    Lauren Marguerite Weinstein, Robert Kelsey Kry, Mololamken LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
    Derek C. Julius, Judith Roberta O’Sullivan, Esquire, Trial, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Before: FARRIS, TYMKOVICH, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Honorable Timothy M, Tymkovich, Chief Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Edgar Angarita-Solorzano (also known as Soled), a native and citizen of Columbia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of her appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We deny the petition.

The IJ did not abuse his discretion in determining that Angarita’s conviction under California Vehicle Code § 2800.3(a) was for a particularly serious crime. See Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder,. 594 F.3d 673, 678-79 (9th Cir.2010). The IJ was entitled, to rely on both Angarita’s credible testimony and the contents of the arrest report, which are materially consistent. Id.; Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir.2015). That Angarita’s offense did not involve the intentional use of force does not preclude the agency from adjudicating it a particularly serious crime. See Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1106-07 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc).

Nor was Angarita deprived of the full and fair hearing guaranteed to her by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The IJ took sufficient care to elicit relevant testimony from Angarita and to ensure that she understood the proceedings as they unfolded. Contrary to Angarita’s argument on appeal, the record in no way demonstrates that Angarita was confused, misled, or obstructed by the manner in which the IJ conducted her hearing. See, e.g., Oshodi v. Holder, 729 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir.2013); Lacsina Pangilinan v. Holder, 568 F.3d 708, 709-710 (9th Cir. 2009); Kaur v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir.2004). We cannot say that Angar-ita was prevented from reasonably presenting her case. Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir.2006).

The record also does not compel a finding that Angarita will more likely than not be tortured if returned to Columbia. See Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir.2011). Angarita bears the burden to prove the likelihood of future torture. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a); Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2015) (en banc). The IJ reasoned that the passage of time and the intervening death of An-garita’s revolutionary father militated against a finding that it was more likely than not that Angarita would be tortured if returned to Columbia. We cannot say the record compels a different conclusion. See Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir .2014).

DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir, R. 36-3.
     
      
      . We grant the outstanding motions to become amicus curiae. Dkt. Nos. 28, 31.
     