
    *Sally Bugg vs. H. Summer, Adm’r.
    Where there is a plaintiff who can sue, and a defendant who can he sued, the Statute of Limitations begins to run.
    The Statute of Limitations is not suspended during the time that elapses between the death of an administrator and the administration de bonis non.
    
    Before Evans, J., at Newberry, Spring Term, 1841.
    This was an action on an account for work and labor. Sally and Sam Bugg were free persons of color, and brother and sister. They lived and worked together. Both were industrious, and the surplus of their gains, after paying expenses, was employed by Sam in the purchase of some property. In 1835, Sam made some declarations which might admit of the construction that he was liable to pay her for her services. He died soon after, in February of the same year. Letters of administration were granted to llamage, in March, 1835. He died about two years after. Administration de bonis non was granted to defendant, 15th January, 1840. This action was commenced 29th January, 1840. The question submitted was, whether the demand was barred by the statute of limitations. From the death of Sam, to the beginning of this suit, was nearly five years, so that if there had been but one administration, the action was barred, and the only question was, whether nine months is to be added to the four years for each administration. This could not well be, when the writ in this case was issued fourteen days after the grant of the second administration, and because the debt was actually barred before the second administration was taken out. The plaintiff was nonsuited.
    The plaintiff appeals, and moves the Conrt to set aside the nonsuit, on the ground, that the statute of limitations did not run during the time there was no administration on the estate of the defendant’s intestate.
    
      Heller, for the motion, Fair, contra,
    submitted the case without argument.
   Curia, per

Evans, J.

The Court concurs with the Circuit Judge. Whenever there is a plaintiff who can sue, and a defendant* who can be sued, the statute of limitations begins to run. A right of action has accrued to the plaintiff, The general rule is, that if the statute begins to runs, it is not suspended by any subsequent event, The only exceptions which I recollect, are infant owners of land, under the Act of 1824, (6 Stat., 238, § 7,) executors and administrators, who cannot be sued until nine months have expired, and the case of war between the nations to which the plaintiff and defendant respectively belong. Without inquiring whether the plaintiff might not have sued Sam Bugg in his lifetime, there could be no doubt she could have sued Damage, his administrator, after the expiration of nine months from the date of his administration, in March, 1835. The plaintiff’s action would have been barred, if llamage had lived, in four years and nine months from March, 1835, which could not extend beyond December, 1839, unless by the death of Damage the statute was suspended until administration was granted to the defendant. This would be against all the authorities. In the case of McCullough vs. Speed, (3 McCord, 455,) the statute commenced to run against McCullough, in his lifetime. Sometime elapsed between his death and the granting of administration to the plaintiff. If this time was deducted, the debt was not barred. But it was decided that as the statute commenced to run against McCullough, it was not suspended by the fact that after his death some time elapsed before administration was granted. This case must be governed by the same principle, and the motion is dismissed.

BiCHARDSON, O’Xeall, and ButleR, JJ., concurred. 
      
      
        а) 3 M‘C. 452; 2 Mi. C. R. 269; 2 M‘C. 151. An.
      
     
      
       4 Rich. 619 ; Act of 1824; 3 Bur. 438, 153; 3 M‘C. 451, overruling 1 M‘C. 139; 2 N. & McC. 296. An.
      
     
      
       1 N.& McC. 334; 4 M‘C. 422. An.
      
     
      
      
        Robson vs. Wall, 2N. & McC. 498. An.
      
     