
    HENRY MILLER, Chairman, on the relation of UZZEL LASSITER et Uxor v. JOHN WILLIAMS.
    In a bequest of personal property to B. R. and if he “dies leaving no heir lawfully begotten of his body,” then over, the limitation is not too remote, but is good as an executory devise.
    Debt, upon the bond given by the defendant as administrator of Benjamin Reddick, deceased. Pleas, performance, and non infregit conventionem. At Greene on the last Circuit, a case agreed, of which the following are the material facts, was submitted to his Honor Judge Dick. John Reddick died in the year 1820, and by his will gave to his son Benjamin Reddick, both real and personal property. The testator then subjoined the following clauses: — “ If Benjamin Reddick dies, leaving no heir lawfully begotten of his body, I give all my property, real and perishable property, to my wife Martha, her natural life.” “ If Benjamin Reddick dies and leaves no heir, or dies before he is old enough to receive his property, and after my wife Martha Reddick’s death, the perishable property to be equally divided between William Williams” and others. Benjamin Reddick died under the age of twenty-one years, and without issue, in the lifetime of his mother, Martha Reddick. The relator’s wife is a sister of the half blood of Benjamin Reddick. The relators contended that the limitation of the property to the widow, and to William Williams and others, in the aforementioned clauses of the will of John Reddick, was upon a contingency too remote to make it a good executory devise: that the whole personal property was absolutely vested in Benjamin Reddick, and that they were entitled as next of kin to recover of the administrator their share of it. His Honor, pro forma, gave judgment for the defendant, and the relators appealed.
    
      Badger for the relators.
    
      Devereux and J. H. Bryan, for the defendant.
   Daniel, Judge,

after stating the case proceeded. — The question submitted for the decision of this Court is, whether the perishable property which Benjamin Reddick, the intestate, received under the will of his father John Reddick, belonged to him absolutely, so as on his death, it should go to his next of kin; or whether, on his death without issue, it should go over to his mother for life by virtue of his father’s will. The judge below was of opinion that on the event which happened, viz. Benjamin dying and leaving no issue in the lifetime of his mother, the property in dispute went to the widow of John Reddick for life, by force of the executory devise in his last will. The plaintiffs have appealed from this decision.

Ever since the case of Forth v. Chapman, 1 Peere Williams’s Rep. 663, the principle has been considered as well settled, both in England and this country, that in a bequest of personal property to a legatee, and if he dies “ leaving no issue,” or dies “ leaving no heir,” then the property to go over to another, the limitation over is not too remote, but is good as an executory devise. The word leaving,” confines the time of the vesting of the property in the executory devisee, to the period of the death of the first taker. Vide Jones and Wife v. Spaight's Heirs, 1 Car. Law Repos. 544. We are of the opinion that the limitation over by the will of John Reddick of the personal property, which is the subject of this suit, is in law good; and that the relators, as next of kin of the intestate, Benjamin Reddick, are not entitled to any share of it. The judgment must be affirmed.

Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.  