
    William Gazoway, vs. Alexander Moore.
    
      Defendant gave plaintiff a note for $80, “ for the hire of his negro man A." Held that it was not competent for plaintiff to prove a verbal stipulation to pay an additional sum, if cotton should bear■ a certain price.
    
    This was an appeal from the decision of a magistrate; tried at the last Fall Term for York District, before Johnson, justice, who affirmed the judgment. It appeared from the certificate of the magistrate, that the appellant Moore had hired of Gazoway a negro man, and gave for the hire a note of the following tenor and effect*—
    “ January 6th, 1823. On the first day of January next! I promise to pay to Mr. Gazoway, or order, eighty dollars for the hire of his negro man Abraham.
    (Signed) A. Moore.
    “ Test — Tiios. Barron.”
    This note Moore paid and took up when it became due. Gazoway however claimed a further sum of twenty dollars, for the recovery of which he sued out a warrant of the magistrate. He proved before the magistrate that the defendant, Moore, had verbally agreed to pay twenty ..dollars more than the sum expressed in the pote, provided cotton should bring ,f 3 per hundred that season, and further evidence was offered to shew that the price of cotton had risen to that sum. The magistrate gave judgment for the additional twenty dollars, and on appeal the •magistrate’s judgment was affirmed. It was now moved that the decision made by the presiding judge should be reversed, pn the ground that the written contract was conclusive as to the terms of the hiring.
   The opinion of the Court ivas delivered by

Mr. Justice Gantt.

The note which was taken to secure the payment of the hire, expressed on its face the consideration which was to be paid. It is unqualified in the terms used, and purports to be the entire sum which by the agreement was intended to be paid for the services of the negro. Whatever views therefore may have been entertained by the parties previous to giving the note, they must give way to the certain and fixed terms expressed in the writing which consummated the contract between them. It would be of dangerous tendency to permit a written contract, the terms whereof are explicit and constitute the law by which it is tp be judged of, to be impugned and varied by oval testimony. The substance and intent of the written agreement in this case, w’as to' shew what was the contract on the part of Moore, and to what extent he was to be answerable for the hire of the negro. Now as parol evidence cannot be. admitted to annul or substantially vary a written agreement, 3 Wils. 275, this rule would be clearly violated, if it were competent for the plaintiff to prove an additional sum beyond that expressed in Moore’s written agreement for the hire: “ Parol ■evidence shqll pot be received to prove an additional rent beyond that expressed in the written agreement for. a, lease.1? 2 Bl. Rep. 1249; 4 Comyn's. Digest, Tit. Evidence, c. 5. Nov shall parol .evidence be permitted to explain a writing where 4he meaning is plain, “ as if a man agree in writing to sell Blackacre for £1000, parol evidence shall not be admitted that he intended Whiteacre should *also pass.”

Williams, for motion.

Rogers, contra.

If then it be law that parol evidence cannot be received to vary what is clearly and substantially set forth in a written agreement; if on a lease expressing a certain rent, no additional rent can be established by parol evidence, then l think it clearly follows that when the sum is expressed (as in this case) which the hirer is to pay, no additional sum can be claimed or established by parol evidence. There would be no end to litigation were it otherwise; a man entering into a contract might be made to answer in as many different ways as the terms of' the contract might be varied by human ingenuity; this would lead to great injustice, cruelty and wrong — fortunately for mankind this is not a rule of jurisprudence here or elsewhere. But this doctrine has been so ably and fully commented upon by my brother Nott, in the case of M'Dowall, vs. Beckly, 2 Const. Decs. 265, as to supercede the necessity of any comments on my part. The principle now involved was decided in that case, which is “ That parol evidence cannot be admitted to contradict, add to, or vary the terms of a written instrument. The motion therefore is granted.

Colcock, Richardson, and JVoit, Justices, concurred,  