
    Grimstead v. Briggs.
    The alteration of a promissory note, with the assent of the maker, at'the time of, or after, the alteration, does not render it void.
    Where in an action on a promissory note, by the indorsee against the makers and indorser, it appeared from the evidence, that the note was made on the 29th of July, 1856, and was due on the first of November following; that the note, at the time of its execution, did not contain the words, “ with ten per cent, interest;" that the words were inserted after the execution of the note, but by whom, or at what precise time, is not known; that before the maturity of the note, J., one of the makers, left the state, and was insolvent; that between the first and tenth of November, 1856, B., the other maker of the note, called upon the attorney of the plaintiff, for the purpose of getting the same to send to the residence of his co-maker, for payment; that the note was delivered to him, he giving a receipt therefor, at which time the note contained said specification as to interest; that B. recommended plaintiff to buy the note; that after B. knew of the alteration of the note, he instructed plaintiff’s attorney, to bring suit thereon; and that he, at no time, before the commencement of the suit, made any objection to the alteration of the note; Held, That the assent of B. to the alteration, might have been reasonably inferred, and that he was liable to pay the note.
    
      Appeal from the Davis District Court.
    
    Johnson & Briggs made tbeir promissory note to one Berger, wbo indorsed tbe same to plaintiff. Tbe makers and indorser being sued, Johnson not being served, tbe material question in the case, arose upon the liability of defendant Briggs. The cause was submitted to the court, and the facts found as follows: The note was made on the 29th of July, 1856, and was due on the first day of the next November, but at the time of its execution, did not contain the words, “ with ten per cent, interest,” which words were inserted after its execution, but by whom, or'at what precise time, was not shown, and did not appear. Before the maturity of the note, Johnson left the state, and was insolvent. Between the 1st and 10th of November, 1856, Briggs called upon the attorney of plaintiff, who held the note for collection, for the purpose of getting the same to send to the residence of Johnson, for payment. The note was delivered to him as requested, he giving a receipt therefor; the note at that time containing the said specification as to interest. No objection was made by either of said defendants, on account of said alteration, until after the commencement of this suit. It is further found that “ defendant Briggs recommended plaintiff to buy said note, and after he knew of the alteration thereof, instructed plaintiff’s attorney to bring suit thereon, and at that time, made no objection to said note on account of said alteration.” From these facts, the court found for plaintiff, and rendered judgment against Briggs for the full amount of the note, with interest, and he now appeals.
    
      Jones & Trimble, for the appellant.
    
      D. P. Palmer, for appellee.
   Weight, C. J.

We see no good reason for disturbing this’judgment. From the facts found, we think the court below was fully justified in concluding, that the defendant Briggs, either assented to said alteration at the time it was made, or if not, that having advised the plaintiff, to purchase the same, after, as is fairly inferable, he knew of said alteration, he is estopped, as against said plaintiff, from insisting upon the same, as a defence in this action. If the alteration was made with his knowledge and consent, the note would not, as assumed by appellant, become void, by reason of such addition or change. This assent would make it 'his instrument, as fully and entirely as if the words had been inserted at the time of its execution. As already stated, such assent could be reasonably inferred from the facts as found by the court below. Ohitty on Bills, 204. But when, in addition to this, we take into consideration the fact, that plaintiff was advised by defendant Briggs, to purchase the note, every pretence for a defence of this character is taken away.

Judgment affirmed. .  