
    John Paysinger v. George Shumpard.
    Columbia,
    May, 1829.
    One coming into possession of property subject to the lien of an execution does not incur a personal liability to the execution creditor, nor can the latter maintain an action against him for the price which he received on subsequently selling it. The lien is on the property only.
    Tried before Mr. Justice Huger, at Newberry, Spring Term, 1829.
    Summary process for money had and received, brought to recover the value of a bale of cotton sold by the defendant under the following circumstances. The cotton belonged originally to one Smith, against whom the plaintiff had recovered judgment to a large amount, and had duly entered his fi. fa. in the sheriff’s office. The defendant, who was fully aware of the existence of this lien, received the cotton in question from Smith, in payment of a debt; and afterwards carried the cotton to market, and sold it. The plaintiff made a demand upon him for the proceeds of the sale, and on his refusal to pay, brought this action. The presiding Judge decreed for the defendant; and the plaintiff moved to reverse his decree as contrary to law.
    Bauskett, for the motion,
    cited Ashe v. Livingston, 2 Bay, 80.
    Nance, contra.
    
   Colcock, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

There is no principle, nor any decided case, on the authority of which this action can be maintained. It is conceded, that an execution duly entered in the sheriff’s office binds all the defendant’s property; and under it the property may be taken and sold in satisfaction, although found in the possession of third persons. But this general lien will certainly not authorize the creditor .to recover from a buna fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, the pj'ice which he may have paid for the debtor’s property; and he might with equal propriety maintain an action for that purpose, as for the recovery of the price which the purchaser receives, if he afterwards sells the property to another. The lien is on the property alone; and a third person coming into possession of it incurs no personal liability to the creditor: neither has the latter any specific claim to the property, but only a general right to the satisfaction of his debt out of whatever belongs to his debtor. And it would be carrying the doctrine of general liens to an extent, which would tend to destroy all interchange of property in this country, and introduce the utmost confusion in business, if every one, through whose hands the property might happen to pass, should be liable for the value to the creditor.

The case from 2 Bay, does not apply. There the plaintiff had a specific lien on the land; but the decision went on the ground, that the sheriff, whose business it was to pay the proceeds of the sale to the senior lien, had by mistake paid it over to one which was junior. That case too went quite far enough, to say no more.

Motion refused.  