
    HUI YING ZHENG, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH
      , United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-304.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 19, 2016.
    Lee Ratner, Law Offices of Michael Brown, Esq., New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Carl McIntyre, Assistant Director; Allen W. Hausman, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted as the respondent in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Hui Ying Zheng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an January 8, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) March 7, 2011, decision, denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Hui Ying Zheng, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 8, 2013), aff'g [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 7, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA decision. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513-14 (2d Cir.2009).

For applications such as Zheng’s, governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, “considering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on the applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam). We “defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make” such a ruling. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

Here, the IJ reasonably based the adverse credibility determination on Zheng’s inconsistent testimony and inconsistencies among her testimony, her witness’s testimony and her documentary evidence. As the agency found, the signatures on the letter from Zheng’s church did not match her description, and the date of her baptismal certificate did not match the date provided by her witness. The IJ reasonably rejected Zheng’s explanation for the inconsistencies. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005).

Although Zheng submitted corroborating letters from her father and two fellow church members in China, the IJ reasonably found that evidence insufficient to establish Zheng’s eligibility for relief absent credible testimony, because the authors were interested parties and unavailable for cross-examination. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (the weight accorded to documentary evidence lies largely within agency’s discretion); see also Matter of H-L-H & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A.2010) (giving diminished evidentiary weight to letters from “relatives and friends,” because they were from interested witnesses not subject to cross-examination), rev’d on other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.2012). Ultimately, the negative demeanor finding, inconsistencies between the testimony, witness testimony, and documentary evidence, and lack of corroborating evidence provide substantial evidence in support of the agency’s adverse credibility determination. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

The only evidence of a threat to Zheng’s life or freedom depended upon her credibility: the adverse credibility determination in this case necessarily precludes sue-cess on her claims for asylum, withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  