
    (118 App. Div. 533)
    In re BRAY.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
    March 6, 1907.)
    Perpetuities—Vested Remainders—Suspension op Power of Alienation.
    Where a testator bequeathed his house and land to his brother, to hold until the last of his four children should become of age and then to be sold and divided equally between the children, the remainder to the children was vested, and there was no suspension of the power of alienation.
    [Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 39, Perpetuities, § 46.j
    Appeal from Surrogate’s Court, Niagara County.
    In the matter of the final settlement of the accounts of Timothy Bra3r as executor of the last will and testament of David White, deceased. From a part of the decree of the Surrogate’s Court, the executor appeals. Reversed and remanded.
    Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, KRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ.
    S. E. Filkins, for appellant.
    G. D. Judson and George F. Thompson, for respondents.
   SPRING, J.

David White, of the county of Niagara, died October 29, 1902, leaving a last will and testament. In the first item, after a legacy to the wife of his brother Patsey, he provided:

“I give and bequeath to my brother, Patsey White, the úse oí my house and seventeen acres of land lying on the extension of Mill street, in the town of Royalton, until the last of my children shall become of age. Then the property shall be sold and divided equally between my children, share and share alike."’

The testator left four minor children, his only heirs at law. The land devised was sold by proceedings in the Surrogate’s Court to pay the debts of the testator, and after paying the same there was a surplus, which came into the hands of the executor and was included among the assets for distribution upon the judicial settlement of his account. The surrogate, in construing the provision of the will quoted, for the purpose of decreeing distribution, has determined that the division of the property of the testator is suspended during the lives of the four minor children, which would be an unlawful suspension, and by his decree has directed distribution of this surplus to the guardians of the respective infants.

We cannot concur in his decision. The testator did .not create any trust in his brother. He only permitted him to enjoy the use of the property for a designated time. The primary scheme of the will apparently was to provide for his children, and he accomplished that purpose by vesting the title in them absolutely, but not to be enjoyed in possession until the youngest child attained his majority. They held a future estate with a precedent estate created at the same time. Section 27, Real Property Law (chapter 547, p. 564, Laws 1896). There was no suspension of the power of alienation. “The absolute power of alienation is suspended only when there is no person in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed.” Section 32, Real Property Laws. There are persons in being who can convey the property devised by the testator. Patsey White, who had the use, and the children, in whom thevfee was vested, could pass an indefeasible title at any time by joining in a conveyance of the premises, and immediate possession of the premises could be given. The remainder was not contingent, but vested; and the construction which permits this will be upheld where it can be consistently done. Hersee v. Simpson, 154 N. Y. 496, 48 N. E. 890; Miller v. Gilbert, 144 N. Y. 68, 38 N. E. 979. If one of the children died, his title would pass by descent to his heirs at law, even though the date of possession was not reached.

The distinction between this case and others which have been held to offend against the statute of perpetuities is that in that class of cases a trust was created and the estate did not vest, as in Haynes v. Sherman et al., 117 N. Y. 433, 22 N. E. 938, while here the devisees took the title immediately upon the death of their devisor, but the enjoyment of it was postponed.

The decree, so far as appealed from, should be reversed, with costs to appellant payable from the fund, and the proceeding remitted to the. Surrogate’s Court of Niagara county to correct its decree in compliance with this opinion. So ordered. All concur.  