
    SUMTER DISTRICT,
    SPRING TERM,
    1801.
    The State v. Pitman.
    An indictment lies, under the act of 1736, for uttering and publishing counterfeited bills of the Branch Bank of the United States, although the same offence is punishable by the laws of the Federal Government. [Fide State v. Tutt, 2 Bailey, 44. State v. Antonio, 2 Treadw. 776. j'
    The prisoner having been committed to prison for passing counterfeit bank bills of the Branch Bank of the United States, estate fished at Charleston, was brought up by habeas corpus, and his 'áischargé moved for on the ground, that the offence specified in the Warrant of commitment was not sufficient to authorise his deten» tion.
    His counsel contended, 1st. That an indictment for the offence Charged in the warrant could not be sustained in a State court, being ah offence against the laws of the United States, over which the national tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction. 2d. That although it should be determined that the constitutional power exercised by congress, in passing laws for the punishment of offences of this nature, does not interfere with, or supersede the necessity of, laws passed by the States, individually, for guarding against the mischievous effects of transgressions of the like kind ; yet that the offence specified in the present case, was not such an offence as was punishable by any law of this State : that the act of 1736 — 7, P. L. 146, 147, which is the only statute of force in this State» which makes the counterfeiting, or uttering counterfeit bills of credit, penal, declares, that “ to pass; fraudulently,- any forged or counterfeit writing obligatory; or promissory note, for payment of money, &c., with an intention to defraud any person, shall render the person who shall commit such fact; guilty,” &c : a'nd that the word “person” cannot be construed to apply to thé president; directors» and company of the bank whose bills have been counterfeited. That penal laws ought to be construed strictly; and especially such as make the doing of any thing, which, at common law; was innocent; or indifferent, a capital offence.
    In England, doubts formerly arose on the construction of the statute, 2 Geo. 2, c. 25, from Which our act of assembly, aforesaid, appears to have been copied, although instead of the words, “ person or persons,” in the British statute, the word “ person” has been substituted in our act:: and it became a serious question in the courts of criminal jurisdiction there, whéther the uttering of counterfeit bills of the corporation of the bank of England, was within the meaning* of the statute. And the stat.- 31 Geo. 2 c. 22; and 18 Geo. 3, c. 18, were afterwards passed, to remove all doubts on the subject. Leach, C. L. 366, Palmer’s case; and lb. 175, Elliot’s case.
    It was argued» that although the present is not a parallel case, inasmuch as the banking company, whose bills are said to be counterfeited, is not a body corporate, yet it serves to shew with-how much strictness and caution statutes of this sort ought to be construed ; and if the words, “ person or persons,” could not, with propriety, be. ¿onstrueá to mean a body politic, surely if is right to object, that the word “ person” cannot be construed, in a criminal case, to mean á society of persons, united, but not legally incorporated. That ubi Lex est speeialis, et ratio ejus generalis, generaliter est accipienda; and, therefore, in divers acts of parliament, the word a perSons” has been holden to include corporations, which is a larger sense than it bears in ordinary discourse, 1 Wooddes. 195. Í Mod. 164. But no instance can be adduced to shew, that the Word “ person,” in the singular number, has.ever been extended to"' Alean “ persons” in the. plural; and, especially, in the case of a felony created by statute.
    Brevard and Brown, for the prisoner. James, Solicitor Northern Circuit,, for the State.
   By the court.

Johnson, J.

The national ■ government may * pass Such laws as may be proper and necessary to avoid the mis. chiefs arising from the counterfeiting, and passing, as true, the forged bills of credit of the bank of the nation; but it cannot be maintained that the several State governments may not also pass such laws, as they shall deem necessary, to the welfare of their internal concerns, in relation to the same subject. The power and authority which may be used and exercised by each, in". this behalf, is by no means incompatible, but perfectly reconeiieable and consistent. As to the other objection to the detention of the prisoner, predicated on a strict construction of our act of assembly, against the offence of forgery, &c., I am of opinion it cannot prevail. ' I- see no necessity for construing these words of the act, “ with an intention to defraud,” as having reference to the person or persons, whose name in the counterfeit bill has been forged; but on the contrary, 1 think they ought to be construed with reference to the person or persons to whom the 'false bill has been passed, where the charge is,' as in this case, for uttering, and not for forging.

So the objections were both overruled, and the motion for the prisoner’s discharge negatived. But having demanded his trial, by motion in open court, on'the first day of the present term, and ild indictment having been preferred against hind, he was admitted to bail on the last day of the term ; the solicitor of the circuit not making, it appear, that the witnesses in behalf óf the 'State, to sup-' port the prosecution in this case, could not have been procured, or that reasonable diligence had been used to enforce their attendance. See stat. 31, Car. 2. P. L. 21. A. A. 1712.  