
    Henrietta Township v. Oxford Township.
    In order to obtain a settlement in a township, under our poor-laws, the fact of residence is not sufficient, unless attended with the Intention, on the part of the resident, of making such township his place of abode.
    Where a person has obtained a settlement in a township, that settlement is not lost by his residing in another township for a year, if his residence in such township is attended with an intention of returning to the former township.
    It is error in the court to charge the jury that the question of intention connected with residence is immaterial and not to be considered by them.
    This cause came into this court on a writ of error to the .district court of Lorain county.
    The case tried in the court below, was an action of debt, brought by Henrietta township against Oxford township, to recover a sum of money alleged to have been expended by Henrietta township, in the maintenance of certain paupers, who, it is averred, had a legal settlement in Oxford. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, on which judgment was entered. Exception was taken to the charge of the court, in which errors have boon assigned. The facts, as set forth in the bill of exceptions, are substantially as follows :
    It appeared in evidence, that David E. Brown, and his wife and four children, had gained a settlement in Oxford township, Erie county; that in the first week of July, 1848, tliey were living in a house claimed by Brown, and from which ♦lie was evicted; that, on the day after the eviction, Brown took a bod and shoemaker’s tools, leaving some of his beds and furniture with his wife, and went away. The trustees of Oxford township, finding the wife destitute, provided a place for her and two or three of the children, and furnished relief for almost three months; after which she lived at different places, part of the time in Oxford, part in Perkins township, having with her usually some of her children, until late in July or early in August, 1849, Brown brought her to Florence township. There was evidence, that July 19, 1848) Brown came into Florence, bringing his tools and a rolling machine, and went to work for Taft, a shoemaker. Ho worked for Taft till August 9,1848, boarding and lodging with Taft. Brown sent a box, labeled to his wife, containing, probably, small shoes— the box being left, as directed, at Milan, three or four miles from where his family wore then living. On August 10, 1848, Brown moved to Heald’s, at another place in Florence, whore he boarded with Heald, and slept in the shoemaker’s shop, where he carried on his business until the last of July or first of August, 1849) when he brought his wife, and the children that were with her, to Florence, as before stated. During the time Brown lived in Florence he had some one of his children with him. Before Brown had gained a residence in Oxford he had lived in Florence with his family, and it was known in Florence that Brown had a family in Oxford, living as before stated. After Brown took his family to Florence, in July or August, 1849, he lived there with them only six or seven days, and from thence removed with his family, to Henrietta township, where he lived till his death, on April 26, 1851. In 1850, and before Brown had been in Henrietta one year, he was warned out of the township by the following warning:
    “ The State of Ohio, Lorain County, ss.
    
    “ To any constable of Henrietta township, greeting :
    “ Whereas, information has been received by us, that certain poor persons have come into this township to reside, who are likely to become a township charge, to wit: Lydia Whelper, Daniel Sheffield, widow of Jedidiah ♦Holcomb, James Holcomb, David Brown, and Daniel Palmerton. You are hereby commanded forthwith to warn the above-named person's to depart the township forthwith, by reading this warrant in the presence of each person heroin named, or by leaving an attested copy thereof, at the last place of residence of the person so named; and of this warrant make legal service and duo return. Dated at Henrietta township, this 18th day of February, 1850.” Signed by the trustees. The constable returned as to Brown, “ served it (this writ) on David Brown, March 11, 1850.” _
    Testimony was given to show the amount of relief given, the return of the paupers to Oxford, (except Brown, who was dead,) presentment of the claim, and the refusal to pay it.
    The case being closed, the court charged the jury, that if Brown had lived in Florence one continuous year, and during that time he had no house or home in Oxford, and his wife and family were during that time living at several different places, that he, Brown, had gained a residence in Florence. The plaintiff then asked the court to charge the jury, that such residence of Brown in Florence during that year, must be open and notorious, and attended with such circumstances as to lead the authorities of the township, in the exercise of proper vigilance, to the conclusion, that there was an intention on the part of Brown, to gain a settlement in the township. The court charged, that it was sufficient if he openly and notoriously lived and worked there one continuous year, while he was without a house in Oxford, and his family living in different places during that time ; and the jury need not inquire as to the intention of Bi’own to make that his place of residence, as intention was not involved in the matter.
    
      H. D. Clark, for plaintiff.
    
      H. Goodwin, for defendant.
   Caldwell, J.

It is said by the plaintiff in error, that the court erred in refusing to give the charge in the language asked, as to the requisite notoriety of the residence, and also in the charge given as to intention. As to the notoriety of the residence, we think the court, although they did not give the language as asked, charged all that the law required. *On this point we have been referred to the case of Henrietta Township v. Brownhelm Township, 9 Ohio, 77. The court in that case say: “The residence must not only be continuous, it must also be open and notorious, and attended with such circumstances as to lead the authorities of the township, in the exercise of proper vigilance, to the conclusion that there is an intention to gain a settlement.” The terms hero used are not contained in the statute, and can only be used to contradistinguish the residence from a secret or clandestine one, or, as was the case in that instance, from that of a person passing about from one township to another, so as to preclude the idea that ho had any fixed place of abode. The language of the statute is: “ That any person or persons, other than those hereinafter provided for, residing one year in any township in this state, without being warned by the overseers of the poor, for said township, to depart the same, or three years after being so warned, without being again so warned as aforesaid, shall be considered as having gained a legal settlement in such township.” No special notoriety of residence is required, either by the letter or spirit of the statute, nor is it necessary that anything should be done to call the attention of the authorities of the township to the fact of such residence. A bona fide residence within the bounds of the township, in accordance with the convenience and circumstances of the party, is all that is necessary to gain a settlement. A person confined to a sick-bed, entirely withdrawn from public observation, if his abode was fixed in the township, and no means taken to conceal that fact, would obtain a settlement as readily as if differently situated. The court, however, charged the jury that they need not inquire as to the intention of Brown, the pauper, to make the township of Florence his place of residence, as intention was not involved in the matter. In this charge, we think the court erred. A person who has gained a legal residence in a place, is never in any instance held to have lost his residence by being absent, when his absence has been accompanied with the intention of returning to *such place of abode. If Brown, then, who had obtained a settlement in Oxford township, had gone into Florence township, although he resided there for a year, if during his stay he had the intention of returning to Oxford township, his settlement would not thereby have been changed; it would still have been in Oxford township. Although the evidence, as given in the bill of exceptions, would probably lead the mind to the conclusion that Brown had no intention of returning to Oxford township during-his residence in Florence township, yet we think the court erred in withdrawing the consideration of that question from the jury. It is contended, however, on the part of the defendant in error, that even if the court had erred in the charge, yet that the record shows that Brown had not been legally warned to leave Henrietta township, and that he had obtained a legal residence there, and that therefore Henrietta township could not recover in this action; and that therefore the judgment being cloarly right, the court would not disturb it. To this it is sufficient to reply that the bill of exceptions does not purport to give all the evidence in the cause, and we are not authorized to predicate any action on the assumption that wo have all the evidence.

The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.  