
    Simmerson v. Tennery.
    An action by an assignee of the claim of a married woman, against her husband, for moneys belonging to her and converted by the husband to his own use, is not barred by the limitations of chapter 3 of the code of 1853, (2 8. & C. 947,) where less than six years have intervened between such assignment and the commencement of the action.
    Error to the District Court of Sandusky County.
    
      The action was originally brought December 23, 1873, in the court of common pleas, by the defendant in error, Emeretta Tennery, against her father, Joseph Simmerson, now deceased. He having died during the pendency of the action, it was revived against his administrator, Alonzo Simmerson, the present plaintiff in error.
    The petition of plaintiff alleged that Rhoda Simmerson, her mother, and wife of Joseph, died about October, 1871, leaving a will whereby she devised to her daughter, the plaintiff, her interest in a lot of land in Clyde, Sandusky county, together with all her claims or rights of action against her husband. It further alleged that in March, 1863, this lot was purchased by Joseph and Rhoda jointly for $520, the conveyance being to them as tenants in common of equal shares, Rhoda paying $200 of the purchase-money out of her own separate moneys.
    That, at this time Rhoda owned a certain'promissory note for $100, which Joseph collected, and applied $70 of the proceeds toward paying the purchase-money, and appropriated the balance to his own use. The deferred payments were secured by a purchase-money mortgage on the premises. To meet the deferred payments, when the same became due, Joseph and Rhoda sold a portion of the lot for $450, out of which the balance of purchase-money ($250) was paid; the rest was appropriated by Joseph to his own use. The petition prayed judgment for the sums claimed to be due, with interest, and for an account.
    The answer, among other matters of defense, alleged that the plaintiff’s cause of action had not accrued to her within six years prior to bringing suit. This the reply denied.
    The court of common pleas, without passing upon any other issues, held that the plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, and rendered judgment in favor of defendants.
    This judgment was reversed in the district court.
    
      B. Meek & J. M. Rhodes, for plaintiff in error, cited Ong v. Sumner, 1 Cin. Sup. C. Rep. 424.
    
      John M. Lemmon. of Lemmon, Finch & Lemmon, for de fendant in error,
    cited Weisner v. Zaun, 39 Wis. 188 ; Burke v. Beveridge, 15 Minn. 205 ; Bauman v. Grubbs, 26 Ind. 419; Dunham v. Sage, 52 N. Y. 229; Morrison v. Noeman, 47 Ill. 477; Michart v. Wyatt, 21 Ala. 813 ; State v. Trautman, 72 N. C. 551; Wilson v. Wilson, 36 Cal. 447.
   By the Court.

The district court did not err in reversing the judgment of the court of common pleas. The plaintiff’s devisor was within the saving clause of the statute (Code, § 19 ; 2 S. & C. 949), during her coverture.

Judgment affirmed.  