
    LOVE et al. v. GLOBE HAT MFG. CO.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
    December 30, 1908.)
    Negligence (§ 134*)—Actions—Sufficiency of Evidence.
    In an action for damages through dye in defendant’s vats leaking through the floor on plaintiffs’ stock of goods, and through the flooding of plaintiffs’ floor and stock by water entering through a hole cut in the roof by defendant’s order, evidence held to establish a prima facie case for plaintiffs.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. § 267; Dec. Dig. § 134.*]
    
      Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Brooklyn, Sixth District. Action by Samuel Dove and others against the Globe Hat Manufacturing Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed, and new trial ordered.
    Argued before JENKS, HOOKER, GAYNOR, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.
    Thomas P. Hall, for appellants.
    Samuel Rosenberg, for respondent.
   RICH, J.

The plaintiffs conduct a hat manufacturing business on

the fifth floor of a building on Greene street. The defendant is a domestic corporation, occupying the sixth floor of the same building with its business of renovating old hats and making new hats from old ones. In its -business it uses large vats containing dyes. The plaintiffs brought this action to recover damages claimed to have been sustained, first, in consequence of the dye in the vats leaking through .the floor upon plaintiffs’ stock of goods; and, second, through the flooding of their floor and stock by water entering the building during a storm, through a hole cut in the roof by defendant’s order.

Upon the trial the plaintiffs, to sustain their cause of action based upon the leaking of the dye, proved the character of defendant’s business, the respective location of the vats and of their stock, the use of dyes in its business, which had on several occasions overflowed the sides of the cement flooring in the vat room, and found its way through places in the ceiling of plaintiffs’ place of business, causing damage for which plaintiffs had presented bills to the defendant. It also appeared that one Bregman, a carpenter, had been employed in defendant’s place of business, under the immediate supervision of defendant’s foreman, Russ, and the general supervision of one Goldman, whose relation to the defendant is not clearly shown. The carpenter testifies that he was the “boss.” On the day that the work was completed Goldman directed Russ and the carpenter, Bregman, to cut a hole in the roof, through which steam could escape, after which he left the room. Bregman, on reaching the roof and discovering indications of an approaching rainstorm, called the attention of the foreman, Russ, to that fact, and suggested that the cutting of a hole be postponed, to which Russ replied that it was not raining, that it was none of his business, and directed him to “go ahead and do it.” Bregman then cut a hole in the roof, 2 feet by 13 inches, shortly after which it commenced to rain, and plaintiffs’ place of business and stock were flooded and damaged. The trial court dismissed the complaint at the close of plaintiffs’ evidence upon the ground that the evidence was not, sufficient to establish the liability of defendant.

I think the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, both as to the damages sustained by reason of the leakage of the dye and those sustained by reason, of the flooding of their place of business, and that the exception to the ruling of the trial court dismissing the complaint presents reversible error.

The judgment of the Municipal Court must be reversed, and a new trial ordered; costs to abide the event. All concur.  