
    Blanton, Appellant, v. King et al.
    
    The jurisdiction, of the probate court, is exclusive over the matters confided to to it by tire constitution.
    The powers of the probate court, so far as its jurisdiction extends, are as ample as th'ose of the court of chancery.
    The court of chancery has no authority to revise the proceedings of the probate court.
    APPEAL from the chancery court.
    This was a suit in chancery, commenced by original bill, to review the proceedings of the probate court of the county of Jefferson.
    The defendants below filed their demurrer to the bill, and assigned the following causes:
    1. That the chancery court has no original jurisdiction of the subject matter set forth in the bill, but that the same belongs to the court of probate of Jefferson county. -
    
      2. Said bill seeks to revise and correct the supposed errors and irregularities of said court of probate, which can only be done by a tribunal having appellate jurisdiction.
    The chancellor overruled the demurrer, and an appeal was taken to this court. ,
    Buckner, for the appellant.
    Hutchinson, contra.
    
    1. The question of jurisdiction. I admit, that if the remedy he full and adequate in the court of original jurisdiction, the court of chancery will not, and ought not, even though its concurrent power exist, to entertain the case. I concede that it is the policy of the law, and the true interest of the country, to have justice dispensed in the simplest and speediest forms attainable.
    The probate court has the original power to grant administration, and to conduct it down to the point of distribution. Revised Code,29. Itwas once allowed a plenary proceeding. Rev. Code, 29, 30. It might have prevented the removal of decedent’s property out of the state. Acts of 1826, p. 80. An appeal into chancery or the high court was given. Acts, February, 1830, p. 180. But those powers were impliedly graduated, and expressly curtailed by the new constitution, and act of December, 1833, p. 28. In the distribution of the judicial power, specified subjects are referred to the probate court; and the last act confers the jurisdiction previously given, only so far as compatible with those declared in the constitution; so that it is now doubtful whether it can order or allow a plenary proceeding.
    But its power, however defined, is not exclusive. In matters of difficulty, complexity, accident, fraud or abuse, arising out of the personal representation of decedents’ estates, the court of chancery has ever exerted a concurrent and controlling power. Mr. Justice Story, in the 9th and 10th chapters of his Commentaries on Equity, shows how very extensive have been the interpo-sitions of the courts of equity, upon the subjects of administration and legacies. But it will suffice to refer only to sections 532. 534, 535. 540, 541, 542. 579. In this case occur all the grounds of interposition stated in the texts — trust, the necessity of a discovery .and account; and as gross and shameless a chain of frauds, as could well have been exhibited. The bill, too, alleges repeated efforts in vain, to have the administration closed in the probate court. The remedy at law, on the bond, was only cumulative, and does not deprive equity of its power. Moore v. Walker, 1 Mar. 489. When equity gains jurisdiction for one object, it will retain it as to all. Rathbone v. Warren, 1 Johns. Rep. 587. It vacates conveyances for fraud. 1 Johns. Chan. Rep. 478; 4 Bibb, 166. The personal representative is trustee for the distributees; Boone v. Durand, 1 Desauss. 588. , And equity would decree according to the portions of those entitled. 4 Bibb, 543; 3 Johns. Chan. Rep. 553; 3 Bibb, 456; 4 Des-saus. 341.
    The administrator here, became the purchaser at his own sales; and on that score equity will compel restitution and account. 1 Story’s Comm. 316, to 320; Hudson v. Hudson, 5 Munf. 180; Lindsey v. Lindsey, 1 Desauss. 150; Anderson v. Fox, 2 H. & M. 245; Hopkins, 522; 9 Peters, 57; 2 Johns. Chan. Rep. 266; 2 Caines’s Cases, 192.
    The, bill, &c., do not seek to revise for error the orders of the probate court; but aver that they were procured without a proper cause, and by the fradulent devices &c., of the administrator. The power of a court of equity, over judgments and proceedings obtained by fraud, cannot seriously be disputed. The interference, on that ground, is of ordinary occurrence. The fraud alleged, in reference to almost every act of the administrator, is of the class called dolus mains, and yet so repeated, and so extensive as to be utterly beyond the powers and means of the probate judge to expose and punish.
    2. It was contended on the argument of the demurrer, and may be reiterated, that the complainants seek recovery of the lands descended to them; and that as to that object their remedy was ample at law. I answer, that the complainants allege that Sarah Blanton died seised of about 500 acres of land, of which the administrator thereupon took possession; that the patents, &c. came to his hands and have been withheld, in consequence of which they cannot specify the lands definitely; and that the administrator has retained the possession, &c., setting up a claim to them: it is, therefore, prayed that he be compelled to deliver up the patents, &c., that an account may be taken of the rents, &c., and his claim to the lands quieted. Could they, by any process or proceeding at law, compel him to produce the title papers? There was no -remedy there, I apprehend. By repeatedly demurring to the bill and producing all possible delay and never answering, the administrator has admitted the facts charged to be true. He, therefore, stands in the attitude of a personal representative tortiously taking the lands that descended to the heirs, and seizing and secreting the title deeds, and setting up a colorable claim to protect and screen himself in the possession and permanency of the profits. In this view he is assuredly the self constituted trustee of the complainants, and as certainly a fit subject for the visitation, rebuke and punishment of a court of equity as could be imagined. In respect of the lands, rents, &c., he is not responsible as administrator, but as trustee; and as the court can compel him to produce the deeds and account, it will take recognition of the whole matter and settle the title likewise. 1 Story’s Com. 488; Ramsey v. Deas, 2 Desauss. 323; 2 Story’s Com. 518.
    3. I do not know, nor can I imagine what objections can or will be made to the preliminary decree.
    . At one term the last demurrer to the bill and supplement was overruled, and instead of answering the matters of gross fraud and abuse charged, or delivering the title deeds, or discovering the personalty, &c. not reported to the probate court, or showing his title, if any, to the lands, the administrator seemed willing to suspend the cause on the demurrer by praying an appeal. The cause stood over until the ensuing term, and the appeal bond not being given, nor any cause shown which had prevented it, the chancellor recalled the appeal, took the complainants’ allegations as confessed, and proceeded to decree that the negroes not delivered to Lenox, with the increase, should be delivered to complainants; that the administrator’s pretended sale of them, and the orders, &c. for such sale, should be vacated as fraudulent; and so proceeded to settle the rights of the parties so far as the same were disclosed by the bill, supplement and exhibits, and ordered a special account to be taken to embrace the prices of the slaves that should not be delivered, their hire, and a general settlement-of the administration; also the quantity, &c., of the lands, their yearly rents, and a report. This decree was made at January term, 1837, and at the July term afterward the appeal now prosecuted was allowed. This last is stated from memory. I have not been enabled to see the transcript since it was filed, and do not know the errors assigned, if any, or the points stated in support of the appeal. I am nevertheless willing to be uninformed of them, trusting, as I do, that the court will read the record.
    It is not necessaL’y that the court of chancery should embrace in one and the same decree all the matters of relief granted. It may adjust the decree to all the exigencies arising; may pass on the rights involved, and order an account to ascertain amounts, &c. 1 Story’s Com. 27, 28; Campbell v. Messier, &c., 4 Johns. Chan. Rep. 334, 342'; Mackey v. Bell, 2 Munf. 523.
   •Mr. Justice Pkax

delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was commenced in the court below by original bill, which states, that Sarah Blanton, late of the county of Jefferson, in the state of Mississippi, died intestate in said county in the year 1826.

That about the 27th day of November, in the yeat 1.826, a short time after the death of said Sarah Blanton, one William W. Blanton was appointed bp the orphans’ court of Jefferson comity administrator of the estate of said Sarah Blanton, and was duly qualified as such.

The bill proceeds to detail the various steps which the administrator had taken in relation to the estate, &c. &e., but they are not involved in the question here presented. All that is material is above recited.

To this bill the defendant demurred, and assigned the following causes:

1. That this court has no original jurisdiction of the subject matter set forth in the said bill of complaint, but that the same belongs to the court of probate of Jefferson county.

2. Said bill seeks to revise and correct the supposed errors and irregularities of said court of probate, which can only be done by a tribunal having appellate jurisdiction.

In art. 4, s. 18 of the revised constitution it is provided, that “A court of probate shall be established in each county of this state, with jurisdiction in all matters testamentary and of administration of orphans’ business and the allotment of dower, in cases of idiocy and lunacy, and of persons non compos mentis.”

The 16th section of the article provides, that “A separate superior court of chancery shall be established with full jurisdiction in all matters of equity.”

It has not been usual in the American constitutions when delegating original judicial power, to use terms of exclusion; for the reason, we apprehend, that the constitutional delegation of a power to one tribunal to adjudge upon particular subjects necessarily excludes those subjects, in the first instance, from the action of any other tribunal. And hence we conclude, that any tribunal, whose original jurisdiction is specified in the constitution, must necessarily have, as to the matters confided to it, an exclusive jurisdiction.

The constitution proposes in the fourth article to vest the judicial power in such courts of law and equity as are therein provided for; and it particularly specifies the jurisdiction of each. In two instances, and these are in the 14th and 16th sections, there are to be found exceptions to specific jurisdiction delegated. From the introduction of these exceptions only, it is safe to conclude that none others were intended, and in all other cases the jurisdiction given is exclusive. Upon any other construction of the constitution, the specific jurisdiction of the several courts would be entirely nugatory. Implication would destroy their definite character, each adjudication would mingle with another until the constitutional boundaries would be effectually destroyed.

But again; if the jurisdiction of the court of chancery be an exclusive jurisdiction, except as to certain matters specified in the constitution, which is admitted by all, then we conclude that the jurisdiction of the court of probate is also exclusive, as to the matters confided to it, because the words used to vest the jurisdiction in each court are precisely the same in meaning.

As to the powers of the court of probate, they are in every respect, as ample, so far as its jurisdiction extends, as those of a court of chancery; for the reason assigned for the interposition of a court of chancery in England does not exist here, because the execution of the trust, with which the administrator stands charged, can be as effectually enforced in a court of probate as in a court of chancery.

That the court of probate has original jurisdiction none will question. Whether it be exclusive of, or concurrent with the court of chancery, the effect as it respects the present suit will be the same; from the well settled rule, that, with courts having concurrent jurisdiction, the one which first assumes jurisdiction excludes the others. Nor is the court of chancery at liberty to disregard the rule here, as it has sometimes been done in England, from the supposed inability of the spiritual courts to do entire justice; because we have seen that our court of probate has ample power to do entire justice.

But if the court of chancery have concurrent jurisdiction of all matters confided to the court of probate, as is contended for, then any person wishing to proceed in that court in the administration of an estate, may apply to it in the first instance, for letters of administration, and have the whole proceeding there conducted. And so in the same manner the whole business which is now transacted in fifty-six courts of probate, might be thrown into one court of chancery. Can such a position be seriously contended for? Surely the injustice and delay which would attend such a vestment and exercise of power repels the idea. With such a mass of business, an hundred years would not suffice to complete the administration of an estate of ordinary complexity with the present organisation of the court, or any other which the ingenuity of man could devise.

The policy of our constitution like that concerted by the great Alfred, is to bring justice home to every man’s door, by the establishment of local jurisdictions, connected with the higher courts which are to correct the errors of limited and inferior ones; thus combining the convenience of the citizen with the certainty of justice; and this policy must be sustained by the judgment in the present case.

The decree of the chancellor must be reversed, the demurrer sustained, and the bill dismissed.  