
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
    APRIL, 1811.
    The State v. George Perrin.
    On the trial of an indictment for a libel, it is necessary to prove the aver-ments or application of the libellous matter, where the meaning is not clear, and there is an introductory statement and averments in the. indictment, in order to justify the inuendoes, as to prove tbe publication and slanderous meaning.
    Motion for a new trial. Indictment for a libel, tried before Smith, J., in Richland district. The indictment charged, that “the defendant did make, and cause to be made and published, a certain false, malicious, and libellous writing, against Jane Cox, in the name of one Jane Roach, &e.”
    The evidence given on the trial proved, that the defendant wrote and published an obscene libel, as charged in the indictment, of and concerning the daughter of one Mrs. Roach, (Mrs. Jane Cox.) But no evidence was given to prove that “ the daughter of Mrs. Roach,” mentioned in the libel, was the same person, Jane Cox, mentioned in the indictment. A civil action for damages, brought by Mrs. Cox, and her husband, for the same written slander, had been tried, just before the trial of this indictment, by the same jury, on which trial sufficient evidence had been given to prove, that the slanderous imputation was meant to apply to Mrs. Cox. But such evidence was neglected to be given on the trial of the indictment.
    
      Note. See Str. 904. .Cowp. 679. If words are doubtful in themselves, their meaning must be ascertained by an inuendo. It is the duty of the jury to construe plain words, and clear allusions, to matters of universal notoriety, according to their obvious meaning, and as every body else who reads, must understand them. Per iVlansf. C. J. Cowp. 680. See 5 Johns. 211, Van Vechten v. Hop-ldns. Libellous matter ambiguously set forth; to identify the person meant, extrinsic facts must be restored to, and proper averments and a colloquium introduced ; such facts go to the jury under the direction of the court. See Cro. J- 107. An inuendo is not to be proved, by opinion. The colloquium and aver-ments was be proved, to shew the truth of the inuendo.
    The defendant was found guilty.
    Egan, in support of the motion in this .court,
    contended, that although it had been proved at the trial, that the defendant had written and published an obscene libel, yet it had not been proved that the libellous matter was meant to apply as charged in the indictment, and for this defect of evidence the defendant was entitled to a new trial. The brief also contained a notice of a motion in arrest of judgment for the improper manner of charging the libellous matter in the indictment; but it was not insisted on. Cited Esp. Dig. 928. Cowp. Rex v. Horne, 672. See 8 East, 427. 9 East, 93.
    Stake, Solicitor of the Southern Circuit, contra.
    
    Insisted that a new trial ought not to be granted, as the application of the slander was well known to the jury.
   Bkevard, J.,

delivered the opinion and resolution of the court, in favor of the motion. Considered the indictment as charging the defendant with having published a false and libellous writing, of and concerning the daughter of Mrs. Roach, with an inuendo showing the application of the slander,, and averring the identity of Mrs. Roach’s daughter, and Mrs. Jane Cox. In this view of the case, the indictment was not supported by evidence; for it was necessary to prove the truth of the averments, or application of the words, as well as the truth of the charge of publishing.

New trial granted.  