
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gerriell Elliott TALMORE, aka Gerriell Talmore, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-10650.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Oct. 8, 2014.
    Filed Oct. 23, 2014.
    Merry Jean Chan, Esquire, Barbara Valliere, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Jerome Matthews, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDCA-Federal Public Defender’s Office, Oakland, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: W. FLETCHER and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and DUFFY, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Gerriell Elliott Talmore appeals from the district court’s judgment. He challenges the 33-month sentence imposed by the district court on the ground that his prior conviction for California first-degree burglary does not qualify as a “crime of violence.” We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

Talmore pled guilty in 2018 to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from carrying firearms and ammunition. He had previously been convicted, inter alia, of first-degree burglary under Section 459 of the California Penal Code. Relying on United States v. Park, 649 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir.2011), the district court held that Talmore’s prior conviction was for a “crime of violence” under Section 4B1.2(a) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and on that basis imposed a sentence enhancement.

Talmore argues that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Descamps v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013), Alleyne v. United States, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), and Moncrieffe v. Holder, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013), are “clearly irreconcilable” with Park, and that Park therefore must be overruled. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). We disagree.

' In Descamps, the Supreme Court held that California first-degree burglary is not a “violent felony” for the purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), because the California statute criminalizes more conduct than is encompassed by “generic” burglary. The Court specifically declined to address whether the crime qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA’s “residual clause” (which is, for present purposes, functionally identical to the “residual clause” in Section 4B 1.2(a)). Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2293 n. 6. In Park, we had held that California first-degree burglary qualifies as a “crime of violence” because it falls under Section 4B 1.2(a)’s “residual clause.” Park, 649 F.3d at 1178. By its own terms, therefore, Descamps leaves Park’s holding undisturbed.

Alleyne and Monerieffe are also not “clearly irreconcilable” with Park. Alleyne held that facts that increase a mandatory minimum sentence must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See 133 S.Ct. at 2158. Monerieffe held that some convictions for drug distribution do not qualify as “aggravated felonies” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. See 133 S.Ct. at 1693-94. Neither case is “clearly irreconcilable” with Park.

Talmore also argues that newly available statistical evidence undermines Park’s holding. Talmore’s statistical evidence, no matter how persuasive, does not permit us, sitting as a three judge panel, to revisit Park.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publi- ■ cation and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     