
    E. C. BLAKE et als. v. ANNIE SHIELDS et als.
    (Filed 6 December, 1916.)
    Estates Tail — Statutes—Eee Simple.
    An estate granted to B. “and to tbe heirs of her own body,” etc., “it being expressly understood that the hereinafter described premises are to descend at her demise to the heirs of her body,” etc., with tenendum, “to have and to hold the above particularly described premises to the said party of the second part and to her heirs forever,” conveys an estate in fee tail to B. which our statute converts in to a fee'simple absolute. Be-visal, sec. 1578.
    PetitioN for partition, instituted before tbe clerk of tbe Superior Court of MontgomeRy County, transferred upon tbe coming in of tbe answer to tbe Superior Court for trial in term-time, and tried at April Term, 1916, before Long, J. From tbe judgment rendered, plaintiffs appealed.
    
      G. G. Broughton, R. T. Poole, R. L. Brown for plaintiffs.
    
    
      Charles A. Armstrong for defendants.
    
   BeowN, J".

Tbe single question presented in tbis case is whether Mary C. Blake took an estate in fee in tbe lands in controversy under a deed executed by Anderson Green, dated 14 February, 1883; if so, tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court, it is admitted, must be affirmed. The conveying clause of tbe deed reads as follows: “Has bargained, given, granted, sold, and conveyed to tbe aforesaid Mary C. Blake and to tbe heirs of her own body, and by these presents do give, grant, sell, and convey to her and her heirs forever, it being expressly understood that tbe hereinafter described premises are to descend at her demise to tbe heirs of her body,” etc. Tbe tenendum is as follows: “To have and to hold tbe above particularly described premises to tbe said party of the second, part and to her heirs forever.”

It is contended by tbe plaintiffs that tbis deed conveys only a life estate to Mary C. Blake. We think tbe point has been determined adversely to that contention by numerous decisions of this Court. It is decided in Harrington v. Grimes, 163 N. C., 76, that an estate to- B. and bis bodily heirs under tbe old law would have conferred a fee tail, which, under our statute, where a contrary intent may not be gathered from tbe instrument, construed as a whole, is converted into a fee simple.

There are cases where tbe words “bodily heirs” are a descriptio personarwn and are sometimes construed to mean children, but that is only where it is plainly manifest from tbe deed that tbe words are used in the sense of children. Such is not the case here. The point presented in this case was decided in a case almost on all-fours at this term. Revis v. Murphy, ante, 519. In that case the limitation was to Avey Revis, her heirs: by tbe body of F. H. Revis. Mr. Justice Walher says: “This was at one time a fee-tail estate special (2 Blk. Com., 113, 114), but by our statute of 1784 (Rev., sec. 1578) it was converted into a fee simple absolute. The form of a limitation here and the one in Jones v. Ragsdale, 141 N. C., 201, are the same. It was held in the latter case that the wife, Zilphia S. Jones, acquired a fee simple under and by virtue of the provisions of the statute, and our ruling in tbis case must be tbe same, viz., that Avey- Revis by tbe deed of tbe Bairds to her got a fee-simple estate.”

Tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court is

Affirmed.  