
    Isaac Day and Richard Craven vs. Isaac Hall.
    What is a sufficient entry on the justice’s docket of the time of issuing process.
    In computing the five days required for the service of a summons, the day of the service or of the appearance should be excluded, and the other day included.
    *The constable who takes a bail bond is a competent witness to prove its execution.
    A bail bond is good, although it is taken in the amount of the debt only, and not of the debt and costs.
    
    Notice to the attorneys, who on the trial represented the parties in their absence, of the time and place of an adjournment of a cause, is sufficient.
    This was a certiorari to remove the judgment and proceedings in an action of debt before a justice of the peace, and was submitted to the court upon the following state of the case agreed on by the attorneys of the parties.
    On the 14th day 'of- April, A. D. ■ 1830, Isaac Hall of the county of Salem, instituted a suit in the court of Jacob W. Mulford, esq., one of the justices of the peace of the county of Salem, against Isaac Day. A warrant was thereupon issued for one hundred dollars in debt, against the said Isaac Day, endorsed "Debt, $100, costs, 72 cents,” and placed in the hands of Adam H. Sickler, one of the constables, for service. The defendant was arrested and gave bond, with R. Graven surety for his appearance on the 22d of April, 1830. The defendant failed to appear. The proceedings before Justice Mulford were discontinued, and the bond handed to the plaintiff. A suit was commenced thereupon before James Wainwright, esq., by Isaac Hall against Isaac Day and Richard Graven. Upon the trial the warrant and bond above referred to, together with the transcript of Justice Mulford, were read in evidence; the bond being first proved by one of the instrumental witnesses, to wit: A. Sickler, the constable. Judgment was rendered against the defendants for the sum of one hundred dollars debt and one dollar eighty-nine and a half cents costs. The parties themselves were not present at the trial, nor at the time of the rendition of the judgment, nor were they informed by the justice of the time at which judgment would be given; but their counsel were present at the trial and were informed. The bond was not taken in the amount of the debt and costs endorsed on the warrant; the bond being for one hundred dollars, and the endorsement for one hundred dollars debt, and seventy-two cents cost.
    
      Thompson argued for the plaintiff in certiorari.
    
      Macculloch for the defendant.
   *By the Court.

The first reason relied on for reversal of the judgment, “That the justice has not sufficiently entered on his docket the time of issuing the process,” is not sustained in point of fact. Under the entry of the names of the parties and the style of the action, the justice has placed the time, “April 3d, 1830.”

The second reason “ That the process of summons had not been served five days previous to its return,” is founded on an erroneous mode of computation. It was served on the 26tli of April, and was returnable on the 1st of May. The true mode is to exclude either the day of service or of appearance, and to include the other. Den v. Drake, 3 Halst. 303.

The third reason is, that the justice admitted improper evidence. The action is upon a bond in the nature of a bail bond. The constable, one of the subscribing witnesses, was examined to prove its due execution. For this purpose he was competent. It was so decided in Smalley and Coriell v. Vanorden, 2 South. 811.

The fourth reason is that the bond is invalid because taken in the amount of the debt only and not of the debt and costs. The plaintiff here, the defendant below, insists the requirement of the statute has not been complied with. The language is, It shall be lawful for the constable who served the warrant to permit the defendant to enter into bond to the plaintiff with a good and sufficient freeholder to the amount of the debt or damages and costs.” The bond in this case is not indeed taken in so large a sum as might have been required, but the defendant has no cause of complaint on this account. The statute is merely directory. Ellis v. Robinson, 2 Penn. 707; Howard and Fitch v. Blackford and others, 2 Penn. 777.

The fifth reason is, that the justice adjourned without giving notice to the parties of the time and place of rendering judgment. The parties did not. themselves attend the trial, but appeared by their respective attorneys; and after hearing the evidence-and allegations, the justice took time to advise, and in the presence of the attorneys adjourned to a subsequent time, of which he then informed them. This proceeding was usual and regular, and the notice was sufficient.

Judgment affirmed.  