
    Oakley against Farrington.
    In an action of slander, for the following words,Squire Oakley is a damned ' rogue,” it was held that they were not actionable, it not appearing that they were spoken of him in his official capacity.
    This was an action of slander. The plaintiff in the declaration was stated to be a justice of the peace, and the slanderous words were charged to have been spoken [*130] of him *in relation to his office. Among others the following words were charged, and on the trial before Mr. Justice Benson, at the last Westchester circuit, were proved to have been spoken by the defendant: “ Squire Oakley (meaning the plaintiff) is a damned rogue.” It did not appear from any circumstance, that these words were spoken of: the plaintiff in his official capacity. The appellation of squire was intended to designate him merely, and was that by which he was usually distinguished from others of the same surname in the part of the country where the parties resided. The defendant on the .trial moved for a non-suit, on the ground that the words so spoken were not actionable, which motion was overruled for the purpose of taking a verdict and referring the question. A verdict was ■accordingly taken for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court; and it was agreed if that opinion should be against the plaintiff, that a nonsuit should be entered!
    Coleman, for the plaintiff,
    cited the case of Aston v. Blagrave, 1 Str. 618, to show that the like words spoken of a magistrate are actionable.
    Woods, contra.
   Per Curiam.

These words spoken of a common person are held not to be actionable.' Although, in this case they were spoken of a magistrate, they had no relation to his official character or conduct. They are, therefore, not.more actionable than if he Was not in office, or if they were spoken of any other individual.

Judgment of nonsuit. 
      
       Words may be actionable with regard to magistrates, or other.public officers, that would not be so if spoken of any private individual; Steph. N. P., 2555. Thus, charging that a justice .of the peace is “ a jaeobite, and for bringing in the Prince of Wales and popery to the destoying of our nation,” Prince v. Howe, 1 Bro. P. C, 64., or “ a rascal, a villain, and a liar,” Aston v. Blagrave, Str., 617; 2 Ld. Raym., 1369, or that “he lacks capacity as a judge,” or “ has abandoned the common principles of truth,” Robbins v. Treadway, 2 J. J. Marsh. 540, has been held actionable per ss, when spoken of these ' officers in their official capacity.
     