
    Reena RAUT, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-71430
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 14, 2016  San Francisco, California
    Filed December 16, 2016
    Kevin Holger Knutson, Esquire, Attorney, Kevin H. Knutson, Attorney at Law, Sacramento, CA, for Petitioner
    Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Alexander Jacob Lutz, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, OIL, Anthony Cardozo Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent
    Before: KOZINSKI, BYBEE and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

1. Petitioner Reena Raut argues that the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) improperly relied on the asylum officer’s notes in their adverse credibility determinations. The officer took detailed notes and testified about the procedures he used to ensure that Raut understood his questions and that he accurately recorded the interview. The BIA reasonably concluded that the officer “was a reliable impeachment source.” Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2004). Raut made inconsistent statements about her persecution. Her varied explanations were not persuasive. Thus, the agency’s adverse credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence.

2. A petitioner must satisfy the Lozada elements to make an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2010); Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). Strict compliance with Lozada is not required when counsel’s ineffectiveness is plain on the face of the record. Tamang, 598 F.3d at 1090. Raut argues that her counsel erred by not laying a foundation for her supporting documents. But Raut’s counsel did ask some foundational questions, and all documents were admitted for the IJ’s consideration. Thus, there was no plain error warranting a waiver of Lozada’s procedural requirements.

DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     