
    Ebenezer Mattoon versus Thomas Kidd and Another.
    A sheriff may lawfully take a bond from his deputy, conditioned to pay over one quarter part of all fees which he shall receive as a deputy sheriff.
    The plaintiff, as sheriff of the county of Hampshire, having appointed the defendant, Thomas Kidd, to be one of his deputies, took from him, and the other defendant, a bond, conditioned, among other things, that Kidd should pay over to him one quarter part of all fees which he should receive as a deputy sheriff. The present action was debt upon that bond.
    The defendants, in a plea in bar, set forth the provision of the statute of 1795, c. 41, commonly called the fee bill, which declares that “ no sheriff shall demand or receive from any of his deputies, more than at the rate of twenty-five per cent, on the amount of fees for travel and service.” And thereupon the defendants say that the writing obligatory declared on is void in law.
    To this plea the plaintiff demurs generally, and the defendants join in demurrer.
    
      Bliss, in support of the demurrer,
    contended that the statute was intended to limit the sheriff to a certain portion of some particular fees received by the deputy, viz. those for travel and service only; and that as to the other emoluments, as the poundage on executions, it was intended to leave' the parties to contract as they pleased. The plea in bar, therefore, suggests nothing prohib ited by the provision referred to in the statute.
    
      Ashmun, for the defendants,
    argued that the statute confined the sneriff to the portion of the fees received by his deputy for travel and service only, and prohibited him from demanding or receiving any part of any other fees. And the reason might be that in the other cases, as of levying executions for instance, the personal responsibility of the deputy was such, that the whole of the fees given by law were not more than an indemnity. Another idea suggested, but apparently not much relied upon, was [ * 34 ] that in common * parlance a quarter part intended more than twenty-five per cent.; the former being supposed to mean twenty-five pounds of every hundred pounds received, and the latter twenty-five pounds of every hundred and twenty-five pounds received.
   By the Court.

The plea in bar, in this case, presents a question on the construction of the statute of 1795, c. 41, commonly known by the name of the fee bill. The clause in question provides “that no sheriff shall demand or receive, from any of his deputies, more than at the rate of twenty-five per cent, on the amount of fees for travel and service.” The defendants contend that the word service is to be taken strictly, as the service of a writ or other precept. If this is the true construction, then either the sheriff is to receive no part of other fees which may be received by his deputies; or else this restriction is to be confined to the two kinds of fees specified in the clause, and for every thing else he is at liberty to exact what he pleases of his deputies; either of which constructions would be unjust, and contrary to the manifest intentions of the legislature. There is no doubt that twenty-five per cent, upon all the fees was intended by this act. The doubt as to the different import of the two expressions used in the statute and the bond is not new; but there is no foundation for the distinction. One quarter part is perfectly synonymous with twenty-five per cent. The bond is legal, and the plea in bar is bad and insufficient.  