
    GURNEY P. HOOD, Commissioner of Banks of NORTH CAROLINA, Ex Rel. COMMERCIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, v. W. T. LOVE, J. WHITE WARE, W. H. WRAY, ROBERT GOLDBERG, J. O. PLONK, J. A. COSTNER, L. A. CROWELL, C. H. HOOVER, W. S. BRUICE, A. S. KARESH, W. W. GLENN, M. E. HERNDON, MRS. KATE FALLS, Administratrix of O. G. FALLS, Deceased; O. M. ROBINSON, C. D. STROUPE, W. J. T. STYERS, V. E. LONG, R. G. CHERRY, A. H. GUION, J. B. THOMASSON, H. C. HARRELSON, J. A. ABERNETHY, E. H. BYARS, Jr., E. E. GROVES, LUCY B. CANSLER, Executrix of Estate of THOS. B. CANSLER, Deceased ; T. L. WARE, T. M. McCOY, M. L. PLONK, R. P. ROBERTS, and F. H. DUNN.
    (Filed 30 November, 1932.)
    1. Pleadings A a: D b — Complaint against directors of bank alleging general course of dealing a.nd systematic neglect lield not demurrable.
    In an action brought by tbe Commissioner of Banks against directors of a bank for damages on account of negligent mismanagement, tbe complaint enumerating in detail negligent acts and omissions of tbe defendants and alleging tbat sucb acts and omissions constituted a general course of dealing and systematic policy of neglect, wrongdoing and mismanagement, in wbicb all defendants participated, and tbat such negligence proximately caused great losses to tbe bank, is helé not demurrable for misjoinder of parties and causes of action.
    3. Pleadings D e — Complaint is to be liberally construed upon demurrer.
    In passing upon tbe sufficiency of a complaint upon demurrer tbe courts will construe it liberally witb a view to substantial justice between tbe parties and will overrule tbe demurrer if any portion of tbe complaint presents facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or sucb facts may be fairly gathered therefrom, tbe remedy being given tbe defendant in proper instances to apply for a bill of particulars, C. S., 534, or for an order tbat tbe pleadings be made more definite and certain by amendment. C. S., 537.
    
      Appeal by defendants from Gowper, Special Judge, at May Term, 1932, of GastoN.
    Affirmed.
    
      O. F. Mason, Jr., and Tilleii, Tilleti & Kennedy for plaintiff.
    
    
      E. T. Oansler, W. C. Feimsler, A. G. Jones, Clyde R. Hoey, E. B. Denny, E. R. Warren, R. G. Cherry and A. L. Quiclcel for defendants.
    
   Clarkson, J.

The question involved, in substance, is as follows: Where, in an action brought by the Commissioner of Banks against directors of a bank for damages on account of negligent mismanagement, the complaint enumerates in detail negligent acts and omissions of the defendants and alleges that such acts and omissions constituted a general course of dealing and systematic policy of neglect, wrongdoing and mismanagement, in which all defendants participated, and that such negligence proximately caused great losses to the bank, is the complaint demurrable? We think not.

The defendants contend that there is a misjoinder of causes and parties, we cannot so hold. We think the present action is similar to Trust Co. v. Peirce, 195 N. C., at p. 718, where we find the following: “The one circumstance which differentiates this case from those cited by the defendants, especially Emerson v. Gaither, 103 Md., 564, 7 Ann. Gas., 1114, most nearly in point and upon which great reliance is put, is the allegation of a general course of dealing and systematic policy of wrongdoing, concealment and mismanagement, virtually amounting to a conspiracy, in which the defendants are all charged with having-participated at different times and in varying degrees. Cotten v. Laurel Park Estates, post, 848, 141 S. E., 339. A connected story is told and a complete picture is painted of a series of transactions, forming-one general scheme, and tending to a single end. This saves the pleading from the challenge of the demurrers. Cotton Mills v. Masline, ante, 12; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224, 50 S. E., 659; Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C., 135, 52 S. E., 198; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 47, 58 S. E., 603; Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 158 N. C., 455, 74 S. E., 465.”

Chapter 344, Public Laws 1931, “An act to amend the Code of Civil Procedure as to joinder of parties.” It amends C. S., 455, “Who may be plaintiffs” and 456 “Who may be defendants,” as follows: “All persons may be made defendants, jointly, severally, or in the alternative, who have, or claim, an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who are necessary parties to a complete determination or settlement of the questions involved. ... If the plaintiff is in doubt as to the persons from whom he is entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants’, to determine wbicb is liable.” This act liberalizes tbe joinder of both plaintiffs and defendants.

In tbe case of S. v. Bank, 193 N. C., at p. 527-8, citing numerous authorities, we find: “When a case is presented on demurrer we are required by tbe statute, 0. S., 535, to construe tbe complaint liberally Svith a view to substantial justice between tbe parties’ and in enforcing this provision, we have adopted tbe rule 'that if in any portion of it, or to any extent, it presents facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or if facts sufficient for that purpose can be fairly gathered from it, tbe pleading will stand however inartificially it may have been drawn, or however uncertain, defective and redundant may be its statements, for contrary to tbe common-law rule every reasonable intendment and presumption must be made in favor of tbe pleader,’ ” Foy v. Stephens, 168 N. C., 438; S. v. Trust Co., 192 N. C., 246; Enloe v. Ragle, 195 N. C., 38; Minnis v. Sharpe, 198 N. C., 364, 202 N. C., 300, ante, 110. Amendment inserting name of Gurney P. Hood, Commissioner, etc., defendants contend was not valid. We cannot so bold.

We find in Commissioner of Banks v. Carrier, 202 N. C., at p. 851, the following: “We have held that actions such as this must be prosecuted in tbe individual name of tbe Commissioner of Banks and not under bis official title. (Citing numerous authorities.) This is a defect wbicb may be cured by amendment.” C. S., 446, 513, 515, 547. Goins v. Sargent, 196 N. C., 478, C. S., 549.

Tbe trial court has plenary power, without consent, to amend pleadings, so far as tbe amendment did not allege substantially a new cause of action. Bridgeman v. Insurance Co., 197 N. C., 599. Allowing all amendments in pleadings is in tbe sound discretion of the court. Sheppard v. Jackson, 198 N. C., 627. The trial court can, in its discretion, amend pleadings before or after judgment to conform to facts proved. Finch v. R. R., 195 N. C., 190.

The defendants, under C. S., 534, may apply to tbe court below for a bill of particulars, and under C. S., 537, apply to make the allegations of tbe pleadings definite and certain by amendment when not so. Power Co. v. Elizabeth City, 188 N. C., at p. 285-6.

In Glass Co. v. Hotel Corp., 197 N. C., at p. 12, this Court says: “A demurrer goes to tbe heart of a pleading and challenges tbe right of tbe pleader to maintain bis position in any view of tbe matter, admitting for tbe purpose, tbe truth of tbe allegations of fact contained therein.”

We are only dealing now with a demurrer wbicb admits for tbe purpose tbe allegations of fact, contained in tbe complaint. It may be by answer and on tbe trial of tbe action a different picture may be shown by tbe defendants.

The able argument of counsel in this Court for defendants was learned and persuasive, but not convincing, for our liberal practice bas gone beyond the position taken by him. Yet the courts must be careful not to allow jungle pleadings whereby injustice may be done litigants. The judgment below overruling the demurrer must be

Affirmed.  