
    Patrick Jeffrey versus The Blue-Hill Turnpike Corporation.
    Where a statute creating a turnpike corporation had provided that the corporation should be liable for all damages which might arise to any person by taking his land'for the road, and the Sessions had passed an order awarding such damages to A B, — it was holden, that an action of debt lay for him against the corporation fbr the sum so awarded.
    The plaintiff declares in debt, for that he, “ by the consideration or the Court of Sessions, begun and holden at Dedham, in, &c., on the fourth Monday of April, 1808, recovered judgment against the said corporation for the sum of 1852 dollars 75 cents; and it was further ordered, by the same * court, that, in [ * 369 ] default of payment of the said sum for the term of six months from the time of the rendition of the said judgment, a warrant of distress should issue for levying the same on the persona-property of the said corporation, to the use and benefit of the saia P. J., with cost, taxed at 155 dollars 51 cents, as by the record of said court will appear. And the said P. J. says that, after the judgment and order aforesaid, in form aforesaid given, viz., on, &c., the Supreme Judicial Court of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, on the petition of the said corporation, and after a full hearing of all concerned, directed, by their certain writ of certiorari, the record of the said cause and the judgment of the said Court of Sessions thereon to be removed into said S. J. Court, holden at Dedham, on, &.c.; that the same Court might then and there cause to be done what of law and right ought to be done in the premises ; by virtue of which said writ of certiorari, the record and proceedings aforesaid into the said S. J. Court, holden at Dedham., as aforesaid, were duly sent and removed. Whereupon it was in such manner proceeded upon the said writ of certiorari, that afterwards, viz., at the S. J. Court, holden, &c., it was by the same Court considered that so much of the order of the Court of Sessions as provides that, in default of payment of the sum mentioned in said order, within the term therein limited, a warrant of distress be levied, &c., be quashed ; and that all other parts of said order of Sessions, and all other the proceedings therein, be affirmed, and that the record aforesaid be remitted, &c., so that such process might be made thereon as by law ought to be made, as will appear by the records of the said S. J. Court;  so that the judgment aforesaid of the Court of Sessions aforesaid, so far as it provides that the said P. J. recover against the said B. H. Turnpike Corporation the several sums aforesaid, is not reversed nor annulled, but affirmed by the judgment aforesaid of the S. J. Court aforesaid, and yet remains wholly unsatisfied; whereby an action has accrued to the plaintiff, &c. Yet though requested,” &c.
    * The defendants demurred to this declaration, and assigned for causes of demurrer, — 1. “ Because it is averred that the said action is brought on the record of a judgment or.order of the Court of Sessions for the county of Norfolk, and no proferí of said record or order is made in said declaration, as by law there ought to have been.” 2. “ Because it is not averred in said declaration that said judgment or order is still in full force and unsatisfied, as hy record thereof in said court remaining will appear, as by law it ought to have been.”
    The plaintiff joined in demurrer.
    
      Davis, (Solicitor-General,) for the defendants,
    confessed that he nad little reliance on the special causes of demurrer. He had intended to submit the point to the consideration of the Court, that an action of debt could not be maintained upon such an order of the Sessions as is here produced. The act incorporating the defendants  gives the same process for the recovery of damages by the owners of land taken by the corporation as in case of highways; and in the case of Gedney vs. The Inhabitants of Tewksbury, 
       this Court decided that an action of debt would not lie against a town, upon an order of Sessions, awarding damages in cases of laying out highways. But, since the decision -in the case of Bigelow vs. The Cambridge and Concord Turnpike Corporation, 
       Mr. Solicitor confessed his apprehensions that this point would fail the defendants also.
    
      Metcalf, for the plaintiff,
    cited 1 Saund. 330, to show that it is not essential to aver the judgment to remain in full force.
    
      
       See 5 Mass. Rep. 420, Com. vs. B. H. T. Corporation.
      
    
    
      
      
        Stat. 1803, c. 131.
    
    
      
       3 Mass. Rep. 307.
    
    
      
       7 Mass. Rep. 202.
    
   Per Curiam.

The supposed defects of form, alleged as causes of demurrer, have not been insisted on. The declaration is not, as we perceive, liable to any objections of that nature. As to the general objection to the remedy by an action of debt, the practice may be considered as settled by the decision of this Court, in the case of Bigelow vs. The Cambridge and Concord Turnpike Corporation.

The statute by which the defendants, in the case at bar, were made a corporation, contains a provision, “ that the * corporation shall be liable to pay all damages which [ * 371 ] may arise to any person by taking his land for the road.”

The proceedings to inquire of damages, and to ascertain the compensation, are prescribed; but nothing is said of the legal remedy by which payment is to be enforced against the corporation. This is a case, therefore, where the common law applies the necessary remedy. A debt has been incurred; the amount of it is ascertained, and the liability of the corporation appears sufficiently from the averments in the plaintiff’s declaration, which is adjudged good and sufficient.

Judgment for the plaintiff. 
      
       Vide Com. Dig., Debt, A, 9. — Mod. Ca. 26, 27.
     