
    Martha Jo PETERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 14-55375
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 11, 2017 
    
    Filed April 24, 2017
    Martha Jo Peters, Pro Se
    Lynette Gridiron Winston, Robert Coll-ings Little, Esquire, Attorney, Anglin Fle-welling Rasmussen Campbell & Trytten, LLP, Pasadena, CA, for Defendant-Appel-lee
    Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Martha Jo Peters appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her diversity action alleging state law claims arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to' state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Peters’ action because Peters failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See United States v. FMC Corp., 531 F.3d 813, 820 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[Ujnder Ninth Circuit precedent, incidental third-party beneficiaries may not enforce consent decrees,...”); see also Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.Sd 988, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions (Docket Entry Nos. 18 and 21) are denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     