
    WALBRIDGE vs. BELL.
    A claim for exemption is in time if made at the term to which an attachment execution is returnable.
    The exemption may he claimed against an equity judgment in a partnership settlement.
    Appeal from the Common Pleas of Erie County, No. 46, July Term, 1884. In Equity.
    The facts of the case appear in the opinion of the Court, which was as follows, per
    Galbraith, P. J.
    The plaintiff, on September 5, 1881, obtained a decree in equity against the defendant for the sum of $333.15 and costs. Nov. 11, 1881, an execution attachment was issued to ■attach all monies in the hands of the Pennsylvania Railroad 'Company, the writ being returnable the first Monday in February, 1882. This writ was served on the defendant November 23, 1881. On December 29, 1881, the answer of the Rail■road Company, garnishee, was filed, admitting $101.66 in their hands belonging to defendant. The defendant gave notice to the garnishees that he claimed the benefit of the $300 exemption law, which said notice in writing -was returned with ■the answer of the garnishee and filed with the same in the ■case December 29, 1881.
    This notice was undoubtedly in time; the defendant wras not bound to make the claim to the officer serving the attachment.
    It is sufficient that it was made before the term to which the writ is returnable. It would have been sufficient if made at That time; Bittenger’s Appeal, 76 Pennsylvania State Reports, 105.
    There is nothing in the point raised by counsel that the defendant cannot claim the exemption in this case. The bill in ■equity on which the decree in favor of the plaintiff was bad, was for a settlement of partnership accounts; the claim was ■ex contractu and not in tort. It rests upon the implied contract of defendant to pay the plaintiff any balance due to him.
    
      The defendant being entitled to the exemption and having made his claim in time, the rule for judgment against the garnishee must be discharged.
    C. H. Walbridge then appealed complaining of the action of the Court in holding the claim to have been made in time; and, second, in holding that the exemption could be claimed against a judgment in equity.
    
      Clark Olds, Esq., for appellant
    argued that the claim was not in time; Hammer vs. Freese, 19 Pa., 255; Rogers vs. Waterman, 25 Pa., 182; Gilleland vs. Rhoads, 34 Pa., 187; Diehl, vs. Holben, 39 Pa., 217; Strouse vs. Becker, 44 Pa., 206; Wray vs. Tammany, 13 Pa., 394. The partners were trustees for each other, and the debt is different from a contract debt; Lefever vs. Underwood, 41 Pa., 509.
    
      E. P. Gould and G. A. Allen, Esqs., contra,
    
    argued that the •claim for exemption was in time; Howard, &c., vs. Phila. & R. R. R. Co., 102 Pa., 220; Yost vs. Heffner, 69 Pa., 68; Bittenger’s Appeal, 76 Pa., 105. Assumpsit will lie after the dissolution of a co-partnership, and hence the exemption may be claimed; Pierce’s Appeal, 103 Pa., 27.
   The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Common Pleas on February 16th, 1885, in the following opinion:

Per Curiam.

There is no merit in any of the specifications of error. Under the facts, the claim for the exemption was made in time; Howard, &c., Association vs. Philadelphia & Reading R. R. Co., 6 Out., 220. Being intime, judgment against the garnishee was correctly refused.

Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant.  