
    Manuel de Jesus Orellana TOBAR, aka Jose de Jesus Orellana Tobar, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-72737
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted June 8, 2016 Pasadena, California
    Filed January 10, 2017
    Michael Steinberg, Alexa M. Lawson-Remer, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner
    Kevin James Conway, Esquire, Attorney, Virginia Lum, Attorney, OIL, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
    Before: RAWLINSON and BEA, Circuit Judges and EATON 
    
    
      
       Richard K. Eaton, Judge of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Manuel de Jesus Orellana To-bar (Tobar) petitions for review of a final order of removal. Tobar asserts that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) erred by denying his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of relief. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing for substantial evidence). The BIA agreed with the determination of the Immigration Judge (IJ) that Tobar’s claim lacked a nexus to a protected ground. To-bar failed to establish a connection between his asserted persecution and his status as an imputed whistleblower. Tobar offered only his association with Sergeant Carrillo and the threat that he would meet “the same end as the Sergeant,” who was going to testify regarding certain high-profile kidnappings. However, there was scant evidence that any testimony from Carrillo would have implicated the government rather than rogue police officers.

The BIA’s failure to cite to the El Salvador Country Report (Country Report) in its denial of CAT relief does not warrant a remand. Absent specific evidence to the contrary, we presume that the BIA considered all evidence presented. See Larita-Martinez v. I.N.S., 220 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000).

PETITION DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . Tobar asserts that the BIA purported to affirm a nonexistent adverse credibility determination. However, because the BIA denied relief on the merits we do not reach the credibility issue.
     
      
      . The government asserts that Tobar failed to exhaust this claim before the BIA, Although Tobar did not use the term "whistleblower,” the facts supporting this claim were sufficiently presented.
     