
    Neil v. Neil.
    1. The jurisdiction exercised in a divorce suit with respect to tlie custody of children is continuing ; the order in that respect may he - modified at any time during the minority of the children, when their interests may require such modification ; and the reservation of such power in the original order is not essential.
    2. An order dismissing a petition in a proceeding to modify a final order with respect to the custody of children in a divorce suit, may he reviewed on error.
    3. Where the district court dismisses a proceeding in error on the erroneous ground that the judgment complained of is not reviewahle, the supreme court is vested with discretion, on reversal of such erroneous - order, to remand the cause to the district court for further proceedings, or render such judgment as that court should have rendered.
    
      Error to the District Court of Franklin county.
    In 1870, a divorce with custody of children was awarded to the defendant in error, in the court of common pleas of Franklin county, and in 1879 the plaintiff in error filed in that court a petition for a modification of the decree so far as it relates to the children. An answer, a reply thereto, and a demurrer to the reply were filed, and the court, finding the petition and reply to be insufficient, sustained the demurrer to the reply and dismissed the petition. The district court dismissed a petition in error to reverse the order, on the ground that it was not reviewable, and this petition in error was filed to obtain a reversal of the order of the district court.
    
      G. L. Converse and O. K. Olds, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Harrison, Olds & Marsh, for defendant in error.
   Okby, C. J.

1. The jurisdiction exercised in divorce eases with respect to children, is continuing, and the power to modify the order in that respect may be exercised, during the minority of the children, whenever their welfare requires such modification. A reservation in the decree of authority to so modify is not essential to the exercise of such power; nor has the statute of limitations any application to such a case. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 15 Ohio St. 427. And see 2 Bishop’s M. & D. § 530.

2. In dismissing the proceeding in error for want of jurisdiction, the district court erred. Formerly such orders were not reviewable on error (Tappan v. Tappan, 6 Ohio St. 64), but the rule has been changed. King v. King, ante, 370; and see Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502. Of course, this power does not extend to an order granting a divorce, for, according to the settled policy in this state, such orders are not reviewable. Rev. Stats. § 5706 ; Parish v. Parish, 9 Ohio St. 534; and see 2 Bishop’s M. & D. § 260.

3. We are vested with discretion, on reversing the order of dismissal, to render such judgment as the district court should have rendered, or remand the cause to that court for further proceedings. Rev. Stats: § 6726, note; 29 Ohio St. 326. Where the evidence is set forth and a reversal is sought upon the ground that it does not support the verdict or judgment, and it appears from the record that the district court, for any cause, failed to determine that ^question, we have in case of reversal on other grounds, uniformly remanded the cause to the district, court for further proceedings, without determining as to the weight or effect of such evidence. l¡n view of the peculiar nature of this proceeding, and the fact that the district court has pronounced no judgment as to the sufficiency of the pleadings, we will remand the cause to the district court, without expressing any opinion as to the sufficiency of the grounds of reversal, except as here indicated.

Judgment reversed.  