
    M‘KEE'S Case.
    The Circuit Court has no appellate jurisdiction of proceedings in the Quarter Sessions, when not according to the course of the common law: hence it has not jurisdiction of a proceeding against a husband for deserting his wife and children.
    The Circuit. Court may remove a cause by habías coz-flus, with a view to the trial of an issue, but it- can only do so when the issue is according to the course of the common law.
    
      John MKee having deserted his wife and children, she made an application to a justice of the peace for relief, who issued a warrant against John MKee, commanding the constable to, take him, and bring him before him, that he might be bound over to appear at the next Court of Quarter Sessions, to answer the complaint of his wife. He was taken, and gave security for his appearance at the next sessions, when his attorney made the necessary certificate, and removed the case into the Circuit Court. It came on to be tried in the'Circuit Court, and his honor justice Rogers dismissed the cause and complaint, on the ground that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of it. From this decision; John MKee appealed to tlié' Supreme Court.
    
      Petrikin and Potter, for appellant.
    The acts of the 9th March, 1771, section 80, and 31st March, 1812, section 6, Purd. Dig. G59-679, authorise a proceeding by overseers of the poor, in cases where the wife is chargeable,, or likely to become so. This is in the nature of a civil proceeding by the záfe, and if she is entitled by any law to recover money, the husband would be entitled to a trial by jury: and if so,The Circuit ■ Court would have jurisdiction. Whenever an issue is to be tricd> that court has jurisdiction. Woods v. Woods, 17 Serg. Sf Razóle, 12. Light v. Light, ib. 273. Robbarts v. Robb arts, -9 Serg.fy Razóle, 191. Whorl. Dig. 463. No. 175.
    
      Valentine and Blanchard,-for appellee,
    whom the court declined to hear.
   Per Curiam.

The Circuit Court is á substitute for the former court of Nisi Prius, with scarce any power beyond the trial of issues, but to render judgment and determine appeals from the Register’s and Orphans’ Courts. There was no necessity, and' consequently no design to give it the general powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in bank. It clearly has no appellate jurisdiction of proceedings in the Quarter Sessions, when not according to the course of the common law; especially of a proceeding like ilie present, which strongly savours of a civil remedy, and which is particularly committed to that court. Even the Supreme Court in bank could take c.ognizancc of it only for the purpose of quashing it, by a certiorari after judgment,-which-the Circuit Court is expressly restrained from granting',- and although it may remove a cause by habeas corpus, with a view to- the trial of an issue,* 1 it can do so-, only when the issue is according to the course of the common law: beside it is enabled by the terms of the act of ,1799,- from' which it derives its powers, to take cognizance of nothing from the Quarter Sessions but indictments. The present- is not a proceeding for alimony, or one in which the intervention of a jury can be had in any shape; and we are satisfied that the judge- at the Circuit pursued the proper course in remanding it to the Sessions.-

Order of the Circuit Court affirmed,-  