
    STEAMBOAT JAMES BATTLE vs. WARING.
    [liisel in admiralty against steamboat.]
    1. Statutory Men on steamboats.- — The lien on steamboats and other vessels, given by statute in this State, (Code, § 2692,) for work done, or materials furnished, and for the wages of the officers, laborers, and crew, does not extend to a claim for money loaned to the master, to be applied by him in discharge of debts which were a statutory lien on the vessel, and which was so applied ; nor can the person who thus advances money to the master, proceed against the vessel by admiralty process under the statute, by analogy to that principle of general maritime law, which gives a lien on the vessel, not only to a person who directly furnishes necessary supplies and repairs in a for■eign port, but also to one who advances money to the master, on the credit of the vessel, in a case of necessity, to pay such furnisher.
    Appeal from tbe City Court of Mobile.
    Tried before tbe Hon. Henry Chamberlain.
    
      The steamboat JAMES Battle, of which William E. James was master, having been libeled under admiralty process at the suit of John H. Gindrat and others, Moses Waring filed his petition in court on the 28th Eebruary, 1861, asserting a hen on the vessel for the sum of two hundred and seventy dollars, the price of three hundred sacks of salt furnished by him to said steamboat, at the instance of the master; within the six months then last past. The petition alleged, 1st, that the salt was furnished, at the specified price, on the credit of the boat and her owners, and that the petitioner claimed a hen on the boat under section 2692 of the Code of Alabama; 2d, that he was entitled to a hen on the boat, for the price of the salt, by virtue of a custom of the port of Mobile; and, 3d, that the master of the boat sold the salt, and apphed the proceeds of sale to the payment of certain debts which at that time were a statutory hen on the vessel, and that the petitioner thereby became entitled to a hen on the boat.
    The record contains what purports to be an “agreed statement of facts”, which is signed by Moses Waring and W. F. James, but is without date; and- there is an admission of record in this court, signed by the counsel of both parties, “that the said statement of facts was made a part of the record, and the cause was submitted and decided on that evidence and proof of the allegations of fact contained in Waring’s petition, both parties reserving the right of appeal.” The statement of facts is in the following words: “On the trial of this cause, the plaintiff proved, that it had been the cüstom in Mobile, for many years, for dealers in salt to supply the steamboats on the Alabama river with salt, at the request of the boats, in order that the boats might make a freight thereon ; that salt was a low-priced article, which the boats could readily dispose of along the river, at a sufficient price to pay the cost and freight; that it was also a part of the usual and customary course of trade, that the salt is furnished at the request of the master of the boat, and is not paid for by the boat, when sold, until the boat’s return to Mobile from the trip; that the boat is at liberty, when the salt is sold, to use the money derived from the sale in paying off the hands, and other bills which, under section 2692 of tbe Code, constitute a lien on tbe boat. Tbe plaintiff proved, also, that tbe steamboat James Battle was regularly enrolled, and was plying on tbe Mobile and Alabama rivers; that on tbe 26th January, and 2d February, 1861, at tbe request of tbe master, be furnished to said steamboat-sacks of salt, in pursuance of said custom, and with tbe customary understanding ; that tbe salt was then worth two hundred and seventy dollars; that tbe boat carried it up tbe river, and sold it in such a way as to realize from tbe sale its original cost and tbe freight; that the boat received tbe money from tbe sale, and applied it in paying off tbe bands, and other claims against tbe boat, which, under section 2692 of tbe Code, were entitled to privileged bens on tbe boat; that all of said claims, so paid, were contracted within six months before that time; and that claims similar to bis bad been allowed by the city court of Mobile, under chapter eight, title two, part third, of tbe Code of Alabama, at least as early as April, 1854.”
    Tbe court allowed tbe plaintiff's claim, and its decree is tbe only matter now assigned as error.
    DabgaN & TayloR, for appellants.
    HamiltoNS & OweN, contra.
    
   R. W. WALKER, J.

Tbe courts of this State can proceed by admiralty process to enforce tbe collection of such debts only as, under our statutes, constitute a lien on tbe vessel. Tbe only debts of this class are those for work done on, or materials supplied tbe vessel, and for tbe wages of tbe officers, laborers, and crew. — Code, § 2692. Tbe most favorable view, for tbe appellee, which can be taken of tbe case, is to consider him as having advanced or loaned money to tbe master of tbe boat, which tbe latter was at liberty to apply, and which be did apply, in paying tbe wages of tbe crew, and other debts which, under tbe section just referred to, constituted a lien on the vessel. Thus considered, tbe debt was merely a debt for money loaned, and does not belong to either of tbe classes enumerated in tbe statute. And as these privileged bens are stricti juris, and are not to be extended argumentatively to cases not within tbe law wbieb confers tbem, (The Kiersage, 2 Curtis’ C. C. 421,) we can not bold that, bj tbe transaction proved on tbe trial, tbe liens of tbe crew and material-men Were transferred to tbe plaintiff. — See Schooner Louisiana v. Fettyplace, 21 Ala. 286; Schooner Southron v. O’Riley, 21 Ala. 228 ; The T. P. Leathers, 1 Newberry’s Adm. 432 ; Godeffroy v. Caldwell, 2 Cal. 489.

In support of tbe decree of tbe circuit court, tbe appel-lee’s counsel invokes tbe analogy furnished by tbe principle of tbe general maritime law, wbicb gives a ben upon a vessel, not' only to tbe party directly furnishing necessary sup-pbes and repairs in a foreign port, but also to one wbo lends money to tbe master, on tbe credit of tbe vessel, in a case of necessity, to pay sucb furnisher. To this argument there are two answers, each of wbieb we consider conclusive. First, this is a proceeding under a statute, and, in order to determine whether the debt is of tbe privileged class, we must look alone to the words of tbe statute, and not beyond tbem to tbe rules of tbe general maritime law; and, second, tbe analogy rebed on fails in this case, because there is nothing in tbe statement of facts to jilstify tbe inference, that tbe arrangement in proof was made under tbe stress of any sucb necessity as, by tbe maritime law, is held indispensable to tbe creation of a ben in favor of one wbo lends money to tbe master. — See Thomas v. Osborne, 19 How. U. S. 22, 30-1; Leddo v. Hughes, 15 Ill. 41; Abbott on Shipping, 100, 107, 116, and notes.

Decree reversed, and cause remanded.  