
    STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY v. Sandra J. CRUMPTON and Robert W. Crumpton.
    1951812.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    Nov. 7, 1997.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 1998.
    
      Michael B. Beers of Beers, Anderson, Jackson & Smith, P.C., Montgomery; Roderick K. Nelson and Sue E. Williamson of Lamar, Nelson & Miller, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
    Clay Hornsby and Larry W. Morris of Morris, Haynes, Ingram & Hornsby, Alexan-. der City, for appellees.
   BUTTS, Justice.

AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.

See Rule 58(a)(1) and.(a)(2)(B), Ala. R.App. P.

ALMON, SHORES, KENNEDY, and COOK, JJ., concur.

HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, and SEE, JJ., dissent.

HOOPER, Chief Justice

(dissenting).

I must respectfully dissent from this Court’s summary affirmance of a judgment against State Farm Fire and Casualty Company on Sandra Crumpton and Robert Crumpton’s claim of bad faith failure to pay a claim on a fire insurance policy. To recover from State Farm for bad faith refusal to pay a claim, the Crumptons had to show: (1) an insurance contract between them and State Farm and a breach thereof by State Farm; (2) an intentional refusal to pay their claim; (3) the absence of any reasonably legitimate or arguable reason for that refusal; and (4) State Farm’s actual knowledge of the absence of any legitimate or arguable reason. National Security Fire & Cos. Co. v. Bowen, 417 So.2d 179 (Ala.1982). The evidence showed that State Farm had a reasonably legitimate or arguable reason for denying the Crumptons’ claim. State Farm’s investigations pointed to arson as the cause of the fire that destroyed the Crumptons’ home. The burn patterns and materials found in the home were consistent with the use of an accelerant. The Birmingham Fire Department’s initial investigation pointed to arson. The Crumptons were the only ones with access to the home and were the last to leave it. The evidence showed that the Crumptons were behind in paying their bills. In addition, the Crumptons represented to the State Farm investigator that they had never pawned anything, yet the investigator found a pawn ticket in the rubble of the home.

State Farm could have legitimately inferred from these factors that the Crumptons had a motive for setting fire to their home and that they did in fact deliberately set fire to their home. The elements of a bad faith refusal to pay a claim do not require a defendant like State Farm to be undebatably correct in its conclusion that this fire was caused by arson. The plaintiff’s burden of proof in a bad faith claim is to show that the nonpayment was made without any reasonable grounds. The evidence showed that State Farm had reasonable grounds to deny the Crumptons’ claim.

HOUSTON, Justice

(dissenting).

Given the facts suggested by the evidence in the record in this case, if the trial court had directed a verdict for the Crumptons on their breach of, contract claim and State Farm had appealed from a judgment on that directed verdict, then, viewing the undisputed facts in the record and the disputed facts construed most favorably toward the Crump-tons, I would have voted to reverse. (Under our standard for reviewing directed verdicts, I would have had to construe the disputed facts most favorably toward the nonmovant, which would have been State Farm in my hypothetical situation of the trial court’s directing a verdict for the Crumptons. However, even if I had given the Crumptons the benefit of the doubt, I would have had to vote to reverse such a judgment). See National Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So.2d 1357 (Ala.1982).

If this is a “normal” or an “ordinary” bad faith case, then I have to vote to reverse. The Crumptons contend that this is not a “normal” or “ordinary” case because, they argue, State Farm did not prove arson. State Farm, at the time this action was filed, had competent and relevant evidence indicating 1) that someone had committed arson; 2) that the insureds (the Crumptons) had a motive for committing the arson; and 3) that the insureds had had an opportunity to be involved in the origin of the fire. That evidence is sufficient for me to conclude that this is a “normal” or “ordinary” bad faith case. Williams v. Allstate Ins. Co., 591 So.2d 38 (Ala.1991); Bush v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 576 So.2d 175 (Ala.1991); Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. Stone, 402 So.2d 899 (Ala.1981).

Therefore, unless there was substantial evidence that State Farm 1) intentionally or recklessly failed to properly investigate the Crumptons’ claim; or 2) intentionally or recklessly failed to properly subject the results of its investigation to a cognitive evaluation or review; or 3) created its own debatable reason for denying the claim so that this would be an abnormal or extraordinary case of bad faith, I must vote to reverse.

I have studied the Crumptons’ brief; it does not persuade me that there was substantial evidence that State Farm did any one of the three things that would make this an abnormal or extraordinary bad faith case.

MADDOX and SEE, JJ., concur.  