
    
      William P. Finley vs. The South Carolina Canal and Rail Road Company.
    
    Defendant in execution owned a tract of land which was intersected by the line dividing two districts. The sheriff of one of the districts levied on, sold, and made a deed of conveyance for the whole tract. Held, that the sheriff’s deed conveyed only the land lying in his own district.
    A sheriff has no authority to levy on and sell land lying out of his district.
    
      Before Frost, J. at Edg-efield, July, extra Term, 1845.
    This was an action of trespass to try titles. The jury found the following special verdict.
    “We, the jury, find that one William Ashley recovered a judgment, in Barnwell district, against William W. Williams, which was enrolled and entered on the 20th November, 1840, and an execution fi. fa. was lodged in the sheriff’s office for Barnwell district, on the same day. That by virtue of the said execution, the same being then in full force and unsatisfied, William J. Harley, as sheriff of Barn-well district, levied on, and on the 4th of November, 1842, sold at public outcry, a tract, of land as the property of William W. Williams, containing one thousand and thirty-eight acres, more or less, and called and known as the Coker Spring tract. That the plaintiff became the purchaser thereof, and received the sheriff’s deed therefor, bearing that date. We further find, that the dividing line between the districts of Edgefield and Barnwell runs through and intersects the said Coker Spring tract, leaving 708 acres thereof in Barnwell district, and 330 acres in Edgefield district. On the portion in Barnwell district, the said William W. Williams resided. We further find, that the sheriff of Barnwell district, at the time of his sale, intended to sell the entire tract, so far as he had authority, as well that portion lying in Edgefield district as that in Barnwell district, and his deed to the plaintiff embraces and includes the whole. We further find, that the lot of land in dispute is a lot containing six and eight tenths. acres, at or near the foot of the inclined plane of the Hail Hoad ; is located in Edgefield district, and was conveyed to the defendant, an incorporated company, by William W. Williams, by deed of release, bearing date the sixteenth of October, one thousand eight hundred and forty-one, and duly recorded in the register’s office at Edgefield, March 7th, 1842. This lot of land is part and parcel of the Coker Spring tract of land, then owned by, and in the possession of, the said W. W. Williams. If the court should be of the opinion that the sheriff of Barnwell district could, under the circumstances above stated, sell that portion of the Coker Spring tract which is situated in Edgefield district, then we find for the plaintiff the land in dispute, and five dollars damages. If otherwise, we find for the defendant.”
    His Honor the presiding Judge, ordered the postea to be delivered to the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, and now moved this court to reverse the order of the presiding Judge, on the grounds — ■
    1. That a sheriff has no jurisdiction or authority beyond his district — consequently, that the sheriff of Barn-well district, under an execution fieri facias, lodged in his district only, could not sell and convey land lying in Edgefield district.
    2. That a corporation aggregate is not liable for acts implying actual force and motive ; consequently, that the defendant is not liable to the suit of trespass to try titles.
    
      Wardlaw, for the motion,
    cited, on the first ground, Act 1839, p. 26 ; 1 N. & McC. 356 ; Dud. 152; 1 N. & McC. 252; 7 Stat. 209; 8 Johns. R. 520; and on the second ground, 1 Sp. 580; 2 Hill, 571 ; Ang. & A. on Corp. 328.
    
      Bausfcett, contra,
    on the first ground, cited 4 Stat. 665; and on the second ground, Ang. & A. on Corp. 333 ; 3 Peters, 409 ; 15 East, 6 ; 8 Stat. 354, 384.
   Curia, per Richardson, J.

The question is general, and applies to all sheriffs. Can a sheriff sell an entire tract of land, when a part only is located within the territorial limits of his own district, because the entire tract, although extending into another district, is contained in one conveyance or grant, and constitutes but one tract or plantation of the freeholder and defendant, whose land the sheriff has levied upon.

It cannot be supposed that a sheriff can, generally, sell the lands of an adjoining district. But in this instance, the juxtaposition and aggregation of the land, in fact, and its reduction and union in one title, is supposed to place the whole under the levy of one sheriff. And certainly, in many instances,' as perhaps in this, it might be convenient and just' to allow sucha power to the sheriff first making a levy upon the part within his district. But once allow such a power, and it would follow that a sheriff, by levying upon one acre of land situated within his district, might sell'many thousands of acres adjoining the one acre levied upon, and yet out of his district..

Usually, a sheriff sells a particular tract, but not from any •legal necessity; for he may, and sometimes does, sell a part or the whole, in separate subdivisions or parcels. But in ho case can he extend his own power, and sell lands beyond his jurisdiction, simply on account of a supposed economy and convenience to the parties concerned, or for his own interest. Such a discretion would be too easily .abused, and would lead to contentions, which of two sheriffs should get the first levy upon a tract of land extending into their two districts.

In fact, such cases of adjoining lands have occurred — ■ but in these, each sheriff sold only the part belonging to his own district; any other practice would be dangerous.

The sheriff’s release to the plaintiff must be expounded to convey no more than the land situated in Barnwell district. The motion to reverse the order made, is, therefore, granted, and the postea awarded to the defendant.

O’Neall, Evans, Wardlaw and Frost, JJ. concurred.  