
    Timothy Wellman versus Lewis Lawrence
    Where an administrator obtained a license to make sale of the real estate oí ms intestate for the payment of debts, and, after a lapse of twelve years, sold the estate, the sale was holden to be void.
    So, where such sale was advertised to be on Friday the 17th, whereas Friday was in fact the 16th, the sale was for that cause void; although, in the last publication, which was on the day of the sale, the error was corrected.
    This was a writ of entry sur disseisin, and was submitted to the decision of the Court upon the following statement of facts agreed by the parties: —
    Some time previous to the year 1801, Adam Wellman died seised of an undivided moiety of a parcel of land, as tenant in common with his mother Mercy Wellman, and the same lawfully descended to Rebecca PVood,, his only heir at law. Upon the petition of the said Rebecca for partition, in which she described herself as tenant in common of said real estate, with others to her unknown, and due process being had thereon, the undivided moiety, so descended from said Adam., was, in February, 1811, set off to the said Rebecca by metes and bounds, in severalty.
    The demandant claims to hold the land so set off to the said Rebecca, under an administration sale made as follows: Timothy Wellman, a principal creditor of said * deceased, was, on the 6th of November, 1801, duly appointed administrator of the said Adam; and he notified his appointment as the law directs, and in due time returned an inventory into the Probate Court; in which the personal estate of the said Adam, was appraised at 160 dollars 45 cents, and the real estate at 1200 dollars On the 10th of January, 1804, the said administrator presented to the Court of Probate a list of debts which, including one in his own favor of 569 dollars 21 cents, amounted to 1110 dollars 99 cents; and he was thereupon duly licensed, by the Court of Common Pleas March term, 1804, to sell so much of the real estate of the said Adam as should be sufficient to pay his just debts. An auction was accordingly duly appointed and notified, and the land aforesaid, at the time and place designated, was offered at public sale — but, without any sale having been effected, the auction was closed without adjournment.
    On the 16th of August, 1816, the said administrator sold at public auction the purparty set off, as aforesaid, to his son, the demandant, and conveyed the same to him by metes and bounds, to hold in severalty. Notice of the time and place of said auction was duly given, excepting in this, that the first publication of said notice stated that the auction would be on Friday, the 17th, whereas Friday was in fact the 16th; but the last publication, which was issued on the day of the sale, stated both the day of the week and the day of the month correctly.
    The said administrator has never paid any debts due from said estate, nor rendered any account of administration. The debts against the estate, including the administrator’s own debt, are upon simple contract; and no action has been brought against the administrator for them. The sureties upon the administration bond are both dead and insolvent.
    Judgment was to be entered, agreeably to the opinion of the Court upon the foregoing facts, upon the nonsuit of the demandant, or the default of the tenant.
    * Pickering argued for the demandant.
    The sale by the administrator was made under a legal order of court therefor. His authority was indisputable; and if any blame attaches to him for the delay of executing that authority, the title of an innocent purchaser ought not to be questioned on that account.  The lapse of time between the obtaining of the order and the actual sale cannot vacate the sale. There is no decision to this effect, nor is there any legal principle to support the position. The statute prescribes no time within which the order must be executed; and the legislature, in the new act to regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings of the “ Courts of Probate,”  by limiting the time within which such orders shall be in force, have implied that under former laws no limitation existed. The truth may well be supposed to be, that the delay was with the understanding and consent of the heirs.
    As to the mistake in the advertisement, it was but a trifling error; the notice was substantially sufficient, and in the last newspaper it was in al] respects correct; and it may be added that purchasers are governed by the notices of the day of sale more than by such as are long before. But the same observation applies with equal force to this objection, viz., that an honest and boná fide purchaser ought not to lose his estate for the carelessness of the administrator, and much less of the printer. In the case of Perkins vs. Fairfield, an administrator’s sale was held valid, although the order was passed under circumstances which did not authorize it, and although the administrator gave no bond to account for the proceeds.
    
      Mack, for the tenant.
    By the judgment for partition the admin istrator was bound ;  if he intended to avail himself of his lien, he should have opposed the partition, on the ground of his authority to sell.
    An administrator can sell the real estate of his intestate only for demands legally existing against the estate. Here is no evidence of such claims at any time ; and at * the time of the sale it is apparent that no claim could have been enforced at law, as every debt was barred by the statute. 
    
    The authority was executed at the first auction. Had he intended then to act further under the license, it was his duty to adjourn the sale. If one disseised make and deliver a lease for years, nothing passes by it; and if he afterwards, being in possession, deliver it again, the second delivery is also void, because the first delivery made it his deed. 
    
    There was no legal notice given of the sale, and without such notice there was no authority. The mistake in the advertisements must have misled or confused those who were disposed to purchase; the day of the month was necessary, to ascertain the day of the week.
    On a fair construction of the statute, an administrator is bound to execute his authority within a reasonable time. It is but a naked authority, and should be strictly pursued. Heirs are interested, as Well as creditors, in the speedy adjustment of estates; yet they have no means of compelling a settlement. All the provisions of the law on this subject show that expedition is required.
    At any rate, his authority to sell must be limited by his liability for debts; and this is confined to four years. This Court will not grant a license for sale by an administrator after four years have expired fi om his taking out letters of administration. 
      The administrator sold, in this case, by metes and bounds; whereas his intestate died seised of an estate in common. 
    
    
      
       7 Mass. Rep. 292, Leverett vs. Harris. —11 Mass. Rep. 227, Perkins vs. Fairfield
      
    
    
      
      
        Stat. 1817, c. 190, § 12.
    
    
      
       2 Mass. Rep. 462, Cook vs. Allen.
      
    
    
      
       3 Mass. Rep. 262, Dean vs. Dean.
      
    
    
      
      
        Co. Lit. 48, b.
      
    
    
      
       Ante, 58, Ex parte Allen, Petitioner. —13 Mass. Rep. 165, Scott vs. Hancock & Al. — Ibid. 201, Brown & Al. vs. Anderson, Adm.
      
    
    
      
       9 Mass. Rep. 34, Porter vs. Hill. —12 Mass. Rep. 348, Bartlett vs. Harlow.
      
    
   Per Curiam.

We are fully of opinion that the demandant can-

not prevail in this action; and this upon two grounds. In the first place, we think that the administrator had no authority to make the sale, under the license, at the period he did. We have already decided that a license is not to be granted, unless to raise money for the payment of debts which the administrator is by law compellable to pay. In * the present case there can be no question that, at the time of his obtaining the

license, there were demands of that description existing against the estate of his intestate. But when he made the sale, no such demands existed in favor of other creditors; and his own claim stood on no better ground than those of others. It is true that the practice, in relation to this subject, has formerly been very loose; but we have endeavored, in several late cases, to ascertain and define the rights and the duties of administrators. As suits against them are by statute to be 'commenced within four years, there can be no good reason for the exercise of the authority given to the courts for licensing the sale of real estate for the payment of debts after that term has expired; except, indeed, if suits are still pending, it would be reasonable to sustain an application for such license within a reasonable time after such suits shall be ended. We should not, then, have licensed this administrator, at the time he made the sale; and there is no ground, on which the sale can be justified, which would not have rendered it equally fitting to have granted a license at that time.

The mistake made in the advertising of the sale is sufficient to render it void. There is the utmost necessity of precision in transactions of this nature. Those who might be disposed to attend the sale, as bidders, would be deterred by observing such a blunder. The corrected notice on the day of the sale did not leave sufficient time for general information,

Demandant nonsuit. 
      
      
         Ex parte Allen, ante, 58. — Thompson vs. Brown & Al. 16 Mass. Rep. 172. ~ Emerson vs. Thomson, 16 Mass. Rep. 429. — Scott vs. Hancock & Al. 13 Mass. Rep 162. — Brown vs. JhuLerson, 13 Mass. Rep. 201. — Clarke vs. Tufts, 5 Pick. 337. —Kicard vs Williams, 7 JVheat. 59—115.
     