
    Ex parte Louis.
    A )tatii-liber may sue for his liberty, unaided by a curator or other person. The appointment of a curator to a statu-liber is only necessary to preserve or administer property, givon or B devised to him after 'he has acquired the right to freedom at a future-time. C. C. Í93.
    APPEAL from the First District Court-of New Orleans, McHenry, J. J.
    
    
      M. Wolfe, for the appellant.
    
      Biron, contrá.
   The judgment of the court Was pronounced by

King, J.

Antoine Gin'eral, by his last will, directed his slave Louis tobo liberated at the age of twenty-one years. Until that age he was left under the care of his executor, David Cousin, with an injunction upon the latter to cause the slave to be taught a trade. Louis lately presented a petition to the District Court representing, that the period for his emancipation had arrived ; that he was entitled to wages for the time that he remained in the service of Cousin, and to damages for ill treatment; and prayed for .the appointment of a curator to take charge of his person and administer his property. An order was granted for the appointment-of a curator, in conformity with this prayer. Cousin subsequently took a rule to show cause why tlje order should not be set aside. The rule was made absolute, and the plaintiff has appealed.

No appointment of a curator was necessary to enable the plaintiff to maintain an action for his liberty. The statu-liher is authorized to appear in court tmaided, for that purpose. The law only contemplates the appointment of a curator to the stalu-liber, for the purpose of preserving and administering property given, or devised, *to him, after he has acquired the future right to his ' freedom. C. C. art. 193. It is neither alleged nor shewn that the petitioner has received a donation or bequest, and, we think, that the judge did not ppr in rescinding the order. The question in relatipn to the petitioner’s right either to ^ the damages or wages claimed, although discussed at bar, does not properly .1 arise in the present litigation. It is understood to be at issue in another action i now pending between the parties, and an expression of opinion in relation t.o it, j at this time, would be premature, as we deem i.t unnecessary to the decision of 1 the isolated question presented. Judgment qffinn,ed. jg  