
    Loren J. LARSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; Amy Rabeau, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-35544
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted November 16, 2016 
    
    Filed November 21, 2016
    Loren J. Larson, Jr., Pro Se.
    Mary Barbara Pinkel, Attorney, AGAK—Office of the Alaska Attorney General (Anchorage), Special Prosecutions & Appeals Division, Anchorage, AK, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Loren J. Larson, Jr„ an Alaska state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We reverse and remand.

Defendants do not dispute on appeal that the policy regarding non-removable wristband identification imposed a substantial burden on Larson’s religious exercise. The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court properly granted summary judgment when it found that defendants established that the non-removable wristband identification was the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling governmental interest in security. However, defendants submitted the declaration of L. Dean Marshall explaining that “some inmates, such as those inmates who serve on work crews or on special projects,” still wear removable identification tags. The declaration does not indicate whether the security concerns underlying the wristband identification requirement are inapplicable to the individuals allowed to wear removable identification tags. Thus, the record shows a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the non-removable wristband identifications are the least restrictive means. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) (stating that under RLUI-PA, “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise” of a prisoner unless the government establishes, that the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive means”). Accordingly, we reverse summary judgment for defendants and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     