
    * James Eunson versus William Healy and John Tuckerman, his Trustee. Asa Nichols & Al., and Oliver W. Champney, versus Same.
    An endorser of a promissory note, after a verdict obtained against him by the endorsee, and before judgment, cannot be sued as the trustee of the endorsee under the statute of February 28, 1795.
    The question in these actions was, whether Tuckerman could be held as the trustee of Healy, by force of the statute of this com monwealth, passed February 28, 1795, entitled, “An Act to enable creditors to receive their just demands out of the goods, effects, and credits, of their debtors, when the same cannot be attached by the ordinary process of law.” The facts appear, in Tuckerman’s answer to the usual interrogatory, as follows: —
    The said Tuckerman makes answer that, on the 5th day of January, A. D. 1797, Amasa Penniman made his note of hand of that date, whereby he promised the said Tuckerman to pay him, or order, 1075 dollars, in sixty days after date, with interest after; which note said Tuckerman endorsed to William Healy, and the said Healy endorsed the same to John Haskins. That, on the 1st day of August, 1801, said Healy sued said Tuckerman, in which suit said Healy set forth, in his declaration, that he had paid said Haskins (who was the last endorsee) the amount of said note. That action was tried at the Supreme Judicial Court at Boston, March term, 1804, and a verdict was obtained against said Tuckerman for 1528 dollars and 29 cents. That, before the said verdict was obtained against him, viz., on the 13th day of December, 1803, the said Tuckerman was summoned as the trustee of the said Healy, at suit of Asa Nichols ; and also before the said verdict was obtained aforesaid, viz., on the 11th day of January, 1804, the said Tucker-man was summoned as trustee of said Healy, at the suit of Oliver W. Champney. That, after the said verdict was obtained as aforesaid, and before judgment was rendered thereon, viz., on the 15th day of March, 1804, the said Tuckerman was summoned, as the trustee of the said Healy, at the suit of James Eunson. The said action of Healy vs. Tuckerman has been continued from term to term, and no judgment has yet been rendered on the said [ * 33 ] * verdict, by reason of the said Tuckerman’s being so summoned, as aforesaid. Upon the foregoing statement of facts, the said Tuckerman submits himself,” &c.
    
      Selfridge and Phillips, of counsel for Nichols and Champney,
    
    would have argued that Tuckerman should be adjudged the trustee of Healy in those actions. But the Court inclined to hear an argument on behalf of Eunson, and suggested that it would be,in season, after the difficulties on their minds in his case were removed, to attend to the question as it related to the other plaintiffs.
    
      W. Sullivan contended, in behalf of Eunson, that Tuckerman,
    
    on the answers he had given, was not the trustee of Healy in the suits of Nichols 8f Ad. and Champney, but that he was trustee of Healy in Eunson’s suit.
    He stated, in support of his positions, the analogy between the proceedings under our trustee law, and the process of foreign attachment, by the custom of London, and some other places; and cited 1 Com. Dig. title Attachment, Letter A,  that the practice under the first trustee act  was to attach money due on bond, note, or account, as well as goods, (notwithstanding the expressions in the act be “ trusted or deposited,”) to the same effect as attachments are made under the before-mentioned custom ; that the first section of the law passed February, 1795, is so comprehensive in its terms as to render every species of personal property liable to attachment, when “ deposited or intrusted ” in the hands of others. The practice under this law, as well as under the former one, has been to construe these words as meaning any legal or equitable accountability for money, or any personal property, and not a mere custody. By any other construction the remedial effects of this act might be entirely defeated, and property might easily be placed beyond the reach of creditors ; such construction of the law is supported by the eleventh section, giving a right against the executors and administrators of trustees, dying pending the process. [ * 34 ] * If these grounds are tenable, Tuckerman must be trustee upon the answer he has given, unless his relation-snip to Healy can be brought within the twelfth  section of the statute. He became debtor to Healy because he had endorsed a negotiable security. When Nichols &r AL, and Champney, made their attachments, his answer would have been that he was party in such a security; that whether he was or was not liable to pay money in consequence of being such party depended on legal decision ; that he did not consider himself liable, and consequently not trustee. When Eunson attached, this decision had been had; the note had ceased" to be negotiable; it was on the files of this Court as the basis of a verdict in which all parties acquiesced. The respondent does not complain, in his answer, that the verdict was wrong; he expresses no intention to arrest judgment, review, or alter, in any respect, the state of the case. He says that j’udgment had been delayed merely on account of these attachments; implying that otherwise he should have paid the money to Healy. This is then a fund in Tuckerman’s hands, which will undoubtedly go to Healy, unless it can be otherwise applied under this attachment. If a j’udgment in Healy’s action vs. Tuckerman be necessary to perfect Eunson’s right, the Court have power over this, and may order the judgment to be entered, as of the term when the verdict was returned. • It is presumed the justice of the case would warrant the exercise of this power.
    
      Eunson relics,
    in support of his claim, that, by the words “ goods, effects, and credits,” every species of personal property is intended ; that by “intrusted and deposited ” any possession or accountability is intended ; and that, after verdict, Tuckerman had in his hands a fund belonging to Healy which was not within the twelfth section of the statute respecting negotiable securities.
    
      
       1 Rol. 551, c. 50, Com. Dig. ubi sup. Letter C.
      
    
    
      
       Passed, 1758.
    
    
      
       By the 12th section it is enacted that, “ No person shall be considered or adjudged to be a trustee, within the intent and meaning of this act, by reason, or on account, of his having made, given, endorsed, negotiated, or accepted, any negotiable security whatever.”
    
   The opinion of the Court was afterwards delivered by

Dana, C. J.

The question arising out of the facts stated by Tuckerman in his answer, and which has been argued at the bar, *is whether a person, who has endorsed a negó- [ *35 ] tiable promissory note, can be held, in virtue of such endorsement, as the trustee of the endorsee ? The words of the statute are plain and comprehensive. But it has been argued that the verdict, which Healy has obtained in an action brought by him against Tuckerman on the note, has changed the relation of these parties, and has given to Eunson’s attachment, which was made after the verdict, a preference to those made in the other cases before the verdict. But the Court think otherwise ; and are unanimously agreed that, from the strong language of the statute, they cannot adjudge Tuckerman to be the trustee of Healy, in Eunson’s action, upon the facts stated. The same language applies with less iloubt to the two other cases. We aive no opinion what would have been the effect, if a judgment had been rendered upon the verdict prior to the making of the attachment.

Trustee discharged. 
      
      
         Prescott vs. Parker, 4 Mass. Rep. 170. — Sharp vs. Clarke & Al. post, 9. — Kidd vs. Shepherd, 4 Mass. Rep. 238. — Gridley vs. Harraden, 14 Mass. Rep. 496.—Foster vs Jones, 15 Mass. Rep. 185. — Winthrop vs. Carleton, 8 Mass. Rep. 456.
     