
    Sundry Creditors of Messrs. Thayer & Sturgis against The Sheriff of Charleston District.
    
      Charleston District,
    
    
      1798.
    
    At sheriffs’ emptor^iT"! §“ed defendant's is no good ren-purchaser the money'i'ffd ^ riff’s sa-
    UPON a rule on the sheriff to bring money into court, to be paid over to the plaintiffs, on their executions, &c.
    The cause shewn by the sheriff in this case was, that he had sold a house and lot on East Bay-street, the property of the defendants Thayer and Sturgis, which had been bought in by John Duncan, at.and for the sum of 1,800/. sterling, but that he had refused to pay the purchase-money unless he had an abatement of 400/. sterling, for the dower which the wives of the defendants might claim, in case of their surviving their husbands ; and therefore prayed the aid and advice of the court, before he made his return, or proceeded to resell the house and lot, at the risk of the purchaser.
    On the part of the creditors it was urged, that this dower, which was made the pretext of non-payment of the money by the purchaser, was a mere possibility, which depended upon a contingency which might or might not happen. That it was very uncertain whether these ladies would survive their husbands or not; and that even if they did, it might be at a very late period of their lives, when their right of dower would be worth very little, if any thing. That, at all events, there was no rule at the common law for ascertaining uncertain and contingent damages; and the dower act only related to widows who had lost their husbands, and whose rights had actually accrued, and which did not depend on possibilities. It was further urged, that this was a case of considerable importance to the public, and merited the serious consideration of the court.
    This sale was made by operation of law, in consequence of a judgment obtained in a court of justice, in which the plaintiffs in the different suits were not bound to warrant- or in-^emnify ^16 purchaser against any such claims; it differed widely from private sales, where the seller was bound to warrant and defend the property free from all incumbrances, or where the payment of the consideration money raised an implied covenant in law. That the right of property of the defendants in the action was the thing seized and sold by the sheriff, more or less ; whatever that might be, the purchaser had a right to by virtue of this sale, and the sherifF could convey no more. It was the duty of the purchaser to examine into the nature of the estate, and the quality of the thing sold, before he made his purchase. Caveat emptor was the proper rule in such a case, and unless that was laid down as the true rule in sheriffs’ sales, it would render them, uncertain in all parts of the country, and constant shifts and pretences would be conjured up, by purchasers, in all cases where after purchase they did not like their bargains, more especially where the wives of defendants were living at the time of such sale.
    On the part of the purchaser, who did not wish to give up his bargain, it was said, a case had been determined in this court in 1793, (Blake’s case,) where a contingent claim of dower had been sent to a jury, to determine what deduction out of the purchase-money ought to be made for her possible claim, which the jury allowed, and which, it was urged, ought to make a precedent in every? case. That although the purchaser had demanded an abatement of 400/. in this case out of the purchase-money, yet he w?as willing to submit it to a jury, as in Mrs. Blake’s case, to ascertain a reasonable deduction in this case.
   Per Curiam.

There is no rule at law for ascertaining possible damages; the principle is absolutely unknown in the history of our jurisprudence. A court of equity will in some cases, where a subsequent right is certain or probable, order indemnity to be given, and make that a condition of their decretal orders; but a court of law possesses no such power. In a case, however, like the present, they thought that it would be clogging public sales, made by operation of law, exceedingly, to lay down any such rule, even if the common law would admit of it. These sales are made by operation of law, in which the will and consent of the defendants are never consulted. They are forced upon them, whether they assent or dissent to or from them, and it is their right, whatever that may be, more or less, that is sold by the sheriff, who is a public officer of justice. There is no warranty in law, either express or implied, raised on any of the parties concerned in such a sale; neither on the part of the former owner, the defendant, nor the sheriff, who is the mere organ of the law for transferring the right of the defendant. Caveat emptor, under those circumstances, is the best possible rule that can be laid down or adopted. Every man who goes to a sheriff’s sale, ought to take care and examine into the title of the defendant carefully before he attempts to bid; and that is one reason, among many, why property is in general sold so much under its real value at these sales. The case of Mrs. Blake, relied upon, had no bearing on or analogy to the present one ; that was an action brought on a special agreement, for the consideration money of a tract or lot of land sold at private sale, in which case legal conveyances were tendered, and the claim of dower went by consent of parties to the jury, to be deducted at once from the consideration money. It was a kind of compromise between the parties, and not fixed by any rule of law ; therefore, can never be urged as a precedent, in a case like the one now under consideration of the court.

The rule was, therefore, made absolute on the sheriff, to bring the money into court, or to resell without delay, at the risk of the purchaser.

Present, Burke, Grimke and Bay.  