
    Beardsley and another v. Hall.
    The act of 1846 (Hart. Dig., art. 1599) has reference to the granting of an injunction for cause» existing at the timo of the rendition of the judgment; it could not have been intended to embrace a case where the injunction is sought upon the ground of a payment and< satisfaction of the judgment. (Note 29.)
    The statute of limitations has no application to payments.
    "Where judgment was obtained in 1840 and execution issued same year, after which there were several executions issued, one in 1844, upon which there was a levy and appraisement, and a fifth in 1850, against which the defendant obtained an injunction, in this case the sheriff, who had received the alias, testified, without objection, that he was present at a conversation between the debtor, the person who had been sheriff and received the first execution, and the attorney of the defendant, at most if not all of which the attorney of the creditors was present; that he did not recollect the precise conversation; ho only recollected that it was understood amongst them that the execution whieli had been in the hands of the former sheriff (in 1840) had been satisfied, and that the former sheriff admitted or stated that the amount had been settled with him while sheriff; but witness did not recollect that the attorney of the creditors took any part in the conversation r Held, That it was competent for the jury to infer the fact of a legal payment apd satisfaction of the first execution when in the hands of the sheriff.
    It is immaterial in our practice whether the present be regarded as a proceeding to enjoin execution or to obtain an entry of satisfaction of the judgment, there being a prayer for general relief.
    Appeal from 'Washington. Beardsley and Adriance obtained a judgment against Hall iu 1840. An execution was issued and placed in the hands of Robert Stevenson, sheriff. At the foot of tins execution, in the transcript of tlie record, were written these words : “ Came to hand April 8th, 1S40, and “ executed.” The margin contained a note by the clerk, u Indorsement of the' “sheriff,” hut the name of the sheriff was not signed. July 12th, 1842, an alias execution was issued, and returned not satisfied, by J. P. Lynch, sheriff.. On the 17th of November, 1S42, a pluries execution was issued, and returned not satisfied, but there was no signature to the return. Execution again issued on the 30th of May, 1S43, and was indorsed by the sheriff, Van E. iron, as received by him, but no further return appeared. On the 30th of May, 1844, another execution issued, and was returned with a levy upon 1Í50 acres of land and an appraisement thereof. On the 30th of March, IS.iO, another execution issued, and this suit was brought by Hall, the defendant iu the execution, to enjoin the execution and for general relief. The petition alleged that the principal and interest of the judgment had been paid to Stevenson on the first execution, and that the costs had been since paid. The defendants denied the payment and pleaded the statute of limitations. An exception to tlie plea of the statute of limitations was overruled. There were two trials, both resulting in favor of Hall. On tlie last verdict judgment was entered for Hall, ordering the execution to be returned satisfied. A motion for a new trial was overruled.
    Noes 2D. — Williams v. Bradbury, post 4S7,
    The only evidence in the case, besides the executions and indorsements thereon as'tlicy are recited above, was tlie testimony of J. IP. Lynch, who succeeded Steveiison as sheriff of Washington county. Lynch testified that an alias execution in said case came to his hands, as sheriff of Washington comity, some time, he, thought, during tlie year 1841, and was returned by him with the understanding that tlie former execution had been satisfied; that it was understood between the said Hall, Stevenson, and Crosby (Hall’s attorney) that the former execution had been paid. In answer to a cross-interrogatory, tlie wit ness stated that Wilson Y. McFarland (the attorney of Beardsley and Adriauee in this and the former suit) was present during most if not all tlie time of a conversation which occurred, tlie witness thought, during the year 1841, between Stevenson, who had been sheriff of Washington county, and Hall and Josiah j. Crosby, in relation to tlie settlement of tlie first execution while in the hands of said Stevenson; witness did not recollect the precise conversation between the parties; lie only recollected that it was understood amongst them that the execution which liad been in the hands of Stevenson had been satisfied, and that Stevenson admitted or stated'that the amount of tlie execution had been settled with him while» sheriff; but witness did not recollect that McFarland took any part in the conversation. Ho exception was taken to tlie admissibility of that part of Lynch’s testimony which was received and is stated above.
    The court charged tlie jury that no admissions or statements made by Stevenson after lie went out of office were binding upon Beardsley and Adriance; but that if said statements were made in the presence of Beardsley and Adri-anos or their attorney then the jury might give the said statement such credence as they thought proper.
    That if Uni jury believed from the evidence that tlie debt was actually paid by Hall to sheriff Stevenson while in office, that then and in that case the statute of limitations could be made to apply to said payment.
    
      J. Sayles, for appellants.
   Wheulbu, J.

Tlie act of 1846 (Hart. Dig-., art. 1599) lias reference to the granting of an injunction for causes existing at the time of the rendition of the judgment. It could not have been intended to embrace a ease like tlie present, where the injunction was sought upon tlie ground of a payment and satisfaction of tlie judgment. The fourth instruction asked by the defendant was rightly refused. The statute of limitations had no proper application (o the case.

Tlie deposition of the witness Lynch was permitted to go to tlie jury without objection. The objection to its admissibility comes now too late. Though tlie facts deposed to may not have been binding upon tlie plaintiffs in execution as an estoppel, yet it was competent for tlie jury to infer from them tlie fact of a legal payment and satisfaction of the execution when in the bands of tlie sheriff.' When a payment was spoken of it was reasonable io infer that a payment in money was intended. The question of fact was for tlie determination of the jury.

It is immaterial in our practice whether tlie present be regarded as a proceeding to enjoin execution or to obtain an entry of satisfaction of tlie judgment. Tlie prayer for general relief was sufficient to-authorize the judgment.

Wo are of opinion that there is no error in the judgment and that it be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.  