
    Thomas Sandford versus Abiel Nichols and Others.
    Of the particular description of the places to be searched, and the goods to be searched for, necessary in a search-warrant.
    
      Trespass, for breaking and entering the plaintiff’s dwellinghouse in Troy, in the county of Bristol, and taking and carrying away his goods, &c. Plea, not guilty, with liberty to give any special matter in evidence. Trial before the Chief Justice, at the last October term at Taunton.
    
    The entry and taking the articles described in the declaration were admitted ; and the defence set up was, that the defendants, as inspectors of the revenue, having cause to suspect a concealment of goods which had been imported into the United States contrary to law, under a warrant from a justice of the peace, entered the house, and seized the goods, as part of the appurtenances of the sloop Patty, which had been seized, libelled, and condemned, in the District Court of the United States, for the district of Massachusetts, for a violation of the embargo laws.
    A copy of the warrant came up in the case. It was directed to the sheriff or his deputy, or any constable of Troy, and recited that a complaint and information on oath had been made to the justice by JV*. W., Esq., collector of the port of Dighton, that “certain goods, wares, and merchandise were lodged or deposited in the houses or stores of Messrs. Thomas Sandford fy Company, of Troy, &c., the duties on said goods, &c., to which they are subject, not having been paid or secured agreeably to the laws of the United Statesand requiring the sheriff, &c., “in * the daytime only, taking suitable aid, to enter into, and make diligent search in, the aforesaid houses and stores, for the goods, wares, and merchandise, above mentioned, and, when found, to delivei the same to the said </V*. W., to be proceeded with and disposed of as the law in such cases has provided.” The officer returned, that he had made search in the house of the said Thomas Sandford, and there found a number of sails and a quantity of rigging, which were claimed by the defendants.
    The plaintiff objected to the warrant’s being read in evidence, or as justifying the entry, without showing a complaint in writing, under oath, as the foundation of the warrant. This objection was overruled ; and, if the warrant was improperly admitted, or would not justify the entry into a dwellinghouse, without proof of a written complaint as aforesaid, the verdict, which was returned for the defendants, was to be set aside, and a new trial granted.
    
      Holmes, for the plaintiff,
    contended, that a certified copy of the complaint and oath should at least have been produced in evidence if its being annexed to the warrant, as is generally practised, might be dispensed with. It is not enough, that the justice says, in his warrant, that such a one had been exhibited to him. If the action were against him, he would be required to show the record of the complaint. His warrant would be no justification.
    
      By the sixth article of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, it is provided, that “no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,' and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” In the warrant in this case there is no description at all of the things to be seized, unless “ certain goods,” &c., can be so ’ called ; and the description of the places to be searched is equally loose, general, and uncertain.
    
      Whitman and Morton, for the defendants.
    The subject-matter of this warrant being within the jurisdiction of the * justice, the officer who executed it, and his assistants, are not trespassers. 
    
    The description of the places and of the things which were the objects ol the search was as particular as the nature of the case admitted. Here were a company of merchants who had been concerned together in illicit commerce ; and it was utterly impossible for the officer of the customs to declare which of them had the custody of the articles subject to forfeiture, or more minutely describe the articles.
    
      Holmes, in reply.
    The justice had no jurisdiction in the case, unless the requisitions of the Constitution were complied with, and with those requisitions the officer is as much bound to be acquainted as the magistrate.
    
      
      
        Bull. N. P. 82, cites Hard. 480. 10 Co. 76. Hill vs. Bateman & al., Strange, 711
    
   Parker, C. J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. We think that the defendants could have justified the acts complained of by showing a regular warrant from a magistrate having jurisdiction over the subject; without showing that it was founded upon a complaint under oath. It will not do to require of executive officers, before they shall be held to obey precepts directed to them, that they shall have evidence of the regularity of the proceedings of the tribunal which commands the duty. Such a principle would put a stop to the execution of legal process ; as officers so situated would be necessarily obliged to judge for themselves, and would often judge wrong, as to the lawfulness of the authority under which they are required to act. It is a general and known principle, that executive officers, obliged by law to serve legal writs and processes, are protected in the rightful discharge of their duty ; if those precepts are sufficient in point of form, and issue from a court or magistrate having jurisdiction of the subject-matter. If such a magistrate shall proceed unlawfully in issuing the process, he, and not the executive officer, will be liable for the injury consequent upon such act.

But it is necessary that the precept under which the officer acts in arresting the body or seizing the goods, and * especially in entering a dwellinghouse by force, should be lawful on the face of it. Thus, if a precept should command him to break and enter a dwellinghouse, without stating any sufficient cause, he could not justify such act under such a precept, because every one is presumed to know that the dwellinghouse of another cannot be lawfully forced, unless for purposes especially provided for by law.

The warrant under which the defence in this case is set up came from lawful authority, and contains an allegation that it was founded on a complaint under oath. But it is deficient in the description of the persons whose houses were to be entered, and of the goods which were the object of search, as prescribed by the amendment to the Constitution cited in the argument. The description is, in both points, defective ; being general and wholly uncertain, instead of being particular. The house actually searched was the house of Thomas Sandford, not of Thomas Sandford and Company; and “goods, wares, and merchandise,” without any specification of their character, quality, number, or weight, or any other circumstance tending to distinguish them, cannot be such a particular description as the Constitution requires.

It is true, that, in the case of smuggled goods, it may be difficult to describe them with minuteness ; nor could this be required. But it would not be difficult to mention the kind of goods to be searched for, or at least to describe them as having been taken out of some certain vessel, so that the officer who should undertake such a search might not conceive himself at liberty to rifle the house, and disturb the arrangements of the family occupying it.

This warrant, therefore, ought not to have been admitted in evidence ; and the plaintiff is, on this account, entitled to a new trial. But, as it does not appear that any articles were actually taken but those which were liable to forfeiture, nor that any violence or injury was done but what was necessary to obtain possession of the goods, * it is probable that very small damages will be recovered upon another trial; the parties will, therefore, judge, whether it is worth their while to proceed further.

Afterwards, the plaintiff agreeing to relinquish his costs, the verdict was suffered to stand ; the objection to the warrant, which prevailed, not having been made at the trial.  