
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Victor Manuel GARCIA-LUNA, also known as Victor Manuel Joyarin, also known as Victor Garcia, also known as Jose R. Maldonado, also known as Victor Manuel Joyarim, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 09-3439-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 21, 2010.
    Mitchell A. Golub, Golub & Golub, LLP, New York, NY, on submission, for Appellant.
    Alexander A. Solomon, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. James, Assistant United States Attorney, of counsel), for Benton J. Campbell, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, on submission, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, ROBERT D. SACK, and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Victor Garcia-Luna appeals from a sentence of 70 months in prison and three years of supervised release imposed for a conviction, following a guilty plea, of illegal reentry into the United States after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the relevant facts and procedural history of this case, and the issues presented on this appeal.

We review sentences under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc), quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 40, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). In coming to a procedurally reasonable sentence, a district court must consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, and “conduct its own independent review of the sentencing factors, aided by the arguments of the prosecution and defense,” in order to reach “an informed and individualized judgment ... as to what is ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ to fulfill the purposes of sentencing.” Id., quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Gareia-Luna argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable, because the district court failed to give adequate consideration to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. In particular, he argues that the district court failed to take adequately into account the circumstances surrounding his re-entry into the United States. Garcia-Luna claims that following his deportation to Colombia, he contacted agents he knew at the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), and told them about a narcotics trafficking ring he had learned of while in prison. According to Garcia-Luna, DEA agents instructed him to travel to Mexico, where thejf secreted him in a hidden compartment in a vehicle into the United States so that he could connect the traffickers with the DEA agents. After making this connection, he claims that he left California with the tacit permission of the agents to return to New York, where he was eventually arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, and subsequently charged with illegal reentry.

The district court clearly considered Garcia-Luna’s story regarding the circumstances surrounding his illegal reentry into the country. It simply did not believe him. The district court found that the story was not credible, because it was not corroborated by any government sources and because of Garcia-Luna’s history of deceit and the use of false names to authorities. The district court’s decision not to credit Garcia-Luna’s story regarding his reentry was completely reasonable given the lack of corroboration and the legitimate questions about Garcia-Luna’s credibility. His sentence was therefore not procedurally unreasonable on this ground.

Nor was it otherwise unreasonable. The district court explicitly stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, and noted that the sentence should afford adequate deterrence before sentencing Garcia-Luna to the bottom of the unchallenged guidelines range of 70 to 87 months imprisonment. Given Garcia-Luna’s history of narcotics dealing and parole violations, this sentence was well within the limits of the district court’s discretion. See id. (“We will ... set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” (emphasis and internal quotations marks omitted)).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  