
    Michael Anthony PIÑA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WASHINGTON, et al., Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 09-35483.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Aug. 2, 2011.
    Filed Oct. 7, 2011.
    Michael Anthony Piña, Seattle, WA, pro se.
    Ronda Denise Larson, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, AGWA-Office of the Washington Attorney General, Olympia, WA, for Respondents-Appellees.
    Before: SCHROEDER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and FOGEL, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Jeremy Fogel, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Petitioner-Appellant Michael Piña (“Piña”) appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006). He asserts that the district court erred in concluding that his federal constitutional claims of juror misconduct are unexhaust-ed and procedurally barred.

Piña exhausted his juror misconduct claims by presenting them to the Washington Supreme Court in a personal restraint petition. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir.2004) (noting that “[i]n Washington, a personal restraint petition may be used to assert the violation of a federal constitutional right even if the defendant did not raise the issue on direct appeal.”).

We need not decide whether Piña’s juror misconduct claims are procedurally barred because those claims clearly lack merit. See Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir.2002) (“[Ajppeals courts are empowered to, and in some cases should, reach the merits of habeas petitions if they are, on their face and without regard to any facts that could be developed below, clearly not meritorious despite an asserted procedural bar.”); see also Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997) (holding that for reasons of judicial economy an appellate court may pass on deciding complicated procedural bar issues when a petition is “easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner” on other grounds).

The state appellate court concluded that, even accepting as true Piña’s claim that his mother overheard jurors discussing the case during an afternoon recess, there was no indication that such discussion prejudiced Piña’s rights or that the trial court’s subsequent cautionary instructions were insufficient to ensure a fair trial. These conclusions are entirely consistent with our case law. See Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 653 (9th Cir.2004) (trial court’s cautionary instructions were sufficient to cure any possible prejudice arising from jury’s alleged premature deliberations); United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir.1974) (“The important thing is not that jurors keep silent with each other about the case but that each juror keep an open mind until the case has been submitted to the jury.... The test is whether or not the misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial.”). In fact, the state appellate court relied expressly upon Davis and Klee in rejecting Piña’s juror misconduct claims. We have not found any United States Supreme Court authority that mandates a different result. See Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir.2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (holding in relevant part that a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the challenged state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court authority).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     