
    JOSEPH JAMES v. SARTIN DRY CLEANING COMPANY.
    (Filed 18 September, 1935.)
    1. Justices of tli© Peace C a—
    A justice of the peace has jurisdiction of an action on contract to recover the amount by which the salary paid plaintiff failed to equal the amount stipulated in the “President’s Reemployment Agreement,” voluntarily signed by defendant employer, when the amount demanded does not exceed two hundred dollars. C. S., 1475.
    
      2. Courts O’ a—
    Our State courts have jurisdiction of an action to recover the amount by which the salary paid an employee fails to equal the amount stipulated in the “President’s Reemployment Agreement,” the Federal Courts not having been given exclusive jurisdiction either by the Constitution or Act of Congress.
    3. Master and Servant B a: Contracts F a—
    An employee may sue upon the “President’s Reemployment Agreement,” voluntarily signed by the employer, either in equity, under the doctrine of subrogation, or at law, as upon a contract made for the benefit of a third person.
    4. Master and Servant A a: Contracts A d—
    The benefit, inter alia, which an employer derives from others in the .industry signing similar agreements is sufficient consideration to support his agreement voluntarily entered into under the National Recovery Act.
    
      5. Master and Servant B a—
    Tile evidence in this case that defendant employer had failed to pay plaintiff employee the amount due plaintiff under the agreement voluntarily entered into by the employer under the National Becovery Act, although conflicting, is held, sufficient to support the -verdict awarding plaintiff a portion of the amount claimed.
    Appeal by defendant from Pless, J., at February Term, 1935, of Forsyth.
    Civil action “for $200.00 due by back salary,” instituted in a court of a justice of tbe peace; dismissed in tbe court of first instance; tried de novo on appeal to tbe Superior Court.
    Plaintiff testified tbat be worked for defendant in 1933 as a “dry cleaner” at a wage less tban tbat stipulated in tbe “President’s Reemployment Agreement,” made pursuant to section 4 (a) of tbe National Industrial Recovery Act (15 U. S. C. A., section 704 [a]), voluntarily signed by defendant; and be sues to recover tbe difference between wbat be was paid and wbat be alleges tbe defendant agreed with tbe President to pay bim for tbe time be was employed. Tbis difference, plaintiff contends, really amounted to $240.00, but be only seeks to recover $200.00.
    Plaintiff says be was first paid $6.00 a week, later $9.00 a week; wbereas, under tbe terms of tbe President’s Reemployment Agreement, relative to hours and wages, be should have been paid not less tban $12.00 a week, or 30 cents an hour for a 40-hour week. “I received $6.00 a week until about three weeks before Christmas, and from tbat time I received $9.00 a week until tbe Saturday before Christmas, when I got drunk and lost my job.” Suit was instituted 26 May, 1934.
    Tbe defendant, on tbe other band, offered evidence tending to show tbat tbe plaintiff was not a “dry cleaner,” but a general utility boy, engaged on part-time basis, and tbat tbe schedule of wages paid bim was accordant with tbe terms of tbe President’s Reemployment Agreement.
    Tbe jury awarded tbe plaintiff $20.00.
    Judgment on tbe verdict, from which tbe defendant appeals, assigning errors.
    
      Ira, Julian for plaintiff j Richard M. Chaniberlain of counsel.
    
    
      Webster & Little for defendant.
    
   Stacy, C. J.

As tbe principal sum demanded in tbe complaint (summons) does not exceed $200, tbe justice of tbe peace bad jurisdiction of tbe action. C. S., 1475; Brantley v. Finch, 97 N. C., 91, 1 S. E., 535; Brock v. Scott, 159 N. C., 513, 75 S. E., 724.

Tbe matter is likewise cognizable in tbe courts of tbis State, tbe jurisdiction of tbe Federal Courts not having been made exclusive, either by the Constitution or Act of Congress. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S., 130; Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S., 624; Mondou v. R. R., 223 U. S., 1.

That tbe plaintiff is entitled to sue upon tbe “President’s Reemployment Agreement,” voluntarily signed by tbe defendant, either in equity, under tbe doctrine of subrogation, or at law, as upon a contract made for tbe benefit of a third person, is fully established and supported by tbe decisions in this jurisdiction. Rector v. Lyda, 180 N. C., 577, 105 S. E., 170; Gorrell v. Water Co., 124 N. C., 328, 32 S. E., 720, 70 Am. St. Rep., 598, 46 L. R. A., 513; Baber v. Hanie, 163 N. C., 588, 80 S. E., 57.

It is said in some of tbe cases that tbe plaintiff occupies the position of a “donee beneficiary,” or, at least, that be is no less advantageously circumstanced. Bank v. Page, 206 N. C., 18, 173 S. E., 312. See annotations: 81 A. L. R., 1271, and 95 A. L. R., 42-43.

Tbe benefit, inter alia, which defendant derived from others in tbe industry signing similar agreements was sufficient consideration to make it enforceable. Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 N. J. Eq., 462; Supply Co. v. Whitehurst, 202 N. C., 413, 163 S. E., 446; Rousseau v. Call, 169 N. C., 173, 85 S. E., 414; University v. Borden, 132 N. C., 476, 44 S. E., 47; Pipkin v. Robinson, 48 N. C., 152; N. J. Orthopedic Hospital v. Wright, 95 N. J. L., 462. See 60 C. J., 956.

"While tbe jury rejected most of plaintiff’s testimony, and might well have found against him on tbe merits of tbe case — it appearing that be was strongly contradicted as to tbe facts — still there is some evidence to support tbe verdict, and tbe trial court declined to set it aside as contrary to tbe weight of tbe evidence. Goodman v. Goodman, 201 N. C., 808, 161 S. E., 686.

No action or ruling of tbe court has been called to our attention which we apprehend should be held for reversible error. Tbe verdict and judgment will be upheld.

No error.  