
    First Department,
    March, 1925.
    Morris H. Hofstadter, Appellant, v. Alexander Bienstock, Respondent.
    
      Libel and slander — not slanderous per se to call professional man “ a crook.”
    
    Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the New York county clerk’s office July 18, 1924, granting defendant’s motion under rule 106 of the Rules of Civil Practice for judgment dismissing the complaint upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
   Per Curiam:

The order should be affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements to the respondent, upon the authority of the majority opinion in Villemin v. Brown (193 App. Div. 777). The complaint in the ease at bar does not allege that the alleged slanderous word was applied to the plaintiff in his profession. Present — Clarke, P. J., Dowling, Merrell, McAvoy and Burr, JJ.; Dowling, J., dissents in memorandum.

Dowling, J.

(dissenting): I dissent and vote to reverse, upon the ground that the use of the word “ crook ” applied to an individual is slanderous per se. (See my dissenting opinion in Villemin v. Brown, 193 App. Div. 779. See, also, Pandolfo v. Bank of Benson, 273 Fed. 51, which expressly holds that the word “ crook ” when used with reference to human conduct of an individual is slanderous per se.) Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. Settle order on notice.  