
    Manuel Jesus LOPEZ-ISLAVA, aka Manuel Jesus Islava-Lopaz, aka Manuel De Jesus Lopez, aka Manuel DeJesus Lopez Islava, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-71920.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Nov. 20, 2015.
    
    Filed Jan. 12, 2016.
    John Martin Pope, Benjamin Wiesinger, Pope & Associates, PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner.
    Colin J. Tucker, Trial, U.S. Department of Justice, Oil, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
      The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Manuel Jesus Lopez-Islava (Lopez-Islava) petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determining that Lopez-Islava’s conviction for residential burglary under Arizona Revised Statute § 131507 was an aggravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Specifically, the BIA determined that Lopez-Islava’s burglary offense constituted a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). However, we conclude that our recent decision in Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.2015), controls the outcome of this case. In Dimaya, we adhered to the rationale articulated in Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2558, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), where the Court held that the residual clause defining a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 was unconstitutionally vague. We held that the similar “residual clause definition of a violent felony [under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) ] is unconstitutionally vague____” Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1111 (internal quotation marks omitted). We are bound by this precedent, which does not support the BIA’s determination.

The petition for review is GRANTED and we REMAND to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this disposition. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) defines a crime of violence as a felony offense "that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”
     