
    CHESHIRE.
    School-District v. Twitchell & a.
    
    
      A school-district situate in two or more towns is entitled to its just proportion of money raised for school purposes by vote of the several towns beyond the amount required by law to be assessed, according to the valuation of persons and property taxable therein ; and a vote of one of the towns making a different disposition of such money is inoperative.
    Debt, by school-district No. 9 in Swanzey, against the selectmen of Richmond to recover school-money. Facts found by the court. Certain inhabitants of Richmond were annexed to district No. 9’in Swanzey for school purposes. At the annual meeting, 1888, the town of Richmond voted to raise $500 for school purposes in excess of the amount required by law. Also, “Voted to divide the five hundred dollars now appropriated as follows : pay to school-district No. 9 in the town of Swanzey the sum of one dollar, and to each school-district in the town of Richmond the sum of one dollar, the remainder of the five hundred dollars to be divided between each school-district in the town of Richmond according to valuation.”
    The plaintiffs claim to recover their proportionate share of the $500, according to the valuation of persons and property taxable in Richmond, under s. 18, a. 86, Gen. Laws. The defendants claim that the vote of the town was valid, by Gen. Laws, e. 85, s. 4, and that under it the plaintiffs are only entitled to recover one dollar.
    
      Lane Dole, for the plaintiffs.
    
      Batchelder Sf Faulkner, for the defendants.
   Blodgett, J.

It is unnecessary to determine whether the vote in question is in accordance with Gen. Laws, e. 85, s. 4, or whether it is within the constitutional authority of the legislature to confer upon towns the right to apportion the school-money raised by taxation according to their discretion; for by e. 86, s. 13, it is expressly provided that “ every district situate in two or more towns shall be entitled to its just proportion of school taxes, income of school funds, and literary fund in each town, according to the valuation of persons and property taxable therein.” This provision being both explicit and peremptory, and its language certain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, and we are bound to give it effect according to its unmistakable import.

It follows, therefore, that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover their proportionate share of the five hundred dollars raised for school purposes, according to their valuation of persons and property in Richmond at the time of the assessment.

Judgment for the plaintiffs accordingly.

Stanley, J., did not sit: the others concurred.  