
    The State of Ohio v. Emery.
    
      Adulteration of food and drugs — Reference of law to U. S. Pharmacopoeia is to the edition in use when law enacted.
    
    1. The reference in section 3, of the pure drug statute (87 Ohio Laws, 248), to the United States Pharmacopoeia, is to the edition in general use when the statute was enacted, which was that of 1880.
    2. The sale of a drug which was equal to the standard of strength, quality, and purity laid down in that edition, is not rendered unlawful because it is below a higher standard laid down in a subsequently revised edition, though the latter edition was in general use when the sale was made.
    3. A copy of the subsequent revised edition is not competent evidence on the trial of a prosecution under the statute.
    (Decided December 1, 1896.)
    
      Exceptions by the prosecuting attorney to the ruling of the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas county.
    The state instituted a prosecution in a justices’ court, against Emery, for having sold, on the 15th day of October, 1895, a drug known as cochineal, that was below the standard required by section 3, of the act of April 22, 1890 (87 Ohio Laws, 248), which provides that:
    “An article shall be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this act — (a) In the case of drugs, (1) If sold under or by a name recognized in the United States Pharmacopoeia, it differs from the standard of strength, quality or purity laid down therein; (2) If, when sold under or by a name not recognized in the United States Pharmacopoeia, but which is found in some other pharmacopoeia or other standard work on materia medica, it differs materially from the standard of strength, quality or purity laid down in such work; (3) if its strength, quality or purity falls below the proposed standard under which it is sold.”
    The United States Pharmacopoeia is a book generally in use by pharmacists and druggists in the United States, and recognized as a standard authority. The edition of the book in use when the act above referred to was passed, and when it took effect, was the edition of 1880. The drug sold by the accused was equal to the standard of strength, quality and purity laid down in that edition. In 1890, the book was revised by an association or cong’ress of pharmacists of the United States and Canada, A new and revised edition known as the edition of 1890, was published in 1893, which purports to be official from January 1, 1894. This edition made numerous changes in that of 1880J among others, raising the standard of cochineal, so that the article sold by the accused was inferior to that standard; and being so, the state claimed the sale was in violation of the statute. On the trial the state was permitted, over the objection of the accused, to give in evidence a copy of the edition of the Pharmacopoeia published in 1893; and for the admission of that evidence, the court of common pleas reversed the sentence passed on the accused, he having’ been convicted before the justice. To this action of the court the prosecuting attorney took the bill of exceptions which is now submitted to the court, according to the provisions of sections 7305 and 7306 of the Revised Statutes.
    
      F. S. Monnett, Attorney General, and James M. (& Walter F. Brown, argued in support of the exceptions.
    The language of the statute- is, “if when sold under or by a name recognized in the United States_ Pharmacopoeia.” The legislature, undoubtedly, knew that the “United States Pharmacopoeia” had borne that name for more than sixty years; and it doubtless knew that every ten years it was revised, and that its revision would continue, but that during all its past revisions, its title had not changed; it continued .to be the “United States Pharmacopoeia.” And the legislature knew when a new revision appeared, it took the place of the old one, and was, so long as it was in force, “the United States Pharmacopoeia,” and the only “United States Pharmacopoeia,” and that by the language “when sold by a name recognized in the United States Pharmacopoeia, ”" the legislature clearly meant the United States Pharmacopoeia in force at the time the sale was. made.
    
      The meaning of a word should first „ be determined, if possible, from the section in which it is used. Spencer v. Metropolitan Board of Works, 22 Ch. Div., 162; Blackwood v. Reg., 8 App. Cas., 94.
    It is a canon of interpretation, that the legislative purpose, and the object aimed at, are to be borne in mind, and that language susceptible of more than one construction, is to receive that which will bring it into harmony with such object and purpose, rather than that which will tend to defeat it. Sedgw. on St., p. 359. Amer. & English Encyclopedia of Law, No. 23, p. 319, and authorities cited.
    The words of a statute are to be construed with reference to the subject-matter of the enactment and to the subject sought to be attained. Rex v. Hall, 1 B. & C., 136 and Amer. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 23, p. 332, and authorities cited.
    In conformity with the rule that the meaning of words is to be adapted to the particular subject-matter in reference to which they are used, “general words are to be restricted or expanded to suit the subject-matter to which they are applied.” Reiche v. Smythe, 13 vol. U. S., 162; 22 vol. U. S., 492; Rex v. Gardner, Cowp. 79. Amer. & Eng. Encyclopedia of law 20, 23, p. 323.
    Where, to construe the words of a statute technically, would render it inoperative, but to construe them according to their popular signification would give it a reasonable operation, the latter construction must prevail. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Pittsburgh, 104 Pa. St., 522.
    Contemporaneous circumstances to be considered. Carolina Savings Bank v. Evans, 28 S. C., 521.
    
      Courts, will, if the language will reasonably permit it, so construe a statute that the whole may stand, and be effective. “To this end words have been .supplied or rejected, their collocation altered, and many dates and' figures corrected.” Amer. & English Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 23, p. 364-5. So as to penal statutes. U. S. v. Hartwell, 6 vol. (U. S.) 395; 134 U. S., 624.
    
      King <& Tracy, for defendant.
    Our proposition of law is that the legislature cannot adopt as a part of its laws, and especially as a part of the penal laws of the state, and incorporate into such laws, a book or work which is not yet in existence.
    The legislature at the time this act was passed did not know, or could not know what would be contained in the Pharmacopoeia of 1890. The book might have been compiled and published by ignorant or vicious persons. Mistakes might have occurred, and for all we know have occurred, in the 1890 edition, and yet it was sought to convict this defendant in error under the penal laws of this state for violating the provisions of the Pharmacopoeia of 1890, which was not in existence at the time the statute was passed.
    It certainly is not necessary to cite authorities to the proposition that the power delegated to the legislature of Ohio to enact laws cannot be delegated by that body to any other person or association.
    Article II, section 1 of the Ohio Constitution. Section 26 of the same article; Railroad v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St., 77; O'Neil et al. v. American Ins. Co., 166 Pa. St., 72; Anderson v. Manchester Fire Ins. Co., 63 N. W. Rep., 241.
    
      If the courts hold that the legislature has no power to delegate authority such as that specified in the above cases to state officials, how much less can the legislature delegate power to irresponsible bodies, conventions and congresses not held under authority of the state, or indeed of any state or of the United States.
    The construction of this law, contended for on behalf of the state, would render it unconstitutional.
    The law is constitutional if given the construction contended for by the defendant in error below, namely that the edition of the Pharmacopoeia which was in existence at the time the law was passed is the edition upon which the prosecution must rely.
    If the legislature desires to adopt the new Pharmacopoeia as the standard it is only necessary for it to amend the law and so state. This it will no doubt do if there is any good reason for doing so. Until it does so the edition of 1880 is the only Pharmacopoeia which can be introduced in evidence in prosecutions in this class of cases.
   By the Court.

The reference in the statute to the United States Pharmacopoeia, could be to no other than the edition of the book in use and recognized when the statute was enacted and went into effect, which was the edition known as that of 1880. It is not to be supposed that the legislature intended to adopt, by reference, as part of the penal laws of the state, an edition of the book not then in existence, and of the contents of which the legislature could then have no knowledge. The drug, with the sale of which the accused was charged, was recognized in the edition of 1880, by the name under which it was sold, and a standard of strength, quality and purity therein laid down. It is not claimed the drug sold was below that standard; and the sale could' not be rendered unlawful because it is below a higher standard laid down in a subsequently revised edition of the book, though that edition' was in use at the time of the sale. To hold that the sale could thus be made unlawful, would be equivalent to holding that the revisers of the book could create and define the offense, a power which belongs to the legislative body, and cannot be delegated.

Exceptions overruled.  