
    Richard A. CHYLINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 10-1345-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 21, 2011.
    
      Richard A. Chylinski, pro se, New Britain, CT, for Appellant.
    John G. Stretton, Edwards Angelí Palmer & Dodge LLP, Stamford, CT, for Ap-pellees.
    PRESENT: JOSEPH M. McLaughlin, josé a. cabranes, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Richard A. Chylinski, pro se, appeals from the judgment of the District Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”) adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation (“R & R”) on his claim against BOA for employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and ask whether a district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). “In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).

Following de novo review of the record, we affirm the order of the District Court. Chylinski failed to file a timely objection to the Magistrate Judge’s R & R and thus waived appellate review of that report. See Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.2003) (“As a rule, a party’s failure to object to any purported error or omission in a magistrate judge’s report waives further judicial review of the point.”). Regardless, Chylinski fails to articulate specific challenges to the R & R or the summary judgment order in his appeal. See LoSacco v. City of Middle-town, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995) (noting that “we need not manufacture claims of error for an appellant proceeding pro se ” and holding that issues not raised in a pro se brief were abandoned).

Furthermore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a hearing on the summary judgment motion. Parties are not automatically entitled to a oral hearing on summary judgment matters. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp., 136 F.3d 313, 316 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that there is no due process right to a hearing on summary judgment). Rather, the decision whether to permit oral argument rests within the court’s discretion. AD/SAT, Div. of Skylight, Inc. v. Assoc. Press, 181 F.3d 216, 226 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam).

CONCLUSION

We have considered Chylinski’s other arguments on appeal and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED.  