
    The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Daniel J. Koechel, Appellant.
    [17 NYS3d 326]
   Clark, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Essex County (Meyer, J.), rendered October 10, 2013, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of attempted assault in the second degree.

Defendant attacked a female hunter with a knife as she emerged from a portable hunting blind in the woods and also destroyed the blind. He was subsequently charged in a four-count indictment with various crimes related to this incident. In satisfaction of the indictment, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted assault in the second degree and waived his right to appeal. He was sentenced, in accordance with the plea agreement, to time served and five years of probation. He now appeals.

Defendant’s sole argument is that his guilty plea was factually insufficient. He is, however, precluded from raising this claim by his valid waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Sibounhome, 125 AD3d 1059, 1060 [2015]; People v Strong, 124 AD3d 992, 992 [2015]). In addition, this claim is unpreserved due to defendant’s failure to make an appropriate postallocution motion, and the narrow exception to the preservation requirement is inapplicable given that defendant did not make any statements that negated an essential element of the crime (see People v Bryant, 128 AD3d 1223, 1224-1225 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 926 [2015]; People v Sibounhome, 125 AD3d at 1060). In any event, were we to consider defendant’s claim, we would find it to be without merit. Indeed, “it was not necessary that [defendant] recite every element of the crime or engage in a factual recitation, inasmuch as his affirmative responses to County Court’s questions established the elements of the crime charged” (People v Campbell, 66 AD3d 1059, 1060 [2009]; see People v Coles, 13 AD3d 665, 666 [2004]). Accordingly, we find no reason to disturb the judgment of conviction.

McCarthy, J.P., Egan Jr. and Lynch, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed. 
      
       To the extent that defendant argues, alternatively, that the requirements for an Alford plea were not satisfied, there is no indication in the record that defendant entered an Alford plea.
     