
    Manley v. People.
    
      Territorial Jurisdiction.
    
    A criminal offence committed on hoard of a steamboat, close to the Long Island shore, in Suffolk county, upon a trip from the city of New York to Norwich, in Connecticut, is not indictable in the county of New York.
    Writ of Error to the general term of the Supreme Court, sitting in the first district, where a conviction of the plaintiff in error upon an indictment for grand larceny, in the Court of General Sessions of the Peace in the city of New York, had been affirmed.
    Manley, the plaintiff in error, was indicted in the Court of General Sessions for the crime of grand larceny. The indictment contained a single count, charging the defendant with having stolen the money of Jerome W. Williams, in the county of New York, on the 11th July 1850.
    The defendant, at the time of the commission of the offence, was steward of the steamboat Knickerbocker. On the 11th July 1850, at five o’clock in the afternoon, the steamer left the city of New York, on a trip to Norwich, in the state of Connecticut; at about eight o’clock that evening, when the vessel was close in to the Long Island shore, opposite Huntingdon, in the county of Suffolk, the money was taken by the prisoner from the captain’s office, upon the boat, and was subsequently brought by him to New York.
    *At the close of the testimony, the prisoner’s counsel requested the court to instruct the jury *- to acquit the defendant for want of jurisdiction; and upon the ground of variance between the proof and the indictment — the latter charging the commission of the crime in the county of New York, whilst the evidence showed its commission, if within this state, to have been in another county.
    The- court declined so to charge, and instructed the jury, that if they believed the property was stolen in one county of this state, and brought into the county of New York, the offence was properly laid in the indictment ; and that the offence was complete, if committed on the steamboat, while navigating the Sound.
    The jury found the prisoner guilty; and the judgment of the court thereon having been affirmed by the supreme court, on error, the prisoner sued out this writ.
    
      Griswold, for the plaintiff in error.
    
      McKeon, for the People.
   Welles, J.

The felony of which the defendant was convicted was committed on board of a steamboat, while on her passage from the city of New York to Norwich, in the state of Connecticut, at a time when the boat was in Long Island Sound, opposite to the county of Suffolk, near to the shore, between Sand’s Point and Huntington. It is contended on the part of *the plaintiff * 297 j -n errOT) ymt the place where the offence was committed was not within the state of New York; and, therefore, that the conviction was illegal, for want of jurisdiction in the court in which it took place.

The jurisdictional boundary lines of this state, as declared by the revised statutes, begin at Lyon’s Point, in the mouth of a brook or river, called Byram river, where it falls into Long Island Sound. The description then proceeds, with great minuteness and particularity of courses, distances and monuments, defining the eastern, northern, western and southern boundaries of the state, until it comes to a rock on the west side o Hudson’s river, in the latitude of forty-one degrees north. The description then proceeds in the following words: “ Then southerly along the west shore, at low-water mark of Hudson’s river, of the Kill Van Kull, of the sound between Staten Island and New Jersey, and of Raritan Bay, to Sandy Hook; and then to the place of beginning, in such manner as to include Staten Island and the islands of meadow on the west side thereof, Shooter’s Island, Long Island, the Isle of Wight, now called Gardiner’s Island, Fisher’s Island, Shelter Island, Plumb Island, Robin’s Island, Ram Island, the Gull Islands and all the islands and waters in the bay of New York and within the bounds above described.” (1 R. S. 61 to 65, § 1.)

Does this description include the locus in quo ? The question is one of no ordinary importance and difficulty. Its solution must depend upon the construction to be given to the language employed in defining the last course of the description, viz., in such manner as to include” the islands, &c., enumerated. If it had concluded with the words, and then to the place of beginning,” .a straight line from Sandy Hook to Lyon’s Point in the mouth of Byram river, would have been intended, which would have excluded the whole of Suffolk, the greater part of Queens, and a portion of Kings counties, leaving the place where the larceny was committed clearly to the east of and without the boundaries of the state. But the line must run in such manner as to include the islands, &c., mentioned.

*There have occurred to my mind two modes of running the line in question, either of which L will secure this object, and one of which, it seems to me, should be substantially adopted. The first is to start from Sandy Hook and run the line, by straight courses, so as to include the islands mentioned, making, with a direct straight line from Sandy Hook to Lyon’s Point, an irregular figure, the exterior of which - shall consist wholly of straight lines, with angles of unequal quantities, and with the vertex of each angle pointing outward from the interior of the figure. This would run the northern line of the figure or tract from some point on Fisher’s Island to Lyon’s Point, in a direct course, and would include the locus in quo.

The second is to run the line directly from Sandy Hook to the place of beginning, in the mouth of Byram river, diverging from a direct course so far, and so far only, as is necessary to include the islands, &c., mentioned, and as soon as that object is attained to return to the original straight direction. By this mode, it is intended to include the whole of the Sound lying east of the first-mentioned direct line from Sandy Hook to Lyon’s Point, and consequently, the place where the offence was committed. I am inclined to adopt the latter of these modes for the following reasons: Section 2, of title 1, of chapter 2, of the first part of the revised statutes (3 R. S. 1) declares, that the state shall be divided into fifty-six counties. This undoubtedly means that the whole state shall be so divided, including the waters and the lands covered with water within its bounds, as will presently be made to appear. Section 2 of the same statute contains a particular description of the extent and boundaries of each of said fifty-six counties. Long Island Sound is either a part of the high seas, or an arm of the ocean, much the largest portion of it separating the state of Connecticut from that part of the state of New York comprising the whole of the county of Suffolk and a part of the county of Queens. These two counties are bounded on the north by the Sound (3 R. S., 2d ed., pp. 1-2, § 2). The state of Connecticut is bounded on the south by the same Sound, and no reason is perceived, ^ why that *state has not the same right as the J state of New York to claim those waters to be within her territory.

The counties of New York and Richmond contain certain waters and lands under water, particularly mentioned in the statute defining their boundaries, respectively, while neither the counties of Suffolk, Queens or Westchester, each of which is contiguous to the Sound, embrace any part of it, either in terms or by fair or necessary implication, excepting the county of Westchester, which, by its easterly "bounds, is made to embrace that part of the Sound lying westerly of a straight line from Sandy Hook to Lyon’s Point, as the west bounds of that part of the state, and excluding that part of the Sound which is declared to be the south boundary of the county. By the act last referred to, all the counties bordering on the Hudson river, above Westchester, on both sides, extend to tlie middle of the river; and Westchester extends to the west shore, at low-water mark, from its south-west comer, as far north as the north-east comer of New Jersey; although by the compact between the states of New York and New Jersey, dated 16th September 1833 (3 R. S., 2d ed., pp. 175-77), the division line between the two states was established in the middle of Hudson river, and consequently, would limit the west bounds of Westchester to that line. All the counties bordering on lakes Ontario and Erie extend north, into those lakes, to the boundary line between the United States and the British dominions; those lying on the rivers Niagara and St. Lawrence, to the same boundary line, where it passes through those rivers opposite the same counties, and the counties on Lake Champlain to the boundary line of the state, where it runs through the middle of the last-mentioned lake.

A careful examination will show that every part of the state is located in some one of the counties enumerated in the statute, and that no part of Long Island Sound, except so much of it as Westchester includes, is embraced in either. There is no authoritative description of either of the counties of this state," which embraces any other portion of the Sound; and the fact 300 ] that some of the counties in its neighborhood are made to embrace, in express terms, adjacent waters and lands under water, *and that those on lakes Erie, Ontario and Champlain, and on the rivers Niagara and St. Lawrence, are extended into those lakes and rivers, to the exterior lines of the state, and that the north and east rivers are embraced in contiguous counties, in and by the same statute and section which bounds the counties of Suffolk and Queens, upon the north, and Westchester, upon the south, on the Sound, is strong, if not conclusive, to show that the state never claimed any part of the Sound, except that part of it lying in Westchester county, to be within her territory, or to extend the jurisdiction of her courts over any other parts of it.

But whatever may be the technical construction of the statute, it should yield, if necessary, to a more enlarged view of the question. Long Island Sound is, by well-settled rules, a part of the high seas, and no one of the states bordering upon it has the right, by any statute or other act of sovereignty, to extend her jurisdiction over it. The high seas include all those parts of the main ocean which are not within the fauces terree — the mouth or chops of a channel; that is, the space between the headlands, so near to each other, that a person on one of them can see with the naked eye what is doing on the other. If the headlands or points upon the main land are thus near, the water within them is an arm of the sea, denominated a bay, gulf, estuary, &c., as the case may be, and is included, or may be, in the adjoining state or country. If the distance between the headlands is greater than that mentioned, the waters between and within them belong to the high seas, and are exclusively under the maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts. No one will contend that the Sound, at the place where the crime in this case was committed, or that the entrance to it at the east end of Long Island, or at any place between those points, is so narrow as to come within the above description or definition of the fauces terree.

There is, however, another view which must determine the case in favor of the plaintiff in error. Admitting the locality of this larceny to be within this state, the question arises, in what county is it? It is not and cannot be contended, that it is in the county of New York; and it is *objected on the part of the plain- ^ tiff in error, that there was no authority to indict *- or try him in that county.

The counsel for the defendants in error relies upon the provision of the revised statutes, declaring that “ when any offence shall have been committed within this state, on board of any vessel navigating any river, lake or canal, an indictment for the same may be found in any county through which such vessel shall be navigated, in the course of the same voyage or trip, or in the county where such voyage or trip shall terminate; and such indictment may be tried, and a conviction thereon had, in such county, in the same manner and with the like effect as in the county where the offence was committed. (2 R. S. 727, § 44.) In the case of the People v. Hulse (3 Hill 309), this statute received a construction with which I fully agree. In that case, the defendant was indicted and tried for a rape, in the Suffolk county oyer and terminer. On the trial, it appeared, that the offence was committed on board of a vessel, while on a voyage from the city of New York to Belle-port, in the town of Brookhaven, in the county of Suffolk, and while the vessel was lying at anchor in a bay or cove on the south side of Long Island, and within the county of Kings, being detained there by adverse winds. The voyage was down the Hudson to the mouth of the same, and thence through the Atlantic ocean to the place of destination; about four-fifths of it being in the ocean The court held, that there had been a mistrial, and quashed the indictment, on the ground that it had been found and tried in the wrong county; and that it was clear, that the offence must be committed while the vessel is in the river, in order to be within the statute. The case referred to is precisely like the present in principle, and decides it, assuming the locality of the offence in this case to have been within the state. The locus in quo in each case was on board of a vessel, when not in a river, and while on a voyage or trip, a portion whereof was through a river.

It was contended by the counsel for the defendant in error, that the portion of the Sound where the larceny was committed is properly a river, and in support of * 302 1 idea, we were referred *to several statutes in which, as was contended, the Sound is designated “ The East River or Sound,” and that those terms are applied indiscriminately to the waters in question. On reference to those statutes, they are found to be those which describe the boundaries of the county of Westchester and the city and county of New York, and clearly refer to the East river before it enters or unites with the Sound. If it were otherwise, and the Sound, at the place in question, was, in statutes distinctly referred to by the term river, it could only be regarded as a descriptio rd, and would afford at most but very slight evidence of its character in this respect. The Sound, at its narrowest place between Sand’s Point and Huntington, must' be from eight to ten miles wide; and as it proceeds eastward, it becomes broader until it attains, the width of about twenty-five miles. It seems, to me, it cannot, in any just or proper sense, be termed a river.

There were other points raised upon the argument which it becomes unnecessary to consider, because, if either of the views which I have taken be correct, the judgment of the supreme court and that of the court of sessions should be reversed.

Edmonds, J.

I cannot recognise the doctrine contended for by the prisoner’s counsel, namely, that as the offence was committed in the Sound, and thus came within the jurisdiction of the United States courts, the state courts have no jurisdiction.

Each government punishes for itself offences against itself. And because the United States courts have cognisance of an offence on our tide waters, it by no means follows, that the state authorities may not also take cognisance of it. The jurisdiction of the federal authorities is not exclusive, except where it is attended by a cession of territory, or expressly made so by a law of congress, in cases where congress have the power to legislate. Now, here was no cession of territory, nor is exclusive jurisdiction given, by the United States statutes, to the United States courts, over offences, except where they are offences against the laws of the United States. So, while it would not be competent for the state tribunals to take cognisance of an act that was *made a crime only by the laws of the United , ____ J J r* 303 States, they may take cognisance of the same L act, if it is also made a crime by the state laws. For then each government would punish offences' against itself, and in matters over which the state authorities had jurisdiction originally, this concurrent power must exist, unless it be determined that the same act cannot at the same time be an offence against both governments. If it may be so, and I see no reason why it should not, then it must be that each government must have power to punish the same act as an offence against each jurisdiction.

It may, however, be, that this will involve the hazard of a man’s being punished twice for the same offence. But against this there is a practical and sufficient remedy, which is growing up in the practice of the several federal and state courts, as congress extends its power by its enactments, and that is, in allowing the judgment in one court to be pleaded in bar in the other. (Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; 1 Kent Com. 399.)

If this view be correct, then, in this case, it is necessary to inquire, whether the offence was committed within the territory of the state, and is made punishable by the state laws. Upon that point, there is no room for a doubt. That was the only point raised in the court below, and the court had no doubt that the boundary line from the east end of Long Island to the boundary of Connecticut, ran straight from one point to the other across the Sound, and did not, as claimed by the prisoner’s counsel, follow the windings of the inner or north shore of Long Island to a point opposite the mouth of Byram river, and then in a straight line across the Sound. It was this latter line alone which placed the offence without the territorial limits of the state, and for such a line the court saw no authority whatever. In that opinion, I concur.

There is, however, another point in this case not raised below but which may nevertheless be considered here; it is this: The indictment is general for a larceny committed in the county of New York. It was not, in fact, committed within the body of that county, but in that of Suffolk; and the offence could be properly laid * in New York only where, under § 44, it *was -* committed on board a vessel navigating a river, &c., which, in the course of its trip, passed through the county of New York; or, under § 50, where the property stolen in one county and brought into another, was taken by burglary or robbery. (2 R. S. 727.)

Now the difficulty in this case is, to determine under which of these sections the prisoner was convicted. And this is a material question, because the difference in the punishment is very great; in one case, being limited to imprisonment for five years, and in the other, extending to imprisonment for life. It seems to me, that the indictment ought to contain the necessary averments to point and locate the offence in the particular part of the statute under which a conviction is sought.

Under such a general mode of pleading as was adopted in this case, the prisoner might he convicted either of a larceny in the city of New York, or of a larceny in any other county, on board of a vessel, which, in the course of its trip, passed through the county of New York, or of stealing property in some other county and bringing it into the county of New York. He would not know from the pleadings which of them was the offence charged against him; he might not even find out on the trial, and finally ascertain only by the extent'of the punishment awarded afterwards. This is a looseness of pleading not tolerated in civil suits, and much less in criminal cases, where greater strictness has always prevailed.

The rule in criminal pleading is, that the charge must contain such a description of the crime and statement of the facts by which it is constituted, as to identify the accusation, lest the charge be of one offence and the conviction of another; as to enable the defendant to know the crime he is called to answer, and to claim any right or indulgence belonging to each offence; as to enable the court to see a definite offence on the record and apply the proper judgment and punishment; and as to enable the defendant to plead a former judgment in bar. (1 Chit. Cr. L. 169.) Now, in all these respects, such a general mode of pleading, in such a case as this, as has been adopted in this case, is a departure from sound and salutary rules. And, therefore, I think, the judgment ought to be arrested, and the judgment of the supreme court should he reversed.

Per Curiam.

Judgment reversed, on the ground that, the portion of Long Island Sound, where the vessel was at the time of the commission of the offence, was an arm of the sea, and not a river, lake or canal, within the meaning of the statute. The other questions were not passed upon.

Judgment reversed. 
      
       In Haskins v. People, 16 N. Y. 350, Denio, C. J., said, this was the only point decided., as was apparent from the printed case used on the argument. If the Zocus in quo had been within the county of Suffolk, and the stolen property had been brought by the prisoner into the county of New York, the court of General Sessions would have had jurisdiction ; but as the place where the offence was committed was an arm of the sea, not within the body of any county, the court was without jurisdiction, under the statute. The state courts, however, have civil and criminal jurisdiction over the waters of Long Island Sound. Mohler v. Norwich and New York Transportation Co., 35 N. Y. 352. A murder committed on board a vessel upon the Sound, is indictable in the adjacent county. People v. Wilson, 3 Park. 199.
     