
    Brace v. Catlin.
    1804.
    In the Court below.
    Nathaniel Brace, Plaintiff; Abijah Catlin, Defendant.
    
    A writing is these words “ Received of satisfaction of ⅛ a discharge vrithin the meaning ol the statute regulating pleas, and cannot be ad-’"lttec5> un^er the general issue, as evidence of the payment of 51. the debt or duty, tor which the ac-aonib ⅛°<⅞⅛
    T „„ , r . . ,. , , , , Hlb was an action ci indemtatus assumpsit, in which the plaintiff declared, that he had conveyed to the defendant, at his request, a certain piece of land, and the defendant, in consideration thereof, promised to pay the plaintiff as much money, as said land was reasonably Worth.
    Plca non assumpsitissue to the iurv : and verdict 1 J J for the defendant.
    On the trial, the plaintiff read in evidence his deed of r ' said land to the defendant, dated the 11th of November, Í "98, which contained an acknowledgment, in the usual form, that the consideration of 200/. had been received by the plaintiff, for said land, to bis full satisfaction. The defendant then offered in evidence a certain writing, executed by the plaintiff, in these words:
    
      Harxvinton, May Í5thy 1/89
    “ This day, received of Abijah Catlin five pounds lawful “ money, in full satisfaction of all debts, dues, and de-u mands, whatever. As witness my hand,
    “ Nathaniel Brace.”
    
    To the admission of which the plaintiff objected, on die ground, that it purported to be a discharge from the plaintiff, whereby the defendant was acquitted from the plaintiff’s demand. The Court overruled the objection, and permitted the writing to be read in evidence, not as a discharge, but as evidence of-payment of five pounds. The plaintiff then offered certain evidence,  which was objected to by the defendant, and rejected bv the Court. A bill ©f exceptions was filed by the plaintiff, for the admission of the former evidence, and the rejection of the latter, on which the case was brought before this Court.
    
      Smith, (of Woodbury) and Gould, for the plaintiff,,
    contended, that the writing, which the Superior Court suffered to be given in evidence, under the general issue, was a discharge, and ought, if the party would have availed himself of it, to have been pleaded specially, 
       It makes no difference with what view the Court admitted this instrument. In whatever light they might consider it, its nature was the same. The only question, therefore, is, what was its legal operation i If the force and effect of it was a discharge, it ought not to have been admitted. The operative words were “ in full of all demands.” It is usual to insert a certain sum, that it may appear to have been given for value received; but the amount of that sum does not affect the operation of the instrument. This writing exactly answered the description of the statute ; it extinguished every claim, -which, at the time, existed; it was an act of the plaintiff, by which the defendant was saved from the plaintiff’s demand. If it had been pleaded specially, and demurred to, would if not Mve been a bar ?
    
    IngersoH, and Daggett, for the defendant,
    contended, that as this action was upon the implied promise, a discharge might be given in evidence under the issue of non assumpsit.
    
    The judgment was reversed.
    
      
      
         The pnncipü questions, which were nude by the counst-i in a;g-uiueng i this evidence ; bul os Uic case was decided by the Courg upon the clues'point solely, a particular stale non ⅛ «mitted.
    
    
      
      
        Slat. 349
    
   By the Cottier.

The statute regulating pieas excepts from matters, which may be given in evidence under the general issue, a discharge from the plaintiff his accord, and every other special matter, whereby the defendant, by the act of the plaintiff, is saved or acquittedfrom the plaintiff’s demand*

It is manifest from the tenor of this instrument, that it tras intended to be a bar to all suits, of whatever nature, which the plaintiff might bring against the defendant, for cause of action prior to its date. It is this understanding of it only, that gives meaning and effect to the terms “ in full satisfaction of all debts, dues, and demands, whatever.” But, although it extends and applies equally to every suit, that might be brought, it cannot be evidence, in every suit, that Sh of the original debt or duty declared upon has been paid. It cannot, therefore, be such evidence, in any particular suit. Nor could it be intended as evidence, in any case, that any definite portion of the si. had been paid on the original debt or duty, in such case ; for no definite portion of it is either expressed, or ascertainable with reference to any case.

The instrument is evidence of an accord, with satisfaction, that Si. was accepted, in Hen of any right of action against the defendant, which the plaintiff had. It is so ;o be taken, both because it has the customary form used m such cases, in this State, and because it cannot, as we have seen, be taken otherwise. It is, therefore, within the exception of the statute. '

If barely the circumstance, that an instrument contains evidence of the payment of a sum of money, renders it admissible under the general issue, the statute will be defeated ; for almost every discharge or acquittance under the hand of the party contains such evidence. The payment, however, in such cases, as in the present case, is not the payment or performance of the original debt or duty, but of what the party receiving has accorded to accept, in lieu thereof ; and it is the accord only, a fact not enquirable into under the general issue, that gives relevancy t’o the payment.  