
    
      Case 90 — PETITION EQUITY
    March 2, 1893.
    Newman, &c., v. Ecton, &c.
    APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, CHANCERY DIVISION.
    1. Sales — Repeal op Remedial Act. — The adoption of the Code of Practice did not have the effect to repeal a remedial act found in the General Statutes, where there was no remedy for the enforcement of the right found in the Code.
    The provisions of chapter 63, article 6, of the General Statutes, in so far as they affect sales of contingent or defeasible interests in land, are not repealed by the Civil Code.
    MORTON V. JO YES por appellants.
    1. The sale could not have been had under the provisions of sec. 491 of the Civil Code, because the estate is not a “particular estate,” but a defeasible fee as held by this court in Ecton v. Smith, 6 Ky. L. R„ 216.
    2. The Code was intended to furnish a complete system of laws in a condensed-form relating to pleading and practice, and by its express provisions laws within the purview of its provisions are repealed. (Civil Code, sec. 838 Broadus v. Broadus, 10 Bush, 307.)
    <C. 13. SEYMOUR por appellees.
    1. The repealing clause of the General Statutes which was construed in Broadus v. Broadus, 10 Bush, were that all statutes “which are repugnant thereto” were repealed, while the Civil Code repeals all “laws within the purview of its provisions.” The framers of the Code evidently had in view this distinction, and only intended the Code to repeal other laws in states of case provided for by the Code.
    2. Repealing all “laws within the purview of its provisions” means in such cases as are provided for in the repealing act, and no others. (Payne v. Conner, 3 Bibb, 181; Patterson v. Caldwell, 1 Met., 495; Com. v. Watts, 84 Ky., 544; Kean v. Tilford, 81 Ky., 602.)
    DANE & BURNETT op counsel on same side.
    
      
      This case was only recently ordered to he officially reported.
    
   JUDGE PRYOR

delivered the opinion op the court.

In the case of Ecton v. Smith, decided in September, 1884 (6 Ky.L.R.,216), it was held that the character of estate held by Alice Ecton, etc., under her father’s will was a defeasible fee. At the suit of Ecton and his wife, Alice, this estate, or a part of it, was sold in a proceeding conforming to the requirements of chapter 63, General Statutes, article 6, and the lots purchased by the appellant. It is insisted that the adoption of the Code of Practice repealed the General Statutes in so far as it affected sales of contingent interest in land or of interests subject to be defeated in the event of the happening or non happening of a certain event. This court in the case of the Commonwealth v. Watts, reported in 84 Ky., expressly held that the repealing clause of the code is to be understood as repealing all acts in relation to cases that are provided for by the repealing act, and in that clause of the General Statutes in force under which this proceeding was had, there is. both a right and a remedy to enforce it, created by the statute, and while the code is intended to’ furnish the remedy, there are many rights created by it other than mere remedy. Since finding such an intermingling of rights and remedies in the code and statutes, this court holds that a remedial act found in the General Statutes is not repealed unless a remedy for the enforcement of the same right is found in the Code of Practice. This being the case, the chancellor was authorized to adjudge the sale. The trouble in this case is that no such statute referred to by appellant is found in the edition of the General Statutes of 1888, but in the statutes of 1883, the sale of contingent interests is authorized, and that statute stands unrepealed.  