
    Alice Keating, Respondent, v. David J. Conviser et al., Appellants.
    
      Libel — letter sent by de,, endant, a creditor of plaintiff, to her employer.
    
    
      Keating v. Conviser, 219 App. Div. 836, affirmed.
    (Submitted November 23, 1927;
    decided December 13, 1927.)
    Appeal from a judgment entered March 23, 1927, upon an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, which reversed an order of the court at a Trial Term setting aside a verdict in favor of plaintiff and reinstated said verdict. The action was for libel, the complaint alleging that defendant sent the following letter to her employer:
    “ Conviser’s “Uneeda
    
      “ 1061 Broadway, Brooklyn, N. Y.
    
      “ Telephone Jefferson 6200
    
      “March 26, 1924.
    “ No. 28817
    
      “ U. S. Lines,
    
      “ 45 Broadway,
    “ N. Y. C.:
    
      “ Gentlemen.— Permit us to direct your attention to a matter of importance.
    “ Miss Alice Keating of your employ purchased from us some time ago, clothing amounting to $79.50. Although agreeing to pay us $2.50 per week, to date we have received no payment on the balance of $10.00 since August 11, 1923.
    
      “ Frankly spealdng, the only basis upon which we extended credit to her was the fact that she was a person in your employ, from each of whom you require a certain standard of honesty.
    “ Now there are two ways open to us to enforce collection. One way is to take the debtor to Court; this involves a loss of time and additional court costs to which naturally we do not like to resort unless absolutely compelled.
    
      “ The other method which we prefer is to appeal to a man in authority like yourself. We honestly believe that a word from you will make her realize the unfairness of withholding payment on a just obligation.
    
      “ Thanking you in advance for any assistance you may give us on this matter, we are
    
      “ Very truly yours,
    “ P. PERLIN,
    
      “ Uneeda Credit Clothing Co.”
    The Appellate Division held that the communication was libelous per se, in view of a prior communication from defendants to plaintiff threatening to make trouble for her in the event she did not pay their bill.
    
      Benjamin Reass and Sylvia Usefof for appellants.
    
      Frederick G. Rita for respondent.
   Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Cardozo, Ch. J., Pound, Crane, Andrews, Lehman, Kellogg and O’Brien, JJ.  