
    Filogonia Rosa Elia Noyola RODRIQUEZ, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-73303.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 12, 2014.
    
    Filed July 9, 2014.
    Antonio M. Zaldana, Law Office of Antonio M. Zaldana, West Covina, CA, for Petitioner.
    
      Sarah Maloney, Oil, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SACK, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Robert D. Sack, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Filogonia Rosa Elia Noyola Rodriquez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of her application for cancellation of removal or voluntary departure based on her inability to establish the requisite good moral character.

“No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established, ... has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under [the Immigration and Nationality Act].” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6). This Court has previously determined that Noyola Rodriquez gave false testimony, Noyola Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 168 Fed.Appx. 283, 234 (9th Cir.2006), and there is substantial evidence in the record to support the immigration judge’s determination on remand that her purpose in doing so was to obtain an immigration benefit, Urzua Covarrubias v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir.2007). Because the IJ’s determination rendered Noyola Rodriquez statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal or voluntary departure, there was no need to consider other evidence of her moral character. Thus, the IJ’s decision not to do so did not violate the scope of this Court’s previous remand order, and, even assuming Noyola Rodriquez’s due process rights were violated, she cannot show prejudice. See Larita-Martinez v. I.N.S., 220 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir.2000).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     