
    Antonio DOLL, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, et al., Respondents.
    No. 3D17-890
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Opinion filed May 10, 2017
    Order Issued June 14, 2017
    
      Antonio Doll, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, for respondents.
    Before LOGUE, SCALES and LUCK, JJ.
   SCALES, J.

Antonio Doll petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he is entitled to immediate release from prison because he was improperly designated a habitual violent felony offender and that his sentences are otherwise illegal. For the reasons stated below, we deny Doll’s instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus and order Doll to show cause why this Court should not prohibit him from making further pro se filings to this Court in circuit court case number 91-37881.

In November 1992, the jury found Doll guilty of burglary of a structure with a firearm and aggravated assault. At .the sentencing hearing held in December 1992, the trial court designated Doll a habitual violent felony offender, sentencing him to thirty years in prison with a fifteen, year minimum mandatory on the burglary conviction, and to ten years in prison with a three year minimum mandatory on the aggravated assault conviction. The court ordered the ten years to run consecutive to the thirty years, and the minimum manda-tories to run concurrently.

This Court affirmed Doll’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See Doll v. State, 626 So.2d 221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (table). Since that time, Doll has filed in this court at least thirteen postconviction appeals or petitions.

The instant petition argues that Doll’s underlying sentences are illegal because the trial court’s ■written order imposing the sentences does not comport with its oral pronouncements at the sentencing hearing. This court recently denied this very claim in appellate case number 3D15-2515. See Doll v. State, 207 So.3d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (table). Doll also claims that he was improperly designated a habitual violent felony offender. This court rejected this very claim in appellate case number 3D04-1854. See Doll v. State, 917 So.2d 881 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). We deny the instant petition.

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Doll is hereby directed to show cause, within forty-five days from the date of this opinion, why he should not be prohibited from filing any further pro se appeals, petitions, motions or other proceedings related to his criminal sentencing in circuit court case number 91-37881.

If Doll does not demonstrate good cause, any such further and unauthorized filings by Doll will subject him to appropriate sanctions, including the issuance of written findings forwarded to the Florida Department of Corrections for its consideration of disciplinary action, including forfeiture of gain time. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2017).

Petition denied. Order to show cause issued.

SCALES, J.

On May 10, 2017, this Court issued an opinion denying Antonio Doll’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Our opinion contained an order to show cause why Doll should not be prohibited from filing with this Court any further pro se appeals, petitions, motions or other proceedings related to his criminal sentence in circuit court case number 91-37881.

Doll responded by filing with this Court a response to the order to show cause, again raising his contention that: (1) his underlying sentences are illegal because the trial court’s written order imposing the sentences do not comport with its oral pronouncements at the sentencing hearing; and (2) he was improperly designated a habitual violent felony offender. Other than attaching a corrected sentencing order to his response—which further confirms no error on the part of the trial court in conforming the written sentence to its oral pronouncements—Doll’s response raises no new information or argument for our consideration. This matter is well settled on the merits. See Doll v. State, No. 3D17-890, 223 So.3d 331, 2017 WL 1927732 (Fla. 3d DCA May 10, 2017). Accordingly, we conclude that Doll has not shown good cause to justify further pro se filings of appeals, petitions, motions or other proceedings with this Court.

Our responsibility is to balance Doll’s pro se right of access to courts with this Court’s need to devote its finite resources to legitimate appeals and petitions, recognizing the seriousness of the sanction when the litigant is a criminal defendant. See State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999). After an order to show cause and an opportunity for the criminal defendant to respond, this Court may prevent further such filings. Id.

We direct the Clerk of the Third District Court of Appeal to refuse to accept from Doll any further pro se filings related to circuit court case number 91-37881; provided, however, that the Clerk of the Third District Court of Appeal may accept filings related to circuit court case number 91-37881 if. such filings have been reviewed and signed by an attorney who is a licensed member of the Florida Bar in good standing.

. Any further and unauthorized pro se filings by Doll will subject him to sanctions, including the issuance of written findings forwarded to the Florida Department of Corrections for consideration by it for disciplinary action, pursuant to section 944,279(1) of the Florida Statutes.

Order issued. 
      
      . At the sentencing hearing, Doll also pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, receiving credit for time served.
     
      
      . Doll v. State, 207 So.3d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus) (table); Doll v. State, 147 So.3d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus) (table); Doll v. State, 107 So.3d 418 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (denying rule 3.800 postconviction motion) (table); Doll v. State, 106 So.3d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (denying petition for writ of certiorari) (table); Doll v. State, 76 So.3d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (denying petition writ of habeas corpus) (table); Doll v. State, 75 So.2d 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (denying petition for writ of habe-as corpus) (table); Doll v. State, 60 So.3d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (denying rule 3.800 post-conviction motion) (table); Doll v. State, 38 So.3d 148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (denying rule 3.850 postconviction motion) (table); Doll v. State, 11 So.3d 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (denying rule 3.850 postconviction motion) (table); Doll v. State, 965 So.2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (denying rule 3.800 postconviction motion) (table); Doll v. State, 917 So.2d 881 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (denying rule 3.800 post-conviction motion); Doll v. State, 700 So.2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (denying rule 3.850 postconviction motion) (table); Doll v. State, 654 So.2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (denying rule 3.850 postconviction motion) (table).
     