
    CROUCH v. TRIMBY & BREWSTER SHOE CO.
    (Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department.
    December 27, 1894.)
    Landlord and Tenant—Lease—Renewal.
    Defendant took possession under a lease for two years from April 1, 1890, with privilege of renewal for a like term by notifying the landlord on or before February 1,1892. During the first term there was an agreement between the parties that the lessee should also have an additional part of the premises, and that a lease for three years from April 1, 1891, should be executed. The premises were repaired for the lessee accordingly, and were occupied by him until March 1, 1893. Held, that the lessee did not elect to extend the original lease for an additional period.
    Appeal from Monroe county court.
    Action by George W. Crouch, Sr., against the Trimby & Brewster Shoe Company. From a judgment entered on a verdict directed by the court in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, made on the minutes of the court, defendant appeals.
    Reversed.
    The defendant was a corporation engaged in manufacturing boots and shoes in the city of Rochester. The plaintiff leased to the defendant by written. lease dated on the 1st day of April, 1890, the third floor of a building in the city of Rochester for the term of two years from its date, at an annual rental of $800, to be paid in equal monthly installments. The lease gave to the defendant the privilege of renewal thereof for an additional term of two-years from March 31, 1892, upon the same terms and conditions, by notifying the landlord to that effect on or before February 1, 1892. The defendant entered into possession of the demised premises, and, its business having increased so that it needed more room, it entered into negotiations with the plaintiff at the close of the first year of the lease for the second floor of the building. It was agreed between the parties that the plaintiff should make such changes in the rooms that they could be occupied together. The changes agreed upon were the connecting of the two rooms by a stairway, and the changing of some partitions. It was agreed that the lease of the two floors should be for the term of three years from the 1st day of April, 1891, at an annual rental of $1,600, payable in monthly installments, and that a written lease should be prepared and executed by the parties. The plaintiff caused one to be prepared for both floors, according to the terms of the agreement, and delivered the same to the defendant. It was, however, never executed; but the required changes were made, and the defendant entered into occupation of the second floor, and continued to occupy and pay the rent for the two floors until the 1st day of March, 1893. It then vacated the premises-. No notice was ever given by the defendant of its election to exercise the privilege of continuing the first lease for the additional two years. The reason assigned by the defendant for leaving the premises was that the plaintiff had leased the first floor of the building for a business which the defendant considered to be hazardous, and which it was claimed increased the danger of the bu tding being destroyed by fire, and increased the cost of insurance. The piaim.ff claimed to recover under the first lease for the use of the third floor for the months of April, May, June, and July, in the year 1893, the sum of 8266.68; and for a second cause of action a like amount for the use of the second floor of the building. At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence the court directed a nonsuit as to the second cause of action, and denied the defendant’s motion for a nonsuit as to the first cause of action. The defendant duly excepted, and at the close of the evidence renewed its motion for a direction of a verdict upon the ground that there was no evidence of a renewal of the first lease. The motion was denied, and the defendant thereupon asked to go to the jury upon the questions whether there was a surrender of the lease of the third floor upon the 1st of April, 1891, and whether the defendant ever elected to continue in occupation of the third floor after the expiration of the two years mentioned in the written lease, and whether there was an eviction of the defendant from the premises. The motions were denied, and the defendant duly excepted, and the court thereupon directed a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of 8208, and the defendant duly excepted.
    Argued before DWIGHT, P. J., and LEWIS, HAIGHT, and BRADLEY, JJ.
    J. B. M. Stevens, for appellant.
    E. F. Turk, for respondent.
   LEWIS, J.

The only question presented by this appeal that merits consideration is whether the defendant, by continuing in the occupation of the third floor in the manner stated, after the expiration of the two years provided for in the written lease, must be held to have waived the necessity of giving the .formal notice provided for by the terms of the written lease, and thereby extended the term for two years after the 1st of April, 1892. The general rule contended for by the plaintiff is that a tenant, occupying premises under a lease containing the provision as to extension of the term like the one in suit, who continues to occupy the premises after the expiration of the term with the consent of the landlord, paying the rent as it accrues, is held to have waived the necessity for giving the notice, and is bound for the additional time. But has that rule any application to this case? Here the tenant, before the time fixed for giving the notice had arrived, determined that the one floor would not accommodate its business, and so informed the plaintiff. Had it not been able to obtain the additional room, there is nothing in the case justifying the conclusion that it would have availed itself of the privilege of continuing the term of the first lease. The evidence negatives any such claim. The premises first leased had been altered by changing the partitions and connécting the two rooms by a stairway, and thereafter both floors were occupied under the new arrangement for the increased rental, which happened to be just twice the amount called for by the first lease. We fail to find any evidence justifying the inference that the defendant ever elected to avail itself of the right to extend the term of the first lease, or that the landlord supposed it was to be extended. By continuing in the possession of both floors after the termination of the first lease, the defendant became a tenant at will. The first lease, by its terms, expired with the month of March in the year 1892, and unless it was extended by the parties thereto for the additional two years the defendant was not liable under its provisions. The question is not whether the conditions of the first lease were changed or modified by the verbal contract for the two rooms; that is not the claim of the defendant; but the question is, was the lease renewed for an additional term of two years? The court, we think, erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiff, and the judgment and order appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. All concur.  