
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Lawrence JENSEN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-30024
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 14, 2016 
    
    Filed December 21, 2016
    Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, Paulette Lynn Stewart, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USHE—Office of the US Attorney, Helena, MT, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Andrew J. Nelson, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FDMT—Federal Defenders of Montana (Missoula), Missou-la, MT, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

David Lawrence Jensen appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 84-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), and 924(a)(2), (d). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Jensen contends that the district court erred by imposing a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possession of a firearm in connection with a burglary. We review for clear error, see United States v. Newhoff, 627 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010), and hold there is none. The record reflects that a stolen gun was found in Jensen’s residence, a credit card was stolen from the theft victim in the same incident, and an individual driving a car that fit the description of Jensen’s car used the stolen credit card on the day on which the victim reported the theft. The district court did not clearly err in holding that this evidence was sufficient, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish that Jensen took a firearm during the course of a burglary. See id. (district court’s inference that defendant stole a firearm was reasonable based on circumstantial evidence, which “can prove a sentencing fact”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     