
    KATE M. WELLS v. JULIA F. WELLS et al.
    (Filed 11 October, 1911.)
    1. Descent and Distribution — Personal Property — Mother Next of Kin, When — Brothers and Sisters of Deceased — Interpretation of Statutes.
    In the descent and distribution of the personal estate of one who dies intestate, without child or legal representatives of a deceased child, and leaving a widow and mother and brothers and sisters, his mother is the next of kin and entitled to equally share the property with the widow in exclusion of the brothers and sisters (Revisal, sec. Ill, 3), and Revisal, sec. 132 (6), has no application.
    2. Interpretation of Statutes — Meaning Plain — Power of Courts.
    It is the duty of the courts to observe the plain meaning expressed in a statute.
    Appeal by defendants from George W. Ward, J., beard by consent August Term, 1911, of DupliN.
    Tbe facts are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion of tbe Court by Mr. GMef Justice Ciarle.
    
    
      Aycoclc & Winston, George R. Ward, and Stevens, Beasley & Weelcs for appellant.
    
    
      D. L. Ward for appellee.
    
   Clark, 0. J.

W. D. Wells, deceased, left surviving bim a widow, wbo, it is admitted, is entitled to balf of tbe personal estate, and bis mother, wbo claims to be entitled to tbe other balf of tbe personal estate; also two sisters and a brother, wbo claim that they are entitled to share equally with tbe mother in that balf of tbe estate — that is, they contend that tbe mother, tbe brother, and tbe two sisters a,re entitled, each, to one-eighth.

Tbe distribution of tbe personal estate of an intestate is entirely statutory. Revisal, 132 (3), provides: “If there be no child nor legal representative of a deceased child, then balf of tbe estáte shall be allotted to tbe widow, and tbe residue be distributed to every of tbe next of kin of tbe intestate, wbo are in equal degree, and to those wbo legally represent them.”

This language is so explicit that it should leave no room for doubt. The next of kin of the intestate in this case is bis mother. His brother and sisters are one degree further removed. It follows, therefore, that the mother is entitled to half of the personalty.

The brother and sisters rely upon Eevisal, 132, subsec. 6: “If, after the death of the father and in the lifetime of the mother, any of his children shall die intestate, without wife or children, every brother or sister, and the representatives of them, shall have an equal share with the mother of the deceased child.” But this case does not come within that section, for the intestate left a widow. It does come within the state of facts provided in subsection 3 above quoted.

It may be asked why the Legislature gives the mother only a child’s share when the intestate leaves no widow, and gives her as next of kin half of the personalty if the intestate leaves a widow. Such is the plain letter of the law, and we do not have to supply reasons for legislative action. But it may be surmised that the difference is due to this, that when the intestate leaves no wife or children, the entire estate is to be divided, and therefore the children share in it; whereas, when the intestate leaves a widow, there is only half the estate left, and the statute gives that to all who are the next of kin “in an equal degree.”

Another reason for subsection 6 is that under Eevisal, 132, subsection 5, formerly on the death of the intestate without leaving widow or children the entire personalty would have gone to the father as the next of kin, because ex jure mariti he would take his wife’s share. Subsection 6, carrying out the same idea, provided that in case of the death of the son, leaving neither widow nor children, the personalty should be distributed equally between the children and the mother, just as if the property had gone to the father and was to be distributed as his personalty under Eevisal, 132, subsec. 2.

It would be useless to cite_cases from other jurisdictions having statutes more or less similar to ours, or reason by analogy from decisions on a somewhat different state of facts. As already said, we cannot surmise as to the reasons for the statute. When, as here, tbe statute is plain, it is tbe duty of tbe Court to observe it as written. Lex scripta est is sufficient for us.

In tbis case we bave not tbe state of facts provided for by Revisal, 132, subsec. 6, and we do bave tbe state of facts provided for by Revisal, 132, subsec. 3. Tbe clerk therefore properly beld tbat tbe yidow is entitled to one-balf of tbe personalty of tbe intestate and tbat tbe mother of tbe deceased, as “next of kin,” is entitled to tbe other half. Tbe judgment overruling tbe clerk is

Reversed.  