
    Thomas Brandon ads. John F. Grimke.
    
    Where a plaintiff has a title to land, an entry gives sufficient possession to maintain trespass quare clausum fregit; but where he does not rely on title, but on possession only, there the possession must be a possessio pedis.
      
    
    Possession of a part, is a possession of the whole tract covered by a plaintiff’s title ;  nor will a river running through the tract sever the possession. '
    If an entire tract be divided into two parts, which are afterwards purchased by one person, they will be united; and to establish the original identity, a color-able or apparent title, definite in its limits, is all that is required.
    A plaintiff’s possession is sufficient to maintain trespass quare clausum fregit, until a defendant proves a title in himself. 
    
    This was an action of trespass quare clausum, fregit, *tried before Mr. Justice Oheves, at Union, Fall Term, 1817.
    The locus in quo was not disputed. The evidence represented it to be on the north side of Tyger river.
    The pleas wore ; 1. Not guilty. 2. Liberum, tenementum.
    
    The trespass was clearly proved.
    The plaintiff went into proof of his title and possession. Both parties claimed under a grant from North Carolina, (before the boundary line was distinctly established,) dated 3d September, 1753, to Wm. Oowden. The original grant was not given in evidence, but the existence of it sufficiently appeared.
    The plaintiff adduced a grant from the State of South Carolina, to Archer Smith, dated 14th October, 1744, which recited the grant from North Carolina to Cowden ; and that Smith had become entitled to the land by purchase, and was then in possession of it; that these facts had been proved according to the Act of Assembly passed 20th August, 1731, (Public Laws, 131 ; 1 Brev.' Dig. 124.) The land thus granted lay on both sides of the Tyger river, and was stated'by the grant to contain six hundred acres. The plaintiff then gave in evidence a lease and release from Archer Smith to Samuel Dubose, for five hundred and seventy-one acres on the south side of Tyger river, dated 15th and 16th December, 1777 ; a lease and release from Samuel Dubose, for the same to James Oliphant, dated 17th and 18th December, 1777, and a deed from Archer Smith to James Oliphant, for the part on the north side of Tyger river, dated 1st April, 1785 ; also a judgment in the case of Bull and JRvsselv. James Oliphant, dated 7th May, and 1791 execution entered in the office of the sheriff of Ninety-Six, on the 9th July, 1791, and a levy on the 20th July, 1791; then a deed from Wm. Tenant, sheriff of Ninety-Six, under a sale by virtue of the said judgment and execution, dated 4th August, 1795. It did not appear in evidence, where the sale had been made. The parol evidence was immensely voluminous, and much of it had little relation -to the real merits of the case.
    *r^le plaintiff proved, that a person of the name of Bailey was on the land in dispute, in L779 or 1780, as tenant to Archer Smith ; that when he left it Holling Summer was on the land, as tenant of Smith. In 1784, James Anderson rented it; and in 1787, Anderson paid rent to Oliphant, who had bought it in 1785, of Archer Smith ; then two persons of the name of Bvett rented it of Oliphant, and then one of them and a person of the name of Goree lived on it, as the witness believed’, as the tenants of .Oliphant; and a person of the name Kidwell lived on it till the death of Oliphant, who died, 1792. The witness, who proved most of the facts, (Stephen Leighton) stated in conclusion, that, from 1779 to 1794, Archer Smith, and James Oliphant, and the tenants holding under them, were in possession of the land in dispute. The plaintiff, after ho purchased at sheriff’s sale, took possession on the south side of the river on the 12th January, 1795. Tilman Bobo, the overseer of the plaintiff on the south side, by plaintiff’s orders, on the 9th August, 1795,vput a person of the name of Simons on the disputed land, but he was driven off by the defendant’s father before he could make any crop. Absolom Bobo, another overseer of the plaintiff on the south side, took possession of the north side, in the fall of 1799, by plaintiff's orders; and at this time the defendant was present. Between 1800 and 1801, oue Bay was on the land, as the plaintiff’s tenant, and was driven off by defendant’s father ; after which, plaintiff’s tenant was restored to possession by process of forcible entry. The defendant took possession of it about eight or nine years before the trial, (which was had in October, 1817,) and has since remained in possession. This action was commenced in the year 1812. The plaintiff had continued constantly in possession of the south side, and had cultivated it from 1795, when he took possession, to the present time.
    The plaintiff then closed his testimony in chief, and the counsel for the defendant moved for a nonsuit, which the Court refused, and the defendant went into *his defence. He relied on the grant to Wm. Cowden, from North Carolina, and gave in evidence a conveyance from Bobert Cowden to Moses Wyley, dated 13th May, 1795, for two hundred and forty-four and one-quarter acres, lying on the north side of Tyger river, being part of the grant to Wm. Cowden. He then gave evidence to show the death of Moses Wyley, and that he left one son, Moses AVyley, who was his heir-at-law ; and then gave in evidence, a conveyance from Moses Wyley. (the younger,) dated 7th February, 1795, to Thomas Brandon, father of the defendant. The defendant further gave in evidence, that Bobert Cowden lived upon the land in dispute fifty-three or fifty-four years ago, (referring to the time of the trial.) That then Moses Wyley (in the winter of the year referred to by the last date,) went to live upon it, and lived on it two years. That after AVyley’s death, but at what distance of time, the witness did not state, the executors of Wyley rented it to Michael Bacon, who lived on it two years. Then James Smith lived on it; but the witness neither stated wheni he went on it, nor under whom he held, he stayed but one year. Afterwards Absolom Langston cultivated it for one year, but did not live on it. The witness who proved these facts, (Wm. Black-stock) stated, that when the first fact occurred, he was a little boy about six years old. Another witness, (Daniel Langston,) stated, that his father, Absolom Langston, and one Thomas Fletcher, rented the land from Thomas Harris, who was said to be executor or administrator of Moses Wyley; he thought the term was ten years. His father lived on the land he was certain two years, .and he thought three. That after he had rented the land, Archer Smith applied to him very often to rent it from him, (Absolom Langston,) for one year; lie said he wished to try his title to the land, and if he did not prove his title in one year, he would give it up. That Smith “ kept coming and wheedling his father” (the witness’ expression,) to get it; and at length to get rid of his importunity, his father let him have it. The father of the witness died within the year, and Smith refused afterwards *to give it up. When the father of the witness gave it up, Smith put Bailey on it as his tenant; this he said was about the time of the battle of Ninety-Six, which it was proved was in 1776. This witness also represented himself as being quite a child at the time of this transaction. Thomas Brandon, the elder, had no possession of the land, except a momentary one, at two periods, when he dispossessed the plaintiff’s tenants. The defendant] also went into evidence to prove that Robert Oowden was the eldest brother, and therefore heir-at-law of Wm. Oowden, the grantee, at the time he conveyed to Wyley. Two witnesses swore, that it was always understood and believed in the neighborhood, (the neighborhood of the lands in dispute,) that Robert was the elder brother of Wm. Oowden. It was further proved, that the defendant was one of the children and heirs of Thomas Brandon, the elder.
    The plaintiff replied in evidence, to show that Robert Oowden was not the oldest brother and heir-at-law of Wm. Oowden, and proved by four witness, (who were intimately acquainted with the family, which was from Virginia originally, and who, except William and Robert, resided in North Carolina,) that there were four brothers, William the eldest, Walter the next, Robert the next, and Samuel the youngest, and that Walter died between ten and twenty years before the time of their examination, in Cabarrus, North Carolina.
    In the argument, the defendant’s counsel contended, that under the plea of not guilty, the plaintiff was bound to prove that he was in actual possession at the time of the trespass, and that the evidence did not establish that fact. 2. That the plaintiff was bound to prove a perfect title in himself. That in establishing a title, under the statute of limitations, the possession of Bailey, and those who came in after him, during the alleged lease to Absolom Langston, ought not to avail the plaintiff, as the possession was fraudulently obtained, and that in the deduction of title, the conveyance of Wm. Tenant, sheriff of Ninety-Six, *was void, as the sale took place after the separation of Union district, where the land lies, from Ninety-Six district, and that, therefore, the sale should have been made in, and by the sheriff of, Union district.
    2. That the defendant had supported his plea of liberum tenemenlum: 1st. By deduction of title from the grantee, Wm. Oowden. 2d. By a possession of five years before the 4th of July, 1776, which was under the Act of Assembly, equivalent to a grant in Moses Wyley, and those claiming under him, and by a deduction of title from M.oses Wyley.
    The counsel for the plaintiff contended :
    ' 1. That though the'y admitted an actual possession at the time of the trespass was necessary to maintain this action, yet, by such possession was not meant in cases like the present, an unceasingpossessio pedis of part of the tract but merely in connection with a precise claim of title, he should, in pursuance of such title, have entered upon the land. That in this case, however, in any view of the law, the possession was actual, because the plaintiff had a constant and possessio pedis of part of the tract, which, according to the case of Reid, v. Eifert, was an actual, legal possession of the whole.
    
    2. That it was not necessary for the plaintiff in his action to have a perfect title, until the defendant had supported his plea of liberum tenementum; that possession was enough against all the world, but the rightful owner. But that the plaintiff had made out a perfect title: 1. By a title deduced from the original grantee. 2. By a title deduced by the posterior grant to Archer Smith. 3. By a possession in James Oliphant, from 1785 to 1794, which, under the statute of limitations, gave him a perfect title, which, by the sheriff’s sale 'and conveyance, was vested in the plaintiff. 4. By a possession in the plaintiff himself from 1785, until the time the defendant took possession in 1808, or 1809.
    That as to the defence, 1st. The defendant had not deduced a title from Oowden, the original *grantee; because Robert Oowden, under whom he claimed, was not the eldest brother of the grantee. That Walter Oowden was the eldest brother and heir of William Oowden. 2d. That in point of fact, the evidence did not establish five years continued possession in those under whom the defendant claimed previous to the 4th of July, 1776.
    The verdict was for the plaintiff.
    The defendant now moved for a nonsuit on the following grounds:
    1. Because there was wanting, on the part of the plaintiff, an actual possession, which is indispensably necessary, to enable him to maintain the action of trespass quare clausum fregit..
    
    2. Because the deed, under which the plaintiff claimed, dated the 4th August, 1795, from William Tenant, sheriff of Ninety-Six district, was illegally executed and of no validity, inasmuch as the district of Union, wherein the land in dispute lies, bad been separated from Ninety-Six, more than four years before Tenant’s deed was executed.
    The defendant also moved for a new trial:
    1. Because the possession of John Bailey, which began the year before the war of the Revolution, and did not terminate until 1782 or 1783, was a possession under Moses Wyley, Who held under Wm. Oowden, the first grantee, from whom the defendant claims, and not an adverse possession.
    2. Because the grant to Archer Smith, under which the plaintiff claims, and which was surreptitiously and fraudulently obtained, was a grant of much later date than that to Wm. Oowden, upon which the defendant relied as the origin of his title, and that the possession of Oowden, and those who held under him, was continued with little interruption until 1783. That the plaintiff’s title was, therefore, fatally defective, and the defendants’s genuine.
    
      
       S. C. again, 2 vol. 382.
    
    
      
       3 Hill, 265; 4 Rich. 106; 3 Strob. 470.
    
    
      
      
        Darby v. Anderson, infra; Williams v. McGee, 1 Constitutional Reports, 90.
    
    
      
      
        Singleton ads. Millett, 356, ante. Lambert v. Stroother, Willes’ Reports, 221. Harker, et al. v. Birkbeck, 3 Burr. Reports, 1563. Graham v. Peat, 1 East’s Rep. 246. Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East’s Rep. 602. Stewart v. Doughty, 9 John. Rep. 108. R.
    
   *The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Cheves, J.

1. The ground for a nonsuit is, that there was wanting, on the part of the plaintiff, an actual possession, which is indispensably necessary to enable him to maintain the action of trespass quare clausum fregit. The general proposition laid down in this ground, no one disputes ; but in most controversies, persons using the same words, apply them to very different ideas. The point, which it should seem, had been very long settled, and ought to have been very clearly settled, has been lately much contested. Some part of this difference of opinion has probably arisen from not fixing the meaning of the term “ actual possession,” which has probably been taken in too limited a sense. Actual possession, is used in contradiction to constructive possession, but does not mean, in all cases, a pedis possesso, though the latter will, in all cases, be an actual possession. A constructive possession, on the other hand, does not mean, in any instance, a case where there has been an actual entry. Thus, to illustrate the question by examples, a person who has the legal title to land, by lease and release, has only a constructive possession, and cannot maintain this action : but, if he enter, he has then actual possession, and can maintain this action ; and this actual possession will continue, though he should not continue to rest with his foot upon the soil, until he be disseised, or until he do some act which may amount to a voluntary abandonment of the possession. 1 Chitty on Pleadings, 175, 177. I think, also, the omission to distinguish between cases, where the action is sustained by title, and where it is rested solely on possession, has been auother cause of the difference of opinion on this subject. Where the plaintiff establishes a good legal title and entry, he is seised and possessed, not constructively, but actually, and can maintain this action. He must have possession besides title ; because the nature of the injury contemplated by the action, is to the possession only. But where he does not rely upon title, but on possession, there the possession must be a possessio pedis ; because less would not furnish that evidence of title to the possession, which this action contemplates. The possession must be rightful. There must be a possession, and a right to that possession.

It is true, that the law takes the fact, that the plaintiff has the present dominion, as evidence of his right to possess, until a contrary title is made out in the defendant, where that dominion extends to present enjoyment of the fruits, or the use of the soil. But whatever view may be taken of this point, it must equally result, that the plaintiff had an actual possession at the time of the trespass, in this case. If an entry only be necessary, he entered and put a tenant on it in 1796. In 1799 he again entered and cultivated it. In 1801, and 1802, he again entered, and was not disseised, until the present defendant entered and committed that trespass for which this action was brought. If an entry be not enough, the evidence proves that he had a continued and unbroken possessio pedis of the part of the tract of land lying on the south side of the river, which, in point of law and fact, was an actual possession. Accordingly, it was not denied in argument, that this possession would have been sufficient, but for two circumstances. 1. That Tyger river, which is said to be a navigable river where it divides this tract of land, ran between that part which the plaintiff cultivated, and the part in dispute. Now if this were admitted to sever the possession, the rule would be entirely without certainty or value. The width and depth of the river will hardly be made the criterion. Where should the line be drawn ? The separation is as distinct, if that be the ground of the argument, where it is made by a stream a foot wide and a foot deep, as by the Santee. If it be the navigable character of the river, that will depend in many instances on the wisdon and liberality of the Legislature, in improving the inland navigation of the country. At one time a tract of land will be *entire; at another divided. It would be a rule utterly uncertain and unsafe. It would deny the benefit of the rule where it would be most wanted. 2d. But it is further said, that the plaintiff’s claim is not to an entire tract, but to two separate tracts: one, that which he cultivates on the south side, the other, the land in dispute. That though it was entire by the grant to Cowden, and by the subsequent grant to Smith, the latter, by subsequent conveyances, divided it into two, and that no subsequent act could unite-them. Now the last member of this proposition is neither fact nor argument, - but bare assertion. In fact, they were united, Oliphant claiming title under the grants to Cowden and Smith, united the whole interest in himself. In fact, they were still more clearly and distinctly united, when the plaintiff purchased the whole interest at sheriff’s sale, and obtained a title for one tract of land, containing the whole quantity, described as lying on both sides of the Tyger river. Why could the original identity not be re-established ? The law, for the purpose of establishing this identity, requires no more than a colorable or apparent title, definite in its limits. Does not the sheriff’s title furnish at least this much ? I have no doubt then, that the plaintiff had. such a possession as enabled him to maintain this action. This was deemed the great point in the case ; for it seemed to be but feebly contested by the counsel for the defendant, that if such possession in the plaintiff was established as would maintain this action, everything else followed of course ; and it does appear to me to be the only point in the case, which deserved consideration. But as the case has been laboriously argued, and has excited much interest, it may be fit to dwell at some length on the other grounds.

2d. The next ground for a nonsuit is the alleged defect in the sheriff’s title. My brethren, who concur with me as to the result of this motion, have doubts of the validity of this deed, seeing that the sale was made by the sheriff of Ninety-Six District, after the establishment of Union Disanl^ decline giving any *opinion on the point. For myself, I entertain with rather more confidence, the opinion to which I inclined on trial. I think the sale was made by the sheriff of Ninety-Six District from necessity. The levy was made by that sheriff, while Union District was a part of Ninety-Six District. By the common law, (aplied in this State to real estate,) the sheriff who levied, had the clear right to complete the exigency of the execution, though his term of office had expired. No change has been made in this law, except, that by an Act of Assembly, the sheriff was to assign^over all unfinished business to his successor, who was to complete it. Who was then the successor of the sheriff of Ninety-Six ? The sheriff of Ninety-Six, or the sheriff of Union ? I am aware that it may be argued, that as to levies within that part of the old District which constitutes Union District, the sheriff of the latter was his successor. If so, in the many divisions and subdivisions of the judicial District of Ninety-Six, (which, at the time of this levy, embraced all the upper part of this State, including the present districts of Edgefield, Abbeville, Pendleton, Greenville, Spartanburgh and Union, and perhaps others,) it would have beeen difficult for the sheriff to have ascertained who his successor was. Was he to transfer the execution, without his books, where the entries concerning it were made ? If, as no doubt in many instances was the fact, there were levies under the same execution in several of the new districts, how could he transfer the execution to several districts ? The cotemporaneous construction and practice, throughout the State, where judicial districts were divided, I believe, was according to the practice in this ease. On the whole, I think it the best construction which the several Acts of Assembly, taken in connection with the previously established law, can receive, and I adhere to it with the more satisfaction, as a different construction, (if I be right as to the practice,) would shake the titles to a great many estates.

But were this conveyance void, it would furnish no *groundfor a nonsuit in this case, for several reasons. 1st. The plaintiff’s possession was sufficient evidence to sustain this action, until the defendant should -have proved a title in himself. 2d. The plaintiff had given evidence - of a long possession in himself, which, of necessity, was to go to the jury as proof of title under the Statute of Limitations. In any view, therefore, this was no ground for a nonsuit.

We come now to the grounds of the motion for a new trial:

The first is, that the possession of Bailey was not an adverse possession ; because it is alleged, it was obtained fraudulently. Whether this would prevent the possession from being adverse, it is quite unnecessary to determine. It is quite as effectual, in legal effect, to commence with the possession of Oliphant, as with that of Smith, and both might be laid out of the question, and the possession of the plaintiff himself, in legal effect, which is simply to give title, under the statute of limitations, is equivalent to both. The only difference would be this, if the possession of the south side were not a legal possession of the north side, then the possession of Oliphant might be material; because he actually occupied and cultivated by his tenants, from 1785 to 1794, the land in dispute. But. in no possible view of the case is the possession of Bailey, or any possession previous to Oliphant’s, of the least materiality.

2d. The next and last ground is, that the grant to Archer Smith, under which the plaintiff claims, is of later date than that to William Cowden, under which the defendant claims, and that the possession.of Cowden, and those claiming under him, was continued with little interruption till 1783; that therefore the plaintiff’s title is fatally defective, and the defendant’s genuine. This ground embraces the title both of the plaintiff and defendant.’ We will first consider the title of the defendant:

As it regards possession, the testimony is, that fifty-three or four years ago, (referring-to the time of the *trial,) which must have been in 1763 or 1764, Wyley went into possession. Bailey went into possession in 1776. -The intervening time is twelve or thirteen years, (¿nd the testimony proves a possession according to one witness of six years, and according to. another of seven years.) Yet the possession-which is proved,'begins with 1763 or 1764, and ends with 1776. The possession; therefore-,• could not have been continued and connected. One of the tenants, James'Smith, is not proved to have held under Wyley. During Wyley’s life, the possession did not exceed two years ; and the possession, though broken and unconnected, by his executors or administrators, did not exceed three or four years. Those under whom the defendant claims,. therefore, clearly had no such possession as would give title, previous to 1776 ; and any possession afterwards, as it did not extend, even according to the statement in this ground, beyond 1783, was wholly immaterial. But even that statement rests on the possession of Archer Smith, by his ■ tenants under the' assumption of facts, that it was proved to have been fraudulently obtained, and the assumption of law that it. was not there-. fore adverse.

•Gunning, for the motion. Gist, contra.

2d. Now as to the defendant’s deduction of title : It is defective, because (as the verdict of the jury has established on very satisfactory proof) Robert Cowden was not the heir of William Cowden, and had no title when he conveyed. It was argued, that Walter had died before Robert, and therefore, though he was not' the heir of William, he was the heir of Walter, and through him succeeded to the title. But the evidence does not prove when Robert died, and renders it probable that Walter survived him If, however, Walter died first, it would make no difference in the defendant’s title; for nothing which Robert inherited after the conveyance to Wyley, could have passed under it. The defendant therefore had proved no title.

The defendant -having made out no title, the plaintiff need go no farther than his possession to sustain this verdict. But it may be said, in one word, that *as the grant to Archer Smith, is valid against all but those who shall prove a better title, there is no defect in the plaintiff’s chain of title, unless the sheriff’s title be invalid; and that under the statute of limitations, if possession of a part be possession of the whole, according to the case of Read v. Eifert , his possession from 1795 to 1808, or 1809, gives him a perfect title under the statute of limitations.

I am, therefore, of opinion that the motions for a nonsuit and a new trial ought to be refused.

Colcock, Nott and Gantt, JJ., concurred. 
      
       See McColman v. Wilkes, 3 Strob. 470.
     
      
       1791, 7 Stat. 263, § 7; 1768-9, 7 Stat. 202, § 9.
     
      
       Infra, 374.
      See oases cited in McColna v. Wilkes, 3 Strob. 465.
     