
    Brumfield v. The Potter and Stymus Manufacturing Co.
    (New York Common Pleas
    General Term,
    June, 1893.)
    Where an action to recover broker’s commissions is tried upon the theory that plaintiffs employment was for the purpose of effecting a lease, the exclusion of evidence tending to show that not plaintiff, but another, brought about the letting, is error, for which a judgment for plaintiff will be reversed.
    Evidence of conversations between third parties, to which plaintiff was not privy, is competent, not to bind plaintiff, but as bearing upon the question whether plaintiff or another procured the contract of letting.
    
      Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the City Court, affirming judgment on verdict.
    Action for compensation of broker’s services in letting property of appellant.
    
      Brewster Kissam, for defendant (appellant).
    
      J. A. Dennison, for plaintiff (respondent).
   Pbvob, J.

The fundamental question is, whether the plaintiff was retained merely to render services in reference to.the letting, to be paid for irrespective of their result, or whether her employment was that of a broker to effect a lease. If the former, the judgment is unimpeachable; if the latter, it cannot stand, because of the exclusion of evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was not the procuring cause of the letting.

It is impossible to doubt that the action was tried and determined as a claim for compensation in effecting a lease of the premises.

The allegation of the complaint denied by the answer is that “ the plaintiff rendered services in procuring such renta] to be made.” The testimony, particularly of the witness Dennison, demonstrates that plaintiff’s claim was for effecting the lease. The trial j udge submitted the case to the jury upon the issue whether the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the letting, and instructed them that if she was not, the defendant was entitled to a verdict; and the opinion at General Term states explicitly the issue to be whether the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the letting.” At this ultimate stage of the controversy it is too late for the respondent to undertake to uphold her judgment on a theory not suggested on the trial nor pretended on the appeal below.

Plaintiff’s right of recovery, then, being dependent on the fact that she procured the letting, it was open to defendant on the pleadings to show that not the plaintiff, but another, brought about the letting; and the exclusion of evidence to the point was fatal error. Goldsmith v. Cook, 39 N. Y. St. Repr, 56.

The respondent objects that the evidence offered in proof of the fact that another was the procuring'cause of the contract, consisting of conversations between third parties, to which plaintiff was not privy, was incompetent, but, manifestly, the contention is untenable, for the negotiations were not adduced as binding the plaintiff, but as demonstrating the per> son by whom the letting was consummated. Rot otherwise than by transactions between third parties, could the fact be established that another, and not the plaintiff, procured the contract of letting.

We should add that appellant’s point as to the invalidity of the lease is not well taken.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, costs to abide event.

Bisohoef and Bookstavee, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.  