
    MURRAY against GALE.
    
      Supreme Court, First District ; General Term,
    
      Nov., 1867.
    Legal Tender.—Measure of Damages.—Contract Payable in Coin.
    On a contract which is expressed to be for the payment of a specified number of dollars, the measure of damages is that sum in legal tender, although, in the contract, the words “ in gold or silver coin” be added.
    It would be otherwise of a contract to pay or deliver a certain quantity and quality of coin.
    Appeal from an order directing judgment on demurrer.
    This action was brought hy Caroline Murray against Margaret Gale, administratrix of William Harrison, and many other defendants, for the foreclosure of a mortgage given to secure a bond made by Harrison during his lifetime to one Frederick Bronson, an executor. The complaint showed that the deceased, on the 26th day of May, 1846, for the purpose of securing payment to Frederick Bronson, executor of Isaac Bronson, deceased, and assignor of the plaintiff, of “the sum Of four thousand dollars in specie, gold and silver coin of the same standard as that by which coins were regulated on the 26th day of May, 1846,” executed a bond and mortgage, conditioned to pay the said Bronson, or his assignees, “in gold and silver coin of the standard by which the coins of the United States were regulated on the 26th day of May, 1846,” the sum of four thousand dollars, and interest in coin, as aforesaid:
    On April 26, 1855, the principal sum secured to be paid by the mortgage was due and unpaid.
    At the last-mentioned day, a partition suit was pending between the heirs to the property described in the mortgage, and who were the defendants in this action.
    The defendants and parties to the partition suit desired to pay the mortgage of the plaintiff in legal tender notes.
    The plaintiff insisted that the bond and mortgage could not be satisfied or extinguished, except by the payment of gold and silver.
    The parties to the partition suit desired a release from the plaintiff in order to sell the premises.
    To enable the parties so to do, and at the same time to save the plaintiff’s right to be paid in coin, the plaintiff released the mortgaged premises, accepted $4,151.66 in legal tender notes, which was the number of dollars due on the bond and mortagage; which, however, she received without prejudice to her claim to be paid in gold and silver.
    The defendants, thereupon, agreed to deposit the balance of two thousand dollars, the difference between the value of the notes and value of coin, to abide the judgment of the court.
    On December 11, 1865, an order was entered in the partition suit, directing the sum of $2,000 to be deposited in the United States Trust Company, in pursuance of the agreement of the parties, to abide the determination of the court, as to the right of the parties.
    And plaintiff accordingly now demanded judgment that the principal and interest were payable in gold and silver coin, and that the sum of two thousand dollars thus deposited in court be paid over to her, with interest.
    A number of the defendants demurred to the complaint, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to .constitute a cruse of action.
    The following opinion was rendered at special term, sustaining the demurrers:
    Sutiieblaxd, J.—I shall treat the demurrers to the complaint, which are general, as presenting, and intending to present for decision, the single question, whether the plaintiff must deem herself and her bond and mortgage satisfied by the $-1,151.68, which she has received in legal tender notes, or whether she is entitled to receive in addition thereto the $2,000 in legal tender notes, deposited in the United States Trust Company, under the order 'of the court in the partition suit, by arrangement between the parties, as and for the difference between $4,151.66 (the amount due on the bond and mortgage for principal and interest) and the market value of a certain quantity or number of pieces of gold or silver coin, of the standard mentioned in the condition of the bond, amounting by tale, or denominationally, to the same sum.
    In my opinion it inevitably follows from the decision of the court of appeals in Meyer v. Roosevelt (27 JV. T., 400), holding the legal tender act to be constitutional and valid, not only as to contracts made after the passage of the act, but also as to contracts made before, that this .court must consider the plaintiff’s bond and mortgage fully paid and satisfied by the $4,151.66, which she has received in legal tender notes, and that there must be judgment on the demurrers.
    The condition of the bond (dated May 26, 1846) is, to pay $4,000 in three years from the date, “in gold or silver coin, of the standard by which the coins of the United Stales were regulated by the laws existing on the 2Qlh day of May, 1846, with interest at the rate, of seven per cent, per annum, payable on the 26th days .of May and November in each and every year, in coin as aforesaid.”
    Gold and silver are used not only for coinage, but extensively for various other useful purposes ; hence gold and silver bullion, as a commodity, or as merchandise, has an intrinsic value, not only for coinage, but for such other purposes ; and hence gold or silver coin has an intrinsic value as a commodity or as merchandise, and may be treated as such by parties in making contracts ; and in construing and enforcing contracts I do not see why the courts should not treat gold or silver coin as the parties have treated it by their contract.
    The coinage, or stamping of portions or pieces of these metals, alloyed with baser metals, by government pre-» rogative, fixes the value of such pieces as money, or coined money ; but the regulated standard of a gold or silver coin of a given weight, that is, the proportion by weight of its fine metal and alloy, determines its relative value as a commodity.
    Before the legal tender act, money meant coined money, in all legal proceedings to enforce the payment or collection of money debts.
    It was the office of money, or coined money, not only to measure the money value of all commodities, even its own value, viewed or treated as a commodity, but also to pay or satisfy money debts. Indeed, if one may be excused from uttering such a mere verbal truism, value in the abstract, or as measured by money, could not be expressed without money. Hence, it is evident, that before the legal tender act, it followed from the office or capacity of coined money, the coinage system of the United States, its adopted unit of value, and the power of Congress to coin money and to regulate the value of coins, that a promise to pay one hundred dollars was in legal effect a promise to pay, at the option of the promissor, one hundred dollars in any coin which might be a legal tender for one hundred dollars at the time of payment; and hence, that a note for one hundred dollars and a note for one hundred dollars payable in one hundred silver dollars, or in one hundred gold dollars, or in five double-eagles, or twenty half-eagles, with or without the additional words lawful or current money of the United States, was the same in legal effect, for in either case the note could have been paid in silver dollars, or in either of the gold coins.
    My excuse for these extremely elementary remarks, must be the peculiar character of the contract in this case.
    The contract is to pay four thousand dollars (the principal mentioned in the condition of the bond) and the interest, in gold or silver coin, of the standard by which the coins of the United States were regulated by the laws, on the 26th day of May, 1846, the date of the bond.
    
      As the standard of a gold or silver coin of a given weight, determines its relative value as bullion, or a commodity, the contract may be said to be, to pay $4,000 and interest, in gold or silver coin of the value of like coin of a certain standard specified in the contract.
    It is plain then, that by the contract, the parties to it treated the gold or silver coin to be paid or tendered, as a commodity, or as specific articles of a commodity, for the coin is to be valued, of course valued in money, in dollars and cents.
    By the contract, the coin tendered in payment is to be valued, and if not of the value or standard called for by the contract, then the difference in values is also to be paid or tendered.
    The values and the difference between them, must of course be expressed in money, in dollars and cents.
    Now the thing, the coin, which by the contract is to be valued in money, cannot by the contract be treated as money. Money and the thing which it is to measure and express the value of, cannot both be viewed or treated as money, even though that thing be gold or silver coin.
    It is evident then, that the parties to the contract.by it treated the coin in which the bond is payable, as a commodity, which by the contract was to be of a certain value, or of a value the means of ascertaining which are fixed by the contract.
    The court must treat the coin in which the bond is payable, as the parties to the contract, by the contract, have treated it; and what is the result ? Of course the result is, that the court must view the contract as a contract to pay a certain sum of money, a money debt in a certain commodity, or in specific articles of a certain commodity at a certain price or valuation, fixed or provided for by the contract. And what is the legal result ?
    It must be deemed settled, that a contract for the payment of a certain sum of money, a note for instance, in specific articles, at a certain price or valuation, to give the paying party the option or privilege of paying the money in such specific articles at the price or valuation, "but does not give to the party entitled to receive payment the right to enforce payment in such articles, at the price named., or any other price or valuation ; that the paying party may pay in the specific articles, or commodity, at the price or valuation, but the receiving party must receive his debt in money, if legally tendered (Pinney v. Gleason, 5 Wend., 394 ; Smith v. Smith, 2 Johns., 235 ; Brooks v. Hubbard, 3 Conn., 58, 60 ; Fletcher v. Derickson, 3 Bosw., 181).
    Of course it follows, if the legal tender act had not been passed, but Congress, after the date of the bond, had materially debased or lowered the standard of gold and silver coin, that the plaintiff would have been obliged to receive payment of her debt in such debased gold or silver coin, by tale or count—that her debt could have been paid in any gold or silver coin, at its then regulated standard or value, as coin or money which was or might be a legal tender for such a sum or amount of money. It is plain, that this result would have followed from the very terms of the contract, and without reference to the consideration that it was the evident intention of Bronson, to whom the bond was executed, as executor, by the-contract, to protect the estate under his charge against the power of Congress to regulate the value of coins, of course to debase them, and that no court could aid a party in thus undertaking by contract to thwart or evade a conceded power of Congress.
    The very terms of the contract compel the court to hold, that the plaintiff’s claim is not for the coin to be valued, or for its value, but that her claim is for her money debt expressed in dollars, and the interest on it by the contract to be paid in gold or silver coin, &c.
    I am not aware that the standard or weight of gold or silver coins (except the weight of half dollars and smaller silver coins, by the act of 1853, and which by the act are made a legal tender for sums not exceeding five dollars), has been lowered, or lessened, or altered since the date of the bond. I cannot see, therefore, how there could have been. occasion for saying what has been said, as to its construction, legal effects, &c., if the legal tender act had never been passed; but the legal tender act was passed, and has' been held constitutional by a court which controls, and has a right to control, the decisions of this court.
    The act does not declare legal tender notes to be coins. The most sanguine alchemist that ever lived, probably never dreamed of converting paper into gold or silver.
    A ten dollar legal tender note does not purport on its face to be ten dollars, but does purport on its face to be a promise to pay ten dollars. On its face it purports to be a promise to pay money, not to be money. But the act does declare that these notes “ shall be lawful money, .and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties on imports, and interest on government bonds, which shall be paid in coins.”
    Now anything which is a legal tender for a money debt, which a party is by law obliged to receive in payment of his money debt, must be money, or considered to be money, for it performs an office, or has a capacity, which nothing but money can perform or have.
    It necessarily follows then, from the terms and legal effect of the terms of the plaintiff’s bond or contract, and from the legal tender act, and the controlling decisions affirming its constitutionality, that I must hold, as the •complaint shows that the plaintiff has received $4,151.66, the amount due on the bond for principal and interest, In legal tender notes, that the bond has been paid, and that she must consider herself and her bond both satisfied by such payment, for such is the controlling law of the case.
    
      Of course, any one must see that when gold or silver coin is the subject of purchase and sale and delivery,' or of pledge, or of special deposit, or of an unlawful conversion, it is perfectly consistent with the foregoing views and conclusions arrived at, for the court to treat it as a commodity, and apply the same rule of damages for its non-delivery, or unlawful conversion, as would be applied for the non-delivery or unlawful conversion of any other article or commodity.
    And to prevent misapprehension of what has been said, and in view of several of the cases growing out of the legal tender act, cited on the argument, and which I have not time more particularly to refer to I will go farther and say, if A. B., in the present condition of things, agrees to sell and deliver 100 bushels of wheat to C. D., or to perform certain! services for. C. D. for one hundred dollars in gold or silver coin, that I do not see why the court cannot and ought not to treat the agreement as an agreement in the one case to exchange one commodity for another commodity, and in the other case as an agreement to exchange or render certain services for a certain commodity.
    An agreement to pay so many dollars in coin, or in coin at a certain valuation by tale or weight is one thing ; but an agreement to pay so many dollars, or to render certain services, or deliver a certain commodity for coin, by tale or weight, is another thing.
    The result "of the legal tender act is, that gold and silver coins have practically ceased to be currency, and have become, except as to the government, practically exclusively a commodity, and are bought, and sold, and speculated in, and commonly viewed and treated as such.
    Why should a court ignore this state of things, unless compelled to do so by the terms of the contract, or by force of the legal tender act %
    
    Why should not A. B. and C. D. be presumed to have made the supposed agreement in view of the fact that gold and silver coin has, as between individuals, become exclusively a commodity—in view of the fact that a gold eagle is worth fourteen or fifteen dollars in legal tender notes 1 Why should not the court consider A. B. and C. D. as having, by their supposed agreement, treated the coin to be paid for the commodity or services as a commodity, and the words “one hundred dollars,” as used by them for the purpose of designating the quantity or number of pieces of coin, at their stamped or coined value, as money to be delivered or paid ? And if A. B. and C. D. have so treated it, by their supposed agreement, why should not the court so treat it, and consider C. D.’s agreement as substantially an agreement to deliver a certain quantity or number of pieces of coin as a com-modify, for a certain other commodity, or for certain services ?
    Iii examining the plaintiff’s case of a money debt,and her rights under her money bond, in view of the legal tender act, I have not intended to say anything not consistent with the conclusion that, if, in the supposed case, A. B. delivered the wheat or performed the services according to agreement on his part, and C. D. did not pay or deliver the coin according to agreement on his part,, he would be legally liable to pay the value of the coin in dollars, that is practically in legal tender notes, for practically legal tender notes are money, and represent dollars.
    The agreement on C. D.’s part in the supposed case is not to pay so many dollars, nor to pay so many dollars in coin, or in coin at a certain valuation, but is an agreement to pay so many dollars in coin “for the wheat or for the services.”
    Mo debt or duty is due from him until A. B. delivers the wheat or performs the services, and when A. B. does this, the terms of the supposed agreement would not compel the court to hold that a money debt of one hundred dollars was due from C. D., and I do not see why the court could not hold, considering the circumstances under which the supposed agreement was made, and with reference to which the parties must be presumed to have contracted, that C. D.’s duty was, on performance by A. B., either to deliver the coin, or to pay its value in legal tender notes.
    There must be judgment for the defendants on the demurrers, with costs.
    From the order thus entered, the plaintiff appealed.
    
      
      Morris S. Miller, for the appellant.
    —I. The intent of the parties was that the "bond should not "be satisfied except by payment in coin.
    II. An express contract for payment or delivery of gold or silver dollars in specie, is legal, notwithstanding the legal tender act (Sears v. Dewey, 14 Allen; Bank of the Commonwealth v. Van Vleck, 49 Barb., 508 ; Dutton v. Pailant, 52 Penn., 109 ; Christchurch v. Farschall, 54 Id., 71 ; Luling v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 30 How. Pr., 69).
    III. A contract like this, to deliver goods or commodities, is not a debt to be satisfied by legal tender notes, until after judgment for damages.
    IY. The law requires debts to be paid in coin ; and an express contract for the purchase of coin is not illegal. And such contract may be in the form of bond and mortgage.
    Y. The legislation of Congress recognizes a distinction between “ coin ” and “ legal currency or lawful money.”
    YI. Upon questions arising upon the construction of the statutes of the United States, the decisions of the courts of the United States are final and conclusive, and will be followed by the courts of this State, whatever may be their own views on the question (Hicks v. Hotchkiss, 7 Johns. Ch., 297). And the United States circuit court having determined the question that an express contract t'or the payment of dollars in specie can be enforced, in the case of Gladstone v. Chamberlain, before Judge Nelson, on demurrer, and before Judge Smalley and a jury, October 25, 1866, and of Thompson v. Riggs, before Justice Cliffobd, to the same effect, this court will follow those decisions.
    YII. As the plaintiff did not sue to recover the debt, nor waive any right by accepting legal tender notes, the precise question before the court is, whether a tender of the notes could have extinguished the mortgage.
    YIII. The case of Rodes v. Bronson (34 N. Y., 649), and Kempton v. Bronson (45 Barb., 618), are distinguished from this case, because the words “gold and silver dollars” are followed, and, the court held, qualified "by the words “lawful money of the United States,” in lieu of the words herein, “ of the same standard, as regulated by law on the 26th day of May, 1846.” The decision in Wilcox v. Morgan, New York Superior Court (1 Abb. Pr., 174 ; S. C., 4 Rob., 58), is not, it is submitted, based upon sound principles of law or justice. Meyers y. Roosevelt (27 N. Y.), and Roosevelt v. Bull’s Head Bank (45 Barb., 479), and the cases of contracts for the payment of lawful currency, are not in point.
    IX. The authorities upon which the decision at supreme court was based, concerning chattel notes, merely affirm the rule that the intent of the parties controls, and applies to the case of the plaintiff, because the manifest intent of the parties expressed is that the payment should be a payment of gold and silver coin.
    
      H. W. Robinson, for the respondents;
    —Cited and relied on the acts of Congress of February 20, 1862 ; July 11, 1862, and March 3, 1863 (12 U. S. Stat. at L., 341, 532, 711); and the following cases : In this State: Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, and Meyer v. Roosevelt, 27 N. Y., 400 ; Hague v. Powers, 39 Barb., 427 ; Roosevelt v. Bull’s Head Bank, 45 Id., 579 ; Kimpton v. Bronson, Id., 618. In Massachusetts: Wood v. Bullens, 6 Allen, 516. In Vermont: Carpenter v. Bank of Northfield, 39 Vt., 46. In New Hampshire : George v. City of Concord, 45 N. H., 434. In Pennsylvania: Shellenberger v. Brinton, 52 Pa., 9. In Michigan: Van Husen v. Kanonse, 13 Mich., 303; Buchegger v. Shultz, 5 Am. Law Reg. N. S., 95. In Indiana: Reynolds v. State Bank, 18 Ind., 454 ; Thayer v. Hedges, 23 Ind., 141 (overruling 22 Ind., 282). In Wisconsin: Brieterback v. Turner, 18 Wis., 140. In Iowa: Warnibold v. Schlicting, 16 Iowa, 240 ; Troutman v. Gowing, 16 Id., 415; Hintrager v. Bates, 18 Id., 172. In California: Lich v. Falkner, 25 Cal., 404 ; Reese v. Stearns, 29 Id., 273. In Missouri: Henderson v. McPhyke, 35 Mo., 235; Appel v. Woltman, 38 Id., 194. In U. S. District Court, N. Dist. N. Y. : Councer v. Steam Tug Griffin, 5 Am. Law Reg. N. S.. 45, affirmed by Nelson, J., Aug., 1865. He also cited and commented on Griswold v. Hepburn (2 Duwal [Ky.] 20); Shoerberger v. Watts (1 Am. Law Reg. N. S., 553); Hintrager v. Bates (18 Iowa, 174); Henderson v. McPhyke (35 Mo., 260) ; Appel v. Woltman (38 Mo., 194) ; Kimpton v. Bronson (45 Barb., 618); Wilson v. Morgan (4 Rob. [N. Y. Superior Ct.], 58 ; Rhodes v. Bronson (34 N. Y, 649); Lord Bacon Leg. Maxims (3 Lord Bacon’s Works, 231, Reg. 8); Emperor of Austria v. Day (30 Law J. N. S., 690); Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck (27 N. Y, 455, and cases cited by Davies, J.); Pinney v. Gleason (5 Wend., 394); Smith v. Smith (2 Johns., 234); Fletcher v. Derickson (2 Bosw., 181) ; 1 Story Eq. Jur., §§ 294-305 ; Story on Contracts, §§ 545, 546 : Dunlop v. Gregory (10 N. Y, 241); Hadley v. Baxendale (26 Eng. Com. L., 403); 1 , Story Eq. Jur., §§ 301-306); Kneettle v. Newcomb (22 N. Y., 247) ; Crawford v. Lockwood (9 How. Pr., 547) ; Harper v. Leal (10 Id., 282).
   By the Court.—Cardozo, J.

—Whatever may be our individual opinions, the constitutionality of the legal tender acts is not an open question in this State (Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck ; Meyer v. Rosevelt, 27 N. Y., 400). The point principally argued before us, was very carefully considered, though perhaps not directly involved, in Rhodes v. Bronson, 34 N. Y., 649.

The court of appeals discussed the law in two aspects : first, reading the condition of the hond without the words “lawful money of the United States” (which it hi fact contained); and secondly, including those words.

Whether that case be treated as a direct adjudication only upon the construction and effect of a bond which contains the words “lawful money of the United States,” or whether it should be recognized as also establishing authoritatively the law applicable to a bond not containing those words, is not very material, because at all events the reasoning of the opinion upon the latter subject is convincing. We think the views it expressed upon ‘ that point entirely sound, and that it is superfluous either to repeat or attempt to add anything'to them here.

It only remains for us to apply them to the present case.

If by “gold coin,” a commodity, and not the currency of the country, was intended to be designated, then, as the bond was conditioned to pay a sum of money, viz : $4000 and interest, in a certain commodity, the tender of so much of that commodity as would at that time have produced in the market the sum of $4000 of lawful money land interest) would have discharged the bond.

Or, if the obligor did not tender the commodity, the damages recoverable would be the amount of the debt agreed to be paid, viz : $4000 and interest (see opinion, pp. «61, 652, 653).

The obligation in this- case is not to deliver or pay a specified quantity and quality of gold, but to pay a sum «ff money, viz : $4000. Whether it be paid in a commodity «w not, it is still to pay a certain sum of money. This is Pile distinction (Same case, p. 653). If the agreement had Been to pay or deliver a certain quantity and quality of a commodity—gold coin, or anything else—upon failure to perform, the promissee might- recover the market value of the article at the time and place when and where it should have Been delivered, But when, as here, the agreement is to pay so many dollars, whether in a commodity or in money, the amount of money agreed to Be paid, and interest, is the only measure of damages for a Breach of the covenant.

Without giving the reasons which, in addition to the views expressed By Justice Smith, lead me to think that the parties to this Bond were contracting for the payment of money only, enough has Been said to dispose of the only points in this case calling for any remarks, and to show that the judgment Below was right, and should Be affirmed with costs.

Judgment affirmed. 
      
       Present, Cardozo, Barnard, and Ingraham JJ.
     
      
       On the 15th of February, i860, the supreme court of the United States announced their decision in the case of Bronson v. Puhodes, brought before them on appeal from the court of appeals of this State.
      This action was brought to redeem real property from the lien of a mortgage made and payable prior to the legal tender act of 1862, and which, by the terms of it, and of the bond, was payable in gold and silver coin, lawful money of the United States. The mortgagor, in 1865, tendered the amount due on the mortgage, in paper money, which he claimed, under the legal tender act of February 25,1862, was a legal tender. The mortgagee refused to receive paper money, claiming he was entitled to payment in gold and silver coin. The decision of the court of appeals is reported, sub nom. liodes v. Bronson, in 34 2V". T., 649.
      
        The supreme court held (reversing that decision) that a contract to pay a certain number of dollars in gold and silver coin, is not distinguishable, in principle, from a contract to deliver an equal weight of bullion of equal fineness ; and the currency acts could not be supposed to be intended to enforce satisfaction of any contract by the tender of depreciated currency equivalent only in nominal value to bullion; and that the bond was in legal import precisely what it was in the understanding of the parties, a valid obligation to be satisfied by the tender of actual payment according to its terms, and not by an offer of only nominal payment.
      Without inquiring whether the clauses of the currency act making United States notes a legal tender were warranted by the constitution, in this case, the court declare that even assuming those clauses to be so warranted, a tender of notes was not a performance of the contract within the true intent of the acts, but that, upon a reasonable construction of the act, if must be held to sustain the proposition that express contracts to pay coin dollars, can only be satisfied by the payment of coin dollars.
      Mr. Justice Davis concurred in the result, namely, that an express contract to pay coin of the United States, made before the legal tender act, was not within the clause of that act which makes treasury notes legal tender in the payment of debts, but stated that if there be any reason in the opinion of the majority which could be applicable to any other class of contracts, it did not receive his assent.
      Mr. Justice Swayne concurred, resting his opinion entirely upon the language of the contract and the construction of the statute, deeming that the question of the constitutional power of Congress did not arise.
      In reference to the form of judgment to be entered in such cases, the opinion of the court, delivered by the chief justice, contained the following directions:—
      “ Some difficulty has been felt in regard to the judgment proper to be entered on contracts payable in coin. This difficulty arises from the supposi- / tion that damages can be assessed only in one description of money; but the act provides that ' the money of the coin of the United States shall be expressed in dollars, dimes, cents and mills, and that all accounts in the public offices, and all proceedings in the courts of the United States shall be kept and had in conformity to this regulation.’
      “ This regulation is part of the first coinage act, and doubtless has reference to the coins provided for by it, but it is a general regulation, and relates to all accounts and all judicial proceedings. When, therefore, two descriptions of money are sanctioned by law, both expressed in dollars, and both made current in payment, it is necessary, in order to prevent ambiguity, and to prevent a failure of justice, to regard this regulation as applicable alike to both, when, therefore, contracts made payable in coin are sued upon, judgment may be rendered for coined dollars and parts of a dollar, and when contracts have been made payable in dollars generally, without specifying in what description of currency payment is to be made, judgment may be entered accordingly, without such description.
      “ Wehave already adopted this rule as to judgments for duties, by affirming the judgment of the circuit court for the District of California in favor of the United States for $1,388.10, payable in gold and silver coin, and judgments on contracts between individuals for the payment of coin may be entered in like manner.”
     