
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
    APRIL, 1807.
    Administrators of Goodwyn v. Tho. Taylor.
    Where a party is to be affected by a recovery in an action between other parties, as a privy, he ought to have reasonable notice, in order that he may have an opportunity of defending the action.
    Trespass on the case, in Richland district,' before Brevakd, J. The defendant, as administrator, having recovered a judgment and execution against one Hay, pointed out a negro to the sheriff, who sold him to satisfy the said execution. The plaintiffs’ intestate was present when the negro was pointed out to the sheriff, and gave information to the defendant, that the negro was liable to the execu. tion, and purchased the negro at the sheriff’s sale. Afterwards, a third person laid claim, to the negro, and sued to recover possession of him; and at the trial of that action', the defendant was called on as a witness, and gave evidence in support of the purchaser’s title; but a judgment was obtained against him. It did not appear that the defendant was vouched by the purchaser on that occasion, or that he had any notice-, that in case of a recovery, against the purchaser, he would be resorted to to answer in damages for the sale of the negro, or for inducing the purchase.
    At the trial, the opinion of the court being decidedly against the plaintiffs, they were advised to suffer a nonsuit, with leave to move to set it aside in this co'urt. At the trial the plaintiffs offered in evidence the record of the recovery against Goodwyn, which was rejected, on the ground, that the defendant had not been notified to defend that suit, and was not a party or privy thereto. On this ground, particularly, the motion in this court was urged by Egan, for the plaintiffs, who insisted that formal notice was unnecessary, and that it is sufficient if a man knows of a suit going on, which may affect him. Cited l Washington’s Rep. 806, Executor Daniel v. Cooke. If the judgment was obtained through negligence, or fraud, it ought to have been shewn. Every judgment of court is presumed to be fair-until the contrary appears. The judgment ought to have been admitted in evidence.
    Staeke, on the contrary,
    contended, that verdicts cannot be given in evidence except between parties, or- privies. In this case there was no proof that the defendant had sold the negro in question, as stated in the declaration. He was sold at sheriff’s sale, at defendant’s instance, but he was not the seller, nor was he bound to warrant: but if he can be made liable at all, yet he ought not to be prejudiced by a recovery in which he was not a party, and had not been advised, or notified, to defend. If he had had reasonable notice, and had been required to defend the action, possibly he might have prevented the judgment from being obtained.
   Wilds, J.,

delivered the resolution of the whole court, that the plaintiffs had given no evidence which entitled them to recover. That the cause of action, stated in the declaration, was altogether unsupported by proof; and that the record offered in evidence had been properly rejected. That verdicts ought not to be admitted in evidence, except between the same parties ; because, otherwise, a man would be bound by a decision, who had not the liberty to cross-examine, or between privies, or where the party has had reasonable notice to come forward and defend the action, for in such cases he may cross-examine, and produce evidence, if he thinks proper. There is no particular form to be observed in vouching; but for the most obvious reason, and on the plainest principles of justice, the party to be affected by a verdict, ought either to be a party, or a privy, in the suit. If he is a stranger to the action, that is, not a party, he ought to have notice within a reasonable time, that the verdict,'-if it is had against the defendant, will be used against himself; so that he may have an opportunity of opposing and defeating the plaintiff’s action, if he should be disposed to do so.

Motion discharged.  