
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Albert REED, Sr., Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 09-3636-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 24, 2010.
    Jonathan J. Einhorn, New Haven, CT, for Appellant.
    H. Gordon Hall, Assistant United States Attorney (Raymond F. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, of counsel), for David B. Fein, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, AMALYA L. KEARSE and CHESTER J. STRAUB, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-appellant Albert Reed, Sr., appeals from the denial of his motion for reconsideration of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Except in a few narrow circumstances, a court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). One exception permits a court to reduce a sentence based on a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. Id. § 3582(c)(2).

Reed concedes on appeal that the original basis for his § 3582(c)(2) motion, Amendment 715 to the Sentencing Guidelines, applies only to defendants who possessed multiple controlled substances, which does not include him. He argues that his sentence should be reconsidered nonetheless in light of recent precedent such as United States v. Regalado, 518 F.3d 143 (2d Cir.2008), which highlight a sentencing court’s discretion with cocaine base guidelines. This argument is foreclosed by Dillon v. United States, which holds that § 3582(c)(2) “authorized only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding.” — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2690-91, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). Moreover, after the reduction in his sentence from his first motion for reconsideration, Reed is now sentenced based upon a career offender sentencing range. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Therefore, Reed is ineligible for any further drug offense reductions, because his sentence is no longer “based on” a drug sentencing range for purposes of § 3582(c)(2).

We have considered all of Reed’s contentions on this appeal and have found them to be without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  