
    PULLIAM v. CAPITAL TRACTION COMPANY.
    Landlord and Tenant; Affidavits of Defense; Notice to Quit.
    1. An affidavit of defense in an action by a landlord to recover possession of demised premises is insufficient, which, consists of denials that the defendant ever rented the property as specifically described; that the defendant rented the property at the rate set forth by the plaintiff; that he unlawfully held possession of the property described, and that the notice to quit the premises was sufficient,—where none of such contradictory statements of conclusions of law is supported by any allegation of fact. (Following Columbia Laundry Co. v. Ellis, 36 App. D. C. 583.)
    2. An objection by a tenant made in his affidavit of defense in an action by his landlord, a corporation, to recover possession of demised property, is insufficient, which is to the effect that the name of the corporation was signed to the notice to quit by its attorney.
    No. 2282,
    Submitted May 3, 1911.
    Decided May 24, 1911.
    
      Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a summary-judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in. a landlord and tenant proceeding, for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense..
    
      Affirmed.
    
    The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:
    This suit was instituted by appellee, the Capital Traction* Company, under the landlord and tenant act, to secure possession of certain premises alleged in the affidavit to have been rented to appellant, Norman L. Pulliam, by the month as a. tenant by sufferance.
    The appellant filed an affidavit of defense in which he denied the existence of the relation of landlord and tenant, for-the reason, as alleged, that he never hired nor rented the premises as described at the specified rate per month, as set forth, in the affidavit filed by appellee. He then denied “that the-plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the premises so described and located from the defendant, or that he, the defendant, 'still remains in occupancy of said premises/ so described and located in said affidavit and alleged notice to quit,, 'without right, and unlawfully detains the same and refuses-to remove therefrom/ meaning the premises so described and located.” This is followed in the affidavit by a denial of the-sufficiency of the notice to quit, for the reason that the name; of the appellee company is signed thereto by its attorney.
    Appellee moved for judgment on the ground of the insufficiency of the affidavit of defense, which motion was granted' by the court. Prom the judgment entered, this appeal is prosecuted.
    
      Mr. Albert Sillers and Mr. Edwin Forrest for the appellant..
    
      Mr. R. Ross Perry, Mr. R. Ross Perry, Jr., Mr. G. Thomas Dunlop, and Mr. Edwin Allan Swingle for the appellee..
   Mr. Justice Van Orsdel

delivered the opinion, of the Court:.

The sufficiency of the affidavit of defense is the sole question: presented. It will be observed that the affidavit states no facts which tend in the least to enlighten the court as to appellant’s, right to defeat the claim of appellee. The affidavit is contradictory and evasive. Appellant first denies that he ever rented the property as specifically described; then denies that he rented the property at the rate set forth in appellee’s affidavit. He follows with a denial that he unlawfully holds possession of the property described, and then denies the sufficiency of the notice to quit the premises described. Not one-of these contradictory conclusions of law is supported in the-affidavit by any allegation of fact. Rule 19 of the rules of" the supreme court of the District of Columbia permits the defendant to file an affidavit of defense “specifically stating iu precise and distinct terms the grounds of his defense, which must be such as would, if true, be sufficient to defeat plaintiff’s, recovery.” Appellant seems to rest his evasive conclusions upon some error in the description of the property and in the-rate of rental as set forth in the notice and affidavit filed by appellee. Mere technical errors in this respect constitute no-defense. If the errors relied upon are sufficient to defeat appellee’s right to recover possession, the facts in support thereof" must clearly appear in appellant’s affidavit. Conclusions based upon a mere intimation of something which the proof might disclose does not meet the requirements of the rule. By the-repeated decisions of this court, such an affidavit hás been held insufficient. Columbia Laundry Co. v. Ellis, 36 App. D. C. 583.

It is contended that the notice is insufficient, for the reason, that the name of the appellee company was signed by its attorney. No objection was made to the sufficiency of the notice-by motion to quash, or otherwise, but appellant, without objection, entered his appearance by filing an affidavit of defense. It is unnecessary, however, to consume time discussing the question of waiver, since the notice is sufficient. Fel ton v. Millard, 81 Cal. 540, 21 Pac. 53a; Bond v. Chapman, 34 Wash. 606, 76 Pac. 97; Cummings v. Winters, 19 Neb. 719, 28 N. W. 302.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs, and it is so ordered.

Affirmed.  