
    Johnson, Administrator of Johnson, against Beardslee and others, Heirs and Devisees of Beardslee.
    The promise debtor* to pay d®^‘ barred Sug^en™ to take the case out of the statute.
    In an action against the i’g™ ofdad<de“pnmfse^by fondants'16who were also hi« pay the debt, was held suffident to charge ants.
    an acknowledgment of the debt, unarcompained with a protestation against the payment of it, is evidence sufficient for r,Ue jury to presume a new promise.
    THIS was an action of assumpsit, to the declaration in which the defendants pleaded non assumpsit, and the statute of limitations, and the plaintiff replied, taking issue on the latter plea. The suit was commenced in August term, 1814, and the parties, without going to trial, made a case for the . . .i . opinion of the court, which was submitted without argumenu.
    In the summer of 1805, the plaintiff’s demand was placed in the hands of one Pumpelly, with whom it was liquidated by John Beardslee, the testator, and the balance struck, The testator died in 1806. After his death, and within six years before the commencement of the suit, the demand was , e . i c i , i n presented to two ol the defendants, who were also executors of the deceased, who admitted the balance to be due, and promised to pay it.
   Per Curiam.

The demand of the plaintiff was liquid ^¡¿¡j John Beardslee, in 1805, and he died in 1806 j consequently, before the statute of limitations had attach-? ed on the debt. Within six years before this s.uit was brought, two of the defendants, and who were also executors of John Beardslee, admitted the demand, and promisepayment.

. Whether the new promise revives the old debt, or oan he enforced as a new promise, upon a valid consideration, is immaterial to be discussed here. On a review of all the cases, (Danforth v. Culver, 11 Johns. Rep. 146.) we were of opinion, that the acknowledgment of the execution of the notes, with an express declaration that the party meant to avail himself of the statute of limitations, was not evidence of a new promise to pay; but we did not intimate, that an acknowledgment of the debt would not have been sufficient, unaccompanied with a protestation against paying it j indeed, there is a current of authorities, that an acknowledgment of the debt is evidence sufficient for the jury to pre-. sume a new promise.

Here, however, is not only an acknowledgment of the debt, but an express promise to pay; and it has always been holden, that a debt, barred by the statute, is a sufficient consideration to uphold a promise. With respect to the other defendants, who have not acknowledged the demand, or promised to pay it, the acknowledgment of one joint debtor, of the existence of the debt, is sufficient to take the case out of the statute. (Smith v. Ludlow, 6 Johns. Rep. 267. 2 H. Bl. 340. Doug. 652.) The court see no reason xvhy that principle should not apply to the case of executors," heirs, and devisees, as well as to every other case.

Judgment for the plaintiff.  