
    Samaad BISHOP, in propria persona, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOYS R US, Delaware, Incorporated, doing business as Toys R Us, Incorporated, doing business as Kids R Incorporated, doing business as Babies R Us, Incorporated, also known as Toys R Us, Incorporated, Defendant-Cross-Claimant-Cross-Defendant-Appellee, John Doe, Security Guard, Jose Nieves, in his individual and official capacity as store director, Gregory D. House, in his individual and official capacity as sales and service manager, Metro One Loss Prevention Group (Guard Division NY) Inc., Michael McDaniel, in his individual and Official capacity as security guard, Defendants-Cross-Defendants-Appellees, Toys “R” US-NY, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 09-1186-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 19, 2010.
    Samaad Bishop, pro se, New York, New York, for Appellant.
    Anna J. Ervolina, Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley, New York, New York, Mary C. Azzaretto, McAndrew, Conboy & Prisco, LLP, Woodbury, New York, for Appellees.
    
      PRESENT: ROGER J. MINER, ROBERT D. SACK, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Samaad Bishop, pro se, appeals from the February 8, 2006, 414 F.Supp.2d 385, order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Castel, /.) granting in part the defendants-appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Bishop also appeals the February 19, 2009, 2009 WL 440434, order of the district court granting the defendants-appellees’ motion for summary judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case.

We review de novo an order granting summary judgment and will affirm the order only upon a finding that there are no genuine questions of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). In determining whether there are genuine questions of material fact, this Court is “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted). In addition, “[w]e review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a suit pursuant to a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir.2006).

We liberally construe Bishop’s notice of appeal to include the district court’s February 2006 order granting in part the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., Phelps v. Kapnolas, 123 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir.1997) (explaining that pleadings and filings of pro se litigants shall be construed broadly). After reviewing Bishop’s arguments on appeal, as well as the record of proceedings below, we affirm the district court’s decisions for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well reasoned opinions.

With respect to Bishop’s equal benefit claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Bishop is correct that the district court did not explicitly address two declarations he submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment. Even affording the declarations full weight, as we must, and after reviewing the surveillance tape for the day in question, we hold that Bishop still has not established that the receipt-checking policy at issue was employed in a discriminatory manner. See, e.g., Demery v. Extebank Deferred Comp. Plan (B), 216 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir.2000) (explaining that existing questions of fact that are immaterial to the appellant’s underlying claims are not grounds for reversal of a grant of summary judgment).

We have considered all of Bishop’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Additionally, Bishop’s motions to strike portions of the ap-pellees’ briefs and for sanctions are DENIED as nothing in the appellees’ briefs warrants such relief.  