
    Esbri v. Estate of Juan Serralles.
    Appeal in cassation from the District Court of,Ponce.
    No. 74.
    Decided June 28, 1902.
    Appeal in Cassation. — When in the consideration of evidence the trial court has committed an error of fact or of law, it is indispensable that said error be clearly stated in the writing by which the appeal is taken setting forth, in the former case, the act or authentic document which shows the evident error of the judge, and, in the latter, the law or legal doctrine relating to the value of evidence, alleged to have been violated, without which requisites the appeal will not be allowed.
    Contbaots. — The court commits no error if, respecting the force an efficacy of obligations, it gives effect to the clauses of a contract, in strict and literal compliance with the terms thereof, when in such clauses a clear and explicit expression of the will of the contracting parties appears.
    In the case at bar, one of the parties agreed to pay the other, in specified instalments, the sum of eighteen thousand dollars, commercial money, whatever might be the coin in circulation or admitted] as such, at the rate of one hundred cents, of the current money, for each and every peso.
    
    
      Held':
    
    
      (а) Pbice Cebtain. — Aleatoby Contbaots. — That in the contract a price certain had been stipulated, and that it can not be considered as rendered void by the conditions for payment, which, although of an aleatory character, are set forth in the contract and, being matually accepted by the parties, are perfectly legal adm admissible under the law.-
    (б) Satisfaction of debts. — That the debtor is now bound to make the stipulated payments, at the rate of one hundred cents of United States currency, which is the circulating medium, for every peso of Mexican money.
    Id. — A1 though under the Organic Act, of April 12, 1900, all debts owing on the date said Act took effect were made payable in the Porto Rican coins then in circulation, or in the coins of the United States at the established rate of exchange, this provision should be understood without prejudice to rights acquired by virtue of previous contracts in which the parties have agreed upon a different manner of satisfying their obligations with respect to the changes that might be brought about in the value of the circulating medium, and under the protection of the laws governing such contracts at the time they were made.
    
      Interpretation oe Contracts. — When the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, courts must, confine themselves to a literal application of the clauses thereof.
    Consideration oe Evidence. — The consideration by the trial court of the-evidence introduced at the trial should be respected by the court of cas-sation unless it be shown, in the proper legal manner, that an error had1 been committed.
    Contracts. — A contract is the law between the contracting parties, and being' equal for all, it does not impair the reciprocity of interests that should exist between both parties.
    STATEMENT OE THE CASE.
    By public deed made and executed in the City of Ponce, before the Notary Joaquin Mayoral, having charge of the protocol kept by Notary Rafael León, who was away on leave of absence, on September 1, 1894, José Nicolás de Car-tagena y Mangual sold to Juan Serrallés y Colón, represented by his attorney in fact, Eduardo Wellenkamp y Chelva, his undivided interest in the sugar-estate called “Ursula”, situated in Barrio “Cintrona”, within the Municipal District of Juana Diaz, for the sum of eighteen thousand pesos commercial money, payable in several installments specified in clause 2 of the aforesaid instrument, namely : “two thousand pesos on the 15th day of July, 1898; two thousand pesos on the 15th of July, 1899, an equal amount of two thousand pesos on the 15th day of July of the year 1900, and three thousand pesos on every 15th day of July of the years 1901 to 1904, both inclusive; all in current money of commerce, whatever the coinage of money may be, and of such character as may be circulating or be accepted in this Province, at the rate of one hundred cents of the circulating money for every peso, and to the exclusion of all kinds of paper money established, or which may be established, although it may be legal tender; which deferred payments should bear interest at the rate of ten per cent, per annum, from the date of the execution of the deed, payable at the expiration of every quarter; the aforesaid undivided interest in the property being mortgaged as security for the instalments and interest agreed upon; in the seventh clause the contracting parties declared that the price at which the sale was made was the just and true value “now”, (that is to say, on the date of the execution of the deed,) of the interest conveyed; and in clause 8, for the purposes of article 127 of the Motgage Law, the parties also declared that the value of the mortgaged interest was eighteen thousand pesos, current money, and waived any new valuation. or actioni leading thereto; they being well aware that this valuation was the one that would serve as a basis for the judicial sale to be held in case of a failure to satisfy the obligation and resort were had to judicial proceedings for the recovery of the money.
    
      
      Resultando: que habiendo incurrido en error Don José Nicolás de Cartagena, al vender, en la escritura de que se ha hecho mérito, la participación expresada de la Hacienda “Ursula”, como de su exclusiva propiedad, siendo así que, habiéndola adquirido constante su matrimonio con su pri-mera esposa Doña Clorinda Pérez y Quiñones, debía esti-marse como ganancial, y por consiguiente como de la pro-piedad del otorgante Cartagena y de sus menores hijos Don José Nicolás, Doña María Mercedes, Don Genaro y Don José Rafael del Carmen Cartagena y Pérez, habidos en su matrimonio con su citada difunta esposa; rectificado dicho «error por medio del oportuno juicio divisorio, en el que le habían sido adjudicados al Don José Nicolás de Cartagena Mangual, en parte del valor de la participación de referen-cia. doce mil ciento treinta y tres pesos treinta y tres y un tercio centavos, y los cinco mil ochocientos sesenta y seis pesos, sesenta y seis y dos tercios centavos restantes, hasta el completó de los diez y ocho mil pesos en que había sido valorada, á sus cuatro hijos los citados Don José Nicolás, Doña María Mercedes, Don Genaro y Don. José Rafael del 'Carmen Cartagena y Pérez, y deseando el expresado Don José Nicolás de Cartagena y Mangual consolidar el contrato de compra-venta que anteriormente había celebrado con Don Juan Serrallés y Colón sobre la participación expre-sada de la Hacienda “ Ursula”, para lo cual había solicitado y obtenido la autorización judicial correspondiente, .en lo que se refería á sus citados hijos menores,, por escritura del día 6 de Octubre del mismo año de 1894, otorgada también en Ponce y ante el mismo Notario Don Joaquín Mayoral, el citado Señor Cartagena por sí y en representación' de sus expresados hijos menores de edad, ratificó la escritura men-cionada de 1? de Septiembre anterior y de. nuevo vendió á. Don Juan Serrallés y Colón las participaciones que á él-y á sus citados hijos correspondían en el condominio que por un diez y ocho por ciento de su total valor les pertenecía en la Hacienda “ Úrsula ”, en precio y cantidad de diez y ocho mil pesos, moneda corriente, de los cuales los doce mil ciento treinta y -tres pesos treinta y tres y un tercio centavos, pertenecientes al Don José Nicolás de Cartagena, los percibiría éste á razón de dos mil pesos en cada día 15 de Julio de los años de 1898, 99-y 1900: tres mil pesos en igual día de 1901; otros tres mil pesos en igual día de 1902; y los ciento treinta y tres pesos treinta y tres y un tercio centavos restantes, en igual día del año 1903 ; y los menores Don José Nicolás, Doña María Mercedes, Don Genaro y Don José Rafael del Carmen Cartagena y Pérez, los cinco mil ochocientos sesenta y seis pesos sesenta y seis y dos tercios centavos, que les correspondían, divisibles entre ellos por cuartas partes, á razón de dos .mil ochocientos sesenta y seis pesos sesenta y seis y dos tercios centavos en 15 de Julio del año 1903, y tres mil pesos en igual día de 1904, como se determina en la cláusula 3^ de la referida escritura, estableciéndose en ella también, como en la anterior, “que todos estos pagos se verificarían en moneda corriente en el comercio, sea cual fuere el cuño de la moneda que con tal carácter circule ó esté aceptado en esta Provincia, á razón de cien centavos de la moneda circulante, por cada un peso, y con exclusión de toda clase de papel moneda, creado ó por crear, aún cuando su circulación fuese forzosa”; devengando dichos plazos el interés del diez por ciento anual desde el 23 de Junio anterior, por trimestres vencidos; y quedando también hipotecado el condominio vendido sobre la Hacienda “Ursula”, á la seguridad del pago del capital, y de los intereses estipulados; con las demás cláusulas y condiciones estable-cidas en la escritura anterior, que se producen literalmente, habiendo sido inscrito dicho documento en el Registro de la Propiedad de Ponce en 6 de Abril del año siguiente.
    
      José Nicolás de Cartagena had in the deed referred to, committed an error in selling the aforesaid interest in the estate “Ursula” as sole owner thereof, whereas said property having been acquired by him during the life of his first spouse, Clorinda Pérez y Quiñones, it should have been considered as pertaining to the conjugal partnership, and therefore belonging to the contracting party Cartagena and to his minor children José Nicolás, María Mercedes, Genaro and José Rafael del Carmen Cartagena y Pérez, had in wedlock with his aforesaid deceased wife. Said error was corrected through the proper judicial partition, wherein José Nicolás de Cartagena y Mangual had been awarded, as his portion of the value of aforesaid interest, twelve thousand and thirty-three pesos and thirty-three and one-third centavos, and the remaining five thousand eight hundred and sixty-six pesos and sixty-six and two-thirds centavos, completing the eighteen thousand pesos at which said interest had been valued, to his aforementioned four children, José Nicolás, Maria Mercedes, Genaro and José Rafael del Carmen Carta-gena y Pérez. Then José Nicolás de Cartagena, desiring to consolidate the contract of purchase and sale which be had previously entered into with Juan Serrallés y Colón, of the aforesaid interest in the estate “Ursula”, for which purpose he had procured the proper judicial authorization, with respect to his aforesaid minor children, by deed.of October 6, of the same year 1894, likewise executed in Ponce and before the aforesaid Notary Joaquin Mayoral, said Carta-gena, in his own right and on behalf of his aforesaid minor children, ratified the above-mentioned deed of September 1, of the previous year, and again sold to Juan Serrallés y Colón the interests belonging to him and to his aforesaid children in the undivided ownership of the estate “Ursula”, representing eighteen per cent of the total value thereof, for the sum of eighteen thousand pesos, current money, whereof twelve thousand one hundred and thirty-three pesos and thirty-three and one-third centavos, belonging to José Nico-lás de Cartagena, would be paid him at the rate of two thousand pesos on the 15th day of July of each of the years 1898, 1899 and 1900; and the five thousand eight hundred and sixty-six pesos and sixty-six and two-thirds centavos belonging to the minors José Nicolás, María Mercedes, -Genaro and José Rafael del Carmen Cartagena y Pérez, to be divided among them in fourth .parts, at the rate of two thousand eight hundred and sixty-six pesos and sixty-six and two-thirds centavos on July 15th, 1903, and three thousand pesos on July 15th, 1904, as stipulated in clause 3 of aforesaid deed, wherein, as in the previous one, it was agreed “that all these payments were to be made in current money of commerce, whatever the coinage may be, and of such character as may be circulating or be accepted in this Province, at the rate of one hundred cents of the circulating money for every peso, and to the exclusion of all kinds of paper money established, although it may be legal tender”; at the rate of ten per cent, interest per annum from June 23 of the preceding year, payable at the expiration of every quarter; the aforesaid transferred interest in the sugar-estate “Ursula” being also mortgaged- as security for payment of the principal and interest agreed upon; with the other clauses and stipulations contained in the- previous deed, which are transcribed literally, said document being recorded in the Registry- of Property of Ponce on April 6, of the following year.
    Then occurred the death of José Nicolás Cartagena y Man-gual, and upon the partition of his estate, his second wife, Be-lén Esbrí y Roubert, was'aw arded in usufruct during her life, the sum of one thousand three hundred and sixty-five pesos; two hundred pesos thereof in the remainder of the value of the furniture, as per inventory, and the remaining one thousand one hundred and sixty-five pesos, in part of the instal-ments of the mortgage credit against Juan Serrallés y Colón, accruing to her deceased husband, as follows: one thousand and thirty-one pesos and sixty-six and two-thirds centavos, of the installment maturing July 14, 1902; and one hundred and thirty-three pesos and thirty-three and one-third centavos, of the total amount of the installment maturing July 15,1903; and having demanded of Don. Eduardo Wellenkamp y Chelva, as attorney-in-fact of the estate of aforesaid Serra-llés, deceased, the interest due for the quarter ending September 15, 1900, on account of the installments that had been awarded her, which interest amounted to twenty-nine dollars and twelve cents, United States currency, without discount, under clause 2 of the deed of purchase and sale of September 1, 1894, as said Wellenkamp refused to pay without making the established discount, said Belén Esbrí y Roubert, brought a verbal civil suit against him before the Municipal Judge of Ponce, who adjudged him to pay the amount claimed, in United States currency, without discount by reason of the difference of money, and the representative of the estate sued having taken on appeal, the District Court of said City affirmed the decision of the Municipal Judge by a majority vote, taxing the costs of both proceedings against appellant.
    On April 17 of last year, Libertad Torres Grau Esq., on behalf of Belén Esbri y Roubert, filed in the District Court of Ponce, the complaint which is the beginning of the present suit, against, the estate of Juan Serrallés y Colón. After rehearsing therein some of the matters above set forth, and stating further that notice of the executory judgment having been served upon Eduardo Wellenkamp, who had appeared at the trial in representation of the party defendant, he was later required to pay and did finally satisfy in United States currency, the amount of the quarterly payment demanded; hut at the expiration of two other quarters, namely, those of December 15, 1900 and March 15, 1901, payment therefor having been demanded of Wellenkamp, in his capacity as representative of the estate of Serrallés y Colón, he positively refused to pay claiming that the interest money, both due and to become due, as well as the principal,. should be paid in the equivalent of provincial money, and not in the current money of commerce at the rate of one hundred cents for each peso of aforesaid money, notwithstanding what had been stipulated by the contracting parties and decided by ’ said District Court in the aforesaid executory judgment; all his friendly observations and efforts having been disregarded, plaintiff invoked in his favor such legal provisions as were deemed pertinent and closed with a prayer that the Court be pleased to admit the said complaint as a “declaratory action of greater import,” and order that notice thereof be served upon the estate of Juan Serrallés y Colón, represented by Eduardo Wellenkamp y Chelva, so that he might appear and answer the same, and that at the proper time judgment be entered declaring that said estate, by virtue of' the express stipulation in clause 2 of the deed of purchase and sale of October 6, 1894, executed by Juan Serrallés y Colón and Nicolás Cartagena y Mangual, was bound to pay Belén Esbrí y Roubert the sums of money due up to the date of the complaint, in American gold, which was the current money of commerce in the Island; and that those yet to fall due, as also" the part of the installments maturing in 1902 and 1903, among those stipulated in said deed, that had been awarded to her in the partition of the property left by her aforesaid husband, be in due time paid in the current money of commerce, whatever be the coinage of the, money then circulating or admitted as such in this Island, at the rate of one hundred cents of the money in circulation for every peso; the legal interest on the installments due and not paid, and the costs of the trial. Said complaint was signed by Rafael Toro Vendrell Esq., “on behalf of the colleague”.
    Notice of the complaint was served upon the estate of Juan Serrallés y Colón and Eduardo Wellenkamp y Chelva being cited in his capacity as representative of said estate, he entered an appearance through Julio M. Padilla Esq., who alleged the dilatory exception of want of capacity on the part of the plaintiff’s representative to sue, the comr plaint not being subscribed by the attorney representing the plaintiff, but by another in his name, which substitution was not authorized, and that of want of capacity of the defendant, inasmuch as Wellenkamp had not the authority attributed to him, because although he was the attorney-in-fact of Mercedes Pérez, widow of Juan Serrallés y Colón, in her own right and on behalf of her infant children Juan Eugenio and Julia Serrallés, as the latter had already attained their majority he had no power to represent them in the trial of the case. And as to the essential part of the complaint he further alleged, among other things, that the estate of Juan Serrallés had never refused to pay the equivalent of the money; that the deed of October 6, 1894, was not the original one of the contract, it having been executed for the purpose of correcting the deed of September 1 of the same year; that in both deeds the controverted clause read: “that all the payments were to be made in current money of commerce, whatever might be the character of the money, at the rate of one hundred cents of the money in circulation for each peso, and to the exclusion etc.”; that on October 6, 1894, when the second contract was executed, in which the aforesaid clause was repeated, Mexican money was circulating in Porto Rico,' and the withdrawal and exchange thereof had been officially announced; that, in fact, the law of appropiations, approved August 6, 1893, for the fiscal year 1893-1894, authorized the exchange of Mexican silver for Spanish silver; that the Royal Decree of August 17, 1895, created an exchange note for the purposes of the withdrawal and exchange of said money; that another (Decree) of the same date, authorized that the contracts or services demanded’by said measure be let out, without a public call for bids; that by Royal Orders of the same date, and of September 11, October 28 and November 28, various provisions were approved for the purpose of preparing and facilitating the operations of said withdrawal and exchange; that by Royal Decree of December 6, Mexican pesos were declared to be demonetized and in place thereof a special peso, bearing the Spanish stamp, was created; that the General Government of Porto Rico, on March 20, 1896, withdrew the Spanish money which was formerly in circulation, and that the exchange of' Mexican silver was also brought about the same year; that the estate of Serrallés had paid in Provincial money, without discount, the rents due Belén Esbri in Mexican money up to July 15, 1900; that this Island had been a Spanish Province until April 11, 1899, when it was ceded to the American Government which made of it a different body politic, under the title of '‘The People of Porto Rico”, pursuant to an Act of Congress, approved April 12, 1900; that on July 31, of the same year, the special money had been definitively withdrawn from circulation, through an exchange for the United States money at the rate of sixty cents of the latter for one hundred cents of the former; and that the exact price and valuation of the property, in case of a public sale, had been fixed in clauses 3 and 8 of the deed of Obtober 6, 1894, and the corresponding clauses 7 and 8, of that of September 1, of the same year, at eighteen thousand pesos of the money then in circulation; and deducing from all these facts such legal considerations as were pertinent to his claims, counsel for Wellenkamp prayed that he be considered as having in due time and manner entered an appearance on behalf of his client, and that the exceptions alleging the lack of capacity of 'both plaintiff and defendant as having been entered and the complaint as having been answered, and that the Court be pleased, upon the trial, to sustain the former and finally dismiss the latter, imposing “perpetual silence” and all the costs upon the plaintiff.
    The evidence in the case having been ordered to be taken and such as was offered by the parties, including documentary, oral and presumptive evidence, being admitted, there were brought and added to the record the original papers of the civil oral action, prosecuted in the Municipal Court of Ponce by Belén Esbri y Roubert against the estate of Juan Serrallés, to recover twenty-nine pesos and twelve centavos, being three months interest on the one thousand one hundred and sixty-five pesos of the mortgage credit appertaining to her from the share in the estate “Ursula” which had been sold to the late Serrallés by the plaintiff’s husband, José Nicolás Cartagena y Mangual, and the two deeds of September 1 and October &, 1894, which gave rise to the aforesaid mortgage credit.
    The case having come on to he heard, the Court overruled the dilatory exceptions alleging lack' of capacity of the plaintiff’s representative and of the defendant himself, taken by counsel for Eduardo Wellenkamp, against which rulings the latter protested, said protest being entered for the purposes of an appeal in cassation. The trial, then, was proceeded with as to the main issue, the testimony of the witnesses Guillermo Schuck, Francisco Paraccini and Antonio Catinchi being taken, the two first-mentioned being merchants, and the last a business agent, all of legal age. To questions put by counsel for Wellenkamp the first witness testified that he knew that transactions effected in business with documents similar to those giving rise to this action, had all been consummated upon the basis of the equivalent monetary value thereof; and to questions put by counsel for the opposition he replied that he did not know in what manner the transactions would have been made in case of documents containing the clause that was now being' discussed. The second witness testified that such transactions in business had been made upon the basis of the’ equivalent and that the documents held by him did not contain the aforesaid clause. And the third witness testified that the transactions in documents containing clauses similar to those under discussion, in which he had intervened, though not so specific, had been effected for their equivalent.
    Upon the termination of the hearing the District Court of Ponce, by a majority vote, rendered judgment on September 17, of last year, sustaining the complaint and holding that the estate of Juan Serrallés y Colón was bound to pay Belén Esbrí y Roubert, widow of Nicolás Cartagena y Man-gual, the income matured up to date, under the contract entered into between Cartagena and Serrallés on October 6, 1894, in American money which was the medium in circulation in the Island; and the income yet to mature, as well as the portion of the intallments belonging to her by reason of said contract, to mature in the years 1902 and 1903, and that had been awarded to her upon the partition of the property left by her aforesaid husband, Cartagena, were in due time to be paid in current money of commerce whatever might be the coinage of the money circulating or accepted as such in this Island, at the rate of one hundred cents of the money in circulation for every peso. The estate of Se-rrallés was furthermore adjudged to pay the interest on the income which was due and unpaid and the costs of the proceedings.
    An explanation of this judgment having been requested by counsel for Eduardo Wellenkamp, in order to determine whether the obligation declared therein was to pay an American dollar for each Provincial or Mexican peso, or to pay in the former of aforesaid coins, at the official rate of exchange, the Court by an order dated November 13 of the same year, declared that the explanation requested would not be made, inasmuch as in the judgment rendered it was clearly stated that the estate of Serrallés had to pay Belén Esbrí the rents and interest due and to become due, in American dollars, whithout discount of any kind on account of the difference in the money in circulation at the time the contract was executed. Thereupon the representative of Eduardo Wellenkamp took an appeal in cassation from aforesaid judgment for error of procedure and also for error of law, which being allowed, the record was forwarded to this Supreme Court and the parties cited; and the parties having .appeared said record was delivered to counsel for appellant who upon returning the same withdrew his appeal for error of procedure and perfected the appeal for violation of law, as coming under paragraphs 1 and 7 of Article 1690 of the Law of Civil Procedure, and alleging the following grounds:
    I. Violation of articles 1091, 1256 and 1258 of tlie Civil Code. The literal text of clauses 2 and 3, respectively, of the deeds of September 1st and October 6th, 1894, clearly shows that it was the purpose of the contracting parties, Cartagena and Serrallés, to fix the price of the interest sold by the former to the latter, at eighteen thousand pesos, in the currency of the country at the time of the contract. This was the principal basis of the contract. The exchange of the Mexican coin for the provincial money, being then about to take place, it was logical that the loss of five per cent should be taken into account in the contract. The necessary' stipulation was therefore made in order to prevent any reduction in the purchase price, which was to be neither more nor less than eighteen thousand pesos of the commercial money in circulation in September 1894. The judgment therefore violates articles 1091, 1256 and 1258 of the Civil Code, which strictly determine the- scope of obligations and contracts, in accordance with the stipulations agreed upon by the contracting parties.
    II. Violation of articles 1445, 1449 and 1500 of the Civil Code. One of the essential requisites for the existence of a contract of purchase and sale, is that the price should be definitely determined; the determination of the price can never be left to the judgment of one of the contracting parties tlie vendee being obliged to pay only tlie price ■ stipulated, as provided in aforesaid articles.
    Tlie judgment appealed from substantially alters tlie value of tlie property sold, by placing upon it a value one third in excess of the just price of eighteen thousand pesos of the money then current in the Island, which was the one agreed upon between vendor and vendee, inasmuch as the commercial peso in circulation at that time was only equivalent to sixty cents of the American money which is now the circulating medium. Thus then, the actual intrinsic, as well as commercial and legal value of the eighteen thousand pesos of Porto Rican money, being equivalent only to ten thousand eight hundred dollars, the judgment of the Ponce Court capriciously increases it by seven thousand dollars, thereby greatly prejudicing the interests of the vendee, and in violation of the legal provisions requiring that the price stipulated in the contract of purchase and sale shall be definitly determined.
    III. Violation of section 11 of the “Organic Act, temporarily to provide revenues and a Civil Government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes”) passed and approved by the Congress of the United States, April 12, 1900. Said section 11 provides in an absolute and imperative manner, “that all debts owing on the date when this Act shall take effect, shall be payable in the coins of Porto Rico, now in circulation, or in the coins of the United States at the rate of exchange of sixty cents United States coins for each peso of Porto Rico coin”. It is then evident that said law has been violated by the judgment of the Ponce Court.
    IV. Violation of articles 1281, 1283, 1284 and 1289 of the Civil Code, referring to interpretation of contracts. The Ponce Court, ignoring the clear terms of the contract of purchase and sale, from which it is seen that the price of the property sold had been fixed at eighteen thousand pesosx commercial money circulating in Porto Rico in September and October of 1894 proceeds to construe the intention of the contracting parties, thereby violating, article 1281 of the Civil Code. The judgment, moreover, violates article 1283 of the same Code, because in the method of interpretation followed, circumstances of the contract are established different from those with regard to which the persons interested intended to contract. It also violates article 1284, because it is unreasonable to suppose that Juan Serra-llés y Colón, proposed to contract the obligation to pay for the property purchased, a price considerably above the one he had recognized it to be worth. It likewise violates article 1289, because nothing can be more opposed to the reciprocity of interests of both contracting parties, than to increase, for the benefit of the vendor, the price of the property sold, by seven thousand two hundred dollars, while said property, the object of the contract, has not received any improvement justifying such an interpretation.
    Y. Violation by undue application of articles 1116, 1125, 1261, 1278 and 1285 of the Civil Code.
    Article 1116 is improperly cited and unduly applied in the judgment, because it refers to impossible conditions which do not exist in the contract.
    The same is true as to article 1125, because it refers to obligations the fulfillment of which has been fixed for a certain day, and in this case there exists no delay in the payment of the price certain, agreed upon.
    Article 1261 has also been misapplied, because the judgment entered assumes that the obligation contracted by Juan Serrallés binds him to pay one hundred cents of the money of the United States for one hundred cents of the money of Porto Rico.
    . For the same reasons article 1278 has also been misapplied, and likewise article 1285, because if, as stated therein, the stipulations of a contract should be interpreted in relation one to the other, it is a serious error to hold that eighteen thousand pesos, Porto Rican money, must be paid with eighteen thousand dollars, United States currency, which is equivalent to thirty thousand pesos of the money in which the price was stipulated; especially when it is agreed in the same clauses of both deeds, dated respectively September 1 and October 6, 1894, that the price of the sale is eigtheen thousand pesos of Porto Rican money; and
    VI. — The foregoing errors of law have given rise to the error in the consideration of .the documents introduced as evidence by the parties, which were passed upon without regard to the legislation in force, governing the point at issue, namely, that established by the Organic Act of April 12,1900.
    The appeal having been pursued through all its stages, a day was set for the hearing, when counsel for both parties appeared and made their arguments.
    
      Mr. Guzmán Benitez {José), for apellant.
    
      Mr. Diaz Navarro, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Quiñones,

after making the above statement of facts, rendered the opinion of the Court.

Under paragraph 9, article 1727 of .the Law of Civil Procedure, an appeal in cassation for violation of law is not admissible when based upon the consideration of the evi■dence on the part of the trial court, unless included in the' provision of subdivision 7 of article 1690 of said law; that is to say, when in the consideration of evidence an error of law or of fact has been committed by the trial Court, in which case according to the jurisprudence established by the Supreme Court of Spain and constantly followed by this Court, it is necessary that in the petition interposing the appeal, it should be clearly stated whether the error committed was of fact or of law, setting forth in the first case, the act or authentic document which shows the evident error of the judge, and in the second case, the law or legal doctrine relating to the value of the evidence, alleged to have been violated; without which requisite the legal point submitted for the decision of the Court cannot be considered as having been properly presented and the appeal is not admissible.

The consideration of the evidence by the trial court, has not been opposed in the manner required by law; for although in the sixth and last ground of the appeal it is claimed that an error had been committed in the consideration of the documents introduced in evidence by the parties, said documents being passed upon regardless of the legislation in force governing the point at issue, namely, that established by the Organic Act of April 12, 1900, what kind of error was committed by the lower court is not stated, and even admitting that it was an error of law, no mention is made of the law or legal doctrine alleged to have been violated, bearing upon the matter of evidence, inasmuch as the Organic Act, of April 12, 1900, mentioned as such'by appellant, is a substantive law, having nothing to do with the evidence presented at a trial, for which reason the appeal as based on subdivision 7, article 1690 of the Law of Civil Procedure, cannot be sustained.

The meaning of the third clause of the deed of sale, dated October 6, 1894, having been interpreted by the lower court in its literal sense and to the full extent and scope of the wording thereof, as a clear and explicit expression of the will of the contracting parties, in holding under said construction the estate of Juan Serrallés to a strict compliance therewith, does not violate, but on the contrary, correctly applies articles 1091, 1256 and 1258 of the Civil Code, that are cited as having been violated in the first ground of the appeal and which articles define the force and efficacy of obligations and bind the parties to the ful-filment thereof, with all the attending consequences; nor articles 1445, 1449 and 1500, of the same Code, cited in the second ground, and which require for the perfection of a contract of purchase and sale the stipulation of a certain price to be paid by the vendee at a time and place specified in the contract, a requisite which was complied with by fixing in the contract of purchase and sale now under discussion, as a certain price of the sale made by José Nicolás de Cartagena to Juan Serrallés y Colón, of his interest and that of his minor children in the estate “Ursula”, the sum of eighteen thousand pesos, commercial money in circulation on the date the contract was entered into, and it cannot be considered as invalidated by virtue of the condition established and mutually accepted by the parties for regulating the payment of pending instalments, according to the value of the money in circulation at the time of their respective maturity, which condition, though aleatory in its nature, is perfectly legitimate and permissible in a contract of purchase and sale, under the provisions of articles 1115 and 1255 of aforesaid Code.

As to Section 11 of the Organic Act, also alleged to have been violated by the judgment, in the third ground of the appeal, although said Section provides that all debts owing on the date the Act takes effect, shall be payable in the coins of Porto Rico then in circulation, or in the coins of the United States at the established rate of exchange, that is to say, sixty cents United States coins, for every peso of Porto Rican money, this provision should be understood without prejudice to rights acquired by virtue of previous contracts in which the parties have agreed upon a different manner of satisfying their obligations, with respect to the changes that might be brought about in the value of the circulating medium, and under the protection of the laws governing such contracts at the time they were entered into; for it being an uncontroverted principle of law, recognized by American legislation and by the legislation in force in the Island, that laws do not have a retroactive effect, it could not have been the intention of the Congress of the United States to rescind such contracts, which, furthermore, were also protected by Section 8 of the Treaty of Paris; and consequently, in holding that the estate of Serrallés was bound to pay the amounts claimed • by the plaintiff Belén Esbri, in the manner provided by clause 3 of the deed of October 6, 1894, the Court has not violated the aforesaid legal provision, and the appeal, as based on this further allegation, cannot properly be admitted.

Neither has there been any violation of the rules for the interpretation of contracts contained in articles 1281, 1283, 1284 and 1289 of the Civil Code; for the terms of clause 3 of the contract of purchase and sale dated October 6, 1894, being clear and leaving no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the Ponce Court has confined itself to an application thereof in its literal sense, in strict compliance with the provisions of the first-mentioned article. Nor has article 1283 been violated, because if the trial Court, in view of the documents and other evidence introduced has considered (and said consideration has not been in due legal form shown to be error,) that the will of the contracting parties upon executing the contract of purchase and sale of October 6, 1894, was such as had been clearly and definetely expressed in the clauses of aforesaid contract, in holding the estate of Serrallés to a strict compliance with the terms of clause 3 of the deed, agreeably to the general sense and scope thereof, without any limitation whatever as to circumstances, has not violated article 1283 of the Civil Code, as claimed by apellant. The contrary was the case with the point raised between Josefa Cayol y Juliá and the agricultural firm Balseiro & Georgetti, recently decided by this Supreme Court, in which the parties had not stated their intention in so clear and explicit a manner as in the case at bar, nor could it offer any difficulty inasmuch as the plaintiff herself had acknoweledged in the complaint, and it was shown at the trial, that the clause of the deed in question on which she based her claim that the vendees, Balseiro & Geor-getti should pay the interest on the outstanding portion of the price in American currency, without making the discount established by the Government of the United States, upon the former money of the country, had been agreed upon by the parties in expectation of the exchange of the Mexican coin, which had been announced by the Spanish Government at the time the contract was entered into. For this reason the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in cas-sation taken by the plaintiff Josefa Cayol from the judgment rendered by the District Court of Arecibo, which had denied the claims of said party, on the strength of article 1283 of the Civil Code, the application of which is under consideration in the present appeal.

Nor has the judgment violated the other rules of interpretation referred to in articles 1284 and 1289 of the Civil Code, for if by clause 3 of the deed of October 6, 1894, the vendee Juan Serrallés engaged to pay the stipulated installments at the rate of one hundred cents current money, whatever might be the coin, for every peso, of Mexican money, nothing is more logical or adequate for the fulfillment of the contract than that the estate of Serrallés should now pay the income due the heirs of the vendor, Cartagena, at the rate of one hundred cents American money, the present legal tender, for every Mexican peso; and the installments and income yet to mature, in the money in circulation when they fall due, in the same proportion agreed upon, in strict compliance with the terms of the contract, which is the law between the contracting parties, and being equal for all, does not impair the 'reciprocity of interests that should exist between both parties.

The violation of the laws cited more or less pertinently in the judgment, but which did not serve as bases for the decision arrived at, such as the articles of the Civil Code mentioned in the 5th allegation should not be considered.

For the reasons above set forth the appeal cannot be sustained as based on any of the grounds urged, which are the only ones of which this Court can take cognizance under the provisions of the Law of Civil Procedure and of General Order No. 118, governing appeals in cassation from final judgments of the District Courts in civil matters.

We, therefore, should declare, and do declare, that the appeal in cassation taken by the representative of the estate of Juan Serrallés y Colón, from the aforesaid judgment of the District Court of Ponce, does not lie, and impose upon him the costs.

Messrs. Justices Hernández and Figueras, concurring.

Messrs. Justices Sulzbacher and MacLeary, dissenting.

Dissenting Opinion of

Mr. Justice Sulzbacher.

The facts in this case are set out fully in the decision of the majority of the court, and therefore for the purposes of this dissenting opinion it is only necessary to make the following statement: The defendant and appellant Eduardo Wellenkamp y Chelva, attorney in fact of Don Juan Se-rrallés y Colón, in consideration of certain real estate sold and conveyed to the latter by Nicolás Cartagena y Man-gual, did, in the month of October, 1894, in the town of Ponce, make and execute before a notary public and in due form of law a certain document of indebtedness to said Ni-colás Cartagena, wherein exists the following clause :

“Said sale is made for the sum of eighteen thousand pesos, commercial money, which shall be paid by the purchaser, Don Juan Serrallés y Colón, who is obligated thereto by Don Eduardo Wellenkamp y Chelva, who appears before him (the notary), and to be received by Don José Nicolás Cartagena, who is also present, in the following instalments: two thousand pesos on the 15th day of July 1898; two thousand pesos more on the same day and month of 1899; an equal amount of two thousand pesos on the 15th day of July of the year 1900 ; and three thousand pesos on every 15th day of July of the years 1901 to 1904, both inclusive; all in current money of commerce, whatever the coinage of money may be, and of such character as may be circulating or be accepted in this Province, at the rate of one hundred cents of the circulating money on every peso, and to the exclusion of all kinds of paper money established, or which may be established, although its circulation may be legal tender.”

The District Court of Ponce held, that under the provisions of said contract, the defendant, the appellant in this Court, is required now to pay American dollars instead of “pesos”, which were the Spanish silver coin, not only in payment of the amounts due at the time of the filing of the suit, but also in payment of all the amounts thereafter to become due under said contract. From this decision the defendant appeals to this Court.

The majority of the court holds that the defendant’s appeal is not well taken; that the writing of his appeal is insufficient and does not set out with clearness and precision the errors of the trial court. The decision is to the effect that the appeal be dismissed. But nevertheless the court proceeds to give its construction to the contract, accepting the same as was expressed by the District Court of Ponce. Neither in this disposition of the case nor in the construction of the contract am I able to concur.

It is contended that the Supreme Court of Porto Rico is a “court of cassation,” and for that reason the Spanish law of procedure and the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain should be the rule of decision for this court. Even were this the case it seems that the defendant’s writing of appeal or of cassation is ample to conform to that system of procedure, according to articles 1690 and 1719 referred to in the majority opinion, and which articles read as follows:

“Art. 1719 . — The paragraph of article 1690 upon which the appeal is based shall be stated in the petition, and the law or legal doctrine alleged to have been violated shall be precisely and clearly cited, as well as the manner in which the violation occurred.
If there should be two or more bases or reasons for appeal, they shall be stated in separate and numbered paragraphs.”
“Art. 1690. — An appeal for annulment of judgment by reason of violation of law or of legal doctrine shall lie:
1. — When the decision contains a violation, erroneous interpretation, or wrongful application of law or of legal doctrine applicable to the case at issue.
2. — -When the judgment is not pertinent to the allegations made by the litigants at the proper time.
3. — When the judgment grants more than is prayed for, .or does not contain any declaration upon some of the allegations made in the action at the proper time.
4. — When the decision contains contradictory rulings.
5. — When the decision disallows a plea of res judicata, provided that this exception has been pleaded in the action.
6. — -When, by reason of the matter at issue, there has been abuse, excess or defect in the exercise of the jurisdiction, whether taking cognizance of a matter which does not come within the jurisdiction of the court or judge, or in not taking cognizance thereof when it is his duty to do so.
7. — If in the consideration of evidence an error of law or of fact should have been committed, provided that the latter error is apparent from documents or authentic acts which show the evident error of the judge.”

Although some of appellant’s objections stated in his writing of appeal could perhaps have been made more specific, yet, taking them all together, they are sufficient to place the whole case and the document in controversy before this court for consideration and decision.

I am, however, of the opinion that the Supreme Court of Porto Rico is not a court of cassation, but a court of appeals, apd as such has the right to.consider the whole case and the merits of the controversy without regard to the technicalities in the manner of its presentation. I arrive at this conclusion by considering the history of the laws now in force here and the origin of this court.

After the occupation by the government of the United States of the Island of Porto Rico, and whilst it was under military administration, a number of regulations called “General Orders” affecting the judicial system, and legislative in character, were adopted and promulgated and became part of the laws of Porto Rico. General Order No. 118 promulgated by Brigadier General George W. Davis, August 16, 1899, is the one which is to be considered in connection with this case. By this General Order the Courts of the island were created, namely, a Supreme Court, District Courts and Municipal Courts. Sections' 2 of said. General Order reads as follows:

“There shall be a Supreme Court of Justice with fixed residence in the city of San Juan, composed of a Chief Justice and four Associate Justices, who jointly will constitute the Supreme Bench for all civil and criminal business.” * * *

The .following sections of said General Order govern appeals from the District Courts to the Supreme Court:

“ 15. — .The criminal business transferred from the abolished courts shall be proceeded with by the district courts. Matters "of civil ligitation shall also follow their course up to the step in procedure known as presentation of proofs when they shall be continued under the rules of civil oral suits estab-lisod by this General Order. If said business shall have got so far as presentation of proofs, without concluding same, the the remainder shall be heard in oral suit but if the suit be found in a stage of proceedings subsequent to the presentation of proofs it shall be finished and decided by the district courts in conformity with existing proceedings, after public hearing, it being understood that recourse of cassation against the decision shall only be allowed within the dispositions of this general order.”
“ 45. — In all cases provided for by the law of criminal procedure appeal in casation will lie against sentences pronounced by the district courts for infraction of law or error in procedure.”
“78.- — -Appeal to the Supreme Court will lie in all civil suits for infraction of law and error in procedure in the eases which the law of civil procedure defines for the latter, but not for suits heard before municipal courts.”
“ 80. — In criminal trials appeal may be taken for infraction of law and error in procedure in cases defined by the law of criminal procedure.”
•‘81. — Notice of appeal shall be giving to the sentencing court not later than ten days after the day of notification of sentence.”
“ 82. — The District Court shall decide whether to allow the appeal only when such is to be taken for error in procedure, and its decision adverse may be appealed against before the Court within fifteen days. For this purpose the district court when denying right of appeal shall grant a literal and certified copy of the ruling against which appeal was sought to the party appealing within three days at the latest, and besides shall order both sides to appear before the Supreme Court.”
“88. — On the termination of the time allowed for appearance and on the appearance of the apellant, the Supreme Court after public hearing shall immediately give a decision on the appeal against the ruling of the lower court debarring right of cassation. The lawyers for both sides may be present, and the matter must be decided before all other business in hand.”

They having been enacted and established by American military authority, and although promulgated in two languages, there can be no doubt but that the English must be held to be the original.

It is evident therefore that in civil matters, at least, the Supreme Court is a Court of appeals and not a court of cassation..

From a different aspect, however, must the courts and the laws of Porto Rico be viewed and construed after the passage by the Congress of the United States of the Organic Act of Porto Rico, being entitled : “ An act temporarily to to provide revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes”, aproved April 12, 1900, especially in view of the following sections of said act:

“Section 8. — That the laws and ordinances of Porto Rico now in force shall continue in full force and. effect except as altered, amended or modified hereinafter, or as altered or modified by military orders and decrees in force when this act shall take effect, and so far as the same are not inconsistent or in conflict witch the statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable or the provisions hereof, until altered amended or repealed by the legislative authority hereinafter provided for Porto Rico or by act of Congress of the United States.” * * *
“Section 38.- — -That the judicial power shall be vested in the courts and tribunals of Porto Rico as already established and now in operation, including municipal courts under and by virtue of General Orders numbered one hundred and eighteen, as promulgated by Brigadier-General Davis, United States Volunteers, August 16, 1899, and including also the Police Courts established by General Orders numbered 195, promulgated November 29, 1899, by Brigadier General Davis, United States Volunteers, and the laws and ordinances of Porto Rico and the municipalities thereof in force, so far as the same are not in conflict herewith, all which courts and tribunals are hereby continued.” * * *

Although section 8 reads that the laws and ordinances in Porto Rico now in force shall continue in force and effect, except as altered, amended, etc., it should nevertheless be held that by said act the laws of Porto Rico became creatures of Congress and American laws by re-enactment; and that they must be construed in accordance and in conformity with the spirit, application, tendency and policy of American jurisprudence, and everything. contrary thereto, or inconsistent, incompatible or unsuitable, must fall without any special legislative action in that respect. And although said section 33 provides “that the judicial powers shall be vested in the courts and tribunals of Porto Rico as already established”, * * * “all of which are hereby continued”, they became thereby courts created and established by the Congress of the United States. It could not have been the intention of the military government, and certainly not that of Congress, to make and constitute the Supreme Court of Porto Rico a court of cassation, thereby giving it all the attributes of the Supreme Court of Spain. American doctrines and theories must control the courts of Porto Rico even in the construction of the laws of Spain, which are still found on the statute books of Porto Rico.

It is a principle of law recognized in the United States and adopted by this- court that, when the laws of a foreign country come under consideration by the courts of the United States, they will be construed in accordance with the constitution, institutions, spirit and jurisprudence of the latter’s courts, irrespective of the construction of the courts or other bodies of foreign countries.

In a suit before the Supreme Court of the United States as to whether a certain foreign institution was a corporation or joint stock company, the court said :

“ It is also urged that tlie several acts of Parliament we liave mentioned expressly declared that they shall not be held to constitute the .body a corporation.
But whatever may be the effect of such declaration in the courts of that country, it cannot alter the essential nature of a corporation or prevent the courts of another jurisdiction from inquiring into its true character whenever that may come into issue. It appears to have been the policy of the English law to attach certain consequences to incorporated bodies, which rendered it desirable that such associations as these should not become technically corporations. Among these, it would seem from the provisions of these acts, is the exemption from individual liability of the shareholder for the contracts of the corporation. Such local policy can have no place here in determining whether an association whose powers are ascertained and its privileges conferred by law, is an incorporated body.” Liverpool Life London Life and Fire Insurance Company. v. Henry K. Oliver, Treasurer. 10 Wall. 566-577.

I, therefore arrive at the conclusion that since courts of cassation, rules of cassation and appeals of cassation are foreign to our laws and legal system; they must be construed and interpreted so as to be in harmony with the legal procedure and methods governing courts in the- United States.

Writs of error have not yet been enacted in Porto Rico, and the Supreme Court should therefore be considered a court of appeals, with power to review any error apparent upon the record.

It has been generally held in the courts of the highest jurisdiction of the United States that where an error is apparent in the record it need not be presented by bill of exceptions even; but in this case the appellant has amply pointed out the errors of the trial court in its rulings. The execution of the document in controversy is not denied by the defendant and apellan! There could, therefore, not have been any other proper evidence before the trial court except the document itself. The construction thereof is the only point in issue, which cannot be affected by any verbal testimony.

It is an historical fact, of which the court should have taken judicial cognizance, that at various periods during the Spanish government, the circulating medium had to undergo many changes, and at about the date of the execution of the document in issue a change from Mexican to Spanish money (■moneda provincial) had been or was about to be made, the difference being about five per cent, in favor of the latter money.

It is a universal principle of law that courts in construing contracts must place themselves in the attitude of the contracting parties. The Civil Code' in force here, recognizing the principle referred to, contains the following sections:

“Art. 1281. — If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be observed.
If the words should appear contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail.”
“Art. 1282. — In order to judge as to the intention of the contracting parties, attention must principally be paid to their acts, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract.”
“Art. 1283. — However general the terms of the contract may be, there should not be understood as included therein things and cases different from those with regard to which the persons interested intend to contract.”
“Art. 1284.- — -If any stipulation of a contract should admit of different meaning's, it should be understood in the sense most suitable to give it effect.”

Applying the principles of law set forth is these sections, it is obvious that the contracting parties at the time of the negotiations had in mind only the change of one peso to another 'peso, — simply a change of currency. It would be most unreasonable to presume that they had in mind a war with another nation, a change in sovereignty, and in consequence thereof a variation in its monetary system, and from silver to a gold standard of values. It would also be irrational to presume that if, for instance, the Kingdom of England had acquired the island of Porto Rico, that instead of Spanish pesos, pounds sterling would have to be paid. Nor is it reasonable to presume that the creditor would have been satisfied with francs instead of pesos in case the Republic of Prance had become the sovereign of Porto Rico. Such a demand by a creditor before a court of justice would be most remarkable and extravagant, when, in this instance, the debtor would have been required to pay sixty-six per cent, premium on the amount of his contract. This certainly was never contemplated by the parties. The construction of the District Court of Ponce of the contract in controversy permits of all these extraordinary comparisons.

It is contended that aleatory contracts are authorized in Porto Rico. They are permitted in all countries where contracts depend on future results, but in^the construction of such agreements or bargains it must appear that the contracting parties had in mind the contingencies which might arise. A person may buy a growing crop, when both parties would take into consideration an abundant harvest as well as a destruction of the crop by the elements, but that the contracting parties would have in mind the probability of a war, a change of sovereignty, and a consequent change of the monetary system, is highly improbable.

These views have seemingly been expressed by this court in the suit of Cayol vs. Balseiro y Georgetty, referred to by the majority of the court. The controversy in that suit was a document made and executed in 1894, the same year of contract in this suit, and involving a similar or the same principle. Therein appeared the following clause:

“And the balance of the price, amounting to twenty thousand pesos current money at the time the same becomes due and payable shall be paid * * * in gold or silver, to the exclusion of all paper money.”

The creditor contended that all payments due him after the passage of the above mentioned act to Congress, of April 12, 1900, would have to he made in American dollars instead of pesos. This court, however, holding otherwise, and speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Quiñones, states:

“Notwithstanding, and although it could not be considered that the purchase price of twenty thousand pesos and interest must be held to be current money at the time the same becomes due and payable at par, nevertheless the suit by Mrs. Josefa Cayol against Balseiro y Georgetty, is not maintainable. Convinced, as seemingly she was by the clause of the instrument, as she alleges in her suit, on account of the prospective change of currency which was expected from Mexican money, that the twenty thousand pesos and interest to be paid in such money as should be substituted therefor. The change of money having been established without considering the difference which could result in the relative value between the one and the other, the stipulation between the parties only referred to a special and particular case, and could have no application to an incident entirely different and to one which the parties could not foresee; for such would be beyond the limits of human prevision.”
“For this reason such events could not enter into the calculations and deliberations of the contracting parties that a change of money would be established five years thereafter by the American government in consequence of the change of sovereignty which happened in this island; because once provincial money was substituted for Mexican money, that thereafter the currency of the United States of America, with a discount of forty per cent, of its value should take its place. Hence on account of this extraordinary and unexpected event, article 1283 of the Civil Code is applicable, which says:
“However general the terms of a contract may be, there should not be understood as included therein things and cases different from those with regard to which the persons interested intended to contract.”

The Act of the Congress of the United States of April 12, 1900, above stated, reads as follows:

“Section 11. — That for the purpose of retiring the Porto Pican coins now in circulation in Porto Rico and substituting therefor the coins of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to redeem, on presentation in Porto Rico, all the silver coins of Porto Rico known as the peso and all other silver and copper Porto Rican coins now in circulation in Porto Rico, not including any such coins that, may be imported into Porto Rico after the first day of February, 1900, at the present established rate of sixty cents in the coins, of the United States for one peso of Porto Rican coins, and for all minor and subsidiary coins the same rate of exchange shall be applied. * * * Provided, hoioever, that all debts owing on the date when this Act shall take effect shall be payable in the coins of Porto Rico now in circulation, or in the coins of the United States at the rate of exchange above named.”

The amount in said document mentioned was owing by appellant to apellee on the 12th day of April 1900, the day when said Act of Congress did take effect. By said Act it was declared that debts owing on that date should he payable in the coins of the Porto Bico, then in circulation, or in coins of the United States at the rate of sixty cents for every peso; of course at the election of the debtor.

The judgment of the District Court of Ponce, holding that instead of pesos due plaintiff the defendant should pay “dollars’’, is in violation of said section 11 of said Act of Congress thereby giving it a retroactive character. The appellant in his writing of appeal duly excepts to this ruling and to all the verbal evidence before the trial court; claiming the privilege conceded by the Act of Congress to pay sixty cents, money of the United States, for every peso he owed.

It was not, nor could it have been, the intention of Congress to change or affect contracts made in Porto Bico prior to the Treaty of Peace between the United States and the Kingdom of Spain. They should remain undisturbed, and unchanged.

The appellee had certain vested rights by virtue of the contract or document in controversy, namely the amount due him by the appellant; subject, however, to the agreed conditions that one peso should be substituted for another peso, in the event the government of Spain should have changed the currency in the province of Porto Rico. Vested rights between contracting parties must remain unaffected by the change of sovereignity; they can be neither increased nor diminished by any legislation of the new government.

“This is the principle of the law of nations, as expounded by the highest authorities. In the case of The Fama, in the 5 C. Kob. 106, Sir William Scott declares it to be the settled principle of the law of nations, that the inhabitants of a conquered territory change their allegiance, and their relation to their former sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, and their rights of property not taken from them by the orders of the conqueror, remain undisturbed.” — Eugene Leitensdorfer et al. vs. James J. Webb, 20 Howard, 176 (U. S.)

The Congress by retiring the Porto Rican coins and substituting therefor coins of the United States, fixed the value of the retired coinage only, and declared what amount or proportion of money of the United States should be paid by the debtor to his creditor instead of pesos on amounts owing at the date of the passage of the Act, should the debtor so elect.

For the various reasons above stated I am of the opinion that the Supreme Court should have reversed the judgment of the District Court of Ponce, and, as authorized under the existing laws here, should have rendered a decision to the effect that the appellant pay the appellee the amounts of money overdue or in past due, either in coins of Porto Rico which were in circulation on the twelfth day of April 1900, or American coins, or dollars, at the rate of -sixty cents for every peso. 
      
       Should read 1718.
     
      
       In the Spanish text oí these sections use is made of the word “casación” instead of appeal ("apelación”) which is used in the English; except in section 45 wherein the phrase "recurso de casación” is used as the equivalent of “appeal in cassation.”
     