
    Oswaldo CALDERON-TERRAZAS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John ASHCROFT, U.S. Attorney General; Aaron Cabrera, Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 03-41318.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Decided Nov. 4, 2004.
    
      Jodilyn Marie Goodwin, Jodi Goodwin Law Office, Harlingen, TX, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Anthony W. Norwood, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before KING, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Oswaldo Calderón-Terrazas appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition challenging his removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because he was convicted of sexual assault of a child under Texas Penal Code § 22.011, an aggravated felony. Calderón-Terrazas argues that sexual assault of a child under Tex. Penal Code § 22.011 is not an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43) and 1101(a)(48). Calderón-Terrazas argues further that the “automatic” removal of a long-term lawful permanent resident with significant ties to the United States violates substantive due process. In addition, Calderón-Terrazas asserts that the BIA erred in deciding his case by summary affirmance without opinion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7), now 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7).

Contrary to the Government’s assertions, the district court had jurisdiction over Calderon-Terrazas’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition because as an alien who is removable for having committed an aggravated felony, he is precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) from seeking direct judicial review, and his petition raises questions of law only. See INS v. St Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001); Flores-Garza v. INS, 328 F.3d 797, 802-04 (5th Cir.2003).

Moreover, Calderon-Terrazas’s crime of “sexual assault of a child” under Texas Penal Code § 22.011 qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) includes within the scope of the term “aggravated felony” the enumerated crimes of “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.” In U.S. v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir.2000) this Court held that in determining whether a specific crime constituted “sexual abuse of a minor” for § 1101(a)(43)(A) purposes, the words of the statute must be read according to “their ordinary contemporary meaning.” Texas Penal Code § 22.011(a)(2)(A) says that “a person commits [the offense of sexual assault] if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means”. This conduct clearly constitutes “sexual abuse of a child”. Sexual abuse of a child is an enumerated crime in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) and therefore expressly declared to be an “aggravated felony”.

Furthermore, Calderon-Terrazas’s deferred adjudication under Texas law is a conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) because it involved an admission of guilt and limitations on his liberty. See Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1999).

The district court determined correctly that the statutes that Calderón-Terrazas challenges as violating his substantive due process rights are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1257-58 (5th Cir.1988); In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1442-43 & n. 16 (5th Cir.1983).

Also contrary to the Government’s assertions, the district court had jurisdiction to review Calderon-Terrazas’s claim that the BIA erred in using its summary affirmance procedure under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7), now 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7). See Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 & n. 7 (5th Cir.2003). The district court did not err in finding that the BIA properly employed its summary affirmance in this case. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 831-33 (5th Cir.2003).

Accordingly, we conclude that Calderón-Terrazas was not denied due process of law and is not entitled to habeas relief.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     