
    SZYMANSKI v. STATE.
    (No. 7370.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 7, 1923.
    Rehearing Denied March 14, 1923.)
    1. Intoxicating liquors <§=>236(20) — Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction of transportation of intoxicating liquors.
    Evidence held sufficient to support conviction for offense of transporting intoxicating liquors.
    2. intoxicating liquors <®=»l38 — Pecuniary or proprietary interest in liquor being unlawfully transported held not essential to convict.
    It is not indispensable to a conviction of the offense of transporting intoxicating liquors that the transporter of the liquor have any pecuniary interest in it, or that he exercise any claim of ownership, or that he have the custody thereof.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    3. Criminal law <§=3459 — Opinion evidence that liquor was intoxicating held competent and sufficient to sustain finding.
    Testimony of state witnesses in prosecution for transportation of intoxicating liquors, after having qualified as to their knowledge and experience and having examined, smelled, and tasted the liquor, that the liquor was intoxicating, held competent evidence and sufficient to sustain finding that liquor was intoxicating.
    4. Intoxicating liquors <§=»I67 — Driver of car knowing companion is transporting intoxicating liquor is guilty of transporting it.
    One with knowledge of the fact that a passenger in his car, or one who is riding therein, is transporting intoxicating liquor, cannot escape liability by pleading that he was merely the driver of the car and that another person had the cafe and control and custody of the liquor.
    Appeal from District Court, Brazos County; W. C. Davis, Judge.
    Louis Szymanski was convicted of transporting intoxicating liquors, and appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Buffington & Leigh, of Anderson, and Henderson & Ranson, of Bryan, for appellant.
    R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   LATTIMORE, J.

Appellant was convicted in the district court of Brazos county of transporting intoxicating liquor, and his punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of one year.

Appellant raises a number of questions in various ways in the record, each complaint in which has been carefully examined; but all of the legal questions raised have been settled by decisions of this court on exactly similar questions, adversely to the contentions made by appellant and no good purpose will be served by any discussion of them in this opinion.

Appellant complains that the testimony is insufficient to support the verdict It is shown by testimony that on the date alleged in the indictment appellant and a man named Prescott and a couple of negroescame by the home of a witness who lived about four miles from College Station in Brazos county. They had some car trouble. The witness near whose home said party came went down to-the scene and rendered some assistance, and Prescott tried to induce him to drink some whisky, which he said they had there in the car, and told him that if he wanted it he was as welcome to it as the flowers of May. Quite a bit of conversation in regard to the whisky was testified to by this witness. The conversation was had in the presence of appellant. After fixing up the car the party drove on, appellant driving. The witness then telephoned to the sheriff, and the officer went out and searched the car in question and found in it a half-gallon jug of whisky and a half-gallon jar of whisky. The jug was in a sack between the seats and the jar was under the back seat.' Appellant’s defense was that he was requested by Prescott to drive him in said car on the day in question. He disclaimed any connection with the whisky. We do.not think it indispensable to a conviction that the transporter of whisky have any pecuniary interest in it, or that he exercise any claim of ownership, or that he have the custody thereof. If it be conceded that there was no' testimony to show that appellant knew there was whisky in the car which he was driving, until the conversation had with the witness first above mentioned, still there-could be no seeming claim that he did not know after that that he was driving a car in which there was whisky. The trial court submitted the issue fairly to the jury, instructing them upon the law of principals, and telling them that unless they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant, either alone or acting with Prescott, transported the liquor in question, he should be found not guilty.

We are unable to agree with appellant’s-contention that the evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict, and an affirmance is-ordered.

On Motion for Rehearing

Appellant asks a rehearing asserting that the testimony was not sufficient to show that the liquor claimed to have been transported by him was intoxicating. He insists that the witnesses cannot taste liquor and then give testimony of sufficient incriminating force, to the intoxicating quality thereof. Referring to the statement of facts, we observe that Mr. Covey testified that he had had experience in drinking and using intoxicating liquor. We quote from his testimony:

“From my experience in drinking and using intoxicating liquor and observing the effects of it upon other people, I think I am able t.o examine liquor by smelling it and tasting it and determine whether it is intoxicating.”

Upon redirect examination, after being questioned by appellant’s counsel as to his ability to determine fi’om examination the intoxicating quality of liquor, this witness testified as follows:

“I have seen a little better grade of corn whisky, but judging from the taste and smell it is like all the rest of it that X ever saw and tastes like it. From my experience in handling and drinking and observing the influence of intoxicating liquor, in my opinion, the contents of that jug would be intoxicating beyond a doubt.”

Being again cross-examined; this witness stated:

“I can tell it would be intoxicating because I have had enough of it to know that a glassful would make me feel it right quick.”

Another witness for the state testified that he had had experience in handling and using intoxicating liquors; that he sold it for 25 years and had felt the effects from drinking it and had observed the influence of it upon others. This witness said that he could taste liquor and tell whether or not it would make him drunk. We take the following from the testimony of said witness:

“(Witness requested to taste fluid.) After having examined this and tasting it, in my opinion, from my experience in drinking intoxicating liquors, the contents of that bottle is capable of producing intoxication; it hasn’t hardly had time to have any effect yet, but it tastes like it. In my judgment a reasonable amount of it would make me drunk. That would be my judgment, the way it tastes and the effect it produces on my throat. * * * My judgment is now, based upon tasting and the effects on my throat, it would produce intoxication; a sufficient amount of this would make a man drunk. I generally carried corn whisky for a certain class of trade, but I did not drink that kind myself.”

We have reproduced this much of the testimony to .make it clear that the state’s witnesses having qualified as to their knowledge and experience, and having examined, smelled, and tasted the liquor in question, said that it was intoxicating. This court would be very loathe to say that a jury would not be justified in accepting and acting upon such testimony.

Appellant is not satisfied with our declaration that it is not indispensable to a conviction for transportation of intoxicating liquor that the transporter have a pecuniary interest in it, or that he exercise any claim of ownership. If the hired servant or employee of another could transport liquor and be held guiltless', the law against transportation would be wholly ineffectual. If one could drive a car through the country or in any other manner, or by any other means, carry with him friends, strangers, or persons in whom he had no interest, knowing them to be transporting intoxicating liquor, and be not held guilty, our law forbidding the transportation of such liquor would be of no avail. It seems but reasonable to conclude that if one in good ’faith permitted another to ride with him, such other person having in his possession or upon his person intoxicating liquor without the knowledge of the driver of the car, there might be a question raised as to the sufficiency of the testimony to support conviction; but where one has unquestioned knowledge of the fact that a passenger in his car or one who is riding therein is transporting intoxicating liquor, we do not believe such person can escape by pleading that he was merely the driver of the car and that another person therein had the care, control, and custody of such liquor.

We have been unable to agree with appellant in either contention, and the motion for rehearing is overruled. 
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