
    Town of Barre vs. Town of Morristown.
    Washington
    
      March, 1832.
    Whore a constable in liis return on a warning-out process stated he had sewed the same by leaving a true and attested copy at the dwelling-house of the person named in the process, without stating with whom, or in what situation, he left the copy,— it was held that the warning was insufficient.
    Where the overseers of the poor ofthe town of B, under the supposition that ceitain paupers residing in the town of M, had a legal settlement in B, supported the paupers for a time in M, and afterwards carried them toB, and supported them therefor a longtime, — it was held that these proceedings of the overseers ofB,‘ though legal evidence, were not conclusive that the paupers were legally settled in B.
    And although in such case the overseers be empowered by the town to use their discretion with regard to the paupers, they cannot by such proceedings change tho place of settlement of the paupers.
    To make an order of removal of a pauper conclusive between the towns who are parties thereto, and also as to all others, it must be perfected by giving the notice required by the statute, that is, by leaving a true and attested copy within thirty days after the order of removal is made ; and this notice cannot bo waived, so a3 to affect the settlement of the pauper, by any agreement of the overseers of the town enti-lled to receive it
    
      This was an appeal from an order of two justices of the ty of Washington for the removal of Thomas Brigham, Sally Brigham, his wife, and Lucy L. Brigham, their daughter, from Barre to Morristown. Plea, that the paupers were unduly removed, because their last legal settlement was not in Mormsloiun. Upon which issue was joined. On the trial it was admitted by the parties, that the paupers removed to Morristown in 1814, and resided there till about the first of January, A. D. 1824 — and that previous to their so going to reside in Morristown, their legal settlement was in Barre. The defendants then offered in evidence the record of a warning relating to these paupers and several other persons, issued by the selectmen oí Morristown, dated December 23d, and served and recorded December 30, 1814; to which the plaintiffs objected for the insufficiency of the officer’s return thereon, which was as follows :
    
      iState of Vermont, > Morristown, December 30th, 1814. By Orleans County, ss. ) virtue of the within summons I served the same by leaving a true and attested copy at the dwelling house of the within named Thomas Brigham with my return thereon "endorsed. Attest, Jona. Cooke, Constable.
    
    The record was accordingly rejected by the court. The defendants then gave in evidence an order of two justices of the county of Orleans, dated December 25, 1823, for the removal of the paupers from Morristown to Barre, with the complaint, process, and proceedings connected therewith. It was not shown, nor pretended, that any copy of this order was delivered to any of the overseers of Barre, nor that the order was executed by a removal of the paupers under it; but in aid of said order, and with a view to make it conclusive upon the question of settlement, the defendants offered parol evidence to prove tho following facts : That for a considerable time previous to the making of said order the overseers, as well of Barra as Morristown, supposed the settlement of the paupers was in Barre, and that communications passed between them upon that supposition ; that in June, A. D. 1823, the overseers of Barre went to Morristownio look to the situation of the paupers; and finding them sick and unable to be removed at that time, they requested tho overseers of Morris-town to provide for them, and promised to pay the expences ;— that in July, 1823, the subject of said paupers was referred by Barre to the discretion of their select-men, being also the overseers, as by a vote of said town, passed February 12th, 1823, offered in evidence; that immediately after the order was made, one the justices wrote to the overseers of Barre, informing them of the order; that in consequence of that information, the overseers of Barre, about the 1st of January, A. D. 1824, went to Morris-town, when they had full notice of the order and previous proceedings, and requested that the order might be no further prosecuted, declaring their full conviction that the paupers belonged to Barre ; — that they therefore paid to the overseers of Morrisioiun the costs which had accrued in the proceedings — being about ‡10,00 — and carried the paupers to Barre, where they were supported by the town as paupers until the present order and removal were made. To the admission of this evidence, the plaintiffs objected, and the same being rejected by the court, a verdict was returned for the plaintiffs. To these decisions of the court the defendants excepted, and the case was reserved for the opinion of this Court.
    
      The counsel for the defendants contended, that the previous order of removal from Morristown, under the circumstances of the case, was conclusive upon the town of Barre.
    
    1. That no undue advantage might be taken of the town to which a pauper should be ordered to remove, the 5th section of the act of 1817, (Stat. 383,^1 provides, “that whenever any order of removal shall be made, &c., an attested copy of such order shall be left with some one of the overseers of the poor of the town to which said pauper shall be ordered to remove, within thirty days after the making of such order.” The principle object of this section of the statute is to give seasonable notice of such order to the town to which a pauper is ordered to remove, that if the overseers of the poor of such town should feel themselves aggrieved by such order, they might take their appeal to the next county court, as is provided by the 6th section of the act of 1797, (Stat. 371.) But notwithstanding the positive words of this statute, it was decided in the case of Bradford vs. Corinth, (1 Aikens, 290,) that if the appeal was entered within the thirty days, no exceptions could be taken by the appellants, on account of the neglect of the appellees to give such notice : and (he court would presume notice to be given, or that claim to the notice was waived by the party appealing. And again, in the case, Stamford vs. Whitins;ham, (2Aikens, 188,) Seinnee, C. J., said, “ithas been repeatedly decided by this Court, if the appeal is taken within the thirty days, (the time limited for giving notice,) a compliance with that requisition of the statute is unnecessary. By taking the appeal within the time the appellant waives the notice.” in these cases the Court decided, that a town might waive • 11, fight to strict notice, by copy of the order, as is provided by statute, iand still be bound by the order. The evidence offered by the appellants on this point in their case, and excluded by the court, 1 r Í. . / . went no further than to show an express waiver ot the notice required to be given by the 5th section of the act of 1817..
    2. This notice being given exclusively for the benefit of the. town, taking the appeal, it is most clear, that such town may-waive ■their right to such notice ; and this waiver may be not only expressed, but implied, from the acts of the parties. — Bradford vs. Corinth, 1 Aihens, 290; Stamford vs. Whiting ham, 2 id. 188; Baris vs. Hiram, 12 Mass. 262 ; Embden vs. Augusta, id. 307. In Connecticut, where,by a provision of their statute,it was necessary for one town, before they could maintain an action againS't another town for expenses incurred for the support of a pauper, to present a statement of such expenses to such town, and demand payment — but the statute does not declare that such statement shall be in writing — Ilosmer, Ch. J., in delivering the opinion of the court in JYewton vs. Danbury, (3 Conn. 553-8J said, if the law had required the .exhibition of notice, and demand to be in writing, my opinion on this point would not be varied « the rule requiring notice is founded in good reason, and was introduced for the defendant’s benefit. The defendant as a consequence may always waive the privilege on the established principle, that, quis-quís potest renunciare juri pro se introducto. The waiver may •be expressed or implied ; and as the select men of Danbury, the •agents of the town, and vested with full power on this subject, explicitly declared, on the demand made by the plaintiffs, “ that •Sally was not the wife of Adam S. Clark, and Danbury was not bo'nnd to support her,” they placed their defence on this ground, •and impliedly waived particular notice. The same doctrine is also held in Strafford vs. Fairfield, 3 Conn. 588. The principle that a party may waive a right created by law for his exclusive benefit is clearly established as relates to bills of exchange and promissory notes. “ It is a settled rule, that though an endorser ■has not had regular notice of non-payment by the drawee, yet, if with a knowledge of that fact, he makes a subsequent promise tb pay, it is a waiver of the want of due notice.” — Durgee vs. Den-nison, 5 J. R. 248. “ The endorser of a note waives the notice {to which he is entitled, by promising payment, when notice of nonpayment is given him at an earlier hour of the day, than the law requires.” — Seely vs. Bisbee, 2 Vi. Rep. 105. And the la.ij* made use of by the Court in the decision of that case, may well be applied to this, when they say, “this promise under all its circumstances was more than a waiver of further notice. It was calculated to prevent the same $ for the plaintiff might well rest satisfied after this promise from the defendant.” So when the service of a writ is irregular, by being served out of, and beyond, the borders of the county, to the sheriff of which it was directed, but defendant on receiving notice of declaration says, “ It is all right, I will call and settle the debt and costs,” the irregularity is waived. — Loyd vs. Hankyard, 17 Com. Law Rep. 259 ; Rawes vs. Knight, 8 do. 270; 2 Chitty’s Rep. 236, 240.
    3. An order of removal duly made, and notice given within thirty days, unappealed from by the town to which a pauper shall he ordered to remove before the next county court, is conclusive between said towns as to the settlement of such pauper. — Straf-ford vs. Ilartland, 2 Ft. Rep. 565 ; Hariland vs. Williamstown, 1 Aikens, 241; 2 Johns. Rep. 105. .In England an order of removal, unappealed from, has the same effect as the affirmance of the order by the court appealed to. It is conclusive to all persons. — lb. 241-51 j Siockham vs. Findon, 2 Salk. 489 ; 6 T. R. 615. It has been decided that a notice, which, if answered or particularly objected to, would be insufficient, may become sufficient by an acceptance of it, by the other party.--Partí vs» Hiram, 12 Mass. 262: The evidence offered by the appellants in this case, and rejected by the court, went to show actual notice of the order of removal from Morristown, given to the overseers of the poor of Barre, by a written communication from* one of the justices making the order to them ; and further, to show, that Barre accepted the order of removal, and waived all objections for the want of that notice, by actually taking charge of the paupers, removing them from Morristown, and supporting them six years. When Barre took under their charge, and removed from Morristown, the paupers in this case, and paid the costs which had accrued to that time, Morristown had accomplished all they sought to, and giving the notice after the acceptance by Barre of the paupers, and their special request to have no further proceed-, ings had, would only have made additional cost for Barre to pay, without effecting any object contemplated by the statute ; and it is now too late lor Barre to object, for want of such notice, after having full notice, and the written forms dispensed with only at their special request. Lord Coke says, “ the’ reason of a law is its soul ; change the reason, and the law is changed.” And again, “ No one gams an advantage from his own deceit. Let us , . , , . . - . ply these maxims to the case at bar. Ihe provision of the statute directing a copy to be left, &c., was intended for the benefit of Barre, that they might have full knowledge of the proceedings had, and, if dissatisfied, take an appeal. Barre having received this knowledge so that they might 'have taken their appeal, and having acquiesced in the justice of such order, and requested that no further proceedings should be had, the reason for leaving the copy was obviated, and Barre, after having acquiesced in such order for six years, should not now be permitted to take advantage of their own wrong,
    4. The overseers of the poor of a town, are the agents of such town, and'their acts and admissions, while executing their agen•cy, will be binding on, and may be proved as evidence against, such town. — Burlington vs. Calais, i PI. Rep. 385; Washington vs. Rising, Bray. Rep. 188.
    
      'The counsel jor the plaintiffs, contra.—
    1st. The record of the warning was properly excluded. It is defective, the officer’s return not showing in what situation the copy was left, which is required to appear by the statute. — Bray. R. 183, no. 10; 2 Aik. 272. Nor can the officer amend his-return* — 2 Aik. R. 272; 7 Mass. 388 ; 8 de. 240; 7 do. 242, '
    2nd. Are the appellees concluded by the -order of December 25th, 1823’? We answer, — Firstly. No legal notice of the order of removal was given, it was not such notice as rendered it necessary, or enabled the appellees, to appeal. — 1 Aik. R. 290. When a particular form of notice is prescribed by statute, rt must be strictly pursued, and a defective notice is not cured or waived by any appearance of the party.— Cowper, 26 ; Commonwealth -vs. Shelden, 3 Mass. R. 188. So nothing will amount to a no.tice in writing to make a settlement under the 3 and 4 W. & M. •c. 11, that is not specified in that act. — 2 Salk. 475. The town that calls on another town for the removal of a pauper, ought to be able to prove that the notice required by the statute, was •actually delivered. — 16 Mass. R. 110. In the case of Button vs. Hinsdale, (6 Mass. R. 501,) it was held, that notice from •-one town to another, to obtain'the removal of a pauper, or the reimbursement of the expenses of a pauper’s support, must be in writing, and the town is not concluded if parol notice is given to its agent, and he makes no objection on this account. Our statute is imperative, that a copy of the warrant (Stat. 370. s. 3) and a ^56 0rc^er remora^ (Stat. 383, s. 5,J shall be left with some one of the overseers of the poor of the town to which the pauper is removed. In Hartland vs. Wilhamstovm. (i Aik. R. 241,) it was said by Skinner, C. J., that previous to the passing of the act of November 4th, 1817, notice' in any other way, than by leaving a copy of the warrant,would not be' good.. ■ The parol evidence there offered to show notice to the appellees of the order of removal, was properly excluded; and without legal' notice of this fact, the town is not estopped from questioning the settlement of the paupers. Had the order in question never been executed, nor a copy of it lodged with one of the appellees, which the case shows was not done in this case, it would not be urged that we are concluded by the order, had not the appellees removed the paupers to Barre. This brings us to the question, is Barre bound by these acts of her overseers ? and can overseers of the poor, virtute officii, waive the execution of an order of removal,, and the notice required to be given by the statute, so as to. conclude their town by any thing short of an appeal from the order ? Overseers of the poor are special agents, with special powers,, which are strictly confined within the acts conferring the power, (D. Chip. 1$. 83, 461, n.) and their acts areno further binding upon the town than as they are done in pursuance of the statute.— 1 Johns. R. 109 ; 2 Crunch 166. By our statute they are vested with certain special powers, among which is that of appealing frota an order of removal made and executed according to the provisions of the statute.371 ,s. 6. But they are nowhere authorized to waive any of the provisions of the statute. Suppose an order qf removal was made by one magistrate by the consent of the overseers of the poor of the town sought to be charged by the order, they agreeing to waive the requirement of the statute which requires the order tobe made by two magistrates. Would the town bebound by such an agreement ? No. But why not; because they exceeded their authority. But have they not as much power to waive this provision of the statute, as the one which requires the order to be executed, and a copy of the warrant and order ol removal to be delivered ? And will not the power claimed for over-, seers of the poor, by the appellants, authorize them to submit to arbitrament a question regarding the settlement of a pauper; and thus bind the town ? But this power was expressly denied to them in Griswold vs. JVorlh-Stonington, (& Con. R. 367.) So in Leavenworth vs. Kingsbury, (2 Day’s R. 323,) it was held, that selectmen could not make on accord regarding the claims of the town. And in Spencer vs. Overton, (1 Day's R. 183) it was decided, that they could not make admissions which would bind the town. It is true, that it has frequently been intimated by this Court, that when an appeal is taken from an order of removal within the thirty days, a neglect to leave a copy of the order is not an objection, which can be taken advantage of. But it is to be observed, in all these cases a copy of the warraut was left. And when the appeal is thus taken, the very thing is done, for which a copy is required to be delivered ; and the court will presume that a copy was duly left. This was the ground of the opinion of the Court in Bedford vs. Corinth, (1 Jlilc. R. 290.) So in Burlington vs. Calais, (1 Vt.R. 385.J it was ruled, that the admissions of an overseer of the poor and agent of a town, that due notice had been received, made while executing his agency, might be proved as evidence against the town. In that case the notice required by the statute had been given, and the agent’s admission went merely as to the receipt of it, not that he had waived notice. So it has been held in Massachusetts, that a defective notice may be waived. This however is a defect in form which may be waived by a provision of the statute of that state. But it is believed to be otherwise in matters of substance. But,
    
      Secondly. Admitting that the acts of the overseers of the poor of Barre are the acts of the town; yetthe appellees are not estopped from questioning the settlement of the paupers. The settlement of the paupers is fixed and determined by the operation of law, and not by the agreement of towns. Therefore,all the requisitions'of the statute, which require notice by copy of a warrant and order, must be strictly pursued in order to estop the town to which the removal is made. Thus, when land is set offon execution,our statute, and that ■pf Connecticut, requires the land tobe appraised by three freeholders of the town in which the land lies. It would seem reasonable ■that the creditor and the debtor might waive this requisition of the ■statute, and agree upon appraisers who resided out of the town. But in. Chapman vs. Griffin, (l Root, 196 ;) and in Metcalf vs. Gillet, (5 Con. R. 400,) it was held otherwise, on the ground that the title is transferred by operation of law, and that none of the provisions of the statute can be waived. So an agreement made between two towns that a pauper’s settlement is in one of them, does not affect his settlement, and neither town is concluded.— 4 Mass. R. 281 ; 15 do. 261 ; 3 Salk. 253. We answer
    
      Thirdly. That it is true that an order of removal duly executed, and either confirmed or unappealed from, is, according to the English law, an adjudication in rem, and therefore final.' — 8 Stark. Ev. 1328 ; 2 Salk. 488, 524, 527. Stress is laid on the order being duly executed. But in the case at bar, the order was never executed, and it is to be regarded as abandoned by the appellants. They at the request of the appellees desisted from proceeding with their order; and it seems that both parties treated it as a nullity, as the paupers were removed to Barre by the appellees, and not under the order. Had the appellants intended to rely upon the order as determining the settlement of the paupers, they should, and in all probability would, have delivered to the appellees a copy of the order as required by the 5th sec. of the act of November, 1817. In Leicester vs. Rehoboih, (4 Mass. R. 180,) where it was contended, that the defendant town-was estopped from questioning the settlement of a pauper, Parsons, C. J., said, “ estoppels are not to be favoured, because the truth may be excluded. And no party ought to be precluded from making a defence according to the truth of his own case, unless in consequence of some positive and unequivocal principle of law.” So in this case, the Court will not hold the appellees estopped, unless they are compelled so to do by some rigid rule oflaw.
    3d. At the trial at the county court, much stress was laid on the circumstance, that the town of Barre had, for several years, supported the paupers, and treated them as being their poor. But the appellants ought not to complain of this, for they are ben-efitted, rather than injured, by it; nor are the appellees affected by it as t'egards the present question. In Rex vs. Wooion St. Lawrence, (Bur. S. C. 581J the parish officers gave a certificate which did not'strictly pursue the certificate act of S &9, W. Ill, c. 30, s. 1, to the parish officers of A? * * * *, acknowledging the settlement of the paupers to be in their parish. The paupers afterwards returned to Wooton St Lawrence, where they were relieved until the making the order of removal to M * * * It was objected on appeal from this order, that the removing parish having so long relieved the paupers and submitted to the certificate, that it was concluded from contesting the settlement, and that the parish ought to be bound by the acts of its •overseers. But the court held otherwise ; and Lord Mansfield added, “ it is no consequence, that because parish officers may-bind their parish in some things, therefore, they may in all.” In Rex vs. Chihers Colton, (8 TermR. 178,) it was held, If it do not distinctly appear on an order of removal, that the justices who made it had jurisdiction, it is a nullity, and the parish to which it is directed, may at any distance of time object to it, though they never appealed against it, although they have acted under it twenty years.
   Williams, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court. — From the facts which are stated in this case the following questions arise.

1st. Whether the warning to Brigham and his wife, made by the select-men of Morristoion, a copy of which was offered in evidence, and rejected, prevented the paupers from gaining a settlement in Morristown.

2nd. Whether the proceedings of the overseers of the poor of Barre, in taking the paupers from Morristoion, and supporting them in Barre, are conclusive evidence of their being settled in Barre.

3d. Whether the order made by the justices of the peace of Orleans county, in December, A. D. 1823, in connection with the other proceedings of the overseers of the poor of Barre, are conclusive evidence, that the settlement of the paupers was in Bane. This last is the most important question in the case, and the only one on which the Court have had any doubts.

On the first question it will be only necessary to remark, that we cannot give to the warning the effect to prevent the paupers from gaining a settlement in Morristoion, without overturning the numerous decisions which have been made on this subject, and without dispensing with the requisitions of the statute. The return does not state with whom, or where, in the house, the copy was left, and is manifestly bad, either as a return on a writ of summons, or on a warning under the statute then in force.

On the second question it will Be sufficient to remark, that the proceedings of the overseers of the poor of Barre may be legal evidence, and, as such, may affect the interest of the town ; but are not conclusive: they are tobe considered in connection with the other evidence, which may be produced. In like manner, relieving the pauper in Morristown, or taking him home when notified that he and his family were becoming chargeable, and supporting and maintaining them, for a long time, was evidence, that the pauper was settled in the town relieving. But if this was done under a mistake, as to the facts, or as to the law,and if it can be shown that the settlement of the pauper was not in the town whose overseers have supported him ; such proceedings are not, and ought not to be, conclusive upon the question of settlement. Jt may be further remarked, that it is not stated in this case, that the overseers of the poor of Barre actually did relieve the paupers while residing in Morristown.

Since the argument the case has been amended by adding a vote of the town of Barre, passed in July, A. D. 1823. This vote does not make any difference in our views of this question. It conferred no additional power on the overseers, was probably passed at their request to sanction any course which they might think proper to take ; but did not by any means enable them to fix the settlement of the paupers in Barre, if they had none there before. It might authorize or justify them in pursuing, or in omitting to pursue, certain measures, the effect of which might have fixed the settlement in Barre. But the vote itself did not alter the character or nature of their proceedings ; and had no tendency in itself directly to alter or affect the settlement of the paupers.

On the last question, as to the effect of the order made by the justices of the peace of the county of Orleans, adjudging the settlement of Brigham to be in Barre, the Court are of opinion, that the order was not conclusive evidence that the settlement was in Barre.

An order or removal unappealed from is conclusive evidence of the settlement of a pauper in the town to which the removal is made. So is an order affirmed on appeal j and such order is not only conclusive between the towns who are parties thereto, but upon all other towns, on the question of settlement. This was decided in a case between Manchester and Dorset, 3 Vt. Rep. 370. An order of removal reversed on appeal is only conclusive between the parties to the order. To give an order bf removal this effect, and to make it conclusive as to all the world, it must be executed ; that is, the pauper must be actually removed, unless prevented by sickness or death ; or the order must be perfected by giving legal notice of the same. When such actual removal is made,- the parish to which the removal is made has notice of the proceedings. Under the statute in England the justices do not order the pauper to remove himself, but direct the overseers of the poor of the parish, making the application, to remove the pauper, and, at the same time, to leave a copy of their proceedings with the overseers of the poor of the parish to which the removal is made.

In this state it is required, that an attested copy of every such order shall be left with the overseers of the poor of the town to which the removal is made, within thirty days after making the •order. This is not only for the purpose of giving notice to the town 5 but it also determines the term of the court to which an appeal is to be had. The appeal is to be taken to the term of the •court holden next after notice of the order is given. °

The leaving this copy is a positive requisition of the statute,and was undoubtedly so required on sufficient and adequate reasons ; and it is not for us to say that it may be dispensed with, or that it is an unnecessary requirement. In the case of Hartland vs. Williamstown, 1 Aiken, 341, the Chief Justice, in giving the opinion of the Court,remarked, that he presumed “ an order would not be conclusive upon the parish to which the pauper was removed ■without notice.” This presumption is fortified by the whole current of authorities, and is founded on principles, which ought never to be departed from. In the same case he remarked, that the statute having made provision for giving notice in a particular way, notice in any other way would not be good. These remarks would lead us to think, that the opinion of the Chief Justice, in •that case, was, that to make such order conclusive, notice of it must be given in the way pointed out by statute. And we in this case come to the conclusion, on examining the statute, that to make an order of removal conclusive, not only between the towns who are parties thereto, but also, as to all others, it must be perfected by giving the notice required by the statute, that is, by leaving a true and attested copy within thirty days after the order of removal is made.

The arguments which have been urged against the view of the case which we have taken, may deserve some consideration.

It has been said, that the proceedings of the town of Barre, and their overseers, and the other proceedings, amount to a waiver of the requisitions of the statute. To this it may be replied, that, if this requisition could be waived, the facts in this case would not amount to such waiver. But further, by no agreement of the parties can a proceeding, wholly imperfect and incomplete, be considered as complete ; by no agreement can a parol contract be treated as a specialty ; an opinion of individuals, as a judgement of a court; a judgement incomplete, and not perfected, as a judgement executed. If the overseers of the poor of Barre had received the paupers, without any order of removal, it could not be contended that this agreement was like an order of removal, conclusive upon the question of settlement as to all others. In only one case has it ever been intimated from the bench, that leaving the copy required by the fifth section of the statute of 1817, in relation to the settlement of the poor, could be dispensed with. It has been intimated, that where an appeal was taken’ irom the order before the expiration of the thirty days,, the party taking suc^ aPPea^ could not object that such copy was-notleft. There may be some ground for this suggestion, as the appeal might be taken, and a decision had thereon, before the expiration of the thirty days. Whether this intimation is correct or not, is not material for us to say. It has been decided, however, that where the appeal was taken after the expiration of the thirty days, the omission to leave such copy was a defect, wich the party appealing might insist on, as an objection to the order ; and the proceedings, on that ground, would be quashed. — Town of Georgia vs. Town of St. Albans, 3 Vt. Rep. 42.

Smith & Peck, for Barre.

Upham & Keith, & Merrill & Spaulding, for Morristown.

The proceedings of both these towns were evidently had under a mistaken view of their respective liabilities. It was-believed that the paupers were settled in Barre, and under this belief the town of Morristown neglected to complete their order by leaving the copy required by the statute. The town of Narre,under the same belief, consented to receive the paupers without taking any appeal or without any actual removal. And it may as well be considered, as an abandonment of the order, on the part of Morristown, as to consider it a waiver on the part of Barre of the notice necessary to perfect the order.

If a town intends to prevent a person from gaining a settlement therein, they must pursue the statute made for this purpose in ever ry essential particular, and not omit any of its provisions, relying upon any agreement, as supplying such omission. A town could not neglect to warn out a pauper, relying on an agreement express or implied on the part of another town, and insist that such agrees ment shall have the same effect as a warning. Nor can they neglect to do every thing required of them by statute to give validity to an order of removal, and insist, that such order shall have all the effect of a valid order.

The town of Morristown did not perfect their order of removal made in 1323, by giving the notice required ; and the order, therefore, cannot be received as conclusive evidence that the paupers were settled in Barre. The judgement of the county court must, therefore, be affirmed.  