
    Devin HARMON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Martin MARSHAL; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 08-56057.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 29, 2010.
    
    Filed Aug. 5, 2010.
    Devin Harmon, Crescent City, CA, pro se.
    Miah Yun, Deputy City, Glendale City Attorney’s Office, Glendale, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: ALARCÓN, LEAVY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Harmon's request for oral argument is denied.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Devin Harmon appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging malicious prosecution. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir.2009). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Harmon failed to raise a triable issue as to whether defendants lacked probable cause. See Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 767 (9th Cir.2006) (to prove malicious prosecution under California law, plaintiff must show an absence of probable cause); see also Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir.2008) (applying absence of probable cause requirement in Fourth Amendment context, following Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006)).

The district court properly relied on defendant Marshall’s declaration regarding fingerprint evidence to establish probable cause, and contrary to Harmon’s contention, the declaration was not subject to the standards for admissibility of expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). See Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir.2006) (evidence relied upon to show probable cause need not meet standards for admissibility of testimony in court).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     