
    Fries against Watson.
    
      Tuesday, June 7.
    
    Where a judgment is revived by repeated writs of scire facias, the plaintiff ohai’gefnte^* rest on the aggregate amount of principal ami interest due at the time of ronderiug judgment on each scire facias.
    In Error.
    ERROR to county. the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin
    
    lrlen,; against Watson, the defendant, in the Court of Com mon . . times by scire Jactas, and the question was, in what manner The plaintiff in error, John Frzds^ having obtained judgagainst Watson, the defendant, in the Court of Com-Pleas of Al.iJJlin county, revived his judgment several interest was to be calculated. The plaintiff contended, that he had a right to charge interest on the aggregate amount of principal and interest which was due at the time of rendering judgment on each scire facias. The defendant insisted, that interest was to be calculated on the amount of the original judgment only. The Court of Common Pleas decided in favour of the defendant.
    
      Hale, for the plaintiff in error.
    This case depends on the practice in Pennsylvania. The law of 1700, 1 Sm. L. 7, provides, “ that lawful interest shall be allowed to the creditor for the sum or value he obtained judgment for, from the time the said judgment was obtained till the time of sale, or till satisfaction be made,” and it has been applied to judgments of every description. In Berryhill v. Wells,
      
       it was decided by this Court, that on a scire facias the real debt, at the time of the judgment entered thereon, is to be composed of principal and interest; and it is said by Yeates J. that interest is to be calculated thereon as a new principal; and that this had been the practice before and since the revolution; and he cites Fitzgerald v. Caldwell.
      
    
    
      Huston, contra.
    The point decided in Berryhill v. Wells,
      
       was, that on a scire facias interest on the original judgment is recoverable. Fitzgerald v. Caldwell,
      
       went no farther. The construction contended for by the plaintiff would encourage a species of legal usury. The act of 4th April, 1798, authorises a scire facias merely for the purpose of reviving the former judgment. The Court are to « direct and order the revival of any such judgment during another period of five years, against the real estate of the defendant.” Its obvious meaning is, not to alter the nature of the obligation of the defendant, but merely to continue it as it then existed. This point has been repeatedly decided by Judge Walker, in the same manner as he has decided the present case, and it has been acquiesced in. The judgment on a scire facias is not for the recovery of any sum, but only that execution shall issue. There ought to be clear proof of a practice that goes to overturn the plain meaning of the act of assembly.
    
      
       5 Binn. 56. 61.
    
    
      
       4 Dall. 364. 252.
    
    
      
       5 Binn. 56.
    
    
      
       4 Dall. 252.
    
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Tilghman C. J.

According to the law of England, no damages are recoverable on a scire facias, consequently no interest could be recovered, although in an action of debt on the judgment, interest might be recovered, by way of damages. But, inasmuch, as our act of assembly, made in the year 1700, directs, that the plaintiff who takes out an execution, may levy to the amount of his judgment and interest, it was decided by this Court in Berryhill v. Wells, 5 Binn. 56, that on a scire facias post annum, Uc. execution might be awarded for the amount of the original judgment and'interest. From this decision it may be inferred, that as to the recovery of interest, there is no difference between a scire facias and an action of debt. And this is putting the matter on the most convenient footing; for why should there be a different recovery, in two modes of proceeding on the same judgment, in the same Court ? I know, that in strictness, a scire facias is not an action, but a demand of execution. But in substance, it is the same as an action. In an action ®f debt, and a scire facias, the object is the same : the obtaining the fruits of the original judgment. Assuming then, that so far as concerns the recovery of interest, there is no difference between an action of debt, and a scire facias, we have only to inquire what interest could be recovered, if instead of each scire facias in the present casé, actions of debt were substituted. In the first action of debt, the plaintiff would have recovered the amount of his original judgment, with interest. The principal and interest would then be thrown into one consolidated sum, which would form the amount of the judgment in the first action of debt. In the second action of debt, the recovery would be, of the amount of the sum recovered in the first action of debt, with interest; and so, toties quoties. This is the principle contended for by the plaintiff. Nor is there any thing against equity in it. The payment of interest is occasioned by the default of the defendant. It is equitable, that he should pay interest on the whole sum detained from the plaintiff. And at each time when the plaintiff obtains judgment on a scire facias, the defendant, who makes default, detains from him the amount of the sum for which judgment was obtained. I have, since the last Term, had an opportunity of inquiring into the practice, and find that it has been usual to calculate interest on the whole amount, including interest due at the time of entering judgment on each scire facias. I am therefore, of opinion, that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas should be reversed, and judgment entered for the plaintiff in error, calculating interest according to the rule which I have mentioned.

Duncan J. gave no opinion, having been counsel for the plaintiff in error.

Judgment reversed, and judgment for the plaintiff in error.  