
    FLOYD v. STATE.
    (No. 11088.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Nov. 2, 1927.
    I.Criminal law <&wkey;922 (7)— Objection to instructions first urged in motion for new trial comes too late (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 658).
    Under Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 658, objection to court’s instructions comes too late when presented for first time in motion for new trial.
    2. Criminal law <&wkey;369( I) — Admitting. cross-examination of defendant as to other charges made against her, and permitting witnesses to state their version thereof, held error.
    Where state’s case was that defendant obtained $10 by pretending to sign check, but check was in fact unsigned and folded when presented, permitting cross-examination of defendant as to her having obtained rings from another person and as to charges made against her by a third person, and permitting such persons to be called as witnesses and give their versions of the transactions, held error as offending general rule prohibiting proof of extraneous crimes or transactions.
    3. False pretenses <&wkey;41 — Cross-examination of defendant as to whether, on other occasions she sought to borrow money from named parties whs improper.
    Where state’s case was that defendant obtained $10 from W. by pretending to sign check for that amount, but check was in fact handed to W. unsigned and folded, cross-examination of defendant as to whether on other occasions she sought to borrow money from n'amed parties was improper.
    Appeal from Lubbock County Court; Chas. Nor dyke, Judge.
    Mrs. C. H. Eloyd was convicted of theft of property under the value of $50, and she appeals.
    Beversed and remanded.
    Owen W. McWhorter, of Lubbock, for appellant.
    A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   HAWKINS, J.

Conviction is for theft of property under the value of $50. Punishment is assessed at a fine of $100 and 30 days’ confinement in the county jail.

The state’s case was that appellant obtained $10 from one Wallace by pretending to sign a check on the Spur National Bank for that amount, but which check in fact was handed to Wallace unsigned and folded. Appellant’s defense was that Wallace had loaned her the $10.

Many complaints are directed at the court’s charge in the motion for new trial. None appear to have been made at the time of trial. Under article 658, 1925 C. C. P., and many authorities construing it, objection to the court’s instructions comes too late which for the first time is presented in motion for new trial.

While appellant was being cross-examined, the state elicited from her, -over objection, that she had obtained from one Watkins some rings, and went into the details of the Watkins transaction. Also, over objection, the state was permitted to cross-examine her as to certain charges claimed to have been made by her against one Nislar. Watkins and Nislar were then called by the state, and also over objection were permitted to give their versions in detail of the respective transactions. Both the examination of appellant and that of the two witnesses was objected to on the ground that the incidents' were entirely collateral and extraneous, and not in any way connected with the transaction under investigation. It does not appear that any prosecutions were ever lodged against appellant growing out of the transactions with Watkins and Aislar. We discover no exception under which the testimony here complained of could be admitted without offending against the general rule prohibiting proof of extraneous crimes or transactions. The testimony of the chief of police relative to the transactions mentioned was likewise inadmissible. But for the allegations in the complaint and information charging theft from Wallace it would be difficult to ascertain from the record whether the state was prosecuting appellant for theft of $10 from Wallace or theft of diamond rings from Watkins.

It is made to appear by other bills of exception that appellant was asked on cross-examination, over objection, if she had not on other occasions sought to borrow money from named parties. We fail to see the relevancy of materiality of such inquiry under the facts before us, and upon another trial such investigation should be omitted, unless the inquiry becomes permissible under some phase of the case not reflected by the present record.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded. 
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