
    Sims’s Administrator v. Lewis’s Executor and Others.
    February 7th, 1816.
    1. Equity Jurisdiction — Sale ot Land — Breach of Contract as to Title — Pecuniary Compensation. — A purchaser of land, suing: for breach of a contract to mate a good. title, may with propriety come into a court of equity for pecuniary compensation, instead of proceeding- at law in the first instance; —if the vendor has conveyed away his property in trust, whereby there might be a difficulty in obtaining satisfaction of his judgment when recovered; — the vendor, or his lawful representative, together with the trustees and cestuys que trusts, being made defendants to the bill.
    2. Same — Same—Same.—In such case, the proceeding in equity is proper, also because it avoids circuity of action, and the court has the power of directing an issue to try by a jury the justice of the plaintiff’s claim.
    3. Same — Fraudulent Contract — Recovery of Honey Paid on. — Where a plaintiff in equity sues to take advantage of a contract found to be fraudulent, he is not to be sustained even to recover back money paid on such contract, but ought to be left to whatever remedy he may have at law.
    Upon an appeal from a decree of the Superior Court of Chancery for the Richmond District.
    The bill was filed in the late High Court of Chancery, by Jesse Sims against John Lewis, acting executor of the last will and testament of Warner Lewis the younger, deceased, the said John Lewis and Wilson C. Nicholas trustees in a deed executed by the said Warner in his life time, and Courtney Lewis his widow, and Courtney Lewis the younger and Elizabeth Lewis his children ; the said deed of trust being executed for the purpose of paying his lawful debts, and, after paying the same, of making provision for the said widow and children.
    The object of the bill was to obtain satisfaction for an alleged failure on the part of the said Warner Lewis to make a good title to certain lands, situate on the north west of the river Ohio, which he sold to a certain John B. Armistead, of whom theplaintiff purchased, and afterwards obtained from the said Warner Lewis a bond to make him a title. — The plain tiff prayed a decree for the full value of the lands with interest;— for a sale of the trust property to satisfy the same, with the costs of this suit;— and for such other and further ^relief as should be consistent with equity, and the nature of his case might require.
    The defendant John Lewis,
    by his answer, insisted that the contract originally made between John B. Armistead and Warner Lewis was obtained by fraud on the part of the former, in taking advantage of the latter, when intoxicated and incapable of business; and that said Warner was, in like manner, fraudulently and deceitfully induced by the said John B. Armistead to execute the title bond mentioned in the bill. — He therefore prayed, that all bonds, deeds and covenants, relating to the premises, be set .aside.
    Sundry depositions were taken on both sides, the general tendency of which was to support the allegations in the answer.
    On the 14th of March, 1806, the cause came on to be heard, when Chancellor Wythe directed, “that a jury be empanelled to inquire and say, not what is the value of the land in the bill mentioned, to which value the plaintiff supposeth himself entitled, but what damage the plaintiff hath sustained by breach of the condition of the bond, or obligation, of Warner Lewis among the exhibits ; and whether both the deed for the land in controversy to John B, Armis-tead, and the bond given for the conveyance to Jesse Sims by Warner Lewis, or either of them, were not obtained by fraud, or by an improper advantage taken of the situation of the said Warner Lewis ; and that the said jury’s inquisition and verdict be certified, &c.”
    In obedience to this order a verdict was found, and certified to the Court of Chancery, “that the deed (if there ever was one) to J. B. Armistead, as well as the bond of conveyance to Jesse Sims, were obtained by taking an improper advantage of the said Warner Lewis’s situation.”
    Chancellor Taylor, afterwards, “being of opinion that the deed of trust in the bill mentioned, can in no manner affect the plaintiff’s remedy at law upon the bond of the 4th of August, 1797,” dismissed the bill, “without prejudice to any remedy at law”:— from which decree the plaintiff appealed.
    
      
      See monographic note on ‘ ‘Jurisdiction” appended to Phippen v. Durham, 8 Gratt. 457.
    
   February 7th, 1816,

JUDGE ROANE

pronounced the court’s opinion.

*This court is of opinion that the original contract of sale by Warner Eewis to J. B. Armistead of the land in controversy, as well as the bond given by the former to Jesse Sims, is impeached of fraud by the answer of the appellee John Lewis, and put in issue by the parties; — that the issue directed in this case extends as well to the one transaction as to the other ; and that the finding of the jury under that issue, taken in connexion with the pleadings and facts proved in the ca'use, is sufficient to j ustify a decree setting aside both contracts ; more especially, as that verdict is supported by the evidence in the cause, and may have been founded, in part, on evidence not spread upon the record.

The court is farther of opinion, that the appellant’s intestate Sims came properly into a Court of Equity, instead of proceeding at law, in the first instance, for damages ;— on the ground that Warner Eewis had conveyed away his property in trust, whereby there might be a difficulty in obtaining satisfaction of his judgment when recovered; and that there is no objection to the proceeding, as he included the executor of the said Warner, as a defendant, who was competent to contest the justice of the claim ; and that this proceeding, while it avoids a circuity of action, obviates the objection, which strongly exists, in favor of the preference of jury trial, in consequence of the power of the Court of Chancery to have the justice of the debt tried by an issue, as was done in the case before us.

The court is farther ox opinion that, as both the transactions aforesaid have been found to have been made under circumstances of imposition sufficient to set aside and vacate the same in a Court of Equity, the appellant ought not, when coming into that court as a plaintiff, to be sustained even to recover back money paid under either of the said contracts ; but that, if he has any right thereto, he ought to be left at law to recover the same.

Oh these grounds the decree is affirmed.  