
    Besik KAVSHBAIA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-4379.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 16, 2016.
    Michael E. Piston, New York, NY, for Petitioners.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant' Attorney General; Emily Anne Radford, Assistant Director; Jesse Lloyd Busen, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, PETER W. HALL and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted as the respondent in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2).
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Besik Kavshbaia, a native and citizen of Georgia, seeks review of an October 17, 2013 decision of the BIA denying his untimely motion to reopen. In re Be-sik Kavshbaia, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Oct. 17, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered, and is permitted to file only one such motion. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Kavshbaia’s motion to reopen, filed in June 2013, was untimely because his order of removal became final in 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i). Petitioner contends, however, that ineffective assistance of counsel excuses his late filing.

The applicable time limitation on motions to reopen may be equitably tolled to accommodate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir.2008). The movant must demonstrate “due diligence” in pursuing a claim during “both the period of time before the ineffective assistance of counsel was or should have been discovered and the period from that point until the motion to reopen is filed.” Id. at 132. “[T]here is no period of time which ... is per se unreasonable, and, therefore, disqualifies a petitioner from equitable tolling — or, for that matter, any. period of time that is per se reasonable.” Jian Hua Wang v. BIA, 508 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir.2007).

The BIA did not err in finding that Kavshbaia had not acted with due diligence. Of greatest import here, Kavshb-aia waited some amount of time, between seven and nineteen months, to speak with a new lawyer after learning of the BIA’s 2002 decision. There were two additional lengthy periods, one from 2003 until 2008 and a second from 2008 through 2013, in which Kavshbaia did not seek advice from counsel. Based on the foregoing, the BIA’s finding that Kavshbaia failed to exercise due diligence was not an abuse of discretion.

Because the BIA did not err in denying the motion to reopen as untimely, we decline to consider Kavshbaia’s challenge to the BIA’s alternative conclusion that he did not show that he was prejudiced by his prior counsel’s ineffective assistance. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. The pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  