
    Appeal of Ursinus College. [Keiper’s Estate.]
    A testator bequeathed $1,250 “ in trust safely to invest at interest, to be used as my nephew requires it to complete his studies in Ursinus College. In case my nephew wishes to discontinue his studies in the said college, the said amount, or what may be left of it, I give and bequeath to the said College for beneficial educational purposes.” At the adjudication of the account of the executor, evidence was offered to prove, and the auditing judge found, that the nephew entered Ursinus College before testator executed his will, and remained there for seven years during testator’s lifetime; that he graduated from the collegiate department and entered the theological department, which he left without completing the course; that testator paid the nephew’s expenses, amounting to $1,295, while at college, giving the money to the nephew in the shape of cheeks, which were paid over by the nephew to the college. Held, that the payment of the nephew’s college expenses operated as an ademption of the legacy.
    
    Jan. 25, 1889.
    Appeal, No. 210, July T.-1888, from a decree of tbe O. C., Pbila. Co., dismissing exceptions to an adjudication of executor’s account, at Jan. T. 1888, No. 440. Creen, J., absent.
    Testator’s will contained the following clause:
    “ 3d. I give and bequeath to my brother, M. R. Keiper, of Washington township, Elizabethville post office, county of Dauphin, and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania-, the sum of one thousand two hundred and fifty dollars in trust safely to invest at interest; to be used as my nephew, John A. Keiper, requires it to complete his studies in said Ursinus College. In case my nephew, John A. Keiper, wishes to discontinue his studies in the said college, the said amount, or what may be left of it, I give and bequeath to the said Ursinus College for beneficial educational purposes.”
    Parol evidence was introduced, from which the following facts were found by the auditing judge, Hanna, P. J.:
    “ It appears from the evidence that testator’s nephew entered the college before testator executed his . will, remained there seven years, first entered the academic department, from thence he passed into the collegiate department, whence he was graduated, and from thence into the theological department, where he remained about one year, when he discontinued his studies without completing the course. This was all during testator’s lifetime, and the expenses of his nephew’s education at the college, amounting to more than $1,250, were paid by him. It'is difficult to presume that while the testator assumed the education of his nephew, and thus stood in loco parentis, defraying the cost thereof to an amount exceeding the legacy he had provided for that purpose, he farther intended to bequeath a like sum for the benefit of his nephew, thus giving, him a double portion of his estate. On the contrary, the natural inference is that, having expended the amount he intended for the education of his nephew, and fully carried out the object contemplated by his will, he considered the testamentary gift, having in view the same object, of no farther effect.
    “ In Wygram on Wills, 360, we find as follows: ‘Ademption is a mode of satisfaction or payment, and not a question of construction. Therefore, where a testator gives a legacy for a particular purpose, and afterward- gives the legatee the said sum for the same purpose, this is an ademption, even where the testator is no relative of the legatee.’ Monck v. Monck, 1 Ball & B. 298.
    “ Lord Thurlow said: ‘ If a legacy be given for a particular purpose, and the testator advances money for the same purpose, it is too late to say it.is not a presumption that he meant to execute it.’ Debeze v. Mann, 2 Bro. C. C. 166.
    “But the advancement must be intended to answer all the purposes of the legacy; a legacy to maintain and conduct, and to apply the principal or part in apprenticing the legatee or for his advancement in the world, is not answered by the testator merely paving an apprentice fee. Robinson v. Whitley, 9 Ves. 577; Roome v. Roome, 3 Atk. 181.
    “ But it must appear on the face of the will that the legacy is for a particular purpose. Parkhurst v. Howell, 6 Ch. 136.
    “In the will before us, the legacy is for the education of testator’s nephew, a particular purpose, and the evidence is that testator advanced to his nephew the amount of his college bills, who paid the same to the treasurer of the college and in excess of the legacy.
    
      “ See also Redfield on Wills, part 2d, page 544.
    “And as to our own case, ademption takes place where a parent bequeaths a legacy to a child and afterward gives a portion to the same child which is ejusdem generis. Where there is nothing on the face of the will and no proof of an intention to give a double portion, an advancement will be a satisfaction or ademption of a legacy bequeathed therein. Swoope’s Ap., 27 Pa. 58. See also Garrett’s Ap., 15 Pa. 212; Miner v. Atherton, 35 Pa. 528; Gill’s Est., 1 Parsons, 139.
    “ In view of the facts as proved, the auditing judge has reached the conclusion that the legacy referred to was adeemed and satisfied by testator in his lifetime, and the claim of Ursinus College is therefore disallowed.”
    It is stated and does not appear to be denied, but was not found by the auditing judge, that testator died July 4, 1887; that his will was dated July 23, 1878; that his nephew entered Ursinus College in 1878 and left in 1885.
    Ursinus College filed exceptions alleging the action of the court, 3, in deciding the legacy adeemed; and, 4, in not decreeing the legacy absolutely to Ursinus College, for beneficial educational purposes.
    The court dismissed the exceptions in the following opinion by Ashman, J.:
    “ Lord Thurlow, in Debeze v. Mann, 2 Bro. C. C. 165, remarked that when a man gives a legacy for a particular purpose, and afterward advances money for the same purpose, it is too late to say it is not a presumption that he meant to execute it. This principle is amply illustrated in the authorities, among others in Warren v. Warren, 1 Bro. C. C. 305, where a legacy was held to be in part satisfaction of a portion under a marriage settlement which the testator had overlooked; and by Hinchcliffe v. Hinchcliffe, 3 Ves. 516; Rosewell v. Bennett, 3 Atk. 77; Strong v. Williams, 12 Mass. 391; Hunter v. Bryant, 2 Wheat. 32; Garrett’s Appeal, 15 Pa. 212; Miner v. Atherton, 35 Pa. 528. It certainly applies to the gift under the third clause of the present will, by which a fund was set apart primarily for the education of the nephew of the testator, and was to go to the college, in whole or in part, as the nephew should discontinue his studies at an eai’ly or late date. The nephew did not complete his studies, but the adjudication finds that a sum equal to the entire fund so bequeathed was actually advanced by the testator in his lifetime for the schooling of his nephew. Hence the purpose of the advancement and of the legacy exactly coincided, and the legacy was accordingly adeemed. The exceptions are dismissed.”
    
      The assignments of error specified the action of the court, 1, in confirming the ad judication ; and, 2, 3, in not sustaining the exceptions, quoting them.
    
      F. G. Hobson, with him John W. Bickel, for appellant.
    A will speaks from the death of the testator. Clarke’s Est., 82 Pa. 528. Several years elapsed after the nephew left college before the death of his uncle, but no change was made in the will.
    This is not the case of a person being paid twice over. What testator paid in his life time went directly to his nephew; what he gives by his will goes for the benefit of the college. The nephew never was a beneficial student.
    The cases cited by the court below show that the ademption depended on some act of the testator himself. Here there is nothing of the kind. The testator kept no account of moneys paid his nephew. He never paid anything directly to the college.
    There is a broad distinction between legacies given to children or creditors and those given -to strangers. A gift in the life-time of the testator to a stranger is a new gratuity, and does not adeem the legacy. 1 itoper on Legacies, 265; Powel v. Cleaver, 2 Bro. C. C. 499; Worthington on Wills, 88 ; 2 Story'Eq. Jur., § 111; Crouch v. Davis, 23 Grattan, Va. 62; Mathews v. Mathews, 2 Yes., Sr. 634.
    
      Francis Skunk Brown, for appellee.
    We print the opinion of the auditing judge and of the court in banc, as part of our argument.
    More than the amount intended to be paid to the college, toward the education of the nephew, was paid before testator’s death. There was no reason why the will should have been altered as testator knew the purpose of the legacy had been accomplished, and that it had been paid.
    Jan. 25, 1889.
   Per Curiam,

Judgment affirmed.  