
    Elizabeth Carson vs. W. G. Richardson.
    'I'Vhere a friend of a defendant, With a view to procure indulgence for ih0 defendant, paid part of the judgment against tbe defendant to the plaintiff’s lawyer, upon condition that no credit should be given on thejudg- ' mint, but the judgment to he assigned to the person, so paying the money, as a security for the money advanced, the court refused a tule upon the plaintiff’s attorney to compel him to enter a credit upon the judgment lor the amount he had so received.
    Tried before judge Gaillard at Sumter District, May 16, 1826.
    Iu this case the following, rule was served upon W. Mayrant: “ On motion of Evans attorney for the junior creditors, It is orden d, That William Mayrant, the attorney for the plaintiff do shew cause on Thursday next, why he should not enter satisfaction on the above case for the sum of $1112 58 ets. paid to him by John S. Richardson, in part of the above case, on the 15th June 1821.” To which he made the following return upon oath. “ That being required by the plaintiff some time in 1821, to raise and collect the amount of interest due on the above stated case, he met and saw John S. Richardson at the court of appeals in Columbia in the same year. That he informed the said John S. Richardson of the same, and that the deponent did not believe the defendant could pay the amount without its distressing him or causing him to make a sacrifice of property. That the said John S. Richardson, then replied, he supposed he must pay it, and he supposed he would have to pay the whole amount of the judgment and would take an assignment. But he wouldep-. deavor to procure-as much indulgence from the plaintiff for his brother the defendant as he could. The said John S. Richardson then made an arrangement for paying to this deponent the amount ofinterest due on the said judgment, which was the-sum of $1112 58 on the 15th June, 1821. That this deponent drew an order on the said John S. Richardson for the said amount. And this deponent further says, that before the said John agreed to pay this amount he said, this deponent as attorney must make such an entry in his books íiSwrtuíd preserve the lien of the said John S. Richardson on the judgment for the amount to be paid by him, to which this deponent assented. And this deponent further says that some time in May last, being called upon by the said John S. Richardson, he, deponent, as attorney, gave the said John S. Richardson an assignment of the judgment for the amount paid; and this deponent further says that with a view to preserve the rights of the said John S. Richardson on the judgment and execution, he never entered any credit on the same for the amount paid by the said John S. Richardson.
    Sworn to before me Wm. Mayrant.”
    
      Robert Bradford, q,. tr.
    On hearing this return, his honor the presiding judge dismissed the rule. From this decision a motion was now made to reverse this order, and to make the rule absolute, on the ground that he who voluntarily pays the judgment debt of another without taking an . assignment of it, is a simple contract creditor, and in this case the assignment being made by thejattorney, and four years after the money was paid, cannot place J. S. Richardson’s claim to be repaid his advancement on any higher footing, than as a simple contract debt.
    
      Evans, Sol. for the motion.
    ‘When money is paid in satisfaction of a judgment, no matter by whom, the judgment is extinguished. It is so whenever the plaintiff cannot revive the judgement by scire facias. But the plaintiffbeing satisfied, the judgment became a nullity, and could not be assigned. This to be sure was a payment pro tanto, andera tanto the judgment was extinguished, and judge Richardson cannot consider himself the judgment creditor for the amount he paid. He can only stand towards Mrs. Carson as a simple contract creditor.
    Besides, an attorney cannot assign a judgment. He may collect, but cannot assign. And, Mr. Mayrant was not acting as Mrs. Carsons attorney, but as agent for judge Richardson. Mrs. Carson does not claim this money. It is between judge Richardson and creditors, and he must stand as a judgment creditor, or his lien is inferior to theirs. Indeed he has no lien and must be postponed.
    
      W. F. DeSaussure. contra,
    Things, the converse of the positions taken by the counsel for the motion may be assumed. The debtor may pay in what manner he prescribes. It was expressly stated by judge Richardson and so said by Mr. Mayrant, that the money so paid was not paid on the judgment. The fund of the creditors has not, nor will be diminished. The payment, was not made of ffm. G, Richardson’s property; therefore the creditors cannot complain that their debtor's property is wrongly applied. It is judge Richardson’s money, and he merely claims it back. No entry or credit was given on the execution; and nothing therefore prevents a scire facias for the amount not paid by the property of Wm. G. Richardson, as a man may buy a judgment and renew it And that he paid plaintiff for the judgment is no satisfaction of the judgment, and not being satisfied what is to prevent the renewal of it by fi. facias? Plaintiff cannot be satisfied of her judgment, because J. Richardson may bring an action for money had and received for this money. This was not paid on the execution, but when paid, it was expressly stipulated that he should have the benefit of the execution to have his money refunded, and the agreement was to keep open the execution for that purpose.
    
      Evans in reply.
    All the assignments here made vverd after the claims of the judgment creditors vested. Bad policy to suffer judgmeuts to be kept open. May lead to fraudulent transactions.
   Nott, J.

'! his application it is admitted, is one for the enforcement of the strict rigid rule of right. On the part of the respondent it is alleged, that the contract with judge Richardson of which he now claims the benefit was founded, in the purest morality, not operating against the rights or interest of any person and intended as a relief to a brother in distress.

It is .obviously the duty of the court to enforce such a 'contract, if there be nothing in the stern and inflexible rules of law which prevents it. . And it does seem to me if there were any such rule, that it should be forever stricken from the law books.

The court is asked to order the attorney in this case to enter a satisfaction on the judgment. This implies of course, that if the satisfaction be not entered he can demand of the sheriff the money in his hands. Why should the court exercise their power over this officer in this manner? Has he violated his duty? Has he injured the applicants by his arrangement with judge Richardson? He has done neither. He has done nothing that the law or justice forbids. Why then-should this court prevent him from carrying into effect this .. agreement? The answer must be, because it will benefit the junior creditors? Suppose this arrangement had not taken place with judge Bichardson, would they have got the money now in dispute? Assuredly they would not. Their claim then is founded upon a supposed want of authority in the attorney to make such an arrangement. But on’this subject they are certainly mistaken. An attorney can make such an arrangement. He may receive money from a friend of a defendant with an understanding made bona fide that it was intended to postpone the evil day, but that when it did arrive his money should be returned. Can he not give a receipt for the money, and thus discharge diedebt of his client? (Douglass 623.) Having then the absolute control of the whole debt, why not pay money to a client to Satisfy him, and af-terwards on the receipt of his debt retain so much? Suppose Mr. Mayrant had sent his own money to his client, saying that at a more convenient season, the property of the. debtor should be sold. Can it be doubted that he might retain when the property of the debtor was sold? And what difference does it make in the case, that he sent the money of another and not his own, when it was sent with that express understanding? Mr. Mayrant is bound to return judge Richardson his money. Mrs. Carson is equally bound in morality She makes no objection. Now the other creditors say there was no assignment by Mrs. Carson. None was necessary,. This it appears to me is the foundation of the mistake.

There is no necessity for an assignment. It is not judge Richardson who is to go to the Sheriff and receive this money. It is Mr. Mayrant and the Sheriff has no right to refuse to pay him the money. He knows that no more than the debt has been made out of the defendants property, and that Mr. Mayrant is the attorney, that was enough for him. Mr. Mayrant’s receipt to him is a good discharge. Let the money be paid and these applicants sue, if they can main-, tain an action. I admit they ought to have their money. But I confess I am at a loss to conceive on what their claim could rest onthis motion. Havethey any lien on the money of judge Richardson in the hands of Mr Mayram? None! Suppose judge Rich ardson’s money was returned to him to-morrow. Who can prevent it? If it were done; then I suppose the right of Mr. Mayrant and Mrs. Carson to receive the one thousand one hundred dollars would not be disputed; and can there be any such legerdemain in the law7 as that a ceremony of that sort should sanctify an act?

The question in behalf of the applicants has been argued on the ground that the respondent w>as an agent, and, as such, his authority was limited. Now this would be very proper, if he were their agent, or if his acts were sanctioned by his principal. But neither being the case, of what importance is it to ascertain w'hat were his powers as an agent? The question, is as to them, had he a right to do the act; and the answer I. think satisfactorily given — as to them he had all the authority of his principal.

The motion is dismissed.

JSvans, for the motion.

W. Mayrant, contra.  