
    Roy WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF FLORENCE; Florence Police Department; Eugene Roeder, Mayor of the City of Florence, in his individual and official capacity; Mike Ingle, Chief of Florence Police Department, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants, and Chuck Pratt, Sergeant, in his individual and official capacity, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 02-1408.
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    Dec. 11, 2003.
    Patrick N. Smith, Atty. at Law, Sarah Christensen, Colorado Springs, CO, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Andrew D. Ringel, David R. Brougham, Hall & Evans, Denver, CO, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before McCONNELL, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER AND JUDGMENT

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant Appellant Chuck Pratt challenges the district court’s decision denying him summary judgment on his qualified immunity defense. “[A]n order denying qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on an issue of law, is immediately appealable.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (citation, quotation omitted). In this case, however, the district court clearly denied Pratt qualified immunity because there remained disputed material factual issues that precluded summary judgment. It is well established that such an order is not immediately appealable. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 319-20, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995); see also Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313. We, therefore, do not have jurisdiction to consider this interlocutory appeal and so DISMISS it. 
      
       This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
     