
    SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert TRINGHAM, Defendant—Appellant, and Finbar Securities Corp., Defendant, v. Juergen Votteler, third party creditor and Jeri Tulipan, Third party, Movants, Robb Evans & Associates LLC, Receiver.
    No. 10-56267.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted July 17, 2012.
    
    Filed July 30, 2012.
    Morgan E.A. Bradylyons, Michael L. Post, Senior Litigation Counsel, Securities & Exchange Commission, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Robert Tringham, San Pedro, CA, pro se.
    Dale E. Fredericks, Dale E. Fredericks Law Office, Walnut Creek, CA, Todd Andrew Picker, Law Office of Todd Picker, Orange, CA, John W. Sullivan, Esquire, John W. Sullivan Law Offices, North Hollywood, CA, Gary Owen Caris, Esquire, Lesley Anne Hawes, Esquire, Mckenna Long & Aldridge LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Third party, Movants.
    Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Robert Tringham appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion to release $24,200 in an ongoing equity receivership. We dismiss.

We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s order because it was not a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See FTC v. Overseas Unlimited Agency, Inc., 878 F.2d 1288, 1234-35 (9th Cir.1989) (an order issued in an equity receivership proceeding that does not “finally resolve[ ] the parties’ rights to [the receivership] assets” is not a final order); see also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (an order is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine unless it resolves an issue completely separate from the merits); SEC v. Capital Consultants LLC, 453 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (a motion is not separate from the merits if its success will mean that “the pool of assets the receiver controls will be smaller” and “the receiver will have fewer resources to distribute to other claimants”).

Contrary to Tringham’s contention, the order does not qualify under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as an order “modifying” or “refusing ... to modify” an injunction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1); Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir.2005) (“a motion that merely seeks to relitigate the issues underlying the original preliminary injunction order” is not a motion to modify the injunction); Thompson v. Enomoto, 815 F.2d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir.1987) (a motion to carry out the terms of the injunction is not a motion to modify the injunction).

The order does not qualify under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(2) as one “appointing a receiver[ ], or refusing [an] order[ ] to wind up a receivership[ ] or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof.” See Canada Life Assur. Co. v. LaPeter, 563 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir.2009) (“We have adopted ‘a policy of strict construction that has confined appeals to the three categories clearly specified in the statute’ ” (citation omitted)).

DISMISSED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     