
    In the Matter of the Certiorari sued out by GEORGE COYLE v. THOMAS D. SHERWOOD and others.
    
      Title to office-—cannot be inquired into upon certvn'añ—chanter 538 of 1873.
    Upon the application of the relator, a writ of certiorari was issued to review his conviction for assault and battery in the Court of Special Sessions, in the city of Mew York, on the ground that the -respondents, who, acting as police justices, constituted the said court, had no lawful authority to hold the same, the act under which they were appointed being unconstitutional. Held, that the police justices, if not such de jure, were such defacto with color of title, and that their acts must be obeyed and respected, until judgment of .ouster be pronounced, against them. Having apparent authority to act, and having rendered judgment between the prisoner and the people, neither can, in this collateral way, call in question the title of the judges.
    Chapter 538 of the Laws of 1873, entitled “ An act to secure better administration in the Police Courts of the city of Mew York,” is constitutional.
    
      Certiorari to review the conviction of the relator, in the court ol Special Sessions, for assault and battery.
    The respondents were, on the 25th of October, 1873, appointed, on nomination by the mayor and confirmation by the board of aldermen, police justices of the city of New York, in pursuance of chapter 538 of the Laws of 1873, and duly qualified as such. On the 14th of February, 1874, the relator was convicted, before them, of assault and battery. The counsel for the prisoner claimed that the court had no jurisdiction, as the act under which the justices were appointed was unconstitutional.
    
      Albert Cardoso and William F. Howe, for the relator.
    
      Benj. K. Phelps, district attorney, for the respondents.
   Brady, J.:

The answer which may properly be made to the points presented on behalf of the relator, is, that the police justices, if not such de jure, are such de facto, with color of title, and their acts must be obeyed and respected until judgment of ouster is pronounced against them. Having apparent authority to act, and having rendered judgment between the prisoner and the people, neither can, in this collateral way, call in question the title of the judges.

No principle is better settled, than that the acts of such persons are valid when they concern the public. Justice Bronson said further: “ It would be impossible to maintain the supremacy of the laws, if individuals were at liberty, in this collateral manner, to question the authority of those who, in fact, hold public offices.” If the objection were, that, assuming the validity of the tribunal whose acts are questioned, the subject-matter was not within its jurisdiction, the question would be one doubtless for consideration. Such is not the case herein. If, however, the relator were right in presenting his objections in the manner adopted, he is nevertheless not entitled to the relief he demands. The points which are urged by him for our consideration, affecting the title of the justices who presided at the Special Sessions, and to the organization of the court in which they sat and pronounced judgment, have recently been under consideration, in the Court of Common Pleas of this county, in'an action in the nature of quo warranto, and have been decided adversely to him, by.an exhaustive and elaborate opinion delivered by Chief Justice Daly.

In the conclusion arrived at in that court, we concur. We think the writ should therefore be dismissed.

Daniels and Westbrook, JJ., concurred.

Writ dismissed. 
      
       The People v. White, 24 Wend., 525; Nelson v. The People, 23 N. Y. Rep., 293.
     
      
       The People ex rel. Edward Hogan v. B. F. Morgan.
     
      
       See 5th Daly.
     