
    Boris Eduardo Quijano MELGAR, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-950 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 7, 2013.
    Linda Kenepaske, New York, N.Y., for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney, General; Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant Director; James A. Hurley, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., For Respondent.
    PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, GERARD E. LYNCH, SUSAN L. CARNEY, and Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Boris Eduardo Quijano Mel-gar, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of a February 10, 2012 order of the BIA affirming the September 19, 2011 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Roger F. Sagerman, denying, inter alia, his application for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Boris Eduardo Quijano Melgar, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Feb. 10, 2012), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. New York, Sept. 19, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). “[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in [INA] section 212(a)(2),” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), which includes crimes involving moral turpitude. Notwithstanding that provision, we retain jurisdiction to review petitions raising “constitutional claims or questions of law,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), to the extent that such claims are not “so insubstantial and frivolous as to be inadequate to invoke federal-question jurisdiction,” Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir.2008) (citations omitted).

Although we have repeatedly assumed that § 1252(a)(2)(C)’s jurisdictional bar applies to claims of deferral of removal under the CAT, see, e.g., Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir.2008); Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir.2007); Maiwand v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir.2007), we have never expressly so held, see De La Rosa v. Holder, 598 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir.2010), and two of our sister circuits have held to the contrary, see Wanjiru v. Holder, 705 F.3d 258, 263 (7th Cir.2013); Lemus-Galvan v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir.2008). We need not resolve that jurisdictional issue, for we may exercise hypothetical jurisdiction where, as here, the jurisdictional issues goes to statutory and not constitutional jurisdiction, and where it is plain that the petitioner’s objections to the agency’s findings are meritless. See Ivanishvili v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 338 n. 2 (2d Cir.2006); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17; Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir.2005).

CAT relief is only available where government officials perform the anticipated torture or “know of or remain willfully blind to an act and thereafter breach their legal responsibility to prevent it.” Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir.2004). Here, the agency concluded that any harm Quijano Melgar might suffer at the hands of Salvadoran gang members would not occur with the knowledge or willful blindness of the government. Although the Salvadoran government may not be entirely effective in controlling gang violence, the agency’s conclusion that the government would not be willfully blind to harm caused by gang members is supported by substantial evidence showing government efforts to target gang members and prevent gang violence, including laws criminalizing membership in gangs. The agency’s finding that Quijano Melgar did not demonstrate that either the government or paramilitary groups indiscriminately harm suspected gang members or individuals with tattoos, or that any harm inflicted upon suspected gang members by the government would constitute torture, is also supported by substantial evidence. It was within the agency’s discretion to give more weight to U.S. State Department reports than to the testimony of petitioner’s expert witness on Salvadoran gangs, which was based almost entirely on anecdotal material. See Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir.2012).

Quijano Melgar also argues that the agency erred in concluding that he had not shown it was more likely than not that he would be tortured in El Salvador because it failed to consider his risk of torture in the aggregate. That argument is merit-less, as the BIA merely summarized the factual findings of the IJ, who explicitly considered “the totality of the documentary evidence of record,” and reasonably concluded that: (1) the evidence did not show that the Salvadoran government engaged in torture of tattooed individuals; (2) paramilitary groups were not engaged in extrajudicial torture or killings generally; and (3) to the extent Quijano Melgar might be tortured by gang members, it would not be with the acquiescence of the government.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  