
    Jambs M. Crawford vs. Gideon L. Spencer.
    Evidence is not admissible to show, that the name of the grantee in a deed was inserted therein, in consequence of a mistake of the scrivener, in the place of that of another person, who was intended as the grantee, and who entered upon and afterwards occupied the land.
    This was a writ of entry to recover a lot of land in Pawtucket.
    At the trial before Metcalf, J., it was proved, that George Wilkinson executed a deed of the premises in question, on the 10th of September 1841, to James Maxwell Crawford, the demandant.
    
      The tenant to support his title offered George Wilkinson, the grantor in said deed, as a witness, to prove that the land was bought of him by George Crawford, father of the demandant who was then under age; that George Crawford paid for it; that the deed, by which the demandant claims, was thereupon made, and was intended to be to George Crawford and to convey the land to him and for his use; that said George was then in possession of the land, having en tered on it, supposing that a former purchase covered it; that the demandant was not intended, by either party, to be benefited by the purchase, which was not meant by them to be for him, or for his use; and that the name “ James Maxwell ” in the deed, was by an accident and mistake of the scrivener who wrote the deed put for “ George,” which was intended by the parties to be the name in the deed and which they instructed him to put in it. The tenant also proposed to show, that George Crawford went into occupation under the deed, and used and occupied the land as his own till his death ; built on it and mortgaged it to the tenant and others as his property. But he did not propose to show, that George Crawford was ever called or known by the name of James M. Crawford.
    The judge rejected the evidence, and a verdict was taken for the demandant, which is to stand and a judgment to be rendered on it, if the evidence was rightly rejected, but to be set aside and a new trial granted, if the evidence was admissible.
    
      C. B. Farnsworth, for the tenant.
    Parol evidence is admissible to. show, that for want of delivery to or for the party claiming under it, the deed never had any legal existence or binding force. 4 Cruise Dig. (Greenl. ed.) 29; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 284. If A. makes his deed and delivers it to B., intending it to operate as a muniment of title tó B., but by accident or otherwise inserts the name of C. therein as grantee, it cannot take effect as a deed to C. Jackson v. Stanley, 10 Johns. 133.
    A. Cushman, for the demandant.
   Metcalf, J.

Here is a plain grant to the demandant; and no fraud in the execution of it is suggested. Nor does any extrinsic fact raise a latent ambiguity as to the true grantee, so as to admit explanatory parol evidence. The testimony which was offered would have merely shown a mistake, which the court has no authority, in any way, to correct. The demanded premises passed to the demandant, by force of the deed; and evidence to contradict the deed, or to control its effect, was rightly rejected. See 12 Johns. 77, 488.

Judgment on the verdict.  