
    Robertson vs. Sullivan.
    A deed acknowledged by the bargainor, takes effect from the date of acknowledgment, and not from the delivery or the date of the deed.
    This was an action of ejectment brought (by the defendant in error, against the plaintiff in error) in the Lincoln circuit court, on the 4th day of Sept. 1831, for twenty acres of land. The defendant to the ejectment entered into the common rule, and pleaded not guilty. At March term, 1823, the cause came on for trial, when the lessor of the plaintiff offered in evidence a deed from Thomas Hickman to him, for the land in controversy, dated the 18th June, 1821, and witnessed by three witnesses. By an endorsement upon the deed, it appears to have been acknowledged by Thos. Hickman, the grantor, in the Davidson county court, at Janua* ry sessions, 1822. There is no certificate that it was ever proven by the witnesses.
    Robertson, the defendant to the action of ejectment, claimed the land by virtue of a distinct title. On the trial of the cause in the circuit court, the defendant, Robertson, by his counsel, moved the court to instruct the jury, that the deed from Hickman to the lessor of the plaintiff, only took effect from the acknowledgment thereof, and that the title of the lessor of the plaintiff, could only relate back to that time; and that this was the true construction of the act of 1806, ch. 49, sec. 3. But the court refused so to charge the jury, and stated to them that the deed took effect from its delivery, which should be taken to be the day of its date, unless the contrary was shewn, except as against creditors and subsequent purchasers.
    The charge of the court was excepted to, and the jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff below, upon which judgment was rendered, an appeal in the nature of a writ of error was prosecuted to this court.
   Opinion of the court delivered by

Judge Catron.

The act of 1806, ch. 49 sec. 3 provides, “that any deed of conveyance made or executed hereafter, the execution of which is established by the acknowledgment of the party executing the same, shall take effect only from the date of such acknowledgment, for the purpose of admission to registration.

It is contended for the defendant in error, that the words, for the purpose of admission to registration,” refer to previous statutes, requiring the registration of deeds, and was intended for the benefic of purchasers and creditors alone. This is not by any means thought to be the meaning of the words. The latter clause was very necessary to explain the manner in which the acknowledgment should be made to give effect to the deed, and to be equal to the proof of two witnesses in a court of record. The previous acts of Assembly, had pointed out the mode in which a deed should be acknowledged for the purpose of authorizing the same to be put upon the records of the country, and after which, no further proof of the execution thereof was ever to be required. This was the description of acknowledgment contemplated by the legislature, to wit: it was to be done “for the purpose of having the deed admitted to registration,” and if not formally done to authorize this, both the deed and the registration are ineffectual to communicate any legal estate to the grantee. The grantee in this cause had no legal estate until the deed was registered, and the deed then related only to the date of the acknowlegment in the Davidson county court. The statute of 1806, has no exceptions, and this court has no power to make any; nor is it believed any subsequent act of Assembly has in any respect affected the provisions of the act of 1806. Furthermore, this question came directly before the court at Rogersville, in the cause of Johnson’s lessee vs. -, in which it was decided, that the act of 1806, was intended to apply to all cases whatever, and that no subsequent statute, in any wise affected the construction. Judge Peck, then at the bar, was of counsel for the lessor of the plaintiffs, and contended that the act of 1806, only applied to cases where creditors and purchasers were concerned. The case, although not reported, is perfectly within the recollection of judges Whyte and Peck, and has settled the construction of the statute.

Jones, for plaintiff in error.

O. B. Hayes, Crabb, and Bell, for deft, in error.

The same point is also decided in the case of Garner’s lessee vs. Johnson, Peck’s Rep. 25, by the circuit court, and treated as law by the supreme court.

We therefore think this judgment ought to be remanded for another trial, for the reason, that the lessor of the plaintiff did not show any title to the land at the commencement of the suit; and so the court below ought to have instructed thejury.

Judgment reversed.  