
    Red River Bridge Company vs. Mayor and Aldermen of Clarksville.
    Franchise. Contract. Constitutional law. A grant By charter, from the Legislature, of an exclusive- right to huild a toll bridge within certain limits, although a contract, is such an exclusive right as must yield to the public interest, and the franchise acquired under it may be taken for the public use upon just compensation being piaid therefor, without violating said contract or impairing its obligation in the sense of the constitution.
    EBOM MONTGOMERY.
    In 1829 the Legislature granted to the plaintiffs the right to erect a bridge across Bed river at the. town of Clarksville, with the usual power to exact tolls of persons crossing the bridge, and stipulated in the charter that no other toll bridge should be at any time erected within one half mile of the plaintiff’s bridge. The plaintiffs erected their bridge at the place designated in the charter, and continued to exact tolls of persons crossing it until the commencement of this suit. In 1847 the Legislature authorized the municipal authorities of the town of Clarksville to purchase the plaintiff’s bridge, or to erect a free bridge near to the same. The corjoo-ration commenced building their bridge within a few feet of the plaintiff’s bridge, whereupon he filed this bill' in chancery at Clarksville, praying an injunction against the erection of said free bridge, and asking compensation for the damage sustained thereby. The Chancellor, (Judge Bbien,) dismissed the bill, and complainants appealed to this court.
    
      Heney & ShaoelbRORd, F. B. Fogg- and Kimble, for complainants.
    Meigs and Bailey, for the respondents.
   McKinney, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

In view of all the facts of this particular case, we think the complainant is entitled to compensation as prayed in the bill. Whether or not the charter granted to the complainant contains the exclusive right alleged in the bill, and admitted in the answer; does not certainly appear, nor is it important to enquire how the fact is, with a view to the decision of the present case. For, assuming that it does,- still- we think it clear that such exclusive right must yield to the public interest. And, admitting the grant to be a contract, and that it is inviolable, yet to hold that the property or franchise acquired under it may be taken for public use “upon just compensation being made therefor,” is not to violate or impair the contract, in the sense of the constitution.

The proof in this record establishes, that the bridge of the complainant was amply sufficient for the accommodation of the public, and that the sole and avowed object of the erection of a free bridge, within a few feet of the former, was to divert the whole travel from it, and thereby destroy its value, under a belief that the inducement held out to the public by a free bridge would greatly promote the local interests of the town of Clarksville.

It is manifest that the erection of a free bridge, under the circumstances of this case, amounts to a total destruction of tlie franchise granted to the complainant, in principle and in effect. The site and structure of the old bridge might as well have been taken and appropriated to the use of the new one; and, while we concede that this might be done, and likewise concede that the grant to the defendants must be regarded as sufficient evidence that the public interest required that it should be done; yet, we hold that it could only be done upon the condition of making “just compensation” to the complainant for the franchise thus destroyed.

It follows, therefore, that the defendants must account for the reasonable value of the complainant’s bridge at the time of the completion of the free bridge.

The decree will be reversed, and an account ordered.  