
    James Ralph DAWSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ex rel. Joe ORTIZ; Board and County Commissioners of Jefferson County; Board and County Commissioners of Adams County; Board and County Commissioners of El Paso County; Board and County Commissioners of Arapahoe County; City and County of Denver, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 03-1128.
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    Sept. 18, 2003.
    James Ralph Dawson, Jr., Limón, CO, pro se.
    Ken Salazar, Attorney General, State of Colorado, Department of Law, J. Alberto Garcia, Colorado Attorney General’s Office, Denver, CO, Martin E. McKinney, Jefferson County Attorney’s Office, Patricia W. Gilbert, County Attorney’s Office, Golden, CO, Hal B. Warren, Adams County Attorney, Brighton, CO, Jay Allen Lauer, El Paso County Attorney, Colorado Springs, CO, Robin Elizabeth Cochran, Asst. City Attorney, Arapahoe County Attorney’s Office, Littleton, CO, Geoffrey S. Wasson, Asst. City Attorney, Office of the City Attorney, Denver, CO, Carl Richard Mangino, City Attorney’s Office, Civil Litigation-Claims Dept., Denver, CO, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER AND JUDGMENT

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiff James Ralph Dawson, Jr., a Colorado state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

Dawson, who has been convicted multiple times in the Colorado state courts, is currently in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) serving an 84-year term of imprisonment as a result of a 1991 criminal conviction. In accordance with the Colorado Restitution Act, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 16-18.5-101 et seq., enacted by the Colorado Legislature in 2000, the DOC regularly withholds money from Dawson’s inmate account to pay fees and costs imposed in connection with his criminal convictions. Dawson filed his § 1983 action seeking money damages and cessation of the withholdings. His complaint alleged in pertinent part that he had “discharged” all of his pre-1991 criminal convictions by serving the necessary terms of imprisonment and that any withholdings from his inmate account in connection with pre-1991 convictions constituted violations of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed the action.

Dawson’s claim against the DOC rests on his misperception that, by serving the requisite terms of imprisonment, he has “discharged” completely all obligations arising from his pre-1991 criminal convictions. As noted by the DOC, Colorado law has long required imposition of money judgments “in favor of the state of Colorado, the appropriate prosecuting attorney, or the appropriate law enforcement agency and against [a person convicted of a criminal offense] for the amount of the costs of prosecution, the amount of the cost of care, and any fine imposed.” Colo.Rev.Stat. § 16-11-501(1). Dawson has not brought to our attention any provision of Colorado law that would allow a convicted person to “discharge” such money judgments merely by serving requisite terms of imprisonment. Thus, to the extent he has failed to actually pay the money judgments against him in connection with his pre-1991 criminal convictions, the DOC is authorized by the Colorado Restitution Act to collect money from his inmate account to satisfy those judgments which remain unpaid. Further, as noted by the district court, nothing in the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause prevents the DOC from doing so. The Colorado Restitution Act does not impose a new financial obligation on Dawson. The Act merely provides a means for collection of his preexisting obligations.

AFFIRMED. Dawson’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs and fees is GRANTED. Dawson is reminded that he remains obligated to make partial payments until the entire balance of the appellate filing fee is paid. 
      
       This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
     
      
      . Dawson’s complaint included a procedural due process claim against the DOC as well as claims against five Colorado counties where he previously had been convicted. Dawson did not file timely objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation of dismissal of those claims and those claims are not at issue in this appeal. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir.1991) (discussing circuit’s firm waiver rule which “provides that the failure to make timely objection to the magistrate's findings or recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions”).
     
      
      . We have some question as to whether Dawson’s claim should have been filed pursuant to § 1983 or as a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We need not decide this question, however, because the withholdings challenged by Dawson clearly do not constitute punishment or otherwise alter his criminal sentences.
     