
    Dana MacLEOD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF BRATTLEBORO and Chad Emery, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 12-5113-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 27, 2013.
    Thomas W. Costello and James A. Va-lente, Costello Valente & Gentry, PC, Brattleboro, VT, for Appellant.
    James F. Carroll, English Carroll & Boe, PC, Middlebury, VT, Nancy G. Sheahan and Kevin J. Coyle, McNeil Led-dy & Sheahan, PC, Burlington, VT, for Appellees.
    
      PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, B.D. PARKER, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Dana MacLeod appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Reiss, C.J.), granting summary judgment in favor of appellees Officer Chad Emery and the Town of Brattleboro (the “Town”) (collectively, “Appellees”) on MacLeod’s claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Officer Chad Emery used excessive force against MacLeod in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

“ ‘We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.’ ” Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[CJlaims of excessive force are to be judged under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). Assessing whether the use of force to make an arrest is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment “requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)).

“[T] he factfinder must determine whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances faced by the arresting officer, the amount of force used was objectively reasonable at the time.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir.2004). The balancing must be done with sensitivity to the factual circumstances of each case, “including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

Once the court has determined the relevant undisputed facts and drawn all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the court’s determination of reasonableness at the summary judgment stage is a pure question of law, and must be made from the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). The “calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

Here, the relevant facts are undisputed. MacLeod was tased by Officer Emery after leading another police officer, Officer Adam Belville, on a high-speed chase through the rainy, “slick” streets of Brat-tleboro in the pre-dawn hours of September 28, 2009. MacLeod Dep. 62:12. MacLeod was originally pulled for speeding. When Officer Belville approached the vehicle to speak with the driver, Mac-Leod sped off without warning — nearly sideswiping Officer Belville — and a chase ensued that placed the officers, the passenger, and other motorists and any pedestrians in substantial, immediate danger.

MacLeod concedes that “the seriousness of his crimes prior to the use of force was not trivial[,]” but he nonetheless claims that the use of force was unreasonable because he had “voluntarily ceased his criminal conduct and was attempting to surrender at the time he was tased[.]” Appellant’s Br. 15. Whatever MacLeod’s subjective intent, the undisputed facts demonstrate that after suddenly speeding away from an investigating officer on “slick,” dark roads at “a rate of speed higher than the speed limit” to evade arrest, MacLeod Dep. 61:20-21, he entered into a deserted a parking lot, exited the vehicle, kneeled on the ground, and then— contravening clear, repeated instructions that he acknowledges he understood— rose to his feet, turned to face the officers with his hands free and outstretched, and refused to return to the ground. Rising from the ground rather than submitting to arrest exacerbated a “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” situation that threatened the lives of officers, bystanders, and MacLeod himself. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

Viewed objectively, MacLeod’s actions immediately prior to being tased do not evince “passive resistance” merely because MacLeod was not actually in the act of fleeing. Cf. Crowell v. Kirkpatrick, 400 Fed.Appx. 592, 595 (2d Cir.2010) (finding use of taser reasonable in part because “[protesters] were actively resisting their arrest at the time they were tased by the officers in this case, having chained themselves to a several hundred pound barrel drum and having refused to free themselves”); Davis v. Callaway, 2007 WL 1079988, at *5, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29468, at *14 (D.Conn. Apr. 9, 2007) (noting that “[officer] could reasonably have interpreted [arrestee’s] previous noncompliance, i.e., standing up, as indicative of the possibility of further resistance”).

For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in MacLeod’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 
      
      . In addition, MacLeod lodged claims against Officer Emery under Vermont law, and against the Town under § 1983 for "unconstitutional policy and practice/inadequate training.” MacLeod does not appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Appel-lees on these claims.
     
      
      . MacLeod’s briefing argues that he could not hear the officers’ instructions to remain on or return to the ground. In his deposition, however, MacLeod stated that he could in fact hear “clearly” the officers’ instructions. MacLeod Dep. 91:22-24. Moreover, the passenger evidently overheard the officers’ instructions, as he complied fully.
     
      
      . Indeed, because MacLeod was unsubdued and had made one clear attempt to evade arrest, "the scope of crime in question was not simply [speeding], but was unknown and potentially far more serious.” Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir.2010).
     