
    The People, Resp’ts, v. The North River Sugar Refining Co., App’lt.
    
    
      (Court of Appeals,
    
    
      Filed June 24, 1890.)
    
    1. Corporations—Dissolution of—Combinations in restraint of business—Trusts.
    The defendant joined a combination with sixteen other corporations engaged in the refining of sugar. All its stock was transferred to the central association, or “ board,” consisting of eleven persons. In exchange, it received and distributed to its stockholders certificates of the board, etc. New directors of the defendant were chosen by the board and subject to removal by it, and by its order defendant ceased to refine sugar. Held, that this was not a sale of the stock to a vendee, but the creation of a “ trust,” and that such action divested defendant of the essential and vital elements of its franchise, and gave away to an irresponsible board its entire independence and self control, and that it had thus violated its charter and failed in the performance of its corporate duties, and that in respects so material and important as to justify a judgment of dissolution.
    3. Same.
    There may he actual corporate conduct which is not formal corporate action; and where that conduct is directed or produced by the whole body, both of officers and stockholders, by every living instrumentality which can possess and wield the corporate franchise, that conduct is of a corporate character, and if illegal and injurious may deserve and receive the penalty of dissolution.
    3. Same.
    It is a violation of law for corporations to enter into a partnership, whether directly or indirectly, through the medium of a trust.
    Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court, general term, first department, affirming a judgment for plaintiff, recovered on the verdict of a jury, and an order denying a motion for a new trial.
    
      Jno. B. Parsons and James C. Carter, for app’lt; Chas. F. Tabor, Att’y Gen., and Roger A. Pryor, for resp’ts.
    
      
       Affirming 27 N. Y. State Rep., 282.
    
   Finch, J.

The judgment sought against the defendant is one of corporate death. The state, which created, asks us to destroy; and the penalty invoked represents the extreme rigor of the law. Its infliction must rest upon grave cause, and be warranted by material misconduct. The life of a corporation is indeed less than that of the humblest citizen, and yet it envelopes great accumulations of property, moves and carries in large volume the business and enterprise of the people, and may not be destroyed without clear and abundant reason. That would be true even if the legislature should debate the destruction of the corporate life by a repeal of the corporate charter; but is beyond dispute where the state summons the offender before its judicial tribunals, and submits its complaint to their judgment and view. By that process It assumes the burden of establishing the charges which it has made, and ipust show us warrant in the facts for the relief which it seeks.

Two of the charges preferred in the complaint have dropped out of sight. They were of little importance, and have been prudently dismissed from the inquiry for that reason; and we are left to consider the one grave and serious accusation to which alone the proofs and argument have been directed. That accusation is adequate to the purpose for which it was framed, but upon two conditions, which dictate the line of inquiry and limit the area of discussion. It appears to be settled that the state as prosecutor must show on the part of the corporation accused some sin against the law of its being which has produced, or tends to produce, injury to the public. The transgression must not be merely formal or incidental, but material and serious; and such as to harm or menace the public welfare. For the state does not concern itself with the quarrels of private litigants. It furnishes for them sufficient courts and remedies, but intervenes as a party only where some public interest requires its action.

Corporations may and often do exceed their authority *where only private rights are affected. When these are adjusted, all mischief ends and all harm is averted. But where the transgression has a wider scope, and threatens the welfare of the people, they may summon the offender to answer for the abuse of its franchise or the violation of its corporate duty. The Code of Civil Procedure authorizes an action for that purpose when the corporation has “violated any provision of law whereby it has forfeited its charter or become liable to be dissolved by the abuse of its powers.”

In Thompson v. The People, 23 Wend., 584, the ground of forfeiture was tersely described as “some misdemeanor in the trust injurious to the public;” and as recently as the case of Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y., 531; 18 N. Y. State Rep., 520, we said: “In the granting of charters the legislature is presumed to have had in view the public interest; and public policy is concerned in the restriction of corporations within chartered limits ; and a departure therefrom is only deemed excusable when it cannot result in prejudice to the public.”

Two questions therefore open before us: First, has the defendant corporation exceeded or abused its powers: and second, does that excess or abuse threaten or harm the public welfare.

The first question requires us to ascertain what the defendant corporation has done in violation of its duty, or omitted to do in performance of its duty. We find disclosed by the proof that it has become an integral part and constituent element of a combination which possesses over it an absolute control, which has absorbed most of its corporate functions, and dictates the extent and manner and terms of its entire business activity. Into that combination, which drew into its control sixteen other corporations engaged in the refining of sugar, the defendant has gone, in some manner and by some process, for as an unquestionable truth we find it there. All its stock has been transferred to the central association of eleven individuals denominated a “board;” in exchange it has taken and distributed to its own stockholders certificates of the board carrying a proportionate interest in what it describes as its capital stock; the new directors of the defendant corporation have been chosen by the board, made eligible by its gift of single shares, and liable to removal under the terms of their appointment at any moment of independent action. It has lost the power to make a dividend, and is compelled to pay over its net earnings to the master whose servant it has become. Under the orders of that master it has ceased to refine sugar, and by so much has lessened the supply upon the market. It cannot stir unless the master approves, and yet is entitled to receive from the earnings of the other refineries, massed as profits in the treasury of the board, its proportionate share for division among its own stockholders holding the substituted certificates. In return for this advantage it has become liable to be mortgaged, not for its own corporate benefit alone, but to supply with funds the controlling board when reaching out for other ana coveted refineries. No one can look these facts fairly in the face, without "being compelled to say that the defendant is in the combination and in to stay. Indeed, so much is with great frankness admitted on the part of the appellant. Its counsel concedes that the stock was transferred “ to the board mentioned in the agreement, and on the terms and for the purposes mentioned in the agreement; and that this action effectually lodged the control of the defendant company, so far as such control can be secured by the voting power, in that board.”

But that truth does not alone solve the problem presented. We .are yet to ascertain whether the corporation became the subordinate and servant of the board by its ow n voluntary action, or the will and power of others than itself; by force of a contract to which it was in reality a party, or as the simple consequence of a ■change of owners; by its fault or its misfortune; by a sale or by a trust For, if it has done nothing, if what has happened and all that has happened is ascertained to be that the stockholders of the defendant, one or many, sold absolutely to the eleven men who constituted the board their entire stock, and the latter, by force of their proprietorship and as owners, have merely chosen .directors in their own interest, and are only managing their property in their own way as any absolute owners may, if that is the truth and the entire and exact truth, it is difficult to see wherein the corporation has sinned, or what it has done beyond merely emitting for a time to carry on its business. That is the theory upon which the appellants stand, and which they submit to our examination.

On the other hand, it is contended that there never was a sale, but a trust constituted by mutual agreement; that they who agreed were the whole body of stockholders in each corporation, necessarily representing and binding the corporation itself; that they transferred their shares to the board upon the trusts declared in the deed; that the certificates issued by the board were the formal declaration of the trust; that the. corporate stockholders parted with the legal title of their stock to the chosen trustees, with the power to vote upon it, but retained, nevertheless, its beneficial ownership through the operation of the certificates ; and so the corporations entered into a partnership with each other, vesting the partnership power in a board of control.

I have brought these two theories face to face where they may confront each other, because, when a choice is made between them, we have gone a long distance toward the end of the controversy. •

In making that choice we must necessarily analyze and construe the deed or contract which formed the terms of the combination, and which not only dictated its character, but brought it into existence. That contract, on the theory of a sale, is an unexpected and unaccountable document. A sale presumes vendors on the one side and vendees on the other, each having life and existence and the power and ability to contract. Here there -was no joint stock association existing or organized until the vendors .themselves created it, and they were obliged to- construct their vendee in the very act of transfer. A contract of sale implies some negotiation between buyer and seller, each consulting his own interest and acting independently and of his free choice. Here there was no negotiation with the board, but the vendors having created their vendee, themselves alone dictated the terms on which they should sell and it should buy. The selling stockholder explicitly swears that the board had nothing whatever to do with fixing the price. In a contract of sale covering property valued at some fifty millions of dollars and containing a patient statement of the terms of the trade we should naturally expect that at least the buyer would give it his signature and bind him.selE to the purchase. This contract of sale is not signed by the vendees at all, and their assent is left to be supplied by inference from their action.

In an ordinary sale the vendee becomes owner, and has the rights of an owner, and may do what he pleases with his own, but this contract tells the owners what they shall do with the property bought, and how they shall hold it, and inferentially, at least, forbids its further sale or transfer. As a general rule, the vendor fixes the value or price of the property which he sells, or sometimes submits the question to disinterested appraisers, but this contract of sale generously allows the value of the personal property separate from the plant to be appraised and fixed by five persons, all of whom are themselves among the purchasers.

These are general considerations which make one hesitate over the theory of a sale as distinguished from a trust; but the doubt increases as we come closer to the details of the agreement and scrutinize its exact terms.

It is observable that the selected transferee of the stock of the •corporations was denominated simply a “board.” That implied agency, a committee of managers, official servants charged with executive duties and acting for and in the interest of others. The idea of a joint stock association, capable of buying and acting as purchaser, had not yet dawned. Explicitly the deed declares “ the shares of the capital stock of the several corporations to be transferred to the board as herein provided shall be transferred to the names of the board as trustees, to be held by them and by their successors as members of the board strictly as joint tenants.” H beyond the inference of agency, suggested by the name and description of the board, more was needed to indicate the real aim and intention, it is supplied by the frank declaration that the transferees shall take as trustees, and hold in joint tenancy, which is the characteristic manner of a trust. "

Other clauses in the instrument point significantly to the same construction. The purchase of stock in a corporation makes the buyer a stockholder. Ho such purchaser would think for a moment of requiring from the corporation a stipulation that he should have the rights of a stockholder, for those rights attach at once by force of his ownership. Yet we find in the document under examination, following the provision which requires the board to take as trustees, a clause entirely superfluous if a sale was meant, but a reasonable stipulation if a trust was intended, that the board shall hold the stock transferred to it, with all the rights and powers incident to stockholders in the several corporations.”

The clause carries with it a distinct suggestion that no absolute sale was intended, but a transfer in trust which might leave the assignors who became the beneficiaries some equitable right over the voting power, and to make sure of the vesting of that right in the trustees a specific and broad covenant was adopted adequate for all emergencies.

The owners of corporate stock, by force of their ownership, may put a mortgage upon the corporate property when the statute permits. Nobody doubts that, and no buyer would demand that permission of the seller. But the contract in question explicitly authorizes the board to raise money by mortgages upon the property of the corporations. It strikes one as odd to see an absolute purchaser requiring his vendor in the deed of conveyance to covenant that the grantee may be at liberty to incumber by mortgage his own property. The astute pen which framed the deed of association had a very different aim and realized that trustees, holding for trust purposes, should have power to mortgage given them if that necessity was contemplated.

A vendor about to sell his property and to a very large amount naturally looks carefully to his pay. A merchant or manufacturer who should sell his wares to a corporation having no other capital than the exact property bought, and take his pay in the stock, of such corporation would scarcely be deemed sane in business circles. The board organized by the refineries had a nominal capital of $50,000,000, but not a single dollar of actual capital beyond the corporate shares transferred; and so the sellers, if indeed they were such, got aliquot parts of their own property in payment for the transfer. If they sold it, they simply got it back under a new name and, as we shall see, heavily watered, and with its care and management entrusted to others, under an arrangement which- might or might not add to its earning power.

If in truth the board was meant to be anything more than a trustee or manager of the combined corporations, if it was contemplated that it should become a joint-stock association at all, it was put by the very articles of its creation under the most singular and oppressive restrictions. What shall we say of a joint-stock association without a dollar of actual capital, and yet forbidden to incur the least debt or obligation? It was commanded that “no action be taken by the board which shall create liability by it or by its members.” Without a dollar it could not borrow a dollar; without money it could incur no debt; its cash resources were to come from a sale of its own certificates reserved over and above those allotted, or from mortgages made by the separate corporations, and yet this curious creation, viewed as a joint-stock association, was able to induce the sale to it of twenty corporations. The stockholders with astonishing generosity sold and transferred to it all their stock, allowed it to pocket fifteen per cent, of its agreed value, and took aliquot parts of the remainder of their own property for their pay. It seems to me that the theory of an absolute sale involves us in difficulties and complications on almost every page of the deed or combination agreement, and that it is an after-thought, framed under pressure, and mismatching the entire tenor and terms of the instrument which it was invented to sustain. Indeed, I notice, among the briefs submitted to our study, a reprint of an article from a distinguished pen which traces the origin and history of economic combinations and monopolies, and ends with a determined defense of the one under review, but concedes it to be a trust, created by contract, and organized and existing as such.

The combination, therefore, framed by the deed was a trust: and, if created by the corporations, or in any respect the consequence or product of their action, some inevitable results would be certain to follow. But here we encounter the stronghold of the appellant’s argument, which is that if the corporations are in some manner in the combination, they are there solely as the result of a contract other than their own; are there without corporate action on their part; and so are sufferers, and not sinners. The reasoning leading to that result is so severely technical as to have suggested a justification almost reminding one of an apology. We are called upon to sever the corporation, the abstract legal entity, from the living and acting corporators; as it were, to separate in our thought the soul from the body, and admitting the sins of the latter, to adjudge that the former remains pure. Let us first recall the facts in the order of their occurrence.

On the 22d day of April, 1887, there was a meeting of defendant’s stockholders, at which all the trustees were present At that meeting the following preamble and resolutions were adopted by a unanimous vote:

W heveas, It is contemplated that the several sugar refineries in New York and other cities shall consolidate their several refineries in one large concern or company; and

W heveas, We deem it for the interest of the North Biver Sugar Befining Company to participate in the above said consolidation ; therefore, be it

Resolved, That Peter Holler, Jr., George H. Holler and Gerd Hartens be, and they are hereby, appointed a. committee to make arrangements to perfect the said consolidation' in behalf of the North Biver Sugar Befining Company, with full power to act and to sign all contracts and agreements in the name of the said North Biver Sugar Befining Company, of whatever name or nature, concerning the said consolidation.

Resolved, That we authorize the president and secretary of the North Biver Sugar Befining Company to sign all contracts, agreements and papers which the above-named committee may make in relation to the said consolidation.”

In September following the secretary of the corporation added its signature to the deed. He tells us under oath: “ I made that signature by virtue of authority from the stockholders and the board of officers of the North Biver Sugar Befining Company, the stockholders and trustees.” It follows that the committee, to whom authority was given to make the agreement, had made it. The stockholders by a unanimous vote decided to go into the proposea combination, and authorized their committee to agree on the terms. A trust of personal property may be created by paroi. That the committee acted; that they contracted for their company upon the terms of the deed, is an inevitable inference from the action of the secretary, who swears that he signed by authority, and could have had none except upon the agreement of the committee. It was, therefore, actually made, and the official signature was but the evidence of the agreement entered into by them. Here was a deliberate corporate act, if stockholders and trustees united can ever perform one, attested by one of the two officers who were authorized to sign. At that moment the defendant company had become a party to the contract by the consent of everybody connected with the corporgtion, and by force of the agreement to that effect which the signature of the secretary shows had been made by the authorized agency.

But it is said the corporation repented and withdrew from the agreement. I do not stop to discuss the question whether they could revoke without the consent of the board and their associates in the trust deed, for assuming that they could, I prefer to analyze their revocation and see the scope arid range of their repentance. The corporation remained a. contracting creator of the.trust until ¡November 4, 1887. By the deed, the trust took effect on October 1st of that year, so that the defendant in its full corporate character became a party to it according to the terms of the deed and remained bound by it for at least one month. But then there did come either repentance or fear. In ¡November the stockholders again assembled and passed the resolution which is relied upon as a revocation. > Its preamble recites a series of denials that the committee had made any agreement or that the president and secretary had signed any, and then, after declaring “ it is deemed inexpedient at the present time to enter into any such consolidation,” they revoked the powers conferred and the resolutions conferring them. That is to say, after the powers had been executed and had put the corporation into the combination, and it had become a constitutent element of the trust, those powers were revoked upon a false assertion that they remained executory and so their revocation could be effective. I say a false assertion, for we are not at liberty to believe that George H. Holler, who was secretary of the corporation and one of the very committee authorized to make the agreement of consolidation, signed the deed when he knew the committee had not agreed and so in violation of his duty and without authority, and then positively swore that he signed by authority of the stockholders and trustees. His act and his oath heavily outweigh the resolutions of repentance. Let us not fail to observe that no signature is withdrawn, no notice is served upon the board or the associates, no consent of theirs asked or demanded, but the parties of one part to a contract come together and pass a resolution that they have not contracted and do not mean to and rely upon that as releasing them from -£heir obligation. All that they effectively did was to raise a question of veracity which must be decided against them upon the act and the oath of their own officer.

That repentance proved to be only a prelude to the exact sin claimed to have been avoided. On the 25th of November, 1887, which was just three weeks after the resolutions of revocation, the stockholders of the defendant company formally resolved to sell their capital stock for $325,000 to John B. Searles, Jr. It is not unworthy of notice that the resolution to sell is prefaced by a recital that their secretary had signed a deed of consolidation “ under the belief that he was authorized so to do,” a matter which had nothing to do with the new agreement to sell, unless the purpose of that agreement lay beneath the surface. The committee to deliver the stock consisted of the same three persons who had originally been authorized to make the agreement of consolidation, which had already been signed by Searles as treasurer of the Havemeyer Sugar Refining Company. The stock was delivered to him, the price paid to the stockholders, and so Searles became the one sole and only stockholder of the defendant company. He and the “ legal entity ” alone survived, and the latter apparently in a state of suspended animation. An effort was made to ascertain from what source the purchase money came, but was not altogether successful. Searles did not furnish it A certain committee of three did, who were to transfer the stock to the board. Searles adds, “those three gentlemen whom I have named as trustees of certain funds paid for the stock; funds received by them for mortgages and other matters connected with the organization. Q. What organization ? A. The Sugar Refineries Company, the board.” Well, the board got the stock from Searles, sole owner and sole stockholder, and gave in exchange certificates for $700,000, or a little more than double the purchase price, and which indicates the amount of water in the board’s capital stock. From that, however, was deducted the fifteen per cent retained by the combination. What Searles did with the certificates we do not know, nor is it important to ascertain. We do know that new directors were chosen by the vote of the board; that Searles became president of the corporation; that its share of the regular dividend has been allotted to it for its certificate holders, and that it has wholly ceased to refine sugar. And thus its baptism in the pool of the board became complete and final.

And yet it is argued that the corporation, the legal entity, has done nothing; that Searles was guilty but the corporate robe that enveloped him was innocent and so he must be left to vrear it undisturbed; that while all that was human and could act had sinned, yet the impalpable entity had not acted at all and must go free. I believe that the history of what occurred as I have already described it furnishes a sufficient answer, assuming that stockholders and trustees acting together can do a corporate act at all. There was corporate action in making the combination agreement which bound the defendant. The revocation of an executed authority left the contract standing. The corporation thus helped to make the trust and became an element of it. If there was anything imperfect in its action, the new stockholder and his associates waived the imperfection by acting upon the agreement of the corporation, and so confirming it in all particulars.

But the assumption underlying the view I have expressed is itself contested, and a proposition asserted which denies the possibility of any corporate action except by the trustees or directors acting "formally as such: a proposition which, if sound, dominates the whole field of controversy, and, establishing that there has been no corporate action at all, effectually shuts out every question of illegality or public injury. I cannot admit that proposition. I think there may be actual corporate conduct which is not formal corporate action; and where that conduct is directed or produced by the whole body both of officers and stockholders, by every living instrumentality which can possess and wield the corporate franchise, that conduct is of a corporate character, and if illegal and injurious may deserve and receive the penalty of dissolution. There always is, and there always must be, corporate conduct without formal corporate action where the thing challenged is an omission to act at all. A corporation organized in the public interest with a view, to the public welfare, and in the expectation of benefit to the community, which is the motive of the state’s grant, may accept the franchise and hold it in sullen silence, doing nothing, resolving nothing, furnishing no formal corporate action upon which the state can put its finger, and say, this the corporation has done by the agency through which it is authorized to act. That is corporate conduct, which the state may question and punish without searching for a formal corporate act.

The directors of a corporation, its authorized and active agency, may see the stockholders perverting its normal purposes by handing it over, bound and helpless, to an irresponsible and foreign authority, and omit all action which they ought to take, offer no resistance, make no protest, but silently acquiesce as directors in the wrong which, as stockholders, they have themselves helped to commit. That again is corporate conduct, though there be an utter absence of directors’ resolutions. Is it asked what they could have done to prevent the organization of the trust; how they were negligent and unfaithful as corporate officers by their omission to act; what good a mere protest or objection would have, accomplished; what effective form their resistance could have assumed ? The answer is that they could have refused to recognize the illegal trust transfer of the stock ; they could have declined to register the new ownership upon their stock-books; they could have said, and acted upon their words, that the original stockholders remained not only the beneficial, but the legal owners of the stock; and, if the board of trustees appealed to the law, the resisting directors could challenge the legality of the transfer as moulded by the combination agreement, and might have defeated the trust and shattered it at the outset of its career. So much they could have done as corporate officers, so much it was their duty to have done as representatives of the corporation; and when, beyond that corporate neglect, they recognized the validity of the stock transfers in trust, put the new and unlawful ownership upon their books, and accepted its votes in the choice of new directors who were to throttle the independence of the corporation and chain it to the will of the trust, I think we must shut our eyes in wilful blindness if we fail to see both corporate neglect and corporate action.

It is true, as we are reminded, that the statute confers upon trustees and directors general authority to manage the stock, property and concerns of manufacturing corporations; and equally true that as a general rule, and as between the companies and those with whom they deal, the corporate action must be manifested through and by the directors; but other statutes indicate with equal plainness that there are coqjorate acts which the trustees cannot perform, and which affect and bind the corporation only upon the condition that they proceed from the stockholders, or from them and the trustees acting together.

In increasing or diminishing the capital stock the corporate act is wholly that of the corporators, and in consolidating two or more companies into one there must be the joint action of both trustees and stockholders. The trust of the refineries, in substance and effect, approached very near to these two corporate acts, so far as the resultant consequences affected the corporators acting. The trust stipulations practically doubled their corporate stock through the agency of the certificates issued, and the combination in its result is largely the equivalent of a substantial consolidation. If these things had been done lawfully, they would have been accomplished by the united action of trustees and corpora-tors, and beyond any question would have been corporate acts. Having been done unlawfully, but by the same united agency aiming at similar results, they must still constitute corporate conduct, unless the bare fact of their illegality takes away their corporate character. To say that would disarm the state' in every case of misuse or abuse of chartered powers.

The abstract idea of a corporation, the legal entity, the impalpable and intangible creation of human thought, is itself a fiction, and has been appropriately described as a figure of speech. It serves very well to designate in our minds the collective action and agency of many individuals as permitted by the law, and the substantial inquiry always is what in a given case has been that collective action and agency. As between the corporation and those with whom it deals, the manner of its exercise usually is material, but as between it and the state the substantial inquiry is only what that collective action and agency has done, what it has in fact accomplished, what is seen to be its effective work, what has been its conduct. It ought not to be otherwise. The state gave the franchise, the charter, not to the impalpable, intangible and almost nebulous fiction of our thought, but to the corporators, the individuals, the acting and living men, to be used by them to redound to their benefit, to strengthen their hands and add energy to their capital. If it is taken away it is taken from them as individuals and corporators, and the legal fiction disappears. The benefit is theirs, the punishment is theirs, and both must attend and depend upon their conduct; and when they all act collectively, as an aggregate body, without the least exception, and so acting reach results and accomplish purposes clearly corporate in their character arid affecting the vitality, the independence, the utility of the corporation itself, we cannot hesitate to conclude that there has been corporate conduct which the state may review and not be defeated by the assumed innocence of a convenient fiction. As was said in People v. Kingston & Middletown Turnpike Co., 23 Wend., 193, “ though the proceeding by information be against-the corporate body, it is the acts or omissions of the individual corporators that are the subject of the judgment of the court.”

It remains to determine whether the conduct of the defendant, in participating in the creation of the trust and becoming an element of it, was illegal and tended to the public injury, and we-may consider the two questions together and without formal separation.

It is quite clear that the effect of the defendant’s action was to divest itself of the essential and vital elements of its franchise by placing them in trust; to accept from the state the gift of corporate life only to disregard the conditions upon which it was given; to receive its powers and privileges merely to put them in pawn; and to give away to an irresponsible board its entire independence and self-control. When it had passed into the hands of the trust, only the shell of a corporation was left standing, as a seeming obedience to the law, but with its internal structure destroyed or removed. Its stockholders retaining their benefical interest, have separated from it their voting power, and so parted with the control which the charter gave them and the state required them to exercise. It has a board of directors nominally and formally in office, but qualified by shares which they do not own, and owing-their official life to the board which can end their power at any moment of disobedience. It can make no dividends, whatever may be its net earnings, and must encumber its property at the command of its master and for purposes wholly foreign to its own corporate interests and duties. At the command of that master it has ceased to refine sugar, and without any doubt for the purpose of so far lessening the market supply as to prevent what is. termed “overproduction.”

In all these respects it has wasted and perverted the privileges conferred by the charter, abused its powers, and proved unfaithful to its duties. But graver still is the illegal action substituted for the conduct which the state had a right to expect and require. It has helped to create an anomalous trust, which is, in substance and effect, a partnership of twenty separate corporations. The-state permits, in many ways, an aggregation of capital, but mindful of the possible dangers to the people, overbalancing the benefits, keeps upon it a restraining hand, and maintains over it a. prudent supervision, where such aggregation depends upon its permission and grows out of its corporate grants. It is a violation of law for corporations to enter into a partnership. N. Y. & Sharon Canal Co. v. The Fulton Bk., 7 Wend., 412; Clearwater v. Meredithl 1 Wall., 29; Whittenton v. Upton, 10 Gray, 596. The case last cited furnishes the reasons with precision and at length. It shows the utter inconsistency of a double allegiance by those who act for the corporation to two different principals, and demonstrates that the vital characteristics of the corporation are of necessity drowned in the paramount authority of the partnership. That the combination of the refineries partakes of the nature of a partnership is not denied. Indeed in one of the papers added to the appellant’s brief it is not only admitted, but asserted and defended. That paper shows quite clearly that by force of the arrangement there was a community of interest in the fund created by the corporate earnings before division, and that each member of the trust shared in the profit and loss of all. It is said, however, that a consolidation of manufacturing corporations is permitted by the law, and that the trust or combination, or partnership, however it may be described, amounts only to a practical consolidation which public policy does not forbid because the statute permits it. Laws of 1867, chap. 960; Laws of 1884, chap. 367. The refineries did not avail themselves of that statute. They chose to disregard it, and to reach its practical results without subjection to the prudential restraints with which the state accompanied its permission. IE there had been a consolidation under the statute, one single corporation would have taken the place of the others dissolved. They would have disappeared utterly, and not as under the trust, remained in apparent existence to threaten and menace other organizations and occupy the ground which otherwise would be left free.

Under the statute, the resultant combination would itself be a corporation deriving its existence from the state, owing duties and obligations to the state, and subject to the control and supervision of the state, and not, as here, an unincorporated board, a colossal and gigantic partnership, having no corporate functions and owing no corporate allegiance. Under the statute, the consolidated taking the place of the separate corporations could have as capital stock only an amount equal to the fair aggregate value of the rights and franchises of the companies absorbed; and not as here, a capital stock double that value at the outset and capable of an elastic and irresponsible increase. The difference is veiy great, and serves further to indicate the inherent illegality of the trust combination.

And here I think we gain a definite view of the injurious tendencies developed by its organization and operation, and of the public interests which are menaced by its action. As corporate grants are always assumed to have'been made for the public benefit, any conduct which destroys their normal functions, and maims and cripples their separate activity, and takes away their free and independent action, must So far disappoint the purpose of their creation as to affect unfavorably the public interest; and that to a much greater extent, when beyond their own several aggregations of capital they compact them all into one combination which stands outside of the ward of the state, which dominates the range of an entire industry, and puts upon the market a capital stock proudly defiant of actual values and capable of unlimited expansion. It is not a sufficient answer to say that similar results may be lawfully accomplished; that an individual having the necessary wealth might have bought all these refineries, manned them, with his own chosen agents, and managed them as a group at his sovereign will; for it is one thing for the state to respect the rights of ownership and protect them out of regard to the business freedom of the citizen, and quite another thing to add to that possibility a further extension of those consequences by creating artificial persons to aid in producing such aggregations.

The individuals are few who hold in possession such enormous wealth, and fewer still who peril it all in a manufacturing enterprise ; but if corporations can combine, and mass their forces in a solid trust or partnership, with little added risk to the capital already embarked, without limit to the magnitude of the aggregation, a tempting and easy road is opened to enormous combinations, vastly exceeding in number and in strength, and in their power over industry, any possibilities of individual ownership; and the State, by the creation of the artificial persons constituting the elements of the combination, and failing to limit and restrain their powers, becomes itself the responsible creator, the voluntary cause of an aggregation of capital, which it simply endures in the individual as the product of his free agency. What it may bear is one thing; what it should cause and create is quite another.

And so we have reached our conclusion; and it appears to us to have been established, that the defendant corporation has violated its charter and failed in the performance of its corporate -duties, and that in inspects so material and important as to justify a judgment of dissolution. Having reached that result, it becomes needless to advance into the wider discussion over monopolies and competition and restraint of trade, and the problems of political economy. Our duty is to leave them until some proper emergency compels their consideration. Without either approval or disapproval of the views expressed upon that branch of - the case by the courts below1, we are enabled to decide that in this State there can be no partnerships of separate and independent corporations, whether directly or indirectly through the medium of a trust; no substantial consolidations which avoid-and disregard the statutory permissions and restraints; but that manufacturing corporations must be and remain several as they were created, or. one under the statute.

The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

All concur.  