
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gregory KOVAR, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-4860-CR.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 26, 2015.
    Richard Haley, Haley Weinblatt & Cal-cagni, LLP, Islandia, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Burton T. Ryan (Jo Ann M. Navickas, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Central Islip and Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CHESTER J. STRAUB, Circuit Judges and LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Loma G. Schofield, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant Gregory Kovar appeals the judgment of the District Court upholding his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(l)(E)(ii), and conspiracy to launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B)(i), (h). The District Court sentenced Kovar principally to 109 months on each count, to run concurrently, followed by five years of supervised release.

On appeal, defendant contends that the Government breached the plea agreement by advocating for an upward departure from the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”). We review interpretations of plea agreements de novo. United States v. Palladino, 347 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir.2003).

In its plea agreement, the Government agreed to “make no motion for an upward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines.” J.A. 52. The District Court found that the recommended term of imprisonment under the guidelines was 70 to . 87 months. The Government then referenced the 120-month recommendation of the Probation Office in its Presentence Report, which was above the proposed Guidelines calculation by that office; implicitly referenced its presentence memorandum, dated December 6, 2013, which advocated for a Guidelines calculation that would include the 120-months recommendation in the Guidelines range; stated that it was seeking a Guidelines sentence “at the minimum”; and stated that it could not seek a higher sentence because of the plea agreement. The sentencing court then imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 109 months, and referenced the 120 months as a benchmark — “I would be inclined to give you 120 months but for the fact that I think you are making some strides. J.A. 250.

Accordingly, with the agreement of the Government and defendant, we remand the cause for resentencing and order that the case be transferred to a different judge. In doing so, we do not suggest any impropriety or bias on the part of the experienced and able district judge.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the cause is REMANDED with instructions to assign the case to a different judge for resentenc-ing. 
      
      .In the Government’s December 6, 2013 pre-sentence memorandum, the Government advocated a higher Criminal History Category than Probation had suggested in order to reach a 120-month sentence and yet remain within the Guidelines range. During oral argument on appeal, defense counsel contended that the Government did not consider advocacy for a "horizontal departure” — in contrast to the more common vertical departure— from the Guidelines as violative of its standard plea agreement. . In its response at oral argument, and in a subsequent submission to the panel, the Government clarified its position that “a horizontal upward departure motion involving criminal history categories ... is as violative of the plea agreement as an upward departure motion resulting in a vertical departure from the Guidelines.” Appel-lee's Letter, January 15, 2015, U.S.C.A. Dkt. No. 72.
     
      
      . The government also "agrees that resen-tencing in front of a different district court,” which is the relief sought by defendant, "would be appropriate in this case.” Appel-lee's Br. 17.
     
      
      . The local rule, which provides for the division of business among the judges of the Eastern District of New York, states in relevant part:
      In a criminal case upon reversal of a judgment and a direction for retrial or resen-tence, on receipt of the mandate of the appellate court the clerk shall randomly select a different judge to preside over the case.
      U.S. Dist. Ct„ E.D.N.Y. L. Rules 50.2(0(1).
     