
    CASE 20 — INJUNCTION
    JANUARY 13.
    Offut’s ex’x vs. Bradford, &c.
    APPEAL prom SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT.
    1. Although an interlocutory order merely dissolving an injunction is not a final decree, revisable by the Court of Appeals, .yet a judgment for damages on the dissolution is final, and may be enforced by execution pendente lite; consequently, when the amount of damages will authorize au appeal, the Court of xlppeals has jurisdiction alone to correct it.
    2. On the dissolution of an injunction sued out by an executrix for her own benefit as devisee, the judgment for damages was properly rendered against her personally, and not against the assets.
    3. An injunction against the creditors of a decedent, cannot be. sued out more than three years alter the qualification of the personal representative. ( Gioil Code, sec. 472.)
    M. Polk, For Appellant,
    CITED—
    
      Revised Statutes, sec. 40, chap. 37, 1 Stanton, 513.
    3 J. J. M., 302; Judah vs. Chiles.
    
    
      Pr. Dec., 282; Lee vs. Gullion.
    
    2 J. J. M., 444; Ward vs. Davidson.
    
    2 Dana, 422 ; 3 J. J. M., 424.
    
    
      8 Dana, 12; Story vs. Hawkins.
    
    James F. Robinson, For Appellee.
    [Brief not in records.]
   JUDGE ROBERTSON

delivered the opinion op the court:

Although an interlocutory order merely dissolving an injunction is not a final decree, revisable by this court, yet a judgment for damages on the dissolution is final, and may be enforced by execution pendente lite; consequently, as there is a' judgment for such damages in this case to the amount of one hundred dollars, this court has jurisdiction alone to correct it; and the motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction is overruled. But we cannot reverse the judgment.

The personal judgment against the executrix, instead of being against the assets, is not apparently erroneous, because the injunction was in the appellant’s personal character, and for her own benefit as devisee; and, consequently, the judgment for damages cannot be reversed merely because it also is personal, nor can it be reversed on the ground that the appellant’s petition would, if filed in time, entitle her to the injunction, for it was not filed within three years after probate of the will and the qualification of the executrix, as required by statute.

Wherefore, we are constrained to affirm the judgment now appealed from.  