
    *Lorenzo D. Monroe et al., plaintiffs in error, vs. Richard V. Carter, defendant in error.
    (Atlanta,
    January Term, 1873.)
    Forcible Entry and Detainer — Possession—New Trial. — When there was a trial before a jury, on a warrant for forcible entry and detainer, and the entry and force by the defendant were admitted, but it was set up that the plaintiff holding as the tenant of the defendant, and there was evidence upon both sides upon the point, in the main, by the parties themselves as witnesses, and the jury found for the plaintiffs, under a charge of the Court telling them that the case turned upon the nature of the plaintiff’s holding, whether in his own right or as tenant, and. the jury found for the plaintiff, this Court will not overrule the Court below in refusing to order a new trial unless the verdict be most manifestly contrary to the evidence. .
    Forcible entry and detainer. Possession. Before Judge Har-REle. Randolph Superior Court. November Term, 1872.
    Richard V. Carter made affidavit before Thomas Coleman, Justice of the Peace, that Lorenzo D. Monroe and Eugenius L. Douglass had forcibly entered and detained a certain lot of-land with a dwelling house and mill thereon in the county of Randolph, of which deponent had had the peaceable, possession. A jury was regularly impaneled and the trial proceeded, '
    The plaintiff testified that he was in the quiet and peaceable possession of said property until January 6th, 1872. On that day he was absent from home, when the defendants took possession and placed a tenant in the dwelling and-mill. The mill and house were both locked. They entered without the consent of the plaintiff.
    The defendants testified that they were in possession of the property during the year 1871 and since; that plaintiff was on the land as their tenant; that they began business on the place on January 6th, 1872.
    Whilst Eugenius L. Douglass was being examined, he was asked by counsel for the plaintiff if there was not a written agreement between plaintiff and defendants as to said property. He replied, that the deed to defendants was in writing, *and plaintiff had a paper from them obligating defendants to reconvey on certain conditions, which he would be glad if plaintiff would produce; he did not think the agreement about the possession of the place was in writing.
    By agreement of all parties the following instrument was introduced in evidence:
    
      “GEORGIA — Randolph County.
    “This agreement made this 4th day of February, 1871, between E. D. Monroe and E. E. Douglass of the one part, and Richard V. Carter of the other part, all of the county and State aforesaid: witnesseth, that whereas, on the 2d day of January of this present year, (1871,) Richard V. Carter, by deed, conveyed to the parties of the first part, lot of land number forty-five, with half of lot number forty-six, lot of land number seventy, south half of lot of land number seventy-one and lot of land number eighty-two, all lying and being in the sixth district of originally Lee, now Randolph county. Now should the said Richard V. Carter, on the 1st day of January, 1872, or before that time, pay to said Lorenzo D. Monroe and E. E. Douglass $1,252 81, with sixteen per centum interest thereon, and pay to Eugenius E. Douglass $970 58, with seven per centum interest thereon to January 1st, 1872, or the time payment may be made, if made before that time, we the said E. D. Monroe and E. E. Douglass, bind ourselves to recovery to said Richard V. Carter the lands with the appurtenances above mentioned and described.
    (Signed)
    “E. L. Douglass. -,
    “L. D. Monroe."
    Much conflicting testimony was introduced as to whether plaintiff, during the year 1871 and until the time when he claimed to have lost possession by the forcible entry of defendants, was in possession in his own right or as the tenant of defendants. The defendants sought to show an advance of money by them to the plaintiff, in consideration of which he agreed to hold the said property as their tenant. The evidence was excluded by the Court.
    *The Court charged the jury, “that the only question to be submitted to and determined by the jury on the trial of forcible entry or forcible entry and detainer, is the possession and the force, without regard to the merit of the title on either side.”
    The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendants filed their petition for certiorari alleging the exclusion of the evidence as to the advance of money and the charge of the Court, as error, which was sanctioned. After argument had, the writ of certiorari was dismissed and a new trial refused. To which ruling the defendants excepted upon each of the grounds aforesaid.
    E. L. Douglass ; Herbert Fielder, for plaintiffs in error.
    Possession is the only question of inquiry: Prince’s Dig. 644; 4 Ga. R„ 193.
    Hood & Kiddoo, for defendant.
    1st. Force having been used in either entry or detainer, plaintiffs in error are guilty: 35 Ga. R., 100.
    2d. Every unlawful entry is a forcible entry: 3 Brevard, 413; 4 Ga. R., 193; 12 E. C. L., 5; 9 Dana’s R., 320; 2 B. Monroe, 300; 9 Yerger, 93, 317.
    
      3d. The verdict .being sustained by the evidence, will not be set aside, whether the charge was right or wrong: 32 Ga. R., 390.
   McCay, Judge.

This is another case of a complaint to this Court of the refusal of a Judge to set aside a verdict of a jury on the facts.

The theory of our law is, that a jury shall pass upon facts. The jurisdiction of this Court only arises when the verdict is so shockingly contrary to the truth of the case, as it appears by the record, that the Judge has abused the power granted him by law to look into the facts and grant or refuse a new trial, accordingly as he shall think the jury have abused their right or not.

*A certiorari, based on a charge of a verdict being contrary to evidence, stands on the same footing as a motion for a new trial, in this respect. Here, the magistrate told the jury distinctly that the question turned on the issue whether the plaintiff in the warrant, had been holding as the tenant of the defendants. There was evidence on both sides, and the decision, by the theory of our law, was with the jury.

Until the Legislature adopts some other mode of trying questions of facts than the trial by jury, it is the duty of the Courts not to interfere with their verdicts for any but very weighty reasons. Primarily, the duty to do that is with the Judge of the Superior Court, and the jurisdiction of this Court only arises when he fails in the performance of his duty. We do not think this is such a case, although the record does, in our opinion, show a stronger case for the plaintiffs in error than for their opponent. But it takes more than this to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court over the verdict of a jury, backed by the judgment of the Judge of the Superior Court.

Judgment affirmed.  