
    Zeewe Dakar MPALA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN, Maria Tonelli, Municipal Librarian, Individual Capacity, Defendants-Appellees, Illingsworth, Badge 59 (WASP) New Haven Police Officer (former), Robinson, Badge 504 (Colored) New Haven Police Officer, Defendants.
    Nos. 13-958, 14-964.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 26, 2014.
    Zeewe Dakar Mpala, pro se, New Haven, CT.
    Victor A. Bolden, Roderick Ryan Williams, New Haven Office of the Corporation Counsel, New Haven, CT, for Defendants-Appellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, DENNY CHIN and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Zeewe Dakar Mpala, proceeding pro se, appeals from the February 28, 2013 judgment of the District Court granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss Mpa-la’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to state a claim, and the March 24, 2014 denial of his motion to reconsider that judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the factual and procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

The only issues Mpala has raised on appeal are whether: (1) the District Court erred by failing to consider the surveillance film of the incident; (2) Mpala adequately alleged an equal protection claim based on library employee Maria Tonelli’s treatment of similarly situated individuals; and (3) the City of New Haven (the “City”) was liable for Tonelli’s conduct.

Each of Mpala’s arguments is unavailing. Mpala claims that the surveillance film showed that Tonelli’s explanation for Mpala’s removal from the library was “fabricated.” Even assuming that the film showed what Mpala claims, it would not have resolved his failure to: (1) identify the due process he was denied; (2) adequately allege that similarly situated individuals were treated differently; (3) adequately allege that his speech was protected by the First Amendment or that it was chilled; or (4) adequately allege that the City was liable under Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Mpala’s argument regarding the City’s liability for Tonelli’s conduct is best characterized as a respondeat superior theory. It is well established that “ ‘a municipality cannot be made liable’ under § 1983 for acts of its employees ‘by application of the doctrine of respondeat superior.’ Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)).

We have considered all of Mpala’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment and order of the District Court. Any pending motions in either appeal are DENIED as moot. 
      
      
        . Mpala has not pleaded facts sufficient to state a plausible equal protection claim.?
     