
    Abraham Mayo versus James Harding.
    Where a seaman shipped for a voyage before the master was appointed, the shipping-paper, at the time of the seaman’s signing it, having a blank space for the master’s name, which was filled when the master signed, it was held that the master was liable to the action of the seaman for his wages.
    Assumpsit for wages due to the plaintiff, as mate of the schooner Eliza, owned by John Gray, now deceased, and commanded by the defendant, on a voyage from Boston to the West Indies and back to Boston.
    
    On the general issue pleaded and joined, the cause was tried at the last November term in this county, before Parlcer, J., and a verdict found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court on the facts in evidence, as they should be reported by the judge.
    It appeared by the shipping-paper, which was in the usual form, that the plaintiff entered as mate on board the said schooner on the IOth of December, 1803, and that he continued on board until the voyage was completed ; and that Harding, the master, did not enter until the 1st of February, 1804. It was in evidence from paroi testimony, that the plaintiff made his contract with Gray, the owner, there being no master until Harding entered. When the voyage was finished, the plaintiff claimed his wages of Gray, who refused to pay him, alleging that, by the reason of the plaintiff’s unskilfulness or negligence in stowing the cargo, a loss [ * 301 ] had happened, much greater in amount than * the sum due to the plaintiff for the wages. After the death of Gray, the plaintiff demanded his wages of his executors, who likewise refused to pay him.
    It also appeared from the testimony of E. Trescot, the person who witnessed the signing of the several persons to the shipping-paper, that he, Trescot, was then in the employment of said Gray, as his clerk ; that, when the plaintiff signed the shipping-paper, only the description of the voyage was filled up in the printed blank, the place therein for the master’s name being then a blank, no master having been engaged, and the same remained a blank until the 1st of February aforesaid, when the defendant engaged as master, at which time also Trescot filled the said blank space with the defendant’s name as master, who continued in that capacity until the completion of the voyage. There was no evidence, other than the contract in the shipping-paper, that the defendant ever promised the plaintiff his wages, or that the plaintiff ever demanded them of him, until he brought this action. As to the merits of the case, as respects the conduct of the plaintiff, and his just right to wages, there was no evidence to support the charge of misconduct above suggested to have been made by Gray.
    
    If the Court, on these facts, should be of opinion that the defendant is liable in law for the wages of the plaintiff, judgment was to be rendered on the verdict, with additional damages, equal to the interest since the finding thereof; otherwise the plaintiff was to become nonsuit, and the defendant recover his costs.
    
      Whitman, for the defendant,
    moved to set aside the verdict, and that the plaintiff should become nonsuit, on the ground that, by the facts in the case, it is apparent that no actual promise was ever made by the defendant, and there is no evidence to support an implied one. The defendant, when the plaintiff entered on board the vessel, had no connection with her, nor for several weeks after. From the circumstances of this case, it is apparent that the plaintiff considered * himself contracting with Gray, [ * 802 ] the owner; and his after-demand on him, and, after the death of Gray, upon his executors, is full confirmation that such were his ideas.
    The law gives a seaman, in ordinary cases, a threefold remedy, — against the owner, the ship, and the master. But the remedy against the latter must be founded wholly on the supposition of an actual contract, or at least an implied one, from the relation of the parties at the time of shipping. But there is no pretence for saying that either of these appears in the case at bar. 
    
    
      Selfridge, for the plaintiff,
    was stopped by the Court.
    
      
      
        Str. 816, Garnam vs Bennett. — Abbott on Shipping, 266, 289.
    
   Curia.

We have heard the counsel for the defendant, and, being satisfied as to the law, a delay in giving our opinion might have an ill effect on contracts by shipping-papers, if such delay should be supposed to arise from any doubt in our minds.

We are clearly of opinion that the objection of the defendant cannot prevail. It is not uncommon for seamen to be shipped by the owner before the master is appointed, and the seamen sign the paper, with a blank left for the name of the master. And it must be understood that the seamen thus signing consent to go the voyage with any master the owner shall appoint, and that the blank be filled with the name of such master when appointed. When the master is appointed, and signs the shipping-paper, the blank being filled with his name, it is an engagement, on his part, to consider the crew already shipped as his crew, and a confirmation of the conduct of the owner in shipping them, as the act of his agent. Each seaman may, therefore, lawfully consider such master as contracting to pay him his wages, in the same manner, and upon the same terms and conditions, as if he had in fact been the master when the seamen were shipped.

Upon these principles, we are satisfied that the verdict is right, and the plaintiff must have judgment.  