
    J.D., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 87-110.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 28, 1989.
    Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robert Kalter, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Steven T, Scott, and Jorge Espinosa, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
    Before HUBBART, BASKIN and COPE, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant was adjudicated delinquent and appeals on the ground that the State did not disclose in discovery a statement made by respondent which was then admitted into evidence. Appellant contends that the lower court failed to conduct a hearing as required by Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971). The record, however, contrary to respondent’s claim, reveals that the court did inquire into the reasons underlying nondisclosure of the statement to the defense and found that respondent had not been prejudiced by the discovery violation. As support for the court’s conclusion affirmatively appears from the record, we affirm. See State v. Hall, 509 So.2d 1093, 1097 (Fla.1987); N.L. v. State, 549 So.2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

Affirmed.

BASKIN, Judge

(dissenting).

The trial court’s inquiry does not comport with the requirements enunciated in Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971). The court made no determination as to the effect of the State’s admitted failure to disclose that it had erroneously denied having in its possession a statement by J.D., in violation of Rule 8.070(a)(l)(iii), Fla. RJuv.P. State v. Hall, 509 So.2d 1093 (Fla.1987); Richardson.

In Cumbie v. State, 345 So.2d 1061 (Fla.1977), the court stated:

It is clear that the trial court’s investigation of the question of prejudice was not the full inquiry Richardson requires. No appellate court can be certain that errors of this type are harmless. A review of the cold record is not an adequate substitute for a trial judge’s determined inquiry into all aspects of the state’s breach of the rules, as Richardson indicates. Especially is this so in eases such as this, where a false response is given to a request for discovery. The mere fact that alleged statements are attributed to the petitioner cannot relieve the state of its duty to disclose; that is precisely the situation contemplated by Rule 3.220(a)(l)(iii).
The trial court erred in admitting into evidence the testimony concerning the alleged statement of the petitioner without conducting an inquiry into the question of prejudice, and this error is reversible as a matter of law.

Cumbie v. State, 345 So.2d at 1062 (footnote omitted). That mandate should have been implemented here.  