
    Patrick Henry, Appellant, v Karen McGeachy, Respondent.
    [53 NYS3d 561]
   In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Solomon, J.), dated October 1, 2015, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

In support of her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of the plaintiff’s spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to the lumbar region of his spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Hall, J.P., Sgroi, Maltese and LaSalle, JJ., concur.  