
    Dong Jin ZHENG, Petitioner, v. BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Respondent.
    No. 08-5318-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 6, 2009.
    
      John Chang, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Michael F. Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Anthony C. Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel; Tiffany Walters Klei-nert, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, JON O. NEWMAN, PIERRE N. LEVAL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Dong Jin Zheng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 9, 2008 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Dong Jin Zheng, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Oct. 9, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. \2006). Where the agency considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008). We find that the agency did not err in denying Zheng’s untimely motion to reopen.

Zheng argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he failed to demonstrate material changed country conditions sufficient to excuse the time limitation for filing his motion to reopen. However, this argument fails where we have previously reviewed the BIA’s consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no error in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish material changed country conditions. See id. at 169-72 (noting that “[w]e do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the agency”); see also Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such ás “the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion”).

Further, while Zheng argues that the BIA failed to explicitly consider certain background evidence, we have rejected the notion that the agency must “expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner,” Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169 (internal quotation marks omitted), and “presume[s] that [the agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise,” Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S.Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006). There is nothing in the record compelling the conclusion that the BIA failed to take into account all of Zheng’s evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).  