
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Geoffrey C. MOUSSEAU, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-50645.
    United States Court of Appeals, . Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 6, 2015.
    
    Filed April 10, 2015.
    Jean-Claude Andre, Assistant U.S., Ranee A. Katzenstein, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Zoran Joseph Segina, I, Assistant U.S., Anoiel Khorshid, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Geoffrey C. Mousseau, Glendale, CA, pro se.
    Before: D.W. NELSON, TASHIMA, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Geoffrey Mousseau (“Mousseau”) appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his motion to determine the enforceability of a restitution order and to lift a restitution lien. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The district court did not err in denying Mousseau’s motion to discharge his restitution obligation and to lift the restitution lien. First, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”) requires full; not partial, restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, 3771(a)(6); United States v. Grice, 319 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir.2003) (per cu-riam). The district court does not have the authority to discharge a restitution obligation that is not fully satisfied. Here, the restitution obligation has not been fully satisfied.

Moreover, a civil settlement in bankruptcy court does not discharge the criminal restitution obligation mandated by the MVRA. A bankruptcy settlement subsequent to the imposition of restitution in criminal court does not waive the requirement of restitution. See United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir.2010); see also United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.1989) (holding “that the existence of a prior bankruptcy settlement does not preclude a subsequent criminal restitution order”). This is so because restitution serves penal objectives, such as deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. Edwards, 595 F.3d at 1013 (citing Cloud, 872 F.2d at 854).

The district court did not err in designating the bankruptcy trustee as the victim. The district court directed Mousseau to remit payments to the trustee so that, in turn, the trustee could return the money to the estate’s creditors. Moreover, even if would have been more precise for the district court to refer to the trustee as the facilitator for the victims’ recovery rather than the sole victim, this choice in language did not cause Mousseau harm. The district court properly credited all payments actually made pursuant to Mous-seau’s bankruptcy settlement, as well as payments by third parties, against Mous-seau’s restitution obligation. Even with these credits, however, Mousseau remains jointly and severally liable for the balance of money owed under the restitution order, an amount in excess of $720,000. Pursuant to the MVRA, the district court cannot discharge a prior restitution order that is not fully satisfied. Any error was harmless.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     