
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Antonio GOMEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 10-30173.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted April 15, 2011.
    Filed April 21, 2011.
    Alexander C. Ekstrom, Assistant U.S., USYA-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Yakima, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Kraig Robert Gardner, Rebecca Louise Pennell, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FDWAID-Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho, Yakima, WA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    
      Before: KLEINFELD, TASHIMA, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Based on the affidavit in support of the application for the search warrant, under the totality of the circumstances, there was a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would have been found at the North Hugo Avenue property. Thus, the magistrate had a substantial basis to determine that probable cause existed. See generally United States v. Crews, 502 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir.2007); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

Because the search warrant authorized officers to search for “any and all paperwork, documents, vehicle registrations, driver’s licenses, or identification cards with the names Sergio Betel Gomez, Antonio Gomez or any combination thereof’ on them, the search of the rag was within the scope of the warrant. Cf. United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir.1984) (“It is axiomatic that if a warrant sufficiently describes the premises to be searched, this will justify a search of the personal effects therein belonging to the person occupying the premises if those objects might contain the items described in the warrant.” (emphasis added)). A driver’s license with a false name, or several, might well be concealed in a rag.

Also, the officer was performing “an otherwise lawful search” for the items specified in the warrant, and would immediately recognize the item in the rag by feel as evidence of a crime. Thus, under the “plain touch” exception to the exclusionary rule, the district court did not err in refusing to suppress the firearm. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     