
    Shed versus Brett and Trustees.
    Going with a promissory note, to demand payment, to the place of business of the makers, in business hours, and finding it shut, is using due diligence.
    This was an action against the defendant, as indorser of another note, made by the same promisors as in the foregoing case. One point in which the present case differed from that, related to the demand on the promisors. William Stevenson,' a notary public, testified, that when the note became due, he went with it, at the request of the indorsee, to the place of business of the promisors, and found it closed, no person being there of whom he could make a demand ; that he made diligent search for the promisors, but could not find either of them. It was objected that this testimony did not prove a demand, nor any sufficient reason for not making one, as both of the promisors lived in Boston, one of them keeping house, and the other boarding with his father.
    And now Prescott and Parsons,
    to show that due diligence had not been used to make a demand, the note not being made payable at the counting-house of the promisors, cited Anderson v. Drake, 14 Johns. Rep. 114; Woodworth v. Bank of America, 19 Johns. Rep. 419 ; Ireland v. Kip, 10 Johns. Rep. 490 ; Ambrose v. Hopwood, 2 Taunt. 61.
    
      Rand, for the plaintiff,
    cited Howe v. Bowes, 16 East, 112 , Browning v. Kinnear, 1 Gow, 81 ; Bateman v. Joseph, 2 Campb. 461 ; S. C. 12 East, 433.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered at the following November term, by

Parker C. J.

Several of the points intended to be reserved in this case have been decided in the preceding. But there is an objection in this, which did not exist in that, viz. that there was no sufficient evidence of a demand upon the makers, or of due diligence to make it. And the question is, whether going to their place of business, finding it shut, no person being left there to answer any inquiries, is due diligence. We put out of the case the declaration of the witness, that he made diligent inquiry, because it does not appear where or of whom he inquired, and as the promisors both lived in Boston, if inquiry was necessary, it would hardly seem that enough was made.

It seems, however, by the authorities, that what was done was sufficient, provided the witness went to the place of business of the makers in business hours ; which is not stated in his testimony. And if, upon further application to Stevenson, he is not able to state this fact, a new trial may be hade or the plaintiff ought to become nonsuit. But supposing this to be with the plaintiff he is entitled to recover. 
      
       See Williams v. Bank of the United States, 2 Peters’s S. C. R. 96; Ogden v. Cowley, 2 Johns. R. 274. It has, however, been held, that where a demand is made at the maker’s house, and the house is shut, and he has gene away, some endeavour must be made to find him. Sullivan v. Mitchell, 1 Car. Law Repos. 482; Collins v. Butler, Str. 1087.
     