
    PEOPLE v. EDWARDS
    1. Criminal Law — Defense—Appointed Counsel — Waiver of Appointed Counsel.
    Allegation of indigent criminal defendant that the trial court’s refusal to permit him to choose between going to trial with appointed counsel or in propria persona was erroneous, held, without merit, where the reeord does not disclose any unwillingness on the court’s part to permit a defense in propria persona or any expression by defendant that he wished to proceed without an attorney and where defendant, aware of available alternatives, had the opportunity before trial to make his decision known or, if undecided, convey his indecision to the eourt.
    2. Criminal Law — Due Process — Assistance of Counsel — Indigent Defendant — Selection of Counsel.
    The right of an indigent defendant to assigned counsel does not give such a defendant the right to an attorney of his own choosing.
    Beferences for Points in Headnotes
    
       21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 310.
    
       21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 318 et seq.
    
    
       21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law | 308,
    
      3. Criminal Law — Sentence—Presence op Counsel.
    Indigent defendants are entitled to effective appointed counsel at the sentencing procedure but it is not an ipso facto denial of the right to counsel where counsel other than the attorney who represented defendant at trial is substituted during the sentencing procedure; counsel’s effectiveness at the sentence proceeding is not determined by his participation at trial.
    Appeal from Kent, John T. Letts, J.
    Submitted Division 3 May 7, 1969, at Grand Rapids.
    (Docket No. 5,660.)
    Decided July 31, 1969.
    Eddie Edwards was convicted of felonious assault. Defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, James K. Miller, Prosecuting Attorney and Robert J. Stephan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
    
      Fred D. Falkinburg, for defendant on appeal.
    Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and R. B. Burns and V. J. Brennan, JJ.
   V. J. Brennan, J.

Defendant, Eddie Edwards, was charged with felonious assault and tried before a Kent county circuit judge sitting without a jury. Shortly before the trial began, defendant requested the court to appoint different counsel as he was dissatisfied with his court-appointed attorney’s preparation for trial. The trial court inquired into the possible causes of his discontent, found none of merit, and told defendant that his attorney was capable of conducting an adequate defense. The trial court also informed defendant that he could either dismiss his attorney and defend himself, or he could continue with said counsel.

Counsel remained and defended Edwards without his objection. The judge found Edwards guilty and subsequently sentenced him to a term of 2-1/2 to 4 years. An associate of the court-appointed attorney represented Edwards during the sentencing proceeding, as the court-appointed attorney had fallen seriously ill. Edwards did not object to the substitution.

On appeal Edwards assigns as error an alleged refusal by the trial court to permit him to choose between continuing with the appointed attorney and defending himself. This allegation is unfounded. The record does not disclose an unwillingness on the trial court’s part to permit a defense in propria persona, nor does it contain an expression by defendant of a desire to represent himself. Aware of the alternatives open to him, defendant had sufficient opportunity, before the trial began to make his decision known, or, if he was undecided, to communicate his indecision to the court.

Defendant also contends the trial court erred by denying his request for a different attorney, although he does not maintain that his trial counsel was incompetent. The right to assigned counsel does not extend to counsel of the indigent defendant’s own choosing. People v. LaMarr (1965), 1 Mich App 389. Therefore the denial of appellant’s request does not constitute error.

Defendant seeks to be resentenced, claiming he was denied due process of law by reason of his trial counsel’s absence during the sentencing proceeding.

The indigent defendant is entitled to the benefit of effective appointed counsel at the sentencing proceeding. People v. Dye (1967), 6 Mich App 217; People v. Theodorou (1968), 10 Mich App 409. The effectiveness of counsel’s assistance at the sentencing proceeding is not determined, however, by his participation at-the trial. Thus the substitution of the associate does not ipso, facto constitute a denial of the right to counsel.

A need for resentencing is not apparent here. Defendant does not contend that the substitute was incompetent or unprepared. Moreover, the trial court inquired into the existence of mitigating circumstances, and defendant was responsive to the questioning.

Affirmed.

All concurred.  