
    THE NASHVILLE, CHATTANOOGA AND SAINT LOUIS RAILWAY COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 13369.
    Decided April 21, 1884.]
    
      On the Facts.
    
    The claimant performs mail service "before the war. The defendants bring a suit in .equity to enforce certain demands. A compromise is effected and a decree entered by consent. It embraces matters not the subject of litigation; among others “mail service” rendered “prior to the 1st day of June, 1871.”
    I.When a decree is properly an adjudication, it is a settled rule that it must conform to the allegations in the pleadings.
    II.When a decree entered by consent is properly a settlement of a controversy, its terms will not be restrained to matters alleged in the pleadings, but will be construed to include all matters which the parties intended should be a subject of settlement and compromise.
    III.Where a decree entered by consent embraces various matters not the subject of litigation and among other, mail service rendered “prior to the 1st day of Jwne, 1871,” it must be held that mail service rendered before the rebellion was included in the settlement.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the ease:
    This action the claimant brought by the voluntary filing of its petition. The following are the facts so far as they are involved in the decision of the court:
    In 1871 a bill in equity, filed in behalf of the United States against the Nashville and Chattanooga Eailway Company, was pending in the United States circuit court for the middle district of Tennessee, to enforce certain demands of the United States against said company. In pursuance of an agreement between and by consent of the parties to the suit, the decree hereinafter set forth was entered in said court.
    The cause of action now pending in this court was not a subject of litigation in the circuit court. The company there did not set up as a set-off or cross-action any demand for mail transportation accruing before or since the war. And in the negotiations which led to the decree above mentioned the claim which forms the subject-matter of this action was not mentioned by either party.
    The following is the decree above described so far as itjs involved in this case:
    “The United States oe America } uvs. ■ | “The Nashville and Chattanooga ¡> Eailroad Company and E. W. Cole, | president. \.
    
    “Be it remembered that on the 10'th day of November, 1871, this cause was heard before the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the middle district of Tennessee at Nashville, upon its equity side, upon the bill of complaint, exhibits, previous proceedings, and agreement of parties in the presence of E. McPhail Smith, United States district attorney, representing the complainant, and E. H. Ewing and W. F. Cooper, solicitors of the defendant, where it appeared to the court that since the last term, in and by virtue of an act of Congress in that behalf, a compromise of all the matters in litigation between the parties has been entered into and fully consummated upon the following terms, stipulations, and conditions, namely, the defendants, the Nashville and Chattanooga Eailroad Company, for, and in consideration of the return and surrender to it, by the United States, of its road as it existed at the time of the said return and' surrender, with all the iron, cross-ties, bridges, and other fixtures, appurtenances, and effects in anywise appertaining and belonging to the said road and returned, surrendered, and turned over therewith, and for and in consideration of the rolling stock, depot houses, and all other the property and effects sold and delivered by the United States to the said defendant, and for which compensation is claimed . by said bill, and for and in consideration of the transfer and assignment of said road, rolling stock, fixtures, appurtenances, and all other said property and effects as aforesaid by the United States to the said defendant, with all the rights of the United States therein acquired by conquest or otherwise, and for and in consideration of the settlement, satisfaction, and discharge of all mutual claims and accounts between the parties as they existed on the 1st day of June, 1871, admitted that there was due from the defendant to the United States on that day the sum of one million of dollars, and agreed to pay the same as follows: One-half of said sum, five hundred thousand dollars, to be paid ten years after the 1st of June, 1871, and the other half twenty years from said date, with interest upon the whole of said principal sum, uotil paid, at the rate of four per cent, per annum, payable semi-annually on the 1st day of December .and June, counting from 1st June,-1871, the said principal and interest made payable at-, and secured by the bonds of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad Company and a mortgage on the company’s road, property, income, and franchise.
    
      if It was further agreed that a final decree might be entered in this cause setting forth the terms of the compromise, and providing that in case of default for more than ninety days in the payment of any instalment of interest as the same falls due, ■or any part thereof, or of the. principal debt at maturity as aforesaid, or any part thereof, the sum in default might be collected by an execution of the decree. It further appearing by the admissions of the parties by their solicitors in open court, that this compromise has been carried out by the execution by the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad Company of its bonds, with interest coupons attached as agreed upon, and by the further execution of a satisfactory mortgage of the road, property, income, and franchises to secure the said bonds and coupons, •according to the terms of the agreement; and the delivery thereof to, and acceptance thereof by, the United States: It is therefore, by consent of parties, ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the compromise as aforesaid be entered and made the descree of this court, and that the rights of the parties be, and they are hereby, declared adjudged and decreed accordingly.
    “ That thesaid Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad Company take their road and all its appurtenances as aforesaid, and all ■the rolling stock, property, and effects as aforesaid, with all the rights of the United States therein, free from all claim or demand of the United States, and subject only to the debt and lien secured by the said agreement of compromise and of this ■decree.
    “ And it is further found by the court, in accordance with the terms of said agreement of compromise and settlement, that there was due from the defendant to the United States on the 1st day of June, 1871, for and on account of the claim set forth in the bill of complaint, after allowing all credits thereon for services rendered by the defendant, to and for the use of the ■complainant for mail service, or military transportation, or on any other account prior to' the day last aforesaid, a balance, amounting to the sum of one million dollars, to bear interest from said day at the rate of four per cent, per annum, payable semi-annually on the 1st day of June and December of each .year, one-half of said principal, to wit, the sum of five hundred thousand dollars, to be paid on the 1st day of June, 1881, and the remainder thereof, to wit, the sum of five hundred thousand dollars to be paid on the 1st day of June, 1891.”
    
      Mr. O. F. Benjamin for the claimant.
    
      Mr. George L. Douglass (with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendants.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The decree which was rendered by the United States dircuit court in Tennessee was not a result of litigation, but the fruit of agreement and compromise. Theparties litigant virtually went before the court, as contracting parties in European countries go before a notary, and made a declaration of what they had agreed upon, and that declaration was embodied in the form of a decree entered by consent.

When a decree is properly an adjudication, “ it is a settled rule that it must conform to the allegations in the 'pleadings as well as the proofs in the case.” (Crocket v. Lee, 7 Wheaton R., 522.) Hence, when construing such a decree, the generality of its terms must be restrained to the matters set up in the pleadings. So when adverse parties voluntarily enter into an agreement of accord, the instrument ordinarily will be construed as settling only the, matter which was in controversy. But it is within the power of the disputants to settle all differences existing between them ; and it is the policy of the law that a settlement of things which might have been settled and ought to have been settled 'shall have full effect given to it, and close the doors of litigation to the contending parties.

In the present case we find, from an inspection of the pleadings, that the claimant’s cause of action was not a subject of litigation in the former suit, and that moreover it was not a subject of- correspondence, nor an item of negotiation when the settlement was a matter of discussion. So far these facts are favorable to the claimant. But we also find, from an inspection of the decree, that the parties went outside of the allegata -and brought into the settlement various things not subjects of litigation, and, among others, “ services rendered by the defendant,” (the claimant here,)' “ to and for the use of 'the complainants,” (the defendants here,) “for mail service;” and we find that this “ mail service ” thus brought into the settlement was without specification or limitation, save that it was rendered “prior to-the 1st day of June, 1871; ” and we find, moreover, that the balance of $1,000,000 found to be “ due from the defendant to the United States on the 1st day of June, 1871, for and on account of the claim set forth in the bill of complaint” was struck “ after allowing all credits thereon for services rendered by the defendant, to and for the nse of the complainant for mail service, or military transportation, or any other account prior to the day last aforesaid.”. Neither party may have thought of this old ante bellum claim, yet both may have intended that all demands should be merged in the accord of the decree, those of the past as well as those of the present, those forgotten as well as those remembered. The complainants were seeking to enforce their demands as a matter of right, and the defendant brought into court and tendered, by way of compromise, first, all of its cross-demands against the complainant existing on the day of settlement, including “mail service”; secondly, $1,000,000 of interest-bearing securities. Those being the conditions and circumstances of the settlement, it is impossible for this court to infer that the defendant intended to carve out of the mass of its surrendered cross-demands and reserve to itself for future litigation one little non-interest-bearing claim, in kind, mail service, in time, prior to “ the 1st day of June, 1871.” Such a demand ought to have been included in the settlement, and it is the opinion of the court that it was.

The judgment of the court is that the petition be dismissed.  