
    Robert E.W. McMILLAN, III, Appellant, v. John W. HORAN, Individually, and John W. Horan, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Harry E. Ward and John W. Horan, as Trustee, under Painters Hill Trust Agreement, Appellee.
    No. 93-573.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Feb. 25, 1994.
    Clifford A. Taylor, Bunnell, for appellant.
    Patrick H. Weidenbenner, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The trial court’s order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint with prejudice for failure of the plaintiff to file an amended complaint within the time allotted by court order is reversed on the authority of Kozel v. Osten-dorf, 629 So.2d 817 (Fla.1994) (corrected opinion). That decision now requires a trial court to consider six factors prior to determining the appropriate sanction for a plaintiffs failure to amend within the time specified by court order. Any final dismissal of a defaulting plaintiff, or the record upon which it is based, should demonstrate that the decision to dismiss conforms with the Kozel factors.

As emphasized in that opinion, our supreme court is concerned with efficiency in the judicial system at all levels. When attorneys fail to adhere to filing deadlines and other procedural requirements, the trial courts, where appropriate, should utilize fines, public reprimands and contempt orders to expedite the progress of cases.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur.

GRIFFIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.

GRIFFIN, Judge,

concurring specially.

I write with some embarrassment to confess that I do not understand footnote two of the supreme court’s opinion in Kozel, and I am a little worried about how it will be interpreted. The supreme court recently took the trouble to revise this footnote, so obviously they understand it, but it has me stumped. The court observes:

[Wjhen the circumstances involve the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint, there are no similar notice requirements. The rules of civil procedure do not require the defendant to file a motion for default or the court to notify the plaintiff that an application for default is pending. Granted, the plaintiff is aware of the filing deadlines and is responsible for the action that she initiates. Nevertheless, dismissal is an unusually harsh sanction when neither the court nor the defendant is required to notify the plaintiff that dismissal is pending.

629 So.2d at 818. The footnote suggests that a plaintiff who fails to timely amend is not entitled to notice and a hearing prior to dismissal. While it is certainly true that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500, which deals with defaulting defendants, does, not make provision for a plaintiffs failure to timely amend, there is a substantial body of case law holding that notice to a plaintiff in such circumstances is required under Rule 1.420. Sekot Laboratories, Inc. v. Gleason, 585 So.2d 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Montgomery Ward, 538 So.2d 974 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Edward L. Nezelek, Inc. v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 413 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Moreover, given the whole tenor of the court’s opinion and the nature of the six factors announced, any decision to dismiss with prejudice would have to be based upon evidence taken at a noticed hearing. How else, for example, would the court determine the reason for the late filing and whether the lateness was justifiable? Whatever footnote two means, I do not believe it means that a plaintiff who fails to meet a court’s time limit to amend a complaint is subject to dismissal with prejudice without notice' or hearing.  