
    Fulton Bank of Brooklyn v. Chase et al.
    
    (Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.
    
    July 2, 1889.)
    • Interpleader—When Lies—Separate Claims.
    Plaintiff sold collaterals placed with it to secure a loan, realizing $3,157 more than was due on the loan. Various parties, claiming portions of the collaterals, brought their several actions against plaintiff for conversion. The debtor’s executors then notified plaintiff that they claimed the $3,157. Held, that the claims of the various parties against plaintiff were separate and distinct, and interpleader would not lie.
    Appeal from special term, Kings county.
    Action by the Fulton Bank of Brooklyn against Herbert D. Chase and others, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, on the following state of facts: In January, 1885, plaintiff loaned one George K. Chase $40,000 on a “collateral stock note,” signed by defendant Herbert D. Chase, and the securities mentioned therein. From time to time portions of these securities were surrendered on payments being made, or on the delivery of other securities. In October, 1887, after the death of George K. Chase, plaintiff sold the securities, realizing $3,157.07 more than the amount of its claim. Afterwards Herbert D. Chase, Christopher Meyer, an 1 Euphemia W. Bedell, each claiming a portion of the pledged securities, brought several actions against the bank for conversion, and the executors of George K. Chase served a notice on the bank that they claimed the surplus realized by the sale of the collaterals. The bank now brings this action against all the claimants, to restrain them from proceeding against it, and to require them “to interplead together concerning their claims to said sum of $3,157.07.” The complaint was dismissed, and plaintiff appeals.
    Argued before Barnard, P. J., and Dykman and Pratt, JJ.
    
      Bergen & Dykman, for appellant. V. & C. A. H. Bartlett, for respondents.
   Pratt, J.

The judgment appealed from is clearly correct. The claims of the various parties against the bank are separate and distinct, each depends on its own circumstances, and they have no inherent connection with each other. If the bank has no legal right to use the stock of Meyer, and by such use incurred a liability to the owner of the stock, the action already brought by the party claiming to be injured is the most convenient means to determine the question. If the bank had such authority, it will prevail in the action. If it liad not, the court cannot afford any relief, and it must respond for such damage as it has inflicted. There is no propriety in the claimants, under the Meyer transaction, being hampered by matters with which they have no concern. The same may be said of each of the other claimants. Their rights depend upon alleged unauthorized dealings of the bank with securities now claimed to be owned by the various plaintiffs; and the limit of their recovery, if they can sustain that claim, does not depend upon the amount realized by the bank. When those claims are disposed of, if the bank prevails, and they shall still have in its possession a fund it cannot conscientiously keep, an application to pay it into court might be entertained. But the court cannot now grant such permission upon the terms asked, viz., that the bank be protected against all the claimants. Judgment affirmed, with costs.  