
    Guy LEMIEUX, Petitioner-Appellant, v. A.P. KANE, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 06-16716.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 14, 2011.
    
    Filed May 18, 2011.
    Guy Lemieux, Soledad, CA, pro se.
    John J. Jordan, Esq., San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    
      Amber Nicole Wipfler, Office of the California Attorney General, Oakland, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: HUG, W. FLETCHER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Guy Lemieux appeals the district court’s denial of his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Lemieux was sentenced in 1986 to 15 years to life for second-degree murder. Lemieux’s petition claims that the California Board of Prison Terms (Parole Board or Board) violated his federal due process rights when, in 2001, it found him unsuitable for parole for the sixth time. The district court held that the Board’s denial was supported by appropriate evidence. Because the remaining facts and procedural history are familiar to the parties, we recite them here only as necessary to explain our decision. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) and, in light of Swarthowt v. Cooke, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 859, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011) (per curiam), we affirm.

Petitioner has not obtained a certificate of appealability (COA) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). At the time Petitioner applied for a COA, our case law was such that it was unnecessary to obtain a COA for us to review a parole board’s decision and, accordingly, Petitioner’s COA application was denied. See Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir.2005) (per curiam), overruled by Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 553-54 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). Because a certificate is now required and because “[w]e may issue such a certificate sua sponte,” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 554, we certify for appeal the issue of whether Lemieux was denied parole in violation of his federal due process rights.

In Swarthout v. Cooke, the Supreme Court recognized that “[bjecause the only federal right at issue is procedural, the relevant inquiry is what process [a prisoner] received, not whether the state court decided the case correctly.” Id. at 863. Procedural due process is satisfied where the inmate “[is] allowed to speak at [his] parole hearings and to contest the evidence against [him], [is] afforded access to [his] records in advance, and [is] notified as to the reasons why parole was denied.” Id. at 862. Such process was afforded here; on December 18, 2001, the Board convened a hearing where Petitioner was represented by counsel, allowed to speak and contest the evidence and given a written decision from the Board. Although Petitioner asserts that the Parole Board’s decision was not supported by “some evidence,” Cooke makes clear that such an argument is for the California courts. Id.; see also Pearson v. Muntz, 639 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir.2011).

Finally, Appellee’s motion for judicial notice of certain documents (Docket No. 19) is denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     