
    Noyes P. Gregory v. The State of Ohio.
    Where A., for the purpose of defrauding B., procured 0., an innocent party, to sign the name of B. to a promissory note, by falsely representing that O. was authorized by B. so to do—Held, that A. was guilty of forgery.
    Motion for the allowance of a writ of error to the Court ■of Common Pleas of Franklin county.
    The plaintiff in error was indicted and convicted, under section 22 of the crimes act, as amended by the act of March 24, 1865 (S. & S. 264), for uttering and publishing as true and genuine a certain false, forged, and counterfeited promissory note for the payment of $300, knowing the same to be false, forged, and counterfeited, with intent to defraud a certain person named in the indictment.
    The note purported to have been made by Daniel Bevis, payable to the order of E. W". Phelps four months after date, or sooner, if made out of the sale of E. W. Phelps’ harvest and saw sharpener; was dated June 13, 1874, and indorsed “ E. W". Phelps.”
    On the tria], evidence was given tending to prove that, .at the date of the note, negotiations were pending between the plaintiff in error and Daniel Bevis, who resides in Prospect township, Marion county, in this state, which resulted in Bevis agreeing to become agent for the sale of the machine above named, in certain townships of Marion and Union counties, to complete which a contract was to be signed in duplicate by Bevis; but, as he was unable to write his name, his daughter Rebecca Jane was called, and directed to sign his name to the contract for him; that while Rebecca Jane was at the table to sign the contract for her father, Miles Gregory, a brother of the plaintiff in error, engaged Mr. Bevis in the inspection of, and conversation about, some pictures that were hanging on the wall at the side of the room opposite that at which the writing was being done, and after she had signed the contract, the plaintiff’ in error produced the note set out in the indictment, and requested her to sign her father’s name to it, saying that it was “<a little agreement between her father and himself;” that she signed it, as requested by the plaintiff in error, without further inquiry; and that the name of Daniel Bevis wTas signed to the note by his daughter, without his authority, knowledge, or consent.
    After the close of the argument, the court charged the jury, among the other instructions given, as follows : “ In this ease, it is admitted that the name of Bevis was written on the note by Miss Bevis, the daughter of Bevis (Bevis not being able to write his name, as he testifies). Now, if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Bevis and the defendant had agreed in regard to the papers Bevis was to sign to complete the negotiation in hand between them— that a promissoiy note was not one of the papers Bevis had agreed to sign, that it was not understood by him that he was to sign, and he did not intend to sign, a promissory note, all of which was known to the defendant; that Bevis being unable to write his name, his daughter wTas called on to act for him in signing such papers as he understood and agreed he would sign—then, and in such case, and to that extent, she was the agent of Bevis, and when she had written his name to those papers, her agency for him ceased. And if you shall further find that the defendant, without the knowledge and consent of Bevis, and with intent to de^aud, directed and procured her to sign the name of' Bevis to the promissory note in evidence, she acted in that respect for the defendant. In law, it was the act of the defendant, and the signature so procured was a forgery, and the note was a false and forged instrument.” To which the plaintiff in error excepted.
    After verdict, a motion was made to set it aside and for a new trial, which was overruled by the court and excepted to; and, after sentence, the plaintiff in error presented his-bill of exceptions, embodying the evidence, ruliugs, and charge of the court, which was signed and sealed by the-court, and made part of the record.
    The reasons for this motion appear in the assignment of error on the transcript of the record on file in this case.
    
      Pond $ Jones and Geo. K. Nash, for plaintiff in error,,
    claimed this was not a case of forgery (8. & C. 409, as amended 8. & 8. 264), but the procuring the signature of a person to a promissory note by a false pretense or pretenses (S. & 0. 429, as amended 70 Ohio L. 39). See 3 Chitty’s Crim. Law, 1006; 2 Bishop on Crim. Law, secs. 472, 473; Wharton’s Crim. Law, sec. 1441; Putnam v.. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 53; Hill v. The State, 1 Yerg. 76; Wright v. People, 1 Breese, 66; Beg v. Collins, 2 Moody & Rob. 46;: lb. 54; 2 Bishop Crim. Law, sec. 590; 1 lb. sec. 584; 22. Penn. St. 394.
    That Rebecca did not act as the agent of Gregory, but as the agent of her father, Bevis, and was ino1 „ced to do-so by the false representations of Gregory. 3 Chitty’s Crim. Law, 1006; 2 Bishop on Crim. Law, se s. 472,473.
    
      John Little, attorney-general, and «7. H. Onhwaite, prosecuting attorney, for the state :
    Rebecca was not the agent of her father m signing the note (1 Parsons on Contracts, 39, 40, 44), b •> the agent of Gregory; and the signing was the signing of the principal, Gregory, and was forgery. 2 Car. & 7 ir. 528; Wharton’s Crim. Law, sec. 1419; 2 Car. & Kir. 01.
   Rex, J.

Numerous errors are assigned on the record; but the errors relied on by counsel for the plaintiff' in error in argument are:

“ 1. That the court erred in overruling the motion of the defendant to take the testimony of Daniel and Rebecca Jane Bevis from the jury.

“ 2. That the court erred in its charge to the jury.

“ 3. That the verdict was against the weight of the evidence in the case.”

The first and second propositions present for decision the same question, viz :

Whether the procuring by the plaintiff in error of the signature of Daniel Bevis to the promissory note set out in the indictment, in the manner shown by the evidence, was a forgery by him ?

The reasons urged by counsel in support of the motion of the plaintiff’ in error to withdraw the testimony of Bevis and his daughter from the jury are : that as the daughter was acting as the agent of her father, in signing his name to the contract, she continued to act in the same capacity in signing his name to the promissory note, although she was not authorized so to do by her father, and was induced thereto by the false pretenses and representations of the plaintiff’ in error; and, therefore, that the plaintiff, if guilty of any crime, is guilty of procuring, by false pretenses, the signature of Daniel Bevis to the promissory note, as the maker thereof, which is also made punishable by statute; and the same reasons are urged in support of their second claim, “ that the court erred in its charge to the jury.”

We do not think that these reasons are well founded. The acts of the agent, to bind the principal, must be within the scope of the authority given to the agent, and if the signing of her father’s name to the promissory note was not within the scope of her authority as his agent, the false pretenses and representations of the plaintiff in error could not and did not extend her authority as such agent.

In this case the agency of the daughter for her father extended to the signing of his name to the contract in duplicate, and no farther. When, therefore, these two papers were signed, her agency for her father ceased. The evidence in the case tends to show that this was the extent of her authority as such agent, and that she was induced to sign the promissory note by the representations of the plaintiff' in error, and at his request, believing at the time •that the representations were true.

In signing her father’s name to the promissory note, Rebecca was therefore the innocent agent of the plaintiff in error, and hence her act was the act of the plaintiff in error, and was a forgery. Reginald v. Clifford, 2 Carr. & Kir. 202.

We are, therefore, of opinion that the court did not err in overruling the motion of the plaintiff in error to withdraw the testimony of the witnesses named from the jury, nor in its charge to the jury.

The evidence set out in the bill of exceptions, in our opinion, fully sustains the verdict.

Motion overruled.

Welch, C. J., White, Gilmore, and McIlvaine, JJ., concurred.  