
    John B. Beazley, use of Frederick Norcom, vs. Seargent S. Prentiss.
    The parties to the record are the only persons in whose name an appeal or writ of error from the circuit court can be prosecuted, and if the case comes up in any other name, it cannot be entertained; an appeal, therefore, prosecuted in the name of and by the assignee of a judgment, from the decision of the circuit court, quashing an execution upon the judgment, must be dismissed.
    A levy upon real estate constitutes no satisfaction of an execution, until consummated by sale ;• therefore, where an execution was levied on real estate, and the sale enjoined, on the ground that other property was first liable; and the judgment creditor levied another execution on the other property designated, the sale of which was again enjoined on the ground that still other property of the judgment debtor was liable before that; and the creditor levied his third execution on the property last designated, which execution with the levy, was quashed because of the previous undisposed of levies; it was held, that the last execution was improperly quashed ; and the quashal of it no bar to the issuing of another execution.
    In error from the circuit court of Warren county; Hon. George Coalter, judge.
    On the 6th of May, Af D. 1845, Seargent S. Prentiss filed his' petition in the circuit court, stating that John B. Beazley, on the 27th of April, 1849, obtained a judgment against him, for $2130; that execution issued, and was levied on lots 132 and 133, which were the property of Prentiss at the time the judgment was obtained, and subject to its lien, and which were worth $8000, and the sale of which was enjoined by the Canal Bank of New Orleans, and a suit was pending between said bank and Beazley; that these lots are still liable to this judgment, and that Beazley has not released or discharged said levy. That afterwards Beazley sued out a second execution, and levied it upon other property of petitioner, to wit, on lots 13 and¡14, and S3, 104 and 105; that lots 33, 104 and 105 were sold for $15, but the sale of lots 13 and 14 was not made, the sale having been enjoined by the Commercial Bank of Natchez; that said'lots were the residence of said Prentiss, and of great value, and were liable to the judgment; that notwithstanding said two levies, yet undischarged, Beazley sued out another execution, and levied it on lots 90, 91, 92 and 93, and upon three quarters of 47 acres of land belonging to Prentiss, which had been advertised for sale, under this the last execution. He prays a supersedeas to the sale, upon the ground that there are already two existing levies of great value, undisposed of, the one enjoined by the Canal Bank, and the one by the Commercial Bank. This supersedeas was granted, and issued against Beazley, who was the only defendant there. In October, 1840, Frederick Norcom filed an answer to the petition, setting out that he is the assignee of Beazley, and sole owner of the judgment; that the value of the property levied on, is greatly overrated; that the sale of lots 132 and 133 was enjoined by the Canal Bank, not because they were not bound by the judgment, which fact the bill admitted; and not seeking to avoid or deny or impugn the judgment or execution, or averring that the same was paid or satisfied, but only seeking to enjoin the sale, until other property of defendants, which was pointed out, should be first sold, which, the bill averred, was liable before these lots levied on. Accordingly a second execution was issued, and levied on the property thus pointed out, and a s¡ale of that enjoined by the Commercial Bank of Natchez, upon the same ground, their bill pointing out as first liable, certain other property belonging to Prentiss; upon that injunction a third execution was issued and levied upon the property so pointed out by the Commercial Bank of Natchez, and upon a levy made upon that, this supersedeas was granted, and the execution quashed. -
    The answer of Norcom entered into details which need not be further noticed. The court below, on the hearing of the petition, quashed the execution and levy; and Norcom appealed and executed bond in his own name as appellant.
    
      Mason and Burwell, for appellant,
    Contended that the last execution was improperly quashed, inasmuch as no sale had taken place under the former levies, which had proved inoperative, and therefore no satisfaction of the execution. They cited Gilbert on Executions, 24, 25; Pickens v. Marlow, 2 S. & M. 434; 4 lb. 133.
    
      W. C. Smedes, for appellee.
    1. This appeal cannot be maintained, because not prosecuted by a party of the record. Hutch. Code, 932, § 15; Smedes’ Digest, Tit. Appeal/p. 43.
    2. Norcom’s answer no evidence, because not a party to the writ; but on the facts disclosed, with two levies undisposed of, the third levy was properly quashed. M’Gehe v. Handley, 5 How. Miss. R. 625; Bibb v; Jones, 7 How. 397; Planters’ Bank v. Spencer, 3 S., & M. 305; Smedes’ Digest, Tit. Execution, § 39, 52, 32; lb. Tit. Judgment, § 140, 80, 94.
   Mr. Justice Clayton

delivered the opinion of the court.

There is a preliminary question made in the argument of this cause, which will render a decision of the merits unnecessary.

The execution which was quashed, issued upon a judgment rendered in favor of John B. Beazley. In an answer to the petition for a supersedeas, Norcom interposed, and alleged that the beneficial interest in the judgment and execution then belonged to him, and upon the quashing of the execution, he took an appeal, and gave bond in his own name. This was not in accordance with the statute, nor with any established practice. The parties on the record are the only persons in whose name an appeal or writ of error from the circuit court can be prosecuted, and if the case comes up in any other name, it cannot be entertained. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

We have looked into the record, however, and the point presented thereby, and it may save litigation to give our impressions in regard to it. The levy upon real estate constitutes no satisfaction of an execution, until consummated by sale. Before that period, there is no change either of property or possession, and no reason to hold the levy to be a satisfaction.- When in this case the party was enjoined from selling the particular lots and lands levied on, because there were other lands which ought to be first subjected, surely he ought to be permitted to pursue those lands. Otherwise he is precluded from making his money, although it is conceded on all hands that some property ought to be liable for it.» A first levy was enjoined, because other property was said to be first liable; a second shared the same fate; and the third execution was quáshed, because the judgment was held to be satisfied by the previous levies. We do not think such satisfaction is substantial.

The present judgment, however, cannot be disturbed, and the appeal will be dismissed. But this will constitute no bar to the > issuing of another execution.  