
    COLBY v TOBBA, INC
    Docket No. 77180.
    Submitted August 8, 1985, at Lansing.
    Decided October 22, 1985.
    Plaintiffs, Robert D. and Geraldine E. Colby, brought an action in the Genesee Circuit Court against defendant, Tobba, Inc., to foreclose a land contract. The court appointed a receiver, entered a judgment of foreclosure and ordered a sale. Prior to the entry of judgment, the receiver made certain payments to the plaintiffs on the contract. The sale was held and, after the period of redemption had expired, the court, Earl E. Borradaile, J., confirmed the sale. Defendant appealed, alleging that acceptance by the plaintiffs of the payments made by the receiver waived the foreclosure and reinstated the land contract. Held:
    
    1. Acceptance of payments by a land contract vendor from a court-appointed receiver for the vendee during the pendency of a foreclosure action does not waive the foreclosure and reinstate the land contract.
    2. The trial court correctly concluded that no surplus from the sale existed.
    Affirmed.
    Vendor and Purchaser — Foreclosures — Receivers — Waiver — Revised Judicature Act.
    Acceptance of payments by a land contract vendor from a court-appointed receiver for the vendee during the pendency of a foreclosure action does not waive the foreclosure and reinstate the land contract (MCL 600.2926, 600.2927, 600.3110; MSA 27A.2926, 27A.2927, 27A.3110).
    References for Points in Headnote
    Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchaser §§ 404 et seq.
    
    Sufficiency of tender of payment to effect defaulting vendee’s redemption of rights in land purchased. 37 ALR4th 286.
    
      Anagnost & Hall, P.C. (by Christ A. Anagnost), for plaintiff.
    
      George Killeen, for defendant._
    
      Before: Hood, P.J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr., and D. P. Kerwin, JJ.
    
      
       Recorder’s court judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
    
   Per Curiam.

This action arises from defendant’s default on a land contract. Defendant is appealing as of right from the order of confirmation of the foreclosure sale of the property. On appeal defendant argues that plaintiffs’ acceptance of payments by a court-appointed receiver constituted a waiver of the initial foreclosure and that it is entitled to credit for all payments made during the forefeiture period. We find defendant’s arguments to be without merit and affirm the trial court.

Defendant argues that acceptance of payments from the court-appointed receiver waived the foreclosure and reinstated the land contract. Defendant’s argument is based upon Krell v Cohen, 214 Mich 590; 183 NW 53 (1921), and Rubenstine v Powers, 215 Mich 434; 184 NW 589 (1921). However, those cases were decided under the law as it existed under the Judicature Act of 1915. That act was repealed, effective January 1, 1963, by the Revised Judicature Act, 1961 PA 236. Additionally we note that defendant as not the one who made the payments: rather, it was the court-appointed receiver. If defendant had wished to retain ownership, payment in full was required. MCL 600.3110; MSA 27A.3110. By making the payments, the court-appointed receiver was fulfilling his statutory duties. MCL 600.2926; MSA 27A.2926; MCL 600.2927; MSA 27A.2927. We decline defendant’s invitation to create a rule which would require vendors to refuse all payments from a court-appointed receiver.

Defendant also contends that it is entitled to a return of approximately $57,000 for payments that it paid during the forfeiture period. After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the trial court that no surplus existed.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

Affirmed. Costs to appellees.  