
    WALLS v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Nov. 20, 1912.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1913.)
    1. Criminal Law (§ 1159)—Vekdict—Con-clusiveness.
    Where the state’s evidence, if believed, is sufficient to support the verdict, it is conclusive on appeal, though contradicted and impeached by the testimony of accused.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3074-3083; Dec. Dig. § 1159.]
    2. Chiminal Law (§ 614)—Continuance-Absence of Witnesses.
    Where a continuance on the ground of the absence of witnesses was granted, and accused thereafter used no diligence to procure their attendance on the trial, a second continuance was properly denied, especially where the application did not show that their testimony could not be procured from another source.
    [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1312-1314; Dec. Dig. § 614.]
    
      3. Seduction (§ 44) — Evidence—Admissibility.
    The state, on a trial for seduction is not confined to proof of the first act of intercourse, but subsequent acts may be shown.
    [Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. § 78; Dee. Dig. § 44.]
    4. Criminal Law '(§ 1091) — Misconduct op Prosecuting Attorney — Bill op Exceptions— Sufficiency.
    Bill of exceptions complaining of statements and argument by the prosecuting attorney, which does not show the occasions for them, or that they were improperly made under the circumstances, does not show reversible error, especially where no written requests were made for instructions that the jury should disregard such matters.
    [Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2S23, 2828-2833, 2843, 2931-2933, 2943; Dec. Dig. § 1091.]
    5. Criminal Law (§ 1091) — Excluding Evidence-Bill op Exceptions.
    A bill of exceptions complaining of the refusal of the court to permit defendant, on trial for seduction, to prove that witnesses had heard that third persons had accused prosecutrix of improper relations with others than defendant, as qualified by the court’s showing that the witnesses in fact, testified the reverse, did not show error; the court indicating to defendant that he could prove the character of prosecutrix by general reputation or by specific acts.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2823, 2828-2833, 2843, 2931-2933, 2943; Dec Dig. § 1091.]
    6. Seduction (§ 36) — Evidence—Justification.
    Where accused seduced prosecutrix by virtue of a promise of marriage, the fact of her subsequent misconduct with others was not a justification or ground of defense.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Seduction, Cent. Dig. § 62; Dee. Dig. § 36.]
    7. Criminal Law ■(§ 553) — Evidence—Credibility op Witnesses.
    Where accused seduced prosecutrix by virtue of a promise of marriage, and she subsequently was guilty of improper acts with others, the fact of her subsequent misconduct may be considered on the question of her credibility as a witness.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1252; Dec. Dig. § 553.]
    8. Criminal Law (§ 1043) — Instructions— Objections — Sufficiency.
    Complaints of instructions on the ground that the court erred in refusing charges mentioned by number are too general to be considered on appeal.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2654, 2655; Dec. Dig. §
    
    Appeal from District Court, Hall County; S. P. Huic, Judge.
    Tom Walls was convicted of crime, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Robert J. Thorne, of Memphis, and H. B. White, of Clarendon, for appellant. C. EJ. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the state.
    
      
      For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
    
      
      For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   PRENDERGAST, J.

The appellant was indicted and convicted of seduction. The t jury fixed the lowest penalty therefor.

Among other grounds, appellant complains that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. It would serve no useful purpose to state the evidence in this case. Suffice it to say that from the state’s side it is amply sufficient, if believed by the jury, to sustain the conviction. That there were contradictions by the defendant’s witnesses of the state’s, and more or less impeaching testimony, does not change the rule. That occurs in a great many cases brought before us. These matters were all for the lower court and the jury. We cannot usurp their power Nor authority, nor take the decision of such questions from them. Kearse v. State, 151 S. W. 827; Love v. State, 150 S. W. 920; Duckett v. State, 150 S. W. 1177, recently decided, but not yet officially reported. Many other cases might be cited.

The indictment in this case follows strictly the statute and the approved forms by Judges Willson, White, and Bishop, and appellant’s motion to quash it was correctly overruled.

Appellant made a motion for a second continuance of this case on account of the absence of three witnesses. The bill, as qualified by the judge, shows that at the June term, 1911, he continued the case, on the application of the appellant, because of the absence of two, if not all three, of these witnesses, and that no diligence whatever was thereafter used to procure their attendance on this trial. The application and bill, as allowed by the court, show no such diligence as would show error in refusing the continuance. Besides, the application did not state that the evidence’ of the absent witnesses could not be procured from any other source. By three other bills appellant complains that the court permitted the state to prove other acts of intercourse, other than the first testified to by the state’s witness. These bills were qualified by the court — some of them, in fact, not approved by the court— others stating that certain objections claimed to have been made were not made, and stating what were made. It is the settled law of this state now that the state is not confined to the first act of intercourse in cases of this character, but that subsequent acts of intercourse to the first one at and before which the promise of marriage is made may be shown. Hinman v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 29, 127 S. W. 221; Murphy v. State, 143 S. W. 618; Battles v. State, 63 Tex. Or. R. 147, 140 S. W. 783. It is needless to cite other cases.

Appellant has other bills of exceptions complaining of brief statements of what the prosecuting attorney said in objecting to questions, in such like matters. The bills are very meager and do not show the occasion for such remarks, nor that they were improperly made under the circumstances. We are of the opinion that no reversible error is presented by any of these matters, even if not qualified by the court; but, as qualified by the court, no error whatever is shown. The same applies to the objection of his meager statement of what the state’s attorney said in the argument in the case before the jury. (Resides, no written charges were requested by appellant to disregard any such argument. Clayton v. State, 149 S. W. 119.

By other bills appellant complains that the court refused to permit him to prove by certain witnesses that such witness had heard that others had accused the prosecutrix of improper relations with other parties than the defendant, and that it was talked generally throughout the community that another, other than appellant, was .responsible for her condition, and that another was generally accused of this girl’s condition, and that such other had left the country on that account. This testimony was objected to as hearsay. The court indicated to appellant that he could prove the character of the prosecutrix by general reputation or by specific acts. The court, in qualifying these bills, shows that the witness would not have testified as claimed by the appellant, but did testify the reverse. These bills show no error, especially as qualified and explained by the court. Parks v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 380, 33 S. W. 872; Carter v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 73, 127 S. W. 215. Nor does the tenth bill, as qualified by the court, show any error, or any such objection to testimony as to show any error.

The court did not err in the sixth paragraph of the charge in telling the jury, in effect, that if appellant had seduced and had carnal intercourse with the prosecutrix by virtue of a promise of marriage, and at that time she was a chaste woman and had not previously had intercourse with any other, the fact, if it was a fact, that she afterwards had intercourse with others would be no justification or ground of defense to appellant. In the charge he further tells the jury that they could consider her subsequent acts or conduct to affect her credibility and the weight to be given to her testimony. This charge was proper under the circumstances of this case. The jury gave the appellant the lowest penalty under the law.

The other complaints of the charge of the court are so general as to point out no error whatever, or authorize this court to consider such grounds, and this applies to his assignments of the refusal of his certain charges; the grounds merely being that the court erred in refusing to give a certain charge, mentioning it by number. Besides this, the charge of the court was full and fair to appellant, submitting everything in his favor as favorably, if not more so, than authorized by law, and in the submission of the case to the jury for a finding required them to find everything necessary and proper to be found against him, beyond a reasonable doubt, before they were authorized to convict him.

Notwithstanding the evidence and record in this ease is voluminous, we have given it a careful and thorough study and investigation. The evidence was amply sufficient, if believed by the jury, as it was, to sustain a conviction, and no reversible error whatever is pointed out.

The judgment is affirmed.  