
    THE NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION COMMISSION, Upon the Complaint of W. D. REDFERN and Others, v. WINSTON-SALEM SOUTHBOUND RAILWAY COMPANY.
    (Filed 12 January, 1916.)
    Corporation Commission — Appeal—Parties—Appeal and Error.
    Under tlie statutory proceedings upon petition to the Corporation Commission to require a railroad company to relocate its depot for the alleged convenience of petitioners of a certain town, the Commission decided with the defendant company, and upon appeal to the Superior Court that court dismissed the action, upon the ground that the petitioners were not such parties as to have acquired the right, the statutes providing that the appeal be taken in the name of the State on relation of the North Carolina Corporation Commission, etc., and the present appeal being in the name of the Commissioners upon the complaint of the petitioners. In this appeal it is Held, that the action by the trial judge in dismissing the appeal was correct.
    Hoke, J., filed concurring opinion; Allen, J., concurring in the result; Clark, C. J., dissenting; Walker, J., concurred in opinion of Justice Brown.
    Appeal by plaintiffs from order of tbe Corporation Commission, beard by Garter, J., Spring Term, 1915, of ÁNSON.
    Tbe court dismissed tbe appeal, and tbe plaintiffs appealed to tbis Court.
    
      Lockhart & Dunlap for plaintiffs.
    
    
      H. H. McLendon, Robinson, Caudle & Pruette for defendant.
    
   BkowN, J.

It is contended tbat any individual may petition tbe Corporation Commission to direct tbe removal of any railroad station in tbis State to some place desired by petitioner, and if tbe Commission refuses, petitioner may appeal to tbe Superior Court and bave tbe matter submitted to tbe decision of a jury. Tbe contention is based upon section 1074, Revisal, viz.: “From all decisions or determinations made by tbe Corporation Commission any party affected thereby shall be entitled to an appeal.”

Tbe statute distinctly confines tbe right of appeal to a party to tbe proceeding.

Tbe petition sets forth no property or proprietary right in petitioners tbat is affected by tbe order of tbe Commission. They are affected only' as citizens of tbe community, and bave no more interest than tbe intervenors and other citizens who oppose tbe removal of tbe station. There is no law tbat authorizes the individual citizen, having no interest in tbe subject-matter except tbat which is common to all, to prosecute before tbe courts in the name of tbe State or Corporation Commission such a proceeding as tbis. Tbat right is reserved to tbe State, which acts for all its citizens.

Tbis proceeding is utterly unauthorized as a legal proceeding. The petition is nothing more than a complaint to the Commission, which it was its duty to investigate and, after investigation, take such action as in its judgment was proper.

In case of an appeal to the courts in such a matter as this, the only authorized parties are the State of North Carolina on relation of the Corporation Commission as • plaintiff and the railroad or other corporation as defendant. The statute is plain as to who may appeal, viz., the State and the corporation whose legal rights are affected by the decision. No one else can appeal, because there are, and under the statute can be, no other parties, and the right to appeal is of course confined to parties to the proceeding. This is manifest from section 1075, which reads as follows:

"Appeal docketed; priority of trial; burden. The cause shall be entitled 'State of North Carolina on relation of the Corporation Commission against (here insert name of appellant)/ and if there are exceptions to any facts found by the Commission, it shall be placed on the civil-issue docket of such court and shall have precedence of other civil actions, and shall be tried under the same rules and regulations as are prescribed for the trial of other civil causes, except that the rates fixed or the decision or determination made by the Commission shall be prima facie just and reasonable.”

Section 1077 plainly indicates that the right of appeal is confined to the State and the corporation whose legal rights are affected by the Commission’s order. Section 1081 also reveal.s what is meant by the words “any party affected thereby,” for it provides, if the corporation “affected” by the order fails to obey, how obedience may be enforced.

There is no decision of this Court contrary to this view. Those cited were appeals by the corporation defendant, whose rights were affected by the Commission’s order, and the only parties to the proceeding were the State and the resisting corporation.

That these so-called petitioners are not parties to this proceeding, and have no right to be, has been expressly decided by this Court in State ex rel. Corporation Commission v. Southern Railway, 151 N. C., 447. That case is on all-fours with this. B. F. Davis and others filed their complaint with the Corporation Commission, asking the removal of the depot of the Southern Eailway at Morganton. The Commission visited Morganton and examined into the matter and ordered the removal of the depot. The railroad company appealed. This Court said: “The motion to dismiss was improperly allowed, as the law required no notice to be served on B. F. Davis, president of the Merchants’ Association, as he was no party to the proceeding. It is not claimed that said association is a legal entity; but if it was, it is no party to a proceeding of this kind. The statute provides that when an appeal is taken from an order of this nature, made by the Corporation Commission, the State shall be the plaintiff, and that the cause shall be docketed, 'State of North Carolina on relation of the Corporation Commission v. the appellant.’ ”

In the ease before us the Commission, after making a personal inspection of the present site and other sites proposed by the petitioners, and after hearing the evidence, found the following facts:

“The present depot at Ansonville is about 1 mile from town, at a point where the line comes to grade. The site, insisted upon by the citizens petitioning the removal is near the center of the town and the site originally selected by the railroad company for its depot at Anson-ville, but later it was decided to reduce the grade of the road, and in reducing the grade it was necessary to make a cut at this point through the hill, ranging from 5 feet to 12 feet in depth. The approach to the depot at this point would be down grade and into the cut, and there being a curve in the railroad approaching from the north, it would, in the opinion of the Commission, create a dangerous situation. The present site is the nearest point to the town that a suitable place could be found for the location of a depot.”

After finding these facts, the Commission made further observations as follows:

“The railroad company procured the land at the point where it sought to have the depot established, and it is in evidence that they would have built on it if it had been practicable to do so; but after the grade was reduced, finding that it was not suitable, they abandoned it. Since the present depot lias been established, practically all of the building has been done in the direction of the depot, and quite a number of buildings, stores, etc., have been erected adjacent to it, and it would be an injustice to these people to move the depot, even if a suitable place was offered.”

From this decision the State of North Carolina has not appealed and is not a party to the proceeding, and the defendant railroad company has not appealed. These petitioners, Redfern and others, have no right to represent the State. That duty is intrusted to the State officers, in this case the Corporation Commission. Therefore, the State, although under the statute an absolutely necessary party, has not been made a party and has not appealed. The complainants, Redfern and others, are not proper parties under the statute, have no locus standi in this proceeding and no right to prosecute it, and, therefore, have no right of appeal.

That this is true is manifest from an examination of the legislation creating and governing the Corporation Commission and from the character of the duties it is charged with, as well as the powers conferred upon it.

Tbe Commission is not a judicial court, but an administrative agency of tbe State, possessing certain quasi judicial and legislative powers. State ex rel. Corporation Commission v. Southern Railway, supra. It is tbe agency tbrougb wbicb tbe State undertakes to regulate and control tbe various corporations doing'business witbin its jurisdiction. Tbe Commission makes freight and passenger rates, rules in regard to baggage, regulates demurrage on cars and storage charges, as well as to establish and locate railroad stations and to require a change of any station, etc. In addition to tbe multiplied subjects of railroad regulation, it is given general power to control and supervise electric power, light and gas companies, and is clothed with power to fix, establish, and' regulate tbe rates and charges of such persons, companies, or corporations.'

Tbe statute contemplates that any person may lay bis complaint or grievance before tbe Commission. It then becomes its duty to investigate tbe complaint, and, if it is well founded, tbe Commission will, upon notice, make such order as will correct it, and institute in the name of the State such legal proceedings as will enforce its order. Tbe statute does not contemplate that every complainant may appeal and litigate tbe matter before tbe courts in bis own name. It must be done in tbe name of tbe State upon tbe relation of tbe Commission. If every individual complainant is allowed to appeal and bring bis grievance before a jury, it would defeat tbe very purpose for wbicb a Commission was created.

Instead of having a system of rates for tbe entire State, tbe rates in each locality would be fixed by tbe verdict of a jury. Farmers interested in tbe reduction of rates between certain points on farm products would originate a proceeding before tbe Commission, and from an adverse decision would bring tbe subject for determination back to tbe vicinage, there to be determined by a jury of tbe same. Persons desiring additional facilities and conveniences witbin tbe entire range and scope of railroad operations would resort to tbe same forum, and tbe result of it would be that tbe Commission, tbe courts, and tbe railroads would be engulfed in a maze of controversies destructive to tbe public welfare and ruinous not only to tbe transportation systems of tbe State, but to tbe peace and prosperity of tbe people.

One of tbe powers conferred upon tbe Corporation Commission exclusively is “to require tbe erection of depot accommodations, and also to require a change in the location of any station. Eevisal, 1097, sub-sees. 1 and 2. This power is recognized by this Court in Dewey v. R. R., 142 N. C., 403, wherein Mr. Justice JIoTce says: “But however this may be, tbe Corporation Commission, tbe body authorized and required by law to determine tbe matter, after full and due inquiry, have fixed upon this as the proper site.” Those words are peculiarly applicable to this case. This method of exerting the power of the State to compel railroads to establish and change their depots is the only feasible and effective method.

It is utterly impracticable to do it through the instrumentalities of courts and juries. Such a matter is foreign to the purposes for which courts were established.

It is contended that section 6 of Laws of 1907, ch. 469, gives the right of appeal to complainants. That section reads as follows: “All persons and corporations affected by this act shall have the same right of appeal from the action of the Corporation Commission under the powers contained in this act as are now provided by law.”

This proceeding is not instituted under that statute, for there is nothing in it relative to establishing or changing railroad stations. Nor is it amendatory of the sections of the Eevisal that confer such power. The act of 1907 connects the words “persons and corporations” together, because the jurisdiction of the Commission extended to persons as well as corporations.

In certain instances persons may be hailed before the Commission and compelled to obey its decrees. In such cases they are defendants or respondents, and may appeal as well as corporations; and that is what section 6 really means. It is limited to persons, and corporations affected by that act of 1907, and does not change the sections of the Eevisal regulating the right and method of appeal.

This act confers upon the Commission the power to require railroads to operate additional trains when in their judgment necessary. It will scarcely be contended that under this statute any person can petition the Commission to order additional trains, and, upon their refusal, such person can appeal to the courts and have the matter submitted to a jury. If that could be done, then the same rule would apply to baggage regulations, freight and passenger rates, and to all matters intrusted to the management and control of the Commission. This would completely destroy all uniformity in the system which the State through its Legislature has devi.sed for the control and management of public-service corporations.

There are cases where individuals can apply to the Commission for relief where their personal and property rights are involved, such as overcharges, personal discriminations, and the like. But where the matter is one which does not affect the property or legal rights of one person, but affects a community or locality, or the public generally, the Legislature does not permit any individual person to litigate the matter before the courts, but provides that the State only may do so.

That is the reason the statute expressly provides that the appeal shall be docketed in the name of the State of North Carolina, and the State will protect before tbe courts tbe rights and interests of its citizens generally.

Tbis appeal is not docketed in tbe name of tbe State, because tbat can be done only upon tbe relation of tbe Corporation Commission. As it is docketed, “Tbe Corporation Commission, upon complaint of Eedfern and others,” tbe Corporation Commission is made tbe plaintiff appellant. Thus we have tbe solecism of tbe Commission appealing from its own decision rendered in favor of tbis defendant.

Affirmed.

Walkee, J., concurs.

AlleN, J., concurs in result.

Horas, J.,

concurring in tbe result: Under tbe broad provisions of tbe statutes applicable, I am inclined to tbe opinion tbat any one who has formally appeared before tbe Corporation Commission, been so recognized as party to tbe proceedings, and who has an interest in tbe questions involved, direct or indirect, may usually appeal from a decision of said Commission adversely affecting such interest; but I concur in the disposition made of tbe present appeal on tbe ground tbat a careful perusal of tbis record fails to disclose a case in which an appeal should be entertained.

Tbe Corporation Commission has been created and organized chiefly as an administrative agency of tbe State and charged, among other important duties, with tbat of looking after and imposing such reasonable rules and regulations on the public-service corporations of tbe State as may be promotive of the public interests,, and their action should not be disturbed unless it is made to appear tbat, in a given case, it is clearly unreasonable and unjust. Tbe statute, Eevisal, sec. 1075, in express terms, provides tbat, on appeal, “decisions or determinations of tbe Commission shall be prima facie just and reasonable.”

In tbe case on appeal there is no allegation or suggestion tbat tbe relevant facts have not all been disclosed, and, on careful consideration of these facts, we find nothing which shows or tbat would uphold tbe conclusion tbat tbe action of tbe Commission in tbe present instance, was either unreasonable or unjust. On tbe contrary, it appears tbat they bad fully and impartially considered tbe case, tbat tbe decision made by them rests on good and sufficient reason, and, in a cause of tbis character, that there is no issue of fact or law presented tbat would require or permit further investigation.

In Cherry v. Canal Co., 140 N. C., pp. 422 and 426, tbe Court quotes with approval from 2 Am. PL and Pr., pp. 499 and 500, as follows: “In 2 A. and E. Enc. PI. and Pr., 499, we find it stated tbat 'appellate courts deal with judicial acts, and it would not avail to reverse a ruling or judgment correct on the record, though it may be founded on an erroneous reason.’ And again, in tbe same volume, at page 500: ‘This system of appeals is founded on public policy, and appellate courts will not encourage litigation by reversing judgments for technical, formal, or other objections which the record shows could not have prejudiced the appellant’s rights. The decided cases in this and other jurisdictions support this position. In Butts v. Screws, 95 N. C., 215, Ashe, J., for the Court, says: “A new trial will not be granted when the action of the trial judge, even if erroneous, could by no possibility injure the appellant.” The position has been many times approved in this State, and its proper application to the facts of the present record requires that the judgment of his Honor, dismissing the appeal, should be affirmed.

It may be that he gave a wrong reason for it, but we are dealing here with results, and, in my opinion, on the facts jn’esented, the judgment dismissing the appeal should be affirmed.

Clark, C. J.,

dissenting: The Corporation Commission is an administrative and judicial body, the latter functions being conferred by virtue of the Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 12, which provides that “The General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the Judicial Department of imwer or jurisdiction which rightfully pertains to it as a coordinate department of the Government; but the General Assembly shall allot and distribute that portion of this power and jurisdiction which does not pertain to the Supreme Court among the other courts prescribed in this Constitution, or which may be established by law, in such manner as they may deem best; provide also a proper system, of appealsj and regulate by law when necessary the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with other provisions of this Constitution.”

In accordance with this provision the General Assembly has created courts subordinate to the Supreme Court, some with exclusive criminal jurisdiction in limited areas; others with criminal and civil jurisdiction; and for the redress of complaints against common carriers, whose regulation is now entirely and fully recognized to be a part of the State Government, it has created the Corporation Commission. It has empowered this body to pass upon all complaints as to the regulation of railroads. Recognizing that a body of three men in a subordinate court came within the power prescribed in Art. IV, sec. 12, of the Constitution, the General Assembly provided for a system of appeals as follows:

“Rev., 1074. Right of; how taleen. From all decisions or determinations made by the Corporation Commission any party affected thereby shall be entitled to an appeal.”

This section further provides that where the exception is to a ruling of law the appeal shall be to the judge at chambers, and if to a finding of fact, to the Superior Court at term: Eevisal, eh. 20, provides for the jurisdiction given to the Corporation Commission and in section .1097 (2) authorizes the Commission “to require a change of any station or the repairing, addition to, or. change of any station-house, by any railroad or other transportation company in order to promote the security, convenience, and the accommodation of the public, and to require the raising or lowering of the track at any crossing when deemed necessary.” Eevisal, 1054, provides that the Corporation Commission “shall be a court of record, known as the Corporation Commission. Such court shall adopt a seal and shall have all the powers and jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction. as to all subjects embraced in this chapter.” One of the subjects embraced, as above stated, is the power to change the location of a railroad station.

The Constitution authorized the General Assembly to establish courts subordinate to the Supreme Court and prescribe the jurisdiction. It created the Corporation. Commission and gave it jurisdiction in the particulars specified, and provided that “either party affected could appeal,” and that such appeal should lie from “all decisions or determinations made by the Corporation Commission.” Certainly the Corporation Commission could not appeal from its own decisions, and if “either party” can appeal, such appeal is not restricted to the defendant corporation.

To remove all doubts as to the scope of the powers conferred upon the Corporation Commission and who may appeal, Laws 1907, ch. 469, “To extend and enlarge the powers of the Corporation Commission,” provides in section 6 thereof: “All persons and corporations affected by this act shall have the same right of appeal from the action of the Corporation Commission under the powers contained in this act as are now provided by law.” One of the facilities required by this act is set out in section 2 thereof: “and to require all transportation and transmission companies to establish and maintain all such public-service, facilities and conveniences as may be reasonable and just.”

In accordance with the above authority, the plaintiffs W. D. Bedfern, W. A. Smith, and L. L. Little and others filed their proceeding before the Corporation Commission, alleging that the defendant railroad company had established its depot 1 mile outside the town of Ansonville, an old and established center, though the defendant had acquired its rights of way. through that section on the representation and agreement that its depot would be located in the said town; that as a consequence the defendant does not furnish such facilities and convenience to its patrons as are reasonable and just; that the defendant company owns a depot site within the town and that its removal to that point would be to the great convenience of its patrons and the public and furnish them with much better public-service facilities, and that it was necessary, in order to do this, that tbe company should provide a depot either upon that site which it now owns or upon some other suitable site in said town.

The defendant railroad company in its reply admitted that it owned a site for a depot in said town, but alleged that the co.st of grading would entail a considerable expense, and that it had expressed its willingness to have the plaintiffs’ complaint passed upon by the Corporation Commission, which had decided against the plaintiffs’ complaint, and asked that the action be dismissed upon the ground that “an appeal does not lie by plaintiffs from an order of the Corporation Commission.” The motion was allowed, and this appeal presents that as the sole question.

The defendant’s answer ignores the fact that if it is an expense now to remove the station to the point in the town of Ansonville, where the defendant had bought a site in pursuance of its agreement, as the plaintiffs allege, to place a station in that town, the defendant has entailed this cost upon itself, and in matters that concern the public convenience the sole question is not the expense to the defendant, but the convenience of the public must also be considered.

In Pate v. R. R., 122 N. C., 881, where the plaintiffs began a proceeding before the Corporation Commission to require the railroad company to establish a station, the Corporation Commission held that the public interests required the establishment of a station, but that it did not have the power under the act to so authorize (which defect was promptly corrected by the Legislature expressly conferring that power),.and the plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court. In that case this Court held: “The appeal will lie in the first instance to the Superior Court, and thence the party cast has his appeal, if he so elect, to this Court.” .

In a later case, S. v. R. R., 161 N. C., 270, where there was an appeal from the Corporation Commission to the Superior Court, on a petition at Rutherfordton against a railroad company in which the plaintiff asked the establishment of a depot, and in the Superior Court judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, an appeal by the plaintiffs to this Court was entertained, Brown, J., writing the opinion which granted the plaintiffs in that case a new trial in the Superior Court.

Revisal, 1054, makes the Corporation Commission a “court of record,” and Brown, J., in Corporation Commission v. R. R., 151 N. C., 447, says that that body, while largely an administrative body (which is true), “possesses certain quasi judicial and legislative powers.”

Revisal, 1068, authorizes such court of record to establish rules of practice, which it has done, and which are set out in Gregory’s Supplement under section 1054. These rules prescribe for the filing of the complaint and service of notice of the proceeding “upon the .opposite party.”

Among tbe many cases sustaining the jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission to grant relief to parties instituting proceedings before the Commission to compel railroads and other corporations to grant proper facilities to the public are Express Co. v. R. R., 111 N. C., 463; Mayo v. Tel. Co., 112 N. C., 343; R. R. Commission v. Tel. Co., 113 N. C., 213; Caldwell v. Wilson, 121 N. C., 425; Pate v. R. R., 122 N. C., 877; and there are many others.

Bevisal, 1074, which provides, “From all decisions or determinations made by the Corporation Commission any party affected thereby shall be entitled to appeal,” further provides: “Before such party shall be allowed to appeal” he shall give notice of appeal and file his exceptions. Further in the same section it is said: “The party appealing” shall file his exceptions, and on exceptions to the law his appeal shall go to the judge of the Superior Court at chambers, and on exceptions to thé issues of fact the case shall be sent to the Superior Court at term. In all this there is not only no hint or intimation that the appeal is limited to the railroad company, but, on the contrary, it is expressly provided that either party, whether persons or corporations, shall have the right to appeal.

It is suggested that although the statute makes the Corporation Commission a court of record and gives either party, whether persons or corporations, the right to appeal from all decisions, that it is not feasible to put these statutes into effect because a-jury is incompetent to pass upon facts when the Corporation Commission has found them against the plaintiffs; but the railroad companies earnestly contend that an appeal to a jury is very appropriate when the decision is against themselves. It is suggested that if the subject of a controversy was as to a freight rate or putting on an extra train, a jury would be entirely incompetent to find the facts under the supervision of a learned judge, but that when those facts are found by three men they are absolutely correct, unless found against the railroad company.

This, however, is a single and very simple question much easier for determination by a jury than many eases that are submitted to them. In this very matter of the change of a railroad station the point was presented in S. v. R. R., 161 N. C., 270, and when the jury found against the plaintiffs this Court, as above stated, sustained their appeal and directed that a jury trial be given the plaintiffs in the Superior Court. In the other two supposed cases in R. R. Connection Case, 137 N. C., 1, the defendant railroad thought that a jury was competent to pass upon the facts on its appeal from an order requiring it to put on an extra train to make the Selma connection. The jury in that case rendered their verdict, but the Superior Court judge entered judgment denying the prayer of the plaintiffs that the connection should be made, if necessary, by putting on an extra train. On appeal to this Court that judgment was reversed and tbe defendant was ordered to make tbe connection, .and, if necessary, to put on tbe extra train. On writ of error to tbe United States Supreme Court tbe judgment of tbis Court was affirmed, 206 U. S., 1. In consequence tbat train is running and tbe connection is made to tbis day, to tbe great accommodation and satisfaction of tbe public; and they owe it to tbat jury’s verdict.

In tbe more difficult matter of fixing rates, wben tbe Legislature of North Carolina directly, and not through its subordinate board of three men, fixed tbe passenger rate at 2 cents tbe reasonableness of tbat regulation was tried before a jury in "Wake County. S. v. R. R., 145 N. C., 495. Tbe same point was also in litigation in tbe Federal court, and though it was there first referred to a referee, tbe issues of fact would have been eliminated from bis report and fpund by a jury as in so many other cases has been done in other States, but tbat tbe railroad company withdrew the action on proof tbat they were making more money than at tbe old rate of 3% cents per mile.

If trial by jury is good and feasible for tbe railroads to use, as they did in tbe above cases, to review the decision or determination of tbe Corporation Commission wben deciding upon a complaint to remove a station, or an order to make a railroad connection and put on an extra train if necessary, or to pass upon tbe reasonableness of rates, then it cannot be too cumbersome for tbe plaintiffs to have tbe jury pass upon tbe same matters, under tbe direction of tbe Superior Court judge, with right to appeal to tbis Court, wben tbe decision of tbe Corporation Commission, the court of record to whom tbe decision is committed in tbe first instance, has been against tbe plaintiffs instead of against tbe railroad company.

Tbe right of appeal is either a right or a privilege. If it is a right, tbe plaintiffs cannot be deprived of it. If it is a privilege, tbe Constitution of tbis State, Art. I, sec. 7, forbade discrimination against our own citizens. It provides: “No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from tbe community.” Tbe General Assembly has not made such discrimination, but, on tbe contrary, has provided for an appeal to tbe Superior Court “from the action of tbe Commission” (not an appeal by tbe Commission from themselves) to “all persons or corporations.” Tbe men who made tbe Constitution of North Carolina and of tbe United States did not think tbat an appeal should be given to tbe moneyed interests, represented by great aggregations of capital, while denying to our own citizens tbe right of trial by juiy. In tbe Constitution of tbe United States tbe provision was omitted, but at tbe instance of Mr. Jefferson it was inserted as tbe Eighth Amendment: “Where tbe value in controversy shall exceed $30, tbe right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” Tbe promised adoption of this and other amendments was the condition upon which ratification by the necessary number of States was had to create the Union.

In Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 250, this Court said that we would not attempt to erect this Court into "a despotism of -five men, which is opposed to the fundamental principles of our Government.” We have reiterated this in several cases, among others, in Supervisors v. Comrs., 169 N. C., 548. But to give to the Corporation Commission the absolute and irreviewable refusal of relief when demanded by the private citizen and property owner, while giving to the railroad company every opportunity for the review of any decision of the Corporation Commission against it, would be indeed to create the most perfect and irresponsible “despotism of three men” that could be conceived. To prevent this construction, the Legislature not only gave the right of appeal to “either' party affected,” Revisal, 1074, but by above cited Laws 1907, ch. 469, sec. 6, it has given the right to appeal to “all persons and corporations affected by the action of the Corporation Commission.” The Corporation Commission certainly could not appeal from their own action, and the plaintiffs are “persons.” They are the “party affected” by the denial of the relief they sought in a matter deeply affecting their pecuniary and their business interests.

There have been many cases known in this State where the high officials of railroads in locating stations have placed them on land privately bought for the personal benefit of said officials and have located the stations at such a distance from a near-by town as to damage the value of property therein while enhancing the value of their own property near the new station. There is no evidence in this record of such fact in this instance. But if in a case of this kind an appeal should lie only in favor of the railroad company, and not for the citizens damaged, there would be much irremediable wrong.

Nothing could make the Corporation Commission more odious to the public than a provision that their decisions should be final and irreviewable against those seeking relief against railroad corporations while giving to the railroad itself the fullest right of appeal to the Superior Court, and then to the Supreme Court — a broad avenue of redress to a privileged class of money and a denial of all appeal to the citizens who have been injured in their property rights and to the community who have been inconvenienced by the refusal of the “public-service facilities and conveniences, as may be reasonable and just,” which the statute requires shall he given them on application to the Corporation Commission, with right of appeal to either party.

Nowhere in our statutes is the right of appeal given more fully and explicitly to either party, whether persons or corporations, than it is conferred from “all decisions and determinations by the Corporation Commission” by Revisa!, 1074, and tbe subsequent act of 1907, cb. 369, sec. 6.

Tbe Legislature certainly meant to give our own citizens tbe same square deal it gave to railroad companies, without discrimination against either. If tbe construction denying to tbe citizen tbe right to appeal equally with tbe corporation does not meet with public approval, tbe General Assembly can doubtless yet make the language so ¡olain that no one can misunderstand it.

Tbe mere form of docketing is nothing more than a formality. It is like an action being brought “State on Relation of A.,” or tbe former action, “A. B. to tbe Use of O. D.” Tbe real parties plaintiffs here are tbe petitioners whose property rights have been damaged by tbe location of this station, and who are entitled to have a jury pass upon tbe question, as in tbe location of tbe Rutherfordton station, when such jury trial was granted to tbe railroad company in tbe location of tbe station at Rutherfordton, S. v. R. R., 161 N. C., 270, and just as a jury trial was granted to tbe railroad company in regard to putting on another train in tbe Railroad Connection Case, 137 N. C., 1. Certainly it was never intended by tbe mere form of docketing to deny tbe explicit right of appeal given to both parties from every determination or decision of tbe Commission. Even under tbe old complex forms of pleading at common law, while a plaintiff might have to choose another forum for bis action, be never lost bis right to litigate or to appeal. Our Constitution and laws do not reserve tbe right of appeal and tbe right of jury trial to corporations and deny them to tbe citizen in controversies between them. Hence, “this protest, which is also prophecy.”  