
    [Chambersburg,
    Monday, September 30, 1811.]
    *Clark against Yeat.
    In Error.
    The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas upon the proceedings of two justices under the landlord and tenant law, brought before that court by certiorari, is not final, but may be brought by writ of error to this Court.
    The twenty-second section of the act of 20th March 1810, which makes the decision of the Common Pleas upon appeals from justices, final, does not apply to proceedings under the landlord and tenant law.
    The proceedings in this cause, which originated under the landlord and tenant law before two justices of the peace, were removed to the Common Pleas of Adams county, and quashed. They were then removed to this Court by writ of error, where a motion was now made to quash the writ, upon the ground that the judgment of the Common Pleas was final, by the twenty-second section of the act of 20th March 1810, 9 St. Laws 219.
    
      Dunlop for the plaintiff in error.
    
      Dobbins for the defendant in error.
   Tilghman C. J.

delivered the Court’s opinion.

This motion is founded on the twenty-second section of the act of 20th March 1810. This act was made for the consolidation of all the acts which gave jurisdiction to justices of the peace touching debts and demands in civil cases; and is almost exclusively occupied with that subject. In the fourth section, mention is made of appeals from the decision of two justices to the Court of Common Pleas or Quarter Sessions; but that cannot affect the present case in which there is no such appeal. The twenty-second'section relates particularly to decisions by a single justice. The first part of the section gives the right of removing the cause from the justice by writ of certiorari, and in the latter part it is enacted that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas shall be final on all proceedings removed as aforesaid, and no writ of error shall issue thereon. It is very clear, that in no part of this section, is there the least allusion to proceedings between landlord and tenant, which are authorized by a different act of assembly, and are conducted in a different manner.

I am therefore of opinion that this law does not prevent the issuing of writs of error in such cases.

Motion overruled.

[Cited in 4 R. 369 ; 26 S. 470.]  