
    EDWARDS v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Oct. 15, 1913.)
    Vagrancy (§ 2) — Sufficiency of Complaint.
    A complaint, charging in one count that on a certain day defendant was “a vagrant person in that on said date he was able to work and did not work, and has no property to support him,” in another count he “was then and there a vagrant in that he habitually loafs and loiters around the streets and alleys and frequents places of ill fame in the city,” and in another that he “was a vagrant person in that he is a professional thief and is engaged in unlawful pursuits,” held insufficient to charge vagrancy under any of the many definitions thereof given by Pen. Code 1911, art. 634.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vagrancy, Cent. Dig; § 2; Dec. Dig. § 2.]
    Appeal from Grayson County Court; J. Q. Adamson, Judge.
    Baxter Edwards was convicted, and appeals.
    Reversed, with instructions to dismiss.
    E. W. Neagle, of Sherman, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   PRENDERGAST, P. J.

Appellant was convicted of vagrancy, and fined $200. This prosecution was begun by a complaint only before a justice °of the peace of Grayson county. The complaint was evidently drawn not by the county attorney or any one familiar with the sufficiency of a pleading charging this offense. After the formal part the complaint alleges that on February 10, 1913, appellant was “a vagrant person in that on said date he was able to work and did not work, and has no property to support him.” In another count, that on said date he “was then and there a vagrant in that he habitually loafs and loiters around the streets and alleys and frequents places of ill fame in the city of Denison, Tex.” Again, in another count, that he “was a vagrant person in that he is a professional thief, and is engaged in unlawful pursuits.” Then in another entirely separate paragraph “that he has no property to support him, and is able to work and does not work.” Appellant, by proper motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial, attacked the sufficiency of each and all of these grounds of the complaint.

Our statute (P. C. art 634) defining vagrancy gives many definitions thereof. It is unnecessary for us to copy this statute, as it can readily be referred to and seen.

We have carefully examined this complaint, in connection with the statute, and in our opinion neither count thereof is sufficient under any or all of the definitions of our Code to charge an offense. The county court therefore erred in not sustaining said motions and holding said complaint insufficient.

The judgment will therefore he reversed, with instructions to the county court to quash the complaint and dismiss the cause.  