
    The Buckeye Pipe Line Company v. Fee.
    
      Causes for which, new trial may he granted — Section 5805, Revised Statutes — Review of evidence in reviewing court— Attachment and garnishment — Section 552t, Revised Statutes — Jurisdiction of court not over property wholly out of the state — Garnishee having property of defendant without state not required to surrender same to custody of court, when.
    
    1. A motion, for a new trial in a cause tried to the court which states as the grounds “That the judgment is not sustained by sufficient evidence, and is contrary to law,” is a substantial statement of the ground authorized by the sixth clause of section 5305, Revised Statutes, and is sufficient to bring the evidence contained in the bill of exceptions up for review in a reviewing court.
    2. Our statutes regulating attachment and garnishment (sections 5522, Revised Statutes, and following), do not give to the court issuing such process jurisdiction over property of the defendant situate wholly beyond the borders of the state, nor power to require a garnishee having property of the defendant in his possession without the state to surrender the same into the custody of the court, and an order on the garnishee requiring such act is without legal effect.
    (Decided May 8, 1900.)
    Error to tbe Circuit Court of Allen county.
    Tbe action below was by William G. Fee against tbe Buckeye Pipe Line Company to recover for a refusal to obey an order of tbe court of common pleas of Allen county, directing tbe company, as garnishee, to turn over to tbe sheriff of that county 1036 barrels of crude petroleum oil, which, it was alleged, tbe company’s answer showed was in its possession belonging to Miller, Tallmage & Russell, against whom Fee bad recovered judgment for $535.90, interest and costs.
    
      The answer of the defendant below admitted the recovery of the judgment as stated, the service of garnishee process upon it; that it answered, admitting its possession of certain oil belonging to the judgment debtor; that it was ordered by the court to deliver such oil to the sheriff, and that it had not done so. All other allegations were denied and new matter by way of defense set up, which was traversed by reply.
    The case was submitted to the court, a jury being waived, upon an agreed statement of facts, which were embodied in a bill of exceptions, the substance of which follows:
    The Buckeye Pipe Line Company is an Ohio corporation ; its business is confined to that of a common carrier and storer of oil, and in no sense is it a purchaser or seller of oil; its principal office is at Lima, Ohio, where the books of its business are kept. On November, 7, 1896, it had in its possession 1086 barrels of oil to the credit (as oil) of Miller, Tallmage & Russell, a firm composed of the defendants against whom Fee’s action was pending, and against whom he recovered the judgment, and the value of the oil was sufficient to satisfy the judgment. The oil was purchased in Huntington county, Indiana, and received by defendant in Indiana, in its usual course of business, and held by it as common carrier and storer of oil, and never was in Ohio; no Indiana oil is carried into or stored in Ohio by defendant.
    The oil territory of Indiana, including Huntington county, and the oil 'territory of northwestern Ohio, including Allen county, Ohio, comprise the territory known as the Lima division of said company; its stations for the delivery of oil are in this territory in both Indiana and Ohio, including said counties of Allen and Huntington, and all transfers of oil are made on its production books at Lima. Its system of storage and pipe lines in Indiana are not connected with its Ohio system of storage and pipe lines; the oil received in Indiana cannot be delivered through its pipes in Ohio, but is delivered in Indiana. The oil produced in Indiana is of a different kind and quality from that produced in Ohio, and generally of a different market value; but since January, 1896, the value of Indiana oil and oil produced in Allen county, Ohio, has been and is the same. Oil received and stored in Indiana from the different wells and delivered by different persons to the defendant is mingled so that the identical oil cannot be returned, but oil of like kind and quality is delivered from the general stock.
    The oil in custody was received on a “run ticket,” copy of which follows: “This oil is received into the general stock of the Buckeye Pipe Line Company, Lima division, subject to a transportation charge of twenty cents per barrel, and a storage charge, which shall be at the rate of twenty-five cents per day per one thousand barrels, so long as the market price of its certificate oil is below $1.00 per barrel; thirty-one cents per day when the market price is from $1.00 to $1.50 per barrel, and forty cents per day when the market price is above $1.50 per barrel, no change, however, to be made in rate of storage on account of prices going above or below the prices named, unless the market price remains above or below a specified point for thirty consecutive days, and it is agreed that the point of delivery shall be at the option of the Buckeye Pipe Line Company, Lima division, within said division. It is agreed that the Buckeye Pipe Line Company, Lima division, shall not in any event be liable for loss of petroleum resulting from lightning, fire, storms or other unavoidable causes, and that such loss shall be charged pro rata upon all petroleum in its custody at the time of such loss, and that the quantity called for by this ticket shall be reduced by- its proportion of such loss, and that transportation and all accruing storage charges shall be paid on the amount as deducted.”
    It is agreed that the defendant had the right to deliver the oil in controversy at any of its delivery stations in Indiana. It is further conceded as a fact that Avhen oil is sold by a person who has oil stored, it is transferred upon the production books of defendant, Lima division, at Lima, by an order directing the transfer of credit to the purchaser of a given number of barrels of oil; that there is a constant market for Indiana and other oil in its custody, and that all oil sold is at once transferred to the credit of the purchaser (as oil) upon presentation of a purchase order at any of its offices and report of that fact by an agent to the Lima office. The owner of oil, or the purchaser, can secure the delivery of the actual oil belonging to him, upon demand and payment of charges, and such deliveries are constantly being made.
    The sheriff did not seize the oil in controversy; the attachment Avas served in no other way than by leaving a copy of the attachment with the agent of the defendant at Lima, Ohio, and informing him of the contents thereof. The sheriff’s return shows proper service as to form and manner.
    In a case pending in the circuit court of Huntington county, Indiana, after January 1, 1897, that court, Avhich is a court of competent jurisdiction, appointed a receiver for Miller, Tallmage & Russell, and directed the defendant to deliver the oil in controversy to said receiver.
    
      The defendant has a lien on this oil for transportation and storage charges. Since the order and judgment recovered by Fee against Miller, Tallmage & Russell, the plaintiff, through the sheriff of Allen county, has made demand upon defendant for the oil in controversy, which has been refused and the oil never delivered.
    On trial, a finding was had for Fee, and judgment rendered for the amount of his claim. Motion for a new trial was overruled, to which the company excepted. The circuit court affirmed the judgment, and the company brings error. Its ground for reversal is that the court “erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant, and in overruling motion of defendant for a new trial.”
    
      James 0. Troup, for plaintiff in error.
    Under the facts of this case the principal question is:
    Can a court in Ohio compel a garnishee, who is not indebted to the defendant in attachment, but has in possession as bailee, property of the defendant, which is located wholly outride of the state of Ohio, to bring that property into Ohio and deliver it into the custody of the court?
    An attachment is a proceeding in rem, incident to the main action, and the steps to be taken under it are very clearly defined by statute, sections 5528 to 5550, Personal property when attached must be seized and taken into custody. “In the absence of a levy so made, the court acquires no jurisdiction over the property sought to be attached.” Root v. R’d. Co., 45 Ohio St., 222.
    In respect to the obligation of the garnishee, the limit of the court’s power, in the first instance, is to order a delivery of the property into court.
    
      Had the court the power to make such order under the facts in this case? The jurisdiction of the court over property in attachment proceedings is limited to such property as is within the sovereignty which created the court. The sovereignty cannot, through any branch of its government, extend its control over either persons or property, beyond its territorieal limits. This proposition is axiomatic and no authority need be cited in support of it. The court by attachment proceedings, lays its hand upon property of the defendant, if it can be found, and holds it until the main controversy be determined. But the hand of the court cannot reach beyond the territorial limits of the sovereignty which created it. “The servant is not greater than his master.” The court, by its garnishee process, obtains constructive possession and control of property of which the sheriff cannot get the actual physical possession. But the court cannot extend its constructive possession and control beyond the territorial lines which limit its physical possession and control. 8 Am. &, Eng. Ency. Law, 1255; Story’s Conflict of Laws, secs. 543, 550.
    It must be borne in mind that this is not a case wherein the garnishee was indebted to the defendants in attachment. The Buckeye Pipe Line Company owed them nothing. It merely had in its possession, as bailee, property which was not and never had been within the state of Ohio. The domicile of the defendants being in Indiana, that is the legal situs of their personal property. In this instance, it is also the actual situs. It follows that two independent sovereignties cannot exercise jurisdiction over property situate exclusively within the territory of one of them. To hold that they can would lead to. inextricable confusion in the transaction of business and in the administration of justice. Lawrence v. Smith, 45 N. H., 533; Bates v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 60 Wis., 296, 372, 374; Latimer v. Union Pacific Ry., 43 Mo., 105; Con. Ins. Co. v. Chase, 33 S. W. Rep., 602; Montrose Pickle Co. v. D. & H. Mfg. Co., 40 N. W. Rep. (Iowa), 705; Am. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Hettler, 56 N. W. Rep. (Nebraska), 711. In a search for authorities which has covered a wide range, I have found but one case where it was held that a garnishment is maintainable, although the goods in possession of the garnishee were at the time in another state. It is the case of Childs & Co. v. Digby, 24 Pa. St., 23. But in the case of Penn. R. R. Co. v. Pennock, 51 Pa. St., 244, 254, the court disapproves of the doctrine announced in Childs v. Digby, and holds the doctrine which is announced in the cases above cited.
    Both on principle and under the authorities above cited, I contend for the general proposition first stated, viz.: A court in Ohio cannot compel a garnishee, who is not indebted to the defendant in attachment and has no property of the defendant in Ohio, but has in possession, as a bailee, property of the defendant, which is located wholly outside of the state of Ohio, to bring that property into Ohio and deliver it into the custody of the court.
    If, however, the court should hold the opposite on the general proposition as above stated, there are considerations which seem to me to have required the discharge of the garnishee in this particular instance. Remembering that this oil was produced and is stored in Indiana and that the garnishee has no connection between its systems of lines in Indiana and its system in Ohio; it should also be remembered that, by the contract under which the oil was received, “the point of delivery shall be at the option of the Buckeye Pipe Line Company.”
    
      Tbe court cannot, for tbe benefit or convenience of any creditor, so vary the terms of tbe contract of delivery as to compel tbe company to deliver tbe oil at any other points than it may select; and certainly not compel a delivery beyond tbe reach of tbe company’s lines. Several of tbe authorities already cited seem to support this proposition in a greater or less degree; but there are others. 1 Bouvier’s Law Die., 163; Schuler v. Israel, 120 U. S., 506. Suppose tbe principal defendants in this case bad sued tbe Buckeye Pipe Line Company in this state for the damages for non-delivery of their oil after demand made. It would surely be a good defense that tbe demand alleged was a demand to deliver in Ohio, and that tbe company is not bound to deliver in Ohio, but is ready to deliver at a designated point on its lines in Indiana. If . in this case Miller, Tallmage & Russell could not compel a delivery in Ohio, neither can their creditors compel a delivery in Ohio.
    It is pleaded in tbe answer of tbe company that since tbe garnishee notice was served upon it, a court in Indiana, of the county where tbe property is located, has appointed a receiver of tbe property and ordered the company to deliver tbe same to him. It is admitted that tbe court bad jurisdiction so to do. This, I claim, is, or ought to be, an all-sufficient reason for a refusal by this court either to order the company to deliver property, not Avithin its jurisdiction, or to hold tbe company responsible for not doing so. A sovereignty within whose territory any personal property is actually situate, has entire dominion over it, while it remains there, to the exclusion of all other sovereignties. Story, Conflict of Laws, secs. 423a, 550, 551.
    For the reasons above stated, and under the authorities ábove cited, I claim the garnishee ought to have been discharged, and the judgment of the courts below ought to be reversed.
    
      Charles B. Axlgate, for defendant in error.
    There was no case made in the record for review in the circuit court because the motion for new trial was not sufficient to present the question attempted to be presented, and hence the judgment of the common pleas in favor of Fee should stand.
    In order to review a case — as the one at bar— upon the evidence, the objection must be made to the finding of the court, that it is not supported by the evidence; that the decision of the court, as to what the facts determine, is not warranted by the evidence. The reason for a new trial must be assigned in the motion for a new trial, in order to bring the evidence in the record up for review in that regard. The objection in this case is, that the judgment is not sustained by sufficient evidence; not that the decision is not sustained. A judgment is the final adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy. A judgment is what the law declares shall be done; it is the award based upon the finding. It is the act of the court warranted by the law, and conclusive between the parties to the suit, because it is founded upon the decision of what the facts determine. To thus attack the judgment without objecting to the finding upon which it is based, does not appear to be such an assignment of error as will bring the evidence in the record up for review, when such motion is overruled. Westfall v. Dungan, 14 Ohio St., 276; Randall v. Turner, 17 Ohio St., 262; Everett v. Sumner, 32 Ohio St., 562; The Buckeye P. L. Co. v. Fee, 15 O. C. C., 637; 8 Circ. Dec., 727.
    It is claimed that the property which was the subject of garnishment, not being in the strict sense a credit, and the identical oil in controversy never having been seized by the officer, and never having been in the state, but always having been in the state of Indiana, renders it impossible that jurisdiction by the proceedings in attachment and garnishment can be acquired here; and hence that recovery cannot be had. That the proceedings being in rem. the jurisdiction is governed by the situs of the property. In most instances this is true; the situs of personal property is, for most purposes, the domicile of the owner, because it is deemed to be attached to his person. But, say the courts, the law for attaching property of non-residents necessarily assumes that the property has a sitios distinct from the owner’s domicile. Wherever the owner may maintain a suit to recover the property, if the grounds exist, the property may be attached as his property. And this would probably determine the sitios of the property in controversy in this case. It is conceded that when the oil of Miller, Talmage & Russell went into the possession of the Buckeye Pipe Line Company, it lost its identity; it was no longer susceptible of separation or seizure; it became and was a part of the common stock of oil of the Buckeye Pipe Line Company, Lima division.
    The Indiana oil, and Ohio oil, is conceded to be of different quality; yet this is a fiction that cuts little figure, when faced by the fact that the oil of both fields was of the same market value, which was also conceded; that it was optional with the company to deliver oil represented by its run tickets, either in Ohio or Indiana, no matter in which field produced; and that the Indiana and Ohio oil, Lima division, was taken and considered and made a common stock of oil, out of which this run ticket might be paid by delivery of the quantity of oil at any of its stations of the Lima division. So that this run ticket represented so much oil of a common stock. Miller, Talmage & Russell owned by virtue of it, so many parts of this common stock; and if any of the common stock was destroyed, they lost their portion of the common stock thus destroyed. This ownership was in the common stock, and their ownership was in the common stock; and they and other owners of the run tickets of this company owned all of the oil of this common stock. None of them owned any particular oil, ei'thdr in Indiana or Ohio; they owned it together, all of it, both in Indiana and Ohio, their interest being defined by their run tickets..
    The liability and rights of this garnishee to this attaching creditor is measured by its liability to Miller, Talmage & Russell. It claims, and has the option, upon demand, to deliver the oil represented by this' run ticket to Miller, Talmage & Russell; could it be successfully denied that Miller, Talmage & Russell would have a right to recover, against the company .in Allen county, Ohio, their interest in the common stock? We think not- After having refused altogether, could the fact that the company had an option as to where it should deliver, justify a refusal to deliver at all? and still refusing, could the court consider its option as any longer a right that it might exercise under its contract? We think not.
    Under the facts as agreed, we must conclude, that the proceedings in attachment and garnishment, clothed Fee with the rights that could have been exercised by Miller, Talmage & Russell. Aid a refusal to deliver the oil at all from this common stock, upon demand of the sheriff, under the order of the court, was a waiver of the company’s right to exercise its option as to the place of delivery; and the property being part of a common stock, the situs of which was as well in Allen connty, Ohio, as in Huntington county, Indiana, we must necessarily conclude that the action was properly brought and jurisdiction properly acquired in the common pleas court.
    It is conceded that the attachment in this state issued, and the proceedings in garnishment were had, before the appointment of the receiver for Miller, Talmage & Russell, by the circuit court of Huntington county, Indiana, and before said court took cognizance of the matter. That being the case, the jurisdiction of a court of this state, competent to deal with the controversy, having been first acquired.over the property in dispute, such jurisdiction is exclusive, and the order of the circuit court of Huntington county, Indiana, upon plaintiff in error, to turn the oil in controversy over to the receiver of that court, is no protection to plaintiff in error.
   Spear, J.

A preliminary question was made by •defendant in error in the circuit court, and is renewed here, with respect to the sufficiency of the motion for new trial, and attention is called to the form of the motion, which is: “First, that the judgment

is not sustained by sufficient evidence; and, second, it is contrary to law.” It is contended that the motion is not sufficient to bring the evidence in the record up for review because the attack is made, not upon the finding or decision of the court, but upon the judgment, and hence the evidence cannot be examined in a reviewing court for any purpose. To sustain this contention would, we think, be to carry techincality to extreme length, especially in view of the provisions of sections 4948 and 5115, Revised Statutes, requiring liberality in the construction of proceedings, and the disregard of immaterial errors g,nd defects.

The statute, sec. 5305, gives one of the grounds for new trial: “6. That the verdict, report, or decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or is contrary to law.” This provision treats of the final action of a jury, a referee or master, and of a court. A jury’s work ends with a verdict, that of a referee or master with a report, and that of a court in a decision. We have here no verdict and no report; simply the action of the court itself. What is a decision as here expressed? Manifestly it is not simply a finding, for a finding concludes nothing. The defeated party is not hurt by a finding, nor is the controversy ended by it, if the action stops there. I-t would seem that the act called here a decision is intended to embrace the last act of the court; in other Avords the judgment. This would appear to be a rational conclusion, giving to the language of clause 6 a practical construction, without the aid of authorities. But the text books make it clear. ' It is true that in an abstract sense there is a shade of difference between the import of the word “decision” and the word “judgment.” As expressed by Abbott (Law Diet., 351), “the decision is the resolution of the principles which determine the controversy; the judgment is the formal paper applying them to the rights of the parties.” But the same author gives the general definition of decision as “the result of the deliberations of a tribunal; the judicial determination of the question or cause.” Freeman in his work on Judgments, sec. 2, says: “A judgment, except where the signification of the word has been changed by statute, is defined as being “the decision or sentence of the law pronounced by a court, or other tribunal, upon the matter contained in the record.” Wharton (Law. Diet., 235 and 437), gives “Decision, a judgment,” and “Judgment, judicial determination; decision of a court.” Definitions in other law dictionaries are of like import. See Bouvier, Rapalje, Anderson, Cochran and others. See, also, Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal., 24. It is insisted by counsel that previous decisions of this court, cited in the brief, rule this case. We think they have no application to it.

We are of opinion that the language of the motion is a substantial statement of the ground authorized by the sixth clause of sec. 5305, and should be held sufficient to all intents and purposes.

Coming now to the merits of the case, the question presented is whether or not the court of Allen county had, by virtue of the attachment proceedings, such control or jurisdiction over the property of the defendants situate in Indiana, and in the possession of the Company, as to enable it to make a valid order requiring the garnishee to produce that property in Allen county and surrender it into the custody of the court. And as to the garnishee, the question is not merely, whether the garnishee had property of the debtor in its hands, but whether it had the property under such circumstances as to make it answerable for it in Allen county.

It is to be remarked at the outset that an attachment proceeding is exclusively a statutory one, and hence we look to our law regulating attachments for the source of authority to the court and its officers. What that statute lawfully authorizes, the plaintiff in attachment is entitled to demand; what it fails to authorize he may not demand, for it is well established that equity does not and cannot aid the statute. The purpose of the statute is to reach the property of defendant in the suit, and subject it to the demand of the plaintiff. In this aspect an attachment proceeding is in the nature of a proceeding in rcm, and, as in all proceedings in rem, the thing against which the proceedings are directed must be brought within the jurisdiction of the court. 1 Green. En. sections 542-3. The proceeding reaches out for the tangible property of the defendant, to b¿ levied on directly by the officer or obtained by garnishee process served on one who may have property of defendant in his possession which the officer cannot get at, or may be owing the defendant. The term attach implies seizure. As stated by Hosmer, C. J., in Hollister v. Goodale, 8 Conn., 332; “The word attach, derived remotely from the Latin term attingo, and more immediately from the French attacher, signifies to take or touch, and was adopted as a precise expression of the thing; nam qui nomina intelligit, res etiam intelligit. The only object of attachment is to take out of the defendant’s possession, and to transfer into the custody of the law, acting through its legal officer, the goods attached, that they may, if necessary, be seized in execution, and be disposed of and delivered to the purchaser. From both these considerations it is apparent that to attach is to take actual possession of property. Hence, the legal doctrine is firmly established that to constitute an attachment of goods, the officer must have actual possession and custody.” This well states the principle at the foundation of the law of attachment, and is to be kept in mind as having an important bearing on the question here. As ancillary to it is the other method of getting at the property by process of garnishment already referred to.

Our statute provides, section 5524 and following, that an order of attachment shall require the officer to attach the goods, etc., of the defendant in his county, not exempt, etc., or so much as will satisfy the plaintiff’s claim. And that when the property attached “is personal property, and can be come at, he shall take it into his custody, and hold it subject to the order of the court.” This seizure and possession is essential to the court’s jurisdiction over the property. Orders of attachment may be issued to the sheriffs of different counties of the state. Where garnishee process issues, if the officer can not get possession of the property, he shall leave with the garnishee a copy of an order of attachment and a written notice that he appear in court and answer touching the property and credits of the defendant in his possession or under his control; and he shall stand liable to the plaintiff for all property in his hands from the time of notice. If he answer, and it be discovered that on or after the service of the order and notice he was possessed of any property of defendant, the court may order the delivery of such property into court. If the garnishee deliver the property disclosed into court, he is allowed his costs.

No question is or could be made that property without the state can, by virtue of a process of attachment, be seized by on Ohio officer, and of course such property could not be delivered into court. And it seems to us clear, that, notwithstanding the somewhat general language of the statute respecting garnishment, the property in the garnishee’s hands, for which he must answer, is intended by the statute to be limited to property within the state, for it could hardly have been the intention of the general assembly to give a plaintiff in attachment greater power over the tangible property of his debtor situate out of the state by virtue of garnishment than would be possible by the direct process of attachment. On the contrary it would seem, considering all the statutes together, that the intent is clearly manifest that property which may be sequestered in the hands of a garnishee must be within the state in order that it may be taken and sold to satisfy such judgment as may be obtained against the debtor, for it is in contemplation that the officer will seize the property in the possession of the garnishee if he is able to get at it; also that the garnishee may voluntarily surrender it to the officer. The inference seems reasonable that property to be so reached is intended to be confined to such as would be subject to seizure by attachment or execution if in the hands of the debtor himself.

The many inconveniences and hardships which would be likely to follow a contrary holding may be easily imagined. The case at bar presents a marked instance. There being no connection between the system of lines located in the producing oil fields in Indiana and the system located in Ohio, literal obedience to the order of the court would be, if not impossible, at least extremely impracticable. Beside this the court of Allen county has ordered the Company to deliver this oil to its sheriff in that county; the court of Huntington county, Indiana, has ordered it to deliver the oil to its receiver. If both orders are valid the Company must deliver the oil in one state and pay its value in the other. A stronger case for the application of the argument ab inconvenienti could hardly be conceived.

It is intimated, though not distinctly claimed, that the court, having the person of the garnishee within its jurisdiction, may, by virtue of some general power, enforce its order. Cases arise involving contract relations in which the undertaking to perform an act purely personal may be enforced, though the act relates to property which is extra-territorial, such as decrees for the specific performance of contracts to convey land situate in foreign parts. Suck execution is not only a strictly personal act, but one to be ■wholly performed where the decree commanding it is rendered. But the practice cannot prevail as to attachments for, as already stated, attachment is strictly statutory. PoAver to entertain such proceeding is given to justices of the peace upon practically the same terms as regulate its exercise by the common pleas, and, taking the statutes on the subject as a whole, it is entirely clear that it Avas never intended to clothe all courts having jurisdiction of the garnishee process Avith equity powers.

It may not be necessary to the determination of this case to decide whether or not there is power in the general assembly to authorize seizure of property outside the state through attachment and garnishee process, but the consideration that the power is at least extremely doubtful, affords another reason for giving to the statutes a construction denying the intent to so provide. It is said in 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. Lrav, 1156: “To charge a garnishee for property of defendant, it is absolutely essential that at the time of service of process, he should have it in his possession and within the state.” And at page 1255: “The domicile of the garnishee does not give the courts of the state jurisdiction over the debt he owes to a party in another state, and is not sufficient to sustain an action in rem. This is not determined by his domicile, but by the situs of the property which he holds.” Mr. Justice Story, in his Conflict of Laws, section 543, observes: “But although every nation may thus rightfully exercise jurisdiction over all persons within its domains, yet all are to understand that in regard thereto, the doctrine applies only to suits purely personal or to suits connected with property within the same sovereignty. For although a person may be within the territorial jurisdiction, yet it is by no means true, in virtue thereof, every sort of suit may there be maintainable against him. A suit cannot for instance, be maintainable against him so as to absolutely bind his property elsewhere.” And, section 550: “A nation within whose territory any personal property is actually situate, has as entire domination over it while therein, in point of sovereignty and jurisdiction, as it has over immovable property situate there. It may regulate its transfer, and subject it to process and execution, and provide for and control the uses and disposition of it, to the same extent that it may exert its authority over immovable property.” Surely this doctrine can not be maintained if the courts of a sister state may sequester and control property outside of their limits at their will. See also, Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 241-277. The principle above stated seems to rest upon substantial ground. The exclusive dominion over property being in the country or state where the property is, remedies afforded to creditors by the laws of their state would have no more concern with it than if it were in a foreign land. Such other states could not reach it for the purpose of taxing it, and thus add to their revenues, or for the purpose of collecting taxes already due and not otherwise collectible. And what the state cannot do for hersélf it would seem clear she cannot do for her citizens. A debtor who by himself or his bailee, has property in another state has the right to keep it there; and such state has an interest in his exercise of the right free from interference by other sovereignties. Western R. R. Co. v. Thornton, 60 Ga., 300.

Decisions by courts of high standing in support of the proposition generally that property outside of the state is not the subject of garnishment are abundant. Some of them follow: Lawrence v. Smith, 45 N. H., 533; Young v. Rose, 11 Foster, 201; Clark v. Brewer, 6 Gray, 320; Penna. R’d Co. v. Pennock, 51 Pa. St., 244; Wheat v. Railroad Co., 4 Kan., 370; Ill. Gen. R. R. Co. v. Cobb, 48 Ill., 402; Sutherland v. Bank, 78 Ky., 250; Bates v. C. M. & St. P. R’y Co., 60 Wis., 296; Montrose P. Co. v, D. & E. Man’g Co., 40 N. W. (Iowa), 705.

But it is insisted that even though it should be conceded that the general rule is as claimed by plaintiff in error, the contract between Miller, Tallmage & Russell and the Company, called the “run ticket” takes this case out of that rule, inasmuch as the oil produced in the two fields was considered and made a common stock of oil out of which the ticket might be paid by delivery of the quantity of oil at any of the stations of the Lima division; so that the ticket represented so much of the common stock sohie of which was in Ohio, and hence demand might be satisfied by a delivery at any of the stations in Ohio. The statement of fact is correct so far as it goes, but it ignores the material qualification provided in the ticket, “that the point of delivery shall be at the option of the Company.” Now it is conceded in argument by defendant in error that “the liability and rights of this garnishee to this attaching creditor are measured by its liability to Miller, Tallmage & Russell.” That is, if under the facts as they existed at the time of the attachment and garnishee process were issued, Miller, Tallmage & Russell could have maintained in Allen county replevin against the Company for this oil, and, failing to obtain possession of the oil, would have been entitled to a recovery for its value, then Fee would have the right to reach the same result by attachment and garnishment. But could Miller, Tallmage & Russell have maintained such an action in Allen county at that time? Manifestly not. The option of selecting the point of delivery had not been exercised by the Company , as no action by the owners had called for its exercise. Conceding that upon demand being made by the owners on the Company for delivery to them of their oil, with tender of charges, a refusal had followed, they might have maintained replevin anywhere in the Lima division, still the stubborn fact remains that no such demand had been made, nor any refusal. Hence the owners had then no cause of action, and, measuring the attaching creditor’s rights by those of the owners of the oil, he had no ground of action. But we are reminded that there was a demand on the Company by the sheriff of Allen county after judgment, and a refusal. Suppose this to be so, how does it help the matter? The demand was for delivery of the oil in Allen county. It was not accompanied by any tender of charges which had accrued. It was not even made at.the time of the service of the writ but after judgment against the non-resident defendants, and, presumably, after the making of the order on the garnishee, and if so could not have been a predicate for such order. The proposition that this demand gave the attaching creditor a right of action entirely loses sight of the fact that no breach of the contract had occurred between Miller, Tallmage & Bussell and the Company, and that, for ought that appears, it was ready and willing to deliver the oil to them on its line in Indiana. At all events if they had then made demand for delivery of the oil in Allen county it might, with entire regard to all contract rights, have been refused by the Company, and they would have had, by reason of refusal of such demand, no right of action. By the same token the sheriff had no such right against the garnishee.

Our conclusion is that the court of common pleas of Allen county did not, by the attachment and garnishment proceeding, acquire jurisdiction of the property of Miller, Tallmage & Russell, in the possession of the Company in Indiana, and was without power to make the order on the garnishee to deliver the property into the custody of the court, and that its order in that behalf is without legal effect.

It follows that the judgment of both courts will be reversed, and judgment be entered for plaintiff in error.

Reversed.  