
    Klever Antonio Macao LOJANO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-3502.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 15, 2014.
    
      Elyssa N. Williams, Formica Williams, P.C., New Haven, CT, for Petitioner.
    Julia J. Tyler, Trial Attorney (Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer P. Levings, Senior Litigation Counsel, on the brief), Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, GERARD E. LYNCH and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Klever Antonio Macao Lojano (“Macao” ), a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of an order of the BIA affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his application for cancellation of removal. In re Klever Antonio Macao Lojano, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (BIA Aug. 22, 2013), affg No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig.Ct. Hartford Oct. 2, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Macao argues that the IJ and the BIA erred in finding that he failed to establish that his removal would result in exceptional hardship for his citizen son, Jonathan, so as to render Macao eligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l). Specifically, Macao claims that the IJ and the BIA assigned insufficient weight to Jonathan’s reduced educational, medical, and economic opportunities in Ecuador. Those claims fall outside our jurisdiction.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)®, we lack jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under ... 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.” Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 319 (2d Cir.2009), quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)® (alterations omitted). This limitation includes the BIA’s “determination of whether a petitioner’s removal would cause exceptional hardship to qualifying relatives, a necessary predicate for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(l)(D).” Hernandez v. Holder, 736 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir.2013). Although we retain jurisdiction to address “constitutional claims or questions of law,” a petition that “essentially disputes the correctness of [the agency’s] fact-finding or the wisdom of [its] exercise of discretion” falls outside the scope of our appellate review. Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Macao’s arguments that the IJ and the BIA should have granted relief based on Jonathan’s history of illness and the disruption of Jonathan’s English-language education challenge precisely the sort of fact-finding and discretionary judgment that § 1252(a)(2)(B)® casts, outside our jurisdiction.

While Macao tries to resurrect our jurisdiction by claiming to raise two legal challenges, neither argument is persuasive. First, Macao argues that the IJ and BIA so profoundly misread and mischaracter-ized the facts regarding Jonathan’s health and education as to commit legal error. As we have recognized, where “some facts important to the subtle determination of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship have been totally overlooked and others have been seriously mischaracterized,” the agency’s resulting judgment is based on “an error of law.” Mendez, 566 F.3d at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the IJ’s and the BIA’s judgments in this case involve no such egregious mis-characterizations. Although Macao insists that the agencies “overlooked” evidence of Jonathan’s obesity and hypertrophic car-diomyopathy, that evidence consisted only of a few notations in Jonathan’s' medical records referring to his “overweight” appearance and “HCM,” with little elaboration. The IJ had an adequate basis in the record to find that those health concerns did not present exceptional circumstances given Macao’s testimony that his son was “healthy” and saw his doctor “[o]nly for office checks.” Similarly, Macao’s claims on appeal that interrupting Jonathan’s English-language schooling at an early age would stunt his linguistic development, or that Jonathan would be forced to work in lieu of attending school in Ecuador, find no support in the record, where Macao testified only that Jonathan does “very well” in school and made no mention of child labor. Neither the IJ nor the BIA committed legal error by “overlooking” material facts -that Macao never raised in the proceedings below.

Second, Macao argues that the IJ applied an incorrect legal standard by equating an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship with “complete destitution” and by failing to consider the totality of his testimony. While a petitioner’s challenge to a legal standard applied by the IJ or BIA is, of course, a question of law, we nevertheless “lack jurisdiction to review any legal argument that is so insubstantial and frivolous as to be inadequate to invoke federal-question jurisdiction.” Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 40. Contrary to Macao’s assertions, the agency did not apply the wrong standard. The IJ’s reference to “complete destitution” came in the context of a holistic analysis of the evidence presented at Macao’s hearing, including Macao’s claims to some savings, Jonathan’s relative familiarity with Ecuador, and his strong family network there. Furthermore, the IJ correctly cited applicable precedents from the BIA defining an exceptional hardship as one “substantially beyond that which ordinarily would be expected to result from the person’s departure.” See In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468 (BIA 2002). Because Macao’s assertions that the IJ either neglected relevant evidence or conflated exceptional hardship with “destitution” find no support in the record, he fails to raise a legal challenge sufficient to invoke our jurisdiction.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. 
      
      . Because an individual’s first Spanish surname typically provides the family name and because petitioner’s own brief refers to him as "Macao,” we adopt the same convention.
     