
    Maund’s Adm’r v. M’Phail.
    April, 1839,
    Richmond.
    Will- -Description oí Legatee Uncertain — Parol Evidence. — An inhabitant of Norfolk having, by his will, given all his negroes “to the agent of the new colonization society in Africa,” to do as he pleases-with them, parol evidence is admitted to fill up the description of the person intended by the testator ; and it appearing by the evidence, that the society meant is the american colonization society for settling free persons of colour in Africa, that J. M. is the agent, residing in Norfolk, of that society, and that he is the person intended, — decree made, declaring him entitled to the slaves, and the increase of the females since the testator’s death.
    Noah Maund of the county of Norfolk made his will in 1829, by which, after giving to William Maund, the son of Marcein and Agnes Manad, all his land and houses, he made the following bequest:
    *“Item, I give all my negroes to the agent of the new colonization society in Africa, to do as he pleases with them, Primus, Harry, Lady, Sam, Elcey, Kider, Charles, Wilcher and Ben. These he can take charge oí after my death.”
    The testator then gave unto his trusty friend Thomas Hodges 500 dollars to execute his will, and gave all the rest of his property, after his just debts were paid, to be equally divided between Mary Jarvis and Mary Jolliff; the latter being his cousin. He appointed Hodges executor of his will; hoping, he says, “it will be received and recorded as I rote it with my own hand. Though it may not be in right form, it is my hole will and desire.”
    The will was admitted to record, and Hodges qualified as executor, but died soon afterwards, and then administration de bonis non with the will annexed was granted to James Wilkins.
    A bill was exhibited in the circuit court of Norfolk county, against Wilkins as administrator, by John M’Phail, charging-, that the society meant. by the description of the new colonization society in Africa, is the american colonization society for settling free persons of colour in Africa ; that at the time the will was made, and for some years previously, and at the time of filing the bill, the complainant was the agent of the society contemplated by the testator, and the only agent in that part of the country; that the complainant's residence is in the borough and county of Norfolk, where he has lived for many years ; that he was personally acquainted with the testator, and had conversed with him, in the borough of Norfolk, not long before his death, on the subject of the colonization society; that the testator meant him by the description “agent of the new colonization society in Africa;” that since the slaves came to the possession of Wilkins as administrator, he has hired them out, and received large sums on ^account of the hires; that neither the slaves nor their hires are wanted for the payment of debts, but nevertheless the administrator has refused to deliver up the slaves and pay over the hires. The complainant, disclaiming any intention of seeking to recover the slaves for the purpose of holding them in bondage, insisted on having them surrendered to him, that he might, as soon as practicable, send them to Ijiberia, whither he believed they were intended by the testator to be sent. Besides a decree for the slaves and their increase, he asked an account of the hires, and a decree for what might appear due on taking it.
    Wilkins, by his answer, denied the existence of any such society as that mentioned in the will, and required proof that there is any agent thereof, capable in law of taking the slaves.
    Richard Kain deposed, that he was acquainted with the testator for upwards of forty years; that he was much with him until about four weeks before his death, and saw him several times during those four weeks ; that within seven or eight weeks before the testator’s death, and also within three or four weeks, he had conversations with the testator respecting the manner in which he intended to dispose of his slaves; that the testator stated to him that he wished them to be freed and sent away to the new colonization society, by John M’Phail taking charge of them, as he was acting in the line of that business; that the testator farther stated that he had so directed in his will, and desired the deponent, if he was the longest liver, to attend to it, as he knew his heirs would try to upset the will, if possible. This witness mentioned farther, that it was known generally in the neighbourhood that John M’Phail of Norfolk was the agent of the american colonization society, and the testator told him that he had talked to M’Phail upon the subject.
    *Thomas G\ Broughton, editor of the Norfolk Herald, deposed that M’Phail advertised in the Herald, from November 1827 to September 1833, as agent of the american colonization society; that the object of the society was to remove free people of colour to Africa ; that in 1829, the society was a new undertaking in that section of the country, and might with propriety have been described by a resident of that section of the country as a new colonization society in Africa; that in the deponent’s -printing establishment, since 1827, M’Phail has been considered the agent, residing in Norfolk, of the society, and he has been generally so reputed in this section of the state; that no other person has been recognized as agent, to his knowledge or belief; and he considers the expression “ the agent of the new colonization society in Africa,” used in the testator’s will, as descriptive of M’Phail.
    The circuit court declared its opinion to be, that according to the true construction of the will, and the testimony in the cause, the complainant was entitled to the slaves before mentioned, and the increase of the females since the testator’s death ; and decreed that an account be taken of their hires since they came to the possession of the defendant, and, if either party should desire it, an account also of .the transactions of the defendant as administrator of Maund.
    Prom this decree an appeal was allowed.
    Harrison, for appellant.
    Parol evidence cannot be admitted to explain the testator’s meaning, to such an extent as is proposed here. Its admission would transcend the principle laid down by chancellor Kent in Mann v. Mann’s ex’ors, 1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 234. Por here it is not attempted to prove that M’Phail is agent of the new colonization society in Africa : but the object of evidence is to shew that the society itself is erroneously described ; that a society was intended *which is known by another name; and that M’Phail is the agent of that other society. He referred, for the general doctrines on this subject, to 1 Roper on Legacies 131, 3, 140, 42, 146, 7, and Powell on Devises 476, 7, 477, 8, 490, 497, and to Thomas v. Thomas, 6 T. R. 671, to shew that evidence of the testator’s declarations is inadmissible. As to the testimony of Broughton that M’Phail advertised as agent, that, he said, was only evidence of M’Phail’s own acts. If M’Phail was the agent described and intended, the fact might have been proved by other and better evidence.
    Robinson, for appellee.
    This court has decided that a bequest of slaves to a particular person by name, in trust to send them to Africa, to the colony at Liberia, is a valid bequest. Elder v. Elder’s ex’or, 4 Leigh 252. Here, however, the object only appears in the description of the person to whom the bequest is made. The bequest of the slaves is to the legatee, to do as he pleases with them. And the only question is whether parol evidence may be received to ascertain what particular individual fills the description. The position that parol evidence is not to be let in except in cases where there is a latent ambiguity, though often laid down, is unsound : such evidence is admitted in other cases, in which there is an ambiguity which cannot otherwise be removed, and which may, by these means, be clearly and satisfactorily explained, “when” (says sir (Thomas Plumer) “the person, or the thing, is designated on the face of the instrument by terms imperfect and equivocal, admitting either of no meaning at all by themselves, or of a variety of different meanings, referring tacitly or expressly, for the ascertainment and completion of the meaning, to extrinsic circumstances, it has never been considered an objection to the reception of the evidence of those circumstances, that the ambiguity was patent, manifested on the face of the instrument.” Colpoys v. Colpoys, Jacob 451 ; 4 Cond. Eng. Ch. *Rep. 216. Evidence will be received to fill up the description of the legatee and shew who was the person intended. 3 Starkie on Evid. title Parol Evidence, p- 1021, and title Will, p. 1695. Starkie lays it down as a general rule that difficulties arising in the application of the terms of a will, from imperfection in the terms of description either of the party to whom the estate is given or of the estate, may be removed by the aid of extrinsic evidence, even although no part of the description be perfectly correct ; p. 1021. One of the strongest cases cited by him to this effect is Beaumont v. Fell, 2 P. Wms. 141, were there was a mistake in both the Christian and sirname. In Price v. Page, 4 Ves. 680, the legacy was to “ --Price, the son of-Price.” (The claimant was the son of a niece of the testator, and the name of his father and of his grandfather was Price. The question was as to the validity of the bequest, and, if valid, whether the claimant or his father was intended. By the evidence it appeared that the testator contributed to the maintenance of the claimant, placed him with an attorney, and said that he would provide for him, and that he had left him something by his will. Upon this evidence the claimant was declared entitled to the legacy. So here, there is evidence that Maund said he wished the slaves ser.t away by the new colonization society, by John M’Phail taking charge of them ; that he had so directed in his will ; that he had talked to M’Phail upon the subject : and there is, besides, evidence that M’Phail was known generally in the neighbourhood as the agent of the american colonization society. The following additional cases were cited and commented upon : Smith v. Coney, 6 Ves. 42; Careless v. Careless, 1 Meriv. 383 ; 19 Ves. 601 ; Still v. Hosle &c., 6 Madd. Ch. Rep. 192; Eade v. Eade &c., 5 Madd. Ch. Rep. 118; Beachcroft &c. v. Beachcroft &c., 1 Madd. Ch. Rep. 430 ; Lord Woodhouselee v. Dalrymple, 2 Meriv. 419. Upon these authorities *(it was argued) the case is plain upon the,will, in connexion with the evidence of Richard Kain. But even if that evidence were out of the case, and if this were a devise instead of a legacy, the description would be sufficiently accurate. There is the american colonization society for colonizing persons in Africa, and M’Phail is the agent of it. There does not appear to be any other colonization society of any similar description. It would be too much to infer that the testator meant the agent of a society which does not exist. It must rather be intended that he meant the agent of the american colonization society, though there be some little inaccuracy in the description. Attorney General v. Mayor of Rye, 7 Taunt. 546 ; 2 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 213 ; 1 Powell on Devises 338 ; Caine v. Roche, 7 Bingh. 226 ; 20 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 111 ; Cook v. Danvers, 7 East 299. It thus appears that even in a devise, where a person is clearly made out to be the individual meant, and there is no other to whom it may be applied, that person will take.
    Harrison, in reply.
    The ground taken on behalf of the appellee is in striking contrast with the evidence in the cause. It is contended that under the will the appellee is to take the slaves as his absolute property, and to support his claim, he adduces evidence which shews that the testator never intended he should take as owner. After the appel-lee has himself adduced this evidence, a court of equity should not permit him to recover these slaves for his own use. The evidence shews an intent to emancipate, and in a proper case it may be determined whether or no the emancipation has been made in a way which is valid under the statute.
    
      
      WHI — Uncertainty as to Name or Description of Legatee — Corporations.—The principal case is cited in Wilson v. Perry, 39 W. Va. 197, 1 S. E. Rep. 323, for the proposition that where the name or description of the legatee is erroneous, and there is no reasonable doubt as to the person intended to be named or described, the mistake will not defeat the be-ciuest; and this rule applies as well to a corporation as to a natural person.
      Same- Latent Ambiguity — Extrinsic Evidence.— where a latent ambiguity has been established by evidence dehors the will, extrinsic evidence may be received to remove the ambiguity and to show the real intention of the testator. The principal case is cited for this proposition in Hawkins v. Garland, 76 Va. 156, 44 Am. Rep. 162. See Roy v. Rowzie, 35 Gratt. 599, and note ; Wilson v. Perry, 39 W. Va. 169, 1 S. E. Rep. 303 ; Senger v. Senger, 81 Va. 687.
      Where there is a latent ambiguity in a written instrum ent, it may be explained by parol testimony ; or where the terms used in the instrument have not a deiinite legal signification, the custom of the trade, or the acts of the parties, may be resorted to, for the construction of them, Bowyer v. Martin, 6 Rand. 525.
    
   PER CURIAM.

The decree is to be affirmed.  