
    WILLIAM JEX, et al., Appellants, v. ADOLPH D. STRAUSS, et al., Respondents.
    
      Letter of introduction—Party procuring not liable to party giving, for damages flowing from acts and transactions which are not the legitimate, natural and approximate consequences of the letter—Acts and transactions not the legitimate consequences of a certain letter—Damages, remoteness of.
    
    The defendants procured from plaintiffs a letter introducing to their agent, at Corn Island, one Delgado, upon the representation that he was their friend, unacquainted with Central America, and about to visit various places on the coast on a pleasure trip, and concealing that Delgado was not so unacquainted, hut in conjunction with others was preparing a hostile expedition against the Sp;mish government, and that they were privy thereto. Defendants having procured this letter of introduction, despatched the “ City of Mexico ” to Com Island, Delgado being on board, furnished with the letter and with a letter written by themselves to such agent advising him that they had shipped goods to him, and requesting him to hold them subject to Delgado’s disposition, to carry out his instructions as to their re-shipment per “ City of Mexico,” and to furnish supplies to that vessel, drafts for winch, drawn on them by the captain, they would honor in New York. The goods referred to in defendants’ letter were in fact arms and ammunition for the hostile expedition. The vessel arrived at Corn Island, having Delgado. on board, but without the arms and ammunition, their shipment having been prevented at the port of New York. All that plaintiffs’ agent did, in consequence of the letter presented by Delgado, was to supply provisions to the vessel and make certain advances, the total amount of which was about $300.
    But Delgado, the captain and some of the vessel’s crew, forcibly entered plaintiff’s building, and made speeches of hostility against Spanish Honduras. The “City of Mexico” subsequently left Corn Island. Shortly afterwards United States vessels arrived there, and the commander of one of them, suspecting that plaintiffs’ agent had some complicity with Delgado’s illegal expedition, forcibly entered plaintiffs’ premises and did sundry acts therein by force, and forcibly took possession of one of plaintiffs’ schooners. Soon after, said commander becoming satisfied of plaintiffs’ innocence, released the schooner and withdrew from Corn Island,
    
      Held, on demurrer to a complaint based on above facts, claiming to recover damages by reason of the fraud perpetrated on them in procuring the letter of introduction and of reckless, wanton and wicked acts of the defendants, that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; because: 1st. The advances could not be regarded as the natural or proximate result of the letter of introduction ; and the action being based on fraud, the amount of those advances could not be recovered as an ordinary indebtedness depending on the breach of an ordinary implied contract or actual promise to pay. 2d. The acts of Delgado .and the crew of the steamship “City of Mexico," and the acts of the United States officers, could not be regarded as a legitimate consequence of that letter; and the damages alleged to have been incurred by those acts were too remote and inconsequential and unconnected with their alleged origin.—the obtaining the letter of introduction—to form a ground of an action.
    Before Sedgwick, Ch. J., Freedman and Truax, JJ.
    
      Decided June 23, 1887.
    Appeal by plaintiffs from order sustaining demurrer to the complaint and from interlocutory judgment entered thereon.
    The defendants demurred on the ground (with another) that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The judge at special term in sustaining the demurrer, wrote the following opinion:
    “ O’Gorman, J.—This is a demurrer to the complaint on the grounds, 1st, that causes of action have been im- ' properly joined; 2d, that the facts as stated in the complaint, did not constitute a cause of action.
    “ The material facts as stated in the complaint and admitted by the demurrer are these: In December, .1885, the plaintiffs were merchants doing business in New York under the firm name of William Jex & Co., and the defendants also carried on business in New York under the firm name of A. D. Strauss & Co.
    “ The plaintiffs have been engaged in trade between New York and British Honduras, the Mosquito coast and the Central American states, and had warehouses, stores, vessels and other property at Corn Island, which is under the jurisdiction of the Mosquito government.
    
      “ The agent of the plaintiffs at Corn Island was named Henry Nelson.
    
      “ The defendants, being known to the plaintiffs as merchants for a number of years, requested plaintiffs to give them a letter introducing one Delgado to Nelson, the plaintiff’s agent at Corn Island, and represented to the plaintiffs that he was their friend, unacquainted with Central America and about to visit various places on the coast on a pleasure trip. Relying on these statements the plaintiffs did write and deliver to the defendants a letter of introduction of Delgado to Nelson. These representations of defendants do plaintiffs were false. Delgado was not a stranger visiting Central America for the first time, but was there, in conjunction with one Soto and other conspirators, preparing a hostile expedition' against the Spanish government and Spanish Honduras, and defendants were privy to and aiding in this expedition by purchasing or chartering the steamship “ City of Mexico ” for the use of Soto and his confederates, and also supplying arms and ammunition for said ship.
    
      “ These facts the defendants concealed from the plaintiffs, and they falsely and fraudulently represented to the plaintiffs that the trip of Delgado was of an entirely private nature.
    “ The defendants on receiving from the plaintiffs this letter of introduction to Nelson in favor of Delgado, wrote a letter themselves to Nelson in which they stated that they had shipped goods to him, and requested him to hold the goods subject to the disposition of Delgado, and requested him (Nelson) to carry out the instructions of Delgado as to re-shipment of these goods per the u City of Mexico.” And they also requested Nelson to furnish supplies to the “ City of Mexico,” and they promised that they would honor the drafts of the captain of the ship on them, the defendants, in New York.
    
      “About December 31, 1885, the “City oí Mexico” arrived at Corn Island from New York with Delgado on board, but without any goods or freight on board, the shipping of the goods, which were in fact arms and ammunition, having been prevented by the customs authorities at the port of New York.
    “ The arms and ammunition, notwithstanding various plans and efforts on the part of the conspirators, never did reach Corn Island, but were finally captured by the officers of the British navy in Kingston, Jamaica, and all that Nelson, the plaintiffs’ agent, did in consequence of the letters presented to him by Delgado—that is to say, the letter from plaintiffs introducing Delgado and also the letter from the defendants to him, Nelson—was to supply provisions for the steamship and make certain advances, for which the defendants are still indebted to the plaintiffs in about $300.
    “Nelson, the plaintiffs’ agent, never by any act gave encouragement or aid to the projected hostile expedition —he refused to give Delgado the use of one of plaintiffs’ schooners, and the correspondence which took place between him and the defendants was without the knowledge of the plaintiffs and was in itself harmless and blameless.
    “Delgado, however, and the captain of the “City of Mexico,” and some of the partially armed crew forcibly entered plaintiffs’ buildings at Corn Island, and held meetings and made public speeches there, announcing their intention to carry on hostilities against Spanish Honduras, and plaintiffs aver in their complaint that but for the letter of introduction procured for Delgado from the plaintiffs, none of such persons would have been allowed peaceably to land or visit the premises of the plaintiffs.
    “ The plans of Delgado to cause the delivery of the goods in Corn Island having wholly failed, he departed from Corn Island in the steamship “ City of Mexico,” which was subsequently captured by vessels of the United States navy.
    
      
      “ Shortly after her departure, vessels of the United States navy arrived at Corn Island, and the commander of one of them suspecting that Nelson had some connection or complicity with the illegal expedition of Delgado, entered the plaintiffs’ premises at Corn Island by force and without permission of plaintiffs and made search therein and examined their books, &c., there, and took temporary possession of one of ‘ their schooners there, subjecting them to unjust and unfounded suspicion and greatly injuring their credit and business.
    “ Soon afterwards, however, becoming satisfied of the innocence of the plaintiffs, the said commander released the schooner and withdrew from Corn Island.
    “ The plaintiffs claim that by reason of the wanton frand perpetrated on them by defendants in procuring the letter of introduction and the reckless, wanton and wicked acts of the defendants, plaintiffs have been injured and damaged in the sum of ten thousand dollars.
    
      “ The question first to be considered is whether, admitting, as this demurrer does admit, all the facts above stated, any cause of action is made out against the defendants.
    “ The wrongful act of the defendants, from which all the alleged injuries and damages are claimed to have been consequences, was the procuring from the plaintiffs the letter of introduction of Delgado to Nelson by means of fraudulent concealment of the truth and fraudulent representation of what was false.
    “ Is there any real connection between that act of the defendants, however blamable, and any injury, real or supposed, incurred by the plaintiffs ?
    
      “ The only injuries incurred by the plaintiffs which can be imputed as the direct consequence or result of that letter are the making by Nelson of the advances on account of the defendants to the amount of three hundred dollars, for the recovery of which sum an action would lie against the defendants.
    
      
      a It may be argued that but for the influence of that letter of introduction to Nelson the advances would not have been made. Yet there is nothing -to show that such advances were directed or allowed or referred to in that letter, or that there was anything in that letter to warrant Nelson as agent of the plaintiffs in having any business dealings or transactions with Delgado or with the defendants. The complaint is silent on that subject.
    
      “ As to the forcible occupation of the premises of the plaintiffs by Delgado and the crew of the steamship, it was a trespass and a wrong, wholly unwarrantable, which cannot be regarded as the natural or approximate consequence or result of that letter. As Avell might a burglary committed by Delgado and the others be claimed to have been a consequence.
    
      a Neither can the forcible occupation of the plaintiffs’ premises or the temporary possession of plaintiffs’ schooner by the commander of a United States man-ofAvar be regarded as a legitimate consequence of that letter. After all that appears, that Avas also a trespass and a wrong, without fraud or justification of any laAV, and for any damages incurred by the plaintiffs which could be legitimately traced to that Avrong, legal remedy by way of action for damages would no doubt exist. The damages alleged to have been incurred by the plaintiffs by these acts of United States naval officers are in my opinion too remote and inconsequential and unconnected Avith their alleged origin and cause—the obtaining of the letter of introduction—to form the grounds of an action.
    “ The plaintiffs failing to sustain their action on the ground of fraud cannot recover in this action the three hundred dollars due them by defendants as an ordinary indebtedness, depending on the breach of an ordinary implied contract or actual promise to pay.
    
      “ In considering this case I have not failed to avail myself of the able briefs submitted to me by the learned ' counsel on both sides.
    
      
      “ The facts, as they now stand admitted by demurrer, are such as might create in the minds of the plaintiffs a not unnatural sense of wrong inflicted on them. But the law is and of necessity must be, at its best, incomplete and imperfect, and unable to cope with all complicated and minute offenses which occur from time to time in the dealings between man and man. With all its scrutiny, some will still elude its grasp from the impossibility of fixing the responsibility with that reasonable certainty which the law properly requires.
    
      “ After giving this case careful attention, I have come to the conclusion that the demurrer must. be sustained with costs.”
    
      Smith & Dougherty, attorneys, and J. Hampden Dougherty of counsel for appellants, on the questions considered in the Special Term opinion, among other things, argued
    I. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants reside here. The letter of introduction was solicited and obtained here. The defendants’ letter to the plaintiffs’ agent was written here. The defendants sent the “ City of Mexico ” from this port to Corn Island. The complaint alleges that these several steps were taken by the defendants in the execution of a plan to arm a filibustering steamship against the government of a friendly republic, and it further alleges that the injuries which resulted to the plaintiffs were consequences of the defendants’ wrongful acts. All the acts of the defendants cluster about, and were done in pursuance of a purpose to arm the steamship, and they present but one cause of action, Under the common law system of pleading, such an action would have been denominated an action upon the case, as.the injuries are in part consequential. 1 Chitty Pleading, 151. But to sustain the complaint does not require proof of actual damage resulting from defendants’ tort, for “ it is a well established principle of the common law that in actions of trespass and in all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon the defendant in having in view the enormity of his offense rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiffs. ..... By the common as well as by the statute law, men are often punished for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts by means of a civil action, and the damages inflicted by way of penalty given to the party injured. So also exemplary damages are given to vindicate a right and protect it against future similar invasions. Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. U. S. 363; Barry v. Edmonds, 116 U. S. 550; The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheaton, 546; Philadelphia, Wil. & Balt. R. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202; Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489; Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512; Voltz v. Blackmar, 64 N. Y. 440; Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill, 466; Wilde v. Hexter, 50 Barb. 448; Chrysler v. Canaday, 90 N. Y. 272; Oliver v. Chapman, 15 Texas, 400 ; Hamilton v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 28 ; Etchberry v. Levielle, 2 Hilton, 40; McAfee v. Crofford, 13 How. U. S. 447; Lane v. Wilcox 55 Barb. 615; Thomas v. Harris, 27 Law J. Exch. 353 ; Welsh v. Durand, 26 Conn. 182; Nye v. Merriam, 35 Vermont, 438; Emblen v. Myers, 30 Law J. Exch. 71; Ellsworth v. Potter, 41 Vt. 685; Field, Law of Damages, (1876), § 32; 1 Addison on Torts, (Dudley & Baylies’ ed.) 8; Bolivar Manufacturing Co. v. Neponset Manufacturing Co., 16 Pick. 235; Rounds v. L. & W. R. R. Co., 3 Him, 335; Denton v. Spear, 4 Mason, 115.
    H. The plaintiffs could maintain their cause of action upon one of several grounds, which is conclusive proof that the complaint sets forth a cause of action. (1) The plaintiffs clearly show a conversion of personal property. The complaint alleges the taking by Delgado and the crew of the “ City of Mexico,” upon the authority of the defendants, of supplies and provisions which were the property of the plaintiffs, for which no payment has been made. The circumstances under which the plaintiffs’ agent parted with the possession of these goods of the plaintiffs, which are pleaded in the complaint, would be admissible in evidence in aggravation of the' taking, or in support of the claim that the taking was unlawful. As it has been held that in actions for trespass to personal property exemplary damages could be obtained, the proof of the circumstances under which these provisions were obtained by the crew of the “ City of Mexico,” would lay a foundation for exemplary damages. It is no answer to say that the plaintiffs could recover the value of these provisions in an action upon contract. Under well-settled rules they are at liberty to sue for conversion. They cannot be forced to proceed in assumpsit. (2) The complaint establishes an injury in the nature of a trespass to other personal property of the plaintiffs, which was entirely due to the wrongful acts of the defendants. The seizure by the United States naval officers of the plaintiffs’ schooner “ Transport ” and of plaintiffs’ books and papers, constituted an injury to personal property of the plaintiffs, and as the naval officers were but obeying the law and the orders of their superiors, they were not liable for the wrong, but the defendants were responsible therefor. Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheaton, 546. (3) The plaintiffs’ cause of action might be rested as well upon another ground, the injury to their character and reputation, in which case the general circumstances narrated in the complaint would be proper as furnishing an estimate of the extent of the injury they had suffered. (4) Again the plaintiffs might rest their action upon a reckless or malicious conspiracy on the part of the defendants to procure the letter and to interest the plaintiffs’ agent in their plans, with resulting damages to the plaintiffs.
    III.. The injuries sustained by the plaintiffs, so far as they are consequential, are not too remote. They are the proximate result of the defendants’ tort. Field’s Law 
      
      of Damages, 32 ; McAfee v. Crofford, supra; Putnam v. Seventh Ave. R. R. Co., 55 N. Y. 108; Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44; Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381; Vandenburgh v. Truax, 4 Den. 404 ; 1 Addison on Torts, (D. & B.’s ed.,) 6; Blewitt v. Hill, 13 East, 14; Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892; Kellogg v. Chicago N. W. R. R. Co., 26 Wis. 223; Hill v. New River Co., 9 B. & S. 303; Addison on Torts, 8; Sedgwick Measure of Damages, 50, 81, 90.
    Ryan y. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210, cited by respondent, is distinguished in Lowry y. Manhattan R. R. Co., supra.
    
    IV. It cannot be justly contended that the action of the naval officers of the United States was not the natural consequence of the defendants’ conduct. It has been argued for the defendants that the proceedings of the commanders of these vessels were unwarrantable, arbitrary and illegal, and constitute a separate and independent wrong for which the defendants are not liable. If the acts of these commanders do not amount to a separate wrong, the defendants are liable therefor. If the naval officers were acting in obedience to law or the lawful instructions of their superiors, and in pursuance of such instructions did what they had reasonable cause for doing, they would not be personally liable, but the responsibility for their acts would attach to the defendants as the persons who set the whole train of consequences in motion. Justification for the course of these naval cruisers may be found in the principles laid down in the following cases, and in the .following sections of the United States Statutes: 1 Atty. G. Opinions, 249 ; U. S. v. Malek Adhel, 2 How. (U. S.) 210; U. S. v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153; U. S. v. Holmes, Ib. 412; The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. R. 408; U. S. R. S., §§ 4293 to 4298, inclusive; The Mariana Flora, 11 Wheaton, 40; Naval Regulations, (1876), c. 20, § 18; The Palmyra, 12 Wheaton, 1; U. S. R. S., § 5287; U. S. v. Mary Ann Hogan, 18 Fed. R. 529; Seward's Works, vol. 5., 452; U. S. R. S., § 1534; Act April 21, 1806, § 2; Naval Regulations (1876), c. 20, § 18. If the naval commanders were acting under proper commissions they could not be personally held liable for a seizure or capture made in good faith. As the plaintiffs could have no redress, either against them or against the government, in such a case they would be remediless unless the defendants, the real cause of the seizure, were liable. It has been repeatedly decided that a government officer is protected from liability for acts of such a nature, done in good faith, and in obedience to authority. Stacy v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642; Locke v. U. S., 7 Cranch. 339; Stoughton v. Dimick, 3 Blatch. 356; City of Mexico, 25 Fed. Rep. 924. See also 24 Federal Rep. 40; U. S. R. S. § 970. The action of the commanders is to be considered proper, if it was in conformity with the law, in the performance of their duties and under circumstances reasonably justifying it. The complaint alleges all that is necessary to lead to this conclusion, and it will become a question for the court or jury, after hearing the evidence, whether the proceedings of these officers were justifiable.
    V. The argument of the defendants’ counsel that these officers exceeded their powers in entering upon plaintiffs’ property situated in a foreign jurisdiction, is untenable. Property may be "seized for violation of the revenue or navigation laws of a nation, wherever it can J>e found, and no objection can be made to such a seizure except in behalf of the power whose rights or jurisdiction have been invaded. It is not open to the claimant of the captured property to make such an objection. 1 Kent's Com. star paging, 121; The Sir William Peel, 5 Wall. 517 ; The Adela, 6 Wall. 266 ; The Purisima Concepcion, 60 Rob. 45; 4 Atty. Gen. Opinions, 285; 8 Opinions Atty. Gen., Sept. 5, 1856; 3 Atty. Gen. Opinions, 405.
    YI. The learned judge at special term assumes that the only wrongful act of the defendants was their procurement by false and fraudulent representations of the letter of introduction for Delgado. This is but one of the wrongful acts on the part of the defendants. It is not the only act of which the plaintiffs complain. The procurement of this letter was the inception of a series of unlawful and malicious proceedings on the part of the defendants to the plaintiffs’ injury. The letter of introduction was obtained to enable them to consummate the plan into which they had entered with Delgado and Soto, of equipping and arming the steamship “ City of Mexico ” against the republic of Spanish Honduras.
    
      Macfarland, Boardman & Platt, attorneys, and W. W. Macfarland, of counsel for respondents, on the question considered in the special term opinion, among other things, argued:
    I. It is of no moment that the conduct of the defendants may have been reprehensible from a moral or ethical point of view. It is essential to a recovery in a court of law that the alleged damages be shown to have followed as the natural, direct and proximate result of the wrong complained of, according to the rules of law for determining that question; otherwise the case is one of damnum absque injuria. Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill, 104. The rules of law on this subject and the rigorous relation between cause and effect which they demand are illustrated in the following cases: Knight v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y., 413; Boyle v. Braddon, 13. M. & W. 738; Moore v. Adams, 2 Chitty, 198; Anthony v. Slade, 11 Met. 290; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cases, 577; Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211; Stevens v. Hartwell, 11 Met. 542; Hovey v. Fulton, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 142; Boyce v. Bailiffe, 1 Camp. 58; Brown v. Cummings, 7 Allen, 507; Chidsey v. Canton, 17 Conn. 475 ; Eames v. N. E. Worsted Co., 11 Met. 370 ; Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill, 104; Alsop v. Alsop, 5 H. & N. 534; Kelly v. Partington, 5 B. & A. 645; Vicars v. 
      Wilcox, 8 East, 1; 2 Smith’s Leading Cases, 484; Collins v. Cave, 4 H. & N. 225.; 6 H. & N. 131; Hoadly v. Transportation Co., 115 Mass. 304; Patch v. City of Covington, 17 B. Monroe, 722; Ashley v. Harrison, Peake, N. P. 194; Ryan v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210.
    II. There is nothing in the complaint to show that the giving of a letter of introduction, the contents of which are withheld, had anything to do with Delgado’s going to Corn Island, or anything to do with his conduct after he arrived at that place, nor that it had any, even the remotest, relation to the conduct of those who accompanied him on the alleged expedition, or to the proceedings of the master of the ship; indeed, we are left without the means of judging as to the possibility of any such relations by the omission of the. pleader to inform us what sort of a letter it was that the defendants obtained by their alleged false pretensions. Nothing could be more absurd than to take the pleader’s conclusions on this subject, for they are utterly worthless for all legal purposes. The letter was not the cause of the alleged expedition against Honduras; it was not the cause of Delgado’s going to Corn Island; it was not the cause, so far as appears, of any event that occurred there. The complaint does not inform us as to the laws of that region, and hence it does not appear that they were violated in any particular, much less that any infraction of local law was the natural, necessary, and proximate consequence, in making Delgado known to Nelson in terms with which we are unacquainted.
    III. («). The pleader’s supposed legal relation between cause and effect results from two sources: 1. Inattention to the rule, as exemplified in the cases above mentioned, the strict observance of which is necessary to prevent our law from going altogether astray and wandering from the domain of logical sequence and necessary connection into the wilderness of sentiment and remote cause; and 2. To the radical misconception of the rules of public law supposed to be involved in the controversy. As to the first, enough has already been said; as to the second, some general observations may not be out of place. (b). The pleader would have us understand that the letter gave rise to the train of events mentioned, and was harmful because Delgado was engaged in a hostile expedition against Honduras; and he assumes that in this affair Delgado Avas violating some la.w. While if this assumption were true there Avould be no legal connection apparent betAveen anything the defendants did and the cause of action, there is really no apparent basis for the assumption. The idea that there is any common law against organizing in one state or country a hostile expedition against another is simply erroneous. Hall’s International Law, §§ 24, 208; pp. 79, 80, 555, 564, 566, 568, 571, 572; Yorris v. Scott, L. R., 9 Exch. 125; U. S. v. Quincy, 6 Pet. 445.
    IV. The alleged grounds of damage are wholly insufficient. They are as follows: 1. That the master of the steamship u City of Mexico” obtained from the plaintiffs’ agent, Nelson, by force or fraud, provisions, supplies, and advances of money to the amount of three hundred dollars. The utter want of relation here between premises and legal conclusion is very manifest. In the first place the letter of introduction has no conceivable relation to the master of the steamship nor to his conduct. But, in the next place, the master of the steamship was not the defendants’ agent; his force or fraud was not their force or fraud. 2. The landing of Delgado at Corn Island. Concerning this matter, it is enough to say his going there or landing does not appear to have relation, in any legal sense, to the letter of introduction ; that his landing >vas lawful, permissive, peaceful and harmless, and so far as appears from the allegations of the complaint, not the cause of any damage in any sense, near or remote. There is neither illegality, fraud, force or guile in this part of the affair. 3. As go this letter written by them directly to the plaintiffs’ agent, Nelson, the plaintiffs’ complaint on that point is trivial and idle. It was a mercantile matter in the ordinary course of mercantile business. It sustained no relation whatever to the letter ofa introduction. 4. There remains only one other alleged ground of damage which is claimed to arise out of the acts of certain naval people in landing a.t Corn Island and invading the plaintiffs’ premises. We have seen—1. That the unlawful acts of third persons, though directly induced by the original wrong of the defendant, are never to be attributed to the original wrong as a proximate cause of the damage for which a recovery can be had. Knight v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 416 ; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cases, 577; Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taun. 39; 1 Smith’s Leading Cases, 482; Vicars v. Wilcox, 8 East, 1; 2 Smith’s Leading Cases, 484; Collins v. Cave, 4 H. & N. 225; 6 Ib. 131; Crain v. Petrie, 6 Hill, 522. 2. The action of these people in landing at Corn Island and invading the plaintiffs’ premises was flagrantly unlawful. It exposed the officers to both civil and criminal proceedings at the suit of the plaintiffs’ agent if any law existed in that place ; it exposed the invaders themselves to public prosecution if there were any penal laws in that region for the protection of the place against .unlawful invasion ;■ and it exposed the government of the United States to reclamation for the wrong, by the Mosquito government whose sovereignty was thus invaded. Neither a naval nor a military force of the United States would dream of so trespassing upon the frontiers of Canada or of Mexico, nor would a naval officer think of landing -a force in the port of Liverpool and overhauling a mercantile establishment under like circumstances; and yet the same legal principles apply in the one case as in the other. Moreover, even seizing the “ City of Mexico ” on suspicion of being a guilty ship, was itself without lawful warrant, and in the beginning a mere trespass, for which the seizing officers were liable and would remain so unless the act of seizure were afterwards adopted by their government; nor even then would they be free; they would still remain liable for all the damages, unless in an action brought to recover them they were able to obtain from the court a certificate of probable cause for the seizure. Waples on Proceedings In Pern §§ 45 and 46; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246; Richmond v. U. S., 9 Cranch 102 ; The Apollyon, 9 Wheat. 362. 3. Moreover, there is not the remotest relation, legal or otherwise, for that matter, between the alleged letter of introduction fraudulently obtained, and the acts of these people.
   By the Court.—Sedgwick, Ch. J.

In my judgment the learned judge below gave the correct construction of the complaint.

The judgment and order should be affirmed with costs.

Freedman and Truax, JJ., concurred.  