
    Collier v. Trow’s Printing & Book-Binding Co.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.
    
    June 19, 1888.)
    Contract—Consideration—Agreement eor Use oe Stereotype Plates.
    Defendant gave plaintiff a proposal in writing, whereby it agreed to allow plaintiff to print books from its stereotype plates, upon payment of a royalty. Plaintiff accepted the proposition. Held, that it was a mere option, and that, as it was without consideration and had never been executed, it was void.
    Submission upon agreed statement of facts.
    Action by Peter P. Collier against Trow’s Printing & Book-Binding Company. The parties agreed upon a statement of facts, and stipulated that the case should be submitted to the general term of the supreme court. The action is based on the following contract:
    “New York, December 24,1884.
    
      “P. F. Collier, Esq., Publisher, Vandewater St., New York—Dear Sir: We hereby agree to allow you to print editions of not less than 3,000 copies at a time from any of our book-plates, in consideration of your paying us a royalty of one-third of one cent, per hundred pages per copy. * * * Yours, respectfully, Trow’s Printing & Book-Binding Co.
    “By B, Lange, Vice-Prest.
    “ Witness: Jac. Doornbos.”
    “I hereby agree to the above proposition, and to all its conditions therein contained. P. B. Collier.
    “Witness: Jac. Doornbos.”
    On the same day plaintiff gave defendant a similar instrument, agreeing to let defendant print from his plates.
    Argued before Van Brunt, P. J., and Brady and Daniels, JJ.
    
      John T. Fenlon, for plaintiff. Raphael J. Moses, for defendant.
   Van Brunt, P. J.

It is not necessary here to set out the facts upon which the plaintiff founds his claim. The alleged agreements or contracts are set out in full in the submission, and they seem to be independent instruments, as claimed by the plaintiff, although they bear the same date. By the one the plaintiff gave the defendant an option; by the other the defendant, gave the plaintiff an option. Until some right was acquired by an accepted execution of each of these so-called contracts they were wholly void for want of consideration. In the first contract it was optional with the defendant whether or not it would act thereunder, and in the second it was optional with the plaintiff, and neither party paid anything as a consideration for this option. The grant of the option, therefore, liad no consideration to support it, and therefore was not binding upon either party. Hothing having been done under the instrument in question to give it life or validity, the plaintiff cannot enforce the promises therein contained. This view of the case does not seem to have occurred to either counsel, but it is within the terms of the submission, as the question to be determined is said to be whether the plaintiff is now entitled to receive plates from the defendant, under all the facts stated. We conclude, for the reasons above stated, that he is not so entitled, and that the defendant is entitled to judgment, with costs.

Daniels and Brady, JJ., concur.  