
    RI CUI, aka Min Soo Jang, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 13-3001.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 28, 2015.
    Jan Potemkin, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    • Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Ernesto H. Molina, Jr., Assistant Director; Joanna L. Watson, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Ri Cui, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 1, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming the June 19, 2012, decision of Immigration Judge (“U”) Douglas B. Schoppert, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ri Cui, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Aug. 1, 2013), affig No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Im-mig.Ct. June 19, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008) (quotation marks omitted). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

Cui’s asylum application is governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005. Accordingly, the agency may, “Considering the totality of the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s “demean- or, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim,” so long as they reasonably support an inference that the applicant is not credible. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 584 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008). “We defer ... to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. In this case, the agency reasonably based its adverse credibility determination on the numerous inconsistencies in Cui’s evidence, and the lack of a plausible explanation for those inconsistencies.

The IJ found that Cui was not credible because he provided an inconsistent account of when his North Korean relatives came to China, when he arrived in the United States, what injuries he sustained as a result of being beaten while in custody, and the length of his detention. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s findings. Furthermore, Cui was confronted with the inconsistencies as he testified, and the agency reasonably found that he did not adequately explain them. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005).

The totality of the circumstances supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination, based on the inconsistencies in Cui’s evidence and his lack of credible explanation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Because the only evidence of a threat to Cui’s life or freedom depended upon his credibility, the adverse credibility finding defeats his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.2006).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  