
    Dobbin and Evans vs. Bradley.
    A party who has engaged to guarantee the payment of the paper of another, made payable at a particular bank, is not liable upon anote drawn by such party, although it be deposited for collection in the bank specified in the guaranty, previous to its maturity, and notice thereof given to the guarantor.
    The claim, against a surety is strictissimi juris.
    
    Error from the superior court of the city of New York. This was an action on a guaranty in these words: “ Washington City, 20tli June, 1827. Mr. Andrew Smith being about to embark in business in this city, and having entire confidence in his integrity and ability, and being satisfied that the business he is about to engage in, will be both safe and profitable, I hereby engage, with the view to assist him, to guarantee the payment of his paper made payable at the United States Branch Bank of this place, to an amount not exceeding $5000, at such dates as he may find expedient. (Signed,) William A. Bradley.” The guaranty was delivered to Smith, the person mentioned in it, who, on the strength of it, on the 3d April, 1828, purchased goods of Messrs. Dobbin & Evans, in the city of New York, to the amount of §3344-57, and gave them his note for that sum, payable to their order six months after date, but not specifying any place of payment. On the 1st October, 1828, the note was left at the United States Branch Bank [423] in the city of Washington for collection, and notice of that fact given to the defendant. Payment was duly demanded of Smith, and notice of nonpayment given to Bradley. Whereupon a suit was brought against Bradley for the recovery of the money. The presiding judge charged the jury, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, because the note given by Smith was not made payable at the place specified in the guaranty, and was not therefore within its terms. The plaintiffs excepted to the charge. The jury found a verdict for the defendant, upon which judgment was entered. The plaintiffs sued out a writ of error.
    
      J. Greenwood and J. Anthon, for the plaintiffs,
    insisted that a variance from the liteial terms of the guaranty did not release the guarantor; that it was enough if the condition was substantially complied with. It was unnecessary that the note should, in terms or on its face, be made payable at the Branch Bank in Washington. The object of the condition in the guaranty was effected by the note being lodged at the Branch Bank for collection, and notice thereof given to the guarantor. In support of this proposition the counsel cited 3 Bing. 107, 3 Carr. & Payne, 162, 12 East, 227, 2 Camp. 413, 3 id. 220, 6 Bing. 244, 3 Moore & Payne, 573, 2 Starkie’s R. 426, Fell on Guaranty, 100.
    
      B. Sedgwick, for the defendant,
    contended that the note not being in accordance with the letter of credit, the defendant was not bound, and cited 10 Johns. R. 189, and 2 Starkie’s R. 406. He also insisted that the plaintiffs had no claim under the letter of credit, having sold their goods nearly a year after its date. The object of the letter was to set up Smith in business, and not that it should operate as a continuing guaranty.
   By the Court,

Bronson, J.

The defendant had an undoubted right to prescribe the terms, and to say in what manner, and under what circumstances he would become answerable for the contracts of Smith; and to the extent of his undertaking, when fairly construed, he is bound and no further. The question is not whether the conditions, by which he has thought proper to qualify his liability, were either reasonable or unreasonable; nor whether they could in any way prove beneficial to the defendant. He had a right to judge of that matter for himself, and we have no authority to review his judgment. He might say, I will guarantee the payment of such accounts as Smith may open, such bills as he may draw on a particular house, his sealed notes or his penal obligations; and there is no principle upon which he could be charged with the debt, in a case not 'falling within the qualification or condition which he thought proper to impose. The defendant has here said, I will guarantee the payment of Smith’s paper made payable at the U. S. Branch Bank of Washington; and for such paper, and such only, he is answerable. There is no dispute about the meaning of the contract. It related to paper which, on its face, should be made payable at the Branch Bank. The note given to the plaintiffs was not made payable at that or any other place. It was payable, or rather Smith was bound to pay it at the store of the plaintiffs in the city of New York, or wherever else the holder might happen to be when it came to maturity. It is of no legal moment that the paper was deposited in the bank before it fell due. The defendant could still say, the case does not come within the terms of my contract; I am-only answerable on paper made payable at the bank, and this note does not answer the description.

I do not put the case upon what has sometimes been said in the books, that the contract of a guarantor or surety can not be carried beyond [425] the strict letter of it. In this as well as in other cases, such a construction should be put upon the contract as will carry into effect the intention of the parties. The extent of obligation must be ascertained, by considering the language of the instrument and the nature of the transaction to which it relates. Commercial guaranties are in extensive use, and I can perceive no reason why they should not receive the same liberal construction for attaining the end which the parties had in view, as is given to other contracts (Douglas v. Reynolds, 7 Peters, 113; Hargreave v. Smee, 6 Bing. 244). But where there is no uncertainty upon the face of the instrument, or when in cases of doubt, we have ascertained the true meaning of the contract, the liability of a guarantor or surety can not be extended by implication or otherwise. The case must be brought strictly within the terms of the guaranty, when reasonably interpreted, or the guarantor will not be liable. The cases speak a uniform language on this subject (Walsh v. Bailie, 10 Johns. R. 180; Lanus v. Barker, id. 312; Wright v. Johnson, 8 Wendell, 512; Bacon v. Chesney, 1 Stark. N. P. R. 192; Bulkeley v. Lord, 2 id. 406; Combe v. Woolf, 8 Bing. 156; Myers v. Edge, 7 T. R. 250). In Bacon v. Chesney, Lord Ellenborough said, the claim as against a surety is strictissimi juris, and it is incumbent on the plaintiff to show that the terms of the guaranty have been strictly complied with. I have met with no case which sanctions a different doctrine.

In the case under consideration there is.no difficulty in ascertaining the true construction of the contract. The meaning is apparent on the face ot the instrument. The difficulty under which the plaintiffs labor is, that they do not bring themselves within the terms of the guaranty; they have no paper of Smith made payable at the IT. S. Branch Bank in Washington. We can not inquire whether it was in any way material to the defendant that it should be made payable in that manner. It is enough that the plaintiffs do not make out a case in which the defendant agreed to respond.

The view which has been taken of the principal question renders it [426] unnecessary to inquire whether this was a continuing guaranty. I have considered the case as though this was the first dealing of Smith under the letter of credit, and without any reference to the lapse of time between the date of the guaranty and the giving of the note. •

Judgment affirmed.  