
    WILLIAM McLEAN vs. MARY C. YOUNG.
    Equity. —
    No. 3351.
    Where the property upon which a mechanic’s lien was claimed was described in the notice of lien as “ lots lettered A, B, C, D, and E, in the subdivision of original lot No. 2, in square No. 791, recorded in the office of the surveyor of the city of Washington, in liber R. W., No. 1, folio 62whereas the lots’were situated in square No. 971, which was the square recorded at the place of reference; and where also the description contained in the notice was applicable alone to Baid last-mentioned square, and where also the owners had not been, misled, and no other rights had intervened; the lien was upheld upon, the ground that the property was sufficiently identified.
    STATEMENT OP THE CASE.
    This was a proceeding to enforce a mechanic’s lien filed by the plaintiff. On October 25,1872, the plaintiff filed a notice-of his intention to hold a lien upon lots lettered A, B, 0, D, and E, in the subdivision of original lot No, 2 in square No. 791, recorded in the office of the surveyor of the city of' Washington, in liber R. W., No. 1, folio 02, and on the buildings erected thereon, &c. The description of the -property in the notice gives rise to the only question in the case. After the court had passed a decree in favor of the plaintiff,, it was discovered that the property upon which plaintiff had, furnished lumber and materials and upon which he intended to file a lien was situated in square No. 971, and not in square No. 791, described both in the notice of lien and in the bill of complaint.
    On the 4th day of February, A. D. 3875, the court, upon consent of counsel, ordered that the above decree for sale be vacated, “ and that the bill of complaint stand amended so as to read square No. 971 instead of square No. 791, and that Mary O. Young have leave to except to the sufficiency of the notice of lien on argument.”
    The court then, on the 12th day of March, A. i>. 1875 passed a decree for the sale of the property described in the bill of complaint, as amended, to satisfy the plaintiff’s claim. From this decree the defendant, Mary O. Young, has taken an appeal to this court.
    The plaintiff attaches importance to the defendant’s answer to the original bill, in which she admits that plaintiff furnished the lumber and materials for the building mentioned in the bill of complaint, and that the description mentioned in the bill is correct, and that the land is owned by her.
    Again the bill alleges that lots A, B, C, D, and E, in the subdivisión, &c., of square 791, were conveyed by the defendant Young to Stickney and Eaton, in trust, to secure $5,00(1 to the Freedman’s Bank, and that said Young conveyed part of said lot E in said square to Mary Y. Withers, &c., and refers to the libers and folios in which said conveyances are recorded, and makes them part of the bill; and the answer of said Young admits the truth of these allegations.
    
    The defendant also contends that the description of the property in the notice of lien is correct in every particular, except as to the number of the square, and this error is corrected by the reference in said notice to the records in the surveyor’s office, and the description of the lots and subdivision therein contained is applicable alone to square lío. 971.
    The language of the statute in regard to the notice of a mechanic’s lien, is : “ Any person wishing to avail himself of the provision of this chapter, whether his claim be due or not, shall file in the office of the clerk of the supreme court of the District, at. any time after the commencement of the building, and within three months after the completion of such building or repairs, a notice of his intention to hold a lien upon the property, declared by this chapter liable to such lien, for the amount due, or to become due, to him, specially setting forth the amount claimed.” Rev. Stat., sec. 693.
    It is then provided that an action shall be commenced within a year to enforce the lien, and that the complaint therein shall contain “a description of the premises.” The premises are accordingly stated correctly in the amended bill.
    
      Eugene Carusi for plaintiff:
    1. The act of Congress does not require that the notice of lien contain a particular description of the premises, but only that it indicate with sufficient certainty the property to be affected by it. Thus, a description of the property in controversy as “the building on the southeast corner of South Carolina avenue and Tenth street east, and the lot of ground upon which the same is situated,” or, as “lots lettered A, 33, C, D, and E, in the subdivision of original lot 2, recorded, &c.j in liber B. W., No. 1, folio 62,” without giving the number of square, would be a compliance with the requirement of the act in this particular. Secs. 1 and 2, act of February 2, 1859. And this, though the law should require a “ correct description” of the property to be given. Phillips on Mechanics’ Liens, § 379, ad fin., authorities cited.
    2. The object of the statute in requiring the “ notice of his intention to hold a lien” to be filed in the clerk’s office manifestly is to give notice by that mode, to the owner of the property and to third parties, of the mechanic’s election to proceed against that specific property for the satisfaction of his demand. If this object is accomplished in the mode prescribed by the act, that is, by the notice of lien, then, as between the lienor and owner, the lien is not lost by any inaccuracy or omission in the notice not misleading the owner. Phillips on Liens, § 382.
    3. The act of Congress does not require that the bill shall follow the description of the property as given in the notice of lien. The language of the statute, in this behalf, is “that the complaint of the plaintiff shall contain a brief statement of the contract, * * * with a description of the premises.” Act of Congress, February 2, 1859, § 4.
    4. The court has the authority, as matter of law, to authorize the amendment of the bill. Phillips on Liens, § 429.
    And if it had not, authority to do so was conferred by consent of counsel.
    
      Bainbridge R. Webb for defendant:
    The lien of the mechanic is exclusively the creature of statute, deriving its existence only from positive enactment. It is a mere incidental accompaniment as a means of enforcing payment, a remedy given by law, which secures the preference provided for, but which does not exist, however equitable the claim may be, unless the party brings himself within the provisions of the statute, and shows a substantial compliance with all its essential requirements. Phillips on Mechanics’ Liens, 15, citing Grant vs. Vandercook, 8 Abbt. Pr., N. S., (N. Y.,) and others. The decisions are unanimous that when a notice is required by statute either to create or continue the lien, it is matter of substantial requirement, and must be complied with on the part of the claimant.
    
      * * * So strictly are the statutory requirements to be complied with, that although a general appearance of a defendant may waive defects in the institution of the foreclosure proceedings, yet it does not waive any defect in the previous notice to create the lien. Phillips on Mechanics’ Liens, 475; Beals vs. Cong. B’nai J., 1 E. D. Smith, (N. Y.,) C54. For the acquisition of' the statutory lien the statute itself must be strictly pursued; and there is in this no inequity, as the party claims a right not existing at common law. Phillips on Mechanics’ Liens, 335. The description must directly point out the property to be charged with the lien. A creditor cannot claim against a building in one public street, and sell by his execution a building in another. Simpson vs. Murray, 2 Penn., 76. To enforce' a lien, the party must describe the land with sufficient accuracy to enable the court to decree the sale, and the purchaser to find the land under such description. Knox vs. Starks, 4 Minn., 20. See also Phillips on Mechanics’ Liens, 519,520,525, and 526. Any such insufficiency in the notice may be taken advantage of by the owner, &c. Id., citing Knabb’s Appeal, 10 Penn., 186; Phillips on Liens, 530.
   By the Court :

The bill was amended by describing the premises correctly. There will be no difficulty, therefore, in executing the judgment upon the right property. The defendant was clearly not misled by the mistake in the notice of lien, for she admitted in her answer to the original bill that she owned the property upon which the materials had been furnished. The reference in the notice to the record in the office of the surveyor, pointing out the book and folio where the subdivision was recorded and the square accurately designated, was sufficient to show the error and to point out the property to be charged with the lien. There were no such lettered lots or subdivision in square 791. But the description in the notice answered in every respect the record to which reference w^s made, except in the number of the square. No other property answered to the reference and this, we think, is sufficient to identify it. The case is free from the embarrassment of intervening rights, and no one can be injured or misled, and the defendant herself has admitted that this was the property upon which the lien was intended to attach. We think the judgment ought to be affirmed.  