
    VALIGURA v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Feb. 5, 1913.)
    1. Criminal Law (§ 1159) — Appeal and Error — Verdict—Evidence.
    A verdict of guilty sustained by the evidence could not be disturbed, though the evidence would also have justified an acquittal.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3074r-3083; Dec. Dig. § 1159.]
    2. Jury (§ 67)— Challenges — Grounds.
    That a juror whose real name was “Andres” was summoned under the name of “Andrews” did not require the court to sustain a challenge to him, where he was identified as the one who was selected by the jury commissioners and summoned as such juror, and who attended; the names being idem sonans.
    [Ed.' Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 291-302, 306; Dec. Dig. § 67.]
    3. Weapons (§ 17) — Carrying Weapons— Prosecution — Evidence—Indictment.
    Where defendant objected to the introduction of testimony that he was seen carrying a pistol on a certain date in 1911 because of uncertainty as to the year charged in the indictment and the clerk of the court testified that the blurred date was 1911, the evidence objected to was properly admitted.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Weapons, Cent. Dig. §§ 20-33; Dec. Dig. § 17.]
    4. Criminal Law (§ 1169) — Harmless Error-Evidence.
    The erroneous admission of hearsay evidence of certain facts in a prosecution for unlawfully carrying a pistol was harmless, where defendant and other witnesses testified to substantially the same facts.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3088, 3137-3143; Dec. Dig. § 1169.]
    5. Witnesses (§ 360) — Impeachment—Rebuttal.
    Where defendant attempted to reflect upon a witness’ testimony by showing that she met him in the road at night, she was properly permitted to testify that defendant had before then told her he was a single man, but that she later learned that he was married.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1165, 1166; Dec. Dig. § 360.]
    Appeal from Lavaca County Court; Pi H. Green, Judge.
    
      Joseph Valigura was convicted of unlawfully carrying a pistol, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   PRENDBRGAST, J.

Appellant was convicted for unlawfully carrying a pistol, and fined §100.

The evidence was amply sufficient to sustain the verdict. It also would have justified the jury to have acquitted appellant. Under such circumstances, the jury being the judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, this court cannot disturb the verdict.

The court did not err in overruling appellant’s challenge to the juror Theodore Andres. Appellant’s bill shows that “Andres” was the correct spelling of the juror’s name. It was spelled by the jury commissioners, and he was summoned under the name of “Theodore Andrews,” but he is identified as the man who was selected by the jury commissioners, summoned as such juror, and attended. It was shown that he got mail addressed to him under the name of “Theodore Andrews,” and that those who did not know him well and were but slightly acquainted with him called him “Andrews.” The appellant’s challenge to the juror was because the correct spelling of his name was “Andres,” and not “Andrews.” There was no question as to the identity of the man, and the court in allowing the bill stated that the juror was a regular juror for the week, had been drawn by the jury commission, and summoned by the sheriff under the name of “Theodore Andrews.” The bill does not show the juror served. “Andres” and “Andrews” are idem sonans. Gentry v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 500, 137 S. W. 696; Feeny v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 588, 138 S. W. 135; Smith v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 185, 140 S. W. 1096.

The offense is charged, as shown by the indictment, to have been committed on or about October 15, A. D. 1911. The indictment copied in the record clearly so shows. When one of the state’s witnesses was on the stand and asked about the charge against appellant and to state the date when, if at all, he saw appellant carrying a pistol, he testified that it was about the 1st of October, A. D. 1911. The appellant objected, because of the uncertainty as to the date charged in the indictment, apparently claiming that the indictment did not allege that it was in 1911. He thereupon introduced the clerk of the court who testified that the indictment was on a printed form, and had the figures “190” printed in it, then explained that the two figures “11” were written apparently one through the edge of the “9” and the other through the edge of the “0.” The court in qualifying the bill stated that the clerk testified that the figures so read made “1911.” The court did not err in permitting the witness to testify over appellant’s objection.

It was improper for the court to permit Joe Chromeak to testify over his objections that his wife had told him that Alzbeta Kastner had told her the night the offense is. charged to have been committed that she had gone or was going down the road to meet the defendant. This was hearsay, but it was not reversible error, because the appellant himself in substance, and all the other witnesses, both for him and against him, testified that she did so go and meet him at his request.

Appellant introduced proof tending to. show that the girl Alzbeta Kastner, whom he had to meet him the night he is charged with carrying a pistol, and who testified for the state that appellant then had a pistol with him, showed it to her, and told her that he had fired it off three times that night, was a prostitute. The state introduced proof tending to show the contrary — that the girl was all right. The testimony shows that the appellant also attacked this girl’s testimony, and attempted to reflect upon her by showing that she met appellant out in the road at night on this occasion. It was also shown that he had called upon the girl before this-time. The court therefore did not err in permitting her to testify under the circumstances that the defendant had before then told' her he was a single man, but that she had later learned that he was a married man. Even if it had been error to permit this testimonyj it could not be reversible error.

There being no reversible error, the judgment will be affirmed.  