
    Ken PAXTON, Attorney General of Texas, Petitioner, v. CITY OF DALLAS, Respondent
    No. 15-0073
    Supreme Court of Texas.
    Argued September 14, 2016
    OPINION DELIVERED: February 3, 2017
    
      Bill Davis, Charles Roy, David A. Talbot Jr., James Edward Davis, Kimberly L. Fuchs, Rosalind L. Hunt, W. Kenneth Pax-ton Jr., for Ken Paxton.
    Barbara E. Rosenberg, Christopher J. Caso, James B. Pinson, Warren M. Ernst, for City of Dallas.
   Justice Guzman

delivered the opinion of the Court,

in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Green, Justice Willett, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Devine, and Justice Brown joined.

Recognizing that government is founded on the authority of the people and “instituted for their benefit,” the Texas Public Information Act (PIA) favors an open and transparent government to ensure the people “retain control over the instruments they have created.” But the PIA simultaneously recognizes that public interests are best advanced by shielding some information from public disclosure. The Legislature, in its considered judgment, has excepted from disclosure more than sixty-categories of information, including information protected by the attorney-client privilege. The issue in this case is whether the governmental body must disclose its attorney-client-privileged communications even though the parties agree the information is categorically excepted from public disclosure under the Act. The controversy exists because (1) the governmental body missed a ten-business-day statutory deadline to request a Texas Attorney General decision affirming a categorical exception to disclosure applies, and (2) an untimely request for an attorney general decision gives rise to a presumption that the information must be disclosed absent a “compelling reason to withhold the information.” The crux of our inquiry concerns the meaning of “compelling reason.”

The PIA does not define, delineate, or restrict the reasons that may be “compelling” enough to withhold requested information following an untimely request for a decision. As a statutory-construction issue of first impression, we must therefore determine whether the interests protected and advanced by the attorney-client privilege are imperative enough to overcome the public’s interest in having governmental bodies promptly request a determination from the attorney general’s office when they seek to protect confidential information from public-information requests. In other words, we must ascertain whether the PIA mandates public dissemination of otherwise confidential attorney-client communications solely because a governmental body missed a statutory deadline.

We hold that, absent waiver, the interests protected by the attorney-client privilege are sufficiently compelling to rebut the public-disclosure presumption that arises on expiration of the PIA’s ten-day deadline. The attorney-client privilege reflects a foundational tenet in the law: ensuring the free flow of information between attorney and client ultimately serves the broader societal interest of effective administration of justice. The Legislature’s choice to exempt information protected by the attorney-client privilege embodies the fundamental understanding that, in the public sector, maintaining candid attorney-client communication directly and significantly serves the public interest by facilitating access to legal advice vital to formulation and implementation of governmental policy. Full and frank legal discourse also protects the government’s interest in litigation, business transactions, and other matters affecting the public. Depriving the privilege of its force thus compromises the public’s interest at both discrete and systemic levels.

Because failing to meet the PIA’s deadline to assert a statutory exception to disclosure does not, in and of itself, constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege, requested information does not automatically lose its confidential status and is not subject to compelled disclosure under the PIA solely on that basis. We therefore affirm the lower-court judgments holding the attorney-client confidences at issue need not be disclosed to the public-information re-questors.

I. The Texas Public Information Act’s Requirements

The PIA embodies the State’s policy that “each person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees.”

Under the PIA, the public has a right of access to “public information,” a broadly defined term. A governmental body must “promptly” produce public information after receiving a request for disclosure, meaning “as soon as possible under the circumstances, that is, within a reasonable time, without delay.” The prompt production of public information furthers the “fundamental philosophy” that “government is the servant and not the master of the people.”

The right to access is not absolute, however; the Legislature incorporated into the PIA more than sixty exceptions to the public-disclosure requirement. Statutory exceptions range from very broad to more specific categories of information, including “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision,” attorney-client information, certain rare books and original manuscripts, various categories of records containing personal information of public employees or private citizens, and sensitive crime-scene images. “[The PIA’s] exceptions embrace the understanding that the public’s right to know is tempered by the individual and other interests at stake in disclosing that information.”

Consistent with the PIA’s fundamental precept that “[t]he people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know,” a governmental body cannot unilaterally determine that requested information is exempt from disclosure. Rather, a governmental body must request a decision from the Texas Attorney General confirming the claimed exception applies to the requested information, unless the Attorney General has previously made a determination that the information falls within a claimed exception.

In harmony with the policy underlying the PIA’s prompt-production requirement, the governmental body asserting an exception to disclosure must request an attorney general decision “within a reasonable time but not later than the 10th business day after the date of receiving the written request.” If a request for decision is untimely, “the information requested in writing is presumed to be subject to required public disclosure and must be released unless there is a compelling reason to withhold the information.”

To secure compliance with the statute, the PIA provides civil-enforcement mechanisms when a governmental body “refuses to request an attorney general’s decision” or “refuses to supply public information or information that the attorney general has determined is public information that is not excepted from disclosure.” In such cases, either the requestor or the Attorney General can institute mandamus proceedings to compel access to the information. The PIA further authorizes certain local or state officials to seek declaratory or in-junctive relief based on a complaint by “a person who claims to be the victim of a [PIA] violation,” but only after the governmental body is afforded notice and fails to timely cure the alleged violation. Subject to limited exceptions, the trial court shall award costs of litigation and reasonable attorney fees to a plaintiff who substantially prevails in a civil-enforcement suit against the governmental body.

The PIA also provides criminal penalties for (1) destruction, removal, or alteration of public information, (2) distribution or misuse of “information considered confidential under the [PIA’s] terms,” and (3) criminally negligent failure to provide access to or copies of public information.

In comparison, “[t]he only suit a governmental body may file seeking to withhold information from a requestor is a suit ... seeking] declaratory relief from compliance with [an attorney general] decision.” Attorney fees and costs may be awarded to a party who substantially prevails in a suit instituted by a governmental body.

II. The Dispute

In this consolidated appeal, the City of Dallas seeks relief from two attorney general decisions concluding the City must disclose confidential attorney-client communications pursuant to public-information requests the City received regarding the McCommas Bluff Landfill (the Landfill case) and a convention-center hotel (the Hotel case). The parties agree the requested information constitutes “public information” under the PIA, but because the information is undisputedly subject to the attorney-client privilege, the City contends the information is excepted from disclosure under PIA sections 552.101 (the confidential-by-law exception) and 552.107 (the attorney-client exception).

Section 552.107 applies to “information that the attorney general or an attorney of a political subdivision is prohibited from disclosing because of a duty to the client under the Texas Rules of Evidence or the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.” Section 552.101 applies to “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” According to the City, section 552.101 encompasses the attorney-client privilege because the privilege derives from the common law and is also memorialized in judicially promulgated rules.

The parties agree the PIA excepts attorney-client communications from public disclosure, although they disagree about whether protection is afforded under the confidential-by-law exception or the attorney-client exception. The dispute is not about whether the PIA excepts the requested information from public disclosure—the parties agree it does. Nor does the City contend that it may unilaterally make that determination. Rather, the dispute arises because the City failed to timely request an attorney general decision affirming that the information falls within one of the asserted exceptions, as required by section 552.301 of the PIA.

The City requested an attorney general decision twenty-six business days after receiving the written request in the Landfill case and forty-nine business days after receiving the request in the Hotel case. The City’s proffered reason for the delay was inadvertence. Because the requests for an open-records ruling were untimely, the City concedes the requested information is presumed to be subject to disclosure unless “a compelling reason to withhold the information” exists. Thus, the determinative issue is whether the City met its burden to rebut the public-disclosure presumption in section 552.302 that was triggered when the City failed to timely seek an attorney general decision.

The City asserts a number of statutory exceptions to disclosure and adamantly argues that important policies underlying the attorney-client privilege present a compelling reason to withhold disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications. The City also claims a compelling reason to withhold the requested landfill information because disclosure would prejudice its bargaining position in a long-term transaction with millions of dollars at stake.

Though attorney-client communications are not intended to be freely accessible to the public under the PIA or available to third parties in proceedings outside the PIA, the Attorney General determined the City must release the requested information. The Attorney General’s letter rulings were based on agency precedent limiting the “compelling reason” standard to (1) information falling under an exception the Attorney General considers to impose “mandatory” confidentiality, meaning the governmental body is prohibited by law from disclosing the information and could not voluntarily disclose the information without being criminally sanctioned under the PIA, and (2) information that could jeopardize third parties if disclosed. The latter circumstance is not implicated by the public-information requests at issue, and the Attorney General asserts the former does not apply because the attorney-client privilege can be waived voluntarily, making confidentiality “discretionary,” not “mandatory.” Taking a constrained view of the statutory language, the Attorney General has determined that the mere ability to waive the attorney-client privilege automatically and categorically precludes the privilege from constituting a compelling reason to withhold confidential attorney-client communications, even if the privilege has not actually been waived. Accordingly, the Attorney General ruled that neither the confidential nature of attorney-client communications nor the City’s particularized allegation of prejudice to its business interests constitutes a compelling reason to withhold the requested information.

The City challenged the letter rulings in separate trial-court proceedings and achieved conflicting results. In the Hotel case, the trial court held the City did not have a compelling reason to withhold the requested information. But in the Landfill case, the trial court found the information is excepted from required public disclosure, explaining the attorney-client privilege is an inherently “compelling reason to withhold information” because it is vital to our adversarial system of justice and no authority supports compelling disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege based solely on a missed deadline. The City and the Attorney General appealed the respective adverse rulings.

In the Landfill case, a divided Third Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in the City’s favor, holding attorney-client communications are excepted from disclosure under the confidential-bylaw exception and, considering the privilege’s purposes and the protections afforded under the law, a compelling reason to withhold the information necessarily exists and rebuts the public-disclosure presumption in section 552.302.

The Hotel case was transferred to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket-equalization order. Applying the appellate decision in the Landfill case as precedent, the court reached the same conclusion, reversing the trial court’s judgment and rendering judgment for the City.

On appeal to this Court, we consolidated the Attorney General’s appeals for argument and disposition.

Ill, Discussion

The parties agree that, had the City timely requested an attorney general decision, the PIA does not require public disclosure of attorney-client confidences in either the Landfill or the Hotel case. Nor is there any dispute that the City’s untimely requests activated a presumption that the requested information must be disclosed absent a “compelling reason to withhold the information.” Thus, the dispositive issue is whether a “compelling reason” exists to rebut the public-disclosure presumption.

The resolution of that issue does not turn on whether the attorney-client privilege falls within one statutory exception or another, or whether confidentiality is at the governmental body’s discretion rather than compulsory, as asserted by the Attorney General. Such extra-textual distinctions are not decisive because the statute prescribes “a compelling reason to withhold the information” as the determinative and only standard.

In resolving the dispute at hand, we affirm that even under the compelling-reason standard, information cannot be withheld unless a statutory exception applies, because public information remains public unless it is expressly excepted from disclosure. But merely establishing an exception cannot always be sufficient to rebut the public-disclosure presumption, because if the statute were so construed, the compelling-reason requirement would be rendered a nullity.

We reject, however, the notion that statutory exceptions are categorically distinct from compelling reasons and that something more is always required to rebut the presumption that arises from a governmental body’s failure to timely request an attorney general decision. In some instances, important policies and interests that animate a statutory exception are compelling in their own right. We hold the attorney-client privilege, which is protected by one or more statutory exceptions to public disclosure, protects and advances interests that provide independently compelling reasons to withhold privileged information unless confidentiality has been waived.

A. “Compelling Reason”

The controlling issue in this case involves the proper construction and application of the “compelling reason” standard in section 552.302 of the PIA, which is implicated when a governmental body seeks to withhold information from public disclosure but fails to make a timely request for an attorney general decision. Statutory construction presents a question of law that we determine de novo under well-established principles.

As always, our mandate is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the statutory language. Further, by statutory directive, we must liberally construe the PIA to promote the policy of open government.

The PIA does not define the phrase “compelling reason” or its constituent terms; accordingly, those words bear their common, ordinary meaning unless a different or more precise definition is apparent from the statutory context or the plain meaning yields an absurd result. Though neither of those qualifying exceptions applies, the Attorney General relies on agency-deference and legislative-ratification doctrines to support a restrictive construction of the compelling-reason standard.

Long before the “compelling reason” safeguard was added to section 552.302, the Attorney General authorized governmental bodies to withhold information from public disclosure despite an untimely request for an open-records decision, if a “compelling reason” or a “compelling demonstration” rebutted the statutory presumption of openness. But the Attorney General recognized only two circumstances that could satisfy that standard: “[1] the asserted exception is ‘mandatory,’ i.e., the information is confidential by law and the governmental body therefore is prohibited from releasing it, or [2] if the release of the information implicates third party interests.” Citing legislative history and relying on agency precedent, the Attorney General asserts the Legislature intended a similarly constrained construction of section 552.302’s compelling-reason standard. As so construed, the Attorney General contends the City cannot rebut the public-disclosure presumption because neither condition exists.

We decline the Attorney General’s invitation to import restrictions that alter the plain language of the statute at issue here. We have long held a statute’s unambiguous language controls the outcome. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, like section 552.302, we do not resort to extrinsic interpretive aids, such as legislative history, “because the statute’s plain language ‘is the surest guide to the Legislature’s intent.’ ” Moreover, although we may consider an agency’s construction of a statute, “deferring to an agency’s construction is appropriate only when the statutory language is ambiguous.” In like manner, legislative ratification applies only to ambiguous statutes. We reject the limitations the Attorney General champions because they are not textually supportable. Instead, we must apply the plain meaning of the phrase “compelling reason to withhold the information,” which is not as circumscribed as the Attorney General advocates.

The meaning of the term “compelling” is of vital importance to our analysis because it represents a qualitative limitation on the justifications that permit withholding information from public disclosure. Neither a reason nor even a good reason would be sufficient to rebut the public-disclosure presumption. The reason must be “compelling.”

Our examination of dictionaries, treatises, and judicial constructions of similar language reveals the term “compelling” connotes urgency, forcefulness, and significantly demanding concerns. “Compelling” means “[urgently requiring attention” and “[djrivingly forceful”; “not able to be resisted; overwhelming” and “not able to be refuted; inspiring conviction”; and “calling for examination, scrutiny, consideration, or thought.” A need is “compelling” if it is “so great that irreparable harm or injustice would result if it is not met”; a reason may be “compelling” if time is of the essence; a governmental interest “is compelling when the balance weighs in its favor”; and the public interest in maintaining confidentiality of information may be “compelling” if the interest advanced by the promise of confidentiality would be “eviscerated” by compelled disclosure.

Though not authoritative, we may, as this Court has often done, look to federal cases for guidance on the meaning of terms not otherwise defined. Federal courts have employed a “compelling reason” standard to determine whether information should be withheld from the public in an analogous context involving sealing judicial records. Much like the policies underlying the PIA, a court’s discretion to seal records is “bounded by a ‘long-established legal tradition’ of the ‘presumptive right of the public to inspect and copy judicial documents and files.’ ” To determine whether “compelling reasons” exist to shield information in court records from public exposure, federal courts employ a balancing test, weighing the interest the public has in access to judicial records against the interest of a party seeking to make judicial records confidential.

We similarly conclude that section 552.302’s compelling-reason standard requires an assessment of the relative importance of a reason for withholding information in relation to the presumption of openness. In that regard, a reason to withhold information will be “compelling” only when it is of such a pressing nature (e.g., urgent, forceful, or demanding) that it outweighs the interests favoring public access to the information and overcomes section 552.302’s presumption that disclosure is required.

B. The Attorney-Client Privilege Protects Significant Interests

Privileges “represent society’s desire to protect certain relationships.” The attorney-client privilege holds a special place among privileges: it is “the oldest and most venerated of the common law privileges of confidential communications.” As “the most sacred of all legally recognized privileges,” “its preservation is essential to the just and orderly operation of our legal system.”

The privilege rests on “the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.” “[T]he privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice.” The privilege’s purpose could not be more evident: “to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys” and, in return, to allow clients to obtain full, fair, and candid counsel. By promoting “full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients,” the privilege “promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”

In the governmental context, the attorney-client privilege applies with “special force.” “[P]ublic officials are duty-bound to understand and respect constitutional, judicial and statutory limitations on their authority; thus, their access to candid legal advice directly and significantly serves the public interest.”

The notion that “sound legal advice or ■advocacy serves public ends” is not rationally debatable. After all, the government conducts its business on behalf of the pub-lie (residents, voters, taxpayers, and ratepayers), and a fully informed servant is a more capable servant. The attorney-client privilege “encourag[es] government officials formulating policies in the public’s interest to consult with counsel in conducting that public business.” The privilege also protects the public fisc when the government is participating in litigation, negotiating billion-dollar contracts, and performing regulatory acts under complex regulatory schemes.

Fundamentally, the promise of confidentiality fosters “a culture in which consultation with government lawyers is accepted as a normal, desirable, and even indispensable part of conducting public business.” And though the dissent dismisses the importance of the privilege in the governmental context as mere hyperbole, affording weight to the policies and interests that drive the privilege’s application cannot be disregarded so handily. At a bare minimum, sound judgment tells us that the people are best served when government officials, “who are expected to uphold and execute the law and who may face criminal prosecution for failing to do so,” operate in an atmosphere that encourages them “to seek out and receive fully informed legal advice.”

The attorney-client privilege exists— and has been a cornerstone of our legal system for nearly 500 years—because the interests protected and secured by the promise of confidentiality are not merely significant; they are quintessentially imperative. Safeguarding the privilege is important—indeed, compelling—because the consequences of disclosure are far from inconsequential. Once information has been disclosed, loss of confidentiality is irreversible. The bell cannot be unrung, and neither dissemination nor use can be effectively restrained. Unsurprisingly, the ramifications are not limited to particularized matters, but are also wrought on a systemic level. The PIA recognizes this by categorically excepting privileged information from the public-access requirement. More to the point, however, significant interests independent of the PIA’s exceptions favor withholding confidential and privileged attorney-client communications from compelled disclosure.

Though the precise issue presented in this case is one of first impression under the PIA, analogous authority from this Court confirms that the attorney-client privilege is inherently compelling. For example, in In re George, we examined the attorney-client privilege in a dispute involving the client’s access to attorney work product. After the client’s attorneys had been disqualified from representing her based on their prior representation of an opposing party, the client sought possession and control of the attorneys’ work product. We held that maintaining confidentiality of the opponent’s attorney-client communications—which had been the basis for the disqualification order—provided a “compelling reason” to deprive the client of her significant property right to the work product generated by her former counsel.

In Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, we considered whether to apply Michigan’s more expansive protections of the attorney-client privilege in lieu of Texas’s narrower attorney-client privilege in a conflict-of-laws analysis. We held that “[t]he purpose of the attorney-client privilege and the reb-anee placed by the client on the confidential nature of the communications create[d] special reasons” to apply the broader attorney-client privilege.

In a different context involving similar tensions between public access and the need for confidentiality, federal courts have affirmed that the need to preserve the attorney-client privilege is compelling. Applying a compelling-reason standard to determine whether to seal judicial records, federal courts generally accept the attorney-client privilege as a “compelling reason” justifying a motion to seal even when balanced against the public’s substantial right to access the information: “When privileged materials must be filed in a case, and the privilege has not been waived, courts generally find compelling reasons to overcome the strong presumption in favor of public access exist sufficient to warrant sealing those materials.”

As the PIA and the common law both bear witness, the attorney-client privilege protects a relationship that is integral to the administration of justice as well as a government that functions for the benefit of the people.

C. Waiver

Despite advancing and protecting important interests, the attorney-client privilege could not be a “compelling reason to withhold the [requested] information” if confidentiality has been waived. Thus, before balancing the interests protected by the privilege against those served by the PIA, we must consider whether noncompliance with section 552.301’s ten-day deadline waives the attorney-client privilege. We hold that a governmental body does not forfeit the attorney-client privilege by failing to timely request an attorney general decision under section 552.301.

“Generally, ‘waiver’ consists of the intentional relinquishment of a known right or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right.” Merely missing a statutory deadline does not mirror any of the conduct our rules and case law recognize as waiving a privilege. Nor does the PIA’s language support the conclusion that the privilege may be waived by inaction or delay. We elaborate on both points as follows.

Rule 511 of the Texas Rules of Evidence governs waiver of evidentiary privileges by voluntary disclosure. Subsection (a) of Rule 511 sets forth the general rule that evidentiary privileges are waived if the privilege holder voluntarily discloses the privileged matter, consents to disclosure, or places the matter at issue. The circumstances Rule 511(a) recognizes as waiving a privilege are materially dissimilar to those presented in this case. Subsection (b) of the rule applies only to the attorney-client privilege and imposes limitations on the general waiver rule to preserve the privilege despite actual disclosure. Under subsection (b), the attorney-client privilege is afforded additional protection against waiver.

The attorney-client privilege may also be waived by inadvertent disclosure during litigation, if the disclosure is accompanied by conduct inconsistent with claiming the privilege of confidentiality. “[T]he essential function of the privilege is to protect a confidence that, once revealed by any means, leaves the privilege with no legitimate function to perform.” Notwithstanding actual disclosure, however, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d) preserves a claim of privilege if the privilege holder (1) did not intend to waive the privilege and (2) takes prompt action to claim the privilege after “actually discover[ing]” the disclosure was made. Rule 193.3(d) “was designed to ensure that important privileges are not waived by mere inadvertence or mistake.” But when inadvertence is coupled with failure to take prompt remedial action after discovering actual disclosure of privileged information, the privilege is waived because inaction under such circumstances is inconsistent with claiming the privilege.

Citing Rule 193.3(d) by analogy, the Attorney General suggests sections 552.301 and 552.302 should be construed as effecting a waiver by inaction or omission. But the scenario described in Rule 193.3(d)— actual disclosure followed by delayed action results in waiver—is the converse of the question presented here: does delay waive the privilege and compel disclosure?

Rule 193.3(d) contemplates waiver of confidentiality in the context of an inadvertent, but actual, disclosure, In this case, there has been no disclosure, and the issue is whether the PIA compels disclosure despite the absence of actual disclosure and without regard to the City’s efforts to maintain confidentiality under section 552.302. Rule 193.3(d) is substantively in-apposite.

In addition to actual disclosure, the attorney-client privilege may be waived by “offensive use” of the privilege. Offensive use occurs when a party seeking affirmative relief “attempts to protect outcome-determinative information from any discovery.” Though we have recognized the vitality of the offensive-use doctrine, we have explained that “an offensive use waiver of a privilege should not lightly be found” because privileges “represent society’s desire to protect certain relationships.” An untimely request for an attorney general decision under section 552.301 does not implicate concerns equivalent to those undergirding the offensive-use doctrine.

Finally, and most decisively, section 552.302’s language cannot reasonably be construed as effecting a waiver of confidentiality. Some PIA sections explicitly refer to waiver, but section 552.302 does not. Rather than waiving interests that are protected by a statutory exception to disclosure, section 552.302’s express language creates a presumption that disclosure is required. Because the presumption is re-buttable, we conclude that missing the statutory deadline in section 552.301 does not waive the attorney-client privilege.

D. Balancing Competing Interests

Our inquiry does not end with establishing that the interests secured by the attorney-client privilege are inherently compelling and that mere delay in seeking an attorney general decision does not waive the privilege. Those determinations impact only one side of the balancing equation. We must also consider whether the significant interests the attorney-client privilege advances outweigh competing interests favoring disclosure and the statutory presumption that disclosure is required.

We begin our analysis by observing that, under the PIA, (1) the public is not entitled to information the Legislature has chosen to except from required public disclosure, and (2) section 552.302’s “compelling reason” safeguard applies only to information the PIA already excepts from disclosure. Accordingly, a request- or’s general right of access to public information is not a competing interest to be weighed under the compelling-reason balancing test.

Instead, the failure to timely request an attorney general decision under section 552.301 of the PIA implicates the public’s interest in the “prompt” production of pub-lie information. The PIA’s deadlines help ensure governmental bodies do not impede the public’s access to public information. Compliance -with statutory deadlines furthers important interests in avoiding delay and preventing gamesmanship and obstructionism.

These interests are undoubtedly significant, but the PIA expressly contemplates they may be overcome by countervailing interests of utmost importance. We conclude the interests protected by the attorney-client privilege surpass that high threshold. When weighed against the need for expediency, the interests protected by the attorney-client privilege—and the irremediable consequences of disclosure— are demonstrably more compelling.

Under the PIA, the public has no right of access to privileged information in the first instance and only a rebuttable presumption of access in the second. We must also consider that the attorney-client privilege is afforded to the government for the public’s benefit; accordingly, the public’s interest is not one-sided in this context. Because the privilege benefits both the governmental body and the people it represents, the public’s interest in maintaining confidentiality must be factored into the analysis. Among other shared benefits, the privilege shields confidential information from third parties whose litigation or business interests are adverse to the public’s interest, promotes a culture that incentivizes governmental bodies to seek legal advice, and allows the free flow of information between attorney and client without fear of compelled public disclosure.

Protecting privileged attorney-client communications is also more urgent than promptness because the PIA provides disincentives to gamesmanship that might otherwise reward dilatory conduct, intentional or otherwise. Under the PIA, there is no benefit to bypassing the Attorney General altogether, and delay bears its own consequences.

For one thing, the interests protected by some statutory exceptions will not independently satisfy the compelling-reason standard; thus, failing to timely assert an applicable exception could result in mandatory disclosure that might otherwise have been avoided. Because section 552.302 provides only a limited safeguard, missing the deadline in section 552.301 is a risky endeavor.

Refusing to request or comply with an attorney general decision carries the additional risk of a civil-enforcement action that—win or lose—would surely be costly. But if lost, obtaining and relying on an attorney general decision under section 552.301 precludes an award of attorney fees and litigation costs to the prevailing plaintiff. The PIA’s fee-shifting provisions thus provide both a carrot and a stick.

Finally, a governmental body’s only way to avoid disclosing public information to a requestor is a suit that “seeks declaratory relief from compliance with [an attorney general] decision issued under Subchapter G [sections 552.301 to 552.309].” This provision also helps secure the Attorney General’s oversight as contemplated by the Legislature.

To require public disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications as an automatic—and irremediable—sanction for missing a statutory deadline is not necessary to achieve the PIA’s objective of an open government and would be a jurisprudential course fraught with peril. Compelled forfeiture of the privilege under such circumstances necessarily undermines its underpinnings and threatens the foundation of a justice system that thrives on full and candid legal representation. Most importantly, however, such an outcome is not supported by a plain reading of the statutory text.

The PIA’s exception for attorney-client communications affirms the importance of honest and candid conversations between governmental bodies and their legal counsel. Eviscerating the privilege by compelling disclosure in pursuit of “promptness” may have a wide-reaching and chilling effect on communications between governmental bodies and their counsel. When a privilege as sacrosanct as the attorney-client privilege is irretrievably lost under the unexceptional facts presented here, “governmental entities might well choose to forego fruitful self-analysis and decide not to seek needed legal advice.”

Robotic perfection by a governmental body’s public information officer is a statutory ideal, not an absolute requirement. To err is human, but to conduct a City’s legal affairs without the occasional error would require divinity. The safeguard the Legislature enacted in section 552.302 exists to prevent such a scenario.

E. Section 552.302 Does Not Require Disclosure

When balanced against the PIA’s promptness requirements, the interests safeguarded by the attorney-client privilege present compelling reasons to withhold information protected by the privilege. The harm from compelled dissemination of confidential attorney-client communications is irremediable, and the consequences are visited on both the governmental body and the taxpayers it represents. Mandating disclosure would further undermine the attorney-client privilege’s fundamental purpose, by impairing frank discourse between a governmental body and its counsel.

In contrast, allowing a governmental body to withhold attorney-client communications after an untimely request for an attorney general decision bears less onerous consequences that may be ameliorated by several statutory incentives and disincentives. Stated summarily, even when a compelling reason exists to withhold disclosure, the PIA incentivizes governmental bodies to request an attorney general decision (1) to ensure the attorney-client privilege covers all the information the governmental body desires to withhold, (2) to assert additional exceptions for withholding information for which no “compelling reason to withhold information” exists, (3) to avoid a costly civil-enforcement action, and (4) to avoid assessment of litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees if the plaintiff substantially prevails in such an action.

Although we must construe the PIA liberally in favor of granting requests for information, we hold that the significant interests supporting withholding confidential and privileged attorney-client communications outweigh the competing interests supporting disclosure. We therefore conclude a “compelling reason” to withhold confidential attorney-client corn-munications exists and, absent waiver, rebuts the presumption that the information protected by the privilege is “subject to required public disclosure.”

F. Response to the Dissent

Though quibbling here and there about the actual importance of the attorney-client privilege in the public sector, the dissent’s analysis fundamentally depends on the fiat that exceptions and compelling reasons are mutually exclusive under the statute. But no authority—statutory or otherwise—supports the conclusion that compelling interests motivating a statutory exception are categorically disqualified from constituting a “compelling reason” to withhold information from public disclosure. The dissent’s proclamation pays lip service to our fundamental obligation to construe statutes as written, but is textually unsupportable and, frankly, preposterous. :

First, (the Legislature has placed no restrictions on the compelling-reason standard.| Indeed, as the dissent readily acknowledges, the “actual language” in section 552.302 applies to “any ‘compelling reason.’” Second, the statute betrays no Legislative intent to ignore policies embodied in and interests protected by statutory exceptions in determining whether a “compelling reason to withhold the information” exists. Not a single word in the PIA supports a construction of section 552.302 as rendering irrelevant, for example, the policy of preventing bio-terrorism that underlies section 552.151 or the interest in avoiding a “substantial threat of physical harm” to an employee or officer as advanced by section 552.152. In this case, our responsibility to determine whether a compelling reason exists requires that we consider the interests protected by the attorney-client privilege—interests the dissent ignores entirely—and not disregard them out of hand merely because they were important enough for the Legislature to protect in the first instance.

This is not, as the dissent says, “a distinction without a difference” because not all of the policies and interests animating a statutory exception will necessarily be compelling in their own right—in whole or part. We cannot, however, ignore those that are. The statutory support for this construction of the statute is, quite simply, the compelling-reason standard articulated in section 552.S02.

The dissent’s theory to the contrary turns on an interpretation of section 552.302 that requires privilege plus other compelling circumstances. Aside from en-grafting restrictions that do not exist in the statutory language, the dissent offers few parameters as to what would qualify. We are left only with the dissent’s view that a compelling reason (1) will usually address the governmental body’s “reasons for its failure to timely and properly assert the privilege,” and (2) “might exist if the governmental body establishes that substantial harm would result if the information is released.”

In summarily concluding that the interests protected by the attorney-client privilege are not significant enough to rebut the public-disclosure presumption, the dissent gives short shrift to the compelling interests underlying the attorney-client privilege, cites no authority supporting compelled disclosure of attorney-client privileged information due to tardiness or inaction, and overlooks the public interest in maintaining confidentiality, of attorney-client communications. As a substitute for these inquiries, the dissent’s analysis elevates promptness to near conclusive importance. The PIA does not, however, require a compelling reason for “untimeliness” or “lack of diligence”; it requires a “compelling reason to withhold the information” from public disclosure. The significant interests advanced and protected by the attorney-client privilege meet that standard.

The dissent’s analytical gaps. are not overcome by the host of boilerplate open-records decisions the dissent offers to “prove[ ]” that routinely depriving the attorney-client privilege of force over the last twenty-two years has not prevented governmental bodies from seeking legal advice or chilled full and frank legal communications. No matter how many open-records decisions have applied the Attorney General’s unduly restrictive interpretation of section 552.302—the underlying rationale of which the dissent correctly repudiates—proof that a rule has been applied is no proof of the rule’s impact. The reality is we do not know how twenty-two years of routinely adverse legal rulings have shaped internal discourse; whether ethical and legal violations have occurred that may have been prevented under a proper construction of the PIA; or how the public fisc has been affected. We do know, however, that the attorney-client privilege exists because the systemic harm from denying it is real even if it is not quantifiable. We also know that the privilege’s purpose is well established and enduring, and that it applies with “special force” to the government because it advances the public’s best interests.

Ipse dixit, however, is not proof of anything—one way or the other—and is no substitute for 500 years of precedent. If it were, the same open-records decisions the dissent relies on would “prove[ ]” and debunk the dissent’s own “parade of horri-bles” by demonstrating that even under the Attorney General’s restrictive construction of the statutory standard, governmental bodies continued to engage the PIA’s oversight process after missing the statutory deadline.

As a final rejoinder, we address the dissent’s refrain that we are substituting our judgment, our preferences, and our rules for the Legislature’s. When we endeavor to ascertain the meaning of an undefined statutory term that is integral to a statutory inquiry, we are not overstepping the bounds of our authority merely because our colleagues disagree with our analysis or conclusions. “[T]o admit that disagreements do and will always exist over hard and fine questions of law doesn’t mean those disagreements are the products of personal will or politics rather than the products of diligent and honest efforts by all involved to make sense of the legal materials at hand.” But if that criticism were fairly lodged in any direction, it would be toward those who, in the guise of interpreting a statute, invent a standard that imposes limitations that are more restrictive than the plain language allows while simultaneously denouncing a party’s construction of the statute on the very same basis. By substituting inflammatory rhetoric for analysis, the dissent confirms the adage that, when neither the law nor the facts are in your favor, pound the table.

IY. Conclusion

The PIA promotes and advances the public’s interest in governmental transparency and openness, but not at the expense of the public’s equally significant interest in ensuring public officials pursue and obtain legal advice and representation in affairs of governance. The significance of the interests protected by the attorney-client privilege and the need to protect attorney-client confidences from compelled public disclosure were not lost on the Legislature in enacting the PIA. The PIA addresses the competing values of transparency and the need for confidentiality by excepting confidential attorney-client communications from mandatory public disclosure. In doing so, the PIA recognizes the importance of the attorney-client privilege and affirms that the public interest is best served when those sworn to protect it are guided by fully informed legal advice in conducting public affairs.

Though the PIA must be construed liberally in favor of granting a request for public information, the “compelling reason” inquiry requires us to weigh the public’s interest in expeditious assertion of a statutory exception against the invaluable right to have attorney-client communications protected from compelled public disclosure. Meeting statutory deadlines is certainly important, but as the PIA plainly articulates, is not determinative. Weighing against the need for prompt action is the irremediable consequence of compelling disclosure; once privileged information is disclosed, confidentiality is lost for all times and all purposes. When the interests are balanced, the compelling nature of the attorney-client privilege is manifest. Because there is a compelling reason to withhold information covered by the attorney-client privilege, we affirm the lower-court judgments holding the City of Dallas need not disclose that information to the re-questors.

Justice Boyd filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Johnson joined.

Justice Boyd,

joined by Justice Johnson, dissenting.

When this Court gets to make the rules, it goes to great lengths to protect attorney-client communications. As the Court explains today, under the common law and our evidentiary and procedural rules (that is, the rules this Court gets to make), most attorney-client communications are protected from compelled disclosure unless the client waives the privilege by intentionally relinquishing it or engaging in conduct inconsistent with the right to claim it. Ante at 262-63 (citing In re Nationwide Ins. Co., 494 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); Tex. R. Evid. 503, 511; Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3(d)).

But we don’t get to make the rules here. When the public seeks access to public information that the government possesses on the public’s behalf, the Texas Public Information Act controls. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.001-.353. The government has no inherent, constitutional, or common-law right to withhold any public information from the public’s view. The Texas Constitution guarantees that all “political power is inherent in the people,” and the government is “founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit.” Tex Const. art. I, § 2. Based on the “fundamental philosophy” of this “constitutional form of representative government,” the people of Texas have declared through their duly elected lawmakers that “it is the policy of this state” that “each person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001(a). Although the people have delegated significant authority to their government, they have not given “their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know.” Id. Instead, the people “insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.” Id.

The Texas Public Information Act recognizes that the government may need to keep certain attorney-client communications confidential, just as it recognizes the government may need to keep certain trade secrets, student records, information about bioterrorist threats, and other types of information confidential. In each case, the Act protects the need for confidentiality by providing an exception to the Act’s public-disclosure requirement. But the Act’s protection is limited, and it treats attorney-client communications exactly the same as all other excepted information.

Relying on Court-created common-law and litigation rules, the Court decides today to treat the attorney-client privilege as unique and special even though the Act does not. The Act treats the privilege as the basis for an exception to the Act’s disclosure requirement, but the Court holds that it is also—categorically and always—a “compelling reason” to withhold government communications from the public even when the government fails to timely and properly claim the Act’s exception. Under the Court’s holding, establishing the exception will always constitute a compelling reason, so the Act’s compelling-reason requirement is meaningless when applied to attorney-client communications. This holding obliterates the sole method by which the Act compels the government to timely and properly assert the attorney-client privilege.

Nothing in the Act supports the Court’s decision to grant the privilege such special treatment. Nor do the Court’s hyperbolic assertions that holding otherwise might cause the government to stop relying on legal advice. At least twenty-two years of reality have conclusively proven the contrary. Adhering to the Act’s requirements instead of the Court’s policy preferences and preposterous predictions, I conclude that the attorney-client privilege cannot independently constitute a compelling reason to permit the government to withhold public information when the government fails to assert the privilege as and when the Act requires. Instead, like every other basis for one of the Act’s exceptions, the privilege triggers an exception to the Act’s disclosure requirement. If the government fails to timely and properly assert that exception, the Act requires that the facts and circumstances of the particular case establish a compelling reason that effectively demands that the information be withheld from the public despite the government’s failure to timely comply with the Act. Because the City of Dallas has provided no such compelling reason in these particular cases, I would reverse.

I.

Compelling Reason

The Texas Public Information Act’s foundational provision requires the government to make public information “available to the public at a minimum during the normal business hours of the governmental body” that possesses the information. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.021. When the government receives a request for public information, it must provide the information to the requestor “promptly,” which means “as soon as possible under the circumstances, that is, within a reasonable time, without delay.” Id. § 552.221(a). The government may withhold requested information only as expressly provided by the Act. See id. § 552.006. The Act pointedly requires that we construe its provisions “liberally ... in favor of granting a request for information.” Id. § 552.001(b). Like any other statute, we must enforce the Act “as written” and “refrain from rewriting [its] text.” Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Tex. 2009) (citing Simmons v. Arnim, 110 Tex. 309, 220 S.W. 66, 70 (1920)).

The Act provides numerous exceptions to its disclosure requirement. See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.101-.156. But the government cannot unilaterally withhold information it believes falls within one of the exceptions. Instead, it must ask the Attorney General to decide whether an exception applies. Id. § 552.301(a). Specifically, the government must ask for the Attorney General’s decision, identify the exceptions on which it relies, and provide notice to the requestor within “a reasonable time” but not more than ten business days after receiving the public-information request. Id. § 552.301(b), (d). Then, within a “reasonable time” but not more than fifteen business days after receiving the request, the government must submit written comments to the Attorney General explaining why the asserted exceptions apply and must send a copy of those comments to the requestor. Id. § 552.301(e), (e-1). The Attorney General must “promptly render a decision ... determining whether the requested information is within one of the exceptions.” Id. § 552.306(a). The government must either comply with the Attorney General’s decision or file suit to challenge it. See id. § 552.324(a).

The Act expressly refers to section 552.301’s ten- and ñfteen-day time limits as “deadlines.” Id. § 552.2615(g). A deadline is “a date or time before which something must be done and after which the opportunity passes or a penalty follows.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 580 (2002). Section 552.302 describes the consequences of the government’s failure to meet section 552.301’s deadlines:

If a governmental body does not request an attorney general decision as provided by Section 552.301 and provide the re-questor with the information required by Sections 552.301(d) and (e-1), the information requested in writing is presumed to be subject to required public disclosure and must be released unless there is a compelling reason to withhold the information.

Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.302 (emphasis added).

In these two consolidated cases, the City of Dallas received requests for information that included its attorney-client communications, but it failed to request the Attorney General’s decision within ten business days as section 552.301 requires. Instead, the City waited until the twenty-sixth business day after receiving one request and tye forty-ninth business day after receiving the other. According to the record, the City never provided any explanation for having missed the deadlines. The parties agree that section 552.302 requires the City to disclose the communications unless a “compelling reason” exists to withhold them, but they disagree on whether the City established a compelling reason. The Court holds that “a reason to withhold information will be ‘compelling’ only when it is of such a pressing nature (e.g., urgent, forceful, or demanding) that it outweighs the interests favoring public access to the information and overcomes section 552.302’s presumption that disclosure is required.” Ante at 259. The Court’s test leans in the right direction, but it ultimately come up short.

With regard to the Court’s first element, the Court makes no effort to define how “pressing” is sufficient. Because the Act does not define the term “compelling” or the phrase “compelling reason,” we must apply their common, ordinary meanings unless “a different or more precise definition is apparent from the term’s use in the context of the statute.” R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Gulf Energy Expl. Corp., 482 S.W.3d 559, 568 (Tex. 2016) (quoting TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011)). Under the common, ordinary meaning of the term, a reason that is “of such a pressing nature” so as to be compelling is one that is not just “urgent” or “forceful,” but so “urgent” and “forceful” that it effectively demands and requires the desired result. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 463 (2002) (defining “compelling” as “demanding respect, honor, or admiration,” and “compel” to mean to “call upon, require, or command without possibility of withholding or denying”) (emphases added). The term “compelling,” in other words, connotes “force or coercion, with little or no volition on the part of the one compelled.” Bryan A. Garner, a Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 183 (2nd ed. 1995) (emphasis added). “To be compelling, a justification must be more than simply legitimate or good; it should be persuasive to the point of demanding respect or acquiescence.” City of Dallas v. Abbott, 304 S.W.3d 380, 393 (Tex. 2010) (Wainwright, J,, dissenting). In short, when a reason is compelling, reasonable minds can only conclude that it demands and requires the intended result. See People v. Wells, 279 Ill.App.3d 564, 216 Ill.Dec. 23, 664 N.E.2d 660, 664 (1996) (concluding that “compelling reasons” are “reasons over which reasonable minds would not diverge”).

The Court’s second element recognizes that the determination of whether a reason is compelling requires balancing competing interests. Ante at 259. Although this is true, the presumption that section 552.302 imposes ensures that the scales are not evenly balanced. Instead, as the federal common-law cases on which the Court relies recognize, the balancing test uses “scales [that] tilt decidedly toward transparency.” Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 70 (1st Cir. 2011). Under the Act, as under the federal common law, the presumption in favor of transparency is “no mere paper tiger,” and “[i]f not overpowering,” is “nonetheless strong and sturdy.” F.T.C. v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Co., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987) (internal citation omitted). This is because the Act recognizes that, “as in so many other instances, justice is better served by sunshine than by darkness.” Id. at 413.

Considering the statutory context and the term’s common meaning, a “compelling reason” to withhold public information despite the government’s failure to timely assert an exception is a reason that, under all the facts and circumstances, is so important and urgent that reasonable minds can only conclude that it clearly outweighs the Act’s fundamental policy of ensuring that the public can promptly obtain its information from its government. See Wells, 216 Ill.Dec. 23, 664 N.E.2d at 664 (stating that compelling reasons are “forceful and impelling reasons irresistible in sense and purpose” that “clearly demonstrate” the proposed conclusion). In other words, a compelling reason is one that undeniably outweighs the Act’s express goal of ensuring that the people (the “master”) are able to promptly obtain public information from their public “servants.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001(a).

II.

The City’s Proposed Compelling Reasons

In these cases, the City asserts three reasons to justify withholding the information at issue. First, the City contends that a compelling reason exists because the information falls under section 552.101’s exception for information that is “confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Id. § 552.101. Second, the City argues that the fact that the information is attorney-client privileged is itself a compelling reason. Finally, the City asserts that a compelling reason exists because publicly disclosing the communications would “substantially harm” the City’s interests in ongoing and future contract negotiations. The Court rejects the City’s first argument, accepts the second, and does not reach the third. I conclude that none of the City’s asserted reasons are compelling under section 552.302.

A. Section 552.101: “confidential by law”

The City first contends that a compelling reason exists because section 552.101 excepts attorney-client communications from the Act’s disclosure requirement. Id. § 552.101 (providing a general exception for information that is “considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision”). The City makes this argument because Texas Attorneys General have long held that section 552.101 itself provides a compelling reason to withhold information under section 552.302. Unlike the City, however, they have construed section 552.101 to except only information that is confidential in a “mandatory” sense, meaning the law prohibits the government from disclosing the information even if it wanted to disclose it. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-676 at 2 (2002); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-665 at 1 n.5 (2000); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-400 at 1 (1983); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-325 at 1 (1982).

The Attorney General contends that section 552.101 does not apply to attorney-client communications because they are subject only to “discretionary” or “permissive” confidentiality, in the sense that a governmental body may withhold its own attorney-client communications but is not prohibited from voluntarily disclosing them. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-676 at 2 (explaining that the privilege “rests with the client governmental body, and like any client, the governmental body is free to waive it”); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-522 at 4 (1989) (distinguishing “information ‘deemed confidential by law’” from permissive exceptions “that protect information that may be disclosed at the discretion of governmental bodies”). Instead, the Attorney General asserts that only section 552.107 excepts attorney-client communications from required disclosure. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.107 (excepting “information that the attorney general or an attorney of -a political subdivision is prohibited from disclosing because of a duty to the client under the, Texas Rules of Evidence or the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct”). Alternatively, if section 552.101 broadly encompasses permissive as well as mandatory confidentiality, the Attorney General argues that only mandatory confidentiality constitutes a compelling reason and a governmental body’s own attorney-client communications are never mandatorily confidential.

The Court does not decide whether section 552.101 excepts attorney-client communications or itself constitutes a compelling reason as the City contends, concluding instead that the existence of a compelling reason “does not turn on whether the attorney-client privilege falls within one statutory exception or another.” Ante at 255. According to the Court, “the attorney-client privilege, which is protected by one or more statutory exceptions to public disclosure, protects and advances interests that provide independently compelling reasons to withhold privileged information unless confidentiality has been waived.” Ante at 256 (footnote omitted). I reject the City’s argument because the existence of a compelling reason does not turn merely on the basis for any of the Act’s exceptions at all.

Construing sections 552.301 and 552.302 together within their statutory context, the Act permits the government to withhold public information despite its failure to timely and properly request the Attorney General’s decision only if an exception applies and a compelling reason exists. Under the Act, public information is always “presumed to be subject to required public disclosure,” and only an exception can overcome that presumption. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.021, .301(a), .302; see also id. § 552.306 (providing that the Attorney General’s role is to determine “whether the requested information is within one of the exceptions”). Nothing in section 552.302 or the remainder of the Act suggests that a governmental body can withhold information by showing a compelling reason instead of an applicable exception after it failed to timely comply with section 552.301. That construction would ignore the relationship between the two sections and encourage the government to intentionally refuse to comply with section 552.301 whenever it concludes that no exception applies.

Instead, when a governmental body fails to timely and properly request the Attorney General’s decision “about whether the information is within [an] exception,” id. § 552.301(a), section 552.302 imposes an additional presumption that applies even though an exception overcomes the foundational presumption favoring disclosure. Although an applicable exception overcomes the Act’s foundational presumption of openness, the governmental body’s failure to timely and properly assert that exception results in a new presumption that the information remains “subject to required public disclosure and must be released unless there is a compelling reason to withhold the information.” Id. § 552.302. Section 552.302, in other words, imposes an additional requirement—not an alternative requirement—that applies when a governmental body fails to timely assert an applicable exception as section 552.301 requires. As a result, the mere fact that one of the Act’s exceptions applies or that a compelling reason exists is insufficient to overcome the government’s failure to timely and properly assert an exception, because the Act requires both. Id.

The Court agrees that the Act always requires an exception to avoid disclosure and that establishing a compelling reason without also establishing an applicable exception is insufficient. Ante at 256 (affirming that “even under the compelling-reason standard, information cannot be withheld unless a statutory exception applies, because public information remains public unless it is expressly excepted from disclosure.”); see also ante at 264 (“[SJection 552.302’s ‘compelling reason’ safeguard applies only to information the [Act] already excepts from disclosure.”)- But the Court concludes that merely establishing an exception is sometimes sufficient, even though it concedes that if it were “always” sufficient “the compelling-reason requirement would be rendered a nullity.” Ante at 256 (emphasis added). The Court asserts that exceptions and compelling reasons are not always “mutually exclusive,” ante at 268, and rejects “the notion that statutory exceptions are categorically distinct from compelling reasons and that something more is always required to rebut the presumption that arises from a governmental body’s failure to timely request an attorney general decision,” ante at 264.

The Court goes on, however, to conclude that an exception and a compelling reason are never mutually exclusive when the attorney-client privilege is at stake, and that the exception for attorney-client communications is categorically and always a compelling reason, regardless of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Yet the Court can provide no statutory basis for deciding when the interests that an exception protects are categorically compelling and when they are not. Instead, based solely on its own view of the attorney-client privilege’s importance, the Court concludes that the privilege—which the Act treats as the basis for an exception under section 552.301—also constitutes a compelling reason under section 552.302. Ante at 277. When the attorney-client privilege is at issue, in other words, the Court is willing to render the compelling-reason requirement “a nullity.” Ante at 256.

Contrary to the Court’s approach, the Act treats each of its exceptions equally. Each exception applies only if a particular set of facts exists. Under the Act, those facts establish an applicable exception that the government may assert under section 552.301; and if it fails to timely and properly assert the exception and the facts that establish it, section 552.302 requires a compelling reason in addition to the exception, regardless of which exception applies. While the Court asserts that, in “some instances, important policies and interests that animate a statutory exception are compelling in their own right,” ante at 256, it then holds that the interests that animate the attorney-client privilege are compelling in all instances. Based on the Act’s language, context, and structure, and honoring its mandate that we construe its language “liberally ... in favor of granting a request for information,” Tex Gov’t Code § 552.001(b), an exception to the Act’s disclosure requirement cannot always independently establish a compelling reason to withhold the information when the government fails to timely and properly assert the exception. Otherwise, as the Court concedes, section 552.302 is rendered a “nullity” because we think “the interests that animate a statutory exception” are important enough. Under the Act, section 552.302 requires “something more.”

That “something more” is a “compelling reason,” and whether it exists depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (holding that the determination of whether a compelling reason exists to grant public access to judicial records must be determined “in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case”); Standard Fin. Mgmt., 830 F.2d at 410-11 (same) (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599, 98 S.Ct. 1306); Compelling Need, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“Generally, courts decide whether a compelling need is present based on the unique facts of each case.”). I thus agree with the Court’s rejection of the Attorney General’s long-held position that only two reasons can ever qualify as compelling under section 552.302. See ante at 269. Instead, to determine whether a compelling reason exists in any given case, courts must “analyze in detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations” that justify withholding each particular document. Rudd Equip. Co. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co., 834 F.3d 589, 594 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002)). And any decision to withhold any particular document “must be narrowly tailored to serve that reason.” Id. (quoting Baxter, 297 F.3d at 548). When a compelling reason is required, “[bjroad and general findings ... are not sufficient to justify closure.” Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (1987)). Broadly establishing an exception does not demonstrate at the particular-document level a compelling reason for withholding.

In other words, establishing an exception does not end the analysis; it begins it. The same facts'and circumstances supporting an exception can also be relevant to establishing a compelling reason, but the compelling-reason analysis requires more than a generalized claim. It requires proof of particular circumstances such that no reasonable person would demand the documents’ production. Thus, regardless of whether section 552.101 excepts privileged attorney-client communications from the Act’s disclosure requirement as the City contends, the fact that information is excepted under any of the Act’s exceptions does not itself provide a compelling reason under section 552.302.

B. The Attorney-Client Privilege

The City next argues that the fact that the attorney-client privilege protects the communications is itself a compelling reason to withhold the communications despite the City’s failure to timely request the Attorney General’s decision. The Court agrees, holding that “absent waiver, the interests protected by the attorney-client privilege are sufficiently compelling to rebut the public-disclosure presumption that arises on expiration of the [Actj’s ten-day deadline.” Ante at 250. To reach this result, the Court attempts to distinguish between an exception to disclosure and the “policies and interests that animate” the exception, holding that the policies and interests can constitute a compelling reason even if the exception itself cannot. Ante at 278. Because the Act treats the policies and interests as the basis for the exception, however, this is a distinction without a difference. Ultimately, the Court’s holding substitutes the Court’s own preference for balancing the competing interests for the approach the Act requires. And even if the interests that an exception protects under section 552.301 could also constitute a compelling reason under section 552.302, the Court both undervalues the interests that section 552.302 protects and overvalues the interests the privilege protects to reach the result the Court desires.

1. The Act’s approach to balancing the competing interests

The Court bases its conclusion on its view that the interests the attorney-client privilege protects are “of utmost importance.” Ante at 265. Like the Court, the Act recognizes the importance of these interests, but it protects them by excepting privileged attorney-client communications from its disclosure requirement. As the Court itself explains, the Act

addresses the competing values of transparency and the need for confidentiality by excepting confidential attorney-client communications from mandatory public disclosure. In doing so, the [Act] recognizes the importance of the attorney-client privilege and affirms that the public interest is best served when those sworn to protect it are guided by fully informed legal advice in conducting public affairs.

Ante at 270 (emphasis added).

In this and every other relevant sense, the Act treats confidential attorney-client communications the same as all other confidential information. The Act provides numerous specific exceptions for particular types of confidential information, and a broad exception for all information that is “considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.101. As the Court notes, the Act provides these exceptions because it recognizes the importance of “the individual and other interests at stake in disclosing that information.” Ante at 251 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2011)).

But the Act also recognizes and protects the broader interests that support the public’s right to promptly access public information. The Act’s very existence is a tribute to the “fundamental philosophy” that “government is the servant and not the master of the people,” and “that each person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees, ... so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001(a). The Act protects these “fundamental” interests by requiring governmental bodies to respond to a request for public information “promptly, ... as soon as possible under the circumstances, ... within a reasonable time, [and] without delay.” Id. § 552.221(a).

An inherent conflict exists between the interests in granting an attorney-client privilege to the government and the interests in granting the public prompt access to public information. Granting evidentiary privileges to the government necessarily undermines the goal of ensuring that the “people remain in control of their government” by creating a risk “that a broad array of materials in many areas of the executive branch will become ‘sequester[ed]’ from public view.” In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Carefully balancing these inherently conflicting interests, the Act protects the government’s privileged attorney-client communications by providing an exception to the disclosure requirement, but it does not permit the government to unilaterally withhold communications based on that exception. To protect the broader interests in the public’s right to promptly access public information, the government must ask the Attorney General to decide whether the exception for attorney-client communications applies within ten business days. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.301(b). Under the Act’s approach, if the government fails to timely ask for the Attorney General’s decision, the communications “must be released unless there is a compelling reason to withhold” them, even though they are privileged and the exception applies. Id. § 552.302. By contrast, under the Court’s approach, the communications need not be disclosed because they are privileged and the exception applies, even though the government failed to timely ash for the Attorney General’s decision.

2. The public’s interest in prompt disclosure

Applying its balancing test, the Court concludes that the only public-information interest that the government’s failure to timely assert the privilege implicates is the public’s interest in “expediency.” Ante at 265; see also ante at 264 (holding that the government’s failure to timely comply with section 552.301 only “implicates the public’s interest in the ‘prompt’ production of public information”). According to the Court, this interest carries little weight because the government’s failure to timely assert the privilege leads only to “delay” and “gamesmanship and obstructionism.” Ante at 265. “When weighed against the need for expediency,” the Court concludes, “the interests protected by the attorney-client privilege—and the irremediable consequences of disclosure—are demonstrably more compelling.” Ante at 265.

This analysis ignores the value the Act expressly and repeatedly places on what the Court calls “expediency.” The Act contains numerous provisions that demonstrate the importance it places on the public’s interest in prompt access to public information. The Act expressly recognizes that the public is entitled “at all times to complete information about the affairs of government.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001(a) (emphasis added). Its foundational provision requires governmental bodies to make public information “available to the public at a minimum during the normal business hours of the governmental body.” Id. § 552.021 (emphasis added). When the government receives a request for public information, the Act expressly requires that it provide the information “promptly,” which the Act defines to mean “as soon as possible under the circumstances, that is, within a. reasonable time, without delay.” Id. § 552.221(a). Numerous other provisions also demonstrate the Act’s recognition that, when it comes to the public’s right to public information, time is of the essence:

— If the government cannot provide information within ten business days after the date the information is requested, it must “certify that fact in writing to the requestor and set a date and hour within a reasonable time when the information will be available for inspection or duplication,” id. § 552.221(d);
— If the government determines that responding to the request requires “programming or manipulation of data,” it must provide the requestor written notice of that determination within twenty days after it receives the request, id. § 552.231;
— If the government determines that its costs to comply with the request will exceed a predetermined limit, it must provide a written estimate to the re-questor “on or before the 10th day after the date on which the public information was requested,” id. § 552.275(e);
— If the request seeks a third party’s proprietary information that may be subject to an exception, the government “shall make a good faith attempt to notify that person ,.. within a reasonable time not later than the 10th business day after” it receives the request, id. § 552.305(d);
— If a person files a complaint with a district or county attorney complaining of a violation of the Act, the district or county attorney shall respond to the complaint “[bjefore the 31st day after the date a complaint is filed,” id. § 552.3215(g);
— The district or county attorney must notify the government before filing suit, and to avoid that suit, the government must cure the violation “before the fourth day after the date” the government receives the notice, id. § 552.3215©;
— If the government believes the Act excepts requested information from its disclosure requirement, it must ask the Attorney General to decide whether an exception applies “within a reasonable time but not later than the 10th business day after the date of receiving the written request,” id. § 552.301(b);
— If the Attorney General notifies the government that he needs additional information to make his decision, the government “shall submit the necessary additional information to the attorney general not later than the seventh calendar day after the date the notice is received,” id. § 552.303(d);
— The Attorney General must “promptly render a decision ... determining whether the requested information is within one of the exceptions,” not “later than the 45th business day after” the Attorney General received the request for decision, id. § 552.306(a); and
— If the government decides to sue to challenge the Attorney General’s decision, it must “bring the suit not later than the 30th calendar day after” it receives the Attorney General’s decision; otherwise, it “shall comply with” the Attorney General’s decision, id. § 552.324(b).

In short, when it comes to the public’s right to public information, the Act recognizes that access delayed is usually access denied. As the federal-court decisions on which the Court relies acknowledge, “a necessary corollary to the presumption [in favor of government transparency] is that once found to be appropriate, access should be immediate and contemporaneous. ... To delay or postpone disclosure undermines the benefit of public scrutiny and may have the same result as complete suppression.” Grove Fresh Distrib., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994).

In light of the Act’s repeated emphasis on timely access, the Court’s attempt to minimize that interest by suggesting that the requestor or the Attorney General can simply file suit to compel disclosure borders the absurd. Ante at 263. By requiring the government to’timely seek the Attorney General’s decision on whether an exception applies, the Act seeks to avoid the very delays that such a suit will inevitably cause. “Indeed, for the presumptive right [of access] to be suspended or nonexistent until after the judge has ruled on a motion, would be to impair the important interest in contemporaneous review by the public ....” In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34, 43 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980)). “The public cannot properly monitor the work of the courts with long delays in adjudication based on secret documents.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 127. When “fundamental” interests like those the Act protects are at stake, the loss of a protected right, “for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Paulsen v. Cty. of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (addressing First Amendment rights)).

Section 552.302’s compelling-reason requirement itself demonstrates the importance the Act places on the public’s interest in prompt access to public information. Section 552.302 protects that interest by imposing the compelling-reason requirement as a consequence for the government’s failure to timely assert an exception. The Court asserts that “the interests protected by the attorney-client privilege ... are demonstrably more compelling” than the public’s interest in prompt access to public information because the consequences of disclosure are “irremediable” and the public “has no right of access to privileged information in the first instance and only a rebuttable presumption of access in the second.” Ante at 265. But the same is true for all information the Act excepts from its disclosure requirement. Section 552.302’s compelling-reason requirement only applies when an exception applies and “the public has no right of access to the information in the first instance and only a rebuttable presumption of access in the second.” Section 552.302 places such great weight on the public’s right to prompt access that it requires disclosure of information even though it is privileged, confidential, and excepted, unless a compelling reason exists.

Under the Court’s reasoning, the interests that support any of the Act’s exceptions will always outweigh the public’s interest in prompt access, because the public never has “a right of access” to excepted information, and the release of that information will always result in a loss of confidentiality that is “irremediable.” Under the Court’s approach, every exception always satisfies the compelling-reason requirement and thus nullifies the requirement completely. The Act, however, places such great value on prompt access to public information that it requires the information to be disclosed unless a compelling reason exists, even though the public has no right to the information and the loss of confidentiality would be irremediable.

3. The government’s interest in the attorney-client privilege

According to the Court, the interests that support the attorney-client privilege always and necessarily outweigh the public’s interest in prompt access to public information because the privilege protects both the “free flow of information between attorney and client” and “the broader societal interest of effective administration of justice.” Ante at 250; see also ante at 260 (explaining that the privilege’s purpose is to “encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys” (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976))),-(stating that the privilege preserves “the just and orderly operation of our legal system” (quoting United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1997))). But the Court fails to consider these interests within the context of the fact that the government has no inherent right to any attorney-client privilege. In Texas, the Act both grants that right to the government and imposes limitations on that right, one of which requires the government to properly assert any applicable exception within ten business days after receiving the public’s request for its information. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.301. This limitation does not exist when a private party asserts the privilege on its own behalf. Under the Act, the privilege is subject to different limitations when the government relies on the privilege to withhold ‘public information.

For this reason, the Court’s reliance on a lack of “waiver” under its own common-law and procedural rules is misplaced. See ante at 250 (holding that the attorney-client privilege is a compelling reason under section 552.302 unless it has been waived, and the failure to meet section 552.301’s deadline “does not, in and of itself, constitute waiver”). The Court concludes that the attorney-client privilege is always a compelling reason under the Act because “[mjerely missing a statutory deadline does not mirror any of the conduct our rules and case law recognize as waiving a privilege.” Ante at 263. But “our rules and case law” do not apply here, and sections 552.301 and 552.302 speak nothing of “waiver” at all. The government’s failure to timely comply with section 552.301 does not “waive” the privilege, and the information therefore remains subject to an applicable exception. But because the government failed to timely assert the privilege as the Act requires, section 552.302 requires it to release the information even though it is privileged and excepted from required disclosure, unless a compelling reason exists to withhold it. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.301, .302. Under the Act, whether the government has “waived” the privilege under our common law and rules is irrelevant to the compelling-reason issue. Instead, the issue is whether there is a compelling reason to withhold the information despite the government’s failure to timely and properly assert that it is privileged and confidential.

Ultimately, the Court concludes that the attorney-client privilege is always independently a compelling reason that outweighs the public’s interest in prompt access to public information because the harm that results from a loss of the privilege “threatens the foundation of a justice system that thrives on full and candid legal representation.” Ante at 266. According to the Court, if the Act requires the government to disclose its attorney-client communications when its employees miss a deadline through mere oversight, mistake, or inadvertence, “governmental entities might well choose to forego fruitful self-analysis and decide not to seek needed legal advice.” Ante at 266 (quoting City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d at 333). “Eviscerating the privilege by compelling disclosure in pursuit of ‘promptness,’ ” the Court laments, “may have a wide-reaching and chilling effect on communications between governmental bodies and them counsel.” Ante at 266. These results would harm the interests of “both the governmental body and the taxpayers it represents,” and would “undermine the attorney-client privilege’s fundamental purpose by impairing frank discourse between a governmental body and its counsel.” Ante at 267.

The parade of horribles the Court describes might well seem compelling, if only there were some factual basis to support the Court’s dire predictions. Reality, however, belies such sophistry. For more than twenty-two years, Texas Attorneys General have issued hundreds of decisions requiring governmental bodies to disclose their attorney-client communications, holding that the “mere fact that the information is within the attorney-client privilege ... does not alone constitute a compelling reason to withhold the information from public disclosure” under section 552.302. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-630 at 5 (1994). Acknowledging these hundreds of Attorney-General decisions, the Court momentarily retreats from its dire predictions and suggests only that there is “no proof of” and “we do not know” the decisions’ impact. Ante at 269-70. Of course, even if that were true, then at best the predictions on which the Court bases its holding are mere speculation that provides no reason—much less a “compelling” reason—to withhold the information. But what the hundreds of decisions prove is that the Court’s central justification for its holding is simply factually incorrect. Disproving the Court’s prediction of “systemic harm,” the Attorney General’s consistent decisions for the past twenty-two years have not “prevented governmental bodies from seeking legal advice” or generating attorney-client communications. If that holding were likely to cause the government to “forego fruitful self-analysis and decide not to seek needed legal advice,” have a “wide-reaching and chilling effect on communications between governmental bodies and their counsel,” and “impair[] frank discourse between a governmental body and its counsel,” surely it would have done so by now.

4. Applying the Act’s approach

Because neither an exception nor the interests it supports can independently qualify as a compelling reason that outweighs the public’s interest in prompt access to public information under the Act, I agree with the Attorneys General that the attorney-client privilege alone cannot and does not constitute a compelling reason under section 552.302. This does not mean that section 552.302 could never permit the government to withhold attorney-client communications if the government fails to timely comply with section 552.301. As discussed, whether a compelling reason exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. I thus agree with the Court that “the public’s interest in maintaining confidentiality [of the government’s attorney-client communications] must be factored into the analysis,” ante at 265, but the compelling-reason standard requires that factoring to occur in each individual case, because the public’s interest and the harmful effects of disclosure will vary from case to case.

In most cases, the relevant facts and circumstances will also include the government’s diligence (or lack thereof) and the reasons for its failure to timely and properly assert the privilege. See, e.g., State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 793-94 (Tex. 2015) (“A litigant’s mistaken understanding of [Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(e) ] is not a compelling reason for this Court to consider an unreviewed mandamus argument.”); In re Dorn, 471 S.W.3d 823, 824 (Tex. 2015) (holding that urgency resulting from the party’s “own making” fails to provide a “compelling reason” for failing to first seek mandamus relief from court of appeals under Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(e)). And when a third party’s interests are at stake, the relevant circumstances may include the efforts the third party made to protect the information once the third party received notice of the request. So if, for example, a governmental body establishes that a natural disaster or some other cause beyond its control prevented it from timely asserting its privilege when it was otherwise prepared to do so, those facts may support the finding of a compelling reason to withhold the information despite the noncompliance. Similarly, as discussed below, a compelling reason might exist if the governmental body establishes that substantial harm would result if the information is released. But the Act requires a compelling reason in addition to the fact that the information is privileged and therefore excepted from disclosure.

The Court fears that requiring “public disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications as an automatic—and irremediable—sanction for missing a statutory deadline ... would be a jurisprudential course fraught with peril.” Ante at 266. The course the Court describes, however, is a legislative course, not merely a jurisprudential one. Even if reality justified the Court’s unfounded fears, we are not at liberty to substitute our own preferred standards for those the Act imposes. Contrary to the Court’s holding, the Act treats the attorney-client privilege as the basis for an exception, not as a compelling reason to withhold such communications when the government fails to timely assert the privilege. The limits on our authority compel us to apply the Act as written.

C. Harm to the City’s interests

Finally, in one of the two cases before us today (Cause No. 15-0073), the City contends that it demonstrated a compelling reason by establishing that the disclosure of its attorney-client communications would “likely inflict substantial harm to the public or the entity.” Because the Court concludes that the attorney-client privilege itself provides a compelling reason, it does not reach this argument. Ante at 266 n.117. I would reach the argument and conclude that the City has failed to establish sufficient harm in this case.

In support of its argument, the City relies on a summary-judgment affidavit in which an assistant city attorney testified that disclosure would “cause substantial harm to the City’s bargaining position on a multi-million dollar long-term transaction.” According to the affidavit, the communications include “critical information” about issues “critical to on-going negotiations” over a landfill gas lease, identify the lease’s “significant provisions” that the City believes “need to be corrected,” and disclose “the mechanics” of how the City “decides how and whether to settle disputes.” The affiant asserts that disclosure of the information would harm the City’s bargaining position in these negotiations and would “prejudice the City in future disputes.” Because the Attorney General did not submit any evidence controverting these factual assertions, the City argues that it established a compelling reason to withhold the information as a matter of law.

The Attorney General disagrees. Consistent with his predecessors’ long-held view that only mandatory confidentiality and harm to a third party can be a compelling reason under section 552.302, the Attorney General argues that harm to the interests of the governmental body that failed to comply with section 552.301 can never qualify as a compelling reason under section 552.302. Compare Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-676 at 12 (2002) (“Harm to the interests of the governmental body that received the request is not a compelling reason.”) with Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-586 at 3 (1991) (stating that the “need of a governmental body, other than the body that has failed to timely seek on open records decision, may, in appropriate circumstances, be a compelling reason for non-disclosure”). According to the Attorney General, protecting the privilege of a party who had the opportunity to claim it but failed to do so cannot constitute a compelling reason because it does nothing to further the purpose of the attorney-client privilege.

I agree with the Attorney General that harm to a third party’s interest can be a compelling reason under section 552.302. In fact, many of the Act’s specific exceptions protect information because a third party has a privacy, proprietary, or other interest in that information. And section 552.305 includes specific provisions to protect a third party’s private interests in otherwise public information. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.305; see also id. § 552.326 (permitting a governmental body to raise exceptions that involve “the property or privacy interests of another person” in a suit filed under the Act even if the governmental body failed to raise those exceptions in its request for the Attorney General’s decision).

But based on section 552.302’s actual language, harm to a governmental body’s own interests can also qualify as a compelling reason. As explained, section 552.302’s plain language permits withholding despite noncompliance not for any specific reason or type of reason, but for any “compelling reason.” Applying the statute’s plain language despite the Attorney General’s longstanding construction to the contrary, see Pretzer v. Motor Vehicle Bd., 138 S.W.3d 908, 914-15 (Tex. 2004) (holding that “neither legislative ratification nor judicial deference to an administrative interpretation can work a contradiction of plain statutory language”), even a noncomplying governmental body’s own interests may qualify as a reason to permit withholding under section 552.302, but only if that reason is “compelling” under the particular facts and circumstances.

In this case, however, the City’s evidence of harm to its own interests, although uncontroverted, fails to provide a compelling reason to withhold the information. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.302; see Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Justiss, 397 S.W.3d 150, 154 (Tex. 2012) (“Evidence that no one disputes does not necessarily establish a fact as a matter of law.”) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005) (“Undisputed evidence and conclusive evidence are not the same— undisputed evidence may or may not be conclusive, and conclusive evidence may or may not be undisputed.”)). Certainly, the City’s affidavit establishes that disclosure of the communications would be likely to result in some harm to the City’s interests. Disclosing communications that identify which lease provisions the City believes to be “critical to the current Lease negotiations” and “critical information” about those provisions would likely weaken the City’s bargaining position to at least some extent and thus potentially cause some harm to the City’s interests. And disclosing “the mechanics” of how the City “decides how and whether to settle disputes” could “prejudice the City in future disputes.”

But other than the affidavit’s broad assertion that the resulting harm would be “substantial,” the City has provided no evidence of the extent of harm the disclosure would cause. The affidavit explains that the City is renegotiating a “multimillion dollar long-term transaction,” but makes no effort to describe the extent to which disclosure would weaken the City’s position or harm the City’s interests. To demonstrate a compelling reason based on an argument that release of public information would harm the governmental body’s interests, the governmental body must provide sufficient facts regarding the nature and extent of the alleged harm to permit the Attorney General or the courts to balance that harm against the public’s interest in prompt access to public information. See, e.g., Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that magistrate did not abuse her discretion in refusing to seal records in light of “the inadequacy of the City’s declarations, which largely make conclusory statements about the content of the documents—that they are confidential and that, in general, their production would, amongst other things, hinder ... future operations with other agencies, endanger informants’ lives, and east [police] officers in a false light. These conclusory offerings do not rise to the level of ‘compelling reasons’ sufficiently specific to bar the public access to the documents.”); see also Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1987) (requiring party seeking protective order against discovery request to show “particular, articulated and demonstrable injury, as opposed to conclusory allegations”).

The City’s vague assertion that release of the information at issue would cause “substantial harm” is insufficient to support the conclusion that the alleged harm creates a compelling reason to withhold the information under section 552.302. See Elizondo v. Krist, 415 S.W.3d 259, 265 (Tex. 2013) (holding that an affidavit was conclusory when there was a “lack of a demonstrable and reasoned basis on which to evaluate [the affiant’s] opinion”). In short, although the City may have established a “good reason” to permit it to withhold the information, it did not establish a compelling one. The City failed to establish that disclosure would cause such harm to the City’s own interests that the need to avoid the harm is so important and urgent that reasonable minds can only conclude that it clearly outweighs the Act’s fundamental policy of ensuring that the public can promptly obtain public information from its governmental bodies.

III.

Conclusion

The Court contends in these eases that the attorney-client privilege is essential and vital to the operation of our judicial system. The Texas Public Information Act agrees, but it exists to promote the “fundamental philosophy” that the public is entitled to promptly access “information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees,” which is essential and vital to our “constitutional form of representative government.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001(a). The Act balances these competing interests by permitting the government to promptly assert its privileges and request the Attorney General’s decision on whether they trigger an exception to the Act’s disclosure requirement and by requiring a compelling reason to withhold even privileged information when a governmental body fails to timely seek the Attorney General’s decision.

Relying on the Act’s plain language, I conclude that a “compelling reason” is one that is so important and urgent that reasonable minds can only conclude that it clearly outweighs the Act’s fundamental policy of ensuring that the public can promptly obtain public information from its governmental bodies. Because the Act requires both that an exception apply and that a compelling reason exist, neither the Act’s exceptions nor the privileges and confidentiality that trigger an exception are sufficient alone to establish a compelling reason. The Act does not support the Attorney General’s position that only certain reasons, or certain types of reasons, can be “compelling,” and instead supports the City’s contention that, under some circumstances, harm to the governmental body’s own interests can present a compelling reason. In these cases, however, the City has failed to demonstrate such harm.

Because the City has failed to demonstrate any compelling reason to withhold the attorney-client communications at issue, the Act requires the City to disclose them. Because the Court holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
      
      . Tex. Const, art. I, § 2.
     
      
      . Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001(a).
     
      
      . See id. §§ 552.101-.1S6.
     
      
      . Id.
      
     
      
      
        . See id. § 552.301.
     
      
      . See id. § 552.302.
     
      
      . See Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1995).
     
      
      . See In re Cty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 418-19 (2d Cir. 2007).
     
      
      . See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005).
     
      
      . Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001(a).
     
      
      . Id. § 552.021,
     
      
      . Id. § 552.002(a) ("Public information” means "information that is written, produced, collected, assembled, or maintained under a law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business” by a governmental body, by its employees or officers in their official capacity if the information pertains to official business of the governmental body, or "for a governmental body” if it owns, has a right of access to, or spends or contributes public money for the purpose of writing, producing, collecting, assembling, or maintaining the information).
     
      
      . Id. § 552.221(a).
     
      
      . Id. § 552.001(a).
     
      
      . Id. §§ 552.101-.156.
     
      
      . Id. § 552.101.
     
      
      . Id. § 552.107.
     
      
      . Id. § 552.120.
     
      
      . E.g., id. §§ 552.102, .114, .115, ,117, .1176, .1235, .124.
     
      
      . Id. § 552.1085.
     
      
      . Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2011).
     
      
      . Tex Gov’t Code § 552.001(a).
     
      
      . Id. § 552.301(a).
     
      
      . Id. § 552.301(b).
     
      
      . Id. § 552.302 (emphasis added).
     
      
      . Id. § 552.321(a).
     
      
      . Id.
      
     
      
      . Id. § 552.3215.
     
      
      . Id. § 552.323(a).
     
      
      . Id. §§ 552.351-.353.
     
      
      . Id. § 552.324(a).
     
      
      
        .Id. § 552.323(b).
     
      
      
        . Id. § 552.107. The evidence and professional-conduct rules “expressly deem certain attorney-client communications to be 'confidential.' ” In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 333 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding). Texas Rule of Evidence 503(a)(5) defines a communication as “confidential” if it is “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” Under Rule 503(b), a client "has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services to the client,” subject to limited exceptions. Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.05(b) imposes a duly of confidentiality and prohibits a lawyer from knowingly revealing confidential information. Rule 1.05(a) defines "[confidential information” to include "privileged information” that is protected by Texas Rule of Evidence 503 and "unprivileged client information.” The Attorney General has ruled that information considered confidential solely under Rule 1.05—including "unprivileged client information”—is not considered confidential under the PIA because Rule 1.05 "permit[s] disclosure of client information ‘[w]hen the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in order to comply with ... other law.’ ” Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. ORD-676 at 2 (2002) (quoting Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 1.05(c)(4)). The Attorney General has thus concluded that "a governmental body's information that is otherwise made confidential solely under rule 1.05 is subject to the rule’s 'other law’ exception to confidentiality when it is requested under the [PIA].” Id. This case does not involve unprivileged information protected from disclosure under Rule 1.05.
     
      
      . Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.101.
     
      
      . The City did not assert a reason for the untimeliness in proceedings below, but at oral argument before this Court, the City's attorney said "we missed the deadlines in both of these instances. It was inadvertence I believe. There’s ... nothing in the record to indicate anything else.” Paxton v. City of Dallas, Oral Arg. No. 15-0073, 2016 WL 4992647, at *6 (Tex. Sept. 14, 2016).
     
      
      . See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.302.
     
      
      . See Tex, Att’y Gen. OR2008-08859 (Hotel case); Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2010-08285 (Landfill case).
     
      
      . According to the Office of the Attorney General, mandatory exceptions include the confidential-by-law exception and those covering information made confidential under the PIA, including sections 552.102 (“Confidentiality of Certain Personnel Information”), .109 ("Confidentiality of Certain Private Communications of an Elected Office Holder”), ,110 ("Confidentiality of Trade Secrets; Confidentiality of Certain Commercial or Financial Information”), .113 ("Confidentiality of Geological or Geophysical Information”), .114 ("Confidentiality of Student Records”), .115 ("Confidentiality of Birth and Death Records”), .117 ("Confidentiality of Certain Addresses ,,. and Personal Family Information”), .118 ("Confidentiality of Official Prescription Program Information”), .119 ("Confidentiality of Certain Photographs of Peace Officers”), .120 ("Confidentiality of Certain Rare Books and Original Manuscripts”), ,121 (“Confidentiality of Certain Documents Held for Historical Research”), .123 ("Confiden- • tiality of Name of Applicant for [CEO] of Institution of Higher Education"), .124 ("Confidentiality of Records of Library or Library System”), ,126 ("Confidentiality of Name of Applicant for Superintendent of public School District”), .131 ("Confidentiality of Certain Economic Development Information”), .133 ("Confidentiality of Public Power Utility Competitive Matters”), .134 ("Confidentiality of Certain Information Relating to Inmate of Department of Criminal Justice”), .135 ("Confidentiality of Certain Information Held by School District”), .136 (“Confidentiality of Credit Card ... Numbers”), .138 ("Confidentiality of Family Violence Shelter Center ... Information”), .139 ("Confidentiality of Government Information Related to Security or Infrastructure Issues for Computers”), .140 ("Confidentiality of Military Discharge Records”), .142 ("Confidentiality of Records Subject to Order of Nondisclosure”), .145 ("Confidentiality of Texas No-Call List”), .148 ("Confidentiality of Certain Personal Information Maintained by Municipality Pertaining to a Minor”), .151 ("Confidentiality of Information Concerning Information Regarding Select Agents”). See Office of the Attorney General, Public Information Handbook 42-43 & n.158 (2016) (citing Act of May 30, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1229, §§ 3-21, 23-26, 28-37).
     
      
      
        .E.g., Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-677 at 10 (2002).
     
      
      . Cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3(d) (actual disclosure of privileged information or materials does not waive the privilege absent disclosure with intent to waive the privilege or failure to claim the privilege within ten days after the party actually discovers the disclosure occurred).
     
      
      . Abbott v. City of Dallas, 453 S.W.3d 580, 587-88 (Tex. App.-Austin 2015).
     
      
      . See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3 ("[T]he court of appeals to which the case is transferred must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis .... ”).
     
      
      . City of Dallas v. Paxton, 2015 WL 601974, at *5 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2015).
     
      
      . In this appeal, we have received amicus curiae briefs from the Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas, which supports the Attorney General’s position; and the Texas Municipal League, Texas City Attorneys Association, and Texas Association of Counties, which are aligned with the City of Dallas.
     
      
      . See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.302.
     
      
      . See id. § 552.001(a) (under the PIA, “each person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees" (emphasis added)); see also Doe v. Tarrant Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 269 S.W.3d 147, 153-54 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.); Simmons v. Kuzmich, 166 S.W.3d 342, 350 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
     
      
      . Because the parties agree the attorney-client exception applies to the requested information, we need not consider whether privileged and confidential attorney-client information is also protected by the confidential-by-law exception. See Tex. Gov't Code §§ 552.101, .107.
     
      
      . See id. §§ 552.301-.302.
     
      
      . TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 2016).
     
      
      . Id.
      
     
      
      . Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001 (demanding liberal construction to implement the state’s policy of open government and to favor disclosing information about governmental affairs).
     
      
      . Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 446 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. 2014).
     
      
      . See, e.g., Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-630 at 3 (1994); Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-552 at 1 (1990); Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-319 at 1-2 (1982); Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-150 at 2 (1977); Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-34 at 2 (1974).
     
      
      . Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-677 at 10 (2002). The PIA expressly prohibits a governmental body from releasing information that is "confidential under law" and imposes criminal liability when a person distributes information that is considered confidential under the PIA. See Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-676 at 2 (2002) (citing Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.007, .352).
     
      
      . See Act of May 25, 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1319, § 21, sec. 552.302, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 4500, 4509; see also Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-630 at 3 (1994); Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-552 at 1 (1990); Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-319 at 1-2 (1982); Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-150 at 2 (1977); Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-34 at 2 (1974).
     
      
      . Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Tex. 2012)).
     
      
      . Sw. Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar, 500 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. 2016); see also Boeing Co. v. Paxton, 466 S.W.3d 831, 838 (Tex. 2015) ("While the Attorney General's interpretation of the [PIA] is entitled to due consideration, as with other administrative statutory constructions, such deference must yield to unambiguous statutory language.”).
     
      
      . Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Tex. 2004) ("If an ambiguous statute that has been interpreted by a court of last resort or given a longstanding construction by a proper administrative officer is re-enacted without substantial change, the Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with that interpretation and to have adopted it.”); see also Pretzer v. Motor Vehicle Bd., 138 S.W.3d 908, 915 (Tex. 2004) (”[N]either legislative ratification nor judicial deference to an administrative interpretation can work a contradiction of plain statutory language.”).
     
      
      . See, e.g., Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 446 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. 2014) (looking to dictionaries, treatises, and state- and federal-court constructions in similar contexts).
     
      
      . The American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2016).
     
      
      . New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010).
     
      
      . Webster's Third New Int’l Dictionary (2002).
     
      
      . Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "compelling need").
     
      
      . State ex rel. Angelini v. Hardberger, 932 S.W.2d 489, 490 (Tex. 1996) (holding exigent circumstances present a compelling reason for this Court to exercise discretion to decide a quo -warranto without prior presentment to the district court).
     
      
      . Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 287, 306 (Tex. 2009); see also Gonzales v. O Centro Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431-32, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006); Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "compelling-state-interest test” as a method "whereby the government's interest in the law and its purpose are balanced against an individual’s constitutional right that is affected by the law”).
     
      
      . Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. 1993).
     
      
      . See, e.g., Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 446 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. 2014).
     
      
      . Rudd Equip. Co. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co., 834 F.3d 589, 593 (6th Cir. 2016) (" ‘[0]nly the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.’ ” (quoting In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983))); U.S. v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2013) (" 'Only the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records that come within the scope of the common-law right of access.’ ” (quoting In re Providence Journal Co., Inc., 293 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002))); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) ('"[Djocu-ments used by parties moving for, or opposing, summary judgment should not remain under seal absent the most compelling reasons.'" (quoting Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982))); Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006) (a party seeking to seal "documents attached to a dispositive motion must meet the high threshold of showing that ‘compelling reasons' support secrecy” (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mnt. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003))).
     
      
      . Rudd Equip., 834 F.3d at 593 (quoting Knoxville, 723 F.2d at 474).
     
      
      . See id. at 594 ("[I]n making this determination, a court must balance the litigants’ privacy interests against the public’s right of access, recognizing our judicial system’s strong presumption in favor of openness.”); Kravetz, 706 F.3d at 59 ("[A] court must carefully balance the presumptive public right of access against the competing interests that are at stake in a particular case.”); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 70 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Decisions on the sealing of judicial documents require a balancing of interests, although the scales tilt decidedly toward transparency.”); Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 ("[Ajfter determining the weight of the presumption of access, the court must 'balance competing considerations against it.’ ” (quoting U.S. v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995))); Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (”[T]he court must ‘conscientiously balance[] the competing interests' of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.” (quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135)).
     
      
      . Cf. Gonzales v. O Centro Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431-32, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006) (recognizing that in applying the compelling-interest test "context matters” and "relevant differences” should be taken into account (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 228, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995))).
     
      
      . See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.302.
     
      
      . Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993).
     
      
      . U.S. v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2002).
     
      
      . U.S. v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1997).
     
      
      . Trammel v. U.S., 445 U.S. 40, 51, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980).
     
      
      . Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 390, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981).
     
      
      . Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 403, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976).
     
      
      . See, e.g., Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 390, 101 S.Ct. 677.
     
      
      . Id. at 389, 101 S.Ct. 677.
     
      
      . In re Cty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005)).
     
      
      . Id. at 418-19.
     
      
      . Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389, 101 S.Ct. 677.
     
      
      . See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1036-37 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he availability of sound legal advice inures to the benefit not only of the client ... but also of the public which is entitled to compliance with the ever growing and increasingly complex body of public law.”).
     
      
      . Guidiville Rancheria of Cal. v. U.S., No. 12-cv-1326 YGR, 2013 WL 6571945, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2013).
     
      
      . Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 534; see also U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 169-70, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (2011) (" ‘The privilege aids government entities and employees in obtaining legal advice founded on a complete and accurate factual picture.' " (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 74 cmt. b (2000))).
     
      
      . Post at 3 (Boyd, L, dissenting).
     
      
      . Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 534.
     
      
      . 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ("The history of [the attorney-client] privilege goes back to the reign of Elizabeth I, where the privilege already appears as unquestioned.” (citing Berd v. Lovelace, Cary 88, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577))).
     
      
      . See Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 64 (3d Cir. 2000).
     
      
      . See Compelling Need, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (a need is “compelling” if it is "so great that irreparable harm ... would result if it is not met”).
     
      
      . See supra n.89.
     
      
      . 28 S.W.3d 511, 512-13 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding).
     
      
      . Id. at 516-20; see also id. at 525 (Brister, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the Court that Ms. Anderson should not be deprived of her property without a compelling reason, but attorney-client confidentiality is a compelling reason.”).
     
      
      . 904 S.W.2d 643, 646-47 (Tex. 1995).
     
      
      . Id. at 647 (emphasis added).
     
      
      
        .See Hanson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. C13-0939JLR, 2013 WL 5674997, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2013) ("Courts generally accept attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine as a ‘compelling reason’ justifying a motion to seal." (citing Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 125)); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Excalibur Reinsurance Corp., No. 11-CV-1209 (CSH), 2013 WL 4012772, at *5 (D. Conn. Aug. 5, 2013) ("[I]t is well-settled within the Second Circuit that the attorney-client privilege may be a sufficiently compelling reason to defeat the public's right of access to judicial documents.’’); Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Centex Homes, No. 11-3638-SC, 2013 WL 707918, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2013) (accepting attorney-client privilege as a compelling reason to allow a party to refile redacted version of document attached to summary-judgment motion); TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. v. Avago Techs. Ltd., No. CV 09-1531-PHX-JAT, 2011 WL 6182346, at *5 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2011) (accepting attorney-client privilege as a compelling reason justifying sealing court records); Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., No. 3:04-CV-703-RAM, 2010 WL 2161930, at *5 (D. Nev. May 28, 2010) (accepting attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine as providing both good cause and a compelling reason to seal nondis-positive and dispositive motions, respectively).
     
      
      . Wilcox v. Bibin, 2:15-CV-00261-EJL-REB, 2016 WL 740396, at *3 (D. Idaho Feb. 24, 2016); see also Rudd Equip. Co. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co., 834 F.3d 589, 594-95 (6th Cir. 2016) (”[0]nly trade secrets, information covered by a recognized privilege (such as the attorney-client privilege), and information required by statute to be maintained in confidence (such as the name of a minor victim of a sexual assault), is typically enough to overcome the presumption of access.” (quoting Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 2002))); Ancier v. Egan, CV No. 14-00294 JMS-RLP, 2015 WL 6757528, at *2 (D. Haw. Nov. 4, 2015) ("Generally, compelling reasons that are sufficient to overcome this strong presumption exist when court filings contain attorney-client communications.” (citing Creative Tent Int’l Inc. v. Kramer, No. CV-15-8005-PCTS-MM, 2015 WL 4638320, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2015))); Guidiville Rancheria of Cal. v. U.S., No. 12-cv-1326 YGR, 2013 WL 6571945, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2013) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege ... establishes compelling reasons for sealing.”).
     
      
      . In re Nationwide Ins. Co., 494 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
     
      
      . See Tex. R. Evid. 511 (a).
     
      
      . Id. 511(b).
     
      
      . 1 McCormick on Evidence § 93 (7th ed. 2013) (emphasis added).
     
      
      . Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3(d); see also Tex. R. Evid. 511(b)(2) ("When made in a Texas state proceeding, an inadvertent disclosure does not operate as a waiver if the holder followed the procedures of Rule of Civil Procedure 193.3(d).”).
     
      
      . In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 439 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.4 cmt. 4 (“The focus is on the intent to waive the privilege, not the intent to produce the material or information. A party who fails to diligently screen documents before producing them does not waive a claim of privilege.”).
     
      
      . See Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.3(d) ("A party who produces material or information without intending .to waive a claim of privilege does not waive that claim under these rules or the Rules of Evidence.”); Tex. R. Evid. 511(b) ("Notwithstanding paragraph (a), the following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to disclosure of a communication or information covered by the lawyer-client privilege or work-product protection.”).
     
      
      . In re M-I L.L.C., 2016 WL 2981342, at *7, 505 S.W.3d 569, 579-80 (Tex. 2016); see Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993) ("In an instance in which the [attorney-client] privilege is being used as a sword rather than a shield, the privilege may be waived.'').
     
      
      . Republic Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d at 163.
     
      
      . See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.0038(f), .008(b), .134(d), .156(d).
     
      
      . Id. § 552.302.
     
      
      . Id. §§ 552.001, .101—.156.
     
      
      . See id. §§ 552.001(a), .021, .301-302.
     
      
      . See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2011); cf. U.S. v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2013) (" ‘Though the public's right of access is vibrant, it is not unfettered. Important countervailing interests can, in given instances, overwhelm the usual presumption and defeat access.' ” (quoting Siedle v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1998))).
     
      
      . Tex. Gov't Code § 552.221(a).
     
      
      . See id. § 552.302.
     
      
      . See, e.g., id. §§ 552.107 (categorically excepting attorney-client privileged information from the statute's public-disclosure requirement), .302 (rebuttably presuming otherwise exempt information is open to the public); cf. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that, although the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) "[did] not itself create a government attorney-client privilegeL) ‘Congress intended that agencies should not lose the protection traditionally afforded through the evidentiary privileges simply because of the passage of FOIA'" (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980))); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 74 (2000) ("Unless applicable law otherwise provides, the attorney-client privilege extends to a communication of a governmental organization ... and of an individual employee or other agent of a governmental organization as a client with respect to his or her personal interest_").
     
      
      . See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 534 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Abrogating the privilege undermines that culture and thereby impairs the public interest."); cf. U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 169, 131 S.Ct. 2313, 180 L.Ed.2d 187 (2011) (“[T]he objectives of the attorney-client privilege apply to governmental clients.”); Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 533 ("There is, then, substantial authority for the view that the rationale supporting the attorney-client privilege applicable to private entities has general relevance to governmental entities as well.”); Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 602 (6th Cir. 2005) ("We see no reason that [the] function [of promoting full and frank communications and encouraging observance of law] is no longer served simply because the corporation is a municipality or, more broadly, that the organization or agency is a government entity. Governments must not only follow the laws, but are under additional constitutional and ethical obligations to their citizens. The privilege helps insure that conversations between municipal officials and attorneys will be honest and complete. In so doing, it encourages and facilitates the fulfillment of those obligations.”); 8 John H. Wig-more, Evidence § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ("The policy of the privilege has been plainly grounded since the latter part of the 1700s .... In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client’s consent.”).
     
      
      . Tex. Gov't Code § 552.324(a)(2).
     
      
      , In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("We may assume that if the government attorney-client privilege does not apply in certain contexts this may chill some communications between government officials and government lawyers.”).
     
      
      . In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 333 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding).
     
      
      . See Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (“[The attorney-client] privilege ‘is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.’ ” (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470, 9 S.Ct. 125, 32 L.Ed. 488 (1888))); In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“We may assume that if the government attorney-client privilege does not apply in .certain contexts this may chill some communications between government officials and government lawyers.”); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (when "the Government is dealing with its attorneys as would any private party seeking advice to protect personal interests,” it “needs the same assurance of confidentiality so it will not be deterred from full and frank communications with its counselors”); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The policy objective of [the attorney-client] privilege is certainly consistent with the policy objective of [an exemption] intended to protect the quality of agency decision-making by preventing the disclosure requirement ofl the [Freedom of Information Act] from cut ing off the flow of information to agency decision-makers. Certainly this covers professional advice on legal questions which bears on those decisions. The opinion of even the finest attorney, however, is no better than the information which his client provides. In order to ensure that a client receives the best possible legal advice, based on a full and frank discussion with his attorney, the attorney-client privilege assures him that confidential communications to his attorney will not be disclosed without his consent.”).
     
      
      . E.g., Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.321 (request- or or attorney general suit for writ of mandamus), .3215 (action for declaratory or injunc-tive relief against a governmental body for violating the PIA), .323 (fee-shifting provisions favoring substantially prevailing plaintiffs).
     
      
      . See id. §§ 552.321, A215, .323.
     
      
      . Id. § 552.001 (demanding liberal construction to implement the state’s policy of open government and to favor disclosing information about governmental affairs).
     
      
      . See id. § 552.302. In light of this holding, we need not address the City’s alternative argument that "substantial harm” to its bargaining position constitutes a "compelling reason” for withholding the requested information.
     
      
      . Post at 36-37 (Boyd, J., dissenting) ("Because the Act requires both that an exception apply and that a compelling reason exist, neither the Act’s exceptions nor the privileges and confidentiality that trigger an exception are sufficient alone to establish a compelling reason.”); id. at 30 (”[N]either an exception nor the interests it supports can independently qualify as a compelling reason that outweighs the public’s interest in prompt access to public information under the Act.”), But see id. at 33 n.20 (agreeing the Court could consider the " 'policy of preventing bioterrorism’ ” that underlies section 552.152’s exception from public disclosure "when deciding whether a compelling reason exists”).
     
      
      
        .Id. at 33-34.
     
      
      . See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.151, .152.
     
      
      . The dissent's claim to "acknowledge the privilege's importance” falls flat because the analysis does not recognize or evaluate the interests underlying the privilege in declaring those interests are necessarily overcome by delay and necessarily overpowered by the public’s interest in promptness. Post at 3 n. 1, 30 (Boyd, J., dissenting). The dissent, instead, relies on the circular argument that the Legislature excepted privileged information from disclosure to protect important interests, but those interests cannot be "compelling reason[s] to withhold information from disclosure” because the Legislature excepted privileged information from disclosure to the public. See id. at 16-17.
     
      
      . Id. at 16.
     
      
      . See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.106(a) (excepting from mandatory disclosure "a draft or working paper involved in the preparation of proposed legislation”), .122 (excepting from mandatory disclosure a test item developed by an educational agency funded by state revenue, a licensing agency, or a governmental body).
     
      
      . Post at 13 (complaining that "the Court can provide no statutory basis for deciding when the interests that an exception protects are categorically compelling and when they are not”).
     
      
      . Id. at 30. The dissent intimates that an untimely request for an attorney general decision equates to "failure to timely and properly assert the [attorney-client] privilege.” Id. While it is true that, in this case, the City did not timely and properly assert a statutory exception to disclosure, the City has jealously guarded its attorney-client privilege, asserting it as a “compelling reason to withhold the information" from disclosure. There is no statutory deadline for asserting the attorney-client privilege or for claiming a "compelling reason to withhold the information.”
     
      
      . Id. at 31.
     
      
      . Id. at 3, 26-29.
     
      
      . Id. at 14 & n.11.
     
      
      . See supra, nn.88-92.
     
      
      . See supra, nn.81-88, 116.
     
      
      . 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ("The history of [the attorney-client] privilege goes back to the reign of Elizabeth I, where the privilege already appears as unquestioned.” (citing Berd v. Lovelace, Cary 88, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577))).
     
      
      . See, e.g., post at 2-3 (Boyd, J., dissenting) ("Under the Court’s holding, establishing the exception will always constitute a compelling reason .... obliterating] the sole method by which the Act compels the government to timely and properly assert the attorney-client privilege.”).
     
      
      . Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch, Law’s Irony, 37 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 743, 752-53 (2014).
     
      
      . Post at 1-3, 6-8,
     
      
      . Contrary to the Court's assertion, I do not "dismiss[] the importance of the privilege in the government context as mere hyperbole." Ante at 260. I acknowledge the privilege’s importance, just as the Act does by excepting privileged attorney-client communications from its disclosure requirement. What I find hyperbolic is the Court’s suggestion that governmental bodies will stop relying on legal advice unless we hold that the privilege is itself a compelling reason to withhold information when a governmental body fails to timely and properly assert the exception. As discussed below, history has proven otherwise.
     
      
      . It is undisputed that the government’s attorney-client communications are "public information” under the Act. "Public information” includes all information "that is written, produced, collected, assembled, or maintained under a law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business,” either (1) by a governmental body, (2) for a governmental body, if the governmental body owns the information, has a right of access to the information, or "spends or contributes public money for the purpose of writing, producing, collecting, assembling, or maintaining the information,” or (3) "by an individual officer or employee of a governmental body in the officer’s or employee’s official capacity and the information pertains to official business of the governmental body.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.002(a).
     
      
      . It is undisputed that the City of Dallas is a governmental body under the Act. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.003(l)(A)(iii) (including in definition of “governmental body” "a municipal governing body in the state").
     
      
      . The Court criticizes the Attorney General for taking a “constrained” and “restrictive” view of the statutory language,” ante at 257, 270, yet that is exactly what the Act instructs the Attorney General and this Court to do.
     
      
      . While the Court acknowledges that the Act imposes a deadline for asserting a "statutory exception,” it contends that there is "no statutory deadline for asserting the attorney-client privilege.” Ante at 269 n.132. To the contrary, section 552.301 imposes both a ten-day deadline for asserting the applicable exception and a fifteen-day deadline for asserting the reason the exception applies. Here, the City missed both deadlines, and thus failed to timely and properly assert the privilege, regardless of how "jealously” it has attempted to guard the privilege thereafter.
     
      
      . At oral argument before this Court, the City’s attorney asserted that the City simply "missed the deadlines in both of these instances. It was inadvertence, I believe. There’s ... nothing in the record to indicate anything else."
     
      
      . Similarly, Black’s defines “compel” as to "cause or bring about by force, threats, or overwhelming pressure” and—within the legal context—to "convince (a court) that there is only one possible resolution of a legal dispute.” Compel, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
     
      
      . Consistent with their common, ordinary meanings, Texas statutes repeatedly use the terms "compel” and "compelling” to refer to court orders, subpoenas, statutes, and other authorities that effectively demand and require their intended result. See, e.g., Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 15.10(g)(5)(E) (referring to court order "compelling” oral testimony); .13(a), (b), (d) (same); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.021(c) (referring to court order "compelling” arbitration); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46C. 104(a) (referring to court order "compelling” testimony); Tex. Elec. Code §§ 221.009(a) (referring to court order "compelling” voter to reveal vote); 231.006 (referring to subpoena "compelling” production of election records); Tex. Est. Code § 309.056(c)(3) (referring to order compelling production of estate inventory); Tex. Fam. Code § 157.372 (referring to court order "compelling” return of kidnapped child); Tex. Fin. Code §§ 35.204(a) (referring to court order "compelling” compliance with subpoena); 185.203(a) (same); Tex. Gov't Code § 33.023(d) (referring to court order "compelling” judge to submit to physical or mental examination); Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 12.002(b) (referring to court order "compelling” compliance with statutory requirements); 314.003(a) (referring to court order "compelling” compliance with civil investigative demand); Tex. Ins. Code §§ 823.35l(b—1) (referring to court order "compelling” witness testimony or production of documents); 4201.601 (referring to commissioner's order "compel[ling]” production of information); Tex. Loc. Govt. Code §§ 54.044(b), (c) (referring to orders "compelling” testimony and production of documents); 325.089 (referring to court order "compelling” compliance with bond requirements); Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 86.001 (referring to statute’s purpose of “compelling” ratable production of natural gas); Tex. Occ. Code § 1702.367(a) (referring to subpoena "compelling” testimony of witness or production of documents); Tex. Prop. Code § 114.008(a)(3) (referring to court order "compel[ling]” trustee to pay money or restore property); Tex. Transp. Code §§ 284.204(b)(2) (referring to order "compelling” attendance of witnesses and production of documents); 682.005 (same); 707.009 (same); 730.007(c)(2) (referring to subpoena "compelling” production of photographic image); Tex. Water Code §§ 54.016(g) (referring to court order "restraining, compelling or requiring” district to comply with consent agreement); 65.513 (referring to court order "compelling” district to comply with bond conditions); 66.319 (same).
     
      
      . Although the City acknowledges that the rules of evidence currently provide the basis for the confidentiality of attorney-client communications, see generally Tex, R. Evid. 503, it contends that the rules merely codify judicial decisions that first recognized the attorney-client privilege as a matter of common law. See In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex. 2001) (explaining that the “rules of procedure and evidence, as well as the statutes that preceded them, have embodied work-product and attorney-client privileges that have long been part of the common law”). Thus, according to tire City, attorney-client communications are "considered confidential by law” that exists "by judicial decisions,” and thus section 552.101 applies and excepts them from the Act's disclosure requirement. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.101.
     
      
      . If, for example, the facts establish that requested information is in a government employee’s personnel file and its "disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” section 552.102 excepts it from the Act's disclosure requirement. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.102(a). If the information relates to "litigation of a civil or criminal nature to which the state or a political subdivision is or may be a party,” section 552.103 excepts it from disclosure, Id. § 552.103(a). And if the information "deals with” the “prosecution of crime” and its release would "interfere with” that prosecution, section 552.108 excepts it from disclosure. Id. § 552.108(a).
     
      
      . Texas Attorneys General have repeatedly held that a compelling reason exists only if either (1) the information is subject to "mandatory” confidentiality, or (2) release of the information would implicate or harm a third party’s interests. See, e.g., Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-676 at 1 (2002); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op, ORD-630 at 2 (2002); Tex, Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-150 at 2 (1977). But the Act’s plain language limits the qualifying reasons not to any specific reasons or types of reasons, but to any reason that is “compelling.”- We cannot judicially amend this plain language to limit the Act’s scope, despite the Attorney General’s office’s longstanding practice of doing so.
     
      
      . See Tex. Gov't Code §§ 552.102 (certain personnel information); .1081 (certain information regarding those who participate in the execution of a convict); .1085 (sensitive crime scene images); .109 (certain private "correspondence or communications of an elected office holder”); .110 (trade secrets and certain commercial or financial information); .113 (geological or geophysical information); .114 (student records); .115 (birth and death records); .117 ("certain addresses, telephone numbers, social security numbers, and personal family information”); .1175 (certain personal identifying information of peace officers, county jailers, and others); .1176 (certain information regarding members of tire State Bar); .118 ("information on or derived from an official prescription form or electronic prescription record filed with the Texas State Board of Pharmacy”); .119 (certain photographs of peace officers); .120 (certain rare books and original manuscripts); .121 (certain documents held for historical research); .123 (the name of an applicant for chief executive officer of an institution of higher education); .1235 (the identity of a private donor to an institution of higher education); .124 (the records of a library or library system); .126 (the name of an applicant for superintendent of a public school district); .127 (personal information relating to participants in a neighborhood crime watch organization); .128 (certain information submitted by a potential vendor or contractor); .129 (certain motor-vehicle inspection information); .130 (certain motor-vehicle records); .131 (certain economic-development information); .132 (crime victim or claimant information); .1325 (certain information in a crime-victim impact statement); .133 (public power utility competitive matters); .134 (certain information relating to an inmate of the Department of Criminal Justice); .135 (certain information held by a school district); .136 (credit card, debit card, charge card, and access device numbers); .137 (certain email addresses); .138 (information regarding a family violence shelter, victims of trafficking shelter center, or sexual assault program); .139 (information related to security or infrastructure issues for computers); .140 (military discharge records); .141 (information in an application for a marriage license); .142 (records subject to a nondisclosure order); .143 (certain investment information); .145 (the Texas no-call list); .146 (certain communications with legislative budget board employees); .147 (social security numbers); .148 (certain personal information maintained by a municipality pertaining to a minor); .149 (records that the comptroller or an appraisal district received from a private entity); .150 (information that could compromise the safety of a hospital district officer or employee); .151 (information regarding select bioterrorism agents); .152 (information concerning the personal safety of a public employee or officer); .155 (certain property tax appraisal photographs); .156 (continuity of operations plans).
     
      
      . Many other provisions impose similar time deadlines that apply in specific circumstances. See, e.g., id. §§ 552.008(b-2) (requiring Attorney General to establish briefing deadlines for disputes involving information sought for legislative purposes and to decide such disputes “not later than the 45th business day after the date the attorney general received the request for a decision”); .024(c-1) (same for disputes over redacted information regarding government employees); .130(d) (same for redacted information regarding motor vehicle records); .136(d) (same for redacted information regarding credit cards and similar access cards); .138(d) (same for redacted information regarding family violence and sexual assaults); see also id. §§ 552.1085(f) (requiring government to notify next of kin regarding a request for a sensitive crime scene image not "later than the 10th business day after” the government receives the request); . 1175(g) (same for disputes over redacted information regarding peace officers, judges, and others); .269(a) (requiring government to “promptly” adjust the amount charged for copies of information in accordance with the Attorney General's determination).
     
      
      . See also Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 123 (“Our public access cases and those in other circuits emphasize the importance of immediate access where a right to access is found.”) (emphasis added); Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 664 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that the public interest in access to public information "encompasses the public’s ability to make a contemporaneous review of the basis of an important decision of the district court”) (emphasis added); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1310 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The presumption of access normally involves a right of contemporaneous access.”) (emphasis added).
     
      
      . The Court asserts that, when the government itself is the client whose communications are at issue, the privilege applies with “special force" because it protects the public’s interest by encouraging government officials to seek legal advice when formulating public policy and conducting government business "on behalf of the public.” Ante at 260 (quoting In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 2007)). But the Court ignores that when the government asserts the privilege, the presumption that favors the public’s interest in prompt access is equally accentuated. See Standard Fin. Mgmt., 830 F.2d at 410 (noting that the “appropriateness of making court files accessible is accentuated in cases where the government is a party”); In re Application of Nat’l Broad. Co., 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The presumption is especially strong in a case ... where the evidence shows the actions of public officials.”). Just as the government ultimately acts on behalf of the public, the information it possesses belongs to the public, and the public, "in delegating [that] authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001(a). Instead, the people, acting through their elected legislators, have decided whether to grant governmental bodies the right to claim the attorney-client privilege as a basis for concealing the public's information from the public. As a result, certain "limitations to the government attorney-client privilege ... may render an otherwise pro-tectable communication unprotected." Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d at 418 n.5.
     
      
      . See also ante at 277 (holding that the privilege protects interests that are "independently compelling reasons to withhold privileged information unless confidentiality has been waived”).
     
      
      . Contrast Tex. Gov't Code §§ 552.0038(f) (providing that an individual "waives the confidentiality” of records held by a public retirement system if the records become "part of the public record of an administrative or judicial proceeding related to a contested case”); .008(b) (providing that a governmental body that releases information to a legislative member, agency, or committee “does not waive or affect the confidentiality of the information” or "waive the right to assert exceptions to required disclosure of the information in the future”); .134(d) (providing that the release of the information regarding a prison inmate to certain eligible entities for law-enforcement purposes "does not waive the right to assert in the future that the information is excepted from required disclosure”); .156(d) (providing that the disclosure of information regarding an agency’s continuity of operations plan "to another governmental body or a federal agency ... does not waive or affect the confidentiality of that information”); see also id. § 552.326(a) (providing generally that "the only exceptions a governmental body may raise in a suit filed under [the Act] are exceptions that the governmental body properly raised” in its request for the Attorney General’s decision).
     
      
      . The Court incorrectly declares that I "repudiate” the "underlying rationale” of this construction of section 552.302. Ante at 269, To be clear, I do not agree with the Attorneys General's long-held conclusion that only two reasons (mandatory confidentiality and harm to a third party) can ever be compelling, see supra n. 11, but I do agree with their holding that the mere fact that information is attorney-client privileged does not constitute a compelling reason under section 552.302.
     
      
      . See also, e.g., Tex. Att’y Gen, Op. OR2016-26762 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-26708 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-26782 at 2 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-26355 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-26022 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-25036 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-24517 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-24334 at 2 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen, Op. OR2016-23955 at 2 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-23689 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-23232 at 2 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op, OR2016-22178 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-21609 at 2 (2016); Tex, Att'y Gen. Op. OR2016-20676 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-19742 at 2 (2016); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2016-16274 at 2 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-15596 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-13176 at 2 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-11856 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-09021 at 2 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-06110 at 2 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-04321 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-03008 at 1 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2016-00799 at 2 (2016); Tex. Att’y Gen, Op. OR2015-27069 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-26538 at 2 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-26325 at 2 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-23096 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2015-22782 at 1(2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-21206 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-21273 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-21250 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-20022 at 2 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-19528 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-18374 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-16995 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2015-16428 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2Ó15-11264 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-11026 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-10858 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-09177 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-08783 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-08104 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-07847 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-06823 at 1 (2015); Tex, Att'y Gen. Op. OR2015-06582 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2015-06121 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2015-05774 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-05223 at 2 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-04386 at 2 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-04356 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2015-03323 at 2 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-01280 at 1 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2015-00851 at 2 (2015); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-22569 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-20386 at 2 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-18679 at 2 (2014); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2014-17855 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-16893 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-16682 at 2 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-16253 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-16253 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2014-12075 at 2 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-12072 at 2 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-11614 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-11382 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-11296 at 2 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-10699 at 2 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-10477 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen, Op. OR2014-10424 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-08748 at 3 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-07913 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2014-07208 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen, Op. OR2014-06251 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op, OR2014-05700 at 2 (2014); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2014-04581 at 3 (2014); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2014-04344 at 2 (2014); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2014-04134 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2014-03504 at 2 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen, Op. OR2014-00789 at 1 (2014); Tex. Att’y Gen, Op. OR2014-00816 at 1 (2014); Tex, Att’y Gen. Op. OR2013-17978 at 1 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2013-17964 at 1 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2013-17799 at 1 (2013); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2013-15173 at 3 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op, OR2013-14328 at 1 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2013-13319 at 3 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2Q13-13170 at 2 (2013); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op, OR2013-12677 at 1 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2013-12690 at 1 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2013-12142 at 2 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2013-09446 at 3 (2013);Tex. Att’y Gen. Op, OR2013-09181 at 1 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2013-08067 at 1 (2013); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2013-07113 at 1 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2013-05127 at 1 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2013-03626 at 2 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2013-03522 at 2 (2013); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2013-03235 at 2 (2013); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2013-01354 at 1 (2013); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2013-01014 at 2 (2013); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2012-19685 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Óp. OR2012-18133 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2012-16940 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-16170 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-13326A at 2 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op, OR2012-15343 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2012-15268 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-14586 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen, Op. OR2012-14409 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-13949 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-13326 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-12032 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-11953 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-11243 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-10820 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2012-09574 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-09465 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-09387 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-09099 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-08205 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2012-07757 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-07651 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-07149 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-06193 at 1 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-05813 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-04159 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-02452 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-01807 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-00156 at 2 (2012); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2012-18915 at 3 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-18675 at 3 (2011); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2011-17569 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-12747 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-11066 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2011-10068 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-09673 at 2 (2011); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2011-09143 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen, Op. OR2011-08740 at 2 (2011); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2011-08057 at 2 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-07794 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-07237 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2011-07013 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2011-05559 at 2 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-05534 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-04966 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-04326 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2011-03582 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-03393 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-02463 at 2 (2011); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2011-02189 at 2 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-02059 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. . Op. OR2011-02091 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2011-01280 at 1 (2011); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-18214 at 2 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-17492 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-16966 at 2 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-16999 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-15391 at 2 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-15134 at 2 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-15140 at 1 (2010); Tex, Att'y Gen. Op. OR2010-14576 at 2 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-13943 at 2 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-11553 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-10853 at 2 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-08618 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-07143 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-05908 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-05699 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-05549 at 2 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-05341 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-05203 at 2 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-03923 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-02743 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-02297 at 2 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-01967 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-00243 at 2 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-00016 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2010-00062 at 1 (2010); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2009-18436 at 2 (2009); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2009-15185 at 1 (2009); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2009-14597 at 2 (2009); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2009-13743 at 1 (2009); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2009-12873 at 2 (2009); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2009-12565 at 1 (2009); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2009-10849 at 1 (2009); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2009-10866 at 1 (2009); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2009-08065 at 1 (2009); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2009-06730 at 1 (2009); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2009-02170 at 1 (2009); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2009-01585 at 1 (2009); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2009-00918 at 1 (2009); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2008-17126 at 2 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-16977 at 1 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-14701 at 2 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-14129 at 1 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-13367 at 1 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-11612 at 2 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-11260 at 1 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-10164 at 1 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-10171 at 1 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-09698 at 2 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-08426 at 1 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-05855 at 2 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-03729 at 2 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op, OR2008-03147 at 2 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-02997 at 2 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-02110 at 1 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2008-02077 at 2 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-01735 at 2 (2008); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-16841 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-16838 at 2 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-14762 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-14425 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2007-14260 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-13579 at 2 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-13435 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-13034 at 2 (2007); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2007-12910 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-12216 at 2 (2007); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2007-11453 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2007-10261 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-08692 at 2 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-08545 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2007-08534 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen, Op. OR2007-08052 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-07987 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2007-07391 at 2 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-07094 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-03551 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-03314 at 2 (2007); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2007-01788 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-01354 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-00794 at 2 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-00553 at 1 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2007-00089 at 2 (2007); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-14584 at 2 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-14471 at 2 (2006); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2006-13750 at 1 (2006); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. QR2006-13055 at 3 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-12538 at 2 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-11676 at 1 (2006); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2006-11681 at 1 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-09007 at 1 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-08109 at 1 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-07273 at 1 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-06054 at 1 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-04800 at 1 (2006); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2006-03925 at 1 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-03295 at 1 (2006); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2006-02743 at 2 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-02636 at 2 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-02437 at 1 (2006); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2006-02336 at 1 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-01599 at 2 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2006-01128 at 2 (2006); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2006-00587 at 2 (2006); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-11717 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-11546 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-10765 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-10610 at 2 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-09046 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-06144 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2005-05286 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-04375 at 2 (2005); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2005-03084 at 2 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-02932 at 2 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-02357 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-02011 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-01591 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-01523 at 2 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-01008 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-00970 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-00421 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-00133 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2005-00160 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att'y Gen, Op. OR2005-00161 at 1 (2005); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-10810 at 2 (2004); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2004-10065 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2004-9644 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-9141 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-8699 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-8417 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2004-8147 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-7620 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-7216 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-7217 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-7153 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-7128 at 2 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-7074 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-6806 at 1 (2004); Tex, Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-6666 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-5123 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-3078 at 2 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2004-1989 at 1 (2004); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2003-9171 at 2 (2003); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2003-8737 at 1 (2003); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2003-8256 at 4 (2003); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2003-8244 at 2 (2003); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2003-6540 at 1 (2003); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2003-4062 at 3 (2003); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2003-3039 at 2 (2003); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2002-3115 at 1 (2002); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2002-0368 at 2 (2002); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2001-0888 at 1 (2001); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2000-4670 at 2 (2000); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2000-3950 at 1 (2000); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR2000-2582 at 1 (2000); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2000-0359 at 3 (2000); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2000-0079 at 1 (2000); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR1999-3 681 at 1 (1999); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR1999-3088 at 1 (1999); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. OR1999-0975 at 1 (1999); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR1995-1197 at 2 (1995).
     
      
      . Although I agree that a third party’s interests can constitute a compelling reason under section 552.302, I do not agree that a third party’s interests will always provide a compelling reason. As explained above, the determination of whether a compelling reason exists must depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. Thus, to respond to the Court’s concern that it should be permitted to consider a "substantial threat of physical harm" to an employee or the "policy of preventing bioterrorism’’ when deciding whether a compelling reason exists, see ante at 268, I agree that the Court should consider such facts, just as it should consider the harm that would result from disclosing attorney-client communications, but it must consider those in light of all the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
     
      
      . See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.102(a) (excepting information in a personnel file when its disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); .104 (certain information related to competition or bidding); .109 (information when release would "constitute an invasion of privacy”); .1081 ("identifying” information regarding persons who participate in a convict’s execution); .1085 (sensitive crime scene images); .109 (certain private correspondence or communications of an elected office holder); .110 (third party’s trade secrets and commercial or financial information); .114 (students’ education records); .115 (birth and death records); .117 (certain persons’ addresses, telephone numbers, social security numbers, and personal family information), .1175 (certain persons' personal identifying information); .1176 (certain persons’ home addresses, home telephone numbers, electronic mail addresses, social security numbers, and birth dates); .123 (the name of an applicant for chief executive officer of an institution of higher education); .1235 (the identity of a private donor to an institution of higher education); .126 (the name of an applicant for superintendent of a public school district); .127 (personal information of participants in a neighborhood crime watch organization); .132 (information regarding crime victims); .136 (credit card, debit card, charge card, and access device numbers); .137 (certain email addresses); .138 (information regarding a family violence shelter, victims of trafficking shelter center, or sexual assault program); .140 (militaiy discharge records); .141 (information in an application for a marriage license); .147 (social security numbers); .148 (certain personal information pertaining to a minor); .149 (certain records received from a private entity); .154 (the name of an applicant for certain executive positions of the Teacher Retirement System).
     