
    Larriante SUMBRY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Cecil DAVIS, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 03-1429.
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 3, 2003.
    
    Decided Dec. 8, 2003.
    Rehearing Denied Dec. 30, 2003.
    Larrianté J. Sumbry, Indiana State Prison, Michigan City, IN, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    David L. Steiner, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for RespondentAppellee.
    Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary, and the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).
    
   Order

Indiana law provides that inmates who engage in frivolous or harassing litigation may be penalized by a reduction in good-time credits. (There is a similar, though little-used, provision in federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1932.) The state deprived Larrianté Sumbry of 120 days’ good-time credit after determining that he had engaged in frivolous litigation. Sumbry sought federal collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, contending that the state had violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment (applied to the states via the fourteenth amendment) by adding together two 60-day deprivations, each stemming from a separate conduct report, to yield the 120-day total. Sumbry contended that the two conduct reports stemmed from a single incident, so that he had been subjected to multiple punishments. The district court denied his petition.

Sumbry’s theory would be incorrect even if this were a criminal prosecution. As long as there is only one proceeding, and hence one “jeopardy,” there is no restriction on cumulative sentences. Whether a legislature provides that bank robbery will be punished by one 20-year sentence, or two consecutive 10-year sentences, is unimportant, as they come to the same thing. See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983); Albemaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691-92, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). But there is a deeper problem. Administrative actions with respect to good-time credits are not criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Superintendent of Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985); Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 105 S.Ct. 2192, 85 L.Ed.2d 553 (1985). How long the state may require a person to serve is fixed by the judgment of conviction; later events, such as good-time credits, parole, and pardon, may reduce that time, but the calculation of these reductions is not a new “jeopardy” for constitutional purposes. That is why a person who commits a new crime while on probation or parole may be criminally prosecuted following the revocation of that status; the revocation affects how much time is served on the original sentence but is not a new (or any) “jeopardy” with respect to the new crime. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980); Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150 (7th Cir. 1994). Just so with good-time credits. See Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir.1996). Thus the double jeopardy clause is irrelevant to Sumbry’s situation.

Affirmed  