
    Kofi ADJEHOUN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-3950.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 14, 2014.
    Theodore A. Vialet, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Jennifer P. Williams, Senior Litigation Counsel; Colette J. Winston, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, DENNY CHIN, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Kofi Adjehoun, a native and citizen of Togo, seeks review of a September 18, 2012, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Kofi Adjehoun, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Sept. 13, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Adjehoun’s motion to reopen, filed in 2012, was untimely because he was ordered removed in absentia in 2002.

Adjehoun contends, however, that the time period for filing his motion to reopen should have been tolled due to his prior counsel’s ineffective assistance. Under the doctrine of equitable tolling, ineffective assistance of counsel may toll the time limitation on a motion to reopen where the movant has exercised “due diligence” in pursuing his claim. See Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir.2008). However, the movant is required to exercise due diligence both before and after he has or should have discovered the alleged ineffective assistance. See id. at 132; Iavorski v. U.S. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir.2000).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely for failure to exercise due diligence throughout the entire period sought to be tolled. See Rashid, 533 F.3d at 130; Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233-34 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). Indeed, Adjehoun acknowledged in his motion to reopen that he “did not do anything for awhile” after the denial of his motion to rescind and reopen in November 2002. Adjehoun’s representation-that he relied on his second attorney’s advice that nothing could be done to pursue his case for approximately eight years before consulting with his current attorney for unspecified reasons on an unspecified date — is insufficient to demonstrate that he diligently pursued his claim. See Rashid, 533 F.3d at 132-33; see also Jian Hua Wang v. BIA 508 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Adjehoun did not merit equitable tolling. See Kaur, 413 F.3d at 233-34.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  