
    ALLAN RUTHERFORD v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 17062.
    Decided November 28, 1892.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    A soldier dies a natural death in Illinois. On a petition by creditors the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia appoints the claimant administrator. The only asset set forth is the cause of action against the United States, the subject of this suit.
    I. The Supremo Court of the District of Columbia is without jurisdiction to grant letters of ancillary administration unless there be local assets within the District.
    II. Where it is alleged in the petition of foreign creditors that the deceased was a soldier who died a natural death in the State of Illinois, and he is desorbed in the letters as “late of Ghioago, III.,” it must be held that the District court found the decedent to have been domiciled in that State.
    III. A claim against the United States which can be prosecuted in this court is not a local asset upon which the Supreme Court of the District can take jurisdiction.
    
      The Reporters1 statement of the case:
    No findings of fact were filed by the court in this case, it going off on a motion of the defendant to dismiss upon grounds which are discussed in the opinion of the court.
    
      Mr. Henry M. Foote (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney - General Cotton) for the motion.
    
      Mr. George A. King opposed:
    The residence and estate of Quinn were both in the District of Columbia. He never had a residence outside of the Army of the United States, and the accidental fact that he was stationed in Illinois at the time of his death gave him no domicile or residence in that State. The official residence of the Army must necessarily be the seat of Government, where its headquarters are located. The temporary service of an officer or soldier gives no domicile or residence in the place where he happens to be stationed. (Wharton on Conflict of Laws, § 50.)
    His estate, too, was in the District of Columbia. The Treasury of the United States, in which by law the moneys of the United States are kept, and where all claims against the United States are to be finally adjusted and settled, is situated within the District. (CooJceY. United States, 91 U. S. R., 389, 398, 399.)
    . The Supreme Court of this District is the only one authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction by the writ of mandamus or other proceeding against an officer as such, over heads of Executive Departments and other ministerial officers of the United States. {McIntyre v. Wood,, 7 Cranch, 504; MeGlnng v. Silliman, 6 Wheat., 598; Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet., 524; United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. R., 378; Butterworth v. Rill, 111, U. S. R., 128.)
    The construction of all official bonds, contracts, and other obligations entered into with the Government is governed by the laws in force at the seat of Government, and not elsewhere. {Cox v. United States, 6 Pet., 172; Duncan v. United States, 7 Pet., 435.)
    “Personal property,” says Judge Cooper, of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, “ whether of a tangible or intangible character is considered as located, for the purposes of administration, in the territory of that State whose laws must furnish the remedies for its reduction to possession.” {Speed v. Kelly, 59 Miss., 47, 51, cited 1 Woerner on Administration, sec. 205. See also New England Company v. Woodworth, 111 U. S., 138.)
   RiohakdsoN, Ch. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant’s intestate had a claim of $708 against the United States due to him as a soldier in the Army as stated, since his decease, by the Second Auditor of the Treasury. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a special term of orphans’ court business, appointed the claimant administrator of the estate of the deceased, and he brings this action.

The only question of law involved is whether or not the District Court had jurisdiction to grant letters of administration.

Tbe petition for such, appointment, by six creditors of Illinois, alleges that: Edward B. Quinn, late a first sergeant of Company E, Fifteenth regiment United States Infantry died a natural death at Chicago, State of Illinois, on or about October 5, 1890;” and the claimant was appointed administrator of Edward B. Quinn, late of Chicago, III.” It does not appear, by the records, that the District Court found that the deceased had any other assets than this claim against the United States, as the petition does not so allege while it does mention this claim specially as a foundation for the jurisdiction. Nor does it appear that there were any creditors in the District whose claims were required to be first satisfied.

It seems then, that the court found the deceased to be domiciled in Illinois and granted ancillary administration on his estate by reason of the claim against the United States and for the sole benefit of Illinois creditors.

In the case of the administrator of Kerwin Wilson, just decided, we have held that a claim against the United States is not a local asset by virtue of which alone the Supreme Court of the District can take jurisdiction to issue ancillary letters of administration.

It is alleged in the petition to this court that the deceased was a foreigner, a soldier in the Army, and never had any fixed or settled domicile in the United States, and so it is argued that it is in this District that the principal administration on his estate may be granted. If these allegations had been made in the petition for the appointment and the court which acted thereon had found the facts so to be, the claimant’s contention might be sustained. We have no means of knowing upon what evidence the District Court acted, and the allegations now made contradict its record designating the deceased as late of Chicago, HI., which in Raborg’s Administrator (2 Harris and Gill, 49) cited and quoted in Eslin’s Case (22 C. Cls. R., 163) the Maryland court of appeals held could not be done.

The Treasury Department refused to pay the claim to the present claimant on the ground that his appointment was void for want of jurisdiction in the court by which it was granted.

The petition must be dismissed.

Nott, J., did not sit in this case but agreed in the conclusion of the court.  