
    
      Julius C. Monet, President of the Board of Police of Harrison County, vs. Benjamin Jones, Clerk of the Probate Court of said county.
    The constitution of this state, which (Art. 4, § 20) gives to the boards of police, “ full jurisdiction over roads, highways, ferries, and bridges, and all other matters of county police,” does not, under the clause, “ matters of county police,” confer the right on boards of police to locate the seats of justice in their respective counties.
    The term, “county police,” in this clause of the constitution, has but little meaning in itself; and, in order properly to define it, legislation is necessary ; the term is inoperative, until legislation designates its subject-matter. The legislature, having previously located the county seat of Hancock county, elsewhere, in the year 1846, passed a law, by the first section of which, it was provided, “that the seat of justice was thereby made permanent, and located in the town of Gainesville.” The other sections contain provisions, that the citizens of Gainesville should erect, at their own expense, suitable public buildings, one-third of the cost of which, should be refunded to them, &c. ; and the seventh section provided the period at which all the officers of the county should remove their books and papers to Gainesville; held, that by this act of the legislature, the seat of justice was absolutely established at Gainesville, dependent on no condition that the citizens should erect the public buildings at their expense; and that the act was constitutional-.
    The fact, that the legislature has at one session established the seat of justice of a county, does not at all militate against the validity of an act establishing a different place for the seat of justice, at a subsequent session; it is a subject at all times under legislative control and discretion.
    On appeal from the circuit court of Harrison county; Hon. Thomas A. Willis, judge.
    Julius 0. Monet, President of the Board of Police, of Hancock county, filed his petition in the circuit court of Harrison county, for a mandamus, in which he alleges that the legislature, at its session of 1846, passed an act, entitled, “ An act to locate the seat of justice for the county of Hancock, and for other purposes,” as follows :
    “Section 1. Be it enacted, by the legislature of the state of Mississippi, that the seat of justice for the county of Hancock, be and the same is made permanent, and located in the town of Gainesville, in said county.
    
      “ Sect. 2. Be it further enacted, that the citizens of the town of Gainesville, shall erect, or cause to be erected, at the expense of the citizens of said town, commodious and suitable buildings, for the accommodation of the several courts of said county, and that said buildings shall be constructed of bricks, and erected upon a square of land donated to said comity for that purpose, by Charles H. Frazier, in said town of Gainesville.
    “Sect. 3. Be it’ further enacted, that when said buildings shall be completed, and ready for the accommodation of said courts, Asa Russ, R. G. Stevenson, Enoch McFadden, Joseph Martin, and Joseph Chandler, shall constitute a board of commissioners, to examine said buildings, and costs of constructing the same, of which amount of costs, said commissioners shall make a statement in writing to the treasurer of said county.
    “ Sect. 4. Be it further enacted, that after said commissioners shall have examined and reported the same to the county treasurer, said treasurer shall, within ten days thereafter, give notice to the several officers of said county, who are compelled to lreep their respective offices at the court-house of said county, to remove their books and papers forthwith to the buildings erected for the accommodation of the several courts; and that the courts thereafter shall be held in the said town of Gaines-ville.
    
      “ Sect. 5. Be it further enacted, that the treasurer of said county, shall pay over to the citizens of the said town of Gainesville, or their agent or agents, one-third of the actual cost of the construction of the aforesaid buildings, in three equal instalments of one, two, and three years, out of moneys not otherwise appropriated in said treasury.
    “Sect. 6. Be it further enacted, that the receipts of said agent or agents of the citizens of Gainesville, shall be a voucher for .the treasurer in settlement of his accounts.
    
      “Sect. 7. Be it further enacted, that should it so happen, that the public buildings ^bove spoken of, should not be completed by the spring term of the circuit court of said county, the several courts shall be held at the usual place of holding the same, up to the spring term of 1846; then all the officers above spoken of, shall, within ten days thereafter, remove their books and papers to the town of Gainesville, to such buildings as the citizens shall have provided for their accommodation, until the completion of the-public buildings above spoken of.
    “ Sect. 8. Be it further enacted, that if any officer or officers shall fail or neglect to comply with the requisitions of this act, they shall be liable to all the pains and penalties .now imposed by law for similar misdemeanor in office.
    “Passed, February 13, 1846.”
    That in the month of April, 1846, Benjamin Jones, clerk of the circuit and probate courts of the county, in obedience to the order, removed tfye books and papers of his office to Gainesville.
    On the second Monday in May, the board of police convened at Shieldsborough, at the court-house; and, having heard the opinion of counsel, came unanimously to the conclusion, that this act of the legislature was unconstitutional and void; and, that Shieldsborough, the old county seat, was the county seat still. They accordingly, by virtue of their constitutional authority, so declared it, and directed Jones to remove the books and papers back from Gainesville to that place. Jones, in contempt of their order, refused to obey them. They, therefore, prayed for a mandamus, to enforce obedience on the part of Jones, to their order.
    The Hon. J. M. Smiley, vice-chancellor, directed a rule, to show cause, to issue returnable to the September term of the circuit court of Harrison county.
    Jones filed an answer, justifying his disobedience, under the act of 1846, locating the county seat at Gainesville. In his answer, he admits that the buildings for the courts had not yet been erected.
    The petitioner demurred to the answer; the demurrer was overruled, and the petition dismissed, and an appeal granted.
    
      The following agreement of counsel was filed :
    “In this case, by agreement of counsel, no question is presented ; but as to the validity of the act of 1846, locating the seat of justice for Hancock county. If the court is of opinion, that the act is void, the opinion below is to be reversed; if, on the other hand, the court should be of opinion that the act is valid, the judgment below should be affirmed. To this question only are the arguments of counsel directed.
    
      Hurst and Monet, for appellant.
    
      W. P. Harris, for appellée.
    
      Hurst and Monet, for appellant,
    contended,
    1. That the act of 1846 was unconstitutional in terms. It manifestly designed to locate the seat of government at Gaines-ville only on condition that the citizens erected the prescribed public buildings; such is the interpretation of all the sections of the act when viewed in connection with the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequences, or the spirit and reason of the law. 1 Bl. Com. 40 ; if the countyseat be moved without a compliance with these expressed conditions, the intention and will of the legislature will be violated. The conditions thus form- part of the act locating the county seat; they constitute the inducement of the law, and if they are unconstitutional, the whole law is so. The conditions are such as the legislature had no right to impose; to command the citizens of part of a county to erect public buildings is a stretch of legislative usurpation, not the exercise of legislative power.
    2. The second section of the act is unconstitutional, because the legislature undertakes to judge of the validity of the title to the land, direct the mode of payment, &e.; which are all matters of county police, and appertain exclusively to the board of police.
    3. Locating county sites is a legitimate matter of county police, and the exercise of the powers by the legislature is an infringement on the jurisdiction of the boards of police. County police means government regulation of the county, and confers authority to administer all public matters for county purposes, of whatsoever nature. Baxter v. Taber, 4 Mass. R. 361.
    
      4. By the acts of 1842, p. 181, and 1843, p. 79, the legislature entered into a contract as to the site of the county seat, 'which is broken by the act of 1846. The citizens under those acts, in good faith, have expended money and erected public buildings ; it is a breach of good faith to sustain the act of 1846.
    
      TV. P. Harris and D. C. Glenn, for appellee.
    1. By all sound rules of interpretation the act of 1846 was an unconditional location of the county seat. The first section is positive, and the seventh section shows that the legislature contemplated a removal to Gainesville, whether the public build - ings were put up or not, and fixes the period for it. The location is in express words made “permanent.”
    2. The argument of appellant is suicidal. If the whole act be merely a proposition to change the county seat on condition the public buildings be erected, then the argument, as to its unconstitutionality, falls to the ground, for the citizens may accept it or not, as they please, and are thus not compelled to obey the legislative bidding. But if the argument as to the unconstitutionality of the second section prevail, then the first section stands as an absolute and permanent location of the county site, unaffected by the second section if declared unconstitutional.
    3. The general law (H. & H. Dig. 466) provides for the erection and repair of public buildings when there are none, or they need repair ; and if the citizens of Gainesville neglect or fail to provide suitable buildings, it is the power and duty of the board of police to provide buildings under the general law.
    4. It is difficult to define the exact character of the board of police, when viewed with reference to the functions they perform. Looking at the various statutory enactments which confer or regulate the powers of these bodies, we would be inclined to regard them as a kind of municipal corporation. The language of the constitution, however, seems to fix upon them the character of courts, and to confine them to the exercise of such judicial functions as arise out of the administration of county affairs. 1st. Because the word “jurisdiction ” refers to the exercise of judicial authority, and is employed in reference to courts, and not to designate the exercise of legislative or executive authority. 2d. Because the hoard of police are placed under the head of the judiciary in the constitution, and constitute a branch of the judicial power of the government; and, like other departments, created by the constitution, are restricted to the sphere to which they belong, by the second section second article, unless a special exception is found in the constitution-. There is one special exception, and only one, and that is the power to order elections for county officers. The words “ full jurisdiction in all matters of county police,” are too comprehensive to be construed into a special exception, within the meaning of the constitution. The location of the place where the courts are to be holden is not necessarily a matter of county police, and certainly bears no resemblance to a judicial proceeding. It does not come within the definition of a judicial proceeding; there are no parties; there is no judgment about any matter in controversy, and by which right is determined.
    
      5. The location of seats of justice is purely legislative, and has been so treated ever since the adoption of the present constitution. Language, however consistent and uniform, furnishes but a feeble argument in favor of a violation of the constitution, in cases where that violation is open and palpable; but in cases of doubt, where the meaning of the constitution depends on the construction of language, and the meaning of particular phrases, long usage and uniform acquiescence in a particular interpretation, furnishes the safest rule of construction. Ever since the adoption of the present constitution, from the very first legislature which sat under it, down to the last, complete control over the subject of court houses and their location has been assumed and exercised by the legislature; and so far as the boards of police have had any connection with the matter, it has been where the legislature pointed them out as bodies of men; not the tribunal itself, to carry out the details of laws passed on the subject.
    6. Counties are municipal bodies, forming subordinate branches of a general system of government. A distinction has been properly drawn between municipal corporations and private cor porations in regard to laws passed in reference to them. It is only in cases of private corporations that laws assume the character of contracts, and in which the right to repeal or modify is denied. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; 4 Wheat. 518.
   Mr. Justice Thacher

delivered the opinion of the court.

A writ of mandamus was issued returnable to the circuit court of Hancock county, addressed to the defendant.in error, as clerk of the circuit and probate courts of that county, based upon his refusal to obey an order of the board of police of the county, commanding him to restore the books and papers belonging to his offices to the court house in Shieldsborough, from whence he had removed them to Gainesville, in said county, and to show cause why a peremptory mandamus should not issue. Upon the return of the writ, the questions made were raised by means of a demurrer filed to the answer of the defendant to the writ of mandamus, which demurrer was overruled by the circuit court.

The constitutionality of the act of 1846, ch. 145, entitled, An act to locate the seat of justice for the county of Hancock, and for other purposes,” is the only question presented to this court, as appears by an agreement of counsel, and we are also desired, in the event our conclusions are in favor of the constitutionality of the act, to .affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

The constitution, (art. 4, sec. 20,) gives to the boards of police “ full jurisdiction over roads, highways, ferries and bridges, and all other matters of county police.” The right of the boards of police to locate the seat of justice in each county, is claimed under its grant of jurisdiction in “ all matters of county police.”

The word “ police,” in law, is not a term of indefinite meaning, although it has several significations. It is administrative, under which its object is to maintain the order, comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of its administration; and it is judicial, under which it seeks to prevent crimes by punishing criminals. The judicial police punishes those offences which the administrative police has not been able to prevent by fit regulations. Strictly speaking, therefore, the term police has relation to a power of organization of a system of regulations tending to the health, order, convenience and comfort of the inhabitants, and to the prevention and punishment of injuries and offences to the public. But it must be remembered, that the constitution has elsewhere specifically"confided to designated officers and tribunals, as to justices of the peace and the various courts of law, the prevention and punishment of offences against the public, and retained, as a part of the sovereignty of the state, the power to enact by the legislature such laws for the preservation of good order and good government, as it may, in its wisdom, deem suitable. It follows, therefore, that the term, as used in this connection in the constitution, conveys but little if any meaning, and in order to properly define it, legislation was necessary. Hence, it will be found, that the legislature has, from time to time, pointed out the extent of the authority so given, by confiding powers to the boards of police “in addition to their jurisdiction specifically vested in them by the constitution,” which specification is a jurisdiction over “roads, highways, ferries and bridges.” H. & H. 445, sec. 3, and passim in the laws relating to the board of police. The grant of general jurisdiction in matters of police to become operative, required legislation to designate its subject-matter. The conclusion necessarily is, that as the power to locate the seats of justice of the several counties, has not been confided to the boards of police by the legislature, the power still remains in that branch of the government.

It is next in order of inquiry, whether the above mentioned act of the legislature of 1846, ch. 145, locating the seat of justice of Hancock county at Gainesville, constituted a location absolutely, or only upon condition. The first and seventh sections of that act, we think, put it beyond doubt, that the location was thereby made absolute, and to take effect, at all events, ten days after the expiration of the spring term of the circuit court of that county, to be holden for the year 1846. These sections are as follows :

“ 1st. That the seat of justice for the county of Hancock, be, and the same is hereby made permanent, and located in the town of Gainesville, in said county.”
“7th. That should it so happen that the public buildings above spoken of should not be completed by the spring term of the circuit court of 1846, that the several courts of said county shall be held at the usual place of holding the, same up to that time. Then all the officers above spoken of shall, within ten days thereafter, remove their books and papers to the town of Gainesville, to such buildings as the citizens shall have provided for their accommodation, until the completion of the public buildings above spoken of.”

The other sections of the act contain the provisions that the citizens of Gainesville shall erect, at their own expense, upon the land donated for that purpose by Charles EL Frazier, suitable brick buildings for the accommodation of the several courts of the county; that certain persons named in the act shall, as a board of commissioners, report the cost of the buildings to the county treasurer, who shall be authorized to refund to these citizens one-third of the cost of their construction ; and that a neglect by any of the officers mentioned in the act, to comply with its requisitions, shall be deemed a misdemeanor in office. These provisions contain no conditions controlling the absolute location of the seat of justice at Gainesville. They simply show, whatever the fact may be, that the legislature must have made the location of the county seat upon the presumption, and in anticipation of an undertaking by the citizens of Gainesville, to erect, at their own expense, the necessary public buildings of brick, and that they provided that those citizens should after-wards be refunded one-third of the actual cost of the buildings. The act makes no conditions, but renders it imperative upon the officers to remove their books and papers after a certain period, under the pains and penalties affixed by law to a misdemeanor in office. As to the undertaking, real or supposed, of the citizens of Gainesville, we have nothing to do, only so far as it may put a condition upon the act in question, which, as we have said, it does not. If no provision shall have been made at that period for the offices, and the legislature having permanently located the seat of justice at Gainesville, the laws elsewhere provide for such an emergency. How. & Hutch. 466, sec. 82.

Lastly; previous acts of the legislature are relied upon as having fixed, beyond the power of change, the seat of justice of the county. Acts of 1842, ch. 60, and 1843, ch. 13. Upon this point, it suffices to say, that the present act is as fully authorized as previous acts, and upon the same principles, and that the subject is at all times at the control of legislative action and discretion.

In consequence, with the foregoing opinion, and in accordance with the agreement of counsel, we direct the judgment of the circuit court to be affirmed.  