
    WILLIAMS’S CASE.
    William B. Williams v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, offers a reward for “ information ” which shall lead to the “ forfeit- ’ ure of any distillery whose proprietor has not given the notice required by law,” and to the “ con victioa ” of the person engaged in operating it; the reward “to be paid upon receipt of the certificate of the United States district attorney having charge of the case that the person so claiming such reward is the person who furnished such information.” The claimant produces such certificates, also certificates of the collector showing the forfeiture of the distilleries. The Commissioner pays him only one-third of the reward promised. He brings suit for the balance. It appears that the persons ■ said to have been “convicted” were found guilty by the jury, but that judgment on the verdict was suspended at the instance of the district attorney on the payment of all costs by the prisoners.
    
    I. The Act 2d March, 1867, (14 Stat. L., p. 471, § 7,) which authorizes the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to pay such sums “ as may in his judgment be deemed necessary for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the 
      
      inteimal-revenue laws ’’“in oases where such expenses are not otherwise provided hy law,” is broad enough to sustain an offer of a reward for information leading to the forfeiture of illicit distilleries and the conviction of the persons operating them. The fact that informers may share in the proceeds of forfeited distilleries, under another statute, does not provide for the “ expenses” as contemplated by this act.
    II. When the Government offers a reward for information which shall lead to the “ conviction ” of persons illegally operating distilleries, the conditions of the offer will be deemed complied with if there be a. verdict-of guilty followed by a mot.ion of the district attorney to suspend judgment on' the payment of all costs by the prisoners. The informer’s obligations in such a case end with the verdict, aud he is not resp msible for the subsequent acts or inaction of the district attorney.
    
      The Reporters' statement of the case:
    The court found the following facts:
    I. In December, 1867, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue published a notice or offer of reward in the following terms :
    tl $300 Reward.
    
    “ Tee a suit y Department,
    “ Oefioe oe Internal Revenue,
    
      Washington, December Wi, 1861.
    “ The share of informers in the property ordinarily liable to forfeiture upon seizure of illicit distilleries is found to be iuade-; quate to insure that interest and vigilance necessary to secure! that observance of the law.
    “I do therefore, by and with the advice and consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, hereby offer, for information hereafter given that shall lead to the forfeiture of any distillery whose • proprietor has not given the notice required by law to the assessor of his district, and which information shall also lead to the conviction of any person engaged iu operating the said distillery, a reward of three hundred dollars, to be paid upon receipt of the certificate of the United^States district attorney having-charge of the case that the person so claiming such reward is the person who furnished such information.
    “ E. A. ROLLINS,
    “ Commissioner."
    
    II. At the November term, 1868, of the United States Circuit Court sitting in the district of North Carolina, before the Hon. George W. Brooks, district judge, and a jury, each of the following-named persons was severally tried on an indictment for distilling without paying the special tax therefor, to which indictment each of the defendants had pleaded not guilty, viz : Jacob Sills, Peter Riley, T. B. Deans, M. 0. McBrantley, Bxum Braswell, E. R. Yick, and EL H. Bryant, and in each case the jury found by their verdict the defendant guilty, as charged in the indictment. But judgment on the verdict was not prayed for by the district attorney, and on his motion it was suspended on the payment of all costs by each of the defendants.
    III. Subsequent to the indictments and trials before described, the claimant in this case produced and filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in each of the cases referred to in the foregoing finding, a certificate of the district attorney having charge of each case, showing that the claimant herein was the person who gave the information which led to the forfeitures and convictions before described •, and also in each case a certificate of the collector of internal reveuue in North Carolina, showing that the distilleries had been forfeited and sold; which certificates of the district attorney and collector were in the form of those annexed to these findings. And the claimant at the same time demanded payment in each case of $300, the reward offered-by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, as set forth in the first finding; but the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Secretary of the Treasury refused to pay to the claimant the full sum of $300, and in lieu thereof paid to him only the sum of $100 in each case.
    
      Certificates referred, to.
    
    
      u I hereby certify that, at the November term, 1868, of the U. S. circuit court for the district of North Carolina, the distillery of Exum Braswell was forfeited, and the said Braswell was convicted of and for carrying on the business of a distiller without having given the notice to the assessor of his district; paid the special tax, or given bond, as required by law, and sentenced to pay all costs in the case, judgment being suspended for his future good conduct, and that William B. Williams was the person who gave the information which led to said forfeiture and conviction ; that said information was given after December 7, 1867, and before March the 17th, 1869, that is, on or about tlie 1st of May, 1868 ; that I, as U. S. attorney for this district, had charge of the case, and that I have given a certificate to no other person as informer in this case.
    “ D. H. starbuck:,
    “77. 8. District Attorney for the District of North Carolina."
    
    “ Warrenton, N. 0., March 11, 1869.
    “I hereby certify that the still and fixtures of Exam Bras-well were forfeited and sold by me, under section ‘ 63 ’ of the act of July 13th, 1866, and that the information leading to said forfeiture and sale was furnished by William B. Williams, of Raleigh, N. C.
    “THOS. REYNOLDS,
    ■ “ Acting Coll’r.”
    
      Mr. Lewis Abraham for the claimant:
    It is contended by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that to entitle an informer to the reward offered, “ sentence” should have followed “conviction,” or that “conviction,” “sen, fence,” and “judgment” are synonymous terms; in fine, that conviction is incomplete without sentence.
    It is not necessary to discuss this proposition at length The following authorities will suffice: That “conviction,” “judgment,” and “sentence” are not identical terms, but have quite separate and distinct legal signification, see McNeill’s Case, 1 Canes, 72, The prisoner had been found guilty, at oyer and terminer, of a conspiracy, but had not appeared on his recognizance in time to receive sentence. He afterward came in and was brought up on his' own petition to have judgment pronounced; but the record of the conviction not being made up and brought into court, the bench said they had nothing before them on which to proceed. Bishop, in his Criminal Law, says, if a verdict will sustain a judgment, the judgment must be pronounced instead of a new trial being granted. Chief-Justice Shaw says, in T3x parte Diclc, “ There is a manifest difference between the case of the offense upon which the party stands convicted, and upon which sentence is now to be passed.” (14 Pick., 88.) “The legal meaning of‘conviction,’ is that legal proceeding of record which ascertains the guilt of the party, and upon which the sentence or judgment is founded, as a verdict, a plea of outlawry, or the like. The law implies that there must be a conviction before punishment. (1 Hawk P. C., c. 10, § 9.) Judgment amounts to conviction, but it does not follow that every one who is convict is adjudged.” (Ibid.) (Shaw, O. J., Richard’s Case, 17 Pick., 296.) “ Conviction is a condition-precedent to judgment.” (Denn. Or. Oases, 668.) “ The judgment consists of two parts, viz, the conviction and the sentence or award of punishment.” (1 Paley, 207.) That conviction is not always followed by judgment, see also 8 Wendell, 204; 4 Ill. Bep., 76. And that it must precede judgment, see 1 Canes, 72; 35 Me. Bep., 594; 16 Ark., 601. Conviction is theeffeetof substantial evidence. (Crabbe’s Syn.) It is simply finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. (Bisb. Orim. Law.) If the jury find him guilty, he is then said to be convicted. (Blaokstoue, book IY, 362.) If a person is convicted, and never sentenced, the conviction may be pleaded in bar. (5 Wheaton, 31; Serg. Const. Law, 278.) It prevents a second prosecution for the same offense. (1 Me. L. C. C., 429; 7 Conn., 4l4; 14 Ohio, 295; 2 Yerg, Tenn., 24; 28 Pa. St. Bep., 13; 2 Gratt. Va.; 558.)
    In any event, it is not competent for the Commissioner to go behind the certificates of “ the United States district attorney having charge of the case.” The contract is fixed and determinate upon their production. If not in due form or incomplete they can be rejected, otherwise they are conclusive, and the facts certified to are indisputable; they furnish no evidence or data as to the value of the services rendered, and an equitable allowance, or quantum meruit compensation, of one hundred dollars in each case is a violation of the contract. The rate of reward having been determined and stipulated in advance, becomes an essential element of the contract, iuto which, by giving his time and services, the claimant entered in good faith. By accepting these certificates as evidence of the claimant’s service the Department is estopped from inquiring into its value. That is adjudicated by the very terms of the contract, and the payment of a portion due thereunder is an admission of the whole liability. Even if sentence were necessary, as a component part of the forfeiture and conviction, the certificates all say the defendant was “ sentenced to pay all costs in the case; ” and as to the forfeitures and sales, they were the results of proceedings in rem, and the very condemnation and sale form, in their nature, the judgment and sentence of the court.
    
      
      Mr. John S. Blair (with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendant:
    The share of the informer is limited to a moiety by Aet 13th July, 1866, (14 Stat. L., 145,) and the Secretary of the Treasury was not allowed to go beyond it. The Act 2d March, 1867, (14 Stat. L., 473, § 7.) which authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to pay necessary expenses in detecting violations of the internal-revenue law, expressly limits him to cases where such expenses are not otherwise provided by law. Congress having already provided for the reward to informers, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was not authorized by this act to exceed the moiety, and his offer of reward creates no contract that is binding on the United States. But, if the act did authorize such offer, the offer must conform to the act, and where the offer contains a word capable of two interpretations, th»t one must be adopted which corresponds to the language and meaning of the act. The language of the act is “such sums # * * for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating,” &c.
    The word “conviction,” in its general sense, means the judgment of the court against a defendant in a criminal case. It also means the verdict of the jury, or the plea of guilty; but, inasmuch as the verdict of the jury is liable to be set aside on motion in arrest of judgment, or for a new trial, it cannot be considered sufficient to vest the right to the reward until judgment is pronounced, and all issues thus finally decided.
    “ It is the judgment, and that only, which is received as the legal, and conclusive evidence of the party’s guilt.” (Greenleaf on Evidence, §375.) “The judgment, and that only, can be received as legal evidence of the party’s guilt, for the purpose of rendering him incompetent to testify ; the finding of a jury is insufficient, because it may be reversed or set aside.” (Bou-vier’s Inst., § 3188.) Whatever may be the peculiar position of the defendant between verdict and judgment in the court where tried, yet in other courts the ouly evidence of conviction is the judgment of the court. Until such judgment the case is pending, and this claimant must wait for the legal determination of those suits before bringing his action.
    In the case of Bex v. Luclmp, (2 Strange, 1048,) where, by statute, the informer was entitled to a forfeiture “ upon conviction,” it was held that the action must be brought upon the judgment quod convictus est. 'And the same rule may well be applied here. The sentence of payment of costs is merely interlocutory.
    There are two ways by which this court can be informed that the indictment was good, that the proceedings were regular, and that there will be no new trial: one is by the judgment of that court, and the other is by a revision of its proceedings. The former, we contend, is the legitimate method. But, as is well known, this offer of $300, independent of the value of the matter forfeited, led, in a great many instances, to collusion. The mere imposition of the costs and forfeiture of stills worth less than $300 has a tendency to foster such cases, and the United States may well insist on the punishment of these defendants before payment of the reward.
    That the verdict of the jury will, in some instances, prevent a second,prosecution of the offense seems to be established by the authorities cited in claimant’s brief. But Williams, J., in State v. Benham, (7 Conn., 414,) cited by claimant’s counsel, says there is much doubt whether the legal principle of the necessity of a j udgment has been extended to cases of that kind; but because both prosecutions were in the same court, and no claim is made that judgment cannot be rendered on the.same verdict, “under such circumstances” he decides that the second information ought not to be supported.
    ' The difference in principle between a second prosecution for the s ame offense, and an action for reward while the conviction is incomplete, is sufficient to deprive those decisions of any force in the case in hand. The legal principle of the necessity of a judgment is not extended to the former on account of the tenderness always exhibited toward a culprit, but that is no reason why judgment should not be necessary in an action on a contract for services.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The Act 2d March, 1867, (14 Stat. L., 471, § 7,) provides “ that the Commissioner of Internal Bevenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, is hereby authorized to pay such sums, not exceeding in the aggregate the amount appropriated therefor, as may, in his judgment, be deemed' necessary for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal-revenue laws, or conniving at the same, in cases where such expenses are not otherwise provided by law.”

The discretion conferred by this statute is very broad, inasmuch as the payments authorized are referred absolutely to the united “ judgment” of the Commissioner and Secretary, and the only restriction set upon their discretion is that the money shall be paid “ for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal-revenue laws or conniving at the same, in cases where such expenses are not otherwise provided by law.”

It is insisted by the counsel for the defendants that this term “ expenses” was intended to embrace those cases where, under the provisions of another statute, {Act 13ih July, 1866,14 Stat. L., 98,145,) an informer might share in the proceeds of a forfeiture; and hence that the “ expenses” in this case were “ otherwise provided by law.” But the word “ expense,” both in its etymology and ordinary use, indicates expenditure, outlay, the disbursement of money, the payment of a price. To agree to share with a man the proceeds of property which is neither owned nor possessed, and which may never be acquired, would ordinarily be spoken of as an agreement that would “ put the Government to no expense.” Here was a class of offenders that, in the judgment of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, could not be reached by the ordinary means of dividing forfeitures with informers. It was necessary, therefore, that the Government should be at the expense of procuring their detection and punishment, or that they should go unpunished. To give moderate rewards for the detection and punishment of such persons seems a reasonable exercise of the discretion vested in the Treasury Department by the statute. Therefore the offer of the reward which forms the basis of the present action was within the authority vested in the Commissioner and Secretary, and a proper exercise of their official discretion.

The offer thus made was of a reward for “information” which should lead to the “forfeiture” of an illicit distillery, and to the “conviction” of the person engaged in operating it. And the offer then expressly agrees that the reward shall “be paid upon the receipt of the certificate of the United States district attorney having charge of the case that the person so claiming such reward is the person who furnished such information.” It is conceded by the defendants that certain illicit distilleries were forfeited, and that the claimant produced and delivered to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the requisite certificates of the proper district attorney; bub it is contended that there was no “conviction” of the guilty parties.

The certificates of the district attorney state that each of the persons against whom information had been given by the claimant was “ convicted,” and the record of the court shows that each was found guilty of the offeuse charged in the indictment by the verdict of a jury, but that judgment on the verdict was not prayed for by the district attorney, and on his motion was suspended “on the payment of all costs.” The objection which the defendants’ counsel raises on this word “conviction” is strictly technical. .

We are of the opinion that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue did not use the word in any such technical sense. It was his purpose to procure evidence or information which should ler.1 to the legal ascertainment of the guilty parties’ guilt. When that was ascertained, that is to say, when a verdict of guilty was rendered, all would be accomplished by the informer’s information that could be effected by evidence; and the remaining proceedings would be entirely beyond the scope of his undertaking. It never could have been the iutent of the OonryypS-sioner that the informer should furnish a prosecuting officer who would perfect the conviction into a judgment, nor that he should induce a district attorney, over whom he had no control, to move for judgment after a verdict should be rendered. The contract arising from the offer and the services under it was for information which should stand the practical test of accomplishing the purpose for which it was required.

But though the proceedings in the district court may not have ripened into that conclusive form which would be indisputable evidence of a defendant’s.guilt in another tribunal, they nevertheless amounted to a conviction so far as to preclude the Government from again puttiug a defendant in jeopardy for the same offense. The district court was the tribunal which had exclusive jurisdiction of the offeuse, and a second trial on the same indictment, or a second indictment for the same cause, must be broughj; in the same court. Assuredly, after the United States had elected to hold the judgment in terrorem over a defendant, and had exacted from him the payment of all costs, no court would allow him to be again subjected to the costs and harass-men ts of a second prosecution.

The counsel for the defendants has also argued that the term “ conviction” in the offer of reward is to be construed by reference to the statute, as meaning, in its words, “trial and punishment.” We are of the same opinion, but draw from it a different N'' Nee; which is, that the statute enlarges rather than re-soricts the intent of the word “ conviction.” The informer’s information led to an indictment, to a trial, and to a verdict of guilty. It also led to punishment; not to a punishment by fine or imprisonment on the judgment of the court, but to a lesser, modified punishment, inflicted at-the instance of the prosecuting officer, who deemed it best to hold the judgment in suspense over the heads of offenders as security for their future good behavior, and who at the same time exacted from them, under its pressure, the payment of “all costs,” which, for anything we know to the contrary, may have included the reward to be paid to this informer. The case, therefore, seems to comply with the conditions of both the offer and the statute.

The judgment of the court is that the claimant recover of the defendants the sum of $1,400.

Peck, J., was absent when this case was heard, and took no part in the decision.  