
    Philip Coleman v. Matthew Rowe, et al.
    It is sufficient if an appeal bond substantially cover the provision in the statute, by securing to the appellee all that the law designed for him. The language of the statute need not be adopted.
    Where the statute required the condition of the appeal bond to be “ to pay, satisfy, andperform the decree or final order of the superior court of chancery, and all costs in case the same be affirmed and upon an appeal from such a decree dissolving an injunction of a judgment at law, the condition of the appeal bond was “ to pay and satisfy the judgment so recovered against him,” <j'C. Held, that the condition of this bond was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute.
    Where in an order granting an appeal from his decision the Chancellor first named three persons as his sureties, and afterwards made the following order : “ In addition to the sureties named in the original order granting an appeal, any two of them, or the following persons, to wit; &c. are approved held, that an appeal bond executed by two of the persons first named, no objection being made to their sufficiency, was in compliance with the order of the Chancellor.
    On appeal from the superior court of chancery.
    A motion was made in this court to dismiss this appeal, for two reasons :
    1. Because the appeal bond was not in conformity with the statute; its condition not being to perform the decree of the Chancellor, but to pay the judgment rendered at law, and which had been enjoined, in case of an affirmance.
    
      2. Because the requisite number of sureties, required by the order of the Chancellor, are not parties to the bond.
    Sufficient of the record is cited in the opinion of the court to explain the character of the motion so far as it rests upon that.
    
      W. Thompson, for motion.
    
      W. and G. S. Yerger, contra.
   Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from the superior court of chancery, which the appellee moves us to dismiss because the appeal bond does not conform to the statute, and because surety was not given according to the direction of the Chancellor.

The condition required by the statute is that the appellant shall “ pay, satisfy and perform the decree or final order of the superior court of chancery, and all costs in case the same be affirmed.” The condition of this bond is, that if the appellant shall “ pay and satisfy the judgment so recovered against him at law, with interest and costs, and also abide by the decision of the high court of errors and appeals, then ” &c. The bond given only differs from the condition given by the statute in this; it is not conditioned to pay and satisfy the decree of the court of chancery, but it is conditioned to pay and satisfy the amount of the judgment at law. This arose from the necessity of the case. It was a bill to enjoin a judgment at law, and the decree from which the appeal is taken, was to dissolve the injunction. No other condition would have been proper, because the Chancellor made no decree for the payment of money. It is sufficient if an appeal bond substantially covers the provision in the statute, by securing to the appellee, all that the law designed for him. The language of the statute need not be adopted.

The other objection is that the Chancellor named three persons as securities, and but two of them were given. In his first order he also named three persons. In the second he says, “ in addition to the sureties named in the original order granting an appeal, any two of them or the following persons, to wit, &c. are approved.” It may be doubtful whether the Chancellor intended to require more than two sureties. That is the usual number, and we do not feel authorized to dismiss the appeal where it is probable no more were intended to be required. No objection is made to the sufficiency of the sureties. The appellee seems to be secured, and that is the object of the bond.

Motion overruled.  