
    William Jones v. State of Mississippi.
    No definite length of time after tlie loss of goods and before possession shown in the accused, is settled on, to raise a presumption of guilt.
    Where the goods are bulky or inconvenient of transmission, a greater lapse of time is allowed to raise such a presumption, than if they were light and easily passed from one to another.
    The authorities hold that the possession must be recent after the loss, to raise the presumption of guilt.
    After the lapse of such a period of time, as in this case, the fact that the chattels were found in the possession of the accused, created no presumption of criminality without any other evidence to support the charge.
    In error from the circuit court of Lauderdale county; Hon. John Watts, judge.
    William Jones, the accused, was indicted in the circuit court of Lauderdale county, for stealing a saddle, the property of William C. Burton. It was proven that the saddle was found in the house of Elijah C. Jones, sometime in May, 1853, but it had been taken from the shop of Burton, in December, 1852, and it was also proven that William Jones, the accused, brought the saddle to the house of E. C. Jones, in the month of July or August, 1852.
    The defendant proved that he was an honest man, and had heretofore sustained a good reputalion in the community where he lived. The defendant asked the court, on the trial of the case, to give the jury the following instructions, which were refused:—
    1st. “ That the possession of the thing stolen must be shown to be in the defendant shortly after the taking; and if the State has not shown that the defendant had possession of the saddle until four or five months after the taking of the saddle, such possession does not raise any presumption of the guilt of the defendant having the saddle in possession in August, 1852.”
    4th. “ To raise a presumption of the guilt of the defendant, from the fact of the property being found in his possession, it must be shown to have been so recently after the taking from the owner; and if the jury believe from the evidence, that the saddle was not found in the possession of defendant until four months or more after the taking, such possession does not raise any presumption of the guilt of the defendant whereon to find a conviction.”
    The defendant excepted to the refusal of the court to give the above instructions. The jury found the defendant guilty, as charged in the indictment; and having moved the court for a new trial, which was refused, the defendant prayed a writ of error to this court.
    
      Chandler and Baldwin for the appellant.
    Glenn, attorney-general, for the State.
   Mr. Justice Handy

delivered the opinion of the court.

Apart from the testimony of the witness Sarah Jones, the only proof of the larceny in this case consists of the evidence .that the article lost was found in the possession of the accused. That witness, it is true, states that the accused brought the article to the house where he resided. But she proves that this took place several months before the property is proved to have been lost by the owner; and if her testimony could have any weight, it must have produced an acquittal.

The evidence shows that the goods were not found in the possession of the accused until the lapse of five or six months after the taking; and the question here presented is, Whether such possession, found after such a lapse of time, of itself raises a presumption in law of a felonious taking by the accused ?

No definite length of time, after loss of goóds and before possession shown in- the accused, seems to be settled, as raising a presumption of guilt. Where the goods are bulky, or inconvenient of transmission, or unlikely to be transferred, it seems that a greater lapse of time is allowed to raise the presumption than when they are light and easily passed from hand to hand, and likely to be so passed; because, in the one case, the goods may not have passed through many hands, and the proof to justify the possession may, therefore, be more simple and easy; but in the latter case, the goods luay, very probably, have come to the accused through many persons, and their transit, from the smallness of their nature and value, be much more difficult to be proved. . Roscoe, Crim. Ev. 18; 3 Greenl. Ev. § 32.

Yet, all the cases hold that the possession must be recent after the loss, in order to impute guilt; and this presumption is founded on the manifest reason, that, where goods have been taken from one person and are quickly thereafter found in the possession of another, there is a strong probability that they were taken by the latter. This probability is stronger or weaker in proportion to the period intervening between the taking and the finding; or it may be entirely removed by the lapse of such time as to render it not improbable that the goods may have been taken by another and passed to the accused, and thus wholly destroy the presumption.

In prosecutions for larceny of chattels like that in this case, it-has been well held, that after the lapse of such a period of time as in this case, the mere fact that the chattels were found in the possession of the accused, created no presumption of criminality; and that such possession, without other evidence of any kind to establish the charge, is not even sufficient to put the party on his defence. Rex v. Adams, 3 C. & P. 600; 3 Greenl. Ev. § 32; State v. Williams, 9 N. Car. 140.

We recognize the soundness of this rule, and accordingly are of opinion that the first and fourth instructions, asked on the part of the accused, should have been granted.

The judgment is, therefore, reversed, and a new trial awarded.  