
    Frederick Tayton DENCER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA STATE BAR; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-56771
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 13, 2018 
    
    Filed February 22, 2018
    
      Frederick Tayton Dencer, Pro Se
    Sean T. Strauss, Esquire, State Bar of California, Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appel-lees
    Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. 
        See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Frederick Tayton Dencer appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from his California State Bar disbarment proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Dencer’s action is a “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment, and he raises claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. See Scheer v. Kelly, 817 F.3d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (as-applied constitutional claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-79 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars district court from exercising jurisdiction over a “de facto” appeal of a state court decision and claims “inextricably intertwined” with the state court decision); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because alleged legal injuries arose from the “state courts purportedly erroneous judgment” and the relief sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     