
    The Inhabitants of Stockbridge, Plaintiffs in Review, versus The Inhabitants of West Stockbridge.
    A deed more than thirty years old may be given in evidence, without proof of its execution, when found in possession of the party claiming under it, and the possession of the thing conveyed has followed the conveyance.
    The conveyance of a slave by the deed of an agent, authorized in writing only by the owner, was held sufficient to transfer the property in the slave.
    And a slave so conveyed was held to have been the slave of the purchaser, notwithstanding his determination and promise not to hold him more than ten years.
    This action, the decision of which upon certain agreed facts has already been reported, (vide ante, vol. xii. p. 400,) came on again for trial upon a review granted by the Court, upon the petition of the inhabitants of Stockbridge, who were original plaintiffs, (vide ante, vol. xiii. p. 302,) before Jackson, J., at the last April term in this county.'
    The action was brought to recover the money expended by the plaintiffs for the support of Frank Duncan, a negro man, whose settlement they allege to be in West Stockbridge. The only question made at the last trial was, whether the said Duncan was formerly the slave of Elijah Williams, Esq., late of West Stockbridge, so as to have gained a settlement from the said Williams, as his master.
    The said Williams, who was deceased before the trial, had given his deposition, which was taken for the original action, and was again used on the trial by review. *He therein states that, in the year 1770, the said Duncan being a slave in New Jersey, he, the said Williams, bought the time or services cf the said slave for the term of ten years, and paid therefor the sum of £100 ; that he was from principle averse to holding a slave, but was willing to purchase his services as aforesaid, if the negro consented to it; that he supposed there was a deed or writing between him and the former owner, but had no particular recollection about it. It did not appear that he considered himself bound to restore the slave to his former master at the end of the ten years.
    The said Williams died in June, 1815; and in the following October, his son, looking over a large quantity of his father’s old papers, accidentally found an instrument purporting to be a bill of sale from one William Bott, of New Jersey, to the said E. Williams, of a negro slave, called Frank. The instrument, a copy of which came up in the case, bears date on the 2d of April, 1770; the consideration expressed in it is £100; and it purports to convey absolutely the whole title and interest in the said slave for his life.
    The plaintiffs offered this paper in evidence at the trial. The defendants objected to its going to the jury; but the judge admitted it, leaving it to the jury to be considered in connection with the said deposition, if they should believe it to relate to the purchase mentioned in the deposition.
    It appeared that the said bill of sale was in the hand-writing of the said Williams ; that the owner of the said slave was one Joseph Firman, of New York, of whom the said Bott had hired him; that Firman, at the request of the slave, had written a letter to Bott, requesting him to sell the slave, or to find another master for him; that Williams came there to procure a man to work at his furnace in Stockbridge, and, upon Bott’s recommendation, Frank consented to go with him, he agreeing with Frank that, if he would serve him faithfully for ten years, he would then give him his time, and would also give him a yoke of steers and ten acres of land; * saying that he did not keep slaves any longer than till they had earned what he paid for them. Williams then paid Bott £100, and Bott undertook to sell and convey the slave to him. The said Frank returned with Williams to Stockbridge, and continued in his service seven years, and paid him £30 for the other three years of the ten years before mentioned; which sum he paid out of his wages and bounty given him as a soldier in the army of the United States.
    
    The defendants objected to the admission of the said bill of sale in evidence, because its execution was not proved by the subscribing witnesses; and also because it did not appear that Bott had any right or authority to sell and convey the slave in this manner. Both these objections were overruled.
    Upon the foregoing facts the judge instructed the jury that, by the purchase and conveyance made as above mentioned, the said Frank became the slave of the said Williams; and that his intention or his agreement above mentioned, to give him his time at the end of ten years, upon the condition of his good behavior for that time, would make no difference in the case.
    A verdict being returned for the plaintiffs, the defendants moved for a new trial, on account of the admission of said evidence, and of the said direction given to the jury.
    
      Whiting and Howe, for the defendants.
    The bill of sale, its execution not being proved by the subscribing witnesses, was improperly admitted in evidence. Its being more than thirty years old is not sufficient of itself, unless it had been found among the papers of the party claiming under it, and unless possession of the article sold had followed its execution. By papers in this rule of the law must be understood the valuable papers of the party, such as he would naturally keep in his desk or other place of security. But this paper was found in the garret, amidst old papers, which had been thrown away as of no value. The possession, too, should pursue the conveyance. Here Williams originally refused to take Frank as a slave, and entered * into a contract with him, incompatible with such a relation, and finally dismissed him from his service, receiving from him a compensation for the remaining term of his service; and this compensation Frank had himself received in the character of a citizen soldier. 
    
    
      Bott was not the owner of the slave, and he had no sufficient authority from Firman to make a bill of sale. Indeed, there is no evidence of any authority. If he had been fully authorized to make such a bill of sale, he should have pursued his authority, and made it in the name of the principal.  But here was, in fact, no sale. To a contract of this species, as to every other contract, the consent of two minds is necessary. Williams would not consent to purchase or to hold a slave. His declarations at the time, as well as his after
    
      conduct, prove this. And if the Court should consider, as far as Williams was himself concerned in the decision, that he should be bound by his acceptance of the bill of sale, according to the terms of it, yet it would be carrying the principle to a great extent to make it binding on third persons and strangers to the transaction, as in this case.
    
      Ashmun, for the plaintiffs.
    The rule of law, that a deed more than thirty years old shall be received in evidence without proof of us execution, is so well established, that even when a subscribing witness to such a deed has been present in court, the court have refused to examine him, that the principle might not be brought into doubt. The bill of sale in this case was in the possession of the vendee nearly half a century, and was found in the place where it was most natural to expect to find it after so long a time, that is, among the old and useless papers of the party. 
    
    The sale of a slave need not be by deed, any more than any other personal chattel; except that in some of the Southern States they are made real property by statute. But let the objections be of what force they may, the sale was good and sufficient, as to all the world but the parties to it, and they always acquiesced in it Williams did all in his power to secure his title, in taking * the conveyance with covenants of warranty. Bott was bound by these covenants; and Firmin, who had authorized Bott by his letter to make the sale, could not question it. Williams’s intention to manumit the slave was not a manumission, nor could it have any operation on the contract. 
    
    
      
       2 D. & E. 466, Rex vs. The Inhabitants of Farringdon. — 1 Esp. Rep. 275, The Governor, &c., of Chelsea Waterworks vs. Cowper. — 3 Johns. 292, Jackson vs. Blanshan.
      
    
    
      
       7 Mass. Rep. 14, Fowler vs. Shearer.
      
    
    
      
      
        Phillips’s Law of Evidence, 349. — Selwyn, 492.
    
    
      
       7 Johns. 330, Kettletas vs. Fleet. —5 Johns. 365.
    
   Per Curiam.

When this cause was before us after the former trial, we decided, upon the testimony of Mr. Williams, which was all the evidence then in the case, that Frank Duncan, the pauper, was not a slave. When the bill of sale, under which Williams held him, was found, we granted a new trial to the plaintiffs.

At this last trial, the defendants have objected to the admission of the bill of sale in evidence, because its execution was not proved by witnesses. But the instrument was more than forty years old, and, as an ancient deed, was properly submitted to the jury. It is an established rule of evidence, and often recognized, that a deed more than thirty years old may be given in evidence, without proof of its execution, when found in the possession of the party claiming under it, and the possession of the thing conveyed has followed the conveyance. ,

The authority of Bott to execute the bill of sale has also been questioned. But a less formal authority was sufficient for the sale of a personal chattel, as a slave must be considered to be, than for the conveyence of real estate; and after more than thirty years’ undisturbed possession even of real property, we should think it too late to question the authority of the agent who had undertaken to convey it. The property of a personal chattel may pass by delivery without deed, and even without writing. In this case, Bott bad sufficient authority from Firmin, the owner, in a letter requesting Bott to sell the slave, or to find another master for him.

It has also been argued that the bill of sale, if its execution had been legally proved, had not the effect to convey the property in the slave. But it appears to have been a full and absolute transfer of the slave for * his life. Williams’s scruples, as to the right of holding a fellow-creature in bondage, made no difference in the character of his property; nor did his intentions to emancipate him, or his promise to that effect, or his final execution of that intent, in any wise affect the nature of his purchase. No contract made with the slave was binding on the master; for the slave could have maintained no action against him, had he failed to fulfil his promise, which was an undertaking merely voluntary on his part. While Frank continued in Williams’s service he was to every intent his slave. He had a legal right to keep him in service for life; and in case of his sickness or inability to labor, his master must have supported him at his own expense.

Judgment on the verdict. 
      
      
        Bull. N. P. 255.
     
      
      
         [Doe vs. Burdett, 4 Ad. & E. 19.—Phil, & A. 650—652. — Ed. ]
     