
    Daniel BARANI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, United States Department of Homeland Security, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 12-1963-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 7, 2013.
    Daniel Barani, pro se, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Sarah Sheive Normand, Leslie A. Ramirez-Fisher, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants-Ap-pellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RICHARD C. WESLEY, J. CLIFFORD WALLACE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Daniel Barani, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint with prejudice, which alleged various violations of the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and other federal statutes. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). See Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997). Dismissing a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is proper “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

We have reviewed all of Barani’s arguments on appeal and hold each of them to be without merit. Substantially for the reasons stated in the District Court’s April 26, 2012 Memorandum and Order, we conclude that Barani’s claims were properly dismissed.

We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, see Williams v. Citigroup, Inc., 659 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir.2011), by implicitly denying Barani’s request for leave to amend his complaint, see Fielding v. Tollaksen, 510 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that “when a district judge enters an order disposing of a case without expressly ruling on a pending objection ... the judgment entered pursuant to that order functions as a final order overruling the objection”). Although district courts generally should not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting the plaintiff leave to amend, granting leave to amend is not necessary when amending the complaint would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.2000). Here, allowing Barani to amend his complaint would be futile as the barriers to relief for his claims cannot be surmounted by reframing the complaint.

Accordingly, the April 27, 2012 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.  