
    *Harriman v. Brown.
    August, 1837,
    Lewisburg.
    (Absent Brooke, J.)
    Evidence — Depositions—Objections Must Be Specific. —A deposition is obi ected to, so far as it states the mere belief of the deponent as to the matters spoken of by him, — the sayings or doing's of others not parties to the suit, — and the understanding, reputation or tradition of the neighbourhood ; and also so far as the answers are given to leading Questions. Held, it is not sufficient to make the objection in these general terms, but it is incumbent on the party objecting to point out the exceptionable passages, and move the court to expunge or disregard them.
    Boundaries — Evidence—Reputation.—The principles on which the court receives evidence of reputation as to boundary, fully discussed, and the rules laid down.
    Same — Same—Declarations by Deceased Person.— Evidence is admissible to prove declarations as to the identity of a particular corner tree or boundary, made by a person who is dead, and had‘peculiar means of knowing the fact; as, for instance, the surveyor or chain carrier upon the original survey, or the owner of the tract, or of an adjoining tract calling for the same boundary; and so also tenants, processioners and others, whose duty or interest would lead them to diligent enquiry and accurate information as to the fact; always excluding those declarations which are liable to the suspicion of bias from interest: per Tucker, P., p. 713.
    Evidence — Admissions.—The admissions of a person who could not be compelled to testify, and whose declarations are against his own interest, ought to be received as if he were dead : per Tucker, P., p. 713.
    Writ of Right — Evidence—Entry—Admissibility to Counteract Patent — The patent under which the demandant in a writ of right claims, is for a tract of land beginning “adjoining the upper end of G. W.’s land, at a large black walnut.” At the trial, the demandant offers in evidence • the entry, which is merely for “200 acres at the upper end of G. w.’s survey, to join the line, and to extend up for quantity.” Held, the reference in the patent to the walnut as a boundary, controls the call for G. W.’s survey ; and the entry cannot be admitted to counteract this construction of the patent.
    Writ of right, in the circuit court of Mason, by John Harriman against Matthew D. Brown. The count demanded a certain tenement containing two hundred acres of land with the appurtenances, in the county of *Mason, bounded as followeth: beginning adjoining the upper end of the land granted to George Washington, on the lower side of the Great Kanawha river, about twenty miles above the mouth thereof, at a large black walnut, thence north 56 degrees west 190 poles to a black oak, south 16 degrees west 443 poles to a sugar tree, south 20 degrees west 228 poles to a white oak, north 75 degrees east 54 poles to a Spanish oak on the river bank, north 10 degrees east 200 poles down the river, north 20 degrees east 160 poles, north 45 degrees east 160 poles, north 60 degrees east 120 poles to the beginning. The mise was duly joined, and the demandant agreed that the tenant might give evidence to prove that he was not, at the time of suing out the praecipe, or afterwards, in possession of any part of the land embraced in the patent to Shadrach Harriman for 200 acres, dated the 17th of October 1787, and that he claimed no title to the same or any part thereof; to have the same effect as if that matter were directly put in issue. The tenant admitted that John Harriman the demandant was the only heir at law and ’legal representative of Shadrach Harriman the patentee of the land claimed in this cause: and proof of his being such was therefore. dispensed with. An order of survey feeing made, a plat and report were returned pursuant thereto.
    At the trial of the cause, the demandant gave in evidence the plat and report of the survey; also a copy of a patent granted on the 15th of December 1772 to general George Washington, for a tract of land containing 10,990 acres, and a copy of another patent granted on the same day to James Craik for 4432 acres: and adduced proof shewing that the devisees and representatives of general Washington have, since the year 1805 or 1806, held by a line marked I H on the plat (running out from a point I on the river) as the upper line of his survey; and proof shewing that the line running out from a point higher up the river, marked C on the plat, *was the lower line of James Craik’s tract, and the line by which that tract had always been holden. And then he gave in evidence a patent granted on the 19th of October 1787, to Shadrach Harriman, for a tract of land containing 200 acres, which tract is described in the patent as beginning adjoining the upper end of George Washington’s land, about 20 miles above the mouth of the Great Kanawha, at a large black walnut.
    The tenant on his part gave in evidence a patent bearing date the 22d of November 1804, by which there was granted unto Andrew Donnally junior one moiety, and to Reuben Slaughter as assignee of the said Andrew Donnally the other moiety, of a tract of land containing 268 acres on the west side of Kanawha river, joining a survey of 300 acres made for Shadrach Harri-man, and extending down the river to the upper end of a survey of 10,990 acres made for George Washington, being about 20 miles above the mouth of Kanawha river; which tract is described in the patent as beginning at a large black walnut, just below a branch, corner to said 300 acre survey. The tenant also gave in evidence a deed for the moiety so granted unto Andrew Donnally junior, from Donnally and wife to Hugh Gilmore, bearing date the 12th of September 1814, and admitted to record in the county court of Mason in March 1817: likewise a deed from Hugh Gilmore and wife and Morris Gilmore to Matthew D. Brown the tenant, bearing date the 18th of August 1829, and admitted to record in the office of Mason county court the first of December following, which deed conveys a tract of land in Mason county, containing 159K acres, beginning at a large red oak tree on the bank of Kanawha river, corner to the land of the heirs of Elliott Brown : and a deed to Elliott Brown from Reuben Slaughter and wife, for the moiety of the 268 acre tract granted to Slaughter, which deed bears date the 9th of June 1812, and was admitted to record in Mason county court on the 30th of the same month. It was admitted by the de-mandan t *that the tenant is the son of the said Elliott Brown, and devisee of the land described in the last mentioned conveyance. And it was proved in the cause that Andrew Donnally junior and Reuben Slaughter, and those claiming under them, had been in possession of the land from the line marked I H on the plat, up to Plantation creek, under and from the date of Donnally and Slaughter’s patent, and by actual occupation from 1810 to the present time: and that the demandant and his ancestor had been in possession of the land from the mouth of Plantation creek up to Craik’s lower river corner, under and from the date of the patent to Shadrach Harri-man, and by actual occupation from 179S to the present time.
    The demandant then offered, as presumptive evidence of his beginning corner being on or adjoining the line of Washington, a copy of an entry on which his survey and patent were founded, in these words: “1785, January 18. Shadrach Harriman, assignee of Jacob Paff, assignee of John Hawkins, by virtue o£a land warrant of 2000 acres, number 16,035, dated 8th of May 1783, enters the same as follows, viz. 400 acres on the Ohio, joining general Washington’s line; 200 acres joining the lower end of G. Washington’s survey on the Big Kana-wha ; and 200 acres at the upper end of said survey, to join the line, and to extend up for quantity.” To the introduction of this entry in evidence the tenant objected, and his objection was sustained by the court: to which opinion the demandant excepted.
    The tenant then offered in evidence a copy of a plat and certificate of survey on which the patent of Shadrach Harriman for 200 acres was founded: also, in connexion with the deposition of Lewis Jones, presently mentioned, a copy of an order of Kana-wha county court, made the 5th of March 1792, by which Francis Watkins was appointed as one of the persons to celebrate the ordinance of marriage within the county: also a copy of the publication of the bans of matrimony between *'David Milburn and Susanna Harri-man, by Francis Watkins, on the 16th of March 1794, stated on the face of the paper to be the last time of asking; with an affidavit made by Francis Watkins on the 7th of July 1794, before a justice of the peace, stating that the copy was a true one, and that he performed the marriage service, to the best of his knowledge, as the law directs: also a copy of an order of Kanawha county court, made the 13th of June 1798, appointing David Milburn guardian of John Harriman. And it was admitted that David Milburn, mentioned in the deposition of Lewis Jones, married the widow of Harriman the patentee, and the mother of the demandant; and that she was living during the period of Jones’s tenancy. The deposition of Lewis Jones being offered in connexion with the foregoing evidence, and the depositions of Benjamin Jones and William Arbuckle being also offered, the demandant objected to the same being read, for certain reasons endorsed on the deposition of Lewis Jones, which were íepeated, as to each of the others, ore tenus. The endorsement states that the deposition was objected to so far as it gives the belief of the deponent, or others, as to the matters spoken of by nim, or the understanding, reputation or tradition of the neighbourhood; it not being competent to prove boundaries between individuals by such evidence: that it was objected to also, so far as it purports to give the sayings or doings of others not parties to this suit, David Milburn being alive, and capable of being used as a witness: and that the answers to some questions were objected to, on the ground that the questions were oí a leading character. The court overruled the objections, and allowed the depositions to be read: to which opinion the demandant excepted. To understand the opinion of the appellate court, it is necessary to set forth portions of the depositions of Lewis Jones and William Arbuckle. Jones deposed that in December 1795 his father moved to the *land of Shadrach Harriman on the Great Kanawha river, in what was then Kanawha county; that his father lived on this land about seven years, and whilst living on it, built a cabin and cleared some land; that Shadrach Harri-man was then dead, and David Milburn, who married his widow and acted as guardian for Harriman’s children, leased the land to the witness’s father; that while his father lived on the land, Milburn shewed to his father particular trees as Har-riman’s corners, and it was then well understood in the country that those trees were Harriman’s corners. The witness stated his belief that he knew the corners of Harriman’s land well, especially the front or river corners. The lower front or river corner, he said, was a black walnut tree, which stood just below the mouth of Plantation creek, which walnut tree was then, by almost every person in the country who knew any thing about the land surveys, called and believed to be Washington’s upper front corner, it being marked with the initials of his name, viz. G. W. At the time of giving this deposition, the witness’s father was dead. By the deposition of William Arbuckle it appeared that the witness, after stating that he always heard that Washington’s upper corner was a black walnut with G. W. on it, and that Harriman’s lower corner was Washington’s upper corner, was asked by what means he ascertained that walnut to be Harriman’s corner; and his answer was, that he was told by Reuben .Slaughter that it was Washington’s upper corner, and from the common report of the country he ascertained that Washington’s upper corner was Harriman’s lower corner.
    The tenant called and examined a witness, who proved that in 1791 a bunting party discovered the walnut tree standing at the mouth of Plantation creek, which was then maked with the letters G. W. and with marks like those usually placed on corner trees; that one of the party concluded it must be general Washington’s *corner, but another was of opinion that the marks looked too new for his survey. The witness however stated that the marks and letters seemed to him at that time to be ancient. By other witnesses it was proved, that from Harmer’s defeat up to the pacification produced by general Wayne’s treaty with the indians in 1795, there were no settlements on the Great Kanawha river, except a military post at the mouth thereof, another post of like character at the mouth of Cole river, and another at the mouth of Elk, from which hunters frequently penetrated the forests in search of game, whose journeys were generally performed up and down the river in canoes. That after Wayne’s treaty, emigrants from the east commenced settlements in the valley of the Great Kanawha, and continued to increase thenceforward. That among the emigrants and settlers on the river, acquainted with the walnut at the mouth of Plantation creek, that tree was reputed and considered as Washington’s upper river corner, and as the lower corner of Harriman’s survey. — To the introduction of this evidence the demandant objected.
    The opinion given by the court relates both to the depositions and the oral testimony. The court decided that the said depositions and oral testimony, so far as they I related to the tradition and reputation of the walnut tree at the mouth of Plantation creek being the upper corner of Washington’s survey, were not proper and competent evidence to prove that fact, unless accompanied by evidence of a possession under his title, and consistent with such tradition and reputation ; but that the said depositions and oral testimony were ad missible to shew that the marks on that tree, and the tradition and reputation in relation thereto, as beforementioned, might have existed as far back as 1786, when Har-riman’s survey was made, and that the said tree might then have been taken and called for by the surveyor of Harriman’s land, as a corner adjoining Washington’s land. *For this purpose the evidence was permitted to go to the jury, to-have such weight as the jury might think it deserved. To which opinion the demand-ant excepted.
    The jury found that the tenant did not hold that part of the land mentioned in the count, lying above Plantation creek, laid down in the plat of the surveyor, and included within certain lines designated by the letters Bf EDCB; and as to that part of the land, they found for the demand-ant, the tenant disclaiming title and tenure thereto. This was land lying wholly above the black walnut. They further found that the tenant had more right to hold the land below Plantation creek, laid down on the-plat, and included within certain lines designated by the letters B I G E B, than the demandant to have it. The land so found for the tenant lay between the black walnut and the point I in Washington’s upper line. Upon this verdict, judgment was rendered in favour of the tenant for the last-mentioned land, with costs; to which judgment the demandant obtained a supersedeas.
    Summers and B. H. Smith, for plaintiff in error.
    Johnson, Craik and Fisher, for defendant in error.
    
      
      Evidence— Depositions — Objections dust Be Specific. —Where evidence is offered, a portion of which is admissible and a portion not, the acceptor must specify the part objected to, for, if the objection is general, it must be overruled. Thus it is the duty of the acceptor to parts of a deposition to point out the exceptional passages contained in the deposition; he must lay his finger upon the passages which in his opinion come within the scope of his objections, so that the mind of the court may be brought to bear upon them. To this effect, the principal case was cited with approval in Parsons v. Harper, 16 Gratt. 76; Trogdon v. Com., 31 Gratt. 868. 875, and/Oí>¿-note\ N. & W. R. Co. v. Ampey, 93 Va. 126,25 S. E. Rep. 226; Washington, etc., R. Co. v. Lacey, 94 Va. 463, 26 S. E. Rep. 834; Richardson v. Donehoo, 16 W. Va. 710; foot-note to Friend v. wilkinson, 9 Gratt. 32. See also, Buster v. Wallace, 4 Hen. & Munf. 82.
      On the subj ect of depositions, see generally, mono-graphic mofe on "Depositions” appended to Field v. Brown, 24 Gratt. 74. As to bills of exception, see monographic note on “Bills of Exception” appended to Sloneman v. Com., 25 Gratt. 887.
    
    
      
      Boundaries-Evidence — Declaration of Deceased Person. — The law is well settled in Virginia that evidence is admissible to prove the declaration of a deceased person as to the identity of a particular corner tree, or boundary, provided such person has peculiar means of knowing the fact in question: as, for instance, the surveyor or chain carriers who were engaged upon the original survey, or the owner of the tract, or of an adjoining tract calling for the same boundaries, and so of tenants, proces-sioners, and others whose duty or interest would lead them to diligent inquiry and accurate information of the fact; always, however, excluding these declarations which are liable to th e suspicion of bias from interest. Fry v. Stowers, 92 Va. 14,22 S. E. Rep. 500, citing principal case. To the same effect, the principal case is cited with approval in Clements v. Kyles, 13 Gratt. 469, 477, 479. 480, and foot-note; Hill v. Proctor. 10 W. Va. 84; Corbleys v. Ripley, 22 W. Va. 158; High v. Pancake, 42 W. Va. 608, 26 S. E. Rep. 588; Robinson v. Dewhurst, 68 Fed. Rep. 338; King v. Watkins, 98 Fed. Rep. 921. InHill v. Proctor, 10 W. Va. 84, Haymond. J., expressing the opinion of the court, saidthatthe above proposition seems to begoodlaw, and that he was not aware that it had been departed from in Virginia or West Virginia.
      In Clements v. Kyles, 13 Gratt. 478, it is said: “But although as stated in the opinion of the court in Boardman v. Reed, 6 Peters’ R. 328, and approved in Ifarrimann. Brown (above cited), from the perishable character of the land marks in this -country, evidence of hearsay as to particular facts may under proper restrictions-be received upon a question of ancient boundary, yet such evidence should be carefully watched because from its very character it may in many or most cases be utterly impossible to meet or disprove it. There must always be some peril in departure from the broad general rules of evidence, and it should not be carried farther than required by the absolute necessities of the case. I think the rule is laid down sufficiently broadly in Karrlmanv, Brown, and I am not disposed to extend it in the least beyond the very terms in which it is there expressed.” In this case (Clements v. Kyles), it was held that the statement of a person, living on the land at the time, made many years before the trial, at which time he was dead, pointing out to the witness two of the corners called for in a certain patent, was not competent evidence to prove the boundaries of that patent; he not having been the surveyor or chain carrier at the making of the survey, or owner of that or adjoining lands calling for the same boundaries, or having any motive or interest to inquire and ascertain the fact.
      To the point that a surveyor’s declarations, whether oral or written, aré not" admissible in evidence where they will contradict the official report of such suveyor upon which the commonwealth has issued a grant, the principal case and Overton v. Davisson. 1 Gratt. 211. 219, are cited in Reusens v. Lawson, 91 Va. 235. 21 S. E. Rep. 347.
    
    
      
      Evidence — Entry in Books of Account by Deceased Person. — On this subject, the principal case was cited in Williamson v. Cline, 40 W. Va. 194, 20 S. E. Rep. 917.
    
   TUCKER, P.

In this case it became important to establish the identity of a black walnut, which the tenant contended was the beginning corner of Harriman’s patent, under which the demandant claimed. His patent call is to adjoin ,the upper end of Washington’s survey, at a large black walnut. Now the acknowledged upper boundary of Washington was about 565 poles, or considerably more than a mile and a half, below the black walnut contended for. And hence it became necessary to ascertain whether this black walnut was the tree referred to in the survey; for if so, it would control the call for Washington’s line, upon the well established principle that natural or artificial boundaries, *which are the objects of the senses, must control the call for ideal boundaries, or for lines which are often matters of conjecture and always liable to be mistaken, and particularly Where (as was the case here) the upper line of Washington was a protracted line. See Baxter v. Evett’s lessee, 7 Monroe 329, 333, 334. In order then to establish the fact that the black walnut was the reputed corner of Harriman, and that in making the survey it was by mistake supposed to "be Washington’s upper corner, the tenant introduced the depositions of Lewis Jones, Benjamin Jones and William Arbuckle. To these depositions the demandant objected. We concur in overruling his objections, for the following very satisfactory reasons, for which X am indebted to my brother Parker.

“Three depositions were offered by the tenant, to the reading of which, and of either of them, the demandant objected, ‘for the reasons indorsed on the deposition of Lewis Jones, which were repeated, as to each of the others, ore tenus. ’

That indorsement objected to the deposition, so far as it gives the belief of the deponent, or others, as to the matters spoken of by him, or the understanding, reputation or tradition of the neighbourhood, it not being competent to prove boundaries between individuals by such, evidence ; also so far as it purports to give the sayings or doings of others, not parties to this suit; that David Milburn is living, and might be used as a witness; that it was not competent to prove what he said or did, even if such testimony was proper, without proving it by himself; that there were some ■questions of a leading character, the answers to which are objected to on that account.

This was the indorsement on the deposition of Lewis Jones. It was not an objection to the whole deposition, on the ground of interest, or any other; and it is palpable that there was much of that deposition which *ought to have been read in evidence, even if some of the demand-ant’s objections were sustainable. Then it was the duty of the party objecting, to point out the exceptionable passages in the depositions, and move the court to expunge or disregard them. The demandant could not object to the reading' of the whole deposition because there were parts of it exceptionable. It certainly was his duty to lay his finger upon the passages which in .his opinion came within the scope of his •objections, so that the mind of the court might be brought to bear upon them, instead of making a motion equivalent to the rejection of all the depositions; a motion which the court could not legally sustain. See Buster’s ex’or v. Wallace, 4 Hen. & Munf. 82.

The objections indorsed upon Jones’s deposition were perhaps all of them unfounded. Milburn was an interested witness, and could not have been examined "by the tenant. He had married the widow, who was entitled to dower in all the land in controversy; and it is not shewn by the demandant that Milburn’s wife was dead. Being alive in the year 1795, the presumption was that at the time of the trial she was still living, unless the contrary was shewn. But even if Milburn was living and competent to give evidence, it is not perceived how the evidence of Jones, connected with Milburn, was incompetent. He speaks of facts, and not of mere declarations on the part of Milburn. Milburn put his father in possession of the land as Shadrach Har-riman’s. He had married the widow, was guardian to the children, and in either character was entitled to rent the land. He also shewed the corners to his tenant, which corners, as the witness say's, were then well understood in the country to be the true corners. It is then not a mere declaration of Milburn that the witness gives in evidence, but it is an act, to wit, the shewing of certain corner trees, which the general reputation of the neighbour-hood fixed upon as the corners to Har-riman’s *land. How could it be illegal evidence for Jones to speak of being shewn corners (no matter by whom) ‘which every person in the country, who knew any thing of the laud surveys, called and believed to be Washington’s,’ — unless this last evidence of general reputation was inadmissible? The act of shewing the corner trees was one thing; the evidence establishing them as the true corners of the land, another. Even if Milburn’s shewing certain trees as the corners of the land was not evidence to establish them as corners, the fact that he pointed out trees, which by other evidence are established as true corners, could not be rejected. The same remarks apply to Benjamin Jones’s deposition; and as to Arbuckle’s, the objections indorsed do not, in several respects, touch it.”

It is objected, however, that evidence of reputation as to boundary is inadmissible, and that for this reason also the testimony introduced was improper.

Questions of boundary, after the lapse of many years, become of necessity questions of hearsay and reputation. For boundaries are artificial, arbitrary, and often perishable ; and when a generation or two have passed away, they cannot be established by the testimony of eyewitnesses. In such cases, therefore, it becomes necessary to look to reputation, or depend upon hearsay evidence of the former existence and actual locality'of an artificial boundary. “That boundaries may be proved by hearsay testimony,” says the supreme court, “is a rule well settled, and the necessity or propriety of which is not now questioned. Land marks are frequently formed of perishable materials, which pass away with the generation in which they were made. By the improvement of the country, and from other causes, they are often destroyed. It is therefore important in many cases, that hearsay or reputation should be received to establish ancient boundaries.” Boardman v. Reed, 6 Peters 328, 341. The reasons for admitting *evidence of reputation are so obvious, indeed, that they are forcibly stated even by those who fall short of our doctrines on this subject. See 1 Starkie on Evid. 54, 56. “Some of these facts,” says this author (boundary is one of those of which he was speaking) “from their antiquity, do not admit of direct proof by living witnesses, and consequently resort must be had to the best means of proof which the nature of the case affords. This consists in the traditionary declarations, in relation to matters of antiquity, of those who were likely to have possessed a knowledge on the subject, derived from their own observation or the information of others. Upon questions of fact to which antiquity is essential, as prescription, custom or boundary, the evi-deuce of living witnesses is of little avail. For any knowledge concerning such rights, drawn from times more remote, recourse must be had to reputation and tradition.” It is singular that with such conclusive reasons in favour of this kind of proof in cases of boundary, the english courts, which recognize them, should have been inclined to confine the principle to public boundaries, such as the boundaries of manors, parishes, highways, and the like, and exclude its operation in a dispute about boundary between two private estates. 1 Starkie’s Evid.; 62 14 East 331; 3 Bac. Abr. Evidence, K. From these authorities it would seem that this has been and still continues vexata quaastio. I shall therefore abandon them, and seek for guidance from the light of reason and from the american cases.

Before I proceed with our enquiry, I beg leave to quote the remarks of justice Story upon this subject of evidence. “It is obvious,” says he, “that as the rules of evidence are founded upon general interest and convenience, they must from time to time admit of modifications, to adapt them to the actual condition and business of men, or they would work manifest injustice; and lord Ellenborough has very justly observed that they *must expand according to the exigencies of society.” 8 Wheat 332. “We are not,” says lord Mansfield, “to sit here, to take our rules of evidence from Keble or from Siderfin.” And if a rigorous adherence to antiquated rules of evidence would be inexpedient or unjust in the english courts, what differences, what expansions of those rules must not necessarily arise in a new country like ours, conquered from the savage, and granted out to private adventurers while it still remained a wilderness. Because we have not manors, shall we therefore lose the benefit of the rule which considers boundarj- as matter of reputation, and permits hearsay evidence of its locality? If a like state of things exists among us, if the principle will be found to apply in its utmost strictness, shall we reject the evidence because the case is not identical7 By no means. What then is the avowed principle on which the distinction rests in the english courts? “In questions concerning public rights, reputation is admissible; for in such cases all mankind are considered as interested in preserving the evidence.” Bac. Abr. ubi supra. “Upon questions of public right, all are interested, and must be presumed conversant with them; and this is the distinction taken between public and private rights.” Per lord Ellenborough, 1 Maule & Selw. 686. “Evidence of reputation upon general points as receivable, because all mankind being interested therein, it is natural to suppose that they may be conversant with the subjects, and that they would discourse together about them, having all the same means of information.” Per lord Kenyon. What language can be more appropriate to the case of land adventurers in our western country? That country was covered with entries and surveys between fifty and sixty years ago, and it was often many years after a survey was made, before the tracts taken up were settled by their owners. Thousands have never yet seen their lands. The impossibility, in innumerable instances, *of proving marked corners by eyewitnesses is apparent. What is to supply that lost evidence? If reputation is admissible to establish the boundaries of a manor, because all the tenants of the manor are interested therein, and are naturally conversant about the boundary, and may be presumed to discourse together about it, what shall we say in the case of our wild lands, which were covered with early adventurers, whose chief concern was to make themselves acquainted with the lines and corners of all around them? Every one, who knows any thing of the history of that country, must know the deep interest and familiar knowledge which the early settlers possessed in relation to the corners and boundaries and localities, not only of their own particular tract, but of almost every tract within range of their settlement. Every one knows that such subjects were not only the familiar topics of conversation, but that they were the all absorbing topics. I will venture to conjecture that for one discussion in private conversation as to the boundaries of an english manor, there have been a hundred animated and interested debates about the situation of a corner tree in our western counties. I take it, therefore, that every motive for the admission of hearsay testimony as to boundary in case of a manor, applies with equal force to its admission in questions of boundary with us. I coincide in the opinion cited from Peters, that “boundaries may be proved by hearsay testimony.” The testimony so admitted must however be that of a witness who is dead; for if living he ought himself to be brought forward. I rely also on the case of Ralston &c. v. Miller &c., 3 Rand. 44, although it was a question as to the boundaries of town lots, which perhaps, upon the strictest principles, may be considered as falling within even the english decisions.

The question still recurs, however, whether evidence may be introduced to prove the declarations of a witness *as to a particular fact, or merely as to general reputation. Thus, admitting the declarations of a witness that this black walnut was the reputed corner, to be proper, should we admit his declarations of the fact that that tree was pointed out to him, by a person who is dead or disqualified, as the true corner?

The doctrine in England, as laid down in the books, is that though hearsay is good evidence in matters of reputation, yet a particular fact cannot be proved by tradi-tionary evidence. Outram v. Morewood, 5 T. R. 123; 1 Starkie on Evid. 61. Yet, notwithstanding this general rule, there are cases which form exceptions to it. Thus, the written memorandum of a father as to the time of the birth of his son may be given in evidence. 1 Starkie on Evid. 70, 71. Yet this is but hearsay reduced to-writing, and hearsay of a particular fact which is perfectly susceptible of proof aliunde. So the written entry, of a surveyor, or his survey, which is made and returned under the sanction of an oath, would toe evidence. Again, the entry of a clerk charging goods to a party is good evidence of the fact of delivery, if the clerk be dead. 1 Starkie on Evid. 72. Yet this is direct evidence, not on oath, to a particular fact which may be otherwise proved. Why then is it admitted? “Because,” says the author, “he had peculiar means of knowledge, and made it in the course of a particular routine of business, at the same time, or nearly so, with the supposed act.” 1 Starkie 72. So with the surveyor. His survey is made in the course of an official routine of business, and he had peculiar means of knowing the facts which it sets forth. So in Nicholls v. Webb, 8 Wheat. 326, the notary’s books were admitted, after his decease, as evidence of the particular facts of a demand of payment and notice of nonpayment; and pari ratione the survey must be admissible to prove a particular fact. Thus, then, it would seem that the written declarations *of a party having peculiar means of information are admissible. How is it as to parol declarations?

In Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch 290, the distinction was strongly taken between general evidence of reputation, and hearsay evidence as to a particular fact. This case was firmly relied on by judge Carr in Gregory v. Baugh, 2 Leigh 665, and cited with approbation also by judge Brooke. The court was divided upon the question, judges Green and Cabell deeming the evidence of the particular fact admissible and proper. Judge Green observed that “all evidence, whether direct or by hearsay and reputation, consists in the proof of specific or particular facts. The general rule is indeed as laid down; but there are admitted exceptions, depending upon no arbitrary decisions of courts of justice, but upon sound principles of necessity and reason, according to the nature of the facts. If the fact be of such a nature as that, in the ordinary course of things, if it really existed, it might reasonably be expected that direct evidence of it would also exist, hearsay or reputation is inadmissible. But pedigree is an exception to the rule, and may be proved by hearsay and reputation. ” He then proceeds to shew that pedigree consists exclusively of specific facts, among which he enumerates identity. All this applies most strongly to the proof of the identity of a corner tree, by proof of the declarations of a deceased witness. It is a fact which, in the ordinary course of things, after a generation has passed away, never can be proved by direct evidence, where the artificial boundary has been destroyed by time; and titles must be insecitre, if this species of evidence is not admitted to establish the locality of a corner, where the marked tree has been destroyed. Accordingly, in the case of Gregory v. Baugh, I understand judge Brooke (who resisted the evidence in that case) to admit that in our country, in cases of boundary, such *evidence of particular facts must be admitted. The same thing is also decided by the supreme court (as I understand the case, already cited from Peters’s Reports) where the court is reported to have said that “boundaries may be proved by hearsay testimony. ’ ’ It is difficult indeed to understand why reputation that a particular tree is the boundary should be evidence, when the direct testimony of the man who knows the fact, and marked the tree, is not so. Both are equally without oath, and the latter has the advantage of the former, not only in being at the foundation, but also in the uncertainty which always hangs around matters of mere reputation, as to the accuracy of the source from whence it has been derived.

I hold, then, clearly, that evidence is admissible to prove the declarations of a deceased person as to the identity of a particular corner tree or boundary, provided such person had peculiar means of knowing the fact; as, for instance, the surveyor or chain carrier who were engaged upon the original survey, or the owner of the tract, or of an adjoining tract calling for the same boundaries; and so of tenants, pro-cessioners, and others whose duty or interest would lead them to diligent enquiry and accurate information of the fact; always, however, excluding those declarations which are liable to the suspicion of bias from interest. If these principles be true, the declarations of Milburn against his own interest (if they are to be considered as declarations) were properly introduced; for that is a sanction for his veracity which the law has always respected; and as he could not be compelled to testify, his admissions ought to be received as if he were dead. See, on this subject, Starkie on Evid. part 4, p. 42, in note, citing 1 Esp. N. P. Cas. 458. See also 2 T. R. 54; 5 T. R. 121.

As to the evidence respecting the hunting party, it appears to me to be fairly incidental to the evidence of *reputation. For it is always proper to enquire into the source from which reputation arises; since peradventure it may have sprung from an improper source. Thus, if Arbuckle had derived his information from Slaughter alone, his evidence would have been assailable, as the tenant claims under Slaughter.

Lastly, as to the entry.. That the entry of a party may sometimes be admitted in evidence before the jury, to identify the calls of the patent, is acknowledged to have been decided by this court in Camden et al. v. Haskill, 3 Rand. 462. In this case the entry was rejected by the same judge who had, upon the trial, admitted it in the case just cited. I think there is much reason for distinction between the two cases. In Camden et al. v. Haskill, the patent called for “a white oak and beech, corner to a survey of 40,000 acres made for David Lockwood;” without any further description. The white oak and beech claimed by the plaintiff were proved to be “80 poles below the falls of Little Kana-wha, on the north side thereof.” The plaintiff introduced a copy of the entry on which his patent was founded, which called to begin at “a white oak and beech on the north bank of the Little Kanawha, 80 poles below the falls thereof,” Now this entry did not control or contradict the patent. It only explained it, and identified the call, which in the patent itself was left indefinite. But in this case the patent call “to adjoin the upper end of Washington’s survey, ata large black walnut;” and thus refers to a certain, visible, actual boundary, which controls the call for the Washington survey, the location of which was mere matter of conjecture, and might easily have been mistaken, and in point of fact was mistaken. Taking the patent without the entry, the black walnut controls the other call. For what, then, was the entry to be introduced? It was, to counteract this legitimate construction of the patent, and to lead the jury to believe *that the plaintiff had a right to go to Washington’s survey, wherever it might be. Whether it ought to have this effect or not, it was illegal testimony. If it would have the effect, it would contradict and control the patent; if not, it would be irrelevant, and therefore improper, as only calculated to embarrass and mislead the jury. I think, therefore, it was properly rejected, and that there is no error in the judgment of the circuit superiour court; which must therefore be affirmed.

The other judges concurred. Judgment affirmed.  