
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joel Arnoldo GUERRERO-ALMODOVAR, a.k.a. Joel Guerrero-Almodovar, Defendant-Appellant.
    Nos. 16-50370, 15-50372
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 26, 2017
    
    Filed July 3, 2017
    Benjamin Joseph Katz, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, Helen H. Hong, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Nicole Ríes Fox, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Timothy Garrison, Trial Attorney, Doug Keller, Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, Defendant-Appellant
    Before: PAEZ, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

In these consolidated appeals, Joel Ar-noldo Guerrero-Almodovar challenges the 63-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for attempted reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and the 12-month-and-one-day consecutive sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Guerrero-Almodovar contends that the district court erred in applying a 16-level enhancement under U-S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2014) because his pri- or conviction under California Penal Code § 211 is not a crime of violence. This claim is foreclosed. See United States v. Becerril-Lopez, 541 F.3d 881, 893 & n.10 (9th Cir. 2008) (robbery conviction under California Penal Code § 211 is categorically a crime of violence). Contrary to Guerrero-Almodovar’s assertion, Descamps v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013), which concerns the modified categorical approach, does not allow us to disregard Becerril-Lopez. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (three-judge panel is bound by circuit precedent unless that precedent is “clearly irreconcilable” with the reasoning of an intervening higher authority).

Guerrero-Almodovar next contends that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment by increasing his sentence on the basis of a prior felony conviction that was not found by a jury. As he concedes, this claim is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), which continues to bind this Court. See United States v. Leyva-Martinez, 632 F.3d 568, 569 (9th Cir. 2011) (order) (“We have repeatedly held ... that Almendarez-Torres is binding unless it is expressly overruled by the Supreme Court.”).

Finally, Guerrero-Almodovar argues that the district court denied him his right of allocution before sentencing him on his violation of supervised release. The record belies this claim. During a consolidated hearing, the court invited Guerrero-Almo-dovar to speak before imposing sentence on his new conviction for illegal reentry and his violation of supervised release. Thus, Guerrero-Almodovar was given “an opportunity to make a statement and present any information in mitigation,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(E), before the sentence was imposed. See United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 666 (9th Cir. 1998).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     