
    Rigs, Aertson & Son vs. Cage, Adm’r.
    The death of the principalis an absolute and instantaneous revocation of the authority of an agent, and all acts done by the agent after the death of the principal, though done in good faith, and in ignorance of the death of the principal, are void.
    ' William Cage and Marcus Cage were merchants and partners in trade in Lagrange, Tennessee. They constituted Bledsoe their .agent to purchase goods for them in Philadelphia. Wiliam Cage died about the middle of August, 1836. Before a knowledge of this event reached Bledsoe, he had purchased of Rigs, Aertson & Son, merchants and partners in Philadelphia, goods, wares and merchandise of the value of $425. The death of William Cage was also unknown to Rigs, Aertson & Son at the time of sale. The goods were shipped and received by the surviving partner, M. Cage, and by him appropriated.
    On the 1st day of September, 1836, after the death of W. Cage, Marcus Cage executed and delivered to Rigs, Aerston & Son, a promissory note for the sum due, to wit, $425, payable six months after date, acknowledging value received, and signed “William Cage & Co.”
    James D. Cage administered upon the estate of William Cage. On the 27th day of June, 1839, Rigs, Aertson & Son instituted an action of assumpsit in the circuit court of Fayette county against James D. Cage, administrator .of William Cage deceased. Plaintiffs’ declaration contained two counts; the first, on the note, and the second for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered. The defendant pleaded non detinet and non est factum to the first count, and non-assumpsit to the second.
    Upon these pleas issues were made up, and they were submitted to a jury upon the above facts at the September term, 1840. Bailey, special judge, charged the jury that the death of a partner, ipso facto, dissolved the partnership; that Bledsoe’s agency terminated at the death of William Cage, and if the goods were sold and delivered to the agent after the death of the principal, the administrator was not chargeable with the value, and the ignorance of the vendors, and of the agent, of the death of W. Cage, at the time of the sale, could not alter the result.
    The jury returned a verdict for defendant, upon which judgment was rendered, a motion for a new trial having been overruled. Plaintiffs appealed in error.
    
      McLanahan, for Rigs, Aertson & Son.
    
      Searcy, for Cage.
   Green, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

The only question in this case is, do the acts of an agent performed after the death of the principal, in pursuance of authority previously given, and in ignorance of the death of the principal, bind the representative of the latter?,

The general principal of the common law is, that an authority conferred by letter of attorney, must be executed during the life of the principal. 1 Bac. Ab. Tit. Authority E. The death of the principal is an instantaneous and absolute revocation of the authority of the agent, unless the power be coupled with an interest. 2 Kent’s Com. 645.

In this case, William Cage, the defendant’s intestate, was dead when the goods were purchased in Philadelphia by Bledsoe the agent. They have never come into the hands of the administrator, but were received by the surviving partner and appropriated by him. Let the judgment be affirmed. ■"'’LL'  