
    Luz AQUINO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PNC MORTGAGE; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-17170
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 13, 2018 
    
    Filed February 26, 2018
    Luz Aquino, Pro Se
    Andrew A. Bao, Attorney, Wolfe & Wy-man, LLP, Walnut Creek, CA, Colt B. Dodrill, Attorney, Wolfe & Wyman LLP, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees PNC Mortgage, PNC Bank, N.A.
    Laurel I. Handley, Anthony R. Sassi, Esquire, Aldridge Pite, LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Clear Recon Corporation
    Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Luz Aquino appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), Fair Credit Reporting Act, and state law claims related to á mortgage on real property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Aquino’s FDCPA claim against PNC Bank, N.A. because Aquino failed to allege facts sufficient to show that PNC was a debt collector under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(ii) (excluding from the definition of debt collector a creditor collecting debts on its behalf); Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 720 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff “must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that [the defendant] is a debt collector” (citation internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Aquino’s FDCPA claim against Clear Recon Corporation because Aquino failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d-1692g. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid' dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly ■ raised and argued in -the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     