
    YONG CI JIANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-2093-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 8, 2011.
    
      Khaghendra Gharti-Chhetry, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Ernesto H. Molina, Jr., Assistant Director; Yanal H. Yousef, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, GERARD E. LYNCH, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Yong Ci Jiang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April 30, 2010, order of the BIA, affirming, upon reconsideration, the December 17, 2007, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Thomas J. Mulligan, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and denying his motion to reopen. In re Yong Ci Jiang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 30, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 17, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

I. Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). For applications governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also In re J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260, 265 (BIA 2007). Analyzed under the REAL ID Act, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence.

In finding Jiang’s testimony not credible, the IJ relied in part on his demeanor, noting that when confronted with questions that raised doubts as to his credibility on cross-examination, he “conveyed the impression that he was crying” in a manner that was “clearly contrived.” Because the IJ was in the best position to observe Jiang’s manner while testifying, we afford his demeanor finding particular deference. See Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 73-74 (2d Cir.2004), overruled on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir.2007). Moreover, because the agency, in conjunction with the demeanor finding, identified an inconsistency in Jiang’s testimony, we may more confidently rely on the IJ’s finding. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir.2006).

Reliance by the agency on an inconsistency in Jiang’s testimony regarding whether he paid a fine to family planning officials was reasonable. See Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Jiang argues that his testimony was not inconsistent, because he never explicitly testified that he personally paid the fine, and he meant that his mother paid the fine while he was in hiding. Review of the record, however, supports the agency’s understanding of Jiang’s testimony and its finding that his testimony was inconsistent. See Borovikova v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 435 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that while the Court “can never be certain that the IJ correctly evaluated a petitioner’s truthfulness, the statute that governs our review rests on the presumption that the IJ is in a better position than a reviewing tribunal to decide such questions”); see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that the agency need not credit an applicant’s explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so).

Ultimately, because a reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled to make contrary findings, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 446 F.3d 289, 294 (2d Cir.2006). Because Jiang’s withholding of removal and CAT claims were based on the same factual predicate as his asylum claim, the adverse credibility determination is dispositive. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (withholding of removal); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005) (CAT).

II. Motion to Reopen

We have reviewed the BIA’s denial of Jiang’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006), mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that motions to reopen are “disfavored,” see Maghradze v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir.2006). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jiang’s motion to reopen based on his failure to establish his prima facie eligibility for relief. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

Jiang argues that the BIA improperly discounted a notice instructing him to report for sterilization, which he submitted with his motion to reopen. However, in light of the agency’s reasonable adverse credibility determination, the BIA did not err in finding that this document was insufficient to rehabilitate Jiang’s credibility given that the notice does not resolve the inconsistency in Jiang’s testimony or the problem with his demeanor, and was thus insufficient to demonstrate his prima facie eligibility for relief. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir.2005). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jiang’s motion to reopen. See id.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  