
    Blackmore vs. Barker et als.
    
    Chancery. Judgment. Notice. The purchaser of property, sold under a decree of the chancery court, becomes a quasi party to the cause so far as relates to the rights and duties that properly appertain to his purchase under the decree, and hence if he fail to pay the purchase money or any' part thereof at the time it becomes due, the court may, upon motion, and without any notice to him, enter judgment and award execution against him for the purchase money remaining unpaid.
    This was a judgment rendered upon the facts stated in the opinion, at the April Term, 1852, of the chancery court at Gallatin, Chancellor Ridley, presiding; from which the defendants appealed.
    JohN J. "White, for plaintiff,
    argued: It has been decided by this court in the case of Deaderiek vs. Smith, 6 Ilumph., 146, that the court has the power to enforce its own decrees; that it has under its control all the sales made by its order until a final disposition is made of the cause; that the purchaser at a sale is a party to the cause, and that his securities by their undertaking become subject to all his liabilities. To be sure, in the statement of the case, it appears that notice was served upon the parties; but the court do not decide the case upon that ground.
    This court, in another case, 8 ITumph., 520, say that where the purchase is made on a credit, the court will, upon application, see that the money is fairly paid to those entitled, before the purchaser will be invested with the title. See, too, -10 Humph., 81.
    MramAY, for defendants,
    argued: 1Tas a chameellor jpower to decree the payment of the purchase money, at a sale made under a decree in chancery, and award execution against the purchaser and his sureties, where 
      
      notice has not leen gimen the pmfiies, nor an order made upon them to pay the money into court, ly a specified day, or on faikm to do so, the cowrt will le moved for a decree cmd execution, agcdnst them to force the payment of the same ? We insist that the chancellor has no such power, either by the acts of assembly, or by the powers which are “properly cmd rightfully incident to a court of chancerythat such is not the regular practice of a court of chcmcery in this country, or elsewhere; that it cannot be sustained by the an-, alogous practice in the chancery court of England, when proceeding in similar cases; that in point of fact, the plaintiffs in this case had no notice of the proceeding, until after the decree was pronounced' and execution awarded. Deadriek et als. vs. Smith et dls., 6 Humph., 138; Woods vs. Mcmn, 3 Sumner’s Rep., 318.
   Totten, J".,

delivered the opinion of the. court.

The defendants executed to the plaintiff, as clerk and master of the chancery court at Q-allatin, two notes for two thousand three hundred and eleven dollars each; the same being for the purchase money of land sold by the clerk and master nnder a decree of that court.

On the 12th of April, 1852, on motion and without formal notice, the said court rendered judgmeut against defendants for a balance of three thousand five hundred dollars due on said xibtes, and awarded execution; whereupon, the defendants appealed to this court.

The error assigned is, that no notice of the motion was given to defendants. This judgment is supported by Deadrick vs. Smith, 6 Humph. R., 146, where the powers of a court of chancery, in this respect, are clearly and fully stated. It is true that no 'notice was given in that case; but it is not alluded to in the opinion as being necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction aforesaid.

The court must have power to enforce its judgments and decrees. “It has under its control all sales made by its order, until a final disposition is made of the cause.” The purchaser of property becomes a quasi party to the cause, so far as relates to the rights and duties that properly appertain to his purchase under the decree. Pie may, therefore, by petition merely, as a party already in court, and without formal bill, present any matter in relation to the sale, that his rights and interests may require; Read vs. Fite, 8 Humph. R., 328; as that a title be made to him on ■ his compliance with the conditions of the sale, or that he be absolved from his contract, by reason of defect of title, and the like; so, on the contrary, is he liable to the action of the court to enforce the compliance with the conditions of the sale. This may be by proceeding m personam in conformity to the practice of chancery in England, (2 Madd. Ch. Pr., 402,) or by judgment and execution as in cases at law under a statute of the State, 1787, ch. 22.

Now, as the purchaser under a decree becomes a party to the suit, as to every thing that relates to the sale, he is already before the court, as another party is before it, to demand his rights or to perform his duties and obligations in relation thereto. The notice, if given, could only be necessary -and have the effect to bring him before the court, and as he is already before it, the notice is useless. It must follow, that in such case, a judgment without formal notice is valid.

It is argued that the' practice may be inconvenient where the purchaser has defence, and is not present at the rendition of tbe judgment; as, where payments have been made or tbe title is defective. But this defence be may still make by petition to tbe chancellor, and tbe judgment will not preclude him from taking such action as tbe equity of- tbe case may require. Besides, it may in many instances be inconvenient or impossible to give notice to tbe party, and we are not to presume that, as a purchaser merely, be has a solicitor in court to whom tbe notice may certainly be given. If there be any objection to, or compliance with tbe sale, tbe purchaser should make it in reasonable time; if none, be should comply with its conditions, and bis contract is sufficient notice to him of tbe time and nature of its performance, and for which be has become liable to tbe action of tbe court.

’Us true, that tbe Act 1832, cb. 92, in relation to sales by order and decree of tbe county court, requires that five days’ notice be given before judgment in that court for. tbe purchase money. But this is a special jurisdiction conferred by tbe statute, and it provides tbe manner in which it shall be exercised. It has no reference to tbe more appropriate proceeding in chancery, and requires no notice in that court, which is but another argument in support of tbe position that we should not require it.

Affirm tbe judgment.  