
    RONG JING WU, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    14-2228
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 23, 2017
    FOR PETITIONER: Lee Ratner, Law Offices of Michael Brown, P.C., New York, NY.
    FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Russell J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation Counsel; John D. Williams, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions, III, is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch as the Respondent in this case.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Rong Jing Wu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 2, 2014 decision of the BIA affirming a September 10, 2012 decision of an Immigration judge (“IJ”) denying Wu’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Rong Jing Wu, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 2, 2014), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Sept. 10, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s opinion, “including the portions not explicitly discussed by the BIA.” Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

We have held that although remand may be “required because of [an] IJ’s apparent bias and hostility toward” a petitioner, such cases are “rare,” Guo-Le Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 2006). Wu argues that this is one of those rare cases.

Wu’s argument is based on the fact that, of the several inconsistencies identified by the IJ, the major one was elicited by the IJ’s own questioning, rather than that of the government attorney. Wu asks us to infer from this fact that the IJ was biased. We decline to do so. The IJ was complying with his statutory obligation to “interrogate, examine, and cross-examine.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(l). Moreover, an IJ may rely on dramatic inconsistencies without seeking explanation. Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2006). According an applicant an opportunity to rehabilitate inconsistent testimony therefore does not violate due process. Beyond the inference that she asks us to draw, Wu has identified no comments or questions by the IJ that raise eyen a slight suggestion of bias. Cf. Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 490-93 (2d Cir. 2008); Guo-Le Huang, 453 F.3d at 149. Accordingly, the IJ did not violate Wu’s due process rights, and there is no cause for remand.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).  