
    THE FLORIDA BAR. In re AMENDMENT TO the INTEGRATION RULE AND the BYLAWS OF the FLORIDA BAR DUES.
    No. 53726.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    May 12, 1978.
    The Board of Governors of the Florida Bar, Russell Troutman, President, Winter Park, Robert L. Floyd, President-elect, Miami, Marshall R. Cassedy, Executive Director, and Norman A. Faulkner, Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, for The Florida Bar, petitioner.
    Jay H. Beckerman, Tallahassee, and Charles Friend, Tallahassee, for respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

This matter is before us on petition of The Florida Bar to amend Article VIII of the Integration Rule relating to dues, Article XVII of the Integration Rule relating to the Clients’ Security Fund, and Article XVI of the Bylaws relating to the Clients’ Security Fund. The Bar requests that this Court amend Article VIII by increasing the maximum amount of annual dues which The Florida Bar is authorized to set from $75.00 to $125.00 per year and amend Article XVII by increasing the amount which may be allocated from the annual dues of members of The Florida Bar to the Clients’ Security Fund from $10.00 to $15.00.

Petitioner contends that an increase in dues is essential to adequately fund the disciplinary program of the Bar since the dramatic increase in the number of Florida lawyers and the effect of inflation have severely taxed the ability of the Bar, in the area of discipline, to meet its obligations to the public and to the legal profession with current revenues. Under the current budget, petitioner submits, the disciplinary process of the Bar is unable to expeditiously process grievances, while under the recommended increase in dues, the grievance process would be budgeted an increase of approximately 130% over the previous budget, which would permit much speedier disposition of grievances. The Bar cites the report of the Supreme Court Special Committee on Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures for the recognition by the Committee of the need for increased funding for the disciplinary program. The Chairman of the Committee, in his letter submitting the report of the Committee, stated:

If our recommendations are accepted, The Florida Bar staff will have to be expanded. We are mindful that this will require the expenditure of additional money and that an increase in income to the Bar will have to be provided. We do not apologize for this fact, however, because the recommendations are deemed to be highly desirable and the cost involved will be money well spent in developing a better system and fostering increased confidence in the process.

Petitioner also contends that additional funding of the Clients’ Security Fund is necessary to continue a viable program of reimbursing clients. It says that the present appropriation of $5.00 per lawyer per year is not sufficient to meet the needs of this fund.

Petitioner specifies the other areas of Bar activity which will benefit from the increase in dues, including membership records, public affairs and lawyer information services. It alleges that increases in the funding of these departments will result in greater service by the Bar to its members.

Due notice was published in The Florida Bar News, and the petition was set for oral argument. All interested parties were given an opportunity to be heard. Having been fully advised in this matter, we find that The Florida Bar has made an adequate showing for increasing the maximum dues to be charged from $75.00 to $125.00. However, any increase in dues must be authorized by the membership of The Florida Bar at its annual meeting. The next meeting of the membership will be on June 16,1978, at the 1978 annual convention.

In order to be able to exercise his or her right to vote for or against the proposed increase in bar dues, a member of the Bar must be physically present at the Bar convention meeting. At oral argument, opponents of the dues increase alleged that to attend the Bar convention a member of the Bar must pay a registration fee of $55.00 and that, in effect, the payment of $55.00 becomes a prerequisite to a member of the Bar being permitted to vote. If such a prerequisite does, in fact, exist, we find it to be unreasonable and hold that members of the Bar should be- given an opportunity to vote on any question at the business meeting without payment of a convention registration fee. This holding, however, does not require that Bar members who have not paid the registration fee be allowed to participate in other convention activities. We hereby direct the Bar to devise a method by which members of the Bar may attend the business meeting at the convention to vote on the increase, and other matters of Bar business there considered, without payment of the $55.00 convention registration fee.

The following amendments to the Integration Rule and the Bylaws proposed by The Florida Bar are, therefore, approved:

Article VIII
DUES
1. On or before July 1, 1978.4976, and on or before July 1 of each year thereafter, every active member of The Florida Bar shall pay annual dues to The Florida Bar in such an amount as shall be set at an annual meeting, and shall also file with the executive director a statement setting forth his business and residential addresses and any other information that may be required by the Board of Governors, provided that at no annual meeting shall the dues be fixed at more than S125.0Q per annum.
Article XVII
CLIENTS’ SECURITY FUND
2. The Board of Governors may allocate from the annual dues of the members of The Florida Bar not more than $15.00 $-10.00 per member per annum to a Clients’ Security Fund.
Bylaws
Article XVI
CLIENTS’ SECURITY FUND
3. Administration and Funding:
The fund shall be administered in accordance with regulations to be adopted by the Board. The committee shall have such duties in the administration of the fund as shall from time to time be prescribed by the Board. The Board shall allocate to the fund from the annual dues of the members of the Bar not more than $15 $10 per member per annum, and the Board is authorized to accept for the fund any contribution or gift offered to it for use in furtherance of the purposes of the fund.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C. J., and BOYD, SUND-BERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.

ENGLAND, J., concurs with an opinion, with which OVERTON, C. J., and SUND-BERG, J., concur.

HATCHETT, J., specially concurs with an opinion.

ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion.

ENGLAND, Justice,

concurring.

The attorneys who are here protesting the Bar’s proposed $50 dues increase have focused our attention on an issue critical to this controversy but infrequently discussed in public — whether The Florida Bar should function under a republican form of government with elected representatives, as is presently the case, or whether it should be operated under the autocratic authority of this Court. This issue underlies the pleas of the protestants that we reject the recommendation of the elected board of the Bar for a variety of policy and evidentiary reasons. I concur in approving the board’s recommendation because I believe the decision on the fundamental issue of governance was made in years past, and the protestants suggest no compelling reason why autocracy should now supplant democracy in the Bar.

The concerns of the protestants with “fat in the budget” of The Florida Bar, and with a misallocation of priorities, are arguments properly addressed to the board of governors through every Florida lawyer’s elected representatives in the judicial circuits of the state. We have provided the mechanism to elect board members and we established elaborate procedures to assure openness and responsibility in the budget preparation process. Under our rules, a committee of The Florida Bar is obliged to prepare a tentative budget for the forthcoming fiscal year which is made available to all members of The Florida Bar, by publication, for commentary and criticism. The budget committee is required to receive and hear all comments at a public meeting, following which a proposed budget is prepared for submission to the full board. The proposed budget is then published in the Bar Journal, together with notice of a meeting to be held on a specific date to consider and adopt a final budget.

If members of The Florida Bar do not avail themselves of the processes we have created to voice their concerns with the level and direction of Bar expenditures, or if having done so their positions are rejected, this Court cannot be expected to override the deliberative judgment of the board based solely on the entreaties of those aggrieved. Members’ supervision of the Bar is tantamount to the superintendence of the people over their legislative and congressional delegates. If those delegates do not reflect the views of the majority of the governed, the electoral process is essentially the only available means by which to effect change.

The role of the Supreme Court in the budget process must be limited not only by the procedures we have created for direct control by the membership of the Bar, but as well by the practicalities of Bar governance. Although we must approve any increase in the dues “cap”, we have delegated to the board, and to the membership of the Bar through its ratification or rejection of any dues increase, the responsibility to adopt a budget that is suitable for the priorities which the organized Bar deems essential to the discharge of its assigned duties. Our responsibility when confronted with a dues increase, it seems to me, is limited to assuring that the purposes proposed by the board for new monies are within the scope of the Bar’s responsibility as the agent of this Court to improve the administration of justice in Florida. Clearly, the board’s objectives with respect to the $50 dues increase which is now sought are within that ambit — indeed, 95% of the dues increase will be allocated to a responsibility which this Court has persistently urged the Bar to undertake more vigorously and more expeditiously. Our only other role with respect to the financial operations of the Bar is a post-expenditure audit review (a function we share with the membership at large), to assure that the .funds which were budgeted have been spent and accounted for properly. Beyond these two limited functions, the organized Bar in Florida is largely self-governing in financial matters, as fully as a democratic society with a republican form of government.

The members of the board were well aware of the dissatisfaction which their proposed dues increase would engender. They now face voter response to the same extent that Florida legislators face the response of the voters when they adopt a tax increase. That is extraneous to this proceeding, however. Nothing brought to us by the protestants suggests that the board acted without regard to the interests of the public and its membership, or that it.proceeded in violation of the rules of procedure established for the budget process. Mere disagreement with the details and breadth of the board’s budget cannot be a basis for Court intercession. More significantly, any dissatisfaction with the dues increase itself can be expressed directly and unequivocally by the vote of the membership at the annual convention.

For these reasons, I join, in approving a $50 increase in the dues “cap”, subject to membership approval or rejection at The Florida Bar Convention under the revised voting procedures prescribed in the majority opinion.

OVERTON, C. J., and SUNDBERG, J., concur.

HATCHETT, Justice,

specially concurring.

I join the majority in authorizing the membership of The Florida Bar to vote on whether or not to impose a dues increase from $75 to a maximum of $125 per year by amending Article XVII of the Integration Rule.

For the past two and a half years, if not longer, this court has increasingly criticized The Florida Bar regarding disciplinary procedures and delays in the handling of discipline cases against lawyers. In fact, this court created a committee, known as the Karl Committee, to study the grievance procedure and to make recommendations for change. That report has been filed with the court and will soon be reviewed for adoption or rejection. While it is yet unclear the action that the court will take on this report, it is clear that additional funds will be needed to streamline grievance procedures and assure to the accused lawyer a speedy determination of the charges. Ninety five percent of the requested dues increase is allocated for this important aspect of the Bar’s program. Central to the Bar’s existence is the duty to discipline its members. When the Bar is no longer able to carry out this function, its reason for existence will be lost.

While I generally agree with Justice England’s analysis of the relationship between this court and the Bar, I differ in one important respect. This court should have two different standards of review of Bar recommendations, depending upon the nature of proposed action. The Bar fulfills two important and separate functions. First, it exists as an arm of this court, administering the policies governing the practice of law in this state, which this court has determined are consistent with the proper administration of justice and in the best interests of our citizens. Such matters include admissions and discipline policies. In this area, recommendations of the Board of Governors are advisory only, and do not carry with them any presumption of correctness. Recommendations of The Florida Bar in these areas will be followed only if they persuade the court that such policies will best fulfill the important state interest sought to be achieved.

Secondly, the Bar is the representative organization for all attorneys admitted to practice in this state. In this regard, the Bar provides additional services to these attorneys, separate from those involving the strict regulation of the practice of law. The court should have a lesser role in approving modifying, or rejecting Bar policies with regards to these activities. The appropriateness of such policies and the question of whether such activities should be paid out of dues should be matters determined by the general Bar membership, through its elected representatives. This court should review the policy positions taken by the Board of Governors to determine whether the notice and hearing procedures taken by the Bar with regard to these proposals have complied with due process standards or have violated other constitutional rights of the membership. It is not the court’s function to review whether policy positions are “good” or efficiently administered. If attorneys disagree with certain policies taken by the Board, then recourse should be through “representative democracy” as outlined in Justice England’s concurrence.

No due process or constitutional objections were raised by the opponents to the dues increase. The appropriateness of the increase should be determined by the Bar membership. Although Justice Adkins may be correct to the extent that he recommends a general ballot as the best means to determine the Bar membership’s attitudes on this issue, that question has not been properly raised, and therefore should not be determined until such later time as a proper petition and briefs on this matter have been presented to the court.

ADKINS, Justice,

dissenting.

By a two-thirds increase in bar dues the receipts of the Florida Bar will rise from $5,065,000.00 to $6,178,100.00. The Bar is still a young organization, but the increase in dues and expenditures has caused the budget to assume a middle-age spread— that is, certain areas in the Florida Bar program are not in proper proportion to its size.

The majority of practicing lawyers never approved integration, only a majority of those participating. The court pointed this out in Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So.2d 902 (Fla.1949) by saying:

“Of the 2,700 ballots mailed to the members of the bar, 1,631 were voted and returned. Of the returned ballots 1,131 voted in favor of integration and 500 voted against integration. The opponents of bar integration challenge the number 2,700 as being an accurate count of the practicing attorneys in the State but our investigation reveals no support for this challenge. We are of the view that the referendum was fairly conducted.”

The court then compared the proposed program with a similar one in California. In discussing the latter program, the court said:

“To support such a program the integrated bar of California has a membership of 15,000 and a budget of $250,000 per an-num which is of course out of the reach of the Florida Bar. It is detailed here for the purpose of giving the objectives of bar integration. Its end result is a stronger and better informed bar and it has so enlarged the confidence of the public in the integrated bar of California, that its aid is sought for recommendation to judicial appointments and it is called on frequently to sponsor movements for the common good. Whatever it fosters it has the advantage of being able to call to its aid one hundred per cent of its members.”

This two-thirds increase in bar dues is a major change in members’ obligations and essentially a judgment upon the proper role of the Florida Bar. Fifty dollars is a notable sum to add to the annual expenses of many attorneys. Despite some well-publicized, well-paid attorneys, many lawyers, such as those employed by the state, earn only a moderate salary. Fifty dollars is a major sum to them.

The Bar, by its own admission, needs a dues increase to revise disciplinary proceedings while maintaining its wide-flung activities in lobbying, CLE, large buildings, consumer information dissemination and other areas. Only because of the combined costs of the disciplinary proceeding changes and continuance of the other activities does the Bar need the fifty-dollar dues increase. By reducing spending in either area, with, of course, a concomitant reduction in activity, the Bar could subsist on the present dues or survive with a much less dramatic increase.

Discipline is the main justification for the Bar’s existence and its most sacred duty. Lawyers and courts, and through them the Bar, hold their unique position solely because they -have solemnly promised to regulate their own behavior in the public interest and police their own ranks more closely then even the most assiduous layman could or would. The Bar’s disciplinary and ethical role should never be abandoned.

But the Bar’s other more peripheral activities may well be abandoned, if they cannot be financed under a reasonable dues structure. Many activities such as the Bar’s lobbying and public information services clearly are far removed from disciplining and regulating attorneys. Perhaps some activities should not even be funded by dues mandated by this court. An attorney who feels that way can more easily and effectively express his opinion by voting against a dues increase as by writing dozens of letters to his representative on the Board of Governors. The decision to fund is as major a policy decision as any other. And this fundamental policy decision should be submitted to the vote of all the Bar’s members, not just those who attend one meeting.

The court is not pontificating on constitutional law nor laying down precedents to guide posterity. It is acting as an administrator. The court administers a powerful regulatory agency whose funding is required of all who wish to practice law in Florida. Like any administrator the court should be fair. It should do its best to achieve its goal while not unfairly restricting or burdening those regulated. I believe that a major financial and policy decision made by less than the entire Bar membership is fundamentally unfair.

A look at the restrictions placed by law and custom on all other American forms of self-governing communities convinces me that this court should exercise more restrictive supervision. The Legislature is restricted by Florida’s constitution. The right to amend the constitution is available to the people if their representative body steps too far out of line. The public has a right to be heard before any state agency can promulgate rules which affect them. Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1977). Shareholders in corporations are guaranteed that at least a majority of them must agree with their directors before major decisions such as amending the Articles of Incorporation are made. Section 607.-181(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1977). Even fraternities or children’s informal neighborhood clubs usually have some sort of constitution and provide for group approval of dues increases and changes in the constitution.

Members of the Florida Bar do not have even these elemental democratic controls over their governors. In the absence of this court’s supervision, there is little restriction on precipitous actions by the Board of Governors. Unlike almost all other representative governing bodies the Bar is not restricted by the document creating it. Not one of this court’s grants' of power to the Bar prohibit it from any action. The Florida Constitution and the United States Constitution apply to the Bar. But even today courts hesitate to strictly apply constitutional standards to an integrated bar. Since the Bar is fettered only by this court, the court should be all the more certain that it reserves some power over fundamental decisions for the lawyers.

The right to vote at meetings during the Bar Convention also lacks substance. The Bar and the majority graciously allow attorneys to vote without charging a $55.00 poll tax. But impediments to voting in the meeting remain. An attorney must find the time to travel to the convention site, must make the trip, and must pay the not insignificant costs of the journey. The convention site this year is in Hollywood, a place very accessible, very delightful, but not very near to the attorneys in Pensacola.

An attorney should not have to go to such troubles and expenses to vote on a major issue. This court should establish some reasonable manner for the Bar membership as a whole to directly control the ultimate decision on a dues increase. Voting by mail as in the Board of Governor’s election would be best. Proxy voting at the very least should be allowed. Without these changes the Bar is not a democracy or a republic. It is a plutocracy which cannot be made to look after the best interest of its members or the general public.

Also, we should re-examine the necessity of out-of-state attorneys, judges and retired judges paying the same amount of dues as the local practicing attorney. Although we have determined that dues are not taxes (Petition of Florida Bar Assoc., supra,) they are in the same posture as special assessments, the amount of which should be determined by the benefits received. The practicing attorney is in the best position to make this judgment and should, by vote, be given an opportunity to express his views. Out of $5,000,000, this postage should be a minor item. In fact the ballot could be placed upon one of the myriad advertising folders which deluge the offices of attorneys. 
      
      . This Court has not yet considered the report of the Supreme Court Special Committee on Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures, and reference to' this letter does not imply approval of that report at this time.
     
      
      . See Fla.Bar Integr. Rule, art. III.
     
      
      . Fla.Bar Integr. Rule, art. IX, § 2.
     
      
      . Id. at § 3.
     
      
      . Id. at § 4.
     
      
      . Id. at §§ 5, 6.
     
      
      . The Florida Bar v. Papy, 358 So.2d 4, No. 50,810 (Fla. opin. filed March 2, 1978); The Florida Bar v. Randolph, 238 So.2d 635 (Fla.1970); The Florida Bar v. King, 174 So.2d 398 (Fla.1965); State ex rel. The Florida Bar v. Oxford, 127 So.2d 107 (Fla.1960).
     
      
      . Fla.Bar Integr. Rule, art. IX, § 12.
     
      
      . It is against the possibility of a rejected budget that we require an alternative budget to be developed at the present level of Bar income. See Fla.Bar Integr. Rule, art. IX, § 7.
     