
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Andrew CAPOCCIA, Defendant-Appellant, Howard Sinnott, Thomas J. Daly, Shirley Dinatale, Rodger Kolsky, Carol Capoccia, Carlo Spano, Defendants.
    
    No. 14-462-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 22, 2014.
    Andrew Capoccia, pro se, Lewisburg, PA, for Andrew Capoccia.
    Gregory L. Waples, Paul J. Van de Graaf, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Tristram J. Coffin, United States Attorney for the District of Vermont, Burlington, VT, for United States of America.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges, and PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption in this case to conform with the caption above.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Paul A. Engelmayer, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Andrew Capoccia, imprisoned at a federal correctional institution and proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s January 22, 2014 order denying his motions to dismiss the second superseding indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B), following his conviction after a jury trial of, inter alia, interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. See United States v. Capoccia, 523 Fed.Appx. 807 (2d Cir.2013); United States v. Capoccia, 402 Fed.Appx. 639 (2d Cir.2010); United States v. Capoccia, 354 Fed.Appx. 522 (2d Cir.2009); United States v. Capoccia, 247 Fed.Appx. 311 (2d Cir.2007); United States v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.2007).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B) provides that “at any time while the case is pending, the court may hear a claim that the indictment or information fails to invoke the court’s jurisdiction or to state an offense.” Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(B). To state an offense, “an indictment ‘need only track the language of the statute and, if necessary to apprise the defendant of the nature of the accusation against him, state time and place in approximate terms.’ ” United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir.2008). “Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over federal criminal prosecutions by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which vests the district courts with the power to hear ‘all offenses against the laws of the United States.’ ” United States v. Yousef, 750 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir.2014). Thus, defects in the indictment undermine subject-matter jurisdiction only if the indictment does not “ ‘allege[ ] all of the statutory elements of a federal offense.’ ” Id.

On appeal, Capoccia raises the “sole issue” of whether “the district court lack[ed] authority to adjudicate- questions of attorney-client retainer agreements” in the state-regulated practice of law. Appellant’s Br. 2; 'Reply Br. 2. The answer is simple. The indictment stated an offense because it closely tracked the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2814 and stated all the statutory elements for conviction. See Frias, 521 F.3d at 285. The District Court had jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings because the indictment set forth all the statutory elements of a federal crime. See Yousef, 750 F.3d at 259-60. Whether Ca-poccia’s specific conduct is “beyond the scope of Congress’ concern” or whether Congress lacked the “authority” to pass 18 U.S.C. § 2314 cannot be considered in a Rule 12(b)(3)(B) motion. Id. at 262.

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Capoccia on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s January 22, 2014 order.  