
    Spear & Patten vs. Pratt.
    A drawee of a bill of exchange may charge himself as acceptor by simply writing . his name across the face of it; and this, notwithstanding the provision of the revised statutes, (1 12. S. 757, § 6, 3d ed.) requiring an acceptance to be in writing and signed by the party.
    
      Semble, that the object of the above statute was merely to obviate the inconvenience of the former rule, which gave effect to a paroi acceptance.
    By the law merchant, any words written by the drawee on a bill of exchange, not putting a direct negative on its request, e. g.—“ accepted,” “ presented,” “ seen,” &c.—constitute prima facie a valid acceptance.
    Assumpsit, tried at the Onondaga circuit, in September, 1841, before Moseley, 0. Judge. The action was against the defendant, Frederick Pratt, as acceptor of a bill of exchange, payable to the order of the plaintiffs. The defendant’s name was written across the face of the bill; and the question was, whether this was such an acceptance as is required by the statute. It was admitted that the defendant, at the time of the acceptance, was a resident of this state. His counsel insisted at the trial that the acceptance was insufficient to charge him, but the circuit judge being of a different opinion, directed the jury to find for the plaintiffs, which" they accordingly did; and the defendant’s counsel, having excepted, now moved for a "new trial upon a bill of exceptions.
    
      A. Taber, for the defendant.
    
      B. D. Noxon, for the plaintiffs.
   By the Court,

Cowen, J.

Any words written by the drawee on a bill, not putting a direct negative upon its request, as “ accepted,” “ presented,” “ seen,’.? the day of the month, or a direction to a third person to pay it, is prima facie a complete acceptance, by the law merchant. (Bayley on Bills, 163, Am, ed. of 1836, and the cases there cited.) ' Writing his name across the bill, as in this case, is. a still clearer indication of intent, and a very common mode of acceptance. This is treated by the law merchant as a written acceptance—a signing by the drawee. “It may be,” says Chitty, “ merely by writing the name at the bottom or across the bill;” and he mentions this as among the more usual modes of acceptance. (Chitty on Bills, 320, Am. ed. of 1839.)

It is supposed that the rule has been altered by 1 R. 8. 757, 2d ed. § 6. This requires the acceptance to be in writing, and signed by the acceptor or his agent. The acceptance in question was, as we have seen, declared by the law merchant to be both a writing and signing. The statute contains no declaration that it should be considered less. Am endorsement must be in writing and signed ; yet the name alone is constantly hold-en to satisfy the requisition. No particular form of expression is necessary in any contract. The customary import of a word, by reason of its appearing in a particular place, and standing in a certain relation, is considered a written expression of intent quite as full and effectual as if pains had been taken to throw it into the most labored periphrase. It is said the revisers, in their note, refer to the French law as the basis of the legislation which they recommended; and that the French law requires more than the drawee’s name—the word accepted, at least. That may be so; but it is enough for us to see that both the terms and the spirit of the act may be satisfied short of that word, and more in accordance with the settled forms of commercial instruments in analogous cases. The whole purpose was probably to obviate the inconveniences of the old law, which gave effect to a paroi acceptance.

New trial denied.  