
    Phillips v. The State of Ohio.
    
      Junk dealers required to keep book — Recording articles dealt in— Validity of Sections 4413 and 4414, Revised Statutes — Constitutional law.
    
    Sections 4413 and 4414, Revised Statutes, which require junk dealers and dealers in second-hand articles of any kind to put up a sign and keep a book containing a description of articles purchased and to retain such articles for at least thirty days before disposing of the same, etc., are a necessary and reasonable exercise of the police power and are therefore constitutional.
    (No. 10427
    Decided December 3, 1907.)
    Error to the Circuit Court of Franklin County.
    The plaintiff in error was tried in the police court of the city of Columbus on two affidavits charging him with receiving certain quantities of old metal, and with having failed to retain the same for the period of thirty days after the metal was received. In the police court the accused filed a demurrer, contending that Sections 4413 and 4414 of the Revised Statutes, under which the affidavits are drawn, are unconstitutional. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant pleaded guilty and was fined in each case. He then prosecuted error to the court of common pleas, and on hearing of the petition in error in said court the judgment was affirmed, and this judgment was afterwards affirmed by the circuit court. The petition in error in this court is prosecuted to reverse the judgments of the several courts below.
    
      Mr. D. B. Ulery and Mr. W. J. Mahoney, for plaintiff in error,
    cited and commented upon the following authorities:
    
      Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 145; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush., 85; In re Application of Jacobs, 98 N. Y., 98; Reduction Co. et al. v. Reduction Works, 126 Fed Rep., 29; Young v. Commonwealth, 101 Va., 853; State v. Dalton, 84 Am. St. Rep., 818; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y., 377; State v. Fisher, 52 Mo., 174; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S., 137; Ex parte Frank, 52 Cal., 606; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio St., 63; Lander v. Chicago, 111 Ill., 291; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y., 378; Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St., 77; Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U. S., 166; Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 Wis., 288; Wright & Taylor v. Crawford, 13 Ohio Dec., 612; People, ex rel., v. Otis et al., 90 N. Y., 48; State v. Julow, 129 Mo., 163; Fulton v. District of Columbia, 2 App. Cases, 431; Millett v. People, 117 Ill., 294; Sipe v. Murphy et al., 49 Ohio St., 536; Sections 1 and 19, Article I, Constitution of Ohio; Section 1, Article XIV, Constitution of United States; Sections 4413 and 4414, Revised Statutes.'
    
      Mr: George S. Marshall, city solicitor, and Mr, Charles E. Carter, assistant city solicitor, for defendant in error,
    cited and commented upon the following authorities:
    Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 1st ed., 292; Hauck v. State, 45 Ohio St., 439; Henry v. Trustees, 48 Ohio St., 671; Burt et al., Assignees, v. Rattle et al., 31 Ohio St., 116; Toledo Commercial Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 55 Ohio St., 217; State v. Cohen, 73 N. H., 543; Grand Rapids v. Braudey, 32 L. R. A., 116; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio St., 63; Commonwealth v. Baxter, 23 Pa. Co. Ct., 270; People v. McGuire, 99 N. Y. Supp., 91; Basemore v. State, 49 S. E. Rep., 701; Commonwealth v. Mintz, 19 Pa. Sup. Ct., 283; State v. Cohen, 63 Atl., 928; Launder v. Chicago, 111 Ill., 291; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich., 43.
   Davis, J.

It is almost an axiom that anything which is reasonable and necessary to secure the peace, safety, morals and best interests of the commonwealth may be done tinder the police power; and this implies that private rights exist, subject to the public welfare. These principles are plainly recognized in Article XIY, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States, and Article I, Section 19, of the Constitution of Ohio. The federal constitution provides: “That no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Of course, the converse is Understood, that- any state may deprive a person of life, liberty or property in the due process of law. That which is due process of law is so well defined in numerous decisions, both state and federal, that we need not discuss it here. The constitution of this state provides that “private property shall be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare.”

Therefore, the general power of the legislature to determine what is necessary for the protection of the public interests being clear, judicial inquiry is necessarily limited to determining whether a particular regulation is reasonable, impartial and within the limitations of the constitution. The legislature is the judge of the mischief and the remedy, and of what shall be state policy, subject to the restrictions just mentioned.

The business of dealing in second-hand articles and junk is one which is peculiarly liable to abuse; and, whether honestly conducted or not, experience has shown that stolen or lost property frequently finds its way to the junk dealer, through the agency of the persons who have unlawfully appropriated it. In view of the fact that it frequently happens that individuals seeking to reclaim their property are suddenly stopped and forever baffled at the door of the junk dealer’s shop, the requirements complained of here seem to us to be very fair and moderate.

We do not think it worth the time it would take to distinguish or explain the cases to which we have been referred by the plaintiff in error. Not one of them reaches the point in contention raised by the plaintiff in error here. Some of them are strongly against him. We find no infirmity in the statute, either in violation of the constitution or in other respects, and the judgment below is

Affirmed.

Spiauck, C. J., Price, Crew, Summers and Spear, JJ., concur.  