
    UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carlos Alberto Mera VALENCIA, aka Frederico Rivera Diaz, aka Luis Hernando Motato Velasco, aka Pintor, aka El Tio, aka Max, aka Maxi, Defendant-Appellant, Hermes Serrano Vargas, aka Diego, Jose Javier Roldan Chica, aka Javier, Julio Enrique Ayala Munoz, Carlos Salazar, aka Compi, Defendants.
    No. 12-1920-CR.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 22, 2013.
    
      Laurie S. Hershey, Manhasset, NY, for Appellant.
    Susan Corkery, Assistant United States Attorney (Emily Berger, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: WALKER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant Carlos Valencia pled guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin internationally in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963, 959(c), and 960(b). The district court (Townes, J.) sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment. Valencia appeals, asserting (1) that the sentence is substantively unreasonable and (2) that the district court erroneously refused to award Valencia credit for acceptance of responsibility. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.

DISCUSSION

In sentencing Valencia, the district court properly considered all of the factors mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 3553, including those identified by Valencia. In light of the serious nature of the offense and the need to achieve specific and general deterrence, the district court believed that the Guidelines-minimum sentence of 168 months’ imprisonment was appropriate. Valencia’s prior history — including a previous conviction, incarceration, and deportation-provide ample support for the district court’s belief that 168 months’ imprisonment is a reasonable sentence for Valencia’s role as a middle-man in this international heroin-distribution conspiracy.

Valencia further argues that the district court committed procedural error by not crediting him for accepting responsibility despite its unchallenged determination that defendant obstructed justice. Valencia expressed his remorse for his behavior to the court, but the court explicitly refused to credit his acceptance because during the course of the proceedings, he continually lied about his name, date of birth, and criminal history, filed his fingertips to disguise his true identity, and lied about his previous attorney’s role in his many attempts to deceive the court. The district court did not err in its assessment of defendant’s credibility or in applying this assessment to his expressions of remorse. See United States v. Ubiera, 486 F.3d 71, 76-77 (2d Cir.2007). The district court distinctly found that the obstruction of justice enhancement was appropriate and that the acceptance of responsibility deduction was not.

Finally, Valencia’s multifaceted deceptions provided the basis for both the obstruction of justice enhancement and the loss of the acceptance of responsibility deduction. See United States v. Champion, 234 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.2000) (per cu-riam). “The Guidelines explicitly permit the same act to be counted both for an obstruction enhancement under section 3C1.1 and for denial of an acceptance of responsibility decrease under section 3E1.1.” United States v. Castellanos, 355 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir.2003); see also United States v. Adekanbi, 675 F.3d 178, 187 (2d Cir.2012).

We have considered Valencia’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgments of the district courts are AFFIRMED.  