
    THOMAS RAGLAND, administrator, plaintiff in error, v. M. BARRINGER, et al., defendants in error.
    (Atlanta,
    June Term, 1870.)
    JUDICIAL NOTICE OE PROCLAMATION' OE GOVERNOR —SUSPENSION OE STATUTE OE LIMITATIONS—DATE OE SUSPENSION.—Where a statute required the Governor to issue a proclamation, and he did it, a,nd that proclamation was used as evb dence in a cause, it was not necessary to set out the proclamation in the bill of exceptions. The Courts will take judicial notice of its contents.—Brown, C. J. dissenting. (R. See end of Report.) The Act of 30th November, 1860, which provided for the suspension of the Statute of Limitations during the suspension of specie payment by the Banks, (which fact of the Suspension of the Banks, was to be made known by the proclamation of the 'Governor,) did not suspend the Statute of Limitations from the date of that Act, but from the date of the Governor’s proclamation, which was made on the 18th of December, 1860* proclaiming the fact that the Banks had suspended specie payments, in accordance with the terms and provisions of that Act.
    Statute of' Limitations. Bill of Exceptions. Before Judge Johnson. Muscogee Superior Court. February Term, 1870.
    In 1867, Ragland, as administrator, de bonis non, of George W. Hardwick, sued Barringer, et al., upon their joint and several promissory note, payable to himself, as such, dated December 15th, 1853, and due twelve months after date. They pleaded the Statute of Limitations. At the trial, plaintiff’s attorney read in evidence the note, and closed.
    Defendant’s counsel read the proclamation of the Governor of Georgia, issued in reference to the suspension of specie payments by the Banks of Savannah, Macon and Augusta, *dated December 18th, 1860. Plaintiff’s attorney then offered to prove, by a witness, that said Banks, or some of them, suspended specie payments before the 15th of December, 1860. Defendant’s counsel objected upon the ground that the date of said suspension was fixed by said proclamation. The objection was sustained. The evidence being closed, the Court charged the jury that the Statute of Limitations was suspended in this State, on the 18th of December, 1860, and that if they believed that more than six years elapsed from the maturity of said note, up to the 18th of December, 1860, they should find, for the defendants.
    The jury found for defendants. Plaintiff’s attorneys say the Court erred in rejecting said witness, and in charging as he did.
    After stating that the plaintiff’s counsel read in evidence said note, and closed, the recital in the bill of exceptions was: “Defendant’s counsel then read to the Court and jury, the proclamation”, of the Governor, etc. The proclamation was not set out, except as stated. Counsel for defendants in error, moved to dismiss the bill-of exceptions, because said proclamation was not copied in the bill of exceptions. The Court (Brown, C. J. dissenting,) overruled the motion upon the ground that it was a matter of which judicial notice would be taken. Attorneys for plaintiff in error, said, in fact, it was not read to the jury, but to the Judge only.
    Peabody & Brannon, Smith & Alexander, for plaintiff in error,
    relied upon the verbiage of said proclamation, and on Brian, ex., et al., v. Banks, 38th Ga. R., 301.
    Ingram & Crawford. R. J. Moses, for defendants.
    
      
       JUDICIAL NOTICE—DOCUMENT SET FORTH NEITHER IN BRIEF OE EVIDENCE NOR BILL OE EXCEPTIONS.—“We have no authority to look outside of the record of any given case for the purpose of discovering something which that record should, but does not, itself disclose. -So far as we have_ been able to ascertain the farthest this court has ever gone in treating as evidence a document not set forth, either in a brief of evidence or bill of exceptions, was in the case of Ragland v. Barringer, 41 Ga. 114, in which a majority of the court held that it would take judicial notice of the contents of a proclamation issued by the governor of this state in compliance with the terms of a statute giving him direction in the premises. Even if the doctrine announced in that case can be said to have any application to one like the present, the decision rendered, therein is not binding as authority for the reason that Chief Justice Brown dissented therefrom.” Western, etc., R. Co. v. Hyer, 113 Ga. 776, 39 S. E. Rep. 447.
    
   WARNER, J.

The errors assigned to the judgment of the Court below in this case, is in rejecting the evidence offered, to prove that the banks had suspended specie payments before the 15th day of December, 1860, and to the charge of the Court to the jury, in regard to the Statute of Limitations, ¡as set forth in the record. Both t questions depend on the construction of *the Act’ of the General Assembly of the 30th November, 1860. That Act authorized the banks to suspend specie payments until the 1st of December, 1861. The- 4th section of that Act provides, that in the event of suspension of specie payment by any of the banks of Savannah, Augusta, and Atlanta, that fact shall be made known by the proclamation of the Governor. The proclamation of the Governor,' announcing the fact .of suspension, in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Act, is dated on the 18th day of December, 1860. The Act further provides, that the Statute of Limitations shall cease to run against any debt during the suspension of said banks. At what time, did the banks legally suspend specie payment, under the Act, so as to legally suspend the running of the Statute of Limitations ? In our judgment, the statute was legally suspended from running, from the time the fact of suspension of the bank was legally made known by the proclamation of the Governor, on the 18th day of December, 1860, as required, and directed by that Act.

In Brian v. Banks, 38th Georgia Reports, page 300, the question now made, was not involved or considered, nor was the attention of the Court called to it on the argument of that case; although, it is stated in general terms, in giving a history of the several Acts suspending the running of the Statute of Limitations in the written opinion, “that the Act of 1860 suspended the running of the Statute of Limitations for one year.” The Act of 1860, according to the construction which we now give to it, (and which we should then have given to it, had our attention been called to the question, as being in any way material in that case,) does not suspend the running of the Statute for one year, but only from the 18th day of December, 1860, until the first day of December, 1861, lacking about eighteen days of bein^ one whole year. According to the construction which we have given to the Act of 1860, there was no error in the Court below in rejecting the evidence offered, or in the charge of the Court to the jury. ■ .

Let the judgment of the Court below be affirmed.  