
    
      The State vs. Samuel F. Isaacs.
    
    1. Where I. sold a horse to a slave belonging to the estate of H., without a written permit, but in the presence and with the assent of an overseer of the estate, whose agency extended no further than to see that the stock of the plantation were properly taken care of, and to give the negroes passes when necessary, it was held that such presence and assent did not legalize the trading.
    2. It might bo otherwise where the master, owner, or other person having the unqualified control of a slave, is present and assents to the sale.
    
      Before O’Neall, J., Gittisonville, Spring Term, 1842.
    The defendant was indicted for selling to a slave of the estate of Thomas Heyward, a black horse. The offence was fully proved by the adduction of a certificate in the defendant’s hand-writing, that he had sold the horse to the slave Jacob. Mr. Heape proved that the cattle of the estate in his neighborhood, with the negro Jacob and the other slaves who had the care of them, were placed under his charge ; that is to say, he was to see that the stock was taken proper care of, and he was to give the negroes tickets, if any were needed. He was present, and assented to the sale made by Isaacs. The presiding Judge instructed the jury that this did not dispense with a written permit, and that the only case which was an exception, would be when the master was present and assenting to the sale. In such a case, it might be regarded as a sale to the master, and not a trading wdth the slave.
    The jury found the defendant guilty. He appealed on the following grounds:
    1. Because his Honor charged that, the Overseer, Heape, who had the care and custody, for the time, of the slave, being present, and consenting to the sale of the horse by defendant to the negro, could not legalize the trading, but the jury must find the defendant guilty.
    2. Because his Honor charged the jury that nothing short of the actual presence of the master, or a ticket, could authorize a trading with a negro.
    Colcock, for the motion,
    cited Stat. at Large, 7, 454; The State vs. Jeter, MSS. 1841.
    
      Edwards, Solicitor, contra,
    cited the case of The State vs. Matthien, MSS. Dec., vol. 1, 622.
   Curia, per

O’Neall, J.

The Act of 1817,1 sec. 7 Stat. at Large, 454, provides “ that from and immediately after the passing of this Act, if any shop-keeper, trader, or other person, shall, at any time hereafter, by himself, or any other person acting for him or her, as his or her clerk, or otherwise, directly or indirectly, buy or purchase from any slave in any part of this State, any corn, rice, peas, or other grain, bacon, flour, tobacco, indigo, cotton, blades, hay, or any other article whatsoever; or shall otherwise deal, trade or traffic witlx any slave not having a permit so to deal, trade or traffic, or to sell any such article, from or under the hand of his master or owner, or such other person as may have the management of such slave, such shopkeeper, trader, or other person, shall, for every such of-fence, forfeit a sum ixot exceeding $1000, and imprisonment ixot exceeding twelve months.” The second sectioxx makes it the duty of the person trading with a slave to retain the permit, and to prove its authenticity when chai’ged with the violation of this law, and failing to do so, to be liable to the penalties of this Act.

The only question here is, whether the presence of Heape (who was to see that the cattle belonging to the estate of Hey wax’d were properly taken care of by Jacob and the other slaves left in charge of them, and to give them passes when necessary,) at the purchase of the horse by Jacob, takes the case out of the Act.

It is only necessai'y to x'ead the law, to be satisfied that it does not. To save a party from the penalties of trading with a slave, when the fact of purchasing from or selling to a slave any article or thing is proved, he must produce and pi'ove a permit in writing, authorizing, such trading, from the master, owner, or other person having the care.

If a master, owner, or other person having the unqualified control of a slave, stands by and authorizes the sale of any article of property to a slave, it might be regarded as a sale to the master, owner, or person having such unqualified control of a slave.

But here Heape was not the master’s general agent in the management of the slave. His authority was qualified and restrained. Outside of the authority conferred upon him, he was a stranger to the master’s rights. Hence his presence could not justify the sale. The motion is dismissed.

Evans, Butler and Wardlaw, JJ., concurred.

Richardson, J., absent at the argument.  