
    Cristian Mauricio SANTACRUZ, aka Cristian Santacruz, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    14-4421
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    September 7, 2016
    For Petitioner: Ashish Kapoor, Kapoor Law Firm, PLLC, Garden City, New York.
    For Respondent: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Ernesto H. Molina, Jr., Assistant Director; Jamie M. Dowd, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C.
    
      PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., REENA RAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Cristian Mauricio Santacruz, a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of the February 6, 2014 reinstated removal order of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the October 31, 2014 order of the IJ granting him withholding of removal. He argues that the reinstatement of his 2008 removal order, which precluded him from seeking discretionary relief such as asylum, deprived him of due process. We review questions of law and constitutional claims de novo. See Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767, 772 (2d Cir. 2009). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Where, as here, “the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed ... under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). In deciding whether to reinstate a removal order, an immigration officer is required to determine whether the alien is the same person against whom the prior removal order was entered and executed, and whether the alien unlawfully reentered the country. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a). Santacruz concedes that he was previously removed pursuant to a removal order and that he subsequently reentered the country unlawfully. Therefore, the reinstatement of his prior removal order was not in error, and his illegal reentry precluded him from seeking discretionary relief such as asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a), (e); see also Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that alien subject to reinstatement of removal order is eligible only for withholding of removal).

Santacruz, however, argues that he was entitled to apply for asylum and that the failure to afford him an opportunity to seek such relief violated his right to due process. His argument is foreclosed by Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d at 130, 138-40 (rejecting applicant’s claims that, despite his illegal reentry and the reinstatement of his prior removal order, he was entitled to apply for asylum, and that § 1231(a)(5) deprived him of due process).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.  