
    PEOPLE v POWELL
    1. Criminal Law — Evidence—Confession—Admissibility—Warning of Rights — Waiver of Rights.
    A trial court’s finding of voluntariness of a defendant’s confession to a police officer was not clearly erroneous where defendant was read a clear and comprehensive summary of his warning of rights at the commencement of the interrogation, and he waived his rights in this regard and voluntarily answered questions posed to him by the officer, and where a challenged statement of the police officer did not constitute a type of subterfuge which would render defendant’s confession involuntary and inadmissible.
    2. Criminal Law — Evidentiary Hearing — Nonjury Trial — Extrajudicial Statements — Admissibility.
    A trial court, in a nonjury trial, did not err in presiding over both an evidentiary hearing and a trial where the defendant did not object to the same judge presiding over the hearing and the trial-in-chief, and where the confession which was the subject of the litigation at the evidentiary hearing was deemed voluntary and admissible.
    Appeal from Menominee, Ernest W. Brown, J.
    Submitted Division 3 March 5, 1974, at Grand Rapids.
    (Docket No. 15494.)
    Decided May 2, 1974.
    Robert D. Powell was convicted of second-degree murder. Defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Edward J. Soronen, Prosecuting Attorney (Prosecuting Attorneys Appellate Service, Donald Ubell, Director, and 
      William P. Weiner, Staff Attorney, of counsel), for the people.
    
      Reference for Points in Headnotes
    [1, 2] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 523-596.
    
      
      Steven Schwartz, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant.
    Before: T. M. Burns, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and Bashara, JJ.
   Per Curiam.

Defendant appeals as of right from his July 25, 1972, conviction by the trial court, sitting without a jury, of second-degree murder. MCLA 750.317; MSA 28.549.

Defendant first claims that the trial court erroneously concluded that defendant’s confession to a police officer was voluntary.

A careful review of the record shows that defendant was read a clear and comprehensive summary of his Miranda rights at the commencement of the interrogation and that he waived his rights in this regard and voluntarily answered questions posed to him by Detective Steeno.

We conclude that the challenged statement of Detective Steeno did not constitute a type of subterfuge which would render defendant’s confession involuntary and inadmissible. Therefore, the trial court’s finding of voluntariness was not clearly erroneous.

In defendant’s second appeal issue, he contends that the trial court erred reversibly presiding over both a Walker hearing and a nonjury trial in this case.

Defendant did not object to the fact that the trial judge presided over both the Walker hearing and the trial-in-chief. Furthermore, the confession which was the subject of the litigation at the Walker hearing was deemed voluntary and admissible. Thus, the trial court was not in the position of having heard at the Walker hearing a confession which it later ruled inadmissible at trial. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the fact that the trial court presided over both the Walker hearing and the trial. See People v Yacks, 38 Mich App 437; 196 NW2d 827 (1972); People v Boyd, 49 Mich App 388; 212 NW2d 333 (1973).

Affirmed. 
      
      
        Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
     
      
      
        People v Walker, 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (On Rehearing, 1965).
     