
    COLTMAN ET AL. vs. MOORE ET AL.
    Equity.
    No. 3122.
    I. In tlie interpretation of a will, the general purpose of the testator is to prevail.
    II. Where all the purposes and conditions of a trust created by a will and codicil are exhausted, equity will distribute the estate among the devisees who are also next of kin, although the period for the expiration of the trust has not arrived.
    III. The court will not extend the trust further than is necessary to- support those of its purposes which are valid in law.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
    The bill of complaint in this cause was filed to procure construction of the last will and testament of Charles L. Coltman, deceased, and for partition of certain real estate devised by said testator. The will of the decedent, after bequeathing to his wife for her life certain personal property and a house and two lots, devises all the rest of his real estate in the city of Washington to Robert Coltman, son of the testator, and his heirs, in trust, to hold the same for the period of twenty years after the testator’s death, and during that period to receive and collect the rents and profits, and apply the same, first to an annuity of $900 to the testator’s widow during her life time, and secondly to divide the residue of such rents and profits equally between said trustee and his three sisters, (these four being the testator’s only children;) conferring power on the trustee to lease any and all of the vacant lots belonging to the testator’s estate, and within said term of twenty years to sell and convey any of said vacant lots if he should think such sale advantageous to the estate, iu which event he should hold and invest the proceeds upon the same trust as set forth in regard to the lots. At the expiration of said term the testator directs his said son Robert to sell, or divide in specie, all his said real estate, reserving sufficient to support the annuity aforesaid, and to pay over the proceeds to himself and his three sisters equally; and in the event of the death, before settlement and division of the. estate, of any of the children of the testator, leaving issue, it is provided that such issue shall in all cases represent and take the share of the deceased parent. In the event of none of said children and no issue or legal descendant of any of them being alive at the expiration of said term of twenty years, all the testator’s real and personal estate is devised to the mayor, board of aldermen and common council, of the city of .Washington, to establish and endow a house of refuge for destitute and reputable females. The will, at its conclusion, nominates Robert Coltman, aforesaid, as the sole executor. By a codicil to the will, the annuity to the testator’s widow is increased to $1,400, and a further annuity to be paid out of the rents of the property is provided for the testator’s daughter, Rebecca, until she shall be eighteen years old, which age she is now past. In this codicil James Adams is nominated "co-executor and trustee” with Robert Coltman, “ they jointly and the survivor of them, and the heirs of the survivor of them, to have and exercise the same powers and authority and duties ” as to the estate as are specified in said will.
    '. Robert Coltman and Adams qualified as executors, but the latter alone assumed the trust under the will. After a time Adams resigned, the trusteeship, and by decree of the court Charles Bradley was substituted in his stead. Bradley also resigned, and no successor to him has been appointed. The unimproved real estate was sold by the trustee for the time being, and its proceeds invested; such investment being at this time sufficient to secure the annuities above mentioned. It is averred in the bill, and not denied in the answers, that the estate yields a revenue very insufficient as compared with the value of the property, much of the revenue being consumed by heavy expenses of the trusteeship and cumbrous and complicated management. It is also maintained in the bill, and not controverted in the answers, that the executory devise to the mayor, aldermen, and common council of Washington is void. The bill asks, among other things, that the fee-simple to the real estate may be adjudged to be in Colt-man’s four children ; that the executory devise to the corporation of Washington may be declared void; that reference-be made to the auditor for ascertainment of the personal estate in the hands of the trustee and the quality and value of the real estate unsold, and that partition be made of said realty. The complainants are the widow of the testator, Robert Coltman, two of his sisters, namely, Mary F. Smith and Rebecca Coltman, and Charles T. Smith, the husband of Mary F. The defendants are the testator’s remaining daughter, Sarah B. Moore, and her husband, John W. Moore, Charles Bradley, trustee, as' aforesaid, and the District of Columbia, as the successor, for certain political and municipal purposes, of the mayor, board of aldermen and common council. A decree pro confessowas taken against Bradley. The District of Columbia answered the bill, admitting its averments, and submitting to the court whether the facts thus stated will justify the conclusions of law sought to be established by the complainants. The answer of John W. and Sarah B. Moore objects to the sale of the property before expiration of the term aforesaid.
    The cause was certified to the general term for hearing in the first instance.
    
      William F. Mattingly and F. L. Stanton for complainants.
    Their brief is too lengthy and elaborate for insertion, and is so condensed as not to admit of an abstract.
    
      R. P. Jackson for defendant, Moore.
    
      William A. Cook for District of Columbia.
   Mr. Justice MacArthur

delivered the opinion of the court:

The general intention of the testator in the interpretation of his will is to prevail, even if it becomes necessary to disregard some of the special details for carrying it into execution. In the present instance the obvious design of the deceased was that his entire estate should go to the enjoyment of his four children and their issue, and the property is to take no other direction until said children and their legal descendants shall become wholly extinct. It is only in that event happening at the expiration of twenty years after his death that the devise over to the city of Washington is to take effect. The purpose of the decedent is equally clear in creating the trust estate. It was necessary in order to support the two annuities and the executory devise to the mayor and common council of the city of Washington. The trustees by the will and codicil were authorized to dispose of the unimproved real estate if they saw fit, and to re-in vest the proceeds for the benefit of the estate, and upon the same trusts as the other property. These are undoubtedly the general purposes for which the trust is created, and the case shows that they have all been executed conformably, to the wishes of the testator as far as they are legal and valid. The only object of the trust that has not been exhausted is the limitation over to the city.

It is now well settled that there is no objection in law to a municipal corporation taking a devise of real and personal estate for a charitable use. When the corporation has a legal capacity to take real and personal estate, then it may take and hold it upon trust in the same manner and to the same extent as a private person may do.” Vidal vs. Girard, 2 How., 127. The statutes of Henry VIII respecting wills, and which declare that corporations shall not take by devise, have never been in operation in the State of Maryland, from which we largely derive our statute law, or adopted into the law of this District, so that the validity of the devise is not affected' thereby. It may well be questioned whether the devise now under .consideration would be good as a charitable gift, within the meaning of 13 Eliz., even if it were made to an individual. It has, however, been adjudicated in the State just mentioned that this statute has never been in force there, and consequently has never been in force in the District of Columbia. Dashill vs. Attorney-General, 5 H. & T., 392; Same vs. Same, 6 H. & J., 1; Wilderman vs. City of Baltimore, 8 Maryland, 551. And the same authorities conclusively show that a devise like the one in this case is too vague and indefinite to be enforced$ and it cannot be supported as a charitable devise by any aid to be derived from the statute last referred to. A practice is, however, recognized in chancery to construe charitable gifts and to administer them upon principles analogous to its provision. Whitman vs. Lex, 17 Serg. & Rawle, 88. And this doctrine has been sanctioned and acted upon by the Supreme Court of the United States. Vidal vs. Girard, supra; Perin et al. vs. Carey et al., 24 How., 465. But it must be conceded in this case that it can derive no aid from this conservative rule, for here the trust is too vague and uncertain to be carried into effect whether chancery has jurisdiction under the statute, or upon some principle of practice analogous to that contained in its provisions. It is not competent to compel either individuals or corporations to execute a trust of this character, which is not sufficiently defined in the instrument creating it. The testator makes the devise to the city “to establish and endow a house of refuge for destitute reputable females.” This is too vague. No means are suggested by which they can by possibility be ascertained. The locality is not stated from which the objects of this bounty are to be selected, whether from the city or District, or from a particular State, or from all the States, or from the world at large; nor is any method pointed ont by which to establish the right of destitute reputable females to that designation. The devise to the city as well as the annuities are out of the way, and all the unimproved real estate has been disposed of, so that all the objects of the trust appear to have been accomplished as far as they legally can be, although the period for its termination has not yet arrived. The only lawful purpose for which it can now be permitted to remain is to postpone the division of the property until the expiration of the twenty years. But we have just seen that the objects for which this term is ordained are wholly exhausted, and the court will not extend the trust further than is necessary to support those of its purposed which are valid in law. Nothing remains now but a naked authority to be exercised by the trustee to collect the rents and profits of the improved estate and to distribute the surplus thereof that may remain, after deducting commissions and expenses, among those who would receive it without such intervention, as the next of kin and heirs at law of the deceased. It may well be inferred that he had no intention that the trust should ever be used to carry out such an unprofitable purpose. By this contrivance the estate at present yields a revenue wholly inadequate to its value, and much of this revenue is consumed by incidental expenses. The devisees are also the heirs at law, and it is manifestly for their interest that this cumbrous method of managing the property should be terminated if the law will permit it. As the objects of the limitation are exhausted or incapable of execution,, an opportunity is thereby afforded of accelerating the general purpose of the deceased to invest his children, who are all of age, with the full enjoyment of his estate. There is no other devise or different direction of the inheritance, and there is no intervening interest to be disturbed by the present division of the estate. This construction goes to confirm the title of the heirs at law, and each will take precisely the same estate which is devised in the will, and which each would be entitled to if there was no will in existence.

For these reasons we are of opinion,that the prayer of the bill in this respect'should be allowed and the estate distributed without further postponement.  