
    THE MILLIKEN IMPRINTING COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [40 C. Cls. R., 81; 202 U. S. R., 168.]
    
      On the defendants’ Appeal.
    
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue issues á circular to contractors for imprinting stamps, stating that for the ensuing fiscal year contracts will contain certain requirements not in the existing contracts, and that “no application for contract to imprint stamps Kill he considered from any person, firm, or corporation not noto engaged, in printing stamps under contract with the Government.” The claimant’s president executes a new contract without reading it on the assurance that the provisions of the circular are embodied in it. Sub- ■' sequently the Commissioner enters into a contract with a corporation which had not been engaged in printing stamps at the time of the circular. The claimant then finds for the first time that that provision of the circular has been omitted from the contract. It files a bill to reform the contract and to recover damages directly caused by the diversion of its business to the new company.
    The court below decides:
    Prior 'to the passage of the Tuclcer Act (24 Stat. L., p. 505) this court was without equity jurisdiction. But by that statute it was invested with equity jurisdiction “when the party would he entitled to redress against the United States either in a court of lato-, equity, or admiralty, if the United States were suable.”
    
    2. The difference between this case and Jones v. United States (131 U. S. R., 1) is that this is a suit to reform a contract and recover money, while the other was a suit to compel the performance of a specific act by an executive officer, the delivery of a patent for public land.
    3. The reformation of written contracts for fraud or mistake is an ordinary exercise of equity jurisdiction.
    4. The equity jurisdiction of this court is not general. It can not grant injunctions or decree the performance of contracts; but where a suit will result simply in a decree for the payment of money, it has jurisdiction as fully as other courts of equity.
    5. To accept and execute a contract without reading it upon- the assurance of a Government clerk in charge of the business that it contains the provisions of a certain circular is not such negligence as will defeat a party’s right to have the contract reformed for mutual mistake of fact.
    6. Where 'a provision of the preliminary agreement in writing is omitted by the party who prepares the formal contract it constitutes a mutual mistake, and the correction of the mistake can not be defeated by his showing that the provision was intentionally omitted without the knowledge of the other party, who executed the formal contract in the belief that the provision was embodied therein.
    7. The written bid of the contractor in consequence of the advertisement of the Government and the acceptance of the bid by the Government constitute the contract between the parties so far as regards the question whether the provisions of the one are contained in the other.
    8. Where a provision of the preliminary agreement was that the Government would not increase the number of manufacturing contractors during the period of the contract, it was a provision intended to increase the business of the contractor, and a material part of the contract.
    9. Where the claimant is able to show that the new contract diverted a certain number of his customers, and the amount of business which he lost thereby, and the profits which he would have made, the damages are neither conjectural nor uncertain.
    The decision of the court below is reversed on the ground that no reasons are disclosed sufficient to justify the reformation of the contract.
   Mr. Justice ITohnes

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court April 30, 1906.  