
    Michael A. HECKERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NYS DIVISION OF PAROLE, John Cieslak, Jr., Parole Officer, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-3164-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 14, 2012.
    
      Michael A. Heckerman, pro se, Kingston, N.Y., for Appellant.
    Kate H. Nepveu, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Nancy A. Spiegel, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, N.Y., for Appellees.
    PRESENT: B.D. PARKER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Michael A. Heckerman, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

In a civil case where the United States is not a party, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) require an appellant to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the judgment or order being appealed. “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007). “[Wjhere jurisdiction is questionable we are obliged to examine the question sua sponte.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 411 F.3d 323, 328 (2d Cir.2005).

In this case, the district court entered judgment on Friday, July 2, 2010, and Heckerman’s undated notice of appeal was not received and filed until Wednesday, August 4, 2010, two days after the 30-day appeal period expired. Although Hecker-man was incarcerated for much of the litigation in the district court, his submissions below indicate that he was released from confinement as of June 30, 2010, several days before the judgment, and that he mailed the notice of appeal from his home address. As such, he cannot avail himself of the “prison mailbox rule,” under which an inmate’s notice of appeal is deemed filed on the date it is placed in the hands of prison officials to be mailed. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(c)(1); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). Accordingly, because Hecker-man’s notice of appeal was not received by the district court within the 30-day appeal period, his appeal is untimely. See Ludgood v. Apex Marine Corp. Ship Mgmt., 311 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir.2002) (per cu-riam).

In addition, only the district courts, not the courts of appeals, have the authority to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal, if certain statutory conditions are met. See § 28 U.S.C. 2107(c); Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5)-(6); see also Fed. R.App. P. 26(b)(1). While a submission signed by a pro se litigant may be construed as a motion to extend the time to appeal when it “may fairly be read as a request to the district court to exercise its discretionary-powers to permit a late appeal,” Campos v. LeFevre, 825 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir.1987), none of Heekerman’s post-judgment submissions provided any indication that he sought such relief.

Accordingly, because the notice of appeal was untimely filed, this appeal must be, and therefore is, DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 
      
      . Although Heckerman’s appeal is untimely as it currently stands, he may still ask the district court to construe his notice of appeal and other post-judgment submissions, including his notice of change of address, as a motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5)(A).
     