
    Charles BRISSETTE and Sandra Brissette, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ENTRUST GROUP, INC.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-16393.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Oct. 21, 2015.
    
    Filed Oct. 28, 2015.
    Michael Winston Brown, Snyder Doren-feld LLP, Agoura Hills, CA, Lawrence Timothy Fisher, Bursor & Fisher, P.A., Walnut Creek, CA, Cathy Lerman, Cathy Jackson Lerman, PA, Coral Springs, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Mark Eugene Terman, Joseph C. Faucher, Esquire, Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Joseph John De Hope, Jr., Kaufman Dolowieh Vo-luck & Gonzo LLP, Tad A. Devlin, Esquire, Gordon & Rees LLP, San Francisco, CA, Olivier Andre Beabeau, Galbut & Galbut, P.C., Phoenix, AZ, William M. Slaughter, Esquire, Slaughter & Reagan, LLP, Ventura, CA, for Defendants-Appel-lees.
    Before: SILVERMAN and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges and DUFFY, District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs Charles and Sandra Brissette appeal from the district court’s denial of their motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and the district court’s subsequent entry of judgment against them. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we AFFIRM.

We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir.2004); see also Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir.2002) (“[Wjhen a district court-has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is ‘particularly broad.’” (quoting Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir.1999))). In dismissing Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, the district court identified several deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ allegations and properly concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to state a viable claim for intentional fraud. Plaintiffs’ proposed second amended complaint failed to cure those deficiencies.

Under California law, “[tjhe elements of intentional misrepresentation, or actual fraud, are: ‘(1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reb-anee); (4) justifiable reliance; and (6) resulting damage.’ ” Anderson v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 56 Cal.App.4th 1468, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 515 (1997) (quoting Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n., 46 Cal.3d 1092, 252 Cal.Rptr. 122, 762 P.2d 46, 53 (1988)). Further, “ ‘[a] fraud claim based upon the suppression or concealment of a material fact must involve a defendant who had a legal duty to disclose the fact.’ ” Hoffman v. 162 N. Wolfe LLC, 228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 820, 826 (2014) (citing Cal. Civ.Code § 1710(3)). Plaintiffs’ proposed second amended complaint still failed to adequately allege the elements of knowledge of falsity, duty to disclose, and reliance. It therefore failed to state a viable claim for intentional fraud. Accordingly, the district court reasonably concluded that further amendment would be futile and did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion to amend. See, e.g., Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir.1987) (finding district court reasonably concluded further amendment would be futile where second amended complaint did not cure deficiencies identified in first amended complaint).

AFFIRMED. 
      
      This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . Plaintiff Stanley Levine was included in Plaintiffs' notice of appeal. On December 30, 2013, we granted Levine’s motion to voluntarily dismiss his appeal. Therefore, Charles and Sandra Brissette remain as the only Plaintiffs-Appellants in this case. Moreover, Levine was the only plaintiff who asserted claims against Defendant Entrust Arizona, LLC n/k/a Vantage Retirement Plans LLC. Accordingly, Entrust Arizona is no longer a defendant in this action.
     
      
      . Plaintiffs’ motion for judicial notice filed December 23, 2013 (Docket Entry No. 36) is GRANTED as to Documents 1-7 and DENIED as to Document 8. See Fed.R.Evid. 201; Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir.2001).
     