
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tristan Jamal GRANT, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-30106.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Aug. 14, 2014.
    
    Filed Aug. 18, 2014.
    Erin White Bradley, Special Assistant U.S., U.S. Department of Justice, Stephanie Carowan Courter, Jo Ann Farrington, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Anchorage, AK, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Fred Richard Curtner, III, Esquire, Federal Public Defender, Noa Eva Oren, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Anchorage, AK, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: FARRIS, D.W. NELSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Tristan Jamal Grant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and his resulting 47-month sentence. We affirm Grant’s conviction and sentence.

1. Grant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Grant was found with 1.69 grams of crack cocaine divided into 13 individual doses, a scale with cocaine resi-’ due, multiple cell phones, and over $1,000 in cash. Prior to his arrest, law enforcement observed two individuals enter the back seat of Grant’s car and leave in less than two minutes. Although Grant explained how most of the evidence could be consistent with Grant’s personal use of crack, the government offered a competing characterization consistent with distribution of crack. Taking the evidence in a light favorable to the government, a rational jury could have agreed with the government and found Grant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Norwood, 603 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir.2010).

2. The district court properly applied a two-level obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The district court found that Grant perjured himself by testifying that the crack cocaine was intended only for personal use, not distribution. The materiality and willful intent behind the false statement, which was designed to negate an element of the charged offense, are apparent from the record. See United States v. Ancheta, 38 F.3d 1114, 1118-19 (9th Cir.1994). Because we find that the enhancement was properly based on Grant’s trial testimony, we do not reach alternate bases for the enhancement. Id. at 1119.

3. The district court properly applied a two level enhancement for possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense. U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(l). The district court did not clearly err by finding Grant possessed a firearm by a preponderance of the evidence because there was ample evidence supporting Grant’s awareness of the gun. Nor was it an abuse of discretion to apply the enhancement because, given the record, it was not “clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Application Note 11(A).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     