
    B.L.J., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 95-3485.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Sept. 4, 1996.
    Louis 0. Frost, Jr., Public Defender; Ward L. Metzger, Assistant Public Defender, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Jean-Jacques A. Darius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse the judgment holding appellant in indirect criminal contempt of court because the order to show cause was not “based upon an affidavit or sworn testimony of an individual having personal knowledge of the essential facts.” Hunt v. State, 659 So.2d 363, 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). We do not intend by this opinion to preclude the initiation of new proceedings, provided that the requirements of Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.150(b) are satisfied.

REVERSED.

MINER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.

LAWRENCE, J., specially concurs with written opinion.

LAWRENCE, Judge,

specially concurring.

I concur with the majority that Hunt v. State, 659 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), requires that the judgment of the trial court be reversed. However, I write to address any suggestion that an order to show cause issued pursuant to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.150(b) must be based only upon an affidavit or sworn testimony of an individual having personal knowledge of the essential facts. Rule 8.150(b) provides in the alternative that an order to show cause may be based upon “the [court’s] own motion.” A.L.B. v. State, 675 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).  