
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shaun KING, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 09-50063.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted March 1, 2010.
    Filed May 13, 2010.
    
      Anne Caitlin Gannon, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Santa Ana, CA, Michael J. Raphael, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, James H. Locklin, Esquire, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDCA-Federal Public Defender’s Office, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Robert Carlin, Esquire, FPDCA-Federal Public Defender’s Office, Santa Ana, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: CANBY and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Shaun King appeals from the seventy-month sentence and life-term of supervised release imposed following his guilty plea to one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part for resentenc-ing.

King argues that the district court failed to adequately explain the reasons for the sentence imposed and failed to consider King’s arguments at sentencing. We disagree. The district court sufficiently explained its sentence “to permit meaningful appellate review.” See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc); United States v. Mix, 457 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir.2006). The record demonstrates that the district court also properly considered King’s arguments at sentencing. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-57, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007).

King argues that the district court erred by applying a four-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7), because the preponderance of the evidence did not support a finding that his offense involved the possession of 300 or more images of child pornography. We agree that the summary of the probation officer’s discussion with the case agent in the pre-sentence investigation report lacks sufficient indicia of reliability to support a finding that the offense involved 300 or more images of child pornography. See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 & cmt.; United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). There was inadequate information in the record from which the district court could conclude that the case agent had the qualifications to evaluate and define which images constituted child pornography as opposed to child erotica or adult pornography. Cf. United States v. Overton, 573 F.3d 679, 686-87 (9th Cir.2009).

The district court’s error was not harmless because it is not clear that the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly found facts supporting the sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Showalter, 569 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir.2009); United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1280 n. 4 (9th Cir.2006). Accordingly, we vacate King’s sentence and remand for resentencing for factual findings consistent with this opinion.

Because the district court clearly erred in finding facts relating to the number of images involved in the offense, we do not reach the question of whether the sentence was substantively reasonable. United States v. Grissom, 525 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir.2008).

King argues that the life-term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable. The district court considered both King’s arguments at sentencing and the statutory sentencing objectives under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir.2008). A life-term of supervised release is substantively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 923-24; see also United States v. Cope, 527 F.3d 944, 952 (9th Cir.2008).

AFFIRMED in part, and VACATED and REMANDED in part. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     