
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Travis Lamont FOOTE, a/k/a Cash, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-6305
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: April 20, 2017
    Decided: May 1, 2017
    Travis Lamont Foote, Appellant Pro Se.
    Judson T. Mihok, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KEENAN, Circuit Judge, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
   Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Travis Lamont Foote seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of ap-pealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Foote has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED 
      
       We remanded this case to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether Foote demonstrated excusable neglect or good cause warranting an extension of the 60-day appeal period. The district court found that an extension was warranted, and the case is now back before us.
     