
    Lee Kent HEMPFLING; Suesie Kent Hempfling, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kent VOLKMER ; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 17-16329
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 18, 2017 
    
    Filed December 26, 2017
    
      Lee Kent Hempfling, Pro Se
    Suesie Kent Hempfling, Pro Se
    Kevin S. Costello, Esquire, Deputy County Attorney, County Attoreney’s Office, Florence, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee Kent Volkmer
    Pamela Linnins, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees Boyd T. Johnson, Mark Bmo-vich
    Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Kent Volkmer has been substituted for his predecessor, M. 'Lando Voyles, as Pinal County Attorney under Fed. R. App, P. 43(c)(2).
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Lee Kent Hempfling and Suesie Kent Hempfling appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process violations in connection with prior state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the Hempflings’ action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feld-man doctrine because it constituted a prohibited “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment and raised a claim that was “inextricably intertwined” with that state court judgment. See id. at 1163-65 (discussing proper ¿pplication of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rooker-Feldman precludes adjudication where “the only redress [plaintiffs] seek is an ‘undoing* of the prior state-court judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Hempflings’ motion for reconsideration because the Hemp-flings failed to state any grounds warranting relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60).

We do not consider issues raised by the Hempflings in their brief that are not supported by argument. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1992).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     