
    Roberta WATTERSON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GARFIELD BEACH CVS, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-16623
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted June 14, 2017 San Francisco, California
    Filed August 02, 2017
    Thomas Alistair Segal, Attorney, Chaim Shaun Setareh, Attorney, Setareh Law Group, Beverly Hills, CA, for- Plaintiff-Appellant
    Gregory G. Iskander, Esquire, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Walnut Creek, CA, for Defendant-Appellee
    Before: SCHROEDER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and PIERSOL, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Roberta Watterson (‘Watterson”) appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee Garfield Beach CVS, LLC (“CVS”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Satey v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

1. Under California law, employees are entitled to be paid for “hours worked,” which is defined as “the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.” See IWC Wage Order No. 7-2001 § 2(G); Cal. Code Regs., title 8, § 11070(2)(G). Watter-son was not “subject to the control of,” or “suffered or permitted to work” by, CVS. She admitted during her deposition that CVS did not require her to sign up for medical insurance; she was not required to complete the wellness program as a condition of her employment; the requirements to complete the wellness program were not work and were not part of her job duties; CVS did not direct her when to complete the requirements of the wellness program; she could complete the questionnaire and schedule appointments when it was convenient for her; she was not required to be reachable or ready to perform work responsibilities; and she was never interrupted. Cf. Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139, 146 (2000). Summary judgment was proper because Watterson failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether time spent completing annual health screenings and wellness questionnaires for a voluntary and optional wellness program instituted by CVS for its employees meets the definition of “hours worked.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of 'summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”).

2. Because the time spent completing the wellness program did not amount to “hours worked,” there hgs been no waiver of California’s minimum wage law. We have considered Watterson’s remaining arguments and find then; all to be either waived or unpersuasive.

Watterson’s motion to take judicial notice of the EEOC report is denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     