
    CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, CHARLESTON,
    JANUARY AND MAY, 1806.
    Crowninshield v. Strobel & Martini, and Strobel v. Strobel.
    The lodgment of a writ of attachment in the sheriff’s office creates nú lien on the property of the absent or absconding debtor, so as to give the attaching creditor a preference or priority, where there are other attaching creditors; but the creditor who shall first levy his attachment, shall be intitled to be first satisfied out of the proceeds of the things or credits so actually attached.
    An attachment against two as copartners cannot be levied on, or operate to charge the property of one of the partners only; but must be levied on the partnership effects.
    The plaintiffs in these several cases had sued out attachments against the defendanl, Strobel, an absent debtor. The attachment sued out by Crowninshield, was against Strobel & Martini, on a joint contract as partners, and was first delivered to the sheriff, but without a copy, or any directions to serve a copy on any particular person to answer as garnishee.
    The second attachment was sued out by Strobel, after the former, but there was a copy for one John Strobel, with a notice, which the sheriff was directed to serve. After the sheriff had served this copy on John Strobel, he was furnished with a copy of the former attachment, with directions to serve the same on John Strobel, which he did. John Strobel, the garnishee, made a joint return that he had in his hands one thousand dollars and upwards, be. longing to D. Strobel, the absent debtor. These attaching credi. tors not agreeing to whom the money attached in the hands of the garnishee should be paid, on a rule to shew cause before Bay, J., in Charleston, he decided that the money was due to the attaching creditor whose attachment was first lodged in the sheriff’s office.
    The motion in this court was to reverse that decision.
    Baxley, and Pringle, in support of the motion.
    The issuing or lodging of a writ of attachment creates no lien on the property or credits of the absent debtor. But the actual levy or seizure of property does. So does the actual service on a person having effects of the absent debtor in his hands or power, or who is indebted to him. The act of 1759 gives this (operation to the service of an attachment expressly. The vigilant creditor ought to be preferred. It is not like an attachment. It is in nature of a distringas; the object of serving the attachment, is to make the defendant a party in court. A general lien cannot be create^ by attachment: only a specified lien. The goods levied on are not taken to satisfy a debt, but to enforce the appearance of the party. The garnishee cannot be bound without notice. But if the lodgment gives a preference, it must he confined to the partnership fund in the first placo. Cited 1 Dali. 377. S J?. Wins. 500. Vin. Abr. 542. 2 Vern. 706. 2 Dali. 73. Bac. Abr. Com. Dig. Tit. Process. 4 Bac. Abr. new ed. 600. 3 Ves. Jr. 4 Ves. Jr. 840.
    Parker. Goods attached are liable to respond the judgment, as on an execution, and, therefore, the same rule should apply to both. It would be ill policy to put it in the power of the sheriff to give a preference. As to the funds of the partnership of Strobel & Martini being first resorted to, the cases cited to that point are all cases in equity. The defendants are answerable in solidum; each for himself, as well as jointly.
   This case was held under advisement until May, 1806, (10th May,) when

Gkimke, J.,

delivered the unanimous opinion of all the judges.

Two questions have been made for our decision, — 1. Whether the mere lodgment of an attachment in the sheriff’s office creates a lien en ail the property and credits of the absent debtors, so as to make them answerable to this attachment in preference to other attachments which may be actually served ; and, 2. Whether an attachment against two defendants on a joint contract, which is served by a levy on the effects or credits of one of the defendants only, is well served, and the attachment can be maintained against both defend, ants, or that one. (

We are all of opinion in favor of the negative of these propositions. The property actually seized, or the credits actually bound by the service of an attachment, shall be answerable to that attachment exclusively ; at all events, that attachment shall have a preferable and prior claim to any other. As to the second point, it is clear that the parties sued cannot be made parties in court, nor can any proceedings goj>n against them until they have been both served, or the attachment has been served on the effects or credits of both of them. If a judgment should go against Strobel alone, the partnership effects must first be taken to pay the partnership debt, and the partnership fund must be exhausted before the private estate of the party can be taken. The money in the hands of the garnishee is not liable to be attached on the attachment against Strobel & Martini, because it is not partnership money. And to make the defendants answerable by attachment on a partnership contract, it is necessary to attach the partnership property, credits, or books of . account.

The service of Crowninshield’s attachment was held insufficient.  