
    JOSEPHINE B. LEWIS, EXECUTRIX OF ESTATE OF JAMES LEWIS, DECEASED, v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 30610.
    Decided April 19, 1915.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    The plaintiff’s decedent was for several terms surveyor general of the State of Louisiana, and this suit was brought to recover an unpaid balance of salary and official fees claimed to be due under the decedent’s appointment received January 19, 1905, and under which he served until May 13, 1909, when he received a letter from the Commissioner of the General Land Office advising him that the office of surveyer general of Louisiana would be permanently closed and discontinued on • July 1, 1909, when the records of the office would be turned over.to the State of Louisiana as soon as proper provision should be made by the legislature of that State for their receipt, pursuant to sections 2218, 2220, and 2221 of the Revised Statutes.
    I.Where two inconsistent acts are passed at different times the last is to be obeyed, and if obedience can not be observed without derogating from the first, it is the first act which must give way.
    II.Every act is made for some purpose, and its operation is not to be impeded by some previous inconsistent enactment.
    III.It is well settled that a subsequent statute which is repugnant to a prior one necessarily repeals the former, although it does not do so in terms.
    
      The Reporter's statement of the case:
    
      Mr. Russell Alden for the plaintiff. Mr. E. F. Colladay was on the brief.
    It is the contention of claimant that the office of surveyor general of Louisiana did not cease until its records were turned over to the State of Louisiana on June B0, 1910; that he remained the surveyor general of Louisiana until that office actually ceased; that the action of the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of the Interior in preventing him from exercising its prerogatives and performing its duties after June 30,1909, was illegal; and that, as the rightful incumbent of the office at the time, he is entitled to the statutory salary attached thereto for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1909, and ending June 30, 1910, the period extending from the time he was deprived by the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of the Interior of the possession and control of the records and other property of said office up to the time when the custodian thereof, appointed by the Secretary of the Interior, turned said records and property over to the State of Louisiana.
    In establishing these contentions claimant would first direct attention to the fact that the office of surveyor general of Louisiana was one created by a section of the Revised Statutes of the United States, R. S., 2207, was filled by appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and carried a salary fixed by statute, R. S., 2208.
    Claimant’s next point is that the office of surveyor general of Louisiana having been established by statute law as a permanently existing office it could be abolished only by act of Congress. The President of the United States himself could not abolish it by Executive order or proclamation. Still less cquld the Secretary of the Interior or the Commissioner of the General Land Office abolish it in the manner attempted by them.
    If the office of surveyor general of Louisiana could be abolished only by act of Congress, that act must be a general one, providing for the automatic abolition of the office under prescribed circumstances, or else it must be a special act. Congress passed no special act abolishing the office of surveyor general of Louisiana. It can not be contended that the passage by Congress of an act appropriating money “ to complete the unfinished drafting and field-note writing-pertaining to surveys in the States of Minnesota, North Dakota, and Louisiana, caused by the discontinuance of the offices of the surveyors general in those States,” was a special act abolishing the office. For the appropriation quoted does not declare the office to be abolished or discontinued, nor is it in the form always adopted when such a purpose was in view. Congress knew how to abolish such an office when it so desired, as will be seen by reference to the sundry civil appropriation act, approved July 31,1876, wherein it is provided, 19 Stat. L., 121, that “ the office of the surveyor general of Kansas is hereby abolished from and after the thirtieth of September next,” and by reference to the sundry civil appropriation act, approved October 2, 1888, wherein it is provided, 25 Stat. L., 525, that “ the office of surveyor general for the district of Nebraska and Iowa is hereby abolished.”
    That Congress knows how to say what it means and does not mean any more than it says is shown forcibly by the passage, on July SI, 1876, of this act above mentioned abolishing the Kansas office, despite the fact that the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation act, approved March 3, 1875, provided, 18 Stat. L., 366, “For surveyor general of Kansas, two thousand dollars, and for the clerks in his office, six thousand three hundred dollars, and the business of the said office shall be settled, and the office shall be closed and discontinued on or before the thirtieth day of June, eighteen hundred and seventy-six.” The office of surveyor general of Louisiana was not abolished then by special act. Was it abolished under the terms of any general enactments, and if so, when?
    Section 2218 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides that “whenever the surveys and records of any such districts (i. e., surveying districts) are completed, the surveyor general thereof shall be required to deliver over, to the secretary of state of the respective States, including such surveys, or to such other officers as may be authorized to receive them, all the field notes, maps, records, and other papers appertaining to land titles within the same; and the office of surveyor general in every such district shall thereafter cease and be discontinued.”
    Section 2219 of these Revised Statutes provides that “ In all cases where, as provided in the preceding section, the field notes, maps, records, and other papers appertaining to land titles in any State are turned over to the authorities of such State,” the powers, etc., formerly vested in the surveyor general thereof shall devolve on the Commissioner of the General Land Office. Section 2221, following, provides that “ The field notes, maps, records, and other papers mentioned in section twenty-two hundred and nineteen shall in no case be turned over to the authorities of any State until such State has provided by law for the reception and safe-keeping of the same as public records, and for the allowance of free access to the same by the authorities of the United States.”
    On May 3, 1907, claimant wrote to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, that—
    " Up to this time section five of the act of March 3, 1831, U. S. Stats., 4, p. 492, has been the statute upon which this office has based its charges for copies from its records. The said section providing that for every copy of a plat of survey there shall be paid twenty-five cents, and for any transcript from the records of said office there shall be paid at the rate of twenty-five cents per hundred words.”
    In reply thereto the Commissioner of the General Land Office wrote to claimant the letter set forth on page 37 of the record herein, in which said commissioner said:
    “You state you were working under an old statute of 1831, 4 Stat. L., 495, which prescribes for your office a fee of 25 cents for plats and 25 cents per hundred words for copies of records.
    In reply you are advised that this law being unrepealed you will continue to charge the fees established by you under this law * *
    On November 11, 1907, claimant wrote to the Commissioner of the General Land Office the letter set forth on page 39 of the record, in which claimant said:
    “ Referring to the second paragraph of your circular letter ‘ M,’ dated October 19, 1907, ‘ amending circular letter “A” of April 15, 1907,’ I beg leave to state that your letter ‘A’ of May 9, 1907, advised me that the law of 1831 being unrepealed I should continue to charge the fees established by me under the said law, and that circular of April 15, 1907, was modified to that extent as far as my office was concerned.
    “ In view of this fact I consider that your aforesaid circular letter £ M ’ of October 19, 1907, stands modified to the same extent.”
    To this letter said commissioner responded in the letter • set forth on page 40 of the record, wherein said commissioner states that—
    “ In reply to yohr letter of the 11th instant, you are di- ' rected to continue to charge the fees established by the act of March 8, 1831, 4 St at. L., 494, for furnishing copies of plats and transcripts of the records of your office.”
    The General Land Office thereupon, during all of claimant’s incumbency of said office of surveyor general of Louisiana, agreed with claimant in recognizing said provisions relating to fees of section 5 of the act of March 3, 1831, as in full force and effect.
    Now, when Congress passed said act of March 3, 1831, and provided in section 5 thereof that—
    “ * * *. for every copy of a plat of survey there shall be paid twenty-five cents, and for any transcript from the records of said office there shall be paid at the rate of twenty-five cents for every hundred words by the individuals requiring the same ”—
    to whom was it intended that said fees were to go ? A review of the legislation which preceded said act of March 3, 1831, and which it superseded, shows clearly that it was intended that said fees should be perquisites attaching to the office of surveyor general of Louisiana, to be retained by him as his private property, in addition to his statutory salary. Such a review follows.
    On May 16, 1796, the President approved an act of Congress entitled “An act providing for the sale of the lands of the United States in the territory northwest of the Eiver Ohio and above the mouth of Kentucky River.” 1 St at. L., 464, which provided, inter alia, section 1:
    “ That a surveyor general shall be appointed, whose duty it shall be to engage a sufficient number of skillful survey- or’s as his deputies, whom he shall cause without delay to survey and mark the unascertained outlines of the lands lying northwest of the River Ohio and above the mouth of the River Kentucky, in which the titles of the Indian tribes have been extinguished, and to divide the same in the manner hereinafter directed * *
    On March 3, 1803, by approval of the President, an act of Congress became law entitled “An act regulating the grants of land, and providing for the disposal of the lands of the United States, south of the State of Tennessee,” in which it was provided, section 10:
    “ That a surveyor of the lands of the United States, south of the State of Tennessee, shall be appointed, whose duty it shall be to engage a sufficient number of skillful surveyors as his deputies, and to cause the lands above mentioned, to which the titles of the Indian tribes have been extinguished, to be surveyed and divided in the manner hereafter directed, and to do and perform all such other acts, in relation to the said lands, as the surveyor-general is authorized and directed to do in relation to the lands lying northwest of the Eiver Ohio, and above the mouth of the Eiver Kentucky.”
    On March 26,1804, the President approved an act of Congress entitled “An act erecting Louisiana into two Territories, and providing for the temporary government thereof.” This act, 1 Stat. L., 283, provided, section 1:
    ' “ That all that portion of country ceded by France to the United States, under the name of Louisiana, which lies south of the Mississippi territory, and of an east and west line to commence on the Mississippi Eiver at the thirty-third degree of north latitude, and to extend west to the western boundary of the said cession, shall constitute a Territory of the United States, under the name of the Territory of Orleans; * * *.”
    “ Sec. 12. The residue of the province of Louisiana, ceded to the United States, shall be called the district of Louisiana; * * *.”
    Following the creation of the Territory of Orleans, an act was passed by Congress, approved March 2, 1805, entitled “An act for ascertaining and adjusting the titles and claims to land, within the Territory of Orleans, and the district of Louisiana,” 2 Stat. L., 324. Section 3 of this act provided:
    “ That for the purpose of more conveniently ascertaining the titles and claims to land in the territory ceded as aforesaid, the Territory of Orleans shall be laid off into two districts, in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct; * *
    Section 7 provided:
    “That the powers vested by law in the surveyor of the lands of the United States south of the State of Tennessee, shall extend over ail the public lands of the United States, to which the Indian title has been, or shall hereafter be extinguished, within the said Territory of Orleans; * * *.”
    The above act was followed by the enactment of “An act supplementary to an act entitled ‘An act for ascertaining and adjusting the titles and claims to land, within the Territory of Orleans and the district of Louisiana,’ ” approved April 21, 1806, 2 Stat. Z., 391. Section 9 of this act reads as follows (the italics are ours):
    “ That the surveyor of the public lands, south of Tennessee, be, and he is hereby directed to appoint a principal deputy for each of the two land districts of the Territory of Orleans, whose duty it shall be to reside and. keep an office in the said districts respectively, * * * and generally to perform in such districts respectively, in conformity with the regulations and instructions of the said surveyor of the public lands south of the State of Tennessee, the duties imposed by law on said surveyor. And each of the principal deputies shall receive an annual compensation of five hundred dollars, and in addition thereto, the following fees, that is to say: For examining and recording the surveys executed by any of the deputies, at the rate of twenty-five cents for every mile of the boundary line of such survey, and for a certified copy of any plat of a survey in the office, twenty-five centsF
    
    On February 20, 1811, an act of Congress was approved, 2 Stat. Z., 641, authorizing the people of the Territory of Orleans to form a constitution and a State government as a prerequisite to admission as a State in the Union, and on April 8,1812, an act of Congress became law, 2 Stat. Z., 701, admitting the former Territory of Orleans into the Union as the State of Louisiana.
    Defendants attempt to justify and vitalize the President’s attempted ratification upon the authority of the case of Heinzen v. U. S., 206 U. S., 370 at 382. But that case is not in point, as an analysis of its holding shows. In the Heinzen case, it was held that Congress had the power to adopt and ratify the previously unauthorized act of the President, in levying and collecting duties on imports into the Philippines, because it had the power originally to enact a law authorizing the exaction of such duties. In the case at bar, it is contended by claimant that the President did not have the authority to ratify the attempted discontinuance of claimant’s office, since he did not have the power originally to discontinue it.
    In the Heinzen case, the ratification which the Supreme Court held to be legal was made by act of the legislature — ■ by statute — enacted in due time, whereas in the case at bar the attempted ratification is by act of the executive taken out of time. In the Heinzen case, the ratiffication and legalization of the unauthorized act was effected by the entire law-making machinery of the Government — the two Houses of Congress and the President — working in conjunction in the enactment and approval of a law; in the case- at bar, the ratification of the illegal act and its vitalization into a legal one is attempted to be made by a single branch of the lawmaking machinery of the Government, i. e., the President of the United States, acting alone and in nonconformity with the established provisions of law on the subject. The President’s power under the law was only to remove claimant from office and thereby terminate claimant’s incumbency of his office, but this was not attempted.
    What the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of the Interior attempted was to terminate, although it was created by statute, the office itself of surveyor general of Louisiana, by discontinuing the same and this neither of them had the power under the law to do. It is this attempted act on their part that the President has now essayed to ratify and validate by his letter of January 9, 1915, and, as the President was without the power to do this act, to abolish this statute-created office, at the time his subordinates attempted it, he can not now legalize their attempt by ratification. As said by Mr. Justice Day of the Supreme Court of the United States, in rendering the dissenting opinion in the recent case of The United States v. The Midwest Oil Company et al., decided February 23,1915:
    “The Constitution does not confer upon him (the President) any power to enact laws or to suspend or repeal such as Congress enacts. Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet., 524, 613.”
    For the above reasons, it is submitted that the President’s ratification contained in his letter is inoperative and of no effect.
    The act of 1806, supra, provides that—
    “ each of the principal deputies shall receive an annual compensation of five hundred dollars, and in addition thereto the following fees; that is to say, for examining and recording the surveys executed by any of the deputies, at the rate of twenty-five cents for every mile of the boundary line of such survey, and for a certified copy of any plat of a survey in the office, twenty-five cents.”
    The act of 1831, supra, provides that — ■
    “a surveyor general for the State of Louisiana shall be appointed who shall have the same authority and perform the same duties respecting the public lands and private land claims in the State of Louisiana as are now vested in and required of the surveyor of the lands of the United States, south of the State of Tennessee, or of the principal deputy surveyors in the said State: * * *.”
    “ Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That the surveyor general to be appointed in pursuance of this act * * * shall be allowed an annual salary of two thousand dollars .* * *; and that the fees heretofore authorized by law for examining and recording surveys be, and the same are hereby, abolished; * * * and for every copy of a plat of survey there shall be paid twenty-five cents, and for any transcript from the records of said office there shall be paid at the rate of twenty-five cents for every hundred words by the individuals requiring the same.”
    Now, note that while the act of 1831 abolished the fees for examining and recording surveys authorized by the act of 1806 — and those are the only fees it did abolish — it specifically retained the fees for furnishing copies of plats of surveys authorized by the earlier act; it specifically vested the newly created surveyor general of Louisiana with the authority, as to Louisiana, of the surveyor of the lands south of Tennessee and his principal deputies. The act of 1806 specifically provided that the fees authorized by it for furnishing copies of plats should be received by the principal deputies in addition to their salaries, and the act of 1831 did not make any provision to the contrary. It must be concluded, therefore, that the authority'of the deputies, under the act of 1806, specifically conferred by the act of 1831 on the surveyor general of Louisiana included the authority granted the deputies by the act of 1806 to receive the fees in question in addition to their salaries. And this was the uniform construction of the act of 1831 given to it by the successive surveyors general of Louisiana and acquiesced in by the Interior Department until the orders and acts of the department in 1907 complained of in this case.
    Defendants’ next contention is that the act of March 3, 1831, was repealed in its entirety by the Eevised Statutes. There being no specific repeal, this contention must be determined by the language of the general repeal provisions of the revision.
    Sections 5595 and 5596 of the Revised Statutes (Title LXXIV — Eepeal provisions) are as follows:
    “ Sec. 5595. The foregoing seventy-three titles embrace the statutes of the United States general and permanent in their nature, in force on the first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-three, as revised and consolidated by commissioners appointed under an act of Congress, and the same shall be designated and cited as The Eevised Statutes of the United States.”
    “ Sec. 5596. All acts of Congress passed prior to said first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-three, any portion of which is embraced in any section of said revision, are hereby repealed, and the section applicable thereto shall be in force in lieu thereof; all parts of such acts not contained in such revision having been repealed or superseded by subsequent acts or not being general and permanent in their nature: Provided, That the incorporation into said revision of any general and permanent provision, taken from an act making appropriations, or from an act containing other provisions of a private, local, or temporary character, shall not repeal or in any way affect any appropriation or any provision of a private, local, or temporary character contained in any of said acts; but the same shall remain in force, and all acts of Congress passed prior to said last-named day no part of which are embraced in said revision shall not be affected or changed by its enactment.”
    It will be seen from the above (1) that the Eevised Statutes did not codify all the existing Federal statute law, but only such of it as was general in its nature, sec. 5595, and (2) that, although the general language in the first lines of section 5596 repeals “ all acts of Congress * * * any portion of which is embraced in any section of said revision,” the proviso in the latter lines of the section expressly saves “ provisions of a * * * local * * * character,” although contained in an act other provisions of which, general in their nature, have been embraced in the revision. It is, therefore, to the fact that the provisions of the act of March 3,1831, relating to fees, in section 5 thereof, are local in their nature that their omission from the Revised Statutes is to be attributed and not to any intent on the part of Congress to repeal them by the enactment of a revision and codification of those parts of the Federal law in their nature general as distinguished from local.
    It is also true that a departmental construction uniformly adhered to from 1831 to 1907 is entitled to very great weight in consideration of the true meaning and effect of statutes dealing with matters directly within the province of the work of the department and subject to its supervision. The extent to which our courts feel bound by such long-continued departmental construction has been made most patent in the recent case of The United States v. The Midwest Oil Gom-pany et al., No. 278, October term, 1914, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on February 23, 1915, in which the whole decision rests upon the force of - custom, long continued and acquiesced in, as establishing the law. As said by Mr. Justice Lamar, in delivering the opinion of the court:
    “It may be argued that while these facts and rulings prove a usage, they do not establish its validity. But government is a practical affair intended for practical men. Both officers, lawmakers, and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the executive department- — on the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been rl lowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice. That presumption is not reasoning in a circle, but the basis of a wise and quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a statute or the existence of a power weight shall be given to the usage itself— even when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation.”
    When, therefore, there has been such long-continued and uniform construction of a statute as in the case at bar, and when such construction gives to statutory provisions such as are here in question the same intent and meaning as that to which their history and language inevitably leads, it should be followed and confirmed.
    
      
      Mr. J. Harwood Graves, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Huston Thompson, for the defendants.
   Barney, Judge,

reviewing facts found to be established, delivered the opinion of the court:

This suit was brought by the plaintiff to recover an unpaid balance of salary and official fees as surveyor general of the State of Louisiana claimed to be due his decedent. ‘ These two claims will be considered separately.

I. The decedent served several terms as surveyor general of the State of Louisiana, but the only one necessary to be here considered is an appointment and commission as such which he received on the 19th of January, 1905, and under which he served until May 13,1909, when he received a letter from the Commissioner of the General Land Office advising him that the office of the surveyor general of Louisiana would be permanently closed and discontinued on July 1, 1909, when the records of the office would be turned over to the State of Louisiana as soon as proper provision should be made by the legislature of that State for their receipt, pursuant to sections 2218, 2220, and 2221 of the Revised Statutes. June 19, 1909, decedent received a communication from said commissioner, under date of June 17, 1909, advising him that Congress had omitted to make an appropriation for the maintenance of his office, in consequence of which a messenger had been detailed to visit his office and supervise the transfer of its records to the State building at Baton Rouge, La., and to select such of the records and Government property as might be considered advisable to remove to Washington. Decedent was directed to render needful assistance to such messenger for this purpose. This communication also stated that, as the State of Louisiana had failed to provide by legislation for the custody of such records, a custodian named had been appointed for that purpose, who would receipt to such messenger for said records. Statements were also made regarding such part of the property in the office, such as stationery, etc., as might be thought advisable to send to Washington or to sell at auction by such custodian,

Pursuant to this communication a messenger from the General Land Office proceeded to the office of said surveyor general in New Orleans, La., caused an inventory to be made of all the records and property therein, and on the 15th day of July, 1909, turned over the same to one Arthur Gascon, who had been appointed as custodian for that purpose by the Secretary of the Interior by an order, as follows:

“DEPARTMENT OP THE INTERIOR,

“ 'Washington, June 16, 1909.

“Arthur Gascon, of Louisiana, is hereby appointed custodian of the documents and records pertaining to the office of the surveyor general of Louisiana upon the discontinuance of that office, at a salary of $1,000 per annum, to take effect upon July 1, 1909.

“ Salary payable from the appropriation for completing field notes, etc., of surveys in Minnesota, North Dakota, and Louisiana.

“ By transfer from chief clerk, office of surveyor general of Louisiana.

“ B. A. Ballinger. Secretary.

“ F. D.”

Said Arthur Gascon remained in custody of said records until June 30, 1910, when, the legislature of the State of Louisiana having enacted the legislation necessary to that end, he delivered the same to the duly authorized officer of said State. Decedent performed no duties connected with the office of surveyor general of Louisiana after he was dispossessed of the office as hereinbefore stated, and has been paid no salary since such dispossession.

The plaintiff now claims that he is entitled to recover the salary of the office from July 1, 1909, the date when the office was taken from decedent, to June 30,1910, or one year. This claim is upon the assumption that said office was not legally vacated before the latter date, on which day the records of the office were turned over to the State of Louisiana. The decedent’s commission was for the term of four years from June 18, 1905, but he continued to hold the office after the expiration of his term under section 2222, Eevised Statutes, which provides as follows *.

“Every surveyor general, * * * except where the President sees cause otherwise to determine, is authorized to continue in the uninterrupted discharge of his regular official duties after the day of the expiration of his commission, and until a new commission is issued to him for the same office, or until the day when his successor enters upon the duties of such office.”

It is upon this statute that the claim in this suit is founded.

In this connection it should be noted that section 2218, Revised Statutes, provides that “whenever the surveys and records of any such districts (i. e., surveying districts) are completed, the surveyor general thereof shall be required to deliver over to the secretary of state of the respective States, including such surveys, or to such officer as may be authorized to receive them, all the field notes, maps, records, and other papers appertaining to land titles within the same; and the office of surveyor general in every such district shall thereafter cease and be discontinued.”

Section 2221, Revised Statutes, provides that such field notes, etc., shall not be turned over to the authorities of any State until such State has provided by law for the reception of the same.

The claim in this case is to be determined upon the construction to be given to the foregoing statutes and the effect to be given to the orders issued by the land commissioner and the Secretary of the Interior which appear in the findings, as well as subsequent legislation of Congress which will be hereafter considered.

It is contended by the plaintiff that the office of surveyor general for the State of Louisiana was never lawfully discontinued until June 30, 1910, on which date the field notes, etc., pertaining to that office were turned over to the officer appointed by the State of Louisiana to receive the same; and that prior to that time decedent was never removed from said office by competent authority. In other words, it is contended that the decedent continued to hold the office of surveyor general of Louisiana until he was removed therefrom by the automatic action of section 2218, Revised Statutes, which provides that when the field notes, etc., of the surveyor general’s office are turned over to the proper authorities of any State “the office of surveyor general in every such district shall thereafter cease and be discontinued.”

On the other hand, it is contended by the def andants that the order of June 16, 1909, quoted in full in Finding Y, in effect terminated the term of office of decedent, and that said order was in law the act of the President; and numerous authorities are cited to sustain that contention. It is also contended by the defendants that like, effect should be given to the order of the President of January 9,1915, also quoted in Finding V.

The Legal effect of these orders will be neither discussed nor decided, as we think the office of surveyor general of the State of Louisiana was effectually abolished by Congress by the act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. L., 945, 987. That statute provides as follows:

“ To enable the Secretary of the Interior to complete the unfinished drafting and field-note writing pertaining to surveys in the States of Minnesota, North Dakota, and Louisiana, caused by the discontinuance of the offices of the surveyors general in those States, six thousand five hundred dollars.”

The authority of Congress to abolish the office of surveyor general of any State, of course, is not denied, and the only question in this case is whether it can do so by indirection; that is to say, can Congress by recognizing and indorsing such abolition thereby accomplish such a result.

We have received but little help from either of the parties in this suit in the discussion of this question, and in the limited time afforded us for that purpose no direct authority upon the question has been found and recourse must be had to the general rules upon the construction of statutes.

If two inconsistent acts are passed at different times, the last is to be obeyed; and if obedience can not be observed without derogating from the first it is the first which must give way. Every act is made for some purpose, and its operation is not to be impeded by some previous inconsistent enactment. Dwarris on Statutes, 531. It is fundamental in the construction of statutes that the intention of the framers must prevail, and the only serious problem is as to how that intention is to be ascertained. Of course, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous we are to go no further to ascertain its meaning. Id., 550 et seq.

It is well settled that a subsequent statute which is repugnant to a prior one necessarily repeals the former one, although it does not do so in terms. Sedgwick on Statutes, 104. In the construction of statutes, if possible, effect must be given to every word contained in it. Hardcastle on Statutes., 41. When jurisdiction is assumed to exist and provision is made as to its mode of exercise, this carries with it by implication jurisdiction of the proceedings so regulated. State v. Miller, 23 Wis., 634. Thus, in the instant case Congress made provision for the expenses incident to the discontinuance of the office of surveyor general for the State of Louisiana, and failed to make any appropriation for its continuance. A recognition and indorsement of the discontinuance of said office could not have been expressed in clearer language.

In addition to this it may well be presumed that Congress knew, as it doubtless did, of all previous correspondence and transactions in connection with this office and enacted this legislation in the light of such knowledge. It says “ caused by the discontinuance of the office of surveyor general in [Lousiana].” That could mean but one thing, and that was that the said office had been discontinued on and after a certain date. We think this legislation had the effect of a direct discontinuance of said office.

II. We come now to consider the next item of the plaintiff’s claim, which is for fees alleged to have been earned during decedent’s incumbency of this office and remaining unpaid. The act of March 3, 1831, 4 Stat., 492, creating the office of surveyor of the public lands for the State of Louisiana, provided as follows:

“Be it enacted Toy the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That a surveyor general for the State of Louisiana shall be appointed, who shall have the same authority and perform the same duties respecting the public lands and private land claims in the State of Louisiana as are now vested in and required of the surveyor of the lands of the United States, south of the State of Tennessee, or of the principal deputy surveyors in the said State; * * *.”

“ Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That the surveyor general to be appointed in pursuance of this act shall establish his office at such place as the President of the United States may deem most expedient for the public service; and that he shall be allowed an annual salary of two thousand dollars, and that he be authorized to employ one skillful draughtsman and recording clerk whose aggregate compensation shall not exceed one thousand five hundred dollars per annum; and that the fees heretofore authorized by law for examining and recording surveys be, and the same are hereby, abolished; and any copy of a plat of survey, or transcript from the records of the office of the said surveyor general, shall be admitted as evidence in any of the courts of the United States or Territories thereof; and for every copy of a plat of survey there shall be paid twenty-five cents, and for any transcript from the records of said office there shall be paid at the rate of twenty-five cents for every hundred words by the individuals requiring the same.”

It will be seen that the statute quoted provides an annual salary of $2,000 for the surveyor general of Louisiana, abolishes fees for examining and recording surveys, and provides for certain other fees to be paid, with no provision as to their disposition. Since July 1, 1878, Congress has only appropriated $1,800 per year for such salary “in full compensation, etc.,” so that since the latter date the annual salary has been but $1,800.

It appears that prior to May 1, 1907, the surveyor general of Louisiana made no report of any such fees collected by him, but since that time he has been required to deposit the same to the credit of the United States Treasury. It is now contended by the plaintiff that these fees were a part of the emoluments of this office.

Section 1765, Revised Statutes, is as follows:

“No officer in any branch of the public service, or any other person whose salary, pay, or emoluments are fixed by law. or regulations, shall receive any additional pay, extra allowance, or compensation, in any form whatever, for the disbursement of public money, or for any other service or duty whatever, unless the same is authorized by law, and the appropriation therefor explicitly states that it is for such additional pay, extra allowance, or compensation.”

Considerable stress is placed by the plaintiff upon the fact that prior'to the act of March 3, 1831, establishing the office of surveyor general of the State of Louisiana, and when the jurisdiction of that officer covered a much larger territory, he was allowed certain fees as a part of his compensation. We believe, however, that we are only to look to the act of March 3, 1831, to determine that question, because that was the law, and the only law, providing for his compensation after that date. In this connection it should also be noted that the act of'March 3,1803, making certain regulations for the then vast territory of Louisiana, among other things provided for a surveyor for the same at an annual salary of $1,500 (sections 10, 13), and made no provision for any fees for him. While the act of April 21, 1806, 2 Stat. L., 391, making further regulations for the same territory' and making provision for deputy surveyors therein and their compensation, provided for the same in the following language: “And each of the said principal deputies shall receive an annual compensation of five hundred dollars, and in addition thereto the following fees, etc.” Sec. 9.

The language of section 1765, Revised Statutes, is too plain for misunderstanding and has always been interpreted according to its letter. King v. United States, 147 U. S., 676; Woodwell v. United States, 214 U. S., 82; 41 C. Cls., 357.

- We see no application of the Weeks case (unreported) to the suit at bar. The statute there under consideration provided in terms “ that the register shall be entitled to a fee, etc.” We think that in this case it would require a strained and entirely unauthorized construction, indeed, to hold that the decedent was entitled under the act of March 3, 1831, supra, to retain the fees therein provided for.

It follows from the foregoing that the petition must be dismissed.

All concur.  