
    DINGMAN vs. NICHOLS.
    Where a sale on credit was alleged to be fraudulent, evidence that the purchaser gambled and was intemperate is not admissible, unless the vendor knew it.
    Error to Common Pleas of Crawford County. No. 90 November Term, 1874.
    There was an action of trespass brought by Andrew J. Nichols against Dingman and others to recover damages for selling certain goods claimed by Nichols at Sheriff’s sale as the property of Samuel Lipton. It appeared that Lipton, a storekeeper, being indebted to various creditors, sold his whole stock of goods to Nichols, receiving $50 in cash, and notes of Nichols for $850, payable in future, and then absconded. Dingman and others, creditors of Lipton, obtained judgments against him, and levied upon and sold the goods transferred to Nichols.
    Upon the trial the defendants alleged that the sale to Nichols was fraudulent, and offered to prove that Nichols was intemperate and gambled, for the purpose of showing that he had not the credit to make such a purchase bona fide. The Court refused to receive the offer. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff; and the defendants then took this writ of error complaining of the rejection of the above offer.
    
      JB. J. Reid and J. A. Neill, Esqs., for plaintiff in error,
    cited: Kauffman vs. Swar, 5 Pa., 230; Reinhard vs. Keenbartz, 6 Watts, 93; Deakers vs. Temple, 41 Pa., 242; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. vs. Hoge, 34 Pa., 221; Kaine vs. Weigley, 22 Pa., 183; Pratt vs. Jewelry Co., 69 Pa., 53; Hartman vs. Shaffer, 71 Pa., 312; Stevenson vs. Stewart, 11 Pa., 307.
    
      
      Guthrie, Esq., contra.
    
   The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Common Pleas on November 2nd, 1874, in the following opinion :

Per-Curiam.

The offer to prove that the plaintiff was intemperate, and that he gambled, was irrelevant to the question of fraud, unless to this proof the fact was added that these habits were known to Lipton at the time he made his'sale to the plaintiff.

Lipton’s knowledge that the plaintiff was untrustworthy on account of these habits was essential to the pertinency of the habit to the question of fraud in the sale.

The offer did not go far enough, and therefore we cannot say the Court erred in rejecting the offer.

Judgment affirmed.  