
    Frederick Sessions against George Barfield.
    Columbia,
    
      April, 1797.
    
    Where arbi-upoífthem'to ■wardonother those1 submh-te't of submission it is a good to set aside, the award. No parol proof should be admitted to vary the import of the terms of submission mentioned in the condition of such bond.
    THIS was an action of debt on an award, tried at Georgetown, in which there was a verdict for the plaintiff.
    & was afterwards taken up to the constitutional court of aPPea^stat Columbia, on a motion for a new trial.
    ln this case, the bond of submission was to abide and perform the arbitrament of the arbitrators therein named, of and concerning a dispute about a horse sold under an execution. The arbitrators, however, took upon them to make their award about other matters, than the dispute about the horse, not mentioned in the éondition of the bond. On the trial, parol testimony was admitted, to prove that it was the intention of the parties to submit those other matters, although not fully expressed in the condition of the bond, which induced the jury to find in favour of the plaintiff.
    Mr. Falconer, in support of the motion for the new trial, an the part of the defendant,
    contended, that no parol test!--mony ought to have been allowed, to prove any matter, not particularly mentioned in the condition of the bond, or in any wise to vary the tenor of it. It ought to speak for itself. That at all events, Mr. Barfield, his client, was only a surety to the bond, no wise concerned in the original dispute, therefore he never could be chargeable for the intent or meaning of the principal, or for any thing not expressed in the bond ; otherwise, every security might be entrapped. That a contrary doctrine, would cut up the statute of frauds by the roots, and set every thing afloat, which had been fixed and rendered certain, by that act; and for that purpose, cited 3 Will. 539. Ibid. 371. 1 Will. 34. Powell on Contracts, 431. 1 Bac. 139.142. 158»
    Mr. Johnson, in reply,
    observed, that the variance arose from a mistake in terms, and that the parol testimony was admitted to explain the meaning of those terms, which the court would always permit in cases of ambiguity: he admitted in the fullest force, the dangerous tendency of suffering parol testimony to contradict or alter any deed whatever ; that the statute of frauds was a wise and salutary act, and should not be impugned in any case ; but insisted, there was no such contradiction before the court.
   By the Court.

It would be a most dangerous thing to suffer either .principals or their sureties to be surprised, by ally evidence to prove that any other matters were sub- 1 J • mitted by arbitration bonds, than those expressed in the , . - , . , . condition of such bond, or so to explain the meaning or the parties, as to make the least variation from the import of the terms of the submission. The court therefore was of opinion, that it was improper to permit any parol testimony to be admitted, in order to explain the intent and meaning of the parties to the arbitration bonds. The terms of submission ought to be plain and explicit, as to the object and design of them; and it is much better to let the time run out and expire, within which awards are to be made, than to introduce a principle of so dangerous a tendency, as the one contended for by the plaintiff on the present occasion ; as in the end it might defeat the statute of frauds.

Rule for a new trial made absolute.

Present, Burke, Grimke, Waties and Bay.

N. B. This was the second new trial which was ordered in this case, there having been a former one, on account of the jury finding against the terms of the submission.  