
    Kenneth HOWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellee,
    No. 16-825
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    January 30, 2017
    For Plaintiff-Appellant: Thomas Ricotta, Ricotta & Marks, P.C., Long Island City, NY.
    For Defendant-Appellee: Joseph E. Field, Littler Mendelson P.C., New York, NY.
    Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, AMALYA L. KEARSE, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Following his termination, plaintiff-appellant Kenneth Howell brought claims against his employer, defendant-appellee Montefiore Medical Center (“Montefiore”), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to Montefiore on all of Howell’s claims. Howell appeals from the grant of summary judgment on his claim that he suffered retaliation for his complaints of discrimination. Specifically, Howell challenges the district court’s conclusion that he did not provide any evidence that Mon-tefiore’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions against him were pretextual. We affirm the district court. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, to determine whether there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 842-43 (2d Cir. 2013).

Howell argues that Montefiore’s proffered reasons for his termination were pretextual, contending that Montefiore’s investigation into a November 30, 2012 altercation between Howell and a coworker was conducted in bad faith. Specifically, Howell points to evidence, considered by Montefiore’s investigator, that weighed against- the investigator’s ultimate conclusion that Howell was at fault during the November 30, 2012 altercation. Even if we assume that this evidence raises a triable issue of fact as to what happened on November 30, 2012, we have explained that “[i]n a discrimination case, ... we are deeidedly not interested in the truth of the allegations against plaintiff. We are interested in what ‘motivated the employer’....” McPherson v. NYC Dep’t of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983)). The evidence on which Howell relies does not bear on Mon-tefiore’s motivation and does not suggest that Montefiore’s investigation was conducted in bad faith. Accordingly, it is not material to the disposition of Howell’s retaliation claim.

Howell also argues that Montefiore’s proffered reasons for its actions against him were pretextual because the other employee involved in the November 30, 2012 altercation was similarly situated to him but was not disciplined or terminated following the incident. However, there is no dispute that Howell had an extensive disciplinary history, including a prior termination later converted to a suspension, while the other employee had no disciplinary history. Accordingly, Howell and the other employee were not similarly situated for Title VII purposes. See Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2000).

Finally, Howell argues that he did not have notice that aggressive and belligerent behavior could result in his termination. This is neither relevant nor accurate. Howell’s notice, or lack thereof, does not bear on Montefiore’s motivations for its actions against him. See McPherson, 457 F.3d at 216. In addition, Howell entered into a settlement agreement with Montefiore to resolve an earlier incident involving belligerent and aggressive behavior on Howell’s part. This agreement stated that Howell would be subject to termination if he repeated such behavior.

We have considered all of plaintiff-appellant’s contentions on appeal and have found in them no basis for reversal. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.  