
    MIDDLETON v. PARKE.
    Rule of Property; Orphans’ Court; Infants’ Real Estate, Mortgage of; Deep of Trust.
    1. A construction of law that has been enunciated by the courts, and acted upon by the community, and which has thereby become a rule of property, should not be lightly overthrown, even though that construction, upon fuller and further consideration, in the light of experience, might not commend itself to the judicial mind.
    2. The denial to the Orphans’ Court of incidental power or constructive authority, by the act of Maryland of 1798, Ch. 101, Subch. 15, Sec. 20, does not mean the denial of such authority as is necessarily implied in that which is expressly granted; and having the power to order the sale of an infant’s real estate under certain circumstances, subject to the ratification of its order by the Equity Court, the Orphans’ Court has the implied power to mortgage it.
    3. When a decree of the Equity Court ratifying an order of the Orphans’ Court authorizing a guardian to mortgage the infant’s real estate, was passed, and the guardian, who was the mother of the infant and widow, executed a deed of trust on the property, which recited the decree and purported to be executed in compliance therewith although the given name of the grantor varied slightly from the true name of the guardian and the deed was signed as “ widow,” it was held, in a suit in ejectment by the ward to recover the property from a purchaser under proceedings foreclosing the deed of trust, fourteen years after the foreclosure, that the execution of the deed of trust by the guardian was a valid exercise of the authority given her to mortgage, and the purchaser at the foreclosure sale took a good title.
    No. 280.
    Submitted March 9, 1894.
    Decided April 2, 1894.
    HEARING Ofl an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment on an agreed statement of facts in an action of ejectment.
    Affirmed.
    The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:
    This is a suit in ejectment in which, upon an agreed statement of facts, there was judgment in the court below for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.
    From the agreed statement of facts, it appears that, on September 29, 1873, one Daniel Middleton died seized of a lot of ground in the city of Washington, designated as part of lot 4 in square 122; that he died intestate and left surviving him a widow, Catherine Middleton, and two infant children -a daughter and a son-who inherited the property subject to the widow's right of dower. The son died on June 8, 1875, when only a little over two years of age. The daughter survived and became entitled to the entire property. She was born May I, 1871. On June 15, 1875, the mother, Catherine Middleton, was, by the Orphans' Court of the District, or rather by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a special term for Orphans' Court .business, appointed guardian of the infant, and gave bond as such in the sum of $200. On the same day she filed a petition in that court for leave to borrow $300 by deed of trust or mortgage upon the real estate of her ward, which was the real estate in controversy in this suit. It was represented in the petition that the money was needed to pay taxes and assessments in arrears for which the property was about to be sold, and also some few. debts of the deceased Daniel Middleton, as well as for the support and maintenance of the ward; and it was alleged that the property could not then be sold without sacrifice; that it was too small to permit any division of it so as to sell a part; that the petitioner was without means to provide for the support and maintenance of the ward, and that it would be for the best interests of all that the property should be mortgaged for the purposes indicated. The petition referred to the two children as though they were then living, notwithstanding that one of them had died ■seven days before that. But this is accounted for by the fact that the petition had evidently been prepared probably ns early as the 2d of June, 1875; which is the date of the affidavits made in support of it; and through inadvertence •or oversight probably had not been corrected. At all events, it is not considered that this is of any importance in the case.
    Thereupon, an order was made by-the court authorizing the guardian to mortgage the property, as proposed, for $300, subject to ratification of the order by the equity court. On the next day, June 16, 1875, a petition was filed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia holding an •equity court, for the ratification of the order passed in the Orphans’ Court term, and that order was ratified.
    Assuming to act upon the authority so granted, Catherine Middleton, on June 17, 1875, borrowed $300, payable in three years, with interest at the then prevailing rate of ten per centum per annum; and to secure the same executed a ■deed of trust of the property in .question to two trustees, the •deed of trust being in the ordinary form of those in universal use in the District of Columbia. The deed, however, is not signed by her as guardian, but as widow, and her name, Catherine, is said to be rather illiterately written as “ Cat-nine.” But the instrument professes in express terms to be executed in pursuance of the decree of the equity court that has been mentioned, and purports to convey the property specified in the petitions filed in the Orphans’ Court and the equity court.
    
      Default was made in the payment of the interest on the loan, and the property was advertised for sale by the trustees,' and sold to the defendant Parke, the appellee in this cause, on August 14, 1877. The terms of sale were somewhat different from those prescribed in the deed of trust; but were agreed to in advance of the sale by Catherine Middleton in writing. Parke paid the purchase money, amounting to $800, immediately entered upon the possession of the property, and has since continued to hold and occupy it, claiming to own the same in fee simple.
    After the payment of costs and expenses and the balance due upon the loan, the residue of the purchase money, amounting to $536.21, was turned over to the guardian, and she accounted for it to the Orphans’ Court. In a petition filed in that court on February xi, 1881, she sets forth in substance the proceedings that have been narrated, the authority that had been given to her to mortgage the property, the execution by her in pursuance of this authority, of the deed of trust that has been mentioned, the application by her of the amount of the loan to the payment of taxes and the care of the child, the subsequent default made by her, the sale of the property by the trustees, their report of sale to her, their payment to her of the residue of the proceeds of sale as above stated ($536.21); and she then proceeds to allege her inability to support and educate the child, unless permission were given her to use a part of the money for that purpose. And she prayed for an allowance of five dollars a month from it for the support and maintenance of the child and for medical attendance. The court thereupon passed an order making the desired allowance to her, and it may be presumed that the money has been so applied.
    Besides the foregoing facts, it also appears from the agreed statement that the proceeding of the Orphans’ Court in this case was but one of many similar proceedings instituted for similar purposes and similarly ratified by the equity court. And a list is given of thirty-six other cases, purporting to be only a partial list, in which, between January 10, 1872, and November 30, 1888, petitions of guardians for leave to borrow money on the security of the real estate of their wards for the support of the wards, or the payment of taxes, or other pressing necessities, were entertained and allowed by the Orphans’ Court, and in which the action of that court was ratified by the equity court, the proceedings presumably being followed by the consummation of the transactions for which authority was sought.
    Notwithstanding the premises, the present suit was instituted on October 13, 1891, by Bernina Middleton, the ward to whom reference has been made, by her next friend, she being at the time yet a minor, although now of full age, and the suit, as stated, is in ejectment to recover the property. A jury was waived in the court below, and the cause was submitted to the court on the agreed statement of facts, the right of appeal being reserved. The court rendered judgment for the defendant.
    
      Mr. Franklin H. Mackey for the appellant.
    1. The Orphans’ Court of this District is a court of very limited jurisdiction. The legislature by the clearest language has prohibited it from exercising any power not expressly granted it by statute. The language of the act is that “the said Orphans’ Court shall not, under pretext of incidental power or constructive authority, exercise any jurisdiction whatever not expressly given by this act or by some other law.” Md. act 1798, Subch. 15, Sec. 20. For construction of the act, see Scott v. Burch, 6 H. & J., 79; Townsend v. Brooke, 9 Gill, 91; Spencer v. Ragan, 9 Gill, 482 ; Lowe v. Lowe, 6 Md., 352 ; Taylor v. Bruscup, 27 Md., 225 ; Broders v. Thompson, 2 H. & J., 125. See also Mauro v. Ritchie, 3 Cr. C. C., 154; Yeaton v. Lynn, 5 Pet., 230. He who claims, therefore, that the Orphans’ Court has jurisdiction to authorize a guardian to mortgage the estate of his ward for any purpose whatever must be able to put his finger upon the statute expressly authorizing such to be done. He cannot maintain the proposition by maintaining that the court has incidentally or constructively such power.
    
      2. The Maryland statute of 1798, Ch. 101, is the only statutory provision from which this power is to be drawn if there be such power. This statute is set out in the case of Thaw v. Ritchie, 136 U. S., 519, and a careful reading of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in that case will satisfy the judicial mind that no such power as that ■claimed for it here is possessed by the Orphans’ Court of this District. See also the decision of the General Term in this last-mentioned case. 5 Mackey, 203. The power to .authorize a sale outright with the approval of the chancellor sitting in equity is quite a different thing from authorizing a mortgage, to say nothing of a deed of trust. In the case of .a sale safeguards are provided whereby the interests of the infant are protected. But what safeguards were there to protect the infant’s interests in the case at bar? Absolutely none whatever. See Stansbury v. Inglehart, 20 D. C., 134, where the limited power of the courts of equity -to deal with .an infant’s realty is elaborately considered and discussed.
    It required an act of the Legislature of Maryland to give the court of equity of that State power to authorize a guardian to mortgage the infant’s realty. Act of 1831, Ch. 311. If the equity courts or the Orphans’ Courts of Maryland had prior to 1831 possessed the power to authorize a guar-dián to mortgage the infant’s realty, it is hardly necessary to say that the foregoing act would not have been passed.
    3. Furthermore, even were it conceded that the Orphans’ Court possessed this jurisdiction, nevertheless Catherine Middleton never exercised the power claimed to have been granted her, for that was a power to mortgage, whereas she made a deed of trust. Powers are to be strictly followed in all cases, but more especially in the case of its exercise over ■an infant’s realty. Had the guardian mortgaged the estate the mortgagee to have foreclosed would have been compelled to resort to a scire facias, which would have at once brought the infant under the protection of the court, with ■all the safeguards which such a judicial proceeding would have thrown around her interests. On the other hand, a deed of trust, under the forms used in this District, does not require the intervention of the court to cut off the equity of redemption, and consequently the infant’s interests are at the mercy of strangers.
    If the proceeding by which the plaintiff in this case was deprived of her inheritance be regular and valid, then the Orphans’ Court instead of being a protection to the infant is its most dangerous enemy. For the record in this case shows how easily it is possible for an irresponsible woman on an ex parte application, supported only by her own oath, and without even being required to give a bond for the faithful discharge of the power vested in her, to deprive her ward of its inheritance.
    4. The argument upon which the counsel for the defense most relies is that as the Orphans’ Court has power to direct a sale, it has power to direct a mortgage or conditional sale, since a power to sell implies a power to make a conditional sale, and that a conditional sale is nothing more nor less than a mortgage. But a power to sell does not always imply a power to mortgage, and whether a conditional sale is a mortgage or not depends entirely upon the nature of the transaction. See Pingrey on Mortgages, Sec. 61.
    But a complete answer to the proposition will be found in the statute itself, which denies to the Orphans’ Court implied or constructive powers, and upon that plain and positive provision we might confidently rest our case.
    5. It is also claimed by the defense that whatever construction the court might now give to the statute, yet because the Orphans’ Court in quite a number of instances has permitted guardians to mortgage their ward’s realty, therefore such repeated action should now be considered to have created a rule of real property. Rules of real property are not created by courts of limited jurisdiction over realty, nor can they be founded on ex parte orders and decrees where the very question now for the first time brought into controversy has heretofore passed sub silentio; moreover, this is a question of jurisdiction and not one relating to rules of property. A court having a statutory jurisdiction only, and a very limited one at that, cannot by any number of usurpa-tions of authority, so enlarge its jurisdiction as to do away with legislative limitations upon its power. The only power which can extend the jurisdiction of the Orphans’ Court is the Legislature, and yet because the Orphans’ Court has two or three times a year in the past exceeded its statutory jurisdiction, we are told; that it may now go on doing so forever.
    The irregularities which attended this whole proceeding from beginning to end only serve the purpose of making the usurpation of authority more glaring. Some of them, even if the court had had jurisdiction, would render the sale absolutely void; others, while gross irregularities, could not, it is admitted, be attacked in a collateral proceeding. I shall therefore content myself with a mere statement of them as a conclusion to this brief. First. The order permitting a mortgage of the estate was made upon a false (however unintentional) representation of facts. The guardian represented to the court that she needed this money to educate and maintain two children, whereas there was but one. Second. The guardian was granted leave to mortgage, not to make a deed of trust, a very material variance under the circumstances of this case. Third. The deed of trust executed was the deed of Catnine Middleton (not Catherine), personally and as a “widow,” and not the deed of a guardian. It recites an individual debt instead of a debt as guardian. In addition to other expressions in the deed, the conveyance was of “ all the estate, right, title, interest and claim whatsoever, either at law or in equity, of the said party of the first part [viz., of Catherine Middleton, not of her ward] of, in and to the said piece or parcel of land and premises.” So, too, the provision for a release to her, her heirs and assigns, shows that she was dealing with the property as her own instead of as the property of her ward. How absurd to say that this deed conveyed the title of Bernina Middleton, who, it is admitted, was the owner of the property. Fotirth. Whatever may have been the power granted to the guardian it is evident that the power exercised was not the power granted. It surely could not have been intended to authorize a conveyance by the guardian of the infant’s property to two entire strangers, giving them unlimited discretion as to the time and manner of sale, the price to be paid, etc., with no provision for a confirmation of the sale by the court, no requirement of security from them, or from the guardian in the handling of the proceeds of the sale, or of any other, even the slightest, safeguard for the protection of the infant’s interest. Though it were sold for the most inadequate price, the title would have passed to the purchaser if the contention of the defense be correct. In every other case known to the law a sale by trustees who derive their authority from a judicial decree before it can pass title must be ratified or confirmed by the court, and yet in the case of the sale of an infant’s realty, where such a safeguard is more than in any other case necessary, we are told that it is entirely superfluous. Fifth. The sale was not because the debt was due and unpaid, but because an instalment of interest amounting to fifteen dollars was in arrear. Thus though the court directed the mortgage to be made for three years, the property was sold in a little over two. Sixth. The deed of trust purports to give the trustees unlimited discretion to sell, uncontrolled even by the holder of the note. They are not to sell “ at the request of the holder of the note,” which is the usual form, but whenever a default is made. Seventh. The sale was made at the request of Catherine Middleton herself. It is true that the holders of the note also sign the request, but it is none the less the request of Catherine Middleton.
    ' Mr. Chas. H. Cragin for the appellee.
   Mr. Justice Morris

delivered the opinion of the Court:

Four errors are assigned by the appellant, but two of these are merely formal. The substantial questions raised are:

1. Whether the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a special term of that court for Orphans’ Court business, had power under the law to authorize a guardian to mortgage the real estate of a ward; and

2. Whether the deed of trust executed in this instance was a valid execution of the authority conferred upon the guardian to mortgage the real estate of the infant, if it be assumed that the court had power to confer such authority.

These questions are undoubtedly of very grave importance. For, although, we are informed that the course of procedure which was followed here has now been practically discontinued in consequence of the repeated attacks upon it, yet it is quite apparent that the procedure itself was generally accepted in the community, by the legal profession and by the courts, as proper, and that many titles now depend upon it; and we should certainly hesitate to disturb and unsettle such titles, without very clear demonstration that the procedure was wholly unwarranted in law. A construction of law that has been enunciated by the coui'ts and accepted and acted upon by the community, and which thereby has become a rule of property, should not be lightly overthrown, even though that construction, upon further and fuller consideration in the light of experience, might not commend itself to the judicial mind. The maxim of stare decisis does not imply a mere blind adherence to precedent; it is a guaranty of peace to the community and of stability of acquired rights, which ought not to be divested by a change in the judicial mind. Wright v. Sill, 2 Black, 544; 1 Kent’s Comm., 475 ; Doolittle v. Bryan, 14 How., 563 ; Reed v. Ownby, 44 Mo., 206 ; Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U. S., 677 ; Thaw v. Ritchie, 136 U. S., 519.

One of the cases contained in the list that has already been mentioned, as appended to the agreed statement of facts, is the case of The Estate of Peter Mansell. There, on August 11, 1874, the guardian of a minor petitioned the Orphans’ Court for leave to borrow money on the ward’s estate in order to pay taxes and to meet the pressing necessities of the minor or minors. The Orphans’ Court granted the authority; and the equity court, after first ratifying that action, afterwards for some reason certified the matter to be heard in the General Term in the first instance for the purpose ’of having an authoritative settlement of the doubt which seems then, probably for the first time, to have arisen in regard to the matter. The decision of the General Term ratified the order of the Orphans’ Court, and sustained the jurisdiction of the latter to make the order. That decision became the law of the District of Columbia. The proceedings in all the subsequent cases, including those in the case now before us, were had upon the faith of that decision. The opinion in the case does not seem to have been reported; but the decision is cited by Mr. Justice Cox in the case of Thaw v. Ritchie, 5 Mackey, 200, 213, and is .there reaffirmed; and it is practically reaffirmed again by the Supreme Court of the United States in its decision on appeal in the same case of Thaw v. Ritchie, 136 U. S., 544.

The authority, therefore, of the Orphans’ Court to order the mortgage of the property of a minor for his support or to pay taxes, having thus been solemnly adjudicated and affirmed, it does not seem that we ought now to reopen the question. But even if we were to regard it as an open one, it is not apparent that fhe appellant’s contention is well founded.

In view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case just cited of Thaw v. Ritchie, 136 U. S., 519, the power of the Orphans’ Court of this District to order the sale of the real estate of a minor for the purposes heretofore indicated, is beyond cavil. The question now raised is only whether the power to order a sale includes the power to order a mortgage. It is argued here, as it was argued in the case of Thaw v. Ritchie, that the act of Maryland of 1798, Ch. 101, which controls such matters, expressly forbids the enlargement of the powers of the Orphans’ Court by any theory of a constructive grant of authority. The language of the act in that regard is this: “ The said Orphans’ Court shall not, under pretext of incidental power, or constructive authority, exercise any jurisdiction whatever not expressly given by this act or some other law.” Act of 1798, Ch. 101, Subch. 15, Sec. 20. The purpose of the act, in view of the peculiar organization of those courts, is very plain to constitute them merely courts of special and limited jurisdiction, to restrict them within the limits of express statutory regulation, and to refuse to them the general authority inherent, by virtue of their creation, in courts of general jurisdiction. In numerous cases, both in Maryland and in the District of Columbia, this limitation has been affirmed, and the words of the statute itself, are too plain for any misconstruction of the meaning of the Legislature in its enactment. And yet it required construction and discussion and much litigation, to establish what was finally established in the case of Thaw v. Ritchie, the authority of the Orphans’ Court to order a sale.

The denial to the Orphans’ Court of incidental power or constructive authority does not mean the denial of such authority as is necessarily implied in that which is expressly granted. “ Incidental,” in this connection, is defined by Webster to mean casual, accessory or collateral — -in other words, something additional. Incidental power is therefore accessory or additional power — coúnected, it is true, with the main subject, and yet additional. The word “ constructive ” is defined by the same author to be “ derivative,” “ inferential.” .Constructive authority would be authority assumed to have been given because some other antecedent authority had been given. Neither of these terms is antagonistic to the theory of the existence of authority necessarily included in that which is specifically mentioned. The power to summon witnesses implies the power to administer oaths; the power to take and approve bonds implies the power to inquire into the sufficiency of sureties; and the power to hear a cause implies the power to direct and control the order of argument. These are self-evident conclusions; but they serve to show that, in the effort to give due effect to the purpose and intention of the Legislature, we should not unreasonably strain the meaning of words or give the law a construction that would defeat its beneficial requirements.

In conferring' upon the Orphans’ Courts the authority which it must now be fully conceded that they possess, to sell the real estate of a ward for a specified purpose, the Legislature had in view the welfare and safety of the ward. Support and maintenance are primary requirements of the law of nature; and a valuable estate would be of no use to the ward if it yielded him no support, and he were permitted to starve before he reached the period, when by his own act, he could convert it into beneficial enjoyment. A sale of the property is authorized by the statute to be made for the support and maintenance, or for the purpose of the payment of the public dues, which are paramount to all private right. If a sufficient sale could be made of some minor estate in the property, such as a life estate, an estate for a limited number of years, or a conditional estate with the right of repurchase, why would not such a sale subserve the purpose of the law, and be within the very letter of the statute? A mortgage is a sale upon condition; therefore most undoubtedly a sale; and no theory of incidental power or constructive authority is required to include it within the letter of the law, as most undoubtedly it is included within its spirit. By a mortgage the estate may be conserved to the ward, and the purpose of support and maintenance accomplished at the same time; while by an absolute sale the estate is in a measure destroyed. So that, if we regard merely the beneficial purposes of the statute, a mortgage would seem to be on general principles more conducive than an absolute sale, to the' best interests of the ward. It is very true that there is danger incidental to a mortgage from which an absolute sale might be comparatively free. But that raises a question for the superintending vigilance of the court, not an argument against the propriety of the proceeding, or the exercise of the jurisdiction. And it may be remarked that, in the present case, there is nothing whatever to show that there was any sacrifice of the ward’s interest, or of the value of the estate, by the proceedings that supervened.

We deem it unnecessary to enter upon any examination of the general question how far the power to sell includes the power of mortgage. íhe general rule is elementary law, that the power to sell includes the power to mortgage, because a mortgage is a sale, although a sale upon condition. But there are cases where a different rule apparently has been held. In all such cases, either by express terms or by necessary implication, the power of sale is limited and its scope defined. Wherever there is such a limitation, it must of course govern and control the action of parties. Powers, it has been said, must be strictly construed; and where a special mode is prescribed for their exercise, no other mode can be allowed. But this principle can have no application to a court, even to a court of the most limited jurisdiction, when, for the beneficial use of the person most interested in it and for the preservation of the life and health of such person, it is authorized to make sale of the estate of that person. Here no limitation is placed upon the mode of the exercise of the power; there is simply a jurisdiction conferred to order a sale; and the terms and mode and all the details of sale are left to the discretion of the court. Indeed, a rigid interpretation of the statute might well lead to the conclusion that a mortgage rather than a sale in fee simple was contemplated by the legislative authority. For the provision of the statute (of Maryland) is of authority to the court “ to allow the guardian to exceed the income of the estate, and to make use of his principal, and to sell part of the same, under its order; provided that no part of the real estate shall, on account of such maintenance or education, be diminished without the approbation of the court of chancery.” (Act of 1798, Ch. 101, Subch. 12, Sec. 10.) This provision is more consistent with a diminution of the estate by a mortgage than with the alienation, and therefore in a measure the practical destruction of it by a deed in fee simple.

We conclude, therefore, that the Orphans’ Court, having power to order a sale of the real estate in this case, subject to ratification of its order by the equity! court, properly exercised that power by ordering a mortgage of the property.

But it is contended, in the second place, that, even if it be conceded that the court had power to direct the execution of a mortgage, yet the authority given to the guardian was not properly exercised in this instance by the execution of a deed of trust such as was here given.

It is argued that a deed '-of trust differs from a mortgage; that the deed of trust in this instance conveyed only the interest of the widow and not the estate of the ward, and that it was improper in any event to convey the property to two strangers, as was done here, to make sale of it in a certain contingency. These and other minor objections that have been suggested rather tend to impeach the regularity of the transaction, which can scarcely be done in a collateral proceeding, than to nullify the conveyance for want of authority to execute it. The deed purports in express terms to be executed in pursuance of the decree of the equity court which ratified the order of the Orphans’ Court allowing the mortgage; and that the signature is rather an illiterate variance from the true name of the party, and that the word “ widow ” is annexed to the signature, ought not to be permitted to militate against the plain intent and purpose of the deed. The deed is*admitted to be the deed of Catherine Middleton; the signature to it is admitted to be her signature; and it is admitted that she executed the deed in assumed compliance with the authority sought to be conferred on her by the Orphans’ Court and the court of equity. The deed, therefore, should be taken to be what upon its face it was intended to be, a deed by the guardian of the ward’s estate to secure a loan by the pledge of that estate. Warner v. Ins. Co., 109 U. S., 357; Dundas v. Hitchcock, 12 How., 272; Patterson v. Wilson, 64 Md., 193 ; Cox v. Chamberlin, 4 Ves. Jr., 637.

Nor is it correct to assert that by any fair construction of the deed, Catherine Middleton conveyed only her own interest in the property, which was merely a dower interest. She expressly conveys the property itself, together with her own interest. It required no authority from, any court for her to convey her dower interest.

There remains, however, the question whether the execution of a deed of trust is a compliance with the authority “ to mortgage the real estate, of said minor.” It is sufficient answer to this that the deed of trust is the only form of mortgage that has been in general use in the District of Columbia for many years. The common law mortgage is practically unknown with us; and every one understands that, when a mortgage of real estate here is spoken of, the deed of trust is what is intended. The petition of Catherine Middleton alleged that it was better to mortgage the property than to sell it, and asked for leave to borrow the money upon deed of trust or mortgage; and the order of court was for leave to mortgage it. The deed of trust is here used as the equivalent of a mortgage; and so the term is universally used by the community. Indeed, while a mortgage is not necessarily perhaps a deed of trust, a deed of trust to secure the loan of money is necessarily a mortgage. This objection, therefore, as well as the others, we are compelled to regard as without foundation.

Upon the whole case, we must regard the judgment of the court below as correct; and so regarding it, we must affirm it, with costs.  