
    [Sunbury,
    June 21, 1826.]
    BOMBAY, Administrator of BOWER, and another, against BOYER.
    IN ERROR.
    The time during which a judgment continues to be a lien upon lands, under the act of the 4th of April, 1798, is to be determined by the record alone, without regard to any private agreement for a stay of execution, not appearing upon tlio record.
    It is not against equity, that a purchaser should insist on counting the five years from the date of the judgment, although he was informed before he made the purchase, that by the condition of the. bond, or a private agreement of the parties, execution could not be issued on the judgment, until a time less than five years before his purchase. . *
    Writ of error to the Court of Common Pjeas of Northumber-land county, in' a scire facias post annum et diem, &c., issued by Jacob K. Boyer, the plaintiff below, against Jacob Bombay administrator of Jacob Bower, deceased, ánd Benjamin Kline, co-defendants below.
    It appeared, that on the 23d of December, 1808, judgment was entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland county for Jacob K. Boyer, the plaintiff below, against Jacob Bower, by confession, for the sum of one thousand three hundred pounds. No declaration or statement was filed; so that nothing appeared on the record but a judgment in an action of debt. The truth, however, was, that the one thousand three hundred pounds for which the judgment was confessed, was the penalty of a bond, conditioned for the payment of six hundred and fifty pounds on the 1st of May, 1809, but intended as a security for the payment of several bonds from a certain Peter Fisher to Jacob Bower, dated the 9th of July, 1807, the first of which was payable the 1st of May, 1812, and the others by annual instalments. These bonds were assigned by Bower to Jacob K. Boyer, the plaintiff. Benjamin Kline, the defendant below, purchased on the 12th of April, 1814, the land of Jacob Bower, which belonged to him at the time of the entry of the plaintiff’s judgment, and was consequently bound by the said judgment, and was informed, before he made the purchase, of the nature of the bond on which the judgment was entered. More than five years elapsed from the date of the judgment, to the time of issuing the scire facias in this suit, but five years had not elapsed from the time of payment of the bonds on which the plaintiff’s judgment was entered to the issuing of the said scire facias. Neither had five years elapsed from the time of payment of the bonds from Fisher to Bower, to the issuing of the said scire facias. On these facts the President of the Court of Common Pleas gave his opinion, that the lien of the plaintiff’s judgment continued, from the time of the payment of the bond on which the judgment was entered, viz. the 1st of May, 1809, for five years thence next ensuing, because no execution could be taken out before the time of payment. And he also gave his opinion, that if Kline purchased, with notice of the real nature and intent of the bond on which the plaintiff’s judgment was entered, he was bound in equity not to take advantage of the lapse of more than five years from the date of the said judgment to the issuing of the scire facias in this suit.
    
      Hepburn and Bellas for the plaintiffs in error.
    The opinion of the court below, that if Kline when he purchased knew of the nature of Boyer’s judgment against Bower, the lien continued, is in direct opposition to the act of the 4th of April, 1798, Purd. Dig. 391, which declares in express terms, that no judgment shall continue a lien on lands longer than five years from the first return day of the term of which such judgment may be entered. This court has gone far enough in deciding, that where it appears from the record that execution cannot immediately issue, the five years are to be computed from the expiration of the cesset. This doctrine may do no harm, because the records are open to all, but to make any thing but the record notice of a judgment to affect purchasers, and to give effect to private arrangements, would totally destroy the security of titles. In the case of The Bank of North America v. Fitzsimons, 3 Binn. 343, though the bank had express notice of the judgment of the Hibberts, yet it was held that the land was discharged of the lien. The act of 1798 is in the nature of an act of limitations, and was so considered by the Chief Justice in the case just cited; and, in reference to acts of limitations, notice to a purchaser does not avail. They cited, also, Dun-lop v. Speer, 3 Binn. 169. 1 Sir. 301. Salk. 322.
    
      
      Greenough and Greer, for the defendant in error.
    In the ease of Pennock v. Hart, 8 Serg. & Rawle, 377, the court departed from the letter of the act of 1798, and gave it an equitable construction, by computing the five years from the time the stay of execution appearing on the record expired. The spirit of that decision embraces this case, for actual notice is at least equal to constructive notice, and if the fact was known to the purchaser, he is as much bound by it as if it appeared on the record, A purchaser with notice of an undocketed judgment, is bound by it. 2 Eq. Jib. 684, pi. 7. And a person who by standing by enables another to commit a fraud, is himself guilty of fraud. 1 Madd. Ch. 322. Í Cowp. 434. When, therefore, Kline purchased with full notice of the nature of the judgment, he tacitly agreed to be bound by its terms, and to seek now to be relieved from those terms, is against conscience.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Tilghman, C. J.

This case depends on the act of the 4th of Jlpril, 1798, by which the lien of judgments on lands is limited to five years. The facts are as follows: [The Chief Justice here stated the facts, and the opinion of the court below.] In both these opinions of the Court of Common Pleas, I think there was error.

1. The act of the 4th of Jlpril, 1798, is entitled, “An act limiting the time during which judgments shall be a lien on real estates,” &c., and, in the case of The Bank of North America v. Fitzsimons, 3 Binn. 358, it is considered as of the nature of an act of limitations. Its words are clear and positive, that “ no judgment shall continue a lien on the real estate of the person against whom such judgment shall be entered, during a longer period than five years from the first return day of the term of which such judgment may be entered,” unless revived in the manner prescribed in that act. It was decided by this court, in Pennock, &c. v. Hart, 8 Serg. & Rawle, 369, that where the judgment was entered with a stay of execution, on record, the five years should run only from the time when the stay of execution expired. But it was not our opinion, that any regard should be paid to a stay of execution agreed on by the parties, but not appearing on record. Such a construction would be a departure both from the letter and spirit of the law. It has always been the policy of our law, to facilitate the sale and transfer of real estate, to which liens were found to be a considerable impediment. In pursuance of this policy, the act in question was made, to which we gave a liberal construction in The Bank of North America v. Fitzsimons, by deciding .that judgment creditors stand upon the same footing as purchasers. .The record is to be looked to, and the commencement of the five years determined from that alone. Now, in the case before us, all that appeared on the record, was the entry of the judgment on a certain day, without any mention of the condition of the bond. Its real intent was a secret, known only to the parties. If people will hang out false colours,'they must take the consequences. Between themselves, it is all very fair that their agreement, however secret, should be carried into execution. But it would be most' unreasonable, to involve strangers in the difficulty and peril of searching beyond the record.

2. Neither is it against equity, that a purchaser should insist on counting the five years from the date of the judgment, although he was informed, before he made the purchase, that by the condition of the bond, or a private agreement of the parties, execution could not be issued on the judgment until a time less than five years before his purchase. His conscience was not burthened with circumstances of that kind. He saw, that by the plain enactment of the law, the land of Bower was discharged from the lien of the plaintiff’s judgment. He was no way concerned in the transactions of the parties to that judgment. He had received no consideration, nor entered into any engagement with either of them, which should preclude him from taking advantage of the law. The case is not similar to those which have arisen on the registering acts, where it has been decided, that although the statute declares that a deed shall be of no effect, unless registered within a certain time, yet equity will support it, against a subsequent purchaser who had notice of the unregistered deed. It was thought to be against good conscience, thus voluntarily to step in and assist the vendor in defrauding the careless vendee, who had neglected to put his deed on record. In the present case, the plaintiff had paid no money for his lien. It was a legal advantage, which he had gained by compulsion. The law gave him the lien, and the law deprived him of it. A subsequent purchaser, therefore, might with good conscience insist on the law. I will add, that'this liberty which courts of chancery have taken with statutes, in contradicting, and almost annihilating their provisions, has introduced great uncertainty, and would not be carried so far, since our experience of its inconvenience, if our steps could be retraced, without shaking the foundations of property. But repeated decisions become a rule of property, which cannot be departed from, without doing a greater mischief than that which it is intended to remedy. As respects the act of assembly which we are now to construe, we are fettered with no decisions which militate with its provisions. It is best, therefore, to adhere to a construction which shall effectuate its plain intent, and not say, that it is against conscience for a purchaser to govern himself by the law as he sees it written. I am of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and ayenire de novo awarded.

Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded. 
      
       On-this point, see Black v. Hobson, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 94.
     