
    Jerome STRONG, Rev., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MERRILL LYNCH, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 11-15252.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 21, 2012.
    
    Filed March 5, 2012.
    Jerome Strong, Rev., pro se.
    Patricia Kruse Gillette, Jessica Susan Pers, Michelle A. Rojas, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe L.L.P., San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: FERNANDEZ, McKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jerome Strong appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his employment action alleging race discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir.2003), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Strong’s race discrimination claim because Strong failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he performed his job satisfactorily, whether similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or whether Merrill Lynch’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions were pretextual. See id. at 1124-25; see also Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir.2000) (same analysis applies to Title VII and FEHA claims).

' The district court properly granted summary judgment on Strong’s racial harassment claim because Strong failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the alleged conduct was because of his race or was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642-44 (9th Cir.2004).

Strong’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     