
    JOHNSTON v THORSBY
    Docket No. 87657.
    Submitted October 20, 1986, at Detroit.
    Decided May 22, 1987.
    Ann P. Johnston and Richard E. Johnston, her husband, brought an action in Wayne Circuit Court against Margaret A. Thorsby, seeking noneconomic damages arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiffs alleged that Ann P. Johnston had suffered serious impairment of body function. Defendant moved for summary disposition on the basis that plaintiffs had failed to meet the threshold requirement necessary to maintain an action for damages. The record showed that Ann Johnston saw a doctor shortly after the accident and complained of lower back pain. Her lower back pain was diagnosed as lumbosacral strain, and she was prescribed Tylenol. Ann Johnston then waited two years before seeing any other doctor regarding the alleged accident-related injury to her shoulder. Her treating doctor at the time said that Ann Johnston might have had a torn rotator cuff, but, if she did, it had long since healed. After Ann Johnston underwent some physical therapy, the doctor indicated that her shoulder had adequately healed and that he did not anticipate future problems. The trial court, Michael L. Stacy, J., granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Plaintiffs appealed.
    The Court of Appeals held:
    
    The question whether a plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function must be submitted to the jury whenever the evidence would cause reasonable minds to differ as to the answer. In the instant case, reasonable minds could not but conclude that the shoulder injury was not a serious impairment of body function.
    Affirmed.
    Insurance — No-Fault — Noneconomic Loss — Serious Impairment of Body Function.
    The question whether a plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function must be submitted to the jury whenever the evidence would cause reasonable minds to differ as to the answer (MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135).
    
      References
    Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance §§ 340 et seq.
    
    What constitutes sufficiently serious personal injury, disability, impairment, or the like to justify recovery of damages outside of no-fault automobile insurance coverage. 33 ALR4th 767.
    
      
      Norman P. Ochs, for plaintiffs.
    
      Dickinson, Brandt, Hanlon, Becker & Lanctot (by Philip R. Blanchard), and Gromek, Bendure & Thomas (by Nancy L. Bosh and Martha F. Moth-ershead), of Counsel, for defendant.
    Before: D. F. Walsh, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and C. W. Simon, JJ.
    
      
       Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
    
   Per Curiam.

Plaintiffs appeal from an order granting summary disposition of their claim for noneconomic damages arising out of an automobile collision that occurred on June 30, 1981. On September 3, 1985, the circuit court held that plaintiffs had failed to meet the threshold provided by MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135 and Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), reh den 417 Mich 1104 (1983), and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs appeal as of right.

Cassidy, however, has been overruled by DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32; 398 NW2d 896 (1986), which sets forth a new test for determining whether a no-fault plaintiff has sustained a serious impairment of body function under MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1). DiFranco has limited retroactive application, but applies to appeals pending when the decision was released, such as the instant case. Id., p 75. We find that the lower court record in the instant case is sufficient for this Court to decide this case under the new standard set forth in DiFranco.

When reviewing orders granting or denying summary disposition, this Court is required under DiFranco to make the following determination:

a) whether a material factual dispute exists as to the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries, and
b) whether reasonable minds could differ regarding whether the plaintiff had sustained a serious impairment of body function. [Id., pp 38-39.]

Whenever the evidence would cause reasonable minds to differ as to whether the plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function, the question must be submitted to the trier of fact. Id., p 38.

The record in the instant case shows that plaintiff saw a doctor shortly after the accident. Her lower back pain was diagnosed as lumbosacral strain, and she was prescribed Tylenol. Plaintiff then waited two years before seeing any other doctors regarding her alleged accident-related injury to her shoulder. Her treating doctor at the time said that plaintiff might have had a torn rotator cuff, but, if she did, it had long since healed. After plaintiff underwent some physical therapy, the doctor indicated that her shoulder had adequately healed and that he did not anticipate future problems.

We find that reasonable minds could not differ regarding whether these facts indicated that plaintiff had sustained a serious impairment of body function as a result of the auto accident. Plaintiff’s wait of two years before seeking treatment of the shoulder and her doctor’s diagnosis that her shoulder had by that time healed indicate that plaintiff’s injury, if caused by the accident, was not a serious impairment of body function. Having made this determination, we find that under DiFranco this issue need not have been submitted to the jury. Therefore, the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.

Affirmed.  