
    Laquinn FISHER, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MESA; et al, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 12-16661.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted June 12, 2014.
    Filed June 23, 2014.
    David Dennis Greene, Esquire, The Law Offices of Ho & Greene, PLLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Jason K. Reed, Mesa City Attorney’s Office, Mesa, AZ, for Defendants-Appel-lees.
    Before: SCHROEDER, GRABER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Laquinn Fisher appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unlawful protective sweep of his apartment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is de novo, Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.2006), and we affirm.

“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). An official is entitled to qualified immunity unless a plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to show that the official violated a constitutional right and that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct. Id. at 2080. A right is clearly established when “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

Here, Fisher is correct that Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990), established the principle that a protective sweep is permissible only if there are “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Id. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093. Nevertheless, general propositions are of “little help in determining whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established,” al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2084. In May 2006, the contours of the right to freedom from unlawful protective sweeps were not sufficiently clear such that reasonable officers would have believed that the protective sweep at issue in this case was unlawful under the circumstances. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (“[I]n the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.”). Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss on the basis that they are shielded by qualified immunity.

Moreover, the district court’s decision to compare and contrast the two Arizona courts’ decisions was consistent with Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999), where the Supreme Court observed that “[i]f judges ... disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy.” Therefore, the district court did not err in comparing the two decisions.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     