
    Masterson v. Beasley, etc.
    
      Application to redeem land sold for taxes.
    
    An appeal does not lie from the judgment of the court of common pleas on application to redeem lands sold for taxes.
    The authority of a person, claiming to act as agent for applicants, to redeem land sold for taxes, is not a matter to be questioned by the purchaser, on certiorari, after the recognition of such power by the common pleas. -
    The validity of the title of the applicant to redeem lands sold for taxes can not be drawn into question on the hearing of the application.
    Before Judges Burnet and Sherman, in Brown county.
    This case was brought before the court at the last term, by appeal. The appeal was dismissed, on the ground that the statute, under which the order was made, did not authorize such a proceeding, and that the right of appeal given by the practice act, was confined to adversary proceedings, conducted according to the course of the common law, and did not extend to summary proceedings authorized by particular statutes.
    The .case has since been brought up by certiorari.
    
    It appears from the record that in November, 1826, an application was made by N. Beasley, as an agent of the minor heirs of N. Massie, to redeem a tract of land sold for taxes. To support the application, Beasley produced the certificate of the auditor of state_ showing that one hundred acres of land charged with taxes in the name of John Jonett, had been sold to the plaintiff, Masterson, on December 29,1823, for the sum of five dollars, being the amount of taxes, penalty, and interest, due thereon, for the years 1821, 1822, and 1823. He also produced the auditor’s receipt showing that the money had been deposited on December 20,1825, for the redemption of said land as the statute directed. It was also proved that the applicants had given the notice required by law. Whereupon it was adjudged by the court that the applicants were entitled to redeem.
    *The transcript contained a bill of exceptions, taken by Masterson, setting out the notice, the publication, the certificate, and the receipt of the auditor, the patent to the heirs of Massie, and the deposition of Wm. Creighton, Jr., Esq., stating the heirship and ages of the applicants. It also sets out a deed offered in evidence by Masterson, executed by the marshal of the district of Ohio, convoying the land in question to one Charles Johnson, by virtue of a judgment and execution, in the Circuit Court of the United States, against the applicants, as heirs at law of N. Massie, deceased. On this testimony Masterson objected to the application, on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain it. The objection was overruled and an order of redemption was made.
    The reasons assigned for reversing the order were:
    
      First. There is no proof of the right or title of the said Beasley, as agent of the said heirs, to the said land or to redeem the same.
    
      Second. There is not any proof in said record or proceedings, of the agency of the said Beasley to apjoly for said redemption as such agent, according to the act of assembly.
    
      Third. The said Masterson gave evidence that the title was not in the said heirs of said Massie, or said agent, and that, therefore, they had no right of redemption.
    Brush, for the plaintiff,
    in arguing the case, relied on two grounds:
    
      First. That Beasley did not show such an agency as entitled him to make the application in the name of the heirs.
    
      Second. That the legal title was in Johnson, and not in Massio’s heirs; and, therefore, that no application to redeem could be sustained in their names or for their benefit.
   By the Court:

The law for the redemption of land sold for taxes is equitable in its provisions, and ought to receive a liberal interpretation. It provides for the security of the purchaser, and protects his right in any event. If the land be redeemed, the purchaser’s money and interest must be refunded in all cases, and if the applicant has not been under any legal disability, he must pay fifty per cent, in addition, and must *also pay for any improvements which may have been made by the purchaser. Such being the conditions of a redemption, the purchaser can not complain, nor can he expect a rigid construction of the statute against the applicant.

An examination of the record certified from the common pleas, shows that the proceedings, on the part of the applicants, have been technically correct.

The question, whether Beasley was legally authorized to represent the minor heirs of Massio, does not in any degree affect the merits of the case, nor does it concern the rights of the purchaser. The court below were satisfied with the evidence of his authority. The guardians of the minors have not questioned it, nor can the purchaser be permitted to do so. As the redemption is made in the name, and for the benefit of the heirs, there is no ground for apprehending the improper intermeddling of a stranger. It is a matter of but little moment in what way the agent derives his power. He acts as an attorney in fact, and if his authority is not disputed by his principal, no other person has a right to complain, because none other have been injured. The purchaser of the tax title must receive everything to which the law entitles him, before the order for a redemption can be operative.

The second error assigned, is not exactly true in point of fact. The sale by the marshal does not necessarily show that the heirs of Massie have been divested of their legal title. The validity of that sale depends on the legality of the judgment and subsequent proceedings, which the heirs are at liberty to contest, and having this privilege, they must be permitted to protect themselves and their possessions against others. If this objection, to the right of redemption by the heirs, should prevail, their right to contest the title claimed under the marshal would be of but little use, for, whatever might be the result of such a contest, their title would be lost by the collector’s sale.

But the statute does not require the person, who applies to redeem', to show a legal title in himself. The only provision on that subject is, that if, on examination, it shall appear to the court, that the claimant has a legal right to redeem such land, or any part thereof, the court shall adjudge the same to him, etc. It is no part of the duty of the court to decide ^questions of title on applications like this. They are to inquire whether the party has a right to redeem, and not whether he has a perfect title to the land. In the Virginia military district, where the land in question is situate, it may happen that one person claims under a junior entry not carried into grant, while another has the possession, and a patent on an elder entry, each party believing himself to have the better title. In such a case, it would be difficult to decide who had the right to redeem, if the construction of the plaintiff be correct. In a court of law the patent must prevail. In a court of equity, the persons holding the junior entry might prevail.

This and similar cases will show the embarrassment to which the court of common pleas may be exposed, if they are to decide questions of title on applications of this kind.

A stranger having no interest in the land will not incur the trouble and expense of redeeming it in his own name, nor his own right; but if such an attempt should be made, it could not succeed, because it is confessedly the duty of the court to require satisfactory evidence of a right to redeem.

The applicant must show that he, or those for whom he professes to act, are in some way connected with the title to the promises, as by deed, descent, contract, or possession under claim of title, either of which will be sufficient.

An equitable title, or a naked, possession, may give a legal right of redemption under the statute, which was not intended to require investigations of title, further than may be necessary to prevent impertinent applications.

This being our view of the subject, it follows that the proceedings, and the order of the court below, must be affirmed.  