
    Bernard Cahn et al. v. Hoffman House.
    
    (New York Common Pleas—Equity Term,
    November, 1893.)
    "Words in ordinary use, or combinations of such words, which are descriptive only of a particular product in respect to its geographical origin, quality and kind, are incapable of exclusive appropriation for the purposes of a trade mark.
    Where the arrangement of the words on the labels is different, and the general design dissimilar, an action for an injunction cannot be maintained on the ground that the defendant’s label is intended to mislead the public into purchasing his goods for those of plaintiff.
    Action to restrain defendant’s use in the sale of rye whiskey of a label which was alleged to be an infringement of plaintiffs’ trade mark.
    
      Thomas B. Odell, for plaintiffs.
    
      John Delahunty, for defendant.
    
      
       Received too late for insertion in proper place.—[Reporter.
    
   Bischoff, J.

In Cahn v. Gottschalk, 14 Daly, 542, it was held that plaintiffs’ use of a label inscribed “ Maryland Club Rye Whiskey ” constituted a trade mark, and that the use by another of a label inscribed “Maryland Jockey Club Rye ■Whiskey ” was an infringement of the former. From the reported opinion, however, in the case referred to, it appears that the decision was predicated of the fact that the inscription of plaintiffs’ label was an arbitrary designation of a particular product sold or manufactured by them. Selchow v. Baker, 93 N. Y. 59.

In the case at bar it appears unchallenged that the word “ Club,” when applied to the various kinds of wines and liquors, has, by usage in the wine and liquor trade, acquired a special and well-understood meaning, and indicates that the wine or liquor so marked is wine or liquor, as the case may be, of superior grade or quality. For that reason I am of the opinion that the two cases are distinguishable.

Observing the meaning of the word “ Club ” in the wine and liquor trade, it, seems clear and indisputable that the inscription of the plaintiffs’ label consists wholly of a combination of words in ordinary use as descriptive adjectives, “Maryland” denoting geographical origin of the product, “ Club ” its quality, and “ Rye Whiskey ” its kind. It is well-settled law that words in ordinary use, or combinations of such words, which are descriptive only of a particular product in the respects mentioned, are incapable of exclusive appropriation for the purposes of a trade mark. Caswell v. Davis, 58 N. Y. 223; Keasbey v. Brooklyn Chemical Works, 41 N. Y. St. Repr. 437; Schendel v. Silver, 63 Hun, 330 ; Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311; Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 51; Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 id. 598.

Nor can this action be maintained on the ground that defendant’s label is intended, or tends to allure the public into a belief that the product or compound bearing it is the one sold or manufactured by plaintiffs. Defendant’s label is inscribed “Maryland Rye,” and underneath, in smaller but equally conspicuous print, “ Club Whiskey.” In that respect, however, it resembles plaintiffs’ label only in that it is descriptive of geographical origin, quality and kind. In design it is so strikingly dissimilar that no one intending to purchase plaintiffs’ product can, by the label merely, be deceived into a belief that he is receiving according to his intention.

There should be judgment for defendant, with costs.

Judgment for defendant, with costs.  