
    UNITED STATES vs. MILLARD H. CRAWFORD. (Two Cases.)
    1. Where there are particular provisions of a statute, indicative of the object and purpose which the Legislature had in enacting it, the use of general language in some of the sections which, if it stood alone, might refer to other objects or have a wider scope than such particular provisions will admit of, will not have such effect if the general language is consistent with and supports the evident purpose of the Legislature in providing against the particular evil, but will be held to apply to that alone and not to have a more general application.
    2. The Oourt may look to the history of the legislation, and to the history of the execution of a law which has remained upon the statute books for a considerable time, for the purpose of gathering light as to the proper construction of the same.
    3. Where an act of Congress is limited to certain localities an act amendatory thereof can have no wider scope than the original act, unless expressly so provided in the amendment.
    4. The act of Congress of 1862 (chap. 126, sec. 1,12 Stat. at L., p. 501; U. S. R. S., sec. 5352), in relation to bigamy, etc., with its amendments of 1882 (22 Stat. at L., 30) and 1887 (24 Stat. L., 635), in relation to polygamy and unlawful cohabitation, is not in force in the District of Columbia.
    No. 16,792 and 16,793.
    Criminal Docket.
    Decided March 12,1888.
    The Chief Justice and Justices Cox and Jamos sitting.
    Motion to qiiash two informations upon which convictions were had in the Police Court and appeals taken to the Criminal Court, and from there certified to the General Term for hearing in the first instance.
    The'Facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
    Messrs. Hunton and Chandler and Maurice Smith, for the motion:
    The law does not apply to this District because: 1, it is limited in terms to the Territories and other places, etc. By implication, these being mentioned as the theater of its operation, the District is excluded; 2, it deals with subjects having their seat elsewhere and not here; 3, it is a unit, and as a unit is inapplicable in express terms to this District; and 4, the general sections and provisions of. the law must follow the destiny and fate of the particular provisions which designate the evils which they are to co-operate in suppressing. The cast of the whole law determines the extent and scope of each part of the law, and parts of the law cannot be greater than the whole. The treatment and punishment of bigamy is different in the District of Columbia from what it is in this law. See Rich. Supp., pp. 279, 280.
    “It is a rule of right reason that general words may be qualified by ¡particular clauses of a statute, but that, on the other hand, a thing which is given in particular shall not be taken away by general words. Sedg. Stat., p. 423.
    Where a general intention is expressed in a statute, and the act also expresses a particular intention incompatible ■with the general intention, the particular intention shall be considered as an exception. Where general words follow particular words, the rule is to construe the former as applicable to the things or persons particularly mentioned. Sandiman vs. Breach, 7 Barn. & C., 100; Sedg. Stat., 423.
    So a statute treating of persons or things of an inferior rank cannot, by general words, be extended to those of a superior. Dwar. Stat., 656; Sedg. Stat., 423.
    General words in one clause of a statute may be restrained by the particular words in a subsequent clause of the same statute. Sedw. Stat., 60; Rex vs. Armagh Archbishop, 8 Mod., 8; Churchill vs. Crease, and Terrington vs. Hargreaves, 5 Bing., 180-492.
    The whole spirit as well as the letter of a statute must be respected; and when the whole context of the law demonstrates a particular intent of the Legislature to effect a certain object, some degree of implication may be called in to aid that intent. Durousseau vs. U. S., 6 Cranch, 314, 323.
    But the statute is always to be so construed that it may have a reasonable effect, agreeably to the intent of the Legislature, especially if the language is obscure. Gore vs. Brazier, 3 Mass., 539, 540; 22 Pick., 573; Richards vs. Dagget, 4 Mass., 537.
    ■And it is always to be presumed that the Legislature have intended the most reasonable and beneficial construction of their acts, if the words of the act are not precise and clear. Pearce vs. Atwood, 13 Mass., 343.
    And such construction will be adopted as appears most reasonable and best suited to accomplish the objects of the statute; and when any particular construction would lead to an absurd consequence, it will be presumed that some exception or qualification was intended by the Legislature to avoid such conclusion. Com. vs. Kimball, 24 Pick., 370.
    The mischief with which this statute deals as a whole was and is polygamy. It is an established rule in the exposition of statutes that the intention of the law giver is to be deduced from a view of the whole and every part of a statute, taken and compared together. Potter’s Dwar., Stat. 194.
    Mr. John Blair Hoge, District Attorney, contra :
    
    It must be conceded that if the act of 1887 (24 Stat. at L., 635) is not in force in the District of Columbia, there is no provision either in the Revised Statutes of the District or the law inherited from Maryland by which the offense charged can be made a subject of prosecution and punishment. Kitty, Laws, chap. 47, sec. 4; 1 MacArthur, 297.
    Unless the act of Congress be in force, an offense, which the criminal law of every State in the Union denounces and punishes as a crime, may be committed here with absolute impunity.
    Section 5352, U. S. R. S., defines and prescribes the punishment of bigamy “in a Territory or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction.” This section was originally enacted July 1, 1862. The Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia make no special provision for this crime, except in section 1155, by which punishment is prescribed for' a group of crimes, among them bigamy; but there is no definition of the offense, nor is there any enumeration of the exceptions which, as in the United States Statute, would be in bar of a conviction.
    An indictment for bigamy here would undoubtedly be framed under Section 5352 R. S., because of its definition of the crime and its indication of the conditions to which a prosecution would not apply. It is a substitution for the Statute of James I, declared to be in force in Maryland by the Act of 1706, and in force here until repealed by the Act of 1862.
    The correctness of these propositions depends upon the question whether the Act of July 1,1862, has been repealed by the enactment of the Revised Statutes of the District, which declare (sec. 1296) that all. acts of Congress passed prior to December 1,1873, relating to the District of Columbia, any portion of which is embraced in the revision, are repealed; and that “The section applicable thereto shall be in force in lieu thereof.”
    It is submitted that the District Statute (1155, R. S. D. C.) including bigamy with other crimes — for which the same penalties are prescribed — makes no alteration in the act of 1862 (5352 R. S.) except in regard to the measure of punishment. The statutory definition of the crime and the excepted conditions remain. According to the familiar canon of construction, it will be taken to have been amended so far as the penalty is concerned, but in nothing else. Potter’s Dwar. Stat., p. 113, note 9.
    The Act of February 21, 1871, providing a Government for the District of Columbia, declares that “The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within the said District of Columbia as elsewhere within the United States.” 16 Stats, at L., 426.
    
      And the Supreme Court has decided that this provision was not affected by the subsequent displacement of the District government organized under that act. Page vs. Burnstine, 102 U. S., 664; U. S. vs. Dunn, 3 Mackey, 151.
    ■ This statute seems to be conclusive of the question. But, independently of it, the rules of statutory construction universally accepted by the courts sustain the proposition that the section referred to is in force’ Potter’s Dwar. Stat., 145, 146; Paw vs. Marsteller, 2 Cranch, 10; U. S. vs. Tynen, 11 Wall.,. 92; U. S. vs. 100 Barrels Spirits, 2 Abb. U. S., 305.
    Assuming, then, that this position is correct, there is little difficulty, in regard to the questions certified from the Criminal Term in the cases at bar.
    The Act of Congress of March 22, 1882 (22 Stats, at L., 30), is entitled “An Act to Amend Section 5352 of the Revised Statutes of the United States in Reference to Bigamy, and for Other Purposes.” Whatever may have been the occasion for the enactment of this statute, in the estimation of Congress, there is no restriction or limitation in its application to all places over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction. The fact that some of its provisions apply particularly to conditions existing in the Territory of Utah, affects in no way other provisions general in their nature and application.
    But this statute has been followed, by the Act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stats, at L., 635), by which it was revised and also amended by the incorporation of additional provisions plainly intended to apply generally to all places within the exclusive control of Congress. Thus it prescribes punishment for adultery, for incest and fornication — offenses not embraced by the former act.
    In conclusion, if the Court be of opinion that Section 5352, Revised Statutes, is in force in the District of Columbia, the act of 1887 (24 Stats, at L., 635), must necessarily be in full force and effect and is the law. The fifth section (p. 636), which defines and prescribes the penalty of fornication — as the two preceding sections define and punish adultery and incest — establishes beyond doubt or conjecture the jurisdiction assailed by the motion certified in these cases.
   Mr. Chief Justice Bingham

delivered the opinion of the Court:

In the case of the United States against Millard H. Crawford, certified from the Criminal Court to be heard here in the first instance, it appears that two prosecutions were commenced against the defendant in the Police Court, informations having been filed charging the defendant with fornication. A conviction ensued in the Police Court and an appeal was taken to the Criminal Court. In the Criminal Court the defendant’s counsel moved to dismiss the prosecution, upon the ground that the information charged the defendant with a violation of no law, ordinance or act of Congress enforceable in the District of Columbia; also that the informations were insufficient, imperfect and uncertain, and do not charge the commission of any offense in this District.

This motion, it appears, was understood to be applicable to two cases against the defendant, but was only filed in one. In the other case a motion was made to quash the information upon substantially the same ground as the motion to dismiss before mentioned. It seems to have been agreed that this motion should apply to both cases.

The position of the defendant filing these motions is, substantially, that the act of 1862 (chap. 126, sec. 1, 12 Stat. at L., 501, U. S. It. S., sec. 5352), by Congress, relates to the Territories of the United States and especially to the Territory of Utah; and that the provisions of the act of 1882 (22 Stats, at L., 30), amendatory of the act of 1862, and the act of 1887 (24 Stats, at L., 635), amendatory of the act of 1882, as well as of the act of 1862, have no application whatever to the District of Columbia, and were not so intended by Congress.

The act of 1862, by its first section, provides as follows: .

“That every person having a husband or wife living, who shall marry any other person, whether married or single, in a Territory of the United States, or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, shall, except in the cases specified in the proviso to this section, be adjudged guilty of bigamy, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $500, and by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; Provided, nevertheless, That this section shall not extend to any person by reason of any former marriage whose husband or wife by such marriage shall have been absent for five successive years without being known to such person within that time to be living; nor to any person by reason of any former marriage which shall have been dissolved by the decree of a competent court; nor to any person by reason of any former marriage which shall have been annulled or pronounced void by the sentence or decree of a competent court on the ground of the nullity of the marriage contract.”

Section 2 relates by express terms to the Government of the State of Deseret, so called, and an ordinance incorporating the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and an act in relation to the compilation and revision of the laws and resolutions in force in Utah Territory.

The third section relates to the Mormon Church, without naming it.

The act of 1882 re-enacts the first section of the act of 1862, with an amendment to punish and prevent polygamy as well as bigamy. ■

The third section of the act of 1882 provides that if any male person in a Territory or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, hereafter cohabits with more than one woman, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than $300, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such punishments, in the discretion of the court.

The remainder of this act relates almost entirely — there are nine sections in it — to matters which by express terms are confined to the Territories of the United States, except section 6, which we think by fair intendment applies only to polygamous offenses.

The Act of March 3, 1887, which is entitled “An Act to Amend an Act entitled An ‘Act to Amend Section 5352 of the Revised Statutes of the United States in Reference to Bigamy and for Other Purposes,’ approved March 22,1882,” provides by its first section for the proceedings and the conduct of proceedings in any prosecution for polygamy or bigamy or unlawful cohabitation under the act of 1882, and that the husband or wife may testify in prosecutions under that act.

The second section provides for the attachment of witnesses in such prosecution. The third section is simply a general provision for the punishment of the crime of adultery, and provides that if any act of adultery be committed between a married woman and a man who is unmarried, both parties to such act shall be guilty of adultery; and when such act is committed between a married man and a woman who is unmarried, the man shall be deemed guilty of adultery.

The fourth section is a provision for. the punishment of the crime of incest, and enacts that all persons cohabiting wrho are within the fourth degree of consanguinity according to the rules of the civil law, shall be within the statute.

There are twenty-nine sections, in this act of 1887, and, excepting the sections to which allusion has been made, all clearly relate to the Territory of Utah, or the Territories of the United States.

It is claimed by the counsel for the United States that the parts of the several acts before recited relate to the District of Columbia and apply here because the language is; “In a Territory of the United States, or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction.” And that, inasmuch as the United States have exclusive jurisdiction over the District of Columbia, necessarily this act applies; that by virtue of the provisions of the declaratory section in the act providing for a territorial government in the District of Columbia in 1871, to the effect that all laws of the United States not locally inapplicable shall have force and effect in the District of Columbia, that the several sections in the original and amendatory acts not in terms' limited to the territories are applicable to and have force and effect in this District.

It is claimed that there is no reason why these sections of the law defining bigamy, adultery and fornication, should not have application in the District of Columbia, not being locally inapplicable.

On the other hand, it is claimed by the defendants that the language used in this statute is entirely different from that used by Congress in any instance where it is intended the act shall have force and effect-in this District; that the language used here is such as is ordinarily used by Congress when the intention is that the act shall apply to places over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction other than the District of Columbia or the Territories of the United States, to wit:- to the places held by the United States for forts, docks and arsenals. It is said, too, that such a construction accords well with the language used in the Constitution of the United States which gives to Congress exclusive jurisdiction over a territory not exceeding ten miles square granted to the United States by any State for the purposes of the seat of government, and all other places acquired by the United States for the purposes of forts, arsenals, docks, etc.; the term “ other places” in this statute and other statutes being restricted in application as in the Constitution and that this language is properly to be construed in these statutes as meaning nothing more nor less than the '■ other places” specified in the Constitution.

It is claimed, and from our examination we think it is true, that the history of legislation by Congress in reference to this District shows that where Congress intended to legislate for the District of Columbia, the habit has been to do so in express terms.

But we are met here with another rule of construction, and that is that the statute is to be construed with reference to the intent of the legislative power, and to arrive at that we first undertake to ascertain the mischief which the legislature had in view and which they desired to correct.

It is clear, we think, from an examination of these statutes that the purpose of Congress in the enactment of the original statute and of the acts amendatory thereof was to destroy the practice of polygamy in the Territory of Utah, chiefly intrenched there, but, perhaps, to some extent existing in the adjoining Territories.

It is another rule of construction that where there are particular provisions of a statute indicative of the object and purpose which the legislature has in enacting it, the use of general language in some of the sections which, if that language stood alone, might refer to other objects or have a wider scope than such particular provisions will admit of, will not have that effect if the general language is consistent with and supports the evident purpose of the legislative power in providing against the particular evil, but will be held to* apply to that alone and not to have a more general application.

We are ®f the opinion that the purpose of Congress in passing these laws was to abolish polygamy in the territories, and was not to provide for punishing the crime of bigamy and cognate misdemeanors in the District of Columbia. The crime of bigamy was already provided for in the District of Columbia at that time. There is no reference to the fact of the existence of a statute or a law in the District of Columbia punishitíg bigamy in the act of 1862.

We may look to the history of legislation and the history of the execution of a law which has been enacted and remained upon the statute books for a considerable time, for the purpose of gathering light as to the proper construction of the same. This law was passed originally in 1862; and if we are correctly informed, it has never been supposed until very recently that it had any application to the District of Columbia. For a period of twenty-six years it has stood without any prosecutions having been attempted until these were commenced.

Again, if the original act in the first section providing for bigamy did not apply to the District of Columbia, then it follows, by a well known rule of construction, that the acts amendatory of the same can have no wider scope than the original act, unless expressly so provided in the amendment. The amendatory acts relate to the same evil, and are part and parcel of the same plan to reach this social vice which existed in a particular portion of the country, and do not, either by the subject matter embraced therein or by the language employed in their enactment, justify the legal presumption that Congress had any intention to extend the enforcement of the same to places and jurisdictions not embraced in the statute of 1862.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the statute of 1862, with its amendments, is not in force in the District of Columbia ; and that the motion to quash the informations must be sustained.  