
    James Ragsdale vs. William Estis, et al.
    A lessee, who has parted with the whole term, cannot distrain on his sub-lessee.
    BEFORE EARLE, J., AT CHESTER, SPRING TERM, 1832.
    This was an action of trespass for taking the goods and chattels of plaintiff. Defendants justified under a distress warrant, for rent in arrear. Estis, one of the defendants, had leased the premises to John Ragsdale, ending the 1st January, 1832, for forty dollars, and had his note payable accordingly. John Ragsdale conveyed his lease to plaintiff for the same term, for forty dollars, and had his note expressed to be for rent dated — day of February, 1831, due 21st February, 1831. On the 29th November, 1831, John Ragsdale issued his distress warrant and distrained a colt, some cotton standing in the field, some picked out, and some cprn and fodder. The proceedings were regular, if John Ragsdale had the legal right to proceed in this way. The property was sold, and the money going to Estis, the original landlord, was paid over to him: he was present and was directing. Mayfield, the other defendant, was the constable. Plaintiff proved that John Ragsdale had previously received the colt, and said he had got it for rent. The colt was worth fifteen or twenty dollars. The Court decreed for plaintiff, on the ground that John Ragsdale had no legal right to issue his distress warrant, and that the colt was in payment of rent.
    Defendants appealed on the grounds
    1. That as plaintiff’s goods were legally sold, under a distress warrant, defendants were not trespassers, and therefore the decree should have been for defendants.
    
      2. If the colt spoken of was in payment, it was only for about fifteen or twenty dollars, which left a balance for which defendants might distrain and sell.
    
      Williams, for appellant.
    
      Thomson, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

JOHNSON, J.

The rule very clearly is that a lessee cannot distrain upon his sub-lessee for rent in arrear; and the tech'nical reasons seem to be, the want of privity of estate between them — the right of distress being inseparable from the reversion. Prescote vs. De Forest, 16 Johnson, 159. But a more practical reason will be found in the circumstance, that if allowed, th^ landlord might be deprived of the means of distress. If the lessee may distrain, so may the sub-lessee on his lessee, and so on, ad infinitum, and thus the tenant in ■ possession be subjected to infinite distress. ,,

Motioii dismissed.

O’Neall and Harper, JJ., concurred.

Motion dismissed.  