
    Brunswick-Balke Collender Company vs. W. T. Boutell, impleaded, etc.
    December 2, 1890.
    Negotiable Instrument — Signature followed by Word “Pres.” — The rule laid down in Pratt v. Beaupre, 18 Minn. 177, (187,) and later cases, as to the prima facie liability ol a person who affixes to his signature to a contract the words “agent,” “trustee,” or the like, followed, and applied in a case where the maker of certain promissory notes affixed the abbreviation “Pres.” to his signature.
    Same — Defence that Signature was on Behalf of Corporation — Proof Requisite. — In such a case, where the defendant undertook to overcome the plaintiff’s prima facie case by testimony tending to show that the notes were executed by him in behalf and as the act of a corporation of which ho was president, and for its debt, and that this was well known and understood by the payee of the notes, it was incumbent upon the defendant to go further, and prove that not only the debt was one which the corporation had the power to incur, but that the corporation authorized it to be incurred.
    Action brought in the municipal court of Minneapolis, against defendant Boutell and F. A. Cotharin, on the following promissory note:
    “Minneapolis, Oct. 6, 1888.
    “Five months after date we promise to pay to the order of Brunswick-Balke Collender Co. fifty-five dollars, with interest at the rate of seven per cent, per annum from date and attorney fees.
    “W. T. Boutell, Pres.
    “F. A.- Cotharin, Secty.
    Defendant Boutell, who alone defended, appeals from an order refusing a new trial.
    
      Penney & Rogers, for appellant.
    
      W. A. McDowell, for respondent.
   Collins, J.

In this case appellant signed certain notes, payable to plaintiff, thus: “W. T. Boutell, Pres.” His defence was that he was the president of the “Calhoun Club,” a corporation duly organized under the laws, of this state; that the notes were executed and delivered by him and the secretary of the club for billiard-tables, purchased by the secretary for the use of the club and from plaintiff; that he acted in his official capacity, solely; all of which, he claims, was known and understood by plaintiff when taking the notes. The case was tried by the court, without a jury, and upon its findings of fact judgment was ordered as demanded in the complaint. The principal controversy upon the trial was as to plaintiff’s knowledge and understanding as to the character in which appellant signed the notes, whether in his individual capacity or in behalf of the corporation, and as its act. There was an abundance of testimony on all disputed points to sustain the findings of the court, and, as a consequence, we cannot interfere.' Again, while the appellant went into the merits of his defence with testimony which, in part, tended to overcome the prima facie case against him, he omitted to show for what purposes or objects the club was incorporated, or what acts were within the scope of its business, or what duties and powers had been conferred upon its president. The trial court was hot informed as to whether or not this corporation could legitimately purchase a billiard-table, and it is sáfe to say that no presumption exists that it could. Even if this could be assumed, appellant made no attempt to show that such a purchase was within the powers of either president or secretary, or that the purchase in question, on time or otherwise, was authorized by directors or stockholders. Failing in this, the attempted defence wás brought directly within the rule established in Pratt v. Beaupre, and followed in Peterson v. Homan, supra.

Order affirmed.  