
    STATE v. WILL WILLIAMS.
    (Filed 6 May, 1925.)
    1. Homicide — Criminal Law — Murder—Premeditation, and Deliberation— Mental Weakness — Drunkenness—Burden of Proof.
    On a trial for a homicide, by killing the deceased with a shotgun, where the prisoner’s counsel contends and offers evidence of the. prisoner’s weak mental condition and of intoxication, upon the question of premeditation and deliberation, to reduce the offense from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree: Helé, the fact of intoxication alone does not have the effect contended for, under the evidence in the case, and the offense will be that of murder in the first degree, if the condition of the prisoner’s mind at the time of the killing was sufficient under the evidence for him to have premeditated and deliberated upon the act, the burden being upon the State to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt.
    2. Same — Intent—Instructions—Appeal and Error.
    
      Helé, under the facts upon this trial for a homicide, the charge upon first degree murder was sufficiently clear, and the jury could not have been misled as to the correctness of the application of the law as to the previous intent of the prisoner necessary to sustain a verdict of the highest degree of the crime.
    3. Criminal Law — Reasonable Doubt — Burden of Proof.
    The burden of showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt required of the State in criminal cases, though not easily defined, imports an uncertainty of mind by the jury after a full, fair and reasonable consideration of the evidence.
    Appeal by defendant from Lane, J., at November Term, 1924, of SCOTLAND.
    This is a criminal action in which, defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. From the judgment in accordance with the statute, that defendant suffer death by electrocution, defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. Assignments of error, based upon exceptions to instructions of the court to the jury and to the refusal of the court to give instructions as requested by defendant, appear in the opinion.
    The evidence for the State was as follows^
    Lewis Gibson testified that on 22 June, 1924, he was coroner of Scotland County, and as such conducted the inquest over the body of Frank Green; the body when first seen by the witness was lying beside his bed in his home with four holes in his breast; he had been shot with a shotgun. He was in his night clothes. He was dead. His death was caused by gunshot wounds.
    Sylvia Green testified that Frank Green, the deceased, was her husband; she and her husband were at home on Saturday night, 22 June, 1924; between one and two o’clock a. m. some one came to tbe bonse and, rapping on tbe side of tbe bouse, called, “Hello, Uncle Frank,” two or three times. Frank got out of bed and replied, “Hello, wbo is that?” Some one said, “Come out here; ain’t nobody to hurt you.” Frank got up, went to tbe door, and said again, “Wbo is that?” Tbe reply was, “Step out here, I want to see you. I already told you it wasn’t anybody to hurt you. I want you to carry me off a piece.” Frank then said, “That’s Will Williams.” Just as be said this, be was shot. Frank came báck into tbe bouse, fell upon tbe bed, and died at once.
    Witness further testified that she saw Will Williams on Thursday before this Saturday night. He came to tbe field, where witness and her children were chopping cotton. He acted as if be was drunk. He took a hoe and began to chop up cotton. Witness told him that if be could not chop better than be was doing to get out of tbe field; that if her husband caught him chopping cotton that way be would run him out of tbe field. He replied, “God damn old man Frank. I will kill him.” He bad been drinking and vomited while in tbe field.
    Rosa Green, daughter'of this witness and deceased, corroborated her mother as to tbe occurrences at their home on Saturday night, and also in tbe cotton field on Thursday. She also testified that defendant asked her, if be killed her father, could be take possession of tbe bouse, and that she told him “No.”
    George Nichols testified that be lived near tbe home of defendant and Spencer Gay. He beard a gun fire tbe night Frank Green was killed. . Just before that be beard an automobile near bis bouse. It stopped near tbe bridge, and Spencer Gay got out and cranked it up. Shortly after this, witness beard tbe gun fire up at Frank Green’s bouse. Pretty soon after, be saw Will Williams pass bis window going in tbe direction of Spencer Gay’s bouse. He then beard an automobile up toward Gay’s bouse.
    Frank Chavis testified that be went to Frank Green’s bouse tbe morning after tbe shooting. While there be saw some tracks around tbe bouse, about a hundred yards from tbe bouse, leading toward tbe home of defendant and Spencer Gay. These tracks came into tbe road where an automobile bad turned around. Witness tracked tbe automobile toward Spencer Gay’s bouse. Defendant was at Frank Green’s bouse that morning with tbe officers. An officer bad Will Williams’ shoes. One of tbe shoes fitted one of tbe tracks found near tbe bouse. Defendant put on tbe shoe. Tbe track be then made was like tbe track found there when witness first went to tbe bouse that morning. There was a dent in both tracks. Defendant’s shoe bad a rubber heel which was worn some.
    
      Spencer Gay was then sworn and offered as a witness by the State. This witness had been indicted and arraigned for the murder of Frank Green. On motion of the solicitor for the State, this indictment and the indictment of defendant had been, without objection, consolidated for the purposes of trial. The joint trial had proceeded until the conclusion of the testimony of the witness Frank Chavis. Spencer Gay, through his counsel, then tendered the State a plea of guilty of murder in the second degree. This plea was accepted, and the judge announced that Spencer Gay was no longer on trial, and that only defendant was now on trial. Spencer Gay testified as follows:
    He had known defendant, Will Williams, five or six years. He saw him Thursday before Frank Green was shot. Defendant came to him that night and said, “The women folks, Miss Sylvia and Rosa, want me to kill the old man, Frank.” He wanted witness to carry him off somewhere. Witness refused to do so.
    On Saturday following, witness was on his way to Gibson. Defendant came to his house. On his return from Gibson, witness met up with defendant. At defendant’s request, witness took him to Effie Davis’ and then to Laurel Hill. They went by Hattie Purvis’ and then to Sexton’s, where defendant got a little whiskey. Both witness and defendant had been drinking. Defendant swapped off whiskey for wine. When they were near George Nichols’ house, the car choked down. Witness cranked the ear and defendant went off. Witness went to sleep in the car. When defendant came back he told witness that he had been to Frank Green’s house and shot the old man — said he did not know whether he had killed him, but that he had shot him. Defendant put the gun in the car and they drove off. Witness saw defendant again next morning.
    The State rested, and defendant offered the following evidence:
    Will Williams, the defendant, testified that on Saturday he went to Gibson with Spencer Gay in his car; that they drove to various places, got whiskey, and finally came to the woods near George Nichols’. Spencer Gay then said to witness: “This is a good time to kill old man Frank. You know them women have been trying to get you to kill him. Listen to me. I done been talking to the women. You go get the gun and come back here. I will stay here until you get back.” Witness got the gun and returned to Spencer Gay. He then said to witness: “You go to old man Frank’s house, call him out and shoot him. Then come back to me. Knock on his house and say, ‘Gome out,’ and if he asks wlm is there, say, Ut ain’t nobody to hurt you.’ ” Witness said to Gay, “Won’t the bloodhounds track me?” Spencer replied, “No, they can’t track you any further than my car.” Witness then testified that be went and did wbat Spencer told bim and came back to tbe car. Witness and Spencer Gay then went off together in tbe car.
    Witness further testified that Sylvia Green and Rosa Green, wife and daughter of deceased, bad asked bim to kill Frank Green; they bad said be was so mean they wanted bim killed. Witness bad refused to do so — had nothing against old man Frank. Tbe night be killed bim be bad drunk about a pint of whiskey and was drunk; does not remember all that happened. It all, came to bim like a dream tbe next morning.
    On cross-examination, tbe solicitor asked tbe witness: “You shot bim with tbe intention that if you killed bim, you would take charge of tbe bouse, tbe four-horse crop and tbe girls?” Witness replied, “Yes, sir.”
    Defendant offered several witnesses who testified as to their opinion of bis mental capacity. They testified that defendant never was very bright; that be bad average intelligence and knew right from wrong. Tom Williams, father of defendant, testified that defendant was “franzy-minded,” didn’t use good common-sense, and bad been to school “mighty little.”
    
      Attorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorney-General Nash for the State.
    
    
      L. B. Prince and E. M. Gill for defendant.
    
   Connor, J.

In view of tbe grave consequences to tbe defendant, of tbe judgment in this case, we have stated tbe evidence in full, substan-. tially as tbe same appears in tbe statement of tbe case on appeal. If tbe facts are as defendant himself testifies, be is guilty of murder in tbe second degree, at least. His testimony as to tbe essential facts is fully and abundantly corroborated by tbe testimony of other witnesses. He admits tbe intentional killing by bim of Frank Green, tbe deceased, with a shotgun, and there is no evidence of justification or excuse. His counsel concede that upon all tbe evidence be is guilty of murder in tbe second degree, and contend only that by reason of weak mental capacity and intoxication, as tbe result of having drunk whiskey during tbe night of tbe homicide, be was unable to “deliberate and premeditate” to such a degree as is essential to guilt of murder in tbe first degree, as found by tbe jury. They do not contend that there is evidence tending to show that defendant was not responsible for bis act and, therefore, not capable of committing crime for either reason.

There were no exceptions to evidence submitted to tbe jury and no exceptions to evidence offered and excluded by tbe court. Tbe charge of tbe court appears in full in tbe statement of tbe case on appeal.

His Honor instructed tbe jury fully and correctly upon tbe law applicable to tbe facts wbicb tbe jury might find from tbe evidence. He defined tbe terms “premeditation” and “deliberation,” and instructed tbe jury tliat tbe burden of proving botb beyond a reasonable doubt was upon tbe State. He stated tbe contentions of botb tbe defendant and tbe State upon tbis phase of tbe case, fully and without objection from tbe learned counsel for defendant. He instructed tbe jury as follows:

“Now, in order for a person to be guilty of murder in tbe first degree, there must be an intent to kill; there must have been sufficient mental capacity to form that intent in tbe mind, and in order for a person to be guilty of any crime there must have been sufficient mental capacity to know right from wrong.
“Drunkenness under tbe law is no excuse for crime and does not relieve tbe person of guilt for crime entirely. But in tbe case of murder, if a person is so intoxicated and rendered so insensible and so irrational by intoxication of any kind, or is naturally so weak-minded from natural causes that be cannot form an intent and cannot premeditate and deliberate, then it reduces tbe offense from murder in tbe first degree to murder in tbe second degree.”

Defendant’s counsel except to these instructions and assign same as error. Tbe assignment cannot be sustained. Tbe instructions are supported by opinions of this Court in S. v. Allen, 186 N. C., 302; S. v. Foster, 172 N. C., 960; S. v. English, 164 N. C., 497. His Honor did not instruct tbe jury that an intent to kill was tbe only element in tbe crime of murder in tbe first degree. In view of tbe full and correct charge as to premeditation and deliberation, tbe jury could not, as intelligent men, have been misled to tbe prejudice of defendant.

Tbe assignment of error based upon tbe exception to tbe definition of reasonable doubt given by bis Honor in bis charge cannot be sustained. His Honor told tbe jury that “by tbe term reasonable doubt is meant a doubt wbicb has a valid and satisfactory reason for it; one arising out of tbe evidence in tbe case — just what tbe terms imply.” Tbe term “reasonable doubt” is not easily defined. It imports an uncertainty of mind, after a consideration of all tbe evidence, tending to establish tbe existence of tbe fact alleged by him upon whom tbe law places tbe burden; tbis uncertainty of mind must be tbe result of a full, fair, and reasonable consideration of all tbe evidence. Black’s Law Dictionary.

Tbe fourth and fifth exceptions are to tbe failure of bis Honor to give instructions requested in apt time and in writing. Botb these instructions were given in tbe charge, tbe principles of law embodied in tbem being clearly stated and fully explained by Ms Honor. Tbe remaining exceptions are formal.

Tbe issue in tbis case involved tbe life and death of defendant. Tbe record shows that tbe trial was conducted by tbe presiding judge with full appreciation of tbe grave responsibilities imposed upon him and in strict compliance with tbe law. Defendant has forfeited bis life and must now suffer death; tbis is in accordance with tbe law of tbe State, for defendant has wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with malice aforethought, killed and murdered Frank Green, against tbe peace and dignity of the State; tbe murder was a deliberate and premeditated killing; tbe punishment prescribed by law is death.

On appeal to tbis Court, where only matters of law or legal inference can be considered, we find

No error.  