
    Davis and another against Reynolds.
    NEW YORK,
    Oct. 1813.
    Where a debtor, prior to the passing of the insolvent act of the 3d oí Jiprily 1311, had fraudulently disposed of, and con eyed awav, his pro-pet Ly; this was held not to he a fraud against that statute, soaslo invalidate his discharge under it; there being no evidence of his having conveyed away his estate in expectation of that act being passed, and with intent to avail himself of it; and xvliether, if that fact had been shown, it would have affected his discharge, quvire*
    
    THIS was an action of debt on a judgment in this court, entered on a bond and warrant, dated the 31st of January, 1811. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and gave in evidence a discharge under the act, entitled “ An act for the benefit of insolvent debtors and their creditors,” passed the 3d of April, 1811.
    On the trial, it appeared that after the existence of the debt on which the judgment was founded, and before the execution of the bond and warrant of attorney, and before the passing of the said act, the defendant had fraudulently disposed of, and conveyed away, his property, with intent, to defraud his creditors. A verdict was taken by consent for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the court upon the question, whether the fraud committed previous to the passing of the act of the 3d April, 1811, invalidated Ms discharge under it.
    
      Huntington, for the plaintiffs.
    
      Fool, contra.
   Per Curiam.

_ The only point touching the validity of the discharge under the act of 1811, is, whether it was procured by fraud, or whether fraud was committed in any of the proceedings upon which it was founded. Nothing of this is pretended; but it is admitted that the defendant acted fraudulently towards his creditors prior to the passing of the act. If the defendant had conveyed away his property in expectation of such an act of insolvency to he passed, and with intention to avail himself of it, the fraud might possibly connect itself with the subsequent proceeding, and infect it. But we have no evidence of any such fact, or sufficient ground to infer it; and the fraud in question might have been committed long before the act passed, and have been after-wards done away by repentance, amendment, and recovery of the property. As a general rule we cannot allow that a prior case of fraud is to affect a subsequent honafi.de proceeding under a subsequent statute. It must be a very special case in which a fraud committed before the existence of a statute could be adjudged a fraud against such statute; and in no case could it be an object of animadversion, criminalder, under the authority of the statute.

Judgment for the defendant,  