
    [Philadelphia,
    January 3, 1825.]
    THOMMON and another against KALBACH and others.
    IN ERROR.
    After an admission by a defendant, that he had at one time been interested in a firm, and that the first entry in the books of the firm had been occasioned by his having received a dividend of the profits, the books maybe given in evidence to explain the nature of his interest, and to show the extent of his admission; notwithstanding he at the same time asserted, that his connexion with the partner, ship had ceased before certain notes, signed by the firm, and upon which the suit was founded, were issued.
    The jury should be permitted to judge of the meaning of the admission; and it is error to withdraw the decision from them.
    The record of this case being returned, on a writ of error to the District Court for the city and county of Philadelphia, together with three bills of exceptions to evidence, and a fourth, to the opinion of the court, it appeared, that the plaintiffs in error had brought suit in the court below, against the defendants in error, Henry Kalbach, David Landis, and Abraham Landis, upon three promissory notes, signed, “ Kalbach and Landis,” and their object was to show, that Abraham Landis was a partner in that firm, and therefore liable for the payment of the notes. In prosecution of this object, they proved that Abraham Landis had said he was interested in the firm ofi Kalbach and Landis, and then offered in evidence the books of the firm. The rejection of the books by the court, was the foundation of the first bill of exceptions.
    The plaintiffs then proved, that in a conversation between a witness and Abraham Landis, he denied that ho was a partner, but said that the first entry in the books was occasioned by his having been interested at first, and that he had received a dividend of about eleven hundred dollars, which appeared in the books, and was made on the 1st of May, 1815, when his interest ceased. The hooks of the firm were then offered again, for the purpose of showing, in the first place, the interpretation and meaning of the expressions used by Abraham Landis, in reply to the inquiry of the witness relative to the entry in the books; and, in the second place, the liability of Abraham Landis, in ease notice was not
    
      given of the dissolution of the partnership, even if it did take place as alleged, on the 1st of May, 1815. The court again rejected the evidence, and sealed a second bill of exceptions.
    The plaintiffs having further given in evidence, that a person in the presence of Abraham Landis had said, that when Kalbach and Landis entered into a speculation in salt, Abraham Landis declined having any thing to do with it, and that his interest in the partnership had ceased, and that Abraham Landis did not deny these facts, a tnird time offered in evidence the books of. the firm, which being rejected by the court, a third bill of exceptions was taken to its opinion.
    An exception was likewise taken by the plaintiffs’ counsel to the charge of the court, because it stated—
    
      “ 1. That an interest in partnership did not imply partnership, and that the expression might mean, that a person had an interest in a trade, and the profits of it, by lending money to the firm at a certain premium, for the payment whereof his reliance was on the trade turning out profitably, and therefore he would not be a partner.
    
      “ 2. That no notice of the dissolution of a partnership was necessary, when the party had not shown previous dealings with the firm; the plaintiffs contending, that general notice is in such case indispensable.
    £< 3. The court should have permitted the jury to judge of the expression, interest in the partnership, instead of which they stated peremptorily, that it did not imply partnership.
    “ 4. The tendency and import of the charge are, that a participation in profits may exist, without a corresponding liability for losses.”
    
      J. R. Ingersott, for the plaintiffs in error,
    cited, Williams v. Keats, 2 Stark. 390. Lansing v. Gaine, 2 Johns. 300. Whiting v. Stirling, 14 Johns. '215. Widdifield v. Widdifield, 2 Binn. 249. Drake v. JElioin, 1 Caines. 184.
    
      Philips, for the defendants in en’or.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Gibson, J.

I can see no reason for rejecting the partnership books, after proof had been made of the admission by Abraham Landis, that he had at one time been interested in the firm of Kalbach and Landis, and that the first entry in those books had been occasioned by his having received a dividend of the profits. I grant, that to connect him with the firm, proof extrinsic to the books ought first to be made, and that his admission of an interest in the concern was not free from all ambiguity. But it was to remove that difficulty, by the production of. something to which he had directly referred, and not as original evidence of partnership, that the books were offered. He had admitted a connexion of some soi’t with the firm; under which he had received a dividend of eleven hundred dollars, which appeared on the books; and that the entry had been made in consequence of his having; been thus interested. Can it be doubted, then, that the books were evidence to explain the nature of his interest, and show the extent of his admission? By the avowal of a connexion with the firm, which authorized the introduction of his name into the partnership books, as a party beneficially interested, he made those books his own, and rendered them competent evidence against himself. But granting that all he said must be taken together, yet that is conclusive only on the court, as to the competency of every part of an admission, and not on the jury, who, if their consciences be satisfied by circumstances aliunde, may disregard those parts of a confession, which go to avoid the effect which the other parts of it would otherwise have. It is immaterial, therefore, to the competency of the hooks, that. Jlbruham Landis at the same time asserted, that his connexion with the firm had ceased, before delivery of the notes, which are the foundation of the action. But even admitting his assertion to bo true, he might nevertheless be liable, under circumstances, on the ground of that connexion: as, if the plaintiffs had dealt with the firm, and had not had notice of any change or dissolution of the partnership. It is clear, then, that the books having been spoken of by Jlbruham Landis, in reference to a connexion between h:m and the firm, were competent evidence as part of his admission, to show the existence of the partnership which the plaintiffs sought to establish.

Exceptions are also taken to the charge, none of which is sus-' tained except one. The jury should have been permitted to judge of the meaning of the admission by Jlbruham Landis, that he had an interest in the concern, and this rather seems to have been withdrawn from them: but the judgment is reversed, mainly on the ground of the exception to the evidence.

Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.  