
    The Assignees of Krebbs vs. Miller.
    A. took the benefit of the Prison Bounds Act, and refused to include in his assignment a horse, and pending an appeal as to the exemption of the horse, A. sold it to the defendant. The Court of Appeals decided that the horse was not exempt, and the plaintiff now brought suit against the defendant for the horse, held that the sale was good against the claim of the plaintiff.
    The assignment under the act has no retrospective operation.
    On the 10th February, 1826, the recorder of the City Court of Charleston made an order that Andrew Krebbs, who was in custody at the suit of the plaintiffs, should be discharged under the provisions of the Prison Bounds Act, on his making the usual assignme at of the property contained in his schedule with the exception, among other'things, of his troop horse, which was now the subject of dispute. In pursuance of this order, lie made an assignment in blank on the back of the schedule, and was forthwith discharged. The plaintiff appealed from this order, so far as it excepted the horse, and upon the hearing in the Court of Appeals, it was set aside; but in the mean time, and pending the appeal, Krebbs sold the horse to the do-fendant, At the trial, the plaintiffs’ counsel filled up the blank assignment in conformity with the order of the Court of Appeals, under an agreement that his doing so should not effect the legal rights of the parties. The plaintiffs now claimed the right of property in the horse, and denied the right of Krebbs to sell it: 1st. Under the order of the Court of Appeals, which they contended by legal operation had relation back to the date of the assignment; and, 2dly. Under the assignment so filled up.
    A nonsuit was ordered, and the question was now brought up by Finley & Gray, and opposed by Furman.
    
   Curia per

Johnson, J.

The arguments in support of the first position, are drawn principally from analogy in the operation of the bankrupt laws of England; and it is true, that an assignment under a commission has relation back to the act of bankruptcy, and all intermediate acts are avoided. But there are several very marked distinctions between this system and our insolvent laws. Tins operation is the effect of an' express provision of the statutes of bankruptcy. Our acts contain none such. The bankrupt laws are Tor the benefit of creditors — are compulsory on the debtor, and prevent him from doing an injustice to his creditors. Our insolvent laws are for the debtor, and enables him to discharge his person, to which, under the general law, his creditor was entitled, by assigning the whole, or so much of his estate and effects as will satisfy his creditors. In the ease of bankruptcy, the assignment is effected' by operation of law; in the other, it is the voluntary act of the party. The judgment or order of the Court of Appeals could not, therefore, operate as an assignment, either at the instant, or by reference back to the date of the assignment made by Krebbs. The second position is equally untenable. The assignment made by Krebbs, was in conformity with the order made by the recorder, in which the horse in ques» tion was expressly excepted and reserved to him, and the effect contended for would be in direct' opposition to the order itself, and the intention of Krebbs, and would gi< e the act a compulsory, and not a voluntary operation.

Nonsuit sustained.  