
    PROFESSIONAL SOLUTIONS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harry MOHRLANG; Lenora Mohrlang; Bruce A. Mohrlang, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 09-1286.
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    Jan. 29, 2010.
    
      John W. Grund, David S. Werber, Grand, Dagner & Nelson, P.C., Denver, CO, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Eric R. Jonsen, Jonsen & Associates, LLC, Broomfield, CO, Ross W. Pulkrabek, Esq., Jones & Keller P.C., Denver, CO, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before GORSUCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge.
   ORDER AND JUDGMENT

NEIL M. GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.

This diversity dispute turns on whether two professional insurance claims against the same attorney are related to one another. Appellant Professional Solutions Insurance Company (PSIC) provided single coverage liability of $500,000, up to an annual aggregate limit of $1 million, to one of its insureds. When appellee Bruce Mohrlang submitted a negligence claim against the insured, and appellee Harry Mohrlang submitted another alleging breach of fiduciary duties, PSIC conceded liability of at least $500,000 on each but argued that under the policy definitions, the claims were related and thus subject to the $500,000 single coverage limit. The parties eventually settled, with PSIC agreeing to pay the single coverage limit of $500,000 and pursue this declaratory judgment action to determine any further liability. The sole question was whether the two claims were related to one another so as to cap PSIC’s liability at $500,000, or whether the two claims were unrelated and thus separately covered under PSIC’s annual aggregate limit of $1 million. On a stipulated record, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Mohrlangs.

The court recognized that the critical inquiry was whether the claims were “temporally, logically or causally connected by any common fact, circumstance, situation, transaction, event, advice or decision.” Aplt.App. at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court understood that Bruce Mohrlang’s claim was based on the insured’s negligence in structuring a corporate stock sale, while Harry Mohrlang alleged breach of fiduciary duties based on the insured’s misrepresentations that caused him to release a deed of trust he held against the corporate entity. Thus, the court set out to ascertain whether the insured’s breach of fiduciary duties was temporally, logically or causally connected to the stock sale; the court concluded it was not.

First, the court found that Harry Mohrl-ang’s claim was not temporally connected to the sale because the insured caused Harry Mohrlang to release his deed of trust some three weeks after the sale closed. Next, the court found no logical connection between the claim and the sale because neither the deed of trust nor the promissory note it secured was incorporated into the final sale agreement and both should have remained unaffected by the sale. Finally, the court determined that no causal connection existed between Harry Mohrlang’s claim and the sale because the promissory note remained a valid, independent obligation even after the sale, and the deed of trust was not released until the insured’s unforeseeable acts severed any causal link that could have existed. Hence, the court ruled that the two claims were unrelated and PSIC was liable under the policy’s $1 million annual aggregate limit.

We have reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, Ellenberg v. N.M. Military Inst., 572 F.3d 815, 819 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1016, - L.Ed.2d - (2009), and agree that the two claims are unrelated, cf. Berry & Murphy, P.C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 803, 814 (10th Cir.2009) (concluding that two alleged acts of malpractice were related). Moreover, having reviewed the parties’ appellate materials, the district court’s order, and the relevant legal authority, we agree with the district court’s cogent and well-reasoned analysis. The analysis was detailed, accurate, and complete, and we see no reason to repeat it here. Accordingly, for substantially the same reasons as articulated by the district court in its order dated February 10, 2009, we AFFIRM. 
      
       After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(0; 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
     
      
      . The policy limits provide:
      Regardless of the number of:
      • you covered by this policy;
      • claims made; or
      • persons or entities making claims
      the policy limits stated in the Declarations apply as follows:
      1. EACH CLAIM-The most we’ll pay for damages and claims expenses arising from each claim made under this policy is [$500,000],
      2. ANNUAL AGGREGATE-The most we’ll pay for all damages and claims expenses arising from all claims made under this policy is [$1,000,000],
      Aplt.App. at 23 (Policy, Sec.F). The policy further provides: "If related claims are subsequently made against you and reported to us, all such related claims, whenever made, shall be considered a single claim....” Id.
      
     
      
      . The policy defines "related claims” as “all claims arising out of a single act or omission or arising out of related acts or omissions in the rendering of professional services.” Id. at 25 (Policy, Sec.I, ¶ 10). In turn, the phrase "related acts or omissions” is defined as "all acts or omissions in the rendering of professional services that are temporally, logically or causally connected by any common fact, circumstance, situation, transaction, event, advice or decision.” Id. (Policy, Sec.I, ¶ 9). Hence the court's recognition that "related claims” are "claims arising out of a single act or omission or arising out of all acts or omissions in the rendering of professional services that are temporally, logically or causally connected by any common fact, circumstance, situation, transaction, event, advice or decision.” Id. at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted).
     