
    CHARLES T. HUTCHINS v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 16832.
    Decided January 25, 1892.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    A naval officer in San Francisco is ordered to New York, via the isthmus, in charge of a detachment of men. The distance hy that route is 6,186 miles; hy the direct overland route, 3,266 miles. The accounting officers allow him his actual expenses of travel, hut refuse mileage hy either route.
    I. The Navy Appropriation Act Set March, 1835 (4 Stat. L., p. 755, § 2), gave naval mileage; the Army Appropriation Act, 187d{ 18 id.,p. 72), took it away; the Navy Appropriation Act, 1876 (19 id., p. 65), restored it; Ohs Navy Appropriation Act, 188$ (22 id., pp. 284,286), withholds it from travel abroad.
    II. The principle which governs the computation of mileage ordinarily is that where an officer is left free to exercise discretion, he must select an ordinary route; hut where a route is prescribed for him hy superior authority, he is entitled to mileage for the distance actually traveled.
    
      III. Travel abroad -within the intent of tie act 1882 means travel in foreign parts. Wliere tie point of departure and tie point of destination are iotli within tiis country, a naval officer is entitled to mileage tioug'i a portion of tie route is on tie iigi seas or tirougi a foreign country. Wliere tie route prescribed by superior authority is complex in character, tie officer may elect to take iis actual expenses by tie route prescribed or iis mileage by tie ordinary direct route.
    Tbe Reporters’ statement of tbe case:
    Tbe following are tbe facts of this case as found by tbe court:
    I. Tbe claimant is an officer in tbe Navy, to wit, a lieutenant-commander. He was serving as sucb on tbe 22d day of May, 1890, when be was ordered to proceed by steamer from San Francisco to New York, via tbe Isthmus of Panama, in charge of a detatchment of men.
    II. He did so proceed from San Francisco to New York, a distance of 6,186 statute miles, and paid bis own transportation and expenses, which were afterwards refunded to him in tbe sum of $97, but be was not allowed or paid anything on account of mileage.
    III. Tbe distance from San Francisco to New York by tbe shortest usually traveled route is 3,266 miles.
    
      Mr. John Paul Jones and Mr. Robert B. Lines for tbe claimant.
    
      Mr. P. P. JDeioees (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Cotton) for tbe defendants.
    Tbe question presented is, was plaintiff traveling abroad under orders.
    It would seem that this would have to be answered in the affirmative. Tbe fact that tbe points of commencement and end of tbe journey are both in tbe United States is of no signifi- ■ canee. Any order to go abroad either expressly or impliedly is an order also to return. As an actual fact every mile of tbe journey from San Francisco to New York by steamer (outside of tbe 3-inile limit) is travel abroad. It was not travel in tbe United States, and is therefore entitled to be paid as sucb travel. Tbe fact that tbe journey by way of tbe isthmus could be made more cheaply than across tbe continent is without significance. If it was not to the interest of the Govern-ernment that he should go by steamer from San Francisco to New York, it is to be presumed he would not have been so ordered.
    He would not be ordered abroad for any service, or it cannot be so presumed, without such service is in the interest of the Government. Mileage is not paid for services; services-are otherwise compensated. Mileage is presumed to approximate to actual expenses. In traveling abroad long distances on the ocean are traversed, in which the actual legitimate expenses incurred bear no proportion to the mileage allowed. It is probable that for this reason the law was changed. Whatever may have been the intent or purpose, plaintiff was ordered to travel abroad, did travel abroad, did not travel in United States, and therefore is not entitled to mileage.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Under the different provisions of law which are declared by the Acts 3d March, 1835 (4 Stat. L., p. 755, § 2), 16th June, 1874 (18 id., p. 72), 30th June, 1876 (19 id., p. 65), 5th August, 1882 (22 id., p. 284, 286), officers in the Navy are entitled to mileage “for traveling expenses when under orders’7 (act 1835), except in the following instances:

“ Officers of the Navy traveling abroad under orders hereafter issued shall travel by the most direct route, the occasion and necessity for such order to be certified by the officers issuing the same; and shall receive, in lieu of the mileage now allowed by law, only their actual and reasonable expenses.77 (Act 5th August, 1882, 22 Stat. L., p. 286.)

Chronologically stated, the Navy appropriation act 1835 gives mileage; the Army appropriation act 1874 takes it away; the Navy appropriation act 1876 restores it; and the Navy appropriation act 1882 withholds it from travel abroad.

The question presented by this case is whether travel from one city in the United States to another city in the United States, from San Francisco to New York, is travel abroad.

On the 22d of May, 1890, the claimant, a lieutenant-commander in the Navy, was ordered to proceed by steamer from San Francisco to New York in charge of a detachment of men. He obeyed the order, and claimed mileage. The accounting offt-cers allowed him his actual expenses, $97, but refused mileage.

If the officer’s discretion had not been interfered with by his superior officer, if he had been left free to travel by any route he deemed best, he would have been bound to take the shortest route of ordinary travel; and whether he did so or not, his mileage would have been computed by that route (Du Bose’s Case 19 C. Cls. R., 514; Hannum’s ib., 516). In other words, he would have been bound to have traveled from San Francisco to New York by rail; and if the lines of railway travel varied in length, he would have been entitled to mileage only for the shortest.

The legislation on this subject must not be regarded as arbitrary, but as founded on some just and rational princiifie. Travel abroad ordinarily involves long ocean voyages, where mileage ceases to be reimbursement and becomes emolument. Travel at home is usually for shorter distances and involves innumerable petty disbursements, running down to 10 cents for a street car or 35 cents for a dinner, as may be seen in the annual reports of the Attorney-General. The purpose of the statutes undoubtedly is that the reimbursement for traveling expenses abroad shall be the actual outlay of the officer, and for traveling expenses at home shall be commuted in the form of mileage. And the principle which governs the computation of mileage is that where the officer is left free to exercise his discretion he must select an ordinary route, but where a route is prescribed for him by superior authority he is entitled to mileage for the distance actually traveled. It, therefore, at first seems that the officer in this case must be entitled either to mileage by the way of the isthmus — that is, for the route he was ordered to take — or merely to the reimbursement of his actual expenses. But there are some other elements which should enter into the consideration of the case.

Travel abroad, in the ordinary acceptation of that very common term, means travel in foreign parts. Travel at home means travel where the point of departure and the point of destination are both in- one’s own country. An officer ordered from Norfolk to New York would not be traveling abroad because the steamer went upon the high seas. An officer ordered from Niagara Falls to Detroit would not be traveling abroad because he took the shortest railroad route and his journey lay wholly through Canada. An officer ordered from Charleston to Savanah would not be traveling abroad because he took the steamer instead of the train.

But the travel in the present case was complex in character. It was travel at home in its design, i. e., in its object being to pass from one point to another point in one’s own country; it was travel abroad in its nature, i. e., in its being by a vastly circuitous route on the high seas and through a foreign country. If the officer had selected this route voluntarily he certainly would not be permitted to reap any advantage from so doing. But here all discretion had been taken from him by his superior officer aud duty was assigned to him which left no alternative.

It therefore seems clear, on the one hand, that the officer should not be deprived of his statutory right to mileage for traveling from one point in his own country to another, and on the other hand that his mileage should not extend -to a kind of travel which in its nature was travel abroad. If the actual expenses had been greater than mileage by the ordinary railroad route, the officer would have had a right to present his account for actual expenses, and the order to proceed by sea and the isthmus would have been sufficient authority for his reimbursement. Conversely, when the mileage by the ordinarily traveled route was greater than the actual expenses of the other, the officer had the right to present his account for mileage, and the order to proceed from San Francisco to New York was sufficient authority for its payment.

It is the opinion of the court that the claimant is entitled to recover mileage for 3,266 miles, at 8 cents per mile, amounting to $261.28, less $97, which has been paid to him; and it is the judgment of the court that he recover $164.28.  