
    Truesdell v. Combs.
    1. Justices of the peace, while acting within the scope of their authority,. are not answerable in a private action for the erroneous exercise of the judicial functions with which they are invested by law.
    2. But such justices, and other inferior tribunals, which are invested only with special jurisdiction, and clothed with limited authority, must, at their peril, keep within their prescribed jurisdiction; and if they transcend the limits of their authority, they are answerable to any one-whose rights are thereby invaded.
    3. And, in such a case, honesty of purpose, while it may mitigate damages, can not justify a clear usurpation of power.
    4. Therefore, where a justice of the peace, without authority of law, issues-a warrant of arrest, both he and the person at whose instance he so acts are liable in an action for false imprisonment at the suit of the party illegally arrested by virtue of such warrant.
    
      Error to the District Court of Trumbull county.
    The original action in this case was brought by defendant in error, in the Court of Common Pleas of Trumbull county, against the plaintiffs in error and two-other parties, to wit, one ITarry C. Dailey and one James Clark. In bis petition, he charged that the defendants below, unlawfully and without just cause, maliciously arrested and imprisoned him from the 11th till the 18th day of July, 1874, on a pretended charge of larceny; and that,, to obtain his discharge from such imprisonment, he had been compelled to pay the sum of eleven dollars by the pretended judgment of the said James Clark, who was a justice of the peace of said county. For this illegal arrest and imprisonment, he asked a judgment for damages in the-sum of $1,000.
    The defendants below, Truesdell, Griffis, and Dailey, answered, denying the allegations of the petition, and alleging that the plaintiff had, as was believed by the defendant, Abel Truesdell, stolen milk from him, by entering upon his premises and milking one of the said defendant’s cows,, and thereupon, in good faith, and without malice, the said, defendant went before the defendant Griffis, who was and is a justice of the peace within and for the county of Trumbull, and made an affidavit charging, as he supposed and believed, the said plaintiff with so entering upon his said premises and stealing milk. And, thereupon, the said Griffis, as-justice of the peace aforesaid, issued a warrant for the arrest of plaintiff, and placed the same in the hands of defendant Harry C. Dailey, who was then, and now is, a constable of said county, who, in obedience of said warrant.,, arrested plaintiff and took him before defendant Clark, who-was also a justice of the peace, and before whom plaintiff was tried, and found guilty of the charge made: that said warrant was issued, and said arrest made, in good faith, and without malice, and with and for a good and legal purpose, and with no intent to maliciously injure the plaintiff,. and they deny that he was injured or damaged in the sum of $1,000, or any other sum whatever.
    To this answer plaintiff'below replied, denying all the allegations of defendants’ answer, except that said defendants , were officers as stated; that said Truesdell made an affidaj vit before said Griffis, who issued said warrant, and that ' said constable arrested plaintiff thereon, and took him before James Clark, said justice, who illegally pretended to try and sentence him to the payment of money.
    Upon the issues joined, the case was tried to a jury, who returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff' below, against •all the defendants, for the sum of $150. Defendants below thereupon moved for a new trial, for the following reasons:
    1. That the damages given by the jury in this case are excessive.
    2. That the verdict given in this case is against,'and contrary to, the weight of evidence and the law of the case.
    3. The court erred, on the trial of this cause, in refusing to charge the jury as requested by defendants.
    4. The court erred in the charge given to the jury.
    The court sustained this motion as to the defendants Clark and Dailey, but as to defendants Truesdell and Griffis the motion was overruled, and judgment was entered against them on the verdict, to which they excepted.
    Upon the trial of the ease, a bill of exceptions was taken by defendants below, embodying all the evidence in the' •case. Erora this evidence it appears, that on the 11th day of July, 1874, Truesdell, one of the plaintiff's in error, went before Griffis, the other plaintiff in error, who was a justice of the peace for said county of Trumbull, and made the following complaint, in writing, under oath:
    “ The State of Ohio, Trumbull County, ss.
    
    “Before me, ¥m. D. Griffis, one of the justices of the peace for said county, personally came Abel Truesdell, who, being duly sworn according to law, deposeth and saith, that on or about the 10th day of July, a. d. 1874, at the county of Trumbull, one Alfred Combs did enter upon the premises of the said' Abel Truesdell, and? while there, did unlawfully attempt to take and drive away one red cow, it being the property of the said Abel Truesdell; aud on or about the 11th day of July, 1874, the said Alfred Combs-did enter upon the premises of the said Abel Truesdell, and, while there, did unlawfully take and convey away, without right or permission, a quantity of milk, the same being the-property of the said Abel Truesdell. And further this deponent saith not. Abel Truesdell.
    “ Sworn to and subscribed before me, at the county aforesaid, this 11th day of July, a. d. 1874.
    “¥m. D. Grieeis, Justice of the Peace.”
    
    Thereupon the said Griffis, as such justice, issued a states warrant, directed to any constable of said county, reciting said complaint, and commanding the arrest of said Combs,, and the bringing of him forthwith before the said justice,, to answer said complaint. This warrant was delivered by the justice to Truesdell, the complainant, who carried it to-the constable, Daily, and placed it in his hands for execution. Daily, in pursuance of the command of the warrant, on the same day, being Saturday, arrested Combs, and took him before Griffis, who, having another trial on hand-, that day, directed the constable to take him before Clark,, another justice of the peace for the same county. The constable, directing Combs to consider himself under arrest,, took him on the following Monday before Clark, who, after-hearing two witnesses on behalf of the state, overruled a motion for his discharge, and found him guilty as charged,, and sentenced him to pay a fine of $5 and the costs of prosecution, amounting in the aggregate to $12, which Combs-having paid, was released from custody.
    The evidence offered on the trial further showed that Truesdell, on whose complaint the warrant issued, and Combs, lived on adjoining lots, and that Truesdell had purchased a milk cow with her young calf, paying $40 therefor, at the request and for the benefit of Combs, who agreed1 to repay him said purchase-money as fast as he could earn-the money from his wages arising from labor in a coal-bank. Truesdell admitted in his testimony that Oombs was to have the right to milk the cow for the benefit of his family. Combs sold the calf for $4, without objection from Truesdell, and paid Truesdell $5, .which he claimed was to apply in part payment for the cow. Truesdell, however, claimed a right to apply this payment otherwise. From the time of the purchase of the cow, she was pastured in Trnesdell’s field, Oombs being chargeable therefor. Trues-dell testified that a few days befoi’e he made complaint a controversy arose between him and Combs as to the own•ersliip of the cow, Combs claiming that the cow was his, ;and that he had a right to get her pastured elsewhere, which he proposed to do. But Truesdell objected to the removal of the cow from his premises until she should be ■fully paid for, and told Oombs that if that was the way he talked, he would not allow him to milk her any longer until he paid for her. On the next day, he testifies, that •Oombs went to the pasture, and undertook to drive the •cow away, for the purpose of having her pastured by a neighbor. Truesdell stopped him, denying his right to take her away till he paid for her. On the next morning, perhaps a half hour before sunrise, Oombs milked the • cow, and Truesdell soon afterward, finding her milked, went over to Combs’ house, and told him he had milked his •cow. Combs said nothing, but his wife, who was present, admitted the fact and claimed he had a right to do so. Truesdell thereupon went to the defendant, Griffis, a justice of the peace, fully stated to him the facts of the case, .and demanded a warrant for the arrest of Combs. Both Truesdell and Griffis believed, as they severally testified on the trial, that the facts stated in Truesdell’s complaint constituted a charge of stealing; and Griffis thereupon re-duced the complaint to writing, and Truesdell having made -oath to its truth, the justice thereupon issued and delivered *to Truesdell a states warrant, which he carried to and put an the hauds of Dailey, the constable.
    The evidence having been closed, counsel for defendants Below, in their argument of the case, asked the court to instruct the jury as follows:
    “ If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff, at the time stated in the affidavit, had actually stolen milk from the defendant, Truesdell, the plaintiff can not recover in this action, although the allegations in the affidavit and warrant did not in law constitute a crime; that while the -statements in the affidavit do not set forth any criminal .■act, yet if it was the intent to charge in said affidavit that the plaintiff had actually stolen milk, by milking the defendant Truesdell’s cow, and in fact you find he had stolen milk in such manner, the defendants are entitled to a verdict.
    “Also that the charges made in the affidavit upon which the warrant was issued do not constitute a crime known to the laws of this state. But if the defendant, Griffis, at the •time he issued the warrant, was an acting justice of the peace for Trumbull county, and in the issuing of such warrant he was endeavoring in good faith to perform his duties as such justice, and actually believed that the charge ¡set forth in the affidavit did constitute a crime under the laws of this state, and was in law stealing, and thereupon in good faith, and in the belief that it was his duty so to_ do, issued the warrant upon which the plaintiff' was arrested, the plaintiff can not recover in this action against .said Griffis. Which instruction the court refused to give.
    “ To which refusal to charge as requested, the defend.ants excepted.”
    Plaintiff's in error took the case to the district court, by petition in error, and assigned the following errors in the judgment of the court of common pleas :
    1. The said court erred in refusing to give the instructions which these plaintiffs prayed the court to give.
    2. The court erred in overruling plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
    8. That the said judgment was given for the said Alfred 'Combs, when it ought to have been given for these plaintiffs, according to the law of the land.
    
      The district court, on hearing of this petition, found there was no error, and affirmed the judgment.
    And thereupon, by leave of court, they presented their petition in error in the Supreme Court, claiming that the-district court erred in sustaining the judgment of the court' of common pleas.
    
      II. II. Moses, for plaintiff in error :
    A magistrate is not liable for injuries resulting from his. errors of judgment, while in the discharge of his duties. Wickman v. Bryan, 11 Wend. 545 ; 7 Wend. 200; Pratt v. Gardner, 2 Cush. 63 ; Yates v. Lansing, Jr., 9 Johns. 396 ; Gregory v. Brown, 4 Bibb (Ky.), 28 ; Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523 ; Mills v. Callet, 6 Bing. 85 ; Stewart v. Hanley, 21 Wend. 551; 7 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 399 ; Bradley v. Fisher,. 7 Wall. 335 ; Davis v. State, 19 Ohio St. 270. Pure intentions and honest endeavor to perform his official duty protects him. Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 452 ; 19 Barb. 283..
    
      George M. Tuttle, for defendant in error :
    As to the liability of the justice, see Harmon v. Gould, Wright, 710; Pickard v. Bills, Wright, 344; 2 Hilliard on Torts, 168, 172, 173; Kelly v. Burns, 4 Gray, 83 ; Addison on Torts, §§ 966, 969, 972.
   Scott, J.

By section 14 of the bill of rights, embodied in the constitution of this state, it is declared that “ the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable . . seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,” etc.

This safeguard against unreasonable seizures the legislature has undertaken to carry into effect, by prescribing the-conditions under which the power to issue process for the apprehension of alleged criminals maybe exercised by justices of the peace.

The power is conferred and the conditions of its exercise are prescribed by sections 23 and 24 of the code of criminal procedure (66 Ohio L. 291), which are as follows :

“ Sec. 23. The magistrates enumerated in the first sec-lion of this code shall have power to issue process for the apprehension of any person charged with a criminal offense, and to execute the powers and duties conferred in this title.

“ Sec. 24. "Whenever a complaiut in writing and upon oath, signed by the complainant, shall be filed with the-magistrate, charging any person with the commission of an offense, it shall be the duty of such magistrate to issue a warrant for the arrest of the person accused, if he shall have reasonable grounds to believe that the offeuse has been committed.”

In this case the written complaint made by Truesdell, and recited in the warrant issued by the justice, very clearly contained no charge of the commission of a criminal offense by any one. The acts charged to have been committed by Combs would, if truly stated, show him guilty of a bare trespass. If we suppose both the plaintiffs in error to have been honestly mistaken, yet their mistake was. one of law, not of fact. They were ignorant of the distinction between a mere trespass committed under a claim of right and larceny. By their testimony on the trial below, they both show that the acts complained of by Trues-dell w’ere fully stated by him to the justice before the complaint was drawn up by the latter, and they are correctly stated in the complaint. On such a state of facts, the justice had no authority to issue a warrant. His mistaken belief that the statute gave him power to issue a states warrant on such a complaint could not confer jurisdiction, nor legalize his usurpation of authority.

It is true, that justices of the peace, while acting within the scope of their authority, as well as the judges of the higher courts, are not answerable in a private action for the erroneous exercise of the judicial functions with which they are invested by law. Such protection is essential to. the honest and independent administration of justice. Pratt v. Gardner, 2 Cush. 68; Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 ; 9 Johns. 895 ; and authorities there cited.

But, on the other hand, it would seem to be well settled that inferior tribunals, invested with special jurisdiction only, and persons clothed with limited authority, such as justices of the peace, must, at their peril, keep within their prescribed jurisdiction; and if they transcend the limits of their authority, they are answerable to any one whose rights are thereby invaded. And honesty of purpose, in such a case, while it may mitigate, damages, can not justify .a clear usurpation of powér. Clark v. May, 2 Cray, 410 ; Knowles v. Davis, 2 Allen, 61; Cohoon v. Speed, 2 Jones (Law), 133 ; Lawrenson v. Hill, 10 Tr. C. L. 177.

If this view of the law be correct, it is clear that the second instruction asked to be given to the jury was properly refused. The question was as to the authority of the justice to issue the warrant for the arrest of Combs, under the oircumstances stated. The limits of his authority were defined by the statute, and could not be affected, either by his ignorance or his honesty.

Whether the first instruction asked for was given or refused by the court below, does not very clearly appear from, the record. But, assuming it to have been refused, as is claimed by plaintiffs in error, we think such refusal was not error. Counsel thought by that instruction to have the jury pass upon a question of fact, not put in issue by the pleadings ; that is to say, whether Combs had in fact been guilty of stealing milk from Truesdell; and to have them instructed that if they found him guilty of such stealing, .-and if it was the intent to charge him with such stealing in the complaint, then the defendants would be entitled to .a verdict. We find no evidence, offered on the trial, tending to prove, a felonious intent on the part of Combs in .milking the cow, the ownership of which was in dispute between himself and Truesdell. There was no evidence tending to prove anything more culpable than was alleged in the complaint; and certainly none which would have warranted the finding contemplated by the instruction asked. The answer of defendants below had not alleged that Combs had in fact been guilty of stealing, but only that Truesdell when he made the complaint believed him to be thus guilty. Under these circumstances, the instruction asked could only .have misled the jury.

Another ground of the motion for a new trial was error in the charge of the court. But as no part of the charge is found in the record, we must presume that it was in all •respects unexceptionable.

A further ground of the motion for a new trial is that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the ’law of the case. We do not think this ground is sustained 'by the record, and conceive it to be unnecessary, on this .subject, to add anything to what has been already said.

The only remaining ground of the motion is that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive.

The case was not without circumstances of aggravation. The plaintiff below was kept under arrest for'some threp days ; procured his x-elease by the payment of twelve dollars ; was subjected among his neighbors to the humiliating charge of pettit lax-ceny ; and this chax’ge the plaintiffs in error, through their counsel, seem to have pei’sisted in xxxaking upon the trial in the coxxx’t below.

If the jury fouixd this charge to be wholly unsupported 'by the evidence, as we think they well might, we can not say that their verdict for $150 was the result of anything •else than the exex’cise of their cool, dispassionate judgments.

We find no exror in the overruling of the motion for a xxew tidal, and think the jxxdgmeixt of the common pleas was pi’operly affirmed by the district court.

Judgment of the district court affirmed.  